Court Opinion

ID: 9537781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:23:56.031128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:01.010339
License: Public Domain

*195O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
A careful reading of the transcript in this case convinces me that our original decision was correct and that we should adhere to our former opinion.
If we disregard the evidence revealing the intention of the parties, there is no doubt that the deed would convey only the land up to the vacated road. It is not difficult to understand how the deed might so describe the property in spite of the intention of the parties to convey the land up to the traveled road popularly known as Longcoy road. The deed was drawn by Mr. Baker’s attorney, a Mr. Christensen, now deceased. It appears that he drafted the description by reference to a map of the particular area. The evidence shows that the vacated portion of Longcoy road running through the property in question continued to be designated as Longcoy road on the maps of this area in spite of the fact that it was vacated. However, the testimony is clear that this part of the road was popularly known as Longcoy road. That part of the traveled road popularly known as Longcoy road which plaintiff claims as her boundary was not designated on the map by that name. The county surveyor stated, “we have always considered it as the Longcoy Road, whether it’s official or not.” It is very likely that if Christensen was unaware of the ambiguity in the term “Longcoy road,” he would have drawn the deed as it was drawn, whether the parties intended the term to refer to the traveled road or the vacated road.
If the evidence shows that the traveled road was intended by the parties, we are entitled to construe the term “Longcoy road” in the deed to reflect their intention in spite of the designation of a footage consistent with the distance to a road not intended to be a monument.
*196Now, if this were a cáse in which, the grantor and grantee were dealing at arm’s length, it might be appropriate to dispose of plaintiff’s claim by applying the maxim caveat emptor, letting the loss fall on plaintiff because of her inattention to the language used in the deed. But this is not such a case; the plaintiff and defendant here did not deal at arm’s length — the defendant stood in a fiduciary relation to the plaintiff, The evidence is absolutely clear on this point. One of the weaknesses in the majority opinion is that it fails to see that the conveyance was made by a fiduciary to the person for whom he was purportedly acting. An excerpt from the defendant Fred Baker’s own testimony proves the relationship of trust.
“Q And had you represented Mrs, Deane [later Mrs. O’Gorman] and managed her affairs after Mr. Deane passed away?
“A Tes, Mr. Deane called me. I talked to him on the telephone, and his affairs were in rather bad shape, and he asked me to help straighten them out, which I agreed to do.
“Q And you took care of Mrs. Deane’s affairs?
“A I assisted her.
“Q Did you advise her ?
“A Yes, on occasions I did.
“Q Did you discuss with Mr. Deane prior to his death about this particular property, the acquisition of it?
“A. No, sir.
“Q Did you discuss it with Mrs. Deane?
“A Mr. Deane?
“Q Yes, Mr. Deane.
“A Not this particular piece of property, no.
“Q Well, I mean, did you discuss the whole parcel of property that you acquired prior—
“A I remember Mr. Deane sáying that any property that we acquired in the neighborhood if *197we wanted to get rid of it, to give him first chance to buy it; he’d like to have more property in that area.
“Q Did you discuss this property with Mrs. Deane after Mr. Deane passed away and prior to your acquiring it? Did you have any discussion with her?
“A I think at about the time I acquired it, because I had made that commitment to Mr. Deane, and—
“Q Did you indicate the parcel that you would retain after you would acquire it, and the parcel that Mrs. Deane was to have?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Did you show her the parcel?
“A I didn’t have — I had no way of exactly what it was. All I had was the maps, which I showed Mrs. Deane — the map, had it in her office.
“Q Did you ever go along the road and show her the boundaries along the road?
“A I might have at some later date. There was a road; they were neighbors, and it’s very possible.”
He further testified as follows with respect to his fiduciary position:
“Q Well, didn’t you suggest to Mrs. Deane that she have Mr. Christensen look after her affairs?
“A It’s possible thát I did.
“Q Well, when you were managing Mrs. Deane’s affairs,, after .the death of Mr. Deane, didn’t you retain, that is, Mr. Christensen as counsel for Mrs. Deane in the estate and in transactions involving sales?
“A I know Mrs. Deane did retain Mr. Christensen as her counsel.
“Q Was it through your suggestion?
“A It might have been.
*198“Q Mr. Baker, now, in executing the deed to Mrs. Deane at the time, did you have that drawn up by Mr. Christensen, or did you draw that up yourself?
“A Mr. Christensen drew the deed.
“Q He drew the deed. Now, at the same time, Mr. Christensen was also representing Mrs. Deane?
“A Yes, he was.”
