Court Opinion

ID: 9697523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:19:11.767836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.273081
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

dissenting:

I find here sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice to warrant an affirmance of the conviction.
It should be borne in mind that, as the majority opinion states, the Maryland rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice is one created by this Court. Thus, our situation differs from that in every other state with such a rule other than Tennessee since the rule in those other states is one laid down by statute.
Our rule was enunciated in Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, *64881 A. 681 (1911). The rationale for the rule was stated by Chief Judge Boyd for the Court:
"But the undoubted fact is that the experience of the Courts, which is certainly much greater than that of juries, is that it is unsafe, at least in the great majority of cases, to rest a conviction upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. Any one who has had experience at nisi prius trials knows how captivating is the story of one relating the circumstances connected with some mysterious crime. When such an one has as a motive the prospect of freedom, a milder sentence or the favor of the officers who have him in charge, an innocent one may undoubtedly be made to suffer, if great caution is not used. Hence it would seem to be safer to require some corroboration ....” 116 Md. at 293.1
The reason for the rule was reiterated by Chief Judge Murphy for the Court in Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 243-44, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977). In that case we rejected a request that we eliminate the requirement for corroboration, concluding that it was safer to require some corroboration of accomplice testimony. The same general idea as to the reason for the rule was expressed in somewhat different language by Judge Delaplaine for the Court in Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955):
"The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime for which he particularly blames the defendant, and it should be regarded with great suspicion *649and caution, because otherwise the life or liberty of an innocent person might be taken away by a witness who makes the accusation either to gratify his malice or to shield himself from punishment, or in the hope of receiving clemency by turning State’s evidence. People v. Sapp, 282 Ill. 51, 118 N.E. 416, 422; United States v. Van Leuven, 65 F. 78, 82.” 208 Md. at 217.
To similar effect see 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2057 at 417 (Chadwick rev. 1978).
The statement of the accomplice to the effect that Turner had shot him in the course of a robbery was admitted as an excited utterance. Two persons said he made that statement. We know that this statement was made but a few short minutes after the commission of the crime. This is gleaned from the testimony of the police officer who saw the accomplice running from the crime scene. Almost immediately he encountered that accomplice at the house where the two people were located who testified as to what was said to them by the accomplice at that place.
It is important to bear in mind that the requirements for admission of a spontaneous or excited utterance as stated by Dean Wigmore include that "[t]here must be some occurrence, startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting” and that "[t]he utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.” 6 Wigmore, op. cit., § 1750 at 202-03. (Emphasis in original.) This statement fits within Dean Wigmore’s specifications.
We have said many times that our cases do not require much in the way of evidence corroborative of the testimony of an accomplice and that while the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient in itself to convict, it must relate to material facts tending either to identify the accused with the perpetrators of the crime or to show the participation of the *650accused in the crime itself. See, e.g., Brown, 281 Md. at 244, and Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643, 650, 150 A.2d 733 (1959).
Applying the New York statutory requirement that corroborative evidence must tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 630, 339 N.E.2d 139 (1975), said, "All that is necessary is to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way that the jury may be reasonably satisfied that the accomplice is telling the truth.” To like effect see People v. Cunningham, 48 N.Y.2d 938, 940, 401 N.E.2d 182 (1979), and People v. Arce, 42 N.Y.2d 179, 186, 366 N.E.2d 279 (1977). I suggest that the statement here accomplishes that purpose.
Since the rule here is of our making, we are at liberty to construe it in the manner which we believe will best serve the ends of justice. It is the testimony of the accomplice which must be corroborated. I think that testimony was corroborated here by what he said to others almost at the scene of the crime. We have here no "captivating .. . story” related to the jury by the accomplice. When the accomplice here almost immediately after being shot made the statement attributed to him he had none of the motives usually given as reasons for the rule. In other words, at that point he was not seeking a milder sentence or the favor of officers who had him in charge, nor is it likely in the few minutes which had elapsed since commission of the crime that he had had sufficient time to reflect relative to his own freedom, the prospect of receiving clemency by turning State’s evidence, or that it provided him an opportunity to gratify any malice he might have had against Turner. In the words of Wigmore, the statement was made before there was "time to contrive and misrepresent.” In other words, in this case the purpose of the rule is not served by a holding that the testimony of two witnesses as to the spontaneous statement of the accomplice made within minutes of the crime does not provide sufficient corroboration of his testimony generally. The holding of the majority here simply adds fuel to the public’s belief that courts go out of their way to protect those who are accused of crime when such action *651is not necessary. It serves no useful purpose other than to let a guilty man go free. It fails to protect the rights of the public generally and, more particularly, the rights of victims of crime.2 Hence, I would affirm.
Chief Judge Murphy authorizes me to state that he joins in the views here expressed.

. In Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643, 647, 150 A.2d 733 (1959), Judge Horney pointed out for the Court that the rule as "applied today is substantially the same as when it was formulated by the decision in . . . Luery,” although "when that case was decided, this Court had neither a duty nor a right to review the legal sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, and a trial court could not take a criminal case away from the jury because of insufficient corroboration.”

. It is ironical that the accomplice and the third member of the trio involved in this incident (convicted of second degree murder) will serve prison terms but the one convicted of first degree murder will be a free man. There was not even a petition for certiorari in the third person’s case. The Court of Special Appeals disposed of his contentions in less than one page of opinion. See Turner v. State, 48 Md. App. 370, 377-78, 428 A.2d 88 (1981). On the issue of corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice, Judge Weant observed for that court that the corroboration by the two persons "went beyond the mere repetition of the excited utterance or admission against interest discussed in section I of appellant Turner’s arguments.” Id. at 380.