Court Opinion

ID: 9916654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 07:08:05.159689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:42.856513
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 5, 2024

                                      In the
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00550-CR

                   RICKY LEE STEVENSON, II, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 199-81736-2022

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      Ricky Lee Stevenson, II, appeals his conviction for aggravated kidnapping.

We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

      Mr. Stevenson began trafficking C.R. for prostitution when she was sixteen

years old. On January 23, 2021, Mr. Stevenson and C.R., who was seventeen by

then, were arguing outside a shop in Plano. Surveillance footage showed Mr.

Stevenson stomping on C.R.’s foot and punching her in the face. As C.R. fell

backwards onto the concrete, Mr. Stevenson turned, walked back towards his car,

and opened his door. Then, after appearing to realize C.R. was lying on the ground

unconscious, Mr. Stevenson returned to C.R. and told her to get in the car. When she
did not respond, he yanked her up by her shirt, and forced her into the passenger side

of his car. As Mr. Stevenson closed the door behind her and started running back to

the drivers’ side, C.R. opened the door and climbed out. Mr. Stevenson then ran back

around the car and again forced C.R. inside. But as he ran back around to the drivers’

side, C.R. again climbed out.

      By this time, a crowd had gathered and called police. An onlooker took C.R.

to safety, and Mr. Stevenson fled in his car. Police later identified him from the

surveillance footage, and the grand jury indicted him on charges of aggravated

kidnapping, enhanced by a prior felony conviction for Assault Family Violence

Impede Breath/Circulation.

      Before trial, Mr. Stevenson hired multiple attorneys to represent him, but he

fired each within a few months of retention. At a pretrial hearing, Mr. Stevenson

informed the trial court that he wished to represent himself, and the court appointed

Matthew Goheen as standby counsel to assist him in the proceedings.

      The jury convicted Mr. Stevenson as charged and sentenced him to 59 years’

imprisonment. In his motion for new trial, Mr. Stevenson asserted denial of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel for the first time, claiming he asked standby counsel to

take over representation mid-trial and that standby counsel refused. The trial court

denied Mr. Stevenson’s motion, and he appeals.

                                         –2–
     THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DENY MR. STEPHENSON HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL

      Mr. Stevenson first contends the trial court’s “unjustifiable interference”

prevented him from reasserting his right to counsel during the trial, thus denying him

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Subject to exceptions not at issue here, a

defendant may waive the right to self-representation once asserted. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(h); Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1986) (A “defendant may . . . waive his right to represent himself once it has

been asserted.”). But to establish error based on the trial court’s refusal to allow such

a waiver, the record must show it was reasonably apparent to the trial court that the

defendant “abandoned his initial request to represent himself.” Funderburg, 717

S.W.2d at 642.

      Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Stevenson never informed the trial court that

he wished to abandon self-representation. Nevertheless, Mr. Stevenson makes the

novel argument that the trial court denied him the right to counsel by preemptively

refusing to allow him to waive self-representation. He bases his argument primarily

on the following exchange at a pretrial hearing:

             [STATE]: And, Judge, I apologize coming late in the game. I
      know the Court’s done admonishments with this defendant. I was
      informed that that’s been done ad nauseam. Just so that I can understand
      with this type of proceeding, once we have a jury in the room, from that
      point forward, while Mr. Goheen will be there for consultation or
      discussion for procedural matters, my understanding is that it would be
      the defendant whose voice is the only voice heard from counsel table
      to the jury. Is that correct?

                                          –3–
             THE COURT: Correct.

             [STATE]: Okay. That’s all I need to know.

             MR. GOHEEN: I’m [here] to ensure due process and procedure.

             [STATE]: Then we’re on the same page.

             THE COURT: And that was at the Court’s request. Not at Mr.
      Stevenson’s request that I appoint standby counsel. Because, obviously,
      in a felony court on first-degree felonies, we do not see people
      representing themselves because most people understand the stakes are
      really, really high. And literally their life is at risk. So. But he is -- it’s
      his decision. I have explained it. We’ve gone over it. I appointed Mr.
      Goheen as standby counsel. He also has conferred with Mr. Stevenson.
      And, at this point, he has elected to continue to represent himself.

             [STATE]: Thank you, Judge. That’s all I have.

            THE COURT: So Mr. Goheen will be here just in case Mr.
      Stevenson has questions, that sort of thing. But Mr. Stevenson has
      elected to represent himself. So, yes, he will be the one presenting the
      case.

