Court Opinion

ID: 9930257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:11:26.036229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:53.518568
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1876-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAWNTEE D. MITCHELL,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted January 9, 2024 – Decided February 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 16-04-0286
                   and 16-04-0288.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Margaret Ruth McLane, Assistant Deputy
                   Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
                   for respondent (Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Shawntee Mitchell appeals from an October 6, 2017 order

denying his suppression motion. He also challenges his aggregate ten-year

sentence under a January 26, 2018 judgment of conviction. We affirm.

                                        I.

      We glean the facts from the motion record. In October 2015, the Union

County Prosecutor's Office (UCPO) commenced a wiretap investigation

targeting Kalil Cooper, a suspected leader of the Grape Street Crips in Elizabeth.

During the investigation, the UCPO intercepted numerous calls between Cooper

and a man named "Body," later identified as defendant.

      In certain intercepted conversations, the UCPO heard Cooper and

defendant talk about expanding their drug distribution into North Carolina,

where defendant lived. Cooper and defendant also discussed the fact defendant

had an associate who stole defendant's "drug stash," and defendant wanted

Cooper to come to North Carolina and hire someone to kill this associate.

      Further investigation revealed Cooper visited defendant in North Carolina

and that the number being used by "Body" was linked to a Facebook page of

someone named "Sean Mitchell." Sergeant Gary Webb, of the UCPO, entered

"Body's" phone number into an intelligence database system and discovered the

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                                        2
number was not only involved in a separate investigation being conducted by

the Wake County Sherriff's Department in North Carolina, but was a phone

number being used by Shawntee Mitchell.

        On December 18, 2015, Webb received a phone call from Officer Jeffrey

McClamb of the Wake County Sheriff's Department, informing Webb that

defendant would be traveling to New Jersey. Based on this tip, Webb searched

the Facebook account linked to Mitchell's number. On December 19, 2015,

Webb learned the user of that Facebook account posted a "check in" at the

Belleville Motor Lodge. Accordingly, Webb asked Detectives Alex Lopez and

Nick Bruno to go to the motor lodge to see if defendant was there.

        Detective Bruno found defendant at the motor lodge, standing by a black

Buick Enclave with Georgia license plates. Although Detective Lopez was not

at the scene at the time, he made a "ghost call" 1 to defendant's phone number.

Once the ghost call was placed, Detective Bruno saw defendant answer his

1
    As the trial court explained in its October 6, 2017 oral opinion, a ghost call

              is a method of identification used when officers have a
              lead o[n] who is using a particular cell phone. When
              officers are conducting surveillance and have a visual
              of a suspect[,] they will place a call to the phone
              number they are investigating . . . to observe the suspect
              answer the phone . . . to identify the user.
                                                                              A-1876-20
                                          3
cellphone and hang up the phone at the same time Detective Lopez ended his

call to defendant's phone. Detective Lopez confirmed the voice he heard on the

ghost call was the same voice he heard during the wiretap investigation.

Defendant then left the motor lodge parking lot and because Detective Bruno

was by himself, he did not follow defendant.

      The next day, Sergeant Webb went to the Belleville Motor Lodge to

surveil defendant. About an hour after Webb arrived at the motor lodge, he saw

the same Buick Enclave Detective Bruno spotted the day before, but Webb was

unsure if one of the people exiting the vehicle was defendant. Some twenty

minutes later, Webb saw six people, including defendant, get into the Buick

Enclave and drive off. Webb followed the vehicle and contacted Detective

Lopez and Detective Anthony Reimer to join in on the surveillance.

      Webb, Lopez, and Reimer followed the Buick Enclave for approximately

ninety minutes, with each officer driving his own vehicle. At one point, the

Buick Enclave stopped at a gas station and Detective Reimer saw what he

thought was a blunt being passed around between the occupants of the vehicle.

      Once the Buick Enclave left the gas station, it entered the Garden State

Parkway and headed southbound.       As Webb followed directly behind the

vehicle, he became concerned it was headed back to North Carolina.

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                                      4
Accordingly, he contacted a Union County Assistant Prosecutor to discuss

arresting defendant based on the information gleaned from the wiretap

investigation. Webb also called a State Police officer who was assigned with

Webb to the wiretap investigation. Webb wanted the State Police to effectuate

a motor vehicle stop because he, Lopez, and Reimer were driving unmarked

cars. Once the Buick Enclave entered the New Jersey State Turnpike and

continued heading southward, Webb contacted an officer at the Cranbury station

and successfully arranged to have a State Trooper effectuate the stop.

