Court Opinion

ID: 9849711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:44:56.979071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.258031
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 53. (concurring). I write separately to emphasize three points. First, the majority opinion does not foreclose all eviden-tiary hearings regarding a double jeopardy claim when an accused pleads guilty. Second, the majority opinion's reliance on the risk of "gamesmanship" as a policy justification for the rule it adopts is misplaced. Third, the instant case is not a "waiver" case.
I. ¶ 54. The majority opinion recognizes that a guilty plea does not render a judgment "impervious to double jeopardy challenges."1 Even when an accused has pleaded guilty, he may make a double jeopardy challenge and get a hearing (1) when the challenge is that the plea is not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, or (2) when claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.2 In the instant case, the circuit court held a hearing to determine whether defense counsel's performance was deficient and the defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The circuit court found that defense counsel and the defendant had discussed a possible multiplicity defense. Accordingly, the circuit court *92held that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel and that the defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. After rendering this holding, the circuit court rejected the defendant's multiplicity challenge, apparently relying on the Broce case.
¶ 55. I write separately to emphasize this point made in the majority opinion:3 Because the majority opinion includes some unnecessarily expansive language that, especially if taken out of context, might be understood to prohibit a fact-finding hearing on double jeopardy in all guilty plea circumstances.4
¶ 56. Although a right, such as the right to be free from double jeopardy, is subject to forfeiture, a guilty plea does not foreclose all opportunities to present evidence in support of a double jeopardy claim.5 In particular, if an accused can "allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act,"6 he may withdraw a guilty plea.
*93¶ 57. As the majority opinion points out, this conclusion is required because a guilty plea waives an accused's right to put on evidence at a trial; it does not waive the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel or Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.7
¶ 58. When an accused makes a motion properly alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel or the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not informed of the availability of a double jeopardy claim, he may be entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing even though the record supports multiple counts. Nothing in the majority opinion forecloses an evidentiary hearing in all circumstances, nor should it.8
HH hH
¶ 59. The contention in the majority opinion that a different forfeiture rule would result in gamesmanship by an accused is misguided.9 To be sure, gamesmanship is to be discouraged. However, the rule *94adopted in the instant case does not target any game an accused is likely to play. Certainly, the instant case is not an example of such gamesmanship.
¶ 60. An accused who pleads guilty and then later moves to withdraw the plea on double jeopardy grounds does not "receive the benefit of a guilty plea and a trial," as the majority opinion contends.10 Even if the defendant wins the "small trial"11 on the motion, the best the defendant can hope for is to be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea, which terminates the plea agreement.12
¶ 61. In the instant case, the result would be that, were the defendant permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, the State would be able to charge her with the *95crimes for which it promised not to charge her under the negotiated plea. The defendant would not get the benefit of the plea bargain. A different rule would create no incentive for gamesmanship.
HH hH HH
¶ 62. Finally, courts and litigants should be more careful in their use of the word "waiver." As the majority opinion explains, "waiver" in the context of the instant case does not refer to the intentional relinquishment of a known right.13 It would be more precise if courts and litigants would use the word "forfeiture."14 Notwithstanding its recognition of this distinction, the majority opinion unfortunately continues to use the language of waiver.
¶ 63. Using "forfeiture" to describe situations where a right is given up because it is not asserted would help delineate between two distinct issues, waiver and forfeiture, that may require different analysis.
¶ 64. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

 Majority op., ¶ 3.

 Id., ¶¶ 3, 43.

 Id.., ¶¶ 43-44.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 26 ("Under Broce, if a court cannot determine, based on the record, whether there is a double jeopardy violation, a guilty plea will relinquish a defendant's opportunity to have her double jeopardy claim resolved on the merits."); ¶ 30 ("These admissions necessarily entail that a defendant relinquishes her opportunity to receive a factual hearing on a fact-intensive unit-of-prosecution claim after pleading guilty."); ¶ 34 ("A guilty plea waives a multiplicity claim anytime the claim cannot be resolved on the record ...."); ¶ 39 ("[B]y entering a guilty plea, a defendant relinquishes the opportunity to receive a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy claim.").

 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a), at 230-32 (2d ed. 1999).

 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 230-31 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970)).

 See majority op., ¶ 43.
Courts have held that by pleading guilty, an accused does not forfeit certain constitutional defenses, including the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the right not to be convicted of conduct that cannot constitutionally be made criminal, and the right not to be selectively prosecuted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 228, and cases cited therein.

 Cf. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984)) (" 'It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.' That principle controls here. Respondents have not called into question the voluntary and intelligent character of their pleas, and therefore are not entitled to the collateral relief they seek.").

 See majority op., ¶ 40.

 Id., ¶ 41.

 Id.

 See State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶ 57, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 564 ("[W]e conclude that when the defendant repudiated the negotiated plea agreement on the ground that it contained multiplicitous counts, the defendant materially and substantially breached the plea agreement. We further conclude that when an accused successfully challenges a plea to and a conviction on one count of a two-count information on grounds of double jeopardy and the information has been amended pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement by which the State made charging concessions, ordinarily the remedy is to reverse the convictions and sentences, to vacate the plea agreement, and to reinstate the original information so that the parties are restored to their positions prior to the negotiated plea agreement. We also conclude, however, that under some circumstances this remedy might not be appropriate."); State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 290, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982) (defendant convicted of two crimes; supreme court held that one of convictions was only an enhancer and remanded "to the circuit court with instructions to enter judgment against the defendant on the single offense of armed robbery while concealing identity and to resentence the defendant.").

 Majority op., ¶ 18 n.ll.

 See 5 LaFave, supra note 5, § 21.6(a), at 224-25.