Court Opinion

ID: 9882652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:01.647362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:40.173284
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lofton, 2023-Ohio-2796.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio                                      Court of Appeals No. L-22-1111

        Appellee                                   Trial Court No. CR0202101525

v.

Nevaeh Lofton                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                  Decided: August 11, 2023

                                             *****

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Michael H. Stahl, for appellant.

                                             *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment by the Lucas County Court of Common

Pleas, which sentenced appellant, Neveah Lofton, to an indefinite prison term of four to

six years for felonious assault after the trial court accepted appellant’s Alford guilty plea

and convicted her of that offense. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms, in

part, and reverses, in part, the judgment of the trial court.
                                      I. Background

       {¶ 2} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On April 13,

2021, the Lucas County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one count of felonious assault,

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D), a felony in the second degree. R.C.

2903.11(A)(1) states, “No person shall knowingly * * * (1) cause serious physical harm

to another[.]” The Lucas County Grand Jury also indicted appellant on one count of

felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D), a felony in the second

degree. R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) states, “No person shall knowingly * * * (2) cause or attempt

to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon[.]” Appellee, state

of Ohio, gave the factual basis for the charges: that on or about January 10, 2021, in

Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, appellant drove her car, a red Ford Fusion, into the victim

and pinned the victim against a building, instantly breaking one leg. The victim was

hospitalized with serious injuries and has undergone numerous surgeries.

       {¶ 3} Appellant entered not-guilty pleas, and the matter proceeded to trial. On the

morning of trial, on February 15, 2022, appellant changed her plea to guilty, pursuant to

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to one count

of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D), a felony in the second

degree. In the plea agreement, appellee dismissed the second count of felonious assault

with a deadly weapon, recommended a four-to-six-year sentence, and recommended a

no-contact order with the victim. After an extensive plea colloquy, the trial court

2.
accepted appellant’s plea and found her guilty of the offense. Later, the trial court

sentenced appellant to serve an indefinite prison term of four to six years. At sentencing,

the trial court summarized the evidence against appellant and her criminal history.

              Court: Ms. Lofton, it was clear from the video footage that the police

       obtained from the nearby business that you intentionally ran down the

       victim. As she was running down the alley[;] you struck her, pinning her to

       the building. It goes without saying that you caused her serious physical

       harm, as well as psychological harm. There was a severe laceration that she

       suffered to her leg, and bone was protruding from that wound, which

       resulted in several surgeries. Despite the video footage, you claim you had

       nothing to do with this. You are 20 years old and you have three felony

       convictions as a juvenile, and you’re wanted in Monroe, Michigan on

       outstanding warrants for domestic violence and two assault offenses.

       {¶ 4} Appellant timely appealed the trial court judgment setting forth one

assignment of error: “Neveah Lofton was denied effective assistance of counsel under the

Ohio and United States Constitutions when her lawyer, who was later permitted to resign

from the practice of law with disciplinary proceedings pending, was completely

unprepared for trial and entered an Alford guilty plea with the jury already empaneled.”

3.
                          II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 5} In support of her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that her trial

counsel, Frank Simmons, was ineffective for two reasons: failing to request a competency

evaluation when she has no memory of the offence and demonstrating his ignorance by

equating her lack of competency with recalcitrance on the issue of guilt, not her failure to

remember. Appellant argues the trial court erred by accepting her Alford guilty plea to

felonious assault, and by finding her guilty, when her mental health issues “were before

the court”: that she had an unmedicated bipolar disorder at the time of the plea.

Appellant further argues her trial counsel was ineffective because since filing the notice

of appeal on May 11, he resigned from the practice of law in Ohio with discipline

pending. Appellant concludes that her trial counsel’s failure to investigate her

competency prior to offering her Alford guilty plea should be reversed on plain error,

after employing a more nuanced analysis than usually followed in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

       {¶ 6} Appellee responds that appellant does not meet her burden to show her trial

counsel was ineffective at the time of her Alford guilty plea for a number of reasons.

