Court Opinion

ID: 9648365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:16:21.252288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:59.185427
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority in its affirmance of defendant’s conviction (sentence 15 years) for robbery in the first degree on Count I. However, I cannot concur in the reversal of the armed criminal action conviction, under Count II (sentence 15 years) because that reversal stems from the majority’s adamant refusal to follow the controlling law, most recently announced by the United States Supreme Court in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). The case at bar is but another of those in which Missouri juries have, in single trials on separate counts convicted defendants of robberies (or other *52statutory crimes), and on armed criminal action charges under § 559.225, RSMo Supp. 1976 (now § 571.015, RSMo 1978).
This court mistakenly holds the double jeopardy proscription of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires reversal of the armed criminal action convictions in those cases. The majority launched this course in Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.banc January 15, 1980) (Sours I), and anchored its position in Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo.banc August 8, 1980) (Sours II). The three districts of our Court of Appeals have been confronted by a surprisingly large number of such cases, and bound by this court’s “Sours” decision, have reversed the armed criminal action convictions. As noted in the margin below,1 between March 23 and June 22 of this year, the United States Supreme Court vacated judgments of reversal in 16 such cases, and in each instance remanded the cause “for further consideration in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981).” In addition, the Court accept*53ed for review three of our cases 2 in which armed criminal action convictions were set aside under the “Sours” notion of double jeopardy, and on May 26, 1981, directed they too be reconsidered in the light of Albernaz. The referenced cases remanded to our appellate courts were subsequently transferred here at our order, and though the mandates are directed to the respective appellate courts, they become the sine qua non to our actions thereon, as well as in the cases here on direct remand.
Haggard, the cause now before us on original appeal, assumes the stance on the substantive issue as those in which our judgments have been vacated and hence, requires our application of the law under Albernaz. The essence of Albernaz, quite simply, is that the Legislature may authorize multiple punishments, and if so, imposition of such sentences is not violative of the double jeopardy provisions of the federal Constitution. The question is one of legislative intent, and because the majority concedes the Missouri Legislature intended to impose punishment for both crimes here involved, i. e., robbery and armed criminal action, the analysis should end and convictions on both counts be affirmed. However, the majority refuses to accept the clearly stated directive of the United States Supreme Court.
Our Legislature has provided for multiple punishment upon conviction of armed criminal action under § 559.225, RSMo Supp. 1976, and robbery in the first degree with a dangerous and deadly weapon, §§ 560.120, RSMo 1969, and 560.135, RSMo Supp.1975, though commission of these crimes occur in the same transaction. In so doing, the Legislature has meticulously defined the crimes and prescribed the punishments, making clear its intent (as conceded by the majority) to convict and punish, within prescribed ranges, for each act. However, on January 15,1980, in Sours I, a majority of this court, overturning our earlier decision in State v. Treadway, 558 S.W.2d 646 (Mo.banc 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838, 99 S.Ct. 124, 58 L.Ed.2d 135 (1978), and, invoking federal double jeopardy doctrine, declared impermissible the convictions for robbery and armed criminal action obtained in a single trial.3
*54While Sours I was under consideration for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court decided Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), and addressing the “double punishment” issue, emphasized that “[t]he dispositive question, therefore, is whether Congress did so provide”, id. at 689, 100 S.Ct. at 1436; i. e., did the Legislature intend to prescribe multiple punishment for the crimes charged; if so, the convictions may stand. As discussed in my dissent in Sours II:
The double punishment doctrine does not constitute a substantive limitation on the legislature’s power to define and punish crimes. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. [684] 695-696, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1440, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, 726 (1980) (concurring opinion of White, J.); 445 U.S. 696-699, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1440, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, 726 (concurring opinion of Blackmun, J.) Westen and Drubel, Towards A General Theory of Double Jeopardy, Sup.Ct. Rev. 81, 112-115 (1978). See also Note “Twice in Jeopardy” 75 Yale L.J. 262, 311-313 (1965). The Court in Whalen addressed the multiple punishment issue in terms of whether the judicial action had exceeded the legislative authorization. After a discussion of Lange, which as noted above can best be described as a legislative authorization case, the Court held, ‘[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause at the very least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies in this respect simply one aspect of the basic principal that within our federal constitutional framework the legislative power, including the power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress.’ Whalen, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, 722 (1980).
Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 607 at 609 (Mo.banc 1980).
