Court Opinion

ID: 2965153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:36:18.89104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.216908
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-2333

                                    GAURAV MANGLA,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                                  BROWN UNIVERSITY,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                     [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                        John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                                         ____________________

                         and Pollak,** Senior District Judge.
                                       _____________________

                                _____________________

               Douglas A. Giron for appellant.
               ________________
               Christopher H. Little,  with whom John E. Bulman  and Little
               _____________________             ______________      ______
          Bulman & Reardon, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
          ______________________

                                 ____________________

                                   February 2, 1998
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

          **    Of  the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania,  sitting   by
          designation.

                    JOHN  R. GIBSON, Senior  Circuit Judge.   Gaurav Mangla
                    JOHN  R. GIBSON, Senior  Circuit Judge.
                                     _____________________

          appeals from a  judgment as a matter  of law entered in  favor of

          Brown University following a trial  on his breach of contract and

          promissory  estoppel claims.   He argues that  the district court

          erred in granting judgment, as a reasonable jury could have found

          that Brown breached  the contract, acted  arbitrarily and in  bad

          faith, and that Brown was  estopped from denying him admission to

          the graduate school.  He  argues that the court improperly raised

          certain evidence  and overlooked and misconstrued  other evidence

          in  reaching  this decision.    We  affirm  the judgment  of  the

          district court.

                    Mangla applied  for  admission to  the  Brown  Graduate

          School in  September  1993, and  was admitted  as a  probationary

          special  student,   a  category of  enrollment  that permits  the

          taking of  graduate level  courses but which  is not in  itself a

          degree program.   His admission in this capacity  was recommended

          by the Computer  Science Department and approved  by the graduate

          council.   Associate Dean Joan Lusk met  with Mangla at that time

          and explained to him that  his admission was probationary because

          he lacked  the requisite academic  background or  course work  in

          computer science.  Lusk further told   Mangla that in order to be

          admitted to  the  degree program  he would  need to  successfully

          complete course  work in the Computer Science Department.  Mangla

          claims  to have  satisfactorily  completed  seven  of  the  eight

          courses required for a Master's degree. 

                                         -2-

                    After completing such course  work, Mangla inquired  of

          Dean  Lusk about his probationary status,  and she instructed him

          to  obtain  a faculty  advisor  for  his  Master's Project.    In

          response,  Mangla obtained a  letter signed by  Professor Stanley

          Zdonik, stating that Mangla "will be working under my supervision

          for  his Master's project."   Mangla claims  that at the  time he

          believed  the letter  served as  a  letter of  recommendation for

          admission into the degree program.

                    In  September  1995,  Brown informed  Mangla  that  his

          special student status was discontinued  and that he had not been

          admitted into  the Master's program.   Mangla thereafter  filed a

          new,  formal application for admission into the Master's program.

          The  Computer   Science  Department  faculty   reviewed  the  new

          application and voted  to recommend that Mangla's  application be

          denied.  Mangla then appealed to the Graduate Council which voted

          unanimously to uphold the department's decision.

                    Mangla brought this  action for breach of  contract and

          promissory  estoppel for  Brown's refusal to  admit him  into its

          Master's program.  The action was tried before a jury, but at the

          close  of evidence, the judge granted judgment as a matter of law

          to Brown  and dictated  detailed findings into  the record.   The

          district court first decided that there was no breach of contract

          because Mangla  knew  that one  of the  things he  had  to do  in

          performing his  side of  the contract was  to obtain  a favorable

          recommendation from the  Computer Science Department faculty  and

          there was no evidence that  any such recommendation was obtained.

                                         -3-

          The court acknowledged Mangla's testimony that Dean Lusk told him

          he would absolutely be admitted if he passed his courses or if he

          got a faculty  member to act  as his advisor.  The court  stated,

          however,  that the  key testimony  was  Mangla's admissions  that

          notwithstanding  anything that  Dean Lusk  may have told  him, he

          knew that a recommendation from the faculty was a requirement for

          his admission into the Master's Program.

