Court Opinion

ID: 9960485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:17:38.259314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:31.116956
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judge AtLee and Senior Judge Haley
            Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
PUBLISHED

            CENK SIDAR
                                                                                    OPINION BY
            v.      Record No. 0837-23-4                                     JUDGE JAMES W. HALEY, JR.
                                                                                   APRIL 16, 2024
            JANE DOE

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                             Randy I. Bellows, Judge

                            John D. Perry (Mariam W. Tadros; Alexandros K. Mitrakas;
                            Womble, Bond, Dickinson (US) LLP; MDE Law Group, PLLC, on
                            brief), for appellant.

                            Walter E. Steimel, Jr. (Thomas F. Urban, II; Steimel Counselors Law
                            Group PLLC; Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, PLC, on brief), for
                            appellee.

                    Cenk Sidar appeals the circuit court’s judgment ordering him to pay $35,000 of Jane Doe’s

            attorney fees, which she incurred in responding to Sidar’s petition for appeal to the Supreme Court

            of Virginia. Rule 1:1A permits an appellee to seek attorney fees and costs if the “final appellate

            judgment [is] favorable to [the] appellee,” but “the application must be filed [in the circuit court]

            within 30 days after entry of [the] final appellate judgment.” Rule 1:1A(a). Sidar argues that the

            court erred in finding that Doe’s application for attorney fees was timely filed and authorized by

            Rule 1:1A. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling.
                                          BACKGROUND1

       The relevant facts can be succinctly stated. Jane Doe sued Cenk Sidar for several

egregious intentional torts.2 The circuit court denied Sidar’s motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction and, finding that the motion lacked a “legitimate basis in either fact or law,”

ordered Sidar to pay $45,596.06 of Doe’s attorney fees as a sanction under Code § 8.01-271.1.

After Doe nonsuited her claims, Sidar appealed to the Supreme Court. That Court denied the

appeal on September 9, 2022. The order doing so reads as follows:

               Upon review of the record in this case and consideration of the
               argument submitted in support of and in opposition to the granting
               of an appeal, the Court is of the opinion there is no reversible error
               in the judgment complained of. Accordingly, the Court refuses the
               petition for appeal.

       On October 7, 2022, pursuant to Rule 1:1A, counsel for Doe attempted to file her request

for attorney fees she incurred in responding to Sidar’s appeal. The Clerk of the Fairfax Circuit

Court would not accept the filing because the clerk’s office had not received the Supreme Court

order refusing the petition for appeal. The circuit court clerk told counsel that the fee application

could not be filed until the Supreme Court returned the case to the circuit court. The clerk’s

office received a copy of the September 9 order on October 24, 2022. Doe then filed the fee

application in the circuit court on November 10, 2022.

       Sidar asserted that Doe’s application was not timely filed because it was filed more than

30 days after the September 9, 2022 order refusing the petition. The circuit court agreed with

Doe that she could not have filed her request for attorney fees until after the Supreme Court

       1
          The facts are recited “in the ‘light most favorable’ to [Doe], the prevailing party in the
trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)).
       2
         The torts were of a sexual nature, which justifies the “Jane Doe” designation. See Code
§ 8.01-15.1.
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considered any rehearing petition, entered a final order, and returned jurisdiction to the circuit

court on October 24, 2022. Consequently, the court concluded that Doe’s November 10, 2022

application was timely under Rule 1:1A. The court awarded Doe $35,000 in attorney fees. This

appeal follows.

                                              ANALYSIS

       The issue before this Court requires us to interpret Rule 1:1A. Because we must “address

questions of jurisdiction and . . . interpretation of the Rules of Court,” our resolution of the issue

“turns on questions of law subject to de novo review.” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App.

250, 259 (2021); see Amin v. County of Henrico, 286 Va. 231, 235 (2013) (“A lower court’s

interpretation of the Rules of [the Supreme] Court, like its interpretation of a statute, presents a

question of law that we review de novo.” (quoting LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465,

469-70 (2012))).

