Court Opinion

ID: 9405450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 16:13:09.801561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.076015
License: Public Domain

J-S09024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 SHAUN ROSARIO                        :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 602 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-63-CR-0001818-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 SHAUN DENNIS ROSARIO                 :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 603 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-63-CR-0001227-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 SHAUN DENNIS ROSARIO                 :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 604 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-63-CR-0001821-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
J-S09024-23

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED: June 28, 2023

     Shaun Dennis Rosario appeals pro se from the May 4, 2022 order

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).   We vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

     By way of background, Appellant was charged at the above-referenced

docket numbers due to three incidents occurring between May 9 and 10, 2011.

Appellant was charged at docket number 1818-2011 (“Theft Docket”) with

multiple theft and summary offenses based upon Appellant allegedly entering

another individual’s dump truck and stealing a hammer on May 9, 2011.

     Later that morning, Appellant was found unresponsive from a drug

overdose with the hammer beneath his prone body.              Appellant was

transported to Mon Valley Hospital for treatment.    Upon awakening in the

hospital, Appellant became irate and combative. Appellant’s ensuing conduct

was previously summarized as follows:

     When he regained consciousness, Appellant expressed his desire
     to be released from the hospital. The treating physician, Dr. Gene
     Manzetti, M.D., explained to Appellant the necessity that Appellant
     remain under the care of the hospital. Appellant became upset at
     that news and insisted that he had the right to leave. At this
     juncture, Dr. Manzetti informed Appellant that there was a
     warrant out for his arrest and when he was discharged from
     medical care the police would have to be informed regarding the
     warrant.

           Testimony demonstrated that upon hearing this information
     Appellant became irate and began yelling at Dr. Manzetti.
     However, Appellant ultimately decided to stay at the hospital
     overnight. [At a]pproximately 1:15 a.m. on May 10, 2011,

                                    -2-
J-S09024-23

     Appellant became agitated and demanded information about his
     treatment. [Stacy Hoffman, R.N.,] provided him with the results
     of his toxicology screen. Appellant read over the report and then
     queried whether there was anyone in the building with weapons.
     Appellant then began to stand up with the aid of Ms. Hoffman and
     nursing assistant Carol May.      Nurse Hoffman testified that
     Appellant then suddenly pushed past them and slammed the door
     shut, trapping everyone inside. Appellant expressed that he was
     not going to go to jail and no one was leaving the room until he
     could go home.

           Security was called to the area. Appellant blockaded the
     door with his body and pulled out his IV and catheter. As a result,
     blood began pouring out of the IV and Appellant began
     deliberately spraying it all over the room.             Testimony
     demonstrated that Appellant, who had previously been diagnosed
     with hepatitis C, spilled blood onto Ms. Hoffman. Appellant then
     demanded Ms. Hoffman remove the catheter. Appellant permitted
     another nurse to retrieve a needleless syringe, which was
     necessary for the removal, and provide it to Ms. Hoffman. After
     the catheter was removed, two security guards, Edward Swick and
     Robert Ashbaugh, arrived and attempted to make entry to the
     room, but Appellant continued to block the door with his body.

           Appellant picked up the syringe and began waving it around
     and threatening Ms. Hoffman, Ms. May and the security guards
     stating he would stab them. Appellant then attempted to grab a
     chair at which time he took some of his weight off of the door and
     security was able to make entry into the room. Appellant then
     grabbed Ms. May and put her in front of him to block himself from
     security. He then lifted Ms. May off of the ground. While Ms. May
     was still in his grasp, the security guards grabbed Appellant and
     put him onto the bed. He continued threatening that he was going
     to stab everyone and making motions to that effect. Testimony
     demonstrated that he swung at the upper body and neck areas of
     the security guards and nurses numerous times with the syringe.
     Ms. May was finally freed from Appellant’s grasp and she and Ms.
     Hoffman were able to exit the room. Appellant finally was
     subdued on the hospital bed, but not before he suddenly lunged
     up at the security guards and grabbed their shirts and attempted
     to take pens from the front pockets of their shirts.

