Court Opinion

ID: 9663467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:39:45.569943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:50.504015
License: Public Domain

CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the "defense of others” privilege outlined in secs. 939.48(1) and (4), Stats.
Sections 939.48(1) and (4), Stats., set forth a very limited privilege under which a person is legally *820justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death to another. It is narrowly tailored to give maximum protection to human life. One may not use deadly force simply because one’s life has been threatened sometime in the past or because it may be threatened at some undetermined time in the future. Deadly force may be used only to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to oneself or to a third person.
Although the majority agrees that this privilege is limited and insists that it has not broadened the scope of the privilege, it has in fact done so in this case by effectively removing the imminent requirement. Under no reading of the record in this case can I conclude that Patrick Jones reasonably believed that he stabbed Donald Price in order to protect his sister Eunice from imminent death or great bodily harm.
According to Eunice’s testimony she had gone inside the house and was there when the stabbing occurred. When Patrick was asked about Eunice’s testimony the following exchange occurred:
Q. Mr. Jones, you heard your sister testify that she was not out there when you — when the stabbing occurred, didn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you saying she’s lying?
A. No, I’m not saying she’s lying.
Q. Well, who would know best whether or not she was out there when the stabbing occurred? Wouldn’t she know best?
A. I guess she would.
*821Q. And she said in no uncertain terms that she had gone in the house to take care of herself at the time the stabbing happened.
A. About the time I came out the back door with the knife, she — they was — he had her by her arm, twisting her arm. She had broke free and then that’s when I guess she left — turned around and went in the house at the time.
Q. So she was gone?
A. Yes.
Q. When the stabbing occurred?
A. Right, she had left. I don’t know where she went.
Q. And it’s your statement today that how many minutes passed before the stabbing occurred after she left?
A. Approximately about one or two minutes.
Thus, Patrick testified that Eunice had been gone one to two minutes before the stabbing occurred. While Eunice may have been in imminent danger when Patrick arrived with the knife, this clearly demonstrates that Eunice’s life was no longer in imminent danger at the time of the stabbing. Her departure created a significant change of circumstances which removed Patrick from protection under the "defense of others” privilege.
The majority, however, speculates that perhaps Patrick did not mean to state that Eunice had been gone a full one or two minutes; instead, he merely meant to say that she had been gone a short time. Majority opinion at page 818. The majority points to other statements in his testimony in which he attempts to show how quickly the whole event happened. Majority *822opinion at page 817. Even if this contention is true, it would not change the fact that Patrick could not have reasonably believed he was protecting the absent Eunice from imminent death or great bodily harm.
Although Patrick did not know that Eunice was in the house at the time of the stabbing, his testimony reveals that he knew she was no longer in harm’s way. Patrick declared that Eunice was gone from the scene. Although he did not know precisely where she was, he knew "she had left” the scene and was gone from the imminent threat of danger.
When faced with a similar situation, this court in Thomas v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 483, 488 (1972), held that the Milwaukee County circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the "defense of others” privilege when the deadly force was used allegedly to protect a woman who had broken away from her assailant and had actually left the presence of the assailant before he was shot. The court held:
At the time of the shooting, Thomas [the defendant] was not defending Pat Bardwell nor was she under any threatened harm of imminent death or great bodily harm. She was not in danger of any harm. She had already left the lower flat and was out of the presence of Officer Chiaverotti [the alleged assailant] who was unarmed. Thomas could not have reasonably believed he was then defending her.

Id.

Following the reasoning set forth in Thomas, Patrick could not have reasonably believed he was defending Eunice from imminent death or great bodily harm. Eunice had left the scene. The uncontroverted evidence is that Eunice was gone when the stabbing *823occurred whether or not Patrick meant the same thing by the words "so fast” and "one or two minutes.” Thus, the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense of others privilege.
In conclusion, I note the defendant does not pursue the self-defense argument in this court, but only requests the court to review the record concerning the "defense of others” privilege.
I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICES DONALD W. STEINMETZ and LOUIS J. CECI join in this dissenting opinion.