Court Opinion

ID: 9965701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:00:58.078671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.309563
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-3044                                                   September Term, 2023
                                                              FILED ON: MAY 3, 2024

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                   APPELLEE

v.
JEREMIAH MCCRIMMON,
                 APPELLANT

                          Appeal from the United States District Court
                                  for the District of Columbia
                                      (No. 1:19-cr-00223)

       Before: KATSAS and PAN, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

                                          JUDGMENT

        This appeal was considered on the briefs and the district-court record. The Court has fully
considered the issues and determined that a published opinion is unwarranted. See Fed. R. App.
P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is

       ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

        Jeremiah McCrimmon abducted a young girl in Maryland, brought her to the District of
Columbia, and sexually assaulted her there. A grand jury charged McCrimmon with violating a
protective order, kidnapping, and multiple counts of sexual abuse. McCrimmon decided to plead
guilty to several of these offenses. In exchange, prosecutors dropped the other charges.

        McCrimmon’s written plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. Absent ineffective
assistance of counsel, which is not alleged here, the waiver bars McCrimmon from appealing any
sentence within the applicable guidelines range. McCrimmon and his counsel both signed the
agreement, which indicates that they had read every page and discussed it with each other. At the
plea hearing, McCrimmon once again affirmed that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty, including the right to appeal outside of a few narrow circumstances. Satisfied that
McCrimmon was knowingly relinquishing his rights, the district court accepted the plea.
       At a sentencing hearing nine months later, McCrimmon expressed some confusion. When
asked whether he understood the presentence report and sentencing process, McCrimmon
demurred that he needed “more clarity.” J.A. 140. The district court allowed him to take 30
minutes to discuss the presentence report and sentencing guidelines with his lawyer. Id. at 144–
45. After the break, McCrimmon confirmed that he was ready to proceed with sentencing.

        The district court sentenced McCrimmon to 384 months in prison, which was within the
applicable guidelines range. The court rejected McCrimmon’s recommendation of 240 months
because his crime was “one of the most grotesque” the court had ever seen, and McCrimmon did
not appear particularly remorseful. J.A. 171–72, 174–75. McCrimmon now appeals, arguing that
the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

       We need not decide that issue, however, because McCrimmon’s appeal waiver covers
challenges to the reasonableness of his within-guidelines sentence. If a waiver is valid and covers
the appeal, then we ordinarily enforce the waiver. United States v. Hunt, 843 F.3d 1022, 1027
(D.C. Cir. 2016). A waiver is valid if the defendant agreed to it “knowingly and voluntarily.”
Khadr v. United States, 67 F.4th 413, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 2023), cert. filed. This standard applies
even when, as is often the case, the defendant waives the right to appeal before he knows what his
sentence will be. See United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

         McCrimmon does not dispute that the appeal waiver covers his challenge to the
reasonableness of his sentence, but he objects that the waiver was not knowing. The record shows
otherwise. For starters, McCrimmon signed the plea agreement, which unambiguously explained
what rights he was giving up. During the plea colloquy, the district court again explained those
rights, and McCrimmon again confirmed his understanding of the bargain. These facts are strong
evidence that McCrimmon’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Davis, 45
F.4th 73, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

        McCrimmon points to his hesitance at the sentencing hearing. But McCrimmon had
already pleaded guilty at that point, and the district court had already accepted his plea. Confusion
months later does not cast doubt on whether the plea was knowing when made. See United States
v. Lee, 888 F.3d 503, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2018). In any event, at the sentencing hearing, the district
court gave McCrimmon time to speak with his lawyer, after which McCrimmon confirmed that he
was ready to go forward. Nothing in the record suggests that McCrimmon “misunderstood or
lacked awareness of the appeal waiver’s terms.” Davis, 45 F.4th at 81.

       For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. The Clerk is directed to
withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for
rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).

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Per Curiam

              FOR THE COURT:
              Mark J. Langer, Clerk

        BY:   /s/
              Daniel J. Reidy
              Deputy Clerk

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