Court Opinion

ID: 9460224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:45:09.263162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:32.081383
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the conviction on the ground that the evidence was lawfully seized under the plain view exception, or as phrased in this circuit without mentioning plain view, “probable cause for the search complained of.” Gills, infra, 357 F.2d p. 303.
The majority finds that:
(1) “. . . the agents had a legitimate reason for this incursion [of the curtilage] unconnected with a search of such premises directed against the accused.” P. 1100.
(2) “They were clearly entitled to go onto defendant’s premises in order to question him concerning the abandoned vehicle near his property.” P. 1100.
(3) “Furthermore, we cannot say that Agent Williams exceeded the scope of his legitimate purpose for being there by walking around to the back door when he was unable to get an answer at the front door.” P. 1100.
(4) “It follows that Agent Williams got within smelling range of the truck without unjustifiably intruding into defendant’s fourth amendment zone of privacy.” P. 1100.
(5) “Agent Williams’ attempts to summon defendant to the front door were interrupted by the arrival of two men in a truck carrying bran — a usual ingredient in the manufacture of moonshine whiskey.” P. 1099.
As noted in the opinion of the court, moonshine whiskey has a distinctive odor, and, contrary to the majority, I am of opinion that the agent “discovered” (see pp. 1100-1101) the moonshine when he smelled the odor coming from the truck and, looking through the crack in the door, saw it without disturbing the door of the vehicle. Under the “totality of facts and circumstances” existing here, Gills, 357 F.2d, p. 302, the ensuing search to me was not the unreasonable search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
We have upheld a search under facts no more favorable to the government in United States v. Gills, 357 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1965), cert, den., 384 U.S. 933, 86 S.Ct. 1448, 16 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966), a case mentioned only by footnote by the majority, which I suggest the opinion of the court here overrules.
Although the majority opinion states the holding in Gills did “not consider the separate issue of a warrantless search,” I find it difficult to grasp how the question arose on appeal, separately or otherwise, “under the Fourth Amendment” as stated at p. 301, Gills, unless the objection in the trial court to the admissibility of the evidence was that the search had been made without a warrant. Gills precisely held that the search was justified because the totality of facts and circumstances created “probable cause for the search complained of,” Gills, p. 303. The majority opinion, then, de*1105spite its holding at p. 1101, that the agent “. . . had probable cause to believe that the truck contained contraband” and “. . . probable cause for the belief that moonshine was to be found in the truck,” necessarily holds that something in addition to probable cause is required for the search of a motor vehicle without a warrant. In my opinion, this case ought to come within the rule expressed in United States v. Haley, 321 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1963):
“If, on the other hand, the search occurred before the arrest, it came within the rule that a search without a warrant of an automobile engaged in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor, made upon probable cause, is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”
The holding of the majority is:
“. . .we hold that, since two of the agents could have guarded, the truck smelling of moonshine whiskey while the third obtained a warrant without significant risk of loss of evidence, the search and seizure in this case violated the fourth amendment and that the fruits thereof should have been suppressed.” (Pp. 1103-1104).
The majority, then, suggests that two of the agents should have stayed on the defendant’s property, without a search warrant, and guarded the truck, obviously for the sole purpose of preventing the defendant from exercising dominion over it — a seizure in any context. In my opinion, this seizure of the whole truck, while awaiting the return of the third agent with the search warrant, would have been at least as unjustifiable as looking through the crack in the door, which has been disapproved. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Holding that the search by looking would be unlawful, when the seizure of the whole truck would not, is construing the Fourth Amendment with critical niceness to which I may not accede.