First, the thorough plea colloquy by the trial court established appellant was a currently-

pregnant, 20-year-old mother of two infants who did not complete the 12th grade, but

understood the proceedings and was satisfied with the amount of time she had with her

trial counsel and with his advice. Second, at sentencing, appellant’s trial counsel raised

4.
the issues of her bipolar and ADHD diagnoses since her youth because he reviewed her

presentence investigation report with her. Third, appellant’s incompetency claim is

traceable to her failure to take the necessary medications to maintain her mental health at

the time of the offense because of her succession of pregnancies. Nevertheless, appellant

confirmed that she has continuously received mental health counseling for her issues.

Fourth, her trial counsel recommended the plea deal because, although she maintained

her innocence, “she was closely knitted to this case,” and the presentence investigation

report included “significant statements” by her: the actual car involved was hers; the car

was at one point under her control; the car is “part of the reason why the victim was

injured”; and “instead of being convicted by a jury and, possibly, sentenced to the high

end,” i.e., the maximum minimum of eight years to maximum of 12 years if the

convictions were merged at sentencing, the plea agreement recommended four-to-six

years, and appellant retained opportunities for probation and access to mental health care.

Fifth, her trial counsel offered mitigation at sentencing that the trial court could “probably

help her, help the community, help her children, help her family” with a sentence that

provides her access to the mental health care she needs, such as receiving the medications

during incarceration, access to probation, or diversion to a correctional treatment facility.

Finally, appellant’s trial counsel was fully licensed during the entire time he represented

appellant, so it is irrelevant that he later resigned from the practice of law.

5.
                  A. Presumption of Licensed Attorney’s Competence

       {¶ 7} An ineffective assistance of counsel claim must overcome the strong

presumption that a properly licensed Ohio lawyer is competent. State v. Hamblin, 37

Ohio St.3d 153, 155-56, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Appellant repeatedly argues that her

trial counsel should be presumed ineffective because, during the course of this appeal, he

resigned from the practice of law with discipline pending. Appellant does not identify

how the resignation is relevant to, or arose out of, her February 15, 2022 Alford guilty

plea, and she did not question the licensure of her trial counsel at any time during the trial

court proceedings. The final act by her trial counsel in the record is the filing of the

notice of appeal to preserve her rights. App.R. 4(A)(1). We find the issue of her trial

counsel’s resignation from the practice of law is not in the record of this appeal. App.R.

9(A)(1). By appellant’s own admission, her trial counsel was licensed to practice law in

Ohio at the time she offered her Alford guilty plea, and his competence is presumed.

       {¶ 8} To overcome her trial counsel’s presumption of competence, appellant has

the burden to show both: (1) deficient performance by her trial counsel below an

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) a reasonable probability of

prejudice that but-for her trial counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different,

i.e., that she would not have offered an Alford guilty plea to one count of felonious

assault and, instead, proceed to trial. Hamblin at 156, citing Strickland at 687. “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

6.
outcome.” Strickland at 694. If appellant fails to meet either prong of the Strickland test,

it is not necessary for us to engage in an analysis of the other prong. State v. Bradley, 42

Ohio St.3d 136, 143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), citing Strickland at 697.

                                 B. Deficient Performance

       {¶ 9} For the first Strickland prong, appellate scrutiny of trial counsel’s

performance is highly deferential. Id. at 142, citing Strickland at 689. “Debatable trial

tactics generally do not constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.” State ex rel.

Mango v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 169 Ohio St.3d 32, 2022-Ohio-1559, 201

N.E.3d 846, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).

       {¶ 10} Appellant argues her trial counsel was not prepared for trial, which is why

he improperly advised her to offer her the Alford guilty plea. But a review of the

February 15, 2022 change-of-plea hearing transcript indicates otherwise. While it is true

that a jury had been assembled to commence trial that morning, it is not unusual for the

parties to continue their plea negotiations until an acceptable plea agreement is reached,

even after the jury is assembled. Her trial counsel placed a number of reasons in the

record for the advisability of her plea, none of which reflect a lack of trial preparation.

