Court Opinion

ID: 9966150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 07:10:52.086067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.027380
License: Public Domain

In the
         Court of Appeals
 Second Appellate District of Texas
          at Fort Worth
       ___________________________
            No. 02-23-00230-CV
       ___________________________

 JOHN STEPHEN VANDERBOL III, Appellant

                       V.

JENSEN ELAINE PAIGE VANDERBOL, Appellee

    On Appeal from the 235th District Court
            Cooke County, Texas
        Trial Court No. CV16-00095

    Before Birdwell, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant John Stephen Vanderbol III (Husband) appeals from a divorce

decree dissolving his marriage to appellee Jensen Elaine Paige Vanderbol (Wife). In

five issues, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering

him to pay $1,840 per month in child support and $100 per month in cash medical

support despite a lack of evidence to justify these awards; (2) ordering the division of

property not proven to belong to the marital estate; (3) granting Husband limited

supervised visitation rights to his and Wife’s child (Child), and conditioning

Husband’s visitation rights on his completion of a psychological evaluation;

(4) ordering Husband to post a bond if he appealed the divorce decree; and

(5) requiring Husband to produce documents relating to a trust that he purportedly

established to provide for Child in the event of a divorce. Because we partially sustain

Husband’s first issue, we reform and affirm the trial court’s child-support award and

the amount of the bond securing this obligation conditioned on Wife’s timely filing

the remittitur suggested herein. Sustaining Husband’s fourth issue, we modify the

divorce decree to delete the appellate bond requirement. Overruling the remainder of

Husband’s issues, we affirm the decree in all other respects.

                                   I. BACKGROUND

      Husband and Wife married in 2011 and separated in February 2015. Because

the parties were unable to reconcile after separating, Wife sued for divorce in

February 2016, and Husband eventually countersued. The protracted divorce

                                           2
proceedings focused on the division of the couple’s property and the allocation of

Husband’s and Wife’s parental rights and obligations with respect to their only child.

      After a two-day bench trial, the trial court signed a final divorce decree in April

2023. Among other things, the decree (1) appointed Husband and Wife as Child’s

joint managing conservators but granted Wife certain exclusive rights, including the

right to designate Child’s primary residence; (2) ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,840

in monthly child support and $100 in cash medical support and to deposit $50,000

into the trial court’s registry to secure the payment of his child-support obligations;

(3) granted Husband limited supervised visitation rights with respect to Child and

conditioned these visitation rights on his completion of, among other things, a

psychological evaluation; (4) ordered Husband to post a bond if he appealed the

divorce decree; and (5) directed Husband to produce documents relating to the

Schwarzer Angriffishund Trust (the Child-Support Trust), which Husband had

purportedly established to provide support for Child if Wife and Husband divorced.

This appeal ensued.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

A. Child Support and Cash Medical Support

      In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering Husband to pay Wife $1,840 per month in child support and $100 per

month in cash medical support and to deposit $50,000 into the court’s registry to

secure the payment of his child-support obligation. Specifically, Husband contends

                                           3
that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Husband

had net resources of $9,200 per month and that the trial court abused its discretion by

using this unsupported finding to calculate the amount of Husband’s support

obligations. Because we agree that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial

court’s monthly-net-resources finding, we sustain Husband’s first issue as it pertains

to the child-support award and the $50,000 bond requirement, but we affirm the trial

court’s cash-medical-support award.

      1. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s judgment granting child support for an abuse of

discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); B.K. v. T.K.,

No. 02-19-00472-CV, 2021 WL 2149621, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 27,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or

without reference to guiding principles or when it fails to analyze or apply the law

correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); B.K.,

2021 WL 2149621, at *2. Although sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent

ground of error under the abuse-of-discretion standard, it is a factor in assessing

whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 143–

44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). When, as here, the trial court did

                                            4
not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law,1 we presume that the trial court made

all findings necessary to support the judgment and will uphold those findings if they

are supported by the record. A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 65 (citing Chenault v. Banks,

296 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)); see Barber v.

Barber, No. 02-21-00291-CV, 2022 WL 4105363, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109).

        2. Statutory Child-Support Guidelines

        When calculating the amount of cash medical support, ongoing child support,

or retroactive child support presumed to be reasonable under Texas law, the obligor’s

gross and net resources are key variables. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.062, .125,

.131.

        If neither parent has access to private health insurance and the children receive

medical care through a government program—as Wife testified Child does here—the

trial court must order cash medical support in “an amount[] not to exceed nine

percent of the obligor’s annual resources.” Id. § 154.182(b)(3), (b-2).

        Although Husband requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, his
        1

request was filed after the applicable deadline. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. The trial court
never filed findings of fact or conclusions of law in accordance with Husband’s late-
filed request, and Husband never filed a notice of past-due findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297. Further, because Husband’s written
request was filed after the divorce decree was signed and the amount of child support
ordered by the court was consistent with the applicable percentage guidelines, the trial
court was not required to make findings under Family Code Section 154.130. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 154.130(a).

                                            5
      The amount of cash medical support is then deducted from the obligor’s gross

resources (along with taxes and certain other expenses) to calculate the obligor’s net

resources. See id. § 154.062(d). And the amount of the obligor’s net resources is used to

determine his presumptively reasonable child-support payments. See id. §§ 154.122, .125.

      By statute, “child support is generally determined by calculating the

child[-]support obligor’s monthly net resources and applying statutory guidelines to

that amount.” Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 331 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no

pet.). The statutory guidelines provide, for example, that an obligor with one child will

pay either fifteen percent or twenty percent of his net resources, depending on

whether those net resources are above a certain threshold. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 154.125(b), (c); see Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 538 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2017, no pet.). However, “when a child-support obligor’s monthly net

resources exceed a ‘maximum amount of net resources to which the statutory

guidelines are applicable,’ which is currently set at $9,200, a trial court ‘shall

presumptively apply the percentage guidelines to the portion of the obligor’s net

resources that does not exceed that amount.’” In re Howley, No. 03-21-00318-CV, 2021

WL 5750190, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 3, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)

(quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.126(a)). Thus, $9,200 is the current maximum

amount of monthly net resources to which the statutory guidelines may be applied. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.126(a); In re B.R.M., No. 09-21-00397-CV, 2023 WL

2530260, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                           6
      Absent evidence of the obligor’s gross resources, the trial court “shall presume

that the party has income equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour week,”

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.068(a), which equates to approximately $15,080 per year

or $1,256.67 per month, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1)(C); M.G. v. T.G., No. 02-21-00433-

CV, 2023 WL 2178762, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (calculating gross resources and explaining); Cervenka v. Cervenka, 672 S.W.3d 814,

819–20 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.) (similar);

Gonzalez, 331 S.W.3d at 868 & n.2 (similar).

      3. Insufficient Evidence of Husband’s Monthly Net Resources

      Here, the trial court found that Husband’s monthly net resources were $9,200

and then used this figure to calculate Husband’s monthly child-support obligation in

accordance with the statutory guidelines. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125(b). But

the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the monthly-net-resources finding.

      Husband, who has suffered at least two strokes and has been diagnosed with

cancer, testified that he is currently unemployed and has been receiving medical

treatment in Thailand because he cannot afford the costs of medical care in the

United States. He explained that the costs of his various medical treatments and his

living expenses are paid for by a trust (the Irrevocable Trust).

      Wife claimed that although Husband was unemployed, he received income

from various trusts, including the Irrevocable Trust and a separate trust that his

                                            7
parents established for their own benefit (the Parents’ Trust).2 But, as explained

below, the evidence that Wife offered in this regard was not sufficiently specific or

detailed to support the trial court’s monthly-net-resources finding.

       Wife testified that she knew that Husband “had a lot of assets in a trust,” but

she offered no evidence regarding the value of these assets or the amounts of any

specific distributions that Husband had received. Wife also testified that during their

marriage, Husband and Wife had “use[d] money” from the Parents’ Trust. According

to Wife, Husband could simply request money from his father, who would then write

him a check from the Parents’ Trust. To Wife’s knowledge, Husband’s father had

never refused such a request. However, the record contains no details concerning the

amounts or frequency of these payments or whether they were meant to be gifts or

loans. Wife also testified that when she and Husband were together, they were able to

pay approximately $5,000 per month in credit-card bills. But because Husband and

Wife separated approximately eight years before trial, this evidence has little, if any,

bearing on Husband’s current financial situation, particularly given Husband’s

significant health problems since the couple separated. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Seager,

       2
         Husband explained that there were three separate trusts referenced in the
record: the Irrevocable Trust, the Parents’ Trust, and the Child-Support Trust. He
testified that he originally formed the Irrevocable Trust in 1995 but that he was “not
[a] party to” the Parents’ Trust “at all” and “ha[d] no idea” when it was created. He
stated that “about six months before” he married Wife, he set up the Child-Support
Trust at the direction of the Irrevocable Trust’s trustee because the Irrevocable
Trust’s governing documents prohibit its assets from being used to pay for child
support or other similar obligations incident to a divorce proceeding.

                                             8
07-02-00492-CV, 2003 WL 2004537, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 1, 2003, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence of obligor’s income from temporary orders

hearing held twenty months before trial “constitute[d] no evidence of a substantive

and probative nature upon which the trial court could order him to pay [child]

support” because the record showed that obligor had since had a brain aneurysm that

rendered him disabled). Further, although Husband acknowledged that the

Irrevocable Trust is currently paying his living expenses and the costs of his medical

treatments in Thailand, the record contains no information concerning the specific

amounts of these expenses.

      Wife also theorized that Husband received significant income from an entity

called 9-Ten Holdings, Inc., a Wyoming corporation whose corporate filings

purportedly name Husband as a director and his girlfriend as the president, or, at a

minimum, that Husband had used 9-Ten Holdings’s bank account to hide or shield

marital assets. But although Husband admitted that he was a director of 9-Ten

Holdings, he denied receiving a salary or anything else from the company besides a

monthly gym membership given to him by his girlfriend as a Christmas gift; he is not

listed as a signatory on the company’s bank accounts; and the company’s bank records

do not show any salary or other regular payments to Husband. 3

      3
       The bank records reflect that 9-Ten Holdings issued a check to Husband for
$8,655.25 in July 2020 and another for $300 in October 2020. It is unclear what these
payments were for, but the timing and varying amounts of the payments suggest that
they were not paychecks.

