Court Opinion

ID: 9493833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:20:43.652679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:03.512873
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Boochever’s majority opinion. I write separately only to respond to two points made by the dissent.
In making its argument that we lack appellate jurisdiction in this case, the dissent criticizes the majority for relying “primarily on cases dealing with substantial assistance departures.... ” The dissent mistakenly asserts that these cases are not relevant to our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. “Section 5K1.1 is different from other departures because a court generally may not order a downward departure under § 5K1.1 unless the prosecutor first moves for it. Most other downward departures, including the fast track departure at issue here, may be granted on motion of the defense and at the district court’s discretion, regardless of the prosecutor’s position.” Dissent at 2765 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0) (emphasis added).
While it is true that there is no statutory requirement that “the prosecutor first move[ ] for it,” it does not follow that a fast track departure may be granted at the district court’s discretion, “regardless of the prosecutor’s position.” The reason that the prosecutor’s position cannot, as a practical matter, be disregarded is because the fast track departure itself is extra-statutory, i.e., it likely is not authorized by § 5K2.0, or any other provision of the Guidelines. Thus, if such a departure were granted in a case in which the prosecution was opposed to it, the prosecution could conceivably appeal the departure,1 and would have strong ground to argue for a reversal.
The fast track “policy” of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California provides for a two-level downward departure from the offense level otherwise calculated in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines, if the defendant agrees to certain conditions, ie., waiver of indictment, plea of guilty, waiver of pretrial motions, and waiver of right to appeal.2 It is highly doubtful, to say the least, that such a departure is authorized by the Guidelines.3 A fast track departure *1170is nowhere specifically authorized by the Guidelines.4 It is also doubtful that the fast track departure can be justified under § 5K2.0, which authorizes only case-by-case departures in unusual cases, not wholesale departures on the basis of a district-wide “policy” of the prosecutor. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (Policy Statement) (“The decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a case-specific basis.”). Further, to justify a departure under § 5K2.0, “certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline.” Id. (Commentary) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)). Cf. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 972-75 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (discussing why existence of a fast track departure policy in another district was not a proper ground for departure in the sentencing district which had no such policy). Yet, there is no requirement in the fast track departure policy of a finding that the case falls outside of the heartland of illegal reentry cases; indeed, the policy seems to target precisely the run-of-the-mill, heartland case.
For these reasons, as a practical matter, fast track departure cases are more like substantial assistance cases than other types of departures in that it would be highly unlikely that a court would feel free to exercise its doubtful discretion to grant such a departure in the absence of the government’s agreement to do so. On the other hand, they are routinely granted when recommended by the government.5 Thus, I submit that the dissent is mistaken in its assumption that “the district court in departure cases relevant to the instant case can be presumed to know that it has discretion to depart because a motion by the prosecutor is not statutorily required.” Dissent at 2766. While the dissent’s presumption is rightly applied in cases clearly falling within § 5K2.0, it has no application with respect to the extra-statutory, fast track departure. I thus conclude that re-viewability of the district court’s failure or refusal to grant a fast track departure should be judged by the standards which we employ to determine whether a court’s failure or refusal to grant a substantial assistance departure is reviewable. Under those cases, as the majority opinion correctly concludes, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision not to depart under the fast track policy in this case.
Finally, we are no less mindful of the extremely heavy workload in the Southern District of California than is the dissent. We disagree, however, with its alarmist prediction that this decision “jeopardizes the fast track program.” Dissent at 2773. As the dissent itself points out, this is a “simple case,” as are most § 1326 cases. Id. In such cases, there will usually be no more than one or two government witnesses and, in all likelihood, no impeachment material in the prosecution’s possession. Thus, in most cases, compliance with the government’s Brady obligation respecting impeachment material in its possession should not be onerous.
