Court Opinion

ID: 9897620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:18:59.957969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:56.099849
License: Public Domain

11/09/2023
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT NASHVILLE
                                 Assigned on Briefs July 3, 2023

PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, ET AL. v. MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY,
                        INC., ET AL.

                   Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
                     No. 22-1025-III   Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

                                  No. M2022-01260-COA-R3-CV

This appeal concerns a petition to access public records filed against a private entity. David
L. Hudson, Jr. (“Hudson”) and Public.Resource.Org filed a petition against Matthew
Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”), in the Chancery Court
for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act
(“the TPRA”) seeking access to and a copy of the complete and current electronic version
of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the TCA.”).1 The Tennessee Code Commission (“the
Commission”) intervened on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright
interest in the TCA. The Trial Court held that the TCA is exempt from disclosure because
Tennessee law provides a separate avenue for publication of the TCA. In addition to its
dispositive ruling, the Trial Court held that Lexis operates as the functional equivalent of a
governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson
appeals. Lexis and the Commission raise issues as well. We hold, inter alia, that Lexis is
a private company performing specific services for the state on a contractual basis. It has
not assumed responsibility for public functions to such an extent as to become the
functional equivalent of a governmental entity. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in
that respect. Otherwise, we affirm.

       Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
                       Affirmed as Modified; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA DENNIS
MCGEE, J., joined. W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., filed a separate concurring opinion.

1
  The record reflects that Public.Resource.Org is an organization based outside of Tennessee and thus lacks
standing to file a petition under the TPRA. See Scripps Media, Inc. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Mental Health &
Substance Abuse Servs., 614 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019); Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-
503(a)(2)(A); Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a). We entered an order directing Public.Resource.Org to show
cause as to why it should not be dismissed for lack of standing. It filed a response acknowledging that it is
not in a position to show cause. Therefore, we entered an order dismissing Public.Resource.Org.
Lucian T. Pera, Memphis, Tennessee, and Joshua Counts Cumby, Nashville, Tennessee,
for the appellant, David L. Hudson, Jr.

Thomas H. Lee, Nashville, Tennessee, and John M. Bowler, Atlanta, Georgia, for the
appellee, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor
General; James P. Urban, Deputy Attorney General; and Kevin M. Kreutz, Deputy
Attorney General, for the appellee, the Tennessee Code Commission.

                                        OPINION

                                       Background

       Hudson filed a petition against Lexis in the Trial Court pursuant to the TPRA, Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 10-7-503 and 10-7-505, seeking access to and a copy of the complete and
current electronic version of the TCA and to obtain judicial review of the actions of Lexis
in denying Hudson’s request for the material. It was and remains Hudson’s contention that
the TCA is a public record that must be disclosed under the TPRA. The Commission
moved to intervene on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright interest
in the TCA. In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to intervene, the
Commission asserted that “the State is the owner of the copyright rights in the annotations
to the TCA. As such, the TCA is exempt from disclosure under the TPRA.” The
Commission was allowed to intervene.

       The Tennessee Code is a compilation of the statutory laws of Tennessee. The TCA
includes the Tennessee Code but also, among other things, annotations and references to
caselaw interpreting the code. The TCA is the “official compilation of the statutes, codes
and session laws of the state of Tennessee of a public and general nature. . . .” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 1-1-105(a). Furthermore, “[t]he text of the statutes, codes and code supplements
(but not the annotations, footnotes and other editorial matter) appearing in the printed
copies of the compilation, containing a copy of the commission’s certificate of approval,
shall constitute prima facie evidence of the statutory law of this state. . . .” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 1-1-111(b) (West eff. July 10, 2014).

       The Commission, which was created by the General Assembly in 1953, produces
and publishes the TCA. The Commission has as its members the Chief Justice of the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, a Director of the
Office of Legal Services for the General Assembly, and two other members appointed by

                                            -2-
the Chief Justice. Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-101 (West eff. March 17, 2016).                The
Commission is authorized to do as follows:

      (a) The Tennessee code commission is hereby authorized and directed to
      formulate and supervise the execution of plans for the compilation,
      arrangement, classification, annotation, editing, indexing, printing, binding,
      publication, sale, distribution and the performance of all other acts necessary
      for the publication of an official compilation of the statutes, codes and
      session laws of the state of Tennessee of a public and general nature, now
      existing and to be enacted in the future, including an electronically
      searchable database of such code, which official compilation shall be known
      as “Tennessee Code Annotated.”

