Court Opinion

ID: 4038371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-28 21:54:20.242581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:13.437302
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                               06-14-00158-CR
                                                                     SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                          TEXARKANA, TEXAS
                                                                         12/23/2014 2:43:37 PM
                                                                               DEBBIE AUTREY
                                                                                        CLERK

                         NO. 06-14-00158-CR

____________________________________________________________
                                                  FILED IN
                                                       6th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                         TEXARKANA, TEXAS
                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS           12/30/2014 2:51:00 PM
                                                            DEBBIE AUTREY
                            SIXTH DISTRICT                      Clerk

                        AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS

____________________________________________________________

              SEMAJ MILAN YRNAH SMITH, APPELLANT

                                   V.

                  THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

____________________________________________________________

               APPEAL IN CAUSE NUMBER CR1300648

                IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2

                      OF HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS

____________________________________________________________

                        BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

____________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
      Comes now the Counsel for Appellant and submits this brief pursuant
to the provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
                IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellate Attorney:
Jason A. Duff
2615 Lee Street
P.O. Box 11
Greenville, Texas 75403

Appellant’s Trial Attorney:
Steve Shipp
4000 Wesley St., Suite E
P.O. box 35
Greenville, TX 75403-0035

Appellee:
The State of Texas by and through
Joel D. Littlefield
Joseph T. O’Neill
Hunt County Attorney
4th Floor Hunt County Courthouse
2500 Lee Street
Greenville, Texas 75401

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                                    TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of the Parties and Counsel ............................................................. 2

Table of Contents ....................................................................................... 3

Index of Authorities ..................................................................................... 4

Statement of the Case ................................................................................ 5

Statement of the Facts ................................................................................ 6

Issues and Authorities................................................................................. 8

        Ineffective Assistance of Counsel .................................................. 8

Conclusion and Prayer for relief ................................................................ 14

Certificate of compliance of typeface and Word Count ............................. 15

Certificate of Service ................................................................................. 16

                                                                                                          3
                              INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASE:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)........................................... 8

STATE CASES:

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, (1985)...................................................... 10

Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ....................... 9

Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) .................. 8

Ex parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ................... 9

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ............ 8

Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d

Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) ............................. 10

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) .................. 8

Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........................ 9

Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 589 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002) ......... 8

                                                                                           4
                       STATEMENT OF THE CASE

     This is an appeal of the judgment and sentence in a criminal case for

the County Court at Law Number 2, in Hunt County, Texas. Appellant

Plead Guilty and signed a Judicial confession of the crime of Possession of

Marijuana, Less than Two Ounces on October 23, 2013. The court

assessed Appellant a sentence of imprisonment for On Hundred Eighty

(180) days in the Hunt County Jail but suspended that sentence and placed

Appellant on Community Supervision for 12 Months on October 23, 2013.

After the state filed a Motion to Revoke and Appellant plead true to the

allegations in that motion. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days

confinement in the Hunt County Jail

      Notice of appeal was given on August 29, 2014 in the trial court. The

reporter’s record was filed on October 2, 2014.

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                       STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

      Appellant was originally plead guilty in this cause to Possession of

Marijuana; Less than two ounces on October 23, 2013. (CR Vol. 1 p. 35).

At that time the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in the Hunt

County Jail but suspended that confinement and placed Appellant under

Community Supervision for a period of 12 months. (CR Vol. 1 p. 35).

      As conditions of his community supervision Appellant was required to

do the following among others:

     Pay Court Costs in the amount of $297.00,
     Pay a fine in the amount of $750.00,
     Pay Attorney Fees in the amount of $650.00,
     Pay $60.00 per month to the Hunt County Community Supervision
and Corrections Department ,
     Perform 60.00 hours of community service at a rate of 10 hours a
month,
     Complete a Drug Offender Program within 180 days of the date he
was placed on probation, and
     Abstain from the use of narcotic or habit forming drugs without a
doctor’s permission.

(CR Vol. p. 36)

      Yet, the Judgment placing Appellant on Community Supervision

lacks the specificity that Appellant should pay the court costs, Attorney’s

fees and fine. In section 10 of that judgment the total amount to be paid,

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the payment amount, the date when payments are to be made and day

which payments thereafter are to be made are left blank. (CR Vol. 1 p.36).

            At the punishment portion of the Motion to revoke hearing

Appellant Testified that although he gained employment he could only

break even with his bills. (RR Vol. 1 p.8). Appellant further testified that all

three of his children live with him and his mother. Before he had obtained

employment he could not complete a drug offender program because he

had to watch his children. (RR Vol. 1 p.13). Then when he started

working his hours were from 7:00 to 7:00, and Sunday to Sunday. (RR Vol.

1 p.9). Appellant stated to the court that now his work has increased he will

be able to pay for his drug classes and fines. (RR Vol. 1 p9-10).

      When asked by the attorney for the State if Appellant though it was

okay to use marijuana and cocaine multiple times while on probation,

appellant replied no. (RR Vol. 1 p. 14)

                                                                               7
                        ISSUES AND AUTHORITIES

                    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      Any allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in

the record. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999);

Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 589 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002), aff’d,

106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Appellant bears the burden of

proving that counsel was ineffective by a preponderance of the evidence.

Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Cannon v.

State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A reviewing court will

rarely be provided the opportunity to make its determination on direct

appeal with a record capable of providing an evaluation of the merits of the

claim involving ineffective assistance claims. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

Granted, “[i]n the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is

simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect” the reasoning of trial

counsel. Id. at 813–14.

      Nonetheless the two-pronged Strickland test handed down by the

United States Supreme Court to determines whether Defendant received

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984).

