Court Opinion

ID: 9704737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:44:51.554827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.902802
License: Public Domain

J. E. Townsend, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part.) I concur in the foregoing opinion, except as to the period of limitation applicable to defendant insurance company’s claim for reimbursement for overpayment of no-fault work-loss benefits.
Sections 3145 and 3146 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., establish a special one-year period of limitation for commencing actions to recover no-fault benefits, whether by the insured or by the insurer for reimbursement or recovery.
At issue is whether the statutory one-year period of limitation relating to the recovery of no-fault benefits or the reimbursement thereof will be given a restricted or a broad application.
The initial clauses of subsections (1) and (2) of § 3145 broadly apply a one-year period of limitation to actions for recovery of personal and property protection insurance benefits.
It has been recognized repeatedly by Michigan courts that the general purpose of the no-fault act *198is to ensure the prompt settlement of no-fault claims. Other statutory provisions which emphasize the importance placed on the prompt resolution of no-fault claims are § 3142, which imposes a twelve percent rate of interest on benefits not paid within thirty days of proof of loss, and § 3148, which imposes a sanction upon an insurance company that it pay the reasonable attorney fees of a claimant’s attorney where the court finds an unreasonable refusal or delay in paying a claim. Such section imposes a reciprocal and equivalent sanction against a claimant for advancing a fraudulent claim or one having no reasonable foundation. A corollary of the goal of prompt claim resolution is the goal of finality of claim resolution.
The nature of damages sought rather than the form of a plaintiffs action determines which statute of limitations controls a particular case. Rach v Wise, 46 Mich App 729, 731-732; 208 NW2d 570 (1973), lv den 390 Mich 778 (1973); Reiterman v Westinghouse, Inc, 106 Mich App 698, 705; 308 NW2d 612 (1981); State Mutual Cyclone Ins Co v O & A Electric Cooperative, 381 Mich 318, 324-325; 161 NW2d 573 (1968); Parish v B F Goodrich Co, 395 Mich 271, 280; 235 NW2d 570 (1975)
In essence, such general principle was applied by a panel of this Court in the case of Badger State Mutual Casualty Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 128 Mich App 120; 339 NW2d 713 (1983), in ruling that the one-year no-fault period of limitation applied to an action by a no-fault insurer against a workers’ compensation insurer for reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid to an insured. The Badger Court stated on pages 128 and 129 as follows:
In the instant case, plaintiff is clearly seeking *199recovery of the no-fault benefits paid to Read. As the trial court stated, while plaintiff’s arguments are compelling, "the statutory language of MCL 500.3145 and 500.3146 makes mandatory the one-year statute of limitations where an action is commenced for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits . . . [t]he Legislature intended by this section to make the subject matter of the action determinative of the limitation rather than the position of the defendant, as plaintiff would advocate.”
We further find that if § 3145(1) is applicable to a suit by a casualty insurer against a no-fault insurer for recovery of casualty benefits paid to an insured, Home Ins Co v Rosquin, 90 Mich App 682; 282 NW2d 446 (1979), then the section is also applicable to an action by a no-fault insurer against a workers’ compensation insurer for reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid to an insured. To create an exception for suits against compensation carriers would defeat the purpose of the section and the no-fault act in general, which is to ensure prompt settlement of claims. Federal Kemper Ins Co v Western Ins Cos, 97 Mich App 204, 211; 293 NW2d 765 (1980).
The Court so found despite the fact that the action in question was not specifically authorized by § 3146, the application of which is limited to tort claims under § 3116.
In this case both opposing parties seek recovery of no-fault benefits. Plaintiff claimed that additional no-fault benefits should be paid and defendant claimed that it should receive reimbursement of no-fault payments made in error or by mistake. The nature of damages sought by both opposing parties is the same. The terms of the same no-fault statute and of the same insurance contract must be applied to determine the proper amount of benefits payable or reimbursable. It matter not *200whether the defendant’s form of action is based upon statute or on common law.
It is patently unfair to apply a one-year period of limitation to a claim for payment of no-fault benefits and to grant a six-year period of limitation to advance a claim for reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid in error under the same insurance contract and as a result of the same motor vehicle accident.
I would reverse that part of the trial court’s decision which applied a six-year period of limitation and remand for application of a one-year period of limitation to defendant’s claim for reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid in error.