      Once the Buick Enclave was pulled over, Detective Lopez and the trooper

went to the driver's side of the vehicle, and Webb and Reimer went to the

passenger side.    Webb ordered defendant, who was sitting in the front

passenger's seat, out of the car.   Webb immediately arrested and searched

defendant after he exited the vehicle. While Webb was standing next to the

vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of burnt and raw marijuana, which he had not

smelled until he opened the car door. The rest of the passengers were then

ordered out of the car and Webb returned to the vehicle, where he found a

handgun underneath a sweatshirt in the middle portion of the vehicle. The

remaining passengers were then placed under arrest and searched. Various types

of cigars were found in the car, but no marijuana or drug paraphernalia was

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                                       5
recovered.

      In 2016, defendant and twenty-one co-defendants were charged with

various offenses under Indictment No. 16-04-0286. Defendant was charged with

first-degree racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c) (count one); first-degree

conspiracy to commit racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d) (count three); first-

degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3 (count six);

and third-degree conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:35-5 (count twenty-three). He was separately charged

with second-degree possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b) under Indictment No. 16-04-00288.

      Defendant moved to suppress the handgun recovered from the Buick

Enclave. In September 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.

Sergeant Webb was the only testifying witness. On October 6, 2017, the judge

entered an order denying the suppression motion. In her accompanying oral

opinion, the judge found the warrantless search of the Buick Enclave was lawful.

She explained "Webb had reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the Buick

was subject to seizure for a violation of law" based on the 2015 wiretap

investigation. The judge also noted the investigation revealed defendant "and

Cooper were engaging in daily conversations regarding talk of expanding

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                                       6
Cooper's drug distribution network down to . . . the North Carolina area and how

they could make good money selling drugs there." Additionally, the judge

credited Webb's testimony that defendant was heard during a wiretapped

conversation saying one of his associates had stolen defendant's drug stash and

defendant "wanted to have Cooper come down to North Carolina and kill

who[m]ever it was that s[tole] the drugs."

      In describing the surveillance undertaken by Webb and other officers in

December 2015, the judge found "Webb possessed . . . probable cause to . . .

arrest [defendant] for conspiracy to commit murder," on the day of his arrest.

She further concluded Webb "was fully aware of the content of the conversations

between [defendant] and Cooper, primarily dealing with drugs and requests by

[defendant] to have the person who stole the drugs . . . murdered." The judge

also found "[t]his information alone was enough for Sergeant Webb to stop the

vehicle, knowing that an occupant of the Buick, [defendant], was subject to

seizure for a violation of law, stemming from the information gained during the

wiretap investigation." She further noted "Webb identified [defendant] from a

photo and watched [defendant] enter the front passenger seat of the Buick."

      Although the judge did not credit Webb's testimony that he could smell

marijuana coming from the Buick Enclave as he followed the Buick down the

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                                       7
Parkway, she did not find he "intentionally lied to the [c]ourt" in making this

statement. On the other hand, she credited Webb's testimony that after stopping

the Buick, Webb opened the front passenger side door and "smelled a strong

odor of . . . both burnt and raw marijuana." The judge found Webb had

"experience doing controlled burns in the Police Academy and transporting raw

marijuana," which could cause "a car [to] smell for up to two days." Therefore,

she concluded "it [wa]s possible for the occupants [of the Buick] to have . . .

smoked earlier in the day [of their arrest], leaving the smell described by

Sergeant Webb[,] who was close enough to smell it" during the stop.

      Additionally, the judge credited Webb's testimony that on the day of

defendant's arrest, while Webb and two other detectives followed the Buick

Enclave for about ninety minutes, occupants of the car "could have discarded

any marijuana residue or delivered or dropped off marijuana" as the car "made

several stops." Thus, she found:

            probable cause [to search the car] arose from
            unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances. This
            vehicle was lawfully stopped based on the reasonable
            suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle was subject to
            seizure for violation of the law. There is no evidence
            before this [c]ourt that the officers had advance
            knowledge that the vehicle [defendant] was in could
            smell like marijuana until the motor vehicle stop. The
            smell    of     marijuana     was    unforeseen     and
            spontaneous[,] . . . as supported by Sergeant Webb's

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                                       8
            testimony that this [wa]s not a planned stop and the
            only reason he requested the stop was because
            [defendant] was heading southbound in the direction of
            North Carolina and [Webb] feared [defendant] was
            returning home.

