Court Opinion

ID: 9893226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 15:06:51.007874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:48.462396
License: Public Domain

TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2023-SC-0308-KB

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION                                               MOVANT

V.                           IN SUPREME COURT

KAYCE RENAE POWELL                                                RESPONDENT

                            OPINION AND ORDER

      Kayce Renae Powell (Powell), Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) Number

93536, was admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky on

April 30, 2010. Her bar roster address is 115 Hammond Plaza, P.O. Box 4,

Hopkinsville, KY 42240.

      This case stems from two consolidated disciplinary matters, 17-DIS-0121

and 19-DIS-0006. Both matters were tried together before Trial Commissioner

Lisa Johnson (Commissioner). In 17-DIS-0121, the Commissioner ruled that

Powell violated four Supreme Court Rules (SCR) that govern attorney

misconduct: Count I - SCR 3.130(3.4)(f), Count II – SCR 3.130(8.2)(a), Count III

– SCR 3.130(3.5)(d), Count IV – SCR 3.130(8.1)(b). Powell was likewise found

guilty of four violations in 19-DIS-0006: Count I – SCR 3.130(1.3), Count II –

SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and (b), Count III – SCR 3.130(1.6), and Count IV – SCR

3.130(1.16)(d).
      The KBA’s Board of Governors (Board) adopted the Commissioners

findings and conclusions and has unanimously recommended that Powell be

suspended from the practice of law for one year, that she provide a detailed

accounting of all hourly fees expended on behalf of the complainant in 19-DIS-

0006, and that she return any unearned fees. After review, this Court accepts

the Board’s recommendation.

                            I.   BACKGROUND

A. 17-DIS-0121

      This case is related to Powell’s representation of Steve Chandler

(Chandler) to contest his brother Keith’s will in Crittenden Circuit Court.

Powell filed the suit in October 2011, alleging lack of mental competency,

undue influence, unnatural disposition, and an equity claim asserting

Chandler’s 50% vested interest in the residence. Her theory of the case was

that the defendants, whom Keith met at work, took advantage of his

diminished mental capacity and improperly influenced him to bequeath the

Chandlers’ multi-generational family farm to them. Keith did so in his will,

which was executed on October 26, 2006.

      The case was assigned to Judge Renee Williams (Judge Williams), and

Keith’s estate was initially represented by Brucie Moore (Moore). Soon after the

case was filed, Moore filed a motion to strike most of Chandler’s complaint. In

April 2012, following a hearing, Judge Williams granted Moore’s motion to

strike; Powell characterizes the ruling as striking “60%” of Chandler’s

complaint including his equity claim. Then, in August 2012, Judge Williams

                                        2
ruled that no evidence outside the two years prior to the execution of Keith’s

will would be admissible at trial.

       In May 2013, Powell filed a motion for Judge Williams’ recusal pursuant

to KRS 26A.015 primarily based on her orders striking most of Chandler’s

complaint and limiting the evidence to within two years of the execution of

Keith’s will. Judge Williams denied the motion. In October 2013, Powell filed a

second motion for Judge Williams’ recusal, this time in this Court, which was

denied. Powell and Chandler also each filed judicial conduct commission (JCC)

complaints against Judge Williams in late 2013 and again in 2017. In March

2014, as the case neared trial, Moore withdrew as the estate’s representative

and attorney Steven Downey (Downey) entered his appearance. 1 Powell would

ultimately file KBA complaints against Attorneys Moore and Downey as well as

a civil suit.

       In April 2014, following trial, the jury rendered a verdict against

Chandler. Around this time, Powell reported the alleged misconduct of

opposing counsel and Judge Williams to the Governor’s office and eventually

the FBI. None of the complaints filed against Judge Williams or Attorneys

Moore and Downey resulted in any disciplinary or criminal charges being

issued against them. Powell’s reports to the Governor’s office and FBI likewise

bore no fruit.

       1 According to Powell, Moore drafted Keith’s will and would therefore be a

material witness at trial. Powell had attempted to have her removed as counsel of
record long before she withdrew for the same reason.

                                           3
       Following the jury verdict, Powell appealed the case to the Court of

Appeals and filed numerous motions to recuse resulting in the recusal of six

judges on that court. The three-judge panel that ultimately heard the case

affirmed it in full. Following the Court of Appeals’ adverse ruling, Powell filed a

petition for reconsideration (PFR) which contained the following statements:

      This Court should first be aware that all filings and recordings of
      both [the] COA and the lower courts have been turned over to the
      Governor’s Office. Which prompted a telephone conversation [with]
      a (DOJ) United States District Attorney. Thereafter, Counsel
      received a call from Federal Bureau Investigator (sic) Special Agent
      Dustin Deterding. There is currently an active FBI Investigation
      concerning these matters which include the previously stricken
      material (i.e. wire fraud).

      ....

      Unlike all other appeals concerning a will contest which address
      the admissibility of testimony and evidence, this Court’s primary
      purpose seems to have been to protect the rulings and reputation
      of Judge [Renee] Williams and the defense attorneys of record.

      ....

      There are far too many misconstrued, inaccurate and disregarded
      arguments within the Order, to simply be a mistake. The COA
      Order shows a far greater concern to protect the reputation of the
      trial judges and defense attorneys rather than the civil rights and
      liberties afforded to the Appellant. Considering the active FBI
      investigation, Counsel wishes to encourage the sitting Judges to
      take another look at the totality of the record.

After the Court of Appeals denied Powell’s PFR, she filed a petition for

discretionary review with this Court. Of note, the petition argued:

      The Movant has been denied his Constitutional substantial rights
      from start to finish. The COA opinion is no exception, and in fact
      various rulings of the COA [have] served to facilitate and
      perpetuate a continuous fraud on the court throughout, by
      striking and covering up Respondent’s Attorney’s false filings, and
      illegal fraudulent conduct.
                                         4
      In response to Powell’s behavior, in particular the disparaging and

threatening arguments directed at the Court of Appeals that she made in her

PFR, the Court of Appeals reported Powell to the KBA. On May 4, 2018, the

Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) via its attorney Sarah Coker (Coker) sent Powell an

investigative letter regarding the concerns raised by the Court of Appeals. The

letter made it clear that no complaint had been filed but requested a written

response to the concerns raised. Powell subsequently requested, and was

granted, two extensions of time to respond. She ultimately responded to the

investigative letter on June 24, 2018, with a letter and seven “books” of

information spanning well over 1,900 pages.

      On November 15 of that year, the Inquiry Commission (IC) filed a

complaint against Powell. On December 26, Powell requested an extension of

time to respond, citing a recent surgery, which the IC granted on January 14,

2019. The order granting Powell’s extension directed that she had until

February 8 to respond to the complaint. Powell never responded to the

complaint, but she nevertheless sent a letter to Coker on February 5 expressing

her personal reservations about the matter being assigned to Coker. 2 The IC

filed the charges at issue herein on May 14, 2019.

      2 Powell stated in the letter that she did not want the case to be assigned to

Coker because the information she provided in her response to the investigatory letter
should have “unequivocally dispelled any notions of wrongdoing” and “should have
resulted in disciplinary investigations and actions against all parties who had actual
knowledge and participated in the most egregious injustice by the judiciary[.]”

                                           5
      Following a hearing and post-hearing briefing by the parties, the

Commissioner found a violation of each Count to be supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.

      Count I alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f): “A lawyer shall not . . .

present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in any civil or criminal

matter[.]” As proof of this violation, the Commissioner pointed to the following

evidence: after Powell lost her case in circuit court, she contacted the

Governor’s office and the FBI; she filed KBA complaints against Attorneys

Moore and Downey; she and her client filed more than one JCC complaint

against Judge Williams; she filed numerous motions to recuse concerning both

Judge Williams and several Court of Appeals judges; and she used

“threatening” language in PFR before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, Powell

stated several times during the hearing that her intent behind these actions

was to get her client a new trial. The Commissioner therefore felt her behavior

fell squarely within Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 3 and a violation of SCR

3.130(3.4)(f) had occurred.

