Court Opinion

ID: 9491810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:24:26.732179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:57.399415
License: Public Domain

*870TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, in which ANDERSON, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, join:
In this habeas corpus case, a law firm undertook to represent a client in a murder prosecution in which the client’s co-defendant had been a long-standing client of the firm. The firm had represented this co-defendant for over ten years in a variety of criminal and civil matters, and the firm’s members had extensive interactions with him on a social level. As a result of these professional and social interactions, the firm became privy to a great deal of information that could have been quite damaging to its former client’s murder defense but which the firm could not disclose because of its ethical obligation of confidentiality to that client. At the same time, however, the firm owed ethical obligations to its current client and had a Sixth Amendment obligation to provide this client with competent representation. These obligations required that all of the firm’s professional decisions be in its current client’s best interests and untainted by conflicts of interest. Because the interests of the firm’s current and former clients were adverse, the resulting clash of the firm’s obligations to each client necessarily tainted the decisions that the firm made in representing its current client.
The firm’s client in the murder prosecution, who ultimately was convicted of first-degree murder, now petitions for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the law firm’s conflict of interest. The majority would deny the writ because, sitting as a “Monday morning quarterback,” it believes that this client was not prejudiced by the firm’s conflicting obligations. Because this result is constitutionally inappropriate and flies in the face of our precedents addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on conflict of interest, I respectfully dissent.
In part LA., I discuss the problems with the majority’s test for determining when a lawyer has an “actual conflict of interest.” In part I.B., I offer some observations regarding the proper application of the majority’s test for determining when such a conflict has an “adverse effect” on the lawyer’s performance. In light of the problems and potential pitfalls identified in part I, part II reconsiders the majority’s determination that the facts of this case do not meet either the actual conflict or adverse effect prongs of Cuyler v. Sullivan. In particular, part II.B. explains that the firm of Foley, Colton & Duncan, P.A., which represented Dr. John Freund (the petitioner) at trial, initially faced two ethically-based conflicts of interest that burdened its representation of Freund. As described in part II.C., a third conflict arose after the firm began to represent Freund that exacerbated this burden. Part III then returns to our precedents interpreting Cuyler and determines that none of these cases forecloses a finding that Freund’s lawyers, burdened as they were by these conflicts of interest, provided ineffective assistance to Freund.1
I.
As both the panel and the majority have recognized, a habeas petitioner who claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer had a conflict of interest must show “that [1] an actual conflict of interest [2] adversely affected his- lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); accord Freund v. Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1543, 1571 (11th Cir.1997), vacated, 135 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir.1998). Our circuit’s interpretation of this standard has developed primarily in two traditional contexts: a lawyer’s “simultaneous representation” of clients with adverse interests, and a lawyer’s “successive representation” of a client against whom a former client appears as a witness. See, e.g., McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1990) (noting that a conflict of interest may arise in either context). The fact that these two types of conflicts arise most frequently does not mean, howev*871er, that these are the only two contexts in which a lawyer’s conflict of interest can deprive her client of the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960-61 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that “the standard developed in Cuyler has been applied to cases in which defendants argue that their lawyers were more interested in publicity than in obtaining an acquittal”); United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463 (11th Cir.1987) (finding Cuyler requirements met where lawyer faced possible prosecution by same United States Attorney’s office that was prosecuting his client); Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 438-40 (5th Cir.1979) (concluding that lawyers who previously had represented the prosecutor who was prosecuting their current client had actual conflict of interest); see also Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251-53 (9th Cir.1989) (finding denial of effective assistance of counsel where lawyer failed to present evidence that would exculpate current client at expense of non-testifying former client).2
It is important to keep this observation in mind when we are faced with situations, such as this one, in which an asserted conflict does not precisely fit within either of these two traditional contexts. In such situations, our prior cases interpreting the two-pronged Cuyler standard should be evaluated with care before they are imported into the new context.
A.
With respect to the first prong of Cuyler, the majority concludes that Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401 (11th Cir.1987), articulates our circuit’s exclusive test for proving an actual conflict of interest in the successive representation context. In order to establish an actual conflict under this test, a habeas petitioner must make “a showing of ‘inconsistent interests.’ ” Smith, 815 F.2d at 1405. As the majority sees it, Smith makes proof of either substantial relatedness or disclosure of confidential information a necessary prerequisite to a finding of inconsistent interests. Even if a petitioner proves both,3 however, this may not be sufficient to establish actual conflict — “other proof of inconsistent interests” also may be required. Ante at 859. Implicit in its interpretation of Smith is the majority’s view that “other proof of inconsistent interests,” standing alone, ean never be sufficient to establish an actual conflict of interest.
This interpretation of Smith, which the majority supports with piecemeal quotations from the opinion, is incorrect for two reasons. First, the Smith decision itself is equivocal on the question of what role “other proof of inconsistent interests” plays in supporting a finding of actual conflict of interest. On the one hand, Smith states:
In [a successive representation case where a criminal defendant’s counsel previously represented a witness], if defendant fails to show that either (1) counsel’s earlier representation of the witness was substantially and particularly related to counsel’s later representation of defendant, or (2) counsel actually learned particular confidential information during the prior representation of the witness that was relevant to defendant’s later case, then defendant has not *872come even close to showing “inconsistent interests.”
815 F.2d at 1405-06. On the other hand, the Smith court ultimately described its holding in the following way: “We merely hold that Smith has failed to show ‘inconsistent interests’ in this case where he has failed to adduce proof of substantial relationship or relevant confidential information or any other proof of inconsistent interests.” 815 F.2d at 1406 (emphasis added).
In order to resolve this ambiguity, it is useful to review our other eases that interpret the actual conflict standard. This review reveals that, both before and after Smith, our eases have sanctioned additional methods — other than substantial relatedness or disclosure of confidential information — of establishing an actual conflict in the successive representation context. See Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that, in light of state law and principles of legal ethics, a substantial question existed as to whether an attorney crossexamining a former client had an actual conflict of interest);4 Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 939 (11th Cir.1986) (stating that the habeas petitioner could show an actual conflict by demonstrating that his attorney “chose between possible alternative courses of action such as eliciting or failing to elicit evidence helpful to [the petitioner] but harmful to [the lawyer’s previous client]”);5 cf. Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 560 (11th Cir.1994) (stating, in the context of a claim of conflict of interest arising from a prior simultaneous representation, that a petitioner must prove actual conflict by “pointing] to specific instances in the record which suggest an impairment or compromise of his interests for the benefit of another party”). Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir.1989) (“In successive representation, conflicts of interest may arise if the cases are substantially related or if the attorney reveals privileged communications of the former client or otherwise divides his loyalties.” (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)). In light of these decisions, it seems incorrect to say that our precedents prohibit a habeas petitioner from establishing an actual conflict of interest unless she can show either substantial relatedness or disclosure of confidential information.
Assuming arguendo that the majority is correct in according little weight to “other proof of inconsistent interests,” its interpretation of Smith suffers from an additional problem in that it purports to apply “in the successive representation context” as a whole. Ante at 859. The facts of Smith, however, merely presented the traditional successive representation pattern wherein a lawyer’s former client appeared as a witness against his current client. In addition, the *873lawyer in Smith apparently represented his former client only once. In this ease, by contrast, one of Freund’s allegations of actual conflict involves a different type of successive representation. Freund contends that the law firm of Foley, Colton & Duncan, P.A., which represented him at trial, previously represented Trent — a separately-tried co-defendant who did not appear as a witness in Freund’s trial — in a broad range of civil and criminal matters from the early 1970s until 1984. While the majority may be correct that its interpretation of Smith should nevertheless extend to the context presented by this claim, ante at 859 n. 31, this does not mean that the legal interpretation our previous cases have given to the two elements of the Smith test — substantial relatedness and disclosure of confidential information— should mechanically be applied in this new factual context. I address this point more fully in part H.A., infra.
B.
As to the second prong of Cuyler, the majority adopts the panel’s statement of our circuit’s test for adverse effect.6 While I agree that this test is faithful to our prior decisions, I also recognize that an unwary court could apply it in a way that effectively requires the habeas petitioner to prove prejudice. The following observations on the application of our test will help courts to avoid this possibility.
When a habeas petitioner is required to show prejudice in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As the majority claims to recognize, however, prejudice is presumed for ineffective assistance claims that are based on a lawyer’s conflict of interest and that meet the two-prong Cuyler test. In the conflict of interest context, therefore, we are forbidden from rejecting an ineffective assistance claim simply because we think that the petitioner probably would be found guilty if tried again.
Instead of a prejudice inquiry, we apply the three-part test outlined by the majority in order to determine whether the actual conflict of interest alleged by the petitioner “adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718); accord McConico, 919 F.2d at 1548 (“A petitioner need not show that the result of the trial would have been different without the. conflict of interest, only that the conflict had some adverse effect on counsel’s performance.”); LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 754 (11th Cir.1988). As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, “it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.7 As a *874result, once an actual conflict of interest has been shown, we must be careful to apply our test for adverse effect to the petitioner’s case as it stood before it was tainted by the lawyer’s conflict. For example, in applying our second requirement that the alternative defense strategy or tactic must be “reasonable under the facts,” the decisive “facts” upon which we rely cannot be drawn from a trial record (or from a pre-trial statement) that was made after the time that the petitioner’s case became tainted. We would slip dangerously close to a prejudice inquiry if we tried to pinpoint tainted “facts” by hypothesizing whether or not the evidence offered at trial would have been the same even if conflict-free defense counsel had followed an alternative strategy.
