Court Opinion

ID: 9352555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:30.247624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.937516
License: Public Domain

J-S41022-22

                                   2023 PA Super 4

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GARY L BATHURST, JR.                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 821 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 14, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
                 Criminal Division at CP-14-CR-0000401-2021

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED JANUARY 06, 2023

        Gary L. Bathurst (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered after the trial court convicted him of driving under the influence of

alcohol (DUI) (incapable of safe driving – first offense), DUI (blood alcohol

concentration (BAC) between 0.08% and 0.10%) and DUI (high rate of alcohol

– BAC between 0.10% and 0.16%).1 After careful review, we affirm.

        At 1:53 a.m. on October 10, 2020, Pennsylvania State Trooper Shane

Eichelberger and Pennsylvania State Trooper Nathan Gordon were on routine

patrol in a marked police cruiser in Centre County. While patrolling on North

Eagle Valley Road, they observed a truck parked in a vehicle pull-off with its

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)-(2), (b).
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rear lights on. The troopers entered the pull-off and parked about 15 yards

behind the truck.

         Trooper Eichelberger exited the police cruiser and walked to Appellant’s

truck.    As the trooper approached, Appellant rolled down the driver’s side

window and lowered the volume on the radio.            The trooper immediately

noticed the odor of alcohol coming from inside the truck. He further observed

that keys were in the ignition and the engine was running.          Additionally,

Trooper Eichelberger saw an open case of beer in the rear of the truck, but no

empty containers. When the trooper asked, Appellant at first denied that he

had been drinking, but then admitted he had a couple of drinks at a local bar

before driving to the pull-off. Because Appellant showed signs of intoxication,

Trooper Eichelberger directed him to exit the truck.         The troopers then

administered field sobriety tests which Appellant failed. The troopers arrested

Appellant for DUI and drove him to the hospital for a BAC test.         The test

revealed Appellant had a BAC of .114%, plus or minus .014%.

         Appellant filed a pre-trial suppression motion. Following a hearing on

January 3, 2022, the suppression court denied the motion.              The case

proceeded to trial, and the trial court convicted Appellant of the above

charges.      On April 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

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aggregate six months of probation.2 Appellant timely appealed. Appellant

and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents two issues for review:

       I. Whether the Suppression Court abused its discretion and erred
       as a matter of law in denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress all
       evidence and fruit of the poisonous tree, which was obtained as a
       result of the search and seizure at issue since the arresting
       officer’s initial encounter with [Appellant] was, from its inception,
       an investigative detention that was not supported by reasonable
       suspicion?

       II. Whether the evidence presented at [Appellant’s] nonjury trial
       was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts for 75 Pa.C.S.A.
       § 3802(a)(1), 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(a)(2), and 75 Pa. C.S.A.
       § 3802(b) since the Commonwealth failed to prove, beyond a
       reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] operated, or was in actual
       physical control of the movement of his motor vehicle after
       imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol to render him incapable of
       safely driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of his
       motor vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

       Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly denied his

suppression motion. He asserts:

       Trooper Eichelberger and Trooper Gordon’s interaction with
       Appellant was, from its inception, an investigative detention
       unsupported by a reasonable articulable belief that Appellant had
       violated any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code or that Appellant
       was engaged in criminal activity.

____________________________________________

2 Pursuant to this Court’s directive, the trial court amended its docket to
properly reflect the April 14, 2022, judgment of sentence. Commonwealth
v. Bathurst, No. 821 MDA 2022 (Pa. Super. June 24, 2022) (order).
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Id. at 17.    Appellant challenges the court’s reasoning based on Trooper

Gordon not being in close proximity to Appellant “when analyzing the factor

of police presence, which is necessary when evaluating police-citizen

interaction.” Id. at 24. Appellant claims Trooper Gordon was near him and

his truck during Trooper Eichelberger’s initial approach. Id. at 24-25. He

states that the police cruiser was parked “a short distance” behind his truck.

Id. at 25. According to Appellant, he “was surrounded by two uniformed State

Troopers, who were shining their flashlights into his vehicle.” Id. (footnote

omitted). Appellant assails the suppression court’s reliance on the troopers’

testimony that there were “no physical impediments that would have

prevented Appellant from driving away[.]”      Id. at 26.   Appellant further

challenges the suppression court’s emphasis on Appellant rolling down his

window without being asked to do so.             Id.    Appellant relies on

Commonwealth v. Powell, 228 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2020), where this Court

found an investigative detention under similar circumstances. Id. at 26-27.

