Court Opinion

ID: 9461597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:18:43.458308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:09.160983
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the disposition of this case for one reason. I believe that our decision is controlled by this Court’s opinion in United States v. Minor, 5 Cir. 1972, 459 F.2d 103.
In Minor, also a federal criminal prosecution, the district court refused to admit the “certified record of the civil adjudication by a state court of plaintiff as an incompetent.” On appeal, we held that the refusal to admit the Florida judgment was error, because it was relevant to the issue being tried in federal court — Minor’s defense of insanity — and its weight was for the jury. Moreover, we held that the error was not harmless because “[t]he evidence in question was both pertinent and powerful when compared to oral testimony.” In the present *323case, the federal district court refused to admit evidence of a state court adjudication that defendant was not guilty of a state crime because of insanity. Here, however, my brethren have held that the refusal to admit the prior adjudication was not reversible error. I believe that neither of the possible bases upon which the majority may have reached its decision distinguish the credibility of the state adjudication here from that in Minor.
First, the majority assumes that Minor’s adjudication of incompetency followed adversarial process while here the state judgment came after the prosecutor confessed a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. There is no significance in this distinction. The credibility of the state court judgment cannot depend on whether it was confessed or adversarial, for the law gives equal weight to both types of judgment. Moreover, the fact that the state prosecutor did not contend that Davis was sane cuts in favor of the reliability of the finding. It indicates that the prosecutor thought that the evidence of insanity was clear enough so as not to be worth investing his time and resources in litigation of the issue.
Second, while in Minor the state adjudication established civil incompetency, here the evidence of insanity stems from an acquittal on a criminal charge. But, the insanity acquittal here is no less probative of the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the state adjudication than was the finding of incompetency by the state court in Minor. Alabama, which tried Davis, has put the burden of proving the affirmative defense on insanity squarely on the defendant. Code of Ala., tit. 15, § 422 reads: “Every person over fourteen years of age charged with crime is presumed to be responsible for his acts, and the burden of proving that he is irresponsible is cast upon the accused. The defense of insanity in all criminal prosecutions shall be clearly proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury.” Minor was evidently civilly committed pursuant to Fla. Stat.Ann. tit. 27, § 394.22 (repealed eff. July 1, 1972) (now Fla.Stat.Ann. tit. 27, § 394.467) under which there was a legal presumption of sanity. Campbell v. Stoner, Fla.1971, 249 So.2d 474. The state adjudication in Minor thus showed that it was more likely than not that Minor was incompetent.
The burden of proving insanity is about the same for a Florida civil adjudication and an Alabama criminal defense. In each case the proponent of insanity is required to carry the burden and prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. If they differ at all, the Alabama criminal procedure places a greater duty on defendant with its “clearly proved to the reasonable satisfaction” standard.
I am convinced that we cannot make any legally cognizable distinction between the probative value of the adjudication of insanity in the state court in this case and that in the state court in Minor. I think the majority here makes the legendary “distinction without a difference”.