Court Opinion

ID: 9731967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:03:11.005486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.226252
License: Public Domain

MINGE, Judge
(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. The requirement of exhaustion is misapplied in this case for several reasons.
First, the Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA) does not require such exhaustion. Minn.Stat. § 14.44 (2002). It provides:
The validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition for a declaratory judgment thereon, addressed to the court of appeals, when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, *386interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.... The declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question, and whether or not the agency has commenced an action against the petitioner to enforce the rule. (Emphasis added.)
Although respondent Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC) is not a state agency, it was created by the state legislature, it operates on a regional basis, and its rule-making prerogatives parallel those of a state agency. If the legislature permits challenges to state-agency rules without a prior request to the agency for reconsideration of the rule, it is illogical and confusing for this court to create such a requirement as a condition of challenging the rule of a local or regional agency. Absent a statute or clear caselaw requiring disparate policies, we should have a consistent rule in our state.
Second, it does not appear necessary for MAC to reconsider Ordinance 87 to ensure that this court has an adequate record for review. The question presented to this court is the validity of Ordinance 87 in light of statutory limits on the scope of MAC’s discretion to subsidize various operations. Context for judicial consideration of this question already exists; MAC has a record from when the original Ordinance 87 was adopted. Although MAC does emphasize that the air-travel industry has gone through significant upheaval in the last five years and that Ordinance 87 needs to be revisited, it does not claim that a new record is necessary to review the legal question raised by NWA. If more is needed, the district court could supplement the MAC record.2
Third, caselaw from other states and federal courts does not require that private parties petition agencies for reconsideration prior to initiating a judicial challenge to the rule. For example, in the case of Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo.1982), a declaratory judgment action was brought to invalidate rules and regulations of that states Environmental Quality Council on the ground that they exceeded the powers and jurisdiction of the Council. In holding that a declaratory judgment action was available to the plaintiffs as an independent action, separate and apart from a petition for review of administrative action, the court stated that
where the relief desired is in the nature of a substitution of judicial decision for that of the agency on issues pertaining to the administration of the subject matter for which the agency was created, the action should not be entertained. If, however, such desired relief concerns the validity and construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, the action should be entertained. This is no more than that obviously and plainly provided for in the language of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
Id. at 1168-69 (emphasis added). Other states are in accord with this reasoning and do not require exhaustion when the plaintiff is challenging the validity of an agency rule or ordinance. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Perell, 52 So.2d 906, 907 (Fla.1951) (holding that exhaustion of ad*387ministrative remedies is not required before proceeding to court to make a “general attack on the validity of the ordinance”); Bio-Medical Lab., Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill.2d 540, 12 Ill.Dec. 600, 370 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1977) (stating that exhaustion is not required when an administrative rule asserting administrative authority is challenged on its face as not authorized by the enabling legislation); Billis v. City of Toledo, 63 Ohio App.2d 188, 410 N.E.2d 767, 768 (1977) (stating that an action for declaratory judgment may be entertained where the construction or validity of administrative regulation is of concern, even if an alternative administrative remedy is available); Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces County Bail Bond Bd., 1 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex.App.1999) (stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the action seeks declaratory judgment concerning the validity or applicability of an agency rule).
Federal caselaw also supports the proposition that exhaustion is not required when the challenged agency action presents a clear and unambiguous violation of statutory rights. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-98, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1665, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (stating that the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine are not applicable where the question is solely one of statutory interpretation ... [and t]he resolution of th[e] issue does not require any particular expertise on the part of the [arbitrator] ....); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir.1980) (stating exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when challenged agency action presents a clear and unambiguous violation of statutory or constitutional rights).
In this case appellant Northwest Airlines, Inc. (NWA) claims MAC Ordinance 87 is invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of Minn.Stat. 473.651 (2002). MAC concedes that the ordinance does not charge rental rates that cover its costs but claims that under other statutes it has authority to subsidize its services. Although the majority is correct .that at its core this is a money dispute, that characterization does not accurately analyze the legal framework of the controversy. The parties disagree over the scope of MACs discretion under the statutes. NWA seeks judicial definition of the statutory limits on that discretion, not a judicial determination of the correct rental rate. The caselaw from other states and federal courts tells us that the judiciary is at least, if not better, qualified to resolve questions of the reach of agencies statutory charter. Indeed, agencies may be less than objective on such questions.
Fourth, there is an economy in the use of resources if the courts are involved in the evaluation of MAC Ordinance 87 at this stage. MAC first adopted the ordinance in 1998. The record indicates that over 800 leases have terms that rely on the ordinance. Since 1998, NWA and MAC have been sparring over the scope of MAC’S discretion to subsidize various operations and the limits on such subsidies. With all these leases in place, it will be exceedingly difficult for MAC to identify the limits on its own discretion and the resulting validity of Ordinance 87 or what may be permissibly done in a new ordinance. Judicial determination of the validity of Ordinance 87 is important for a fresh MAC look at the subject. Without the opportunity for judiciary consideration at this stage, we are undoubtedly creating a situation where three or more rounds of appeals and MAC proceedings will be needed. This gives the term “exhaustion” an ironic new meaning for the parties.
Fifth, Minnesota caselaw does not require the result reached by the majority. See, e.g., Connor v. Township of Chanhas*388sen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957); Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dept. Relief Ass’n, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944); Barron v. City of Minneapolis, 212 Minn. 566, 4 N.W.2d 622 (1942). In fact, the Conner case indicates exhaustion is not required. Connor, 249 Minn. at 209, 81 N.W.2d at 794. Connor held that because the court was presented with a controversy as to legal rights, exhaustion of remedies was not required and the declaratory judgment action was an appropriate remedy. Id. Similarly, in Montgomery, a case cited in Connor, the court reached an identical result. The plaintiff in Montgomery sought a declaratory judgment as to his right to receive a pension. Montgomery, 218 Minn. at 29, 15 N.W.2d at 123. The court stated that the general purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to afford an alternative remedy which can be used whether or not further relief could be claimed. Id. at 30, 15 N.W.2d at 124.
Finally, as the majority opinion notes, NWA alleges that MAC is dilatory and perhaps worse m delaying consideration and resolution of the underlying matter. MAC claims that it is proceeding in good faith and points out that NWA neglected to participate in the original Ordinance 87 hearings. Although judicial review should not be granted, denied, or delayed based on sniping by the parties, the exchange of charges is troubling. The majority admonishes MAC to act promptly. Perhaps the awkwardness of enforcing this admonition is an added consideration for judicial review at this juncture.
Based on Minnesota case law and the facts and circumstances present in this proceeding, appellant should not be required to first exhaust its administrative remedies. For these reasons, I dissent.

. Under MAPA, appeals of state-agency rules come straight to this court with neither a district court proceeding nor agency reconsideration to create a record. By contrast, judicial review of MAC action starts with the district court. Query, does multi-layered judicial review justify less emphasis on exhaustion?