Court Opinion

ID: 9535618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:51:21.921673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:17.343892
License: Public Domain

HAIRE, Judge,
dissenting:
The issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing without leave to amend, Count One of plaintiff’s complaint. The determination of that issue involves a consideration by this Court of the parameters of a defendant’s liability for unintentionally caused emotional distress.
Count One of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendants’ vehicle, on October 20, 1973, struck the automobile in which plaintiff, Dorothy Ann Keck, and her mother, Beatrice Gillespie, were passengers. There is a further allegation to the effect that as *124a proximate result of the accident, plaintiff’s mother received fatal injuries and expired some three months after the accident. The specific allegations which led to the filing of the defendants’ motion to dismiss are contained in paragraph VI of Count One and read as follows:
“Prior to the events aforementioned and during the prolonged and futile agonizing battle for life which MRS. GILLESPIE underwent, the Plaintiff DOROTHY ANN KECK had been a very close and loving daughter. Further, Plaintiff has been caused to suffer severe emotional and physical distress, sorrow, mental suffering, pain, shock, anxiety and anguish because of the aforementioned injuries to her mother and being present during her mother’s battle for life all to her damage."
A close examination of this allegation reveals two distinct bases upon which recovery is sought for plaintiff’s “severe emotional and physical distress”. The first is for such distress resulting “because of the aforementioned injuries [to her mother].” The second is for the emotional and physical distress which resulted from “being present during her mother’s battle for life. . .”
From the foregoing it appears that plaintiff sought damages not only for her alleged mental and physical distress and shock resulting from the witnessing of her mother’s injuries at the scene of the accident,1 but also for her mental distress resulting from the observance of her mother’s pain and suffering during the three month period following the accident while her mother was in the hospital prior to her death. In my opinion recovery should be allowed for the former, but not for the latter. None of the authorities cited in the parties’ briefs or in the majority opinion allow recovery for emotional or physical damages resulting to a friend or relative from a mere observance of an injured third party during a period not substantially contemporaneous with the occurrence of the tortious event. The authorities cited by the majority allow recovery for physical injury resulting from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from a substantially contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident or the resulting injuries, as contrasted with the emotional trauma suffered by all friends and relatives engendered by observance of the pain, suffering and injuries of the accident victim over an extended period of time, such as during the three month period of hospitalization of plaintiff’s mother in the case at hand. As noted by Prosser, such a restriction is admittedly quite arbitrary, and is imposed only to draw a line somewhere short of undue liability. It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant, who, by his conduct, has negligently endangered one man, were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of the injuries received by the victim of the negligent tortfeasor. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 54, at 334-35 (4th ed. 1971).
For the foregoing reasons I cannot concur in the majority opinion. I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of paragraph VI of Count One of plaintiff’s complaint, and remand with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend the allegations of Count One so as to state a claim within the limitations set forth in this dissent.

. Defendants contended, both in their motion to dismiss in the trial court and in their brief on this appeal, that plaintiffs allegations in paragraph VI did not sufficiently allege damages resulting from the witnessing of her mother’s injuries at the scene of the accident. While the allegation may be somewhat inartfully drawn, it is my opinion that it is sufficient for this purpose.