Court Opinion

ID: 9853227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:44:44.016137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.062420
License: Public Domain

Hays, C. J.
I respectfully dissent.
Being a law action, this court is limited to the correction of errors in the trial court. Rule 334, R. C. P. The trial court directed a verdict as to defendant’s pleaded setoff in his answer and dismissed his counterclaim which was stated in two counts. In the setoff and , count 1 of the counterclaim the defendant pleaded as follows: “* * * while certain employees * * * of the plaintiff * * * were performing certain repair and construction work * * * said * * * employee # * * so carelessly and. negligently operated an acetylene [electric] cutting or welding torch as to cause said building * * * to catch fire * * * and that as a direct and proximate result thereof this defendant suffered damage * * * [Italics mine].” Count 2 of the counterclaim contains the same statement with the additional statements: “* * * that by reason of the facts and circumstances * * * the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care in the use and management of the said instrumentalities under his exclusive care and control * * *. That defendant * * * is relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”
I. Error assigned as to the setoff and count 1 of the counterclaim is that general negligence was alleged and there is sufficient evidence to take such propositions to the jury. The trial court directed a verdict as to the setoff and dismissed count 1 on the basis of no showing of negligence in the manner as alleged therein.
The majority opinion states that while it need not be determined whether defendant pleaded general or specific negligence, it assumes a specific act of negligence is charged. As I read the opinion, after making such a statement, it literally casts it aside and considers the allegation of negligence to be general. It in effect says that defendant pleads plaintiff was negligent in the manner in which it performed the work of repair or construction, which it was employed to do.
The defendant’s allegation of negligence is clear and unambiguous. It plainly alleges that plaintiff’s employees so negligently operated the torch as to cause the fire. The word “operate” has various meanings according to the context, but generally *136means, “to put into, or to continue in operation or activity; * « * £0 manage. * * » -¿o work, as to operate a, machine; to perform a work or labor.” 67 C. J. S., page 502; Webster’s International Dictionary. See also Miller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 66 Iowa 364, 23 N.W. 756; Babcock v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 72 Iowa 197, 33 N.W. 628; Mears v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 103 Iowa 203, 72 N.W. 509; Connors v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 111 Iowa 384, 82 N.W. 953; Volquardsen v. Iowa Telephone Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N.W. 928, 28 L. R. A., N. S., 554; Haller v. Quaker Oats Co., 181 Iowa 389, 164 N.W. 863; State v. Erie, 210 Iowa 974, 232 N.W. 279, 72 A. L. R. 137. There can be little question as to the meaning of the word “operated” as pleaded above. “Context” means “a part of a discourse preceding or following a text, passage or word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning.” Webster’s International Dictionary. By using the word “torch” after the word “operated” defendant eleai’ly limits the charge of negligence to the manner in which plaintiff’s employees managed or used the torch. Under it, defendant was privileged to show any act or acts of plaintiff’s employees in the use or operation of the torch, i.e., such as, that it was carelessly handled; that the cutting flame was too high;' that it emitted sparks; or any other happening that might show or tend to show that the torch was not operating in a proper manner, or, perhaps, that it was being operated by inexperienced or incompetent workmen. Scan the record as you will, there is not one scintilla of evidence in regard thereto. The record merely shows the torch was being used and that somewhere in the vicinity a fire started. It may have been due to negligence in the operation or use of the torch or it may not. It may not have been necessary for the defendant to pin point wherein plaintiff was negligent, but he did so and thus limited the grounds of inquiry to the negligence thus charged. See Volquardsen v. Iowa Telephone Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N.W. 928, 28 L. R. A., N. S., 554; Stone v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 149 Iowa 240, 244, 128 N.W. 354; Thompson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 158 Iowa 235, 238, 139 N.W. 557; Rauch v. Des Moines Elec. Co., 206 Iowa 309, 218 N.W. 340. To have submitted any other would constitute error. Jakeway v. Allen, 227 Iowa 1182, 290 N.W. 507.