      (b) “Publication,” as used in this chapter, includes the necessary actions by
      whatever means and in whatever form for development of a Tennessee Code
      database.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-105. In addition:

      (a) The Tennessee code commission has full power and authority on behalf
      of the state of Tennessee to perform all acts and to negotiate and enter into
      all contracts necessary for and expedient to the successful production and
      publication of a revised compilation of the statutory laws of Tennessee,
      including the power and authority to enter into contracts with a law book
      publisher for the editing, compiling, annotating, indexing, printing, binding,
      publication, sale and distribution of the revised compilation and the
      performance and execution of all other publication plans formulated by the
      commission.

      (b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to render invalid or impair the
      obligations of any contract previously entered into by the commission for the
      purposes set forth in this section or with a suitable contractor for an
      electronically searchable database of such code.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-106. Further still:

      (a) Any contract with a law book publisher for the purposes referred to in §§
      1-1-105 and 1-1-106 shall prescribe the specifications for the publication of
      the revised compilation, including the size of type to be used in the text of
      the statutes and the annotations, the grade and weight of the paper to be used,
      the size of the volumes, appropriate provisions for the insertion of pocket
                                            -3-
       supplements and the publication of replacement volumes, the price at which
       Tennessee Code Annotated shall be sold in Tennessee when originally
       published, and such other provisions as are necessary for the full
       performance of the publication plans formulated by the commission.

       (b) The price at which pocket supplements and replacement volumes are to
       be sold from time to time in Tennessee shall be controlled by the commission
       in such contracts as it may, from time to time, in its discretion execute.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-107.

        The Commission contracts with Lexis to edit the TCA and support the distribution
process. Under the contract, the Commission has the final say over the content of the TCA.
The specifications are precise. The Commission also sets the price at which Lexis sells the
TCA, and the Commission compensates Lexis by allowing it to keep the proceeds from its
sale of the TCA.

       In August 2022, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Hudson’s petition. The
Trial Court held, among other things, that “[Lexis] is not required to provide access to the
Petitioners of Tennessee Code Annotated because the publication fits within an exception
under the Public Records Act, and the Petition in this case must be dismissed.” The Trial
Court reasoned that other provisions of Tennessee law govern access to the TCA, and thus
the TCA is exempt from disclosure. This ruling was dispositive. However, the Trial Court
also ruled for the sake of completeness that Lexis is the functional equivalent of a
governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson
timely appealed to this Court.

                                        Discussion

        The parties address albeit to different ends the same three issues, which we restate
slightly as follows: 1) whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that the TCA is
disqualified from copyright protection; 2) whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that
Lexis is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity; and 3) whether the Trial Court
erred in concluding that the TCA is exempt from disclosure under the TPRA.

       We first address whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that the TCA is
disqualified from copyright protection. Lexis and the Commission contend that the Trial
Court erred by addressing the question at all. They state that determinations of copyright
status are reserved for the federal courts. This implicates the Trial Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law reviewed de
novo without a presumption of correctness. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727,
                                            -4-
729 (Tenn. 2000) (citation omitted). The Commission cites a case from this Court which
states:

        The Copyright Act is unusually broad in its assertion of federal authority.
        Rather than sharing jurisdiction with the state courts as is normally the case,
        the statute expressly withdraws from the state courts any jurisdiction to
        enforce the provisions of the Act and converts all state common or statutory
        law “within the general scope of copyright” into federal law to be uniformly
        applied throughout the nation.

Wells v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting
Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, the Commission also
acknowledges an opinion by this Court in which we stated that just because an action is
predicated on rights derived from the Copyright Act, that action is not necessarily one for
copyright infringement or one that arises under the Copyright Act. See Minor Miracle
Prods., LLC v. Starkey, No. M2011-00072-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 112593, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2012), no appl. perm. appeal filed (citing Peay v. Morton, 571 F.Supp.
108, 112-13 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)). While state courts may not rule definitively on copyright
status, a state court does not have to utterly avoid any questions touching upon copyright.
We note that the Commission intervened in this case in part to protect the state’s alleged
copyright interest in the TCA. It would be a curious thing if neither the Trial Court nor
this Court could address the state’s purported copyright interest when that purported
interest was asserted in opposition to the TPRA petition.2 Insofar as the Trial Court
addressed the TCA’s copyright eligibility for purposes of ruling on the TPRA petition, the
Trial Court did not exceed its authority.

