Court Opinion

ID: 9945824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:04:08.377122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:13.744887
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                       Alexander R. Irwin,                  FILED
                                        Appellant-Defendant             Feb 28 2024, 8:35 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                    v.                       and Tax Court

                                         State of Indiana,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                          February 28, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-501
                            Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court
                          The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge
                                      Trial Court Cause No.
                                      89D02-2106-F2-000011

                               Opinion by Judge Felix
                      Judge Bailey concurs with separate opinion.
                   Judge May concurs in result with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024          Page 1 of 23
      Felix, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Alexander R. Irwin was convicted of dealing in cocaine, dealing in a narcotic

      drug, and dealing in methamphetamine. Irwin presents two issues on appeal,

      which we restate as follows:

          1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted security
             camera footage into evidence; and
          2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to give
             Irwin’s proffered jury instruction.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In the spring of 2021, Detective Chase Patton of the Wayne County Drug Task

      Force received three anonymous tips about Irwin dealing drugs out of his

      apartment in Richmond, Indiana. As a result, Detective Patton began

      conducting surveillance on the apartment.

[4]   At the time, Kacey Lawrence was dating Irwin and living with him at the

      apartment. On May 17, 2021, Detective Patton observed Lawrence leave the

      apartment and get into a vehicle with an individual he recognized from past

      drug investigations. Since Detective Patton was conducting surveillance in an

      unmarked vehicle, he called a patrol officer to follow Lawrence in the vehicle,

      and that officer conducted a traffic stop. The officer found Lawrence with a bag

      of methamphetamine, and Lawrence told law enforcement that Irwin was

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024     Page 2 of 23
      dealing drugs out of the apartment. The officer arrested Lawrence for

      possession of methamphetamine.

[5]   During the three weeks Detective Patton conducted surveillance on the

      apartment, he observed an “uncommon amount of visitors” coming in and out

      of the back entrance. On two occasions after Lawrence’s arrest, Detective

      Patton asked patrol officers to follow the vehicles of visitors who he observed

      leave the apartment. In both instances, officers conducted a traffic stop and

      found the passengers to be in possession of methamphetamine. Thereafter,

      Detective Patton applied for a search warrant on the apartment to search for

      and seize illegal drugs.

[6]   On June 2, 2021, law enforcement executed the search warrant. The officers

      found Irwin on the back porch of the apartment with $4,500 in cash and three

      bags of narcotics on his person. Law enforcement found Lawrence inside the

      apartment and began questioning her. Lawrence told police where firearms and

      narcotics could be located. In the apartment, officers found narcotics,

      methamphetamine, firearms, syringes, baggies, and a digital scale. Irwin was

      arrested and charged with dealing in cocaine, a Level 2 Felony;1 dealing in a

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(e)(1).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024       Page 3 of 23
      narcotic drug, a Level 2 Felony; 2 and dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2

      Felony3.

[7]   During Irwin’s arrest, Lieutenant Chad Porfidio met with Irwin’s landlord to

      retrieve security camera footage from the property. The building had a security

      camera facing the back entrance to the apartment, and the landlord kept the

      video recordings saved on a computer. Lieutenant Porfidio downloaded

      footage from the camera for the 30 days leading up to Irwin’s arrest onto a hard

      drive and collected it for evidence. Detective Patton reviewed the entire video,

      highlighted the relevant excerpts of footage, and took notes on those excerpts.

[8]   At trial, the State offered the relevant excerpts of security camera footage (the

      “Security Footage”) into evidence. Initially, the State attempted to authenticate

      the Security Footage through Detective Patton’s testimony about reviewing the

      video in its entirety. Irwin objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.

      Later, the State presented testimony from Lieutenant Porfidio to authenticate

      the Security Footage. Lieutenant Porfidio testified about his familiarity with

      security camera systems like the one used at the apartment, and he testified that

      the Security Footage had not been altered. Irwin renewed his objection, and

      the trial court admitted the Security Footage over his objection.

      2
          Id.
      3
          Id. at § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024       Page 4 of 23
[9]    After the State rested its case, Irwin planned to call Lawrence to the witness

       stand to testify. At the time, the parties and the trial court were aware that, if

       called to testify, Lawrence intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege

       against self-incrimination, so the court excused the jury from the courtroom

       prior to Lawrence’s testimony. During direct examination, Lawrence

       responded to each question asked of her by invoking her Fifth Amendment

       privilege to remain silent.

