Court Opinion

ID: 9693576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:50:30.531011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.532947
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Because I cannot agree with the majority that informing a defendant that he must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to mere “surplusage,” I dissent.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101 requires the lower court to ascertain from the defendant upon the record whether he is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to a jury trial. The majority “wholly agree[s] with the proposition that in a jury trial waiver colloquy a defendant must be informed of the essential protections in a jury trial as well as the consequences attendant upon a relinquishment of those safeguards.” Majority Op. at 191. Those safeguards are “the requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community (a jury of one’s peers), that the verdict be *83unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.” Commonwealth v. Greene, 483 Pa. 195, 196, 394 A.2d 978 (1978). In reviewing the jury waiver colloquy held below, the majority appears more concerned that certain words are mentioned rather than their concepts understood. Such a mechanistic approach misperceives the purpose of the Rule 1101 colloquy. I fail to see how a defendant can fully understand the essential protections afforded by the unanimity requirement when he is not informed of the standard upon which the jury must agree. The most fundamental protection of our jury system is that each juror must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty of the crime charged. Yet the majority finds such information “surplus-age.” I believe that the concepts of unanimity and reasonable doubt are so intrinsically intertwined and basic to an understanding of a jury trial that a lower court cannot possible ascertain whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent without first informing the defendant of both concepts. This basic interdependence was acknowledged by our Supreme Court when it enumerated the essential protections of a jury trial as
that the jury be composed of one’s peers chosen from members of the accused’s community, that the accused has the right to participate in the selection of the jury, and that every member of the jury must be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the accused’s guilt.
Commonwealth v. Morin, 477 Pa. 80, 85, 383 A.2d 832, 834 (1978) (emphasis added). The failure of the lower court to inform appellant of the reasonable doubt standard precluded it from ascertaining whether appellant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, and thus, mandates, reversal.
Moreover, the failure to inform appellant of the reasonable doubt standard is particularly critical in this case because the unanimity requirement was explained to appellant as:
If anyone of those 12 people decided you were not guilty, the case would result in a mistrial and the Com*84monwealth could try you again. Do you understand that?
(N.T. September 7, 1979 at 5) (emphasis added). This language misrepresents the burden of proof in a criminal case by implying that the burden was upon appellant to prove to at least one of the jurors that he was not guilty. Appellant had no obligation to prove his innocence or to make the jury “decide” that he was not guilty. The Commonwealth was required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to each and every juror. A juror need only have a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt to preclude conviction. He need not be convinced that appellant was not guilty of the offense charged. Thus, as a result of the court’s failure to inform appellant of the reasonable doubt standard, and the misleading colloquy concerning unanimity, appellant was left without a proper understanding of a jury’s role in a jury trial. Accordingly, I would hold that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent and that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue.