Court Opinion

ID: 9902231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:06:13.568089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.916794
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                        CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                            NOVEMBER 24, 2023
                                                                         STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 213

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Charles Deverek Brame,                               Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230024

Appeal from the District Court of Richland County, Southeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Bradley A. Cruff, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Megan E. Kummer, State’s Attorney, Wahpeton, ND, for plaintiff and appellee;
submitted on brief.

Laura C. Ringsak, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant; submitted on
brief.
                                      State v. Brame
                                       No. 20230024

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Charles Deverek Brame pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault in
violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-07(1)(e). On appeal1, Brame seeks to withdraw
his guilty pleas because the district court failed to explicitly ask him whether
he was entering his plea voluntarily or whether his plea resulted from force,
threats, or promises. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2). A Rule 11 error does not
automatically lead to reversal. We conclude that a defendant who failed to first
raise the alleged error in the district court must show a Rule 11 violation’s
impact on substantial rights before we will undo a guilty plea. Because Brame
did not show the alleged violation had an impact on his substantial rights, we
affirm the criminal judgment.

                                               I

[¶2] On March 11, 2022, Brame was charged with two counts of sexual
assault and delivery of an alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of 21
years. On March 14, 2022, Brame signed a notification of rights and
acknowledgment form. During his initial appearance, the district court read to
Brame the charges against him, informed him of the maximum possible
penalty for each charge, and advised Brame of his right to be represented by
counsel. The court did not advise Brame of any other rights afforded to a
criminal defendant.

[¶3] Brame pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a preliminary hearing.
The district court confirmed that Brame had not been threatened or coerced
into waiving his right to a preliminary hearing. The court did not advise Brame
of any other rights.

1 We remanded to provide the State an opportunity to file any relevant transcripts which may show

the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure. State v. Brame, 2023 ND 121, ¶ 1, 993 N.W.2d 338.

                                               1
[¶4] Brame appeared for a pretrial conference hearing, and advised the
district court he would like to enter a plea of guilty. The State moved to dismiss
the delivery of alcohol charge leaving open the two counts of sexual assault.
The parties also informed the court that a joint sentencing proposal had been
reached. The court read Brame the charges and entered into the following
exchange with Brame:

      THE COURT: Okay. So. Mr. Brame, count 1, sexual assault—

      MR. KRASSIN: —just a second your Honor. (Private conversation
      with client.) Okay. Thank you.

      THE COURT: Count 1, sexual assault, a class C felony. How do
      you plead?

      MR. BRAME: Guilty your Honor.

      THE COURT: Count 2, same charge, a class C felony. How do you
      plead?

      MR. BRAME: Guilty your Honor.

      THE COURT: Are your pleas voluntary and knowing?

      MR. BRAME: Yes.

      THE COURT: Factual basis Ms. Kummer.

      MS. KUMMER: Okay. It looks like on March 8 of 2022 Jane Doe
      went to the Wahpeton Police Department to report that she had
      been sexually assaulted by her step-father earlier on March 8, in
      the city of Wahpeton, Richland County. Jane Doe’s step-father was
      identified as Mr. Charles Brame, who is the defendant who
      appears before you. She told officers that on the morning of March
      8 the defendant told her that he was going to take her shopping for
      clothes. Jane Doe then stated that she and the defendant drove to
      a store where the defendant purchased alcohol. Jane Doe stated
      while she and the defendant were in the car he began touching her
      breasts and thighs over her clothing and he told her to spread her
      legs apart. This incident took place in the city of Wahpeton. Jane

                                        2
      Doe was between the ages of 15 and 17 years old at the time. That’s
      count 1.

      Count 2 is that on that same date, place, and circumstances, here
      in the city of Wahpeton, after that incident took place in the
      vehicle, he then took her to the AmericInn and booked a hotel
      room. The AmericInn is also located in the city of Wahpeton,
      Richland County. Once inside the hotel room the defendant
      removed her clothing and he removed his own clothing. He then
      told Jane Doe to drink the alcohol provided to her. He then
      performed oral sex on Jane Doe. The defendant also penetrated
      Jane Doe’s vagina, both digitally and with his penis. He then—
      Jane Doe told an officer that she told the defendant multiple times
      that it hurt and that he needed to stop but he refused to stop.