Plaintiff testified as follows:
“Q Now, at this time, and during this period that we are discussing with respect to acquiring this property, was Mr. Baker representing you in handling your affairs ?
“A Yes, he was.
“Q And what did he tell you, if anything, with respect to worrying about your affairs, business affairs ?
“A Well, I would ask questions once in a while— I’m no business woman; I have no business training at all — I would ask questions once in a while and he would say, ‘Well, now, we’ll see; you don’t worry your pretty head about that. I will tend to that, and then we will go over it.’
“Q Did Mr. Christensen ever discuss any business affairs with you either with respect to this property—
“A No, not that I remember.
“Q If he did, did Mr. Christensen call you with respect to any business matters ?
“A Well, often, you know, in different things.
“Q Would you answer him or would you refer him to Mr. Baker?
“A Well, I’d always refer him to Mr. Baker, because it seemed to be Fred’s decision regardless. You must remember that I thought Mr. Baker was one of the best friends I had. He and his wife — they were our closest neighbors.
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*199“Q Now, Mrs. O’Uorman, did yon and Mr. Baker have other joint ventures — I mean, with respect to acquisition of property besides this ?
“A Yes, we do.”
Plaintiff was led to believe that Mr. Baker was acting in her interest. As a result, she not only relied upon him to deal fairly with her, but she was also induced to rely upon an attorney whose loyalty was at best divided. Under such circumstances we should resolve all doubts against Mr. Baker if plaintiff was justifiably misled by the ambiguous description. The testimony reveals that she was not only misled but that Mr. Baker’s conduct was a substantial factor in misleading her. She testified that she and Baker drove “around” the property and that Baker described it as including all of the land up to the fence along Linwood avenue. She testified:
“A He told me what good roads I had all the way around my piece of property, good county roads, and that if I ever wanted to subdivide it that other road that came down there, Wichita, it would be so easy to cut it right straight in half and subdivide it.
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“Q What was any conversation that you had with him in respect to this parcel in relation to the other parcel?
“A He asked me how much I wanted. * * * And I said, ‘Well, how much is in this piece?’ And he said, ‘around 40 aeres,’ and I said, ‘Is that, then,- — -is that piece on the other side of Linwood’ — that would be in front of his house. I don’t know what—
“Q That would be east?
“A East. ‘Maybe you take that and I take this one, because it’s at the entrance practically of my guest house.’ We were buying it to protect our homes. We had a lot of money in our homes out there and that’s why we bought it.”
*200The parcel in dispute was not separately fenced or marked off from the land to the west of the vacated road. The fence enclosing the property ran along Linwood avenue to the east and along Bailroad avenue to the south. It would be reasonable for plaintiff to assume that the entire parcel, fenced as it was and bounded by traveled roads, constituted the subject matter of the conveyance.
The parcel in dispute more naturally formed a unit with plaintiff’s adjoining land than it would with defendants’ land on the other side of Linwood avenue. Baker attempted to answer this by testifying as follows:
“Q Now, then, when you deeded the property west of Longcoy Boad [referring here to the vacated road] — that is, the big piece, to Mrs. Deane, why was it that you did not include the property west of Linwood Boad?
“A Well, there was several reasons. This old line, this Longcoy Boad line more or less squared up my property, didn’t take a corner out of it. I did want to do this. We bought the property to protect our home which is right here (indicating).
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“Q Tes. Now, then, why is it that you wanted the piece of property marked B ?
“A Well, we bought it for protection. I was afraid that sometime maybe when I bought the whole tract, I was afraid that there may be some housing project of cheaper houses, and we have a very nice home, and we wanted to protect it. I didn’t deed this piece. If it ever changed hands with Mrs. Deane, if I had deeded it to her, there was a hazard there that I might get a filling station or something across from my property, and thirdly, I still think, and there was a movement on not very long ago — it’s very *201difficult to get in here on Lake Eoad at the present time, because you have to — ”
At another point in his testimony, he said:
“A Well, it cut a nasty corner out of my property, and when we discussed the map, my property was squared up, and the Longcoy Eoad is a road that will eventually, I think, go through.
“Q In view of its vacation, now?
“A Yes, sir. I think it will eventually go through. I think that will eventually be the road that will connect with Eusk Eoad and Lake Eoad; it’s a logical place for the road to be.”
Although this testimony would indicate that Baker regarded the vacated road site as a valuable appurtenance to his land, there was other testimony that is not entirely consistent with this idea. The following testimony reveals this latter attitude.
