Court Opinion

ID: 9914154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 18:02:01.829455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:25.335950
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Johnson CA2/5

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318816

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA485308)
        v.

 CLARK LORENZO JOHNSON,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                            ____________________________
                          INTRODUCTION
       Defendant Clark Lorenzo Johnson was convicted of
trafficking three minors for commercial sex acts and attempting
to kidnap two sex workers, one of whom he also attempted to
traffic. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by denying his
six requests to substitute appointed counsel; his counsel provided
constitutionally defective representation by failing to object to
testimony by the prosecution’s human trafficking expert; and the
evidence is insufficient to support one of the trafficking
convictions. We affirm.
                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       By amended information dated August 12, 2021, defendant
was charged with two counts of attempted human trafficking
(Pen. Code, § 664/236.1, subd. (b); counts 1–2); one count of
attempted kidnapping (§ 664/207, subd. (a); count 3); and three
counts of human trafficking of a minor to engage in a commercial
sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 4–6).1 The information also
alleged defendant had sustained one prior strike conviction.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) Defendant pled
not guilty and denied the allegation.
       Although defendant sought a speedy trial, proceedings were
delayed for over a year due to the Covid-19 pandemic. After a
jury trial at which he testified on his own behalf, defendant was
found guilty of all counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury
found the strike allegation true.
       The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior
strike under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero)

1       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                  2
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate term of
36 years in prison. The court selected count 5 (§ 236.1,
subd. (c)(1)) as the principal count and imposed the middle term
of 8 years, doubled to 16 years for the prior strike. The court
imposed consecutive terms of 4 years, 8 months—one-third the
midterm of 7 years, doubled for the strike prior—for counts 1 and
2 (§ 664/236.1, subd. (b)) and consecutive terms of 5 years,
4 months—one-third the midterm of 8 years, doubled for the
strike prior—for counts 4 and 6 (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)). The court
stayed sentence on count 3 (§ 664/207, subd. (g)) under
section 654.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.     Princess, L.M., and Madison Work as Prostitutes
       Sometime around Thanksgiving 2019, high school students
Madison M., Princess W., L.M., and Raven drove from San Diego
to Los Angeles in a stolen, red Volkswagen Jetta. All of the girls
were minors. A pimp named S.B. may have also been in the car.
       Once Madison, Princess, and L.M. arrived in Los Angeles,
they spent several days working for S.B. as prostitutes.2 But
Madison soon left Princess and L.M. behind and began working
for defendant, who went by the name Payso.
       Not long after Madison’s departure, Princess and L.M.
spotted her with defendant in a gray car. Soon thereafter,
Princess and L.M. decided to work for defendant. Princess made

2     It is not clear what became of Raven once the girls reached
Los Angeles. Defendant was not charged with any offense
related to Raven, and it does not appear that she performed sex
work under his direction. Only Princess testified at trial.

                                3
the switch from S.B. to defendant because she wanted to stay
with Madison.
       Defendant was in charge of Princess, L.M., and Madison
between approximately November 29 and December 4, 2019.
Princess estimated that she saw about 10 clients during this
period. All three girls would give defendant the money they
earned performing sex work.
       The prosecution introduced a photograph of Princess and
L.M. captioned “King Payso’s Bitch,” with a moneybag symbol.
Another photograph of Princess was captioned, “Making money
moves Bitch.” It also included a moneybag.
2.     December 4, 2019 Arrests
       On December 4, 2019, at 3:37 a.m., police saw defendant
driving the stolen Volkswagen Jetta. Princess and L.M. were
also in the car. Princess was wearing glittery brown shorts and a
tight shirt. L.M. was wearing a black shirt, black jacket, and
black thong underwear—but nothing else. Defendant and the
two girls were taken into custody. (Princess later admitted a
joyriding allegation (Veh. Code, § 10851) in the San Diego
juvenile court.)
       A search of the car revealed $1,700 in cash. Police also
recovered a red Skytel mobile phone from the front seat and an
iPhone from the back seat. They subsequently extracted the
contents of both phones.
       The Skytel username was kingpaycasso@kingpaycasso; it
contained a photograph of defendant. The phone was logged in to
the Instagram account king.paycasso. Many of the messages in
the account were addressed to “Daddy” and discussed
arrangements for sex work.
       The iPhone had the usernames Bitchdusse and Princess

