Court Opinion

ID: 9403448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 13:04:33.101247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.259938
License: Public Domain

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                    Decided: June 21, 2023

               S23A0531. ROUNTREE v. THE STATE.

      ELLINGTON, Justice.

      Quavion S. Rountree appeals his conviction for malice murder

in connection with the shooting death of Anahitdeep Singh Sandhu.1

      1  Sandhu was killed on April 28, 2019. On May 7, 2019, a Houston
County grand jury indicted Rountree and Delvin Ross for malice murder,
felony murder, and aggravated assault. Rountree was tried separately before
a jury from June 21 to 23, 2021, and was found guilty on all counts. As of the
time of Rountree’s trial, the charges against Ross had not been resolved. On
July 7, 2021, Rountree was sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder.
With respect to the remaining counts, the State accurately observes that the
trial court purported to merge the felony murder count into the count of malice
murder, but the felony murder count was actually vacated by operation of law.
See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993); Calmer v.
State, 309 Ga. 368, 368 n.1 (846 SE2d 40) (2020). And as the District Attorney
correctly recognizes, although the trial court purported to merge the
aggravated assault count into the felony murder count, the aggravated assault
count actually merged into the malice murder count for sentencing. See
Malcolm, 263 Ga. at 373-374 (5); Calmer, 309 Ga. at 368 n.1. Rountree filed a
timely motion for a new trial, which he amended on March 24, 2022. After a
hearing on October 4, 2022, the trial court denied the amended motion for new
trial on November 8, 2022. Rountree filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the April 2023 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
Rountree contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the

jury on voluntary manslaughter and on mutual combat. Because

Rountree has failed to carry his burden of showing plain error, we

affirm.

      The evidence submitted at trial shows the following. 2 On April

28, 2019, Sandhu and his fellow United States Marine, Desmen

Worley, were on furlough, visiting Worley’s hometown and staying

at Grimaldi Miro’s apartment in the same apartment complex where

Rountree lived. That afternoon, Sandhu and Miro walked to

Rountree’s apartment for the purpose of trading a prescription

medication containing codeine for ecstasy pills. When Rountree said

that he did not have any pills, all of them walked out of the

      2 Rountree makes a passing, one-sentence request that this Court review
the sufficiency of the evidence. However, he never argues or even asserts that
the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient. Thus, Rountree has
failed to carry his burden on appeal of showing that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support his conviction. See Charles v. State, 315 Ga.
651, 654-655 (2) (884 SE2d 363) (2023) (holding that the appellant had not
carried his burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient, because he
had “not articulated why he contends that the trial evidence was insufficient
to support his convictions, much less formulated an argument showing that
the trial evidence failed to prove an essential element of any crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
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apartment. Rountree said that he considered Sandhu a “threat,”

although Miro did not see Sandhu flash a gun or do anything that

was threatening. Sandhu and Miro then walked back to Miro’s

apartment.

     Rountree called Delvin Ross, walked away from his apartment,

and told Miro and others that he “felt like doing something stupid.”

They could tell Rountree was “angry” and “upset,” they tried to

reason with him and calm him down, and they told him that Sandhu

“didn’t mean . . . any type of disrespect.” Ross drove up and got out

of his car, and Rountree grabbed a pistol from Ross and chambered

a round. When Ross and Miro tried to hold Rountree back, he

threatened to shoot one of them.

     Rountree went to Miro’s apartment, and Sandhu came out and

stood in the doorway. Rountree pointed Ross’s pistol at Sandhu and

told him to turn over the gun and the prescription drug that he had.

When Sandhu lowered his hands to reach for the gun in his

waistband, Rountree shot him several times, fatally wounding him.

Several eyewitnesses testified that Rountree shot Sandhu, and they

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gave other testimony consistent with the preceding summary of the

evidence.

     Rountree testified that he was in his apartment with his two

children and his fiancée when Miro and Sandhu came over; that he

saw Sandhu had a firearm; that he feared for his life and his

children’s lives; that he ushered Miro and Sandhu outside where

Sandhu used racial epithets and asked Rountree if he “want[ed] to

do this out here or inside,” which Rountree took as a threat; that he

thought they were trying to rob him; that he called Ross and, when

Ross arrived, took the pistol from him and chambered a round; that

he went to tell Sandhu to stay away from his apartment; and that

he shot Sandhu after he saw Sandhu reach for his gun. Based on

this testimony, the jury was charged on the defense of justification

at Rountree’s request.

     1. Rountree contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by failing to charge the jury on mutual combat and on voluntary

manslaughter. He concedes that the omission of the mutual-combat

instruction can be reviewed for plain error only, but contends that

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he preserved for ordinary appellate review his enumeration

pertaining to the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. He has not,

however, so we review both contentions for plain error only.

     Rountree argues that his objection at the charge conference to

the omission of his requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter

was sufficient to preserve the issue for ordinary appellate review.

However, “[o]bjections at a charge conference do not suffice to

preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given.” Carruth v.

State, 290 Ga. 342, 347 (6) (721 SE2d 80) (2012). In this case,

Rountree made no objection when the trial court finished reading

the charge to the jury. Instead, after the trial court excused the jury

and asked if the parties had objections to the charge, defense counsel

answered, “No, your Honor.” Because of Rountree’s failure to make

any objection to the charge as given, both his contention relating to

the trial court’s omission of his requested instruction on voluntary

manslaughter and his contention regarding omission of an

instruction on mutual combat can be reviewed only for plain error.

