Court Opinion

ID: 9955058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 16:09:51.150399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.361791
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40590

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ADAM LAFRANCE,

      Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY
Robert A. Aragon, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Mark A. Perlata-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}     The district court granted Defendant Adam LaFrance’s motion to suppress all
evidence resulting from a traffic stop in which Defendant was a passenger. The State
appeals arguing the district court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude the arresting
officer had unlawfully expanded the scope of his investigation when questioning
Defendant. We affirm, holding that the officer asked impermissible questions beyond the
scope of the initial reason for the stop and did not otherwise develop independent
reasonable suspicion. See State v. Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 10, 472 P.3d 1214.

BACKGROUND

{2}    Deputy Brandon Salazar was patrolling I-40 near Gallup, New Mexico when he
stopped a vehicle for following a semitruck too closely, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
66-7-318(A) (1978, amended 2021). Deputy Salazar approached the vehicle where
Defendant was the passenger and stated he would give the driver a warning for
following too closely. The driver offered Deputy Salazar his driver’s license, but
explained that the vehicle was rented, and therefore not registered in his name. Deputy
Salazar requested the rental agreement and the driver said he would pull it up on his
phone. Deputy Salazar asked the driver to go to his patrol car so that he could check
the driver’s identification before he would let the two men go. After about ten seconds,
the driver left his vehicle and sat down in the passenger’s seat of Deputy Salazar’s
patrol car.

{3}     As the driver continued to search for the rental agreement on his phone, Deputy
Salazar questioned him about his travel. He asked the driver where he and Defendant
were coming from, and the driver replied that they had come from California. Deputy
Salazar then asked how long the two men had been there, and why they had travelled
to California. The driver explained they had been there for two days for a painting job.
The officer pressed further, asking where in California the driver and Defendant had
been, and seeking specific details about the painting job. Deputy Salazar then reiterated
to the driver that he would only issue a warning for following too close, and mentioned
that he would need to obtain the vehicle identification number (VIN) from the rental. He
asked the driver to remain next to his patrol car while he recorded the VIN.

{4}    When Deputy Salazar approached the driver’s vehicle, he also questioned
Defendant about their trip. Deputy Salazar asked Defendant where the two men were
coming from, what they had been doing in California, how long they had been there for,
and what kind of job the driver had performed in California. Defendant provided answers
that were inconsistent with the answers the driver had given to Deputy Salazar.

{5}    Deputy Salazar asked the driver to return back to the passenger seat in the
patrol car, asked the driver if there were any illegal substances in the vehicle, and
requested consent to search the vehicle. The driver initially consented and then
declined. Deputy Salazar detained the two men in order to apply for a search warrant,
suspecting that they were involved in drug trafficking, noting that they had provided
inconsistent stories. After obtaining a warrant and searching the vehicle, Deputy Salazar
found a backpack in the trunk that contained a large bag of methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with trafficking by possession with intent to distribute, and
conspiracy to commit trafficking, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-31-20 (2006) and
30-28-2 (1979).
{6}    Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop,
arguing that Deputy Salazar had improperly expanded his investigation in violation of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution. The district court granted Defendant’s motion, finding in
relevant part:

       1.     Deputy Salazar knowingly and deliberately embarked upon a
              fishing expedition when speaking with . . . Defendant about the
              latter’s recent travel history and the reasons behind it;

       2.     Deputy Salazar conducted an investigation of . . . Defendant’s
              recent actions, designs and purposes that was utterly unrelated to
              the original reason for the traffic stop and the legitimate law
              enforcement concerns emanating therefrom;

       3.     The conclusion reached by . . . Deputy [Salazar] that . . . Defendant
              was engaged in the transport of illegal drugs because the story of
              his travels and objectives was incredible, is itself divorced from
              reality and the product of a determined and concealed desire to
              conduct a search rather than a reasoned deduction based on the
              evidence which allows for the formulation of probable cause.

The State appealed.

DISCUSSION

{7}     “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. We review factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal determinations
de novo.” State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “In the absence of factual findings, when the evidence
conflicts, we consider the evidence that supports the district court’s ruling, and we draw
all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of that ruling.” Tuton, 2020-NMCA-
042, ¶ 8 (text only) (citation omitted). “Our review of a district court’s determination of
whether reasonable suspicion existed is based on the totality of the circumstances.”
State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. A law officer may
develop reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable
person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” State v. Simpson, 2016-
NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 388 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
burden to show reasonableness is on the [s]tate.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30.

