Court Opinion

ID: 9530082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:15.465681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.810480
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the court’s decision granting petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and reversing his conviction. *703As the majority holds, when an attorney on inactive status and with disciplinary charges pending submits his resignation from membership in the State Bar and then represents a defendant in a criminal case, the defendant is denied the right to counsel guaranteed by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
The majority also concludes, however, that an attorney who has been suspended from legal practice based on conduct involving moral turpitude can provide the legal representation constitutionally guaranteed to criminal defendants. I disagree. When, as here, an attorney is suspended from the practice of law following an adjudication establishing the attorney’s lack of good moral character, that person cannot provide the assistance of counsel that our state Constitution guarantees.
I.
The relevant facts are as follows: In 1987, before he undertook to represent petitioner, Raymond Hane was charged with four felony counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of fourteen. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) Included in the charges was the special allegation that Hane had befriended the child victim for the purpose of committing the alleged unlawful acts. (Id., § 1203.066, subd. (a)(3).) On March 4, 1988, Hane pleaded guilty to one of the counts and admitted the special allegation.
On April 6, 1988, after receiving a certified copy of the record of Hane’s conviction, we issued an order suspending him, effective May 6, 1988, from the practice of law pending our further order. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6102, subd. (a); In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 195 [793 P.2d 54].)
This court’s order suspending Hane from the practice of law also required him—within 30 days of May 6, 1988, the effective date of the order—to comply with rule 955 of the California Rules of Court by notifying clients and opposing counsel of his suspension and by filing with any court or other tribunal before which he had matters pending a copy of the notice he had sent to opposing counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 955(a)(1) & (4).)
In March 1989, almost a year after this court had suspended Hane’s right to practice law because of his conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude, Hane agreed to represent petitioner on a felony charge of selling cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352.) Thereafter, on May 8, 1989, Hane signed a form resigning from membership in the State Bar of California and specifying that his resignation was with disciplinary charges pending against him. On May 10, 1989, the Clerk of the State Bar Court filed Hane’s *704resignation. As of that date, Hane was on “inactive” status, which unequivocally prohibited him from practicing law in this state. (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 6125.)1 The terms of Hane’s resignation required him to give notice of his inactive status to petitioner, opposing counsel and the court. Without doing so, on May 23,1989, Hane appeared on petitioner’s behalf at a pretrial conference in petitioner’s felony case. On June 27, 1989, he represented petitioner in a one-day court trial, which resulted in petitioner’s conviction.
Petitioner later learned that Hane’s representation of him occurred while Hane was suspended from legal practice for a conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude and after Hane had submitted his resignation from State Bar membership. Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus contending he had been denied the right to counsel.
II.
In concluding that Hane’s representation of petitioner violated the right to counsel guaranteed by the California Constitution, the majority relies solely on the fact that Hane had resigned his membership in the State Bar before he appeared as counsel at petitioner’s felony trial. The majority attaches no constitutional significance to the fact that Hane was suspended from practicing law because of his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude.
Although it acknowledges that fitness to practice law requires good moral character as well as professional competence (maj. opn., ante, p. 699), the majority draws a distinction between unfitness demonstrated by a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude and “a legislative or judicial assessment of the attorney’s professional competence” (id. at p. 697). According to the majority, an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law because of bad moral character can provide the legal representation of a criminal defendant guaranteed by the state Constitution. I disagree.
A defendant in a criminal case is “entitled to be advised and represented at every critical stage of the case by counsel certified by the State to be competent and of good moral standing.” (Huckelbury v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1976) 337 So.2d 400, 402, italics added; accord Solina v. U.S. (2d Cir. 1983) 709 F.2d 160, 167; U.S. v. Novak (2d Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d 883, 887-889.) Thus, as other courts have recognized, the problem of representation by a person disqualified from the practice of law for moral turpitude is not simply one of professional competence.
*705Like other states, California requires that a person establish “good moral character” before gaining admission to the State Bar. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6060, subd. (b).) There is “no vocation in life where moral character counts for so much.” (State v. Murrell (Fla. 1954) 74 So.2d 221, 224.) A person who lacks good moral character is deemed unfit to practice law, and on that basis alone will be denied admission to the State Bar. (See In re Lamb (1989) 49 Cal.3d 239, 242 [260 Cal.Rptr. 856, 776 P.2d 765]; In re Mostman (1989) 47 Cal.3d 725, 736 [254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 765 P.2d 448].) Once granted, State Bar membership is conditioned on an attorney’s continuing good moral character. (See generally, Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 2.3.)
An attorney’s “ascertainable failure” to satisfy the licensing state’s standard for good moral character is “a serious substantive flaw” in licensure, just as significant as the inability to meet the threshold requirements pertaining to legal knowledge. (U.S. v. Novak, supra, 903 F.2d 883, 888.) Such substantive flaws in licensure cannot be likened to mere “ ‘technical defect^]’ ” such as failing to take the oath after satisfying all other requirements for admission. (Ibid., and cases there cited.)
In California, a conviction of a serious sexual offense “ ‘repugnant to accepted moral standards,’ ” as involved here, is “on its face” proof of an attorney’s moral turpitude. (In re Duggan (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416, 422 [130 Cal.Rptr. 715, 551 P.2d 19].) An attorney prohibited from practicing law as a result of moral turpitude, no matter how technically competent, lacks the essential moral qualification that California requires of its lawyers.
In this case, Hane represented petitioner in a felony trial while suspended from the practice of law following his felony conviction for sexually molesting a child whom he had befriended for the very purpose of committing lewd acts. Because Hane’s suspension for a crime involving moral turpitude was “a serious substantive flaw” in his licensure (U.S. v. Novak, supra, 903 F.2d at p. 888), his representation deprived petitioner of the right to qualified counsel that article I, section 15 of our state Constitution guarantees.
The requirement that a lawyer have good moral character not only benefits individual clients, it also protects the courts. (See, e.g., In re Scott (1991) 52 Cal.3d 968, 978 [277 Cal.Rptr. 201, 802 P.2d 985]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165, 170 [141 Cal.Rptr. 805, 570 P.2d 1223].) An attorney is an officer of the court. (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Attorneys, § 2, p. 22.) This is a venerable concept, dating at least from 1275 A.D. (Gerber, Lawyers, Courts, and Professionalism (1989) p. 120.) As officers of the *706court, lawyers have obligations to the system of justice that transcend their duties to a particular client
Here, after his felony conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude and while suspended from the practice of law, Hane appeared as counsel for petitioner in a felony trial. In violation of rule 955 of the California Rules of Court, Hane fraudulently concealed his suspension from his client, opposing counsel, and the court. There can be no confidence in legal representation by such an individual, whose lack of veracity and trustworthiness impugns the very integrity of the judicial system.
III.
The majority reverses petitioner’s conviction because the person who purported to give him the “assistance of counsel” guaranteed by article I, section 15 of our state Constitution had previously submitted his resignation from membership in the State Bar. But the majority also concludes that an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law on grounds of moral unfitness is still enough of an attorney to provide the legal assistance our Constitution guarantees. I cannot accept the latter conclusion. The right to counsel means the right to assistance by one whom the state has duly certified as both technically competent and morally fit. When this court suspends an attorney from the practice of law after receiving proof that the attorney has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, it withdraws the certification of good moral standing without which no individual can claim the status of “counsel” in our courts. In my view, petitioner’s conviction must be set aside because his only legal representative was an individual who had lost his right to practice law on grounds of moral unfitness.
Mosk, J., concurred.

That section provided: “No person shall practice law in this State unless he is an active member of the State Bar.” (Italics added.) A 1990 amendment modified the language but left the substance unchanged.