Court Opinion

ID: 9704221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:27:12.250554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:58.734062
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring and dissenting).1 For those concerned solely with whether the prison is built near the Milwaukee County Stadium, this decision presents cause neither to rejoice nor to despair. The prison may be built at the Menomo-nee Valley site. Construction, however, has been delayed pending a full WEPA proceeding or further legislation. For those interested in judicial review and the relation of the legislature and the judiciary, this opinion presents cause for concern. In striking down legislation authorizing the speedy construction of the Me-nomonee Valley prison, the court has usurped the legislative function and engaged in judicial lawmaking.
I do not address the wisdom of the legislative decisions to build a prison in Milwaukee, to place the prison at the Menomonee Valley site, or to provide truncated WEPA and review proceedings. These are political issues for the legislature and the people.
I write because the majority decides this case as if the court were sitting as a legislature. This is the second time in less than two months that I object to the court's decision on these grounds, and I am troubled about the direction in which the court appears to be moving. Once again the court expounds not the state constitution or the statutes but its own view. With this opinion the court usurps the legislative prerogative to formulate and implement the public policy of this state *123regarding the location of prisons and the urgency of prison construction. We "denigrate the legislature or, alternatively, we, as a court, are invading an area of the law . . . which ... is beyond the reach of a court. . . . Clearly the majority's strained interpretation is an invasion of the legislative prerogative." State v. Willi-quette, 129 Wis 2d 239, 268, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986) (Heffernan, C.J. and Abrahamson, J. dissenting.)
The legislative goal is to build a new medium/maximum security prison in Milwaukee expeditiously while affording protection of environmental interests. Everyone agrees that there is urgency in building prisons in Wisconsin and that the legislature may provide a truncated WEPA process to expedite all prison construction in the state. Everyone agrees that the legislature may select Menomonee Valley in Milwaukee as the site for a prison. The dispute centers on whether legislation calling for a truncated WEPA process for this prison only is constitutional.
In applying an equal protection analysis, the court should set forth what it views as the legislative objective and the legislative means to reach this objective so that it may review whether the objective is legitimate and whether there is a rational relation between the objective and the means. The majority opinion fails to state clearly and consistently what it views as the legislative objective and means, and then confuses the legislative objective with the majority's narrowly stated legislative rationale. With this confused and confusing analytical framework, the majority nevertheless launches into an equal protection discussion. According to the majority, the constitutionality of this legislation turns on the legitimacy of the legislature's belief that special urgency attends the construction of *124this prison.2 The majority's determination of unconstitutionality hinges on the majority's reading of the Fiad Report. As I see it, the majority misreads the Fiad Report.
The standard of review for determining the constitutionality of this legislation is a minimal, relatively relaxed rational basis test. This legislation does not intrude on any fundamental rights and does not create any suspect classification. This legislation does not involve an insular minority, a disadvantaged group, or a group that does not have a voice in the legislative process. This legislation does not impede human freedom. This legislation, contrary to the impression created by the majority, does not impose a unique or severe burden on any person or group of persons. The legislature has prescribed noncontested hearings in many instances, and both the contested and informational hearings provide interested persons with a fair, meaningful hearing. This prison siting legislation just adds another exception to the long list of exceptions to the contested hearing set forth in sec. 227.064, Stats. 1983-84. This court has not previously questioned the legislative authority to adopt exceptions to the contested hearing. See Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 375 N.W.2d 649 (1985).
*125In approaching an equal protection case like the one before us, a court exercises judicial restraint, giving great deference to the legislature. This deference reflects the court's awareness that establishing public policy which involves drawing lines and creating distinctions is a legislative task. Yet the rational basis test is not a toothless test. The equal protection guarantee will not be satisfied by implausible justifications for the statute.3
As the majority acknowledges, statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. The burden rests on those challenging the statute to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus in this case the court is supposed to presume that facts exist which support the legislative determination that the urgency to build this prison differs from the urgency to build prisons elsewhere in the state. Pages 98-100. Only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no such facts should the court declare the law unconstitutional.
The Brewers attempt to carry this heavy burden by asserting that the urgency "of prison construction is equally applicable to all potential sites."4 The Brew*126ers assert that the legislature had no factual premise for deciding that the construction of this medium/maximum institution was especially urgent. In other words the Brewers assert that the objective of building a prison in Milwaukee expeditiously is not a legitimate legislative objective. To support their assertions the Brewers refer the court to the entire 315-page Fiad Report, without citing any particular page, or any particular facts, figures, or discussion. If that is all the Brewers have to say, the Brewers should lose. They have not met their burden of proving the legislation unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority overlooks the Brewers' failure to carry the burden and improperly shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion to the state to prove that the need to build this medium/maximum security prison in Milwaukee is more urgent than the need to build prisons elsewhere in the state. To use the majority's phrase, the state must supply the missing "critical link." Pages 102-103.