                  Had the stop taken place and there was no smell
            [of] marijuana[,] it would have been a brief detention
            of the motor vehicle and its occupants and therefore[,]
            not unreasonable. Accordingly, the search of this
            vehicle was proper under the automobile exception.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      On December 4, 2017, defendant pled guilty to the first-degree charges of

racketeering and conspiracy to commit murder, as well as the second-degree

weapon charge. During the plea hearing, defendant admitted he was "a member

of a criminal enterprise known as the Grape Street Crips," he "engaged in

multiple criminal actions on behalf of, and in furtherance of, the Grape Street

Crips," and "conspired to murder an individual who had committed a theft." He

also testified that on the day of his arrest, before the motor vehicle stop and

search occurred, he knew the gun was in the car and he had access to it.

      On January 26, 2018, defendant was sentenced to concurrent ten-year

prison terms on the racketeering and conspiracy charges, subject to the No Early

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a concurrent five-year term, subject to a

forty-two-month parole ineligibility period on the weapon charge, consistent

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                                       9
with the terms of his plea agreement. All remaining charges were dismissed.

      During sentencing, the judge analyzed the applicable aggravating and

mitigating factors, and addressed defense counsel and defendant directly as she

explained her analysis, stating:

            I do find [a]ggravating [f]actor [number three], the risk
            that this defendant will commit another offense. I find
            that based on his prior drug and alcohol use, [and] . . .
            based on prior crimes [of a] similar . . . nature, namely
            drug offenses, which are also involved here as the basis
            for the racketeering.

                  I find [a]ggravating [f]actor [number six], the
            prior criminal record of this defendant and the
            seriousness [of] the offenses for which he's been
            convicted. . . . It appears . . . you do have prior felony
            convictions . . . for drug sales . . . .

                  . . . [T]here is no doubt that at least on one
            occasion[,] you have been convicted of a felony in the
            State of North Carolina . . . . And I also note that you
            have previously violated probation. . . .

                   . . . I also find [a]ggravating [f]actor [number
            nine], the need to deter this defendant and others from
            violating the law. I don't think there's any doubt that
            engaging in drug distribution, possession of a handgun,
            and . . . the conspiracy part of this, . . . . there is,
            obviously, a need to deter that kind of activity . . . .

      In addressing the mitigating factors argued by defense counsel, the judge

stated:

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                                       10
      [R]egarding [m]itigating [f]actor [number seven], no
      prior criminal activity, I am not inclined to find that
      mitigating factor. This defendant does have, from what
      I can see, misdemeanors in the State of North Carolina,
      as well as [a] felony conviction. . . .

             Mitigating [f]actor [number nine], the character
      and attitude of this defendant indicate that he is unlikely
      to commit another offense. The defense is asking me
      to consider that. I am not inclined to find that
      mitigating factor. I think that while [defendant is]
      making positive changes in his life[,] and . . . all the
      things that he's doing—the anger management with
      progressive thinking, the [Narcotics Anonymous] and
      the [Alcoholics Anonymous programs]—it's difficult
      for this court to find that . . . [defendant's] character and
      attitude indicate that he's unlikely to commit another
      offense when you look at the entire picture in this
      matter.

             Regarding [m]itigating [f]actor [number eleven],
      that the imprisonment of this defendant would entail an
      excessive hardship to himself or his dependents[,
      w]hile I certainly agree that there will be hardship to
      his family, . . . I do not find that there are circumstances
      here th[at] exceed any hardship that would be[fall] . . .
      any other person who has a family who is going to be
      going to State [p]rison, so I am not inclined to find that
      [m]itigating [f]actor.

             So[,] this court finds that [a]ggravating [f]actors
      [three, six] and [nine] outweigh the [m]itigating
      [f]actors, which are non-existent. . . . and although a
      greater sentence can be imposed, I will give . . .
      defendant the benefit of this plea agreement . . . .

Finally, the judge rejected defendant's request that he be sentenced in the

                                                                      A-1876-20
                                  11
second-degree range for his first-degree offenses. She informed defendant:

            [B]ecause [defense counsel] has asked me to sentence
            you a degree lower, . . . to do that I have to be clearly
            convinced that the [m]itigating [f]actors substantially
            outweigh the [a]ggravating [f]actors, and the interests
            of justice demands it. . . . Since I do find that the
            [a]ggravating [f]actors outweigh the [m]itigating
            [f]actors I don't get to that argument, and I don't think
            sentencing you a degree lower under these
            circumstances is appropriate . . . .

      In December 2019, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief

(PCR), alleging in part, that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

direct appeal after defendant was sentenced. The same judge who sentenced

defendant partially granted his petition, finding defendant was entitled to limited

relief based on plea counsel's failure to file a timely direct appeal. The judge

ordered that defendant be allowed to file a direct appeal within forty-five days

and dismissed his remaining claims without prejudice.         In April 2021, we

granted defendant's motion to file his notice of appeal as within time.