A de facto prejudice inquiry can also insinuate itself into our adverse effect test in another way. With regard to our third requirement that the petitioner must link his lawyer’s actual conflict with the lawyer’s decision to forgo an alternative defense strategy, the danger lies in the following question: at what point in the representation should a court find that the lawyer has made such a decision? In order to avoid this danger, a decision must be deemed conclusively made at the first moment that the lawyer, influenced by an actual conflict of interest, elects to forgo a reasonable alternative strategy. Once this election has been made, the taint of the lawyer’s conflict of interest irrevocably has affected the petitioner’s case. If we instead imported an element of “cure” into this linkage requirement by asking whether the lawyer subsequently reversed her election (in whole or part) and, if so, whether this reversal was sufficient to purge the taint, we would indulge in unguided speculation in order to determine whether her initial tainted election ultimately was harmless. We cannot truthfully measure what the lawyer’s sequence of choices has cost the petitioner, and that is why this type of inquiry into prejudice is forbidden.
In sum, the distinction between our test for “adverse effect” in the conflict of interest context and our test for “prejudice” in other ineffective assistance contexts has an important purpose. See supra note 7. We should therefore implement these tests carefully, in accordance with the foregoing observations, in order to ensure that the distinction does not become merely semantic.
II.
A.
In light of the problems and potential pitfalls identified in part I, it is necessary to revisit the majority’s determination that the facts of Freund’s case do not meet either the actual conflict or adverse effect prongs of Cuyler. It would be possible to undertake this task by articulating an alternative test for actual conflict and mechanically applying this test — along with the above test for adverse effect — to the facts underlying Freund’s case in order to determine whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. This approach, however, has two significant drawbacks. First, it is difficult to articulate a reasoned basis for disagreeing with a court’s decision to apply (or not to apply) abstract labels, such as those that appeal’ in our prior cases interpreting Cuyler, to a given set of facts without a clear appreciation of the ethical and constitutional policies underlying the labels. This difficulty is illustrated by the majority’s disagreement with the panel’s conclusion that the law firm’s prior representations of Trent were “substantially related” to its later representation of Freund. Second, it is important to note that two of the three sources of actual conflict alleged by Freund — the law firm’s prior representation of Trent and Trent’s allegations against the firm’s members — do not correspond to either of the two traditional contexts in which we have interpreted Cuyler. We would need to be quite cautious, therefore, in applying any test derived from our prior cases interpreting Cuyler to the present facts. See supra part I (introduction).
A more informative approach that avoids these drawbacks begins with a look over the law firm’s shoulder at the time when its *875members decided to represent Freund. As part II.B. explains, this look reveals that the law firm initially faced two ethically-based conflicts of interest that burdened its representation of Freund. As described in part II.C., a third conflict of interest arose after the firm began to represent Freund that exacerbated this burden. Part III then returns to our prior cases interpreting Cuyler in order to determine whether any of these eases forecloses a finding that Freund’s lawyers, burdened as they were by these conflicts of interest, provided ineffective assistance to Freund.
B.
1.
In deciding to represent Freund, the law firm of Foley, Colton & Duncan, P.A., faced a difficult dilemma because of its prior representations of Trent and Mills. As counsel to Freund, the firm had a duty to provide him with the competent representation to which he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment. In discharging this duty, of course, the firm’s lawyers had an obligation to obey Florida’s rules of legal ethics. One relevant ethical obligation was the firm’s duty under Canon 7 of the former Florida Code of Professional Responsibility8 to represent its client zealously. This duty requires that a lawyer “be loyal to her client and ensure that every professional decision she makes on behalf of the client is in the client's best interests.” Freund, 117 F.3d at 1572. A lawyer who intentionally prejudices or harms the interests of her client violates this duty. See Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7 — 101(A)(3) (1986).
A second ethical obligation was the firm’s duty under Canon 5 of the Florida Code to “exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.” Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (1986). A lawyer is required to avoid conflicts of interest in order to fulfill this duty. See Barclay v. Wainwright, 444 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1984). Therefore, a lawyer is prohibited from representing a potential client when the lawyer’s professional judgment will be, or reasonably may be, affected by his “own financial, business, property, or personal interests,” unless the client gives his informed consent. Fla. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(A) (1986). In addition, a lawyer is prohibited from representing a new client if that representation is likely to have an adverse effect on the lawyer’s judgment on behalf of another client, unless both clients give their informed consent. See Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(A), (C) (1986).9
While the firm owed these two ethical obligations to Freund alone, it owed a third ethical obligation to Freund as well as to its former clients Trent and Mills. This obligation was the firm’s duty of confidentiality under Canon 4 of the Florida Code, which requires a lawyer to “preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.” Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4 (1986). The term “confidences” refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege, while the term “secrets” refers to other information gained during the professional relationship “that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.” Fla.Code of *876Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(A) (1986). Because of this duty, a lawyer could be subject to discipline for revealing a client’s confidences or secrets or for using them either to the disadvantage of the client or for the benefit of the lawyer or a third person without the client’s informed consent. See Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B) (1986); Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); see also Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.9(b) (1994).10
The duty of confidentiality affords broad protection to a client’s confidences and secrets. See Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (noting that protection is broader than attorney-client evi-dentiary privilege). This protection “exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge.” Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-4 (1986). The protection is also perpetual; a lawyer must forever preserve the confidences and secrets of every client, whether ongoing or former. See Fla. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-6 (1986); Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.9(b) (1994); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla.1991).
In deciding to accept Freund as a client, the firm was required to determine that it could represent him without violating any of the above ethical obligations that it owed him. Given that it had previously represented two people — Trent, Freund’s co-defendant, and Mills, a witness for the prosecution in Freund’s case who could have been charged with several crimes arising from her participation in the events surrounding Walker’s murder11 — with interests materially adverse to Freund’s interests, however, the firm faced a substantial likelihood that its ethical obligations to Freund would come into direct and irreconcilable conflict with its ethical obligations to its former clients.12 The initial question that-must be answered in order to determine the significance of the firm’s potential ethical conflict to our Sixth Amendment analysis under Cuyler is this: does a lawyer’s Sixth Amendment duty to provide its current client with competent representation require it to disregard the rules of ethics governing its conduct with respect to its former clients if to do so would benefit its current client? If the answer to this question is yes, then we need not inquire further into the issue of whether the firm actually was confronted with conflicting ethical obligations in this case; if faced with such a conflict, the firm would simply be forced to ignore its ethical duties to its former clients. If the answer is no, however, we should proceed to determine whether the firm actually faced conflicting ethical obligations in this case that adversely affected its representation of Freund.
It seems clear that this initial question must be answered in the negative. If we were to conclude that the Sixth Amendment required lawyers to violate their ethical obligations to former clients in order to provide competent representation to their current *877clients, lawyers who heeded our conclusion would be barraged with lawsuits by their former clients and would face state bar disciplinary proceedings. Irrespective of whether these actions were successful,13 the public’s confidence in the ability of the legal profession to hold secrets in confidence would be irreparably damaged. The ability of the states to promulgate effective ethical standards in order to regulate the conduct of lawyers would also be substantially undermined. See Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1027 (describing, in the civil disqualification context, the adverse consequences of allowing an attorney to reveal the confidences of his former client). Such consequences are not lightly to be presumed, and there is no reason to assume that they are warranted by the Sixth Amendment.
2.
The firm, therefore, could not ignore its ethical obligations to its former clients in attempting to provide Freund with competent representation that was consistent with its ethical obligations to him. In order to determine whether the firm’s representation of Freund was burdened by its ethical obligations to Trent and Mills, we should ask two questions. First, we should consider what defense strategies or tactics a competent lawyer not burdened by ethical obligations to Trent and Mills would have considered. Second, we should ask whether a competent lawyer with ethical obligations to Trent and Mills would conclude that his prior representation of these clients in any way restricted— or even foreclosed — his ability to use any of these strategies in representing Freund.
At the beginning of Freund’s case, just prior to the time that his lawyer Robert Foley announced that Freund would rely on an insanity defense, an unburdened and competent lawyer could have chosen to follow any of the following four reasonable defense strategies. First, the lawyer could have attempted to obtain a plea bargain for Freund in exchange for Freund’s cooperation in the State’s prosecution of the other people who either were present on the night of the murder or helped to conceal the crime — Mills, Angelilli, Daniell, and Fullerton.14
A second possible strategy was to rely on an insanity defense and thus effectively admit that Freund murdered Ralph Walker. Given the significant brain damage that Freund sustained as a result of his 1983 suicide attempt, which caused symptoms such as reduced ability to reason and appreciate the consequences of his actions, see Freund, 117 F.3d at 1548, this strategy had some basis in fact. As Freund’s attorneys informed him long after they had already elected to rely on an insanity defense, however, such a defense did not have a high probability of success. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1568.
Third, competent counsel could have implicated Trent indirectly in Walker’s murder by contending that Freund killed Walker but lacked the criminal intent to commit murder because he was under the dominion and control of Trent, who ordered the killing and knew that Freund, because of his mental state, would carry out the order.15 Freund’s *878brain damage would also have provided support for this contention.
A fourth possible strategy was to contend that Trent, not Freund, personally killed Walker.16 This strategy of directly implicating Trent in Walker’s murder was supported by several facts, all of which a competent lawyer could have learned quite early in the case under the liberal discovery regime that applies to criminal cases in Florida.17 Before Freund arrived on the night of the murder, for example, Trent actually shot at Walker and missed. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1550. All of the physical evidence in the case implicated Trent, and all three of the State’s principal fact witnesses at Freund’s trial testified that Trent was in control of everything that transpired on the night of the murder. See id. at 1567, 1581. Moreover, Trent harbored strong negative race-based feelings toward Walker that certainly played a part in the events leading up to the murder and provided him with a motive for the murder itself;18 there was no indication, however, that Freund had any such feelings. The only evidence directly implicating Freund was An-gelilli’s uncorroborated testimony that she saw Freund making stabbing motions with Trent’s knife, but she also testified that she could not see where the knife landed.19 See id. at 1552,1567.
Freund’s lawyers, bearing ethical obligations to Trent and Mills, took little time to gather evidence and consider which of these options they would pursue. Only two or three days after Freund’s arraignment, the lawyers deliberately locked their client into one of these options by calling a press conference to announce that Freund would rely on an insanity defense. This defense had the potential to relieve both Freund and Trent of liability for first-degree murder: Trent because he did not commit the murder, and Freund because he was insane when he killed Walker. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1556 & n. 27. A question therefore arises regarding whether the firm’s decision to pursue this defense was influenced by its ethical obligations to Trent.