                                          9
      Wife claimed that in 2021, Husband had written checks totaling approximately

$66,000 from 9-Ten Holdings’s account to pay for charges that he had made on a

Navy Federal Credit Union credit card.4 But while 9-Ten Holdings’s bank records

reflect payments to Navy Federal Credit Union to service credit-card debt, nothing in

the record shows what these credit-card charges were for. Indeed, during trial, 9-Ten

Holdings’s attorney asserted that these credit-card charges were for the company’s

routine business expenses. And Husband denied that he had ever used a Navy Federal

Credit Union credit card5 or had written checks on 9-Ten Holdings’s account. Thus,

Wife’s theory that 9-Ten Holdings’s credit-card payments to Navy Federal Credit

Union were for Husband’s personal expenses rests on mere speculation, which is not

evidence. See Hurley v. Tarrant Cnty., 232 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2007, no pet.) (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 164 (Tex.

2004)); see also McKinney Ave. Props. No. 2, Ltd. v. Branch Bank & Tr. Co., No. 05-14-

      4
        In her appellate briefing, Wife claims that, in addition to the Navy Federal
Credit Union payments, 9-Ten Holdings issued checks for, among other things,
Husband’s rent, residential utility bills, and attorney’s fees. But the record is
undeveloped as to these supposed payments, and other than Wife’s counsel’s cursory
remarks during his opening statement, there is nothing to connect any payments
reflected in 9-Ten Holdings’s bank records to Husband’s living expenses or attorney’s
fees. For example, 9-Ten Holdings’s bank records show checks written to Vijay
Prathani in 2019, 2020, and 2021, and Wife’s counsel asserted in his opening
statement that “we have checks to the landlord” and that “[o]ne of his landlords . . . I
believe is Mr. Prathani,” but Wife’s counsel never questioned Husband about these
checks or asked him to confirm whether Mr. Prathani was, in fact, his landlord at the
time the checks were written.
      Wife testified that Husband had used a Navy Federal Credit Union credit card
      5

when they lived together.

                                          10
00206-CV, 2015 WL 3549877, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (noting that while a party is entitled to reasonable inferences from the evidence, a

party cannot create a fact issue based on mere speculation).

      Wife also points to Husband’s ability to clear certain past-due child-support

obligations by making large lump-sum payments 6 as evidence supporting the trial

court’s monthly-net-resources finding. But Husband testified that he had borrowed

the money to make the most recent of these payments from his father and his

girlfriend, and the record contains no evidence regarding the source of the funds used

for the other payments.

      Finally, Wife notes that in Husband’s pro se complaint filed against State Farm

in February 2019, he claimed that he had suffered $3.64 million in property damage as

a result of a fire and suggests that this supports the trial court’s monthly-net-resources

finding. But this fire occurred in February 2017. Thus, while Husband may have

judicially admitted that he had at least $3.64 million in assets approximately seven

years ago, see TX Far W., Ltd. v. Tex. Invs. Mgmt., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 295, 307 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (quoting Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44

S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001)), this admission does not constitute substantive and

probative evidence of his current financial situation, see Marriage of Seager, 2003 WL

2004537, at *1. Indeed, as discussed below, the record reflects that Husband settled

      6
       According to Wife, Husband made lump-sum payments of $18,360.30 in
October 2018; $7,802.74 in January 2020; $7,500.00 in March 2021; and $15,000.00 in
January 2023.

                                           11
his lawsuit against State Farm—in which Husband also asserted claims for economic

damages and fraud and sought the recovery of $175,940,000 in total damages—for

approximately $438,343,7 and the trial court awarded Wife one-half of this amount in

its division of the marital estate. Therefore, even if Husband did have $3.64 million

worth of personal property that was destroyed in the February 2017 fire, he was able

to recoup only a small fraction of its value from State Farm.

      Although the record certainly engenders the belief that Husband comes from

an affluent background and has considerable financial resources available to him, it

contains no substantive or probative evidence of Husband’s current income, including

trust income, or the assets that he—or any trust with which he is associated—owns. 8

      7
         Husband and his girlfriend each filed suit against State Farm to recover on
claims related to the fire that damaged their residence. Their lawsuits were later
consolidated, and ultimately a settlement was reached resolving all of Husband’s and
his girlfriend’s claims against State Farm. State Farm issued settlement checks payable
to both Husband and his girlfriend totaling approximately $876,686. Husband’s one-
half share of the settlement payments equals $438,343.
      8
       It appears from the record that Wife attempted to obtain financial data from
Husband and that Husband failed to respond to her discovery requests. Rule 215.3 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

      If the court finds a party is abusing the discovery process in seeking,
      making or resisting discovery or if the court finds that any interrogatory
      or request for inspection or production is unreasonably frivolous,
      oppressive, or harassing, or that a response or answer is unreasonably
      frivolous or made for purposes of delay, then the court in which the
      action is pending may, after notice and hearing, impose any appropriate
      sanction authorized by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) of Rule
      215.2(b). Such order of sanction shall be subject to review on appeal
      from the final judgment.

