Court Opinion

ID: 9535855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:45:34.460641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:21.942971
License: Public Domain

Hoffman, J.
This appeal arose from, a judgment adverse to appellant, Washington Township of Allen County, Indi*361ana, defendant below. The action began with the filing of a complaint by appellee against appellant for payment for services rendered on behalf of Mrs. C. W. Hutchens, deceased, by appellee, Parkview Memorial Hospital, for her hospital care and treatment. Appellee sued on the basis of § 5 of the Acts of 1935, ch. 116, p. 432, as amended by Acts 1963, ch. 256, §1, p. 389, §52-148, Burns’ 1964 Repl.1, commonly known as the “Poor Relief Act”, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“The overseer of the poor in each township shall have the oversight and care of all poor persons in his township so long as they remain a charge, and shall see that they are properly relieved and taken care of in the manner required by law. He shall, in cases of necessity, promptly provide medical and surgical attendance for all of the poor in his township who are not provided for in public institutions; and shall also see that such medicines and/or medical supplies and/or special diets and/or nursing as are prescribed by the physician or surgeon in attendance upon the poor are properly furnished.”
The facts important to a determination of the issues in this cause are as follows:
Mrs. C. W. (Georgia) Hutchens and her husband, Cecil, were both industrious, but somewhat economically marginal. The Hutchens lived in Washington Township, Allen County, Indiana, since 1955. They were both in their late fifties. Mrs. Hutchens had not worked since 1951. In 1961, Mr. Hutchens was released from his employment with the Bowser Company (where he had worked for 11 years) when the company moved to Tennessee. There was no retirement provision for Mr. Hutchens and, thereafter, he took a series of odd jobs for various employers, rarely making more than $2 per hour. During the early part of this decade, Mrs. Hutchens began to suffer severely from a diabetic condition with various complications. By August of 1963, Mr. Hutchens was deeply *362in debt as a result of five successive hospitalizations of his wife and the consequent hospital and medical bills. He filed bankruptcy and was discharged in bankruptcy, but new debts quickly accumulated to take the place of the old ones. With income amounting to little more than $200 a month, Hutchens was faced with obligations for car payments, house payments, necessary drugs costing from $3 to $17 per week, insurance, taxes, heating bills, grocery bills and all the other budget requirements.2
Mrs. Hutchens, during this period, made an unfortunate effort to avoid seeing a doctor in order to minimize doctor and medical expenses. After some months, the obvious necessity of medical treatment forced Hutchens to take his wife to a doctor on August 26, 1963. The doctor immediately hospitalized her and began emergency treatment for a gangrenous condition of both legs and a part of the pelvic area. Mrs. Hutchens spent the remaining two years of her life in the hospital undergoing constant treatment. Both legs were amputated, and in her final illness an absess of the brain developed. Excluding doctors’ bills, the entire hospital bill, chargeable to Hutchens, including room, drugs and other required expenditures amounted to $19,806.18. The hospital charged off $5,000 as charity, reducing the total to $14,806.18. For the first 70 days of Mrs. Hutchens’ hospitalization a minimal amount of money was provided by insurance benefits where Mr. Hutchens was employed. Mr. Hutchens also voluntarily agreed to, and did, pay $6 per week out of his somewhat sporadic wages to the hospital up until the death of his wife.
After the insurance policy expired and when it became obvious to Mr. Hutchens that the hospital and medical bills were going to far exceed his income, he sought the assistance of his township trustee, having first been informed by *363the county welfare department that the trustee was the proper administrative agent for such a request. Mr. Hutchens went to the home of John R. Sunderland, township trustee for Washington Township, Allen County, Indiana. There he met with Mrs. Lucy Sunderland, the trustee’s wife, who acted throughout as her husband’s agent. Mrs. Sunderland treated him summarily. Upon finding he was “employed”, and “buying his own home”, she told him that unless he was “down and out”, he was ineligible for assistance, and on further inquiry by Mr. Hutchens, Mrs. Sunderland told him it would be useless for him to return.