                                    -3-
J-S09024-23

Commonwealth v. Rosario (“Rosario I”), 136 A.3d 1028 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(unpublished memorandum at 2-4) (cleaned up). As a result, Appellant was

charged at docket number 1821-2011 (“Hospital Docket”), with numerous

assault-related crimes for his actions against the nurses and security guards.

      Shortly thereafter, Appellant was discharged by the hospital, transferred

to the custody of the police, and handcuffed and shackled. Constable Walter

Fronzaglio placed Appellant in the rear of a van for transport to the

Washington County Correctional Facility. The van did not have a partition

between the driver and the rear passengers, but Appellant’s leg shackles were

secured to the frame of his seat.    While initially calm and conversive with

Constable Fronzaglio, Appellant, seemingly unprovoked, once again became

combative:

      Appellant began screaming “I want out of this fucking van. I’m
      getting the fuck out of here. I want to be free.” Constable
      Fronzaglio testified that Appellant then jumped on him while he
      was driving and reached for his gun on his right hip. Constable
      Fronzaglio was carrying a .40 caliber pistol in a leather snap
      holster. In response, Constable Fronzaglio let go of the steering
      wheel and grabbed Appellant’s hand that was on his gun.
      Constable Fronzaglio also grabbed Appellant’s head and tried to
      pull him away from his person. During the struggle the van veered
      off the road and flipped over.

            The van landed upside down on an embankment. Constable
      Fronzaglio testified he could not see anything and was disoriented.
      He believed he was lying on the roof of the van and was still
      struggling with Appellant. Appellant then tried to crawl out of the
      van. Constable Fronzaglio began punching him in the head and
      yelled for Appellant to get back into the van. Constable Fronzaglio
      was able to free himself and crawl out of an opening near the
      passenger side window and exited the van. Appellant was still
      trapped in the van.

                                     -4-
J-S09024-23

           Upon noticing Constable Fronzaglio waving his arms on the
     side of the road, a truck driver, Lawrence Prenni, called 9-1-1 and
     pulled over to see if he could be of assistance. Constable
     Fronzaglio asked Mr. Prenni to assist him in pulling Appellant out
     of the van. As the Constable was pulling Appellant from the
     wreckage, Appellant stabbed Constable Fronzaglio in the calf with
     a knife. Mr. Prenni grabbed the knife from Appellant and threw it.
     Mr. Prenni subdued Appellant until the Pennsylvania State Police
     [“PSP”] arrived.

            The [PSP] arrived at the scene and were able to pull
     Appellant from the van. Constable Fronzaglio testified that he had
     articles from other prisoners in his van that he holds in safe
     keeping until offenders retrieve them, as such articles are not
     permitted to go into the jail. He testified he had a knife in the van
     from such an instance. Appellant was searched at the scene by
     the [PSP] and they discovered Appellant had one of the
     Constable’s spare .40 caliber magazines in his pocket.

           Constable Fronzaglio was taken to the hospital by the
     Donora Police. At Mon Valley Hospital he was treated for a stab
     wound to the right calf and bumps and bruises sustained during
     the crash. Appellant was taken into custody.

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 4-6) (cleaned up).             Based upon the

foregoing, Appellant was charged at docket number 1227-2011 (“Escape

Docket”) with several assaultive and escape-related crimes.

     While being transported to his preliminary hearing by PSP, the troopers

told Appellant that they did not want any problems on the return trip to the

Washington County Correctional Facility. Appellant, referencing the manner

in which he was secured inside the PSP vehicle, replied, “If I was locked up

like this in the first place, none of this would have happened[.]”           Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 6) (cleaned up).

