Court Opinion

ID: 9393995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 20:03:56.662483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.724548
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 210427-U

                                   Order filed May 11, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-21-0427
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 10-CF-1096
                                                       )
      DANIEL EMMANUEL MOORE,                           )       Honorable
                                                       )       Katherine S. Gorman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Albrecht and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received
                  ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2          Defendant, Daniel Emmanuel Moore, appeals from the Peoria County circuit court’s

     denial of his postconviction petition following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant

     argues that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel provided ineffective

     assistance by advising him that a mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement was or might be

     unconstitutional, which prompted him to reject a favorable plea offer. We affirm.
¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          Following a jury trial in November 2011, defendant was found guilty of two counts of

     armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)) and one count of burglary (id. § 19-1(a)). In

     October 2012, prior to sentencing, defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion seeking a ruling that a

     15-year firearm enhancement was unconstitutional because the supreme court in People v.

     Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 86-87 (2007) held that it violated the proportionate penalties clause of

     the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I., § 11) and subsequent legislation failed to revive

     it. The motion noted that, at the time, there was a split amongst the appellate courts as to whether

     the enhancement remained unconstitutional or whether it had been revived and it cited to People

     v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151 and People v. Brown, 2012 IL App (5th) 100452, as well

     as this court’s unpublished order in People v. Blair, 2012 IL App (3d) 100743-U. The court

     denied the motion. It sentenced defendant to concurrent 35-year terms of imprisonment for each

     of the armed robbery charges and a 14-year term of imprisonment for the burglary charge. The

     35-year sentences for armed robbery each consisted of a 20-year sentence plus the 15-year

     enhancement. Defendant appealed and this court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in

     part. People v. Moore, 2014 IL App (3d) 120928-U, ¶ 35.

¶5          Defendant filed, as a self-represented litigant, a postconviction petition alleging that he

     received ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations. Specifically, defendant

     alleged that, based on a misapprehension of the law, counsel advised him that the 15-year

     enhancement did not apply to him and to reject the State’s offer of 20 years’ imprisonment.

     Defendant further alleged that he rejected the offer based on counsel’s advice and if he had

     known the 15-year enhancement applied to him, he would have accepted the offer.

                                                        2
¶6          Defendant was appointed postconviction counsel and the matter ultimately proceeded to a

     third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant testified that prior to trial he received an offer from

     the State of 20 years’ imprisonment. Trial counsel told him the State was “willing to drop one

     armed robbery, the 21 to 45, if [defendant was] willing to give up [his] appeal rights and take 20

     years. Trial counsel advised that only three things could happen, he could: (1) accept the 20-year

     deal and serve 10 years; (2) go to trial and be found not guilty; or (3) be found guilty at trial and

     face up to 30 years’ imprisonment, because the 15-year enhancement did not apply to him.

     Defendant stated that trial counsel told him that the courts were “having issues with this matter

     as we speak under the Hauschild and Garcia.” Trial counsel advised defendant not to take the

     plea deal. Defendant’s understanding was that he faced between 6 and 30 years’ imprisonment

     and not 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment because trial counsel told him the 15-year enhancement

     was unconstitutional. He based his decision to reject the plea on counsel’s advice. Defendant

     would have accepted the deal if he had known he faced 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment. Defendant

     explained his reasoning for rejecting the 20-year offer when he believed the maximum he was

     facing was 30 years by saying, “If I take 20 and do 10 and I get 30 and only do 15, that’s a small

     window.”

¶7          Defendant admitted that trial counsel told him that the State believed the 15-year

     enhancement was valid and the sentencing range was 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment but stated

     counsel also told him the State was wrong. When the State asked if defendant stated that he told

     trial counsel he understood 21 years’ imprisonment could be his minimum, defendant stated, “I

     recall saying if they would apply the 21 to 45, but it looked like it was 6 to 30. So, you know, I

     was looking at the 6 to 30.”

                                                       3
¶8             Trial counsel testified that he would never tell a client that something was guaranteed.

       Due to the length of time that had passed since trial, counsel no longer had his file regarding this

       matter and thus, was unable to review the same. With regard to the plea offer at issue, counsel

       remembered that the 15-year enhancement was at issue and they were aware of that prior to trial.

       They discussed that “what was at play” was whether the enhancement applied. Trial counsel

       testified that a case had stricken that enhancement but there was also a legislative enactment that

       was thought to revive it. He also noted that a couple of appellate cases had held the enhancement

       was not revived, including an unpublished decision from this court and that at sentencing he

       argued the enhancement did not apply based upon those cases.

¶9             As to his discussion with defendant, counsel stated that “[t]he discussion I had with

       [defendant] was this either applies or it doesn’t. If it does not apply, your sentencing range is 6 to

       30. If it does apply, your sentencing range is 21 to 45.” Trial counsel never promised defendant

       that the enhancement would not apply. Counsel recalled discussing with defendant that if the

       enhancement did apply, the offer was a better offer than if the enhancement did not apply.

       Counsel stated that “[i]t just didn’t go the way [defendant’s] recollecting with me guaranteeing

       an outcome.” He advised defendant “very clearly” that there was a scenario in which the 15-year

       enhancement would apply and his discussions with defendant included the fact that they were

       dealing with different potential sentencing ranges, depending on whether the enhancement

       applied. At the time of defendant’s case, he would not have told any clients whether or not to

       take an offer because it is the client’s decision.

¶ 10           Trial counsel filed a motion regarding whether the 15-year enhancement applied, but it

       was filed after the verdict and prior to sentencing. Counsel admitted it may have been a better

                                                            4
       practice to file that motion prior to defendant making a decision on the offer but added that he

       was not sure the court would have entertained it at that point.

