Court Opinion

ID: 3212303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-06-11 06:18:08.711436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:55.115231
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-15-00008-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                   CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MICHAEL CORTEZ,                                                           Appellant,

                                          v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee.

                 On appeal from the 156th District Court of
                            Bee County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
     Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Longoria
               Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

      A jury found appellant Michael Cortez guilty of three counts of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony offense enhanced to habitual felony

offender status. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b) (West, Westlaw through
2015 R.S.); id. § 12.42(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The jury sentenced

appellant to forty-five years’ imprisonment on each count, with the sentences ordered to

run concurrently. See id. § 12.42(d). Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an

Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

                                          I. ANDERS BRIEF

        Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the

record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief

need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must

provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal

authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

        In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing,

that counsel has: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided the appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed the

appellant of appellant’s rights to file a pro se response,1 and review the record preparatory

        1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with
the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
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to filing that response; and (4) provided appellant with a pro se motion for access to the

appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–320, Stafford,
813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an

adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response.

                                          II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

no reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the

issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the

court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”);

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                     III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he

must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s

court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the
case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
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motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered

to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of

his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In

re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006).

                                                            DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the
9th day of June, 2016.

        2  No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the court of criminal appeals, see id. R. 68.3, and should
comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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