Court Opinion

ID: 9912199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 19:10:54.698334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:53.331482
License: Public Domain

12/21/2023

                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT JACKSON
                                September 12, 2023 Session

                IDA STEINBERG v. RENEA STEINBERG ET AL.

                   Appeal from the Probate Court for Shelby County
                        No. PR-6842 Karen D. Webster, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. W2022-01376-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

In denying appellees’ motion to remove an estate’s personal representative, the trial court
adopted appellees’ proposed findings of fact verbatim and proposed conclusions of law “to
the degree they [were] not in conflict with [the] court’s order.” The proposed findings and
conclusions were signed by the trial court judge and attached to the order. Because we
cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s order represents its independent judgment, we
vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is
the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court Vacated and
                                    Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.
FRIERSON, II, and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined.

Edward T. Autry and R. Scott Vincent, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ida
Steinberg.

Aubrey L. Brown, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kimberly Steinberg.

Janet Davis Lamanna and Stanley Noel Medlin, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees,
Renea Steinberg and Judy Franklin.

                                          OPINION

                      I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       This matter involves the latest installment in a long-standing probate dispute
between Defendants/Appellees Renea Steinberg, Judy Franklin, and Kimberly Steinberg
(collectively, “Appellees”), and Plaintiff/Appellant Ida Steinberg (“Appellant”), the
daughters and beneficiaries of Lewie Polk Steinberg (“Decedent”). Because this appeal
involves only a narrow issue, we discuss the case’s history only as necessary.

        Decedent died testate in July 2016, and his 2011 will was admitted to probate in the
Shelby County Probate Court (“the trial court”) in August 2016. Appellant was appointed
as the Personal Representative of Decedent’s estate. Over the next few years, the parties
engaged in contentious litigation regarding the administration of the estate, especially the
payment of attorney’s fees. This Court has previously addressed two awards of attorney’s
fees in this matter. See Steinberg v. Steinberg, No. W2020-01149-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL
4078519 (Tenn. Ct. App. September 6, 2022).

       On August 14, 2020, Appellees filed a verified petition to remove Appellant as
Personal Representative, appoint a replacement, and hold Appellant in civil contempt.
Therein, Appellees alleged that Appellant had not complied with the parties’ October 2018
mediated settlement agreement even after the trial court’s November 5, 2019 order finding
the agreement to be binding and enforceable. Appellees argued that Appellant’s failure to
comply with the trial court’s order and the mediated settlement agreement prevented the
distribution of the estate’s assets; created a conflict of interest between Appellant,
Appellees, and the estate; and evinced a violation of Appellant’s fiduciary duty as Personal
Representative. Appellees requested that the trial court remove Appellant as the executor
of Decedent’s estate, consider each day after its November 2019 order as a separate and
distinct count of civil contempt, and require Appellant to pay Appellees’ attorney’s fees.

        The trial court heard Appellees’ petition over the course of several telephonic and
in-person hearings between October 2020 and April 2022. Appellees filed their proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law with the trial court on June 10, 2022. On August
24, 2022, Appellees filed an emergency motion regarding the status of the trial court’s
ruling in consideration of the trial court judge’s impending September 1, 2022 vacation of
office. Appellees requested that, if an order was not entered prior to that date, the trial court
judge retain the right to render judgment on the case pursuant to statute rather than have
the matter retried.

       The trial court entered its order on August 30, 2022. After reciting the procedural
history in response to Appellees’ petition, the entirety of the order is as follows:

       IT FURTHER APPEARS TO THE COURT that [Appellees’] Findings of
       Fact and Conclusions of Law offered (1) a less stringent resolve than the
       court considered to render on June 21, 2022 and offered (2) an expedient
       means by which to close this estate at that time.

                                              -2-
      IT FURTHER APPEARS TO THE COURT that as of the date of this
      order, however, the Personal Representative has attended to the estate’s
      administration, rendering moot the justification for her removal. Because the
      estate has been substantially administered, with not much more remaining
      other than to make final distributions and to close; removing the Personal
      Representative at this juncture would be an unnecessary expense to the
      estate. But for COVID-19, the Personal Representative’s delayed
      administration would be contemptuous.

      IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

             1. That in consideration of the law, the court’s review of the entire
                record, all relevant facts and circumstances, and due to portions of
                the Verified Petition have been rendered moot; it is now appropriate
                that the remaining portions of the Verified Petition be denied.
             2. [Appellees’] Findings of Fact are adopted in the court’s ruling and
                order, and are attached hereto and incorporated herein as if stated
                verbatim.
             3. That [Appellees’] Conclusions of Law are adopted, attached, and
                incorporated herein to the degree they are not in conflict with this
                court’s order.
             4. The Personal Representative shall expeditiously complete
                administration of this estate and close this estate.
             5. [Appellees’] attorney’s fees and court costs shall be paid from the
                Estate.
             6. [Appellant’s] attorney’s fees shall be paid by [Appellant].
             7. That in accordance with Tennessee Rule Civil Procedure 54.0[2],
                this court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay
                and expressly directs the entry of a Final Judgment on the Verified
                Petition to Remove Personal Representative and for Contempt.

The attached copy of Appellees’ proposed findings and conclusions, discussed in more
detail, infra, was signed and dated by the trial court judge below the line printed for the
judge to sign. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

                                  II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which are taken from her brief:

      1. Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error by adopting
      Appellee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the Trial
      Court’s August 30, 2022 Order.

                                            -3-
       2. Whether the Trial Court committed reversible error in the assessment of
       attorney’s fees in the Trial Court’s August 30, 2022 Order, specifically, when
       it required Appellant, as Personal Representative, to pay her own attorney’s
       fees and awarded Appellees’ attorney’s fees to be paid from the decedent’s
       estate.

Appellees request their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

                                III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Under Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we review the
trial court’s factual findings de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness.
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. E2017-00100-COA-R3-CV, 2019
WL 81594, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2019). A trial court’s decisions regarding the
award of attorney’s fees are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Wright ex
rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011).

                                        IV. ANALYSIS

                                              A.

        As a threshold jurisdictional matter, we note that we must first discuss the finality
of the trial court’s order because neither the trial court’s order nor the adopted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law address the specific amount of attorney’s fees to be
paid to Appellees by the estate. “Generally, an order that does not adjudicate all of the
claims between all of the parties is ‘subject to revision at any time before entry of a final
judgment’ and is not appealable as of right.” In re Conservatorship of Campbell, No.
M2016-02563-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 5067494, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2017)
(citing Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a)). This Court has held, however, “that when an intermediate
order entered in a probate court proceeding resolves a discrete issue, the final judgment
rule may be suspended.” Id. (citing In re Estate of Goza, No. W2013-02240-COA-R3-CV,
2014 WL 7246509, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014) (“[W]e recognize the difficulty
of applying the final judgment rule of Rule 3 to probate proceedings, which often contain
multiple intermediate orders that are final with regard to certain discrete issues.”)); see also
Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that the finality
requirement of Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure could be waived
under Rule 2 which allows the suspension of our appellate procedure rules for good cause,
except as to certain rules not applicable here). In determining finality, this Court is directed
to review “whether the order is temporary and whether any review is pending in the [t]rial
[c]ourt.” Conservatorship of Acree v. Acree, No. M2011-02699-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL
5873578, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (noting that review as final judgments

                                             -4-
“could be applied to orders awarding attorney’s fees, or any other orders entered in a
conservatorship case, which often spans many years”). Here, the trial court’s August 30,
2022 order addressing Appellees’ petition was neither temporary nor awaiting further
review. But the discrete issue that is presented in this appeal involves an order containing
two decisions regarding attorney’s fees: (1) the decision to deny Appellant’s request that
her attorney’s fees be paid from the estate; and (2) the decision to allow certain of
Appellees’ fees to be paid from the estate. That second decision, however, is not final
because no specific number was attached to the award of attorney’s fees. See Scott v.
Noland Co., No. 03A01-9407-CV-00248, 1995 WL 11177, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12,
1995) (concluding that there was no final order when the trial court did not award a specific
amount of attorney’s fees). As such, it is questionable whether this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal in the absence of a specific amount of attorney’s fees
awarded to Appellees. Nevertheless, our review of the trial court’s order reveals other
significant deficiencies in the order, discussed, infra, that will require additional
consideration by the trial court. So then, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s assignment
of error. See Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 559.

      Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ request to remove
her as Personal Representative for the estate. Instead, she argues that the trial court
committed reversible error through its adoption of Appellees’ proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. We agree.

      A court speaks through its written orders. Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d
96, 119 (Tenn. 2015). Our Supreme Court has emphasized that a trial court’s decisions
must result from its own independent judgment. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439
S.W.3d 303, 312 (Tenn. 2014).1 This requirement stems from the understanding that

        [t]he essential purposes of courts and judges are to afford litigants a public
        forum to air their disputes, and to adjudicate and resolve the disputes between
        the contending parties. To carry out these purposes, judges must arrive at
        their decisions by applying the relevant law to the facts of the case. Because
        making these decisions is a “high judicial function,” a court’s decisions must
        be, and must appear to be, the result of the exercise of the trial court’s own
        judgment.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[i]n addition to expecting judges to
be ‘fair, impartial, and engaged,’ the litigants, the bench and bar, and the public expect
them to explain why a particular result is correct based on the applicable legal principles”;

        1
          This Court has previously applied the reasoning in Smith, which dealt with a trial court order
granting summary judgment, to other types of cases where trial courts are required to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law, including bench trials. See Mitchell, 2019 WL 81594, at *6.

                                                   -5-
indeed, a trial court “[p]roviding reasons for a decision reinforces the legitimacy of the
legal process which, in turn, promotes respect for the judicial system.” Id. at 312–13
(citations omitted).

        Accordingly, “[a] trial court’s verbatim adoption of verbiage submitted by the
prevailing party detracts from the appearance of a hardworking, independent judge and
does little to enhance the reputation of the judiciary.” Id. at 316. As such, “findings of fact,
conclusions of law, opinions, and orders prepared by trial judges themselves are preferable
to those prepared by counsel.” Id. at 314. Two conditions exist for the acceptance of party-
prepared findings of fact, conclusions of law, or orders: (1) “the findings and conclusions
must accurately reflect the decision of the trial court” and (2) “the record must not create
doubt that the decision represents the trial court’s own deliberations and decision.” Id. at
316 (citations omitted). Thus, “when the record provides no insight into the trial court’s
decision-making process, or when the record ‘casts doubt’ on whether the trial court
‘conducted its own independent review, or that the opinion is the product of its own
judgment,’” reviewing courts have declined to accept a trial court’s use of party-prepared
findings or conclusions. Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., Mitchell, 2019 WL 81594, at *7
(“Based upon the record before us, we cannot make a determination that Wife’s proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, adopted verbatim by the trial court, represent the
trial court’s own independent analysis and judgment and not that of Wife or Wife’s
counsel.”); Cunningham v. Eastman Credit Union, No. E2019-00987-COA-R3-CV, 2020
WL 2764412, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2020) (“Based upon the record before us, we
cannot determine that [appellee’s] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
adopted nearly verbatim by the trial court, represent the trial court’s own independent
analysis and judgment.”); Regions Com. Equip. Fin., LLC v. Richards Aviation Inc., No.
W2018-00033-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1949633, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019)
(noting that “neither the oral ruling nor the written order give the factual or legal basis of
the court’s ruling and . . . the basis [is] not readily apparent; neither is there any indication
that the court considered the disputed facts or [appellant’s] affirmative defenses”).

       The trial court can comply with its obligations in a number of ways:

       First, the trial court may state the grounds for its decision at the same time it
       announces its decision on the record. Second, the trial court may announce
       its decision and inform counsel that it will provide the grounds in a
       subsequently filed memorandum or memorandum opinion. Third, after
       announcing its decision, the trial court may notify the parties of the grounds
       for its decision by letter, as long as the letter has been provided to all parties
       and has been made part of the record.

