Court Opinion

ID: 9848711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:25:47.808811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.226866
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that Alfred Stivali’s case is not preempted by federal bankruptcy law and that the trial court should have considered the efficacy of his claims against Aquiport Aylesbury, Inc., I must respectfully dissent.
Stivali contends that the order lifting the stay required the defendants to abandon the existing dispossessory proceedings which had been stayed and initiate a new proceeding. Based on the mechan*392ics of a stay, this argument is totally without merit.
Decided June 9, 2000.
Matthew D. Gansereit, for appellants.
The bankruptcy court, having reviewed and considered Stivali’s wilful disregard for his rental obligations, decided to abdicate its authority to limit Aquiport’s remedies to federal law and explicitly granted Aquiport the right to pursue its state law claims and lifted the stay. Therefore, Stivali cannot argue that the defendants violated the automatic stay imposed in his bankruptcy proceedings, thereby implicating the preemptive provisions of 11 USC § 362 (h).1 At the time of the wrong claimed by Stivali, the stay was no longer in existence. For this reason, this case is distinguishable from Smith v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 225 Ga. App. 383 (481 SE2d 558) (1997). The bankruptcy court’s order states: “The automatic stay is lifted as it applies to the Movant, Northstar Management Company Inc. d/b/a Aylesbury Farms. The Movant is entitled to commence dispossessory proceedings against the respondent [, Stivali,] according to applicable state law.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a stay as “[a] stopping; the act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the order of a court.” A stay cannot, however, be equated to the termination of an action. A stay temporarily halts a certain action until the stay is lifted. A stay merely pauses an action during the existence of the stay. It does not eradicate it. Therefore, once the bankruptcy court lifted the stay on defendants’ dispossessory proceeding, there was no longer any limitation on the action being prosecuted. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, the defendants would be required to file a duplicative dispossessory action in the same court in which its original action was already pending.
Therefore, because Aquiport did not violate the automatic stay and no rational construction of the bankruptcy court’s explicit order supports Stivali’s arguments, this case is not preempted by federal law pursuant to Smith, supra. Accordingly, I would remand this case for the trial court’s determination of Stivali’s claims in a manner consistent with this dissent.
*393Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James T. McDonald, Jr., for appellees.

 The federal Bankruptcy Code provides: “An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay... shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney! ] fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 USC § 362 (h). Therefore, in cases involving allegations that a defendant has wilfully violated an automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, federal law preempts state law, and the plaintiff must seek recompense in bankruptcy court.