Court Opinion

ID: 9959107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 17:01:23.578434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.911568
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14206     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2024   Page: 1 of 22

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-14206
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        ROOBINA ZADOORIAN,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        GWINNETT TECHNICAL COLLEGE,
        KIMBERLY STRONG,
        Director of Sonography Program,
        JIM SASS,
        Dean of Health Imaging & Informatics,
        REBECCA ALEXANDER,
        VP of Academic Aﬀairs,
        DEREK DABROWIAK,
        Executive Director, Student Aﬀairs - TCSG, et al.,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-14206

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00922-LMM
                            ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Roobina Zadoorian appeals the district court’s order dis-
        missing her Title VI discrimination lawsuit against Gwinnett Tech-
        nical College (“GTC”), the Technical College System of Georgia
        (“TCSG”), and a number of school administrators and staff (collec-
        tively with GTC and TCSG, the “State Defendants”). She also ap-
        peals the district court’s dismissal of her Administrative Procedures
        Act (“APA”) claim against the U.S. Department of Education’s Of-
        fice of Civil Rights (“OCR”).
               She argues that the district court erroneously dismissed her
        Title VI claims of intentional discrimination and retaliation against
        the State Defendants as time-barred because it incorrectly: (1) de-
        termined that her limitations period began before she alleges that
        she was aware of a similarly situated comparator; (2) failed to toll
        the limitations period due to State Defendants’ fraud; and (3) relied
        on Georgia’s two-year limitations period for personal injury claims,
        rather than the six-year period for contract claims.
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        22-14206                 Opinion of the Court                                3

               Next, she argues that the district court erroneously dis-
        missed her APA claim against OCR due to sovereign immunity be-
        cause: (1) she had no adequate alternative remedy beyond an APA
        suit, because her OCR complaint related to disparate impact and
        not intentional discrimination; and (2) OCR failed to properly in-
        vestigate her complaint pursuant to its own regulations.
               We write only for the parties who are already familiar with
        the facts. Accordingly, we include only such facts as are necessary
        to understand our opinion.
                                     I. DISCUSSION
        A. With respect to the State Defendants, did the district court err in its
        application of the statute of limitations?
               “[W]e review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
        application of the statute of limitations.” United States v. Frediani,
        790 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). “A
        finding that equitable modification does not apply is subject to de
        novo review; however, this [C]ourt is bound by the district court’s
        factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Sturniolo v.
        Sheaffer, Eaton, Inc., 15 F.3d 1023, 1024 (11th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs
        may “plead [themselves] out of court” by alleging facts inconsistent
        with the timeliness of their complaint. See Villareal v. R.J. Reynolds
        Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
               Issues not raised in an initial brief are forfeited and generally
        deemed abandoned. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-72
        (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), petition for cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
        “[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right;
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14206

        waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
        known right.” Id. at 872 (quotation marks omitted). “Waiver di-
        rectly implicates the power of the parties to control the course of
        the litigation; if a party affirmatively and intentionally relinquishes
        an issue, then courts must respect that decision.” Id.
                Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
        the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from par-
        ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
        nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
        assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Claims under Title VI are appropri-
        ately subjected to constitutional analysis. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
        Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286-87 (1978); accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
        U.S. 306, 343 (2003). Further, standards that govern claims under
        Title VII are instructive in Title VI cases. Ga. State Conf. of Branches
        of NAACP v. State of Ga., 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
                “Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional
        discrimination.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001)
        (quotation marks omitted, alterations adopted). “A plaintiff may
        prove a claim of intentional discrimination through direct evi-
        dence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof.” Rioux
        v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
               We have consistently applied iterations of the McDonnell
        Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate claims of inten-
        tional discrimination and retaliation that rely on circumstantial ev-
        idence and done so even when such claims arise in contexts other
        than employment. See Johnson v. Miami-Dade, 948 F.3d 1318, 1325
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        22-14206                Opinion of the Court                           5

