Court Opinion

ID: 9740867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:43:25.08666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.837258
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Petition for Rehearing. The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing wherein they assert that we did not consider the underlying 1-1 Light Industrial Zoning Classification as applied to their property. We did not do so for the reasons hereinafter stated. The master in chancery, who took the proofs in the case, defined the issues of the case. He noted that pursuant to section 15 of the McHenry County Zoning Ordinance, the plaintiffs applied for a conditional use permit and that the ordinance provides that no such permit shall issue unless the Board of Supervisors shall find compliance with its seven standards listed in section 15, which are set forth in full in our opinion. In further delineating the issues, he stated: “The plaintiffs allege as part of their case, the full compliance with the foregoing requirements. Such allegations are traversed by the defendants. “The ultimate questions presented to the Court are: “1. Whether Section 15 of the McHenry County Zoning Ordinance is void and unenforceable because the authority to require conditional use permits has not been delegated to counties. “2. Whether Section 15 is unconstitutional because it purports to establish an unreasonable classification in that it discriminates against certain uses which are reasonably compatible with other uses permitted in established district, no district being provided for such uses. “3. Whether counties are without authority to create conditional use classification whereby otherwise lawful uses are effectively prohibited unless the County Board of Supervisors find that there is a ‘public necessity’ for the proposed conditional use. “4. Whether Section 15 is unconstitutional because of its lack of certainty and vagueness.” The final judgment order appealed from — presumably prepared by the plaintiffs — set forth the jurisdictional requirements, the ownership of the subject property, its legal description and related the pertinent facts concerning the litigating parties. It found the issues in the cause for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and overruled the exceptions to the master’s report. Thereupon, the court found and adjudged: “a. All the conditions imposed by Section 15 of the McHenry County Zoning Ordinance under ‘Standards’ have or will be met by the plaintiffs with the exception that plaintiffs have failed to establish that there is a ‘public necessity’ for the use proposed as required in subparagraph 1. “b. The requirement that a public necessity be established as a condition precedent to the issuance of a conditional use permit as applied to trailer camps and trailer sales is unconstitutional and constitutes an exercise of a power not delegated to the County Board of Supervisors. “c. Section 15 purports to create a classification that bears no substantial relation to public welfare and is therefore invalid as applied to the subject property. “7. That Section 15 of the McHenry County Building and Zoning Ordinance is unenforceable as applied to the subject property. “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS follows: “1. That Section 15 of the McHenry County Building and Zoning Ordinance is null and void as applied to the subject property.....” It was from this judgment order that the defendant appealed. The plaintiffs filed no post-trial motion seeking to broaden the terms of the order and filed no cross appeal therefrom as provided for in former Supreme Court Rule 35 and present Rule 303. (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 110, par 101.35(1); Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 110A, par 303 (b).) Had the plaintiffs, in fact, sought an adjudication relative to the validity of the underlying “1-1” Light Industrial classification — an issue not included in the primary appeal in this case — they could have sought such relief by post-trial motion and could have filed notice of cross appeal from that part of the order which failed or refused to consider such issue. A notice of cross appeal is mandatory if an appellee desires to appeal from all or any part of an order, and unless given, the matters sought to be reviewed are not preserved for such review. People ex rel. Southfield Co. v. Jarecki, 408 Ill 266, 271-276 inch, 96 NE2d 569 (1951) ; Robbins v. Campbell, 65 Ill App2d 478, 485, 486, 213 NE2d 641 (1965); Bawden v. Furlong, 16 Ill App2d 174,185,147 NE2d 889 (1958). At page 4 of plaintiffs’ brief, they designate the issues presented for review, as follows: “1. Whether the McHenry County Zoning Ordinance as applied to the subject property is invalid insofar as it prohibits the establishment on the subject property of a mobile home park and mobile home sales except as a conditional use. “2. Whether the refusal of a ‘conditional use’ for trailer park and trailer sales on the subject property was unreasonable, arbitrary and invalid. “3. Whether the County of McHenry has the authority to create a category of ‘conditional uses,’ including trailer parks and sales, as provided in Section 15 of the ordinance. “4. Whether the County of McHenry has the legal right to bar trailer parks and sales from all districts in the County including the 1-1 District except as ‘conditional uses.’ ” (Italics Ours.) The case was not decided in the trial court on the issue of the validity of the 1-1 zoning classification as applied to the plaintiffs’ property. It is clear from the issues as defined by both the master and by the plaintiffs, and as determined by the judgment order, that the plaintiffs attacked the provisions of section 15 of the County Zoning Ordinances insofar as they prevented the use of their property for a mobile home park and mobile home sales use. In both the trial and the appeal of this case, the fact that the property was located in an 1-1 zoning classification was nothing more than a fortuitous circumstance. In McMillen v. Rydbom, 56 Ill App2d 14, 205 NE2d 813 (1965), at page 28, we pertinently stated: “The theory, upon which a case is tried in a lower court, cannot be changed on appeal; and an issue not presented to, or considered by the trial court, cannot be raised for the first time on review. Woman’s Athletic Club of Chicago v. Hulman, 31 Ill2d 449, 454, 202 NE2d 528 (1964); Benson v. Isaacs, 22 Ill2d 606, 610,177 NE2d 209 (1961); In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill2d 545, 548,131 NE2d 487 (1956) ; McCook Window Co. v. Hardwood Door Corp., 52 Ill App2d 278, 285, 202 NE2d 36 (1st Dist 1964); People ex rel. Bourne v. Johnson, 48 Ill App2d 307, 309,199 NE2d 68 (1st Dist 1964).” The unique characteristics of certain uses of land which preclude its classification in any particular district or districts, give rise to the special or conditional use techniques. When any designated land use is properly classified as a special or conditional use, such use may not be permitted except upon compliance with the applicable ordinance provisions relative thereto. Such provisions may include certain standards or conditions which must be satisfied. In the case at bar, the issues before the trial and review courts were the validity of and the compliance with section 15 of the McHenry County Zoning Ordinances. If the plaintiffs can ignore this section, or fail to comply with its standards, and yet obtain the desired use of their land, then the special use ordinance is completely circumvented. Such result should not obtain unless section 15 of the ordinance, or some pertinent part thereof, is unconstitutional and void. In our opinion we specifically determined the validity of section 15 of the McHenry County Zoning Ordinances, and the right thereunder to include a trailer park within a special use classification. The County Zoning Ordinances did not provide any general zoning use classification under which land may be used as a mobile home park as a matter of right, but rather, specifically included such use within their special use classification. Therefore, the underlying 1-1 zoning classification was immaterial to the determination of whether or not a mobile home park may be permitted on the plaintiffs’ property. This determination rests on the validity of and the compliance with the seven conditions set forth in section 15 of the special use ordinance. The plaintiffs challenged the right of the defendant to include the first condition — a finding of a “public necessity” — in the zoning ordinance and conceded that such condition had not been met. Since we have found that such a prerequisite is proper and permissible, the plaintiffs’ concession that they have not complied with this condition is fatal to their attempt to use their land for a trailer park. Under point III of their petition for rehearing, the plaintiffs have completely misstated the court’s opinion in these words: “This opinion marks a milestone in zoning litigation. For the first time in any reported case in Illinois a court is holding that ‘public necessity’ and ‘public necessity’ alone is a pre-condition for a private property owner to enjoy the use of his property.’’ Even a cursory reading of the opinion will clearly disclose the error of the plaintiffs’ statement. We noted in our opinion that section 15 established a number of standards or conditions for those uses, which, because of their unique character, cannot be classified as within any general use district without considering, in each case, the impact on neighboring land, and that public necessity for the particular use at the requested location is only one of these standards or conditions. We also specifically observed that this is not the traditional type of zoning case, but rather, one dealing with a special use; that in the traditional zoning case, no one factor is determinative and the normal tests for resolving the validity of the zoning classification would govern (see: La Salle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill2d 40, 46, 47, 145 NE2d 65 (1957); Sinclair Pipe Line v. Richton Park, 19 Ill2d 370, 376-380 incl., 167 NE2d 406 (1960)); and that public need in such case is, at best, but one of the factors to be considered. For the foregoing reasons, we adhere to the opinion as originally adopted and the petition for rehearing is denied.