Court Opinion

ID: 2963925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:31.612645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:48.681350
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1731

                                  MARY McCABE, ETC.,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                          LIFE-LINE AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.,

                                Defendants, Appellees,

                                               
                                       ________

                                  THE CITY OF LYNN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Charles M. Burnim, with whom Michael J. Barry and George S.
             _________________            ________________     _________
        Markopoulos were on brief for appellant.
        ___________
             Charles M. Campo, Jr., with whom Floyd H. Anderson and Kassler &
             _____________________            _________________     _________
        Feuer, P.C. were on brief for appellee McCabe.
        ___________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                  February 29, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR, Circuit Judge.  In this appeal by the City of Lynn
                    CYR, Circuit Judge.
                         _____________

          ("City"), we consider whether an established City policy, permit-

          ting  forcible,  warrantless  entries  of private  residences  to

          enforce involuntary civil commitment orders, violates  the Fourth

          Amendment to the United States Constitution.   The district court

          granted summary judgment  for plaintiff Mary  McCabe, administra-

          trix of the  estate of  Ruchla Zinger, a  Holocaust survivor  who

          died in her Lynn home  during a tragic attempt by City  police to

          execute  an involuntary  commitment order  which had  been issued

          against  her.   For  the reasons  discussed  in this  opinion, we

          conclude that the challenged City policy came within an exception

          to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Ms. Zinger, a 64-year-old Lynn, Massachusetts, resident

          with a history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalization,

          as well as severe  obesity and high blood pressure,  resisted all

          attempts  at communication  and intervention  by family  members.

          She  refused to  be examined  by a  doctor after  threatening her

          former husband  with physical  harm and upsetting  her downstairs

          neighbors  by causing loud and violent disturbances in her apart-

          ment, thereby prompting her  family to initiate eviction proceed-

          ings against her.1   Subsequently,  on September 6,  1989, a  li-

          censed  psychiatrist,  Dr.  Jakov Barden,  signed  an application
                              
          ____________________

               1Ms. Zinger's former husband and their children owned the 
          building in which Ms. Zinger's apartment was located.

                                          2

          [hereinafter:  "pink paper"] for a ten-day involuntary commitment

          of Ms.  Zinger pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123,   12(a),

          based exclusively on the reports of family members  and neighbors

          as to Ms. Zinger's physical and behavioral symptoms.  

                    The next  morning, Constable Kenneth  Jackson, who  had

          been unsuccessful in previous  attempts to serve Ms. Zinger  with

          an  eviction notice, and was  scheduled to execute  a judgment of

          eviction  against her at  1:00 p.m. that  afternoon, learned that

          the  pink  paper had  been issued  against  Ms. Zinger  the night

          before, and contacted the Lynn police department.  The  constable

          informed  the  Lynn police,  based  on  his experience  with  Ms.

          Zinger, that he believed she would resist committal.  The consta-

          ble  and the Lynn police officers arranged  to meet at the Zinger

          apartment  building at 1:00 p.m.,  to execute the  pink paper and

          the eviction order.  

                    Three Lynn police officers and the constable arrived at

          the Zinger apartment building  at the appointed hour, accompanied

          by  a crew from the  Life-Line Ambulance Service,  which had been

          engaged to  restrain Ms.  Zinger as necessary,  physically remove

          her from the apartment, and transport her to the hospital.  After

          receiving no response to their knocks, the officers kicked in the

          outside apartment-house door and proceeded upstairs to the Zinger

          apartment.   The officers  knocked and announced  their presence,

          received no response, and  began to kick in the  Zinger apartment

          door.   Ms. Zinger  began screaming  "Why are  you kicking  in my

          door?" then cracked  it open.  Identifying themselves  as police,

                                          3

          the  officers told her  that they were  going to bring  her under

          medical care, to which  she responded:  "No  doctors!"  When  she

          began  to close the door,  the officers shoved  their way inside.

          Later, while  the officers  were forcibly  removing her from  the

          apartment, Ms.  Zinger suffered a  cardio-respiratory arrest  and

          died.2 

                    After  McCabe, as administratrix, instituted this civil

          rights  action under 42 U.S.C.    1983 against  the City, amongst

          others,3  in  September 1992,  an  amended  complaint alleged  an
                              
          ____________________

               2The only  constitutional violation McCabe attributes to the
          City  is the forcible warrantless entry.  In her cross-motion for
          summary  judgment, McCabe  did  not press  her "excessive  force"
          claim  that a City policy authorized or caused the police actions
          utilized  to restrain  Ms. Zinger.   See  infra note  4.   We now
                                               ___  _____
          summarize  the  allegations against  the  individual officers  in
          order to provide additional context.  
               After the officers pushed their  way into her apartment  and
          Ms.  Zinger began screaming, the officers forced her to the floor
          on her  stomach and handcuffed  her hands behind  her back.   She
          lost control of her bladder.  The ambulance crew refused to carry
          her  down the  stairs, asserting  that she  was too  heavy.   The
          officers then placed her in a sitting position.  With one officer
          gripping  her ankles and another holding her under her handcuffed
          arms, she was  carried to the stairs, then  dragged down one step
          at a time while still  in a sitting position.  At the bottom, the
          ambulance  crew strapped her onto  the stretcher, face  down.  By
          this time she had stopped screaming and the officers noticed that
          her hands appeared blue and she was bleeding from her mouth.  Ms.
          Zinger was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.

               3The judgment appealed from is nonetheless "final" as to all
          parties and claims.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 28 U.S.C.   1291.
                               ___
          The original  ten-count complaint named as  defendants, the City,
          the dispatching police supervisor and the three individual police
          officers who  executed  the pink  paper  (in their  official  and
          individual capacities), the constable, the ambulance company, the
          ambulance crew,  Dr. Barden, and  the Tri-City Mental  Health and
          Retardation Center where Dr.  Barden worked.  In addition  to her
          claims  under     1983,  McCabe alleged  common-law  assault  and
          battery, and negligence.  In June 1993, McCabe settled all claims
          against the doctor and  the hospital.  In February  1995, after a
          jury returned verdicts against  the City and Life-Line Ambulance,

                                          4

          established  City policy  permitting police  officers to  execute

          pink  papers  by  means  of forcible,  warrantless  entries  into

          private residences absent demonstrable exigent circumstances, and

          that this  City policy proximately caused  an actionable depriva-

          tion  of  Ms. Zinger's  Fourth Amendment  right  to be  free from

          unreasonable  searches.4    After  hearing,  the  district  court

          granted the McCabe cross-motion  for summary judgment against the

          City on the issue of liability.   McCabe v. City of Lynn,  875 F.
                                            ______    ____________

          Supp. 53,  63 (D. Mass.  1995).  In  the ensuing trial,  the jury

          awarded $850,000 in damages against the City and $500,000 against

          Life-Line Ambulance.  The City thereupon brought this appeal from

          the final judgment entered against it.  

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   District Court Opinion
          A.   District Court Opinion
               ______________________

                    The district court found  that the City policy violated

          the  Fourth Amendment, for the following reasons.  The City's own

          policy expert attested that the City did not require its officers

          to obtain a search  warrant before effecting a warrantless  entry

          of a residence to execute a pink paper, leaving it instead to the

          discretion  of the officers  whether and when  such a warrantless
                              
          ____________________

          the claims against the four  police officers, the constable,  and
          the ambulance crew were dismissed, without prejudice, by stipula-
          tion. 

               4By  contrast,  the initial  complaint  had  alleged a  City
          policy  permitting the use of  excessive force, and  a failure to
          train or supervise officers, in executing involuntary  commitment
          seizures.

