Court Opinion

ID: 9524129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:12.099509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:12.747146
License: Public Domain

APPENDIX STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GERALD L. POWERSDirect Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 96-08230  -08231, Joseph Dailey, Judge No. W1999-02348-CCA-R3-DD — Filed September 28, 2001
The Defendant, Gerald L. Powers, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery and of aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for the murder on the basis of three aggravating circumstances: that the Defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies; that the Defendant committed the murder to avoid his arrest and/or prosecution; and that the Defendant committed the murder while committing a kidnapping. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery, to be served consecutive to the death sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges his convictions, raising the following issues: (1) whether the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator is sufficient; (2) whether a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial is material and prejudicial; (3) whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the crimes; (4) whether the Defendant's wife's testimony should have been suppressed pursuant to the marital communications privilege; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence in support of a third-party defense; (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting a lay witness's testimony identifying photographs as being of the Defendant; and (7) whether the trial court erred in admitting a deposition taken in Mississippi by a Tennessee notary public. The Defendant challenges the imposition of the death sentence on the following grounds: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the facts underlying the Defendant's prior felonies; (2) whether the Defendant's prior felonies were violent within the meaning of the statutory aggravating circumstance; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the Defendant committed the murder to avoid his arrest and/or prosecution; (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the victim's bad character; and (5) whether Tennessee's death penalty scheme is constitutional. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range II offender for the aggravated robbery. Upon our review of the record and relevant legal authority, we find no reversible error in the Defendant's convictions or in the imposition of the death sentence. We reduce the Defendant's sentence for the aggravated robbery to twenty years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed as Modified.
Robert W. Wedemeyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Joe G. Riley and John Everett Williams, JJ., joined. *Page 413 
W. Mark Ward, Assistant Public Defender, (on appeal), Memphis, Tennessee; Tony N. Brayton, Assistant Public Defender, (on appeal), Memphis, Tennessee; Garland Erguden, Assistant Public Defender, (on appeal), Memphis, Tennessee; Loyce Lambert-Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee; and Larry H. Nance, (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gerald Powers.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Alice B. Lustre, Assistant Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, Assistant District Attorney General; and Jerry R. Kitchen, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
 OPINION [DELETED: SUMMARY OF FACTS] ANALYSIS: GUILT PHASE ISSUES
[DELETED: I. SUFFICIENCY OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE]
[DELETED: II. VARIANCE BETWEEN INDICTMENT AND PROOF]
[DELETED: III. JURISDICTION]
 [DELETED: IV. MARITAL PRIVILEGE]
[DELETED: V. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW THIRD PARTIES' MOTIVES TO MURDER THE VICTIM]
 VI. IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
During the course of his testimony explaining the surveillance videotapes taken at Sam's Town casino on the night of April 18, 1996, Tom Scott repeatedly referred to the person seen in the tapes as "Mr. Powers." Mr. Scott did not know the Defendant; rather, he referred to the person as "Mr. Powers" on the basis of information provided to him by the F.B.I. Accordingly, the Defendant objected to Mr. Scott's identification of him as based on inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the Defendant's objection, and the Defendant now argues that the trial court's ruling was error.
We agree with the Defendant that Mr. Scott should not have been allowed to refer to the person shown in the tapes as "Mr. Powers." "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Tenn. R. Evid. 602. Mr. Scott admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the Defendant's appearance or identity and that his knowledge of the Defendant's identity was based on information provided to him by the F.B.I. Accordingly, the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant's objection.
During the State's redirect examination of Mr. Scott, the prosecutor asked him to identify whether any person in the courtroom was the person shown in the videotape. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court allowed Mr. Scott to testify that the person in the videotape was the Defendant. We agree with the Defendant that the prosecutor's question called for an opinion from a lay witness.
Our Rules of Evidence provide that a lay witness's testimony "in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and *Page 414 
(2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Tenn. R. Evid. 701(a). Certainly, Mr. Scott's testimony that the person in the tape was the Defendant was "rationally based" on Mr. Scott's perception of the similarities between the photographs and the Defendant's person in the courtroom. Id. However, Mr. Scott's opinion about the identity of the person in the tape was not necessary to a clear understanding of his testimony, nor was it helpful in the determination of a fact in issue. While the Defendant's identity as the man in the tape was certainly an issue in the trial, Mr. Scott was in no better position to identify that person as the Defendant than were the jurors: Mr. Scott had no more past familiarity with or knowledge of the Defendant than did they. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in permitting the State to seek Mr. Scott's opinion on this issue.
Nevertheless, we find both of the trial court's errors regarding Mr. Scott's testimony to be harmless. The jurors saw the videotape and had the Defendant before them; each juror therefore had the opportunity to determine for her or himself whether the person in the video was the Defendant. Mr. Scott admitted that he did not know the Defendant and admitted that his identification was based on hearsay information. Moreover, Ms. Powers viewed a still photograph made from the surveillance tapes and identified the person therein as the Defendant. Ms. Powers was certainly qualified to testify as to the Defendant's identity, and we are confident that the jury gave far more weight to her testimony than it did to Mr. Scott's. Accordingly, we find this issue to be without merit.
 [DELETED: VII. ADMISSIBILITY OF MARGARET YORK'S DEPOSITION] ANALYSIS: SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES
[DELETED: VIII. ADMISSIBILITY OF FACTS UNDERLYING PRIOR VIOLENTFELONIES]
[DELETED: IX. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLETO ESTABLISH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE FOR PRIOR VIOLENT FELONIES]
[DELETED: X. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT THE DEFENDANTCOMMITTED THE MURDER TO AVOID HIS ARREST AND/OR PROSECUTION]
[DELETED: XI. ADMISSIBILITY OF VICTIM'S CHARACTER EVIDENCE]
[DELETED: XII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TENNESSEE'S DEATH PENALTY]
[DELETED: XIII. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW]
 [DELETED: XIV. DEFENDANT'S STATUS AS A RANGE III OFFENDER] CONCLUSION
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and the issues raised by the Defendant. We have further conducted a proportionality review of the sentence of death imposed upon the Defendant. Finding no reversible error in the guilt phase of the trial; finding that the death penalty is proportionate to the crime, that it was *Page 415 
neither arbitrarily nor capriciously applied; finding that the evidence supports the jury's finding of the three aggravating circumstances; and finding that the evidence supports the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances, we affirm the Defendant's convictions and sentence of death. Finding that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a Range III offender, we reduce his sentence for the aggravated robbery to twenty years as a Range II offender. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
CONCUR:
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge