Court Opinion

ID: 9385227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 15:03:04.273844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.927607
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2023-0415
                            ____________

                         LOUIS B. GASKIN,
                            Appellant,

                                  vs.

                        STATE OF FLORIDA,
                             Appellee.

                             ____________

                          No. SC2023-0440
                            ____________

                         LOUIS B. GASKIN,
                            Petitioner,

                                  vs.

                       RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,
                           Respondent.

                            April 6, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Louis B. Gaskin, a prisoner under sentences of death and an

active death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his third

successive motion for postconviction relief. He also petitions this
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, moves for a stay of execution,

and requests oral argument. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,

§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. As we explain below, we affirm the

summary denial of Gaskin’s postconviction motion, and we deny his

habeas petition, motion for stay of execution, and request for oral

argument.

                           BACKGROUND

     The following facts were set forth in this Court’s opinion on

direct appeal:

           The convictions arise from events occurring on the
     night of December 20, 1989, when Gaskin drove from
     Bunnell to Palm Coast and spotted a light in the house of
     the victims, Robert and Georgette Sturmfels. Gaskin
     parked his car in the woods and, with a loaded gun,
     approached the house. Through a window he saw the
     Sturmfels[es] sitting in their den. After circling the house
     a number of times, Gaskin shot Mr. Sturmfels twice
     through the window. As Mrs. Sturmfels rose to leave the
     room, Gaskin shot her and then shot Mr. Sturmfels a
     third time. Mrs. Sturmfels crawled into the hallway, and
     Gaskin pursued her around the house until he saw her
     through the door and shot her again. Gaskin then pulled
     out a screen, broke the window, and entered the home.
     He fired one more bullet into each of the Sturmfels[es]’
     heads and covered the bodies with blankets. Gaskin
     then went through the house taking lamps, video
     cassette recorders, some cash, and jewelry.
           Gaskin then proceeded to the home of Joseph and
     Mary Rector, whom he again spied through a window
     sitting in their den. While Gaskin cut their phone lines,

                                 -2-
     the Rectors went to bed and turned out the lights. In an
     effort to roust Mr. Rector, Gaskin threw a log and some
     rocks at the house. When Mr. Rector rose to investigate,
     Gaskin shot him from outside the house. The Rectors
     managed to get to their car and drive to the hospital in
     spite of additional shots fired at their car as they sped
     away. Gaskin then burglarized the house.
            Gaskin’s involvement in the shootings was brought
     to the attention of the authorities by Alfonso Golden,
     cousin of Gaskin’s girlfriend. The night of the murders,
     Gaskin had appeared at Golden’s home and asked to
     leave some “Christmas presents.” Gaskin told Golden
     that he had “jacked” the presents and left the victims
     “stiff.” Golden learned of the robberies and murders after
     watching the news and called the authorities to report
     what he knew. The property that had been left with
     Golden was subsequently identified as belonging to the
     Sturmfels[es].
            Gaskin was arrested on December 30, and a search
     of Gaskin’s home produced more of the stolen items.
     After signing a rights-waiver form, Gaskin confessed to
     the crimes and directed the authorities to further
     evidence of the crime in a nearby canal.

Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 1991).

     After a jury trial, Gaskin was convicted of nine of the ten

counts for which he was indicted. As to Mr. and Mrs. Sturmfels,

Gaskin was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated

murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of armed robbery,

and one count of burglary. Id. As to Mr. and Mrs. Rector, Gaskin

was convicted of one count for the attempted first-degree murder of

Joseph Rector, one count of armed robbery, and one count of

                                -3-
burglary. Id. The jury acquitted Gaskin of the attempted first-

degree murder of Mary Rector. Id.

       During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence in the

form of a ballistics demonstration, “firing various types of bullets

from the rifle used in the murders to demonstrate that the

ammunition Gaskin chose to use in the murders supports a finding

that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Id. at 918-19.

