Court Opinion

ID: 9860115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:11:19.668939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:04.571224
License: Public Domain

MASON, Justice
(serving after June 14, 1978, by special assignment), dissenting.
Plaintiff, Doren S. Adams, based his claim for relief in this postconviction proceeding upon the contention the trial court failed to make a determination his tendered guilty plea was voluntary, intelligent and accurate before accepting it.
The majority recognizes that the resolution of the question whether Adams’ guilty plea was voluntarily tendered depends on whether testimony at the postconviction hearing may supply deficiencies in the record made at the plea-stage. Since I cannot agree with the majority’s resolution of the question, I dissent.
In my opinion, unless the record in the original plea proceeding affirmatively shows the plea was voluntary and intelligent, the accused must be permitted to plead anew.
A plea of guilty in order to provide the basis for conviction and support a judgment and sentence must be a voluntary and intelligent act done with actual knowledge of the existence and meaning of the constitutional rights involved and with full understanding of the nature of the charge made against him and the direct consequences of the plea. State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1974).
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judg*446ment upon such plea without making such inquiry as may satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. Ryan v. Iowa State Penitentiary, Ft. Madison, 218 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1974).
A trial judge has a duty to determine that a tendered guilty plea is voluntary, intelligent and accurate before accepting it. State v. Reed, 252 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1977).
The determination of defendant’s understanding of the charge has two aspects. The judge must explain the charge to the defendant, and he must inquire into defendant’s understanding of it. State v. Brown, 262 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1978).
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 427, the Court said, “There is no adequate substitute for demonstrati[on] in the record at the [same] time the plea is entered the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge against him.” (Emphasis supplied). We adopted this principle in State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d at 306.
In the present case counsel for Adams at the plea stage was called as a witness in the postconviction proceeding. The State asked defense counsel: “Now, did you discuss or do you think that there is a high probability that you discussed with Doren the terms— with discussing the elements of the offense, the possible consequences of pleading guilty?” He answered, “In all truthfulness, I do not remember the incident where we discussed it. Now, it is a practice of mine, of course, when- we first examine the charge, determine what type of charge it is, how heavy the penalty is.”
Defense counsel further testified that he could not say he had ever neglected in his practice to tell the accused what the penalties were but he did not recall any case where he had failed to do so.
The majority relies in this collateral proceeding upon the “murky memory” of defense counsel, a hazard warned against in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1713, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 280, and pointed out again in the dissent in Reaves, 254 N.W.2d at 511.
In light of the pronouncements in McCarthy and Boykin I would hold the introduction of extrinsic evidence in a collateral attack proceeding to enable the state to meet its burden to prove the accused’s plea was voluntary and intelligent should be precluded.
In my view the majority in State v. Reaves has brought about the very situation in the present ease which was warned against in the dissent in Reaves.
I would reverse the conviction in the present case and remand to permit plaintiff to plead anew.
REYNOLDSON, C. J., and McCORMICK, J., join in this dissent.