Court Opinion

ID: 9401583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 17:02:09.383739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.602499
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          No. 22-30141

                  Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
                                                  1:21-cr-00243-
    v.                                               BLW-1

MIGUEL MICHAEL ALANIZ,
                                                     OPINION
                  Defendant-Appellant.

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the District of Idaho
         B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted March 28, 2023
                     Seattle, Washington

                       Filed June 13, 2023

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Andrew D. Hurwitz,
     Circuit Judges, and Philip S. Gutierrez,* Chief District
                             Judge.

                Opinion by Chief Judge Gutierrez

*
  The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief United States District Judge
for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
2                    UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

                          SUMMARY**

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed a sentence imposed in a case that
required the panel to consider whether U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for an enhancement of the
Guidelines calculation if a defendant possessed a dangerous
weapon at the time of a felony drug offense, is constitutional
under the Second Amendment following New York State
Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111
(2022).
    Applying the two-part test adopted by Bruen, the panel
assumed, without deciding, that step one is met—when the
Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s
conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that
conduct. At step two, however, the panel found §
2D1.1(b)(1) constitutional because it clearly comports with
a history and tradition of regulating the possession of
firearms during the commission of felonies involving a risk
of violence.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ                   3

                         COUNSEL

William M. Pope (argued), Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office; Spokane,
Washington; Nicole Owens, Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office; Boise, Idaho;
for Defendant-Appellant.
Syrena C. Hargrove (argued) and Christopher A. Booker,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Joshua D. Hurwit, United
States Attorney, District of Idaho; Office of the United States
Attorney; Boise, Idaho; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         OPINION

GUTIERREZ, Chief District Judge:

    This case requires us to consider whether United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1(b)(1), which
provides for an enhancement of the Guidelines calculation if
a defendant possessed a dangerous weapon at the time of a
felony drug offense, is constitutional under the Second
Amendment following New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). We
conclude that, in light of a well-established historical
tradition of regulation, Miguel Michael Alaniz did not have
the right to “keep and bear arms” during and in close
proximity to his criminal activities.
4                  UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

                     BACKGROUND
I.     Arrest and Conviction
    Alaniz was the subject of a year-long investigation by the
Idaho State Police for drug trafficking and distribution. On
three occasions in 2021, Alaniz sold cocaine out of his home
and vehicle to a confidential informant. After the third
transaction, officers stopped Alaniz’s car and arrested him.
A search of the car revealed a loaded handgun near the center
console.
    Shortly thereafter, the police obtained a warrant to search
Alaniz’s home. The search uncovered forty-seven grams of
cocaine inside a pantry and safe in the kitchen and scales
with white powdery residue in the bedroom. Officers also
seized twelve additional firearms. Eleven of them, including
at least one AR-15 rifle and one AK-47 rifle, were in the
bedroom; a hunting rifle was hidden behind the living room
couch.
    After a grand jury indicted Alaniz, he pleaded guilty,
without a plea agreement, to three counts of cocaine
distribution and one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C).
II.    Sentencing
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 governs sentencing for felony drug
trafficking and provides offense-specific enhancements and
departures. Alaniz’s presentence report recommended that
the district court apply both § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s dangerous
weapon enhancement and a downward departure under the
“safety valve” in § 2D1.1(b)(18). Section 2D1.1(b)(1)
enhances a defendant’s Guidelines sentence by two levels
“[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was
                   UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ                   5

possessed” and present during the crime, “unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.11(A); see also
United States v. Nelson, 222 F.3d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Section 2D1.1(b)(1) applies ‘if the weapon was
present. . . .’” (citation omitted)). But under § 2D1.1(b)(18),
a two-level downward departure applies if the defendant did
not “possess a firearm . . . in connection with the offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2).
    Despite their seeming facial overlap, § 2D1.1(b)(1) and
§ 2D1.1(b)(18) require distinct inquires. See Nelson, 222
F.3d at 549–51. Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government
simply bears the burden of proving that the weapon was
possessed at the time of the offense. See id. at 551 n.3. The
enhancement then applies unless the defendant can show it
was “clearly improbable” that the weapon was possessed in
connection with the offense. See id.; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
cmt. n.11(A). But to invoke the “safety valve” in
§ 2D1.1(b)(18), the defendant has a lower burden, and must
only show by a preponderance that a dangerous weapon was
not used in connection with the crime. See Nelson, 222 F.3d
at 550.
    Both Alaniz and the government objected to the
presentence report. To meet its burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1)
and oppose application of § 2D1.1(b)(18), the government
offered evidence that Alaniz possessed the seized firearms
both temporally and spatially proximate to his drug
trafficking. The government also argued that the number
and kind of firearms seized supported a finding that they
were used in connection with his criminal activities. Alaniz,
however, offered evidence that the guns were used for lawful
purposes, such as hunting, and not in connection with his
6                  UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

