Court Opinion

ID: 9881015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 14:08:26.674887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:52.154787
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc.,                 :
and Pitch Pine Hunting Club, Inc.,               :
                                                 :
                               Petitioners       :
                                                 :
                  v.                             : No. 456 M.D. 2021
                                                 : Submitted: May 10, 2023
Pennsylvania Game Commission,                    :
and Mark Gritzer, in his official                :
capacity as an officer of the                    :
Pennsylvania Game Commission,                    :
                                                 :
                               Respondents       :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                                FILED: September 29, 2023

               Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, are the cross-applications
for summary relief1 filed by Petitioners Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc., and Pitch

       1
          Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any time after the filing of a petition for review in
an appellate or original jurisdiction matter the court may on application enter judgment if the right
of the applicant thereto is clear.” Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b); see also Summit School, Inc. v. Department
of Education, 108 A.3d 192, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). In deciding a request for summary relief,
“this [C]ourt must determine whether it is clear from the undisputed facts that either party has a
clear right to the relief requested.” Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Turnpike Commission, 703
A.2d 589, 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), aff’d, 713 A.2d 96 (Pa. 1998). Determinations as to whether
an agency lacks statutory authority or whether an agency’s particular statement of policy is an
unpromulgated regulation are questions of law. Markham v. Wolf, 136 A.3d 134, 138 (Pa. 2016).
Pine Hunting Club, Inc. (collectively, Hunting Clubs), and Respondents
Pennsylvania Game Commission, and Mark Gritzer, in his official capacity as an
officer of the Pennsylvania Game Commission (collectively, Commission). The
issues before us are whether Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007),
was wrongly decided, and whether, barring Russo, Sections 303(c) and 901(a)(2)
and (8) of the Game and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa. C.S. §§303(c) and 901(a)(2) and (8)
(Entry Statutes), are unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §8 (Section 8). As we are bound by Russo, we grant
the Commission’s application for summary relief, deny the Hunting Clubs’
application, and enter judgment in the Commission’s favor.

                                  I. Background
             The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Hunting Clubs are
member-owned hunting clubs that own thousands of acres of private land in
Clearfield County. Members use the properties to hunt, vacation, and enjoy nature.
To ensure their members’ privacy, the Hunting Clubs have posted their properties
with no trespassing signs and have installed gates at all entrances to exclude
nonmembers and intruders. However, the Entry Statutes empower game wardens
with unfettered discretion to enter upon and roam private land without consent,
warrants, or probable cause.
             The Hunting Clubs filed the present action to challenge the
constitutionality of the Entry Statutes as violative of Section 8, which forbids
warrantless searches of “possessions.” The Hunting Clubs argue that private land is
a “possession” within the purview of constitutional protection.       However, the
Hunting Clubs recognize that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously rejected
similar constitutional claims in Russo. The Hunting Clubs further recognize that this

                                         2
Court is bound by, and may not overturn, this binding precedent. Both parties have
filed cross-applications for summary relief, which are now before us.

                               II. Cross-Applications
             The parties’ cross-applications for summary relief present two issues
for our review.     First, whether Russo, which held that private land is not a
“possession” and can never receive protection from “unreasonable searches” under
Section 8, was wrongly decided. Second, barring Russo, whether the Entry Statutes,
which grant game wardens unfettered power to enter and roam posted private land
in order to look for evidence of potential game offenses, violate Section 8.

                                   III. Discussion
                                   A. Contentions
             The Hunting Clubs recognize that Russo constitutes binding precedent
that forecloses their constitutional challenge of the Entry Statutes. However, they
believe that Russo was wrongly decided. According to the Hunting Clubs, the term
“possessions” in Section 8 should be construed to include private land. Indeed,
article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §1 (Section 1),
recognizes the right of possessing property. The Hunting Clubs argue that it is
illogical to say that Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protects the right to
“possess” land, but that land is not a “possession” for purposes of Section 8.
             The Hunting Clubs further argue that, barring Russo, the Entry Statutes
are unconstitutional under Section 8. Landowners who signal that their land is not
open to the public have a reasonable expectation of privacy and must be entitled to
protection under Section 8. If the land is protected, then game wardens who want to
search it must obtain consent or a warrant, or show a warrant exception. Because

                                           3
the Entry Statutes authorize warrantless searches of land that is used and marked as
private, they violate Section 8.
             The Commission counters that Russo is binding precedent and controls
the outcome here. Contrary to the Hunting Clubs’ assertions, Russo was properly
decided. No Pennsylvania court has ever held that possession or ownership alone
creates a right to privacy that is protected by Section 8. Russo properly applied the
factors for deciding the scope of state constitutional protection. It thoroughly and
accurately analyzed the text of Section 8, its history under Pennsylvania law, the
majority of sister states that support the current interpretation of the open fields
doctrine, and the public policy issues involved. Under Russo, the Entry Statutes are
indisputably constitutional, and this precedent should not be overturned.
             Even barring Russo, the Commission argues that the Entry Statutes are
valid exercises of the Commonwealth’s constitutional obligations as trustee of
wildlife under article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art.
I, §27, commonly known as the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA). The
Commission, as designated by the Commonwealth, is constitutionally responsible
for managing and protecting wildlife in the state. In order to execute this authority,
the Commission employees need to enter private property where wildlife may be
present and hunting may be occurring. Hunters have surrendered their reasonable
expectation of privacy by choosing to participate in a highly regulated activity.
Thus, the Commission argues that the Hunting Clubs do not present a case that might
implicate privacy rights under Section 8.