After Mrs. Hutchens’ death, Mr. Lanning Baker, business manager of appellee, approached the trustee, through Mrs. Sunderland, concerning the Hutchens’ account, and the possibility of the trustee paying it. Again, Mrs. Sunderland “told me [Mr. Baker] in no uncertain terms that she didn’t think that the Township would help in any way at all.”
Both litigants are essentially agreed on the issues involved in this case, namely: 1) Was Mrs. Hutchens a “poor person” within the meaning of the statute, thus entitling her to the care and attendance of the township trustee under the provisions of § 52-148, supra; and 2) was the notice or application given to the trustee such that a duty to investigate the conditions and circumstances of the alleged “poor person” would devolve upon him?
The trial court by its decision found Mrs. Hutchens was a “poor person” and that effective notice had been communicated to the trustee, and awarded a verdict to appellee in the amount of the account outstanding.
Appellant then filed a motion for new trial which was overruled, and this appeal followed.
Appellant presents the question to us with two specifications of error: 1) that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence; and 2) that the decision of the court is contrary to law.
*364In addition to the two issues here raised, a more basic consideration and determination is necessary. It must be decided what the duty of the township trustee is with respect to “poor persons”, and at what point that duty arises under the statute. Appellant argues that the trustee- is under no obligation unless he agrees to pay prior to the time the patient enters the hospital, or medical aid is administered. Appellant further argues that the only exception to this requirement is the emergency exception, where an “indigent” requires immediate aid and attendance. We find no relation between the “emergency” exception and this case.
Based upon the statutory prerequisite of “necessity”, appellant argues that no necessity was shown in this case since the services had already been rendered at the time the trustee was advised of the situation. Such a distinction is superficial. Necessity for treatment was certainly shown and that is the central concern. The following uncontradicted testimony, on direct examination, of Dr. Richard B. Juergens, the decedent’s physician, is of probative value here:
“Q Would you describe, please, for the Court here her condition when you saw her on August 26,1963?
“A She was complaining mainly of paralysis of the right leg with some swelling and some discoloration. She had some redness in both of her inguinal regions or in the groin, and there was gangrene formation in the left inguinal region, also involving a small portion of the external genitalia, or the vulva. She was speaking, cooperative, coherent. She was having some discomfort from the swelling in the areas of inflammation and gangrene.
“Q What did you think ought to be done with her ?
“A She needed to be hospitalized.
“Q Will you tell the Court whether or not you thought that hospitalization ought to take place immediately or could be taken care of some other time ?
“A No, it needed to be immediate.
“Q How urgent was it?
*365“A I would say if it wasn’t properly taken care of and taken care of promptly it would be a life and death matter.”
This testimony is adequate evidence of the necessity for prompt medical and surgical care. The fact that Mrs. Hut-chens was already being cared for when the trustee was informed of the situation furnished no excuse for non-performance of the duty on the part of the township trustee to care for her upon a determination of her status as a “poor person.” The Board of Commissioners of Tipton County v. Brown, 4 Ind. App. 288, 290, 30 N. E. 925 (1892).
For purposes of our next consideration, we refer to Parkview Hosp. v. County Dept. Pub. Welf., 134 Ind. App. 689, at page 695, 191 N. E. 2d 116 (1963), where Judge Pfaff, speaking for this court, held that the terms “indigent person” and “poor person” are synonymous, and elaborated on a definition with respect to the Poor Relief Act, Acts 1935, ch. 116, §33, p. 432, §52-176, Burns’ 1964 Repl., as follows:
“[W]e do not understand the legislative intent to be that in order for a person to be an ‘indigent person’ within the meaning thereof there must be a complete lack of resources. Rather, we believe the legislative intent was to include those persons who did not have resources sufficient to pay for all the medical and hospital services required by the injury.”
The Legislature has provided a definition of the term, “indigent person”, Acts 1965, ch. 172, § 1, p. 302, § 52-1146, Burns’ 1968 Cum. Supp., which reads in pertinent part:
“For the purpose of this act the term ‘indigent person’ shall mean a person without financial resources to pay for such medical or hospital care.”
Applied to the situation at hand, the Hutchens were “poor persons” within the purview of the statute at the time of Mr. Hutchens’ visit to the home of the township trustee. The *366unfortunate fact is that Mr. Hutchens, like many Americans today, was making an honest effort, in good faith, to make ends meet. At the age of 59 he suddenly was left without a job and with no particular skill or trade to qualify him for further employment. At the same time, his wife became seriously ill with diabetes and complications. Still, Mr. Hutchens made every effort to preserve a financial balance. However, his financial liabilities far outweighed his income. Not until the obvious became apparent to him did Mr. Hutchens seek the aid of the “overseer of the poor.”
Considering the evidence most favorable to the appellee, Mr. Hutchens and his wife were “poor persons” by any subjective or objective test, and thus, the specification of error on sufficiency is answered — there was no error, and there was a sufficiency of evidence.
Finally, the legal effect of the notice, or lack of notice, to the township trustee must be considered.
The duty of the trustee to provide medical and hospital care for poor persons is mandatory. There is no room for discretion once the determination is made. Section 52-148, supra. No such determination was ever made in this case. On direct examination Mr. Hutchens testified as follows:
“Q Did you see Mr. Sunderland, or where did you go to see him?
“A I was out to Mr. Sunderland’s house.
“Q Who was present ?
“A Mr. Sunderland wasn’t there. I talked to his wife and she seemed to be running the business.
“Q Did she act as though she had authority to act on behalf of the Township Trustee?
“A Yes, she did.
“Q And what did she say to you and what did you say to her?
*367“A Well, I asked her if I could get any assistance at all, and she said no, not if I was working. She said you couldn’t have a job, you had to be down and out to get any assistance from the Trustee.
“Q Did you explain to her these facts and all these details?
“A Yes, I explained to her all right.
“Q Did you tell her it looked like Mrs. Hutchens would be there until she passed on?
“A Yes.
“Q Did you tell her everything you knew at that time? “A Yes. She barely sympathized with me.
“Q Did she ask you to comeback?
“A No.
“Q Tell you to sign or file a form ?
“A No.”
On cross-examination, Mr. Hutchens testified:
“Q After this visit, did you ever go back to the Washington Township Trustee’s office?
“A No, she told me it wouldn’t do any good to come back.
“Q So you never went back?
“A No.”
Three things are apparent from this testimony: 1) the township trustee had actual notice of the situation; 2) Mr. Hutchens was not informed of the need to file an application, nor was a form of application offered to him by Mrs. Sunder-land; and 3) the township trustee, through his agent, chose not to investigate beyond the brief inquiry made by his wife.
The trial court properly found that effective notice was given to the trustee. We emphasize the more substantive consideration; namely, the duty of the trustee to provide for poor persons within his jurisdiction. A prior authorization by the trustee is not a prerequisite to *368imposition of responsibility under, the statute (§ 52-148, supra) on the township, for care of “poor persons.” The duty exists absque ulla conditione. The conditional proviso within the Act is not the duty to provide treatment and care to “poor persons” in cases of necessity, (this is mandatory) but the determination, by the trustee, of one’s status as a “poor person.” This, question must be answered, according to the standards supplied by the Legislature and the courts, at whatever time it is presented to the trustee. At that point the duty to investigate and determine the status of an alleged poor person arises. The question is not, whether prior authorization was obtained. We take notice of the fact that in these times, the trustee is often unknown in his own township. It would be too easy for him to simply refuse aid and attendance because of some technical error; but the Legislature intended for this Act to have a more substantial effect. Parkview Hosp. v. County Dept. Pub. Welf., supra. To say, as appellant suggests, that it should be relieved of responsibility simply because strict compliance with the formal application requirements was not followed is to disregard the manifest purpose of the Act. (§ 52-176, supra.)
It follows from this discussion that the decision of the trial court was based on sufficient evidence and was not contrary to law.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. Costs taxed against appellant.
Pfaff, C.J. and Sharp, J., concur; White, J., dissents with opinion.

. This Act was amended in 1967, but at all times pertinent hereto was as stated above.

. The record showed that Hutchens had no equity in either his house or his car.