Court Opinion

ID: 9943297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 05:04:35.186045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:46.566857
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re CADP, Minor.                                                    February 22, 2024

                                                                      Nos. 366087; 366088
                                                                      Kalkaska Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC Nos. 22-001067-AM;
                                                                              22-001066-AM

Before: HOOD, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        These consolidated appeals involve three competing petitions for adoption of a minor child,
CADP. Yvonne Robinson; Jason and Daena Thibodeau; and David and Donna Prevo all sought
consent to adopt CADP, and respondent, the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI), granted consent
to Robinson and denied consent to the Thibodeaus and the Prevos. The Thibodeaus and the Prevos
(collectively: “petitioners”) filed motions pursuant to MCL 710.45 (“§ 45 motions”), challenging
the denials of consent, and these petitions were denied. We vacate the trial court’s order denying
the petitions and remand for additional proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This is the second time that these petitions have been before this Court, and the prior appeal
resulted in a published opinion reversing the trial court’s decision on a discovery matter. See In
re CADP, 341 Mich App 370; 990 NW2d 386 (2022). The facts underlying these petitions are set
forth in this Court’s prior opinion:

               The parents of CADP, who was born in 2018, are deceased. [The Prevos]
       are the paternal grandparents who filed a petition seeking to adopt CADP. [The
       Prevos’] daughter and son-in-law, Daena and Jason Thibodeau, also wished to
       adopt CADP, as did CADP’s maternal grandmother, Yvonne Robinson . . . . The
       Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) recommended Yvonne for the adoption. [The
       Prevos] then filed a motion under MCL 710.45, alleging that MCI’s decision to

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         withhold consent for petitioners to adopt CADP was arbitrary and capricious.[1] [Id.
         at 374-375.]

        With respect to the first appeal, petitioners had sent subpoenas to DHHS and BCS seeking
“[a]ny and all documents relating to CADP,” but “the court concluded that petitioners were not
entitled to discovery because the general discovery rules do not apply to § 45 proceedings; the
information sought was confidential, in any event; and petitioners’ subpoenas were overbroad.”
Id. at 376-377 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). This Court, however, agreed with
petitioners that “the discovery rules apply to a § 45 hearing initiated by motion, their subpoenas
were not overbroad, and the confidential nature of the information would have been adequately
safeguarded by a protective order or in camera inspection while allowing for a meaningful § 45
review to occur.” Id. at 378-379. Therefore, this Court reversed the trial court’s orders denying
discovery and quashing the subpoenas. Id. at 374, 396.

         Following remand from this Court, the circuit court divided the case into three distinct case
files: one for the Prevos, one for the Thibodeaus, and one for Robinson. The Thibodeaus and
Prevos sought discovery of the entirety of CADP’s case files, but despite this Court’s previous
order, BCS contended that it could only disclose those files related to the specific prospective
adopter who sought discovery. The trial court adopted a narrow construction of this Court’s
opinion and reasoned that this Court did not deem the entirety of the files necessarily discoverable
to each party. Therefore, the discovery requests were denied, and the § 45 hearings proceeded
without petitioners ever getting access to the case files relating to Robinson. In its final orders,
the trial court concluded that the MCI superintendent’s decision to grant consent to Robinson and
deny consent to the Thibodeaus and the Prevos was not arbitrary and capricious.

                                           II. DISCOVERY

        Petitioners2 argue that the trial court erred by only allowing the Prevos and Thibodeaus to
access their own files. We agree.

1
    As explained in In re Keast, 278 Mich App 415, 423; 750 NW2d 643 (2008):

                The MCI superintendent represents the state of Michigan as guardian of all
         children committed to the state by a family court after termination of parental rights.
         MCL 400.203. The superintendent is authorized to consent to the adoption of any
         child committed to the MCI as a state ward. MCL 400.209. Consent by the
         superintendent to the adoption of a state ward is required before the family court
         can approve a prospective adoption. MCL 710.43(1)(b). Under MCL 710.45(2), a
         person who has filed a petition to adopt a state ward and has not received consent
         from the MCI may file a motion in family court to challenge the MCI
         superintendent’s denial of consent.
2
 This argument was raised both by the Thibodeaus in Docket No. 366087 and by the Prevos in
Docket No. 366088.

