Court Opinion

ID: 9375036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 18:01:02.337926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:55.193294
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-7020     Document: 010110817513       Date Filed: 02/24/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          February 24, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  BRIAN TYRONE SCOTT,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 22-7020
                                                  (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-00239-RAW-JAR)
  PANDEE RAMIREZ,                                              (E.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Brian Tyrone Scott appeals pro se1 from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 action challenging his confinement and seeking damages against Oklahoma District

 Court Judge Pandee Ramirez. Scott also challenges the district court’s imposition of

 a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous and assess a strike as well.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
         We afford Scott’s pro se materials a liberal construction, but we do not act as
 his advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
Appellate Case: 22-7020    Document: 010110817513        Date Filed: 02/24/2023       Page: 2

                                             I

       Scott filed this action under § 1983, claiming he is confined in prison with no

 charges. He alleged Judge Ramirez granted him post-conviction relief based on lack

 of jurisdiction, but she then repeatedly stayed her ruling pending his transfer to

 federal or tribal authorities. Scott therefore sought damages against Judge Ramirez

 for every day he remained illegally in state custody.

       On screening, the district court dismissed the action, ruling that Scott’s

 challenge to his confinement failed to state a claim because it had to be brought in an

 application for habeas relief, not a § 1983 action, and his damages claim against

 Judge Ramirez was barred by absolute judicial immunity. See 28 U.S.C.

 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). The district court also imposed a strike, and after it denied

 Scott’s motions for reconsideration, he appealed.2

                                            II

       We generally review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim, see Young

 v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009), and questions of immunity, see

 Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1315 (10th Cir. 2019). We accept as true

 well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, but a plaintiff must offer more than

       2
          Scott filed two motions for reconsideration, which the district court construed
 as seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b), respectively. The district
 court entered a single order denying both motions on April 28, 2022. Scott’s opening
 brief references the April 28, 2022, denial of reconsideration, but it advances no
 meaningful argument challenging that order. Our review is therefore limited to the
 district court’s order of dismissal. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2
 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that “scattered statements” and “issues adverted to in a
 perfunctory manner” are waived (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-7020    Document: 010110817513         Date Filed: 02/24/2023      Page: 3

 “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

 action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to

 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

       A. Failure to State a Claim

       Scott first appears to dispute the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a

 claim. He maintains he is “a confined person in prison with no charges,” Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 6, and asserts that once Judge Ramirez granted post-conviction relief,

 she had no authority to stay or correct her ruling—she was obliged to immediately

 release him. But he says Judge Ramirez stayed her decision, and she has since

 vacated the grant of post-conviction relief and reimposed his convictions without any

 authority to do so.3

       Scott’s attempt to use § 1983 to challenge his confinement is squarely

 foreclosed by our caselaw. “In this circuit, a prisoner who challenges the fact or

 duration of his confinement and seeks immediate release or a shortened period of

 confinement, must do so through an application for habeas corpus.” Palma-Salazar

       3
         For the first time on appeal, Scott contends that in vacating the grant of
 post-conviction relief and reimposing his convictions, Judge Ramirez “issued a new
 verdict on count 4” by stating he was convicted of larceny of an automobile, rather
 than “unauthorized use of vehicle.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 3-4. He says he was never
 indicted, arraigned, or convicted of larceny of an automobile. See id. at 5. This is a
 new argument based on new factual allegations that do not appear in the complaint,
 and thus, we will not consider it. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205
 (10th Cir. 2018) (refusing to consider arguments “not tied to the allegations in the
 complaint”).
                                             3
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 v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). Indeed, § 1983 is not an appropriate

 vehicle to challenge the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement. See Boutwell v.

 Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a writ of habeas

 corpus, not § 1983, is the “sole federal remedy” for challenging the fact or duration

 of physical imprisonment (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Scott

 contends the district court should have allowed him to explain why dismissal was

 improper, § 1915A “does not require that . . . the plaintiff be provided an opportunity

 to respond before dismissal,” Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court correctly

 dismissed the action to the extent Scott challenged his confinement via § 1983.

       B. Judicial Immunity

       Scott also contends the district court erred in concluding that Judge Ramirez

 enjoyed absolute judicial immunity. “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for

 his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of

 grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978).

              The appropriate inquiry in determining whether a particular judge
       is immune is whether the challenged action was judicial, and whether at
       the time the challenged action was taken the judge had subject matter
       jurisdiction. Stated differently, judges are liable only when they act in
       clear absence of all jurisdiction; they are absolutely immune even when
       their action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial
       authority.

 Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal

 quotation marks omitted).

                                            4
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        It cannot be said that Judge Ramirez acted in the clear absence of all

 jurisdiction. After all, Scott invoked the state courts’ jurisdiction in seeking

 post-conviction relief. And the Oklahoma district courts are courts of general

 jurisdiction. See Okla. Const. art. VII, § 7(a) (“The District Court shall have

 unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters . . . and such powers of

 review of administrative action as may be provided by statute.”). “[J]udges of courts

 of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial

 acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S.

 at 355-56. Scott disputes Judge Ramirez’s orders staying and vacating the grant of

 post-conviction relief, but these were judicial acts. “[I]ndeed, little could be thought

 a more quintessential judicial act than entry of a legal judgment.” Lundahl v.

 Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus, the district court correctly

 determined that Judge Ramirez was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

        C. Imposition of Strike

        Scott next contends the district court erred in imposing a strike pursuant to

 § 1915(g). Under the three-strikes provision of § 1915(g), “a prisoner is barred from

 bringing new civil cases or appeals in civil cases without the prepayment of filing

 fees if three prior civil cases or appeals in civil cases have been dismissed as

 frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.” Smith v. Veterans Admin.,

 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011). “[A] dismissal under § 1915A counts as a

 strike when the action was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a

 claim, the same grounds listed in § 1915(g).” Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

                                              5
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 635 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v.

 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015)). Likewise, a dismissal under § 1915A(b)(2) based

 on a defendant’s immunity can count as a strike if such a dismissal was subsumed in

 frivolousness or an appellant’s failure to state a claim. See id. at 1178. The district

 court here dismissed under both § 1915A(b)(1) and (2) based on failure to state a

 claim and immunity, and we construe the latter to be subsumed in frivolousness or

 the failure to state a claim, which are permissible grounds for imposing a strike under

 § 1915(g). See id. at 1178. There was, therefore, no error in assessing a strike.

       Finally, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous and impose a strike as well. “An

 appeal may be frivolous if it consists of irrelevant and illogical arguments based on

 factual misrepresentations and false premises, or when the result is obvious, or the

 appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Wheeler v. Comm’r,

 528 F.3d 773, 782 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the

 relevant caselaw, the result here was obvious and Scott’s arguments are meritless.

                                            III

       Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed as frivolous. The district court’s

 dismissal counts as one strike, see Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1177-78, and our dismissal

 counts as a second strike, see id. at 1176.4

                                                        Entered for the Court

                                                        Gregory A. Phillips
                                                        Circuit Judge

       4
         Judge Rossman concurs in the imposition of an appellate strike to the extent
 frivolousness is based on the application of absolute judicial immunity.
                                                6