                                4
Waggs. The call log contained numerous calls to King Paycasso.
The phone contained a photo of defendant with the words “Smack
Man” and “King Paycasso.” There was also a photograph of the
stolen Jetta. The windshield was fogged over, and “Daddy” and
“Payso” had been written in the condensation.
3.    February 12, 2020 Arrest
      On February 12, 2020, Los Angeles Police Department
Detective Vanessa Rios and her partner were monitoring
Figueroa Boulevard between 65th Street and 66th Street. Other
undercover units were nearby. The area, known as “the blade,” is
one of the largest prostitution tracks in Los Angeles.
      Rios observed sex workers standing on different corners.
One of the workers, C.T., was at the corner of 66th Street and
Denver Avenue, waving down cars. Rios saw a car speed down
66th Street, stop quickly, then reverse. Defendant was in the
passenger seat. Defendant yelled at C.T., “Bitch, this is
pimping.” C.T. tried to walk away without looking at him. Then
defendant yelled, “Bitch, there’s some pimping going on here” and
“you’re out of pocket.” He continued: “You in the pocket, bitch.
You in the pocket.” Rios testified that this meant C.T. had
another pimp and was ignoring defendant. C.T. walked away,
but defendant’s car cut her off by driving on the sidewalk. C.T.
walked the other direction because she thought defendant was
going to rob and kidnap her. The car left C.T. behind and
continued north. Detective Rios followed.
      This time, defendant jumped out of the car, chased a
prostitute later identified as Jane Doe, and tried to grab her.
Defendant yelled, “faggot bitch, you’re mine.” Rios explained this
was a derogatory term to refer to someone who is not following
the rules and is acting “out of pocket.” Defendant aggressively

                                5
chased Doe, who fled between two parked cars. He rushed
towards her, grabbed her right hand, and pulled her towards
him. Believing Doe was going to be kidnapped, Rios and her
partner got out of their car to intercede. Doe fled on foot, and
defendant left by car; he was eventually apprehended.
       Following his arrest, defendant made three phone calls
from jail, which were recorded and played for the jury. In one of
the calls, defendant said he had “caught one of these cases before”
and believed the only way he would be convicted was if a witness
were to “tell” on him. He believed “there’s nobody to tell on me”
because the police had intervened. In the second call, defendant
reiterated his belief that “there’s no one to testify against me.”
The other caller agreed: “If they don’t have a victim, bro, it’s a
D.A. reject.” Defendant explained his strategy: “I’m going to go
speedy trial. This month.” In the third call, defendant asked an
unidentified person to provide information from defendant’s
Instagram account, which was under the name “The Real King
Payso.”
4.     Defendant’s Testimony
       Defendant testified on his own behalf.
       He explained that at the time of his December 2019 arrest,
he had only known Princess for a few days. They first met at a
nail salon on December 1, 2019, and went to a hookah lounge
later that evening. Defendant communicated with Princess
through social media. He used the name King Paycasso on social
media because he was an art lover who had worked at The Broad
museum.
       The evening of December 4, 2019, Princess had invited
defendant to a party in downtown Los Angeles. Princess
introduced him to L.M. that evening. They went to the party in

                                6
Princess’s car, but Princess asked defendant to drive because she
had been drinking.
       Defendant did not know that the Jetta was stolen. He
testified that the Skytel phone recovered from the front
passenger seat was not his, but admitted that he had used it to
log on to his Instagram account. He also denied ownership of the
iPhone recovered from the back seat.
       Defendant denied that Princess and L.M. worked for him as
prostitutes. He denied ever meeting Madison.
       Defendant testified that on February 12, 2020, he saw his
friend’s sister near 66th Street and Denver Avenue and stopped
to say hello. He told the woman that her brother was looking for
her, but she ignored him and turned away. Concerned, defendant
got out of the car and tried again to tell the woman that her
brother was looking for her. He denied trying to kidnap her. He
denied ever trying to persuade or kidnap anyone into
prostitution.
       When defendant was arrested, he was on probation for
driving a car without the owner’s consent and on parole for
residential burglary. He also admitted a prior conviction for
human trafficking of a 13-year-old.
       Defendant was convicted of crimes related to all five
women. The jury convicted him of three counts of human
trafficking of a minor as to L.M., Princess and Madison;
attempted human trafficking of C.T.; and attempted human
trafficking and attempted kidnapping of Jane Doe.
                           DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that the trial court erred, individually
and cumulatively, by denying his six requests to substitute
appointed counsel; that counsel provided constitutionally