*137The majority opinion says that in determining whether there is negligence in a particular case the circumstances of that case are to be considered and that the most common definition of negligence is “failure to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances.” The opinion further states, “It may be conceded that if plaintiff had been using this torch under different circumstances — say in a vacant, fireproof building — it would not have been negligent in so doing. But it does not follow it was not negligent in using its torch on this building under the circumstances shown by the evidence.” It then recites at considerable length the type of building, its contents and failure to have a fire extinguisher handy. What the opinion says is that the jury might find plaintiff was negligent in attempting to cut the holes by means of a torch, regardless of what the record may show as to the manner in which the torch was operated. The answer to that is defendant did not so plead. Moyers v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 242 Iowa 1038, 48 N.W.2d 881; Roller v. Independent Silo Co., 242 Iowa 1277, 49 N.W.2d 838, and Ruth v. O’Neill, 245 Iowa 1158, 66 N.W.2d 44, are cited as authority for the majority view. In the Ruth case the negligence was clear-and the real issue was causation. In the Roller case it is clear that the electric wires had been scraped in working on the silo and ágain causation -was the issue, not negligence. The Sears case pleads general negligence in the installation of a furnace. The opinion also cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions but an examination thereof clearly shows such a different pleading and factual situation as to eliminate them as an authority here. In my opinion the trial court was correct as to the setoff and count 1 of the counterclaim.
II. The majority opinion also states that defendant was entitled to go to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur theory. I do not agree and think the trial court was correct. -
The opinion rightly states that the mere occurrence of a fire does not permit an inference of negligence under the res ipsa doctrine and that he must establish the way the injury occurred as well as his adversary’s control of the instrumentalities involved. It then says, “Since, as we have held, the evidence justifies the finding the torch caused the fire [referring no doubt to *138Division IY of the opinion], defendant was entitled to go to the jury on the issue of res ipsa loquitur.”
While the basic principle of the rule is well established, it is also well established that the absence of any of the foundation facts makes the rule inapplicable. Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 66 N.W.2d 465, 50 A. L. R.2d 964. The first foundation fact is, “what thing caused the damage?” As is stated in Orr v. Des Moines Elec. L. Co., 207 Iowa 1149, 1155, 222 N.W. 560, 562: “It is only where the evidence shows the acts which produced the injury that the presumption of negligence can arise under this doctrine. That is to say, until it is known what did occasion the injury, it cannot be presumed that the defendant was guilty of some negligence which produced the injury.” (Italics added.) In 65 C. J. S., Negligence, section 220(8)b, page 1010, it is said, “In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur, plaintiff must establish the thing that caused the injury.” See also annotation 49 A. L. R.2d 368.
The majority opinion sets forth the record in the light most favorable to the defendant, and rightfully so. Taking the testimony set forth therein and all the rest as it appears in the record and in my opinion, there is not one word that will show the torch was the thing that caused the fire. In Dodge v. McFall, 242 Iowa 12, 14, 45 N.W.2d 501, 502, it is said, “No presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact of injury to the plaintiff, although it may arise from the nature of the cause or the manner of the injury.” (Citing Cahill v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 148 Iowa 241, 246, 125 N.W. 331, 28 L. R. A., N. S., 1121.) In the Cahill case, page 246, it gives two examples of what is meant by the statement, “from the nature of the cause or manner of the injury”: (1) A trainman injured while in line of duty will not justify an inference of negligence on the part of the employer, but if it appear the injury was received in a collision between two trains of the same company moving in opposite directions on the same track, an inference of negligence does arise. (2) A workman in a mine is injured from the explosion of a blast— this alone will not entitle him to recover, but if he was entitled to a warning before the blast and none was given, a different rule prevails. I have found nothing in the record nor does the majority opinion point out anything that makes any exception to the *139statement in the Dodge case that, “No presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact of [an] injury”, and yet that is just what the majority opinion does: a building, a blowtorch used near the top of the wall in the south end, a fire starts at the bottom of the wall somewhere near the place where the torch is being used. Room for plenty of inference but it can only be inference that permits one to say the torch caused the fire.
Another foundation fact necessary if the rule is to apply is that the instrumentality causing the fire was in exclusive control of the plaintiff in the instant case.
The record shows that whatever work was done by plaintiff was confined to the outside of the warehouse. At the time the work was done defendant had an employee named Hoffman who was a general warehouse laborer. On the day in question he was in and about the building and just before the plaintiff commenced work he moved some cardboard cartons in the warehouse. Whether he left the building after moving the cartons does not appear and he was not called as a witness. It does not appear that plaintiff was in the exclusive control of the building during the cutting period. Under the rule announced in Highland Golf Club v. Sinclair Ref. Co., D. C. Iowa (Judge Graven), 59 F. Supp. 911, the rule does not apply.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Smith and LarsoN, JJ., join in this dissent.