Court Opinion

ID: 9613854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:26.182319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:32.384906
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
Today, this court takes Fourth Amendment law one step forward, two steps backward, and one step sideways. In attempting to illuminate and refine the contours of the constitutional standards relating to temporary detentions, confusion and uncertainty are created instead of the clarity essential to achieve compliance with the goals of the Fourth Amendment.1 The majority opinion opens the way for a foreseeable trampling of the fundamental “right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” (Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U.S. 438, 478 [72 L.Ed. 944, 956, 48 S.Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376] [dis. opn. by Brandeis, J.].)
The Fourth Amendment is not a “kind of nuisance, a serious impediment in the war against crime” nor “an outworn bit of Eighteenth Century romantic rationalism but an indispensible need for a democratic society,” the abuse of which “more than any one single factor gave rise to American independence.” (Harris v. United States (1947) 331 U.S. 145, 157, 159, 161 [91 L.Ed. 1399, 1409, 1410, 1411, 67 S.Ct. 1098] [dis. opn. by Frankfurter, J.].) “Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to *903know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.” (Brinegar v. United States (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 180-181 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1893, 69 S.Ct. 1302] [dis. opn. by Jackson, J.].) Thus, in determining the range and depth of the Fourth Amendment guarantees, courts must be aware that “in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.” (Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 320-321 [3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1270, 79 S.Ct. 1202].)
The Fourth Amendment commands the government to respect the collective security of the people “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” In the first and most important instance the Fourth Amendment speaks to the state’s police officers. (See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment (1974) 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 367-372.) If the police are to comply, they must be able to understand what the Fourth Amendment demands of them. The courts interpret these demands by articulating Fourth Amendment “rule[s] governing police conduct.” (People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 452 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) But if the policé are to conform to these rules in concrete situations, the rules must be clear. The police officer in the field must be able to determine with some certainty, before he or she acts, whether or not the invasion of privacy is justified under the Constitution.
Detention decisions normally arise when an officer is confronted by a spontaneous, fast-changing situation. Often, if action is to be taken, it necessitates quick, sometimes immediate, action on the part of the officer. If the officer is to be controlled by the Fourth Amendment in making a detention decision, the courts cannot realistically direct the officer to engage in a sensitive ad hoc balancing test nor in a sliding scale analysis that matches multiple categories of intrusions with corresponding levels of sufficiency of proof. Such mental exercises “may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be ‘literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.’ ” (LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized ProceduresThe Robinson Dilemma (1974) Sup.Ct.Rev. 127, 141.) (Citation omitted.)
A police officer will be afforded little assistance in his or her detention decision by an open-ended general standard, such as “reasonableness,” *904which “is obviously much too amorphous either to guide or regulate the police.” (Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, 58 Minn.L.Rev. at pp. 414-415; cf.,post, at pp. 905-907.) As commands or controls on police officers, these types of rules are “splendid in [their] flexibility, [but] awful in [their] unintelligibility, unadministrability, enforcibility and general ooziness.” (Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, at p. 415.)
It is true that the complexities of life do not lend themselves to a discipline of “clear” rules, but this court must take care that the rules it sets forth are at least fairly clear. Vague, highly debatable or intensely sophisticated directives are of no value in settings where concrete decisions must be made without the possibility of prolonged contemplation or foreknowledge of a specific situation. When a court chooses to articulate open-ended rules for use in such settings, it chooses unworkable rules that will be applied unevenly and honored only in their breach.
In the present case, this court must decide whether a “detention” occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The gravity of this question cannot be minimized for there are “few issues more important to a society than the amount of power that it permits its police to use without effective control by law.” (Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, 58 Minn.L.Rev. at p. 377.) If certain police activity does not amount to a “detention,” then that activity is not scrutinized by the courts since it is not controlled by the Fourth Amendment. (Id., at p. 388.) In holding that certain activity rises to the level of a “detention,” the courts merely hold that the activity is subject to legal scrutiny in light of the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness.
I agree with the holding of the majority that there was a detention in the present case. The reasons advanced for this holding are sound and advance Fourth Amendment law. The current definition of a detention is expanded to cover any occasion where an officer personally contacts an individual whom the officer suspects may be involved in some criminal activity. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 895.) This sort of interaction between officer and citizen is what the Fourth Amendment sought to control. While the majority’s language overlaps to a large extent the pre-existing detention tests, which remain intact,2 it covers in a clear and concise fashion some *905situations where other courts have had difficulty. (See, e.g., People v. Larkin (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 346, 349 [125 Cal.Rptr. 137]; Batts v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 435, 439 [100 Cal.Rptr. 181]; People v. Blackmon (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 346, 349 [80 Cal.Rptr. 862].) The majority’s test will be easy for the courts to employ and simple for the police to apply in the field. For example, if an officer accosts an individual with any idea the individual might be involved in criminal activity, the officer knows his or her conduct will be subject to the rules on detention. Thus, the majority opinion not only applies the Fourth Amendment in a context where it clearly should, but it does so in a fashion capable of application in concrete day to day situations.
The same comment cannot be made concerning the majority’s determination of the legality of a detention based upon “suspicious circumstances.” Prior to today’s holding, this court had held that “[t]here must be a ‘rational suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place . . . some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity. . . . [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime.’ [Citation.] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful.” (Irwin v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423, 427 [82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12].)
The first sentence of this holding in Irwin identified the three elements that must exist in order to constitute “suspicious circumstances.” The second sentence articulated the amount of evidence that was necessary to make a detention based on “suspicious circumstances” reasonable. Both sentences were necessary so that the police, acting in detention situations in the field, could accurately adhere to the commands of the Fourth Amendment. Neither one standing alone would adequately guide an officer’s detention decision. For example, omitting the second sentence while using only the first would be analogous to instructing a jury in a criminal case on the elements of the offense but failing to instruct on the standard of proof.
