Court Opinion

ID: 9522345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:23:30.508819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:36.256195
License: Public Domain

STATON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion fails to give effect to the explicit provisions contained in the statutes governing election contests. Therefore, I believe that the petitions filed by Bodine and Hos-tetler were timely filed and I would reverse the trial court's dismissal and remand this case for further proceedings.
While I agree with the majority that an election contest is a proceeding created by statute and that the statutory procedures must be followed, I cannot agree that IND. CODE 3-1-1-2.5 (1982 Ed.) applies to election contests. The statute governing election contests contains an explicit provision that the rules governing civil proceedings will govern proceedings to contest elections:
"'The court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall fix a time, within twenty (20) days after the return day fixed in such notice to the contestee, for the hearing of the contest proceedings, except in case a recount is had, then the court or judge shall fix such hearing for a time within twenty (20) days after the filing of the certificate of such recount commissioners. Such proceedings shall be heard and determined by the court, without a jury, and the practice and procedure in civil actions shall govern, except as otherwise provided in this article."
IND.CODE 3-1-28-6 (1982 Ed.) (emphasis supplied.) The clear meaning of the statute is that a proceeding to contest an election will be governed by the civil rules of procedure. It would be incongruous to say that the civil rules apply after a proceeding under the statute has been initiated but do not apply to the initiation of such proceedings. Although IC 3-1-1-2.5 concerns "filings" and the term "filing" is not defined in the election statutes, it is logical to assume that the noon deadline applies to filings which relate directly to the election process, such as filings to declare candidacy for an office. See IND.CODE 8-1-9-5 (1983 Supp.). In contrast, the proceeding to contest an election is a judicial proceeding, instituted in accordance with the rules governing civil proceedings. IC 8-1-1-2.5 is couched in general terms; IC 3-1-28-6 specifically addresses election contests. A specific statute will control over a more general statute where the two cannot be harmonized. Skarton v. Slack (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 856, 859 (trans. denied.)
Another argument made in favor of applying IC 3-1-1-2.5 to election contest proceedings is that IC 3-1-28-6 specifically excepts provisions made "in this article" from the general statement that the civil rules will govern, and "this article" refers to Article 1 of Title 3 of the Indiana Code, which includes IC 8-1-1-2.5. This argument is clearly incorrect.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the court must give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (1981), Ind., 418 N.E.2d 207, 210. In determining legislative intent, we will look to the statutory language but will not interpret that language in such a way as to produce an absurd or illogical result. Walton v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 398, 398 N.E.2d 667, 670-71. If the meaning is ambiguous, we will construe the statute consistently with other statutes. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., supra.
When applying these rules, it should be determined that "this article" as used in IC 8-1-28-6 refers to what is now identified as "Chapter 28" of Article 1 of Title 8. When IC 3-1-28-6 was originally enacted as part of the Indiana Election Code, 1945 *544Ind.Acts Chapter 208, it appeared as follows:
"ARTICLE 28
"CONTEST OF ELECTIONS-DISTRICT, CIRCUIT, COUNTY TOWNSHIP AND MUNICIPAL OFFICES
* * a # a «k
"Hearing-Decision-Appeal. See. 846. The court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall fix a time, within twenty (20) days after the return day fixed in such notice to the contestee, for the hearing of the contest proceeding, except in case a recount is had, then the court or judge shall fix such hearing for a time within twenty (20) days after the filing of the certificate of such recount commissioners. Such proceeding shall be heard and determined by the court, without a jury, and the practice and procedure in civil actions shall govern, except as otherwise provided in this article. ..."
The section was incorporated intact into the Indiana Code as IC 3-1-28-6. It is apparent that the reference to "this article" refers to Article 28 of 1945 Ind.Acts, Chapter 208. This position is supported by an examination of references in surrounding statutes, such as "section three hundred and forty-one," IC 3-1-28-4 and "sections three hundred and twenty-four to three hundred and forty," IC 8-1-28-5. These references cannot refer to sections of the act as presently codified; they clearly refer to the sections as numbered in the original act. The Legislature, by stating "except as otherwise provided in this article," IC 3-1-28-6, clearly intended that "this article" mean the provisions presently codified at IC 3-1-28-1 through 8-1-28-8. Because IC 3-1-1-2.5 is not within IC 8-1-28-1 et seq., we must look to the rules of Trial Procedure to determine whether the petitions of Hostetler and Bodine were timely filed.
TR. 6(A) sets forth the following method for computing time:
"Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is:
(1) a Saturday,
(2) a Sunday,
(8) a legal holiday as defined by state statute, or
(4) a day the office in which the act is to be done is closed during regular business hours.
In any event, the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the office is closed. When the period of time allowed is less than seven [7] days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and days on which the office is closed shall be excluded from the computations."
This rule does not require that a prescribed period end at noon. By the express language of IC 8-1-28-6, TR. 6 applies to proceedings to contest an election. There is no dispute that Bodine and Hostetler filed their petitions on the fifteenth day after the election. Therefore, the petitions were timely filed and should not have been dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and would reverse the trial court's dismissal and remand for further proceedings.