Court Opinion

ID: 9966177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 12:01:51.29663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:41.189432
License: Public Domain

************************************************
   The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
  The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       0, 0

         2                           ,0                             0 Conn. App. 1
                             Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

                      JAMES HILTON v. COMMISSIONER
                             OF CORRECTION
                                (AC 46270)
                                   Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.

                                             Syllabus

         The petitioner sought relief in a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
             claiming, inter alia, that R, his counsel during his first habeas action,
             and G, his criminal trial counsel, had rendered ineffective assistance by
             failing to present expert testimony from a forensic pathologist to support
             the petitioner’s claim of actual innocence. The petitioner had been con-
             victed of several crimes, including murder, as a result of a drug related
             shooting. K, an associate medical examiner, had performed an autopsy
             that showed that the victim died from a single gunshot to the head at
             close range. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, K testified that the barrel
             of the gun had been touching the victim’s skin when the gun was dis-
             charged and that the wound was a typical contact gunshot wound of
             entrance. This court upheld the petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal.
             At his first habeas trial, R presented the testimony of C, the state’s
             chief medical examiner, which was consistent with that of K, and the
             testimony of D, a forensic scientist. At that habeas trial, the petitioner
             claimed, inter alia, that G had improperly failed to present the testimony
             of an expert witness, such as D, to attack K’s testimony. D, however,
             testified at the first habeas trial that the victim’s wound could resemble
             a contact wound but that he could not conclude with certainty that the
             victim had sustained a contact wound. The habeas court denied the
             habeas petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish
             that G rendered ineffective assistance. This court upheld the habeas
             court’s decision, concluding that D had not contradicted K’s opinion at
             the criminal trial that the victim’s wound was a contact gunshot wound
             and that D’s testimony would not have been helpful at the criminal trial
             to establish that the petitioner did not shoot the victim. At the second
             habeas trial, the petitioner presented the testimony of W, an expert in
             forensic pathology, who disagreed with K’s conclusion that the victim
             suffered from a contact wound. The habeas court declined to credit W’s
             testimony, reasoning that W had not reviewed certain testimony and
             that his opinion did not overcome the overwhelming evidence the state
             presented against the petitioner at the criminal trial. The court denied
             the habeas petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish
             that G and R had rendered ineffective assistance. The court thereafter
             granted in part and denied in part the petitioner’s petition for certification
             to appeal. Held:
         1. The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner had failed to
             establish that he was prejudiced as a result of G’s and R’s decisions not
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 1

       0 Conn. App. 1                                  ,0                             3
                          Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
           to present the testimony of a forensic pathology expert: W’s testimony,
           at best, challenged the nature of the victim’s injury and was inconsistent
           with that of witnesses at the petitioner’s criminal trial that the petitioner
           had been standing next to the victim when the shooting occurred, and
           G had presented testimony similar to that of W at the criminal trial;
           moreover, W’s testimony did not undermine confidence in the outcome
           of the criminal trial, as C’s testimony was consistent with that of K and
           other state’s witnesses, and the state had presented what this court
           in the petitioner’s two prior appeals characterized as overwhelming
           evidence against the petitioner at his criminal trial; accordingly, a reason-
           able probability did not exist that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal
           trial would have been different had G presented expert testimony from
           a forensic pathologist such as W, and, because the petitioner failed to
           establish that he was prejudiced by G’s performance, the petitioner’s
           ineffectiveness claim necessarily failed as to R.
       2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court abused
           its discretion in denying him certification to appeal as to his claim that
           the court had applied the wrong legal standard in finding W not credible;
           the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claim was debatable among
           jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different
           manner or that the question was adequate to deserve encouragement
           to proceed further.
       3. This court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal as to his claim that the habeas
           court had applied an erroneous legal standard in concluding that W’s
           testimony was not credible when it denied the petitioner certification
           to appeal as to that issue: contrary to the petitioner’s contention that
           the habeas court should have relied on Lapointe v. Commissioner of
           Correction (316 Conn. 225) and assessed W’s credibility in light of
           whether a jury could have credited W’s testimony, the petitioner’s claim
           was factually distinguishable from Lapointe, in which the state’s case
           was relatively weak, whereas the state in the present case had presented
           overwhelming evidence against the petitioner, and legally distinguish-
           able from Lapointe, which limited appellate evaluation of an expert
           witness’ credibility to claims under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83),
           in which a habeas court’s function, as part of its determination of the
           legal question of materiality, is to make a predictive evaluation, rather
           than an absolute finding, as to whether the evidence withheld by the
           state reasonably could be credited by the ultimate fact finder and, if
           so, whether that evidence reasonably could lead to a different result at
           a trial; moreover, the court in Lapointe neither precluded a habeas court
           from determining the credibility of an expert witness and that witness’
           conclusions, as the petitioner claimed, nor did the court in Lapointe
           establish that a petitioner is entitled to a new trial by presenting an
           expert of sufficient import and credibility, as such a vague standard
           could necessitate a new criminal trial in nearly all postconviction habeas
Page 2                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       0, 0

         4                           ,0                             0 Conn. App. 1
                             Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
             proceedings involving expert witnesses; accordingly, this court deter-
             mined that Lapointe was inapplicable to the petitioner’s case and would
             not disturb the habeas court’s factual finding that W was not credible.
                     Argued January 31—officially released May 7, 2024

                                       Procedural History

           Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
         Tolland and tried to the court, Klatt, J.; judgment deny-
         ing the petition; thereafter, the court granted in part
         and denied in part the petition for certification to
         appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court.
         Affirmed; appeal dismissed in part.
             Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (petitioner).
            Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state’s attorney,
         with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
         attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, supervisory assistant
         state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                                             Opinion

            ALVORD, J. The petitioner, James Hilton, appeals
         from the judgment of the habeas court denying his
         second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 On appeal,
            1
              The habeas court granted in part and denied in part the petitioner’s
         petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court.
         ‘‘We are mindful of our jurisprudence that, following the granting of a petition
         for certification to appeal, ‘at least in the absence of demonstrable prejudice,
         the legislature did not intend the terms of the habeas court’s grant of certifica-
         tion to be a limitation on the specific issues subject to appellate review.’
         James L. v. Commissioner of Correction, 245 Conn. 132, 138, 712 A.2d 947
         (1998). Thus, ‘once the habeas court, in its gatekeeping function, certified
         that appellate review was warranted, any issue could be presented on appeal,
         so long as the opposing party is not prejudiced.’ Logan v. Commissioner
         of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 744, 753 n.7, 9 A.3d 776 (2010), cert. denied,
         300 Conn. 918, 14 A.3d 333 (2011). In James L., however, the court expressly
         noted: ‘This case does not present a question of mixed certification, in which
         a habeas court expressly grants permission to appeal with regard to some,
         but not all, of the issues on which certification was requested.’ James L. v.
         Commissioner of Correction, supra, 138 n.7. It remains unsettled whether
         a habeas petitioner is limited in the claims he or she may pursue on appeal
         when a habeas court grants certification to appeal as to certain specific
         claims and denies certification to appeal as to others.’’ Diaz v. Commis-
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 3