Increased prosecutorial efficiency is a commendable goal, but it surely should not be advanced at the cost of requiring the *1171accused to give up an unwaivable constitutional right. The appropriate solution to the Southern District of California’s caseload crisis6 is for Congress to authorize more judgeships, not to shortcut the Constitution.
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Court today crafts a rule that is both unnecessary to the disposition of this case and detrimental to the ability of an overburdened and understaffed district to dispose fairly and expeditiously of criminal cases under the “fast track” program. I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND.
Shortly after her arrest and initial appearance, the government offered Angela Ruiz, a “mule” caught red-handed carrying drugs across the border, a plea bargain. The agreement, if accepted, would have required her to file no motions other than certain sentencing memoranda, to plead guilty within 30 days of her initial appearance, and to wáive her rights to an indictment and to non-exculpatory impeachment material.1 In exchange, the government would argue at her sentencing hearing for a two-level fast track downward departure, which the sentencing court would have plenary discretion to grant or deny. Had she taken it, the district court would have achieved a quick disposition in a simple case. The parties would have been spared the time and expense of pre-trial proceedings and trial preparation. And the defendant would have received the benefit of a reduced sentence. But Ruiz chose to decline the government’s offer to participate in the fast track program.
The prosecutor was forced to continue with the costly, time-consuming process of prosecuting her case. The grand jury proceeded to indict her. She was arraigned and a date for the motions hearing was set. Prior to the motions hearing, Ruiz’s appearance bond was revoked and she was remanded to custody because she had tested positive for use of cocaine and POP. Two months after her initial appearance, without reference to the fast track agreement previously offered by the government, Ruiz entered an unconditional plea of guilty.
Despite Ruiz’s rejection of the fast track plea offer, at the sentencing hearing her counsel argued that she was entitled to a two-level fast track downward departure. The government opposed the motion. The trial court considered her argument and rejected it. She was sentenced within the guidelines range for the crime to which she had unconditionally pled guilty.
Ruiz now asks us to reverse the district court and to give her the benefit of the fast track agreement that she rejected despite the fact that she deprived the government of its benefit by forcing it to indict her and continue prosecuting her. She asserts that she is entitled to this benefit because requiring her to waive her right to impeachment information places an unconstitutional condition on her acceptance of the agreement.
Ruiz’s counsel concocted this argument post hoc in an attempt to obtain for his client a second bite at the sentencing apple. Prior to sentencing, Ruiz did not object to the plea offer’s requirement that she waive her right to impeachment material. The record is devoid of any evidence that she requested from the government *1172an agreement that did not contain such a waiver.
The majority, announcing today for the first time that the right to impeachment information is one of those rare constitutional rights that cannot be waived, has regrettably decided to give Ruiz another bite. I cannot join in this unprecedented decision.
II. JURISDICTION.
We lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this case for two reasons. First, we do not have jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to deny a request for a downward departure. Second, Ruiz unconditionally pled guilty to the charge of marijuana importation. We have no jurisdiction to review a defendant’s claim that her constitutional rights werfe violated if the alleged violation occurred prior to the entry of an unconditional guilty plea. We therefore cannot decide whether Ruiz can waive her rights to impeachment information.
A. Jurisdiction to Review Ruiz’s Sentence.
The majority characterizes Ruiz’s claim as a challenge to the sentence based on the prosecutor’s alleged unconstitutional motive in refusing to recommend th'e downward departure. With few exceptions, we lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision not to depart. See United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir.1990).
1. The District Court’s Discretion to Depart.
The majority relies primarily on cases dealing with substantial assistance departures in deciding that this case falls within an exception to the jurisdictional bar.2 See Op. at 2774. See also U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. These cases are not relevant to the type of departure requested by Ruiz. Section 5K1.1 is different from other departures because a court generally may not order a downward departure under § 5K1.1 unless the prosecutor first moves for it. Most other downward departures, including the fast track departure at issue here, may be granted on motion of the defense and at the district court’s discretion, regardless of the prosecutor’s position. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
