Court Opinion

ID: 9955938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:02:23.185609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.259790
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 Rav-Noy v. Khorsandi CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 ZE’EV RAV-NOY, Individually                                   B322804
 and as Trustee, etc., et al.,
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Cross-complainants and                              Super. Ct. No. SC123117)
           Appellants,

           v.

 JACK KHORSANDI,

           Cross-defendant and
           Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.
     Tepper & Associates, Foster Tepper and Walter Whitman
Moore for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
     Azadegan Law Group, Ramin Azadegan; Joseph S. Socher,
APC, and Joseph S. Socher for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
       Ze’ev Rav-Noy (Rav-Noy) and his wife Varda Rav-Noy,
Individually and as Trustees of the Ze’ev Rav-Noy and Varda
Rav-Noy 1995 Revocable Trust and their limited liability
companies, Geulah Investments, LLC (Geulah), and 9033
Wilshire, LLC (Wilshire LLC) (collectively, appellants), appeal
from a judgment following an order granting summary judgment
in favor of respondent Jack Khorsandi1 on appellants’ cross-
complaint against Khorsandi. The cross-complaint alleged
Khorsandi, along with Rabbi Hertzel Illulian and his nonprofit
corporation, Jewish Educational Movement (JEM),2 defrauded
appellants in connection with two real estate transactions. The
court granted summary judgment to Khorsandi solely on statute
of limitations grounds. In so doing, the court rejected appellants’
arguments that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded
earlier litigation between JEM, Illulian and appellants equitably
tolled the statute of limitations on appellants’ claims against
Khorsandi. Appellants challenge that ruling, arguing there
was a triable issue of fact as to whether the doctrine of equitable
tolling could apply and salvage appellants’ otherwise time-barred
claims against Khorsandi. We hold there was no triable issue
as to whether Khorsandi received the type of notice required for
equitable tolling to apply. Accordingly, we affirm.

      1 Some portions of the record refer to respondent as “Jack
Khorsandy” as well.
      2 Claims between JEM, Illulian, and appellants were
submitted to rabbinical arbitration. JEM and Illulian were not
named as cross-defendants and are not parties to this appeal.

                                 2
            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
       Because this appeal is from a judgment pursuant to an
order granting summary judgment, in summarizing the salient
facts, “[w]e consider all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposition papers except that to which objections were made and
properly sustained by the trial court” and “ ‘ “view the evidence
in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party [citation],
liberally construing [his or] her evidentiary submission while
strictly scrutinizing defendants’ own showing, and resolving any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff ’s favor.” (Saelzler
v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 . . . .)’ ” (South
Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group v. City of South Lake Tahoe
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 735, 745 (South Lake Tahoe).) “ ‘We accept
as true both the facts shown by the losing party’s evidence and
reasonable inferences from that evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856 . . . .)’ ” (South Lake
Tahoe, supra, at p. 745.)

      A.    Purchase of the 6317 Wilshire Property
       In 2004, Khorsandi and Illulian met with Rav-Noy, and
Khorsandi presented himself as the owner of a property located
at 6317 Wilshire Boulevard in Beverly Hills (the 6317 Wilshire
property). Khorsandi initially offered to sell the property to
Rav-Noy for $5.9 million. Khorsandi then offered to sell Rav-Noy
the property for $4.9 million and to donate $1 million to JEM,
Illulian’s nonprofit, if Rav-Noy would agree to donate $1 million
to JEM as well. Rav-Noy agreed.
       Kevin Bral was the true owner of the 6317 Wilshire
property at the time Rav-Noy and Khorsandi reached this
agreement. Unbeknownst to Rav-Noy, Bral had agreed to sell
the property to Illulian for $3,895,000. Illulian told Bral that

