Court Opinion

ID: 9652689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:30:28.413109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.516520
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Waiving trial by jury, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere in a bench trial to the offense of aggravated sexual assault under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, §§ 22.-011(a)(2)(A) and 22.021(a)(5). The court assessed punishment at 8 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal the only point of error urged was that the “evidence admitted against appellant is insufficient to sustain the conviction.’’
Appellant argued that the only evidence offered before the court on his plea of guilty was stipulated evidence which was accepted by the court under Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., as the basis for its judgment, and that such evidence was insufficient.
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, examined the stipulation and agreed with appellant that the forms used for the stipulation and as filled in did not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. It reversed the conviction and without citation of authority rendered “a judgment of acquittal.” Bender v. State (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], No. 01-84-0554-CR—1985).
In its petitions for discretionary review, the State contended that the Court of Appeals misread and misconstrued the stipulation entered into between the appellant and the State and offered to sustain appellant’s plea of nolo contendere. We granted the State’s petitions to determine the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
It is obvious that appellant or his counsel took the Harris County form used for stipulations where the plea in a felony case before the court is guilty or nolo conten-dere and through interlineation “modified” what would have otherwise been a written judicial confession. The interlineation and resulting modification was apparently not observed by the State, and the stipulations were offered by the State as evidence and were “accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment.” Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P.
There can be no question that the plea of nolo contendere was freely and voluntarily entered, and that the appellant was duly admonished of the consequences of the plea in accordance with Article 26.13, V.A. C.C.P. In addition the appellant waived in writing the appearance, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses against him and also waived his privilege against self-incrimination and consented to both the oral and written stipulation of evidence, etc. See Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. Appel*280lant does not contend etc. In the same written form (for waiver of rights, etc.) is found typed the allegations of the indictment. The first count was crossed out on the form leaving only the allegations of the second consent to which the appellant entered a plea of non-contendere. Below this part of the form is found the printed statement, “I understand the above allegations and I confess that they are true and that the acts alleged were committed on _” While the date was filled in on the form, someone struck the words “... I confess that they [allegations] are true” and entered interlineations in ink which prevented the stipulation from being a judicial confession when it was sworn to by the appellant. Thus, it is obvious that the appellant or his counsel or someone took the Harris County form used for stipulations where the plea before the court in a felony case is guilty or nolo contendere and through interlineation “modified” what would have otherwise been a written judicial confession, which standing alone would have been sufficient to meet the evidentia-ry requirements of Article 1.15, supra. The interlineation and resulting modification of the form were apparently not observed by the State which offered the stipulations as evidence and “were accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment.” Article 1.15, supra.
The “doctored up” portion of the waiver form as utilized was the basis of the complaint on appeal that the evidence was insufficient.
The Court of Appeals found that a reading of the stipulations reflected insufficient evidence and ordered an acquittal. If the stipulation is insufficient to meet the requirements of Article 1.15, supra, that is one matter; the order of acquittal is another. The Court of Appeals cites no authorities for the order of acquittal. Surely a defendant who enters a nolo contendere plea freely and voluntarily and persists in such plea despite the admonishment of the consequences is not entitled to go free and stand acquitted because of the interlineation utilized. The order of acquittal may well rest upon Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), which held that the Double .Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction.
While the said double jeopardy prohibition is applicable to the states, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), it is important to note that Burks and Greene involved contested jury trials where the plea in each case was “not guilty” and where the burden was on the prosecution to prove each element of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
In the instant case the prior conviction involved a plea of nolo contendere before the court and a failure to comply with a state statute. Article 1.15, supra.
In Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), it was held there is no federal constitutional requirement that evidence of guilt must be offered to corroborate a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a state criminal prosecution and that the “rationality” test of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), has no application thereto, and that a defendant cannot collaterally attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support his plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
More recently in Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), this Court held that Burks and Greene do not apply in a federal constitutional sense to federal or state cases where the defendant has intelligently and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, noting that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), made clear that such a plea is a conviction with nothing remaining but for the court to determine punishment and render judgment. See and cf Federal Rules Cr.Pro. Rule 11(f). Martin also made clear that the failure to comply with the rather unique Texas statute (Article 1.15, supra) *281does not constitute a federal constitutional violation, nor render Burks and Greene applicable, so that a defendant who intelligently and knowingly enters a guilty plea may stand acquitted forevermore of the crime.1
Thus, Burks and Greene are not a basis for ordering an acquittal in the instant case. Further, if the court accepted such stipulated evidence as the basis for its judgment, there was trial error in light of Article 1.15, supra. Burks and Greene have no application to trial error. Martin, supra.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
TEAGUE, J., dissents.

. To the extent that Laflore v. State, 595 S.W.2d 862 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion on Rehearing), and their progeny are in conflict with this opinion they are overruled to the extent of the conflict.