Court Opinion

ID: 9598784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:11:41.877904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:42.362141
License: Public Domain

*436Rosellini, C. J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion contains a complete, carefully considered recitation of the pertinent facts. There is no need to restate them.
The defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the state’s evidence and 'all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Furthermore, it requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the defendant and in a light most favorable to the state. State v. Reynolds, 51 Wn.2d 830, 833, 322 P.2d 356 (1958). However, the foregoing test does not invite speculation. It only authorizes the reasonable drawing of inferences.
An inference is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts already proved or admitted. Fannin v. Roe, 62 Wn.2d 239, 242, 382 P.2d 264 (1963); Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wn.2d 376, 393, 165 P.2d 95 (1946); Barnes v. J. C. Penney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 644, 70 P.2d 311 (1937). On the other hand, speculation is no more than guesswork or conjecture. Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, (College ed. 1959). it is a mental process by which one reaches a conclusion as to the existence of an essential fact by theorizing either on incomplete evidence or on assumed factual premises that are outside of and beyond the actual scope of the evidence. Brawley v. Esterly, 267 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. 1954).
In the light of the foregoing test, the majority opinion correctly concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the defendant violated RCW 46.56.040 by driving his automobile “in a reckless manner.” However, the jury also was permitted to determine whether he had violated the statute by driving his automobile “while under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor.”
I have no illusions that the defendant is innocent of negligent homicide insofar as the charge is based on “reckless driving.” But unfortunately, evidence of his being “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” was not suffi*437cient to submit that specific issue to the jury. There was nothing from which the jury could have reasonably drawn an inference that he was so affected. Thus, I must disagree with the conclusion that the question was properly submitted to the jury.
The manner in which beer was sprinkled throughout the case unquestionably supports a conclusion that the defendant had consumed intoxicating liquor. However, he was not accused of having committed negligent homicide by driving an automobile after the consumption of intoxicating liquor. He was specifically charged with having committed negligent homicide by driving his automobile “while under the influence of or affected by” the liquor he drank. The vital issue is not whether the defendant had, or had not, consumed any particular quantity of intoxicating liquor. The issue here is whether, at the time of the accident, he was under the influence of the amount of intoxicating liquor which he had consumed. State v. Hurd, 5 Wn.2d 308, 316, 105 P.2d 59 (1940).
This issue may be established by circumstantial evidence but the circumstances must themselves be proved and not assumed. State v. Donckers, 200 Wash. 45, 93 P.2d 355 (1939). One may not fill weaknesses or gaps in the proof by suspicion, speculation or surmise. State v. Hiser, 51 Wn.2d 282, 317 P.2d 1072 (1957). Furthermore, the facts and circumstances in evidence must be consistent with each other and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant’s innocence. State v. Mickens, 61 Wn.2d 83, 377 P.2d 240 (1962).
Of course, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt is a question for the trier of fact. State v. Courville, 63 Wn.2d 498, 387 P.2d 938 (1963). Also, there inheres in the jury’s verdict of guilty a finding that the circumstances proved were consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. State v. Long, 44 Wn.2d 255, 266 P.2d 797 (1954). Nevertheless, the appellate court still must determine whether there is substantial evidence tending to establish circumstances on which such a finding *438can be predicated. State v. Long, supra. At best the record supports a conclusion that the defendant drank a total of seven beers prior to the fatal accident. Nevertheless, this fact does not exist in a vacuum. Although he may have partaken of seven beers, his drinking occurred over an extended period of 12 or 13 hours (12 noon Saturday to approximately 1 a.m. Sunday). Furthermore, six of the seven beers were consumed prior to approximately 6 p.m. Saturday. The seventh beer was consumed at about 1 a.m., after an interval of approximately seven hours. This, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the defendant was under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident.
Nor does the added fact that the defendant had beer available during the considerable time he spent at two taverns, and at a party, support an inference that he consumed any particular quantity. It neither supports an inference that he consumed more than acknowledged by witnesses nor an inference that he was under the influence of the quantity consumed. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 38 Wn.2d 748, 754, 231 P.2d 607, 25 A.L.R.2d 919 (1951). The most that is established is a mere opportunity to imbibe to excess.
The opportunity to do an act may be shown as a link in proving circumstantially that an accused committed the act. People v. Cooper, 81 Cal. App. 2d 110, 183 P.2d 67 (1947); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 907, p. 556; 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 246. However, opportunity standing alone does not rise to the dignity of proof that an accused actually committed the act. State v. Coffey, 228 N. C. 119, 44 S.E.2d 886 (1947); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 907, p. 556 note 86. It is merely one circumstance which, coupled with others, might be sufficient. Standing alone it means nothing. State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163, 43 A.2d 76 (1945). The opportunity to commit a crime is not a substitute for proof of the commission of a crime. Lair v. State, 316 P.2d 225, 71 A.L.R. 2d 856 (Okla. Crim. 1957). Nor is a showing of mere opportunity to commit a crime sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty. People v. Cooper, supra; Baker v. State, 236 Ind. *43955, 138 N.E.2d 641 (1956). See, also, Commonwealth v. Curtis, 318 Mass. 584, 63 N.E.2d 341 (1945); Lang v. State, 252 Ala. 640, 42 So. 2d 512 (1949); Thomas v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 526, 189 S.W.2d 621 (1945); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 907, p. 556 note 86.
Before one may be deprived of his freedom, the law must surely exact something more than the mere opportunity to have been affected by intoxicating liquor. If a prolonged visit in a tavern, coupled with mere opportunity to imbibe to excess, is now considered sufficient proof that one is affected by the liquor he drank, then the liberty of many innocent people may be easily sacrificed in the future.
Aside from the mere opportunity to drink to excess, there is no inference that can be reasonably drawn that the defendant was in fact under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The odor of liquor on the breath of an accused is recognized as one link in the chain to establish circumstantially that he was under the influence of intoxicants. State v. Boesseau, 168 Wash. 669, 13 P.2d 53 (1932). But, in the instant case, no witness testified that he smelled such an odor. Even the state trooper, who was at the scene of the accident, did not so testify. Undoubtedly, he was too busy tending the injured. Nevertheless, the logic of the explanation does not shift the state’s burden of proving the defendant’s state of sobriety. The fact that proof is difficult to get or is logically overlooked does not change or shift the burden of proof. United States v. Morley, 99 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1938).
One’s manner of speech or his personal conduct at or about the time of an accident is another method of supplying a necessary link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. State v. Forsyth, 131 Wash. 611, 230 Pac. 821 (1924). In this case, however, the defendant’s speech was not discussed and all the state’s witnesses appeared to agree that the defendant was sober at the time in question.
Proof that one drove erratically is recognized as another possible link in the chain of evidence to establish circumstantially that an accused was affected by intoxicants. State *440v. Dalton, 158 Wash. 144, 290 Pac. 989 (1930). But those who testified about the defendant’s driving contended that they observed nothing unusual.
Without question, there was evidence of speed in excess of the lawful limit. Such speed was sufficient to establish “reckless driving.” RCW 46.48.026. This in turn was sufficient to support the charge of negligent homicide based upon “reckless driving.” RCW 46.56.040. But it does not support an inference that the defendant was also under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Sober men frequently commit the same violation.
Granted, all testimony concerning the defendant’s drinking, driving and sobriety was elicited from his friends who themselves had been drinking. Nevertheless, this was the only evidence on the subject. If submitted, the jury would have had a right to accept or reject it. If the evidence was believed, the jury would have been required to find that the accused was not under the influence of intoxicants. On the other hand, if the jury rejected the testimony, the defendant’s statement to the state trooper would have become the only remaining evidence on the subject of drinking. The statement merely established that he 'had consumed three beers, the last of which was consumed at about 2:30 p.m., Saturday afternoon (approximately 10% hours prior to the accident). Clearly such evidence would have been insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was affected by intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident. State v. Hurd, supra; Cameron v. Boone, 62 Wn.2d 420, 425, 383 P.2d 277 (1963). Under either alternative, it would have been necessary for the jury to resolve the issue in the defendant’s favor. Thus, there was no disputed fact to submit to the jury on the subject of intoxication.
A third alternative is suggested by the majority opinion. It is indicated that the jury could have discounted the testimony of the defendant’s friends and decided that their estimate of consumed liquor was “conservative.” Without question, such a conclusion could have supported a finding that the defendant had consumed no less beer than appeared *441in the record. But it would not have supported a finding that the defendant consumed more than appeared in the record, or that it was consumed at different times or places. Such a conclusion could not have been established by logical deduction from other facts already proved or admitted. It could have been based only upon pure speculation. Hiatus in proof cannot be filled by suspicion, speculation or surmise. State v. Hiser, 51 Wn.2d 282, 317 P.2d 1072.
In an effort to support its contention that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicants, the state asserts that the defendant failed to establish that he consumed any food during the time he drank the beer in question. On the other hand, there is also no proof that he failed to eat. For lack of proof the pendulum hangs at dead center. It is basic law that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is under no obligation to disprove the charge against him. He has no obligation to testify and his silence is no substitute for proof by the state. State v. Hiser, supra. The state must establish its case based upon the strength of its own position, not upon the weakness of the defendant’s case. United States v. Morley, supra, or upon the fact that some unfavorable circumstances are not satisfactorily explained. State v. Bailey, 286 S.W. 422 (Mo. App. 1926); Reyes v. State, 151 Neb. 636, 38 N.W.2d 539 (1949); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 907, p. 558 note 1..
Finally, the trial judge- excluded evidence- of a blood sample taken from the defendant at the time he was admitted to the hospital. This was a matter of legal right, not a matter of good fortune or a whimsical gift. Thus, we must completely reject any hint that the blood sample might- have had a high alcohol content by reason of the defendant’s objection to the evidence. Although there is a temptation to use this circumstance to supply -a missing link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, we must not give it even minuscule weight. If we yield, we have taken away a legal right; for we will be saying that the exercise of such a right justifies the jury in inferring guilt.
After reducing the facts to their bare essentials, one is forced to conclude that there was no evidence that, at the *442time of the accident, the defendant was affected by the the quantity of intoxicants he had consumed. Nor was there any inference of such fact that could have been reasonably drawn from the evidence. A contrary conclusion requires speculation, surmise and conjecture.
It was improper to submit, by instruction, an issue that was unsupported by evidence in the record. State v. Collins, 66 Wn.2d 71, 76, 400 P.2d 793 (1965); State v. Nelson, 144 Wash. 370, 372, 258 Pac. 24 (1927). See, also Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 365 P.2d 328 (1961).
The consequences of the accident were horrible. Unfortunately, adequate proof of the effect of defendant’s liquor consumption was either unavailable or difficult to obtain. However, this fails to change the burden of proof. I am reluctantly compelled to dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the liquor issue was properly submitted to the jury.
Weaver and Hale, JJ., concur with Rosellini, C. J.