Court Opinion

ID: 9628842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:04.628691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.258945
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the opinion of the majority in this case. In my view, it rests upon a holding, not justified by the statute or case law of this jurisdiction, that the liability of the surety on the appearance bonds ends as a matter of law when sentence is pronounced.
In People v. Doe, 172 Cal.App.2d Supp. 812, 342 P.2d 533, 535, a case not in point on the facts, it is said:
“A bail bond serves a three-fold purpose: (1) it permits release of a defendant from incarceration; (2) it delivers the custody of the defendant to the bail bondsmen; (3) it guarantees the personal appearance of the defendant for trial, and in execution of any judgment * *. The last above stated is the primary purpose * * * (Emphasis Added.)
*1363In this connection, it should be noted that the first sentence of a section of the California statutes (Penal Code, Sec. 1305) is practically identical with the portion of 22 O.S.1971, Sec. 1108, quoted in the opinion of the majority in this case. Under both of these statutes, the bondsman guarantees the appearance of the. defendant in execution of the sentence.
In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance, Sec. 105, it is said:
“The effect of sentence on the termination of liability under a bail bond largely depends on the terms of the bond * *. But where the terms of the bond are that the principal is to surrender himself in execution of judgment, or that the principal will abide the order of the court, it is the principal’s duty to surrender himself and submit to the penalty of the law, and on his failure to do so his sureties are liable under the bond.” (Emphasis added.)
In 8 C.J.S. Bail § 79 at page 222, it is said:
“The effect of the postponement of sentence or of the execution thereof until a definite date without the consent of the surety depends on the obligation of the bond, and if the obligation is construed to require surrender of the principal in execution of sentence the postponement will not discharge the surety * * (Emphasis added.)
In U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Justice Court, etc., Court of Appeal, 99 Cal.App.2d 683, 222 P.2d 292, 295 (1950) quoting 8 C.J.S. Bail § 79, subd. g, p. 158, it is stated:
“Sureties on a bond conditioned that the principal shall abide the judgment of the court, or that he will appear for judgment and render himself in execution thereof, are not discharged by a conviction or pronouncement of sentence, and the principal must further submit to such punishment as shall be adjudged.”
In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance § 98, it is said:
“[A] bond is binding only to the extent of statutory conditions, and surplus conditions cannot be enforced. On the other hand, the sureties on a bail bond cannot change or lessen a liability fixed by statute.”
So, in my opinion, this Court is not authorized to hold ineffectual the positive provision of our statute, as quoted by the majority, that the principal “[shall] surrender himself in execution of the judgment” (22 O.S. 1971 § 1108).
There is another statute which supports, at least indirectly and incidentally, the proposition that the liability of the surety on a bail bond is not necessarily terminated when sentence is pronounced. On this question (when the liability is terminated) our statutes make no distinction between convictions for felonies and convictions for misdemeanors. 22 O.S.1971, Sec. 963, provides in pertinent part that under certain circumstances, “ * * * if the conviction is for misdemeanor judgment may be pronounced in the defendant’s absence * *.” I find it hard to believe that the legislature intended to make it possible, under certain circumstances, for the court to pronounce judgment in the absence of the defendant, but that such pronouncement would have the effect of terminating the liability of the bail bondsmen.
For the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.