Court Opinion

ID: 9965100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:09:59.975823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.311818
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41217

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RYAN KAPUSCINSKI,

       Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Joseph Montaño and Courtney B. Weaks, District Court Judges

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

The Law Office of Scott M. Davidson
Scott M. Davidson
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUFFY, Judge.

{1}     This matter was submitted to this Court on the brief in chief, pursuant to the
Administrative Order for Appeals in Criminal Cases from the Second, Eleventh, and
Twelfth Judicial District Courts in In re Pilot Project for Criminal Appeals, No. 2022-002,
effective November 1, 2022. Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing
submitted to this Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this
case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the
following reasons.
{2}    Following a seven-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of one count of criminal
sexual contact of a minor, twelve counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor (13-
18), and one count of bribery of a witness. [2 RP 431-32; BIC 10] Defendant raises five
issues on appeal.

{3}    Defendant first argues that his right to due process was violated based on the
questioning of the victims by a deputy with the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office. [BIC
12, 26-29] Defendant asserts that the deputy arrived at the victim’s residence in
response to a call alleging a sexual offense, assembled the two child victims and their
parents around the dinner table, and asked them questions without separating the
victims. [BIC 27] Defendant then points to a brief portion of the deputy’s cross-
examination where she stated that, as part of her training, “one way” to ensure reliability
of statements from people is to separate them from each other and get their statements
separately. [Id.] The deputy acknowledged that she did not do that in this circumstance.
[BIC 28] Defendant argues that “[b]y asking questions of two separate alleged victims
and witnesses in the same room at the same time, the deputy irreversibly corrupted the
statements by the witnesses and alleged victims.” [Id.] Defendant maintains that the
admission of the tainted evidence violated his right to due process.

{4}    We perceive a number of difficulties with Defendant’s argument. First, Defendant
does not indicate whether and where counsel objected at trial to preserve the issue for
our review. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (stating that the brief in chief shall contain “an
argument which, with respect to each issue presented, shall contain a statement of the
applicable standard of review, the contentions of the appellant, and a statement
explaining how the issue was preserved in the court below, with citations to authorities,
record proper, transcript of proceedings, or exhibits relied on.” (emphasis added)); Rule
12-321(A). On the merits, Defendant has not established that the circumstances of the
investigation were improper or that the resulting statements were unreliable as a result.
Nor has Defendant demonstrated by citation to authority that the admission of this
evidence in this case amounted to a due process violation. Consequently, even
assuming that the standard of review for this issue is de novo, Defendant has not
demonstrated either that an error occurred or that he is entitled to reversal on this issue.

{5}     Defendant next argues that his right to equal protection was infringed by the
district court’s refusal to afford him additional peremptory challenges under Rule 5-
606(D)(1) NMRA. [BIC 29-33] Defendant provides us with no authority to support his
contention that a violation of Rule 5-606(D)(1) implicates equal protection. See Vigil-
Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60.

{6}    Regardless, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s request for
additional peremptory challenges under Rule 5-606(D)(1). Rule 5-606(D)(1) provides a
defendant with five peremptory challenges in most circumstances, see Rule 5-
606(D)(1)(c), but a total of twelve when “the offense charged is punishable by life
imprisonment.” Rule 5-606(D)(1)(b). Defendant asserts that it “defies logic” that he
would not be entitled to the number of peremptory challenges in Rule 5-606(D)(1)(b)
because he was originally facing forty felonies, 550 years of potential sentencing
exposure, and ultimately sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. [BIC 30] Under Rule
5-606(D)(1), however, “the number of peremptories depends upon the punishment for
the ‘offense charged.’” State v. McKelvy, 1978-NMCA-006, ¶ 4, 91 N.M. 384, 574 P.2d
604. None of the offenses charged here prescribed a punishment of life imprisonment.
See State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 42, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314 (“[A] ‘life
sentence’ means ‘thirty years imprisonment before the possibility of parole and without
good time credit eligibility.’” (quoting State v. Tofoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 148 N.M.
391, 237 P.3d 693)); McKelvy, 1978-NMCA-006, ¶¶ 2-4 (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that he was entitled to twelve peremptory challenges because, if convicted,
he would have faced life imprisonment based on a fourth felony conviction and the
habitual offender statute prescribed such punishment, but “[n]o habitual offender charge
was involved when the jury was being selected”). “The fact that an indictment contains
several counts does not entitle [an] accused to any additional peremptory challenges.”
State v. Compton, 1953-NMSC-036, ¶ 38, 57 N.M. 227, 257 P.2d 915 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, we conclude that Defendant was
not entitled to twelve peremptory challenges under Rule 5-606(D)(1)(b) based on the
offenses charged, because although Defendant faced a potential sentence of more than
thirty years imprisonment based on the charges brought against him in this case, none
carried a life sentence. [1 RP 58-71; 2 RP 429-33] See State v. Salazar, 1954-NMSC-
062, ¶¶ 1, 16, 58 N.M. 489, 272 P.2d 688 (rejecting a defendant’s argument that he was
entitled to more than five peremptory challenges because he was charged with two
separate counts of manslaughter).

