Court Opinion

ID: 9940499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:12:28.924262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:56.875812
License: Public Domain

672                   February 14, 2024                  No. 91

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
               KENNETH RAYMOND PAGE,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Douglas County Circuit Court
                  20CR42167; A178281

   William A. Marshall, Judge. (Supplemental Judgment
entered March 29, 2022)
  Ann Marie Simmons,            Judge.    (Judgment     entered
February 22, 2022)
   Submitted October 3, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Morgen E. Daniels, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
   MOONEY, J.
   Affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 672 (2024)   673
674                                                           State v. Page

          MOONEY, J.
         Defendant ignited a firework mortar that misfired,
scattered brick shrapnel, and caused damage to the victim’s,
M’s, house and property. After defendant pleaded no con-
test to one count of second-degree criminal mischief, ORS
164.354,1 the trial court entered a judgment of conviction.
A restitution hearing was conducted after which the court
imposed restitution of approximately $7,600, including the
cost of painting the exterior of M’s house. Defendant appeals
from the resulting supplemental judgment and money
award, assigning error to that portion of the restitution
award attributable to the expense incurred by M to paint
the two sides of his house that were not directly damaged by
the explosion. We conclude that the trial court did not err.
We affirm.
         We review the trial court’s imposition of restitution
for legal error, remaining mindful that we are bound by the
trial court’s findings if they are supported by any evidence
in the record. State v. Lobue, 304 Or App 13, 16, 466 P3d 83,
rev den, 367 Or 257 (2020). In the absence of “express find-
ings on a disputed fact, we assume that the court implicitly
found the facts consistent with the judgment entered,” id.,
and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the state, State v. Smith, 291 Or App 785, 788, 420 P3d 644
(2018). We state the pertinent facts accordingly.
        M sought coverage from his homeowner’s insurance
company, Mutual of Enumclaw (Enumclaw), for the prop-
erty damage that was caused by the explosion and flying
shrapnel set into motion by defendant when he ignited the
firework mortar. A claims adjuster from Enumclaw testified
that after inspecting and documenting the damage, they
developed a cost estimate of the anticipated remedial work
using a software program, standard within the insurance

   1
     ORS 164.354 provides:
       “(1) A person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the second
   degree if:
       “* * * * *
       “(b) Having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the
   person has such right, * * * the person recklessly damages property of another
   in an amount exceeding $500.”
Cite as 330 Or App 672 (2024)                                          675

industry, called “Exact Analysis.” The line item for paint-
ing included only those exterior walls “that had sustained
damage.” Contractors were retained to repair the damage,
and Pierce Restoration (Pierce) was selected to serve as the
painting contractor. The adjuster testified that the work done,
including the painting, was necessary and reasonable and
that the amounts paid for that work were also reasonable.
         M testified that he personally paid Pierce to paint
the undamaged sides of his house because the new paint
on the sides that had been damaged and repaired did not
match the older, faded paint on the remaining sides. M tes-
tified that the color of the fresh paint was close, but clearly
darker, than the existing paint. He testified further that he
liked to keep his “place looking pretty nice,” and that the
partially painted house looked as though it was not “ke[pt]
up.” He paid Pierce the amount it charged him because it is
a “reputable company” and because it charged him the same
amount that it charged Enumclaw for painting the first two
walls. The sentencing court included the painting cost that
M incurred in the restitution award, with this explanation:
   “[M] described this as reasonable and necessary to match
   up the paint so that it was similar quality and, and color
   to what was on half of the house that the Defendant had
   damaged.
      “And that it was reasonable and necessary. There was
   no testimony to the contrary from anyone else and no cross-
   examination about whether it was reasonable and neces-
   sary. And, and so I’m going to allow that. And that amount,
   as I understand it, is $3,693.30. And so that will be the
   order of the Court. Thank you.”
The propriety of including that cost in the restitution award
is the sole issue before us now.
         ORS 137.106 (2021)2 requires a trial court to order
restitution “[w]hen a person is convicted of a crime * * * that
has resulted in economic damages.” ORS 137.103(2) defines
“economic damages” by incorporating most of the definition
given to that term by ORS 31.705(2)(a) for civil matters. As
explained in State v. Herfurth, 283 Or App 149, 153-54, 388

   2
     ORS 137.106 was amended in 2022. Or Laws 2022, ch 57, § 1. Those amend-
ments are now in effect, but they are not relevant to this case.
676                                             State v. Page

P3d 1104 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 350 (2017), economic dam-
ages are the “objectively verifiable monetary losses” that
would be recoverable “against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the defendant’s criminal activities.” (Internal
quotation marks and footnote omitted.) When restitution is
imposed as a sanction in a criminal sentence, it is “informed
by principles enunciated in civil cases concerning recover-
able economic damages.” State v. Islam, 359 Or 796, 800,
377 P3d 533 (2016). There are three prerequisites for the
imposition of restitution as part of a defendant’s criminal
sentence: (1) criminal activities, (2) economic damages, and
(3) a causal relationship between the criminal activity and
the economic damages. State v. Kirkland, 268 Or App 420,
424, 342 P3d 163 (2015). The state bears the burden of
proving the factual prerequisites necessary to support an
award of restitution and that the award is reasonable. ORS
137.106(1)(a); State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 367 Or 614, 620,
482 P3d 62 (2021).
         Defendant argues first that the state did not meet
its burden to establish that the cost of painting the undam-
aged sides of M’s house could “be attributed to his criminal
activities.” He emphasizes that his “criminal activities were
not a ‘but for’ cause of M’s additional painting cost loss,”
and he points instead to Pierce, claiming that M’s loss was
caused by Pierce’s “negligence in failing to match the paint
color.” But defendant’s view of the necessary causal link is
too narrow.
          The “but for” test is often used in civil cases to
determine “whether a defendant’s negligence is one of many
potential causes of a plaintiff’s harm.” Haas v. Estate of
Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 749, 525 P3d 451 (2023)
(emphasis in original). The test does not, however, reduce
causation to a single cause. It asks whether the harm would
have occurred “but for”—or, in the absence of—”the defen-
dant’s negligence.” Id. Moreover, the “but for” test is not the
only test used to measure factual causation in civil cases.
See, e.g., Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc., 351 Or 1, 7-8,
261 P3d 1215 (2011) (discussing cause in fact and the “sub-
stantial factor” test). The Supreme Court has not expressed
an opinion on the question of “whether the factual causation
Cite as 330 Or App 672 (2024)                             677

