Court Opinion

ID: 9663736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:49:30.753085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:55.765031
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The unusual nature of the present case requires my separate opinion. The majority opinion has persuasively disposed of the allegations of error based upon the "reasonable doubt” standard of proof. This opinion, however, fails to provide plaintiffs with the full measure of relief to which they are entitled. Believing that overwhelming evidence is disclosed by the present record to grant *315the requested use without injury to the township, I dissent as follows.
The majority relied upon the fundamental principle of law that a commission or agency should be provided with an opportunity to reconsider a matter after an error is laid bare by review, in denying plaintiffs’ writ for superintending control, I am in agreement with this principle but find that it is not applicable in every case. In conjunction with the majority’s statement regarding administrative law principles, it is said:
"[A]nd in some instances remand has been held unnecessary or the court has been held to have the option to decide for itself or to remand.”1
This is in accord with the concept that parties will not be forced to exhaust their administrative remedies where such is futile or inadequate.2
Complete reliance upon administrative law principles dictating remand must be tempered by the fact that we are confronted with a zoning case rather than review of a purely administrative agency. Although courts are bound by the often-quoted phrase that they are not to become "super zoning boards”3 they are simultaneously directed to hear zoning appeals de novo.4 It is within the delicate balance of these principles that this case is judged.
Courts are given the authority to grant requested zoning relief when the zoning board’s *316decision is shown to be arbitrary and capricious by a preponderance of the evidence. This issue was raised in Certain-Teed Products Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434 (1958), which involved plaintiffs request to build a gypsum plant in defendant’s township. Justice Edwards, writing a separate opinion, approved the request for declaratory judgment since plaintiff offered to avoid the detrimental conditions complained of and he stated:
"We cannot find in this record that the township board or the circuit court had before them facts which indicated that petitioner’s contemplated plant operation, if built and operated to its represented standards, would offend the standards of the ordinance or be more objectionable than many other industries able to locate in the same district as a matter of right under the local ordinance.” Certain-Teed Products Corp, p 454.
Justice Edwards’ opinion constitutes a minority view since the majority did not agree to direct entry of a declaratory judgment authorizing plaintiff to proceed with the mining and manufacture of gypsum. A careful reading of this opinion indicates that the majority wanted a hearing before the trial judge to establish guidelines for plaintiffs business and require it to meet each promise upon penalty of suspension of its use. Since the effect of the majority’s actions was to approve plaintiffs building permit pursuant to subsequently imposed standards, it reveals support for the proposition that the Court can grant the requested use when the record contains no contrary findings without a remand to the zoning board for the same decision. Our courts have similarly, and rightly, disposed of appropriate cases in which the zoning authorities’ action was unreasonable, capricious and arbitrary. Faucher v Grosse Ile Twp Building Inspector, 321 *317Mich 193 (1948); Senefsky v Huntington Woods, 307 Mich 728 (1943).5
As I read the record, testimony and exhibits, it conclusively supports the permissibility of plaintiffs’ proposed use. Plaintiffs presented expert testimony to satisfy the standards found in §8.05 of defendant’s ordinance. Plaintiffs, first, presented a biologist from the Department of Conservation who testified that their fencing techniques met department standards and their preserve constituted no danger to surrounding domestic animals. An assistant state veterinarian qualified in animal disease control was next offered by plaintiffs. This expert witness, after inspecting the premises and health records of imported animals, concluded that the preserve constituted no danger to persons or animals.
Plaintiffs further offered the testimony of Kenneth McCord, recently retired from the position of Law Enforcement Executive and Assistant Supervisor of Hunter Safety Training for the State of Michigan. After inspecting the premises and reviewing the safety procedures used, he stated that there was no measurable hazard to persons outside the preserve and a greater risk of danger was presented by the unsupervised hunting upon adjacent state land. The minimal number of hunts occurring twice a week was a factor included in his conclusion that the preserve presented no danger to the surrounding community. The final witness offered was a planning consultant who found that township facilities would not be burdened or affected by the preserve. This testimony satisfied the criteria established by §8.05 of the zoning ordinance.
The evidence submitted by plaintiffs was uncon*318troverted and satisfied the conditions of defendant’s ordinance. In fact, this evidence is sufficient to satisfy the higher burden of proof of "reasonable doubt” imposed by the township below. The present case is controlled by Justice Edwards’ statement that:
"[T]he members of the township board indicate no factual knowledge to the contrary but a retention of 'doubt’ which apparently tipped the scales. We believe this record indicates that appellant’s application to the township board received the form, but not the fact, of administrative due process.”6
In view of the quantum of evidence already produced below, what can be gained by a remand which will be predicated upon the lesser standard of "preponderance of the evidence”? Defendants, like the citizens opposing the proposed use, had the benefit of an opportunity to be heard and to present proofs and of the imposition of a higher burden of proof upon plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ ability to prevail under these circumstances indicates that defendants would have little to present upon remand. Based upon the overwhelming evidence presented, there is no doubt that defendants’ denial of the requested use was arbitrary and capricious.
The requested remand will force plaintiffs to commit a useless and futile act. I would grant the request for superintending control pursuant to GCR 1963, 711.2, finding that a remand will not provide plaintiffs a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy”.

 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 765, p 665.

 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 605, p 441; Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 20.07, p 367.

 Brae Bum, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425 (1957).

 Biske v City of Troy, 381 Mich 611 (1969); Bowman v City of Southfield, 377 Mich 237 (1966); S.B.S. Builders, Inc v Madison Heights, 38 Mich App 1 (1972); House v Bloomfield Hills, 18 Mich App 184 (1969).

 Cf. Bridges v Gardner, 368 F2d 86 (CA 5, 1966).

 Certain-Teed Products Corp v Paris Twp, 351 Mich 434, 451 (1958).