Court Opinion

ID: 9929030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:13:04.237187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:30.728272
License: Public Domain

J-A24027-23

 JOHN FOX, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF         :        PENNSYLVANIA
 DIANE FOX, DECEASED                    :
                                        :
                     Appellant          :
                                        :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :   No. 3066 EDA 2022
                                        :
 MATTHEW J. DOWNEY, M.D.,               :
 NORTHEASTERN                           :
 GASTROENTEROLOGY ASSOCIATES,           :
 P.C. WAYNE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL           :
 AND WAYNE MEMORIAL HEALTH              :
 SYSTEM, INC.                           :

            Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
                              2017-00493

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                      FILED FEBRUARY 01, 2024

     Appellant, John Fox, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of

Diane Fox, Deceased, appeals from the November 4, 2022 Order, entered in

the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, granting the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Appellees, Matthew J. Downey, M.D., Northeastern

Gastroenterology Associates, P.C., Wayne Memorial Hospital, and Wayne

Memorial Health System Inc., and dismissing Appellant’s complaint with

prejudice in this medical and corporate negligence action.     After careful

review, we affirm.
J-A24027-23

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.     On May 9,

2018, Appellant filed a ten-count Amended Complaint against Appellees

asserting medical negligence and related claims arising from Dr. Downey’s

alleged negligence in performing an endoscopy on Appellant’s wife.1, 2

       Pursuant to a case management order, the court initially scheduled trial

in this matter for November 2019, and ordered that Appellant produce his

expert reports by July 1, 2019. However, the court subsequently continued

the trial date five times—primarily, but not exclusively—at Appellant’s request,

before finally scheduling trial for November 14, 2022.3 During this period, the

trial court also issued numerous case management orders, the last of which,

entered on October 28, 2021, set November 15, 2021, as the deadline for

Appellant to file expert reports.

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, Appellant raised one claim of negligence against Dr. Downey,

claims of negligence, vicarious liability, and ostensible agency against
Northeastern Gastroenterology Associates, P.C., Wayne Memorial Hospital,
and Wayne Memorial Health System, Inc., one claim of corporate negligence
against Wayne Memorial Hospital, and wrongful death and survival claims
against all defendants. On November 1, 2022, the trial court approved a
stipulation of the parties dismissing Wayne Memorial Hospital and Wayne
Memorial Health System, Inc., as defendants.

2 Appellant claimed that Dr. Downey, who treated Appellant’s wife from
October 22, 2015, to October 25, 2015, performed the endoscopy procedure
incorrectly, which led to various complications, including infection, sepsis, and
ultimately Appellant’s wife’s death on September 5, 2016.

3 Appellant requested and received three continuances, the parties jointly
requested one continuance, and the court once rescheduled trial once due to
the COVID-19 pandemic.

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       On October 14, 2022, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment

in which they asserted that, to date, Appellant had “not produced any expert

reports to support any claims on any theories of liability against any

[Appellees].”     Motion, 10/14/22, at ¶ 9.      Appellees argued that, because

Pennsylvania law requires a medical malpractice plaintiff seeking to establish

negligence to present expert medical testimony to demonstrate that a

defendant departed from the generally accepted standards of medical practice

and that this departure caused the plaintiff’s injury, Appellant’s failure to

produce any expert reports entitles Appellees to judgment as a matter of law.

Appellees also argued that, given the proximity to trial, they would “sustain

severe prejudice by late expert submissions” because “the late hour of the

potential reports do not allow [them] sufficient notice or time for trial

preparation.” Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Moreover, they asserted that any effort by

Appellant to produce an expert report at this late date would violate the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court’s October 28, 2021

scheduling order.4

       On October 17, 2022, eleven months after his expert report was due,

Appellant identified his expert, Dr. John Y. Nasr, for the first time and

produced an expert report authored by him.

____________________________________________

4 Appellee acknowledged that, once the court had continued the trial date to

November 14, 2022, the parties informally agreed to extend the deadline for
Appellant to produce expert reports. The record does not reflect that this
“informal agreement” resulted in an order of court extending the deadline.

