Court Opinion

ID: 9642971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:13:56.178946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.405996
License: Public Domain

ROACH, Justice,
dissenting in part.
After reviewing the record, the relevant case law, and literature on the subject of defamation, it has become clear that the *804Supreme Court of West Virginia was correct when it observed that “the litigation of a cause of action for defamation can prove to be a daunting task for the most learned jurist or the most experienced counsel.” Pritt v. Republican National Committee, 210 W.Va. 446, 557 S.E.2d 853, 861 (2001). With this in mind, however, I must respectfully dissent.
I concur only in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict for reputation damages was proper. I dissent because I believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in evaluating the actual malice element regarding the statements at issue. I also agree with Justice Cooper that the award of punitive damages was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the clear directives of the United States Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), although I do not agree with his conclusion on the proper amount of punitive damages.1
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that courts have an independent duty to analyze whether the statements in question were made with actual malice. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989), the Court explained:
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. This rule is not simply premised on common-law tradition, but on the unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard. Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of breathing space so that protected speech is not discouraged. The meaning of terms such as actual mal*805ice — and, more particularly, reckless disregard — however, is not readily captured in one infallible definition. Rather, only through the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content to these otherwise elusive constitutional standards. Moreover, such elucidation is particularly important in the area of free speech for precisely the same reason that the actual malice standard is itself necessary. Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech — the more elusive the standard, the less protection it affords. Most fundamentally, the rule is premised on the recognition that judges, as expositors of the Constitution, have a duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual malice.
Id. at 685-686, 109 S.Ct. at 2694-2695 (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
In explaining a court’s duty, the Supreme Court explained:
In determining whether the constitutional standard has been satisfied, the reviewing court must consider the factual record in full. Although credibility determinations are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard because the trier of fact has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the reviewing court must examine for itself the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect.
Id. at 688-689, 109 S.Ct. at 2696 (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). Thus, we are required to independently evaluate whether the statements in question were made with actual malice.
On the other hand, we are not at liberty to review a jury’s factual findings independently. Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., 801 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Ky.1990) (“At least in deciding what are the so-called underlying, subsidiary or historical facts, as contrasted with the finding of malice, where the evidence conflicts appellate review still must be in terms of what the jury could find as the true facts and what the jury could reasonably infer from the testimony of witnesses when considered as a whole. We accept the jury’s finding as to disputed facts when there is supporting evidence because we claim no superior ability to divine the truth by reason of judicial office, and we question the good judgment of any judge who thinks he has such special powers.” (citation omitted)); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499-500, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1959, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact via application of the clearly erroneous standard under the federal rules in a defamation case). Instead, our review is limited.
I believe that there is supporting evidence as to the jury’s findings: (i) that the Starchaser ride did not malfunction (the “Malfunction Statement”); (ii) that state inspectors did not think the Starchaser ride was too dangerous (the “Too Dangerous Statement”); and (iii) that Kentucky Kingdom did not remove a key component of the Starchaser ride (the “Removal Statement”). However, I agree with the Court of Appeals that there was not a sufficient showing of actual malice as to two of the statements.
Malfunction Statement and Removal Statement
Based on the evidence at trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that the Star-*806chaser ride did not malfunction and that operator error did not equate with ride malfunction. At trial, Kentucky Kingdom’s CEO, Ed Hart, testified that the “ride never malfunctioned.” WHAS-TV’s corporate representative testified that the statement that the Starchaser ride malfunctioned was an “inaccurate statement.” Additionally, the WHAS-TV reporter who covered the story testified that mechanical malfunction and human error are “two different things.”
However, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that WHAS-TV did not know the Malfunction Statement was false at the time of its telecasts and that WHAS-TV did not act with a reckless disregard for the truth. The Court of Appeals explained:
Kentucky Kingdom’s characterization of the accident differed from WHAS-TV’s. Kentucky Kingdom maintained that the ride did not malfunction, but rather that operator error caused the accident. Kentucky Kingdom informed WHAS-TV of its interpretation of what caused the accident. We do not believe, however, that this difference in characterization is sufficient to establish that the publisher [WHAS-TV] of the defamatory falsehood [had] entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the published matter. Accordingly, the evidence does not establish that WHAS-TV acted with actual malice.
Court of Appeals Opinion at 7 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation footnote omitted). Thus, the statement was not made with actual malice, and the jury’s verdict as to this statement should be reversed.
I also believe that a reasonable juror could conclude that the Removal Statement was false. The Court of Appeals explained:
In 1996, WHAS-TV reported that Kentucky Kingdom had removed a key component of the Starchaser. A WHAS-TV reporter gathered this information from deposition testimony given in the Noonan case and from a conversation he had with an employee of the company the reporter thought (incorrectly, as it turned out) had manufactured the ride. Kentucky Kingdom’s technical services manager stated in his deposition that a brake on the Starchaser was not used. This brake was part of the ride’s dispatch system. The employee informed the reporter that a braking system was necessary on the ride and the technical services manager stated that the accident would not have occurred if the brake was in use. Trial testimony revealed that there was some confusion as to what braking system the employee referred: the dispatch system brake or the reducing brakes. The WHAS-TV reporter testified at trial that the words “removed” and “key component” were his own words and that those words were inaccurate. Based on the foregoing, we believe that evidence, although conflicting, supports the jury’s finding that the “removed a key component” report was false.
Id. at 7-8.2
Again, however, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that the statement was not made with actual malice. The Court of Appeals explained:
Once again, however, we are unconvinced that WHAS-TV acted with actual malice. The reporter testified that he used those words to inform the audience *807that the brake was “removed from the process, removed from the procedure, was not being used.” We do not believe that the distinction between “removed” and “did not use” is constitutionally sufficient to establish [actual malice].
Id. at 8-9.