Shrugging off the teaching of Whalen and the Court’s mandate that our case be reconsidered in light of that decision, the majority, on August 18, 1980, in Sours II, reiterated its position, declaring that although the Missouri Legislature intended punishment for both crimes, it could not constitutionally so authorize, and convictions under both statutes constituted double jeopardy. Dissatisfied with this expression of indifference toward the holding of Whalen, the State again petitioned for certiorari, and during pendency of that proceeding, William Scott Sours was, on September 25, 1980, released from the Missouri State Penitentiary. This fact was relayed to the Court by brief of Sours’ counsel4 opposing issuance of the writ, and on January 26, 1981, the petition for certiorari in Missouri v. Sours (from Sours II) was denied, with the statement that “Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist would dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari as moot.” Missouri v. Sours, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 953, 67 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981).
Less than two months later, on March 9, Justice Rehnquist delivering the opinion, the Court decided Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which had upheld petitioner’s convic*55tions and sentences and denied his claim of double jeopardy. The Court, by way of introduction to its incisive pellucid opinion, noted:
We granted certiorari to consider whether Congress intended consecutive sentences to be imposed for the violation of these two conspiracy statutes and, if so, whether such cumulative punishment violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
450 U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1140.
By its decision the Court, in its concluding paragraphs, removed any question as to its views on the matter, stating:
Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishment, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.
450 U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1145.
Immediately after this pronouncement, the Court commenced a succession of orders to Missouri’s appellate courts beginning March 23rd, vacating judgments which had reversed armed criminal action convictions when accompanied with convictions of other crimes, and mandating further consideration in the light of Albernaz.
On May 12, 1981, the Supreme Court of Delaware, acting responsibly, followed the mandate of the Court under Albernaz in a case involving imposition of multiple sentences for (1) first-degree assault, 11 Del.C. § 613(1), and (2) possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, 11 Del.C. § 1447. Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476 (Del.1981). (Hunter III). The Delaware court had vacated the multiple sentences in Hunter v. State, 420 A.2d 119 (Del.1980) (Hunter I), and had reaffirmed its position in light of Whalen, upon motion for reargument and clarification, in Hunter v. State, 420 A.2d 119, 127 (Del.1980) (No. 215, 1978, decided June 24, 1980) (Hunter II). As in the similar Missouri cases, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-tiorari, vacated the judgment and ordered the Delaware court to reconsider in the light of Albernaz. Delaware v. Hunter, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1689, 68 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981). On May 12, 1981, the Delaware court responded with Hunter III, recognizing the clear import of Albernaz which it described as
the emergence of the evolving rule stands unmistakably clear by virtue of the vote of 6 to 3, cast in the face of the flat contradiction of the concurring Justices, including the author of Whalen.
Applying the rule of Albernaz to the instant case, we now hold that where the General Assembly intended, as we have found that it did in § 613(1) and § 1447, to impose multiple punishments for two offenses not satisfying the Bloekburger test, imposition of two consecutive sentences by a court as a result of a single criminal trial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(Footnote omitted). 430 A.2d at 481.
In sum, the Delaware court, recognizing “the rule of supremacy”, correctly read and properly followed the “evolving rule” enunciated by the Court in Albernaz. It strains credulity how the majority here can do otherwise.
It serves little purpose to casually dismiss Albernaz as the majority has done with its unjustified characterization of the Delaware court’s so-called “frustration”. Under the Rule of Federal Supremacy, we are not permitted such cavalier evasion of the principles of Whalen and the mandate of Alber-naz.
In a manner reminiscent of Quixana’s Don Quixote de la Mancha’s search for giants that became a comic tilt with windmills, the majority vainly seeks authority to justify its action by suggesting that the denial of certiorari in Sours II somehow condones its reversal of the armed criminal action conviction in contravention of the mandate of Albernaz. This language appears in the majority opinion:
*56On January 26, 1981, the United States Supreme Court entered its order denying the petition of the state for certiorari in Sours II. Following the same reasoning expressed by the Hunter court, a large majority of the Court tacitly, if not in fact, sustained our position as stated in Sours II. Only Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist noted that they ‘would dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari as moot.’ - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 953, 67 L.Ed.2d at 118. (Emphasis added).
I submit it is pure conjecture to state that denial of certiorari in Sours II constitutes a manifestation of “the same reasoning expressed by the Hunter court,” or that “a large majority of the Court tacitly, if not in fact, sustained our position as stated in Sours II.” If the Court had intended the denial of certiorari attain the level of authority set by the majority here, it would not have vacated the judgments rendered in 16 of our Court of Appeals’ decisions and in 3 of this court’s decisions all bottomed on Sours, and in each instance, mandated reconsideration in the light of Albernaz. The Court did not order us to reexamine these cases “in light of its denial of the petition for certiorari in Sours IT’, and yet, such is the attenuated position of the majority. Indeed, if the significance of denial of cer-tiorari in Sours were as the majority describes, the 19 referenced judgments vacated and remanded to Missouri courts would not have been reviewed; instead, those petitions too would have been summarily denied.
