Court Opinion

ID: 9908666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:01:05.773438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.792721
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2050     Document: 010110966176        Date Filed: 12/11/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         December 11, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-2050
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:21-CR-01286-KG-1)
  VICTOR CRUZ-CRUZ,                                             (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-2051
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:21-CR-01178-KG-1)
  VICTOR CRUZ-CRUZ, a/k/a Basilio                               (D. N.M.)
  Cruz-Cruz,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       *
               This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
 doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
 however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-2050     Document: 010110966176          Date Filed: 12/11/2023       Page: 2

        Defendant-Appellant Victor Cruz-Cruz was living in Mexico when he began

 receiving threats from a cartel, which motivated him to flee Mexico for the United States.

 U.S. border patrol agents intercepted him near the border, and he eventually pleaded

 guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for unlawfully reentering the United States after

 entering unlawfully on several previous occasions. At sentencing, the district court

 imposed a 30-month term of imprisonment in connection with Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s latest

 reentry violation. The court also found that Mr. Cruz-Cruz had violated terms of

 supervised release that were in place due to a previous reentry offense. It imposed an 18-

 month sentence for the supervised-release violation, with 6 months to run consecutive to

 the sentence for Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s latest reentry conviction, yielding a total sentence of 36

 months’ imprisonment. 1

        During the sentencing hearing, before setting Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s guidelines range or

 analyzing the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court warned Mr.

 Cruz-Cruz that “that if you do return in the future, the sentence does become much longer

 with each return.” The court then imposed a term of imprisonment that exceeded the

 sentence Mr. Cruz-Cruz received for his previous reentry offense. Mr. Cruz-Cruz argues

 for the first time on appeal that the district court committed a plain procedural error by

 determining, before undertaking the relevant statutory sentencing analysis, that his

 sentence must exceed the term imposed on his previous reentry conviction. He also

        1
               This case on appeal is comprised of two consolidated actions: No. 22-
 2050, in which Mr. Cruz-Cruz was convicted of unlawful reentry; and No. 22-2051,
 which is the revocation proceeding.
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 argues—again for the first time on appeal—that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconstitutional

 because Congress enacted the statute based on discriminatory animus. Mr. Cruz-Cruz

 acknowledges that he cannot establish plain error at this juncture because there is no

 controlling precedent that supports his challenge. However, he observes that we are

 considering the same constitutional challenge in United States v. Amador-Bonilla, No.

 22-6036, and says that he is raising his challenge solely for purposes of preservation, in

 the hopes of benefitting from a ruling favorable to the defendant in Amador-Bonilla.

        Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),

 we hold that the district court did not plainly err. Accordingly, we uphold Mr. Cruz-

 Cruz’s conviction and sentence and affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                              I

        Mr. Cruz-Cruz was born in Veracruz, Mexico. He first entered the United States

 illegally as a minor, and he lived here for approximately eight years, at which point he

 was deported. Between 2008 and 2018, Mr. Cruz-Cruz unlawfully reentered the United

 States and was deported back to Mexico on four other occasions. Notably, Mr. Cruz-

 Cruz had been previously convicted in federal court on three separate occasions for

 reentry-related offenses. As most relevant here, in 2010, he was convicted of such an

 offense in a New York federal court and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and three

 years of supervised release. And, in 2018, he was convicted of another reentry offense in

 an Arizona federal court and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and three years of

 supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment for this 2018 offense in 2019

 and was thereafter deported to Mexico for the fifth time. His conditions of release

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 included a requirement that he refrain from committing another federal offense and from

 reentering the United States without permission.

        After his fifth deportation, Mr. Cruz-Cruz did return to Veracruz and begin

 working as a municipal police officer. Several months later, he began receiving two

 paychecks and learned that one of the checks came as a “tip[]” from a cartel. R., Vol. II,

 ¶ 41, at 12 (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), filed Jan. 19, 2022). He thereafter

 quit the police force, but the cartel began sending him threats, so he relocated to another

 village. The cartel persisted, issuing threats to his family, at which point he relocated to

 another city in Mexico and arranged to reenter the United States. While he was in transit,

 the Cartel De El Noreste kidnapped Mr. Cruz-Cruz and held him for ransom. His family

 paid the ransom, and he thereafter fled to the United States.

