Court Opinion

ID: 9951685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 19:02:26.248831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:01.042698
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Cooper CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D082990

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FSB046672)

LLOYD ANTHONY COOPER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Harold T. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
         Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa Mandel and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      Facing federal removal proceedings following his guilty plea to a sex
offense, Lloyd Anthony Cooper unsuccessfully filed a motion to vacate his

conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7.1 On appeal, Cooper
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion because he proved he did
not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea, and
that had he understood those consequences he would not have entered the
plea. He relies on his illiteracy and limited cognitive abilities, a portion of
the plea form falsely indicating he could read, and the court’s and probation
report’s discussion of his immigration status. He also points to the court’s
exclusion of an expert’s report on hearsay grounds regarding his mental
functioning and argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to call the expert as a witness. We affirm, as there is insufficient
proof that Cooper misunderstood the ramifications of his plea, and the
claimed error by his counsel did not impact the outcome of the proceedings.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Guilty Plea

      On November 1, 2004, the San Bernardino County District Attorney
charged Cooper with four counts of lewd conduct with his stepdaughter, a
child under the age of 14, in violation of section 288, subdivision (a).)
Although he subsequently denied the charges, in a recorded phone call with
Cooper’s then-wife, the victim’s mother Jacqueline K. (Jacqueline), Cooper
admitted molesting the victim one time.
      As the result of negotiations between Cooper’s trial counsel, David
Goldstein (Goldstein), and the deputy district attorney, Cooper pleaded
guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts.

1    All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise designated.
                                        2
On November 14, 2005, Cooper executed a “Declaration by Defendant Re:
Change of Plea (Guilty),” which was the form used by Cooper’s sentencing
court to enter felony guilty pleas and to advise defendants of their rights.
(Some capitalization omitted.) Cooper, a citizen of Jamaica whose resident
alien card had expired, initialed paragraph 14 of that form, which stated,
“I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
may will result from a conviction of the offense(s) to which I plea guilty/nolo

contendere (no contest).”2 Goldstein struck the word “may” and handwrote
the word “will” in its place. Cooper also initialed paragraph 21(a), which
stated, “I can read and understand English.”
      Cooper entered his plea at a hearing on November 15, 2005, at which
he and Goldstein confirmed they went over both the printed and handwritten
portions of the plea form and Cooper understood everything on the form.
When asked by the trial court, Cooper confirmed he understood that his
conviction “could” result in deportation, denial of citizenship, or exclusion
from admission into the United States.
      The trial court sentenced Cooper two months later and, consistent with
his plea bargain, he received 364 days in jail and three years of probation,
and the remaining counts were dismissed.

2     A violation of section 288, subdivision (a) is an “aggravated felony”
under federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); U.S. v. Baron-Medina (9th Cir.
1999) 187 F.3d 1144, 1147.), subjecting Cooper to mandatory deportation and
permanent exclusion from the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii);
People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 710).
                                        3
B.    Immigration Proceedings

      In 2012, the United States Department of Homeland Security
personally served Cooper with a notice to appear stating he was subject to
removal as a result of his conviction. Cooper was ordered removed in 2013,
but he successfully appealed that ruling in 2014 because the immigration
court did not observe the reasonable safeguards Cooper requested to
accommodate his limited cognitive functioning. The matter was remanded to
a different immigration judge with instructions to apply the safeguards
identified by Cooper.
      The record indicates the latest hearing in Cooper’s immigration
proceedings was set for October 11, 2022, but it is silent as to the result of
that hearing or the status of the proceedings. Nonetheless, Cooper asserts in
his brief that he is still waiting for new hearing to be scheduled, and the
People do not contest that assertion. Given the lack of any dispute on the
issue, we presume Cooper’s immigration case is still pending.

C.    Section 1473.7 Motion

      After completing his sentence and probation, Cooper filed a motion to
vacate his conviction pursuant to section 1473.7 in July 2021. He argued he
did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea because he was
cognitively challenged and illiterate, and Goldstein failed to adequately
advise and represent him. Cooper filed his own declaration in support of the
motion confirming his Jamaican citizenship and his arrival in the United

States on an immigrant visa.3 He declared he was illiterate,4 he could not

3     Although Cooper’s declaration states that he arrived in the United
States in 1998, his counsel indicates the date was a typographical error.
Other portions of the record reflect that he came to this country in December
1988.

