Court Opinion

ID: 9567812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:03.640506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:44.560068
License: Public Domain

Moore, Justice
(dissenting in part):
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of Cooper’s murder conviction for failure to obtain an on-the-record waiver of his statutory right to personally address the jury during the guilt phase of the trial. I would find that Cooper knowingly and voluntarily waived his right.
The trial judge granted Cooper’s request to participate as co-counsel, along with his two attorneys, and admonished the attorneys to explain trial procedures to Cooper. The two attorneys, H. Patterson McWhirter and John Earl Duncan, are skilled criminal trial attorneys who have experience in representing defendants in capital murder trials.
In Cooper’s presence, the trial judge explained the procedures to be followed:
Now, when the case begins, it will be opened by the Solicitor either reading or explaining to the trial jury the indictments in the case. The defendant will then be afforded an opportunity to make an opening statement. The Court will then receive evidence in the case. When all of the evidence has been received by the Court, counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant and the defendant himself if he elects to do so, will state for the jury their respective positions in a summation or a final argument, after which the Court will then fully state to the trial jury the applicable law in this case. (Emphasis added.)
*94Moments later, the trial judge reiterated to the jury venire that the Defendant himself had the right to make a final closing argument:
... But you should not form any definite or fixed opinion of the merits of the case until you have heard all the evidence in the case, all the final arguments of counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant and the Defendant himself, if he elects to make a final argument, and the instruction, finally, of the law by the Court, (emphasis added).
In State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185, 188, 403 S.E. (2d) 623, 624 (1991), this Court held:
We hold that the knowing and voluntary waiver requirement must be satisfied by a full record. This may be established by colloquy between the court and the defendant himself, between the court and defendant’s counsel, or both.
In this case, there was never any suggestion Cooper wished to make a final argument in either phase of the trial. To the contrary, prior to the guilt phase closing arguments, defense counsel announced to the Court “... I believe, originally, we had asked for two arguments. We have now decided we would only have one.” This colloquy obviously shows a discussion of final arguments among defense counsel. The only reasonable inference is that Cooper, acting as co-counsel, made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right, of which he was obviously aware, to personally have a closing argument.
At best, Cooper is entitled only to a limited remand for a hearing to determine if he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to make a personal closing argument to the jury. See State v. Charping, — S.C. —, 437 S.E. (2d) 88 (1993) (dissent and cases cited therein); State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 403 S.E. (2d) 632 (1991); Vickery v. State, 258 S.C. 33, 186 S.E. (2d) 827 (1972). There is no reason why counsel, on remand, should not be allowed to explain if Cooper waived his right. After a hearing, if the trial judge finds he did, the murder conviction is affirmed; and if he did not, the murder conviction is reversed.