                                          5

          entry  was necessary.  Id. at 58.   The district court noted that
                                 __

          warrantless,  nonconsensual entries  into private  residences are

          presumptively "unreasonable"  under the Fourth  Amendment, absent

          exigent circumstances.   Id. at 58-59.  Although imminent threats
                                   ___

          to the lives and safety of the police officers, or members of the

          public, often  give rise  to exigent circumstances  justifying an

          immediate  warrantless  entry, the  court  found  that "the  Lynn

          police  acted with  leisure in  arranging  a convenient  time" to
                              _______

          serve the pink paper upon Ms. Zinger, thereby belying any conten-

          tion that "'some real[,] immediate or serious consequences [would

          occur] if  [the officers]  postponed action  to get  a warrant.'"

          Id. at 59, 62 (citation omitted).  
          ___

                    The  district  court nonetheless  recognized  that even

          absent exigent  circumstances the warrant requirement  may not be

          applicable  in certain  regulatory  contexts wherein  warrantless

          search  procedures serve  as invaluable  "administrative tool[s]"

          and are "far less invasive" than searches directed at discovering

          evidence  of crime.   Id.  at 59-60.    The court  identified two
                                ___

          factors which  weighed against a ruling that  the challenged City

          policy  came within  this  special regulatory  category.   First,

          unlike  a  judicial  officer,  the  licensed  medical-psychiatric

          physicians authorized to  issue pink papers under Mass. Gen. Laws

          Ann.  ch. 123,   12(a),  are "not qualified  to determine whether

          probable cause exists."   Id. at 61.  Second,  "the agents of the
                                    ___

          doctors  in this case are  police officers with  guns and batons,

          not  hospital  orderlies and  nurses,"  so  that  "[t]here is  no

                                          6

          therapeutic  relationship which  a warrant  mechanism would  dis-

          rupt."  Id.
                  ___

          B.   Standard of Review
          B.   Standard of Review
               __________________

                    We  review  a grant  of  summary judgment  de  novo, to
                                                               __  ____

          determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to  inter-

          rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

          if any,  show that there is  no genuine issue as  to any material

          fact  and that the  moving party is  entitled to a  judgment as a

          matter of  law."  Fed. R.  Civ. P. 56(c); see  Velez-Gomez v. SMA
                                                    ___  ___________    ___

          Life  Assurance Co.,  8 F.3d  873, 874-75  (1st Cir. 1993).   All
          ___________________

          competent evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed

          in the  light  most  favorable  to the  party  resisting  summary

          judgment.  Id. 
                     ___

          C.   Applicable Law
          C.   Applicable Law
               ______________

                    A municipal liability claim under   1983 requires proof

          that the municipality maintained a policy or custom which caused,

          or was the  moving force behind, a deprivation  of constitutional

          rights.   See, e.g., Oklahoma City  v. Tuttle, 471  U.S. 808, 819
                    ___  ____  _____________     ______

          (1985);  Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
                   ______    ___________________________

          (1978);  Bordanaro v.  McLeod, 871  F.2d 1151,  1156 (1st  Cir.),
                   _________     ______

          cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). 
          _____ ______

                    The Fourth  Amendment applies not only  to governmental

          searches  and seizures  in criminal  investigations, but  also in

          various civil proceedings. See  Soldal v. Cook County, Ill.,  506
                  _____              ___  ______    _________________

          U.S. 56, __, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992); O'Connor  v. Ortega, 480
                                                   ________     ______

          U.S.  709, 715  (1987) ("[B]ecause  the individual's  interest in

                                          7

          privacy and  personal security `suffers whether  the government's

          motivation  is  to investigate  violations  of  criminal laws  or

          breaches  of other statutory or  regulatory standards,' .  . . it

          would  be `anomalous to say  that the individual  and his private

          property  are fully protected  by the Fourth  Amendment only when

          the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.'") (quoting New
                                                                        ___

          Jersey v.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985)).  Included among the
          ______     ______

          civil  proceedings  in which  the  Fourth  Amendment applies  are

          involuntary commitment proceedings  for dangerous persons suffer-

          ing from mental illness.  See Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d
                                    ___ _____    _____

          Cir. 1993); Villanova v.  Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795-96  (7th Cir.
                      _________     ______

          1992).

                    The fundamental inquiry  under the Fourth  Amendment is

          whether a  particular search or search  procedure is "reasonable"

          in the circumstances.  See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-
                                 ___ ____    __________

          40 (1973);  Wyman v. James, 400  U.S. 309, 318 (1971);  Camara v.
                      _____    _____                              ______

          Municipal Ct.  of  San  Francisco,  387  U.S.  523,  538  (1967).
          _________________________________

          Nonconsensual  entries  by  government  agents  into a  residence

          without a search or  arrest warrant5 are presumptively "unreason-

          able"  under the Fourth Amendment.   See Welsh  v. Wisconsin, 466
                                               ___ _____     _________

          U.S. 740, 748-49  (1984); Payton v. New  York, 445 U.S.  573, 586
                                    ______    _________

          (1980);  Hegarty  v. Somerset  County,  53 F.3d  1367,  1373 (1st
                   _______     ________________
                              
          ____________________

               5"[A]  [felony]  arrest warrant  founded  on probable  cause
          implicitly  carries with  it  the limited  authority  to enter  a
          dwelling  in  which the  suspect lives  when  there is  reason to
          believe  the suspect is  within."  Payton  v. New  York, 445 U.S.
                                             ______     _________
          573, 603 (1980). But see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
                           ___ ___ ________    _____________
          214 (1981) (noting that the "arrest warrant" rule is inapplicable
          where suspect is within another person's residence).

                                          8

          Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 675 (1995).  This presumption  is
                 _____ ______

          designed to safeguard the special privacy expectations tradition-

          ally  recognized in the American  home by requiring  that a "neu-

          tral" and  detached judicial officer make  an independent assess-

          ment  as to whether law enforcement agents have probable cause to

          effect  an intended search or arrest  within the home.  See Stea-
                                                                  ___ _____

          gald  v. United  States, 451 U.S.  204, 212 (1981).   The warrant
          ____     ______________

          requirement is not  absolute, of course, and the  presumption may

          be overcome in at least two ways.

                    First, a  warrantless entry  and search of  a residence

          may be "reasonable," in Fourth Amendment terms, if the government

          can  demonstrate certain  exceptional  types of  "exigent circum-

          stances":  (1)  "hot pursuit"  of a felon  into a residence;  (2)

          imminent  destruction of  evidence  within the  residence; (3)  a

          threatened and  potentially successful  escape by a  suspect from

          inside the  residence; or (4) an  imminent threat to the  life or

          safety of members of the public, the police officers, or a person

          located  within the residence.   See United States  v. Tibolt, 72
                                           ___ _____________     ______

          F.3d  965, ___  (1st Cir.  1995) [Nos.  94-1714 &  2221, 1995  WL

          757848,  at  *3  (Dec. 29,  1995)];  Hegarty,  53  F.3d at  1374.
                                               _______

          Normally,  "exigent circumstances"  exceptions     by  their very

          nature    turn upon the objective reasonableness of ad hoc, fact-
                                                              __ ___

          specific assessments contemporaneously made by  government agents

          in  light of  the developing  circumstances at  the scene  of the

          search.  See id. at 1378.
                   ___ ___

                    Second, a residential search pursuant to an established

                                          9

          warrantless search  procedure may  be reasonable if  conducted in
                              _________

          furtherance of an important administrative or regulatory purpose,

          or  "special need," which would be  undermined systemically by an
                                                         ____________

          impracticable warrant or probable-cause requirement.   Griffin v.
                                                                 _______

          Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) ("[W]e  have permitted excep-
          _________

          tions when `special  needs, beyond  the normal need  for law  en-

          forcement,   make  the  warrant  and  probable-cause  requirement

          impracticable.'")  (citation omitted). See,  e.g., id. (upholding
                                                 ___   ____  ___

          probation officers'  prerogative to conduct  warrantless searches

          of  probationers'  homes for  evidence of  probation infraction);

          O'Connor,  480 U.S.  at  709 (noting  that government  employer's
          ________

          warrantless searches  of employees'  work space to  recover work-

          related  materials may be "reasonable" in particular circumstanc-

          es); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (holding  that warrantless in-school
               ______

          searches of  students' personal  property by public  school offi-

          cials did not  violate Fourth Amendment);  United States v.  Car-
                                                     _____________     ____

          dona,  903 F.2d 60 (1st  Cir. 1990) (extending  Griffin to parole
          ____                                            _______

          officers'  warrantless searches  of parolees'  residences), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 498 U.S. 1049 (1991); cf. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 309 (holding
          ______                        ___ _____

          that social  worker's warrantless  visitation  to welfare  recip-

          ient's home did not implicate Fourth Amendment).  The reasonable-

          ness of a particular "special need" search procedure will depend,

          of course, on whether the  court's "careful balancing of  govern-

          mental and private interests suggests that the public interest is

          best  served by a Fourth  Amendment standard that  stops short of

          probable cause."  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
                            ______

                                          10

          D.   Alleged "Deprivation"
          D.   Alleged "Deprivation"
               _____________________

                    Turning to the initial  hurdle confronting McCabe under

             1983, see Monell,  436 U.S. at 694,  we must determine whether
                   ___ ______

          the   undisputed  evidence  demonstrates  that  the  warrantless,

          forcible entry of the Zinger residence by the Lynn police consti-

          tuted  a  deprivation  of  decedent's  Fourth  Amendment  rights.

          Oddly, none  of the  cases  the City  cites  as support  for  the

          constitutionality of comparable  involuntary commitment  statutes

          deals  straightforwardly  with  the   precise  issue  before  us:

          whether a prescribed statutory search procedure (i.e., Mass. Gen.

          Laws Ann. ch. 123,   12(a)) violates the Fourth Amendment because

          it routinely  allows warrantless  entries of a  residence, absent

          "exigent circumstances," to  effect involuntary commitments;  nor

          have we found such  a case.  The cases cited by the City consider

          whether  a seizure of the person effected pursuant to an involun-
                                    ______

          tary commitment statute violates  the due process requirements of
                                                ___ _______

          the  Fifth and Fourteenth  Amendments,6 or whether  the manner in

          which the government detains a  person violates the Fourth Amend-

          ment  prohibition against  unreasonable seizures.7   Nonetheless,
                              
          ____________________

               6See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 963
                ___  ____  _______________    _______
          (2d Cir. 1983) (involving a Fourteenth Amendment "due process"
          challenge to the New York involuntary commitment statute).

               7See Moore v. Wyoming Medical Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531, 1535,
                ___ _____    ____________________
          1537 (D. Wyo. 1993) (focusing on "seizure" of person subjected to
          involuntary commitment,  and noting only in  passing that seizure
          followed a  forcible warrantless  entry of  the  home); see  also
                                                                  ___  ____
          Glass, 984  F.2d at  58 (holding  that the  committing physicians
          _____
          were  entitled  to  qualified  immunity  for  ordering  "seizure"
          because they  reasonably believed  that subject was  mentally ill
          and "dangerous");  Villanova, 972 F.2d at  797 (discussing Fourth
                             _________
          Amendment and due process  implications arising from prolongation

                                          11

          to the  extent the technically inapposite  "seizure" cases relied

          on  by the City might  be considered appropriate  analogs in this

          unchartered area, we consult their reasoning for guidance. 

                    Although the parties  devote considerable attention  to

          whether  there remains  a genuine  factual dispute  regarding the

          substance  of  the  challenged  City "policy,"  we  consider  its

          essential  features clear  enough;  that is,  the policy  permits

          warrantless  residential  searches,  without  requiring  "exigent

          circumstances,"  in order  to  effect  an involuntary  commitment

          pursuant to a  properly issued pink paper.   Of course,  the City

          argues that every  entry is per se  "exigent" since a pink  paper
                                      ___ __

          can  only issue upon an  expert medical finding  that the subject

          presently  poses a  "likelihood of  serious harm"  to  herself or

          others, which in turn provides  the police with reasonable  cause

          to believe that an  immediate, forcible entry for the  purpose of
                              
          ____________________

          of  involuntary commitment,  or  seizure of  the person,  without
          independent  judicial  determination  of  probable  cause,  where
          commitment occurred while person was in jail).
                                                  ____
               Moreover,  the  absence  of  any authority  for  the  McCabe
          contention    that the warrantless  "forcible entry" phase of  an
          involuntary  commitment should  be  treated differently  than the
          committal "seizure" itself    arguably indicates that a constitu-
          tional  foundation is  lacking.   See  Cardona,  903 F.2d  at  64
                                            ___  _______
          (rejecting similar attempt to draw  "entirely artificial distinc-
          tion[s]  between `search'  jurisprudence and  `seizure' jurispru-
          dence").   And since the  cases cited by  the City overwhelmingly
          hold  that warrantless, involuntary commitment seizures generally
          comport with  the strictures  of the  Fourth Amendment,  see Vil-
                                                                   ___ ____
          lanova, 972 F.2d at  795 ("There is  no requirement of a  warrant
          ______
          issued by  a judicial officer [to  seize the person  subject to a
          commitment order]."),  thus constituting  a valid pink  paper the
          practical  equivalent of an arrest warrant, see supra note 5; cf.
                                                      ___ _____         ___
          Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748-49;  Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; Hegarty,  53
          _____                       ______                   _______
          F.3d at 1373,  a separate  requirement that a  search warrant  be
          obtained before entering the residence to seize the subject could
          be viewed as supererogatory.

                                          12

          detaining the resistant subject is necessary to avert the  "seri-

          ous harm" identified in the pink paper.  

                    On the  other hand,  McCabe contends that  these remote

          medical-psychiatric "emergency" determinations do not equate with

          constitutionally cognizable "exigent circumstances," because they

          do  not turn  on the  executing officer's  fact-specific, on-the-

          scene assessment as to  the immediacy of any putative  threat the

          subject  may pose  to herself  or others.   McCabe  stresses that

          during  the several hours which were allowed to elapse before the

          pink  paper was executed upon Ms. Zinger, the officers would have

          had ample time to obtain a search warrant.  And McCabe points out

          that  none of  the four  recognized "exigent  circumstances," see
                                                                        ___

          supra p. 10,  was plainly present immediately before the forcible
          _____

          police entry.            As these claims reflect the  legal gloss

          placed on  the record  evidence, rather  than  a genuine  factual

          dispute  concerning the substance of the City policy, we need not

          enter the skirmish  over the  distinctions between  "emergencies"

          and "exigent  circumstances."  The  City policy, as  evidenced by

          the  actual  conduct  of  its police  officers,8  falls  squarely

          within  a recognized  class of  systemic "special  need" searches
                                          ________

                              
          ____________________

               8Contrary to McCabe's contention, we need not decide whether
          the City  waived the argument  that its police  officers' actions
          were  not  undertaken pursuant  to City  policy,  and that  it is
          therefore  not liable  under Monell, 436  U.S. at 694.   The City
                                       ______
          merely  argues that  the  actual police  conduct  in effecting  a
          warrantless entry often provides the best circumstantial evidence
          as  to the nature  of the challenged municipal  policy.  See Bor-
                                                                   ___ ____
          danaro, 871 F.2d at  1156-57 (observing that the event  itself is
          ______
          evidence that police officers  acted in accordance with municipal
          policy). 

