Court Opinion

ID: 9428968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:19.974322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:16.540864
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.01 et seq. (1972 and Supp. 1981), can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political party that can show a “reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Id., at 74. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.
M
The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a small political party with approximately 60 members in the State of Ohio. The Party states in its constitution that its aim is “the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers’ government to achieve socialism.” As the District Court found, the SWP does not advocate the use of violence. It seeks instead to achieve social change through the political process, and its members regularly run for public office. The SWP’s candidates have had little success at the polls. In 1980, for example, the Ohio SWP’s candidate for the United States Senate received fewer than 77,000 votes, less than 1.9% of the total *89vote. Campaign contributions and expenditures in Ohio have averaged about $15,000 annually since 1974.
In 1974 appellees instituted a class action1 in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law. The Ohio statute requires every candidate for political office to file a statement identifying each contributor and each recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds. §3517.10.2 The “object or pur*90pose”3 of each disbursement must also be disclosed. The lists of names and addresses of contributors and recipients are open to public inspection for at least six years. Violations of the disclosure requirements are punishable by fines of up to $1,000 for each day of violation. §3517.99.
On November 6, 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered a temporary restraining order barring the enforcement of the disclosure requirements against the class pending a determination of the merits.4 The case was then transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which entered an identical temporary restraining order in February 1975.5 Accordingly, since 1974 *91appellees have not disclosed the names of contributors and recipients but have otherwise complied with the statute. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2281. Following extensive discovery, the trial was held in February 1981. After reviewing the “substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters,” the three-judge court concluded that under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Ohio disclosure requirements are unconstitutional as applied to appellees.6 We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1122 (1981).
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The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 462. The right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs will yield *92only to a “‘subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,’” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 265 (1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a “substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest.” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 546.
In Buckley v. Valeo this Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on political parties by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq. 424 U. S., at 60-74. The Court found three government interests sufficient in general to justify requiring disclosure of information concerning campaign contributions and expenditures:7 enhancement of voters’ knowledge about a candidate’s possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, and the enforcement of contribution limitations.8 The Court stressed, however, that in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The government’s interests in compelling disclosures are “diminished” in the case of minor parties. Id., at 70. Minor party candidates “usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints” well known to the public, and the improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially greater:
*93“We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.” Id., at 71 (footnotes omitted).
We concluded that in some circumstances the diminished government interests furthered by compelling disclosures by minor parties does not justify the greater threat to First Amendment values.
Buckley v. Valeo set forth the following test for determining when the First Amendment requires exempting minor parties from compelled disclosures:
“The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.” Id., at 74.
The Court acknowledged that “unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden” on minor parties. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that “[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury.” Ibid.
“The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be *94able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.” Ibid.
Appellants concede that the Buckley test for exempting minor parties governs the disclosure of the names of contributors, but they contend that the test has no application to the compelled disclosure of names of recipients of campaign disbursements.9 Appellants assert that the State has a substantial interest in preventing the misuse of campaign funds.10 They also argue that the disclosure of the names of *95recipients of campaign funds will have no significant impact on First Amendment rights, because, unlike a contribution, the mere receipt of money for commercial services does not affirmatively express political support.
We reject appellants’ unduly narrow view of the minor-party exemption recognized in Buckley. Appellants’ attempt to limit the exemption to laws requiring disclosure of contributors is inconsistent with the rationale for the exemption stated in Buckley. The Court concluded that the government interests supporting disclosure are weaker in the case of minor parties, while the threat to First Amendment values is greater. Both of these considerations apply not only to the disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.
Although appellants contend that requiring disclosure of recipients of disbursements is necessary to prevent corruption, this Court recognized in Buckley that this concededly legitimate government interest has less force in the context of minor parties. The federal law considered in Buckley, like the Ohio law at issue here, required campaign committees to identify both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. 2 U. S. C. §§ 432(c) and (d), and 434(a) and (b). We stated that “by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity,” disclosure requirements “ten[d] to ‘prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.’” Id., at 67 (emphasis added), quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 548 (1934). We concluded, however, that because minor party candidates are unlikely to win elections, the government’s general interest in “deterring the ‘buying’ of elections” is “reduced” in the case of minor parties. 424 U. S., at 70.11
*96Moreover, appellants seriously understate the threat to First Amendment rights that would result from requiring minor parties to disclose the recipients of campaign disburse*97ments. Expenditures by a political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages paid to party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the very core of the First Amendment.12 Disbursements may also go to persons who choose to express their support for an unpopular cause by providing services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion.13 Should their involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the party is solely financial.14 Even individuals *98who receive disbursements for “merely” commercial transactions may be deterred by the public enmity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information.15 Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, such an individual may well be deterred from providing services by even a small risk of harassment.16 Compelled disclosure of the names of such recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party’s ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce “the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 71 (footnotes omitted). See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 250-251 (plurality opinion) (“Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents”).
We hold, therefore, that the test announced in Buckley for safeguarding the First Amendment interests of minor parties and their members and supporters applies not only to the compelled disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the compelled disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.
Ill
The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found “substantial evi*99dence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters.” Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that “private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to maintain employment.”
The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the SWP. FBI surveillance of the SWP was “massive” and continued until at least 1976. The FBI also conducted a counterintelligence program against the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP’s youth organization. One of the aims of the “SWP Disruption Program” was the dissemination of information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function. This program included “disclosing to the press the criminal records of SWP candidates, and sending anonymous letters to SWP members, supporters, spouses, and employers.”17 Until at least 1976, the FBI employed various covert techniques to *100obtain information about the SWP, including information concerning the sources of its funds and the nature of its expenditures. The District Court specifically found that the FBI had conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP and had interfered with its activities within the State.18 Government surveillance was not limited to the FBI. The United States Civil Service Commission also gathered information on the SWP, the YSA, and their supporters, and the FBI routinely distributed its reports to Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, the United States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The District Court properly concluded that the evidence of private and Government hostility toward the SWP and its members establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the names of contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment, and reprisals.19 There were numerous instances of recent harassment of the SWP both in Ohio and *101in other States.20 There was also considerable evidence of past Government harassment. Appellants challenge the relevance of this evidence of Government harassment in light of recent efforts to curb official misconduct. Notwithstanding these efforts, the evidence suggests that hostility toward the SWP is ingrained and likely to continue. All this evidence was properly relied on by the District Court. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 74.
IV
The First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling disclosures by a minor party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals. Such disclosures would infringe the *102First Amendment rights of the party and its members and supporters. In light of the substantial evidence of past and present hostility from private persons and Government officials against the SWP, Ohio’s campaign disclosure requirements cannot be constitutionally applied to the Ohio SWP.
The judgment of the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

