Court Opinion

ID: 9408915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 05:06:51.130684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.643750
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
               revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                        STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

OMAR AKEEM AMOS,                                                UNPUBLISHED
                                                                July 13, 2023
             Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

MICHIGAN HEAD & SPINE INSTITUTE, P.C., and
ASCENSION ST. JOHN HOSPITAL,

      Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                               No. 360091
                                                                Wayne Circuit Court
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE                                  LC No. 20-012063-NF
COMPANY,

             Defendant-Appellant,

and

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE and USAA
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

             Defendants.

OMAR AKEEM AMOS,

             Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

MICHIGAN HEAD & SPINE INSTITUTE, P.C.,
and ASCENSION ST. JOHN HOSPITAL,

             Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                             -1-
v                                                                     No. 360098
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE                                        LC No. 20-012063-NF
COMPANY and FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,

                 Defendants,

and

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and LETICA, JJ.

LETICA, J. (dissenting).

       I respectfully dissent. The circuit court erred when it denied Progressive and USAA’s
motions for summary disposition and subsequent motions for reconsideration because there was
no genuine issue of material fact on this record that plaintiff Omar Amos (Omar)1 was willfully
operating a motor vehicle he unlawfully took from his mother Venus and that he knew or should
have known he took it unlawfully.

                                  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

        On Sunday May 24, 2020, the day before Memorial Day, Venus went to bed at about
8:30 p.m. Thirty-two-year-old Omar recalled taking the 8-Mile Grand River bus to Venus’s house3
as the sun was setting.4 By 10:12 p.m., a crash involving Venus’s vehicle was reported to police.
Omar, whose driver’s license had been suspended for years, had been driving Venus’s vehicle.

1
  To distinguish plaintiff Omar Amos from his mother Venus Amos (Venus), I refer to them by
their first names.
2
    I agree with the majority’s recitation of the procedural background and its standard of review.
3
  Omar testified that he spent his time equally between the homes of his mother and the mother of
his child. Earlier, however, Omar told a Progressive employee that he did not often stay at Venus’s
home, perhaps “once every two weeks or something like that.” In deciding a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court views conflicting evidence “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 7-
8; 972 NW2d 860 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
4
  Although no additional information was provided about when Omar arrived on the bus or when
the sun set, governmental records reflect sunset occurred at 8:56 p.m.
<https://gml.noaa.gov/grad/solcalc/sunrise.html> (accessed July 5, 2023). See MRE 201.

                                                  -2-
Omar rear-ended a vehicle stopped for a red light, jumped a curb, and toppled a light pole before
striking a building. Two additional adult occupants in Venus’s vehicle, Omar’s female
acquaintance and her brother, fled after the crash. The acquaintance’s brother returned to the scene
and was transported to the hospital. Omar was seriously injured and subsequent hospital testing
showed that he was positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and had a 0.171 blood-alcohol level,
twice the legal limit.

       During Venus’s subsequent deposition, she testified she purchased that vehicle in February
2018. Venus had two sets of keys, which she typically kept in her bag or in a safe place, usually
her bedroom dresser. But, on the date of the accident, Venus felt unwell and she could have put
the keys anywhere. During Omar’s deposition, Omar testified that he did not have keys to Venus’s
vehicle and that if he wanted to take and use it, he had to get the keys from Venus. Omar told a
Progressive employee that he saw Venus’s keys on the table on the night of the accident and took
them.

        Before the accident, Omar did not keep count of the number of times he had driven Venus’s
vehicle, but it was “[n]ot that many.” When offered the option of choosing whether he had driven
the vehicle once or twice or “a handful of times” or on a “regular basis,” Omar responded: “I’ll
just go with a handful.”5 When asked why he was permitted to use the car on those occasions,
Omar responded “the main number one reason” was “to spend some time with [his] son.”6

        Omar also testified that “before using” Venus’s vehicle, he had to ask her for permission
to do so. And when questioned about whether he had to ask for permission “each time” he “wanted
to take and use” Venus’s vehicle, Omar answered: “Absolutely. Yes.” Omar further testified that
there was never a time he took Venus’s vehicle without asking Venus for permission. Yet, on the
night of the accident, Omar frankly acknowledged that he did not seek Venus’s permission to use
her vehicle. Instead, he took the keys to Venus’s vehicle from Venus’s home while Venus slept,
and drove off without her permission. Due to the accident, Omar could not recall the exact time
he drove off in Venus’s vehicle.

