Court Opinion

ID: 9901430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:04:57.207311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:33.489311
License: Public Domain

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                    NEWS RELEASE #046

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 20th day of October, 2023 are as follows:

BY Genovese, J.:

 2023-CA-00398            THE CARTESIAN COMPANY, INC. AND GREG GACHASSIN VS. THE
                          DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ETHICS ADJUDICATORY
                          BOARD PANEL A AND THE LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS (Parish of
                          East Baton Rouge)

                          AFFIRMED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART; AFFIRMED AS
                          AMENDED, AND REVERSED IN PART. SEE OPINION.

                          Hughes, J., concurs in the result.
                          Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
                          Crain, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
                          McCallum, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by
                          Crichton and Crain, J.J.
                         SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                    No. 2023-CA-00398

        THE CARTESIAN COMPANY, INC. AND GREG GACHASSIN

                                              VS.

THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ETHICS ADJUDICATORY
    BOARD PANEL A AND THE LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS

    On Appeal from the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge

Genovese, J.,

        This matter involves the constitutionality of a statute which is part of the

Louisiana Ethics Code, La. R.S. 42:1113(B). 1 At issue is whether the trial court

erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs/Respondents,

The Cartesian Company, Inc. (“Cartesian”) and Greg Gachassin (collectively

“Plaintiffs”).    The trial court ruled that the words “in any way interested

in” contained in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) “are hereby struck down, and declared of no

effect, as violating both the Federal and State Constitutions because these words . . .

are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad . . . as interpreted and applied” to

Plaintiffs. The trial court also denied the motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendants/Respondents, Division of Administration Law Ethics Adjudicatory

Board (Panel A) (“EAB”) and the Louisiana Board of Ethics (“BOE”)(collectively

“BOE”).2 Defendants appealed, and the matter was transferred by the appellate court

as a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 5(D). Cartesian Co.,

Inc. v. Div. of Admin. L. Ethics Adjudicatory Bd. Panel A (“Cartesian III”), 22-0158

1
 Pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4448, this Court sent notice to the Louisiana Attorney General of the
challenge to the statute’s constitutionality. As of the date of this opinion, the Attorney General
has not filed a brief in this appeal.
2
  Effective August 1, 2023, the legislature revised and amended La. C.C.P. art. 966 which governs
motions for summary judgment. The parties’ motions for summary judgment were filed in 2021;
thus, the version of La. C.C.P. art. 966 (2016) which was in effect in 2021 is controlling.
(La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1021. For the reasons discussed below, we find

the trial court erred in finding the phrase “in any way interested in” facially

unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the judgment.

However, we find the trial court correctly determined the phrase was

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs and unconstitutionally vague on its

face as to all of its applications. As a result, the phrase “or be in any way interested

in” is hereby struck from La. R.S. 42:1113(B). The remainder of the statute remains

viable and can stand. Accordingly, this portion of the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed, amended in part, and affirmed as amended.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          The Lafayette Public Trust Financing Authority (“LPTFA”) administers the

Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program in Lafayette and West Lafayette. 3 The

Louisiana Housing Authorities Law grants municipalities and parishes the authority

to establish public housing authorities, and the Lafayette Housing Authority (LHA)

was established pursuant to that authority.4

          Mr. Gachassin served as an appointed trustee/member of the LPTFA from

August 19, 2003, until his resignation on November 17, 2009. He served as

chairman of the LPTFA from April 6, 2007, until his resignation. Mr. Gachassin is

also the sole owner, director, and president of Cartesian, a real estate development

firm.

          In 2009, the LPTFA became involved in two housing development projects

known as Cypress Trails and Villa Gardens.

          The Cypress Trails project was an affordable housing development located in

Lafayette, Louisiana, which was a project of the LPTFA. On October 30, 2009, the

3
    The LPTFA was created pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2341.
4
    La. R.S. 40:391, et seq.

                                               2
Cypress Trails Corporation (“Cypress Trails Inc.”) was incorporated to serve as an

instrumentality of the LPTFA in promoting and advancing housing for persons of

low income and particularly the elderly or handicapped in the City of Lafayette and

Lafayette Parish. According to Richard Becker, general counsel for the LPTFA,

Cypress Trails Inc. was created as an instrumentality of the LPTFA to implement

the Cypress Trails project. 5 The Board of Commissioners of Cypress Trails Inc. was

comprised of the same individuals who served on the LPTFA’s Board of Trustees,

including Mr. Gachassin, who also served as Cypress Trails Inc.’s first Executive

Director.6 On November 1, 2009, a partnership known as the Cypress Trails Limited

Partnership (“Cypress Trails LP”) was created between Cypress Trails Inc., as

general partner, the LHA, as special limited partner, and Mr. Becker, as a limited

partner. In executing the articles of partnership for Cypress Trails LP, Cypress Trails

Inc. was represented by Mr. Gachassin, who signed the articles in his capacity as

chairman of the LPTFA. 7 The partnership was created to acquire the property to

build, own, and operate the Cypress Trails project.

          Villa Gardens project was an affordable housing project also located in

Lafayette, Louisiana, which was a project of the LHA. In 2006, the LHA requested

a loan from the LPTFA in order to purchase the property ultimately used as the site

of the Villa Gardens development. Mr. Gachassin’s proposal that the $425,000.00

loan be made at an interest rate of three percent per annum was unanimously

approved by the LPTFA. On November 1, 2009, a partnership known as the Villa

Gardens Limited Partnership (“Villa Gardens LP”) was created between Villa

Gardens Housing Corporation (“Villa Gardens Inc.”), an instrumentality of the

5
 Bd. of Ethics in Matter of Cartesian Co., Inc., 16-1556, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/12/17) 233 So.3d
9, 12 (“Cartesian I”).
6
    Id.
7
    Id.

                                                3
LHA, as general partner, and Walter Guillory, as limited partner. The partnership

was created to acquire the property to build, own, and operate the Villa Gardens

project.8

          By a written contract dated November 1, 2009, Cartesian entered into separate

“Project Consultant Agreement[s]” with Cypress Trails LP and Villa Gardens LP to

oversee the development and construction of the housing projects for a fee of

$500,000.00. Mr. Gachassin signed the consultant agreements as “President” of

Cartesian.9 The Cypress Trails project was under the supervision or jurisdiction of

LPTFA at that time. Over the course of the next several years, Cartesian fulfilled

the terms of the consultant agreements and received full payment of $500,000.00 for

each agreement.10

          On November 4, 2009, Mr. Gachassin, in his capacity as chairman of the

Board of Trustees of the LPTFA, participated in a meeting that addressed various

issues related to the Cypress Trails and Villa Gardens projects. Mr. Gachassin

presented an update and overview of the strategy for the Cypress Trails project. Mr.

Gachassin also instructed Mr. Becker to prepare a resolution to authorize and

empower the officers of the LPTFA and its counsel “to do all things and take all

actions necessary or advisable to cause the LPTFA tax credit affordable housing

project Cypress Trails to proceed to closing.” 11 This resolution granted authority to

the specified officers and general counsel to hire a project consultant for the Cypress

Trails project without obtaining further approval of the LPTFA Board of Trustees.

The Board of Trustees voted unanimously to proceed with the Cypress Trails project

8
    Cartesian I, 16-1556, p. 4, 233 So.3d at 12.
9
 At the time Mr. Gachassin signed as president of Cartesian on November 1, 2009, Cartesian’s
existence as a legal entity was not yet effective, as it was not formed until November 6, 2009.
Cartesian I, 16-1556, p. 5, 233 So.3d at 13.

10
     Cartesian I, 16-1556, pp. 4-5, 233 So.3d at 13.
11
     Cartesian I, 16-1556, pp. 5, 233 So.3d at 13.

                                                     4
and to adopt the resolution prepared by Mr. Becker. Additionally, the board voted

to “recast the existing loan . . . to the [LHA] to a long term, no interest, cash flow

loan to be repaid to the LPTFA by the [LHA] out of the cash flow from the Villa

Gardens project.”12 The minutes of the meeting did not reflect a recusal by Mr.

Gachassin from these votes. 13 On November 17, 2009, Mr. Gachassin resigned from

the Board of LPTFA.

