Court Opinion

ID: 9916756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:01:30.735727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:57.562403
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________
                                          )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 )
                                          )
                                          )
            v.                            )                    Criminal No. 21-cr-354 (APM)
                                          )
THOMAS B. ADAMS, JR,                      )
                                          )
      Defendant.                          )
_________________________________________ )

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                                  I.

       On January 30, 2023, following a stipulated bench trial, the court found Defendant

Thomas B. Adams, Jr. guilty of (1) obstruction of an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(c)(2) (Count One) and (2) entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) (Count Two). On June 16, 2023, the court sentenced

Defendant to 14 months of incarceration and three years of supervised release on Count One and

12 months of incarceration and one year of supervised release on Count Two, with each term of

incarceration and supervised release to run concurrently. Defendant self-surrendered to the Bureau

of Prisons on August 5, 2023, and has remained detained since then.

       Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Release Pending Appeal, ECF No. 82

[hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.

                                                  II.

       Under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1), a court “shall order the release” of an individual pending

appeal if it finds: “(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose

a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released”; and “(B) that the appeal
is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in,”

as relevant here, “(i) reversal . . . . [or] (iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than

the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.”

       The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant is not likely to flee and

would not pose a danger if released. Defendant lacks the financial resources to flee and has strong

community ties. Presentence Investigation Report, ECF No. 64 [hereinafter PSR], at 22–25, 29–

30. He also appeared at all court hearings, whether in person or remotely. Although he has some

criminal history, including charges for burglary, those offenses occurred over 20 years ago when

he was under 21 years old. Id. at 15–17. His more recent offenses are of the substance use variety,

including two violations for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 17–19. Defendant also had a stable

residence and was employed before his incarceration. Id. at 24, 27. Notwithstanding his history

of substance use, id. at 26–27, including while this case was pending, the court found at sentencing

that Defendant was not a threat to the community and permitted him to self-surrender. Sentencing

Hr’g Tr., June 16, 2023 [hereinafter Sentencing Hr’g Tr.], at 78. There is no indication of recent

violence or other criminal activity that would disturb these findings.

       The court also finds that Defendant’s appeal is not for the purpose of delay.

                                                  III.

       The government contests whether Defendant’s appeal raises a substantial question of law.

Gov’t Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 83 [hereinafter Gov’t Opp’n], at 3–4. Defendant intends to

raise on appeal that his conduct falls outside the scope of § 1512(c)(2). Def.’s Mot. at 6–7.

Defendant argued before this court that he did not obstruct an official proceeding because he did

not take “some action with respect to a document, record, or some other object.” Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss Count One: Obstruction of an Official Proceeding, ECF No. 35, at 9–13. The court

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rejected his reading of the statute, Order, ECF No. 48, at 1–2, as did a divided panel of the D.C.

Circuit in United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). But the Supreme Court recently

granted certiorari in Fischer to resolve whether § 1512(c)(2) covers “acts unrelated to

investigations and evidence,” which prompted the instant motion. Fischer v. United States,

No. 23-5572, 2023 WL 8605748 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2023); Petition for Certiorari, Fischer v. United

States, No. 23-5572 (filed Sept. 11, 2023).

       A “substantial question of law” for purposes of § 3143(b) means a “close question or one

that very well could be decided the other way.” United States v. Perholtz, 836 F.2d 554, 555 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question of whether Defendant’s admitted

conduct violates § 1512(c)(2) meets this standard. To be sure, as the government argues, the

Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Fischer does not mean Defendant’s conviction will

be vacated. Gov’t Opp’n at 4. However, it takes four justices to grant certiorari and, although this

court will not attempt to read tea leaves, the Supreme Court’s decision to review Fischer means,

at a minimum, that this case poses a “close question.”

                                                IV.

       The court now considers whether a favorable outcome in Fischer is “likely to result in” a

“reversal . . . [or] a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time

already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.” 18 U.S.C. § § 3143(b)(1). If the

defense prevails in Fischer, Defendant’s § 1512(c)(2) conviction will be vacated. But Defendant

also stands guilty of a second count of entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds

under § 1752(a)(1), a misdemeanor for which he received a statutory maximum 12-month

sentence. Defendant thus far has served over five months of his sentence. See Def.’s Mot. at 9. If

the Supreme Court were to issue a favorable ruling in Fischer near the end of its term in June 2024,

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at that point Defendant will have served approximately 11 months. So, the question becomes

whether a reversal of Defendant’s § 1512(c)(2) conviction would result in a “reduced sentence to

a term of imprisonment” of less than 11 months. The court finds that it would.

         Due to his § 1512(c)(2) conviction, the court determined Defendant’s guidelines range to

be 30 to 37 months. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 38–40. That range was based on a Criminal History

Category III and a total offense level of 17.1 Two of Defendant’s criminal history points were due

to “status points.” PSR at 20. Because the recent Sentencing Guidelines’ “status points”

amendment had yet to come into effect, for the purpose of considering a variance, the court treated

Defendant as a Category II offender, reducing the guidelines range to 27 to 33 months. Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. at 38. The court’s below-guidelines sentence of 14 months reflected a balancing of the

§ 3553(a) factors, with particular emphasis on Defendant’s history and characteristics and avoiding

unwarranted disparities. Id. at 63–74.

         The applicable guidelines range would look quite different without a § 1512(c)(2) felony

conviction. The base offense level for Count Two is a four. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.3(a) (trespass). Two

points would be added because the entry occurred on a “restricted building or grounds.” Id.

§ 2B2.3(b)(1)(A)(vii). Defendant would not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility

for the reasons discussed above, see supra note 1, resulting in a total offense level of six. With a

Criminal History Category of III, the applicable guidelines range would be two to eight months in

Zone B. For variance purposes, the court would treat Defendant’s Criminal History as Category II,

1
  Defendant had a total of six criminal history points, including two “status” points based on his having committed the
instant offense while on supervision in another matter. PSR at 20; Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 37–38. The court applied
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 to the § 1512(c)(2) violation. The base offense level was 14, and the court added three levels for
substantial interference with the administration of justice, see § 2J1.2(b)(2), for a total offense level of 17. Sentencing
Hr’g Tr. at 38–39. The court denied Defendant acceptance-of-responsibility points due to public statements made
after his stipulated trial, which the court deemed inconsistent with his factual admissions. Id. at 33–37. The court
calculated the same base offense level for Count Two, finding that Defendant entered and remained on restricted
grounds to commit a felony, that is, a violation of § 1512(c)(2). Id. at 39–40; see U.S.S.G. § 2B2.3(c)(1).

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see supra, resulting in a guidelines range of one to seven months in Zone B, see U.S.S.G.

Sentencing Table.

       The government contends that the court should deny release pending appeal because

Defendant’s “conduct on and after January 6 warrants the 12 months imposed on Count Two, even

if his conviction on Count One is reversed.” Gov’t Opp’n at 4. But that position overlooks the

revised Sentencing Guidelines range. The top end of the guidelines range for a § 1752(a)(1)

violation alone would be eight months (or seven months, if treated as a Category II offender).

Thus, to sustain a 12-month sentence, the court would have to vary upwards by four months (or

five months, if treated as a Category II offender). “To sustain an upward variance,” the court

would have to “state the specific reason why the defendant’s conduct was more harmful or

egregious than the typical case represented by the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range.”

United States v. Murray, 897 F.3d 298, 308–09 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). There is no basis for such an enhanced sentence in this case. Thus, even a top-

of-the-guidelines, eight-month sentence on Count Two, standing alone, would constitute a “term

of imprisonment less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the

appeal process,” that is, 11 months. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iv).

       The court still must determine Defendant’s “likely reduced sentence” assuming the

§ 1512(c)(2) conviction is vacated. Id. § 3143(b) (providing that, “in the circumstance described

in subparagraph (B)(iv) of this paragraph, the judicial officer shall order the detention terminated

at the expiration of the likely reduced sentence”). Such a sentence likely would be no more than

the time Defendant already has served. In determining Defendant’s sentence, the court varied

below the guidelines range in large part due to Defendant’s history and characteristics, including

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the obstacles he overcame in life and his work accomplishments. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 64–65.

That factor would again play a sizeable role in any resentencing.

       Moreover, the court also varied to avoid unwarranted disparities, as it was cognizant of

sentences other defendants had received for a top-count conviction under § 1512(c)(2). Id. at 71–

73. If Defendant were to be resentenced on Count Two, he would be a misdemeanant, not a felon.

This court consistently has imposed sentences of short terms of incarceration (90 days or less) or

probation with home confinement for January 6 defendants convicted only of a misdemeanor.

Def.’s Mot. at 8–9 n.5. Defendant’s conduct is distinguishable from those defendants because he

entered the Senate chamber on January 6, and the court was troubled by the public statements he

made denying responsibility after his stipulated trial. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 68–69. Still,

weighing all of the § 3553(a) factors, the court likely would have sentenced Defendant to no more

than the time he already has served if only convicted of a single count of violating § 1752(a)(1).

                                                V.

       Accordingly, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Release Pending Appeal,

ECF No. 82. Defendant shall be released forthwith. Defendant shall report to the U.S. Probation

Office in his district of residence within 48 hours of his release. His release conditions shall be

the same as the conditions of supervised release set forth in the Judgment. Judgment, ECF No. 72,

at 5–7. The parties shall contact the court within three days of the Supreme Court issuing its

decision in Fischer to schedule a status conference to address whether further proceedings will be

necessary. The court will issue a separate order to accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: January 10, 2024                                     Amit P. Mehta
                                                     United States District Court Judge

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