Court Opinion

ID: 9784404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:44:10.422736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:54.257294
License: Public Domain

JAMES EDWARD WELSH, Judge.
Ever since the enactment of Missouri's Workers’ Compensation Law eighty-five years ago, the legislature has intended to impose liability upon employers to furnish compensation pursuant to the Act for employee injuries and deaths falling within the Act’s scope and to make such compensation under the Act the employees’ exclusive remedy. When the legislature included coverage for occupational diseases within the Act’s scope over fifty years ago, it intended that workers’ compensation be the exclusive remedy for those occupational diseases. Today, the majority disregards this longstanding legislative intent of exclusivity and interprets the Act to permit employees with occupational diseases to proceed with claims for compensation under the common law. Because I believe that such an interpretation is contrary to the legislature’s intent, unwarranted in light of the Act’s legislative history, and impermissible when considering the Act as a whole, I respectfully dissent.

Gunter’s Claim is for an Occupational Disease

Gunter is seeking recompense for an occupational disease. The Act defines an “occupational disease” as “an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of employment.” § 287.067.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Gunter’s claim, that he was exposed to asbestos during the course of his work with KCP & L and that this asbestos exposure directly and proximately caused him to develop mesothelioma, falls squarely within the Act’s definition of an occupational disease. “An injury by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.” § 287.067.2. Thus, if Gunter’s mesothelioma arose out of and in the course of his employment with KCP & L, and his exposure to asbestos through his employment with KCP & L were the prevailing factor in causing his mesothelio-*31ma, his mesothelioma would constitute a compensable occupational disease under the Act.

Employer Liability and Exclusivity

An employer’s liability to furnish compensation to an employee for injuries that fall within the Act’s scope is set out in section 287.120, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010, which also makes such compensation the employee’s exclusive remedy for the injury:
1. Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person....
2. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.
These two subsections, which together comprise the Act’s exclusivity provision, go hand in hand. As a plurality of the Missouri Supreme Court recently noted, if an employee’s injury does not meet the requirements of subsection 1, then “an employer shall not be liable to the employee under the act” for such injury, and correspondingly, the injury is not subject to the Act’s exclusivity as set out in subsection 2. Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations (“MARA ”), 277 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Mo. banc 2009). Indeed, instead of being subject to the Act’s exclusivity, an employee whose injury does not meet the requirements of subsection 1 of section 287.120 is excluded from the Act, as the employer is not liable to furnish compensation to the employee for such injury under the Act. Id. at 679-80. Thus, the Act’s exclusivity is coextensive with an employer’s liability to furnish compensation under the Act. Subsections 1 and 2 of section 287.120 must, therefore, be considered together in determining whether Gunter’s occupational disease claim is subject to the Act’s exclusivity.1

Principles of Statutory Interpretation

The determination as to whether Gun-ter’s occupational disease claim is subject to subsections 1 and 2 of section 287.120 is a matter of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislature’s intent from the language used and to give effect to that intent. Ridinger v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 189 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Mo.App. 2006). Statutes are to be construed consistent with the obvious purpose of the legislature. United Asset Mgmt. Trust Co. v. Clark, 332 S.W.3d 159, 167 (Mo.App. *322010). In ascertaining that purpose, it is appropriate to consider the history of the statute. Id. Moreover, we do not read a particular statutory provision in isolation. Id. Instead, “ ‘we construe the provisions of a legislative act together and read a questioned phrase in harmony with the entire act.’” Id. (citation omitted). In doing so, we avoid interpretations that lead to unreasonable, oppressive, or absurd results. Id. We must employ “ ‘rules of statutory construction that subserve rather than subvert legislative intent.’ ” Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo., 188 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Mo. banc 2004) (citation omitted). We presume “that the legislature intended that every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute have effect,” and that “the legislature did not insert verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.” State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