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understand and respond to situations like normal people, and he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.
      Cooper also submitted two reports from psychologists to support his
motion. The first is from Dr. Kristina Roberts, who evaluated Cooper’s
intellectual functioning, mental status and cognitive abilities on February 25,
2013. Dr. Roberts determined Cooper’s intellectual functioning is in the
“mildly-mentally retarded range,” and “his approximate mental functioning
would be equivalent to an 8-12 year old [sic] child.” While Cooper possessed
“functional adaptability, allowing him to live independently and maintain
employment,” Dr. Roberts believed “he will likely be unable to reason the
consequences of his actions at a higher level of functioning,” and “he is unable
to reason abstractly.”
      The second report is from Dr. Michael E. Kania, who evaluated
Cooper on October 4, 2005, to determine if he suffered from pedophilia.
Kania reported that prior to moving to the United States at the age of 22,
Cooper took special education classes in Jamaica, never learned to read, and
never graduated high school. Cooper nonetheless began living independently
at the age of 23, and he was able to maintain employment at a Mervyn’s
warehouse for nine years without any problems. Kania determined that
“Cooper’s cognitive functioning is intact for the most part,” and he “appears to
be functioning in the low-normal range intellectually,” which “may be a result
of limited education.” Kania also noted that Cooper “has some difficulty
understanding questions” at times, and “at other times his thinking is
somewhat concrete.”

4     Cooper testified at the hearing on the motion that his sister and second
ex-wife read him this declaration before he signed it.
                                       5
      Cooper also submitted support letters from his mother, four siblings,
a brother-in-law, and a niece, all of whom live in the United States.
Generally attesting to Cooper’s character, these letters indicate he has been
able to achieve success and provide for his family despite having a learning
disability, with one describing him as “very intelligent.”
      Finally, Cooper relied on the probation report from his sentencing,
which indicated that he could not read or write. He claimed the report
implied he might be able to avoid deportation because it recommended that
if probation is granted, Cooper serve 365 days in jail “until such time as the
Department of Homeland Security is able to either verify the defendant’s
status as being legal, or the defendant is deported.”

D.    Evidentiary Hearing

      Goldstein, Cooper, and Jacqueline testified at the September 16, 2022
hearing on Cooper’s motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea.

      1.    Goldstein’s Testimony

      Goldstein was an experienced criminal defense attorney, representing
many clients with intellectual disabilities, and in 2004 and 2005 he routinely
took special care to advise noncitizen clients concerning possible immigration
consequences. He knew Cooper had challenges with his ability to read, but
he did not see any other obvious signs of disability, and he relied on verbal
communication for all purposes in his representation of Cooper. Cooper’s
family members were usually present when Goldstein met with him, and
they were present when he and Goldstein went through the plea. Goldstein
discussed Cooper’s immigration status with Cooper and his family, and either
Cooper or his family members told Goldstein that they were also working
with an immigration attorney.

                                       6
      Goldstein spent a meaningful amount of time with Cooper discussing
the nature of his plea and how it would affect his immigration chances.
He struck “may” and replaced it with “will’ in paragraph 14 of the plea form
because Cooper would get deported based on the nature of his offense, and
he needed to be so advised. After Goldstein explained this consequence to
Cooper in very clear terms, Cooper did not show the slightest
misunderstanding. Goldstein also believed that based on his custom and
practice, he read and explained paragraph 21(a) regarding English
proficiency and Cooper affirmed his understanding by initialing that
paragraph.
      Cooper’s potential sentence was approximately 14 years in prison, and
Goldstein felt fortunate to get a disposition that did not involve prison time.
Goldstein believed he could not get a better deal regarding immigration, and
that Cooper’s immigration consequences were part of the reason the deputy
district attorney agreed to the disposition.

