Court Opinion

ID: 9942536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:11:40.579544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:12.332803
License: Public Domain

[J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                EASTERN DISTRICT

 CARA SALSBERG,                                  :   No. 7 EAP 2022
                                                 :
                      Appellant                  :   Appeal from the Judgment of
                                                 :   Superior Court entered on
                                                 :   September 15, 2021 at No. 623 EDA
               v.                                :   2019 affirming the Order entered on
                                                 :   January 17, 2019 in the Court of
                                                 :   Common Pleas, Philadelphia
 DONNA MANN AND DREXEL                           :   County, Civil Division at No.
 UNIVERSITY,                                     :   170603584.
                                                 :
                      Appellees                  :   ARGUED: March 7, 2023

                      CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                                   DECIDED: February 21, 2024
       The majority recognizes the tort of intentional interference with the performance of

contract by a third party in the context of an at-will employment relationship. In doing so,

however, the majority misapprehends our Commonwealth’s long-held view of the at-will

employment doctrine by casting it as its opposite, as contractual. As well, the majority

underappreciates that the tort’s ambiguous, subjective, and unpredictable nature will

serve to weaken the at-will employment doctrine, bringing it closer to a de facto “just

cause” standard, and discounts the negative effects its holding will have on Pennsylvania

businesses. For the reasons that follow, I dissent from the adoption of this tort in the at-

will employment setting, and, thus, respectfully, concur only in denying relief.

       For over 150 years, Pennsylvania has assiduously preserved the utility and

simplicity of the at-will employment doctrine, allowing only narrow exceptions involving

matters implicating public policy. See, e.g., Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 556 (Pa.
2009); Henry v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co., 21 A. 157, 157 (Pa. 1891); Peacock v.

Cummings, 46 Pa. 434, 437 (Pa. 1864). An at-will employment relationship is of indefinite

duration, and may be ended at any time ― by either party. Specifically, an employee can

leave his or her employment at any time and for any reason. Equally, an employer may

discharge the employee at any time and for any reason, except if the reason violates a

statutory prohibition or a recognized public policy. Weaver, 975 A.2d at 564.

       Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is entitled “Intentional

Interference with Performance of Contract by Third Person.” Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 766.1 Under the Restatement’s articulation of the tort, and our case law, recovery

requires the satisfaction of four elements.2 The first element, consistent with the tort’s

title, requires the existence of a contract between the complainant and a third party. In

this context, that would require a contract between the employee and his employer. Thus,

by name and requirement, the existence of a contract is central to the recognition of a

cause of action for the intentional interference with the performance of a contract by a

third party. As noted above, the at-will employment doctrine, foundationally, is not based

upon a contractual relationship. Indeed, it is defined by the absence of a contract; a

contract, or even an implied contract, strips an employer-employee relationship of its at-

1 Section 766 provides in full:    “One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person
by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject
to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the
third person to perform the contract.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766.
2 In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Pa. 1978),

our Court set forth the elements to state a cause of action for intentional interference with
contractual relations: (1) the existence of a contractual relationship between the
complainant and a third party; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm the plaintiff
by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) the absence of privilege or justification
on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage as a result of
defendant’s conduct.

                              [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 2
will status. See Weaver, 975 A.2d at 562 (“absent a statutory or contractual provision to

the contrary, either party may terminate an employment relationship for any or no

reason”); id. at 563 (“These cases demonstrate that the strong presumption of all non-

contractual employment relations is at-will.”); Geary v. United States Steel Corporation,

319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974) (“Absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary,

the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employment

relationship for any or no reason.”); Henry, 21 A. at 157 (“A railroad corporation, or an

individual, may discharge an employe with or without cause at pleasure, unless restrained

by some contract . . . .”). For this foundational reason, our Court should not recognize

the tort of intentional interference with the performance of a contract by a third party in

the context of an at-will employment relationship, as no contract exists to be interfered

with.3

         Related thereto, the tort’s second element under Section 766 requires the

defendant to “induc[e] or otherwise caus[e] the third person not to perform the contract.”

Our case law requires an intent by the defendant to harm the plaintiff by purposely causing

“a third person not to [] perform a contract with” the plaintiff. Adler, 393 A.2d at 1182-83.

What is the contract that Donna Mann allegedly induced the third party, Drexel University,

not to perform? It must be a contract for continued employment. Indeed, that is the

gravamen of Carl Salsberg’s complaint. Salsberg Complaint at ¶ 9 (“Defendant Mann . .

