Court Opinion

ID: 9959782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:35.662953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.240546
License: Public Domain

J-S06040-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
  CLAY CALDWELL                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1900 EDA 2023

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 15, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0202251-2000

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED APRIL 12, 2024

       Clay Caldwell (“Caldwell”) appeals pro se from the denial of his serial

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We affirm.

       In August 1999, Caldwell assaulted a former girlfriend, and in January

2000, he violated a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order by entering her home

and murdering her in advance of her testimony at his forthcoming trial for

assaulting her. In December 2000, Caldwell entered a negotiated plea to first-

degree murder, and in exchange the Commonwealth withdrew several other

charges and agreed not to seek the death penalty. Caldwell did not file a

direct appeal.

       Caldwell filed a pro se PCRA petition in June 2001, alleging plea counsel

rendered ineffective assistance concerning the plea. The trial court appointed

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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PCRA counsel for Caldwell, who subsequently filed a “no-merit” letter and a

petition for permission to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,

544 A.3d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.3d 213 (Pa.

Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court dismissed the petition and granted

PCRA counsel permission to withdraw. This Court dismissed Caldwell’s appeal

for failure to file a docketing statement.

      In February 2006, Caldwell filed a pro se second PCRA petition, asserting

the ineffectiveness of plea counsel and PCRA counsel.           The PCRA court

dismissed the petition as untimely, and this Court affirmed.                 See

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, No. 1705 EDA 2006 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(unpublished memorandum). This Court subsequently affirmed the dismissal

of Caldwell’s third and fourth pro se PCRA petitions. See Commonwealth v.

Caldwell,    No.   3603    EDA    2014       (Pa.   Super.   2015)   (unpublished

memorandum).

      In October 2021, Caldwell filed a pro se application for relief in the

Commonwealth Court, challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 statute

stating that life imprisonment for first-degree murder is to be served without

parole. The Commonwealth Court transferred the case to the Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas. Caldwell filed a pro se brief in support of what had

become his fifth PCRA petition, asserting the constitutional challenge to the

1974 statute and a Miranda violation, but making no mention of the

timeliness of his petition. See Caldwell’s Brief Memorandum of Law in Support

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of his PCRA after Remand, 7/18/22, at 3-19. In April 2023, the PCRA court

issued a notice of intent to dismiss Caldwell’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

907.    Caldwell timely responded pro se to the Rule 907 notice, alleging,

without proof, the application of three subsections of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2), which addresses eligibility for relief under the PCRA.              See

Petitioner’s Responsive Reply, 5/8/23, at 1. Caldwell also filed a pro se motion

to correct the defects in his petition, again referring to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543,

not 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) which states exceptions that permit the

review of untimely PCRA petitions.             See Motion for Leave of Court to File

Amendments, 5/8/23, at 1.2             In June 2023, the PCRA court dismissed

Caldwell’s petition as untimely. Later that month, after the dismissal of his

petition, Caldwell filed a pro se supplemental amended petition, asserting,

inter alia: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not “having [Caldwell] present

when being accused of killing the victim by false testimony of the arresting

officer,” see Petitioner’s Supplemental Amended Petition, 6/22/23, at 2, (2)

the time-bar did not apply to his application for relief, see id. at 5, and (3)

the 1974 statutory change constituted a violation of the constitution which so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place, see id. at 7.

____________________________________________

2 Caldwell also filed a discovery motion based on newly-discovered evidence

in May 2023, and a letter in June 2023, requesting an extension of time to
assert exceptions to the jurisdictional time bar.

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      Caldwell filed a pro se timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not

order him to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, and he did not do so. The PCRA

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Caldwell raises four issues for our review:

      1. Whether the lower court gave [Caldwell] the proper notice of
      the “lower courts”, “Changes to the form”, from [Caldwell’s]
      “Application for Relief” -to- the present . . . PCRA pet[ition] after
      the transfer . . by the Commonwealth Court . . . ?

      2. Whether the lower court denied [Caldwell] due process in not
      addressing his motion for leave of court to make the necessary
      amendments freely pursuant to . . . Rule 905(A)(B) and
      Pa.R.Crim.P. . . . 109[?]

      3. Did [the] lower court deny/dismiss [Caldwell’s] due process
      right after the transfer to its jurisdiction . . . [in that] no hearing
      was held on that in . . . the presence of [Caldwell] . . . [?]

      4. Did the lower court err[] in dismissing [Caldwell’s] exception
      to [Rule] 907 and 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9545(b)(i-iii), when shown
      under 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9543(a)(2)(vii) [i]llegal sentence, which is
      also an exception under § 9545(b), cognizable under the
      provisions[?]

Caldwell’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered, and unnecessary capitalization

corrected).

      Before this Court can consider the merits of any of Caldwell’s claims, we

must first assess whether we have jurisdiction to review them. Our standard

of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-settled:

             We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
      the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
      is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the

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      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

      Under the PCRA, any petition including a second or subsequent petition

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes

final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.             See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature,

and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition

was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093

(Pa. 2010).