[10]   Following Lawerence’s testimony, the jury returned to the courtroom and Irwin

       rested his case. Prior to closing arguments, Irwin requested the trial court to

       instruct the jury that Lawrence took the witness stand and invoked her Fifth

       Amendment privilege. The court denied the proposed instruction. The jury

       found Irwin guilty as charged, and Irwin now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       1. The Security Footage Was Properly Authenticated and Admissible

[11]   Irwin argues that the trial court erred in admitting the Security Footage without

       proper authentication. We review the admission of evidence for abuse of

       discretion. McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561 (Ind. 2018). “We will

       reverse only if the trial court’s ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of

       the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d

       1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied).

[12]   The State offered the Security Footage under the silent-witness theory. Videos

       and photographs are often offered as demonstrative evidence, but, under the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024         Page 5 of 23
       silent-witness theory, they are offered as substantive evidence. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d

       at 1282. “Evidence offered for substantive purposes acts as a silent-witness[ ] as

       to what activity is being depicted whereas evidence offered for demonstrative

       purposes is merely an aid[] that assist[s] in a human witness’s testimony.”

       Kirby v. State, 217 N.E.3d 575, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Knapp, 9

       N.E.3d at 1282) (internal quotation marks omitted). When videos or

       photographs are admitted as substantive evidence, “the foundational

       requirements . . . are vastly different from the foundational requirements for

       demonstrative evidence.” Smith v. State, 491 N.E.2d 193, 196 (Ind. 1986). The

       foundation for videos or photographs as demonstrative evidence requires

       testimony that the evidence “accurately depict[s] the scene or occurrence as it

       appeared at the time in question.” Id. The foundation for the admission of

       videos or photographs as substantive evidence requires “a strong showing of

       authenticity and competency, including proof that the evidence was not

       altered.” McCallister 91 N.E.3d at 561–62 (citing Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1282).

[13]   To properly authenticate a piece of evidence, “the proponent must produce

       evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent

       claims it is.” Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a). “In order to authenticate videos or

       photographs using the silent-witness theory, there must be evidence describing

       the process or system that produced the videos or photographs and showing

       that the process or system produced an accurate result.” McFall v. State, 71

       N.E.3d 383, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Evid. R. 901(b)(9)). Surveillance

       video footage may be properly authenticated and admissible under the silent-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024      Page 6 of 23
       witness theory when the proponent presents “testimony from someone with

       knowledge on the security system that produced the video or image, on the

       integrity of the system’s process, and on whether [the] video or image was

       altered.” Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[14]   First, we note that, at trial, Irwin did not object to the admission of the Security

       Footage on the grounds raised on appeal. Irwin objected to the admission of

       the Security Footage arguing that the business records exception applied, and

       Lieutenant Porfidio had not viewed the footage; he did not mention the silent-

       witness theory or its foundational requirements in his objection. “[A] defendant

       may not object to the admission of evidence on one basis at trial and then raise

       a different basis on appeal.” Ward v. State, 203 N.E.3d 524, 531 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (citing Bradfield v. State, 192 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)). Thus,

       this evidentiary argument is waived. Id.

[15]   Waiver notwithstanding, the State provided sufficient evidence to authenticate

       the Security Footage. Lieutenant Porfidio testified about his familiarity with

       the type of security system used at the apartment and his conversation with the

       landlord. The testimony provided that: (1) the security system was located in a

       locked room; (2) the landlord was the only person with access to that room; (3)

       the landlord did not alter the footage; (4) Lieutenant Porfidio downloaded the

       Security system on the day of the arrest; and (5) there was no way the Security

       Footage could have been manipulated when Lieutenant Porfidio downloaded it

       from the security system. The State provided the foundation to demonstrate the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024        Page 7 of 23
       Security Footage was authentic and unaltered. We hold that the trial court did

       not abuse its discretion by admitting the Security Footage.

       2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Rejecting Irwin’s Proposed
       Jury Instruction

[16]   Irwin argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right4 to a

       complete defense when it rejected his proffered jury instruction. We review the

       trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion, Miller v.

       State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022), including “the court’s refusal to give a

       tendered instruction,” Elmer Buchata Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939,

       944 (Ind. 2001).

[17]   We review alleged federal constitutional errors de novo. Zanders v. State, 118

       N.E.3d 736, 740 (Ind. 2019). “[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal

       defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” In re

       Crisis Connection, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Kubsch v. State,

       784 N.E.2d 905, 923–24 (Ind. 2003)). However, this right does not guarantee a

       defendant every defense imaginable. See Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1132

       (Ind. 2001). In presenting a defense, “[t]he accused, as is required of the State,

       must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to

       4
        Irwin alleges a violation of the Indiana Constitution. Appellant’s Br. at 14. His argument, however, lacks
       any citations or cogent reasoning related to his state constitutional claim in violation of Indiana Appellate
       Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We therefore consider this argument waived and decline to address it. See Davidson v. State,
       211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024                              Page 8 of 23
       assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”

       Id. (quoting Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind.1998)).