                                          13

          which are conducted without  warrants in furtherance of important

          administrative  purposes.    Again, the  fundamental  concern  of

          Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in  general, and in "special need"

          search cases as  well, is whether an established search procedure

          is "reasonable"  in  light of  the  actual circumstances  in  the

          particular  case.  See Cady, 413  U.S. at 439-40; see also O'Con-
                             ___ ____                       ___ ____ ______

          nor, 480 U.S. at 719; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.  "Reasonableness,"
          ___                   ______

          in turn, depends on  "'balanc[ing] the nature and quality  of the

          intrusion on the individual's  Fourth Amendment interests against

          the importance  of the governmental interests  alleged to justify

          the intrusion.'"   O'Connor, 480 U.S. at  719 (citation omitted);
                             ________

          see T.L.O.,  469 U.S. at 341;  Cardona, 903 F.2d at  67; cf. Vil-
          ___ ______                     _______                   ___ ____

          lanova,  972 F.2d  at 796.   On  balance, we  find that  the City
          ______

          policy permitting forcible, warrantless  entries by police  offi-

          cers  in possession of a  pink paper properly  issued pursuant to

          Mass. Gen.  Laws Ann. ch. 123,    12(a), is reasonable  under the

          Fourth Amendment.  

               1.   State's "Administrative" Interest
               1.   State's "Administrative" Interest
                    _________________________________

                    (a)  Parens Patriae and Police Power
                    (a)  Parens Patriae and Police Power
                         _______________________________

                    The  legitimacy  of  the  State's  parens  patriae  and
                                                       ______  _______

          "police power"  interests in  ensuring that "dangerous"  mentally

          ill persons not harm themselves or others is beyond dispute.  See
                                                                        ___

          Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
          ______    ____                                     _____ __ _____

          grounds,  457  U.S. 291  (1982);  Thompson  v. Commonwealth,  438
          _______                           ________     ____________

          N.E.2d 33, 36 (Mass. 1982).  The potential consequences attending

          a  delayed commitment     both  to the  mentally ill  subject and

                                          14

          others    may be extremely serious, sometimes including death  or

          bodily  injury.  Thus, we  think it is  especially significant to

          the  present  analysis that  warrantless "special  need" searches

          have been condoned by the courts in circumstances where the State

          interests  were  far  less  compelling and  urgent.    Cf., e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (noting:  because "public employees are
          ________

          entrusted with tremendous  responsibility," "the consequences  of

          their misconduct  or  incompetence to  both  the agency  and  the

          public interest can  be severe");  New York v.  Burger, 482  U.S.
                                             ________     ______

          702, 708-09  (1987) (noting:  where "the  government interests in

          regulating particular businesses are concomitantly  heightened, a

          warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reason-

          able[,]" and  that  "the  State has  a  substantial  interest  in

          regulating   the   vehicle-dismantling  and   automobile-junkyard

          industry because motor vehicle  theft has increased in the  State

          and because the problem  of theft is associated with  this indus-

          try");  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 ("Against the child's interest in
                  ______

          privacy  must be  set the  substantial interest  of teachers  and

          administrators in maintaining discipline  in the classroom and on

          school grounds.").  

                    We therefore  inquire whether these  residential search

          procedures  are  appropriately  tailored to  the  legitimate  and

          important interests at stake; in other words,  whether the proce-

          dures are reasonably  designed to ensure accurate  identification

          and prompt detention of recalcitrant and "dangerous" mentally ill

          persons who require  immediate temporary commitment.  See  id. at
                                                                ___  ___

                                          15

          341 (noting two-part inquiry whether the search procedure was (i)

          "'justified at  its inception'" and (ii)  "'reasonably related in

          scope to  the circumstances  which justified the  interference in

          the first  place'") (citations  omitted).9   We think that  Mass.

          Gen. Laws Ann.  ch. 123,   12(a), in general,  and the commitment

          order  issued by  Dr. Barden,  in particular,  were appropriately

          suited to these legitimate purposes.  

                    The application for  temporary hospitalization,  signed

          by Dr. Barden, expressly referenced Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123,

            12(a), which authorizes  four categories of involuntary commit-

          ment procedures:    

                    (1)  a qualified  physician, psychologist, or
                         psychiatric  nurse  who  has  personally
                         examined a person, and who has reason to
                         believe that  the person would  create a
                         "likelihood of serious harm," may sign a
                         "pink paper" authorizing law enforcement
                         officials  to  restrain  that person  to
                         permit hospitalization for up to  a ten-
                         day period;

                    (2)  in an "emergency situation," a qualified
                         physician, psychologist, or  psychiatric
                         nurse  may sign a  pink paper, even when
                         the alleged mentally ill  person refuses
                         to submit to  a medical examination,  if
                         the  "facts  and circumstances"  suggest
                         that the person would create  a "likeli-
                         hood of serious harm";

                    (3)  in  an  "emergency situation,"  a police
                         officer  may  restrain a  person  he be-
                         lieves creates a "likelihood  of serious
                         harm," if no  qualified physician,  psy-
                              
          ____________________

               9Thus, a  "mental illness"  determination alone is  insuffi-
          cient to support an involuntary commitment  order; the State must
          also show that the person subjected to involuntary  commitment is
          "dangerous."   See O'Connor  v. Donaldson, 422  U.S. 563,  575-76
                         ___ ________     _________
          (1975).  

                                          16

                         chologist,  or  psychiatric nurse  is a-
                         vailable to sign a pink paper; or

                    (4)  at any time, any person may apply to the
                         district or  juvenile courts for  a com-
                         mitment order, and after a  hearing, the
                         court may issue a warrant for the appre-
                         hension and appearance of the person who
                         creates a "likelihood of serious harm."

          Mass. Gen.  Laws Ann. ch.  123,   12(a); see  infra Appendix, for
                                                   ___  _____

          text; see generally Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258-
                ___ _________ ________    ______________

          60 (1st  Cir. 1994)  (tracing history of  Massachusetts emergency

          involuntary  commitment  procedure  from colonial  times  through

          enactment of chapter  123).   As only the  category 4  commitment

          procedure expressly incorporates a warrant requirement,  we think

          it  clear  that  the  statute  implicitly  authorizes warrantless

          searches and seizures in the three remaining contexts.  Since Ms.

          Zinger  repeatedly  rejected  family  pleas that  she  submit  to

          examination by  a physician,  and because  Dr.  Barden based  his

          expert  medical-psychiatric opinion  exclusively on  reports from

          family  members and  neighbors, we  conclude  also that  the pink

          paper in this case did issue under category 2.  The only question

          before  us,  therefore,  concerns  the  constitutionality  of the

          "category 2" warrantless search procedure. 

                    The pink paper was based on Dr. Barden's expert opinion

          that Ms. Zinger  "require[d] hospitalization so  as to avoid  the

          likelihood of serious  harm by  reason of mental  illness."   Dr.

          Barden  described  the  particular  grounds for  concluding  that

          immediate hospitalization was required:

                    [Patient]  has a [history]  of mental illness
                    and she was  hospitalized at Danvers  [State]

                                          17

                    Hospital couple  of years ago.   [Patient] is
                    very angry and hostile; she is very impulsive
                    and explosive.  She  made threats to harm her
                    ex-husband.  [Patient]  is dangerous to  oth-
                    ers.