Further, the majority ignores the long established rule that denial of review on certiorari neither imports a decision on the merits of the opinion below, nor forecloses subsequent consideration of the issues determined therein. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443, 93 S.Ct. 631, 636, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n. 1, 93 S.Ct. 647, 650, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 689 n.5, 84 S.Ct. 984, 988, 12 L.Ed.2d 23 (1964). As stated in Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 71 S.Ct. 9, 95 L.Ed. 619 (1950), “denial of the petition seeking to bring here [on certiorari] the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania carries with it no support of the decision in that case, nor of any of the views in the opinion supporting it.” Id. at 845, 71 S.Ct. at 9. Hence, the majority’s reliance on the denial of the petition for certiorari, for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court gave its blessing to this court’s constitutional interpretation in Sours I and II, seems quite unjustified.
Finally, we have reached the point where this court must honor the “rule of supremacy” and gracefully accept the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the organic law embodied in the Constitution of the United States. By refusing so to do, the majority would burden our Legislature with its view of so-called federal constitutional restraints contrary to those enunciated by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975), the Court stated, “a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.” [emphasis in original] Id. at 719, 95 S.Ct. at 1219. The Oregon court’s belief that it could “interpret the Fourth Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by the United States Supreme Court” was held “unsupported by any cited authority, is not the law and surely must be an inadvertent error; in any event, we reject it.” Id. at 719, n. 4, 95 S.Ct. at 1219. This rule of supremacy was again asserted in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), where, in discussing a criminal accused’s rights to counsel and to remain silent, the Court held that by creating an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver by the accused of such rights could ever suffice, the North Carolina Supreme Court had “gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law. It follows that its judgment cannot stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 376, 99 S.Ct. at 1759. *57We too are required to abide the Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution, and may not burden our Legislature with federal constitutional notions contrary to the Court’s mandate. Our duty is clear, yet the majority has avoided it, stating:
Until such time as the Supreme Court of the United States declares clearly and unequivocally that the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the legislative branch of government, we cannot . . . enforce multiple punishments for same offense arising out of a single transaction.
Neither the Oregon court in Hass nor the North Carolina court in Butler were permitted to journey such an imperious path of nonconformance.
For these reasons, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing defendant’s conviction for armed criminal action.

. To the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, the United States Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Counselman,-U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 1690, 68 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981), vacated and remanded “for further consideration in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981),” the following decisions rendered by that district: (1) State v. White, 610 S.W.2d 646 (Mo.App. 1980), affirming conviction of first degree robbery, but reversing armed criminal action judgment; (2) State v. Williams, 610 S.W.2d 644 (Mo.App. 1980), affirming judgments of assault with intent to rape with malice aforethought (together with carrying a concealed weapon), but reversing on armed criminal action; (3) State v. Payne, 607 S.W.2d 822 (Mo.App. 1980), affirming on first degree robbery and reversing on armed criminal action; (4) State v. Counselman, 603 S.W.2d 3 (Mo.App. 1980), again affirming the first degree robbery conviction and setting aside the armed criminal action conviction; and, (5) State v. McGee, 602 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. App.1980), reversing and remanding the conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm without malice, as well as vacating the armed criminal action conviction. These causes were transferred for disposition in this court on June 2, 1981. Additionally, (6) State v. Lowery, 608 S.W.2d 445 (Mo.App. 1980), affirming the first degree robbery conviction but reversing on armed criminal action, was vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, with the above-quoted instruction. Missouri v. Lowery, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 3044, 69 L.Ed.2d 415 (1981). On June 22, 1981, the cause was transferred to be determined here. The Court’s latest pronouncement occurred in Missouri v. Crews, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 3103, 69 L.Ed.2d 968 (1981), where the Court vacated and remanded to the Eastern District four additional cases with instructions to reexamine in the light of Albernaz: (7) State v. Crews, 607 S.W.2d 759 (Mo.App. 1980), affirming robbery and kidnapping convictions and reversing on armed criminal action; (8) State v. Crews, 607 S.W.2d 729 (Mo.App. 1980), again affirming first degree robbery and kidnapping judgments, but reversing the armed criminal action conviction; (9) State v. Helton, 607 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.App.1980), affirming the first degree robbery conviction, yet reversing the armed criminal action judgment; and, (10) State v. Tunstall, 607 S.W.2d 809 (Mo.App.1980), affirming the pronouncement of guilt of attempted first degree robbery, but reversing the armed criminal action conviction. These causes were transferred on July 9, 1981, for disposition in this court.
