Court Opinion

ID: 9892807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 21:04:30.568029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:27.683379
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/24/23
                     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
        Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.
 JAY C. SHAH,
                                             A162676
        Defendant and Appellant;
 CRAIG J. BASSETT et al.,                    (San Francisco County
                                              Super. Ct. Nos. SCN214619,
        Claimants and Appellants.             CT10009193)

       Defendant Jay Shah’s appeal attacks the trial court’s power to levy
property under Penal Code section 186.11, also known as the “Freeze and
Seize” law. 1 (People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 82 (Semaan).) The
power is a component of California’s “aggravated white collar crime
enhancement,” and is intended to aid in the enforcement of restitution
awards in a subset of white collar criminal cases. (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(1);
Semaan, at p. 86.) It does so by preventing a defendant from disposing of
assets pending trial, and then using those assets to pay restitution to victims
if the People secure a conviction.
       According to Shah, a trial court must seize any properties under section
186.11 by the time of the sentencing hearing and no later. Any later, Shah

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                       1
contends, and the trial court is divested of all jurisdiction to make orders to
seize property under section 186.11. The court made the levying order at
issue here eight years after Shah’s original sentencing. Shah also argues
that this court affirmed his conviction in 2016 and did not properly remand
the case, and so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to later levy the property.
      We reject both of Shah’s arguments. Shah proposes a tortured reading
of section 186.11 that seeks to import time limitations into the statute that
are not there. Shah’s proposed interpretation would place restrictions on the
trial court’s ability to make orders relating to restitution that ignore the
legislative purpose of section 186.11 and California’s over-arching statutory
framework for restitution in criminal cases. Within that framework, trial
courts are empowered to make and enforce restitution orders because
California recognizes restitution for victims of crime as a constitutional right.
This does not change even after the Courts of Appeal decide a criminal case
on the merits. The lack of a disposition formally remanding Shah’s original
appeal for further proceedings was also no bar to the trial court’s levying
order. We affirm.
                               BACKGROUND
   A. The Criminal Case
      Shah’s current appeal is the latest of several criminal and civil appeals
in the aftermath of a jury’s September 2012 verdict against him. The charges
and Shah’s trial were summarized in this court’s decision on Shah’s appeal
challenging his conviction and sentence. (People v. Shah (Jul. 8, 2016,
A138475) [nonpub. opn.] (Shah).)
      From September 2008 through March 2010, Shah engaged in
fraudulent transactions involving three luxury condominiums owned by
victim Shirley Hwang. Shah managed to transfer Hwang’s property into the

                                        2
name of his codefendant and then use the property to obtain over $2 million
in loans for himself.
      Shah was convicted of multiple offenses, including conspiracy to
commit money laundering (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), identity theft (§ 530.5,
subd. (a)), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), money laundering (§ 186.10,
subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), and filing false deeds including deeds of trust
(§ 115, subd. (a)). Enhancement allegations including taking a property
valued over $3.2 million in the commission or attempted commission of a
felony pursuant to former section 12022.6, subdivisions (a)(2) through (a)(4),
and special findings, including a pattern of white collar crime pursuant to
section 186.11, subdivision (a)(2) were also found true.
   B. Pre-Conviction Section 186.11 Proceedings
      Early in the criminal case, prosecutors linked Shah to at least four
properties: a 106-acre “ranch” in Santa Clara County (the ranch property)
and three properties in Los Banos in Merced County (the Los Banos
properties). In mid-2010, Shah transferred the ranch property to his parents.
In September 2010, the court ordered a temporary restraining order (TRO)
barring “the sale, encumbrance, or disposal of the ranch and the Los Banos
properties.” (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2) [prosecuting agency may seek TRO to
“prevent dissipation or secreting of assets or property”].)
      When the court entered the TRO, prosecutors recorded a lis pendens
against each of the properties.2 In October 2010, however, the court ordered
a release of the Los Banos properties from lis pendens for the limited purpose
of allowing Shah to withdraw up to $96,500 in equity through first or second

      2 A lis pendens is a formal notice of a pending action relating to real

property that is recorded in the chain of title for the property. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 405.20.)

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mortgages to pay for “reasonable legal fees in connection with the criminal
proceeding, and reasonable and appropriate living expenses.” (§ 186.11,
subd. (f)(4).)
      The court replaced the TRO with a preliminary injunction in November
2010. (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2) [relief may include TRO, preliminary injunction,
or “any other protective relief necessary to preserve the property or assets”].)
The preliminary injunction specifically identified Shah, as well as Shah’s
parents and third party Craig Bassett (Shah’s former attorney), as restrained
parties. The court ordered that the “preliminary injunction shall remain in
effect until further order of the court.”
      As a condition of its order giving Shah access to equity in his properties
to pay living and legal expenses, the court had ordered him to provide the
district attorney with “an accounting of his expenditures and funds
disbursed.” He never did. The court also provided that the People could “re-
record notices of lis pendens against the properties upon completion of the
financing provided for in this order.” They never did.
      In May 2011, Shah used third party Denise Wood separate property
trust (Wood trust) to refinance a loan to “Megan & Kasi Properties” (which
Shah controlled as its principal), in the amount of $92,000 secured by one of
the Los Banos properties. In June 2011, Shah also obtained a $92,000 loan
from the “Rathkey Trust” secured by one of the Los Banos properties.
   C. Sentencing, Restitution, and Resentencing
      In March 2013, Shah was sentenced to 20 years in state prison and
ordered to pay a $14.1 million restitution fine. The parties and the court did
not discuss the preliminary injunction at the sentencing hearing.
      The People subsequently moved to modify the sentence to include an
order for victim restitution pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f). The