The requirement under § 5K1.1 that the prosecutor move prior to the district court having authority to depart is the underlying basis for the litigation that gives rise to the cases cited by the majority. Those cases deal with whether, if the prosecutor refuses for some reason to move for the departure, the district court has the authority to grant the departure notwithstanding the lack of a motion, as is required. See, e.g., United States v. Khoury, 62 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.1995). In Khoury we held that if the defendant makes a “substantial threshold showing” that the prosecutor acted with an unconstitutional motive in refusing to move for a § 5K1.1 departure, the district court must conduct a hearing to determine whether such a motive existed and whether the departure should be granted despite the lack of a motion by the prosecutor. Id. at 1141. If the district court, without conducting a “substantial threshold showing” inquiry, concludes that it does not have discretion to depart, its decision is reviewable on appeal. Id.
If, however, the district court concludes that the defendant did not make a substantial threshold showing of unconstitutional motive, then the district court has no discretion to depart. See United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir.1995). In such a situation, the only determination that is reviewable on appeal is whether the defendant made a substantial threshold showing of unconstitutional motive. Id. Finally, if the district court decides that it *1173has discretion to depart, and exercises that discretion by denying the departure, its decision is not reviewable on appeal. See id.
The presumption in § 5K1.1 cases is that the district court did not know that it had discretion to depart unless it clearly indicated that it did know. In contrast, the district court in departure cases relevant to the instant case can be presumed to know that it has discretion to depart because a motion by the prosecutor is not statutorily required. Although in cases not involving § 5K1.1 a district court may consider a prosecutor’s arguments in favor of or against the departure when a prosecutor makes such an argument, the court has the discretion to depart and can do so sua sponte. We recently acknowledged: “To hold that government consent [to a departure] is a mandatory condition in cases other than those in which government consent is explicitly required by the Guidelines (as it is, for example, in departures for substantial assistance), ... runs afoul ... of the Guidelines themselves, by impermissibly shifting the locus of discretionary decisionmaking from the district judge to the prosecution.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 198 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).
Because other sentencing departures do not require the prosecutor to move, it makes sense to treat the district court’s decision differently in cases that do not involve departures under § 5K1.1. We may presume in these cases, including in the instant case, that the district court knows what the law is and applies the law correctly even if it does not explicitly acknowledge that it has discretion and is exercising that discretion. See United States v. Eaton, 31 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir.1994) (“We have held that a court’s failure to depart without any comment on its authority to do so does not automatically convert a discretionary departure into a sentence imposed in violation of law.”); United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that a sentence imposed was not in violation of the law under § 3742(a) when the district court said nothing about its discretion to depart and simply imposed the sentence without comment). Cf. United States v. Cervantes-Valenzuela, 931 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir.1991) (“We assume that the district court knows and applies the law correctly.... ”). Thus, we only have jurisdiction to review' decisions not to depart in § 5K2.0 departure cases if the district court explicitly states or clearly indicates that it believes it does not have discretion to depart.
In this case, a fair reading of the transcript does not indicate in any way that the district court believed that it was not authorized to make a departure in the absence of a government motion. Although the district court did question Ruiz about her rejection of the plea agreement, it never stated nor even implied that it could not depart on its own. It recognized its discretion not to depart even if the prosecutor had moved for the departure. It concluded:
The Court has read and considered the presentence report, the sentencing documents filed on behalf of the Defendant, and the Court finds that the base level of the offense is 18.... [T]he Court feels that this is not a proper case for any departures except for provided for by the regular sentencing procedures.
This statement is sufficient to establish that the district court exercised discretion in refusing to grant Ruiz the downward departure she sought.
2. The “Substantial Threshold Showing” Requirement.
Even following the majority’s new rule that the § 5K1.1 standard applies to fast track downward departures, Ruiz failed to make a “substantial threshold showing” that the prosecutor acted with an unconstitutional motive. To make a substantial threshold showing of unconstitutional motive, a defendant must show that the prosecutor was vindictively punishing her for exercising a constitutional right by refusing to move for the departure.
