Court Opinion

ID: 7707186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-30 19:05:14.687949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:26:58.597139
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
Upon our conclusion that, in the circumstances of his ease, the appellant Jackson became entitled to administrative gain time under section 944.276, Florida Statutes (1987)(repealed by eh. 88-122, § 6, at 527, 537, Laws of Fla.) and provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988)(repealed by ch. 93-406, § 32, at 2911, 2966, Laws of Fla.), the order below denying mandamus is reversed1 because he was unlawfully deprived of those benefits by the enactment of section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993). Lynce v. Mathis, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); see also Orosz v. Singletary, 693 So.2d 538 (Fla.1997). The cause is remanded for determination of the precise amount of time to which he is entitled.

. We reject the appellee’s claim that the appeal is untimely.