Court Opinion

ID: 9550468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:35:34.056114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:34.080778
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting) — I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority. It is clear to me that Georgia-Pacific's addition of six electrolytic cells for the manufacture of chlorine constitutes an enlargement of the nonconforming use in violation of section 20.06.027(b) of the Bellingham City Code.
It bears note that Georgia-Pacific proceeded with its plant improvements after the commencement of the action against the City of Bellingham. The six cells were installed at considerable expense despite the pending litigation.
My disagreement with the majority is based on an interpretation of a perfectly clear and unambiguous provision in the zoning ordinance. A court should not depart from the ordinary meaning of the words in a statute absent some ambiguity or statutory definition. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 90 Wn.2d 191, 580 P.2d 262 (1978). By the terms of the ordinance a nonconforming use cannot be enlarged. That is precisely what has occurred in this case. If Georgia-Pacific had increased its production simply by using more efficient methods, employing new techniques or equipment, or by increasing the work force or number of hours of operation, such additional production would clearly result from "intensification" of the nonconforming use. In the present case, however, extra cells were added to the production line. It thus escapes me how the addition of six extra cells can be called anything but an enlargement.
Counsel for the City and Georgia-Pacific admitted during argument before this court that if the six cells had been added to the production line but installed in a separate building, the additions would have in that case constituted an enlargement. They claim, however, that since the additional cells were installed within the same building as the *734original 26 cells, the nonconforming use is merely intensified. Such reasoning cannot withstand the most superficial analysis.
The "enlargement" referred to in the ordinance plainly does not mean the enlargement of the building itself or an increase in the number of buildings in use, but refers to the enlargement of the "nonconforming use". The use is the manufacture of chlorine, and the enlargement of that use is the increased production resulting from the addition of the six new cells. An analogous example which clearly demonstrates the difference between an enlargement and an intensification would be the operation of a 6-pump gas station as a nonconforming use. If the station increased the number of hours of operation and thus pumped more gas or devised some new modern method of pumping the gas faster out of the tanks that it had, such would amount to an intensification of the use. However, if the gas station added six pumps in order to increase production, there is no question in my mind but that it would constitute an enlargement of the use.
A statute which is plain needs no construction. Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 587 P.2d 535 (1978); Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 799, 567 P.2d 205 (1977). The ordinance in question here is clear, unambiguous and easy of interpretation. It should therefore be unnecessary to turn to the rules of statutory construction to interpret the ordinance. Nonetheless, the ordinance may be viewed in light of our ruling in Coleman v. Walla Walla, 44 Wn.2d 296, 266 P.2d 1034 (1954), where this court stated that the purpose and intent of nonconforming use ordinances was not to allow the enlargement of nonconforming uses but to restrict and ultimately phase them out entirely. The court in Coleman quoted from State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952), as follows:
'"The ultimate purpose of zoning ordinances is to confine certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities. The continued existence of those which are *735nonconforming is inconsistent with that object, and it is contemplated that conditions should be reduced to conformity as completely and as speedily as possible with due regard to the special interests of those concerned, and where suppression is not feasible without working substantial injustice, that there shall be accomplished "the greatest possible amelioration of the offending use which justice to that use permits." "The accepted method of accomplishing this result is as follows: The nonconformity is in no case allowed to increase. It is permitted to continue until some change in the premises is contemplated by the owner, when, in so far as expedient, the authorities take advantage of this fact to compel a lessening or complete suppression of the nonconformity.'""
Coleman v. Walla Walla, supra at 299. The City Council of Bellingham for what I assume were valid reasons has rezoned the area in question so as to prohibit the manufacture of chlorine. Pursuant to the reasoning expressed in Coleman, the permission to operate the plant as a nonconforming use should be interpreted as a mere toleration of the manufacture of chlorine in the area, and such toleration should not be construed as permission to increase and enlarge the nonconforming use so as to perpetuate it.
By misinterpreting the word "intensification", the court has reached a decision which is contrary to the plain meaning and intent of the nonconforming use ordinances. I would reverse.
Utter, C.J., and Rosellini and Dolliver, JJ., concur with Williams, J.