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        This Court “review[s] a trial court’s decision to grant or deny discovery for [an] abuse of
discretion.” Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 219 Mich App 46, 50; 555 NW2d
871 (1996). To the extent this issue requires interpreting a statute, review is de novo. Elba Twp v
Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 278; 831 NW2d 204 (2013).

       The lower court ruled that neither the Prevos nor the Thibodeaus were entitled to discovery
of adoption materials related to Robinson. This ruling violated the law-of-the-case doctrine
because it was contrary to this Court’s opinion in the prior appeal. As explained in Rott v Rott,
508 Mich 274, 286-287; 972 NW2d 789 (2021):

               The law-of-the-case doctrine is a judicially created, self-imposed restraint
       designed to promote consistency throughout the life of a lawsuit. The idea is that
       if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for
       further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will
       not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the
       facts remain materially the same. Thus, as a general rule, an appellate court’s
       determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the
       appellate court in subsequent appeals. The purpose of the doctrine is primarily to
       maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the
       course of a single continuing lawsuit. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.]

In other words, the lower court was barred from making any rulings contrary to this Court’s
decision in the prior appeal.

       When it decided In re CADP, 341 Mich App at 386, this Court made the following
statements:

       Petitioners [i.e., the Prevos] sought the case files relating to CADP, which is
       relevant evidence under MCR 2.302(B)(1) for the purpose of determining whether
       MCI’s decision to withhold consent to adopt the minor child was arbitrary and
       capricious. In other words, the reasons supporting MCI’s decision to withhold
       consent may be determined to be invalid if, for example, the information relied
       upon was inaccurate, the child’s circumstances were not properly considered, or
       certain facts were not considered. Any such evidence may only be obtained through
       appropriate discovery, and specific objections to requested discovery information
       may be addressed by the trial court, including through a motion for a protective
       order under MCR 2.302(C) or a request for an in camera review. Because it is
       petitioners’ burden in a § 45 hearing to establish “by clear and convincing
       evidence that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious,” MCL
       710.45(7), petitioners must be afforded the means to attempt to carry that burden.
       [Emphasis added.]

This passage indicates that this Court has already concluded that the “case files” were relevant.
Moreover, this Court cited with approval an unpublished opinion in which the petitioner, who had
been denied consent to adopt, was allowed to review the entire MCI file. See In re CADP, 341
Mich App at 384-385, citing In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH (On Remand), unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 4, 2014 (Docket Nos. 309161 and 312691).

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The Court particularly emphasized the statement that “Michigan is strongly committed to a far-
reaching and open discovery practice.” Id. at 385, quoting In re COH, upub op at 9.

         The lower court also reasoned that neither the Prevos nor the Thibodeaus were entitled to
the information pertaining to Robinson in light of footnote 8 in In re CADP. But a close reading
of In re CADP makes it clear that that footnote was dealing solely with information obtained during
the child-protection portion of the proceedings, and it is undisputed that neither the Prevos nor the
Thibodeaus are seeking any information relating to those particular proceedings. The In re CADP
Court discussed MCL 722.627 and noted that it deals with cases of abuse and neglect. In re CADP,
341 Mich App at 393-395. MCL 722.627 provided,3 at the pertinent time:

                  (2) Unless made public as specified information released under section 7d,
         a written report, document, or photograph filed with the department as provided in
         this act is a confidential record available only to 1 or more of the following:

                                               * * *

                 (g) A court for the purposes of determining the suitability of a person as a
         guardian of a minor or that otherwise determines that the information is necessary
         to decide an issue before the court, or in the event of a child’s death, a court that
         had jurisdiction over that child under section 2(b) of chapter XIIA of the probate
         code of 1939, 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.2.