     Appellant argues:

     In the instant matter, the Suppression Court’s conclusion ignores
     the fact that two uniformed state troopers pulled up behind
     Appellant’s lawfully parked vehicle in their marked police units at
     1:53 a.m., and proceeded to approach Appellant’s vehicle on both
     sides, all while shining their flashlights in Appellant’s vehicle.
     Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable citizen who
     was approached by multiple state troopers, with their full display
     of authority, would have felt compelled to believe that they had to
     roll down their window so that the trooper could engage with
     them, even without any direct commands to do so.

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Id. at 27. Appellant claims the troopers effectuated an investigative detention

unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 28. We disagree.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      When we review the ruling of a suppression court, we must
      determine whether the factual findings are supported by the
      record. When it is a defendant who appealed, we must consider
      only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence
      for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a
      whole, remains uncontradicted. Assuming that there is support in
      the record, we are bound by the facts as are found and we may
      reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are in error.

Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

and brackets omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the record developed

at the suppression hearing, considering the evidence presented by the

Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any uncontradicted evidence

presented by the appellant. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 487

(Pa. 2018).

      There are three categories of encounters between citizens and the

police:

      (1) A mere encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3)
      custodial detentions. The first of these, a “mere encounter” (or
      request for information), need not be supported by any level of
      suspicion, but carries no compulsion to stop or respond. Second,
      an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable
      suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention,
      but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
      functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial
      detention” must be supported by probable cause.

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Commonwealth        v.   Baldwin,   147    A.3d   1200,   1202   (Pa.   Super.

2016) (citation omitted). Mere encounters need not be supported by any level

of suspicion of illegality, but an investigative detention must be supported by

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Adams, 205

A.3d 1195, 1200 (Pa. 2019).

      The line between mere encounters and investigative detentions is

demarcated by an objective test known as the “free to leave” test. Id.; see

also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“So long as a reasonable

person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ …

the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” (citation

omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968) (“Only when the

officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way

restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has

occurred.”).   The “free to leave” test “requires the court to determine

‘whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the

encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable

person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about

his business.’” Adams, 205 A.3d at 1200 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437).

      We have explained:

      To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an
      investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of
      law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. To
      decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all
      the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
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       whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have
       communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free
       to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the
       encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether,
       considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
       reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have thought he
       was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.

Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citations omitted).

       In Powell, we concluded that officers had effectuated an investigative

detention. Powell, 228 A.3d at 2. While on routine patrol at 11:37 p.m.,

Edinboro Police Officer William Winkler and a sheriff’s deputy observed Ronald

Powell’s truck parked perpendicular to parking lines in a small public parking

lot. Id. at 2. The truck’s engine was running, and no other cars were in the

lot.   Id.   Officer Winkler pulled his marked vehicle directly behind the

passenger side of the truck but did not activate his lights. Id. Officer Winkler

and the deputy exited their vehicle and approached Powell’s driver and

passenger side windows, respectively.      Id.   Although the windows were

closed, Officer Winkler could see Powell eating food from Taco Bell.        Id.

Importantly, Officer Winkler ordered Powell to roll down his window. After

Powell complied, Officer Winkler smelled a strong odor of alcohol and saw that

Powell’s eyes were glassy. Id. at 3. Officer Winkler then administered field

sobriety tests. Id. When Powell failed the tests, Officer Winkler arrested him

for DUI. Id. This Court affirmed the suppression court’s determination that

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under such circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed he

was free to leave. We explained:

       … Officer Winkler did not physically restrain Powell’s
       movement. However, there were other factors in this case that
       convince us that a reasonable person in Powell’s position would
       not have felt free to leave. Namely, while Powell sat alone in his
       vehicle, parked legally and eating food from a nearby restaurant,
       Officer Winkler parked his vehicle “right behind” Powell’s
       car. He and the sheriff’s deputy both approached Powell’s
       vehicle and positioned themselves on either side of it.
       Although Officer Winkler could see that Powell was innocuously
       eating food, he knocked on Powell’s window. When Powell
       looked at him, Officer Winkler ordered Powell to lower his
       window. In light of the totality of these circumstances,
       Powell was subjected to an investigative detention at the
       point of that command.

Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).

       By contrast, the evidence presented at Appellant’s suppression hearing,

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports the

suppression court’s denial of suppression. At 1:53 a.m. on October 10, 2020,

Trooper Eichelberger and Trooper Gordon observed taillights in a pull-off. N.T.

(Suppression Hearing), 1/3/22, at 1-2, 6. Trooper Eichelberger testified:

       I specifically[] remember my partner, Trooper Gordon, noticing
       the taillights because I remember him saying, well, that’s weird,
       there’s taillights but there’s no headlights. At least we don’t
       remember seeing headlights as we passed.

Id. at 11.3

____________________________________________

3 Trooper Eichelberger testified Appellant’s headlights were not on when the
troopers “were up at” Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 11.

