Court Opinion

ID: 9838518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 17:04:51.399607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.545499
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/6/23 In re N.S. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re N.S., a Person Coming                                     B316048
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 (Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00622)
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
           v.
 L.D.,
           Defendant and Appellant.
 In re N.D., a Person Coming                                     B324410
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 (Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP00622A)
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
           v.
 B.S.,
           Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Terry T. Truong, Commissioner.
Conditionally affirmed and remanded with directions.
      Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant L.D.
      Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.S.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________

                        INTRODUCTION
       In these consolidated appeals, L.D. (Father) and B.S.
(Mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights over their daughter, N.S., under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Both parents assert the court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the applicable provisions of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) and related California law. DCFS concedes that the
initial ICWA inquiry was inadequate as to the paternal side of
the family because no inquiry was made of known and available
paternal extended family members about N.S.’s possible Indian
ancestry. We further conclude that DCFS must conduct further
inquiry as to maternal side of the family, based on the maternal

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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grandfather’s Cahuilla tribal membership, to determine whether
there is reason to know that N.S. is an Indian child. We
therefore conditionally affirm the order terminating parental
rights and remand for full ICWA compliance.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On January 31, 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of then one-week-old N.S.2 The petition alleged N.S. was
at substantial risk of harm based on Mother’s use of
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana during her
pregnancy, and Father’s failure to protect N.S. from Mother’s
drug abuse.
       In the parents’ initial interviews with DCFS, Father denied
having any Native American ancestry. He reported that he and
Mother resided with the paternal grandmother and Father’s
three siblings. Mother informed DCFS that the maternal
grandfather was registered with a tribe, and that he intended to
register her as well but had not done so. She did not know the
tribal name at that time.
       At the February 3, 2020 detention hearing, Father
submitted a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)
form in which he indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry
as far as he knew. Mother stated in her ICWA-020 form that the
maternal grandfather was a member of the “Cahuilla” tribe.
The juvenile court ordered DCFS to gather as much information
as possible from Mother and to provide “appropriate notices.”

2 In these consolidated cases, one case is captioned, “In re N.S.”
and the other is captioned “In re N.D.” N.S. and N.D. are the
same child, and for simplicity we refer to the child as N.S.

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      On March 5, 2020, DCFS interviewed Mother regarding her
Indian ancestry. Mother reported that her family were registered
members of the “Cahuilla” tribe and provided the maternal
grandfather’s tribal enrollment number. The following day,
DCFS interviewed the maternal grandfather and the maternal
great-grandmother. They shared the names of some family
members, but had limited information about their family history.
DCFS prepared an ICWA notice based on the minimal
information provided.
      On March 9, 2020, DCFS sent by certified mail Notice of
Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child (ICWA-030) forms to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the Interior,
and the “Cahuilla Band of Mission Indians.” The original notices,
however, omitted the maternal grandfather’s tribal enrollment
number. On March 23, 2020, DCFS corrected this error by
sending revised notices, which included the tribal enrollment
number. The notices sent to the tribe were mailed to a P.O. box
in Temecula, California.
      In an interim review report filed on June 26, 2020, DCFS
indicated it had received “return to sender” notices from the tribe.
DCFS also had received written correspondence from both the
BIA and the Department of the Interior, which advised DCFS to
send the information provided in the ICWA notice directly to
Lisa Mariano of the “Cahuilla Band of Indians” at an address in
Anza, California.
      On June 23, 2020, DCFS spoke with Mariano about N.S.’s
possible Indian status. Mariano confirmed that the maternal
grandfather’s name “was in the database,” though the date of
birth provided by DCFS was not the same. While DCFS also
provided the maternal grandfather’s tribal enrollment number,

