Court Opinion

ID: 9414584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 06:00:16.107074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.786749
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     STEVEN M. FITTEN,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-1221-16-0390-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: August 1, 2023
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Steven M. Fitten, El Paso, Texas, pro se.

           Steven L. Parker, APO/AP, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to clarify that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant ’s
     claims of retaliation for his activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) as to
     Vacancy Number 770787, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         From October 1997 to November 2006, the appellant was employed by the
     agency as an Attorney Advisor. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 32 at 19-20. From
     October 2012 to August 2015, the appellant applied to 12 vacancies wit h the
     agency. IAF, Tab 9, Tab 28 at 4. He was not interviewed or selected for any of
     the vacancies. Id. After exhausting his administrative remedies with the Office
     of Special Counsel (OSC) regarding the nonselections, he filed the instant IRA
     appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1.
¶3         The administrative judge found jurisdiction, held the requested hearing, and
     issued an initial decision denying corrective action. IAF, Tab 53, Initial Decision
     (ID). Specifically, she found that the appellant did not prove that his protected
     disclosures and activity were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision not to
     hire him for 11 of the 12 vacancies. ID at 9-24. However, she found that the
     appellant proved that his protected disclosures and activity were a contributing
                                                                                           3

     factor in the agency’s decision not to hire him for Vacancy Number 1328199, a
     Supervisory Contract Specialist position.         ID at 21-22.      Nevertheless, she
     concluded that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
     not have selected the appellant, regardless of his protected disclosures and
     activity. ID at 24-29.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
     response opposing the appellant’s petition.        Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tabs 1, 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         To establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation regarding the
     nonselections, the appellant must demonstrate, by preponderant evidence, that he
     made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected
     activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), that was a
     contributing factor in the agency’s decision not to select him for the vacancies at
     issue. See Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8
     (2016).      As the administrative judge found, the appellant made protected
     disclosures to the agency’s Inspector General and to OSC, and engaged in
     protected activity. ID at 7-8; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B), (9)(C). 2 She also
     found that he engaged in protected activity when he assisted another employee

     2
       Prior to December 12, 2017, the whistleblower protection statutory schemes provided
     that “cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency,
     or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions of law,” is protected.
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C); Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 28, aff’d,
     No. 2022-1967, 2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023). Effective December 12,
     2017, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 (NDAA for 2018) amended
     section 2302(b)(9)(C) to provide that, in addition to the Inspector General of an agency
     or the Special Counsel, a disclosure to “any other component responsible for internal
     investigation or review” is also protected. Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1), 131 Stat.
     1283, 1618 (2017). The NDAA for 2018 amendment to section 2302(b)(9)(C) is not
     retroactive. Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 28-32. The expansion of section 2302(b)(9)(C)
     does not affect the outcome of this appeal because all of the relevant events occurred
     prior to December 12, 2017.
                                                                                          4

     with an OSC complaint. 3 ID at 7-8; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B). Accordingly,
     he must prove that his protected disclosures and activity were a contributing
     factor in his nonselections. Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8.
¶6         An employee      may prove      the contributing factor element         through
     circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel
     action knew of the protected disclosures or activity, and that the personnel action
     occurred within 1 to 2 years of the disclosures or activity.             Mastrullo v.
     Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 18, 21 (2015). If the appellant fails
     to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the administrative judge ordinarily shall
     consider whether the appellant proved contributing factor through other evidence,
     such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for
     taking the personnel action, whether the protected activity was personally
     directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether those individuals had
     a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Rumsey v. Department of
     Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 26 (2013).

     3
       The administrative judge found that, although the appellant engaged in protected
     activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) in 2005 and 2007 when he assisted
     another employee with an OSC complaint, this activity was not a contributing factor in
     his nonselection for certain vacancies, including his nonselection for Vacancy
     Number 770787 on December 20, 2012. ID at 8, 10-11; IAF, Tab 35 at 173. The
     provision of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) that
     provides for the filing of an appeal on the basis of section 2302(b)(9)(B) became
     effective on December 27, 2012, which is after the appellant’s nonselection for Vacancy
     Number 770787 on December 20, 2012. Pub. L. No. 112-19, 126 Stat. 1465, 1465.
     Accordingly, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s section 2302(b)(9) claim
     concerning this vacancy. See Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R.
     629, ¶¶ 10-15 (2014). Thus, we modify the initial decision to the extent that the
     administrative judge considered whether the appellant’s protected activity under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) was a contributing factor in his nonselection for Vacancy
     Number 770787. Any error in this regard is harmless because the administrative judge
     based her finding that the appellant failed to prove the contributing factor element on
     the fact that the selecting official for Vacancy Number 770787 did not know the
     appellant and that there was no evidence that he, or any of the other individuals
     involved in the selection process, knew the appellant or knew he had engaged in prior
     protected activity. ID at 10.
                                                                                       5

