Court Opinion

ID: 9909349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 07:08:56.570001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:06.758799
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in part; Reversed and Rendered in part; and Opinion Filed
December 8, 2023

                                        In the
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00080-CV

  STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
     ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant
                            V.
                   ANNE TANNER, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the Collin County Probate
                             Collin County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-2020

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                            Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      Steven Williams sued Anne Tanner for allegedly breaching a Rule 11

settlement agreement. After a jury found in his favor, the trial court signed a final

judgment awarding Williams his damages but granting Tanner’s motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict concerning attorney’s fees. Williams asks us

to reinstate the jury’s attorney’s fees award. We affirm in part and reverse and render

in part in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
      Williams sued Tanner to enforce a settlement agreement and alleged several

causes of action, including breach of contract. Counsel represented Williams and

Tanner appeared pro se. During trial, Williams’s counsel presented evidence

concerning his attorney’s fees and Tanner neither objected, conducted any cross-

examination, nor presented any controverting evidence. The proposed jury charge

focused on Tanner’s alleged breach of contract and contained questions concerning

Williams’s attorney’s fees; again, Tanner did not object.

      The jury found Tanner committed a material breach of the underlying Rule 11

settlement agreement and awarded $6,338.39 in damages, $37,811 in attorney’s fees,

$30,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, and another $45,000 for representation at the

Supreme Court of Texas through oral argument and the completion of proceedings.

Tanner then acquired counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, and argued Williams should take nothing based on (1) an ambiguity in the

Rule 11 agreement, (2) the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because a person

necessary for the just adjudication of the dispute was not involved, and (3)

Williams’s failure to segregate his attorney’s fees.

      The trial court granted Tanner’s motion only with respect to Williams’s

attorney’s fees because the evidence “was insufficient to support a judgment” and

Williams failed to segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Williams

timely appealed and, in three issues, argues the trial court erred because (1) Tanner

waived her objections and Williams sufficiently segregated his fees, (2) some

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evidence supports the jury’s fee award, and (3) the trial court granted relief Tanner

did not request.

      In his first issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s

motion because Tanner waived her arguments concerning attorney’s fees. The

record shows Tanner failed to object to Williams’s evidence concerning attorney’s

fees in a timely manner and failed to object to the jury charge; instead, her first

complaint about his fees appeared in her motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. Tanner’s untimely complaint is therefore waived. See Green Int’l, Inc. v.

Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 1997); In re A.M.W., 313 S.W.3d 887, 893

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Ogden v. Ryals, No. 14-10-01052-CV, 2012 WL

3016856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict based on a failure to segregate attorney’s fees.

      In his second issue, Williams argues the evidence sufficiently supports the

jury’s verdict as to fees. Though the segregation complaint is waivable, evidence

must still sufficiently support the jury’s verdict, and a trial court can properly

disregard a jury’s answer if it does not. See Green Int’l Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389–90

(citing Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994)). A

trial court may disregard a jury finding only if it is unsupported by evidence or if the

issue is immaterial. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157. Our review of the trial court’s ruling

employs the well-settled legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard. Del Bosque v.

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Barbosa, No. 05-22-00230-CV, 2023 WL 1097556, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.

30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      “Generally, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding and a

JNOV must be granted when the record demonstrates: (1) the complete absence of

evidence on a vital fact; (2) a rule of law or evidence precluded according weight to

the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a

vital fact amounted to no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively

established the opposite of a vital fact.” Id. The record lacks evidence conclusively

establishing that Williams was not entitled to attorney’s fees and neither the trial

court nor the parties have identified any rule of law or evidence that precluded

according weight to Williams’s evidence.

      Instead, the record reveals that Williams’s attorney testified as to the specific

legal services he performed on his client’s behalf, the general reasons he needed to

perform those services, when he performed those services, the amount of time it took

him to perform those services, his hourly rates through the years he performed

relevant services, the reasonableness of the amount of time it took him to complete

those services, and the reasonableness of his hourly rate as it increased over the

years. Counsel specifically prefaced each explanation of fees by limiting it to those

fees caused by Tanner’s breach. The evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s

verdict. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017); Rohrmoos Venture

v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019). This evidence is

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also more than a scintilla concerning vital facts. Del Bosque, 2023 WL 1097556, at

*2. As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence supporting

Williams’s attorney’s fees.

      Finally, Tanner attempts to raise cross-points challenging the remaining

portions of the jury’s verdict but has not filed a notice of appeal. In the absence of a

notice of appeal, we cannot grant her more favorable relief than the trial court

granted except for just cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); City of Austin v.

Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012); Dean v. Lafeyette Place (Section

One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 817–18 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Tanner has not addressed, nor do we find just cause in the

record to grant greater relief than the trial court granted. Thus, the absence of a notice

of appeal waives Tanner’s cross-points. See id.; Lubbock Cnty., Texas v. Trammel’s

Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. 2002); Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist.

v. GE Capital Corp., 58 S.W.3d 290, 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).

      Accordingly, without reaching Williams’s third issue, see TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1, we reverse the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to

Williams’s attorney’s fees, render judgment including Williams’s attorney’s fees,

and affirm the remaining portions of the judgment.
                                              /Cory L. Carlyle/
                                             CORY L. CARLYLE
                                             JUSTICE
230080f.p05
                                           –5–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS                            On Appeal from the Collin County
INDEPENDENT                                    Probate, Collin County, Texas
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE                           Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-
ESTATE OF COURTNEY                             2020.
WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant                  Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
                                               Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
No. 05-23-00080-CV           V.                participating.

ANNE TANNER, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED in part and judgment is RENDERED reinstating the jury’s
award of Williams’s attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment
is AFFIRMED.

    It is ORDERED that appellant STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS,
DECEASED recover his costs of this appeal from appellee ANNE TANNER.

Judgment entered this 8th day of December, 2023.

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