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court held a series of restitution hearings in 2015. On August 20, 2015, the
trial court issued an order for Shah to pay $311,767.05 plus interest to
Hwang.
      In 2016, this court concluded in Shah that some of the sentencing
enhancements were improperly imposed but affirmed the judgment in all
other respects. (Shah, supra, A138475 [disposition as modified striking two
section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2) enhancements and staying sentence on
another].) It stated that Shah’s sentence shall be reduced by a total of 24
months.
      The trial court re-sentenced Shah at a hearing on February 17, 2017.
The court stated that it had jurisdiction and would follow the instructions of
the appellate court. It reduced Shah’s sentence by 24 months, and ordered
the two enhancements stricken and stayed the sentence on the third. It
directed the clerk to prepare a new abstract of judgment. No one objected to
conducting a resentencing hearing. Nor did anyone mention the preliminary
injunction at this hearing.
      After Shah’s resentencing, the litigants and court focused on the
collection of the restitution owed by Shah. At a hearing on August 9, 2017,
the prosecution served Shah with Judicial Council CR-115 form seeking
information concerning his assets. No one mentioned the preliminary
injunction at this hearing (or the next hearing on January 11, 2018).
      At a hearing on March 26, 2018, the prosecution asked for modification
of the earlier restitution order to account for Hwang’s attorney fees incurred
trying to enforce the original restitution award and associated legal
proceedings. The prosecution mentioned the frozen ranch property and Los
Banos properties at that hearing. Again, no one suggested that the trial
court needed to void the preliminary injunction or otherwise “unfreeze” the

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subject properties. During one of several continuances on its request, the
prosecution noted: “Restitution has been pending since 2015.” On October
29, 2020, the court issued a supplemental restitution order awarding Hwang
an additional $704,203.79 plus interest for attorney fees.
   D. Hwang’s Civil Action
      While the criminal case against Shah was proceeding, Hwang filed a
civil action against Shah for various tort claims, including conversion,
trespass, concealment, and slander of title. The trial court consolidated
Hwang’s civil action with another case filed against Shah by Commonwealth
Land Title Insurance Company (the insurer of loans Shah and his
coconspirators had secured with Hwang’s properties).
      In September 2018, Hwang prevailed in her civil action. She secured a
substantial civil judgment—over $3.8 million, including $1.6 million in
punitive damages. The judgment was affirmed in the nonpublished opinion
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company v. Shah (Aug. 31, 2021,
A156674).
      Hwang also prevailed on her postjudgment motion to (1) amend the
judgment to add alter ego entities of Shah (including Megan & Kasi
Properties) as judgment debtors, and (2) void certain transfers made by the
alter ego entities to various transferees of properties that were the subject of
the preliminary injunction in Shah’s criminal case. The postjudgment order
was affirmed in the nonpublished opinion Hwang v. FedEx Office & Print
Servs. (Nov. 16, 2021, A160429) (Hwang).
      In Hwang, Division Three of this court concluded that voiding the
transfers enforced the injunction in the criminal proceedings and was
consistent with section 186.11, subdivision (d)(2). (Hwang, supra, A160429.)
It explained: “By voiding the transfers of the Los Banos properties, the civil

                                        6
court’s enforcement of the criminal injunction simply operated to maintain
the court-ordered status quo (Shah’s possession of the Los Banos properties)
and did not in itself establish any rights or remedies belonging to Hwang.
Preservation of the frozen properties inured to the benefit of the public, which
had a ‘significant’ interest both in compensating victims of white collar crime
and in recovering fines imposed against white collar criminals. (See Pen.
Code, § 186.11, subd. (f)(3)(E).).” (Ibid.) Division Three also confirmed that
the criminal injunction remained in effect, and rejected the argument that
the injunction expired back at the time of sentencing by operation of section
186.11, subdivision (h)(1)(A) (section 186.11(h)(1)(A)). (Hwang, supra,
A160429.)
   E. The 2020–2021 Section 186.11 Proceedings
      In late 2020, against the backdrop of the two then-pending civil
appeals, Hwang worked with the San Francisco County District Attorney’s
Office to initiate further proceedings in the criminal case to levy the
properties tied to Shah. Hwang filed a motion, joined by the People,3 asking
to levy the ranch property and Los Banos properties—which they argued
remained subject to the court’s preliminary injunction—to satisfy restitution
pursuant to section 186.11. The motion also asked the court to void the 2010
transfer of the ranch property from Shah to his parents. Meanwhile, Hwang
obtained an order from the Merced County Superior Court permitting her to
sell the Los Banos properties at a sheriff’s sale.
      Section 186.11, subdivision (d)(3) sets forth procedures to provide third
parties with an opportunity to submit a verified claim of ownership as to
seized properties. No one submitted a verified claim as to the Los Banos

      3 On a parallel track, the People filed a motion to determine the validity

and priority of liens on the four properties.

                                        7
properties, but Shah’s parents and Bassett submitted verified claims for the
ranch property. The trial court accepted Bassett’s claim (for $41,513.53). It
rejected Shah’s parent’s claim, however, upon determining that Shah had
transferred the ranch property to them after committing the crimes alleged in
the complaint, so they were not bona fide purchasers for purposes of section
186.11, subdivision (e), which describes procedures for preserving status quo
of property.
      The hearing on the motion to levy occurred over three days: December
14, 2020, January 13, 2021, and March 17, 2021. The third party claimants
argued at length that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to levy the four
properties because of the passage of time since the sentencing hearing. They
focused on the portion of section 186.11(h)(1)(A) that reads: “If the defendant
is convicted . . . the trial judge shall continue the preliminary injunction or
[TRO] until the date of the criminal sentencing and shall make a finding at
that time as to what portion, if any, of the property or assets subject to the
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall be levied upon to
pay fines and restitution to victims of the crime.” Shah’s specially appearing
new counsel argued “levying upon property is supposed to be done at the time
of sentencing at which Mr. Jay Shah would have been present with counsel.”
The third parties further objected to the seizure of the Los Banos properties
because a lis pendens had not been re-recorded against those properties.
They also objected to an order that would unwind a transfer of property that
occurred before the entry of the TRO and preliminary injunction.
      The trial court articulated “provisional” rulings on January 13, 2021,
including a thorough explanation of its reasoning on section 186.11(h)(1)(A).
It noted: “I can tell you after two years in this department that a restitution
award rarely happens at time of sentencing. And so, it seems odd that the

