Court Opinion

ID: 9904983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 16:07:11.260202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:04.530176
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0762

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                     Respondent,

                                           vs.

                                Salahedden K. Nakhleh,
                                      Appellant.

                               Filed November 27, 2023
                                      Reversed
                                   Connolly, Judge

                              Martin County District Court
                                File No. 46-VB-23-138

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Taylor McGowan, Martin County Attorney, Fairmont, Minnesota (for respondent)

Rodd Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Hooten,

Judge.

                          NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

      On appeal from his adjudication for petty-misdemeanor speeding in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1) (2022), appellant argues that the evidence was


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his driving conduct occurred in an

“urban district” as required by the statute under which he was cited. Because the applicable

statute required respondent to prove that appellant’s driving conduct occurred in an “urban

district,” and respondent presented no evidence at trial on this element, we reverse.

                                         FACTS

       In February 2023, appellant Salahedden K. Nakhleh received a petty-misdemeanor

citation for speeding in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1). A bench trial was

then held at which a City of Truman police officer testified that, while on routine patrol,

his radar indicated that appellant’s semi-truck was traveling “47 MPH . . . inside the city

limits of Truman.” According to the officer, the posted speed limit in the City of Truman

is 30 mph. And the officer testified that, after stopping appellant’s vehicle, appellant

acknowledged “traveling above the posted speed limit.” The district court subsequently

found appellant guilty of the cited offense. This appeal follows.

                                       DECISION

       Appellant challenges his adjudication for petty-misdemeanor speeding in violation

of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1). He argues that, under the statute, respondent State

of Minnesota was required to prove that the road on which he was traveling when he was

cited for speeding was in an “urban district” as defined by Minnesota law. Appellant

contends that, because respondent presented no evidence on this element of the offense,

the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of speeding under section 169.14,

subdivision 2(a)(1).

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         Appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of Minn. Stat.

§ 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1), which presents us with a question of statutory interpretation that

we review de novo. Douglas v. State, 986 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 2023). “Under the de

novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead exercise

independent review.” Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).

         “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). To do so, we must

first determine if the statute is facially ambiguous. Douglas, 986 N.W.2d at 709. “A statute

is ambiguous if, when interpreting words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary

meanings, the court concludes that the statutory language is subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotations omitted). If a statute is unambiguous, we must

follow the plain meaning of the statute. State v. McReynolds, 973 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn.

2022).

         The statute under which appellant was cited provides:

                      Where no special hazard exists the following speeds
               shall be lawful, but any speeds in excess of such limits shall be
               prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent
               and that it is unlawful; except that the speed limit within any
               municipality shall be a maximum limit and any speed in excess
               thereof shall be unlawful:

                      (1) 30 miles per hour in an urban district . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1). “Urban district” is defined as “the territory contiguous

to and including any city street or town road that is built up with structures devoted to

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business, industry, or dwelling houses situated at intervals of less than 100 feet for a

distance of a quarter of a mile or more.” Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 90 (2022).

       Appellant does not dispute that the posted speed limit in the City of Truman was 30

mph, or that he was driving in excess of the posted speed limit. But appellant argues that

section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1) provides that “it is unlawful for a driver to travel over

‘30 mph in an urban district.’ [It] does not say that it is unlawful for a driver to travel over

30 mph ‘where a sign says so’ or where ‘a police officer asserts the speed limit is 30 mph.’”

Thus, appellant contends that respondent “was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the relevant roadway constituted an ‘urban district’ as defined by Minnesota law.”

       We agree. A careful review of the statute under which appellant was cited reveals

no language referencing a posted speed limit. See Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1).

Instead, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides that “any speeds in

excess” of “30 miles per hour in an urban district” are “prima facia evidence that the speed

is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.” Id. This language provides a

rebuttable presumption that speeds in excess of “30 miles per hour in an urban district” are

unreasonable and unlawful. Id.

       The statute then provides the following exception: “except that the speed limit

within any municipality shall be a maximum limit and any speed in excess thereof shall be

unlawful.” Id. This language imposes strict liability for a violation of the speed limits

listed in section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1)-(8), if the speed-limit violation occurs “within

any municipality.” Id. But without any language referencing a posted speed limit, the

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specific statute under which appellant was cited required respondent to prove that appellant

was traveling in excess of 30 miles per hour in an urban district. See id.

