Court Opinion

ID: 9597010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:54:58.618477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:25.646884
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn and Ness, Justices
(dissenting) :
We respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the lower court, thereby reinstating the verdict of the jury.
This proceeding by the South Carolina State Highway Department, appellant, was instituted for the purpose of condemning 15.48 acres of land, owned by the respondents, for the construction of Interstate Highway 77 in Richland County. Our statute, §§ 33-135, 136, provides that a landowner in such a proceeding may be paid just compensation, required by the constitution, in money, or in benefits to the remainder of the property, or by a combination of the two. *129There was abundant evidence warranting the jury’s finding that the benefits to the landowners were greater than the losses. Accordingly, the jury found in favor of the Highway Department.
After the jury verdict had been received, counsel for the landowners made a motion as follows:
“Your Honor, we move for a directed verdict in favor of the landowner in the amount of damages as shown by them on the grounds that the preponderance of the evidence clearly shows so, and failing -that, for a new trial.”
Grounds for the directed verdict were asserted, but none were indicated for a new trial. The motion does not assert that a new trial should be granted because the verdict is contrary to the fair preponderance of 'the evidence. It does not ask the judge to invoke his “thirteenth juror” power, to set a verdict aside when the judge is dissatisfied with the justice of a case.
The matter came to be heard before the trial judge, who overruled the motion for a directed verdict but granted a new trial on .the ground that “the Court is of the opinion that the verdict of .the jury is contrary to the fair preponderance of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted.”
Among the exceptions interposed by the Highway Department in this appeal is one as follows:
“5. The Court erred in granting a new trial, the error being that it was an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial on the ground .that the verdict was against the fair preponderance of the evidence, when no motion for a new trial was made upon that ground.” (Emphasis added.)
In Ulmers v. Willingham, 238 S. C. 503, 120 S. E. (2d) 859 (1961), there was before this Court a kindred matter. Therein, the defendants moved for a new trial but no grounds were stated. The motion was denied. This Court ruled that inasmuch as no grounds for granting of the mo*130tion were stated, no question was presented. Likewise, we think .that no- ground for a new trial having been asserted in the lower court, it was inappropriate, as a matter of law, to grant the motion.
Assuming, without so deciding, that cases could arise wherein the judge -might be justified in granting a new trial of his own volition, this simply is not such a case. The evidence fully justifies the verdict. No reason for granting the relief allowed appears in the judge’s order. Even though this Court has not heretofore required the trial judge to spell out the reasons for granting the relief, such practice is clearly preferable, and we know of no reason why an order granting such drastic relief should not be full, so as to permit review.