Court Opinion

ID: 9457333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:18:57.767154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:18.168324
License: Public Domain

MERRILL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the District Court. My difference with the majority relates to part V of its opinion. In other respects I concur.
In my judgment it was a denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the sentencing judge, in imposing the death penalty, to resolve crucial factual disputes on the basis of statements made to him by persons not under oath and not subject to confrontation of petitioner or to his cross-examination.
In two respects I distinguish other types of cases, reserving judgment as to the rule that should today apply in such cases.
1. Sentences Other Than Death
I readily accept the fact, emphasized by the majority, that the sentencing function ordinarily is quite different in its nature from that of the ascertainment of guilt. Further, I concede that these differences may well justify application of a different standard in the determination of what constitutes due process.
The legislatively fixed and mandatory sentence is becoming a rarity. Sentencing today (together with the modifications permitted by probation and parole proceedings) involves more than a ceremonial pronouncement of what the legislature has prescribed as fitting punishment. It involves an informed exercise of discretion, essentially administrative, in determining how, in the interests of society, the prisoner should be treated. In this respect Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (relied on by the majority), notes, “Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.” Certainly in the twenty *318years since Williams the emphasis in this direction has increased.
It is to this essentially administrative determination as to manner of treatment, where the defendant has already with due process been tried for his liberty, that the due process question of what constitutes fundamental fairness in the sentencing procedures is directed.1
In this setting the death penalty subsists as an anomaly. It does not contemplate correction or treatment. It is an outright rejection of such aims. It is instead total retribution.
Today it cannot be said that the death penalty is the norm for first degree murder and that the choice of life imprisonment is an act of clemency based on mitigating circumstances. It is common knowledge that the choice of death is not the rule but the exception and apparently is reserved for cases where the homicidal malice is found to be not only unmitigated but aggravated.
The death sentence, then, is not to be likened to the administrative determinations upon which sentencing, probation or parole decisions are ordinarily founded. On the contrary it is the most awesome of truly judicial responsibilities: an adjudication of guilt of aggravated and unmitigated first degree murder. It is at the sentencing hearing that the defendant goes on trial for his life.
Facts which, where a lesser sentence is involved, may be relevant solely to the question of treatment (e. g., prior criminal record, family or social background, history of mental illness) here can become relevant to the aggravation/mitigation issues and thus bear on the quality or quantum of guilt. If factual disputes are presented in these respects the constitutional standards of due process appropriate to the ascertainment of guilt should, then, apply in their resolution.
2. Cases Not Involving Disputed Facts
Williams v. New York, supra, on which the majority relies, was not concerned with factual disputes respecting matters of mitigation or aggravation.2 It was concerned primarily with whether due process required that the rules of evidence fashioned for trial should apply to the sentencing procedures. It dealt with problems of competence and relevance.
Here the crucial factual issue at the time of sentencing as tendered by the defendant was whether his criminal acts were the product of mental illness or defect.3 This issue was resolved against *319the defendant on the basis of out-of-court statements made to the judge.4 For the reasons stated I regard this as a denial of due process.

. That real problems remain in defining sentencing clue process is made clear by this court’s opinion in Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968).

. The court states at 337 U.S. 244, 09 S.Ct. 1081:
“The accuracy of the statements made by the judge as to appellant’s background and past practices were not challenged by appellant or his counsel, nor was the judge asked to disregard any of them or to afford appellant a chance to refute or discredit any of them by cross-examination or otherwise.”

. Insanity had been the crucial issue from the start. At the outset the defendant had pdeaded not guilty, giving notice pursuant to Arizona procedure of his intention to show evidence of insanity. He had a history of mental illness, and had at one point been committed to the California State Jlental Hospital at Stockton, California. The court ordered a sanity hearing to determine his competence to stand trial. At that hearing, as the majority opinion notes, Dr. Tucliler was called by the defendant and testified that in his opinion the defendant was sane under Arizona law (the M’Naghten Rule) and competent to stand trial; still “he would probably be a hospital case under the Durham rule.” I take this to be an expression of the opinion that the defendant’s criminal acts were the product of his mental defect. Immediately following this testimony, “in light of the doctors testimony,” the defendant changed his idea to one of guilty.

. In imposing sentence the judge stated:
“I cannot understand, hlr. Alford, what possesses a man, that he can kill three defenseless children ; that he can methodically, after shooting them, walk around to each of the bodies and place another bullet through the heart of each, while they are lying dead or dying on the ground * * * I did not learn of this, this factor of this case, until after you entered your guilty plea and I discussed the matter with the investigating officers, in attempting to find out what all the facts in this case were, in order that I could arrive at what I felt to be a just decision. As I stated, I did not until then learn of the fact that beneath each of the bodies they found a 45 caliber bullet on the ground.”
The judge stated that he was so disturbed by the facts he had ascertained from the investigating officers that he had called Dr. Tuchler in Phoenix and informed him of the new evidence and that the doctor had changed his opinion respecting applicability of the Durham rule. In the light of the new facts the doctor now stated that “it was not any mental deficiency that caused the firing of the 45” but that “this was the act of a cold, calculating mind anxious to destroy anyone who might later testify against him.”