Court Opinion

ID: 9861151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:47:17.899809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:23.942244
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Britt-El was not accorded all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled at the time his first post-conviction petition was filed. Britt-El’s first petition was improperly dismissed by the circuit court, on the court’s own motion, on the grounds that it was untimely. As we recently held in People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), such sua sponte dismissals are not permitted under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. A significant feature of Boclair is that it did not limit its interpretation of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to cases pending on direct review or those arising in the future. We should not impose such a limitation now. Decisions by our court are presumed to apply retroactively as well as prospectively. Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 196 (1999); Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (1992). Although that presumption may be overcome, prospective-only application is the exception. Retroactivity is the norm. Unless our court has expressly stated in its ruling that the decision will only be applied prospectively, overcoming the presumption in favor of retroactivity requires consideration of three factors: (1)whether the decision established a new principle of law; (2) whether, given the purposes and history of the new rule, its operation would be retarded or promoted by prospective application; and (3) whether substantial inequitable results would be produced if the decision were applied retroactively. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 197; Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 88 (1997). The first of these three factors is a threshold requirement. If it is not met, that is, if the decision does not establish a new principle of law, there is no need for further inquiry. The presumption cannot be overcome. The decision will not be limited to prospective application. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 197. Contrary to the majority’s view, Boclair did not produce a change in the law. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act did not mean one thing prior to our decision in Boclair and something else afterward. In construing the plain language of the Act as we did in Boclair, our court established no new common law principles. We recognized no new rules of constitutional procedure. We overruled no prior decisions of this court. Our decision interpreting the Act simply declared what the law had always meant from its effective date forward. See Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir. 1975). That being so, there is no basis for overcoming the presumption in favor of retroactive as well as prospective application. The interpretation of the Act we followed in Boclair is unquestionably applicable to the present case. People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19 (1998), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the decisions cited by my colleagues to reach a contrary result, are inapposite. Unlike the post-conviction proceeding before us today, neither of those cases involved the applicability of a decision which merely interpreted and applied the plain language of an existing statute. Where a judicial interpretation of a statue involves a commonsense construction based on the clear wording of the law as enacted by the General Assembly, the notion that the decision should be applied only prospectively is untenable. See People v. Turnbeaugh, 116 Ill. App. 3d 199, 205 (1983). The appellate court’s opinion in People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1995), cited by my colleagues, does not alter this conclusion. The issue in Heirens was not whether the court could summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition as untimely on its own motion, but whether the State should be barred from challenging the petition’s timeliness. Unlike Boclair and the case before us today, the timeliness of the petition in Heirens was specifically challenged by the State in its motions to dismiss. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 399. The statutory authority of the trial court to rule, sua sponte, that the petition had been filed too late was neither raised nor decided. Even if Heirens could be construed as authorizing the circuit court’s action at the time Britt-El’s first petition was dismissed, that is not a sufficient basis for refusing to follow Boclair now. As previously indicated, Boclair established no new criminal or common law rules. It merely interpreted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in accordance with the Act’s plain language. Giving the clear language of a statute its effect as written cannot be said to result in a change in the law, even where prior decisions of the appellate court have reached contrary interpretations. See People v. Crete, 113 Ill. 2d 156, 160-63 (1986). Accordingly, new judicial decisions which do not enlarge the meaning of a statute but simply interpret the statute’s unambiguous language will be followed in post-conviction proceedings notwithstanding the fact that the appellate court may once have construed the law differently. See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 367-69 (1996); People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430-37 (1997). Because the circuit court misapplied the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and dismissed Britt-El’s original petition when it had no statutory authority to do so, the initial post-conviction proceedings were fundamentally deficient. They served none of the purposes for which the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted. In this regard, the situation is analogous to that presented to our court in People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972), where the circuit court erroneously dismissed the original post-conviction petition without appointing counsel. Because of the circuit court’s fundamental error, our court viewed the original proceedings as a virtual nullity. People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988). I fail to see how we can take a different view here. The majority’s contention that Britt-El was not prejudiced by the circuit court’s failure to follow the plain language of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is misguided. It is easy for the State to claim now that it would have challenged the timeliness of the original post-conviction petition if the circuit court had not raised the matter first, but the fact is that it did not. The State was not obligated to move for dismissal of the original petition on the grounds that it was untimely, and it filed no such motion. The timeliness of the petition became an issue only when it was improperly injected into the case by the circuit court. The State does not invariably raise all of the affirmative defenses available to it, and we have no basis to assume that it would have raised a limitations defense here. Although the State did embrace that defense later, it is important to remember that the subsequent litigation regarding the timeliness of the original petition was necessary only because of the circuit court’s initial error in dismissing the petition. Had the circuit court not acted in violation of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the petition’s timeliness may never have been contested and Britt-El would not have been forced into a position of having to plead, after the fact, that the delay should be excused. By allowing the circuit court’s undeniable error in dismissing Britt-El’s original post-conviction petition on procedural grounds to block Britt-El from litigating the merits of his post-conviction claims in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding, the majority has denied him the “ ‘one complete opportunity to show a substantial denial of his constitutional rights’ ” to which he is entitled. See Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 376, quoting People v. Logan, 72 Ill. 2d 358, 370 (1978). That is not justice. It is the impersonation of justice. Fundamental fairness and the law demand a contrary result. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court affirming dismissal of Britt-El’s second petition for post-conviction relief should be reversed, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for farther proceedings. I therefore dissent.