      Jane Doe’s mother told an officer that after speaking with Jane
      Doe, she went to the hotel and found the defendant naked. Jane
      Doe’s mother stated that the defendant told her that the [sic]
      wanted to make Jane Doe a woman. During this time, Jane Doe
      was between the ages of 15 and 17 years old.

      THE COURT: Do you agree with that factual basis Mr. Krassin?

      MR. KRASSIN: We certainly don’t agree on some of the details but
      we do agree that the charges that have been filed, that some of the
      conduct met each of those—one is sexual contact and the other is
      sexual act.

      THE COURT: I’ll find sufficient factual basis for the charges. Find
      your pleas of guilty to be voluntary and knowing. I’ll accept them.
      And you can go either way—sentencing and then victim impact.

[¶5] At the conclusion of the victim impact statements, the district court
adopted the joint recommendation and sentenced Brame to thirty months with
credit for time served. Brame appealed.

                                      II

[¶6] Brame argues the district court violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) by failing
to inform him of the rights under Rule 11(b). “Before accepting a guilty plea,

                                      3
the court must advise the defendant of certain rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.”
State v. Magnuson, 1997 ND 228, ¶ 16, 571 N.W.2d 642. The advice required
to be given by Rule 11 is mandatory and binding on the court. State v.
Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345, 346 (N.D. 1990). Although Rule 11 does not
require any ritualistic, predetermined formality by the trial court, the court
must substantially comply with the procedural requirements of the rule to
ensure the defendant is entering a voluntary plea of guilty. State v. Hoffarth,
456 N.W.2d 111, 113-14 (N.D. 1990).

[¶7] Rule11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides:

      (1) The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first, by
      addressing the defendant personally [except as provided in Rule
      43(b)] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining
      that the defendant understands the following:

         (A) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded,
         to persist in that plea;

         (B) the right to a jury trial;

         (C) the right to be represented by counsel at trial and at every
         other stage of the proceeding and, if necessary, the right to have
         the counsel provided under Rule 44;

         (D) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse
         witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to
         testify and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of
         witnesses;

         (E) the defendant’s waiver of these trial rights if the court
         accepts a plea of guilty;

         (F) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is
         pleading;

         (G) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment,
         fine, and mandatory fee;

                                          4
         (H) any mandatory minimum penalty;

         (I) the court’s authority to order restitution; and

         (J) that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States
         citizen may be removed from the United States, denied
         citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the
         future.

      (2) Ensuring That a Plea is Voluntary. Before accepting a plea of
      guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open
      court, unless the defendant’s presence is not required under Rule
      43(b)(2) or (c), and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not
      result from force, threats, or promises other than promises in a
      plea agreement. The court must also inquire whether the
      defendant’s willingness to plead guilty results from discussion
      between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the
      defendant’s attorney.

[¶8] “A trial court is not required to readvise a defendant of each of his rights
at a change of plea hearing, provided the court determines that the defendant
was properly advised at arraignment, and that the defendant now recalls that
advice.” State v. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d 183, 185 (N.D. 1994). “It is sufficient to
satisfy due process if the defendant’s knowledge of his rights is clearly reflected
from the whole record.” Id.

[¶9] Brame concedes he did not challenge in the district court the court’s
compliance with Rule 11 nor did he move to withdraw his guilty pleas. When
a party in a criminal case fails to raise an issue in the district court, our review
on appeal is limited to determining whether there has been obvious error.
N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b); State v. Henes, 2009 ND 42, ¶ 7, 763 N.W.2d 502; State
v. Keener, 2008 ND 156, ¶ 16, 755 N.W.2d 462. “To establish obvious error, a
defendant must demonstrate ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights.’” State v. Myers, 2009 ND 141, ¶ 10, 770 N.W.2d 713
(quoting State v. Gibbs, 2009 ND 44, ¶ 12, 763 N.W.2d 430); Henes, at ¶ 8. An
alleged error must be a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under
current law to constitute obvious error. State v. Blurton, 2009 ND 144, ¶ 8, 770
N.W.2d 231; Keener, at ¶ 16.

