Court Opinion

ID: 9725365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:43:22.211882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:14.498454
License: Public Domain

*261Liacos, C.J.
(concurring). While in agreement with the result reached in this case, I write separately out of a concern that the court’s citation of opinions from other jurisdictions suggests an overly restrictive view of the availability of relief from judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). It is my opinion that the court’s decision finds ample support in the precedent of this court and needs no other reinforcement.
The court denies the plaintiff relief from judgment under subsections (2) and (3) of Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b) (identical to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 [b]) because the plaintiff failed to advance his newly-discovered evidence and fraud claims within one year of the decree of divorce of the parties. Relief under subsection (6) of rule 60 (b) is denied because “the reason relied on [by the plaintiff] can be construed to fit within one of the specific categories enumerated in rule 60 (b) (l)-(5). Bromfield v. Commonwealth, 400 Mass. 254, 256 (1987).” Ante at 257. At this point, the court need go no further in discussing rule 60 (b) as it applies to the facts of this case.
Nonetheless, the court chooses to elaborate by referring to paternity decisions in which other courts “have routinely applied their procedural or statutory equivalents to rule 60 (b) in denying relief in similar situations.” Ante at 257. Most of these decisions involve situations in which the one-year limitation on relief from judgment under rule 60 (b) (l)-(3) would apply to bar the plaintiff’s claim, were it brought in Massachusetts. See, e.g., Rucinski v. Rucinski, 172 Mich. App. 20 (1988). However, two of the cases cited, as described by the court, inappropriately suggest an overly restrictive view of rule 60 (b) which is not supported by past decisions of this court. A more thorough examination of these cases, however, reveals that such a restrictive view is not warranted.
In Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 255 Ga. 715 (1986), the Georgia Supreme Court denied a petition for relief from judgment brought by the plaintiff ex-husband, who presented newly-discovered blood test evidence to deny paternity two *262years after agreeing to paternity in a divorce settlement agreement. On the basis of its characterization of the plaintiffs motion as an “extraordinary motion for new trial,” the court stated that “the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment are inapposite.” Id. at 717. The plaintiffs extraordinary motion for new trial was denied because he failed to meet his burden to prove that “want of due diligence was not the reason that the [new] evidence was not acquired sooner.” Id. Therefore, the Roddenberry decision implies that the plaintiffs motion might have been granted had he been able to prove that no lack of due diligence existed.
The court describes Marriage of Yakubec, 154 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1987), as a case in which the plaintiff was denied relief from judgment because he “ ‘showed a complete lack of diligence in pursuing his rights’ in waiting several months before filing petition to vacate divorce judgment after ‘learning’ of his ex-wife’s ‘fraud’ regarding paternity of the child” (emphasis added). Ante at 258 n.6, quoting Marriage of Yakubec, supra at 543-544. At first blush, the suggestion that a delay of “several months” in bringing a petition warrants a finding of a lack of due diligence appears somewhat Draconian. However, the Illinois court’s decision in this case becomes more reasonable when we learn that the plaintiffs petition was not brought until approximately fifteen years after the parties were divorced, and that the plaintiff did not act to deny paternity until he was served with a petition for rule to show cause to enforce child support and maintenance obligations over $31,000 in arrears. Id. at 543. In these circumstances, a finding of a lack of due diligence appears justified.
Aside from the citation of the cases described above, I find myself in agreement with the court’s opinion. Accordingly, I concur.