Court Opinion

ID: 9372330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 13:09:43.424055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.767729
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                                    OPINION

                                               No. 04-21-00453-CV

                                   IN THE INTEREST OF E.A.C., a Child

                        From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                     Trial Court No. 2010-CI-06011
                            Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:         Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:            Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                    Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 15, 2023

MOOT CLAIMS DISMISSED; REVERSED AND REMANDED

           In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship, Mom sought to modify the existing

possession order for her child E.A.C. 1 Dad, with whom E.A.C. had been living out of state for

several years, filed a plea to the jurisdiction. He argued the trial court had lost its exclusive

continuing jurisdiction. The trial court agreed, and it granted Dad’s plea. Mom appealed.

           During the pendency of this appeal, E.A.C. turned eighteen years old, which mooted

Mom’s claims for conservatorship, possession and access, and enforcement of a conservatorship

order. We dismiss Mom’s claims for conservatorship, possession and access, and enforcement of

a conservatorship as moot. But because E.A.C. still had a significant connection with Texas and

Mom’s claim for attorney’s fees and a portion of her interference with possessory interest claim

1
    We use aliases to protect the child’s identity. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
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survive, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we remand

this cause to the trial court.

                                                 BACKGROUND

        E.A.C. was born to Mom and Dad in September 2004. Mom and Dad divorced in Bexar

County, Texas, in 2010, and each was appointed as a joint managing conservator.

        In January 2018, Mom petitioned to modify the parent-child relationship with respect to

E.A.C., 2 Dad counter-petitioned, and the case was tried to a jury in 2019. On June 4, 2020, in

accordance with the verdict, the trial court appointed Mom as a possessory conservator and Dad

as sole managing conservator. Dad was also given the right to designate the primary residence of

the child, and E.A.C. continued living with Dad in California. Mom appealed, but this court

affirmed the trial court’s order. See In re E.A.C., 647 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2022, no pet.).

        In July 2021, Mom again petitioned to modify the parent-child relationship. She also

sought attorney’s fees and damages for Dad’s alleged interference with her possessory interest

with E.A.C. Dad filed an answer and a plea to the jurisdiction; the trial court heard only the plea

to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted Dad’s plea, and Mom appeals. She argues, inter alia,

the trial court abused its discretion by granting Dad’s plea against her petition to modify the child

custody order, petition for enforcement of the child custody order, and her claim for interference

with possessory interest in a child.

        Because mootness disposes of several of Mom’s issues, we begin with mootness.

2
 Mom and Dad had another child together, but that child was born several years before E.A.C., and that child was not
a subject of the underlying petition for modification.

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                                              MOOTNESS

        An issue may become moot at any time, including on appeal, and the court may sua sponte

consider mootness. See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (citing United States

v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)). “Mootness occurs when events make it impossible

for the court to grant the relief requested or otherwise ‘affect the parties’ rights or interests.’” State

ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369

S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012)).

A.      Child’s Majority Moots Conservatorship Issues

        “When a child turns eighteen years old, issues of conservatorship become moot.” In re

J.D., No. 04-19-00239-CV, 2020 WL 4607015, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re N.J.D., No. 04-13-00293-CV, 2014 WL 555915, at *1 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Feb. 12, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.102(2)

(defining a child as “an individual who has not attained 18 years of age”).

        With respect to that child, there is no longer a live controversy for issues of custody,

possession, or access; those issues are moot. In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d 118, 127

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (quoting D.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., No. 03-11-00453-CV, 2012 WL 1403333, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 19, 2012, no pet.)

(mem. op.)).

        “When a case becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction and cannot hear the case, because

any decision would constitute an advisory opinion that is ‘outside the jurisdiction conferred by

Texas Constitution article II, section 1.’” Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6 (quoting Matthews, on behalf

of M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016)).

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B.     When Claims May Survive

       But “[a] case is not [necessarily] rendered moot simply because some of the issues become

moot during the appellate process.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex.

2005) (orig. proceeding) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 642–43 (Tex.

2005)). “If only some claims or issues become moot, the case remains ‘live,’ at least as to other

claims or issues that are not moot.” Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6 (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root,

Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737).