                                          12
Cf. Panozzo v. Panozzo, 904 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

1995, no writ) (“Apparently, Husband is financially well off and has considerable

resources available to him, but that belief is no substitute for evidence.”). There is

nothing in the record to substantiate the trial court’s finding that Husband has

monthly net resources of $9,200. Because the record contains insufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s monthly-net-resources finding, the trial court abused its

discretion by ordering Husband to pay $1,840 per month in child support. See M.G.,

2023 WL 2178762, at *3–4 (concluding that evidence was insufficient to support

child-support award because husband had failed to “provide evidence of [wife’s] past

or present resources” and had “merely estimated her earning ability via work and

possibly her trust fund”); Panozzo, 904 S.W.2d at 785 (holding that the trial court had

abused its discretion by ordering husband to pay $10,000 per month in child support

for two children even though “[t]here were references in the . . . record to substantial

Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.3. Thus, if this case is remanded because Wife does not agree to
the remittitur suggested below and the trial court finds after notice and a hearing that
Husband is abusing the discovery process, it has the discretion—subject to review for
abuse—to sanction Husband by, inter alia, ordering “that the matters regarding which
the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
the purposes of the action in accordance with” Wife’s claim or “refusing to allow
[Husband] to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him
from introducing designated matters in evidence.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b)(3)–(4),
215.3; see In re J.D.N., 183 S.W.3d 128, 131–32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)
(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing death-penalty sanctions
on father, deeming his monthly income to be $6,000, and then awarding $1,200 in
monthly child support based on statutory guidelines after the father had repeatedly been
warned yet failed to provide financial documentation of his net resources).

                                           13
monies on deposit in Brownsville” because “there was no evidence offered of

[h]usband’s income or net resources as defined by the [Family] Code”).

      Accordingly, we sustain Husband’s first issue as it pertains to the trial court’s

child-support award.

      4. Cash Medical Support
      The lack of evidence to support the trial court’s monthly-net-resources finding

necessitates the reformation or reversal of the child-support award, but the same does

not hold true for the cash-medical-support award. As noted above, because Child

receives medical care through a government program, the trial court was required to

order cash medical support in “an amount[] not to exceed nine percent of

[Husband’s] annual resources.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.182(b)(3), (b-2). Further,

absent evidence of an obligor’s gross resources, the Family Code provides that the

trial court “shall presume that the party has income equal to the federal minimum

wage for a 40-hour week,” id. § 154.068(a), that is, $1,256.67 per month, 29 U.S.C.A.

§ 206(a)(1)(C); M.G., 2023 WL 2178762, at *4. Because the trial court’s cash-medical-

support award of $100 per month does not exceed nine percent of this presumed

income amount, 9 it does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we

overrule Husband’s first issue as it pertains to the cash-medical-support award.

      9
       Nine percent of $1,256.67 is $113.10, but the trial court ordered Husband to
pay only $100 in cash medical support.

                                          14
      5. Child-Support Bond

      Family Code Section 157.109 authorizes a trial court to order a support obligor

to post a bond to secure payment of his support obligations if, among other things, he

“is employed by an employer not subject to the jurisdiction of the court or for whom

income withholding is unworkable or inappropriate.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 157.109(a)(2). Because Husband is a self-described “entrepreneur” who has had

offices overseas and spends significant time in Thailand, the trial court acted within its

discretion by determining that income withholding is unworkable in this case and

ordering Husband to post a bond. See id.; In re Gonzalez, 993 S.W.2d 147, 157 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (holding that trial court acted within its discretion

by ordering obligor to post a bond because the evidence showed that he was “a

citizen and resident of Mexico, that he [was] employed by Mexican companies owned

by himself and his family, and that his salary d[id] not include all the monetary

benefits he receive[d] from the companies”). However, because the bond amount was

based upon the trial court’s improper child-support award, we sustain Husband’s first

issue as it pertains to the amount of the bond.

      6. Remittitur Suggestion

      As noted above, without evidence regarding the resources available to

Husband, the trial court was required to presume that he worked forty hours per week

earning the federal minimum wage. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.068(a); M.G.,

2023 WL 2178762, at *4. This equates to gross resources of $1,256.67 per month.

                                           15
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1)(C); M.G., 2023 WL 2178762, at *4. Deducting federal income

and social security taxes10 leaves a balance of approximately $1,168.67 per month. 11

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.062(d)(1)–(2). Subtracting the $100-per-month cash-

medical-support award from this balance leaves presumed net resources of $1,068.67

per month. Id. § 154.062(d)(5).

      Per the statutory guidelines, Husband’s child support obligation would be

twenty percent of his monthly net resources, or $213.73 per month. Id. § 154.125(b).

Thus, the trial court’s child-support award is excessive by $1,626.27 per month.