                                        8
accounting and determination of what is owed to a victim can take place over
the course of years, but the determination under [section 186.11](h)(1)(A) of
what money will be needed to seize to pay off restitution must happen at time
of sentencing or the restitution hearing but not after. That would be an
absurd result and we are to avoid absurd results.”
      The trial court then continued the hearing to allow Shah to appear with
new counsel. On March 3, 2021, Shah’s new attorney filed a joinder to the
third parties’ opposition to the motion. Hwang filed supplemental papers on
March 8. The hearing concluded on March 17.
   F. The April 19, 2021 Order
      The trial court issued a written order on April 19, 2021, summarizing
its findings and granting much of the relief sought by the People and Hwang.
The court observed that, by this time, Shah had been ordered to pay Hwang
“in excess of $1.2 million (including interest and the costs of collection).” But
“nearly 12 years from the time her ordeal began, the total amount of
restitution that Ms. Hwang [had] received [was] $150 that was seized from
Shah’s prison account.”
      The trial court found it had jurisdiction to make levying orders under
section 186.11, subdivision (h)(1)(C).4 Citing People v. Pollard (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 483, 489–490 (Pollard), the court noted it had personal
jurisdiction over Shah and in rem jurisdiction over the ranch property. While
the lis pendens had not been re-recorded against the Los Banos properties,
the trial court decided it either had in rem or quasi-in rem jurisdiction to

      4 Section 186.11, subdivision (h)(1)(C) states:  “The sentencing court
shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the order to pay additional fines and
restitution and, in appropriate cases, may initiate probation violation
proceedings or contempt of court proceedings against a defendant who is
found to have willfully failed to comply with any lawful order of the court.”

                                        9
make orders concerning those properties. The court observed that the
“preliminary injunction by its terms ‘shall remain in effect until further order
of the court,’ ” and the court never terminated it. The trial court discussed
the purposes of section 186.11 at length. After noting that Shah had already
filed a notice of appeal, the court then referred back to its reasoning
expressed during the January 13 hearing concerning applicability of section
186.11(h)(1)(A).
      The court also rejected Shah and the third parties’ arguments that it
could only levy properties at the time of sentencing. It rejected the third
parties’ proposed statutory construction and concluded that it retained the
authority to levy the properties pursuant to section 186.11. The court also
concluded that it had the power to address violations of the preliminary
injunction by invalidating improper transactions. These included a lien that
Shah’s parents had placed on the ranch property in 2013, as well as the
transactions involving the Los Banos properties and third parties Rathkey
trust and the Wood trust. The court also determined that the transfer of the
ranch property to Shah’s parents prior to the entry of the preliminary
injunction did not bar the court from levying the property.
   G. The Shah and Third Party Appeals
      Two appeals followed the trial court’s April 19, 2021 order. Shah’s
appeal No. A161990 concerned the attorney’s fee component of a
supplemental restitution award. We granted a motion to dismiss this appeal
as moot based on a settlement reached in Shah’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
      After Shah filed his notice in this appeal, Shah’s parents, Bassett, and
Rathkey trust also filed notices of appeal as third party claimants. Each of
these third party appeals, however, has since been dismissed based on

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resolutions obtained in Shah’s bankruptcy proceedings. Only Shah’s appeal
remains pending.
                                DISCUSSION
      Two arguments remain in Shah’s appeal.5 First, Shah argues that
section 186.11 should be construed to bar the trial court from levying a
defendant’s property or assets at any point after sentencing. Second, Shah
argues that the trial court lacked authority to conduct a section
186.11(h)(1)(A) hearing four years after this court “affirmed the judgment
and did not remand the case for further proceedings.”
      We disagree with both arguments. Section 186.11 and its legislative
history do not support the statutory construction Shah attempts to advance,
particularly in the overall context of California’s legislative framework for
restitution. Victim restitution is enshrined in the California Constitution,
and California law empowers the trial courts to aid in the recovery of victim
restitution from defendants convicted of a crime. That power extends until a
defendant makes full restitution to his victim(s) and does not end when the
appeal on the merits of the underlying criminal conviction is complete. There

      5 Shah raised a third argument in his opening brief that the trial

court’s April 19, 2021 order directed that the frozen properties be levied upon
to pay Hwang the $1,015,970.84 in restitution plus interest “nunc pro tunc”
to August 23, 2015. The People concede that an order nunc pro tunc would
indeed have been error, but explain that the issue is now moot as a result of
Shah’s bankruptcy proceedings. Shah admits that the issue is “possibly”
moot, but suggests the People have not cited to documents in the record that
“conclusively establish[ed]” mootness. Given that Shah appears to all but
concede the issue, and provides no legal authority for his position even if not
conceded, we decline to address it. (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078
[“Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other
than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate
review”].)