                                7
defective representation by failing to object to testimony by the
prosecution’s human trafficking expert; and that the evidence is
constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction for
trafficking Madison.
1.     The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying the
       Marsden Motions
       Defendant made six requests for substitute counsel under
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)—the first after
nearly a year of Covid-19-related delays, and five others during
his trial six months later. The record reveals defendant’s
increasing frustration with his circumstances and the way in
which his case was proceeding—frustration often directed at his
lawyer. Frustration aside, the record does not support that the
attorney–client relationship was so broken that constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel was likely to result. We conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
motions. Rather, the trial court consistently displayed patience,
empathy, and determination to protect defendant’s constitutional
rights during often-heated proceedings.
       1.1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       Indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
court-appointed trial counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Gideon
v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.) But a defendant does not
have an absolute right to more than one appointed attorney.
(Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) The court must appoint
substitute counsel when the defendant has shown the first
attorney is not providing adequate representation or the
defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in an
irreconcilable conflict that makes ineffective legal representation
likely to result. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 693, 696

                                 8
(Smith).)3
       “[W]hether to permit a defendant to discharge his
appointed counsel and substitute another attorney during the
trial is within the discretion of the trial court. . . .” (Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) When a defendant seeks to discharge
appointed counsel and asserts inadequate representation, the
court must allow the defendant to explain the basis of his
contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s
inadequate performance. (Id., at pp. 123–125; People v. Johnson
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572.)
       “It is the very nature of a Marsden motion, at whatever
stage it is made, that the trial court must determine whether
counsel has been providing competent representation.” (Smith,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 694–695.) “ ‘Depending on the nature of
the grievances related by defendant, it may be necessary for the
court also to question his [or her] attorney.’ [Citation.] [But]
‘inquiry into the attorney’s state of mind is required only in those
situations in which a satisfactory explanation for counsel’s
conduct or attitude toward his client is necessary in order to
determine whether counsel can provide adequate
representation.’ ” (People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859,
870.) Typically, once the court has afforded the defendant a
reasonable opportunity to express his concerns, the decision to
relieve counsel rests within the court’s discretion. (People v.
Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 [“If the court holds an
adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)
       Accordingly, we review both the adequacy of a Marsden

3    We discuss the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel in section 2, post.

                                 9
hearing and the court’s denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 488.) “ ‘Denial
is not an abuse of discretion “unless the defendant has shown
that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the
defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Ng
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500, cert. denied sub nom. Ng v. California
(2023) 143 S.Ct. 750.)
       1.2. First Marsden Hearing
       Defendant’s Marsden motions are best understood against
the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic.
       Defendant was taken into custody on February 12, 2020.
At the end of March, he was held to answer and denied bail. On
April 20, he was arraigned. Defendant thought the case against
him was weak because no victims would be available to testify,
and he believed such testimony was legally necessary. His
strategy was to assert his right to a speedy trial and proceed as
quickly as possible. The matter was duly set for a pretrial
conference within the statutory period. Things were proceeding
apace.
       But then the Covid-19 pandemic hit. Defendant’s pretrial
hearing date was vacated, and he remained in county jail. Over
the next year, as his detention continued, defendant’s case was
several times delayed.4
       In November 2020, the court noted that defendant had
been “adamant about not waiving time.” By February 16, 2021,
defendant had become frustrated that his appointed attorney was
not visiting him in the jail. Based on the transcripts from that

4     Defendant does not argue on appeal that the delays
violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

                                10
day and the two court dates that followed, it appears counsel
resisted going to the jail in person until the prosecution presented
a concrete plea offer. Counsel had been attempting to
communicate with defendant by phone in the interim.
       Things came to a head on March 30, 2021. The court
announced that another Covid-19 directive had been issued and
defendant’s trial would have to be continued yet again. At that
point, defendant requested his first Marsden hearing.
       Defendant explained: “I’ve been incarcerat[ed] about a year
and it’s—quite frankly, I’m just, like, my communication’s not
there.” Plea negotiations had seemed like they were starting to
progress, but “I don’t know if my counsel would really like to see
eye to eye on the entire situation I asked about.” Defendant
wanted counsel to come to the jail to answer his questions, and he
was frustrated that the only in-person meetings occurred in
court.
       Counsel explained to the court that he had set up multiple
telephone conversations with defendant and had sent his
investigator to meet with defendant at the jail, but defendant
often could not be located. Counsel believed “the problem that is
happening is not a lack of communication. It’s [that defendant]
wants to hear something from me that I won’t tell him because
I’m bound . . . to give a truthful evaluation of his case. And I am.”
       The court expressed sympathy toward defendant. It
explained that visiting the jail had always been difficult—“but
this is the worst year we’ve ever had bar none. And we are not
done with it yet, unfortunately.” The court stressed that counsel
had an obligation to give defendant an honest evaluation of his
case, and that an effective lawyer will not sugarcoat the bad
parts of a criminal case.

