Court Opinion

ID: 9797409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:19:41.084948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:56.602700
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI J.,
concurring.
In arguing that the jury was misinstructed on her IIED claim, Karen Carpenter argues that Instruction No. 17 was erroneous because the superior court mistakenly assumed that Carpenter was a "public figure." I agree, and would resolve this issue on that basis.
Whether Instruction No. 17 was erroneous depends on whether Carpenter was a public figure. Relying in part on Hustler Maga-gine, Inc. v. Falwell,1 the trial court instructed the jury to disregard statements of opinion and to apply the standard of lability applied to a defamation claim brought by a public figure. But if Carpenter is not a public figure, Falwell, which applied defamation standards to an IIED claim brought by *71a public figure, does not control Carpenter's TIED claim.2
The Supreme Court has identified two bases on which to ground public figure status:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular pub-lie controversy and thereby becomes a pub-He figure for a limited range of issues.[3]
A person in this second category is often referred to as a "limited-purpose public figure." 4 To find public figure status on this basis, a court must conduct a two-part ingqui-ry: first, whether there is a public controversy; and second, whether the nature and extent of the person's participation in the controversy were sufficient to make him or her a public figure within that controversy.5 The superior court, pointing to Carpenter's contacts with government officials and KJNO advertisers, reasoned that Carpenter fit "within [the] definition of limited public figure, at least to the extent of her efforts to remove the Tom Leykis Show from the air." The dissent also takes this approach. Although the topic of whether the show should be canceled in Juneau arguably generated a public controversy,6 I do not believe that Carpenter's participation was sufficient to confer limited-purpose public figure status on her.
Based on its analysis of the Supreme Court's precedents, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has adopted the following test to determine whether a defendant has established that a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure:
A defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1) successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (8) assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and continuing access to the media.[7]
I believe that this test appropriately states what a defendant must prove, and that it accurately reflects the Supreme Court's analysis in this area. I would adopt it here.
I assume that Carpenter "voluntarily injected" herself into the topic of whether the show should be aired in Juneau, although there is little evidence that this question was "public" before July 24. KJNO had already received some complaints and some advertisers had already cancelled, but its manager regarded the station's decision whether to stop broadcasting the show as a "private thing."
Therefore, I have doubts that there was a "public controversy." Assuming, however, that Leykis satisfied the second element, inquiry on whether Leykis established that Carpenter's conduct satisfied the test's first, third, and fourth elements leads to the conclusion that she was not a public figure.
Carpenter testified that after hearing the Tom Leykis Show for the first time on July *7220, she discussed the program with about five friends and associates. She contacted a woman named Lorene Kappler who was trying to get the Tom Leykis show taken off the air and asked Kappler what she could do to help. Kappler said she would send a letter to KINO and asked Carpenter to do so as well. They also discussed several other ideas during what Kappler estimated to be a half-dozen telephone conversations. Carpenter never actually met Kappler.
The next day, July 21, Carpenter left messages for three City and Borough of Juneau assembly members. Two members never returned her calls; she actually spoke to only one. Carpenter related her concerns to that member, inquired whether Juneau had any decency ordinances, and asked for advice on how to handle the situation. That member checked with the city attorney and then informed Carpenter that Juneau had no decency ordinances; she suggested that Carpenter contact the radio station's advertisers.
Carpenter also called the governor's office on July 21, but testified that she "wasn't specific about what [she] wanted when [she] called them." She recalled that she was simply "trying to see if there were any de-ceney laws regarding broadcasting." She received no response. Carpenter also contacted the congressional office in Juneau in an attempt to gather information about any federal decency laws, but apparently did not request assistance in getting the show taken off the air.
Carpenter testified that on July 22 she contacted "three or four" advertisers and asked them if they knew their ads were being run during the Tom Leykis Show and whether they wanted their advertising dollars to support the content of the show. On the same day she also faxed her complaint letter to KJNO. Carpenter testified that she was unaware that, as required by federal regulations, the letter would be placed in the station's "public file."8 She did not write directly to Westwood One or the Tom Leykis Show and did not intend her letter to be forwarded; she thought "it was a local issue."
Carpenter testified that she did nothing related to The Tom Leykis Show on July 23.
KJNO's last broadcast of the program was on July 24.
Carpenter testified that she probably spent a total of six hours on the issue, and spent most of that time talking with Kappler. The KINO station manager agreed at his deposition, in a passage read at trial, that nothing in Carpenter's letter to the station indicated to him she was a public person rather than a private person expressing her personal point of view.
