Court Opinion

ID: 9925492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-20 01:00:33.022403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.471093
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10783        Document: 00517038516              Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/19/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                       No. 22-10783
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                January 19, 2024
                                     ____________
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
   Marcus Traylor,                                                                        Clerk

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                             versus

   Gideon Yorka,

                                    Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:21-CV-406
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Following an altercation in a Dallas bar, Officer Gideon Yorka struck
   Marcus Traylor in the face and placed him under arrest.                            Traylor
   subsequently brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force,
   unlawful arrest, and fabrication of evidence. The district court granted
   qualified immunity to Yorka on the excessive force and unlawful arrest claims

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                       No. 22-10783

   but denied qualified immunity on the fabrication-of-evidence claim. For the
   reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.
                                  I.      Background
          On the evening of February 16, 2020, Marcus Traylor and three of his
   friends attended Clutch Bar and Restaurant (“Clutch”) in Dallas, Texas. 1
   That night, Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) Officer Gideon Yorka and
   another DPD officer were working private security at Clutch. The officers
   were off duty but wearing their full DPD uniforms.
          At the bar, Traylor’s group ordered “bottle service,” which included
   one bottle of champagne and two bottles of hard alcohol. Traylor consumed
   “two or three glasses” of champagne over the course of an hour. At some
   point, Clutch security asked the group to leave because Traylor’s friend had
   fallen asleep. When Traylor lingered to pay his tab, a Clutch bouncer grabbed
   him from behind and brought him to the ground. Yorka was outside during
   this altercation. However, Clutch security informed him that there had been
   a fight inside and sought his assistance. Yorka and his colleague then entered
   the bar to break up the commotion, where Yorka observed Traylor with a
   bloodied mouth being restrained on the floor by Clutch security. Yorka
   picked Traylor up by the arm and escorted him out of the bar. During this
   encounter, Yorka detected the smell of alcohol on Traylor’s breath.
          The parties’ versions of the events outside of the bar vary
   significantly. According to Traylor, he cooperated as Yorka escorted him
   past a crowd outside of the bar and shoved him into the street. Yorka

          _____________________
          1
             Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment order, we discuss the
   following facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Traylor. See Deville v.
   Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). However, we note factual
   discrepancies where relevant.

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   instructed Traylor to leave, but Traylor told Yorka that his wallet and
   belongings were still inside Clutch. Yorka, however, remained adamant that
   Traylor leave immediately. Traylor then walked towards the curb to find
   assistance from a security guard or another person to help get his wallet. As
   Traylor approached the curb, Yorka struck him in the face, causing him to
   fall to the ground.
          According to Yorka, Traylor was uncooperative as he escorted him
   outside of the bar. Traylor repeatedly tried to turn around to go back inside,
   but Yorka was able to regain control and shove Traylor into the street. Once
   released, Traylor again tried to go back to the bar, saying “this sh** is not
   over; this motherf***er started it.” Yorka again pushed Traylor away
   towards the street. When Traylor continued to make his way back towards
   the bar, Yorka pushed him a second time. Traylor then used his forearm to
   shove Yorka in the chest and neck area, creating separation between the two.
   When Traylor again approached Yorka, Yorka punched him.
          A bystander recorded a portion of the relevant events. The video
   shows a crowded scene both inside and outside of the bar. The camera then
   pans to the left and shows Traylor in a white hoodie standing in the street.
   Yorka is standing a few feet away facing Traylor. Traylor leans forward and
   walks in Yorka’s direction. Yorka then punches Traylor in the face, and
   Traylor falls to the ground. The interaction lasts only a few seconds before
   the video cuts to the officers helping Yorka and an ambulance arriving.
          The parties agree on the events after Yorka struck Traylor. An
   ambulance took Traylor to the hospital. Traylor was then arrested and
   charged with felony assault against a peace officer. The jail supervisor,
   however, rejected the charge and reduced it to a class C misdemeanor for
   offensive contact. Officers issued Traylor a citation and released him that
   night. The misdemeanor was later dismissed.