        (11th Cir. 2020) (applying the framework to Title VII claims of un-
        lawful employment discrimination and retaliation); see also Alvarez
        v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying
        on the framework for a Title VII discrimination claim based on cir-
        cumstantial evidence); Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417 (apply-
        ing the framework to a Title VI disparate impact claim raised in an
        educational context).
               “[A] Title VII plaintiff proceeding under McDonnell Douglas
        must prove, as a preliminary matter, not only that she is a member
        of a protected class, that she suffered an adverse . . . action, and that
        she was qualified for the [benefit] in question, but also that she was
        treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals outside her
        class.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir.
        2019) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
               “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
        show: (1) that [s]he engaged in statutorily protected expression;
        (2) that [s]he suffered an adverse . . . action; and (3) that there is
        some causal relationship between the two events.” Johnson, 948
        F.3d at 1325 (quotation marks omitted) (employment context).
               Although the McDonnell Douglas framework is regularly em-
        ployed in discrimination cases, we have also explained that, to sur-
        vive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging discrimination “need
        not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas
        prima facie case.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239,
        1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted) (citing
        Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). “This is because
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14206

        McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary
        standard, not a pleading requirement.” Id.
                Under this Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior
        panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
        it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
        preme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v.
        Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). To constitute “over-
        ruling” under this rule, the intervening “Supreme Court decision
        must be clearly on point” and “actually abrogate or directly conflict
        with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.”
        United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               In Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City of New York, the
        Supreme Court noted that Title VI’s “legislative history clearly
        shows that Congress intended Title VI to be a typical ‘contractual’
        spending power provision.” 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983). Thus, the
        Court reasoned “that compensatory relief, or other relief based on
        past violations of the conditions attached to the use of federal
        funds, is not available as a private remedy for Title VI violations
        not involving intentional discrimination.” Id. at 602-03.
                In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court “applied [a] con-
        tract-law analogy . . . [to] defin[e] the scope of conduct for which
        [federal] funding recipients may be held liable for money dam-
        ages.” 536 U.S. 181. 186-89 (2002). Because “punitive damages,
        unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are generally not
        available for breach of contract,” the Court held that “punitive
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        22-14206                Opinion of the Court                            7

        damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title
        VI.” Id. at 187-89.
               We have held that Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations
        for personal injury claims applies to claims under Title VI. Rozar v.
        Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 560-61 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing O.C.G.A.
        § 9-3-33). We reasoned that claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
        1981 are subject to states’ personal injury limitations periods, and
        thus, “[c]haracterizing section 2000d claims as personal injury ac-
        tions for limitations purposes promotes a consistent and uniform
        framework by which suitable statutes of limitations can be deter-
        mined for civil rights claims, and serves Congress’ objectives by
        avoiding uncertainty and creating an effective remedy for the en-
        forcement of federal civil rights.” Id. at 561 (quotation marks omit-
        ted, alterations adopted). By contrast, “[w]ritten contract claims
        have a six-year statute of limitations under Georgia law.” Anthony
        v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 626 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
        O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24).
               The Georgia Supreme Court issued emergency orders in the
        wake of COVID-19 which tolled limitations periods for all civil
        claims during a 122-day period between March 14, 2020, and July
        14, 2020. Ga. Sup. Ct. Orders of March 14, 2020, and June 12, 2020. 1

               1 See Court Information Regarding The Coronavirus, SUPREME COURT OF

        GEORGIA,            https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/court_co-
        rona_info (last visited March 1, 2024).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14206

                Equitable modification generally applies when a plaintiff al-
        leges that a defendant was actively misleading as to the reasoning
        behind the adverse action taken against the plaintiff. See Villarreal,
        839 F.3d at 972. Where a plaintiff does not allege that the defendant
        was actively misleading, “[t]he general test for equitable tolling”
        applies, which “requires the party seeking tolling to prove (1) that
        he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some ex-
        traordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely fil-
        ing.” Id. at 971-72 (quotation marks omitted); see also Cocke v. Mer-
        rill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Equitable
        tolling is a type of equitable modification, which often focuses on
        the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on
        the lack of prejudice to the defendant.” (quotation marks omitted,
        alteration adopted)).
                “Under equitable modification, a limitations period does not
        start to run until the facts which would support a charge of discrim-
        ination are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a rea-
        sonably prudent regard for his rights.” Sturniolo, 15 F.3d at 1025
        (citing Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th
        Cir. 1975)); accord Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561-62; Villarreal, 839 F.3d at
        971-72. “Plaintiffs must know or have reason to know that they
        were injured, and must be aware or should be aware of who in-
        flicted the injury.” Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562. In practice, “[t]his rule
        requires a court first to identify the alleged injuries, and then to
        determine when plaintiffs could have sued for them.” Id.
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                          9

