Court Opinion

ID: 9839628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 17:03:53.847856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:54.156555
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 Whitehurst v. City of Los Angeles CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

DAVID WHITEHURST,                                                 B321755

       Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct.
         v.                                                       No. 19STCP04420

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

       Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
     David Whitehurst, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Vivienne A.
Swanigan, Assistant City Attorney, and Erika Johnson-Brooks,
Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
                       INTRODUCTION

       The Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment
Department discharged David Whitehurst for using his position
as an inspector to cancel inspections and avoid paying fees on
properties he owned. The Board of Civil Service Commissioners
of the City of Los Angeles upheld Whitehurst’s discharge, and the
trial court denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate.
Whitehurst appeals, arguing that the Department violated his
due process rights by disciplining him for conduct he committed
eight years earlier, that substantial evidence did not support the
findings against him, that a prior settlement agreement barred
the Department from disciplining him, and that the Board
abused its discretion in upholding his discharge. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Department and Whitehurst Settle Previous
             Disciplinary Charges
       Whitehurst began working for the Department as a
housing inspector in the Code Enforcement Division in 1999.
Whitehurst was promoted to senior housing inspector in 2002
and principal inspector in 2012. In 2016 Whitehurst was
principal inspector for the central regional office. He supervised
a group of inspectors who inspected multifamily rental properties
and enforced code provisions and zoning laws governing the
construction, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, and use of
residential and commercial structures.
       In June 2016 the Department disciplined Whitehurst for
violating Department rules and failing to carry out his

                                 2
supervisory duties adequately after Whitehurst knowingly
approved a subordinate employee’s falsified timesheet. The
Department proposed suspending Whitehurst for 11 days, but
agreed to reduce the suspension to five days. The Department
and Whitehurst documented the arrangement in a settlement
agreement and mutual release.

      B.     The Department Discovers and Investigates
             Additional Misconduct by Whitehurst
       On September 6, 2016 the Department scheduled an
inspection for a rental property on West 77th Street in
Los Angeles and mailed an inspection notice to the property
owner, Faith Christian Center. On September 19, 2016
Whitehurst closed the case in the Department’s information
management system, which canceled the inspection. He added a
note in the system stating he had closed the case because the
units were “HACLA [Housing Authority of the City of Los
Angeles] Section 8 leased” and sent the note to an administrative
clerk in the south regional office, which had jurisdiction over the
77th Street property.1 When the clerk received Whitehurst’s
note, she told principal inspector Jim Heiberg, who managed the
south regional office, Whitehurst had closed the case. Heiberg
reopened the case because it was the Department’s policy to

1      Section 8 is a federal program that provides financial
assistance to low-income tenants. The program is administered
by local public housing authorities such as the Housing Authority
of the City of Los Angeles. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the
City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860,
864, fn.1.)

                                 3
inspect Section 8 properties unless they were government-owned,
which the 77th Street property was not.
       A few weeks later Whitehurst went to the south regional
office and asked Heiberg why he reopened the case after
Whitehurst had closed it. Heiberg told Whitehurst the
Department inspected privately owned Section 8 properties and
asked Whitehurst what his concern was. Whitehurst told
Heiberg he owned the property and asked for an extension on the
inspection because he was going on vacation.2 Heiberg agreed to
give Whitehurst a 30-day extension, until November 21, 2016.
Heiberg asked Ken Lam, Heiberg’s supervisor and the chief
inspector of the south regional office, to attend the inspection
because, when an employee owned a property, the Department
required an employee with a higher classification than the
employee-owner to be present.
       Around the same time Whitehurst spoke with Heiberg,
Whitehurst also asked his supervisor, chief inspector Robert
Galardi, about the Department’s policy for inspecting Section 8
properties, although Whitehurst did not mention the 77th Street
property. On November 17, 2016 Whitehurst again asked
Galardi about the Department’s policy, said the Department had
scheduled an inspection for a Section 8 property Whitehurst
owned, and asked to postpone the inspection. Galardi asked

2     The Department’s records listed Faith Christian Center
Inc. as the owner of the 77th Street property. At the
administrative hearing Whitehurst argued that he was not the
owner of the property, but admitted that he owned all the shares
of Faith Christian Center. The hearing examiner found
Whitehurst had a substantial interest in the property as “owner,
president, director,” or in “some other official role.” Whitehurst
does not challenge this finding.