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      The following day, Appellant filed a motion to continue the November

14, 2022 trial date due to the “unforeseen and unanticipated inability to obtain

a timely expert medical report . . . despite good faith efforts to do so.” Motion,

11/14/22, at ¶ 4.    In particular, Appellant’s “gastrointestinal surgeon[, Dr.

Nasr,] has not been able to timely respond to telephonic and email requests

for follow up communication and timely produce an expert liability report.”

Id. The trial court denied the motion to continue.

      On October 31, 2022, Appellant filed an answer to Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment. Appellant denied that the trial court’s October 28, 2021

scheduling order required him to produce expert reports by November 15,

2021, because the parties had informally agreed to extend the deadline, albeit

to an unspecified date in the future. Appellant, nevertheless, admitted that

he did not produce an expert report until October 17, 2022, just under one

month before the commencement of trial, due to “unforeseen and

unpredictable reasons set forth in [Appellant’s] Motion for Continuance.”

Answer, 10/31/22, at ¶ 7. In addition, Appellant acknowledged that he would

be seeking to replace Dr. Nasr as his expert prior to trial and, therefore, would

“benefit from a continuance of the trial to replace the expert.” Id. at ¶ 10.

Appellant argued that, because he produced Dr. Nasr’s expert report providing

expert medical testimony regarding the standard of care and causation, he

had presented a prima facie case of medical malpractice. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

      Following a hearing, on November 4, 2022, the trial court granted

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with

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prejudice pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(2).5             Relying on Pa.R.Civ.P.

4003.5(b)6 and Kurian ex rel. Kurian v. Anisman, 851 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super.

2004), the trial court determined that, although Appellant had not acted in

bad faith, allowing Appellant’s expert report at such a late stage would

prejudice Appellees. The court observed that, as in Kurian, Appellant had

only identified Dr. Nasr as his expert in response to Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment, and, even after doing so, stated at the hearing on the

motion that he intended to use an expert other than Dr. Nasr to testify at trial.

The court further observed that Appellant produced Dr. Nasr’s report

approximately 11 months late and less than one month before trial. The court

also found that any additional delay would disrupt the efficient and just

administration of justice.       The court, therefore, exercised its discretion to

exclude Appellant’s expert report and concluded that, without it, Appellant had

failed to establish a prima facie case against Appellees.

       This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with the trial court’s

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In lieu of filing a Rule 1925(a)

____________________________________________

5 Rule 1035.2(2) permits a party to seek judgment as a matter of law where

an adverse party “has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause
of action . . . which[,] in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
to a jury.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(2).

6 Rule 4003.5(b) provides that, “[an] expert whose identity is not disclosed

[through interrogatories] shall not be permitted to testify on behalf of the
defaulting party at the trial of the action. However, if the failure to disclose
the identity of the witness is the result of extenuating circumstances beyond
the control of the defaulting party, the court may grant a continuance or other
appropriate relief.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b).

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opinion, the trial court directed this Court to its November 4, 2022

Memorandum and Opinion for an explanation of the reasons underlying its

decision.

      Appellant raises the following four questions for our review:

      1. Should this [C]ourt overrule Kurian ex rel. Kurian v.
         Anisman, 851 A.2d 152, 159 (Pa. Super. 2004), the case
         relied upon by the trial court to sua sponte exclude Appellant’s
         expert report pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b)?

      2. Did the trial court err when it applied Kurian ex rel. Kurian
         v. Anisman, 851 A.2d 152, 159 (Pa. Super. 2004)[,] here,
         where this case is distinguishable from Kurian because there
         is no prejudice readily identifiable on the record?

      3. Did the trial court commit legal error when it applied
         Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b) here without conducting an evidentiary
         hearing to gather facts necessary to assess the prejudice to
         each party, as required under Rule 4003.5(b)?

      4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it did not grant a
         continuance, as contemplated by Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b), given
         the exceptional circumstances present here and where such
         relief would have avoided prejudice to all parties?

