Court Opinion

ID: 6553156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-19 22:30:55.302789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:09.700111
License: Public Domain

JOHN E. JENNINGS, Judge, dissenting. I would affirm the trial court’s granting of summary judgment based upon the merger clause. The purported oral agreement between the parties was a general agreement covering the basics of the entire licensing operation. Likewise, the License Agreement is a framework within which the overall licensing operation between appellants and appel-lees is to take place. It contains general terms applicable to any store that becomes part of the store-within-a-store arrangement. It is clearly a master agreement that covers the entire licensing operation between Wal-Mart and Ultracuts, with the details for each individual store to be recited in attached schedules or addenda. The merger clause provides that any prior understandings, arrangements, agreements, statements, or communications, oral or written, with respect to “this agreement” are superseded. I can see no ambiguity here. The parties are businessmen, dealing at arms length. They are bound by the agreement they entered into. Because it is clear to me that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to the appellee on the basis of the merger clause, I would not reach the issues of the alternative bases for summary judgment. I respectfully dissent. Pittman, J., joins in this dissent.