Court Opinion

ID: 9571988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:37:06.947659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:17.484135
License: Public Domain

*520DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 82. (concurring). The majority opinion and Justice Bradley's concurrence conclude that a "numbers jury" is not an "anonymous jury" as that term is understood in the case law. Majority op., ¶ 11; Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶ 50, 53. I agree. No juror information was withheld from anyone in this case. The circuit court merely instructed the attorneys to refer to the jurors by number rather than name during voir dire, consistent with the circuit court's standard practice for cases of this type. The parties and the public had unrestricted access to all juror identifying information. As such, the anonymous jury case law does not apply.
¶ 83. The majority opinion nevertheless applies the anonymous jury case law, assumes that the presumption of innocence has been violated, and imposes the procedural requirements prescribed by the inapplicable anonymous jury cases, thereby prohibiting any voir dire by number in this state unless there is 1) an individualized determination of a need for juror protection; and 2) a precautionary instruction to protect against any negative reflection on the defendant. Majority op., ¶¶ 12-27.1 cannot agree with this approach.
¶ 84. Voir dire by number does not implicate the presumption of innocence in the same way that the cases have assumed the use of an anonymous jury does. It has not been demonstrated — in this case or in the case law — that mere voir dire by number, without any restriction on access to juror information, has any serious adverse impact on the presumption of innocence. Any suggestion that it does is pure speculation. Indeed, the majority engages in no evaluation of this point at all, but merely extrapolates a presumption of innocence/due process violation from cases that in*521volved true anonymous juries rather than the far more innocuous practice of voir dire by number.
¶ 85. Our courthouses today are equipped with various security precautions — metal detectors at courthouse entrances, security glass in individual courtrooms, armed deputy sheriffs in the courtroom and in the courthouse hallways — all of which suggest at least some level of risk to the people who work and visit there, including the jurors. It cannot seriously he suggested that the presumption of innocence has necessarily been compromised by the use of any of these sorts of generalized protections. Certain special security precautions are sometimes taken in individual cases, such as posting extra deputies in the courtroom, without encumbering the presumption of innocence or requiring particularized due process justifications. Voir dire by number (if a circuit court chooses to use this technique) falls within this category of routine security measures, whether used as a general practice, in a certain class of cases, or case-by-case.
¶ 86. In my view, voir dire by number, without any other restriction on the scope of voir dire or the parties' or the public's access to juror identifying information, does not rise to the level of an encumbrance on the presumption of innocence so as to implicate the defendant's right to due process. In answer to the certified questions in this case, I would clarify that a "numbers jury" is not an "anonymous jury" within the meaning of State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996) or the federal case law cited by the majority and concurring opinions.
¶ 87. Because voir dire by number is not the equivalent of an anonymous jury, the presumption of innocence has not been undermined and there is no need to impose any particularized due process prereq*522uisites upon a decision to conduct voir dire by number, either as a general practice or in an individual case. Accordingly, there is no error, and therefore no need to inquire into the applicability of harmless error analysis.