BOE charges/EAB hearing and decision

          In 2012, BOE alleged multiple Ethics Code violations against Mr. Gachassin

and Cartesian, and a hearing was held before EAB. 14 Pertinent to this appeal, BOE

alleged Plaintiffs violated the prohibition set forth in La. R.S. 42:1113(B), which

provides:

                Other than a legislator, no appointed member of any board or
          commission, member of his immediate family, or legal entity in which
          he has a substantial economic interest shall bid on or enter into or be in
          any way interested in any contract, subcontract, or other transaction
          which is under the supervision or jurisdiction of the agency of such
          appointed member [emphasis added].

La. R.S. 42:1155(A) provides:
                 If an investigation conducted pursuant to this Part reveals that
          any public servant or other person has violated any law within the
          jurisdiction of the Board of Ethics to his economic advantage, and after
          an adjudicatory hearing on the matter, the Ethics Adjudicatory Board
          may order the payment of penalties. Recovery may include, in addition
          to an amount equal to such economic advantage, penalties not to exceed
          one half of the amount of the economic advantage.

          Following a hearing, EAB issued its “Decision and Order” (“decision”).

EAB’s decision emphasized that in order for Mr. Gachassin to have violated La. R.S.

12
     Cartesian I, 16-1556, pp. 5-6, 233 So.3d at 13.
13
     Cartesian I, 16-1556, p. 6, 233 So.3d at 13.
14
     Louisiana Constitution Article X, § 21 provides:
         The legislature shall enact a code of ethics for all officials and employees of the
         state and its political subdivisions. The code shall be administered by one or more
         boards created by the legislature with qualifications, terms of office, duties, and
         powers provided by law.

                                                    5
42:1113(B), BOE had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) while Mr.

Gachassin was an appointed member of a board or commission; (2) he bid on,

entered into, or was in any way interested in any contract, subcontract, or other

transaction; and, (3) which was under the supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA,

his agency.15        Additionally, it held that to find Cartesian violated La. R.S.

42:1113(B), BOE must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) while Mr.

Gachassin had a substantial economic interest in Cartesian; (2) Cartesian bid on,

entered into, or was in any way interested in any contract, subcontract, or other

transaction; and, (3) which is under the supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA, his

agency. 16 EAB found BOE had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mr.

Gachassin, as Cartesian’s president, director, sole shareholder, and employer, had a

substantial economic interest in Cartesian, and while Cypress Trails was under the

supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA, the following action ensued:

         On November 1, 2009, during Gachassin’s tenure as the Chairman and
         board member of the LPTFA, Cartesian entered into $500,000 project
         consultant agreement[] with . . . Cypress Trails LP . . . to provide
         services on Cypress Trails. . . . Gachassin signed the agreement[ ] in his
         capacity as President of Cartesian. His action showed his interest in the
         agreement[].[17]

EAB concluded: “Because the BOE proved by clear and convincing evidence that

Cypress Trails was under the supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA, Gachassin

violated La. R.S. 42:1113(B) when he was any way interested in the project

consultant agreement . . . .” 18       Additionally, EAB found BOE met its burden of

proving that Mr. Gachassin had a substantial economic interest in Cartesian, and

15
     EAB decision, p. 24.
16
     EAB decision, p. 27.
17
     EAB decision, pp. 24-25.
18
     EAB decision, p. 25 (emphasis added).

                                              6
while Cypress Trails was under the supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA, the

following action ensued:

                 On November 10, 2009, after Cartesian became a legal entity, it
         honored the provisions of November 1, 2009 project consultant
         agreement[] and provided project consultant services on Cypress Trails.
         . . . By providing these services, Cartesian was “in any way interested”
         in the agreement[]. . . .[19]

         Pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1155(A), EAB imposed fines and penalties as a result

of the violations, finding that Plaintiffs violated the Ethics Code to their “economic

advantage.”20

Appellate court decision (Cartesian I)

         Plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court reversed in part, vacated in part,

amended in part, remanded in part, and affirmed in part EAB’s decision.21 Bd. of

Ethics in Matter of Cartesian Co., Inc., (“Cartesian I”) 16-1556 (La. App. 1 Cir.

10/12/17), 233 So.3d 9. Notably, Plaintiffs argued EAB erred as a matter of law in

finding they violated La. R.S. 42:1113(B) with respect to the Cypress Trails project

because: (1) the Cypress Trails project was not under the “supervision or

jurisdiction” of the LPTFA; and, (2) the phrase “in any way interested [in]” was

19
     EAB decision, p. 28 (emphasis added).
20
   Other ethics violations that EAB determined Mr. Gachassin violated were La. R.S. 42:1112(A),
(B), and (D) by failing to recuse himself and voting to move forward with the Cypress Trails
project and to recast the loan associated with the Villa Gardens project, as well as participating in
discussions regarding those matters at the LPTFA meeting; and, La. R.S. 42:1121(A)(1) by
assisting Cartesian, in return for compensation, with various transactions involving the LPTFA
within two years of his resignation as chairman of the LPTFA. For each of the five Ethics Code
violations EAB found Mr. Gachassin committed, EAB imposed a $10,000.00 fine, for a total of
$50,000.00. EAB imposed a single fine of $10,000.00 upon Cartesian. Additionally, based on its
conclusion, pursuant to La. R.S. 42:1155, that Mr. Gachassin and Cartesian violated the Ethics
Code to their “economic advantage,” EAB imposed a penalty of $1.5 million, in solido. Cartesian
I, 16-1556, pp. 7-8, 233 So.3d at 14.
21
   The appellate court reversed EAB’s finding that Mr. Gachassin violated La. R.S. 42:1112(B).
Cartesian I, 16-1556, p. 16, 233 So.3d at 20. Additionally, it held that EAB erred in its legal
interpretation of La. R.S. 42:1155(A), vacated the $1.5 million penalty, and remanded the matter
to allow EAB to exercise its discretion in imposing a new penalty. Id., 16-1556, p. 27, 233 So.3d
at 27. Furthermore, it reduced the $30,000.00 fines imposed on Mr. Gachassin for violating La.
R.S. 42:1112 to $10,000.00, and it affirmed the two $10,000.00 fines imposed on Mr. Gachassin
for violating La. R.S. 42:1113(B) and 42:1121(A), as well as the $10,000.00 fine imposed on
Cartesian for violating La. R.S. 42:1113(B). Id., 16-1556, pp. 29-30, 233 So.3d at 28.

                                                 7
unconstitutionally “vague and overbroad.” Cartesian I, 16-1556, p. 17, 233 So.3d at

20.

       The appellate court found Plaintiffs’ argument that the Cypress Trails project

was not under the supervision or jurisdiction of the LPTFA meritless and affirmed

EAB’s decision that Mr. Gachassin and Cartesian violated section (B) of La. R.S.

42:1113. Cartesian I, 16-1556, pp.17-19, 233 So.3d at 20-22.

       As to Plaintiffs claim that the phrase “in any way interested [in]” set forth in

La. R.S. 42:1113(B) was unconstitutionally overbroad, general, and vague, the

appellate court did not consider the issue reasoning that it was not properly before

it. The appellate court emphasized that EAB lacked authority to consider the

constitutional issue as that issue had to first be raised in the trial court. Cartesian I,

16-1556, p. 20, 233 So.3d at 22.

       Plaintiffs did not seek review of the appellate court’s decision; thus, it became

final. See La. C.C.P. art. 2166 (A)(“The judgment of a court of appeal becomes final

and definitive if neither an application to the court of appeal for rehearing nor an

application to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari is timely filed.”).

Declaratory judgment action

       After Cartesian I, Plaintiffs filed in the trial court a declaratory judgment

action against BOE and EAB, alleging La. R.S. 42:1113(B) was unconstitutional. In

particular, they asserted the language in the statute, “in any way interested in,” was

unconstitutionally “broad, vague, and general” as it failed to provide notice of the

prohibited conduct. 22 They argued “in any way interested in” was not defined in the

Ethics Code, in the charges against it, or in EAB’s ruling. Plaintiffs asserted that the

same phrase was held unconstitutional in State v. Murtes, 94 So.2d 446, 448 (La.

