Court Opinion

ID: 9383829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:54.42075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.270075
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0394-MR

CHASE STONE                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CR-00122

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                               OPINION
                   VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Chase Stone appeals the trial court’s imposition of

court costs. Appellant argues that he is a poor person and the costs should have

been waived. We agree; therefore, we vacate the portion of Appellant’s conviction

that requires him to pay court costs. We remand for the entry of a new judgment

and sentence which waives the court costs.
                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              On March 18, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to two years in prison

pursuant to a guilty plea.1 He was also ordered to pay $185 in court costs and a

$25 bond fee, for a total of $210 in court costs and fees. Appellant had secured his

release prior to sentencing by paying $150 toward a partially secured bond.2 At

sentencing, the court indicated that it was going to release the bond and apply the

$150 toward the court costs and fees. Appellant was then ordered to pay the

remainder of the costs and fees by March 1, 2023. Appellant appeals the

imposition of court costs.

                                        ANALYSIS

              This issue was not preserved for review; therefore, we will review it

for palpable error. Jones v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 820, 822 (Ky. App.

2017).

              A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
              party may be considered by the court on motion for a
              new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
              insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
              appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
              that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

1
  We note that this two-year term was to run consecutively with a six-year term of imprisonment
stemming from another conviction for a total of eight years in prison.
2
 Appellant’s bond was $1,500, but he was allowed to post a partially secured bond in the
amount of $150. This was ten percent of the full bond amount.

                                              -2-
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. “[I]f upon consideration of

the whole case the reviewing court does not conclude that a substantial possibility

exists that the result would have been any different, the error complained of will be

held to be nonprejudicial.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Ky.

App. 1986) (citation omitted). This Court has previously held that the imposition

of court costs on a poor defendant is palpable error. Jones, 527 S.W.3d at 822.

             Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 23A.205 states:

             (1) Court costs for a criminal case in the Circuit Court
             shall be one hundred dollars ($100).

             (2) The taxation of court costs against a defendant, upon
             conviction in a case, shall be mandatory and shall not be
             subject to probation, suspension, proration, deduction, or
             other form of nonimposition in the terms of a plea
             bargain or otherwise, unless the court finds that the
             defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2)
             and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be
             unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future.

             (3) If the court finds that the defendant does not meet the
             standard articulated in subsection (2) of this section and
             that the defendant is nonetheless unable to pay the full
             amount of the court costs, fees, or fines at the time of
             sentencing, then the court may establish an installment
             payment plan in accordance with KRS 534.020.

KRS 453.190(2) defines a poor person as “a person who . . . is unable to pay the

costs and fees of the proceeding in which he is involved without depriving himself

or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter, or clothing.”

                                          -3-
              On appeal, Appellant argues that he is a poor person and should not

have been ordered to pay the court costs and fees. We agree.

              KRS 23A.205 contemplates three distinct and mutually
              exclusive classifications of persons: (1) those who are
              able to pay their costs, (2) “poor persons” who are not
              required to pay court costs at all, and (3) those who are
              not “poor persons,” yet nevertheless cannot pay
              immediately and are entitled to enter into a payment plan.

Jones, 527 S.W.3d at 823. Here, during the sentencing hearing, the court asked if

Appellant could pay the full amount of the court costs. He responded in the

negative. Evidence in the record also indicates that, while Appellant is an able

bodied person who could conceivably hold a job, he was unemployed at the time of

sentencing.

              In addition, Appellant moved to pursue his appeal in forma pauperis.

The trial court granted the motion on April 1, 2022, finding that he was a pauper

pursuant to KRS 453.190 and KRS 31.110(2)(b). KRS 31.110(2)(b) entitles a

“needy person” to representation by an attorney even if they cannot afford one.3

KRS 453.190(1), on the other hand, allows a “poor person” to proceed on appeal

without paying any costs. The case of Miller v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857,

870 (Ky. 2013), held that an appellate court can consider whether a defendant was

3
 A “needy person” for purposes of appointed counsel is not the same as a “poor person” for the
purposes of waiving court costs. Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Ky. 2012).

                                              -4-
granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to KRS 453.190 in determining whether

court costs and fees should have been waived.

             Finally, Appellant’s sentence was filled out on an AOC form. This

form has a section allowing a defendant to pay costs and fees pursuant to an

installment plan. This section was left blank by the court. Although Appellant

was given just under a year to pay the costs and fees, he was specifically not put on

an installment plan, his payment was only deferred. See Chadwell v.

Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 899 (Ky. 2021).

             Taking all the above information into consideration, we conclude that

Appellant was a poor person who was entitled to have his court costs and bond fee

waived. Appellant stated he was unable to pay the remainder of the costs and fees

after the $150 was applied. He was also unemployed and was entering an eight-

year term of imprisonment. These facts indicate Appellant was unable to pay the

costs at present or within the foreseeable future; therefore, he does not fit within

the Jones classification number one. Appellant was also not put on an installment

plan; therefore, he does not fit within the Jones classification number three.

Finally, fourteen days after Appellant was sentenced, the trial court considered him

to be a poor person for the purposes of filing an appeal. Appellant could not pay

the full amount of the costs at sentencing, will not be able to pay for the

foreseeable future, and the trial court classified Appellant as a poor person for the

                                          -5-
purposes of filing an appeal. This means that Appellant fits within the Jones

classification number two and the court costs and bond fee should have been

waived.

             We believe the Jones case cited above supports our decision. In

Jones, another panel of this Court held that the imposition of $160 in court costs to

William Jones was erroneous. The Court held that Mr. Jones “had no job, assets or

income, was facing a three and one-half year prison sentence, and had nothing but

a phone card while in jail.” Jones, 527 S.W.3d at 823. The Court in Jones also

took into consideration the fact that the trial court considered Mr. Jones a poor

person for purposes of filing an in forma pauperis appeal. Id. at 824. A similar

situation is before us. Appellant was deemed a poor person for purposes of appeal,

he has no employment, he is facing a multiyear sentence, and it appears the only

asset he has is the $150 bond payment.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the forgoing, we vacate that part of Appellant’s conviction

which required him to pay court costs and the bond fee. Appellant is a poor person

and those costs and fees should have been waived. The court’s conclusion to the

contrary was palpable error.

                                         -6-
           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Julia K. Pearson          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Perry T. Ryan
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                         -7-