Court Opinion

ID: 9528302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:39:34.798654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:39.150530
License: Public Domain

On Petitions For Rehearing
White, J.
All appellees have filed petitions for rehearing and the broad thrust of all is that appellee Freyn Brothers’ Instruction No. II1 correctly states the law notwithstanding *116its apparent conflict with the statute published as Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 20-304 and quoted, in part, in appellant’s Instruction No. 16.2 In our original opinion we stated that “[a]ppellees have cited no authority and made no express argument that this apparent statutory duty [as quoted from the statute by appellant’s instruction] is illusory and applies only to ‘shafts, openings, wells,’ etc., which are not obvious to or discoverable by a person of plaintiff’s age and experience using reasonable care for his own safety.” Appellee Freyn Brothers, Inc., has now, for the first time, in its petition for rehearing, attempted to show that the statute makes no change in the common law duty of owners, contractors, etc. The petition charges that our opinion contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court as stated in Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ropp, 190 Ind. 115, 129 N. E. 475 (1921), and Emerson Brantingham Co. v. Growe, 191 Ind. 564, 133 N. E. 919 (1922). But appellee has misread these cases as holding that “Burns § 20-304 does nothing more than declare the common law”. Each of those cases was concerned merely with the last clause of the statute, which provides “and, generally it shall be the duty of all owners, . . . [etc.] to use every device, care, and precaution . . . .” This, indeed, is a general statutory provision of which Cleveland, etc. v. Ropp, supra, rightly said (190 Ind. at 121) :
“These instructions are erroneous, because they exact more than ordinary care. They are copies of the language in the latter part of § 4, Acts 1911, p. 597 (§ 3862a et seq. Burns 1914), as follows:
*117‘And, generally, it shall be the duty of all owners, managers, operators, contractors, sub-contractors, and all other persons having charge of, or responsible for, any work, mechanism, machinery, appliance, building, factory, plants, means, employment, or business of whatsoever nature, involving risk or danger to employes, or to the public, to use every device, care and precaution which it is practicable and possible to use for the protection and safety of life, limb and health, limited only by the necessity for preserving the reasonable efficiency of such structure, ways, work, plant, building, factory, elevator, cars, engines, machinery, appliances, apparatus, or other devices or materials, without regard to additional cost of suitable materials or safety appliances, or safe conditions, or operations, the first concern being safety to life, limb and health.’
“Statutes which are general in their terms do no more than declare the common law. Monteith v. Kokomo Wood, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149, 151, 64 N. E. 610, 58 L. R. A. 944; Benkowski v. Sanders & Egbert Co. (1915), 60 Ind. App. 374, 380, 109 N. E. 924. This is but another way of saying that the language quoted from the above statute has no effect at all in determining liability.” (Emphasis added.)
As had already been pointed out in Benkowski v. Sanders & Egbert Co., cited in the above quotation (60 Ind. App. at 380):
“There are other provisions of the act of 1911, supra, which impose specific duties on persons engaged in the construction of buildings, to provide specified kinds of flooring, staging, scaffolding, and protections for the workers engaged in such work, but the portion of § 4 quoted, which purports to apply to persons other than those engaged in the construction of buildings, imposes merely general duties, and not specific duties. Where a statute lays a specific duty on an employer, violation on his part of such specific duty is negligence. Suelzer v. Carpenter (1915), 183 Ind. 23, 107 N. E. 467; Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 413, 420, 73 N. E. 899; Monteith v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149, 152, 64 N. E. 610, 58 L.R.A. 944. Where merely general duties are imposed, a somewhat different rule is applied. Monteith v. Kokomo, etc., Co., supra. 151.”
This holding was approved and followed by the Indiana *118Supreme Court in Kawneer Mfg. Co. v. Kalter, 187 Ind. 99, 104, 118 N. E. 561 (1918), as follows:
“Section 1 of the act approved March 6, 1911, supra, § 3862a Burns 1914), provides: ‘That every employer, or person, managing or conducting any business, or work, or plant in the State of Indiana, of the character mentioned in this act, is, for the purposes of this act, conducting a dangerous occupation at the time of such occurrence, and subject to the provisions of this act.’ And § 4 of the same act makes it ‘the duty of all owners, contractors, sub-contractors, corporations, agents, or persons whatsoever, engaged in the * * * construction, erection, repair, alteration * * * of any building * * * to see and to require * * * that all scaffolding, staging * * * and all contrivances used are amply, adequately and properly constructed, to bear all weights and adapted to and perform the services and meet the requirements for which they are designed or used, with safety * * *,’ and for a failure to do these things § 5, supra (§ 3862e Burns 1914), provides a penalty.
* * *
“Assuming that the jury found that appellant was the ‘employer’ or ‘contractor’ conducting* the work of erecting and altering the store front, then, under the statute, it was ‘conducting a dangerous occupation.’ It was by statute charged with a specific duty to see that all scaffolding was carefully selected, inspected and tested, so as to detect any defects, and to see that it was adequate and properly constructed to ‘perform the service and meet the requirements’ for which it was designed or used with safety. The complaint alleges that the scaffold on which appellee was working at the time of the accident was not adequate and was not properly constructed, and there is evidence to support this allegation. (Emphasis added.)
“True, as appellant claims, the act of March 6, 1911, supra, does not in so many words authorize the bringing of a civil action for damages on account of its violation, but under the allegations of the complaint this case proceeded to trial and judgment on the theory that appellee’s injuries resulted from the negligence of appellant, his employer, by reason of the construction of a defective and unsafe scaffold, due to appellant’s negligence, fault and omission of duty, as specifically set forth in the complaint, which also shows a violation of a duty imposed on appellant by § 4 of the act, supra. It has been held that ‘where *119a statute lays a specific duty on an employer, violation on Ms part of such specific duty is negligence.’ Benkowski v. Sanders, etc., Co. (1915), 60 Ind. App. 374, 380, 109 N. E. 924, 926, and cases cited.” (Emphasis added.)
