Court Opinion

ID: 9697542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:20:32.963657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.379543
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
I cannot agree that the search which revealed the presence of narcotics was a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
The facts of this case can be simply stated: On the night of October 21, 1972, the arresting officers received a radio call to the effect that two men were “prowling” in the area of 48th and Sansom Streets in Philadelphia. Four officers, in two separate cars, arrived in the area and observed appellant and his co-defendant walk along the sidewalk, part, and proceed to walk in opposite directions. One of the men walked on a porch. Approximately ten minutes later the same scenario was repeated. Eventually, the two men came together and walked toward a parked automobile. As they were about to enter the vehicle, the police approached. Appellant uttered an oath and attempted to flee, but was stopped and arrested. A search of appellant’s person revealed 25 glassine packets of heroin.
At the time of appellant’s arrest, the crime of “prowling” was defined as follows: “Whoever at night time *353maliciously loiters or maliciously prowls around a dwelling house... belonging to or occupied by another, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . .” (Emphasis added). 18 P.S. §4418.1 The purpose and scope of the statute has been defined by our Court: “This Act was obviously intended to punish not only those persons who at night are bent on peeping into the private affairs of citizens in their dwellings, but also those individuals who are found at or near dwellings without lawful purpose or reason and tuhose presence can only he explained in some preparation for or attempt at illegality or crime. The mischief prohibited is that intentional act, without legal justification or excuse, which has as its purpose injury to the privacy, person or property of another.” Commonwealth v. DeWan, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 203, 208, 124 A.2d 139 (1956) (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court has approved this definition: “ ‘Malicious,’ .as used in this statute, has been defined to mean ‘[having] as its purpose injury to the privacy, person or property of another.’.. Commonwealth v. Dial, 445 Pa. 251, 256, 285 A.2d 125 (1971). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 312, 315, 137 A.2d 903 (1958).
At trial, the Commonwealth proved only that appellant walked on a porch for a very short period of time some minutes prior to his arrest, which occurred at a parked automobile. There is absolutely no evidence of record which would indicate that appellant attempted to enter any residence, or that appellant invaded the privacy of any person’s home. Proof that appellant walked on a porch and almost immediately came back to the sidewalk cannot' serve to support a belief that appellant was “maliciously” prowling. It was incumbent upon the Com*354monwealth to show that the arresting officers had reason to believe that appellant intended to injure “the privacy, person or property of another.” Merely walking on a porch and immediately leaving cannot provide the necessary probable cause.
Arrests and/or convictions for prowling have been upheld by the appellate courts. The evidence presented in those cases, however, was far stronger than the meager testimony provided in the instant case. For example, in Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 167, 240 A.2d 570 (1968), the defendants twice passed within fifty feet of an apartment building while the arresting officer was within their view. On their third passage, the officer was out of sight. The defendants went to the apartment parking lot, one standing at the rear of the car in the manner of a lookout as the other entered the building. Similarly, the facts of Commonwealth v. Nicholls, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 410, 217 A.2d 768 (1966), presented a stronger case. There, the appellant attempted to open the door and peeped in the window in the company of a known burglar. Finally in Commonwealth v. Williams, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 312, 137 A.2d 903 (1958), the appellant was wearing rubber galoshes on a dry night and climbed a fence to gain entry to a hotel for the purpose of committing adultery.2
The evidence produced by the Commonwealth in the instant case cannot support a finding of probable cause to arrest for malicious prowling. As a result, the arrest was unlawful, and the search conducted incident thereto was likewise unlawful. The evidence obtained in the search, therefore, was improperly admitted at trial.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Act of May 27, 1949, P.L. 1900, §1, 18 P.S. §4418. This section has been reenacted under the new Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1, 18 Pa.C.S. §5506. The statute has been upheld as not impermissibly vague. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 456 Pa. 495, 321 A.2d 917 (1974).

. Commonwealth v. Duncan, supra, is inapposite. The Supreme Court granted allocatur limited “ ‘to the constitutional issue of vagueness and the issue of... the use and meaning of the word “around” in the statute.’ ” 466 Pa. at 497, 321 A.2d at 918. Thus, the Supreme Court in Duncan assumed that the element of maliciousness was present.