Court Opinion

ID: 9523335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:39:29.033471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:56.411816
License: Public Domain

BURKE, P. J., dissenting: The chancellor did not modify the decree. He ordered that the plaintiff be allowed to enroll Steven in a school of his mother’s choosing. The father has remarried. He does not seek any modification with respect to the custody of the children, recognizing that the mother is a proper person to retain their custody. The order appealed from recites that the parties were present in open court and represented by counsel, and that the chancellor was “fully advised in the premises.” The defendant did not bring a report of the trial proceedings. It is a matter of common knowledge that in custody and matrimonial cases the facts in dispute are frequently presented by statements of the parties and lawyers, and that the court enters orders based upon the facts so presented. In the instant case the order recites that the judge was fully advised in the premises. He could be advised by testimony, statements or both. On appeal all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the judgment order or decree appealed from and error will never be presumed. Union Drain. Dist. No. 5 v. Hamilton, 390 Ill. 487, 61 N.E.2d 343; Goldschmidt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 335 Ill. App. 461, 82 N.E.2d 357; 222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v. Murphy, 325 Ill. App. 392, 60 N.E.2d 450. It is neither the function nor the province of the reviewing court to search the record for errors, although it may search the record for grounds of affirmance. People v. Craig, 404 Ill. 505, 89 N.E.2d 409; Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 148 N. E. 69. Where the record on appeal is incomplete, the court will assume that the omitted portion contained that which justified the order of the court. Any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. Vinyard v. Barnes, 124 Ill. 346, 16 N. E. 254; City of Chicago v. Tearney, 187 Ill. App. 441; Devine v. Kelly Atkinson Const. Co., 156 Ill. App. 602; Housing Authority of Gallatin County v. Church of God, 401 Ill. 100, 81 N.E.2d 500; Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Turner, 341 Ill. 101, 173 N. E. 52. Under the law we are required to assume that the matters presented to the chancellor justified the order he entered. In Donahue v. Donahue, 61 A.2d, 243, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey had before it an appeal from the denial by chancery of an application for an order respecting the religious training of two children. The master declined to interfere with the religious training of the children. In affirming the order of the Court of Chancery the reviewing court said (245): “Under what circumstances, if any, a court would be justified in intervening with respect to the religious training selected by a parent having custody need not here be considered. No end of difficulties would arise if judges sought to proscribe the selection of a religious faith made by a parent having custody. See People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 1936, 271 N. Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661. Intervention in matters of religion is a perilous adventure upon which the judiciary should be loathe to embark.” In the Sisson case, 271 N. Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660, the Court of Appeals of New York considered this subject. A reading of the case discloses that the trial court by its order sustaining a writ of habeas corpus deprived the father of a ten year old daughter of his right to control the child jointly with the mother and awarded exclusive guardianship and control to the mother. The Appellate Division, 285 N. Y. Supp. 41, modified the order by returning the child to the joint guardianship, custody and control of both parents, with the limitation that the father should not take the child from the town in which she resides without the consent of the mother, nor from her home for a longer period of time than two hours at a time and then only after personal notice to the mother of the purpose and place of the proposed visit. The Court of Appeals in directing that the order of the Appellate Division and of the trial court be reversed and tbe writ of habeas corpus dismissed, said (2 N.E.2d 660, 661): “Disagreement between the parents has arisen over the education of the child. In no way does it appear that the health or welfare of the child is in danger. In proceedings for the custody of children, the courts have reiterated that their sole point of view is the welfare of the child. The parents of this child are obviously interested only in her welfare. When they realize that for the good of the child it is necessary for them to repress to some extent the natural desire of each to have the child educated solely according to bis or her point of view, the remaining sources of difficulty doubtless will disappear. The court cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home. Dispute between parents when it does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the welfare of the child is beyond the reach of the law. The vast majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and self-restraint of father and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents bow to bring up their children. Only when moral, mental and physical conditions are so bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should the courts be called upon to act.” The majority opinion reverses the order and remands the cause with directions to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with the views expressed. It assumes that the chancellor proceeded without being conversant with the facts. The order and the conduct of the parties indicates that be was fully advised as to all pertinent matters and that be proceeded with due regard to the law. The paramount consideration in determining custody is the welfare and best interest of the child. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300. The defendant concedes that the welfare and best interest of bis son is served by the custody being continued'in the mother. The parties have now been separated seven years. The divorce decree embodying the agreement as to the education of the child was entered more than five years ago. The children are not parties to the agreement or the divorce decree. The majority opinion sets out the variant views of courts and authors who have spoken on this subject. It will be difficult if not impossible for a chancellor to select the view to adopt and apply to the facts presented. The record shows that the trial judge being fully advised in the premises did not disturb the decree and left the child in the care and custody of the mother. The child is receiving good care. The order should be affirmed.