Kawneer (last above cited and quoted) was decided three years prior to the decision in Cleveland, etc., v. Ropp, supra, on which appellee mistakenly relies as holding that Burns § 20-304 (the statute involved in all these cases, which is also § 5 of the Act of March 6, 1911, ch. 236, p. 597, the “Dangerous Employment Act”) does nothing more than declare the common law. Both opinions cited and relied on Benkoioski, but Cleveland did not mention Kawneer, probably because Kawneer has so little to say about the general provisions of the statute, being concerned only with the specific duties imposed by the statute.
One of the specific duties imposed by Burns § 20-304 (Acts 1911, ch. 236, § 4, p. 597) is the requirement that electrical wires be insulated. In Linn Grove, etc., Power Co. v. Fenning, 86 Ind. App. 170, 172, 154 N. E. 877 (1927), we said:
“Appellee’s complaint and cause of action is grounded on the first part of the above section, which makes it the duty of any person engaged in transmitting electricity of dangerous voltage to see that full and complete insulation, shall be provided at all points where the public are liable to come in contact with the wires. City of Decatur v. Eady (1917), 186 Ind. 205, 115 N. E. 577; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ropp (1921), 190 Ind. 115, 129 N. E. 475; Emerson Brantingham Co. v. Growe (1922), 191 Ind. 564, 133 N. E. 919, and similar cases cited by appellant are not decisive of the question involved. None of the cases cited undertakes to construe the part of said section now under consideration. Some of the cases cited refer to the last part of the section and hold that part to be simply declarative of the common law. _ Our attention has been called to no case holding the provision concerning the insulation of electric wire is simply declaratory of the common law, and we know of no decision so holding. The Supreme Court, in Terre Haute, etc., Traction Co. v. Hayes (1924), 195 Ind. 638, 145 N. E. 569, after quoting § 4443, supra, held that a complaint which *120charged that an employer required an employee, in the discharge of his duties, to go into a room where there were wires carrying a high and dangerous current of electricity and which were not insulated, charged negligence. _ And, on the authority of that case, we hold the complaint in the instant case charged negligence.” (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, as in Linn Grove, “[o]ur attention has been called to no case holding the provision concerning . . . [the inclosure and protection of all shafts, openings, wells, etc.] is simply declaratory of the common law.” On the contrary, in Monteith v. Kokomo Wood, etc., Co., 159 Ind. 149, 151, 64 N. E. 610, 58 L.R.A. 944 (1902), the distinction between general statutes which are merely declaratory of the common law and those which impose absolute and specific duties is clearly exemplified in such a way as to leave no doubt but that this provision must be classified as imposing an absolute and specific duty. Monteith is the other authority cited in Cleveland, etc. v. Ropp, supra, on which appellee relies. At page 151 of 159 Ind., it states:
“It is entirely clear, however, that where an absolute and specific duty to guard or fence dangerous machinery is imposed upon the master by statute, such new condition must, in a very material manner, affect the relations of the parties, and modify, to a considerable extent, their rights .and duties as they existed at common law. And here a distinction is to be noted between statutes such as the employer's liability act (Acts 1893, p. 294, §§ 7083-7087 Burns 1901), which provide in general terms that the employer shall be liable for injuries to an employe where the injury is occasioned by reason of defects in the condition of ways, works, plant, tools, and machinery, etc., and statutes which require of the employer the performance of a specific duty, such as to guard or fence dangerous machinery. Statutes of the former class do little more than declare the rule of the common law. Statutes of the latter class impose specific obligations. A failure to comply with the requirements of the first may or may not be negligence. A violation of the second is an unlawful act or omission, a plain breach of a particular duty owing to the servant, and generally constitutes negligence per se. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. V. Burton, 139 Ind. 357; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Conoyer, 149 Ind. 524; Shirk v. Wabash R. Co., 14 Ind. App. *121126; Thompson, Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 10, 11, 211; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 7 S. E. 912, 12 Am. St. 320; Thompson v. Wright, 22 Ont. 127.”
The duty to inclose and protect shafts, openings, wells, etc., is a specific statutory duty which applies to all such places of danger. Those “which should have been obvious to or discoverable by a person of plaintiff’s age and experience using reasonable care for his own safety” are not excepted. In fact, it is highly doubtful that there is any other exception. But no other possible exception is involved in Freyn Bros.’ Instruction No. 11. It is, therefore, entirely irrelevant whether the limitation on the general duty in the last clause also means that the specific duty to inclose and protect shafts, openings, wells, etc., is also limited by the necessity for preserving the reasonable efficiency of the building.3
Some clarification is apparently necessary concerning our statement of what was held in the two cases cited in the following sentence from our opinion: “As interpreted in Leet v. Block, 182 Ind. 271, 274, 106 N. E. 373, 20 A.L.R. 654 (1914), and Bruemmer v. Clark Equipment Co., 341 F. 2d 23 (7 Circ. 1965), that statute [Burns §20-304] imposes duties only “ ‘ “ on the particular owner, contractor, or subcontractor who has “charge of” or is “responsible for” the works, etc., in question.” ’ ” The intent of the whole paragraph is to say that this is all that those cases hold ;4 that they *122do not hold that the duty which the statute purports to impose on “such, ‘particular owner’,” etc., to inclose and protect “all shafts, openings, wells,” etc., is illusory and applies only to such thereof as are not obvious to or discoverable by a person of plaintiff’s age, etc.
No useful purpose would be served by mention of other reasons relied on for a rehearing.
Appellant has filed a motion asking that the petition for rehearing filed by appellee Freyn Bros., Inc., be dismissed or in the alternative be denied. Appellant’s motion points out that the petition contains argument in violation of Supreme Court Rule 2-22 (Appellate Rule 11 in the new Indiana Rules of Procedure). The motion is well taken. Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 16 Ind. Dec. 54, 241 N. E. 2d 872 (1968); Barkey v. Schermerhorn, 143 Ind. App. 310, 15 Ind. Dec. 549, 240 N.E. 2d 93 (1968).
The petitions for rehearing are denied.
Hoffman, P.J., Pfaff and Sharp, JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in 155 N. E. 2d 123.