{8}    We limit our review to determining whether Deputy Salazar’s conduct was
reasonable under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution because it
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution in this instance. See id. ¶ 55 (“[The analysis in State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-
034, ¶ 37, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836, overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, ¶¶ 17, 55], requiring a reasonable justification for the initial stop and that all
questions asked during the stop be reasonably related to the reason for the stop or
otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, ensures that investigating officers do not
engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ during traffic stops. This approach comports better with
the broader protections provided under Article II, Section 10, which we have determined
are best analyzed under a case-by-case approach rather than bright-line temporal tests
developed under the Fourth Amendment.”).

{9}    “[U]nder Article II, Section 10, both the duration and [the] scope of a stop must be
reasonable under the circumstances and . . . even questions that do not prolong the
encounter are improper if they are not reasonably related to the reason for the stop or
otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion.” State v. Bell, 2015-NMCA-028, ¶ 16,
345 P.3d 342 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Unrelated
questions are only justified (1) if supported by independent reasonable suspicion, (2) for
reasons of officer safety, or (3) if the interaction has developed into a consensual
encounter.” Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). An officer may ask “limited questions about travel plans” when those questions
are “reasonably related to the initial stop.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37; see State v.
Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 1, 15, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830 (holding that
questions about travel plans were reasonable because the driver’s name was not on a
vehicle rental contract, which gave “the officer . . . a right to investigate whether the
vehicle was stolen”).

{10} The State initially argues that the standard of reasonable suspicion for “an
expansion of an investigatory stop fundamentally differs from the constitutional
reasonableness of an initial investigatory stop because the initial governmental intrusion
on personal privacy and liberty is greater than an expansion of an initial investigation.”
(Emphasis added.) More specifically, the State argues that the standard for reasonable
suspicion to expand an investigation is essentially lower because expansion does not
require either specific or individualized suspicion of criminal activity, and because
expansion “is evaluated in terms of the evolving nature of the stop relative to whether
the actions taken are reasonable to resolve or explain the suspicious circumstances.”

{11} Reasonable suspicion required to expand an investigative stop “need not
necessarily be of a specific crime.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23. Similarly, an officer
may develop reasonable suspicion to investigate more than one individual in limited
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 28, 144 N.M. 37,
183 P.3d 922 (deeming the expanded questioning of the driver of a vehicle reasonable
after the passenger—who police suspected had committed a separate crime—admitted
to having evidence of a drug crime in his pocket). Expansion of an investigation does
entail “a graduated response to the evolving circumstances of a situation.” Id. ¶ 16.
Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that the standard for reasonable suspicion to
expand an investigation is less than that of reasonable suspicion to initiate an
investigation. In either case, “[r]easonable suspicion must consist of more than an
officer’s hunch that something is amiss; it requires objectively reasonable indications of
criminal activity.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23. “A law enforcement officer must have
reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity has been or may be
afoot in order to expand an investigation.” Id. ¶ 59 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{12} Here, our review requires us to determine if Deputy Salazar’s questions were
reasonably related to the initial stop, or if he had otherwise developed independent
reasonable suspicion to question Defendant. The State does not argue that Deputy
Salazar questioned Defendant for reasons of officer safety or because the interaction
had developed into a consensual encounter. Our review of the record shows the same.

{13} Deputy Salazar pulled the driver over for following too close to a semitruck on the
interstate. He told the driver he would issue a warning, and asked the driver to come to
his patrol vehicle to verify his identification and the information in the rental car
agreement. Deputy Salazar then asked a series of questions about travel plans
unrelated to the rental agreement or initial stop: where in California the driver and
Defendant had been, what kind of painting job they had done, how big the room they
painted was, how much they had been paid, when they had arrived in California, who
the two men worked for, how they would find their jobs, what color they had painted the
room in California, and if they had done any sightseeing during the trip. Deputy Salazar
then asked Defendant a series of similar questions.