      In Blum, Attorney Blum filed a motion to have a hearing officer alter his

order establishing the procedure for a tribunal hearing. 4 In the motion, Blum

stated “it is nevertheless appropriate to issue the following caution: at the fist

whiff of something like this occurring, the undersigned will press charges

      3 404 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2013).

      4 Id. at 851.

                                         6
against the Hearing Officer aimed at securing a lifetime ban on the holding of

any judicial position in the United States.” 5 This Court upheld the trial

commissioner’s finding that a violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) had occurred,

holding that “Blum, acting under the guise of concern for his fellow attorneys,

maintained the possibility of disciplinary sanctions or proceedings at the

forefront of his court filings and communications in an attempt to get what he

wanted—the relitigation of the charges against [his client.]” 6

      Count II alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(8.2)(a): “A lawyer shall not

make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard

as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge[.]”

The Commissioner noted the “outright accusations of judicial misconduct”

contained in Powell’s PFR before the Court of Appeals and petition for

discretionary review to this Court. Additionally, during the hearing Powell was

pressed by the Commissioner as to whether she had specific, objective evidence

of an illegal conspiracy between Attorneys Moore and Downey and Judge

Williams or evidence of Judge Williams’ alleged bias against her. Powell

conceded she did not and did not call any witnesses to substantiate those

allegations.

      The Commissioner found that a sanction was accordingly warranted

under KBA v. Waller. 7 In Waller, an attorney called a judge a “lying

      5 Id. at 852.

      6 Id.

      7 929 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1996).

                                          7
incompetent ass-hole” in a memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss,

and this Court upheld the Board’s finding that Waller violated SCR

3.130(8.2)(a). 8

      Count III alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(3.5)(d): “A lawyer shall not . . .

engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” The Commissioner found

that Powell violated this rule, first, by repeatedly filing the same pleadings over

a seven-year period. In support, the Commissioner cited Powell’s response

letter to the OBC’s investigation letter in which she stated “[a]s you will come to

see, I filed the same information repeatedly throughout all seven years of

litigation[,]” as well as the heading of “Book 2” that Powell filed in response to

the investigation letter, which said

      Steve Chandler’s complaint remained the same from start to finish.
      As early as the initial probate court, Steve informed that judge that
      not everything in the house belonged to his brother and that he
      never received his share of the estate. Steve’s story didn’t change
      in the slightest. The same arguments against Judge Williams’
      strike order and extremely narrow interpretation of relevant law
      remained the same throughout, making the exact same arguments
      from 2011 until December of 2014.

The Commissioner found that these statements, in conjunction with the fact

that many of Powell’s filings were returned for deficiencies, that she requested

the Court of Appeals to take unusual or uncommon steps, 9 that she sought at

both the circuit court and Court of Appeals level to have several judges

      8 Id. at 182.

      9 The concluding paragraph of Powell’s reply brief to the Court of Appeals

states: “Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the jury verdict, and in
an unprecedented manner declare the will void, or in the alternative reverse and
remand this cause of action[.]”

                                            8
recused, and that she filed a civil case against opposing counsel, “had the

obvious effect of burdening the Court system[.]”

      Count IV alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(8.1)(b): “[A] lawyer in . . . in

connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to

a lawful demand for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority[.]” During

the hearing, Powell acknowledged that she received the IC complaint and had

requested an extension of time. However, she claimed that she never received

the January 2019 order granting her an extension and assumed that the

matter had been dropped. The Commissioner found Powell’s belief was not

reasonable and that she therefore violated the rule.

B. 19-DIS-0006

      This case stems from Powell’s representation of Angella Linton (Angella)

in a dog bite case. During the relevant time, Angella’s daughter-in-law Cindy

Linton (Cindy) was Powell’s legal assistant, and Powell agreed to take the case

as a favor to Cindy. Powell met with Angella on July 24, 2017, to discuss her

case and entered into a one-page retainer agreement on the same day. Under

the retainer agreement, Angella agreed to pay Powell a $1,500.00 “non-

refundable” retainer fee to be “billed out at a 10 minute rate for $15 or an

hourly rate of $100.” The retainer agreement does not state that the fee to file

the case may be paid out of the retainer fee.

      Powell filed Angella’s case in Trigg Circuit Court on August 16, 2017.

She conducted pre-trial practice in the case until March 2018; she served and

answered interrogatories and obtained an order to compel discovery. During

                                         9
this period Powell predominately communicated with Angella about the case

“through Cindy,” and acknowledged only speaking on the phone with Angella

about the case once or twice between August 2017 and March 2018.

Additionally, Powell never provided Angella with any monthly or periodic

accounting of her fees, but she did provide Angella with a receipt for the

$400.00 filing fee.

      Sometime in mid-April 2018, Powell closed her private practice and

accepted a job with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Powell

claimed, without supporting documentation, that she was given permission by

the Cabinet to continue working on a handful of the unfinished cases from her

private practice, including Angella’s. But at some point she concluded that she

would not have sufficient time to devote to Angella’s case. Nevertheless, she

had already discussed Angella’s case with another attorney, Steve Underwood

(Underwood), in February or March 2018 and requested that he take it. 10

Powell gave Angella’s case file to Underwood on July 26, 2018. After reviewing

the file Underwood decided not to take the case, and he never filed an entry of

appearance. Powell claimed to be unaware that Underwood had never filed an

appearance until November 2018.

      Powell never sent any written communication to Angella to inform her

that she was closing her practice. But, she claimed that during a seventeen-

      10 The evidence was contradictory as to whether Powell intended to remain

counsel of record and work on the case alongside Underwood or completely relinquish
the case to him.

                                        10
minute phone call in May 2017 she explained to Angella that she had obtained

new employment and would not be able to devote sufficient time to Angella’s

case, that she asked Underwood to look at the case and he may decide to

represent her and discussed confidentiality. Angella testified that she did not

remember this phone call and, at any rate, Powell acknowledged that Angella

never signed a written agreement consenting to her speaking with Underwood

about the case or to allowing him to review her case file. Angella was not made

aware that Powell had discussed her case with Underwood or that she had

given him her case file until December 2018. Angella terminated Powell’s

representation around late January or early February 2019 and hired a new

attorney who filed an entry of appearance in February 2019.

      Angella filed a bar complaint against Powell in January 2019, and a

formal charge was subsequently issued on May 24, 2019, asserting the counts

at issue herein. Following the consolidated hearing, the Commissioner found

that a violation of each of the counts was supported by a preponderance of the

evidence.

      Count I alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(1.3): “A lawyer shall act with

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” To support her

finding that this rule was violated, the Commissioner cited the fact that Powell

was unaware that Underwood had not filed an entry of appearance in Angella’s

case until November 2018; that she never sent any written communication to

Angella informing her that she was closing her practice; and that she

communicated with her client about the case almost exclusively through

                                       11
Cindy. The Commissioner found that the following testimony succinctly

confirmed Powell’s violation of the rule:

      TC 11: [. . .] You assumed that Mr. Underwood was taking care of
      the case in October [2018]; is that correct?

      Powell: Yes. I actually did after conversation with Mr. Courtney’s
      office.

      TC: Okay. So then what happened when you called Mr.
      Underwood?

      Powell: When you say taking care of the case?

      TC: Yeah.

      Powell: And that’s where the confusion gets. I never handed the
      case over to just Mr. Underwood. I always fully intended to
      continue the case with him.

      TC: But you weren’t working on the case at that point because—

      Powell: Nobody was because [opposing counsel] never answered
      anything. 12

The Commissioner found that “that of course is EXACTLY the problem, given

that Ms. Powell closed her office in March 2018.”

