Court Opinion

ID: 9929349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:42.34912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:14.472301
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0203-MR

JESSICA HILL                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE TRACY E. DAVIS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-005320

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY AND TYLER DELONJAY                                            APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND MCNEILL,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Jessica Hill appeals from the order dismissing her

claims against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”)

entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on January 20, 2023 and amended on

February 8, 2023. After a careful review of the record, briefs, and applicable law,

we affirm.
                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                On August 5, 2020, Tyler Delonjay – a 17-year-old minor living with

his aunt, Suzanne Small – obtained permission and borrowed her vehicle to go to a

friend’s house. Unfortunately, Tyler ran into a vehicle operated by Appellant.

Appellant was injured and ultimately sued Tyler, Suzanne, State Farm, and Tyler’s

father, Jason Delonjay.1

                As part of the litigation, multiple depositions were taken, including

testimony by Tyler, Jason, and Suzanne, all of whom testified that Tyler lived with

Jason until May 2020, and then moved in with Suzanne until after the accident.

When Tyler moved from Jason’s house, he left nothing except his bed, dresser, and

television, which he later purchased from his father. Because Tyler and Jason were

struggling to get along, Tyler had no intention of moving back to Jason’s house

and has not spent a night there since he left. Eventually, Jason moved the trial

court for a judgment on the pleadings, which was granted, and the claims against

him were dismissed with prejudice.

                Appellant moved the trial court for summary judgment against State

Farm, asserting that Tyler was insured as a resident relative under Jason’s State

Farm policy. State Farm filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and response

in opposition to Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, denying coverage

1
    Jason Delonjay had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm.

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based on the policy’s language defining “resident relative” as one “who resides

primarily with the first person shown as a named insured on the Declarations

Page,” and the fact that Tyler did not primarily reside with Jason at the time of the

accident. (Emphasis omitted.)

                On the same day Appellant filed her reply and noticed submission of

the matter for final adjudication, the trial court entered its order granting State

Farm’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant then moved to have the order

amended to include the finality language required by CR2 54.01(1). That motion

was granted, and this appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03.

“[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a

matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce

evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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             An appellate court’s role in reviewing an award of summary judgment

is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material

fact exists, and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary

judgment is reviewed de novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v.

Audubon Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing

Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Ky. App. 2000)).

                                    ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by entering

summary judgment in favor of State Farm because State Farm’s policy definition

of “resident relative” is ambiguous and should be construed against its drafter. As

previously mentioned, the policy defines “resident relative” as one “who resides

primarily with the first person shown as a named insured on the Declarations

Page[.]” (Emphasis omitted.)

             It is well-established that “residence” may mean legal residence or

domicile, or an actual residence where one may be temporarily abiding. See Burr’s

Adm’r v. Hatter, 240 Ky. 721, 43 S.W.2d 26, 27 (1931); Old Reliable Ins. Co. v.

Brown, 558 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ky. App. 1977); Perry v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,

860 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Ky. 1993). To interpret which type of residence is meant

under the policy, we must consider “what could be reasonably expected by the

                                         -4-
insured from the plain contract language, as it is controlling.” Foreman v. Auto

Club Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 617 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Ky. 2021). Given the modifier

“primarily,” it only makes sense that the policy herein refers to one’s actual

residence. In other words, the residence in which one is living with an intent to

make that residence their abode. Accordingly, we cannot say that the policy’s

definition is ambiguous.

             In the alternative, Appellant argues the case should be remanded for a

jury determination of whether Tyler was a “resident relative” under the policy.

                    Legal residency is based on fact and intention. As
             to what is or was one’s residence often presents difficult
             questions and each case must be disposed of on its own
             peculiar facts. Kentucky case law has previously defined
             residence as a “factual place of abode or living in a
             particular locality.” Whether a new residence has been
             acquired or an old residence abandoned is dependent on
             the totality of all facts and circumstances.

Perry, 860 S.W.2d at 764 (citations omitted). “Residency and intent are questions

of fact and not of law where the evidence supports more than one inference upon

which reasonable minds may differ.” Bratcher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty

Company, 642 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Ky. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Appellant claims that whether Tyler intended to live with his

aunt and maintain a new primary residence is a question of fact for the jury.

             Generally, Appellant would be correct, and this matter would need to

be remanded for a jury trial to determine Tyler’s residency; however, based on the

                                         -5-
particular facts of this case, such a remand is unnecessary. “[W]hen no questions

of material fact exist or when only one reasonable conclusion can be reached, the

litigation may still be terminated.” Dishman v. C & R Asphalt, LLC, 460 S.W.3d

341, 346 (Ky. App. 2014) (citation omitted). Here, there is only one reasonable

conclusion based on the evidence presented to the trial court, and that conclusion is

that Tyler was not primarily residing with his father at the time of the automobile

accident.

             The evidence indicated that Tyler physically resided with Suzanne at

the time of the accident. In addition, Tyler’s deposition testimony was that he did

not intend on returning to live with his father. In fact, Tyler has never returned to

live with his father, has not spent the night at his father’s house, and only goes to

Jason’s house for holidays and birthdays. Jason also converted Tyler’s old room

into a walk-in closet. Finally, Tyler’s personal belongings were removed from

Jason’s house and transferred to Suzanne’s home. Tyler’s bed, dresser, and

television were left at Jason’s residence; however, Jason testified that this was

because Suzanne had provided those things for Tyler at her house. Based on this

evidence, there is only one inference on which reasonable minds may conclude,

that Tyler was not primarily residing with Jason.

             While Tyler’s driver’s license, old court documents, and employment

records indicated Tyler lived at Jason’s residence, the acts and intentions of Tyler,

                                          -6-
Jason, and Suzanne indicate that Tyler was not actually residing with Jason at the

time of the accident. These documents would not cause a reasonable person to

come to a different conclusion.

                                  CONCLUSION

            Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson

Circuit Court.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE STATE
                                          FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
Marvin L. Coan                            INSURANCE COMPANY:
David L. Sage
Louisville, Kentucky                      Curt L. Sitlinger
                                          Christopher D. Snead
                                          Louisville, Kentucky

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