Court Opinion

ID: 8639132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:50:16.144323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:56:02.250206
License: Public Domain

MARSHALL, Circuit Justice.
This is an action of debt brought upon the official bond of the marshal of this district, the intestate of the defendant, upon which the jury have found a verdict which assesses contingent damages, dependent on a case stated by the parties. This case is so stated, as to require the court to take into view the instructions which would have been given to the jury at the trial, had instructions been asked.
The first breach assigned in the replication is, that the moneys were received by the deputy of the marshal for the United States, on executions placed in his hands, which money has never been paid over. On this breach no controversy arises.
The second breach assigned is, that two writs of capias ad respondendum were issued against debtors of the United States, which were placed in the hands of the same deputy, who neglected them or either of them, or to return them or either of them,—“whereby, the United States were prevented from recovering judgment against each of the said debtors, and each of them have been, and are, totally lost to the said United States.” Damages are assessed to the amount of these two debts. The case stated, is “that two writs of capias ad respondendum, against two several debtors of the United States, were placed in the hands of the deputy, who, instead of executing them, received the sums due from the several defendant's, and made return thereof on the writs, after which the suits were dismissed. The United States have never received this money, and they now claim it from the estate of the marshal. In this second assignment of breaches, the receipt of the money is not brought into view. The neglect of duty in not serving the process, is the fault alleged to have been committed by the officer; and for this neglect his principal is unquestionably liable. But what is the extent of his liability ? But one general answer can be given to the question. As in all other instances of neglect, he is liable to the extent of the injury produced thereby. This is to be ascertained by jury. The replication alleges that the debt has been lost thereby; and if' this fact be as alleged, the amount of the debt is the measure of damages. But this isv a subject for the consideration of the jury. It was not submitted to the jury, and has been transferred to the court. If the loss of the debt was the direct and legal consequence of this neglect, the verdict ought to stand: but if this be a subject on which the judgment of the jury, under the instruction of the court ought to be exercised, then it would be improper in the court to decide upon it until that judgment is exercised. It is too obvious to require discussion, that the loss of a debt *1303is not the necessary consequence of neglecting to serve the first process which comes to the hands of the officer. The law provides for new process; and the question, whether that new process may not be as available to the plaintiff as the original process, depends on circumstances, of which the jury must judge. If, in this case, the plaintiff has been prevented from issuing new process by the act of the officer, that is not alleged in this part of the replication. If it may be given in evidence on this real assignment, then we must loot in the act which is alleged to have arrested further proceedings. That act is the receipt of the money due to the United States. If the officer was not authorized to receive this money, his receipt of it could not bind the United States, nor prevent further proceedings according to law. If he was authorized to receive it, the defendant will admit that the plaintiff could proceed no farther; and that the loss of the debt is the consequence of not serving the process, and receiving the money. This question will be properly considered, under the third breach assigned in the replication.
NOTE. After the above instructions were given, the jury found for the plaintiffs on the first breach assigned, as in the special verdict; for the defendant, on the second and fourth breaches, and for the plaintiffs on the third, assessing their damages on that breach at one cent.
3. The third breach is, that the officer did arrest the said debtors, as commanded by the said process, who, thereupon, respectively paid td the said deputy, the full amounts of their respective debts aforesaid; and in consideration thereof, the said deputy did then and there discharge the said debtors from the arrests aforesaid, and willfully failed to make due return of the said arrests, or either of them, or to account for and pay the amounts so received from said debtors, or any part thereof, to the said United States, whereby the said United States was prevented from obtaining judgments against their said debtors for their said debts, and the said debts were, and are wholly lost to the said United States. To support this breach, it would be necessary to show, in the first place, that the debtors were arrested. This is not proved: but may, and perhaps ought to be. assumed by the jury, from the facts admitted in the case. The material inquiry, then, presents itself: Was the receipt of the money an official act? Was it authorized by the mandate of the writ’ We are decidedly of opinion that it was not. The mandate of the writ was to take the person of the defendants mentioned therein, and to have them before the court, to answer the United States in a plea of debt, &e. A controversy exists between the parties, which is to be adjusted, not by the officer, but by the court. His duty is ministerial, not judicial It is to bring the debtor into court to receive its judgment, not to render that judgment. The sum actually due, is, generally, less than that demanded in the writ, and in these cases, it was considerably less. The officer does not know officially the real amount of the debt, and, consequently, cannot adjust it and receive the money. If he is not authorized to ascertain the sum due, and to receive that sum, neither is he authorized to receive the whole sum mentioned in the writ, and to .discharge the persons arrested. His duty is prescribed by the words of the writ; he is to obey its mandate. It would be time misapplied to enter into a consideration of the consequences of permitting the officer to depart from the mandate of the writ, and to make himself accountable to the United States, when not authorized by law so to do. It is enough to say that the writ did not authorize him to receive the money, and that its receipt was not an official act. Since the money was not- received by virtue of the writ, with the authority of which the deputy was entrusted, his principal cannot be chargeable by the legal force of that receipt; if he is chargeable, it is in consequence of the official acts performed or omitted by his deputy. The act performed is, making his return, which is, “Debt and cost satisfied.” The charge in the replication, is, that upon receiving the money he discharged the debtors. That this proceeding is i misfeasance in office, which subjects the principal to the action of the United States, is not controverted; but on this breach, as on the second, the amount of damages depends on the amount of injury. The return of the officer did not prevent the United States from taking such farther steps as are authorized by law; if the return shows service of the process, the plaintiffs might proceed against the defendants and the marshal for want of bail; if it does not show service, or if it shows a discharge, the plaintiffs might sue out a new process. The return that the debt was satisfied, did not bind the United States. The amount of injury, therefore, depends on all the circumstances, and those circumstances must be weighed by a jury. The counsel for the United States insists, that the money received by the deputy, is the measure of damages sustained by the United States, that tne deputy is responsible for the sum so received, and as he received it by colour of his office, the principal is also responsible to the same extent. But if the receipt of this money did not stop the United States, if it was not an official act authorized by the process or by law, the loss of the debt does not appear to be a necessary consequence from the return on the writ, or the neglect to take bail.