        On June 4, 2021, border patrol agents found Mr. Cruz-Cruz in southern New

 Mexico without legal authorization. At that time, Mr. Cruz-Cruz was still serving a term

 of supervision in connection with his 2018 unlawful reentry offense. Mr. Cruz-Cruz

 pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to one count of unlawful reentry in violation of 8

 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) and (2), and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The Presentence Investigation

 Report (“PSR”) calculated his guidelines range on this count as 30-to-37 months’

 imprisonment. Mr. Cruz-Cruz also later admitted at his sentencing hearing that the same

 conduct violated his conditions of supervised release, for which the court listed his

 guidelines range as 18 to 24 months.

        Neither party objected to the PSR, and Mr. Cruz-Cruz moved for a downward

 variance. His motion explained in detail the dangerous circumstances that led him to flee

                                               4
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 Mexico for the United States. He also explained that he grew up poor, in an abusive

 household, and that his priority now is to return to Mexico in order to pay his family back

 for the ransom they paid and to help finance his ill mother’s medical expenses.

         The government requested a bottom-guidelines sentence of 30 months’

 imprisonment on the new reentry conviction and 18 months on the supervised release

 violation, with 9 months to run concurrently, for a total of 39 months. In doing so, the

 government emphasized that Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s previous sentence for unlawful reentry had

 not deterred him from unlawfully reentering the United States again in 2021. With

 respect to his claim that he fled Mexico out of concern for his safety, the government

 responded that he had not presented himself to border officials with a fear-based claim

 for relief.

         The district court then held a combined hearing on (1) the revocation and

 sentencing for Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s violation of supervised release, and (2) sentencing for his

 unlawful reentry conviction. At the hearing, Mr. Cruz-Cruz admitted that he violated the

 conditions of his supervised release. The court then heard arguments from the parties as

 to Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s sentence for his violation of supervised release and unlawful reentry.

         Following arguments, the court addressed Mr. Cruz-Cruz. It began by asking

 whether he had a plan to protect himself upon returning to Mexico. See R., Vol. IV, at 21

 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., dated Apr. 13, 2022). After receiving some assurances, the court

 then addressed Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s criminal history, explaining that this was Mr. Cruz-

 Cruz’s “third conviction for returning to the United States without permission” and

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 recounting the 18-and 24-month sentences he had received for his previous reentry

 offenses. Id. at 22. The court then made the following remarks:

                      Now, it’s very important that you do remember and
               consider that if you do return in the future, the sentence does
               become much longer with each return. And this is because any
               sentence has to promote respect for the law. And this being
               your third conviction, it is my intention to impose a sentence
               to promote respect for the law and to deter you from returning
               ever again in the future, not unless you have permission to do
               so.

 Id. (emphasis added).

        After several other cautionary statements, the court explained the basis for the

 sentence it intended to impose, stating:

               I’ll explain the sentence to you, Mr. Cruz. First, as to the
               charge to which you’ve admitted of returning to the United
               States after being deported, now, there are no objections to the
               presentence report, and, therefore, I’ll adopt all the factual
               findings. I’ve also considered the sentencing guidelines as
               they apply to your case, including the offense level of 13.
               Because of the convictions . . . you have on your record, your
               criminal history category is 5. The range for sentencing is 30
               to 37 months.

                      I’ve also considered the 3553 factors, including, as I’ve
               noted, your history of returning, your criminal history, your
               family, your son in the United States, and even the danger that
               resulted in your flight from Mexico.

 Id. at 23.