       0 Conn. App. 1                                 ,0                           5
                          Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) improp-
       erly rejected his claim that his right to the effective
       assistance of counsel was violated when his first habeas
       counsel, Attorney David B. Rozwaski, failed to present
       the expert testimony of a forensic pathologist in support
       of his claim that the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel,
       Attorney Al Ghiroli, had provided ineffective assistance
       of counsel and (2) abused its discretion in denying his
       petition for certification to appeal as to his claim that
       the habeas court applied the wrong legal standard in
       assessing witness credibility. We affirm the judgment
       of the habeas court as it relates to the petitioner’s first
       claim. We dismiss the appeal as to the petitioner’s sec-
       ond claim.
          The following facts and procedural history, as set
       forth by this court in the petitioner’s direct appeal from
       his conviction or as undisputed in the record, are rele-
       vant to our resolution of the petitioner’s appeal. ‘‘The
       victim, William Rodriguez, was shot on July 14, 2000,
       at approximately 9 p.m. in the area of Truman Street
       and King Place in New Haven. Sergeant Anthony Duff
       arrived at the scene of the shooting and discovered the
       victim’s body on the sidewalk, surrounded by a crowd
       of people. An autopsy performed on the victim’s body
       revealed that he died from a single gunshot at close
       range to the left side of his head. Bullet fragments
       removed during the victim’s autopsy were tested and
       found to be consistent with having been fired from
       either a .38 special or a .357 magnum firearm. No gun
       was ever recovered.
         ‘‘The shooting was precipitated by a drug turf war.
       Anna Rodriguez, the victim’s longtime friend, testified
       sioner of Correction, 214 Conn. App. 199, 202 n.1, 280 A.3d 526, cert. denied,
       345 Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022). In this case, as in Diaz, ‘‘[b]ecause
       neither party has challenged the propriety of the habeas court’s unusual
       mixed certification order, we leave that issue for another day and simply
       address each of the petitioner’s claims in turn.’’ Id.
Page 4                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

         6                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 1
                       Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

         that two days before the murder, she and her boyfriend
         had gone to visit the victim, who had just moved to an
         apartment on Truman Street. Rodriguez testified that
         upon arriving outside the victim’s apartment, her boy-
         friend sounded his car horn, and the victim and his
         girlfriend, Cora Moore, came outside to visit them. At
         that point, the [petitioner] suddenly approached on the
         passenger’s side of the car and peered inside. When the
         [petitioner] recognized Rodriguez’ boyfriend, he
         walked away.
           ‘‘The jury also heard testimony from Sherice Mills,
         who stated that on the afternoon of the shooting,
         ‘Shawn,’ an associate of the victim, verbally confronted
         the [petitioner] and one of his associates regarding
         Shawn’s drug dealing activities on Truman Street, which
         was part of the [petitioner’s] drug territory. During that
         conversation, Shawn threatened the [petitioner] and his
         associate. The confrontation soon ended, and Shawn
         and the victim drove off in the victim’s car.
            ‘‘Two women testified as eyewitnesses to the actual
         shooting. Mills testified that the victim left his porch
         to make a drug sale to someone in a car. She testified
         that moments later, while the victim was at the car, she
         heard the [petitioner] state that he was ‘about to kill
         [the victim],’ and observed the [petitioner] walk across
         the street and shoot the victim in the head. According
         to Mills, the [petitioner] fell to the ground with the
         victim, and the [petitioner] ‘kept holding [the victim’s]
         head, saying he didn’t mean to do it and [telling] some-
         body to call the police.’ Mills later identified the [peti-
         tioner] as the shooter from an array of photographs.
           ‘‘A second eyewitness, Simone Williams, who was on
         the porch at the time of the shooting, testified about
         essentially the same events as did Mills. Williams’ testi-
         mony added that the [petitioner] had approached the
         victim from behind and stated: ‘You ain’t from around
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 5

       0 Conn. App. 1                         ,0                 7
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       here, son,’ and, ‘You need to move from around here,
       son,’ and that she then saw the [petitioner] take a gun
       from behind his back and shoot the victim. When the
       shooting stopped, Williams testified, the victim fell to
       the ground, and the [petitioner] yelled for someone to
       call an ambulance. A short time later, the [petitioner]
       fled the scene. Williams went to the police station some-
       time later and related to the police what she had
       observed concerning the shooting. At that time, she
       positively identified the [petitioner] in a photographic
       array and did so again at trial.
         ‘‘The state also presented testimony from Moore, the
       victim’s girlfriend, that while she was in Toisann Hen-
       derson’s second floor apartment on Truman Street play-
       ing with Henderson’s baby and listening to music, she
       heard a gunshot. Minutes after the shooting, Henderson
       ran from the porch into the apartment and told Moore
       that the [petitioner] had shot her boyfriend. Moore ran
       outside where she found the victim lying motionless
       on the ground. She fell to the ground and started crying
       and hugging him. Shortly thereafter, Duff arrived. On
       the basis of the information that the witnesses provided,
       Duff dispatched the [petitioner’s] description over the
       police radio.
          ‘‘At trial, the [petitioner] testified that after meeting
       with his family, he voluntarily went to the police station,
       accompanied by his brother-in-law, Sergeant Nate
       Blackman, and provided a statement about the shoot-
       ing. While he was in police custody, the [petitioner]
       stated that he had been sitting on his porch when he
       heard a commotion and went to see what was happen-
       ing. The [petitioner] further told the police that a third
       man had drawn a gun, that the [petitioner] had grappled
       for the gun, and ‘it went bashing across [the victim’s]
       head.’ Later in the interview, the [petitioner] was asked
       if he could give more detail about the shooting. It was
       at that point that the [petitioner] ended the interview.
Page 6                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

         8                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 1
                       Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

         At trial, [the petitioner] described how several seconds
         after he fought with the third man, a fourth man shot
         the victim and ran away. Immediately after the gunshot,
         the [petitioner] testified, he applied pressure to the vic-
         tim’s wound to stop the bleeding. [The petitioner] fur-
         ther testified that he left the victim to make sure some-
         one had called an ambulance. When [the petitioner]
         returned and saw that the victim was receiving aid, he
         went to and sat on the porch. The [petitioner] testified
         that he sat on the porch until people in the crowd
         began to tell the police that he did the shooting. [The
         petitioner] then stated that he became scared, and went
         directly to see his children and then to Blackman’s
         house.

            ‘‘During their investigation, the police learned that
         after the shooting, the [petitioner] went to see his fian-
         cée, Maybertha Ashley. . . . [H]er sister, Andrea Ash-
         ley, testified that the [petitioner] had given his bloody
         clothes to his fiancée, who in turn gave them to Andrea
         Ashley to wash. When the police arrested the [peti-
         tioner] at the police station, they took the clothing he
         had worn on the evening of the shooting. The blood
         samples and clothes collected from both the victim and
         the [petitioner] were sent to the state forensic labora-
         tory. A state’s expert testified that a drop of blood found
         on the [petitioner’s] boxer shorts matched the victim’s
         blood type and DNA. Despite the fact that the victim had
         been shot at fairly close range, there was no detectable
         blood on the [petitioner’s] other clothes. The [peti-
         tioner] denied ever having his clothes washed after
         the shooting, and explained that his clothes were not
         covered in blood because he wore his shirt over his
         head and his pants around his knees.

           ‘‘On September 12, 2000, the [petitioner] was charged
         with murder, and criminal possession of and carrying
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    Page 7

       0 Conn. App. 1                                ,0                           9
                         Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       a pistol or revolver without a permit.’’ (Footnotes omit-
       ted.) State v. Hilton, 79 Conn. App. 155, 157–60, 829
       A.3d 890 (2003).