      2.     Cooper’s Testimony

      The parties agreed that Cooper’s declaration attached to his motion
would be submitted as his testimony, and his live testimony was limited to
cross and re-direct examination. Cooper affirmed he cannot read or write,
but his live testimony otherwise provided limited information as he expressed
difficulty with memory. When asked if he remembered pleading guilty in
2005, Cooper responded, “I don’t know what to say.” He did recall coming to
court in 2005 and having one of his sisters come with him. Cooper was
unable to state the number of years he worked at Mervyn’s, but did verify he
worked there for a while offloading trailers. All he was able to remember
regarding his immigration proceedings was that immigration officials came

                                        7
and picked him up, and his second ex-wife hired an immigration attorney.
He could not recall when these incidents happened.

      3.     Jacqueline’s Testimony

      Cooper and Jacqueline lived together for approximately seven or eight
years, and they divorced in 2006 as a result of the charges filed against
Cooper. Cooper could not read or write, but he spoke fluent English and
never needed someone to explain things to him. He was able to take care of
himself and independently performed daily tasks such as cooking, driving,
and managing the couple’s differing work schedules while taking care of their
two children and Jacqueline’s daughter. Jacqueline worked with Cooper at
Mervyn’s store, where he was employed fulltime for approximately six years
and competently operated a scan gun on which he typed in information such
as addresses of stores and the size and color of merchandise.

E.    Trial Court’s Ruling

      After sustaining the People’s hearsay objection to Dr. Roberts’s report,
the trial court admitted the remainder of the exhibits submitted with the
motion. Although the prosecutor argued that the motion was untimely, the
trial court implicitly disagreed and addressed the merits. Citing Goldstein
and Jacqueline’s testimony and the modification of paragraph 14 of the plea
form, the court found that Cooper understood the immigration consequences
of his plea and denied the motion.
                                  DISCUSSION

      We begin with section 1473.7, first disposing of the assertion that
Cooper’s motion was untimely, and then finding that Cooper failed to carry
his burden of showing he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. We then reject Cooper’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, finding it fails for lack of prejudice.

                                         8
A.    Section 1473.7

      “[S]ection 1473.7, which was enacted by the Legislature in 2016 and
became effective on January 1, 2017, created a new avenue of postconviction
relief for noncitizens who pleaded guilty to a crime without fully
comprehending the immigration consequences that might follow.” (People v.
Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 752, fn. omitted (Alatorre).) The court
shall vacate a conviction under section 1473.7 if the moving party shows,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her conviction is “legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.”
(§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1), (e)(1)–(4).) The moving party must also show the
challenged conviction “is currently causing or has the potential to cause
removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful
status, or naturalization.” (Id., subds. (e)(1).)
      We independently review the denial of a motion under section 1473.7.
(People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).) Under this
standard, we exercise our “ ‘ “independent judgment to determine whether
the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 319–320.) We “must give
deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on
‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed.’ ” ’
[Citation.] But when the trial court’s findings ‘derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,’ the trial court and the reviewing court
‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is owed.” (Id. at p. 320.)

      1.    Timeliness

      Relying on the January 1, 2019 effective date of a recent amendment
to section 1473.7 as the triggering event for timeliness purposes, the People

                                         9
argue Cooper’s motion was untimely because it was filed two and a half years
later. Cooper contends the triggering event for timeliness is a final removal
order, and because no such order has been issued, his motion is timely.
      When a motion under section 1473.7 is based on immigration
consequences, it is presumptively timely if the moving party is no longer in
custody. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) It may be deemed untimely, however, if “not filed
with reasonable diligence after the later of” (1) the initiation of immigration
court proceedings against the party, (2) the denial of an immigration benefit,
or (3) a final removal order. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) We have described this
standard as “strikingly generous,” as the moving party’s “reasonable
diligence is measured from the later of three possible triggering events.”
(Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 758–759.) “Under this framework,
the same petitioner could receive notice to appear in immigration court
(§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(2)(A)), and do nothing at all for months, or even years,
until a final removal order is issued.” (Alatorre, at pp. 758–759.)
      Cooper’s situation is like the hypothetical we posed in Alatorre.
A final removal order has not been issued in his ongoing immigration
proceedings, and the statute allows Cooper to delay seeking relief until
he receives notice of such an order. Because Cooper has the ability to file a

timely motion in the future, we decline to find the current motion untimely.5

      2.    Merits of the Motion to Vacate

      We now turn to the merits of Cooper’s motion to vacate his conviction,
in which he claims a reduced ability to comprehend the plea based on his
illiteracy and cognitive disability. He also argues his initialing of paragraph

