Court Opinion

ID: 9716850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:52:24.754737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.084738
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DAVID L. RICHARDS, Justice
(Assigned).
Appellant was convicted of the offense of capital murder in connection with the death of her three-year-old stepson, John Henderson. The head injury causing the death occurred at a time when the child was in appellant’s care at their residence. The disputed issues at trial concerned appellant’s intent and the manner and means of death. The State waived the death penalty and, following appellant’s conviction, she was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Foot points are presented on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Dr. David Donahue concerning the forces necessary to cause the victim’s injury; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Howard Kefler concerning the forces necessary to cause the victim’s injury; (3) the trial court wrongly excluded a written statement provided to police authorities by the victim’s father; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion for directed verdict. We will affirm.
Points one and two challenge the testimony of Dr. David Donahue and Dr. Howard Kefler concerning the forces necessary to cause the injury resulting in the victim’s death. Appellant’s specific complaints challenge the reliability of the doctors’ *324opinions that the force causing the child’s massive brain injury and death was not consistent with appellant’s assertion that the injury was the accidental result of a short fall onto a bedroom dresser after she struck the child in the mouth.
Reviewing courts will not disturb the trial court’s determination that a witness is or is not qualified as an expert unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Consequently, the court will not conclude the trial court has abused its discretion if, in the same circumstances, it would have ruled differently or if the trial court committed a mere error in judgment. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.1995). Instead, we are to gauge an abuse of discretion by determining whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.
Under evidentiary rule 702, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tex.R. Evid. 702. This rule imposes a special gatekeeping obligation on the trial court to ensure the reliability of all expert testimony. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 722-26 (Tex.1998). The trial judge fulfills this obligation by determining as a precondition to admissibility that: (1) the putative expert is qualified as an expert; (2) the expert’s testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline; and (3) the testimony is relevant. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. A valid connection to the pertinent inquiry is a necessary precondition to admissibility. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795-96, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (stating factors that would be helpful are whether scientific method can be or has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, what the known or potential rate of error is, and whether it has attained general acceptance in the field).
The role of the trial court in qualifying experts is to ensure “that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion.” Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex.1996). The party offering the experts testimony bears the burden to show the witness possesses “special knowledge as to the very matter on which he proposes to give an opinion.” Id. at 152-53.
In Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the Daubert inquiry is “flexible,” and noted that there is general agreement among the federal courts that: (1) the gatekeeping function of trial judges regarding the reliability of expert evidence applies to all forms of expert testimony; and (2) the Daubert factors “do not necessarily apply outside the hard science context.” Id. at 561. The court emphasized that “methods of proving reliability will vary, depending upon the field of expertise” and recognized:
When addressing fields of study aside from the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or fields that are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific method, Kelly’s requirement of reliability applies but with less rigor than to the hard sciences. To speak of the validity of a “theory” or *325“technique” in these fields may be roughly accurate but somewhat misleading.

Id.