Before the July 24 broadcast, Carpenter did not write letters about the show to the editor of the local newspaper. She did not appear on television or radio. She did not organize or attend community meetings on the subject. She did not picket the station. In other words, Carpenter did not do any of the things that courts in other jurisdictions have found significant in concluding that a plaintiff invited the public's attention to his or her views.9 Aside from discussions with Kappler, friends, and associates, and a handful of telephone calls to local, state, and federal governmental offices, there was no evidence that Carpenter communicated with anyone other than private individuals specifically associated with airing the Tom Leykis Show on KJNO (Le., some advertisers and *73the station itself).10 On these facts, I would conclude that Carpenter did not "invite[ ] public attention" to her views.
I also conclude that the evidence did not establish that Carpenter "assumed a position of prominence" through her participation in the controversy. Steve Rhyner, the manager of KJNO, testified that Carpenter was not the only listener who complained. He testified that major advertisers were cancelling from the show before Carpenter became involved. "[Tihe straw that broke the camel's back," according to Rhyner, was one particular Leykis show that Rhyner did not "care for personally." Rhyner then made the final decision to cancel the show. Carpenter was therefore one of several people concerned about the content of the show and there was nothing especially noteworthy about her participation.11
Finally, there is no evidence that Carpenter had or exercised any access to the media, much less "regular and continuing access." The fact that Leykis read Carpenter's letter on the air during the July 24 broadcast does not change my conclusion, because "those charged with defamation eannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.12
Because Carpenter did not "engage the public's attention" and did not "assume special prominence in the resolution" of the controversy over the Tom Leykis Show, I would hold that she was not a public figure.13
As a private figure, Carpenter is entitled to greater protection from hurtful speech.14 In Gertz, the Supreme Court, addressing a defamation claim brought by a private figure, explained:
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements th{aln private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.[15]
*74The Court also reasoned that private figures deserve protection more than public figures because the private individual has not voluntarily become involved in a public controversy; he has not intentionally exposed himself to increased risk of injury.16 Where private figures are concerned, a different balance is struck between First Amendment concerns and the state's interest in allowing individuals to seek compensation for injury to reputation.17 In such cases, the state has a "strong and legitimate" interest in protecting private individuals.18 This interest, and the justifications for distinguishing between defamation claims brought by private and public figures, apply with equal force to IIED claims involving speech.
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Supreme Court applied defamation standards to an IIED claim brought by a public figure.19 The Court held that the First Amendment limits an IIED action involving speech directed toward a public figure to the same extent that it would limit a defamation action based on the same speech.20 That is, speech that is protected for purposes of a defamation claim because it is opinion, or because it is a true statement of fact, or because it was false but made without actual malice, may not serve as the basis for an IIED claim brought by a public figure. Falwell by its terms governs only public figure cases.21 Because I believe that the state's interest in protecting private individuals from the intentional infliction of emotional distress outweighs the First Amendment interest in speech on private matters concerning private individuals, I would decline to extend Falwell to IIED claims brought by private figures such as Carpenter.
The state has a "strong and legitimate" interest in protecting private individuals from unprovoked verbal attacks. Private figures like Carpenter are both less equipped to defend themselves against attack and more worthy of protection than are public figures who run the risk of closer public serutiny, but "enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication." 22 Although Carpenter voluntarily participated in the controversy over the show's cancellation, the limited and discrete nature of her participation did not warrant the degree of exposure she received.
Application of defamation standards to the IIED claims of private figures exposes to retaliation any private individual exercising her own free speech rights to complain about media program content. In such cireum-stances, no one could ever safely complain about the media without risking public attack. It would chill listeners' desire to voice their opinions. This result is inconsistent with the value placed on listener input by the FCC regulations as well as the values represented by the First Amendment.23
Finally, the statements that allegedly inflicted emotional distress on Carpenter were not fairly a part of any public issue. Neither Carpenter's sex life nor her contact information was a matter of widespread public interest. Leykis's remarks generally constituted personal insults and jabs at Carpenter's alleged sexual proclivities; they were not the sort of speech that encourages "the free and robust debate of public issues." 24 Protection of personal insults or offensive parodies targeted at public figures is necessary to ensure uninhibited public debate.25 But protection of insults and threats directed at private figures is not necessary to give adequate *75"breathing space" 26 to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
For these reasons, I would conclude that Instruction No. 17 misstated the applicable law. I would remand for retrial of the IED issue without affording Leykis the protection of the ruling that Carpenter is a public figure.

