Court Opinion

ID: 9771777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:53:00.608473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:36.384463
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case reversing and rendering judgment in favor of the appellant, I would reach that conclusion for entirely different reasons.
As indicated by the factual statement of the majority opinion, the agreement that appellee sought specific performance upon, arose out of negotiations to settle pending litigation between appellee and appellant. In fact, the general outline of the settlement agreement that was signed recognizes in its final paragraph that the final settlement agreement should be placed into the record before the trial court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
I believe that the facts in this case are such that the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.1984) is applicable.
Appellant in its argument under point one asserts the application of Rule 11 to this agreement. Appellant points out that the outline, although signed by the attorneys, was not signed by the parties. Secondly, the settlement documents evidencing the final agreement between the parties, although prepared, were not signed by ap-pellee. Appellant also points out that the agreement was not reduced to a signed document filed with the trial court, nor was it announced in detail in open court. Prior to the finalization of the documents in question, the appellant withdrew its consent and agreement to the settlement proposal. Appellee then filed a cross action asserting terms of the general outlined settlement agreement and suing for specific performance. In its first amended original answer in the severed action, appellant pleaded, in paragraph three, that appellee waived and was estopped from asserting any alleged settlement agreement between the parties in that the alleged settlement agreement was not in writing, signed and filed with the papers in this cause or made in open court and entered of record. Although not referring specifically thereto, this language tracks the provisions of Rule 11, Tex.R.Civ.P.
During the course of the trial the record reflects that the appellant brought its Rule 11 pleading to the attention of the court; and, furthermore, prior to the time the case was submitted to the jury on special issues it appears that the appellant again brought the question of the application of Rule 11 to the attention of the court. The record reflects that the court stated that the issue of the application of Rule 11 was a question of law rather than of fact and ruled that Rule 11 was not applicable in the case. I am of the opinion that that ruling was erroneous and Rule 11 does apply.
In my view this case is almost on all fours with the facts in Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.1984). In that case the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 is a minimum requirement for enforcement of all agreements concerning pending suits, including, but not limited to, agreed judgments. The clear language of the rule indicates, and the Texas Supreme Court held, that compliance with Rule 11 is a general prerequisite for any judgment enforcing an agreement touching a pending suit. 682 S.W.2d at 529.
The appellee relies on Stewart v. Mathes, 528 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1978, no writ) that a settlement agreement is simply another form of contract and therefore is governed by the general rules of contract. The Stewart case was distinguished by the Texas Supreme Court in. Kennedy v. Hyde at page 528. Appellee also relies on the case of Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas), writ refused n.r.e. per curiam 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.1981). Browning is distinguishable because it is clear in the recitation of the fact that the settlement agreement was read into the court record, and therefore Rule 11 was not applicable.
In Kennedy v. Hyde the Supreme Court concluded that the fact that the settlement agreement was disputed and that consent *422to the same had been withdrawn, rendered the agreement unenforceable at the moment its existence was denied in the pleadings and that Rule 11 prohibited further inquiry. See Old Republic Insurance Company v. Franklin, 727 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Masi v. Scheel, 724 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).
I would hold that the disposition of this case is controlled by Rule 11 and that the trial court should not have proceeded further. Accordingly, I would reverse and render in favor of the appellant herein, for the reasons stated.