History of Occupational Disease Coverage in Workers’ Compensation Law

Missouri voters passed the original version of the Workers’ Compensation Law by referendum in 1926. Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 307 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 1957). This original version of the Act covered accidental injuries only and excluded coverage for occupational diseases. Renfro v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 235 Mo.App. 226, 130 S.W.2d 165, 171 (1939); § 3305(b), RSMo 1929. The Act defined an “accident” as “an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” § 3305(b), RSMo 1929. The Act defined an “injury” as “violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom.” Id. After defining the terms “accident” and “injury,” the Act specifically stated, “The said terms shall in no ease except as herein provided be construed to include occupational disease in any form.” Id. The Act recognized the employee’s continued right to proceed on claims for occupational disease outside of the Act, stating “that nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to deprive employees of their rights under the laws of this state pertaining to occupational diseases.” Id.
The Act’s original exclusivity provision, like the present-day section 287.120, performed two functions. First, it imposed liability upon employers subject to the Act to furnish compensation, “irrespective of negligence,” for “personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” and correspondingly released those employers “from all other liability therefor whatsoever.” § 3301, RSMo 1929. Compare § 287.120.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Second, it made the Act the exclusive remedy for “such accidental injury or death.” § 3301, RSMo 1929. Compare § 287.120.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Thus, pursuant to the exclusivity provision, the Act, if applicable, was “wholly substitutional in character” and supplanted and superseded any rights and remedies that a plaintiff might have had at common law or otherwise. De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1931).
In 1931, the legislature amended the Act to provide optional coverage for occupational diseases. § 287.020.4, RSMo 1949.2 *33In amending the Act to include this optional coverage, the legislature simply added language providing for the election of occupational disease coverage to the statute’s existing language in the definitions section of the Act. Id. The legislature did not redefine the terms “accident” or “injury,” and it did not add a definition of “occupational disease.” § 287.020, RSMo 1949. The pertinent definitions provisions, with the new language providing for coverage for occupational diseases in brackets, read:
2. The word “accident” as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.
3. The term “injury” and “personal injuries” shall mean only violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. The said terms shall in no case except as herein provided be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the workman is at work.
4. “Death” when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation means only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects occurring within three hundred weeks after the accident; provided, that nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to deprive employees of their rights under the laws of this state pertaining to occupational diseases, [unless the employer shall file with the commission a written notice that he elects to bring himself with respect to occupational disease within the provisions of this chapter and by keeping posted in a conspicuous place on his premises a notice thereof to be furnished by the commission, and any employee entering the services of such employer and any employee remaining in such service thirty days after the posting of such notice shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to accept this section unless he shall have filed with the commission and his employer a written notice that he elects to reject this act.]
Id. The legislature did not change the exclusivity provision’s language imposing liability upon employers to furnish compensation for accidental injuries and deaths and making the Act the exclusive remedy for such accidental injuries and deaths. § 287.120.1 and .2, RSMo 1949.
For almost thirty years after 1931, the references to occupational disease coverage in the definitions portion of section 287.020 remained the only language in the Act “providing directly or by inference for compensation under the Act by reason of occupational diseases.” Staples, 307 S.W.2d at 460. Because the legislature had not defined “occupational diseases” or changed the definitions of “accident” or “injury” when it added coverage for occupational diseases in the 1931 amendment, it became “the duty of the courts to determine and apply the meaning of the terms [‘accident,’ ‘injury,’ and ‘personal injuries’] in connection with occupational disease cases, even though [these terms] were not originally intended to apply to such cases.” Renfro, 130 S.W.2d at 171.
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the courts’ struggle to try to apply the *34terms “accident” and “injury” in the context of occupational disease cases in Staples, 307 S.W.2d 457. The claimants in Staples were the widow and surviving children of an employee who died of silico-tuberculoses, an occupational disease. Id. at 458-59. The employer asserted that the claim for death benefits was barred by section 287.020.4, RSMo 1949, because the employee’s death did not occur within 300 weeks after the “accident” occurred, which the employer contended was the day that the employee discovered the disease. Id. The claimants argued that a death by occupational disease was not a death by “accident” and, therefore, the 300 weeks’ time limit did not apply. Id. at 459.
The Supreme Court rejected the claimants’ argument, finding that the Act must be construed in such a way to include occupational diseases. Id. at 462-63. The Court recognized that an occupational disease was not a “true ‘accident,’ ” as that term was expressly defined in section 287.020.2, because it was not the result of an “unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently.” Id. at 459-60. Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that the legislature had expressed its intent that occupational diseases be covered when it enacted the 1931 amendment giving employers and employees the option to elect occupational disease coverage. Id. at 462. Because the legislature did not revise the definitions of “accident” or “injury” and did not define “occupational disease” in that amendment, the Court found that the only way to effectuate the legislature’s intent to cover occupational diseases for those who elected such coverage was to broaden the statutory definitions of “accident” and “injury” and construe them “in harmony with the purpose of the amendment.” Id. The Court reasoned:
The legislature has enacted an amendment for the very purpose of authorizing employers and employees to elect to bring occupational disease claims and injuries under the Act, and, respectively, to pay and receive compensation therefor, in lieu of all common laiv rights of action. The very bringing of such claims under the Act presupposes an “injury,” and, therefore, an injury has generally been recognized as present and existing in all compensable occupational disease cases. Generally, in compensation cases a compensable injury presupposes an “accident,” for an injury is the result of an accident.... It is almost unthinkable that the legislature would adopt the amendment in question without contemplating and intending that its previously enacted definitions be broadened to fit the necessities of occupational disease claims.