{7}    Defendant next argues that he was denied the right to an impartial jury because
the district court failed “to purge the taint created by a biased juror who voiced his desire
to physically attack” Defendant. [BIC 33] Defendant asserts that, following opening
statements and a small portion of the evidence, a juror told the bailiff that “he wanted to
go over there and essentially beat the crap out of [D]efendant.” [BIC 34] After being
informed of this statement, the district court excused the juror. [BIC 15, 34] Defendant
does not dispute that the dismissal was appropriate but, instead, asserts that his
convictions should be reversed because a whole new jury should have been impaneled.
[BIC 35]

{8}     Defendant again does not indicate whether this argument was raised and
preserved before the district court. In particular, Defendant does not assert that he
moved for a mistrial on these grounds. See Medler v. Henry, 1940-NMSC-028, ¶ 39, 44
N.M. 275, 101 P.2d 398 (“Appellant did not move for a mistrial which was a protection
open to appellant if her counsel believed that irreparable damage had been done. He
who knowingly bets on a lame horse has no just cause for complaint if his steed finishes
out of the money on three legs.”). Defendant also does not make an argument that the
failure to declare a mistrial and impanel an entirely new jury was fundamental error.
[BIC 33-36] See State v. Gallegos, 2009-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 25-26, 146 N.M. 88, 206 P.3d
993 (reviewing for fundamental error a defendant’s contention that the district court
should have declared a mistrial sua sponte based on alleged juror misconduct when the
defendant did not move for a mistrial). Reviewing for fundamental error on our own
accord, we conclude there was none.
{9}   We employ the fundamental error doctrine “only under extraordinary
circumstances to prevent the miscarriage of justice.” State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ¶
13, 144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Accordingly, we will use the doctrine to reverse a conviction only if the
       defendant’s guilt is so questionable that upholding a conviction would
       shock the conscience, or where, notwithstanding the apparent culpability
       of the defendant, substantial justice has not been served. Substantial
       justice has not been served when a fundamental unfairness within the
       system has undermined judicial integrity.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

{10} Generally, “[w]hen a seated juror is excused and replaced by an alternate juror
prior to deliberations, the verdict is not affected.” State v. Pettigrew, 1993-NMCA-095, ¶
18, 116 N.M. 135, 860 P.2d 777. Defendant does not present any evidence to illustrate
that the remaining jurors were biased or partial. Indeed, Defendant does not expressly
state that the other jurors were even present when the comment was made. [BIC 35]
Defendant merely asserts that the remaining jurors were never adequately probed by
the district court, thereby implying, without citation to authority, it was incumbent on the
district court to determine whether the comment had an impact on the rest of the jury.
[Id.]