        On the substance of the copyright issue, the Commission argues that the state has a
valid copyright interest in the TCA. Hudson and the Commission discuss Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1498, 206 L.Ed.2d 732 (2020), a case
by the Supreme Court of the United States addressing whether Georgia’s code annotations
are eligible for copyright protection. In Georgia, Public.Resource.Org posted the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated online where it could be downloaded without charge. Id. at
1505. Georgia’s Code Revision Commission sued Public.Resource.Org for copyright
infringement. Id. In the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
the Court ruled against copyright eligibility for the Georgia annotations. Id. at 1506. The
Court, relying upon the government edicts doctrine, stated:

2
  We decline, however, to take judicial notice of certain correspondence which Hudson has attached to his
reply brief purporting to show that the United States Copyright Office rejected Lexis’s application to
register the TCA for copyright protection.
                                                  -5-
               We hold that the annotations in Georgia’s Official Code are ineligible
       for copyright protection. . . . A careful examination of our government edicts
       precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on the identity of the author.
       Under the government edicts doctrine, judges—and, we now confirm,
       legislators—may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce
       in the course of their official duties as judges and legislators. That rule
       applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. And
       it applies to the annotations here because they are authored by an arm of the
       legislature in the course of its official duties.

Georgia, 140 S.Ct. at 1506.

        The Commission raises several points to distinguish the facts of Georgia from those
of the instant case, to wit: that the annotations in Georgia were authored by the Georgia
legislature acting in its legislative capacity whereas no Tennessee legislator or jurist
authored the TCA while carrying out a legislative or judicial function; that the Tennessee
General Assembly does not control the Commission; that in contrast to Georgia, the
Tennessee General Assembly does not vote to “merge” annotations with the Tennessee
Code; that no court has construed the Commission as acting in a legislative capacity; and
that the Commission lacks lawmaking authority. The Commission acknowledges that it
was created by the General Assembly and that the General Assembly funds and staffs it.
Notwithstanding that, according to the Commission, the Trial Court incorrectly relied on
an overly simplistic finding that the Commission functions as an “arm” of the legislature.
The Commission says that instead it is “a civic or governmental body vested with
governmental authority to act on behalf of the State,” not a legislative body.

        While the procedures used by Georgia vis-à-vis its code annotations and those used
by Tennessee are not identical, the distinctions are immaterial as to the issue before us.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Georgia was sweeping in its analysis of the government edicts
doctrine. That analysis yields the same result in the appeal at bar. The Commission is,
indeed, an “arm” of the legislature. It could hardly be other. If it is a “civic” or
“governmental body,” it is one created by the legislature for producing the TCA, a
distinctly legislative goal. The Commission’s proffered distinctions between the facts of
this case and those of Georgia are overwhelmed by the breadth of the Supreme Court’s
holding. As applied here, the Commission, which is an arm of the General Assembly,
produces the TCA (with the contracted-for assistance of Lexis) in the course of its official
duties.

       The Georgia Court noted that, while “Georgia minimizes the OCGA annotations as
non-binding and non-authoritative”, “that description undersells their practical
significance.” 140 S.Ct. at 1512. The Court contrasted “economy-class” readers and “first-
                                            -6-
class” readers—i.e., the former having access to only the bare code, and the latter with the
benefit of crucial added context. Id. That applies just as well to the TCA. The TCA is the
definitive version of Tennessee statutory law, which courts almost always cite to. The facts
of Georgia are analogous to the case at bar in every meaningful respect. We do not
presume to bind federal courts as to the TCA’s eligibility for copyright protection, but we
hold for purposes of Hudson’s TPRA petition that the TCA is ineligible for copyright
protection. We affirm the Trial Court on this issue.

