Court Opinion

ID: 9418798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:39:45.549628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:10.606163
License: Public Domain

*123Mr. Justice Roberts,
dissenting.
The petitioner and two others were charged with murder committed^ in an attempt to rob a gasoline station. The petitioner and one of his co-defendants were tried together; the third testified for the Commonwealth.
There is no dispute that when the three embarked on their evil enterprise all were armed, and it is not denied that they approached the station with intent to commit either larceny or robbery; but the record exhibits grave contradictions as to which of them fired the fatal shot, and as to the petitioner’s abandonment of the common-plan before the shot was fired. The situation and size of the station, its arrangement, its contents, the location and size of doors and windows, and the position of surrounding objects, were vital factors in corroboration of contradiction of the varying accounts given in the testimony of the three participants.
After the jury had been empaneled and sworn the district attorney moved for a view of the scene of the murder. The request was granted. The district attorney then made a short statement to the jury, telling them' they were to view the premises and that when they returned from the view he would make a fuller opening. In the course of a colloquy between counsel and the judge the latter announced that he would appoint the defendants’ counsel to go on the view as representing their respective clients. Counsel for the petitioner moved that his client be permitted to accompany the jury on the view, asserting this was the defendant’s right under the federal constitution. The motion was denied and an exception reserved to the ruling.
The judge, the official stenographer, the district attorney, and counsel for the defendants, accompanied the jury to the scene. The judge controlled the entire proceeding, and everything that was said or done was’taken by the stenographer and. made a part of the record of *124the trial. . The pointing out of features of the scene by the district attorney went beyond a mere showing, and what he said closely approached argument.1 During the progress of the view the court formulated and placed of record a stipulation as to changes which had occurred since the shooting.2 In his charge to the jury the judge said:
*125“ Now, what have you before you on which to form your judgment and to render your finding and verdict? The view, the testimony given by the witnesses, and the exhibits, comprise the evidence in this case, comprise the evidence that is before you.” 3
“As I say, it is for the jury to say, from all the evidence before you, taking into consideration what it is contended outside of the evidence that you have relative to the firing of any shot — the conduct of any of thé parties just before and just after, ,and any appearances or any evidence that you may gather from the appearance of the locality itself, the testimony relative to the result of the shot, the course of it, and what was done. All that is a part of the sur-' rounding evidence and the circumstances that you shall take into consideration. And then, having takeii all the” surrounding circumstances into consideration, it is for you to say from all the evidence before you,' whether or not it was a withdrawal.” 3
In Massachusetts what the jury observes in the course of a view is evidence in the cause. In Tully v. Fitchburg R. Co., 134 Mass. 499, 503, it was said:
“ In many cases, and perhaps in most, except those for the assessment of damages, a view is allowed for the pur*126pose of enabling the jury better to understand and apply the evidence which is given in court; but it is not necessarily limited to this; and, in most cases of a view, a jury must of necessity acquire a certain amount of information, which they may properly treat as evidence in the case.”
And in Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 29-30; 140 N.E. 470, 478, a prosecution for homicide, the Supreme Judicial Court held:
“ The things thus seen by the jurors could not well be banished from their minds. A view often dispenses with the necessity of detailed description by plan'or word of mouth. Inevitably that which the jury see on a view will be utilized in reaching a verdict. In that sense that which is disclosed on a view is evidence. It is rightly described as such. Expressions to that effect are in numerous decisions.”
In Commonwealth v. Handren, 261 Mass. 294, 297; 158 N.E. 894, 896, the court observed:
“And the knowledge which the jurors thus acquire is evidence in the case.”
Of such weight is the knowledge thus obtained that it may tip the scales in favor of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict. Thus in Hanks v. Boston & A. R. Co., 147 Mass. 495, 499; 18 N.E. 218, 220, where the question was whether the case ought to have been submitted to the jury or a binding direction given, it was said:
“ It is to be observed that the jury may have been materially aided by a view taken by them of the locality.”
Compare Smith v. Morse, 148 Mass. 407, 410; 19 N.E. 393.
It necessarily follows that the court may instruct the jury to take into consideration what they saw. In Commonwealth v. Mara, 257 Mass. 198, 209; 153 N.E. 793, 795, the ruling was:
*127“ There was no error in the part of the instructions which permitted the jury to consider in deciding this question what they observed on the view.”
And in Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 365; 153 N.E. 834, 836, this was said:
“ The defendant also excepted to the statement by the trial judge to the jury that what they would see on the view would be competent evidence for them to consider. . . . There was no error in the statement of the judge as to the right of the jury to consider as evidence what was seen by them on the view.”
In the light of these rulings, which were concretely applied in this case, the question is whether the denial of petitioner’s request to be presept at the view deprived him of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This court has never had occasion to pass upon the precise point; but many pronouncements regarding the requirements of due process seem to leave no doubt as to the proper resolution of the issue.
The concept of due process is not technical. Form is disregarded if substantial rights are preserved.4 In whatsoever proceeding, whether it affect property or liberty or life, the Fourteenth Amendment commands the observance of that standard of common fairness, the failure to observe which would offend men’s sense of the decencies and proprieties of civilized life. It is fundamental that there can be no due process without reasonable notice and a fair hearing.5 Though the usual and customary forms of procedure be disregarded, the hearing may neverthe*128less be fair, if it safeguards the defendant’s substantial rights.