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeals, Western District, five cases, “for further consideration in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981).” Missouri v. Brown, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981). The overturned decisions, transferred here on June 11, 1981, include: (11) State v. Martin, 610 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.1980), affirming on first degree robbery and reversing on armed criminal action; (12) State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.App.1980), affirming kidnapping, as well as rape and sodomy convictions, but reversing the armed criminal action convictions; (13) State v. Hawkins, 608 S.W.2d 496 (Mo.App.1980), affirming armed robbery judgment, but reversing on armed criminal action; (14) Brown v. State, 607 S.W.2d 801 (Mo.App.1980), upholding, on a motion for postconviction relief, the first degree robbery conviction, while vacating the armed criminal action conviction; and (15) State v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.App.1980), again affirming on first degree robbery, but reversing armed criminal action conviction.
In Missouri v. Sinclair, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 3044, 69 L.Ed.2d 415 (1981), the Court vacated, remanding to the Court of Appeals, Southern District, “for further consideration in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 68 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981),” (16) State v. Sinclair, 606 S.W.2d 271 (Mo.App.1980), reversing an armed criminal action conviction, while affirming the second degree assault conviction. The cause was transferred on July 9, 1981, to this court for disposition.

. The United States Supreme Court issued its mandate to this court to reconsider three cases “in light of Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981).” Missouri v. Greer, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 3000, 69 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981). The vacated cases were: (1) State v. Williams, 606 S.W.2d 777 (Mo.1980) (Div. 1), affirming first degree robbery convictions and reversing on armed criminal action; (2) State v. Kendrick, 606 S.W.2d 643 (Mo.1980) (Div. 2), again affirming on robbery first degree, but vacating the armed criminal action convictions; and, (3) State v. Greer, 605 S.W.2d 93 (Mo.1980) (Div. 2), affirming the second degree murder conviction, but setting aside the armed criminal action judgment.
In addition to these cases on which the Supreme Court has taken action, there is pending in the Court a petition for certiorari filed by the State (bringing the total number of such petitions to 20) in response to a writ of habeas corpus issued by this court releasing Willie Williams. (See, Order of June 15, 1981, entered in Williams v. Wyrick, No. 62879.) This court also issued opinions in three cases today reversing armed criminal action, relying on Sours and Haggard: (1) State v. Fletcher, 619 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.banc 1981), affirming kidnapping, rape and robbery convictions, but vacating a life sentence for armed criminal action; (2) State v. Gaskin, 618 S.W.2d 620 (Mo.1981), affirming a verdict of first degree robbery (together with assault with intent to kill with malice aforethought) and reversing the armed criminal action conviction; and (3) State v. Pennington, 618 S.W.2d 614 (1981), affirming a robbery first degree conviction, but reversing a guilty verdict of armed criminal action. Past reversals and vacations of sentences not challenged by petition for certiorari number approximately 40, including another inmate released by writ of habeas corpus. (It should be noted that permitting successful challenge by habeas corpus thwarts the mandate of Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.banc 1976), that Rule 27.26 provide the exclusive method by which to attack the validity of a conviction.) These figures, of course, merely represent the tip of the iceberg. They only begin to reflect the total number of criminal cases affected by Sours, for they do not include prosecutions for crimes involving a weapon in which armed criminal action was not charged or convictions of armed criminal action set aside by the trial court, all occurring after Sours I, January 15, 1980.

. It is of great interest that no statement of rationale was offered to explain how the majority selected the armed criminal action, vis a vis, *54the robbery conviction for reversal. One must ask, what theory of double jeopardy authorizes that result. This question, raised in my dissent in Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 607 l.c. 610 (Mo.banc 1980) (Sours II), went unanswered by the majority there. Again, in the case sub judice a similar ad hoc choice is made by the majority without citation of authority or explication of rationale. This is but another of the flaws inherent in the majority’s position, and made particularly apparent by today’s decision in State v. Fletcher, 619 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.banc 1981), where the majority vacated a life sentence for armed criminal action, and upheld 15 year sentences for rape and kidnapping and a 30 year sentence for robbery. The State might well have preferred vacation of one of the lesser sentences, yet the majority, with its apparent distaste for armed criminal action, makes this choice for the State.

. A perusal of the brief reveals that mootness resulting from Sours’ September release was a principal ground urged for denial of the State’s petition.