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was also nothing about the handling of Shah’s original appeal on the merits
of his conviction that divested the trial court of its power to make further
orders relating to restitution, including under section 186.11.
                            I. Standard of Review
      Shah presents his argument on section 186.11 as a pure question of
statutory construction requiring de novo review. We certainly agree that
“ ‘[w]e review questions of statutory construction de novo.’ ” (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1120.)
      Shah, however, appears to assume that a failure to strictly adhere to
the procedure outlined in a statute whose construction was disputed
necessarily requires automatic reversal. California law dispels that
assumption, holding that appellate courts review questions of law (like
statutory construction) de novo and the trial court’s application of the law for
abuse of discretion. (E.g., Pollard, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 490; People v.
Green (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 360, 371 (Green) [reviewing language of section
186.11 de novo, but reviewing actions under the doctrine of substantial
compliance and explaining statute “ ‘may be deemed satisfied’ ” under
doctrine by “ ‘reasonable attempt’ ” to comply “ ‘in good faith’ ”]); City of
Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297–1298 [pertinent
question is whether application “is within the range of discretion conferred
upon the trial courts under [the statute], read in light of the purposes and
policy of the statute”].) Consistent with this framework, restitution orders
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Czirban (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1050, 1063–1064 [direct victim restitution orders and restitution
as condition of probation reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
      In summary, we review the legal question regarding statutory
construction of section 186.11 de novo. But we review the trial court’s

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application of section 186.11 in the context of restitution for abuse of
discretion, which may include evaluating whether a deviation from the
procedure described by the statute was harmless under the circumstances.
   II. Section 186.11 Did Not Bar the Trial Court’s April 2021 Order
   A. Statutory Construction Principles
      We begin with a brief overview of the California law guiding our
statutory construction analysis. “ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the
enactment.’ ” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 1120.) “We look first to ‘the words of the statute, which are the most
reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘The statute’s plain
meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ ”
(Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387–388.)
“We decline to insert any additional restrictions into an otherwise
unambiguous provision.” (Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 77, 85.) We construe the language of the statute “in its full
statutory context, keeping in mind the nature and purposes of the statutory
scheme as a whole.” (California Medical Assn. v. Aetna Health of California
Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075, 1087; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment &
Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386–1387.)
   B. Statutory Scheme of Section 186.11
      The “aggravated white collar crime enhancement” of section 186.11
serves three functions: it creates a sentencing enhancement to charges of
fraud or embezzlement, as well as a procedural mechanism to freeze a
defendant’s assets and following a conviction, seize those assets to pay victim
restitution. (Semaan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 86.) We address each function
in turn.

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            1. The Enhancement
      Section 186.11, subdivision (a)(1) applies to “[a]ny person who commits
two or more related felonies, a material element of which is fraud or
embezzlement, which involve a pattern of related felony conduct, and the
pattern of related felony conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss
by another person or entity of, more than one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000).” For purposes of the enhancement, a “ ‘pattern of related felony
conduct’ means engaging in at least two felonies that have the same or
similar purpose, result, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or are
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and that are not
isolated events.” (Ibid.) The enhancement adds a further consecutive prison
term, which varies depending on the amount taken, as well as fines up to
“double the value of the taking” in some circumstances. (Id., subds. (a)(1)–
(3), (c).) The remedies set out in section 186.11 “are cumulative to each other
and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.”
(Id., subd. (k).) A fine imposed under the enhancement is “in lieu of all other
fines that may be imposed pursuant to any other provision of law for the
crimes for which the defendant has been convicted in the action.” (Ibid.)
            2. Freezing Assets or Property
      Section 186.11, subdivision (d)(2) sets out a procedure for a prosecutor
to file a petition “to prevent dissipation or secreting of assets or property” by
freezing and seizing a defendant’s property.
      Concurrent with or subsequent to the filing of the petition, the
prosecution may move for pendente lite orders, including a TRO or
preliminary injunction. (§ 186.11, subd. (e)(1).) The prosecution may seek a
TRO ex parte upon a showing of good cause. (Id., subd. (f)(1).) Once the
court imposes the TRO or injunction, prosecutors are directed to record a lis

                                        14
pendens against the property pending the outcome of the criminal trial. (Id.,
subd. (d)(4).)
      In anticipation of a preliminary injunction hearing, the People must
give notice to all parties with an interest in the property, not just the
criminal defendant. (§ 186.11, subds. (d)(3), (f)(1).) “[A]ny interested person
may file a verified claim with the superior court stating the nature and
amount of their claimed interest” in the assets or properties that are the
subject of the prosecutor’s petition. (Ibid.) They may also request an “order
to show cause hearing” and have the hearing conducted within 10 days (or
sooner upon a showing of good cause). (Id., subd. (f)(2).)6
      At the preliminary injunction hearing, the trial court will “determine
whether the [TRO] should remain in effect, whether relief should be granted
from any lis pendens . . . or whether any existing order should be modified in
the interests of justice.” (§ 186.11, subd. (f)(2).) In making this determination,
the trial court “has the discretion to consider any matter that it deems reliable
and appropriate, including hearsay statements, in order to reach a just and
equitable decision. The court shall weigh the relative degree of certainty of the
outcome on the merits and the consequences to each of the parties of granting
the interim relief. If the prosecution is likely to prevail on the merits and the
risk of the dissipation of assets outweighs the potential harm to the defendants
and the interested parties, the court shall grant injunctive relief. The court
shall give significant weight to the following factors: [¶] (A) The public interest
in preserving the property or assets pendente lite. [¶] (B) The difficulty of
preserving the property or assets pendente lite where the underlying alleged

      6 Section 186.11, subdivision (h)(3) also requires the court “to protect

the legitimately acquired interests of any innocent third persons” when
issuing its final order on disposition of property to fulfill a defendant’s
responsibility to provide restitution.