        Venus confirmed Omar’s understanding of when Omar could use her vehicle. When asked
if it was “fair to say that if Omar wanted to borrow and use [Venus’s vehicle] . . . he had to come
and ask for [her] permission,” Venus answered: “Yes.” And Venus confirmed that Omar asked
for her permission on those handful of occasions that he used her vehicle before the accident.
Venus also confirmed that on the day of the accident Omar did not ask for permission before taking
her vehicle because she was asleep. Finally, when asked if “Omar ever discussed with [Venus]
that he knew he should not have taken” her vehicle, Venus testified that he had and that Omar
“told [Venus] he was sorry for doing that.”

5
  During an earlier telephone call with Progressive’s representative, when offered the choice
between “one to two” or “five or more times,” Omar thought it was “one or two.” See footnote 2.
6
  At Omar’s deposition, he testified that his son was four; however, Omar did not provide a
birthdate for the child. Because Omar’s deposition was taken eight months after the accident, it is
unclear whether the child was three or four years old when the accident occurred.

                                                -3-
                                     II. APPLICABLE LAW

       As the majority recognizes, in pertinent part, MCL 500.3113 provides:

       A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance [(PIP)] benefits for
       accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following
       circumstances existed:

       (a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or
       motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known
       that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. [MCL 500.3113(a).]

        Our Supreme Court has held that “any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision
of the Michigan Penal Code—including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, informally known as
the ‘joyriding’ statutes—has taken the vehicle unlawfully within the meaning of
MCL 500.3113(a).” Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 492 Mich 503, 537; 821
NW2d 117 (2012). Both joyriding statutes prohibit the taking of a motor vehicle without the
authority of the owner. MCL 750.413; MCL 750.414. The term “authority’ in the context of the
joyriding statutes means “the ‘right to control, command or determine.’ ” Rambin v Allstate Ins
Co, 495 Mich 316, 332; 852 NW2d 34 (2014), quoting Random House Webster’s Dictionary
(1996), superseded by statute as recognized by Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich
App 1, 25; 972 NW2d 860 (2021). In relevant part, MCL 750.413 provides that “[a]ny person
who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away . . . any motor
vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” MCL 750.414 similarly provides,
in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without
intent to steal the same . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” Although MCL 750.414 “prohibits
the unauthorized use or taking of a motor vehicle, it does not require a showing that the perpetrator
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.” Rambin, 495 Mich at 329.

        After Rambin, the Legislature amended MCL 500.3113(a). 2014 PA 489. The original
version of the statute contained a safe harbor provision for one who unlawfully took a vehicle but
“reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.” 1986 PA 93. In
Ahmed, this Court concluded that MCL 500.3113(a), as amended, eliminated the safe harbor
provision contained in the former version of the statute. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 23. Under the
new standard, it is no longer sufficient for a person seeking PIP benefits to show he lacked actual
knowledge that he did not have authority from the owner to take the vehicle. Id. at 25. For
purposes of applying MCL 500.3113(a), a person has unlawfully taken a vehicle under
MCL 750.414 if the person did not take steps to determine whether the owner had granted him
authority to take the vehicle.7 Id. at 26-27.

7
 2014 PA 489 only amended the scienter requirement for MCL 750.414 as it relates to litigation
concerning the application of MCL 500.3113(a), and the legislation did not amend the mens rea
necessary to prove a violation of MCL 750.414 in criminal cases. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 26 n
12.

                                                -4-
        In Ahmed, the plaintiff was injured while driving a rental car and sought PIP benefits from
the defendant. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 4-5. The car was rented by the plaintiff’s wife, who gave
the plaintiff permission to drive the vehicle. Id. The plaintiff was not licensed to drive when the
accident occurred. Id. at 5. Under the express terms of the contract, which the plaintiff never read,
unlicensed drivers were expressly forbidden from driving the car. Id. Thus, the plaintiff was
expressly not authorized to drive the car by the vehicle’s owner, the rental car company, but he did
not have actual knowledge that he lacked authority. Id. This Court concluded that, under the
“should have known” standard, the plaintiff was obligated to learn the terms of the contract and
could not merely assume he was permitted to take the car. Id. at 26-27. This Court explained that
“[t]he mere assumption or supposition that it must be permissible to take a third party’s property,
without more, does not satisfy the ‘should have known’ standard of MCL 500.3113(a).” Id. at 27.

