Court Opinion

ID: 9688507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:52:31.294964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:39.838196
License: Public Domain

HEFLIN, Chief Justice
(concurring in the result) :
I concur in the result of the majority opinion in this cause but disagree with the language which attempts to cure the so-called definitional infirmities in the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act by judicial construction.
The majority opinion attempts to make the reasoning in Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So.2d 218 (1974), applicable to the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act. In Pierce, this court engrafted by judicial construction the requirements of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) to the 1961 Alabama Obscenity Statute to make it constitutional.
While Miller v. California, supr.a, substituted a less stringent prosecutorial requirement than the one developed from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 974, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966), in regard to literary, artistic, political or scientific values, it also addressed the issue of limiting specificity necessary for criminal obscenity statutes to withstand constitutional attacks on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
The majority opinion states that the definitional infirmities in the Alabama Red *672Light Abatement Act are cured by judicial construction. However, I cannot find in the majority opinion any language by .which the requirements of Miller are added to the statute in question. I assume that the intent of the majority opinion is to engraft Miller’s requirements of limiting specificity to the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act. Even if such language did appear in the majority opinion to accomplish such intent, I would, nevertheless maintain that the court does not have the right to judicially engraft these requirements of limiting specificity to the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act.
The following appears in Miller:
“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S., at 354, 91 S.Ct. [1410], at 1411-1412; Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. at 485, 77 S.Ct. [1304], at 1309 ‘The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes [footnote omitted]’. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. at 642, 71 S.Ct. [920], at 932, and cases cited. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-50, 81 S.Ct. 391, 393-395, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1961); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S., at 502, 72 S.Ct. [777], at 780. We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra, 390 U.S. at 682-685, 88 S.Ct. [1298], at 1302-1305. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritátively construed. * * * A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, 408 U.S. at 230, 92 S.Ct. at 2245, quoting Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. at 489, 77 S.Ct. [1304] at 1311; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the ‘utterly without redeeming social value’ test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 419, 86 S.Ct. [975], at 977 [16 L.Ed.2d 1]; that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time. * * * See supra, at 2613. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary. See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, 408 U.S. at 232, 92 S.Ct. [2245], at 2247; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 383 U.S. at 459-460, 86 S.Ct. [975], at 998 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S., at 204, 84 S.Ct. [1676], at 1686 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. at 497-498, 77 S. Ct. [1304], at 1315-1316 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
“We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for *673the States. That must await their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion, supra:
“(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
“(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.” (Emphasis supplied)
One of the requirements in Miller was that the statutes designed to regulate obscene matters can not be overly broad but must be carefully limited by legislative act or judicial construction. The following language in Pierce reflects this court’s treatment of this requirement:
“In Miller, the court attempted to provide ‘positive guidance’ to other courts dealing with obscenity issues. The court recognized rthe inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression.’ Therefore, the court continued, ‘[sítate statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.’ The first limitation mentioned by the court was the scope of the staUite: r[lV]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.’ Furthermore, r[t]hat conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or [as] authoritatively construed.’ Other guidelines are succinctly stated in the following language:
“The first issue this court must deal with is whether the statute [the Alabama 1961 Obscenity Statute] contains the necessary specificity as required by Miller. The U. S. Supreme Court in Miller invites judicial construction as a method of supplying the required specificity if such is absent from the statute. * * * [T]his court now specifically incorporates the Miller guidelines or tests heretofore set out into its construction of the word ‘obscene’ in Section 374(3). Thus the operation of the provisions of Section 374(4) applicable in this case is limited to matter which depicts or describes sexual conduct. The regulated matter is more specifically restricted to (a) ‘Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,’ or (b) ‘Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.’ ” (Emphasis supplied)
From Miller it was concluded that in the absence of legislative language supplying the necessary limiting specificity, some state statutes could be judicially construed by engrafting to the statute the necessary limiting specificity and thereby pass constitutional muster. In fact, Miller seems to invite judicial construction as a method of supplying the required limiting specificity if such language is absent from the statute. While normally the task of providing limiting specificity to a statute is a legislative function, nevertheless, this court engrafted such limiting specificity to the 1961 Obscenity Statute because of the U. S. Supreme Court’s invitation to do so.
Now the majority opinion goes beyond statutes designated to control obscenity and attempts to make the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act a weapon against “hardcore pornography.” Obviously, the legislature felt that this act was not an obscenity control statute. This act was passed in 1919 and was on the books when the 1961 Obscenity Act was passed. The 1961 Obscenity Act possesses all of the injunctive relief features which the majority opinion would give to this act. See Title 14, §§ 374(5)-(11), Code of Alabama, 1940, as amended (1958 Recompiled — 1973 Cumulative Supp.). Further, there is no invitation from the Supreme Court of the United States for judicial construction to supply the necessary limiting specificity to this *674statute. I interpret Miller as limiting judicial construction engraftments to statutes designed to specifically control obscenity. The act in question is indeed broad and comprehensive in its scope — much more so than the 1961 Obscenity Statute. In my opinion the majority opinion goes beyond the pale of permissible judicial construction and crosses over into the realm of ex-, elusive legislative drafting by attempting to apply the same reasoning as was applied in Pierce.
Another reason why I cannot concur in the treatment given by the majority opinion involves a consideration of the residual effects that will inure to the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act following such judicial engraftments. Before such engraftments the act in question was a broad, comprehensive act, useful to the State in fighting battles against prostitution, assignation and lewdness. If the majority opinion engrafts the requirements of Miller to this act then this act will have to be construed in the future in a much more narrow and restricted sense and can only be used as a weapon against prostitution, assignation and hard-core pornography. The former broad protective scope given to “lewdness” is considerably reduced by the majority opinion.
As was previously pointed out, the 1961 Obscenity Act provides within its arsenal injunctive relief from obscene materials. This act can be used to enjoin the showing of obscene motion picture films. There is no real reason to transform the Alabama Red Light Abatement Act into an injunctive relief procedure to combat hard-core pornographic films because such a procedure has been available since 1961.
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully disagree with certain specified aspects of the majority opinion but feel that the result reached by the majority is correct.
BLOODWORTH and SHORES, JJ., concur.