Court Opinion

ID: 9705263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:56.152585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.328359
License: Public Domain

*221
Smith, J.

dissenting:

I dissent from so much of the opinion in this case as reverses the judgment of conviction upon the basis that hearsay evidence should have been admitted. I find no case which requires — or suggests — that the evidence here presented should be admitted.
Let us begin by examining the definition of hearsay. E. Cleary, McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972), gives the following definition:
"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.”
McCormick further states in § 245:
"In order to encourage witnesses to put forth their best efforts and to expose inaccuracies which might be present with respect to any of the foregoing factors, the Anglo-American tradition evolved three conditions under which witnesses ordinarily will be required to testify: oath, personal presence at the trial, and cross-examination. The rule against hearsay is designed to insure compliance with these ideal conditions, and when one of them is absent the hearsay objection becomes pertinent.”
Id. at 581-82.
Certain exceptions to the hearsay rule have come into our law. Indicia of reliability must exist in order for evidence to be admitted under one of those exceptions. See generally, D. Binder, The Hearsay Handbook (1975). Professor Irving Younger in his lectures on evidence might well ask the question, "Does it smell right?” One of those exceptions is declarations against interest. Many states have seen fit to restrict *222such admissions to declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest, excluding declarations against penal interest. See McCormick §§ 277-278. Maryland is among those which have discarded the restriction so as to admit a declaration against penal interest. See Dyson v. State, 238 Md. 398, 407, 209 A.2d 609 (1965), vacated on other grounds, 383 U.S. 106 (1966); Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 103, 200 A.2d 683, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 861 (1964); Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), affirmed, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 (1946); Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926),1 and Harris v. State, 40 Md. App. 58, 62-63, 387 A.2d 1152 (1978).
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1979), upon which the majority relies, are not applicable. In both cases what was held admissible was a statement by another individual that he had committed the crime for which the defendants were on trial. As anyone can see, such a statement has earmarks of reliability. That is a far cry from what we have here.
Chambers was convicted of murdering a policeman. One of his defenses was that another person, McDonald, had shot the deputy in question. A lifelong friend of McDonald’s testified that he saw McDonald shoot the officer. A second witness, a cousin of the officer, testified that he saw McDonald with a pistol in his hand immediately after the shooting. As Justice Powell put it for the Court:
"In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, Chambers endeavored to show the jury that McDonald had repeatedly confessed to the crime. Chambers attempted to prove that McDonald had admitted responsibility for the murder on four separate occasions, once when he gave the sworn statement to Chambers’ counsel and three other *223times prior to that occasion in private conversations with friends.” 410 U.S. at 289.
Chambers asked the trial court to require McDonald to appear. The State did not call him as a witness, so Chambers did. He had McDonald’s sworn confession read to the jury. The State responded by eliciting from McDonald that he had repudiated his prior confession, and that the only reason for it was that he had been promised he would not go to jail and would share in a tort recovery Chambers would bring against the town which employed the police officer. Chambers asked the court for permission to examine McDonald as an adverse witness, but the court refused, saying that he was hostile, but not adverse. On appeal the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the trial court’s ruling, finding, according to the Supreme Court, "that 'McDonald’s testimony was not adverse to appellant’ because '[n]owhere did he point the finger at Chambers.’ 252 So. 2d, at 220.” 410 U.S. at 292.
Chambers then sought to introduce the testimony of the three other witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted that he shot the officer. The first one would have said McDonald told him the night of the shooting that he shot the officer in question. The State objected to the admission of this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. The trial court sustained the exception. The second witness testified out of the presence of the jury that while he, McDonald and another were taking Chambers to the hospital McDonald said that he shot the deputy. The witness stated that one week later McDonald reminded him of their prior conversation and urged the witness not to "mess him up.” Again an objection was urged and sustained on hearsay grounds. The third witness would have said that he had been a friend and neighbor of McDonald for about twenty-five years. The day after the shooting he and McDonald walked out to a well near McDonald’s house and there McDonald told him that he *224was the one who shot the officer. McDonald also told him that he had disposed of the revolver. Several weeks after the shooting this witness accompanied McDonald when he purchased a new weapon. Hearsay again was the reason for exclusion of the testimony.
Justice Powell described for the Court "Chambers’ predicament,” stating, "As a consequence of the combination of Mississippi’s 'party witness’ or 'voucher’ rule and its hearsay rule, he was unable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited McDonald’s repudiation and demonstrated his complicity.” Id. at 294.
It was in the context of the above that the Court said, "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” Id. The Court held Chambers had a right to cross-examine McDonald. It said that Mississippi’s "voucher” rule, which did not let a party impeach his own witness, bore little relationship to the realities of the criminal process. To the extent the confession incriminated McDonald, it exculpated Chambers; and, the retraction inculpated Chambers to the same extent it exculpated McDonald. The voucher rule, as applied, interfered with Chambers’ right to defend aginst the State’s charges.
More relevant to this case is the Court’s discussion as to the exclusion as hearsay of the testimony of the three witnesses who heard McDonald confess. Justice Powell said for the Court:
"The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant’s word is not subject to *225cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). A number of exceptions have developed over the years to allow admission of hearsay statements made under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination. Among the most prevalent of these exceptions is the one applicable to declarations against interest — an exception founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made. Mississippi recognizes this exception but applies it only to declarations against pecuniary interest.” 410 U.S. at 298-99.
