Court Opinion

ID: 9957764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 13:07:00.758785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:37.562901
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Davenport, 2024-Ohio-1289.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                 :   APPEAL NO. C-230353
                                                    TRIAL NO. B-2106325
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :

     vs.                                        :
                                                        O P I N I O N.
 KEVIN DAVENPORT,                               :

           Defendant-Appellant.                 :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 5, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr.,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Godbey Law, LLC, and James J. Whitfield, for Defendant-Appellant.
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Presiding Judge.

           {¶1}   While driving, defendant-appellant Kevin Davenport noticed a car

following him. After unsuccessfully attempting to lose the car that was tailing him,

Davenport, without leaving his vehicle, reached through the rear-seat console of his

car to the trunk, retrieved two firearms, and loaded the firearms. Davenport exited

from his vehicle with a firearm in hand. The other driver was a plainclothes police

officer.

           {¶2}   The trial court convicted Davenport of carrying a concealed weapon in

violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) (prohibiting a person from knowingly having a

handgun “concealed ready at hand”) and improperly handling firearms in a motor

vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) (prohibiting a person from “knowingly

transport[ing] or hav[ing] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that

the firearm is accessible to the operator * * * without leaving the vehicle.”).

           {¶3}   Davenport appeals his convictions, arguing that the trial court abused

its discretion in declining to provide the jury an instruction on the affirmative defense

of entrapment. Because Davenport failed to present evidence showing his entitlement

to an entrapment jury instruction, we overrule Davenport’s assignment of error.

                                I.   Facts and Procedure

           {¶4}   In December 2021, Detective Grisby was patrolling the Camp

Washington neighborhood and observed a Nissan with an out-of-state license plate

pull into a gas station, turn into the street, and pull onto a side street briefly before

driving away. Grisby became suspicious, so she began to loosely tail the Nissan. Grisby

soon lost sight of the Nissan. Davenport was later identified as the Nissan’s driver.

                                             2
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶5}   Detective Fox, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, testified that after

hearing a description of the Nissan over the police radio, he located the Nissan and

loosely tailed it. A few minutes after Fox began to follow the Nissan, Davenport

stopped his vehicle on the Western Hills viaduct, reversed towards Fox’s vehicle,

stopped roughly one-to-two car lengths from Fox, and “jumped out of the vehicle.” Fox

testified that Davenport “pulled out a gun and pointed that gun straight at me.”

       {¶6}   Fox retreated to the rear of his vehicle and identified himself as a police

officer. Fox fired his weapon once toward Davenport but did not hit him. When

uniformed officers arrived, Davenport walked back to his vehicle and put his firearm

on top of his vehicle. Officers arrested Davenport.

   A. Davenport accessed firearms through the trunk of his vehicle

       {¶7}   Detective Beebe investigated the events after Davenport’s arrest. In an

interview with Beebe, which the jury watched, Davenport said that he reached into the

trunk of his vehicle to retrieve the firearms while Fox was following him. He confirmed

that he did not leave the vehicle to access the firearms.

       {¶8}   Davenport first said that the two firearms and ammunition had been

inside of an unzipped bag in the trunk, but later he said that the “big gun” was outside

of the bag. Davenport said that the smaller firearm inside of the bag was “loaded

ready.” Davenport told Beebe that his ammunition was in the bag or loaded into the

firearms. He admitted that he did not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon.

       {¶9}   At trial, Davenport’s story changed—he testified that he had placed the

firearms in the trunk unloaded, with the ammunition in the glove box. Davenport

testified that he had retrieved the firearms and ammunition without leaving the

vehicle by putting his car in neutral, lowering the backseat down, and reaching into

                                           3
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the trunk where the firearms were located. Davenport “pulled both [guns] in the front

because they were both in the bag, and [his] clips [were] in the glove box, and [he]

loaded them both just in case.”

   B. The jury instructions and verdict

       {¶10} Davenport filed proposed jury instructions, which included an

entrapment instruction. Davenport argued, “but for the behavior of the police officers

in this case, there would have never been the charges that were filed.”

       {¶11} After the parties argued for and against the entrapment instruction, the

trial court denied Davenport’s proposed jury instruction. The jury found Davenport

guilty of carrying a concealed weapon and improperly handling a firearm in a motor

vehicle. The trial court sentenced Davenport to 18 months of community control and

ordered the firearms to be destroyed. Davenport appeals.

