Court Opinion

ID: 9955867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:00:44.399999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:32.195939
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHAD D. BEGAY,                                  No. 23-15013

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:22-cv-08051-DLR-MHB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
WINSLOW, CITY OF; CARL
CALNIMPTEWA,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      Chad D. Begay appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

as untimely his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an excessive force claim arising

out of his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal as time-barred

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and equitable tolling analysis where relevant facts are undisputed); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Begay’s action because his claim was

barred by the statute of limitations and Begay did not allege facts sufficient to

establish equitable tolling. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury claim); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 394

(2007) (federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations for

personal injury actions and borrow applicable tolling provisions from state law);

Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998) (unsound mind equitable tolling may

not be established by “conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable

to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities” but rather requires

plaintiff to provide “specific facts”).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Begay’s post-

judgment motion because Begay failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth the standard of review and grounds for reconsideration

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)).

      We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not

                                           2                                    23-15013
consider documents not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias,

921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

      AFFIRMED.

                                         3                                   23-15013