Court Opinion

ID: 9400227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 19:02:32.741959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:43.058017
License: Public Domain

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                                                                  [PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 21-14317
                            ____________________

        ANDREZ MARQUEZ,
        On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
        including but not limited to, Clarissa Morejon,
        Morgan Howard, Sophia Feliciano, James Bromley,
        and Jeﬀ Barr,
        CLARISSA MOREJON,
        MORGAN HOWARD,
        SOPHIA FELICIANO,
        JAMES BROMLEY, et al.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        AMAZON.COM, INC.,
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                     21-14317

                                                             Defendant-Appellee.

                               ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80392-DMM
                             ____________________

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SANDS,∗ District
        Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon.com, Inc.
        (“Amazon”) stopped providing “Rapid Delivery” 1 to Amazon
        Prime (“Prime”) subscribers. Because Prime subscribers were not
        notified of the suspension and continued to pay full price for their
        memberships, Andrez Marquez and other plaintiffs brought a
        putative class action against Amazon alleging breach of contract,
        breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
        the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), and unjust
        enrichment. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to

        ∗Honorable W. Louis Sands, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
        1
         “Rapid Delivery” is not a contract term. The parties and the district court,
        however, used the term to describe the enhanced shipping options available
        to Prime subscribers. We follow suit.
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        21-14317                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim
        with prejudice because it found that Amazon did not have a duty
        to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery to Prime subscribers. After
        careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
                                   I.      Background
               A. Facts and Contract Terms
               Prime is a fee-based subscription service. Prime subscribers
        receive several benefits not available to other Amazon customers,
        including Rapid Delivery, which is two-hour, same-day, one-day,
        or two-day shipping at no additional cost for certain Prime-eligible
        items purchased from Amazon’s online marketplace. From the
        start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 to at least May
        2020, Amazon suspended Rapid Delivery without notifying Prime
        members. Plaintiffs alleged that, rather than providing the full
        benefit of Prime membership to its subscribers, Amazon instead
        “focused on profits from consumer grocery and pharmacy
        spending to compete with major pharmacy and grocery chains as
        well as keep[] up with significantly increased demand.” 2
              As Prime subscribers, each plaintiff agreed to identical
        contracts with Amazon. The contracts included the Amazon
        Prime Terms and Conditions (“Terms & Conditions”) which, in

        2
          Amazon did not stop collecting subscription fees from existing Prime
        subscribers during its suspension of Rapid Delivery. Rather, during this time,
        Amazon sold new Prime subscriptions, listed goods as Prime-eligible, and
        represented that it would provide Rapid Delivery.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14317

        turn, incorporated provisions from several linked documents.
        Specifically, in the first paragraph, the Terms & Conditions stated:
              Please note that your use of the Amazon.com website
              and Prime membership are also governed by the
              agreements listed and linked to below, as well as
              other applicable terms, conditions, limitations and
              requirements on the Amazon.com website, all of
              which . . . are incorporated into these Terms. If you sign
              up for a Prime membership, you accept these terms,
              conditions, limitations and requirements.
        There were multiple hyperlinks immediately below this section of
        text. In pertinent part, the first hyperlink incorporated the
        “Conditions of Use” and the second incorporated the
        “Amazon.com Privacy Notice.”
               Within the Terms & Conditions was a bolded section
        entitled “Shipping Benefits and Eligible Purchases.” This “Shipping
        Benefits and Eligible Purchases” section included a hyperlink
        entitled “Prime shipping benefits” that linked to a webpage entitled
        “Amazon Prime Shipping Benefits – Eligible Items & Addresses.”
        The “Amazon Prime Shipping Benefits – Eligible Items &
        Addresses” webpage also linked to another webpage entitled
        “Amazon Prime Shipping Benefits.” The “Amazon Prime Shipping
        Benefits” webpage detailed shipping speeds, catalogued “eligible
        items,” and provided the prices that Prime members would have
        to pay for those services.
               With the structure of the contract in mind, we now turn to
        its operative text.
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        21-14317                   Opinion of the Court                                5