       Rule 1:1A provides:

                   (a) Notwithstanding any provision of Rule 1:1, in any civil
                   action appealed to an appellate court that results in a final
                   appellate judgment favorable to an appellee, a prevailing
                   appellee who has recovered attorney fees, costs or both in the
                   circuit court pursuant to a contract, statute or other applicable
                   law may make application in the circuit court in which
                   judgment was entered for attorney fees, costs or both incurred
                   on appeal. The application must be filed within 30 days after
                   the entry of a final appellate judgment and may be made in the
                   same case from which the appeal was taken, which case will be
                   reinstated on the circuit court docket upon the filing of the
                   application. The appellee is not required to file a separate suit
                   or action to recover the fees and costs incurred on appeal, and
                   the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction of the case for the
                   purpose of adjudicating the application. The circuit court’s
                   order granting or refusing the application, in whole or in part,
                   is a final order for purposes of Rule 1:1. The phrase “final
                   appellate judgment” as used in this rule means the issuance of
                   the mandate by the appellate court or, in cases in which no

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                   mandate issues, the final judgment or order of the appellate
                   court disposing of the matter.

(Emphases added).

                   (b) Nothing in this Rule restricts or prohibits the exercise of
                   any other right or remedy for the recovery of attorney fees or
                   costs, by separate suit or action, or otherwise.

       In conducting de novo review “[w]e apply the plain meaning of the language appearing in

the [rule] unless it is ambiguous or applying the plain language leads to an absurd result.”

Northcraft v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 593 (2023) (quoting Baldwin v. Commonwealth,

69 Va. App. 75, 82 (2018)). Language is ambiguous if it is “difficult to comprehend” or is

unclear. Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375, 381 (2014) (quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va.

220, 227 n.8 (2006)).

       As pertinent to this case, Rule 1:1A was amended effective January 1, 2022, in

conjunction with the change in this Court’s jurisdiction over civil cases. The prior version of the

rule stated that a party who had prevailed in any civil action in a circuit court that was appealed

to the Supreme Court could request attorney fees incurred in responding to the appeal within 30

days of the Supreme Court’s denial of the petition and any petition for rehearing, whichever was

later. The amendment removed the specific reference to the Supreme Court and stated the

application had to be filed within 30 days of “the entry of the final appellate judgment.” The

amended rule defined “final appellate judgment” as “the issuance of the mandate by the appellate

court or, in cases in which no mandate issues, the final judgment or order of the appellate court

disposing of the matter.”

       As amended, the rule plainly contemplates that in some cases, an appellate court will

issue a final order without an accompanying mandate. The rule does not define “final judgment

or order” or “mandate,” but those terms have been defined elsewhere. A “final order” is one that

“disposes of the entire action and leaves nothing to be done except the ministerial
                                                -4-
superintendence of execution of the judgment.” Kosko v. Ramser, 299 Va. 684, 687 (2021)

(quoting Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 560 (2002)). See Mills v.

Mills, 77 Va. App. 543, 567 (2023) (holding that a Supreme Court order denying a petition for

appeal was a “final appellate judgment” under Rule 1:1A because “it disposed of the entire

matter”).3 In contrast, a mandate is “[a]n order from an appellate court directing a lower court to

take a specified action.” Mandate, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

       In this case, the Supreme Court’s September 9, 2022 order denying Sidar’s petition for

appeal was the final appellate judgment because it disposed of the matter. Sending the

September 9 order to the circuit court and returning the case on October 24, 2022 was merely a

“ministerial superintendence of execution of the judgment.” Kosko, 299 Va. at 687. The

Supreme Court did not issue a mandate on October 24, 2022. Therefore, Doe’s November 10,