          The  involuntary  commitment application,  and  the Massachusetts

          statute,  define "likelihood  of serious  harm"     the governing

          criterion for commitment    as: 

                    (1) a  substantial risk  of physical harm  to
                    the  person [her]self  as manifested  by evi-
                    dence of, threats of, or attempts at, suicide
                    or serious  bodily harm;   (2) a  substantial
                    risk  of physical  harm to  other persons  as
                    manifested by evidence of homicidal  or other
                    violent  behavior or evidence that others are
                    placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior
                    and serious physical harm to  them;  or (3) a
                    very substantial risk of  physical impairment
                    or injury  to the person  [her]self as  mani-
                    fested  by evidence that  such person's judg-
                    ment is  so affected that [s]he  is unable to
                    protect [her]self  in the community  and that
                    reasonable provision for h[er]  protection is
                    not available in the community.

          Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.  ch. 123,   1; see Rogers,  634 F.2d at 658.
                                              ___ ______

          The relevant  medical history, including Ms.  Zinger's history of

          mental illness and prior  hospitalization at Danvers State Hospi-

          tal, and the behavioral symptoms reported to Dr. Barden by family

          members,  plainly satisfied  the second  clause in  the statutory

          definition of "likelihood of serious harm." 

                    The  statutory  definition  of  "likelihood  of serious

          harm,"  particularly  its  requirement  that  there  be objective

          medical  indicia of  "dangerousness," effectively  "constitutes a

          codified set  of `exigent circumstances' which are constitutional

          under  the Fourth Amendment."  Moore v. Wyoming Medical Ctr., 825
                                         _____    ____________________

          F. Supp. 1531, 1538 n.4, 1546 (D. Wyo. 1993).   Given the notori-

                                          18

          ous difficulties  in predicting  individual human  behavior based

          solely on  symptomatology, id.  at 1539,  we conclude  that Mass.
                                     ___

          Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123,   1, prescribes  a sufficiently clear and

          reasonably  reliable  administrative standard  for  ensuring that

          involuntary commitments  are  limited to  imminently  "dangerous"

          mentally ill persons in emergent circumstances. 

                    Finally, the specific focus  and overall context of the

          Massachusetts  statute  implicitly  circumscribe  the  category 2

          search  procedure within  narrow  bounds.   A  police officer  is

          permitted to enter a  residence without a warrant for  the exclu-

          sive purpose  of detaining a recalcitrant  and dangerous mentally

          ill person  pursuant to  a duly issued  pink paper,  but may  not

          engage  in a generalized search.  As  the officers in the instant

          case did not  exceed these  bounds, we conclude  that Mass.  Gen.

          Laws Ann. ch. 123,    12(a), and consequently the  City policy in

          pursuance  of  the statutory  design, see  supra pps.  12-14, are
                                                ___  _____

          appropriately  tailored  to serve  the  legitimate  and important

          State and municipal interest  in ensuring that dangerous mentally

          ill persons not cause physical harm to themselves or others.

                    (b)  Practicality of Warrant Requirement
                    (b)  Practicality of Warrant Requirement
                         ___________________________________

                    The determination  that there  exists a legitimate  and

          substantial  governmental  interest in  conducting  a warrantless

          search  in certain  circumstances  satisfies  only the  threshold

          inquiry  under the  reasonableness test.   For  an administrative

          search  procedure to survive  constitutional challenge  under the

          "special need" exception, it must also appear that the burdens of

                                          19

          complying  with a  warrant requirement are  likely to  defeat the

          important governmental purposes the warrantless  search procedure

          was designed to serve.    

                    In  assessing  whether  the  public  interest
                    demands  creation of  a general  exception to
                    the  Fourth Amendment's  warrant requirement,
                    the question is not whether the public inter-
                    est justifies the type of search in question,
                    but whether the authority to search should be
                    evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends
                    in part upon whether the burden  of obtaining
                    a warrant is likely  to frustrate the govern-
                    mental purpose behind the search.  

          Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
          ______

                    Compliance with a warrant requirement in the context of

          these temporary, involuntary commitments  for medical-psychiatric

          examination  would entail  critical  delays  in safeguarding  the

          mentally ill person,  and others, without affording  commensurate

          privacy protections  to the subject.  Category  2 searches foster

          important governmental  interests  largely because  the  inherent

          imprecision in predicting the timing of any outbreak  of "danger-

          ousness" on the  part of the  recalcitrant, mentally ill  person,

          see  Moore, 825 F. Supp. at 1539,  inevitably means that the time
          ___  _____

          spent  securing judicial  approval of  a pink paper  represents a

          potentially dangerous delay of incalculable proportion.    
                                         ____________

                    In this  particular case,  of course, McCabe  points to

          the undisputed  evidence that the police  officers waited several

          hours before executing the  pink paper, thus demonstrating little

          concern that Ms. Zinger might exhibit the sort of sudden onset of

          "dangerousness" alluded to in the assessment made by  Dr. Barden.

          Although this argument might hold sway were the constitutionality

                                          20

          of  the warrantless  entry dependent on  an ad  hoc, on-the-scene
                                                      __  ___

          "exigent circumstances"  determination made by the  police, it is

          no rejoinder to the claimed "reasonableness" of a  "special need"

          search  procedure policy, which must  focus not on the particular

          case but  on  the essential  systemic  attributes of  the  search

          procedure itself: 

                    The  dissent  argues  that in  this  case the
                    police had  ample  time to  secure an  arrest
                    warrant,  rendering  invalid  any claim  that
                    complying  with traditional  fourth amendment
                    requirements was impracticable.   That  view-
                    point  distorts Griffin's  "impracticability"
                                    _______
                    prong.  In  Griffin, the Court inquired  into
                                _______
                    the  systemic impracticability  of compelling
                         ________ ________________
                    those involved in implementation of  a proba-
                    tion regime to obtain  warrants.  The imprac-
                    ticability  of  obtaining  a warrant  in  the
                    particular case did not  enter into the equa-
                    __________ ____
                    tion;  indeed, Justice Blackmun argued unsuc-
                    cessfully for much the same  sort of particu-
                    larized inquiry . . . . Whether it was feasi-
                    ble  for the  police to  obtain a  warrant in
                    this  particular case  is irrelevant  for the
                    purpose at hand.

          Cardona,  903 F.2d  at  68 n.7  (emphasis added;  citations omit-
          _______

          ted).10    Although  the  Fourth  Amendment  warrant  requirement
                              
          ____________________

               10There  is  no record  evidence  that  the challenged  City
          policy required officers to  execute pink papers within a  speci-
          fied time.  In all  events, however, we do not think  the several
          hours that elapsed  between the  issuance and  execution of  this
          pink paper, which enabled the constable and police  to coordinate
          their  actions, can be considered  so inordinate as  to call into
          question  the  emergent  nature of  Ms.  Zinger's  mental-health-
          related  dangerousness.    Whereas  delay  might  belie  "exigent
          circumstances," were that the  warrant exception primarily relied
          upon by the City, no  such rigid time constraints can  be imposed
          in  a particular  "special need"  case as  a precondition  to the
          validity of  the systemic search procedure  itself.  Nonetheless,
          we  express no opinion as to whether, in another case, inordinate
          delay in issuing and executing a pink paper might tend  to under-
          mine a predicate finding  that the subject posed a  real "likeli-
          hood of serious harm" at the time the finding was made. 