¶7        If the appellant proves his prima facie case, then the burden of persuasion
     shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
     taken the same action in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures or
     activity. Campbell v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 12 (2016). In
     determining whether an agency has met its burden of proving that it would not
     have selected the appellant absent his protected disclosures or activity, the Board
     will consider the following factors: (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in
     support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on
     the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any
     evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are not
     whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security
     Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does not view
     the Carr factors as discrete elements and instead will weigh the factors together
     to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. Campbell,
     123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 12.

     The appellant proved that his protected disclosures and activity were a
     contributing factor in his nonselection for Vacancy Number 1328199, but not in
     the other identified vacancies.
¶8        The administrative judge, in her initial decision, found that the appellant
     only proved that his protected disclosures and activity were a contributing factor
     in his nonselection for Vacancy Number 1328199. ID at 9-24. The appellant
     challenges her findings as to the other vacancies. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, 12-15.
     For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the administrative judge’s
     contributing factor determinations.
¶9        Citing hearing testimony, the administrative judge found that the
     individuals involved in the selections for Vacancy Numbers 77 0787, 1161320,
     1418863, 1418855, and 1472669 did not know the appellant or had no knowledge
     of him beyond his applications. ID at 10-11, 19-20, 22-24. She also found, based
     upon her determination that his testimony was credible, that the selecting official
                                                                                          6

      for Vacancy Number 821536 could not recall the appellant’s protected disclosures
      and activity. ID at 12-15; IAF, Tab 15 at 13-14. Further, the administrative
      judge found that the selecting official for Vacancy Numbers 897081, 117 1251,
      and 1076978, who testified at the hearing, did not know about the appellant’s
      protected disclosures and activity.      ID at 16-21; IAF, Tab 15 at 17-18.      The
      administrative judge also found that, although the agency cancelled Vacancy
      Number JI 801049 after it obtained an exception to the hiring freeze to fill the
      position, and cancelled Vacancy Number 818751 when agency officials, who had
      been awaiting an exception to the hiring freeze, did not resubmit the position for
      hiring, the appellant did not proffer evidence that the cancellation was in
      retaliation for his protected disclosures and activity. ID at 11 -12; IAF, Tab 15
      at 15.
¶10            Observing that none of the officials involved in these nonselections knew of
      the appellant’s protected activity when they made their decisions, and that there
      was a lapse of 5 to 12 years between the activity and the nonselections, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant did not establish contributing factor
      through the knowledge/timing test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).         ID at 9-10; see
      Agoranos v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶¶ 21, 24 (2013)
      (explaining that a lapse of more than 2 years between the protected activity and
      the personnel action is too great to satisfy the knowledge/timing test) . Therefore,
      the administrative judge also considered whether the contributing factor element
      might be established by alternative means, i.e., by considering evidence such as
      the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action,
      whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the relevant agency
      officials, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against
      the appellant.       ID at 9-10; see Salerno v. Department of the Interior,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13 (2016). Nevertheless, despite a detailed and thorough
      analysis of the particular facts surrounding each of these 11 nonselections, the
      administrative judge found insufficient evidence to support a finding of
                                                                                        7

      contributing factor for any of them. ID at 9-24. We see no reason to disturb
      these findings and the appellant has not presented any evidence that supports
      disturbing these findings. See Broughton v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987).