The States need not adopt a particular form of accusa- • tion,6 or prescribe any one method of trial,* ****7 or adhere to any set mode of selecting-the triers of fact,8 To conform^ to modern conditions, they may substitute a new form of procedure for one long practised and recognized.9 But, whatever the form or method of procedure adopted, they remain always subject to the prohibition against that which is commonly thought essentially unfair to him who is to be afforded a hearing. Tested by this, principle the trial of. an issue beyond the claim asserted,10 the-participation of a' judge affected with a personal interest in the result,11 the forcing of a trial under pressure of mob domination,12 or the deprivation of the right to present evidence bearing on the issue,13 have been adjudged to deny, due process. And this court'has recently decided that in the trial, of a capital offense due process includes the right of the accused to be represented by counsel.14
Our traditions, the Bills of Rights of our federal and state constitutions, state legislation and the decisions of the courts of the nation and the states, unite in testimony that the privilege of the accused to be present throughout *129his trial is of the very essence of due process. The trial as respects the prisoner’s right of presence in the constitutional sense, does not include the formal procedure of indictment or preliminary steps antecedent to the hearing on the merits, or stages of the litigation'after the rendition/ of the verdict,15 but does comprehend the inquiry by the ordained trier of fact from beginning to end.16
Speaking generally of the administration of criminal justice throughout the nation, this court has said:17 “A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner; ” and in enforcing the mandate of a territorial statute this language.was used:18
“ Such being the relation which the citizen holds to the public, and the object of punishment for public wrongs, the legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life or liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be personally present at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law required by the Constitution.”
To allay the apprehensions of the people lest the federal government invade their liberties, the first ten amendments to the Constitution were' adopted. The Sixth assures .one accused of crime that if prosecuted under federal law he shall have a public trial, be informed of -the nature and cause of the' accusation, be confronted with *130the witnesses against him, and have the assistance of counsel for his defense. But the-purpose that all trials, in state as well as national tribunals, should not lack the same quality of fairness, is evidenced by the embodiment of a guarantee of similar import in the constitution of every state in the Union.19 Out of excess of caution the fundamental law of many of the States specifically safeguards the right of the accused, “ to appear and defend in person.” 20 But mere differences in phraseology have not obscured the fact that all these instruments were intended to secure the same great privilege — a fair hearing. Accordingly, the. courts have uniformly and invariably held that the Sixth Amendment, as respects federal trials, and the analogous declarations of right of the state constitutions touching- trials in state courts, secure to the accused the privilege of presence at every stage of his trial. This court has so declared. In commenting upon the section of the Philippine Civil Government Act which extends to the accused in all criminal prosecutions “ the right to be heard by himself and counsel,” this was said':
"An identical or similar provision is found in the constitutions of the several States, and its substantial equiv.*131alent is embodiéd in the Sixth Amendment to the Con,.„itution of the United States. ... In eases of felony our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded it [the right so granted] as extending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the jury and the reception of the verdict, and as being scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself.” 21
And, as if to make assurance doubly sure, the legislatures of many of the States have adopted statutes redundant to the constitutional mandate explicitly declaring the right of the accused to be present at his trial.22
In the light of the universal acceptance of this fundamental rule of fairness that the prisoner may be present throughout his trial, it is not a matter of assumption but a certainty that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the observance of the rule.
It has been urged that the prisoner’s privilege of presence is for no other purpose than to safeguard his opportunity to cross-examine the adverse witnesses: But the privilege goes deeper than the mere opportunity to cross-examine, and secures his right to be present at every stage of the trial. The cases cited in the margin,23 while by no *132means exhausting the authorities, sufficiently illustrate and amply sustain the proposition that the right is fundamental and assures him who stands in jeopardy that he may in person, see, hear and know all that is placed before the tribunal having power by its finding to deprive him of. liberty or life. ■ It would be tedious and unnecessary to quote the language used in vindication of the privilege. The books are full of discussions of the subject.
The accused cannot cross-examine his own witnesses. Will it be suggested that, for this reason, he may be excluded from the court room while they give their evidence? He cannot cross-examine documents or physical exhibits. But documents, plans, maps, photographs, the clothing worn by the victim and by the perpetrator of the alleged' crime, the weapon used, and other material objects may be more potent than word of mouth, to carry conviction to the jury’s mind; and, so of the physical appearance of the scene of the crime. No reason is apparent why, if the accused may be excluded from a view, he may not also be excluded from the court room while such documentary and physical evidence is proffered to and examined by the jury. The opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses is only one of many reasons for the defendant’s presence throughout the trial. In no State save in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and in no *133cases save in those there recently decided, has the privilege or the fundamental nature of the right it preserves been questioned or denied. As the cases show,24 the right of presence exists at every step in the trial, whether it be during the giving of oral testimony, the submission of a document, the presentation of physical exhibits, the argument of counsel, the charge of the court, or the rendition of the verdict.
It cannot successfully be contended that as the Sixth Amendment has no application to trials in state courts, and the Fourteenth does not draw to itself and embody the provisions of state constitutions (Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454), fhe due process secured by the Four-: teenth Amendment does not embrace a right secured by those instruments. In Powell v. Alabama, supra, the argument that the conclusion would-be difficult that the right to counsel specifically preserved by the Sixth Amendment was also within the intendment of the due process clause of the Fourteenth, was answered thus:
“ In . . . Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241, this court held that a judgment of a state court, even though authorized by statute, by which private property was taken for public use without just compensation, was in violation of the due process of law required by. the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation: This holding was followed in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 277; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 524; and San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 754.
“ Likewise, this court has considered that freedom of speech and of the press are rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' although in the First Amendment, Congress is prohibited in spe*134cific terms from abridging the right. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707.
“. . . The rule is an aid to construction, and in some instances may be. conclusive; but it must-yield to more compelling considerations whenever such considerations exist. The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘ fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions ’ (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316), is obviously one of those compelling considerations which must prevail in determining whether it is embraced within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although it be specifically dealt with in another part of the Federal Constitution.” (pp. 66, 67.)
If, then, a view of the premises where crime is alleged to have been committed is a part of the process of submission of data to the triers of fact, upon which judgment is to be founded; if the knowledge thereby gained is to play its part with oral testimony and written evidence in striking the balance between the state and the prisoner, it is a part of the trial. If this) is true the Constitution secures the accused’s presence. In this conclusion all the courts, save those of Massachusetts, agree. Such difference of view as the authorities exhibit as to the prisoner’s right to be present at á view arises out of a disagreement on the question whether the view is a part of the trial, whether it"ís, in effect, the taking of evidence. The great weight of authority is that it forms a part of the trial, and for that reason a defendant who so desires is entitled to be present.25 Many decisions hold that he may waive the *135privilege;26 but an examination of the cases discloses none (with a single possible exception) where a denial of his request to accompany the jury on the view has not been held reversible error. And the stateménts that a view is not a part of the trial or that it is not the taking of evidence, and denying, on that ground, the defendant’s right to be present, are invariably found in cases where the defendant requested the view and did not ask to accompany the jury, or waived either expressly or by conduct his right so to do. Such statements are dicta, since the accused waived whatever right he had. Moreover, in several of the opinions which deny the right it is said that the prisoner ought always to be allowed to accompany the jury if he so requests.27
*136It is true there is disagreement as to the nature and function of a view. On the one hand, the assertion is that its purpose is merely to acquaint the jury with the scene and thus enable them better to understand the testimony, and hence it forms no part of the trial and is not the taking of evidence. On the other, the suggestion is that the jury are bound to carry in mind what they see, and .form their judgment from the knowledge so obtained, and so the view amounts to the taking of evidence.28 The distinction seems too fine for practical purposes; but however that may be, discussion of .this abstract question is unimportant in a case like the present where the view was held to be evidence, and the jury were expressly so instructed.
The respondent urges that whatever may have been the petitioner’s right, the record demonstrates he could have suffered no harm by reason of his absence. The argument is far from convincing in the light of the circumstances and the rule annotmced by-the court as respects the use the jury were at liberty to make of the knowledge gained by their view of the premises. But if it were clear that the verdict was not affected by knowledge gained on the view or that the result would have been the same had the appellant been present, still the denial of his constitutional right ought not be condoned. Nor ought this court to convert the inquiry from one as to the denial of the right into oné as to the prejudice suffered by the denial. To pivot affirmance on the question of the amount of harm done the accused, is to beg the constitutional question involved. The very substance of the defendant’s right is to be present. By hypothesis it is *137unfair to exclude him. • As this court has recently said with respect to disregard of the mandate of the Sixth Amendment respecting trial by jury:29
“ But the constitutional question cannot thus be settled by the simple process of ascertaining that the infraction assailed is unimportant when compared with similar but more serious infractions which might be conceived. ... It is not our province to measure the extent to which the Constitution has been contravened and' ignore the violation, if in our. opinion, it is not, relatively, as bad as it might have been.”
A distinction-has always been observed in the meaning of due process as affecting property rights, and as applying to procedure in the courts. In the former aspect the requirement is satisfied if no actual injury is inflicted, and the substantial rights of the citizen are hot infringed; the result rather than the means of reaching it is the important consideration. But where the conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is not that a just result shall have been obtained, but that the result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way. Procedural due process has to do with the manner of the trial; dictates that in the conduct of judicial inquiry certain fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard of those rules, and is .not satisfied, though the result is just, if the hearing was unfair.
In this case, the view was a part of the trial. The jury were not sent, to the scene in the custody of bailiffs who had no knowledge of the place or the circumstances of the crime. They were not instructed to view the premises so- as to better understand the testimony. They went forth with the judge presiding, the stenographer officiating, the District Attorney and the counsel of the defendants. As has been shown, more than a mere view of the *138premises was had. Matters were called to the jury’s attention in detail so that they could form judgments of distance; relative position, the alinements of objects, all having a crucial bearing upon the truthfulness of the testimony subsequently given, and they were told they might take their own estimates of these matters in corroboration or contradiction of the other evidence. Little wonder, in these circumstances, that the court felt it right to appoint the defendants’ counsel to accompany the jury on the view. If the prisoners were entitled to this protection, by the same token they were entitled themselves to.be present.
' I think that the petitioner was deprived of a constitutional right and that the judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concur in this opinion.