                                          21

          imposes a  minimal burden  on governmental authorities  in normal

          circumstances, we think there  can be little doubt that  it would

          delay  the execution  of  involuntary commitment  orders to  some
                                                                       ____

          degree in all cases,  thereby appreciably increasing the systemic
                    ___

          risk  that the vital  protective purposes  served by  the State's

          parens patriae  and  "police  power"  responsibilities  would  be
          ______ _______

          frustrated in individual cases not identifiable  in advance.  See
                                                                        ___

          supra Section II.D.1(a).
          _____

                    More  importantly  by   far,  however,  the  additional

          burdens  imposed on  the City  and State  by a  universal warrant

          requirement in category 2 searches seem to us "undue" and "unrea-

          sonable"  when  viewed  in  relation to  the  minimal  additional

          protection  afforded  by a  requirement  that  a  pink  paper  be

          screened by a  magistrate before  it is executed.   The  district

          court  ruled that  the Fourth  Amendment warrant  requirement was

          violated notwithstanding compliance with  the "pink paper" proce-

          dure under  Mass. Gen. Laws  Ann. ch. 123,    12(a),  because the

          issuing physician "is not qualified to determine whether probable

          cause exists."   McCabe, 875 F. Supp. at 61.   On the other hand,
                           ______

          the Supreme Court  has noted  that rigid adherence  to a  warrant

          requirement  reaches its  most suspect  extreme where  a judicial

          officer lacks the innate expertise to assess the soundness of the

          basic  ground upon which the warrant request is predicated.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  Griffin, 483  U.S. at  879 n.  6   (observing  that "[o]ur
          ____   _______

          discussion  pertains  to  the  reasons  generally supporting  the

          proposition  that  the search  decision  should  be  left to  the

                                          22

          expertise of  probation authorities  rather than  a magistrate");

          cf. Rogers, 634  F.2d at 660 ("While  judicial determinations are
          ___ ______

          certainly preferable in general, room must be left  for responsi-

          ble state officials  to respond to exigencies that render totally

          impractical recourse  to traditional forms  of judicial  process.

          `The  judicial model  of  fact finding  for all  constitutionally

          protected interests, regardless of  their nature, can turn ratio-

          nal  decisionmaking into an  unmanageable enterprise.'") (quoting

          Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979)).  
          ______    __ __

                    A pink  paper is issued or withheld  principally on the

          strength of expert medical-psychiatric assessments (i.e., diagno-

          ses  and prognoses  founded on  the available  evidence), whereas

          judicial  officers normally are called  upon to make judgments as

          to whether there is "probable cause" for an arrest or search.  As

          the Second Circuit has pointed out:

                    "[T]he  initial inquiry in a civil commitment
                    proceeding is very different from the central
                    issue in either a delinquency proceeding or a
                    criminal  prosecution.   In the  latter cases
                    the basic issue  is a straightforward factual
                    question--did  the  accused  commit  the  act
                    alleged?   There  may  be factual  issues  to
                    resolve in  a commitment proceeding,  but the
                    factual aspects represent only  the beginning
                    of the inquiry.   Whether  the individual  is
                    mentally ill and  dangerous to either himself
                    or others and is  in need of confined therapy
                    turns on the meaning  of the facts which must
                                 _______
                    be  interpreted  by expert  psychiatrists and
                    psychologists." 

          Project Release v. Prevost,  722 F.2d 960, 972-73 (2d  Cir. 1983)
          _______ _______    _______

          (quoting  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)); see also
                    _________    _____                             ___ ____

          O'Connor, 480 U.S. at  723 ("Indeed, it is difficult  to give the
          ________

                                          23

          concept  of probable  cause,  rooted as  it  is in  the  criminal

          investigatory context, much meaning when  the purpose of a search

          is to  retrieve a file  for work-related  reasons."); Wyman,  400
                                                                _____

          U.S.  at 324 (in the  home-visitation setting, "the warrant argu-

          ment is out  of place"  since, as a  practical matter,  "probable

          cause" is more than an agency seeks or needs to know).11  

                    To  be sure,  judicial  oversight  might  provide  some

          preliminary  insulation against  obvious abuse;  for example,  by

          screening  out  patently  unreliable information  utilized  by  a

          physician in formulating a diagnosis or prognosis, which can be a

          matter  of  particular concern  in  category  2 cases  where  the

                              
          ____________________

               11It  is  largely  irrelevant  whether  the  "likelihood  of
          serious harm" criterion in Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123,   12(a),
          approximates  the  "probable  cause" inquiry  appropriate  in the
          search warrant context.   The "probable  cause" inquiry often  is
          jettisoned in civil administrative searches:

                    "[W]here a careful balancing  of governmental
                    and private interests  suggests that the pub-
                    lic interest  is best  served by a  Fourth A-
                    mendment  standard   of  reasonableness  that
                    stops  short of probable  cause, we  have not
                    hesitated to adopt such a standard."  We have
                    concluded, for example, that  the appropriate
                    standard for administrative  searches is  not
                    probable  cause  in its  traditional meaning.
                    Instead,  an  administrative  warrant can  be
                    obtained if there is  a showing that  reason-
                    able legislative  or administrative standards
                    for conducting an inspection are satisfied.

          O'Connor,  480  U.S.  at  722-23 (citations  omitted);  see  also
          ________                                                ___  ____
          T.L.O., 469 U.S. at  340-41 ("'[P]robable cause' is not  an irre-
          ______
          ducible requirement of a  valid search.  The fundamental  command
          of  the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reason-
          able,  and although 'both the  concept of probable  cause and the
          requirement  of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,
          ...  in certain  limited  circumstances neither  is  required.'")
          (citations omitted). 

                                          24

          physician has not examined  the patient and must rely  on second-

          hand reports as  to the subject's physical,  emotional and behav-

          ioral  symptoms.   On  the other  hand,  the statutory  mechanism

          itself affords  reasonable safeguards  against such concerns:   a

          pink paper  can  be authorized  only  by a  licensed  psychiatric

          physician,  see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.  ch. 123,    1, 12(a), whose
                      ___

          extensive  education  and  specialized  experience  and  training

          should enable  the psychiatric  physician more reliably  to parse

          such lay  reports, especially  those provided by  family members,

          with  the  requisite  professional  skepticism.12    Though  this

          safeguard is by  no means  foolproof, we  think it  would be  the

          exceptional  case in  which  an expert  evaluation  was based  on

          patently insufficient or unreliable information.  Further, to the
          ________

          degree that judicial factfinding were thought to  be necessary as

          a  general rule, in order  to ferret out  latent unreliability in
                                                    ______

          the foundational evidence (e.g., possible ulterior family motives

          or antipathy  toward the  patient) upon which  expert psychiatric

          evaluations  are  based,  the  resulting  delays in  implementing
                              
          ____________________

               12The other statutory safeguards would not forestall improp-
          er warrantless  entries of a  subject's residence.   See Cardona,
                                                               ___ _______
          903  F.2d at 66 ("While  the actual invasion  of privacy does not
          occur  until the  search  or seizure  occurs, the  constitutional
          protection is viable  only to  the extent that  it restricts  the
          authority responsible for making  the search or seizure decision,
          prior to the time the decision crystallizes.").  Nonetheless, the
          other safeguards do mitigate any resulting injury to the subject.
          For example, in order  to detain a dangerous mentally  ill person
          for  more than  ten days,  the State  must petition  the district
          court, and prove beyond reasonable doubt that the patient poses a
          "likelihood of serious harm."  See Mass. Gen.  Laws Ann. ch. 123,
                                         ___
              7, 8 (requiring ongoing, periodic  judicial review of commit-
          ment decision),  12(d); Commonwealth  v. Nassar 406  N.E.2d 1286,
                                  ____________     ______
          1290-91 (Mass. 1980).

                                          25

          involuntary commitment orders could  have far more serious conse-

          quences  for the mentally ill, their families, and members of the

          public.    Finally, such  a  detailed  factfinding mission  would

          greatly  exceed any "screening"  function normally  undertaken by

          judicial officers in reviewing search warrant applications.  

