Court Opinion

ID: 9757277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:28:37.055015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:37.032396
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority, and I join in Part I of the opinion. I also agree with the majority’s adoption in Part II of the “Public Records” exception to the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, I would not “strictly construe” or limit the exception to “factual findings.” To deny the trial court any discretion in admitting evaluations or opinions contained in public records is both contrary to the weight of the case law and unsound.
One formulation of the public records exception is set forth in Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), which provides that public documents containing “factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law” are not to be excluded by the hearsay rule. (Emphasis added.) As we are adopting the public records exception as a common law development, and since we are not construing a rule or statute, we are not of course limited by the wording of the federal rule. Nonetheless, even the cases under the federal rule have not strictly construed or applied the phrase “factual findings.”
The majority cites several federal cases which have addressed the construction to be given the “factual findings” language of Rule 803(8)(C). The majority quotes Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.1984), regarding the rule’s underlying rationale. The court in Ellis further noted (745 F.2d at 301):
*614[303 Md. 581 (1985).]
“Although there has been some disagreement over whether ‘evaluative’ public records or reports were intended by Congress to be considered ‘factual findings’ for the purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), it is well established that the phrase should be interpreted broadly.” (Emphasis added.)
One of the cases relied upon in Ellis was Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.1983), in which it was stated (724 F.2d at 618):
“[Cjourts construing the term ‘factual findings’ in Rule 803(8)(C) have given it broad scope. See, e.g., United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 498 F.Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C.1980) (citing cases). They have often admitted government reports setting forth agency opinions and conclusions on the ground that such reports, because they are public records based on investigations conducted pursuant to lawful authority, are presumptively reliable. That is, ‘there is no reason not to admit the findings simply because they tend towards the conclusory rather than the factual end, unless, as Rule 803(8)(C) further provides, the ‘sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.’ Id. See also Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., [588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2054, 60 L.Ed.2d 661 (1979)]; United States v. School District of Ferndale, Michigan, 577 F.2d 1339, 1354 (6th Cir.1978). We agree with the district court that once a report is conclusively shown to represent findings of a public agency made pursuant to an investigation authorized by law, the central inquiry becomes whether the report is trustworthy.”
The overwhelming majority of cases are in accord with this view. Litton Systems v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 984, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984); Melville v. American Home Assur. Co., 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir.1978); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 518 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D.Ill.1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electrical *615Industrial Co., Ltd., 505 F.Supp. 1125 (E.D.Pa.1980); see 4 Weinstein’s Evidence, ¶ 803(8)[03].
As I understand the majority, the Court is drawing a firm line between “fact” and “opinion,” and is requiring the trial judge to distinguish, in every instance in which a public record is offered for admission, between fact and opinion. The majority is not allowing the trial judge any latitude or discretion in admitting evaluations or conclusions if, as a matter of law, they are deemed to fall within the category of “opinions.” This is an unworkable rule.
The principal problem with this approach, as the majority seems to acknowledge, is that there is often no clear line between “fact” and “opinion.” This Court, regarding the gray area between the two, stated in Glaros v. State, 223 Md. 272, 277, 164 A.2d 461 (1960): “The assumption that there is a difference in kind between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ has been said to be an illusion. ‘There is no conceivable statement however specific, detailed, and “factual,” that is not in some measure the product of inference and reflection as well as observation and memory.’ ”
By not allowing the trial judge any discretion, the Court forces him to go painstakingly through any public record or report and attempt to exclude all material that may not be in the strictest sense “factual.” This could present a very difficult and time consuming task, and one in which there are no satisfactory guidelines. Moreover, the majority’s position will present a problem not only to the trial courts, but to the appellate courts as well. In every case where the public records exception is involved, an appeal may be predicated on the ground that certain “opinions” were erroneously admitted or that relevant “facts” were excluded.
In my view, the trial judges should be given some degree of discretion in admitting the contents of public records. If a public agency or official is deemed to supply sufficiently accurate and trustworthy reports for the factual findings to be admitted into evidence, it should logically follow that the agency’s or official’s conclusions would also be sufficiently *616reliable. To decide otherwise, by denying the trial court any discretion when admitting public records, is unreasonable.
Accordingly, I would follow the majority of cases in allowing the trial court a degree of discretion with regard to the admissibility of the contents of public records. Therefore, I cannot join all of Part II of the Court’s opinion.