. intentionally interfered with [Salsberg’s] employment contract with Drexel University

which resulted in [Salsberg’s] termination.”); id. at ¶ 89 (“Mann acted in her own selfish

capacity when she induced Drexel University to terminate [Salsberg’s] employment.”); id.

3 I acknowledge that the Restatement (Second) of Torts and various states have
conceptualized the at-will employment relationship as contractual, see, e.g., Majority
Opinion at 22 n.13; however, as discussed herein, this is not the law in Pennsylvania.

                             [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 3
at ¶ 92 (“Defendant Mann was abusive, harassing, insulting and deliberately lied about

[Salsberg’s] conduct for the sole purpose of terminating her.”).

       Critically, however, under Pennsylvania’s articulation of the at-will employment

doctrine, there can be no contract for continued employment. There is no prospective

employment relationship, nor an expectation of one.          Rather, the relationship is an

indefinite one. As observed by the Superior Court, at-will employment offers “nothing

more than a mere hope,” as either party may terminate the employment relationship at

any time, for any or no reason ― literally on a whim. Salsberg v. Mann, 262 A.3d 1267,

1271 (Pa. Super. 2021). That is the essence of the doctrine. Simply stated, interference

with an employment relationship that is terminable at will cannot be actionable under an

interference with contract theory because, when a party terminates such a relationship,

there is no breach of contract. As such, it is impossible for an at-will employee to satisfy

the tort’s second element of inducing or causing a third-party employer not to perform an

employment contract ― again, there is no contract.

       Indeed, it is for this reason that the theory that an employee possesses an

expectation of continued employment until termination, see Majority Opinion at 24, which

serves as the basis for the tort, must fail. An expectation interest is a legally recognizable

interest, based upon contract, which is implicated in formulating a remedy for a breach of

that contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 (1981) (“Judicial remedies

under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following

interests of a promisee: (a) his ‘expectation interest,’ which is his interest in having the

benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had

the contract been performed . . . .”); id. (“The law of contract remedies implements the

policy in favor of allowing individuals to order their own affairs by making legally

enforceable promises. Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach

                              [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 4
of contract, it enforces the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the injured

party had when he made the contract.”); Trosky v. Civil Service Commission, City of

Pittsburgh, 652 A.2d 813, 817 (Pa. 1995) (“In addressing the concept of remedies

generally, we may note that in the law of contracts remedies for breach are designed to

protect . . . a party's expectation interest ‘by attempting to put him in as good a position

as he would have been had the contract been performed, that is, had there been no

breach.’”). Thus, as there is no contract for continued employment under the at-will

employment doctrine, there can be no expectation interest in continued employment

which can be thwarted.

       Furthermore, injecting an expectation of continued employment into the at-will

employment paradigm could alter, or at a minimum cloud, the employment rights of

government employees, at least with respect to the right to a notice and hearing which

hinges on the employee’s expectation interest. See Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 681 A.2d

1261, 1263 (Pa. 1996) (“An individual employed by a government agency does not enjoy

a property right in her employment unless she has an expectation of continued

employment. . . . That expectation may be guaranteed by statute, contract, or be quasi-

contractual in nature. If the individual has such an expectation, she is entitled to notice

and a hearing under Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 553. . . . If, however, the individual

does not have an expectation of continued employment, she is an at-will employee who

does not have a right to a hearing.” (citations omitted)).

       Finally, the majority frankly acknowledges the danger of “eviscerating our at-will

employment principles and stifling employers’ ability to structure and conduct their

business as they choose,” Majority Opinion at 29-30, but hopes for a “limited impact” of

this newly embraced tort on the at-will employment doctrine and urges our courts to be

“vigilant” in this regard. Id. at 30, 31. Make no mistake, as set forth below, today’s

                             [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 5
decision will have a significant impact on employment law in our Commonwealth, as the

vast majority of workers in Pennsylvania are at-will.

       First, the workplace requires clear guidelines as to acceptable and unacceptable

conduct.   Yet, the standard for recovery under the tort of intentional contractual

interference is multi-factored, subjective, and depends upon the particular circumstances

of a case, leaving officers, supervisors, and managers to guess as to what constitutes

“improper” conduct (or “unprivileged” conduct in the majority’s parlance) and whether their

actions are within their scope of employment or authority.

