Court Opinion

ID: 9371778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 21:00:31.169313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.003670
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4539

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        BRAYAN MENGOU,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00008-GMG-RWT-2)

        Submitted: January 30, 2023                                  Decided: February 15, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Aaron D. Moss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lara Kay
        Omps-Botteicher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West
        Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Brayan Mengou pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to aiding and

        abetting the illegal transportation or receipt of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D). The district court sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment.

        On appeal, Mengou’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

        738 (1967), concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning

        whether Mengou’s sentence is reasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm.

               We review Mengou’s sentence “for reasonableness ‘under a deferential abuse-of-

        discretion standard.’” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting

        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). Our reasonableness review has procedural

        and substantive components. We first must ensure that the district court did not commit

        procedural error, such as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing]

        Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

        § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to

        adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111-12

        (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “When rendering a sentence, the district

        court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented”; state in open

        court the reasons supporting its chosen sentence; and “address the parties’ nonfrivolous

        arguments in favor of a particular sentence” and, if it rejects them, explain why in a manner

        allowing for “meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218

        (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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               If the sentence is procedurally sound, we review the substantive reasonableness of

        the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Substantive reasonableness review “takes into account

        the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its

        discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in

        § 3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

        marks omitted).     Any sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is

        presumptively substantively reasonable, and Mengou bears the burden of demonstrating

        that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United

        States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 230 (4th Cir. 2016).

               Anders counsel questions whether the district court erred in enhancing Mengou’s

        base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). The Guidelines instruct that the enhancement is warranted if the

        defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony

        offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or

        reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony

        offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). “[A] firearm is possessed ‘in connection with’ another

        felony offense for purposes of the four-level enhancement when that firearm ‘facilitated[]

        or had the potential of facilitating’ another felony.” United States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283,

        287 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A)). “[T]his standard is not

        especially burdensome: We will find it satisfied when a firearm has some purpose or effect

        with respect to the other offense, including cases where a firearm is present for protection

        or to embolden the actor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When the other felony

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        offense is drug trafficking, then . . . a firearm found in close physical proximity to drugs

        presumptively has the potential of facilitating the trafficking offense.” Id. at 287-88

        (cleaned up); see USSG § 2K2.1 cmt n.14(B). We conclude that the district did not clearly

        err by applying the four-level enhancement because, at the very least, Mengou possessed a

        firearm with “reason to believe” that it would be used or possessed in connection with a

        drug trafficking offense. See USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

               Anders counsel further questions whether the district court adequately addressed

        Mengou’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a reduced sentence, including the mitigating

        effects of his youth and his traumatic childhood. Upon review, we conclude that the district

        court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a 60-month sentence and implicitly

        acknowledged Mengou’s mitigation arguments in that explanation. See United States v.

        Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 521 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that reviewing courts can use surrounding

        context to infer sufficient consideration of mitigation arguments). The court considered

        Mengou’s extensive involvement with gangs and drugs, his long criminal history that

        began at the age of 13, his prior felony conviction for a gang-related assault, and his

        minimal employment history. However, the court also paid particular attention to a pre-

        sentencing forensic psychiatric evaluation of Mengou that recounted in detail his personal

        history and traumatic childhood, considered the arguments regarding Mengou’s young age

        in finding that he needed the structure and training that prison would provide, and imposed

        a supervised release condition designed to assist Mengou escape his gang-related past.

        Therefore, we conclude that Mengou’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. Finally, we

        conclude that Mengou’s within-Guidelines sentence was also substantively reasonable.

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               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        This court requires that counsel inform Mengou, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Mengou requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Mengou.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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