         At the petitioner’s criminal trial, the state presented
       the testimony of Arkady Katsnelson, an associate medi-
       cal examiner in the Office of the Chief Medical Exam-
       iner, who had performed the victim’s autopsy. Katsnel-
       son testified that, because ‘‘there was no evidence of
       soot or gun powder,’’ the victim’s gunshot wound in
       this particular case resembled either a ‘‘long distance’’
       or a contact wound.2 When asked whether the victim’s
       gunshot wound was typical, Katsnelson testified: ‘‘This
       gunshot wound, it is not typical from a gunshot wound
       which was created from a long distance because a gun-
       shot wound from a distance will be a round shape, and
       the round shape wound and the size of the wound will
       be slightly bigger than the size of the bullet. In this
       particular case, it’s not a typical gunshot wound of
       entry which is created from a long distance.’’ Thus,
       Katsnelson testified: ‘‘[M]y conclusion is, this gunshot
       wound is consistent with a contact gunshot wound of
       entrance. It means in this particular case the barrel
       of the gun was touching the skin when the gun was
       discharged. It is the reason for my conclusion, number
       one, there is no evidence of soot or gunpowder around,
       and number two, which is extremely important also,
       the size of the wound. The wound is 3.2 centimeters in
       vertical dimension and it is 1.2 centimeters in horizontal
       dimension and it is the reason I believe this gunshot
       wound is a typical contact gunshot wound.’’

         Following a jury trial, during which the petitioner was
       represented by Ghiroli, the petitioner was convicted
         2
           Katsnelson testified that ‘‘[a] contact wound means, if the barrel of the
       gun is touching the skin, touching the body’’ and that a long distance wound
       results from a gun generally being ‘‘more than three feet’’ away.
Page 8                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

         10                          ,0                           0 Conn. App. 1
                            Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

         of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a,3
         carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in viola-
         tion of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-35 (a),4 and
         criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation
         of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-217c.5 See State
         v. Hilton, supra, 79 Conn. App. 156. ‘‘On September 28,
         2001, the court sentenced the [petitioner] to a term of
         sixty years imprisonment on the charge of murder, a
         consecutive term of five years imprisonment on the
         charge of carrying a pistol without a permit and a con-
         current term of five years imprisonment on the charge
         of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver for a total
         effective sentence of sixty-five years imprisonment.’’
         Id., 160. The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on
         direct appeal. Id., 170.
            Thereafter, the petitioner commenced his first habeas
         action, during which he was represented by Rozwaski.
         ‘‘In his third amended petition, dated December 19,
         2011, [the petitioner] alleged, inter alia, that [Ghiroli]
         had provided him with ineffective assistance. Specifi-
         cally . . . [the petitioner] alleged that [Ghiroli] was
           3
              General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of murder
         when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
         of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or
         deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be
         an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or
         acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
         was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to
         be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation
         under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided
         nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecu-
         tion for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or
         any other crime.’’
            4
              General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No
         person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon one’s person, except when
         such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such person,
         without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .’’
            5
              General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-217c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
         A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such
         person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1)
         has been convicted of a felony . . . .’’
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 9

       0 Conn. App. 1                                ,0                           11
                          Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       ineffective in failing to cross-examine witnesses prop-
       erly, failing to present witnesses, failing to prepare the
       petitioner to testify and failing to present sentence miti-
       gation evidence.’’6 Hilton v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, 161 Conn. App. 58, 64–65, 127 A.3d 1101 (2015),
       cert. denied, 320 Conn. 921, 132 A.3d 1095 (2016).

          During the petitioner’s first habeas trial, ‘‘the peti-
       tioner argued that [Ghiroli] was ineffective in his cross-
       examination of Katsnelson regarding the nature of the
       victim’s fatal wound.’’ Id., 69. ‘‘[T]he petitioner pre-
       sented the expert testimony of Harold Wayne Carver II,
       the state’s chief medical examiner, and Peter DeForest,
       who held a doctorate degree in forensic science, regard-
       ing Katsnelson’s autopsy report and conclusions.’’ Id.,
       69–70.

          When asked whether certain indicia ‘‘conclusively
       prove[d] that the wound was made by a contact shot,’’
       Carver testified, ‘‘I believe that there’s sufficient evi-
       dence here between the photographs and the written
       record to make that diagnosis, yes.’’ Carver noted that,
       had he looked at the autopsy report without the corres-
       ponding photographs, then a ‘‘contact wound would be
       on the short list of explanations but would not be the
       only one.’’ Carver testified that the abnormal shape of
       the wound, however, is ‘‘the major basis for my diagno-
       sis that it was a contact wound . . . .’’
          6
            ‘‘The third amended petition also alleged that the petitioner had received
       ineffective assistance of his appellate attorney, that he was actually innocent
       of the crimes charged, and that the state had failed to provide him with
       exculpatory information in violation of his due process rights under Brady
       v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), the United
       States constitution and the Connecticut constitution.’’ Hilton v. Commis-
       sioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 58, 65 n.2, 127 A.3d 1101 (2015), cert.
       denied, 320 Conn. 921, 132 A.3d 1095 (2016). The petitioner withdrew his
       claims as to his appellate attorney during his first habeas trial, and, in his
       appeal following his first habeas trial, the petitioner did not challenge the
       court’s denial of his actual innocence and Brady claims. Id.
Page 10                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

          12                          ,0                           0 Conn. App. 1
                             Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

             DeForest testified that, on the basis of the autopsy
          report and photographs, the wound ‘‘[s]uperficially
          . . . could resemble a contact wound.’’ When asked
          for his conclusion as to the type of wound the victim
          suffered, DeForest responded ‘‘[t]hat it’s—it’s ambigu-
          ous. I can’t eliminate the idea of it being a contact shot
          where the supporting evidence was not elicited or that
          it could be a—a destabilized bullet that caused the
          damage and that the scene investigation didn’t find
          areas or impact sights where a bullet may have inter-
          acted with something else.’’ Thus, due to the wound’s
          ambiguities, DeForest testified that he could not con-
          clude with certainty whether the victim suffered from
          a contact wound.

             After the conclusion of the petitioner’s first habeas
          trial, the habeas court issued a memorandum of deci-
          sion denying the petitioner’s claims. On appeal,7 this
          court ‘‘agree[d] with the respondent [the Commissioner
          of Correction] and the habeas court that the petitioner
          failed to sustain his burden of establishing either defi-
          cient performance or prejudice with respect to the
          cross-examination of Katsnelson. As to the former, we
          have stated that [a]n attorney’s line of questioning on
          examination of a witness clearly is tactical in nature.
          [As such, this] court will not, in hindsight, second-guess
          counsel’s trial strategy. . . . In regard to the latter,
          given the other evidence and the inconclusive and inde-
          terminate nature of DeForest’s testimony, the petitioner
          failed to sustain his burden of establishing prejudice.’’
             7
               On appeal to this court, the petitioner claimed ‘‘that the court improperly
          concluded that [the petitioner] had received effective assistance of counsel
          during his criminal trial and at sentencing. Specifically, [the petitioner]
          argue[d] that [Ghiroli had] provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1)
          secure sufficient information and properly cross-examine two of the state’s
          witnesses, (2) present witnesses in support of his defense, (3) prepare the
          petitioner to testify and (4) present sentence mitigation evidence.’’ Hilton
          v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161 Conn. App. 65.
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                   Page 11

