Court Opinion

ID: 9715538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:08:07.396692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.568291
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I concur in the Court’s decision that the trial court’s finding of competency was supported by the evidence and findings. I disagree with its conclusion that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion to represent himself. The record amply demonstrates that the court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
An understanding of the self-representation issue requires a brief synopsis of the lengthy pretrial proceedings. Some of them were summarized in an earlier opinion arising out of the same case, State v. Bean, 163 Vt. 457, 658 A.2d 940 (1995). Defendant was arrested in February 1993 for violating an abuse prevention order protecting his mother. At his initial court appearance, defendant indicated that he would like to represent himself “[f]or now,” but also indicated that he was seeking access to “my proper counsel,” allegedly an out-of-state attorney. Id. at 459, 658 A.2d at 942. At his arraignment several days later, defendant expressed an interest in proceeding pro se, but again alluded to out-of-state counsel and indicated that he wanted to hold open the option of obtaining an attorney. The court subsequently appointed a public defender until defendant’s competency to stand trial could be determined.
At the conclusion of a hearing in June 1993, defendant moved to proceed pro se. At a hearing on the motion several weeks later, defendant explained that he was not comfortable with the assigned *305public defender, expressed an interest in standby counsel, and suggested a specific law firm. The court kept the public-defender assignment, however, pending further proceedings. In the meantime, defendant’s appointed counsel moved forward with discovery of medical records of defendant’s mother, who had been evaluated for competency and sanity in connection with unrelated criminal charges, and also moved to suppress several incriminating statements made by defendant at arraignment.
At the conclusion of defendant’s competency hearing in September 1994, the court ruled that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant thereupon asserted that he was entitled to representation by counsel of his choice, indicated that he wished to be represented by the assigned public defender, but cautioned that he also wished to preserve for the future his choice of representation. Expressing dissatisfaction with delays resulting from the State’s appeal of the court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress, defendant moved, in July 1994, to remove the assigned public defender, indicating that he had been in contact with an unidentified private attorney. In August 1994, the court ordered a substitution of counsel, assigning a new attorney to the case, who remained defendant’s counsel of record through the remainder of the proceedings.
New counsel again raised the issue of defendant’s competence to stand trial, and a second competency hearing was held in August 1995. The court again found that defendant was competent to stand trial, which was set to commence in February 1996. Just before trial, however, counsel again questioned defendant’s competence, and another competency hearing was scheduled just prior to jury selection. The evaluating psychiatrist testified that although defendant met the criteria for a diagnosis of schizophrenia paranoid type, and demonstrated “unusually obstructionist” behavior toward the trial proceedings, he was nevertheless competent to stand trial. The trial court again ruled that defendant was competent.
The State’s first witness was defendant’s mother. Before she took the stand, defendant indicated that he did not wish to be in the courtroom. At the conclusion of the mother’s direct testimony, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wished to return to the courtroom to be present for counsel’s cross-examination. Counsel also stated for the record that defendant had “demanded that I do certain things during cross-examination that are not consistent with the trial strategy that I have, and in my view [are] not consistent with his best interests at trial which I think are within the purview of *306my decision making as an attorney.” During counsel’s cross-examination of the mother, defendant sought unsuccessfully to speak with counsel several times, called out counsel’s name after each question and answer in an apparent attempt to attract his attention, and asked the court to allow him to cross-examine the witness, which the court denied. Defendant continued to interrupt the questioning during the State’s redirect.
After calling two more witnesses, the State rested. Before the defense could proceed, defendant informed the court that he was “still having trouble with assisting my counsel in my defense. He won’t .... allow me to assist him in the defense.” The court inquired of defense counsel whether there was anything he wanted to add. Counsel indicated there was nothing. Defendant then asserted that it was his right to defend himself. Interpreting the statement as a motion to proceed pro se, the court denied the request. Defendant then argued that he was being denied his constitutional right and ability to defend himself, stating:
I was not able to question the witnesses. My competency has been in question right from the very beginning. My lawyer would not bring up questions of competency of the witness. In fact, my — Patricia Lancaster’s [the first assigned public defender] prime concern was the witness’s competency. No question of her competency has been brought up. I don’t believe my attorney is handling my case with [the] reliability of counsel. I’m not being represented.
