Court Opinion

ID: 9571897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:07.568658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:08.943828
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I agree that Minn.Stat. § 259.28, subd. 2 creates an impermissible racial classification and is unconstitutional. I disagree with the majority's affirmance of the result in this case on the ground that the trial court conducted an alternate “best interests’’ analysis. In fact, the proceedings were limited to whether there was “good cause” not to apply the relative preference under the statute we have now found unconstitutional. Because the trial court’s refusal to consider appellants’ petition resulted in the exclusion of certain evidence and the skewing of the weight afforded to other evidence, a new trial is necessary. I therefore respectfully dissent.
1. The majority concludes the trial court acted within its discretion in choosing to entertain only the petition of respondent grandparents. I disagree. In this case, appellants’ petition was filed first. The grandparents were allowed to intervene in the proceeding to consider appellants’ petition. Despite this posture, the trial court issued an order only a few days before trial limiting the evidence to the issue of whether there was good cause not to grant the grandparents’ petition.
By preliminarily barring evidence in support of appellants’ petition, the trial court rendered it impossible to make a reasoned determination of D.L.’s best interests based on all of the relevant evidence. Moreover, the trial court’s focus on whether there was good cause not to place D.L. with her grandparents may well have affected the court's evaluation of critical evidence on the effect of the disruption of the primary caretaker bond. The experts agreed that D.L. will be psychologically damaged if removed from appellants’ care, but disagreed as to the likelihood of long term damage. The evidence respondents presented that D.L. will not be permanently harmed would be of less weight in an inquiry where her best interests is the only issue.
2. Further, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there is a “common law” preference for near relatives in adoption proceedings. The power to decree an adoption is purely statutory and the statute is the measure of the court’s authority. In re Jordet, 248 Minn. 433, 439, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (1957). Without statutory authorization, no preference for near relatives may be applied.
The majority seeks to extend the common law preference for near relative placement in custody proceedings to adoption proceedings. The common law custody preference fostered the goal of preserving the family unit while parental rights continued. The adoption statute, by contrast, seeks to provide a permanent family relationship for children only after the biological parents’ rights have been terminated. To achieve this purpose, the act severs all biological relationships and creates a new parent/child relationship with a new family and new relatives. See Minn. Stat. § 259.29, subd. 1 (1990).
Accordingly, our supreme court has not recognized a near relative preference in adoption proceedings. See In re Niskanen, 301 Minn. 53, 55, 223 N.W.2d 754, 756 (1974) (in adoption contest between foster parents and grandmother, no presumption such as that in favor of a natural parent is applicable to any of the petitioners, since parental rights have been terminated). The majority’s attempt in this case to construct a nonstatutory relative adoptive *417preference is contrary to the clear import of Niskanen.
In summary, the trial court explicitly limited the proceedings here to the issue of whether the statutory relative preference should apply. Our determination that the standard on which the trial court relied is unconstitutional compels a remand for consideration under a true “best interests” standard. Although I recognize the need for certainty for D.L., the importance of determining her permanent home based on all the relevant evidence and according to the proper standard justifies the delay that would be caused by further proceedings. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.