                                 3
Khorsandi was Illulian’s business partner, and asked that Bral
put title in Khorsandi’s name, rather than Illulian’s. Illulian
and Khorsandi then set up a double escrow—one for the sale
from Bral to Illulian/Khorsandi, one for the sale from Khorsandi
to Geulah, a limited liability company Rav-Noy formed in
connection with the transaction—with simultaneous closing
dates, allowing Illulian and Khorsandi to use Rav-Noy’s money
to pay Bral for the 6317 Wilshire property without Rav-Noy
knowing of Bral’s involvement. As a result, the escrow
paperwork Rav-Noy received indicated that Khorsandi was the
seller, whereas the escrow paperwork Bral received indicated
that Khorsandi was the buyer.
       Rav-Noy provided the funds with which Geulah purchased
the 6317 Wilshire property. Title to the property was first
transferred to Khorsandi, then immediately transferred again
to Geulah. Rav-Noy also made the promised $1 million donation
to JEM. Approximately $1 million from the transaction’s escrow
account was transferred to Khorsandi as “seller proceeds.”
(Capitalization omitted.)

      B.    Purchase of the 9033 Wilshire Property
      In December 2004, Illulian encouraged Rav-Noy to
purchase a property located at 9033 Wilshire Boulevard
in Beverly Hills (the 9033 Wilshire property). Illulian told
Rav-Noy that JEM already had a contract to buy the property
from a third party. Illulian proposed that JEM assign the
contract to Illulian and Rav-Noy, that Illulian then negotiate
and complete the purchase of the property using Rav-Noy’s
money, and that Illulian and Rav-Noy eventually sell the
property for a profit. Around January 27, 2005, Rav-Noy
agreed to this arrangement and contractually obligated

                                4
himself to provide the $12 million with which Wilshire LLC,
a company Rav-Noy and Illulian formed for the purpose of the
transaction, was to purchase the property. Rav-Noy further
agreed that Illulian would receive a profit participation interest
and would manage the 9033 Wilshire property until it was resold.
Rav-Noy deposited $250,000 into escrow, and the third-party
seller returned to JEM the $250,000 that JEM had previously
deposited into escrow.
       In or around April 2005, after Rav-Noy’s $250,000 deposit
had become nonrefundable, Illulian orally informed Rav-Noy
that Khorsandi also had a contractual right to purchase
the 9033 Wilshire property from the third-party seller for
$12 million, but that Khorsandi would let Rav-Noy buy the
property from the seller instead if Rav-Noy would agree to pay
Khorsandi $2.5 million when the property was resold at some
point in the future. Illulian also suggested that this arrangement
was akin to Khorsandi lending Rav-Noy $2.5 million, and that
Rav-Noy therefore should pay interest on it until the property
was resold. Illulian and Rav-Noy referred to this proposed
obligation to pay Khorsandi $2.5 million (with interest) as the
“ ‘phantom loan.’ ”
       Rav-Noy told Illulian that if Illulian would produce
documentation supporting Illulian’s assertions about Khorsandi
having a right to buy the building for $12 million, then Rav-Noy
would agree to pay Khorsandi the requested $2.5 million upon
the resale of the building. Illulian assured Rav-Noy that Illulian
would provide such documents. Illulian never did so, nor did
Khorsandi ever actually have any right to purchase the property.
       After escrow closed on the 9033 Wilshire property, Illulian,
acting in his role as vice president of operations of Wilshire LLC,

                                5
withdrew funds from the company account on a monthly basis,
ostensibly to pay interest to Khorsandi on what Illulian and
Rav-Noy referred to as the phantom loan. Rav-Noy agreed to
this, believing Illulian’s representations that the requested
documentation of Khorsandi’s right to purchase the property
would be forthcoming. After several months, Rav-Noy demanded
that Illulian stop using Wilshire LLC’s money to pay Khorsandi
interest on the phantom loan, because Rav-Noy had not received
the requested documentation.

