Court Opinion

ID: 9710970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:36.314562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.466518
License: Public Domain

OTIS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. While it may have been error for the trial court to refuse to give plaintiffs’ requested jury instructions, the jury’s rejection of plaintiffs’ theory of direct cause makes such error harmless at best.
At trial, plaintiffs pursued a singular theory of causation. Allegedly, defendant Ries improperly designed and installed the ventilation system for the furnace in question. Whether his alleged malfeasance is characterized as negligence, a breach of warranty, or the creation of an unreasonably dangerous product, the alleged effect of his conduct was to make the venting system susceptible to blockage through the accumulation of leaves and other debris falling from the chimney. This allegedly resulted in the exhaust fumes from the furnace, including carbon monoxide, being vented out into the basement area underneath the living quarters. Plaintiffs contended that from there the fumes seeped upwards, accumulating in the living room. When Mrs. O’Laughlin entered that room from her bedroom, she allegedly was overcome by the carbon monoxide present, lost consciousness, and fell upon the furnace grating, suffering severe burns.
The evidence fails to support this theory of causation, as the jury verdict reflects.
The furnace which was installed by Ries was a 70,000 BTU capacity, Empire brand floor furnace. It was installed in the floor of the living room area of plaintiffs’ home by being suspended from the floor joists in the basement. The body of the furnace was thus located in the basement, with a grate in the floor itself through which the heat arose from the furnace into the living room area. The portion of the furnace which transferred the heat to the grate was sealed in such a manner that it was not possible for any gases from the furnace to escape through the grate. They could only be exhausted from the furnace into the basement. To vent these gases from the furnace, Ries ran a horizontal vent pipe from the furnace to one wall of the basement. From there the pipe was connected to a vertical pipe that ran up through the floor, inside the wall of the living area, and into the bottom of an already existing chimney that extended partway down the wall of the living area. The chimney had previously been used to vent a freestanding gas space heater, and ran from the first floor living area through the second floor, and out the roof. Ries merely connected the vertical pipe to the bottom of the chimney and did not continue the piping up through the chimney as a liner.
Plaintiffs contended that the ventilation system was defective in two respects. First, it was asserted that Ries should have installed a “drip-T” at the point where the horizontal pipe met the vertical. This device, which consists of an extension of the vertical pipe downward beyond the connection with the horizontal pipe, would have allowed debris to accumulate in the bottom of the vertical pipe without blocking the horizontal one. Additionally, such a construction would have allowed plaintiffs an easy method for cleaning the ventilation system by merely removing the bottom of the vertical pipe. Ries testified that there was no room to install a “drip-T.” He did, *834however, construct the connection between the pipes so that by the removal of two screws the pipes could be separated for cleaning. It is uncontradicted that leaves, twigs, and other debris which had fallen from the chimney did accumulate at the connection in considerable quantities.
Second, plaintiffs produced expert testimony which indicated that it was improper for Ries to fail to line the existing chimney. The venting of the furnace exhaust directly through the masonry chimney allegedly resulted in condensation forming on the chimney walls, causing the masonry to deteriorate, and sand to fall down the chimney, adding to the blockage.
Given these conditions, plaintiffs’ theory of causation was that the flue gases, unable to escape through the blocked ventilation system, “backed up” and spilled out into the basement. There they allegedly accumulated and seeped upward through the floor.
It is clear that without proof of the existence of carbon monoxide in plaintiffs’ living quarters at a level sufficient to induce fainting, plaintiffs would be precluded from recovery under any legal theory that they might advance, because there would be no causal relationship between Ries’ conduct and Mrs. O’Laughlin’s injuries.
