Court Opinion

ID: 9961201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 13:00:51.743624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:26.910402
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

IMAN A. AL SALIHI,                              DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        SF-1221-21-0397-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: April 17, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Dennis P. Hickman , Monterey, California, for the appellant.

      Andrea Campanile , Esquire, APO, Armed Forces Pacific, for the agency.

      Karen L. Judkins and Laura H. Heller , Monterey, California, for the
        agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
which denied corrective action in her individual right of action (IRA) appeal.
For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                 2

VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Western Regional
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                   BACKGROUND
         The appellant received a term appointment with a not-to-exceed date of
March 20, 2019, as an Assistant Professor at the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California. Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 30 at 258.         Her term appointment was twice extended through
March 20, 2021.       Id. at 243, 245.     During her tenure with the agency, the
appellant worked in the Middle East School 1 (MES) 2 , in several departments,
under several different Department Chairs.          Id. at 243, 245, 258; Hearing
Recording (HR) (testimony of the appellant).
         Between June 2020 and February 2021, the appellant exchanged a series of
emails with the Commandant of DLIFLC regarding, among other things,
the recording and certifying of teaching hours in the Consolidated Teacher
Activities Reports (CTAR) within MES. 3 IAF, Tab 31 at 11-25. Specifically,
the appellant contended that MES’s process for submitting CTARs was not
uniform across its departments and that certain department chairs, including her
former chair, did not allow teachers to verify their teaching hours on the CTARs,
resulting in discrepancies in recorded teaching hours.         Id.   The appellant
explained that she personally had not received credit for all of the hours
she taught between 2018-2019, estimating that she did not receive credit for over
150 hours.       Id. at 16-17.    She also identified several individuals for the
Commandant to contact that could verify her claims, including at least one person
who had also not received credit for all teaching hours. Id. at 17. The appellant
further explained that the lack of transparency in CTAR processing, specifically
in Department D, made it easy for individuals to abuse leave and falsify time and
2
    The agency refers to the Middle East School 1 as UMA.
3
  CTARs record an instructor’s teaching hours and are used for time and attendance
purposes. HR (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                     3

attendance records, and she provided specific examples of individuals she
believed her former Department Chair was allowing to abuse leave and/or falsify
hours. Id. at 18-19.
      The Commandant took the appellant’s concerns seriously, explaining that
“[j]ust the perception that teachers are not getting credit for tracking hours is
concerning and worthy of fixing.” Id. at 16. Later, he informed the appellant that
he wanted to “fix this problem,” but he had to make sure that leadership
understood the problem was within MES and asked if she had any objection to
him “call[ing] out MES specifically regarding CTAR[s] problems.”            Id. at 20.
The appellant confirmed that the Commandant may proceed with “call[ing] out”
MES regarding the CTAR issue but requested that he not disclose her name for
fear of retaliation.      Id. at 21.     Thereafter, the Commandant forwarded the
appellant an email chain between himself, the Provost, and the Dean, with the
Chief of Staff copied, in which the Dean acknowledged concerns regarding
CTARs from “some faculty” and advised that MES had created CTAR procedures
that were “to be uniformly followed.” Id. at 21-23. Approximately one month
before the Dean’s email response to the Provost and Commandant, the appellant
had a meeting with the Dean, in which she discussed her concerns regarding the
CTAR issues, specifically within Department D. Id. at 18.
      On March 1, 2021, the agency issued the appellant a memorandum
informing    her   that     her   term     appointment   had   not   been    renewed,
and her employment would end on March 20, 2021.            IAF, Tab 19 at 14.      On
March 16, 2021, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) alleging that, in reprisal for disclosing the CTAR issues, the
agency issued her a letter of reprimand in February 2021, declined to extend her
term appointment beyond March 20, 2021, and investigated her regarding a
timecard irregularity on March 11, 2021. 4 IAF, Tab 8 at 9-21. On May 25, 2021,
4
  OSC appears to have characterized the investigation as a hostile work environment
claim, IAF, Tab 1 at 24; however, the appellant, either before OSC or before the Board,
did not so characterize her claim, IAF, Tab 8 at 6, 9-21.
                                                                                       4

