Court Opinion

ID: 9583567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:54.26549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:57.162243
License: Public Domain

HEDRICK, Chief Judge.
To prevent a manifest injustice, we, ex mero motu, suspend the rules of appellate procedure to review all aspects of this case and reverse portions of the judgment and remand the case for a new trial on plaintiffs claim for breach of express warranty. Rule 2, N.C. Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Defendants first contend that the evidence in this record is insufficient to support a finding that defendant Pioneer Coach made any warranty to plaintiff. We disagree. The evidence in the record tends to show that Pioneer Coach advertised the sale of the automobile in a magazine under its name and logo and that at the time of purchase the automobile displayed Pioneer Coach license tags and was titled in the company’s name. Plaintiff *350negotiated the sale with Thomas LeBeau on Pioneer Coach’s lot. Pioneer Coach submitted a credit application for plaintiff to a finance company which routinely handled credit applications from Pioneer Coach. After loan approval, the finance company issued a check jointly payable to plaintiff, his wife and Pioneer Coach. This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Pioneer Coach owned the automobile and that Thomas LeBeau acted as its agent in negotiating the sale. See, Vickery v. Construction Co., 47 N.C. App. 98, 266 S.E. 2d 711, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 106 (1980). Therefore, any warranties made by Thomas LeBeau during negotiations are attributable to Pioneer Coach. Hunsucker v. Corbitt, 187 N.C. 496, 122 S.E. 378 (1924).
In our opinion, the evidence in the record is not sufficient to raise an inference that defendants breached an implied warranty. Under G.S. 25-2-315, there is a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose “[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. . . .” The seller’s warranty, however, is not his personal guarantee regarding the continuous and future operation of the goods which he has sold. Pake v. Byrd, 55 N.C. App. 551, 286 S.E. 2d 588 (1982). To establish a breach of warranty, there must be evidence sufficient to show that a defect existed at the time of the sale. Id., Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 188 S.E. 2d 653 (1972).
In the present case, we need not decide whether defendants made an implied warranty that the automobile was fit for the particular purpose of long distance driving, because no evidence was introduced to show that the breakdown was caused by any defect that existed at the time of the sale. In the absence of such evidence, the issue of breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose should not have been submitted to the jury.
We cannot tell whether the jury found that defendants breached an express warranty because of the form of issues five and six as submitted to the jury. There is, however, in our opinion, evidence to support a finding by the jury that defendants breached an express warranty. Plaintiff testified at trial that Thomas LeBeau told him that certain engine parts had been replaced within six months. The testimony of Bernard Smith, an *351employee of Pioneer Coach, that he had replaced these parts approximately “a year and a half’ before the sale was uncon-troverted. This evidence is clearly sufficient for the jury to find that defendant Thomas LeBeau made and breached an express warranty regarding the recency of the repairs. Evidence that plaintiff examined the engine prior to the purchase does not discharge defendants from the express warranty because plaintiffs testimony indicates that he relied on defendants’ assurance rather than on his own judgment as to the condition of the engine and the defect was one which he could not have readily discovered. Pake v. Byrd, 55 N.C. App. 551, 286 S.E. 2d 588 (1982).
While there is evidence in this record of a breach of an express warranty regarding the time when engine parts were replaced, there is no evidence to support the award of damages for breach of express warranty in the amount of $2,200.00. There is no evidence as to the value of the vehicle as warranted (with parts replaced within six months) compared to its actual value at the time of acceptance (with parts replaced within one and a half years). G.S. 25-2-714(2); Williams v. Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 269 S.E. 2d 184, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 406, 273 S.E. 2d 451 (1980). Thus, there must be a new trial with respect to plaintiffs claim for express warranty.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding and concluding that defendants violated G.S. 75-1.1, and in awarding plaintiff treble damages and attorney’s fees. G.S. 75-l.Ka) provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” G.S. 75-16 further provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If any person shall be injured ... by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person . . . so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
Pursuant to G.S. 75-16.1, upon a finding that the party charged with a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 willfully engaged in the act or practice and that there was an unwarranted refusal to resolve *352the matter, the trial court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees.
A practice is unfair and violates the statute “when it offends established public policy and when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” Lee v. Payton, 67 N.C. App. 480, 482, 313 S.E. 2d 247, 249 (1984) (citation omitted). An act is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive, but proof of actual deception is not required. Id. As an essential element of a cause of action under G.S. 75-16, plaintiff must prove not only that defendants violated G.S. 75-1.1, but also that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ misrepresentations. Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E. 2d 271 (1980).
While there is evidence in this record that defendants misrepresented that the engine parts had been replaced within six months prior to the sale of the automobile, there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered an “injury” because of such representation. The record contains no evidence which tends to show that the automobile broke down because the parts had not been replaced within six months. Thus, the court erred in trebling any damages and awarding attorney’s fees.
For the reasons stated, the judgment ordering that defendants, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $2,200.00, trebling such damages against defendant Pioneer Coach, and awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,340.00, must be reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court for a new trial on plaintiffs claim for breach of express warranty.
Reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial on the issue of breach of express warranty.
Judge Johnson concurs.
Judge Phillips dissents.