The following are outstanding instances:
“ The Court: Now, Mr. Volpe, if you are ready.
“ Mr. Volpe. Just first stand here, gentlemen, and take a look inside of the gasoline station. Now step in, please.
“(The following occurred inside the filling station:)
“Mr. Volpe: Now, gentlemen, I call your attention to this glass here (indicating), this window (indicating the back window of the filling station,) about the position of the glass, and I ask you to look at that, and the relative, position of the entrance, especially to the right or to the left, coming in through the door. And then this oil' tank here on the right of this window; the other two windows on the right of the building, and I want you to take note of the size of the room, and this- telephone here, and these two doors, one on each side of the telephone. Take note, also, of the location of this other gas tank over here, back of the door; this desk on the left. Also look' out the window at the back, and notice the gravel in the yard, and the fence there.”
“Mr. Volpe: I want you to take- a view of the other side of the sidewalk from this location, and note the driveway on the right of the gas station, and on the left, and these two pumps, or three pumps, noticing the distance from the pumps on the entrance of the gas station.
“ Now, I would like to have you come over here and take a look at the gas station as it sits back there.
“(The jury were taken across the street to the opposite sidewalk.) •
“Mr. Volpe: I want you to get a look at the whole layout, the righthand entrance and the lefthand entrance over there, where that car is standing. Take particular notice of the width of this street, and, as you stand here, notice the bridge going towards Union Square, . with the right and left driveways.”