        Our determination that the TCA is ineligible for copyright protection is not
dispositive. This remains a public records case. More precisely, it is an effort by Hudson
to access records held by a private entity, Lexis, by means of the TPRA. In order to achieve
that, he must vindicate his theory that Lexis, in helping the Commission produce the TCA,
operates as the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. Otherwise, as a private
entity, Lexis is not subject to the TPRA. We therefore address whether the Trial Court
erred in concluding that Lexis is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. This
Court has discussed the TPRA thusly:

               The Tennessee Supreme Court has characterized the TPRA as “an all
       encompassing legislative attempt to cover all printed matter created or
       received by government in its official capacity.” Griffin v. City of Knoxville,
       821 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Bd. of Ed. v. Memphis Publ’g Co.,
       585 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tenn. App. 1979)). It has opined that the TPRA’s
       broad legislative mandate “require[s] disclosure of government records even
       when there are significant countervailing considerations.” Gautreaux v.
       Internal Medicine Educ. Found., 336 S.W.3d 526, 529 [(Tenn. 2011)] (citing
       Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994)).
       The TPRA requires the courts to construe the statute broadly “so as to give
       the fullest possible public access to public records.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-
       7-505(d). Accordingly, there is a “presumption of openness” under the
       TPRA, “favoring disclosure of governmental records.” Schneider v. City of
       Jackson, 226 S.W.3d 332, 340 (Tenn. 2007) (citing see State v. Cawood, 134
       S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tenn. 2004); Tennessean v. Elec. Power Bd., 979 S.W.2d
       297, 305 (Tenn. 1998); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 785
       (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).

              Notwithstanding the presumption of openness, in the interest of public
       policy the General Assembly has provided specific explicit exemptions from
       disclosure contained in the TPRA itself. It has also “acknowledged and
       validated both explicit and implicit exceptions from disclosure found
       elsewhere in state law.” Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 2004). In an action filed for review of the denial of access to a record
                                             -7-
      by a governmental entity, the governmental entity carries the burden of proof
      to justify nondisclosure by a preponderance of the evidence. Schneider, 226
      S.W.3d at 339 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(c)).

Patterson v. Convention Ctr. Auth., 421 S.W.3d 597, 606-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

       With regard to when a private entity acts as the functional equivalent of a
governmental entity, the Tennessee Supreme Court has interpreted records made or
received in connection with the transaction of official business as inclusive of “those
records in the hands of any private entity which operates as the functional equivalent of a
governmental agency.” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Familv Servs., Inc.,
87 S.W.3d 67, 79 (Tenn. 2002) (footnote omitted). In articulating the test for functional
equivalence, our Supreme Court explained:

      In making this determination, we look to the totality of the circumstances in
      each given case, and no single factor will be dispositive. The cornerstone of
      this analysis, of course, is whether and to what extent the entity performs a
      governmental or public function, for we intend by our holding to ensure that
      a governmental agency cannot, intentionally or unintentionally, avoid its
      disclosure obligations under the Act by contractually delegating its
      responsibilities to a private entity. Beyond this consideration, additional
      factors relevant to the analysis include, but are not limited to, (1) the level of
      government funding of the entity; (2) the extent of government involvement
      with, regulation of, or control over the entity; and (3) whether the entity was
      created by an act of the legislature or previously determined by law to be
      open to public access.

             We caution that our holding clearly is not intended to allow public
      access to the records of every private entity which provides any specific,
      contracted-for services to governmental agencies. A private business does
      not open its records to public scrutiny merely by doing business with, or
      performing services on behalf of, state or municipal government. But when
      an entity assumes responsibility for providing public functions to such an
      extent that it becomes the functional equivalent of a governmental agency,
      the Tennessee Public Records Act guarantees that the entity is held
      accountable to the public for its performance of those functions.

Cherokee, 87 S.W.3d at 79.

      The ‘cornerstone’ question of this analysis is whether and to what extent Lexis
performs a governmental or public function. Hudson argues that Lexis does perform such
                                             -8-
a role. He cites the fact that every citizen is presumed to know the law. He continues:
“The law cannot be the law without being published, and thus publication of the law is a
necessary and integral part of the government function of law-making.” Hudson submits
that the Commission has “complete control and supervision over Lexis. . . .” However, we
disagree with Hudson as to the nature and implications of this control. The control
exercised by the Commission is over the product, not Lexis itself. It is akin to the state
demanding certain exacting specifications in road construction or any other project. If the
state were dissatisfied, it could contract with another vendor. In any event, Lexis itself is
not under state control. It is simply performing a carefully regulated service for the state.
That the product at issue happens to be a compilation of the official statutory law of the
state makes no difference to the fact that Lexis is still providing a specific service and not
acting as a governmental entity. The Commission has the ultimate say over the TCA’s
content. Lexis is not a stand-in for government; it is just performing a contracted-for job
within tightly specified parameters.