                                            II.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

            POINT I

            THE POLICE IMPROPERLY EVADED THE
            WARRANT REQUIREMENT BY SITTING ON
            PROBABLE CAUSE RATHER THAN SEARCHING

                                                                             A-1876-20
                                       12
            THE   CAR    IMMEDIATELY.     IN   THE
            ALTERNATIVE,   THE    POLICE    LACKED
            PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR.

            POINT II

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT
            OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
            AND IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE INTERESTS
            OF JUSTICE REQUIRED A DOWNGRADE.

      These arguments are unavailing.

      We begin with the principles that guide our analysis. An appellate court

must uphold a trial court's findings on a suppression motion if they are supported

by "sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300,

313 (2014). This deference is applicable regardless of whether there was a

testimonial hearing, or whether the court based its findings solely on its review

of documentary evidence. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964); State v.

S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). We typically will not reverse a trial court's

findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous or mistaken. S.S., 229

N.J. at 381. But a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v.

Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 644 (App. Div. 2021) (citing S.S., 229 N.J. at 380).

      "Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution

guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or

seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012). "[S]earches and seizures

                                                                            A-1876-20
                                       13
conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively

unreasonable and therefore invalid." State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398

(2022) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)). To overcome the

presumption that a warrantless search is unlawful, "the State bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence not only that the search or seizure

was premised on probable cause, but also that it 'f[ell] within one of the few

well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Bryant, 227

N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 193 N.J.

528, 552 (2008)). "One such exception is the automobile exception." State v.

Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015).

      "To lawfully stop a motor vehicle, 'a police officer must have a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is

committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons

offense.'" State v. Nyema, 465 N.J. Super. 181, 190 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting

State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)). Moreover, "an investigatory stop

is permissible 'if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530,

545-46 (2019)).    The reasonable suspicion inquiry considers the officers'

                                                                            A-1876-20
                                       14
background and training, and permits them "to draw on their own experience

and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the

cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained

person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

      Probable cause "requires 'a practical, common sense determination

whether, given all of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" State v. Myers, 442 N.J.

Super. 287, 301 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46

(2004)).

      At the time of defendant's arrest, New Jersey courts recognized "that the

smell of marijuana itself constitute[d] probable cause that a criminal offense

ha[d] been committed and that additional contraband might be present." State

v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) 2 (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502,

515-16 (2003) (holding that smell of burnt marijuana on driver's person

constituted probable cause "a criminal offense ha[s] been committed" and that

2
  Pursuant to the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance,
and Marketplace Modernization Act, N.J.S.A. 24:61-31 to -56, which became
effective on February 22, 2021, an odor of marijuana cannot create reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -
10c(a).
                                                                         A-1876-20
                                     15
the vehicle may contain "additional contraband")). The strength of the odor was

irrelevant for purposes of establishing probable cause. State v. Judge, 275 N.J.

Super. 194, 201 (App. Div. 1994).

        In Witt, our Supreme Court "announced . . . a sharp departure from a more

narrow construction of the automobile exception the Court had previously

adopted in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), and in State v. Cooke, 163

N.J. 657 (2000)." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 2019).

The Witt Court acknowledged "the unforeseeability and spontaneity of the

circumstances giving rise to probable cause, and the inherent mobility of the

automobile," and "the unanticipated circumstances that give rise to probable

cause occur swiftly." Witt, 223 N.J. at 431 (quoting Cooke, 163 N.J. at 672).

Thus,

              [i]n the aftermath of Witt, the current law of this State
              now authorizes warrantless on-the-scene searches of
              motor vehicles in situations where: (1) the police have
              probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence
              of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances giving
              rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and
              spontaneous.

              [Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. at 22 (citing Witt, 223 N.J.
              at 447-48).]

        Consequently, a warrantless roadside search of a vehicle is permissible

under the automobile exception articulated in Alston and Witt where "the

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                                        16
circumstances giving rise to probable cause" are "unforeseeable and

spontaneous" and the probable cause did not exist "well in advance" of the

search. State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 174 (2023). When the Alston/Witt test is

satisfied, a law enforcement officer has the discretion to proceed with a

warrantless roadside search or impound the vehicle and secure a warrant.

Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. at 15.

      It also is well settled that our "review of a sentencing [judge]'s imposition

of sentence is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232

N.J. 308, 318 (2018). Under this deferential standard, we "must not substitute

[our] judgment for that of the sentencing [judge]." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J.