*1174In Khoury, for example, the prosecutor initially moved for a substantial assistance departure at sentencing, but after the defendant withdrew his guilty plea, went to trial, and was found guilty, the prosecutor refused to make a new motion for substantial assistance. Khoury, 62 F.3d at 1139-40. We held that this constituted a substantial threshold showing of unconstitutional motive because nothing had changed between the first sentencing hearing and the second, other than the trial, that would reasonably lead the prosecutor to no longer believe that the defendant had offered substantial assistance. Id. at 1142. From this, the district court in Khoury could infer that the prosecutor was punishing the defendant for exercising his right to trial, thus justifying a hearing to make a determination as to whether the prosecutor acted improperly. Compare id. with Murphy, 65 F.3d at 763 (holding that the defendant did not meet the substantial threshold showing merely by offering evidence that the prosecutor threatened to withhold a § 5K1.1 motion if the defendant went to trial, and then carrying out that threat).
Unlike Khoury, where the only reasonable inference was that the prosecutor was punishing the defendant for exercising his right to trial, here there were other highly plausible, and more likely reasons why the prosecutor refused to move for the departure. Ruiz did not plead within thirty days from the initial appearance and she did not waive her right to an indictment. The government invested more time and work in preparing Ruiz’s case than would have been required.if Ruiz had accepted the plea agreement and pled within the time constraints, even without the impeachment waiver.
The very purpose of the fast track downward departure is to expedite the plea process and dramatically reduce the workload of the federal prosecutors, public defenders, and the district court. In exchange for expediting the resolution of the District’s pending cases, the defendant receives a two-level downward departure at sentencing. Once everyone is required to put more time and effort into the case, as was necessary here, the reason for offering the departure is thwarted. The record supports the conclusion that this is the legitimate reason for the prosecutor’s opposition to the downward departure in Ruiz’s case (“[W]e [the government] are giving up all the benefits that would normally come with the fast track departure.”).
Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that Ruiz told the prosecutor at the time of the offer that she was rejecting it because of the impeachment waiver. Nor does the record show that she attempted to negotiate away the waiver but was rebuffed. Such evidence, along with the prosecutor’s refusal to move, may have been sufficient to satisfy the “substantial threshold showing” standard, but none was offered. The only evidence in her favor before us is that she was offered the departure and refused it, later pled guilty, and then the prosecutor opposed her motion for the fast track downward departure. That evidence is insufficient to entitle her to a hearing under Khoury.
3. The Distinction Between Unconstitutional Motive and Unconstitutional Waiver.
The majority further complicates matters by mistakenly conflating two distinct constitutional challenges present in this case. It is asserted that, in order to make her claim for unconstitutional motive, Ruiz must show that the impeachment waiver was unconstitutional. But whether Ruiz could or could not waive her rights to the impeachment information is wholly irrelevant to whether the prosecutor acted with an unconstitutional motive at sentencing.
To illustrate this principle, one need only look at the facts in Khoury. 62 F.3d at 1138. The issue there was not whether Khoury could waive his right to trial. He undoubtedly could. Rather the issue was whether the prosecutor acted unconstitutionally by opposing a motion for a downward departure at sentencing solely be*1175cause Khoury opted to exercise his right to a trial. Id. at 1142. We concluded that a prosecutor cannot act vindictively in refusing to move for a downward departure because a defendant wishes to exercise her constitutional rights. Id.3
Likewise in this case, if the problem was really with the prosecutor’s actions at the sentencing hearing, then whether Ruiz could or could not waive her right to impeachment information is irrelevant to whether the prosecutor acted with an unconstitutional motive at sentencing. In other words, even if Ruiz could waive her impeachment rights (as Khoury could waive his right to trial), Ruiz might still have a claim for unconstitutional motive against the prosecutor, following the majority’s new rule that the “substantial threshold showing” standard applies in fast track departure cases.
The only way to reach the issue of whether impeachment rights are waivable is through a direct challenge to the plea offer, not by challenging the sentence. We do not have jurisdiction on this record to entertain a direct challenge to the waiver.
B. Jurisdiction to Review the Impeachment Waiver.
“An unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent constitutional defects.” United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has made it clear that a defendant, after admitting in open court that she is guilty, may not raise a claim that her constitutional rights were violated before she entered the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). She may challenge her plea only by demonstrating that it was not made voluntarily and intelligently. Id. She may do this by showing that her counsel was ineffective in giving her advice regarding the guilty plea, id., or by demonstrating that her plea was made without the benefit of Brady material that the prosecution deliberately withheld without her knowledge. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.1995).