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crimes involve issues of fraud and moral turpitude. [¶] (C) The fact that the
requested relief is being sought by a public prosecutor on behalf of alleged
victims of white collar crimes. [¶] (D) The likelihood that substantial public
harm has occurred where aggravated white collar crime is alleged to have been
committed. [¶] (E) The significant public interest involved in compensating the
victims of white collar crime and paying court-imposed restitution and fines.”
(Id., subd. (f)(3)(A)–(E).)
             3. Postconviction Seizure of Assets or Property
      If the defendant is convicted, as in this case, section 186.11 directs the
trial court to hold a hearing concerning levying the property to pay
restitution (colloquially, the “seizing” in the “freeze and seize” process).7 The
timing of the commencement of the seizure process, and of the ultimate
ruling concerning disposition of the four Shah properties to pay restitution to
Hwang, are the primary issues raised by Shah here.
      The focal point of this appeal, section 186.11(h)(1)(A), begins: “If the
defendant is convicted . . . the trial judge shall continue the preliminary
injunction or [TRO] until the date of the criminal sentencing and shall make a
finding at that time as to what portion, if any, of the property or assets subject
to the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall be levied
upon to pay fines and restitution to victims of the crime.” (§ 186.11,
subd. (h)(1)(A), italics added.)

     7 If the defendant is instead acquitted, then the preliminary injunction

or TRO “shall be dissolved.” (§ 186.11, subd. (g).) If the jury does not reach a
unanimous verdict, then “the court shall have the discretion to continue or
dissolve all or a portion of the preliminary injunction or [TRO] based upon
the interests of justice. However, if the prosecuting agency elects not to retry
the case, any preliminary injunction or [TRO] . . . shall be dissolved.” (Ibid.)

                                        16
      The balance of section 186.11, subdivision (h)(1) provides context
regarding the court’s responsibilities. Subdivision (h)(1)(B) continues:
“Additionally, the court shall order the defendant to make full restitution to
the victim. The payment of the restitution ordered by the court pursuant to
this section shall be made a condition of any probation granted by the court if
the existence of facts that would make the defendant subject to the
aggravated white collar crime enhancement . . . have been admitted or found
to be true by the trier of fact.” The accompanying period of probation may
“continue for up to 10 years or until full restitution is made to the victim,
whichever is earlier.” (Ibid.) Subdivision (h)(1)(C) of section 186.11 then
provides that the sentencing court “shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the
order to pay additional fines and restitution,” and may punish willful
violations of the court’s orders via probation violation or contempt
proceedings. Section 186.11, subdivision (h)(1)(D) concludes that, during any
appeal that has the effect of staying execution of the judgment or other court
order concerning restitution under the statute, “the preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be maintained in full force and effect
during the pendency of the appellate period.”
   C. Analysis
      As summarized above, Shah’s primary argument in this appeal is that
section 186.11 should be construed to bar the trial court from levying the
ranch property and Los Banos properties eight years after his original
sentencing. Based on this proposed interpretation of the statute, Shah
contends that the trial court’s levying order is void.
            1. Plain Language of Section 186.11(h)(1)(A)
      We begin with the plain language of section 186.11(h)(1)(A). Shah
commits laser focus to the provision that the sentencing court “shall” make a

                                       17
finding at the criminal sentencing about what portion of a defendant’s frozen
assets it will levy to pay the defendant’s fines and victim restitution. Shah’s
argument reads too much into the statute and, in the process, mistakes a
procedural rule for a jurisdictional mandate. Simply put, the plain language
of section 186.11(h)(1)(A) does not say that prosecutors lose the ability to
ask—or that the trial court loses its discretion—to levy a frozen property by
failing to undertake the process by the end of the sentencing hearing.
      Shah does identify a procedural misstep regarding the “freeze and
seize” process in this case. Pursuant to section 186.11(h)(1)(A), a levying
order should have been on the agenda at the September 2013 sentencing. It
was not, and it appears no one brought it to the trial court’s attention. Nor
was any issue regarding the levying order (or section 186.11 or the
preliminary injunction) raised in Shah when Shah presented other
arguments on sentencing.
      The trial court instead held a restitution hearing on August 20, 2015.
After the Shah decision, the trial court held a hearing on remand to adjust
Shah’s sentence as instructed by this court. No one mentioned the
preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, Hwang was pursuing restitution in her
parallel civil action. The People then moved forward with restitution
proceedings in the criminal case following the remittitur from Shah. Those
efforts culminated in the trial court’s April 19, 2021 order now before us. It is
this order, in which the trial court found it was still permissible for it to make
a levying order, despite the apparent earlier error in failing to issue a levying
order at the sentencing hearing, that we now review for abuse of discretion.
(Pollard, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 490; Green, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 371.)

                                       18
      Despite Shah’s steadfast argument to the contrary, use of the word
“shall” in section 186.11(h)(1)(A) is not especially helpful in connection with
the timing of the hearing. Nothing in the plain language of the provision
suggests that the timing of the postconviction levying order is a jurisdictional
mandate. Nor does it contemplate the expiration of the preliminary
injunction or TRO at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.8 Such
alternative language would do what Shah argues the statute does, which is
make it impossible to levy property after sentencing. The reality, however, is
that the statute is silent concerning what might happen if any frozen
properties are not levied by the end of the sentencing hearing. We decline
Shah’s suggestion to rewrite it.
            2. The Integrated Lender and Green Decisions
      In urging his restrictive construction of section 186.11(h)(1)(A), Shah
relies heavily on Integrated Lender Services, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 867 (Integrated Lender). We agree with the trial court
that Integrated Lender is not instructive here. In that case, the defendant
had entered a plea but did not admit the aggravated white-collar fraud
enhancement. (Id. at p. 906.) Unsurprisingly, without an admission of guilt
or conviction under the enhancement, section 186.11 could not be used to

      8 Indeed, the Hwang decision confirmed that the criminal injunction

relating to the ranch property and Los Banos properties remained in effect
after Shah’s sentencing in 2013 and at least through the date of that appeal.
(Hwang, supra, A160429.) Citations to unpublished California appellate
opinions are permitted when the unpublished decision “is relevant under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel,” as was true
here. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).) Shah was a party to the
Hwang case, but none of the parties cite (let alone discuss) the decision in
their briefing on this appeal. We therefore have no occasion to address
whether collateral estoppel ought to bar re-litigation of the issue in
connection with this appeal.

