Court Opinion

ID: 9478338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:46:47.570793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:22.875986
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority here asserts a novel and startling conclusion — that although plaintiff has won decisively on one theory, all other possible theories supporting its claim must be pursued to conclusion in the district court before judgment is appealable under Rule 54(b). What the majority seems to ignore here is the basic proposition that to “win” a plaintiff need prevail on only one theory, while to “win” a defendant must prevail on all the theories proposed by the plaintiff. I agree that what we have here is one “claim” of IHB against Cyanamid based on two theories— strict liability and negligence. Had IHB lost on its strict liability theory, that loss would not have been appealable, because the remaining negligence theory would have afforded a completely viable opportunity for plaintiff to achieve full vindication of its claim. However, I do not agree that IHB, once it has prevailed on its strict liability theory and received a money judg*1447ment for its claimed damages, has any further claim — or part of a claim — against Cyanamid. Because IHB won on its strict liability theory, its negligence theory is moot, unless and until the district court’s ruling is reversed.
The majority here has cited not a single case in which a plaintiff won all that was sought on summary judgment (with judgment entered to that effect), but was held not to have a final judgment for Rule 54 purposes.1 Clearly, under the eases cited by the majority, if IHB had lost on its strict liability theory, there would be nothing final about that determination, and the parties would move on to litigate negligence. However, what we are ordering here, it seems, is that a plaintiff, having won all he asks on a summary judgment, must go on to prosecute on all his other theories — presumably to confer finality on his “claim.”2
*1448There may be scenarios under which such an approach might relieve some burdens on appellate judges. However, it seems more likely to impose totally redundant and indefensible burdens on appellate and trial courts alike, which will have to pursue consideration of multiple theories in the many cases where one would suffice. It effectively requires the plaintiff to fire additional bullets into the corpse of a defendant he has already killed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. In many of the Seventh Circuit cases cited by the majority, plaintiffs had lost on one or more theories, but had remaining to them alternate theories on which relief could be sought. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chemical Group, Inc., 725 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.1984) (summary judgment for defendant on three of plaintiffs five theories not ap-pealable); Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.1983) (summary judgment for defendant on time-barred discrimination claims and on class certification not appealable while rest of discrimination claim remained undecided in district court). In ODC Communications Corp. v. Wenruth Investments, 826 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.1987), cited by the majority, the plaintiff won a partial summary judgment on its claim seeking pre-judgment possession of the property in question, but the appellate court specifically noted that the trial court had not finally decided the issue of ownership and permanent possession. Thus plaintiff had not won all it sought on the "ownership" issue.
Several other Seventh Circuit cases involve appeals on claims for which counterclaims, directly attacking the foundations of the successful claims, still remained for disposition. See Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v. Dominik, 852 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.1988) (Count I of counterclaim asserts "same claim” as complaint; no appeal while counterclaim still pending); In re Berke, 837 F.2d 293 (7th Cir.1988) (summary judgment for debtor on request for payment for services not appealable before resolution of city's counterclaim alleging debtor’s claims to be fraudulent); but see American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 739 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir.1984) (where summary judgment for plaintiff effectively disposes of defendants’ counterclaim, appellate court will grant review; however, use of Rule 54(b) in this case “unnecessary”). Although Cyanamid has a counterclaim pending, it sounds in negligence, and thus does not attack the district court’s holding on strict liability; a finding that IHB had been negligent would not affect a recovery based on strict liability. Appendix of Appellant at 40. Further, the factual inquiry required for a finding of negligence clearly differs from that required for a finding of strict liability, for which inquiry into fault and the causal details behind the accident were unnecessary. Cf. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 432, 83 L.Ed.2d 359 (1984) (special master and district judge could have — but did not — reach territorial exclusivity issue in deciding appealed charges, but must reach issue to decide remaining charge; appeal allowed).
There is a third-party complaint remaining, but it does not impede appeal under 54(b) because it involves a distinct party. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.1986); National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.1986); Walker v. Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 599 (7th Cir.1985). Thus, in no Seventh Circuit case cited was review denied where plaintiff won full vindication on one theory of a multi-theory claim, with no pending counterclaims that would call that victory into question.
This is also true of the cases from other circuits cited by the majority. Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998 (D.C.Cir.1984) (dismissal of one of plaintiffs theories not appealable while two viable theories remained); Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 732 F.2d 1167 (3d Cir.1984) (dismissal of one of plaintiff’s theories against federal officials not appealable under 54(b) while two other grounds for relief remained); McIntyre v. First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 585 F.2d 190 (6th Cir.1978) (district court judgment for defendant on federal portion of single count not appealable while state law portion remained); Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.1978) (district court should not grant separate summary judgment for defendant on each of two issues when they constitute a single claim); Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1968) (order dismissing two of three causes of action as to seven of ten defendants satisfies Rule 54(b) multiple claim requirement, but fails on “no just reason for delay” requirement); Rieser v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 224 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.1955) (district court dismissal of time-barred claims ap-pealable though timely claims remained).

. The dubious procedural posture of the case at this point is underscored by an examination of what should happen next. Why, for example, should the plaintiff want to pursue these alternative theories when it has won all it sought and had judgment entered in its favor? The only plausible reason would be to confer finality on its claim since lack of finality presumably prevents collection of its judgment.
A plaintiff in this situation could, of course, elect to abandon its other theories to confer *1448finality on the result, but this might require it to risk losing valid claims altogether if the district court decision is not affirmed on appeal because in some cases the plaintiff may be barred by res judicata from subsequently raising alternative theories not raised in the original action. Even in cases in which this could be avoided, the plaintiff and district court would then have to go through the needlessly cumbersome process of reinstating portions of the original complaint, a result unlikely to promote the goal of judicial efficiency.
The defendant, on the other hand, is placed in the odd position of having to push forward to achieve resolution of the plaintiff’s alternative theories in order to appeal an adverse decision that if affirmed would fully settle the issue.
Finally, consider the stance of this case if the plaintiffs original complaint had been the only claim involved — or if, upon remand, all the remaining claims were disposed of without additional consideration of the plaintiff’s negligence count. (As a practical matter, that is unlikely to occur in this case because Cyanamid’s cross and counterclaims against IHB both raise negligence issues. But the content of the outstanding claims in this case should not govern our treatment of the procedural problem here.) If the outstanding cross, counter and third-party claims were resolved, the defendant could presumably appeal the district court's ruling on strict liability without any further action on the negligence count — because in that case there would be no need for Rule 54(b) certification. The single claim involved in this appeal would be deemed finally decided as it stands, even with the negligence count unresolved, if the outstanding cross, counter or third-party claims were disposed of. The same would not be true if the district court had granted summary judgment for the defendant on the strict liability count. It is unclear what practical justification the majority finds for applying so different a standard for finality within a single claim under Rule 54(b); the key difference should be in determining finality as between unarguably distinct claims. Neither the rationale behind the rule nor any related case law supports the new standard announced here for determination of finality within single claims.