Court Opinion

ID: 9474811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:09:27.387576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:20.947664
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because I believe that the arbitrator’s award “[drew] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The basis of the award is that Foley discharged Thomas without questioning PG & E’s decision to exclude him from the jobsite as a security risk. The arbitrator could rationally have read into the just cause clause an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such an interpretation would hardly be novel. See, e.g., Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.3d 752, 206 Cal.Rptr. 354, 362, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1984) (a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied “in every contract.”) (emphasis in original). It would have been a simple matter for Foley to have tested the strength of PG & E’s claim that Thomas was a security risk. For example, Foley could have interviewed Thomas and discussed his side of the story with PG & E. I recognize that Foley may have struck out in any effort to persuade PG & E to lift its ban of Thomas, but that’s not the point. The point is that Foley did nothing to challenge PG & E’s declaration that Thomas was “persona non grata” before firing him. Thus the arbitrator could rationally have concluded that Foley discharged Thomas without just cause.
Moreover, the arbitrator’s interpretation of the just cause provision of the contract reflected his familiarity with the common law of the shop. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) (“the industrial common law — the practices of the industry and the shop — is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement”). The Union claims, and Foley does not dispute, that in a number of unreported decisions arbitrators have interpreted similar “just cause” provisions as imposing a duty on employers to investigate the charges underlying a sole customer’s “persona non grata” determination.
In providing for compulsory arbitration of grievances, Foley bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362. Therefore, so long as “‘the arbitrator’s interpretation could, in some rational manner, be derived from the collective bargaining agreement’, .... [his] award must be affirmed.” Desert Palace v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1982), quoting Local 1020, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. FMC Corp., 658 F.2d 1285, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). For “the courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.” United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362.
I would reverse the district court judgment vacating the arbitrator’s award for failing to show proper deference to the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. See Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir.1985); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & Allied Workers International Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir.1969).