        Hudson cites several cases, including Allen v. Day, 213 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006), in support of his argument that Lexis is the functional equivalent of a governmental
entity. In Allen, this Court held that a private entity managing day-to-day operations at a
public arena was the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. Id. at 246, 261.
Importantly, in that case, the private entity “participate[d] in making binding governmental
decisions regarding the management of the Arena[.]” Id. at 256. Here, the Commission
has the final say on the TCA’s contents. Lexis just helps implement the process. Other
examples of functional equivalence cited by Hudson relating to education and prisons, for
instance, implicate areas of traditional government intervention. The present matter is
distinct. While the state certainly has always been in the law-making business, it has not
traditionally been in the self-publishing business. Thus, we conclude that under the main
Cherokee factor, Lexis does not perform a governmental function. Additionally, the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Cherokee clarified that the rationale underpinning the
functional equivalence doctrine is to ensure that the state does not avoid disclosure by
delegating to a private entity. 87 S.W.3d at 79. Here, the state is not avoiding disclosure
of the TCA through its contractual relationship with Lexis. On the contrary, the state
contracts with Lexis to produce and publish the TCA, not to hide it.

       The remaining Cherokee factors likewise do not support a finding of functional
equivalence. Lexis is not controlled by the state. As discussed above, it simply adheres to
stringent specifications in performing a contracted-for service to the state. Lexis also is
not funded by the state. Finally, Lexis was not created by the General Assembly. The
Cherokee factors weigh strongly against a finding of functional equivalence as to Lexis.
We hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, Lexis does not operate as the
functional equivalent of a governmental entity simply by virtue of its specific, contracted-

                                             -9-
for services for the state in connection with publishing the TCA. We modify the Trial
Court’s judgment to that extent.

       Our conclusion that Lexis is not the functional equivalent of a governmental entity
means that it is not subject to the TPRA. However, in the event that we are wrong about
that, we proceed to consider whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that the TCA is
exempt from disclosure under the TPRA. The TPRA states, as relevant:

       (a)(1) As used in this part and title 8, chapter 4, part 6:
       (A) “Public record or records” or “state record or records”:
       (i) Means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs,
       microfilms, electronic data processing files and output, films, sound
       recordings, or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics,
       made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the
       transaction of official business by any governmental entity; and

                                             ***

       (2)(A) All state, county and municipal records shall, at all times during
       business hours, which for public hospitals shall be during the business hours
       of their administrative offices, be open for personal inspection by any citizen
       of this state, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of
       inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.

                                             ***

       (7)(A)(i) A governmental entity shall not require a written request or assess
       a charge to view a public record unless otherwise required by law. Requests
       to view public records may be submitted in person or by telephone, fax, mail,
       or email if the governmental entity uses such means of communication to
       transact official business, or via internet portal if the governmental entity
       maintains an internet portal that is used for accepting public records requests.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (West July 1, 2022 to April 16, 2023) (emphasis added).

        Lexis argues that the “otherwise” clauses apply here. To this end, it cites a number
of statutes, including: Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-105(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-106(a); and
Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-113(b) (“The commission shall not be authorized to subsidize the
publication of the code out of public funds, but shall require that the cost of publication be
borne by the publisher, and the publisher shall be required to depend for compensation
upon the proceeds of the sale of the publication.”). Lexis also cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-
                                            -10-
10-108(d) (“If public information is stored in a computer-readable form, the committee has
exclusive authority to determine the form in which the information will be reproduced for
the requestor of the information; provided, that the reproduction, publication, and sale of
Tennessee Code Annotated in any form, in whole or in part, shall be pursuant to the
provisions of title 1, chapter 1. If access to such public information is also available in
printed form, it need not be provided in an electronic readable form.”). According to Lexis,
Tennessee law provides an exclusive path to accessing the TCA, and the TPRA is not the
means to do it. In response, Hudson says that Lexis and the Commission cannot establish
an exemption from disclosure for the TCA by pointing to a “grab bag” of statutes that
merely mention the Commission or the TCA.

       This issue involves statutory interpretation. Our Supreme Court has given guidance
with regard to interpreting statutes, stating:

       Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to the facts of a case
       involve questions of law and are reviewed under a de novo standard of review
       with no presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court. Tenn. Dep’t
       of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017); Arden v. Kozawa,
       466 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tenn. 2015). We thus independently review the
       relevant provisions of the Charter without any deference to the
       interpretations of the Commission or the trial court. See Pressley, 528
       S.W.3d at 512.

