Court Opinion

ID: 9705368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:04:26.321126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.487094
License: Public Domain

*513SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 38. (dissenting). For too many years victims have been the forgotten people in the criminal justice system. Victims frequently have viewed themselves as twice victimized — first by the criminal and then by the legal system. The victim rights movement has been a potent force for reforms that enable victims to be informed about their cases as they move through the criminal justice system and to influence the system's handing of their cases. The case before us is about one such reform — the victim's impact statement at sentencing.
¶ 39. The court of appeals concluded that because the victim's relatives described the impact of the crime on their lives to influence the circuit court to impose a lengthy prison sentence, the circuit court erred in not considering the victim's criminal record to show that the victim's relatives may have overstated their loss or may have misconceived the character of their loved one. The court of appeals wrote: "Faced with recommendations that [the defendant] serve a lengthy prison sentence, in part, because of the virtue of her victim, [the defendant], in fairness, should have had the opportunity to recommend a lesser sentence, in part, because [the victim's] record compromised claims about his virtue." State v. Spears, 220 Wis. 2d 720, 727-28, 585 N.W.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1998).
¶ 40. The majority opinion significantly narrows the court of appeals decision and the purposes for which a victim's criminal record is admissible at sentencing. The majority opinion holds that the victim's criminal record is admissible in this case at the defendant's sentencing because the circumstances of the crime may be considered in sentencing, the victim's criminal record is probative of the victim's assaultive *514character and the victim's criminal record supports the defendant's view of the circumstances of the crime. Majority op. at 499. The majority writes that "whether [the victim] physically assaulted the [defendant] is the only disputed question for the purpose of this appeal." Majority op. at 499.
¶ 41. Assuming for purposes of this dissent, without deciding the issue, that the majority opinion is correct about the admissibility of a victim's criminal record for these limited purposes, I conclude that the majority has decided a hypothetical case, not the one presently before this court.
¶ 42. In this case the circuit court admitted the criminal record; it gave it no weight. Without using the victim's criminal record, the circuit court found that the victim had snatched the defendant's purse and had physically assaulted the defendant. The circuit court stated that "while the victim's bad conduct and character of the night of his death was an important mitigating factor in this sentencing, the victim's general character was not a sentencing factor, and there was simply no reason to give his prior record any weight."
¶ 43. The circuit court explained that it accepted the defendant's view of the circumstances of the crime and considered the circumstances of the crime in sentencing the defendant:
". . . I'm satisfied that [the victim] in this case engaged in an assaultive offense against [the defendant]. . . .I'm satisfied that [the victim] set about. . .to snatch [the defendant's] purse. . .and that this was done with some violence or at least the threat of violence. There is some unresolved issue here about whether there was an actual physical assault... .[I]n sentencing you [the defendant], I do *515have to try to understand what it was you [the defendant] did and why you did it, and whether or not a physical blow was struck. It's quite clear that you [the defendant] were subject to some assault, either by violence or the threat of violence, and it's on that basis — those bases that I am proceeding to decide upon a sentence that is hopefully fair to you [the defendant], and fair to the victim's family in this case, and fair to the community."
Majority op. at 504.
¶ 44. Given the circuit court's acceptance of the assaultive nature of the victim and. the defendant's version of the circumstances of the crime, including the victim's initiating the encounter by purse snatching and by violence or threat of violence, further evidence in the form of the victim's criminal record was not necessary. Indeed the criminal record was irrelevant. The circuit court had already accepted as true those facts to which, according to the majority opinion, the criminal record may be relevant.
¶ 45. Sentencing is a discretionary decision. An appellate court starts out with the presumption that the circuit court acted reasonably. State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 418-19, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998). The circuit court has wide latitude in determining the information pertinent to the sentencing decision. State v. Marshal, 172 Wis. 2d 491, 500 n.7, 493 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1992). The circuit court exercised its discretion in this case. Nothing in the record points to an erroneous exercise of discretion. I would therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the order of the circuit court.
¶ 46. As to the broader implications of the issue presented in this case, I share the concerns of the circuit court that considering the victim's criminal record *516would lead to an improper balancing of the "comparative worth" of the defendant and the victim. The circuit court eloquently expressed these concerns as follows:
For the most part, the victim's individual worth is not itself a proper factor at sentencing. . . .The court should .. .not attempt to measure the relative value of the victim's life. While the defendant may benefit when no one appears to mourn the deceased, there is no corresponding right to argue that "since nobody else cares, why should we" or to otherwise seek to diminish the value of the victim's life.
Even though there might be circumstances in which the court could weigh the positive contributions and worth of the victim in assessing the harm caused by the crime, it does not follow that there is a right to have the court consider that a victim was a terrible burden on society. Such an inquiry opens a door which should remain closed. If the victim's prior criminal record is admissible, does the defendant also have the right to present evidence that the victim cheated on his taxes, was emotionally abusive to his children, suffered from chronic alcoholism, or couldn't hold a job? Such an inquiry would demean the victim families in such cases, without serving any legitimate sentencing purpose. In addition, even should a sentencing court be entitled to consider the murder of a career criminal as less serious, certainly the court has the discretion not to do so. In this case, I chose not to treat the victim's criminal record as a mitigating factor.
. . . .Even the most vile member of the community has the right to be free from unlawful, violent death, and once his life has been taken we will never know what positive contributions he might yet have made.
¶ 47. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
*517¶ 48. I am authorized to state that JUSTICES ANN WALSH BRADLEY AND DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.