Court Opinion

ID: 9556233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:09:27.498035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:58.106028
License: Public Domain

J-A12041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    EDWARD TURNER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1724 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                      at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000941-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 16, 2023

       Edward Turner appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his convictions for driving under the influence of a controlled substance

(“DUI”)-impaired ability, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of

small amount of marijuana, speeding, and careless driving.1 Turner challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

       Turner was arrested after being pulled over on State Route 22 for

traveling at a high rate of speed. N.T. 5/2/22 at 30-32, 37. At Turner’s trial,

the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Robert Griffin of the

Pennsylvania State Police. Id. at 24. Trooper Griffin testified that at the time

of his testimony, he had been a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police for

nine years. Id. Throughout his career, Trooper Griffin had conducted
____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(31)(i); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a)(2); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a).
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thousands of traffic stops and completed approximately 250 DUI arrests, with

roughly a quarter of those DUI arrests being related to marijuana use. Id. at

25, 112-13.

       Trooper Griffin testified that he and his partner conducted a traffic stop

of the car driven by Turner because Turner was traveling at 90 miles per hour

in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. Id. at 30-31. While conducting the traffic stop

and speaking with Turner, Trooper Griffin detected the smell of marijuana. Id.

at 32. Trooper Griffin said that Turner then told him that he had partial

marijuana cigarettes in the center console. Id. Trooper Griffin also observed

that Turner had red eyes and a piece of green vegetable matter that he

believed was marijuana in his beard. Id. at 32-33. When Trooper Griffin

pointed out the green substance, Turner “flicked” it out of the window and

onto the road. Id. at 33. Trooper Griffin testified that Turner admitted he had

smoked marijuana approximately one hour before the traffic stop. Id.

       Based on the interaction during the stop, Trooper Griffin asked Turner

to get out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests, including the “walk and

turn,” “one-leg stand,” and “Romberg” tests.2 Id. at 35, 41, 105-06. Trooper

Griffin stated that when Turner exited the vehicle, he smelled an odor of

marijuana on Turner’s person and breath. Id. at 34. During the field sobriety

tests, Turner exhibited difficulty with balance and maintaining certain

____________________________________________

2 The “Romberg” test is a balance and estimation test during where the subject

is instructed to tilt their head back while standing with their arms at their side,
and estimate the passage of thirty seconds. N.T., 5/2/22, at 105-06.

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positions, stepped out of designated lines, and swayed.3 Id. at 35, 94-95,

103, 109-10. He also exhibited glassy, bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, and

difficulty in following the trooper’s instructions. Id. at 33-35. Additionally,

Trooper Griffin testified that Turner had a green tongue, which Trooper Griffin

stated was an indicator of marijuana use. Id. at 35. Trooper Griffin said Turner

did not fumble when retrieving his license or slur his speech while answering

questions. Id. at 76.

       Trooper Griffin testified that he believed that Turner was under the

influence of marijuana and impaired such that he was unable to drive safely,

and he took Turner into custody. Id. at 37. Trooper Griffin said he made the

decision to arrest Turner based on the “totality of the circumstances,”

consisting of the field test results, the high rate of speed, Turner’s admission

to smoking marijuana prior to the stop, the presence of marijuana in the

center console, the strong marijuana odor, the substance on Turner’s beard,

and Turner’s bloodshot, glassy eyes. Id. at 42.

       Trooper Griffin further testified that a search of Turner’s vehicle revealed

eight partially burned cigarettes and a bag containing a green leafy substance,

both later confirmed to contain marijuana. Id. at 44, 46. Trooper Griffin took

Turner to Lehigh Valley Muhlenberg Hospital for a blood draw, but Turner

refused the blood draw and refused to sign an implied consent warnings form.

Id. at 49-52; Commonwealth Exh. at 3. Turner stated that he had already
____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth presented video of the traffic stop and search to the
jury, which included the completion of the field sobriety tests. Id. at 38-39.