                                            4
                                     B. Analysis
            The Entry Statutes authorize wildlife enforcement officers to enter and
inspect property for violations. Specifically, Section 303(c) of the Game and
Wildlife Code provides:

            (c) Power and authority.--

            Every officer, employee or representative of the
            [C]ommission in the exercise of their powers and duties
            shall have the right and authority to go upon or enter any
            property, posted or otherwise, outside of buildings.
34 Pa. C.S. §303(c). Section 901(a)(2) and (8) of the Game and Wildlife Code
provides:

            (a) Powers.--

            Any officer whose duty it is to enforce this title or any
            officer investigating any alleged violation of this title shall
            have the power and duty to:

                                        ***

                   (2) Go upon any land or water outside of buildings,
            except curtilage, posted or otherwise, in the performance
            of the officer’s duty.

                                        ***

                   (8) Conduct administrative inspections of persons,
            licenses and permits, firearms, ammunition and other
            implements of taking, game bags, game, meat poles, tags,
            clothing, waterfowl blinds, decoys, tree stands, immediate
            hunting locations, or any means of transportation or its
            attachments used as blinds or as hunting locations, and any
            coolers or containers possessed at a hunting location when
            prima facie evidence of hunting exists. Any officer
            conducting an administrative inspection shall, if any
            person is present, present a badge or other means of

                                          5
             official identification and state the purpose of the
             inspection.
34 Pa. C.S. §901(a)(2), (8).
             The Hunting Clubs challenge the Entry Statutes as unconstitutional.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the Fourth Amendment to the United
States (U.S.) Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. IV (Fourth Amendment), and its
analogous state counterpart, Section 8.
             The Fourth Amendment provides:

             The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
             houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
             and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
             issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
             affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
             searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 8 provides:

             The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
             and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
             and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person
             or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as
             may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
             affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const. art. I, §8 (emphasis added).
             In Russo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined whether a
landowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy against enforcement of the Game
and Wildlife Code in his open fields under the Fourth Amendment and Section 8.
Russo involved an appeal from a conviction for violation of the Game and Wildlife
Code’s prohibition against certain types of baiting in bear hunting. Russo, 934 A.2d
at 1200; see Section 2308(a)(8) of the Game and Wildlife Code, 34
Pa. C.S. §2308(a)(8).    The conviction was based on evidence that wildlife
conservation officers gathered when they entered the landowner’s hunting camp,

                                          6
which was posted with “No Trespassing” signs, without a warrant. Russo, 934 A.2d
at 1201. The landowner filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence, which was
denied. Id. at 1202.
              On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that both the Fourth Amendment
and Section 8 protect the reasonable expectations of privacy of those legitimately
occupying a certain space, relative to searches and seizures of law enforcement
personnel. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1208. However, the Supreme Court determined that
this reasonable expectation of privacy did not extend to open fields. Id. at 1209.
Under the interpretative doctrine of ejusdem generis,2 the Court construed Section
8’s use of the term “possessions” in the light of the particular words preceding it –
all of which refer to intimate things about one’s person. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1205-
06. Given the textual similarity between the two constitutional provisions, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment’s open fields doctrine, as enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984),3 applied equally

       2
          The interpretative doctrine of ejusdem generis refers to “the same kind or class.”
Department of Environmental Protection v. Cumberland Coal Resources, LP, 102 A.3d 962, 976
(Pa. 2014). However, the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the application of this doctrine in
statutory construction. Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department of Environmental Protection,
292 A.3d 921, 943 (Pa. 2023) (plurality) (“We find that ejusdem generis plays no role in the
statutory analysis.”).

