Court Opinion

ID: 9646026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 06:09:29.492771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:01.543487
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed August 15, 2023

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00489-CR

                CORDARIUS TYRELL GOLSTON, Appellant
                                V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F18-76768

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                          Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      Appellant Cordarius Tyrell Golston was convicted of manslaughter after a

bench trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years. Appellant appeals,

complaining that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. We

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                I.   BACKGROUND

      This case arises from an altercation that occurred between two groups of men–

the “Jones” group, consisting of appellant, the victim Nicholas Diggs, and several

other friends; and the “Brown” group, consisting of Josh Brown and several of his
friends. On November 23, 2018, the Jones group went out to celebrate Cuiney

Jones’s birthday. The group first went to a club called Town House where they

encountered the Brown group. Brown had harassed Jones on social media about

Jones’s girlfriend. According to appellant, he and Brown exchanged words about

Brown’s problems with appellant’s friends while there.

      The Jones group left Town House and went to Dallas Cabaret South. The

security guard was hesitant to let Jones in due to his level of intoxication but

ultimately relented. Approximately 10–15 minutes later the Brown group arrived.

Appellant testified that he and Brown exchanged words at a more heated level than

at Town House.

      Sidney Williams, a security guard at the Dallas Cabaret South, saw appellant’s

group arrive. Later, appellant and one of his friends came out of the club, and

Williams described appellant as upset. Appellant wanted his friend to tell some

unknown person or persons in the club to come outside and “handle it like a man.”

Appellant’s friend told him to calm down because Williams was not going to go for

that. Appellant told his friend that “the murder rate in this mother fucker is about to

go up.” The friend told appellant they needed to get away from the club, so appellant

and some of the other men in their group walked across the street to a shopping

center parking lot.

      Brown’s group exited the club and went across the street to where the Jones

group was congregated. Williams heard the groups exchanging words, and then he

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saw a “gang or group fight” break out. Two or three men attacked appellant.

Appellant testified that he was pistol whipped during the fight. He further testified

that once he broke free of the men who attacked him, he heard Brown say, “Man,

pop the trunk. Pop the trunk. Open the car. Open the car.” Appellant took this as an

indication that Brown was going for a firearm. Appellant got a gun out of his friend’s

vehicle, aimed for Brown, and ended up shooting both Brown and appellant’s friend

Diggs. Williams described appellant’s shooting as “sporadic” and “indiscriminate.”

He saw Diggs fall while appellant was shooting. Diggs died from a gunshot wound

to the neck.

      A grand jury indicted appellant for murder. Appellant pleaded no contest

without an agreed sentence recommendation from the State, waived his right to a

jury trial, and proceeded to trial before the bench. The court found appellant guilty

of the lesser offense of manslaughter and sentenced him to 12 years in prison.

Appellant appealed the trial court’s judgment on May 20, 2022. In two issues,

appellant complains that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove appellant was

guilty of manslaughter; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to disprove self-

defense. In response, the State argues that (1) appellant has forfeited his points of

error because he did not present his complaints to the trial court; (2) appellant’s first

point of error is not cognizable because Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981), does not apply to bench trials; and (3) appellant’s second point of

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error is not cognizable because the Jackson v. Virginia rationality test does not apply

to no-contest pleas.

                       II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal

conviction, we apply well-established standards. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 316 (1979). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

and determine whether a rational jury could have found all the elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313; Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The jury, as the fact-finder, may make

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial in determining appellant’s

guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When there

is conflicting evidence, we presume the fact-finder resolved those conflicts in favor

of the verdict and defer to that resolution so long as it is supported by the evidence.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

      We also defer to the trier of fact’s determinations of witness credibility and

the weight to be given their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323

S.W.3d at 899. Our role as an intermediate appellate court is restricted to guarding

against the “rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v.

State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Laster v. State, 275

S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

                                         –4–
                               III.   DISCUSSION

      The State argues that appellant waived his challenges on both issues—

therefore, we address waiver before turning to appellant’s evidentiary sufficiency

challenges.

A.    Waiver of Sufficiency of Evidence Challenge

      To preserve error for appellate review, an appellant must show that he

objected in the trial court and that his objection “stated the grounds for the ruling

that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to

make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were

apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Clark v. State, 365

S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The issue on appeal must comport with

the objection made at trial. Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986)).

      The objecting party must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he

thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him

at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Pena v.

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. State, 827

S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). A trial court’s ruling will not be reversed

based on a legal theory that the complaining party did not present to it. State v. Story,

445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118,

122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

                                          –5–
      Legal sufficiency challenges, if brought under Jackson or article 1.15 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, can be raised for the first time on appeal. Euan v. State,

No. 05-16-00252-CR, 2017 WL 1536514, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2017,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).        However, appellant’s

sufficiency challenge to manslaughter appears to be based neither on Jackson nor

article 1.15.   Appellant has not presented any authority exempting his legal

sufficiency challenge from regular error preservation requirements, and we can find

none. Therefore, appellant failed to preserve his evidentiary sufficiency regarding

the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A);

Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d at 339; see also Wood v. State, No. 13-13-00130-CR,

2014 WL 5499908, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Oct. 30, 2014, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing an evidentiary

sufficiency challenge on a lesser-included offense argument based on preservation).

      Further, appellant did not preserve his challenge to the trial court’s rejection

of his claim of self-defense because he did not present his claim to the trial court in

the form of a request to withdraw his plea or an objection to the trial court’s failure

to withdraw his plea sua sponte. See Compton v. State, No. 05-08-00773-CR, 2010

WL 2698775, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). We cannot presume that appellant would have pled not

guilty or otherwise changed his defense strategy had he known the court was

considering manslaughter rather than murder, and he never asked the trial court to

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allow him to do so when the trial court was in a position to consider it. We overrule

appellant’s first and second issues. See Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464; Story, 445 S.W.3d

at 732.1

                                         IV.      CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        /Maricela Breedlove/
220489f.p05                                             MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                                        JUSTICE

1
  Even if appellant had properly preserved his evidentiary sufficiency challenges for our review, we would
still overrule appellant’s two issues on the merits. As to appellant’s first issue, although we have never
considered the issue in this Court, we concur with our sister court that the Royster test upon which
appellant’s first issue rests is applicable only to jury trials. See Johnson v. State, No. 04-08-00919-CR,
2010 WL 3249895, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (providing an analysis for why Royster is only applicable in the jury context). As to appellant’s
second issue, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, there is no constitutional requirement that the State
offer evidence of guilt to corroborate defendant’s plea. See Euan, 2017 WL 153614, at *7. Accordingly,
courts do not apply the Jackson rationality test when a defendant pleads guilty. Wright v. State, 930 S.W.2d
131, 132 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no pet.). A plea of no contest has the same legal effect as a guilty plea
under Texas law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.02(5). Therefore, appellant’s second argument that
the State did not successfully disprove self-defense is without merit. See Euan, 2017 WL 153614, at *7.
                                                    –7–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CORDARIUS TYRELL GOLSTON,                    On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F-1876768-V.
No. 05-22-00489-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Breedlove. Justices Nowell and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Goldstein participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 15th day of August, 2023.

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