5     We also note that the People’s reliance on the effective date of an
amendment to section 1473.7 as the triggering event for timeliness is
misplaced, as we recently rejected a similar approach employed by the trial
court in Alatorre. (Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.)
                                       10
21(a), which inaccurately stated he could read, demonstrates he did not
understand what he was signing. He further notes that the discussion of
his immigration status orally by the court and in the probation report implied
he might be able to avoid deportation.
      To prevail under section 1473.7, Cooper must show by the
preponderance of the evidence that (1) he did not meaningfully understand
the immigration consequences of his plea; (2) his misunderstanding was
prejudicial; and (3) his conviction is either causing or could cause removal or
the denial of an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.
(§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1), (e)(1)–(2).) We focus our analysis on the first of these
three requirements because the trial court found that Cooper failed to carry
his burden of showing he misunderstood that his plea subjected him to
mandatory deportation.
      “[A] petitioner’s own subjective error qualifies for relief under the
statute if the evidence shows he or she misunderstood the immigration
consequences of a plea deal.” (Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 769.)
“Under this principle, the ‘error’ is that the petitioner subjectively
misunderstood the immigration consequences of the plea, and there is no
additional need to establish this mistake was caused by some ‘third party.’ ”
(Ibid.)
      At the outset, we note the trial court made a factual finding that both
Goldstein and Jacqueline were credible witnesses, as it relied on their
testimony over Cooper’s in finding that Cooper understood the consequences
of his plea. We must defer to that assessment.
      As for Cooper’s illiteracy, Goldstein knew Cooper had challenges with
his ability to read, and he therefore relied on verbal (rather than written)
communication for all purposes. Goldstein took the additional step of

                                        11
modifying paragraph 14 of plea form to reflect that immigration
consequences were inevitable, and although Cooper may not have been able
to read that modification, Goldstein explained it to him in clear terms, after
which Cooper did not show the slightest misunderstanding and he initialed
the paragraph. Accordingly, while Cooper may be illiterate, that does not
appear to have interfered with his understanding of the consequences he
faced by pleading guilty.
      Turning to Cooper’s cognitive abilities, Dr. Kania, who examined
Cooper near the time of his plea, found him to be in the low-normal range
intellectually with cognitive functioning that is primarily intact. While below
average, this diagnosis does not describe a person who is so cognitively
impaired as to be unable to understand that a guilty plea would result in
deportation. Further, based on Jacqueline’s testimony and the family
support letters describing Cooper as a fully functioning adult capable of
achieving success and supporting his family, with one letter even describing
Cooper as “very intelligent,” we are not convinced that Cooper lacked the
basic cognitive ability to understand that his guilty plea would lead to
removal from this country.
      It is also significant that Goldstein advised Cooper in the presence of
his family members, who were aware of Cooper’s cognitive abilities and
illiteracy, and were thus available to assist him. Cooper or his family
members also told Goldstein they were working with an immigration
attorney at the time of the plea, indicating at a minimum an awareness that
this case could have adverse immigration consequences. Additionally, none
of the support letters from Cooper’s family state that he misunderstood how
his plea would affect his immigration status, instead asking for leniency
based on Cooper’s character and ties to the United States.

                                      12
      Further, misunderstanding of immigration consequences can be shown
through postconviction conduct that is inconsistent with a person’s
immigration status. (See, e.g., Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320
[becoming well-known in the community and taking an international
commercial flight to the United States was inconsistent with the behavior
of a person who understood that his convictions effectively ended his lawful
resident status]; Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 770 [finding
misunderstanding based on the defendant’s attempts to become a naturalized
citizen after his deportable conviction].) Cooper has not identified any
actions he took after his conviction that were inconsistent with his deportable
status, such as attempting to renew his resident alien card that expired
before he entered his plea.
      Cooper’s reliance on the probation report’s discussion of his
immigration status is unconvincing. He did not declare or testify that the
report confused him, nor could he have independently relied on it because
he is unable to read. There is also no indication that Goldstein relied on the
probation report’s equivocal provisions in advising Cooper, as Goldstein’s
testimony indicates he explained to Cooper deportation was certain to occur.
      As for the trial court’s discussion of immigration consequences, it first
emphasized the importance of Goldstein’s advice by confirming that Cooper
went over all the printed and handwritten portions of the plea form with
Goldstein, they had sufficient time to discuss the consequences of his plea,
and Cooper understood everything in the form. While the trial court’s
subsequent question, in which it asked Cooper if he was aware his conviction
“could” result in immigration consequences, suggested those consequences
might not be certain, Cooper did not declare or testify that he relied on the
phrasing of that question or that it caused him any confusion. Additionally,