The defense presented penalty phase testimony of “Janet Morris,

Gaskin’s cousin, who testified that she and Gaskin were raised by

their great-grandparents, who were very strict, and that Gaskin

never gave anyone any trouble during his formative years.” Id. at

919.

       The jury recommended that Gaskin be sentenced to death for

the Sturmfelses’ murders by votes of eight to four. Id. For

additional consideration in sentencing, the trial court also received

“a certified judgment and sentence for an unrelated burglary, a

copy of Gaskin’s statement, and a copy of a psychiatric report.” Id.

       The trial court found three aggravating factors as to both

murders: (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated,

without any pretense of moral or legal justification, (2) Gaskin was

                                  -4-
previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony

involving the use or threat of violence (prior violent felony based on

the contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses and the other

felony convictions relating to the Sturmfelses and the Rectors), and

(3) the murders were committed while Gaskin was engaged in the

commission of a robbery or burglary. Id. A fourth aggravating

factor, that the murder was especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or

cruel, was found as to victim Georgette Sturmfels. Id.

     The trial court found as mitigating circumstances that (1) the

murders were committed while Gaskin was under extreme mental

or emotional disturbance, and (2) Gaskin suffered a deprived

childhood. Id.

     Gaskin challenged his convictions and sentences on direct

appeal. Because he was improperly convicted of and sentenced for

four counts of first-degree murder—premeditated and felony

murder as to each of the Sturmfelses—this Court affirmed two of

the first-degree murder convictions and sentences, remanded to the

trial court to vacate the other two, and affirmed the remaining

convictions and sentences. Id. at 922. Gaskin then successfully

petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, which, due

                                 -5-
to the unconstitutionally vague jury instruction on the “especially

wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, remanded the

case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida,

505 U.S. 1079 (1992). See Gaskin v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1216 (1992).

Upon remand, this Court held that Gaskin did not preserve the

issue but that even if it had been preserved, the error was harmless

as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels given the other aggravating

factors in the case. See Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla.

1993).

     Since that time, Gaskin has unsuccessfully challenged his

convictions and sentences in state and federal court. See Gaskin v.

State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999) (initial postconviction appeal

affirming the denial of relief on certain claims and remanding for an

evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims);

Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2002) (initial postconviction

appeal upon remand, affirming the denial of relief on Gaskin’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d

399 (Fla. 2017) (opinion affirming the denial of first successive

postconviction motion); Gaskin v. State, 237 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 2018)

(opinion affirming the denial of second successive postconviction

                                 -6-
motion); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL 57987 (Fla. Jan. 6, 2020) (order

dismissing pro se all writs petition); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL

2467112 (Fla. May 13, 2020) (order dismissing pro se all writs

petition); Gaskin v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 494 F.3d 997 (11th Cir.

2007) (opinion affirming the denial of federal habeas petition).

     Governor Ron DeSantis signed Gaskin’s death warrant on

March 13, 2023. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.851, Gaskin filed a third successive motion for postconviction

relief and argued the following claims: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences

violate his constitutional rights because his jury was never

presented with mitigation that would have resulted in

recommendations of life imprisonment; (2) Gaskin’s constitutional

rights were violated because the jury was not unanimous in finding

applicable aggravating circumstances and in recommending death,

and this Court’s decision on the partial retroactivity of Hurst 1 was

arbitrary and capricious; (3) the delay between Gaskin’s clemency

proceedings and the denial of clemency without any updated

proceedings violated Gaskin’s constitutional rights; and (4) it is

     1. Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).

                                 -7-
unconstitutional to execute Gaskin after almost thirty-three years of

living on death row in near-total solitary confinement.

     After holding a Huff 2 hearing, the circuit court summarily

denied relief on all four claims. Gaskin now appeals that denial and

raises three issues. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas

corpus, moves for a stay of execution, and requests oral argument.