 The plaintiff class as eventually certified includes all SWP candidates for political office in Ohio, their campaign committees and treasurers, and people who contribute to or receive disbursements from SWP campaign committees. The defendants are the Ohio Secretary of State and other state and local officials who administer the disclosure law.

 Section 3517.10 provides in relevant part:
“(A) Every campaign committee, political committee, and political party which made or received a contribution or made an expenditure in connection with the nomination or election of any candidate at any election held in this state shall file, on a form prescribed under this section, a full, true, and itemized statement, made under penalty of election falsification, setting forth in detail the contributions and expenditures ....
“(B) Each statement required by division (A) of this section shall contain the following information:
“(4) A statement of contributions made or received, which shall include:
“(a) The month, day, and year of the contribution;
“(b) The full name and address of each person, including any chairman or treasurer thereof if other than an individual, from whom contributions are received. The requirement of filing the full address does not apply to any statement filed by a state or local committee of a political party, to a finance committee of such committee, or to a committee recognized by a state or local committee as its fund-raising auxiliary.
“(c) A description of the contribution received, if other than money;
“(d) The value in dollars and cents of the contribution;
“(e) All contributions and expenditures shall be itemized separately regardless of the amount except a receipt of a contribution from a person in the sum of twenty-five dollars or less at one social or fund-raising activity. An account of the total contributions from each such social or fund-raising activity shall be listed separately, together with the expenses incurred and *90paid in connection with such activity. No continuing association which makes a contribution from funds which are derived solely from regular dues paid by members of the association shall be required to list the name or address of any members who paid such dues.
“(5) A statement of expenditures which shall include:
“(a) The month, day, and year of expenditure;
“(b) The full name and address of each person to whom the expenditure was made, including any chairman or treasurer thereof if a committee, association, or group of persons;
“(c) The object or purpose for which the expenditure was made;
“(d) The amount of each expenditure.
“(C) . . .
“. . . All such statements shall be open to public inspection in the office where they are filed, and shall be carefully preserved for a period of at least six years.”
If the candidate is running for a statewide office, the statement shall be filed with the Ohio Secretary of State; otherwise, the statement shall be filed with the appropriate county board of elections. § 3517.11(A).

 § 3517.10(B)(5)(c).

