Court Opinion

ID: 9384589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 14:00:52.473239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.913889
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2187   Document: 44     Page: 1   Filed: 04/04/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  RAMON E. ROANE,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                            v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2021-2187
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 20-3293, Judge Amanda L. Mere-
 dith.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 4, 2023
                 ______________________

    KENNETH DOJAQUEZ, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka,
 KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

     SOSUN BAE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Divi-
 sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
 DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
 KYLE SHANE BECKRICH, BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH
 MARIE HOSFORD, KELLY A. KRYSTYNIAK, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; EVAN SCOTT GRANT, Y. KEN LEE, Office of Gen-
 eral Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Af-
 fairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 21-2187     Document: 44      Page: 2    Filed: 04/04/2023

 2                                       ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH

                   ______________________

     Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
      Ramon Roane appeals the final decision of the United
 States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims which held
 that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based
 on individual unemployability because his service-con-
 nected disabilities did not preclude all forms of substan-
 tially gainful employment. Because we conclude that the
 Veterans Court properly interpreted the benefit of the
 doubt rule under 38 U.S.C. § 5107 and applied the appro-
 priate standard of review to the Board’s application of the
 benefit of the doubt rule under § 7261(b)(1), we affirm.
                               I
      Mr. Roane served in the U.S. Navy from August 1981
 to March 1991. In December 2013, he underwent voca-
 tional rehabilitation for his disabilities, including paralysis
 of the sciatic nerve, degenerative arthritis of the spine, and
 limited flexion of the knee. In August 2017, he filed a for-
 mal application for total disability based on individual un-
 employability (TDIU) where he alleged that he was unable
 to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation due
 to his service-connected disabilities. 1 At the time, he had a
 combined disability rating of 70 percent.
     Between 2016 and 2019, Mr. Roane was examined sev-
 eral times by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Those
 examinations showed that his disabilities interfered with

     1   A TDIU rating is assigned to a veteran who meets
 disability percentage thresholds and is unable to secure or
 follow a substantially gainful occupation due to service-
 connected disabilities. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340,
 4.16.
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 ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH                                         3

 his ability to perform occupational tasks due to his inability
 to sit or stand for extended periods and difficulty changing
 positions from sitting to standing. But in November 2017,
 a peripheral nerve examiner opined that despite these lim-
 itations, he should be able to “seek and maintain a substan-
 tially gainful light physical or sedentary type of
 employment.” J.A. 3. The same month, a VA regional office
 denied his TDIU claim.
      Mr. Roane disagreed with the decision of the regional
 office and opted to submit additional evidence to the Board.
 In May 2019, he obtained a private vocational assessment
 where the expert opined that his difficulties with prolonged
 sitting, standing, and walking “affect his ability to perform
 any type of substantially gainful employment, even seden-
 tary employment.” J.A. 4.
     In April 2020, the Board issued its decision denying a
 TDIU rating. The Board found that Mr. Roane’s service-
 connected disabilities met the rating requirement of 70
 percent for TDIU under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), but that they
 “are not shown to be such as to preclude all forms of sub-
 stantially gainful employment.” J.A. 42–43. The Board
 noted that Mr. Roane, with his college education, skills,
 and experience, is not precluded from work “that can be
 done sitting, with opportunity to stand as required.” J.A.
 43. In making its determination, the Board considered both
 the VA examination reports, which did not suggest a find-
 ing of TDIU, and the private examination report, which
 opined that Mr. Roane was unemployable. The Board found
 the latter report to be “conclusory and lacking persuasive
 probative value.” J.A. 43.
     The Veterans Court affirmed. The Veterans Court
 found no error in the Board’s consideration of the evidence
 or in its application of the benefit of the doubt rule. In par-
 ticular, the Veterans Court noted that “the Board . . . sum-
 marized the evidence of record, determined that
 [Mr. Roane], despite his physical limitations, is not
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 4                                      ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH

 precluded from all forms of substantially gainful employ-
 ment consistent with his education, intellectual skills, and
 experience, and explained its reasons for discounting the
 2019 vocational counselor’s favorable opinion to the con-
 trary.” J.A. 6–7.
     Mr. Roane appeals.
                              II
      We review de novo the Veterans Court’s interpretation
 of law. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
 Unless an appeal from the Veterans Court decision pre-
 sents a constitutional issue, this Court may not review “a
 challenge to a factual determination,” or “a challenge to a
 law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular
 case.” 38 U.S.C § 7292(d)(2)(A)–(B).
    Because Mr. Roane argues that the Veterans Court
 wrongly interpreted 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107 and § 7261(b)(1), we
 have jurisdiction to review these narrow issues.
                              A
     Mr. Roane first argues that the Veterans Court misin-
 terpreted 38 U.S.C. § 5107 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, which re-
 late to how the Board determines whether the benefit of
 the doubt rule applies. He argues that § 5107(b) and
 § 3.102 require the Board to: “1) identify which evidence is
 positive or negative; 2) explain why with adequate reasons
 and bases; and 3) explain why the benefit of the doubt was
 not afforded” because, according to him, without such safe-
 guards, the Veterans Court “is unable to determine
 whether evidence was either persuasively positive or neg-
 ative.” Appellant’s Br. 16–17. Mr. Roane alleges that the
 Board legally erred by just summarizing the record as a
 whole, rather than identifying each evidence as positive or
 negative.
     Mr. Roane’s argument finds no support in the plain
 language of either the cited statute or regulation. The
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 ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH                                         5

 statute provides that “[w]hen there is an approximate bal-
 ance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue
 material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary
 shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” 38
 U.S.C. § 5107(b). Similarly, the regulation provides that
 “[w]hen, after careful consideration of all procurable and
 assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding ser-
 vice origin, the degree of disability, or any other point, such
 doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant.” 38 C.F.R.
 § 3.102. Although these provisions require the Secretary to
 carefully consider all evidence and determine whether
 there’s an approximate balance of positive and negative ev-
 idence, they do not specify in what manner that review
 must be performed and certainly not to the degree of spec-
 ificity requested by Mr. Roane.
      We recently addressed the same issue in Mattox v.
 McDonough, 56 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2023). There, the vet-
 eran also argued that the Board was required to specifi-
 cally identify and list each piece of positive and negative
 evidence. Id. at 1376–77. Although we agreed that the
 Board was required to identify and consider the relevant
 evidence, we specifically rejected the argument that it was
 required to “give a precise and comprehensive listing of
 positive and negative evidence.” Id. at 1377–78. Rather, we
 held that it is sufficient for the Board to identify key evi-
 dence and assign probative weight in its benefit of the
 doubt analysis. Id. And we observed that the Board had
 fulfilled its duty by noting the competing reports of the VA
 examiners, which were clearly negative, and Mr. Mattox’s
 doctor, which was clearly positive. Id.
     Similarly, the Board here fulfilled its duty by identify-
 ing positive and negative evidence and assigning probative
 weight in its benefit of the doubt analysis. In particular,
 the Board considered the competing evidence of the VA ex-
 aminers’ medical reports, which were negative evidence,
 and Mr. Roane’s private vocational assessment, which was
 positive evidence. The Board thus properly interpreted the
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 6                                         ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH

 law. And the Veterans Court did not legally err by declin-
 ing to impose the heightened requirements suggested by
 Mr. Roane.
                                 B
     Mr. Roane next argues that the Veterans Court incor-
 rectly interpreted the standard of review it should apply to
 the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule un-
 der § 7261(b)(1).
     Section 7261 provides in relevant part that:
     (a) In any action brought under this chapter, the
         Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims . . .
         shall—
     ...
           (4) in the case of a finding of material fact
           adverse to the claimant . . . hold unlawful
           and set aside or reverse such finding if the
           finding is clearly erroneous.
     (b) In making the determinations under subsection
     (a), the Court shall review the record of proceedings
     before the Secretary and the Board of Veterans’ Ap-
     peals pursuant to section 7252(b) of this title and
     shall—
           (1) take due account of the Secretary’s ap-
           plication of section 5107(b) of this title; and
           (2) take due account of the rule of prejudi-
           cial error.
     (c) In no event shall findings of fact made by the
     Secretary or the Board of Veterans’ Appeals be sub-
     ject to trial de novo by the Court.
 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)–(c) (emphases added).
     Mr. Roane argues that the “take due account” language
 in § 7261(b) requires the Veterans Court to conduct an
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 ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH                                       7