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Mariano stated that such information was not needed at that
time to locate him in the database. According to Mariano, in
order for a child to be identified as an ICWA child, the child’s
parent must be enrolled in the tribe without interruption. If a
grandparent was enrolled, but not the parent, then the child
could not be considered a tribal member until the parent was
enrolled and registered. Mother was not currently an enrolled or
registered member of the “Cahuilla Band of Indians.” After
reviewing a copy of the ICWA notice via e-mail, Mariano
requested that DCFS send the notice via registered mail, and
indicated that she would prepare a written response on behalf of
the tribal council. Mariano also stated that, while a child may
not be an enrolled tribal member, ICWA applied if there was
reason to know that the child was an Indian child.
       DCFS resent the ICWA notice to the “Cahuilla Band of
Mission Indians” at the address in Anza, California.
On August 30, 2020, DCFS again spoke with Mariano, who
reported that Mother had not completed any documentation
proving that she was eligible to register as a Cahuilla tribal
member. As of that date, DCFS still had not received any written
correspondence from the tribe.
       In a last-minute information for the court report filed on
November 16, 2020, DCFS stated that it had received a certified
return receipt card from the tribe in response to the ICWA notice,
but no other written correspondence. On September 24 and
October 29, 2020, DCFS had follow-up calls with Mariano, who
confirmed that Mother had not provided any new information or
contacted the tribe.
       Over the course of the proceedings, DCFS had contact with
relatives on the paternal side of N.S.’s family. In January 2020,

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a social worker visited the paternal grandmother at her home
and asked for information on the parents’ whereabouts. In June
2020, the social worker spoke with two paternal aunts, L.M. and
A.D., to inquire about a possible relative placement for N.S.
There is no indication that DCFS asked any of these paternal
relatives whether N.S. might be an Indian child.
       The jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held on
November 20, 2020. The juvenile court found it had no reason to
know that N.S. was an Indian child. The court sustained the
petition as pled, declared N.S. a dependent of the court under
section 300, subdivision (b), and removed the child from parental
custody. The court bypassed reunification services for both
parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
       On October 29, 2021, the juvenile court held the section
366.26 hearing. The court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that N.S. was adoptable and no exception to the
termination of parental rights applied. The court terminated
parental rights over N.S. and ordered adoption as the child’s
permanent plan.
       Both Mother and Father appeal from the order terminating
parental rights.
                           DISCUSSION
       On appeal, both parents argue, and DCFS concedes, that
the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance with ICWA’s
inquiry provisions as to the paternal side of the family, because
DCFS did not inquire of known and available paternal extended
family members about N.S.’s possible Indian ancestry. Father
also asserts that the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance
with ICWA’s notice provisions as to the maternal side of the
family, because DCFS provided notice to only one of eight

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federally recognized Cahuilla tribes. We conclude that a
conditional affirmance and remand for full compliance with
ICWA is required in this case.
I.     Governing law
       “ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
American Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families.” (In re Josiah T. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) To that end, ICWA mandates that “[i]n
any involuntary proceeding in a [s]tate court, where the court
knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,
the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or
Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe” of the pending
proceedings and the right to intervene. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
Similarly, California law requires notice to the child’s parent,
Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe if there is “reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in the proceeding.
(§ 224.3, subd. (a).)
       Both juvenile courts and child protective agencies “have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed,
is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14 [“juvenile court has an affirmative and
continuing duty in all dependency proceedings to inquire into a
child’s Indian status”].) “ ‘This continuing duty can be divided
into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further
inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’ ” (In re
Josiah T., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
       California law provides that the duty to inquire “begins
with the initial contact” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and requires the

                                  7
juvenile court and child protective agency to ask all relevant
involved individuals whether the child is or may be an Indian
child (id., subds. (a)–(c)). At the first appearance of each party,
the court must inquire whether that party “knows or has reason
to know that the child is an Indian child,” and must “instruct the
parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive
information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian
child.” (Id., subd. (c).) Additionally, when the agency takes a
child into temporary custody, it must inquire of a nonexclusive
group that includes the child, the parents, and extended family
members “whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Id.,
subd. (b)). Extended family members include adults who are the
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
       If the juvenile court or the child protective agency “has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
but does not have sufficient information to determine that there
is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the court or
social worker “shall make further inquiry regarding the possible
Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e).) “[R]eason to believe” means the court or social worker
has information “suggesting that either the parent of the child or
the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).) Further inquiry includes, but is
not limited to, “[i]nterviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and
extended family members,” and “[c]ontacting the tribe or tribes
and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have
information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status,
or eligibility.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A), (C).)

