Court Opinion

ID: 9882726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:08.37599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:24.992606
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Chandler, 2023-Ohio-3476.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 112292
                 v.                                  :

PORSHE CHANDLER,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 28, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-671895-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Kenan Mack, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Buckeye Law Office and Craig W. Smotzer, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, Porshe Chandler (“Chandler”), appeals her

convictions for aggravated robbery, theft, and grand theft, challenging the
sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

               In June 2022, Chandler was charged with a nine-count indictment.

Counts 1 and 2 charged her with aggravated robbery. Counts 3-5 charged her with

robbery. Counts 6 and 7 charged her with felonious assault. Counts 8 and 9 charged

her with grand theft. Each of Counts 1-9 carried a one-year firearm specification.

The charges stem from an incident during which Chandler challenged the victim,

Briana Tate (“Tate”), to a fist fight.

               The matter proceeded to a jury trial, at which the following evidence

was adduced.

               Tate testified that she and Chandler dated on-and-off for two years.

Tate described their relationship as tumultuous. Tate testified that Chandler and

her were in an argument prior to June 6, 2022, which is the date of their physical

altercation. Chandler messaged Tate at 3:00 a.m. that morning, challenging her to

a fight outside her house. Tate did not accept the challenge, responding to Chandler

that she was in bed and would not be leaving her house until she had to go to work

at 6:00 a.m. that morning. Around this time, Chandler began messaging her with a

different Instagram account to come outside. Tate testified that Chandler was using

a different account because she had blocked Chandler’s account.

               Tate left her house that morning with her two children intending to

drop them off at day care. Tate testified that Chandler was waiting for her outside
with a group of people in a car. Chandler was driving her car around Tate and her

children as they walked to Tate’s car challenging Tate to fight. Chandler stated to

Tate, “‘I want to fight. I want to fight. I want to fight.’” (Tr. 238.) Tate brandished

her handgun to keep Chandler at a distance as she loaded her children in the car.

Chandler left the scene once Tate and her children were in her vehicle. This

interaction was captured on video.

               Tate received a phone call from her neighbor while she dropped her

children at daycare, which prompted her to return home. Tate returned home to

find that the windows of her home were broken. Tate called Chandler and asked

“what is the problem.” (Tr. 245.) Chandler responded, “‘I just want to fight you. I

just want to fight you. You pulled out a gun. I want to fight you, what is so wrong

with fighting?’” (Tr. 245.) Tate was so frustrated with the situation that she agreed

to meet Chandler on West 28th Street in Cleveland to fight. Tate drove there in her

white Ford Fusion.1

               When Tate arrived, Chandler was already standing in the middle of

the street. Tate walked up to Chandler and said, “I don’t even want to fight you.”

(Tr. 248.) Chandler, who was standing in a fighting stance, threw a punch at Tate

and the two began to fight. The two fought with each other for about a minute before

Chandler’s friends and family broke up the fight by pulling Tate and Chandler apart.

Chandler’s cousin recorded the fight with her cell phone.

       1 Selethia O’Neal testified that she owns the Ford Fusion and she only gave Tate

permission to use it.
               Once Chandler and Tate were separated, Chandler walked over to

Tate’s car and “jumped right into [Tate’s] car.” (Tr. 251.) Tate left her keys in the

car and the doors were unlocked. Chandler locked the doors after she entered Tate’s

car. Tate, knowing that “[e]verything [she] owned was in the car when [Chandler]

got in the car, including the car itself,” got onto the hood of the car in an attempt to

stop Chandler. (Tr. 259.) Tate had her car keys, house keys, gun, phone, wallet, and

purse in the car. Tate told Chandler, “‘[G]et out of my car, you’re doing too much.

Get out of my car.’” (Tr. 259.) Chandler “look[ed] [her] dead in [her] face and said,

‘this is what you wanted, a b***h to show you that she loved you. This is what you

wanted me to do to show you that I love you and care about you.’” (Tr. 259.)

               Chandler then accelerated the car with Tate still on the hood.

Chandler continued to drive in a loop with Tate on the hood of the car. Tate testified

that she never gave Chandler permission to take any of her personal belongings or

drive her car. While she sitting on the windshield, Tate turned around in an attempt

to stop Chandler and punched the window. Tate testified that she “tried [t]o break

the * * * top window * * * everything to me was in the car, I couldn’t get into the car,

she was just driving.” (Tr. 268.) Tate further testified that her arm was stuck

between the door as she was on the hood of the car trying to get Chandler out of the

car. Tate thought her arm was going to break. Cell phone recordings of the fight

and Chandler driving around with Tate on the hood of her vehicle were played for

the jury.
               Eventually, Tate was thrown from the hood of her vehicle. She

remembered “going down” and waking up with her “head busted open, mouth

busted open.” (Tr. 273.) Tate then remembered getting up and walking trying to

find someone. She testified that “[b]lood was pouring on top of dirt, rocks, little

holes in [her] arms.” (Tr. 272-273.) Tate testified about the extent of her injuries,

stating that she had a big gash on her head that required stitches, her lip was split

open, her tooth was chipped, she had road rash on her legs, arms, and stomach, and

she had holes in both knees.

               Tate flagged down Cleveland Police Officer Zachary Banks (“Officer

Banks”) who was on patrol in the area that day. Officer Banks testified that Tate was

acting frantically and bleeding from the head.         She appeared confused and

disoriented. Officer Banks, who was a paramedic prior to becoming a police officer,

believed that Tate sustained a head injury and called EMS for transport to

MetroHealth Medical Center. Officer Banks’s body camera system was active during

the encounter, and the video of his encounter with Tate was played for the jury.

Officer Banks also testified that Tate’s car was found in a parking lot near West 28th.

               Chandler testified in her own defense. She testified that she had been

angry at Tate about some videos circulating on social media, which caused their

argument that prompted their fight. Chandler’s testimony about the facts leading

up to the incident on West 28th was consistent with Tate’s testimony. The testimony

diverged after Chandler and Tate were pulled apart from each other.
               Chandler testified that Tate came running at her with a knife in her

hand, so she ran towards Tate’s vehicle and got in. Chandler testified that she fought

with Tate as she entered the vehicle. Chandler further testified that Tate cut her with

the knife during this fight, but she never sought medical treatment. According to

Chandler, Tate jumped onto the hood of the car and was trying to punch her through

the window. Chandler testified that she eventually stopped the car. She exited from

the passenger side of Tate’s vehicle and ran toward the back of the housing projects.

Chandler further testified that Tate was not thrown off of the car. Rather, Tate got

off the hood of the vehicle and chased after Chandler. The two them started fighting

by a stairwell. Chandler stated that Tate was “trying to push [her] down the stairs,

but [she] beat [Tate] to the punch and [Tate] went down the stairs” head first. (Tr.

479.) Immediately after the incident, Chandler left for Columbus to be with her

fiancé.

               On cross-examination, the state replayed some of the video of the

incident. Chandler could not identify any footage of Tate holding a knife. Nor was

there footage of the fight by the stairwell as Chandler described. While Chandler

stated that the cut was deep enough to cause nerve damage, she testified that there

was no blood in the car because her arm only bled into her jacket. The state also

played for the jury an audio message that Chandler sent to Tate three days after the

incident in which Chandler states, “‘You should have just laid there and died.” (Tr.

532.) When asked what she meant by that, Chandler responded, “Because when I

last see [Tate], she was going down the stairs.”
              Following the conclusion of trial, the jury found Chandler guilty of

aggravated robbery as charged in Count 1, robbery as charged in Counts 3-5, and

grand theft as charged in Count 9. The jury found her not guilty of all remaining

counts and each of the accompanying one-year firearm specifications.              At

sentencing, all counts merged and plaintiff-appellee, the state of Ohio, elected to

proceed with sentencing on Count 1 (aggravated robbery) with Counts 3, 4, 5, and 9

merging into Count 1. The court then sentenced Chandler to a minimum of four

years and a maximum of 6 years in prison.

              Chandler now appeals, raising the following two assignments of error

for review:

      ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: [Chandler’s] convictions are
      unsupported by sufficient evidence.

      ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO: [Chandler’s] convictions are
      against the manifest weight of the evidence

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

              In the first assignment of error, Chandler argues that the state failed

to present sufficient evidence of the elements of the charged offenses. Specifically,

Chandler claims the state failed to establish that she intended to commit a theft

offense, and, as a result, her convictions must be overturned.

