Court Opinion

ID: 9852963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:40:01.733276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.582184
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the El Paso County District Court and hold that Colorado Springs Ordinance No. 92-159 (Ordinance) violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by imposing a prior restraint on speech and is facially unconstitutional.
On March 19, 1993, the El Paso County District Court issued an order declaring certain sections of the Ordinance and a provision of the 1980 Colorado Springs Code (Code) unenforceable because of facial violations of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellants/cross-appellees, the City of Colorado Springs and the members of the Colorado Springs City Council (defendants), appeal those portions of the district court’s order that declared part of the Ordinance unenforceable. The appel-lees/cross-appellants, .operators of sexually oriented business establishments (plaintiffs), appeal from those portions of the district court’s order upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance with portions of the Ordinance stricken.
*300The majority affirms the district court in part and reverses in part. I agree with the majority’s First Amendment analysis of the substantive provisions in the Ordinance. However, the majority concludes that the Ordinance provides adequate procedural safeguards to applicants for licenses for sexually oriented businesses. Maj. op. at 289. I disagree. The Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it fails to provide for adequate procedural safeguards to preserve freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, I would hold the licensing scheme provided in the Ordinance to be facially unconstitutional and reverse the judgment of the district court.
I
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. Regulations enacted to restrain protected speech on the basis of content are presumptively unconstitutional. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 928-29, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). If the restrictions are primarily directed at the noneommunicative aspects of protected speech, the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of protected speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753-54, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible “so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.” City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 928.
Prior restraints are judicial and administrative orders that forbid certain communications when issued prior to the time the communications are to occur. Alexander v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2771, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993). A governmental regulation that places a prior restraint on the exercise of free expression bears “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225, 110 S.Ct. 596, 604, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2144, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57, 85 S.Ct. 734, 738, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965).
Freedom of speech is abridged when the government may exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether individuals may engage in protected speech. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05. When a regulation that creates a prior restraint fails to provide for adequate procedural safeguards to ensure a prompt decision, the government has exercised the prohibited unbridled discretion. Id. at 227, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06.
In Freedman, the United States Supreme Court held that a Maryland law requiring film distributors to submit films to the Maryland State Board of Censors for approval was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60, 85 S.Ct. at 739-40. Three procedural safeguards are necessary, under Freedman, to “obviate the dangers of a censorship system”: (1) any restraint prior to judicial review can only be imposed for no longer than necessary to preserve the status quo; (2) prompt judicial review must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and bear the burden of proof once in court. Id. at 58-59, 85 S.Ct. at 738-39. If a licensing scheme does not contain necessary procedural safeguards and “is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, [in providing for] judicial review, the censor’s determination may in practice be final.” Id. at 58, 85 S.Ct. at 738.
In FW/PBS, the Court examined the constitutionality of a Dallas ordinance that imposed a system of zoning and licensing requirements for sexually oriented businesses. The ordinance was directed toward combat-ting the secondary effects of urban blight and crime. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that the city’s licensing scheme was an unconstitutional prior restraint because it failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. The Court identified two evils associated with the prior restraints imposed *301by the Dallas ordinance. First, a licensing “scheme that places ‘unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship.’ ” Id. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. at 605 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2144, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Second, a prior restraint is impermissible if it fails to place limits on the time within which the decisionmaker must issue the license. Id. at 226, 110 S.Ct. at 605.
The FW/PBS Court reviewed Freedman and concluded that Freedman involved direct censorship, which is presumptively invalid, while the Dallas ordinance involved issuing licenses to applicants, which is not presumptively invalid. Id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. at 606. The Court stated, “[b]ecause the licensing scheme at issue in this ease does not present the grave dangers of a censorship system ... we conclude that the full procedural protections set forth in Freedman are not required.” Id. (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58, 85 S.Ct. at 738).20 The plurality determined the first two Freedman safeguards must be considered in evaluating a licensing scheme for sexually oriented businesses. Id. at 228-30, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. The Court stated:
The core policy underlying Freedman is that the license for a First Amendment-protected business must be issued within a reasonable period of time, because undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech. Thus, the first two safeguards are essential: the li-censor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period during which the status quo is maintained, and there must be the possibility of prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied.
Id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. at 606. Federal courts have reaffirmed the FW/PBS procedural safeguards in the context of licensing schemes for sexually oriented businesses. See, e.g., TK’s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 707-08 (5th Cir.1994); Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 831 F.Supp. 1241, 1247 (D.Md.1993); Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F.Supp. 1568, 1573 (D.Minn.1992).