                                4
Whitehurst to put his request in writing. Whitehurst wrote a
letter to Galardi asking him to postpone the inspection until early
February 2017. Whitehurst stated that he was the “president of
Faith Christian Center” and that he “took over title” to the
property from his mother in 2011. Galardi contacted Heiberg,
who told Galardi that he had already granted Whitehurst an
extension.
       On November 21, 2016 housing inspector Greg Leduff
arrived at the 77th Street property to conduct the inspection.
Whitehurst told Leduff he was president of Faith Christian
Center, which owned the property. LeDuff inspected the exterior
of the property and noted several code violations. When chief
inspector Lam and senior inspector Marcel Nicholas arrived,
Whitehurst refused to allow them to inspect the interior of the
building and stated the units were Section 8 and inspected by
HACLA. Lam explained the Department’s policy on inspecting
Section 8 properties, but Whitehurst refused to allow them to
enter. Whitehurst also refused to allow the inspectors to contact
the property’s tenants. He said the inspectors were “not welcome
on the property” and told them not to come back.
       The Department issued a notice to comply that listed the
exterior violations Leduff found. The Department also issued a
notice and order to provide entry. On January 26, 2017 Leduff
returned to the 77th Street property with chief inspector
Germain Mendoza to conduct the reinspection. Leduff inspected
the four interior units and recorded code violations. The
Department issued another notice to comply and scheduled a
reinspection for March 15, 2017.
       Meanwhile, the Department reviewed its records for the
77th Street property and discovered it had never been inspected.

                                5
The Department discovered that, while Whitehurst managed the
south regional office, he had closed inspection cases and canceled
inspections for the property in 2009 and 2013. The Department
also discovered that Whitehurst owned a second property, on
109th Street, under the jurisdiction of the south regional office
and that he had closed an inspection case for that property in
2014, citing Section 8 tenancy as the reason. Whitehurst
admitted he closed cases for the two properties, but said he did so
because he believed the Department did not inspect Section 8
properties. Whitehurst said he thought his actions were
appropriate and did “not see it as a conflict of interest.”
       During its investigation the Department also discovered it
was not assessing Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) fees on the
77th Street property, even though the Department determined
during a 2009 audit the property was subject to the RSO, which
applies to properties built before 1978. On further investigation,
the Department learned that in 2009 Whitehurst changed the
“built date” in the Department’s billing system from 1955 (when
the building on the property was constructed) to 1997 (when the
building was converted to four units). The Department concluded
Whitehurst entered false information about the date the property
was built and the building’s history, which caused the
Department not to bill the property for RSO fees for nearly 10
years.

      C.     The Department Discharges Whitehurst, the Hearing
             Examiner Conducts an Evidentiary Hearing, and the
             Board Upholds Whitehurst’s Discharge
      In April 2017 the Department served Whitehurst with a
notice of hearing under Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975)

                                6
15 Cal.3d 194, 215 (Skelly) informing Whitehurst the Department
intended to discharge him.3 The notice listed six charges:
(1) “Using official position or office for personal gain or
advantage”; (2) “Engaging in any activity which constitutes a
conflict of interest”; (3) “Engaging in unethical, inappropriate,
and/or illegal behavior in conflict with job duties, on or off the
job”; (4) “Falsifying City Records such as time reports, mileage
reports, expense accounts or other work related documents”;
(5) “A violation of Departmental rules”; and (6) “Misusing
delegated authority in the performance of duties.” The
Department scheduled the hearing, and Whitehurst submitted a
written response. After the hearing the Department discharged
Whitehurst.
       Whitehurst appealed to the Board. The Board appointed a
hearing examiner, who conducted a 21-day evidentiary hearing
between September 2017 and December 2018. The examiner
issued a 129-page report recommending that the Board find the
Department had complied with the requirements of Skelly, that
the Board sustain all six charges, and that the discharge was
appropriate. In July 2019, after considering the hearing
examiner’s report, the Board (1) found the Department met its
obligations under Skelly, (2) sustained charges 1 through 4 and 6,
(3) did not sustain charge 5 (violation of Department rules), and
(4) sustained the penalty of discharge.

