Court Opinion

ID: 9452411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:40:09.231442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:12.512580
License: Public Domain

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
While the back door was ajar, it was not open wide enough to enable Falbaum to enter without giving it a further push. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that the wide-open-door rule sanctioned by such cases as Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 9 Cir., 352 F.2d 626; United States v. Conti, 2 Cir., 361 F.2d 153; and United States v. Williams, 6 Cir., 351 F.2d 475, is applicable. In my opinion, therefore, Falbaum broke open an outer door within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
However, I think the facts related in the majority opinion establish exigent • circumstances excusing Falbaum from giving the section 3109 notice before exercising the slight amount of force needed to push open the partly-open back door. Vanella’s hurried exit out the back door gave Falbaum reasonable cause to believe that Vanella knew that an officer was at the front door to arrest him. Fal-baum tried to stop Vanella to talk with him, the fair inference being that, if afforded the opportunity, he would have given Vanella further notice of what Va-nella apparently already knew.
When Vanella, instead of stopping, turned around and ran back into the house, Falbaum was entitled to believe that Vanella was either seeking a means of escape through some other exit, or desired to destroy articles which, had Va-nella been arrested, Falbaum would have been entitled to seize. Falbaum’s entry through the partially open back door was thus in hot pursuit of a man who undoubtedly already knew his arrest was being sought. In my opinion, Falbaum was entitled to continue that pursuit by pushing open the door, without shouting notice of his authority and purpose to the rapidly receding figure of Vanella.
In all other respects I concur in the views expressed in the majority opinion.