      Nothing in that exchange suggests the trial court would prevent standby

counsel from taking over the representation later upon Mr. Stevenson’s request. The

trial court merely clarified that, “at [that] point,” because Mr. Stevenson had elected

to “continue to represent himself,” standby counsel’s role was to advise Mr.

Stevenson rather than address the jury. The trial court’s statements in that regard are

consistent with protecting Mr. Stevenson’s elected right to self-representation

against potential interference from standby counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465

U.S. 168, 181–82 (1984) (noting that participation by standby counsel in the jury’s

presence is “problematic” because it undermines the defendant’s pro se presentation

                                           –4–
of his defense); Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)

(“There was no unsolicited, unwarranted participation by court-appointed standby

counsel so as to interfere with appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to self-

representation.”).

      The only other portion of the record Mr. Stevenson identifies as support for

his argument is standby counsel’s post-trial testimony that it was his

“understanding,” based in part on previous unspecified warnings and

admonishments from the trial court, that “should [Mr. Stevenson] insist on

representing himself, that he would have to do so; and that, basically, he wouldn’t

be able to switch courses midstream.” But the record does not reflect what the trial

court purportedly said to give counsel that “understanding,” apart from the exchange

identified above—which we conclude does not establish an objectively reasonable

basis for believing that the trial court would reject any future request to waive self-

representation. Thus, without excluding the possibility that a trial court could

preemptively deny the right to counsel by making statements suggesting that it

would not permit a defendant to waive his right to self-representation once asserted,

the record does not establish such a denial here.

               THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MR. STEVENSON’S
                               MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

      Mr. Stevenson next contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for

new trial, regardless of whether the trial court had preemptively denied him the right

                                         –5–
to waive self-representation. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of

discretion. See State v. Gutierrez, 541 S.W.3d 91, 97–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Mr.

Stevenson contends he proved that: (1) he “unequivocally reasserted his right to

counsel” by asking standby counsel to take over the case; and (2) switching

representation during the trial was permissible under the factors identified in Medley

v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000). Thus, according to Mr.

Stevenson, standby counsel’s refusal to take over the case effectively denied him the

right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, warranting a new trial.

      We reject the initial premise of Mr. Stevenson’s argument because merely

asking standby counsel to take over representation is not sufficient to reassert the

right to counsel once it has been waived. To waive the right to self-representation

after asserting it, a defendant must make it reasonably apparent to the trial court that

he wishes to abandon self-representation. See Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642 (“A

waiver may be found if it reasonably appears to the court that defendant has

abandoned his initial request to represent himself.”). Mr. Stevenson did nothing to

make the trial court aware that he wished to abandon self-representation, despite his

standby counsel advising him that abandoning self-representation was an issue he

would have to take up with the court. On this record, Mr. Stevenson did not establish

that he was denied the right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed under the Sixth

Amendment and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for

new trial.

                                          –6–
         THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS MR. STEVENSON’S CONVICTION

         Mr. Stevenson next contends the evidence does not support his conviction for

aggravated kidnapping. We review evidentiary sufficiency under the familiar

Jackson v. Virginia1 standard, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict to determine whether the factfinder could rationally find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

         A person commits aggravated kidnapping if “the person intentionally or

knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the

commission of the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b). “‘Abduct’ means to

restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by . . . using or threatening to

use deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2)(B). “‘Restrain’ means to restrict a person’s

movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty,

by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person.” Id.

§ 20.01(1). “Restraint is ‘without consent’ if it is accomplished by . . . force,

intimidation, or deception.” Id. § 20.01(1)(A).

         As relevant to Mr. Stevenson’s arguments, the indictment alleged that he

         did intentionally and knowingly abduct [C.R.] . . . by restricting the
         movements of [C.R.] without her consent so as to interfere substantially
         with her liberty, by moving her from one place to another with the intent
         to prevent her liberation, by using or threatening to use deadly force,
         namely striking [C.R.] in the head with a deadly weapon, to wit:
         Defendant’s hand.

   1
       443 U.S. 307 (1979).
                                           –7–
      Mr. Stevenson does not challenge the jury’s conclusion that he committed the

requisite conduct; instead, he argues the evidence is insufficient to prove he formed

the requisite intent to restrain C.R. before using the deadly force, so as to meet the

statutory definition of “abduct.” He argues that, because the surveillance video

shows he walked back to his car after punching C.R., rather than forcing her to get

into the car immediately after the punch, a rational jury could not conclude he

punched C.R. with the intent to force her into the car.

