Court Opinion

ID: 9864906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:16:23.471809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:33.905641
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the decision.
In 1929 the Legislature amended section 5347, C. L. of 1921, so as to read: “If any decedent leaves a widow residing in this state, in all cases she shall be allowed to have and retain as her sole and separate property, the sum of two thousand dollars in cash, or at her election, the equivalent thereof in value of real and/or personal property, to be set aside and awarded in the manner now provided by law. * * *” S. L. 1929, p. 640, c. 184. The quoted words down to and including those italicized were carried forward from section 5347, supra. Under C. L. section 5350, the court appoints an appraiser, who estimates the value of the property allowed to the widow. That constitutes the setting aside and awarding of the widow’s allowance. Of course, when the widow elects to take all of her allowance in cash, no appraisal is necessary.
The purpose of the widow’s allowance is promptly to furnish support to the widow and children when the need is most urgent; that is to say, before the distribution of the property, which takes place at the close of the administration of the estate, and may not occur until the expiration of several months, or even years. The language of the Act of 1929, supra, is that the widow may have and retain the property as “her sole and separate property.” It is obvious that if the property is the property of the estate, it cannot be the sole and separate property of the widow; and it is no less obvious that if it is her sole and separate property, it cannot be the property of the estate. It is my belief that there is no lawful warrant for applying the widow’s sole and separate prop*516erty to the payment of any of the claims or demands against the estate, or to the payment of the expenses of administering’ the estate. The sole and separate property of no other person can be so applied; how, then, can the widow’s?
Nor, in my opinion, does the fact that the widow, as administratrix, incurred the expense for rent while operating the business under order of court, subject her sole and separate property to the payment of the rent, or any part thereof. The status of a widow and that of an administratrix are separate and distinct. An administratrix or administrator of an estate may be, and is sometimes, a person other than the widow. Mrs. Reininger’s action as administratrix subjdcted the property of the estate, not the widow’s sole and separate property, to the payment of the rent.
The provision in section 1 of the Act of 1911, being-section 5331, C. L., attempting to classify the allqwance to widows and orphans as fourth class demands against the estate, and the other statutory provisions cited in the majority opinion, that seem to recognize such classification, are in irreconcilable conflict with the Act of 1929, supra. All cannot stand. The former provisions, which are at variance with and defeat the humane purpose of the allowance to widows and orphans, should give way to the latter provision, which is in harmony with and accomplishes that purpose.
The widow, notwithstanding her right to a more favorable order, acquiesced in the order that she be paid her allowance as a demand of the second class. She makes no complaint of that order. The judgment, it seems to me, should be affirmed.
Me. Justice Campbell and Me. Justice Bueke concur herein.