                                           III. ANALYSIS

       In this case, the undisputed facts show that 32-year-old Omar, whose license to drive had
been suspended for years,8 was prohibited from taking Venus’s vehicle on the day of the accident
without her permission and that he knew or should have known his taking was prohibited.

       Venus owned the vehicle, having purchased it in February 2018. Omar did not have keys
to Venus’s vehicle, and, if he wanted to take and use it, he had to get the keys from Venus. Despite
knowing that Omar’s license was suspended, Venus let Omar use her vehicle on a “handful” of
occasions over 2-1/4 years to spend time with his young son.

        Omar testified that “before using” Venus’s vehicle, he had to ask her for permission. And,
when asked whether he had to request permission “each time” he “wanted to take and use” Venus’s
vehicle, Omar answered: “Absolutely. Yes.”9 (Emphasis added). Except for the night of the
accident, Omar never took Venus’s vehicle without asking Venus for permission. That night,
Omar did not ask Venus for permission. Instead, he took the keys to Venus’s vehicle from Venus’s
home while Venus slept and drove off. Because MCL 500.3113(a) “examines the legality of a
taking from the driver’s perspective,” Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 522, this ends the inquiry of

8
 It is a crime for a vehicle owner to “knowingly permit . . . [her vehicle] . . . to be operated on a
highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor
vehicles . . . within this state by a person whose license . . . is suspended . . ., except as permitted
under” the Motor Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq. See MCL 257.904(2). The penalty for that
offense depends on the number of prior convictions for the same offense and whether it causes
another person to suffer a serious impairment of body function or death. See MCL 257.904(3)
and (7).
9
 Although the majority posits “that families often do not articulate hard-and-fast rules that must
be followed in all circumstances,” this family had a hard-and-fast rule in place. More specifically,
Omar had to ask Venus for permission to use her vehicle and she had to give Omar express
permission before he could drive her vehicle.

                                                  -5-
whether Omar unlawfully took Venus’s vehicle without authority and whether he knew or should
have known that he took it unlawfully.

        In any event, Venus confirmed Omar correctly understood the condition under which he
could use her vehicle. “[I]f Omar wanted to borrow and use” her vehicle, “he had to come and ask
for [her] permission.” And, in fact, Omar had asked Venus for her permission on those handful of
occasions that he had used her vehicle before the accident. On the night of the accident, however,
Omar did not ask Venus for permission before he took her vehicle because she was asleep. Finally,
when she and Omar discussed that “he knew he should not have taken” her vehicle, Omar “told
[Venus] he was sorry for doing that.” In other words, Omar apologized to Venus for failing to
obtain her approval to use her vehicle because he knew he should not have taken it before securing
her permission.

        Appellees,10 however, argue that there was no unlawful taking in this case given Omar and
Venus’s subsequent affidavits and Venus’s deposition testimony that she would have allowed
Omar to take the vehicle that night if he had asked. In Omar’s affidavit, he averred: “On the date
of the accident, I was of the belief I had permission to use my mother’s vehicle.” In Venus’s
affidavit, she averred:

          4. That Omar normally requested permission when using my vehicle. However, I
          did not require him to obtain permission before taking or using my vehicle.

          5. . . . If Omar would have asked to use the vehicle I would have granted him
          permission to use my vehicle on May 24, 2020.

Because these affidavits directly conflicted with Omar and Venus’s deposition testimony, namely,
that Omar had to request permission from Venus before he used her vehicle, they cannot create a
genuine issue of material fact. See Dykes v William Beaumont Hosp, 246 Mich App 471, 479-
482; 633 NW2d 440 (2001) (It is well-established that a party may not create a question of fact by
making assertions in an affidavit that are contrary to prior deposition testimony.).

       Appellees also point to Venus’s deposition testimony as demonstrating that Venus would
have permitted Omar to take the vehicle that night if he had asked to do so. It is true that, during
Venus’s deposition, MSHI’s attorney asked Venus whether, absent “psychic foreknowledge of this
accident,” she “would . . . have given [Omar] permission to use [her vehicle,]” if he had “woken
[her] up that evening and asked to use” it. It is also true that Venus answered affirmatively.11
Later, however, Progressive’s counsel followed up on Venus’s response, and Venus, who

10
     Appellees collectively refers to Omar and the service providers seeking recovery of PIP benefits.
11
   It appears that Venus was unaware that Omar was drinking or using marijuana before the
accident. At Omar’s deposition, Omar himself denied drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana on
the day of the accident. After the accident, however, hospital test results showed that Omar was
positive for THC and had a 0.17 blood-alcohol level, more than two times the legal limit.

