Court Opinion

ID: 9462954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:54:12.855121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:51.781396
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.
In this case we review a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, six FBI agents sued for allegedly arresting the plaintiff-appellant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On summary judgment, our first concern is whether there was any genuine issue of material fact, Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Liability turns on the reasonable good faith of the officers for acts occurring during the investigation and arrest of the appellant.
We affirm the judgment of the District Court as to all appellees except Agent Ar-wine. We are of the opinion that reasonable men might well differ as to whether he acted in reasonable good faith and that as to him this issue should have gone to trial.
I. Facts
Viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Company, 5 Cir. 1968, 392 F.2d 706, cert, denied, 393 U.S. 924, 89 S.Ct. 255, 21 L.Ed.2d 260 (1968), the facts are as follows.
During 1971 and 1972, an extensive federal investigation of alleged gambling activities was being conducted in central Florida. The primary target was one Henry Trafficante, but the investigation culminated in the indictment of fifty seven defendants, Trafficante included. Also named as a defendant was the appellant, Margaret S. Rodriguez, who turned out to be altogether innocent.
As part of the investigation, on September 30,1971, Judge Joseph P. Lieb authorized the interception of telephone calls made to and from Tampa telephone number 238-2354. This wiretap was authorized pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con*396trol and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. The telephone, located in a residence at 801 E. Jean Street, Tampa, was being used by suspect Frank Fraterrigo Vega. Judge Lieb also authorized the use of a pen register, a device to record telephone numbers called from the Vega phone. The wiretap began on October 1, 1971.
On October 5, 1971, at 9:47 a. m., Vega called 935-0024 but the pen register recorded “9” for “0” in the fourth digit, thus listing the number as 935-9024, an error, or malfunction, not discovered until much later. Vega spoke to a female called “Margo”, about gambling activities. On the basis of this conversation, it appeared that Margo was a bookmaker, and at various points in the conversation reference was made to an individual named “Gene”. Appellee John J. Batley, a special agent of the FBI, monitored and recorded the call.
“Margo” was a stranger to the investigators, and Special Agent Joseph A. Arwine was assigned to determine her identity. He was given a handwritten log, prepared by Batley, which showed the call had occurred at 9:47 a. m. on October 5, between Vega at 238-2354 and Arwine’s subject at 935-9024. Arwine also received a ten page transcript of the conversation. The precise assignment given Arwine was: (1) to determine the identity of the unknown female suspect; (2) to determine her record with the Tampa police, the Hillsborough County sheriff, and the Greater Tampa Credit Bureau; and (3) to determine the suspect’s make of car and her license number. Because of the ongoing investigation, Arwine was directed not to interview the subject.
Arwine’s initial step was to peruse the 1971 edition of the Hill-Donnelly Criss Cross Telephone Directory for Tampa and the equivalent of the Tampa, Florida City Directory. He could not find telephone number 935-9024 in either volume, and correctly deduced that the number was unlisted. Consequently, Arwine contacted the General Telephone Company in Tampa and asked an employee of the Security Division to ascertain the subscriber to 935-9024. According to Arwine’s affidavit, the security employee identified the subscriber to the unlisted number as the appellant, Margaret S. Rodriguez, 3420 Grace Street, Tampa. This was a gross error, apparently on the part of the telephone company employee. Telephone number 935-9024 was actually a pay telephone, unlisted because all pay telephones are unlisted. On the other hand, the appellant’s telephone, 876-5646, is not unlisted; it is listed in the name of her home-conducted business, Margo’s Beauty Salon. Furthermore, the number 876-5646 bears no resemblance to the number 935-9024.
Obviously, Arwine could not have more completely been led astray. He was given the wrong number to begin with and then received wholly inaccurate information by the telephone company.
The “information” which Arwine received from the telephone company was preserved in handwritten notes dated October 28, 1971. Arwine does not remember the name of the employee who supplied the information, and he did not obtain a copy of the company records for 935-9024. Arwine simply informed Special Agent James S. Kinne of his “discoveries”.