22
  Plaintiffs also argued that the $1.5 million penalty was unconstitutionally confiscated. However,
this issue was not raised in the motion for summary judgment, the trial court’s judgment, or in
brief to this Court, except to the extent they argue the statute was penal in nature as evidenced by
the fine/penalty.

                                                 8
1957), wherein this Court held the words “‘in any way interested’ are so broad,

general and vague as to fail to define the offense which the statute seeks to prohibit;

and moreover it fails to constitutionally inform the purported offender of the action

denounced as an offense.”

       Plaintiffs requested that the court declare the phrase unconstitutionally

“general, vague, and overly broad, as purportedly interpreted and applied” and

dismiss EAB’s finding that they violated La. R.S. 42:1113(B).

       During the course of the declaratory judgment litigation, Plaintiffs filed a

notice of deposition directed to BOE pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1442. 23 In response,

BOE filed a motion to quash, arguing the evidence sought was irrelevant to the

constitutional challenge. The trial court denied the motion, and BOE sought review.

On appeal, a five judge panel (with one concurrence) granted the writ and reversed

the trial court’s judgment, writing in pertinent part:

       We find that the trial court erred in denying the Louisiana Board of
       Ethics’ motion to quash the second La. Code Civ. P. art. 1442 notice of
       deposition and reverse the trial court’s October 28, 2019 ruling. This
       matter does not involve First Amendment freedoms[;] and[,]
       therefore[,] the plaintiffs’, Greg Gachassin and The Cartesian
       Company, Inc.’s, vagueness challenge to La. R.S. 42:1113(B) must be
       examined in light of the facts of the case at hand and as applied to them.
       State v. Boyd, 97-0579 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074, 1076. They may
       not speculate about hypothetical conduct that could also be prosecuted
       under the same statute. State v. Hair, 2000-2694 (La. 5/15/01), 784
       So.2d 1269, 1273. Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to show the
       requested information is discoverable herein. La. Code Civ. P. art.
       1422.

Cartesian Co., Inc. v. Div. of Admin. L. Ethics Adjudicatory Bd. Panel A, 20-0103,

2020 WL 3639539, at *1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/6/20), writ denied, 20-01053 (La.

11/10/20), 303 So.3d 1044 (“Cartesian II”).

23
  La. C.C.P. art. 1442 provides in pertinent part: “A party may in his notice name as the deponent
a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and
designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested.”

                                                9
Motions for Summary Judgment

      In April of 2021, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

      BOE argued it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, as there

were no genuine issues of material fact that the phrase “in any way interested in” set

forth in La. R.S. 42:1113(A) was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. BOE

asserted that the phrase was not overbroad, as it did not infringe upon

constitutionally protected conduct, and the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague

because it clearly proscribed the conduct at issue—the execution of the consulting

agreement by Mr. Gachassin as President of Cartesian with Cypress Trails LP, while

Cypress Trails Projects was under the supervision or jurisdiction of LPTFA, of

which Mr. Gachassin was a member. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982)(discussed infra). BOE

emphasized that laws regulating business are held to a lesser standard of definiteness

than statutes imposing criminal penalties. See, Id., 455 U.S. at 498; La. Chem. Ass’n.

v. State through the La. Dept. of Rev., 16-0501, p. 13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/7/17), 217

So.3d 455, 464, writ denied, 17-0761 (La. 9/22/17), 227 So.3d 826 (citation

omitted). In support of its motion, BOE attached as exhibits EAB’s decision and

BOE’s post-hearing memorandum dated April 28, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a motion to

strike BOE’s exhibits.

      Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the phrase

“in any way interested in” set forth in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) was unconstitutionally

overbroad and vague. They reiterated EAB found them in violation of La. R.S.

42:1113(B) because they were in any way interested in the Cypress Trails contract,

which resulted in the imposition of fines and penalties pursuant to La. R.S.

42:1155(A). Plaintiffs asserted that because a violation of La. R.S. 42:1113(B)

resulted in imposition of fines and penalties, La. R.S. 42:1113(B) was penal in nature

and subject to the construction under the criminal statutes, and it should be strictly

                                         10
construed. Plaintiffs emphasized the United States Supreme Court in Sessions v.

Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1212, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018),24 held that

the prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes is an “essential” of due process.

Plaintiffs continued in further asserting that, “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine . . .

guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute

proscribes.” Id. (citing Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct.

839 (1972)). Plaintiffs argued under Louisiana law that a statute is vague if its

meaning is not clear to the average citizen or if an ordinary person of reasonable

intelligence is incapable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct to it.

State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 532-533 (La. 1989).

       Plaintiffs asserted that Murtes, 94 So.2d 446, was controlling law in this case

as this Court held the same phrase, “in any way interested in,” as set forth in La. R.S.

48:422, was unconstitutionally vague. Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:422 provided

in part that “no member of the legislature or officer of the executive department of

the state shall be in any way interested in any contract for the building or improving

of any highway or any other public work . . . (emphasis added).” Plaintiffs

contended, as in Murtes, that neither the Ethics Code, BOE, EAB, nor case law

define the phrase “in any way interested in.” In support of their motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiffs attached as exhibits the affidavit of Mr. Gachassin, the transcript

of EAB April, 2016 hearing, and the petition for declaratory judgment.

       BOA opposed the motion, asserting Plaintiffs had adequate notice of the

prohibited conduct.

       Following a hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment. The judgment was

silent as to Plaintiffs’ motion to strike. The judgment granted Plaintiffs’ motion for

24
  Sessions involved an alien removal case. Although civil in nature, the United States Supreme
Court has determined such cases will be reviewed under the established criteria of the void for
vagueness doctrine applicable to criminal laws. Id., 138 S.Ct. at 1213.

                                              11
summary judgment and denied BOE’s motion for summary judgment. The initial

judgment by the trial court was silent as to the issue of constitutionality, but implied

the phrase in question was unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the appellate court

held the judgment lacked decretal language and remanded the case to the trial court

for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment’s deficiencies. On remand, the

trial court amended its judgment, providing in pertinent part:

              IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
       Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of The Cartesian Company
       and Greg Gachassin and against the Louisiana Board of Ethics is
       GRANTED, and, accordingly the challenged words “in any way
       interested in,” as contained and identified in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) be
       and are hereby struck down, and declared of no effect, as violating both
       the Federal and State Constitutions, because these words in the penal
       statute are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and, as interpreted
       and applied to The Cartesian Company and Greg Gachassin by the
       Louisiana Board of Ethics and by the Ethics Adjudicatory Board,
       Division of Administrative Law, in proceedings entitled In the Matter
       of The Cartesian Company and Greg Gachassin . . . pending before the
       Ethics Adjudicatory Board.

       The trial court adopted the written reasons provided by Plaintiffs to support

the judgment. In its written reasons,25 the trial court held that Murtes, 94 So.2d 446,

was controlling law because this Court found the exact phrase unconstitutional. It

opined La. R.S. 42:1113 was penal in nature, thus, it should be strictly construed,

with the rule of lenity applied in favor of Plaintiffs.

       BOE appealed, and the appellate court held it had no jurisdiction to consider

the constitutional matter opining, in pertinent part: “Because the judgment at issue

declared a portion of La. R.S. 42:1113(B) facially unconstitutional and

unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, Sec.

5(D).” Cartesian III, 22-0158, p. 3, 352 So.3d at 1023 (footnote omitted).

25
   Although a trial court’s reasons for judgment are not binding, an appellate court may use them
to gain insight on the judgment. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 19-1106, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/10/21),
313 So.3d 413, 423, writ denied, 21-00390 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So.3d 220, and 21-00380 (La. 5/4/21),
315 So.3d 222 (citations omitted).

                                               12
          This direct appeal by BOE followed.
                                            DISCUSSION

          BOE raises multiple issues challenging the trial court’s judgment granting

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying BOE’s motion for summary

judgment.26 In reviewing the trial court’s judgment, we will review whether the trial

court’s ruling that the phrase “in any way interested in” set forth in La. R.S.