At the conclusion of defendant’s statement, the court inquired whether there was anything he wished to add. Defendant responded: “I’ve felt that way from the very beginning; I’m not being represented.” The court inquired of counsel whether there was anything he wanted to add. Counsel indicated there was nothing. The court then denied the request. Defendant thereupon asked to be excused from the courtroom and did not return for the duration of the trial.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself. The Court agrees, reasoning that “[although defendant did not explicitly state this reason for his motion . . . counsel’s pursuit of the insanity defense, and his refusal to present other defense theories defendant supported, was the reason defendant asserted ‘I’m not being represented’ and sought to proceed pro se.” 171 Vt. at 296, 762 A.2d at 1263. This conclusion provides the springboard for the Court’s extended discussion of the *307question of who controls the decision to pursue an insanity defense, and its ultimate conclusion that because defendant had the right to control that issue, the self-representation motion was wrongfully denied.
The flaw in the Court’s reasoning, in my view, is its assumption that defendant’s motion was premised upon counsel’s decision to pursue an insanity defense. Yet the Court acknowledges that defendant did not bring the motion on this basis. Rather, the motion was grounded expressly upon counsel’s failure, in defendant’s view, to adequately impeach the complainant’s (defendant’s mother) competency, and his refusal to allow him to participate in the cross-examination of the witness. The essence of the motion, as defendant explained it, was that counsel would not “allow me to assist in the defense . . . my lawyer would not bring up questions of competency of the witness.” Defendant compared defense counsel’s conduct to that of his former public defender, who, he asserted, had made the mother’s competency a “prime concern.”
The events preceding the motion provide the context for defendant’s action. Immediately before the witness’s testimony, defense counsel expressly warned the court that defendant had “demanded that I do certain things during cross-examination [of the mother] that are not consistent with the trial strategy that I have.” Defendant then repeatedly attempted — without success — to interrupt counsel’s cross-examination, to attract counsel’s attention, and to take over the cross-examination himself. Plainly frustrated with counsel’s failure to cooperate with his desires in this regard, and with the trial court’s refusal to allow him to conduct the examination on his own, defendant moved to represent himself.
That defendant had often expressed a disinclination to pursue an insanity defense during earlier proceedings is obvious from the record, but equally obvious is the fact that counsel had long been inclined to proceed otherwise, and that issue had often been discussed. Defendant had proven his ability to make his views known, and there is no reason to assume that he was unable to raise the insanity-defense issue had he so desired. Thus, the real question before the trial court was whether a motion made mid-trial to proceed pro se on the basis of defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s approach to the cross-examination of a State witness justified a decision to relieve assigned counsel and allow defendant to represent himself through the remainder of the trial. Viewed in light of the *308factual circumstances and the relevant law, I believe that the court acted well within its discretion in denying such a motion.*
As the Court correctly observes, the relevant considerations before a trial court in addressing such a motion were cogently summarized by the California Supreme Court in People v. Windham, 560 P.2d 1187 (Cal. 1977). As the court there explained, when a defendant has elected to proceed to trial represented by counsel and trial has commenced, “it is thereafter within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether such a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro se.” Id. at 1189. Factors which the court should consider in considering such a request “are the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.” Id. at 1191-92.
*309Here there was no issue concerning counsel’s competence to represent defendant or, more particularly, to cross-examine the witness in question. Decisions concerning whether or how to impeach the witness involved trial tactics within counsel’s exclusive decisional control. See In re Trombly, 160 Vt. 215, 218-19, 627 A.2d 855, 857 (1998) (apart from issues that directly relate to crime upon which jury may rest its verdict, such as what plea to enter, whether to waive jury, and whether to testify, trial tactics are ultimately defense counsel’s call); 1 American Bar Ass’n Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-5.2(b) (2d ed. 1980) (decision on what witnesses to call, whether and how to cross-examine witnesses, and other tactical decisions are exclusive province of trial attorney). Although defendant objected to counsel’s cross-examination strategy, this was an area exclusively within counsel’s control, and there was nothing to suggest that counsel’s cross-examination was inadequate or below the standard of a competent attorney.
