Court Opinion

ID: 9716260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:32:42.976704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.162265
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I dissent and, in doing so, I am reminded of Mr. Justice Buackmun’s recent observation in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449-50, 92 S. Ct. 589, 593 (1972) (dissenting opinion) : “The Court’s opinion, of course, is a fine and acceptable exposition of abstract law. If I felt that it fit [this] case, I would join it. The Court, however, fails ... to give effect to certain facts that, for me, are controlling.” Here, the majority’s discussion of the constitutionality of the anti-abortion statutes* is an “acceptable exposition of abstract law.” However, the majority fails to give effect to the con*338trolling fact that appellant, Benjamin King, did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute either at trial or before the court en banc, but, rather, asserts the issue, for the first time, on direct appeal. We have repeatedly held that this Court will not consider issues which were neither raised nor considered in the trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A. 2d 741 (1972); Commonwealth v. Donovem, 447 Pa. 450, 291 A. 2d 116 (1972); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 445 Pa. 364, 284 A. 2d 717 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bittner, 441 Pa. 216, 272 A. 2d 484 (1971); Heppe Estate, 440 Pa. 328, 269 A. 2d 687 (1970); Wenzel v. Morris Dist. Co., Inc., 439 Pa. 364, 266 A. 2d 662 (1970); Commonwealth v. Payton, 431 Pa. 105, 244 A. 2d 644 (1968); Brunswick Corp. v. Key Enterprises, Inc., 431 Pa. 15, 244 A. 2d 658 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Myers, 423 Pa. 124, 222 A. 2d 880 (1966); Bechler v. Oliva, 400 Pa. 299, 161 A. 2d 156 (1960).
Recently, we unanimously said: “The appellant, who was represented by counsel throughout all the proceedings below, did not raise either of these issues at trial or in his post-trial motions. We have consistently held that issues not raised in the court below are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to this Court.” Commonwealth v. Agie, supra at 189, 296 A. 2d at 741.
Similarly, the majority fails to give effect to the fact that appellee, Barry Page, is not, on this record, eligible for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act [PCHA], Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §§1 et seq., 19 P.S. §§1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972). On October 21,1968, Page pleaded guilty to performing two abortions and was, subsequently, sentenced to two to five years imprisonment. Appellee, however, did not appeal from that judgment of sentence. Rather, on *339March 4, 1970, he filed a POHA petition alleging that the anti-abortion statute is unconstitutional.
In my view, we need not reach the merits of that issue—as does the majority—for Page has waived the right to litigate this claim by failing to take a direct appeal. Section 3 of the PCHA mandates that “[t]o be eligible for relief under this act, a person must . . . prove . . . [t]hat the error resulting in his conviction and sentence has not been . . . waived.” Act of January 25, 1988, P. L. (1965) 1580, §3, 19 P.S. §1180-3 (Supp. 1972). The act further provides that an issue is waived if:
“ (1) The petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted, or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this act; and
“(2) The petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue.
“(c) There is a rebuttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure.” Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §4, 19 P.S. §1180-4 (Supp. 1972).
Plere, Page failed to appeal from the judgment of sentence. He has not asserted any “extraordinary circumstances to justify Ms failure to raise the issue” on direct appeal. Moreover, no evidence has been offered to rebut the “presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure.” Confronted with similar facts in Commonwealth v. Parker, 449 Pa. 282, 285, 296 A. 2d 744, 745-46 (1972), we said, “Under such circumstances, the instant collateral attack on his conviction and sentence is foreclosed.”
I dissent.

 Act of June 24, 1939, P. D. 872, §§718, 719, 18 P.S. §§4718, 4719 (1963).