Court Opinion

ID: 9715324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:00:32.287647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.589979
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I must dissent to the portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the trial court erred in granting Nor-Cen summary judgment on the negligence claim. The majority's opinion extends Nor-Cen's legal obligation beyond the pale of reason to protect Appellants [hereinafter Short and Guests].
Even had Nor-Cen been negligent in failing to provide a second means of egress as required by the city ordinance, Short and Guests had the burden to prove not only that the violation was the cause in fact of their injuries, but that Nor-Cen was legally responsible, i.e., that Nor-Cen's violation was the proximate cause of their injuries. Conrad v. Tomlinson (1972), 258 Ind. 115, 279 N.E.2d 546; Welch v. Railroad Crossing, Inc. (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 383; Ray v. Goldsmith (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 176, trans. denied; 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 142 (1971). Short and Guests failed to meet this burden, and therefore summary judgment on the negligence issue was appropriate.
A firmly established rule has been with us a long time, that:
"when between an alleged act of negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes the wilful, malicious and criminal act of a third party which causes the injury and which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the allegedly negligent party, the causal chain between the negligence and the injury is broken."
Welch, supra, at 390 (quoting Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 782, 785) Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt (1972), 151 Ind.App. 217, 279 N.E.2d 266, trans. denied; Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray (1942), 111 Ind.App. 467, 89 N.E.2d 776, trans. denied; McIntosh v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (1941), 111 Ind.App. 550, 38 N.E.2d 263; see also City of Mobile v. Largay (1977), Ala., 346 So.2d 398; 7795 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court (1981), 116 Cal.App.3d 901, 172 Cal.Rptr. 528; Graham v. M & J Corp. (1980), D.C.App., 424 A.2d 103; De Foe v. W. & J. Sloane (1953), D.C.App., 99 A.2d 639; Rosinek v. Cox Enters., Inc. (1983), 166 Ga.App. 699, 305 S.E.2d 393; C.S. v. Sophir (1985), 220 Neb. 51, 368 N.W.2d 444; Mitchell v. Pearson Enters. (1985), Utah, 697 P.2d 240. See generally KEETON & Prosser On tus Law or Torts § 44 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984), Restatement (Seconp) or Torts §§ 442B and 448 (1965); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3p 881, § 9 (1972). The third party is said to have "deliberately assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the consequences of his act is shifted to him." ResratemsnNt (Src onp) or Torts § 442B comment c.
The criminal act of arson was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Nor-Cen's alleged violation of the ordinance and therefore superceded any negligence on the part of Nor-Cen. See Hercules, Inc. v. Lewis (1983), 168 Ga.App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 865 (defendant's alleged negligence in leaving trailer parked on side of road was not proximate cause of injury as a matter of *1163law because criminal act of arson was not reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act); East Ramapo Cent. School Dist. v. Orangetown-Monsey Hebrew School (1988), A.D., 529 N.Y.S.2d 576 (intervening criminal act of arson not reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligence); see also City of Mobile, supra; 7735 Hollywood Boulevard, supra; Rosinek, supra; Welch, supra; C.S., supra.
The uncontradicted facts here show that Nor-Cen had no knowledge of any criminal activities in the neighborhood, including prior acts or threats of arson. Record at 717. Nor-Cen provided workable locks on the doors to the entrance of the apartment and there was no argument that it failed to maintain adequate security to prevent entrance by intruders.
The majority vaults over the proximate cause hurdle by concluding that fire, whatever its origin, was foreseeable. Yet, a landlord is not an insurer of safety. The foreseeability element does not require that the precise hazard or consequence be foreseen, but "neither does it encompass anything which might conceivably occur." Crull v. Platt (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1211, 1215, trans. denied (emphasis supplied). The scope of foreseeable risk following from the landlord's negligence should not be widened to include risk of fire hazard generally. "[The doctrine of superseding, intervening criminal acts may not be avoided simply by generalizing the classification of risk." Hercules, supra at 689, 309 S.E.2d at 867. So, it was the intervening act of the arsonist in setting the fire which led to the injury of Short and Guests; without his criminal act, the injury would not have occurred.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the manner in which the fire was set did prevent the escape by Short and Guests. The arsonist carefully spread the accellerant in the upstairs hallway (outside the upstairs apartment door), down the stairs, and in the lower foyer before setting the entire area ablaze. Obviously, the arsonist's mind was bent on preventing any means of escape. Even had Nor-Cen provided a see-ond means of egress, the inference is that the arsonist was intent on his evil deed in any event.
I would affirm the trial court's decision in all respects.