                                     -5-
J-S09024-23

        In 2013, Appellant proceeded to a consolidated jury trial on all three

dockets.1 Appellant was acquitted of all charges at the Theft Docket. At the

Hospital Docket, the jury convicted Appellant of two counts each of terroristic

threats, false imprisonment, and unlawful restraint, and four counts of simple

assault. The jury convicted Appellant at the Escape Docket with two counts

each of aggravated assault and simple assault, and one count each of assault

by prisoner, disarming law enforcement officer, and criminal attempt (escape

with a deadly weapon).2          The trial court sentenced Appellant to a total

aggregate sentence of seventeen to thirty-four years of incarceration.

        Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. On

direct appeal to this Court, Appellant challenged the effective assistance of

counsel, the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines, the discretionary

aspects of his sentence, and the calculation of Appellant’s credit for time

served.     We dismissed Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

without prejudice to raise it in a collateral proceeding, deemed the

underdeveloped guidelines issue waived, and affirmed Appellant’s judgment

of sentence. See Rosario I, supra.
____________________________________________

1 Appellant was appointed several different attorneys to represent him pre-
trial, all of whom sought to withdraw due to various conflicts. Of relevance to
the instant appeal, John Puskar, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant
on April 11, 2013. Subsequently, Thomas Agrafiotis, Esquire, was appointed
to represent Appellant. Attorney Agrafiotis represented Appellant at trial and
on appeal. However, as Appellant wished to challenge counsel’s effectiveness
on direct appeal, Appellant was appointed new counsel, Renee Colbert, for
appeal purposes.

2   He was found not guilty of one charge of aggravated assault.

                                           -6-
J-S09024-23

      Thereafter, Appellant initiated the instant PCRA proceedings by timely

filing pro se his first PCRA petition.     Therein, he raised several claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, trial court error, and constitutional violations.

The PCRA court ultimately appointed Molly Maguire Gaussa, Esquire, who filed

a no-merit letter and sought leave to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth

v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550

A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).          The PCRA court granted Attorney

Gaussa’s petition to withdraw and issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. On June

25, 2019, Appellant filed a response challenging the assistance of Attorney

Gaussa, and the PCRA court entered an order dismissing the petition.

Appellant did not receive a copy of the dismissal order. Nearly a year later,

Appellant pro se sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which

the PCRA court denied.

      On October 29, 2020, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal at all three

docket numbers, challenging the dismissal of his PCRA petition. The PCRA

court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a statement raising

fourteen challenges. The PCRA court, in its responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion,

found the appeal to be untimely and Appellant’s claims waived because he

incorporated by reference other filings into his Rule 1925(b) statement. In

the alternative, the court addressed the merits of the claims and determined

that they were all either waived for failure to raise in the PCRA court or lacked

                                       -7-
J-S09024-23

merit.       This Court, before reaching the merits of Appellant’s claims, quashed

the appeal as premature because we found there was no final, appealable

order entered on the docket. See Commonwealth v. Rosario (“Rosario

II”), 276 A.3d 245 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision at 5). We

directed that once the clerk of courts served the order dismissing Appellant’s

petition, Appellant would have thirty days to file separate notices of appeal at

each docket. See id.

        The clerk of courts noted service of the dismissal order on Appellant on

May 4, 2022. These timely-filed notices of appeal followed.3 The PCRA court

did not order a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement and Appellant did not

file one.      The PCRA court nonetheless filed a supplemental Rule 1925(a)

opinion.4      In his statement of questions, Appellant presents the following

issues for our consideration:

        1.      Did the PCRA court err in failing to hold an evidentiary
                hearing on [Appellant’s] post-conviction claim of trial
                counsel[’]s ineffectiveness.

____________________________________________

3   This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals.

4 Both the Commonwealth and the PCRA court aver that Appellant’s claims are
waived for failing to include them with sufficient detail in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. However, since Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was filed at
the quashed appeal and the PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise
statement as part of the instant appeal, we decline to find waiver on this basis.
That being said, our leniency is not boundless. See Commonwealth v.
Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“Although this Court is willing
to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers
no special benefit upon the appellant.” (cleaned up)).

