Court Opinion

ID: 9412747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 15:09:52.36181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:13.558335
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-22-00543-CR

                              Victor Antonio MARTINEZ BLANCO,
                                             Appellant

                                                 v.

                                       The STATE of Texas,
                                             Appellee

                    From the 454th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. 19-07-13332-CR
                           Honorable Daniel J. Kindred, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Concurring Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 26, 2023

AFFIRMED

           A jury convicted Victor Antonio Martinez Blanco of evading arrest with a motor vehicle

and the trial court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. In a single issue on appeal,

Martinez Blanco contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

                                           BACKGROUND

           When he was arrested, Martinez Blanco was a resident with legal status in the United

States. The appellate record contains no information about any plea-bargain agreements the State

may have offered Martinez Blanco or advice he may have received from his court-appointed
                                                                                       04-22-00543-CR

counsel before he pled not guilty. On appeal, he claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

properly advise him of the immigration consequences of taking his case to trial.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                          Applicable Law

       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient and he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Counsel’s performance is

deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Ex parte Aguilar, 537 S.W.3d

122, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prejudice exists if an

appellant shows “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id.

       An appellant “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel

was ineffective.” Id. at 813. He must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and “[a]ny allegation of

ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively

demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Id. On direct appeal of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, there is “[a] substantial risk of failure” because “[i]n the majority of instances, the

record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial

counsel.” Id. at 813–14.

       In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel relating to legal advice counsel provided on the immigration consequences

of a criminal conviction. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010). The Court reasoned

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“immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.” Id. at 369. The Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has similarly recognized, “[a]lthough criminal and immigration law

often interact, criminal law attorneys are not necessarily specialists in immigration law.” Ex parte

Aguilar, 537 S.W.3d at 125. The “objective standard of reasonableness” looks different for

criminal defense attorneys when criminal law outcomes result in immigration law consequences,

and that standard changes depending on how clear the immigration consequences are. Padilla, 559

U.S. at 369. If “the law is not succinct and straightforward, . . . a criminal defense attorney need

do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of

adverse immigration consequences.” Id. “But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . .

the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.

                                             Application

       Martinez Blanco contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of

immigration consequences of “taking his case to trial.” On appeal, he claims he would not have

gone to trial and instead would have accepted a plea-bargain agreement if he had been informed

that a conviction would result in his deportation.

       To establish ineffective assistance, Martinez Blanco has to demonstrate that if he had been

properly advised of the immigration consequences of taking his case to trial—and, presumably, a

conviction—he instead would have accepted a plea-bargain agreement that would have allowed

him to remain in the United States. Cf. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. But, as Martinez Blanco concedes

on appeal, “[i]t is unclear from the record what plea offers were made to Appellant prior to his

trial.” The undeveloped record here simply does not demonstrate that the State offered Martinez

Blanco any plea-bargain agreement, much less a plea-bargain agreement that would have allowed

him to avoid deportation. In the absence of such evidence, any conclusion that he would have an

option to avoid deportation would be purely speculative. Cf. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357,

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369–70 (2017) (finding ineffective assistance where record supported defendant’s claim that he

would not have pled guilty had counsel correctly advised him that upon conviction, deportation

was mandatory; defendant was informed on the record at the plea colloquy that his conviction

“could result in your being deported”; answered in the affirmative when asked whether the

deportation consequences “affect your decision about whether you want to plead guilty or not”;

defendant sought advice from counsel; and “counsel assured him that the judge’s statement was a

‘standard warning’”). In these circumstances, we must conclude that he has not overcome the

presumption of effective assistance of counsel. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

                                              CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Martinez Blanco’s sole issue on appeal and affirm

the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

                                                   Beth Watkins, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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