Court Opinion

ID: 9812838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:49:42.907127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:49.184956
License: Public Domain

*15MerriíioN, C. J.
(dissenting): Generally, a party to an action may, but he is not bound to, become a witness in his own behalf on the trial, ami that he does not ordinarily creates no presumption to his prejudice, nor is the fact that he does not the proper subject of comment to the jury by counsel in his argument to them upon the evidence. But when the evidence tends to prove material facts to the prejudice of a party as to facts, matters and things apparently within his knowledge, or that ought so to be, and he could contradict, modify or explain such adverse evidence, and he is present at the trial, or might conv» niently be, and he fails to testify, as he might do, that lie does not, is a subject fairly to be commented upon by the opposing party If a party can, and has opportunity to, contradict, modify or explain any evidence produced on the trial to his prejudice, and he will not, the fair and reasonable inference is that he cannot, such inference being more or less strong, according to the attending circumstances. A party should, in justice to the Court and jury, as well as to himself, produce competent evidence to prove his side of the case as clearly a.id strongly as he well can, without regard to a very nice or fanciful sense of delicacy on his part as to becoming a witness in his own behalf. A judicial trial is practical and earnest, and the purpose is to truly ascertain the material facts in issue, and to this end all, certainly sufficient, competent evidence should be produced, whether the witnesses be the parlies or otherwise. It is strong circumstantial evidence against a party that he omits to give evidence to repel circumstances and evidence to his prejudice which he has power to produce and will not, and it is not otherwise when he may do so by himself as a witness and will not. What I have thus said is fully sustained by what is decided and said, pertinent here, in Goodman v. Sapp, 102 N. C , 477; Chambers v. Greenwood, 68 N. C., 274; Gragg v. Wagner, 77 N. C , 246; Black v. Wright, 9 Ired., 447.
*16In ihis case, I am of opinion that the failure of the defendant to become a witness in his own behalf would have been a subj< ct of fair comment but for the important fact that the plaintiff himself examined him before the trial, as allowed by the statute (The Code, §§581, 582), and his examination was duly filed by the Clerk before whom the same was taken. That examination was very thorough and searching, embracing, substantially and very fully, the matters and things as to which the plaintiff’s counsel complained he had not testified about on the trial, as he might have done. The plaintiff did not put such examination in evidence on the trial, as he had the right to do, but the defendant did, as he might do. The statute (The Code, §582) expressly provides that such examination “ may be read by either party on the trial.” It was evidence for the defendant, subject to be rebutted by adverse testimony of the plaintiff, and commented upon by counsel to the jury. While the defendant was not examined before the jury, he was examined in a way allowed by law, and his evidence was before them for all pertinent purposes. Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s counsel was allowed to make strong and prolonged comments, not simply upon his testimony as given, but as well upon the fact that he was not again examined, and in the presence of the jury. He and his counsel, no doubt, thought that the examination of him by the plaintiff was full and sufficient.
Inasmuch as the defendant had thus been examined, I think the Court erred in allowing the counsel to complain and comment and lay great stress,upon the fact that he was not examined, at his own instance, in the presence of a jury. It is altogether probable that the very forcible comment had undue weight with them. The clear tendency of it was to strongly incline and prejudice them against the defendant because he had not been re-examined before them, when, in fact, he had been examined very thoroughly by the plaintiff in a way he chose, and that examination was before them *17to be commented upon by counsel. It might be that if the plaintiff had, before the introduction of evidence on the trial was closed, notified the defendant bis counsel would comment on the fact that he abstained from going on the witness-stand before the jury, that the case would be different. But that case is not presented
Per Curiam. Affirmed.