Court Opinion

ID: 9915294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 23:02:50.534686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:22.910708
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 220469-U

                                  Order filed January 4, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Du Page County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0469
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 12-CF-339
                                                        )
      LUIS M. MORETA,                                   )       Honorable
                                                        )       John J. Kinsella,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The court properly dismissed defendant’s second-stage postconviction petition, and
                  postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.

¶2          Defendant, Luis M. Moreta, appeals from the Du Page County circuit court’s second-stage

     dismissal of his postconviction petition. First, defendant argues that the court erred in dismissing

     his petition because he made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

     Second, defendant contends that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by

     failing to attach a witness’s affidavit to the amended petition. We affirm.
¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West

     2010)). The evidence adduced at trial showed that defendant contacted Ross-Emerson about using

     Craigslist to commit a robbery together. Defendant’s girlfriend and Ross-Emerson’s girlfriend

     were sisters, Alison and Jennifer DuBonetti, respectively. Ross-Emerson created a fraudulent

     Craigslist post to sell a non-existent motorcycle using a new email address and fake photographs

     found online. Defendant went with Ross-Emerson to purchase a prepaid cell phone to facilitate

     Ross-Emerson’s communication with potential buyers, and later, defendant purchased more

     minutes for the phone. Bank records and store receipts corroborated the transactions. Several

     weeks before the charged incident, defendant, Ross-Emerson, and Victor Arroyo unsuccessfully

     attempted to rob an unrelated individual through Craigslist.

¶5          On December 2, 2011, Samual Benito-Ortiz communicated with Ross-Emerson regarding

     Ross-Emerson’s Craigslist post and arranged a meeting at approximately 9 p.m. Defendant drove

     Arroyo and Ross-Emerson in his black Dodge van to a dark location in a parking lot. Arroyo and

     Ross-Emerson observed defendant’s black revolver and silver semiautomatic firearm in the front

     console. Ross-Emerson negotiated the price for the motorcycle to $3700, which Benito-Ortiz

     confirmed that he had brought when Ross-Emerson first met him in the parking lot. Aldwin

     Caraballo and Wesley Guarderas accompanied Benito-Ortiz. Ross-Emerson called defendant’s

     cell phone and told him there were too many people with Benito-Ortiz, but defendant instructed

     Ross-Emerson to continue with their plan. Phone records corroborated the calls Ross-Emerson

     made to defendant and Benito-Ortiz. Ross-Emerson led the three individuals to the van, where

     defendant and Arroyo jumped out, wearing black hooded sweatshirts and clothing covering their

     faces and pointing guns. Defendant held the black revolver to Benito-Ortiz’s head while Arroyo

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     held the silver semiautomatic firearm. Defendant and Arroyo took keys and money from Caraballo,

     Benito-Ortiz, and Guarderas. All three were then ordered to walk out of view and defendant, Ross-

     Emerson, and Arroyo drove away in the van.

¶6          After the robbery, defendant split the stolen $3700 between himself, Ross-Emerson, and

     Arroyo. Later, defendant gave police written consent to search his residence, where officers

     located a black revolver and defendant’s cell phone. Caraballo, Guarderas, Ross-Emerson, and

     Arroyo identified the black revolver located in defendant’s bedroom closet, as well as one located

     in defendant’s black Dodge van, as those used in the robbery. Testimony from Alison and

     Jennifer’s mother, Theresa DuBonetti; Alison’s boss; and Alison was offered in support of

     defendant’s alibi that he was with Alison at the time of the crime.

¶7          The jury found defendant guilty. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the court

     denied. The court sentenced defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant

     argued that the court erred in allowing a police officer to testify regarding cell phone records absent

     qualifying him as an expert, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing

     argument. The Second District affirmed. People v. Moreta, 2017 IL App (2d) 150375-U, ¶ 37.

¶8          Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition raising a number of claims, including,

     inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present Jennifer’s

     testimony. Defendant stated that Jennifer “knew that [defendant] did not commit” the offense but

     detectives “pressured and threatened” her to say he had. Defendant attached a notarized letter from

     Jennifer, stating that she told the police that Ross-Emerson repeatedly requested to use defendant’s

     van for the robbery. Further, defendant could not have committed the crime because Jennifer

     observed defendant and Alison bring their children to Theresa’s house to watch them while

     defendant and Alison went out. Jennifer was present when Ross-Emerson used defendant’s van

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       and called defendant after the robbery to let him know “everything went good.” Jennifer also stated

       that the police department was “corrupt” and threatened to take her child away, which coerced her

       statement that defendant participated in the crime. The court appointed counsel and advanced

       defendant’s petition to the second stage.