The second sentence of the Irwin formulation is disapproved by the majority but nothing is advanced to replace it with another rule of comparable clarity. Instead, conclusionaiy labels are suggested. If the suspicious circumstances are equivalent to “mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch,” a detention based thereon would be impermissible. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 893.) If the circumstances constitute “a reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity,” a detention would be lawful. (Maj. *906opn., ante, at p. 894.)But how can an officer acting in the field determine ■whether the specific circumstances he or she observes are in Fourth Amendment terms a “reasonable suspicion” rather than a “mere hunch?” No clue is provided by the majority except that the officer should be “objectively reasonable.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 894.) At best such a standard is woefully lacking in precision and has no place in a set of rules which are “calculated to prevent, not to repair” transgressions against the Fourth Amendment. (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 [4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1677-1678, 80 S.Ct. 1437].)
A command to “be reasonable” affords an officer no specific guidance to deal with a specific situation. “Reasonableness” calls on each individual to look primarily to his or her own set of values or personal sense of equities to determine what is proper. What is “reasonable” to one person may be unreasonable, unjustified, arbitrary, or outrageous to another. Under a regime of “reasonableness,” our populace’s freedom from unwarranted police detention will depend more upon the personalities or moods of the police patrolling an area than upon our state or federal Constitutions. Moreover, since judges must employ the same nebulous “reasonableness” rule as police officers, no meaningful clarification as to their duties will result from judges’ rulings on motions to suppress evidence.
If this rule is adopted, it will lead to uncertainty over whether the sanction of exclusion of evidence will be applied. This will have a deleterious effect upon the Fourth Amendment since control over the police’s behavior will be reduced. (See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1976) 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1685, 1696.) The police will be encouraged to make detentions in the hope that some trial or appellate judge can be found who will hold the detention “reasonable.” Such seize-now-justify-later behavior has been repeatedly condemned as inimical to the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 219, 226 [101 Cal.Rptr. 860, 496 P.2d 1228]; see also, e.g., Mestas v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 537, 542 [102 Cal.Rptr. 729, 498 P.2d 977].)
Further, vagueness and uncertainty will tend to discourage officers from becoming proficient in Fourth Amendment law. “[Uncertainty reduces the incentive to find out the nature of one’s duties . . .,” since the reward from such proficiency is unpredictable. (Kennedy, op. cit. supra, at pp. 1698-1699.) Although an understanding by the police of Fourth Amendment rules is essential for the success of these rules (cf., ante, at *907pp. 903-904), the use of an imprecise general standard such as “reasonableness” decreases the ability of the police to acquire that understanding.
A “reasonableness” standard is, therefore, self-defeating. In providing no clear guidance to the police, this court’s holding will lead at best to the uneven and sporadic application of the fundamental rules of our society.
The Irwin rule that a detention may not occur unless the circumstances are more consistent with criminal activity than innocent activity, speaks directly “in terms of how much evidence is needed for certain [police] actions. . . .” (LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond (1968) 67 Mich.L.Rev. 39, 52, fn. 63.) This is imperative if the police “are to have a clear understanding of their authority.....” (Ibid.) Irwin affords guidance to police in the field trying to evaluate “suspicious circumstances.” When such guidance is provided, the police will be capable of conforming their conduct to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.3
Some decisions of the Court of Appeal have stated that the Irwin rule improperly equates the standard for detention with the standard for arrest. (E.g., People v. Moreno (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 962, 967 [134 Cal.Rptr. 322]; People v. Superior Court (Acosta) (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [98 Cal.Rptr. 161].) However, these cases misconstrue the Irwin test. To justify an arrest, the facts must “lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” (People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 412-413 [2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577].) (Italics added.) In short, there must be probable cause to believe the suspect has committed or is committing a particular crime. However, to justify a detention, there must merely be probable cause to believe the suspect is engaging, has engaged, or will engage in general “criminal activity. ” (Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 427.) (Italics added.)
The difference between the showing necessary for an arrest and that for a detention based on suspicious circumstances lies not in the amount of proof needed to sustain the act but in the “elements” required. An arrest requires probable cause to believe a specific crime has been committed. A *908detention requires a lesser showing of probable cause to believe nonspecific criminal activity is afoot (i.e., unusual activity related to crime [see ante, at p. 905]). This difference was clearly articulated in a -post-Mickelson decision by this court. “There are, in fact, two determinations of probable cause which we are called upon to make in the instant case; (1) did the officer have probable cause to detain [the suspect] for questioning when they first approached him, and (2) if so, did the officers have probable cause based on knowledge thus lawfully obtained when they searched him?” (People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe (1964) 62 Cal.2d 92, 95 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706].) (Italics added.)
The vagueness of the majority’s standard for detentions is illustrated by the fact that the result of today’s decision is patently inconsistent with the results of most of the cases it cites with approval for their criticism of the Irwin test. Consider three of those cases. In People v. Moreno, supra, a man was driving a car at 7 p.m. on a public road in a commercial area, one and one-half blocks from where the road became a private road leading to a sportsman’s club a mile away. There had been six thefts or burglaries within a mile radius of that location during the prior year. In People v. Larkin, supra, a woman stood talking to several known heroin users in front of a pool hall in a high crime area. When a police car circled by for the second time, the officers saw the woman enter the pool hall with one other person. In People v. Higbee (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 944 [112 Cal.Rptr. 690] a man sat in front of a residence in a high crime area for two minutes, with his motorcycle engine running. In all three cases, the Courts of Appeal sustained detentions based upon these meager showings.
In the present appeal, two minors were walking during school hours down a public street in a “high crime area.” One of the two disappeared for a short time, while the other stood on a street comer. A passing police officer, who was looking for “three black males” in connection with recent burglaries in the area, noted both minors were black. The majority quite properly holds this showing insufficient to justify a detention either for suspicious circumstances or for investigation of the recent burglaries. Surely, any officer who had read Moreno, Larkin and Higbee would probably have concluded the detention in the present case was proper. Today’s result would not justify future reliance on those decisions. The extent to which other decisions in this line have continuing validity *909remains debatable, depending upon one’s view of their “reasonableness.”4
The Irwin rule was good law because it was clear and concise. It was not a departure from the settled law of this court.5 Since it was far more useful in the concrete situations the police face in their encounters with our citizens, Irwin should not be replaced by a general standard that is at once unclear and imprecise. Today’s decision ensures that we will have a Fourth Amendment “with all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach blot.”6

Unless otherwise specified, the phrase “Fourth Amendment” in this opinion refers to both the state and federal guarantees against unreasonable seizures and searches. (See People v. Triggs (1973) 8 Cal.3d 884, 891-892, fn. 5 [106 Cal.Rptr. 408, 506 P.2d 232].)

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, footnote 16 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 878 [45 L.Ed.2d 607, 614-615, 95 S.Ct. 2574]; People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 678, 683 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800] (It was “clear” that the officer made a detention when he “went to the telephone booth [the defendant was using], and asked defendant his name and several questions.”).

Of course, people, including judges and police officers, will differ in some cases over whether the particular facts are more consistent with innocent activity than with criminal activity. However, the differences will occur less frequently and the arguments will be much more focused than if a general “reasonableness” standard is used. At least, the parties will know what the question is. A debate over “reasonableness” all too often consists of nothing more than “Yes it is” and “No it isn’t.”

It is certainly a telling criticism of the majority’s standard that eVen in the comparatively calm atmosphere of appellate courts, it leads so easily to inconsistent or incorrect results.

It has been suggested that Irwin was overruled sub silentio by this court’s opinions in People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85 [115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 524 P.2d 353] and People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384 [124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632]. (See People v. Moreno, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at pp. 968-969; People v. Knutson (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 856, 862 [131 Cal.Rptr. 846]; People v. Larkin, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at p. 349; People v. Rios (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1011 [124 Cal.Rptr. 737]; People v. Higbee, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 950.)
This suggestion ignores the fact that neither Flores nor Harris involved detentions based upon observed “suspicious circumstances,” as was the case in Irwin. Rather, the suspects in the two former decisions were detained because of their resemblance to particular suspects in prior known crimes. In such a situation it is unnecessary for an officer to observe the suspect engaged in suspicious activity at the time of detention. Indeed, in most such instances, the suspect will be engaged in no unusual activity when detained, but detention may nevertheless be proper for other reasons.
It was thus unnecessary for the court in Flores or Harris to discuss the suspicious circumstances rules of Irwin. Failure to do so indicates this court’s awareness of the different settings of the cases (see Tiffany, et el., Detection of Crime (1967) pp. 19, 34), rather than any disapproval of Irwin.

Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, at page 375.