It is readily apparent that competent lawyers who bore ethical obligations to Trent would never have taken Freund’s case. Such lawyers undoubtedly would have concluded that their ability to choose among the above options solely in accordance with Freund’s best interests, as required by their ethical duty of zealous representation, was restricted by their ethical obligations to Trent. Specifically, the ethical obligation of confidentiality *879that Freund’s lawyers owed Trent restricted their ability to claim either that Trent killed Walker or that Freund killed Walker while he was under Trent’s control. This obligation also restricted their ability to obtain any significant concessions for Freund in a plea bargain with State prosecutors. In order to understand why, it is necessary to examine the nature and scope of the firm’s prior representation of Trent.
Trent had a long-standing and wide-ranging legal relationship with the firm. The firm’s lawyers represented Trent in a broad range of civil and criminal matters from the early 1970s until 1984; they also represented his mother’s estate. Trent referred many of his employees and friends who needed legal representation to the firm, including Eleanor Mills. The relationship between Trent and the firm was also deeper than that of attorney and client. Trent became a fixture at the law firm’s offices, and his employees came to the offices often in order to use the firm’s copier and other office equipment. Trent also performed interior design work for the offices, as well as for Foley and Colton and the parents of Duncan.
Two of the criminal prosecutions in which the firm represented Trent were particularly relevant to the firm’s later representation of Freund. In 1983, Trent allegedly brandished a gun on a public street and threatened to kill two people. When the police stopped Trent’s car a few days later in order to arrest him on assault charges, they found the drugs diazepam — a drug that was in Walker’s bloodstream when he died — and metha-qualone in Trent’s possession. Trent was charged with drug possession and aggravated assault, and the State initiated a forfeiture proceeding against Trent’s car in relation to the possession charge. The firm represented Trent during the entire forfeiture proceeding. In the criminal prosecutions, the firm ultimately withdrew as counsel in May 1984 after filing several pretrial motions and appearing in court on Trent’s behalf.
This extensive history of representation meant that the firm still owed Trent an extensive ethical obligation of confidentiality during its representation of Freund. The firm thus was prohibited, inter alia, from disclosing any information it gained during its professional relationship with Trent if such disclosure was likely to be detrimental to Trent. This prohibition was particularly broad in light of the wealth of potentially detrimental information that the firm gained while representing Trent. Trent himself admitted, in his testimony at the hearing held on his motion to sever his and Freund’s prosecutions for separate trial, that he disclosed his participation in multiple criminal activities involving drugs and prostitution to members of the firm after they advised him that all communications would be completely confidential. Trent also discussed with the lawyers his sexual exploits and his use of sexual devices such as handcuffs — a device that Trent used to restrain Walker prior to the murder. Furthermore, it is appropriate to assume that the firm, ethically bound to act as competent and zealous counsel to Trent in the drug and assault prosecutions, obtained all information from its client that would have been helpful in working out a plea agreement and, in the event of Trent’s conviction, in presenting an effective argument at sentencing. A competent lawyer eliciting this information, for example, would seek to gain an indepth appreciation of the good and bad sides of Trent’s character, including his past criminal activity, in order to avoid surprises and be prepared to make the best possible arguments on his client’s behalf.
This broad confidentiality obligation seriously hampered the firm’s ability convincingly to implicate Trent in Walker’s violent murder — whether by arguing that Trent personally killed Walker or that Freund did so while under Trent’s control — by limiting its ability to present to a jury evidence of Trent’s sexual proclivities and history of violence, diazepam possession, and other criminal conduct.20 The firm also would be *880unable to cross-examine Trent effectively regarding these matters in the event that he was tried jointly with Freund. Even if they were tried separately, as they ultimately were, the firm would be unable to use anything it learned in its prior representation of Trent to throw blame on him.
The firm’s broad confidentiality obligation to Trent also constrained its ability to negotiate a favorable plea agreement for Freund. See United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)) (“Exploring possible plea negotiations is an important part of providing adequate representation of a criminal client, and this part is easily precluded by a conflict of interest.”). In seeking such a plea agreement, competent lawyers for Freund certainly would have attempted to convince State prosecutors that Trent, not Freund, was the person most worthy of punishment for Walker’s murder. Providing prosecutors with information on Trent’s long history of violence and criminal conduct would have been a very persuasive method of accomplishing this goal. Because the firm that represented Freund had an obligation of confidentiality that prevented it from disclosing information likely to be detrimental to Trent, however, it could not use this method.
Clearly, therefore, the firm’s decision regarding how best to defend Freund was burdened from the start by its ethical obligations to Trent. The firm’s representation of Freund was also burdened, albeit less severely, by its prior representation of Mills. While this latter burden did not affect the firm’s decision to pursue an insanity defense rather than one of the other strategies discussed above, it did affect the firm’s tactics in cross-examining Mills — a key prosecution witness at Freund’s trial.
The firm’s representation of Mills related to Mills’ arrest in early 1984 for attempting to sell a kilogram of cocaine to an undercover police officer.21 In April 1984, several weeks before the murder, Trent met Mills and offered to help her in two ways with the cocaine trafficking charges that she was facing. First, he discussed having her serve as an informant for the local police. Second, he referred Mills to the firm for representation on the charges. Mills then met with Roger Colton at Trent’s apartment to seek legal advice on the charges, and she discussed the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges with Colton. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1577 n. 82.
Because it was apparent from the beginning of Freund’s prosecution that Mills would be a prosecution witness, the firm was faced with a dilemma. In consulting with Mills about her cocaine trafficking charges, the firm very likely obtained information that it could use to impeach her testimony on cross-examination. For example, the record strongly suggests that the firm learned that Mills frequently used cocaine. The firm certainly also learned that Mills was a friend of Trent and that Trent was trying to help her avoid jail time through cooperation with the police. While cross-examining Mills on these issues would raise questions as to her credibility and pro-Trent bias and thus aid Freund’s defense, it would also violate the firm’s continuing ethical obligation of confidentiality to Mills.22 Douglas Duncan ultimately did cross-examine Mills about her trafficking charges and Trent’s assistance, but he stopped short of having Mills admit that Trent had referred her to his law firm for representation. Because a conflict-free lawyer could have elicited this fact in order to discredit Mills and suggest bias, it is clear that the firm’s ethical obligation of confidentiality to Mills also burdened its representation of Freund.
3.
As the above discussion demonstrates, Freund’s lawyers faced conflicting ethical ob*881ligations from the moment that they began representing Freund. On the one hand, the firm’s obligations to represent Freund zealously and exercise independent professional judgment on his behalf meant that all of its professional decisions had to be in Freund’s best interests and untainted by conflict of interest. On the other hand, its obligations of confidentiality to Trent and Mills placed a heavy burden on its ability to implicate Trent in Walker’s murder, to obtain a favorable plea bargain for Freund, or to impeach Mills’ testimony on cross-examination by suggesting bias. Not surprisingly, therefore, the firm decided quite early in its representation of Freund not to pursue any of these strategies.23 Given that the firm’s ethical dilemmas restricted the strategies that it could use in defending Freund, the conclusion seems inescapable that an “actual conflict” of interest “adversely affected” the firm’s performance in representing him. How, then, could we conclude under Cuyler that Freund was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel as a result of the firm’s ethically-based conflicts of interest? Three possibilities deserve mention.
First, it could be noted that our precedent clearly establishes that a violation of state ethical rules by a criminal defense lawyer does not necessarily deprive his client of the effective assistance of counsel. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1572 n. 66 (citing Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1023 n. 12). In this case, however, we do not merely have a violation of state ethical rules — we have a conflict between the ethical obligations that certain lawyers simultaneously owed to their current and former clients. When the law of ethics renders a lawyer unable to reconcile the duties he owes to separate clients, our precedent is consistent with the conclusion that the lawyer has an actual conflict of interest. See supra note 4.
A second argument could be made that the adverse effect of these ethically-based conflicts on the firm’s representation of Freund was de minimis. As to Mills, one could claim that Duncan’s cross-examination was sufficient to impugn her credibility and suggest bias without revealing the fact that Trent referred her to Duncan’s firm. As to Trent, it could be claimed that any adverse effect Freund suffered because the law firm’s ethical obligations led it initially to disregard the option of implicating Trent in Walker’s murder was later cured in the course of Freund’s prosecution. As the prosecution unfolded, for example, the eases against Trent and Freund were severed for trial, Trent pled guilty after a mistrial and did not testify against Freund, Duncan indirectly implicated Trent in Walker’s murder during his portion of the firm’s closing argument to the jury at Freund’s trial, and Foley directly implicated Trent during his portion of the closing argument. Both of these claims, however, commit a fundamental mistake: they put the judge in the role of a “Monday morning quarterback” who must determine whether Freund was prejudiced by the firm’s ethical conflicts. As explained in part I.B., supra, this type of inquiry is forbidden; prejudice is presumed once actual conflict and adverse effect have been established.
Finally, it could be claimed that these two ethical conflicts of interest did not establish an “actual conflict” that “adversely affected” Freund’s case as required by our precedents that have interpreted Cuyler in other contexts. For example, one could argue that we should hold mechanically that the firm’s prior representations of Trent were not “substantially related” to its later representation of Freund, or that the firm did not actually learn confidential information during its representation of Mills that was relevant to Freund’s case. Such contentions are addressed in part III, infra.
*882C.
The two ethically-based conflicts of interest discussed above were not the only conflicts that adversely affected the firm’s representation of Freund. A third conflict, rooted in the firm’s own interests rather than in its ethical obligations to a third party, arose after the firm’s representation of Freund had already begun. This conflict strongly reinforced the firm’s initial aversion, rooted in the ethical duty of confidentiality that it owed Trent, to a defense strategy of implicating Trent in Walker’s murder.
This third conflict grew out of a hearing held to determine whether to grant Trent’s motion to sever the murder prosecutions of Trent and Freund for separate trial. The main ground for Trent’s motion involved the ethical conflict discussed above that arose from the firm’s prior representation of Trent: the law firm had acquired confidential information during this representation that it could use to Trent’s detriment at trial. While the firm (on Freund’s behalf) initially supported severance, it later joined the State in resisting a separate trial. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1557 & n. 29, 1559. Trent, presumably upset by his former law firm’s opposition to severance and by the prospect that it might use his confidences against him, testified at the severance hearing. He began by detailing the attorney-client relationship that had developed between himself and the firm. During the course of the representation, Trent had confided to Foley and Colton his personal secrets, business affairs, and participation in multiple criminal activities involving drugs and prostitution. Moving to a description of his personal relationship with Foley and Colton, Trent made several serious allegations against both lawyers. He claimed to have delivered cocaine to their friends, sometimes at the firm’s offices. He also claimed to have provided both men with prostitutes on many occasions, often as payment for legal services. Finally, he alleged that both lawyers had attended and participated in many of his “sex parties” involving cocaine and prostitutes. In light of these allegations, the firm again changed its position on severance and argued that the “delicate nature” of the ethical rules pertaining to conflicts of interest made cross-examination of Trent inappropriate. Over the State’s opposition, the trial judge then granted a severance.
