Court Opinion

ID: 9415019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 18:00:45.855706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.768575
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0351n.06

                                          No. 21-5987

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                     FILED
                                               )                                Aug 02, 2023
 JAMIE RAGER, Mother, Guardian and Next Friend )                            DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 of GC, a minor,                               )
                                               )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                               )               ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                               )               UNITED STATES DISTRICT
 v.
                                               )               COURT FOR THE EASTERN
 MCMINN COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOE GUY, )                          DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
 McMinn County, Tennessee, Sheriff; DERRICK )
                                               )                                      OPINION
 SAXE, Officer,
                                               )
        Defendants-Appellants.                 )

                   Before: GUY, WHITE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

        LARSEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GUY, J., joined in full, and
WHITE, J., joined in all but Section II.A. WHITE, J. (pp. 7–8), delivered a separate opinion
dissenting in part.

        LARSEN, Circuit Judge. After his arrest, Timothy Cook was placed in a booking cell at
the McMinn County Detention Center with a previously violent, frequent flyer at the prison, Jarrod
Jones. Jones attacked Cook. Although the officers on duty responded within seconds, Cook died.
Jamie Rager is the mother of Cook’s child, GC, who is Cook’s sole heir. She brought a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 suit as GC’s next friend against Officer Derrick Saxe, Sheriff Joe Guy, and McMinn
County. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part. Pertinent to this appeal, Officer Saxe and Sheriff Guy appeal the denial of
qualified immunity, and McMinn County appeals the denial of summary judgment on Rager’s
Monell claims. For the reasons stated, we REVERSE in part and DISMISS in part for lack of
jurisdiction.
No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

                                                 I.

         Tennessee police arrested Timothy Cook for driving under the influence and took him to
the McMinn County Detention Center (the Jail). Officers placed him in a holding cell (Cell One)
while they completed the booking. Jarrod Jones also was arrested that day, for theft and trespass.
He too was placed in Cell One for booking. Although there were five cells in the Jail’s booking
area, it was common for multiple detainees to be held together in Cell One, the largest cell in the
booking area. Jones had a lengthy criminal history and many prior stays at the Jail. Although
Jones was not exhibiting aggressive behavior during booking, he had been disciplined numerous
times for assaulting other inmates at the Jail. In fact, just nineteen days prior to the assault of
Cook, Jones had assaulted another inmate in Cell One. Although jail officials knew of Jones’s
assaultive tendencies, the Jail had an informal “clean-slate” policy, meaning that every inmate who
entered the Jail was treated the same, even those with past disciplinary issues, unless the inmate
demonstrated behavior, upon arrival at the Jail, showing that he needed to be segregated.
According to McMinn County Sheriff Joe Guy, he thought the policy was “just the right thing to
do” and that officers “try not to prejudge people, even though we may have some knowledge on
them.”

         Shortly before 6:30 p.m., Jones began to assault Cook. Deputy Dale Murray saw Jones
punch Cook. Cook fell to the ground, and Jones stomped on him. Deputy Murray alerted Officer
Derrick Saxe to the assault. Officer Saxe was seated at the booking desk close to Cell One. He
stood up, saw the assault, grabbed the cell key, and jogged to Cell One. The officers arrived at
Cell One approximately twelve seconds after noticing the fight and entered the cell approximately
sixteen seconds after it had started. They immediately stopped the assault, but it was too late.
Cook was unresponsive, had no pulse, and was not breathing. Despite efforts to save Cook, he
later died at a local hospital.

         Jamie Rager brought a § 1983 suit on behalf of Cook’s child and sole heir against Officer
Saxe, Sheriff Guy, and McMinn County. She also raised claims under Tennessee law. Defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

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No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

Pertinent to defendants’ appeal, the district court denied qualified immunity to Officer Saxe and
Sheriff Guy and allowed the claims against McMinn County to proceed to trial.1

                                                   II.

        Denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment grounded on qualified immunity is
appealable “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Watkins v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 658
(6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We review de novo the denial of qualified immunity. Klein v.
Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).

                                            A. Officer Saxe

        Failure to Protect. Officer Saxe first challenges the district court’s decision to deny him
qualified immunity on Rager’s failure-to-protect claim. Because Cook was a pretrial detainee, his
claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Westmoreland v.
Butler County, 29 F.4th 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2022). “[T]o establish deliberate indifference for failure
to protect [under the Fourteenth Amendment], ‘a defendant officer must [1] act intentionally in a
manner that [2] puts the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, [3] without taking reasonable steps
to abate that risk, [4] and by failing to do so actually cause the plaintiff’s injuries.” Stein v. Gunkel,
43 F.4th 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 729).

        Even if Rager can establish the first two elements, her claim fails the third. “The third
element requires more than negligence because ‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.’” Id. at 639–40 (quoting
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015)). To establish the third element, Rager must
show that Officer Saxe “was more than merely negligent; the officer must have acted with reckless
disregard in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm.” Id. at 640 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

        Here, Rager cannot make such a showing. Officer Saxe had no part in placing Cook and
Jones together; they were placed in Cell One together prior to his shift. At some point, Officer

1
  The district court also granted summary judgment to defendants on Rager’s claim for failure to
fund the jail and her state-law claims. Those claims are not before the court on appeal.

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No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

Saxe noticed Cook and Jones together, though he couldn’t remember when. On the day of the
incident, Jones didn’t offer any indication that he would suddenly and viciously attack Cook, such
that Officer Saxe would have understood that failing to separate them left Cook facing an
unjustifiably high risk of harm. And once Officer Saxe learned of the assault, he stopped it within
sixteen seconds. In sum, it cannot be said that Officer Saxe acted with reckless disregard in the
face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm. See id. (concluding the same where the officer likewise
had minimal involvement in placing the victim and violent inmate in the same cell and where he
was “otherwise follow[ing] jail procedures”).

       Rager responds that because Officer Saxe knew of Jones’s prior violent history, he had a
duty to immediately segregate Jones from the rest of the population. But she offers no case that
would put Saxe on notice that he had to remove Jones from the cell where there was no indication
on that day that Jones was likely to attack Cook. Rager bears the burden of establishing that Saxe
is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Since the defendant officers have raised the qualified immunity defense, plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.”). She has not done so.

       Qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
229 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Officer Saxe was not plainly
incompetent, nor did he knowingly violate the law. As a result, he is entitled to qualified immunity
on Rager’s failure-to-protect claim.

       Failure to Train. Officer Saxe next challenges the denial of qualified immunity on Rager’s
failure-to-train claim. For such a claim, Rager must establish “(1) the training or supervision was
inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s
deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the
injury.” Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

       Rager’s failure-to-train claim against Officer Saxe fails because she has not identified any
person whom Saxe failed to train. To the extent Officer Saxe is a supervisory official, he is liable
only if his “failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual” caused the

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No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

unconstitutional conduct. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). According to
Rager, Officer Saxe is the “offending individual.” Id. We know of no case that holds a supervisor
liable for failing to supervise, control, or train himself. Rager’s failure-to-train claim against
Officer Saxe fails from the start, and Officer Saxe is entitled to qualified immunity.

                                          B. Sheriff Guy

       Sheriff Guy challenges the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Rager’s claims
against him in his individual capacity for failure to protect and failure to train. Rager’s claims are
premised entirely on Sheriff Guy’s creation of the “clean slate” policy that, in Rager’s view, failed
to protect Cook from violence and precluded Sheriff Guy from properly training employees on
how to handle violent inmates. For a supervisor to be liable in his individual capacity, he must
have “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it.” Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
That participation must go beyond being the individual behind the policy that led to the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct. See id. at 543–44; Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647
(6th Cir. 2012) (A failure to supervise and train claim based on a supervisory official’s “adherence
to or continuation of a policy . . . improperly conflate[d] a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory
liability with one of municipal liability.”); Harvey v. Campbell County, 453 F. App’x 557, 563
(6th Cir. 2011) (“To the extent plaintiffs have adduced supporting findings that McClellan or Scott
was a County policymaker on matters of training and was so deliberately indifferent to the need
for more comprehensive training as to render the training deficiency a matter of de facto County
policy, he would be liable, if at all, in his official capacity, i.e., rendering the County liable.”).
Because Rager’s claims against Sheriff Guy are premised entirely on the policy he created as the
policymaking authority for McMinn County, we must construe her claims as claims of municipal
liability. Rager offers no cases indicating to the contrary, and Sheriff Guy therefore is entitled to
summary judgment on Rager’s claims for individual liability.

                                         III. McMinn County

       McMinn County appeals the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Rager’s
Monell claim. We must assess our jurisdiction to consider the County’s appeal.

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No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

       A county “is not eligible for qualified immunity, and the denial of summary judgment” on
a Monell or official-capacity claim “is not an independently appealable ‘final decision’ under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.” Lane v. City of LaFollette, 490 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, “an
appellate court can exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction on a § 1983 claim alleging municipal
liability where the municipality’s motion for summary judgment is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the qualified immunity analysis properly before the Court.” Id. An appeal is inextricably
intertwined if “the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred resolves the case against
the defendants in their individual capacities and the case against the municipality’s officers in their
official capacities.” Id. Said differently, “[a] pendent appellate claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’
with a properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal ‘only if . . . appellate resolution of the
collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well.” Martin v. City of Broadview
Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 963 (6th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Mattox v. City
of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 524 (6th Cir. 1999)).

       McMinn County argues that we have jurisdiction over its appeal because “the § 1983 claim
for failure to protect against McMinn County is inextricably intertwined with the issue of
Defendant Guy’s qualified immunity.” Appellant Br. at 25. But as explained above, we must treat
Rager’s individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Guy as claims against the County because they
are based entirely on Guy’s policymaking authority. Counties are not entitled to qualified
immunity, so there is no “qualified immunity analysis properly before the Court” that would allow
us to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the Monell claims. Lane, 490 F.3d at 423. The only claims
with respect to Sherriff Guy’s conduct are Monell claims. We lack pendent jurisdiction over the
County’s appeal.

                                                ***

       We REVERSE in part and DISMISS in part for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                 -6-
No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

        HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. I concur in all but Section II.A. of
the majority opinion; I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity to Officer Saxe.

        “[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Pretrial detainees are similarly
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brawner v. Scott County, 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir.
2021). In Brawner, we held that a pretrial detainee stated a § 1983 claim that jail officials were
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need where the jail officials “acted deliberately [and]
recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.’” Id. at 596. In Westmoreland v. Butler County, we applied Brawner in the
context of a pretrial detainee who claimed that jail officials had failed to protect him from the risk
of violence at the hands of his fellow detainees and held that a deliberate indifference claim for a
jail official’s failure to protect a pretrial detainee is viable if the officer “[1] act[s] intentionally in
a manner that [2] puts the plaintiff at substantial risk of harm, [3] without taking reasonable steps
to abate that risk, and [4] by failing to do so actually cause[s] the plaintiff’s injuries.” 29 F.4th
721, 729 (6th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the key question here is whether Saxe was “more than
merely negligent” and instead “acted with reckless disregard of an unjustifiably high risk of harm”
by failing to remove Cook from his holding cell with Jones. Id. at 730.

        The majority describes Jones as a “previously violent, frequent flyer at the prison.” This
does not fully capture Jones’s history at the Detention Center. Jones had been incarcerated at the
Detention Center fifteen times before he assaulted and killed Cook in Holding Cell One. On
several of those occasions, he was disciplined for assaulting other inmates. Most notably, just
nineteen days before Jones killed Cook, Jones assaulted a pretrial detainee in the same holding
cell. The incident report of that assault includes details very similar to those here: the officer
working the booking counter “looked up from the prisoner register and saw Inmate Rodriguez on
the ground and Inmate Jones punching him in the face.” R.6-2, PID 93. McMinn County
categorizes inmate assault or homicide a “Class A” inmate violation, the highest offense level,
which can result in disciplinary segregation of up to thirty or sixty days per offense, administrative
segregation, an increase in an inmate’s sentence, forfeiture of good-time credits, and a referral for

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No. 21-5987, Rager v. McMinn County, et al.

criminal prosecution. R.28-5, PID 240, 258. That Jones had committed several “Class A” inmate
violations during his fifteen stays at the Detention Center suggests that his history was known by
the Detention Center staff. And, when deposed, Saxe stated that he knew “[Jones] from being
arrested before,” agreed that Jones had “caused trouble in the jail before” and noted that he was
“sure [he] was” personally involved in an incident with Jones but could not remember which
incident. R.28-1, PID 216-217.

       There is ample evidence that Jones had a proclivity for violence against other inmates and
detainees that was random and unprovoked. Jones’s well-documented history of assaults against
other inmates, together with Saxe’s testimony that he was aware of Jones’s past, is sufficient to
support an inference that Saxe appreciated, or was recklessly indifferent to, the risk to Cook’s
safety when he left him in a cell with Jones. As the district court explained, “[a] reasonable jury
could find that Defendant Saxe knew of the risk Jones posed to [Cook] and he disregarded that
risk by allowing the two to remain in a dark cell together.” R.37, PID 420.1 Accordingly, I would
affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Saxe.

1
  In Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633 (6th Cir. 2022), this court held that jail officers were protected
by qualified immunity against a failure-to-protect claim brought by a pretrial detainee who was
assaulted in his cell by another detainee. Stein is distinguishable because here Saxe had actual
knowledge of Cook’s violent tendencies against other inmates and detainees at the Detention
Center, in contrast to the officers in Stein who, at best, knew only that the detainee had been
arrested in connection with outstanding assault warrants. Further, the officers in Stein were
involved in classifying the pretrial detainee; they did not have the opportunity to place him in or
remove him from the cell with his attacker.

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