Court Opinion

ID: 9897410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:12.928302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.897116
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   May 04 2023, 9:11 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
James G. Pittman                                           ADAM R. NORMAN AND
Bedford, Indiana                                           MATTHEW A. NORMAN
                                                           David J. Theising
                                                           Harrison & Moberly, LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Pamela J. Hensler
                                                           Mallor Grodner LLP
                                                           Bloomington, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MLS Enterprises, LLC,                                      May 4, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff/Counterclaim                           Court of Appeals Case No.
Defendant,                                                 22A-PL-2755
                                                           Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Erik C. Allen,
Adam R. Norman and                                         Special Judge
Matthew A. Norman,                                         Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Defendants/                                      47C01-2006-PL-699
Counterclaimants/Third-Party
Plaintiff

                                 Opinion by Judge Bailey
                           Judges Brown and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023                             Page 1 of 13
      Bailey, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   MLS Enterprises (“MLS”) and farmers Adam and Matthew Norman (“the

      Normans”) possess adjoining properties in Lawrence County. MLS obtained a

      survey revealing an approximately one-quarter acre discrepancy between its

      deed boundary and a fence boundary, with one fence line deviation favoring

      MLS and one favoring the Normans. MLS filed an action to quiet title in itself

      to approximately one-tenth of an acre used by the Normans for agricultural

      purposes.

[2]   The Normans counterclaimed and moved for partial summary judgment. They

      asserted that MLS held a deed with a legal description inconsistent with that in

      a Quit Claim Deed given to MLS’s predecessor. The Normans also asserted

      that they had acquired title to the disputed land by either acquiescence or

      adverse possession. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the

      Normans, without articulating specific grounds therefor, and entered the order

      as a final and appealable judgment. MLS challenges the grant of partial

      summary judgment. We affirm.

      Issues
[3]   MLS presents two consolidated and restated issues for review:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023          Page 2 of 13
              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the
                       admission of designated evidence by denying MLS’s
                       motion to strike two paragraphs from Adam’s affidavit;
                       and

              II.      Whether partial summary judgment was improvidently
                       granted.

      Facts and Procedural History
[4]   In 1961, 1977, and 1988, Hugh and Georgia Gresham jointly acquired land in

      Lawrence County aggregating to 304 acres. After Georgia’s death in 1999,

      Hugh owned the land. At some point, he deeded a portion of the land to his

      heirs, but in 2012 they deeded the land back to Hugh by a Quit Claim Deed.

[5]   From 1999 until November 5, 2019, Hugh leased part of his acreage, located to

      the north of Gresham Road, to the Normans and their father for farming

      purposes. On January 31, 2006, Hugh sold 140 acres to the Normans. Prior to

      the sale, the parties walked the land, and Hugh pointed to a wire fence

      extending over a portion of the real estate. Woods were on one side and

      agricultural land on the other side. After the sale, the Normans used the

      property up to the wire fence for agricultural purposes, including the pasturing

      of livestock. In 2007, the Normans re-strung some of the fence with barbed

      wire. In 2012, they erected an electric fence just inside the wire fence.

      According to the Normans, they understood that the wire fence was the

      boundary line between the Gresham/Norman properties.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023             Page 3 of 13
[6]   Hugh died in June of 2019. On November 5, 2019, Hugh’s estate sold 164.66

      acres to MLS. In conjunction with its purchase of land, MLS commissioned a

      land survey (“the Oakley survey”). MLS concluded that the deed line and

      fence line differ; more specifically, that the wire fence encroaches in two areas.

      The first difference between the deed line and fence line is a tract of 0.103 acres

      to the east, occupied by MLS. The second is a tract of 0.099 acres to the west,

      occupied by the Normans.

[7]   On June 19, 2020, MLS filed a Complaint to Quiet Title to Real Estate (“the

      Complaint”) naming the Normans as defendants. MLS contended that it

      owned all property described in a 2019 Personal Representative’s Deed from

      Brenda McCammon, JoEllen Powell, and Carolyn Zeeks (Hugh’s heirs). The

      Normans filed an answer and counterclaim. In Count 1, the Normans sought

      to quiet title to the 0.099-acre tract in themselves. Count 2 alleged a claim for

      trespass against MLS, related to alleged spraying of chemicals onto agricultural

      crops.1 The Normans asserted that a legal description attached to the

      Complaint, based upon the Oakley survey, is inconsistent with that in a deed of

      prior conveyance. The Normans also claimed to have acquired title by

      acquiescence, or alternatively, by adverse possession.

