Court Opinion

ID: 9684690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:08:28.392373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:58.925227
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Judge
(concurring).
In State v. Reese, Mo.Banc., 457 S.W.2d 713, this court in an exhaustive opinion by *502Robert G. Brady, Special Judge, held that at the time the trial court accepted three pleas of guilty from Reese there was a total lack of any attempt at compliance with the rules relative to the acceptance of guilty pleas in that the trial court made no effort to ascertain the voluntariness of defendant’s plea and his understanding of the nature of the charges and the pleas were not voluntarily entered. For a full exposition of the basis for this holding, see State v. Reese, supra, loe. cit. 717-718-719. This holding compelled the conclusion that defendant be permitted to withdraw two of the three pleas of guilty. The basis for remanding the cause relative to the third plea of guilty was to receive into evidence the full body of a letter that was written by Reese to the judge who took the pleas of guilty. The purpose of that remand, however, was to determine whether or not the letter constituted a confession by defendant to the third offense. Thus the question of guilt or innocence was made the determinative basis upon which the question of whether or not Reese would be permitted to withdraw the plea would hinge. This type of remand should not have been ordered as it is contrary to this court’s holding in State v. Thompson, Mo.Banc., 324 S.W.2d 133 (1959), where this court, speaking through the late Judge Storckman, said, “The guilt or innocence of the prisoner cannot be considered on habeas corpus or its counterpart a motion under Rule 27.26, but only the legality of his restraint.” This concept has been adhered to over the years by this and other courts. To vary from it would permit a convicted defendant to relitigate the entire question of guilt or innocence in collateral proceedings and would open the door to rule 27.26 proceedings being instituted by persons whose convictions have become final purely on the contention that the person was not guilty even though found guilty by a judge or jury and even though the conviction was affirmed on appeal. It is my view that litigation must come to an end at some point and that to permit the state to defeat a post-conviction relief proceeding upon a finding therein that the defendant was in fact guilty would require that the defendant be permitted to win a post-conviction relief proceeding upon a finding therein that he was not guilty. Neither habeas corpus nor its counterpart, rule 27.26, was ever intended to serve this purpose.
Nothing occurred on remand to vary the previous decision that all three pleas were not voluntarily entered. That is the law of this case and in my view must be followed at this time. The writer did not participate in the decision in State v. Reese, 457 S.W.2d 713, because not a member of this court at the time that cause was submitted. However, as stated, the law of the case was set forth by this court in State v. Reese, supra, and must be adhered to at this time. The determination made by the court therein was that the three pleas were not voluntarily entered. That is still the case. For this reason I concur in the principal opinion.