These allegations gave the firm a strong additional incentive to continue with Freund’s insanity defense, which it had publicly adopted quite early in the representation (and thus could not easily reject in any event), rather than either use a defense in Freund’s separate trial that would implicate Trent or obtain a plea agreement for Freund that would adversely impact Trent. Trent had made it quite clear that he would respond to any attempt by the law firm to harm his interests. The next such attempt certainly could have incited Trent to produce evidence in support of his charges, which could have resulted in Foley and Colton being disciplined by the Florida Bar or prosecuted by the State. It is not surprising, therefore, that Freund’s lawyers presented an insanity defense at trial.
While it is true that Freund’s lawyer Robert Foley eventually did suggest in his closing argument at Freund’s trial that Trent may have committed the murder and then told Freund that it was Freund who did it, this fact does not belie the proposition that Trent’s allegations helped convince the law firm to continue pursuing an insanity defense.24 By the time of Freund’s trial, Trent had already pled guilty to second-degree murder following a mistrial. Therefore, Foley’s spontaneous musings in closing25 no *883longer had the potential to harm Trent’s interests.
III.
As the above discussion has demonstrated, Trent’s allegations and the firm’s conflicting ethical obligations imposed significant restrictions on the firm’s ability to pursue certain reasonable tactical options that conflict-free counsel could have used in defending Freund. In other words, the use of these options would have conflicted with the firm’s “other loyalties” (its ethical obligations to Trent and Mills) and “interests” (in avoiding any potentially harmful consequences of Trent’s allegations). Freund, 117 F.3d at 1580 (quoting United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir.1985)) (noting that in order to establish adverse effect, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that a reasonable alternative defense strategy or tactic that might have been pursued “was inherently in conflict with ... the attorney’s other loyalties or interests”). The firm thus decided early in its representation of Freund that it would not pursue these options. It seems clear, therefore, that an “actual conflict” of interest “adversely affected” the firm’s performance in defending Freund. This part considers whether any of our prior cases interpreting Cuyler forecloses a finding that Freund’s lawyers, burdened as they were by the conflicts of interest discussed above, pi'o-vided ineffective assistance to Freund.
The organizational scheme of this part deliberately tracks the majority’s analysis of the merits. Ante at part IV.C. Part III.A. reviews the three separate sources of actual conflict demonstrated by Freund. Part III.B. then examines two adverse effects that can be linked to these conflicts.
A.
1.
The majority rejects the claim that the firm, in representing Freund, faced an actual conflict of interest because of obligations arising from its long history of representing Trent. Assuming arguendo that the majority is correct to analyze this claim by applying its problematic interpretation of Smith26 solely to the firm’s prior representation of Trent on the assault and diazepam possession charges,27 it is apparent that the result of the majority’s analysis is not supported by our precedents.
Under the majority’s view of Smith, a habeas petitioner may be able to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest if he first establishes that “counsel’s earlier representation ... was substantially and particularly related to counsel’s later representation of the defendant.” Smith, 815 F.2d at 1405. The Smith court derived this “substantially and particularly related” test primarily from our prior cases addressing the standard for disqualifying a lawyer in a civil matter concerning a former client, as well as from ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. See id. at 1406 n. 2; see also note 9, supra (quoting Florida’s equivalent rule of professional conduct). The majority also relies in part on a civil disqualification case to support its determination that the assault and diazepam possession charges on which the firm previously represented Trent were not “substantially and particularly related” to its representation of Freund. As the following discussion shows, however, our civil disqualification jurisprudence does not support the majority’s conclusion.
The essential thrust of the majority’s argument is that the similarities between the *884offenses involved in the firm’s prior representation of Trent and its subsequent representation of Freund are not sufficient to establish a substantial relationship because “myriad factors differentiate the subject matter of each representation.” Ante at 864. The majority cites two cases to support the general proposition that substantial relatedness exists when the prior and subsequent representations concern the very same events, criminal transactions, or subject matter. Ante at 864 (citing United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir.1980); Kraft, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co. (In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.), 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.1981)). Neither of these cases, however, support the proposition that substantial relatedness exists only in these situations. See supra note 4 (noting that the Martinez court applied a test more abstract than Smith’s substantial relatedness test); see also Kraft, 659 F.2d at 1346. In fact, the Kraft case provides a substantially broader definition of substantial relatedness in the civil disqualification context:
The [past representation] does not need to be “relevant” [to the present action] in the evidentiary sense to be “substantially related.” It need only be akin to the present action in a way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved. The existence of a “substantial relationship” [in the case before the court] is self-evident.... Where parts of the present action and past representation concern the very same subject matter, reasonable minds must agree they are substantially related.
Id. (emphasis added). While sharing the same subject matter is thus sufficient to establish substantial relatedness, the Kraft court clearly states that it is not necessary. All that need be shown to establish substantial relatedness is that the past action reasonably could be understood as important to the issues involved in the present one.
Applying the Kraft definition to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the firm’s prior representation of Trent on the assault and diazepam possession charges28 reason*885ably could be understood as important to two issues involved in the firm’s later representation of Freund. If the law firm chose to defend Freund by implicating Trent in Walker’s murder, the information it learned in representing Trent on the diazepam possession charge would be useful in proving that Trent injected Walker with diazepam. Similarly, information that the firm learned in representing Trent on the assault charge would be useful in proving that Trent committed the violent killing. See supra part II.B.2. (describing information that the firm learned from Trent); see also Freund, 117 F.3d at 1576 n. 76 (discussing how this information could be used at Freund’s trial or in a deposition of Trent). Clearly, therefore, the firm’s prior representation of Trent and subsequent representation of Freund were substantially related under Kraft. While substantial relatedness is not always sufficient to establish an actual conflict of interest under the majority’s view of Smith it can — at the very least — be said that our precedent does not foreclose the conclusion that the firm faced an actual conflict of interest because of its prior representation of Trent.29
2.
Freund also argues that the firm’s prior representation of Mills, who appeared as a prosecution witness in his trial, created an actual conflict of interest. Our precedent does not foreclose the conclusion that an actual conflict was created under Smith because the firm actually learned confidential information during its representation of Mills that was relevant in the firm’s later representation of Freund.
When Mills consulted with the law firm at Trent’s apartment regarding the cocaine trafficking charge described in part II.B.2., supra, the firm certainly learned that Mills was a close friend of Trent and that Trent was helping her to avoid jail time through cooperation with the police.30 These facts could have been used to suggest on cross-examination that Mills was biased in favor of Trent and thus was likely to accuse Freund falsely of Walker’s murder in order to protect Trent.
The majority argues that even if the firm did learn relevant confidential information during its representation of Mills, the confidential nature of the information “ceased to exist” when Mills testified to “everything that she had told” the firm in a deposition taken by Trent’s counsel in Duncan’s presence prior to Freund’s trial. Ante at 866. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, Mills’ testimony did not relieve the firm from its duty of confidentiality to her. A lawyer remains bound by his duty of confidentiality “even though the same information is discoverable from other sources,” Buntrock, 419 So.2d at 403, and “without regard to ... the fact that others share the [information].” Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-4 (1986). Second, even if Mills’ testimony could have operated to relieve the firm from its confidentiality duty as to the subjects she disclosed in the deposition, we still could not be sure that her deposition disclosures were actually coextensive with “everything that she had told” the firm. In fact, despite having supposedly disclosed everything she had told the firm in response to questions by Trent’s counsel at her deposition, Mills then refused to answer any of Duncan’s deposition questions on the ground that her prior consultation with the firm had established an attorney-client relationship. This refusal suggests that she did not fully *886disclose everything that she had told the firm — much less all of the confidential information that the firm “actually learned ... during [its] prior representation of [Mills],” Smith, 815 F.2d at 1405 (emphasis added)— in answering the questions posed by Trent’s counsel. Therefore, the information that the firm learned during its representation of Mills but that Mills did not disclose at her deposition certainly retained its confidential nature.
8.
Finally, Freund argues that the firm faced an actual conflict of interest because Trent’s allegations at the severance hearing of embarrassing and illegal conduct by Foley and Colton gave the firm a strong incentive not to further antagonize Trent by implicating him in Walker’s murder as part of Freund’s defense. In order to respond to the majority’s rejection of this claim, it is first necessary to determine the nature of our circuit’s test for proving an actual conflict of interest in this context. The majority neglects to mention that the successive representation case of Smith v. White — which even the majority does not construe to apply beyond cases of actual conflict arising because “a criminal defendant’s counsel previously represented a witness”31 or a non-testifying, separately-tried co-defendant — is inapplicable in assessing this claim. Instead, cases such as United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir.1987), and United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.1993), provide the proper framework for assessing claims that “the personal interests of the attorney and the interests of the client are in actual conflict.” Id. at 609.
These cases support the proposition that actual conflict has been established when a lawyer’s own personal interests would be compromised by pursuing a particular defense theory. See McLain, 823 F.2d at 1463-64 (finding actual conflict where defense counsel was under criminal investigation and had incentive to delay defendant’s trial and avoid plea bargaining in hopes of delaying indictment against himself); Fulton, 5 F.3d at 609 (“A situation in which the attorney’s own interests diverge from those of the client presents the same core problem presented in the multiple representation cases: the attorney’s fealty to the client is compromised.”). Freund clearly has established actual conflict under this definition. After the firm decided to oppose Trent’s motion for severance on Freund’s behalf, Trent made serious allegations against Foley and Colton at the severance hearing. If the firm antagonized Trent again by defending Freund on the theory that Trent murdered Walker, it certainly was possible that Trent would produce evidence to support his allegations. Foley and Colton would then be at risk of being disciplined by the Florida Bar or prosecuted by the State. Plainly, then, it was in the firm’s best interests not to defend Freund by implicating Trent in Walker’s murder.
