Court Opinion

ID: 9845636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:35.048372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.777608
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITING and JUSTICE LACY
join, dissenting.
I dissent because I do not believe that the Medical Malpractice Act, Code § 8.01-581.1 et seq., applies to acts of sexual molestation committed by a health care provider when such acts would constitute the crime of sexual assault.
As the majority correctly observes, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Dr. Antonio provided health care to Ms. Hagan at the time he allegedly sexually molested her. It is true that the Act defines health care as “any act . . . by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical . . . care.” Code § 8.01-581.1. However, I do not interpret the phrase “any act” as broadly as the majority because to do so would cause illogical consequences which the Act clearly was not designed to achieve.
The Act was passed by the General Assembly in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis. The purpose of the Act was to curtail the escalating costs of medical malpractice insurance premiums so that Virginia’s health care providers would be able to afford such coverage. See Senate Document No. 22, entitled Re*353port of the Commission to Study the Costs and Administration of Health Care Services to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia. The Act, among other things, creates a process which is intended to resolve colorable claims of medical malpractice against health care providers and discourage the pursuit of frivolous claims. To accomplish these objectives, the Act grants numerous protections to health care providers which are not enjoyed by other classes of defendants. See Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
Courts are not at liberty to rewrite statutes because that is the function of the legislature. However, we have repeatedly said that “[wjhile in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity.” Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990); Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934); See also Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 638, 175 S.E. 320, 327 (1934); Ingram v. Harris, 174 Va. 1, 9, 5 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1939) (Hudgins, J., dissenting).
The majority’s literal construction of the Act will create illogical results which the General Assembly did not intend. For example, under the majority’s holding, a physician who commits an act of sexual molestation on a young boy during the course of a urological examination would be entitled to the protection of the Act. Similarly, an obstetrician who sexually assaulted a female patient during a pelvic examination would also be entitled to the protection of the Act. Certainly, the General Assembly did not intend such a broad interpretation of the Act.
Neither Gonzalez v. Fairfax Hospital System, 239 Va. 307, 389 S.E.2d 458 (1990) nor Glisson v. Loxley, 235 Va. 62, 366 S.E.2d 68 (1988), relied upon by the majority, involved acts of sexual molestation committed by a physician. Rather, they involved issues of negligence.
The tort alleged by Hagan was not a tort based upon the provision of health care but rather a tort arising out of Dr. Antonio’s prurient interests and actions. This alleged tort falls outside of the scope of the Act. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a trial on the merits.