Section 8-9-104(A) of the Ordinance provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate a sexually oriented business without a license issued by the Licensing Officer under the provisions of this Chapter.” (Footnote omitted.) The licensing scheme contained in the Ordinance constitutes a prior restraint because speech is subjected to governmental regulation prior to the time that the speech is to occur. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 224-26, 110 S.Ct. at 603-05.
II
A
Section 8-9-104(D) of the Ordinance states that an application for a sexually oriented business license must be accompanied by a zoning permit. Section 8-9-105(A)(6) of the Ordinance provides, in relevant part:
A. The sexually oriented business shall be issued a license within thirty (30) days after receipt of an application ... unless the Licensing Officer finds one or more of the following:
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6. The applicant has not been issued a permit by the Zoning Administrator ... and that such permit, if issued, is not subject to appeal....
If the zoning permit is subject to appeal, section 8-9-104(D) provides that “no further action shall be taken upon such application until such appeal is finally adjudicated.”
*302After reviewing the appeal process for an adverse decision by the zoning administrator, the majority states:
Thus, when the applicant decides to appeal an adverse zoning administrator decision, the process of licensure is tolled by means of the applicant’s decision. To conclude, as the plaintiffs do, that the voluntary choice of an applicant to appeal a zoning classification renders the licensing scheme itself unconstitutional because there is no specified time limit for the completion of such appeal process ignores the fact that the time limit specified by the Ordinance for final action by the licensing officer remains intact. The amount of time consumed by the process of judicial review of an adverse zoning administrator determination will also depend in large part on the conduct of the applicant.
Maj. op. at 282.
I disagree with the majority because the Ordinance places unbridled discretion in the zoning administrator and fails to specify a time limit within which a decision on an applicant’s appeal must be rendered.
In FW/PBS, the Dallas ordinance provided that approval for issuance of a license would be made within thirty days after receipt of an application. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06. Prior to issuance of a license, health, fire, and budding inspections were required. Id. Because the licensing scheme did not place time limits on when the inspections had to occur, the Court stated “the city’s regulatory scheme allows indefinite postponement of the issuance of a license.” Id. The Court concluded:
Where the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion. A scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.

Id.

Here, section 8-9-104(D) provides:
Contemporaneously with the submission of an application for a license, the applicant shall submit the permit from the Zoning Administrator indicating that the requirements of Article 11 of Chapter 14.1 of the City Code are met unless the applicant’s sexually oriented business is an existing non-conforming use under the provisions of Article 13 of Chapter 14.1 of the City Code. In the event that such permit is subject to appeal, no further action shall be taken upon such application until such appeal is finally adjudicated.
(Footnote omitted.) Section 14.1-11-103(d) of the Colorado Springs Zoning Ordinance requires the zoning administrator to approve or deny an application for a zoning permit within ten working days after the application is submitted.
The plain language of section 8-9-104(D) is ambiguous as to whether a permit from the zoning administrator is a prerequisite to applying for a license. The first sentence of section 8-9-104(D) states that an applicant must have received a zoning permit before applying for a license. The second sentence implies that an application can be submitted prior to zoning approval, but the application will be held in abeyance until an appeal of the zoning administrator’s decision is adjudicated.
If approval from the zoning administrator is a prerequisite to submitting an application, the thirty day period for a decision on the application by the city council will not begin to run until after the application is finally approved by the zoning administrator. Approval by the zoning administrator may be delayed indefinitely because no time limit is specified for the zoning administrator’s decision on the appeal.
If an application can be submitted prior to the zoning administrator’s approval, the thirty day time period will start to run, but will be tolled during the time that the zoning administrator is considering the applicant’s appeal. The ostensibly thirty day time limit may be extended indefinitely because no time limit is specified for the zoning administrator’s decision on the appeal.
Although the Ordinance sets specific time limits for a decision on an application for a license, appeal of the zoning administrator’s decision may delay the licensing process in*303definitely regardless of whether a zoning permit is a prerequisite to submitting an application. The process delineated in the Ordinance also places unbridled discretion in the zoning administrator to prevent approval of an application.
