Court Opinion

ID: 9619404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:27:26.219291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:46.923239
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
The opinion by the Chief Justice reaches the correct result, but in my view does not respond to the issue addressed by the parties.
An element of requested damages in the plaintiffs’ complaint is alleged diminution in the value of the plaintiffs’ lands caused by the threat and risk of anticipated future flooding. The issue on appeal is alleged error in the court’s holding in a summary judgment proceeding that “[t]here is no indication in the record before the court that future flooding is an inevitable consequence of the existence of the sewage treatment lagoons. In the absence of clear proof that the flooding problem is certain, it is improper to characterize the injury as permanent.”
On a motion for summary judgment the evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom will be construed most favorably toward the nonmoving party, Taylor v. Choules, 102 Idaho 222, 628 P.2d 1056 (1981); Palmer v. Idaho Bank & Trust of Kooskia, 100 Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597 (1979); McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979).
The plaintiffs, in support of their claim of error, point to this deposition testimony of their engineer, Mr. Williams:
“A. My opinion, based upon what I observed and based upon what I would project as the deterioration of the soil cement, if something is not done to correct that condition, and the action of the rodents, if something is not done to correct that condition, and the potential for wave action, if something is not done to correct that, I would say that failure is inevitable.
“Q. When you make the statement that repair of the soil cement lining would be necessary to preserve the integrity of these sewage lagoons, is that to state that effectively what need to be done is to redesign, re-engineer and reconstruct the lining of the entire sewage lagoon system?
(Objection and ruling omitted.)
“A. Yes.
“Q. Based upon the facts available to you at this moment, and without drawing any assumptions as to future conduct of any party, is there a significant risk that, because of the defects you have testified to, the lagoons will breach sometime in the future?
“A. Yes.
*531Q. Well, it’s true, is it not, that soil cement does require some upkeep to keep it in good condition?
“A. On the inside of those cells, there’s practically no way to provide upkeep for them. The material is deteriorating. There’s no way to put it back.
“Q. Well, you were anticipating, I guess, a few questions down the line. But if we were starting from scratch and the soil cement was new, you can maintain it, can you not?
“A. No, I don’t agree that it can be maintained under these conditions.
“Q. What is it about these particular conditions that prevent the soil cement from being maintained?
“A. The weather conditions of freezing and thawing, and water action.” (Emphasis added.)
This, so plaintiffs contend, establishes a genuine issue as to the risk of future flooding. Plaintiffs’ appraisers in turn, accepting that the engineer’s testimony was sufficient, did testify to significant diminished values on the two properties involved.
On the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Williams, who was the only engineer expert who testified, on cross-examination was perhaps a bit contradicting of his direct testimony:
“Q. Assuming that the conditions [of the structure of the Rupert sewage lagoon] remain the same, isn’t it more likely than not that the lagoons will stand and not break?
“A. Well, I would say, to say more likely than not, I don’t like to make that distinction, but I am saying that they are relatively safe under the present conditions.
“A. In my opinion, right now the embankments [of the Rupert sewage lagoon] appear to be in relatively stable condition. I do not see any immediate danger of failure.
“Q. At this time, do the structures present, in your opinion as an engineer, at this moment, an unreasonable risk of flooding at this time?
“A. Not today.
“Q. Yes, assuming the conditions [of the Rupert sewage lagoon] as they exist now, as you apparently observed them, continue, how likely [to breach again]?
“A. Under today’s conditions, not likely.
“Q. It’s not likely that it [the Rupert sewage lagoon] will fail?
“A. No.”
The City of Rupert points directly to the issue on appeal:
“The Court should note that the only area of damages before it on this appeal concern Plaintiffs’ claim that because the property has flooded, and because it allegedly might flood again, potential buyers of the property would be unwilling to pay what otherwise would be its fair market value. The $60,000 figure is the diminution claimed by Shaw while Crane prays for $130,000 for this type of damage. The trial court has allowed the other damage claims to go forward. These claims involve the actual physical damage to the property, potential loss of productivity, crop loss and the like.
