Court Opinion

ID: 6918593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 22:52:05.004941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:06:44.139703
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and Goodrich, McLaughlin, KALODNER, STALEY, HASTIE and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
HASTIE, Circuit Judge.
On rehearing before the court en banc the reasoning and the conclusion of the division which originally considered and decided this appeal seem sound to a majority of the court. Accordingly, we adhere to the original opinion and decision. At the same time additional observations on two points seem appropriate.
The original opinion on this appeal has already dealt with and rejected the argument that language used by this court in an appeal on the principal claim in this three-party litigation negatives the explicit finding of the jury which originally heard the three-party controversy that the ship upon which the accident occurred was seaworthy. We point now to a separate and additional consideration which reinforces that conclusion.
While the third-party claim now under consideration was actually litigated in an original three-party trial, it was dismissed at the end of that trial.1 Thereafter, only the original plaintiff and defendant were parties to an appeal upon which the judgment as between those parties was affirmed. Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia, 3 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 30. In these circumstances no mere comment on that occasion by the appellate court about the trial evidence should bind the third-party defendant who was not and could not have been a party to the appeal. While the original judgment on the principal claim, as affirmed, left the jury’s finding of negligence of the original defendant as an authoritatively established fact for purposes of the retrial of the third-party claim, it would be unfair to go further and employ mere judicial comment on the evidence made on the original appeal in the absence of the third-party defendant as a pronouncement binding against the absentee.
A second point which was considered on the first hearing but not discussed in the court’s opinion has again been urged strongly and, therefore, is analysed here. Appellant says that the only evidence of negligence on its part appears in incompetent testimony of an expert witness.
In fact there was substantial evidence of negligence in the unloading operation apart from and independent of the testimony of the expert in question. There was evidence of inadequate supervision of the unloading by the two supervisory employees of appellant assigned to this job. It was testified that during the period which immediately preceded the collapse of the stow in the course of unloading these supervisors had diverted their attention from this unloading to a separate job of loading railroad cars being performed by the appellant on the pier nearby. There was also testimony by a second expert that the method of unloading which left a high unsupported wall of sugar bags standing near the working stevedores was dangerous and created an unnecessary and unreasonable risk of collapse at any time. None of this involved or depended upon the allegedly incompetent testimony of the first expert witness, a Captain Andersen.
In addition, we find no prejudicial error in the testimony of Captain Andersen. He qualified as an experienced *242marine surveyor and superintendent who, among other experiences, had instructed military and naval personnel in stevedor-ing operations during the second World War. A hypothetical question was put to him, stating and assuming conditions and circumstances indicated by the testimony, and asking his opinion as to the cause of the collapse of the stow. He replied: “My opinion is that the wall of sugar that collapsed was due (sic) to it being struck by an outside force, or foreign force.”
On direct examination the witness offered no opinion as to what “outside force” caused the collapse. However, on cross-examination counsel for appellant sought to have the witness identify the specific outside force which in his opinion struck the sugar; In response to this inquiry Captain Andersen stated that in his opinion it was the cargo runner loaded with sugar being lifted from the hold which swung against the face of the stow. After this had been elicited on cross-examination he was asked on redirect examination how he arrived at the “belief that such a thing would happen during this discharge.” He then explained the construction and operation of the lifting structures and tackle, how the load was pulled sideways as well as vertically, that no guy lines were used and that in these circumstances it was unavoidable that the load being lifted would frequently strike the adjacent standing wall of sugar bags.
The first noteworthy circumstance in connection with this testimony is that the direct examination of the witness elicited no more than the opinion that in the circumstances revealed in the evidence some outside force would be necessary to cause the collapse of the piled bags of sugar. Certainly an expert would have meaningful judgment beyond that of a layman as to the stability of a described stow standing without lateral support. His opinion that an outside force was needed to dislodge the stow was a meaningful and proper aid to the jury’s, fact finding. Cf. Bram v. United States, 1897, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Coal Min. Co., 8 Cir., 1929, 30 F.2d 794; 7 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed. 1940, § 1976. In addition, it seems more helpful to the defense than hurtful for the jury to hear an opinion that some outside force would be required to cause the stow from which the defendant had removed lateral support to collapse. A contrary opinion would certainly have been very damaging.
What may well have been damaging to the defendant was the opinion of the witness as to the particular outside force which operated in this case. But the defense itself asked for that identification after the direct examination of the witness had ended and, having received it, cannot complain that it was hurtful. Thereafter, all plaintiff’s counsel did on redirect examination was to obtain a more detailed explanation and justification of the answer the defense had elicited in terms of structures and forces present in this case.
Finally, having asked for and obtained this damaging testimony, the defense sought to nullify it by presenting the operator of a winch during this unloading who testified that he had not noticed any striking of the stow by moving drafts of cargo. ‘Though this was far from a categorical statement that no striking had occurred, the court in its charge specifically told the jury to disregard the opinion of the expert if the testimony of persons present at the unloading was persuasive that there had been no striking of the stow. Beyond that there was a correct general charge as to the role and significance of expert testimony.
In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the court committed no prejudicial. error, but rather that any hurt the defense may have suffered was self inflicted. We adhere to our affirmance of the judgment of the district court.

. Later, the trial judge concluded that he should not have dismissed the third-party claim. Accordingly, he reinstated it and directed that it he tried again in the separate proceeding which has led to the present appeal.