required by ORS 137.106 is limited to ‘but-for’ causation.”
State v. Ramos, 358 Or 581, 586 n 3, 368 P3d 446 (2016).
        The evidence here, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the state, is that defendant set off a large fire-
work mortar that misfired, scattered brick shrapnel, and
damaged M’s nearby house. The damage and associated
repairs were sufficiently extensive to necessitate repainting
the damaged exterior walls entirely. Not surprisingly, the
fresh paint on the repaired walls did not match the exist-
ing paint on the undamaged walls, and the difference was
noticeable. The required causal link between defendant’s
criminal conduct and M’s expense in painting the undam-
aged walls is inferable from the sentencing court’s finding
that M painted those walls “to match up the paint so that
it was similar [in] quality and * * * color to what was on”
the damaged and repainted walls. In other words, the court
found that M would not have incurred the expense of paint-
ing those two walls in the absence of defendant’s criminal
conduct. The record supports that finding.
         Defendant next argues that even if the state estab-
lished the necessary causal link, “it was not reasonably fore-
seeable that defendant’s firework mishap would cause the
painting company to fail to match paint colors, thus result-
ing in M’s wish to have the undamaged sides of his house
repainted.” That argument goes to whether the cost of paint-
ing the undamaged walls is “the kind[ ] of harm for which
a defendant may be held liable.” Ramos, 358 Or at 595. We
answer that question by applying “reasonable foreseeabil-
ity” as a “limiting concept” under ORS 137.106. Ramos, 358
Or at 596.
         The question is “whether a reasonable person in [ ]
defendant’s position would have foreseen that someone in
[M’s] position could reasonably incur damages of the same
general kind that [M] incurred[,]” as a result of defendant’s
criminal conduct. Id. at 597. We infer from the court’s find-
ings and the supplemental judgment that it found that the
act of igniting the mortar had the effect of damaging M’s
house; that the damage led to repairs and repainting; that
the house ended up with fresh paint on two sides and older
paint on the other two sides—which predictably made the
678                                                            State v. Page

sides appear mismatched; and, finally, that the mismatched
appearance of the house reasonably led to M’s decision to
repaint the undamaged walls to restore the house to its uni-
form and tidy look.
        The relationship running between each step was
reasonably foreseeable. See State v. Buswell, 308 Or App
389, 394-95, 479 P3d 341 (2021) (concluding that “ ‘it is a rea-
sonably foreseeable consequence of the robbery that [the vic-
tim] would use sick leave immediately following the robbery
to recover from its trauma’ ”); State v. Venable, 316 Or App
235, 240, 502 P3d 250 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 338 (2022)
(concluding that where the defendant stole victim’s cell
phone, restitution award could include expenses incurred by
victim because he was deprived of the ability to use that
phone to perform his job). The record supports that someone
in defendant’s position would reasonably have foreseen that
igniting a large firework mortar might result in damage to
surrounding buildings, requiring significant repairs and
paint costs, including those incurred by M in this case. The
expense incurred to paint the undamaged walls qualifies
as economic damages and the trial court did not err when it
included that cost in restitution.
         As to the appropriate measure of damages, we apply
yet another civil law principle because the property that
defendant damaged was real property.3 In civil cases involv-
ing temporary damage to real property, where the damage
is “reasonably susceptible to repair,” the appropriate mea-
sure of damages is “the cost of restoring the property to
its original condition[.]” McCormick v. City of Portland, 191
Or App 383, 390-91, 82 P3d 1043, rev den, 337 Or 616 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That same measure
of damages for restitution applies here. See State v. Boyar,
328 Or App 678, 681, 538 P3d 1225, rev den, 371 Or 771
(2023) (applying same measure of damages for restitution
where the defendant’s criminal conduct caused damage to
transit station door). Defendant set a string of predictable
events into motion when he committed the crime of criminal
    3
      See, e.g., ORS 307.010(1)(b), which defines real property for state property
tax laws to include, among other things, “(B) All buildings, structures, improve-
ments, machinery, equipment or fixtures erected upon, above or affixed to the
land[.]”
Cite as 330 Or App 672 (2024)                            679

mischief in the second degree. M’s house appeared uniform
in color before defendant acted. Its appearance was not uni-
form in color after defendant acted. The measure of damages
thus reasonably included the cost of painting the undam-
aged walls because that was necessary to restore the house
to its original condition. The cost that M incurred to paint
the undamaged walls was the same as the cost Enumclaw
incurred to paint the other two exterior walls which, accord-
ing to the claims adjuster’s testimony, was reasonable.
        Affirmed.