Court Opinion

ID: 9656728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:57:31.622756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:34.955041
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority but disagree with how the majority interprets and applies Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a (2008) — the statute that defines “park zone.” Minnesota Statute § 152.01, subd. 12a, provides that a park zone “includes the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, of the park boundary.” (Emphasis added.) In my view, the use of the term “city block” in the statute unambiguously refers to a numerical measure of a distance equal to a linear segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets.
I reach this result because the key concept in the statute is one of distance, not area. While the statute does include the concept of area, it is from a linear measurement of distance — “one city block”— that the area included in a park zone is *547determined. Because I conclude that there is no concept of area in the statute other than the area that is ascertained by using the distance of “one city block,” my interpretation and application of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is at odds with that of the majority. More specifically, I conclude that once we determine that “one city block” is a linear measurement of distance and then decide how that distance is determined, we need say no more. This is so because after making these two decisions, we have a sufficient basis to determine the area of the park zone and whether Carufel was selling drugs within this zone.
Minnesota Statutes § 152.01, subd. 12a, provides that a park zone is delimited by measuring “300 feet” or “one city block” from a park boundary, “whichever distance is greater.” (Emphasis added.) I conclude that both “300 feet” and “one city block” as used in the statute, are measures of “distance” that are used to ascertain the “area” of a park zone. Both “300 feet” and “one city block” should be treated consistently. It cannot be disputed that “300 feet” is a measure of distance. Thus, to be consistent, the words “one city block” must also be a measure of distance.
The majority would have us divide the land surrounding a public park into rectangular blocks bounded by city streets on all four sides and concludes that the “park zone includes the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the park.” By adopting this definition of “city block” the majority conflates the different means by which distance and area are measured1 and as a result unduly complicates the straightforward concept of distance as articulated in the statute. Distance is a linear measurement — the extent of the space between two objects or points — and is typically expressed in terms such as: 10 feet wide; 5 feet, 10 inches tall; 100 yards long; or “300 feet.” Area is a different type of measurement. It is a measure of the surface area of something and this measurement of area is expressed in terms distinctly different from those used for distance, i.e. square foot, square yard, square kilometer, square mile, or square block. Because distance and area are two distinct concepts of measurement, they should not be conflated. While measurements of distance can be used to determine area, distance should not be equated or confused with a measurement of area. It is at this point that the majority and I part company.
While the term “city block,” as indicated above, can be used to determine an area such as a square block — or as the majority states, “a rectangular section of a city or town bounded on each side by consecutive streets” — the term “city block” is not used in the statute to mean area. In contrast to the majority, I conclude that the legislature intended the term “city block” to mean a measure of distance that equals a linear segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets. Supporting my conclusion is the observation that if the legislature wanted the statute to define area as being bounded on each side by consecutive cross streets, it could have used terms such as the area enclosed within the boundary of adjacent streets, city streets, or even a square block or rectangular block. But the legislature did not do so; rather, it gave us a measurement of distance which we are to use to determine the area in a park zone.
*548Because “city block” is a measure of distance used to determine the area of a park zone, we must be precise in how we define where that distance begins and ends. This second question is more difficult to answer than the first because the legislature has not provided a definition and there are several alternatives to choose from in determining the distance. If a city block means a segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets, I conclude that the best answer to this question is that a city block starts at the middle of one of the cross streets, and ends at the middle of the next cross street. This definition is consistent with the general rule of law on land title descriptions and boundaries.
It is a general rule of land title descriptions and boundaries that a municipality takes only an easement in a public right of way and that a conveyance carries title to the center of the right of way subject to the public easement. While this is a rule of construction that may be rebutted by an express provision showing the right of way was not intended to be conveyed, I conclude that it is appropriate to apply this general rule when interpreting the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a. More particularly, I refer to Joyce Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Land Titles § 146 (3d ed. 2003), which provides that:
Whether acquired by deed, dedication, condemnation, or prescription, the general rule is that in acquiring public rights of way, a municipality takes an easement only.... It is the general rule to construe such conveyances to carry the title to the center of the right of way, subject to the public easement, provided the grantor at the time owned to the center, and no words of specific description show a contrary intent.
Our case law likewise recognizes that “any abutting landowner owns to the middle of the platted street or alley and that the soil and its appurtenances, within the limits of such street or alley, belong to the owner in fee, subject only to the right of the public to use or remove the same for the purpose of improvement.” Kochevar v. City of Gilbert, 273 Minn. 274, 276, 141 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1966); see also Harrington v. Saint Paul & Sioux City R.R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 (1871) (“We see no reason why the trustee’s deed to plaintiff did not pass to her the legal title to the fee of the land to the center of the street adjoining her lots, as in the ordinary case of conveyance of lands adjoining a highway.”).
The definition I propose provides a precise, unambiguous answer to the question of what is meant by the linear measurement of a “city block” in the statute. Moreover, this definition eliminates the possibility of any gaps within the area comprising the park zone and provides a context to answer questions we may face when applying the statute in the future. The attached diagram illustrates the precision that follows from the use of the term “city block” as I have defined it.
*549[[Image here]]
While my interpretation and application of Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, will have the same end result as the majority’s interpretation, the distinction between our respective analyses of the statute is important. This is so because the result under the two definitions may not be the same in all instances. For example, the result may differ when determining whether a point located on the square blocks that lie to the northwest, northeast, southeast, and southwest of a park is within the park zone. Under my interpretation, we ascertain the distance of a city block, then use that distance to measure from the edge of the park. Using this linear measurement, we can easily ascertain the area included within the park zone. Only the locations or places that are within the surface area created by measuring the distance of 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, from the edge of the park would be within the park zone.
I find the majority’s statement that a park zone “includes the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the park” to be confusing because it unnecessarily brings into the equation an entirely different unit of measurement, “the entire area of a block.” Moreover, the majority potentially answers or presumes to answer a broader question than we are asked to address today. Under the majority’s holding, the total area within the square blocks that lie to the northwest, northeast, southeast, and southwest of Gabrych Park are “directly adjacent” to the Park and therefore under its definition must be included within the park zone. Whether all or part of those square blocks are in the park zone is not a question before us. Here, I take issue with the majority’s characterization of the concurrence as being an advisory opinion because it answers more than the question before us. The concurrence does *550no such thing. I do not purport to answer any specific question regarding the outcome of a hypothetical, I attempt only to elucidate my interpretation of the statute and how it is to be applied, and to demonstrate the distinction between my interpretation and that of the majority.
While I agree with Carufel that the words “one city block” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, must be interpreted as being a unit of linear measurement, I disagree with Carufel’s application of the statute. Carufel fails to use “city block” as a measurement of distance to determine the area of a park zone. Once the distance of a city block is determined, we must use that distance to delimit the park zone. Setting the boundary of the park zone is accomplished by measuring the length of one city block outward in any direction from any point on the park boundary. All of the surface area between the park boundary and the outward extremity of that measurement is in the park zone.2
Even though Carufel’s house faces Adams Street, it is within a park zone because it is located within the area ascertained by measuring the length of one city block outward from the boundary of Ga-brych Park. (See attached diagram). Houses and other points on the western side of Adams Street are within one city block of the edge of the park and are therefore within the park zone; but houses across the street on the eastern side of Adams Street lie beyond the park zone because they are not within one city block of the park. Under my interpretation, Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance convictions are sustained because his house lies within the area created by measuring the distance of one city block from the park boundary.
Finally, if one were to conclude that Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is ambiguous — which I do not — I believe my interpretation should still prevail over that of the majority because the rule of lenity would then apply. The rule of lenity states that “[w]hen the statute in question is a criminal statute, courts should resolve ambiguity concerning the ambit of the statute in favor of lenity.” State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn.2003); see also State v. Walsh, 43 Minn. 444, 445, 45 N.W. 721, 721 (1890) (“A statute is not to be deemed to make an act criminal, which would not have been so except for the statute, unless the intention of the legislature to effect that result is apparent, and not seriously doubtful.”). Applying the rule of lenity, my interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 12a, is more appropriate than the majority’s interpretation because it is the more narrow interpretation of this criminal statute.
To conclude, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Carufel’s second-degree controlled substance convictions. But, I would do so under an interpretation of the statute that holds one city block as used in the statute is a linear measure of distance and that this distance is equal to a segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets, a segment which begins and ends at the middle point of each cross street.

. I note that the majority does recognize this difference when it says that "[djistance is a measurement of the line between two objects. Area is a measurement of the entire surface of an object.”

. The majority states that “the concurrence implicitly accepts Carufel’s argument that a sale in Carufel's backyard is excluded [from the park zone].' This is a flawed reading of my concurrence and my response to this statement is contained in the analysis set forth herein.