Court Opinion

ID: 9949930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 20:08:09.563429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:42.110583
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 211665-U
                                        No. 1-21-1665
                                                                              Second Division
                                                                               March 12, 2024

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ____________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                      FIRST DISTRICT
 ____________________________________________________________________________

                                        )           Appeal from the
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF             )           Circuit Court of
 ILLINOIS,                              )           Cook County.
                                        )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                        )           No. 19 CR 16790
    v.                                  )
                                        )
 JESUS MELERO,                          )           Honorable
                                        )           Ramon Ocasio III,
       Defendant-Appellant.             )           Judge, Presiding.
 ____________________________________________________________________________

                JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1     Held:    Defendant's seven-year sentence for aggravated domestic battery is affirmed over
               his contention that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum
               sentence.

¶2     Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Jesus Melero was found guilty of aggravated

domestic battery and the trial court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal,

defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a seven-year sentence of
No. 1-21-1665

imprisonment where the court based its decision on a personal belief or arbitrary reason and did

not properly consider evidence in mitigation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On December 10, 2019, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated domestic

battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2018)), two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05), two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1)), one count of aggravated unlawful

restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1), and one count of unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a)) following

an incident occurring on November 6, 2019, where defendant allegedly punched, hit, and stabbed

his wife. The case proceeded to a bench trial on May 6, 2021, at which the following evidence was

presented.

¶5     The victim, Patricia Beltran, testified that she married defendant in July 2019 and they

subsequently purchased a home together in Cicero, Illinois. According to Beltran, after they were

married, Beltran noticed that defendant’s behavior changed and he became paranoid and he

accused Beltran of having an extramarital affair. Defendant also would take her cell phone, erase

messages, and look through it. She testified that he had an application called Life360 that would

track her location. On November 6, 2019, an argument between Beltran and defendant ensued

when defendant picked up Beltran from work. After Beltran made dinner at home, defendant stated

that he wanted a divorce and instructed Beltran to sign “a divorce document.” She filled out the

paperwork and defendant grabbed the document, stating that it was proof that she was having an

affair because she was willing to get a divorce. Beltran testified that at that point she was “upset”

and “scared” because defendant had “a look in his eye that was terrifying[.]” She stated to

defendant that they needed a break from each other and she walked towards the front door.

Defendant grabbed her hair and he “started hitting [her] and punching [her]” in the face. He then

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No. 1-21-1665

dragged her into the bedroom, and when she turned around, defendant started swinging a large,

serrated knife at her. She jumped on top of the bed and started yelling for help. Defendant kept

swinging the knife at her and stabbing her with it until she was cornered against the wall. She

testified that he “stabbed [her] on [her] legs, on [her] arm, [her] fingers, and then on [her] torso.”

She observed blood splattered everywhere. At some point, defendant began to calm down and she

walked towards the bedroom door but he “slammed the knife on the floor in front of [her] feet”

and threatened to cut off her toes if she left the room. Defendant then received a phone call from

a coworker and afterwards “he snapped out of it” and began apologizing to Beltran. He helped her

take a shower and change clothes. She testified that she was holding onto her left hand tightly

because it was bleeding. She also had a large cut on her right arm. They laid in bed until 5 a.m.

and defendant then helped her get ready and dropped her off at work. During this entire episode,

defendant retained possession of Beltran’s cell phone. He returned her cell phone to her when he

dropped her off at work.

¶6     While she was at work, Beltran’s fingers continued to bleed and she noticed that her fingers

were turning purple. She called her sister-in-law, who picked her up from work around 3 p.m. and

took her to Northwestern Immediate Care Center. Beltran testified that she turned her cell phone

off when she left work with her sister-in-law, and she did not tell her sister-in-law how she

sustained the injuries to her hand because she was “scared” and “was still processing.” At the

medical center, Beltran informed medical staff that she cut herself on a mirror. She testified that

she said this because she was “scared to get [defendant] in trouble because [she] didn’t want him

to be mad at [her].” The doctor stated that the wound was too deep to treat there and she needed to

go to the emergency room.

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No. 1-21-1665

¶7     Her sister-in-law then picked up Beltran’s sister, Toni, and dropped them both off at the

police station at Blue Island Avenue and 15th Street where Beltran intended to file a police report

and obtain an order of protection. The officers at Blue Island instructed her that she needed to go

to the police station in Cicero to do that. At this time, Beltran did not inform the police as to why

she needed an order of protection and her family members also were not aware.