Smith, 439 S.W.3d at 316 n.28. These scenarios all include one shared feature: that the
trial court must “state the grounds for its decision before it invites or requests the prevailing

                                              -6-
party to draft a proposed order.” Id. at 316 (emphasis added). In these situations, the typical
manner of determining whether a trial court exercised its independent judgment is to
compare the trial court’s oral ruling with its written order. See SecurAmerica Bus. Credit
v. Southland Transp. Co., No. W2016-02505-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1100958, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018). Small differences, such as the incorporation of “facts and
reasoning expounded upon by the court” will not prevent a finding that the written order
reflects the deliberation of the trial court. Hardy v. Tenn. State Univ., No. M2014-02450-
COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1242659, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2016). Significant
expansion upon the findings and conclusions within the trial court’s oral ruling, however,
may “cast doubt on whether the written order reflects the independent judgment of the
court.” SecurAmerica Bus. Credit, 2018 WL 1100958, at *7 (citing Smith, 439 S.W.3d
at 316).

        The issue here, though, is not that the trial court’s written order does not match its
oral ruling. Indeed, the record before us contains no indication whether the trial court made
an oral ruling as to Appellees’ petition or provided the parties with any bases for its ultimate
decision prior to the filing of Appellees’ proposed findings and conclusions and the
subsequent entering of the trial court’s order. This Court has held that another way that the
trial court may comply with Smith without making an oral ruling is by inviting the parties
to prepare proposed orders and then independently drafting an order using the proposed
orders with sufficient alterations to demonstrate independent judgment. See Vaughn v.
DMC-Memphis, LLC, No. W2019-00886-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 274761, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2021) (“Ms. Vaughn concedes in her brief that the written order ultimately
entered by the trial court contains two paragraphs that were not included in the proposed
order. . . . [T]hese alterations confirm that the order entered was not a verbatim copy of
what was submitted by DMC, but was the trial court’s own independent judgment.”).
Conversely, however, if the trial court simply adopts one of the proposed orders without
alterations, then the trial court has not complied with Smith. See, e.g., Holston Presbytery
of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Bethany Presbyterian Church, No. E2022-
01337-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 4789082, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2023) (holding
that the order did not comply with Smith where the trial court asked the parties to prepare
proposed orders then adopted one party’s proposed order without alterations, but soldiering
on to consider the single legal issue); Regions Com. Equip. Fin. LLC v. Richards Aviation
Inc., No. W2020-00408-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1811754, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6,
2021) (vacating the adoption of a party-proposed order when “the trial court made no
additions, omissions, or alterations to the order proposed by” one party).

        The issue presented in this case is similar to, but not identical to the above line of
cases. In particular, Appellant argues that the trial court’s written order is in conflict with
the very findings of fact and conclusions of law that the trial court adopted, signed, and
attached to the order. The trial court itself recognized the apparent inconsistency between
its ultimate decision regarding the petition and Appellees’ proposed conclusions of law

                                             -7-
with its incorporation of only those conclusions “not in conflict with [the] court’s order.”

        We agree that the trial court’s actions were deficient in this case. As an initial matter,
the trial court’s perfunctory excision of those conclusions in conflict with her order does
not clearly establish which aspects of Appellees’ proposed conclusions the trial court is not
adopting. The trial court’s skeletal order combined with its wholesale adoption of
Appellees’ proposed findings of fact and imprecisely defined partial adoption of Appellees’
proposed conclusions of law therefore leaves it to the parties and this Court to “perform
the equivalent of an archeological dig [to] endeavor to reconstruct the probable basis for
the [trial] court’s decision[.]” Smith, 439 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Church v. Perales, 39
S.W.3d 149, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). This plainly goes against the reminder in Smith
of “the fundamental importance” that decisions by trial courts are “adequately explained”
and “the product of the trial court’s independent judgment[,]” regardless of who prepares
the order. Id.; see also In re Noah J., No. W2014-01778-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 1332665,
at *4, *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015) (noting that “[w]ithout sufficient findings and
conclusions, ‘this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its ultimate
decision’” and finding an abuse of discretion where “[t]he trial court’s order [did] not
indicate how or why it reached its decision on . . . this award of attorney’s fees” despite no
indication it was prepared by a party) (internal citation omitted)).

