Court Opinion

ID: 9516551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:45:09.026166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:34.147032
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.
dissenting. I respectfully dissent because the language of 28 V.S.A. § 255 is plain and unambiguous, and it is the function of this Court to enforce the plain meaning of the statute. Where the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it must be. enforced according to its terms, In re 66 No. Main Street, 145 Vt. 1, 3, 481 A.2d 1053, 1055 (1984), and “there is no need for construction.” Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 86, 499 A.2d 23, 26 (1985). I find no “narrow and particular circumstances,” Dykstra v. Property Valuation & Review Division, 156 Vt. 215, 218, 591 A.2d 63, 65 (1991), which would permit a deviation from the rule that the plain meaning of statutory language will be enforced. While relief from service of the one-year prison term may not have been what the trial court intended, the statute clearly and unequivocally requires it. The result can be easily avoided in future cases by more careful drafting of the terms of probation. See State v. Murray, 159 Vt. 198, 202-06, 617 A.2d 135, 137-39 (1992) (general language of probation agreement insufficient to allow court to extend the duration of defedant’s probation where specific term of probation agreement provided a limited probation period); State v. White, 150 Vt. 132, 135, 549 A.2d 1069, 1072 (1988)(same). We should not use a strained and tortured construction of a statute to achieve a desired result. I would reverse.
I am authorized to say that Justice Gibson joins in this dissent.