Court Opinion

ID: 9645654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:31:42.10352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:41.390932
License: Public Domain

*384ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
It is understandable that this employer could have expected the insurance company to renew its policy. And it is certainly unfair that appellant should be denied compensation for her husband’s death because the employer failed to renew an insurance policy, and the estate of the employer (from which the widow could recover in an ordinary case) is insolvent. However, it is equally understandable that the insurance carrier could expect to rely on the settled law of this Commonwealth that its silence did not constitute an offer to renew an insurance policy. Luther v. Coal Operators Casualty Co., 379 Pa. 113, 108 A.2d 691 (1954). See Avondale Cut Rate, Inc. v. Associated Excess Underwriters, Inc., 406 Pa. 493, 178 A.2d 758 (1962). And it is equally unfair that this insurance carrier should now be told that its reliance on this basic principle of contract law was unjustified. Therefore, I dissent.
It may be that private insurance companies wishing to insure social insurance liabilities should have the duty to notify policyholders of the due date of premiums and of an intention not to renew. But this duty should be imposed by the Legislature, prospectively and with adequate notice, not by this Court retrospectively and by surprise.
The need for legislative, not judicial, action in this area is made clear by the questions left unanswered by the majority opinion, which imposes wide-ranging quasi-contractual responsibility upon an entire industry. For example, if an insurance carrier fails to send a notice of non-renewal after the expiration of a newly issued, one-time insurance policy, will it nonetheless be held liable for injuries which occur beyond the expiration date, or will liability attach only after the carrier or its agent has voluntarily sent renewal bills once, or twice, or three times? Does the liability created by the insurance carrier’s silence extend only for a matter of days, as in this case, or for months, or even years?
That the Legislature has chosen not to adopt the rule set forth in the majority opinion is made clear by its recent enactments in the field of social insurance. In 1968, the *385Legislature announced and implemented a policy with regard to automobile insurance carriers which stated that
“[n]o insurer shall cancel a policy except for one or the other of the following specified reasons:
(1) Nonpayment of premium; or
(2) The driver’s license or motor vehicle registration of the named insured has been under suspension or revocation during the policy period .. . . ”
Act of June 5, 1968, P.L. 150, No. 78 § 4, 40 P.S. § 1008.4. On the same day, in the next section of the Act, the Legislature announced a prospective rule for automobile insurers similar to the majority’s judicially created, retrospective rule for workmen’s compensation insurers:
“No cancellation or refusal to renew by an insurer of a policy of automobile insurance shall be effective unless the insurer shall deliver or mail to the named insured at the address shown in the policy a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew. Such notice shall: (1) Be approved as to form by the Insurance Commissioner prior to use; (2) State the date, not less than thirty days after the date of such mailing or delivering, on which such cancellation or refusal to renew shall become effective, . . .; (3) State the specific reason or reasons of the insurer for cancellation or refusal to renew . . .; (4) Advise the insured of his right to request in writing, within ten days of the receipt of the notice of cancellation or intention not to renew, or of the receipt of the reason or reasons for the cancellation or refusal to renew if they were not stated in the notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew, that the Insurance Commissioner review the action of the insurer; (5) Either in the notice or in an accompanying statement advise the insured of his possible eligibility for insurance through the automobile assigned risk plan.”
Act of June 5, 1968, P.L. 150, No. 78 § 5, 40 P.S. § 1008.5, effective in 60 days.
In 1975, the Legislature announced and implemented a judgment with regard to cancellation of workmen’s compen*386sation insurance similar to its earlier judgment regarding cancellation of automobile insurance:
“Except for nonpayment of premiums, no policy of insurance issued or renewed against liability under . . . ‘The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ ... or under . . . ‘The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act,’ . . . may be cancelled or terminated by an insurer during the term of the policy.”
Act of October 4, 1975, P.L. § 346, No. 100 § 1, 40 P.S. § 813. At that time the Legislature did not enact, and at no time since has it enacted, a requirement for notice of cancellation or non-renewal of workmen’s compensation insurance policies. Perhaps the Legislature believes that, as opposed to individual drivers, employers who have voluntarily undertaken the many responsibilities of running a business are able to assume the responsibility of maintaining their insurance against employees’ injuries.* Whatever the reason, and whatever the wisdom of that reason, the Legislature has clearly chosen to omit a notice requirement for non-renewal of workmen’s compensation insurance policies from its comprehensive regulation of the insurance industry.
Quite recently this Court refused to create judicially a cause of action for bad faith conduct of insurance carriers. D’Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981). In so doing, we stated: “Surely it is for the Legislature to announce and implement the Commonwealth’s public policy governing the regulation of insurance carriers.” Id., 494 Pa. at 508, 431 A.2d at 970. Because the Legislature has chosen not to act in an area manifestly within its control, and because the majority’s new rule contravenes a sound principle of contract law and unfairly imposes retrospective liability, I *387would affirm the unanimous decision of the Commonwealth Court.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
Mr. Chief Justice O’Brien dissents from the denial of reargument. Mr. Justice Roberts also dissents and would grant reargument for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion (joined by Nix, J.) filed in this matter.

 As Commissioner Reede of the Workmen’s Compensation Board of Appeal observes in his opinion concurring in the denial of benefits to appellant, if this case had arisen in New York, appellant would have received compensation. There, the legislature has created a fund to provide compensation for claimants against insolvent employers who have failed to procure workmen’s compensation insurance. N.Y. Workmen’s Compensation Law (McKinney) § 26-a.