Next, Arwine contacted the Tampa police, the Hillsborough sheriff, and the Tampa Credit Bureau. He learned that appellant did, in fact, live at 3420 Grace Street and had operated Margo’s Beauty Salon for about sixteen years. Moreover, she had never been arrested by the local authorities.
On December 5, 1971, Arwine conferred with Detective Sergeant John Fairbanks of the Tampa police vice squad. Arwine asked whether Fairbanks had ever encountered a Margaret or Margo Rodriguez in his gambling investigations for the Tampa police, but he did not provide Fairbanks with the suspect’s address, age, or physical description. Indeed, the conference took place in Ybor City, away from Fairbanks’ office where he could have had access to his files. In response Fairbanks related that he had investigated a Margaret Rodriguez who had once owned a beauty parlor. No attempt was made by Arwine to see or copy the records of Fairbanks’ earlier investigation. *397This was most unfortunate because the Margaret Rodriguez to whom Fairbanks referred was a totally unrelated individual who, at the time, was facing state criminal charges for gambling.
After this “corroboration”, by Fairbanks, Arwine was satisfied he had correctly identified the unknown female telephone conversationalist. He reported his written findings to Special Agent Kinne on December 15,1971. Kinne presented the evidence to a grand jury, which indicted the appellant and 56 others. Arrest warrants were issued the same day, February 1, 1972, but they were not served until March 3.
Two days later, February 3, Agent Kinne interviewed Gene Bennett, whom Kinne believed to be the “Gene” discussed in the Vega-“Margo” telephone conversation. Bennett confirmed that he was the subject of the conversation, but he denied knowing any bookmaker named Margo.
In the meantime, plans were laid for simultaneous execution of the arrest warrants on March 3, 1972. The volume of the arrests necessitated extra manpower, and among the agents ordered to report to Tampa to help with the arrests were special agents Donald E. Ritchey and Geral W. Sosbee. Neither had participated in the investigation; neither knew whom they would be arresting until they arrived in Tampa March 3. They were directed to arrest the appellant, which they did at 9:16 a. m. in appellant’s home-beauty parlor, in the presence of her family and one of her customers.
Appellant was taken to the FBI office in Tampa, where she was questioned, photographed, and fingerprinted. At 10:25 a. m. she was turned over to a United States Marshall for processing and incarceration. Once again, she was questioned, photographed, and fingerprinted. Afterwards, she was presented to a United States Magistrate and was released on a surety bond at 2:00 p. m. Appellant remained under the surety bond throughout the time she was under indictment — from February 1, 1972 to May 31, 1973. Twice during that time appellant appeared in court, for arraignment on May 11, 1972, and for an Omnibus hearing on October 2, 1972.
All of this, of course, was an inexcusable, indefensible turn of events.
On March 13, 1973, more than a year after appellant’s arrest, Agent Kinne allowed her attorney to listen to the tape of the Vega-“Margo” telephone conversation. The attorney told Kinne that the voice on the tape was not that of the appellant. Consequently, Kinne reinterviewed Gene Bennett two days later. Bennett confirmed again that the conversation was about him, but said he knew no bookmaker named “Margo”. The only “Margo” he knew, said Bennett, had worked in a convenience store on Armenia Avenue in Tampa. Subsequent checking by Kinne revealed that this “Margo” was Margaret Waltz, 2503 W. Custer, Tampa. Ms. Waltz’ phone number was 935-0024; the number recorded by the pen register had been 935-9024.
On March 22, 1973, Kinne interviewed Ms. Waltz. After listening to the taped conversation, Ms. Waltz admitted she was the “Margo” whose conversation was on the tape, but she denied any illegal activity.
On March 27, 1973, the Assistant United States Attorney in Tampa requested dismissal of the indictment against the appellant. Actual dismissal followed on May 31, 1973.
