Court Opinion

ID: 9543161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:45.059464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:48.210049
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I can agree that there was no basis for an arrest, but cannot agree that the statute is contrary to the provision of our constitution. It does not permit an unlawful seizure (arrest). It merely transfers the right of redress for a wrongful arrest to the orderly procedure of a court trial instead of a brawl in the streets.1
The question of lawfulness of an arrest may be a close one, and a brawl may result in a killing. The legislature was wise in passing the statute in question in the interest of maintaining order and preventing confrontations which might lead to bloodshed. Nowhere in the statute can it be found that an unreasonable seizure (arrest) is permitted or encouraged. There is no change in the law that one making an unlawful arrest must answer for it, and so there is no basis for saying the statute conflicts with the Constitution.
The common law gave a person the right to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have changed since the time when self-help was permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest. At common law, arrests were often made by citizens. Judges were not available for speedy release on bond, and trials were long delayed. Such conditions no longer exist. An arrested person must be taken forthwith before a magistrate, and trials must not be unreasonably delayed.2 A defendant is entitled to bail in a reasonable amount.3 Besides the statute does not prevent resistance to an unlawful arrest when made by a private person. It only applies to arrests made by a known police officer.
By both our constitution4 and statute,5 the ruling of the district court in cases appealed from a justice of the peace court is final except as to cases involving the constitutionality of a statute.6 This matter is 'such a case, and so we must limit our review to the determination of whether the statute is invalid. We may not review the facts of the case.
It appears that the prevailing opinion is influenced by the facts of the case and seeks an impermissible way to correct what it considers a bad verdict.
That is the function of the trial court— not that of an appellate tribunal. If we wish to be jurors, we should renounce our position as justices and wait until our names are drawn for jury service.
In reviewing a statute to ascertain its constitutionality, certain rules of construction must be applied;
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to be valid and in conformity with the constitution.7
(b) It should not be held to be invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some particular constitutional provision.8
(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an ordinance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge.9
*806In the case of State v. Packard10 it was said:
It is recognized that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be sustained as falling within the constitutional framework [citations omitted], and that a statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it. [Citations omitted].
The Supreme Court of the United States in Roth v. U. S.11 said:
. . . This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirement of due process. “. . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . . ” United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877.
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners of City of Los Angeles12 is in point:
It should be kept in mind that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which could result in potential or actual danger to the “peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare” of the public. A municipality cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and specify those precise activities or conduct which are intended to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel [Daniel v. Board of Police Com’rs, 190 Cal.App.2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting from an earlier case, “To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements [of due process of law] it is not necessary that it furnishes detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.”
The author of the prevailing opinion apparently doubts that the statute violates the constitutional provision regarding unreasonable seizures as claimed by the appellant. He seems to buttress the decision on the constitutional challenge of vagueness. This claim is personal to the author of the. opinion, and was not raised either at trial or on appeal.
I can see nothing vague about the language of the statute in question. Any person of ordinary intelligence should know that when a known officer is making, or attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or lay interference is prohibited by the law.
In my opinion the statute is not unconstitutional, and we are duty bound to so say and to affirm the judgment.

. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1969) ; Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68; State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annotation in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases holding it a crime to resist a known officer when making an arrest even absent a statute like ours.

. Art. I, Sec. 12, Utah Const.

. Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

. Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

. Sec. 78-3-5, U.C.A.1953.

. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed. 603 (1897) ; State v. Holtgrove, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930).

. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ; Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948).

. Cases cited note 1 supra.

. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., supra note 7.

. 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952).

. 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1956).

. 7 Cal.3d 64, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496 P.2d 840, 845 (1972).