The state supplies the critical link by relying on the same Fiad Report cited by the Brewers. The state reads the report as supplying a factual basis supporting an urgency to construct a medium/maximum institution in Milwaukee.
The majority disagrees, however, with both the Brewers' and the state's reading of the Fiad Report. The majority finds that the Fiad Report supplies only *127"the missing link which would support legislative action expediting the environmental review procedure for all prison construction in southeastern Wisconsin. The Fiad Report supports the proposition that the critical need for prison space exists in southeastern Wisconsin." (Emphasis added.) Page 102. The majority states that the Fiad Report refers to the "southeast section of Wisconsin" as Region 2 (Racine, Waukesha, Walworth, Washington and Ozaukee counties) and Region 3 (Milwaukee County). Page 86. No citation to the Fiad Report is given. The majority finds that the Fiad Report emphasizes the "southeast section of Wisconsin" and does not "single out the City of Milwaukee [the largest metropolitan center in southeastern Wisconsin] ...as having a special, critical need." Pages 102-103.
It is the majority, not the report, that emphasizes southeastern Wisconsin. It is the majority, not the report, that identifies the "southeast section of Wisconsin" by county, geographical area and population. In fact, the Fiad Report infrequently uses the terms "southeastern Wisconsin" or "southeast section" and "southeast region" of Wisconsin and does not specify what regions or counties these geographical references include. The report does, however, consistently discuss the prison needs in Milwaukee (region 3) and the prison needs in each of the four other regions of the state. The regions are not described as geographical sections of the state. They are described by number (regions 1-5) and by the counties constituting each region. See, e.g., Fiad Report pp. 75, 78, 80,122,123, 228, 229.
The majority concludes that the legislature had no factual premise for believing that circumstances attending the construction of this prison require expedited proceedings. The majority reaches its conclusion *128by sweeping aside and utterly disregarding those parts of the record supporting the urgency for a prison in Milwaukee.
The majority wrongly asserts that "nothing in the record, nothing in the arguments submitted in the state and nothing in the Fiad Report" provides the critical link between prison needs in the state and an urgency for a prison in Milwaukee. Page 103.
The Fiad Report does single out Milwaukee and does support an urgency for a prison in Milwaukee. The Fiad Report clearly demonstrates that the need for new prisons is more critical in Milwaukee than in the other four regions of the state.
The report recommends — and the legislature adopts — the policy that new prisons should be located near the urban or metropolitan area that contributes the most inmates in order to facilitate the inmates' ties with family and community. Fiad Report, p. 11. The report states that "the majority of residents [Wisconsin's inmate population] are from Milwaukee County," even though Milwaukee county itself represents "only 22% of the state total population." Fiad Report, pp. 5, 74. It follows that the projected need for prison beds in the state, according to the Fiad Report, is greatest in Milwaukee county. Fiad Report, pp. 39, 78, 80, 82. The Fiad Report projects the need for new prison beds in Milwaukee to be one and a half times the need of the rest of the state. Fiad Report, pp. 40, 226-43.
This urgent need for prison beds in Milwaukee is reflected in the recommendations in the Fiad Report. The report recommends a six-year plan for the construction of 23 facilities, 10 of which are to be located in Milwaukee county. Fiad Report, p. 228. These 10 facilities would house approximately 60 percent of the *129projected new prison beds. Fiad Report, pp. 21, 228. Moreover, two of the three maximum and medium security institutions — one maximum security and one medium security — are to be located in Milwaukee county, housing approximately 60 percent of the state's new medium/maximum security beds. Fiad Report, p. 228.
The growing crisis in prison space, the need to house prisoners in their home community, and the data in the Fiad Report provide ample basis to hold that the expeditious construction of this medium/maximum prison in Milwaukee county is a legitimate legislative objective. The legislature's conclusion that there is a special urgency for a Milwaukee medium/maximum prison is reasonable and not irrational or arbitrary.
When the legislature passed the Menomonee Valley siting law there was no medium or maximum security institution in Milwaukee. There is still no such institution in Milwaukee today. The legislature's attempts to build a prison in Milwaukee before 1983, including building a prison at the Menomonee Valley site, had been frustrated. See, e.g., ch. 221, sec. 353, Laws of 1979. Although other prisons may be needed in Milwaukee or in the state, the equal protection clause does not require the legislature to strike at all evils at the same time. The legislature may address itself to that phase of a problem which it views as most acute.5
*130The record also provides a rational relation between the legislature's means — adopting a truncated WEPA process for this first medium/maximum prison in Milwaukee — and the legislature's objective. The legislature could reasonably conclude that a contested hearing would be so time consuming as to defeat the construction of this institution and that an informational hearing, such as was provided, would be sufficient to protect interested persons while expediting the process.