               First, the Terms & Conditions provided that: “Prime
        shipping benefits depend[ed] upon inventory availability, order
        deadlines, and in some cases the shipping address.” Second, the
        Terms & Conditions provided: “[Amazon] may exclude products
        with special shipping characteristics at [its] discretion.” Third, the
        Terms & Conditions provided:
                From time to time, Amazon may choose in its sole
                discretion to add or remove Prime membership
                benefits . . . [Amazon] may in [its] discretion
                change . . . any aspect of Prime membership, without
                notice . . . YOUR CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP
                AFTER WE CHANGE THESE TERMS
                CONSTITUTES YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
                CHANGES.
        Additionally, the Conditions of Use provided (in all caps):
                AMAZON SERVICES AND ALL INFORMATION,
                CONTENT,         MATERIALS,       PRODUCTS
                (INCLUDING SOFTWARE) AND OTHER
                SERVICES INCLUDED OR OTHERWISE MADE
                AVAILABLE TO YOU THROUGH THE AMAZON
                SERVICES ARE PROVIDED BY AMAZON ON AN
                “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” BASIS . . . .
        The Conditions of Use also contained a choice-of-law clause
        selecting Washington law. 3

        3
         The choice-of-law provision provided the following—“By using any Amazon
        Service, you agree that . . . the laws of the state of Washington, without regard
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        6                           Opinion of the Court                         21-14317

                B. Procedural History
              Plaintiffs were Prime subscribers between March 2020 and
        May 2020 who—with one exception4—periodically placed orders
        for Rapid Delivery. Plaintiffs filed this case in Florida state court.
        Amazon removed to the United States District Court for the
        Southern District of Florida based on diversity jurisdiction.
               Plaintiffs then filed their First Amended Complaint, which
        asserted claims for breach of contract (Claim I), breach of the
        covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Claim II), violation of the
        WCPA (Claim III), and unjust enrichment (Claim IV).
        Importantly, plaintiffs did not plead the obvious: Amazon’s
        suspension of Rapid Delivery was in response to the COVID-19
        pandemic.5

        to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any
        dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Amazon.”
        4
         For nine of the ten named plaintiffs, the First Amended Complaint alleges
        that “[f]rom time to time [he or she] placed one or more orders on Amazon
        Prime for Rapid Delivery.” For the other named plaintiff, however, the only
        allegation is that he “utilized Rapid Delivery” without any allegation that he
        actually placed orders for Rapid Delivery.
        5
          Presumably, plaintiffs omitted reference to COVID-19 in their complaint to
        try to prevent the district court from considering COVID-19’s effect when
        assessing the plausibility of their claims. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
        550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This ruse is creative lawyering, but it does not work.
        While “[a]nalysis of a 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] is limited primarily to the
        face of the complaint and attachments thereto,” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons,
        Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue
        Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997)), the Supreme Court has
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        21-14317                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

               Amazon moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court dismissed all claims with
        prejudice for failure to state a claim. The district court held that,
        on the breach of contract claim, “Plaintiffs [did] not ple[a]d facts
        that establish[ed] that [Amazon] owed a duty to provide [Prime]
        subscribers with unqualified rapid delivery shipping.” That is,
        without a promise to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery, Amazon
        necessarily did not breach its contract by suspending that service.
        Relatedly, the district court found that the contract was neither
        procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, and it specifically
        “note[d] the irony” of plaintiffs’ argument that prioritizing the
        shipment of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic was
        unconscionable because Amazon “exercised responsible business
        judgment during an unprecedented global public health crisis.” 6
        Through reasoning similar to its breach of contract analysis, the

        instructed courts that the plausibility determination is “context-specific” and
        “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
        sense,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Roe
        v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1062 n.5 (11th Cir. 2010). The effect of
        COVID-19 in early 2020 was properly considered as part of the district court’s
        “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. As such,
        plaintiffs’ argument that the district court—and our court—cannot consider
        the effect of COVID-19 because it is not mentioned in their complaint
        necessarily fails.
        6
         The district court advanced similar reasoning when it considered the “public
        interest impact” element of the WCPA claim: “In addition, [d]efendant did not
        violate the public interest—indeed it made a good faith effort to serve the
        public interest—when it prioritized the shipment of essential goods during the
        onset of the pandemic.”
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        8                          Opinion of the Court               21-14317

