Court Opinion

ID: 9630196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:04:44.06024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:33.556834
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Justice
(dissenting).
This appeal presents for decision three basic issues: First, was the jury correctly-instructed as to the law? Included in this question..is whether appellant is entitled to> *544instructions applicable to his testimony based upon the hypothesis that it is true, when such testimony affects a material issue. Second, can the right of appellant to reclaim money which he was required to pay to be relieved from a forfeiture of his bond be now decided? Third, was the entry into the Tetonia Club at the time charged a lawful entry and without intent to steal?
While some other assignments of error are not without merit, the propositions above outlined are, in my opinion, decisive of the appeal and should result in a reversal of the conviction.
State’s witnesses testified in substance that in the early morning (night time) of December 29, 1952, they observed two men enter the Tetonia Club and emerge carrying two slot machines. These machines were placed in a motor vehicle and the two men returned to the club and later reappeared with two more slot machines. Witnesses observed no tools or instrumentalities that could be or were used in breaking into the building. The men carrying the machines appeared to be in no hurry. Other witnesses testified to matters connecting appellant as being one of the persons who entered the Club.
Appellant did not deny the entry or the taking of the machines from the building. He testified that he purchased the machines; paid $250 for them, and the money contained therein, and secured permission from the proprietor or his agent to take possession of the machines at the time and place im question; that his only purpose i'n entering the building was to - obtain what he owned; that he had no intention of committing larceny while in the building. Of the five slot machines identified as allegedly stolen, one, the witness testified, had been delivered to him by the proprietor of the business, or his agent, on December 27th, and arrangements were made between the Club manager and appellant for appellant to come back after closing hours for the other machines purchased and paid for. Also, it was arranged with the manager, or proprietor’s agent, that if the place were not open when appellant came for the machines, the door would be unlocked and he might enter. Appellant testified the door was unlocked and he entered and took the machines as per agreement.
; Appellant also explained why the manager of the Club did not want the four machines removed during business hours. The explanation given is reasonable.
If appellant’s testimony be true, he committed no crime. Whether the testimony be true or false is for the determination of the jury, to be decided by it on proper instructions. Until such time as appellant has been so tried and found guilty, he cannot be legally convicted.
It follows that if appellant entered the Tetonia Club with the permission and consent of the owner, his agent, or one in charge as manager, to take what he allegédly owned and had formerly purchased, he is not guilty of burglary or any other crime.
When, appellant entered the building which he. was' charged with burglarizing, *545in order to constitute the crime of burglary, there must have existed in his mind at the time of the entry, a specific intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or some felony. If the intent did not exist at the time of the entry, regardless of what happened thereafter, the crime of burglary was not committed. State v. Dwyer, 33 Idaho 224, 191 P. 203; State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 199 P. 647, 17 A.L.R. 902; State v. Bigley, 53 Idaho 636, 26 P.2d 375.
The burglarious intent may be shown by stealing property after the entry is made, but one cannot steal what he already owns.
Conformable to his defense, and with evidence to support the contention, appellant requested the following instruction:
“You are further instructed that the crime of ‘burglary’ requires a specific intent. By this it is meant that the State has the burden of proving that at the time the defendant entered the Tetonia Club, if you find that he did enter it, that he entered said establishment with the specific intent to commit larceny therein, and if he entered for some other purpose than to commit larceny, it would not constitute burglary.- This intent, like other essential elements of the offense charged, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The instruction so requested was a correct statement of law, was not covered by other instructions and should have been given.
Appellant requested the following instruction :
“The jury are instructed that if the defendant in this case was admitted to the Tetonia Club, if you believe from the evidence that he was ever in the Tetonia Club, by the owner or by a tenant in possession or by a partner or lessee of the manager in possession for the owner, and that by reason of the permission and consent of such person he did enter said Tetonia Club, he would not be guilty as charged of the crime of burglary; and if you so find or if you even have a reasonable doubt thereof, you should find the defendant not guilty.”
The instruction requested is applicable to the facts in the case, is a correct statement of the law, and is based on testimony properly admitted. The requested instruction is not covered by other instructions and should have been given.
In requested instruction No. 3, after outlining the definition of burglary and larceny, the appellant requested the following instruction:
“You are further instructed that the foregoing sections of the Code, defining larceny, include in such definition the essential element of taking, stealing or carrying away of personal property from the possession of another without any right to said property. You will note that an essential element and ingredient of the crime of larceny is therefore, the proof of ownership, and unless the State proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the element of ownership and rightful possession of said property alleged to have been *546taken by the defendant, then you must acquit the defendant.”
The instruction is correct.
Nowhere in the instructions given were the essential elements of the crime of burglary defined. A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to an affirmative instruction applicable to his testimony based upon the hypothesis that it is true when such testimony affects a material issue. State v. Huskinson, 71 Idaho 82, 226 P.2d 779; Dismore v. State, 60 Okl.Cr. 346, 44 P.2d 894, 895; State v. White, 46 Idaho 124, syl. 10, 266 P. 415; State v. Moultrie, 43 Idaho 766, 254 P. 520.
From the very nature of the definition of burglary there must be a specific intent at the time of the entry to steal or commit a felony.
A person who enters a building by permission and takes possession of what he claims to own is not guilty of burglary. It seems to me this proposition is so fundamental that an extensive review of authorities is not required. See 12 C.J.S., Burglary, § 2, page 666; 9 Am.Jur. 254, Sec. 26; State v. Gailey, 69 Idaho 146, syl. 9, 204 P.2d 254.
Under the provisions of Art. 1, § 7, Idaho Constitution, the right of trial by jury is made inviolate. Such a trial means on an issue of fact, free from prejudice, with proper instructions as to the law covering the situation.
I am also of the opinion that the question of the forfeiture of appellant’s bond and reinstatement of the same under the terms imposed which required appellant to pay $480, is reviewable in this proceeding. Section 13-219, I.C., provides as follows:
“Upon an appeal from a judgment the court may review the verdict or decision and any intermediate order or decision, if excepted to, which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment, except a decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken: provided, that whenever there is substantial evidence to support a verdict the same shall not be set aside.”
The forfeiture of appellant’s bail and reinstatement of it on terms is an intermediate order and should be reviewed on appeal from the judgment. I find nothing in the codes which specifically makes the order forfeiting the bond appealable. It is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment.
I consider the action of the trial court in imposing terms for the reinstatement of the bond an abuse of discretion. The money which appellant was required to pay should be returned to him. No defendant in a criminal action should be required to pay the State to prosecute him.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, and the $480 penalty imposed should be returned to appellant.