Court Opinion

ID: 9685899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:08:04.707374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:00.984748
License: Public Domain

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                                                 RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2022-SC-0062-MR
                                2022-SC-0064-TG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, JUDGE
                          NO. 12-CR-00128-001

JOSHUA MORSCH                                                           APPELLEE

AND
                                2022-SC-0132-TG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, JUDGE
                          NO. 12-CR-00128-002

KATHY STEWART                                                           APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                         VACATING AND REMANDING

      This case, on transfer from the Court of Appeals pursuant to CR1 74.02,

presents a challenge to the Clay Circuit Court orders which removed the death

      1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions of CR 74.02 are now

contained in Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 17.
penalty as a potential sentencing option for Appellees Joshua Morsch and

Kathy Stewart. We find error in the trial court’s pretrial ruling excluding the

death penalty, and error in the trial court’s actions while the Commonwealth’s

interlocutory appeal was pending. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s

orders excluding the death penalty in Appellees’ cases and vacate the final

judgment on Morsch’s plea of guilty that was entered while the

Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal was pending. On remand, these cases

shall proceed to a jury trial with the death penalty as a possible sentencing

option. Should either Appellee plead guilty on remand, sentencing by a jury is

required if the Commonwealth requests it. Appellees’ victims shall be given

notice of any plea or sentencing proceeding, as required under Marsy’s Law.

                      I. Facts and Procedural Background

      This case has lingered in Kentucky courts for more than a decade. In

2012, Morsch gave a recorded statement to law enforcement admitting that he

had murdered Earl Woods during a planned robbery. Morsch stated that on

the day in question, Woods had answered his door in a wheelchair; Morsch

beat Woods in the head several times with a hammer before ransacking his

house looking for items (prescription pills) to steal; and before leaving, Morsch

slit Woods’s throat and wrist, causing him to bleed out and die. A grand jury

indicted Morsch for murder, first-degree robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and

being a second-degree persistent felony offender (“PFO-2”). The Clay County

                                        2
Commonwealth’s Attorney, under KRS2 532.025, filed a notice of intent to seek

the death penalty as a possible sentence, identifying murder committed in the

course of first-degree robbery as the statutory aggravator.

      Stewart is alleged to have participated in the planning of the robbery and

by distracting Woods’s roommate during the commission of the offense, thereby

preventing that person from observing or stopping the crime.3 Following

Morsch’s confession, a grand jury indicted Stewart for complicity to murder,

first-degree robbery, theft by unlawful taking, being a PFO-2, and a felon in

possession of a firearm. The Clay County Commonwealth’s Attorney also filed

a notice of intent to seek the death penalty as a possible sentence for Stewart,

identifying robbery in the first degree as the statutory aggravator. The trial

court later severed Stewart’s case from Morsch’s, and the Commonwealth

chose to try Morsch first.

      Morsch’s trial was delayed for over a decade, due to Morsch’s numerous

motions to continue and various scheduling conflicts. At no time did the

Commonwealth present Morsch with a plea offer. Additionally, Morsch did not

assert his right to a speedy trial until 2022. Morsch’s counsel filed multiple

pretrial motions to preclude the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty

as a possible punishment option or declare it unconstitutional. The trial court

      2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

      3 Morsch’s account of Stewart’s participation in the crime, as articulated by his

attorney at Morsch’s sentencing, was that Morsch was at Woods’s house to steal pills
on Stewart’s behalf, that Stewart planned the robbery, forced a hammer into Morsch’s
hands, and told him to steal prescription pills from Woods if Morsch did not want
Stewart to end their relationship.

                                          3
denied all motions until January 18, 2022, when it changed course and

entered an order excluding the death penalty as a sentencing option finding it

disproportionate to other death penalty cases from a pretrial review of the

evidence.

      The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal from that order

pursuant to RCr4 12.04 and KRS 22A.020(4), objecting to the trial court’s

removal of the death penalty as a possible sentence. Mere hours after the

Commonwealth filed its interlocutory appeal, Morsch filed a motion for a

speedy trial by jury and noticed the motion for the following morning.

