Court Opinion

ID: 9761863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:57:16.351091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.177870
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent and I would affirm the judgments of sentence of death entered by the jury of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
Under the interpretations previously adopted by a majority of the members of this Court, two of the four aggravating circumstances found by the jury cannot be sustained, namely that the victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by appellant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding, and that the killing was committed by means of torture. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(5) and (8). See respectively Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987) (with Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by McDermott and Papadakos, JJ.), and Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728 (1987) (dissenting opinions by Larsen, McDermott and Papadakos, JJ.). However, I cannot subscribe to the majority’s conclusion that our invalidation of two of the four aggravating circumstances found by the jury necessarily requires this Court to vacate the sentences of death. The majority states: “The jury’s finding of four aggravating circumstances, two of which are unsupported by the evidence, and unspecified mitigating circumstances requires that the death sentences imposed on the Appellant be vacated.” Majority slip op. at 817 (citations omitted).
I adhere to the position that, where the jury finds multiple aggravating circumstances and some mitigating circumstances, and imposes the death penalty upon its determination that those aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating, this Court need not automatically vacate the *454sentence of death upon invalidation of one or more (but less than all) of the aggravating circumstances. In fact, such automatic vacation of a sentence of death in these circumstances is in direct contravention of the statutory standard of review as established by the General Assembly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aulisio, 514 Pa. 84, 100-105, 522 A.2d 1075, 1083-85 (1987) (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by McDermott, J.) and at 514 Pa. 108-110, 522 A.2d 1087-88 (Papadakos, J., dissenting, expressing same view); see also Commonwealth v. Crawley, supra at 514 Pa. 565-567, 526 A.2d 347-48 (Larsen, J., dissenting, joined by McDermott and Papadakos, JJ.) As I stated in Aulisio,
It is simply not true that “the sentencing statute” requires us to vacate a sentence of death where we have invalidated one of multiple aggravating circumstances found by a jury which has also found the existence of some mitigating circumstances.
The Sentencing Code provides that:
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d); or
(iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h) (emphasis added).
Here, the evidence clearly “supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d),” namely that appellant was convicted of another offense committed at the same time for which a sentence of death was imposable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(10). Thus, assuming for the sake of argument only that there was insufficient evidence to support one of the aggravating circumstances, the continuing vitality of the remaining *455aggravating circumstance requires that we affirm the sentence of death unless we determine that it was “the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” This Court should review the entire record to determine whether consideration of an improper or unsupported aggravating circumstance so infected the jury’s deliberations and determination as to render the sentence of death the product of passion, prejudice or an arbitrary factor.
514 Pa. at 102, 522 A.2d at 1084.
In the instant case, I have no doubt that the sentences of death were imposed because of the evidence of the brutal executions of the two elderly victims and of the two valid aggravating circumstances, and that those sentences were not the result of the jury’s consideration of aggravating circumstances for which there is insufficient evidence or any other arbitrary factor. There is ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that the double homicide was deliberately committed in order to prevent the robbery victims from identifying their assailants. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6). (“The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.”) There is also overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant had been “convicted of another ... State offense, committed ... at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable____” 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 9711(d)(10).
While we do not know exactly which mitigating circumstances were found by the jury, we do know that evidence was presented regarding appellant’s young age at the time of the killings (eighteen years), that he had no significant history of felony convictions, that appellant could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law, and regarding appellant’s character, remorsefulness, and religious involvement. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(1), (3), (4) and (8). The psychological and other evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing regarding appellant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or con*456form his conduct to the law was simply not persuasive, and the record evidence established the contrary, namely that neither appellant’s age, immaturity nor mental condition prevented him from coldly calculating, planning and executing his scheme to rob and murder two elderly victims who would be easy prey for his gang. Indeed, he had originally planned to make the murders appear to be heart attacks, but these plans were scuttled when appellant could not procure a syringe with which to inject air into his victims’ veins. I also find the evidence of appellant’s lack of a significant history of felony convictions and of his character to be relatively miniscule in light of his conduct which, more than anything else ever could, unmistakeably demonstrated his violent nature and his cold, menacing murderous character. Slashing the throats and stabbing the chests of his helpless victims, who had been tied face to face so that each could view the violence done to the other, was not the last-minute desperation decision of a good boy gone bad, a lad who “just happened” to get caught-up in events on one occasion. Rather, appellant masterminded the robbery-murder conspiracy and intended all along to eliminate his victims.
Under these circumstances, I have conducted the review mandated by statute, and I conclude that the sentences of death were not the result of “passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,” but were, rather, the result of the brutal facts and the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrating the existence of two aggravating circumstances which outweighed any mitigating circumstances. I would, therefore, affirm the sentences of death.