Court Opinion

ID: 9955860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:00:41.728942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:31.250232
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES BENJAMIN BARSTAD,                           No. 22-35867

                Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No. 4:21-cv-05105-SAB

 v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF WASHINGTON, sued jointly
and severally, in personal/private/
“Individual” and official/public/de
facto/“Person”al capacities; JEFFEREY
UTTECHT, sued jointly and severally, in
personal/private/“Individual” and
official/public/de facto/“Person”al capacities;
JAY INSLEE, sued jointly and severally, in
personal/private/”Individual” and
official/public/de facto/“Person”al capacities,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Washington
                   Stanley A. Bastian, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Washington state prisoner James Benjamin Barstad appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that

defendants failed to protect him from COVID-19. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.

2015). We affirm.

      The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barstad’s claims

against the State of Washington and defendants Uttecht and Inslee in their official

capacities because these defendants are not “persons” under § 1983. See Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State

nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”); see

also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (state

defendant’s removal of action did not alter the conclusion that the action failed to

present a valid federal claim because “a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a

§ 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted”).

      The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barstad’s claims

against defendants Uttecht and Inslee in their individual capacities because Barstad

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants

were personally involved in any alleged constitutional violations. See Starr v.

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983

only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is

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a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Barstad’s motion

for a further extension of time to serve a second set of interrogatories because

Barstad did not show that he diligently pursued discovery opportunities or that

allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See

Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2006)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining requirements to show an abuse of

discretion in this context).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Barstad’s motion

seeking leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied

when amendment would be futile).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Barstad’s motion

for reconsideration because Barstad failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63

(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

      Barstad’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for

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preliminary injunctive relief is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan,

954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided,

the reversal of a denial of preliminary injunction would have no practical

consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      Barstad’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 22) is denied.

      AFFIRMED.

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