Court Opinion

ID: 9940167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:15:58.247629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:38.849355
License: Public Domain

While I agree this matter should be returned to the trial court for consideration in the light of recent legislation, I fear that inappropriate language in the majority opinion may mislead the bench and bar. Several times in the majority opinion — indeed, in framing a question at the outset — there is reference to "compensation" for contributions to education. I must assume the repetition of that term was calculated and not inadvertent.
At no place in the relevant legislation does the word "compensation" appear. With clarity and precision, the Legislature referred instead to "reimbursement." The terms are not synonymous; there is a significant distinction that extends beyond mere semantics. Reimbursement implies repayment of a debt or obligation; that is what the Legislature obviously contemplated. Compensation, on the other hand, may be payment in any sum for any lawful purpose; the Legislature also obviously did not intend to give such a blank check to trial courts.
Furthermore, the majority, in their creative reference to "compensation," fail to emphasize to whom it is to be paid. It is not to an individual spouse, in response to the initial query of the majority. The Legislature was crystal clear: reimbursement is to be made to the community. The community consists of both the husband and the wife, not one or the other. Thus when reimbursement is made to the community, that reclaimed community asset should be divided between the husband and wife in the same manner as all other community property.
I point out that the issue framed in this case does not involve the element of spousal support. That is to be awarded generally on the basis of the needs of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay, although a number of other factors may be considered. (Civ. Code, § 4801) The only issue raised by the appellant in these proceedings is whether acquired knowledge and education are a species of property subject to monetary division. The Legislature has now answered that question in the negative.
To review the legislation: Civil Code section 4800.3, subdivision (b)(1), provides "The community shall bereimbursed for community contributions *Page 771 
to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with interest. . . ." Subdivision (c) provides "Thereimbursement and assignment required by this section shall be reduced or modified. . . ." Subdivision (d) is even more precise: "Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment ofloans pursuant to this section is the exclusive remedy of thecommunity or a party for the education or training and any resulting enhancement of the earning capacity of a party." (Italics added.)
One searches in vain in the statute for a single use of the word "compensation." Thus I find it curious that the majority choose to employ that term rather than to consistently adhere to "reimbursement," the only monetary claim authorized by the Legislature. I trust that trial courts will not be misled into making awards of any sums for any purpose other than that permitted in what the Legislature described with remarkable emphasis as "the exclusive remedy." *Page 772