Court Opinion

ID: 9522086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:40.3162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:16.447852
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, specially concurring: Although I agree with the decision reached by the majority, I do not agree that it is necessary to rely on the subsequent legislative amendment to the statute. As I noted in my dissent in People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 29, there is an inherent problem in attempting to interpret legislative intent based on the subsequent action of a later legislature. (119 Ill. 2d at 39.) The continually changing membership of the legislature “impels us to seek ‘intent’ in the objective words of its statutes, as informed by our own judgment and common sense, rather than in the inevitably subjective thoughts of individual members.” 119 Ill. 2d at 39. The statute here in question is printed in the majority opinion (123 Ill. 2d at 207-08). We are confronted with the interpretation of this specific statute in effect in 1985; the fact that it was subsequently amended, absent a finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, need not impact our decision. While the State argues that the meaning of the statute is clear, the defendant alleges that the language is ambiguous. While the statute may be imprecisely drafted, I do not believe that it is void due to ambiguity or vagueness. What is required of a penal statute is that it convey a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 8, 91 L. Ed. 1877,1883, 67 S. Ct. 1538,1542. Justice Marshall noted in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294, that as long as we are “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29, 92 S. Ct. at 2300.) Grayned involved interpretation of a Rockford antinoise ordinance which restricted activities which “tend to disturb the peace” around a school. In upholding the ordinance, the Court noted that it was “clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits” (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 229, 92 S. Ct. at 2300) and that it served as fair notice to those to whom it was directed. In so holding, the Court recognized that the ordinance “may not be as precise” as other statutes which the Court had upheld but that it “clearly ‘delineates its reach in words of common understanding.’ ” 408 U.S. at 112, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 230, 92 S. Ct. at 2301. I turn now to applying the Grayned principles to the statute here in question, being also cognizant of the necessity of strictly construing criminal statutes in favor of the accused. (People v. Foster (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 48, 55.) The question thus becomes one of whether, within common understanding and practices, the defendant was sufficiently warned that his activities were proscribed by the statute. One of the activities which the statute prohibits is sexual relations within families when the person “knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** Father or mother, when the child or stepchild *** was 18 years of age or over.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11—11(2).) Both children and stepchildren are protected by this statute. A person is not a stepchild in a vacuum — it is a relationship created between two people. To speak of a stepchild in a family setting implies the existence of a stepparent. When confronted with an implication in statutory language, “[t]he usual standard used to interpret a statute *** is *** to determine if the statute embraces such consequential applications and effects as are necessary, essential, natural or proper.” (2A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction §55.03, at 602 (4th ed. 1984).) The mere existence of the person referred to as a stepchild necessarily, naturally and properly implies the existence of a stepparent. The protection afforded the stepchild may not be removed merely because the legislature was not as precise in its use of language as one might have wanted. Imprecision does not equate with ambiguity nor does it necessitate reliance on subsequent statutory amendments. For these reasons, I specially concur.