[8]   After MLS answered the counterclaim and discovery commenced, the

      Normans engaged Lawrence County Surveyor Corey Allen to perform a

      1
          This trespass claim is pending in the Lawrence Circuit Court and is not a subject of this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023                                         Page 4 of 13
       boundary retracement survey of the disputed land. Subsequent to receipt of

       Allen’s report and survey (“the Allen survey”), the Normans were granted leave

       to file an amended counter-complaint. They added Farm Credit Mid-America,

       FLCA (“FCMA”) as a third-party defendant.2 FCMA filed an answer and

       asserted that it holds a lien against the real estate described in the Complaint.

       MLS was permitted to amend its complaint to add Count 2, a claim of adverse

       possession as to the 0.103 acres occupied by MLS.

[9]    On February 28, 2022, the Normans filed a motion for partial summary

       judgment upon the competing quiet title claims set forth in the Complaint and

       Count 1 of the counterclaim. The Normans submitted as designated materials

       the affidavits of Adam and Allen. In moving for summary judgment, the

       Normans pointed to Allen’s discovery of a discrepancy between the legal

       description in Exhibit A to the Complaint and a legal description contained in a

       2012 Quitclaim deed from Hugh’s heirs, by which Hugh had acquired title to

       part of the real estate later conveyed to MLS. MLS and FCMA filed responses

       in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, designated materials

       in opposition, and moved to strike several portions of Adam’s affidavit.

[10]   On August 12, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing. No party having

       moved to reform the deed based upon either the Oakley survey or Allen survey,

       argument was heard solely upon claims of acquisition of title by acquiescence

       2
           FCMA is not an active participant in this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023           Page 5 of 13
       or adverse possession. On August 17, 2022, the trial court entered its order,

       granting in part and denying in part the motion to strike portions of Adam’s

       affidavit. On the same day, the trial court entered an order granting the

       Normans’ motion for partial summary judgment and directing its entry as a

       final appealable judgment. MLS filed a motion to correct error, which was

       summarily denied. This appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Admissibility of Portions of Adam Norman Affidavit
[11]   Indiana Trial Rule 56 permits parties to submit affidavits and evidence in

       support of their motions for summary judgment. That rule states in relevant

       part:

               [A] party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings,
               depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of
               judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for
               purposes of the motion. ... Supporting and opposing affidavits
               shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
               would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
               that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
               therein. Sworn or certified copies not previously self-
               authenticated of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
               affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

       Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)-(E). “Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

       the trial court will consider only properly designated evidence which would be

       admissible at trial.” Zelman v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 133 N.E.3d 244,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023          Page 6 of 13
       248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We accord great deference to the evidentiary rulings

       of the trial court and will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Blevins v.

       Clark, 740 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse of discretion

       occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts

       and circumstances set before it. Id.

[12]   FCMA moved to strike portions of Adam’s affidavit on hearsay grounds.

       Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at

       the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

       Ind. Evid. Rule 801(c). The trial court granted the motion in part and denied

       the motion in part. At issue here is the language of Paragraphs 14 and 15:

               14. In late 2005, prior to purchasing the Norman Property from
               Hugh F. Gresham, my brother Mathew A. Norman and I walked
               the Norman Property with said Hugh F. Gresham, who pointed
               out the Partition Fence as the boundary line between the
               Norman Property and the MLS Property north of Gresham
               Road.

               15. Since acquiring title to the Norman Property in 2006, my
               brother Mathew A. Norman and I had an understanding and
               agreement with said Hugh F. Grisham that the Partition Fence
               was the boundary line between the Norman Property and the
               MLS Property north of Gresham Road.

       (App. Vol. II, pg. 122.)

[13]   In these paragraphs, Adam did not repeat statements made by another person.

