Court Opinion

ID: 9744210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:56:53.515607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.517521
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Today, the majority holds that a plaintiff may not bring a retaliatory discharge action against the agent or employee of the plaintiffs former employer who actually fired the plaintiff on the employer’s behalf. Rather, the majority holds that the only proper defendant in a retaliatory discharge action is the plaintiffs former employer. 182 Ill. 2d at 13-14, 22. I respectfully disagree. Based on both the law and public policy, I would hold that a plaintiff may bring a retaliatory discharge action against not only the plaintiffs former employer, but also the employer’s agent or employee who actually fired the plaintiff on the employer’s behalf. Accordingly, I dissent from part I of the majority opinion. I. The Law The controlling legal principles are so well settled, and their application in Illinois is so established, that their recitation should not be necessary. However, in light of this decision, these principles must be explained again. Of course, in a case where the principal commands the agent to commit a tort, the principal is liable to a plaintiff not based on agency law. Rather, the principal is liable based on the tort rule “that one causing and intending an ait or result is as responsible as if he had personally performed the act or produced the result.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 212, Comment a, at 455 (1958); accord W. Seavey, Agency § 82, at 137 (1964). The law concerning an agent’s liability where the principal commands the agent to commit a tort is equally straightforward. “The basic proposition concerning the agent’s or servant’s tort liability is simple and readily stated: it is normally unaffected by the fact that he is an agent or servant.” P. Mechem, Agency § 343, at 232 (4th ed. 1952). I repeat: “An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal ***.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343, at 105 (1958); accord W. Seavey, Agency § 129, at 220 (1964). This is the law in Illinois. 1 Ill. L. & Prac. Agency § 184, at 792 (1953). The law reasons that the agent’s tort liability: “is not based upon the contractual relationship existing between the principal and agent, but upon the common-law obligation that every person must so act or use that which he controls as not to injure another. In other words, if the agent is under a duty to third persons as well as to his principal, a breach of his duty to such third persons will render the agent liable to them. Thus, whether he is acting on his own behalf or for another, an agent who violates a duty which he owes to a third person is answerable to the injured party for the consequences. It is no excuse to an agent that his principal is also liable for a tort ***. Nor is an agent who is guilty of tortious conduct relieved from liability merely because he acted at the request, or even at the command or direction, of the principal.” 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 309, at 813-14 (1986). These principles apply equally to nonagent employees. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 488, at 929 (1996). Illinois courts have long approved of this reasoning. Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 18 (1890); Gateway Erectors Division of Imoco-Gateway Corp. v. Lutheran General Hospital, 102 Ill. App. 3d 300, 301-02 (1981). Not only is the law clear on the joint liability of principal and agent in cases such as this, but the law is also clear on their joinder as defendants. “Principal and agent can be joined in an action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent or that of agent and principal, and a judgment can be rendered against each.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B(1), at 472 (1958); accord W. Seavey, Agency § 95, at 169 (1964). The agency relationship “simply provides an alternative defendant. The principal and his agent are jointly and severally liable for all of the damages sustained by the plaintiff.” 1 J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 7.02, at 187 (rev. ed. 1988); accord 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 480 (1996) (nonagent employees). This court long ago explained: “that a joint complaint against a master and his servant or principal and agent states but a single cause of action arising from the same act of negligence *** and both being liable for the same act of negligence they may be joined as defendants.” Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 606 (1931). Accord Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 77 (1946); Laver v. Kingston, 11 Ill. App. 2d 323, 327-28 (1956). The majority states that these general principles of agency law may not “logically” be applied to the tort of retaliatory discharge. The majority first reasoned that “only ‘the employer’ has the power to hire or fire an employee. Obviously, an agent or employee of the employer may carry out that function on the employer’s behalf, but it is still the authority of the employer which is being exercised.” (Emphasis in original.) 