      C.    Disputes Arise Between Rav-Noy and Illulian
       By July 2008, disputes arose between Illulian and
Rav-Noy regarding Illulian’s management of the two properties.
According to Rav-Noy, the disputes regarding the 9033 Wilshire
property resulted from Illulian failing to maintain the property
in good condition, pay property taxes, or collect rent increases
from tenants. As to the 6317 Wilshire property, according to
Rav-Noy, Illulian rented the property to an illegal marijuana
business, triggering a Drug Enforcement Administration
investigation, and refused to cooperate with Rav-Noy’s efforts
to sell the property. Rav-Noy terminated Illulian from his
membership in both Geulah and Wilshire LLC, pursuant to the
terms of the respective operating agreements for these entities.
       On July 17, 2008, Illulian’s attorney sent Rav-Noy a
letter claiming that Rav-Noy owed JEM $2.5 million under the
phantom loan arrangement, because Khorsandi and JEM had
purportedly agreed Khorsandi would pay JEM the $2.5 million
he was to receive pursuant to that arrangement when the 9033
Wilshire property was sold.
       As to the 6317 Wilshire property, Illulian initially refused
to vacate his office there, complicating Rav-Noy’s efforts to

                                 6
sell the property, and ultimately leading to Geulah (through
Rav-Noy) bringing an unlawful detainer action against Illulian.
At the unlawful detainer trial, Illulian testified that Khorsandi
had owned the 6317 Wilshire property through “some kind
of partnership” with Bral. Geulah prevailed at trial, Illulian
vacated the 6317 Wilshire property, and Geulah (through
Rav-Noy) sold the property to a third party.

      D.    Rabbinical Arbitration of Certain Disputes
            Between Illulian, JEM, and Rav-Noy
       On July 29, 2009, Rav-Noy signed an agreement to submit
Rav-Noy and Illulian’s disputes regarding both properties to
rabbinical arbitration. Illulian did not sign the agreement at
that time. Without a fully-executed arbitration agreement yet
in place, on October 15, 2009, appellants filed a civil lawsuit
against Illulian for breach of contract and false promise. The
false promise claim was based on allegations that Illulian had
falsely “represented to [Rav-Noy and Geulah] that [Illulian]
would perform [his] obligations under the agreements, but
those representations were false in that [he] did not ever intend
to perform [his] obligations under the agreements.” The initial
complaint did not identify any of the specific obligations or
contractual terms of the agreement. Nor did the complaint
mention Khorsandi.
       On November 8, 2009, after being served with appellants’
complaint, Illulian signed the arbitration agreement.
       On April 16, 2010, during a deposition in connection with
the arbitration, the company that had sold the 9033 Wilshire
property to Wilshire LLC confirmed that Khorsandi had never
had any right to buy the property or control who did. On
April 22, 2010, Bral, who had sold the 6317 Wilshire property

                                 7
to Geulah, provided a notarized declaration describing
Khorsandi’s and Illulian’s true roles in the purchase of that
property, as described above.
        On April 26, 2010, Rav-Noy and Illulian signed a second
arbitration agreement, adding JEM—but not Khorsandi—as a
party.
        At the conclusion of the arbitration in June 2014, the
arbitrators declined to announce a decision. Illulian then
filed the instant action seeking damages against appellants.
Appellants moved unsuccessfully to compel further rabbinical
arbitration pursuant to the agreement between Rav-Noy and
Illulian, and then appealed the adverse ruling. This court
affirmed. In 2015, while that appeal was pending, JEM filed
a report with the California Secretary of State identifying
Khorsandi as JEM’s chief financial officer. Promptly after
remittitur issued, on February 22, 2018, appellants filed their
cross-complaint in the instant action, for the first time adding
Khorsandi as a party. The cross-complaint alleged, inter alia,
claims for fraud and unfair competition against Illulian, JEM,
and Khorsandi.
        In the cross-complaint, appellants alleged that “[t]he
first time that [they] had any reason to suspect that Khorsand[i]
was not the real owner of the [6317 Wilshire property] was in
2009, when [they] received their client files from their former
attorneys, who had represented [both appellants] and Illulian
and JEM [previously], . . . [and] refused to deliver [appellants’]
client files.” Appellants more specifically alleged that, in
February 2009, Rav-Noy filed a lawsuit to obtain the client files
from that firm, at which time Rav-Noy “suspected in particular”
that the attorneys’ refusal to turn over the files was “in order to

                                 8
conceal misconduct.” Appellants alleged that, through this
action and additional subpoenas, they ultimately received
the paperwork associated with the double escrow in the 6317
Wilshire property transaction and learned of Khorsandi’s true
role therein in April 2010. At a subsequent deposition in 2020,
however, Rav-Noy testified that he first learned of the double
escrow and that “Jack Khorsandi was involved in [the] double
escrow” in “approximately 2008.”