“Plaintiffs’ claim for these losses is based upon the fact of the flood, the possibility that the lagoon system might release water and flood the property again, the notoriety of this flooding, and the alleged detrimental effect that it might have on the market value of the property. Since the breach Plaintiffs have not attempted, and do not intend at this time, to sell their property.
“It should be noted, in passing, that Plaintiffs argue that although the structure is now safe, as Mr. Williams, their engineer, testified, it will become unsafe in the future because the City of Rupert, through improper maintenance and failure to repair, will allow the structure to become unsafe such that it will flood again.”
The contractor defendant relies on Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 92 N.E. 500 (Mass.1910), and Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Kerns, 164 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir.1947), and Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. *532558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971), for the proposition that apprehension of future injury will not sustain a claim of permanent injury. The engineering firm defendant urges in its brief that “the record establishes that plaintiffs cannot prove the probability that a flood will occur in the future.”1
From the reading of the briefs it appears that the parties involved and the court below used probable, certain, and possible as more or less interchangably. No issue has been raised that the court erred in requiring certainty as to future injury. The issue presented hinges on the direct testimony of the engineer, which, though open to the challenge that it is conflicting and self-contradictory, nevertheless on a motion for summary judgment does raise a genuine triable issue of fact to be resolved at trial. In further proceedings it is suggested by the Chief Justice that the proper test to be applied as to establishing the threat and risk of future flooding, however, is one of a reasonable degree of probability, and not one of certainty. I do not disagree, but did not perceive that such was the heart of the controversy.
Where “probability,” in another context, has come before the Court, resort has been made to Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition, where it has been given a meaning of “having more evidence for than against.” Dean v. Dravo Corp., 95 Idaho 558, 511 P.2d 1334 (1973), also citing other authority utilizing almost the same language. Id. at 562, 511 P.2d at 1337. The word “certain,” as used by the trial court, does not appear to be a term much used in civil jurisprudence, and as to what extent it would be said to require greater proof than “probable,” we are not called upon to venture — noting as aforesaid that in the proceedings below and in the briefs filed in this Court there has not been any apparent disagreement between the parties.
On Rehearing. In keeping with my recently expressed belief that there are occasions when appellate courts on rehearing should not ordinarily withdraw and discard their first opinions — which may be perceived as a belief that better insight is thus had in the evolvement of the final opinion stating the law of the case — I stand by my earlier opinion, supra, and offer these additional comments.
As I hoped to make clear earlier, the damages sought are for alleged diminution in value of plaintiffs’ lands allegedly caused by the threat and risk of anticipated future flooding. Damages are not sought presently for injuries which may be caused by future flooding, but for diminution in present market value attributable to the threat. The situation here would be similar to the erection by Brown of an eighteen-story building adjacent to White’s cottage, the problem being a mistake in construction which leaves Brown’s building with a ten degree list in the direction of White’s cottage. A drop in the market value of White’s cottage is not open to challenge. Yet the eighteen-story building may stand a long time before it topples over onto the cottage. Meanwhile, so it seems to me, as it also seems where a residence is threatened by the eruption of a volcano, the market value is affected downward. While it is not likely that a responsible defendant can be found regarding the volcano, in this case before us, as with the leaning skyscraper, defendants are about who can respond in damages, if damages can be proven, and if liability is established.
While there may be some merit in Justice Bakes’ view that summary judgment as to the designer and the builder should be affirmed, all considered, however, as with the eighteen-story building which started listing, all of those connected with the construction of the lagoon appear to be properly joined in this action — the purpose of which is not to establish present damages for a future flood, but to obtain present damages for diminished market value. One could also believe that the City of *533Rupert would interplead the designer and the builder if the latter two were allowed out on their motions aimed at the plaintiffs.
Continuing to adhere to the belief that the issues raised should be resolved at trial, I have joined the Court’s opinion.

. FOOTNOTE ADDED ON REHEARING. The district court also relied on those cases for the proposition that speculative and conjectural damages cannot be obtained, and that injury to the reputation of land would be too speculative and too uncertain.