The majority concludes that the applicant is responsible for any potential delay in the licensing process if the applicant appeals the zoning administrator’s decision. Maj. op. at 294. The majority’s construction of the Ordinance ignores the presumption against the validity of prior restraints. See, e.g., FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05; City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2144, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57, 85 S.Ct. 734, 738, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). The applicant’s decision to appeal does not remedy the fact that appeal of the zoning administrator’s decision may be delayed indefinitely. The majority misconstrues the rationale of FW/PBS and the burden of proof imposed on the defendants. The burden should not be placed on the plaintiffs because of their decision to appeal an adverse decision by the zoning administrator, but should properly lie with the defendants because they seek to regulate protected speech.
B
Section 8-9-105(D) of the Ordinance provides that applicants may appeal the denial of their application by the licensing officer. Sections 8-l-601(B) through -601(D) of the Code provide the procedures for appeal when the application for a license is denied:
B. If the Licensing Officer shall not so find he shall thereupon deny such application and notify the applicant of the denial by serving upon the applicant personally a copy of such denial and the reasons supporting such denial or by mailing the same to him by registered or certified mail at the business address shown on the application.
C. Any applicant aggrieved by any final order of the licensing officer after the denial of such application shall have the right to appeal to the City Council by filing a written appeal, stating the grounds thereof, with the City Clerk within ten (10) days following the date of denial of said application.
D.In the event an appeal is timely filed, it shall be heard at the next regular City Council meeting occurring at least ten (10) days after said filing with the City Clerk. Review by Council shall be a de novo hearing.
Section 8-1-808 of the Code provides:
A. The decision of the City Council in all cases shall be final and conclusive and shall be served upon the licensee by personal service, by registered or certified mail, or by posting as provided in Section 8-1-804 of this Chapter.
B. A decision of the City Council is reviewable only by Court under Colo. R.Civ.P. 106(a)(4). There shall be no stay of execution pending a review by the Court except by Court order.
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) provides, in relevant part:
(a) ... In the following cases relief may be obtained in the district court....
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(4) Where any governmental body or officer or any lower judicial body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law:
(I) Review shall be limited to a determination of whether the body or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, based on the evidence in the record before the body or officer.
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(V) The proceedings before or decision of the body or officer may be stayed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(VII) A defendant required to certify a record shall give written notice to all parties, simultaneously with filing, of the date of filing the record with the clerk. The plaintiff shall file, and serve on all parties, an opening brief within forty days after the *304date on which the record was filed. If no record is requested by the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall file an opening brief within forty days after the defendant has served its answer upon the plaintiff. The defendant may file and serve an answer brief within thirty days after service of the plaintiffs brief, and the plaintiff may file and serve a reply brief to the defendant’s answer brief within fifteen days after service of the answer brief.
(VIII) The court may accelerate or continue any action which, in the discretion of the court, requires acceleration or continuance.
After examining the adequacy of the procedural safeguards provided by the Ordinance and the Code, the majority concludes:
C.R.C.P. 106 and the Ordinance provide adequate safeguards to ensure that any impermissible prior restraint on a particular applicant’s protected rights of free speech may be remedied promptly by judicial intervention_ The provisions of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(VIII) specifically authorize a district court to accelerate or continue any action, and, as indicated, C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) authorizes a district court to stay any decision to deny, suspend, or revoke a license. These provisions are adequate to withstand the plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Ordinance.
Maj. op. at 284. I disagree because the mechanisms provided by the Ordinance and the Code do not provide the appropriate standard of appellate review and do not constitute prompt judicial review of constitutionally protected speech.
1
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) fails to provide the appropriate standard of appellate review required for prior restraints of constitutionally protected speech. Under the explicit language of the Ordinance and the Code, judicial review of city council decisions is limited to the procedures provided in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) and (VIII), which provide for a stay and accelerated review, respectfully, are within the discretion of the district court and are extraordinary remedies. The standard of review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is limited to an abuse of discretion, and cannot be used as a substitute for prescribed appellate procedures. See, e.g., Kirbens v. Martinez, 742 P.2d 330, 333 (Colo.1987) (“Proceedings authorized by C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) are extraordinary in nature, and accordingly, may not be employed as a substitute for prescribed appellate procedures.”) (citations omitted); People v. Adams County Court, 793 P.2d 656, 656 (Colo.App.1990) (“Proceedings authorized by C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) are extraordinary in nature, and the rule cannot be used as a substitute for prescribed appellate procedures.”).
In Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 n. 9 (11th Cir.1994), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined the Freedman standard for the type of judicial review required for protected speech. The court reviewed cases that have interpreted Freedman and stated:
the Court indicated that the statute, regulation, or ordinance itself must explicitly provide for prompt judicial review of the decision to suppress expressive activity.... The Court thus implied that a state’s statutory or common-law mechanisms for review of administrative decisions does not satisfy the procedural requirements of Freedman.
Id. Other federal cases have stated the appropriate level of judicial review required by FW/PBS for a sexually oriented licensing scheme to be constitutional. See, e.g., TK’s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir.1994) (“FW/PBS requires only a prompt judicial hearing, a standard that the order meets by giving an unsuccessful license applicant 30 days to appeal to a district court in Denton County ‘on a trial de novo basis.’ ”) (quoting Denton County licensing order); Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 831 F.Supp. 1241, 1250 (D.Md.1993) (“In light of FW/PBS, the Har-ford County ordinance is constitutional because it expressly provides for judicial review by the County’s circuit court.”).
Section 8-1-801 is a Code provision which states that all business and licensing decisions by the Colorado Springs City Council are subject to review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Judicial review of the denial of a *305license for a sexually oriented business is not specifically provided in the Ordinance. Review of administrative decisions under the statutory mechanism in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not meet the Freedman standard for review of protected speech. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1501 n. 9. Because the Ordinance fails to provide for the appropriate level of judicial review in the event a license is denied, the Ordinance is facially unconstitutional.
2
In FW/PBS, the Court found the Dallas licensing scheme unconstitutional because it failed to provide a time limit within which the licensor’s decision had to be made, and it did not provide “an avenue for prompt judicial review so as to minimize suppression of the speech in the event of a license denial.” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 606. The Ordinance fails to provide for prompt judicial review when an application for a license is denied. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(VII) permits up to eighty-five days for filing briefs. Because an applicant who has been denied a license will seek to facilitate judicial review, it is unlikely that the applicant will exercise a full forty days to file an opening brief and fifteen days to file a reply brief. However, the city that has denied the license has an incentive to exercise the full thirty days permitted under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(VTI) to file an answer brief. A minimum of thirty days and a maximum of eighty-five days is permitted for filing briefs under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(VTI).
The Supreme Court has not specifically provided a uniform standard for determining what constitutes prompt judicial review. However, in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1406-07, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), the Court interpreted a federal statute that imposed a prior restraint to require judicial review to be sought within fourteen days. The Court stated that delays between forty days and six months prior to commencement of proceedings did not constitute prompt judicial review. Id. at 371-72, 91 S.Ct. at 1405-06.
The time period under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) for the review of protected speech is not prompt judicial review because of the lengthy period for filing briefs, and potential delays and continuances. In addition to the lengthy briefing schedule, an applicant may determine that the procedures outlined in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) are too burdensome, which may chill the exercise of protected speech. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59, 85 S.Ct. at 739.
3
The majority concludes that “an application for a license not acted upon by the licensing officer within thirty days of the receipt of the application must be deemed granted.” Maj. op. at 281. The Ordinance, however, fails to explicitly provide that an application not acted upon within thirty days will be granted.
In Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F.Supp. 1568, 1574 (D.Minn.1992), an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses did not contain a provision to assure that the status quo was maintained during the time that an application for a license was pending with the city council. The city promised not to enforce the ordinance during the pendency of an action on the constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 1575. The court determined that because the ordinance did not, on its face, meet the requirements of FW/PBS the ordinance was facially unconstitutional. Id.
Section 8-9-104(A) of the Ordinance provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate a sexually oriented business without a license issued by the Licensing Officer under the provisions of this Chapter.” (Footnote omitted.) The defendants assert that the Ordinance should be construed to require approval of an application if the application is not acted upon within thirty days. However, the Ordinance provides that a person may not operate a sexually oriented business without a license. In the event an application is not acted upon within thirty days, the Ordinance is silent. Because the application process may be postponed indefinitely, the Ordinance is facially unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I would hold the licensing scheme provided in the Ordinance to be fa-*306daily unconstitutional and reverse the judgment of the district court.
LOHR, J., joins in this dissent.

. In FW/PBS, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, reasoned that the Freedman requirement that the censor bear the burden of initiating judicial action and the burden of proof in the judicial proceeding should not apply to the licensing scheme of sexually oriented businesses. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but stated that all three of the Freedman procedural safeguards should apply in analyzing the constitutionality of the Dallas licensing scheme. The fragmented opinion of the FW/PBS Court leaves the application of the third Freedman factor in question.