Court Opinion

ID: 9490460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:44:02.534747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:06.599118
License: Public Domain

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge, specially
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the majority affirming appellant’s conviction and remanding for resentencing.
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by incorporating in its jury charge the original indictment. He argues that the indictment should have been redacted to omit any reference to the goverm ment’s theory that he sought to influence a public official to commit a fraud upon the United States. As the majority correctly observes, the proof at trial focused on the government’s other theory, i.e, that appellant sought to influence an official act. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) with id. § 201(b)(1)(B).
Because trial counsel did not object to use of the unredacted indictment, review is for plain error. Fed. R.Crim. P. 52(b). Even assuming that it was error to submit the original indictment to the jury, and that the error was “plain” in the sense of being “clear” or “obvious,” appellant has demonstrated no effect on his substantial rights. Cf. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir.1994). Accordingly, this first claim fails.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred in its jury charge by failing to define the “official act” which he allegedly attempted to influence. The court refused defense counsel’s request to define the official act for the jury, instead referring the jury to the unredacted indictment. Appellant contends that this was confusing in that the jury may have concluded that the “official act” was the unspecified and unproven “fraud” mentioned in the indictment.
Any confusion on this score was invited, if not manufactured, by defense counsel in his closing argument to the jury. Appellant complains that the jury charge regarding the “official act” was “ambiguous and confusing ... in light of counsel’s arguments;” yet it *359was defense counsel who described the “official act” as the “fraud” alleged in the indictment.1 This circuit will not reverse on the basis of invited error, absent manifest injustice. United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir.1993). There was no such injustice in this case. It is clear from the record evidence and the comments of the district court that the official act which appellant allegedly sought to influence was the RTC’s sale of the note.2
Appellant’s sufficiency claims are merit-less. Accordingly, I would affirm appellant’s conviction. However, I would vacate and remand his sentence for the reasons expressed by the majority. I therefore concur in the judgment.

. Defense counsel argued to the jury:
They charged that Joe Pankhurst with intent corruptly gave $10,000 to Ronnie Hooks with the intent to influence an official act. And here is the official act: To commit and aid in committing a fraud upon the United States, that is the acceptance of an offer by the defendant to purchase a loan being sold to the public by the Resolution Trust Corporation.... [H]e wasn't trying to get to perpetuate a fraud. He was trying to do a reasonable business deal.

. As the district court explained to the jury at the beginning of the trial:
Mr. Pankhurst is charged with giving a $10,-000 payment to Mr. Hooks to influence Mr. Hooks to sell him the note. That’s what the case, basically, is about.