Court Opinion

ID: 9953398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 00:07:34.623592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:06.075764
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion ILO
                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    DEMITRI ARI GEE,                                       No. 85987
                    Appellant,
                    vs.                                                      FILE
                    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                    Respondent.                                              MAR 2 i 2024

                               Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea,
                   of driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm. Eighth
                   Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mary Kay Holthus, Judge.
                               Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

                   McAvoy Amaya & Revero, Attorneys, and Michael J. McAvoyAmaya and
                   Timothy E. Revero, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, and Karen Mishler, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
                   County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH,                      PICKERING, and
                   PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

                                                    OPINION

                   By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
                               The issues in this appeal are twofold. First, under Nied v. State,
                   138 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 509 P.3d 36 (2022), and its progeny, we reiterate that
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                an order of restitution must be based on competent evidence. Second, we
                address whether a defendant's restitution obligation to the State of Nevada
                Victims of Crime Program (Victims of Crime) should be offset by the amount
                the defendant's insurance provider paid to the victim for the same losses.
                Because appellant Demitri Gee challenged the amount requested for
                Victims of Crime and the State failed to present evidence to support it, we
                conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution
                not supported by competent evidence. Further, we conclude that the district
                court abused its discretion by failing to evaluate whether the award to
                Victims of Crime needed to be offset by the cornpensation provided to the
                victim through Gee's insurance.      Accordingly, we vacate the $9,940 in
                restitution that was awarded to Victims of Crime but otherwise affirm the
                judgment of conviction. We remand for further proceedings as to restitution
                and instruct the district court to determine what, if any, portion of the
                $9,940 should be offset by the payment from Gee's insurance.
                                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            Gee was driving while intoxicated when he lost control of his
                vehicle and spun into other lanes of traffic. Gee's truck collided with a car
                carrying driver Patricia Allen and passenger Alcie Allen. After the collision,
                Gee exited his truck and fled the scene. The Allens were severely injured.
                They both required surgery and endured several months of pain and
                suffering during which they were unable to work.
                            As a result of the collision, Gee was charged with two counts of
                driving under the influence resulting in substantial bodily harm and one
                count each of failing to stop at the scene of a crash involving death or
                personal injury, unlawfully crossing a divided highway, and operating a
                motor vehicle without security. Gee and the Allens entered into a civil
                settlement agreement, and the Allens received pecuniary compensation
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                through Gee's insurance. Subsequently, Gee and the State executed a
                guilty plea agreement. By the terms of the agreement, the State agreed to
                make no recommendation at sentencing and to dismiss the counts brought
                against Gee except one count of driving under the influence resulting in
                substantial bodily harm. The plea agreement included language that Gee
                agreed "to pay restitution as determined by Parole and Probation" and that
                he "underst[ood] that, if appropriate, [he] will be ordered to make
                restitution to the victim of the offense to which [he is] pleading guilty and
                to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not
                prosecuted pursuant to this agreement."
                            At Gee's sentencing hearing, the State requested as restitution
                $9,940 paid to Victims of Crime to reimburse payments made to Mr. Allen
                for lost wages, $30.99 for medical equipment that Mr. Allen bought, and
                $3,880.40 for Mrs. Allen.     Gee acknowledged that he received bank
                documents and receipts supporting the $3,880.40 amount for rideshare
                costs, medical bills, and the insurance deductible, and restitution request
                forms for the $3,880.40 and $30.99 amounts. Gee did not object to these
                amounts. However, he challenged the $9,940 amount requested. Gee
                indicated that he had not received supporting documentation for that
                amount and that he had already compensated the Allens through his
                insurer. Gee asserted that the Allens had collectively received $300,000
                through the civil settlement and that Gee's insurance paid for their medical
                costs. The district court instructed the State to provide documentation
                related to the challenged amount and ordered a status check on the issue.
                            Before the status check was held, and without further notice to
                the parties, the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Gee was
                fined $2,000 and sentenced to serve a prison term of 8-20 years. The district

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                court ordered him to pay restitution as requested by the State in the amount
                of $30.99 to Mrs. Allen and $3,880.40 to Mrs. Allen.' The district court also
                ordered Gee to pay the challenged amount of $9,940 to Victims of Crime.
                Gee appeals the judgment of conviction, challenging only the $9,940 in
                restitution awarded to Victims of Crime.
                                             DISCUSSION
                            Gee argues the district court erred by entering a judgment of
                conviction with an amount of restitution that was not based on competent
                evidence. He also argues the district court should have offset the restitution
                award by the amount that his insurance paid the Aliens. It is for the district
                court at sentencing to "set an amount of restitution for each victim" when
                restitution is appropriate." NRS 176.033(3). We review a district court's
                restitution determination for an abuse of discretion. Nied, 138 Nev., Adv.
                Op. 30, 509 P.3d at 39. We conclude the district court abused its discretion
                both because the award was not based on competent evidence and because
                it failed to evaluate whether an offset was required.
                The district court abused its discretion by entering the judgment of
                conviction and awarding restitution that was not based on competent
                evidence
                            Gee first argues the district court erred by awarding $9,940 in
                restitution that was not supported by competent evidence. Specifically, he
                contends that the State failed to provide documentation to support the
                amount, such as receipts, copies of checks, or other paperwork documenting
                lost wages. Gee argues that he was ultimately prevented from effectively
                challenging the restitution award because the district court entered the