                                       13
“in evaluating whether the defendant is entitled to relief under section
1473.7, ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel’s independent
evaluation of the charges’ ” ’ ” rather than the generic statements in the [plea
form] and plea colloquy.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160,
1175.) In light of all the evidence described above, including our deference to
the trial court’s assessment of Goldstein’s testimony, it is not more likely
than not that Cooper misunderstood the ramifications of his plea based on

the phrasing of the trial court’s question.6 (See People v. Rodriguez (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 995, 1003 [“ ‘A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence
if . . . it is more likely than not that the fact is true.’ ”].)
        The same applies to paragraph 21(a) of the plea form, in which Cooper
acknowledged he could “read and understand English.” Although this
paragraph is inaccurate regarding Cooper’s ability to read, it is simply
outweighed by the other evidence, particularly Goldstein’s testimony
regarding paragraph 14 of the plea form, which addressed the pertinent issue
of Cooper’s understanding of his immigration consequences.
        Cooper’s appellate counsel understandably emphasizes that he no
longer has any immediate family members in Jamaica, suggesting he must
not have understood the real impact of his decision to plead guilty. We are
not unsympathetic to his plight, but our inquiry is a limited one. Based on
the totality of the evidence and the trial court’s crediting of Goldstein and
Jacqueline’s testimony to which we must defer, Cooper has failed to show he
did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his guilty
plea.

6     There was also nothing unusual about the trial court’s phrasing of this
question, as it followed the statutory admonishment the court was required
to give. (§ 1016.5, subd. (a).)
                                           14
B.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      Cooper argues his counsel at the section 1473.7 motion hearing was
ineffective because he failed to call Dr. Roberts as a witness, resulting in the
exclusion of her report as hearsay. He claims no reasonable attorney would
fail to arrange for the live testimony of an expert witness, and the trial court
would have ruled in his favor had it considered the contents of Roberts’s
report.
      To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) resulting
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. (People v. Hoyt
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) The second element of prejudice “is a contextual
inquiry that examines the actual effect of a defense attorney’s error on the
trial outcome.” (People v. Zaheer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 326, 339.) Focusing
on that second element, we find that Cooper’s claim fails because he cannot
establish prejudice even if his attorney’s performance was deficient.
      Dr. Roberts examined Cooper more than seven years after his plea, and
the trial court questioned the value of later-obtained evidence. On the other
hand, the trial court gave great weight to Jacqueline’s testimony because she
was married to Cooper at the time of his plea, during which she observed
Cooper functioning as a normal adult. The trial court also credited
Goldstein’s testimony, in which he described Cooper as not showing the
slightest misunderstanding of the immigration consequences or any signs of
disability other than his inability to read. Further, Dr. Kania, who examined
Cooper one month before the plea, found Cooper to have a higher level of
mental functioning than did Dr. Roberts. Under these circumstances, it is

                                        15
reasonably likely the trial court would have found that Roberts’s opinion was
outweighed by the contemporaneous evidence of Cooper’s cognitive abilities
at the time of his plea.
      Additionally, Dr. Roberts’s opinion that Cooper was in the “mildly-
mentally retarded range” is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that
Cooper understood the effect of his conviction. Cooper’s immigration
consequences were not a complex concept, as it was a simple matter of cause
and effect to understand that Cooper’s conviction would lead to deportation.
The plausible basis for a misunderstanding lies in the explanation of the
immigration consequences, and the trial court’s acceptance of Goldstein’s
testimony shows it found those consequences were sufficiently explained.
      Based on the foregoing, it is not reasonably likely that the admission
of Dr. Roberts’s report or testimony would have produced a more favorable
result for Cooper. As such, Cooper has failed to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
                               DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed.

                                                                         DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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