       0 Conn. App. 1                               ,0                         13
                         Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Hilton v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, supra, 161 Conn. App. 70–71. This court also
       rejected the petitioner’s claim that counsel improperly
       failed to present the testimony of DeForest at his crimi-
       nal trial to attack the testimony of Katsnelson. See id.,
       72. This court agreed with the habeas court’s analysis
       that ‘‘DeForest’s testimony would not have been helpful
       in establishing that the petitioner did not shoot the
       victim. Katsnelson had testified at the criminal trial that
       the fatal wound was a contact gunshot wound. DeForest
       did not contradict this opinion, ‘but could only say that
       the evidence was ambiguous, and therefore he could
       not offer an opinion as to the type of wound, and there-
       fore could not say that it was not a contact wound.’ ’’ Id.,
       73–74. Thus, the petitioner did not sustain his burden
       of proving that the testimony of DeForest would have
       been helpful to his defense. Id., 74. This court affirmed
       the judgment of the habeas court,8 and our Supreme
       Court denied the petitioner’s petition for certification
       to appeal.
          In 2016, the petitioner, then self-represented, filed
       this second habeas action. In his operative, second
       amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed Sep-
       tember 23, 2020, the petitioner raised what the habeas
       court described as ‘‘a myriad of allegations’’ in thirteen
       counts. Relevant to this appeal are the petitioner’s alle-
       gations that Ghiroli and Rozwaski rendered ineffective
       assistance of counsel by not presenting expert testi-
       mony from a forensic pathologist to challenge the testi-
       mony of Katsnelson and establish that he was actually
       innocent. See footnote 12 of this opinion.
         8
           The respondent also appealed from the judgment of the first habeas
       court. See Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161 Conn. App.
       60. On appeal, the respondent claimed ‘‘that the court improperly determined
       that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect
       to his claim regarding sentence review. As a result of this determination,
       the habeas court reinstated the petitioner’s right to apply for sentence
       review.’’ Id. The respondent prevailed on appeal, and this court reversed
       the judgment. Id., 85.
Page 12                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        0, 0

          14                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

             Prior to the start of the habeas trial, on November
          30, 2021, the petitioner’s counsel filed an appearance
          on the petitioner’s behalf. The matter was tried to the
          habeas court, Klatt, J., on December 20, 2021, and May
          31, 2022. The court admitted into evidence as full exhib-
          its copies of the transcripts of the petitioner’s underly-
          ing criminal trial and first habeas trial, a copy of a report
          from the petitioner’s forensic pathology expert, Cyril
          H. Wecht, a copy of Katsnelson’s autopsy report, and
          photographs taken during the autopsy. Additionally, the
          court heard testimony from the following witnesses:
          (1) the petitioner; (2) Wecht; (3) Maybertha Ashley; (4)
          Attorney Michael Brown, the petitioner’s legal expert;
          and (5) Rozwaski. Thereafter, the parties filed post-
          trial briefs.
             Relevant to the petitioner’s appeal, Wecht testified
          that, on the basis of his review of Katsnelson’s autopsy
          report and photographs, certain testimony from the
          petitioner’s criminal trial, including the testimony of
          Katsnelson, a police report, the petitioner’s posttrial
          brief, and a report from a private investigator service,
          it was his ‘‘opinion this gunshot wound, fatal gunshot
          wound of the victim’s head, was fired from a distance
          beyond twenty-four inches in the absence of gunpowder
          residue, stippling powder. I find nothing to contradict
          that and everything to support it. So I believe this was
          what we would call a gunshot wound of distance or
          long-range gunshot wound. I cannot tell you what the
          distance would have been beyond the twenty-four
          inches. I can’t tell you if that was three feet or four
          feet. That, I cannot do, but I can say that I believe it
          was a distance gunshot wound and certainly not a tight
          contact wound.’’ Wecht testified that, on this basis, he
          disagreed with Katsnelson’s conclusion that the victim
          suffered from a contact wound.
            On February 1, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
          of decision denying the petitioner’s petition for a writ
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                  Page 13

       0 Conn. App. 1                              ,0                         15
                         Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       of habeas corpus. The court stated that its ‘‘discussion
       of the claims will track the petitioner’s posttrial brief
       and will be limited to only those claims briefed by the
       petitioner.’’ Specifically, the court addressed, inter alia,
       the petitioner’s contentions that ‘‘counsel failed to prop-
       erly investigate [Katsnelson’s] report and testimony’’
       and that ‘‘counsel failed to hire and utilize a forensic
       pathologist or medical examiner to challenge [Katsnel-
       son’s] conclusions.’’ The court found that ‘‘[the peti-
       tioner] has failed to prove both the deficient perfor-
       mance and prejudice prongs’’ of his ineffective
       assistance of counsel claims.

         The petitioner filed a petition for certification to
       appeal wherein he stated nine grounds on which he
       proposed to appeal. Relevant to this appeal9 are the
       following grounds: ‘‘(1) [w]hether the trial court erred
       by ruling that the petitioner’s expert was ‘not . . .
       credible,’ instead of applying the correct standard under
       Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, [316 Conn.
       225, 112 A.3d 1 (2015)], that is, whether the petitioner’s
       expert was of sufficient import and credibility that the
       petitioner is entitled to a new trial at which a jury
       will evaluate that testimony . . . (3) [w]hether a jury
       reasonably could credit the petitioner’s expert’s testi-
       mony . . . (4) [w]hether there was strong reason that
       the jury might well have found the testimony of the
       petitioner’s expert persuasive, considering the expert’s
       unquestioned qualifications and experience . . . (5)
       [w]hether the testimony of the petitioner’s expert is
       sufficient, if credited, to call into question the outcome
       of the petitioner’s criminal trial . . . (6) [w]hether the
       testimony of the petitioner’s expert and the other evi-
       dence presented raises a reasonable probability that
       the result of the proceedings would have been different
         9
           The petitioner did not brief in this appeal three of the grounds raised
       in his petition for certification to appeal.
Page 14                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

          16                          ,0                           0 Conn. App. 1
                             Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          . . . [and] (7) [w]hether the evidence raises a probabil-
          ity sufficient to undermine the confidence in the out-
          come of the trial . . . .’’
             Thereafter, on February 14, 2023, the habeas court
          issued an order on the petition for certification to
          appeal, stating in relevant part that ‘‘the petition for
          certification to appeal is denied as to the grounds indi-
          cated in [inter alia, ground one] . . . because [that
          ground is] not debatable among jurists of reason, able
          to be resolved in a different manner, or deserving of
          encouragement to proceed further. . . . The court
          grants the petition for certification to appeal as to
          grounds (3) through (7), which all individually and col-
          lectively seek to challenge this court’s prejudice deter-
          mination.’’ (Citations omitted.) This appeal followed.
                                                 I
            We begin with the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
          court improperly rejected his claim that his right to
          the effective assistance of counsel was violated when
          Rozwaski failed to present the expert testimony of a
          forensic pathologist during his first habeas trial in sup-
          port of the claim that Ghiroli had provided ineffective
          assistance of counsel during his criminal trial.10 With
            10
               ‘‘It is axiomatic that courts may decide against a petitioner on either
          prong [of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
          104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], whichever is easier. . . . [T]he
          petitioner’s failure to prove either [the performance prong or the prejudice
          prong] is fatal to a habeas petition. . . . [A] court need not determine
          whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the preju-
          dice suffered by the [petitioner] as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . .
          If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
          of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.’’ (Emphasis
          added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Delgado v. Commissioner of Cor-
          rection, 224 Conn. App. 283, 291–92, 311 A.3d 740, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
          902,        A.3d     (2024). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is well established that [a] court
          deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not address the
          question of counsel’s performance, if it is easier to dispose of the claim on
          the ground of insufficient prejudice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
          Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 342 Conn. 771, 783–84, 272 A.3d
          189 (2022). Thus, because we conclude that the habeas court properly
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 15