OSC closed its file in the matter and informed the appellant of her right to seek
corrective action from the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 24-25.
      Thereafter, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board asserting the
same claims she raised before OSC. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge issued
a jurisdictional order in which she apprised the appellant of the applicable law
and burden of proof requirements for an IRA appeal and ordered her to submit
evidence   and   argument     establishing    Board   jurisdiction.     IAF,   Tab    3.
The appellant responded to the order, and the administrative judge found that the
appellant exhausted her administrative remedies and made a nonfrivolous
allegation that her CTAR disclosures were protected disclosures that were a
contributing factor in the letter of reprimand, the non-extension of her term
appointment, and the investigation into an irregularity in one of her time cards.
IAF, Tab 14.
      After holding a hearing on the merits of the appellant’s claims,
the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s request
for corrective action.       IAF, Tab 47, Initial Decision (ID).          Specifically,
the administrative   judge    found   that,   while   the   appellant   exhausted    her
administrative remedies before OSC, she failed to prove that her disclosures
regarding the CTAR issues were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) because
they constituted policy disagreements, were speculative, and were merely
personal complaints. ID at 14-19. Therefore, the administrative judge found that
the appellant failed to prove that she had a reasonable belief that her disclosures
evidenced any of the sort of wrongdoing contemplated by section 2302(b)(8)(A).
ID at 16, 20.
                                                                                       5

         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. 5
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. She argues that the administrative judge
erred in finding that her disclosures were not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)
(8) and asserts that her appointment was not renewed because she was the source
of reports regarding the Dean and Department Chairs’ failure to properly handle
CTARs, which resulted in inaccuracies and discrepancies in recorded hours. 6
Id. at 5-15. The agency has filed a response to the petition for review. PFR File,
Tab 3.

                  DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
         Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, at the merits stage
of the appeal, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that she made a
protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), or engaged in an activity
protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and that such
disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in an agency’s personnel action.
Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 13. If the appellant meets that
burden, the agency is given an opportunity to prove by clear and convincing

5
   The appellant filed her petition for review in California, which is 3 hours behind
Eastern time. All pleadings filed via e-Appeal Online are time stamped with Eastern
Time. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m)(1) (2022). Although the appellant’s Board appeal was
time stamped as being filed on April 1, 2022, at 1:57 a.m., Eastern Time, it was actually
filed on March 31, 2022, at 10:57 p.m., Pacific Time. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Thus, the
appellant’s petition for review, which was due on March 31, 2022, was timely filed.
6
  The appellant also includes within her petition for review a rebuttal of the agency’s
report of investigation, which was provided in the agency’s prehearing submissions,
regarding allegations that three Department Chairs harassed and/or created a toxic or
unprofessional work environment for the appellant. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-29, IAF,
Tab 30 at 43-206. Specifically, the appellant challenges the agency’s findings and
recommendations that no adverse action be taken against the three Department Chairs
and that adverse action be taken against the appellant for engaging in harassment
toward students, instructors, and supervisors. IAF, Tab 30 at 71. As the accuracy of
the agency’s report of investigation has no impact as to whether the appellant made a
protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in a covered personnel action, we do
not address it.
                                                                                     6

evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action absent the protected
disclosure or activity. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2).

The appellant established that her CTAR allegations were protected disclosures
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
       The administrative judge found that the appellant’s CTAR disclosures were
not protected because she failed to establish that she held a reasonable belief that
they evidenced the type of wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
ID at 14-19.   Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
emails did not disclose any known leave abuse or falsification, but instead
contained allegations that were based on “purely surmise and speculation.” ID
at 16-17. She also found that CTAR reports were not subject to any law, rule, or
regulation and that the appellant’s CTAR allegations, at most, constituted a policy
disagreement. ID at 17. Furthermore, to the extent that the appellant disclosed
that   she   had   not   been   credited   with   the   correct   number   of   hours,
the administrative judge determined that this was a personal complaint or
grievance, which did not constitute whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 18.
       A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes
evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Smith, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 14.
A reasonable belief exists if a disinterested observer with knowledge of the
essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant could
reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence one of the
categories of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A). Smith, 2022 MSPB 4,
¶ 14. The appellant need not prove that the matter disclosed actually established
one of the types of wrongdoing listed under section 2302(b)(8)(A); rather,
she must only show that the matter disclosed was one which a reasonable person
in her position would believe evidenced any of the situations specified in section
2302(b)(8)(A). Smith, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 14.
                                                                                    7

      The administrative judge’s characterization of the appellant’s disclosures
as pure speculation, personal complaints, and/or policy disagreements was
incorrect. ID at 14-19. The appellant alleged that CTAR reports, which recorded
teaching hours and overall attendance, were not being uniformly verified by the
teachers in MES, thus resulting in discrepancies between recorded hours and
actual hours worked. IAF, Tab 31 at 11-25. The appellant’s claims amount to
allegations of time and attendance fraud, which is a clear violation of law, rule, or
regulation. Grubb v. Department of the Interior, 96 M.S.P.R. 361, ¶ 12 (2004).
      Regarding whether the appellant held a reasonable belief that her
disclosures evidence a violation of law, rule, or regulation, the appellant
explained that her allegations were based on her own personal experience,
the experience of others, and her observation of her colleagues’ schedules and
behaviors. IAF, Tab 31 at 11-25; HR (testimony of the appellant). The Board
has found that an appellant holds a reasonable belief where her disclosures are
based on personal experiences and observations, especially when corroborated by
other evidence. See Taylor v. Department of the Navy, 101 M.S.P.R. 478, ¶ 7
(2006) (finding that the appellant who, based on his own observations, reported
that his supervisor was misusing his Government-owned vehicle and Government
credit card, made a protected disclosure); Grubb, 96 M.S.P.R. 361, ¶ 12 (finding
that the appellant’s specific allegations of time and attendance abuse based, in
part, on her personal observations, established she held a reasonable belief).
      Here, the appellant’s personal experience and observations were validated
by the reaction of the agency officials, including the Commandant and the Dean,
both of whom seemed to acknowledge that there was a CTAR issue which needed
addressing. IAF, Tab 31 at 20, 23. While the agency’s reaction does not prove
that the agency actually violated a law, rule, or regulation, these reactions
seemingly confirm that a problem existed, thus giving credibility to the
reasonableness of the appellant’s belief. See Laberge v. Department of the Navy,
91 M.S.P.R. 585, ¶ 14 (2002), aff'd, 66 F. App’x 204 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining
                                                                                       8

that the agency’s reaction, which included not disputing the reasonableness of the
appellant’s belief and citing testimony that the Commander agreed with the
appellant’s recommendations and delayed work as a result, helped establish the
reasonableness of the appellant’s beliefs).          Accordingly, we find that the
appellant held a reasonable belief that her CTAR disclosures constituted a
violation of law, rule, or regulation, and thus, they are protected under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8)(A).

The appellant established that her protected disclosures were a contributing factor
in the agency’s decision not to extend her term appointment.
      The administrative judge did not make any findings as to whether the
appellant met the contributing factor standard.         ID at 19-20.      Nevertheless,
the record is fully developed on this issue and, as set forth below,
clearly establishes that the appellant met the contributing factor standard with
respect to the non-extension of her appointment. 7
      To prove a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action,
the appellant need only demonstrate that the fact of, or the content of,
the disclosure was one of the factors that tended to affect the personnel action in
any way. Covington v. Department of the Interior , 2023 MSPB 5, ¶ 43. The
knowledge/timing test allows an appellant to demonstrate that the disclosure was
a contributing factor in the personnel action through circumstantial evidence,
such as evidence that the official who took the personnel action knew of the
disclosure and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that
a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor
in the personnel action. Id.
7
  Herein, we only make a contributing factor finding regarding the non-extension of the
appellant’s term appointment. As we set forth below, we direct the administrative judge
to make a finding as to whether the appellant met the contributing factor standard
regarding the February 2021 letter of reprimand. Regarding the investigation into time
keeping irregularities, the Board has found that, as here, where an investigation does
not result in a disciplinary or adverse action, or the threat of such action, it does not
constitute a covered personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Spivey v. Department of
Justice, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 9.
                                                                                   9

        The appellant has established that the agency officials involved in the
non-extension of her term appointment had knowledge of her disclosures. First,
while the Provost and the Chief of Staff made the ultimate decision not to extend
the appellant’s term appointment, they did so based on the recommendation of the
Dean.    HR (testimony of the Provost, testimony of the Dean).        The Provost,
Chief of Staff, and Dean were all aware that someone had raised CTAR concerns,
given that the Commandant “call[ed] out” MES about the CTARs and sent several
emails asking about MES’s handling of CTARs. IAF, Tab 31 at 20-25. Even
crediting the Commandant’s testimony that he did not disclose the name of the
appellant when he spoke to the Provost, Chief of Staff, and the Dean about her
CTAR concerns, the Dean was aware that the appellant had these concerns
because the appellant had disclosed them during a July 2020 meeting between the
two of them. Id. at 18; HR (testimony of the Commandant). Thus, the agency
officials involved in the decision not to extend the appellant’s appointment had
either actual or constructive knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures, and she has
satisfied the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test.
        Additionally, we find that the appellant has established the timing prong of
the knowledge/timing test.     The Board has found that personnel actions taken
within approximately 1 to 2 years of the protected disclosure satisfy the
knowledge/timing test. Peterson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R.
113, ¶ 16 (2011). Here, the appellant made her disclosures starting in June 2020,
and 9 months later the agency notified her that her term appointment was not
being extended.     IAF, Tab 19 at 14, Tab 31 at 11.       Therefore, the appellant
satisfies the knowledge/timing test, and she established that her protected
disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision not to extend her
appointment.
                                                                                10

Because there are outstanding issues of material fact which necessitate credibility
determinations, we remand this matter to the regional office for further
adjudication as set forth in this order.
      As the appellant has made her prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal,
corrective action must be ordered unless the agency can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel actions absent her
whistleblowing. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). After reviewing the record, we believe
there are material disputes of fact that require credibility determinations and the
administrative judge is in the best position to make these determinations.
See Agoranos v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 32 (2013) (finding
that the administrative judge was in the best position to make necessary
credibility findings and remanding the appeal to further analyze the clear and
convincing standard). Thus, we find that a remand is necessary.
      The administrative judge who oversaw the proceedings below and issued
the initial decision is no longer employed by the Board. When there is conflicting
testimony on a material issue and a new administrative judge will decide the case,
the testimony should be heard again to permit credibility determinations on
witness demeanor.     Lin v. Department of the Air Force, 2023 MSPB 2, ¶ 24.
Therefore, the newly assigned administrative judge should accept evidence and
argument, and hold a supplemental hearing, on the following. The administrative
judge should analyze the Carr factors and make a finding as to whether the
agency has met the clear and convincing burden regarding the non-extension of
the appellant’s term appointment. The administrative judge should also make a
finding as to whether the appellant established that her protected disclosures were
a contributing factor in the February 2021 letter of reprimand. To the extent that
the administrative judge finds that the appellant has met the contributing factor
standard regarding the February 2021 letter of reprimand, she shall then make a
finding regarding whether the agency met its clear and convincing standard with
respect to this personnel action.
                                                                                 11

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Western
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.