Court Opinion

ID: 9627532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:47:13.886649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:39.601713
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, J.,
filed a specially concurring opinion.
APPENDIX
• Kelsey v. District Court, 22 Wyo. 297, 139 P. 433 (1914).
This court concluded that writs of certio-rari and error were abolished, but the petition in error was still vital, pursuant to the 1886 statute found in W.S. 5130 (1910). The petitioner sought a writ of review challenging the jurisdiction of the district court to enter judgment committing his daughter to the Home of the Good Shepherd in Denver. The court determined there was no statute giving the writ of review vitality, and it was denied.
• City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916).
The court described the writ as discretionary, saying it could not be used arbitrarily or capriciously and held the writ would not issue if another adequate remedy was available. The opinion identified certiorari as a tool to keep trial courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and concluded the district court had jurisdiction of a quasi-criminal appeal from a municipal court. The writ was denied.
• State v. Dahlem, 37 Wyo. 498, 263 P. 708 (1928).
This court held the 1886 enactment limiting use of certiorari1 void because our Constitution, adopted after the statute of 1886, authorized use of certiorari, as well as other writs. Wyo.Const. art. 5, § 3. Dahlem questioned the jurisdiction of the governor to remove a sheriff from office for unlawful removal and disposal of whiskey and, though we recognized our power to issue the writ, we declined to grant relief, finding the governor did have jurisdiction.
• Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954).
The court held a common law writ of certiorari is not available and denied a remedy through use of the writ to a party who had lost his right of appeal by lack of diligence.
• State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, 409 P.2d 769 (Wyo.1966).
The court again described the writ as discretionary and issuable only where no other adequate remedy exists and that injunction was available only in criminal matters when there is an attempt to enforce an unconstitutional law and its enforcement will result in irreparable injury. We de-*1365dined use of certiorari and permitted removal proceedings against then Adjutant General Pearson to go forward, noting the proceedings were not criminal and a claim to the contrary was speculative and could be determined only when a criminal sanction was enforced.
• Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo.1982).
Though certiorari was not used, the proposition was restated that this court may properly address incidental questions not raised by parties but which are bound to rise again in the case. The court indicated W.R.A.P. 12.122 authorizes use of certiora-ri, though other remedies are available.
• City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340 (Wyo.1983).
By now the court was using certiorari more frequently to redress issues of great importance. Certiorari was granted to review a municipal judge’s decision that W.S. 31 — 6—105(f) (1977) was unconstitutional (violation of a defendant’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination to require submission to sobriety test): Some jurisdictions limit certiorari to a use that merely tests the exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate courts, but we held that prohibition filled that purpose and, in creating both prohibition and certiorari, the framers of our constitution must have intended some different function for each and did not intend to limit certiorari as it was used under common law. The case was identified as one which required review to prevent a failure of justice and needed conclusive resolution; issuance of the writ was consistent with the discretionary nature of certiorari because the city had no appeal from the order of the municipal judge; the ruling was of great importance to the entire state and a question of first impression; and the issue was of constitutional magnitude. We reversed the municipal court’s determination.
• Stamper v. State, 672 P.2d 106 (Wyo. 1983).
Certiorari was granted to review a non-appealable district court order denying the defendant’s motion for dismissal of the complaint on double jeopardy grounds. The writ was granted to afford the defendant redress of his double jeopardy claim before exposure occurred. We held the double jeopardy claim was without merit and remanded.
• State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1984).
Certiorari was granted to the state to review a district court’s order suppressing evidence collected by investigators for an insurance company in an arson case. In justifying use of the writ the court said:
