Court Opinion

ID: 9628319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:16:45.442643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:03.899126
License: Public Domain

*867Manoukian, J., dissenting, with whom Mowbray, C. J., concurs:
I am unable to acquiesce in the reversal and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Although it is true, as stated by the majority, that “when evidence is lost as a result of inadequate governmental handling, a conviction may be reversed, Howard v. State, 95 Nev. 580, 600 P.2d 214 (1979); Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 527, 598 P.2d 1144 (1979); United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974),” we have more often held that when there exists overwhelming evidence of guilt, we will, within due process limitations, view the error as harmless. Hendee v. State, 92 Nev. 669, 557 P.2d 275 (1976) (evidence that pistol used in commission of crime was stolen, while error, considered harmless because evidence of guilt overwhelming); Johnson v. State, 92 Nev. 405, 551 P.2d 241 (1976) (where evidence of guilt overwhelming, failure to give instruction is harmless); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 532 P.2d 1034 (1975) (FBI agents self-destruction of interrogation notes done without malicious motive and, because of overwhelming evidence of guilt, considered harmless); Drummond v. State, 86 Nev. 4, 462 P.2d 1012 (1970) (Bruton violation held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence of guilt was overwhelming);1 Pacheco v. State, 82 Nev. 172, 414 P.2d 100 (1966) (improper prosecutorial remark during closing argument considered harmless when verdict is free from doubt). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Here, there was strong circumstantial evidence of guilt filling the alleged evidentiary voids. Moreover, Crockett’s successful assertion that the prosecution was guilty of the suppression, loss and destruction of certain evidence is, although on cursory review somewhat persuasive, lacking in merit.
The majority states that “[tjaken alone, we must consider circumstantial evidence in this case sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, in effect, the unreported blood grouping test indicating a ‘B’ reaction was direct exculpatory evidence.” There is no question but that the examination and results of a sample vaginal swab from the victim’s body is important. Appellant contends that the manner of governmental preservation prevented anyone from ever knowing who the killer is. The police criminologist’s lab assistant testified that she got a “B” reaction either due to the presence of “B” antigens, due to a *868third party contributor other than appellant, or due to bacterial deterioration traceable to the manner in which the swab was maintained. The forensic serologist confirmed the lab assistant’s testimony that bacterial action can result in a false “B” reaction. The lab assistant further testified that the “B” reaction was not a strong one, so that there existed no real indication of a third party contributor. Of course, had there been a strong “B” reaction, that evidence would be both crucial and exculpatory. Here, the jury apparently concluded there was bacterial contamination and that a valid test would show no basis to conclude there was any reliable possibility of a third party contributor.
In terms of testing, cases require only enough to insure fairness in the proceedings. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1969); United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1324-29 (2d Cir. 1975). In the instant case, tests were conducted, the government’s experts were thoroughly cross-examined regarding methodology, and the notes relative to such testing were made available for defense examination. The constitution does not guarantee to the defense the automatic right to conduct such testing, United States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213, 218-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Oglesby v. United States, 414 U.S. 1026 (1973); United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236, 237-38 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); see People v. Eddington, 218 N.W.2d 831 (Mich.App. 1974), but does require enough to insure fairness. The fairness requirement here was met.
In the instant case the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the constitutional error which provides the basis for the majority’s reversal of the conviction is, in my view, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). The record shows that on July 2, 1974, decedent, Blythe Harrington, age fifteen and one-half, left her home where she resided with her mother and appellant. At 5:15 p.m. that day she was seen riding a horse toward Antelope Valley, northeast of Reno, a path on which she and appellant had ridden horseback a number of times before. Appellant returned home from his construction job shortly after 5:00 p.m. whereupon he quickly saddled his horse and followed Blythe’s path, ultimately traveling approximately nineteen miles. The assertion that he was traveling at a much faster pace than Blythe is a fact which is consistent with the police officers’ interpretation of the horse tracks found near the death scene. As the majority correctly states, “It was undisputed that both Crockett and the victim rode north on Lemon Valley Road. ...” Additionally, the uncontradicted evidence shows that Blythe’s totally nude *869body was found in Antelope Valley later that evening, such discovery reported by appellant. The victim had recently experienced consensual sexual intercourse and the lack of evidence of a struggle is indicative that the victim was familiar with the killer. Appellant admitted to police the fact of his long-term sexual affair with the victim, his step-daughter.2 Moreover, Blythe was shot two times with a .22 caliber firearm; appellant was the owner of a .22 rifle and was carrying a .22 pistol upon his return from his initial search for Blythe July 2; and, the appellant may have worn a heavy construction shoe similar to one of the prints identified at the homicide scene.
It is well settled that the guilt of an accused can be established wholly by circumstantial evidence. Bailey v. State, 94 Nev. 323, 325, 326, 579 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1978); State v. Plunkett, 62 Nev. 258, 278, 142 P.2d 893 (1943). See Curtis v. State, 93 Nev. 504, 560 P.2d 583 (1977). Within this factual setting, the absence of the items of evidence, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in nature, was insignificant.
While there are other issues raised by appellant which might arguably warrant reversal, but which would permit retrial, the grounds relied upon by the majority are shallow because *870founded upon empty defense claims which are easily answerable. The claimed errors were either of appellant’s own making, the unavailable evidence was unimportant or corroborated, or in any event, the failure to produce the evidence was non-prejudicial.

 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), held that the use against Bruton of a co-defendant’s confession was violative of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.

 Additional evidence of appellant’s sexual affair with the victim was shown by the victim’s diary admitted into evidence over appellant’s objection. The victim’s assertion that appellant was having an affair with her could have reasonably been discerned by the jury as a motive for the murder. Appellant may have wished to keep his step-daughter quiet about the allegation — whether or not it was true. Notwithstanding the fact that the lower court found the seizure of the scraps of paper to have been with appellant’s consent, the seizure is justified as one of potential evidence of a crime found inadvertently and in plain view by officers lawfully on the premises under a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). Even though this diary may not have been specifically mentioned in the search warrant, because it was in plain view and its discovery was inadvertent, the officers could seize it in order to determine if it was evidence of the crime. United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 896-97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969).
The district court also properly admitted the diary over the claims that it was a denial of the right to confrontation and improperly placed before the jury unproven criminal conduct and was thus prejudicial. This was allowed as a hearsay exception as the statements were found to be against the victim’s societal interest. NRS 51.345( 1 )(d). But, because this was evidence tending to show appellant’s motive, it could have been admitted as non-hearsay. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the statements in the diary were against the victim’s societal interest. Moreover, because this diary was the major item of evidence establishing motive, the trial court could properly admit it finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial impact. Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 100, 545 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1976).