See OCGA § 17-8-58 (a), (b); Davis v. State, 312 Ga. 870, 873 (2) (866

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SE2d 390) (2021) (Failure to charge on voluntary manslaughter was

reviewed only for plain error where the appellant “made a written

request for a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter” and argued

the point at the charge conference but “did not object to the omission

of the charge after the trial court instructed the jury.”); Anderson v.

State, 309 Ga. 618, 622-623 (3) (847 SE2d 572) (2020) (Where the

appellant “did not request the charge in writing and made no

objections to the instructions ultimately given to the jury . . . , his

contention relating to the failure of the trial court to give the charge

in this instance is reviewed only for plain error.”). And where “an

alleged error regarding a jury instruction is not affirmatively

waived,” reversal is not authorized under plain error review unless

“the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the

instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Davis, 312 Ga. at 873-874 (2).

     2. As for Rountree’s contention that the trial court erred by

failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, he has shown

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no error, much less plain error.

     A person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if he “causes the

death of another human being under circumstances which would

otherwise be murder” and “acts solely as the result of a sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation

sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]” OCGA §

16-5-2 (a). “Even slight evidence showing that the victim seriously

provoked the defendant requires the trial court to give a requested

charge on voluntary manslaughter.” Behl v. State, 315 Ga. 814, 816

(1) (885 SE2d 7) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     In support of his argument that the evidence required the trial

court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Rountree

relies primarily on his own testimony that he was fearful for the

lives of his children and himself because Sandhu brought a weapon

to his home. But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a weapon

nor fighting are the types of provocation that demand a voluntary

manslaughter charge.” Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

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     Rountree also testified that Sandhu used threatening words

and racial epithets. But “angry statements alone ordinarily do not

amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-

5-2 (a). To put it simply, words alone generally are not sufficient

provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to voluntary

manslaughter.” Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 331 (2) (737 SE2d 673)

(2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Ramirez v. State,

307 Ga. 550, 553 (2) n.2 (837 SE2d 328) (2019) (stating that it is a

longstanding part of Georgia’s law of voluntary manslaughter that

“provocation by words, threats, menaces or contemptuous gestures

shall in no case be sufficient to free the person killing from the guilt

and crime of murder”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed,

“words alone, regardless of the degree of their insulting nature, will

not in any case justify the excitement of passion so as to reduce the

crime from murder to manslaughter when the killing is done solely

on account of the indignation aroused by use of opprobrious words.”

Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Cf. Ware

v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 850 (III) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (recognizing

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the “limited exception to this rule for words informing a defendant

of adulterous conduct”) (citation and punctuation omitted). The

threatening and insulting words that Rountree testified were used

by Sandhu, no matter how menacing or offensive they were to

Rountree, were still only words, regardless of Rountree’s ultimate

violent response.3 See Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (a) (841

SE2d 696) (2020) (“[The victim’s] use of a crude phrase, [i.e., calling

the defendant a ‘mother f**ker’ after his mother recently had died,]

no matter how offensive to [the defendant], was still only words; [the

defendant’s] violent reaction to those words does not change the fact

that they were only words.”).

      Accordingly, there was no evidence whatsoever of serious

provocation sufficient to excite a sudden, violent, and irresistible

passion in a reasonable person such that Rountree would have been

      3 Rountree does not argue that the combined effect of Sandhu’s alleged
words and his possession of a weapon constituted the requisite serious
provocation. Moreover, given that the fear that someone will pull a weapon is
not a “type[ ] of provocation that demand[s] a voluntary manslaughter charge,”
Behl, 315 Ga. at 816 (1), we conclude that evidence of Sandhu’s mere possession
of a gun did not transform his alleged words into a serious provocation.
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entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. See id. And

Rountree, therefore, has failed to meet the plain-error test.

     3. With respect to Rountree’s contention that the trial court

erred by failing to instruct the jury on mutual combat, he merely

“adopts” his previous “argument and citation of authority” regarding

the omission of a voluntary manslaughter charge. However,

Rountree never explains why it was error, much less plain error, not

to charge specifically on mutual combat. Indeed, the evidence

presented at trial, including that which Rountree argues in support

of his claim of error in the omission of a voluntary manslaughter

instruction, does not show “a willingness, a readiness, and an

intention upon the part of both parties to fight” and therefore does

not require a charge on mutual combat. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga.

459, 463 (1) (863 SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a request

to charge on mutual combat where there was “no evidence of an

agreement, willingness, or readiness to fight between [the victim]

and any of his attackers”). See also Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 212,

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217-218 (2) (845 SE2d 573) (2020) (“Evidence of self-defense does not

support a jury instruction on mutual combat as a basis for voluntary

manslaughter.”); Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 398 (3) (830 SE2d

110) (2019) (Appellant “points to no record evidence that he and [the

victim] intended to engage in mutual combat, and we can find

none.”). Thus, Rountree has failed to carry his burden on appeal of

showing plain error. See Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 823 (2) (809

SE2d 727) (2018) (“The appellant has the burden of showing a clear

or obvious error and further making an affirmative showing that the

error probably did affect the outcome below.”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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