Court Opinion

ID: 9490414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:43:00.626581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:05.291298
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that venue is proper in the Western District of Virginia. However, because this case raises an important issue of first impression in the federal courts,* I write separately to express my view on two points. First, under the CSRA venue does not He wherever the child resides. Rather, venue is proper here because the Western District of Virginia is the place where the child support payments are designated for disbursement. Second, despite suggestions to the contrary in our precedent, legislative purpose should not be allowed to circumvent the constitutional requirement that venue lies where the crime is committed.
I.
I do not read the majority opinion as stating that venue is proper under the CSRA wherever the child resides. Here, Murphy was charged with “willfully failing] to pay a past due support obhgation with respect to a child in another state.” 18 U.S.C.A. *142§ 228(a). Willfully failing to pay is not an act, rather it is a failure to act. It is well established that “where the crime charged is a failure to do a legally required act, the place fixed for its performance fixes the situs of the crime.” Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220, 76 S.Ct. 739, 742, 100 L.Ed. 1097 (1956).
The 1990 Texas court order requiring Murphy to pay child support clearly stated that Murphy owed the past due child support to “the State of Virginia and/or petitioner.” Because the payments were for “disbursement to the Central Registry for Child Support of the initiating State,” Virginia was the ultimate place fixed for Murphy’s performance. For this reason, the Western District of Virginia was a proper venue for Murphy’s prosecution.
II.
As the majority opinion correctly notes, the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to be tried where the crime is committed. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that the “the trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed”); U.S. Const, amend. VI (requiring that the trial of all crimes shall be held in the “State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). The Constitution, however, does not provide any help in determining where a crime is committed. That determination must be made “from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703, 66 S.Ct. 1213, 1216, 90 L.Ed. 1529 (1946); see also Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635-37, 81 S.Ct. 358, 361-62, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961).
In United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413 (4th Cir.1993), we stated that “the nature of the crime alleged” could be determined by “looking] at the purpose of the statute as evidenced by its legislative history.” Id. at 416. Our analysis in Cofield was based, I believe, on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s directive in Anderson. Although we must consider “the nature of the crime alleged” in determining venue, I believe that this phrase requires an exhaustive inquiry into the precise conduct proscribed by Congress rather than a dubious inquiry into the purpose of the statute as evidenced by its legislative history. Otherwise, legislative purpose could be used to circumvent the constitutional requirement that venue lie where the crime is committed. For example, venue could be improperly fixed for the convenience of the prosecution or the accused. See Johnston, 351 U.S. at 220-21, 76 S.Ct. at 742 (noting that because the Constitution fixes venue in the place where the crime was committed, any “variation from that rule for [the] convenience of the prosecution or the accused is not justified”). Proper venue analysis should consider congressional purpose only to the extent it was actually given effect in the statutory text.

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is currently considering this issue. See United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining whether venue is proper in the district where the child resided).