Court Opinion

ID: 9898595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:03:49.883905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:46.369414
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION EIGHT

 SUSAN NICOLETTI,                     B319377

        Plaintiff and Appellant,      (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 20STCV42957)
        v.

 GOLDRICH KEST,

        Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Daniel Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
      Pick & Boydston and Brian D. Boydston for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      Clyde & Co US, Alison K. Beanum, Douglas J. Collodel, and
Brett C. Safford for Defendant and Respondent.
                  _____________________________

      This is an appeal from a trial court order granting
Respondent Dolphin Marina Apartments’ (Dolphin) (erroneously
sued as Goldrich Kest doing business as Dolphin Marina
Apartments) summary judgment motion against Appellant Susan
Nicoletti (Nicoletti). We conclude that Dolphin owed no duty to
warn Nicoletti of a water current that openly and obviously
interfered with one of three building entrances. Accordingly, we
affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On April 9, 2020, Nicoletti took her neighbor’s dog for a
walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex located at 13900
Panay Way, Marina Del Rey, California. Nicoletti observed that
it was raining that day with thunderstorms. At around 3:30
p.m., Nicoletti crossed the driveway of the North Side Gate
entrance that led to the underground parking lot. The apartment
complex also had a South Side Gate entrance and another
entrance on Panay Way. Nicoletti was a thirteen-year resident of
Dolphin’s apartment complex and was familiar with its premises.
Nicoletti testified that she had gone past the North Side Gate
“thousands of times” before the incident.
      Before crossing, Nicoletti observed that the concrete on the
North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a
current that was running down the driveway. Nicoletti did not
observe any caution tape or other warning advisements. Nicoletti
proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down.
Nicoletti then fell down the North Side Gate driveway and hit the
gate at the bottom of the driveway. Nicoletti sustained injuries
to her right shoulder, left knee, and face.
      On November 9, 2020, Nicoletti filed a complaint against
Dolphin alleging general negligence and premises liability
because Dolphin had a duty to warn of the running rainwater on
the driveway with caution tape or other warning signals.
      On August 12, 2021, Dolphin filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that because the running rainwater was open
and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. On December 29,

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2021, Nicoletti filed her opposition to Dolphin’s motion for
summary judgment.
       The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court reasoned that Dolphin did not have a
duty to warn of the running rainwater on the driveway because it
was a dangerous condition that was sufficiently obvious.
The trial court concluded that “[a] reasonably careful person
would know that the running water on the driveway was
dangerous and thus, the undisputed facts show that she was
aware of an open and obvious condition for which the Defendant
had no duty of care about which to warn her.”
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of review
       “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is
no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for
summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make
a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of
material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a
shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of
production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)
       When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that
the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of
action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “[T]he defendant
must ‘support[]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits,
declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions,
and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’

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(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).) The defendant may, but need
not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the
plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present
evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by
the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he
has discovered nothing.” (Aguilar, at p. 855.)
       On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we review the
record de novo to determine whether triable issues of material
fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th
763, 767.) We resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in
favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Id. at p. 768.)
       “In performing an independent review of the granting of
summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by
the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the
elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes
facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the
opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to
‘decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the
existence of a triable, material fact issue.’ ” (Oakland Raiders v.
National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.)
“We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the
reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of
the trial court, not its rationale.” (Ibid.) Thus, a reviewing court
“will affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any ground
that the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the
trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.”
(Angelotti v. The Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394,
1402.)

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II.   The trial court correctly granted summary judgment
      on Nicoletti’s negligence and premises liability
      claims
      a.      The rainwater current on the driveway was
              open and obvious
      Nicoletti argues that the dangerous condition caused by the
lateral force of rainwater was not open and obvious. As such,
Dolphin had a duty to warn of the dangerous condition.
We disagree.
      A landowner must “ ‘maintain land in [its] possession and
control in a reasonably safe condition.’ ” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997)
14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.) But an accident on a landowner’s
property does not necessarily create premises liability. (Edwards
v. California Sports, Inc. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1284, 1287.)
      “ ‘The elements of a cause of action for premises liability
are the same as those for negligence.’ ” (Jones v. Awad (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.) The plaintiff must prove duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages. (Jacobs v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438,
446 (Jacobs).)
      “Whether a duty should be imposed on a defendant [in a
premises liability action] depends on a variety of policy
considerations, known as the Rowland factors.” (Jacobs, supra,
14 Cal.App.5th at p. 446; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d
108, 112–113.) The “most important” of these considerations or
factors is “the foreseeability of injury to another.” (Osborn v.
Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122; Krongos v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 394.)
A “court’s task—in determining ‘duty’—is not to decide whether a
particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of