      We suggest that Wife file a remittitur within fifteen days from the date of this

opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.3. On the condition that Wife agrees to a reduction in

Husband’s child-support obligation from $1,840 per month to $213.73 per month and

a proportionate reduction of the child-support bond from $50,000 to $5,808, we

      10
        Because Husband testified that he plans to live in Texas going forward, there
is no need to deduct any amounts for state income tax. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 154.062(d)(3); see also In re A.M., No. 07-20-00130-CV, 2020 WL 7651973, at *4
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 23, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that Texas does
not have a state income tax).
      11
          The social-security-tax rate is 6.2 percent, which, for a full-time minimum-
wage worker, equates to approximately $78 per month. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 3101(a). As
of the 2023 tax year, the federal income tax rate for single filers is ten percent on the
first $11,000 of taxable income. IRS, Federal Income Tax Rates & Brackets,
https://www.irs.gov/filing/federal-income-tax-rates-and-brackets (last visited Apr.
26, 2024). The standard deduction for single filers is $13,850. IRS, IRS Provides Tax
Inflation Adjustments for Tax Year 2023, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-provides-
tax-inflation-adjustments-for-tax-year-2023 (last visited Apr. 26, 2024). Thus, a single
full-time minimum-wage worker would pay approximately $120 per year, or $10 per
month, in federal income tax.

                                           16
reform and affirm these aspects of the divorce decree. See id. However, if no remittitur

is filed, having found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding child

support, we will reverse the child-support award and remand this matter to the trial

court for a new trial regarding Husband’s child-support obligation and the amount of

the bond securing that obligation. See id.; Blazek v. Blazek, 669 S.W.2d 347, 348–49

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (suggesting remittitur regarding

excessive child-support award and ultimately reversing and remanding trial court’s

judgment after the suggested remittitur was not filed).

B. Property Division

       In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

awarding Wife $219,171.40 as her share of the settlement proceeds that Husband and

his girlfriend received from State Farm. 12 Husband contends that the trial court erred

by determining that these proceeds were community property. We disagree.

       1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       Considering both parties’ rights, a trial court is charged with dividing the

community estate in a “just and right” manner. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001; Watson

v. Watson, 286 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). We review the

trial court’s division of property under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Loaiza

        As noted above, Husband and his girlfriend received a total of $876,685.59 in
       12

settlement proceeds from State Farm. See supra note 7. The trial court awarded Wife
one-half of Husband’s one-half share of these proceeds, or one-fourth of the total
amount.

                                            17
v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Murff v.

Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981)).

      Only community property is subject to the trial court’s just-and-right division

in a divorce proceeding. Barnard v. Barnard, 133 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2004, pet. denied). Generally, all property possessed by either spouse during or

on dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 3.003(a). This is a rebuttable presumption, and a spouse claiming that

any asset is separate property must prove the separate character of the property by

clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3.003(b). “A party seeking to rebut the

community presumption must trace the assets on hand during the marriage back to

property that is separate in character.” In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d 683, 696–97

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (quoting In re Marriage of Born, No. 06-08-

00066-CV, 2009 WL 1010876, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 16, 2009, no pet.)

(mem. op.)). “Tracing involves establishing the separate origin of the property

through evidence showing the time and means by which the spouse originally

obtained possession of the property.” Id. at 697 (citing Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605,

612 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)). “[C]onclusory or uncorroborated

testimony that funds are separate property is insufficient to rebut the community

presumption, unless there is also evidence that traces the funds.” Id. (quoting Marriage

of Born, 2009 WL 1010876, at *5); accord Remley v. Remley, No. 02-07-00044-CV, 2008

WL 4355347, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 25, 2008, no pet.) (per curiam)

                                          18
(mem. op.) (citing Irvin v. Parker, 139 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

no pet.)). Any doubt as to the character of the property should be resolved in favor of

the community estate. Irvin, 139 S.W.3d at 708 (citing Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612); Akin

v. Akin, 649 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

      The community presumption applies to settlement proceeds. See Thornhill v.

Thornhill, 666 S.W.3d 823, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); Licata

v. Licata, 11 S.W.3d 269, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

Because of this presumption, if a spouse receives a settlement from a lawsuit during

marriage, some or all of which could be community property, it is that spouse’s

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence which portion of the settlement

does not belong to the community estate. Thornhill, 666 S.W.3d at 827 (first citing

Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Okelberry, 525 S.W.3d 786, 793–94 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); and then citing Licata, 11 S.W.3d at 273).

      Thus, to establish an abuse of discretion here, Husband must demonstrate that

he presented conclusive evidence that the settlement proceeds did not belong to the

marital estate. See Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017)

(explaining that when a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an

issue on which it bears the burden of proof, the judgment must be sustained unless

the record conclusively establishes all vital facts in support of the issue). “Evidence is

conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions . . . .” City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

                                            19
      2. Analysis

      Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife one

half of his share of the settlement proceeds because the record contains no evidence

proving that Husband owned the house that burned down or that he received

compensation for anything other than his separate personal property lost in the fire.

But Husband’s argument reverses the burden of proof. Because Husband’s lawsuit

against State Farm included community claims, it was not Wife’s burden to prove that

the settlement proceeds belonged to the community estate; rather, it was Husband’s

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they did not. See Thornhill, 666

S.W.3d at 827. And Husband has not shown that he presented conclusive evidence

rebutting the community presumption. See Shields Ltd. P’ship, 526 S.W.3d at 480.

      Husband’s lawsuit against State Farm included claims for economic damages

based on “lost value, loss of opportunity, and loss of ‘business momentum’” and “loss

of ability to conduct business.” To the extent that the settlement proceeds cover these

losses pertaining to Husband’s lost earning capacity, they belong to the community

estate. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 3.001(3); Thornhill, 666 S.W.3d at 827 (explaining

that “recovery for loss of earning capacity . . . and other expenses associated with

injury to the community estate are community property”). Because some or all of the

settlement proceeds could be community property, it was Husband’s burden to prove

by clear and convincing evidence which portion of the settlement does not belong to

the community estate. See Thornhill, 666 S.W.3d at 827.