               “It is not necessary for a plaintiff to know all the facts that
        support [her] claim in order to file a claim.” Sturniolo, 15 F.3d at
        1025. For example, a plaintiff in an age-based employment discrim-
        ination case “who is aware that he is being replaced in a position
        he believes he is able to handle by a person outside the protected
        age group knows enough to support filing a claim.” Id. (alterations
        adopted).
                “A corollary of [equitable modification], often found in cases
        where wrongful concealment of facts is alleged, is that a party re-
        sponsible for such wrongful concealment is estopped from assert-
        ing the statute of limitations as a defense.” Reeb, 516 F.2d at 930.
        This principle is evident in the Georgia statutes, which tolls the in-
        itiation of limitations periods until the plaintiff discovers a defend-
        ant’s fraud in cases where such fraud deterred the plaintiff from
        bringing an action. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96.
                In Sturniolo, we reversed and remanded a district court’s or-
        der granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the
        basis that Sturniolo’s age-based employment discrimination claim
        was time-barred. 15 F.3d at 1024, 1026. We reasoned that it was
        improper for the district court to initiate the limitations period on
        the date of Sturniolo’s firing because, at the time, Sturniolo be-
        lieved that his employer had legitimate, business-related reasons
        for firing him, and he did not learn that his employer had replaced
        him with a younger individual “until several months after his dis-
        charge.” Id. at 1025-26. We explained that “[t]he date when Stur-
        niolo knew or should have known that [his employer] had hired a
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                         22-14206

        younger individual to replace him is the date upon which the toll-
        ing period should commence.” Id. at 1026.
                In Reeb, our predecessor circuit reversed and remanded a dis-
        trict court’s order dismissing Reeb’s employment discrimination
        claim for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that her complaint before
        the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was untimely. 2
        516 F.2d at 925, 931. The Court highlighted that Reeb alleged that
        her employer actively sought to mislead her as to its reasons for
        firing her and that she believed her employer’s proffered reasoning
        for some six months. Id. at 930. When Reeb learned that she had
        been replaced by an allegedly less qualified male, “she immediately
        filed charges” that very same week. Id. at 926. The Court vacated
        and remanded the district court’s judgment, noting that the district
        court “did not make any findings with respect to the allegations
        that [Reeb’s employer] misled [her] or attempted to conceal the al-
        leged discrimination . . . , nor did it make findings with respect to
        when a person similarly situated with a prudent regard for his
        rights would have discovered the discrimination in the absence of
        misleading statements or concealment” by the employer. Id. at
        931.
               As an initial matter, we address only Zadoorian’s intentional
        discrimination and retaliation claims raised in Counts 1 and 4 of her

                2 Here, unlike Reeb, Plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative reme-

        dies prior to filing suits under Title VI. Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921
        F.2d 1190, 1200 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991).
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                       11