       0 Conn. App. 1                                  ,0                           17
                          Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       respect to the prejudice prong, the petitioner contends
       that the court improperly determined that he failed to
       show that he was prejudiced by Ghiroli’s and Roz-
       waski’s decisions not to present a forensic pathology
       expert to provide testimony similar to that of Wecht.11
       The petitioner maintains that ‘‘[a]n objective review of
       the state’s case against the petitioner reveals that [the
       petitioner’s] scientific expert evidence would raise
       more than a reasonable probability that the result of
       the proceeding would have been different if it had it
       been presented at the criminal trial.’’12 The respondent
       determined that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice, we need
       not address the performance prong.
          11
             As noted previously in this opinion, the habeas court granted certifica-
       tion to appeal as to the petitioner’s grounds challenging the court’s determi-
       nation that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate prejudice.
          12
             The petitioner claims that ‘‘[t]he trial court erred because a jury reason-
       ably could credit the petitioner’s scientific expert evidence, which proves
       the petitioner’s innocence by clear and convincing evidence and raises more
       than a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have
       been different but for prior counsel’s failure to present the evidence.’’ The
       respondent argues, inter alia, that, had Wecht testified at the petitioner’s
       criminal trial, such testimony would not have proved the petitioner’s inno-
       cence because the jury instead would have weighed Wecht’s testimony with
       the totality of the evidence that had been presented. In support of this
       contention, the respondent relies on Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn.
       397, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994), for the proposition that the testimony of a petition-
       er’s new expert is ‘‘nothing more than a[n] [additional] expert opinion derived
       from an interpretation of the underlying autopsy data that [other experts]
       ha[ve] already interpreted.’’ Id., 437. Our Supreme Court in Summerville
       also stated that a petitioner’s new expert testimony ‘‘is not the kind of
       evidence that renders prior expert opinions . . . scientifically impossible
       or improbable. Indeed, if it were, [t]he ultimate result would be a never-
       ending battle of [pathologists] appointed [or retained] as experts for the sole
       purpose of discrediting a prior [pathologist’s] diagnosis.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Id. Wecht’s testimony at the petitioner’s habeas trial would
       not have satisfied the clear and convincing standard because his testimony
       did not unquestionably establish the petitioner’s innocence and was, at most,
       contradictory to, and offered to discredit a portion of, the state’s evidence
       at the underlying criminal trial. See Ross v. Commissioner of Correction,
       217 Conn. App. 286, 305–306, 288 A.3d 1055, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915,
       290 A.3d 374 (2023); Myers v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App.
       592, 616–17, 284 A.3d 309 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1021, 293 A.3d 897
       (2023), and cert. denied sub nom. Myers v. State, 346 Conn. 1021, 293 A.3d
Page 16                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

          18                         ,0                          0 Conn. App. 1
                            Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          disagrees and argues that the petitioner has failed to
          prove prejudice because he has not shown a reasonable
          probability that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal
          trial would have changed had the jury heard testimony
          similar to that of Wecht. We agree with the respondent.
             The following procedural history is relevant to our
          resolution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision,
          the habeas court stated in relevant part: ‘‘[The peti-
          tioner] has argued that the expert testimony of [Wecht],
          combined with his testimony . . . would establish the
          prejudice prong of [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
          668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. [The
          petitioner] argues that . . . [Wecht’s] testimony that
          the gunshot was fired from a distance of at least greater
          than two feet supports his testimony that another per-
          son, at least eight feet away fired the fatal shot. . . .
             ‘‘[The petitioner] however chooses to ignore the
          remaining evidence in the state’s case. There were mul-
          tiple witnesses to the argument and ongoing feud
          between him and the victim. Identification was not an
          issue, as all parties knew each other. There were two
          eyewitnesses who remained on the scene and gave
          statements to the police identifying [the petitioner] as
          the shooter and placing him standing right next to the
          victim when he was shot. There were no witnesses to
          [the petitioner’s] third and fourth individuals. . . .
             ‘‘In short, [the petitioner] has failed to demonstrate
          that there is a reasonabl[e] probability that the outcome
          of the criminal trial would have been different had . . .
          [Wecht] . . . testified. The state had abundant evi-
          dence, motive, and forensic testimony to support its
          case against [the petitioner]. [Wecht’s] testimony fails
          to show not only the necessary performance prong, but
          also the prejudice prong. The state’s evidence against
          897 (2023). Accordingly, the petitioner did not meet the high burden of proof
          necessary to sustain a claim of actual innocence.
0, 0                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 17

       0 Conn. App. 1                                  ,0                            19
                           Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       [the petitioner] was overwhelming and his claims
       against trial counsel must fail.
         ‘‘In addition, any of [the petitioner’s] claims as against
       habeas counsel must fail by the same reasoning. [The
       petitioner’s] posttrial brief ignores the testimony of
       [Carver] and submits that the testimon[y] of . . .
       [Wecht] . . . [is] sufficient to undermine the confi-
       dence in the outcome of the habeas trial. [First habeas]
       counsel did in fact offer expert medical testimony from
       a more than qualified witness. His testimony was consis-
       tent with [that of Katsnelson] and other state’s wit-
       nesses. [Wecht’s] testimony at best challenged [the]
       nature of the injury and was inconsistent with eyewit-
       ness testimony, but did nothing to overcome the state’s
       evidence and undermine this court’s confidence in the
       outcome of the jury trial.’’
          Our standard of review and the relevant legal princi-
       ples on ineffective assistance of counsel claims are well
       settled. ‘‘A criminal defendant’s right to the effective
       assistance of counsel extends through the first appeal
       of right and is guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
       amendments to the United States constitution and by
       article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . .13
       To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
       sel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged
       test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, [supra,
       466 U.S. 687]. Strickland requires that a petitioner sat-
       isfy both a performance prong and a prejudice prong.
       To satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must dem-
       onstrate that counsel made errors so serious that coun-
       sel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . .
          13
             ‘‘[T]he state and federal constitutional standards for review of ineffective
       assistance of counsel claims are identical and the rights afforded are essen-
       tially coextensive in nature and, thus, do not require separate analysis.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jordan v. Commissioner of Correction,
       197 Conn. App. 822, 830 n.8, 234 A.3d 78 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 279, 267
       A.3d 120 (2021).
Page 18                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          20                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . To satisfy the preju-
          dice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is
          a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro-
          fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
          been different.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote in original;
          internal quotation marks omitted.) Jordan v. Commis-
          sioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App. 822, 829–30, 234
          A.3d 78 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 279, 267 A.3d 120 (2021).
             ‘‘An evaluation of the prejudice prong involves a con-
          sideration of whether there is a reasonable probability
          that, absent the errors, the [fact finder] would have had
          a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. . . . A reasonable
          probability is a probability sufficient to undermine con-
          fidence in the outcome. . . . We do not conduct this
          inquiry in a vacuum, rather, we must consider the total-
          ity of the evidence before the judge or jury. . . . Fur-
          ther, we are required to undertake an objective review
          of the nature and strength of the state’s case. . . . As
          our Supreme Court [has explained], [s]ome errors will
          have had pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn
          from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary pic-
          ture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.
          Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly sup-
          ported by the record is more likely to have been affected
          by errors than one with overwhelming record support.
          . . . [A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask
          if the [petitioner] has met the burden of showing that
          the decision reached would reasonably likely have been
          different absent the errors. . . .
             ‘‘In other words, [i]n assessing prejudice under
          Strickland, the question is not whether a court can
          be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the
          outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt
          might have been established if counsel acted differently.
          . . . Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably
          likely the result would have been different. . . . The
          likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 19