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          On February 25, 2021, Traylor filed this suit against Yorka pursuant
   to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Traylor alleges that Yorka (1) used excessive force in
   violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) unlawfully arrested him in violation
   of the Fourth Amendment, and (3) fabricated evidence of assault in violation
   of Traylor’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right. Upon
   Yorka’s motion for summary judgment, the district court granted qualified
   immunity to Yorka on the excessive force and unlawful arrest claims.
   However, the district court denied qualified immunity on Traylor’s
   fabrication-of-evidence claim. Both parties timely appealed.
                   II.    Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
          The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Traylor’s
   federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As to Traylor’s excessive
   force and unlawful arrest claims, we have jurisdiction over the district court’s
   partial final judgment entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   54(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Briargrove Shopping Ctr. Joint Venture v.
   Pilgrim Enters., 170 F.3d 536, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1999). As to Traylor’s
   substantive due process claim, we have jurisdiction to immediately review
   the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Jason v. Tanner, 938 F.3d
   191, 194 (5th Cir. 2019).
          We review a district court’s entry of summary judgment based on
   qualified immunity de novo. Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir.
   2016). In conducting this review, we must “view the facts in the light most
   favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its
   favor.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
   curiam). Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of
   material fact, and the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
   Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Fed.
   R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

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           In qualified immunity cases on interlocutory appeal, we consider only
   “the scope of clearly established law and the objective reasonableness of the
   defendant’s acts.” Jason, 938 F.3d at 194 (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). We “can review the materiality of any factual disputes, but
   not their genuineness.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2
                                    III.      Discussion
           Traylor raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether Yorka was entitled to
   qualified immunity on the excessive force claim; and (2) whether Yorka was
   entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim. On cross appeal,
   Yorka raises an additional issue of whether he was entitled to qualified
   immunity on the fabrication-of-evidence claim. We address each issue in
   turn.
       A. Excessive Force
           Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private citizens may sue public officials for
   violations of their constitutional rights. However, “[q]ualified immunity
   shields from liability ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
   violate the law.’” Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir.
   2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To determine
   whether qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim, we ask (1) whether “the
   official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right
   was clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190–91 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Traylor’s
   claim fails at the first inquiry because Yorka’s use of force did not violate
   Traylor’s Fourth Amendment right.

           _____________________
           2
             Because the district court entered final judgment on the excessive force and
   unlawful arrest claims, these limitations apply only to the fabrication-of-evidence claim.

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          To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff
   must show that he “suffer[ed] an injury that result[ed] directly and only from
   a clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable use of force.” Joseph ex. rel.
   Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020). The district court
   did not address whether Traylor suffered an injury, but undisputed evidence
   shows that he suffered a broken wrist from falling after Yorka’s punch. Thus,
   the only remaining issue is whether Yorka’s use of force was “objectively
   unreasonable.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We look to
   several factors for this inquiry, including “(1) the severity of the crime at
   issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of
   officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332 (citing Graham,
   490 U.S. at 396). “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be
   judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
   with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d
   722, 729 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
          Construing all factual disputes in Traylor’s favor, Yorka’s use of force
   was not objectively unreasonable. Even under Traylor’s version of events,
   Yorka could have reasonably believed Traylor posed a threat. Clutch security
   had just informed Yorka that Traylor had been in a fight, and Yorka observed
   Traylor bloodied on the floor with a strong scent of alcohol. See Escobar v.
   Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2018) (considering that an officer had
   been warned plaintiff was a threat). Most importantly, the video shows
   Traylor moving quickly towards Yorka. Even accepting Traylor’s version as
   true, and therefore interpreting his actions as walking towards a third party
   to ask about retrieving his wallet, the video still supports Yorka’s perception
   of a threat, which is the key question in such a quick and messy situation.
   Indeed, Traylor leans forward then walks in Yorka’s direction. Given
   Traylor’s insistence on retrieving his wallet and the information Yorka