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       According to Trooper Eichelberger,

       we c[a]me in through the second entrance and approach[ed] the
       vehicle from the rear. I specifically remember – I didn’t turn on
       my [red and blue police] lights at all, just like I normally do. Every
       time I see a car parked there, especially at that time of night, I
       always want to check on the operator and make sure he’s okay.
       So I always like to stop and talk to the operator, if they’re okay,
       I’m on my way.

             So I pull in, see the vehicle … I park my patrol vehicle, I
       would say at least 15 yards away, and I walk from the patrol
       vehicle on foot up to the driver’s side of the vehicle.

Id.   Notably, Trooper Eichelberger did not activate his red and blue police

lights, and parked “at least 15 yards away” from Appellant’s truck. See id.

(explaining Appellant could have driven forward without impediment).

       Trooper Eichelberger continued:

       [A]s I approach[ed] from the driver’s side, [Appellant] rolled down
       his window.4 As he rolled down his window, I immediately
       detected an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. While
       speaking with him, he initially denied drinking alcohol but then he
       later admitted that he got in an argument with his girlfriend, that
       he was just waiting to go to work. So he was sitting [there]
       waiting to go to work, and that he worked in the Bellefonte area
       doing construction.

Id. at 8 (footnote added). According to the trooper, Appellant “made it seem

like he just got done at the Linger[-]In” bar. Id. at 27. Trooper Eichelberger

observed that Appellant had “[s]luggish, glassy, bloodshot eyes,” and saw an

open case of beer on the backseat of the truck. Id. at 8. During this initial

____________________________________________

4Trooper Eichelberger later testified he asked Appellant, “Are you okay, sir?”
Id. at 23.
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encounter, which Trooper Eichelberger described as a welfare check, he did

not tell Appellant he was under arrest or could not leave. Id. at 8-9. Likewise,

he did not exercise any force or restrain Appellant. Id. at 9.

      Trooper Gordon also testified that the troopers drove into the pull-off

area after seeing taillights. Id. at 30. Trooper Gordon stated that after the

troopers parked their cruiser, “Nothing was blocking the front of [Appellant’s]

vehicle. He also, facing southbound, could have went out the southern exit of

that pull-off.” Id. at 31. Trooper Gordon confirmed that Trooper Eichelberger

first approached Appellant’s truck. Id. Trooper Gordon could not hear the

conversation. Id. at 40, 41.

      The totality of the circumstances in this case are distinguishable from

Powell. As the suppression court explained:

      The court did review the case of Commonwealth v[.] Powell ….
      The court does make a couple of distinctions from this case.

             One, … the court [in Powell] relied on the fact that the
      officer ordered the defendant to lower his driver’s side window. In
      this case, that was not the testimony that was provided[;] Trooper
      Eichelberger testified that [Appellant] voluntarily lowered his
      window.

              There was also, from the Powell decision, … officers [that]
      both approached the driver’s side and the passenger’s side. The
      court [in the instant case], based on the testimony that it heard
      today, that actually Trooper Eichelberger made the first contact
      initially to check … to see if [Appellant] was okay, based on it was
      1:53 a.m., obviously this is a rural area, they did not see
      headlights, and Trooper Eichelberger testified that he has
      check[ed] on the welfare of motorists in that position late at night
      on other occasions. So the court will chock that up as a welfare
      check by the trooper.
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               Based on that, the initial interaction was just a mere
         encounter and [Appellant] would have been free to leave, the
         reasonable person would have thought they would have been free
         to leave, and it did not escalate into an investigative detention
         until the trooper smelled alcoholic beverage upon talking to
         [Appellant].

N.T., 1/3/22, at 51-52 (some capitalization omitted).

         The record supports the suppression court’s rationale.          See id.;

see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1047-48 (Pa. Super.

2008) (officer was permitted to check on the welfare of occupants of a legally

parked car at night even with no outward signs of distress, where he did not

observe anything that led him to believe that something illegal was going on).

         Our review further discloses that Trooper Eichelberger’s subsequent

investigative detention of Appellant was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Appellant initially denied drinking, but then admitted consuming a couple of

drinks at the Linger-In bar before driving to the pull-off; there were no empty

beer cans or other evidence that Appellant had consumed alcohol while parked

at the pull-off; and Appellant showed multiple signs of alcohol impairment.

Given the totality of circumstances, we discern no error by the suppression

court.

         In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant specifically claims there insufficient evidence

that he was operating or in physical control of his truck. Id. Appellant asserts

there is no
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     [legal] authority that would suggest that a citizen could be found
     to be in actual, physical control[] of a motor vehicle simply by
     being found in the driver’s seat with the motor running. Rather,
     there must be additional evidence to suggest that the defendant
     had been intoxicated when they started their vehicle and intended
     to drive from that area.