¶8     Her sister-in-law retrieved them from the police station and drove to the emergency room

at Northwestern. When Beltran first spoke with a nurse, she did not explain what caused the

injuries because her sister was with her, and she had not yet told her sister or sister-in-law what

happened. Beltran testified that she was embarrassed and ashamed of what happened. Eventually,

after speaking with a security guard who intimated that her daughter had been a victim of domestic

violence, Beltran decided to reveal what defendant had done and a social worker was called.

Beltran received medical treatment, which included 20 stitches on her left hand and the wounds

on her forearm and leg were cleaned.

¶9     Beltran was discharged from the hospital in the early hours of November 8, 2019. She went

to her brother’s house that morning and later to the police station, where she obtained an order of

protection against defendant. In obtaining the order, she submitted an affidavit, attesting to the

events that occurred on November 6. She further averred that, on September 19, 2019, defendant

picked up Beltran from work and accused her of cheating on him. When they arrived home, they

continued arguing and defendant punched her, threw items at her, and swung a pipe at her. He then

proceeded to throw her down the stairs. She testified that, following the September incident, she

went to Loyola Hospital for medical treatment and informed medical staff that she tripped and fell

down the stairs. According to Beltran, she stated this, rather than that defendant injured her,

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No. 1-21-1665

because he was with her in the treatment room at all times. After leaving the police station, she

called defendant to inform him of the order and she stayed at her brother’s house for a few days.

¶ 10   At this point, the State entered into evidence several photographs of Beltran, which were

taken at the Cicero Police Department a few days after the incident. The photographs showed that

Beltran had a black eye and wounds on her arm and leg. Photographs from Northwestern Hospital

were also introduced, which showed the injuries to her left hand.

¶ 11   Beltran further testified that she later underwent surgery on her fingers as well as physical

therapy to regain movement in her fingers. She testified that she has permanent scarring due to her

injuries and she lost sensation on the top half of two fingers as a result of this incident.

¶ 12   Finally, the State entered a certified copy of defendant’s 2014 misdemeanor domestic

battery conviction.

¶ 13   The trial court found defendant guilty of all counts and subsequently merged all other

counts into the aggravated domestic battery count. In so finding, the trial court stated that it

believed Beltran to be a victim of emotional and mental abuse and that defendant “intentionally

and knowingly caused great bodily harm to [Beltran] by cutting her with a knife to her arm, to her

hand, to her leg.”

¶ 14   On June 2, 2021, defendant filed a motion requesting that the court vacate its findings of

guilt, or in the alternative, grant him a new trial. However, soon after that motion was filed,

defendant “fired” private counsel, and the trial court later appointed a public defender to represent

defendant. On November 16, 2021, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an amended motion for a

new trial. On December 22, 2021, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial.

¶ 15   Also on December 22, 2021, the court conducted the sentencing hearing. Defendant’s

presentence investigation (PSI) report was submitted to the court. In aggravation, the State

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No. 1-21-1665

submitted Beltran’s victim impact statement. Beltran’s statement illustrated an environment of fear

created by defendant, specifically stating that he was “possessive and angry” and that he installed

cameras throughout their home so he could watch her. She further stated that she was still learning

to use her left hand and she would never be the same emotionally and felt like she was “faking

being alive.” The State also submitted a statement from defendant’s daughter, Alysa Melero.

Therein, Alysa stated that defendant “brainwashed” her; defendant is “paranoid” and “lost”;

defendant hurt everyone in her family; she was “locked inside the house for days at a time”; she is

terrified of defendant; she heard Beltran’s cries and she wished she could have protected Beltran

from defendant; defendant called Beltran derogatory names and hit her; and defendant threatened

to shoot or hit Beltran and herself constantly. Lastly, she stated that she did not “want him near

any of us.”

¶ 16   In mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant has a high school education, two

children, no felony arrests or convictions, and 21 years of reliable employment as a union painter.

Defense counsel asked for the court to impose the minimum sentence. The court asked if defendant

would like to make a statement in allocution. Inexplicably, defendant stated “I brought you a

Christmas present.” He then stated, “I just want it over with” and affirmed that he was declining

the opportunity to speak on his own behalf.

¶ 17   In announcing sentence, the trial court stated: “I get the impression that you don’t accept

responsibilities for your actions. I think that the maximum sentence is probably not enough but

that’s all I can give you.” After merging the other counts into aggravated domestic battery, the

court sentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to consider his

sentence, which the trial court denied.

¶ 18   This appeal followed.

