Court Opinion

ID: 9707433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:11:34.470088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.737733
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Bowen, C. J.,
(Dissenting Opinion in which Martin, J., Concurs.)
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case.
In my opinion, the record shows that the appellees established a good cause of action based upon Burns’ Stat., §6-2101. The appellant administrator failed and refused to close the estate by filing its final report within the time prescribed by statute and thereby permitted claims based on three alleged lost notes to be, filed by. *530three different claimants and prosecuted to judgment, although .none of the said claims were filed until more than two years after the issuance of letters and publication of notices of administration, and the estate thereby became insolvent.
The majority opinion which recites the foregoing facts proceeds on the theory that the cause of action created on behalf of an administrator for the unexcused failure to file his final report when due does not create such an actionable wrong unless such failure results in a devastavit, and that there is nothing in the record which would establish evidence of a devastavit.
When we examine the record in this case in connection with the type of evidence which was allowed to serve as the basis for the judgments on the lost notes claims, in the light of all of the other circumstances, including the administrator’s refusal to take steps demanded by appellees, it seems clear that circumstances were shown by which the lower court could have concluded that the administrator did not act in good faith, and that the failure of the administrator in the instant case to file his final report did result in a devastavit.
It would seem that §6-2101 Burns’ Stat., is rendered ineffectual as a remedy if the heirs of an estate are compelled to take some action during the course of administration under the probate code and prosecute an appeal to final judgment or thereby be barred from maintaining an action under this statute. As the majority opinion recites, the control of litigation in the probate matters remained with the appellant.
It seems that the effect of the majority holding requires that heirs of an estate must prosecute an appeal in probate matters, although not parties thereto, to preserve their cause of action against an administrator, thereby making such remedy exclusive and thereby to all *531intents and purposes destroying any separate cause of action which might exist by virtue of §6-2101 Burns’ Stat. Assuming for the sake of argument that the heirs as aggrieved parties might have a right of appeal under the probate code, it does not seem reasonable to deny them, in the event they have not so appealed, the right to prosecute a cause of action under §6-2101 Burns’ Stat., under the circumstances shown in the record in this case.
The appellees did participate in the defense of such actions, but such participation was unavailing because of their lack of control, and the fact that they were not parties, and that the appellant refused their proper demands to insure an adequate defense, and refused to file a motion for a new trial. We think a better rule should be adapted to the circumstances of this case as enunciated in the case of City of Louisville, et al. v. Babb (1934), 7 F. Supp. 658, which was an action by the City and the Louisville Bridge Commission against the Treasurer of Clark County, filed in the U. S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, to enjoin collection of tax on the Jeffersonville-Louisville bridge. Taxpayers had previously sued the Clark County Auditor in the Clark Circuit Court to mandate him to place the bridge on the tax duplicate and the bridge commission employed Mr. Wilmer T. Fox as attorney who appeared, with the Clark County attorney, for the defendant auditor. The plaintiffs had prevailed in that action, and the bridge was placed on the tax duplicate. The District Court denied the injunction on the merits, and in an opinion by Judge Baltzell said:
“Before one not a party to an action is bound thereby there must be shown affirmatively that such nonparty actually assumed control of the defense in such action, and that such defense was as *532complete as though he. had been an actual party thereto. This includes not only the trial in the first instance, but the right to appeal as well. (Authorities cited.”)
The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (75 F. 2d 162) reversed the District Court, holding the injunction should not have been denied on the merits, and at page 164 expressly, approved the above-quoted holding of Judge Baltzell’s opinion. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. (295 U. S. 738, 79 L. Ed. 1686, 55 S. Ct. 650.) .
.The case relied upon in the majority opinion for the holding that the appellees had the right to appeal from the decision in the probate cause is Jaqua v. Reinhard, Admr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 261, 190 N. E. 887. However, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar. While, this case holds that the right of appeal under §6-2101 Burns’ Stat., is not necessarily confined to a party to a judgment, the parties who were held to have such right of appeal were sureties on an administrator’s bond, which bond had been filed as a part of the record in a probate cause. In addition, in the foregoing facts, there was a motion for a new trial filed, and overruled and, therefore, something from which an appeal could be taken.
In my opinion, the judgment of the.lower court should have been affirmed..
Martin, J„ concurs in this dissent.
Rehearing denied 106 N. E. 2d 465.