Court Opinion

ID: 9385164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 07:22:17.206041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.131761
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                 EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      EL PASO, TEXAS

                                                  §               No. 08-22-00083-CV

 IN THE INTERST OF                                §                 Appeal from the

 SEBASTIAN AGUILERA,                              §           383rd Judicial District Court

 A CHILD.                                         §             of El Paso County, Texas

                                                  §               (TC# 2010AG3943)

                                         OPINION

          Appellant Adrien Rene Harper, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order dismissing his

motion to modify child support for want of prosecution. He raises two issues for our review. We

affirm.

          I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          Appellant filed his “Prior Parent’s Original Motion to Modify/Contest Child Support

Payment/Seizure” on September 24, 2021. On the same day, he also filed an “Petitioner’s Original

motion to Vacate Lien Unauthorized by Law.” In his filings, he made numerous allegations,

ultimately seeking to recover payments he claims were improperly seized from his inmate trust

account. He attached a document entitled “Notice of Lien” as an exhibit to his motions. The notice

identified Appellant as the Obligor of an unpaid child support obligation arising from a child
support order entered in November 2014. Appellant did not contact the clerk’s office with any

instructions to serve or cite the Attorney General, the named defendant.

       On March 1, 2022, the trial court held a final dismissal hearing. On April 13, 2022, the trial

court entered an order of dismissal for want of prosecution. This appeal followed.

       II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

       In his first issue, Appellant complains that the trial court denied him the opportunity to

dispute the seizure of stimulus payments to satisfy his child support obligation. In his second issue,

Appellant contends his child support obligation should have been readjusted because his parental

rights to the child were terminated while he was incarcerated.

       As an initial matter, we recognize Appellant is a pro se litigant. Accordingly, we construe

his brief liberally and take both his complaints as a challenge to the trial court’s order dismissing

his cause for want of prosecution. See Palmer v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 656 S.W.3d 640, 644

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (recognizing that courts consider pro se briefing “liberally and

with patience”). However, we also note that pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of

procedure and do not otherwise gain an unfair advantage by virtue of their pro se status. Id. We

address both issues together.

        III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss for want of prosecution under an abuse of

discretion standard. Id. We reverse a trial court’s decision to dismiss a cause for want of

prosecution “only if it amounted to a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Fox v. Wardy, 225

S.W.3d 198, 199–200 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.)). “A trial court abuses its discretion

when it acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, or when it acts without reference to any

guiding rules or principles.” Id. (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,

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241–42 (Tex. 1985)). If the trial court’s order does not specify the reason for dismissal, we will

affirm if any proper ground supports the dismissal. Fox, 225 S.W.3d at 200 (citing Shook v.

Gilmore & Tatge Mfg. Co. Inc., 951 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied)).

         IV. APPLICABLE LAW
         A trial court’s authority to dismiss a suit for want of prosecution is derived from two

sources: Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court’s inherent power.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a; see Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630

(Tex. 1999). The trial court may dismiss under Rule 165a on “failure of any party seeking

affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice,” or when a case

is “not disposed of within time standards promulgated by the Supreme Court . . . .” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 165a(1)–(2). The common law vests the trial court with the inherent power to dismiss a cause

when “a plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case with due diligence.” Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at

630.

         When the trial court exercises either authority, it must provide notice and opportunity to

the parties. See id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1) (“Notice of the court’s intention to dismiss and the date

and place of the dismissal hearing shall be sent by the clerk to each attorney of record . . . .”).“The

failure to provide adequate notice of the trial court’s intent to dismiss for want of prosecution

requires reversal” Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630–31. 1

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  The clerk’s record does not show when the trial court notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss the cause for want
of prosecution, and Appellant does not contest notice in his appellate brief. However, we note for the sake of
completion, and because Appellant has alleged various due process violations, Appellant acknowledged his receipt
“by first class mail on December 27, 2021, Honorable Associate Judges Order to set final hearing . . . March 1, 2022.”
Appellant refers to the March hearing as the “now pending dismissal hearing” in other letters to the trial court.
Accordingly, we conclude the record supports that Appellant received proper notice. See General Elec. Co. v. Falcon
Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1991) (holding, in a writ of error proceeding, that “[t]he
absence from the record of affirmative proof that notice of intent to dismiss or of the order of dismissal was provided
does not establish error [on the face of the record]”).

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       A trial court may dismiss for want of prosecution if the plaintiff fails to “use reasonable

diligence to advance the case” to trial. Allen v. Rushing, 129 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2004, no pet.). The rules of procedure require that every pleading, plea, motion, or

application for an order “must be filed with the clerk of court . . . and at the same time, a true copy

must be served on all other parties . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(a) (emphasis added). Once a plaintiff

files an original petition, citation should issue and be served on all named defendants.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(a), 99(a). “Upon the filing of the petition, the clerk, when requested, shall

forthwith issue a citation and deliver the citation as directed by the requesting party. The party

requesting citation shall be responsible for obtaining service of the citation and a copy of the

petition.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 99(a) (emphasis added). The plaintiff bears the burden to ensure service,

and the “duty to exercise diligence continues until service of process is achieved. Allen, 129

S.W.3d at 231 (quoting Boyattia v. Hinojosa, 18 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet.

denied).

       Whether the record demonstrates that the plaintiff attempted to serve the named defendants

is one of the factors appellate courts consider when reviewing a trial court’s order dismissing a

cause for want of prosecution. Id. Incarcerated pro se plaintiffs are not exempt from this procedural

requirement and must demonstrate due diligence to serve defendants. Id. However, appellate courts

have recognized the “level of reasonable diligence for [incarcerated plaintiffs] is somewhat lower

than that for litigants who are free and represented by counsel.” In re Marriage of Buster, 115

S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).

       V. DISCUSSION

       Here, the trial court’s order does not give its reason for dismissing the cause for want of

prosecution. Appellant filed his original motion in September 2021. Six months later, in

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March 2022, the trial court held a final dismissal hearing. The case remained on the docket for one

more month before the trial court entered its final order. The record does not show that Appellant

contacted the clerk’s office with instructions to serve or cite the Attorney General.

       The record does contain, as an attachment to one of Appellant’s filings, a letter addressed

to the Attorney General that is marked “return to sender.” The letter does not contain any attempt

to serve or notify the Attorney General about appellant’s lawsuit. Further, the letter is dated

April 20, 2021. Appellant filed his suit five months later, in September. Therefore, Appellant’s

attempt to contact the Attorney General cannot show diligence or attempted service.

       Appellant had the burden to prosecute his case with diligence. We cannot say the record

shows he met his burden. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

dismissing Appellant’s case for want of prosecution. All pending motions are denied as moot. We

overrule Appellant’s issues.

       VI. CONCLUSION
       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                              MELISSA GOODWIN, Justice

March 31, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Soto and Goodwin, J.J.

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