Court Opinion

ID: 9709859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:56:14.716835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:52.104184
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
I recognize the salutary purposes of the national and state legislation designed to preserve railroad corridors while benefiting the public with a recreational resource, as amply developed by the majority. A difficulty arises, however, when the advancement of larger public interests imposes a disproportionate burden on the property of a few individuals. Where this is the case, the public benefit certainly can be preserved, but only by assuring fair compensation to those who are adversely affected.
The threshold issue in this appeal involves the application of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251, which may operate to displace reversionary interests upon abandonment of railroad rights-of-way converted to trail use, implicating a potential right to compensation from the United States government. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8, 11-*67013, 110 S.Ct. 914, 920-23, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). It is one thing to presume that Congress intended to pay for some rights-of-way acquired for rail conversions approved by the Surface Transportation Board, the federal administrative agency vested with regulatory authority over railroads. See id. It is quite another to presume compensation should extend to private rail banking endeavors without any federal agency involvement whatsoever. The intent to provide federal funding for private rail banking endeavors seems particularly unlikely where the National Trails System Act itself prescribes a role for the Surface Transportation Board. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“If a State, political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full responsibility ..., then the [Surface Transportation] Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discontinuance or disruption of such use.”).
Regardless of the above, I recognize Buffalo Township v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 813 A.2d 659 (2002), is dispositive on this point. See id. at 651-52, 813 A.2d at 670.1 Moreover, although I find Appellants’ arguments related to the permissibility of “unilateral” private rail banking to be colorable, ultimately, I agree with the majority that the National Trails System Act does not make a distinction between rail banking accomplished upon an express agreement of a railroad retaining some residual right of reentry and rail banking accomplished more unilaterally by a trails organization upon the mere consent of a railroad which does not retain a right of reentry. Thus, after Buffalo Tomiship, I agree that the *671National Trails System Act insulates the rights-of-way under review from reversion under state law.
The remaining issue addressed by the majority is whether the application of the National Trails System Act effectuates a taking in the present case. According to the majority, it does not, since the instruments creating the rights-of-way refer to a “Road,” which the dictionary defines, in one alternative, as a “course or path.” See Majority Opinion, op. at 667-68, 976 A.2d at 492. Although recognizing that the dictionary also observes that “road” can be used to signify “a railroad,” the majority reasons that “[i]t seems most likely that the parties simply meant by ‘road’ a through-way.” Id. at 666 n. 7, 976 A.2d at 491 n. 7.
Contrary to the majority’s perspective, I believe there are abundant reasons to conclude that the relevant rights-of-way were railroad rights-of-way, beginning with the identity of the parties in interest — namely, Conrail’s predecessor, Allegheny Valley Rail Road Company, and landowners who were being asked to host a right-of-way for the construction of a railroad. Moreover, while the relevant instruments of conveyance are not models of clarity, the references to “Road” are to a particular road (via the use of the phrases “said Road” and “the Road”), commencing immediately after the identification of “Allegheny Valley Rail Road Company.” Certainly, it is at least a reasonable interpretation that the reference “said Road” is to the Rail Road that is the subject of Allegheny Valley Rail Road Company’s business, since no other references to any other “road” appear on the face of the instrument. Moreover, the instruments enable “the Company to construct and repair the Road, and the right to conduct and carry water by aqueducts and pipes, and the right to make proper drains.” It is difficult to envision that property owners would have foreseen a railroad company coming onto their property to construct and repair a recreational trail for hikers and bicyclists as opposed to a railroad.2 Indeed, in Baltimore *672& O.R. Co. v. Bond, 845 Pa. 360, 29 A.2d 60 (1942), this Court considered similar references to “said road” in an instrument of conveyance for a railroad right-of-way, indicating that “the intent and purpose of the grant was, that a railroad should be located and operated through the grantor’s land, advantaging his property, and when the railroad ceased to operate, the grant should terminate.” Id. at 362, 29 A.2d at 61.3 Finally, the instrument at issue in this case extended the right-of-way only “so long as the same shall be required for the use and purposes of said Road.” (emphasis added). The document thus suggests against an understanding that “said Road” would be replaced by an entirely different conception of a road.
It is also very clear that Conrail intended to unconditionally divest itself of its own property interest in the subject rights-of-way under governing state law, and thus, to terminate the *673use of “said Road.” Conrail obtained federal and state authorization to unconditionally abandon the rail corridor. Consistent with this authorization, it sold all of its interests by quitclaim deed;4 subsequently, the tracks and associated railroad equipment were dismantled and removed. In answers to requests for admissions, Conrail admitted to consummating “abandonment,” according to its own understanding of the term. R.R. at 678a.5
The vehicle of preserving potential future rail use via indefinite, interim trail use simply did not exist at Pennsylvania common law; that is the reason for the relevant federal and state enactments. While I am sympathetic to the highly valuable efforts of Appellees to preserve our public resources, I am also cognizant of the protected interests of landowners who are faced with a substantially changed use of their land as a public recreation facility. See generally Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1542 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“When.the easements here were granted to the Preseaults’ predecessors in *674title at the turn of the century, specifically for transportation of goods and persons via railroad, could it be said that the parties contemplated that a century later the easements would be used for recreational hiking and biking trails, or that it was necessary to so construe them in order to give the grantee railroad that for which it bargained? We think not.”).
I have no doubt that most hikers are responsible people committed to the preservation of the environment and respect for the property of others. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to presume that all trail users are responsible and landowners will never encounter difficulties with the few who are not. I also do not support the idea that the terms of the railroad rights-of-way at issue here are broad enough to impose on Appellants such burdens as are inherent in the operation of a public recreational trail which, by its nature, invites a diverse population of visitors onto the property.
Again, to the extent the majority’s efforts further the advancement of the public interests it emphasizes, they are understandable. However, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned against unduly undermining other constitutional values in pursuit of such aims. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (“We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”). The majority’s broad policy approach suggesting “the value of many transportation networks” are to be preserved through accommodation of “major technological advance[s],” see Majority Opinion, op. at 668, 976 A.2d at 492, apparently at the expense of select individuals made subject to disproportionate burdens associated with unanticipated uses, is fundamentally at odds with such values. Indeed, the majority’s perspective, in this regard, seems inconsistent with its previous explanation that Conrail’s right-of-way could not be used for highway purposes, absent just compensation. See Majority Opinion, op. at 666 n. 7, 976 A.2d at 491 n. 7.
Justice EAKIN joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. I mention the above concerns, because, although I authored a dissent in Buffalo Township, my focus was directed to different legal issues pertinent to that decision. Thus, I take this opportunity to express my reservations regarding the applicable Congressional intent. The practical difficulty is that, if the federal government does not ultimately accept this Court’s interpretation that Congress intended to fund private rail banking acquisitions, landowners who have legitimate takings claims will have been placed into a sort of legal limbo, in which responsibility for compensation is universally offloaded.