On October 24, 1973, appellant initiated this suit by filing a complaint charging Agents Ritchey, Sosbee, and unknown agents with violating her Fourth Amendment rights. Ritchey and Sosbee responded with a motion for dismissal, claiming the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that they had official immunity. Alternatively, they asked for a summary judgment. The District Court denied the dismissal, saying federal police officers were not absolutely immune, but deferred ruling on the summary judgment.
Subsequently, the unknown agents referred to in the complaint were identified as Special Agent John J. Batley, who had monitored the wiretap on Vega’s phone; *398Special Agent Joseph A. Arwine, who had mistakenly identified “Margo”; Special Agent James S. Kinne, who had presented Arwine’s findings to the grand jury; and former Special Agent in Charge Joseph F. Santoiana, Jr., who had been the immediate supervisor to the other agents. These individuals were joined as party defendants, and they renewed the pre-trial motions of Ritchey and Sosbee, asserting (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (2) that they acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that their actions were valid, and (3) also asked for dismissal of the cause or for summary judgment.
After two extensions of time, all defendants filed their single answer on October 17, 1974. Three defenses were laid out. First, they renewed their charge that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Next, they asserted that the claim against Agent Santoiana was barred by the doctrine of official immunity. Finally, the remaining agents asserted the defense of good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of their actions.
Affidavits from all the parties were filed relative to the summary judgment question. In the meantime appellant began discovery. Interrogatories were sent to Agents Santoiana and Arwine, a deposition was taken from the Security Director of the General Telephone Company of Tampa, and a request was made for production of documents and things. However, summary judgment was entered before discovery was completed. The Santoiana interrogatories, aimed at disclosing agency guidelines for identifying unknown parties to telephone conversations, were never answered. Neither was the request for production.
Although the Santoiana interrogatories were never answered, those addressed to Agent Arwine were. Arwine’s answers established that the handwritten log prepared by Agent Batley showed that Batley originally was unsure whether the female who spoke to Vega was called “Margo” or “Barbara”. Agent Arwine said he did not recall listening to the tape of the conversation; instead he relied on the typed transcript. Moreover, he flatly denied ever dialing telephone number 935-9024.
In addition to the Arwine interrogatories, appellant also procured the deposition of James E. McMahon, Security Director for General Telephone Company of Tampa, Florida. McMahon reported that requests by law enforcement officers for telephone subscriber information would be handled as follows:

A. Non-Published (NP) Telephone Numbers

(1) A subpoena, summons, court order, or administrative order from a legislative body would normally be required to obtain non-published numbers or to obtain subscribers’ names and addresses to NP numbers.
(2) All subpoenas, et cetera, would be indexed, filed and made a part of the permanent records in the Security Department.
(3) All public coin telephones (pay stations) are issued NP numbers for the primary purpose of eliminating the listing of the pay station from the telephone directory. If a verbal inquiry was received for information on a public pay station, it would be furnished without a subpoena, et cetera and no permanent record of the request would be retained.
(4) In emergency situations, involving life or death, or involving major crimes, non-published information may have been furnished to a law enforcement official in 1971 upon receipt of verbal request without a subpoena, et cetera. No permanent record of the request would have been retained.
A hearing relative to the summary judgment issue was held on October 22, 1974. On November 4, 1974, the District Court denied the agents’ motion to dismiss but granted summary judgment in their behalf. The District Court held that more than mere negligence was necessary for appellant to recover, that there was no genuine issue as to the agents’ subjective good faith, but noted that appellant’s strongest case was thát against Agent Arwine. Because *399the phone company gave Arwine the wrong name to go with 935-9024 and in light of the Fairbanks’ “corroboration” the Court held that Arwine was reasonable in his good faith. Accordingly, the Court found there were no genuine issues of material fact — the facts indisputably made out a reasonable, good faith defense — and summary judgment was granted.
On April 6, 1976, this case was orally argued before this Court. On May 8,1976, we granted appellees’ motion to supplement the record on appeal to include the following paragraph.
