Court Opinion

ID: 9488803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:55:53.684623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:06.465098
License: Public Domain

RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring separately.
While I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the analytical route my colleagues take to get there.
I am entirely satisfied that Bartlik met his threshold burden of proving a prima facie case. The petitioner’s burden at this stage is “not onerous; rather, a prima facie showing is ‘quite easy to meet.’ ” Kahn v. Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 277 (7th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). A prima facie showing requires proof that:
(1) the employment relationship is governed by the Energy Reorganization Act;
(2) the employee engaged in protected activity;
(3) the employee was subject to an adverse employment action; and
(4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Id.; Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 934 (11th Cir.1995). Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is a sufficient nexus to satisfy the fourth prong. Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 934.
There is no dispute that the TVA is an employer subject to the ERA; that Bartlik is a covered employee; that he engaged in protected activity; that he was subject to an adverse employment action; and that there is a temporal nexus between the protected activity and Bartlik’s discharge, all of which create an inference of unlawful termination. The majority opinion suggests that because the adverse employment action taken against Bartlik was a nonrenewal of his contract rather than a discharge, temporal proximity is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing. To me, this is a distinction without a difference. Thus, the requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination are met.
But just as it is clear to me that Bartlik made out a prima facie case, it is equally clear that the TVA articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for extending Bart-lik’s contract when it pointed to the change in contracting methods, and its nonrenewal of the contracts of all “staff augmentees” who did not meet strict criteria. The question then becomes whether TVA had a higher burden, that of persuasion, because Bartlik produced evidence showing that discrimination “played a role” in his discharge. See Kahn, 64 F.3d at 278. Bartlik’s argument in this regard plainly fails. Contrary to Bart-lik’s suggestions, neither the ALJ nor the Secretary found that Bartlik proved that his protected activities “played a role” in the adverse employment action, and there is simply no evidence in the record that would support such a claim; certainly Hosmer’s remark, that he didn’t “want any contractors working on problems which they discovered,” standing alone, is insufficient to amount to such a showing.
Nonetheless, I think Hosmer’s remark is somewhat more significant than my colleagues suggest. The force of Hosmer’s statement as evidence of unlawful discrimination can only be appreciated when it is recognized that the statement was made immediately after Hosmer asked a supervisor for recommendations for the survey team and was given Bartlik’s name. Thus, the statement was not merely a general indication of employment philosophy, but was specifically directed at Bartlik. Even so, it is not direct evidence of discrimination, but only circumstantial and, as such, it was insufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the TVA.
Accordingly, our inquiry is restricted to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s finding that the TVA proffered a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason for Bartlik’s termination. This finding had ample evidentiary support.
*105I agree, therefore, that the decision of the Secretary of Labor should be affirmed.