                                          20
      Although Husband contends that the settlement proceeds were to cover

damage to the house—which he claims was solely owned by his girlfriend—and his

separate personal property, the only evidence in the record to support this contention

is Husband’s own testimony. See Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 697 (noting that,

standing alone, “[c]onclusory or uncorroborated testimony that funds are separate

property is insufficient to rebut the community presumption”). The settlement checks

from State Farm do not explicitly state what losses they are intended to cover, and

they list both Husband and his girlfriend as payees. 13 Thus, the evidence regarding

which losses the settlement proceeds were intended to cover is far from conclusive.

      Further, even if we were to assume that Husband had successfully shown that

the settlement proceeds were for damage to the house and Husband’s personal

property, the trial court still could have reasonably concluded that Husband failed to

present clear and convincing evidence rebutting the community presumption. See City

of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816. The only evidence that the house was solely owned by

Husband’s girlfriend is Husband’s own testimony; he offered no certificate of title,

      13
         Husband makes much of the fact that his girlfriend was listed as the payee for
a majority of the checks on State Farm’s pay log and asserts that this means that she
was the “lead payee” for these amounts. But all of the actual checks offered into
evidence were made payable to both Husband and his girlfriend and specifically stated
on the reverse side that they “must be endorsed by all payees.” The pay log appears to
list whichever payee’s name appears first on the check as the “payee.” However,
Husband has not shown that the order in which State Farm lists the payees on the
checks indicates the loss that the check is intended to cover. Nor has he cited any
authority showing that the order in which the payees are listed on the check bears any
legal significance, nor are we aware of any.

                                          21
deed records, or other documentary evidence showing that he lacked an ownership

interest in the house. Similarly, Husband’s own testimony is the only evidence

supporting his claim that the personal property damaged in the fire was his separate

property. But mere testimony of property’s separate character that is unsupported by

documentary evidence is generally insufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convincing

standard. In re Marriage of Williams, No. 14-15-00090-CV, 2016 WL 2997094, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first citing

Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pets.

denied); and then citing Zamarripa v. Zamarripa, No. 14-08-00083-CV, 2009 WL

1875580, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2009, pet. denied) (mem.

op.)); see Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 697; see also McShane v. McShane, No. 03-01-

00721-CV, 2003 WL 1338722, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2003, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“Uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness, even if

uncontradicted, generally does not establish a fact conclusively . . . .” (citing Kirtley v.

Kirtley, 417 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1967, writ dism’d w.o.j.))).

       In sum, given this record, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that

Husband failed to rebut the presumption that the settlement proceeds were

community property. See Thornhill, 666 S.W.3d at 827. Thus, Husband has not

established that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife a share of the

settlement proceeds as part of its division of the community estate. See Lecuona v.

Lecuona, No. 03-17-00138-CV, 2018 WL 2994587, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15,

                                            22
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816 (explaining that

evidence is not conclusive if reasonable people could differ in their conclusions).

      Accordingly, we overrule Husband’s second issue.

C. Husband’s Visitation Rights with Respect to Child

      In his third issue, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting him limited supervised visitation rights with respect to Child and

conditioning these visitation rights on Husband’s completion of a psychological

evaluation. We disagree.

      1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decisions on custody, control, possession, and

visitation matters for an abuse of discretion. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449,

451 (Tex. 1982); see also In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2005, no pet.) (reasoning that the trial court has “wide latitude in determining the best

interests of a minor child”). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion,

we must decide whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or

principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or

unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134

S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004); W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725.

      An appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely

because the appellate court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I.

du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995); see Low, 221

                                           23
S.W.3d at 620. We must be cognizant that the trial court is in a better position to decide

custody cases because “it faced the parties and their witnesses, observed their

demeanor, and had the opportunity to evaluate the claims made by each parent.” In re

J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).

      The best interest of the child is always the primary consideration in determining

issues of conservatorship and possession. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002. While

there is a statutory presumption that the parents be appointed joint managing

conservators, there is no statutory presumption that joint managing conservators be

awarded equal periods of possession. Compare id. § 153.131(b) (presumption that

appointment of parents as joint managing conservators is in best interest of child),

with id. § 153.135 (providing that joint managing conservatorship does not require the

award of equal or nearly equal periods of physical possession of and access to the

child). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in restricting a parent’s possession

when the record contains some evidence to support a finding that such restrictions

are in the child’s best interest.” Nikolenko v. Nikolenko, No. 01-20-00284-CV, 2022 WL

479988, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 17, 2022, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (citing In re P.A.C., 498 S.W.3d 210, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,

pet. denied)), cert. denied, 2024 WL 1143680 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2024) (No. 23-746); see

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002); W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725.

                                           24
       2. Analysis

       Here, the trial court named Husband and Wife as Child’s joint managing

conservators, but it found that restricting Husband’s access to and possession of Child

was in the child’s best interest. Thus, the trial court ordered Husband to complete (1) a

psychological evaluation, (2) a court-approved parenting course, and (3) reunification

therapy through a counselor chosen by Wife. The decree provides that after fulfilling

these three requirements, Husband will be allowed to have supervised possession of

Child for three hours on the first, third, and fifth Sundays of every month.