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                 21
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       just conceivable. . . . Notably, the petitioner must
       meet this burden not by use of speculation but by
       demonstrable realities.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Madera v. Commissioner of
       Correction, 221 Conn. App. 546, 555–56, 302 A.3d 910,
       cert. denied, 348 Conn. 928, 305 A.3d 265 (2023).
          ‘‘Our Supreme Court, in Lozada v. Warden, [223
       Conn. 834, 843, 613 A.2d 818 (1992)], established that
       habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for the ineffec-
       tive assistance of appointed habeas counsel, authoriz-
       ing . . . a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus
       . . . challenging the performance of counsel in litigat-
       ing an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . .
       [that] had claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at
       the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial or on direct
       appeal. . . . [T]he court in Lozada also emphasized
       that a petitioner asserting a habeas on a habeas faces
       the herculean task . . . of proving in accordance with
       [Strickland] both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel
       was ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel was inef-
       fective. . . .
         ‘‘Simply put, a petitioner cannot succeed . . . on a
       claim that his habeas counsel was ineffective by failing
       to raise a claim against trial counsel or prior habeas
       counsel in a prior habeas action unless the petitioner
       ultimately will be able to demonstrate that the claim
       against trial or prior habeas counsel would have had a
       reasonable probability of success if raised.’’ (Citations
       omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crocker v.
       Commissioner of Correction, 220 Conn. App. 567, 585–
       86, 300 A.3d 607, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 911, 303 A.3d
       10 (2023).
          We now turn to the merits of the petitioner’s claim,
       recognizing that the claimed ineffective assistance
       regarding his first habeas counsel, Rozwaski, must fail
       if the claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel,
Page 20                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          22                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          Ghiroli, is without merit. See Lebron v. Commissioner
          of Correction, 204 Conn. App. 44, 50, 250 A.3d 44, cert.
          denied, 336 Conn. 948, 250 A.3d 695 (2021). For the
          reasons that follow, we conclude that the habeas court
          properly determined that the petitioner has failed to
          satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Specifically,
          the petitioner has failed to show that, had Ghiroli pre-
          sented testimony similar to that of Wecht during the
          petitioner’s criminal trial, there exists a reasonable
          probability that the outcome of that proceeding would
          have been different.

             In the present case, the habeas court determined
          that Wecht’s testimony did not undermine the state’s
          ‘‘abundant evidence, motive, and forensic testimony to
          support its case against [the petitioner].’’ The court
          characterized the state’s evidence against the petitioner
          as ‘‘overwhelming,’’ and emphasized evidence of the
          ‘‘multiple witnesses to the argument and ongoing feud
          between [the petitioner] and the victim,’’ and the ‘‘two
          eyewitnesses who remained on the scene and gave
          statements to the police identifying [the petitioner] as
          the shooter and placing him standing right next to the
          victim when he was shot.’’ We agree with the court that
          the state presented overwhelming evidence against the
          petitioner. This court has, on two prior occasions, rec-
          ognized the strength of the state’s case against the peti-
          tioner. First, in the petitioner’s direct appeal following
          his criminal trial, this court stated that ‘‘the evidence
          against the [petitioner] was overwhelming.’’ State v.
          Hilton, supra, 79 Conn. App. 168. Subsequently, in the
          petitioner’s appeal following his first habeas trial, this
          court observed that ‘‘the petitioner failed to carry his
          burden of demonstrating that there is a reasonable prob-
          ability that the outcome of the trial would have been
          different had he been more prepared, given the strong
          and overwhelming evidence presented by the state.’’
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                     Page 21

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0               23
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161
       Conn. App. 76.
          Additionally, the habeas court determined that
       Wecht’s testimony did not undermine confidence in the
       outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial because the
       petitioner’s first habeas counsel, Rozwaski, presented
       the testimony of Carver, which was ‘‘consistent with
       [that of Katsnelson] and other state’s witnesses.’’ At the
       petitioner’s first habeas trial, Carver addressed Katsnel-
       son’s conclusion that the victim suffered a contact
       wound and testified that, had he looked at the autopsy
       report without the corresponding photographs, then a
       ‘‘contact wound would be on the short list of explana-
       tions but would not be the only one.’’ When asked,
       however, whether Katsnelson’s conclusion that the vic-
       tim suffered from a contact shot was proper, Carver
       responded, ‘‘I believe that there’s sufficient evidence
       here between the photographs and the written record
       to make that diagnosis, yes.’’ Carver also discussed the
       abnormality of the shape of the wound by testifying
       that ‘‘the major basis for my diagnosis that it was a
       contact wound [is] the fact [that] part of th[e] edge of
       the hole doesn’t have an abrasion. . . . That would
       indicate that the forces that created that part of the
       hole came from inside, not from the outside. And the
       only way to do that would be the gasses from a contact
       wound.’’ The habeas court determined that, on the basis
       of Carver’s earlier testimony, the petitioner had failed
       to sustain his burden of proving prejudice because the
       testimony of Wecht was insufficient ‘‘to undermine . . .
       confidence in the outcome of the habeas trial. [Roz-
       waski] did in fact offer expert medical testimony from
       a more than qualified witness. His testimony was consis-
       tent with [that of Katsnelson] and other state’s wit-
       nesses. [Wecht’s] testimony at best challenged [the]
       nature of the injury and was inconsistent with eyewit-
       ness testimony, but did nothing to overcome the state’s
Page 22                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          24                          ,0                           0 Conn. App. 1
                             Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          evidence and undermine this court’s confidence in the
          outcome of the jury trial.’’14 Accordingly, on the basis
          of the record before us, including the overwhelming
          evidence the state presented against the petitioner, we
          conclude that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a
          reasonable probability that the outcome of the criminal
          trial would have been different had Ghiroli presented
          expert testimony from a forensic pathologist, such as
          Wecht.
            In sum, we conclude that the habeas court correctly
          determined that the petitioner had failed to sustain his
          burden of establishing prejudice under Strickland as
          to Ghiroli’s decision not to present expert testimony
          and, therefore, the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assis-
          tance of counsel against Rozwaski necessarily fails. We,
          therefore, conclude that the court properly denied the
          petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
          this claim.
                                                II
            The petitioner next claims that the habeas court
          abused its discretion in denying him certification to
          appeal with respect to his claim that the court applied
          the wrong legal standard in finding Wecht not credible.
          He contends that the court should have used the stan-
          dard set forth by our Supreme Court in Lapointe v.
          Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 225. We
          conclude that Lapointe is inapplicable to the present
          case and that the court’s finding that Wecht was not
          credible is not clearly erroneous.
            14
               Rozwaski also presented the testimony of DeForest on the petitioner’s
          behalf. DeForest testified that, pursuant to his review of Katsnelson’s
          autopsy report and photographs, the wound ‘‘[s]uperficially . . . could
          resemble a contact wound.’’ When asked to render an opinion as to what
          type of gunshot wound the victim suffered, DeForest testified: ‘‘The—that
          I can’t reach a conclusion. That it’s—it’s ambiguous,’’ and could have resulted
          from either a long distance or a contact gunshot. As a result, DeForest
          testified that he could not conclude, to a reasonable degree of scientific
          certainty, that the victim had not sustained a contact gunshot wound.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                    Page 23