                                                  -6-
recognized that Omar’s driver’s license was suspended,12 further explained that she allowed Omar
to take her vehicle “to go see his little boy.” Venus then clarified that she would not have allowed
Omar to take her car for any other reason.13

         Regardless, before our Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum, 492 Mich at 523, an owner’s
statement after the accident that he or she would have given consent and allowed the driver to take
the vehicle was one factor in determining whether there was an unlawful taking under
MCL 500.3113(a). Landon v Titan Ins Co, 251 Mich App 633, 649; 651 NW2d 93 (2002). When
Landon was decided, whether a vehicle owner had authorized a taking was determined by applying
the test for whether consent had been given under the vehicle owner’s liability statute,
MCL 257.401, which presumes the owner gave his or her consent to the driver. Bronson Methodist
Hosp v Forshee, 198 Mich App 617, 623-626; 499 NW2d 423 (1993), overruled by Spectrum, 492
Mich at 523. In Spectrum, our Supreme Court overruled Bronson, narrowing the circumstances
under which a person can claim to have lawfully taken a vehicle and eliminating the presumption
of consent for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Spectrum, 492 Mich at 523. Thus, even under the
previous, more forgiving standard for determining the lawfulness of a taking, Venus’s after-the-
fact consent would not be dispositive in this case. Under the current version of MCL 500.3113(a),
one runs afoul of MCL 750.414 when he takes a motor vehicle and knows or should have known
that “the owner prohibited the taking.” Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 25-26. And, again, the lawfulness
of the taking is determined by whether the person was prohibited from taking the vehicle when the
taking actually occurred. Id. at 13-15. In this case, Omar was prohibited from taking Venus’s
vehicle without obtaining her prior assent.

         In denying appellants’ motions for summary disposition, the trial court judge expressed his
concern that Omar would be left without PIP benefits despite his serious injuries and explained
that if the judge’s child took his vehicle without his knowledge while he slept, he would be upset,
but that it would not necessarily mean that he would not have permitted his child to take the
vehicle. The trial court’s hypothetical failed to recognize that the deposition testimony in this case
established that this parent and adult “child” had a mutual understanding that this adult “child”
was not permitted to take the car without asking this parent for permission, which this adult “child”
failed to obtain, especially considering this adult “child’s” status as a suspended driver.14

        The majority seems to suggest that absent an express written agreement prohibiting driving
altogether in a familial setting, permission is a fluid concept and an after-the-fact approval suffices.
Doing so ignores Venus and Omar’s straightforward deposition testimony. On this record, there
is no dispute that Omar did not actually have Venus’s permission to take her vehicle. Omar

12
     See footnote 8.
13
  Venus went to sleep around 8:30 p.m. and the vehicle crash was reported by 10:12 p.m. Omar
was traveling on 8 Mile Road, a route he typically took to his son’s home. The shortest distance
between Venus’s home and the home where Omar’s child lived was over seventeen miles and
required approximately thirty minutes to reach via vehicle. Omar’s adult passengers were not
deposed, and therefore, provided no additional information about whether Omar actually visited
his three- or four-year-old son that night.
14
     See footnote 8.

                                                  -7-
unequivocally testified that he knew he needed his mother’s prior permission before taking her
vehicle, the same permission he had secured on those rare occasions when he had asked to use her
vehicle over the course of more than two years. Nor could Omar simply assume that he had
permission to take a vehicle from its owner. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 27. And, even if Omar had
assumed that Venus would have granted permission had he asked, the facts are that Omar knew
that he needed Venus’s permission to drive her vehicle each and every time and that he knew he
took her vehicle without her permission while she was sleeping. Omar even apologized to Venus
after they discussed that he should not have taken her vehicle without permission. Accordingly,
Omar unlawfully took Venus’s vehicle contrary to the joyriding statutes and was willingly
operating it when the accident occurred, meaning Omar is barred from recovering PIP benefits
pursuant to MCL 500.3113(a).

        For these reasons, the trial court erred when it denied appellants’ motions for summary
disposition and reconsideration. I would reverse and remand to the circuit court with instructions
to enter an order granting appellants’ motions for summary disposition.

                                                            /s/ Anica Letica

                                               -8-