182 Ill. 2d at 21. The majority subsequently reasoned: “As explained above, the power to hire and fire employees is ultimately possessed only by the employer. Consequently, the tort of retaliatory discharge may be committed only by the employer. The agent or employee who carries out the employer’s decision to fire will not be subject to personal liability for retaliatory discharge.” 182 Ill. 2d at 22. The majority’s reasoning cannot withstand analysis. The majority is quite correct that: only the employer can fire an employee; an agent can execute that function on the employer’s behalf; but the agent is nonetheless exercising the authority of the employer. However, all agents exercise their principals’ authority on their principals’ behalf. In so doing, their acts are viewed as the acts of their principals. This is what agency law is all about. W. Seavey, Agency § 8(B), at 11 (1964); P. Mechera, Agency § 35, at 19 (4th ed. 1952); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 (1958); 1 Ill. L. & Prac. Agency § 111 (1953). Their single act, if tortious, states a single cause of action, to which they both may be joined as defendants. Skala, 343 Ill. at 606. Indeed, the majority acknowledges this in part II of its opinion. See 182 Ill. 2d at 24. Thus, the application of these well-settled principles of agency law would not “expand” the tort of retaliatory discharge. The tort of retaliatory discharge is not unique in this regard. The majority is incorrect, as a matter of law, in its conclusion that only the employer can commit the tort of retaliatory discharge. Let me illustrate with two hypotheticals. In the first, an employer says to her agent: “I authorize and order you to punch plaintiff in the face.” The agent goes to the plaintiff and says: “Our employer has authorized and ordered me to punch you in the face, and I do so on our employer’s behalf.” The agent then punches plaintiff in the face. In the second, as alleged in the present case, the employer says to her agent: “Plaintiff is exercising a legal right or is refusing to do an illegal act. In retaliation, I want to fire plaintiff. I authorize and order you to fire plaintiff.” The agent goes to the plaintiff and says: “Our employer has authorized and ordered me to fire you, and I do so on our employer’s behalf. You’re fired.” Can it be seriously questioned that the plaintiff in each hypothetical has a tort cause of action against both the principal and the agent jointly and severally? Based on the above-stated principles of agency and tort law, the plaintiff in the first hypothetical may sue both the principal and the agent for the tort of battery, and in the second hypothetical for the tort of retaliatory discharge. This court applied these principles long ago. In Johnson v. Barber, 10 Ill. 425 (1849), the plaintiff brought a tort action against a principal and his agent. Defendants tendered a jury instruction stating that plaintiff could not recover against both the principal and the agent. According to the instruction, if the agent had acted under the direction of the principal, then the principal alone is liable. If the agent had acted in a manner contrary to the principal’s direction, then the principal is not liable and must be acquitted. Johnson, 10 Ill. at 427. The trial court refused the instruction and this court affirmed: “The seventh instruction was clearly wrong. If the act complained of was illegal, the fact that one of the defendants committed it under the direction of the other, did not shield him from responsibility, but both were equally liable to the party injured, as well the one who did the act as the one who procured it to be done. All concerned in the commission of an unlawful act are responsible for the consequences. Admit the principle asserted by this instruction, and every person charged with the commission of an act prohibited by law could excuse himself by showing that he acted in obedience to the command or under the direction of another. Such a doctrine would be subversive of private rights and detrimental to the public interests.” Johnson, 10 Ill. at 430-31. As characterized by this court in Johnson, the majority opinion is clearly wrong on this issue as a matter of law. I agree with the observation made in Zurek v. Hasten, 553 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ill. 1982), that “it would distort normal tort doctrine, once a cause of action is recognized, to impose liability on a wrongdoer’s principal but not on the wrongdoer himself.” Zurek, 553 F. Supp. at 749 (interpreting Illinois law); accord Haltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1994). II. Public Policy Also, contrary to the majority (see 182 Ill. 2d at 21), I agree with the public policy that holding the “active wrongdoer” liable, in addition to the former employer, promotes the deterrent goal of the tort. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 190 Ill. App. 3d 592, 602 (1989), citing Zurek, 553 F. Supp. at 749. As this court observed nearly 150 years ago, to hold otherwise, as the majority does today, would be “detrimental to the public interests.” Johnson, 10 Ill. at 431. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that a plaintiff may bring a retaliatory discharge action against not only the plaintiffs former employer, but also the employer’s agent or employee who actually fired the plaintiff on the employer’s behalf. Accordingly, I dissent from part I of the majority opinion. JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.