2022 application under Rule 1:1A was untimely, and the circuit court erred in awarding her fees

under Rule 1:1A.4

       3
          In Mills, the trial court awarded attorney fees to the husband for expenses incurred
defending against the wife’s unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 77 Va. App.
at 566. Rejecting the wife’s argument that there was no final appellate judgment, this Court held
that the husband’s application for attorney fees was timely filed within 30 days of the entry of
the order denying the wife’s appeal. Id. at 567.
       4
          Sidar also argues that the circuit court had no inherent authority to award attorney fees.
The stated basis in Doe’s application for attorney fees was Rule 1:1A(a), but the circuit court
found that she also was entitled to fees under “Rule 1:1A(b) and the inherent power of th[e]
court.” However, construing subpart (b) as providing an independent basis for awarding attorney
fees, even though a fee application was not timely filed, would lead to an absurd result, making
the 30-day filing requirement in subpart (a) superfluous. Subpart (b) makes clear that nothing in
the rule “restricts or prohibits the exercise of any other right or remedy for the recovery of
attorney fees,” such as “by separate suit or action.” But Doe did not seek attorney fees by
separate suit or action. A motion for the recovery of attorney fees under the mechanism
provided in subpart (a) must comply with the procedural requirements of that subpart, including
the 30-day requirement. Thus, the circuit court erred in awarding fees under Rule 1:1A(b).
        Sidar argues that even if the application was timely filed, Doe was not entitled to attorney
fees under Rule 1:1A because he committed no sanctionable conduct on appeal and there was no
other basis to award attorney fees to her. Because we hold that the fee application was not
timely filed, we do not address his alternative argument. See Calway v. City of Chesapeake, 79
                                                  -5-
        Further, the circuit court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the case until it

was returned to the clerk’s office. Rule 1:1B(a)(1) states that after a notice of appeal is filed,

“the circuit court retains concurrent jurisdiction for the purposes specified in this Rule, including

acting upon any of the matters set forth in subparts (a)(3)(A)-(H) of this Rule.” (Emphasis

added). Subpart (a)(3)(H) then explicitly permits a circuit court to “tak[e] any other action

authorized by statute or Rule of Court . . . which actions include . . . those authorized by . . .

Rule[] 1:1A . . . so long as the party requesting the action complies with the applicable time

limitation in the . . . Rule authorizing such action.” Rule 1:1B(a)(3)(H) (emphasis added). Thus,

the circuit court retained limited concurrent jurisdiction over this case to act under Rule 1:1A, if

the application for attorney fees was filed within the 30-day time limitation, regardless of

whether the Supreme Court had “returned” the case to the circuit court.5

        This Court recognizes that the circuit court clerk’s error in not allowing Doe to file her

application for fees on October 7, 2022 created a substantial hardship for Doe. The unfortunate

circumstances, however, do not entitle her to relief in this Court. See generally Shankle v. Spahr,

121 Va. 598, 610 (1917) (“Our province is not to make law, but to administer it, and we must,

therefore, decide this case according to the settled law as it is written, and not permit a hard case

to make bad law.”).

        Finally, citing Rules 1:1A and 5:20(g), Doe requests attorney fees. In this instance, the

appellee has not prevailed on appeal and we deny the request.

Va. App. 220, 230-31 (2023) (stating that an appellate court should decide cases “on the best and
narrowest grounds available” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))).
        5
          See Schneider v. Brant, No. 0396-22-4 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2022) (per curiam) (stating
that the appellee did not need to specifically request his case be remanded to the trial court to
determine fees and costs under Rule 1:1A because the trial court had “continuing jurisdiction of
the case for the purpose of adjudicating” an application for attorney fees). See Rule 5A:1(f)
(stating that unpublished cases may be cited as informative but are not considered as binding
authority).
                                                 -6-
                                          CONCLUSION

       The circuit court erred in finding that Doe’s application for attorney fees was timely filed

in accordance with Rule 1:1A.

                                                           Reversed, vacated, and final judgment.

                                               -7-