Court Opinion

ID: 9513690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:39:07.702788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:58.256940
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 24] I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion, although of somewhat limited effect because of the 1999 Amendment to N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05, providing that child support judgments are not to be cancelled, see Ruscheinsky v. Ulrich, 2000 ND 133, ¶ 9, 612 N.W.2d 283, relies on State v. Davenport, 536 N.W.2d 686 (N.D.1995) to reach its conclusion that UIFSA is to be applied retroactively. In Davenport, a majority of the court, relying on In re W.M.V., 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1978), concluded a statute can be applied retroactively if there is an implied intent to apply it retroactively.
*18[¶ 25] • I dissented in Davenport, as did Justice Beryl Levine, because the majority in that case relied on W.M.V. and ignored Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237 (N.D.1979), which held that in view of N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10, which orders that no part of the Code is retroactive unless it is especially declared to be so, all statutes, substantive or procedural, are to be applied prospectively unless the Legislature clearly expresses they are to be applied retroactively. In Reiling, we reviewed prior case law, noting that while substantive statutes have not been applied retroactively without a clear expression of legislative intent to do so, Id. at 238-39, the issue of retroactivity of procedural statutes “has received different interpretations in the past.” Id. at 240. In adopting a narrow interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10, which would make it applicable to substantive and procedural statutes, the Reiling court stated:
A narrow interpretation of § 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., clearly presents the better rule. In enacting the statute the legislature intended to have no statute apply retroactively unless it specifically provides that it is to apply retroactively. By giving § 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., a narrow interpretation in this case, the legislature will be given notice that it must specifically state that a statute is to apply retroactively if the legislature desires it to apply retroactively.
Id. at 240 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). Thus, Reiling, relying on N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10, establishes a presumption that a statute is not to be applied retroactively in the absence of a specific legislative statement to the contrary.
[¶ 26] Reiling was decided in 1979, but today, because of the mischief of the Davenport opinion, the majority continues to find legislative intent by implication, in this case from decisions in other jurisdictions which applied UIFSA retroactively. That implied intent is a far cry from specific statements referred to in Reiling.
[¶ 27] In truth, it appears the majority has abandoned the Reiling requirement and I fear that the Court will, in the future, be looking in corners and under rocks to find by implication the express intent required by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10 to apply a statute retroactively.
[¶28] I would reverse the decision of the district court.
[¶ 29] Gerald W. Vande Walle