Court Opinion

ID: 9757448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:40:59.291284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:39.471423
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the disciplinary court could refuse to vacate its own impoundment order. The infringement of appellant’s first amendment right to gather information is not justified because: (1) there are less restrictive means of protecting the asserted governmental interests given recognition by the majority; and (2) even if no less restrictive alternatives exist, there is no compelling state interest to justify this governmental secrecy. The majority affirms the concealment of the record of a court proceeding despite the clear public policy to the contrary. It does so without *120having the record available.1
2I would reverse the court’s refusal to vacate the impoundment order.
I
The first amendment right to gather news is clearly established in Pennsylvania. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), app. dism., 415 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1547, 39 L.Ed.2d 863 (1974).2 The importance of this right can be fully appreciated by relating it to the very foundation of the first amendment. Justice Brandéis observed:
“[Those who won our independence know] that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government ; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”
Whitney v. People of California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (dissenting opinion); *121see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720-21, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
Silence imposed by refusing to inform is indistinguishable in effect from silence imposed by curtailing the speech of those already informed.3 The evils are identical in either case: the curtailment of public debate and discussion of “supposed grievances and proposed remedies”; the dampening of “thought, hope and imagination”; the loss of the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people; 4 the imposition of secrecy over governmental decision processes; and, ultimately, the denial of a citizen’s right to meaningful self-government. The first amendment serves “. . .to promote honesty of government by seeing to it that public business functions under the hard light of full public scrutiny.” Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972). Recent national events fully illustrate both the dangers of government by secrecy and the absolute necessity of an informed public.5
*122Only a free press can effectuate this first amendment “right to know” held by the public. Public debate and discussion is, meaningless without an effective vehicle to convey information concerning governmental decisions.6 Although the press may not have any “special access” to information not available to the public,7 curtailing the press’ right to gather what should be public information is a direct infringement of the public’s right to know and its capacity to participate in governmental affairs.
Thus, the press’ right to gather information must be given first amendment protection. As with other first amendment rights, this protection is not absolute. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-86, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2657-59, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, supra, 453 Pa. at 163, 308 A.2d at 896. The right to gather news may be affected by virtually any governmental action and may give rise to “speculative” or uncertain first amendment claims. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 690, 693-94, 92 S.Ct. at 2661, 2663; *123Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-81, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965). Here, however, the government is imposing a direct restriction on the right to gather news by impounding court records. Such secrecy can only be justified by showing a “compelling” or “paramount” state interest in maintaining the restriction. See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 700, 92 S.Ct. at 2666; McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, supra, 453 Pa. at 163, 308 A.2d at 896; DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825, 829, 86 S.Ct. 1148, 1151, 16 L.Ed.2d 292 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439, 83 S.Ct. 328, 341 (1963).8
Even if the court imposing secrecy can show such a compelling interest, our review must extend further. We must scrutinize the impoundment order to ensure that no less restrictive alternative is available. See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 680-81, 92 S.Ct. at 2656; Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293 n. 8, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274; NAACP v. Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 340; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).9
*124This scrutiny must also be applied when the state asserts a compelling interest in protecting the rights of others, such as a defendant’s right to a fair trial or a citizen’s right to privacy, to justify restrictions on first amendment rights. We must ensure that the competing interests are fairly balanced and that no unnecessary burdens on first amendment rights are imposed. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, supra.
The majority describes the first amendment right to gather information as “amorphous” and appears to assert that it is not worthy of full first amendment protection. Yet the very cases cited by the majority are to the contrary.
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L. Ed.2d 495 (1974), the Court held that the press did not have a right of unlimited access to interview prison inmates because of the serious disciplinary problems, such a policy had created in the past. The Court was careful to note that:
“. . . this regulation is not part of an attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of those conditions.”
Id. at 830, 94 S.Ct. at 2808. On the contrary, the press was given regular tours of the entire system, allowed random interviews, permitted to investigate any particular prison program, and given an opportunity to sit in on group meetings and to interview inmate participants. The Court stated that these policies reflected “. *125a recognition that the conditions in this Nation’s prisons are a matter that is both newsworthy and of great public importance.” Id. at 830, 94 S.Ct. at 2808 n. 7. However, the state demonstrated that the press’ right to gather news at prisons could be reasonably regulated because of a strong state interest in prison security and inmate rehabilitation. The limited restrictions imposed were shown to be the minimum necessary to protect those interests. This showing is far more substantial than the majority’s characterization of a “reasonable exercise of administration discretion” 10
In Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, newsmen who were required to divulge their confidential sources to the grand jury asserted the newsman’s privilege based in part on the press’ right to gather news. The Court agreed that such a first amendment right to gather news existed, but found that the requirement to testify created only a “speculative” burden on that right. Id., 408 U.S. at 693-94, 92 S.Ct. at 2663. Moreover, the grand jury had a constitutionally mandated role in law enforcement, a “fundamental function of government.” The Court concluded:
“[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering . . . .”
Id. at 690, 92 S.Ct. at 2661.
In McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, supra, this Court denied a newspaper access to names on the Commonwealth’s welfare rolls. We stated that the Commonwealth had a “paramount” and “compelling” interest that justified such restriction. The privacy of welfare recipients is a *126crucial element in the Commonwealth’s quest to preserve family life and to “ ‘encourage self-respect, self-dependency and the desire to be a good citizen and useful to society.’ ” We concluded:
“The statutory limitation imposed on appellees’ asserted First Amendment right to compel the disclosure of those receiving assistance is no greater than necessary to protect the substantial governmental and individual interests involved.”
Id. 453 Pa. at 165, 308 A.2d at 897.
The majority cites other instances in which the press’ right to access to news sources is restricted, such as grand jury hearings or some aspects of criminal trials. However, such restrictions are clearly compelled because the state must protect the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, supra. Moreover, a court violates a newsman’s first amendment rights if its supervisory powers are used more broadly than required to protect those rights. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947).