        district court found that Claim II (breach of good faith and fair
        dealing) and Claim III (violation of the WCPA) also failed. Finally,
        the district court held that Claim IV (unjust enrichment) failed
        because there was a contract between the parties; and, under
        Washington law, unjust enrichment applies only when there is no
        contractual relationship.
               Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                             II.      Standard of Review
               “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
        dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting
        the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the
        light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna
        Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mills v. Foremost
        Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008)). But “[o]ur duty to
        accept the facts in the complaint as true does not require us to
        ignore specific factual details of the pleading in favor of general or
        conclusory allegations,” because “when the exhibits contradict the
        general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits
        govern.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205–06 (11th
        Cir. 2007).
                After Twombly and Iqbal, the standard to survive a 12(b)(6)
        motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is “plausibility.” See
        Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
        556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “to survive a motion to dismiss,
        a complaint must now contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
        as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Am.
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        21-14317                  Opinion of the Court                               9

        Dental, 605 F.3d at 1289 (quotations omitted). “A claim has facial
        plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
        court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
        for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This standard
        requires plaintiffs to provide more than “naked assertions devoid
        of further factual enhancement,” mere “labels and conclusions,” or
        “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.
        (quotations omitted & alterations adopted). Ultimately, “[a]
        complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when,
        ignoring any mere conclusory statements, the remaining
        allegations do not plausibly suggest that the defendant is liable.”
        Harper v. Pro. Prob. Servs. Inc., 976 F.3d 1236, 1240 n.4 (11th Cir.
        2020) (quotations omitted).
                “[W]e may affirm [the district court’s] judgment on any
        ground that finds support in the record.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger,
        Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
                                    III.    Discussion
              To begin, we assume that Amazon’s contract with Prime
        subscribers included a promise to provide Rapid Delivery. 7

        7
          We note that the district court did not employ this assumption, and the
        assumption is by no means a given. On the one hand, the Amazon Prime
        Shipping Benefits page stated: “Your Amazon Prime membership includes a
        variety of shipping benefits, including several shipping options if you need to
        expedite your delivery.” And this same page included a table showing the
        expedited shipping speeds available to Prime members and the associated
        costs (or lack thereof) for those services. These facts, along with plaintiffs’
        allegations, suggest that Rapid Delivery was contractually promised. On the
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14317

        Proceeding from this assumption, we find that plaintiffs have not
        stated a claim for breach of contract because Amazon had the right
        to limit Rapid Delivery. We also hold that Amazon’s significant
        discretionary authority over Rapid Delivery does not render the
        contract unconscionable. Then, we conclude that plaintiffs have
        not sufficiently alleged that Amazon breached its duty of good faith
        or violated the WCPA. Finally, because plaintiffs pleaded a
        contractual relationship in their unjust enrichment count, we hold
        that their unjust enrichment claim fails. In sum, we affirm the
        district court’s judgment on each claim, although we reach our
        conclusions for different reasons.
               A. Breach of Contract and Unconscionability
                       1.      Breach of Contract
               Plaintiffs allege that Amazon breached its contract with
        plaintiffs by suspending Rapid Delivery from at least March 2020 to
        at least May 2020. The district court found that Amazon had no
        duty to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery and, as such, it did not
        breach its contract by suspending that service.

        other hand, however, many facts—such as the contractual terms that gave
        Amazon “sole discretion” over Prime membership benefits and indicated that
        Amazon provided its services on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis—
        indicate that Rapid Delivery was not contractually promised. In the end,
        because we conclude that even if Rapid Delivery was contractually promised,
        Amazon still did not breach its contract, breach the covenant of good faith, or
        violate the WCPA, we assume that Rapid Delivery was promised.
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        21-14317                 Opinion of the Court                            11

