Court Opinion

ID: 9492454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:41:33.477323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:18.770014
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the majority opinion in all other respects, I disagree with *969Judge Kravitch’s interpretation of the term “for pecuniary gain” as it is used in connection with Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2. For that reason, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the five level increase in the sentence.
Judge Kraviteh and I agree that “distribution,” for purposes of § 2G2.2, means distribution for pecuniary gain. We believe that meaning to be clear from the text of Application Note 1, which states that “ ‘distribution’ includes any act related to distribution for pecuniary gain.... ” But, Judge Kraviteh then concludes that the requirement that the distribution be “for pecuniary gain” is satisfied so long as the offender in question receives something that has monetary value in exchange. Here, we part company. I believe that the phrase “for pecuniary gain” applies when the offender in question has acted to acquire something with monetary value because of that value — put another way, when the offender’s actions are motivated, at least in substantial part, by a desire for profit.
Thus, while I agree with Judge Kraviteh and the Seventh Circuit in Black that distribution for pecuniary gain can include a variety of acts, such as barters, swaps, and trades, I believe that in order to qualify for the enhancement, those acts must be motivated by a desire for economic benefit. In contrast, Judge Kraviteh would find that “[a] person who delivers pornography in order to receive other pornography that has economic value acts for ‘pecuniary gain’ and therefore engages in ‘distribution’ for purposes of Section 2G2.2(b)(2).” Thus, Judge Kravitch’s interpretation of the Guidelines would in essence read the word “for” out of the Application Note.
Webster’s Neiv World Dictionary defines “for” as: “with the aim or purpose of ...; in order to ... get, have, keep, etc., because of.... ” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College Edition (3d ed.1988). The plain meaning of the Note, therefore, is that to act for pecuniary gain is to act in order to obtain pecuniary gain-that, simply put, pecuniary gain must be the motive for the act. A person who exchanges pornography for more pornography may be acting for pecuniary gain, but he may also be acting out of an entirely different motivation wholly unrelated to a desire for profit — specifically, he may be acting out of a desire for personal pleasure or gratification. To me, acting for the latter purpose is not acting “for pecuniary gain,” even though pecuniary gain may be an incidental benefit of the transaction.1
In my view, the profit (or economic benefit) motive is an essential element of an act for pecuniary gain, for two reasons — in addition to the fact that such is the plain meaning of the Application Note. First, any other reading would mean that any one in possession of child pornography who trades pictures with acquaintances for mutual satisfaction or gratification would automatically qualify for the same five level enhancement that would be received by commercial venturers who sell child pornography for money, or who, in hopes of escaping detection or prosecution, exchange or barter pornographic materials for other items that have a significant economic value. Second, to construe distribution as applying to transactions that are motivated by considerations unrelated to economic benefit would leave nothing to be covered by the base offense level other than the acts of the rare individuals who on occasion make gifts of pornographic pictures to similarly-inclined acquaintances, without any hope or expectation that those acquaintances will return the favor — a very small class indeed.
The Chairman of the Sentencing Commission has confirmed that the five level enhancement was intended to include only *970for-profit distribution. As Judge Kravitch notes in her opinion, Chairman Wilkins stated that sentences under § 2G2.2 were “further increased by at least five levels if the offense involved for-profit distribution.” 137 Cong. Rec. H6736-02, H6737 (1991) (letter of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Judge Nelson’s special concurrence, a comparison of the sentencing guidelines concerning child pornography with those concerning other forms of pornography, i.e. “obscenity,” demonstrates clearly that in both categories of cases the Sentencing Commission’s intention in imposing a five level increase was simply to have that increase apply whenever the distribution of the material was “for pecuniary profit.” A reading of the two relevant sections should make that clear. Moreover, while Judge Nelson’s “logical” justification for his position — namely, that the Commission intended to give heavier sentences to those who engage in offenses involving child pornography — accurately describes the Commission’s desires, it does not in any way support Judge Nelson’s position. The Commission’s intent to punish child pornography more severely is manifested by its establishment of a higher base level of punishment for that offense. In fact, the Commission established a far higher base level for trafficking in child pornography than for trafficking in obscene material not involving children (15 for trafficking in child pornography; and 10 for importing, mailing or transporting obscene matter). The Commission therefore had no cause to, and did not, create nice distinctions regarding the use of the term “distribution” in its child pornography and obscenity guidelines in order to provide for heavier penalties for child pornography. Instead, having already recognized the difference in the seriousness of the two offenses by imposing different base level sentences, the Commission then provided that the punishment for each type of offense (both more serious and less serious) would be increased by five levels whenever any of the crimes were committed for pecuniary gain. In short, under the Sentencing Guidelines, those who engage in distribution of child pornography, whether for pecuniary gain or not, do in fact receive heavier sentences than those who engage in the trafficking of obscenity under similar circumstances. As a result, Judge Nelson’s argument that interpreting § 2G2.2(b)(2) to require pecuniary gain “negates a clear choice to give heavier sentences to those who engage in child pornography offenses” is plainly not correct.
Finally, Judge Nelson’s suggestion that § 2G2.2’s base offense level is intended to deal simply with “receipt” is inconsistent not only with the Commission’s specification of the acts covered by that section— namely, “Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or Advertising Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to Traffic” — but with the related Guidelines sections such as § 2G2.4, which only two sub-sections later establishes a lower base level for possession of the same materials. Because possession, as described in § 2G2.4 includes subcategories such as possession of ten or more books, magazines or periodicals, it is clear that in most instances, possession will involve the prior receipt of the child pornography by the defendant. The purpose of Section 2G2.2 is to deal with (and punish more severely) persons engaged in more than simple possession (including prior receipt) — specifically, it is intended to levy the appropriate punishment on persons who engage in “trafficking” — a far more pernicious activity. Once that concept is understood, it follows inevitably that the five level increase is intended to apply to people who traffic for pecuniary gain.
The business of child pornography feeds off of the victimization of children. I believe that the Sentencing Commission intended to distinguish (and punish with *971particular severity) those who make a profit out of the exploitation of children from those who are essentially consumers; who simply exchange pornography with other consumers; who, for reasons that most of us have enormous difficulty fathoming (but are certainly non-pecuniary), derive personal pleasure and gratification from viewing the illicit materials. All of the evidence shows that Laney falls into the latter category. For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s five level enhancement under § 2G2.2.

. Thus, while Judge Kraviteh and I would agree that the five level enhancement applies to someone who trades one set of pornographic images for another for the purpose of obtaining some economic benefit, she would also hold that the five level enhancement applies to a person who makes the same trade solely for the purpose of his own personal gratification and regardless of any incidental economic benefit that may accrue.