Court Opinion

ID: 9743421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:33:07.699513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.192601
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: It is well established that anonymous speech is protected by the first amendment. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200, 142 L. Ed. 2d 599, 614-15, 119 S. Ct. 636, 646 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, 446, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559, 563, 80 S. Ct. 536, 539 (1960); Crue v. Aiken, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1089 (C.D. Ill. 2001); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). The United States Supreme Court in Mclntrye stated, “[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 436, 115 S. Ct. at 1516. The majority state that they can find no case law to support the proposition that “anonymous Internet speakers enjoy a higher degree of protection from claims of defamation than the private individual who has a cause of action against him for defamation.” 402 Ill. App. 3d at 713. This conclusion, however, misses the point. The protection of the anonymity of speech is a separate issue from the defamatory nature of the speech. In other words, no one suggests that an anonymous speaker deserves a higher degree of protection from claims of defamation than an individual whose identity is known. Rather, it is the anonymity itself that is equally worthy of protection. Illinois recognized the right to speak anonymously in People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987). In White, the supreme court struck down a provision of the election code that required the name and address of a distributor to be printed on certain political pamphlets. The Illinois Supreme Court explained that, “Anonymous political literature was a key weapon in the arsenal of colonial patriots, and ‘[e]ven the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names.’ ” White, 116 Ill. 2d at 176, quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. at 65, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 563, 80 S. Ct. at 539. Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 563, 80 S. Ct. at 539. The Internet is simply a modern-day leaflet (with some obvious differences not relevant to our discussion here). First amendment protections extend to speech via the Internet. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874, 906, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997); Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (App. 2001). The ability to speak anonymously through the Internet allows for diverse exchange of ideas. The Dendrite court explained that the need to provide injured parties with a forum in which they may seek redress for grievances must be balanced against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or pseudonymously. Specifically, the court noted: “People are permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as those acts are not in violation of the law. This ability to speak one’s mind without the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate. Furthermore, it permits persons to obtain information relevant to a sensitive or intimate condition without fear of embarrassment. People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to discover their identity.” Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super, at 151, 775 A.2d at 767. I disagree with the majority that the application of Supreme Court Rule 224 (134 Ill. 2d R. 224), coupled with a section 2 — 615 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2006)) analysis, provides the same protection to anonymous free speech as the Dendrite-Cahill test. The majority state, “a court considering whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 615 must determine whether the complaint alone has stated sufficient facts to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” 402 Ill. App. 3d at 712. Fact pleading is insufficient to address the problem. Fact pleading has simply not eliminated frivolous lawsuits in Illinois. Plaintiffs routinely plead “facts” which later cannot be proven. If “facts” are pled that lead to the discovery of the speaker’s identity, and then these facts cannot later be proven, the harm to anonymous speech is a fait accompli. Granting the previously anonymous speaker summary judgment would not undo the prior harm: disclosure of the speaker’s identity. I would adopt the Dendrite-Cahill test and find that the circuit court below correctly applied it. As set forth above, this four-part test places the burden on a petitioner to demonstrate that the purported underlying defamation claim could successfully withstand a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 462-63. Ensuring that a petitioner can maintain a defamation case, as a matter of law, before ordering disclosure of identifying information of anonymous Internet commentators sufficiently balances one’s right to speak anonymously against protecting another from defamation. As the Arizona Supreme Court concluded, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that it would survive a motion for summary judgment “furthers the goal of compelling identification of anonymous internet speakers only as a means to redress legitimate misuses of speech rather than as a means to retaliate against or chill legitimate uses of speech.” Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, Ill, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (App. 2007). Application of the Dendrite-Cahill test adds a crucial extra layer of protection to anonymous speech, beyond that proposed by the majority. The additional procedural requirements articulated in the DendriteCahill test are not designed to protect defamatory anonymous speech. Rather, they are designed to protect the identity of those participating in nonactionable anonymous speech. Once an anonymous speaker’s identity is revealed, it cannot be “unrevealed.” Clearly, the right to speak anonymously is not absolute. The majority correctly observe that there is no constitutional right to defame and that words that impute a person has committed a crime are considered to be defamatory per se. 402 Ill. App. 3d at 715, citing Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 88. However, even though a statement may fit into a defamatory per se category, it still may be constitutionally protected if it cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual fact. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 518. From a review of the record, I also agree with the circuit court’s finding that the context of the bribery allegations at issue, and the fact they were published on an Internet forum, make it clear that the statements are nothing more than conjecture, surmise, and a statement of subjective theory. There is no suggestion that the blogger knew how the permit process worked or had any substantial evidence that a crime was committed. In light of the statement’s social context, no reasonable person would interpret this to be a statement of fact. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 518. Any reasonable person would construe the words for what they were: the venting of one’s spleen by someone disgruntled by the decision of a local body politic. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.