Court Opinion

ID: 9608810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:17:55.593704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:06.216888
License: Public Domain

Keenan, J.,**
joined by Coleman, J., concurring.
I believe that the test for review of non-constitutional error articulated by the majority is far more rigid than that provided by Code § 8.01-678. Further, while the majority expressly states that it does not apply the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), to evaluate non-constitutional error, I believe that its standard is also more stringent than Chapman.
Code § 8.01-678 directs that the trial record be reviewed as a whole in determining whether trial error necessitates reversal of a cause. It provides:
*1011[W]hen it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed ... [f] or any . . . defect, imperfection, or omission in the record, or for any other error committed on the trial.
This language requires the reviewing court to consider the nature of the error committed, in the context of the entire case, to determine whether the parties have had a fair trial and substantial justice has been reached. In contrast, the majority opinion requires the reviewing court to consider the fact finder’s original burden of proof in weighing the error and presume that the error is prejudicial unless the record affirmatively shows that it did not affect the result.
Code § 8.01-678, however, does not require that the record affirmatively show that the error did not affect the verdict. Nevertheless, the majority imposes this requirement in the test that it articulates here. I believe that such a requirement is more stringent than the Chapman standard which the majority abandons today because this standard requires the reviewing court to find with certainty that the error had no effect upon the verdict, rather than simply finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Even under the standard of review for constitutional error, “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” the reviewing court is not required to disclaim every possibility that the error may have influenced a juror’s consideration of the case, but only that no reasonable doubt exists upon the whole record that the verdict was affected by the error. Justice Traynor has said that non-constitutional error is harmless when it is “highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 34-35 (1976). I believe that is but yet another way of saying that it “plainly appears ... the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.”
An appellate court must consider the error and evaluate its effect, if any, upon how the fact finder weighed and balanced the evidence or resolved the credibility of witnesses. Thus, while the appellate court, in considering whether error is harmless, does not weigh and balance the evidence in the role of fact finder to determine whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it *1012does evaluate how the error may have affected the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses in deciding whether, in accordance with the mandate of Code § 8.01-678, “the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.”
In applying Code § 8.01-678, our Supreme Court has applied several tests for analyzing non-constitutional error. I believe that each of those tests is but another expression by the Supreme Court, in the context of the particular case, of the statutory standard that error will be deemed harmless when it “plainly appears” that “the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.” In Boykins v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 309, 313, 170 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1969), the Court stated: “[A] conviction should not be reversed unless the introduction of improper evidence suggests a manifest probability that it was prejudicial to the defendant.” The use of this “test” by the Court appears to be limited to cases of non-constitutional error where a timely curative instruction has been given. In other cases involving non-constitutional error, our Supreme Court has cited Code § 8.01-678 while at the same time holding that the error at issue was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 280, 337 S.E.2d 264 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); Rozier v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 525, 248 S.E.2d 789 (1978).
Other “tests” for non-constitutional error have also been employed by the Supreme Court. In Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 315 S.E.2d 242 (1984), the Court looked to whether the evidence exclusive of the improper evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction. In Bond v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 534, 311 S.E.2d 769 (1984), the Court held that error in the admission of expert opinion may be harmless when the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming. In Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 292 S.E.2d 358 (1982), the Court found that reversal was not required on the basis that the improper evidence did not excite the passions of the jury. In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 291, 296, 269 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1980), cited by the majority, the Court held that error is “presumed to be prejudicial unless it plainly appears that it could not have affected the result.”
I do not believe that these cases, considered as a whole, require an initial presumption that the error is prejudicial unless the rec*1013ord affirmatively shows that it did not affect the result. Although Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 291, 269 S.E.2d 811 (1980), cited by the majority, speaks of a presumption of prejudice, numerous Supreme Court cases following it do not. Further, while Caldwell has been cited by the Court in some of its decisions, many more cases decided since Caldwell have employed other tests for the review of non-constitutional error.
I disagree with the majority’s decision to single out and select the Caldwell standard as a new uniform standard for application of Code § 8.01-678, particularly since Caldwell provides a more strict standard than Chapman. As recently as Mu’Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433, 442 n.4, 389 S.E.2d 886, 892 n.4 (1990), the Supreme Court noted that use of the Chapman standard is not required in reviewing cases of non-constitutional error. Since use of the Chapman standard is not required here, I conclude that use of the more stringent Caldwell standard is likewise not required. For this reason, I do not join in adopting the majority’s new test which effectively paraphrases Caldwell.
Applying the plain language of Code § 8.01-678 to the case before us, I would find that a fair trial was not had on the merits. Lavinder’s credibility was critical because his testimony and the testimony of his witnesses directly contradicted the Commonwealth’s evidence. Therefore, the admission of the improper impeachment evidence does not, in my view, satisfy the standard of review provided in Code § 8.01-678. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and remand this matter for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.

 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to her investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia.