Court Opinion

ID: 9807548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:08:49.65599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:07.415589
License: Public Domain

Stacy, O. J.,
dissenting: The only suggestion of illegality of the slot machines in question is the bare i¡osi dixit of the sheriff, “it is denied that said machines are legal.” Thus, upon this denial, which is a mere conclusion, it is presumed by the majority “that the court found sufficient facts to support the judgment.” No such presumption can be indulged when all the evidence is before us and there is none to support it. Dunn v. Wilson, 210 N. C., 493. Even findings without evidence are unavailing. Howard v. Board of Education, 189 N. C., 675, 127 S. E., 704. The present holding is at variance with the decision in Hospital v. Rockingham County, ante, 205; Flemming v. Asheville, 203 N. C., 810, 167 S. E., 77; and Smith v. Comrs., 191 N. C., 775, 133 S. E., 1.
Under the principles heretofore established, the plaintiffs are denied the equal administration of the laws. Advertising Co. v. Asheville, 189 *683N. C., 737, 128 S. E., 149; Sanders v. Ins. Co., 183 N. C., 66, 110 S. E., 597; Tomlinson v. Cranor, 209 N. C., 688, 184 S. E., 554. A government that demands and accepts $3,700 in license taxes for the privilege of operating said machines, as it has done here, ought, at least, to hear the plaintiffs on the question of the legality of their business, and not leave it to the sheriff to determine. The courts are open to all alike. To be just to everyone, regardless of race, color, creed, or condition, whether high or low, rich or poor, saint or sinner, is the first and foremost duty of a State. Of course, this is what the defendant contends has been done in the instant case, but he is not the one to decide the matter.
It is the general practice of equity courts, upon a prima facie showing for injunctive relief, to continue the restraining order to the hearing, when it appears that no harm can come to the defendant from such continuance, and great injury might result to the plaintiff from a dissolution of the injunction. Little v. Trust Co., 208 N. C., 726, 182 S. E., 491; Boushiar v. Willis, 207 N. C., 511, 177 S. E., 632; Porter v. Ins. Co., ibid., 646, 178 S. E., 223; Troutman v. Shuford, 206 N. C., 909, 174 S. E., 230; Thomason v. Swenson, 204 N. C., 759, 169 S. E., 620; Parker v. Bank, 200 N. C., 441, 157 S. E., 419; Cullins v. State College, 198 N. C., 337, 151 S. E., 646; Wentz v. Land Co., 193 N. C., 32, 135 S. E., 480; Hurwitz v. Sand Co., 189 N. C., 1, 126 S. E., 171. “Where it will not harm the defendant to continue the injunction, and may causé great injury to the plaintiff if it is dissolved, the court generally will restrain the party until the hearing” — Walker, J., in Seip v. Wright, 173 N. C., 14, 91 S. E., 359.
The plaintiffs are entitled to invoke the procedure heretofore established by the decisions. This is all they are now asking.
What is said in reference to the 1937 act should be regarded as obiter. The statute is not applicable to the present controversy, and it is not before us for interpretation or construction. It could hardly be that all slot machines, including scales, music boxes, vending machines, etc., are made unlawful by the act. S. v. Brockwell, 209 N. C., 209, 183 S. E., 378. See dissenting opinion in S. v. Humphries, 210 N. C., 406, 186 S. E., 473.
ConNoe, J., concurs in dissenting opinion.