Court Opinion

ID: 8860811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 17:47:28.997004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:48.894002
License: Public Domain

THAYER, Circuit Judge.
I concur in the view that the case should be reversed for error in the instruction which is quoted above,-iu the opinion of the majority of the court. There was a. controversy before the jury as to whether the engineer and conductor of the extra train ought to have been notified at Edmondson that freight-train No. 5 had not arrived at Forrest Ciiv, and that they must keep a sharp lookout for the freight train between the two stations last mentioned. Three expert railroad men, who were called as witnesses for the plaintiff below, testified, in substance, that such notice ought to have been giveu; that as the engineer of the extra train would naturally infer that the freight train had reached Forrest City by the time the extra train reached Edmondson, since the. freight train was then overdue at the former station, he ought to have been notified by the train dispatcher at Edmondson that, such was not the fact, and that for some unknown reason the freight train had been delayed, and was not where it would very naturally be expected to be. In other words, three railroad men expressed the opinion, in subs!anee, that, as applied to the facts existing when the extra reached Edmondson, the standard rules were not adequaie 1o afford protection to trainmen and passengers, but that some further precautions ought to have been taken by the train dispatcher. Several witnesses for the defendant company expressed a contrary opinion, namely, that the standard rules were sufficient to meet any and (‘very emergency, and that no additional notice ought to have been given at Edmondson. This was one of the crucial issues in the ease, to winch the attention of the jury should have been more specifically directed. The instruction above quoted, which was giveu by the *952court, was couched in very general language, and was liable to be understood by the jury as meaning that it was the duty of the train dispatcher, in any event, and without reference to the existence of the rules, to have given notice at Edmondson that the freight train had not arrived at Forrest City. Being too general, as applied to the issue of fact above stated, and for that reason being liable to mislead, I agree that the case should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
Other views, however, are expressed in the opinion of the majority of the court, to which I cannot assent. It is held broadly, as I understand, that when a railroad company adopts rules for the operation of its trains, or. for the management of its business, and puts them in force, the question as to the reasonableness and sufficiency of such rules to afford protection to its employes and to the traveling public is always a question of law to be decided by the court. In my judgment, this proposition is not tenable, either upon principle or authority. •• When a controversy arises in a court of justice touching the reasonableness or sufficiency of a code of rules that has been adopted by a corporation or individual for the management of their business, and competent witnesses express different opinions upon that subject, an issue of fact is presented, which can only be determined by a jury, unless a trial by jury is waived. Judges cannot arrogate to themselves the power of determining such questions, on the ground that such practice insures greater unanimity of opinion, or on any other ground, without denving suitors their constitutional right of a trial by jury. The cases cited by the majority of the court in support of the proposition that the question whether a given code of rules is reasonable and sufficient is one of law (with one exception, to wit, Railway Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420, 423) were all cases where a rule or regulation was introduced without any testimony tending to show whether the regulation was reasonable or otherwise, and the decisions were simply to the effect that in such cases the court could properly decide as to reasonableness of the regulation. In three of the cases, and particularly in the case of Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126, 131, to which all the other cases refer as the foundation of the doctrine, it was clearly intimated that .the reasonableness of a regulation is a question of fact for the jury when there is á conflict of testimony upon that issue, and it is difficult to conceive how the rule could be otherwise without ignoring fundamental principles. In the case of Railway Co. v. Adcock, 52 Ark. 406, 410, 12 S. W. 874, the court said, “The facts being uncontroverted, it was the province of the court to declare the regulations reasonable.” The same remark was quoted with approval in the subsequent case of Railroad Co. v. Hammond, 58 Ark. 324, 334, 24 S. W. 723; and in a late case in New York (Abel v. Canal Co., 128 N. Y. 662, 666, 667, 28 N. E. 663), where the sufficiency of a code of rules which had been adopted by a railway company was challenged, and there was some testimony on that subject besides the rules themselves, it was held that the issue presented was properly-submitted to the jury. • I conclude, therefore, that the reasonableness of a regulation is a question of law for the court only in those cases where no testimony is offered tending to show whether it is reasonable or otherwise, and *953that where, as in the case at: bar, there is a conflict of testimony on such issue, the question is one of fact for the jury.
In the opinion in chief it is further held that the defendant company is not liable to the plaintiff, even if it was guilty of negligence in failing to inform those in charge of the extra train at Edmondson of the then whereabouts of the freight train. This conclusion is based on the ground that the negligence of the defendant company was not the proximate cause of the accident, but that the accident was solely occasioned by the fault of certain fellow servants of the plaintiff. I am not able to assent to this proposition. Tf, as the testimony for the plaintiff below tended to show, the rules were insufficient for the protection of trainmen and passengers, as applied to the conditions existing when the extra train reached Edmondson, and if at that station the train dispatcher ought to have given the information last above specified to the engineer and conductor of the extra train, then, in my judgment, it was the right of the jury to determine whether such omission of duty on the part of the defendant company directly contributed to the accident. The question as to what was the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily not one of legal knowledge, but of fact, for the jury to determine, in view of all the accompanying circumstances. Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 474. And in the case at bar the jury might well have reached the conclusion that a word of caution spoken at Edmondson to the engineer in charge of the extra train would have prevented the disaster. The operator at Edmondson evidently thought that the extra train ought to be warned that the freight train had not reached Forrest City, for as it came into view he said to the train dispatcher, over the wire: “Here comes the special. Have you any orders for it?” Tire engineer of the extra train well knew that sufficient time had elapsed to enable the freight train to reach Forrest City, and he doubtless supposed that it had passed that station some time before the extra reached Edmondson. If he had been warned that it had not reached Forrest City, he would doubtless have exercised a degree of care commensurate with the conditions which actually existed, and the jury might reasonably have found that the failure to give such warning directly contributed to the injury. Moreover, the fact that certain fellow servants of the plaintiff were also guilty of negligence did not absolve the defendant company from liability for its own neglect of duty, or that of its train dispatcher, since it is well settled that it is no excuse for a master, when sued by his servant, that the negligence of a fellow empioyé, as well as his own, contributed to occasion the injury. For these reasons I cannot concur in the,views of my associates, that they have the right to determine that the negligence of the defendant company was not the proximate cause of the accident.