      But the jury saw the surveillance video. The jury heard evidence that C.R. told

a witness that Mr. Stevenson was trying to take her somewhere she did not want to

go. The jury could rationally infer from that statement that Mr. Stevenson punched

C.R. to coerce her into going with him against her will. With respect to Mr.

Stevenson initially walking back to the car after punching her, the jury could

rationally conclude he expected C.R. to follow, and when she did not—because she

was lying on the ground unconscious—he walked over, told her to get in the car, and

then physically forced her to do so. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,

the jury could rationally conclude Mr. Stevenson struck C.R. with the requisite intent

to “restrain” her for purposes of meeting the statutory definition of “abduct.”

                        THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE MODIFIED

      Mr. Stevenson next contends the trial court erred by requiring Mr. Stevenson

to register as a sex offender, and the State appropriately concedes the error. As Mr.

Stevenson correctly points out, the State did not allege or prove either that Mr.

                                         –8–
Stevenson committed aggravated kidnapping with the intent to sexually abuse C.R.

or that C.R. was younger than seventeen years old at the time of the offense. Thus,

Mr. Stevenson’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping is not a reportable conviction.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.001 (5)(C), (E), 62.0051. We modify the

judgment to remove the sex offender registration requirement.

      Mr. Stevenson next contends we should modify the judgment to accurately

reflect that his waiver of counsel and punishment election were not made in writing

and that he did not waive his right to appeal. The State agrees. We have the power

to modify judgments to speak truth when provided with the necessary information.

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); McDade v. State, 613 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2020, no pet.) (citing Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet.

ref’d)). The record shows Mr. Stevenson’s counsel waiver was not in writing, that

he made an oral election for the jury to assess punishment, and that he did not waive

his right to appeal. We therefore modify the judgment accordingly.

             THERE WAS A RECORD BASIS FOR THE CHALLENGED COSTS

      Finally, Mr. Stevenson complains that the trial court improperly assessed

certain costs against him—$35 for serving a writ and $50 for a “warrant”—because

there is no basis in the record for assessing those costs under code of criminal

procedure article 102.011. With respect to the $35 assessment, the record shows the

sheriff served a search warrant for Mr. Stevenson’s Facebook records. Thus, there

was a basis for that cost under code of criminal procedure article 102.011(a)(4).

                                        –9–
      With respect to the $50 assessment, the State argues that a “bench warrant”

issued in the case qualifies as a reimbursable “arrest warrant” under article

102.011(a)(2). According to the State, a “bench warrant is, by definition, an arrest

warrant.” See Bench Warrant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining

“bench warrant” as including “a writ issued directly by a judge to a law-enforcement

officer, esp. for the arrest of a person who has been . . . indicted”)). We agree.

Though the statute does not specifically define “arrest warrants,” subsection

(b) describes reimbursement fees in addition to those provided by subsection (a).

One of those fees is for mileage associated with “conveying a prisoner arrested on a

warrant or capias issued in another county to the court or jail of the county.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.011(b)(2). This describes the situation here, where as Mr.

Stevenson’s brief accurately describes, “a ‘bench warrant’ was issued to return

Appellant from another county.” We conclude the statute contemplates including

bench warrants in the $50 fee “for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant,

capias, or capias pro fine.” See id. (a)(2).

      As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We direct the trial court to

prepare a corrected judgment that reflects the modifications made in this Court’s

opinion and judgment.

                                          –10–
      See Shumate v. State, 649 S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no

pet.); see also Jones v. State, No. 05-22-00328-CR, 2023 WL 6567781, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                          /Cory L. Carlyle//
220550f.u05                               CORY L. CARLYLE
Do Not Publish                            JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                      –11–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

RICKY LEE STEVENSON, II,                      On Appeal from the 199th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 199-81736-
No. 05-22-00550-CR          V.                2022.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
                                              participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      We remove the mark in the box next to the sentence: “Defendant is
      required to register as sex offender in accordance with Chapter 62,
      CCP.”

      We remove the phrase “in writing” from the sentence in the judgment
      stating: “Defendant appeared without counsel and knowingly,
      intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to representation by
      counsel in writing in open court.”

      We replace the phrase “filed a written election” with “orally elected”
      in the sentence: “Defendant entered a plea and filed a written election
      to have the jury assess punishment.”

      We remove the following sentences: “APPEAL WAIVED. NO
      PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

                                       –12–
Judgment entered this 5th day of January, 2024.

                                       –13–