Court Opinion

ID: 9536804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:07:22.171713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:21.511584
License: Public Domain

*638RABINOWITZ, Justice
(dissenting).
I would reverse the judgment and commitment in this case because of the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the issue of self defense. In my view, neither of the grounds given by the trial judge as the basis for his ruling are correct. There is no requirement that counsel for the accused must raise all defenses in his opening statement to the jury or suffer the risk of preclusion. This is particularly apparent where the evidentiary basis of the defense originates in the government’s own case in chief.1 Nor does Criminal Rule 30(a) require that all requested instructions must be in writing. Criminal Rule 30(a) is permissive in form. Federal precedent construing the federal counterpart to Alaska Criminal Rule 30(a) has held oral requests sufficient if the court is clearly informed of the point involved. Hull v. United States, 324 F.2d 817, 824 (Sth Cir. 1963); Dunn v. United States, 318 F.2d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1963).
It is established that an accused is entitled to a specific instruction on his theory of the case if there is evidence to support it and a proper request for such an instruction is made.2 The majority’s reliance on the Steelman3 case constitutes a clear warning to defense counsel that unless a requested instruction is “entirely correct” the trial judge is under no obligation to instruct the jury on the subject matter of the imperfect request. Such an overly technical approach is inconsistent with Pepsi Cola Bottling Company v. Superior Burner Service Company, 427 P.2d 833, 837 (Alaska 1967). In that case, which involved civil litigation, we said:
Numerous authorities have concluded that if the defective, or erroneous, requested instruction directs the court’s attention to an issue which the jury has not been instructed upon but which is necessary to enable the jury to intelligently determine the case, ‘the court’s error in failing to charge may not be excused by technical defects in a request to charge.’4 (footnote omitted)
In the case at bar, counsel for the accused made a timely, although oral, request to the trial court for an instruction on self defense. Since there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for this request, I am of the view that the trial court was under a duty to charge the jury on this essential facet of the case.5 The weakness or implausibility of such evidence is not a relevant consideration.6 Nor do I consider it an inordinate burdening of the trial court to require it to have instructed on self defense in the circumstances of this case.
*639I find it difficult to perceive how the trial judge is metamorphized into an advocate by requiring him to instruct on self defense in the circumstances of the case at bar. The “adversary structure” of our system of justice could have been maintained by the trial court’s granting a recess during which time counsel for the accused could be required to submit in writing a requested instruction of the subject of self defense.

. Under Alaska’s procedures, counsel for defense is given the option of deferring opening statement until after the government has produced its evidence and presented its case in chief. Criminal Rule 27(a) (2).

. In Brooke v. United States, 128 U.S.App. D.C. 19, 3S5 F.2d 279, 284 (1967) (footnote omitted). the court said :
Where there is evidentiary support for special facts sustaining a rational defensive theory, to which the court’s attention is specifically directed, the defendant is entitled to have the jury charged on that theory. However weak the evidence, however implausible the theory may appear to be, the matter is for the jury’s determination.

. Cherry v. Stedman, 269 F.2d 774, 777-778 (8th Cir. 1968).

. Civ.R. 51(a), which was construed in Pepsi- Cola Bottling, is materially similar to Crim.R. 30(a). Civ.R. 51(a) reads in part:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial ns the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law set forth in the requests.

. In Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted), the court said:
This conforms to the general rule that in a criminal case instructions are erroneous if they exclude from jury consideration an affirmative defense as to which evidence lias been received.

. See Brooke v. United States, 128 U.S. App.D.C. 19, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (1967).