This case, involving total secrecy, is also governed by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The court of common pleas, by impounding the disciplinary records, has restricted the rights of appellant and of the public to be informed. For this Court to sustain such an order, either the infringement must be “speculative,” or the state must make a strong showing of a “compelling state interest” which cannot be adequately protected by less restrictive means. Here, neither basis for upholding the impoundment order is present.
II
As the majority correctly notes, the courts have the power and duty to discipline attorneys practicing before *127them. In fact, courts must exercise this power in order to maintain the public trust in the judicial process. In Moyerman’s Case, 312 Pa. 555, 564, 167 A. 579, 583 (1933), we stated:
“The law is an ancient and honorable profession. Throughout its whole existence it has been maintained in the confidence of the people by the integrity of its members. . . . The practicing members of the profession are the arms of the court, which exists only for the administration of justice, and as officers of the court they are held out to the community as worthy of special trust and confidence. The court itself would fail its duty to the public if it did not, when an attorney has proved himself unworthy, withdraw its endorsement and strike his name from the rolls.
See In re Shignon, 462 Pa. 1, 23, 329 A.2d 235, 246 (1974).
Disciplinary proceedings are an integral part of a court’s obligation to the public. They have become an increasingly important method of demonstrating the trustworthiness of the legal profession and ensuring the effectiveness of the judicial process.11 We should there*128fore scrutinize with particular care any judicially created restriction which removes disciplinary proceedings in a court of law from “the hard light of public scrutiny.”
The majority’s analysis fails to employ such scrutiny. It states that disciplinary proceedings are “non-governmental in nature.” This assertion not only ignores the court’s responsibility to the public to ensure that the proceedings are effective, but also conflicts with the obvious fact that court officials act in their official capacity when they discipline attorneys. Further, private attorneys are themselves officers of the court. All court actions are public property. The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Craig v. Harney, supra, 331 U.S. at 374, 67 S.Ct. at 1254:
“What transpires in the court room is public property. . There is no special prequisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.”
That Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044-45, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975):
“With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to . bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”
*129Finally, the Pennsylvania Constitution states:
“The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof(Emphasis added.)
Pennsylvania Const., art. 1, § 7.
The majority, ignoring the public’s right to examine court proceedings as provided in the State and Federal Constitutions, asserts that McLaughlin’s (appellee’s) expectation of confidentiality is a sufficiency compelling interest to impound the disciplinary records. Perhaps an accused attorney subject to a disciplinary proceeding could assert a limited interest in confidentiality, as the majority assets. However, a mere expectation of privacy by the attorney cannot justify the blanket rule of secrecy approved by the majority. It allows a court to impound its own disciplinary record after the proceedings are completed without divulging the reasons for its action, without divulging its decision and without any provision for review.12
The majority relies on the Clark Report13 to support its claimed compelling state interest in confidentiality. What the committee recommends is that disciplinary proceedings be kept confidential “until hearings have been held and the charges sustained by the trial authority.” 14
*130The report is concerned with the prejudicial effect of the widely publicized filing of charges against a private attorney and the largely ignored exoneration at some later time. Although they may be legitimate concerns that require limited protection, they offer no justification for the majority’s absolute rule of secrecy, which permanently impounds a court’s disciplinary records even when the charges are sustained.15
Even if one were to accept the majority’s assertion that a private attorney has a reasonable expectation of privacy which the courts are permitted to honor, appellee is no longer a “private attorney” and cannot reasonably have that expectation. Because he has accepted an appointive governmental position with extensive responsibility to the public, he is a “public official.” Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S.Ct. 633, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 *131(1971); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966).16 This case is particularly sensitive because appellee, as assistant district attorney, is himself charged with upholding the law. The public therefore has a strong interest in knowing appellee’s qualifications and fitness for his public position. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L. Ed.2d 789 (1974); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S.Ct. 209, 217, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). This interest cannot be thwarted by claiming an expectation of confidentiality. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 n. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 n. 1, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) ; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967).17
The majority argues that the “public official” rule should not be applied here because appellee was a private attorney at the time of the disciplinary hearing. The majority’s “private attorney” rule would put a lid of secrecy on any misconduct which occurred before an official assumed his post discovered during the disciplinary proceedings. Its rule applies even if the misconduct relates to the means by which the attorney became a public official. Further, that appellee might once have had a right to privacy is not dispositive now;18 the public has *132a right to any information in the impounded record which concerns appellee’s fitness for office. The Supreme Court of the United States has reaffirmed this principle:
“ [S] ociety’s interest in the officers of government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S.Ct. 209, 217, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), the public’s interest extends to ‘anything that might touch on an official’s fitness for office. . New personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.’ ”
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S. Ct. at 3009. Appellee’s conduct as a “private attorney,” the very concern of his disciplinary hearing, is undeniably relevant in determining his qualifications and fitness as an assistant district attorney.
Other interests noted by the majority — the reputation and livelihood of a private attorney and the rehabilitative effects of the disciplinary order — likewise fail to justify absolute secrecy of these court proceedings. The strong public interest in obtaining information concerning a public official’s “fitness for office” cannot be so completely infringed by a blanket assertion of inapplicable or uncertain state interests.
Finally, the majority maintains that the state’s interest in confidentiality is “vital” because, here, it serves “in assisting legitimate governmental processes.” Such a broad pronouncement could equally justify secrecy in every aspect of governmental operations, a practice repugnant to our fundamental principles of self-government.
Here, unlike the uncertain impairment in Branzburg, there is a total impairment of the public’s first amend*133ment right of access to impounded information involving a court decision. The public has a right to know, and the press a right to report, whether public servants are qualified to perform their duties and whether disciplinary procedures, important governmental and court functions, are fair and effective. The disciplinary court has imposed a drastic order of secrecy jeopardizing these rights and, by so doing, concealing what transpires in the public’s courts from public scrutiny. Unlike McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, supra, no compelling privacy rights have been shown to exist, and, unlike the other cases relied on by the majority, no compelling state interest has been established.
This case offers no justification for erecting a wall of governmental secrecy between the court’s action and the public. As Justice Brandéis stated:
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 19
It is regrettable that the majority, by condoning secrecy, makes an unnecessary and self-defeating retreat into darkness.
I dissent.