        The court then imposed its sentence. For the reentry violation, the court imposed a

 30-month term of imprisonment, noting that 30 months was the minimum pursuant to the

 guidelines and marked a 6-month increase from the sentence imposed in connection with

 Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s most recent past reentry violation. See id. at 23–24. The court also

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 imposed an 18-month sentence for Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s violation of his supervised release, of

 which 12 months would run concurrently with the sentence for his reentry violation,

 leaving 6 months to run consecutively. See id. at 25–26. Neither party raised any

 objections. Mr. Cruz-Cruz nevertheless subsequently filed this appeal.

                                               II

        Mr. Cruz-Cruz raises two challenges. First, he argues—under a plain error

 standard, which applies because he failed to raise this argument (i.e., forfeited it) before

 the district court—that the district court committed a plain procedural error and thereby

 imposed an unreasonable sentence by “setting an absolute sentencing floor based on the

 length of [his] prior reentry sentence.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 5. Second, he argues—

 again under plain error due to forfeiture in the district court—that 8 U.S.C. § 1326

 violates the right to equal protection guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United

 States Constitution because Congress enacted the statute based on discriminatory animus.

 Regarding his second argument, Mr. Cruz-Cruz concedes that he cannot satisfy the plain

 error standard under existing law. But because the same issue is pending before this

 Court in United States v. Amador-Bonilla, No. 22-6036, he raises the issue for purposes

 of preservation, arguing that if we decide Amador-Bonilla in the defendant’s favor, the

 district court’s error in sentencing him under § 1326 would become plain requiring

 reversal.

        Taking each issue in turn, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in

 connection with either issue Mr. Cruz-Cruz raises on appeal.

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                                                A

        We begin with Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s argument that the district court imposed an

 unreasonable sentence. When reviewing a district court’s sentence, we follow a “two-

 step process.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting

 United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895 (10th Cir. 2008)). First, we review the

 sentence for “procedural reasonableness” by determining “whether the district court

 committed any error in calculating or explaining the sentence.” Id. At the second step,

 we review for “substantive reasonableness,” asking “whether the length of the sentence is

 reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18

 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quoting United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208,

 1215 (10th Cir. 2008)).

        Mr. Cruz-Cruz raises only a procedural challenge. Therefore, we have no need to

 (and thus do not) reach the second step of the process. He argues that the district court

 committed a procedural error by setting an absolute sentencing floor commensurate with

 the length of the sentence imposed in connection with his prior reentry offense.

        We ordinarily review procedural challenges to a sentence for an abuse of

 discretion, but Mr. Cruz-Cruz acknowledges that he did not raise his procedural challenge

 before the district court, so our review is for plain error. See United States v. Gantt, 679

 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012). In order to satisfy the plain error standard, Mr. Cruz-

 Cruz must demonstrate the following: “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear

 or obvious under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If he satisfies these

 criteria, this Court may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the

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 fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Goode,

 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132,

 1141 (10th Cir. 2003)).

        In this case, we assume arguendo that the district court erred because, even

 assuming it did, any such error was not plain. Our analysis therefore begins and ends

 with the second prong of our plain error test.

                                               1

        “An error is plain if it is ‘clear or obvious under current, well-settled law.’”

 United States v. Faulkner, 950 F.3d 670, 678 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.

 Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 930 (10th Cir. 2013)). Ordinarily, “[f]or an error to be plain and

 contrary to well-settled law, either this court or the Supreme Court must have addressed

 the issue.” United States v. Marquez, 898 F.3d 1036, 1051 (10th Cir. 2018). 2

        2
               To be sure, we have observed that “[t]he absence of . . . precedent [on
 point] will not . . . prevent a finding of plain error if the district court’s interpretation
 was clearly erroneous.” United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009)
 (quoting United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003)). But we
 have generally applied this principle in circumstances where a statutory term clearly
 dictated a particular interpretation that the district court contravened. See United
 States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the error was
 plain, even absent precedent on point where the guidelines provision at issue “clearly
 and obviously” foreclosed the district court’s interpretation); cf. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d
 at 1187–88 (discerning no error that was plain, where no precedent was on point and
 the defendant’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provision was “not
 compelled”). Here, the resolution of the inquiry into whether the district court erred
 does not turn on the court’s interpretation of particular statutory language.
 Accordingly, this limited aspect of the plain error standard is not at issue here.