                                 11
        With that, the court had reached the crux of the matter.
Defendant replied: “Absolutely. I completely understand that.
And I’ve been very patient. I want to go home to my family. . . .
That’s the whole reason why I want a speedy trial. I understand
the issues, but they have obligations, and I pled not guilty.”
Defendant was not happy with the prosecution’s plea offer and
wanted his lawyer to understand “the case I’m being charged for
is trumped up” and to “tell the D.A. my point of view.”
Ultimately, defendant wanted to be released from jail.
        After suggesting that both defendant and his attorney
remain patient and act with mutual understanding, the court
ordered them to speak face-to-face after the hearing. Although
the court did not formally rule on defendant’s Marsden motion
that day, defendant argues that on six occasions, including this
hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Marsden
relief.
        We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to
either the way it conducted the first Marsden hearing or any
implied ruling that day not to substitute counsel. As a general
matter, the “ ‘number of times one sees his attorney, and the way
in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently
establish incompetence.’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1192 (Cole).)
        1.3. Second Marsden Hearing
        When defendant and his attorney returned to court about a
month later, in May 2021, counsel explained that he had been
speaking with defendant on the phone and planned to meet with
him in person at the jail as soon as the prosecution could provide
a firm plea offer. But concerns about Covid-19 persisted, and the
delays continued through the spring and summer. On August 3,

                                12
2021, the court acknowledged defendant still had no interest in
settling or waiving statutory time, and a trial date was set.
       The case was finally called for trial on September 7, 2021,
but before the first prospective jurors could be sworn, defendant
requested another Marsden hearing. Defendant explained:
“Your Honor, I’d like to bring to the court’s attention or
awareness that I’m here fighting for my innocence. My counsel,
[Defense Attorney], has called me dumb, stupid, used words
[such] as ‘you people,’ to intimidate me. Your Honor, [Defense
Attorney] is telling me it’s my fault [I’ll be] sitting in prison
serving a life sentence while I profess my innocence and try to
communicate with him.” Defendant informed the court that
counsel said he would visit the jail in person but had “never
showed” and “the majority of the time, he has no consultation
with me.”
       The court first explained that defendant was not facing a
life sentence. Then, the court turned to counsel for a response.
Counsel replied: “I have never used the word[s] ‘dumb’ or ‘stupid’
in my conversations with the defendant.” Counsel also denied
using “you people.” He had, however, “tried to convey to him the
seriousness of the case, and, in my opinion, the extreme odds
against him on this case, and to tell him everything about what’s
going to happen because I feel I’m obligated to do that.”
       Turning to defendant’s other concerns: “As far as
communications with the defendant, I have seen him in jail. My
investigator has seen him in jail. I’ve had conference calls that
he has not appeared at, but when there’s not been a conference
call, and the next time we were in court, I spent a tremendous
amount of time going over everything with him.”
       Counsel concluded: “There’s nothing more I can go over

                                13
with him. It’s his choice to go to trial or not. It is my choice to
accurately make sure that he understands the consequences of
what will happen. And yes, I agree this is not a life case, but
looking at his age and the amount of years he could face, I have
said, ‘This could be the rest of your life in prison.’ ”
       The court treated the motion as one under Marsden and
denied it. The court explained that although it had “heard
annoyance,” it had not “heard anything that suggests that Mr.
[Attorney] is not performing the functions of counsel.” Nor was
the court persuaded that counsel had belittled defendant: “I’ve
never heard Mr. [Attorney] refer to any defendant as ‘dumb,’
‘stupid,’ or ‘those people,’ any of that kind of thing. Lord knows
he’s represented people on heavy cases in the past.”
       We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to
either the way it conducted the second Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel. Although counsel may have
been frustrated that defendant would not accept hard truths
about his situation—and defendant may have been frustrated
based on his belief that his attorney was not wholeheartedly
convinced of his innocence—those frustrations appear nothing
more than the frequent give and take of the attorney–client
relationship in criminal cases. They do not reflect an
irreconcilable conflict.
       Nor was the court required to credit defendant’s name-
calling allegations. “To the extent there was a credibility
question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court
was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s explanation.’ ” (Smith, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Because the court found defendant’s
allegations were not credible, it was not required to inquire
expressly into counsel’s attitude towards his client. (See, e.g.,