                    The  court further found  that there was  no promissory

          estoppel because there  was no reasonable reliance on  any of the

          alleged  representations.   There was  explicit  language in  the

          Graduate School manual that even the department does not have the

          power to  offer  admission  and that  offers  of  admission  have

          binding force only  when made by the Graduate  School in writing.

          The court stated  that Mangla's argument that he  was entitled to

          the  written  offer   of  admission  is   nothing  more  than   a

          circumvention  of the  explicit  requirement  set  forth  in  the

          Graduate School manual.  Further,  the district court stated that

          it was quite a stretch  to interpret Professor Zdonik's letter as

          amounting to  a recommendation by  the Department that  Mangla be

          accepted.  Even viewing the letter in the light most favorable to

          Mangla, the district  court determined that  it defied logic  and

          reason to read  the letter as a recommendation  from the Computer

          Science Department.  Thus, the district court held that there was

          no issue for the jury to decide, and judgment as a matter of  law

          was granted.

                                         -4-

                                          I.
                                          I.

                    In ruling on a motion for  judgment as a matter of law,

          the  district court must examine  the evidence, and inferences to

          be  drawn therefrom,  in the  light  most favorable  to the  non-

          movant.  See  Rol n-Alvarado v. Municipality of San  Juan, 1 F.3d
                   ___  ______________    _________________________

          74, 76 (1st Cir. 1993).  Judgment as a matter  of law may then be

          granted "only if  the evidence, viewed from this  perspective, is

          such that reasonable  minds could not differ as  to the outcome."

          Id. at 77.
          ___

                    When a judgment as a matter  of law is appealed to this

          court,  we must apply precisely the  same criteria that constrain

          the district  court. See Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731,
                               ___ ______    ________________

          735  (1st  Cir. 1994).    Accordingly,  we  review the  grant  of

          judgment as  a  matter of  law under  a de  novo  standard.   See
                                                                        ___

          Jordan-Milton Mach., Inc.  v. F/V Teresa Marie, II,  978 F.2d 32,
          _________________________     ____________________

          34 (1st Cir. 1992).

                                         II.
                                         II.

                    Mangla argues  that judgment  as  a matter  of law  was

          inappropriate because  a reasonable  jury could  find that  Brown

          University breached a contract with Mangla by refusing  to confer

          regular degree status upon him.

                    The  district   court,  in  this  diversity  case,  was

          required to apply the substantive  law of Rhode Island.  However,

          after careful research,  we have discovered no case  in which the

          Rhode Island courts  have addressed the contractual  relationship

          between  a private  academic institution  and its  students.   We

                                         -5-

          therefore  resolve Mangla's breach of contract claim according to

          those  legal principles which we believe  the Rhode Island courts

          would most likely adopt.  See Lyons v. Salve Regina  College, 565
                                    ___ _____    _____________________

          F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
                                         _____ ______

                    The   student-college   relationship   is   essentially

          contractual in nature.  See  Russell v. Salve Regina College, 938
                                  ___  _______    ____________________

          F.2d  315, 316 (1st  Cir. 1991).   The terms of  the contract may

          include statements provided in  student manuals and  registration

          materials.  See Lyons, 565 F.2d at 202 (construing College Manual
                      ___ _____

          and Academic Information booklet as terms of a contract between a

          student  and college).  The proper  standard for interpreting the

          contractual  terms is  that of  "reasonable  expectation --  what

          meaning  the  party  making  the  manifestation,  the university,

          should  reasonably expect  the  other  party to  give  it."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          (quoting  Giles  v.  Howard University,  428  F.  Supp. 603,  605
                    _____      _________________

          (D.D.C. 1977)).

