Court Opinion

ID: 9763453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:45:38.144322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.629290
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join that portion of the majority opinion addressing the motion for new trial grounds for review but I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to dismiss the grounds for review relating to the issue of restitution.
I.
Although we initially decided to review appellant’s restitution grounds, the majority, purporting to rely on Armstrong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), concludes resolution of those grounds would be advisory. Majority op., 877 S.W.2d 325, 325, n. 1. In Armstrong, the defendant appealed from his conviction and the State cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and dismissed the State’s appeal. Id., 805 S.W.2d at 792. We held resolution of the State’s point of error would be advisory be*328cause, regardless of its resolution, Armstrong could not be retried. Id,., 805 S.W.2d at 794.
However, in the instant case, the majority’s conclusion that resolving the restitution grounds would be advisory is contingent upon the action of the Court of Appeals on remand. The majority states:
We [have] remand[ed] this case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether appellant waived counsel on his motion for new trial. In the event the Court of Appeals concludes that appellant was entitled to counsel in preparing his motion, did not forfeit that right and remands the case to the trial court to allow appellant time to refile his motion for new trial with the benefit of counsel ... the possibility exists that the motion would be granted, rendering moot any decision of this Court pertaining to the issue of restitution.
Majority op., 877 S.W. at 325, n. 1. (Emphasis supplied.)
Armstrong is distinguishable because appellate resolution of the State’s point of error in that case could not be given effect. However, in the instant case, resolution of the restitution grounds could be given effect if the Court of Appeals concludes appellant waived counsel on his motion for new trial. Consequently, our opinion would not be advisory.
II.
The instant case arose from the same transactions as Martin v. State, 806 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991). And the Court of Appeals relied on its opinion in Martin to resolve appellant’s restitution issues. Connor v. State, 809 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991). However, we reversed the Court of Appeals in Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), holding the trial judge erred by ordering restitution to “persons other than just the victim of the crime for which [Martin] was convicted.” Id., 874 S.W.2d at 679. Should the Court of Appeals determine appellant waived counsel on his motion for new trial, it would be prudent for that Court to reconsider the restitution issue in light of our opinion in Martin. However, in limiting the scope of the remand to the motion for new trial issue, the majority precludes the Court of Appeals from considering the restitution issue. Williams v. State, 829 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). Under this remand, if the Court of Appeals determines appellant is not entitled to relief on the motion for new trial issue, appellant must again seek discretionary review of the restitution grounds. Such an action would be a needless waste of everyone’s time and resources. Consequently, I would permit the Court of Appeals to reconsider the restitution issue in light of Martin.
With these comments, I respectfully dissent.
CAMPBELL and OVERSTREET, JJ., join this opinion.