Court Opinion

ID: 9575464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:03.784614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:13.386282
License: Public Domain

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion, relying almost exclusively on unpublished case law, dismisses this appeal without prejudice, holding that Lee’s challenge to certain conditions of his supervised release is not ripe for appellate review. This conclusion implies that we might one day have jurisdiction to hear these claims, but, in my opinion, this court will never have jurisdiction over Lee’s challenge to conditions of his supervised release, as it is clear that he has waived his right to assert these claims on appeal. I would therefore dismiss Lee’s claims with prejudice.
“It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive his right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement.” United States v. Smith, 344 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir.2001). “When a defendant waives his right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement, this [c]ourt is bound by that agreement and will not review the sentence except in limited circumstances.” Smith, 344 F.3d at 483 (alteration omitted).
Lee’s plea agreement included a waiver of most of his appellate rights, stating:
I understand that [18 U.S.C. § 3742] gives me the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court. Acknowledging this, I knowingly and voluntarily waive my right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined so long as my sentence is within the statutory maximum specified [in this Plea Agreement]. This waiver is made in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this Plea Agreement. The waiver in this paragraph does not apply to claims relating directly to this waiver of appellate rights or to its negotiation that also involve the involuntariness of my plea, prosecutorial misconduct, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
*452This waiver clearly forecloses Lee’s claims on appeal. Lee waived his right to appeal “any sentence ... and the manner in which the sentence is determined so long as [the] sentence is within the statutory maximum.” The district court sentenced Lee to 188 months’ imprisonment, which is much less than the 360-month maximum authorized by statute. And Lee now contests “the manner in which the sentence is determined,” arguing that “[t]he district court may not impose nonstandard conditions of supervised release without notice to the defense and without a meaningful hearing as to those conditions.” Because Lee’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, and because he is challenging the “manner” in which the district court determined his sentence (i.e., the alleged lack of notice and lack of a meaningful hearing), I would hold that the waiver in the plea agreement bars Lee from asserting these arguments on appeal. Furthermore, while the waiver in the plea agreement explicitly disclaims applicability to certain claims, Lee’s claims on appeal do not fall within any of these exceptions. His claims, even under the broadest of readings, do not “relat[e] directly to [ ]his waiver of appellate rights” or “involve the involuntariness of [his] plea, prosecutorial misconduct, or ineffective assistance of counsel.” I therefore conclude that Lee’s claims are not excluded from the waiver of appellate rights in the plea agreement and, for the foregoing reasons, would dismiss this appeal with prejudice.
I am unpersuaded by the majority’s elevation of, and total dependence upon, the phrase “within the statutory maximum” in Lee’s waiver. The entire provision containing that phrase states, “I knowingly and voluntarily waive my right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined so long as my sentence is within the statutory maximum specified [in this Plea Agreement].” When this language is viewed as a whole, it is clear to me that Lee waived his right to appeal any portion of his sentence, which includes the terms and conditions of supervised release. The majority ignores the express statement that Lee “waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence imposed by the [c]ourt.” Because Lee waived his right to appeal any sentence, and because his sentence, like those of most other defendants, included a term of supervised release, his waiver encompasses his right to challenge the terms of that supervised release. I thus dissent from the judgment for the reasons expressed herein.