       3
          As our Supreme Court explained: “[T]he Oliver Court noted that open fields are not
‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the [Oliver] Court observed, “[t]he
Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather than real,
property.” Russo, 934 A.2d at 1204 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 n.7). The Supreme Court
continued:

              Even assuming one had a subjective expectation of privacy in his
              open fields, the Oliver Court went on to reason, such an expectation
              is not one that society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable:

(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                               7
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1208-09. The Supreme
Court also opined that the open fields doctrine is consistent with the ERA, which
enshrines the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting and conserving public natural
resources, including wildlife within its fields and forests. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1212-
13. Thus, the Court concluded that the landowner had “no reasonable expectation
of privacy” under either the Fourth Amendment or Section 8, arising from posting
“No Trespassing” signs at his hunting camp where Section 901(a)(2) of the Game
and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa. C.S. §901(a)(2), specifically authorizes an officer to “go
upon any land or water outside of buildings, posted or otherwise, in the performance
of the officer’s duty.” Russo, 934 A.2d at 1203. The Supreme Court held that “the
guarantees of . . . Section 8 . . . do not extend to open fields.” Id. at 1213. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the determination that the wildlife conservation officers did
not violate the landowner’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id.

                      [O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those
                      intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to
                      shelter from         government interference         or
                      surveillance. There is no societal interest in
                      protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the
                      cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.
                      Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually
                      are accessible to the public and the police in ways
                      that a home, an office, or commercial structure would
                      not be. It is not generally true that fences or “No
                      Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from
                      viewing open fields in rural areas. And both
                      petitioner . . . and respondent . . . concede that the
                      public and police lawfully may survey lands from the
                      air.

Russo, 934 A.2d at 1204 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178).
                                                8
            The Supreme Court’s opinion in Russo is binding precedent. See
Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1996) (holding that an opinion
decided by a majority of our Supreme Court “becomes binding precedent on the
courts of this Commonwealth”). As an intermediate appellate court, we have no
authority to refuse to apply Supreme Court precedent, much less overturn it. Zauflik
v. Pennsbury School District, 72 A.3d 773, 783-84 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), aff’d, 104
A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2014). Based on Russo, the Entry Statutes are constitutional. We
decline to express an advisory opinion on whether, barring Russo, these statutes
violate Section 8 or are in accord with the Commission’s trustee duties under the
ERA. See Assalita v. Chestnut Ridge Homeowners Association, 866 A.2d 1214,
1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (holding courts should not issue advisory opinions).
Therefore, in accordance with Russo, we conclude that the Hunting Clubs are not
entitled to summary relief, but that the Commission is.

                                 IV. Conclusion
            For these reasons, we grant the Commission’s application for summary
relief; we deny the Hunting Clubs’ application for summary relief; and we enter
judgment in the Commission’s favor.

                                      MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

                                         9
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc.,         :
and Pitch Pine Hunting Club, Inc.,       :
                                         :
                         Petitioners     :
                                         :
              v.                         : No. 456 M.D. 2021
                                         :
Pennsylvania Game Commission,            :
and Mark Gritzer, in his official        :
capacity as an officer of the            :
Pennsylvania Game Commission,            :
                                         :
                         Respondents     :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2023, Petitioners’ application
for summary relief is DENIED; Respondents’ application for summary relief is
GRANTED; and judgment is entered in favor of Respondents.

                                       __________________________________
                                       MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc.,          :
and Pitch Pine Hunting Club, Inc.,        :
                  Petitioners             :
                                          :
               v.                         :   No. 456 M.D. 2021
                                          :
Pennsylvania Game Commission,             :   Submitted: May 10, 2023
and Mark Gritzer, in his official         :
capacity as an officer of the             :
Pennsylvania Game Commission,             :
                    Respondents           :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                   FILED: September 29, 2023

             I concur in the decision because we are bound by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007), to reach this result.
However, I write separately to emphasize my agreement with Justice Cappy’s
Dissenting Opinion in Russo wherein he opined that Section 901(a)(2) of the Game
and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa. C.S. § 901(a)(2), is inconsistent with the protections
afforded by article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §
8 to the extent that it authorizes entry onto posted private property without any level
of suspicion of illegal activity. In this regard, I believe Justice Cappy, evaluating
the four factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991),
correctly observed that

             the text of article I, section 8, its history in this
             Commonwealth, the related case law of other states, and
             the relevant policy considerations support constitutional
             protection of a Pennsylvania landowner’s right to privacy
             when he or she has posted the property in a manner that
             indicates that entry is not permitted. Accordingly, I would
             hold that a citizen may claim privacy in an open field
             under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 8 of the Pennsylvania
             Constitution when indicia would lead a reasonable person
             to conclude that the area is private.
Russo, 934 A.2d at 1217 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
             I must adhere to the caution of former Justice Cappy in his Dissenting
Opinion that a “constitutional rule which permits state agents to enter private land
in outright disregard of the property owner’s efforts to maintain privacy is one that
offends the fundamental rights of Pennsylvania citizens.” Id. at 1214.
             Nevertheless, the fact remains that the view of Justice Cappy in Russo
is a minority view.       Accordingly, although I fundamentally disagree that
Punxsutawney Hunt Club, Inc., and Pitch Pine Hunting Club had no constitutionally
protected privacy interest in their posted private land, I must nevertheless concur in
the result reached by the Majority.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

      Judge Wallace joined in the Concurring Opinion.

                                      PAM -2