                    Mangla maintains that he reasonably expected that if he

          satisfactorily performed his  course work and obtained  a sponsor

          for  his master's  project he  would  be admitted  as a  master's

          degree  candidate in  the Computer  Science  Department.   Mangla

          bases his claim on the  alleged statements of Associate Dean Lusk

          and members of the Computer Science Department faculty.  However,

          Brown University's graduate school catalog specifically provided:

                      Caveat.    Applicants are  asked  to take
                      particular notice  of the  fact that  the
                      individual  academic  departments,  while
                      having  a  major role  in  evaluating the
                      applications  of all  candidates, do  not
                      have  the power  to offer  admission, and

                                         -6-

                      that  offers  of admission  have  binding
                      force  only  when  made  by the  Graduate
                      School in  writing over the  signature of
                      the Dean  of the Graduate  School or  her
                      representative.

                    By its terms,  this provision divested faculty  members

          of  any authority  to  promise  admission  or  to  determine  the

          necessary prerequisites for admission.  Because the provision was

          included in the  graduate school catalog, Brown  could reasonably

          expect  students  to  be  aware of  the  policy.    Thus,  it was

          reasonable for Brown to  expect its students not to  rely on oral

          statements by individual  faculty members as binding  promises by

          the university.

                    Likewise, the statements of Associate Dean Lusk did not

          give  Mangla   a  right   to  be  admitted.     As   an  apparent

          representative of  the Dean of the Graduate School, Lusk arguably

          had  the  authority to  offer  admission.   The  caveat, however,

          restricted  the acceptable  form of  such  an offer  to a  signed

          writing.   Mangla concedes  that no such  writing exists  in this

          case.   Therefore,  the language of  the graduate  school catalog

          seriously compromises Mangla's claim that Lusk's  statements gave

          him a contractual right to be offered admission.

                    As  Mangla  correctly  asserts,   the  graduate  school

          catalog is not  a wholly integrated contract but  instead is only

          one part of a  more complex contractual relationship between  the

          student and  the college.   We do  not foreclose  the possibility

          that, under certain circumstances, the  university could obligate

          itself through the actions and  oral statements of its officials,

                                         -7-

          despite the language of the caveat provision.  A reasonable jury,

          however, could  not find that  such circumstances  exist in  this

          case.

                    Particularly fatal to  Mangla's contract claim in  this

          case  was  his  failure  to  secure  a  recommendation  from  the

          department faculty.  Mangla admitted at  trial that he understood

          that a faculty recommendation was a prerequisite to his admission

          as  a  regular degree  candidate.    Mangla maintains  that  this

          requirement was reasonably  met by a  letter signed by  Professor

          Zdonik, a member of the Computer Science department faculty.  The

          Zdonik  letter  does  not,  however,  recommend  that  Mangla  be

          admitted.   Rather,  the letter,  addressed "To  whomever  it may

          concern," identifies Mangla  as a graduate student  working under

          Zdonik's supervision "for his Master's project" and requests that

          Mangla be  provided with  help and the  use of resources  for his

          research while living in Princeton,  New Jersey.  Mangla does not

          claim to have  informed Zdonik of his intent to use the letter as

          a letter of recommendation.  Indeed, Mangla does not even contend

          the letter  was a  faculty recommendation,  but instead  contends

          that  he  reasonably  believed  it  was  the  "equivalent   of  a

          recommendation."   No reasonable jury  could find that the letter

          signed  by  Zdonik  reasonably fulfilled  the  prerequisite  of a

          faculty recommendation.   As a  result, no reasonable  jury could

          conclude that  Brown should  have reasonably  expected Mangla  to

          believe  that the university was contractually obligated to admit

          him.

                                         -8-

                                         III.
                                         III.

                    Mangla  argues that a  jury could reasonably  find that

          Brown  acted arbitrarily  or in  bad faith  in refusing  to admit

          Mangla  as  a  regular  degree candidate.    Brown  responds that

          Mangla's  claim   of   arbitrariness  must   fail   because   the

          university's   decision   did  not   substantially   depart  from

          established academic norms.

