Court Opinion

ID: 9906566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 16:01:38.00004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:12.720662
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13794    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 12/04/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13794
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JERRY MICHAEL BEASLEY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00043-LSC-JHE-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13794

       Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Jerry Beasley appeals his conviction for possession of meth-
       amphetamine with intent to distribute, challenging the district
       court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Beasley
       argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
       motion because his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty by
       failing to provide him with all of the discovery in his case, only
       providing the discovery photographs in black and white, and telling
       him to plead guilty because he did not have a defense.
              We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
       for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298
       (11th Cir. 2006). An abuse of discretion only occurs if the denial
       was “arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting United States v.
       Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1327 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).
              A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after the court ac-
       cepts it but before it imposes a sentence if he “can show a fair and
       just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
       11(d)(2)(B). “In determining whether the defendant has met this
       burden, the district court may consider the totality of the circum-
       stances surrounding the plea.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469,
       471-72 (11th Cir. 1988). The factors a court should consider “in-
       clude (1) whether close assistance of counsel was available;
       (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judi-
       cial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the
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       22-13794               Opinion of the Court                          3

       government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to
       withdraw his plea.” Id. at 472 (citation omitted). “The good faith,
       credibility and weight of a defendant’s assertions . . . are issues for
       the trial court to decide.” Id. “[A] district court need not ﬁnd prej-
       udice to the government before it can deny a defendant’s motion
       to withdraw, [but] it may take this factor into account when as-
       sessing the defendant’s motion.” Id. at 474. We have previously
       concluded that, where factors one and two strongly lean against
       the appellant, we need not give considerable weight or attention to
       factors three and four. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808
       F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987).
              “A guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily made if the de-
       fendant enters his plea without coercion and understands the na-
       ture of the charges and the consequences of his plea.” United States
       v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009). District courts must
       follow the procedures set out in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) when accept-
       ing guilty pleas, which include advising the defendant of the rights
       that they are waiving and the consequences of their plea, question-
       ing them to make sure that they understand those rights and con-
       sequences, ensuring that the plea is voluntary and did not result
       from coercion, and determining that there is a factual basis for the
       plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); see also United States v. Presendieu, 880
       F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018). “These procedures are designed
       to address the three ‘core objectives’ necessary for a knowing and
       voluntary guilty plea: (1) that the defendant enters his plea free
       from coercion, (2) that he understands the nature of the charges,
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13794

       and (3) that he understands the consequences of his plea.” Pres-
       endieu, 880 F.3d at 1238.
              “There is a strong presumption that the statements made
       during [a plea] colloquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d
       185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). For that reason, “when a defendant makes
       statements under oath at a plea colloquy, he bears a heavy burden
       to show his statements were false.” United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d
       166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988).
              The timing of the motion to withdraw the plea is also an
       important consideration. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 801. “The
       longer the delay between the entry of the plea and the motion to
       withdraw it, the more substantial the reasons must be as to why
       the defendant seeks withdrawal.” Buckles, 843 F.2d at 473.
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
       ing Beasley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Brehm, 442
       F.3d at 1298. First, its finding that Beasley had close assistance of
       counsel was proper. It was within its discretion to find credible
       Beasley’s attorney’s testimony at the withdrawal hearing and
       therefore find that the attorney had given Beasley all of the discov-
       ery, had discussed the case and the consequences of pleading guilty
       with him, had prepared to go to trial when Beasley at first did not
       want to plead guilty, had not given him incorrect advice that he
       could freely withdraw his plea before sentencing, and had reviewed
       the plea agreement with him. Although Beasley contested many
       of these assertions, the court was allowed to find his testimony not
       to be credible. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472.
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       22-13794               Opinion of the Court                        5