        complaint before the district court, as she expressly waived any
        challenge to her Title VI claims alleged in Counts 2, 3, and 5.
               Here, the district court did not err in ﬁnding that Za-
        doorian’s claims of intentional discrimination and retaliation under
        Title VI were time-barred. First, the district court appropriately
        applied Georgia’s two-year personal injury limitations period to
        Zadoorian’s Title VI claims, pursuant to this Court’s holding in
        Rozar. 85 F.3d at 560-61; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Rozar remains good
        law because both Barnes and Guardians related to what remedies
        are available to Title VI plaintiﬀs and did not address what statute
        of limitations applies to such claims. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186-89;
        Guardians, 463 U.S. at 599, 602-03. Thus, neither case constitutes
        an intervening Supreme Court decision that is clearly on point or
        directly in conﬂict with Rozar such that this Court may decline to
        apply that case. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352; Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1255.
               Second, the district court did not err in determining that the
        limitations period for Zadoorian’s Title VI claims began running by
        July 11, 2017, because Zadoorian had reason to believe that GTC
        had subjected her to intentional discrimination and retaliation by
        this date. This determination is supported by Zadoorian’s July 12,
        2017, email to TCSG’s executive director, Dabrowiak. In that mes-
        sage, the following statements by Zadoorian show that she had the
        requisite knowledge to initiate the limitations period by that time:
        (1) that she had been discriminated against in the Program’s admis-
        sions process; (2) that the process had been subject to “manipula-
        tion” by Director Strong in order to aid “white Americans;” and
        (3) that her interaction with Dean Sass “show[ed] his hostile inten-
        tion and discrimination towards [her].” Further, Zadoorian had
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                     22-14206

        received the ﬁnal selection criteria—that she alleges was altered af-
        ter applications had been submitted in order to intentionally dis-
        criminate against her—approximately one month before she sent
        her email to Dabrowiak.
               Therefore, because she knew of her alleged injury and who
        caused it, she could have sued for intentional discrimination based
        on these facts, and the district court did not err in determining that
        the limitations period for Zadoorian’s intentional discrimination
        claim began running when she had her interaction with Dean Sass
        on July 11, 2017. See Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562. 3
               Similarly, the district court did not err in determining that
        the limitations period for Zadoorian’s retaliation claim had begun
        running by this same date. Sass’s allegedly retaliatory conduct took
        place on July 11, 2017, when he explicitly linked his demand for Za-
        doorian to leave the college to her complaint. 4 The very next day,
        she labeled this interaction as “[r]etaliation” in a complaint ﬁled
        with OCR. Because she was aware that Sass had caused her alleged
        injury of retaliation immediately after the interaction occurred, she

               3   Thus, the district court properly held that Zadoorian’s limitations
        period expired on July 11, 2019, more than two and one-half years before she
        filed suit on March 4, 2022. The limitations period also expired before the
        Georgia Supreme Court issued its emergency order tolling the 122 days be-
        tween March 14, 2020, and July 14, 2020.
               4 Although it not clear whether Sass was aware that Zadoorian had

        complained of discrimination to GTC staff or to OCR, Zadoorian told Sass on
        June 14, 20217, that she had a complaint and set up an appointment with Sass
        for the next day to talk about it.
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                         13

        could have sued on July 11, 2017, and thus, the district court did not
        err in determining that her limitations period began running by this
        date. Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562.
                There is no merit in Zadoorian’s argument that the limita-
        tions period did not begin running until November 19, 2019 (when
        she asserts she ﬁrst learned of a similarly situated comparator).
        First, as to her retaliation claim, a plaintiﬀ need not identify a com-
        parator to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation. See Johnson,
        948 F.3d at 1325. Thus—even accepting as true Zadoorian’s erro-
        neous assertion that a limitations period does not initiate until the
        plaintiﬀ is aware of all facts necessary to establish a prima facie
        claim—the date she performed her calculations and became aware
        of a comparator would not be dispositive of the initiation of the
        limitations period for her retaliation claim.
                Next, as to Zadoorian’s claim of intentional discrimination,
        it was not necessary for Zadoorian to be able to identify a discrete
        comparator to initiate this claim’s limitations period. A complaint
        alleging discrimination “need not allege facts suﬃcient to make out
        a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case” in order to survive the
        motion to dismiss stage. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; see also Sturniolo,
        15 F.3d at 1025 (“It is not necessary for a plaintiﬀ to know all the
        facts that support his claim in order to ﬁle a claim.”). In evaluating
        when a limitations period began to run, courts look to whether a
        plaintiﬀ could have sued for the alleged injury. Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562.
        As described above, the allegations from Zadoorian’s July 12, 2017,
        email to Dabrowiak, as well as the portion of her OCR complaint
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                       22-14206

