Court Opinion

ID: 9600663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:29:37.433783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:52.418775
License: Public Domain

WIRTZ, J.,
WITH WHOM CASSIDY, J., JOINS, DISSENTING:
In my opinion, a realistic appraisal of the evidence in the record discloses that the injuries sustained by plaintiff resulted in, at most, a “black eye,” albeit a severe one. I am of the conviction that the award of the jury of $5,000 as general damages for such injury was clearly excessive under the rule applicable in this jurisdiction as set forth in Vasconcellos v. Juarez, 37 Haw. 364, 366. Cf., Crawford v. American Stores Co., 5 N.J. Misc. 413, 136 Atl. 715; Dyer v. Warwick, 19 La. App. 354, 140 So. 254; Lexington & E. Ry. v. Robinson, 186 Ky. 739, 216 S.W. 86; Brannan v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 4 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1941); Jackson v. Ellis, 213 Ark. 826, 212 S.W.2d 715; Pagliro v. Cleveland, 302 Ky. 306, 194 S.W.2d 647; Kansas City So. Ry. v. Hopson, 208 Ark. 548, 186 S.W.2d 946; Dillon v. Miranne, 11 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 1942). It should be borne in mind that the jury, in the same verdict, awarded punitive damages in the sum of $1,000, which was warranted by the deliberate attack made on plaintiff, and this aspect of damages has no place in the consideration of the adequacy of the general damages which are compensatory in nature.
The verdict of the jury in this case in making this unsupportable award for general damages is understand*123able in view of the volunteered and unresponsive testimony of the plaintiff on cross-examination, painting a most tragic picture of his straitened financial condition and the hardships suffered by him and his family because of the “hard times” he and they went through at about the time of this unfortunate incident, including the necessity, as he testified that “I had to dispense with everything that I had in order to take care [of] the death of a sister and a major operation on another.” The evidence was clearly inadmissible and without doubt would have been stricken had an appropriate motion been made. Even absent such a motion, the evidence was so flagrantly irrelevant and prejudicial that it is difficult to understand why the court did not exclude it of its own volition. Cf., Lindeman v. Raynor, 43 Haw. 299, 303. Sympathy, induced by such evidence, can only tend to overwhelm a jury into an unrealistic display of generosity.
The intimation in the main opinion that it is incumbent on a defendant in a personal injury case to offer medical testimony concerning the extent of plaintiff’s injuries to counter the self-serving statements of plaintiff, who himself offered no medical testimony, is particularly disturbing. Such a requirement, simply because we have a statute giving the defendant a right to have a plaintiff submit to a medical examination in personal injury cases, would seriously affect the burden of proof in such cases. It is basic, in my understanding, that a plaintiff has the burden to sustain by adequate evidence the extent of damages suffered by him. To require the defendant to meet the self-serving statements of the plaintiff concerning the damages sustained by him by competent medical testimony would in effect require the defendant, to some extent, to establish the case against himself.
In Cherry v. Hawkins, 137 So. 2d 815, 818 (Miss. *1241962), the court had this to say concerning a jury award of $4,500 for eye injuries from a negligently operated electric torch:
“* * * An eye injury is one which particularly indicates the need for expert medical testimony, where a plaintiff is seeking substantial damages, as here. The physiology and prognosis of eye injuries are complex medical questions. Plaintiff’s evidence leaves the jury and the court completely in the dark as to the precise injuries to his eyes and the future effects, if any, of those injuries.
“The burden was on plaintiff to show the extent of his injuries and loss of earnings. His evidence fails to meet that burden, gives no indication of the medical nature of the injuries to his eyes, and no possible measure of the loss of earnings. For these and the other stated reasons, the verdict is grossly excessive.”
The court in Duty v. Gunter, 350 S.W.2d 908 (Ark. 1961), reduced a jury award of $6,300 to $2,300 for personal injury damages involving a cut eye requiring seven stitches, a broken rib and sleeplessness caused by pain, saying at page 909:
“* * * we are very firmly of the view that the evidence in the instant case does not support the amount of judgment, i.e., the injuries do not appear to be so substantial or disabling as to justify the amount awarded. Gunter was not in the hospital more than thirty or forty minutes, and was released, leaving by taxi. His medical expense was nominal; his visits to the doctor after the collision appear to be infrequent, and neither the broken rib, nor the ‘sleeplessness’ complained of, was corroborated. Appellant strongly argues the failure of Gunter to offer supporting medical evidence. This, of course, is noticeable, but *125it is likewise true that appellant offered no medical evidence to minimize the asserted injuries.
“Determining the proper amount of award in a personal injury suit is indeed difficult, but when we give the evidence its greatest probative value, as we must, we are of the opinion that the proof introduced will not justify a judgment for personal injury damages in excess of $2,300.”
Further, the absence of medical testimony casts grave doubts that the assault here perpetrated on the plaintiff caused the conditions complained of at the trial. In Kimmel v. Solow, 199 N.Y.S.2d 375, the court had this to say at page 376:
“There was no testimony in open court by the doctor who treated respondent or by the doctors who examined her; in lieu thereof the doctors’ reports were received in evidence pursuant to the consent of the parties. There was no direct issue of the doctors’ credibility to be determined by the trier of the facts. In our opinion, the evidence did not require or justify findings that the accident was the competent producing cause of all the conditions testified to by respondent and that such conditions were permanent.”
Cf., Raphael v. Chicago & West Towns Rys., 293 Ill. App. 58, 11 N.E.2d 831.
I would remand the case with a remittitur offering the plaintiff the opportunity to accept a substantially lesser sum on general damages in lieu of a new trial.