       The following evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination

that these restrictions are in Child’s best interest:

       • Upon receiving a text from Wife informing him that she had filed for
         divorce, Husband showed up fifteen minutes later banging on her front
         door. During their ensuing conversation, which Wife recorded, Husband
         became agitated and began hitting himself in the head with a closed fist hard
         enough to make a noise. This caused Wife to fear that Husband might try to
         hurt her—or even kill her—and she asked him to stop. During the heated
         conversation, Husband could not control his cursing in front of Child, who
         was two years old at the time. At one point during this episode, Husband
         told Wife, “You’re lucky I’m not doing worse,” which Wife understood to
         be a threat.

       • The next month, Husband refused to return Child following a visit, accusing
         Wife of “irrational behavior,” “hav[ing] nefarious intentions,” and being a
         “flight risk.” Husband only returned Child after Wife called the police.

       • Shortly thereafter, Wife contacted Child Protective Services because she was
         concerned that Husband had not been properly supervising Child, and Wife
         testified that CPS made a finding of neglectful supervision against Husband.

       • After a temporary-orders hearing in March 2016, the trial court ordered
         Husband to undergo a psychological evaluation and to take

                                             25
           anger-management classes. But Husband never underwent a psychological
           evaluation, and while he took an online anger-management class, it does not
           appear that he took it seriously. He live streamed his attendance of the
           anger-management course, and during the live stream he stated that “we’re
           going to enjoy the bulls**t that is the hypocrisy of the family court system”
           and expressed his intent to disobey the orders of the court. See, e.g., Mauldin
           v. Clements, 428 S.W.3d 247, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
           pet.) (noting that the fact that mother had “repeatedly demonstrated an
           unwillingness to cooperate with the trial court’s orders” by, among other
           things, failing to “seek[] individual therapy” was a factor supporting the trial
           court’s determination that limiting her visitation with her children to
           supervised visitation was in the children’s best interest).

      • Wife testified that it was “very, very common” for Husband to yell at her
        and threaten her; that he often slept with a gun under his pillow; and that
        although Husband was never physically violent directly towards her, he was
        frequently violent towards objects in her vicinity.14 Cf. In re J.I.T.P., 99
        S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (noting
        that “[a] parent’s abusive or violent conduct can produce a home
        environment that endangers a child’s well-being” and that “want of self
        control[] and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of
        endangerment”).
      Given this record, we conclude that there is some evidence to support a finding

that restrictions on Husband’s possession, including supervised visitation conditioned

on the completion of a psychological evaluation, are in Child’s best interest.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 15 See Nikolenko, 2022 WL

      14
         As an example, Wife described an incident in which Husband had kicked
apart a bookshelf in their garage, damaging it to the point that it was no longer
functional and had to be thrown away. She also stated that “[h]e would take a baseball
bat to the trees out in the front yard.”

       Husband argues that because the trial court did not find that he had
      15

committed family violence and because there are certain cases in which parents who
had committed family violence were given less onerous restrictions than those
imposed on Husband here, the trial court abused its discretion. However, as noted

                                            26
479988, at *16; P.A.C., 498 S.W.3d at 219–20; see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 141

(Tex. App.—Austin 2009) (mem. op.) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its

discretion by restricting father’s visitation until after he completed a “court-ordered

neuropsychological evaluation”), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011).

       We overrule Husband’s third issue.

D. Appellate Bond

       In his fourth issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering Husband to post a $25,000 bond if he appealed the divorce decree to this

court and to post an additional $10,000 bond if he appealed to the Texas Supreme

Court. We agree.

       Generally, appellants in civil cases are not required to post a bond to perfect an

appeal. See In re Marriage of Richards, 991 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, op.

on motion) (per curiam) (explaining that after extensive changes to the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure that went into effect on September 1, 1997, appellants in civil

cases are no longer required to post a “cost bond” to cover the costs incurred by the

appellee if the appeal is unsuccessful), disp. on merits, 991 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.—

above, the best interest of the child is always the primary consideration in determining
issues of conservatorship and possession, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002, and a trial
court’s best-interest determination is necessarily fact-specific, see, e.g., Dunn v. Garcia,
No. 01-21-00100-CV, 2022 WL 2347739, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June
30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because each family situation is unique, the mere fact
that other courts may have imposed lesser restrictions in certain cases—even those
involving family violence—does not lead us to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the above-described restrictions on Husband’s access to Child.

                                            27
Amarillo 1999, pet dism’d). Further, although a trial court may award appellate

attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in certain circumstances, these fees must be

conditioned upon the recipient’s success on appeal. See Sundance Mins., L.P. v. Moore,

354 S.W.3d 507, 515 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); Keith v. Keith, 221

S.W.3d 156, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Hous. Livestock Show

& Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d 555, 586 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). And

“a court is prohibited from requiring a party to post bond for conditional appellate

fees.” In re K.K.W., No. 05-16-00795-CV, 2018 WL 1477533, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Mar. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hughes v. Habitat Apartments, 828 S.W.2d

794, 795 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (per curiam)).