        labeled “[r]etaliation,” “plausibly suggest that [Zadoorian] suﬀered
        an adverse . . . action due to intentional . . . discrimination,” and
        thus, she could have sued for intentional discrimination immedi-
        ately after her July 11, 2017, interaction with Sass such that her lim-
        itations period began running on this date. Surtain, 789 F.3d at
        1246.
                Even if identiﬁcation of a comparator were necessary to in-
        itiate the limitations period—i.e. even if the comparator infor-
        mation from OCR’s September 30, 2019, letter were necessary for
        Zadoorian to learn of the requisite facts to initiate the limitations
        period 5 —her ﬁlings before the district court concede that she re-
        ceived this letter on October 4, 2019. Zadoorian fails to explain
        why “a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights”
        could not have performed the necessary calculations that same
        month. See Sturniolo, 15 F.3d at 1025. Thus, even if the information
        from OCR’s September 30, 2019, letter were necessary for Za-
        doorian to learn of a comparator, and thus, to ﬁle a lawsuit, the
        limitations period would have initiated on October 4, 2019, when

               5 Zadoorian does not clearly explain why the OCR’s letter dated Sep-

        tember 30, 2019, was necessary for her to identify a similarly situated compar-
        ator. Zadoorian already had access to the final selection criteria and believed
        that the criteria had been manipulated so that less-qualified applicants outside
        of her protected group could be admitted to the program instead of her. Thus,
        even if awareness of a comparator were necessary to initiate the limitations
        period, Zadoorian likely could had identified the comparator as “the low-
        est-scoring applicant outside of her protected group” after she received the
        final selection criteria and could have provided additional detail as necessary
        following discovery.
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                        15

        she received the letter and when a reasonably prudent person con-
        cerned for their rights would have performed the necessary calcu-
        lations. See id.; accord Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561-62. Even accounting for
        the 122-day pause in limitations periods pursuant to emergency or-
        ders from Georgia Supreme Court, Zadoorian had until February
        2, 2022, such that her March 4, 2022, complaint was not timely. Ga.
        Sup. Ct. Orders of March 14, 2020, and June 12, 2020; Rozar, 85 F.3d
        at 560-61; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.
                Zadoorian’s reliance on Sturniolo is misplaced. For the rea-
        sons stated supra, it was not necessary for Zadoorian to be aware
        of a speciﬁc comparator in order for the limitations period to begin
        running. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246. In any event, in Sturniolo, this
        Court explained that a plaintiﬀ in an age-based employment dis-
        crimination case “who is aware that he is being replaced in a posi-
        tion he believes he is able to handle by a person outside the pro-
        tected age group knows” the necessary facts to initiate the limita-
        tions period. 15 F.3d at 1025 (alterations adopted). Here, Za-
        doorian’s June 19, 2017, email to Alexander, and July 12, 2017, email
        to Dabrowiak, demonstrate that Zadoorian was aware of facts that
        would support her claims following her July 11, 2017, interaction
        with Sass. For example, just days after she was rejected from the
        Program, Zadoorian emailed Alexander stating that she was re-
        jected, despite her higher qualiﬁcations, so that less-qualiﬁed appli-
        cants outside of her protected group would be admitted. Za-
        doorian’s case is therefore unlike Sturniolo, where the plaintiﬀ ini-
        tially believed that he was ﬁred for a legitimate reason and only
        learned several months after his ﬁring that he was replaced by
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-14206