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

                                      A.

      An order granting summary judgment will be reversed if the trial court

committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion.    Malanchuk v.

Sivchuk, 148 A.3d 860, 865 (Pa. Super. 2016). Where, as here, the trial

court’s decision regarding a motion for summary judgment involves a finding

based upon its procedural history, we evaluate that order under an abuse of

discretion standard. Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482, 488 (Pa. 2006).

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                                                B.

       In his first issue, Appellant urges this Court to overrule Kurian, alleging

that Kurian improperly interpreted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s

decision in Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, 813 A.2d 778 (Pa. 2002) (OAJC)

and conflicts with Rule 1035.3(b).7            Appellant’s Brief at 25-39. Appellant

argues that the Court in Kurian, “misunderst[ood ] the interplay between the

relevant [R]ules” of Civil Procedure and its holding is “fundamentally flawed

because . . . a sanction pursuant to Rule 4003.5(b) requires an assessment of

prejudice, which cannot be accomplished when a trial court raises the issue

sua sponte in a motion for summary judgment.”              Id. at 33-34.    Appellant

characterizes Kurian’s reasoning as “weak” and its holding “inconsistent with

our Rules of Civil Procedure because a court, at the summary judgment stage,

is not in a position to make the necessary findings of fact required to impose

a Rule 4003.5(b) sanction.” Id. at 38.

       It is well-settled that “except in circumstances where intervening

authority by our Supreme Court calls into question a previous decision of this

Court,” Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006), a

three-judge “panel [of the Superior Court] is bound by existing precedent and,

therefore,    lacks   the    authority    to   overturn   another   panel   decision.”

Commonwealth v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 482 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal

____________________________________________

7 Rule 1035.3(b) permits an adverse party to “supplement the record or set

forth reasons why the party cannot present evidence essential to justify
opposition to [a] motion [for summary judgment.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(b).

                                           -7-
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denied, 286 A.3d 214 (Pa. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. Beck, 78

A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that a three-judge panel of this

Court “is not empowered to overrule another panel of the Superior Court”).

Cf. Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338, 354 (Pa. 2023) (“An en banc

panel of an intermediate court is authorized to overrule a three-judge panel

decision of the same court.”) (citation omitted).

       Because our Supreme Court has not issued any decisions calling into

question this Court’s holding in Kurian, we are bound by Kurian and decline

Appellant’s invitation to overturn it.8

                                               C.

       In his second and third issues, Appellant avers that the court erred in

applying the holding in Kurian without holding an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether Appellant’s late-produced expert report prejudiced any

party. Appellant’s Brief at 39-45. Appellant attempts to distinguish this case

from Kurian by emphasizing that the plaintiff there “brazenly violated multiple

orders and [] the informal extension of the expert deadline.”       Id. at 40.

Appellant argues that because the plaintiff in Kurian produced the expert

witness report on the day the parties were supposed to go to trial, the court

could readily discern on the face of the record the prejudice caused.      Id.

Appellant, therefore, concludes that “Kurian’s holding that a trial court can
____________________________________________

8 Moreover, as discussed infra, in Monroe v. CBH20, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 804-

860 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), an en banc panel of this Court recently
considered issues similar to those presented in Kurian and approved that
panel’s analysis and reasoning.

                                           -8-
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sua sponte raise Rule 4003.5(b) as a sanction to preclude an otherwise Rule

1035.3-compliant expert report is limited to cases where prejudice is apparent

on the face of the record.” Id. We disagree.

      This Court has held that, “when a party makes a timely response to a

summary judgment motion and attempts to supplement the record with

otherwise untimely expert reports, the court may, on its own motion,

determine whether this is allowed under Rule 4003.5(b).” Kurian, 851 A.2d

at 159. In other words, when considering a motion for summary judgment,

the court must determine whether the movant would be prejudiced by the

inclusion of the supplemental expert report. Id. at 159, 162.