                                               * * *

                 (k) A child placing agency licensed under 1973 PA 116, MCL 722.111 to
         722.128, for the purpose of investigating an applicant for adoption, a foster care
         applicant or licensee or an employee of a foster care applicant or licensee, an adult
         member of an applicant’s or licensee’s household, or other persons in a foster care
         or adoptive home who are directly responsible for the care and welfare of children,
         to determine suitability of a home for adoption or foster care. The child placing
         agency shall disclose the information to a foster care applicant or licensee under
         1973 PA 116, MCL 722.111 to 722.128, or to an applicant for adoption.

       In the prior appeal, this Court stated that the act referred to was the Child Protection Law
(CPL), MCL 722.621 et seq., and it concluded that the lower court could preclude from discovery
information pertaining to abuse and neglect. In re CADP, 341 Mich App at 395. This Court stated:

         But petitioners have explicitly stated the following:

                         There was only a one month period of time from when the
                 court took jurisdiction over [CADP] and when his mother died, and
                 to the extent any of the case file contained information relating to

3
    There has since been a renumbering and a minor rewording of this statute. See 2022 PA 68.

                                                  -4-
               the abuse and neglect case against her, that information could have
               been excluded and still can be.

                In other words, petitioners agree that information pertaining to abuse and
       neglect can be excluded from discovery. While petitioners did not explicitly state
       this in their motion for discovery, the court, in exercising its discretion, could have
       recognized this limitation on otherwise allowable discovery. [Id. at 395 (alteration
       and footnote omitted).]

This Court, in connection with this ruling, added footnote 8, which provides:

              The parties also cite MCL 722.627(2)(k), which speaks to a child-placing
       agency’s provision of information obtained from DHHS to “an applicant for
       adoption.” BCS is a child-placing agency. . . . [and] it seems that the information
       to be provided by the agency to the applicant for adoption is the information
       pertaining to that applicant. Petitioners noted below that BCS had, indeed, agreed
       to provide records pertaining specifically to petitioners. [In re CADP, 341 Mich
       App at 395 n 8.]

When read in context, it is clear that this Court ruled that any information from the abuse-and-
neglect case—not information from the adoption case as whole—and pertaining to an applicant
for adoption was to be provided only to that applicant. It is not this Court’s role to usurp the ruling
of In re CADP. “Even if the prior decision was erroneous, that alone is insufficient to avoid
application of the law of the case doctrine.”4 Duncan v Michigan, 300 Mich App 176, 189; 832
NW2d 761 (2013). The lower court’s discovery ruling on remand contradicted the rulings of In
re CADP.

        Because the trial court did not allow discovery into the information pertaining to Robinson,
the Thibodeaus and the Prevos were not “afforded the means to attempt to carry [their] burden” to
establish that MCI’s decision to withhold consent to adopt CADP was arbitrary and capricious.
Therefore, we vacate the court’s order denying these petitions, and remand this case for additional
proceedings. On remand, the court shall allow the Thibodeaus and Prevos to conduct full
discovery into CADP’s case files, including those pertaining to Robinson. The court shall then
conduct the § 45 hearings anew, and shall consider all evidence relevant to CADP’s welfare, rather
than limiting the presentation of evidence to that pertaining to the particular petitioner. Because
we vacate the court’s orders on these grounds, we decline to address petitioners’ arguments
pertaining to the court’s ultimate conclusion that MCI’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.5

4
 We are not indicating that the ruling in In re CADP was erroneous but are merely stating that
even if it was, it must be applied.
5
  Petitioners and amici also raise arguments relating to the trial court’s statements suggesting that
its decision hinges on whether MCI had “any good reason” to grant consent to Robinson.
However, this standard is firmly established by Michigan caselaw. See In re TEM, 343 Mich App
171, 179; 996 NW2d 850 (2022) (“Michigan authority is clear that the court is to determine if there

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                                 III. PARTICIPATION OF BCS

        Petitioners6 argue that the trial court erred by allowing BCS, a nonparty, to participate in
the § 45 hearing. We agree.

