Court Opinion

ID: 9749629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:54:20.349637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:54.067006
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
When Terrance Williams failed to appear at the call of the trial list on November 4, 1988, the Honorable Abraham J. Gafni entered a judgment of non pros. This was nothing more nor less than is contemplated by Pa.R.C.P. 218. Without filing any petition to remove the non pros, Williams appeals directly to this court. The majority would review the entire record in order to speculate upon why Williams did not answer the call of the list on November 4, 1988. I would not. I dissent.
My colleagues begin by guessing that Williams was not aware that his case was listed for trial “[apparently due to his incarceration.” They then proceed to examine the content of numerous documents filed by Williams, none of which would have been immediately available to the calendar control judge when the trial list was being called. From this examination, the majority concludes that the appellee, Stephen Gallagher, knew what the lawsuit was all about and, therefore, could not have been prejudiced! From this springs the conclusion that Judge Gafni abused his discretion by applying Rule 218.
By failing to file a petition to remove the non pros, Williams has denied the trial court its right to consider its own action. Judge Gafni correctly sets forth the flaw in Williams’ position in his Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925:
Plaintiff has appealed this judgment directly to the Superior Court, and no motion to vacate the judgment of non pros has been filed with this Court. Accordingly, this Court is unaware of the existence of any of the elements necessary to vacate a non pros including whether the default that occasioned the entry of judgment can be reasonably explained or that the cause of action is valid. Toczylowski v. General Bindery Co., 359 Pa.Su*589per. 572, 575, 519 A.2d 500, 503 (1986). Without this information, the Court can express no opinion with respect to the judgment of non pros.
Opinion, Gafni, J., dated 2/21/89, filed February 23, 1989.
I agree completely with Judge Gafni. In those cases arising under Rule 218 where the appeal is taken immediately from the entry of non pros, the only element controlling the discretion of the trial judge is whether a plaintiff has placed a satisfactory excuse of nonreadiness before the court at the time the case is called for trial. See Valley Peat & Humus v. Sunnylands, Inc., — Pa.Super. —, 581 A.2d 193 (en banc) (Dissenting Opinion by Johnson, J.) (No. 981 Philadelphia 1989, filed Oct. 5, 1990).
Based upon the analysis set forth in my Dissenting Opinion in Valley Peat & Humus, supra, I strongly believe that prejudice is not an element to be considered in the review of any Rule 218 dismissal on direct appeal.
The majority begins by recognizing that a party may file a direct appeal from the entry of a judgment of non pros. I do not disagree. Where that is done, however, we should refrain from speculation and guesswork about what the trial court should have known at time of entry of the non pros. We are limited to considering the certified record on appeal when reviewing a case. Barner v. Barner, 364 Pa.Super. 1, 527 A.2d 122 (1987).
Judge Gafni appropriately limited himself to those matters which had been properly placed before him, both in administering the call of the list and in complying with Pa.R.A.P.1925. Were we to do the same, we would find no abuse of discretion on the part of the most distinguished trial judge.
In a companion case, the majority would place upon our trial judges the obligation of holding, at the time a case is called for trial, “a brief discussion with counsel present” and “argument.... concerning any prejudice resulting to [defendant] from [plaintiffs] failure to appear.” Elcomp, Inc. v. Drolet, Nos. 1698 and 1699 Pittsburgh 1988, — *590Pa.Super. -, 581 A.2d 193 (1990) (en banc). On this appeal, the majority takes the trial judge to task for not having taken “a mere glance, at any pleading or correspondence filed by the appellant in the trial court.” Majority opinion, at page 586-587.
These suggestions arise from the refusal of the majority to distinguish between (1) a direct appeal from the order entering a non pros and (2) an appeal from an order refusing to remove the judgment of non pros. When the trial judge in this case declares that he is, as a matter of law, unaware of the existence of any of the elements necessary to vacate a non pros, because no petition to remove the judgment has been filed, I am prepared to believe him.
Compliance with established law and procedure has nothing to do with mystery. It does remain a mystery, however, as to the exact documents upon which the majority relies in reaching its numerous findings of fact. The majority opinion does not set this forth. It may well be that, within the luxury that we on a reviewing court enjoy in considering a matter from many different angles without the press of time, the explanation or excuse for appellant’s absence at the call of the list, and the nature of appellant’s cause of action, and the surrounding equities in this case are, as the majority declares, “obvious.”
But that is not what we have to decide on this appeal. We need only determine what facts were available to Judge Gafni at the moment he entered the judgment of non pros. Until either Williams or the majority cites to something specific in the record certified on this appeal, which cited information was available to, and should have been known by, Judge Gafni at the time the list was called, I will continue to afford Judge Gafni the respect and credibility which is his due.
The appropriate proceeding would have been a petition and rule to open the judgment, a proceeding which would necessarily have involved the taking of testimony to establish the verity of the facts alleged for the removal of the *591judgment. Cox v. Felice Perri & Sons, 412 Pa. 415, 417, 195 A.2d 79, 80 (1963). Had Williams filed a petition to vacate the non pros, and if the trial court had acted upon that petition after the filing of an answer and a hearing thereon, we would then be faced with the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate that judgment. See Nivens v. Chestnut Hill Hospital, 373 Pa.Super. 377, 541 A.2d 365 (1988); Toczylowski v. General Bindery Co., 359 Pa.Super. 572, 519 A.2d 500 (1986). Williams has not filed any such petition, and that question is not properly before us. Compare Wilson v. Vincent, 300 Pa. 321, 150 A. 642 (1930).
The only issue before us on this appeal is this:
When a case is called for trial, if without satisfactory excuse a plaintiff is not ready, may a court enter a non pros on its own motion without abusing its discretion?
I read Pa.R.C.P. 218 and say: “Yes.” My colleagues examine the entire record from September 1987 to November 1988 and say: “No.” Hence, this dissent.