              The court was further able to rely on Beasley’s statements
       at the plea hearing, which are afforded a strong presumption of
       truth. Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187. Even if Beasley was equivocal about
       attorney Neff’s performance in the case at that time, he ultimately
       affirmed that Neff had “done okay” and explained the case to him
       without bringing up any of the specific grievances that he later as-
       serted against him. Specifically concerning the claim that Neff told
       him that he could withdraw his plea, Beasley even stated at the first
       withdrawal hearing that he thought he could freely withdraw his
       plea and that nobody had told him that he was able to do so. That
       inconsistency with his later assertion was enough to justify the
       court’s finding that Neff’s testimony was more credible than
       Beasley’s.
               The only consistent fact between Neff’s and Beasley’s testi-
       monies was that Neff only provided Beasley with black-and-white
       photographs. However, the court noted that the defense that Of-
       ficer Stanton cropped the photo and fabricated the trash pull evi-
       dence was not unavailable to Beasley before his plea hearing be-
       cause the details that he claimed supported that argument could be
       identified in both the black-and-white and color versions of the
       pickup-truck photo. This was further supported by Neff’s testi-
       mony that Beasley pointed out this argument to him using the
       black-and-white photo. He further did not think that it would have
       aided in Beasley’s defense anyway, which the court agreed with
       when it found that the result of the hearing would have been the
       same even if Beasley had access to the color photo. Thus, on the
       totality of the circumstances, there is enough evidence on the
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13794

       record to support the court’s finding that Neff provided Beasley
       with sufficiently close assistance.
               Regarding the second factor, the district court did not abuse
       its discretion in relying on Beasley’s statements at the plea hearing
       in finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, given the
       strong presumption of truth afforded to such statements. Medlock,
       12 F.3d at 187. Beasley’s admissions at the plea hearing that he un-
       derstood the charges against him, the conditions of the plea agree-
       ment, and the consequences of the plea agreement, and that he was
       not being coerced into pleading guilty all support the court’s find-
       ing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. Beasley
       does not cite to any specific, credible facts that would undermine
       the strong presumption of truth underlying his statements at the
       plea hearing. His statement that Neff coerced him into pleading
       guilty by telling him that he did not have a defense is contradicted
       by Neff’s testimony, which the court found more credible than
       Beasley’s.
              All of these facts support the court’s finding that Beasley
       likely wanted to withdraw his guilty plea not because he was co-
       erced into pleading guilty “but because he [was] fac[ing] extensive
       time in prison.” Beasley even stated to the court at the first with-
       drawal hearing that he pled guilty to buy himself more time before
       pleading not guilty as a means of delaying his case. The voluntari-
       ness of Beasley’s plea was also supported by the length of time be-
       tween the court’s acceptance of the plea and his motion to with-
       draw it, approximately two-and-one-half months. As the district
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       22-13794               Opinion of the Court                        7

       court found, the fact that the motion to withdraw was so close in
       time to the calculation of Beasley’s guideline range suggests that,
       like in Gonzalez-Mercado, he “withdrew his plea in anticipation of a
       harsher sanction” than he expected. 808 F.2d at 801. Based on the
       totality of the circumstances, there are enough facts on the record
       to support the court’s finding that Beasley’s guilty plea was know-
       ing and voluntary.
               The court did not directly discuss factors three or four, but
       it did not need to discuss either based on its findings with respect
       to factors one and two. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 474. Even so, nei-
       ther factor suggests that the district court abused its discretion in
       denying Beasley’s motion. Many resources were expended on
       Beasley’s case, including a suppression hearing, two change of plea
       hearings, and two hearings addressing his pro se motions. If the
       court allowed Beasley to withdraw his plea, many more resources
       would then be expended, including a jury trial. Regarding factor
       four, the government would be prejudiced if the court allowed
       Beasley to withdraw his plea because it would be required to col-
       lect and reinterview witnesses, regather evidence, and prepare for
       trial after already having gone through the plea process. Regard-
       less, to deny Beasley’s motion, the district court did not need to
       find that the government would have been prejudiced if it allowed
       him to withdraw the plea. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 474.
               In sum, because Beasley had available the close assistance of
       effective counsel and pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily, the
       district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-13794

       withdraw his plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). See id. 843
       F.2d at 471-72.
             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is
             AFFIRMED.