                      'The $30.99 amount was requested for Mr. Allen yet awarded to Mrs.
                Allen in the judgment of conviction. We have considered Gee's argument
                on this issue, and we find no error.
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                judgment of conviction ordering restitution before the State provided
                evidence to support the challenged award. We agree.
                             "A sentencing judge generally has wide discretion when
                ordering restitution pursuant to NRS 176.033(3) but must use reliable and
                accurate information in calculating a restitution award." Id. (internal
                quotation marks omitted). "A defendant is not entitled to a full evidentiary
                hearing at sentencing regarding restitution," but a defendant "is entitled to
                challenge restitution sought by the state and may obtain and present
                evidence to support that challenge." Martinez u. State, 115 Nev. 9, 13, 974
                P.2d 133, 135 (1999).
                             In Nied, "the State was required to present evidence at
                sentencing to prove the amount of restitution" because Nied challenged the
                amount stated in the presentence report for the victim's medical costs. 138
                Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 509 P.3d at 39-40.        The district court's award of
                restitution appeared to be based on the figure recommended in the
                presentence report.     Id. at 39.   However, when the victim provided
                testimony arid documents relating to his medical costs, his calculations
                conflicted with the total amount recommended in the report. Id. at 39-40.
                Thus, we determined the award was not supported by competent evidence.
                Id. at 40.
                             Based on the scant evidence provided here, we conclude the
                district court did not use reliable and accurate information to award $9,940
                in restitution. The only evidence in the record to support the amount
                requested for Victims of Crirne was the presentence investigation report
                (PSI) and an email from the State. The PSI indicated that Victims of Crime
                had approved $9,660 for the lost wages of one of the victims but that no
                payment had been issued. The State emailed Gee and informed him the

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                State was trying to confirm what, if any, amount Victims of Crime had paid
                out to the victims. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested $9,940.
                It described this conflicting figure as "the most current amount," compared
                to the amount listed in the PSI. At that point, the State orally confirmed
                that the amount had now been paid to Mr. Allen. The State did not provide
                any supporting documentation.
                            Gee challenged the amount. Under Nied, the State needed to
                present evidence to support the amount that Gee challenged. Although the
                district court ordered the State to provide copies of the supporting
                documents for the $9,940 amount and scheduled a status check to reassess
                the request and propriety of the restitution award, it ultimately entered the
                judgment of conviction that included the $9,940 award before holding the
                scheduled status check. We conclude the district court's award to Victims
                of Crime was not based on competent evidence because the State did not
                present evidence to support the basis for the challenged amount awarded.
                Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
                awarding the $9,940 in restitution.
                            We reiterate that restitution awards must be supported by
                competent evidence. An argument such as the one the State implies here,
                that Gee agreed to pay any restitution amount as determined by Parole and
                Probation simply because of the language in the guilty plea agreement, is
                unavailing. Such an interpretation is unsustainable given the requirement
                that restitution awards be supported by competent and reliable evidence
                under Nied and Martinez.
                            We further reiterate that a judgment of conviction must include
                a final and specific determination as to restitution and may not purport to
                reserve such a determination for later. A judgment of conviction with a