Although I do not agree with Justice Cooper’s conclusion as to the truth of the Malfunction Statement and the Removal Statement, I believe his discussion of the Malfunction Statement and Removal Statement further bolsters the conclusion that WHAS-TV did not make these two statements with actual malice. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the jury’s verdict as to these two statements.
Too Dangerous Statement
In WHAS-TV’s first broadcast concerning the Starchaser ride on July 27, 1994, reporter Lisa Kiava interviewed a Kentucky Kingdom patron who stated, “I mean everybody should know about it, how-dangerous this ride is. It should be closed down, forever, I think.” Kiava then said, “State inspectors also think the ride is too dangerous.”
The record easily establishes that this statement, the Too Dangerous Statement, was false. Kiava testified that she got the statement from producer Kelly Dearing-Smith who told her that she had spoken to state ride inspectors at the Department of Agriculture and the inspectors had told Dearing-Smith that the Starchaser ride was too dangerous. However, Dearing-Smith testified that she did not know the source of this information. Roger Nesbitt, the Communications Director of the Department of Agriculture testified that he had no knowledge of any ride inspector making the Too Dangerous Statement. In addition, Carl Dills, the • State of Kentucky’s chief ride inspector testified that he did not tell anyone from WHAS-TV that this ride was too dangerous and further stated that he had no knowledge of anyone from the Department of Agriculture saying that the ride was too dangerous. In fact, Dills testified that he rode the ride “all the time myself.” And finally, WHAS-TV’s corporate representative at trial testified that the Too Dangerous Statement was inaccurate and that he believed a retraction should have been issued.
After reviewing the record, I also believe that the circumstantial evidence demonstrated that there was clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The evidence described above establishes that (i) no one at WHAS-TV claimed to have spoken to any state inspector that made a statement that resembled the Too Dangerous Statement; (ii) the Department of Agriculture had no knowledge of anyone making such a statement; and (iii) WHAS-TV’s corporate representative admitted that the statement was inaccurate and should have been retracted. In addition, WHAS-TV’s actions after the July 27, 1994 telecast demonstrate at least a reckless disregard of the truth. Roger Nesbitt called WHAS-TV on July 29, 2004 and spoke' to Dearing-Smith about the July 27, 1994 telecast. On that day, Dear-ing Smith flagged the script surrounding the Too Dangerous Statement. Dearing also prepared an internal, memorandum that was introduced at trial. It states:
TO: NICK
FROM: KELLEY DEARING
RE: KENTUCKY- KINGDOM PHONECALL
I HAPPENED TO PICK UP A CALL FOR LISA KIAVA SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE KENTUCKY KINGDOM ACCIDENT. WHEN I TOLD THE CALLER LISA WAS NOT HERE TODAY AND ASKED IF I COULD *808HELP, HE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS BEING WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT INSPECTS RIDES. I CANNOT REMEMBER HIS NAME.
HE SAID HE WAS CALLING WITH A CONCERN OVER A STORY WE RAN ON THE ACCIDENT. HE SAID SOMEONE WITH KENTUCKY KINGDOM HAD CALLED HIM. HE SAID WE HAD REPORTED THAT STATE INSPECTORS SAID THE RIDE HAD “MALFUNCTIONED”. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT STATE INSPECTORS HAD NOT SAID THAT — AND HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO WE HAD SPOKE WITH. AT THIS POINT — I TOLD HIM I WOULD TRY TO GET TO THE END OF THE PROBLEM. I LEFT A MESSAGE ON LISA KIAVA’S ANSWERING MACHINE, EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF THE CALL. AFTER THE CALL, I WENT INTO THE ARCHIVE SCRIPT TO LISA’S STORY AND PUT A NOTATION IN THE SCRIPT THAT SAID “DO NOT REPORT, ACCURATE???” TO LET OTHERS LOOKING FOR FILE INFORMATION NOT REPEAT THE SAME WORDING UNTIL THIS PROBLEM WAS SOLVED.
THANKS.
KELLEY DEARING
Dearing-Smith testified that the source for the Too Dangerous Statement was never verified. Instead of making inquiry into this issue, WHAS-TV ran the Too Dangerous Statement the next day. In addition, from May 19, 1996 through May 22, 1996, WHAS-TV aired a four part series of investigative reports from reporter Doug Proffitt about the Starchaser accident. At the end of each of these lengthy segments, Proffitt read a statement that noted Kentucky Kingdom had filed a lawsuit about the 1994 telecasts and then he stated that the 1994 stories were true. Proffitt testified that he had not seen the original stories and the executive news director had prepared the statement.
After conducting the independent review that is mandated by Bose, I conclude that the cléar and convincing evidence established that the Too Dangerous Statement was made with actual malice because the evidence shows that the statement was made with the knowledge that it was false or with the reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
Substantial Truth
I believe that the majority is incorrect in its analysis of substantial truth. The majority claims that this doctrine “is a convenient and necessary phrase invented by lawyers and judges to apply in very narrow and limited circumstances and relates only to incidental information and not to essential content.” Ante at 791-92. In fact, this doctrine goes to the heart of protecting First Amendment principles. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991), the United States Supreme Court explained that one method of analyzing whether the statements were made with actual malice is to determine whether they were “substantially true” despite the fact that they may be technically false because they are not literally true.
The constitutional question we must consider here is whether ... the evidence suffices to show that respondents acted with the requisite knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. This inquiry in turn requires us to consider the concept of falsity; for we cannot discuss the standards for knowledge or reckless disregard without *809some understanding of the acts required for liability.... We ... must determine what, in addition to this technical falsity, proves falsity for purposes of the actual malice inquiry.
Id. at 513-514, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2481. The Court went so far as to expressly note that “[o]ur definition of actual malice relies upon th[e] historical understanding” of the substantial truth doctrine. Id. at 517, 111 S.Ct. at 2433. Clearly, in a case that involves comments about a public figure by a media defendant, substantial truth is not a “narrow and limited” doctrine but a constitutional doctrine.3 I would also note that this means that the substantial truth doctrine is more appropriately applied as part of a court’s actual malice review or by the trial court at the summary judgment stage. See Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky.1966) (applying substantial truth doctrine at the summary judgment stage).
I do not believe it is error to instruct the jury on falsity alone. The vast majority of courts that have been presented with “falsity” (as opposed to the “substantial truth”) instructions have tacitly approved those instructions. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (failing to find error in a falsity instruction). In fact, I have been able to find only one case that has expressly required the use of a substantial truth instruction. See Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 731 So.2d 702, 707 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) (reversing because “the trial court was incorrect in finding that ‘substantial truth’ should not be presented to the jury”). Thus, I conclude that it is not required that the jury be instructed as to substantial truth — an instruction as to falsity is sufficient. However, I believe it is better practice for the jury to be instructed that for purposes of the falsity of the statements, “false” means “not substantially true.” Though such an instruction is not required, it would allow for a more robust presentation of the substantial truth defense by the defendant.
Finally, I think that the implied libel instructions were erroneous, and I join Part III.B. of Justice Cooper’s dissenting opinion. And since the jury did not return a damage award on each specific statement, the judgment should be remanded for a trial on damages as to the Too Dangerous Statement.