               The overriding purpose of a court in construing a statute is to ascertain
       and effectuate the legislative intent, without either expanding or contracting
       the statute’s intended scope. Ray v. Madison Cnty., Tenn., 536 S.W.3d 824,
       831 (Tenn. 2017); Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 512. Legislative intent is first and
       foremost reflected in the language of the statute. Lee Medical, Inc. v.
       Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). “We presume that the
       Legislature intended each word in a statute to have a specific purpose and
       meaning.” Arden, 466 S.W.3d at 764. The words used in a statute are to be
       given their natural and ordinary meaning, and, because “words are known by
       the company they keep,” we construe them in the context in which they
       appear and in light of the general purpose of the statute. Lee Medical, 312
       S.W.3d at 526; Ray, 536 S.W.3d at 831. “We endeavor to construe statutes
       in a reasonable manner ‘which avoids statutory conflict and provides for
       harmonious operation of the laws.’ ” Ray, 536 S.W.3d at 831 (citation
       omitted). When a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous, we need look no
       further than the language of the statute itself. Lee Medical, 312 S.W.3d at
       527. “We simply apply the plain meaning without complicating the task.”
       Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 513.
                                             -11-
              When, however, the language of a statute is ambiguous, we resort to
      rules of statutory construction and external sources in order to ascertain and
      give effect to the legislative intent. Lee Medical, 312 S.W.3d at 527; Ray,
      536 S.W.3d at 832. These external sources may include the broader statutory
      scheme, the history and purpose of the legislation, public policy, historical
      facts preceding or contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute, and
      legislative history. Lee Medical, 312 S.W.3d at 527-28; Ray, 536 S.W.3d at
      831-32. The language of a statute is ambiguous when it is subject to differing
      interpretations which yield contrary results. In re Hogue, 286 S.W.3d 890,
      894 (Tenn. 2009). “This proposition does not mean that an ambiguity exists
      merely because the parties proffer different interpretations of the statute. A
      party cannot create an ambiguity by presenting a nonsensical or clearly
      erroneous interpretation of a statute.” Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 50
      n.20 (Tenn. 2011).

Wallace v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 546 S.W.3d 47, 52-53 (Tenn.
2018) (footnotes omitted).

        We agree with Hudson that no single statute cited by Lexis or the Commission
contains an explicit exemption from disclosure for the TCA under the TPRA.
Nevertheless, the law recognizes implicit exemptions, as well. Patterson, 421 S.W.3d at
606 (citation omitted). We look to the overall statutory mechanism for the production and
sale of the TCA to determine whether title 1, chapter 1 of the TCA and other law serve as
an exception to the TPRA’s general requirement of disclosure. The only reasonable
conclusion is that the General Assembly intended to contract with a publisher to produce
and publish the TCA and then allow it to be sold by the publisher—not given away for free
upon request. Hudson seeks free access to the TCA by means of a request for public
records. This would circumvent the statutory scheme in place for producing and publishing
the TCA. Such a result would undermine the state’s practice of contracting with publishers
like Lexis. On this, we are guided by the General Assembly’s clear intent, not the
underlying wisdom of the policy, which we do not pass judgment on. If one could obtain
the TCA for free by making a public records request, few if any publishers would contract
with the state to publish the TCA. Fewer consumers still would want to pay for the TCA
if it were required to be given away for free upon request. Given that there is a statutory
framework in place for the production and distribution of the TCA, requiring unfettered
free access under the TPRA would negate this statutory approach. We construe statutes to
effectuate rather than nullify law. We also construe statutes to harmonize the law wherever
possible. We, therefore, hold that Tennessee law ‘otherwise provides’ the exclusive avenue
for obtaining the TCA. Thus, the TCA is exempt from disclosure under the TPRA. We
affirm the Trial Court on this issue.
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       In summary, we hold that for purposes of the TPRA, the TCA is ineligible for
copyright protection under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc. We hold further that Lexis is not the functional equivalent of a
governmental entity. Finally, we hold that if Lexis were the functional equivalent of a
governmental entity, the TCA would be exempt from disclosure under the TPRA because
Tennessee law otherwise provides a separate, exclusive avenue for obtaining the TCA. We
affirm the Trial Court’s judgment as modified.

                                        Conclusion

        The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed as modified, and this cause is remanded
to the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against
the Appellant, David L. Hudson, Jr., and his surety, if any.

                                           ____________________________________
                                           D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

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