Court Opinion

ID: 9860602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:26:58.34574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:28.906631
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SIMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the conclusions of the majority except for its determination that the allegation that the defendants were negligent in requiring the plaintiff to play on a synthetic turf which was improperly constructed, installed or maintained did not state a cause of action. The plaintiff’s allegations that he was furnished improperly designed protective clothing and his allegations with respect to the condition of the synthetic turf are prefaced by identical language. The specific allegation concerning the equipment is that the defendants: “Provided to the plaintiff and required the plaintiff to use improperly designed, obsolete, worn, defective or dangerous football helmet, face-mask, padding, football clothing and other equipment.” Similarly, the allegation concerning the artificial turf reads that the defendants: “Required the plaintiff to play in the aforesaid varsity football game on October 4, 1974, on a synthetic turf field which was improperly constructed, installed and maintained.” I believe both of these allegations state the defendants failed to provide safe conditions under which to play. The faulty equipment furnished in the one case was the protective clothing with which the student played; in the other, it was the unsafe field on which he played. Since the defendants’ alleged negligence in failing to inspect and test the clothing and equipment furnished gives rise to a cause of action as stated by Gerrity and the majority here, the defendants should be equally responsible when the defect that gives rise to injury results from the defendants’ failure to inspect and test the playing field surface. A playing field is just as much a part of the equipment used by a football team as is a helmet, especially as far as its potential for causing injury and the need for proper inspection of it is concerned. Also, I disagree with the majority’s reading of section 3—106 of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 85, par. 3—106), a reading which bars the action the plaintiff alleges with respect to the synthetic turf at Hanson Stadium. I interpret the statute on which the majority relies as applicable to parks, playgrounds and open areas used for recreational purposes, which are generally open for use and enjoyment by the general public. I see no justification for extending it to cover a stadium such as Hanson Stadium, which is utilized by the Board of Education primarily or exclusively for competitive athletic team events at which entry is restricted to those who pay admission fees. There is nothing in the record which indicates that Hanson Stadium was a park, playground or open area available for use and enjoyment by the public in general except for the opportunity to be spectators at athletic events when an admission fee was paid. Thus, I would reverse and remand for the additional reason that the allegations of the plaintiff’s amended complaint that defendants were negligent in providing the plaintiff with an improperly constructed, installed and maintained playing surface is also approved by the Gerrity reasoning.