3      In Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194 the Supreme Court held a
permanent civil service employee has due process rights to
certain preremoval safeguards, including “notice of the proposed
action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials
upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either
orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.”
(Id. at p. 215.)

                                  7
      D.     Whitehurst Files a Petition for Writ of Administrative
             Mandate, Which the Trial Court Denies
       In October 2019 Whitehurst filed a petition for writ of
mandate in the superior court challenging the Board’s decision.
The court denied the petition. Applying the independent
judgment standard of review, the court rejected Whitehurst’s
contentions that the Department violated his due process rights
under Skelly, that the Board abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence and excluding other evidence at the hearing, and
that the 2016 settlement agreement precluded the Department
from disciplining Whitehurst. The court also found it did not
need to determine whether the City acted appropriately in
inspecting the 77th Street property, an issue Whitehurst raised
in his reply brief but not in his operative second amended
petition. Whitehurst timely appealed from the judgment denying
the petition.

                             DISCUSSION

       A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       A trial court ruling on a petition for writ of administrative
mandate must decide whether an agency “proceeded without, or
in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and
whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is established
if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by
law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the
findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
       “When a fundamental vested right is involved, such as the
right of a city employee to continued employment [citation], the

                                  8
trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine
whether due process requirements were met and whether the
agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence.”
(Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Comrs. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279; see Lozano v. City of Los Angeles
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 723; Cassidy v. California Bd. of
Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 626.) “[W]hen a court
reviews an administrative determination [affecting a vested
fundamental right], the court must ‘exercise its independent
judgment on the facts, as well as on the law . . . .’” (Fukuda v.
City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811; see Bautista v. County
of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 869, 875.) We review the
trial court’s factual findings, not the agency’s findings, for
substantial evidence and the court’s legal determinations
de novo. (Lozano, at p. 723; Melkonians v. Los Angeles County
Civil Service Com. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168.)

      B.      Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
              Finding the Department Did Not Violate Whitehurst’s
              Due Process Rights
       Whitehurst argues the Department violated his due process
rights by “denying [him] a speedy resolution” of the charge he
falsified a record by changing the “built date” of the 77th Street
property. Whitehurst contends that he changed the date on
February 26, 2009, that by November 6, 2009 the Department
knew he had changed the date, but that the Department waited
until 2017 to discipline him. Whitehurst asserts the Department
knew by November 6, 2009 he had falsified the record because on
that date it sent a letter to Faith Christian Center stating the

                                9
Department had determined the 77th Street property was subject
to the RSO.
      Ample evidence supported the trial court’s finding the delay
did not violate Whitehurst’s due process rights. As an initial
matter, Whitehurst has not demonstrated the Department knew
before 2017 he falsified the record. Whitehurst points out that in
November 2009 the Department sent a letter stating the 77th
Street property was subject to the RSO. But there was no
evidence the Department knew before 2017, when it (a)
discovered Whitehurst owned the property and (b) began looking
at the records, that Whitehurst had changed the “built date” from
1955 to 1997.
      But even assuming the Department knew in 2009
Whitehurst had falsified a record and waited until 2017 to
discipline him, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding Whitehurst did not articulate or demonstrate “any
prejudice allegedly suffered from any delay.” (See Fisher v. State
Personnel Bd. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1, 20 [party claiming error
based on a violation of Skelly rights must demonstrate “prejudice
arising from the reasonable probability the party ‘would have
obtained a better outcome’ in the absence of the error”]; Chemical
Specialties Manufacturers Assn., Inc. v. Deukmejian (1991)
227 Cal.App.3d 663, 672 [“courts have consistently ruled that
generally ‘“[d]elay is not a bar unless it works to the
disadvantage or prejudice of other parties”’”]; Brown v. State
Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1159 [“‘[d]elay is not a
bar unless it works to the disadvantage or prejudice of other
parties’”]; see also Li v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
836, 865 [“no remedy is available to petitioner for failing to
demonstrate, in his petition, that he would have received a