        someone outside of his protected group. 15 F.3d at 1025-26. Thus,
        Sturniolo supports the district court’s determination that the limi-
        tations period for Zadoorian’s Title VI claims began to run by July
        11, 2017.
               Finally, Zadoorian’s assertion that the district court errone-
        ously failed to consider if her claims should be subject to the prin-
        ciple of equitable modiﬁcation fails. The district court did apply
        this principle when it determined that—despite her assertions that
        she was blocked from accessing necessary information—Za-
        doorian’s limitations period nevertheless began running by July 11,
        2017, when a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights
        would have become aware of the facts necessary to support the
        claims. Sturniolo, 15 F.3d at 1025. In other words, even if there
        were fraud, it didn’t prevent Zadoorian from becoming aware of
        the facts necessary to support her claims. For fraudulent conceal-
        ment to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiﬀ must show “suc-
        cessful concealment of the cause of action.” Fedance v. Harris, 1
        F.4th 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2021).
                Zadoorian points to Reeb in support of her contentions that:
        (1) the State Defendants should be estopped from asserting the stat-
        ute of limitations; or (2) that her case should be remanded for lack
        of sufficient findings by the district court. Such reliance is mis-
        placed. Here, unlike Reeb, the district court addressed: (1) Za-
        doorian’s assertions that the State Defendants misled her in order
        to conceal their discriminatory intent; and (2) when Zadoorian be-
        came aware of the facts supporting her claim such that her
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        22-14206                Opinion of the Court                           17

        limitations period began running. Reeb, 516 F.2d at 925-26, 930-31.
        The district court ultimately determined that the State Defendants
        did not conceal their alleged discrimination because Zadoorian be-
        came aware of the facts to support her claim on July 11, 2017. Ac-
        cordingly, her argument that her case requires remand to address
        the issue of the State Defendants’ alleged fraud fails.
               Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
        B. With respect to the APA claim against OCR, did the district court err
        in dismissing Zadoorian’s claim for lack of jurisdiction because of sover-
        eign immunity?
                “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
        for sovereign immunity.” Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Sem-
        inole Tribe of Florida, 692 F.3d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation
        marks omitted). The federal government and its agencies are enti-
        tled to sovereign immunity from civil lawsuits, except to the extent
        it consents to be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
        (1980). The plaintiff has the burden of showing an unequivocal
        waiver of sovereign immunity as to the specific claims that he seeks
        to bring against the government. Id. Further, we may affirm on
        any ground supported by the record. Wright v. City of St. Petersburg,
        Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016).
                Chapter 5 of the APA contains a waiver of the immunity for
        claims that allows for judicial review for “[a] person suffering legal
        wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
        by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” but lim-
        its the waiver to claims “seeking relief other than money damages.”
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14206

        5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA expressly provides, however, that this
        waiver does not “affect[] other limitations on judicial review or the
        power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on
        any other appropriate legal or equitable ground” or “confer[] au-
        thority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit
        expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” Id.
               Significant for this appeal, judicial review under the APA is
        available only for an “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute
        and final agency action for which there is no other adequate rem-
        edy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Where there is no private right of
        action otherwise, parties can seek review under either a “specific
        authorization in the substantive statute” or under the general re-
        view provisions of the APA. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.
        871, 882 (1990); see also Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d
        1163, 1173 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that, because the statute at issue
        did not provide for a private right of action, any challenge to
        agency action must be brought under the APA).
                In Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Su-
        preme Court stated that “lawsuits to end discrimination [] would
        be the preferable and more effective remedy” for discrimination in
        federally funded programs than placing on individual plaintiffs “the
        burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are so per-
        vasively discriminatory that a complete cut-off of federal funding is
        appropriate.” 441 U.S. at 688-89, 704-06 & n.38 (holding that a
        plaintiff could raise a claim of discrimination directly against a med-
        ical school).
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                        19

