Court Opinion

ID: 9759455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:16:58.585425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.808375
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the departure of Davis from the finance company, this is an appealing case in which to say that the estate should recover on the policy. However, I cannot ignore the plain meaning of “leave of absence” in the policy.
In this type group policy, all of the testimony and facts concerning events after he permanently left the employment are irrelevant. The policy contract is with Davis, and the terms of the contract are binding. Counsel for Davis’ estate agreed that paying the insurance premiums after Davis left and was on terminal leave did not bind *840the insurance company. Neither did any other act of Davis or the finance company. In this type group policy, the insurance company looks to the finance company for the payment of premiums and relies on the terms of the policy as to coverage.
There is no question that Davis had permanently left the finance company. He had rented an office for the practice of law. It is not disputed that he was not returning. It is further clear that he had ceased active work for the finance company. By this clause, Davis had terminated employment and coverage.
The exception clause provided an escape from the above provision for leave of absence or temporary layoff. These two exceptions terminated if the status lasted more than six months.
The plain, ordinary usage of leave of absence means a leave with the plain connotation that at the end of the leave there will be a return to work for the company. The plain meaning of temporary layoff is that it is contemplated that there will be a return to work for the company.
Layoff means separation with no present prospect of return. Addition of temporary plainly means that a return is contemplated.
The majority makes much of the fact that leave was not qualified by the word temporary, as was layoff. To require temporary leave of absence would be redundant, as all is covered by the six-month limit.
Both clauses contemplate a return to work which does not fit Davis at all. If he was on leave, it was terminal leave which is not the same as leave of absence. I am amazed that the English language can be tortured to the extent as done by the majority.
The fact that the majority states that the policy does not exclude terminal leave is irrelevant. The policy does not exclude a lot of things. It does plainly say what it includes, and Davis does not fit the plain language of the policy.
Eventually, it will be necessary to have a court dictionary if the court continues to give words a meaning other than generally understood meanings.
The ambiguity mentioned by the majority is in the opinion, not in the policy, resulting in a rewriting of the policy by the court, leave of absence meaning the same as terminal leave.
Here, there is an “unequivocal, conspicuous, plain, and clear manifestation of the company's intent to exclude coverage" and defeat the doctrine of reasonable expectation.
The majority had to create an ambiguity, where none existed, to invoke the doctrine and use the doctrine of reasonable expectation as a further reason for imposing liability.
I do not believe we should rewrite insurance policies to impose liability.
Accordingly, I dissent.