Court Opinion

ID: 9743793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:43:23.621289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.616943
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Achor, J.
The opinion by Arterburn, J. asserts that objections to a judgment or sentence “should have been made at a time when the same could still have been corrected by the trial court otherwise such objections are waived on appeal..
This statement seems to imply that all right to correct an erroneous sentence is lost unless so asserted. In my opinion the implication of the above statement is not consistent with Rule 2-40B1 and the *650opinions of this court. See: Dowd, Warden v. Todd (1962), 243 Ind. 232,184 N. E. 2d 4.
The fact that this court, by adopting Rule 2-40B as a specific procedure for the correction of an erroneous sentence seems to indicate that the court intended to provide an independent procedure by which to correct the error other than by the regular procedure of new trial and appeal.
The opinion of Judge Arterburn cites several cases as holding that a party who is present when an irregular judgment is rendered or an improper sentence passed against himself must object at the time of the error, if any question is to be preserved thereon. Evans v. State (1898), 150 Ind. 651, 655, 50 N. E. 820; State v. Arnold (1895), 144 Ind. 651, 42 N. E. 1095; Mountjoy v. State (1881), 78 Ind. 172.
It occurs to me that this interpretation of the above cited cases is not entirely warranted. For example in the Evans case, supra, the court actually held that:
“The error, if any, committed by the court, was in rendering judgment on the verdict under the reformatory act of 1897, fixing the penalty for grand instead of petit larceny. Appellant made a general objection to the judgment, but did not point out any specific objection thereto, or move to modify the same so as to conform to the verdict. It is settled law in this State that the form or substance of a judgment cannot be first questioned in this court, but the question' must be first presented to the court below by a motion to modify, which must specify wherein it should be corrected and modified, and the objection must particularly point out the defect or mistake complained of, and ask that the same be corrected. If the court rules against the party asking such correction, such ruling of the court below must be assigned as error in this court. Unless this is done no objection can be made available for reversal here, however erroneous in form or substance such judgment may appear to be.” [Cases cited.] [My emphasis.]
*651I find no statement in that case to the effect that the defendant must object at the time when an irregular judgment is rendered or an improper sentence is passed against him. Rather, it seems that the ruling of the court in the Evans case, supra, is substantially in conformity with Rule 2-40B, supra.
I do agree that where the accused is represented by counsel and is charged with knowledge of the error at the time of sentencing, his conduct with respect thereto may thereafter be such as to estop him from challenging the validity thereof. Dowd, Warden v. Todd, supra, provided that the determinate sentence imposed is within the scope of the indeterminate sentence, as provided by statute.
Where, as in this case, there was such knowledge, and the convicted defendant enters into an agreement in which he specifically accepted such a sentence and the state agreed to dismiss numerous other cases filed against him on the basis of that agreement principles of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel should be effective to bar a belated petition to correct the sentence which, although erroneous, was not void.

. “Whenever it shall appear from the indictment or affidavit and final judgment in any criminal cause that an erroneous sentence has been imposed by the trial court, the defendant in such cause may at any time petition the trial court to correct retroactively such judgment to conform to the term of imprisonment specified in the applicable statute upon proper notice (by serving a copy of the petition in person or by mail) upon the prosecuting attorney of the circuit and the attorney general of Indiana. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a final order granting or denying said petition under the same rules and conditions as provided in Rules 2-40 and 2-40A of this Court.” Rule 2-40B.