Court Opinion

ID: 9407815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 14:06:30.718446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.993710
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Louis Charles Bouie,                        :
                  Petitioner                :
                                            :
      v.                                    : No. 206 M.D. 2022
                                            :
Pennsylvania Department                     :
of Corrections,                             :
                 Respondent                 : Submitted: April 14, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                  FILED: July 10, 2023

      Petitioner Louis Charles Bouie (Bouie), an inmate currently incarcerated
within our Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a Petition for Review (PFR) in
our original jurisdiction, through which he seeks relief regarding Respondent
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (Department) refusal to place him in what
is known as the State Drug Treatment Program (SDTP or Program),1 a component

      1
          As explained by the Department, the SDTP
               is a [Department-administered] 24-month intensive treatment
               program
               ....
               for statutorily eligible inmates who have been convicted of
               substance use-related crimes who have undergone an assessment
               performed by the [Department], which assessment has concluded
               that the inmate is in need of drug and alcohol addiction treatment
               and would benefit from commitment to the SDTP and that
               placement in SDTP would be appropriate. This program follows
               guidelines set forth in 61 Pa. C.S. Ch. 41. The SDTP shall address
(Footnote continued on next page…)
           the individually assessed drug and alcohol abuse and addiction
           needs of a participant and shall address other issues essential to the
           participant’s successful reintegration into the community, including,
           but not limited to, educational and employment issues.
           ....
           [SDTP] replaced the former State Intermediate Punishment
           Program (SIP) within the Department . . . . This change is
           outlined in Act 115 of 2019[, Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776,
           No. 119] . . . JRI2[]. Unlike SIP, which was a 24-month flat
           sentence imposed by a judge to address substance use-related
           crimes, the SDTP is a treatment program to which an offender
           may be referred following evaluation and classification
           completed by the Department.
           ....
           The main differences between the SDTP and the former SIP
           Program are:
                  • SDTP is not a sentence imposed by a judge. It is a treatment
                  program offered to eligible offenders whom the Department
                  believes will benefit from placement in the program.
                  • In cases where a SDTP participant is unable to complete
                  the mandatory program levels prior to his/her maximum
                  release date, and is otherwise progressing well in the
                  program, the Department may grant a program extension up
                  to 30 months.
                  • Upon certification by the Department of the participant’s
                  successful completion of the program, the entire term of
                  confinement that rendered the participant eligible to
                  participate in the SDTP shall be deemed to have been served.
                  The sentencing judge will be notified of an offender’s
                  admission to the SDTP, and of successful completion of or
                  removal from the program.
                  • Upon unsuccessful completion or removal from the
                  program, the offender will revert to his/her original sentence
                  and may be eligible for consideration of parole at minimum
                  sentence. The judge will be issued a program
                  expulsion/removal letter but will not be asked to conduct a
                  revocation/resentencing hearing to address the expulsion.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                             2
of Justice Reinvestment Initiative 2 (JRI2).2 In response, the Department has filed
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. After thorough review, we sustain
the Department’s preliminary objections and dismiss the PFR.
                                        I. Background
       On August 27, 2019, Bouie was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lehigh County (Common Pleas) of three counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. PFR, Exs. A, C.3 Common Pleas then sentenced
Bouie on October 29, 2019, to an aggregate term of 5 to 10 years in state prison,

State Drug Treatment Program (SDTP), PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/
community-reentry/Documents/JRI%202/SDTP%20Brochure.pdf (last visited July 5, 2023)
(emphasis added); see 61 Pa. C.S. § 4105 (articulating the particulars of the SDTP).

       2
           Per the Department:
                In Dec[ember] 2019, a collection of bills commonly known as
                [JRI2] were passed into law, which changed how select
                [Department] programs operate. Among the programs affected
                were: [SDTP]; Quick Dips; Short Sentence Parole; and Quehanna
                Boot Camp.
                Another change affects deductions from inmates’ accounts.
                Monetary deductions for restitution and other court-ordered
                financial obligations have increased from 20 [%] to 25 [%]. The
                [Department] will now make the mandatory monetary deductions of
                at least 25 percent of deposits made to inmate accounts.
Justice Reinvestment      Initiative 2 (JRI2)/Act      115,     PA. DEP’T OF               CORR.,
https://www.cor.pa.gov/community-reentry/Pages/JRI2.aspx (last visited July 5, 2023).