       Adam’s averments pertain to conduct that he says he observed – pointing to a

       fence – and to his own assessment that the fence in question functioned as a
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023             Page 7 of 13
       partition fence pursuant to an agreement. Such would have been admissible

       had Adam testified at a trial. However, as we will expand upon below, Adam

       articulated no statement from Hugh to support Adam’s subjective belief that an

       agreement had been reached. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

       admission of the two challenged paragraphs of Adam’s affidavit.

       Summary Judgment
[14]   Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter

       shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

       party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). But

       summary judgment is not a means for resolution of factual disputes and

       “should not be used as an abbreviated trial, even where the proof is difficult or

       where the court may believe that the non-moving party will not succeed at

       trial.” Pierson ex rel. Pierson v. Serv. Am. Corp., 9 N.E.3d 712, 715 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014), trans. denied. We review de novo whether the trial court properly granted

       summary judgment. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

[15]   When we review a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the

       same as that of the trial court. Shambaugh & Son, Inc. v. Carlisle, 763 N.E.2d

       459, 461 (Ind. 2002). We consider only those facts that the parties designated

       to the trial court. Id. The Court must accept as true those facts alleged by the

       nonmoving party, construe the evidence in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve

       all doubts against the moving party. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023             Page 8 of 13
[16]   A trial court’s order on summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of

       validity; the party appealing from a grant of summary judgment must bear the

       burden of persuading this Court that the decision was erroneous. Indianapolis

       Downs, LLC v. Herr, 834 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We

       may affirm the grant of summary judgment upon any basis argued by the

       parties and supported by the record. Payton v. Hadley, 819 N.E.2d 432, 438

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, Trial Rule 56(H) specifically prohibits this

       Court from reversing a grant of summary judgment on the ground that there is a

       genuine issue of material fact, unless the material fact and the evidence relevant

       thereto shall have been specifically designated to the trial court.

       AutoXchange.com, Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2004).

[17]   In this case, the parties agree that a wire fence has stood at the subject property

       for many years. Mature trees have been used as fenceposts in some portions.

       In addition to the Normans’ observations commencing with their 1999 lease,

       the Lawrence County surveyor, in completing the Allen survey, uncovered

       evidence that an earlier fence had existed at the same location. At the disputed

       area, one side was used for agricultural purposes up to the fence and the other –

       wooded – side was not appropriate for or utilized for agricultural purposes.

       Shortly after purchasing land from Hugh, the Normans restrung a portion of

       fencing. They subsequently installed electric fencing. Although these basic

       facts do not appear to be in dispute, the existence of a stated or implied

       boundary agreement between Hugh and the Normans is in dispute.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023              Page 9 of 13
[18]   The trial court did not articulate the basis for its decision. At the outset of our

       review, we observe that, due to disparate requirements, the same facts (even if

       undisputed) will not support both the doctrine of title by acquiescence and a

       claim of adverse possession.

[19]   Adverse Possession. In Fraley v. Minger, our Supreme Court summarized and

       restated the common law doctrine of adverse possession:

               [T]he doctrine of adverse possession entitles a person without
               title to obtain ownership to a parcel of land upon clear and
               convincing proof of control, intent, notice, and duration, as
               follows:

               (1) Control—The claimant must exercise a degree of use and
               control over the parcel that is normal and customary considering
               the characteristics of the land (reflecting the former elements of
               “actual,” and in some ways “exclusive,” possession);

               (2) Intent—The claimant must demonstrate intent to claim full
               ownership of the tract superior to the rights of all others,
               particularly the legal owner (reflecting the former elements of
               “claim of right,” “exclusive,” “hostile,” and “adverse”);

               (3) Notice—The claimant’s actions with respect to the land must
               be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to the legal
               owner of the claimant's intent and exclusive control (reflecting
               the former “visible,” “open,” “notorious,” and in some ways the
               “hostile,” elements); and,

               (4) Duration—the claimant must satisfy each of these elements
               continuously for the required period of time (reflecting the former
               “continuous” element).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023           Page 10 of 13
       829 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Ind. 2005). Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-11,

       the required period of time is ten years.