Id. (emphasis added).
The italicized language indicates that the Court in Staples recognized that the legislature intended that all of the Act, including section 287.120’s exclusivity provision, apply to occupational diseases. This is confirmed by the Court’s statement later in the opinion that “[tjhere is no indication in the Act that the legislature did not intend for all occupational disease claims to be subject to the same conditions and limitations as other claims.” Id. at 463.
The Court, therefore, held that the term “accident” must be construed to include a compensable disability resulting from an occupational disease and causing death. Id. at 462-63.3 In so holding, the Court *35also relied upon section 287.020.2’s language that “[t]he word ‘accident’ as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean....” Id. at 462. The Court found that the context of the word “accident,” as it pertained to section 287.020.4’s death provision, required a broader meaning in order to apply the Act to occupational diseases. Id. Ergo, the Court in Staples found that the word “accident,” as it relates to occupational diseases, has a different meaning than the word “accident,” as it is defined in the statute.
In 1959, the legislature amended the Act to add two sections specifically addressing occupational diseases. Section 287.067, RSMo 1959, expressly defined the term “occupational disease” to mean “a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment.” § 287.067.1. This definition of “occupational disease” did not refer to or require an accident for compensability. Id. Also in this section, the legislature articulated when a disease is deemed to arise out of employment, and it recognized loss of hearing due to industrial noise and radiation disability as two types of occupational diseases. § 287.067. At the same time, the legislature enacted section 287.063, RSMo 1959, which set out the procedure for an employer’s and employee’s election of occupational disease coverage, the notice of election requirements, when an employee is deemed to have been exposed to an occupational disease, which of the employee’s employers is liable for compensation, and when the statute of limitations for an occupational disease begins to run.
When the legislature created these new provisions pertaining to occupational disease in 1959, it did not redefine the terms “accident” or “injury” in section 287.020 to expressly include occupational disease, and it did not change the language of section 287.120’s exclusivity provision. §§ 287.020 and 287.120, RSMo 1959. In 1963, the legislature did, however, rewrite section 287.020’s definition of “death” to provide that the limitation that a death occur within 300 weeks after an accident to be com-pensable did not apply to death by occupational disease. § 287.020.4, RSMo Cum. Supp.1963. This indicates that the legislature recognized the distinction between death by accident and death by occupational disease but intended that the Act cover both. “ ‘When the legislature enacts a statute referring to terms which have had other legislative or judicial meanings attached to them, the legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of these meanings.’” State ex rel. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hartenbach, 267 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Mo.App.2008) (citation omitted). This was tantamount to a legislative imprimatur of the Staples decision and its different definitions of the word “accident” in varying contexts of the statutes. Essentially, it was an express affirmation that the Court in Staples correctly determined the General Assembly’s legislative intent.
In 1974, the legislature amended the Act to make coverage for occupational diseases mandatory. The legislature deleted the language in section 287.063 allowing employers and employees to elect coverage for occupational disease, and it deleted language in section 287.120 stating that only employers who elected to accept the provisions of Chapter 287 were required to furnish compensation under the Act. §§ 287.063 and 287.120.1, RSMo 1978. At the same time, the legislature amended section 287.110, the provision setting forth *36the scope of the Act, to provide that the Workers’ Compensation Law applied to all occupational diseases in addition to all injuries. § 287.110.2, RSMo 1978. Again, the legislature did not change the definition of “accident” or “injury” to expressly include occupational disease, and it did not change the exclusivity provision’s language requiring accidental injury or death to trigger an employer’s liability and the Act’s exclusivity.
The 1974 amendments were significant for several reasons. First, by eliminating the option to elect occupational disease coverage, the legislature expressed its intent to make coverage for occupational diseases mandatory for employers and employees subject to the Act. Second, by stating that the scope of the Act covers “all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in this state,” the legislature recognized the difference between injuries by accident and occupational diseases. Nevertheless, the legislature explicitly stated that Chapter 287 applied to both. Third, by deleting the language in section 287.120.1 restricting the Act’s application to only employers who elect coverage under the Act at the same time that it deleted the language in section 287.063 providing for the election of occupational disease coverage, the legislature implicitly recognized that the provisions of section 287.120 applied to occupational diseases, even though the Act’s definitions of “accident” and “injury” did not expressly include occupational diseases. It may be assumed that the legislature was aware of Staples’s interpretation of the term “accident” and found that no change was necessary to reflect a differing intent. See Hartenbach, 267 S.W.3d at 729.
In the years following the 1974 amendments, the legislature continued to make additions, deletions, and revisions to the occupational disease provisions, to section 287.020’s definitions, and to section 287.120. In all of its amendments, however, the legislature did not change the definitions of “accident” and “injury” to include occupational disease, and it did not change the language of the exclusivity provision requiring an accidental injury or death. Nevertheless, in interpreting the Act, courts of this state routinely acknowledged the distinction between accidents and occupational diseases and recognized that the Act covered both. See, e.g., Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Mo. banc 1983); Garrone v. Treasurer of Mo., 157 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Mo.App.2004); Bull v. Excel Corp., 985 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo.App.1999); Myers v. Rival Mfg. Co., 442 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo.App.1969); Liebrum v. Laclede Gas Co., 419 S.W.2d 517, 520-21 (Mo.App.1967). Throughout this time, the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (“Division”) also distinguished between accidents and occupational diseases and recognized that the Act covered both.4
*37To construe section 287.120’s exclusivity provision requiring an accidental injury or death in harmony with the Act’s express provisions for coverage for occupational diseases, the term “accident” in section 287.120 had to be interpreted to refer to both those events encompassed by section 287.020.2’s definition of “accident” and occupational diseases.