The normal products of the combustion of natural gas are principally water and carbon dioxide. Carbon monoxide is usually produced in only trace amounts unless the combustion occurs in an oxygen-poor environment. The presence of a pure blue flame indicates that the gas is burning completely, with sufficient oxygen. Alvin Tu-rek, an employee of defendant Minnesota Natural Gas Company, inspected the furnace on January 10, 1973, 2 days after Mrs. O’Laughlin was injured. Before he made any attempt to clear the venting system he checked the furnace and found that flue gases were “spilling out” — that is, not venting. Nonetheless, he observed that the furnace was burning a pure blue flame, indicating that it was receiving sufficient oxygen to fully burn the natural gas. Thomas Carson, an engineer employed by Minnesota Natural Gas Company, testified that this particular furnace (and furnaces generally) was designed so that it produces minimal carbon monoxide even if the vent is for some reason obstructed.
In addition to this evidence that the furnace was, despite the blocked vent, burning normally, it appeared from the testimony that two of the basement windows near the furnace were broken at the time of the accident. This would have allowed the un-vented flue gases to escape from the basement. Also, the newly remodeled floor of plaintiffs’ home consisted of tongue and groove oak, covered with fir, and then carpeting, reducing the possibility that any flue gases which did accumulate in the basement would seep into the living area in any quantity.
The only evidence presented by plaintiffs of the presence of carbon monoxide were the symptoms exhibited by two children of plaintiffs who stayed with their father after the accident. On the first night they felt nauseous, and had headaches. Both are symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning, as well as a number of other illnesses, such as influenza. They were examined by a physician, and treated with oxygen, to which they responded. The doctor rendered his opinion that they were suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning; based upon a hypothetical question, he also stated his belief that Mrs. O’Laughlin was suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning at the time of the accident.
However, the jury also considered evidence of Mrs. O’Laughlin’s physical condition before the accident. On the morning in question Mrs. O’Laughlin testified that she felt fine upon awakening, in fact she “felt very good.” If at that time she had been suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning, she would have felt lethargic and nauseous, and would have had a headache. She put on her robe, and walked to the living room, where she felt a “wave of heat” and passed out. Dr. John Coe, chief of pathology at Hennepin County General Hospital and the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, testified that if there had been carbon monoxide gas present in a sufficient *835quantity to cause her to collapse, Mrs. O’Laughlin would have lapsed into a deep coma after the several additional minutes that she lay on the grate before her husband found her. However, immediately after she was pulled from the grate by her husband, she was conscious, and never lost consciousness after that. Her husband exhibited no symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning, despite the fact that he sat with her in the same room for several minutes while waiting for the ambulance. Additionally, Mrs. O’Laughlin’s own physician testified that she had complained to him as early as 1971 (before the furnace was installed) of experiencing feelings of light-headedness, especially prominent in the morning. He testified further that this was not an uncommon phenomenon in people of Mrs. O’Laughlin’s age.
In light of the conflicting evidence, whether or not plaintiffs had established by a preponderance of the evidence their theory of causation would be a question of fact which this court could not determine as a matter of law on the present record. But the jury verdict makes that determination unnecessary. The jury found that plaintiffs were negligent, but that this negligence was not a direct cause of the accident. The significance of this finding is clear.
Plaintiffs testified that it had been their custom to clean out the ventilation system of their old space heaters on a regular basis, and were thus aware of the need for such maintenance. Yet they did not attempt to clean out the new ventilating system at any time between the installation date and the accident. The jury evidently felt that this failure was a negligent one on plaintiffs’ part. It was the only conduct of plaintiffs that conceivably could have been the basis for the jury’s finding of negligence.
The jury also found that this negligence was not a cause of the accident. The inescapable conclusion compelled by these two findings is that the jury determined that despite the blockage of the venting system, carbon monoxide did not cause Mrs. O’Laughlin to fall. This being the case, Ries could not be liable to plaintiffs even if he breached an implied warranty or created a defective product by his design or installation of the ventilation system. The blocked pipe (which would have constituted the breach of warranty or defect) was found by the jury to not have been a cause of the accident. Thus, failure to give the requested instructions was only harmless error.
For these reasons, I would affirm.