Court Opinion

ID: 9472241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:54:08.528152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:49.675877
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
At contest in this case is whether the employer, WMATA, may be held liable under Section 49 of the Act, for having discriminated against the claimant in his efforts to return to work between October, 1978, and June 27, 1980. The crucial issue is the motivation for WMATA’s actions. The majority remands the case to reconsider whether the employer’s discrimination against Geddes was partly motivated by his having filed a claim for disability compensation. The majority opinion indicates that the Benefits Review Board somehow erred in two respects: first, by imposing on *1419the claimant an overly strict burden of proof; and, second, by failing to shift the burden onto the employer once the claimant had made a particular showing.
From the record, it does not appear to me that the first error to which the majority opinion refers ever occurred in the administrative proceedings. On the second point, I would hold that the burden of proof was properly allocated and applied. The administrative law judge (AU) properly stated the law, correctly evaluated the evidence, and concluded unambiguously from the evidence that there was “no [creditable] evidence” that the employer’s discrimination against Geddes had been “motivated by animus against him because he filed a compensation claim.” See infra. The Board reached the same conclusion and affirmed. Accordingly, I believe that a remand of this case is unwarranted and futile, and I must respectfully dissent.
1. The Light Burden of Proof on the Claimant
Particularly in view of the majority opinion, close attention to the AU’s opinion is necessary. The Board’s affirmance of the AU adopted his legal analysis, his standard for evaluating the evidence, and his factual findings. The AU set forth the legal framework for his decision as follows:
[A]nimus against the employee for filing a compensation claim ... may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Dill v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, BRB No. 76-504, 6 BRBS 738 (November 21, 1977). The Claimant has the burden of proof under this section. Martin v. General Dynamics Corporation, BRB No. 78-191, 9 BRBS 836 (June 15, 1978). But, unlike a civil case, a Claimant bringing a case under Section 49 does not have to prove his discrimination claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Gondolfi v. Mid-Gulf Stevedores, BRB No. 77-331, 7 BRBS 1001 (February 28, 1978). The evidence presented is to be evaluated in terms of the “beneficient [sic] or humanitarian” purposes of the Act and in accord with the rule that any doubtful question of fact must be resolved in favor of the injured employee. Alley v. J. Garfinckel and Company, 1 BRBS 6, BRB No. 74-111 (August 6, 1974).
Geddes v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 79-DCWC-136, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 2, 1980) (decision and order upon reconsideration) (hereinafter “AU Decision”) (JA 12, 13). Contrary to the majority’s discussion of the proper burden of proof, Majority Opinion at 1416-1417, the AU’s legal analysis here was entirely sound. Both as to the slight burden on the claimant and as to the required construction of doubtful evidence in favor of the claimant, the AU indicates that he was fully aware of the proper standards, and there is nothing to indicate that he did not apply them. The majority’s suggestions to the contrary are simply unfounded.
2. The Majority’s Theory of a Shifting Burden of Proof
The majority also states that the burden of proof was improperly allocated in this case — that once the claimant had shown the existence of a general “animus” against him, then the burden should have been shifted onto WMATA to rebut the inference that its discrimination had been partly motivated by the filing of the disability claim. The majority views this perceived error as grounds for a remand of the case. I cannot agree. Neither the factual record in this case nor the statute provides any basis for a remand.
A. The Facts
The factual record reveals the futility of a remand. Having considered all of the evidence, the AU found the following:
[T]here is no evidence in the record to which I attach any weight that will support a finding that any of the acts or attitudes taken against the Claimant were motivated by animus against him because he filed a compensation claim. Rather, the testimony of the WMATA witnesses in both hearings has convinced me that his treatment was the result of an ongoing feeling at WMA-*1420TA, stemming from the public hearing incident, that Mr. Geddes was not a “team player” and perhaps was considered an undesirable employee. It is clear from the evidence presented by the Claimant that WMATA was aware at least that Mr. Geddes was inquiring about if not actually attempting to return to work. But instead of assisting him, the Employer treated the Claimant as an outcast, undoubtedly intending to induce Mr. Geddes to leave WMATA permanently. However, the language of Section 49 is specified in limiting sanctions to only those situations in which discrimination results because an employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation.

On the basis of the evidence presented, I find that the discrimination directed against the Claimant began at the time of the public rate hearings in 1975 and that the Employer’s subsequent actions against the Claimant were motivated by general animus against the Claimant, not by the fact that he filed a workmen’s compensation claim.

AU Decision at 4 (JA 15) (emphasis added).
This specific finding that the employer’s action was “not [motivated] by the fact that he filed a workmen’s compensation claim,” and the Board’s concurrence in that finding, disposes of this case. Quite clearly, the AU found on the evidence that the employer’s actions against Geddes were motivated by the ill will toward Geddes that arose when the claimant spoke out against WMATA in 1975, and not by his filing of a claim. The AU found no evidence to the contrary. With this specific finding negating the fact that the employer was partly motivated by Geddes’ filing his compensation claim — a finding that is fully supported by the administrative record — I cannot see the need, desirability, or justification for a remand. When WMATA had a motivation as strong as existed here to discriminate against an employee who was considered disloyal, and who was once fired because of that alleged disloyalty and only rehired because of pressure, I cannot agree that “it is reasonable to presume that, unless otherwise explained, the employer’s act was at least partially motivated by the employee’s claim for compensation.” Majority Opinion at 1418. There is no sound reason to manufacture such a presumption in this case. On the record before us, the motivation is completely “otherwise explained.” The harassment to which Geddes was subjected before he filed his compensation claim, including the aborted attempt to discharge him, constitutes strong support in favor of a conclusion that filing the compensation claim was not the cause of WMATA’s subsequent refusal to permit him to return to work. The proper conclusion to draw from that evidence was for the trier of fact, who faced up to the motivation issue and squarely found no creditable evidence to support Geddes’ Section 49 claim.
B. The Majority’s Misguided Legal Analysis
Furthermore, even if there were some factual ambiguity in the record, I could not agree that the case ought to be remanded for reconsideration in light of the majority’s suggested theory of the shifting burden of proof. As the majority concedes, a Section 49 claimant bears some burden of proof, albeit a light one. As the majority must also acknowledge, that burden applies to the motivation element of a Section 49 offense. In the precise language of the statute, the discrimination must result “because [the] employee has claimed ... compensation from [the] employer ____” 33 ILS.C. § 948a (1976) (emphasis added). The burden of proof, to the extent that it exists, is where the statute puts it — upon the claimant.
Viewed against the purposes of Section 49, the majority’s theory does not make sense. In almost all cases where some discrimination is found — as in that at bar— there will be some motive for the discrimination, and very few such motives will be entirely benign. The purpose of Section 49, however, is not to serve as an all-purpose restraint on improper employer activi*1421ties, but rather to select out one particular motive — retaliation against the filing of a claim — and to render that specific motive unlawful.1 The mere presence of some other “undesirable” motive changes nothing about the purpose or operation of the statute. The notion of general “animus,” to which the majority repeatedly refers, may be a convenient summary of the facts of this case, but it is nonetheless a concept alien to the statute under which this case must be decided. I would agree that when a claimant makes an initial showing that the employer’s discrimination was improperly motivated within the particular sense of Section 49, then the burden of proceeding naturally shifts to the party with potential access to information that might rebut that showing. An initial showing of some other sort of “improper” motive, however, is immaterial to the claimant’s case, and indeed can only tend to aid the defense. The majority’s theory that the burden of proof shifts whenever any form of general animus or improper motive has been demonstrated can have but one of two practical effects: 1) conversion of Section 49 from a limited legislative provision designed to prevent retaliation against the filing of claims into an all-purpose restraint on employment decisions; or 2) overruling Congress’ determination that a claimant must carry some light burden of showing that the motive for the discrimination against him was the one set forth in the statute. In either event, the majority’s construction mangles the statute.

. Of course, collective bargaining agreements, federal statutes, state laws, and the Constitution may preclude employment actions based on other employer motivations. Those sources of contractual and legal rights, however, give rise to different cases — cases outside the scope of Section 49.