Court Opinion

ID: 9374227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:07:43.857455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.670970
License: Public Domain

J-S02032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 DAVON D. WILLIAMS                        :   No. 1180 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 28, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-22-CR-0005056-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                        FILED: FEBRUARY 22, 2023

      The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on

July 28, 2022, which granted relief in favor of Appellee, Davon D. Williams, on

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. The Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court erred by

giving Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), retroactive

effect to find that Appellee’s conviction resulted from a violation of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. After careful review, we agree and, thus, reverse.

      On August 23, 2017, the Pennsylvania State Police stopped a vehicle

driven by Whitney Thomas for a traffic violation. Appellee was a passenger in

Thomas’ vehicle. When the troopers approached the vehicle, they noticed the

smell of marijuana. The troopers conducted a probable cause search of the

vehicle and found 10,005 bags of heroin in the trunk.
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      On February 21, 2018, Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence

derived from the traffic stop. Appellee argued that the police lacked probable

cause to search Thomas’ vehicle. After conducting a hearing confined to the

existence of probable cause, the trial court denied the motion.

      On August 23, 2018, the trial court convicted Appellee at a bench trial

of, inter alia, Possession with Intent to Distribute heroin. The court imposed a

96-to-220-month sentence of incarceration.

      This Court affirmed Appellee’s judgment of sentence and, on October

20, 2020, our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth

v. Williams, 225 A.3d 1168 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 18, 2019) (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied, 240 A.3d 875. Appellee then had 90 days, until

January 18, 2021, to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

      On December 20, 2020, our Supreme Court issued Alexander, in which

the Court determined that, to comply with Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, “a showing of both probable cause and exigent

circumstances [is necessary] to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.”

Alexander, 243 A.3d at 181. The Alexander decision overruled case law that

permitted the warrantless search of an automobile based solely on probable

cause, without the need for exigent circumstances. Id. at 202-05.

      On February 12, 2021, Appellee pro se filed the instant PCRA Petition,

his first. On May 20, 2022, following a series of events not relevant to the

instant appeal, Appellee filed a counseled amended petition raising an

Alexander-based claim. He argued that no exigent circumstances existed to

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justify the warrantless search of Thomas’ vehicle and, as a result, the police

violated his rights under the Pennsylvania constitution when they conducted

the warrantless search.

      On July 25, 2022, after conducting a hearing, the court granted Appellee

relief and vacated his conviction and sentence. The court reasoned that

because our Supreme Court decided Alexander during the pendency of

Appellee’s direct appeal period, Alexander had retroactive effect, was

controlling in Appellee’s case, and mandated a finding that Appellee’s

conviction resulted from a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

      The Commonwealth timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both it and the

PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The Commonwealth raises the

following issue for our review:

      Whether the PCRA court erred in granting [Appellee’s] PCRA
      petition where [A]ppellee never challenged exigency at all stages
      of adjudication up to and including direct appeal, but only probable
      cause, and thus Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177
      (Pa. 2020), did not apply retroactively to [A]ppellee’s case on
      direct appeal?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 4.

      “We review an order granting a petition under the PCRA in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v.

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013). Our review is limited to the

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. Id. “We will not disturb

a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of

legal error.” Id.

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       Appellee’s claim arises under Section 9543(a)(2)(i) of the PCRA, which

affords a petitioner relief where, inter alia, the petitioner’s conviction resulted

from “[a] violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth [that] so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). This

section of the PCRA “provides a mechanism for vindicating existing

constitutional rights[.]” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 817 (Pa.

2014).1 Our Supreme Court’s application of this rule makes clear that the right

must have existed at the time of the conviction or be retroactively applicable

to the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1075 (Pa.

2006); Commonwealth v. Tilley, 780 A.2d 649, 652 (Pa. 2001).

       Our Supreme Court decided Alexander during the 90-day period in

which Appellee could seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The rule,

therefore, was not in existence at the time of Appellee’s conviction. Moreover,

Alexander       is   not    “automatically”      retroactive.   Commonwealth    v.

Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). To have

retroactive effect, Appellee must have “preserved [his Alexander claim] at

all stages of adjudication up to and including the direct appeal” by challenging

both probable cause and exigency. Id. at 503 (citation and quotation marks
____________________________________________

1 We note that the PCRA “also provides a mechanism for implementing new
constitutional rules of retroactive application, no matter when the rule is
established.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1021 (Pa. 2013).
Since Alexander is not “automatically” retroactive, this mechanism does not
provide Appellee relief. Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502
(Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc).

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omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Moore, 263 A.3d 1193, 1199 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (finding waiver of Alexander claim for failure to challenge

exigency at all stages of adjudication).

      The PCRA court in this case acknowledged that Appellee did not

challenge exigency in the trial court. PCRA Ct. Op., 10/13/22, at 10.

Notwithstanding this failure, however, the court found that Appellee preserved

his Alexander claim by challenging probable cause at every stage of

adjudication. Id. at 6-10. The court then applied Alexander, found that no

exigent circumstances existed to justify the search of Thomas’ vehicle,

determined that the search violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, and

concluded that this violation resulted in Appellee’s conviction. See id. See

also N.T. Hr’g, 7/25/22, at 6-7.

      The record confirms that Appellee failed to challenge exigency in the

trial court. Appellee did not raise an exigency challenge in his suppression

motion or at the suppression hearing. See Suppression Motion, 2/21/18; N.T.

Hr’g, 4/18/18. See also Post-Sentence Motion, 8/31/18, at 1-3 (requesting

reconsideration of suppression motion but not challenging exigency).

Alexander, therefore, is not retroactively applicable to Appellee’s conviction

and he is not entitled to its application on collateral review. See Sneed, 899

A.2d at 1075 (denying PCRA claim based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79 (1986), which was decided during the pendency of petitioner’s direct

appeal, for failure to preserve it at all stages of adjudication); Tilley, 780 A.2d

at 652 (same).

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      This finding is dispositive of Appellee’s petition and should have resulted

in its denial. The PCRA court’s decision to grant Appellee relief notwithstanding

the inapplicability of Alexander was legal error. As a result, we reverse the

PCRA court order which granted Appellee PCRA relief and vacated his

conviction and sentence.

      Order reversed, conviction and judgment of sentence reinstated.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023

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