                               10
different outcome had the trial court” applied the correct
standard of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5].)
       Whitehurst argues the delay prejudiced him because, had
the Department disciplined him earlier, different supervisors
would have investigated him and those supervisors had given
him positive performance evaluations. But as the trial court
found, the Board had and considered Whitehurst’s performance
evaluations, and Whitehurst did not contend either of his
previous supervisors had percipient knowledge about the RSO
designation. Whitehurst did not demonstrate he would have
obtained a better outcome when he had different supervisors.
       Whitehurst also argues he was harmed by the delay
because he would have been judged less harshly as a lower-
ranking employee and because it would have been easier for him
to find a new job when he was eight years younger. Whitehurst
also asserts the passage of time “made the situation look even
worse” to the hearing examiner because by the time of the
hearing the 77th Street property had not been billed for RSO fees
for nearly 10 years. Because Whitehurst did not raise these
arguments in the administrative proceedings or the trial court,
however, he forfeited them. (See Doe v. University of Southern
California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 26, 37; Rand v. Board of
Psychology (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 565, 587.)4
       Forfeiture also applies to Whitehurst’s argument the
Department’s charges were barred by laches, an argument he
raises for the first time on appeal. (See Blaser v. State Teachers’
Retirement System (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 349, 378 [laches is
forfeited if not raised in the trial court]; City of Oakland v. Public

4     These purported concerns are also too speculative to
constitute prejudice.

                                  11
Employees’ Retirement System (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 29, 52
[laches issues “not litigated in the trial court” nor “timely raised
in an administrative proceeding” are forfeited].) The laches
argument fails on the merits. Analogizing his case to those under
Government Code section 19635, which provides a three-year
statute of limitations for discipline of state civil service
employees, Whitehurst contends the Department had to
discipline him within three years of the misconduct. Whitehurst
cites Brown v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 1151,
which involved the dismissal of a faculty member at a state
university. Although the court in that case concluded
Government Code section 19635 did not apply because the faculty
member was not a state civil service employee, the court
borrowed the three-year period “as a measure of the outer limit of
reasonable delay in determining laches.” (Id. at p. 1160.) The
court in Brown stated that the “‘effect of the violation of [the
analogous] statute is to shift the burden to the plaintiff to prove
that his delay was excusable and that the defendant was not
prejudiced thereby.’” (Id. at p. 1161.)
        Even if we were to borrow the three-year statute of
limitations of Government Code section 19635 as a laches
measure, doing so would not help Whitehurst because under that
statute an agency must serve notice of an action based on
“falsification of records” within “three years after the discovery of
the . . . falsification.” As discussed, there is no evidence in the
record the Department discovered before 2017 that Whitehurst
falsified the “built date” of the 77th Street property, and the
Department promptly served Whitehurst with notice of the
proposed discharge in April 2017. In addition, as discussed,
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding

                                 12
Whitehurst suffered no prejudice from the purported delay, and
laches requires prejudice. (See Lam v. Bureau of Security &
Investigative Services (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 29, 36 [“Delay alone
ordinarily does not constitute laches”]; Brown v. State Personnel
Bd., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1151 [“what generally makes
delay unreasonable is that it results in prejudice”].)5

      C.     Whitehurst’s Challenge to the Findings by the Trial
             Court and the Board Lacks Merit
       In his opening brief Whitehurst complains about various
aspects of the Department’s investigation, the administrative
hearing, the Board’s findings, and the trial court’s ruling. We
interpret these complaints as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Whitehurst, however, did not argue in the trial court
substantial evidence did not support the Board’s findings, and for
this reason the trial court did not rule on the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting those findings. Because Whitehurst did not

5      In the trial court Whitehurst also argued the Board
violated his due process rights because the hearing examiner’s
report incorrectly stated Whitehurst was previously disciplined
for falsification of city records, when in fact he was disciplined for
violation of department rules. Whitehurst mentions this
argument in passing in his opening brief, stating the hearing
examiner “tainted his report” by including this “falsehood,” but
Whitehurst does not explain how the error prejudiced him. (See
Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 368, 379 [“‘“review is limited to issues which have
been adequately raised and briefed”’”].) In any event, substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding any such error did
not.

                                 13
timely challenge the Board’s findings in the trial court,6 he may
not challenge them for the first time now. (See Franz v. Board of
Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 31 Cal.3d 124, 143 [“to allow
the issue to be raised here, when not presented before the trial
court, would undermine orderly procedure on administrative
mandamus”]; M.N. v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 607, 632 [by not making the argument in the trial
court, a student appealing from a judgment denying his petition
for writ of administrative mandate forfeited the argument the
district failed to make required factual findings]; Noguchi v. Civil
Service Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1540 [government
employee who appealed from a judgment denying his petition for
writ of administrative mandate, “[h]aving failed to present the
issue to the superior court,” was “in no position to raise [the]
issue as error on . . . appeal”].)
       In any event, substantial evidence supported the Board’s
findings. In its first charge the Board alleged Whitehurst used
his “official position or office for personal gain or advantage.” As
a Department employee, Whitehurst had access to the
Department’s information management system. He used that
access to change the date the 77th Street property was built. As
an experienced inspector, Whitehurst undoubtedly knew

6      In his reply brief in the trial court, Whitehurst challenged
some of the Board’s findings. The trial court, however, did not
reach the sufficiency of the evidence because Whitehurst did not
raise it in his opening brief. (See Contractors’ State License Bd. v.
Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 125, 130, fn. 3 [trial court
has discretion to “not consider arguments first raised in a reply
brief because of the potential unfairness to the opposing party,
who is deprived of the opportunity to respond to the new
argument”].)

                                 14
changing the date would remove the property from the RSO and
cause the City not to assess RSO fees. Similarly, Whitehurst
used his access to the Department’s system to cancel inspections
on the 77th Street property and the 109th Street property,
preventing the Department from finding potential violations
Whitehurst would have to correct.
       The evidence also supported the Board’s finding on the
second charge that Whitehurst engaged in “activity which
constitutes a conflict of interest.” As discussed, Whitehurst used
his position to remove the 77th Street property from the RSO and
to prevent the Department from inspecting that property and the
109th Street property. In addition to giving himself financial
benefits arising from decreased costs, Whitehurst’s actions
removed legal protections from his tenants. Whitehurst’s conduct
violated rules 1 and 9 of the Department’s Rules of Employee
Conduct and rules I and IX of the City’s Code of Ethics, both of
which required Whitehurst to disqualify himself from making
any decisions or recommendations concerning either property.
Whitehurst’s conduct also violated rule 2 of the Rules of
Employee Conduct and Code of Ethics by eroding public
confidence in the Department’s impartiality.
       In its third charge the Department alleged Whitehurst
engaged in “unethical, inappropriate, and/or illegal behavior in
conflict with job duties, on or off the job.” Substantial evidence
supported the Board’s finding Whitehurst “‘should have taken no
role whatsoever in any decision involving property in which he or
a family member had an interest.’” Rule 9 of the Department’s
Rules of Employee Conduct and rule IX of the City’s Code of
Ethics required Whitehurst to disqualify himself from matters
where he had a financial interest. Whitehurst spent days of

                               15
testimony at the hearing focused on, and testifying about,
whether he was authorized to change the date and whether the
property was subject to the RSO. But as the hearing examiner
stated, “The point that he seems to have missed is that he should
not be the one making any of those determinations. He has an
interest in what happens with the property, and thus recusal is
the only thing he should have concerned himself with.”
       Substantial evidence also supported the Board’s findings on
the fourth charge for “falsifying city records.” The Board found
Whitehurst intentionally falsified the date the 77th Street
property was built and improperly canceled inspections.
Rejecting Whitehurst’s assertion the Department should not have
inspected the 77th Street property, the hearing examiner stated,
“This was not [Whitehurst’s] determination to make in the first
place. Even if his conclusion is correct that the Department’s
policy was not to inspect Section 8 units if they had been recently
inspected by another city department, this did not give him the
authority to cancel the inspection of a property that he has an
interest in. Taking actions on property that he had an interest in
was not just marginally unethical, it was highly unethical,
immoral, and inappropriate.”
       Finally, the same evidence supporting the findings on the
first four charges also supported the finding on the sixth charge
for “misusing delegated authority in the performance of duties.”
The Department put Whitehurst in a position of trust. He
betrayed that trust by using his position to change dates and
cancel inspections for properties in which he had a financial
interest.
       Whitehurst does not directly address most of the evidence
supporting these findings. Instead, he argues he was right and

                                16
the Department was wrong about whether it should inspect
Section 8 properties. Whitehurst spends much of his briefing
defending his view of Department policy on that issue, arguing
that the Department “unlawfully forced a duplicative inspection”
of the 77th Street property, “in violation of City Council’s
instructions,” and that the Board “prosecuted [him] for following
City Council’s instructions.” But as the trial court found,
“whether the City’s policy did not require an inspection of the
77th Street Property is not relevant to the charges sustained.”
Whitehurst fundamentally misconstrues the basis for his
discipline. The Department did not discipline Whitehurst for
refusing to inspect Section 8 properties; it disciplined him for
using his position as a Department employee and supervisor to
take actions that financially benefitted him. Even if Whitehurst
correctly interpreted the policy, it was a conflict of interest for
him to be making any decisions about properties where he had a
financial interest.
       Whitehurst makes much of the fact that, although the
hearing examiner found he violated Department rules by
ignoring the policy regarding inspecting Section 8 properties, the
Board voted not to sustain the fifth charge for violating
Department rules. He suggests the Board’s action vindicated him
on the issue of inspecting Section 8 properties. What Whitehurst
ignores is that the Board voted to sustain the five other charges
against him. Those charges were based on Whitehurst’s actions
in changing the “built date” for the 77th Street property,
canceling inspections of the 77th Street property and the 109th
Street property, and failing to recuse himself from decisions
related to both properties.

                                17
      Whitehurst also argues the Department’s Policies and
Procedures Manual Rules of Employee Conduct did not require
him to recuse himself from decisions concerning inspections of his
properties. Pointing to a rule requiring employees who “have
financial matters coming before . . . the Department in which
they are employed” to “disqualify themselves,” Whitehurst argues
an “inspection notice is not a financial matter.” What was a
financial matter, however, was Whitehurst’s ownership interest
in the two properties, and Whitehurst gained financially by
canceling inspections. As the hearing examiner found, “if there is
no inspection then no violations can be found, thus there can be
no requirement to correct those violations, and the corporation in
which [Whitehurst] has an interest . . . would not have to spend
funds to correct these potential violations.”

      D.     The 2016 Settlement Agreement Did Not Bar the
             Department From Disciplining Whitehurst
      Whitehurst argues the Board erred in failing to enforce a
settlement agreement he entered into with the Department in
June 2016, approximately four months before the Department
learned Whitehurst canceled an inspection on property he owned.
This argument fails too.
      “‘A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal
principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement
contracts.’” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th
781, 789.) Where there is no conflict over extrinsic evidence,
interpretation of a contract is a question of law, which we review
de novo. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 900, 915; Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493, 507.)

                               18
       The settlement agreement was not related to the conduct
that formed the basis for the Department’s decisions to discipline
Whitehurst and terminate his employment. Instead, the
agreement expressly resolved “all issues” between the
Department and Whitehurst “in connection with the proposed
disciplinary action of an eleven (11) working day suspension.”
That proposed 11-day suspension (reduced to five days) was for
knowingly approving a subordinate employee’s falsified
timesheet.
       Whitehurst argues the settlement agreement precluded the
Department from disciplining him for any “undefined acts that
occurred prior to the agreement,” including Whitehurst’s conduct
in 2009 when he changed the “built date” of the 77th Street
property. To support this argument Whitehurst points to a
provision that “placed [Whitehurst] on notice that any further
violations of policies and procedures of [the Department] and the
city will result in further disciplinary action up to and including
discharge.” He argues this provision meant the Department
could discipline him only if he committed “further violations” (i.e.,
future violations) and not if it discovered he had committed past
violations.
       The plain language of the settlement agreement makes
clear the parties did not intend the provision to have such a
broad scope. The agreement resolved issues “in connection with
the proposed disciplinary action.” Neither party released claims
related to anything other than the proposed 11-day suspension
for approving a subordinate’s falsified timesheet. Nor did the
agreement, by warning Whitehurst the Department would
discipline him for “further violations of policies and procedures,”
waive the Department’s right to discipline him for past violations

                                 19
unrelated to the proposed 11-day suspension. The trial court
correctly ruled “the parties’ settlement agreement did not
preclude the Department from disciplining [Whitehurst] for acts
other than those leading to his 5-day working suspension.”

       E.     The Penalty of Discharge Was Not Excessive
       Whitehurst contends the Board abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive penalty. We will not disturb the Board’s
choice of penalty absent “‘“an arbitrary, capricious or patently
abusive exercise of discretion.”’” (Cassidy v. California Bd. of
Accountancy, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627-628; see Flippin
v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Comrs., supra,
148 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.) “‘Only in an exceptional case will an
abuse of discretion be shown because reasonable minds cannot
differ on the appropriate penalty.’” (Pasos v. Los Angeles County
Civil Service Com. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 690, 700.)
       “In considering whether . . . abuse occurred in the context
of public employee discipline, . . . the overriding consideration in
these cases is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted
in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[harm] to the public
service.’” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 218; see Pasos v. Los
Angeles County Civil Service Com., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 701.) “Other relevant factors include the circumstances
surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.”
(Skelly, at p. 218; see Pasos, at p. 701.)
       The Board did not abuse its discretion in upholding
Whitehurst’s discharge. The city’s personnel policies authorized
discharge as a penalty for a first offense for three of the five

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charges the Board sustained against Whitehurst.7 And this was
not Whitehurst’s first offense. Whitehurst had served a five-day
suspension only a few weeks before committing the misconduct
that gave rise to this case.
      Whitehurst’s misconduct was serious. He abused his
position to avoid paying fees and to cancel inspections on two
properties he owned. Whitehurst canceled inspections of his
properties multiple times. He failed to recognize his conflict of
interest and disregarded Department and City rules requiring
him to recuse himself from decisions affecting his financial
interest. His actions undermined public trust in the integrity of
the Department. Rather than acknowledge his mistakes,
Whitehurst continued to insist he did nothing wrong, giving the
Department every reason to believe he would continue to act
inappropriately if allowed to continue in his position.
      Daniel Gomez, director of the Department’s Code
Enforcement Division, testified it was appropriate to discharge
Whitehurst because his violation of the “fundamental principle
that you recuse yourself from making decisions on your own
property” was “a significant violation of public trust.” That
misconduct, combined with Whitehurst’s refusal to allow
inspectors to enter the 77th Street property during the
inspection, caused Gomez to lose “trust and faith in Mr.
Whitehurst’s ability to make prudent decisions from this point
forward.”

7      According to the Department’s policies and procedures
manual, discharge is the only suggested penalty for a first offense
for falsifying city records and is within the range of suggested
penalties for using official position for personal gain or advantage
and engaging in unethical, inappropriate, or illegal behavior.

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                            DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs
on appeal.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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