Court Opinion

ID: 9673820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:54.244554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.303719
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the decision of the trial court. Subsequent to our re*535versal of his second-degree murder conviction in 1970, defendant was not retried until 1972, because of numerous adjournments. In his amicus curiae brief in this appeal, the trial judge indicates that when he set the date for the retrial, he advised defense counsel that because of the delay defendant would be given credit for the time he waited on bond in the event that he was convicted on retrial. The subsequent sentencing order, however, indicated only that defendant would be given credit for the 635 days served under the original conviction. Defense counsel, therefore, petitioned the court for reduction of sentence. The judge ordered that the order of conviction and sentence be amended to reflect credit for 1,218 days. The Department of Corrections refused to recognize that order. The trial judge then ordered a new trial and dismissed the charges on the date defendant would have been released from prison had the judge’s order granting credit been followed. Although somewhat unorthodox, the actions of the trial court were not invalid.
As noted by the majority, a trial court has the power to grant a new trial when "it shall appear to the court that justice has not been done”, MCLA 770.1; MSA 28.1098. A trial judge may sua sponte grant a new trial even after the time for filing such a motion has lapsed. People v Hurwich, 259 Mich 361; 243 NW 230 (1932), People v Barrows, 358 Mich 267; 99 NW2d 347 (1959). The grant of a motion for new trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of clear abuse of such discretion. People v Bersine, 48 Mich App 295; 210 NW2d 501 (1973). This Court has held that abuse of discretion with respect to the granting of a motion for new trial connotes more than an error of law or of judgment, and that it implies *536an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court. People v Poole, 7 Mich App 237; 151 NW2d 365 (1967). It is apparent that the trial judge felt that it was unjust to deny defendant the credit against sentence. I cannot say that the trial judge was unreasonable or arbitrary in granting a new trial.
On the question of changing a previously imposed sentence, I also must disagree. I find no authority on point which forecloses a trial court from doing what was done in this case. The authority cited by the majority is inapposite. The actions taken by the trial court in the instant case take it out of the rule about altering a validly imposed sentence. Indeed the judge may have done indirectly what he cannot do directly, but that does not make his actions wrong. I would hold that in view of the law relating to the granting of new trials, the court’s actions in the instant case were not contrary to law.