. The impounded record is so sealed in secrecy that the majority decides this case without knowing the date of the disciplinary proceeding, the findings of the disciplinary court, the attending circumstances of the alleged misconduct, or the reasons for the resulting impoundment order. In fact, this totally silent record does not reveal whether the court which refused to vacate the impoundment order had any of this essential information before it.

. “[W]e agree that [the right to gather news], emanating from the First Amendment, does exist, [but] this right, as all other First Amendment rights, is not absolute.”
McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 163, 308 A.2d 888, 896 (1973) app. dism. 415 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1547, 39 L.Ed.2d 863 (1974); see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2656-57, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).

. See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum.L.Rev. 838, 843-46 (1971); Note, The Right to the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1505, 1505-07 (1974); Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 93, 93-94 (1973).

. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2809, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S. Ct. 209, 217, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).

. Statutory rights to access to governmental information have been created at both the federal and state level. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C., § 552 (1972); Right to Know Act, Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, § 1 et seq., 65 P.S. § 66.1 et seq. (1959). The Committee Report, commenting on the federal statute, observes:
“A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies. A danger signal in the United States is the fact that such a political truism needs repeating.”
H.R.Rep.No.1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
Because of the dangers of governmental secrecy, the government has the burden of showing the necessity of nondisclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, apd exemptions are con*122strued narrowly in favor of disclosure. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 491 F.2d 63, 66 (1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 n. 15 (1973) and cases cited therein.
These statutory provisions have explicit exemptions for court proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1972); Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, § 1, 65 P.S. § 66.1 (1959). However, they clearly illustrate a legislative policy in favor of public disclosure of governmental business which is derived directly from the first amendment. See Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F.Supp. 107, 121 (D.C.D.C.1975). We should follow the same principles in determining the procedures to be followed for disclosure of judicial proceedings.

, See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602-03, 73 S.Ct. 872, 877, 97 L.Ed. 1277 (1953); Note, Colum.L.Rev., supra note 3, at 839-43.

. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2810, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2658, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1280-81, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 163, 308 A.2d 888, 896 (1973), app. dism., 415 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1547, 39 L.Ed.2d 863 (1974).