[20]   Also, the adverse possessor must pay “all taxes and special assessments that the

       adverse possessor reasonably believes in good faith to be due on the real

       property during the period the adverse possessor claims to have adversely

       possessed the real property.” I.C. § 32-21-7-1.1 “Substantial compliance

       satisfies this statutory tax payment requirement ‘where the adverse claimant has

       a reasonable and good faith belief that the claimant is paying the taxes during

       the period of adverse possession.’” Celebration Worship Center, Inc. v. Tucker, 35

       N.E.3d 251, 254 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 493).

[21]   Successive periods of possession may be tacked together to meet the requisite

       ten-year requirement. Henry v. Liebner, 32 N.E.3d 258, 268 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2015), trans. denied. Once title vests in the adverse claimant at the end of the

       requisite ten-year period, the title may not be lost, abandoned, or forfeited.

       Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 487.

[22]   Here, the designated materials reveal the following. As to control over the

       disputed area, the Normans exercised a degree of use and control normal and

       customary considering the characteristics of the land. They used the area up to

       the wire fence for agricultural purposes, including pasturing of livestock. Their

       own intent to claim full ownership of the area is not a matter of dispute. With

       regard to actions providing actual or constructive notice to the legal owner, the

       Normans restrung fencing in 2007; they installed an electric fence; and they

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023          Page 11 of 13
       released their livestock to graze up to the fence. This use has been continuous

       since 2006. As to the payment of taxes, the parties had paid the Lawrence

       County assessments for their respective parcels, but the fence boundaries were

       such that each had occupied some portion of land that the deed boundary

       would have allocated to the other. In these circumstances, the Normans

       claimed that they had achieved substantial compliance with the relevant statute

       for payment of taxes, and MLS did not counter this contention.

[23]   To withstand summary judgment after the Normans made a prima facie

       showing of each element of adverse possession, it was incumbent upon MLS to

       come forward with some designated evidence to the contrary. They did not do

       so. Summary judgment was not improvidently granted to the Normans.3

       3
         The Normans also contended that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of title by
       acquiescence. The doctrine of title by acquiescence was recognized by our Indiana Supreme Court in 1856.
       See Ball v. Cox, 7 Ind. 453 (1856). There, the deed to Cox had “left the boundary line … an open question to
       be settled by survey” and the Court recognized that estoppel might operate based upon the intent and
       conduct of the parties. Id. at 461. The applicable period was recognized as twenty years: “as a general rule,
       … twenty years’ acquiescence is necessary to support an implied agreement in a boundary variant from that
       clearly expressed in the title deeds.” Id. at 460. The Court explained its reasoning for the time frame:

                It would be clearly against the policy both of the statute of frauds and the statute of
                limitations, to allow a mere intruder, without any claim or color of title, to acquire rights
                on easier terms than those who hold under an adverse possession.

       Id. at 461. Thereafter, our Indiana Supreme Court described the doctrine succinctly: “[t]he location of a
       division boundary line between two land proprietors, acquiesced in and acted upon, and the premises
       improved up to the line by each for twenty years, becomes binding as the true line.” Wingler v. Simpson, 93
       Ind. 201, 203 (1884).

       Although seldom used as the law of adverse possession developed, the doctrine remains viable in some
       circumstances. Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The doctrine
       of acquiescence applies only when:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023                                     Page 12 of 13
                                                   Conclusion
[24]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of designated

       evidentiary materials. The Normans are entitled to summary judgment on an

       adverse possession claim.

[25]   Affirmed.

       Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

                two adjoining property owners (1) share a good-faith belief concerning the location of the
                common boundary line that separates their properties and, (2) although the agreed-upon
                location is not in fact the actual boundary, (3) use their properties as if that boundary was
                the actual boundary (4) for a period of at least twenty years. It is the original agreement
                between the adjoining owners that takes this and all other “acquiescence” cases out of the
                realm of adverse possession.

       Id. at 1274 (J. Friedlander concurring, in which Judge Kirsch and Judge Riley join) (emphasis in original).
       We need not discuss the applicability of the doctrine here, because the Normans are entitled to summary
       judgment on a separate basis.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2755 | May 4, 2023                                    Page 13 of 13