                In Guardians, the Supreme Court held “that compensatory
        relief, or other relief based on past violations of the conditions at-
        tached to the use of federal funds, is not available as a private rem-
        edy for Title VI violations not involving intentional discrimina-
        tion.” 463 U.S. at 602-03. In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme
        Court held that Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination only,
        and thus, there is no private right of action to enforce disparate im-
        pact claims under Title VI. 532 U.S. at 281, 285-86.
                The district court properly held that Zadoorian’s claim
        against OCR was barred by sovereign immunity because her claim
        against the State Defendants is an adequate alternative remedy. Za-
        doorian argues on appeal that her administrative claim against
        OCR was for disparate impact, not intentional discrimination. And
        because there is no private cause of action for disparate impact un-
        der Title VI, she argues that there was no alternative remedy and
        therefor, there was no sovereign immunity bar to her claim against
        OCR. We disagree; the district court correctly read Zadoorian’s
        OCR complaint as one for intentional discrimination—not one for
        disparate impact. Thus, the district court properly held that her
        claim against the State Defendants was an adequate alternative
        remedy and properly dismissed Zadoorian’s APA claim against the
        OCR due to sovereign immunity. Although Zadoorian’s adminis-
        trative complaint to the OCR alleged that the Program’s admission
        criteria beneﬁted “white Americans” to the detriment of non-na-
        tive English speakers, her OCR complaint averred that this eﬀect
        was intentional, rather than the unintended consequence of other-
        wise neutral admissions criteria. For example, Zadoorian
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14206

        contended that GTC “manipulated the data” and implied that her
        rejection and ranking as the highest-scoring non-alternate was “in-
        tentional.” Further, although Zadoorian’s OCR complaint re-
        quested a mandate that GTC “try to ﬁx the problem and correct
        the selection process” as relief, she tied this remedy to her personal
        rejection and even requested OCR “to send the wrongly selected
        students home” so that she could study in the program.
                Additionally, OCR made clear in its January 9, 2018, letter
        that it would only investigate Zadoorian’s claim of “diﬀerent treat-
        ment,” and Zadoorian replied with her consent signature. It is true
        that Zadoorian sent a follow-up email to OCR highlighting the dis-
        parate impact of—what was purportedly intentionally discrimina-
        tory—selection criteria. However, she made this assertion in fur-
        therance of her own claim of intentional discrimination, alleging
        that Strong intentionally designed the discriminatory criteria to
        beneﬁt “her favorite white American students[],” and explicitly rais-
        ing the disparate impact of the criteria “[i]n defending [her] case
        against [State Defendants’] claim” that they did not intentionally
        discriminate because the same scoring criteria was used for all ap-
        plicants.
               As further evidence that Zadoorian’s complaint before the
        OCR related to intentional discrimination, the APA claim that she
        raised before the district court alleged that OCR ignored the asser-
        tions from her OCR complaint that: (1) Strong changed the admis-
        sions criteria after applications had been submitted; (2) her
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        22-14206               Opinion of the Court                       21

        evidence constituted “proof of [GTC’s] intention”; and (3) GTC
        “never intended to get the higher qualiﬁed students in their pro-
        gram.”
                Contrary to Zadoorian’s assertion, the OCR’s September 30,
        2019, letter to her did not suggest that her OCR complaint had as-
        serted a disparate impact claim. Rather, it expressly stated that
        OCR had interpreted her complaint as one for disparate treatment,
        Doc. 35-3 at 1, and it expressly found insuﬃcient evidence to sus-
        tain such a claim. “Based on the preponderance of evidence, OCR
        has determined that there is insuﬃcient evidence to support a ﬁnd-
        ing that the Complainant was subjected to diﬀerent treatment on
        the basis of national origin as alleged in this complaint.” Id. at 5.
        Also, OCR’s explicit recognition that her complaint “alleged that
        the College subjected [her] to diﬀerent treatment on the basis of
        national origin in its Sonography Program,” as well as OCR’s ear-
        lier indication that it would only investigate a claim of intentional
        discrimination, undercuts any argument that the OCR understood
        her complaint as—or that the complaint, in fact, was—related to
        disparate impact.
               Therefore, because Zadoorian’s OCR complaint related to
        intentional discrimination, she had an adequate alternative remedy
        in the form of a private suit against GTC. Guardians, 463 U.S. at
        602-03. This precluded Zadoorian from filing a claim under the
        APA due to sovereign immunity. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Cannon, 441 U.S.
        at 704-06 & n. 38. Thus, this Court need not reach Zadoorian’s
        additional arguments as to the merits of her jurisdictionally
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        22                   Opinion of the Court             22-14206

        barred-APA claim. See Wright, 833 F.3d at 1294. Accordingly, we
        affirm.
              AFFIRMED.