Court Opinion

ID: 9717165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:38.222174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.771096
License: Public Domain

*589CONOVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as to the majority's holding the negligence cause of action in this case must be returned for trial. The negligence of Faygo Beverage, Inc. (Fay-go), if any, is not actionable in this cause. I do, however, concur in the majority's conclusions (a) the implied warranty in tort causes of action no longer exist in Indiana, and (b) Mr. Thiele is not entitled to pursue Faygo for a defective product under our statute codifying product liability actions.
Under the facts before us, the injury to Mr. Thiele's eye was proximately caused by the broken piece of glass. The question then becomes whether the carton's negligent design which produced the "trampoline effect" complained of was a concurrent or non-actionable remote cause of Thiele's injury.
I. Negligent Design
Staton, P.J., discussing this subject recently said
In determining whether a negligent act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury the test is whether the injury is a natural and probable consequence which, in light of the circumstances, should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated. Havert v. Caldwell (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154, 158. The key is the foreseeability of the ultimate injury as a natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. Id. A rule related closely to the foreseeability requirement is that an intervening cause may cut off the liability of the original actor. (citing case)
For independent intervening conduct to prevent the extension of liability to the conduct of the original wrongdoer, the later conduct must constitute a cause interrupting the natural sequence of events, turning aside their course, preventing the natural and probable result of the original act or omission, and producing a result that could not have been reasonably anticipated. (citing case) It is a well settled principle that when defendant's negligence merely creates a condition by which the subsequent injury-producing acts of another are made possible, the existence of the first condition cannot be the proximate cause of the injury. (citing case) (emphasis in original).
Crull v. Platt (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1211, 1214-15. See, also Havert v. Caldwell (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154, 156-158. While the question of whether an intervening cause was such as to break the causal connection between defendant's act and the injury is generally for the trier of fact, in plain and indisputable cases where only a single inference or conclusion can be drawn, such question is a matter of law for the court. Crull, 471 N.E.2d at 1215.
Injuries of the general kind Thiele here suffered were not reasonably foreseeable by Faygo's packaging engineers as they were designing the carton in question, in my opinion. While foreseeability does not mean the precise hazard or exact consequences should have been foreseen, "neither does it encompass anything which might conceivably occur." Crull, 471 N.E.2d at 1215. Pinched or cut fingers from the carton's bending were reasonably foreseeable at that time, perhaps the stinging or bruising of these extremities by the covering's "trampoline action" when it was flexed, but injuries of the nature Thiele suffered were not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law during the carton's design stage in my opinion. The negligence of an unidentified independent responsible agency caused the broken piece of glass to be placed on top of the carton's plastic wrapper. Such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury here. It broke the causal connection between Fay-go's alleged negligence and Thiele's injury. Faygo's negligent design
cannot as a matter of law be held to be the proximate cause of the injuries ... due to the unforeseeability of the [unknown responsible independent agency's] subsequent act....
Havert, 452 N.E.2d at 159; Slinkard v. Babb (1954), 125 Ind.App. 76, 112 N.E.2d 876, 880, reh. den'd. 125 Ind.App. 76, 117 N.E.2d 564, trans. den'd. 233 Ind. 633, 122 N.E.2d 463.
*590Thiele's negligent design theory fails as a matter of law for those reasons, in my opinion.
For those reasons, I would affirm the trial court in all respects.