                                       19
seize the subject property. (Integrated Lender, at pp. 875–876.) Integrated
Lender made clear that even with an admission or conviction, the victim does
not obtain a property interest based on some combination of a lis pendens,
TRO, preliminary injunction, or restitution order under section 186.11. The
victim must obtain a levying order under section 186.11(h)(1)(A). (Integrated
Lender, at p. 875.) But nothing in Integrated Lender suggests that the trial
court must vacate a preliminary injunction under section 186.11 if the
property had not been levied at the time of the sentencing hearing or that the
court is barred from making a levying order after that hearing.9
      Nor have the parties presented any other authority that supports Shah’s
proposed reading of section 186.11(h)(1)(A). In Green, for example, prosecutors
never obtained a preliminary injunction while a criminal case was pending,
believing that an executed search warrant was sufficient to secure the assets
at issue. (Green, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.) The appellate court
concluded that failure to obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction to freeze the
assets under section 186.11 barred the trial court from later exercising the
authority to seize those assets using the procedures set out in the statute.
(Green, at p. 370.) It expressed: “No petition, no preliminary injunction; no

      9 We note that, in dicta, the court in Integrated Lender referenced

potential difficulties in enforcement of a TRO or preliminary injunction
“years after the proceedings in which it was entered have been concluded,”
but then declined to “reach the issue.” (Integrated Lender, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at p. 877.) We have no reason to question the trial court’s
determination here that the preliminary injunction remained in effect as of
April 19, 2021 (the date of the levying order). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 533 [“In
any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or [TRO]
upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon
which the injunction or [TRO] was granted, that the law upon which the
injunction or [TRO] was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice
would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or
[TRO]”].)

                                       20
preliminary injunction, no levy.” (Ibid.) Here, unlike Green, the trial court
issued a preliminary injunction and otherwise complied with the requirements
of section 186.11 through Shah’s conviction. Its only arguable misstep was in
not making a levying order at the sentencing hearing, but instead waiting until
postconviction restitution proceedings had commenced.
             3. Statutory Context and Purpose
      Our interpretation of section 186.11(h)(1)(A) is supported by the context
of the statute as a whole. The statute is explicit that the “freeze and seize”
procedure is intended “[t]o prevent dissipation or secreting of assets or
property.” (§ 186.11, subd. (d)(2).) The court’s duty to “order the defendant to
make full restitution to the victim” is mandatory. (Id., subd. (h)(1)(B).) In
deciding whether to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction, the court is
required to give “significant weight” to factors related to the protection of the
public interest and the victims of white collar crime. (Id., subd. (f)(3)(A)–(E).)
It is also required to “seek to protect the interests of any innocent third
persons.” (Id., subd. (f)(5).)
      More importantly, the statute expressly contemplates postsentencing
proceedings by providing that the trial court “shall retain jurisdiction to
enforce the order to pay additional fines and restitution.” (§ 186.11,
subd. (h)(1)(C).) And notwithstanding provisions that limit the duration of
probation conditions (like the two-year limit on felony probation set out in
section 1203.1, subdivision (a)), the court may impose probation for “up to 10
years or until full restitution is made to the victim.” (§ 186.11 subd. (h)(1)(B).)
      Our conclusion that section 186.11 does not bar a court from issuing a
levying order after sentencing finds further support in the legislative history of
the statute. In 1995, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 950 to
“establish[] a procedure for the freezing and levying upon the financial assets

                                        21
of persons alleged to have committed aggravated white collar crime in order to
obtain restitution for the crime victims . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc.,
Analysis of Senate Bill No. 950 (1995–1996) Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 17,
1995, p. 3 (Senate Committee Analysis).) The office of the bill’s author felt
“that a major point of frustration for prosecutors occurs when persons
convicted of major fraud crimes are allowed to enjoy the benefits of their
crimes, even after serving a term of incarceration. The author feels that it is
very difficult to say that justice has truly been done when a person is
sentenced to a few years in state prison but still retains millions of dollars in
assets which should rightfully go to the victims of crime.” (Id., at p. 5.)
      The author of the bill argued that, under then-existing law, “it is very
difficult for a prosecutor to freeze the assets of a criminal defendant pending
a criminal conviction. As a result, by the time such a defendant is convicted,
all assets have been dissipated, hidden, or transferred out of the jurisdiction
of the court. The result is that major fraud defendants are sentenced to serve
state prison sentences without losing the proceeds of their crimes. Criminals
retain the stolen money and can enjoy a lavish life-style after release from
custody at the expense of their victims. [¶] The victims of crime . . . are
manipulated by sophisticated criminals. Public prosecutors do not have the
tools necessary to get restitution for these victims whose lives, retirement or
careers could be in a state of ruin.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, at pp. 5–6.)
In short, the key point of the “freeze and seize” law was to “freeze the assets
of those alleged to have committed white collar crime at the time of their
arrest. This will assure restitution is paid to victims if the defendant is
convicted.”10 (Id. at p. 6.)