                             ANALYSIS

  Gaskin’s Third Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief

     Gaskin argues that the circuit court erred in its summary

denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief, and

he raises three issues in this appeal: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences

and execution are unconstitutional because the mitigating

circumstances in his case outweigh the aggravating factors,

exempting him from the class of persons subject to the death

penalty; (2) Gaskin’s death sentences and execution are

unconstitutional because his jury failed to make specific findings

regarding the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances,

and the jury did not unanimously recommend that he be sentenced

     2. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

                                 -8-
to death (Hurst claim); and (3) executing Gaskin after more than

thirty years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

                         Standard of Review

     Gaskin’s successive postconviction claims are governed by

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In particular, a motion

for postconviction relief must set forth the type of relief the

defendant seeks, see rule 3.851(e)(1)(C), and it must include “a

detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an

evidentiary hearing is sought.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(D).

Whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires

a factual determination, the movant is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing. However, rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a

successive postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing

“[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that

the movant is entitled to no relief.”

     Because the circuit court denied Gaskin’s third successive

rule 3.851 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, this

Court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the

movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not

                                  -9-
refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record

conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Pardo v.

State, 108 So. 3d 558, 561 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Gore v. State, 91 So.

3d 769, 774 (Fla. 2012)).

                     Mitigating Circumstances

     Gaskin argues that his death sentences are unconstitutional

because the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating

factors in his case. In particular, he contends that the jury was not

presented with mitigating evidence that had it been presented,

would have resulted in sentences of life imprisonment for the

murders. Gaskin asserts that defense counsel failed to investigate

and present mental health mitigation in the form of expert and lay

testimony that would have more fully informed the jury of various

mental health challenges. Additionally, he contends that the

defense mental health expert, who was hired by defense counsel but

never called to testify at trial, was not provided the information

necessary to develop a full mental health profile. During the death

warrant proceedings in the circuit court, Gaskin sought an

evidentiary hearing to present mental health expert testimony, but

postconviction counsel acknowledged at the Huff hearing that the

                                - 10 -
expert’s testimony would not have been offered as newly discovered

evidence.

     The circuit court did not err in summarily denying this claim

because it is procedurally barred. Gaskin raised this claim in his

initial motion for postconviction relief, and it was fully considered

by the circuit court and this Court. Although the circuit court

summarily denied the claim at first, this Court remanded Gaskin’s

case for an evidentiary hearing to consider whether defense counsel

was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present certain

mitigating evidence, (2) failing to provide information to defense

experts, and (3) failing to call certain witnesses to testify on his

behalf.3 Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied

Gaskin’s initial motion for postconviction relief, and this Court

affirmed.

     Even if Gaskin’s claim was not procedurally barred, he still

would not be entitled to relief. In denying initial postconviction

relief, the circuit court concluded that defense counsel made

      3. An additional claim, regarding counsel’s status as a deputy
sheriff, was also granted an evidentiary hearing, but Gaskin did not
later appeal the circuit court’s denial of that claim.

                                 - 11 -
reasonable strategic decisions not to present certain evidence and

the testimony of certain witnesses because that would have resulted

in the jury hearing highly negative information about Gaskin. This

Court explained:

            In the order denying relief, the trial court addressed
     Gaskin’s allegation that trial counsel should have called
     mental health experts to testify at the penalty phase
     about mental mitigation. The trial court noted that
     Dr. Krop, one of the defense mental health experts at
     trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he expressly
     told counsel before trial that he would not be of much
     help to the defense because he would have to testify
     about Gaskin’s extensive history of past criminal
     conduct, sexual deviancy, and lack of remorse. The trial
     court also stated that trial counsel testified at the hearing
     that he made a strategic decision not to present mental
     health experts precisely because Gaskin’s background
     contained many negatives (including Dr. Krop’s proposed
     testimony).

Gaskin, 822 So. 2d at 1247-48. The trial court found that counsel

conducted a reasonable investigation before trial and “made a

reasonable, strategic decision not to present this information to the

jury and not to present Dr. Krop’s findings to the judge.” Id. at

1248.