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         Mr. Cruz-Cruz argues that “the Supreme Court and this Court have plainly

  established ‘a required order of operations in federal sentencings’” under which a district

  court “is supposed to start with the facts, calculate the advisory guideline range, and then

  decide whether a variance is warranted to ensure a just sentence.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at

  7 (quoting United States v. Moore, 30 F.4th 1021, 1025 (10th Cir. 2022)). That process,

  he continues, requires courts to “start with the guidelines as [the] ‘initial benchmark,’ and

  then ‘make individualized determinations based on the applicable statutory criteria.’” Id.

  at 8 (first quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 536 (2013); then quoting United

  States v. Hartley, 34 F.4th 919, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2022)).

         Yet before adopting the uncontested guidelines range from the PSR or analyzing

  the § 3553(a) factors, the district court stated that if Mr. Cruz-Cruz reentered the United

  States again, “the sentence does become much longer with each return.” R., Vol. IV, at

  22. The judge then stated his “intention to impose a sentence to promote respect for the

  law and to deter [Mr. Cruz-Cruz] from returning ever again in the future.” Id. And after

  specifying the guidelines range and reviewing the § 3553(a) factors, the court then

  imposed a sentence that “mark[ed] a six-month increase from the sentence” Mr. Cruz-

  Cruz received on his prior reentry offense. Id. at 24. Mr. Cruz-Cruz argues the district

  court plainly erred by setting an absolute sentencing floor that was tied to the length of

  the sentence he received for his prior reentry offense.

         In arguing that the district court plainly erred, Mr. Cruz-Cruz relies on two of our

  recent precedents—Moore and Hartley—where we concluded that the district court did

  procedurally err by following a sentencing approach that effectively precluded

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  individualized analysis. In Moore, the district court offered the defendant a choice in

  selecting his sentence. See 30 F.4th at 1022. The defendant could have accepted an

  immediate 51-month term of imprisonment, which the government recommended, and

  which fell at the low end of his guidelines range. See id. at 1023. Alternatively, the court

  offered him a 48-month sentence of probation, subject to at least an 84-month term of

  imprisonment for any future probation violation. See id. at 1022–23. The defendant

  chose the latter option, and when he violated the terms of his probation, the district court

  sentenced him to the 84-month term of imprisonment it had promised. See id. at 1023–

  24.

         We held that the district court committed plain procedural error. See id. at 1025.

  As we explained, Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent “have established a

  required order of operations in federal sentencings” under which “[a] district court ‘is

  supposed to start with the facts,’ calculate the advisory guideline range, and then ‘decide

  whether a variance is warranted to ensure a just sentence.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

  Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2014)). “[T]he plain error” in Moore,

  we reasoned, “lies in preordaining a minimum future sentence and bypassing the required

  analysis that is available only after probation has been revoked.” Id. When a defendant

  violates his terms of probation, district courts must consider the § 3553(a) factors in

  deciding whether to continue the term of probation without revision or revoke probation

  and resentence the defendant. See id. at 1026. In Moore, the district court “bypass[ed]”

  that process by “preordaining” the sentence it would impose were the defendant to violate

  his terms of probation. Id. at 1025. The “problem” with the district court’s procedure is

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  that it could not “have known whether Mr. Moore’s future conduct would justify the at-

  least-33-month-consecutive increase to its offered 51-month sentence.” Id. Thus, we

  held the district court plainly erred.

         The second case Mr. Cruz-Cruz invokes is Hartley. There, two different

  defendants moved for early termination of their probation in separate proceedings before

  the same district judge. See 34 F.4th at 923–24. The judge denied their motions,

  reasoning—categorically—that early termination is not appropriate when probation

  constitutes the defendant’s entire sentence. See id. The judge employed the same

  language in denying both motions, as well as those of other defendants. See id.

