Court Opinion

ID: 9372861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:11.120014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.074494
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MITCH WINE,                                       DOCKET NUMBER
                           Appellant,                  DA-0752-18-0116-X-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: February 10, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mitch Wine, Mountain View, Arkansas, pro se.

           Lindsey Gotkin, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                          FINAL ORDER

¶1         In a February 20, 2019 compliance initial decision, the administrative judge
     found the agency in noncompliance with the April 30, 2018 initial decision

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are no t
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     dismissing the appellant’s removal appeal as settled. 2 Wine v. Department of the
     Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab
     19, Compliance Initial Decision (CID); Wine v. Department of the Interior, MSPB
     Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-I-1, Tab 56, Initial Decision (ID). For the reasons
     discussed below, we find the agency in compliance and DISMISS the petition for
     enforcement.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        On April 30, 2018, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appellant’s removal appeal on the basis of a settlement agreement
     submitted by the parties. ID at 1-2. As explained below, neither party filed a
     timely petition for review, and thus the initial decision became the final decision
     of the Board with respect to the appellant’s removal and the entry of the
     settlement agreement into the record for future enforcement.
¶3        The settlement agreement provided, in relevant part, that the agency would
     withdraw its original termination memorandum (which removed the appellant for
     misconduct) and replace it with a memorandum terminating the appellant for
     inability to perform the essential functions of his position .      The agency was
     further required to restore the appellant’s pay and leave balances from the date of
     his original termination until the date his terminat ion for medical reasons became
     effective. See CID at 4-6. The appellant was required to “unequivocally accept
     his termination for medical reasons” and waive any appeal, grievance, or other
     right he might have to contest the termination for medical reason s.        See CID

     2
       On November 26, 2021—more than 3 years after issuance of the initial decision, and
     more than 2 years after issuance of the compliance initial decision underlying the
     instant compliance referral matter—the appellant petitioned for review of the initial
     decision. On February 10, 2023, the Board dismissed his petition for review as
     untimely filed without good cause for the delay. Wine v. Department of the Interior,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-I-1, Final Order (Feb. 10, 2023). Thus, the
     operative decision regarding the parties’ settlement obligations remains the April 30,
     2018 initial decision dismissing the removal appeal as settled.
                                                                                            3

     at 4-5.      Finally, the settlement agreement contained the following language
     relevant to this petition for enforcement:
               The Agency and the Appellant agree to cooperate with each other
               when/if the Appellant applies for disability retirement. The Agency
               specifically agrees to supply a Form 3112B (Supervisor’s Statement)
               that will express the Agency’s belief that the Appellant is not able to
               perform the essential functions of his position due to his medical
               condition, that it has attempted to accommodate him but cannot do
               more than it has already done due to his medical condition, and that
               it has no ability to transfer him to another suitable position due to his
               medical condition. The Appellant acknowledges that the Agency is
               not guaranteeing he will be deemed eligible for disability retirement,
               as that decision is not the Agency’s decision to make.
     See CID at 6.
¶4         On September 19, 2018, the appellant filed this petition for enforcement, 3
     primarily alleging that the agency had failed to pay him severance pay and that
     the revised termination memorandum improperly stated that his removal for
     medical inability to perform was taken for the efficiency of the service. See CID
     at 7-10.
¶5         On February 20, 2019, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial
     decision finding the agency partially noncompliant with the settlement agreement.
     The administrative judge rejected the appellant’s claim to severance pay, finding
     that the settlement agreement did not require such payment. CID at 10. The
     administrative judge further rejected the appellant’s claim that the agency

     3
       On March 26, 2019, the appellant filed a second petition for enforcement, which the
     administrative judge dismissed in part and denied in part. Wine v. Department of the
     Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-C-2, Compliance File, Tab 1, Tab 28,
     Compliance Initial Decision. On July 1, 2019, the appellant filed a third petition for
     enforcement, which the administrative judge dismissed. Wine v. Department of the
     Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-C-3, Compliance File, Tab 1, Tab 13,
     Compliance Initial Decision. Neither party petitioned for review in either case, and
     neither is before us in the present matter. The appellant has three other cases pending
     on petition for review that likewise are not before us in the present matter. See Wine v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0513-W-2; Wine v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-21-0342-W-1; Wine v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-4324-21-0377-I-1.
                                                                                        4