drug crimes. Alaniz also challenged the constitutionality of
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) under Bruen.
    At sentencing, the district court concluded that the two-
level § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applied but found—albeit
deeming it a “close call”—that Alaniz was entitled to safety
valve relief under § 2D1.1(b)(18). It also found that
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) was well-supported by a historical tradition of
Second Amendment regulation and rejected Alaniz’s
constitutional objection. Calculating a total offense level of
15, the court sentenced Alaniz to a below-Guidelines term of
15 months in prison.
                       DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Alaniz challenges only the constitutionality
of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) under Bruen.           We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the
constitutionality of a statute de novo. See United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010).
I.     The Second Amendment Framework
     The Second Amendment instructs that “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Although the
Amendment has historical underpinnings in English and
early American law, the Supreme Court only began some
fifteen years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008), to define the contours of the right.
     Heller analyzed the Amendment’s text and history and
concluded that it protects the “law-abiding, responsible”
citizen’s possession of arms for the “lawful purpose of self-
defense.” 554 U.S. at 576–603, 630, 635; see also
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010)
                   UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ                  7

(“[W]e concluded [in Heller that] citizens must be permitted
to ‘use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 630)). After Heller,
the Courts of Appeals “coalesced around a ‘two-step’
framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges.”
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125, 2127 n.4 (collecting cases); see
also United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th
Cir. 2013) (adopting framework). Under that framework, we
first looked to history to determine “whether the challenged
law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”
See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. If so, we then applied a
means-end scrutiny based on “the extent to which the law
burdens the core of the Second Amendment right.” Jackson
v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th
Cir. 2014).
    This two-step approach, however, was rejected in Bruen
as “one step too many.” 142 S. Ct. at 2127. Bruen upheld
the step one inquiry used by the Courts of Appeals as
“broadly consistent with Heller.” Id. But it rejected the step
two means-end analysis, noting that Heller instead
“demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as
informed by history.” Id. As the Court explained, Heller
started with “a ‘textual analysis’ focused on the ‘normal and
ordinary’ meaning of the Second Amendment’s language.”
Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–78). It then “relied on
the historical understanding of the Amendment to demark
the limits on the exercise of that right,” assessing “the
lawfulness of [the statute] by scrutinizing whether it
comported with history and tradition.” Id. at 2128.
   In keeping with Heller’s text-and-history standard,
Bruen adopted the following two-part test:
8                   UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

        [W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text
        covers an individual’s conduct, the
        Constitution presumptively protects that
        conduct. To justify its regulation, . . . the
        government must demonstrate that the
        regulation is consistent with this Nation’s
        historical tradition of firearm regulation.
        Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with
        this Nation’s historical tradition may a court
        conclude that the individual’s conduct falls
        outside      the    Second       Amendment’s
        “unqualified command.”

Id. at 2126 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366
U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)).
    Bruen step one involves a threshold inquiry. In
alignment with Heller, it requires a textual analysis,
determining whether the challenger is “part of ‘the people’
whom the Second Amendment protects,” whether the
weapon at issue is “‘in common use’ today for self-defense,”
and whether the “proposed course of conduct” falls within
the Second Amendment. Id. at 2134–35 (citing Heller, 554
U.S. at 580, 627).
    If the first step is satisfied, we proceed to Bruen step two,
at which the “Government bears the burden of proving the
constitutionality of its actions” by showing that the regulated
conduct falls within “the outer bounds of the right to keep
and bear arms.” Id. at 2127, 2130 (citations omitted). Like
First Amendment categories of unprotected speech, the outer
bounds of the Second Amendment right are determined by
analyzing a historical tradition of regulation. See id. at 2130.
Thus, to carry its burden, the government must produce
representative analogues to demonstrate that the challenged
                      UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ                        9

law is consistent with a historical tradition of regulation. Id.
at 2127, 2131–33.
    Notably, the analogue required at step two need not be a
“historical twin.” Id. at 2133. Rather, we use history to
“guide our consideration of modern regulations that were
unimaginable at the founding.” See id. at 2132. Bruen,
therefore, instructs that the analogue must be “relevantly
similar” as judged by “at least two metrics: how and why the
regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed
self-defense.” Id. at 2132–33 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599;
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767). In other words, in analyzing a
burden on the possession of firearms, we look to “whether
modern and historical regulations impose a comparable
burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that
burden is comparably justified.” Id. at 2133.
II.     The Constitutionality of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
    Alaniz argues that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) violates his
Second Amendment right by punishing him for lawfully
possessing firearms. We assume, without deciding, that step
one of the Bruen test is met. But we find § 2D1.1(b)(1)
constitutional under step two because it clearly comports
with a history and tradition of regulating the possession of
firearms during the commission of felonies involving a risk
of violence.
    The government offers on appeal a number of founding-
era statutes to prove a historical tradition of sentencing
enhancements tied to firearm possession.1 We conclude that