               We take a different path. We assume that Amazon had a
        duty to provide Rapid Delivery, but still conclude that Amazon did
        not breach its contract because it had contractual authority to
        suspend Rapid Delivery.
               Under Washington law, 8 “[a] breach of contract is actionable
        only if the contract imposes a duty, the duty is breached, and the
        breach proximately causes damage to the claimant.” Nw. Indep.
        Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 899 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. Ct. App.
        1995); see also Baldwin v. Silver, 269 P.3d 284, 289 (Wash. Ct. App.
        2011) (“Breach of contract . . . claims depend on proof of four
        common elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages.”). The
        contract language is given its “ordinary, usual, and popular
        meaning,” Myers v. State, 218 P.3d 241, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
        and courts must “give[] effect to all the contract’s provisions,”
        Nishikawa v. U.S. Eagle High, LLC, 158 P.3d 1265, 1268 (Wash. Ct.
        App. 2007). And, of course, if an action is permitted by the
        contract, the performance of that action is not a breach. See Myers,
        218 P.3d at 244 (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of a breach of
        contract claim in a wrongful termination dispute when the
        “contract grant[ed] [defendant] broad authority to terminate the
        contract”).
               The contract repeatedly qualified the rights of Prime
        subscribers and gave Amazon the authority to modify Prime
        benefits—including Rapid Delivery. In particular, we focus on two

        8
         The parties agree that we must apply Washington law in light of the choice-
        of-law clause in their contract.
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       21-14317

        terms that demonstrate Amazon did not breach its contract with
        plaintiffs.
              First, the Terms & Conditions provided that “Amazon may
        choose . . . to add or remove Prime membership benefits.”
        Second, the Conditions of Use reiterated that “AMAZON
        SERVICES . . . ARE PROVIDED BY AMAZON ON AN ‘AS IS’
        AND ‘AS AVAILABLE’ BASIS.” 9 Standing together, these terms
        decide this claim. It is undisputable that the contract provides
        Amazon with the right to suspend Rapid Delivery. We do not
        belabor the point because the ultimate analysis is rather simple:
        Amazon had the contractual right to suspend Rapid Delivery, so it
        did not breach its contract with plaintiffs by suspending Rapid
        Delivery. 10 Id.

        9
         Amazon also points to the term providing that “shipping benefits depend upon
        inventory availability, order deadlines, and in some cases the shipping address”
        to show that plaintiffs did not have an unqualified right to Rapid Delivery.
        Plaintiffs respond that this provision is inapposite because Amazon did not
        suspend Rapid Delivery for the above-listed reasons. We need not address this
        specific dispute because we conclude that other contract terms clearly provide
        Amazon the right to suspend Rapid Delivery and, therefore, it did not breach
        its contract with plaintiffs.
        10
          It bears repeating that plaintiffs were free to cancel their Prime memberships
        at any time. If they chose not to cancel, however, their “continued
        membership . . . constitute[d] . . . acceptance of the[] changes.”          This
        provision reinforces our conclusion that there was no breach. That is, once
        plaintiffs accepted the new terms, they lost their claim that Amazon breached
        the original terms.
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        21-14317                Opinion of the Court                         13

                Plaintiffs argue that we cannot read the contractual
        discretion so broadly because we must give “reasonable, fair, just,
        and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention” when
        interpreting a contract. See Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81 v. Spokane Educ.
        Ass’n, 331 P.3d 60, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). We conclude that this
        statement of law actually cuts against plaintiffs’ argument. That is,
        the contract’s express intention is to give Amazon broad authority
        over Rapid Delivery, and it is “fair” and “reasonable” to read the
        contract that way. Id.
                Plaintiffs also argue that if Amazon had such broad
        discretion over Rapid Delivery—which, in their estimation, is the
        “core” benefit of Prime membership—such authority would
        render the contract “illusory.” “In Washington, a contract is
        illusory only if it lacks all consideration and mutuality of obligation,
        e.g., the promisor has no obligations with regard to any parts of the
        contract.” Ekin v. Amazon Servs., LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1176
        (W.D. Wash. 2014). While this opinion has focused primarily on
        Rapid Delivery, there are other Prime benefits and services (such
        as streaming access for movies, television shows, and music) that
        were not suspended. Thus, the contract was not “completely
        illusory.” Id.
                      2.     Unconscionability
               Plaintiffs also contend that the contract is both procedurally
        and substantively unconscionable and that the district court erred
        in ruling otherwise. The district court found that the contract was
        not procedurally unconscionable because “[p]laintiffs have not
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                 21-14317