 The order restrained various state officials from “applying to or enforcing against plaintiffs ... the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law and the penalty provision of that law, the effect of which will be to postpone the beginning of any possible period of violation of that law by plaintiffs, . . . until such time as the case is decided by the three judge panel, which is hereby convened.” (Citations omitted.)

 Apparently none of the parties throughout the 6-year period questioned whether the extended duration of the temporary restraining order *91conformed to the requirements of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 Because it invalidated the Ohio statute as applied to the Ohio SWP, the District Court did not decide appellees’ claim that the statute was facially invalid. The Ohio statute requires disclosure of contributions and expenditures no matter how small the amount. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.10(B)(4)(e) (Supp. 1981). Appellees contended that the absence of a monetary threshold rendered the statute facially invalid since the compelled disclosure of nominal contributions and expenditures lacks a substantial nexus with any claimed government interest. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 82-84.
The District Court’s opinion is unreported.

 Title 2 U. S. C. §§432, 434, and 438 (1976 ed., Supp. V) require each political committee to keep detailed records of both contributions and expenditures, including the names of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements, and to file reports with the Federal Election Commission which are made available to the public.

 The government interest in enforcing limitations is completely inapplicable in this case, since the Ohio law imposes no limitations on the amount of campaign contributions.

 We believe that the question whether the Buckley test applies to the compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us. Throughout this litigation Ohio has maintained that it can constitutionally require the SWP to disclose the names of both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign expenditures. In invalidating both aspects of the Ohio statute as applied to the SWP, the District Court necessarily held (1) that the Buckley standard, which permits flexible proof of the reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals, applies to both contributions and expenditures, and (2) that the evidence was sufficient to show a reasonable probability that disclosure would subject both contributors and recipients to public hostility and harassment. In their jurisdictional statement, appellants appealed from the entire judgment entered below and presented the following question for review:
“Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the provisions of Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for public office file a report disclosing the full names and addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States when applied to the committees of candidates of a minority party which can establish only isolated instances of harassment directed toward the organization or its members within Ohio during recent years.” Juris. Statement i.
We think that the correctness of both holdings of the District Court is “fairly included” in the question presented in the jurisdictional statement. This Court’s Rule 15.1(a). See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 559, n. 6 (1978) (“[0]ur power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented”).

 This is one of three government interests identified in Buckley. Appellants do not contend that the other two interests, enhancing voters’ abil*95ity to evaluate candidates and enforcing contribution limitations, support the disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign disbursements.

 The partial dissent suggests that the government interest in the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is not significantly diminished in the case of minor political parties, since parties with little likelihood of electoral success might nevertheless finance improper campaign activities merely to *96gain recognition. Post, at 109-110. The partial dissent relies on Justice White’s separate opinion in Buckley, in which he pointed out that “unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election.” 424 U. S., at 265 (emphasis in original).
An examination of the context in which Justice White made this observation indicates precisely why the state interest here is insubstantial. Justice White was addressing the constitutionality of ceilings on campaign expenditures applicable to all candidates. His point was that such ceilings “could play a substantial role in preventing unethical practices.” Ibid. In the case of minor parties, however, their limited financial resources serve as a built-in expenditure ceiling which minimizes the likelihood that they will expend substantial amounts of money to finance improper campaign activities. See id., at 71. For example, far from having “unlimited money,” the Ohio SWP has had an average of roughly $15,000 available each year to spend on its election efforts. Most of the limited resources of minor parties will typically be needed to pay for the ordinary fixed costs of conducting campaigns, such as filing fees, travel expenses, and the expenses incurred in publishing and distributing campaign literature and maintaining offices. Thus Justice White’s observation that “financing illegal activities is low on the campaign organization’s priority list,” id., at 265, is particularly apposite in the case of minor parties. We cannot agree, therefore, that minor parties are as likely as major parties to make significant expenditures in funding dirty tricks or other improper campaign activities. See post, at 110. Moreover, the expenditure by minor parties of even a substantial portion of their limited funds on illegal activities would be unlikely to have a substantial impact.
Furthermore, the mere possibility that minor parties will resort to corrupt or unfair tactics cannot justify the substantial infringement on First Amendment interests that would result from compelling the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. In Buckley, we acknowledged the possibility that supporters of a major party candidate might channel money into minor parties to divert votes from other major party contenders, 424 U. S., at 70, and that, as noted by the partial dissent, post, at 110, and n. 5, occasionally minor parties may affect the outcomes of elections. We thus recognized that the distorting influence of large contributors on elections may not be entirely absent in the context of minor parties. Nevertheless, because we concluded that the government interest in disclosing contributors is substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we held that minor parties *97are entitled to an exemption from requirements that contributors be disclosed where they can show a reasonable probability of harassment. 424 U. S., at 70. Because we similarly conclude that the government interest in requiring the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is substantially reduced in the ease of minor parties, we hold that the minor-party exemption recognized in Buckley applies to compelled disclosure of expenditures as well.

