Court Opinion

ID: 9763226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:11.962349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:31.152369
License: Public Domain

Otis H. Turner, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result reached by the court although for additional reasons, which may be inferred from the majority opinion, but which I choose to enunciate and emphasize. The rules of practice and procedure, including the Rules of Evidence, constitute the foundation supporting our system based upon the rule of law. In order for the system to work in an efficient manner, it is imperative that the rules under which litigants and their attorneys operate be, as nearly as possible, definite, certain, and uniform in their application. Not only are these objectives necessary to achieve uniform justices, but they are also essential to promote uniformity in practice. No other means are available for those involved in the justice system on a day-to-day basis — the lawyers and trial judges — to know with any degree of certainty the extent of their obligations and limitations in their efforts to achieve the efficient and consistent administration of justice. It is clear that those matters that are procedural in nature inherently rest with the judiciary. As this juncture, I feel compelled to elaborate on the basis for my concurrence. In our cases cited by the majority, we have alluded to “matters of public policy.” Clearly, matters of public policy enacted as laws by the legislature involving substantive rights as distinguished from matters of procedure will always be controlling, subject to constitutional restraints. However, it is not sufficient to say simply that we will defer to legislative enactment on all “matters of public policy”; in fact, all enactments of the General Assembly become matters of “public policy.” Therefore, even though a particular legislative enactment, procedural in nature, may serve to enhance or advance an acknowledged public policy issue, if the legislatively enacted procedure conflicts with a procedure established by the judicial branch, then in all such cases the judicially established procedure should prevail unless and until it is changed or modified by the judicial branch. This position in no way conflicts with our decisions which hold that in matters of procedure clearly involving public policy issues, where the judicial branch has not previously spoken and preempted the subject, a legislative enactment not in conflict with established rules of practice and procedure will be recognized and enforced. See Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990). To adhere to this policy will aid in promoting the stability of our system of jurisprudence. It will secure the establishment of a body of procedural law which, it is to be hoped, will be uniform in its application and consequently less subject to exceptions which, although created with all good intentions, in their proliferation may overturn an entire area of established practice and procedure. For this court to hold otherwise, litigants and their attorneys would have no objective means for determining which procedures meet the “public policy” criteria. A final resolution would thus only follow an oftentimes expensive trial and appeal. Price, J., joins.