      E.    Summary Judgment Motion
      Khorsandi moved for summary judgment, and the trial
court granted the motion on statute of limitations grounds.
      The trial court found applicable the doctrine of delayed
discovery, under which any applicable statute of limitations does
not begin to run “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) The court noted that “Rav-Noy
explicitly attest[ed] in his deposition and declaration that he
realized he was defrauded regarding the sale in 2008 at the
earliest, or 2009 at the latest[, and that] [i]n both his deposition
and declaration, he admits he knew Khorsandi was involved.”
On this basis, the court concluded the claims had accrued in
2009.
      The court rejected arguments that the statute had been
equitably tolled, because nothing supported the first requirement
of equitable tolling: timely notice to Khorsandi of appellants’
possible claims against him. In so concluding, the court found no
evidence suggested Khorsandi had been officially affiliated with
JEM before 2015, so Khorsandi’s officer role at the company did
not impute notice to him of the pending lawsuit and arbitration
against JEM that began many years before 2015.

                                 9
       The court also rejected appellants’ arguments that
their proffered evidence of Illulian’s ongoing relationship with
Khorsandi during the arbitration and thereafter provided a basis
on which to infer Khorsandi had notice of appellants’ potential
claims against him regarding the two properties. To support
this argument, appellants relied on Khorsandi being JEM’s
chief financial officer in 2016 and Illulian’s 2020 deposition
testimony regarding the nature of his ongoing relationship with
Khorsandi.3 Appellants also relied on evidence that, from March
2018 to July 2021, Khorsandi, Illulian and JEM were criminal
codefendants in an action filed by the State of California for fire
code violations at a building owned by JEM. Finally, appellants
relied on Khorsandi’s 2020 deposition that he discussed the
rabbinical arbitration with Illulian “maybe a couple of years ago.”
       The court stated that even if Khorsandi was aware of the
claims and arbitration between JEM / Illulian and Rav-Noy, and
even if Illulian had discussed the litigation, arbitration, or real
estate transactions with Khorsandi, this would not have put
Khorsandi on notice that Rav-Noy or any of the other appellants
intended to pursue potential claims against Khorsandi.

      3 Therein, Illulian testified as follows: “Khorsandi is
very close to me, a close friend, a confid[a]nt. . . . I work with
him when his—when I have real estate things, I ask him. . . .
Mr. Khorsandi helps me many different aspects.” “I speak to
him about all the deals, anything that comes in real estate or
stuff[,] I always consult with him.” Illulian further testified
at his deposition that Khorsandi had donated money to JEM
“[m]any times,” donates “[a]ll the time,” may have loaned money
to JEM, and “was one of the people officially in the . . . documents
of JEM” in 2015 or 2016.

                                 10
      Finally, the court noted that appellants had failed to
establish another element of equitable tolling: that they had
diligently and in good faith pursued claims against Khorsandi
once Rav-Noy suspected Khorsandi’s involvement in the allegedly
fraudulent real estate transactions.
      After the court granted Khorsandi motion for summary
judgment, it entered judgment on appellants’ cross-complaint in
Khorsandi’s favor. Appellants timely appealed.
                          DISCUSSION
       On appeal from a judgment following an order granting
summary judgment, our review is de novo. (South Lake Tahoe,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 745.) “ ‘A defendant moving for
summary judgment must show “that one or more elements
of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)’ ” (South Lake Tahoe, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
at p. 745.) “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate only when
“all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence
and inferences therefrom would allow a reasonable juror to
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation].” (South Lake Tahoe, supra,
at pp. 745–746.)