. See also Note, Colum.L.Rev., supra note 3 at 843; Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 Ind.L.J. 209 (1952); Comment, U.Pitt.L.Rev., supra note 3, at 93-4.
One writer questions the existence of a right of access because he doubts that it could be effectively enforced by the courts. However, he focuses his discussion on a court’s ability to police the disclosing practices of the executive and legislative branches of government. Clearly this Court has the power and duty to supervise judicial disclosure procedures. See Note, Harv.L.Rev., supra note 3, at 1510-14.

. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L. Ed.2d 231 (1960), the Court stated:
“[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” (footnotes omitted.)
*124This fundamental principle certainly applies to the impoundment of court records. See also, Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).

. Saxbe v. Washington, 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974), also cited by the majority, involved limited regulation of the press’ access to prison inmates that “did not differ significantly” from those found in Pell. The Court therefore applied the same analysis in upholding such regulation,

. Many commentators have also emphasized that disciplinary proceedings are a crucial element of a court’s obligation to the public. Cole, Bar Discipline and Spevack v. Klein, 53 A.B.A.J. 819, 820-21 (1967); Holland, The Objectives of Attorney Discipline: A Pennsylvania View, 79 Dick.L.Rev. 558, 568 (1975); Roberts Pennsylvania’s Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 Pa. B.A.Q. 490 (1968); Wright, Self-Discipline of the Bar: Theory or Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971). Wide ranging reforms have been urged because of public mistrust of the profession. See ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970) (hereinafter “Clark Report”); Commentary, The Bar and Watergate: Conversations with Chesterfield Smith, 1 Hastings Con.L.Q. 31 (1974); Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self Regulation?, 2 Ill.L.Forum 193 (1974) (reprinted by American Bar Foundation, 5 Research Contributions 193 (1974); Wright, supra.
The Clark Report begins:
“After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the country, this Committee must report the existence of a *128scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession.”
It also warns that unless the courts demonstrate the effectiveness of their policing methods, demands will be made that disciplinary proceedings be turned over to independent examiners. Clark Report, supra at 2.
The need for reform prompted the adoption of our own disciplinary rules, which were not in effect at the time of this disciplinary hearing. See Jones, State of the Judiciary, 43 Pa.B.A.Q. 292, 293-94 (1972).

. Public confidence in the effectiveness of disciplinary proceedings would be strengthened by providing public access and judicial review. Failure to include either of these safeguards creates the appearance and danger of arbitrary abuses of discretion. See K. Davis, Discretionary Justice 102-16, 151-55 (1969).

. See note 11 supra.

. Clark Report, supra note 11, at 138. Holland, supra note 11, at 570 would also give a limited confidentiality privilege to protect “an attorney . . from adverse publicity until the charges are proved or he himself requests the charges be made public.”
In Nichols v. Gamso, 35 N.Y.2d 35, 358 N.Y.S.2d 712, 315 N. E.2d 770 (1974), the court stated that it was probably an abuse of discretion, as a “matter of public policy,” absent compelling *130circumstances affecting the public interest, “not to make available to public scrutiny so much of the [disciplinary] record and proceedings as bear on the charges sustained [against a trial judge].” The court also stated that there should be judicial review, particularly when “the subject of the charges is continued in office.”

. Many commentators question even a limited grant of confidentiality. See, e. g., Commentary, The Bar and Watergate: Conversations with Chesterfied Smith, supra note 11, at 35; Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 233-34; Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1974); see also Leach, The New Look in Disciplinary Enforcement in England, 61 A.B.A.J. 212-14 (1975).
Marks & Cathcart state:
“All stages of a disciplinary proceeding should be disclosed because confidentiality is incompatible with the profession’s need to publicize at least its formal efforts at self-regulation, and because the nature of the proceedings (except for the confidentiality) more closely resembles a criminal trial than an informal regulatory hearing. The origins of secrecy in disciplinary proceedings are remote; perhaps they are rooted in a guild outlook. Secrecy, however, does not serve the broader professional interests. Further, there is a question whether secrecy of proceedings, at least after preliminary screenings, is consistent with the licensing rationale, which requires accountability to the public.”
Marks & Cathcart, supra.
Michigan has recently made all formal disciplinary proceedings open to the public. See Marks & Cathcart, supra.

. See also Pa.Const. art. I, § 7, which provides that no one may be convicted for publishing materials “relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity . (Emphasis added.)

. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). Appellee’s daughter, a rape victim, brought an invasion of privacy action against a broadcaster based on a state statute which provided criminal penalties against those who broadcast rape victims’ names. The Court denied relief finding that the strong privacy interest was outweighed by the press’ privilege to report the events of those court proceedings.

. For example, the past conduct of political candidates for office is subject to the “public official” rule. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 91 S.Ct. 628, 28 L.Ed.2d 57 (1971). The reasoning of these cases is clearly relevant here.

. L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money 92 (1914).