Court Opinion

ID: 9701625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:27:42.226703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:35.067069
License: Public Domain

BoiS, J.,
dissenting:
The record before us reveals not only that the defendant was in physical control of an operable vehicle, but that he attempted to operate it upon being awakened. Admittedly no one witnessed the operation, but this court has long held that “ ‘[d]irect evidence that the defendant was observed in the act of operating the motor vehicle is not an indispensable requisite to prove his operation.’ State v. Costello, 110 N.H. 182, 183, 263 A.2d 671, 672 (1970), and ‘circumstantial evidence may be utilized as proof of a crime, and eyewitnesses to the offense charged are not essential.’ State v. *510Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 50, 226 A.2d 873, 877 (1967); 15 D. Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice § 491.25 n.18 (1969, 1974 Supp.) see 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed., 1940).’ ” State v. Allen, 114 N.H. 682, 683, 327 A.2d 715, 716 (1974); see also State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976); State v. Martin, 116 N.H. 47, 351 A.2d 52 (1976); State v. Craigue, 115 N.H. 239, 338 A.2d 548 (1975).
The majority opinion seems to be based on a belief that the defendant’s account of what transpired was not unreasonable and that the State offered no evidence to dispute his testimony.
It is established law that in our examination of the record we are bound by the indisputable principle that conflicts in the testimony are for the trier of fact. State v. Berry, 117 N.H. 352, 355, 373 A.2d 355, 357 (1977); State v. Bergeron, 115 N.H. 70, 74, 333 A.2d 721, 724 (1975); State v. Reed, 106 N.H. 140, 141, 207 A.2d 443, 444 (1965). “[I]t is axiomatic that the Trial Court . . . , who had an opportunity to observe apd hear the defendant. . . , [is] in a better position to judge his capacity and evaluate his testimony . . . than an appellate court.” State v. Reed, supra at 145, 207 A.2d at 446. “Questions regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given testimony are for the [court] to resolve.” Duby v. Osgood, 120 N.H. 356, 415 A.2d 326 (1980). “[T]he factfinder is not bound to believe even uncontroverted evidence.” 93 Clearing House, Inc. v. Khoury, 120 N.H. 346, 415 A.2d 671 (1980). “[T]he trier of fact is not bound by an expert’s testimony even when it is uncontradicted.” State v. Rullo, 120 N.H. 149, 152, 412 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1980). Our caselaw makes it abundantly clear that the trier of fact may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject, in whole or in part any witness’ testimony. It is therefore a question of credibility and not one of reasonableness.
“In reviewing on appeal a trial court’s determination, the question presented is whether there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable person could reach the conclusion which the trial court did.” State v. Inselburg, 114 N.H. 824, 830, 330 A.2d 457, 461 (1974). Findings of fact are binding on this court and “[o]n review, we will not substitute our own conclusions of fact if the [court’s] findings could reasonably be made on the evidence.” Bourgeois v. Town of Bedford, 120 N.H. 145, 412 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980); Duby v. Osgood, 120 N.H. 356, 415 A.2d 326 (1980).
I therefore conclude that the conviction of the defendant was warranted by the evidence in this case.