Court Opinion

ID: 9638850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:56:18.837274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.250119
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice (dissenting). My dissent goes to that part of the majority opinion beginning with Section “4. Peaceful Picketing.’ ’ In that Section, — the principal portion of the opinion — the majority is holding that equity may enjoin peaceful picketing whenever the Union has breached a collective bargaining contract; because (insists the majority) anything that encourages a breach of contract is an ‘ ‘ unlawful purpose. ’ ’ Here is the language of the majority: “. . . it is insisted that a State Court has no power to enjoin picketing under the circumstances of this case where, as we see it, the purpose of the picketing was to force the breach of a contract. ... A careful consideration of the Lion Oil opinion impels the conclusion that it holds picketing to force the breach of a lawful contract to be picketing for an unlawful purpose.” Now the foregoing is the foundation on which the majority builds its argument in support of the injunction in the case at bar. The strike in the present case was wrongful in the sense that it was in violation of contract, but it was not unlawful because there was no breach of the peace shown to have been committed, or threatened to be committed. At the penalty of repetition, I copy what I said on this point in my dissenting opinion in Lion Oil Co.1 v. Marsh, 220 Ark. 678, 249 S. W. 2d 569: “ ‘Unlawful’ means ‘in violation of law.’ In State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that the term ‘unlawful’ means ‘that which is not lawful, or that which is contrary to some express provision of the law,’ and that ‘unlawful purpose’ means for the purpose of doing something that is prohibited by law. I realize that the word ‘unlawful’ may sometimes refer to mere civil violations, as distinct from criminal violations,2 but the general meaning of ‘unlawful’ is ‘violation of law. ’3 Certainly that is the meaning of the words ‘ unlawful purpose’ in connection with labor disturbances. In the case of Cole v. State, 214 Ark. 387, 216 S. W. 2d 402,4 we discussed the words ‘unlawful assemblage’ in connection with our Freedom-to-Work statute; and we there committed this Court to the view that an unlawful assemblage was one for the accomplishing of an act forbidden by law. That case and its reasoning are clearly against the majority holding in the case at bar. There is no law that adjudges a fine or other criminal penalty against a person who violates a contract. All that the defendants have done in this case is to violate a contract, and such is not unlawful within the purview of our labor laws. So I insist that an injunction against picketing should not issue in this case, because the purpose of the picketing5  It seems clear to me that the majority is creating an entirely new conception of “unlawful purpose’’ which it proposes to apply only in labor cases.6 I insist that the law on “unlawful purpose” as it exists generally should be applied to this case, instead of some new conception of ‘ ‘ unlawful purpose ’ ’ designed to apply only in labor cases. 'The majority says that it is declaring the public policy of Arkansas to be that equity will enjoin picketing when the picketing is in violation of a contract. I cannot believe that such a declaration of public policy is in line with what the Supreme Court of the United States had in mind when it was discussing ‘ ‘ public policy ’ ’ in such cases as Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S. 460, 94 L. Ed. 985, 70 S. Ct. 718, and International Brotherhood v. Hamke, 339 U. S. 470, 94 L. Ed. 995, 70 S. Ct. 773. But there is no necessity for me to enter into a discussion of “public policy”; because the determination of whether the majority’s present declaration of “public policy” is in accordance with the Federal Constitution and laws is a matter that the United States Supreme Court will ultimately determine. My duty is performed when I have' done my best to follow — not my own personal desires but my understanding of — the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this Court. That duty impels the present dissent.  In Arkansas Law Review, Vol. 7, p. 147, there is a ease note on the Lion Oil ease; and the writer of that case note accurately foretold the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court in Garner V. Teamsters Local, 98 L. Ed. (Adv. Op.), p. 161. See also Annotation, 32 A. L. R. 2d 829.    See 66 C. J. 35.    See Kelly v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 284.    This case was affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion. See 338 U. S. 345, 70 S. Ct. 172, and 94 L. Ed. 155.    For Annotations on the validity of statutes and ordinances forbidding picketing, see 35 A. L. R. 1200, 108 A. L. R. 1119, 122 A. L. R. 1043, 125 A. L. R. 963, and 130 A. L. R. 1303. while wrongful — was not unlawful. ’ ’   . Neither side has argued a point that has occurred to me while I was working on this dissent. It is this: Quite irrespective of “unlawful purpose” and “public policy,” the law generally is that in some instances equity will issue an injunction to prevent a breach of contract; and that since the picketing in the case at bar is designed to bring about a breach of the contract, then an injunction might issue against such picketing. Such thought was suggested to me by the language contained in the opinion of Mr. Justice George Rose Smith in the case of Smith v. Ark. Motor Freight Lines, 214 Ark. 553, 217 S. W. 2d 249. That was a case in which the Union and the employer had made a contract covering wages, working conditions, and the like. One provision of the agreement was that the employer might employ other than Union members, but after 30 days, such employees must become members of the Union if they continued to work for the employer. The suit was filed by the Union, alleging that the employer had retained non-union members for more than 30 days, and the prayer was for specific performance and an injunction against the continued employment of persons not belonging to the Union. The Chancery Court decided against the Union on a misunderstanding of the law governing class actions, and the Union appealed. But the appellee (employer) took a cross-appeal, and argued that a contract for personal services could not be specifically enforced. Of course, this was not a contract for personal services; but Mr. Justice George Rose Smith, in answering the appellee’s argument, said: “A sufficient answer would be that appellants also ask for an injunction to enforce appellee’s negative covenant against the retention of non-union employees, and injunction is the normal means of enforcing such a covenant. Walsh on ‘Equity,’ § 67.” The- Freedom-to-Work Amendment .was not briefed, but the case indicates that injunction is proper to prevent the breach of a contract governing wages, working conditions, and the like. So it might be argued that injunction was the proper remedy in the case at bar to prevent a breach-of the contract by the Union; and that the picketing was designed to cause a.breach of the contract. In support of such argument, there might be cited Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742, 134 Am. St. R. 88, in which it was.said in effect that an injunction restraining the breach of a contract is a negative specific performance thereof,- And that the jurisdiction1 of equity to grant such injunction-is-substantially-coincident with the jurisdiction to compel specific performance, and that when a contract may be specifically enforced, then equity will restrain its breach by injunction if such is the only practicable mode of enforcement. Other cases involving injunctions to prevent breach of contract may be found in West’s Arkansas Digest, "Injunction,” Key No. 57, et seq. As aforesaid, the foregoing.line of reasoning has not been urged in the case at bar. If successfully urged, it could at most only result in my concurrence herein; because I would still be obliged to dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which discusses “unlawful contract” and “public policy.”