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                        restitution award that "does not specify its terms," including the obligation's
                        dollar amount, "is riot a final judgment," Whitehead v. State, 128 Nev. 259,
                        262-63, 285 P.3d 1053, 1055 (2012). However, once the judgment is entered
                        with the specified restitution amount, the judgment is final. Thus, we hold
                        that a district court should not enter a judgment of conviction until the
                        evidence supporting restitution has been reviewed and the amount to award
                        has been determined.
                        The district court abused its discretion by failing to evaluate whether the
                        award to Victims of Crime needed to be offset by the arnount paid by Gee's
                        insurance
                                    Gee argues that the district court was required to offset
                        restitution awarded to Victims of Crime by the amount the Allens already
                        recovered from his insurance. We agree that the district court needed to
                        assess whether an offset was required.
                                    "[A] district court must offset the defendant's restitution
                        obligation by the amount the defendant's insurer paid to the victim for
                        losses subject to the restitution order." Nied, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 509
                        P.3d at 41. But see Martinez, 115 Nev. at 12, 974 P.2d at 135 (concluding
                        "[a] defendant's obligation to pay restitution to the victim may not, of course,
                        be reduced because a victim is reimbursed by" the victim's own insurer).
                        The amount "offset is limited to the portion of the payments intended to
                        compensate the victim for costs recoverable as restitution; thus, any portion
                        directed to pay attorney fees or excludable damages such as pain and
                        suffering should not be credited against the restitution." Nied, 138 Nev.,
                        Adv. Op. 30, 509 P.3d at 41-42. As we emphasized in Nied, "restitution is
                        intended to compensate the victim for costs and losses caused by the
                        defendant." Id. at 38. However, there is a risk of double recovery when
                        there is both a restitution order compensating the victim and a civil
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                settlement compensating the victim through the defendant's insurance. Id.
                at 42. Accordingly, in requiring restitution to be offset by the amount
                provided by the defendant's insurance, we concluded that "the primary
                purpose of restitution" is "to make the victim whole," but to do so "without
                giving the victim a windfall or double recovery." Id.
                            In this matter, Victims of Crime compensated Mr. Allen for his
                lost wages, and Victims of Crime then sought reimbursement for that
                compensation from Gee through restitution. Victims of Crime exists "to
                assist victims of violent crimes through a period of financial hardship which
                arises when their assailants are judgment proof or unknown."           State,
                Victims of Crime Fund u. Barry, 106 Nev. 291, 293, 792 P.2d 26, 27 (1990).
                However, when "the victims are no longer suffering financial hardship and
                have recovered full economic compensation for their losses, fundamental
                fairness dictates in favor of full reimbursement [from the victims]
                to . . . [Victims of Crime]." Id. Victims of Crime has statutory subrogation
                rights such that it can seek reimbursement from victims it has
                compensated. When a victim accepts an award from Victims of Crime, "[t]he
                State of Nevada is inlnlediately subrogated in the amount of the award to
                any right of action or recovery the [victim] may have against any party."
                NRS 217.240(1). Further, when the victim obtains recovery from any source
                "for damages caused by the crime," the victim must "promptly notify the
                Director of the source and amount of that recovery, and shall promptly
                pay . . . the Department." NRS 217.240(2).
                            Here, there was no dispute that the Allens received money from
                Gee through a civil settlement. However, it was unclear what amounts
                within that settlement payment were awarded for what purposes. It was
                also uncertain whether and what amount Victims of Crime issued to Mr.

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                     Allen for lost wages. Because the district court short-circuited the process
                     by entering the judgment of conviction before holding the status check, we
                     do not know whether the award to Victims of Crime was proper. For
                     instance, if Mr. Allen received compensation for lost wages from the
                     settlement with Gee, then Victims of Crime would need to exercise its
                     subrogation rights to seek reimbursement from Mr. Allen. The disputed
                     issues would have been resolved at the status check. However, because the
                     hearing was not held, it is unclear if Gee already paid for Mr. Allen's lost
                     wages through the civil settlement. To avoid a potential double recovery for
                     the victim and duplicate payment by the defendant, we hold that restitution
                     awards to Victims of Crime must be offset by compensation victims receive
                     from a defendant, or in this case, a defendant's insurer, when both
                     payments cover the same losses. Accordingly, we conclude the district court
                     abused its discretion by awarding restitution without assessing if the award
                     to Victims of Crime duplicated recovery from Gee's insurance.2
                                                CONCLUSION
                                 We emphasize that a judgment of conviction must include a
                     final and specific determination as to restitution and may not purport to
                     reserve such a determination for later. Before entering a judgment of
                     conviction—a final judgment—a district court must review the evidence and
                     state the amount of restitution it will order. In addition, restitution awards
                     to the Victims of Crime Program must be offset by compensation victims

                           2We have considered Gee's remaining arguments, including that the
                     judgment of conviction was not served on him or counsel, and we find no
                     error. Gee also argues that a release of claims in a civil settlement is a
                     complete bar to restitution. However, because he made this argument after
                     the judgment of conviction was entered, it is not properly before us in this
                     appeal.
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                receive through the defendant's insurer when the payments cover the same
                losses. Therefore, a district court must evaluate whether a civil settlement

                and a restitution award to Victims of Crime would compensate victims for
                the same losses and thus whether an offset is needed. Here, the district
                court abused its discretion by awarding an amount that was not based on

                competent evidence and by failing to evaluate whether the settlement from
                Gee's insurer and the award to Victims of Crime duplicated Mr. Allen's
                recovery. Therefore, we vacate the $9,940 award of restitution and remand
                for further proceedings for the district court to determine what, if any,
                portion of the $9,940 should be offset by the payment from Gee's insurance.
                We affirm the judgment of conviction as to the sentence and the other two
                restitution awards that were not challenged on appeal. Accordingly, we
                affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the district court.

                                                    Stiglich

                We concur:

                                               J.
                Pickering

                Parraguirre

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