         In addition to the plain language of the statute, State v. Manley, 353 N.W.2d 649

(Minn. App. 1984), indicates that “urban district” is an element of Minn. Stat. § 169.14,

subd. 2(a)(1). In that case, the defendant was cited for speeding under Minn. Stat. § 169.14,

subd. 2 (1982),1 after a police officer’s radar measured the defendant’s speed at 55 miles

per hour within the city limits of Wilmar, which had a posted speed limit of 40 miles per

hour. Manley, 353 N.W.2d at 650-51. The matter proceeded to a jury trial and, after the

state rested, the defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the state failed to prove

that the defendant drove in excess of 55 miles per hour or at an excessive speed in an urban

district. Id. at 651. While the defendant’s motion to dismiss was still under advisement,

the state moved to amend the complaint to charge the defendant with violating Minn. Stat.

§ 169.14, subd. 5 (1982).2 Id. The district court granted the motion to amend, and the jury

1
    Minnesota Statutes section 169.14, subdivision 2 (1982) provided:

                Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be
                lawful, but any speeds in excess of such limits shall be prima
                facia evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and
                that it is unlawful; except that the speed limit within any
                municipality shall be a maximum limit and any speed in excess
                thereof shall be unlawful:

                       (1) 30 miles per hour in an urban district;
                       (2) 65 miles per hour in other locations during the
                daytime;
                       (3) 55 miles per hour in such other locations during the
                nighttime.
2
    This statute provides:

                                              5
subsequently found the defendant guilty of violating section 169.14, subdivision 5. Id. at

650-51.

       On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by

permitting the amendment of the complaint after the state rested its case. Id. at 650. This

court agreed, concluding that the “[a]mendment of the complaint from a subdivision 2

charge to a subdivision 5 charge was error because the amendment charged a different

offense which substantially prejudiced the rights of [the defendant].” Id. at 652. In

reaching this conclusion, this court recognized that the “elements of [Minn. Stat. § 169.14,

subd. 2 (1982)] are speed in excess of 55 m.p.h. or speed in excess of 30 m.p.h. in an urban

                     When local authorities believe that the existing speed
              limit upon any street or highway, or part thereof, within their
              respective jurisdictions and not part of the trunk highway
              system is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under
              existing conditions, they may request the commissioner to
              authorize, upon the basis for an engineering and traffic
              investigation, the erection of appropriate signs designating
              what speed is reasonable and safe, and the commissioner may
              authorize the erection of appropriate signs designating a
              reasonable and safe speed limit thereat, which speed limit shall
              be effective when such signs are erected. Any speeds in excess
              of these speed limits shall be prima facie evidence that the
              speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful;
              except that any speed limit within any municipality shall be a
              maximum limit and any speed in excess thereof shall be
              unlawful. Alteration of speed limits on streets and highways
              shall be made only upon authority of the commissioner except
              as provided in subdivision 5a.

Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 5 (1982).

                                             6
district,” which varied from the elements of section 169.14, subdivision 5. Id. at 651-52

(emphasis added).

       The language of the current version of section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1), is

identical to the language of the statute discussed in Manley. Compare Minn. Stat. § 169.14,

subd. 2(a)(1) (2022), with Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2 (1982). And this court in Manley

stated that an element of the statute is “speed in excess of 30 m.p.h. in an urban district.”

353 N.W.2d at 651-52. The decision in Manley is consistent with the plain language of

section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1). We therefore conclude that respondent was required

to prove that appellant was driving in excess of 30 miles per hour in an urban district.

       Respondent acknowledges that “Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1), makes no

mention of signage.” But respondent contends that “other provisions within that section

indicate that speed-limit signs set the enforceable speeds at a given location.” Respondent

argues that “[t]o suggest that speed-limit signs are immaterial in certain circumstances but

indispensable in others creates an inconsistency within the enforcement of the various

speed limits set within Minn. Stat. § 169.14.” Thus, respondent contends that “[a]n

examination of the entirety of [section] 169.14 indicates that the designation of the roadway

need not be established where the speed limit is otherwise posted.”

       We recognize that, when analyzing statutory language, the statute is read as a whole,

and each section is to be interpreted in light of the surrounding sections in order to avoid

conflicting interpretations. See Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277

(Minn. 2000). But a review of section 169.14, as a whole, demonstrates that there is no

language in the statute stating that all speed limits in Minnesota are established by posted

                                             7
signage.   Instead, the speed limits in Minnesota are established by section 169.14,

subdivision 2(a)(1)-(8), based upon differing types of roadways or highways. See Minn.

Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a). Specifically, subdivision 2(a) provides that the following speeds

are unlawful:

                       (1) 30 miles per hour in an urban district;
                       (2) 65 miles per hour on noninterstate expressways, as
                defined in section 160.02, subdivision 18b, and noninterstate
                freeways, as defined in section 160.02, subdivision 19;
                       (3) 55 miles per hour in locations other than those
                specified in this section;
                       (4) 70 miles per hour on interstate highways outside the
                limits of any urbanized area with a population of greater than
                50,000 as defined by order of the commissioner of
                transportation;
                       (5) 65 miles per hour on interstate highways inside the
                limits of any urbanized area with a population of greater than
                50,000 as defined by order of the commissioner of
                transportation;
                       (6) ten miles per hour in alleys;
                       (7) 25 miles per hour in residential roadways if adopted
                by the road authority have jurisdiction over the residential
                roadway; and
                       (8) 35 miles per hour in a rural residential district if
                adopted by the road authority having jurisdiction over the rural
                residential district.

Id. These speed limits provide a uniform system of speed limits in Minnesota that put

drivers on notice of the speed limit on a particular type of road regardless of whether there

is a posted speed limit.

       However, the road authority having jurisdiction over a type of roadway may change

the speed limit as established in section 169.14, subdivision 2(a). See, e.g., Minn. Stat.

§ 169.14, subds. 4, 5 (2022). In such situations, the new speed limit “shall be effective”

when appropriate signs designating a reasonable and safe speed limit are erected. Id. In

                                               8
fact, clauses (7) and (8) of subdivision 2(a) specifically contemplate changes in the uniform

speed limits by the appropriate road authority because those clauses provide that the speed

limits adopted in those clauses do not become “effective unless the road authority has

erected signs designating the speed limit.” Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(b)-(c). In these

situations, it is necessary to require signs posting the speed limit because the roadway

authority has changed the uniform speed limit on that particular road or highway.

       Nevertheless, the references to posted speed limits in section 169.14 are specific to

the clauses where the uniform speed limits have been changed. And there is no indication

in section 169.14 that signs be posted on every road establishing the speed limit. See

generally Minn. Stat. § 169.14. Rather, the speed limits are established by Minn. Stat.

§ 169.14, subd. 2(a), making posted signs generally unnecessary because it is well settled

that all members of society are presumed to know the law. See State v. Jacobson, 697

N.W.2d 610, 615 (Minn. 2005) (“It is assumed that all members of an ordered society are

presumed either to know the law or, at least, to have acquainted themselves with those laws

that are likely to affect their usual activities.” (quotation omitted)). As such, section

169.14, when read as whole, does not support respondent’s position that the designation of

the roadway need not be established where the speed limit is otherwise posted.

       Respondent also contends that “[t]o the extent that Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a),

is ambiguous, requiring the State to prove the location of the offense meets the statutory

definition is contrary to the Legislature’s intent” and produces an absurd result. But as

stated above, section 169.14, subdivision 2(a), is unambiguous and, therefore, there is no

need to resort to statutory construction. See State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d

                                             9
695, 701 (Minn. 1996) (stating that if a statute, construed according to ordinary rules of

grammar, is unambiguous, a court may engage in no further statutory construction and

must apply its plain meaning). Moreover, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd.

2(a)(1), requires the state to prove that the offender exceeded 30 mph in an urban district

in order for the offender to be found guilty of that offense. The fact that respondent does

not believe that proof of an urban district is an element of the offense does not make such

an interpretation of section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1), absurd.

       Respondent further argues that caselaw demonstrates that “failure to abide by the

posted speed limit is sufficient for prosecution under Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1).”

We disagree. In State, City of St. Louis Park v. Bogren, cited by respondent, the offender’s

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his adjudication for speeding centered on the

claim that the state “failed to show a lack of outside interference, that the officer’s

testimony was inconsistent, and that the officer’s training and knowledge were

inadequate.” 410 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. App. 1987). There is nothing in that case

indicating that the offender raised a challenge similar to the challenge raised here.

Similarly, the issues raised in State v. Wood, 845 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. App. 2014), rev.

denied (Minn. June 17, 2014), also cited by respondent, are vastly different from the

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge raised by appellant in this case. And as addressed

above, this court in Manley, specifically stated that “speed in excess of 30 m.p.h. in an

urban district” is an element of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1). 353 N.W.2d at 651.

       Because speed in excess of 30 mph in an urban district is an element of the offense

under which appellant was cited, there must be evidence demonstrating that the roadway

                                            10
on which appellant was traveling was located in an urban district as defined in Minn. Stat.

§ 169.011, subd. 90. The record reflects that no such evidence was produced. In fact,

respondent does not argue otherwise. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient to sustain appellant’s adjudication for petty misdemeanor speeding

in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1).

       Reversed.

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