The 2005 Amendments

In 2005, the legislature rewrote the Act’s definition of an accident. § 287.020.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. The pre-2005 definition of the term “accident” began by stating, “The word ‘accident’ as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean.... ” § 287.020.2, RSMo 2000. The 2005-amended definition of “accident” begins, “The word ‘accident’ as used in this chapter shall mean....” § 287.020.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Under the new definition of “accident,” there must be an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain at an identifiable time and place. Id. Additionally, this unexpected event or unusual strain must produce, at that time, “objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift.” Id.
The legislature also rewrote the standard for compensability of a work-related injury and an occupational disease. Before 2005, an injury was compensable if, among other things, “the employment” was “a substantial factor” in causing the injury. § 287.020.3(2), RSMo 2000. An occupational disease was compensable if it met this standard for a compensable injury. § 287.067.2, RSMo 2000. After the 2005 amendments, an injury is compensa-ble only if “an accident” was “the prevailing factor” in causing the injury. § 287.020.3(2), RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Likewise, an injury by occupational disease is compensable “only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.” § 287.067.2, RSMo Cum. Supp.2010.
In addition to rewriting the definition of an accident and the standard for compens-ability of an injury and an occupational disease, the legislature added subsection 10 to 287.020, which says:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of “accident”, “occupational disease”, “arising out of’, and “in the course of the employment” to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D.2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
The legislature made other changes to section 287.020 in 2005, including:
• Dictating that an injury from an idiopathic cause is not compensable, section 287.020.3(3), RSMo Cum.Supp. 2010;
• Enacting a provision to the effect that injuries sustained while traveling to and from work in a company-owned or company-subsidized vehicle are not compensable, section 287.020.5, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010;
• Precluding compensation for accidents that occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer, even if the accident occurred on a route custom*38arily used by employees to get to and from work, id,.; and
• Restricting compensation for myocardial infarction or cardiovascular disease or cerebrovascular accident to instances in which the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition, section 287.020.3(4), RSMo Cum.Supp.2010.
Each of the foregoing provisions constituted a legislative overruling of court decisions interpreting broadly the phrase “accident” in section 287.020.5
In the 2005 amendments, the legislature also completely rewrote section 287.800, which, before 2005, had stated that the provisions of Chapter 287 should be “liberally construed with a view to the public welfare.” § 287.800, RSMo 2000. The legislature modified section 287.800 to require that the provisions of Chapter 287 now be “strictly” construed. § 287.800.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. Strict construction of a statute means that we do not give a statute “broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms” and that we “presume[] nothing that is not expressed.” Robinson v. Hooker, 323 5.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo.App.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (noting that general co-employee immunity was not expressed in the statute, but had been adopted by judicial decision).

The Purpose of the 2005 Amendments

The legislature’s purpose for the 2005 amendments can be gleaned from various subsections of section 287.020, in which the legislature clearly rejected and overruled the holdings in a substantial number of judicial decisions, with only a few of those cases mentioned by name: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App.2002) (nurse’s knee “popped” due to degenerative condition while walking at work), Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1999) (health care worker’s foot fell asleep, causing her to fall when she stood up), and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. banc 1999) (employee fell in cafeteria owned by separate entity in same building as her employer’s office while she was on lunch break and walking to a table with her lunch). The General Assembly legislatively overruled the numerous cases that it believed had misinterpreted the scope of the phrases “accident” and “arising out of and in the course of employment.” In the legislature’s view, these cases and the others that were overruled without specific mention6 had “liberally” interpreted the Act to find that workers’ compensation benefits were available for injuries and diseases that were caused by normal activities of everyday life that coincidentally occurred at work or that had some connection to work that the General Assembly considered more remote. Importantly, none of these cases addressed occupational diseases in any way. The abrogation of these cases in no way demonstrates that the legislature intended to exclude occupational diseases from any part of the Act.

Occupational Diseases and the Exclusivity Provision

Nevertheless, a needlessly narrow construction of the plain language of the 2005-amended definitions of “accident” and “injury” and the exclusivity provision does just that-it restricts, if not eliminates, coverage for occupational diseases under the *39Act. For, if we fastidiously construe section 287.120’s language that an employer is liable to furnish compensation under the Act “for personal injury or death of the employee by accident” and that the Act’s rights and remedies are the employee’s exclusive rights and remedies “on account of such accidental injury or death,” then occupational diseases must fit within section 287.020.2’s definition of “accident” to be covered under the Act and be subject to the Act’s exclusivity provision. MARA, 277 S.W.3d at 679.7
Meticulously applying the plain language of section 287.120 and 287.020.2’s definition of “accident” to occupational diseases, an employer is liable under the Act and an employee is excluded from remedies outside of the Act only for those occupational diseases that produce objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. Unlike an injury by accident that occurs on a particular date, however, “an occupational disease develops and manifests itself over a period of time and is not caused by a single event.” Garrone, 157 S.W.3d at 243. Thus, this needlessly narrow construction of the plain language of section 287.120 appears to eliminate from the Act’s scope most, if not all, occupational diseases. As discussed more fully below, however, I do not believe that was the legislature’s intent.

Eliminating or Restricting Occupational Disease Coverage Is Contrary to Legislature’s Expressed Intent