. “It is a matter of common knowledge that hazards and dangers are present in homes and elsewhere in everyday life, and that hazards and dangers are likely to be greater on a construction site.
“Reasonable care did not require anyone connected with the construction here involved to place or post any barricades or warnings as to any hazardous or dangerous conditions which should have been obvious to or discoverable by a person of plaintiff’s age and experience using reasonable care for his own safety.”

. “You are instructed that [at] the time of the accident in question there was in full force and effect a statute in the State of Indiana which provided in part as follows:
‘It is hereby made the duty of all owners, contractors, subcontrae-tors, corporations, agents . . . engaged in the care, . . . management, construction, erection, ... of any building, ... or business of whatsoever kind ... to require . . . that all shafts, openings, wells, stairways, floor openings, and similar places or conditions of danger, are inclosed and protected . . .’
“You are instructed that if you find, after considering all of the evidence in this case that the defendants or any of them violated the provisions of this statute, then they would be guilty of negligence.”

. Appellee Freyn Brothers’ Instruction No. 9, to which appellant did not object, paraphrased the general duty of the last clause of the statute and pointed out that it applied only to the particular owner, etc., having charge of or responsible for the work and that, “in all events . . . [it] would not apply to work or conditions of risk or danger necessary to the reasonable efficiency of the areaway where plaintiff fell.’’ We do not find that there was any request by any appellee that the jury be instructed that this limitation also applies to the specific duty to inclose and protect shafts, etc.

. It is true, however, that Leet holds, in language quoted with emphasis by the Federal Court of Appeals in Bruemmer that: “ ‘It was the purpose of the enactment to fix a higher standard of care on the person having the particular work in charge ....’” 341 F.2d- at 26, quoting 182 Ind. at 275. This, however, is dicta. The higher standard of care is not dicta as described in other cases quoted in the present opinion.