       0 Conn. App. 1                       ,0               25
                    Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          ‘‘The following legal principles are relevant to our
       resolution of the petitioner’s claim. General Statutes
       § 52-470 (g) provides: No appeal from the judgment
       rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or
       on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a
       crime in order to obtain such person’s release may be
       taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the
       case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the
       case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge
       of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court
       Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in
       the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court
       having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.
         ‘‘Faced with the habeas court’s denial of certification
       to appeal, a petitioner’s first burden is to demonstrate
       that the habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse of
       discretion. . . . A petitioner may establish an abuse of
       discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debat-
       able among jurists of reason . . . [a] court could
       resolve the issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . .
       the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement
       to proceed further. . . . The required determination
       may be made on the basis of the record before the
       habeas court and applicable legal principles. . . . If
       the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the
       petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of
       the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. . . .
          ‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
       its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
       certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
       the petitioner’s underlying [claim] to determine whether
       the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
       tioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review
       the petitioner’s substantive [claim] for the purpose of
       ascertaining whether [that claim satisfies] one or more
       of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme
       Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas
Page 24                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        0, 0

          26                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Glen S. v. Commissioner of
          Correction, 223 Conn. App. 152, 158–59, 307 A.3d 951,
          cert. denied, 348 Conn. 951, 308 A.3d 1038 (2024).
             For the reasons set forth in part III of this opinion,
          we conclude that the petitioner has failed to demon-
          strate that his claim is debatable among jurists of rea-
          son, that a court could resolve the issue in a different
          manner, or that the question is adequate to deserve
          encouragement to proceed further. Thus, we conclude
          that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in
          denying the petition for certification to appeal on this
          ground.
                                        III
             The petitioner’s substantive claim on appeal, relying
          on Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316
          Conn. 225, is that the habeas court applied the wrong
          legal standard in assessing witness credibility. Specifi-
          cally, the ‘‘[p]etitioner’s argument is that the trial court
          erred when it made an assessment of who it thought
          was ‘more credible’ . . . without determining, as a
          matter of law, if a reasonable jury could credit the
          petitioner’s scientific expert evidence—which it could.’’
          (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) The respondent
          disagrees and asserts, inter alia, that Lapointe is inappli-
          cable in the present case because of its ‘‘explicit limita-
          tion on its exception to [the] general rule of deference
          to a fact finder’s credibility assessment.’’ We agree with
          the respondent.
             The following additional procedural history is rele-
          vant to our resolution of this claim. In its memorandum
          of decision, the habeas court stated: ‘‘The primary focus
          of [the petitioner’s] claims is the autopsy and the conclu-
          sions reached by [Katsnelson], in particular the distance
          that the deadly shot was fired from. This issue has now
          been litigated in the criminal trial and both habeas trials.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 25

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                27
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       The jury and two separate habeas courts have heard
       from a total of four experts: [Katsnelson]; [DeForest];
       [Carver]; and [Wecht]. [The petitioner] now posits that
       [Wecht’s] conclusions and testimony prove his inno-
       cence. This court does not agree.’’
          Specifically, the court determined that ‘‘[t]hree of the
       four experts found that there were indicia of a contact
       wound. Only [Wecht] completely ruled out the possibil-
       ity of a contact wound. The court does not find
       [Wecht’s] assessment to be credible, especially because
       he did not review [Carver’s] testimony from the first
       habeas trial. [Carver] observed a stellate tear and evi-
       dence of a blowback laceration. Additionally, [Wecht]
       did not provide any explanation for the causes of the
       oval wound. Nor did [Wecht’s] evaluation address the
       potential effects of the victim[’s] being kept alive for a
       day or more so that organs could be harvested from
       his cleaned and disinfected body, the blood from the
       wound washing away gunshot residue, or the begin-
       nings of the healing process making residue in the
       wound difficult to detect. The more credible evidence
       establishes that the shot that killed the victim was a
       contact shot.
          ‘‘Because the court does not find [Wecht’s] conclu-
       sion that the shot could not have been fired from less
       than twenty-four inches to be credible, [the petitioner’s]
       claims premised thereon must fail.’’
          As noted previously, the habeas court denied the
       petitioner certification to appeal as to his claim that
       the legal standard used by the court to assess witness
       credibility was erroneous. In denying certification to
       appeal on this ground, the court stated that it found
       ‘‘Wecht’s conclusion that the shot could not have been
       fired from less than twenty-four inches to be not credi-
       ble. The court did not find [Wecht] credible based on
       the totality of all evidence from the criminal, prior
Page 26                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          28                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          habeas, and current habeas trials. [Wecht] did not
          review all relevant evidence, and his opinion was con-
          tradicted by the factual findings regarding the shape of
          the wound, stellate tearing, and evidence of a blowback
          laceration. It is this lack of foundation supporting
          [Wecht’s] conclusion about the shot distance that
          caused the court to find him not credible as an expert
          witness.
             ‘‘Contrary to the petitioner’s argument in the petition
          for certification to appeal, Lapointe v. Commissioner
          of Correction, [supra, 316 Conn. 225], does not preclude
          a habeas court from determining that an expert witness
          and their conclusion are not credible. Nor does
          Lapointe establish a standard that a petitioner is enti-
          tled to a new trial by presenting an expert who is of
          sufficient import and credibility. Such a vague standard
          could necessitate a new criminal trial in nearly all post-
          conviction habeas proceedings involving expert wit-
          nesses. A habeas court’s credibility assessments and
          how they impact the prejudice prong of the ineffective
          assistance of counsel standard would be rendered
          meaningless if a habeas court had to grant a new trial
          upon the presentation of expert testimony that was of
          sufficient import and credibility.’’ (Emphasis omitted;
          internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, the
          court denied the first ground of the petition for certifica-
          tion to appeal on the ground that it is ‘‘not debatable
          among jurists of reason, able to be resolved in a different
          manner, or deserving of encouragement to proceed fur-
          ther.’’
             In addition to our well settled standard of review on
          ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in part
          I of this opinion, the following additional legal princi-
          ples are relevant to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘The
          habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of
          the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
          their testimony. . . . Questions of whether to believe
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 27