         We held that the district court abused its discretion by “categorical[ly] reject[ing] .

  . . early termination of probation in these cases.” Id. at 932. District courts may

  “terminate probation upon consideration of (1) the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

  factors, (2) ‘the conduct of the defendant,’ and (3) ‘the interest of justice.’” Id. at 930–31

  (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c)). Hartley reasoned that the “district judge’s blanket policy”

  of denying early termination when probation amounted to the defendant’s entire sentence

  “is in direct conflict with . . . statutory . . . rules governing probation.” Id. (quoting

  United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005)). As we explained, “[t]he

  district court abused its discretion by refusing to exercise its discretion properly under

  § 3564(c).” Id. at 933.

         Mr. Cruz-Cruz argues that Moore and Hartley render the district court’s

  sentencing decision in his case plainly erroneous. Like the sentencing decisions in those

  cases, Mr. Cruz-Cruz argues that the district court, here, erroneously cabined its

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  discretion by indicating it would adopt—and then actually adopting—a sentence that

  exceeded the length of what he received on his prior reentry offense. In doing so, Mr.

  Cruz-Cruz argues the court “violated the established order of operations” and failed to

  consider how all the relevant factors “weighed against each other in this individual case.”

  Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 9–10.

                                                2

         Assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we conclude that its error was

  not plain—that is, clear or obvious. The district court did not commit the specific

  procedural errors that required reversal in Moore and Hartley, and those cases therefore

  do not constitute “well-settled law” that definitely resolves the issue Mr. Cruz-Cruz

  presents. Faulkner, 950 F.3d at 678 (quoting Brooks, 736 F.3d at 930).

         In Moore and Hartley, we concluded that the district courts erred because they

  explicitly predetermined the outcome of the defendants’ sentencing proceedings or

  applied a categorical policy that prevented the courts from analyzing the relevant

  statutory factors. In Moore, the district court set a specific minimum sentence—84

  months—if the defendant were to violate his terms of parole, which the court then

  applied when a violation occurred. See 30 F.4th at 1022–24. We concluded that the

  court plainly erred in doing so because it “bypass[ed] the required analysis” that applies

  in a revocation proceeding, and it “could[] [not] have known whether [the defendant’s]

  future conduct would justify the at-least-33-month-consecutive increase to [the court’s]

  offered 51-month sentence.” Id. at 1025. Likewise, in Hartley, before undertaking the

  relevant statutory analysis, the district court adopted a “blanket policy” that

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  “categorical[ly] reject[ed] . . . early termination of probation” where probation constitutes

  the entirety of the defendant’s sentence. 34 F.4th at 930–32.

         By contrast, in this case, the district court did not predetermine a specific sentence

  or apply a categorical policy. It stated that “if you do return in the future, the sentence

  does become much longer with each return.” R., Vol. IV, at 22. But the court never

  stated it would impose a longer sentence for Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s latest violation based on

  any legal requirement or “blanket policy” without considering the full range of factors

  that govern sentencing determinations. Cf. Hartley, 34 F.4th at 931; Moore, 30 F.4th at

  1025. Rather, its statement is most naturally read as a factual description of what

  typically occurs when federal courts sentence defendants for repeated unlawful reentry

  offenses in light of the statutory requirement that they impose sentences that “afford

  adequate deterrence” and “promote respect for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–

  (B). 3 Indeed, the court’s statement that “the sentence does become much longer with

         3
                As the government argues, the general principle that repeated violations
  tend to increase a defendant’s sentence permeates the federal sentencing regime. See
  Aplee.’s Resp. Br. at 12. The guidelines capture this principle:

                       The Comprehensive Crime Control Act sets forth
                four purposes of sentencing. (See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).)
                A defendant’s record of past criminal conduct is directly
                relevant to those purposes. A defendant with a record of
                prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender
                and thus deserving of greater punishment. General
                deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message
                be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will
                aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.