Id. at 32. Appellant points out that his headlights were not illuminated, and

he was not wearing his seatbelt. Id. He claims, “the Commonwealth could

not present any evidence as to when Appellant had driven or if he was

intoxicated when he had driven.” Id. at 32-33.

     We recognize:

     Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a
     question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
     of review is plenary. We review the evidence in the light most
     favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether there is
     sufficient evidence to allow the [factfinder] to find every element
     of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

     In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
     substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition,
     we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
     Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
     Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
     fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
     as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the
     combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
     burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
     doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
     applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
     all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
     [factfinder,] while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses
     and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
     part] or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014).

     Section 3802 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:

     (a) General impairment.

         (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a
         sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
         rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
         actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

         (2) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a
         sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol
         concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least
         0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours after the
         individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical
         control of the movement of the vehicle.

     (b) High rate of alcohol. — An individual may not drive, operate
     or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after
     imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol
     concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.10%
     but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has
     driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the
     movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)-(2), (b).

     Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his

operation and physical control of his truck. Appellant’s Brief at 33. We have

explained:

           “The term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical
     control of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the
     management of the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that
     the vehicle was in motion.” Commonwealth v. Toland, 995
     A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v.
     Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “The
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      Commonwealth can establish through wholly circumstantial
      evidence that a defendant was driving, operating or in actual
      physical control of a motor vehicle.” Id. (quoting Brotherson,
      888 A.2d at 905).         Courts review “a combination of the
      following factors” to determine “whether a person had ‘actual
      physical control’ of an automobile: the motor running, the location
      of the vehicle, and additional evidence showing that the defendant
      had driven the vehicle.” Id. (quoting Brotherson, 888 A.2d at
      904). “A determination of actual physical control of a vehicle is
      based upon the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting
      Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 905).

Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant parked his

truck in the pull-off with its rear lights on.   N.T. (Trial), 3/14/22, at 5-6.

Trooper Eichelberger testified, “after my partner stated that he observed

taillights, we pulled in from the northern entrance, approaching the vehicle

from the rear.” Id. at 9. As Trooper Eichelberger walked toward the truck,

Appellant rolled down his window. Id. at 10. The trooper saw keys in the

ignition and the engine was running. Id. at 12. Trooper Eichelberger testified:

      [Appellant’s] eyes were bloodshot, he appeared sluggish, had
      slurred speech. He indicated that he was sitting there at the pull
      off waiting to go to work, which I felt was odd because it was a
      Sunday morning, but that’s what he stated. He was just waiting
      to go to work. He got in this argument with his girlfriend, and
      that he had just came from the Linger-In Tavern where he had
      two beers.

      …

      So initially when I asked him, he stated that he did not drink.
      While standing there I also observed an open case of [beer] in the
      back seat … behind where [Appellant] was seated. At which point
      he’s like, I did have two beers at Linger-In, I came from there.
      I’m now sitting here waiting to go to work.
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Id. at 11-12. Appellant told Trooper Eichelberger the case of beer was “old.”

Id. at 13.

      On cross-examination, Trooper Eichelberger repeated that Appellant

admitted to drinking two beers at the Linger-In.          Id. at 26.     Trooper

Eichelberger explained:

      [Appellant] said [he] just came from the Linger-In. He never gave
      an exact time. He never said – I don’t know if his interpretation
      is just coming from the Linger-In is an hour ago or if it’s 15
      minutes ago. He never gave that interpretation. That’s just the
      words he provided to me.

Id. at 26. After Appellant failed field sobriety tests, his BAC was tested and

“was .114 [percent], plus or minus .014 percent.” Id. at 20.

      In deeming the evidence sufficient to demonstrate Appellant operated

or was in physical control of the vehicle, the trial court opined:

      Here, testimony was presented at [Appellant’s] Non-Jury Trial which
      suggested that [Appellant’s] vehicle’s engine was running and the
      stereo was active when responding troopers discovered his vehicle
      on a public highway pull-off and approached. The evidence reflected
      [Appellant’s] own admission that he had drank two beers shortly
      before driving to the location where he was found by the responding
      troopers. … This [c]ourt … was satisfied by the Commonwealth’s
      showing that [Appellant] exercised actual physical control of his
      vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol to render him
      unable to safely exercise such control. This evidence, viewed in a
      light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established that
      Appellant violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)-(2) and (b)….
      Because [Appellant’s BAC] concentration was found to be .114%,
      plus or minus .014%, and because [Appellant] was in actual
      physical control of his vehicle, the evidence supports this [c]ourt’s
      verdict.

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Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/22, at 4-5; see also id. at 6 (evidence sufficient to

sustain Appellant’s conviction under Section 3802(a)(2)); 7 (evidence

sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction under Section 3802(b)). As the

record supports the trial court’s findings, we discern no error.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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