Court Opinion

ID: 9699930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:58:03.06167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:00.406166
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING
OPINION BY BENDER, J.:
¶ 1 Because I am not persuaded that a genuine material fact is at issue, I must respectfully dissent. Specifically, I am not convinced by Preferred’s argument that the June 18, 2003 date rather than the *29October 4, 2001 date is the appropriate date from which to establish the running of the statute of limitations Rather, I note that the language of the Bond Law, quoted by the Majority, and the language of the Bond itself, which tracts the Bond Law’s language, speak in terms of the performance of the last of the labor or the furnishing of the last of the material for which the claim is made. The Bond provides that “suit shall be commenced not later than one (1) year from the date of Final Completion of the work under the said Contract.” Labor and Materialmen’s Payment Bond, at 1-2. Most revealing, however, is the letter sent by Preferred to Liberty on February 28, 2003, stating that:
According to our records the substantial date of completion is October 4, 2001 that was signed off by the City of Pittsburgh-Department of Fire’s Inspector Norm McDowell. In fact Inspector McDowell would be willing to testify on our behalf as such. Preferred Fire Protection contacted you on September 27, 2002 which would be under the one-year date to commence any action on the Payment Bond.
Preferred’s letter, 2/28/03 (emphasis added). Preferred should be held to the status that it asserted in its letter that it claimed could be supported by the fire inspector’s testimony, i.e., that it had completed its work. Additionally, a statement sent by Preferred to Joseph Davis, Inc. on May 14, 2002, acknowledges Davis’ payment of $71,550 and shows a balance due by Davis of $43,093, which Preferred considered to be more than 90 days past due.
¶ 2 I also note that the decision in Valley Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 603, 394 A.2d 677 (1978), relied on by Preferred, refers to the “work performed upon the demand of the contracting body to correct defects in the work as originally completed.” Id. at 679. That was not the situation here. Also in Valley Forge, it is evident that the court discussed the work to be completed as being substantial and not, as here, the mere turning of a valve handle and resetting the system to facilitate the second inspection.
¶ 3 By Preferred’s own words, the work was completed on October 4, 2001, following inspection by the city’s fire inspector, thus, triggering Preferred’s demands for payment. The second inspection related only to the acquisition of an occupancy permit that did not involve work contemplated by the contract between Preferred and Davis or under the bond with Davis’ insurer, Liberty. Because I would find that no genuine issue of material fact existed for a jury to decide, I would conclude that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it granted Liberty’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, I would affirm.