42:1113(B) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face and as applied to

Plaintiffs was correct. 27

Burden Of Proof/Standard of Review

          This Court applies a de novo standard of review in considering the lower

courts’ rulings on summary judgment motions and uses the same criteria that govern

the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. See

26
     In its brief to this Court, BOE assigns the following errors:
           1. The District Court erred by finding La. R.S. 42:1113(B) unconstitutional on its
           face and not following the prior pronouncement of the First Circuit Court of Appeal
           in this matter.
           2. The District Court erred by applying Murtes to La. R.S. 42:1113(B).
           3. The District Court erred by failing to apply the legal precedent of Broussard,
           which found La. R.S. 42:1113(B) constitutional.
           4. The District Court erred in its application of the Rule of Lenity to the phrase “in
           any way interested” as contained in La. R.S. 42:1113(B).
           5. The District Court erred by finding that Appellees met their burden of proof on
           summary judgment and holding La. R.S. 42:1113(B) unconstitutional on its face.
           6. The District Court erred by finding that Appellees met their burden of proof on
           summary judgment and holding La. R.S. 42:1113(B) unconstitutionally vague as
           applied.
           7. The District Court erred by not granting the BOE’s Motion for Summary
           Judgment as the evidence submitted by Appellees proves that Appellees are not
           entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
           8. The District Court erred by improperly considering Appellees’ Motion to Strike
           and Ex-Parte Motion to Strike.
27
   The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must satisfy three steps: (1) raise the
unconstitutionality in the trial court; (2) the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially
pleaded; and, (3) the grounds outlining the basis of unconstitutionality must be particularized. State
v. Hatton, 07-2377, p. 14 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 719 (citing State v. Schoening, 00-0903, p.
3 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So.2d 769, 764, and Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., 94-1238, p. 8 (La. 11/30/94),
646 So.2d 859, 864-65). “The purpose of these procedural rules is to afford interested parties
sufficient time to brief and prepare arguments defending the constitutionality of the challenged
statute,” and provide the trial court with “thoughtful and complete arguments relating to the issue
of constitutionality as well as furnish reviewing courts with an adequate record upon which to
consider the constitutionality of the statute.” Hatton, 07-2377, pp. 14-15, 985 So.2d at 719 (citing
Schoening, 00-0903, p. 3, 770 So.2d at 764, and Vallo, 94-1238, p. 8, 646 So.2d at 865). In this
case, Plaintiffs met all three steps challenging the constitutionality of the phrase set forth in La.
R.S. 42:1113(B) under overbreadth, although briefly, and the vagueness doctrines.
                                                    13
Catahoula Par. Sch. Bd. v. La. Mach. Rentals, LLC, 12-2504, p. 8 (La. 10/15/13),

124 So.3d 1065, 1071 (footnotes omitted). On a motion for summary judgment,

the burden of proof remains with the mover. However, if the moving party will not

bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out an absence of factual

support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or

defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support sufficient to

establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the

opponent of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact

and summary judgment will be granted. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

      Additionally, “[t]he determination of whether a statute . . . is constitutional

presents a question of law, which is reviewed by this Court de novo.” Westlawn

Cemeteries, L.L.C. v. La. Cemetery Bd., 21-01414, p. 12 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d

548, 559 (citations omitted).

      In Carver v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety, this Court set forth the

applicable law when reviewing the constitutionality of a statute:

             All statutory enactments are presumed constitutional, and every
      presumption of law and fact must be indulged in favor of legality.
      Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc., 95-2621 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d
      1135. . . . The presumption is especially forceful in the case of statutes
      enacted to promote a public purpose. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128,
      1132 (La. 1993). The legislature is given great deference in the judicial
      determination of a statute’s constitutionality, and legislators are
      presumed to have weighed the relevant constitutional considerations in
      enacting legislation. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission v.
      Olivier, 04-2147 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 570, 573. Because a state
      statute is presumed constitutional, the party challenging the statute
      bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional. State v. Brenan, 99-
      2291 (La. 5/16/00), 772 So.2d 64, 67. The burden plaintiffs carry in
      challenging the constitutionality of a statute is a heavy burden. It is not
      enough for a person challenging a statute to show that its
      constitutionality is fairly debatable; it must be shown clearly and
      convincingly that it was the constitutional aim to deny the legislature
      the power to enact the statute. Hite v. Larpenter, 04-1821 (La. App. 1
      Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 140, 145, writ denied, 05-2255 (La. 3/10/06),
      925 So.2d 511.
             ....
             Because of the presumption of constitutionality, in determining
      the validity of a constitutional challenge, a Court “must construe a

                                           14
      statute so as to preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to do
      so.” M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 07-2371, p. 22 (La.
      7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 31.

Carver, 17-1340, pp. 5-6 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 226, 230.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Overbreadth doctrine

      The overbreadth doctrine is a creature unique to the First Amendment. State

v. Sandifer, 95-2226, p. 12 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 1324, 1332. In Village of

Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (footnotes omitted), the United States Supreme

Court, in reviewing a non-criminal regulatory statute, set forth the analysis when

reviewing a facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine and held in pertinent

part: “In a facial challenge to the overbreadth . . . of a law, a court’s first task is to

determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally

[First Amendment] protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge

must fail.” See also, State v. Smith, 13-2318, p. 8 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 867, 873.

In Smith, 13-2318, p. 7, 144 So.3d at 873 (citation omitted), this Court emphasized

the overbreadth doctrine is to be used “sparingly” and “only as a last resort.” There

must be “a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise

recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be

facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. (quoting Members of City Council

of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118,

2126 (1984)). We find no First Amendment freedom is at issue herein; thus,

Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge fails. As a result, the trial court erred in finding the

phrase unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.

Vagueness challenge

      “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness

if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 (1972); see also, La. Chem. Ass’n, 16-0501, p. 13,

                                           15
217 So.3d at 464 (“A law is fatally vague and offends due process when a person of

ordinary intelligence does not have a reasonable opportunity to know what is

prohibited so that he may act accordingly or if the law does not provide a standard

to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application.”).28

          The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at

494-95 (footnotes omitted), set forth the analysis for a challenge to the vagueness of

a law:

          The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and,
          assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected
          conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is
          impermissibly vague in all of its applications.[29] A plaintiff who
          engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
          the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court
          should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing
          other hypothetical applications of the law.[30]

Additionally, this Court, in State v. Hair, 00-2694, p. 5 (La. 5/15/01), 784 So.2d

1269, 1273, addressed a vagueness challenge and held in pertinent part:

                 It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which
          do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the
          light of the facts of the case at hand. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S.
          87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie,
          419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); State v. Boyd,
          97-0579 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074. A defendant engaged in

28
  United States Constitution Amendment XIV provides in pertinent part: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .
.” Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 2 provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of law.”
29
  We note in Robinson v. Gov’t of the D.C., 234 F. Supp.3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2017)(citing United
States Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the federal district court
emphasized that the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602, 135 S.Ct.
2551, 2560-61 (2015), cast doubt in the “in all of its applications” standard set forth in Village of
Hoffman Estates, but did not precisely define what standard governs facial vagueness challenges.
30
     In Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, the Court expounded:
          “One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it
          for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2561, 41 L.Ed.2d
          439 (1974). The rationale is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant
          must prove that the enactment is vague “‘not in the sense that it requires a person
          to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
          rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ Coates v. City of
          Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). Such
          a provision simply has no core.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578, 94 S.Ct. 1242,
          1249, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

                                                    16
       conduct clearly described in a statute cannot complain of the vagueness
       of the statute as applied to others. Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478,
       1486 (9th Cir.1994). A defendant may not establish that a statute is
       unconstitutionally vague by speculating about hypothetical conduct
       which could also be prosecuted under the same statute. State v.
       Sandifer, 95-2226, p. 10 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 1324, 1331-32 (citing
       City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, 290 So.2d 865, 868 (La. 1974)).

See also, State v. Turner, 05-2425, p. 14 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 89, 99 (“Because

the defendant did not establish the statute was vague as it pertained to his conduct,

the trial court prematurely found the statute was unconstitutionally vague.)”