       In some instances, a claim for attorney’s fees can survive the related issue becoming moot,

as explained in Harper:

           Whether an attorney’s-fees claim breathes life into an otherwise moot appeal
       depends first on whether the claimant seeks the fees under a statute that authorizes
       fees only for a prevailing party or, alternatively, under a statute that permits fees
       based on equitable principles regardless of who prevails. If the statute allows a
       non-prevailing party to recover fees under equitable principles, the claim for fees
       always breathes life into a case that has otherwise become moot, because the trial
       court must always consider the relative merits of the parties’ positions (among other
       factors) when exercising its discretion to award fees to either party.
           But when the party seeks attorney’s fees under a prevailing-party statute, the
       determination whether the attorney’s-fees claim is moot depends on whether the
       party prevailed before the underlying substantive claim became moot. As we
       recognized in Camarena, if the party prevailed before the substantive claim became
       moot, the party’s claim for attorney’s fees under a prevailing-party statute remains
       a live controversy and a court must consider the claim’s merits to determine
       whether the party properly prevailed. But as we recognized in Speer v.
       Presbyterian Children’s Home & Service Agency, if the party did not prevail before
       the substantive claim became moot, the party’s claim for attorney’s fees is also
       moot because the party can never prevail and thus can never be entitled to attorney’s
       fees.

Id. at 7–8 (citations omitted).

C.     Child Becomes an Adult

       E.A.C. turned eighteen years old in September 2022: he became an adult, see TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 152.102(2); In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 127, and there is no evidence

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that he is subject to any ongoing legal disability. Thus, we must determine what claims, if any,

from Mom’s July 2021 petition to modify the parent-child relationship are still live. See Harper,

562 S.W.3d at 7–8.

D.     Mom’s Claims

       In her petition to modify the parent-child relationship, Mom presented claims for

conservatorship, possession and access, enforcement, and interference with possessory interest.

       1.      Conservatorship Claim

       In her conservatorship claim, Mom asked the trial court to modify the possession order,

appoint her as sole managing conservator, allow her to designate the primary residence of the child,

and assign specific rights and duties to her.

       2.      Possession and Access Claim

       In her possession and access claim, Mom asked the trial court to apply the Bexar County

Standing Order applicable to SAPCRs and issue temporary orders for conservatorship, possession,

and access.

       3.      Enforcement Claim

       In her enforcement claim, Mom asked the trial court to enforce its June 4, 2020 order

regarding Mom’s possession and access to E.A.C. Mom alleged that Dad illegally maintained

possession of E.A.C. in June 2021, and she seeks contempt punishments against Dad.

       4.      Interference with Possessory Interest Claim

       In her interference with possessory interest claim, Mom cites Chapter 42 of the Texas

Family Code. She seeks attorney’s fees, costs, expenses, and exemplary damages.

E.     Conservatorship and Related Claims are Moot

       Because E.A.C. became an adult, he has no ongoing legal disability, and no exceptions to

mootness apply, Mom’s claims for conservatorship, possession and access, and enforcement are

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moot. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.102(2); In re J.D., 2020 WL 4607015, at *1; In re N.J.D.,

2014 WL 555915, at *1; see also In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 127; Ngo v. Ngo,

133 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.). Because these claims

are moot, we need not address them further.

F.     Interference with Possessory Interest Claim

       Whether Mom’s interference with possessory interest claim survives is a more complex

question. We begin by reciting the applicable statutory provisions.

       1.       Applicable Statute

       To address circumstances where a person interferes with the plaintiff’s possessory right to

a child, the legislature created a civil cause of action: “A person who takes or retains possession

of a child or who conceals the whereabouts of a child in violation of a possessory right of another

person may be liable for damages to that person.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a).

       The legislature also specified the type of damages the plaintiff may recover:

       (a) Damages may include:
            (1) the actual costs and expenses incurred, including attorney’s fees, in:
                 (A) locating a child who is the subject of the order;
                 (B) recovering possession of the child if the petitioner is entitled to
                     possession; and
                 (C) enforcing the order and prosecuting the suit; and
            (2) mental suffering and anguish incurred by the plaintiff because of a
                violation of the order.
       (b) A person liable for damages who acted with malice or with an intent to cause
           harm to the plaintiff may be liable for exemplary damages.

Id. § 42.006.

       2.       Creating Liability for Past Actions

       Under the interference provision, the plaintiff may be able to recover possession of the

child and obtain the court’s help in enforcing the possession order. See id. § 42.002. But these

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prospective forms of relief become moot when the child becomes an adult. See In re Marriage of

Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 127; In re J.D., 2020 WL 4607015, at *1; In re N.J.D., 2014 WL 555915,

at *1.

         On the other hand, the statute’s plain language contemplates imposing liability for

interference, including past interference. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a).

         The interference provision allows the plaintiff to allege that the defendant took or retained

possession of the child in violation of the plaintiff’s possessory right. Id. (creating a cause of

action against “[a] person who takes or retains possession of a child . . . in violation of a possessory

right of another person”). The plain language does not condition the cause of action on a present

or ongoing interference. Id.