The majority claims, however, that no actual conflict was created because “the damage was done” once Trent made his allegations at the severance hearing.32 Ante at 866. By making his allegations only after the firm decided to oppose his motion for severance, however, Trent had made it quite clear that he would respond to any attempt by the law firm to harm his interests. At any time before Trent pled guilty to second-degree murder following his mistrial, therefore, it was risky for the firm to defend Freund by implicating Trent in Walker’s murder. If the firm pursued such a defense, Trent might have responded by producing evidence to support his allegations or by making addi*887tional allegations against the firm’s members. The majority has no reason to suppose that Trent was out of ammunition to use against the law firm’s members once he had made his severance hearing allegations, or that he would not have been inclined to manufacture additional allegations against the firm if he knew of no actual wrongdoing to disclose.
B.
1.
Turning'to the adverse effect of the above conflicts on the firm’s performance in representing Freund, Freund claims that two of these conflicts — the firm’s obligations arising from its long history of representing Trent and Trent’s allegations against Foley and Colton — may be linked to the firm’s decision to forgo the reasonable defense strategy of claiming that Trent personally stabbed Walker to death.33 Despite the majority’s efforts to prove otherwise, this claim is not foreclosed by our precedent.
The majority first concludes that a strategy of shifting the blame for Walker’s murder to Trent did not meet the first two elements of our test for adverse effect because it was not a plausible defense strategy that was reasonable under the facts. See United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1537 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1331 (11th Cir.1983)) (“Failure to adopt a strategy of shifting blame may well give rise to an actual conflict of interest, but to do so the strategy must have been an option realistically available to trial counsel.”). It offers two arguments to support this conclusion. First, it argues that while all of the State’s physical evidence in the Walker murder either belonged to or was found on property belonging to Trent, all three of the State’s principal fact witnesses— Mills, Angelilli, and Daniell — testified against Freund. Because Duncan predicted that these witnesses would not change their stories on cross-examination after viewing them testimony at Trent’s trial, no fact witnesses were available to corroborate Freund’s inno-eence. Shifting the blame to Trent, in the majority’s view, was therefore an unrealistic strategy.
One difficulty with the majority’s argument is that it is not possible to conclude with any confidence that attempting to get the witnesses to change their stories on cross-examination “would have proved fruitless,” ante at 868, when this judgment is being made based on a record that was tainted by conflicts of interest. See. supra part I.B. (noting that when we consider whether an alternative defense strategy or tactic is “reasonable under the facts,” the decisive “facts” upon which we rely cannot be drawn from a record made after the time that the petitioner’s case became tainted). In particular, it is difficult. to credit Duncan’s self-serving post hoc statement at the Rule 3.850 hearing that he did not think he could have effectively impeached the witnesses based on what he saw at Trent’s trial.
A second problem is that the majority’s argument ignores both the serious credibility problems of the State’s principal witnesses and several significant facts that competent, conflict-free counsel could have used to implicate Trent. While the State’s witnesses may not have changed their stories on cross-examination, effective cross-examination by conflict-free counsel certainly could have discredited the witnesses sufficiently that the jury would disregard their testimony as biased in favor of Trent, influenced by the drugs and alcohol that each witness used on the night of the murder, and deliberately orchestrated in an effort to reduce their own chances of prosecution. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1553 n. 16 (listing the crimes with which Mills, Angelilli, and Daniell could have been charged for their conduct surrounding Walker’s death). In addition, the facts that conflict-free counsel could have used to implicate Trent went well beyond the physical evidence mentioned by the majority. Counsel also could have shown that Trent controlled the events that transpired on the night of the murder, that he had a powerful *888race-based motive to murder Walker, that he shot at Walker and lunged at Walker with his knife, and that he had a history of violence, diazepam possession, and other criminal conduct. See supra part II.B.2. Therefore, the strategy of defending Freund by claiming that Trent killed Walker cannot be dismissed as unreasonable based on the majority’s first argument.34
The majority also argues that a defense strategy of shifting the blame for Walker’s murder to Trent was unreasonable because Freund admitted to Foley and Duncan that he stabbed Walker and admitted to his psychiatrist that he stabbed Walker because Trent told him to do it. As a result, the majority reasons, the firm’s lawyers could have been disbarred if they defended Freund by claiming that Trent murdered Walker.35 It is certainly true that the ethics rules in effect at the time of Freund’s trial prohibited his lawyers from suborning perjury, knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence, or knowingly making false statements of fact. See Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A) (1986). Even if Freund’s lawyers had been absolutely certain that Freund — and only Freund — had stabbed Walker,36 however, these rules would not have prevented them from putting the state to its burden of proof by vigorously cross-examining the State’s witnesses and by arguing to the jury in closing that the evidence presented at trial did not establish Freund’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.37 This vigorous cross-examination could have extended even to matters about which the lawyers either knew or believed that the witness was telling the truth. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 4-7.6(b) (3d ed. 1993) (“Defense counsel’s belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination.”).38 In closing, *889Freund’s lawyers could then have argued to the jury any “reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record”39 in support of the claim that the prosecution had not established Freund’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it would have been entirely permissible for Freund’s lawyers to argue in closing that a reasonable doubt existed as to Freund’s guilt because the jury could infer from the evidence that Trent had killed Walker.
After making these unconvincing arguments, the majority turns to the third element of our test for adverse effect and contends that Freund did not establish a link between either of the two actual conflicts mentioned above and the firm’s decision not to defend Freund by claiming that Trent personally murdered Walker. As to the first conflict, the majority argues that the firm’s obligations arising from its long history of representing Trent did not have a wide-ranging effect on the decisions it made in representing Freund. Im support of this argument, the majority notes that the firm did attempt to implicate Trent indirectly in Walker’s murder during Freund’s trial. While discussing the evidence during his portion of the firm’s closing argument to the jury at Freund’s trial, Duncan claimed that Trent knew that Freund’s mental condition left him susceptible to influence and that Trent manipulated Freund to make him kill Walker. Because this claim could have resulted in a criminal conviction for Trent if proven in a hypothetical joint trial, the majority believes that the firm’s decisions were not “colored” by its “allegiance to Trent.” Ante at 868.
An initial problem with the majority’s argument is that Duncan’s indirect implication of Trent at Freund’s trial is not very helpful in answering the. question of whether the firm’s obligations to Trent may be linked to the firm’s decision to forgo the argument that Trent directly and personally murdered Walker in favor of an insanity defense. See Martinez, 630 F.2d at 363 (“[W]e cannot be sure that, because [the lawyer] failed to pull some punches [in questioning his former client for the benefit of his current client], he refrained from pulling others.”). Two additional problems with the majority’s argument negate any minimal probative value that Duncan’s claim might otherwise have.
First, the majority’s argument falls under its own weight once one realizes that Trent had already pled guilty to second-degree murder before Freund’s separate trial began. Freund’s lawyers, although still constrained to follow the insanity defense that they publicly adopted early in the representation, were thus free at trial to abandon a pure insanity defense in favor of a defense that indirectly implicated Trent40 — by arguing that Trent took advantage of Freund’s mental state and ordered Freund to kill Walker — without having to worry that this defense would negatively affect Trent. Tellingly, Freund’s lawyers did not support this latter defense by offering any evidence that could have violated their obligation of confidentiality arising from their lengthy representation of Trent. See supra part II.B.2. (noting that this obligation limited the firm’s ability to support an argument that Freund killed Walker while under Trent’s control by presenting evidence of Trent’s sexual proclivities and history of violence, diazepam possession, and other criminal conduct).
Another problem with the majority’s argument is that it employs the artifice of “Monday morning quarterbacking,” importing an element of “cure” into our test for adverse effect by suggesting that Duncan’s claim in his closing argument at Freund’s trial was sufficient to demonstrate that the firm did not pull its punches against Trent while representing Freund. This suggestion, however, does not in any way affect the conclusion of part II.B., supra, that the firm — influenced by its ethically-based conflict of interest — elected at the beginning of Freund’s case to forgo the reasonable alternative defense strategy of claiming that Trent per*890sonally murdered Walker. If we were to conclude that Duncan’s subsequent partial reversal of this election was sufficient to remove the initial taint that the firm’s conflict of interest imposed on its representation of Freund, we would be indulging in a prohibited inquiry into prejudice.41 See supra part I.B.
As to the second conflict, the majority argues that the firm’s actual conflict of interest arising from Trent’s allegations against Foley and Colton at the severance hearing did not motivate the firm’s initial decision to reject the defense that Trent murdered Walker. Given that Trent’s allegations had not yet been made when the firm announced that it would rely on an insanity defense, the majority certainly may be correct.42 This argument does not affect the conclusion, however, that Trent’s allegations reinforced the firm’s initial decision to rely on an insanity defense. See supra part II.C. Thus, it cannot be said that this actual conflict “played absolutely no role in counsel’s ... strategy.” Buenoano v. Singletary, 74 F.3d 1078, 1087 (11th Cir.1996) (emphasis added).
2.
Freund also claims that the conflict of interest arising from the firm’s obligation of confidentiality to Mills may be linked to its decision to forgo the reasonable alternative defense tactic of suggesting on cross-examination that Mills had a pro-Trent bias by eliciting the fact that Trent referred Mills to the firm. In rejecting this claim, the majority states that our test for adverse effect required Freund to show that, but for the firm’s previous professional relationship with Mills, the firm would have questioned Mills about Trent’s referring her to the law firm. Ante at 869. This is an incorrect statement of our test for adverse effect. All that must be shown under our test is that an alternative strategy or tactic that was reasonable under the facts might have been pursued by a conflict-free lawyer, but that this alternative was inherently in conflict with (or not undertaken due to) the other loyalties or interests of the client’s actual lawyer. See supra note 6. The majority’s statement of the test, by contrast, requires Freund to engage in “unguided speculation” in order to quantify the degree to which the actual representation he received differed from the representation that he hypothetically could have received if represented by conflict-free counsel. Because such speculation smacks of prejudice, we must not require it. See supra note 7; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (noting that prejudice is established by showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different” (emphasis added)).
Applying the proper reading of our test for adverse effect to Freund’s claim, it is undisputed that the tactic of eliciting that Trent referred Mills to the firm was reasonable under the facts and might have been pursued by a conflict-free lawyer. As to the link between the firm’s conflict and its decision not to elicit this information, it is plain that the tactic of asking Mills whether Trent referred her to the very law firm that was cross-examining her at Freund’s trial was inherently in conflict with the firm’s continuing obligation of confidentiality to her. See supra part II.B.2. The majority’s claim that no link was established because Duncan’s cross-examination of Mills was consistent with the firm’s insanity theory of defense is simply a non sequitur. The fact that the effect of one of the firm’s conflicts of interest — its failure to elicit certain information from Mills on cross-examination — ultimately happened to be consistent with the effect of another of its conflicts — its decision to pursue an insanity defense' — is probative of nothing.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we should vacate the district court’s denial of Freund’s 28 *891U.S.C. § 2254 petition and remand this case to the district court with the instruction that it grant Freund a writ of habeas corpus.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge,

