Court Opinion

ID: 9567069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:48:03.612723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:32.203304
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, the trial court was correct and should be affirmed by this Court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A number of earlier decisions of this Court apply a rule concerning mutually exclusive convictions. That rule has no application to a verdict of acquittal. It is meaningful only with referap.ce to examining multiple convictions to determine if they are mutually exclusive, that is, if one necessarily excludes the other. This point is made particularly well in Thomas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 586, 587 (1) (405 SE2d 512) (rev’d on other grounds, 261 Ga. 854 (413 SE2d 196)) via a quote from 18 ALR3d 259, 283: “ ‘The general rule dispensing with the necessity for consistency as between the acquittals and guilty verdicts under a multicount indictment or information is hot ordinarily applied where the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are mutually exclusive of each other.’ ” All of the cases relied upon by the majority involve only mutually exclusive multiple convictions. Thomas held convictions for armed robbery of a car and for theft by receiving the same car were mutually exclusive. Harrison v. State, 213 Ga. App. 366, 368 (3) (444 SE2d 613) involves whether convictions for misdemeanor theft by taking and a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (possession of a gun or knife during the commission of certain felonies) were mutually exclusive. Harrison in turn is predicated on Jefferson v. State, 196 Ga. App. 770, 771 (2) (397 SE2d 129) which approves a jury charge which authorizes a conviction for' possession of a firearm during a (felony) crime only if a felony conviction is returned for the underlying robbery, but not if the robbery charge results in a misdemeanor conviction.
When one begins to examine the question of whether a conviction is consistent 'with an acquittal, one is within the area governed by the decision in Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) (341 SE2d 216) which abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. In my view, Milam is controlling here and I would hold that the verdicts in the case sub judice, as in Cleveland v. State, 212 Ga. App. 361 (441 SE2d 820), are merely inconsistent since there are no mutually exclusive convic*438tions.
Decided November 1, 1996.
Martin H. Eaves, for appellant.
Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, Kathy L. Register, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Beasley and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.