Court Opinion

ID: 9681502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:51:41.269695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.283859
License: Public Domain

REEVES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Some background facts are necessary. After the property had been divided, the parties and their attorneys could not agree on the amount of a fee to be paid the referee. On December 5, 1983, the parties and their attorneys appeared before the trial judge; the referee was also present. Appellants’ attorney requested a hearing as to an appropriate fee to be paid to the referee.
The court refused to conduct a hearing at that time. Appellants’ attorney was shown the referee’s report and a proposed judgment, but did not have an opportunity to study the instruments as the judge required their return upon termination of the conference. On the afternoon of December 10th or 13th1 appellants’ attorney received *284a call notifying him that a hearing would be held for entry of the judgment at 9:30 a.m. on December 15, 1983. Appellants’ attorney unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena the referee.
The hearing was held on December 15th, at which time appellants’ attorney filed a motion for a continuance due to the absence of the referee. The trial judge refused the motion and entered judgment awarding the referee a fee of $13,500.00.
I am of the opinion that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit some type of evidentiary hearing as to the reasonableness of the referee’s fee. I cannot comprehend how the majority can find evidence to support the trial court’s decision as to the reasonableness of the referee’s fee. The “Referee’s Report” was hearsay; it was objected to by appellants’ attorney.
I am well aware that the trial court has broad discretion in setting compensation for the referee and the award will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion apparent from the record. Poston v. Poston, 572 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ); Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495, 502 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In the above two cases, the court awarded fees without a formal hearing. In Poston, the court found some evidence to support the award of the guardian ad litem fees by his actual activities reflected in the record. In Roberson, evidence reflected that the master held numerous hearings, examined many witnesses and held conferences with attorneys and various expert witnesses, all of which was apparent from the record. In contrast, the services performed in this case, for the most part, were performed by the referee outside the presence of the court.
At every trial, our judicial system as well as the controversy between the parties is on trial and the trial court should be constantly aware of such scrutiny. While it is true a trial court labors under a heavy docket, the litigant whose cause is under the court’s consideration demands and deserves the full panoply due all who turn to the legal system.
The appellant should have had the opportunity to examine the referee as to what he had done to earn the fee appellant was obligated to pay. The hearing could have been abbreviated, but it should have taken place.
I would reverse and remand for a hearing on the referee’s fee.

. The narration of the facts in this dissent is from the affidavits attached to appellants' Motion for Partial New Trial. The affidavit of B. Frank Pennypacker, appellants’ attorney’s law *284partner states the trial judge contacted Mr. Stewart on December 10th while appellants’ attorney, James D. Stewart’s statement states the trial judge telephoned him on December 13th.