Court Opinion

ID: 9543055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:43.268834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:37.579784
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
A consideration of the complaint herein and the evidence admitted in support thereof, clearly reveals a prima facie case of breach of contract. A right to relief is clearly shown, and the net result of the majority opinion is, that because plaintiff stated that defendants were indebted to it in the amount of $2,450 and prayed for a judgment in that amount, it was an irrevocable election to sue for the purchase price. Only one cause of action existed, which was for breach of contract.
The pertinent parts of the complaint are as follows: “4. That heretofore on or about January 17, 1947, the defendants did order from plaintiff one thousand motors with cord attached, to be manufactured by plaintiff at an agreed price of $2.45 per motor plus cord. 5. That plaintiff, pursuant to said order, has manufactured, especially for defendants, the said motors, and has of*518fered and does herein renew its offer to deliver said motors to defendants, but that defendants have failed and refused to pay for the same or to accept delivery thereof. 6. That defendants are indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $2,450.00.”
It is not disputed that plaintiff, upon order, completed 500 of the motors and had partially completed the remaining 500, but they were not assembled. Plaintiff notified defendants that the 500 motors were ready, awaiting shipping instructions from the defendants. That the defendants failed to pay for the motors or accept delivery thereof is undisputed. It also is undisputed that the motors, as manufactured, were of a type specially designed for defendants’ use and had no market value for resale.
Primarily, because plaintiff fixed the figure of the amount due from the defendants at what appears to be exactly the contract price, it was held by the trial court that plaintiff had elected to sue for the purchase price and had not complied with one particular of the Uniform Sales Act, to wit: that plaintiff, after offer to deliver the goods to the defendants, and defendants’ refusal to receive them, had not notified the defendants that the goods were thereafter held by the seller as “bailee” for the buyer, and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff did not amend the complaint nor offer to do so, as it now says, there was no amendment it could make.
As now determined by the majority opinion, plaintiff after stating a cause of action, and showing the right to relief, is precluded from recovery on a technicality in the pleadings. Such is only a pretense of justice. If a litigant and counsel, in a just cause, can be so bewildered by the inconsistencies of procedure under the peculiarities of the wording of the so-called Uniform Sales Act (for which I have another name) and the rules of this court, as to-, endanger recovery of such an amount as is justly due, and allow the debtor to escape, *519it is a sad commentary on our laws of procedure. I find no mandatory provision in the Uniform Sales Act calling for the result here obtained. The act provides that the seller “may” offer to deliver the goods, and “may” notify the buyer that the goods are thereafter held by the seller as bailee for the buyer. If the seller was tied down by the use of the mandatory word “shall,” we might find an excuse for the judgment in this case. Time has not permitted me full research on this question; however, I find that one state, Massachusetts, did not accept the Uniform Sales Act as so written, but in the sections involved here did substitute the word “shall” for “may.” This is significant.
In my opinion, the correspondence between plaintiff and defendants, held by the trial court to be a contract, discloses sufficient compliance with the troublesome section of the act, if plaintiff is to be held to have proceeded under that section of the act in an “action for the price.” Plaintiff clearly stated a cause of action under section 64, “Action for Damages for Nonacceptance of Goods,” but because it happened to use figures that were the exact amount of the contract price, it is now held to be fatal. Under all rules of reformed procedure, plaintiff was- entitled to recover, not on its theory of damages, nor on the exact figure claimed, but properly and justly on the facts in the record showing a basis of recovery. If these facts disclose he was entitled to no relief, then it is to be denied, and recovery should properly be available without amendment, if not thought necessary, to the pleadings. Nestor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 25 F. Supp. 478.
Due to the fact, as here shown, that the goods as specially manufactured to be adapted to defendants’ peculiar use, had no market value, then plaintiff was entitled to consider that the amount it could recover would be an amount equal to' the purchase price. It is permitted under the Act to recover the profit it would have made if the contract or the sale had been *520fully performed. This surely includes all costs of processing the order as well as the profit to be made thereon. As is said in Percival Co. v. Sea, 207 Ia. 245 (222 N.W. 886), “If it has no value, then the entire purchase price may be obtained by the seller. Without such right to remuneration, there would not be full compensation.”
Now to the question of election. Plaintiff could not be held to an irrevocable election unless it was pursuing one of two inconsistent remedies. To establish the indebtedness, and a right to relief, the same facts were here necessary to support both remedies. The state of facts relied upon by plaintiff as to a breach of contract and liability on the part of .the defendants is consistent with either action, that of one for the purchase price or for damages, and the same facts are not repugnant to the establishment of liability or recovery under the other companion section of the Act. I do not find that the procedural remedies provided are inconsistent because fundamentally the assertion of one mode of redress does not negate or repudiate the other. The facts as to the existence of defendants’ liability are obvious under both sections of the Act.
It is to be noted that plaintiff did not allege reliance on any particular section of any statute, therefore if the trial court determined that plaintiff had no cause of action and could not recover under section 63 of the Act, it was not justified in dismissing a complaint in which were employed the almost identical wording of section 64. In other words, the complaint stated a claim for damage. Let it fall where it may, under any law, the plaintiff was entitled to remain in court. The effect of the majority opinion is, and I am fearful does establish a precedent, that a request in the prayer of a complaint can be held to be an irrevocable election by the pleader. An amendment would have been nothing more than an amendment to the prayer. Under our rules of civil procedure, and many of our statutes, a pleader is stalked by the shadow of an irrevocable election.
*521I am confident that after reading the above and foregoing it can-be determined that I dissent to the majority opinion and I think a rehearing should be granted.
Mr. Justice Hays and Mr. Justice Alter join in this dissent.