                    Under Rhode  Island law,  contracts contain an  implied

          duty of good faith  and fair dealing.  See A.A.A.  Pool Service &
                                                 ___ ______________________

          Supply, Inc.  v. Aetna Casualty &  Surety Co., 395 A.2d  724, 725
          ____________     ____________________________

          (R.I. 1978).  Because the parties  do not  contend otherwise,  we

          assume for  the purposes  of argument that  Brown's duty  of good

          faith   extended  to  its  review  of  Mangla's  application  for

          admission as a degree candidate.   We thus turn our focus to  the

          question of whether Brown met that duty.

                    The decision to grant or deny admission to a student is

          a quintessential matter  of academic judgment.   Courts have long

          recognized that matters of academic judgment are generally better

          left to  the educational institutions  than to the  judiciary and

          have accorded  great deference where  such matters are  at issue.

          As the Supreme Court stated  in Regents of University of Michigan
                                          _________________________________

          v. Ewing,  474 U.S. 214,  225 (1985), "Plainly, [judges]  may not
             _____

          override  [the faculty's professional judgment] unless it is such

          a  substantial departure  from  accepted  academic  norms  as  to

          demonstrate  that the  person or  committee  responsible did  not

          actually exercise professional judgment."

                                         -9-

                    Applying the standard of deference enunciated in Ewing,
                                                                     _____

          we conclude that  no reasonable jury could find  that Brown acted

          arbitrarily  or in  bad faith in  refusing to  admit Mangla  as a

          regular  degree  candidate.    The  Computer  Science  Department

          recommended  against Mangla's admission on the ground that Mangla

          did  not  demonstrate an  ability  to undertake  the  research or

          independent work required for a  Master's thesis or project.  The

          department's position was  based in part on  negative assessments

          of  Mangla's research capabilities provided by professors who had

          supervised Mangla's previous attempts at a research project.

                    Mangla argues  the department's decision  was arbitrary

          and in bad faith  because he was never informed that  he would be

          judged  on  his  ability  to do  independent  research.   Mangla,

          however,  was aware  that  a  Master's thesis  or  project was  a

          necessary component  of the Master's  program.  We believe  it is

          self-evident  that  a  committee evaluating  an  application  for

          admission into  a Master's  program would  be concerned  with the

          applicant's  prospects  of  successfully  completing  the  degree

          requirements.

                    The  evidence  establishes  that  Brown  judged  Mangla

          according  to legitimate criteria and  had a sufficient basis for

          believing that Mangla did not meet those criteria.  Consequently,

          no reasonable jury could infer that Brown acted arbitrarily or in

          bad  faith when  it  decided  not to  admit  Mangla  as a  degree

          candidate.

                                         IV.
                                         IV.

                                         -10-

                    Finally,  Mangla argues  that a  reasonable  jury could

          have  found Brown  liable on  a promissory  estoppel theory.   We

          reject his argument.

                    Under Rhode Island  law, "A promise which  the promisor

          should reasonably expect to  induce action or forbearance on  the

          part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such

          action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only

          by  enforcement  of  the  promise."    B.M.L.  Corp.  v.  Greater
                                                 _____________      _______

          Providence Deposit Corp.,  et al., 495 A.2d 675,  677 (R.I. 1985)
          _________________________________

          (quoting 1  Restatement (Second) Contracts    90 at  242 (1981)).

          Thus, the proper focus of our inquiry is again  on the reasonable

          expectations of the party making the manifestation.

                    As  we have previously discussed, Brown should not have

          reasonably expected Mangla to rely on the oral statements of Dean

          Lusk or the  individual faculty  members as  binding promises  of

          admission.  Therefore, we uphold the district court's ruling that

          no  reasonable  jury could  find  that  Brown was  estopped  from

          denying Mangla admission as a Master's degree candidate.

                    We affirm the judgment as  a matter of law in favor  of
                       ______

          Brown University. 

                                         -11-