 For example, the expenditure statements filed by the SWP contain a substantial percentage of entries designated as per diem, travel expenses, room rental, and so on. The Ohio statute makes it particularly easy to identify these individuals since it requires disclosure of the purpose of the disbursements as well as the identity of the recipients. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(B)(5)(c) (Supp. 1981).

 “ ‘[Financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 66, quoting California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). The District Court found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at least until 1976 routinely investigated the financial transactions of the SWP and kept track of the payees of SWP checks.

 The fact that some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may not be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those who are so exposed. We cannot agree with the partial dissent’s assertion that disclosures of disbursements paid to campaign workers and supporters will not increase the probability that they will be subjected to harassment and hostility. Post, at 111-112. Apart from the fact that individuals may work for a candidate in a variety of ways without publicizing their involvement, the application of a disclosure requirement results in a dramatic increase in public exposure. Under Ohio law a person’s affiliation with the party will be recorded in a document that must be kept open to inspection *98by any one who wishes to examine it for a period of at least six years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.10(C) (Supp. 1981). The preservation of unorthodox political affiliations in public records substantially increases the potential for harassment above and beyond the risk that an individual faces simply as a result of having worked for an unpopular party at one time.

 See, e. g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F. Supp. 895, 904 (SDNY 1978) (FBI interference with SWP travel arrangements and speaker hall rental), vacated on other grounds, 596 F. 2d 58 (CA2), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 903 (1979).

 Moreover, it would be hard to think of many instances in which the state interest in preventing vote-buying and improper campaign activities *99would be furthered by the disclosure of payments for routine commercial services.

 The District Court was quoting from Part I of the Final Report of Special Master Judge Breitel in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 73 Civ. 3160 (TPG) (SDNY, Feb. 4, 1980), detailing the United States Government’s admissions concerning the existence and nature of the Government surveillance of the SWP.

 The District Court also found the following:
“The Government possesses about 8,000,000 documents relating to the SWP, YSA . . . and their members. . . . Since 1960 the FBI has had about 300 informants who were members of the SWP and/or YSA and 1,000 nonmember informants. Both the Cleveland and Cincinnati FBI field offices had one or more SWP or YSA member informants. Approximately 21 of the SWP member informants held local branch offices. Three informants even ran for elective office as SWP candidates. The 18 informants whose files were disclosed to Judge Breitel received total payments of $358,648.38 for their services and expenses.” (Footnotes omitted.)

 After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, the District Court concluded: “[T]he totality of the circumstances establishes that, in Ohio, public disclosure that a person is a member of or has made a contribution to the SWP would create a reasonable probability that he or she would be subjected to threats, harassment or reprisals.” The District Court then enjoined the compelled disclosures of either contributors’ or recipients’ names. Although the District Court did not expressly refer in the quoted passage to disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign disbursements, it is evident from the opinion that the District Court was addressing both contributors and recipients.

 Some of the recent episodes of threats, harassment, and reprisals against the SWP and its members occurred outside of Ohio. Anti-SWP occurrences in places such as Chicago (SWP office vandalized) and Pittsburgh (shot fired at SWP building) are certainly relevant to the determination of the public’s attitude toward the SWP in Ohio. In Buckley we stated that “[n]ew parties that have no history upon which to draw may . . . offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.” 424 U. S., at 74. Surely the Ohio SWP may offer evidence of the experiences of other chapters espousing the same political philosophy. See 1980 Illinois Socialist Workers Campaign v. State of Illinois Board of Elections, 531F. Supp. 915, 921 (ND Ill. 1981).
Appellants point to the lack of direct evidence linking the Ohio statute’s disclosure requirements to the harassment of campaign contributors or recipients of disbursements. In Buckley, however, we rejected such “unduly strict requirements of proof” in favor of “flexibility in the proof of injury.” 424 U. S., at 74. We thus rejected requiring a minor party to “come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear” or prove that “chill and harassment [are] directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought.” Ibid. We think that these considerations are equally applicable to the proof required to establish a reasonable probability that recipients will be subjected to threats and harassment if their names are disclosed. While the partial dissent appears to agree, post, at 112-113, n. 7, its “separately focused inquiry,” post, at 112, and n. 7, in reality requires evidence of chill and harassment directly attributable to the expenditure-disclosure requirement.