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       “If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We generally review the
juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence
test, “ ‘ “which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible
evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.” ’ ” (In re
Josiah T., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.)
II.    Remand is required for initial inquiry as to the
       paternal side of the family
       At the November 20, 2020 jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, the juvenile court made an express finding that there
was no reason to know that N.S. was an Indian child. As DCFS
concedes, however, the evidence was insufficient to support that
finding as to the paternal side of the family because the agency
failed to fully comply with its initial duty of inquiry.
       The record reflects that DCFS had in-person contact with
N.S.’s paternal grandmother with whom both parents were
residing at the start of the proceedings. DCFS also had contact
with two paternal aunts, L.M. and A.D., about a possible relative
placement for N.S. There is no indication in the record, however,
that DCFS ever asked any of these known and available paternal
relatives whether N.S. had any Indian ancestry. In the absence
of any evidence that DCFS complied with its duty to inquire of
the child’s paternal extended family members, as required by
section 224.2, subdivision (b), the juvenile court’s finding that
there was no reason to know that N.S. was an Indian child was
not supported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Jayden G.

                                9
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 311 [ICWA error where DCFS failed
to inquire of extended family members for whom it had contact
information]; In re J.W. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 384, 389 [ICWA
error where DCFS did not ask mother’s extended family members
about their Indian ancestry, despite having contact with
maternal grandmother, uncle, and aunt]; In re M.M. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 61, 70, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276099
[ICWA error where no inquiry was made of extended family
members with whom DCFS had contact].)
       Appellate courts have adopted several divergent standards
for deciding whether an ICWA inquiry error is prejudicial. (See
In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 611–618 [describing four
approaches for assessing prejudice at the initial inquiry stage
and adopting a fifth, injury-focused standard].) In this case,
however, we need not decide which standard of prejudice applies.
While DCFS initially argued that any ICWA inquiry error was
harmless, it later conceded in a letter brief that the case should
be remanded for DCFS to conduct a complete initial inquiry, and
if required, proceed in accordance with ICWA’s notice provisions.
In light of this concession, we agree that remand for compliance
with ICWA and related California law is the proper remedy here.
III. Remand is required for further inquiry as to the
       maternal side of the family
       On appeal, Father claims the juvenile court also erred in
finding ICWA did not apply as to the maternal side of the family,
because the court failed to ensure that DCFS provided notice of
the proceedings to all eight federally recognized Cahuilla tribes.
DCFS contends it complied with ICWA as to the maternal side of
the family because it confirmed the maternal grandfather was in
the database of the “Cahuilla Band of Indians,” and sent notice to

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that specific tribe. Because the record is unclear as to whether
DCFS contacted all relevant Cahuilla tribes based on the
information provided, we conclude that, on remand, DCFS must
conduct further inquiry into the maternal grandfather’s tribal
membership to determine whether there is reason to know that
N.S. is an Indian child.
       In both her ICWA-020 form and her follow-up interview
with DCFS, Mother reported that the maternal grandfather was
a registered member of the “Cahuilla” tribe. Mother also
provided DCFS with the maternal grandfather’s tribal
enrollment number. This information was sufficient to require
DCFS to conduct further inquiry into N.S.’s Indian ancestry by
interviewing extended family members, and by contacting the
relevant tribe or tribes regarding the child’s membership or
eligibility. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), (C).)
       At the further inquiry stage, contact with a tribe must, at
a minimum, include “telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail
contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt of notices”
under ICWA, and “sharing information identified by the tribe
as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility
determination.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) Each year, the BIA
publishes a list of federally recognized Indian tribes and their
designated agents for receipt of ICWA notices in the Federal
Register. (25 C.F.R. § 23.105 (2022).) As of March 2020, there
were eight Cahuilla tribes listed: (1) Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians of the Agua Caliente Indian Reservation;
(2) Augustine Band of Cahuilla Indians; (3) Cahuilla Band of
Mission Indians; (4) Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno
Indians; (5) Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians;
(6) Ramona Band of Cahuilla; (7) Santa Rosa Band of Cahuilla