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No. 1-21-1665

¶ 19                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20   On appeal, defendant argues that his seven-year sentence is excessive and the trial court

abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence. He requests that this court reduce his

sentence or remand for a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 21   The Illinois Constitution requires a trial court to impose a sentence that balances the

seriousness of the offense and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11;

People v. Lee, 379 Ill. App. 3d 533, 539 (2008). To achieve such balance, the trial court must

consider both aggravating and mitigating factors including: “the nature and circumstances of the

crime, the defendant's conduct in the commission of the crime, and the defendant's personal

history, including his age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general moral

character, social environment, and education.” People v. Maldonado, 240 Ill. App. 3d 470, 485-

86 (1992). The trial court, as opposed to the reviewing court, is the best situated to assess these

factors. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 323 (1985). Accordingly, the trial court has broad

discretion to impose a sentence, and a sentence that is within statutory limits is reviewed for an

abuse of that discretion. People v. Contursi, 2019 IL App (1st) 162894, ¶ 23. This court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because we would have weighed the

sentencing factors differently, and we will alter a sentence only when it varies greatly from the

spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id.

Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan 1, 1967), reviewing courts have the power

to reduce sentences; however, that power should be used “cautiously and sparingly.” People v.

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010).

¶ 22   Here, defendant was found guilty of aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony with a

statutory sentencing range of 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018).

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No. 1-21-1665

Defendant’s sentence was the statutory maximum sentence for this offense. Because the court’s

sentence falls within the statutory range, we must presume it is proper. See People v. Neasom,

2017 IL App (1st) 143875, ¶ 49. Such a sentence will only be overturned upon “an affirmative

showing that the sentence imposed greatly departs from the spirit and purpose of the law or is

manifestly contrary to constitutional guidelines.” People v. Boclair, 225 Ill. App. 3d 331, 335

(1992). For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s imposition of the maximum

sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 23   Our review of the record shows that the relevant facts of the case support a finding that the

seven-year sentence is not greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly

disproportionate. The evidence presented at the trial showed that, while in their home, defendant

suddenly attacked Beltran, pulling her hair and punching her in the face, and he inflicted serious

injuries to her by repeatedly cutting her with a knife while she was trapped in the corner of their

bedroom. He further threatened her during this incident, stating that he would cut off her toes if

she tried to leave. His actions were both violent and erratic. Moreover, Beltran’s testimony

depicted defendant as a highly possessive and paranoid individual who tracked Beltran’s location

and did not allow her any semblance of privacy. The evidence also showed that, in her affidavit in

obtaining an order of protection, Beltran referenced a prior violent episode during which defendant

swung a pipe at her and pushed her down a flight of stairs. Beltran’s testimony and her victim

impact statement demonstrated that she was extremely fearful of defendant, going so far as to

avoid certain traffic routes and hospitals when seeking treatment for her injuries. Beltran’s injuries,

which included knife wounds to her torso, leg, forearm, and fingers, were not insignificant by any

means. In addition to the stitches she received on her hand, she later required surgery and physical

therapy to regain use of her fingers, and she has permanent scars from her wounds and has lost

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No. 1-21-1665

feeling in her fingers. Taken together, the evidence showed a dangerous man who caused severe

physical injuries and emotional damage to Beltran.

¶ 24   Additionally, defendant’s daughter, Alysa, submitted a victim impact statement that

matched Beltran’s depiction of defendant. Her statement also indicated that individuals other than

Beltran have been caused harm by defendant and are at risk of further harm. Further, although

defendant does not have an extensive criminal history, there is a prior misdemeanor conviction for

domestic battery, indicating that this is not the first time defendant has been the perpetrator of

domestic violence and his behavior has escalated. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial

court’s imposition of the maximum sentence was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 25   Nonetheless, defendant contends that the trial court “seemingly imposed the maximum

sentence upon [defendant] either for a personal belief or arbitrary reason.” A defendant’s sentence

may be remanded for resentencing when a trial court fashions a sentence based on the court’s

personal beliefs or arbitrary reasons. People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583, 586-87 (1975). Here, in

announcing sentence, the trial court stated: “I think that the maximum sentence is probably not

enough but that’s all I can give you.” Defendant asserts that the court erroneously based its

sentencing decision on the opinion that the maximum for aggravated domestic battery is too low.

The State argues that the court’s statement only stressed the seriousness of the offense and the

court did not disregard the statutory sentencing limits. We agree with the State and reject

defendant’s argument for the following reasons.

¶ 26   We do not find that the court’s limited statement can be construed as a personal belief in

regards to these types of crime. In Bolyard, the supreme court found that the trial court had abused

its discretion in sentencing the defendant because the court’s sentence was based on a personal

belief. 61 Ill. 2d at 587. However, there, the trial judge expressly opined that certain crimes,

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No. 1-21-1665

regardless of the specific facts of the case, are not deserving of probation and arbitrarily denied

consideration of probation for an eligible defendant. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d at 585-587. In this case,

the trial court did not announce a definitive opinion on the sentencing range for aggravated

domestic battery, and even if the court did believe the maximum sentence should be increased for

that offense, the court did not ultimately sentence defendant outside the range. Thus, we do not

find the court’s sentencing decision was based on a personal belief or arbitrary reason.