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told Trooper Griffin that he had used marijuana and questioned the need for

a blood draw. N.T. 5/2/22 at 51. After the refusal, Trooper Griffin decided to

transport Turner to the police barracks and request a search warrant for a

blood sample. Id. at 52-53. While being transported to the barracks, Turner

stated that he wanted to give blood, but still refused to sign the implied

consent form. Id. at 53. Trooper Griffin applied for a search that was approved

later that morning. Id. at 56-58. Upon receipt of the search warrant, Turner

was transported to another local hospital where he once again refused to

submit to a blood draw. Id. at 58.

      A jury convicted Turner of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial

court convicted Turner of DUI-impaired ability, possession of small amount of

marijuana, speeding, and careless driving. The trial court sentenced Turner to

three days to six months’ incarceration and a $1,000 fine for the DUI

conviction; a concurrent period of 12 months’ probation and a fine for the

possession of drug paraphernalia conviction; and fines for the possession of a

small amount of marijuana, speeding, and careless driving convictions. Turner

filed a timely appeal.

      Turner raises the following issue:

         Should the Court vacate [Turner’s] conviction for DUI
         controlled substance— general impairment where (a) the
         sole basis for the traffic stop was speeding (b) expert
         testimony is required to link marijuana use to the inability
         to safely drive (c) the arresting officer lacked the required
         expertise (d) the [field sobriety tests] were not probative of
         marijuana impairment and (e) less than 7 minutes elapsed
         between the initial stop and [Turner’s] arrest for suspected
         DUI?

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Turner’s Br. at 4.

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citation omitted). In conducting this analysis, we may not substitute

our judgment for that of the factfinder. See Commonwealth v. Patterson,

180 A.3d 1217, 1230 (Pa.Super. 2018). The Commonwealth’s evidence need

not preclude every possibility of innocence and it may carry its burden of

proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with wholly circumstantial evidence.

See Feliciano, 67 A.3d at 23; Patterson, 180 A.3d at 1229. The factfinder

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Id.

      Turner claims the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence

to sustain the DUI conviction. He argues that expert testimony was necessary

to link his admitted marijuana use to his purported inability to operate his

vehicle safely. Turner claims that the required expertise was absent in this

case because Trooper Griffin lacked the necessary expertise to link Turner’s

marijuana usage to his inability to drive safely, and the court should have

excluded the trooper’s lay testimony. See Turner’s Br. at 13, 16.

      Turner further contends that the field sobriety tests were not probative

of marijuana impairment, noting that, among other things, Turner estimated

the passage of 30 seconds in 29 seconds. Turner relies on Commonwealth

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v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), to support his sufficiency

claim. He claims that the Court in Gause emphasized a need for expert

testimony to establish a DUI controlled substance charge, “unless the

circumstances are so telling of recent marijuana use” that a clear connection

between marijuana use and impairment is formed. Turner’s Br. at 14 (quoting

Gause, 164 A.3d at 537).

      Turner has improperly conflated the issue of admissibility of opinion

testimony and the sufficiency of the evidence. We do not review based on a

diminished record. Rather, we review the sufficiency claims based on the

entirety of the evidence received, without consideration of its admissibility.

See Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 350 (Pa.Super. 2022). To the

extent Turner challenges the admissibility of Trooper Griffin’s opinions, he

waived the issue by not including it in his Statement of Questions Presented

and his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii);

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

      The crime of DUI-impaired ability provides, in relevant part, that, “[a]n

individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the

movement of a vehicle,” when “[t]he individual is under the influence of a

drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability

to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of

the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 (d)(2). The Commonwealth must establish

that the defendant was “‘under the influence of a drug to a degree that

impairs’   his   or   her   ability   to   safely   drive   or   operate   a   vehicle.”

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Commonwealth v. Williamson, 962 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Pa.Super. 2008)

(citation omitted). Expert testimony is not mandatory in every prosecution to

establish that a defendant’s inability to drive safely was caused by the

ingestion of a controlled substance. See Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d

1231, 1239 (Pa. 2001). Rather, “[t]he need for expert testimony in a

subsection 3802(d)(2) prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case

basis, taking into account not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or

otherwise, but also the nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth’s

evidence.” Id. Evidence that the defendant refused to undergo blood testing

is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(e);

Commonwealth v. Bell, 211 A.3d 761, 763-64, 776 (Pa. 2019).