. 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 LEd.2d 41 (1988).

. Whether Carpenter is a public figure is a question of law that we decide de novo. Mount Juneau Enters., Inc. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829, 835 (Alaska 1995) (citations omitted).

3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (emphasis added).

. See, eg., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 LEd.2d 202 (1986).

. See, eg., Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir.2001).

. In Mount Juneau Enterprises we explained that '"'[al public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public, but rather 'a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way.'" 891 P.2d at 836 (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.Cir. 1980)); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 LEd.2d 154 (1976).

7. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir.1984) (relying on Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 958; Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 LEd.2d 411 (1979)).

. 47 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR.) 73.1202 (2004) provides that
All written comments and suggestions received from the public by licensees of commercial AM, FM, TV and Class A TV broadcast stations regarding operation of their station shall be maintained in the local public inspection file, unless the letter writer has requested that the letter not be made public or when the licensee feels that it should be excluded from the public inspection file because of the nature of fis content, such as a defamatory or obscene letter.

. See, eg., Chevalier v. Animal Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 839 F.Supp. 1224, 1234 (N.D.Tex.1993) (plaintiff appeared on television, gave interviews to magazines, and "apparently tried to orchestrate a counter-letter-writing campaign"); Samuels v. Berger, 191 A.D.2d 627, 595 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (plaintiff took out newspaper advertisements, purchased advertising time on local radio, spoke at public hearings, and wrote letter to editor).

. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (holding that lawyer who attended coroner's inquest and filed action for damages did not "engage the public's attention" because he "never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so").

. See Bell v. Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm., 187 F.Supp.2d 605, 609, 612 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (holding that campaign volunteer who had expressed support for one of candidate's political positions in television advertisement and who also posed for photographs with candidate did not become limited-purpose public figure because his actions were not sufficiently "significant" and because he did not assume "a position that ... propel{led] him to the forefront of the campaign") (quoting Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548, 557 (1996) (internal quotations omitted)); Nehls v. Hillsdale College, 178 F.Supp.2d 771, 778 (E.D.Mich.2001) (holding that expelled student, whose role in controversy merited only "short blurb in a nine page [magazine] article," did not assume position of prominence).

. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135, 99 S.Ct. 2675 (citing Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167-68, 99 S.Ct. 2701).

. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997.
Our previous cases concluding that a person had become a limited-purpose public figure all involved situations in which the person made public expressions of opinion or sought public approval. See Mount Juneau Enters., Inc. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829, 835 (Alaska 1995) (holding that tramway project developer who voluntarily sought public approval of project was public figure); Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344, 1353 (Alaska 1990) (holding that former state transportation department employee who brought allegations of departmental corruption to public attention was public figure); Rybachek v. Sutton, 761 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Alaska 1988) (holding that newspaper columnist on natural resource and mining issues injected herself into public controversy on those issues); Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 941 (Alaska 1988) (holding that candidate for state medical board voluntarily placed herself in position of public attention given strong public interest in board appointee's qualifications).

. Despite the error of concluding that Carpenter was a limited-purpose public figure, it was not error to grant summary judgment against Carpenter on her defamation and false light publicity claims. Statements that do not reasonably imply false facts-even those targeted at private figures-are not susceptible to defamation and false light liability. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 341, 94 S.Ct. 2997; White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C.Cir.1990).

15. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.C1. 2997 (fooinote omitted).

. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997.

. Id. at 343, 94 S.Ct. 2997.

. Id. at 348, 94 S.Ct. 2997.

. 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 LEd.2d 41 (1988).

. Id. at 56, 108 S.Ct. 876.

. Id. at 50, 108 S.Ct. 876.

. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. 2997.

. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1202 (2004) (requiring licensees of commercial AM, FM, TV, and Class A TV broadcast stations to maintain all written comments and suggestions regarding operation of station in local public inspection file).

. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985).

. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52, 108 S.Ct. 876.

. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 LEd.2d 686 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 LEd.2d 405 (1963)).