Judge Dykman, dissenting in the court of appeals, summarized the basis for the legislature's determination of special urgency for a medium/maximum prison in Milwaukee as follows:
"The legislature could have concluded that the need for a prison in Milwaukee was so severe that, although several sites existed, one would be designated that would be as certain of success as possible. That site was the Menominee Valley site. Given the court's holding in Outagamie County [Outagamie County v. Smith, 38 Wis. 2d 24, 155 N.W.2d 639 (1968)], the legislature was not required to explain why it chose the Menominee Valley site as the site it wanted ahead of all others. The only question is whether a rational reason exists for the decision that at least one prison would be located in Milwaukee County. The substantial number of prisoners from Milwaukee County, the overcrowding in Wisconsin prisons, and the stated beneficial effect of locating a prison near prisoners' families are rational reasons why the legislature could determine that although many prisons were needed, one of them would be located in Milwaukee County.
"The provisions of 1983 Act 27 pertaining to the procedure for building a prison at the Menominee *131Valley site are rational ways to achieve that result. Appellants were not denied equal protection by the Menominee Valley prison siting provisions of 1983 Act 27."
While the majority purports to apply the rational basis test, it actually substitutes its judgment for that of the legislature.6 Without justification the majority declares that the legislature acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or irrational manner in this case. The majority thus violates longstanding equal protection doctrine requiring the court to uphold legislation where there is a rational basis for legislative action even if the court does not agree with the legislature's fact-finding or the wisdom of the legislative act. The court has misperceived its role. The reviewing court is not a fact finder. The reviewing court must look for evidence supporting the legislation, and if it identifies conflicting evidence or if there is room for dispute, the court must uphold the legislation.
As I see it, the Brewers have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature had no reasonable basis to believe that special urgency attends the construction of this prison. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record the circuit court found that "Milwaukee's need for and difficulty in siting additional prisons differs substantially from those in the rest of the state — making reasonable different administrative and judicial remedies in considering the environmental impact." The record substantiates these findings and the court should not set them aside. I can*132not join the majority as it usurps the legislative function.
Turning to the question of whether the prison siting legislation is a private or local law within art. IV, sec. 18, of the Wisconsin Constitution, I conclude, as does the majority, that the prison siting legislation is not a private or local law. I am, however, distressed by the far-reaching implications of the opinion.
In the guise of interpreting art. IV, sec. 18, the court attempts to promulgate a legislative form manual. The court puts the legislature on notice that the court is readying its pens, pencils, and word processors to use art. IV, sec. 18, aggressively to monitor the legislative process. As to existing statutes, the court suggests that a myriad of statutes and the entire budgetary process are unconstitutional. As to future laws, the court warns that it will be peering over the legislators' shoulders ready to declare unconstitutional any provision in a statute or budget bill whose form does not comport with the form that the court thinks is required by art. IV, sec. 18.
Art. IV, sec. 18, regulates the form of a statute, not the substance. It does not prohibit the legislature from enacting private or local laws; it requires only that the legislature adopt private or local laws by means of separate, titled bills. Historically the court has had difficulty determining what is and is not a private or local law because many laws have, at one and the same time, private or local as well as statewide characteristics. Because no court, including this one, has developed a bright-line test to identify private or local laws under art. IV, sec. 18, and because the legislature has the power to enact private and local laws, the court should, in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers, ex*133ercise restraint in declaring laws unconstitutional under art. IV, sec. 18. As long as art. IV, sec. 18, remains in the constitution, the court should adhere to precedent and rely on art. IV, sec. 18, to invalidate a statute on the basis of the form of the statute only in exceptional cases like Soo Line, 101 Wis. 2d 64, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981), where the private and local aspects are pervasive and only a general statewide interest is set forth.
Because the court's opinion poses a threat to the legislature's autonomy and the legislature's effective functioning as a separate, independent branch of government, I must disassociate myself from this part of the opinion.
In concluding I comment briefly on a final matter. On the face of the majority and dissenting opinions, this case appears to be a run-of-the-mill equal protection case in which the majority and dissent agree on the statement of the rational basis test but disagree on the application of the test to the facts. This is a simplistic reading of the majority opinion. The majority opinion presents a new, interesting twist in state constitutional equal protection law.7 The court has, without *134discussion or explanation, given the state constitutional equal protection guarantee a new substantive *135content that differs from that of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. The use of the tougher equal protection test is a throwback to the Lochner substantive due process doctrine.8 Only time will tell whether the court will follow this new, independent approach in interpreting the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection or whether this case is a sport.
For these reasons I do not join the majority opinion.

