Court Opinion

ID: 7838404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 16:45:19.004492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:13.023218
License: Public Domain

Statement of Circuit
Judge LEVENTHAL:
I concur without reservation in the excellent opinion for the court.
I write an additional word only because of observations in the concurring opinion authored by Chief Judge Bazelon. I would not have thought they required airing today, since they in no way relate, so far as I can see, to the court’s en banc opinion. But since they have been floated I propose to bring them to earth, though I can here present only the highlights of analysis.
What does and should a reviewing court do when it considers a challenge to technical administrative decision-making? In my view, the panel opinion in this case overstepped the bounds of proper judicial supervision in its willingness to substitute its own scientific judgments for that of the EPA. In an effort to refute that approach convincingly the panel dissent may have over-reacted and responded too much in kind. In a kind of sur-rebuttal against such overzealousness, Judge Bazelon has also over-reacted. His opinion — if I read it right — advocates engaging in no substantive review at all, whenever the substantive issues at stake involve technical matters that the judges involved consider beyond their individual technical competence.
If he is not saying that, if he agrees there must be some substantive review, then I am at a loss to discern its significance. Certainly it does not help those seeking enlightenment to recognize when the difference in degree of substantive review becomes a difference in kind.
Taking the opinion in its fair implication, as a signal to judges to abstain from any substantive review, it is my view that while giving up is the easier course, it is not legitimately open to us at present. In the case of legislative enactments, the sole responsibility of the courts is constitutional due process review. In the case of agency decision-making the courts have an additional responsibility set by Congress. Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly — and courts have upheld such delegation1 — because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not • irrational or discriminatory. Nor is that envisioned judicial role ephemeral, as Overton Park2 makes clear.
Our present system of review assumes judges will acquire whatever technical knowledge is necessary as background for decision of the legal questions. It may be that some judges are not initially equipped for this role, just as they may not be technically equipped initially to decide issues of obviousness and infringement in patent cases. If technical difficulties loom large, Congress may push to establish specialized courts. Thus far, it has proceeded on the *441assumption that we can both have the important values secured by generalist judges and rely on them to acquire whatever technical background is necessary.
The aim of the judges is not to exercise expertise or decide technical questions, but simply to gain sufficient background orientation. Our obligation is not to be jettisoned because our initial technical understanding may be meagre when compared to our initial grasp of FCC or freedom of speech questions. When called upon to make de novo decisions, individual judges have had to acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical questions in such fields as economics, science, technology and psychology. Our role is not as demanding when we are engaged in review of agency decisions, where we exercise restraint, and affirm even if we would have decided otherwise so long as the agency’s decisionmaking is not irrational or discriminatory.
The substantive review of administrative action is modest, but it cannot be carried out in a vacuum of understanding. Better no judicial review at all than a charade that gives the imprimatur without the substance of judicial confirmation that the agency is not acting unreasonably. Once the presumption of regularity in agency action3 is challenged with a factual submission, and even to determine whether such a challenge has been made, the agency’s record and reasoning has to be looked at. If there is some factual support for the challenge, there must be either evidence or judicial notice available explicating the agency’s result, or a remand to supply the gap.4
Mistakes may mar the exercise of any judicial function. While in this case the panel made such a mistake, it did not stem from judicial incompetence to deal with technical issues, but from confusion about the proper stance for substantive review of agency action in an area where the state of current knowledge does not generate customary definitiveness and certainty. In other eases the court has dealt ably with these problems, without either abandoning substantive review or ousting the agency’s action for lack of factual underpinning.5
On issues of substantive review, on conformance to statutory standards and requirements of rationality, the judges must act with restraint. Restraint, yes, abdication, no.

. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737 (D.D.C., 1971) (3-judge court).

. 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe requires the reviewing court to scrutinize the facts and consider whether the agency decision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors” in the context of nonformalized, discretionary executive decisionmaking. A fortiori, at least that rigor of review should apply to more formal decisionmaking processes like informal rulemaking.

. Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 56 S.Ct. 159, 80 L.Ed. 138 (1935).

. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375 (1973). It should be noted that the court remanded for further proceedings. It refused to vacate and set aside the agency’s action, not withstanding motions filed for that specific purpose. This was made a ground for seeking certiorari. Certiorari was denied, 417 U.S. 921, 94 S.Ct. 2628, 41 L.Ed.2d 226 (1974).

.See e. g., Judge Wright’s opinion in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 501 F.2d 722 (1974); Judge McGowan’s opinion in Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 499 F.2d 467 (1974).