Court Opinion

ID: 9763930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:02:05.1973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:51.514084
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing
In connection with her motion for rehearing, appellee has requested that we make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, in part with respect to our refusal to grant appellee’s “Motion to Strike Statement of Facts, Bills of Exception and Transcript.”
Appellants’ motion for new trial was overruled December 23, 1958. Their statement of facts and bills of exception were filed in the Trial Court, respectively, on April 10, 1959 and March 27, 1959, more than fifty days after their motion for new trial was overruled. No extension of time was applied for in the Trial Court or granted by that Court, Appellants, however, did file in this Court on February 10, 1959 their application for an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts and transcript, and this Court on February 26, 1959, entered an order for good cause extending the time for filing to and including April 10, 1959, on which date the transcript and statement of facts were filed in this Court. The statement of facts and bills of exception were not agreed to or approved, nor the filing of same waived by appellee or her counsel, but the statement of facts was approved and ordered filed by the trial judge on April 10, 1959 and was filed in the Trial Court on that day, and thereafter timely filed in this Court on the same day.
Rule 389-a, T.R.C.P., provides: “The approval of the trial judge of a statement of facts shall be deemed tantamount to filing the same in the trial court.” It is our view that if the statement of facts, when timely presented to this Court and filed, contains the agreement of counsel or the approval of the trial judge ordering the same to be filed, appellee has no just cause for complaint, regardless of whether the agreement or order is dated or bears a date subsequent to the expiration of 50 days after the rendition of final judgment or order overruling motion for new trial. We think Rule 389-a makes the filing of the *249statement of facts in the Trial Court unnecessary in such case. Had the Supreme Court desired to require the approval of the trial judge before the expiration of the fifty day period, it could have very readily so provided. We do not agree with appel-lee that the time limit prescribed in Rule 381 should be written into Rule 389-a. The rules are distinct and cover entirely different situations.
On March 27, 1959 appellants filed in the office of the District Clerk of Harris County a written designation of instruments to be included in the transcript. Ap-pellee’s counsel states on oath that appellants did not deliver or mail to appellee or her attorney a copy thereof, as required by Rule 376. Appellants’ counsel counters by sworn statement that they did mail a copy thereof to appellee’s attorney on the same day that it was filed in the office of the District Clerk. We, therefore, find that such request was mailed by appellants’ counsel but was not received by appellee’s counsel. Proof of mailing is sufficient to meet the requirement of Rule 376. Appel-lee’s counsel was notified by the Clerk of this Court on February 26, 1959 that the time for filing the transcript and statement of facts was extended to include April 10, 1959, and on April 10, 1959 was notified by the Clerk of this Court that the same were duly filed. Appellee’s counsel has not requested that any additional instruments be included in the transcript, nor has he requested leave to file a supplemental transcript, which doubtless would have been granted had he applied therefor. Appellee has shown no harm as a result of not receiving a copy of the written direction for transcript.
Our original opinion correctly states that appellants filed a motion for the Court to enter judgment non obstante veredicto. Our holding, however, is not based thereupon. The record does not indicate that notice of such motion was given as required by Rule 301. It appears that the motion was filed subsequent to entry of judgment.
We find that appellants’ motion for instructed verdict was made in open court and in the presence of appellee’s counsel, when appellee rested, and renewed when both sides rested. Said motion, which was overruled, together with appellants’ exceptions, appears in the statement of facts but not in the transcript or bill of exception. Appellee did not waive the reducing of such motion to a formal writing or the filing thereof. We have concluded, however, that the failure to reduce said motion to a formal writing is immaterial since there is no evidence that warranted submission of the case to the jury. Such motion states the specific grounds therefor and particularly “that the testimony has wholly failed to show any negligence whatsoever on the part of these defendants, which caused or brought about the injuries of plaintiff.” Marlin Associates v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 1950, 226 S.W.2d 190.
Special Issue No. 5 inquires whether appellants were negligent in permitting to exist the defective condition inquired about in preceding Issues. As appears in their bill of exception No. One, appellants properly objected to the submission of such Issue on the ground that there was no evidence raising the Issue of negligence on the part of appellants in permitting such condition to exist, and no evidence upon which a finding of negligence could be sustained. We think this sufficiently raises the objection of “No negligence” in connection with the other evidentiary Issues inquiring about the alleged defective condition of the sidewalk.
In appellants’ motion for new trial, it is stated, among other things, that the Court erred in submitting the cause to the jury upon any Issue of negligence on the part of the appellants predicated upon the condition of the sidewalk in question, for the reason that there is no evidence establishing any defective condition of such sidewalk such as would amount to actionable negligence on the part of appellants, in the manner of maintenance of such sidewalk.
*250As indicated in our original opinion, we have construed appellants’ first Point in their brief as an assignment of no evidence of negligence rather than an assignment that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury findings.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.