            The appellant cannot prove a claim of retaliation as a perceived
            whistleblower.
¶11        The appellant next asserts that agency officials refused to hire him because
      of his reputation as a whistleblower. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. He argues that, even
      if his protected disclosures and activity occurred more than 2 years prior to his
      nonselection, he still could prove a whistleblower retaliation claim based upon his
      status as a perceived whistleblower. Id. (citing King v. Department of the Army,
      116 M.S.P.R.    689,   ¶¶ 8-11    (2011)).    Accordingly,    he   challenges   the
      administrative judge’s failure to analyze his claims of retaliation as such. Id. As
      discussed below, we disagree with this argument.
¶12        An employee is entitled to protection as a perceived whistleblower if he can
      show that the agency officials involved in taking the personnel action believed
      that he made protected disclosures or engaged in protected activity, regardless of
      whether he actually did so.      Rumsey, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 7.     In a perceived
      whistleblower case, the issue of whether the appellant actually made pro tected
      disclosures is immaterial, and the issue of whether the agency perceived the
      appellant as a whistleblower will essentially stand in for that portion of the
      Board’s analysis. King, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8. In some circumstances, such as
      when an appellant is alleging he was perceived to have made disclosures
      regarding matters distinct from his actual protected activity, it may be appropriate
      to engage in a perceived whistleblower analysis even when the appellant has
      proven that he actually made protected disclosures. However, in this case, the
      appellant’s perceived whistleblower claim is based entirely on the same set of
      facts as his claim of retaliation for actual protected activity. Specifically, the
      appellant is claiming perceived whistleblower status based on his disclosures
                                                                                        8

      concerning contracting matters, his assistance to another employee in filing a
      Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act complaint, and
      his notification to agency management that he had filed an OSC complaint
      concerning his nonselections. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 29 at 19-21, Tab 5
      at 51-55, Tab 51, Hearing Recording, Track 2 (testimony of M.G.), Track 6
      (testimony of W.W.)      The administrative judge considered these matters and
      correctly found that they constituted protected activity in their own right.     ID
      at 7-8, 21-22,   The appellant has not explained, nor do we perceive, how the
      outcome of the appeal would change if the Board considered the se same matters
      under a perceived whistleblower theory.           Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant’s argument does not provide a reason for disturbing the initial decision.

            The appellant has not demonstrated that his protected disclosures and
            activity were a contributing factor in his nonselection for Vacancy
            Numbers 897081 and 1076978 based upon his allegation that the selecting
            official had constructive knowledge of his disclosures or activity.
¶13         The appellant also asserts that, although the selecting official for Vacancy
      Numbers 897081 and 1076978 never met him, the official had constructive
      knowledge of his disclosures and activity based upon the comments of other
      agency officials. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10; IAF, Tab 15 at 17-18. An appellant
      can show that a protected disclosure or protected activity was a contributing
      factor in a personnel action by proving that the official taking the action had
      constructive knowledge of the protected disclosure.      Bradley v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 15 (2016).            He may establish an
      official’s constructive knowledge of a protected disclosure or protected activity
      by demonstrating that an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure
      influenced the official accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id.
¶14         The administrative judge considered the testimony of the other agency
      officials specified by the appellant and found that the individuals did not know of
      the disclosures or activity at the time of the appellant’s nonselection.         ID
      at 13-14, 16-17. Specifically, she considered the testimony of one of the officials
                                                                                          9

      that, although he recalled the occurrence of certain investigations that arose in the
      early 2000s, he did not recall that the investigations arose from the appellant’s
      disclosures or activity. ID at 13-14. She also found that, although the selecting
      official consulted with the other employee, the other employee’s testimony
      reflected that he was not aware of the appellant’s prior disclosures. ID at 16-17.
      Based on these well-reasoned conclusions, we find that the appellant did not
      establish that the individuals involved in the selection process had actual
      knowledge of his disclosures or activity and that the selecting official did not
      have constructive knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures. See Easterbrook v.
      Department of Justice, 85 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 11 (2000) (finding that the appellant
      failed to prove that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in a
      personnel action because he did not show that the employee relations specialist
      knew of his disclosures or that individuals with actual knowledge of the
      disclosures influenced her). Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant only proved that his protected disclosures and activity were a
      contributing factor in his nonselection for Vacancy Number 1328199. ID at 9-24.