     As to Gaskin’s argument that counsel should have presented

the testimony of additional lay witnesses, the trial court observed

                                - 12 -
that the testimony of such witnesses, offered at the evidentiary

hearing, produced the following:

     [T]here was testimony regarding the Defendant sexually
     forcing himself on a six-year-old boy, the Defendant’s
     consensual, incestuous relationships and sexual
     deviancy, including bestiality, the Defendant’s violent
     attempt to sexually force himself on his former girlfriend,
     the Defendant’s admission that he loved to kill and that
     he killed cats and snakes, and his history of stealing at
     school and from his great-grandparents.

Id. The trial court concluded that counsel reasonably decided not

to present testimony relating to Gaskin’s violent past and criminal

conduct because the jury may have considered it additional

aggravation. Id.

     This Court affirmed, concluding that counsel’s strategy

regarding mitigating evidence was reasonable: “It is apparent from

the record that the witnesses who Gaskin alleges should have

testified on his behalf were subject to being cross-examined about

disturbing information about Gaskin, which would have defeated

trial counsel’s strategy.” Id. at 1249.

     Gaskin concedes in his initial brief that this issue is

procedurally barred but argues that constitutional infirmities afflict

his case and are sufficient to overcome a procedural bar. However,

                                 - 13 -
we reject this argument and conclude that Gaskin’s constitutional

arguments are insufficient to overcome the procedural bar. The

circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this

claim, which was previously raised and considered, and is

conclusively refuted by the record.

                                Hurst

     Gaskin next argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to

Hurst v. Florida and section 921.141, Florida Statutes. He

maintains that he was unconstitutionally denied a jury

determination, proof of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable

doubt, unanimity as to aggravating factors, and unanimous jury

recommendations of death. He argues that this amounts to a

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and his right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

     This issue is procedurally barred, as it was raised and

addressed in Gaskin’s first and second successive motions for

postconviction relief. Gaskin first sought postconviction relief

following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v.

Florida, and again following this Court’s decision in Hurst v. State,

202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Appealing the circuit court’s denial of

                                - 14 -
both successive motions, this Court affirmed on the grounds that

Hurst is not retroactive to Gaskin’s sentences, which became final

before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided. See

Gaskin, 218 So. 3d at 401 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 471

(2017); Gaskin, 237 So. 3d at 929 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.

Ct. 327 (2018).

     This Court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments relating

to the retroactivity of Hurst. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d

216, 217 (Fla. 2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla.

2017); Bogle v. State, 213 So. 3d 833, 855 (Fla. 2017); Asay v.

State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016).

     Moreover, in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 504-05 (Fla.

2020), this Court held that unanimous jury recommendations of

death are not required. Rather, what is required is the finding of

one or more aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

at 502-03 (“Under longstanding Florida law, there is only one

eligibility finding required: the existence of one or more statutory

aggravating circumstances.”). The jury found Gaskin guilty of the

contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses, in addition to

multiple other felonies including armed robbery and burglary.

                                 - 15 -
These unanimous findings by the jury establish the existence of two

aggravating factors: prior violent felony and murder committed

while engaged in the commission of a robbery or burglary. Thus,

these findings satisfy the requirements in Poole.

     Additionally, Gaskin’s equal protection argument is a further

attempt to challenge this Court’s consistent holding on Hurst

retroactivity. This argument is also procedurally barred and has

previously been rejected by this Court. See Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at

113. The circuit court’s summary denial of Gaskin’s Hurst claim

was proper.

                  Length of Time on Death Row

     Gaskin also argues that executing him after he has spent more

than three decades on death row, and most of that time in what he

deems solitary confinement, constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment.

     However, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that

a lengthy stay on death row amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment. Gaskin concedes that recently, this Court observed

that “[n]o federal or state court has accepted the argument that a

prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual

                                - 16 -
punishment.” Dillbeck v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S32 (Fla. Feb. 16,

2023) (quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).

Gaskin has argued no grounds for departing from this precedent.

