Court Opinion

ID: 9491442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:14:32.201776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:39.541872
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge,
dissenting.
The question before this Court is whether there is substantial evidence to support the National Labor Relations Board’s decision— not whether the Board made the correct decision. Were we to try this case anew, we might, and I emphasize the word “might,” reach a result different from that reached by the Board. We are not trying this case anew, however. As an appellate court, we are bound by certain constraints. We do not find facts, and we review the lower courts’ decisions under varying degrees of deference. We have received this appeal from an administrative board, and we therefore review the Board’s decision to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the Board. I believe there is sufficient evidence on the record to support the Board’s decision. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I. Standards of Review
The standards of review are the crux of this ease. They determine the bounds of our inquiry into the Board’s decisionmaking process. We review the Board’s factual findings under a substantial evidence standard. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The Board’s application of the law to the facts is also reviewed under a substantial-evidence standard. See NLRB v. Pentre Elec., Inc., 998 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir.1993). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). In reviewing the substantiality of the evidence, this Court “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the evidence’s] weight,” and we do so by reviewing the record as a whole. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456. A reviewing court may not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Id. In essence, under the substantial evidence standard of review we are asked to weigh the quantum of evidence supporting *342the Board’s decision. If there is sufficient evidence, and it is in rough parity with or in excess of the evidence going against the Board’s decision, we should enforce the Board’s decision. See, e.g., YHA, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 168, 172 (1993) (noting that “this court cannot substitute its own findings for those of the Board merely because substantial evidence may support both”).
II. Facts
The majority presents a lengthy rendition of the facts, and I will emphasize only a few in my dissent. In reference tq the trailer fire, someone labeled “K,” probably Horse-head Director of Operations Thomas Knep-per or perhaps Horsehead negotiator Martha Koletar, is quoted as saying during a bargaining session that: “We realize it could also have been a visit by Clymersville personnel as they have already demonstrated their ability.” The phrase “Clymersville personnel” appears to refer to a group of people who were suing Horsehead for environmental damage. This group also may include the person whom the majority opinion refers to as a “kindly environmentalist in Clymersville.” See supra at 336. According to the majority, Knepper declined to blame union members for the fire because he did not want to antagonize the union negotiating team. See supra at 335 n. 6. Indeed, Horsehead was so solicitous of the tender feelings of the union members that it declined even to question its employees regarding the source of the fire.
Horsehead delayed the onset of negotiations until early February, and the parties agreed to begin the negotiations by focusing on non-economic issues. The majority acknowledges that Horsehead did not make a wage proposal at the initial, February 7 meeting. Even after Horsehead made its February 25 wage proposal, the negotiations followed a stop-and-start pattern. During meetings on the 25th, Horsehead negotiators said they' were having difficulty reaching company higher-ups in New York City. For reasons that remain unclear, although union representative John Williams testified in the administrative hearing that “we offered to meet the whole weekend of the 26th and 27th,” no meeting was scheduled for Saturday, February 26. Horsehead then canceled a meeting scheduled for Sunday, February 27. The majority points out that Horse-head’s Knepper testified that the union’s Williams “had no objection to cancellation of the Sunday meeting.” See supra at 335. Williams’s testimony, however, seems to indicate that he intended to meet on Sunday. When asked: “Did you meet on Sunday the 27th?” Williams responded:
At 12:00 o’clock I drove in. When I got here I met with the committee to try and find out what was happening and we did. Then the mediator come to my room. I was staying at the Holiday Inn. He said that he would come back — he called Ms. Koletar and she was the only one there. She said that she’d meet with us but the rest of the people were at the plant so there was no meeting on Sunday.
The next time economic proposals were discussed was on February 28, the day before the collective-bargaining agreement was due to expire.
III. Analysis
A. Bargaining
The majority and I basically agree on the standards under which good or bad-faith bargaining should be judged. We differ primarily on the question of whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support a conclusion that Horsehead engaged in dilatory, bad-faith bargaining. I continue to believe the evidence is substantial and sufficient to support the Board’s decision.
Although I generally agree with the majority’s framing of the question of how to judge bargaining, I would like to emphasize a few points. The majority notes that “[a] company’s good faith is judged by whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the company ‘desired “to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bargaining contract.” ’ ” See supra at 339 (quoting Pease Co. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1044, 1049 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960))). I would like to emphasize the “totality of the circumstances” element of the majority’s equation. Although I *343believe that a desire to enter a contract can be indicative of good-faith bargaining, I do not believe it is or should be dispositive. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 761-62 (2d Cir.1969) (“ ‘[D]esire to reach agreement’ may mean different things to different people, but in the context of a meaningful and purposeful reading of section 8(a)(5) it must mean more than a willingness to sign a piece of paper. The statute does not say that any ‘agreement’ reached will validate whatever tactics have been employed to exact it.”). Were desire to enter a contract — any contract no matter how onerous to the employees — the only criterion for judging bargaining, an employer would seldom, if ever, be found to have acted in bad faith. What employer, for instance, would not desire to enter a contract that guaranteed employees minimum wage, no medical or life insurance, and no vacation days? To continue a conceit introduced by the majority, it would be fair to describe such an agreement as a “Dickensian Contract.” I find it difficult to believe that simply evincing a desire to enter a “Dickensian Contract” would satisfy an employer’s duty to bargain in good faith.