      Count II alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and (b):

      (a) A lawyer shall:

         (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or
             circumstance with respect to which the client's informed
             consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these
             Rules;
         (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by
             which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
         (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
             the matter;

      11 Trial Commissioner.

      12 (Emphasis added).

                                        12
         (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
             information; and
         (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on
             the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the
             client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of
             Professional Conduct or other law.

      (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
          necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
          regarding the representation.

       First, the Commissioner noted that Angella provided Powell her physical

address and telephone number on their retainer agreement and that her

contact information never changed. Yet, Angella testified that she had

difficulty communicating with Powell during the representation and had to rely

on Cindy to obtain and relay information. Moreover, even though Powell

received several text messages from Cindy beginning in April 2018 expressing

Angella’s distress at receiving no communication from Powell about her case

and requesting that Powell contact Angella, she did not do so until November

2018. Powell’s only explanation for this was that she did not have Angella’s

phone number.

      Second, during her testimony, Powell indicated she intended to either

have a fee-splitting arrangement with Underwood or work on the case for free.

But neither the decision to involve another attorney nor a proposed change in

the fee structure was discussed with Angella beforehand. In that vein, Powell

failed to communicate with Angella regarding fees by never providing her with

an accounting of how the fees were disbursed. And, there was an issue raised

regarding paying the filing fee for the case out of her retainer which was not

expressly provided for in the retainer agreement.
                                       13
          The Commissioner concluded that Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Hatcher 13

supported the finding of a violation. In Hatcher, the attorney refused to return

her clients’ phone calls and did not keep them informed about their case, and

this Court upheld the Board’s finding that she violated SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and

(b). 14

          Count III alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(1.6): “A lawyer shall not reveal

information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives

informed consent[.]” The Commissioner found that this rule was violated by

Powell discussing Angella’s case with Underwood and giving him her case file

prior to obtaining Angella’s express consent to doing so.

          Count IV alleged a violation of SCR 3.130(1.16)(d):

          Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to
          the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
          such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
          employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
          which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of
          fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.

The Commissioner found that Powell violated this rule by effectively

withdrawing from the representation in a way that did not protect Angella’s

interests, by failing to give Angella reasonable notice that she should find other

counsel, and by not refunding any unearned fees. Angella’s fees have never

been itemized, and any unearned fees should have been returned to her after

          13 929 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1996).

          14 Id. at 193.

                                           14
the representation was terminated, and a failure to do this alone constituted a

violation of the rule.

C. Sanctions

      To determine an appropriate sanction, the Commissioner considered

several relevant factors under the ABA Standards for imposing lawyer

sanctions, including: the lawyer’s mental state, evaluation of the duties

violated, the actual or potential injury to the client, and the existence of

aggravating or mitigating factors. 15

      The Commissioner found that Powell acted knowingly. She further found

that in 17-DIS-0121, Powell violated duties she owed as a professional by

recklessly and repeatedly questioning the integrity of multiple Kentucky judges

and either used or threatened to use disciplinary and criminal proceedings to

gain an advantage in her client’s case. She further found that Powell’s seven

year “war of attrition” disrupted the normal workings of the court. In 19-DIS-

0006, the Commissioner found that Powell violated duties owed to Angella by

failing to act diligently on her behalf, failing to respond to repeated attempts to

communicate with her, sharing her confidential information, effectively

abandoning her case, and by failing to account for fees earned or return any

unearned fees.

      15 See, e.g., Wells v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 508 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Ky. 2017)

(“[A]lthough not binding, the ABA Standards ‘can at times serve as persuasive
authority’.”).

                                         15
      Concerning the actual or potential injuries to her clients, the

Commissioner acknowledged that not much was known about Chandler

because Powell did not respond to the subpoena requesting his representation

agreement. However, much was known about Angella, a “very sweet and very

kind” 80-year-old woman on a fixed income who testified that $1,500 “[meant]

a lot to her.” Angella also testified that she was unfamiliar with legal concepts

and put her full trust in Powell. These facts also went to Angella’s vulnerability

as an aggravating factor.