Reading the current versions of 287.120 and 287.020.2 as eliminating occupational diseases from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Law is directly contrary to the legislature’s express statement of the Act’s scope. In section 287.110.2, the legislature states:
This chapter shall apply to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in this state, regardless of where the contract of employment was made, and also to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted outside of this state under contract of employment made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide, and also to all injuries received and occupational diseases contracted outside of this state where the employee’s employment was principally localized in this state within thirteen calendar weeks of the injury or diagnosis of the occupational disease.
(Emphasis added.) Reading sections 287.120 and 287.020.2 as eliminating occupational diseases from the Act’s scope also renders superfluous the numerous statutory provisions in the Act specifically addressing occupational disease claims.8
*40Indeed, even reading sections 287.120 and 287.020.2 not to eliminate occupational diseases but merely to narrow the Act’s coverage to only those occupational diseases that produce objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift (if such an occupational disease exists) directly conflicts with statutory provisions defining and prescribing the parameters of compensable occupational disease claims. The most obvious of these is section 287.067.3, which provides for the compensability of repetitive motion injuries. Repetitive motion injuries, by their very nature, do not occur during a single work shift. We know that the legislature recognized this because it said in section 287.067.8 that a current employer is not liable for the occupational disease of repetitive motion injury where the employee’s exposure to the repetitive motion “is for a period of less than three months ” and exposure to the repetitive motion with the immediate prior employer was the prevailing factor in causing the injury. (Emphasis added.)
Other statutes also indicate that the legislature did not intend to limit compensation of occupational diseases to single work shift events. In prescribing the presumption of exposure for occupational diseases, section 287.063.1 says that an employee “shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists.” (Emphasis added.) In prescribing which employer is liable for compensation for an occupational disease, section 287.063.2 says that “[t]he employer liable for the compensation in this section provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease prior to evidence of disability, regardless of the length of time of such last exposure.” (Emphasis added.) For loss of hearing due to industrial noise to be compensable as an occupational disease, section 287.067.4 requires that the loss of hearing be due to “prolonged exposure to harmful noise in employment.” (Emphasis added.) These statutory provisions speak in terms of an employee’s exposure to the *41occupational disease hazard over a period of time — not in a single work shift.

Section 287.120 Continues to Include Occupational Diseases

Legislative intent is the pole star of statutory interpretation and construction. Once determined, the result is ordained and a liberal versus strict construction is a secondary, if not irrelevant, consideration.9 Strict construction is neither a directive to read one statute in isolation nor a directive to read one statutory provision in such a way as to render other provisions of a comprehensive act absurd or superfluous. Strict construction of the Act does not require, and, indeed, the canons of statutory construction do not permit, an interpretation of section 287.120 that finds that, following the 2005 amendments, occupational diseases either (a) are no longer covered by the Act; (b) are covered, but only when the occupational disease is the result of a specific event during a single work shift; or (c), are covered, but the employer is not entitled to the benefit of exclusivity under section 287.120.2. To find that occupational diseases are no longer covered by the Act after the 2005 amendments is not only directly contrary to the legislature’s express inclusion of occupational diseases within the Act’s scope, but it renders superfluous the myriad statutory provisions specifically addressing occupational diseases — many of which were also amended in 2005.10 To find that occupational diseases are covered, but only when the occupational disease is the result of a specific event during a single work shift, is contrary to several statutory provisions that indicate that occupational disease exposure occurs over time. Finally, to find that occupational diseases are included in Chapter 287, but that the employer is no longer entitled to the benefit of exclusivity under section 287.120.2, is contrary to the longstanding principle that the Act is not supplemental or complimentary but is “wholly substitu-tional in character,” supplanting and superseding any rights a plaintiff might have at common law or otherwise. State ex rel. Tri-County Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Dial, 192 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Mo. banc 2006); De May, 37 S.W.2d at 645.

*42
No Unintended Consequences

Once legislative intent has been determined and becomes the pole star of statutory construction, there can be no unintended consequences of legislation by judicial interpretation. To find “unintended consequences” by closely parsing the language is to take a very wooden approach to statutory interpretation, as though the words of a single section of the statute exist in a vacuum. In the face of the legislative history before us, it cannot be seriously contended that the legislature intended to decouple the Act’s coverage from the Act’s exclusivity. Mutuality of the Act’s benefits and burdens is a fundamental precept of the Act. “In return for providing compensation which is both assured and insured, the employer is relieved of the burden of civil actions for damages.” Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo. banc 1991) (Blackmar, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 478-79 (Mo. banc 2009). Any decoupling of the Act’s coverage from the Act’s exclusivity is violence done the legislative scheme as it has existed for over fifty years and a position taken by neither party to this case.
Ever since the legislature added coverage for occupational diseases in 1931 and made it mandatory in 1974, the legislature’s intent has been for the Act to cover occupational diseases and to do so in the manner prescribed by the statutory provisions addressing occupational diseases. Historically, the courts and the.Commission have effectuated the legislature’s intent by distinguishing between an accident and an occupational disease but also recognizing that the Act covers both. For the Act to cover both, however, section 287.120’s references to “accidental injury or death” necessarily had to encompass both section 287.020.2’s definition of an accident and occupational disease.
I do not believe that the legislature expressed a different intent regarding the Act’s coverage of occupational diseases when it enacted the 2005 amendments. The majority’s construction of section 287.120 to sever compensability from exclusivity was as logical at the time Staples was decided as it is at present. The gravamen of Staples is that, no matter how the word “accident” is defined, it must be read to include occupational disease to avoid an absurd and irrational result. The majority’s reasoning that a change in the definition of the word “accident” requires a different conclusion misses the point of Staples altogether.
To continue to subserve rather than subvert the legislature’s intent, I believe that we must read section 287.120’s exclusivity provision in harmony with the occupational disease provisions. I would find that section 287.120’s language stating that an employer is liable under the Act and that an employee is excluded from remedies outside of the Act for “accidental injury or death” arising out of and in the course of employment includes both an “accident,” as defined in section 287.020.2, and an “occupational disease,” as defined in section 287.067.
Although this is a case of first impression for the appellate courts of this state since the 2005 amendments took effect, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri recently addressed this exact issue in Idekr v. PPG Industries, Inc., 2011 WL 144922 (W.D.Mo. Jan.18, 2011). As in this case, the employee in Idekr filed a tort claim against her former employer for what was, essentially, an occupational disease. Id. at *1-2. When the employer contended that the employee’s tort claim was barred by the *43Workers’ Compensation Law, the employee argued that the 2005 amendments eliminated occupational diseases from the Act’s scope or restricted coverage to only those that were caused in a single work shift pursuant to the narrow definition of “accident.” Id. at *2. The district court disagreed, noting, as we have, the legislature’s express declaration in section 287.110 that the Act covers occupational diseases; the fact that, in 2005, the legislature had amended, rather than eliminated, numerous provisions within the Act relating to occupational diseases; and the Missouri Supreme Court’s recognition, before the 2005 amendments, that to effectuate the legislature’s express intent that the Act cover occupational diseases, the definitions of “accident” and “injury” had to be read to include occupational diseases. Id. Based upon these considerations, the district court concluded that “the Missouri Supreme Court would hold that the 2005 amendments did not remove occupational diseases from the Workers’ Compensation Law’s scope.” Id. While I recognize that federal decisional law, although persuasive, is not binding, I would conclude that Idekr, which expressly decided the issue before us, tracked applicable Missouri law and reached the correct result.