. Because the majority does not address the issue of whether any of the conflicts of interest that affected the law firm’s representation of Freund were waived by Freund, I do not discuss this issue further here. See Freund v. Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1543, 1582-83 (11th Cir.1997), vacated, 135 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir.1998).

. But see Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266 & n. 10 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc) ("Although the federal circuit courts have unblinkingly applied Cuyler's 'actual conflict' and ‘adverse effect' standards to all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts, a careful reading of the Supreme Court cases belies this expansiveness.” (footnote omitted)). The panel opinion in Beets, by contrast, contained the following assessment: “Together, [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981),] suggest that the Cuyler analysis may not be limited to conflicts of interest involving [simultaneous] or successive representation. Consequently, it is no wonder that this court and others have recognized numerous circumstances in which an attorney has breached the duty of loyalty.” Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478, 1481 (5th Cir.1993), modified, 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir.1995).

. Of course, a petitioner would never actually need to prove both. As the majority acknowledges, our rule is that once the petitioner "proves that the subject matters of the present and prior representations are 'substantially related,’ the court will irrebuttably presume that relevant confidential information was disclosed during the former period of representation." Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981).

. The Lightbourne court also observed, and the panel opinion in this case acknowledged, that a violation of state ethical rules by a criminal defense lawyer does not necessarily deprive her client of the effective assistance of counsel. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1572 n. 66 (quoting Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1023 n. 12). Nevertheless, when the law of ethics renders a lawyer unable to reconcile the duties she owes to separate clients, ethical considerations play an important role in determining whether she had an actual conflict of interest. This role was recognized not only in Lightbourne, but also in United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 363 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1980), cited in Smith, 815 F.2d at 1406 n. 2. In Martinez, the first case in our circuit to perform a conflict of interest analysis in the successive representation context, the facts demonstrated both substantial relatedness and disclosure of confidential information. The test that the court applied to these facts in order to determine whether an actual conflict of interest existed, however, was more abstract. In finding that an actual conflict did exist, the court observed that the lawyer was "torn between conflicting duties” to his prior and current clients. See Martinez, 630 F.2d at 363.

