Court Opinion

ID: 9487888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:29:16.066719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:32.720740
License: Public Domain

SAFFELS, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.-
Because I cannot support the decision by the majority to substitute its- determination of witness credibility for that of the jury, I dissent.
From the outset, it is clear that the majority questioned the credibility of Tracy Duhart and consequently determined that the jury could not have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1 I fear the court has invaded the province of the jury and erroneously taken on the role of trier of fact.
“An appellate court may not decide the credibility of witnesses as that,is the exclusive task of the fact trier. [I]t is for the jury to decide which witnesses to believe and which not. Once the jury has spoken, this court may not reweigh the credibility of witnesses.” U.S. v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349, 352-53 (10th Cir.1993). Credibility determi*635nations are for the jury, not the appellate court. U.S. v. Uresti-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir.1992).
“In determining whether evidence is sufficient.... [w]e will not weigh evidence or determine credibility. Appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to cases where the failure of the prosecution is clear. The evidence need not be unconnected to every condition save that of guilt.” U.S. v. Cardono-Usquiano, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir.1994).
“An appellate court can reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is a strict one and a jury verdict will not be overturned lightly.” U.S. v. Frayer, 9 F.3d 1367, 1371 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, Haney v. U.S., — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 77, 130 L.Ed.2d 31 (1994). A defendant must meet a heavy burden to gain reversal on a claim of sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant must show that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (emphasis added). U.S. v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 460 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1073, 127 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).
The defendant argues that “if evidence is consistent with both innocence and guilt, it cannot support a conviction.” United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772, 775 (10th Cir.1984). The majority seems to implicitly concur by offering its discussion of “equally plausible inference[s].” However, this court in United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1530 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128, 106 S.Ct. 1657, 90 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) clearly stated that its past use of “consistent with both innocence and guilt” language in numerous opinions, including Varoz, was unfortunate and antithetical to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 138, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2793, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It is erroneous to suggest that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained if a reasonable hypothesis could be designed which is consistent with innocence. Id.
Ms. Duhart testified that the defendants: had access to the trunk; were at the rear of the ear with the trunk open on at least two occasions; carried certain items when they were at the rear of the car with the trunk up and which were not brought into the passenger compartment; conducted a search under the dashboard and under the hood; and pretended to be asleep when Officer Barney pulled the car to the side of the road.
The jury, as all juries are, was free to believe this testimony. It is inconsistent with the role of appellate courts for us to now decide the jury was not free to believe that testimony on the basis of our reading of a cold record. “Only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict.” U.S. v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1206 (7th Cir.1993). Only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment may a trial judge or an appellate court reverse a jury verdict. 5 A J. Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 50.07[2] (2d ed. 1984).
I do not believe this is one of those rare cases that contains no evidence to support the jury verdict or for which there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. I do believe the jury properly exercised its judgment and that we are not now free to question that judgment even though we might, had we been members of the jury, have reached a different conclusion.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. The majority states: "... it is blatant Ms. Du-hart strained the limits of credulity." Again, the majority attacks Ms. Duhart’s testimony and states: " ... there is no doubt Ms. Duhart's version of the events is patently inconsistent and of dubious credibility...." Once more the majority questions the testimony of the witness when it comments "Notwithstanding the critical evidence spewed by Ms. Duhart defies logic_”