       Further, although the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes a trial

court to order a party to furnish a bond or other security before further pursuing

litigation if the trial court determines that the party is a “vexatious litigant,” see Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.055(a), the statute establishes specific procedures

that must be followed before the trial court can make such a determination, see id.

§§ 11.051–.057. The statute contemplates that a vexatious-litigant determination will

only be made after a motion is filed and the court, after giving notice to all parties,

conducts a hearing thereon. See id. §§ 11.051, .053(a).

       During trial, Wife asked the trial court to declare Husband a vexatious litigant

and to require him to post a bond if he appealed to this court and another bond if he

appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. But it does not appear that Wife ever filed a

                                            28
motion seeking this relief. See id. § 11.051. Nor does it appear from the record that

Husband was given notice before trial of Wife’s request to have him declared a

vexatious litigant. See id. § 11.053(a). Further, Wife offered no evidence showing

(1) that Husband satisfied the statutory criteria necessary for a vexatious-litigant

finding, 16 see id. § 11.054, or (2) that the amounts of the bonds—$25,000 and

$10,000—bore any relation to the reasonable expenses, including costs and attorney’s

fees, that Wife would incur as a result of an appeal,17 see id. § 11.055(c); Yowell v.

Granite Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020) (admonishing that even though

appellate attorney’s fees are uncertain, this “does not excuse a party seeking to recover

contingent appellate fees from the need to provide opinion testimony about the

       16
          In her brief, Wife notes that Husband appears on the Office of Court
Administration’s list of vexatious litigants based on prior litigation that he filed against
his first ex-wife in Cooke County. See Office of Court Administration, Vexatious
Litigants, https://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious-litigants/ (last visited Apr.
26, 2024). But it does not appear that Wife offered evidence of this prior vexatious-
litigant finding at trial, nor did she offer any evidence to establish that Husband’s
prior litigation against his first ex-wife was “based on the same or substantially similar
facts, transition [sic], or occurrence” as the present case. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 11.054(3). Thus, the trial court could not properly have relied on the prior
vexatious-litigant finding against Husband to grant Wife’s vexatious-litigant motion in
this case. See id.; Douglas v. Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
       17
         Indeed, because Wife is represented by Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas, she
likely will not incur any appellate attorney’s fees. See Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas,
www.legalaidtx.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2024) (“Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas works
to ensure equal access to justice by providing free civil legal services to low-income
individuals and families in the 114 counties we serve across North and West Texas.”).

                                            29
services it reasonably believes will be necessary to defend the appeal and a reasonable

hourly rate for those services”).

       Because the only basis on which Wife asked the trial court to require Husband

to post an appellate bond is the vexatious-litigant statute and because Wife failed to

comply with the procedural requirements of that statute or to offer any evidence

satisfying the statutory criteria for a vexatious-litigant finding, the trial court erred by

ordering Husband to post an appellate bond.

       Accordingly, we sustain Husband’s fourth issue.

E. Information Concerning the Child-Support Trust

       In his fifth issue, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering him to produce documents relating to the Child-Support Trust. We disagree.

       Husband argues that he should not be required to provide information about

the Child-Support Trust because the trial court found that the prenuptial agreement

providing for the trust’s payment of child support did not exist and that any

memoranda of understanding between the parties were “null and void.” Husband

asserts that the trial court’s findings make the Child-Support Trust irrelevant to the

divorce proceeding and that he should not be required “to give [Wife] information

about a trust that does not ‘exist.’”

       But Husband’s argument conflates the trust’s existence with that of the

prenuptial agreement and the memoranda of understanding; the trial court never

found that the trust did not exist. Indeed, Husband acknowledged that the trust exists

                                            30
and testified that he created it approximately six months before he married Wife “to

take care of any future marriage, children, so on and so forth.”

       Wife testified that she wanted information regarding the Child-Support Trust

so that she could determine whether Child might be able to receive distributions from

it in the future to help cover the costs of his college education. Given Wife’s

reasonable belief that Child may be entitled to receive distributions from the trust to

cover educational expenses and Husband’s acknowledgement that he had established

the trust to take care of his children, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by ordering Husband to provide information pertaining to the trust. Cf.

Rubinett v. Rubinett, No. 02-08-00021-CV, 2009 WL 1372936, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 14, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (overruling husband’s complaint that

the trial court had abused its discretion by ordering him to provide documentation to

wife concerning a college fund that he had set up with his separate property for the

benefit of their son).

       We overrule Husband’s fifth issue.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

       Having sustained, in part, Husband’s first issue, we reform and affirm the trial

court’s child-support award and the amount of the bond securing this award

conditioned upon Wife’s filing a remittitur as suggested above. See Tex. R. App. P.

46.3. But if Wife does not file the suggested remittitur within fifteen days, we will

reverse the child-support award and remand for a new trial regarding Husband’s

                                            31
child-support obligation and the amount of the bond securing that obligation. See id.

Further, having sustained Husband’s fourth issue, we modify the divorce decree to

delete the requirement that Husband post appellate bonds in the event of appeals to

this court and the Texas Supreme Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b). Having

overruled Husband’s remaining issues, we affirm the decree in all other respects. See

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

                                                    /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                    Wade Birdwell
                                                    Justice

Delivered: May 2, 2024

                                         32