                    We discern no  sufficient justification for superimpos-

          ing  such a  judicial factfinding  mechanism upon  the evaluation

          made  by the  licensed psychiatric  physician in  the involuntary

          commitment context, especially since it promises no corresponding

          systemic benefit to offset the systemic delays in executing  pink

          papers in emergent circumstances.   See Griffin, 483 U.S.  at 876
                                              ___ _______

          ("A warrant requirement would  interfere to an appreciable degree

          with the probation  system, setting up  a magistrate rather  than

          the probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the

          probationer requires.").  

               2.   The Interests of the Mentally Ill
               2.   The Interests of the Mentally Ill
                    _________________________________

                    Next,  we consider the  extent to which  the category 2

          search procedure infringes  legitimate Fourth Amendment interests

          of  the mentally  ill.  See  T.L.O., 469  U.S. at  341; cf. also,
                                  ___  ______                     __  ____

          Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 256 ("Involuntary confinement for compulsory
          ________

          psychiatric treatment  is a  `massive curtailment of  liberty.'")

          (quoting Humphrey v.  Cady, 405 U.S.  504, 509 (1972))  (citation
                   ________     ____

          omitted).   We point  out again,  however, that  McCabe presently

          challenges only  the alleged infringement of  Ms. Zinger's Fourth

          Amendment right to be free from unreasonable governmental entries

          to  her residence,  see  supra note  2,  and does  not  allege an
                              ___  _____

                                          26

          infringement of her liberty  interest to be free from  any unrea-

          sonable  governmental restraint attending  the subsequent seizure

          of her person.  

                    (a)  Civil Context
                    (a)  Civil Context
                         _____________

                    Although  the  Fourth  Amendment  is  implicated  in  a

          variety of  civil proceedings, Soldal,  113 S. Ct.  at   548, the
                                         ______

          Supreme Court  has made it clear that the civil nature of certain

          search  procedures may  call for  a  narrowed application  of the

          warrant and probable  cause requirements.  Where  a search proce-

          dure is not designed to gather information in a criminal investi-

          gation,  its relative  unintrusiveness may  militate in  favor of

          relaxing  the warrant requirement. See O'Connor,  480 U.S. at 721
                                             ___ ________

          ("While   police,  and  even  [some]  administrative  enforcement

          personnel, conduct searches for  the primary purpose of obtaining

          evidence for  use in  criminal or other  enforcement proceedings,
                   

          employers  most frequently need to enter the offices and desks of

          their  employees  for  legitimate  work-related   reasons  wholly

          unrelated to  illegal conduct.");  Wyman, 400  U.S. at  323 (home
                                             _____

          visitation program "does not  deal with crime or with  the actual

          or suspected perpetrators of crime," and "[t]he caseworker is not

          a sleuth  but rather, we trust, . . .  a friend to one in need");

          see  also Project Release, 722  F.2d at 972-73 ("[T]he difference
          ___  ____ _______________

          between  civil and  criminal confinement  may nonetheless  be re-

          flected in  different standards and procedures  applicable in the

          context of each of the two systems     so long as due process  is

          satisfied.") (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425).  In the instant
                               _________

                                          27

          case, McCabe has not  suggested that the challenged entry  of the

          Zinger residence  was effected for  any criminal law  purpose, or

          any regulatory purpose other than to enable her  temporary hospi-

          talization and the psychiatric examination she adamantly refused.

                    (b)  Impartiality of Decisionmaker
                    (b)  Impartiality of Decisionmaker
                         _____________________________

                    Finally, it is most  significant in the present context

          that the  official decision to initiate  an involuntary "category

          2" commitment  rests with  a licensed psychiatric  physician, not

          with  law enforcement officials.   See Steagald, 451  U.S. at 212
                                             ___ ________

          (noting that the Fourth Amendment warrant  requirement interposes

          "neutral"  and  detached  judicial  officer  between  police  and

          "probable  cause" determination).  The Supreme Court consistently

          premises "special need" warrant exceptions  on the presence of  a

          search authorization  by an impartial,  or at least  a relatively

          impartial person.  See Cardona, 903 F.2d at 64-65 ("The [Griffin]
                             ___ _______                           _______

          Court's  focus was on the degree of security inherent in allowing

          a particular decisionmaker, i.e., a  probation officer, to make a

          particular decision, i.e., whether a probationer's home should be

          searched,  based on  a  particular (relatively  modest) level  of

          proof, i.e.,  `reasonable grounds.'").  Unlike the characteristic

          relationship  between  law  enforcement  personnel  and  criminal

          suspects, a  committing physician's relationship with  a patient,

          or even a nonpatient, is in no sense adversarial.  

                    The role of the licensed physician  under Massachusetts

          law is to provide a neutral, objective assessment of the "danger-

                                          28

          ousness" and "likelihood of serious risk" criteria upon which the

          involuntary commitment  decision depends.  A  physician's ethical

          responsibilities  likewise  require  that   appropriate  medical-

          psychiatric criteria  be utilized  in assessing the  condition of

          the subject  person.  Cf., e.g.,  Griffin, 483 U.S. at  876 ("Al-
                                __   ____   _______

          though  a  probation  officer  is not  an  impartial  magistrate,

          neither is he the  police officer who normally  conducts searches

          against the  ordinary citizen.   He is  an employee of  the State

          Department  of Health  and Social  Services who,  while assuredly

          charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed  to

          have in mind the welfare of the probationer.").  Nor is there any

          allegation or  evidence that the  Lynn police possessed  or exer-

          cised any influence, direct or indirect, over the medical-psychi-

          atric decision  to issue the pink paper.  Cf. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
                                                    ___ ______

          337 n.5 ("Nor do we express any opinion on the standards (if any)

          governing  searches of such areas by school officials or by other

          public authorities acting at the request of school officials.").

                    The district  court  nonetheless struck  down the  City

          policy because "the agents of the doctors in this case are police

          officers with guns  and batons, not hospital  orderlies and nurs-

          es,"  so that  "[t]here  is no  therapeutic relationship  which a

          warrant mechanism  would  disrupt."   McCabe,  875  F.  Supp.  at
                                                ______

          61.13   Whether  an  administrative search  procedure leaves  too
                              
          ____________________

               13Although there is no evidence that Dr. Barden had been Ms.
          Zinger's regular physician, the  challenged City policy is  to be
          evaluated  in light  of its  systemic traits  and purposes.   Cf.
                                                                        ___
          Cardona, 903 F.2d at 67; supra pp.  22-23.  No doubt many, if not
          _______                  _____
          most, category 2  searches are executed  pursuant to pink  papers

                                          29

          much discretion to  law enforcement  officers in the  field is  a

          recurring Fourth Amendment concern.   See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S.
                                                ___  ____  ______

          at 532-33 ("The practical effect  of this system is to leave  the

          occupant  subject to the discretion of the official in the field.

          This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which

          we  have  consistently  circumscribed  by a  requirement  that  a

          disinterested party warrant the  need to search.").   Under Mass.
                                                   

          Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123,   12(a), however, the decision to conduct

          a  category 2 "search" is  never left to  the executing officers.

