Court Opinion

ID: 9692931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:12:47.506002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:25.517210
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent to the holding of the majority and would affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the trial court.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of interfering with Custody of Children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904, as a result of taking his child and keeping him for a period of four years in violation of a custody Order. Following the jury verdict, he was sentenced to a period of incarceration of nine to twenty-four months. The thrust of the charge was that appellant, the father of a male child known as “Bugsy” and born May 3,1978, took Bugsy from the jurisdiction in violation of temporary and final Orders awarding custody to the mother. Appellant held the child in various locations in the states of Maine, Pennsylvania, New York and Texas from January of 1981 through July of 1984.
The appellant raises nine issues 1 in his appeal, all of which were considered and properly resolved by the court below. I would rely on the decision of the Honorable Thomas C. Raup in the trial court but believe further amplification to be in order on the issue of the existence of the court Order and appellant’s knowledge of it, the issue as to the statute of limitations as a defense and appropriateness of sentence. The majority would find no valid Order existed as personal notice was never given of the pendency of a custody action.
As to the first issue, appellant maintains there could be no “taking” within the intent of the statute (18 Pa.C.S. § 2904) if there had been no court Order in existence prior *491to the time the child was taken. The rationale is that prior to the existence of a court Order, both parents have an equal right to custody of the child. That argument is sound except where the court has acquired jurisdiction to enter an Order by the filing of a complaint with notice to the respondent and thereafter a valid Order was entered. Notice can be established by personal service on the party or his counsel or by proof of actual knowledge by the party that he knew of the time, place and nature of the proceeding. The night before the hearing of February 6, appellant was told by appellee (by phone) of the hearing.
The evidence in this case was clear and convincing, if not overwhelming, that appellant knew there was to be a custody hearing on February 6, 1981, and that a preliminary Order of January 1981 had preserved the status quo by keeping primary custody with the mother. This case is very similar to Fatemi v. Fatemi, 371 Pa.Super. 101, 537 A.2d 840 (1988) as to notice, as in that case, personal notice was never given but actual notice was attributed to the father, who absconded with the child (Majority Opinion, Cirillo, P.J.; Concurring Opinion, Tamilia, J.). Neither appellant or his counsel appeared before the master or court, and on that date, February 6, the court entered a custody Order in favor of the mother.
The subsequent behavior of appellant and his family in traveling from state to state and surreptitiously slipping in and out of Pennsylvania after appellant’s mother, May Stewart, was notified by Lenore Urbano, appellee’s attorney, of the Order prior to February 27, 1981, (May Stewart was later correctly designated by the court as an unindicted co-conspirator) is convincing evidence of actual notice of the court Order and retention of the child in face of that Order. The Order itself must be considered unassailable as having been properly entered. The appellant had his opportunity to be heard and chose flight and concealment to avoid its implications. For four years he concealed himself and the child in Maine, New York and Texas and would only permit brief visits with the child by the mother, under his absolute *492control, until he was arrested by the F.B.I. in Texas. The taking occurred once the Order was entered and he acquired knowledge of it. Once it became clear that appellant had actual knowledge of the Order, “a taking” is established, as was correctly concluded by the trial judge and jury-
The second issue flows from the first in that the appellant alleges the taking occurs, for purpose of the two-year statute of limitations, as of the initial physical control exercised in January 1981. I do not agree. The interference with custody legislation was implemented to stop child snatching. This restrictive interpretation of the statute of limitation posited by appellant would encourage it. The personality capable of taking a child and concealing it from the other parent is motivated by obstinacy, hate and anger and frequently control over the child becomes the core of his existence and the greatest revenge that can be extracted is deprivation of the child from the other party. To hold that the statute runs two years from the initial taking, rather than when the taking ceases by return, places the wrongdoer at risk for only two years, a risk many would consider well worth the effort. The trial court correctly held this to be a continuing offense. The trial court referring to the comments of the Joint State Government Commission, concerning section 2904, held that the conduct which was to be prevented by the statute was long term interference and not sporadic brief acts; therefore, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the defendant’s course of conduct is terminated. Finally, the trial court held that the appellant was notified of the Order in July 1984 while in New York, which brings him within two years of the statute at any rate. It was at that time that he fled from New York, stopping in Pennsylvania, thereafter alighting in Texas.
Finally, appellant alleges an excessive sentence. While appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987) in presenting a statement of reasons necessary for this Court to review the discretionary aspects of the sen*493tenee, because the Commonwealth has raised no objections, I would consider it.
The range of sentence employed by the court is within the guideline ranges and does not exceed the statutory limits. The sentencing record discloses that the court considered the gravity of the offense and its impact on appellee and her children. This crime is one of extreme emotional cruelty to the mother and the devastation psychologically that it imposed on the child, to deny him contact with his mother, alienate him from her and his sibling, deny him important educational opportunities, and surround him with an atmosphere of concealment, subterfuge and flight, is incalculable. Many crimes of violence do not leave this emotional impact lingering in the lives of their victims. I believe the trial court considered the appellant and his past, his violence physically and psychologically and agree with his belief that a strong impact must be made on appellant to prevent future behavior of a similar nature. I find no error in this sentence. I believe the trial court has carefully disposed of the remaining substantive and legal issues and would affirm the judgment of sentence.

. We deliberately focus our attention on the basic issues in this case as appellant is in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) which limits Statement of Questions Involved to one page.