Court Opinion

ID: 9733174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:56:08.498839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.089252
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977), this Court explained that the purpose of its already-existent rule excluding evidence obtained during unnecessary prearraignment delay was “not simply to guard against the coercive influence of custodial interrogation, but to ensure that the rights to which an accused is entitled at preliminary arraignment are afforded without unnecessary delay.” Id., 471 Pa. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added). The “six-hour” rule promulgated in Davenport was designed to effectuate those underlying purposes in a way that was both certain and workable. Although the majority opinion in the instant case recognizes the dual purposes of the rule excluding evidence obtained during unnecessary delay, the majority proposes a drastic abridgment of the Davenport rule that will severely undermine the second of those essential purposes. If, as the majority opinion proposes, only statements obtained after the lapse of the six-hour period should be subject to exclusion, then once the police obtain a statement prior to the end of that period, there will no longer be a compulsion on their part to have the accused arraigned in a timely manner. The sanction for unnecessary delay will be gone. If an *410accused’s right to arraignment without unnecessary delay is to be ensured, as we have said it must, then the sanction for violation of that right must continue to be the exclusion of evidence, regardless of what point during the delay the evidence is obtained. The police must be kept cognizant that even though they have obtained a statement before the lapse of the prescribed six-hour period, continued unnecessary delay beyond that period will result in the exclusion of even that evidence.
The “six-hour” rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Davenport has had a salutary effect on the administration of criminal justice in this state, in that the rule, while being sensitive to essential rights of an accused, also provides law enforcement officials and the court’s with a clear and manageable guideline.
I, therefore, dissent.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.