Court Opinion

ID: 9627942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:00:04.051886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:19.787043
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join the court’s opinion, though I certainly agree the right of cross-examination may be limited to relevant matters. As the court acknowledges, because a witness’ bias and hostility affect credibility, it is always relevant to show these matters. Any ruling preventing a defendant from demonstrating bias through cross-examination “is constitutional error.” Morris K. Udall, et al, Arizona Law of Evidence § 35 at 60-61 (3d ed. 1991).
The statute in question is the product of a joint rules-statutory implementation committee appointed by this court and the legislature. Given the history of the committee discussions and the constitutional right to explore the issue of bias, I believe the better interpretation is that A.R.S. § 13-4433(f) and Rule 39(b)(ll) contemplate that comment would be permitted on the victim’s refusal to grant an interview and, when such comment was made, “the court shall instruct” on the victim’s constitutional right to refuse that interview. Id. I acknowledge, however, that the statute and the rule are ambiguously worded and can be read any one of three ways: to forbid comment but provide for an instruction if one is made; to permit comment and to require an instruction when that comment is made; or, as the court concludes today, to leave it to the trial judge to determine admissibility under the Rules of Evidence. Given the court’s rule-making power under article VI, § 5(5) of the Arizona Constitution, it is reasonable to read the rule and the statute according to the third possibility.
I would choose, however, what I believe the committee had in mind — to permit comment or questions and to require an instruction when mention is made. But even if we take the court’s view and allow the trial judge discretion to admit under the Rules of Evidence, I believe the court has erred. As the court itself acknowledges, ' there are “cases in which the fact of refusal or manner of refusal is relevant to bias or some other issue.” Opinion at 1166. This being so, the court puts the cart before the horse in requiring an ultimate showing of relevance before the victim can be asked first whether he or she refused the interview and then about the reasons for such refusal. The court requires counsel to perform the impossible. How can the foundation of bias or hostility be shown without first establishing the fact of refusal and then exploring the reasons for that refusal in attempting to show it was prompted by something other than the exercise of a constitutional right? Of course, in some cases the victim may display untoward hostility, bias, or anger from the witness stand and so provide the necessary foundation. But in that event, the fact of interview refusal is probably unimportant icing on the cake. It is the fact of refusal and the reasons for the refusal that may permit counsel to show bias or hostility. I fear the court today sanctions an unduly restrictive limitation of the constitutional right to cross-examine on the issue of credibility. See 4 Wein-stein’s FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611.03[4][a], at 611-30 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 1997).
Hopefully trial judges will give defense counsel wide latitude and will broadly interpret the court’s foundational requirement that “victims refused the interviews for a reason or in a manner bearing on their credibility, ____” Opinion at 1163. Perhaps some offer of proof by way of cross-examination out of the presence of the jury will be necessary to allow counsel to establish that foundation, bearing in mind that the lawyer has not had the opportunity to speak to the witness before cross-examination. Counsel must be given some opportunity to approach the issue and explore it. State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125, 571 P.2d 268, 271 (1977); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750,19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968).
I respectfully dissent.