Justice Powell said for the Court that this "materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-interest hearsay exception appears to be accepted by most States in their criminal trial processes, although a number of States have discarded it.” 410 U.S. at 299. As we have already noted, Maryland is among the states which have discarded this rule.
It becomes important to look at the circumstances existent in Chambers, which circumstances are absent in this case. Justice Powell summarized them for the Court:
"The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. First, each of McDonald’s confessions was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case — McDonald’s sworn confession, the testimony of an eye-witness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, *226and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S., at 89. McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role in the shooting to any of this three friends and he must have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner not to 'mess him up.’ Finally, if there was any question about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial statements, McDonald was present in the courtroom and was under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).” 410 U.S. at 300-01 (footnote omitted).
The Court went on to say:
"Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical to Chambers’ defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied *227mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” 410 U.S. at 302.
In Green, 442 U.S. 95, he and Moore were indicted together for the rape and murder of a woman. Moore was tried separately, was convicted of both crimes, and had been sentenced to death at the time Green’s case reached the Supreme Court. Green had also been so convicted and sentenced to death. During sentencing Green sought to prove he was not present when the woman was killed and had not participated in her death. According to the Court:
"He attempted to introduce the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified for the State at Moore’s trial. According to Pasby, Moore had confided to him that he had killed Allen, shooting her twice after ordering petitioner to run an errand. The trial court refused to allow introduction of this evidence, ruling that Pasby’s testimony constituted hearsay that was inadmissible under Ga. Code § 38-301 (1978).” 442 U.S. at 96 (footnote omitted).
It was in this context that the Court said that the exclusion of the evidence "constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 97. It said, "Substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability.” Id. The Court further stated:
"Moore made his statement spontaneously to a close friend. The evidence corroborating the confession was ample, and indeed sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore and a capital sentence. The statement was against interest, and there was no reason to believe that Moore had any ulterior motive in making it. Perhaps most important, the State considered the testimony sufficiently reliable to use it against Moore, and to base a sentence of death upon it. In these unique circumstances, 'the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.’ Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).” Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
*228It is important to see the clearly distinguishing features between Chambers and Green on the one side and the case at bar on the other. The Supreme Court had before it in its cases confessions to close friends made by the murderers almost immediately after the crimes had been committed. It was the testimony of the friends as to these confessions to them which was sought to be admitted. Here there is a statement, not a confession, allegedly made by the murderer two and a half weeks before the murder. The statement is to the victim, not a close friend. The victim then allegedly related this statement to a business acquaintance of hers. It is the testimony of this acquaintance which is sought to be admitted, a long way from the situation in both Chambers and Green, where murder was confessed. Even these superficial observations demonstrate how much further the testimony sought to be admitted here is from that in Chambers and Green.
The factors which the Supreme Court relies upon to demonstrate reliability in the hearsay are key elements to compare here. In both Supreme Court cases the confessions were made spontaneously and to close friends shortly after the murder. Here the alleged threat was made two and a half weeks before the murder. We are not told when the victim made her statement relative to this alleged threat. We have na showing that it was made to a confidant. The statement was in no way against the interest of the declarant.
In Chambers there was ample evidence corroborating the confessions, e.g., sworn confessions, eye witness testimony, etc. Here there is a letter to the court, allegedly written by the husband, confessing to the crime. He denies writing the letter and he is supported in this statement by the defendant’s own daughter who says that this letter is not in the handwriting of the husband. The only thing corroborating the hearsay testimony of Mrs. Douglass is her note allegedly written immediately after her conversation with the victim. This note says nothing more than that Douglass should not hire or rent to the Fosters because they are "bad news.” It supports in no way threats to kill the victim by the husband or anyone else.
*229In Chambers and Green each confession was self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interest. Here, although the husband’s alleged threat may have been self-incriminating and against his interest, the statements of the victim certainly were not in any way incriminating or against her interest.
It can be seen that almost none of the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Chambers and Green is present here. It is important to note that in Chambers the Court concluded its opinion by stating:
"In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.” 410 U.S. 302-03.
The Court closed its opinion in Green, as we have already stated, by speaking of "unique circumstances” and referring to Chambers. These statements show that it was not the intention of the Supreme Court for these two cases to be interpreted in a manner such that the states’ rules of evidence, particularly as they relate to hearsay, would be selectively emasculated.
Chambers and Green do not mandate the reversal here. This evidence utterly fails to meet any test of reliability. The majority has been unable to produce any case holding evidence comparable to this should be admitted. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Rodowsky concur in the views here expressed.
*230ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration and Stay of Issuance of Mandate filed in the above entitled case, it is this 16th day of September, 1983
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the motion be, and it is hereby, denied.
/s/ Robert C. Murphy
Chief Judge

. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1476, at 354 n. 9 (Rev. 1974), speaks of the opinion in Brennan as "excellent.”