Court Opinion

ID: 9527602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:31:51.460965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:56.221061
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: • The majority relies upon Sapp v. Johnston, 15 Ill. App. 3d 119, for its result in this case. In Sapp the father and mother were divorced and the adult son resided with the mother. (Thus the son was emancipated.) Under these facts the court in Sapp held that there was no common law duty of the father to support the son and that the father was not liable under the family expense section of the husband and wife act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, eh. 68, par. 15). The facts in this case are much different. Plaintiffs’ son, Cyrus, was barely past the age of 21, he was living with and being supported by his parents, both during the summer and when he was attending school. He was claimed as a dependent in plaintiffs’ income tax for the year before the accident and also for the year the accident occurred. At the time of the accident, section 15 of the husband and wife act provided: “The expenses of the family and of the education of the children shall be chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either of them, in favor of the creditors therefor, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately.” In my opinion this act imposed on both parents the obligation to pay the medical, hospital and funeral expenses of their son and the assets used by the father in payment of these expenses were properly within the meaning of the Dramshop Act. This is so because Cyrus, although 21 years of age, was not yet emancipated. Emancipation as employed in the law of parent and child means the relinquishment of parental control, conferring on the child the right to its own earnings and terminating the parents’ legal liability of support. “Ordinarily attainment of its majority emancipates a child, and gives the right to renounce the legal rights and duties of the relation to the child or the parent. On the other hand, there is no fixed age at which a child necessarily becomes emancipated, and the fact that a child has attained its majority does not, ipso facto, work emancipation; a child is not emancipated where it continues to live with the parent, and the latter continues to provide it support and care.” 67 C.J.S. Parent & Child §89. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding, 46 Ill. App. 3d 15, involved the question of whether a Miss Differding qualified for insurance coverage as a member of her parents’ household under a policy issued by plaintiff to her parents. At the time of the accident which precipitated the dispute over the policy coverage, Miss Differding was attending Northern Illinois University on a post-graduate basis. While at the university she would rent various apartments to live in as her needs arose and her choice of locations varied. During her enrollment at Northern she maintained a permanent residence with her mother and father at 8 Oak Lane, Park Forest, Illinois. She used this address on various personal documents to denote her permanent home. These items include her Illinois driver’s license, voter’s registration card, library card, checking account, income tax statements and student activities fees receipt from Northern. Throughout her attendance at Northern she would regularly return to Park Forest on weekends, semester breaks and school vacations. In deciding that Miss Differding was unemancipated and therefore qualified for coverage under the policy in question, the court said: “In determining whether Miss Differding is covered under this section of the policies, the question becomes whether she was emancipated. What constitutes an emancipation is a question of law, but whether there has been an emancipation is a question of fact. [Citations.] State Farm argues both issues, urging Miss Differding had reached the age of majority and was therefore emancipated as a matter of law, along with claiming she was in fact emancipated and not a resident of the Differding household. As to the question of emancipation as a matter of law, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, citing common law cases including Rex v. Roach (1795), 101 Eng. Rep. 536,6 T. R. 248, concluded it is a general rule, and always has been so, that attaining the age of 21 years is not ipso facto emancipation of the child from his or her father, although at that age a child may emancipate himself by separating from his father. [Citation.] The Illinois Supreme Court has never rendered an opinion on whether all children reaching majority are emancipated. In Waldron v. Waldron (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 964, 968, 301 N.E.2d 167, 171, while recognizing the age of majority in Illinois as being 18 years of age, the appellate court (5th District) held an 18-year-old child was not emancipated and the father’s obligation to pay support under a divorce decree therefore did not end. The absence of a definitive ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court along with the appellate court opinion in Waldron and sister state opinions indicate the meaning of the term unemancipated,’ as used in the policies of insurance, may include those who have attained the age of majority. Insurers write the policies and if the language of the contract has a dual interpretation they must be charged with the ambiguity. [Citation.] State Farm could have cleared any ambiguity by using the description unemancipated minor children’ rather than ‘unemancipated children,’ in defining those who are deemed to be residents of the insured’s household, but did not do so and now must be charged with the ambiguity. Even without the rule of construction in favor of insured persons and against insurance companies the same result would be reached. Along with the Illinois appellate court in Waldron the Illinois legislature recognizes parental rights and duties as to children who have reached the age of majority. By State statute the county circuit court may order payments for support of a child whether of minor or majority age. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 40, pars. 14, 19.) The law in Illinois is in accord with the common law and the common understanding of the term. The test is not the age of the child but whether there is an entire surrender of the right to care, custody and earnings of such child as well as a renunciation of parental duties. Regarding the question of fact as to whether Miss Differding was unemancipated, numerous circumstances must be examined. By definition, within the insurance contracts, ‘unmarried and unemancipated children, while away * 0 * attending school, are deemed to be residents * * * .’ It is uncontroverted that Miss Differding was unmarried and was away attending school. Most importantly, there is ample proof Miss Differding maintained a permanent residence with her family in Park Forest during her entire enrollment at Northern. She used her Park Forest address on her driver’s license, voter’s registration card, library card, checking account and income tax statements, and she regularly returned to her family residence on weekends, vacations and semester breaks. After considering the entire record, we hold Miss Differding was in fact unemancipated and qualifies for insurance coverage as a resident of the Differding household.” 46 Ill. App. 3d 15, 19-20. Under the rationale of the Differding case, Cyrus was not yet emancipated. By agreement with his parents Cyrus stayed in their home and accepted their love, affection, support and education. Thus he was not yet emancipated and they were still liable for his support under the family expense statute and under common law. In Hight v. Hight, 5 Ill. App. 3d 991, the court discussed the 1967 amendment to the Divorce Act which provided that the trial court in a divorce case could provide for the payment of support for education of children past their majority. In speaking of the amendment, the Hight court said: “The amendment now makes it clear that whether a parent should or should not provide for the education of children does not and ought not depend upon whether the children have reached their majority. There can be little doubt but that the statutory amendment recognizes a broader necessity for additional education of children and a broader responsibility for parents to provide the education in accordance with the needs, ability and financial resources of parents and children.” 5 Ill. App. 3d 991,993. In 67 C.J.S. Parent & Child §17, the author says: “The legal liability for the support of the child ceases when it reaches the age of majority unless the child elects to remain the servant of its father, under his roof, and receive support from him, or unless it is in such a feeble and dependent condition physically or mentally as to be unable to support itself;” * “ .” In this case Cyrus was still under his parents’ roof when he became “feeble and dependent” upon his father and mother until his death as the result of an accident. Surely they cannot be classified as mere volunteers when they carried out their parental duties by paying his medical and funeral expenses.