¶ 27   Further, this court should not focus on a few words or statements of the trial court but

consider the entire record as a whole. People v. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526-27 (1986). Here, the

statement that the maximum was too low was directly preceded by: “I get the impression that you

don’t accept responsibilities for your actions.” This suggests that the court was, in fact, reflecting

upon the specific facts and circumstances of defendant’s case, and in particular, defendant’s lack

of remorse. Our supreme court has held that lack of remorse may be properly considered in

determining a sentence, but a court may not rely on the defendant’s exercise of his right against

self-incrimination and must rely on other sources. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 529; People v. Barrow, 133

Ill. 2d 226, 281 (1989); see also People v. Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, ¶ 62 (A

“[d]efendant’s invocation of his right to not allocate” cannot serve as a basis for a finding of lack

of remorse.). Notwithstanding defendant’s refusal to make a statement in allocution, the record

otherwise supports the court’s finding that defendant did not accept responsibility and showed no

remorse for his actions. At a previous appearance before the court, defendant asserted: “I wanted

to show you, Judge, how my wife came here and lied to you in your courtroom. She spit on your

floor. She lied to you, sir. And with all respect, she lied to the State’s Attorney. She lied to the

detectives, and everybody else.” These statements indicate that defendant refused accountability

for his actions, and, in fact, the accusatory nature of his statements lend credence to Beltran and

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No. 1-21-1665

Alysa’s victim impact statements. Because the trial court is best situated to assess a defendant’s

demeanor and credibility, we see no reason to reject the trial court’s finding that defendant failed

to take responsibility for his actions. See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213 (the trial court, having

observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in the best position to consider the defendant’s

credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age).

Thus, the trial court properly considered defendant’s lack of remorse in deciding that the maximum

sentence was warranted. See People v. Donlow, 2020 IL App (4th) 170374, ¶ 84 (“[T]rial courts

may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse or lack of veracity in imposing a sentence, since those

are factors which may have a bearing on the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 28   Lastly, defendant asserts that the record shows ample mitigating evidence that

demonstrates his rehabilitative potential, specifically his consistent employment history as a union

painter for 21 years and his lack of prior felony convictions. Further, in his reply brief, he contends

that “[t]he only way to definitively know whether the court properly considered the appropriate

factors in mitigation is where a court lists the specific factors it considered when fashioning a

sentence, which the court in this case failed to do.” However, the court is not required to recite

each factor considered or the weight given to the evidence presented. People v. Garibay, 366 Ill.

App. 3d 1103, 1109 (2006). Moreover, absent some affirmative indication to the contrary, the trial

court is presumed to have properly considered all relevant factors and any evidence in mitigation

or aggravation. People v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123258, ¶ 48. In the instant case, defendant

has not made such a showing. Defendant’s criminal history and employment history were

presented to the court by defense counsel at the hearing and in defendant’s PSI, of which the court

acknowledged receipt. There is nothing in the record that affirmatively shows that the court

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No. 1-21-1665

ignored defendant’s evidence in mitigation. Moreover, the trial court is “presumed to know the

law and apply it properly.” People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (1997). Because there is no express

indication in the record that the court disregarded factors in mitigation, defendant’s argument that

the mitigating evidence was not considered is meritless. To the extent that defendant implores this

court to reweigh the evidence in mitigation and arrive at a lesser sentence, we reject his request.

See People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46 (the reviewing court will not reweigh evidence

the trial court relied upon in sentencing the defendant). The trial court has broad discretionary

powers in its sentencing decision, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212-13.

¶ 29     In any case, the presence of a mitigating factor does not automatically entitle the defendant

to the statutory minimum sentence. People v. Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 130438 ¶ 133. In fact, the

seriousness of the offense is the most significant factor in determining a sentence (People v. Busse,

2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 28), and as we have explained, the evidence presented showed that

defendant inflicted serious physical injuries upon Beltran, which left permanent scars, and caused

her emotional trauma. It would not be unreasonable to find that the seriousness of the offense

outweighed defendant’s solid employment history and lack of felony convictions. Thus,

defendant’s argument that the trial court did not properly consider mitigating evidence is without

merit.

¶ 30     Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

defendant to seven years’ imprisonment.

¶ 31                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32     For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 33     Affirmed.

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