The Commission is the Initial Forum for Determination of Gunter’s Claims

Because I believe that claims for occupational diseases clearly continue to be subject to section 287.120’s exclusivity provision, I would also find that such claims are committed to the Commission’s initial determination. Courts used to say that the Commission had “subject matter jurisdiction” over workers’ compensation claims. See, e.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621-23 (Mo. banc 2002), overruled by McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 478-79. In Webb ex rel. J.C.W. v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. banc 2009), however, the Supreme Court explained that, pursuant to article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution, “ ‘[t]he circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.’ ” Because employees’ claims against employers are civil matters, the circuit court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
After Webb, the Supreme Court further clarified in McCracken that the question as to whether a workers’ compensation claim is committed to the Commission in the first instance is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction but an issue of the circuit court’s statutory authority to proceed. 298 S.W.3d at 477. The party asserting that the Act applies and, therefore, that the claim is committed to the Commission’s initial determination must plead and prove it as an affirmative defense or else it is waived. Id. at 479.11
McCracken showed how this works in practice. If a tort defendant does not properly raise the issue of an employer-employee relationship, the circuit court may proceed to adjudicate the tort claim according to common law principles. Id. The defendant cannot later attack the judgment as having been rendered without “subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. But if the defendant initially shows that there is an employer-employee relationship, and the injury apparently arose out of that relationship, the circuit court must dismiss the matter and allow the matter to proceed in the Commission. See id. at 477. The circuit court does not have the option of retaining the case, proceeding to adjudicate the causation issue and the negligence issue, and then entering judgment accord*44ingly. While both the Commission and the court may have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction of the dispute, only one forum is the proper initial forum under these circumstances. The case must be dismissed so that it can be processed in the Commission because the Commission is the only proper initial forum for the matter in this procedural setting. See id. at 477-78.12
Along with the proper interpretation of the scope of the exclusivity clause, the need for the utilization of the proper initial forum supports granting the writ in this case. The reason this makes abundant sense becomes evident upon reflection. Gunter contends that the exposure through employment was not the prevailing factor in his occupational disease. Without an extended evidentiary hearing with live witnesses and expert testimony as to the mesothelioma, no fact-finder can know the truth of his assertion. If the workplace exposure were the prevailing cause, then his exclusive remedy would be under Chapter 287. KCP & L and its insurer would be responsible for the compensation to be paid under the Act, with KCP & L presumably entitled to assert claims for subrogation against the manufacturers. The determination of causation issues (and thereby, indirectly, liability issues) does not lend itself as readily to resolution by summary judgment as does the determination of such matters as employment (as in McCracken).
Gunter understandably wishes to have a jury try the issue of causation so that he could ask the jury to And that the workplace exposure existed so to create liability in tort under standards applicable to toxic tort cases, but that it was not the prevailing factor in his occupational disease. KCP & L, on the other hand, would presumably ask the jury to find that the workplace exposure was the prevailing factor. Thus, in the civil tort case, KCP & L would presumably be trying to show that it is more at fault, while Gunter would be trying to show that KCP & L is less at fault. If the case should be decided such that the workplace injury were found to be the prevailing factor, and accordingly, the case must be reinstituted in the Commission, each side would then presumably discharge its prior expert witnesses and hire new experts to try the issue in reverse in the Commission (unless there were an issue of res judicata or judicial estoppel that would preclude such reverse retrial).13
Also, if KCP & L were successful in proving to the jury that the workplace exposure was actually the prevailing factor in the disease, Gunter might argue that instead of dismissing the matter in circuit court (perhaps due to limitations reasons, or just to save time), the circuit court should proceed to act like an Administrá-*45tive Law Judge and enter an award pursuant to Chapter 287. If the circuit court did purport to enter an award pursuant to Chapter 287, one might wonder whether the appeal by any party would go to the Commission or directly to this court.
All of this is simply to make the point that judicial policy requires that, regardless of the degree to which exclusivity of remedy applies, there should be one initial forum for workplace injury and disease claims. It does not mean that the circuit court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of such claims. The policy of one initial forum is not a jurisdictional doctrine; it is a judicial policy independent of interpreting the meaning of “accident” under section 287.020. If both parties prefer to try the claim as a tort case in the circuit court rather than as a workers’ compensation claim, the defendant need not raise exclusivity as an affirmative defense, and the circuit court clearly can proceed to adjudicate the claim. McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 479. But if ignoring and waiving Chapter 287 and waiving the right to have the Commission make the initial determination as to the proper forum is not consensual, there are multiple sound policy reasons to require that the initial forum be the Commission. This policy would rest, of course, on the same footing (to a large extent) as the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It would involve some of the same policy reasons, but actually, because of the unique nature of the Workers’ Compensation Law, such policy reasons may exist with even greater force.
Gunter wishes to suggest that if a claimant asserting a claim against an employer contends that he or she does not have a covered claim under Chapter 287, the claimant should have a free pass to proceed directly to circuit court and be able to stay there until the claims have been adjudicated. Gunter argues that such is the logical understanding of MARA. Such would create a system that allows the claimant the unqualified, unilateral right to select his or her own initial forum. If that were the effect of MARA, then McCracken would make no sense, because McCracken determined that, where the facts show that there is an employer-employee relationship, the case should be dismissed so that it may be conducted in the initial instance as a workers’ compensation claim in the Commission. McCracken allows the circuit court to be the initial arbiter of the existence of the employment relationship, with the Commission the initial arbiter of the compensability of the claim. McCracken never envisioned what Gunter argues for here.
KCP & L had the burden of showing in its motion for summary judgment that there was no genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the following elements: (1) Gunter’s alleged claims were based upon an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with KCP & L; and (2) Gunter was acting as an employee of KCP & L. See Treaster v. Betts, 324 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Mo.App.2010); Fortenberry v. Buck, 307 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Mo.App.2010). It should be noted that there is no third requirement of showing that the injury is not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. If there were such a third requirement, then the circuit courts would be adjudging com-pensability and thereby performing the statutorily-created function of the Commission.
In its motion for summary judgment, KCP & L asserted that it was uncontro-verted that Gunter was employed by KCP & L; that Gunter claimed to have been exposed to asbestos during the course of his work for KCP & L; that Gunter claimed that this exposure caused him to develop an asbestos-related disease; and *46that KCP & L qualified as an “employer” under the Act because it employed more than five persons at all relevant times during Gunter’s employment. KCP & L met its burden.
In response, Gunter admitted these facts but noted that, at the same time that he worked for KCP & L, he worked as a home remodeler and was exposed to asbestos as part of this outside work. Thus, Gunter contends that the undisputed facts do not establish that his workplace exposure to asbestos was the prevailing factor in causing his mesothelioma, which section 287.067.2 requires for his mesothelioma to constitute a compensable occupational disease. This is an issue of causation, however, which is committed to the Commission’s initial determination. See Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 161.