      Turner’s argument lacks merit. In Gause, an officer initiated a traffic

stop of the defendant’s vehicle for failure to have working taillights. 164 A.3d

at 535. During the stop, the defendant provided his license and registration

without fumbling. Id. The officer smelled alcohol and the defendant admitted

that he had consumed one beer before driving. Id. The defendant also

completed, “with varying levels of success,” multiple field sobriety tests. Id.

Among the field sobriety tests was a Romberg test, which the responding

officer stated she administers when she suspects marijuana use. Id. The

officer testified that she did not smell or see marijuana, but suspected

marijuana use because the defendant exhibited eyelid tremors, which the

officer associated with recent marijuana ingestion. Id. at 535-37. On appeal,

the defendant challenged the admissibility of the officer’s lay opinion that

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eyelid tremors are indicative of marijuana impairment. He contended that

such an opinion required expert testimony and that the officer’s lay opinion as

insufficient to carry the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. Id. at 536-37.

      We agreed. We characterized Griffith as holding “that expert testimony

is not necessary to establish impairment under subsection 3802(d)(2) where

there exists other independent evidence of impairment.” Id. at 538. We

concluded that attributing body or eyelid tremors to marijuana use required

specialized knowledge and therefore the officer’s lay opinion testimony was

inadmissible. Id. at 539. We therefore vacated the conviction because without

the officer’s lay opinion, there was a “total lack of proof that [the defendant]

was under the influence of a drug to a degree that his ability to safely drive

was impaired.” Id. at 540.

      In Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 304-05 (Pa.Super.

2012), the defendant was involved in an accident and admitted at the accident

scene that the accident was his fault and said he had smoked marijuana earlier

in the day. He argued that evidence of marijuana metabolites in his blood,

“without expert explanation,” was insufficient to prove he was under the

influence of marijuana at the time of the accident. Id. at 308. We agreed with

the appellant that, for purposes of establishing that he was incapable of driving

safely, reliance upon test results showing the presence of marijuana

metabolites in his blood was improper. We explained that the meaning of their

presence in terms of his ability to drive safely was “not an issue within the

knowledge of an ordinary layman.” Id.

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      We nonetheless found the evidence sufficient, finding other evidence

supported the finding that he was intoxicated to such an extent as to be unable

to drive safely. We pointed out that although his three daughters were injured,

covered in glass, and crying, the appellant was “unusually calm in his

demeanor.” Id. at 308. We further noted that he admitted to using marijuana

earlier in the day, there was a marijuana odor in the car, and the police found

marijuana in the appellant’s car. We concluded such evidence was sufficient

to prove the appellant unable to safely operate his vehicle due to marijuana

use. Id. at 309.

      Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the

conviction and did not need to present expert testimony. Perhaps most

importantly, unlike the defendant in Gause, but like the defendant in

Hutchins, Turner told Trooper Griffin that he had ingested marijuana only

one hour before driving, and Trooper Griffin found marijuana cigarettes in the

vehicle’s center console. Additionally, unlike the defendant in Gause, Turner

was driving at an excessive speed, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of

marijuana. Further, Trooper Griffin observed green matter in Turner’s beard,

which Trooper Griffin suspected to be marijuana and which Turner “flicked”

from his beard onto a road. Moreover, Turner had difficulty with some aspects

of the field sobriety tests and refused a blood draw. The Commonwealth

presented sufficient evidence that Turner was driving under the influence of

marijuana while being impaired to a degree that impacted his ability to drive

safely. See Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 307-11; see also Commonwealth v.

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Kerry, 906 A.2d 1237, 1238-39, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2006) (finding four cans of

beer on appellant’s person, bloodshot eyes, and odor of alcohol sufficient

evidence to convict on DUI charge). Considering the specific drug at issue, the

nature of the case, and the strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence, expert

testimony was not required in this instance to establish impairment by

marijuana use. See Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 307-11.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/16/2023

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