  U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual Ch. 4, Pt. A, intro. comment (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
  2021).
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  each return” immediately prefaced its discussion of deterrence, where the court explained

  it “inten[ded] to impose a sentence” that would “promote respect for the law and . . . deter

  [Mr. Cruz-Cruz] from returning ever again.” R., Vol. IV, at 22.

         Furthermore, the district court’s general statement that “if you do return in the

  future, the sentence does become much longer with each return,” did not prevent it from

  conducting an analysis pursuant to the applicable order of operations. Id. Specifically,

  after issuing background admonitions regarding repeated reentry violations, the court

  discussed Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s guidelines range and addressed the § 3553(a) factors. See id.

  at 23. And in doing so, the court accounted for “the danger that resulted in [Mr. Cruz-

  Cruz’s] flight from Mexico.” 4 Id. Thus, although the court revealed an intent to impose

  a sentence that was designed to deter future reentry violations, it did so as part of the

  holistic analysis required under our precedents.

         On plain error review, “[w]e . . . traditionally do not disturb decisions entrusted by

  statute or other rule of law to the discretion of a district court unless we have ‘a definite

  and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the

  bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477

  F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1042

         4
                Although the district court’s analysis under the § 3553(a) factors was
  arguably cursory, when imposing a sentence within the guidelines range, our
  precedents do not require more. See United States v. Lopez-Florez, 444 F.3d 1218,
  1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (“When the defendant has not raised any substantial
  contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and the district court
  imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range, our post-Booker precedents do not
  require the court to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors justify the
  sentence.”).
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  (10th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, we are guided by our traditional presumption that “[t]rial

  judges . . . know the law and apply it in making their decisions.” Id. (quoting United

  States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1512–13 (10th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, we decline

  here to find plain (i.e., clear or obvious) error based on a statement that appears to

  describe a factual reality of sentencing for repeated unlawful reentry violations and does

  not purport to invoke any legal requirement or blanket policy demanding successively

  longer sentences.

         To be sure, in Hartley we cautioned against drawing overly narrow distinctions in

  this area. See 34 F.4th at 932 n.8. As we explained, our “cases stand for the broader

  proposition that in the sentencing context a district court may not base its decision on ‘its

  own policy’ and ‘own custom,’ or a ‘preordain[ed] . . . minimum future sentence and

  bypass[ ] the required analysis.’” Id. (first quoting United States v. Cozad, 21 F.4th 1259,

  1266–67 (10th Cir. 2022); then quoting Moore, 30 F.4th at 1025). But the district court

  here did not base its sentencing determination on its own rigid policy or preordain Mr.

  Cruz-Cruz’s sentence in a way that bypassed the requisite statutory analysis.

                                                3

         Though it does not bind us on this appeal, the analysis of a Tenth Circuit panel in

  United States v. Corchado-Aguirre, 629 F. App’x 837 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished), is

  persuasive and reinforces our conclusion.

         Corchado-Aguirre addressed a procedural challenge to the defendant’s

  sentence for his fifth reentry conviction. See 629 F. App’x at 838. In connection

  with his fourth conviction, the defendant had received a 15-month sentence. See id.

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  When considering the sentence for his fifth conviction, the district court judge made

  several remarks concerning the appropriate sentence length. The judge stated the

  following: “[T]he sentences [for Mr. Corchado-Aguirre’[sic] illegal entry offenses]

  are getting longer, and nothing seems to work here.” Id. at 840 (alterations in

  original). The judge also stated that “[i]t would not be appropriate to sentence him to

  the same things he’s received in the past” and that “15 months . . . doesn’t seem to

  deter Mr. Corchado-Aguirre.” Id. The judge then sentenced the defendant to a 16-

  month term of imprisonment. See id. In light of the judge’s remarks, the defendant

  argued that the judge committed a procedural error because he mistakenly believed

  that, as a matter of law, he had to sentence the defendant to a term that exceeded

  what the defendant received in connection with his previous reentry violation. See

  id. at 839.

