Court Opinion

ID: 9495289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:58:39.136419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:55.165482
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Only one legal question is at issue here: whether, as set forth in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge to the scheduling of his parole hearing. I conclude that the writ of habeas corpus does not provide the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge and, for that reason, he may bring a § 1983 action.
The writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for challenges that necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (D.C.Cir.1998); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997). Here, petitioner appeals only the scheduling of his release hearing. Neither outcome of that decision' — -rescheduling the hearing or *667not rescheduling the hearing — necessarily implies the invalidity of petitioner’s continued confinement. Thus, because petitioner does not challenge a release decision, the writ of habeas corpus is not petitioner’s exclusive remedy and he may challenge it through a § 1983 action. For this reason, I concur in reversing the district court’s dismissal.