Court Opinion

ID: 9950957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 13:07:56.505749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:31.412610
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-910.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                              HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                             :      APPEAL NO. C-230284
                                                   TRIAL NO. B-2204945
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                      O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                     :

 JAMAYIA HARRIS,                            :

        Defendant-Appellant.                :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 13, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Jamayia Harris appeals from the trial court’s

judgment convicting her of sexual battery following her guilty plea. In her two

assignments of error, Harris argues that the trial court erred to her prejudice by

imposing a sentence that was not contemplated by the plea agreement and that she

did not enter her guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Because a trial

court is not bound by a recommended sentence in a plea agreement, we overrule

Harris’s challenge to her sentence. Further, we hold that the trial court substantially

complied with Harris’s non-constitutional rights pursuant to Crim.R. 11 in accepting

her guilty plea. Accordingly, we overrule Harris’s assignments of error and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}    The charges against Harris relate to an incident that occurred on

September 11, 2022, in which Harris performed non-consensual sexual acts on the

victim, J.J., while the victim was unconscious. Harris was initially indicted on three

charges: one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), one count of sexual

battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), and one count of sexual battery in violation

of R.C. 2907.03(A)(3).

       {¶3}   The parties negotiated a plea agreement. The plea agreement stated

that Harris would be sentenced to three years of incarceration for one sexual battery

charge. The rape count would be reduced to gross sexual imposition, for which Harris

would be sentenced to one year of incarceration and the second count of sexual battery

would be dismissed. The written plea form used by the parties misstated the potential

                                               2
                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

sentencing range of the sexual battery charge as nine to 36 months rather than the

correct range of 12 to 60 months.

       {¶4}      At the sentencing hearing on May 1, 2023, the trial court noted the error

in the written plea form. The trial court sentenced Harris to four years for sexual

battery. The trial court merged the count of gross sexual imposition into the sexual

battery count.

       {¶5}      The trial court repeatedly confirmed Harris’s understanding of the

sexual battery change and the sentence it carried during the hearing. Harris objected

for the record, but did not seek to withdraw her plea. When asked, she confirmed that

she had spoken to her lawyer about the correct sentencing range and that she

understood it. Harris’s attorney also repeatedly affirmed her agreement with the

sexual battery change.

       {¶6}      Harris was sentenced to four years of incarceration and classified as a

Tier I sex offender.

       {¶7}      Harris now appeals.

                             Deviation from Plea Agreement

       {¶8}      In her first assignment of error, Harris argues that the trial court erred

to her prejudice by deviating from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement.

Harris specifically takes issue with the fact that the trial court imposed four years on

the sexual battery count, rather than the three-year sentence contemplated by the plea

agreement, even though her negotiated total four-year sentence did not change.

       {¶9}      As a general principle, a trial court is not bound by the parties’

sentencing recommendation in a plea agreement and has the discretion to impose a

different sentence. State v. Shaw, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230089, 2023-Ohio-3230,

                                                 3
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

¶ 6; see also State v. Elliott, 2021-Ohio-424, 168 N.E.3d 33, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.) (“[P]lea

agreements are not inherently binding upon the trial court.”). Accordingly, absent

circumstances not present in this case, a trial court may deviate from a recommended

sentence in a plea agreement if: (1) the sentence otherwise comports with the law, and

(2) the defendant is on notice that the court may deviate from what is recommended.

Shaw at ¶ 6.

       {¶10} Harris does not contend that her sentence did not comport with the law.

Thus, the only question is whether the trial court put Harris on notice that it may

deviate from the recommended sentence in the plea agreement.

       {¶11} At the plea hearing, the trial court referred to the parties’ contemplation

that Harris would receive three years for the sexual battery charge and one year for the

gross sexual imposition charge, to be served consecutively, as a “recommendation.”

The trial court informed Harris that it was not obligated to accept the

recommendation, and Harris indicated she understood. Harris further indicated she

still wanted to proceed with the plea knowing that the trial court was not required to

accept the sentence that the parties contemplated. As in Shaw, this was sufficient to

put Harris on notice that the trial court may deviate from the plea agreement at

sentencing. Further, Harris received the four-year sentence she bargained for, albeit

in a different form. Harris’s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.

                                     Plea Colloquy

       {¶12} In her second assignment of error, Harris argues that she did not

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter a plea of guilty.

       {¶13} Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform the defendant

of his or her constitutional and non-constitutional rights. Crim.R. 11(C)(2). In State

                                                4
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

v. Carpenter, the court explained the level of compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)

required for each category of rights:

       When reviewing a defendant’s constitutional rights (right to a jury trial,

       right to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with

       Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). In contrast, when reviewing a defendant’s non-

       constitutional rights (maximum penalty involved, understanding effect

       of plea, etc.), a trial must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)

       and (b).   Substantial compliance means that under the totality of

       circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications

       of his plea and the rights he is waiving.

(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) State v. Carpenter, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 22CA24, 2023-Ohio-2838, ¶ 10.

       {¶14} An appellate court must independently review the record to ensure

compliance with constitutional safeguards. Id. at ¶ 12. An appellate court will affirm

the trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea “if the record reveals that the trial court

engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the defendant and explained in a manner

reasonably intelligible to the defendant the consequences of pleading guilty.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted). Id. at ¶ 13. A defendant seeking “to invalidate a plea on

the basis that the trial court partially, but not fully, informed the defendant of his or

her non-constitutional rights must demonstrate a prejudicial effect.” Id. at ¶ 14. This

occurs when a defendant would not have entered a guilty plea but for the trial court’s

failure. Id.

       {¶15} Harris argues that she was not adequately informed of the maximum

penalty for the sexual battery charge, a non-constitutional right that requires

                                               5
                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

substantial compliance. But she makes no argument that she would not have entered

a guilty plea if the trial court had correctly informed her of the sentencing range for

sexual battery at the plea hearing and therefore cannot demonstrate the required

prejudicial effect. In fact, when the clerical error was discovered and Harris was

questioned about her understanding of the change at the sentencing hearing, she

repeatedly indicated that she understood. Harris’s counsel also relayed her desire to

go forward. The fact that Harris received the same outcome that she anticipated—four

years in prison—but through a different mechanism, namely merged counts rather

than consecutive sentences—also cuts against the notion that Harris was prejudiced in

entering her plea.

       {¶16} In the absence of prejudice to Harris, and given the trial court’s robust

dialogue upon discovering the clerical error in the plea form, the trial court

substantially complied with Harris’s non-constitutional right to be informed of the

maximum penalty against her under Crim.R. 11. Accordingly, her second assignment

of error is overruled.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶17} For the reasons set forth above, the trial court was not bound by the

parties’ recommended sentence in the plea agreement, and the trial court substantially

complied with Harris’s non-constitutional rights under Crim.R. 11. Accordingly,

Harris’s assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

                                               6
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                                 7