Court Opinion

ID: 9964013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 19:00:48.704675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.997536
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _______________

                                      No. 22-2013
                                    _______________

        MARTHA OSORIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
                                              Appellant

                                             v.

                 TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.; JOHN DOES 1-25
                            _______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of New Jersey
                                (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-19812)
                      District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
                                    _______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                   on June 26, 2023

     Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

                                  (Filed: April 26, 2024)

                                    _______________

                                       OPINION *
                                    _______________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

       Appellant Martha Osorio filed a putative class action against Transworld Systems,

Inc., a debt collector, for allegedly violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. The District Court dismissed Osorio’s

Complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As it turns out,

however, Osorio never had standing to bring her claim in the first place because she

failed to plead a concrete injury as required for our exercise of jurisdiction under Article

III. We will therefore vacate the District Court’s opinion and remand for the Complaint

to be dismissed.

                                      DISCUSSION 1

       In the fall of 2021, Osorio received a letter from Transworld indicating that she

owed money to Garden State Healthcare Associates and that the business had placed her

account with Transworld for collections. According to Osorio’s Complaint, the letter

failed to explicitly state whether Garden State was the original creditor or the current

creditor, which allegedly violated the FDCPA. That failure, Osorio alleged, “create[ed]

confusion” and left Osorio “uncertain as to whom the debt [wa]s owed.” App. 77.

Osorio did not allege that she suffered any additional consequences because of this

confusion and uncertainty.

       1
        Although neither we nor the District Court possess jurisdiction to hear this case,
we have jurisdiction to assess our own jurisdiction. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 429 n.10 (3d Cir. 2016).
                                              2
       To bring a suit in federal court, a plaintiff must establish Article III standing.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 417 (2021). A key component of standing’s

“irreducible constitutional minimum” is an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and

particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992) (citation omitted). While an intangible harm may qualify as a cognizable injury,

the harm must bear a “close relationship” to an injury “‘traditionally’ recognized as

providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts”: in other words, the injury must have

a “close historical or common-law analogue.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424 (quoting

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)).

       In Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., this Court analyzed the plaintiff’s alleged injury

under this rubric where the statutorily required information was included in the debt

collector’s notice but in a manner the plaintiff allegedly found confusing. 84 F.4th 132,

149 (3d Cir. 2023); cf. Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47 F.4th 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2022)

(analyzing a similar claim in which statutorily required information was omitted entirely

from the notice under the different rubric of “informational injury”). We explained that,

although a purported FDCPA violation could easily lead to the type of injury recognized

by the common-law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, a debtor’s “confusion, without

more,” is not enough. Huber, 84 F.4th at 149. Rather, to bring suit, a FDCPA claimant

“must suffer some cognizable harm that flows from [her] confusion.” Id. That harm

could be small. But Osorio did not plead any harm besides confusion itself, so we cannot

reach the merits of her claim.

                                              3
                                    CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and

remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss the Complaint.

                                            4