      Caldwell’s judgment of sentence became final on July 22, 2001, when

he did not file an appeal to this Court.        See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3),

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that an appellant has thirty days after an order

becomes final to file a timely direct appeal). Caldwell had until July 22, 2002,

to file the instant petition but did not file it until 2021. Thus, Caldwell’s petition

is facially untimely, precluding review of the merits of the issues raised in the

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petition unless Caldwell proves a time-bar exception. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d

at 1093.

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the

petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under

section 9545(b)(1), which provides:

      (b) Time for filing petition.—

      (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

          (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
       Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
       to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
       exercise of due diligence; or

          (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
       recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
       Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
       this section and has been held by that court to apply
       retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).        Where the petition is untimely, the petitioner

bears the burden to plead in the petition and prove one of the exceptions

applies. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (requiring a PCRA petition allege, and

the   petitioner   prove,   the    application   of   a   time   bar   exception);

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999) (same).

      When a court issues a notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent

to dismiss a PCRA petition without a hearing, a petitioner may respond to the

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proposed dismissal within twenty days. “The judge thereafter shall order the

petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended petition, or direct that the

proceedings continue.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

      Caldwell’s first two issues assert he lacked proper notice the PCRA court

was reviewing his petition as a PCRA petition, and he did not have the

opportunity to amend his petition to correct its defects concerning time-bar

exceptions. See Caldwell’s Brief at 4.

      The PCRA court found Caldwell’s petition failed to acknowledge or

address the time bar, thereby failing to meet his obligation to plead and offer

to prove a time-bar exception. The court thus found it did not have jurisdiction

to consider Caldwell’s petition and dismissed it.      See Rule 907 Notice,

4/28/23; PCRA Court Order, 6/15/23; PCRA Court Opinion, 6/15/23, at

unnumbered 2.

      The trial court properly concluded Caldwell failed to file a timely PCRA

petition or plead and demonstrate the application of a time-bar exception.

Caldwell’s fifth PCRA petition was clearly untimely, and his general references

to the PCRA eligibility requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543, addressing

eligibility for PCRA relief, did not assert, much less demonstrate, the

applicability of the time bar exceptions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Caldwell’s appellate assertions that he did not have proper notice that his

petition was being treated as a PCRA petition following transfer from the

Commonwealth Court, and the PCRA court violated his due process rights by

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failing to grant him leave to amend his petition fail. Caldwell clearly knew that

he was litigating a PCRA petition because in July 2022, he filed a “Brief

Memorandum of Law in Support of his PCRA after Remand.” Thus, Caldwell

had nearly one year to assert a time-bar exception before the court dismissed

his PCRA petition. Additionally, Rule 907 permits a court to dismiss a petition

and does not require it to permit amendment of the petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

907(1). Here, where Caldwell’s pre-dismissal filings did not assert a time-bar

exception, much less attempt to prove one, the PCRA court did not err by

dismissing the petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Beasley, 741 A.2d

at 1261.

      Caldwell’s third issue asserts the PCRA court denied him due process by

failing to hold a hearing on his petition in his presence. See Caldwell’s Brief

at 4. No hearing is required before the PCRA court dismisses a petition where

the petitioner fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA by

pleading and proving a time-bar exception.           See Commonwealth v.

Hudson, 156 A.3d 1194, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v.

Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 427 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Caldwell’s final issue asserts he pled a time-bar exception because he

received an illegal sentence. See Caldwell’s Brief at 4. Although challenges

to the legality of sentence cannot be waived, they must be asserted in a timely

petition to be reviewable. See Commonwealth v. Hromek, 232 A.3d 881,

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884 (Pa. 2020). There is thus no merit to Caldwell’s claim that his assertion

of an illegal sentence rendered his untimely petition reviewable.3

       Order affirmed.

Date: 4/12/2024

____________________________________________

3  For the first time on appeal, Caldwell claims he has after-discovered
evidence, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi), in the form of a
newspaper article about a police detective who allegedly gave false testimony
against him. See Caldwell’s Brief at 9-13. Apart from the fact this claim and
all other claims first raised on appeal are unreviewable, see Pa.R.A.P. 302(a),
this claim does not assert a 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(ii) time-bar exception, and
does not assert facts Caldwell could not have known of the allegedly false
testimony with the exercise of due diligence nearly twenty-five years ago.
See Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(2).

      Caldwell’s additional assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, see
Caldwell’s Brief at 14-19; a Miranda violation, see Caldwell’s Brief at 24-27;
and the unconstitutionality of the 1974 statute addressing life imprisonment
without parole, see Caldwell’s Brief at 29-32, are all first raised on appeal and
do not constitute time-bar exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii); Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136
(Pa. Super. 2023).

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