                                           -8-
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      2.    Did PCRA court err in accepting PCRA counsel’s “no-merit
            letter.”

      3.    Did PCRA counsel err in failing to investigate and amend the
            PCRA petition pursuant to Rule 905(a)(b).

Appellant’s brief at 2.   However, in the argument section of his brief he

presents eleven issues and neglects to present any argument specific to the

issues raised in his statement of questions.       See id. at 8 (summary of

argument, which includes two sentences baldly asserting error as to the lack

of an evidentiary hearing and the adequacy of the no-merit letter). This Court

will not develop Appellant’s arguments for him.       See Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 925 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly, his claims that the

PCRA court erred in accepting counsel’s Turner/Finley letter and in

dismissing his petition without a hearing are waived. See Johnson, supra

at 925 (finding issues waived where the brief lacked any development of the

claims in the argument section and did not cite to any authority).

      We now turn to the eleven issues raised in the argument section of his

brief. He raises two claims of trial court error. See Appellant’s brief at 12-14

(claiming the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Appellant’s expert

witness to testify at trial that “Appellant was in a state of delirium” and

therefore unable to form the specific intent necessary for the assaultive and

disarming crimes at the Hospital and Escape Dockets), and at 28-29 (claiming

the trial court abused its discretion in denying Attorney Agrafiotis’s pre-trial

request for a continuance to prepare for trial and PCRA counsel was ineffective

                                      -9-
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for failing to raise this PCRA claim). Since Appellant could have raised these

claims on direct appeal but failed to do so, they are waived.                See

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 2001); 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed

to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior

state postconviction proceeding.”).

      We next turn to Appellant’s remaining issues, which are couched within

PCRA counsel’s purported ineffectiveness for failing to raise specific claims in

an amended PCRA petition. We consider these mindful of the following. “Our

standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record

evidence and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d

266, 269 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). Counsel is presumed to be effective

and the petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation omitted).

To do so, he must establish the following three elements:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. (citations omitted). Failure to prove any of the three elements will result

in dismissal of the ineffectiveness claim. Id. (citation omitted).

                                      - 10 -
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      Most of Appellant’s claims aver that PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise claims as to the ineffectiveness of appellate and/or trial counsel.

“In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is

whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in

fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective,

then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the

underlying issue.”      Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270

(Pa.Super. 2010).

      As a first-time PCRA petitioner, Appellant “enjoys a well-recognized right

to legal representation during this initial collateral review of his judgment of

sentence. In this context, the right to counsel conferred on initial PCRA review

means an enforceable right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 621 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

As a means of enforcing this right, our Supreme Court has clarified that “a

PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new

counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the

first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley,

261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). In these scenarios, Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) waiver does not apply. Id. at 405. Our Supreme Court outlined the

following procedure for appellate courts to follow in reviewing claims of

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel raised for the first time on appeal from

the dismissal of a PCRA petition:

                                      - 11 -
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      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

Id. at 402 (cleaned up).

      In other words, “appellate courts will have the ability to grant or deny

relief on straightforward claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA

court for the development of the record.” Id. at 403. Thus, our Supreme

Court reaffirmed the preference for evidentiary hearings and the “general rule”

that “a lawyer should not be held ineffective without first having an

opportunity to address the accusation in some fashion.” Commonwealth v.

Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 895 (Pa. 2010), overruled on other grounds by

Bradley, supra. Moreover, the appropriate forum for the development of an

evidentiary record on PCRA claims is the PCRA court as the appellate courts

do not serve as fact-finding courts. See Commonwealth v. Shaw, 247 A.3d

1008, 1017 (Pa. 2021).

      Here, Appellant’s claims pertaining to PCRA counsel’s stewardship can

be summarized as follows:

      1.    Trial, appellate, and PCRA counsel failed to raise the claim
            that his convictions for assault by a prisoner and attempted
            escape should be reversed because the arrest warrant for
            the Theft Docket was illegal. See Appellant’s brief at 9-10.