 What occurred is shown by the notes, as follows:
“ Mr. Volpe: That'middle pump wasn’t, there at the time.
“ The Court: It is agreed that the only pumps that were there were the two outside pumps, and that the middle, or blue one, was not there.
*125“ Mr. Volpe: Yes, your Honor.
“ The Court: I can state that to them.
“(The jury left the bus and assembled on the sidewalk.)
“The Court: Now,'"it is agreed that at the time of the offense,— that is, on April 9, 1931, — there were but two pumps in front of the gasoline station, the- one on the extreme right, that is painted green,- and the one on the extreme left, that is painted black. Those two were there. The one in the middle, with the blue striping on it, was not there. It is also suggested that the jurors look at the street lights from that corner down there (indicating), and the situation of those' lights and those down the street.”

 During the trial, when certain plans were being put in evidence, the judge said: “What they [the jury] saw is to be taken equally with any evidence that is before them.” . • " ;

 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 524, 532; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236; Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436; Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624.

 Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 318; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 111.

 Hurtado v. California, supra; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83; Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483.

 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167.

 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638.

 Hurtado v. California, supra, 528, 529; Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 111.

 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 282; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 281-2.

 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510.

 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86.

 Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317.

 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45.

 ” Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442; Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 331.

 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574; Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442.

 Lewis v. United States, supra, p. 372.

 Hopt v. Utah, supra, p. 579.

 In two States (California and Nevada) the constitutions omit reference to the right of the accused to confront the witness against him; but the omission -is supplied by statute: Cal. Stats. 1911, Ch. 187, p. 364, Penal Code, § 686; Nevada Compiled Laws, 1929, Vol. 5, § 10654.

 Arizona, Const, of 1910, Art. II, § 24; California, Const. of 1879, Art. I, § 13; Colorado, Const, of 1876, Art. II, § 16; Idaho, Const, of 1889, Art. I, § 13; Illinois, Const. of 1870, Art. 2, § 9; Kansas, Const. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 10; Missouri, Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 22; Montana, Const. of 1889, Art. III, § 16; Nebraska, Const. of 1875, Art. I, § 11; Nevada, Const. of 1864, Art. I, § 8; New Mexico, Const. of 1911, Art. II, § 14 (as amended); New York, Const. of 1894, Art. I, § 6; North Dakota, Const. of 1889, Art. I, § 13; Ohio, Const, of 1851, (as amended Sept. 3, 1912), Art. I, § 10; South Dakota, Const. of 1889, Art. VI, § 7; Utah, Const. of 1895, Art. I, § 12; Washington, Const. of 1889, Art. I, § 22; Wyoming, Const. of 1889, Art. I, § 10.

 Diaz v. United States, supra, p. 454.

 La. Code Crim. Proc. (Dart 1932), Art. 365. Ann. Laws of Mass., Vol. 9, Ch. 278, § 6; Comp. Laws Michigan, 1929, Vol. 3, Ch. 287, § 17129; Revised Codes of Montana, 1921, Vol. 4, Part II, Ch. 1, § 11611; Nevada Comp. Laws, 1929, Vol. 5, § 10654, § 10921; New York Code of Crim. Pro., Cahill, § 8, par. 2; No. Dak. Comp. Laws, 1913, Vol. 2, § 10393; Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1932, § 996; Vermont General Laws 1917, § 2496; Virginia Code of 1930, § 4894; Pierce's Washington Code, § 1086-324; Wisconsin Statutes 1931, § 357.07; Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931, § 33-903.