      A.    Date of Discovery for Purposes of Calculating
            Statute of Limitations
     The unfair competition claim in appellants’ cross-complaint
against Khorsandi is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

                                11
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.) The fraud and all other causes of
action in the cross-complaint are subject to a three-year statute
of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d); First Nationwide
Savings v. Perry (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1670.) Neither
party contends that these statutes of limitations began to run at
the time the alleged misconduct occurred. Rather, all agree that
the statute began to run at the time appellants “discover[ed], or
ha[d] reason to discover” Khorsandi’s alleged misconduct. (Fox,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) They disagree, however, as to when
that occurred. Appellants contend that Rav-Noy first learned of
Khorsandi’s true role in the alleged real estate schemes in April
2010, when Rav-Noy received certain discovery in arbitration.
Khorsandi contends appellants were sufficiently aware of
Khorsandi’s involvement at least a year before then, and possibly
as early as 2008, based on Rav-Noy’s deposition testimony that
he suspected Khorsandi was part of a fraud in connection with
the 6317 Wilshire property transaction in “approximately 2008.”
       We need not resolve this dispute. Even accepting the
later discovery date of April 2010, given the applicable three-
and four-year statutes of limitations, the only way there could
be a triable question as to whether Rav-Noy’s February 2018
cross-complaint was time-barred is if there is a triable question
regarding the statute being equitably tolled for a significant
portion of the time between April 2010 and February 2018. For
reasons we outline below, however, we conclude the trier of fact
could not reasonably conclude that the doctrine of equitable
tolling applies.

      B.    Equitable Tolling
      The equitable tolling doctrine “allows our courts, ‘in
carefully considered situations’ [citation], to exercise their

                                 12
inherent equitable powers to ‘soften the harsh impact of technical
rules’ [citation] by tolling statutes of limitations.” (Saint Francis
Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020)
9 Cal.5th 710, 724 (Saint Francis).) “[E]quitable tolling today
applies when three ‘elements’ are present: ‘[(1)] timely notice,
and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and [(3)] reasonable
and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.’ (Addison
[v. State of California (1978)] 21 Cal.3d [313,] 319 [(Addison)].)
These requirements are designed to ‘balanc[e] . . . the injustice
to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against . . . the
important public interest or policy expressed by the [operative]
limitations statute.’ [Citation.]” (Saint Francis, supra, at
pp. 724–725.)
       Appellants argue that, based on the evidence before the
court at summary judgment, a reasonable trier of fact could
find they had established the elements of equitable tolling.
We disagree that there was a triable question as to the first
element—timely notice to Khorsandi—and thus need not
consider whether appellants met the remaining requirements.
       “ ‘ “The timely notice requirement [for equitable tolling]
essentially means that the first claim must have been filed
within the statutory period . . . [and that] the filing of the first
claim must alert the defendant in the second claim of the need
to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for the
second claim.” ’ ” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community
College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 102, fn. 2 (McDonald).)
Although “ ‘ “[g]enerally this means that the defendant in the
first claim is the same one being sued in the second,” [citation]’ ”
a defendant also may be “ ‘ “alert[ed]” ’ ” by other means to the
need “ ‘ “to begin investigating the facts which form the basis for

                                 13
the . . . claim [against that defendant].” ’ ” (Ibid.) Specifically,
when during the limitations period the defendant was put on
notice that the plaintiff intended to hold that defendant legally
responsible for the plaintiff ’s injury, this, too, can satisfy the
equitable tolling doctrine’s notice requirement—even if that
defendant was not named in an earlier lawsuit filed by that
plaintiff. This is because a reasonable defendant, upon receiving
notice that a plaintiff intends to seek legal recourse against the
defendant regarding certain conduct, will understand the need
to begin investigating and/or preserving evidence regarding such
conduct, even if the plaintiff has not yet filed suit against him.
A necessary corollary to this understanding of equitable tolling
notice is that a defendant knowing a plaintiff has sued someone
else regarding that conduct—at least without also receiving
notice that the plaintiff intends to hold the defendant legally
responsible as well—does not satisfy the notice requirement.
This is because a reasonable defendant under such circumstances
would have no need to begin preserving evidence or investigating
plaintiff ’s claims. Indeed, under such circumstances, the
defendant could only speculate as to what claims against it,
if any, the plaintiff might one day pursue, and thus what the
defendant might investigate or what evidence he might preserve.
This is consistent with “the [equitable tolling] doctrine’s
underlying rationale and purpose,” as the doctrine “is designed to
apply when a plaintiff has ‘ “satisfied the notification purpose of
a limitations statute” ’ (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102.)”
(Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 727.) The “ ‘notification
purpose of a limitations statute’ ” is specific to a particular
defendant: that is, it requires a plaintiff, within a certain time
frame, to “afford[ ] a defendant notice of the claims against it