Conclusion

Gunter’s tort claims against KCP & L seek recompense for the occupational disease of mesothelioma that he allegedly incurred as a result of his exposure to asbestos during and in the course of his employment. His claims are subject to section 287.120’s exclusivity provision and are, therefore, exclusively covered by the Workers’ Compensation Law. Gunter’s claims are committed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s initial determination. KCP & L properly pled the Act’s applicability as an affirmative defense and proved it in its motion for summary judgment. Thus, I would find that the circuit court erred in overruling KCP & L’s motion for summary judgment and make the preliminary writ of prohibition permanent.

. To justify disregarding section 287.120.1 in interpreting section 287.120.2, the majority asserts that section 287.120.1 “is not the only provision that imposes liability on employers for work-related injury claims” and that section 287.063, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010, and section 287.067.2 also render employers liable for occupational disease claims. I disagree. Section 287.063.1 defines when an employee is "conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease” but contains no language setting out an employer’s liability to furnish compensation for the occupational disease. Likewise, while section 287.067.2 states when an injury by occupational disease is compensable, it, too, does not contain language mandating the employer’s liability to furnish such compensation. Although section 287.063.2 does refer to employer liability in the context of occupational disease, it does not impose liability for compensation but, rather, merely specifies which employer — to the exclusion of any other employers — is liable for that compensation.

. When the legislature amended the Act in 1931 to include optional coverage for occupational diseases, the section containing the amendment was still numbered section 3305(b). 1931 Mo. Laws 382. The Act was renumbered in 1949 as Chapter 287. Section *333305 was renumbered as section 287.020, which is what it is numbered today. For clarity's sake, I will cite to the sections in Chapter 287.

. The Court in Staples declined to rule on whether the term “accident” must be construed to include a compensable disability resulting from an occupational disease that does not cause death, because that issue was not before it. 307 S.W.2d at 463. Two years later, in Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo. banc 1959), the Court *35recognized that the terms "accident” and "injury” in the Act included a compensability disability from all occupational diseases, not just those causing death.

. It appears that sometime in the late 1990s, the Division’s Administrative Law Judges began using prescribed forms for recording their findings of fact and conclusions of law. The forms, which the Division continues to use, require the judges to address: "Was there an accident or incident of occupational disease under the law?”; "Date of accident or onset of occupational disease”; "State location where accident occurred or occupational disease contracted”; "Was above employee in employ of above employer at time of alleged accident or occupational disease?”; "Did accident or occupational disease arise out of and in the course of the employment?”; "Describe work employee was doing and how accident happened or occupational disease contracted”; "Did accident or occupational disease cause death?”; and "Parts of body injured by accident or occupational disease.” See, e.g., Eaton v. AT & T/Southwestem Bell Telephone L.P., 2011 WL 939214 *1 (March 9, 2011); Honeycutt v. Condaire, Inc., 2002 WL 31233727 *1 (October 3, 2002); Childress v. *37Earl Scheib Auto Paint, 1997 WL 216284 *6 (April 4, 1997).