The Court in Tollett made it clear that the primary inquiry is whether the plea was entered into voluntarily and intelligently. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602. Even if the alleged unconstitutionality was unknown to the defendant at the time she entered the unconditional plea, she is not entitled to appellate review unless she can make a showing that the plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently. Id.
The only way for Ruiz to challenge the impeachment waiver is by challenging her plea. And she can only challenge her plea by demonstrating that it was not made *1176voluntarily or intelligently-that is, by demonstrating (1) that she made the plea without the benefit of the impeachment material and (2) that the impeachment material would have affected her decision to plead guilty. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453-54. But she did not accept the government’s plea offer. She has never alleged that she did not receive the impeachment material and we may presume in the absence of such an allegation that this information (if it even existed) was not kept from her.
The majority attempts to evade the Tol-lett rule by characterizing the unconstitutional act as the prosecutor’s refusal to move for the downward departure at sentencing. Because the refusal occurred after the plea was entered, the majority argues, the Tollett rule precluding appellate review of antecedent constitutional defects is inapplicable.
As demonstrated in Khoury, however, Ruiz’s complaint about the sentence imposed does not depend upon the waivability of her rights to impeachment information. The alleged unconstitutionality of the prosecutor’s actions at sentencing are entirely distinct from the alleged unconstitutionality of the impeachment waiver that she never complained of before unconditionally pleading guilty.
Her complaint with regard to the waiver can only be that the prosecutor unconstitutionally conditioned the two-level downward departure on her waiving her un-waivable right to impeachment material. But the prosecutor requested this condition at the time of the plea offer, not at the time of sentencing. The constitutional defect, if any, occurred prior to the entry of the unconditional guilty plea. Thus, the Tollett rule applies, and Ruiz waived any challenge she may have had to the alleged unconstitutional conditioning of the downward departure on the impeachment waiver. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review both Ruiz’s sentence and the constitutionality of the impeachment waiver.
III. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RULE.
In addition to the jurisdictional bar to our review, the Court’s decision makes little sense from a policy standpoint. The government has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of government witnesses and protecting ongoing investigations into other drug courier cases. We should not unnecessarily create a new rule that forces the government to turn over information to a defendant immediately upon beginning plea bargain negotiations, when that information will generally be of little use to the defendant unless she goes to trial. This disclosure is especially problematic when the release of the information could have detrimental consequences in future criminal proceedings, as it would, for example, if the government were required to publicly release information on the identity of an informant that it would like to keep confidential for as long as possible.
Perhaps most importantly, the majority’s decision jeopardizes the fast track program, which, to this point, has been a highly successful way of resolving, prior to indictment, these types of cases in the Southern District of California. Through the fast track program the District has been able to dramatically expedite the processing of its heavy workload 4 by encouraging defendants in simple cases like this to plead very early in the process, waive indictment, and promise not to file any motions other than sentencing memoran-da.
By also asking a defendant to waive her right to impeachment information, the *1177prosecution can save itself from the often time-consuming process of determining which witnesses it may call at trial, what potential impeachment information on each witness is in its possession, and whether it must disclose that information to the defendant. This time-saving aspect is one of the reasons underlying the Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Because the majority holds the impeachment waiver unconstitutional, despite the fact that it lacks jurisdiction to do so, it dramatically reduces the efficacy of the fast track program. The government no longer has an incentive to offer the departure if the plea agreement does not significantly reduce the District’s workload. Thus, the majority’s new rule delays the efficient handling of cases that should be disposed of promptly to the benefit of everyone.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We lack jurisdiction to review Ruiz’s sentence. More importantly, we lack jurisdiction to issue an unprecedented rule that defendants may not waive their rights to impeachment material. This brand new rule harms the administration of justice. I respectfully dissent.