     We also reject Gaskin’s arguments regarding what he

characterizes as solitary confinement on death row. In fact, noting

the similarities to the recent Dillbeck death warrant case, Gaskin

further concedes: “Mr. Gaskin recognizes that his conditions were

similar, if not identical, to Mr. Dillbeck’s, up to and including the

length of their stays on death row, however, he asserted this claim

to exhaust for further review.” The circuit court properly summarily

denied relief.

                            Habeas Claim

     In his habeas petition, Gaskin argues that he is entitled to

relief because during the penalty phase, the jury was

unconstitutionally instructed that it may consider whether “the

crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was especially

wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.” The trial court found the

existence of the aggravating factor as to Georgette Sturmfels but

rejected it as to Robert Sturmfels.

                                 - 17 -
      After the United States Supreme Court remanded Gaskin’s

case for reconsideration in light of Espinosa, this Court concluded

that the issue was not preserved. This Court further concluded

that even if the issue had been preserved, any error in finding the

aggravating factor as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels was

harmless.

      Presently, Gaskin challenges this Court’s conclusion that he

did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue and contends

that he did argue the unconstitutionality of the aggravating factor

in a pretrial motion. He also argues that this Court’s conclusion

that he did not object at trial cannot be conclusively determined

because relevant discussions may be missing from the record.

Gaskin maintains that the jury improperly considered the

unconstitutionally vague instruction as to both murders, and that

he is entitled to relief.

      Habeas corpus is not to be used to litigate or relitigate issues

which could have been, should have been, or were previously

raised. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla.

1992).

                                 - 18 -
     Where this Court has previously ruled that the Espinosa error

as to Georgette Sturmfels was harmless, see Gaskin, 615 So. 2d at

680, we do not revisit that ruling.

     However, we recognize that this Court did not address the

Espinosa error as to Robert Sturmfels, even though the following

argument was made by appellate counsel in the initial brief on

remand from the United States Supreme Court:

           The fact that the trial court did not find HAC
     present in one of the murders does not render the error
     harmless as to that sentence. Even though the trial
     court did not find it, the jury returned a death
     recommendation (eight to four on both murders) after
     hearing the unconstitutional Espinosa instruction.
     Sochor, supra. Likewise, after hearing the trial court’s
     “blanket” statement that he would impose the death
     penalty even if this aggravating circumstance were
     stricken, means absolutely nothing.

We must presume that this Court rejected this argument. However,

because the jury was given the unconstitutional instruction as to

both murders, we will explain the harmless error analysis implicit

in this Court’s earlier decision.

     Although the jury was erroneously instructed on the

“especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, the

error is also harmless as to Robert Sturmfels. Affirmance of

                                    - 19 -
Gaskin’s sentence is required if “there is no reasonable possibility

that the error contributed to the” death sentence. State v. DiGuilio,

491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).

     We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the

error contributed to the death sentence for the murder of Robert

Sturmfels in light of the substantial aggravation in this case: the

extremely weighty (1) prior violent felony, and (2) cold, calculated,

and premeditated factors, see Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 215

(Fla. 2020), and (3) the murder occurred during the commission of a

robbery or burglary factor.

     As such, we deny Gaskin’s habeas petition.

                   Motion for Stay of Execution

     Gaskin argues that more time is needed to resolve the complex

issues he raises in his appeal and habeas petition. However, we

disagree. Because Gaskin has failed to raise substantial grounds

upon which relief might be granted, a stay is not appropriate here.

See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 952 (Fla. 1998) (denying

motion for stay of execution where movant failed to establish

“substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted”).

                                 - 20 -
                           CONCLUSION

     For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Gaskin’s third

successive motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a stay of

execution. We also deny his request for oral argument.

     No rehearing will be entertained by this Court, and the

mandate shall issue immediately.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,
    Terence R. Perkins, Judge
    Case No. 181990CF000001AXXXXX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Tracy M. Henry
and Cortney L. Hackett, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

     for Appellant/Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Doris
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
Florida, and Patrick Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, Florida,

     for Appellee/Respondent

                                - 21 -