       As declared by the appellate court in Cartesian II: “[T]his matter does not

involve First Amendment freedoms, and therefore the plaintiffs’. . . vagueness

challenge to La. R.S. 42:1113(B) must be examined in light of the facts of the case

at hand and as applied to them.” Id., 20-0103, 2020 WL 3639539, at *1.31

       Before reviewing the statute for vagueness in light of the facts, we examine

the standards for evaluating vagueness:

       The standards for evaluating vagueness were enunciated in Grayned v.
       City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33
       L.Ed.2d 222 (1972):
             “Vague laws offend several important values. First,
             because we assume that man is free to steer between
             lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
             person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
             know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
             Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
             warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory
             enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
             standards for those who apply them. A vague law
             impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
             policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
             hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
             arbitrary and discriminatory application.” (footnotes
             omitted).

31
   BOE asserts that the appellate court’s decision in Cartesian II, 20-0103, 2020 WL 3639539, at
*1, held that because Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge to La. R.S. 42:1113(B) did not involve First
Amendment freedoms, it “must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand and as applied
to them” was law of the case and binding on the trial court. See Jones v. McDonald’s Corp., 97-
2287, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 1 Cir.1998), 723 So.2d 492, 494. However, the law of the case doctrine
does not apply in the context of a trial court ruling on interlocutory issues. See Land v. Vidrine,
10-1342, p. 9 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36, 42. The trial court’s judgment, which involved a
preliminary discovery matter against a party to the action, is interlocutory and non-appealable. See
Fortenberry v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 17-25 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 233 So.3d 161. Thus, the
law of the case doctrine is inapplicable. Notwithstanding, the holding by the court in Cartesian II
is the proper law to be applied in this case.
                                                17
      [T]hus, economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test
      because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because
      businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully,
      can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of
      action. Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify
      the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an
      administrative process. The Court has also expressed greater tolerance
      of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the
      consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. And the
      Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s
      vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the
      complainant that his conduct is proscribed.

Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 498-99 (footnotes omitted); see also, Med Express

Ambulance Services, Inc. v. Evangeline Par. Police Jury, 96-0543, p. 11 (La.

11/25/96), 684 So.2d 359, 367 (wherein this Court discussed a vagueness challenge

to a non-criminal business regulation and held, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates,

455 U.S. at 497 n. 7, that “[t]o sustain a challenge for vagueness, the opponent of

the ordinance must prove that the ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires

a person to conform . . . to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but

rather in the sense that no standard conduct is specified at all[.]”). In State v. Boyd,

97-0579, p. 3 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074, 1076 (citations omitted), in dicta, this

Court, to lend guidance in reviewing a criminal statute on the basis of vagueness,

held in pertinent part: “[T]he statute must not contain a standard so vague that the

public is uncertain as to the proscribed conduct and the factfinder is unfettered by

any legally fixed standards as to what is prohibited by the statute.” The Boyd Court

emphasized “the fact that a statute’s terms are subjective and susceptible to

interpretation does not render it vague,” and “[d]ue process requires only that the

language of a statute have generally accepted meaning so that a person of ordinary

and reasonable intelligence is capable of discerning its proscriptions and is given fair

notice of the conduct which is forbidden by its terms.” Id. (citations omitted). In

comparison, a vague statute prohibits no specific or definite act and “leaves open the

widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of

                                          18
which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.” Boyd, 97-0579, p. 3,

710 So.2d at 1076-77 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316,

319-20, 46 L.Ed.2d (1975); United States v. L Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89,

41 S.Ct. 298 (1921)). In F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253,

132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012), the United States Supreme Court opined that “a

regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove, but rather

because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.”

        Generally, civil statutes are held to a lesser standard of definiteness than

statutes imposing criminal penalties. See Med Exp. Ambulance Service, Inc., 96-

0543, p. 11, 684 So.2d at 367. In this case, BOE asserts the statute is civil in nature

and the lesser standard of definiteness applies. 32 In contrast, Plaintiffs assert the

statute is penal in nature and a stricter standard of definiteness applies.33 Whether

32
  In support thereof, BOE cites Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 431 So.2d
752, 760 (La. 1983), wherein this Court held the Code of Ethics was not penal in nature and,
therefore, subject to a less strict standard of specificity than criminal law. See also, Bonomo v. La.
Downs, Inc., 337 So.2d 553, 559 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1976)(wherein, although in dicta, the appellate
court opined: “There is a distinction in construing civil statutes where admittedly vague words are
employed and where no criminal penalty is imposed (with terms such as just cause, good moral
character, financial ability) from criminal statutes. See Annotation of U.S. Supreme Court cases
on this subject, 40 L.Ed.2d 823 (1975).”).
33
  In Gibbs Construction. Co. v. State, Department of Labor, 540 So.2d 268, 269 (La. 1989), this
Court emphasized that statutes which authorize the imposition of a penalty are to be strictly
construed. Plaintiffs assert that because a violation of La. R.S. 42:1113(B) resulted in imposition
of fines or penalties, La. R.S. 42:1113(B) was penal in nature and subject to construction under
the criminal statutes, and it should be strictly construed. The trial court agreed. In support, the trial
court cited Louisiana Board of Ethics v. Randolph, 13-1509, 2014 WL 4198343 at p. 3 n. 3 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 8/21/14), writ denied, 14-1987 (La. 11/21/14), 160 So.3d 974, wherein a footnote, the
appellate court espoused:
        We are aware that in Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 431
        So.2d 752, 759-60 (La.1983), the Supreme Court stated with little discussion that
        the Code of Ethics was not penal in nature. However, since Glazer was decided
        over thirty-years ago, the Supreme Court has held on several occasions, as has this
        Court, that statutes that impose civil fines or penalties are penal in nature and must
        be strictly construed. See Katie Realty, Ltd. v. Louisiana Citizens Property
        Insurance Corporation, 12-0588 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 324, 328-31; Iberia
        Medical Center v. Ward, 09-2705 (La. 11/30/10), 53 So.3d 421, 433-34; Gibbs
        Construction Company, Inc. v. State, Department of Labor, 540 So.2d 268, 269
        (La. 1989). We believe the latter decisions indicate a shift in the Supreme Court’s
        position regarding the penal nature of statutes, including provisions of the Code of
        Ethics, that impose civil fines and penalties.
The cases cited in support by the Randolph court did not involve Ethics Code violations. See Katie
Realty, Ltd. v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 12-0588 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 324
(wherein at issue was the interpretation of statutes imposing a penalty if the insurer failed to timely
pay settlement funds); and Iberia Med. Ctr. v. Ward, 09-2705 (La. 11/30/10), 53 So.3d 421
                                                   19
the statute at issue is penal in nature need not be resolved because, under a strict or

less stringent construction standard, we find, for the reasons discussed infra, the

phrase “in any way interested in” is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs

and unconstitutionally vague on its face in all of its applications. 34

       As discussed supra, La. R.S. 42:1113(B) provides:

             Other than a legislator, no appointed member of any board or
       commission, member of his immediate family, or legal entity in which
       he has a substantial economic interest shall bid on or enter into or be in
       any way interested in any contract, subcontract, or other transaction
       which is under the supervision or jurisdiction of the agency of such
       appointed member [emphasis added].

