Court Opinion

ID: 9940347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 01:01:58.140823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:47.489721
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 P. v. Covarrubias CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062480

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 12NF1746)

 JUAN CARLOS COVARRUBIAS,                                              OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             Juan Carlos Covarrubias challenges the summary denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His court-appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). This court gave Covarrubias 30 days to file a
supplemental brief on his own behalf. None was filed. In the interests of justice, we
have examined the record on appeal. (Delgadillo, at p. 232.) We conclude that although
the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel for Covarrubias before denying his
petition, the error was harmless. We thus affirm the postjudgment order.

                                          FACTS
              In 2015, a jury convicted Covarrubias of street terrorism (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246), and found gang allegations
on the latter charge to be true (§§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)). The
jury acquitted him of conspiracy to commit murder.
              In 2023, Covarrubias filed and served a form petition for resentencing and
asked the trial court to appoint counsel to represent him. Without appointing counsel or
holding a prima facie hearing, the court summarily denied the petition on the ground he
was ineligible for resentencing.

                                      DISCUSSION
              Following Wende/Delgadillo guidelines, we have reviewed counsel’s brief
and the appellate record. We conclude the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel for
Covarrubias before denying his petition was harmless error because he was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963, 973–974 (Lewis).)
              Upon receipt of a petition that complies with the requirements of
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1), “the court shall appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) This language is “mandatory”: “petitioners who file

1             All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2
a complying petition requesting counsel are to receive counsel upon the filing of a
compliant petition.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963.) Covarrubias filed and served a
facially compliant form petition, with all information and averments required by section
1172.6, subdivision (b)(1). The court was thus required to appoint counsel for
Covarrubias. (Lewis, at pp. 963, 973.)

              Even where error is shown, the petitioner still must “‘demonstrate there is a
reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he . . . would have obtained a more
favorable result.’ [Citations.] More specifically, a petitioner ‘whose petition is denied
before an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable
that if [he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not
have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 974.) But if the record of conviction demonstrates a petitioner is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law, a court may summarily deny the petition. (Lewis, at pp. 970–
972.)
              Covarrubias cannot make this showing. Resentencing relief under section
1172.6 is available only to persons “convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or [who] accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(2).) Covarrubias did not accept a plea offer and was not convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter at trial. He is thus ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. In summary, our review of the entire record does not show the existence of an
arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 442–443.)

                                              3
                                DISPOSITION
          The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                           DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

                                       4