                                         5
[¶10] While Brame’s written acknowledgement of rights and the information
provided during earlier hearings satisfied the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1),
Brame is able to demonstrate an error because the district court did not comply
with Rule 11(b)(2) at the pretrial conference when his pleas of guilty were
accepted. Rule 11(b)(2) requires the court to “determine that the plea is
voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises other than
promises in a plea agreement” and “inquire whether the defendant’s
willingness to plead guilty results from discussion between the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.”

[¶11] Here, Brame must show the error was plain. “A ‘plain’ error is a ‘clear’
or ‘obvious’ deviation from current law.” State v. Landrus, 2022 ND 107, ¶ 10,
974 N.W.2d 676 (quoting State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658).
Plea discussions resulted in Brame agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for
dismissal of the delivery of alcohol charge and the parties’ joint sentencing
proposal. The district court did not enter into an exchange with Brame to
confirm that he had not been threatened or coerced into entering the pleas. The
court did not determine whether Brame had been promised anything in
exchange for his pleas of guilty. The court did not inquire whether Brame’s
willingness to plead guilty resulted from discussion between the prosecuting
attorney and Brame or Brame’s attorney.

[¶12] In discussing the requirements of Rule 11(b)(2), formerly Rule 11(c), we
have noted “[t]he purpose of the inquiry required by the second sentence of
Rule 11(c), N.D.R.Crim.P., is for the trial court to ascertain whether the plea
of guilty is the result of plea negotiations.” State v. Beckman, 1999 ND 54, ¶ 11,
591 N.W.2d 120. “Where the trial court is so alerted, it must make additional
inquiry to satisfy the concerns of the second sentence of Rule 11(c).” State v.
Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 18, 606 N.W.2d 524.

[¶13] The district court did not inquire whether any promise had been made
to Brame or inquire into Brame’s understanding of any agreement leading to
his change of plea. Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 18. This was a clear deviation from
the requirements of Rule 11 and constitutes plain error.

                                        6
[¶14] Despite concluding the district court committed a Rule 11 violation,
Brame fails to satisfy the third obvious error prong—an effect on substantial
rights. State v. Hoehn, 2019 ND 222, ¶ 24, 932 N.W.2d 553. “If an error does
not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, then it must be disregarded.” Id.
(citing N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(a)). In order to affect substantial rights, an error must
have been prejudicial, or affected the outcome of the proceeding. State v.
Erickstad, 2000 ND 202, ¶ 22, 620 N.W.2d 136. The defendant bears the
burden of showing the alleged error was prejudicial. State v. Patterson, 2014
ND 193, ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d 113; see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542
U.S. 74, 76 (2004) (To prove that an error has affected substantial rights, a
defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would
not have entered the plea.”).

[¶15] On appeal, Brame does not argue that his plea was in fact involuntary
or that it resulted from force, threats, or promises. Brame does not argue he
had in any way been misled or prejudiced as a result of the plea negotiations
nor does he assert he would have declined to plead guilty if the district court
had asked the Rule 11(b)(2) questions. The record does not show that Brame
was incompetent to plead guilty or that he was vulnerable to coercion.

[¶16] We do not conclude that Brame has shown a reasonable probability that
compliance with Rule 11 would have led to a different plea. Any Rule 11
violation therefore failed to affect his substantial rights. See United States v.
Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause [the
defendant] does not assert on appeal that he would not have entered the plea
but for the district court’s alleged error, he has not demonstrated the
probability of a different result and thus cannot show that the district court’s
action affected his substantial rights.” (cleaned up)). “When our rule is derived
from a federal rule, we may look to the federal courts’ interpretation or
construction of identical or similar language as persuasive authority for
interpreting our rule.” State v. Trevino, 2011 ND 232, ¶ 9, 807 N.W.2d 211
(citing State v. Runck, 534 N.W.2d 829, 831 (N.D. 1995)); State v. Jenkins, 326
N.W.2d 67, 69-70 n.4 (N.D. 1982); State v. Rueb, 249 N.W.2d 506, 510 (N.D.
1976); see also N.D.R.Crim.P. 2, explanatory note.

                                        7
[¶17] Based on the full record before us, Brame failed to establish his plea of
guilty was not voluntary or intelligently entered, or that the district court’s
failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(2) affected Brame’s substantial rights.

                                     III

[¶18] Brame has failed to support his claim that the district court’s failure to
comply with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(2) amounted to obvious error requiring
reversal of his convictions. We affirm the judgment.

[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                       8