The court also noted that the Daubert “factors” apply to hard science but not to expert testimony involving clinical medicine. Id. at 561 (citing United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1156, 1158 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127, 117 S.Ct. 2527, 138 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1997) and Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016 n. 6 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1069, 118 S.Ct. 739, 139 L.Ed.2d 676 (1998)). Concerning Freeman, the court ruled that where an expert relies on his experience and training and not a particular methodology to reach his conclusions, the Daubert “analysis” is inappropriate. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561.
We believe the doctors’ testimony here falls into the clinical medicine category, as opposed to a “hard” science category. The testimony established that Dr. Donahue is a board-certified pediatric neurosurgeon. Similarly, Dr. Kelfer is board certified in pediatric neurology and general pediatrics. Their testimony at the Daubert hearing supports the State’s contention that the subject matter of their testimony was within both doctors’ fields of practice. Both were proven to have training and experience in dealing specifically with head injuries to children and both testified that determining what caused an injury was a regular part of their practice. In fact, Dr. Kefler testified that he was called by the hospital personnel to evaluate the child’s brain damage in the instant case in an attempt to determine its cause. Dr. Donahue disputed defense counsel’s characterization of such,an endeavor as “forensic,” explaining that determining the cause of injury was a part of his training, practice, and experience, and a vital part of clinical medicine.
Similarly, while Dr. Kefler admitted that he was not trained in forensics or forensic pathology, it was a regular part of his practice to make determinations as to the cause of injuries. Also, the testimony of both doctors was shown to be predicated upon and to utilize the principles involved in their fields. Both explained that their opinions were based on the various tests, examinations, and treatments given to the victim. Finally, both indicated they had referred to studies and literature in the field in reaching their conclusions. Given the above predicates, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling their testimony was admissible. Points one and two are overruled.
In point three, appellant complains of the trial court’s decision excluding the following written statement provided to police authorities by her husband, William Henderson:
My wife, Teresa A. Henderson, and myself have discipline [sic] our three children in the following way.
We usually start with time out. The duration of time out depended on the way the child reacted in time out. The rule was that you do not move or talk in time out. If a child did move or talked, we either left them in time out longer. If the child persisted, they were told to turn around and were either spanked on the butt or slapped on the cheek or mouth. Never severely. A belt was sometimes used but only on the butt. Never the head.
If a child talks back, they were slapped on the cheek or mouth and again not severely. Telling a lie was the same.
Jake had problems eating at some meals. He would intentionally hold food in his mouth for hours. At this point, we would tell him to chew and swallow. *326If he didn’t he would get a slap on the cheek and then he would usually swallow. A few times, he would get a light slap on his leg. None of this was ever done for amusement or intentional and never severe.
His pottie training was handled lightly. He would get time out if he wet his pants and that was it.
A majority, about 95% of the spanking was done by hand. A belt was only used in severe cases and never to injure the child.
In closing[,] I would like to say that our disicpline [sic] policy was not a good policy. But, we never, especially my wife, abused our children. Although I was not present at the time of the offense, I believe as god as my witness, that what happen [sic] was an accident with a tragic ending. In one day I have lost my son, the support of my family, and most likely, my other son. But I stand by my wife and will always say that she would never intentionally hurt or injure or kill any child. I bear no grudge and pray for release.
As in the preceding points, we cannot overturn the trial court’s ruling absent a holding that the trial court abused its discretion. Bolden v. State, 967 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref d). Appellant contends the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion because the statement qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule-a statement of family history concerning the death of his son. The rule provides:
(3) Statement of Personal or Family History
(A) A statement concerning the de-clarant’s own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact or personal or family history even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or
(B) A statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was intimately associated with the other’s family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.
Tex.R. Evid. 804(b)(3)
The rule, which is identical to its federal counterpart, rests on the assumption that the type of declarant specified by the rule will not a make a statement, such as a date of a marriage, or the existence of a ceremony, unless it is trustworthy. See U.S. v. Carvalho, 742 F.2d 146, 151 (4th Cir.1984). Here, the declarant provided far different information than the matters set forth in the rule. Summarized, his statement concerned methods of child discipline practiced in the home and asserted the “fact” that his wife would not intentionally have caused the death of their son. Rule 804(b)(3) does not apply where the matter asserted by the declarant involves nontrustworthy “facts” such as state of mind. See id. (holding exception inapplicable where declaration went to issue concerning couple’s motive for marriage). Point three is overruled.
In' point four, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for instructed verdict. Her specific complaint concerns the lack of evidence supporting paragraph six of the indictment, in which the state alleged that she knowingly caused the victim’s death by causing him to strike an object unknown to the grand jury. The indictment alleged alternative manners and means in separate paragraphs. In one paragraph, the state alleged appellant caused the child to strike an object unknown to the grand jury. Ap*327pellant moved for a dh’ected verdict on grounds the State had failed to prove the object the child struck was unknown to the grand jury.
A complaint that the trial court erred in overruling a motion for directed verdict is actually an attack upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See McDuff v. State, 989 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844, 118 S.Ct. 125,139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997). Here, alternative theories of manner and means were submitted to the jury; however, appellant’s challenge on appeal concerns only one of those theories. Appellant does not contend the evidence is insufficient under the other theories submitted. Because we are required to uphold the sufficiency of the evidence if the evidence is sufficient to convict under any of the allegations submitted, point four is overruled. See id.
Moreover, appellant’s point fails on its merits. A prima facie showing is made that the weapon was unknown to the grand jury where the evidence does not establish the type of weapon used. Hicks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227, 114 S.Ct. 2725, 129 L.Ed.2d 848 (1994). Here, there was some circumstantial evidence that the child’s head was struck against something other than the dresser because the dresser had many undisturbed figurines and other fragile items still in place following the injury. Moreover, given the large number of injuries to the child’s face, the medical examiner opined that it was likely the injury was caused by multiple blows to the child’s head. Point four is overruled.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a dissenting opinion.