      10 The Legislature amended section 186.11 to lower the monetary

threshold to $100,000 because it viewed the previous $500,000 level as

                                        22
      The legislative history does not reflect any importance being placed on
the timing of a levying order with the sentencing hearing, or any limitation
on the trial court’s jurisdiction to make a levying order only at the sentencing
hearing. Committee records say only what legislators believed would happen
if a defendant is convicted under the white collar criminal enhancement.
“[T]he preliminary injunction or [TRO] would be continued until the date of
the criminal sentencing. At the criminal sentencing, the trial judge would
make a finding as to what portion, if any, of the assets subject to the
preliminary injunction or [TRO] would be levied upon to pay fines, restitution
to victims of crime, and the reasonable costs of the investigation and
prosecution of the defendant. [¶] The order . . . could exceed the total amount
that was subject to the preliminary injunction . . . and would be converted
into an enforceable civil judgment by the criminal court. [¶] The court would
order that any person convicted of aggravated white collar crime to make full
restitution to the victim or to make restitution to the victim based on his or
her ability to pay.” (Sen. Comm. Analysis, supra, at pp. 12–13.)
      Shah argues that there are “sage policy reasons” why the Legislature
“required that the trial court make [its] findings” concerning postconviction
levying of property at the time of sentencing “rather than going on ad
infinitum.” Shah specifically identifies the cloud over title to a property
caused by a lis pendens subject to a preliminary injunction, and the concern
that an injunction lasting past the sentencing hearing could lead to
“neglected property” and failure to pay property taxes. These rationales
amount to speculation and find no purchase in the legislative history.

“exempt[ing] too many fraud cases to be truly effective.” (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 2827 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.)
Apr. 23, 1996.)

                                       23
      In summary, the legislative history of section 186.11 provides no
support for construction of the statute that would impose the sentencing
hearing as the absolute jurisdictional deadline for the trial court to issue a
levying order. The Legislature was explicit that it added section 186.11 to fill
a gap in California’s framework for victim restitution in white collar criminal
cases, making it more difficult for someone convicted of an aggravated white
collar crime to nevertheless benefit from their ill-gotten gains. Shah’s
reading of the statute would contravene the stated purpose of the law by
limiting a court’s ability to aid in recovery of restitution.
             4. Broader Legislative Framework Regarding Victim Restitution

      Our conclusion that the trial court was not barred from issuing a
levying order after the sentencing hearing is also supported by California’s
broader legislative framework for restitution. California elevates victim
restitution to a constitutional right. Article I, section 28 of the California
Constitution, also known as the “Victims’ Bill of Rights,” provides: “In order
to preserve and protect a victim’s rights to justice and due process, a victim
shall be entitled to the following rights. [¶] . . . [¶] (13) To restitution.
[¶] (A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California
that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have
the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the
crimes causing the losses they suffer. [¶] (B) Restitution shall be ordered
from the convicted persons wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the
sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.
[¶] (C) All monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any
person who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay
the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.” (Cal. Const. art. I,
§ 28(b)(13)(A)–(C).)

                                         24
      Statutes like section 1202.4 implement this constitutional mandate.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) explains, “It is the intent of the Legislature
that a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the
commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant
convicted of that crime.” Accordingly, the court “shall order the defendant to
pay both” a “restitution fine” and “restitution to the victim or victims,” which
is “enforceable as if the order were a civil judgment.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
      Flexibility in the use of tools available to the People and to the courts is
central to California’s view of restitution. As the trial court recognized,
“[R]estitution is a critical part of the criminal proceeding, and the court
retains continuing jurisdiction to modify an order for victim restitution.”
(§§ 1202.42, subd. (d), 1202.46; People v. Dehle (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1380,
1390; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1207.) The key is to
provide “full restitution” to victims of crime, regardless of the timing.
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) “If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time
of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount
shall be determined at the direction of the court. The court shall order full
restitution.” (Ibid.)
      Section 1202.46 further gives the court ongoing power to make orders
relating to restitution, and explicitly avoids setting a deadline for a court to
make an order concerning restitution. With certain exceptions not relevant
here, section 1202.46 provides that “when the economic losses of a victim
cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of
Section 1202.4, the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a
restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such
time as the losses may be determined. This section does not prohibit a
victim, the district attorney, or a court on its own motion from requesting

                                        25
correction, at any time, of a sentence when the sentence is invalid due to the
omission of a restitution order or fine pursuant to Section 1202.4.”
      Section 186.11 operates in this greater constitutional and legislative
framework. It, “like other provisions of the Penal Code (e.g., § 1202.4 et
seq.),” implements the California Constitution’s mandate concerning
restitution for victims of crime. (Semaan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 86.) Under
California’s other restitution laws, “there is no limitation upon when the
court must next set a restitution hearing, nor is there a limitation on the
permissible reasons that may prevent fixing the amount of restitution.”
(People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) Given this context, and
the central importance of restitution to California’s system of justice, we
cannot accept Shah’s position that the sentencing hearing is the outside
deadline for a levying order as a matter of law based on the statute as
written.11 (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra,
43 Cal.3d at pp. 1386–1387.)
      Shah attempts to minimize the value of California’s legislative
framework regarding victim restitution in our analysis here by arguing that

      11 Shah suggests that the timing of the restitution order in August 2015

“begs the question why restitution was not set earlier such as at the time of
sentencing.” He is wrong. The timing of the trial court’s first restitution
order was entirely consistent with section 1202.4. As the trial court noted in
its April 19, 2021 order, California’s legislative framework for restitution
means “the court can award losses to the victim and modify that award
should other losses accrue or be discovered. That is what happened in this
case and what happens in many cases. It is the experience of this court that
the determination and imposition of restitution rarely happens at [the] time
of sentencing. It thus seems wrong that the accounting and determination of
what is owed to a victim can take place over the course of years, [citation],
but the determination under subdivision (h)(1)(A) of what money will be
needed to seize to pay restitution must happen at time of sentencing and
never after.”