       3
         Bouie’s PFR does not comport with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1513’s
formatting requirements. Rather than pleading each averment in its own, separate paragraph, along
with properly labelled and articulated legal claims, Bouie instead properly enumerates some
averments, but then shifts to a two-page narrative statement he has titled “Argument,” in which he
blends additional averments with legal assertions and requests for relief. For reasons unknown, the
Department elected not to attack these manifest deficiencies through its preliminary objections.
Accordingly, and for simplicity’s sake, we cite to paragraph numbers where they have been
provided, page numbers where they have not, and the attached exhibits using the designations used
by Bouie.

                                                3
with credit for time served in presentence detention. Id. ¶1, Ex. A. Thereafter, on
April 22, 2021, Bouie sent a letter to Common Pleas, in which he stated that he was
trying to overcome his addiction to alcohol and prescription drugs, and asked
Common Pleas to help him secure placement in the SDTP. Id. ¶3, Ex. C. Common
Pleas responded on April 28, 2021, and encouraged Bouie to pursue that goal by
following the statutory guidelines governing admission. Id. ¶4, Ex. D. In doing so,
Common Pleas also stated that it had not deemed Bouie ineligible for the SDTP, but
cautioned Bouie that his “prior conviction for robbery in 2009 would seemingly
disqualify [him] from the [P]rogram.” Id., Ex. D.
       Bouie then embarked upon an unsuccessful effort to convince the Department
to place him in the SDTP. On June 14, 2021, the Department ran Bouie through a
drug screening protocol, determined that he would benefit from treatment for
substance abuse issues, and informed Bouie that he would be enrolled in an
appropriate program once he drew closer to the minimum date on his 2019 sentence.
Id. ¶5, Ex. E. However, at a roughly contemporaneous point, Bouie was informed
by the Department that he was not eligible for the SDTP, because he had been
sentenced prior to the Program’s creation. See id. ¶6, Ex. F. Bouie challenged this
conclusion via letters to the Department, inmate requests, and grievances, none of
which caused the Department to change its position regarding his SDTP eligibility.
See id. ¶¶6-19, Exs. F, I-N, Q, S.
       On April 4, 2022, Bouie filed his PFR with our Court, in which he argues that
the Department’s position regarding SDTP eligibility is legally erroneous. PFR at 5.
As relief, Bouie requests that we “reverse” a JRI2 “Form”4 that has been

       4
         This “Form” is a single-sheet “inmate reference” that explains the eligibility requirements
for, and the parameters of, several programs that were established through JRI2, including the
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 4
promulgated by the Department and, in addition, direct the Department to admit him
into the SDTP and/or refund to him the additional, JRI2-mandated deductions it had
made from his inmate account since JRI2 went into effect. Id. at 5-6. The Department
responded to the PFR by submitting its preliminary objections on September 13,
2022, to which Bouie responded in opposition on October 3, 2022.
                                        II. Discussion
       In its preliminary objections, the Department demurs to the PFR for two
reasons. First, the SDTP did not exist at the time of Bouie’s sentencing in 2019,
which renders him ineligible for the Program. Department’s Br. at 10. Second, even
if Bouie is eligible, he does not have a right to be placed in the SDTP, because such
placement decisions are made at the Department’s discretion. Id. at 10-11.
              In ruling on preliminary objections, this Court accepts as
              true all well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all
              inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. Key v.
              Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
              However, this Court need not accept unwarranted
              inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative allegations,
              or expressions of opinion. Id. For preliminary objections
              to be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law
              will permit no recovery. Id. Any doubt must be resolved
              in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 250 A.3d 1269, 1274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting
Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519, 522 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).
       Our analysis is complicated slightly by Bouie’s failure to identify the precise
nature of the claim or claims he pursues against the Department, as well as his
request that we “reverse” what appears to be nothing more than an informational
pamphlet. In context, however, Bouie appears to rest his case on two propositions.

SDTP. See PFR, Ex. G. The JRI2 Form expressly states that inmates are “[o]nly eligible [for these
programs] if [they] were sentenced on or after 12/18/19.” Id.

                                               5
First, the Department’s determination that inmates can only enter the SDTP if they
were sentenced on or after the date of the Program’s creation contravenes the
language used in Sections 4103 through 4105 of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code),
61 Pa. C.S. §§ 4103-4105, and, thus, is legally erroneous. See PFR at 4-5. Second,
the Department was required to place him in the SDTP, because he was technically
eligible for admission into the SDTP and had been assessed by the Department as
someone who would benefit from treatment for his substance abuse issues. See id.
In other words, he appears to seek a ruling that both states that the Department’s
Code interpretation is incorrect and orders the Department to take nondiscretionary
action. The gravamen of Bouie’s assertions can thus be most comfortably
characterized as requests for declaratory judgment and for mandamus relief.
      As for the general nature of these types of claims,
            [a] declaratory judgment declares the rights, status, and
            other legal relations “whether or not further relief is or
            could be claimed.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 7532.[] It has been
            observed that “[d]eclaratory judgments are nothing more
            than judicial searchlights, switched on at the behest of a
            litigant to illuminate an existing legal right, status or other
            relation.” Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp[.], . . . 471 A.2d
            1252, 1254 ([Pa. Super.] 1984). Stated otherwise, “[t]he
            purpose of awarding declaratory relief is to finally settle
            and make certain the rights or legal status of parties.”
            Geisinger Clinic v. Di Cuccio, . . . 606 A.2d 509, 519 ([Pa.
            Super.] 1992)[.]
            A declaratory judgment, unlike an injunction, does not
            order a party to act. This is so because “the distinctive
            characteristic of the declaratory judgment is that the
            declaration stands by itself; that is to say, no executory
            process follows as of course.” Petition of Kariher, . . . 131
            A. 265, 268 ([Pa.] 1925).
Eagleview Corp. Ctr. Ass’n v. Citadel Fed. Credit Union, 150 A.3d 1024, 1029-30
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (footnote omitted). By contrast, “mandamus is an extraordinary

                                          6
writ which lies to compel performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where
there is a clear legal right in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the respondent,
and a want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy.” Cooper v. City of
Greensburg, 363 A.2d 813, 815 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976). “The purpose of mandamus is
not to establish legal rights but only to enforce those legal rights that have already
been established.” Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, Zoning Hearing Bd., 32
A.3d 287, 290 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “Mandamus will lie only to compel public
officials to perform their duties in accordance with the law [when] those duties are
ministerial in character and not discretionary.” Rakus v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 770,
772 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (citing Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub.
Instruction, 244 A.2d 754 (Pa. 1968)).
      Moving on, both of Bouie’s claims present us with pure questions of statutory
interpretation.
             It is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, this Court’s
             objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of our
             General Assembly. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). The best
             expression of this intent is found in the statute’s plain
             language. Cagey v. Com[.], . . . 179 A.3d 458, 462 ([Pa.]
             2018). If the statutory language is “clear and free from all
             ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the
             pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). . . .
             “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous
             and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
             occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory
             interpretation and construction; the statute must be given
             its plain and obvious meaning.” Com[.] ex rel. Cartwright
             v. Cartwright, . . . 40 A.2d 30, 33 ([Pa.] 1944).
O’Donnell v. Allegheny Cnty. N. Tax Collection Comm., 266 A.3d 2, 16 (Pa. 2021).
      Several statutory provisions guide our analysis. First, Section 4105 of the
Code tasked the Department with establishing and administering the SDTP; sets the
duration for which an inmate may be enrolled in the Program; specifies the minimum

                                            7
amount of time an inmate must spend in each phase of the SDTP; and vests the
Department with discretion to shift an inmate between different phases and, if
necessary, to expel an inmate from the Program. 61 Pa. C.S. § 4105(a)-(c), (f). Next,
Section 4104 of the Code governs the selection process for admission into the SDTP
and reads as follows, in relevant part:
             (a) Duties of [the Pennsylvania Commission on
             Sentencing (Commission)] and sentencing judge.--
                   (1) Through the use of sentencing guidelines, the
                   [C]ommission shall employ the term “eligible
                   person” as defined in this chapter to further identify
                   persons who would be potentially appropriate for
                   participation in the [SDTP]. The sentencing judge
                   shall employ the sentencing guidelines to identify
                   persons who are eligible for participation in the
                   [SDTP]. The judge shall consider the position of a
                   victim of the crime, as advised by the prosecuting
                   attorney, on whether to exclude the person from
                   eligibility for placement in the [SDTP]. The judge
                   shall exclude the person from eligibility if the
                   prosecuting attorney opposes eligibility. The judge
                   shall note on the sentencing order if a person has
                   been excluded from eligibility for the [SDTP]. If the
                   person is not excluded from eligibility, the
                   minimum sentence imposed shall operate as the
                   minimum for parole eligibility purposes if the
                   person is not placed in the [SDTP] by the
                   [D]epartment under subsection (c) or if the person
                   is expelled from the [SDTP] under section 4105(f)
                   (relating to [the SDTP]).
                   (2)(i) The prosecuting attorney shall advise the
                   court if the prosecuting attorney or a victim of the
                   crime opposes eligibility and, in the prosecuting
                   attorney’s sole discretion, may advise the court that
                   the Commonwealth has elected to waive the
                   eligibility requirements of this chapter if the victim
                   has been given notice of the prosecuting attorney’s
                   intent to waive the eligibility requirements and an
                   opportunity to be heard on the issue.