     violated the settlement agreement through its language in the revised termination
     memorandum, noting that the Board has held that removal for medical inability to
     perform the essential functions of one’s position promotes the efficiency of the
     service. CID at 10-11.
¶6        However, the administrative judge found that the agency failed to establish
     that it fully complied with the cooperation provision set forth above.          The
     administrative judge faulted the agency’s cooperation with the appellant’s
     disability retirement application in two respects. First, although the appellant had
     submitted a disability retirement application to the agency for transmission to the
     Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on his behalf, the agency had lost the
     documentation and was unable to confirm that it had transmitted the entire
     application to OPM.      CID at 11-12.   The administrative judge found that the
     agency’s handling of the application was “careless and negligent” but not
     bad-faith noncompliance. CID at 16-17. Second, the administrative judge found
     that the copy of the Standard Form 3112B (SF-3112B), Supervisor’s Statement,
     that the agency located (apparently as part of the materials the agency had
     prepared to submit to OPM with the appellant’s lost disability retirement
     application) used language incompatible with the cooperation provision of the
     settlement agreement.     The administrative judge expl ained that the SF-3112B
     contained references to the appellant’s “unsatisfactory conduct” and that this was
     at odds with the agreement that the agency provide an SF-3112B that would
     “express the Agency’s belief that the Appellant is not able to perform the
     essential functions of his position due to his medical condition, that it has
     attempted to accommodate him but cannot do more than it has already done due
     to his medical condition, and that it has no ability to transfer him to another
     suitable position due to his medical condition.” CID at 15. The administrative
     judge found that the language used by the agency breached the settlement
     agreement, but she did not address whether the breach was material . CID at 16.
                                                                                             5

¶7        The administrative judge ordered the agency to provide the appellant the
     following: a revised SF-3112B eliminating the information that contravened the
     cooperation provision; a SF-3112D (Agency Certification of Reassignment and
     Accommodation Efforts) “completed in accordance with the information s et out
     in the parties’ settlement agreement”; and a completed copy of SF -3112E
     (agency-completed Disability Retirement Application Checklist). CID at 18 -19.
     The administrative judge further instructed the appellant to inform the agency
     whether he wished to submit his disability retirement application directly, or
     resubmit it to the agency for transmittal to OPM on his behalf. CID at 17 -18.
     Finally, the administrative judge directed the parties to work to complete the
     application and send it to OPM “without further delay,” and advised the appellant
     of the relevant deadline and how to meet it, regardless of whether he submitted
     his application directly or through the agency and regardless of whether he
     received completed copies of the forms from the agency. CID at 18 & n.13.
¶8        In the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge informed the
     agency that, if it decided to take the actions required by the decision, it must
     submit to the Office of the Clerk of the Board, within the time limit for filing a
     petition for review under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), a statement that it had taken the
     actions identified in the compliance initial decision, along with evidence
     establishing   that    it    had   taken   those   actions.   CID   at 19-20;   5   C.F.R.
     § 1201.183(a)(6)(i).        She also informed the parties of their option to request
     Board review of the compliance initial decision by filing a petition for review by
     March 27, 2019, the date on which the findings of noncompliance would become
     final unless a petition for review was filed.                 CID at 20; see 5 C.F.R.
     §§ 1201.114(e), 1201.183(a)(6)(ii), 1201.183(b).          Neither party filed a petition
     for review of the compliance initial decision with the Board.
¶9        The agency timely filed a statement that it had taken the actions identified
     in the compliance initial decision, and the appellant’s petition for enforcement
     accordingly was referred to the Board for a final decision on issues of
                                                                                       6

      compliance.   Wine v. Department of Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-
      0116-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 2. The parties subsequently filed
      multiple pleadings contesting, among other things, the agency’s obligations, the
      scope of the compliance initial decision and its relation to the appellant’s other
      MSPB and non-MSPB litigation, and the outcome of the appellant’s disability
      retirement application. As explained below, we find that the agency cured any
      material breach of the settlement agreement and that, under the circumstances, the
      appellant is not entitled to rescission of the settlement agreement.

                                          ANALYSIS
¶10         A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, will be enforced in
      accordance with contract law.        Burke v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      121 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 8 (2014). The Board will enforce a settlement agreement
      that has been entered into the record in the same manner as a final Board decision
      or order.   Id.   When the appellant alleges noncompliance with a set tlement
      agreement, the agency must produce relevant material evidence of its compliance
      with the agreement or show that there was good cause for noncompliance.        Id.
      The ultimate burden, however, remains with the appellant to prove breach by a
      preponderance of the evidence. Id.
¶11         Over the course of the compliance referral litigation, the agency submitted
      an evolving series of pleadings, supported by documentation, noting that it had
      completed the three forms as ordered by the compliance initial decision; that it
      had submitted the appellant’s completed disability retirement application to OPM
      on April 26 and 29, 2019, before his 1-year filing deadline expired; that it had
      attempted to further the success of the appellant’s disability retirement
      application by informing him that OPM wanted him to submit a SF-3107, but the
      appellant refused to cooperate; and that OPM had approved the appellant’s
      disability retirement application and the appellant was receiving interim benefits
                                                                                         7

      until OPM could finalize his benefits determination. CRF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at
      4,6,10, Tab 13 at 8-14, Tab 19 at 9-13, 16, 21.
¶12         The appellant countered these submissions with claims that the settlement
      agreement was invalid or unlawful; that the agency unlawfully accessed his
      medical records to remove him from his job; that the administrative judge should
      have awarded him interim relief to remedy delays in processing his disability
      retirement application caused by the agency’s actions; that the agency did not
      cooperate in submitting his disability retirement application, as ordered by the
      administrative judge; that the agency lied about its communications with OPM
      and transmitted information to OPM that would doom his disability retirement
      application; and that OPM’s eventual grant of benefits was for a shorter time
      frame than expected “as a result of the Agency’s ‘careless’ and ‘negligent’ breach
      of the settlement agreement.” CRF, Tab 6 at 5-6, Tab 7 at 4-5, Tab 9 at 5-6, Tab
      16 at 4, Tab 24 at 5. The appellant also made various claims related to his 2016
      workers compensation litigation, argued that he was entitled to consequential or
      compensatory damages, and moved for sanctions against the agency. CRF, Tab 7
      at 4-5, 7, Tab 18 at 4-5. Finally, in response to the Board’s request that he clarify
      the relief he sought if he prevailed, he stated that he wished to rescind the
      settlement agreement and reinstate his removal appeal because the agency did not
      timely submit his disability retirement application to OPM. CRF, Tab 11, Tab 12
      at 4-5.
¶13         Having carefully considered both parties’ submissions, we find that the
      agency has fully complied with its obligations under the settlement agreement and
      with the instructions in the compliance initial decision. The appellant has not
      submitted evidence supporting his arguments that the agency failed to cooperate
      with him, lied to OPM, or otherwise impeded the timely submission and
      processing of his disability retirement application.      By contrast, the agency
      submitted evidence that it revised the documents in accordance with the
      administrative judge’s instructions and submitted the appellant’s disability
                                                                                        8

      retirement application to OPM despite the appellant’s lack of cooperation and
      abusive language and behavior toward agency counsel. CRF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 19
      at 9-13.   The agency also provided evidence that OPM approved the application.
      CRF, Tab 19 at 16, 21.        Although the appellant variously insists that the
      application was untimely filed or that the benefits awarded were for a shor ter time
      frame than expected due to the agency’s original failure to submit his application,
      he has not provided anything to substantiate these claims.          Moreover, the
      settlement agreement expressly disclaimed any guarantee by the agency that the
      appellant would be deemed eligible for disability retirement. See CID at 6. It
      follows, therefore, that the settlement agreement did not guarantee that the
      appellant would receive a certain amount in benefits or that the benefits would
      flow from a certain date. The appellant has not pointed to any specific error in
      the agency’s portion of the application forms that could have impacted the
      starting date or amount of his benefits. Indeed, as the agency pointed out, the
      appellant himself refused to submit an updated version of the SF-3107 as
      requested by OPM, and it is not clear what effect, if any, such refusal may have
      had on his application. Accordingly, we find that the agency has complied with
      its obligations.
¶14         Although the appellant seeks to rescind the settlement agreement and
      reinstate his removal appeal due to the original breach of the agreement, we hold
      that such relief is inappropriate where, as here, the agency has cured the breach
      and the appellant has received the full benefit of his bargain. See Tretchick v.
      Department of Transportation, 109 F.3d 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
      suggestion that there is an “absolute right” to rescission in response to a breach
      and rejecting rescission where any purported breach had been cured) ; King v.
      Department of the Navy, No. 98-3342, 1999 WL 37406, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12,
                                                                                  9

1999) (unpublished) 4 (affirming denial of rescission where the agency had cured
its breach of the settlement agreement 6 years later, and the appellant provided no
evidence that she was harmed by the breach or the delay in curing it); cf. Lutz v.
U.S. Postal Service, 485 F.3d 1377, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding material
breach potentially justifying rescission where “negative statements contained in”
the agency forms “prejudiced the disability proceedings” and resulted in denial of
benefits).   Thus, assuming arguendo that the agency’s breach was materia l—
which the administrative judge did not address, and we need not now decide —we
find that, as in Tretchick, rescission is inappropriate because the agency cured its
breach of the agreement and the appellant received all the benefits to which the
agreement entitled him. Although it is conceivable that the appellant might have
received his disability retirement benefits sooner if the agency had not lost his
original application, the settlement agreement did not require that the agency act
within a particular time frame. It merely required that the agency cooperate with
the appellant “when/if” the appellant applied for disability retirement , which the
agency ultimately did, such that the application was granted . This is in contrast
to the situation in Lutz, 485 F.3d at 1381-82. It is also distinguishable from Lary
v. U.S. Postal Service, 472 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006), clarified on denial of
rehearing, 493 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the agency’s failure to
provide necessary documents within the specific time frame set by the settl ement
agreement caused the appellant’s disability retirement application to be denied as
untimely filed. That is not the case here, where the agency ultimately managed to
timely file the application on the appellant’s behalf.    Moreover, the appellant
based his rescission request on his erroneous belief that the agency did not timely
submit his application to OPM. CRF, Tab 12 at 4-5. If the appellant believes
OPM’s annuity calculation is incorrect as to the substance or the starting date of

4
  The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of a court when it finds its
reasoning persuasive, as we do here. Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9,
¶ 16 n.6.
                                                                                         10

      the benefits, he separately may challenge OPM’s decision in accordance with the
      documentation provided to him by OPM with regard to his appeal rights. 5
¶15           We deny the appellant’s various other claims as outside the scope of this
      proceeding. His claim that the agency illegally accessed his medical records was
      denied in his second compliance proceeding, Wine v. Department of the Interior,
      MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-18-0116-C-2, Compliance File, Tab 28, Compliance
      Initial Decision at 4-6, and the appellant did not seek further review of that
      decision.     His claims regarding whistleblower reprisal and violations of the
      Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
      (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) are before the Board in three
      separate appeals, as explained above, supra ¶ 4 n.3, and are not part of this case.
      His attempts to relitigate another forum’s denial of his workers compensation
      benefits likewise are not properly before us and are not relevant to this case. In
      light of the disposition reached in this decision, we deny the various motions to
      strike, for sanctions, for transfer of this matter to a United States district court,
      and other forms of relief sought by the parties. 6
¶16           Having found the agency in compliance, we dismiss the petition for
      enforcement. This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Boar d in
      this compliance proceeding. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section
      1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

      5
          We express no opinion on whether any such challenge would be timely.
      6
        We deny the appellant’s request that Member Leavitt recuse himself on the basis of
      having “sabotaged” the appellant’s whistleblower claims at the Office of Special
      Counsel. See CRF, Tab 21 at 4. Member Leavitt was not employed by the Office of
      Special Counsel during the relevant time frame; and even if he had been, the appellant
      has offered no specifics regarding the alleged sabotage or other purported conflict of
      interest. Although Member Limon has recused himself from this case, his recusal is not
      related to the appellant’s claims of conflict or bias.
                                                                                       11

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    12

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                 13

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at the ir respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, t hen you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     14

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the li nk below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.