      “Whether due process has been afforded is a constitutional issue that is reviewed de novo.”
Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013).

       MCL 710.24a(1) delineates the interested parties in an adoption petition, and it provides:

               Interested parties in a petition for adoption are all of the following:

               (a) The petitioner or petitioners.

               (b) The adoptee, if over 14 years of age.

              (c) A minor parent, adult parent, or surviving parent of an adoptee, unless 1
       or more of the following apply:

               (i) The rights of the parent have been terminated by a court of competent
       jurisdiction.

              (ii) A guardian of the adoptee, with specific authority to consent to adoption,
       has been appointed.

              (iii) A guardian of the parent, with specific authority to consent to adoption,
       has been appointed.

               (iv) The rights of the parent have been released.

               (v) The parent has consented to the granting of the petition.

is any good reason to support the MCI Superintendent's decision; if so, the decision must be
upheld.”). In this instance, we are also bound by the law of the case. See CADP, 341 Mich App
at 380 (“Regarding the withholding of consent to adopt, it is the absence of any good reason to
withhold consent, rather than the presence of good reasons to grant it, that indicates that the
decision maker has acted arbitrarily and capriciously.” (Quotation marks, citation, and alteration
omitted.)).
6
 This argument was raised both by the Thibodeaus in Docket No. 366087 and by the Prevos in
Docket No. 366088.

                                                    -6-
               (d) The department or a child placing agency to which the adoptee has been,
       or for purposes of subsection (3) is proposed to be, released or committed by an
       order of the court.

               (e) A parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem of an unemancipated minor
       parent of the adoptee.

               (f) The court with permanent custody of the adoptee.

               (g) A court with continuing jurisdiction over the adoptee.

              (h) A child placing agency of another state or country that has authority to
       consent to adoption.

               (i) The guardian or guardian ad litem of an interested party.[7]

It is undisputed that BCS does not qualify as an interested party under any of these designations;
indeed, representatives of BCS repeatedly referred to BCS as a nonparty in the trial court. Despite
being a nonparty, attorneys for BCS actively participated in the § 45 hearing and even raised
objections. The participation went far beyond the scope of the limited appearances filed by the
BCS attorneys, pursuant to MCR 2.117(B)(2)(c), to tend to discovery matters.

      In People v Henderson, 382 Mich 582, 585-586; 171 NW2d 436 (1969), the Michigan
Supreme Court discussed the role of attorneys for those who are not parties to the litigation:

               A witness to a lawsuit has a perfect right to hire his own lawyer, and have
       him attend the trial as a spectator. He has a right to the advice of his counsellor
       before taking the stand, or during any recess. In a proper case, the court in its
       discretion might grant a recess for that very purpose.

               But if an attorney does not represent one of the parties to the litigation, there
       is no basis for him to participate as an advocate before the bar.

               If he objects, and his objection is sustained erroneously, against whom is
       the error committed? Against whom is the appeal to be taken? If his objection be
       overruled erroneously, can the error be saved to the witness? Surely witnesses have
       no right of appeal.

             A decision to object or not object is often a matter of trial strategy. On
       whose doorstep is that strategy to be laid?

              The notion of permitting witnesses’ attorneys to participate in civil trials or
       in criminal trials generally is so inconsistent with our adversary system as to

7
  While not pertinent to this case, when an Indian child is at issue, “the Indian child's tribe have a
right to intervene at any point” during the proceeding. MCL 712B.7(6).

                                                 -7-
       constitute a denial of due process of law, to an objecting party. [Emphasis added,
       footnote omitted.]

         The application of Henderson to the facts before us is simple. BCS was not a party to this
litigation. Therefore, attorneys for BCS had no right to participate in the § 45 hearings. See id.
Despite this fact and over petitioners’ objections, attorneys for BCS actively participated in the
hearing to an extent suggesting that BCS actually was a party. Allowing this to happen was “so
inconsistent with our adversary system as to constitute a denial of due process of law” to
petitioners. Id. Therefore, on remand, the trial court shall not allow BCS’s attorneys to participate
beyond the scope of their limited appearances for the purposes of discovery.