                                14
People v. Winn, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 870 [inquiry into
counsel’s state of mind required only where such inquiry is
necessary to determine whether counsel can provide adequate
representation].)
       1.4. Third Marsden Hearing
       On September 9, 2021, the jury was empaneled and
testimony began. Trial proceeded smoothly until September 14,
when a dramatic outburst in open court led to a third Marsden
hearing.
       After the court explained the schedule to the seated jurors
and the prosecutor prepared to call his first witness, defendant
interjected: “I would like to address the court.” The court told
him to wait, but defendant continued: “I cannot and will not
continue working with Mr. [Attorney].” As the court tried to
quiet defendant, usher the jury out, and gain control over the
situation, defendant offered a litany of complaints, including
counsel’s failure to visit and refusal to ask certain questions: “I
can’t deal with it. I want him to ask a simple question, and he
doesn’t ask those questions for me.”
       The court promptly cleared the courtroom. The court began
by admonishing defendant to stop talking when instructed to be
quiet and advising him that his outburst did not help him with
the jury.
       Defendant responded: “I’m sorry, but I have—I take—I
can’t do it no more. I continue to ask certain things, and I can’t
get straightforward answers. Every time he talk[s] to me, he got
attitude with me. He laughs in my face. He told me I’m going to
lose. I’m not dealing with him.
       “I’m prepared—man, I can’t. I’d rather do this by myself if
that’s the case. I want someone to fight for my life. And he

                                15
laughing with the District Attorney. I’d rather study myself if I
have to. I can’t do this. I’m trying. He didn’t even come back
there and talk to me. I’m not about to keep dealing with this.”
       When the court asked what counsel had not done,
defendant replied: “A variety of different things.” Pressed for
specifics, defendant responded that counsel’s cross-examinations
were too brief and tracked the prosecutor’s questions too closely.
Counsel refused to ask the questions defendant thought were
important—“He didn’t bring up most of the different things that I
write down and I’m asking him to say, and he’s not even saying
them”—and defendant was concerned the opportunity was
slipping away. For example, defendant explained that when
cross-examining a witness the previous day, counsel had not
elicited testimony that defendant lacked knowledge the Jetta had
been stolen. The court reminded him that counsel had indeed
brought out the information defendant sought, and the court
provided specific examples of how counsel had done so.
       Defendant replied: “I’m—Your Honor, I—the only thing I
know is the way that he—he—he makes it seem. It just—two
months of him being my counsel is just—this is not my first time.
Like I told you, he called me dum[b] before, and he already told
me, ‘You’re going to lose.’ He’s not—I don’t want him. I’ll do it
myself.”
       The court found defendant’s request for self-representation
was involuntary, then explained that although counsel was not
bombastic, his style was effective; he had covered all the issues.5

5     Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal or argue
the court erred by denying his request to represent himself. (See
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).)

                                16
The court had observed defendant passing notes to counsel and
saw counsel explain that the information defendant sought was
inadmissible. The court assured defendant that a number of
issues had broken his way during the trial, and concluded he had
not received ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the court
did not address defendant’s complaints that counsel had called
him names and was too pessimistic about the likelihood of an
acquittal, the court had adequately investigated—and rejected—
those concerns at the previous Marsden hearing.
      We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to
either the way it conducted the third Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel. (See Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 1192 [complaints concerning “tactical disagreements . . . do not
by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ ”]; People v.
Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1026 [where defendant’s
dissatisfaction was based on attorney’s in-court performance,
court could rely on its personal observations to evaluate
defendant’s complaints].)
      1.5. Fourth Marsden Hearing
      As soon as defense counsel appeared in court the following
morning, he informed the court that defendant wanted to bring a
fourth Marsden motion.
      This time, defendant was upset that defense counsel had
not shown him evidence from the Skytel mobile phone before the
prosecutor introduced it at trial. Counsel acknowledged that
technical problems had prevented him from sharing certain
screenshots with defendant in advance; the discovery had been
provided on the eve of trial, and defendant did not want to agree
to another delay. Counsel explained, however, that the issue did
not affect either counsel’s trial preparation or defendant’s ability

                                 17
to participate in his defense because defendant was aware of the
phone’s contents.6
       When questioned, defendant could not explain what he
would have done differently if he had seen the screen shots in
advance because “it happened so quickly.” As with the dispute
over cross-examination, defendant seemed mostly concerned that
the evidence would cause the jury to believe he had participated
in “the robbery that I had nothing to do with. That wasn’t my
vehicle. So it’s, like, how did I—how can evidence that has
nothing to do with a robbery or me be basically turned in on me,
used against me, when the car—it’s not my car. It’s not my
belongings.”
       Defendant had not been charged with robbery or anything
related to the stolen Jetta, and the court explained, as it had the
day before, that counsel had been laying a foundation to argue
that the phone did not belong to defendant. The court found no
violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel and denied
the motion.
       We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to
either the way it conducted the fourth Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel.
       1.6. Fifth Marsden Hearing
       On September 21, during the prosecutor’s closing
argument, defendant brought his fifth Marsden motion. Again,

6     Defendant complains that the court did not ask counsel “if
his conduct regarding this evidence resulted from a negative
attitude toward appellant and the case.” Because counsel had
already provided an explanation, which the court apparently
accepted, it was not required to inquire further on that point.

                                 18
defendant focused on mobile-phone-related cross-examination.
And again, he objected to receiving late discovery. Counsel
provided a detailed explanation of his decision not to bring a
witness back for further cross-examination, a strategy the court
agreed was sound given the equivocal state of the evidence.
       Defendant also raised concerns about one of the jurors, who
defendant believed had been asleep the day before. It is not clear
how or if this complaint related to the Marsden motion, since
counsel had moved for a mistrial on that basis when it happened,
but the court assured defendant it had been watching the juror
like a hawk.
       Finally, defendant asserted his right to represent himself
under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806—but when he acknowledged
he was not prepared to proceed with closing argument, the court
denied the request as untimely. The court observed: “So we’re
not continuing the case or delaying it. I understand exactly why
you want it, and it’s not going to happen.”
       We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to
either the way it conducted the fifth Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel. “ ‘When a defendant chooses to
be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is “captain of
the ship” and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for
the defendant.’ ” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729.)
“Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney
do not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 728–729.)
       1.7. Sixth Marsden Hearing
       Later that day, after the jurors began deliberations,
defendant brought his sixth Marsden motion. This time, he
wanted to make an additional record about the sleeping juror.

                                19
Because this concern did not involve a conflict with counsel, we
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the
way it conducted the sixth Marsden hearing or its decision not to
substitute counsel.
       1.8. Cumulative Error
       Even when no single error is prejudicial, aggregate
prejudice from multiple errors may render a trial fundamentally
unfair. A “series of trial errors, though independently harmless,
may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of
reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th
800, 844.) Defendant contends his six Marsden hearings “showed
an escalation in the irreconcilable differences between
[defendant] and his appointed counsel, and the total breakdown
of their attorney–client relationship.”
       Starting with the second motion, each was more or less a
repetition of earlier motions, and each time defendant raised the
same or similar problems he had with counsel. The mere fact
that defendant made, and the court denied, repeated Marsden
motions does not by itself establish irreconcilable conflict or
cumulative error where none otherwise exists. (People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 293; see People v. Ng, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 481, 495–496, 498–499 [no abuse of discretion
where court denied 37 Marsden motions].)
2.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant contends Detective Rios exceeded the
permissible scope of expert testimony because she offered
opinions on ultimate facts that were within the jurors’ common
knowledge. Since trial counsel’s failure to object forfeits the issue
on appeal, he argues he received constitutionally defective
assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded.

                                 20
       2.1. Challenged Evidence
       Rios testified as the prosecution’s human trafficking expert.
       Rios testified that on the night of February 12, 2020, she
saw defendant speeding; he yelled out the passenger window,
“Bitch, this is pimping.” Rios testified that by using this
terminology, defendant was identifying himself as a pimp and
trying to catch a prospective prostitute by calling her a bitch.
Rios then heard defendant yell, “Bitch, you in the pocket. You in
the pocket.” Rios understood this to mean that C.T. was
following the rules of the game. Rios also testified that C.T. did
not make eye contact with defendant, which indicated she worked
for another pimp. After leaving C.T., defendant yelled, “Faggot
bitch, you’re mine” and attempted to grab Jane Doe. In Rios’s
experience, “faggot bitch” was a derogatory term for a prostitute
who was out of pocket and not following the rules of the game.
Defendant contends this testimony exceeded the proper scope of
expert testimony by applying definitions to defendant’s actual
conduct and concluding the conduct was that of a pimp engaged
in human trafficking.
       Rios was also shown text messages and photographs from
the Skytel phone seized from the Jetta. She explained that the
names, words, and symbols in the messages referred to
prostitution activities. Defendant contends Rios exceeded the
bounds of permissible expert opinion by reading the messages
aloud to the jury, interpreting what they meant based on the
definitions she had provided earlier in her testimony, and
positing that defendant posted the messages in furtherance of his
pimping and human trafficking activities.
       2.2. Defendant forfeited his challenge to the evidence.
       The rules of evidence are not self-executing. We may not

                                21
reverse a judgment or verdict based on “the erroneous admission
of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an objection to
or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely
made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection or motion[.]” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) This rule
exists to give the trial court a concrete legal proposition to pass
on, to allow the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to cure
the defect, and to prevent abuse. (People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Defendant concedes trial counsel did not
object to Rios’s testimony on the ground he now asserts, thereby
forfeiting his challenges to it on appeal, but argues that failure
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
       2.3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Under either the federal or state Constitution, the
“benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).) To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must satisfy two requirements.
(Id. at pp. 690–692.)
       First, he must show his attorney’s conduct was “outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.” (Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.) Then, he must demonstrate the
deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s failings, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. (Id. at p. 694.) “It is not
sufficient to show the alleged errors may have had some
conceivable effect on the trial’s outcome; the defendant must
demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that absent the errors the

                                22
result would have been different.” (People v. Mesa (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.)
      Typically, if “the record does not shed light on why counsel
acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject
the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to
provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no
satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188,
1212.) These arguments should instead be raised on collateral
review. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–
267.)
      Defendant argues counsel had no conceivable tactical basis
not to object because he “did object to the testimony of Detective
Rios as beyond her area of expertise.” He posits that this shows
counsel “wanted to keep out this evidence.” Unlike the objections
counsel actually offered, however, objecting on the grounds now
advanced would not necessarily have led to wholesale exclusion of
the testimony.
      Defense counsel could have reasonably expected that
objecting would instead prompt the prosecutor to elicit the same
information by asking detailed hypotheticals tracking the facts of
the case—an approach that would only highlight the evidence to
the jurors. (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 [expert
may testify in response to hypothetical question that relates to
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury but cannot testify that a
defendant’s actions establish his criminal intent].)
      Because we can discern that defense counsel may have had
a plausible tactical reason not to object, we conclude defendant
has not established on this record that he received
constitutionally inadequate representation.

                                23
3.    Sufficiency of the Evidence for Trafficking Madison
      (Count 6)
      Defendant was charged in court 6 with human trafficking
of Madison for purposes of pimping. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) A
criminal defendant may not be convicted of a crime unless the
prosecution proves every fact necessary for conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; see Cal.
Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364;
People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) Defendant contends
there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
trafficking Madison. We disagree.
       3.1. Standard of Review
       In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th
47, 59–60.) “The record must disclose substantial evidence to
support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
       In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053.) We may not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary
conflicts (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181), and we
must accept all logical inferences the jury might have drawn from
the evidence, even if we would have concluded otherwise (People
v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242).

                               24
       The same standard applies where the conviction rests
primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Thompson
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) “ ‘Although it is the jury’s duty to
acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which
suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the
appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Simply put, if the
circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the
judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”
(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143.)
       In sum, “reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.”
(People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
       3.2. Elements of Sex Trafficking
       To convict defendant of trafficking Madison for a
commercial sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)), as charged in count 6,
the prosecution was required to prove:
       ◦ Defendant caused, induced, or persuaded
           Madison to engage in a commercial sex act—or
           intended to do so;
       ◦ When defendant acted, he intended to commit the
           crime of pimping (§ 266h); and
       ◦ When defendant did so, Madison was under 18
           years of age.
(§ 236.1, subd. (c); see CALCRIM No. 1244.) To prove the second
element—that defendant intended to commit pimping—the
prosecution had to prove:

                                25
      ◦    Defendant knew Madison was a prostitute; and
      ◦    The money or other proceeds Madison earned as a
           prostitute supported defendant, in whole or in
           part; or
       ◦ Defendant asked for payment or received
           payment for soliciting prostitution customers for
           Madison.
(§ 266h; see CALCRIM No. 1150.)
       3.3. Substantial evidence supports defendant’s
              conviction for trafficking Madison.
       Defendant concedes substantial evidence supports his
convictions for trafficking Princess and L.M. (counts 4 and 5) but
contends the evidence is constitutionally inadequate to support
his conviction for trafficking Madison (count 6). He argues that
unlike Princess and L.M., Madison “had a level of autonomy and
leadership in the business arrangement . . . .” We are not
persuaded.
       First, convictions for trafficking non-testifying minor
victims often rest on circumstantial evidence. (See People v.
Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 487–488 [three testifying
victims offered substantial evidence defendant encouraged eight
non-testifying victims to engage in prostitution where defendant
assisted the women with prostitution-related activities].) In this
case, only Princess testified. Madison did not. Although
Princess’s testimony often lacked detail, it would have been
reasonable for the jury to infer from it that Madison, Princess,
and L.M. had similar relationships with defendant. The girls
traveled together from San Diego to Los Angeles sometime after
November 25, 2019. Princess identified herself, L.M., and
Madison in several photographs taken during the period the

                                26
three women were in Los Angeles making money working as
prostitutes. When they arrived, they spent a couple of days
working as prostitutes for S.B. After Madison left to work for
defendant, the other two girls followed her because they wanted
to stay together. Defendant was in charge of three of them
between approximately November 29 and December 4, 2019.
Taken together, the three girls spent about 10 days in Los
Angeles; during that time, all three worked for S.B. for a couple
of days, and all three worked for defendant for about a week. It
is reasonable to infer from this timeline that Madison worked for
defendant for only a day or so longer than the others. Based on
this inference, the jury could reasonably deduce that Madison’s
relationship with defendant was not appreciably different or
more autonomous than his relationship with the other two girls.
       Second, the jury could infer from Princess’s testimony that
defendant had facilitated Madison’s prostitution. (People v.
Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980, 989 [intent to influence may
be inferred from acts of assistance].) Princess testified that she
first encountered defendant when she saw defendant driving
Madison around. Princess also testified that she gave her
earnings to defendant because she had seen Madison do so.
Madison was a “girl[ ] in the group” and one of her “wifies”
because they worked for the same person. The jury could
reasonably infer from this conduct that defendant taught
Madison how to behave and thereby caused her to engage in sex
work. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).)
       Finally, the jury could have used defendant’s prior sex-
trafficking conviction as evidence that he had a propensity to
commit—and did commit—sex trafficking of Madison. “Evidence
of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a

                                27
defendant’s disposition to commit such acts. [Citation.]
However, the Legislature has created exceptions to this rule in
cases involving sexual offenses . . . .” (People v. Reyes (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 246, 251.) Evidence Code section 1108 “allows
evidence of the defendant’s uncharged sex crimes to be
introduced in a sex offense prosecution to demonstrate the
defendant’s disposition to commit such crimes.” (People v.
Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1009.)
       Here, the jury heard evidence that defendant had
previously been convicted of trafficking a 13-year-old girl. The
court admitted into evidence the transcript of the preliminary
hearing at which defendant was held to answer.7 According to
the transcript, defendant taught the victim “the ways of being a
prostitute.” Defendant picked the victim up from her house and
drove her to Figueroa Boulevard, where he would give her
condoms, set prices for various sex acts, and tell her how many
acts to perform. When the victim completed her quota, defendant
would pick her up, and the victim would pay him a portion of her
earnings.
       The jury was instructed under Evidence Code section 1108
that if it concluded “defendant committed the uncharged offense,
you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence
that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual
offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the
defendant was likely to commit and did commit human
trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act . . . as charged in
Count[ ] . . . Six . . . .”
       To be sure, as defendant stresses, the evidence against him

7     The transcript was admitted at defense counsel’s request.

                                28
was stronger as to Princess and L.M because it included
incriminating text messages and photographs recovered from the
phones in the stolen Jetta—evidence that did not directly pertain
to count 6. Taken as a whole, the evidence—although perhaps
less persuasive than that for the other counts—was
constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
count 6.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 RUBIN, P. J.
I CONCUR:

                       MOOR, J.

                               29
The People v. Clark Lorenzo Johnson
B318816

BAKER, J., Concurring

      I join the opinion for the court with the exception of its
reliance on Evidence Code section 1108 propensity evidence to
conclude substantial evidence supports defendant and appellant
Clark Johnson’s (defendant’s) conviction of human trafficking in
count six. I believe substantial evidence supports defendant’s
conviction on that count without need to rely on a judgment that
he has a general propensity to commit sex offenses.

                              BAKER, J.