Court Opinion

ID: 9706856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:53:22.491024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.458484
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, dissenting: I do not agree that the State committed reversible error when it introduced hearsay identification evidence and referred to that evidence in closing argument. Neither the cases cited by the majority nor the circumstances of this case support overturning an otherwise proper conviction because of the introduction of improper hearsay identification when the defendant confessed to the crime and his identification was not an issue at trial. At trial, the State presented four witnesses: Johnson’s adult accomplice, Chester Turner; the victim, Carlo Farino; and arresting officers Stampnick and Ustaszewski. Turner testified about the burglary committed with Johnson and two juveniles. Farino identified items taken from his home. Officers Stampnick and Ustaszewski testified that they arrested Johnson after they responded to a call about a break-in at the victim’s home. According to Stampnick, several male Hispanics came up to the police car and described four individuals whom they had observed running from the scene. According to Ustaszewski these witnesses had seen the four individuals break into a building. Both officers stated that the witnesses described the four alleged perpetrators. Shortly afterwards, when the officers observed Johnson jumping from nearby railroad tracks and hiding in some bushes, they arrested him. The officers then took Johnson back to the crime scene, where the witnesses identified him. According to Ustaszewski, there were five to seven of these witnesses, but none of them would give his name to the police. The officers testified further that Stampnick gave Johnson his Miranda rights. Afterwards, Johnson admitted acting as a lookout for the break-in. He then led the police to the house where Turner and the juveniles were waiting. In its closing argument, the State referred once again to the unknown witnesses, their identification of Johnson, and their refusal to testify. On appeal Johnson contends that the police testimony about the identifications made by unknown witnesses at the crime scene was hearsay and reversible error and this error was compounded when the State referred to the identifications in closing argument. When police testify about conversations with witnesses during an investigation, the State may introduce the fact of the conversation to show police investigative procedures but may not introduce the substance of the conversation. (Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 247-49.) I agree with the majority that the testimony here went beyond this permissible limit and thus constitutes error. Unlike the majority, however, I believe the error was a harmless one, that is, a “technical violation of a rule of evidence not considered a sufficient basis for reversal because the admission or exclusion did not affect a substantial right of a party.” (People v. Demeron (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 440, 446, 505 N.E.2d 1222.) This kind of error may be disregarded. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) One test for harmless error is “whether the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence.” (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526.) When the hearsay involves identification, the error is harmless unless “it was a substitute for courtroom identification or used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification.” Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d at 676. The majority cites Lopez as a case on point. While I agree that Lopez is a correct statement of the law, it can easily be distinguished on its facts. First, in Lopez identification was an issue. While the defendant did not testify, his opening argument suggested a “modified alibi defense” that he was in another tavern at the time of the shooting. Lopez, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 672. Second, the hearsay identification in Lopez was used to “strengthen or corroborate a weak identification.” (Lopez, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 676.) The court reasoned: “[W]e are not convinced that the jury would have found [the court witnesses’] identification of defendant to be as strong, as the State contends [sic], in the absence of the State’s introduction and repeated exploitation of the [hearsay] squadrol identifications. At trial, it was disputed whether [one court witness] had told the police she was ‘pretty sure’ but not positive about her identification of defendant, and that she was hysterical after the shooting. The record also discloses that [another court witness] only saw defendant for approximately 10 seconds when he allegedly entered and left the tavern. In closing and rebuttal arguments, the State specifically stated that the [hearsay] identifications corroborated [these court witnesses’] identifications of defendant as the shooter.” Lopez, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 676-77. In this case, by contrast, identification is simply not at issue. The hearsay witnesses merely indicated that Johnson had fled from the scene with three others. Even if these witnesses had appeared in court, they could do no more than place Johnson at the vicinity of the crime. The most important evidence against Johnson was his own confession to the police and his action in leading the police to a place where the three other burglars were waiting. Johnson’s specific role in the burglary was at issue; his identity as a person on the scene was not. Since the hearsay “merely duplicated] properly admitted evidence” (Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d at 157) and did not “substitute for courtroom identification” or “strengthen or corroborate a weak identification” (Lopez, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 676), it was harmless. The State’s reintroduction of the hearsay identification in closing was also harmless unless the result of the trial “might have been otherwise had the remarks not been made.” (People v. Love (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 104, 115, 486 N.E.2d 1337.) Again, since identification was not the issue, this brief closing reference to identification evidence which should have been excluded at trial was not reversible error. I would affirm.