“Q Did you ever indicate that there was a misunderstanding between you and Mrs. O’Gorman as to the property that she was to have obtained from you?
“A I don’t remember; no, sir.
“Q You could have, though?
“A Well,—
“Q If I were to indicate that you did so in a letter to Mr. Christensen, would that be correct?
“A That I — oh, yes, if you had a letter. As a matter of fact, years and years and years later when this thing did come up — and I am not wishing to have any trouble with Mrs. Deane, and I thought, as I said to Mr. Christensen, I think in that, letter that I might consider it, if it would be used strictly for residential purposes, that I might deed that property. I was leaning over backwards. I didn’t want to have any trouble with Mrs. Deane.
*202“Q Wasn’t that the understanding, at the time you acquired the property that that was the purpose of acquiring it, that you would maintain it, both of you to protect your other home property and keep it for residential purposes ?
“A That’s right; that’s right.
“Q Well, then, there wouldn’t have been any objection. That was your understanding, that she would have obtained all of this property, then?
“A No, not all of it. I don’t — I just don’t quite— are you inferring that at the time I made this arrangement, that I, with Mrs. Deane, included this whole thing?
“Q Yes.
“A No, I don’t see how you could get that interpretation. We did discuss the fact that it should be sold and would be sold only for residential purposes, that part which I owned and that part which she owned.
“Q Well, didn’t you just testify that you had told Mr. Christensen of any difficulty, that you would convey it to her if it was maintained for residential purposes?
“A That was my idea at that time. The first thing I knew there was a suit. Mrs. Deane never called on me, has never talked to me about the thing. I was hoping that she would.”
There was other evidence indicating that Baker regarded the parcel in dispute as a part of the land intended to be conveyed. After the conveyance to plaintiff the defendants paid plaintiff for pasturing cattle in the enclosed parcel. In this connection the following testimony was elicited:
“Q Well, now, was there any way that you determined how the rental was to be determined between this portion that you claim that you retained and this portion here (indicating) ?
“A The only way we had to determine that was by the maps Mrs. Deane had, that I discussed with *203Mrs. Deane. The whole place had been plotted very carefully. Mrs. Deane has a map showing it in that proportion.”
The non-responsive answer is not helpful in explaining the rental transaction. If the pasture land had been treated as embracing two parcels it seems strange that this fact would not have been discussed in arriving at the rental to be paid by defendants, and if it was discussed Baker could have responded directly to the question put to him.
Others dealt with plaintiff rather than the defendant for the rental of the tract enclosed by the fence along the traveled roads. The Milwaulde Bod & Gun Club was in search of a suitable site for shooting facilities. The club negotiated with plaintiff, not the defendants, for the property now in dispute.
More enlightening is the fact that the Milwaukie Saddle Club leased the property from plaintiff at a time when Baker was a member of the club. On cross-examination Baker testified as follows:
“Q Did you know about the cattle the saddle club operating on her property and using this portion that is in dispute?
“A At one time I was a member of the saddle club.
“Q Did you also use that in connection as a member of the saddle club?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Did you give the saddle club permission or—
“A Well, I was perfectly willing to. I didn’t care how much they used it. I don’t know — I don’t think they asked for written permission. I’m sure they didn’t.”
There were other incidents involving the use of the property which are more consistent with plaintiff’s position than with defendant’s. Baker’s testimony as *204viewed in the cold record was not very convincing; it is quite possible that the live testimony heard by the trial judge was even less convincing.
As a fiduciary Baker should be required to present a clearer explanation of the transaction than he did, in spite of the fact that plaintiff had the burden of proof. By rejecting our former opinion we not only do an injustice to plaintiff, but we do so by introducing into our law erroneous ideas with respect to the court’s function in construing deeds. As a consequence the court excludes evidence which, if considered, would favor the plaintiff and in my opinion would, with other evidence, sustain her contention.
It is stated that the description in the deed does not create a latent ambiguity, yet the very quotation which is used to define a latent ambiguity gives as an illustration a description “where the call was for ‘Swift Creek Swamp,’ and it appeared that two points were called by the same name” and “it was held competent to show which point was intended by the call for ‘Swift Creek Swamp’.” That is essentially the situation before us. The description contains a call to Longcoy road and there are two roads which are know by that name. The majority opinion states “that the language of the deed points out the object described as the terminus so that it cannot be said that the language used may describe equally well both objects.” But that assumes the very question we are trying to answer, i.e., which of the two roads did the parties have in mind in referring to Longcoy road. True, the distance to the vacated road is the same as the distance described in the deed. But this does not establish that there is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the call “Longcoy road” as used by the parties. The fact that the distance comports with the vacated road is evidence in support of *205defendants’ position. That, however, is only one inference supporting defendants’ claim and there is other evidence supporting a contrary inference, i.e., that the traveled road popularly known as Longcoy road was intended.