¶ 11          The court determined that the issue regarding the 15-year enhancement was evolving. It

       found that the “uncertainty at the time most certainly made it challenging to advise criminal

       defendants, including [defendant] about the penalty range.” Further, the court found that

       defendant was aware of the conflict regarding the sentencing range and trial counsel addressed

       the conflict prior to trial and before sentencing. The court concluded that defendant failed to

       meet his burden of establishing ineffective assistance, in part, based upon the timeline of the

       evolution of the law regarding the enhancement and the testimony from defendant and posttrial

       counsel referencing the fluidity of the law. The court denied the postconviction petition.

       Defendant appeals.

¶ 12                                                II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Defendant argues that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he received

       ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations. He argues that there was no legal

       basis for trial counsel to advise defendant that the 15-year enhancement might not or would not

       apply because there was no conflict in the law at the time defendant rejected the plea-deal.

       Specifically, he argues that the appellate court decisions which ruled that the 15-year

       enhancement did not apply did not yet exist and People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007),

       “unambiguously held that an amendment to one statute in a proportionate penalties comparison

       revived the offense in the other statute.”

¶ 14          “[A]t a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of

       the evidence, a substantial violation of a constitutional right.” People v. Williams, 2017 IL App

       (1st) 152021, ¶ 22. “When a petition is advanced to a third-stage, evidentiary hearing, where

                                                         5
       fact-finding and credibility determinations are involved, we will not reverse a circuit court’s

       decision unless it is manifestly erroneous.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006).

       However, where pure questions of law are presented, we generally apply a de novo standard of

       review. Id. “Typically, review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves a mixed

       question of law and fact, and therefore, a hybrid standard of review would apply.” People v.

       Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 55.

¶ 15          “To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both

       deficient performance and prejudice.” People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 187-88 (2000).

       “Counsel’s performance is measured by an objective standard of competence under prevailing

       professional norms.” Id. at 188. “[T]he effectiveness of *** counsel must be assessed against an

       objective standard of reasonableness from the perspective of the time of the alleged error and

       without hindsight.” People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610, ¶ 66. “To prevail, a defendant

       must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.” People v. Evans, 209 Ill.

       2d 194, 220 (2004).

¶ 16          As defendant points out, the appellate court decisions which trial counsel apparently

       referenced in his testimony as support for his position that the enhancement did not apply—

       People v. Blair, 2012 IL App (3d) 100743-U and People v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th)

       110151)—did not exist until after defendant’s trial and could not have been the basis for his

       advice to defendant. However, that does not mean there was no legal support for trial counsel’s

       position that the enhancement may not apply or that there was no conflict regarding the

       application of the enhancement. Although there was no conflict amongst the appellate courts at

       the time trial counsel was advising defendant regarding the plea, there was a conflict between his

       interpretation of the law and the State’s and there was a legal basis for this conflict.

                                                         6
¶ 17          Notably, defendant testified that counsel predicated his advice, in part, on Hauschild. The

       parties do not dispute that in Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d at 86-87, our supreme court determined that

       the 15-year firearm enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm was

       unconstitutional because it punished identical conduct more harshly than the offense of armed

       violence predicated on robbery with a category I or category II weapon. Subsequently, the

       legislature, through Public Act 95-688 (eff. Oct. 23, 2007), amended the armed violence statute

       so that armed robbery would not serve as a predicate offense for armed violence. However, it did

       not amend the armed robbery statute or reenact the15-year firearm enhancement for armed

       robbery. The failure to act on the armed robbery statute is what led the courts in Blair, 2012 IL

       App (3d) 100743-U, ¶ 9, and Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151, ¶ 52, to determine that Public

       Act 95-688 did not revive the 15-year enhancement. Although those cases did not exist at the

       time defendant was advised about the applicability of the enhancement, the caselaw

       underpinning those decisions did exist. See generally Blair, 2012 IL App (3d) 100743-U (citing

       Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007) and People v. Manuel, 94 Ill. 2d 242 (1983)); Gillespie, 2012 IL

       App (4th) 110151 (same).

¶ 18          It was not until People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 32, that our supreme court made clear

       that in the face of an identical elements proportionality violation the legislature can remedy the

       constitutional violation and revive the unconstitutional statute by amending the comparison

       statute, as the legislature did in Public Act 95-688. Our supreme court’s decision in Blair did not

       exist until after trial and sentencing in this matter and until that decision was released, it was up

       for debate whether, in relation to a proportionate penalties violation, the statute deemed

       unconstitutional needed to be amended to revive it or whether an amendment to the comparison

       statute would suffice. Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, Hauschild did not unambiguously

                                                         7
       hold that an amendment to one statute in a proportionate penalties comparison revived the

       offense in the other statute. If Hauschild had been unambiguous in this regard, there would not

       have been a split in the appellate courts on the issue and the supreme court would not have had to

       make it clear in Blair. Thus, while the appellate court cases did not exist when trial counsel

       advised defendant of his belief that the enhancement did not apply, there certainly was room for

       interpretation of the existing law on this issue and he cannot be faulted for advising defendant of

       the conflict between his interpretation of the law and the State’s. In fact, it was his duty to do so,

       and the court specifically found that he addressed the conflict with defendant prior to trial and

       defendant was aware of the conflict. See e.g., People v. Curry, 178 Ill. 2d 509, 528 (1997) (“[A]

       criminal defense attorney has the obligation to inform his or her client about the maximum and

       minimum sentences that can be imposed for the offenses with which the defendant is charged.”).

       Thus, in light of the state of the law at the time counsel provided advice to defendant regarding

       the enhancement, we cannot say his performance regarding that advice was deficient. Thus,

       defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel provided ineffective

       assistance and the court properly denied his postconviction petition.

¶ 19                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 21          Affirmed.

                                                         8