However, rather than arguing the speedy-trial motion at the hearing, Morsch

instead moved to enter an open guilty plea to all counts. The Commonwealth

objected, noting its pending interlocutory appeal, the resolution of which may

result in the death penalty being a possible sentencing option in this case. In

response, defense counsel argued that the interlocutory appeal did not divest

the trial court of jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings. The trial court

agreed to entertain Morsch’s guilty plea, stating that if this Court renders an

opinion reinstating the death penalty, it will “cross that bridge when it comes to

it.” Morsch’s counsel made clear that his plea was predicated on the death

penalty being excluded as a sentencing option.

      During the plea colloquy, the issue of sentencing arose. The court stated

that the jury would set the penalty, but Morsch’s counsel asked that the court

      4 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                        4
set Morsch’s sentence that day. To allow for this expedited sentencing,

Morsch’s counsel proffered a prewritten motion to waive the customary

presentence investigation. The court hesitated, stating it “did not anticipate

that.” The Commonwealth objected to sentencing Morsch that day, noting that

Morsch’s victims have a constitutional right to be notified of plea and

sentencing proceedings. In response, defense counsel stated that this case

predates Marsy’s Law so those rights do not attach and further, that the

Commonwealth had never invoked Marsy’s Law before this point.

      The trial court proceeded with sentencing, and allowed defense counsel

to describe its unsworn theory of the evidence, and to argue for mitigation in

sentencing. No witnesses were called. Defense counsel painted a picture of

Morsch’s troubled childhood, in which he allegedly suffered physical abuse,

bouts of hunger and homelessness, and the loss of his sister. Turning to the

crime at hand, defense counsel alleged that Woods was a drug dealer and that

Morsch had been high on methamphetamine and driven to commit the crime

by Stewart, who wanted Morsch to steal prescription pills for her.

      The Commonwealth reiterated its objection, emphasizing that it had

waited for years to ensure this case was heard by a jury with all sentencing

options available. Nevertheless, the trial court sentenced Morsch to life

without parole for 25 years for the murder conviction and to terms-of-years

sentences for the remaining convictions and entered a final judgment

accordingly. The entire hearing, from the contested open guilty plea to the

pronouncement of sentence, took less than 30 minutes.

                                        5
      The Commonwealth appealed Morsch’s final judgment and sentence,

which as a matter of right5 proceeded directly to this Court. This Court

accepted transfer of Morsch’s interlocutory appeal pursuant to CR 74.02, as

the issue raised is of great and immediate public importance and arose in

capital litigation, an area exclusively within the appellate jurisdiction of the

Kentucky Supreme Court. Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 577

(Ky. 1990). The interlocutory appeal has been consolidated with Morsch’s

matter of right appeal.

      On March 7, 2022, the trial court granted Stewart’s request to exclude

the death penalty and adopted and incorporated the Morsch order in full.

Stewart’s motion to exclude the death penalty was based on the trial court’s

exclusion of the death penalty for Morsch (the more culpable of the defendants)

and her argument that death was prohibited under the holding of Enmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) because her acts do not exhibit the requisite mens

rea for death. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal from that

order, which has likewise been transferred to this Court. On appeal, Stewart

opposed joint briefing with Morsch, which we indulged, but after review of

Appellees’ individually-filed briefs, we elect to address their appeals in a single

decision.

      5 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

                                         6
                                    II. Analysis

      By excluding the death penalty in Appellees’ cases and by entering final

judgment in Morsch’s case, the trial court appeared to make a conscious effort

to bring resolution to these decade-old cases. However, despite its good

intentions, the trial court committed numerous reversible errors. The first set

of errors concerns the trial court’s entry of pretrial orders removing the death

penalty as a sentencing option. The second set of errors involves actions the

trial court took in Morsch’s case while divested of jurisdiction by the

Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal. The third set of errors relates to the

trial court’s handling of Morsch’s sentencing. Each will be addressed in turn.