{11} Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating the impact, if any, on the
verdict or that the replacement of an alternate juror affected his ability to receive a fair
trial or prejudiced his case. Id. (“Defendants presented no evidence to show that the
alternate juror was biased, partial, or disqualified for any reason.”). Further, while “not all
questions of fundamental error turn solely on guilt or innocence” of the defendant, see
State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633, in these
circumstances there is no argument directed “on process and the underlying integrity of
our judicial system.” Id. ¶ 16; see also Rule 12-321 (B)(1)-(2) NMRA (stating, despite a
lack of preservation, that the reviewing court can consider jurisdictional questions or, in
its discretion, questions involving general public interest or fundamental error or
fundamental rights of a party). Therefore, we conclude there was no fundamental error.
See Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 17 (providing that fundamental error only occurs in
“cases with defendants who are indisputably innocent, and cases in which a mistake in
the process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt
of the accused”).

{12} Defendant further argues that “[t]he prosecution introduced multiple items of
evidence that failed to meet minimal evidentiary standards.” [BIC 37] The argument
stems from the admission of several photographs. [BIC 16-22, 37] In the factual
background section of Defendant’s brief, he identifies the following photos: three photos
depicting a vibrator, a photo depicting lingerie, two photos of outfits, a photo depicting
the contents of a witness’s phone that was apparently excluded later in the trial, eight
photos where Defendant fails to identify their contents in the brief, five photos of
Defendant, and two photos of what Defendant alleges are incomplete Snapchat
conversation from a witness’s phone. [BIC 16-22] However, in the argument section of
Defendant’s brief, he only mentions the photos depicting the vibrators, the photo of the
lingerie, the two photos of the outfits, and two photos of Defendant. [BIC 37-38] As to
the photos depicting the vibrators, lingerie, and outfits, Defendant asserts that the
district court abused its discretion because the witness did not know when the photos
were taken, and thus their relevance was not established. [BIC 38] Defendant also
generally asserts that the “exhibits lacked foundation.” [Id.] But see State v. Fuentes,
2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (“The mere assertion of an
evidentiary rule is not argument.”). As to the photos depicting Defendant, he asserts
only that “[t]hese irrelevant photographs should not have been admitted into evidence.”
[Id.]

{13} Beyond bare assertions of relevance and foundation, in neither the facts nor
argument section of the brief does Defendant present any authority in support of these
arguments, nor does he inform this Court of the grounds the district court relied on in
admitting these photos or provide the full context in which the State moved to admit
them at trial. As such, Defendant has effectively asked this Court to review the record
and the relevant case law to determine whether the district court erred in admitting the
photos. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339,
110 P.3d 1076; Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29.

{14} There is a presumption of correctness in the rulings of the district court, and the
party claiming error bears the burden of showing such error. State v. Aragon, 1999-
NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211. “We are not obligated to review [the
d]efendant’s undeveloped argument, nor are we obligated to search the record for facts,
arguments, and rulings to find support for [the d]efendant’s claim of error.” State v.
Willyard, 2019-NMCA-058, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 445 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, we briefly note that several of the crimes Defendant was charged
with concerned the use or giving of a vibrator and lingerie, which undoubtedly makes
the photos of those items relevant. [1 RP 60, 66, 71] And the fact that the witness did
not know when the photos were taken did not mean the photos were inadmissible. See
State v. Gallegos, 1977-NMCA-113, ¶ 26, 91 N.M. 107, 570 P.2d 938 (“The fact that the
witness had not personally taken the photograph, or had not seen the photograph
taken, was not grounds for its exclusion.”); State v. Lopez, 2018-NMCA-002, ¶ 31, 410
P.3d 226 (“Photographic evidence . . . must fairly and accurately represent the depicted
subject in order to satisfy the foundation requirement for authentication of photographs.
Photographic evidence is admissible when a sponsoring witness can testify that it is a
fair and accurate representation of the subject matter, based on that witness’s personal
observation.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Consequently, we affirm
the district court’s admission of the photos.

{15} Lastly, Defendant argues that his convictions should be reversed based on
cumulative error. [BIC 39-41] Because we conclude that there was no error based on
arguments discussed above, we likewise conclude there was no cumulative error. See
State v. Samora, 2013-NMSC-038, ¶ 28, 307 P.3d 328 (“Where there is no error to
accumulate, there can be no cumulative error.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm.

{16}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge

GERALD E. BACA, Judge