Court Opinion

ID: 9724492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:58:40.965986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:01.189243
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, J.
I concur in the judgment of the court and in the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion except for its criticism of the opinion of Division Five of this court in Herbert v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 718 [215 Cal.Rptr. 477], Since the majority correctly finds Herbert “distinguishable on several points” (majority opn., ante, p. 293), I see no need to “expressly decline to follow Herbert.” (Majority opn., ante, p. 294.)
The majority, incorrectly in my opinion, concludes that the Herbert case “would apparently attempt ... to force respondent herein to arbitrate *295. . . (Majority opn., ante, p. 294.) However, the holding in Herbert distinguishes the situation, like that presented in the case before us, where “[tjhere was no provision in the agreement whereby the signing party intended to bind his or her heirs to the arbitration clause.” (Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 725, fn. 2.) Furthermore, by expressing its disapproval of Herbert, the majority in cursory fashion expresses an opinion on an issue not before us, namely, construction of an arbitration provision in the context of the well-established rule that “[t]he statutory cause of action for wrongful death (sec. 377, Code Civ. Proc.) . . . is a joint one, a single one and an indivisible one” (Watkins v. Nutting (1941) 17 Cal.2d 490, 498 [110 P.2d 384]), the term “indivisible” signifying “that there cannot be a series of suits by heirs against the tortfeasor for their individual damages. [Citation.]” (Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d.690, 694 [36 Cal.Rptr. 321, 388 P.2d 353].) Since the result reached by Division Five is premised on this rule (Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 722), and the present case does not involve an action for wrongful death, I find the majority’s discussion of the Herbert case to be inappropriate and unnecessary to our decision.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 14, 1988, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 15, 1988.