Court Opinion

ID: 9757213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:25:45.527404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.449506
License: Public Domain

SCOLNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is, of course, true that this Court gives great deference to the substantive decision of the Superior Court as to whether the plaintiff has shown “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment ... in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment_” M.R. Civ.P. 4A; see DiPietro v. Casco Northern Bank, 490 A.2d 215, 218 (Me.1985); Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d 870, 874 (Me.1984). But the occasion for that deference exists only where the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion.
Rule 4A(h) states that, “[ajffidavits required by this rule shall set forth specific facts sufficient to warrant the required findings_” Where the plaintiff’s request for attachment is not so supported it is insufficient. The Superior Court then has no discretion to proceed to the substantive issue of “reasonable likelihood.” Connor v. Stitham, 485 A.2d 659, 660 (Me.1984); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325, 1329 (Me.1981).
This is a medical malpractice action. In support of their motion for an ex parte attachment the Plaintiffs presented two affidavits. Their own contains only allegations of injury and conclusory statements concerning the Defendant’s professional negligence. The second was from their attorney. While he is admittedly an experienced practitioner, he neither would nor could be a witness in the case, particularly as to the appropriate standard of medical care. Even if he could, his affidavit refers to the facts underlying the claim only in his statement that the affidavit is “based on my professional experience and my personal knowledge of the facts of this case....” While he stated facts relevant to the need for an ex parte attachment, M.R.Civ.P. 4A(f)(i), (ii), he failed to state in non-conclu-sory fashion any specific fact that would support a finding of plaintiff’s reasonable likelihood of recovery.
Attached to the Plaintiffs’ affidavit were unsworn medical records. These, of course, do not comply with Rule 4A(h). Connor v. Stitham, 485 A.2d at 660. The Plaintiffs concede that their sole function is illustrative, and do “not rely upon the medical records to sustain any part of the burden imposed upon them by Rule 4A.” Also before the court at that time were the complaint, unsworn and thus insufficient for this purpose, and the Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim, made under 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903. Like their affidavit, this Notice contains only allegations of injury and conclusions regarding liability. Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion turns on the supposed sufficiency of these documents, taken together, under Rule 4A(h).
The Court states, “[t]he complaint provides a factual basis for the claim because the attached statutory notice of claim, itself an affidavit, accomplishes the same purpose....” Clearly, the motion Justice may consider any materials as to which the requirements of Rule 4A(h) are met. Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d 870, 874 (Me.1984). In this case the Notice of Claim was attested to before the complaint was filed as required by 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903 (Supp.1984). While the complaint incorporated *780the Notice by reference, the converse is not also true. The motion for attachment does not refer to the complaint, nor did the Plaintiffs’ affidavit incorporate it. Though their attorney’s affidavit refers to the complaint, that could not be for the purpose of adopting allegations to which the attorney himself could not specifically attest. The Justice could no more consider this complaint in ruling on the attachment than he could consider that day’s newspaper. Similarly, the affidavit from a second lawyer, submitted on the Defendant’s motion to dissolve, was insufficient. While he is also an experienced practitioner, his affidavit consists solely of a legal conclusion.
Of all the foregoing material, only the Plaintiffs’ statements that the Defendant supervised the birth and that the minor plaintiff suffers from injuries are specific factual allegations. The rest is entirely irrelevant to the Superior Court’s decision under M.R.Civ.P. 4A. There are no specific facts from which the Superior Court could have determined how the Defendant was in breach of his duty, let alone what he should have done in the exercise of reasonable care. Even assuming that the Plaintiffs may rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, they have stated nothing to show that the injuries would not have occurred had the Defendant exercised due care. See Corbett v. Curtis, 225 A.2d 402, 405 (Me.1967).
There is no need for the Court to decide here whether or not an expert’s testimony is required in the attachment proceeding, since there were no sworn factual allegations at all from which the motion Justice could determine whether the Plaintiffs might prevail on the issue of liability. It is highly unlikely that the Plaintiffs will be able to prove their case at trial without an expert, but here, where there were not even sufficient factual allegations made by a lay person, the Court does not have to decide that expert testimony is not needed as well.
The fact that this Court gives great deference to the Superior Court in its decision to grant an attachment reflects our concern for judicial economy: for avoiding protracted litigation over what is, essentially, a collateral matter in a lawsuit. It does not reflect any lack of importance of the Rule 4A decision. “Because pre-judgment attachment can work serious hardship on a defendant before the merits of the plaintiff’s case are fully determined, the attachment procedures prescribed by legislation and implementing court rules must be strictly adhered to.” Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d at 1328; Englebrecht v. Development Corp., 361 A.2d 908, 910 (Me.1976).
The test embodied in M.R.Civ.P. 4A is a constitutional requirement, introduced as a result of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). The automatic procedure for obtaining attachments that prevailed before 1972 was rejected by the United States Supreme Court, and the 1973 amendment to Rule 4A reflects the change in policy. See M.R.Civ.P. 4A, Advisory Committee’s Note, 1 Field, McKusiek & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice 61-68 (2d ed. Supp.1981). This Court has previously had no trouble reversing the approval of attachments that were not supported by affidavits meeting “the specificity required by subsection (h) of Rule 4A.” Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d at 1329; see, e.g., Connor v. Stitham, 485 A.2d 659; Hayes v. Smith, 476 A.2d 192 (Me.1984) (Mem.); The Dartmouth Co. v. Day’s Inc., 419 A.2d 366 (Me.1980); Englebrecht v. Development Corp., 361 A.2d 908. It should not hesitate to do the same in this case.