The request for authorization to dismiss the indictment against plaintiff contains a statement that an Agent of this Bureau called 935-9024 on January 20, 1972, on a pretext for purposes of voice identification and spoke to a woman who stated she operated a beauty parlor and resided at 3420 Grace Street. Inquiry with our Tampa Office as to who made this call to the above number, which is the coin box telephone at Biff Burgers mentioned previously, discloses that Special Agent Arwine made the call. He states that he made the call but how realizes that it was not to 935-9024. He states that, without having the file in front of him, he must have looked up the telephone number of Margo’s Beauty Salon at 3420 Grace Street, 876-5646, and made the call without realizing it was a different number from that provided to him by the pen register. [Emphasis added],
II. The Law and the Decision
A. General Principles
Violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action against him for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Since 1971, certain legal rules have developed around a Bivens cause of action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 2 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 1339. But, for the most part, courts have applied § 1983 law to Bivens cases. See, e. g., Brubaker v. King, 7 Cir., 1974, 505 F.2d 534.
In the instant case we look to Bivens-1983 case law for answers to the following questions: (1) In a Bivens situation, are investigative officers, not participating in the actual arrest, as amenable to suit as the arresting officers? (2) Assuming investigative officers to be potentially liable, are their defenses the same as those available to the arresting officers? (3) Can mere negligence render an officer liable, or is a malevolent intent required?
While the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the question of whether investigative officers, not participating in the actual arrest, are encompassed by the Bivens1983 case law, at least one other circuit has assumed jurisdiction in this situation. In Brubaker v. King, 7 Cir., 1974, 505 F.2d 534, the plaintiff brought a 1983-Fourth Amendment suit against arresting officers, postal inspector, and an investigator from the Bureau of Customs. The Seventh Circuit, relying on Bivens, assumed subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim against the postal inspector and federal investigator, who did not perform the arrest, and held that summary judgment was properly granted because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ good faith belief that probable cause existed. Likewise, in Tritsis v. Backer, 7 Cir., 1974, 501 F.2d 1021, the Seventh Circuit assumed jurisdiction in plaintiff’s action against employees of the Internal Revenue Service in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for wrongful arrest. Some of the agents had performed merely investigative functions, such as making phone calls, which ultimately led to the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff, who was misidentified due to a mix-up in names.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did find federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in a Fifth Amendment suit against federal officials and agents, in which plaintiff alleged that defendants had deprived *400him of due process of the law in their investigation leading to his prosecution and in the prosecution itself. Weir v. Muller, 5 Cir., 1976, 527 F.2d 872. Without discussing the merits of the case, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 873. Also, in Perry v. Jones, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 778, a 1983-false arrest suit, the Fifth Circuit implicitly assumed jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim against an investigating state officer and others, by upholding the granting of a directed verdict for defendants based on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. The investigating officer had merely obtained and reduced to writing the statements of witnesses identifying the plaintiff, which led to his wrongful arrest, but, the officer did not file the complaint nor make the arrest.
Furthermore, general principles of tort law provide a cause of action for unlawful' arrest against a defendant who “affirmatively instigated, encouraged, incited, or caused the unlawful arrest”. Palmentere v. Campbell, 8 Cir., 1965, 344 F,2d 234; 238; Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company v. Lewis, 69 App.D.C. 191, 99 F.2d 424, 425 (1938); Burlington Transp. Company v. Josephson, 8 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 372, 375; See Prosser, The Law of Torts § 11 at 47 (1971).
Thus, based on the broad language of the Bivens holding, the decisions of the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit’s holdings in analogous cases, and principles of general tort law, we hold that this Coürt has subject-matter jurisdiction over investigative agents Batley, Arwine, and Kinne, who are amenable to a Bivens-Fourth Amendment suit. It is important, in considering the question of jurisdiction, to distinguish between a decision oh the merits and one on jurisdictional grounds. In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, at 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, at 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1945), the Supreme Court said:
. [I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 493, 494, 22 S.Ct. 783, 785, 786, 46 L.Ed. 1005; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 305-308, 44 S.Ct. 96, 98-99, 68 L.Ed. 308.
Having dedded that investigative officers may be appropriate defendants in a Bivens-Fourth Amendment suit, we arfe faced with the question of what defenses are available to them,
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, at 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), the Supreme Court held that officers who effect an arrest may avail themselves of the defense of good faith and probable caüse in a subsequent § 1983 action for false arrest. In the Bivens remand, the Second Circuit held the defense to be available to officers unable to prove the evanescent concept of probable cause, if they can prove they acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest. Bivens, 2 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347. In this Circuit the defense of reasonable good faith in false imprisonment eases has been characterized as a qualified immunity rather than a defense, Bryan v. Jones, 5 Cir. 1976, 530 F.2d 1210 (en banc). Nevertheless, by whatever name, the result is the same: An officer with probable cause to arrest, or who acts in reasonable good faith, is not liable.
An officer or an officer-investigator is not liable for every error he commits. Even if misinformed as to the facts, an arresting officer who acts with probable cause or in reasonable good faith as to the validity of his actions is not liable in action for false arrest or for the consequences ensuing from such an arrest. We can conceive of no sound reason dictating a differ*401ent rule for officer-investigators. They should be entitled to a defense generally equivalent to the reasonable good faith defense available to an arresting officer. For a discussion of what amounts to good faith, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). We think the following quotation from Wood is particularly apt here, although expressed in the specific context of school discipline:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
* * sfc * * *
A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.
In the application of these rules, both objective and subjective good faith must be considered, 95 S.Ct. at 1000.
The District Court held that the degree of culpability necessary for investigators to incur Bivens liability was not present here but did not define the requisite degree of culpability; it only said that simple negligence was not enough.
A summary judgment is reviewable only to determine whether any actual dispute exists as to material facts. Dunnington v. First Atlantic National Bank, 5 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 1017. If any dispute exists, then summary disposition is improper. “[Sjummary judgment should be granted only when it is quite clear what the truth is. . Thus if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions and inferences from the evidence, the court must submit the case to the jury.” Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 73, 76. Consequently, the primary issue is whether our facts permit any genuine dispute as to whether the appellees, or any of them, acted in reasonable good faith.
B. Agents Ritchey and Sosbee
These appellees played no part in the gambling investigation that led to appellant’s arrest; their only role was to make the arrest. The law is plain that an officer who arrests someone pursuant to a valid warrant has no liability for false arrest even though the suspect is later proved innocent. Perry v. Jones, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 778; Fleming v. McEnany, 2 Cir., 1974, 491 F.2d 1353. The warrant for appellant’s arrest resulted from a grand jury indictment and was signed by a deputy clerk of the United States District Court. Therefore, Agents Ritchey and Sosbee had a duty to arrest appellant. “A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest . . . and being mulcted in damages if he does.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).
Furthermore, there is no indication that Ritchey and Sosbee exceeded the scope of the arrest authorization. Appellant alleges no abuse by them, and the facts permit no inference that any abuse occurred. Consequently, as to Agents Ritchey and Sosbee the summary judgment must be affirmed.
C. Agent Batley
Agent Batley’s investigative role was limited to monitoring the wiretap on Frank Vega’s telephone. Affidavits disclosed that he overheard the “Margo” conversation, logged the time of the call, and noted the names of the principals in the conversation. Batley’s handwritten log was later given to Agent Arwine to aid in identifying “Margo”. Even if somehow responsible for the malfunction of the pen register, Batley did not cause or instigate appellant’s arrest. Furthermore, appellant offers no facts to dispute Batley’s reasonable good faith. Accordingly, the summary *402judgment is also affirmed as to appellee Batley.