In most of the deeds which come before courts for construction the language in the deed is perfectly clear and unambiguous. It is only when such words “are brought in contact with collateral facts” that is to say, in attempting to apply the various calls in laying out the description on the land, that ambiguity becomes apparent. In Re Nystuen's Estate, N D, 80 NW2d 671, 680 (1956). As pointed out in 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed) § 2465, p 213, there is “always some concrete and local object, fully known to the parties but unknown to the Court, and in every such ease it is obvious that ‘words used must be translated into things and facts’; the parties to the deed almost always use terms of description which are peculiar to themselves.” Grimes v. Jordan, Texas, 260 SW2d 220 (1953); Ferris v. Emmons, 214 Cal 501, 6 P2d 950 (1931). The majority opinion now records in our reports the adoption of the “rule against disturbing a clear meaning” (see Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed) § 2461 et seq,), the fallacy of which is recognized in all the respectable texts on evidence and in most of the adjudicated cases.
If our former opinion is to be rejected we should not do so at the cost of adopting a discredited rule of construction. We have before us the question of whether the parties to the deed, in referring to the Longcoy road, meant the vacated road or the existing road sometimes known by that name. We are free to examine any evidence tending to indicate which of these two. roads was intended. With that evidence available it appears to me from the record that the more plausible explanation of the parties’ purpose at the time of the *206conveyance was to include the land up to the traveled road.
As I have already indicated, the fact that the distance given in the deed is identical with the distance up to the vacated road is some evidence in support of defendants’ claim. However, there was evidence, a part of which is recited in our original opinion, showing a contrary intent. I believe that the latter evidence preponderates. I think that the majority of the court has over-emphasized the fact that the distance call conforms to the actual distance to the vacated road. Realizing the frequency with which attorneys and others draft descriptions with reference to maps, incorporating into the deed the measurements and other features appearing in the map, it would not be surprising if the draftsman in this case made the mistake of identifying the Longcoy road on a map as the road intended by the parties when in fact they had in mind the visible road known to them as Longcoy road. In this connection, I think that the visibility of the existing road and the non-visibility and nonexistence of the vacated road is significant. The rule of construction preferring visible monuments over other calls (ORS 93.310(2)) is in part a recognition that objects which can be seen, rather than the designation of invisible referents are normally intended by the parties to enclose the land conveyed. It is stated in Skelton, Boundaries and Adjacent Properties, § 171, p 157 that “visibility is an important element in determining the degree of certainty to be ascribed to a monument.” The cases support this statement. The language in Falls Village Water Power Co. v. Tibbetts, 31 Conn 165, 167 (1862) is particularly appropriate:
“# * * Now a road or highway, mentioned in a deed as a boundary, must be understood to mean, what is meant by other existing objects or monu*207ments described and intended as boundaries, viz., an object existing in fact, not of record merely— something apparent, unmistakable and permanent. The origin of a highway which the parties to a deed use as a boundary is immaterial, and it is not to be supposed that the parties thought of it. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, they must be presumed to have intended the then apparent and traveled, and the only apparent and traveled highway between the points named, passing the land; and not a highway which existed of record, but had long been apparently abandoned by the public, and the existence and former use of which may not have been known to them.”
In Harris v. Hull, executor, 70 Ga 831, 841 (1883) the court, relying upon Tyler, Law of Boundaries, p 119, stated that the rule that courses and distances must ordinarily yield to visible and ascertained objects is founded “upon the legal presumption that all grants and conveyances are made with reference to an actual view of the premises by the parties thereto.” Tyler’s Law of Boundaries, Fences and Window Lights, pp 119-120 (1876). See Koch v. Gordon, 231 Mo 645, 133 SW 609 (1910); Smith v. Stacey, 73 NYS 1022, 68 App Div 521 (1902); Clark on Surveying and Boundaries (3d ed) §683 (1959). Where there are conflicting monuments normally the one which corresponds with the distance given will prevail. Patton on Titles, § 150, p 400. But this again is no more than a statement of a preference for a particular construction in the absence of evidence indicating a contrary intent. There was evidence of a contrary intent in the instant case. We properly appraised that evidence in our former opinion and we should now adhere to it.
McAllister, C. J. and Sloan, J., concur in this dissent.