. As the panel noted, this formulation of our actual conflict test tends to blend together the actual conflict and adverse effect inquiries of Cuyler. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1571 n. 65 (citing cases prior to Porter that employed this test). I mention it here merely to illustrate that the majority's unduly narrow test for actual conflict is contrary to our precedent.
It is also worth noting that Smith itself recognized this "possible alternative courses of action” test for actual conflict. See Smith, 815 F.2d at 1404 (quoting Barham v. United States, 724 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1984)). Without explanation, however, the Smith court failed to include this test in its subsequent list of the possible methods by which a petitioner could demonstrate actual conflict. Id. at 1405-06.

. This test consists of three requirements. In summary, a habeas petitioner must:
1) point to some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that might have been pursued;
2) demonstrate that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts; and
3) show some link between the actual conflict and the decision to forgo the alternative defense strategy (i.e., establish that the alternative was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the lawyer's other loyalties or interests). See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1579-80.

. The source of this measuring difficulty provides a powerful rationale for our presumption of prejudice. As we recognized in Duncan v. Alabama, the harm caused by conflicting interests "is difficult to measure because the harm 'is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process.’” 881 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). Of course, the harm may also lie in what the advocate actually does when pursuing a certain strategy that he might not have done under an alternative strategy; this type of harm is also difficult to measure. Given this difficulty, we are not supposed to engage in “unguided speculation” in either of these situations (or both situations together) in order to quantify the degree to which the actual representation received by the petitioner differed from the representation that hé hypothetically could have received if represented by conflict-free counsel. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491, 98 S.Ct. at 1182 (concluding that the concepts of prejudice and harmless error are inapplicable in the conflict of interest con*874text). Such speculation regarding the cost of the conflict of interest to the petitioner is not "susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application.” Id. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 1182.

. At the time of Freund's trial, members of the Florida Bar were governed by the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility. The Florida Code was replaced in 1987 by Chapter 4 of the Rulés Regulating the Florida Bar, entitled "Rules of Professional Conduct.” See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1572.

. The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar currently provide more detailed restrictions relating to a lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment. For example, the rules prohibit a lawyer from representing a client if the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment "may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own interests,” unless the lawyer reasonably believes that he can represent the client and the client consents after consultation. Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b) (1994). With respect to conflicts of interest involving former clients, Rule 4-1.9(a) provides that a lawyer who has represented a former client in a matter must not later "represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.” Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.9(a) (1994).

. The Code did allow a lawyer to reveal a client's confidences or secrets in two limited situations, neither of which is relevant in this case. See Fla.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(D) (1986) (providing that a lawyer may reveal a client's (1) confidences or secrets when ordered to do so by a tribunal after exhausting appellate remedies or (2) intent to commit a crime).

. For a list of the crimes with which Mills could have been charged, see Freund, 117 F.3d at 1553 n. 16.

. The three ethical duties discussed above can place conflicting obligations on a lawyer in certain circumstances. For example, when a current client’s interests are adverse to the interests of a former client whom the lawyer represented in a related matter, the lawyer's duty to represent the current client zealously and his duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of the former client may become irreconcilable. It is quite likely that the lawyer obtained information in the former representation that could be useful in the current representation. See Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) ("Whenever an attorney seeks to represent an interest adverse to that of a former client, the possibility arises that the attorney, whether intentionally or inadvertently, will reveal to his present client confidential information entrusted to him during his previous representation.”). If the lawyer used this information in representing his current client, he would violate his ethical obligation of confidentiality to his former client. If he refrained from using the information, however, he would violate his duty zealously to represent his current client.

. It is possible that lawyers would be able to invoke their Sixth Amendment obligation to their client as a defense in these actions.

. Fullerton was subject to prosecution for his role in concealing the crime. For a list of the crimes with which the other three people could have been charged, see Freund, 117 F.3d at 1553 n. 16.

. In Florida, the crime of murder in the first degree includes a premeditated killing and a killing "committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,” certain felonies, including kidnapping. See Fla. Stat. ch. 782.04(l)(a)(l), (2)(f) (Supp.1984). The contention that Freund was under Trent's dominion and control could support an argument that Freund's killing of Walker was not premeditated, as well as an argument that Freund lacked the necessary intent to commit kidnapping. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1580 n. 89.
If Freund ultimately was convicted under the felony-murder portion of the statute,- this contention could also support an argument that Freund could not receive the death penalty because he did not act either with the intent that Walker die or with reckless disregard for Walker's life. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (intent); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S, 137, 157-58, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) (reckless disregard).

. This strategy was not foreclosed by Freund's confession to his lawyers and psychiatrist. See infra part III.B.l.

. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.220. For example, this rule states that after the filing of an indictment or information, "the defendant may take the deposition upon oral examination of any person who may have information relevant to the offense charged.”

. These facts do not appear in the majority opinion. As the panel noted in its discussion of the events leading up to the murder, see Freund, 117 F.3d at 1550-51, Walker (who was African-American) began whispering to Angelilli that he wanted to have sex with her. When she ignored him, Walker became upset and loudly demanded sex. Trent then told Mills, who ran a female escort service, to "call up one of your girls and get a black girl over here for Ralph [Walker].” Mills, afraid to put any of "her girls” in danger, pretended to make the call and told Trent that she could not reach anyone. Walker then went into Trent's bedroom and returned with an aluminum baseball bat, which he slammed onto a table with such force that he dented the bat. He said that Trent would just have to "ignore this," but he was going to have sex with Angelilli. Walker then grabbed a .357 magnum pistol from the table and came toward Angelilli with the gun in one hand and the bat in the other. Trent knocked the .357 magnum away and shot at Walker with a .45 pistol, but the bullet hit a dining room chair. Trent then pointed his gun at Walker, handcuffed him, and yelled threats of death — accompanied by racial epithets — at him. One of the threats that Trent yelled was: "You're dead Ralph Walker! You're dead, nigger, and you’re goin' home to your mama in a box." Trent then called Bruce Fullerton (one of his henchmen) and asked him to bring a steamer trunk, a sledgehammer, and a chain saw to Trent's apartment. Fullerton apparently ignored these instructions. Later in the evening, Trent used racial epithets again when he repeatedly confided to Daniell (one of Trent's employees) that he had always had a fantasy of killing a man of Walker's race and then sodomizing the man's body.

.Of course, there was also evidence that Trent had kicked Walker, lunged at Walker with his knife, and yelled threats of death at Walker earlier in the evening. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1550.

. While such information regarding prior bad acts generally is not admissible solely to prove propensity or bad character, conflict-free counsel could have used it to prove things such as motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or identity. See Fla. Evid.Code § 90.404(2). In addition, even if this information could not have been offered as evidence, it could have been used by *880conflict-free counsel in effectively deposing Trent or cross-examining him at trial.

. Mills testified at Freund's trial that she was trying to sell four kilograms of cocaine. The undercover police officer requested and received only one kilogram, for which he was to pay about $37,000. Mills’ serious drug offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. See Fla. Stat. ch. 893.135(l)(b)l.c. (1995).

. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, this obligation of confidentiality was not waived by Mills. See infra part III.A.2.; see also Freund, 117 F.3d at 1578 n. 83.