57, 70 (2014). Instead, our role is to determine whether:

            (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
            aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
            sentencing court were not based upon competent and
            credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
            of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
            sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
            judicial conscience."

            [Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95
            N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]

      When sentencing a defendant, "judges first must identify any relevant

aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) that

apply to the case."    State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014).       Therefore, in

                                                                             A-1876-20
                                       17
reviewing a trial judge's sentencing decision, we determine "whether the

aggravating and mitigating factors found . . . were based upon competent,

credible evidence in the record." State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 140

(App. Div. 1984). We apply a deferential standard of review unless the trial

judge failed to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors; merely

enumerated them; forwent a qualitative analysis; or provided little insight into

the decision. Case, 220 N.J. at 65.

      Finally, we recognize "the standard governing the downgrading of a

defendant's sentence . . . is high." State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996).

In Megargel, our Supreme Court established the following two-part test to

justify a downgrade:     (1) "[t]he court must be 'clearly convinced that the

mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating ones'"; and (2) "the

interest of justice demand[s] a downgraded sentence." Id. at 496 (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)). In applying this test, "the severity of the crime" is "the

most . . . important factor." Id. at 500. "The reasons justifying a downgrade

must be 'compelling,' and something in addition to and separate from, the

mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors." State v.

Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Megargel, 143 N.J. at

505). "Although the degree of the crime is the focus of the sentence, facts

                                                                             A-1876-20
                                       18
personal to the defendant may be considered in the sentencing process," such as

"a defendant's role in the incident." Megargel, 143 N.J. at 501.

      Governed by these standards, we discern no basis to reverse the October

6, 2017 denial of defendant's suppression motion, nor any grounds to disturb

defendant's aggregate sentence.

      Here, the same judge presided over defendant's suppression, plea, and

sentencing hearings. As discussed, following the suppression hearing, she found

the motor vehicle stop was lawful "based on the reasonable suspicion that an

occupant of the vehicle[—defendant—]was subject to seizure for violation of

the law." The judge also concluded probable cause for the search of the Buick

was predicated on the marijuana odor detected during a lawful motor vehicle

stop to arrest defendant. Further, she found:

            this [wa]s not a planned stop and the only reason
            [Webb] requested the stop was because [defendant] was
            heading southbound in the direction of North Carolina
            and he feared [defendant] was returning home.

                  Had the stop taken place and there was no smell
            [of] marijuana[,] it would have been a brief detention
            of the motor vehicle and its occupants[,] and therefore
            [it was] not unreasonable.

      In addressing defendant's probable cause arguments, the judge also

determined Webb had "experience doing controlled burns in the Police Academy

                                                                         A-1876-20
                                      19
and transporting raw marijuana [where] a car could smell for up to two days."

Thus, she credited his testimony "that as he opened the door [of the front

passenger seat of the Buick Enclave,] he smelled a strong odor of . . . both burnt

and raw marijuana." Critically, she further found "[t]here [wa]s no evidence

before th[e c]ourt that the officers had advance knowledge that the vehicle

[defendant] was in could smell like marijuana until the motor vehicle stop," and

concluded "probable cause [for the search] arose from unforeseeable and

spontaneous circumstances."

      The judge's factual and credibility findings are well supported on the

record and entitled to our deference. Accordingly, we decline to second-guess

her legal conclusions regarding the lawfulness of the motor vehicle stop and the

search and seizure. Moreover, we agree with the judge that "probable cause [for

the search] arose from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances" so that the

search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

      We also reject defendant's sentencing arguments. The record reflects the

judge sentenced defendant only after carefully analyzing numerous aggravating

and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), including mitigating

factors raised by plea counsel. The judge also fully addressed defendant's

request to be sentenced in the second-degree range on his first-degree charges.

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                                       20
In doing so, she considered and rejected defendant's proposed mitigating factors

for the reasons we have cited. She also sufficiently detailed her reasons for

findings aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense), six (prior criminal

history), and nine (need to deter) applied. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3)(6) and (9)

before sentencing defendant consistent with his plea agreement.

      Because the judge's findings regarding the applicable aggravating factors

and non-existent mitigating factors are supported on this record, we have no

reason to disturb her sentencing decision, including her denial of defendant's

request for a downward departure under Megargel. In short, we are persuaded

the judge adhered to the sentencing guidelines, properly conducted her analysis

of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and did not err in imposing

a sentence consistent with defendant's plea agreement.

      To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments,

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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                                      21