Neither appellee nor the trial court had to agree to a plea agreement, and the entire

discussion by the trial court, appellee, and appellant’s trial counsel contains no concern

that her trial counsel was unprepared for trial.

7.
      {¶ 11} After the trial court ascertained appellant’s age, level of schooling,

understanding of the English language, and the absence of drugs or medication that

would interfere with her understanding of what was taking place, the trial court’s lengthy

plea colloquy continued, and appellant’s answers are coherent, lucid, and direct:

              Court: Your attorney said that you are going to enter a plea of guilty

      pursuant to the Supreme Court case of North Carolina versus Alford to

      count one in the indictment, which is felonious assault, a felony of the

      second degree. And in exchange for your plea the State of Ohio will nolle,

      or dismiss, count two at time of sentencing. The State is requesting a no

      contact order with the victim, and the State is also recommending a

      sentence of four to six years. Is that your understanding of what you’re

      doing here today?

              A: Yes, ma’am.

              Court: And knowing that, do you still wish to go forward with the

      plea?

              A: Yes, ma’am.

              Court: Are you satisfied with the amount of time you’ve had to

      speak with your attorney about this case?

              A: Yes, ma’am.

              Court: Are you satisfied with his advice and counsel?

8.
               A: Yes.

               Court: Did anyone force you to enter this plea?

               A: No.

               Court: Did anyone promise you anything to get you to enter this

       plea?

               A: No.

               Court: You’re doing it voluntarily?

               A: Yes.

       {¶ 12} The trial court then exhaustively reviewed each right appellant was waiving

with her Alford guilty plea and reviewed each potential sentence and sanction to appellant

if the court accepted her plea and found her guilty of felonious assault. The trial court

then addressed the reason for appellant’s Alford guilty plea:

               Court: You are entering a plea of guilty but you do not admit

       committing this offense. Do you understand that?

               A: Yes.

               Court: The only reason you’re entering this plea is to avoid the risk

       of being convicted of a more serious offense and facing a more serious

       penalty at trial. Do you understand that?

               A: Yes.

               ***

9.
              Court: I have in my hand a plea form which appears to have your

      signature on each of these pages. Is that your signature that appears on this

      form?

              A: Yes, ma’am.

              Curt: Did you read the form or have it read to you before you signed

      it?

              A: Yes, ma’am.

              Court: Did you have any questions about anything contained in the

      plea form?

              A: No, ma’am.

              Court: Do you have any questions about anything that’s taking place

      here today?

              A: No, ma’am.

              Court: The Court finds the Defendant was advised of all

      Constitutional rights, understanding the nature of the charge, the effect of

      the plea and the maximum penalty involved. She made a knowing,

      intelligent, voluntary waiver of those rights. The plea is accepted and

      ordered filed and a finding of guilty is made. I’m going to refer this matter

      to the Probation Department for a presentence report. * * *.

10.
       {¶ 13} The sentencing hearing was held on April 6. Appellant’s trial counsel

placed on the record the following mitigation considerations that arose from the

presentence investigation report:

              Court: This matter is before the Court for sentencing. Mr. Simmons,

       is there anything you would like to say on behalf of your client?

              Counsel: Yes, Judge, please. Thank you. I did review the disclosable

       portion of the presentence report, Judge, and I did go over it with my client.

              ***

              [T]he Defendant pled pursuant to North Carolina versus Alford. I did

       go over the evidence with her, indicating that the reason why she entered

       the plea, it was the actual vehicle she was identified with. Be that as it may,

       she’s maintained her position, as you [may have noted] * * * in the

       significant statements in the presentence report, which she has maintained

       throughout this event. However, due to the fact that she was closely knitted

       to this case, she was part of the case because the vehicle that she, at one

       point, had in her control was part of the case and part of the reason why the

       victim was injured.

              That being said, Judge, we would ask the Court to consider these

       factors when imposing a sentence on the Defendant. One, very young. Two,

       I’m not sure the mental health is all together there. Three, she’s got

11.
       children, but it’s just – I think the mental health issue is preventing her

       from actually being at her best, making the best decisions, being able to

       make recollections or recall or dealing with certain situations, it’s not good.

       I think that any involvement in this case that she has, she should be

       punished, but I’m not clear as to what that involvement is.

              And since she pled and is found guilty of it, she’s here to * * * take

       whatever this Court is going to issue. And, quite honestly, Judge,

       incarceration at some point is probably going to be part of the resolution

       because of the medications, but she can’t even take her meds because she’s

       pregnant now.

              So I’m not sure what a person that needs meds that has – or has been

       involved in an incident of this nature, how to deal with it. Other than, she’s

       here to accept her portion of responsibility because she entered the plea.

       And instead of being convicted by a jury and, possibly, sentenced to the

       high end, I would ask the Court to consider, maybe sentence her on the low

       end, maybe with giving her a chance for probation at some point. Or if she

       can get into CTF for mental health now, it would be something that would

       probably help her, help the community, help her children, help her family.

       {¶ 14} Appellant, again, gave no indication of incompetence when she coherently,

lucidly, and directly answered to the trial court’s question at sentencing:

12.
              Court: Thank you, Mr. Simmons. Ms. Lofton, is there anything you

       would like to say?

              A: Just that I am actually in mental health, it’s just that I cannot

       physically take the meds. But as far as the counseling and everything goes,

       that’s what I’m on for [with Unison services]. My next appointment is on

       the 19th.

       {¶ 15} The trial court then proceeded to announce its sentencing decision, which

was the recommendation from the plea deal. Nevertheless, appellant argues that her trial

counsel’s failure to investigate her obvious mental health issues and require a

competency evaluation warrant presuming deficient performance by him. We disagree.

Appellant does not argue her incompetence was obvious at her Alford guilty plea hearing;

rather, she argues at the sentencing phase her trial counsel was ineffective by not seeking

to withdraw her plea and then demand a trial, subject to her competency to stand trial.

Appellant cites to Justice O’Neill’s partial concurrence and partial dissent in State v.

McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 361, to support her

argument that the two-prong approach in Strickland requires a nuanced and more

complex analysis to “accurately reflect the decision in Strickland itself, or subsequent

decisions.”

       {¶ 16} We find appellant’s reliance on Justice O’Neill’s discussion in McKelton is

misplaced and distinguishable from this matter. In that capital-murder case, the

13.
defendant had three trial counsel, all of whom sought to withdraw from representation

because the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated too far, but two of them were

denied withdrawal. Id. at ¶ 355. During the sentencing mitigation phase, those two

attorneys failed to hire the ABA-recommended number of trained mitigation specialists

for a death-penalty case, and Justice O’Neill goes into great detail as why more should be

expected from defense counsel “in the context of a capital-sentencing hearing” of an

“exceptional case.” Id. at ¶ 356-366. There is no support in the record of this matter to

analyze it for death-penalty mitigation.

       {¶ 17} Appellant also urges us to employ the analyses set forth in the following

United States Supreme Court cases: Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274, 188 L.Ed.2d

1, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) (“The trial attorney’s failure to request additional funding in

order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly believed that

he had received all he could get under Alabama law constituted deficient performance.”);

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000) (“[Trial

counsel] failed to conduct an investigation [for the sentencing phase] that would have

uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood, not

because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law

barred access to such records.”); and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 173, 182 L.Ed.2d

398, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) (“[T]he Michigan Court of Appeals identified respondent’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim but failed to apply Strickland to assess it. Rather

14.
than applying Strickland, the state court simply found that respondent’s rejection of the

plea was knowing and voluntary.”).

       {¶ 18} We are not persuaded, as the material facts from the foregoing cases are,

once again, not present here to support employing any analysis different from the long-

standing Strickland test. There is no support in the record that appellant’s trial counsel,

like in Hinton, mistakenly believed that he reached a funding cap to retain a firearms

expert for a capital-murder case. Nor is there support on the record that appellant’s trial

counsel failed to offer mitigating evidence of, for example, her borderline mental

retardation during sentencing following a capital-murder conviction, like in Williams.

Nor is there support in the record that appellant’s trial counsel improperly advised

appellant to reject a plea offer and go to trial as determined during habeas corpus post-

conviction relief for an assault-with-intent-to-murder offense, like in Lafler. Therefore,

appellant’s trial counsel’s presumption of competence stands.

       {¶ 19} An Alford plea is a guilty plea while the defendant maintains actual

innocence of the charges. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814

N.E.2d 51, ¶ 13. “‘The constitutional standard for assessing a defendant’s competency to

enter a guilty plea is the same as that for determining his competency to stand trial.’”

State v. Hardin, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-18-014, 2021-Ohio-3764, ¶ 15, quoting State v.

Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 56.

15.
       {¶ 20} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.37(G), appellant is presumed to be competent to

stand trial, and she bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she

is not competent. State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d

1112, ¶ 32. The two-part test for competency to stand trial is: (1) whether appellant has

sufficient present ability to consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding, and (2) whether appellant has a rational as well as factual understanding

of the proceedings against her. Id., citing State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650

N.E.2d 433 (1995). A competency hearing, pursuant to R.C. 2945.37(B), is not

warranted in the absence from the record of sufficient indicia of incompetence to call into

question appellant’s right to a fair trial. Hardin at ¶ 18, citing Montgomery at ¶ 55. The

Ohio Supreme Court has found it noteworthy when, as in this case, from the record no

one questioned appellant’s competency from her behavior in any court proceedings. Id.

at ¶ 20, citing Montgomery at ¶ 57.

       {¶ 21} We find the record of the Alford guilty plea hearing and of the sentencing

hearing show appellant’s coherent, lucid and direct responses to all of the trial court’s

questions, and appellant failed to show otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellant had both sufficient, present ability to consult with her trial counsel with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding, and was satisfied with such consultations

and advice from her trial counsel. Appellant also had a rational and factual

understanding of the felonious assault proceedings against her and explicitly stated she

16.
offered her Alford guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Although

appellant maintained her innocence, that is a material reason to offer of an Alford guilty

plea.

        {¶ 22} Due process principles mandate that a legally incompetent defendant shall

not be subjected to trial. Berry at 359. However, “incompetency is not automatic upon a

proffer of a mental concern for a defendant.” Hardin at ¶ 15, citing Neyland at ¶ 48.

“Incompetency must not be equated with mere mental or emotional instability or even

with outright insanity. A defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and

still be capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting his counsel.”

State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986). “Incompetency is

defined in Ohio as the defendant’s inability to understand “* * * the nature and objective

of the proceedings against him or of presently assisting in his defense.’” Id., quoting

R.C. 2945.37(A). By this definition, we find the record does not support appellant’s self-

proclaimed incompetence.

        {¶ 23} Nor is there evidence in the record that appellant’s mental health history

impacted her ability to enter the Alford guilty plea. The standard of validity of an Alford

plea is “a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence

provided that the plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that some

factual basis exists to support the allegations in the indictment.” In re Kirby, 101 Ohio

St.3d 312, 2004-Ohio-970, 804 N.E.2d 476, ¶ 15. On appeal, a criminal defendant whose

17.
guilty plea was accepted by the trial court is limited to attacking the voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent character of the guilty plea. State v. Luna, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-016,

2020-Ohio-3211, ¶ 8.

       {¶ 24} The test to determine whether an Alford plea was voluntarily, knowingly,

and intelligently made is whether: (1) the plea was not the result of coercion, deception or

intimidation; (2) trial counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) trial counsel’s

advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the plea; (4) the plea was

made with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) the plea was motivated

either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or

both. State v. Morris, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1187, 2020-Ohio-704, ¶ 12.

       {¶ 25} We reviewed the record and find that all five elements of a valid Alford

guilty plea are present in this case. We do not find, under the first-prong of the

Strickland test, a deficient performance by her trial counsel below an objective standard

of reasonable representation. We do not find that appellant met her burden by a

preponderance of the evidence that her trial counsel’s performance was ineffective.

       {¶ 26} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is found not well-taken.

                           III. Postrelease-Control-Advisement

       {¶ 27} Given our decision on appellant’s assignment of error, we reject appellant’s

urging that the plain-error doctrine applies to appellant’s self-proclaimed incompetency.

Ordinarily we would not proceed with any further plain-error inquiry, App.R.

18.
12(A)(1)(b), but appellee presents us with an exceptional circumstance regarding the

postrelease-control advisement.

       {¶ 28} The Supreme Court of Ohio instructs us to take notice of the Crim.R. 52(B)

plain error doctrine “‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175,

2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 62, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372

N.E.2d 804 (1978). The extreme caution is necessary for appellate courts, which

normally should not consider questions on which the lower court has not ruled, to

consider on appeal any issues not first raised before the trial court. Long at 95-96, citing

Crim.R. 52(B).

       {¶ 29} Appellant does not argue on appeal, but appellee acknowledges, that

between the date of the offense on January 10, 2021, and the trial court’s sentencing

hearing on April 6, 2022, R.C. 2967.28(B) was amended, effective on September 30,

2021. The trial court’s April 7 sentencing judgment entry states appellant was provided

the appropriate postrelease-control advisements, including being “subject to 3 years

mandatory post-release control.” However, that language is pursuant to former R.C.

2967.28(B)(2) and R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d). Rather, appellant is entitled to an advisement

of a lesser period of postrelease control. Effective at the time of sentencing, R.C.

2967.28(B)(3), formerly R.C. 2967.28(B)(2), states appellant’s postrelease control for a

second-degree felony shall be “up to three years, but not less than eighteen months.”

19.
       {¶ 30} If a statute is amended and becomes effective while the defendant’s case is

pending in the trial court, then R.C. 1.58 guides its application to the pending case. State

v. Mallory, 8th Dist. No. 111115, 2022-Ohio-3667, 199 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 92. Appellant can

seek the benefit of the statutorily-reduced duration of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 95.

       {¶ 31} The failure of the sentencing entry to properly reflect the period of

postrelease-control advisement is not fatal to appellant’s sentence for two reasons.

       {¶ 32} First, we find that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and 2967.28(B) operate in tandem

to confirm that such error “in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a

statement to that effect [that the offender’s sentence includes a period of post-release

control] does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision

that is required for the offender under [R.C. 2967.28(B)].”

       {¶ 33} Second, the record shows that at the sentencing hearing on April 6, the trial

court verbally advised, “Once you’re released from prison you’re going to have up to

mandatory three years of post-release control.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, the

written plea form appellant signed on February 15, notified her that the postrelease

control for a second-degree felony was “a mandatory period of not less than eighteen

months but not more than three years” (Emphasis added.) Upon review of the entire

record, we find appellant received the proper postrelease control advisement, even if the

sentencing judgment does not reflect it.

20.
       {¶ 34} Pursuant to Crim.R. 36, we remand this case to the trial court for the

limited purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the trial court’s clerical error in its

April 7, 2022 judgment entry so that appellant’s postrelease control for a second-degree

felony shall be “up to three years, but not less than eighteen months” pursuant to R.C.

2967.28(B)(3), formerly R.C. 2967.28(B)(2). State ex rel. Randlett v. Lynch, 168 Ohio

St.3d 568, 2022-Ohio-3260, 200 N.E.3d 236, ¶ 15; State v. Irving, 6th Dist. Wood No.

WD-22-009, 2022-Ohio-4019, ¶ 11.

                                       IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 35} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, for the limited purpose of a

nunc pro tunc entry to correct the trial court’s April 7, 2022 judgment entry that

appellant’s postrelease control for a second-degree felony shall be “up to three years, but

not less than eighteen months” pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B)(3). Appellant and appellee

are ordered to equally pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                  Judgment affirmed, in part,
                                                                       and reversed, in part.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

21.
                                                                            State of Ohio
                                                                        v. Nevaeh Lofton
                                                                               L-22-1111

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                          ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                              ____________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, J.                                     JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                              ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

22.