   A. Excluding the Death Penalty as a Sentencing Option.

      Under Kentucky law, a person convicted of a capital offense may be

sentenced to death pursuant to KRS 532.030. The Commonwealth’s Attorney,

by statute, has discretion to determine whether to seek the death penalty in all

cases that statutorily qualify. For sentencing purposes, to be death-penalty

eligible, a jury must find the evidence has proven the existence of at least one

aggravating circumstance, as set forth in KRS 532.025(2). Aside from the

death penalty, the sentencing options for an offender convicted of a capital

offense are numerous: term of imprisonment for life without the benefit of

probation or parole, a term of life imprisonment without the benefit of

probation or parole until the offender has served a minimum of twenty-five (25)

years, a sentence of life, or to a term of note less than twenty (2) years no more

than fifty (50) years. KRS 532.030(1). Thus, for a capital offense, the

                                        7
sentencing range extends from twenty (20) years to death. The sentencing

phase of trial provides a defendant with the opportunity to present mitigating

evidence to a jury in a plea for leniency. Id.

      Imposition of the death penalty is subject to the Eighth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, which, as applicable to the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from imposing cruel or unusual

punishments. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). To avoid being

cruel or unusual, a death sentence must be proportionate to the crime

committed. The United States Supreme Court has adopted “evolving standards

of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” as a measure to

ensure that punishments are not disproportionately cruel or unusual. Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). As recently noted by this Court in White v.

Commonwealth, “[t]he United States Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida[, 572

U.S. 701 (2014),] held that some punishments are prohibited by the Eighth

Amendment ‘as a categorical matter.’” 600 S.W.3d 176, 179–80 (Ky. 2020).

Those categorical bars include: “1) the denaturalization of a natural-born

citizen; 2) sentencing a juvenile to death; and 3) sentencing persons with [an]

intellectual disability to death.” Id. at 180 (internal quotations omitted).

      Appellees do not allege that they fall into any of these recognized

categorial bars, nor does the trial court’s orders excluding the death penalty

make such findings. The trial court ultimately found that the death penalty

was constitutionally disproportionate and comparatively disproportionate,

based on its understanding of the evidence pretrial. The trial court found that

                                         8
a death sentence in capital cases involving the trafficking of narcotics has

never been recommended by a jury and that the Commonwealth’s pursuit of

the imposition of the death penalty in these types of cases unnecessarily

consumes time and resources. As part of its rationale for excluding the death

penalty, the trial court considered other cases over which it had presided and

other factually similar capital cases, state-wide.

      On de novo review of the purely legal issue presented, Osborne v.

Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky. 2006), we conclude that decision

was not for the trial court to make. The General Assembly has specifically

authorized capital punishment for murder committed in conjunction with first-

degree robbery and the Commonwealth properly exercised its discretion to seek

the death penalty in these cases. The trial court had no authority, prior to

hearing the evidence presented in the guilt phase of trial, to exclude capital

punishment as a sentencing option. Commonwealth v. Guernsey, 501 S.W.3d

884, 888 (Ky. 2016).

      Rather, only after the Commonwealth has had the opportunity to present

its evidence at trial, and thereby subject that evidence to the adversarial

process in the guilt phase, does the trial court gain authority to determine

whether a death sentence would be inherently disproportionate. See id. at 892

(“summary judgment is unavailable in the criminal context in Kentucky[]”).

The rationale for this process is as follows:

      Our adversary system of criminal justice assigns the roles of the
      participants. It is the duty of the prosecuting authority and defense
      counsel to intimately know the case prior to trial, and ordinarily

                                         9
      the trial judge does not gain such insight until all the evidence has
      been heard. Even then, in most cases, the court is not legally
      competent to make a final sentencing determination until a
      presentence investigation has occurred. For the trial court to
      determine the maximum sentence which may be imposed without
      a right of plea withdrawal, absent the concurrence of the
      Commonwealth, prior to trial, and without benefit of a presentence
      investigation, radically alters the substance of the process.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky. 1992)).

      Moreover, the trial court lacks authority at any point to conduct a

comparative proportionality review, as that function is reserved solely to this

Court as a matter of law, and only after the facts have been presented at trial

and a death sentence has been imposed. See KRS 532.075(3)(c) (mandating

that this Court engage in a proportionality review to determine “whether the

sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in

similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant[]”); Guernsey, 501

S.W.3d at 888 (the purpose of this review is “to ensure that a death sentence is

not disproportionate relative to other sentences imposed for similar crimes” on

all relevant cases statewide).

      Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s orders excluding the death

penalty, but in doing so feel compelled to expressly reaffirm our recent

unanimous opinion in Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2020),

given the insistence of Appellees’ counsel that our ruling was erroneous and

should be overruled. In Bredhold, a case in which no recognized Eighth

Amendment categorial bar applied to the defendants, the defendants had yet to

be adjudicated guilty and the Commonwealth’s power to punish had yet to be

                                       10
invoked, yet the Fayette Circuit Court nonetheless determined pretrial that

Kentucky’s death penalty was unconstitutional as to the age-based group

identified by the defendants (between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-one

(21) at the time of their offense). On review, we held that at this stage of the

criminal proceedings, the case was not justiciable, as the defendants did not

have actual or imminent injury that could support standing to raise a

constitutional challenge to the death penalty statute since they had yet to be

convicted, much less sentenced. Id. at 412-14. Accordingly, we vacated the

interlocutory orders and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.

      Here, neither Appellee has been convicted or sentenced. Under our

holding in Bredhold, they lack standing at this juncture to challenge the

imposition, or constitutionality, of the death penalty as a possible punishment.

We decline Appellees’ invitation to reverse course on our ruling in Bredhold.

   B. Trial Court Proceedings While the Commonwealth’s Interlocutory
      Appeal Was Pending.

      Mere hours after the Commonwealth filed its interlocutory appeal from

the trial court’s order excluding the death penalty as a sentencing option in

Morsch’s case, Morsch filed a motion for a speedy trial and noticed the motion

for the next morning. Instead of discussing that motion in court, Morsch

sought to enter a surprise guilty plea and requested immediate sentencing.

The Commonwealth objected, noting its ongoing interlocutory appeal. Morsch’s

counsel argued that the proceedings need not be delayed despite the appeal.

      KRS 22A.020(4) allows the Commonwealth to secure appellate review of

interlocutory orders in criminal cases before jeopardy attaches. This statutory
                                        11
provision “furthers the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest in the orderly

administration of justice.” Ballard v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Ky.

2010). KRS 22A.020(4) specifies that an interlocutory appeal “shall not

suspend the proceedings in the case.” Notably, this Court “for over forty years

has interpreted the term ‘proceedings’ in KRS 22A.020(4)(a) to refer only to

proceedings after the attachment of jeopardy.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 636

S.W.3d 421, 442 (Ky. 2021). Jeopardy attaches once a jury is empaneled and

sworn. Maupin v. Commonwealth, 542 S.W.3d 926, 929 n.11 (Ky. 2018).

Thus, under KRS 22A.020(4), “once the proceedings commence and jeopardy

attaches, the proceedings will not be suspended while the Commonwealth

seeks review of rulings made during the course of the trial.” Commonwealth v.

Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 84–85 (Ky. 2002).

      Here, since a jury had yet to be empaneled and jeopardy had not yet

attached, the trial court should have stayed proceedings pending resolution of

the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal. Morsch argues that staying his case

impeded his right to a speedy trial. However, the record reflects Morsch has

slow-walked the Commonwealth’s case for nearly a decade and is largely

responsible for all the delays in this case. Even the trial court chastised

Morsch’s counsel at a January 6, 2022, hearing: “Don’t argue with me about

delay. All the delay that I’ve seen these nine years has been from your desk.”

At that same hearing, the trial court observed that the Commonwealth has

been ready to try this case since the year after Morsch was indicted.

                                        12
      Morsch’s self-induced delays defeat his claim that staying his case for

purposes of addressing the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal impedes his

right to a speedy trial, when he waited almost ten years before asserting that

right for the first time. See, e.g., Stacy v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 787, 798

(Ky. 2013) (defendants must “vigorously” pursue their speedy-trial rights);

Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Ky. 2001) (defendants who

request continuances “toll the running of the constitutional speedy trial

clock[]”). For these reasons, the trial court should have stayed any further

proceedings pending appellate review of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory

appeal. Accordingly, we vacate Morsch’s guilty plea and sentence.

   C. The Sentencing Procedure.

      The trial court compounded its errors by sentencing Morsch without

timely notice to the Commonwealth and by dismissing the Commonwealth’s

request for sentencing by a jury. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, this Court

squarely addressed the issue of “whether, upon an unconditional guilty plea,

the Commonwealth is entitled to present its case for punishment to a jury for

its verdict prior to imposition of final judgment.” 910 S.W.2d 229, 229 (Ky.

