Court Opinion

ID: 9739766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:20:36.706275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.810426
License: Public Domain

SIMONETT, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted plaintiff-respondents in a class action suit. Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled that Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 (1992), which imposes a dura-tional residency requirement for full general assistance-work readiness benefits, was *199unconstitutional. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn.App.1992). We granted the petition for further review of the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and we now affirm.
Faced with a budget crisis for the 1992-93 biennium, the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 256D.065, effective July 1, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “1991 amendment”), which reduces general assistance grants available to certain welfare recipients during their first 6 months of residency in this state. The amendment reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of sections 256D.01 to 256D.21, otherwise eligible applicants without minor children, who have been residing in the state less than six months, shall be granted general assistance and work readiness payments in an amount that * * * equal[s] 60 percent of the amount that the applicant would be eligible to receive under section 256D.06, subdivision 1. A person may receive benefits in excess of this amount, equal to the lesser of the benefits actually received in the last state of residence or the maximum benefits allowable under section 256D.06, subdivision 1.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff-respondents are unmarried adults without children who had resided in Minnesota less than 6 months and had applied for general assistance benefits after July 1, 1991. They received the reduced benefits and filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 violates their right to travel, as well as the equal protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions and the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution. The district court certified the action as a class action.
Welfare recipients who have resided in Minnesota for at least 6 months receive general assistance benefits of $203 a month for a single person and $260 per month for a married couple. Minn.Stat. §§ 256D.05, subd. la and 256D.06, subd. 1 (1990 & Supp.1991).1 Under the 1991 amendment, recipients who have resided in this state less than 6 months receive only 60 percent of these amounts.
In other words, eligible adults without minor children who have resided in Minnesota for less than 6 months receive $122 per month (instead of $203) if a single person and $156 per month (instead of $260) if a married couple; however, if the applicant provides verification, that person receives either the amount received in the previous state or the $203 or $260 per month granted Minnesota residents, whichever is lesser. Thus Minnesota will match the welfare benefits granted in the recipient’s prior state but only up to the maximum Minnesota grant. Many states, however, provide no general assistance-work readiness benefits to their indigent residents.
The trial court ruled that the 1991 amendment violated the respondents’ fundamental right to travel and to equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution, but did not reach the question of whether the Minnesota equal protection clause was violated. The trial court concluded that the primary purpose of the 1991 amendment was to deter indigents from coming to Minnesota, and that the law “burdens plaintiffs’ right to travel because it uses a classification which penalizes the exercise of that right.” The court enjoined further enforcement of the law but denied retroactive benefits.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the 1991 amendment was unconstitutional. Because the right to travel was implicated by the 6-month residency requirement, the appeals court held *200the classification thereby created was subject to strict scrutiny; and because the law failed this heightened standard, it was unconstitutional. In addition, the court of appeals went on to hold that the law also violated our state’s equal protection clause. Finally the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of retroactive benefits and remanded to the trial court to fashion a remedy for members of the class.
We granted the commissioner’s petition for further review, which raises only the constitutional issues of equal protection and right to travel. (Issues relating to the privileges and immunities clause and to retroactive benefits are not raised here.)
The first two issues, as set out in the appellant commissioner’s brief, are (1) whether the 1991 amendment violates the constitutional right to travel, and (2) whether the amendment violates the federal equal protection clause. It seems to us the question is not so much whether the right to travel has been “violated,” but whether the right to travel has been so burdened by the durational residency requirement of the 1991 amendment that the statute’s classification requires strict scrutiny rather than minimal rational basis analysis. “In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.” Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2313 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981).
The right to travel is inherent in the concept of our country as a federal union; hence the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right under the federal constitution. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-60, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178-79, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). This right to travel, which includes the right to migrate, is delineated in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions, particularly Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); and Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986). The right to travel is implicated when a statute actually deters such travel, when impeding-travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903, 106 S.Ct. at 2320.
In this case, there is no evidence that the 1991 amendment actually deters migration or seeks to impede travel. Indigent newcomers to Minnesota are no worse off (and maybe better off) for welfare benefits in this state than they were in the state of their prior residency, so that the level of benefits under the 1991 amendment is not a deterrent to leaving the prior state. And while the purpose of the legislation was to conserve funds, it is clear from the statute itself that it was intended to save money without placing a deterrence on an indigent’s decision to travel.
This lawsuit, then, is to be judged under the third type of situation, under those right-to-travel cases that have dealt “with state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they established residence, resulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents.” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903, 106 S.Ct. at 2321.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), is particularly pertinent. There a state statute denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided in the state for at least 1 year. The statute created two classes of needy persons, one composed of residents residing in the state for over a year and the other of residents residing in the state for less than a year. “Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.” Id. at 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1333. The Court then held that the 1-year waiting period, which would cause indigents to hesitate to migrate to the state, failed to meet equal protection standards. While a state has a legitimate interest in preserving its fiscal integrity, the saving of welfare costs, said the Court, does not justify discriminating against newcomers.
*201A few years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). There an Arizona statute required a year’s residence in a county as a condition for receiving non-emergency medical care at county expense. It was understood this statute covered interstate movement. The Court reasoned that medical care is as much a basic necessity of life to an indigent as welfare benefits; and, therefore, following Shapiro, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional. The Court held that the 1-year durational residency requirement for nonemergency free medical care created an “invidious classification” that impinged on the right to travel by denying newcomers the basic necessities of life and for which there was no compelling state interest. Id. at 269, 94 S.Ct. at 1088.
In several cases the United States Supreme Court has struck down state statutes with fixed point residency requirements. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985) (state veterans preference limited to veterans who had been state residents on or prior to a certain date); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (veterans preference limited to veterans who had entered military service when a state resident or had been residents prior to a certain date). Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (Alaskan statute distributing oil revenue payments to all residents with the amount of the payments varying with years of residency, held, invalid, failing to meet even the minimal rational basis test). In these three cases, interstate movement is less directly involved because the conferring of benefits is not dependent on a waiting period, but simply on the length of the residency.
Under the analysis applied in the United States Supreme Court’s decisions, which we must follow, the 1991 amendment clearly implicates the right to travel. If a needy resident of Minnesota has resided here less than 6 months, he or she receives only 60 percent of the general assistance or work readiness benefits that other needy residents of Minnesota receive. These two classes are composed of equally needy welfare recipients, but members of the first class — solely because of a shorter residency — have their benefits reduced 40 percent.
Arguably the “right to travel” should focus on the interstate travel itself, not on what happens after the travel has ended. Within this context, it would seem that the decision to migrate is dependent upon a comparison of the benefits available in the state one proposes to leave with the benefits available in the state one proposes to go to. We understand the dissent in this case to take this position.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has extended the so-called “right to travel” to include what might better be called a “right to abide in any state,” i.e., a right to live and settle down anywhere one chooses in this country without being disadvantaged because of that choice. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1001, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Inherent in making this choice is the exercise of the right to travel, or as it is sometimes and more precisely called, the right to migrate. Thus, it is said, a durational residency requirement involves an “indirect manner of burdening the right [to travel].” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903, 106 S.Ct. at 2321.
In determining this “indirect” burdening of the right to travel, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the comparison, in our case, is to be made between recent residents to Minnesota and other Minnesota residents, not between recent Minnesota residents and residents of other states. The Court has made this abundantly clear. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the Court said, “[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally.” Or as put in Soto-Lopez, the right to migrate “protects residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated differently, simply because of the *202timing of their migration, from other similarly situated residents.” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904, 106 S.Ct. at 2322. Or Hooper, 472 U.S. 612, 623, 105 S.Ct. at 2868: “The State may not favor established residents over new residents based on the view that the State may take care of ‘its own,’ if such is defined by prior residence.” 2
Plainly, then, the 1991 amendment implicates the constitutional right to travel. Even if so, contends the appellant commissioner, the “60 percent benefits for 6 months” does not penalize the right to travel so as to trigger strict scrutiny. “Penalize,” as used in this context, does not mean, however, to sanction or punish, but rather to suffer disadvantage, loss or hardship. See Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1970) (quoted approvingly in Memorial Hospital at footnote 10). The nature of the disadvantage or hardship is important. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. at 1333 n. 21 (durational residence requirements for a license to hunt or fish or to practice a profession may not constitute a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel); Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 192, 210 N.W.2d 221, 225 (1973) (durational residency requirement for bringing a divorce action valid, observing “not every penalty in interstate travel triggers the compelling-state-interest test”).
At stake in this case are payments for the basic necessities of life, just as in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital. Half a year is a long time to wait for full general assistance benefits. “[Ejven temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can operate to penalize migration.” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907, 106 S.Ct. at 2323. A divided Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits in certain instances, but the waiting period there was only 60 days. Jones v. Milwaukee County, 168 Wis.2d 892, 485 N.W.2d 21 (1992). Here, instead of receiving $203 or $260 a month, the newly arrived indigents receive $81 a month less if single and $104 a month less if a couple, a not insignificant amount, especially if a Minnesota winter is at hand.3
Nor is it necessary to show that the 6-month waiting period has actually stopped people from coming to Minnesota. “Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1002, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). It is not to be expected individuals in other states, if deterred from migrating here, would come forward to say so. The test, rather, is whether it is reasonable to infer that needy individuals would be discouraged from migrating. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S.Ct. at 1328 (“An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance * * *.”); Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. at 1081 (An indigent “may hesitate if he knows that he must make the move without the possibility of falling back on the State for medical care.”).
Finally, the fact that the 1991 amendment does provide at least reduced welfare benefits does not make the deprivation any less a “penalty” on travel. In Memorial Hospital, the fact that Arizona provided emergency medical care during the waiting period, while nonemergency medical care was denied, did not save the Arizona statute from being held unconstitutional.4
*203True, a state is not constitutionally required to provide welfare benefits in an adequate amount or in any amount. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). The equal protection clause is not an entitlement clause. Indeed, many states do not have a general assistance program, and recently Michigan canceled its entire general assistance-work readiness program. But when a state decides to provide welfare benefits, the constitutional right to travel, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, mandates that the state distribute these benefits equally to its needy residents who are similarly situated without distinguishing between its residents on the duration of their residency.5
We conclude, therefore, that the “60 percent benefits for 6 months” plan “penalizes” the fundamental constitutional right to migrate. Indeed, under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, we have no alternative. Only one step in our analysis then remains, namely, determining whether the state can show a compelling state interest for its durational residency requirement. The appellant commissioner claims the 1991 amendment serves a legitimate state interest, but, as the commissioner acknowledges, if there has been an impingement on the fundamental right to travel, the strict scrutiny standard governs, and the commissioner does not contend (nor could she) that the 1991 amendment meets a compelling state interest.
The purpose of the 1991 amendment was to conserve limited state funds, but Shapiro and Memorial Hospital flatly hold this is not a compelling reason. “The conservation of the taxpayers’ purse,” declares Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 263, 94 S.Ct. at 1085, “is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely migrate and settle in another State.”
The 1991 amendment is, therefore, unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. There is no need to consider whether the 1991 amendment violates our state equal protection clause, and we do not reach that issue.
Affirmed.
PAGE, Justice, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