       For example, proposed conclusion (15) determines that the petition’s request for a
finding of contempt has been rendered moot by Appellant’s compliance with the mediated
settlement agreement, yet the trial court’s order explained that, but for the COVID-19
Pandemic, Appellant’s actions would have been contemptuous. We are left to guess
whether the trial court intended to strike this proposed conclusion as conflicting with its
order or whether we are expected to read these conclusions in harmony.

        Several other proposed conclusions reference Appellant’s breach of her fiduciary
duty to the estate. However, the trial court ruled both that the justification for removing
Appellant as Personal Representative had been mooted and that removing Appellant would
result in unnecessary expense. Thus, it is unclear whether these conclusions conflict with
the trial court’s ultimate decision not to remove Appellant. The trial court may have meant
to conclude that Appellant had breached her fiduciary duties but other elements, like the
cost of further proceedings to remove her, counseled against acting on the breach or it may
have concluded that Appellant’s later actions rectified what might have earlier been
considered a breach. Without clear guidance from the trial court, the parties are left to
interpret the trial court’s meaning on their own. Although neither party has appealed the
trial court’s ultimate decision to remove Appellant as Personal Representative, the trial
court’s findings as to Appellant’s efforts in that capacity are highly relevant to the
attorney’s fees questions in this appeal.

       Likewise, proposed conclusion (14) and several proposed findings of fact include

                                              -8-
bare, conclusory statements regarding the necessity of the parties’ actions and whether the
actions benefitted the estate. We explained in the prior appeal in this case that while a trial
court “has discretion ‘to find that . . . [an attorney’s] services inured to the benefit of the
estate, and that such fees should be paid as part of the costs of administration of the
estate[,]’ . . . we are unable to determine whether the trial court correctly exercised its
discretion without some indication of what legal standard the trial court applied or what
evidence it relied upon.” Steinberg, 2022 WL 4078519, at *6 (first quoting Tigrett v.
Tigrett, 61 Tenn. App. 172, 203, 453 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Tenn. 1967); and then citing In re
Noah J., 2015 WL 1332665, at *5). The trial court’s failure to clearly provide the reasoning
behind its discretionary decision, therefore, once again leaves us “wonder[ing] on what
basis the court reached its ultimate decision” and “unable to afford appropriate deference
to the trial court’s decision[.]” In re Noah J., 2015 WL 1332665, at *5 (first quoting
Hardin v. Hardin, No. W2012-00273-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6727533, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 27, 2012); and then quoting In re Connor S.L., No. W2012-00587-COA-R3-
JV, 2012 WL 5462839, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012)); cf. Smith, 439 S.W.3d at
314–15 (noting that “the United States Supreme Court has criticized federal trial courts for
their ‘verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly
when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation
to the record’” (citation omitted)).

        Moreover, the trial court’s order did not limit its adoption of the proposed findings
of fact in any way, such that we might assume that each proposed finding was incorporated
wholesale into the order. Yet proposed finding of fact (19) states that “[Appellees] have
demonstrated good cause to have [Appellant] removed as the personal representative of the
Estate.” Again, it is not clear whether this statement conflicts with the trial court’s ultimate
decision not to remove Appellant as Personal Representative or if the two are meant to be
read in harmony. But, because the trial court did not delineate any of the proposed findings
as not being adopted, this finding is fully incorporated into its ruling regardless of the
resulting ambiguity. As Smith contemplated, this insouciant verbatim adoption of
Appellees’ proposed findings does not lend support to “the appearance of a hardworking,
independent judge” or “enhance the reputation of the judiciary.” Smith, 439 S.W.3d at 316.