¶9            Counsel filed a compliant Rule 615(c) certificate and an amended postconviction petition,

       alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when it failed to: (1) move to suppress

       the consent to search defendant’s apartment, which resulted in the discovery of the revolver and

       cell phone; (2) effectively argue the motion in limine to bar evidence of other crimes; (3) object or

       move to limit the other-crimes evidence; (4) propose jury instructions to address the evidence; and

       (5) preserve his contentions in a posttrial motion. It further alleged that appellate counsel was

       ineffective for failing to raise the listed issues on appeal. Postconviction counsel attached an

       affidavit from defendant to the petition. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss

       defendant’s petition. Defendant appealed.

¶ 10                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11          On appeal, defendant argues (1) the circuit court erred by granting the State’s motion to

       dismiss his amended postconviction petition at the second stage because his pro se petition made

       a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call Jennifer as a

       witness, and (2) postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance when it failed to attach

       an affidavit from Jennifer to its amended petition.

¶ 12          The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) permits a criminal defendant to challenge the

       proceedings which resulted in his conviction by asserting that “there was a substantial denial of

       his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 725

       ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2016). Postconviction proceedings allow inquiry into constitutional

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       issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that were not and could not have been

       previously adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d 410, 417-18 (2002). To be

       entitled to postconviction relief, defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a

       constitutional violation in the proceeding, which resulted in the conviction being challenged. 725

       ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2016); People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471 (2006).

¶ 13          The Act provides for three stages of postconviction proceedings. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at

       471-72. At the first stage, the circuit court must either dismiss the petition if it is frivolous or

       patently without merit or docket the petition for further consideration. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2),

       (b) (West 2016); Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472. At the second stage of the proceedings, the court

       may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, who would make any necessary amendments to

       the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-4, 122-5 (West 2016); Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472. If the allegations

       in the petition, as supported by the record or accompanied affidavits, have made a substantial

       showing of a violation of constitutional rights, the postconviction proceedings advance to a third-

       stage evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2016); Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472-73.

¶ 14          To ensure a reasonable level of assistance, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1,

       2017), requires counsel to: (1) consult with defendant, by mail or in person, to determine his claims

       of constitutional deprivation; (2) examine the record of the challenged proceedings; and (3) make

       any amendments to the pro se petition necessary for an adequate presentation of defendant’s

       claims. A rebuttable presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance

       arises when counsel files a certificate indicating that Rule 651(c)’s requirements were complied

       with. People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19. Here, counsel filed the required certificate,

       and we presume he provided reasonable assistance. “It is defendant’s burden to overcome this

       presumption by demonstrating his attorney’s failure to substantially comply with the duties

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       mandated by Rule 651(c).” Id. We review whether postconviction counsel substantially complied

       with Rule 651(c) de novo. People v. Bass, 2018 IL App (1st) 152650, ¶ 13.

¶ 15          We initially observe that while defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in

       dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition at the second stage because trial counsel was

       ineffective for failing to call Jennifer as a witness, this contention was abandoned in the amended

       postconviction petition filed by appointed counsel. Where a petitioner alleges a specific

       ineffectiveness of counsel contention in a pro se petition, but the amended petition subsequently

       filed by appointed counsel does not advance the contention, that issue is not before the court.

       People v. Phelps, 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38 (1972).

¶ 16          Moreover, defendant does not argue on appeal the unreasonable assistance of

       postconviction counsel for failing to shape and advance the Jennifer claim in the amended

       postconviction petition. Instead, defendant reasons that the court should have considered counsel’s

       amended petition as an addendum to defendant’s pro se petition, and that the court was required

       to consider both. We disagree. It is well accepted that an amended pleading “supersedes” prior

       pleadings. People v. Cross, 144 Ill. App. 3d 409, 412 (1986) (‘[A]n amendment which is complete

       in itself and which makes no reference to the prior pleading supersedes it *** being in effect

       abandoned or withdrawn.”). Where postconviction counsel did not advance defendant’s pro se

       claim at the second stage, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a claim no longer before

       it at the second-stage proceedings.

¶ 17          For the same reason defendant’s claim that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable

       assistance for failing to attach an affidavit from Jennifer to its amended petition necessarily fails.

       As noted above, appointed counsel did not include the Jennifer contention in the amended

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       postconviction petition, rendering any affidavit from her irrelevant. Supra ¶ 15. Counsel did not

       provide unreasonable assistance for failing to support a claim not included in the amended petition.

       ¶ 18    Finally, we note defendant’s argument, raised for the first time in his reply brief, that

       postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance where he did not include defendant’s

       pro se Jennifer contention in the amended postconviction petition. This argument, however, is

       forfeited where it was not raised in defendant’s appellant brief. People v. Borello, 389 Ill. App. 3d

       985, 998 (2009) (citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7)’s admonition, “[p]oints not argued

       [in the appellant’s brief] are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief ***.”)).

¶ 19                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20           The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 21           Affirmed.

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