      The Commissioner found that several other aggravating factors were also

present. First, Powell committed multiple offenses in each case. In addition,

the Commissioner found that she acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,

citing her apparent personal animus against Judge Williams, and Attorneys

Moore and Downey. This distain was fostered by Powell’s belief that they

“demeaned” her, made her out to be a “clown,” made her look bad, and

“belittled” and “chastised” her. The Commissioner was also struck by the

number of times Powell lamented about Downey getting “the last word,” and

noted ten times in the record that it occurred. The Commissioner concluded

based on this evidence that Powell’s primary motive was to be vindicated and

prevail over people she felt had demeaned her.

      Powell also refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct.

She repeatedly characterized the disciplinary actions against her as a

conspiracy, especially those in 17-DIS-0121 (the will contest). She continued

to believe she had done nothing wrong and, instead, that the “high

                                       16
connections” of the parties involved were trying to “kill the messenger.” She

felt the KBA was “really pressing hard and trying to bully [her] into saying that

[she] was wrong for questioning the integrity of [Judge Williams] and the Court

of Appeals.” Furthermore, in a hypothetical posed to her by the Commissioner,

she was unable to even consider that she might be wrong.

      Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner recommended that Powell be

suspended from the practice of law for one year and that she provide a detailed

accounting of all hourly fees expended on Angella’s behalf and return any

unearned fees immediately. The Commissioner noted that the $400 filing fee

could not be deducted from the retainer amount because the retainer fee did

not provide for it.

      Powell then appealed the Commissioner’s ruling to the Board.

D. The Board

      Following oral arguments, the Board held by a vote of 20-0 that the

Commissioner’s report was supported by substantial evidence and was not

clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 16 It recommended that this Court find her

guilty of all eight violations across both disciplinary cases. It further

recommended that we impose both sanctions recommended by the

Commissioner and, additionally, that the costs of the proceeding, totaling

$11,723.08, should be assessed against Powell pursuant to SCR 3.450.

                                   II.   ANALYSIS

      16 See SCR 3.370(5)(a)(i).

                                            17
      Powell requests that this Court “absolve her of any wrongdoing,

unprofessional or unethical conduct, and find her not guilty of violating the

counts as charged.” In the alternative, she asks this Court to reverse the

Board and the Commissioner and “remand this matter to the KBA Disciplinary

Clerk for appointment of a new Trial Commissioner and a fair and impartial

hearing[.]” The KBA argues that we should uphold both decisions, and that

both the ABA Standards and case law support the imposition of a one year

suspension.

      To begin, we note that Powell has provided no relevant argument or

evidence concerning her charges in 17-DIS-0121. Rather, she continues to

allege that Judge Williams, Attorneys Moore and Downey, and the Court of

Appeals illegally conspired against herself and her client, and that all her

actions were warranted. Regarding 19-DIS-0006, her only argument is that

she obtained Angella’s permission to involve Underwood in her case during the

seventeen-minute May 2018 phone call. This argument ignores the fact that

Powell acknowledged speaking to Underwood about Angella’s case, a

confidential matter, in February or March 2018 without first obtaining

Angella’s prior approval. It also ignores Angella’s testimony that she was

completely unaware that Powell had involved another attorney or had given

him her case file until November of that year. Apart from this, Powell asserts

no relevant arguments in support of her innocence.

                                        18
      With that said, based upon our independent review of the record and

findings of fact, 17 this Court holds that Powell violated Count I - SCR

3.130(3.4)(f), Count II – SCR 3.130(8.2)(a), Count III – SCR 3.130(3.5)(d), and

Count IV – SCR 3.130(8.1)(b) in 17-DIS-0121, and Count I – SCR 3.130(1.3),

Count II – SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and (b), Count III – SCR 3.130(1.6), and Count IV

– SCR 3.130(1.16)(d) in 19-DIS-0006 based on the facts cited and thorough

reasoning provided by the Commissioner.