{14} These questions were not related to the initial reason for the stop—following a
semitruck too closely. Although an officer may ask some questions, the questions must
be “reasonably related to scope of the initial stop.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37. As
such, Deputy Salazar’s extensive questioning of Defendant exceeded the degree
permissible under the New Mexico Constitution. See Tuton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 12.

{15} We must next determine whether Deputy Salazar otherwise developed
independent reasonable suspicion to expand his investigation and ask Defendant
questions that were unrelated to the original stop. “Courts defer to the training and
experience of the officer when determining whether particularized and objective indicia
of criminal activity existed.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although we defer to an officer’s training and experience, “[r]easonable
suspicion develops when the officer becomes aware of specific articulable facts that,
judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred
or was occurring.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

{16} Deputy Salazar testified that he had experience and training specific to
identifying smugglers of narcotics. He stated that he initially developed reasonable
suspicion when he asked the driver to exit the vehicle, but “both occupants stayed in the
vehicle for roughly fifteen to twenty seconds, and communicated, which [he] believed
was them getting their stories situated before exiting.” However, the lapel camera
footage shows that the driver spent no more than ten seconds in the vehicle after
Deputy Salazar asked him to come to the patrol vehicle. During that brief interval,
neither the driver nor Defendant made any overt, furtive movements by reaching into
areas of the vehicle. Cf. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 60 (holding an officer possessed
reasonable suspicion after witnessing the defendant’s furtive movements appearing to
hide something under the passenger’s seat before stopping his vehicle).

{17} Deputy Salazar also testified that the driver appeared uneasy in his patrol
vehicle, stating that he had “short, shallow breathing, which is a sign of nervousness.”
However, our Courts have declined to “equat[e] simple nervousness with reasonable
suspicion.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 29, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (holding
that a defendant’s “fidgety and nervous demeanor . . . did not suffice to create
reasonable suspicion” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Rather,
“[d]emeanor is only one factor to be considered in weighing the totality of the
circumstances, and those circumstances as a whole must be reasonably connected to
the expansion of an investigation.” Tutton, 2020-NMCA-042, ¶ 14. Nervousness alone
cannot justify reasonable suspicion. Cf. State v. Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 4, 145
N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion—in part—
because the “driver’s hand was visibly trembling, and he appeared uncommonly
nervous”).

{18} The State finally argues Defendant’s inconsistent responses gave Deputy
Salazar reasonable suspicion that he and the driver were involved in some other
criminal activity. However, Deputy Salazar only could have asked those questions if he
had reasonable suspicion to do so. By the time Defendant had provided inconsistent
answers, Deputy Salazar had unlawfully expanded the scope of his investigation. By
way of comparison, he had no reason to believe the two men were travelling in a stolen
rental vehicle before asking his questions, cf. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 15, nor did
he witness anything about the vehicle or Defendant’s behavior that would have justified
such extensive questioning. Cf. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 37 (concluding it was
reasonable for an officer to question the defendant about travel when the vehicle had a
misplaced registration tag, suspicious tools in the back and smelled of gasoline); Leyva,
2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 61 (concluding it was reasonable for the officer to inquire into the
presence of weapons or other contraband in the vehicle after witnessing the defendant
appear to hide an unknown item under the seat of his car while being pulled over);
Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶¶ 16-17 (concluding it was reasonable for an officer to
question the defendant where the vehicle smelled heavily of air freshener, perfume, or
aftershave, and the backseat of the car had been removed). Furthermore, Deputy
Salazar did not have a valid reason to expand his investigation to Defendant, then a
passenger of the vehicle, and not subject to the reason for the initial stop. See
Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 28 (deeming the expanded questioning of the driver of
a vehicle reasonable after the passenger, who was suspected of committing a crime
unrelated to stopping the driver, admitted to having drugs in the driver’s vehicle). See
also State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (declining to
hold that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment when
the “[s]tate had not established individualized, particularized suspicion that [the
defendant—who was not the subject to the initial investigation—] had committed or was
about to commit a crime”).
{19} We therefore hold that the district court reasonably concluded that Deputy
Salazar had embarked on a fishing expedition when asking Defendant questions
unrelated to the original reason for the traffic stop. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 55.

CONCLUSION

{20}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{21}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge