Court Opinion

ID: 9956698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 19:02:07.43904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:45.605827
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 P. v. Savary CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B333620

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. KA083613-01)
         v.

KEFFIER HORACE SAVARY,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

      John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                    ——————————
      Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review this appeal of an order denying
appellant’s petition for resentencing brought under Penal Code1
section 1172.6. We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
       In 2012, a jury convicted appellant Keffier Savary of first
degree murder with enhancements for personal use of and
discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death
during commission of the offense. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c) & (d).) Under a different case number, KA094210,
a second jury convicted appellant of witness intimidation and
conspiracy to commit murder. (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 136.1,
subd. (a)(1).) On February 28, 2013, the court sentenced
appellant to an aggregate term of 77 years to life on all counts of
conviction.
       In 2023, Savary filed a petition for resentencing on the
murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel to represent Savary. The People opposed the
petition, arguing that the jury was not instructed on any theory
of culpability that imputed malice to appellant based solely on his
participation in a crime. Nor was the jury instructed on aiding
and abetting. He was prosecuted as the actual killer who acted
with actual malice. Attached to the People’s opposition are the
instructions given to the jury in the murder case.
       On August 17, 2023, the trial court denied the petition,
ruling that appellant had not made a prima facie case for
resentencing because he had not been prosecuted for murder on a
now-invalid theory of guilt and he “was prosecuted as the actual

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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perpetrator who acted with actual malice.” Savary timely
appealed.
       For context only, we recount the facts of the convictions
from our opinion in Savary’s direct appeal: In 2008, Savary killed
Harrison Smith, who was having an affair with Savary’s
estranged wife. While in custody for the 2008 murder, Savary
attempted to dissuade his wife from testifying and conspired with
his girlfriend to have his wife and another witness killed. (People
v. Savary (Feb. 3, 2015, B247512) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On January 8, 2024, we appointed counsel to represent
Savary on appeal. On February 1, 2024, counsel filed a no-issue
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us he had
told appellant he may file his own supplemental brief within
30 days. Counsel sent Savary transcripts of the record on appeal
as well as a copy of the brief.
       On February 1, 2024, this court sent Savary notice that a
brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised
him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief
or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We
also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
       On March 4, 2024, Savary filed a supplemental brief, in
which he contends: 1) he was convicted with false evidence and
prosecutorial misconduct; 2) the prosecutor stole his property and
used it as payment to pay off a false witness; 3) the entire
conviction is fraudulent; 4) the prosecutor hid the crime of grand
theft and misappropriation of his property from the jury and the
defense; and 5) the jury was instructed on imputed malice.

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                           DISCUSSION
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for
liability for murder (and later, attempted murder). It also limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957) (Lewis).) Petitions for resentencing carry
out the intent of Senate Bill No. 1437, which was “to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
Lewis, at p. 967.) Petitions under section 1172.6 address
convictions where a defendant was not the shooter, but was held
vicariously liable on one of several theories of liability nullified by
the statute.
       The trial court is entitled to review the record of conviction
and deny a resentencing petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing if the record establishes ineligibility for resentencing as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 970–971.)
       Savary’s first four contentions challenge misconduct which
allegedly occurred at his trial. An appeal from a post-judgment
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a vehicle to
raise unrelated claims of error allegedly committed by the trial
court; it is not another opportunity to challenge the original
judgment on new grounds. (People v. Farfan (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [the mere filing of a section 1172.6
petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise
claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s findings]; People v. Allison (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 449, 461 [a petition for resentencing does not

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provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved], disapproved on another ground in People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 718, fn. 3.) Thus, section 1172.6 does not
afford a retrial on every element of a conviction for murder.
Rather, Savary must allege facts which, if true, would
demonstrate that he could not presently be convicted of murder
“because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The first four contentions
alleging trial court error do not satisfy this requirement.
       Savary’s fifth contention is that the jury was improperly
instructed on imputed malice. We reject this contention as well.
Vicarious liability and imputed malice were not theories
presented to the jury. The jury was not instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, the felony murder rule, any
theory of aiding and abetting or any other theory of liability for
murder based on participation in a different crime. Nor was the
jury instructed on imputed malice. Instead, the jury was
instructed on murder with malice aforethought and first degree
murder. (CALCRIM No. 520 and 521.) These instructions
included explanations of express and implied, not imputed,
malice. In light of the instructions, Savary is not eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52 [“if the record shows that the jury was not instructed on either
the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder
doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law”].)
       Finally, without stating any reasons, Savary asks us to
remove and replace appellate counsel. In effect, he appears to be
invoking the rule of People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

                                  5
(Marsden).) Marsden established that a defendant is entitled to
appointment of new counsel if the record clearly shows current
appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result. (People v. Zendejas (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1108.)
The rule of Marsden is “grounded in the constitutional right to
effective counsel” under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. (People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d
863, 869.) “Criminal defendants have a right to the effective
assistance of counsel on the first appeal granted as a matter of
right from a criminal conviction.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 224.)
       An appeal from the denial of a petition for resentencing is
not a first appeal as of right and there is no constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel on appeal from resentencing
appeals. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 227, fn. omitted
[“there is no federal constitutional right to counsel under
subdivision (c) of section 1172.6, and the right to counsel at that
point in the proceedings is purely statutory. Given there is no
constitutional right to counsel in a proceeding under section
1172.6, subdivision (c), it would ‘defy logic’ to conclude there is a
constitutional right to counsel ‘to appeal [that] state collateral
determination.’ ”].) Absent a constitutional right to appointed
counsel, there is no basis for a Marsden hearing.
       We are not required to independently review the record and
we decline to do so. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)

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                          DISPOSITION
     The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

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