       Regarding whether the challenged conduct is “improper,” this assessment is made

by applying a multi-factor balancing test which includes considerations of “the nature of

the actor’s conduct,” “motive,” “the interests sought to be advanced,” “social interests,”

and concepts of “remoteness.”4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767.               Regarding

4 Section 767 of the Restatement provides:

              In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally
              interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation
              of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the
              following factors:
              (a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
              (b) the actor's motive,
              (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
              interferes,
              (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
              (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of
              the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
              (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
              interference and
              (g) the relations between the parties.
(continued…)

                             [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 6
whether an officer, supervisor, or manager’s actions are within his or her scope of

employment or authority, the majority adopts Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228. As

with the definition of “improper” conduct, this “scope of employment” litmus lacks clarity,

and is defined by a fact-specific, multi-factor, conjunctive test.5 Section 228 is fraught

with subjectivity, implicating questions of what precisely is “authorized,” whether conduct

is “substantially within” or “far beyond” time or space limits, and whether it is “too little

actuated” by a purpose to serve the employer. Id. § 228. Both of these assessments ―

requiring improper conduct and scope of employment or authority ― are situation-driven,

amorphous, and subjective, and will lead to an increase in litigation, with most cases

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767. The Restatement commentary indicates that its
drafters settled on the term “improper” as a “single word that will indicate for this tort the
balancing process expressed by the two terms ‘culpable and not justified.’” Walnut St.
Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 475 n.9 (Pa. 2011). The
commentary adds that “Section 767 specifies and analyzes the factors to be taken into
consideration in determining whether the interference is improper, and must therefore be
read and applied to each of the earlier sections . . . . Sections 768–773 state specific
applications of the factors set out in § 767 to certain types of factual patterns.” Id.
5 Section 228 provides:

              (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
              but only if:
                     (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
                    (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
              and space limits;
                    (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve
              the master, and
                    (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against
              another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
              (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment
              if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the
              authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a
              purpose to serve the master.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228.

                              [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 7
going to trial to resolve contested facts, placing a heavy burden on businesses and our

judicial system.

       Perhaps more importantly, as a result of this circumstance-driven and inherently

ambiguous construct, the importation of this intentional interference tort has the potential

to alter the freedom inherent in the at-will employment doctrine and shift it towards one

where terminations are for only “just cause.” Specifically, because of the vagueness of

the tort ― and the resulting uncertainty as to whether an officer, supervisor, or manager

is acting within his scope of employment or authority, or whether his conduct is improper

or unprivileged ― and the threat of legal action, a supervisor, when considering an

adverse employment action such as termination, will, as a practical matter, terminate an

employee only for “just” reasons, i.e., a just cause discharge. This undermines the nature

of the at-will employment doctrine, essentially transforming it into a de facto “just cause”

framework, thereby curtailing an employer’s prerogative to discharge an employee for

any reason. Whether imposing a just cause requirement for termination upon employers

is desirable is debatable, but the creation of exceptions or alterations to the at-will

employment doctrine are generally for the General Assembly and not for the courts.6

       Moreover, the majority’s decision will not impact only employee terminations. An

adverse employment action such as a demotion, suspension, or even a warning placed

in an employee’s personnel file could serve as the basis for a cause of action under this

tort. The candid nature of performance evaluations will be chilled by the threat of litigation.

6 In the at-will employment context, and with respect to the evolution of this common law

doctrine, our Court has been clear that “it is for the legislature to formulate the public
policies of the Commonwealth.” Weaver, 975 A.2d at 563. The right of a court to declare
the common law as to public policy exists “only when a given policy is so obviously for or
against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion
in regard to it.” Id. (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe (City of Philadelphia Police Beneficiary
Association), 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941)). Indeed, our Commonwealth's traditional view
is “that exceptions to at-will employment should be few and carefully sculpted so as not
to erode an employer's inherent right to operate its business as it chooses.” Id.

                              [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 8
A former employer responding to a new employer’s request for a job reference for a

probationary employee will be hard pressed to give anything more than the dates of

employment in light of a potential action for the intentional interference with contractual

relations. Similarly, a former employer’s attempt to enforce a noncompete agreement

through a demand that a competing employer terminate or alter a new employee’s status

could subject the former employer to liability.

       In summary, it is inconsistent with Pennsylvania’s at-will employment doctrine to

allow for a contract-based tort of this nature, and the majority’s well-meaning attempt to

inject it into the at-will employment context will not only shift the doctrine closer to a just

cause framework, but will bring increased litigation and confusion to the workplace. For

these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s adoption of the tort of the

intentional interference with the performance of a contract by a third party in the context

of at-will employment. However, I concur in the result, as the majority ultimately denies

relief to Salsberg, the plaintiff who advanced this theory of recovery below.

                              [J-4-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 9