      In Kurian, this Court found that the appellees would be prejudiced by

the late inclusion of the expert report since the appellants had violated

numerous court-ordered deadlines and offered the report on the day of trial.

Id. at 162. We reasoned that allowing the report at such a late stage caused

“unfair surprise and prejudice,” since appellees would be left with no time to

evaluate and respond to the expert testimony. Id. We observed that such

prejudice could be neutralized if the court delayed trial; however, we

concluded that further delaying trial would “disrupt the efficient and just

administration of justice and would send a blatant message that case

management deadlines are meaningless.” Id. Hence, the Court determined

that the trial court did not err in precluding the expert reports and granting

summary judgment.

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      Recently, in Monroe v. CBH20, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 804-860 (Pa. Super.

2022) (en banc), this Court considered Kurian and its discussion of the

interplay between Rules 4003.5(b) and 1035.5(b). Id. at 803-806. Notably,

this Court emphasized that, pursuant to Kurian, the trial court may preclude

an otherwise untimely expert report produced as part of a timely response to

a motion for summary judgment where the “complaining party shows that he

has been prejudiced from properly preparing his case for trial as a result of

the dilatory disclosure.” Id. at 805 (citing Kurian, 851 A.2d at 162).

      Here, Appellant denies that he “continually” violated court orders and

asserts that there is no evidence on the record that his conduct prejudiced

Appellees. Appellant’s Brief at 40. He contends that the trial court erred in

“apparently conclud[ing] that prejudice existed simply because of the time

that elapsed from the court’s-imposed deadline and the trial date.” Id. at 41.

Appellant further summarily posits that because Appellees had agreed to an

informal extension of the deadline for producing the expert report, they could

not be prejudiced by that elapsed time. Id. at 42. He also baldly asserts that

the trial court inappropriately considered his acknowledgement that he intends

to replace Dr. Nasr with a new expert when determining that his conduct had

prejudiced Appellees, arguing that “[w]hat trial counsel intends to do in the

future—and whether this court allows him to do so—is a determination for

another day.” Id.

      Appellant’s arguments and our review of the record fail to convince us

that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his expert report without

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holding an evidentiary hearing. The record clearly indicates that Appellant

violated the trial court’s scheduling order when he did not produce any expert

reports by the deadline for doing so, and, instead, waited an additional 11

months before providing Appellees with Dr. Nasr’s report. In addition, the

purported agreement between the parties to extend the deadline for producing

the expert report is of no moment as the parties did not reduce it to writing

as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 201.                See Pa.R.Civ.P. 201 (“Agreements of

attorneys relating to the business of the court shall be in writing, except such

agreements [made at the bar of the court] as are noted by the prothonotary

upon the minutes or by the stenographer on the stenographer’s notes.”).

       Moreover, given that Appellant’s counsel indicated less than one month

before trial was scheduled to commence that he intended to replace Dr. Nasr

with a new, unidentified expert, who would presumably author a new expert

report, Dr. Nasr’s report was of no value to Appellees in their preparation of a

defense against Appellant’s medical malpractice claims. See Miller v. Brass

Rail Tavern, Inc., 664 A.2d 525, 530 n.3 (Pa. 1995) ([T]he purpose of

Pa.R.C[iv].P. 4003.5 is to prevent surprise.”). Therefore, it is evident from

the record that Appellant’s conduct prevented Appellees from preparing for

trial to their detriment.9

____________________________________________

9 We observe that Appellant has not cited to any case law in support of his

assertion that Appellees could not be prejudiced by Appellant’s 11-month
delay in providing them with an expert report simply because they informally
agreed to an extension of the deadline for Appellant to provide the report.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant also complains that the trial court erred by not holding a

hearing to develop the factual record so that it could properly consider the

factors set forth in Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d

1270 (Pa. 1986), before imposing a Rule 4003.5(b) sanction.10 Appellant’s

Brief at 44. He essentially argues that the trial court failed to consider the

prejudice to him before excluding Dr. Nasr’s report.