         The damages provision allows the successful plaintiff to recover “the actual costs and

expenses incurred” and damages for the “mental suffering and anguish incurred.” Id. § 42.006(a).

It also authorizes exemplary damages if the defendant “acted with malice or intent to cause harm

to the plaintiff.” Id. § 42.006(b).

         The legislature’s use of past-tense verbs—i.e., incurred and acted—refer to past actions

and show the legislature’s intent to allow recovery for past interference. See id. § 42.006;

Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)

(recognizing that the section allows recovery of past and prospective actual costs and expenses).

         3.     Dad’s Potential Liability

         Here, Mom alleged that Dad interfered with her possessory interest in E.A.C. while E.A.C.

was still a child. But at the hearing on Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court expressly

limited arguments to only the jurisdiction question. Without considering the merits of Mom’s

interference with possessory interest claim, the trial court granted Dad’s plea. After the trial court

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signed its order and while this case was on appeal, E.A.C. became an adult—which mooted Mom’s

conservatorship claims. See In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 127.

         However, given the legislature’s intent to allow a plaintiff to recover damages for past

actions involving an interference with possessory interest claim, we conclude that the portion of

Mom’s claim—that Dad interfered with her possessory interest in E.A.C.—which accrued before

E.A.C.’s eighteenth birthday did not become moot when E.A.C. became an adult. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. §§ 42.002, .006; cf. In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 128 (“When the

custody determination implicates the financial obligations imposed by the final decree that accrued

prior to the child’s emancipation—such as attorney’s fees and the amount of previously-accrued

child support—‘a live controversy remains to such extent.’”).

         Accordingly, if Mom prevails in her interference claim, the trial court may award damages

for her cognizable damage that accrued while E.A.C. was still a child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§§ 42.002, .006; cf. In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 128.

         On the other hand, if Dad prevails and Mom’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation, Dad would be entitled to his attorney’s fees and court costs. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 42.009; Brann v. Guimaraes, No. 14-20-00023-CV, 2021 WL 4099651, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 9, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

         Regardless of who may prevail, the portion of Mom’s claim for interference with her

possessory interest that accrued before E.A.C. became an adult is still live. Cf. In re Marriage of

Comstock, 639 S.W.3d at 127; In re J.D., 2020 WL 4607015, at *1; In re N.J.D., 2014 WL 555915,

at *1.

G.       Attorney’s Fees

         Under a separate heading in her petition to modify the parent-child relationship, Mom again

asked for costs and attorney’s fees, but she did not cite any specific authorizing statute.

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        We construe her claim as a request under Title 5 for attorney’s fees “in a suit under this

title.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 106.002(a) (“In a suit under this title, the court may render

judgment for reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses and order the judgment and postjudgment

interest to be paid directly to an attorney.”).

        The applicable provision, section 106.002, is not a prevailing party statute. See Lenz v.

Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 21 (Tex. 2002) (“An attorney’s fees award in a suit affecting the parent-child

relationship is discretionary with the trial court.”); In re R.E.S., 482 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (“[T]he current language of Family Code Section 106.002 does not

impose a prevailing-party requirement.”); In re A.B.R., No. 04-17-00220-CV, 2018 WL 3998684,

at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

        Because section 106.002 is a discretionary award statute, Mom’s attorney’s fees claim

under section 106.002 survives. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 106.002(a); Harper, 562 S.W.3d at

7 (“If the statute allows a non-prevailing party to recover fees under equitable principles, the claim

for fees always breathes life into a case that has otherwise become moot, because the trial court

must always consider the relative merits of the parties’ positions (among other factors) when

exercising its discretion to award fees to either party.”); In re R.E.S., 482 S.W.3d at 586.

        Because some of Mom’s claims survive E.A.C. becoming an adult, we now consider

whether the trial court erred in granting Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction.

                                    PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

        In his plea to the jurisdiction, Dad argued the trial court had lost exclusive continuing

jurisdiction because neither he nor E.A.C. had a significant connection with Texas and there was

no substantial evidence of E.A.C.’s care, protection, training, or relationships in Texas.

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A.     Hearing on the Plea

       At the hearing on Dad’s plea, the trial court allowed Mom and Dad to testify regarding the

jurisdictional question.

       Dad testified that E.A.C. had not lived in Texas since January 2015, he and E.A.C. had

lived in California since January 2018, neither he nor E.A.C. had a significant connection with

Texas, and there was no substantial evidence about E.A.C. in Texas pertaining to E.A.C.’s care,

protection, training, or personal relationships.

