Court Opinion

ID: 9748201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:54:51.540673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:32.656493
License: Public Domain

O’FARRELL, J.,* Concurring and Dissenting.
As a parolee, defendant was subject to a greatly reduced expectation of privacy. As such, I agree that the surveillance method employed here was not unduly intrusive.
However, I respectfully dissent as to the sentencing issue.
After carefully evaluating the facts of the present offense as well as the defendant’s prior history, the trial court expressed a desire to strike priors in furtherance of justice for the purpose of imposing a sentence that was reasonable in light of all relevant factors. (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (a) and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628] (Romero)). However, the court expressed a belief that it lacked the power to do so, relying primarily on People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429] (Williams).
The reason for striking a prior in furtherance of justice should at least be “ 1 “that which would motivate a reasonable judge.” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 13 *962Cal.4th at pp. 530-531). It would be an abuse of discretion to do so simply for the purpose of judicial convenience or because of court congestion, or simply because a defendant pleads guilty, or if the court is guided solely by a personal antipathy for the effect of the three strikes law.
The record reflects that the trial court harbored none of these improper motives. What it does show is that the court was motivated by the lack of violence in the defendant’s history and the fact that the present.offense was neither serious nor violent.
The court indicated that it was constrained by Williams, from exercising discretion to strike. I disagree. The defendant in Williams pled guilty to driving under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP) and had a history of violence, including convictions for rape, felon in possession of a firearm (twice), attempted robbery and spousal battery. The probation officer’s report described him as a “clear and present danger to the community and to himself.” In its decision the Supreme Court found “nothing” favorable to defendant’s position. “The record on appeal is devoid of mitigation.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163.)
Although defendant’s history and this offense bring him within the letter of the three strikes law, the Supreme Court has directed that sentencing courts must look to whether a given defendant comes within the spirit of that law in ruling on a motion to strike priors. If he may be deemed outside that spirit, in whole or in part, he should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more of the qualifying felonies. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) A glimpse of the legislative history to the three strikes initiative helps define the spirit and purpose of the law as the proponents envisioned it. “3 Strikes keeps career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars where they belong.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) argument in favor of Prop. 184, p. 36.)
I agree with the majority that an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for the properly exercised judgment of the trial court. But here the record shows that the trial court incorrectly felt it was foreclosed from exercising that discretion.
I would remand the matter for reconsideration of sentencing.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 27, 2002. Chin, J., did not participate therein. Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Judge of the Monterey Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.