       We first observe that Feingold did not impose on the trial court a

requirement to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to determining whether to

exclude a late-filed expert report as Appellant implies.         Instead as the

Feingold Court noted, Rule 4003.5(b) merely requires that the court “balance

the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the prejudice to each

party.” Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1273. Moreover, Rule 4003.5(b) “give[s] the

trial court discretion to preclude expert trial testimony at any pretrial date[.]”

Kurian, 851 A.2d at 161 (emphasis omitted).
____________________________________________

Further, we reject the premise of his argument. As noted above, prejudice
arises not because of the delay per se but because of the consequence of the
delay, i.e., the lack of time to review the report and prepare an appropriate
defense in response to it.

10 The Feingold factors are:

       (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the
       excluded witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that
       party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the
       rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly
       and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court, and
       (4) bad faith [or] willfulness in failing to comply with the court’s
       order.

Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1272-73 (citation omitted).

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      As noted above, Appellant produced an expert report 11 months after

the deadline to do so and more than three years after he filed the complaint

initiating this matter. Critically, however, Appellant subsequently conceded

at the November 2, 2022 hearing on Appellees’ motion for summary judgment

that he would not be using Dr. Nasr as an expert witness at trial. Thus, less

than two weeks before trial, Appellant still had not identified his expert witness

and had not produced an expert report upon which he intended to rely in

support of his medical malpractice claims. In light of these facts, as well as

the court’s acknowledgement that it had already continued this matter five

times, its concern that “any additional delay in trial would disrupt the efficient

and just administration of justice[,]” Trial Ct. Op., at 4, and its prerogative to

enforce its own case management orders, we conclude that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion as provided in Rule 4003.5(b). Appellant is,

thus, not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                              D.

      In his final issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in not continuing this matter as permitted by Rule 4003.5(b).

Appellant’s Brief at 45-48. Appellant contends that his difficulty in obtaining

Dr. Nasr’s report “fits comfortably within Rule 4003.5(b)’s exception for

extenuating circumstances,” especially because, Appellant’s conduct was not

willful or in bad faith.   Id. at 45-46.      Appellant argues that any prejudice

Appellees suffered as a result of his conduct was not significant enough to

outweigh the prejudice he suffered as a result of the dismissal of his case. Id.

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at 46.   He claims the following facts support this argument: (1) Appellees

agreed informally to extend the expert deadline; (2) Appellees knew Appellant

had obtained an expert and were just waiting for him to write the expert

report; (3) Appellees should not have been surprised by the contents of the

expert report because it “hues closely to the Complaint”; and (4) Appellees

never sought any discovery sanctions to preclude Appellant’s expert from

testifying. Id. at 47-48.

      We reiterate that, pursuant to Rule 4003.5(b), if a party does not

disclose the identity of an expert witness as required through interrogatories,

and the failure to do so “is the result of extenuating circumstances beyond the

control of the defaulting party, the court may grant a continuance or other

appropriate relief.”    Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(b) (emphasis added).          When

considering whether to exclude a plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, “[i]n the

absence of bad faith or willful disobedience of the rules, the most significant

considerations are the importance of the witness’ testimony and the prejudice,

if any, to the party against whom the witness will testify.”        Linker v.

Churnetski Transp., Inc., 520 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. Super. 1987).

      Here, the trial court found “no bad faith or misrepresentation” on

Appellant’s part. Nevertheless, it declined to continue the case owing to the

disruption to the “efficient and just administration of justice” that a sixth

continuance would cause. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4. Further, based on the prejudice

caused by Appellant’s failure to timely identify and produce Dr. Nasr’s expert

report, followed by Appellant’s admission that he intended to replace Dr. Nasr

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mere weeks prior to trial, the trial court properly exercised its discretion

provided by Rule 4003.5(b) in declining to continue this matter rather than

exclude Dr. Nasr’s expert report and testimony. This claim, thus, fails.

                                      E.

      In sum, none of Appellant’s issues merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and

dismissing Appellant’s claims with prejudice.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/1/2024

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