                               II.   Law and Analysis

       {¶12} In his sole assignment of error, Davenport argues the trial court abused

its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment.

       {¶13} “We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a defendant’s

proposed jury instruction under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v.

Thompkins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220307, 2023-Ohio-2603, ¶ 15, quoting State v.

Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190598, 2020-Ohio-5421, ¶ 34. “A trial court

abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable,

or arbitrary.” Id., quoting State v. Pittman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220460, 2023-

Ohio-1990, ¶ 10, citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

                                           4
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

   A. Entrapment Jury Instructions

       {¶14} A trial court should provide a defendant’s requested jury instructions

when those instructions are applicable to the facts of the case and are correct

statements of law, and when reasonable jurors could reach the conclusion sought by

the requested instructions. State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45

N.E.3d 127, ¶ 240. “[A] trial court must fully and completely give the jury all

instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and

discharge its duty as the fact finder.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090137,

2010-Ohio-4116, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 553 N.E.2d 640

(1990), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶15} A trial court should include a proposed affirmative-defense jury

instruction when the defendant introduced sufficient evidence that, if believed, would

cause reasonable jurors to question whether the defense existed. Id., quoting State v.

Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.

Whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to require an affirmative-defense

instruction is left to the trial court’s discretion because it is in the best position to gauge

the evidence before the jury. State v. Fulmer, 117 Ohio St.3d 319, 2008-Ohio-936, 883

N.E.2d 1052, ¶ 72.

       {¶16} When raising an entrapment defense, the defendant admits the

commission of the crime and attempts to avoid liability by showing that “the

government induced him to commit a crime that he was not predisposed to commit.”

Jones at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d 187, 193, 449 N.E.2d 1295 (1983).

Entrapment is an affirmative defense. Id. at ¶ 30, citing Doran at paragraph two of the

                                              5
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

syllabus. Therefore, the defendant bears the burdens of production and persuasion by

a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; R.C. 2901.05(A).

       {¶17} To establish entrapment, the defendant must submit evidence showing

that (1) the criminal design, plan, or idea originated with the government, (2) the

government induced the defendant to commit the criminal act, and (3) the defendant

was not predisposed to commit the crime. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090137,

2010-Ohio-4116, at ¶ 28, quoting Doran at paragraph one of the syllabus.

   B. Davenport was not entitled to an entrapment instruction

       {¶18} Initially, we note what is not before us. Davenport does not raise a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument—by asserting the entrapment defense to both

counts, Davenport admitted that the state satisfied the elements of both offenses.

Davenport also does not raise a self-defense argument and accordingly, the

reasonableness of Davenport’s actions in response to the police tailing him is

irrelevant to our analysis.

       {¶19} Davenport’s appellate brief lays out the facts and the pertinent law. His

entire argument is as follows: “Considering the testimony presented and construing

the evidence objectively, there is a question of fact whether Mr. Davenport was

induced by the undercover officer(s) to commit the crimes charged. Mr. Davenport’s

history, the evidence provided, and his testimony clearly supports, at the minimum,

providing the jury an instruction on entrapment.”

       {¶20} Davenport fails to specify which parts of the record support his

argument. He does not point to any part of the trial transcript to show that he

produced evidence demonstrating his entitlement to an entrapment instruction.

“Under App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7), an appellate court may disregard arguments

                                          6
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

where the appellant fails to identify the issues and the relevant portions of the record

to support the argument. It is not this court’s role to scour the record to root out issues

and arguments.” La Spisa v. La Spisa, 2023-Ohio-3467, 225 N.E.3d 398, ¶ 57 (8th

Dist.).

          {¶21} Even if Davenport had identified portions of the record to support his

argument, the result would not change. At trial, Davenport offered no evidence to show

that the criminal design, plan, or idea—Davenport knowingly having concealed

weapons ready at hand, and Davenport transporting those firearms and ammunition

in a motor vehicle when the firearms and ammunition were accessible to Davenport

without leaving his vehicle—originated with the state. And he offered no evidence to

show that the state induced him into placing those firearms and ammunition in his

vehicle where they were concealed and readily accessible to him without leaving the

vehicle. Davenport’s failure to offer such evidence is fatal to his assertion that he was

entitled to an entrapment jury instruction at trial.

          {¶22} We overrule Davenport’s sole assignment of error.

                                    III.   Conclusion

          {¶23} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Davenport’s sole assignment of

error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE and BERGERON, JJ., concur.

Please note:

          The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                              7