Court Opinion

ID: 9645714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:22.606691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.659346
License: Public Domain

Parskey, J.
(concurring). Although I am prepared in a proper case to consider whether the language of General Statutes § 46b-57 is broad enough to encompass other than legal interests for the purpose of intervention in custody proceedings, I do not regard this case as appropriate for such consideration. While it is true that the third party “intervenor” had been an adoptive parent, the record discloses that he consented to the termination of his parental rights. His present claim that such consent was given under duress is not properly raised in a motion to intervene. The proper way to raise such claims is by filing, in a timely fashion, a motion to reopen and vacate the termination judgment. Failing that, the third party “intervenor” must be treated in the present case as a legal stranger.
Because the “intervenor,” nevertheless, presses a claim for intervention based on a broad view of “interest,” additional observations are suggested. What appears on the surface as simply a problem of statutory construction on closer analysis involves more complex issues. To start with, assuming the existence of a present controversy, the immediate litigants are parents, each of whom possesses a constitutional right. The right of a parent to the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children is not a mere lagniappe that comes with the relationship. Rather it is an essential constitutional right which warrants deference and, in the absence of a powerful countervailing interest, pro*510tection. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972). The corollary to this proposition is that in any controversy "between a possessor of a constitutionally protected custodial right and a possessor of a lesser interest, ordinarily the latter must give way.1 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 53 U. Ed. 2d 14 (1977); Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 551, 438 A.2d 755 (1980). Because I do not read the court’s opinion as standing for the proposition that the flexible interest test for intervention would give the trial court discretion, under the rubric of “the best interests of the child,” to override a person’s constitutional parental rights in favor of such intervening party I concur both in the opinion and the result. See In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 648, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (Parskey, J., dissenting).

 To what extent, if any, parental rights might be attenuated in a case in which a grandparent seeks visitation rights pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59 need not be addressed at this time.