There must be something more to the determination of whether an employer has acted in bad faith. The Court in Pease appears to have considered more than merely a desire to enter a contract. As the Court noted: “Our examination of the specific indi-cia relied on by the ALJ and the Board leads us to conclude that neither the proposals nor the tactics of the Company, nor the sum of its conduct, amounts to substantial evidence of bad faith.” See Pease, 666 F.2d at 1049. As noted by the majority, undue delay can constitute bad faith. See supra at 338-39. See also Calex Corp. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 904, 909 (6th Cir.1998) (“Dilatory and delaying tactics that undermine the process of collective bargaining are indicative of bad faith bargaining.”); Kobell v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 965 F.2d 1401, 1408 (6th Cir.1992) (“Dilatory or evasive tactics have been considered by the Board as indicative of bad faith.”).
According to the majority, “[t]his case does not involve anything close to the pattern of delay found in Calex....” See supra at 339. The majority is correct in this analysis— Calex involves an extreme example of dilatory bargaining tactics. The majority’s analysis, however, is also misleading. The comparison between the facts of the case at hand and those of Calex is true as far as it goes, but it does not answer the question of whether Horsehead has engaged in dilatory bargaining. Just because Horsehead has not acted as egregiously as Calex Corporation does not mean that Horsehead has bargained in good faith. Calex does not provide a baseline level for judging dilatory tactics. I see Calex rather as an extreme example and believe that a company can run afoul’of the labor laws, as Horsehead has here, without reaching the level of obstructionism exhibited in Calex. '' ’
The majority contends that the Board erred in refusing to consider Horsehead’s proffered evidence of postdockout negotiations and contract resolution. I believe the Board acted correctly. Horsehead attempted to introduce affidavits in which the company’s chief negotiator testified regarding the ongoing negotiations and their ultimate resolution in a completed contract. The majority argues that these affidavits would have been instructive on Horsehead’s desire to reach an agreement and therefore show that the company did not negotiate in bad faith. No one doubts that Horsehead intended to reach an agreement — on its terms. The Board questioned the tactics Horsehead used prior to the lockout, and this pre-lockout bargaining bears no relation to post-lockout negotiations. Evidence of post-lockout negotiations is therefore not relevant to accusations of pre-lockout bad faith. Cf. NLRB v. Ramona’s Mexican Food Prods., 531 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir.1975) (“The ultimate terms of the post strike agreement reached after a long unsuccessful unfair labor practices strike infers more to the success of the Company officials’ evasive, stalling, and unlawful tactics than it does to- the presence of good faith bargaining.”). Under the majority’s reasoning, a company could engage in the most nefarious negotiating tactics possible, force a lockout to put pressure on the employees, and then attempt to clean up-fhe mess with good-faith, post-lockout bargaining. Horsehead cannot *344retroactively “cure” its prior negotiating tactics with post-lockout bargaining, and evidence regarding these activities has no relevance to pre-lockout activities.
B. Lockout
Because the majority determined that Horsehead did not bargain in bad faith, it found that the lockout was lawful. I contend that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Horsehead engaged in bad-faith bargaining, and I believe the lockout was an outgrowth of this activity.
Lockouts are. not per se unlawful. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (holding that “employer violates neither § 8(a)(1) nor § 8(a)(3) when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position”). A lockout can, however, be unlawful if it is implemented out of hostility to the process of collective bargaining. See id. at 309, 85 S.Ct. 955.
Horsehead claims it resorted to a lockout to avoid further sabotage to its plant. The only incident of alleged sabotage before the lockout, however, was the burning of the trailer. In that situation, arson was not definitively proven, nor was it determined that union members had set the fire. According to negotiation notes from the time of the fire, Horsehead management discussed the possibility that people- from Clymersville were involved. Horsehead management also declined to question any of the union members who were on duty at the time of the fire. The other alleged incidents of sabotage — the cutting of the conveyor belt, the jamming of the recycling pipelines, and the like — were discovered after the lockout began. Horse-head may have had a legitimate fear of sabotage, but, in light of the Board’s finding of bad-faith bargaining, I agree with the Board that the lockout was a product of this bargaining and therefore unlawful.
C. Videotaping
I agree with the majority that Horsehead engaged iri indiscriminate videotaping of union activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
IV. Conclusion
This case is the product of a bitter labor dispute. Both sides played hardball. The Board, however, concluded that Horsehead crossed the line and negotiated in bad faith. Given the substantial evidence on the record in support of the Board’s decision, I believe the Board’s cross-application for enforcement should have been granted and Horsehead’s petition to review the Board’s order should have been denied. I respectfully dissent.