Court Opinion

ID: 9913274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 16:02:36.565679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:21.064515
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                       CHRISTINA PAYLAN, M.D.,

                                  Appellant,

                                      v.

                           JOSHUA STATTON,

                                  Appellee.

                              No. 2D21-3904

                           December 27, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Doneene D. Loar,
Judge.

Christina Paylan, M.D., pro se.

No appearance for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.
      Christina Paylan, M.D., appeals the trial court's order dismissing
her stalking injunction petition against her former boyfriend, Joshua
Statton. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We
affirm.
                               Background
      In September 2021, Dr. Paylan petitioned for a stalking injunction
against Mr. Statton. She claimed that the two had a "casual dating
relationship"1 between 2012 and October 2019. After the relationship
ended, Mr. Statton sent derogatory and profane emails to Dr. Paylan.
Her petition included seven such emails, dated between March 16 and
May 6, 2020. The final straw that prompted her petition was when Mr.
Statton went to Dr. Paylan's home in September 2021, and, in broad
daylight, took a turtle lawn ornament, a Bed Bath & Beyond trinket, from
her yard. Dr. Paylan's security camera captured the footage. The trial
court issued an ex parte temporary injunction.
      After conducting a final hearing, where both parties proceeded pro
se, the trial court dismissed the petition. The trial court reasoned that
there was no "ongoing course of conduct" involving "recent, repeated,
malicious, willful harassment." The trial court found that Mr. Statton
sent "some uncivil disgusting emails . . . two years ago" following a
"disgusting breakup where a lot of really horrible things were said."
However, "at best," the trial court explained, there was "potentially a
petty [sic] theft of a turtle."
      Dr. Paylan contends that she presented competent, substantial
evidence to the trial court supporting issuance of a stalking injunction.
                                  Discussion
      "An order . . . denying an injunction following an evidentiary
hearing is normally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 'The trial court
is afforded broad discretion in . . . denying . . . injunctions, and unless a
clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, an appellate court must not
disturb the trial court's decision.' " Shaw v. Tampa Elec. Co., 949 So. 2d
1066, 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting Jackson v. Echols, 937 So. 2d

      1 Our record reflects that the parties' relationship was more than

casual. We also note that, for a time, Mr. Statton managed Dr. Paylan's
2020 campaign for political office.
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1247, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). As explained below, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.
      Florida courts may enjoin stalking under section 784.0485, Florida
Statutes (2021). Such relief is appropriate when "[a] person . . . willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another
person." § 784.048(2); accord Alter v. Paquette, 98 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012) ("A person is guilty of stalking when he or she maliciously,
willfully, and repeatedly harasses another person." (citing § 784.048(2),
Fla. Stat. (2011))). "[H]arass" is "a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a); see also
Johnstone v. State, 298 So. 3d 660, 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) ("[S]talking
requires the proof of a series of acts, willfully and maliciously directed at
a specific person(s) and evidencing a continuity of purpose, which acts
serve no legitimate purpose and cause substantial emotional distress to
that person(s).").
      "In order to be entitled to a stalking injunction two separate
instances of stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence."
DiTanna v. Edwards, 323 So. 3d 194, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); see also
Givens v. Holmes, 241 So. 3d 232, 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("Each
incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence
to support an injunction against stalking." (quoting Touhey v. Seda, 133
So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014))). Dr. Paylan bore the burden of
proof. See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018) ("Turning to the facts of this case, it was incumbent on Ms.
Copeland to prove stalking by competent, substantial evidence.").
      Dr. Paylan's stalking petition foundered on several bases.

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I.   A Course of Conduct is Lacking
     The alleged stalking incidents Dr. Paylan relied on were remote and
isolated. They do not constitute a "course of conduct" demonstrating "a
continuity of purpose." See § 784.048(1)(b) (" 'Course of conduct' means
a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose."). "A course of
conduct requires multiple acts that are separated by time or distance."
Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).
     Mr. Statton stopped sending offensive emails by May 2020. These
incidents were stale. The turtle ornament theft occurred over a year
later. See Wright v. Norris, 320 So. 3d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
("Norris's testimony that Wright yelled at her in a Walmart a few years
earlier simply was insufficient to support issuance of the [stalking]
injunction."); Gill v. Gill, 50 So. 3d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[A]n
isolated incident of domestic violence that occurred years before a
petition for injunction is filed will not usually support the issuance of an
injunction in the absence of additional current allegations."); Jones v.
Jones, 32 So. 3d 772, 773–74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (concluding that a
pushing incident that occurred three years before the injunction was
filed was not sufficient to support the issuance of an injunction against
domestic violence); Ahern v. Leon, 332 So. 3d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022) ("The last alleged 'harassment' occurred in mid-2018, eighteen
months before Appellee filed the petition. Appellee admitted that, before
December 2019, he did not feel it necessary to file a restraining order or
contact the police because of any threat posed by Appellant. While that
fact is not dispositive, the mere circumstance that Appellant was
contracted to work at Appellee's place of employment (eighteen months
after her last contact with Appellant) is not a harassing 'course of

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conduct' under the statute."). We reject Dr. Paylan's efforts to show a
continuity of purpose.2
II.   The Want of Incidents
      Dr. Paylan failed to establish two separate, but more recent,
stalking incidents. Because the emails were too remote for the trial
court's consideration, the turtle ornament theft is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to constitute stalking. See Stallings v. Bernard, 334 So. 3d
365, 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("Because the record does not demonstrate
any basis for finding that Stallings engaged in a course of conduct
involving two separate incidents of stalking that evidenced a continuity of
purpose to harass Bernard, we reverse."); Roach v. Brower, 180 So. 3d
1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (observing that in order to be entitled to
an injunction for stalking, the petitioner must allege and prove two
separate instances of stalking); Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144 ("[B]y its
statutory definition, stalking requires proof of repeated acts." (quoting
Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))); Chiu v.
Adams, 327 So. 3d 889, 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (holding that petitioner
failed to establish more than one instance of stalking following their
breakup).
      At the final hearing, Dr. Paylan presented additional evidence of a
"parking lot incident." Specifically, her witness, Dr. Prakash Patel,
testified that "three years ago," in January 2019, Mr. Statton texted him
about seeing Drs. Patel and Paylan speaking in Dr. Paylan's office
parking lot. Apparently, Mr. Statton and Drs. Patel and Paylan were
friends at one time.

      2 Section 784.048(1)(b) defines "course of conduct" as "a series of

acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose." (Emphasis added.) However, the statute does not allow for
aggregation of temporally distant acts.
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       Dr. Paylan did not include this incident in her petition.
Nonetheless, over Mr. Statton's objection, the trial court admitted Dr.
Patel's testimony. See Stanlick v. Stanlick, 291 So. 3d 674, 674 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2020) (concluding that the "trial court erred by allowing [former
wife] to testify, over [former husband's] objection, about alleged incidents
that she did not include in her petition [for domestic violence]").
However, like the emails, this incident was too remote. Further, because
Mr. Statton prevailed in the trial court, any testimony about the "parking
lot incident" was harmless. Moreover, our record does not show that in
orally pronouncing its ruling, the trial court considered or mentioned this
unpleaded incident. See T.B. v. A.B., 186 So. 3d 544, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015) ("When the trial court grants an injunction based on improperly
admitted evidence, harmful error is clearly established.").
III.   Dr. Paylan and the Reasonable Person Standard
       Dr. Paylan failed to demonstrate that Mr. Statton's conduct was
sufficient to cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.
See Goudy v. Duquette, 112 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("In
determining if an incident causes substantial emotional distress, courts
use a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard." (quoting
Slack v. Kling, 959 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))). Because "[t]he
reasonable person standard is applied to a person in the position of the
party . . . the standard is case specific." David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871,
876 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted).
       Although we agree that Mr. Statton's aged emails were offensive
and his trespass and the theft of the turtle ornament is troubling,3 we
cannot say that Mr. Statton's behavior could cause "substantial

       3 At the final hearing, Mr. Statton offered to return the ornament to

Dr. Paylan, if she wanted it.
                                      6
emotional distress" to a reasonable person in Dr. Paylan's position. See,
e.g., Laquidara v. Houghtaling, 320 So. 3d 243, 244–45 (Fla. 2d DCA
2021) (concluding that while a business owner yelling, screaming, and
"hurling profanities" at a neighboring business owner over the use of an
easement, with accompanying conduct designed to disrupt the business
operations "was admittedly uncivil and offensive," it did not "r[i]se to a
level that would have caused a reasonable person in the Houghtalings'
situation to suffer the substantial emotional distress necessary for an
injunction"); Sinopoli v. Clark, 290 So. 3d 159, 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
(concluding that appellee's distress over her neighbor's yard maintenance
and other conduct did not rise to the level of causing substantial
emotional distress in a reasonable person); Caterino v. Torello, 276 So. 3d
88, 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (reversing an injunction for protection against
stalking because a reasonable person would not suffer substantial
emotional distress as a result of yelling and cursing); Leach v. Kersey,
162 So. 3d 1104, 1106–07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding that because
petitioner failed to demonstrate that she suffered substantial emotional
distress after her lover's wife contacted her through social media and the
telephone, the trial court erred in granting the injunction against
stalking).
      We recently catalogued a series of cases explaining the reasonable
person requirement:
      The conduct referenced by the circuit court in this case—
      entering upon the property and removing the permit—would
      not cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
      distress. Compare Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 990
      (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (reversing injunction for protection
      against stalking because a reasonable person would not
      suffer substantial emotional distress as a result of a
      neighbor—who had been complaining about the petitioner's
      outdoor light and dogs—looking at the petitioner's utility

                                      7
     meter near the petitioner's property on multiple occasions
     and staring at the petitioner while she sunbathed), and David
     v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing
     injunction for protection against stalking because a
     reasonable person would not suffer substantial emotional
     distress when respondent "banged on [petitioner's] door and
     left her a letter and a check"), with Robertson v. Robertson,
     164 So. 3d 87, 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (affirming entry of
     injunction for protection against stalking because
     respondent's conduct of looking inside petitioner's house in
     the middle of the night with a flashlight, uninvited and
     without warning, for three consecutive nights constituted a
     course of conduct causing substantial emotional distress).
     See also Touhey, 133 So. 3d at 1204–05 (reversing injunction
     for protection against stalking because the actions of the
     respondent—visiting the petitioner's office once and calling
     the office twice to inquire about petitioner's whereabouts—
     would not cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
     emotional distress); Jones v. Jackson, 67 So. 3d 1203, 1204
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (concluding that there was not competent
     substantial evidence of stalking because a reasonable person
     in the petitioner's position would not have suffered
     substantial emotional distress as a result of receiving
     threatening phone calls and text messages).
Caterino, 276 So. 3d at 93. The case law dictates that Mr. Statton's
emails and theft of Dr. Paylan's turtle ornament are insufficient to cause
substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person. See Craft v.
Fuller, 298 So. 3d 99, 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (" '[T]he "substantial
emotional distress" that is necessary to support a stalking injunction is
greater than just an ordinary feeling of distress' or simple
embarrassment." (quoting Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2018))).
                                Conclusion
     We affirm the trial court's order dismissing Dr. Paylan's stalking
injunction petition.
     Affirmed.

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KHOUZAM and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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