Court Opinion

ID: 9625821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:51:51.874799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:31.782579
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
Between the' date of the original opinion and the rehearing, the Honorable EDWIN M. HOLDEN, C. J., resigned and the Honorable CHARLES F. KOELSCH, District Judge, was called in and participated on rehearing.
GIVENS, Chief Justice.
Appellants asked for a rehearing and therewith sought augmentation of the record to include the Fund’s claimed showing before the' Board, requesting amendment and correction of the original transcript and proceedings, thereby proving the Fund never waived all of its answer, but at the most only the paragraph interposing the statute of limitation, inferentially admitting only claimant’s asserted incompetency, and thus there was no basis for the Board’s awarding of compensation, because in the absence of such complete withdrawal of the answer, there was no showing of a compensable accident.
The Court granted a rehearing and augmentation thus: “The Industrial Accident Board is required to immediately set a time for a hearing to determine what actually took place at the time the Fund withdrew its answer herein in whole or in part, permitting showings and countershowings by all parties interested. The Board to ultimately, definitively determine and state exactly its conception of the correct record of the proceedings at that time and certify the same, with all showings and counter-showings, to this Court in augmentation of the original transcript filed herein.”
Thereafter, the Board filed with the Court an additional transcript containing a recitation by the Board of the proceedings leading up to the award, a statement of the conference and promulgation of the minute entry quoted in the original opinion thus: “Upon Mr. Oppenheim’s return, all members of the Board being present, the official reporter was called in and Mr. Op-penheim dictated in the presence of Mr. Musgrave, the Manager and of Mr. Oros the Minute Entry which appears in the certified transcript. No objection was voiced by anyone at that time.” There was also included a letter from the attorney for the Fund indicating the Fund had no objection to paying the claim (as stated in her petition) for $1200 to Mrs. Rivera on proof she was the legal widow and upon' a proper order being entered, which requirements were complied with.
In addition to such narrative, there is the testimony of the Manager of the Fund to the.effect he only admitted Paragraph 7 of claimant’s petition, which asserted her incompetence. As diametrically opposed to this is the testimony of respondent’s attor*81ney that at the hearing the Manager actually and verbally withdrew the Fund’s answer and admitted every allegation in respondent’s petition.
The Board, in compliance with our Order, thus concluded their resolution of these conflicts: “The Board, having heretofore certified to the Supreme Court what it regards as the judicial record herein, adheres to its former certification but will submit to the Supreme Court a transcript of the proceedings at this hearing held under its order of November 21, 1950.”
The Board thus adheres to its original minute entry reciting that “the Manager of the Fund withdrew formal answer and admitted the allegations of claimant’s petition” has certified to us as a finding of fact, such withdrawal and admission.
This proceeding cannot be considered as a compromise of a common law controversy, 'but is governed by the statutes. Authorities cited in original opinion and Cretella v. New York Dock Co., 289 N.Y. 254, 45 N.E.2d 429, though there is ostensible authority to the contrary, Brigham Young University v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152; Barber Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266. Though it may be argued the Fund’s withdrawal of its answer and admission of the allegations were only conditional; i. e., upon the payment of only $1200, no^ amount was due to or could be paid either to the State, if there were no heirs, or to claimant, unless there were a compensable accident; the amount of the award is positively fixed by the statute and no less amount could be agreed upon.
By the augmentation of the record and the rehearing, we have thus considered every point raised by appellants in their assignments of error and petition for rehearing. Adhering to the proposition first laid down, that the extent of physical disability — in this case death — having once been determined, the amount of compensation must be irreducibly in accordance with the statute (there could, of course, be no change of condition); therefore, on the basis of the finding of fact by the Board, based on substantial though conflicting evidence, that the Fund withdrew its entire answer and admitted the allegations of the petitioner— “That on or about the 28th day of October, 194P, Joe Rivera received a personal injury caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with his employer, E. C. Johnston, which employment was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Law and death resulted from said accident on or about said date,” the only valid award that could be made is for the full amount of compensation as provided by the statutes, and therefore, the conclusion in the original opinion is reaffirmed. Costs to respondent.
PORTER, TAYLOR, and KEETON, JJ., and KOELSCH, District Judge, concur.
*82This opinion was completed and agreed upon prior to the expiration of the term of CHARLES F. KOELSCH, District Judge.