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                29
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our
       review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fields v.
       Commissioner of Correction, 179 Conn. App. 567, 575,
       180 A.3d 638 (2018). ‘‘The habeas court is afforded broad
       discretion in making its factual findings, and those find-
       ings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly errone-
       ous. . . . Thus, [t]his court does not retry the case
       or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Necaise v. Commissioner of
       Correction, 112 Conn. App. 817, 825, 964 A.2d 562, cert.
       denied, 292 Conn. 911, 973 A.2d 660 (2009).
         On appeal, the petitioner argues that we should devi-
       ate from these principles in light of our Supreme Court’s
       decision in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction,
       supra, 316 Conn. 225. We disagree.
          In Lapointe, our Supreme Court ‘‘granted the respon-
       dent’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
       the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court properly
       determine that the [petitioner’s] first habeas counsel
       was ineffective for failing to pursue a claim that the
       state had suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v.
       Maryland, [373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
       215 (1963)],’ ’’ and ‘‘answer[ed] the certified question in
       the affirmative because the testimony of the petitioner’s
       experts was more than sufficient to call into question
       the reliability of the petitioner’s conviction. Indeed,
       even if that expert testimony only tended to support
       the petitioner’s claim that he could not have murdered
       the victim, in view of the tenuous nature of the state’s
       case against the petitioner—based as it was on his
       suspect admissions—the state’s Brady violation would
       warrant a new trial because, as the United States
       Supreme Court has recognized, exculpatory evidence
       of even ‘minor importance’ may well be ‘sufficient to
       create a reasonable doubt’ when, as in the present case,
       ‘the [guilty] verdict is already of questionable validity
       . . . .’ United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113, 96 S.
Page 28                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          30                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). Accordingly, [our
          Supreme Court] affirm[ed] the judgment of the Appel-
          late Court reversing in part the judgment of the third
          habeas court and ordering a new trial.’’ (Emphasis
          added.) Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction,
          supra, 316 Conn. 234.
             The present case is both factually and legally distin-
          guishable from Lapointe. As set forth in part I of this
          opinion, this court twice has identified the state’s evi-
          dence against the petitioner as ‘‘overwhelming’’; Hilton
          v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161 Conn. App.
          76; State v. Hilton, supra, 79 Conn. App. 168; whereas
          our Supreme Court in Lapointe stated that its conclu-
          sion took ‘‘due account of the fact that the state’s case
          against the petitioner was relatively weak, founded as
          it was on highly questionable admissions.’’ Lapointe v.
          Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 261.
          Thus, because we agree that the state presented over-
          whelming evidence against the petitioner, the petition-
          er’s appeal is factually distinguishable from Lapointe.
             Next, the petitioner’s legal argument is different from
          that raised in Lapointe. In the present case, the peti-
          tioner challenges the habeas court’s finding that Wecht
          was not credible. The court determined, in light of find-
          ing Wecht not credible, that the petitioner had failed
          to establish that the outcome of his criminal trial would
          have been different had a jury heard Wecht’s testimony.
          Accordingly, the court concluded that the decisions of
          Ghiroli and Rozwaski not to present the expert testi-
          mony of a forensic pathologist did not constitute inef-
          fective assistance of counsel. In contrast, the petitioner
          in Lapointe argued that prior counsel ‘‘rendered ineffec-
          tive assistance in failing to demonstrate that the state
          withheld certain exculpatory evidence prior to trial in
          violation of Brady . . . .’’ Id., 229. This distinction is
          significant. In Lapointe, our Supreme Court determined
          that, ‘‘for purposes of the present case, which involves
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                     Page 29

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0               31
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the state,
       our task is not to determine whether the jury more
       likely than not would have credited [the] testimony
       [of the petitioner’s witnesses], such that the petitioner
       would have prevailed at a new trial. . . . The question,
       rather, is whether the jury reasonably could have cred-
       ited the testimony of the petitioner’s witnesses.’’ (Cita-
       tion omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 293–94. In other
       words, the court stated that, ‘‘[i]n such circumstances,
       when the habeas court’s assessment of the expert testi-
       mony has nothing to do with the personal credibility
       of the expert witness but instead is based entirely on
       the court’s evaluation of the foundational soundness of
       the witness’ professional opinion, this court is as well
       situated as the habeas court to assess that testimony
       for Brady purposes.’’ Id., 269.
          Our Supreme Court explained its reasoning for lim-
       iting an appellate court’s evaluation of the credibility
       of an expert witness specifically to Brady claims as
       follows: ‘‘Our conclusion in this regard is limited to
       the kind of fact-finding that is implicated in the Brady
       context. In cases involving claims under Brady, the
       function of the habeas court is to determine whether
       the evidence withheld by the state is sufficiently credi-
       ble that a jury reasonably could credit it and, if so,
       whether the evidence also is sufficiently pertinent to
       an issue in the case that it reasonably could lead to a
       different result. This predictive evaluation of the evi-
       dence is different from the ordinary case, in which the
       fact finder is responsible for the ultimate assessment
       of credibility. Thus, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
       recently explained, ‘[a]ssessing credibility for purposes
       of [Brady] prejudice is not necessarily the same thing
       as assessing credibility at a trial.’ Commonwealth v.
       Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 359, 966 A.2d 523 (2009).’’
       Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316
       Conn. 272 n.42. The court further stated that,
Page 30                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          32                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

          ‘‘[b]ecause, in addressing a claim under Brady, a habeas
          court’s credibility determination is not an ‘absolute’
          finding, as the factual findings of the ultimate finder of
          fact are, but merely is a threshold evidentiary assess-
          ment required for the purpose of determining whether
          the ultimate finder of fact reasonably could credit the
          evidence, the principle that reviewing courts typically
          defer to credibility findings in the Brady context has
          its sole basis in the fact that the habeas court is ordi-
          narily in a better position to judge credibility, and is
          not based on the general prohibition against appellate
          fact-finding. Consequently, when this court is in as good
          a position as the habeas court to assess credibility for
          the purpose of reviewing a claim under Brady,
          reviewing the habeas court’s credibility assessment de
          novo does not place this court in the improper role of
          finding ultimate facts but merely allows this court to
          carry out its proper role of determining the legal ques-
          tion of materiality under Brady.’’ Id.

             A petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
          sel outside of the Brady context is, therefore, treated
          differently from a petitioner’s claim implicating Brady.
          With respect to the former, this court has articulated
          a ‘‘well settled standard of review governing challenges
          to a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assistance
          of counsel claims. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot
          disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court
          unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of
          whether the facts as found by the habeas court consti-
          tuted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right
          to effective assistance of counsel is plenary. . . . In a
          habeas trial, the court is the trier of fact and, thus, is
          the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the
          weight to be given to their testimony . . . . It is simply
          not the role of this court on appeal to second-guess
          credibility determinations made by the habeas court.’’
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 31

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                33
                     Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction

       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Delgado v. Com-
       missioner of Correction, 224 Conn. App. 283, 290–91,
       311 A.3d 740, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 902,      A.3d
           (2024).
          In the present case, both the petitioner’s principal
       appellate brief and reply brief set forth scant argument
       as to why this court should apply Lapointe to his claim
       on appeal. Significantly, the petitioner does not (1)
       address our Supreme Court’s limitation of Lapointe
       to Brady claims, (2) attempt to reconcile the factual
       dissimilarities between his claims on appeal and
       Lapointe, or (3) provide argument as to why this court
       should read Lapointe beyond the Supreme Court’s lan-
       guage to apply its reasoning to his ineffective assistance
       of counsel claim. Accordingly, we will not deviate from
       our well settled rule that ‘‘[i]t is simply not the role of
       this court on appeal to second-guess credibility determi-
       nations made by the habeas court.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Fields v. Commissioner of Correction,
       supra, 179 Conn. App. 569. Therefore, on the basis of
       the record before us, we conclude that the present case
       is not governed by Lapointe. Accordingly, we will not
       disturb the habeas court’s finding that Wecht was not
       credible. See Perez v. Commissioner of Correction,
       194 Conn. App. 239, 243, 220 A.3d 901 (‘‘[t]he issue of
       credibility is not debatable among jurists of reason and,
       thus, cannot be used to overturn the decision of a
       habeas court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
       denied, 334 Conn. 910, 221 A.3d 43 (2019).
          The judgment is affirmed with respect to the petition-
       er’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; the
       appeal is dismissed as to the petitioner’s remaining
       claim.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.