Court Opinion

ID: 9498878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:30:19.830074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:07.506623
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE,
Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we must review Jones’s overall sentence for reasonableness. However, because the district court’s failure to explain why it rejected Jones’s argument seeking a lower sentence under a relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor flies in the face of this -court’s precedents and makes the sentence impossible properly to review, I cannot find Jones’s sentence reasonable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), this court reviews a sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 n. 3 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005). Although procedural reasonableness does not require the district court to cite each *872§ 3553(a) factor in arriving at a sentence, McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3, it does require, as this court has held and the majority recognizes, that the district court “consider the advisory Guidelines range and all relevant factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Majority Opinion (“Maj.Op.”) at 869 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 553-54 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir.2005); Webb, 403 F.3d at 383. The presumption of reasonableness afforded to sentences within the advisory Guidelines range, United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.2006), does not relieve the district court of its duty “to explain to the parties and the reviewing court its reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. The presumption is rebutted where the district court fails to articulate its rationale in a way that permits meaningful appellate review. This court has held that meaningful reasonableness review requires that “[wjhere a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” Id. at 554; accord Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644 (explaining that a sentence within the Guidelines range carries no presumption of reasonableness where the record does not reflect that the court considered “all of the relevant section 3553(a) factors”); Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305 (stating that procedural reasonableness requires “reference to the applicable Guidelines provisions”).
In this case, Jones clearly argued that he was entitled to a reduction in his sentence because he had already served a one-year sentence for the same conduct at issue in the instant case. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) also discusses the applicability of the policy statement found at U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (“USSG”) § 5K2.23, which advises courts that they can, when certain circumstances are met, depart downwards for sentences already served based on the same conduct.1 The district *873court must consider relevant policy statements in its sentencing determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). United States v. Williams, 432 F.3d 621, 623-24 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir.2005). Under the mandates of procedural reasonableness, the district court was obligated to demonstrate that it considered, as directed lay 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) and USSG § 5K2.23, the fact that Jones had already served a one-year sentence for the same conduct at issue here.2 That the district court has failed to do. Despite the facts that Jones raised the issue of his time already served for the same conduct and that the PSR discussed the potential applicability of USSG § 5K2.23, the district court made no mention of them and provided no indication that it had considered either the policy statement or the time already served.
The majority incorrectly asserts that the district court complied with the standards for procedural reasonableness set forth in Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554, because the district court “explained] to the parties and the reviewing court' its reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Maj. Op: at 871. Richardson certainly requires this, but it also requires more, namely that “[wjhere a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” 437 F.3d at 554. Although the majority may believe that “a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range should not lose its presumption of reasonableness whenever a district judge does not explicitly address every defense argument for a below-Guidelines sentence,” Maj. Op. at 871, this panel is not at liberty to contradict the law of this circuit as previously decided by a unanimous panel of this court in Richardson. See 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) (directing that “[rjeported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels”).
Perhaps recognizing that it cannot merely ignore Richardson’s conclusion that a sentence is unreasonable if the district court fails to consider a defendant’s argument seeking a lower sentence or explain its basis for rejecting such an argument, the majority somehow “flnd[sj” that the district court “was aware of Jones’ previous state sentence but nevertheless sentenced him to twelve months of imprisonment in light of the gravity of the offense and his extensive criminal history,” based on the fact that “the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23 was articulated in the presentence report and defense counsel twice informed the district court....” Maj. Op. at 871. However, the majority’s speculation regarding the district judge’s consideration of this factor also directly contradicts Richardson, which requires that for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” 437 F.3d at 554 (emphases added). A sentencing court has *874not met this obligation where this court must guess as to what the court below did or did not consider. Rather, there must be “sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the court’s consideration” of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3; accord Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644 (explaining that the sentencing court’s consideration of “all of the relevant section 3553(a) factors” must be “clear from the record”). Where the district judge fails “to explicitly consider” these factors, there must be “other evidence in the record demonstrating that they were thoroughly considered by the district court.” McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3. Neither the Government nor the majority can point to any such evidence. Indeed, the majority’s conjectural “finding]” makes plain that the record neither “affirmatively demonstrate^],” McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n. 3, nor makes “clear,” Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644, that the district court even considered Jones’s state sentence, let alone explained its reasons for rejecting his argument on this ground. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary is pure speculation in contravention of Richardson, Foreman, and McBride.
Due to the district court’s failure to explain its consideration and rejection of Jones’s argument in support of a reduced sentence, Jones’s sentence cannot be meaningfully reviewed. I would therefore vacate Jones’s sentence and remand for resentencing. I respectfully dissent.

. It is not clear that Jones was eligible for a reduction in his sentence under USSG § 5K2.23. The PSR indicates that Jones's state conviction and sentence would have been considered sufficiently similar conduct under USSG § 5K2.23. The PSR specifically noted that Jones did not receive any criminal history points for his receiving stolen property conviction because it "is considered conduct which is part of the instant offense.” Joint Appendix at 46 (PSR at 13). The government did not object to this statement in the PSR. Regardless of whether the policy statement applied, both Jones and the PSR reasonably raised the issue of his time already served as applicable to his sentence, and thus the district court was obligated to consider it and explain the court's assessment as to why it did or did not apply. See Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. Richardson makes clear that the duty of the district court to explain its determination of a defendant’s argument for a reduced sentence applies equally where the district court ultimately rejects the defendant's argument. Id. Moreover, even if USSG § 5K2.23 was not applicable, Jones's already-served prison time for the same conduct should have been considered, as the majority acknowledges, as part of the assessment of other § 3553(a) factors, including the need for the sentence to impose a "just punishment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and the need for the sentence to provide "adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). See Maj. Op. at 869 n. 5.
I now turn to a brief note on terminology. Our court has previously explained that departures based on Chapter 5 of the Guidelines should be referred to as “Guideline departures,” and that "sentences lower than the Guidelines recommendation based on section 3553(a) factors” can be referred to as "Non-Guideline departures.” McBride, 434 F.3d at 477 n. 5. Several of our sister circuits reserve the term "departure" for traditional Chapter 5 departures, and refer to "Non-Guideline departures” as "variances.” See, e.g., United *873States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir.2006); United States v. Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896-97 (8th Cir.2006). The term 'Variance'' is useful in clearly distinguishing traditional departures from sentences that fall below the Guidelines based on the district court's discretion in applying the'§ 3553(a) factors.

. The majority notes that Jones specifically sought probation and that probation was not available to him because of the type of crime of which he was convicted and the fact that he had been sentenced to imprisonment for another offense. Maj. Op. at 867-868 n. 3. Whether Jones was eligible for probation does not affect this court's review of the sentence because Jones remained eligible to receive a lesser sentence short of probation under the advisory Guidelines, and thus consideration of the USSG § 5K2.23 policy statement was relevant.