Court Opinion

ID: 9575559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:46.365397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:23.107245
License: Public Domain

Judge McGEE
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority opinion’s broad construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143.135.3(d) and (d).
*533I do not disagree with the majority opinion that the General Assembly provided a contractor an alternative appeal option under N.C.G.S. § 143-135.3(d) for a dissatisfied contractor to appeal from the decision of the OSC. However, once plaintiff contractor selected the option of “commencing]” its case under N.C.G.S. § 143-135.3(cl) by filing a petition with the OAH, it could not then “institute” a complaint in superior court under N.C.G.S. § 143-135.3(d) when the statute provides for the civil action in state court in lieu of a contested case. The benefit of an alternative appeal option does not warrant plaintiff offending the strict construction of N.C.G.S. § 143.135.3. See Construction Co. v. Dept. of Administration, 3 N.C. App. 551, 553, 165 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1969) (“[S]tatutes permitting suit, being in [derogation] of sovereign right of immunity, are to be strictly construed.”); see also In re Thompson Arthur Paving Co., 81 N.C. App. 645, 647-48, 344 S.E.2d 853, 855, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 506, 349 S.E.2d 874 (1986) (“Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.”); see also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380 (1999) (“Among the statutes in derogation of sovereignty and subject to the rule requiring strict construction in favor of the state are those allowing suits against the state or its representative ... or waiving its immunity from liability!.]”).
The majority opinion emphasizes that plaintiff decided to proceed in superior court “before any hearing or other action had occurred before the OAH.” Nonetheless, this overlooks the fact that the contractor both “commencefd]" its case by filing a petition with the OAH and also “institute[d]” a complaint in superior court, resulting in two actions pending at the same time in two different forums. N.C.G.S. § 143-135.3(cl) (“[a] contractor . . . may commence a contested case on the claim[.]”); N.C.G.S. § 143-135.3(d) (“the contractor may, in lieu of the procedures set forth in [subsection(cl)] . . . institute a civil action[.]”) (emphasis added). By employing the verbs “commence” and “institute” in the respective subsections of the statute, I believe the General Assembly intended to measure the time of these procedures from the contractor’s first act or commencement of the case, not the OAH’s decision to hear the case, as the majority opinion suggests. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990) (holding that legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain language of the statute); see also Black's Law Dictionary 268, 800 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “commence” as “[t]o initiate by performing the first act or step” and defin*534ing “institute” as “[t]o inaugurate or commence^]”). If the General Assembly intended that these procedures be measured by an OAH hearing of the contractor’s case, not the contractor’s action to “commence” or “institute” the action, it would have expressly so stated. It did not choose to do so.
Strictly construing N.C.G.S. §§ 143-135(cl) and (d), as we must, plaintiff’s both commencing of its contested case in the administrative court and also instituting a complaint in superior court violated the provisions of the statute necessary to waive defendants’ claim to sovereign immunity. See Construction Co., 3 N.C. App. at 553, 165 S.E.2d at 340; see also In Re Thompson, 81 N.C. App. at 647-48, 344 S.E.2d at 855. The majority opinion characterizes the strict construction of the two-tiered process available to plaintiff as essentially a “penalty.” However unfortunate the result, the majority opinion has interpreted the waiver statute too broadly and failed to follow “the admonition to strictly construe statutes which waive the benefits of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” State v. Taylor, 85 N.C. App. 549, 557, 355 S.E.2d. 169, 175 (1987) (Eagles, J., dissenting), rev’d, 322 N.C. 433, 436, 368 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988) (holding that the Court of Appeals erred in “broadening the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity[.]”). I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment for defendants UNC-CH and DOA.