        offered any facts that suggest they lacked a reasonable choice in
        deciding whether or not to subscribe to [Prime],” and was not
        substantively unconscionable because Amazon’s right to modify
        the contract—which plaintiffs could have terminated at any time—
        did not meet the high threshold for substantive unconscionability.
        Ignoring the inherent tension in asserting a claim for breach of
        contract (i.e., there is an enforceable contract that has been
        breached) as well as a claim for unconscionability (i.e., this is an
        unenforceable contract), plaintiffs’ argument fails.
              “In Washington, either substantive or procedural
        unconscionability is sufficient to void a contract.” Gandee v. LDL
        Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1199 (Wash. 2013). “The
        burden of proving that a contract or contract clause is
        unconscionable lies upon the party attacking it.” Tjart v. Smith
        Barney, Inc., 28 P.3d 823, 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
                Plaintiffs allege that the contract is procedurally
        unconscionable because “it was part of an adhesion contract, was
        buried in a maze of fine print, and plaintiffs lacked a reasonable
        opportunity to understand the provision[s].”             Procedural
        unconscionability is the lack of a meaningful choice, “considering
        all the circumstances surrounding the transaction including (1) the
        manner in which the contract was entered, (2) whether each party
        had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
        contract, and (3) whether the important terms [were] hidden in a
        maze of fine print.” Id. (alterations adopted & quotations omitted).
        Under the first element, to determine whether a contract is an
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        21-14317               Opinion of the Court                       15

        adhesion contract, we consider: “(1) whether the contract is a
        standard form printed contract, (2) whether it was prepared by one
        party and submitted to the other on a take it or leave it basis, and
        (3) whether there was no true equality of bargaining power
        between the parties.” Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns., Inc., 103 P.3d
        753, 760 (Wash. 2004) (quoting Yakima Cnty. (W. Valley) Fire Prot.
        Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 858 P.2d 245, 248 (Wash. 1993))
        (quotations omitted). Even if a contract is an adhesion contract,
        that fact alone is not determinative. Romney v. Franciscan Med. Grp.,
        349 P.3d 32, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (“The fact that a contract is
        an adhesion contract is relevant but not determinative.”).
        Similarly, “the fact that unequal bargaining power exists will not,
        standing alone, justify a finding of procedural unconscionability.”
        Zuver, 103 P.3d at 761.
               Plaintiffs are correct that the contract was an adhesion
        contract. See id. The contract was a “standard form printed
        contract,” prepared by Amazon, and plaintiffs have considerably
        less bargaining power than Amazon. See id. This finding, however,
        helps plaintiffs with only the first of the three elements of
        procedural unconscionability. See Romney, 349 P.3d at 37.
               Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden on the remaining
        elements of procedural unconscionability. On the second element
        (reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract),
        plaintiffs offer no explanation as to how their opportunity to
        understand the contract was inhibited. As addressed below, the
        terms were clearly laid out and there is no allegation (or evidence)
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14317

        that plaintiffs were under time pressure that affected their
        opportunity to read the contract. Plaintiffs suggest that they
        “lacked a reasonable opportunity . . . because [the provision
        allowing Amazon to suspend Rapid Delivery] directly conflicts
        with the actual core benefit offered: Rapid Delivery,” but this
        argument misses the mark. For one, this argument does not
        address plaintiffs’ opportunity to understand the contract in any
        way. And, in any event, Amazon Prime membership included
        other “core” benefits such as streaming access for movies,
        television shows, and music which were unaffected by the
        suspension of Rapid Delivery.
                On the third element (hidden terms), despite plaintiffs’ claim
        that the terms were buried in a maze of fine print, the evidence
        again favors Amazon. While there were several hyperlinks
        between different documents, the pertinent provisions were often
        in prominent places under clearly labeled subheadings, written in
        clear language, and/or emphasized in all caps.
              In sum, while plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the
        contract was an adhesion contract, they have not carried their
        burden of alleging the remaining elements of procedural
        unconscionability. See Tjart, 28 P.3d at 830.
               Plaintiffs also allege that the contract is “substantively
        unconscionable because it purported to confer on Amazon
        unfettered discretion to unilaterally modify the contract.”
        “Substantive unconscionability involves those cases where a clause
        or term in the contract is alleged to be one-sided or overly harsh[.]”
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        21-14317                 Opinion of the Court                            17

        Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781 (Wash. 2004). “[T]erms
        sometimes used to define substantive unconscionability” include
        “[s]hocking to the conscience, monstrously harsh, and exceedingly
        calloused.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[U]nilateral change-in-terms
        provision[s]” do not render a contract substantively
        unconscionable unless the contract is completely illusory, which
        occurs only when the contract “lacks all consideration and
        mutuality of obligation, e.g., the promisor has no obligations with
        regard to any parts of the contract.” Ekin, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 1176;
        see also Associated Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Nw. Cascade, Inc., 203 P.3d
        1077, 1080 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (“A party to a terminable at will
        contract can unilaterally modify the contract because, in doing so,
        the party is simply terminating the old contract and offering a new
        one.”).
               Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this demanding standard. Under the
        contract, Amazon had authority to suspend certain Prime benefits,
        but the terms were far from “monstrously harsh” or “shock[ing]
        [to] the conscience.” Adler, 103 P.3d at 781. Instead, the terms
        provided the benefits of Prime, described Amazon’s authority to
        alter those benefits, and gave plaintiffs the option to cancel their
        Prime membership at any time.
             In the end, Amazon’s contractual discretion was substantial,
        but the contract was not procedurally or substantively
        unconscionable under Washington law.11 See id.

         Because we find that the provisions allowing Amazon to suspend Rapid
        11

        Delivery are not unconscionable, we do not address plaintiffs’ argument that
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                   21-14317

               B. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
                Plaintiffs argue that because the contract gave Amazon
        significant discretionary authority, it was required—under
        Washington law—to operate according to the duty of good faith
        and fair dealing. The district court held that Amazon had no duty
        to provide Rapid Delivery and, therefore, plaintiffs did not show
        that “there [was] anything that [Amazon] . . . failed to perform in
        good faith.” Again, we do not follow the district court’s approach
        to duty. Nonetheless, after analyzing the contract’s terms and
        comparing them with Washington law, we find that plaintiffs have
        not sufficiently alleged that Amazon violated the duty of good faith
        and fair dealing.
                 “Under Washington law, there is in every contract an
        implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that obligates the parties
        to cooperate with each other so that each may obtain the full
        benefit of performance.” Rekhter v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health
        Servs., 323 P.3d 1036, 1041 (Wash. 2014) (quotations, alterations,
        and citations omitted). The covenant “requires only that the
        parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their
        agreement,” and does not “inject substantive terms into the parties’
        contract.” Badgett v. Sec. State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360 (Wash. 1991)
        (quotations omitted); Myers, 218 P.3d at 244 (“[C]ovenants of good
        faith . . . do not trump express terms or unambiguous rights in a
        contract.”). Critically, however, “if a contract gives a party

        the unconscionable portions should be severed from the rest of the still-
        operative contract.
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        21-14317                  Opinion of the Court                             19

        unconditional authority to determine a term, there is no duty of
        good faith and fair dealing.” Rekhter, 323 P.3d at 1044.
               Plaintiffs are correct on one point: Amazon had substantial
        discretion under the contract.          Under Rekhter, however,
        unconditional authority to determine a term effectively cancels the
        duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. Per the terms of the
        contract, Amazon “may choose in its sole discretion to add or
        remove Prime membership benefits,” which is the quintessential
        case of a “contract [that] gives a party unconditional authority.”
        Accordingly, we must find that “there is no duty of good faith and
        fair dealing” under Washington law. Id. Further, the contract
        specified that Prime services were provided on an “AS IS” and “AS
        AVAILABLE” basis and it notified plaintiffs that if they disagreed
        with any updated terms they were required to “cancel [their]
        memberships.” Amazon did not breach the duty of good faith and
        fair dealing because it was non-existent in this instance.12
               C. Violation of WCPA
               We turn now to plaintiffs’ argument that Amazon violated
        a Washington state statute—the WCPA—by engaging in deceptive
        practices. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920. The