       Plaintiffs assert that the phrase “in any way interested in” is vague, and this

Court has previously held the same phrase unconstitutional in Murtes, 94 So.2d

446.35 The Murtes Court held the criminal statute failed to define the phrase “in any

way interested in” as to inform the purported offender of the action denounced as an

offense. Id., 94 So.2d at 448. Plaintiffs emphasize that the United States Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals has held that, “when entertaining a facial challenge to state or

municipal legislation, ‘[v]agueness can be ameliorated by a state court’s

authoritative interpretations, if they provide sufficient clarity.’” Roy v City of

Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir 2020)(quoting Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 5

v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 597 (5th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs urge the Ethics

(wherein this Court characterized the workers’ compensation statute imposing penalties and
attorney’s fees penal in nature, and applied a strict construction of the statute at issue).
34
   In State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La. 7/1/11), 67 So.3d 452, the defendants argued that the Sex
Offender Assessment Panels (SOAP)(La. R.S. 15:560 et seq.), which monitored the defendants’
behaviors after release, was unconstitutionally vague. This Court, because SOAP was a regulatory,
rather than a criminal, statutory scheme, suggested a void for vagueness constitutional analysis to
determine whether the scheme comports with due process was not proper. Id., 10-2804, pp. 15-16,
67 So.3d at 463. Notwithstanding, this Court has addressed the vagueness doctrine in cases where
a non-criminal statute was challenged as unconstitutionally vague. See Med Exp. Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 684 So.2d 359 and Louisiana Chem. Ass’n, 217 So.3d 455.
35
  BOE contends any reference to Murtes is merely a red herring. It argues there are three separate
means for Plaintiffs to have violated the Ethics Code under La. R.S. 42:1113(B), and this Court
need not analyze the phrase “in any way interested in” since Plaintiffs admit they entered into a
contract with LPTFA. However, EAB found Plaintiffs violated the statute on that basis, and EAB’s
decision was affirmed by the appellate court and became final.
                                                20
Code lacks a definition of the phrase, and EAB’s opinions or case law fail to define

the phrase. Plaintiffs contend it had no notice of the meaning of “in any way

interested in” and did not believe their participation in the project with the full

knowledge of the LPTFA was an ethical violation. Plaintiffs assert that, as in

Murtes, the statute’s failure to “indicate, determine or define the interest which it

seeks to prohibit is . . . fatal.” Id., 94 So.2d at 447.

       BOE asserts Plaintiffs failed to prove under no circumstances that the

prohibition in the phrase would be valid. BOE maintains that a reasonable

interpretation of La. R.S. 42:1113(B) provides Plaintiffs notice that contracting for

profit related to projects under the authority of the LPTFA constituted violations of

the Ethics Code.36 BOE emphasizes that courts have a duty to adopt a construction

of a statute that harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the

same subject. See Turner v. East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 17-1769, p. 4 (La. App.

1 Cir. 6/4/18), 252 So.3d 990, 993. BOE asserts that a plain reading of the phrase

“in any way interested in” with the other provisions of the Ethics Code makes it clear

the phrase is concerned with a public servant’s financial or pecuniary interests and

36
   BOE references a Florida Supreme Court case wherein the same phrase was challenged as
unconstitutionally vague. In State v. Dinsmore, 308 So.2d 32, 37-38 (Fla. 1975), the statute at
issue was similar to the one in Murtes:
        It is unlawful for any commissioned or other officer of this state, or for any officer
        elected or otherwise of any county or incorporated town or city therein, to bid or
        enter into, or be in any way interested in, a contract for the working of any public
        road or street, the construction or building of any bridge, the erecting or building
        of any house, or for the performance of any other public work in which the said
        officer was a party to the letting, and any person who violates the provisions of his
        section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. . . .
The trial court found the language “‘to be interested or be in any way interested in the contract or
the work for any public road’ . . . over broad in that the term ‘in any way interested in’ could very
well include conduct which would indicate at best limited relationship of the accused with alleged
criminal conduct.” Id. at 38. The Florida Supreme Court reversed holding: “It has long been the
policy of this Court, as between two or more possible constructions, to give a statute that
interpretation which would support its constitutionality. In that posture, we construe the words
‘interested in’ . . . to mean a financial interest, personal to the accused, and not related to the
community generally. With that construction, we find the statute to be not unconstitutional . . . .”
Id. While we acknowledge the Florida Supreme Court’s non-binding determination, this Court in
Murtes, when faced with multiple constructions of the same word/phrase, found it warranted a
finding of unconstitutional vagueness.
                                                 21
preventing a public servant from using his public office for private gain.37

Additionally, BOE contends that looking at the plain meaning of the word “interest”

as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, and

Dictionary.com in the context of the statute makes clear the phrase concerns a

financial or pecuniary interest.38 Furthermore, BOE asserts that the facts indicate

that Mr. Gachassin could have violated La. R.S. 42:1113(B) by entering into a

contract under the supervision or jurisdiction of his agency; thus, there was no need

to review the constitutionality of the phrase “be in any way interested.”

          Examining the phrase at issue in light of the facts, the undisputed evidence

shows Mr. Gachassin, while the chairman and a board member of the LPTFA and

acting in his capacity as President of Cartesian, entered into a project consultant

agreement between Cartesian and Cypress Trails LP, which Cartesian honored,

while the Cypress Trails project was under the supervision of LPTFA. La. R.S.

42:1113(B) clearly prohibited Plaintiffs from bidding on or entering into a contract

or subcontract with Cypress Trails LP. However, EAB held Plaintiffs each violated

section (B) of La. R.S. 42:1113 because they were “in any way interested in” the

project consultant agreement with Cypress Trails LP to provide services on Cypress

Trails, which finding was affirmed by the appellate court, and the judgment became

final.

37
   BOE references La. R.S. 42:1111 (payments for nonpublic services prohibited); La. R.S.
42:1112 (prohibited participation in certain transactions where a substantial economic interest is
present); La. R.S. 42:1113 (prohibited contractual arrangements); La. R.S. 42:1114 (financial
disclosures); and, La. R.S. 42:1115 (prohibited gifts or things of economic value).
38
     BOE writes:
        Black’s Law Dictionary defines “interest” to be the object of any human desire,
        especially, an advantage or profit of a financial nature (conflict of interest). An
        additional definition of “interest” includes the compensation fixed by agreement or
        allowed by law for the use or detention of money. Black’s Law Dictionary 828 (8th
        ed. 2007). Merriam-Webster defines “interest” as an advantage or benefit and
        defines “interested” as being affected or involved. Merriam-Webster.com
        Dictionary, Merriam-Webster (2022). Dictionary.com defines “interested” as
        influenced by personal or selfish motives or having an interest or share, or having
        money involved. Dictionary.com, Random House (2022).

                                                 22
       In Murtes, at issue was La. R.S. 48:422, which provided in part that “no

member of the legislature or officer of the executive department of the state shall be

in any way interested in any contract. . . .” This Court held that the words “‘in any

way interested’ are so broad, general and vague as to fail to define the offense which

the statute seeks to prohibit; and moreover it fails to constitutionally inform the

purported offender of the action denounced as an offense.” Id., 94 So.2d at 448.39 It

emphasized in pertinent part:

               The word ‘interested’ is defined in Webster’s New International
       Dictionary, Second Edition, as: 1. Having the attention engaged; having
       emotion or passion excited; as an interested listener. 2. Having an
       interest; having a share or concern in some project or affair; involved;
       liable to be affected or prejudiced; as, an interested witness; having self-
       interest; not disinterested; as generosity proceeding from interested
       motives.
               Conceivably the interest contemplated and intended to be
       prohibited by the statute could be a financial interest, but not an interest
       based on sentimental or ethical considerations alone. But the statute
       does not define so the term as used therein. It is further conceivable that
       interest which is a financial interest, which touches one’s pocket, is apt
       to prejudice the judgment. Interest which amounts to mere sentiment,
       good-will, or civic-mindedness may, and perhaps in rare cases does, so
       color the judgment of some, but the danger in the latter respect is far
       more remote. Manifestly the statute’s failure to indicate, determine,
       or define the interest which it seeks to prohibit is conspicuously
       fatal.

Id. at 447 (emphasis added). As in Murtes, the phrase “in any way interested in” set

forth in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) is undefined by the Ethics Code or cases interpreting

the Ethics Code.40 Turning to the language of the phrase itself, the starting point in

39
 As the result of an application for rehearing, this Court clarified its decree and held:
       LSA-R.S. 48:422 insofar as it prohibits any member of the Legislature or officer of
       the Executive Department of the State from being ‘in any way interested in any
       contract’ for the building or improving of any highway or any other public work
       coming under the supervision of the Department of Highways or in any contract for
       the furnishing of any material or supplies of any kind to be used in connection
       therewith is hereby decreed to be unconstitutional . . . .
Murtes, 94 So.2d at 448-49.

