Court Opinion

ID: 9588882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:25.379291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.510343
License: Public Domain

Compton, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority today departs from a long line of cases which hold that the circuit court may not acquire jurisdiction to try a minor defendant without compliance having been made with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law, Code § 16.1-139 et seq. The cases include Matthews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 358, 218 S.E.2d 538 (1975), decided less than five months ago. The Court deviates from the case law notwithstanding the recent (1973) extensive amendment of the transfer statute, which placed more stringent requirements on the transfer, or certification, step in the juvenile process than had been provided at the time the applicable cases preceding Matthews were decided. Before today, compliance with the requirements of the juvenile statutes relating to the transfer hearing was necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court. And, want of this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by silence, neglect or failure to object. Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 893-94 (1947). Now, my brethren hold that the provision of the transfer statute dealing with the important subject of notice of transfer hearing time, place and purpose is a mere matter of procedure which may be waived. I disagree.
In Matthews, a case decided subsequent to the proceedings below, we held that the failure to make the findings required by subsection (a) (4) of the present transfer statute was jurisdictional error. 216 Va. at 361, 218 S.E.2d at 541. Such a determination recognized the *671“critically important” action taken at the transfer hearing which determines vital statutory rights of the juvenile. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). Transfer of jurisdiction is probably the most severe sanction which may be imposed by the juvenile court. Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 Ind. L. J. 583, 586 (1967). See Note, Review of Improper Juvenile Transfer Hearings, 60 Va. L. Rev. 818, 818-19 (1974). Under our statutes, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts confers “special rights and immunities” on children. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556. For example, they are shielded from publicity and from the probability of adult punishment, and its consequences. But upon transfer, the juvenile is “exposed to the probability of severe punishment; . . . the confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile proceeding is replaced by the publicity and the normative concepts of penal law; the child acquires a public arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium attached thereto by prospective employers; if convicted as an adult, the child may be detained well past his twenty-first birthday; he may lose certain civil rights and be disqualified for public employment.” Schornhorst, supra at 586-87.
Not only did our holding in Matthews recognize the gravity of the action taken at the transfer hearing, it also was consistent with our prior decisions dealing with the certification procedure generally in the juvenile courts under former statutory provisions. See Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d 288 (1969); Gogley v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 160 S.E.2d 746 (1968); Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 156 S.E.2d 624 (1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966). See also Norwood v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 886, 128 S.E.2d 425 (1962). Cf. Durrette v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 735, 113 S.E.2d 842 (1960).
The holdings in Matthews, Pruitt, Gogley and Gregory were all based on Peyton v. French, which emanated from Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955). In Peyton v. French, we said that:
“[T]he clear purpose and intent of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Law cannot be achieved if it is not mandatory that the proceedings set forth in §§ 16.1-164, 16.1-166, 16.1-167, 16.1-172, 16.1-173 and 16.1-116(a) [the former transfer statute] be complied with. Indeed, the very language of the statutes makes it *672mandatory that the aforesaid mentioned statutes be followed before criminal jurisdiction in a proper court of record comes into being.
“Here the convictions in the circuit court resulted from the judge of the juvenile and domestic relations court taking the petitioner from boyhood to manhood by ‘certifying’ him for grand jury action and trial as an adult without proper hearing. The circuit court derived its purported jurisdiction through the action taken in the juvenile court. The action of the juvenile court judge in dealing with the petitioner in his absence without a hearing and without notice to his parents, and the failure of the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent petitioner’s interest, violated the mandatory provisions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Law and the requirements of due process, and was a denial of petitioner’s constitutional guarantee under § 8 [now art. I, § 8] of the Constitution of Virginia. [Citations omitted],
“We are of opinion that a preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was jurisdictional and not procedural, and that before the circuit court could. acquire jurisdiction to try petitioner there must have been a compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Law. Thus the failure of the juvenile court to comply with the applicable statutes rendered the circuit court proceedings void and the petitioner was unlawfully imprisoned . . . .” 207 Va. at 79-80, 147 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added).
I would apply this rule to the notice defect in this case, as it was applied to the defects in the foregoing cases. As stated, Matthews was decided under the same statute which governs this case. There, the circuit court failed to make the required statutory findings. The earlier cases were decided under forerunners to the present statute. In Tilton, the required investigation of the “physical, mental and social condition and personality of the child”, and of the facts of the charged violation, had not been made. In Peyton v. French, as stated, the juvenile court had failed to provide the defendant a proper transfer hearing or notify the child’s parents of the hearing or appoint a guardian ad litem. In Gregory and Gogley no guardian ad litem had been appointed to represent the defendant at the transfer hearing.
I perceive no significant difference in the substantive nature of the foregoing defects, especially those in Matthews and Tilton, held to be jurisdictional, and the notice defect held procedural in this case, and the majority makes no attempt to draw a distinction. In my view, *673the requirement of written notice of the time, place and purpose of the transfer hearing to the defendant, and his parents or attorney, is as substantial as was the requirement for findings in Matthews and the requirement of an investigation in Tilton.
Finally, the jurisdictional nature of the requirements of the transfer statute is made explicit in the body of the enactment. Section 16.1-176(f) provides that, “No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age shall be prosecuted in the court of record for a criminal offense previously committed unless the case has been transferred or removed as provided in this section, or as provided for in § 16.1-176.2.” (Emphasis supplied). And this case has not been “transferred” in accordance with § 16.1-176 nor has it been “removed” as provided in the section nor has the jurisdiction of the juvenile court been “waived” in accordance with Code § 16.1-176.2.
Accordingly, since the circuit court faded to acquire subject matter jurisdiction of this case, I would hold the defendant’s conviction to be void.