[T]he rulings of the district court were premised upon constitutional grounds, which results in the presentation to this court of issues of constitutional magnitude. Whether constitutional protections with respect to inculpatory statements of an accused and evidence obtained from the person or property of the accused are to be extended to private individuals is a significant question of first impression in the State * * *. Consequently, we conclude that because of the importance of the evidence suppressed or the use of which is potentially denied to the State • * *; the constitutional magnitude of the issues raised; and the importance of determining the rule with respect to such matters in the State * * *, [we] appropriately exercised [our] discretion in granting * * * certiorari in this case.
Id. at 632-33. We held the court had erroneously suppressed the evidence, dissolved the stay of proceedings, and remanded. Heiner pled guilty to a lesser included of*1366fense of arson and was placed on probation.
• State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1984).
Certiorari was granted to review a district court order dismissing manslaughter charges against a defendant who, through gross negligence, caused the deaths of two persons in an automobile accident. The court held that the vehicular homicide statute3 preempted the state from trying the defendant for manslaughter. We determined the issue was of constitutional magnitude and of great public import; however, the bar was served notice that the court would exercise its discretion to grant certiorari under unusual circumstances and on rare occasions only. Id. at 528. The vehicular homicide statute was held to be unconstitutional and the case was remanded for trial on the manslaughter charges; Sodergren was convicted. Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo.1986).
• Kobos v. Sugden, 694 P.2d 110 (Wyo. 1985).
Certiorari was granted to review a claim that the assigned district judge was biased and should be removed from a case. The court declined to grant relief.
• Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1985).
Certiorari was granted to review a partial summary judgment which was not a final order. This was done to resolve issues in a partition of property case because of the possibility the petitioner might suffer irreparable damage by the partitioning before all claims could be disposed of and an appeal taken. Summary judgment was upheld and the case remanded.
• Stamper v. State, 701 P.2d 557 (Wyo.1985).
Certiorari was granted for the same reason as the 1983 Stamper case. In the 1985 opinion, by unpublished order, the 1983 opinion was withdrawn because no criminal charges were actually pending in the earlier case. In 1985, such charges were pending and the case was decided in the same manner as in 1983.
• Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985).
Certiorari was granted to review a troublesome policy question concerning abuse of discretion in sentencing. Wright’s sentence had been affirmed on appeal. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090 (Wyo.1983). This court reiterated the limited kinds of circumstances in which certiorari would be granted, citing some of the above cases. Certiorari was granted in Wright to prevent a failure of justice. Wright was convicted of unlawful delivery of marijuana and given a prison sentence of two to four years. He was twenty years old, a first-time felony offender, and an honor student at Sheridan College. A probation officer recommended probation, in part for the reasons outlined above, and in part because Wright sold a small amount of marijuana to undercover officers after they broached the subject with him as to where they might obtain drugs. Wright, 707 P.2d at 156-57. The sentencing practices of the district court were examined, and we held that denial of probation to Wright was a departure from the court’s practice and unsupported by reasons discernable in the record. The case was remanded, directing Wright’s sentence be suspended and he be placed on probation.
• State v. District Court of the Second Judicial District, 715 P.2d 191 (Wyo.1986).
Certiorari was granted to the state to determine the parameters of the substantive right to release on bail pending appeal and where the defendant had been granted bail.4 Certiorari was granted because the state challenged the jurisdiction of the court to grant bail and because of the important constitutional and statutory issue whether there is a right to bail on appeal under Wyoming law. We upheld the grant of bail, holding that statutes provided for a substantive right of bail.5
*1367• Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1986): and Murry v. State, 631 P.2d 26 (Wyo.1981).
A defendant’s appeal was reinstated which had been dismissed because of untimely notice of appeal. The basis for our decision was a United States Supreme Court case which held that where a state creates an appeal of right, it denies due process to dismiss the appeal if dismissal results from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, reh’g denied, 470 U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 1783, 84 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The effect of Evitts is that an attorney’s mistake will not justify loss of the client’s right of appeal. Foote v. State, 751 P.2d 884, 887 (Wyo.1988); Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 327 (Wyo.1986).
• Yates v. State, 723 P.2d 37 (Wyo.1986); Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo.1986); and Shepard v. State, 720 P.2d 904 (Wyo.1986).
Certiorari was granted; relief was denied, however, because none presented the rare and unusual circumstances required.
• Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987).
Certiorari was granted because of the importance of the issue, abrogation of in-terspousal tort immunity, despite the fact the order appealed from was a partial summary judgment. The concept of inter-spousal tort immunity was abrogated, both prospectively and retroactively, to any case not yet a final judgment.
• Smizer v. State, 763 P.2d 1254 (Wyo.1988).
Appeal was dismissed, calling attention to W.S. 7-14-107 (Cum.Supp.1988), which provides that appellate review of post-conviction relief petitions must be sought by writ of certiorari. See also W.R.A.P. 13. The court stated that strict adherence to this procedure would be required. Smizer clarified there is no time limit on filing a petition for writ of certiorari except that found in W.R.A.P. 13.02, which applies only to an “order, decision or opinion of the district court in its appellate capacity.”
• State v. Denhardt, 760 P.2d 988 (Wyo.1988).
Certiorari was granted where the state had challenged a county court’s decision to dismiss an information charging a defendant with furnishing alcoholic beverages to a minor who was operating or occupying a motor vehicle. The state has no right of appeal where a prosecution is frustrated by action of a lower court, but relief was not granted in Denhardt because this court agreed with the county court that the criminal information was deficient.
• Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo.1988).
Certiorari was granted where the district court denied a motion to disqualify an attorney. Although not an appealable final order, this court found review by certiorari proper because: it was a serious and unsettled question in our jurisprudence; failure to resolve the question at an early stage could have resulted in injustice; the case involved an abuse of discretion; and, this court is charged with responsibility of supervising the conduct of Wyoming State Bar members. This court ordered that the subject attorney be disqualified from representing the specified client.
• Loper v. Shillinger, 772 P.2d 552 (Wyo.1989).
Certiorari was granted to review a criminal defendant’s claim that a sentence imposed for a crime committed while on parole should be presumed to run concurrently with the remainder of the original sentence reinstated by parole revocation. This court held that no such presumption exists.
• Continental Insurance Company v. First Wyoming Bank, 771 P.2d 374 (Wyo.1989).
Certiorari was used to review a district court order requiring petitioner to divulge, in discovery, privileged documents. We held the district court acted in disregard of governing legal precepts and its actions constituted a gross miscarriage of justice. Moreover, we premised our action on our constitutional obligation to exercise general superintending control over lower courts. Wyo.Const, art. 5, § 2. This court directed *1368the case be assigned to another judge because of the presiding judge’s apparent bias, holding that the district court erroneously required discovery of the documents.
• V-l Oil Company v. Honorable Robert B. Ranch, 767 P.2d 612 (Wyo.1989).
Certiorari was granted to review the district court’s order denying V-l’s motion to stay proceedings in the Wyoming court until a parallel case filed in Utah was decided. V-l filed a creditor’s claim in an estate and then filed actions in both Utah and Wyoming because it was uncertain as to the meaning of the term “proper court” found in W.S. 2-7-718 (July 1980 Repl.). In order to correct an abuse of discretion, and to further the best interests of the administration of justice, this court granted relief and stayed the Wyoming action. In an older case a similar result was achieved by use of a writ of prohibition. Osborne v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 654 P.2d 124 (Wyo.1982).
• Gooder v. Roth, 788 P.2d 611 (Wyo.1990).
Certiorari was granted where this court determined that a district court’s order granting the respondents a partial judgment on the issue of liability (an unappeala-ble order which left only damages for decision) was unfounded, unreasonable and an abuse of the court’s discretion. The district court granted the partial judgment as a sanction under W.R.C.P. 37(d) because petitioners allegedly failed to identify their expert witnesses for trial. The record did not justify the sanction.

. See W.S. 6392 (1920).

. Rule 12.12. Relief available by Independent action.
The relief, review, or redress available in suits for injunction against agency action or enforcement thereof, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judgment of rights, status, or legal relations based on administrative action or inaction, in actions for mandamus to compel administrative action, and in applications for writs of certio-rari and prohibition to review or prevent administrative action shall be available by independent action notwithstanding any petition for review filed.

. W.S. 31 — 5—1117(b) (Cum.Supp.1980) (now W.S. 6 — 2—106(b) (June 1988 Repl.)).

. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.1986).

.Since our decision in that case, §§ 7-11-507 and 7-11-511 have been repealed and our holding in this case may no longer reflect the status of current law.