Court Opinion

ID: 9552566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:13:07.174114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:11.809899
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The opinion of the Court properly sets aside the special verdicts attributing causative negligence to 16 year old Calvin and 9 year old Bryce. In my view, similar treatment should be accorded the special verdict insofar as it also purports to assess causative negligence to 13 year old Steven.
Although the Court’s opinion states that the highway was designed for speeds up to 70 miles per hour, this I would assume is logically concluded from the fact that for many years and until the 1974 oil shortage crisis, it was posted for a maximum speed of 70 miles per hour. If its design capacity were established, one would imagine that the speed would be considerably in excess of 70. A 13 year old boy is old enough to be cognizant of speed limits, patrol cars, and speeding tickets. Steven’s testimony that he was uncomfortable on seeing that the car’s speedometer registered 60-65 miles per hour falls a long way short of amounting to evidence that he apprehended any danger, or even that there was any danger. Vaughn v. Murray, 214 Kan. 456, 521 P.2d 262 (1974). Moreover, almost prima facie so it would seem, there is no danger per se in a car being driven at that speed on that highway. There may be a worry that the vehicle may be stopped and ticketed for violating an energy-conservation imposed limit.
Moreover, even were one to indulge in the assumption that Steven should have remonstrated with the driver, it is pure speculation for a jury to say, if it did, which is doubtful, that his failure to do so occasioned the mishap. It is quite obvious that the jury, erroneously given the issue of passenger negligence, went awry1 in assessing group negligence because one of the group remarked at seeing an airplane, and the youthful driver allowed her attention to be diverted from her duty of controlling the vehicle. As a matter of law it cannot be said that in the circumstances of this particular case a reasonably prudent 13 year old in the back seat of a passenger automobile going at a moderate speed and under control would be compelled to attempt backseat supervision over the driver.
“Contributory negligence has been variously defined, although the basic idea of the definitions is the same. In Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619 at 633, 277 P. 542 at 547 (1929) appears the following definition:
“ ‘To constitute contributory negligence there must be a breach of the duty imposed by law upon persons to protect themselves from injury from the negligent act of another, and that such breach must concur with the negligence of the other in producing the injury complained of * * V
“In Williamson v. Neitzel, 45 Idaho 39, 45, 260 P. 689, 690 (1927) appears the following:
“ ‘A general definition of what constitutes contributory negligence is that it is the doing, or the omitting to do, that which under the circumstances a reasonable man would not have done, or would not have omitted to do, to avoid any injury resulting to himself from the negligence of the defendant.
“And Stowers v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 87, 97, 237 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1951) contains the following discussion:
“ ‘In determining the question of contributory negligence, due care or ordinary prudence under the circumstances is the only test. The presence or absence of contributory negligence *321must be adjudged by the conditions, circumstances and surroundings at the time of the accident and whether under such the person _acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted,
Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 417 P.2d 75 (1966).
In this case, unlike Bell v. Joint School District No. 241, 94 Idaho 837, 499 P.2d 323 (1972), the boy Steven had no right of supervision over the driver, and was not shown to have any authority over the driver whatever. In Bell the trial court gave the following instruction, which this Court footnoted in the opinion:
“The court’s instruction No. 16 reads as follows:
“ ‘Every person under all circumstances, and whether on business or pleasure, must exercise ordinary care for his own safety. This duty of self-protection applies not only to a person who is the driver of an automobile, but also to a person who is merely an occupant such as a guest or passenger.
“ ‘Whenever the conduct of the driver in his operation of the car becomes in any respect negligent and such negligent conduct creates danger to the degree of subjecting the occupants to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the occupants know, or in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to know, that they are unreasonably exposing themselves to such danger, they are then required, in order to measure up to the standard of ordinary care for their own protection, to conduct themselves in the manner that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would conduct himself under the same or similar circumstances. Conduct, as used herein, may involve the action, inaction, protest or silence of the passenger.’ ” (Emphasis added)
Bell, 94 Idaho at 840, 499 P.2d at 326.
There is merit in the Court’s conclusion to direct the entry of judgment in plaintiffs’ favor for the amount of damages set for the deaths of Calvin and Bryce, but judgment for Steven’s damages should also be directed.
I am not averse, however, to the granting of an entire new trial on all issues, and believe that I so understood respondents’ attorney at oral argument to say that the jury’s misfunction in assessing liability to the passengers in all likelihood spilled over into assessing the driver’s fault for the deaths and injuries. If so, and it is a well-taken point, this jury also may have misfired in its obligation to set damages re-fleeting just compensation,

. That the jury went awry is hardly open to doubt. Besides the three children, there were two other children in the vehicle. They are not involved in the action — but obviously should have been assessed their proportionate share of “group” negligence.