Court Opinion

ID: 9464051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:24:11.864055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:26.375100
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
One of the fundamental concepts of the law of conspiracy is that there is no such thing as a one-man conspiracy. United States v. Gisehaltz, 278 F.Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y.1967). For this reason, one member of an alleged conspiracy cannot be convicted if all other members are acquitted. United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828, 95 S.Ct. 49, 42 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974); United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971); Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897,82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961). 21 U.S.C. § 848 proscribes a one-man offense. A defendant can be indicted alone and convicted alone. Conviction requires no proof of the agreement which is implicit in every conspiracy. See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965).
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s position that concerted action is the equivalent of conspiratorial action. A conspiracy requires “preconcert and connivance”. United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 & 424 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 1136, 47 L.Ed.2d 334 (1976). Concerted action, on the other hand, may result from duress rather than agreement. Cf. United States v. Tierney, 424 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850, 91 S.Ct. 53, 27 L.Ed.2d 87 (1970). It may occur without criminal intent on the part of one or more of the parties involved. See Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836, 89 S.Ct. 110, 21 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968); United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72-73 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002, 87 S.Ct. 705, 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1949). It may be simply the joint activity associated with aiding and abetting. United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218, 220 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 584, 60 S.Ct. 108, 84 L.Ed. 489 (1939); Jamail v. United States, 55 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1932). One who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a crime is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). This, in substance, is the conduct prohibited by § 848. Conspiracy to commit a substantive offense and aiding and abetting its commission are separate and distinct crimes, and a defendant may be convicted of both. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069,1083 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970).
The District Court instructed the jury, without exception, that before appellant *1061could be convicted of violating § 848, the jury must find that he committed the substantive offenses charged in Counts 8, 9 and 10 of the indictment; that these were part of a continuing series of violations by appellant; that he occupied a supervisory position or position of management; and that he obtained substantial income from the violations. Proof of none of these was required for conviction under the conspiracy count. The two offenses are not, therefore, “the same in law and in fact.” Because I conclude also that a conspiratorial agreement is not an essential element of a § 848 violation, I cannot concur in the majority’s holding that the sentences for these disparate offenses constituted double jeopardy.
I therefore respectfully dissent.