Court Opinion

ID: 9449306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:04:52.66754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:22.956186
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    YVONNE STONE,1                           §
                                             § No. 483, 2022
          Petitioner Below,                  §
          Appellant,                         § Court Below–Family Court
                                             § of the State of Delaware
          v.                                 §
                                             § File No. CK19-01031
    CALVIN SMITH,                            § Petition No. 22-10207
                                             §
          Respondent Below,                  §
          Appellee.                          §

                               Submitted: May 26, 2023
                               Decided:   August 3, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

                                           ORDER

         After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the record on appeal,

it appears to the Court that:

         (1)    The appellant, Yvonne Stone (“the Mother”), filed this appeal from a

December 1, 2022 Family Court order denying the Mother’s motion for

reconsideration of the Family Court’s order that granted the appellee’s motion to

dismiss the Mother’s petition for custody modification. For the following reasons,

we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.

1
    The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
         (2)     The Mother and the appellee, Calvin Smith (“the Father”), are the

parents of two minor children (“the Children”). The record reflects that, beginning

in early 2019, the parties engaged in an acrimonious custody battle, with the Mother

repeatedly complaining to the court and State agencies that the Father was abusing

the Children.2 The Family Court held a trial on the parties’ multiple cross-petitions

for custody and findings of contempt over three days—December 15, 2020, March

25, 2021, and April 9, 2021. Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a final

custody order on June 29, 2021 (“the Custody Order”). Among other things, the

Custody Order: (i) awarded primary residential placement of the Children to the

Father and established a visitation schedule for the Mother; (ii) dismissed the

Mother’s two petitions for findings of contempt; and (iii) found that the Mother had

previously been in contempt of the court’s orders on three occasions when she failed

to return the Children to the Father for scheduled visitation. The Mother did not

appeal the Custody Order.

         (3)     On May 10, 2022, the Mother filed a petition for modification of the

Custody Order, seeking joint custody and primary placement of the Children. The

Mother also moved for interim relief, seeking increased visitation with the Children

pending the outcome of her motion for custody modification. Because the motion

2
    Notably, none of these claims were substantiated.

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for interim relief had not been properly served on the Father, the Family Court denied

it without prejudice. On September 23, 2022, the Mother filed a motion for an

emergency ex parte order, alleging that the Father had relocated and was refusing to

let her visit with the Children. Also on September 23, 2022, the Mother renewed

her motion for interim relief, claiming that the Father was attempting to alienate the

Children from the Mother and seeking sole custody and primary placement of the

Children. The Family Court denied the motion for emergency relief, finding that the

allegations did not warrant immediate relief.

      (4)    The Father moved to dismiss the Mother’s petitions for custody

modification and interim relief, citing insufficiency of process and the Mother’s

failure to state a claim under the heightened standard required under 13 Del. C. §

729(c)(1) for a petition for custody modification filed within two years of a Family

Court custody order entered after a full hearing on the merits. While the Father’s

motion to dismiss was pending, the Mother filed another motion for an emergency

ex parte order, asking the court to grant her immediate weekend overnight visitation

and extra communication with the Children during the week and to find the Father

in contempt of court. The Mother also filed a motion to reopen the Custody Order,

claiming that it should be set aside because she had been unable to attend the final

two days of the custody hearing. The Father objected to the motion to reopen,

pointing out that the Mother had failed to advise the Family Court that she could not

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participate in the final days of the custody hearing, despite her obvious familiarity

with Family Court litigation procedure, and arguing that the Mother had filed the

motion to reopen to circumvent the heightened standard she was required to meet

under Section 729(c)(1).

         (5)     On October 26, 2022, the Family Court denied the Mother’s motion for

an emergency ex parte order and directed the parties to comply with the visitation

terms of the Custody Order. On November 15, 2022, the Family Court granted the

Father’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the motion was unopposed and that

the Mother had failed to plead that enforcement of the Custody Order would

endanger the Children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional

development as required by Section 729(c)(1).3 Finally, on November 21, 2022, the

Family Court denied as untimely the Mother’s motion to reopen the Custody Order.

         (6)     On November 28, 2022, the Mother filed a motion to reargue the

Family Court’s November 15, 2022 order because the Family Court had concluded

that the Father’s motion to dismiss was unopposed, but the Mother had, in fact,

responded to and opposed the motion. After conducting an initial review of the filing

as required by 10 Del. C. § 8803, the Family Court ordered that the filing be

3
    This order also disposed of the Mother’s renewed motion for interim relief.

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dismissed as legally frivolous. Although the order purportedly rejected the filing, it

also noted that the motion for reargument was denied. This appeal followed.

          (7)   This Court’s review of a Family Court decision includes a review of

both the law and the facts.4 Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.5 If the law

was correctly applied, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion.6 We review

a trial court’s denial of a motion for reargument for abuse of discretion.7

          (8)   On appeal, the Mother argues that the Family Court improperly

dismissed her filing as legally frivolous and that the Family Court erred when it

granted the Father’s motion to dismiss because, she claims, the Custody Order was

not entered after a full hearing on the merits. The Mother also alleges that she was

deprived of the opportunity to participate in the custody hearing and that the Family

Court judge who rejected her motion for reargument is biased against her. The

Mother’s arguments are unavailing.

          (9)   As a preliminary matter, the Mother has waived any arguments relating

to the proceedings that led to the entry of the Custody Order because she failed to

appeal that order. Second, although we agree with the Mother that the Family Court

4
    Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006).
5
    Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Del. 2012).
6
    Id.
7
    Maddox v. Isaacs, 2013 WL 4858989, at *1 (Del. Sept. 10, 2013).

                                                5
should not have rejected her filing as legally frivolous because she raised a legitimate

objection to the Family Court’s finding that the Father’s motion to dismiss was

unopposed, we nevertheless affirm the Family Court’s denial of the Mother’s motion

for reargument on the independent and alternative basis that the Family Court did

not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.8 Contrary to the Mother’s argument

on appeal, the fact that the Mother declined to participate in the final two days of the

hearing without notifying the court does not mean that she was deprived the

opportunity to participate in the hearing.9 The Custody Order was therefore “entered

by the [Family] Court after a full hearing on the merits,” and the Mother was required

to plead in her petition for custody modification that continuing enforcement of the

Custody Order “may endanger the [Children’s] physical health or significantly

impair [their] emotional development.”10 She did not do so. Accordingly, the

Family Court properly granted the Father’s motion to dismiss, and the Family Court

did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Mother’s motion for reargument,

which did not set forth any valid reason to set aside the Family Court’s order granting

8
  See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that
this Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment on the basis of a different rationale than that
articulated by the trial court).
9
    We observe that the Mother does not deny that she was aware of the dates of the custody hearing.
10
     13 Del. C. § 729(c).

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the motion to dismiss.11 Finally, we have carefully reviewed the record and find that

it is devoid of any evidence that the Family Court judge harbors any bias against the

Mother.12

       NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court be AFFIRMED.

                                               BY THE COURT:

                                               /s/ Karen L. Valihura
                                               Justice

11
  See Dickens v. Coupe, 2019 WL 1220717, at *2 (Del. Mar. 13, 2019) (noting that the proper
purpose of a motion for reargument is to ask the trial court to reconsider whether it overlooked an
applicable legal principle or misapprehended the law or the facts).
12
   See Beck v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Del. 2001) (noting that judges need not recuse
themselves based on allegations of personal bias for or against a party; the alleged bias or prejudice
must be based on information that the trial judge acquired from an extra-judicial source).

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