                                    - 12 -
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     2.   PCRA counsel should have raised trial counsel’s
          ineffectiveness for failing to argue that the evidence was
          insufficient for assault by a prisoner because Appellant did
          not meet the definition of a prisoner. Id. at 11.

     3.   PCRA counsel failed to raise a legality of sentencing issue
          based upon the argument that Appellant was convicted of
          assault by a prisoner and attempted aggravated assault for
          the same conduct of stabbing Constable Fronzaglio, and his
          conviction for escape was impossible because he was
          handcuffed and shackled and never attempted to escape.
          Id. at 15.

     4.   PCRA counsel failed to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
          for not objecting to a violation of the six-hour arraignment
          rule at each docket. Appellant claims prejudice because his
          pre-arraignment statements were used against him at trial.
          Id. at 16-17.

     5.   PCRA counsel failed to raise the ineffective assistance of
          Attorney Puskar for misadvising Appellant about a plea
          offer. Id. at 18-19.

     6.   PCRA counsel failed to raise the ineffectiveness of Attorneys
          Puskar and Agrafiotis for failing to move for suppression of
          Appellant’s statements given at the hospital without
          Miranda warnings, and Attorney Agrafiotis for failing to
          attack the reliability and voluntariness of the statements at
          trial. Id. at 20-24.

     7.   PCRA counsel failed to present Appellant’s claim that
          Attorneys Puskar and Agrafiotis did not properly argue for
          admission of expert witness testimony at trial regarding
          Appellant’s mental illness and the effect of the drugs
          ingested voluntarily by Appellant and administered to
          Appellant during his stay at the hospital, insofar as they
          related to Appellant’s state of mind and involuntary
          intoxication as a defense. Id. at 25-27.

     8.   PCRA counsel failed to argue that several officers of the
          court obstructed the administration of justice from the time
          of the preliminary hearing to the instant PCRA proceedings,

                                  - 13 -
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            due in large part to the absence of requested transcripts.
            Id. at 30-32.

      9.    PCRA counsel failed to present Appellant’s claim that he was
            prejudiced by the violation of the sequestration order. With
            regard to the underlying substance of the violation,
            Appellant contends that the transcript has been modified to
            conceal the violation. Id. at 33-35.

      Upon review of the certified record, we are satisfied that Appellant raised

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the earliest opportunity. Indeed, Appellant

first raised PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in response to the PCRA court’s Rule

907 notice. In the order denying Appellant’s petition for an extension of time

to file a notice of appeal, the PCRA court stated that it reviewed Appellant’s

response prior to dismissing his PCRA petition.       See PCRA Court Order,

8/13/20, at unnumbered 1. However, our review of the certified record does

not evince that the PCRA court considered Appellant’s properly-raised claims

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness prior to dismissing the PCRA petition. In

fact, we observe that the dismissal order, which was filed three hours after

Appellant’s response, does not reference Appellant’s response or his assertion

that PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

      Appellant has raised more than mere boilerplate assertions but has not

had the opportunity to develop the claims outside of the pro se argument in

his brief. See Bradley, supra, at 402. As “relief is not plainly unavailable

as a matter of law,” we conclude that “remand should be afforded” with

respect to these claims.   Id.   Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition and remand for the appointment of counsel to assist

                                     - 14 -
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Appellant in litigating his ineffective assistance of counsel claims pertaining to

PCRA counsel.    Newly-appointed counsel shall file a brief discussing those

claims within a reasonable time frame.            See Betts, supra at 625.

“Thereafter, the PCRA court shall have the discretion to proceed as it deems

fit under Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,”

including granting new counsel the opportunity to file an amended petition on

Appellant’s behalf, holding an evidentiary hearing, or issuing notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Id.

      Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.           Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/2023

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