Court Opinion

ID: 9861098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:41:09.065743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:13.300170
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the “reasonable likelihood” test of DR 7-107(D) does not violate the constitutionally protected free speech rights of attorneys while they are participating in criminal trials. I do so because the majority has construed this standard to require a “showing by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney’s extrajudicial speech truly jeopardized trial fairness....” Ante at 626. This test precludes the Court from disciplining an attorney based on the vague feeling that his statement could possibly, or even foresee-ably, have affected the trial. Rather, before discipline may be imposed, the Court must have a firm conviction that the statement created an immediate danger of jeopardizing the fairness of the trial. Moreover, the restriction on speech is narrowly limited to attorneys associated with the prosecution or defense of criminal trials. It does not extend to civil trials; nor does it encompass attorneys who are not associated with the case.
I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that an “attorney with no supervening professional responsibilities in a pending criminal ease would seemingly enjoy the same free speech rights as any other citizen.” Ante at 633. I therefore concur that the Constitution prohibits the discipline of attorneys for exercising their right to free speech when they are not directly associated with a criminal trial unless that speech creates a clear and present danger of prejudicing the administration of justice. Ante at 634.
*637I write because I believe that the justification for applying the clear and present danger test to attorneys not associated with a criminal case requires fuller elaboration. I also think that the application of that clear and present danger test to this case requires greater discussion so that our decision today does not chill protected speech by attorneys.
As the majority notes, the First Amendment protects public speech critical of the government. “The Constitution unquestionably guarantees the right of citizens to criticize public officials, including judges.” Ante at 613 (citations omitted). The freedom of our citizens to say what they think of public officials is our firmest check on government tyranny. This Court has stated that freedom of speech
fosters the criticism of official conduct that is necessary to make government responsive to citizens. That is why democracies do not punish inaccurate speech. [Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176 at 201 (1982)]
Judges are public officials. As part of the state government, they are subject to public criticism like any other official. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1397, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473, 1499 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). Public debate about courts, and even the performance of specific judges, has long been part of our political and legal system.
Like other citizens, attorneys are entitled to speak freely. This right is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution. Ante at 614-615. See R.M.J., - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 929, 935-38, 71 L.Ed.2d 64, 70-75 (1982); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273, 77 S.Ct. 722, 733, 1 L.Ed.2d 810, 825 (1957). Since attorneys are officers of the courts, they may be constitutionally subject to certain limitations on their speech to protect the fairness of criminal trials, see ante at 615-616. However, when attorneys are not direct participants in the criminal proceedings there is little, if any, justification for imposing greater limits on their speech than those limits that apply to the general public. I believe that the Constitution demands such a result. Lawyers do not possess any inside information about a trial in which they are not participating; *638nor do they speak for any of the parties. The only difference between such attorneys and the general public is that attorneys may know more about trials and the conduct of specific judges. Because of this knowledge, their statements may be more valuable to the public or have a greater impact on public opinion. However,'their expertise does not by itself create an increased danger of prejudice to the fairness of the trial.
Justice Stewart has distinguished between lawyers actively participating in criminal trials and those who are not. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 666, 79 S.Ct. at 1397, 3 L.Ed.2d at 1499 (concurring opinion). He suggested that the Constitution did not permit the same restrictions on attorneys not immediately engaged in the litigation. “Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too has a constitutional freedom of utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice.” Id. I agree with this distinction.
Ordinarily, restrictions on speech are prohibited by the Constitution unless they are limited to speech that creates a “clear and present danger” of harming a compelling state interest unrelated to the suppression of speech. See ante at 618-619; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 33 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941). This standard is the only appropriate one for determining whether this Court may discipline an attorney for statements critical of a criminal trial judge when that attorney is not directly associated with the case. See ante at 633-634. Attorneys cannot be disciplined under DR 1-102(A)(5) for out-of-court statements unless their speech presents a clear and present danger of interfering with the administration of justice or otherwise harming a compelling state interest.
In this case, Hinds called a press conference to state that the trial of Joanne Chesimard was “legalized lynching,” a “travesty,” and a “kangaroo court.” He claimed that the judge lacked “racial sensitivity.” Ante at 610-611. Hinds did not make his statements inside the courtroom. He did not address it to *639any juror or potential witness. His statement had nothing to do with the specific merits of the case. Hinds spoke as Director of the National Conference of Black Lawyers about a case which had national significance. I do not believe that these statements posed a clear and present danger of threatening the fairness of Joanne Chesimard’s trial. There is no question that an ordinary citizen would be absolutely free to make these statements in public. I do not think any lawyer can be forbidden from making such statements if he is not associated with the case.1 This is not the type of conduct that is encompassed by the prohibition against prejudicing the administration of justice. Because these statements did not pose a clear and present danger of prejudicing the administration of justice, Hinds did not violate DR 1-102(AX5).
I recognize, of course, that public criticism of judges might reduce respect for the legal system. This criticism, and the possible loss of respect, may sometimes be undeserved. Yet the Constitution does not permit us to coerce citizens, including attorneys, to silently acquiesce in official acts that they deplore. As we stated in Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, supra:
Sometimes published statements will hurt. Sometimes they will turn out to be untrue. Nevertheless, those regrettable consequences must yield to the need for an informed citizenry. [89 N.J. at 200]
Preventing a potential loss of respect by citizens for our legal institutions is not a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify restrictions on speech. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 270, 62 S.Ct. at 197, 86 L.Ed. at 207. The lawyer’s role as officer of the court is to protect the fairness of trials. While attorneys also have some responsibility for ensuring public confidence in the legal system, the system’s public image cannct be protected at the cost of shielding judges from criticism. As Justice Black stated in Bridges v. California, supra:
*640The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect. [314 U.S. at 270-71, 62 S.Ct. at 197-198, 86 L.Ed. at 207]
It is also possible that criticisms of judges may turn out to be deserved. If this is so, then public criticism will in fact improve, rather than prejudice, the administration of justice. It will remind judges that they are officials of the state and that their actions, like those of other officials, will be reviewed and judged by the citizenry. There is no reason to believe that public statements about the official behavior of judges, even when not accurate, reduce the ability of our legal system to protect rights and do justice. There is every reason to believe that public scrutiny and debate about the conduct of public officials is a necessary element of our system of government. See Shattuck and Byers, “An Egalitarian Interpretation of the First Amendment,” 16 Harv.C.R.—C.L.L.Rev. 377, 379-81 (1981). Unlike authoritarian governments that stifle both participation in politics and public debate, our system of government encourages citizens to speak their minds on issues of public importance. We do not fear criticism of officials. We welcome it and we expect it to be vigorous and forthright. We want active and informed citizens, not timid subjects.
Attorneys are more knowledgeable than other citizens about the official conduct of judges. Preventing attorneys from criticizing judges would go a long way toward insulating judges from public scrutiny. This is not a result that a democracy could tolerate.

The question of Hinds’ possible association with the case presents different problems. However, for the purpose of applying DR 1-102(A)(5), we assume that he is not associated with the case.