40
   BOE argues the trial court erred in failing to follow the legal precedent in Broussard v.
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 461 So.2d 1227 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). In
Broussard, the plaintiff who entered into a subcontract with his agency was found in violation of
La. R.S. 42:1113(B). On appeal, the plaintiff argued that La. R.S. 42:1113(B) can be construed to
prohibit a great number of activities which were not reasonably related to the legislative goal in
adopting the Ethics Code. The appellate court rejected the argument reasoning that “the various
                                               23
interpreting any statute, we look to the common and approved usage of the undefined

word “interested” in the context of the Ethics Code as a whole. See La. R.S. 1:3

(“Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed

according to the common and approved usage of the language.”); La. C.C. art. 10

(“When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be

interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”);

and, Hopkins v. Howard, 05-0732, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/5/06), 930 So.2d 999,

1005, writ denied, 06-1047 (La. 6/23/06), 930 So.2d 984 (quoting 2A Norman

Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:28 (6th ed.2000))(“Dictionaries

provide a useful starting point for determining what statutory terms mean, at least in

the abstract, by suggesting what the legislature could have meant by using particular

terms.”).

prohibitions contained in Section 1113(B), which generally addresses the question of public
servants, their families, and their companies entering into business transactions with the public
servant’s agency, are essential to the Legislature’s goals in enacting the Code.” Id. at 1234. The
appellate court looked to the Ethics Code’s declaration of policy set forth in La. R.S. 42:1101(B)
to define the goals:
        It is essential to the proper operation of democratic government that elected
        officials and public employees be independent and impartial; that governmental
        decisions and policy be made in the proper channel of the governmental structure;
        that public office and employment not be used for private gain other than the
        remuneration provided by law; and[,] that there be public confidence in the integrity
        of government. The attainment of one or more of these ends is impaired when a
        conflict exists between the private interests of an elected official or a public
        employee and his duties as such. The public interest, therefore, requires that the law
        protect against such conflicts of interest and that it establish appropriate ethical
        standards with respect to the conduct of elected officials and public employees
        without creating unnecessary barriers to public service. It is the purpose of this
        Chapter to implement these policies and objectives.
Id. BOE asserts the appellate court in Broussard held “in any way interested” in La. R.S.
42:1113(B) was essential to the legislature’s goals to protect the appearance of integrity of
governmental agencies and processes, which supports a finding that the phrase is constitutional.
Plaintiffs assert that BOE’s reliance on Broussard, 461 So.2d 1227, is misplaced. They emphasize
that the defendant in Broussard was found in violation of section (B) of La. R.S. 42:1113 because
he entered into a subcontract with his agency; the phrase being challenged by Plaintiffs was not at
issue. We agree Broussard is not dispositive of the issue before us. The violation in Broussard,
entering into a subcontract with his agency, was specifically prohibited in La. R.S. 42:1113(B).
The declaration of policy set forth in La. R.S. 42:1101(B) did not address what the meaning of “in
any way interested in” included.

                                                24
       “Interested” in the phrase “be in any way interested in” is a verb. Black’s

Law Dictionary (2nd Edition) does not define the verb “interested,” but defines the

term “interested person” as “the term given to a concerned person or a person with

a share in something.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (2023) defines “interest”

the verb as “to arouse or hold the interest of” and “to persuade to participate or take

part.” Dictionary.com (2023) defines the verb “interest” as follows: a. “to engage

or excite the attention or curiosity of”; b. “to concern (a person, nation, etc.) in

something”; c. “to cause to take a personal concern or share; induce to participate”;

and, d. “to cause to be concerned.”

       Looking to common and approved usage of the word “interested” in the

phrase at issue in context of the Ethics Code as a whole, we find the phrase is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts in the instant case. Plaintiffs, as

movers, proved they did not have a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct

was prohibited under the phrase “in any way interested in.” The phrase at issue

prohibits no specific or definite act and “leaves open the widest conceivable inquiry,

the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow

or adequately guard against.” Boyd, 97-0579, p. 3, 710 So.2d at 1076-77 (citing

Powell, 423 U.S. at 92; L Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89). As emphasized by

this Court in Murtes, “Courts can do no more than interpret and construe statutes.

They cannot, under the guise of interpretation, assume legislative function.” Id., 94

So.2d at 448 (citation omitted). 41

41
  Compare cases in which this Court rejected a vagueness challenge: Glazer v. Comm’n on Ethics
for Pub. Emps., 431 So.2d 752, wherein this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to an Ethics
Code violation when this Court found the challenged terms were defined in the Ethics Code; and,
Med Exp. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 684 So.2d 359, wherein a vagueness challenge to Evangeline
Parish Code Art. II, § 24-20 through 24-32, which set forth a regulatory scheme for ambulance
services within Evangeline Parish, was upheld on the basis that, from the ordinances, an applicant
knew the application process, and the ordinance provided objective standards for determining
whether to issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity. See also, Barber v. La.
Workforce Comm’n, 17-0844, p. 21 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/19/18), 266 So.3d 368, 385, writ denied,
18-1878 (La. 2/18/19), 264 So.3d 451, cert denied, 140 S.Ct. 158 (2019), wherein the appellate
court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the phrase “higher ranking” in LAC 40:I.2715(L) was
impermissibly vague, reasoning testimony indicated the different levels of medical literature were
                                               25
       When the burden shifted to BOE, it failed to show genuine issues of material

fact remain, and that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

       Thus, the trial court was correct in finding Plaintiffs established that the phrase

“in any way interested in” was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them, in

violation of Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional right to due process. As the

Plaintiffs established the phrase was unconstitutionally vague as applied to their

conduct, the trial court was correct in finding, as in Murtes, the phrase

unconstitutionally vague on its face in all of its applications. There are no set of

circumstances under which the phrase “in any way interested in” as set forth in La.

R.S. 42:1113(B) would be valid. See State v. Webb, 13-1681, pp. 6-7 (La. 5/7/14),

144 So.3d 971, 977 (quoting Prejean v. Barousse, 12-1177, p. 4 (La. 1/29/13), 107

So.3d 569, 571-72)(“To challenge a legislative act as unconstitutional on its face is

the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must

establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.”).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment.

BOE’s Motion for Summary Judgment

       As Plaintiffs established they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law, the trial court’s denial of BOE’s summary judgment was warranted.42

described in the medical treatment schedule, and, while the process of locating higher ranking
scientific medical literature may be difficult, it was not unclear as to what must be proved.
42
   Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike one of BOE’s exhibits filed in support of its motion for
summary judgment, EAB’s decision. Plaintiffs alleged the exhibit was unsworn, unverified, and
not properly attached to an affidavit. On appeal, Defendants complain the trial court erred by
improperly considering Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. First, the trial court’s judgment was silent as
to this issue. When a trial court judgment is silent as to a claim or demand, it is presumed the relief
sought was denied. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 12 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d
16, 26 (citations omitted). Second, La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2) provides: “[a]ny objection to a
document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum.” Comment (k) of the
Revision Comments 2015 to Article 966 states that this “provision changes prior law by
specifically removing the motion to strike as a means of raising an objection to a document offered
by an adverse party in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and does not
allow a party to file that motion.” Finally, Plaintiffs do not argue the decision was incomplete or
altered. Thus, Defendants’ complaint is moot.

                                                  26
                                          CONCLUSION

        The trial court erred in finding the phrase “in any way interested in” set forth

in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) facially unconstitutionally overbroad; thus, that portion of

the judgment is reversed. However, we find the trial court correctly determined the

phrase was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs, in violation of

Plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional right to due process, and unconstitutionally

vague on its face in all of its applications. As a result, the phrase “or be in any way

interested in” is hereby struck from La. R.S. 42:1113(B). We find the remainder of

the statute remains viable and can stand.43 Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment

is affirmed in part, amended in part, and affirmed as amended.

   AFFIRMED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART; AFFIRMED AS
AMENDED, AND REVERSED IN PART.

43
   In State v. Azar, 539 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La. 1989), this Court held in pertinent part:
            The unconstitutionality of one portion of a statute does not necessarily render
        the entire statute unenforceable. If the remaining portion of the statute is severable
        from the offending portion, this court may strike only the offending portion and
        leave the remainder intact.” The test for severability is whether the unconstitutional
        portions of the statute are so interrelated and connected with the constitutional parts
        that they cannot be separated without destroying the intention manifested by the
        legislature in passing the act. Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 237 La. 315,
        111 So.2d 126 (1958).
In the present case, the phrase “or be in any way interested in” adds little, if anything, to the statute.
Removal of the phrase will not affect the legislative intent behind section (B) of La. R.S. 42:1113.

