Court Opinion

ID: 9727563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:43:28.158759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:40.239666
License: Public Domain

ROTH, P.
J.—I dissent.
Accepting the facts tersely stated by appellant in his opening brief: “Appellant observed respondents [szc] vehicle and commenced pacing it to determine a possible speeding violation. Appellant then activated his emergency equipment, causing respondent to follow the appellant to the parking area near the center divider.
Appellant then stopped his vehicle some thirty (30) feet in front of respondent. Respondent kept coming, struck appellant and pushed him into the center divider.
“Respondent stated that in order to stop he had to pump his brakes and that his back right brake cylinder had been leaking. Examination of *476respondents [jic] vehicle by the investigating police officer resulted, among other things in a finding that, ‘Brake pedal went clear to floor threp (3) times before any pressure was developed
On those facts summary judgment was properly granted. In pertinent part, the trial judge said: “I don’t see how you can separate this whole little sequence of events, which probably didn’t take more than three total minutes, you know—the man pulled somebody over for speeding, gets out of his car, and starts to the car. What he is doing in between those two cars is more than I know, but he apparently was there.”
I am, as was the trial judge, unable meaningfully to distinguish the situation at bench from that dealt with in Hubbard, where a contrary result to that arrived at by my colleagues was reached.
On the facts, even the dissent in Hubbard [28 Cal.3d 480] would appear to require affirmance. At page 488 of that case, Tobriner, J. said: “If the police officer in the present case had suffered injury in the normal course of stopping the defendant for negligent speeding, I would agree that this action would fall under the traditional fireman’s rule because in that event the defendant’s negligence would have caused the officer’s injury only in the sense that it 'created the occasion’ for the officer’s presence at the location of the accident. In the case at bar, however, after the defendant became aware of the police officer’s presence on the scene, the defendant committed an additional and subsequent act of misconduct which foreseeably created a new and additional risk of danger to the officer and which ultimately caused the officer’s serious injuries.”
As noted above, appellant’s claim here was that his injury was related to respondent’s defective brakes rather than his speeding, but even if a distinction is properly otherwise to be drawn between the two, in no event would the former constitute a subsequent act of misconduct within the quoted language.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 18, 1982. Roth, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of defendant and respondent for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 1, 1982. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.