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   received about the fight, Yorka could have reasonably interpreted Traylor’s
   steps as a “charge” towards him. Further, the video shows that only a couple
   of seconds spanned between Traylor’s steps towards Yorka and Yorka’s
   strike. The tense environment and need for a split-second decision indicate
   that Yorka’s use of force was not unreasonable. See Graham, 490 U.S. at
   396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact
   that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
   circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
   amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”). In looking back,
   it is always easy to think of other things that could have been done differently.
   Yet, although Yorka’s escalation to a strike to the face “may not have been
   as restrained as we would like to expect from model police conduct . . .
   qualified immunity ‘protect[s] officers from the sometimes hazy border
   between excessive and acceptable force’” in the moment. Griggs, 841 F.3d
   at 315 (alterations in original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
   (2001)).
          Traylor argues that the district court erred by determining Yorka
   acted reasonably based on Yorka’s version of events. Traylor claims that,
   under his version, Yorka would have had no reason to doubt that he was
   merely attempting to retrieve his wallet.        But Traylor disregards that
   reasonability “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
   the scene.” Darden, 880 F.3d at 729 (quotation omitted). Although Traylor
   did submit evidence that his intent was to speak to a third party, he has not
   produced evidence showing that this intent manifested in any outward
   action. See Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e measure
   excessive force by the objective circumstances, not by the subjective
   intentions of the arrestee.”). Even interpreting the video in Traylor’s favor,
   it clearly shows him, at the very least, quickly approaching Yorka. Thus, the

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   factual dispute of whether Traylor intended to charge at Yorka or speak to a
   third party is immaterial.
          Because of the tense situation and Yorka’s need to make a split-second
   decision, Yorka’s use of force did not violate Traylor’s Fourth Amendment
   right. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Traylor’s
   excessive force claim.
      B. Unlawful Arrest
          The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable seizures of both property
   and people. California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). A seizure is
   reasonable if it is based on probable cause. Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568
   F.3d 181, 208 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore, to defeat qualified immunity on an
   unlawful arrest claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) probable cause did not exist,
   and (2) the defendant-official was “objectively unreasonable in believing
   there was probable cause for the arrest.” Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 858 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
   denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023).
          Here, the district court found that Yorka had probable cause to arrest
   Traylor for interference with a police officer’s performance of public duties
   in violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.15. Traylor argues that the district
   court erred by treating § 38.15 as a strict liability provision because the statute
   instead requires a showing of criminal negligence. But Traylor provides no
   authority requiring a showing of criminal negligence for arrest on suspected
   violation of § 38.15.     Indeed, our precedent has not imposed such a
   requirement. See, e.g., Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 656–57 (5th
   Cir. 2004) (holding that officer had probable cause for arrest under § 38.15
   after plaintiff ignored warnings not to intervene and instead stepped forward
   towards the officer); Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017)

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   (affirming probable cause for arrest under § 38.15 where the plaintiff failed to
   follow an officer’s order to move his truck).
           Further, uncontested evidence shows that Traylor failed to comply
   with Yorka’s numerous orders to leave. This instruction was made in
   Yorka’s duty to maintain the peace at Clutch, as even an off-duty officer has
   a duty “to preserve the peace within the officer’s jurisdiction.” Bustos v.
   Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 466 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tex. Code
   Crim. Proc. art. 2.13(a)). Thus, Yorka had probable cause to arrest
   Traylor for interfering with the performance of his public duties. See Buehler
   v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 992 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[R]efusing to obey police
   officers’ repeated and unambiguous warnings to step back so as not to
   interfere with officers’ official duties . . . establishes probable cause to arrest
   for a violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.15(a)(1).”). Accordingly, we affirm
   the district court’s dismissal of Traylor’s unlawful arrest claim.
       C. Fabrication of Evidence
           In Cole v. Carson, we recognized a substantive due process right “not
   to have police deliberately fabricate evidence and use it to frame and bring
   false charges against a person.” 802 F.3d 752, 771 (5th Cir. 2015). 3 Here,
   Traylor claims that Yorka fabricated evidence of assault by making a false
   statement that Traylor pushed him. The district court denied qualified