. This Court’s duty to review punitive damages consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is not optional. See U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’’). Even if we were persuaded that Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg were correct in Campbell in their criticism of the use of the Due Process Clause to constrain the size of a punitive damages award, we are bound by the controlling opinion of the United States Supreme Court when they are interpreting the United States Constitution. Gardner v. Commonwealth, 642 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Ky.1982) ("We are bound by the Constitution and the construction given to it by the United States Supreme Court ....”); see also Plumlee's Adm'x v. Citizen’s Nat. Bank of Bowling Green, 271 Ky. 226, 111 S.W.2d 607, 610 (1937) ("[I]t is firmly settled that inferior federal courts and all state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court upon all questions involving construction, interpretation, and application of Federal statutes.”). Punitive damages awards must be analyzed through the filter of Campbell, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), as Justice Cooper does in his dissent. However, Justice Cooper states that the punitive damages award in this matter should be "at or near” the same amount of compensatory damages. Ante at 803. I do not believe that this case falls within Campbell’s description of the type of case where the punitive damages can only equal compensatory damages. 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. at 1524. Having reviewed the United States Supreme Court's Opinions in Haslip, Campbell, and Gore, I would find that the punitive award should be reduced to a two to one ratio.

. Kentucky Kingdom CEO, Ed Hart, also testified that the reducing brake and the dispatch motor brake were never removed.

. This is not to say that the substantial truth doctrine does not have common law roots. In fact, substantial truth still plays an important, but distinct, role as a defense in common law defamation. See Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 3.7 (Practicing Law Institute 2004).