              The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function when
reviewing sufficiency is to determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

               With a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review whether

the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted

at trial supported the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91682,

2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997).      A sufficiency of the evidence argument is not a factual

determination, but a question of law. Thompkins at 386.

               In State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d

1161, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned:

       But it is worth remembering what is not part of the court’s role when
       conducting a sufficiency review. It falls to the trier of fact to ‘“resolve
       conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
       reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” [State v.
       McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶
       24], quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
       L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, an appellate court’s role is limited. It does
       not ask whether the evidence should be believed or assess the
       evidence’s “credibility or effect in inducing belief.” State v. Richardson,
       150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13, citing
       Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. Instead, it asks
       whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed, supports the
       conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

Id. at ¶ 16.
               Here, Chandler was convicted of aggravated robbery under R.C.

2911.01(A)(1), robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(1)-(3), and grand theft under R.C.

2913.02(A)(1). R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) provides:

      No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense * * * or in fleeing
      immediately after the attempt or offense, shall * * *:

      Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the
      offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate
      that the offender possesses it, or use it[.]

R.C. 2911.02(A)(1)-(3) provides:

      No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing
      immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:

      (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under
      the offender’s control;

      (2) Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on
      another;

      (3) Use or threaten the immediate use of force against another.

Lastly, R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the

owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the

property or services * * * [w]ithout the consent of the owner or person authorized to

give consent[.]”

               In support of her argument that the state failed to establish that she

intended to commit a theft offense, Chandler attacks Tate’s credibility. Chandler

testified to a different version of events than Tate and stated that she entered Tate’s

car to escape an ongoing attack, not to steal the car. Chandler’s credibility attack,
however, is an issue of manifest weight, not sufficiency. When the evidence is

examined under a sufficiency review, it clearly supports the convictions.

              Tate testified that when Chandler first entered her car, she locked the

door. Tate stated:

      First thing in my head, I’m like my car keys, my house keys, my gun,
      my phone, my money, like my wallet, my purse was in the car.
      Everything I owned was in the car when she got in the car, including
      the car itself. So I got on the car to stop the car and I told [Chandler],
      “Get out of my car, you’re doing too much. Get out of my car.”

(Tr. 259.) Chandler replied, “‘This is what you wanted, a b***h to show you that she

loved you. This is what you wanted me to do to show you that I love you and care

about you.’” (Tr. 259.) Tate and Selethia O’Neal both testified that they never gave

Chandler permission to drive the Ford Fusion. Additionally, Chandler admitted

through her own testimony that she got into Tate’s car and drove away while fighting

with Tate, who was on the hood of the car. Officer Banks testified that the car was

subsequently found in a parking lot near West 28th. This evidence, when viewed in

a light most favorable to the state, establishes that Chandler committed the

underlying theft offense needed to support the convictions.

              Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled

      B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In the second assignment of error, Chandler argues that the jury lost

its way because it did not properly evaluate the evidence presented at trial.

              When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court,

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’ State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reversal on the basis that a verdict

is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “‘only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin at 175.

               As this court has previously stated:

      The criminal manifest weight-of-the-evidence standard addresses the
      evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382,
      2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio
      St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest weight-of-the-
      evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the following question:
      whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?
      Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient evidence to
      support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the manifest weight
      of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95,
      2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

      When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
      that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
      appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact
      finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id., quoting
      Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87.

               Chandler argues that Tate’s testimony was not convincing and Tate

could have been motivated to obscure the fact that she may have turned into the

aggressor after the fight initially broke up. While Chandler attacks Tate’s credibility,

Chandler failed to introduce other evidence to corroborate her claims. Rather, the
evidence reveals that Chandler instigated the fight, got into Tate’s car, locked it, and

drove away with Tate’s belongings in the car, all while fighting with Tate, who was

on the car hood. After reviewing the entire record, weighing the inferences, and

examining the credibility of witnesses, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way

and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Chandler’s convictions are not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

               Thus, the second assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               Tate’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.        The evidence presented at trial

demonstrates that Chandler instigated the fight, got into Tate’s car, locked it, and

proceeded to flee the scene with Tate’s belongings in the car, all while fighting with

Tate as she was sitting on the hood of her car.

               Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.             The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded

to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR