Court Opinion

ID: 9716178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:29:50.624307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.688851
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
This case is before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing, defendant’s opposition thereto, and plaintiff’s reply. On November 8, 1979, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in this age discrimination action granting judgment to defendant, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, and finding, inter alia, 1) age of less than forty years at time of hiring is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the position of Flight Officer at American Airlines, Inc., under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976); and 2) under the rationale of East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977), plaintiff had suffered no injury and was not entitled to any relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1976).
Plaintiff contends the Court “erred as a matter of law” in reaching both of these decisions. Plaintiff asserts, for the first time in this litigation, that the BFOQ issue is controlled by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”) 1, which, it is claimed, directly conflicts with the Court’s finding on this issue.2 According to plaintiff, *152§ 43(d)(1) of the ADA, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(d)(1) (West Supp.1979), effectively prevents age from being a bona fide occupational qualification in the commercial airline industry. In addition, plaintiff claims the Court erred in finding that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief, whether or not discriminated against on the basis of age. Accordingly, plaintiff contends that: 1) judgment in this action, entered November 8, 1979, should be vacated, 2) judgment should be entered for plaintiff, 3) back pay, liquidated damages, costs and attorney’s fees should be awarded to plaintiff, and 4) defendant should consider and test plaintiff for the position of Flight Officer at American Airlines, Inc. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff contends the following provision of the ADA controls the determination of the BFOQ issue:
Each person who is a protected employee of.an air carrier which is subject to regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board who is furloughed or otherwise terminated by such an air carrier (other than for cause) prior to the last day of the 10-year period beginning on October 24, 1978 shall have first right of hire, regardless of age, in his occupational specialty, by any other air carrier hiring additional employees which held a certificate issued under section 1371 of this title prior to October 24, 1978. Each such air carrier hiring additional employees shall have a duty to hire such a person before they hire any other person, except that such air carrier may recall any of its own furloughed employees before hiring such a person. Any employee who is furloughed or otherwise terminated (other than for cause), and who is hired by another air carrier under the provisions of this subsection, shall retain his rights of seniority and right of recall with the air carrier that furloughed or terminated him.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(d)(1) (West Supp.1979).
The Court notes at the outset that this is the first time in this litigation that plaintiff has advanced this argument. Plaintiff states that the ADA was previously “overlooked”, and asserts no persuasive reason for such lack of diligence on his part. Under Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P., it is unmistakably clear that rehearings are not to be granted solely to permit the losing party to present arguments or theories which could, and should have been presented at trial, but were not. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 482 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1973); Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., 392 F.2d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 1968). Accordingly, it is apparent that most of plaintiff’s contentions need not be considered by the Court. Nevertheless, the Court has considered plaintiff’s principal contentions on their merits, and finds them unpersuasive.
Initially, it is evident that the ADA offers no protection to plaintiff because he is not a “protected employee” thereunder. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(h)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Plaintiff concedes this, but argues that § 43(d)(1) of the ADA, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(d)(1) (West Supp.1979), conflicts with the logic of the Court’s findings on the BFOQ issue. The Court disagrees.
Section 5(a) of the ADA clearly indicates Congress intended that implementation of the legislation should result in “no diminution of the high standard of safety in air transportation attained in the United States on October 24, 1978”, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a) (West Supp.1979). The underlying rationale of the Court’s findings on the BFOQ issue is the paramount importance of safety in the commercial airline industry. The Court found that American’s hiring policy with respect to pilot-applicant age allows future Captains to acquire extensive flight experience. Moreover, the Court concluded upon persuasive and credible evidence that such experience is essential to the safe operation of American’s business. The Court finds it without doubt that the elimination of American’s hiring policy with respect to pilot-applicant age, as violative of § 43(d)(1) of the ADA, would indeed result in a “diminution of the high standard of safety in air transportation attained in the United States.”
*153There is no indication in the legislative history3 of the ADA that Congress considered the interplay between the provisions of the ADA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Certainly, Congress intended to preserve any age requirements that amount to safety-related bona fide occupational qualifications under law existing on October 24, 1978. The Court finds that § 43(d)(1) of the ADA, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(d)(1) (West Supp.1979), must be read to require any “protected employee”, seeking to exercise the first right to hire, to satisfy any bona fide occupational qualifications established by the hiring air carrier. See, Airline Employer Protection Program, Proposed Rules, 44 Fed.Reg. 19146, 19150 (March 30, 1979) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 638.11(b)). Only this interpretation preserves the important occupational qualifications required in the interest of air safety. Accordingly, the Court finds no conflict between § 43(d)(1) of the ADA and the finding that age below forty years at time of hiring is a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of Flight Officer at American Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff also challenges the Court’s finding that plaintiff suffered no injury and is entitled to no relief, whether or not discriminated against on the basis of age, because American would not have hired him in any event. In doing so, plaintiff reargues several issues which were before the Court at time of trial. The Court need not, and will not, reconsider these issues. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, supra; Echevarria v. United States Steel Corp., supra. However, plaintiff contends the Court is “mistaken on a fundamental matter of law” and urges that plaintiff is entitled to back pay and liquidated damages whether or not he is entitled to injunctive relief. The Court recognizes that under certain circumstances, an injured plaintiff who is not entitled to injunctive relief may still be entitled to back pay and liquidated damages. Rodrigues v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2254, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966, 98 S.Ct. 506, 54 L.Ed.2d 451 (1977). Such circumstances, however, are not present in the instant case.
The Court has re-examined the evidence on the relief issue and reaches the same conclusion: plaintiff would not have been hired by American, whether or not he was discriminated against on the basis of age. The Court found that plaintiff’s Coast Guard record alone justifies the conclusion that plaintiff would not have been hired by American. Clearly, aside from basic qualifications such as height, weight and education, plaintiff was never competitively qualified, at any age, for the position at American which he sought. Simply stated, plaintiff does not meet American’s other qualifications on a competitive basis. Under such circumstances, plaintiff has suffered no injury. East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977). It is obvious that one who has suffered no injury is not entitled to relief of any kind.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the entire record herein, it is, by the Court, this 17th day of December, 1979,
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing shall be, and the same hereby is, denied.

. Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (Oct. 24, 1978).

. Plaintiff-intervenor Ray Marshall, Secretary, United States Department of Labor, joins in this claim. See plaintiff-intervenor’s Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing, filed December 6, 1979.

. The legislative history and purpose of the ADA, is collected at 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3737.