 “additional and independent non[-]deferential review” of
 the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule, be-
 cause a deferential review that is constrained by the stand-
 ard of review in § 7261(a) would be “meaningless.”
 Appellant’s Br. 23–24. But Mr. Roane’s argument is not
 supported by the text or structure of 38 U.S.C. § 7261, and
 we decline to adopt this far-reaching interpretation of the
 phrase “take due account.”
     We begin with the text of the statute and “give effect to
 that clear language without rendering any portion of it
 meaningless.” Sharp v. United States, 580 F.3d 1234, 1237
 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Although only § 7261(b)(1) is at issue in
 this appeal, the “take due account” language on which
 Mr. Roane relies must be read in context of the rest of the
 statute, including subsections (a) and (c). King v. Burwell,
 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (“Our duty [in statutory construc-
 tion] is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” (in-
 ternal quotation marks omitted)).
      Section 7261(a) sets the scope and the relevant stand-
 ards of review the Veterans Court must apply. Bowling v.
 McDonough, 38 F.4th 1051, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Euzebio
 v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Rele-
 vant here, § 7261(a)(4) provides that the Veterans Court
 can set aside or reverse a finding of material fact only if
 “the finding is clearly erroneous.” Since the Veterans
 Court’s review under § 7261(b) is tied to § 7261(a), the Vet-
 erans Court can review facts only under the clearly erro-
 neous standard when considering the Board’s benefit of the
 doubt determination. And if subsection (a) were not enough
 to conclude that the Veterans Court could not make de novo
 factual findings, § 7261(c) makes clear that “[i]n no event”
 can the Veterans Court conduct a de novo review of mate-
 rial facts. By including subsection (c), Congress expressly
 limited the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction to exclude de novo
 fact-finding. Therefore, when considering subsection (b)(1)
 alongside its neighboring subsections, not only is the type
 of non-deferential review Mr. Roane asked for not
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 8                                       ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH

 authorized in subsection (a), but it is also expressly prohib-
 ited in subsection (c). Indeed, we have repeatedly held that
 the Veterans Court can only “review the Board’s weighing
 of the evidence; it may not weigh any evidence itself.” E.g.,
 Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
 Based on the text of § 7261 and our precedent, the Veterans
 Court cannot conduct its own independent and non-defer-
 ential review of the facts to take due account of the Board’s
 application of the benefit of the doubt rule.
      This understanding of the phrase “take due account” is
 also consistent with our interpretation of the phrase “take
 due account” in the parallel provision, § 7261(b)(2), which
 directs the Veterans Court to “take due account of the rule
 of prejudicial error.” We generally give identical words and
 phrases within the same statute the same meaning, espe-
 cially when they appear within the same statutory sen-
 tence. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408 (2011).
 Although we have not directly addressed the meaning of
 “take due account” in the context of § 7261(b)(1), we have
 addressed the meaning of that phrase in § 7261(b)(2). Tad-
 lock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1332–36 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
 In Tadlock, the Veterans Court affirmed a Board’s decision
 even though the Board had made a clearly erroneous fac-
 tual finding because the court found the error to be non-
 prejudicial. In reaching this conclusion, the Veterans Court
 made new factual determinations that had not been con-
 sidered by the Board. Id. at 1332. We vacated the Veterans
 Court’s decision after observing that § 7261(c) explicitly
 prohibits the Veterans Court, an appellate tribunal, from
 engaging in de novo fact finding. Id. at 1334 (citation omit-
 ted). We further concluded that “§ 7261(b)’s command that
 the Veterans Court ‘give due account of the rule of prejudi-
 cial error’ does not give it the right to make de novo find-
 ings of fact or otherwise resolve matters that are open to
 debate.” Id. at 1337. Similarly, the phrase “take due ac-
 count” in § 7261(b)(1) cannot provide the Veterans Court
 the authority to deviate from the standards of review
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 ROANE   v. MCDONOUGH                                        9

 articulated in § 7261(a), or to directly contradict Congress’s
 explicit instruction that the Veterans Court refrain from de
 novo fact-finding, as required under subsection (c).
     By asking for an “additional and independent
 non[-]deferential review” of the Board’s application of the
 benefit of the doubt rule, Appellant’s Br. 24, Mr. Roane es-
 sentially asks us to allow the Veterans Court to reweigh
 evidence de novo. But this understanding would impermis-
 sibly expand the scope of the Veterans Court’s review be-
 yond what is specified in § 7261(a) and would directly
 violate § 7261(c). We will not expand the interpretation of
 § 7261(b) so broadly. The Veterans Court did not misinter-
 pret the statutory requirements of § 7261 by reviewing the
 Board’s factual determinations for clear error while taking
 due account of the Board’s application of the benefit of the
 doubt rule. 2
                              III
     Because we conclude that the Veterans Court properly
 interpreted the benefit of the doubt rule under 38 U.S.C.
 § 5107 and applied the appropriate standard of review to
 the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule un-
 der § 7261(b)(1), we affirm.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.

     2   To the extent that Mr. Roane argues that the Vet-
 erans Court erred in its factual determination that the
 Board provided adequate bases for denying his TDIU
 claim, that is an application of law to fact that we cannot
 review. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).