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        First, Defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional

norms. Strickland, at 687–88. It is true, that here is a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance and that the challenged action could be considered sound trial

strategy. Id. at 689; Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000). Therefore, courts will not second-guess the strategy of trial counsel

at trial through hindsight. Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1979); Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2005, pet. ref’d).

      Second, Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a showing that but for

counsel’s unprofessional error, there is a reasonable probability that the

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687–88. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome, meaning that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. Strickland requires the applicant to establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the harm resulting from trial

counsel's deficiency undermines the confidence in the trial's outcome. Ex

parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

                                                                                 9
Ineffectiveness through Failure to Obtain an Expert

      In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, (1985), the United States Supreme

Court explained that due process requires access to the raw materials

integral to the building of an effective defense. Id. at 77. Morevoer the State

must provide a defendant with the basic tools to present his defense within

our adversarial system. Id. While the Ake case dealt with the appointment

of a psychiatrist, Ake requires the appointment of an expert regardless of

his field of expertise. Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338

(Tex.Cr.App.1995).

      As the Court set out in Rey: "There is no principled way to distinguish

between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case

must be not what field of expert knowledge is involved, but rather how

important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense

expert could have given." Rey at 338. Hence, the nature of an expert's field

and the importance and complexity of the issue will bear directly upon

whether the appointment of an expert will be helpful. Id. The type of expert

is also relevant to the determination of whether the trial was fundamentally

unfair without the expert's assistance. Id.

      However, this does not mean that the State must "purchase for an

indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterparts might

                                                                             10
buy." Ake, supra. Nor does it mean that a defendant has a constitutional

right to choose an expert of his personal liking. Ake, supra; Cantu v. State,

939 S.W.2d 627, 638-639 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). Rather, the purpose of the

appointment is to level the playing field; to give a defendant access to a

competent expert who can assist in the evaluation, preparation, and

presentation of the defense. Rey, at 337.

      In a case such as this, Appellant can find no prevailing professional

norm that would justify not obtaining an expert to counter the State’s

contention that Appellant used drugs by examining the validity of the test.

Moreover no sound trial strategy could justify the lack of a defense expert

as in this case where Appellant states that he did not think it was ok to use

marijuana and cocaine multiple times while on probation. (RR Vol. 1 p.14).

      Trial counsel's deficiency undermines the confidence in the trial's

outcome by a preponderance of the evidence because the lack of an expert

to counter the state’s created a completely unlevelled playing field in favor

of the state. Therefore Appellant was given effective assistance of counsel.

      Ineffectiveness through Failure to object revocation base on

paragraph one.

                                                                              11
      In the States “Second Amended Motion for Revoke Community

Supervision” they allege:

      “Said Defendant failed to pay all Court Cost in the amount of $297.00.
Fine in the amount of $750.00 and Attorney Fees in the amount of $650.00
to the Hunt County Community Supervision and Corrections Department at
the combined monthly rate of $277.00 per month with the first said payment
being due on or before the 7th day of November 2013 with like payments
being due on or before the same date each month thereafter for the months
of November, December 2013, January, February, March and April 2014
and is currently delinquent in the amount of $360.00;” (CR Vol. 1 p. 36)

      But because the actual order does not specify those date certain

terms, Appellant cannot be in violation of them. (CR Vol. 1 p. 60).

Appellant, by the terms of the Judgment setting out the terms of community

supervision still could have paid his fees and be in compliance with the

order. Thus, trial counsel clearly failed to advise his client not to plead true

to that allegation which had a reasonable probability to undermine the

outcome.

      Strickland’s prejudice prong

      But for trial counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. The

trial court exclaimed that “throughout this entire probation it appears that

you just didn’t take it seriously at all.” (RR Vol. 1 p.19). The court further

                                                                                 12
explained that the probation office will not file a probation revocation if

you’re too poor to pay...I am not going to make you serve that time as long

as you abide by the terms and conditions of probation. And you’ve failed

that in every way.”

      The trial court’s statement was an unambiguous indication that had

defendant complied with some of the terms of his probation, a lesser

sentence would have been likely. Therefore if it not for trial counsel’s error

on the countering the drug allegation or the ambiguous fee order, or both

the trial court would have not sent Appellant to jail or would have sentenced

him to something less than the maximum.

                                                                              13
                            PRAYER FOR RELIEF

      Wherefore, premises considered, Appellant respectfully prays that his

revocation of community supervision in the above entitled and numbered

cause be reversed and remanded for a new hearing. Appellant further

prays for all other lawful relief to which he may be entitled, at law or in

equity.

                                                  Respectfully submitted,

                                                    /s/ Jason A. Duff______
                                                  Jason A. Duff
                                                  State Bar No. 24059696
                                                  2615 Lee Street
                                                  P.O. Box 11
                                                  Greenville, TX 75403

                                                  Attorney for the Appellant

                                                                               14
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE OF TYPEFACE AND WORD COUNT

        In accordance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 (e) and
(i), the undersigned attorney or record certifies that Appellants Brief
contains 14-point typeface of the body of the brief, 12-point typeface for
footnotes in the brief and contains 1,569, excluding those words identified
as not being counted in appellate rule of procedure 9.4(i)(1), and was
prepared on Microsoft Word 2010.

____/s/ Jason A. Duff____              _________
Jason A. Duff
Attorney for the Appellant

                                                                          15
                       CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument was forwarded to Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana, Texas and
to Hunt County Attorney Joel D. Littlefield, on this the 23rd day of
December, 2014, by Electronic Filing and Service.

___/s/ Jason A. Duff         _________
Jason A. Duff
Attorney for the Appellant

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