      As Powell’s guilt has been established, our task is now to determine

whether a one-year suspension is appropriate. 18 We conclude that the ABA

Standards, as well as this Court’s case law, warrant a one-year suspension.

      The ABA Standards, Section 4.42 provides that “[s]uspension is generally

appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client

and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or (2) a lawyer engages in a

pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” As noted,

Powell effectively abandoned Angella’s representation after March 2018 and

refused to respond to her requests for communication. This caused Angella

emotional distress, negatively affected her financially, and could have resulted

in her case being dismissed for a failure to prosecute.

      Section 7.2 of the Standards states that “Suspension is generally

appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a

duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client,

      17 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Greene, 386 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky. 2012).

      18 Id.

                                        19
the public or the legal system.” In addition to the potential and actual harm

caused to Angella, Powell also repeatedly asserted unfounded accusations of

unethical conduct towards opposing counsel, Judge Williams, and the Court of

Appeals. She also admitted that she filed the same argument repeatedly over a

seven-year period in the circuit court. These actions unnecessarily burdened

the legal system.

      We agree with the Commissioner’s conclusion that Powell acted

knowingly and violated duties she owed to both her client Angella and the

duties she owed as a professional. We also agree with the Commissioner’s

finding of aggravating factors, including multiple offenses, refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, and the vulnerability of her

client Angella. However, we note that the Commissioner did not consider

Powell’s lack of prior discipline in mitigation.

      But, as the Standards are merely advisory, we primarily look to our case

law to determine the appropriateness of a one-year sanction. The KBA cites

Waller, Blum, Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Matthews, 19 and Coorssen v. Kentucky Bar

Ass’n 20 in support of the one-year suspension.

      As noted, in Waller an attorney successfully obtained the recusal of a

judge whom he thereafter called a “lying incompetent ass-hole” in a

memorandum he filed with the court. 21 The Board found him guilty of violating

      19 283 S.W.3d 741 (Ky. 2009).

      20 266 S.W.3d 237 (Ky. 2008).

      21 Waller, 929 S.W.2d at 181.

                                         20
SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) and recommended a public reprimand. 22 This Court rejected

the Board’s recommended sanction and imposed a six month suspension,

reasoning:

      While we have given due regard to the Board’s recommendation
      and would agree if this were an isolated incident of intemperate
      language accompanied by a meaningful expression of regret, such
      is not the case. Respondent is utterly unrepentant and apparently
      intent on convincing this Court the truth of his assertions. As
      such, we must impose a punishment of sufficient severity to
      forcefully inform respondent that he is wrong. 23

      In Blum, this Court found the attorney guilty of three charges in relation

to a single disciplinary case. 24 The Blum Court held that he violated SCR 3.130

3.130(3.4)(f) by threatening to press disciplinary charges solely to gain an

advantage in his client’s case; that he violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(c) by making

unsubstantiated and unrelated allegations to the case and by “multiplying the

proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously” resulting in needless delay and

unnecessary expense; and that he violated SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) by alleging that

the hearing officer conspired against his client, was incompetent, and by

asserting that the hearing was “rigged.” 25

      The attorney would not acknowledge his wrongdoing and, citing Waller,

the Blum Court felt it necessary to “impose a punishment of sufficient severity

      22 Id. at 182.

      23 Id. at 183.

      24 404 S.W.3d at 844.