                                       26
“[t]here are countervailing public policy considerations applicable to section
186.11 [that] do not apply to general awards of restitution.” He attempts to
distinguish sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 by contending they illustrate that
the Legislature is capable of providing for continuing jurisdiction over
matters related to restitution when it determines that to be appropriate. He
also argues that the court can still order restitution even if it cannot levy the
subject properties.
      We are not persuaded. As described above, section 186.11, subdivisions
(h)(1)(C) and (h)(1)(D) explicitly reserve the trial court’s “jurisdiction to
enforce the order to pay additional fines and restitution” and mandate that
the preliminary injunction remain in place during an appeal on the merits.
(See also Pollard, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488–490.) Had the
Legislature wished to impose such a jurisdictional bar to the trial court’s
ability to make restitution orders that would satisfy article I, section 28 of the
California Constitution, not to mention Penal Code sections 1202.4 and
1202.46, it could have done so in the statutory language and the legislative
history would reflect such efforts. It does not. As for Shah’s argument that
the court’s inability to ever make a levying order after a sentencing hearing
would not deny Hwang her right to restitution, his approach would still
short-circuit the purpose of section 186.11: to ease the process by preventing
assets from being hidden, and then using those assets to actually pay
restitution rather than to make hollow orders that are extremely difficult and
time consuming to enforce.
      In its well-reasoned April 19, 2021 order, the trial court properly
concluded that it remained empowered to make a levying order seizing and
disposing of the ranch property and Los Banos properties that remained
subject to the preliminary injunction. We agree with its determination that

                                        27
“the better and fairer interpretation is that Ms. Hwang is entitled to have
this court now make a finding as to ‘what portion, if any, of the property or
assets subject to the preliminary injunction . . . shall be levied upon to pay
fines and restitution to victims of the crime.’ ” Doing so would uphold
Hwang’s constitutional rights while avoiding a situation in which Shah would
“achieve a windfall due to the failure of the court” to act. Such a result is
exactly what section 186.11 and its legislative history contemplates.
      Again, Shah advances an all-or-nothing jurisdictional argument. He
offers no alternative argument that the levying order was error in excess of
the trial court’s jurisdiction (instead of void), or that any such error was more
than harmless. To the extent that the trial court should have made its
findings concerning levying at the sentencing hearing, it was not raised in
the original Shah appeal, and we are hard-pressed to identify any potential
harm that would rise to the level of reversable error.
 II. The Remittitur from Shah’s Direct Appeal from His Conviction
           Did Not Bar the Trial Court’s April 2021 Order

      Shah argues that, in Shah, supra, A138475, this court “did not remand
the cause for further proceedings necessary to carry out the judgment.”
According to him, the lack of a formal remand meant the trial court lacked
any power “to make findings regarding frozen property when it failed to do so
at sentencing when it had jurisdiction to take such action.”
      Shah is wrong. First, as noted above, section 186.11 provides that the
trial court’s preliminary injunction “shall be maintained in full force and effect
during the pendency of the appellate period.” (§ 186.11, subd. (h)(1)(D).)
Section 186.11 thus anticipates hearings regarding restitution derived from
properties frozen by a preliminary injunction under the statute. Second,
contrary to Shah’s recollection, the trial court did in fact conduct resentencing
proceedings to adjust the abstract of judgment to conform with this court’s

                                       28
disposition after the remittitur issued—it is not true that “there was nothing
for the [trial court] to do” and something was, in fact, remanded
notwithstanding the lack of the word “remand” in this court’s disposition.
Third, Shah cites only People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 333 to support
his position, but that case is inapposite. It concluded that a defendant seeking
to challenge his mandatory sex offender registration status after he had
appealed his conviction had to do so by writ of mandate in the trial court (not a
freestanding postjudgment motion), by virtue of the rule generally precluding
postjudgment motions in criminal cases. (Id. at p. 335.) Finally, as discussed
above, sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 both expressly contemplate proceedings
relating to restitution well after a conviction, and any related appeals.
Hearings pursuant to section 186.11 are among them.
                    III. Potential Further Proceedings
      The Attorney General requests that the April 19, 2021 order be
affirmed, but proposes that we remand the case for reconsideration of the
order “in light of payment to victim Shirley Hwang and prospective payment
to claimant Craig J. Bassett in Jay Shah’s bankruptcy proceedings.” For the
avoidance of doubt, a party with appropriate standing may file a motion to
reconsider in light of the bankruptcy proceedings if they wish. We lack
sufficient information concerning the terms of orders in the bankruptcy
proceedings to assess whether a motion for reconsideration might have merit.
                                DISPOSITION
      The April 19, 2021 order is affirmed.

                                       29
                                         _________________________
                                         Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

People v. Shah (A162676)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    30
Trial Court:                  San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge:                  Hon. Alexandra Gordon

Attorney for Defendant        By Appointment of the Court of Appeal
and Appellant:                First District Appellate Project
                              Edward A. Mahler

Attorneys for Claimants       Craig J. Bassett Pro Se
and Appellants:               Law Offices of Craig J. Bassett

                              Benjamin R. Levinson
                              Law Offices of Benjamin R. Levinson

                              Mark S. Goldrosen
                              Law Office of Mark S. Goldrosen

                              Jenny D. Smith
                              Law Offices of Dek Ketchum

Attorneys for Plaintiff and   Rob Bonta
and Respondent:               Attorney General of California

                              Lance E. Winters
                              Chief Assistant Attorney General

                              Jeffrey M. Laurence
                              Senior Assistant Attorney General

                              Catherine A. Rivlin
                              Supervising Deputy Attorney General

                              Allen R. Crown
                              Deputy Attorney General

                               31