Court Opinion

ID: 9716614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:06.163172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.265349
License: Public Domain

*551HARRELL, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
Although I have no huge quarrel with the opportunity presented by the judgment reached by the Majority Opinion allowing the Court of Special Appeals the opportunity to engage in an analysis of whether lesser included offenses existed here, I submit that the record is adequate to conclude that the Circuit Court for Charles County actually convicted Prue under Counts 3 through 8. The Majority Opinion opines that further proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals are required in order to determine whether any or all of the offenses charged in Counts 3 through 8 constitute lesser included offenses of the flagship charges, and that, to the extent Counts 3 through 8 are not lesser included offenses, the docket entries should be changed to reflect acquittals on those counts. In my view, such a remand is unnecessary because the record, including the trial judge’s comments immediately prior to closing arguments regarding the potential merger of Counts 3 through 8 with Count 2 if a guilty verdict on Count 2 were to be rendered, and the consistent docket entries reflecting that result, demonstrate clearly the trial judge’s unambiguous intent to convict Respondent on Counts 3 through 8. As such, I would hold that the trial judge, in fact, was not silent as to verdicts on Counts 3 through 8 when the record as a whole is considered, and that the docket entries should not be amended.
In reaching its conclusion that the trial judge was silent as to Counts 3 through 8, the Majority Opinion asserts that, because the rendition of a formal verdict in a bench trial is confined ordinarily to a specific portion of the trial, recourse to relevant comments made by the trial judge immediately prior to closing arguments or relevant matters occurring immediately following formal announcement of the verdict is not permitted in resolving what was the intended disposition of the charges. In this regard, I disagree with the Majority Opinion.
Where there is uncertainty regarding a verdict, a reviewing court may look to the relevant surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the trier of fact. See Pettiford v. *552State, 8 Md.App. 560, 569, 261 A.2d 216, 221 (1970) (citing Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 A. 60 (1933), for the proposition that, in a bench trial context, “[w]hen the trial judge has caused some uncertainty by not making a specific finding of guilt, ... the reviewing court may look to the surrounding circumstances to determine the trial judge’s intent”); see also Simmons, 165 Md. at 169, 167 A. at 66 (“Where the meaning of the verdict is so unmistakable, mere inartificiality in its form will not be sufficient to defeat justice by a nullification of a verdict which plainly declared the intent of the jury....”); State v. Brauer, 16 Neb.App. 257, 743 N.W.2d 655, 658-60 (2007) (noting that “resort may be had to the entire record” to determine the intent of an assertedly ambiguous bench verdict, where the trial court’s recitation of guilt stated that he found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol “or” driving while having an impermissible concentration of alcohol in his blood, two alternate theories of guilt presented by the State); State ex rel. Beaird v. Del Muro, 98 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (holding that, where the trial court’s judgment of conviction assertedly was ambiguous because it stated that defendant violated the terms of his probation in “one or more” of four ways, the reviewing court was empowered to “ascertain the court’s intent from the record”). As part of the “surrounding circumstances,” a reviewing court may consider relevant statements and exchanges appearing in the record outside the formal recitation of the verdict, as well as the docket entries purporting to reflect the verdict. Barber v. State, 16 Md.App. 235, 242, 295 A.2d 814, 818 (1972) (“[W]hen the language used unmistakably expresses a conclusion, technicalities in the form of the verdict cannot be used to invalidate that verdict. The docket entry as recorded correctly reflects the jury’s verdict____”); Pettiford, 8 Md.App. at 569, 261 A.2d at 221-22 (“Further, we note that the clerk of the court reached a similar interpretation of the judge’s words as evidenced by the docket entry ‘guilty addendum.’ ”).
As is known by most persons who have been engaged to be married and by many professional athletes and rock-and-roll *553stars with pierced ears, diamonds are graded, among other things, for clarity; that is, the relative absence or appearance of internal “inclusions” and external “blemishes.” Under the rating system of the Gemologieal Institute of America (GIA), a “flawless” category diamond (no flaws visible under 10X magnification) receives the grade of “FL.” The next highest category, “internally flawless” (meaning no inclusions and only small blemishes visible under the same magnification), receives the grade of “IF.” If the record of the present case were a diamond, it would be one of “IF” clarity regarding the intention of the trial judge in rendering his verdict.
On 9 March 2007, after the parties rested their cases, but before closing arguments, the State announced, in open court, that it would be focusing on Counts 1 and 9, because the remaining Counts would merge into Count 1 for sentencing purposes.1 Considering the trial judge’s recitation of the verdict, his extensive findings of fact in support of the guilty verdicts,2 his comments prior to closing argument regarding *554merger of Counts 3 through 8 with Count 2 if a conviction on Count 2 were to be rendered,3 and the consistent docket entries reflecting that result made shortly after the trial judge’s announcement of the verdict,4 it is pellucid that the *555trial judge’s crystal clear intent was to (and in fact did) render guilty verdicts also on Counts 3 through 8. The record of the discussion between the trial judge and the State prior to closing argument demonstrates that the trial judge agreed (and the defense apparently did not disagree) that any convictions on Counts 3 through 8 would merge with Count 2 upon a finding of guilt on Count 2, due to the former being lesser included offenses of the flagship Count 2. In addition, the clerk’s docket entry regarding the trial judge’s verdict, stating that Counts 3 through 8 merged with Count 2, provides a clear indication and understanding of that intent on the part of the trial judge with regards to those counts. Despite his omission in the formal oral rendition of the verdict of specific guilty verdicts for each count of the indictment, the trial judge intended to find Respondent guilty of Counts 3 through 8 by virtue of finding him guilty of Count 2. Thus, I would hold that the trial judge in fact did render verdicts as to Counts 3 through 8 and that, therefore, the docket entries should not be amended. As such, remand to the Court of Special Appeals for further consideration regarding whether Counts 3 through 8 constitute lesser included offenses is unnecessary, although I am confident that court will conclude that they are lesser included offenses, whereupon this case will be in the same posture as I propose to leave it now, affirmance of the trial court’s judgments. On this record, Prue is not entitled to the potential windfall delivered by the Majority opinion.
Judges MURPHY and ADKINS authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. Although the colloquy does not make clear, merger, as discussed in this context, was alluded to as a sentencing principle. See Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 321, 951 A.2d 832, 840-41 (2008); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 352-59, 893 A.2d 1018, 1055-58 (2006); Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 236-37, 772 A.2d 283, 299 (2001).