1995). In that case, the Commonwealth sought the death penalty and

requested that the trial court empanel a jury for the purpose of recommending

punishment. The trial court declined to do so and it alone fixed the

punishment. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that “[b]y its plain

language, RCr 9.26(1) requires the consent of the Commonwealth as well as

approval of the court for a defendant's waiver of a jury trial to be effective.” Id.

                                         13
Further, in cases permitting the death penalty, “jury sentencing is deeply

ingrained in Kentucky law.” Id. at 231. As such, jury participation in

sentencing “has been regarded as indispensable except upon concurrence of all

involved.” Id. The Johnson court expressly declined to construe RCr 9.84(2)

“so as to eliminate the Commonwealth's right to demand a jury when the

defendant pleads guilty.” Id.

       Indeed, even when a defendant pleads guilty, jury participation is

important for “the Commonwealth may introduce evidence to increase the

punishment to be inflicted, and the defendant may produce evidence in an

effort to mitigate the punishment.” Id. The “public’s right of participation” in

the sentencing process should thus “not be taken lightly.” Id. In the case at

bar, the trial court committed error by accepting a plea of guilty from Morsch

and by sentencing him without empaneling a jury to recommend a

punishment, as requested by the Commonwealth.

       Moreover, because of Morsch’s “bait-and-switch” tactic of noticing a

motion for speedy trial but instead seeking to enter a surprise guilty plea, the

Commonwealth was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for sentencing and

Morsch’s victims were deprived of their constitutional right to be present for the

plea and sentencing proceedings. In 2020, Kentucky voters ratified a proposed

amendment to Kentucky’s Constitution known as Marsy’s Law (codified at Ky.

Const. § 26A) which gives victims “justice and due process” by providing them

a “meaningful role” in the “criminal and juvenile justice system.” Ky. Const. §

26A.

                                       14
      Section 26A gives victims of crime procedural protections
      throughout the criminal justice process. Among other things, the
      law gives crime victims the right to be notified of court proceedings,
      the right to speak at proceedings where a plea or sentencing may
      occur, and the right to have their safety considered when rulings
      are made.

Gordon v. Jud. Conduct Comm'n, 655 S.W.3d 167, 180 (Ky. 2022). “The victim,

the victim's attorney or other lawful representative, or the attorney for the

Commonwealth upon request of the victim may seek enforcement of the[se]

rights[.]” Ky. Const. § 26A. If the victim is deceased, as is the case here, KRS

421.500(1) defines “victim” to include the spouse of the deceased and his or her

children, among others.

      Under the express language of Section 26A, the Commonwealth had

authority to seek enforcement of the victims’ rights on their behalf. Marsy’s

Law was in effect at the time the Commonwealth invoked the victims’ rights.

The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to afford Morsch’s victims

the constitutional right afforded to them by Section 26A. Even outside the

requirements of Marsy’s Law, it would be poor practice for a trial court to move

forward with final resolution of a murder case without the individuals most

impacted by the offense having any notice of the proceedings. On remand,

Morsch’s victims shall be given ample notice of any proceeding involving a

release, plea or sentencing and given the right to be present, and heard, if

applicable. Notice to the Commonwealth is sufficient for purposes of notifying

the victims of their rights under Marsy’s Law.

                                        15
                                 III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Clay Circuit Court’s orders

excluding the death penalty as a sentencing option in Appellees’ cases and

vacate Morsch’s final judgment and sentence. This case is remanded to the

trial court with instructions to proceed to a jury trial in which the death

penalty is included as a sentencing option. Should either Appellee plead guilty

to the charges contained in the indictment, sentencing by a jury is required if

the Commonwealth requests it. Lastly, no plea or sentencing proceeding shall

take place without ample notice to the Commonwealth, and to that effect,

Morsch’s victims.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                        16
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew Franklin Kuhn
Michael Robert Wajda
Jeffrey Allan Cross
Assistant Attorney General

Harold Douglas Rader
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
JOSHUA MORSCH:

Kayla Danielle Deatherage
Shannon Renee Dupree
Bonnie Katherine Potter
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
KATHY STEWART:

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Department of Public Advocacy

                                    17