                                14
[i.e., the defendant] so that [the defendant] may gather and
preserve evidence.” (McDonald, supra, at p. 102, italics added.)
        Our colleagues in the Fifth District have expressly
recognized that notice of a plaintiff ’s intent to hold a defendant
legally responsible for certain conduct may satisfy the notice
requirement for equitable tolling claims against the defendant
based on that conduct, but that notice of a plaintiff ’s lawsuit
against someone other than defendant cannot. (See Garabedian
v. Skochko (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 836, 847–848 (Garabedian).)
Specifically, in Garabedian, the Fifth District held that “the
doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply merely because
defendant B has obtained timely knowledge of a claim against
defendant A for which defendant B knows or believes he may
share liability. This point seems to have been recognized in
Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917 . . . ,
in which the court stated, ‘under ordinary circumstances [a]
workers’ compensation claim would not equitably toll a personal
injury action against a third party who might also be liable
for the injury.’ ([Id.] at pp. 924–925.)” (Garabedian, supra,
at p. 847.) Applying this concept, Garabedian concluded that
“although [plaintiff ’s] filing the [earlier in time] claim . . . put
the agency on notice of [plaintiff ’s] intended suit against the
government, it did not put [defendant] on notice of [plaintiff ’s]
intended suit against him.” (Id. at p. 848.)
        Appellants argue we should not follow Garabedian because
“the timely notice element, as applied in modern cases”—
presumably referring to the cases appellants cite in their briefs

                                 15
as supporting their interpretation of the notice requirement4—
“does not require the plaintiff to prove that, when the plaintiff
filed the first action, the plaintiff intended at that time to sue
the defendant.” Although these cases on which appellants rely
may not expressly identify notice of plaintiff ’s intent to hold the
defendant legally responsible as the applicable test, they are all
consistent with this framework. For example, in Saint Francis,
supra, 9 Cal.5th 710, a hospital disagreed with an administrative
decision of the Department of Public Health and submitted
a request for reconsideration of that decision. (Id. at p. 718.)
The hospital also wrote to the department “that, if the request
for reconsideration was denied, it ‘intend[ed] to petition for a
writ of mandate with the superior court.’ ” (Ibid, capitalization
omitted.) The hospital ultimately did seek such a writ, but
after the time period for doing so had expired. (Id. at p. 719.)
The Supreme Court concluded that, although the hospital
had not sued or sought legal recourse against the department
in the earlier administrative proceedings, the “request
for reconsideration, together with the e-mail notifying the
[defendant’s] counsel of its intent to file a petition for a writ
of administrative mandate [within the limitations period] . . .
provided the [defendant] with timely notice” that “satisfied the
first element of equitable tolling.” (Id. at p. 727.) St. Francis
thus involved a situation in which the defendant had timely

      4 Namely, these cases are:   Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th
710, Apple Valley Unified School District v. Vavrinek, Trine,
Day & Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 934 (Apple Valley), Hopkins v.
Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736 (Hopkins), and, indirectly,
Structural Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. City of Orange (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 459 (Structural Steel) and Stalberg v. Western Title
Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 925 (Stalberg).

