Court Opinion

ID: 9523808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:47:04.938677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:54.962695
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(dissenting). There is ample record support for the judge’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s discharge was made in circumstances that entitle her to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). “[T]he defendant’s performance of a public function and the substantial involvement of the State, through the Springfield Juvenile Court, in its affairs establish ‘a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the [defendant’s] challenged action ... so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 643 (1982) (Greaney, J., dissenting), quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
The plaintiff was hired in 1971 by the Juvenile Court as a social worker and assigned to the intensive juvenile probation program. In 1972, in order to increase its financial flexibility, this program was incorporated as YDP. YDP’s incorporation was expressly approved by the Juvenile Court judge and the chief probation officer. After incorporation, the plaintiff was transferred from the court’s staff to YDP’s staff and sworn as a deputy probation officer of the Juvenile Court. See G. L. c. 276, § 89A. The plaintiff, as a YDP employee, continued to perform the same tasks she had performed when employed by the court.
*661The plaintiffs duties at the court and at YDP required investigations of probationers and the monitoring of their progress in school, duties imposed by statute on juvenile probation officers. See G. L. c. 119, § 57.1 In performing her job, the plaintiff had access to court records and school records. Such records are not available to the public (which, of course, includes private contractors). See G. L. c. 119, § 60A.2
The court’s view that YDP “engaged in innovative counseling, recreational and educational programs not normally associated with traditional probation,”3 supra at 655, is contradicted by the facts. The plaintiff’s functions as a YDP employee were performed by her as an employee of the Springfield Juvenile Court probation department in 1971. The judge found that the plaintiff’s services if “not identical to, complement the service[s] of the Juvenile Court Probation Department” as required by the statutes of this Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 119, §§ 57-59, 62, 67, and 68. See also G. L. c. 119, § 60A.
*662The Commonwealth paid for YDP, allowed YDP access to confidential records, relied on YDP reports in the sentencing of juveniles, and swore in YDP staff as deputy probation officers so that children “in the care of probation officers . . . may receive to a greater degree individual attention and guidance.” G. L. c. 276, § 89A, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 478, § 292. The functions of YDP were the same as those required of probation officers under G. L. c. 119, § 57. In sum, the plaintiff performed functions that were traditional and exclusive functions of State government. The plaintiffs firing, therefore, constituted State action. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-353 (1974).
The facts also support the conclusion that YDP was an integral part of the Springfield Juvenile Court, clearly a State agency. YDP had as one of its incorporators the judge of the Juvenile Court, as well as two other persons with supervisory positions with that court. At the time the plaintiff was fired, five of the nine directors were State officials or were public employees.4 I think it highly unlikely that a private contractor would have permitted a majority of its board of directors to be public officials or public employees.
The function of the Intensive Juvenile Probation Program of YDP was, as the name implied, to provide probationers with intensive probation. The program to which the plaintiff was assigned was subject “in all phases, to the final approval of the presiding justice of the Springfield Juvenile Court. . . which [included] policy, programming, and personnel.” The judge of the Juvenile Court was YDP’s first president, and he remained on its board until June, 1979. The functions of YDP could not be performed were it not for the power of the Juvenile Court to investigate youthful offenders, amass probation records, authorize use of these records by other public agencies, and offer youthful offen*663ders a chance to participate in these programs, rather than be committed to the Department of Youth Services.
The plaintiff was paid by checks issued by the State Treasurer’s office. Although the plaintiff was listed as a “nonemployee,” her W-2 statements identified the Commonwealth as her “employer” and no FICA deductions were taken from her checks. The plaintiff was given an official State title, Commonwealth letterhead and business cards, and the authority to report to the court on a child’s behavior. The evidence supports a conclusion that there was “a close, working partnership between the Juvenile Court and the defendant in which the latter’s freedom of decision making was circumscribed by State officers of the Juvenile Court who possessed, and exercised, the power to approve its staffing, policies, and operating methodology.” Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 646 (1982) (Greaney, J., dissenting). The facts establish a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the discharge of the plaintiff so that acts of YDP may be considered those of the State. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838-839 n.6 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
This case is clearly distinguishable from Rendell-Baker, supra, and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), on which the court relies. In Rendell-Baker, the claim of State action was limited to funding and regulation. In the instant case, in addition to funding and regulation, the plaintiff was cloaked with the authority of an official of the Juvenile Court probation department and had the same responsibilities as a State court probation officer. She had access to nonpublic information. Further, the plaintiff performed the same services for YDP as she did for the court. In contrast, the school in Rendell-Baker was founded as a private institution, and no member of the board was chosen by a public official or was a public official. Nor was there any evidence that the employees were sworn as public officials or that they exercised State authority. See Rendell-Baker, supra at 832. In Blum v. Yaretsky, supra at 1005, the con*664tested actions were done by private nursing homes and private physicians, who received funding from the State, and who were regulated by the State. In Blum, RendellBaker, and the other examples of nonexclusive activities cited by the court, supra at 655 n.2, the services could be provided by private contractors to the public or to private persons. In the instant case, probation services are provided by courts in lieu of other sentences for those convicted or found delinquent by the criminal or juvenile justice systems. Court probation services are not services provided by private contractors. Rather, they are exclusive State public services used by courts.
The State dominated YDP. The nexus between YDP and the Juvenile Court was substantial. YDP was accountable exclusively to the Juvenile Court, its employees had official State titles and had no private function. The plaintiff lost her State position as a deputy probation officer as a result of her discharge. Thus, it is irrelevant that the three court officials did not participate in the actual firing. What this court apparently now thinks is that Rendell-Baker requires the discharge be accomplished by a State official. The court’s interpretation of Rendell-Baker is far narrower than the Supreme Court’s view that the conduct merely be “fairly attributable to the State.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra at 838, quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Neither Rendell-Baker nor Blum changed the prior law. In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court “considered each of the factors alleged by the petitioners ... [to determine whether] the discharge decisions . . . [were] fairly attributable to the State.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra at 840 (e.g., funding, id. at 840; regulation, id. at 841; public function, id. at 842; and “symbiotic relationship,” id. at 842-843). The flaw in the court’s opinion is that it fails to consider the various factors and isolates the firing from the totality of the facts. I conclude YDP’s action in firing the plaintiff is chargeable to the State and thus constitutes State action. I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

 General Laws c. 119, § 57, as amended by St. 1973, c. 1073, § 12, requires that “[ejvery case of a delinquent child shall be investigated by the probation officer, who shall make a report regarding the character of such child, his school record, home surroundings and the previous complaints against him, if any.”

 “The records of the court, including those of a juvenile appeals session, in all cases of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine, inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent of a justice of such court . . . .” G. L. c. 119, § 60A, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 478, § 59. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 858 n.10, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 894 (1980), S.C. 383 Mass. 838 (1981), rev’d, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (The purpose of the statute is “to protect the identity of minors ... to prevent stigmatization of minors and to encourage rehabilitation,” an objective hard to realize if the records are made available to private contractors). See also 603 Code Mass. Regs. 23.07 (4)(b) and (2)(d) (1978) (school records [obtained by plaintiff] are not available to the public).

In Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651 (1959), we recognized that the provisions governing delinquent children required “basic changes in the traditional method of dealing with criminal offenders [which] have been made in the case of juveniles.” Thus, I see no merit to the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs services were not “traditional probation.”

 The chief probation officer of the Juvenile Court, the assistant chief probation officer, the assistant clerk magistrate of the Juvenile Court, the principal planner of the criminal justice office for the city of Springfield, and an employee of the Department of Youth Services. Three of the five were court employees.