        It seems that the trial court adopted Appellees’ proposed findings and conclusions
in an effort to resolve this matter prior to the trial court judge vacating her office. Certainly,
the trial court stated that Appellees’ proposed findings and conclusions offered “an
expedient means by which to close this estate[.]” We recognize the protracted nature of
this case and the potential relief to the parties of having this issue finalized sooner rather
than later. However, these circumstances do not excuse the entering of an order in conflict
with the very findings of fact and conclusions of law it adopts. Such a situation falls
distinctly within the worst-case scenario envisioned by the Smith Court, where a trial
court’s “verbatim adoption of verbiage” submitted by a party creates “the impression that
the trial court ceded its decision-making responsibility to one of the parties.” Smith, 439

                                              -9-
S.W.3d at 315. Because the trial court did not clearly provide the grounds for and reasoning
behind its decision, the trial court’s order does not appear to be the result of the exercise of
the trial court’s own independent judgment. Based on the record before us, we cannot
determine whether the trial court properly performed the “high judicial function” expected
of all courts. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to
the trial court for entry of an appropriate order demonstrating the trial court’s exercise of
its independent judgment and individualized decision-making.2 See, e.g., id.; Mitchell,
2019 WL 81594, at *7; Cunningham, 2020 WL 2764412, at *5. If, on remand, attorney’s
fees are awarded to either party, the trial court shall specify the amount of the award.

                                                      B.

       Appellant also disputes the trial court’s ruling that Appellees’ attorney’s fees would
be wholly paid by the estate but her attorney’s fees would not be paid by the estate at all.
She also argues that attorney’s fees not directly related to the petition to remove her as
Personal Representative of the estate were outside the scope of relief available for the trial
court to award. As we have vacated the trial court’s August 30, 2022 order and remanded
this matter for reconsideration, these arguments have been pretermitted as moot. See
Cunningham, 2020 WL 2764412, at *5. Moreover, an order evincing the trial court’s
exercise of its independent judgment in compliance with the directives in Smith should
contain a clearer explanation for the basis of such an award in order to support meaningful
appellate review of the discretionary decision of granting attorney’s fees.

                                                      C.

        Appellees have requested their attorney’s fees on appeal, citing to caselaw for the
proposition that legal expenses incurred for the benefit of the whole estate rather than
individual beneficiaries may be repaid by the estate. See In re Estate of Waller, No.
M2022-00183-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 16634405, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2022).
However, Appellees offer no argument to explain how their actions have inured to the
benefit of the estate other than the trial court’s finding of the same. As discussed above,
this finding by the trial court is made only in a bare statement to that effect within the
        2
           We take judicial notice that the trial court judge has vacated her office and is no longer presiding
in the trial court to review this case upon remand. Cf. Kathryne B.F. v. Michael David B., No. W2014-
01863-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4366311, at *17 n.17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2015) (“We take judicial
notice of the fact that the original trial judge has retired.”); State v. Tawater, No. M2013-02126-CCA-R3-
CD, 2014 WL 4809537, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014) (“We take judicial notice that the trial
judge who presided over this case has retired.”). We have previously found it appropriate to remand to the
trial court notwithstanding that a new judge may be required to preside over the matter. Cf. Regions Com.
Equip. Fin. LLC, 2021 WL 1811754, at *7 (vacating and remanding despite the fact that the original trial
judge had retired); Steinberg, 2022 WL 4078519, at *7 n.10. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
it is appropriate to remand this matter to the trial court despite the fact that a new judge will be required to
preside over this case.

                                                    - 10 -
proposed findings of fact it adopted verbatim. As such, we decline to exercise our
discretion to award Appellees their attorney’s fees on appeal. See Moran v. Willensky, 339
S.W.3d 651, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (“An award of appellate attorney’s fees is a matter
within this Court’s sound discretion.” (citing Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995))).

                                     V. CONCLUSION

        The judgment of the Shelby County Probate Court is hereby vacated and remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal
are taxed to Appellees, Renea Steinberg, Judy Franklin, and Kimberly Steinberg, for which
execution may issue if necessary.

                                           S/ J. Steven Stafford
                                           J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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