           _____________________
           3
             Cole has a complex procedural history. The Supreme Court vacated Cole and
   remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015)
   (per curiam). Hunter v. Cole, 580 U.S. 994, 994 (2016) (mem.). On remand, we reinstated
   the Cole opinion regarding the due process fabrication-of-evidence claim because Mullenix
   did not concern that issue. See Cole v. Carson, 905 F.3d 334, 347 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Cole
   II”). Cole II was subsequently vacated when we granted rehearing en banc. Cole v. Carson,
   915 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2019). However, the en banc court held that Cole’s fabrication-of-
   evidence claim remained viable. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised
   (Aug. 21, 2019).

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   immunity because it concluded this case is similar to Cole and Traylor raised
   a fact issue as to whether Yorka’s statement was fabricated. However, as
   discussed above, Traylor must establish both a violation of his constitutional
   right and that this right was clearly established. See Cunningham, 983 F.3d at
   190–91. We may limit our analysis to the “clearly established” prong if it
   resolves the qualified immunity issue. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
   236–37 (2009). Because Cole did not clearly establish Traylor’s right as
   relevant here, we conclude that Yorka is entitled to qualified immunity.
           A § 1983 plaintiff bears a heavy burden of establishing that an officer
   violated clearly established law. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th
   Cir. 2019). “A right is clearly established only if relevant precedent ‘ha[s]
   placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id. (alterations in
   original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)); see also
   Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (“A clearly established
   right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
   understood that what he is doing violates that right.” (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted)). Traylor relies solely on Cole, in which we
   established a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim for
   fabrication of evidence. But we may not define clearly established law with
   such a high level of generality. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. Instead, “[t]he
   dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is
   clearly established.’” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at
   742).   Thus, Cole can establish Traylor’s right only if the facts there
   “squarely govern[]” the specific facts at issue here. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138
   S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). We conclude that
   they do not.
           In Cole, three officers pursued the plaintiff and subsequently opened
   fire. 802 F.3d at 755–56. After the shooting, the officers had time to confer
   before giving their statements, and they ultimately claimed that the plaintiff

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   was given a prior warning and pointed his gun towards one of the officers. Id.
   at 756. Indeed, Cole involved allegations of a conspiracy and the calculated
   fabrication of evidence to justify a shooting. 4 See id. This false evidence led
   to a felony charge for aggravated assault on a public servant, which in turn
   caused significant reputational injuries and legal expenses. 5 Id. at 756, 766.
           The facts of Cole are distinguishable from those presented here. This
   case involves a quick and chaotic incident in which the parties have different
   versions of events. Traylor has not shown that Yorka had the time or
   deliberation to fabricate evidence of assault. Further, Traylor did not face
   the extreme consequences as those of the plaintiff in Cole. Indeed, Traylor’s
   charge was reduced to a misdemeanor the same night of the incident. Given
   this significant divergence of facts, Cole did not clearly establish that “every
   reasonable official” in Yorka’s position would have understood that his
   conduct violated Traylor’s Fourteenth Amendment right. See Mullenix, 577
   U.S. at 11 (quotation omitted). Yorka is thus entitled to qualified immunity
   on Traylor’s fabrication-of-evidence claim.
                                     IV.      Conclusion
           For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   order granting qualified immunity to Yorka on the excessive force and
   unlawful arrest claims. However, we REVERSE the district court’s order
   as to the fabrication-of-evidence claim and REMAND for entry of summary
   judgement in favor of Yorka.

           _____________________
           4
            Unlike this case, we addressed the fabrication-of-evidence claim in Cole at the
   motion-to-dismiss stage. 802 F.3d at 755.
           5
            The charge was dismissed several months after the incident, and after the plaintiff
   incurred substantial legal fees to confront the charge. Cole, 802 F.3d at 755.

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