Court Opinion

ID: 9651196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:09:58.828293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:30.852543
License: Public Domain

BRATTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Generally, there are three classes of parties. They are proper parties, necessary parties, and indispensable parties. Proper or formal parties are those not interested in the controversy between the immediate parties but have an interest in the subject matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit. Necessary parties are those who have an interest in the subject matter and who are within the jurisdiction of the court, but are not so indispensable to the relief asked as would prevent the court from entering a judgment in their absence. Indispensable parties are those whose interests are so bound up in the subject matter of the litigation and the relief sought that the court cannot proceed in their absence to a final judgment without affecting their interests. And indispensable parties include those who have such an interest in the controversy or its subject matter that a final judgment between the other parties before the court cannot be rendered without leaving the controversy in such a situation that its final determination may be inconsistent with equity. Jennings v. United States, 8 Cir., 264 F. 399.
Approximately ten years prior to the institution of this action, Martin V. Jeffers *30executed a bill of sale purporting to convey to J. H. Jeffers and Sons all of his right, title, and interest in the cattle- bearing the RUN brand, and those bearing the PX brand. J. H. Jeffers and Sons was a partnership, and the members of the partnership have operated the business continuously ever since. If valid, that conveyance had the effect of dissolving the partnership previously existing to which Martin V. Jeffers was a party. In order for the executor of the estate of Martin V. Jeffers to prevail, the conveyance must be set aside or its effect circumvented in some manner. It is settled law in New Mexico that a contract, or conveyance of property, cannot be annulled without all parties to it, or their legal representatives, being parties to the action. Page v. Town of Gallup, 26 N.M. 239, 191 P. 460. Under recognized principles of long standing, an accounting cannot be had for the period subsequent to the execution of the conveyance without the members of the partnership being parties, along with J. H. Jeffers. De Manderfield v. Field, 7 N.M. 17, 32 P. 146.
Coming to the question of limitations, the original complaint was filed in March, 1940, about two years after the cause of action accrued. Summons was issued on the day of the filing of the complaint, the Marshal requested the then attorney for plaintiffs to advance the required fees for service, the request was ignored, and the process was seasonably returned not served. In July, 1940, alias summons was issued, the Marshal again requested the attorney to advance the necessary fees, again the request was ignored, and the process was returned not served. In May, 1942, more than two years after the filing of the original complaint, and more than four years after the cause of action accrued, a second alias summons was issued, present counsel for plaintiffs promptly advanced the fees, and service was had on J. H. Jeffers. But the process served on him was issued and served after the four-year period had expired.
The mere filing of a complaint within the four-year period, without more, is not enough to interrupt the running of the statute. It must be followed by reasonable diligence in causing process to be issued and service had on the defendant. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574, 35 S.Ct. 440, 59 L.Ed. 725; United States v. Hardy, 4 Cir., 74 F.2d 841. And prepayment of fees for service of process on proper demand is part of the diligence required to toll the statute. Maier v. Independent Taxi Owner’s Ass’n, 68 App.D.C. 307, 96 F.2d 579. The repeated failure on request to advance the sum necessary for fees — extending over a period of two years and until after the four-year period expired — constituted a lack of diligence. The statute was not interrupted. The judgment should be affirmed.