       Mom testified that she lives in Bexar County, Texas, her parents and extended family also

live here, and E.A.C. has repeatedly visited her and her family here.

B.     Trial Court’s Ruling, Finding, Conclusion

       After it heard the parents’ testimony, the trial court granted Dad’s plea, and it issued

findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found that Dad “established that the child, E.A.C. and

[Dad] . . . no longer [have] a significant connection with this state, and that substantial evidence is

no longer available in this state concerning [E.A.C.’s] care, protection, training and personal

relationships.” It concluded that Dad “met Texas Family Code 152.202 requirements.”

       Mom challenges the trial court’s finding and conclusion.

       We briefly recite the applicable law and standard of review.

C.     Standard of Review

       A defendant may challenge a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction by a plea to the

jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

       “Where the jurisdictional issue or facts do not implicate the merits of the case, and the facts

are disputed, the court—not the jury—must make the necessary fact findings to resolve the

jurisdictional issue.” Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,

no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226).

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       On appellate review, “when the jurisdictional issue is not intertwined with the merits, we

must defer to the trial court’s express or implied factual determinations that are supported by

sufficient evidence,” Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 66 (Tex. 2019) (emphasis added)

(citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–28), but “any fact findings made to resolve the jurisdictional

issue may be challenged, as any other fact findings, for legal and factual sufficiency,” Poindexter,

306 S.W.3d at 806 (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.

2002)); accord In re Y.B., 300 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).

       We review de novo the trial court’s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction. City

of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226).

D.     Jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

       For a SAPCR, “the UCCJEA articulates circumstances under which a court has, or loses,

‘jurisdiction’ over child-custody determinations.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Tex. 2020)

(citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)). “The party seeking to invoke the trial court’s

jurisdiction has the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s authority to

hear the case.” Cortez v. Cortez, 639 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no

pet.); accord In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 509–10.

       “We construe the pleadings in favor of the party invoking jurisdiction and consider relevant

evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue.” Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 306 (citing

Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)).

       “For purposes of the UCCJEA, jurisdiction is determined at the time child-custody

proceedings commence.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 513; see Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 305.

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E.        Establishing Loss of Continuing Jurisdiction

          A trial court which has established initial child custody jurisdiction under section 152.201

“has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the determination.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201;

see In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).

          However, the trial court may lose that exclusive continuing jurisdiction when two elements

are established. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202(a)(1); In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373, 375

(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

          First, “a court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent,

nor the child and a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state.” TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202(a)(1); accord In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 375.

          Second, the court also determines “that substantial evidence is no longer available in this

state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.” TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 152.202(a)(1); accord In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 375.

          For the first element, “the UCCJEA does not premise the exclusive continuing jurisdiction

determination on which state has the most significant connection with the child.” In re Forlenza,

140 S.W.3d at 378 (“[A]lthough evidence was admitted which establishes that [the child] has

significant ties with [a different state], that fact alone does not necessarily mean that there is no

significant connection with Texas . . . .” (quoting In re McCormick, 87 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.))).

          If there is a significant connection with Texas, we need not address the substantial evidence

element; the trial court’s exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not lost because of the significant

connection. See id. at 379 (“[E]xclusive jurisdiction continues in the decree-granting state as long

as a significant connection exists or substantial evidence is present.”); Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 308

(same).

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F.     Significant Connection

       “Visitation within the state is generally considered as evidence of a significant connection,

particularly when the children maintain a relationship with relatives in the state other than the

noncustodial parent.” Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 309 (quoting In re A.C.S., 157 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2004, no pet.)); see also In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 377 (“Other courts commonly

consider visitation within the state as evidence of a significant connection.”).

G.     Discussion

       Here, the parties do not dispute, and the record conclusively establishes, that when Mom

filed her motion to modify in July 2021, the trial court had exclusive continuing jurisdiction over

E.A.C. See In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 513.

       Dad argued that he and E.A.C. had no significant connection with Texas, but the record

conclusively establishes that E.A.C. had a substantial connection with Texas. Cf. In re Forlenza,

140 S.W.3d at 376; Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 308. For example, Dad testified that Mom, her parents,

and some of E.A.C.’s cousins live in San Antonio.

       And Mom testified that she and her parents still live in Bexar County, and E.A.C. had

visited her in Texas at least five times in the previous eighteen months. E.A.C.’s visits with her

included a spring break, a six-week summer visit, and a Christmas visit in 2020, and a summer

visit in 2021. When E.A.C. visits her, they go out to dinner, go shopping and to museums, and

spend time together. They also visit with her parents. Her parents will take E.A.C. out to dinner

or have Mom and E.A.C. over to their home for dinner. And when E.A.C. is at home in California,

Mom speaks with E.A.C. twice a week for a few minutes.

       Dad testified that E.A.C. had no friends in San Antonio, but Mom testified that E.A.C. “has

a close friend that he’s known all his life” in Bexar County. Other than Mom’s testimony about

whether E.A.C. has a friend in Bexar County, Mom’s testimony regarding E.A.C.’s connections

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to Texas was either undisputed or affirmed by Dad. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

815 (Tex. 2005) (noting that “[u]ndisputed contrary evidence may . . . become conclusive when a

party admits it is true”). Notably, Dad did not dispute Mom’s testimony about the number, nature,

or duration of E.A.C.’s recent visits to Texas. See id.

       Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court erred when it found that E.A.C.

did not have a significant connection with Texas. See In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 378 (“Because

the record establishes that the children visited Texas on a number of occasions and maintained a

close relationship with their mother and other relatives residing in Texas, all important

considerations under the UCCJEA, we hold that the children have a significant connection with

Texas sufficient to support the trial court’s exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the modification

proceedings.”).

       Because the record conclusively establishes that E.A.C. had a significant connection with

Texas, we need not consider the substantial evidence elements. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 152.202(a)(1); In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 379; Cortez, 639 S.W.3d at 308.

       We necessarily conclude that the trial court erred when it found it had lost exclusive

continuing jurisdiction and granted Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 152.202(a)(1); In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 377–78.

       We sustain Mom’s first issue.

                                      INCONVENIENT FORUM

       In her second issue, Mom argues Texas is not an inconvenient forum, but she recognizes

that the trial court did not rule on whether California was a more convenient forum. She asserts

that, if the trial court granted Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction based on Texas being an inconvenient

forum, it erred.

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        Similar to In re Forlenza, the central issue before us is whether the trial court retained

exclusive continuing jurisdiction, not whether Texas is an inconvenient forum. 3 See In re

Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 378 (“Importantly, the only issue before us is whether the Texas court

retained jurisdiction; the court could still decline to exercise that jurisdiction if another forum was

more convenient.”). The record shows the trial court granted Dad’s plea because it, albeit

erroneously, concluded it lost exclusive continuing jurisdiction—not for an inconvenient forum.

        Because we are reversing the trial court’s order with respect to the surviving issues, Mom’s

second issue is moot.

                           INTERFERENCE WITH POSSESSORY INTEREST

        In her third issue, Mom argues the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing her

interference with possessory interest claim “because that suit was not governed by Chapter 152 of

the Family Code.”

        For different reasons, we have already determined that part of Mom’s interference with

possessory interest claim is moot, but her claim for any cognizable damage she incurred before

E.A.C. became an adult survives. Thus, Mom’s third issue is moot.

                                AWARD OF DAD’S ATTORNEY’S FEES

        The remaining matter is the award of attorney’s fees to Dad. In his plea to the jurisdiction,

Dad stated it was necessary for him to hire an attorney “to preserve and protect the child’s rights,”

and he sought attorney’s fees. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 106.002(a) (authorizing attorney’s

fees in a SAPCR). The trial court awarded Dad attorney’s fees, and Mom asked this court to

reverse the trial court’s order—which includes the attorney’s fees award.

3
 We express no opinion on whether Texas is an inconvenient forum. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207; In re
Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d at 378.

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                                                                                       04-21-00453-CV

       The award was based on the trial court’s discretion at the time, but since then, E.A.C.

became an adult, and there are fewer live claims. Because “[a]n attorney’s fees award in a suit

affecting the parent-child relationship is discretionary with the trial court,” Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d

10, 21 (Tex. 2002), and the factors that may influence the trial court’s discretion have changed, we

reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Dad. On remand, the trial court may again exercise its

discretion regarding any award of attorney’s fees. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 106.002(a); Lenz,

79 S.W.3d at 21.

                                            CONCLUSION

       After the trial court signed its order granting Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction, and while this

case was on appeal, E.A.C. turned eighteen years old; for child custody purposes, E.A.C. became

an adult, and Mom’s claims for conservatorship, possession and access, and enforcement of a child

custody order became moot.

       We dismiss Mom’s claims for conservatorship, possession and access, and enforcement of

a child custody order. But because E.A.C. still had a significant connection with Texas and Mom’s

claims for interference with possessory interest and attorney’s fees survive, we reverse the trial

court’s order granting Dad’s plea to the jurisdiction with respect to Mom’s surviving claims and

the award of attorney’s fees to Dad, and we remand this cause to the trial court.

                                                    Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

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