Court Opinion

ID: 9674627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:32:12.477379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.646609
License: Public Domain

HAWTHORNE, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority has reversed the conviction and sentence because of certain alleged errors considered prejudicial to the rights of the accused. I have serious doubt that these were errors, but even if they were, I do not think they were prejudicial to the accused so as to entitle him to a new trial.
Bill of Exception No. 2 dealing with the district attorney’s opening statement was found by the majority to have merit. Before discussing the so-called objectionable remarks, I should like to point out that the district attorney at the very beginning of this statement told the jui-y: “ * * * Before we proceed, I would like to point out and ask you to bear in mind that these opening statements are not evidence in the case. You are not to consider them as evidence, as fact; are not to consider them in deliberating and arriving at your verdict. The opening statements are not evidence. They do not prove a thing. * * * ”
The first portion of the statement objected to is: “Well, where was the defendant, Forrest White, on October 25 [the date of the offense] ? Gentlemen, I can tell you that October 25 was not a normal day in the life of Forrest K. White.” When objection was made, the district attorney continued: * * * I’m outlining for the jury what we expect to prove. We expect to prove that October 25 was not a normal day in the life of Forrest K. White, and take it from there, if the Court permits.” In overruling the objection the trial judge said, in effect, that he could not tell at the time the objection was made that the remark was not going to be connected with what the State intended to prove in the case. In his per curiam he tells us that when the objection was urged, he could not tell whether or not the State had evidence to support the statement, and that’no prejudice resulted to the accused because in the court’s opinion October 25 certainly was not a normal day in the life of the defendant from the standpoint of both the State and the defense.
One of the other remarks which the majority considers objectionable reads: “ * * * tYe expect to prove that he *611made this charge of homosexuality as a defense. We expect to prove that no normal person or no person with any intelligence would ever believe that a man in an airplane who couldn’t fly could possibly sell a defense of self defense that the pilot actually struck him first.” As I view this remark, it is merely anticipatory of the defense which was expected to be urged by the accused, and in fact was urged (see State v. Woods, 161 La. 863, 866, 109 So. 519), and the remark is nothing more than a statement that the facts adduced by the State would show on the trial that such a defense was unrealistic and unbelievable.
The per curiam of the trial judge says that the opening statement of the district attorney, considered in its entirety, was not in his opinion prejudicial to the defendant. With this I agree. It is settled in the jurisprudence of this court that a trial judge in his discretion has control of the scope and extent of the opening statement, and that a conviction will not be reversed for error therein unless the rights of the defendant are plainly violated. State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359; State v. Clark, 231 La. 807, 93 So.2d 13. This court has held on numerous occasions that even in the argument before the jury at the close of the trial, it is only in extreme cases that a verdict will be set aside on account of improper remarks made by the prosecuting officer. 2 Marr’s Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana (2d ed.1923), sec. 668, p. 1024, and cases cited thereunder.
Bills of Exception Nos. 8 and 14 are, in my opinion, also without merit. I do not think the accused was denied a fair trial or prejudiced in any way because the trial judge determined in chambers that the juror Wolf was disqualified, thereafter discharging him in open court and substituting the alternate juror Ayres in his place.1 Under the law of this state an accused does not have the right to select a particular juror but has only the right to reject an obnoxious juror. The alternate juror Ayres was accepted by the defense after voir dire examination and served as such from the start of the trial until seated as a regular juror, and no question was raised as to his qualifications. How, then, was the accused prejudiced?
A decision by the Supreme Court of California, People v. Abbott, 47 Cal.2d 362, 303 P.2d 730, is directly in point and is well reasoned. In that case after evidence had been adduced for some 11 days, the trial judge, becoming- concerned as to the qualifications of one of the regular jurors, requested an investigation by the sheriff. After receiving the sheriff’s re*613port the judge called counsel for both the defense and the prosecution into his chambers and discussed the juror’s qualifications on the basis of the sheriff’s report. He then sent for the juror and questioned him there in chambers, stating that there would be no cross-examination by counsel. Defense counsel protested, contending that the proceeding to disqualify the juror was not proper and that the examination of this juror should be conducted in open court. The judge, having concluded to discharge the juror, did so in open court in the presence of the jury and seated an alternate juror who had been selected and sworn at the beginning of the trial.2 In concluding that defendant’s motion for a mistrial under these circumstances had been properly overruled the Supreme Court of California said:
“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was good cause for discharging Rettig [the juror]. That determination, therefore, cannot now be disturbed. In re Devlin, 139 Cal.App.2d 810, 813, 294 P.2d 466; cf. People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 889-890, 256 P.2d 911; People v. Craig, 196 Cal. 19, 25, 235 P. 721. Moreover, there is no showing that Abbott [the accused] was prejudiced. He was not entitled to be tried by a jury composed of any particular individuals. People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 324-325, 295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385. The juror who was substituted for Rettig was examined fully by both sides on voir dire, accepted as a qualified alternate and served as such from the start of the trial until seated as a regular juror. There is no claim that he was unable to render a fair verdict. It was not error to conduct the proceedings in chambers in Abbott’s absence. No objection based on this ground was made until after Rettig was discharged in open court, but even if we assume that Abbott is now in a position to raise the point, it is settled that the presence of a defendant is required only where it has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. Snyder v. [Commonwealth of] Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674; People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 893-894, 186 P.2d 405. The absence of Abbott during the proceeding in chambers could not have affected his right to a fair trial. The cases upon which he relies are readily distinguishable because they involved the original selection of a jury in such a manner that jurors unacceptable to the defendant either participated in the trial or may have done so. Lewis v. U. S., 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011; Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262.”
*615I see no merit in Bill No. 9, for in my view the trial judge in his discretion properly denied defendant’s request for a further inspection of the airplane by the jury. Out of the presence of the jury, which had been withdrawn, he stated:
“Gentlemen, the Court feels this way about it. The Court granted an inspection of the plane to the members of the jury without the taking of any testimony at the scene, specifically restricting that there be no testimony taken at the scene, solely for the purpose of letting the jury, prior to the testimony of Mr. Odom and prior to the testimony of Mr. White, see the plane itself and the size of the plane and the manner in which the seats were arranged, and the jury inspected the plane. The Court does not believe that any demonstrations at the scene of the plane or any questions at the scene of the plane would help the jury in determining the questions of fact that have been testified hereto. The Court believes they are familiar enough with the plane, having examined it, to consider the evidence of all the witnesses in relation to it.”
That' portion of the general charge to which objection was made, which forms the basis of Bill No. 13, and which was found by the majority to be “unwise”, reads:
“The law provides that the use of force or violence upon the person of another, is justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person’s lawful possession; provided, that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense. Under this rule, the use of an unreasonable amount of force or violence to protect one’s person or property would not be justifiable, and the test is what an ordinary person would deem to be a reasonable use of force or violence and what would appear to be necessary, rather than actual necessity, under the circumstances, to prevent the offense against one’s person or property.
“In this connection, you are to consider all of the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the accused at the time of the alleged aggravated battery, and determine from those circumstances and at that time what would appear to an ordinary person to be a reasonable use of force or violence to prevent an offense against him. To further illustrate this rule — if it appeared to an adult that a small child was about to slap the adult with an open hand, it would ■not be reasonable or apparently necessary for the adult to maim or kill to prevent such offense. If the evidence establishes the use of any force or violence in this case and if justification is claimed as a defense under the law given above, it will be your province to determine if the force or violence was used for the purpose of prevent*617ing a forcible offense against a person or property, and to determine if the force or violence so used was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense.”
I see nothing erroneous or prejudicial in this charge.
The trial judge overruled .a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and Bill No. 15 was reserved. The judge says in his per curiam that the newly discovered evidence was cumulative in character, was merely corroborative of testimony which was intended to impeach the credibility of the prosecuting witness, and could have been discovered before or during the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence (in fact it came to light the day after the verdict of guilty was rendered). Under the circumstances I think he properly refused a new trial under R.S. 15:511.
I respectfully dissent.

. Where a juror states his doubt as to his ability to perforin his duty justly, good cause for dismissal exists. People v. Taylor, 11 Cal.Rptr. 480, 189 Cal.App.2d 490 (1961).

. The pertinent portion of the statute of California dealing with alternate jurors is the same in substance as ours.