Court Opinion

ID: 9764145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:12:10.980067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.131373
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
There can be no quarrel with the holding by the majority that a consent interlocutory judgment cannot be set aside if it was entered prior to the time that the consent of one of the parties was revoked. But appellant in this case complains of the fact that the trial court entered a final judgment without a hearing on the merits after he had made known to the court that he had withdrawn his consent to the agreement on which the agreed interlocutory judgment was based.
The authorities cited in the majority opinion hold that a valid consent judgment cannot be rendered if, at the time the court undertakes to make the agreement of the parties the judgment of the court the trial judge has knowledge that one of the parties to the agreement has withdrawn his consent or if, prior to rendition of the judgment, the trial court has knowledge of facts which would reasonably prompt further inquiry and such inquiry would disclose the lack of continued consent. It is clear in this case that, at the time the final judgment was rendered, the trial court was fully aware of the fact that appellant had revoked his consent. While it is true that at the time the interlocutory order was rendered the trial court had no reason to suspect that appellant was dissatisfied with the agreement, this fact can justify no more *405than a holding that the interlocutory order was properly rendered.
Since appellant did not consent to the rendition of the final judgment, basing such judgment on the repudiated agreement was clearly error. Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288 (1951).