Court Opinion

ID: 9682236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:15.731212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.308821
License: Public Domain

CARR, Justice,1
dissenting.
In my view, the dispositive issue this appeal presents is whether, under the facts and law of this case, there is sufficient evidence, or any evidence, to support the trial court’s judgment appointing a non-parent managing conservator of Baby Girl Rodriguez, a minor child.
Appellant Mark Humberson’s two points of error contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment non ob-stante veredicto because there is no evidence [point one] and insufficient evidence [point two] to support a jury submission or finding that appointment of appellant as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical or emotional development. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a) (Vernon 1996) and Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1990).
To the extent that appellant claims error because of the trial court’s refusal to grant appellant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, I agree with the majority that that portion of appellant’s appeal should be denied because the trial court in this type of case does not possess the power to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.002(c) (Vernon 1996); In Interest of Soliz, 671 S.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). Consequently, the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
However, while I agree with the majority that our record reflects “that there is no evidence that any act or omission, behavior, or conduct by Mark will impair Madison [the child],” I respectfully dissent because, unlike the majority, I do not agree that this case is a case of first impression nor distinguishable from Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1990). I would hold on this legal issue that Lewelling is controlling; and, that at the present time under the current state of Texas laws, the Lewelling standard that non-parents seeking custody here cannot benefit from their bonding or attachment with the child by “offering it as some evidence of significant impairment to [the child].” Id. at 168. Accordingly, because appellees Walsh-es’ significant impact argument was rejected by our Supreme Court in Lewelling, we are required to reject the same argument here.
Applying the correctly stated standards of review set out by the majority to the evidence in our record through the prism of the Lewelling view of Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a) (Vernon 1996), I find there is no evidence and insufficient evidence to support a jury submission or finding that appointment of the parent in this ease [Mark Humberson] as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical or emotional development. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order naming the Walshes managing conservators and render a decision naming Mark Humberson, the parent, managing conservator.
For the reasons stated, I respectively dissent.

. Assigned to this case by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.003(a) (Vernon Supp.1996).