                                 16
notice regarding plaintiff ’s intent to seek relief from the
defendant, even though the plaintiff ultimately sought that
relief in an untimely fashion. That this was sufficient to satisfy
the equitable tolling notice requirement is consistent with our
view, and that expressed in Garabedian, that the notice required
for equitable tolling depends on notice of a plaintiff ’s intent to
seek relief from the particular defendant at issue.
       Further, as noted in another case on which appellants
rely, Apple Valley, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 934, other “decisions
applying equitable tolling against defendants who were not
parties to the prior action[ ] . . . involve fact situations in which
the defendants clearly had notice of the claims against them
before the statutes expired.” (Id. at p. 955 [collecting cases].)
Apple Valley discusses two cases in particular, both of
which are likewise consistent with our understanding of the
equitable tolling notice requirement: Structural Steel, supra,
40 Cal.App.4th 459 and Stalberg, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 925.
(See Apple Valley, supra, at pp. 955–956.) In Structural Steel, a
subcontractor sued a general contractor and its surety to obtain
payment for certain construction work, then later sued the city
in a separate action seeking payment for the same construction
work. (Structural Steel, supra, at pp. 462–463.) The Court of
Appeal rejected the city’s argument that the statute of limitations
barred the suit, citing equitable tolling. (Id. at p. 466.) With
respect to the notice requirement of equitable tolling, the court
concluded that the city had received notice of the plaintiff ’s claim
against it within the limitations period, because (1) at the time
the subcontractor sued the general contractor and surety—i.e.,
within the limitations period—the subcontractor sent a letter
informing the city of the lawsuit and stating the city might also

                                 17
be liable (ibid.) and (2) even before the subcontractor sued the
contractor and surety, the subcontractor served a stop notice on
the city demanding that it withhold payment from the surety to
cover the subcontractor’s claim (id. at p. 462).
       Similarly, in Stalberg, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 925, the
plaintiffs’ title insurer had recorded deeds for upstream property
owners, which included a fictitious easement across the plaintiffs’
properties. (Id. at pp. 929–930.) The plaintiffs filed a quiet title
suit against the upstream owners, then later filed a separate
untimely slander of title suit against their insurer. (Id. at
p. 930.) In concluding the insurer had sufficient notice for
equitable tolling to apply to the latter suit, the court noted,
inter alia, that “[d]uring the progress of the quiet title litigation
[against the upstream owners], plaintiffs learned that [the
insurer] was responsible for the recording of the fictitious
easement” and “corresponded with [the insurer], informing [it]
of their awareness of its culpability in this matter, and, upon
the completion of the quiet title action, plaintiffs promptly filed
an action against [the insurer].” (Id. at p. 933.)
       In the above cases, the defendant at issue received, during
the limitations period, notice of the plaintiff ’s intent to pursue
claims against that defendant or otherwise hold that defendant
responsible—not just notice of the plaintiff ’s intent to pursue
claims against some other defendant, or to generally pursue
claims regarding a particular incident. (Cf., e.g., Aguilera v.
Heiman (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 590, 600 [“no timely notice” to
an individual on whose property the plaintiff was injured where
plaintiff “timely filed for workers’ compensation” in connection
with the injury but “the workers’ compensation claim nam[ed]
as defendant only [plaintiff ’s employer and an insurance-related

                                 18
entity]” and did not add the individual until after the limitations
period had expired], capitalization omitted.) This is not clearly
the case, however, in the final decision appellants cite for this
point, Hopkins, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 736. Nevertheless,
Hopkins is consistent with our understanding of the equitable
tolling notice requirement. Appellants describe Hopkins as
holding that “equitable tolling applied [to a suit] against [the]
building owner [defendants] in [a] premises liability case based
on [a] prior workers’ compensation proceeding against plaintiff ’s
employer, where building owner[s] knew about, but [were] not a
party to, [the] prior proceeding.” But in Hopkins, “[i]t appear[ed]
[to the Court of Appeal] to be undisputed that [defendants]
received notice of the need to begin to investigate the facts that
formed the basis of [plaintiff ’s] claims well within the ordinary
statute of limitations period.” (Id. at p. 751.) As a basis for this
conclusion, Hopkins notes that the defendants, through their
insurer, had “undert[aken] an investigation into the accident
[at issue]” during the limitations period, including, for example,
obtaining the plaintiff ’s medical records. (Id. at p. 751, fn. 8.)
Because the purpose of assuring the defendant received notice of
the plaintiff ’s intent to seek legal recourse against the defendant
is to assure the defendant has the opportunity to investigate the
plaintiff ’s potential claims, the lack of such notice in Hopkins was
not prejudicial—the defendants were already undertaking such
investigation. Moreover, Hopkins did not go so far as to hold that
these facts supported equitable tolling notice, but rather held
that “[t]he trial court’s reasons for determining that the equitable
tolling doctrine does not apply in this case [were] legally
insufficient” and “remanded to the trial court for a determination
as to whether [plaintiff] demonstrated the required elements of

