Court Opinion

ID: 9448105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:23:32.83403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:17.780216
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority’s view that "the net result of plaintiff’s referred to testimony [relating to his drinking habits] was harmful to his cause”. I disagree, however, with the majority’s view that the extensive examination of plaintiff with respect to his rather extraordinary drinking habits which portrayed him as a “heavy” drinker was not such prejudicial error as to require a new trial.
It is settled in New Jersey that, while evidence of a car operator’s intoxication at the time of the accident is admissible as “proper evidence of negligence”,1 evidence as to his being a heavy drinker, or of his prior intoxication, is irrelevant and must be excluded. Shelly v. Brunswick Traction Co., Ct.Err. & App.1901, 65 N.J.L. 639, 48 A. 562, 563. It was there said:
“To prove that the plaintiff was intoxicated on previous occasions, or, * * * was addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, would not prove that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and to show that on previous occasions of intoxication he was in a helpless condition would not tend to show that on the occasion in question he was intoxicated to such a degree as to be helpless.”
In the instant case there was not an iota of evidence that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the happening of the accident and the trial judge committed reversible prejudicial error when he permitted introduction of evidence as to the plaintiff’s drinking habits.
I vigorously disagree with the majority’s view that the evidence of prior drinking was admissible because it bore on the question as to plaintiff’s “credibility” with respect to his testimony as to how the accident happened.
The general rule is contra to the majority’s view and while research has failed to disclose its specific application in New Jersey, I believe that the courts of that state would subscribe to it.
The general rule was stated as follows in McQuage v. City of New York, 1954, 285 App.Div. 249, 253, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111, 116:
“ * * * The obvious purpose of the testimony was not to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff but to show that he had been intoxicated on other occasions and thus permit the jury to draw the inference that he was intoxicated at the time of the happening of the accident. Proof of intoxication on occasions prior to the *605accident was not admissible to prove or suggest that plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The authorities relied upon by the defendant relate to proof of intoxication at the time of the event. It has been said upon the general subject of testimonial impeachment that ‘a general habit of intemperance tells us nothing of the witness’ testimonial incapacity except as it indicates actual intoxication at the time of the event observed or the time of testifying; and hence, since in its bearing upon moral character it does not involve the veracity-trait * * it will ususally not be admissible.’ (3 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) § 933, p. 481).” (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the majority concedes that the mooted evidence was prejudicial to the plaintiff, and as I view it, its admission was clear error, the judgment below should be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.

. Roether v. Pearson, App.Div.1955, 36 N.J.Super. 465, 116 A.2d 529, 531.