        12
          Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in analyzing the duty of good
        faith because it rooted its analysis in the fact that “no contract provision
        imposed on Amazon a duty to provide Rapid Delivery.” This argument does
        not affect our analysis because (1) we have analyzed duty differently than the
        district court and (2) it would not change Washington law which gets rid of
        the duty of good faith in this circumstance.
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                         21-14317

        district court held that plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that
        Amazon engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice.
               The WCPA allows out-of-state plaintiffs to sue Washington
        corporations for “deceptive acts that directly or indirectly affect the
        people of Washington.” Thornell v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., 363
        P.3d 587, 592 (Wash. 2015). Plaintiffs must establish five elements
        to prevail in a WCPA suit: “(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act or
        practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; [that has a] (3) public
        interest impact; [that results in] (4) [an] injury to plaintiff in his or
        her business or property; [and] (5) causation.” Hangman Ridge
        Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash.
        1986); see also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920. Our
        analysis leads inescapably to the conclusion that the district court
        correctly dismissed this claim.
                        1.      Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice
               Under this element, the touchstone is whether a
        representation was “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer.”
        Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 895 (Wash. 2009)
        (quotations omitted). “A plaintiff need not show that the act in
        question was intended to deceive, but that the alleged act had the
        capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.” Hangman
        Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535. “The capacity . . . to deceive is determined
        with reference to the least sophisticated consumers among us.”13

        13
          Amazon contends that the “least sophisticated” standard does not apply to
        the WCPA. This argument, however, rests on an unpublished opinion that is
        not entirely persuasive. See Kelly v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs. LLC, No. 47941-9-II,
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        21-14317                    Opinion of the Court                                21

        Keithly v. Intelius Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
        (noting as well that “[online] consumers do not read every word
        on a webpage and [the Federal Trade Commission] advises
        advertisers that they must draw attention to important disclosures
        to ensure that they are seen”). Even still, a representation that does
        not “hid[e] the ball in any way,” HB Dev., LLC v. W. Pac. Mut. Ins.,
        86 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187 (E.D. Wash. 2015), is not unfair or
        deceptive—despite the impact that those terms may have on the
        consumer—because “[p]erfection is not the standard,” Keithly, 764
        F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
               Plaintiffs unconvincingly argue there are three ways that
        Amazon engaged in an “unfair or deceptive” act or practice as
        alleged in the First Amended Complaint: (1) by breaching its
        contract and the duty of good faith, (2) by representing that it
        would provide Rapid Delivery, and (3) by not representing that it
        could suspend Rapid Delivery without notification or refund in
        order to “compete against other companies, including grocery and

        2016 WL 7468227, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016). Other Washington
        cases suggest that the “least sophisticated” standard is properly applied to
        claims under the WCPA. See, e.g., Panag, 204 P.3d at 895 (including as part of
        its overview of the proper standards in a WCPA case that the court “look not
        to the most sophisticated readers but rather to the least” (quoting Jeter v. Credit
        Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)). Because
        plaintiffs cannot even satisfy the “least sophisticated” standard, we assume
        without deciding that this lower threshold is the proper standard under
        Washington law.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                21-14317

        pharmacy companies” and “promote sales with higher profit
        margins.”
               The first argument has already been addressed. Amazon did
        not breach its contract or the duty of good faith. Thus, we turn to
        plaintiffs’ second and third arguments. In essence, both arguments
        are that “the least sophisticated consumer” was “likely to [be]
        misl[ed]” by the contract’s terms.
                While the contract contained a large amount of text and in
        some cases required reference to other terms (via hyperlink), the
        critical provisions would not deceive a “substantial portion of the
        public” even if the “least sophisticated” consumer is the
        benchmark. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535; Panag, 204 P.3d at 895.
        Amazon’s discretionary authority to suspend Rapid Delivery was
        made exceedingly clear from the outset. The provisions that
        outline this discretion were easy to understand. Two of the most
        important provisions—concerning Amazon’s power to alter
        subscribers’ memberships and emphasizing that its services were
        provided on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis—were
        emphasized in all caps. This set of facts in no way resembles
        “hid[ing] the ball” because the provisions were easily accessible and
        straightforward; as such, they would not deceive a “substantial
        portion” of the public. HB Dev., 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1185, 1187
        (holding that “[t]here [was] no evidence that [defendants] hid the
        ball” because the pertinent language was presented clearly and
        defendants did not neglect to disclose critical information). For
        these reasons, Amazon’s representations were not “unfair” or
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        21-14317                  Opinion of the Court                             23