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Indians; and (8) Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians.
(84 Fed.Reg. 20387 et seq. (May 9, 2019).) As of April 2020, the
tribe formerly listed as the Cahuilla Band of Mission Indians
became listed as the Cahuilla Band of Indians, but the
designated agent and address for this tribe remained the same.
(85 Fed.Reg. 24022 (Apr. 30, 2020).)
       On March 6, 2020, DCFS interviewed the maternal
grandfather and the maternal great-grandmother. The record
does not disclose what information these individuals provided to
DCFS apart from the names of some family members. It is thus
unclear whether the maternal grandfather or other relative
informed DCFS of the specific Cahuilla tribe in which he was a
member. Based on the minimal information that was provided,
DCFS prepared an ICWA notice for only one of the eight federally
recognized Cahuilla tribes—the Cahuilla Band of Mission
Indians (now referred to as the Cahuilla Band of Indians)—but
mailed it to a different address than that listed for the tribe in
the Federal Register.
       At the direction of the BIA and the Department of the
Interior, DCFS later contacted Mariano, the designated agent for
service of ICWA notices for the Cahuilla Band of Indians.
According to a DCFS report, Mariano confirmed in a telephone
call with DCFS that the maternal grandfather’s name “was in the
database.” The record is unclear, however, whether this
“database” was limited to members of the Cahuilla Band of
Indians only, or included members of other Cahuilla tribes.
In addition, while Mariano stated that a child was not eligible for
membership in the Cahuilla Band of Indians unless the parent
was a registered member, the record does not disclose whether
other Cahuilla tribes apply these same eligibility criteria.

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      Accordingly, on this record, we cannot ascertain the reason
why DCFS contacted the Cahuilla Band of Indians only, and not
any of the seven other federally recognized Cahuilla tribes.
We also cannot determine whether the inclusion of the maternal
grandfather’s name in the “database” referenced in the DCFS
report means that he was a confirmed member of the Cahuilla
Band of Indians, and was not a member of, or eligible for
membership in, any other Cahuilla tribe. If, for example, the
maternal grandfather identified the Cahuilla Band of Indians as
his specific tribe, then there would be a proper basis for the
targeted inquiry that DCFS conducted. Additionally, if the
Cahuilla Band of Indians confirmed the maternal grandfather
was a member of that tribe in particular, then DCFS would not
be required to contact the other Cahuilla tribes. Here, however,
the record does not adequately demonstrate the basis for DCFS’s
focused inquiry. For these reasons, we conclude that, on remand,
DCFS must conduct further inquiry into N.S.’s possible Indian
status, including gathering any additional information that may
be necessary to confirm the maternal grandfather’s specific tribal
membership so that the relevant tribe or tribes may determine
whether there is reason to know that N.S. is an Indian child.
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s section 366.26 order terminating
parental rights over N.S. is conditionally affirmed, and the
matter is remanded for compliance with ICWA and related
California law. On remand, the juvenile court must promptly
direct DCFS to comply with its duty of inquiry in accordance with
section 224.2, including interviewing known and available
extended family members and contacting the relevant tribe or
tribes about N.S.’s possible Indian status. If that information

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establishes a reason to know that an Indian child is involved,
notice must be provided in accordance with ICWA and
section 224.3. DCFS shall thereafter notify the court of its
actions and file certified mail return receipts for any ICWA
notices that were sent, together with any responses received.
The court must determine, on the record, whether the ICWA
inquiry and notice requirements have been satisfied and whether
N.S. is an Indian child. If the court determines that N.S. is an
Indian child, it must vacate its order and conduct a new
section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further proceedings,
in accordance with ICWA and related California law. If not,
the court’s original section 366.26 order shall remain in effect.

                                    VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

              STRATTON, P. J.

              GRIMES, J.

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