. Immediately prior to reciting his verdicts on Counts 1, 2, and 9, the trial judge stated on the record extensive findings of fact supporting his decision;
Now, as to the actions of the defendant at the time in question.
First, we have him with a blood alcohol concentration, almost double of what the legal, per se definition is in Maryland.
He was aware of that, because he tried to avoid the police officers on the sidewalk at Legends [a bar].
He allowed the decedent jointly with himself to operate the motorcycle, with the knowledge, a, that she had been drinking. And as I note she was over the per se limit of under the influence.
He knew she had only driven in this strange tandem way on five occasions, and she was not licensed for a motorcycle.
He facilitated the motorcycle to exceed twice the posted speed limit, by telling the decedent when he wanted to shift to a higher gear. In other words if they had left it in first gear, obviously they couldn’t have gotten up to 75 miles per hour. I think that’s common sense.
*554The defendant and the decedent engaged in this bifurcated operation, where the decedent operated the hand-bars and the accelerator. And obviously that’s an impediment to both of them, and to their safety, if an emergency situation arouse (sic), and that’s what basically happened here. She was a total intoxicated, inexperienced driver, on a motorcycle, doing 75 miles an hour, at night, and she lost control. She failed to keep her vehicle under control.
So I am convinced that such conduct evidence is a wanton or reckless disregard for human life.

. The record reflects the following colloquy between the State and the trial judge immediately prior to closing argument:
STATE: Your Honor, I think when all is said and done, out of the nine counts you have on the indictment, there are only two counts the court needs—needs to decide. That would be count one, the manslaughter count, and count nine, the possession of marijuana account (sic).
STATE: Of the other eight counts, counts two through eight, we’re going—are going to merge into count one, manslaughter. Everything else is (unintelligible) defense. So let’s talk about—let’s talk about that. Lastly before—
THE COURT: Does two merge?
STATE: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you sure?
STATE: Yes, because it is going to be—all count two is, is a homicide under the influence. A lesser included of manslaughter. Manslaughter requires gross negligence. Well okay, I guess we could take—we could say—
THE COURT: There's a different element.
STATE:—count two—count two requires the BAC, plus negligence, plus death. Where manslaughter requires gross negligence plus death.
THE COURT: That’s right.
STATE: So the court gets the sentencing—I don’t know if the court can be candid to both separate sentences for those two counts. THE COURT: Yeah, so, I would agree with you on the other ones though. I think the other ones pretty well merge into [Count] two.
STATE: But I think in terms of sentencing, should the court find him guilty in both counts one and two, I think the court (unintelligible) sentences.

. Specifically, the docket entry for 9 March 2007 reflects:
"Opinion given by Court.
*555Court finds Deft guilty of:
Count 1-Negligent Manslaugliter-Auto/Boat/Other Vehicle
Count 2-Negligent Homiside (sic) Other Vehicle Under Influence
Count 9-Possession-Marijuana
Count 3 thur (sic) 8 to merge with Count 2.”