      The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would not have
      selected the appellant regardless of his protected disclosures or protected activity.
¶15         The administrative judge found that the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would not have selected the appellant for Vacancy
      Number 1328199, a Supervisory Contract Specialist position, regardless of his
      protected disclosures and activity, because the agency had strong reasons for not
      selecting him and it only had a slight motive to retaliate against him. ID at 24-29.
      The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s findings regarding Carr
      factor one: the strength of the agency’s reasons for not selecting him. 4 PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 7-8, 10-12. In particular, he argues that the agency did not properly

      4
        The appellant has not challenged, and we discern no basis to disturb, the
      administrative judge’s analysis concerning Carr factors two and three.
                                                                                       10

      consider his qualifications and failed to properly weigh his education, training,
      work experience, awards, and references. Id. Further, he asserts that the agency
      “blacklisted him” and found that he did not have recent experience, even though
      he did. Id. at 9.
¶16         The administrative judge found that the agency had strong reasons for not
      hiring the appellant, who was 1 of 61 applicants. ID at 25; IAF, Tab 15 at 87-98.
      She considered the testimony of agency officials involved in the selection who
      stated that they considered that the appellant did not take a relevant leadership
      course.   ID at 25.   They also considered each applicant’s contracting officer
      experience, contract specialist experience, and supervisory experience, including
      length, level, and recency of such experience.     ID at 25-27.    Another official
      testified that the appellant’s experience was more than 15 years old and that
      relevant processes and procedures had changed in the past 15 years based upon
      new technology. ID at 26. Although the appellant asserted that his years as an
      attorney handling contracting matters and his experience from 2011 to 2015 as an
      adjunct professor constitute recent contracting experience that reflects his current
      capability to handle the position, the administrative judge found compelling the
      testimony of agency officials who stated that this did not constitute recent
      relevant experience. ID at 26-27.
¶17         We must defer to the administrative judge’s findings crediting the test imony
      of these agency officials because they are implicitly based upon the credibility
      and demeanor of these witnesses. See Purifoy, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
      2016). Further, we agree with the administrative judge that the individuals who
      were selected for the position had significantly more recent relevant experience
      than did the appellant. ID at 29; IAF, Tab 15 at 99-133. Accordingly, we agree
      with the administrative judge’s findings that the agency had strong reasons for
      not selecting the appellant and that the agency, therefore, proved by clear and
                                                                                          11

      convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision absent his
      protected disclosures and activity. 5 ID at 24-29.

      The appellant’s remaining arguments do not provide a reason for disturbing the
      initial decision.
¶18         The appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred by failing to
      compel evidence from an individual that related to the protected activities and
      OSC complaint of another employee that he assisted while he was employed at
      the agency.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 16.         He also argues generally that the
      administrative judge improperly denied testimony that would have established his
      qualifications for the relevant positions and the knowledge of agency officials
      about his protected disclosures and activity.     Id. An administrative judge has
      broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters, and absent an abuse of discretion ,
      the Board will not find reversible error in such rulings . Kingsley v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16 (2016).         The appellant’s arguments do not
      demonstrate an abuse of discretion and thus they do not provide a reason for
      disturbing the initial decision.
¶19         The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge should not have
      accepted the agency file because it was submitted after the filing deadline. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 16. The administrative judge issued a jurisdiction order on April 5,
      2016, and ordered the agency to respond by April 25, 2016. IAF, Tab 3. On
      April 22, 2016, the agency requested an extension of this deadline, which the
      administrative judge granted until May 3, 2016. IAF, Tabs 6-7. The agency filed

      5
        The appellant asserts that he should have been considered for noncompetitive
      placement for “Vacancy 80149.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, 15. To the extent that the
      appellant is attempting to refer to Vacancy Number JI 801049, this vacancy was
      cancelled and thus his argument does not provide a reason for disturbing the initial
      decision. IAF, Tab 15 at 226. The appellant further argues that t he administrative
      judge should have addressed his argument that the agency improperly denied him
      noncompetitive placement for all vacancies. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The appellant has
      provided no basis to support this argument, and thus, it also does not provide a reason
      for disturbing the initial decision. See Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.
                                                                                      12

its response on that date.     IAF, Tab 8.     The administrative judge ordered the
agency to submit the agency file by May 12, 2016, and it did so. IAF, Tabs 9, 15.
To the extent that the appellant is challenging the administrative judge ’s ruling to
grant the agency an extension to file its jurisdictional response or otherwise
challenges the agency’s submission of the agency file, we find that he has not
demonstrated the administrative judge’s abuse of discretion in any way. Thus, he
has not provided a reason for disturbing the initial decision.           See Kingsley,
123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the no tice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        13

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                14

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     15

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2 302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              16

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.