Court Opinion

ID: 9603862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:10:30.282759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:12.322840
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe the punitive damages awarded in this case were excessive, I respectfully dissent.
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408 (123 SC 1513, 1519-1520, 155 LE2d 585) (2003).
As stated by the majority, courts reviewing punitive damage awards are to consider three guideposts: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm, supra at 1520.
“The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State Farm, supra at 1521. In determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions, courts must consider whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved *351repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id.
In the instant case, only the first two of these five factors were present. There was no evidence that the victim was financially vulnerable. In addition, this was an isolated incident; Craig had no previous arrests for DUI. And, the harm was the result of an accident, not intentional malice, trickery, or deceit.
Looking at the second Gore guidepost, we note that the Supreme Court has “been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.” State Farm, supra at 1524. The Court has stated, however, that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process” and “an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Id.
In this case, compensatory damages were $8,801 and the punitive damages were $200,000; thus, the punitive damages awarded were over 22 times the amount of compensatory damages.
Moreover, the majority seeks to negate the disparity between the two awards by leaping to the conclusion that Holsey could have died in this accident and cites to compensatory damages in wrongful death cases as analogous to the potential damages in this case. Although driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs is always dangerous and there is always a chance that a traffic accident can be fatal, this analogy is not helpful and the majority cites to no authority on point which would support this assumption. The only authority cited is Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga. 613 (409 SE2d 501) (1991), which was decided before the recent United States Supreme Court holdings and specifically rejects “the notion that punitive damages must necessarily bear some relationship to the actual damages awarded by the jury.” Id. at 614.
In the case before us, the evidence was that there were two people in the car that Craig hit from behind. There was no evidence at trial that the driver suffered any injuries and Holsey, the passenger, had back and neck strain which appeared to have resolved itself at the time of trial. This was not a potentially fatal accident nor is it a potential wrongful death case.
As to the third factor, the disparity between the punitive damages and any penalties provided for in comparable cases, the majority acknowledges that there is a great disparity here and therefore, the third guidepost’s requirement is not met.
*352Decided November 25, 2003
Mabry & McClelland, James T. Budd, Brian W. Sprinkle, for appellant.
Mathis & Adams, Charles A. Mathis, Jr., Andrew B. Koplan, Aileen R. Page, Cash, Krugler & Fredericks, David N. Krugler, for appellee.
When an appellant brings a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court is required to conduct a de novo review of the punitive damages awarded and reverse an award “imposed indiscriminately” which constitutes an “arbitrary deprivation of property.” State Farm, supra at 1520. In this case, of the three guideposts set out by Gore, the last two are not met, and only two of the five factors to be considered are present in the first one. Accordingly, the punitive damages awarded in this case were excessive and the judgment should be reversed.