 Slocovitch v. State, 46 Ala. 227; Whittaker v. State, 173 Ark. 1172; 294 S.W. 397; Lowman v. State, 80 Fla. 18; 85 So. 166; Chance v. State, 156 Ga. 428; 119 S.E. 303; People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593; 137 N.E. 454; Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69; 125 N.E. 773; State v. Reidel, 26 Iowa 430; Riddle v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 220; 287 S.W. 704; State v. Hutchinson, 163 La. 146; 111 So. 656; Duffy v. *132State, 151 Md. 456; 135 Atl. 189; Commonwealth v. Cody, 165 Mass. 133; 42 N.E. 575; State v. Dingman, 177 Minn. 283 ; 225 N.W. 82; Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 755; 12 So. 822; State v. Hoffman, 78 Mo. 256; State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420; 293 Pac. 309; Miller v. State, 29 Neb. 437 ; 45 N.W. 451; State v. Duvel, 103 N.J.L. 715; 137 Atl. 718; People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91; State v. Dixon, 185 N.C. 727; 117 S.E. 170; State v. Schasker, 60 N.D. 462; 235 N.W. 345; Cole v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. Rep. 50; 248 Pac. 347; State v. Chandler, 128 Ore. 204; 274 Pac. 303; Gray v. State, 158 Tenn. 370; 13 S.W. (2d) 793; Schafer v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. Rep. 500; 40 S.W. (2d) 147; State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505; 57 Pac. 542; Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592; 130 S.E. 398; State v. Shutzler, 82 Wash. 365; 144 Pac. 284; State v. Howerton, 100 W.Va. 501; 130 S.E. 655.

 See the cases cited in notes 16 and 23.

 Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328; People v. Bush, 68 Cal. 623; 10 Pac. 169; 71 Cal. 602, 12 Pac. 781; Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533; 98 So. 605; Chance v. State, 156 Ga. 428; 19 S.E. 303; State v. McGinnis, 12 Idaho 336; 85 Pac, 1089; Freeman v. Commonwealth, *135226 Ky. 850; 10 S.W. (2d) 827; State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46; People v. Auerbach, 176 Mich. 23, 45; 141 N.W. 869 (semble); Bailey v. State, 147 Miss. 428; 112 So. 594; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 31; Colletti v. State, 12 Oh. App. 104; Watson v. State, 166 Tenn. 400; 61 SW. (2d) 476; State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312; 73 Pac. 562, 633; Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600; 115 S.E. 679; State v. Hilsinger, 167 Wash. 427; 9 P. (2d) 357; State v. McCausland, 82 W.Va. 525; 96 S.E. 938.

 Whitley v. State, 114 Ark. 243; 169 S.W. 952; People v. Searle, 33 Cal. App. 228; 164 Pac. 819; Haynes v. State, 71 Fla. 585; 72 So. 180; State v. Stratton, 103 Kan. 226; 173 Pac. 300; State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342; 40 Pac. 372; Colletti v. State, 12 Oh. App. 104; Starr v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. Rep. 440; 115 Pac. 356; State v. Congdon, 14 R.I. 458; Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34; 134 Pac. 260, 135 id. 749

 Elias v. Territory, 9. Ariz. 1; 76 Pac. 605; Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289; 4 N.E. 870; but see Barber v. State, 199 Ind. 146; 155 N.E. 819; State v. Rogers, 145 Minn. 303; 177 N.W. 358; People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286; 50 N.E. 947; State v. Sing, 114 Ore. 267, 274 ; 229 Pac. 921; Commonwealth v. Van Horn, 188 Pa. 143; 41 Atl. 469; State v. Collins, 125 S.C. 267; 118 S.E. 423. The last mentioned case, while apparently a decision against-the right, contains but a mere statement on the subject without reference to the occurrences at the trial, and is probably based upon a waiver. It cites as authority State v. Suber, 89 S.C. 100; 71 S.E. 466, which is a clear case of waiver. If this is not so the case apparently stands alone.

 Compare with cases cited in note 25 the following: Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34; 134 Pac. 260, 135 id. 749; State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342; 40 Pac. 372; People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286; 50 N.E. 947; Starr v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. Rep. 440; 115 Pac. 356; State v. Lee Doon, 7 Wash. 308; 34 Pac. 1103,

 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292.