Court Opinion

ID: 9654281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:12:33.644792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:25.894258
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur. This is the first time since coming to the Court that I have had an opportunity to express any opinion on either the doctrine of comparative negligence or the doctrine of relative fault.
Philosophically, I am persuaded that the doctrine of pure comparative negligence, like that of pure relative fault as it was first announced in Missouri Pacific v. Whitehead and Kales, 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. banc 1978), is far more attuned to the needs and realities of modern day society than our existing body of tort case law, rules and statutes.
I recognize that this state should not adopt pure comparative negligence across the board without dealing with contributory negligence, the humanitarian doctrine, contribution, indemnity, joint and several liability, res ipsa loquitur, the rear-end doctrine, the doctrine of strict tort liability, the holding of State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie1 that a plaintiff may choose the defendant he desires to sue, interspousal immunity, The Workmen’s Compensation Law,2 court rules, instructions, suitable methods for the release of claims where there are multiple defendants, and possibly other matters.
To adopt comparative negligence without undertaking a systematic treatment of this multitude of related issues would be to place the bar on a violent and stormy sea of uncertainty and frustration that would make the post-Whitehead and Kales era seem a serene and placid mountain lake in comparison. Any single opinion that would attempt to deal with all of these issues could only result in a giant legislative enactment by judicial fiat. My inability to find agreement among scholars, judges, lawyers, or my brothers of this court as to the exact form of “comparative negligence” best suited to our social and economic need's also makes me reluctant to do other than concur in the per curiam.
The adoption of pure relative fault in Whitehead and Kales constituted a first step toward the judicial adoption of pure comparative negligence. I interpret our action of this date as a reversal of our prior *295course which was in the direction of adoption of comparative negligence by judicial action. Having so reversed our course, I believe we should now extricate both the bar and the litigants of this state from the twilight zone of partial pure relative fault created by our prior decisions in Whitehead and Kales and State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc., v. Ferriss.3 I believe that we should overrule Whitehead and Kales and return the law of torts in Missouri to whatever degree of stability existed for the one hundred and fifty years prior that decision.
By this opinion I would announce to my former colleagues of the General Assembly that, with respect to comparative negligence, “the ball is now in your court”.
I would urge their most thorough study and consideration of the comparative negligence doctrine as a method of redressing injuries resulting from negligent acts. The legislative process has a superior capability for getting the input of the finest legal scholars, the best trial lawyers, and the consumer public in determining the system of tort law best adapted to our present day social and economic needs. “No area of the law cries out more for a clear policy established by democratically elected representatives.” American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578, 617, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 208, 578 P.2d 899, 925 (1978).

. 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (1948).

. § 287.120.1, RSMo 1978.

. In Maryland Heights, 588 S.W.2d 489, filed September 11, 1979 (Mo. banc) rehearing denied contemporaneously herewith, this Court refused to compel the joinder of decedent’s employer as a third-party defendant in a wrongful death action brought against a construction subcontractor because judgment and recovery against the employer was legally barred under § 287.120.1, RSMo 1978. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion filed by Donnelly, J., in that case, refusing to permit a third party petition against the employer for the purpose of comparing the employer’s fault is inconsistent with the general principles announced in Whitehead and Kales. A parallel problem arises in the wake of Whitehead and Kales in the context of attempts to settle with one of several defendants. In short, the adoption of relative fault in Whitehead and Kales has resulted in a situation in which no attorney in this state can confidently negotiate and draft an effective release of a client or opponent.