Court Opinion

ID: 9393426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 08:08:51.296804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.216775
License: Public Domain

In the
               Court of Appeals
 Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                    No. 06-23-00030-CV

JOHN TRAYLOR D/B/A JOHN TRAYLOR INSURANCE, Appellant

                              V.

                 RAMONA LANE, Appellee

            On Appeal from the 76th District Court
                   Morris County, Texas
                  Trial Court No. 26,113

        Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
         Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

       John Traylor d/b/a John Traylor Insurance requests this Court’s permission to bring a

permissive appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (Supp.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3; TEX.

R. CIV. P. 168. Because the trial court’s order granting permission to seek a permissive appeal

fails to comply with Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and because Traylor’s

petition fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 28.3(e)(4) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure, we deny the request.

I.     Background

       Ramona Lane sued John Traylor d/b/a/ John Traylor Insurance complaining of on-the-job

sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.

       Traylor filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that Lane failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and failed to file a

claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The trial court granted the plea to

the jurisdiction on “[p]laintiff’s claims as to sexual harassment, hostile work environment,

discrimination and any other claims arising out of the sexual harassment allegation” and

dismissed those claims with prejudice. The trial court denied Traylor’s plea to the jurisdiction

“regarding [p]laintiff’s claim of tort based on assault.”

       This Court dismissed, for want of jurisdiction, Traylor’s appeal of the trial court’s order.

Thereafter, Traylor filed a second plea to the jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative

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remedies—the denial of which he now seeks permission to appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(d).

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d).

II.    Discussion

       Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that certain

otherwise non-appealable orders may be appealed. The statute states:

       (d)    On a party’s motion or on its own initiative, a trial court in a civil action
       may, by written order, permit an appeal from an order that is not otherwise
       appealable if:

                       (1)    the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of
               law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and

                     (2)      an immediate appeal from the order may materially
               advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d). Rule 28.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure requires that the petition for permissive appeal must “argue clearly and concisely why

the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial

ground for difference of opinion and how an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4). Finally, Rule 168

of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may permit an appeal from an

otherwise unappealable interlocutory order. The trial court must grant such permission in the

order to be appealed, and the “permission must identify the controlling question of law as to

which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and must state why an immediate

appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 168.

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       Here, the trial court’s order stated:

       On the 14th day of March, 2023, the Court heard Defendant’s Second Plea to the
       Jurisdiction. The Court finds that the motion should be Denied.

       IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Second Plea to the Jurisdiction
       regarding Plaintiff’s Common Assault Cause of Action is Denied.

       IT IS FURTHER ORDER[ED] that Defendant is permitted to appeal this order to
       the Texas Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
       CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) based on the following factors:

       (1)     the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which
       there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and

       (2)    an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
       termination of the litigation.

       Although the trial court’s order expressly grants permission to appeal the order, it does

not identify the “controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for

difference of opinion.” The order likewise does not “state why an immediate appeal may

materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. The order does

not provide any information regarding the basis of the second plea to the jurisdiction or the

court’s reasons for denying it. Consequently, the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule

168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. “Rule 168 plainly requires the court, in the portion of

the order that grants permission to appeal, to identify the controlling question of law at issue.”

Armour Pipe Line Co. v. Sandel Energy, Inc., No. 14-16-00010-CV, 2016 WL 514229, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 9, 2016, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (quoting Long

v. State, No. 03-12-00437-CV, 2012 WL 3055510, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 25, 2012, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“denying application for interlocutory appeal because the trial court’s order

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does not identify the controlling question of law”)); see Est. of Marshall, 04-15-00521-CV, 2015

WL 5245268, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 9, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(denying application for interlocutory appeal because the trial court’s order did not “state why an

immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”).

       In addition, “rule 28.3 requires that a petition for permission to appeal must ‘argue clearly

and concisely why the order to be appealed’ meets those two requirements.” Indus. Specialists,

LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co., LLC, 652 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Tex. 2022) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P.

28.3(e)(4)).   After having reviewed Traylor’s petition for permission to appeal, we have

concluded that it fails to comply with Rule 28.3(e)(4). Although the petition states what Traylor

believed to be the controlling question of law, the petition did not explain whether the question

involved a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” and did not explain how “an immediate

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the ligation.” TEX. R.

APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); see Gulf Coast Asphalt Co., L.L.C. v. Lloyd, 457 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Richardson v. Kays, No. 02-03-241-CV, 2003 WL

22457054, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(denying an application to appeal that did “not mention, discuss, or analyze why the issue . . .

involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of

opinion”).

III.   Conclusion

       Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 168 and because the petition

does not comply with Rule 28.3(e)(4), we must deny the petition seeking permission to appeal

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the interlocutory order. Because Traylor also filed a notice of appeal in this cause, thereby

attempting to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See

TEX. R. APP. 25.1(b).

                                             Charles van Cleef
                                             Justice

Date Submitted:         May 4, 2023
Date Decided:           May 5, 2023

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