Court Opinion

ID: 8812314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 15:06:48.764446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:20.111055
License: Public Domain

HOUGH, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). [1] Using the word “usury” with reference to the statutes of New York, it disposes of Braker’s major defense to refer to our decision in Brown v. Fletcher, supra. The present transaction shows no insurance procured at Braker’s expense, nor any covenant on his part to pay at all events. This leaves the main inquiry one of fact, viz. whether Braker did in form absolutely sell and assign his expectancy, knowing what he did and intending to do it.
On this point it is of no importance whether he liked to sell, or preferred to borrow. Many an act is voluntary in the legal sense, although induced by unwelcome and distasteful circumstances. With the court below we find it amply proven that Braker did sell to Finance Company his expectancies under the fifteenth and sixteenth articles of his father’s will, with full knowledge of what he was doing, and intending to do what he did. That he also contemporaneously intended to deny such willingness and knowledge, should he live to be 55 years old, is, we think, also proven, but is quite immaterial, except as a reflection upon Braker’s character.
*586[2] There remains a renewed appeal to the doctrine of catching bargains. The material facts on this point do not differ from those in the Brown case, except that Braker was about a year older. This doctrine (in so far as it does not rest upon a desire to preserve to the heir the family estate) is but an aid to equity when endeavoring to apply what Justice Bradley called “a principle of law, as well as of natural justice,” namely, that “greater consideration and care are due to persons known to be unable to take care of themselves than to those who are fully able to do so.” Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 185, 6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. Ed. 839.2
In so far as decisions have been based on judicial desire, confessed or obvious, to preserve and perpetuate family estates, we decline to follow the same, regarding such doctrine as wholly unsuited to our national spirit, and certainly unsupported by any ruling of our highest court.
It having been agreed for a long time that mere inadequacy of price is not enough to set aside the sale of an expectancy, the inquiry always is whether an unconscionable advantage was taken by or through means inequitable, even though legal. Thus “catching bargains” becomes no more than a phrase convenient to describe the kind of fraud often capable of perpetration upon the young, the inexperienced, or' the absolutely ignorant. For a good example, see Hallett v. Collins, 10 How. 184, 13 L. Ed. 376. When such circumstances are proven, and it is insisted “that the proceedings were all conducted according to the forms of law,” the comment of Justice Bradley (Graffam v. Burgess, supra) is always appropriate. He said:
“Very likely. Some of the most atrocious frauds are committed in that way. Indeed, the greater the fraud intended, the more particular the parties to it often are to proceed according to the strictest forms of law.”
But where, as here, the man who in due form sells that which may be much, in consideration of that which is very little, is upwards of 40 years old, of good education, well to do according to any reasonable standard of expenditure, and under no other coercion than that of his own bad habits, we are still agreed that to such a man the doctrine of catching bargains has no application, and neither by reason nor authority are we compelled to assist him in escaping from a predicament of his own creation.3
[3, 4] The point that these plaintiffs have not shown a right to sue as foreign executors under Code Civ. Proc. § 1836a, is without substance. The reason for a foreign executor’s inability to sue is not that the court cannot hear him, but that he is officially confined to his own jurisdiction. When that disability is removed by the Eegisla-*587ture, he may address any court sitting within the territorial area of legislative power. Thus the statute of New York in effect entitles these plaintiffs as nonresidents to sue in the courts of the United States. It was so held under similar circumstances in Beaumont v. Beaumont (C. C.) 144 Fed. 288. That the production and filing of the exemplification of letters required by the statute is a condition subsequent to suit, and may be complied with at such time as the court permits, was decided in respect of this particular statute in Lecouturier v. Ickelheimer et al. (D. C.) 205 Fed. 683, which decision we approve.
[5] In respect of Ritchey’s effort to exclude Provident Company et al. from all participation in this fund, we are of opinion that the original transfer by way of collateral security to Wood, deceased, was not a “forgery.” Counsel seems to use that word rather to indicate invalidity than to accuse of crime, and such invalidity rests wholly upon the admitted or proven fact that an instrument bearing date March 5, 1902, was neither created nor delivered until July 5, 1903. But a forgery (irrespective of any statute) consists essentially in the false making or material alteration of a writing which, if genuine, would be of legal efficacy, and of doing this with intent to defraud. We find as facts that there was no intent to defraud, and that nothing was falsely made. The erroneous date was no more than a draftsman’s error, which has done no one any harm. Nor-did this document even purport ter minimize or interfere with any rights in or belonging to Banes at the date when it took effect, to wit, its delivery on July 5, 1903.
[6] The absolute conveyance to Wood’s executors of 1912 did not, and did not purport to, extinguish the rights obtained by Wood through his note and the accompanying agreement of hypothecation. It attempted to make the executors absolute owners of any $20,000 that might accrue under the sixteenth article of the Braker will; but it did not in die least affect their position as pledgee in respect of the fifteenth article. The attempt was idle, because of the earlier assignment to Banes; but Ritchey surely cannot complain of that.4
Nor can it be held that Wood’s executors unwittingly surrendered what they already had, in consideration of something of no worth after the transfer to Banes of 1907.
[7] The New York statute permitting and regulating recording of assignments of the interests in estates is not retroactive. Such is the general law; it was so held in respect of deeds in this state. Jackson *588v. Chamberlin, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 620. It follows that, the transfer by Bralcer to the Finance Company having been absolute and valid, the conveyances of parts thereof made before the existence of a recording act are enforceable in the order of time of making, and that the decree of the court below was substantially right. It is therefore affirmed, with one bill of costs to the appellees, to be assessed against both appellants.5

 The cases on this subject .are, we think, all collated in 11 Corpus Juris, p. 32. See, also, the earlier view that the doctrine is one primarily for the benefit of “an heir expectant.” Bouvier’s .Law Dictionary (12th ltd.) sub nom. “Catching Bargains.”

 See the treatment of a not dissimilar transaction with a much younger man, per Justice (then Vice Chancellor) Pitney, in Dixon v. Bentley, 68 N. J. Eq. 124, 59 Atl. 1036. The purchasers were the same men who as New York Finance Company dealt with Braker.

 The collateral assignment to Wood (erroneously dated March 5, 1902) begins with a recital to the effect that Braker had sold to the Finance Company Ills interest under the sixteenth article oí the will to the extent oí S20,000; and then in the habendum clause assigns to Wood ali the “estate, right, title, and interest” of the Finance Company in the estate of Braker, deceased. In point of fact the Finance Company had an estate under the Braker will in respect of both the fifteenth and sixteenth articles thereof. The plaintiffs pleaded a right to be reimbursed out of the funds arising under both articles. As neither in pleading nor by argument has it been asserted that the conveyance by way of pledge was limited by the recital above mentioned, we do not advert to the point.

 As the fund in the .trustee’s hands is large enough- to pay both the Banes and Wood notes, with interest, and leave a surplus to Bitchey, we leave unnoticed, as merely academic, the inquiry whether Bitchey, as Banes’ assignee, could not be compelled to stand wholly upon his assignment of 1907, instead of his note plus the assignment of 1907. The court below regarded the 1907 instrument as of no effect at all for lack of consideration. It is certainly arguable that the Finance Company could give away what they owned absolutely, and that they in effect did so; but, as the fund is ample, the order of payment becomes immaterial.