Court Opinion

ID: 9707862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:28.423516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.013258
License: Public Domain

MYSE, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which finds that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it received evidence regarding Dr. Richard Kokemoor's duty to refer Donna Johnson to other physicians. While I agree that Kokemoor did not have a duty to refer Johnson to other physicians as an element of an informed consent claim, the receipt of such evidence was harmless error. I reach this conclusion for three reasons.
First, the evidence regarding other physicians and their rates of success was properly before the jury as part of the true risk Johnson faced in undertaking the operation proposed by Kokemoor. Because the jury was aware that there were other physicians who enjoyed a significantly reduced risk of a bad result from the pro*228posed surgery, the introduction of referral opinions is unlikely to have affected the jury's determination.
Second, the majority believed that the improperly admitted referral testimony is likely to have influenced the jury solely as it related to the causation question of whether Johnson would have undertaken the proposed surgery had she understood the true risk. The evidence properly before the jury demonstrated that the surgery proposed by Kokemoor bore a 20-30% risk of a bad result. If Johnson did nothing she faced a 2% per year cumulative risk that the aneurysm would rupture. A bad result in this proposed surgery involved either death or the type of substantial disability that could result, and did result, in paralysis, loss of bowel and bladder control, speech and vision impairment and loss of body motor coordination. I seriously question what a reasonable person would do if faced with a 20-30% risk of such catastrophic proportions when waiting for better techniques, new medications or other medical innovations involved only a 2% per year cumulative risk. Even if Kokemoor's failure to disclose the substantial risk of death or disability caused Johnson to refrain from seeking a second opinion from a doctor more experienced with this type of aneurysm, Johnson would be entitled to prevail because she would not have undertaken the risk of the operation proposed by Kokemoor. The evidence seems compelling that Johnson would not have undertaken the operation if Kokemoor had disclosed the true risks. I cannot conclude that reference to referrals to other physicians had any substantial impact on the jury's deliberation on this issue.
Third, during oral argument Kokemoor's attorney conceded that if the court properly received the results of other physicians' experiences with this operation as *229part of the evidence directed at proving that Kokemoor did not accurately identify the true risk of the proposed operation, the receipt of referral evidence would not be prejudicial error. Counsel properly reasoned that the evidence was before the jury as part of the proof of the true risk and would not have influenced the jury's determinations of the questions submitted to them on the special verdict. In view of this concession, I see no basis for reversing this judgment.