. Granted, it would take real "chutzpah'' for it to do so, but such chutzpah has been demonstrated before. See United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir.2000) (Silverman, J., dissenting).

. It is important to note that this departure "policy'' is a policy of the United States Attorney; it is not the policy of the United States Sentencing Commission or even of the district court.

.The legality of the fast track departure is not' at issue in this case and I do not directly address that issue. My only purpose in pointing out the doubtful legality of the fast track departure is to demonstrate why it is more appropriate to analogize to our substantial assistance cases, rather than to our § 5K2.0 departure cases, in terms of appellate jurisdiction and review.

. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which provides for a two or three-level downward adjustment of the offense level for early acceptance of responsibility, duplicates many of the factors on which the fast track departure is based. The extra-point decrease is given for "timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently.” Id. § 3E1.1(b)(2). In the Southern District of California, the two-level, fast track departure is given in addition to the § 3El.l adjustment.

. The fast track policy can remain workable only so long as the parties can depend on the court to carry through with the government's bargain in the fast track plea agreement that, in return for reducing the government's pros-ecutorial burden, the defendant will receive the benefit of an extra two-level downward departure outside the parameters of the Gttidelines.

. As the dissent points out, the weighted caseload per active judgeship in the Southern District of California was more than twice the median caseload of all districts in the Ninth Circuit. See dissent at 2773 n. 4.

. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the government was not asking Ruiz to waive her rights to Brady information. In the stan-. dard plea agreement offered to Ruiz, the gov-eminent acknowledges its ongoing obligation to give the defendant all information relating to factual innocence, and only requires the defendant to waive her rights to information that goes to impeachment of government witnesses. The government remains obligated to turn over all Brady material, including impeachment information that clearly falls under the Brady rule.

. A U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 "substantial assistance" departure rewards a defendant for providing the prosecutor with material assistance in prosecuting the case against co-defendants or investigating other related cases. Unlike a fast track downward departure, a substantial assistance departure does not reward a defendant for expediting resolution of her case.

. The majority argues that “if the Brady waiver were constitutional, Ruiz would have no basis for arguing that the government withheld the ‘fast track’ recommendation for an unconstitutional reason.” Op. at 2757 n. 7. Ruiz’s basis for arguing that the government acted unconstitutionally in refusing to-recommend the fast track departure would he that the prosecutor was punishing Ruiz for exercising her constitutional right to receive impeachment information, whether or not that right is waivable. See Murphy, 65 F.3d at 763 (holding that the defendant was required to present objective evidence that the prosecutor’s decision to refuse a § 5K1.1 recommendation was "motivated by a desire to punish him for exercising his [waivable] right to trial”); Khoury, 62 F.3d at 1138 (holding that a prosecutor acts with an unconstitutional motive by refusing to recommend a downward departure in order to punish a defendant for exercising his waivable right to a jury trial).
I do not believe that Ruiz has made a substantial threshold showing that the prosecutor acted with a motive to punish her for exercising her right to receive the undisclosed material, whether or not that right is waiva-ble. The majority disagrees. But the majority, by further holding that Ruiz cannot waive her right to receive what it mistakenly characterizes as Brady information, transforms this case from a minor dispute about the application of firmly established law to a distinct set of facts, to a new constitutional rule that once presumably waivable rights are now unwaiva-ble. This transformation is wholly unnecessary to the resolution of the case and sets a dangerous precedent.

. According to the 1999 Annual Report for the Ninth Circuit, the weighted total of filings per judgeship in 1998 was 1,030. See 1999 Annual Report for the Ninth Circuit at 52. The mean total for all district judges in the Ninth Circuit was almost half that of the Southern District of California, at 530 filings per judgeship, and the median was less than half, at 481 filings per judgeship. Id. The next busiest district, the District of Arizona, had total filings per judgeship of 814, over 200 filings per judgeship less than the Southern District of California. Id.