Court Opinion

ID: 9746635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:30:42.706197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.586405
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.
I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, the laws of contract interpretation direct us to base an interpretation on the ordinary use of words (Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1197-1198 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 144]) and to avoid an interpretation which makes the contract unusual or extraordinary. (Sayble v. Feinman (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 509, 513 [142 Cal.Rptr. 895].) I believe that by taking a magnifying glass to the word “action” and ascribing a technical meaning to that word, the majority has violated the rules it cites.
The majority impliedly finds that the parties intended that “action” bear a technical meaning and that they knowingly agreed to only a “narrowly drawn” fee provision. I see no basis for that implied finding. The fee provision in the release seems to be an ordinary one, in which the parties add teeth to their commitment to release all claims by providing that if there is litigation on those claims in violation of the release, the loser pays the winner’s fees. In this case, there was litigation in violation of the release, which means, in my view, that fees should have been awarded. The majority has defeated; not enforced, the overall meaning of the release.
It may be that, as the majority writes, “action” has a technical meaning which includes a filing but not an answer, but that is not the only meaning which the law ascribes to the term. “[U]se of the term ‘action’ does not in all contexts refer to the technical meaning of the term as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Best v. California Apprenticeship Council (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1460 [240 Cal.Rptr. 1] [term “action” in Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5, encompassed administrative proceedings which preceded filing of a writ].) Another court has observed that “An action is not limited to the complaint but refers to the entire judicial proceeding at least through judgment and is generally considered synonymous with ‘suit.’ (Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 387 [150 Cal.Rptr. 841].) Action is not the same as cause of action.” (Nassif v. Municipal Court (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1294,1298 [263 Cal.Rptr. 195] [“action” for purposes of Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310].) “ ‘Generally an action is defined as a proceeding wherein one asserts a right or seeks redress for a wrong. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 22.) An *747action is usually deemed to commence upon the filing of a complaint ([Code Civ. Proc.,] §§ 350 & 411.10) and remains pending until the judgment is final. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1049.) . . .’ [Citation.]” (Sunkyong Trading (H.K.) Ltd. v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 282, 288-289 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 504] [“action” under Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6].) These cases teach us that, like many words, “action” is not limited and precise, but general and inclusive. “How the party achieves the goal of enforcing the right in question is not determinative of the right to an award of attorney fees .. . . The impact of the litigation is.” (In re Head (1986) 42 Cal.3d 223, 228-229 [228 Cal.Rptr. 184, 721 P.2d 65] [Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 fees available to prevailing party in habeas corpus proceedings].)
In an everyday sense, “action” includes both an answer and an affirmative defense, for the simple reason that the two are in many ways alike. The defendant has the burden of proof on the affirmative defense just as the plaintiff does on a complaint. The rules which relate to pleading a cause of action in a complaint also apply to pleading an affirmative defense in an answer. Because there is no replication in California, affording a plaintiff a chance to deny the allegations of affirmative defense, they are deemed controverted. If the defendant prevails on the release defense, it will only be because the court has “enforced” the release. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §§ 1008-1010, pp. 461-465.) Thus, an equitable right of action may properly be asserted as an equitable defense “in an action involving the same subject-matter brought ... by the plaintiff. The party relying upon such equitable defense must, however, plead it with the same fullness and particularity as is required in cases involving like subjects of inquiry in suits in equity. . . . He then becomes an actor with respect to the matters alleged by him. . . . [Citations.]” (Swasey v. Adair (1891) 88 Cal. 179, 181-182 [25 P. 1119], italics added.) Raising a release as an affirmative defense is legally the same as bringing an “action” to enforce it. The defendant becomes an actor.
Neither party asserts that the language of the release is ambiguous, and we thus do not have the benefit (or burden) of extrinsic evidence. However, I believe I may confidently state that it is not within the imagination of mortal lawyers to draft an attorney fee clause which provides for fees if the winner filed, but not if the winner defended, and that if lawyers ever managed to agree on such an unusual arrangement, they would document that agreement with elaborate care.
On August 24, 2004, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.