        “deceptive.” 14 See, e.g., Keithly, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (“Perfection
        is not the standard . . . .”).
               Simply put, plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that
        Amazon engaged in “unfair or deceptive” business practices under
        Washington law. This conclusion alone defeats plaintiffs’ WCPA
        claim because they cannot satisfy each of the five required
        elements. Even so, we proceed to another element to emphasize
        that plaintiffs’ claim is doubly deficient.
                       2.      Public Interest Impact
                To succeed on a WCPA claim, plaintiffs must also
        demonstrate a “public interest impact.” Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d
        at 533, 537 (emphasizing the WCPA’s focus of “protect[ing] the
        general public”). This element may be satisfied in multiple ways,
        id. at 538, but the Washington legislature has instructed that “this
        act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are
        reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of
        business or which are not injurious to the public interest,” Wash.
        Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.920. Plaintiffs argue that Amazon’s
        suspension of Rapid Delivery was a breach that affected “millions”
        of people such that it affected the public interest. Plaintiffs’
        argument is paradoxical. Essentially, plaintiffs contend that by

        14
          To the extent that plaintiffs’ third argument (that Amazon did not represent
        that it could suspend Rapid Delivery to concentrate on groceries and
        pharmaceuticals) includes their contention that the district court erred by
        considering the realities of COVID-19, we have already found that argument
        meritless.
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        24                       Opinion of the Court                    21-14317

        suspending Rapid Delivery to prioritize essential goods at the
        outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon harmed the public
        interest. As we have explained, we are allowed to use our
        “experience and common sense” to acknowledge the COVID-19
        pandemic even though it was not included as a factual allegation in
        the First Amended Complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. We need
        only common sense to dispense with this argument because
        Amazon’s prioritization of essential goods during the COVID-19
        pandemic obviously did not harm the public interest. 15
              For the reasons above, we hold that the district court was
        correct to dismiss plaintiffs’ WCPA claim.
               D. Unjust Enrichment
                Plaintiffs’ claim that Amazon was unjustly enriched because
        it received plaintiffs’ subscription fees without conferring the
        benefit of Rapid Delivery is a non-starter. Washington law is clear
        that unjust enrichment is appropriate only absent a contract. See
        Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 2008) (“Unjust
        enrichment is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit
        retained absent any contractual relationship . . . .” (emphasis added));
        see also Pengbo Xiao v. Feast Buffet, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1190–
        91 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Under Washington law . . . [w]here a valid
        contract governs the rights and obligations of the parties, unjust

        15
          Plaintiffs also face obstacles on the injury and causation elements. It is
        unnecessary to address these issues given plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the
        preceding elements.
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        21-14317                Opinion of the Court                        25

        enrichment does not apply.”). Plaintiffs, however, specifically
        incorporated the terms of their contract with Amazon as part of
        their unjust enrichment count. So, while plaintiffs may plead
        breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative, see,
        e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3), they have not done so. Instead,
        plaintiffs pleaded a contractual relationship as part of their unjust
        enrichment claim, and that contractual relationship defeats their
        unjust enrichment claim under Washington law. 16 Young, 191 P.3d
        at 1262; see also Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 41 F.4th 873, 887
        (7th Cir. 2022) (“[A] party may not incorporate by reference
        allegations of the existence of a contract between the parties in the
        unjust enrichment count.”).
                                 IV.    Conclusion
               Plaintiffs ask us to ignore the plain meaning of the contract
        they agreed to, forget the worldwide effect of the COVID-19
        pandemic, and reverse the district court’s dismissal. We decline
        their request.
               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
        plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim with
        prejudice.
               AFFIRMED.

        16
          To the extent plaintiffs argue there was not an enforceable contract
        (unconscionability), we have already dispensed with that argument.