. Ultimately, however, the firm did implicate Trent indirectly in Walker’s murder during Freund's trial. In addition, Freund’s lawyer Robert Foley suggested in his closing argument to the jury at Freund’s trial that Trent may have personally committed the murder and then told Freund that it was Freund who did it; this belated suggestion obviously was inconsistent with the firm's defense strategy of claiming that Freund had committed the murder but was insane. For a discussion of why these changes in defense strategy do not alter the conclusion that the firm's ethically-based conflict of interest adversely affected its representation of Freund, see part III.B.l. and note 41, infra.

. This point also applies to Duncan's claim, made during his portion of the firm’s closing argument at Freund’s trial, that the evidence indirectly implicated Trent in Walker’s murder.

. Foley’s comments were unsupported by any evidence that Trent may have murdered Walker. When questioned at the hearing held on Freund’s motion to vacate the judgment and sentence in his case pursuant to Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850, Duncan indicated that Foley’s statement was not a planned part of the firm’s defense of Freund. Duncan admitted that he was shocked when Foley made the statement and that the statement hindered Freund’s insanity defense. Duncan testified that he later asked Foley why he had made the statement; Foley answered that he did it to "appease" Freund's mother.

. As explained previously, it is problematic for the majority mechanically to apply Smith — and our other cases interpreting the two elements of the Smith test — to Freund’s argument that the firm’s prior representation of Trent gave rise to an actual conflict of interest. It is also troubling that, despite our precedent to the contrary, the majority gives little weight to “other proof of inconsistent interests" — such as proof of conflicting obligations under the principles of legal ethics — as a means of establishing actual conflict under Smith. See supra part I.A; see also note 4, supra, and accompanying text.

. As revealed in part H.B.2., supra, the firm had an extensive relationship with Trent that extended well beyond these two prosecutions. As part of this relationship, the firm learned a great deal of information that was potentially detrimental to Trent. The majority’s focus on the diazepam and assault prosecutions alone thus seems unduly narrow.

. The majority contends that Freund failed to introduce evidence at the Rule 3.850 hearing concerning the scope and nature of the firm’s prior representation of Trent — including its representation of Trent on the assault and diazepam possession charges. Ante at 862-63. This failure, however, does not prevent us — -just as it did not prevent the state judge who held the hearing— from considering facts concerning the firm's pri- or representation of Trent from three other sources: facts that the prosecutor elicited from witnesses who testified at the hearing, facts of which the state judge took judicial notice at the hearing, and facts that appeared in the record of prior state court proceedings relating to Freund’s murder prosecution. The record of these proceedings became part of the record of the Rule 3.850 hearing by operation of law. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850 ("If the motion and the files and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the motion shall be denied without a hearing.” (emphasis added)).
The federal statutory provision upon which Rule 3.850 is based is 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). See State v. Bolyea, 520 So.2d 562, 563 (Fla.1988) ("Rule 3.850 was taken nearly word-for-word from [section 2255], and we plainly have given the rule the same broad scope as its federal counterpart. Moreover, we explicitly have recognized federal precedent interpreting [section 2255] as persuasive authority in construing Rule 3.850.” (footnote and citation omitted)). Like Rule 3.850, section 2255 requires the trial court to consider the record of prior proceedings in the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) ("Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon....”); Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 7 advisory committee notes ("It is less likely that the court will feel the need to expand the record in a § 2255 proceeding ... because the trial (or sentencing) judge is the one hearing the motion (see Rule 4) and should already have a complete file on the case in his possession.”).
Recognizing that the record of prior proceedings is properly before the court in a proceeding under Rule 3.850, Freund's Rule 3.850 motion quoted extensively from Trent’s testimony at the severance hearing and from Mills' deposition testimony prior to Freund’s trial. In responding to this motion, the State attached Mills’ deposition and a portion of the transcript of Freund's trial as exhibits. During the hearing that ultimately was held on Freund's motion, the judge expressly made the pleadings, motions, and transcripts from Freund’s prosecution a part of the record. The judge also took judicial notice of the court files on Trent's aggravated assault and diazepam possession prosecutions. After the hearing, several memoranda were filed by both parties that contained additional references to the record of prior proceedings in Freund’s case and to the court files on Trent’s prosecutions. It is plain, therefore, that this court also may refer to these materials.

. Because Freund has demonstrated that the firm's representation of him was substantially related to its prior representation of Trent, it is not necessary to refute the majority's argument that the firm did not learn confidential information during its representation of Trent that was relevant in the firm's later representation of Freund. See supra note 3. Nonetheless, it seems plain that the firm did learn relevant confidential information during its representation of Trent. See supra part II.B.2. (discussing the wealth of potentially detrimental information that the firm gained while representing Trent).

. The majority again claims that Freund did little at the Rule 3.850 hearing to develop the historical facts surrounding the firm's consultation with Mills. As mentioned in note 28, supra, however, it is appropriate to glean these facts from evidence developed by the prosecutor at the hearing and from the record of prior state court proceedings in Freund's case. The majority ultimately does use these sources in setting out the facts surrounding the consultation. Ante at part IV.C.l.ii.

. Smith, 815 F.2d at 1405.

. The majority also points out, ante at 866-67, that Colton denied each and every accusation made by Trent "unequivocably and totally” in front of the media — a denial that he obviously was obliged to make if he wanted to avoid prosecution and disciplinary proceedings, particularly given the heavy media presence at the hearing. Even if the allegations actually were false, however, Freund's defense would still have been impaired. See Fulton, 5 F.3d at 610 ("[E]ven if the attorney is demonstrably innocent and the government's witness’s allegations are plainly false, the defense is impaired because vital cross-examination becomes unavailable to the defendant.”); Freund, 117 F.3d at 1579 n. 86 (applying this observation to Freund’s case and noting that although Trent was not a witness at Freund's trial, he certainly could have been).

. As discussed in part II.B.2., supra, the firm’s ethical obligations to Trent also constrained its ability to pursue the reasonable defense strategy of negotiating a favorable plea agreement for Freund.

. This defense strategy was not merely a viable one; it had the potential to be at least as effective as an insanily defense. Freund’s own lawyers estimated that the insanity defense was effective only thirty percent of the time or less. In addition, a letter to the prosecutor from Foley reveals that the firm felt that Freund’s particular insanity defense had the potential to lead only to a guilty verdict on a lesser charge — not to complete relief from criminal liability. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1581 n. 91. A blame-shifting defense, on the other hand, could have led to a verdict of not guilty.

. Under the majority's theory, Foley would have been subject to discipline for suggesting in his closing argument that Trent might have murdered Walker and then told Freund that it was Freund who did it.

. One basis upon which Freund’s lawyers could have disbelieved their client's confession was that Freund told a friend who visited him in jail that he had not killed Walker. In addition, some of the symptoms caused by Freund’s brain damage were impaired memory and amenability to influence by others. See Freund, 117 F.3d at 1548, 1563-64. Even if the lawyers did believe that Freund stabbed Walker, however, it certainly was possible that Freund was not the only person who did so. On the night of the murder, Trent had lunged at Walker with his knife while yelling threats of death and racial epithets. The State’s witnesses at Freund’s trial also confirmed that Trent periodically was alone with Freund and Walker in the room where Walker was stabbed in both the back and the chest.

. See, e.g., United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 867 (6th Cir.1978) (Peck, J„ dissenting) ("It is not the lawyer’s role to determine a client's guilt or innocence, and 'reasonable cause to believe’ a client guilty cannot ethically affect a lawyer’s representation.”); see also Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-3.1 (1994) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding ... unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.... A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding ... may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.’’); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 comment (3d ed. 1996) ("[The exception in rule 3.1 for criminal proceedings] reflects the constitutional principle that the state must prove every element of the crime charged and may not, by procedural rule or otherwise, shift its burden to the defendant.... Accordingly, the criminal defense lawyer has the ethical obligation to force the government to prove its case.’’).

.The commentary to Standard 4-7.6 helpfully expands upon this statement;
There unquestionably are many cases in which defense counsel cannot provide the accused with a defense at all if counsel is precluded from engaging in vigorous cross-examination of witnesses either believed or known to have testified truthfully. For example, where the defendant has admitted guilt to the lawyer and does not plan to testify, and the lawyer simply intends to put the state to its proof and raise a reasonable doubt, skillful cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses is essential. Indeed, were counsel in this circumstance to forgo vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses, counsel would violate the *889clear duty of zealous representation that is owed the client.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 4-7.6 "commentary (3d ed.1993).

. Id. Standard 4-7.7(a).

. These are the second and third possible defense strategies described in part II.B.2., supra.

. This response would also apply to any claim that Foley, by suggesting in his closing argument to the jury that Trent may have committed the murder and then told Freund that it was Freund who did it, fully reversed the firm's initial election and removed the taint.

. If Trent’s allegations were true, however, the firm might have anticipated from the very beginning of its representation of Freund that Trent would make these matters public if the firm seriously harmed his interests.