1
  Alaniz contends that the government’s analogues cannot be considered
on appeal because they were not raised below. But that is not so. “[I]t
is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not arguments.” United
10                    UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

this historical tradition is well-established.2 Notably, several
States enacted laws throughout the 1800s that increased the
severity of punishment for certain felonies when weapons
were possessed, but not necessarily used, during the
commission of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hope,
39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 1, 9–10 (1839) (analyzing an 1805
statute that aggravated burglary to the first degree when a
defendant possessed a weapon); People v. Fellinger, 24
How. Pr. 341, 342 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1862) (same); State v.
Tutt, 63 Mo. 595, 599 (1876) (same); United States v.
Bernard, 24 F. Cas. 1131, 1131 (C.C.D.N.J. 1819)
(discussing a New Jersey statute that punished the
possession and exhibition of a firearm during the robbery of
a postal worker). Indeed, Bruen itself confirms that the right
to keep and bear arms was understood at the Founding to be
limited where there was a likelihood of a breach of peace.
See 142 S. Ct. at 2144–46 (citing Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn.

States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004). Because
the constitutional claim was raised below, we may consider the
government’s step two arguments and analogues put forward on appeal.
2
  States began in the 1700s to impose harsher punishments for crimes
committed with firearms, and the tradition persisted through the Second
Founding. See Mark Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to
the Early 20th Century 99–101 (Jan. 15, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), https://perma.cc/5NNG-7KVH (collecting laws from the
colonial era through the 1800s). Accordingly, we need not reach the
question of the proper era from which to draw the historical analogues.
See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 (“[T]here is an ongoing scholarly debate
on whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding
of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
1868 when defining its scope . . . . We need not address this issue
today . . . .”).
                   UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ                 11

356, 358–61 (1833); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421–23
(1843) (per curiam); O’Neil v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849)).
    Alaniz argues that the government cannot satisfy the step
two inquiry because its analogues are not sufficiently similar
to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).        He asserts that in the
government’s examples, possession was an element of the
offense and therefore required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. He also contends that felony drug trafficking presents
the same “perceived societal problem,” as did smuggling
crimes in the founding era, thus, in his view, requiring the
government to present a “distinctly similar” historical
analogue. Id. at 2131.
    Alaniz’s argument, however, is divorced from both
reality and the law. Illegal drug trafficking is a largely
modern crime.         It is animated by unprecedented
contemporary concerns regarding drug abuse and is not
closely analogous to founding-era smuggling crimes, which
primarily focused on punishing importers who evaded
customs duties. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10–13
(2005); see also Margarita Mercado Echegaray, Note, Drug
Prohibition in America: Federal Drug Policy and Its
Consequences, 75 Rev. Jur. U. P.R. 1215, 1219 (2006);
Aaron T. Knapp, From Empire to Law: Customs Collection
in the American Founding, 43 Law & Soc. Inquiry 554, 565–
66 (2018) (describing the Collection Act of 1789 that created
“a customs collection regime” that aimed to “prevent fraud
and evasion” through “punishing wrongdoing”). And Bruen
expressly recognized that “cases implicating unprecedented
societal concerns,” like the one here, “may require a more
nuanced approach.” 142 S. Ct. at 2132.
    Viewing the government’s proposed analogues through
this lens, we are satisfied that they are “relevantly similar”
12                 UNITED STATES V. ALANIZ

to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). See id. The analogues show a
longstanding tradition of enhancing a defendant’s sentence
for the increased risk of violence created by mere possession
of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Drug
trafficking fits squarely within that category of crimes. Like
burglary or robbery, drug trafficking plainly poses
substantial risks of confrontation that can lead to immediate
violence. See United States v. Zamora, 37 F.3d 531, 533
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he possession of a gun during a drug
trafficking offense increases the risk of violence.”);
Echegaray, supra at 1241 (describing additional efforts to
regulate illegal drug trafficking to curb related crimes and
violence); see also § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. 11(A) (“The
enhancement for weapon possession in subsection (b)(1)
reflects the increased danger of violence when drug
traffickers possess weapons.”).          Section 2D1.1(b)(1),
therefore, imposes a “comparable burden” to the historical
analogues and is “comparably justified.” See Bruen, 142 S.
Ct. at 2133.
    This historical record assures us that the two-level
enhancement here is of a kind that the Founders would have
tolerated. See id. at 2132. We thus conclude that application
of § 2D1.1(b)(1) to Alaniz’s sentence is constitutional.
     AFFIRMED.