The court could also consider defendant’s prior “proclivity to substitute counsel.” Windham, 560 P.2d at 1192. As the record summarized earlier demonstrates, defendant had made a regular practice of moving to substitute counsel, and then equivocating and changing his mind. The forensic psychiatrist’s observation that defendant was manipulative and obstructionist was amply borne out. Thus, the court was justified in viewing the most recent motion with some skepticism.
Finally, the court had to consider the fact that the motion was brought after one change of attorneys had already occurred, years of pretrial proceedings had taken place, a jury had been selected and trial had commenced. In these circumstances, the potential for delay disruption, or error resulting from the removal of competent counsel and the appointment of defendant strongly militated against a decision to allow defendant to represent himself. The court might even have faced the prospect of dismissing the jury had defendant sought and obtained a continuance. See id. (court may consider length and stage of proceeding, and disruption or delay that may result from granting motion).
Thus, all of the relevant factors supported the court’s decision to deny the motion. Although the court did not, in this case, conduct an extensive sua sponte inquiry of defendant, such an inquiry is not necessary where the defendant, or counsel, provides the court with sufficient information for an informed decision. See United States v. *310Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion to substitute counsel where defendant fully stated reasons for request); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 932-34 (2d Cir. 1981) (court’s failure to inquire into request to substitute counsel found to be harmless where defendant otherwise stated his reasons). The record reflects that defendant had no difficulty voicing his views and concerns in support of the motion for self-representation, and that these concerns provided an insufficient basis to grant the mid-trial motion. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment. I am authorized to say that Judge Jenkins joins in this opinion.

 In a footnote, the Court asserts that this interpretation of the events surrounding defendant’s motion is inconsistent with what actually occurred at trial. The Court makes four points in this regard.
First, the Court reiterates the point that the trial court was on notice, from the beginning of trial, of defendant’s general opposition to the use of an insanity defense. This reinforces the Court’s argument that the unstated basis of the motion was counsel’s reliance on the insanity defense. It does not, however, alter the fact that the motion was, in actuality, grounded on a different disagreement with counsel, i.e., the conduct of counsel’s cross-examination of the victim.
The Court’s second and third points suggest that defendant’s objection to counsel’s cross-examination of the victim was, in reality, an objection to his use of the insanity defense; that, in fact, the dispute was not over “how” to cross-examine the witness, but “whether to cross-examine at all.” 171 Vt. at 297 n.1, 762 A.2d at 1264 n.1. I do not believe the Court accurately characterizes what occurred. Counsel informed the court prior to the cross-examination that defendant had “demanded that I do certain things during cross-examination that are not consistent with the trial strategy that I have.” This shows a disagreement over how to cross-examine, not over whether to cross-examine.
Finally, the Court cites a statement by counsel suggesting that the “strategy” to which counsel referred was his use of “this defense,” i.e., the insanity defense. This was an off-hand remark by counsel prior to a court-ordered break to allow counsel to consult with defendant. After the break, counsel actually explained for the record the basis of defendant’s concern. Counsel indicated that defendant believed “angels” were “controlling” both the witness and defense counsel, and that defendant further believed the angels “would not allow me to do what I have to do, and I can’t represent him, and that he again wants to fire me. And it’s the angels and the devils are conspiring together.” Thus, the record discloses that defendant wished to conduct the cross-examination himself because he believed counsel was being controlled by “angels and devils” and was therefore ill equipped to represent him. Whatever these concerns may reveal about defendant’s competence to represent himself, they certainly do not support the Court’s claim that defendant’s objection to counsel’s cross-examination was, in reality, an objection to use of the insanity defense.