Court Opinion

ID: 9840601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:01:18.818682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:05.948857
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 19 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NIGEL RAY LACHEY,                               No.    21-17095

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01438-BNW

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security; UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                   Brenda Weksler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted September 19, 2023**

Before: D. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

      Nigel Ray Lachey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application

for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the

district court’s decision de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir.

2016), and we affirm.

      Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Lachey did not meet

or equal listing 12.04 at step three of his analysis. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1, §§ 12.00(A)(2), 12.04. The ALJ correctly found (1) that Lachey neither

had an extreme limitation in one area of mental functioning nor had marked

limitations in two areas of mental functioning, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b), and (2) that Lachey did not demonstrate that he only

marginally adjusted the requirements of daily life despite ongoing treatment, see

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(G)(2). We do not reach Lachey’s

assertion that he meets other unspecified listings. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533

F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to reach issues that are not argued

“with any specificity”).

      The ALJ also did not err by failing to develop the record, where the record

does not indicate that Lachey’s juvenile records were relevant or that an additional

consultative examination was necessary. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(1)

(establishing that the agency must develop the medical record only for the year

preceding a claim “unless there is a reason to believe that development of an

earlier period is necessary”); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir.

                                          2                                     21-17095
2001) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper

evaluation of the evidence.”).

      To the extent that Lachey contends the ALJ did not allow him to review

exhibits, prevented him from raising issues and presenting witnesses, improperly

weighed medical opinions, and failed to consider evidence, we reject the

contentions as unsupported by the record.

      AFFIRMED.

                                        3                                   21-17095