. The 1991 amendment applies also to work readiness benefits. These benefits are paid for 6 months in a 12-month period (with a minor exception) to a recipient who complies with the training requirements of the work readiness program. Maximum work readiness benefits are also $203 a month for a single person and $260 a month for a married couple, and are reduced to 60 percent for recipients who have resided in this state for less than 6 months. See Minn.Stat. § 256D.051 (1990 & Supp.1991).

.Under the dissent's view, the 1991 amendment creates two classes, one class consisting of indigents residing in Minnesota, and the other class consisting of indigents living in other states. Here the distinction between the classes is the place of residence, not the duration of residence.
But if the place of residence is the relevant distinction, it seems the equal protection problem largely dissipates. There are ample differ-enees between states to justify different welfare benefits in different states.

. The commissioner estimates that the 1991 amendment will save the state approximately $890,000 in fiscal year 1992, $1 million in 1993, $1.2 million in 1994, and $1 million in 1995.

. Recently, we might add, a federal district court held California’s AFDC program, patterned similarly to this state’s 1991 amendment, *203unconstitutional. Green v. Anderson, 811 F.Supp. 516 (E.D.Cal.1993). The California plan imposed a 1-year residency requirement on newly arrived residents but provided reduced benefits not to exceed what the family would have received in the state of prior residence during the 1-year waiting period. Following Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, the court held the plan unconstitutional.

. The .assumption that nonresident indigents move to a new state because of higher welfare benefits is apparently unproven and in some doubt. There are many other factors to account for migrating to Minnesota, such as job opportunities, the presence of family and friends, etc. Then, too, the net impact of in-migration and out-migration has been estimated at about zero. See Welfare Migration Study: A Report to the 1991 Legislature, Dept. of Human Services (Feb.1991) at 24-25.
It should be noted, too, that the general assistance-work readiness programs deal with those persons residing in the state. The problem of transients, le., those who pass through the state just long enough to pick up a welfare check, is a different problem, and is handled by weekly grants or vouchers for food and shelter by a county. Id. As Shapiro makes clear, the state may require residency for receipt of benefits without impinging on the constitutional right to travel, but it may not require a waiting period before receipt of benefits. 394 U.S. at 637, 89 S.Ct. at 1333.