Court Opinion

ID: 9673861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:29.453707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:03.380066
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
(Dissenting). I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty they all had to agree that the defendant was guilty of at least one of the categories of party to a crime. However, I disagree with the majority that this error requires a reversal.
The unanimity requirement announced in this opinion is a new constitutional rule. While generally the person raising the issue for the first time is entitled to the benefit of the new rule, even though his trial was held prior to the court’s holding, he is not entitled to a reversal and new trial if the error was harmless. Allison v. State, 62 Wis.2d 14, 29, 214 N.W.2d 437, 445 (1974); Jones v. State, 37 Wis.2d 56, 69a-69b, 155 N.W.2d 571, 572 (1968). I believe the error as applied to this case was harmless and therefore Holland’s conviction should be affirmed.
A review of the evidence presented at trial by both the State’s witnesses and the defendant’s witnesses shows that there is credible evidence to support only one category of the party to a crime statute — aiding and abetting. The only evidence presented to the jury that could have possibly supported a finding that Holland directly committed the murder was the testimony of Hoppe. He testified that Holland had gone into the bedroom where Westbrook was lying and suffocated her. However, Hoppe’s testimony was contradicted by every other witness including the State’s main witness, Ms. Jans. Based on the evidence submitted on the theory of direct commission, no reasonable jury could have concluded that *602Holland directly committed the murder. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty on direct commission.
The evidence was also insufficient to support a verdict of conspiracy. In this state, a person may be found guilty of party to a crime (conspiracy) if he agreed to commit a crime and the crime charged, while not the crime he agreed to commit, was the natural and probable consequence of the crime he agreed to commit. Wis JI—Criminal, Part I, 400. However, before the defendant may be found guilty under these circumstances, the State must prove that the crime charged was the natural and probable consequence. Turner v. State, 76 Wis.2d 1, 10-13, 250 N.W.2d 706, 711-12 (1977).
To prove that second degree murder was the natural and probable consequence of sexual perversion, the State had to prove that the conduct which Hoppe and Holland agreed to commit was so imminently dangerous that they could or should have known that death would result. Turner v. State, 76 Wis.2d at 10-14, 250 N.W.2d at 711-13, Thus, where the State claims that the defendant is liable for the crime charged (murder) because he conspired to commit another crime (sexual perversion) which resulted in death, they must prove that the conduct the defendant agreed to commit was so imminently dangerous that death was a foreseeable result.
The evidence in this case was insufficient to support a jury finding that the conduct Holland agreed to commit was so imminently dangerous that death was a foreseeable result. The State presented no evidence whatsoever that would tend to show that Holland had any reason to believe that Hoppe would go far beyond the acts of sexual perversion and strangle his victim. Nor is the act of sexual perversion itself so imminently dangerous to life that death is a foreseeable result. While in some instances other facts known to the defendant may make *603sexual perversion imminently dangerous, such as the tender age of the victim and the physical characteristics of the victim and assailant, Turner v. State, 76 Wis.2d at 13, 250 N.W.2d at 713, none of these factors were present here. In Turner the victim was nine years old. Here the victims were full grown adults. While any form of sexual perversion may in some sense be denominated dangerous, it is not inherently and consciously dangerous to life unless other facts known to the defendant make it imminently dangerous to that victim. There were no facts known to Holland that made his conduct imminently dangerous to the life of the victims. As the court stated in Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226, 246 (1874), cited with approval in Seidler v. State, 64 Wis.2d 456, 462, 219 N.W.2d 320, 324 (1974), and Turner v. State, 76 Wis.2d at 11, 250 N.W.2d at 712:
The first condition of the statute is, that the act producing death shall be imminently dangerous to others. It has been said that every act producing death must be thus dangerous. Perhaps this is literally true. But the statute does not go on fortuitous or latent danger, but on essential and apparent danger, of the act producing death. The act must be inherently and consciously dangerous to life, not such as casually produces death by misdaventure. It must be dangerous in and of itself, as committed and when committed, whether death follow it or not.
The most the evidence in this case shows is that the death of Westbrook, at least as to Holland’s liability, was a result of misadventure. He had no knowledge of any facts about Hoppe or their victims which would render his conduct of agreeing to commit sexual perversion in and of itself imminently dangerous to life. The State, therefore, failed to prove any facts which, if believed, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that *604murder was the natural and probable consequence of Holland’s agreement to commit sexual perversion.
Since no reasonable jury could have concluded that Holland directly committed'the murder nor could they conclude that murder was the natural and probable consequence of Holland’s agreement to commit sexual perversion, the jury’s verdict is only sustainable on the aiding and abetting category of party to a crime. The evidence presented in this case on aiding and abetting was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
• Ms. Jans testified that after she and Holland heard Ms. Westbook screaming for help, Holland held her on the couch and prevented her from aiding her friend. This testimony was uncontradicted by Holland. Also, Ms. Jans testified that after Hoppe had come out of the bedroom, he said that Ms. Jans would have to be killed because she had seen too much. There was a knock on the door and Holland prevented Ms. Jans from leaving to get help. Ms. Jans also testified that Holland attempted to divert the attention of the person at the front door thus preventing help for Ms. Westbrook. These facts, if believed by the jury, are sufficient to support a finding of guilty of party to a crime (aiding and abetting).
Since the verdict in this case is only süstainable on a finding of guilty of party to a crime (aiding and abetting), the trial court’s failure to instruct on unanimity was harmless. There was only one category any reasonable jury could have agreed upon — aiding and abetting. We must assume that the jury was reasonable, followed the instructions of the court, and returned its verdict based on the credible evidence submitted to it. We are not permitted to go behind the jury verdict if it is supported by credible evidence. Peters v. State, 70 Wis.2d 22, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975); State v. Shaw, 58 Wis.2d 25, 205 N.W.2d 132 (1973); State v. Johnson, 11 Wis.2d 130, 104 N.W.2d 379 (1960). Thus, we must assume that the jury returned a verdict of guilty of party *605to a crime (aiding and abetting). Since they could not have reasonably believed the defendant was guilty of either of the other two categories, and they were instructed that they had to return a unanimous verdict, they were unanimous. They all agreed that Holland was guilty of second degree murder, party to a crime, aiding and abetting.