         A panel of our court, however, rejected the defendant’s position. See id. at

  840–41. As the panel reasoned, the district court’s “conclusion that the need for

  deterrence called for a sentence that was one month longer than his previous sentence

  for illegal re-entry was not based on an understanding that the law dictated such a

  result.” Id. at 840. Rather, it was based on the court’s “consideration that 15 months

  did not deter Mr. Corchado-Aguirre from reoffending for the fifth time.” Id. The

  court simply “decided a longer sentence was needed to provide added deterrence.”

  Id.

         We interpret the district court’s statements to Mr. Cruz-Cruz in a similar light.

  As in Corchado-Aguirre, the district court here never stated that the law or its own

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  blanket policy required the court to impose successively longer sentences for each

  reentry offense. Rather, read in context, the court’s statement that “the sentence does

  become much longer with each return” was part of its discussion stressing the need to

  promote deterrence. R., Vol. IV, at 22. Immediately after referring to increasingly

  longer sentences for future violations, the court emphasized that it planned “to

  impose a sentence [that would] promote respect for the law and . . . deter [Mr. Cruz-

  Cruz] from returning ever again.” Id. The district court’s statements suggest the

  court imposed a longer sentence on Mr. Cruz-Cruz’s latest reentry conviction “not

  because it thought the law compelled it, but because the defendant’s history of

  immigration offenses and sentences and the deterrence considerations called for it in

  this case.” 629 F. App’x at 840.

                                            ***

        For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Cruz-Cruz has failed to establish

  that the district court’s sentencing determination amounted to procedural error that was

  “clear or obvious under current, well-settled law.” Faulkner, 950 F.3d at 678 (quoting

  Brooks, 736 F.3d at 930).

                                              B

        Mr. Cruz-Cruz also argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 8 U.S.C.

  § 1326, is unconstitutional because Congress enacted the statute based on racially

  discriminatory animus, thereby violating the guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth

  Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 13 (citing Vill.

  of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). As Mr. Cruz-

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  Cruz acknowledges, he did not raise this argument before the district court. See id. at 14.

  But he explains that the same issue is before us in United States v. Amador-Bonilla, No.

  22-6036, so he raises the argument here solely for purposes of preservation. See id. He

  argues that if Amador-Bonilla comes down in favor of the defendant, he could satisfy our

  plain-error standard, which would require that we vacate his latest conviction under

  § 1326 and remand for resentencing on his supervised released violation. See id. at 13–

  14.

         The government responds that Mr. Cruz-Cruz cannot establish plain error on the

  grounds that § 1326 is unconstitutional because no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case

  has reached that conclusion. See Aplee.’s Resp. Br. at 17–18. However, the government

  acknowledges that if the Supreme Court or this Court were to strike down § 1326 on the

  grounds Mr. Cruz-Cruz raises here, he has preserved his challenge. See id.

         We conclude that Mr. Cruz-Cruz has preserved his right to pursue his

  constitutional challenge to § 1326 in the event we issue a ruling that is favorable to the

  defendant in Amador-Bonilla. Yet to be clear, we have yet to issue a decision in Amador-

  Bonilla. And, as Mr. Cruz-Cruz concedes, see Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 6, he cannot—at

  present, without a favorable ruling in Amador-Bonilla—establish that the district court

  committed a “clear or obvious” error “under current, well-settled law.” Faulkner, 950

  F.3d at 678 (quoting Brooks, 736 F.3d at 930). Accordingly, even assuming that § 1326

  is unconstitutional and the district court consequently erred in applying it, Mr. Cruz-Cruz

  cannot establish at this time that any such error was “plain”—that is, clear or obvious. Id.

  We therefore reject his constitutional challenge to his conviction under § 1326.

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                                         III

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

                                          Entered for the Court

                                          Jerome A. Holmes
                                          Chief Judge

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