Court Opinion

ID: 9712523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:55:28.146402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.717409
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I concur but feel constrained to address myself to appellant’s argument that Children’s Services thwarted her effort to perform parental duties during the requisite six month period. See 1 P.S. § 311(1) (current version at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)). The lead opinion notes that appellant did seek to visit her son one time during that period, but that she was refused visitation because of her failure to follow through with counselling.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that parental rights are not necessarily terminated even where there was no direct contact between parent and child for the statutory six month period. Such failure was excused where the parent exhibited persistence in the face of obstacles to that contact.
In In re Adoption of J. A. B., 487 Pa. 79, 408 A.2d 1363 (1979), the mother testified that she sought to visit her son many times, but the social services agency thwarted her overtures. The parents argued that their failure to perform parental duties resulted directly from the intransigience of the agency. The Supreme Court excused the period of no contact:
The evidence in this case establishes that the agency discouraged the parents from maintaining contact with J. by averting their inquiries and advising them to wait until their other problems were under control before attempting to re-establish their relationship with him. It is apparent from the record that the agency viewed J. as the family’s troublemaker and scapegoat and had determined *101it was in the best interests of both family and child that he not be returned.
Id., 487 Pa. at 90, 408 A.2d at 1368.
The Supreme Court in Adoption of J.A.B. applied a “totality of the circumstances” test in reversing a lower court decree terminating parental rights:
The court’s finding of an absence of direct contact between J. and his parents for a period in excess of six months is not disputed. However, this fact alone will not support a determination of failure to perform parental duties where the totality of the circumstances, including evidence of the parents’ individual circumstances and any explanation offered by them, does not warrant termination of their rights.
Id., 487 Pa. at 89, 408 A.2d at 1368.
Similarly, in In re D. J. Y., 487 Pa. 125, 408 A.2d 1387 (1979), the natural mother of D. J. Y. attempted to contact her son but was thwarted in that attempt by the natural father and paternal grandparents. Again, although the orphans’ court found the requisite six month period, it excused the mother’s lack of contact, declined to terminate her parental rights, and dismissed the grandparents’ petition to adopt their grandson. The Supreme Court cited In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 625, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (1977), in excusing the mother’s failure to contact D. J. Y.:
“the question whether a parent has failed or refused to perform parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the case. A finding of abandonment, . . . will not be predicated upon parental conduct which is reasonably explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the parent’s control. It may only result when a parent has failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship.” (citations omitted)
Id., 487 Pa. at 130-131, 408 A.2d at 1390.
In Adoption of S.H., 476 Pa. 608, 383 A.2d 529 (1978), the orphans’ court found that under a “totality of the circumstances” test the father’s failure to contact his child was *102excused because despite his persistence he had been thwarted by his former wife, her new husband and her mother:
The father’s extended attempts to locate his son after his wife left him, to persuade the mother to permit visitation, to send letters and gifts from prison to his son, to arrange for visitation through his new fiancee . . . demonstrate the “reasonable firmness ‘in declining to yield to obstacles . . .’” which will preserve parental rights. Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. [210] at 216, 331 A.2d [652] at 655.
Id., 476 Pa. at 615, 383 A.2d at 533.
It is clear from the preceding authority that to safeguard his or her parental rights, a parent may not acquiesce in obstructive behavior by either the social service agency or the custodial parent. He or she must exhibit “reasonable firmness” in refusing to yield to such obstacles. Accord In re M.A.K., 489 Pa. 597, 414 A.2d 1052 (1980).
As the lead opinion notes, appellant attempted only once during the six month period to visit her son. That request was denied because she had failed to comply with the requirements established for her by the social service agency. She did not persist in her effort to see her child and thus her behavior is distinguishable from the above cases where failure to contact the child for a period of six months was excused.
In the instant case, the agency fulfilled its responsibility in seeking to reunite mother and son; appellant decidedly did not. I therefore agree that the order of the lower court should be affirmed.