Court Opinion

ID: 9395066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 00:00:31.57354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.260007
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30625      Document: 00516751526         Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/15/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                               FILED
                                                                        May 15, 2023
                                   No. 21-30625                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                               Clerk

   Percy Taylor,

                                                              Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   James LeBlanc, Secretary,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 3:21-CV-72
                   ______________________________

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
          We withdraw our prior opinion in this case, Taylor v. LeBlanc, 60 F.4th
   246 (5th Cir. 2023), and substitute the following in its place.
                                        ***
          The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive
   any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
   Const. amend. XIV. § 1.          So it should go without saying that the
   government cannot hold a prisoner without the legal authority to do so, for
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                                    No. 21-30625

   that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due process of
   law.” Id.
          Consistent with these principles, “[o]ur precedent establishes that a
   jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”
   Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “Detention of a prisoner
   thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially
   valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”
   Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).
          The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections recently
   conducted a study that uncovered a substantial number of inmates who were
   detained long past the expiration of their sentences. See Crittindon v.
   LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2022). Many inmates are detained in jail
   during trial or sentencing, and then transferred to the Department to serve
   the rest of their sentence in prison. But the study discovered that some local
   jails in Louisiana were often slow to communicate with the Department. As
   a result, some inmates would not get credit for their jailtime in a timely
   manner, and would therefore remain in prison past the length of their
   sentences.
          Percy Taylor was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence, but
   for a different reason: Department officials gave him credit for time served
   in pre-trial detention, but only for one (rather than both) of his two
   consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law then in
   effect. But Taylor was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at
   the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer
   than he should have.
          After his release, Taylor brought suit against various Louisiana
   officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns
   only one of those claims: Taylor’s claim against the head of the Department,

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   Secretary James LeBlanc. LeBlanc appeals the denial of qualified immunity
   arguing, inter alia, that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light
   of clearly established law.
          The right to timely release is clearly established. But Taylor does not
   show how LeBlanc’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
   established law. Taylor contends that LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable
   because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney.
   But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by
   a member of the bar. Accordingly, we reverse.
                                           I.
          For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in
   Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
   (2009).
          Taylor was imprisoned for a Louisiana felony conviction. He was later
   released on parole for good behavior.
          While on parole, Taylor was arrested, detained pending trial, and
   eventually convicted on another felony offense. His parole for his first
   offense was revoked, and he was additionally sentenced to a second,
   consecutive term of imprisonment.
          During his imprisonment, Taylor concluded that Department officials
   had miscalculated his release date. So he filed a grievance. He argued that
   the time he spent in pre-trial detention prior to his second conviction should
   have been credited to both of his sentences, rather than just his second
   sentence. Relatedly, he also argued that his parole on his first conviction
   should have been deemed revoked as of his arrest on the second offense,
   rather than at the time of his conviction. A non-attorney Department

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   employee denied the grievance, seemingly misconstruing it as a request for
   good time credits he wasn’t entitled to.
          Taylor appealed his grievance unsuccessfully.          The denial order
   explained that, under current law, the time Taylor spent in pre-trial detention
   could not be credited toward his first sentence. See La. Code Crim.
   Proc. art. 880(E). The order noted that overlapping credits are prohibited
   when the sentences are consecutively, rather than concurrently, imposed.
   See id. at 880(B).
          Taylor sought review from the state district court. A commissioner
   issued a report recommending that the court grant the petition for review.
   The report concluded that Taylor’s time in jail should have been credited
   toward both sentences, under the law in effect at the time his sentence was
   entered.
          The court adopted the recommendation and ordered that Taylor’s
   release date be recalculated. According to the correctly calculated release
   date, Taylor should have been released over a year earlier.
          Taylor sued, bringing various claims seeking damages for false
   imprisonment, including a § 1983 claim against LeBlanc. The operative
   complaint alleged, inter alia, that LeBlanc—a final policymaker—failed to
   implement policies to ensure his timely release, and failed to train or
   supervise the employees who administer the grievance process.             The
   complaint alleged that LeBlanc was aware of concerns that a substantial
   number of inmates were being overdetained.
          The district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to
   dismiss. As relevant here, the court denied the motion as to the claim against
   LeBlanc, finding that he wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity.

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           LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity. 1
                                                II.
           “Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review
   orders denying qualified immunity.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310
   (5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
   dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, accepting as true all well-pleaded
   facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
   Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
           “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
   from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
   established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
   would have known.”             Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
   (quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
   unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
   plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
   objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
   violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We are free to decide which prong of the
   qualified immunity analysis to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242

           _____________________
           1
              Taylor argues that the district court shouldn’t have dismissed the other claims.
   We lack jurisdiction to review those dismissals on interlocutory appeal. This court has
   jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court. Tracy v. Lumpkin, 43 F.4th 473, 475
   (5th Cir. 2022). But the collateral-order doctrine presents a “narrow” exception to that
   principle. Id. Under the collateral-order doctrine, “non-final orders are immediately
   appealable if they: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an
   important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) are effectively
   unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). Taylor’s remaining
   claims don’t fall within this exception. Nor does pendant jurisdiction exist, because those
   other claims are not “inextricably intertwined” with the denial of qualified immunity for
   Secretary LeBlanc. Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir.
   2014).

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   (“[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best
   position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
   fair and efficient disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
          It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
   from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
   F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. But under prong two of the qualified
   immunity analysis, Taylor must also show how Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions
   were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of
   the violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445.
          The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that “[w]hether an
   official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an
   allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal
   reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
   clearly established at the time it was taken.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565
   U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (cleaned up, emphasis added).
          So a plaintiff must show that “the conduct of the defendants was
   objectively unreasonable in the light of . . . clearly established law.” Hare v.
   City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
   See also, e.g., Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2021) (defendant
   “is entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions were objectively
   unreasonable in light of clearly established law”) (quotations omitted); Blake
   v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (qualified immunity turns on
   whether defendant’s conduct is “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
   established law”); Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (same).
          But the objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official
   action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
   has previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing

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   law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
   (2002) (citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id.
   at 739–41.
                                        III.
          Department officials declined to credit Taylor’s pre-trial detention to
   both of his consecutive sentences. That was correct under current law. See
   La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 880(B). But it was wrong here, because
   Taylor’s release date should have been governed by the law applicable at the
   time of his sentence. That would have allowed Taylor to credit his jail time
   to both of his sentences.
          This appeal, however, does not concern the conduct of lower-level
   officials at the Department. Rather, the question before us is whether
   LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable in how he supervised the entire
   Department.
          Taylor contends that LeBlanc should have delegated the calculation
   of release dates to lawyers rather than non-lawyers—and that his failure to
   do so was objectively unreasonable. But Taylor does not point to anything
   that suggests the Constitution requires these determinations be made by
   attorneys.
          We reverse.

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