. See footnote 6 infra.

. Other cases that were clearly overruled, but not mentioned by name, include Wells v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. banc 2000); Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. banc 1996); and Alexander v. D.L. Sitton Motor Lines, 851 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. banc 1993).

. In interpreting 287.120’s exclusivity provisions and the 2005 amendments to the definitions of "accident” and "injury” in MARA, the Supreme Court declared that workers who are excluded from the Act by the narrower definition of accidental injury “have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act, because they no longer fall within the exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.” 277 S.W.3d at 680. The Court did not rule which injuries fell within the amended definition of "accident,” however, as it stated that it was "not asked to decide what injuries fall within the definition of ‘accident’ in section 287.020.2 and, therefore, no opinion is expressed.” Id.

. See § 287.020.4 (providing time limit for compensable death by occupational disease); § 287.063.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010 (setting out presumption of exposure for occupational disease); § 287.063.2 (stating which employer is liable for compensation for occupational disease); § 287.063.3 (stating when statute of limitations for occupational disease begins to run); § 287.067.1 (defining occupational disease); § 287.067.2 (stating when injury by occupational disease is compensable); § 287.067.3 (recognizing injury by repetitive *40motion as occupational disease); § 287.067.4 (recognizing loss of hearing due to industrial noise as occupational disease); § 287.067.5 (recognizing radiation disability as occupational disease); § 287.067.6 (recognizing when diseases of lungs are occupational diseases); § 287.067.7 (recognizing contagious or communicable disease as occupational disease); § 287.067.8 (stating which employer is liable for compensation for occupational disease due to repetitive motion); § 287.070, RSMo 2000 (recognizing occupational diseases related to cleanup of illegal drug laboratory); § 287.127.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010 (requiring employers to post notice advising employees of duty to report occupational diseases within thirty days of time employee becomes reasonably aware of work-relatedness of illness); § 287.197.1, RSMo Cum. Supp.2010 (defining loss of hearing due to industrial noise occupational disease); § 287.197.2 (prescribing calculation of percentage of occupational deafness); § 287.197.3 (prescribing calculation of disability payments for occupational deafness); § 287.197.7 (prescribing timing of claim for occupational deafness); § 287.197.8 (stating which employer is liable for compensation for occupational deafness); § 287.266.2, RSMo 2000 (providing for recovery of payments made to person eligible for public assistance for occupational disease); § 287.266.6 (stating department of social services’s rights regarding payments to provider for persons eligible for public assistance for injury by occupational disease); § 287.420, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010 (requiring employee to give employer written notice of occupational disease within thirty days after diagnosis); § 287.902, RSMo 2000 (creating Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Company to insure employers against occupational disease).

. Indeed, when the legislative intent demands it, we have departed from the plain meaning of the words used and found "or” to mean "and,” and "shall” to mean "may.” See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 511 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. 1974); Farmers & Merchs. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Mo. banc 1995).

. These indicia of legislative intent and the specific provisions of the Act that address occupational diseases distinguish this case from Robinson, 323 S.W.3d 418, where the invocation of "strict construction” was largely determinative. Before the 2005 amendments, courts had relied upon a judicial extension of immunity for co-employees to " ‘fix’ the Act's omission of agency principles in determining liability for workplace injuries.” Id. at 423. In Robinson, we reevaluated this judicial construct of co-employee immunity under principles of strict construction in light of the 2005 amendment to the Act. Id. at 424. In doing so, we determined that a strict construction of the word "employer” in section 287.120's exclusivity provisions did not shield a co-employee from civil liability. Id. at 423-25. Robinson is distinguishable from this case because there were no statutory provisions addressing co-employee immunity. Here, there are numerous statutes expressly addressing occupational diseases. To apply a "strict” construction of section 287.120 to preclude the exclusivity provisions’ application to occupational diseases would disregard the occupational disease statutes and lead to the absurd result of effectively eliminating occupational diseases from the Act’s scope. It is one thing to take the legislature’s admonition concerning strict construction seriously as it relates to a judicially-created doctrine, as was the case in Robinson, and entirely another to utilize the admonition to frustrate the announced intention of the legislature.

. In this case, KCP & L properly raised the Act’s applicability as an affirmative defense.

. I am reluctant to use the term "primary jurisdiction” not because I believe it erroneous but to avoid the confusion that seems to permeate any use of the word "jurisdiction.” Reminiscent of Mark Twain’s quote from Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar in Following the Equator (1897):
We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it — • and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again — and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one anymore.

. This could give rise to a whole host of problems. If the circuit court’s adjudication were regarded as res judicata or estoppel, claimants who are anticipating having a difficult time proving liability under Chapter 287 might elect to go to the circuit court first in order to receive the benefit of having the employer prove prevailing factor; then, upon going to the Commission, the claimant could rely upon the circuit court’s ruling to prove the necessary causation for purposes of Chapter 287.