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a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more
generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that
liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.”
(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6; Jacobs, supra,
14 Cal.App.5th at p. 446.) “ ‘Foreseeability, when analyzed to
determine the existence or scope of a duty, is a question of law to
be decided by the court.’ ” (Jacobs, at p. 446.)
       A harm is typically not foreseeable if the “dangerous
condition is open and obvious.” (Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at
p. 447.) “ ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could
reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a
warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy
or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.] In that situation, owners
and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive
the obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition.”
(Ibid.)
       In Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 1461 (Sanchez), our colleagues in Division One held
that “the presence of standing water and the manner in which it
drained into or toward the transportation office would have been
obvious and apparent to any reasonably observant person, as
would the danger that the water might create slippery surfaces
and cause one to slip and fall.” (Id. at p. 1470.) As such, the
property owner had no duty to warn of the dangerous condition.
(Ibid.)
       Nicoletti contends that although she was aware that it was
raining and the ground on the driveway to the North Side Gate
was wet with rainwater, she did not know that the current of
rainwater posed a danger to her safety. Nicoletti does not

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dispute that she observed that there was water running down the
driveway. Nicoletti instead attempts to distinguish Sanchez
because in that case, the water was standing. (See Sanchez,
supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470.) However, running water on a
surface is arguably a more obvious danger than standing water.
Not only does the water current make the surface slippery, but
also a reasonable person would observe that running water could
create a force that would cause someone to fall over. Further,
“[i]t is a matter of common knowledge among children and adults
that wet concrete is slippery and that, when on a slanting incline”
such as a driveway, “it does not provide a safe footing.” (Betts v.
City and County of San Francisco (1952) 108 Cal.App.2d 701,
703.) Accordingly, the dangerous condition was open and obvious
to Nicoletti, and Dolphin had no duty to warn.
        b.    Even assuming Nicoletti did not forfeit the
              necessity exception to the open and obvious
              rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits
        Nicoletti further argues for the first time on appeal that
necessity required her to cross the North Side Gate driveway.
We disagree. Even assuming Nicoletti did not forfeit this
argument, we conclude that she was not required to use the
North Side Gate entrance and could have used a different
entrance to enter the apartment complex.
        While as a general rule, a landowner does not have a duty
to remedy or warn of an obviously dangerous condition on his or
her property, “ ‘this is not true in all cases. “[I]t is foreseeable
that even an obvious danger may cause injury, if the practical
necessity of encountering the danger, when weighed against the
apparent risk involved, is such that under the circumstances, a
person might choose to encounter the danger.” ’ ” (Kinsman v.

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Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 673.) A landowner’s duty of
care is not negated “ ‘when it is foreseeable that, because of
necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to
encounter the condition.’ ” (Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 201, 215 (Kaney).)
        Nicoletti did not argue this exception to the open and
obvious rule to the trial court. Because Nicoletti did not make
the argument in the summary judgment proceedings below, the
argument is forfeited on appeal. (Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 672.)
        Even assuming the argument is not forfeited, Nicoletti’s
claim fails on the merits. Nicoletti relies on Kaney for her claim
that the circumstances here fall under the exception to the open
and obvious rule. In Kaney, Division Two of our district held that
“it is foreseeable that occupants and visitors would, by necessity,
use the stairs to access the lone bathroom.” (Kaney, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 215.) Here, Nicoletti was not required to use
the North Side Gate entrance to the apartment complex.
Nicoletti fails to rebut Dolphin’s evidence showing that the
apartment complex had multiple entrances. Relatedly, she
proffers no evidence that she was required to use the North Side
Gate entrance. In contrast, the plaintiff in Kaney could only
access the bathroom in the building using the dangerous
stairwell. (Ibid.) Moreover, even crediting Nicoletti’s testimony
that she passed by the North Side Gate “thousands of times” does
not assist her. Here, Nicoletti’s testimony that she commonly
used one of the three entrances falls short of establishing a
“necessity” to use that entrance when water currents impeded it.
(See ibid.) Nicoletti’s argument that other residents commonly
used the North Side Gate entrance is unsupported by the record

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and fails for that reason. In addition, as with Nicoletti herself,
other residents’ common use of an entrance does not point to a
“necessity” to use that particular entrance. (See ibid.)
Accordingly, the undisputed facts indicate that it was not
foreseeable that Nicoletti would “ ‘knowingly embrace an entirely
obvious risk’ ” by choosing to cross the North Side Gate driveway.
(Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.)
      Our holding is also consistent with our Supreme Court’s
declaration that courts must assign tort duties “to ensure that
those ‘best situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to
do so.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1153
[quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453,
462 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.)].) Under these circumstances,
Nicoletti was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of
walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a
rainstorm that began that same day. As discussed above,
Nicoletti could have chosen to use a different entrance. The
burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather
conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed
by Nicoletti’s ability to avoid a condition she should have
observed as obviously dangerous.
      Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted Dolphin’s
motion for summary judgment.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on
appeal.

                                  VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

                GRIMES, Acting P. J.

                WILEY, J.

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