D. Agent Kinne
With the possible exception of Agent Ar-wine, Agent Kinne’s role in the investigation was more extensive than that of the other appellees. Kinne presented to the grand jury the evidence which resulted in appellant’s indictment. Two days later, Kinne interviewed Gene Bennett, the “Gene” discussed by Vega and “Margo” in their telephone conversation, and asked him who “Margo” was. Consequently, appellant contends that Kinne was uncertain about Arwine’s identification of “Margo”, and, in presenting evidence to the grand jury despite this uncertainty, Kinne may not have acted in reasonable good faith. In appellant’s estimation this shows summary judgment inappropriate as to Kinne.
Agent Kinne’s belated interrogation of Bennett is subject to numerous innocent interpretations. Appellees’ brief submits the most likely explanation: Kinne could not interrogate Bennett before the wiretap terminated without blowing the operation; and later, when interrogation was permissible, a question about “Margo’s” identity was obligatory. We do not believe appellant has alleged any facts creating a material dispute as to Kinne’s reasonable good faith in presenting evidence to the grand jury. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment as to appellee Kinne.
E. Agent in Charge Santoiana
We find no evidence that this appellee, by any error in his supervision, caused appellant’s unfortunate arrest. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment as to him also. E. g., Williams v. Vincent, 2 Cir. 1974, 508 F.2d 541, 546; Jennings v. Davis, 8 Cir. 1973, 476 F.2d 1271; Roberts v. Williams, 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 819, 830-33, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S.Ct. 83, 30 L.Ed.2d 110.
F. Agent Arwine
Employing the teachings of Wood v. Strickland, supra, we note the total absence of any proof that Agent Arwine acted out of any malicious intention to injure Mrs. Rodriguez or to cause a deprivation of her constitutional rights.
The issue as to his liability is thus reduced to whether he “reasonably should have known” that what he did would violate, or proximately cause a violation of, the constitutional rights of the appellant. Moreover, he cannot be cast in damages unless he acted “with such disregard of [her] clearly established constitutional rights that his actions cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith”, 95 S.Ct. at 1001.
His assignment, certainly one of responsibility, the moreso because he knew he was dealing with the inconclusive gleanings of a wiretap, was to identify “Margo”, the unknown female. In his efforts, Arwine uncovered four items which might have tended to identify the appellant as the suspect— and he mishandled three of them.
He began with a telephone number, 935-9024, which was wrong, and with a name “Margo”, which was essentially correct. He went to the telephone company to learn the subscriber to telephone number 935-9024 but, for the second time, he was put on the wrong road. As a matter of reasonable good faith, Arwine cannot be charged with these errors.
It is what he did afterwards, and failed to do, that brings into question the summary judgment in his favor.
Arwine checked with the Greater Tampa Credit Bureau. He there learned that for sixteen years appellant had operated a beauty salon, Margo’s Beauty Parlor, in her home. This was the one item of accurate data Arwine compiled in the entire investigation, but he drew the wrong inference from this correct item. Because the name of the beauty salon corresponded to the name of the female party to the wiretapped conversation, Arwine, without further verification, jumped to the erroneous conclusion that he had identified the suspect.
An earlier check with the Tampa police and the sheriff of Hillsborough County disclosed that Margaret S. Rodriguez of 3420 *403Grace Street had never been arrested by local authorities. It may be that this should have put a reasonable man, especially a trained investigator, on notice that he might be on the trail of an innocent person. At least, it could have been enough to cause one possessed of reasonable care for the rights of innocent persons, to make reasonably certain that his deductions were not mere surmise but factually correct. Ar-wine did informally ask Tampa detective sergeant John Fairbanks whether he remembered encountering the name “Margaret Rodriguez” in his gambling investigation. Fairbanks replied that he did and that she worked as a beautician. Without asking Fairbanks to check his records, or to make them available for his inspection, Ar-wine accepted this as concrete corroboration. An examination of the records could quickly have revealed that the Margaret Rodriguez recollected by Fairbanks was a different woman, a woman then under indictment in state court.
On the record to this point, which was all that it had before it, the District Court held that Arwine’s errors did not go beyond simple negligence.
Subsequent to oral argument in this case, appellee moved to supplement the record with a disclosure of the following information.
In January, 1972, prior to the arrest which occurred on March 3, 1972, Arwine placed a telephone call for the purpose of comparing the appellant’s voice with the voice recorded in the tapped telephone conversation. When the party on the other end of the line said she was Margaret Rodriguez of 3420 Grace Street, Arwine thought he had conclusively identified his suspect. More than a year later, after the real Margo had been located, Arwine realized that he had not actually dialed 935-9024 (the tapped number as recorded by the pen register) but, instead, had looked up Margo’s Beauty Salon in the telephone book and had dialed that number. Arwine, at the time he made that call, did not have the file before him and thus did not know the pen register number. He used the telephone directory, even though he knew that the pen register number was unlisted.
In response to pre-trial interrogatories Arwine could not recall listening to the recorded conversation. He also flatly denied ever calling 935-9024. In-fact, he had not, but this evidence was misleading because he had dialed Margaret Rodriguez’ correct telephone number and then failed to compare the voice he then heard with that of the telephone recording.
As already pointed out, this caused the return of an indictment which should never have been returned. It caused the arrest and jailing of a wholly innocent person. It caused that person the suspense, anxiety, and expense of a criminal prosecution which hung over her head for more than a year.
There are some facts in this case which cannot be disputed. Arwine did know that in the pursuit of a criminal investigation he was on the trail of a woman who for sixteen years had operated a beauty salon at the same location and had never been arrested for any offense. He used the telephone directory to “call” an unlisted telephone number. He did reach the appellant on the telephone, but made no effort to compare the voice he then heard with that on the telephone recording. Whether or not he was “ordered” to refrain from interviewing Mrs. Rodriguez, with no further consultation with his superiors he did not give her a chance to tell him that she was in total ignorance of the criminal activity which he was investigating. Instead, the conglomeration of errors committed by him was the vital link in the chain which caused her to be indicted and to suffer the treatment already described. There is no room for any reasonable doubt that he understood the purpose for which his “information” was collected and what it might cause.
This case is decided purely within the context of a summary judgment. On the state of the present record, we are unable to say that reasonable men could not differ as to whether Agent Arwine was entitled to a good faith defense. That is what we decide and all that we decide.
*404In light of the dissenting opinion we emphasize that we do not intend to hold, and we do not hold, “that a federal law enforcement officer who participates in a criminal investigation culminating in a federal grand jury indictment can be held answerable to one indicted and subsequently arrested . . that "all that the claimant must prove is that the indictment against him has been dismissed . .
On the present record, no reasonable man could apprehend that the appellant might have been indicted, with all the attendant consequences, if the unfortunate series of errors had not been committed, which ultimately led to an invasion of the appellant’s constitutional right not to be indicted, bailed, and required to live under the threat of a criminal trial because of utterly groundless charges. We attribute no significance to the fact that the indictment was dismissed. But for the fact that these errors were committed, the prosecution most assuredly would never have ensued it.
This case is not like Perry v. Jones, cited in the dissent, in which the victims of a robbery identified Perry as one of the participants. The officers could hardly have ignored that information, short of further inconsistent facts. Here, nobody identified Rodriguez as the one participating in the phone call, nor could anyone have done so, since it is undisputed that the call was to an entirely different person.
Furthermore, we have no desire to impinge upon the integrity of the grand jury process. There is no reason to believe that there are enough utterly groundless cases, apparently caused altogether by the acts of an investigating officer, to blow up a threatening cloud on the horizon.
We do not rule on the merits of whether or not Agent Arwine did in fact act in good faith. We simply hold that on this record the case against him should not have been dismissed on summary judgment, for reasonable minds could differ on the validity of this defense.
As to all appellees except Arwine, the summary judgment is affirmed.
As to Arwine, the summary judgment is reversed, and his case is remanded for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART.
IN PART, REVERSED and REMANDED.