                                                   27
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                 No. 2023-CA-00398

      THE CARTESIAN COMPANY, INC. AND GREG GACHASSIN

                                         VS.

THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ETHICS ADJUDICATORY
    BOARD PANEL A AND THE LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS

  On Appeal from the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge

CRICHTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons:

      I concur in the majority’s finding that the language “in any way interested in”

found in La. R.S. 42:1113(B) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. However, I

disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the phrase is unconstitutionally vague

as applied to plaintiffs herein and “unconstitutionally vague on its face as to all of

its applications.” For the reasons that follow, I dissent.

      As a general rule, statutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore, the

party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of proving its

unconstitutionality. City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement and

Relief Fund, 05-2548 (La. 10/1/07), 986 So. 2d 1. Furthermore, “[t]o challenge a

legislative act as unconstitutional on its face is the most difficult challenge to mount

successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist

under which the statute would be valid.” State v. Webb, 13-1681, p. 6-7 (La. 5/7/14),

144 So. 3d 971, 977, quoting Prejean v. Barousse, 12-1177, p. 4 (La. 1/29/13), 107

So. 3d 569, 571-72. In my view, plaintiff in these circumstances has not met this

heavy burden of establishing that the phrase “in any way interested in” is vague such

that he, a person of above-ordinary intelligence serving on the Board of Trustees for

the Lafayette Public Trust Financing Authority (“LPTFA”), did not have a

reasonable opportunity to know that he is prohibited from bidding on or entering

                                           1
into a contract or subcontract which would “in any way” be of interest to him.

Plaintiff knowingly entered into development and construction projects that were

under the supervision or jurisdiction of LPTFA and which financially benefitted his

own company to the tune of nearly $1,000,000. The record before us establishes

that plaintiff is not an inexperienced businessperson and, in my view, is very much

the “person of ordinary intelligence” that the law contemplates. Thus, I find

plaintiff’s argument that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to know that his

conduct was prohibited disingenuous.

         Finally, I find the majority’s reliance on the decades old case of State v.

Murtes, 232 La. 486 (1957), reh’g denied, 2/25/57, unpersuasive. In Murtes, this

Court found similar language in La. R.S. 48:422, a criminal statute addressing the

prohibition of a member of the legislature or executive department of the state from

being “in any way interested in” any contract for the building or improving of a

highway or public work under the supervision of the Department of Highways,

unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the Court found “the words of the statute ‘in

any way interested’ are so broad, general and vague as to fail to define the offense

which the statute seeks to prohibit; and moreover it fails to constitutionally inform

the purported offender of the action denounced as an offense.” Id. at 492. Not only

does the Court’s Murtes decision predate the United States Supreme Court’s more

recent guidance on constitutional analyses, as noted by Justice Crain in his partial

dissent, the Court in Murtes did not strike the language from the statute (as the

majority has done in this instance). Notably, La. R.S. 48:422 has not been revised

and currently maintains the same language. 1

1
    La. R.S. 48:422 presently provides:

         Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no member of the legislature or officer
         of the executive department of the state shall be in any way interested in any
         contract for the building or improving of any public work coming under the
         supervision of the Department of Transportation and Development or in any
         contract for the furnishing of any material or supplies of any kind to be used in
                                                  2
       Accordingly, I find the majority incorrectly concludes the phrase “in any way

interested in” is unconstitutionally vague such that it warrants striking that language

from the statute. I would vacate the trial court’s ruling and find La. R.S. 42:1113(B)

constitutional in its entirety.

       connection therewith, nor shall any such member or officer receive any gratuity,
       commission, or payment of any sort as compensation for the procurement of any
       such contract.

       Nothing contained in this Section prohibits members of the legislature or officers
       of the executive department of the state who are licensed contractors under the laws
       of this state from bidding on any contract for the building or improving of any
       public work coming under the supervision of the Department of Transportation and
       Development nor from being awarded such contracts on a competitive basis as
       provided by law.

       Whoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be fined not more than one
       thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than twelve months, or both, and shall
       be removed from his position by the governor if he is an officer of the executive
       department.

                                                3
                     SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                               No. 2023-CA-00398

      THE CARTESIAN COMPANY, INC. AND GREG GACHASSIN

                                        VS.

THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ETHICS ADJUDICATORY
    BOARD PANEL A AND THE LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS

  On Appeal from the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge

CRAIN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

      I agree the statutory language at issue is not unconstitutionally overbroad. I

disagree with the majority’s conclusion the provision is unconstitutionally vague.

      A statute is unconstitutionally vague if an ordinary person of reasonable

intelligence is not capable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct to

it. State v. Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d 531, 532 (La. 1989). A law must give the person

of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that

he may act accordingly. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,

Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498; 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193; 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). When, as

here, First Amendment freedoms are not implicated, a vagueness challenge must be

examined in light of the facts of the case at hand. See United States v. Powell, 423

U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); State v. Hair, 00-2694 (La.

5/15/01), 784 So. 2d 1269, 1273. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is

clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the

conduct of others.” Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495; 102 S.Ct. at 1191. A court

should thus examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other hypothetical

applications of the law. Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495; 102 S.Ct. at 1191.
        Louisiana Revised Statute 42:1113B provides that “no appointed member of

any board . . . or legal entity in which he has a substantial economic interest shall

bid on or enter into or be in any way interested in any contract . . . which is under

the supervision or jurisdiction of the agency of such appointed member.” Greg

Gachassin was chairman of a public financing authority involved in the development

of two affordable housing projects. It is undisputed the housing projects and various

contracts related thereto fell under the supervision and jurisdiction of the financing

authority chaired by Gachassin. Acting through his wholly owned company,

Gachassin entered lucrative consulting agreements for both projects that ultimately

paid him a total of $1,000,000.

        Looking at the language of Section 1113B, a person of ordinary intelligence

can reasonably discern that the substantial compensation to be received by

Gachassin for consulting on the housing projects made him “interested in any

contract” under the financing authority’s supervision and jurisdiction. See Village

of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498; 102 S.Ct. at 1193; Hair, 784 So. 2d at 1273;

Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d at 532. The law thus gave Gachassin “fair notice that his

contemplated conduct is forbidden.” See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405

U.S. 156, 162; 92 S.Ct. 839, 843; 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); State v. Comeaux, 319 So.

2d 897, 899 (La. 1975). Because Gachassin engaged in conduct clearly proscribed

by Section 1113B, he cannot complain the law is unconstitutionally vague. See

Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495; 102 S.Ct. at 1191; State v. Hair, 784 So. 2d at

1273.

        This case is factually distinguishable from State v. Murtes, 232 La. 486; 94

So.2d 446 (1957), which involved a criminal statute subject to greater scrutiny. See

Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498-99; 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 (“The Court has also

expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties

because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”) Unlike the

                                          2
defendant in Murtes, Gachassin also had the opportunity to get an advisory opinion

from the Board of Ethics before engaging in his questionable conduct. See La. R.S.

42:1134E; Duplantis v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 00-1750 (La. 3/23/01), 782 So. 2d

582, 586. Less scrutiny is applied to an allegedly vague law where “the regulated

enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own

inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.” Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at

498; 102 S.Ct. at 1193; Med Express Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Evangeline Parish

Police Jury, 96-0543 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 359, 367. Lastly, Murtes predated

a host of cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and this court providing greater clarity

for the appropriate legal standards used to determine if a law is unconstitutionally

vague. See e.g. Village of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498; 102 S.Ct. at 1193; United States

v. Powell, 423 U.S. at 92, 96 S.Ct. at 319-20; State v. Hair, 784 So. 2d at 1273; Med

Express Ambulance, 684 So. 2d at 367; State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d at 899.

      Given the facts of this case, the phrase “in any way interested in any contract,”

as used in La. R.S. 42:1113B, is not unconstitutionally vague. I would reverse the

summary judgment granted to plaintiffs and grant summary judgment to defendants

declaring La. R.S. 42:1113B constitutional.

                                          3