Court Opinion

ID: 9838857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 15:00:51.709819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:19.253419
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11855    Document: 34-1     Date Filed: 09/08/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11855
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DANZAVIERAN DURAND THURMAN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00103-TPB-MRM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11855

       Before LUCK, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Danzavieran Thurman appeals the procedural and substan-
       tive reasonableness of his 120-month sentence. The sentence was
       imposed after Thurman pleaded guilty to being a felon in posses-
       sion of a ﬁrearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
       922(g) and 924(a)(2). No reversible error has been shown; we af-
       ﬁrm.
              After Thurman pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession of-
       fense, a probation oﬃcer prepared a Presentence Investigation Re-
       port (“PSI”). The PSI described the oﬀense conduct as involving an
       armed home invasion robbery. During the robbery, two armed
       men -- one of whom was later identiﬁed as Thurman -- held a
       woman and her two minor children at gunpoint. One of the men
       also struck the female victim twice in the head with his gun. The
       men then stole various items from the victim’s house, including
       electronics, jewelry, and $12,000 in cash.
              The PSI assigned Thurman a criminal history category of VI
       based on Thurman’s prior convictions for attempted robbery, lewd
       exhibition, battery, resisting an oﬃcer without violence, and for the
       possession and sale of drugs. Based on Thurman’s criminal history
       category of VI, the total oﬀense level of 25, and the applicable stat-
       utory-maximum sentence, Thurman’s advisory guidelines range
       was calculated as 110 to 120 months’ imprisonment. Neither party
       objected to the PSI.
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       22-11855                 Opinion of the Court                              3

              At the sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the
       PSI’s calculation of the applicable guidelines range. After consid-
       ering the parties’ arguments at sentencing, the totality of the cir-
       cumstances, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court
       sentenced Thurman to 120 months’ imprisonment.
             On appeal, Thurman ﬁrst challenges the procedural reason-
       ableness of his sentence.* Thurman contends that the district
       court failed to consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a). Thurman also argues that the district court failed to ex-
       plain adequately the reasons for imposing the chosen sentence.
               We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
       ential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
       38, 41 (2007). When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasona-
       bleness, we review de novo legal questions and review for clear error
       the district court’s factual ﬁndings. See United States v. Rodriguez-
       Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004).
              A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district
       court calculates incorrectly the guidelines range, treats the guide-
       lines as mandatory, fails to consider the section 3553(a) factors,
       chooses a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to ex-
       plain the chosen sentence. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,

       * The government contends that Thurman’s procedural-reasonableness argu-
       ment should be reviewed only for plain error because Thurman never raised
       expressly the specific objections he now raises on appeal. We need not decide
       this issue, however, because we conclude that Thurman’s argument fails un-
       der an abuse-of-discretion standard.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11855

       1323 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court may base its ﬁndings of
       fact on undisputed statements in the PSI. United States v. Bennett,
       472 F.3d 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2006).
              Thurman has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is pro-
       cedurally unsound. In imposing Thurman’s sentence, the district
       court said it had considered the parties’ arguments, the undisputed
       information in the PSI, and the advisory guidelines. The district
       court also said expressly that it had considered “all the factors iden-
       tiﬁed in Title 18 U.S. Code section 3553(a)(1) through (7)” and had
       determined that the chosen sentence was “suﬃcient but not
       greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of
       sentencing.” The district court then explained that a statutory-
       maximum sentence of 120 months was appropriate given that
       Thurman committed the instant felon-in-possession oﬀense less
       than 5 months after being released from prison.
               This language demonstrates suﬃciently that the district
       court considered the section 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Dor-
       man, 488 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not
       state on the record that it has explicitly considered each [section
       3553(a)] factor and need not discuss each factor. . . . Rather, an
       acknowledgement by the district court that it has considered the
       defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suﬃce.”). The
       district court’s explanation for the chosen sentence is also “enough
       to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a rea-
       soned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”
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       22-11855               Opinion of the Court                        5

       See United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir.
       2020).
              Thurman next challenges his sentence as substantively un-
       reasonable. In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sen-
       tence, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, including . . .
       whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in
       question.” See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. “The party challenging
       the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is
       unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.”
       United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012).
              The district court must impose a sentence that is “suﬃcient,
       but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reﬂect
       the seriousness of the oﬀense, promote respect for the law, provide
       just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public
       from future crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We will not vacate a sen-
       tence on substantive-reasonableness grounds unless “we are left
       with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court com-
       mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
       by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
       sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” See Cabezas-Montano,
       949 F.3d at 611.
               Thurman has failed to demonstrate that his sentence sub-
       stantively is unreasonable. About Thurman’s history and charac-
       teristics, the district court noted that Thurman’s criminal record
       was “really bad.” Thurman’s ﬁrst adult conviction was for a 2002
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                22-11855

       attempted robbery committed when Thurman was 15 years’ old.
       Thurman was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. While incar-
       cerated, Thurman incurred 47 disciplinary violations, including a
       violation for lewd exhibition: an oﬀense for which Thurman was
       convicted and sentenced to an additional 18 months’ imprison-
       ment. Within eight months of his release from prison in Septem-
       ber 2013, Thurman had three arrests for drug oﬀenses and for re-
       sisting an oﬃcer without violence. Thurman was convicted of
       those oﬀenses and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
              Thurman was released from prison in June 2017 and -- eight
       months later -- committed another drug oﬀense. Thurman served
       a 30-month sentence and was released from prison in May 2020.
       Four months later, Thurman was involved in a domestic-violence
       episode during which he choked his pregnant girlfriend. Thurman
       was convicted for battery and for resisting an oﬃcer without vio-
       lence and was sentenced to one year in prison.
             Thurman committed the instant felon-in-possession oﬀense
       ﬁve months after his release from prison in May 2020 and less than
       three weeks after his arrest for battery and resisting an oﬃcer.
              Given the serious nature and circumstances of Thurman’s
       instant gun oﬀense and Thurman’s extensive criminal history and
       recidivism, the district court concluded reasonably that the statu-
       tory-maximum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment was suﬃ-
       cient and necessary to reﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, to pro-
       mote respect for the law, to provide adequate deterrence, and to
       protect the public.
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       22-11855               Opinion of the Court                         7

               On appeal, Thurman argues that the district court failed to
       consider adequately Thurman’s mental health diagnoses. During
       the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged that Thur-
       man suﬀered from mental health conditions, including bipolar dis-
       order and schizophrenia. That the district court aﬀorded more
       weight to some aggravating factors than it did to other mitigating
       factors does not make Thurman’s sentence unreasonable. “The
       weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter com-
       mitted to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not
       substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” United
       States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations and
       brackets omitted).
              Nor did the district court focus improperly on the possible
       state sentence Thurman might have faced had he been prosecuted
       for the underlying armed-home-invasion-robbery oﬀense. Alt-
       hough the district court inquired about the outcome of Thurman’s
       state prosecution, the district court explained that it was seeking to
       determine whether Thurman had a related state conviction and
       sentence stemming from the October 2020 oﬀense conduct.
               On this record, we cannot conclude that Thurman’s sen-
       tence was unreasonable or that “the district court committed a
       clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.” See Cab-
       ezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 611. Thurman has failed to meet his bur-
       den of showing that his sentence is unreasonable, either procedur-
       ally or substantively.
                    AFFIRMED.