          Moreover, the  mere fact that law enforcement  officials serve as

          the agents who implement  the authorizing physician's decision to

          approve  a category 2 search  does not necessarily  mean that the

          procedure is not within the "special need" category: 

                    [W]e fail to see any  constitutional signifi-
                    cance in the fact that police officers, rath-
                    er than "administrative" agents,  are permit-
                    ted to conduct the    415-a5 inspection.  The
                    significance respondent alleges  lies in  the
                    role of police  officers as enforcers  of the
                    penal  laws  and in  the  officers'  power to
                    arrest  for offenses other than violations of
                    the administrative  scheme.  It  is, however,
                    important to note that state police officers,
                    like those in New York, have numerous  duties
                    in addition  to those associated  with tradi-
                    tional  police work.  .  . .  As a  practical
                    matter, many States do not have the resources
                              
          ____________________

          issued  by the  subject-patient's current  or former  psychiatric
          physician.  Unlike law  enforcement officers, who rarely interact
          with a  search target on more than one occasion, as a rule physi-
          cians  possess  reliable personal  knowledge  of their  patients,
          based on  an ongoing  doctor-patient relationship.   Cf. Griffin,
                                                               ___ _______
          483 U.S.  at 879 ("As  was true, then,  in [O'Connor]  . . .  and
                                                      ________
          [T.L.O.], we deal with a  situation in which there is an  ongoing
           ______
          supervisory relationship    and one that is not, or at  least not
          entirely, adversarial    between the object of the search and the
          decisionmaker.").  

                                          30

                    to  assign  the enforcement  of  a particular
                    administrative scheme to a  specialized agen-
                    cy.  So long as  a regulatory scheme is prop-
                    erly administrative, it is not rendered ille-
                    gal by the  fact that the inspecting  officer
                    has the  power to arrest individuals for vio-
                    lations  other  than  those  created  by  the
                    scheme itself.  In  sum, we decline to impose
                                        
                    upon the  States the burden  of requiring the
                    enforcement of their  regulatory statutes  to
                    be carried out by specialized agents.

          Burger, 482  U.S. at 717-18; Cardona, 903 F.2d at 65 ("The [Grif-
          ______                       _______                        _____

          fin] Court did  not lend any special salience to  the identity of
          ___

          the  person(s) executing  the search";  "[w]hether the  decision,

          once  reached [by  the  probation officer],  is realized  through

          police officers, parole officers, or a tag team representing both

          camps, is peripheral to the Court's holding."). 

                    We  conclude that  these  considerations,  on  balance,

          favor a limited "special need" exception to  the warrant require-

          ment in the particular  setting presented in this case.   Accord-

          ingly, we hold that the Fourth  Amendment is not infringed by the

          challenged City policy,  which authorizes warrantless entries  of

          residences  by the  police for  the sole  purpose of  executing a

          properly issued category  2 pink paper  within a reasonable  time

          after its issuance. 

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    We retrace the bounds of our ruling.  We do not suggest

          that the factors we have discussed, see Section II.D, alone or in
                                              ___

          combination invariably  provide adequate  support for  a "special

          need"  exception to the warrant  requirement.  The balancing test

                                          31

          for determining whether an  administrative procedure comes within

          the  "special need"  exception is  designedly fact-specific,  and

          must  be calibrated anew in assessing  the reasonableness of each

          administrative  search procedure to which it is applied.  Nor, of

          course,  do  we suggest  that  all  comparable state  involuntary

          commitment statutes,  or any other  provision of Mass.  Gen. Laws

          Ann. ch. 123,  or other categories  of searches authorized  under

          chapter  123,  section  12(a),  necessarily  satisfy  the  Fourth

          Amendment.  See, e.g., Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326 ("Our holding today
                      ___  ____  _____

          does  not mean . . . that  a termination of benefits upon refusal

          of  a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge

          under all conceivable circumstances.  The early morning mass raid

          upon homes of welfare recipients is not unknown.").  We hold only

          that law enforcement officers in possession of a pink paper, duly

          issued  pursuant to category 2,  Mass. Gen. Laws  Ann. ch. 123,  

          12(a), may effect a warrantless entry  of the subject's residence

          within a reasonable time after the pink paper issues.  

                                          32

                    Since  the challenged  City  policy  comports with  the

          "special need" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-

          ment, the City is entitled  to summary judgment.  We intimate  no

          viewpoint  concerning  any  other  aspect  of these  proceedings,

          including the  McCabe claims against the  individual police offi-

          cers, the  constable, and the  ambulance crew, which  claims were

          dismissed, without prejudice.  See supra note 3.
                                         ___ _____

                    The district court judgment is reversed and the case is
                    The district court judgment is reversed and the case is
                    _______________________________________________________

          remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
          remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
          _________________________________________________________________

          with this opinion; costs to appellant.
          with this opinion; costs to appellant.
          _____________________________________

                                          33

                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX

          Chapter 123, Section 12:

                    (a)  Any  physician who  is  licensed  pursuant to
               section two of chapter one hundred and twelve or quali-
               fied  psychiatric nurse mental health clinical special-
               ist authorized  to practice  as such  under regulations
               promulgated  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section
               eighty  B of said chapter  one hundred and  twelve or a
               qualified  psychologist  licensed pursuant  to sections
               one  hundred  and eighteen  to  one  hundred and  twen-
               ty-nine,  inclusive  of  said chapter  one  hundred and
               twelve,  who after  examining  a person  has reason  to
               believe that  failure to hospitalize such  person would
               create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental
               illness may restrain or authorize the restraint of such
               person and apply for the hospitalization of such person
               for a  ten day  period at  a public  facility  or at  a
               private facility  authorized for  such purposes by  the
               department.
            
               If an examination is not possible because of  the emer-
               gency  nature of the case and because of the refusal of
               the person  to consent to such  examination, the physi-
               cian, qualified psychologist  or qualified  psychiatric
               nurse mental health clinical specialist on the basis of
               the  facts and circumstances  may determine that hospi-
               talization is necessary and may apply therefore.  

               In an  emergency situation,  if a  physician, qualified
               psychologist  or  qualified  psychiatric  nurse  mental
               health clinical specialist  is not available, a  police
               officer,  who believes  that failure  to  hospitalize a
               person  would create  a likelihood  of serious  harm by
               reason of  mental illness may restrain  such person and
               apply for the hospitalization of such person for a  ten
               day period at a  public facility or a private  facility
               authorized  for such  purpose  by the  department.   An
               application for hospitalization shall state the reasons
               for the restraint of such person and any other relevant
               information which may assist the admitting physician or
               physicians.   Whenever practicable, prior to transport-
               ing  such  person,  the  applicant  shall  telephone or
               otherwise communicate  with a facility to  describe the
               circumstances  and known clinical history and to deter-
               mine  whether the  facility is  the proper  facility to
               receive  such person  and also  to give  notice of  any
               restraint  to be  used  and to  determine whether  such
               restraint is necessary.

                    ....

                                          34

                    (e) Any person may  make application to a district
               court justice  or a justice  of the juvenile  court de-
               partment  for a ten day  commitment to a  facility of a
               mentally ill  person whom the failure  to confine would
               cause a likelihood of serious harm.  After hearing such
               evidence  as  he  may consider  sufficient,  a district
               court justice or  a justice of  the juvenile court  de-
               partment may  issue a warrant for  the apprehension and
               appearance  before  him  of  the  alleged  mentally ill
               person, if in his judgment the condition or conduct  of
               such  person  makes such  action  necessary or  proper.
               Following apprehension, the court shall have the person
               examined by a physician designated to have the authori-
               ty  to admit to a  facility or examined  by a qualified
               psychologist in accordance with  the regulations of the
               department.   If said physician  or qualified psycholo-
               gist reports that the failure to hospitalize the person
               would create a likelihood of serious harm  by reason of
               mental illness, the court  may order the person commit-
               ted to a facility for a  period not to exceed ten days,
               but the  superintendent may  discharge him at  any time
               within the ten day period.

                                          35