                                     IV. DISQUALIFICATION

       The Prevos argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a recusal. We
disagree.

        Both parties moved to disqualify the trial court in October 2022. After a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion on the basis that it was untimely, and even if it wasn’t, there was no basis
for establishing judicial bias. On de novo review, the Chief Judge agreed, issuing a thorough
opinion as to why the motion was both untimely and without merit. We review this decision for
an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 516; 759 NW2d 833
(2008).

        It is clear that both the trial court and Chief Judge of that court were right: the joint motion
to disqualify was untimely—by years. MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a) provides that “all motions for
disqualification must be filed within 14 days of the discovery of the grounds for disqualification.
If the discovery is made within 14 days of the trial date, the motion must be made forthwith.”
When seeking disqualification, the Prevos relied upon three pieces of evidence: (1) certain
comments made on the record by the trial court in child protection proceedings that occurred in
2019; (2) a case note from the present case in which a BCS worker stated that the trial judge had
made it evident in the autumn of 2019 that Donna Prevo was inappropriate for placement of CADP,
and (3) information from an MCI employee, who stated on January 28, 2021, that the judge “has
a strong opinion of Prevo grandparents,” “has made it clear she doesn’t like Prevos from removal,”
and “[h]as a favorable view of [Robinson].” As both trial courts recognized, the Prevos had the
transcripts containing the comments years before the filing of the motion for disqualification on
October 12, 2022, and the Prevos themselves acknowledge that they learned of the case note in
“mid-August 2022.” Although the Prevos apparently only learned of the MCI employee comment
on September 30, 2022, bringing it within the 14-day deadline, this comment appears to be a
summation of the earlier comments of which the parties were already aware. That the trial court
mentioned, during a hearing on October 7, 2022, the mere possibility that a party might suggest
grounds for disqualification existed did not “reset” the period for filing the motion for
disqualification.

        Even if the motion was timely, it was meritless. It is well established that “judicial rulings,
in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the
judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

                                                  -8-
impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Armstrong v Ypsilanti
Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597; 640 NW2d 321 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 603; 691 NW2d 812 (2004). Indeed, “[r]epeated rulings
against a litigant, even if erroneous, are not grounds for disqualification. The court must form an
opinion as to the merits of the matters before it. This opinion, whether pro or con, cannot constitute
bias or prejudice.” Band v Livonia Assoc, 176 Mich App 95, 118; 439 NW2d 285 (1989), citing
Mahlen Land Corp v Kurtz, 355 Mich 340, 350; 94 NW2d 888 (1959). This Court presumes that
the trial judge is impartial and the party asserting otherwise bears a heavy burden to overcome that
presumption. In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 566; 781 NW2d 132 (2009).

        Here, the only comments actually made by the trial court—the 2019 comments—were
made in the context of deciding a placement issue in the child protection proceedings. Importantly,
the comments were not from extraneous sources but instead were made by the presiding judge on
the basis of what had been observed by the court, or at minimum reported to it, during the
proceedings. These relevant, on-the-record comments do not constitute evidence of improper bias.
See In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566-567 (a trial judge’s remarks, which are hostile to or critical
of the parties, their cases, or their counsel, ordinarily will not establish a disqualifying bias).
Indeed, the trial court was performing its proper function when making the comments, the
comments were relevant to those prior proceedings, and the court expressly stated that it had no
bias against any of the parties.

        The law on disqualification is clear, and its faithful application leads to the dual conclusions
that the motion was untimely and contained no proper basis to remove the trial court.

                                         V. CONCLUSION

        We vacate the trial court’s order denying the Thibodeaus’ and Prevos’ petitions to set aside
MCI’s denial of consent to adopt CADP. This case is remanded for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                /s/ Noah P. Hood
                                                                /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                                /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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