Court Opinion

ID: 9772974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:13.926126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.528239
License: Public Domain

POPE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
United States Fire Insurance Company’s contract to cover the insured’s aircraft is clear and unambiguous. The insurer lived up to its contract and the insured did not, but the insurer loses. The contract between the parties expressly provides, not once, but twice that there is no coverage for the accident upon which plaintiffs sue. This is the language of the contract:
The Use of Aircraft: The aircraft must be used for personal or business transportation only. There is no coverage under the policy if ... (4) airworthiness certificate is not in full force and effect or has been converted to restricted or experimental.
The Declaration Sheet of the policy says: THE USE OF THE AIRCRAFT: There is no coverage under the policy if the airworthiness certificate is not in full force and effect or has been converted to restricted or experimental.
There is no lack of clarity about coverage. The court so holds. The policy requirement is not onerous. It required only that the insured comply with federal safety regulations and that the plane be submitted to periodic safety inspections. The insurance company is not equipped to make mechanical inspections to determine whether aircraft are airworthy.
The ambiguity rule that applies uniquely to insurance companies is not applicable here. Insurance contracts, for ample reason, are disfavored in interpretation suits. All that need be proved to prevail against an insurance contract is that the contract is not clear and that an adversary’s position is “no more than one which is not itself unreasonable.” Lloyds Casualty Insurer v. McCrary, 149 Tex. 172, 179, 229 S.W.2d 605, 609 (1950). This burden is not borne by disputants in other classes of ambiguous agreements. The rule arises because customers of insurance companies cannot negotiate the terms of policies and it has often been followed.
Absent ambiguity, however, insurance contracts are construed the same as other contracts and the provisions are given their *940ordinary meaning. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Simon, 416 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.1967); United American Ins. Co. v. Selby, 161 Tex. 162, 338 S.W.2d 160 (1960), 84 A.L.R.2d 367; Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 157 Tex. 183, 300 S.W.2d 639 (1957).
The insured made a conscious and deliberate decision to ignore the policy requirement for coverage, that is, the annual inspection required by federal safety regulations. This is the testimony of Robert G. Holt, co-owner of the airplane, about the reason the insured consciously breached the contract:
“Q Do you know whether there was an annual inspection done between June 12 and June 18,1981 — June 12, 1980 to July 18, 1981?
“A There was not any done.
“Q Do you know why it was not done?
“A Well, we had decided to sell the aircraft prior to the accident.
“A [W]e were trying to decide whether to sell the airplane with an annual or without an annual. So this is often done. The mechanic that'was going to do the annual was on vacation in the latter part of June so we didn’t get it done. And we decided to go ahead and get it done before we sold it so that whoever wanted to buy it could fly it.
“Q I assume then from what you are telling me, it was kind of a proposition that you wanted not to spend the money on the annual until you decided whether you were going to sell it or not, in substance; is that right?
“A Well, yes sir. And that is probably more or less our thinking at the time.”
United States Fire Insurance Company in its policy provisions for coverage relied upon what was the unmistakable rule in most jurisdictions. The court’s opinion cites some of the decisions that respect compliance with a clear statement in an insurance policy requiring adherence to federal safety regulations. The court acknowledges that the rule it announces is contrary to the reasoning of most courts.
The court has written a new clause into the policy. It adds to the contract the .requirement that the insurance company must prove that the breach was the cause of the accident. Proof of a causal relation between the insured’s breach and the accident has been uniformly rejected by our prior Texas decisions as it has been by the majority of jurisdictions. In Schepps Grocer Supply, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d 13 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court rejected the contention that causation should be written into the contract by holding that the insurer did not have to prove a causal connection between the loss and the breach when the insurer proved a policy exclusion. This court refused to add a provision for causation to the clear terms of a policy when we decided Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bowie, 574 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.1978).
Today’s decision means that insurance policies — life, casualty, fire — though agreed upon by insured and insurer, though authorized by the Board of Insurance, though clear and unambiguous, are burdened with uncertain terms that this court may from time to time determine should have been included in the parties' contract. The court characterizes the insurer's breach as “nothing more than a technicality.” Aircraft safety a technicality? The object of the policy provision requiring compliance with the federal regulations is safety.
Courts are not in the business of writing insurance contracts. Our duty is to apply unambiguous contracts as they are written. The court has written out of the contract the clear and express provision that the aircraft airworthiness certificate shall be kept in full force and effect. I would affirm the judgment of the two lower courts.
McGEE, J., joins in this dissent.