 I concur in that part of the decision upholding the prison siting provision and dissent from that part of the decision invalidating the review procedures.

 The way the court states the legislature's objective and the legislature's means of reaching the objective affects the rational basis equal protection analysis. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, sec. 16-2 (1978); Tussman and tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1076-1087 (1969).

 This court and the United States Supreme Court have used numerous formulations for the rational basis test and have afforded the legislature different degrees of deference. See authorities cited in County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 487, n.4, 312 N.W.2d 731 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). See also Barnett and Cohen, Constitutional Law — Cases and Materials 652 (7th ed. 1985).

 The Brewers' brief sets forth the argument as follows:
"It is prison construction generally, pursuant to the Master Plan developed in 1977, which is urgent — not construction of a maxi*126mum security prison in the Menomonee Valley alone. . . [T]he urgency of prison construction is equally applicable to all potential sites. [The urgency] might justify a special set of procedural rules for prison construction generally but it does not justify one set of rules for a prison being built in Milwaukee and a different set of rules for prisons to be built anywhere else in the state.. . ." Brewers' brief, pp. 40-42.

 The legislature can experiment with different methods of achieving its goal. As long as the means chosen by the legislature rationally advance the legislature's objective, the court must disregard other methods that the judges as individuals would have preferred.

 Compare this case with the application of the rational basis test in North Side Bank v. Gentile, 129 Wis. 2d 208, 385 N.W.2d 133 (1986).

 Ordinarily a litigant challenging state action relies on the federal constitution and may "throw in" a reference to the analogous state constitutional provision. See Comment, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 596, 620, n.145 (1979).
In this case the challenger — and thus the court — relies solely on the state constitution. A rare event.
Following precedent, the court uses the rational basis test under the state constitutional equal protection clause. The court has traditionally applied the minimal rational basis test to interpret the equal protection clause of the state constitution and has *134said that art. I, sec. 1 is substantially equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49-50, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
The Brewers, however, never urged the court to apply the rational basis test, which is used under the equal protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions. Indeed the Brewers carefully avoided any mention of this test or of the federal constitutional equal protection guarantee.
The Brewers probably did not claim a violation of federal equal protection because they were well aware that the United States Supreme Court's review of state regulatory legislation under the rational basis test is minimal, and this statute would in all probability pass muster. See 2 Rotunda, Nowak & Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure ¶ 18.3 (1986); Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law, 590 et seq. (2d ed. Hornbook series 1983). Indeed if this court struck down the statute on federal equal protection grounds, the United States Supreme Court might summarily reverse or vacate this court's decision. See, e.g., Idaho Dept of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (per curiam); County Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (per curiam), reh'g denied 434 U.S. 976 (1977) (per curiam).
The Brewers relied solely on the Wisconsin Constitution, arguing in effect that a "unique" test, the five-factor test, applies to the state constitution's equal protection guarantee.
The Brewers' principal argument under the five-factor test was that the prison siting legislation establishes an unconstitutional closed classification under the state constitution. While the court appears to have used the closed class factor to declare curative acts for municipalities unconstitutional under art. IV, secs. 31, 32 of the state constitution, the court has not treated a closed class as automatically unconstitutional under the state constitution's equal protection clause. See Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 364-65, 177 N.W.2d 131 (1970); Bence v. City of Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982); Klitsner, *135Statutes — Special Legislation — Constitutional Prohibition Against Granting or Amending City Charters, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 396; Winters, Classification and Municipalities, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 279 (1962).
By relying on the state constitution, the Brewers could hope to accomplish two things. First, they might divert the court from applying the minimal rational basis test, a test that appeared to be a losing one for the Brewers. Although the court applies the rational basis test, surprisingly it holds for the Brewers. Second, the Brewers no doubt hoped that if the court held for them on the "unique" five-factor test under the state constitution, the court's decision would be insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court. This court, not the United States Supreme Court, is the final interpreter of the Wisconsin Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1984-85). There is, however, a question whether this court's opinion rests on adequate and independent state grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983).

 For a discussion of state courts' applying a more stringent rational basis test under the state constitution than under the federal constitution, see, e.g., Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation under State Constitutions, in Developments in State Constitutional Law: The Williamsburg Conference 94 (B. Mc-Graw ed. 1985); Bennett, "Mere"Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049 (1979); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976).