      25 Id. at 858.

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to forcefully inform Blum that he [was] wrong[.]” 26 The Court therefore adopted

the Board’s recommended sanction of a 181-day suspension. 27

      Matthews involved two consolidated disciplinary cases. 28 In the first

case, the attorney was paid $1,000 to represent the client in a civil matter. 29

The attorney filed the claim, but thereafter he stopped all communication with

the client. 30 The client never received a refund, and her case file was not

returned. 31 The attorney failed to file a response to the disciplinary charges

that followed and was found guilty of five violations: SCR 3.130(1.3), SCR

3.130(1.4)(a), SCR 3.130(1.16)(d), SCR 3.130(3.4)(c), and SCR 3.130(8.1)(b). 32

The second case involved similar conduct; after he was paid $1,000 to work on

a civil case and filed the suit, he ceased communicating with his clients and his

failure to perform any work in the case resulted in the case being dismissed. 33

He again failed to respond to the resulting disciplinary charges and was found

guilty of the same five counts as the first disciplinary case. 34 This Court

upheld the findings of guilt in both cases. 35 After noting that the attorney was

      26 Id. at 857.

      27 Id.

      28 283 S.W.3d at 741-42.

      29 Id. at 741.

      30 Id.

      31 Id.

      32 Id. at 742.

      33 Id.

      34 Id.

      35 Id.

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already serving a suspension for failure to pay bar dues, this Court imposed a

suspension from the practice of law for 181 days. 36

      The final case, Coorssen, also involved two consolidated disciplinary

cases. 37 In the first case, the attorney was paid $5,000 to represent the client

in a criminal matter. 38 During the representation the attorney failed to return

numerous calls from the client regarding the case and failed to properly

communicate with the client in a way that would enable the client to make

informed decisions. 39 In addition, once the representation ended, the attorney

initially failed to refund the client’s unearned fees and failed to return the

client’s file. 40 The attorney was charged with violating SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and

(b) as well as SCR 3.130(1.16)(d). 41

      In the second case, the attorney was paid $2,200 to represent the client

in a dissolution of marriage action. 42 He failed to diligently represent the client

by failing to inform her about mediation scheduling and not returning her

phone calls or keeping her updated about the case. 43 Additionally, the attorney

was suspended at some point during the representation but, following the

suspension, he failed to properly inform the client in writing that he had been

      36 Id. at 743.

      37 266 S.W.3d at 238-40.

      38 Id. at 238.

      39 Id. at 240.

      40 Id.

      41 Id.

      42 Id.

      43 Id.

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suspended, failed to properly withdraw from the representation, and failed to

return her unearned fees. 44 He was charged with violating SCR 3.130(1.3),

SCR 3.130(1.4)(a) and (b), SCR 3.130(1.16)(d), SCR 3.130(3.4)(c), SCR

3.130(1.15)(b), and SCR 3.130(8.3)(c).

      Before this Court, the attorney admitted that he committed all eight of

the violations and agreed to the imposition of a sanction. 45 This Court

suspended him from the practice of law for one year, with 181 days to be

served and the remainder probated for two years subject to several

conditions. 46

      Based on the foregoing considerations under the ABA Standards and the

relevant case law, we agree that a one year suspension is an appropriate

sanction in the case before us.

      Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

      (1) Kayce Renae Powell is suspended from the practice of law in the
          Commonwealth of Kentucky for one (1) year;

      (2) Powell shall provide a detailed accounting of all hourly fees expended
          of behalf of Angella Linton and refund any unearned fees. In
          conducting that accounting, the $400 filing fee shall not be deducted
          from the retainer amount;

      (3) Pursuant to SCR 3.450, Powell shall pay all costs associated with
          these disciplinary proceedings against her and for which execution
          may issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order;

      (4) As required by SCR 3.390, Powell shall within twenty (20) days after
          the issuance of this Opinion and Order, notify by letter duly placed

      44 Id. at 240-41.

      45 Id. at 241.

      46 Id.

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   with the United States Postal Service, all courts or other tribunals in
   which she has matters pending, and all clients of her inability to
   represent them and of the necessity and urgency of promptly
   retaining new counsel. Powell shall simultaneously provide a copy of
   all such letters of notification to the Office of Bar Counsel. Likewise,
   Powell shall immediately cancel any pending advertisements, to the
   extent possible, and shall terminate any advertising activity for the
   duration of the term of suspension.

All sitting. All concur.

Entered: October 26, 2023.

                                   ______________________________________
                                              CHIEF JUSTICE

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