Court Opinion

ID: 9534527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:36.466408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:11.600860
License: Public Domain

McFARLAND, Justice
(specially concurring).
Both the majority and dissenting opinions set forth the facts involved in this case. I concur in'the results reached by the majority. The regulatory power of the Arizona Corporation Commission is fully discussed in both the majority and dissenting opinions. The real question involved here is whether the commission had authority to issue the order June 1, 1964, in which it directed that petitioner “be forthwith ordered to immediately restore the services that had been discontinued.”
A.R.S. § 40-367, set forth in both the majority and dissenting opinions, provides the only method by which the railroad could legally reduce its train service. The railroad did not comply with this section of the statute, which provides:
“No change shall be made by any public service corporation * * * except after thirty days notice to the commission and to the public as provided in this chapter.”
No notice was given to the commission before the removal of the train which thereby reduced the service. The object of A.R.S. § 40-367 is two-fold. One is to give the public notice of any proposed change and allow people thirty days in which to make other arrangements for transportation. The other is to give the commission time to set up a hearing to determine whether the changed schedule would provide reasonable and adequate service. It is true, as set forth in the majority opinion, the commission could proceed as provided in A.R.S. § 40-421, § 40— 424, and § 40-425, which provides for penalties for all violations as set forth *350therein. However, this procedure is not the only procedure which the commission could follow because it offers absolutely no protection to the public that the service will be continued for the thirty-day period.
I agree with the majority that General Order U-8 (quoted in the majority and dissenting opinions) is inconsistent with A. R.S. § 40-367 which permits a change after thirty days’ notice. Proceeding solely under U-8, it is conceivable that the commission might not have a hearing on the necessity for the service for a much longer period of time. The commission contends that A.R.S. § 40-202 is sufficient authority to support its General Order U-8. A.R.S. § 40-202 provides:
“A. The commission may supervise and regulate every public service corporation in the state and do all things, whether specifically designated in this title or in addition thereto, necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.
“B. A public service corporation shall comply with every order, decision, rule or regulation made by the commission in any matter relating to or affecting its business as a public service corporation, and shall do everything necessary to secure compliance with and observance of every such order, decision, rule or regulation.”
While I do not agree that A.R.S. § 40-202 is sufficient authority to support the order U-8, it is sufficient authority for the commission to have entered an order — after notice for the railroad to file a schedule of any proposed change, and as provided for in B, A.R.S. § 40-367 — for the railroad to restore its service for a period not exceeding the statutory thirty days. This may have been what the commission was attempting to do. The order did not so read. The facts in the case show that the commission, first, on April 18, 1964, ordered the railroad without notice “to maintain present traffic train schedules through Arizona pending public hearing.” However, on April 29, 1964, it vacated this order and directed a public hearing to be held before the commission on May 19th as to why the passenger service previously provided (before April 18, 1964) should not be restored. In doing this, it did not order the railroad ■ to maintain the service but indirectly relieved it of the duty of restoring the service pending a hearing. .
Under A.R.S. § 40-367, C, the commission may allow changes without requiring thirty days’ notice. It is clearly shown that while the commission did not have formal notice of the change it had actual notice of the same, and proceeded accordingly. Under these circumstances, after taking jurisdiction and setting up a' hearing and the railroad appearing with its witnesses on the appointed day — which had been continued to June 1, 1964 — it was the *351duty of the commission to proceed with the hearing and determine whether the changed service was reasonable and adequate.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the opinion of the majority that the order of June 8, 1964, ordering petitioner to restore immediately the discontinued service, should be vacated and set aside.