                                 19
equitable tolling.” (Id. at p. 746, italics omitted.) Hopkins thus
does not reject or call into question the framework we set out
above.
       Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude
that appellants have not identified any facts based on which
the jury could find Khorsandi was put on notice during the
limitations period of appellants’ intent to hold him legally
responsible for their alleged injuries at issue in the earlier
litigation with JEM and Illulian. Appellants did not name
Khorsandi as a defendant in their earlier claims (in litigation or
arbitration). Nothing suggests actual notice to Khorsandi during
the limitations period of appellants’ intent to sue him, as there
was in Structural Steel and Stalberg. Nor did appellants seek
some other relief from Khorsandi during the limitations period,
similar to what occurred in Saint Francis. Nor did Khorsandi
undertake an investigation of appellants’ potential claims against
him, as occurred in Hopkins, such that a failure to satisfy the
equitable tolling notice requirement might not be prejudicial.5
Without notice during the limitations period that appellants

      5 Appellants briefly argue that Khorsandi similarly
investigated Rav-Noy’s claims against him by writing “to the
escrow company in [August] 2008 to secure copies of records
from the two escrows that Khorsandi and Illulian used to
defraud Rav-Noy” and that “[t]he trier of fact can infer that
Khorsandi did so because he knew about the dispute; anticipated
litigation; and was collecting evidence accordingly.” But the only
dispute between the parties at the time of that request involved
Illulian’s management of the properties and had nothing to do
with the circumstances under which Rav-Noy purchased the
properties. The record thus does not support the inference that
appellants posit, and does not provide a basis for Hopkins to
guide our result.

                                20
intended to seek legal recourse against Khorsandi regarding
the real estate transactions, there was nothing to “alert
[Khorsandi] . . . of the need to begin investigating the facts
which form the basis for” appellants’ untimely claims against
him regarding those transactions. (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 102, fn. 2.)
       Appellants make several arguments that presuppose
notice to Khorsandi of the litigation against Illulian and JEM
is sufficient to establish equitable tolling notice. For example,
appellants argue the evidence here “would readily permit the
trier of fact to find that Illulian, JEM and Khorsand[i] were co-
conspirators[,]” a finding that “would be all that the law requires
to impute the knowledge of each co-conspirator to the others. . . .
[¶] In other words, the law presumes what common sense
dictates: Illulian, JEM and Khorsand[i], as co-conspirators,
would of course keep one another informed about legal
proceedings involving victims of their multimillion dollar
fraudulent schemes.” Similarly, appellants point to evidence
suggesting that Khorsandi was a confidant of Illulian, and that
Illulian sought advice from Khorsandi on real estate matters,
allowing the jury to infer Illulian kept Khorsandi abreast of
appellants’ lawsuits against JEM and Illulian regarding the real
estate transactions in question. We do not disagree that this and
other evidence presented at summary judgment support a triable
issue as to whether Khorsandi had notice during the limitations
period that appellants were suing and pursuing relief from JEM
and Illulian, rather than Khorsandi, in connection with the two
real estate transactions. But, for the reasons set forth above,
this does not establish notice that appellants intended to pursue
a lawsuit against Khorsandi regarding those transactions,

                                21
and is thus insufficient to satisfy the equitable tolling notice
requirement. (See Garabedian, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 847–848.)
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in
finding no triable issue as to the notice requirement of equitable
tolling, and in granting summary judgment based on the statute
of limitations.

                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs
on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  CHANEY, J.

                  WEINGART, J.

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