                                          8
                      (ii) The court, after considering victim input, may
                      refuse to accept the prosecuting attorney’s waiver of
                      the eligibility requirements.
               (b) Assessment of addiction.--The [D]epartment shall
               conduct an assessment of the addiction and other treatment
               needs of an eligible person and determine whether the
               person would benefit from the [SDTP], public safety
               would be enhanced by the person’s participation in the
               [SDTP], and placement of the person in the [SDTP] would
               not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. The
               assessment shall be conducted using a nationally
               recognized assessment instrument or an instrument that
               has been normed and validated on the [D]epartment’s
               inmate population by a recognized expert in such matters.
               The assessment instrument shall be administered by
               persons skilled in the treatment of drug and alcohol
               addiction and trained to conduct assessments. The
               assessments shall be reviewed and approved by a
               supervisor with at least three years of experience
               providing drug and alcohol counseling services.
               (c) Placement in the [SDTP].--If the [D]epartment in its
               discretion believes an eligible person would benefit from
               the [SDTP] and placement in the [SDTP] is appropriate,
               the [D]epartment shall make the placement and notify the
               court, the eligible person, the [C]ommission and the
               attorney for the Commonwealth of the placement.
Id. § 4104. Finally, Section 4108 directs that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law to the contrary,” the Code’s SDTP provisions are not to be construed as
imbuing anyone with the right to “participate in a drug offender treatment
program[.]” Id. § 4108-(1)(i).5

       5
          “Drug offender treatment program” is defined in Section 4103 of the Code as “[a]n
individualized treatment program established by the Department . . . consisting primarily of drug
and alcohol addiction treatment that satisfies the terms and conditions listed in [S]ection 4105 [of
the Code] (relating to drug offender treatment program).” 61 Pa. C.S. § 4103. Section 4105 of the
Code is titled “State drug treatment program.” Id. § 4105. Simply put, the SDTP is a Code-defined
drug offender treatment program.

                                                 9
       These statutes, through their plain language, enable us to make three salient
conclusions. First, though the Department is ultimately responsible for determining
whether an “eligible” inmate should be admitted into the SDTP, that determination
can only occur after the relevant court has made a threshold eligibility decision
during the course of sentencing that inmate. See id. § 4104(a)-(c). Second, the
Department has broad latitude when considering whether to place an eligible inmate
in the SDTP, as well as regarding how to handle an inmate post-admission. See id.
§§ 4104(b)-(c), 4105(b)-(c), (f). Finally, and regardless of an inmate’s Program
eligibility or the results of a Department-administered addiction assessment, nothing
in the statutes that govern the SDTP gives an inmate a legally enforceable right to
gain admission thereto. See id. §§ 4104(b)-(c), 4105(b)-(c), (f), 4108-(1)(i).
       Here, Bouie was sentenced by Common Pleas on October 29, 2019, nearly
four months before February 18, 2020, when the laws establishing the SDTP went
into effect. See id. § 4105; PFR, Exs. A, C. As the SDTP did not exist when Bouie
was sentenced, Common Pleas obviously could not make a Program eligibility
determination for him at that juncture. The timing of Bouie’s sentencing thus
deprives him of SDTP eligibility.6 Furthermore, even if this was not the case, Bouie’s
involvement with the SDTP would be at the Department’s discretion, and he would
have no legally enforceable right to compel the Department to admit him into the
Program. Consequently, we conclude that Bouie does not have a right, clear or
otherwise, to the relief he seeks and, thus, has failed to state a legally viable claim
in his PFR.

       6
          Indeed, only those individuals who were sentenced on or after February 18, 2020, can be
allowed into the SDTP, because admission into the SDTP cannot occur without a predicate judicial
eligibility decision.

                                               10
                                III. Conclusion
      In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we sustain the Department’s
preliminary objections and dismiss Bouie’s PFR.

                                       ____________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                      11
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Louis Charles Bouie,                :
                  Petitioner        :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 206 M.D. 2022
                                    :
Pennsylvania Department             :
of Corrections,                     :
                 Respondent         :

                                 ORDER

      AND NOW, this 10th day of July 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that
Respondent Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ preliminary objections are
SUSTAINED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Louis Charles Bouie’s
Petition for Review is DISMISSED.

                                      ____________________________
                                      ELLEN CEISLER, Judge