Court Opinion

ID: 9794559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:00.960938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:54.287115
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
OEC 609-1 provides:
“(1) The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or interest. However, before this can be done, the statements must be related to the witness and the conduct described, with the circumstances of times, places and persons present, and the witness shall be asked whether the witness made the statements or engaged in such conduct, and, if so, allowed to explain. If the statements are in writing, they shall be known to the witness.
*33“(2) If a witness fully admits the facts claimed to show the bias or interest of the witness, additional evidence of that bias or interest shall not be admitted. If the witness denies or does not fully admit the facts claimed to show bias or interest, the party attacking the credibility of the witness may then offer evidence to prove those facts.
“(3) Evidence to support or rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked by evidence of bias or interest shall be limited to evidence showing a lack of bias or interest.”
Defendant readily acknowledges that during cross-examination of Cooper he elicited evidence that, in exchange for his testimony, Cooper was allowed to admit responsiblity for the homicide in juvenile court, even though he denied participation in the crime. Such evidence constituted impeachment, because it tended to show that Cooper had an interest in the outcome of this case.
The legislative commentary explains:
“Self-interest commonly takes the form of having a stake in the outcome of litigation. Interest is suggested, for example, if a witness testifies for the prosecution when the witness is an accomplice in the same crime, or is the subject of another indictment. In its extreme form, self-interest is manifest in corrupt activity such as taking a bribe to testify falsely, or writing a letter to intimidate another witness into giving perjured testimony.” State v. Moore, 180 Or 502, 176 P2d 631 [177 P2d 413] (1947). Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 259 (1982).
When the defendant has brought out facts which, if unexplained, would tend to show that the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case, the state is entitled to rehabilitate the witness by disclosing the entire basis of the agreement.1 The legislative commentary explains further:
“To evaluate the credibility of a witness fairly, the jury should hear all the facts relating to possible bias and self-interest. State v. Ellsworth, 30 Or 145, 47 P 199 (1896); Clevenger v. Schallhorn, 205 Or 209, 296 P2d 651 (1955) * * *.” Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 260 (1982).
*34An additional argument can be made that evidence of the whole agreement was independently admissible once defendant had alluded to a portion thereof. See OEC 106.
I would hold that the trial court did not err, nor did it abuse its discretion, in permitting the state to introduce State’s Exhibit 200. Middleton does not require a reversal here. The state was entitled to offer the evidence, if only to show that it did not bargain for any particular testimony. Accordingly, I dissent.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of defendant’s other assignments.

 But see State v. Middleton, 61 Or App 680, 658 P2d 555 rev allowed 294 Or 792 (1983) (polygraph examination). Here, the portion of the plea agreement requiring Cooper to take a polygraph examination was not offered as evidence.