Court Opinion

ID: 9693372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:38:54.568499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:45.620896
License: Public Domain

*89DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot so easily distinguish Ludmer v. Nernberg, 520 Pa. 218, 553 A.2d 924 (1989), I cannot agree 'with the majority’s determination that the only date on which the tort of malicious prosecution occurs, for insurance purposes, is the date on which the allegedly wrongful suit is filed.
In Ludmer v. Nernberg, Nernberg had filed suit against Ludmer claiming that Lud-mer, the treating physician for one of Nern-berg’s clients in a personal injury lawsuit, did not properly cooperate with him in the preparation of the personal injury action and interfered with the contractual relationship between Nernberg and his client. Summary judgment was granted, this court affirmed and the supreme court denied allocatur. Ludmer then filed suit against Nernberg under the Dragonetti Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A §§ 8351-8354. Nernberg argued that the Dragonetti Act did not apply since his action, ie., the allegedly wrongful suit, was filed prior to its enactment. In fact, at the time the allegedly wrongful suit was filed, it was not an actionable tort to file such a suit as long as there was neither an arrest nor a seizure of property. It did not become a tort until the Dragonetti Act removed this requirement of arrest or seizure of property. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 8351(b). The effective date of the Dragonetti Act was after Nemberg filed the allegedly wrongful suit but before Nem-berg’s suit terminated in Ludmer’s favor. Our supreme court held that, because favorable termination is an element of a suit brought under the Dragonetti Act, the cause of action does not accrue until termination. Thus, the Act applied because it was in effect when the allegedly wrongful suit terminated.
The Ludmer court’s determination that the cause of action does not accrue until the allegedly wrongful suit terminates means no tort has occurred until then. Under the majority’s holding, the “occurrence” for which the insurance company is liable is the commencement of suit, an occurrence which, under Ludmer, is not yet a tort. Moreover, the statute itself refers not just to the commencement of suit but the “procurement, initiation or continuation” of civil proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 8351(a).
The majority’s policy consideration, of not allowing a tortfeasor to shift its burden to an unwary insurance company, is not persuasive either. In Roess v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 383 F.Supp. 1231 (M.D.Fla.1974), the court found that, because favorable termination is an element of the cause of action, the insurer whose coverage included the time of termination was hable. The court considered the same policy consideration and noted, “[I]t hardly seems apt to refer to the insurance company as ‘unwary.’ One simple question on its application form (concerning pending litigation) would serve to protect its position.” Id at 1235. See also Royal Indemnity Co. v. Werner, 979 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir.1992) (dissenting opinion by Gibson, J.); Paterson Tallow Co., Inc. v. Royal Globe Insurance Companies, 89 N.J. 24, 444 A.2d 579 (1982) (dissenting opinion by Schreiber, J.)
For these reasons, I dissent.