. Notably, the majority does not accept that a highway could be constructed through Appellants' lands on the strength of the railroad right-of-way, since the parties would not likely have anticipated it. See *672Majority Opinion, op. at 666 n. 7, 976 A.2d at 491 n. 7. It seems as or more unlikely that the parties would have anticipated the construction of a recreational trail.

. According to the majority, "the deed contains no language specifying that the easement terminates upon cessation of rail service.” Majority Opinion, op. at 666, 976 A.2d at 491. As reflected above, however, in Bond this Court read a materially similar right-of-way instrument as embodying precisely the understanding that termination of the right-of-way occurs upon the cessation of railroad operations.
The majority also cautions that the intent to abandon rail service should not be confused with intent to abandon the right-of-way. See Majority Opinion, op. at 667-68, 976 A.2d at 492. Bond, however, demonstrates that, under Pennsylvania law interpreting a right-of-way instrument materially similar to those involved here, continued railway use and the preservation of the right-of-way are integrally intertwined. See Bond., 345 Pa. at 362, 29 A.2d at 61.
The majority undertakes to distinguish Bond based on the character of the change in use (telegraph lines, in Bond, versus recreational trail use here). See Majority Opinion, op. at 668 n. 9, 976 A.2d at 492 n. 9. It makes no effort, however, to square the material passages of Bond’s reasoning construing the phrase "said Road” in a railroad easement to mean a "railroad” with its substantially different interpretation of "said Road" to mean, broadly, "a through-way.” Majority Opinion, op. at 666 n. 7, 667-68, 976 A.2d at 491 n. 7, 492. The majority also does not address Bond's central determination that the "intent and purpose of the grant was, that a railroad should be located and operated through the grantor's land, advantaging his property, and when the railroad ceased to operate, the grant should be terminated.” Bond, 345 Pa. at 362, 29 A.2d at 61. In these regards, Bond’s reasoning simply does not *673allow for materially different uses of a railroad right-of-way, ‘'interim” or otherwise.

. A quitclaim deed is an instrument via which a seller conveys whatever interest he may think he has in real property, without any representations or warranties as to actual title. See Greek Catholic Congregation v. Plummer, 338 Pa. 373, 377, 12 A.2d 435, 437 (1940).

. An affidavit from the director of Appellee Allegheny Valley Land Trust also demonstrates the understanding that Conrail did not wish to ‘‘become involved” in rail banking, and thus, the decision was made to establish “interim trail use without involving Conrail.” R.R. at 475a; see also R.R. at 579a, 621a, 632a (reflecting Appellees’ admissions that Conrail refused to enter into a private rail banking agreement, intended to "give up its property rights” upon the transfer of its interests to AVLT, and “transferred all future interests in the Rail Corridor [and] it did not did not reserve the right to re-enter the Rail Corridor”). While the majority indicates that the agreement between Conrail and AVLT provides that Conrail can resume rail service in the future, such agreement is "only on such terms and conditions as Grantor and Grantee hereto may hereafter mutually agree upon in writing.” It is well settled, however, that such an "agreement to agree” establishes no legally enforceable obligation. Onyx Oils & Resins, Inc. v. Moss, 367 Pa. 416, 419, 80 A.2d 815, 816 (1951) ("An agreement to agree is incapable of enforcement, especially when it is stipulated that the proposed compact shall be mutually agreeable.").
There is no question that Conrail consented to and cooperated with AVLT in the organization’s own rail banking efforts. Conrail, however, did not do so at the expense of its own intention to unconditionally abandon its own interest and participation.