Court Opinion

ID: 9732057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:06:22.286241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.825331
License: Public Domain

BERGER, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that there is no “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule under the Delaware Constitution. But it does not rest its conclusion on any analysis of the exception or its impact on the rights sought to be protected by the exclusionary rule. Instead, the majority says that: (i) Delaware’s constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures is different from and broader than the similar protection found in the Fourth Amendment; and (ii) this Court could not adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule without overruling precedents spanning 50 years. In fact, this is a case of first impression, and even if the State and Federal Constitutions are to be interpreted differently, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized under Delaware law.
As the majority points out, a prior version of Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution does predate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That said, the language of the two provisions is “substantially identical”96 and, until last year, this Court followed federal law on search and seizure issues without finding any differences in the constitutional protections afforded under state law. In Rickards v. State, for example, this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule, finding that the two constitutional guarantees are, “for all practical purposes, identical,”97 and that the federal exclusionary rule is “the most effective way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure....”98 This Court continued to follow federal law in Cook v. State,99 when we adopted the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule, and in Mason v. State,100 when we recog*822nized the “exigent circumstances” doctrine as an exception to the search warrant requirement.
Until last year, this Court had “never decided whether, and in what situations, Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution should be interpreted to provide protections that are greater than the rights accorded citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment as it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”101 In Jones v. State, a majority of this Court found that the United States Supreme Court’s California v. Hodari D.102 decision was “not consistent with our view of when a person is ‘seized’ within the meaning of Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. ...”103 Accordingly, the majority in Jones refused to follow federal law on this point, and held that a person is seized, under Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, “when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.”104
The majority now finds another difference between our State and Federal Constitutions. Under federal law, evidence obtained with a search warrant that is later held to be invalid will not be suppressed as long as the police officer “[acted] with objective good faith ... obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.”105 The majority holds that this “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in our state because “exclusion is the constitutional remedy for a violation of the search and seizure protections ... of the Delaware Constitution.”
The majority suggests that its conclusion is the only one permitted under existing case law, and that the dissenters would force the Court to reverse ancient and respected precedent to rule otherwise. That is not so. Neither Rickards nor Mason addressed this issue. Rickards was decided long before Leon and simply adopted the federal exclusionary rule. Mason, which was decided after Leon, expressly stated that “Leon is not applicable to the questions presented in this appeal.” 106
When the exclusionary rule was adopted by this Court, it was considered the most practical remedy for an invasion of a person’s right to. be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Rickards court noted that police efforts to thwart crime cannot justify a “deliberate invasion” of a citizen’s constitutional rights.107 In Cook, however, this Court recognized that suppression of evidence is not always the appropriate remedy for a deliberate violation of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Cook court held that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, illegally seized evidence is admissible when the police can show that they would have discovered that evidence, eventually, through lawful means. Since the Cook decision establishes that there are some exceptions to the exclusionary rule, this Court should examine the good faith exception to see whether it, too, should be recognized.
There are several reasons why the good faith exception should be adopted in Delaware. First, to the extent that the exclusionary rule is intended to deter police misconduct, it serves no purpose in the circumstances that would give rise to the good faith exception. A police officer who (i) prepares an affidavit of probable cause, which the officer reasonably believes is sufficient to obtain a warrant, and (ii) presents it to an independent magistrate, who also concludes that the affidavit supports *823the issuance of a warrant, is doing exactly what the law requires. The officer is making a good faith, objectively reasonable effort to protect our citizens’ privacy rights by securing a warrant. Since the officer believes she/he is upholding the constitution, suppression of the seized evidence, based on a later finding that the warrant was defective, will not deter future “misconduct.”
The majority suggests that suppression is not intended to deter police abuses, but to remedy the unconstitutional invasion of an individual’s privacy. If that is so, then why is there an exception for evidence obtained through intentional police misconduct just because the evidence would have been discovered lawfully at some later time? The individual’s constitutional rights are violated, but we provide no suppression remedy. And since we countenance knowing constitutional violations where the police make no effort to comply with the law, certainly we should condone unknowing constitutional violations where the police are attempting to fully comply with the law.
Finally, it is good public policy to promote consistency in our laws. The majority’s suggestion that judges would be violating their oaths of office if they interpret the State and Federal Constitutions uniformly is wrong. Where, as here, the two constitutional provisions are virtually identical, and there is a long history of interpreting them consistently, this Court should deviate from federal interpretations only if there are compelling reasons to do so. The majority has offered no compelling reasons and I find none. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Rickards v. State, Del.Supr., 77 A.2d 199, 204 (1950).

. Ibid.

. Id. at 205.

. Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 264 (1977).

. Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 242 (1987).

. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (1999).

. 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).

. 745 A.2d at 863.

. 745 A.2d at 869.

. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

. Mason v. State, 534 A.2d at 254.

.77 A.2d at 205.