[18]   The trial court rejected Irwin’s proposed jury instruction concerning Lawrence

       invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege on the witness stand. Our Supreme

       Court has recognized that “defendants do not have a right to force a witness to

       invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury.” Stephenson v. State, 864

       N.E.2d 1022, 1047 (Ind. 2007) (citing United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d

       916, 931 (10th Cir. 2002)). Additionally, once that privilege is invoked outside

       the presence of the jury,

               (1) Neither the judge nor counsel may comment upon the claim
                   of a privilege . . . . No inference may be drawn from the
                   claim of a privilege.

               (2) In jury cases, the judge, to the extent practicable, must
                   conduct proceedings so as to allow parties and witnesses to
                   claim privilege without the jury’s knowledge.

       Evid. R. 501(d)(1)–(2).

[19]   Irwin asked the court to instruct the jury that “[w]hen questioned, Kacey

       Lawrence invoked her right to [sic] self-incrimination and refused to answer

       any questions posed to her.” Tr. Vol. III at 117. Irwin intended for the jury to

       infer Lawrence’s culpability in furtherance of his theory that the drugs in the

       apartment belonged to Lawrence. The purpose of this instruction conflicts with

       the protection afforded to privilege in our rules of evidence. See Evid. R.

       501(d)(1).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024       Page 9 of 23
[20]   Irwin relies on our decision in Martin v. State, 179 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2021) for his claim that “the trial court was not permitted to deny” his

       requested jury instruction, Appellant’s Br. at 14, but this argument is

       unpersuasive. In Martin, we suggested the types of circumstances that could

       permit a trial court judge to decide to allow a witness to be called to the stand

       even though that witness was expected to invoke the right to remain silent. 179

       N.E.3d at 1068. We said that “[s]uch a witness might be an occurrence witness

       who is needed to provide foundational facts as to the circumstances

       surrounding an event. The witness might make an identification or offer some

       corroboration of a fact in issue.” Id. Here, neither of these circumstances were

       argued to the trial court judge nor on appeal. The types of circumstances where

       such a witness could be called to the stand even though the witness is expected

       to remain silent are not applicable in this case. However, even if they were,

       since “[t]he trial court has broad discretion as to how to instruct the jury,”

       McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Kane v. State, 976

       N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind.2012)), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in denying Irwin’s proffered jury instruction.

[21]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., concurs with separate opinion.

       May, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Jessica L. Richert
       Richmond, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024        Page 10 of 23
Josiah J. Swinney
Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Courtney L. Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501| February 28, 2024   Page 11 of 23
       Bailey, Judge, concurring.

[22]   I, like my colleague, concur in full with the majority’s analysis of the jury

       instruction issue. As to the admission of the Security Footage, I agree with the

       majority’s conclusion that Irwin waived the particular issue presented on appeal

       for failure to raise that issue in the trial court. “A party may not object on one

       ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal.” White v. State, 772

       N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002). That alone would be sufficient to resolve this

       issue yet because my colleagues have chosen to address the evidentiary issue on

       its merits, I feel compelled to write separately.

[23]   I also agree with the majority that, notwithstanding Irwin’s procedural default,

       the State provided an adequate foundation for the admission of the Security

       Footage. It may have been desirable to call as a witness the landlord (who was

       more familiar than the officer with the security system) and question the

       landlord as to the recording system’s historical performance. But the omission

       of this particular witness is not fatal. “Absolute proof” of the authenticity of an

       item of evidence is not required. Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 962 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. When the sponsoring witness adequately

       described the recording system and showed that it produced an accurate result,

       it became a matter of weight as opposed to admissibility of the evidence.

[24]   Additionally, I disagree with the suggestion that the reasoning of Kirby v. State,

       217 N.E.3d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) amounts to a watering down of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024     Page 12 of 23
       authentication threshold. Upon review of the record, the Kirby Court found it

       to be “unlikely that the video was, or could have been, altered during this time

       period,” which was the “time elapsed between the recording of the arson and

       the detectives’ viewing of the video.” Id. at 588. And in Kirby, as in this case,

       there was substantial evidence of guilt independent of the video:

               [T]he video’s depiction of the arson was corroborated by other
               evidence: Lindsay’s 911 call placed Kirby and Brandon at the
               house, and Lindsay described Kirby as shirtless and wearing
               shorts. On the same day as the fire, law enforcement recovered
               jean shorts and white shoes on which gasoline was identified
               from Brandon’s house. Finally, at the suppression hearing,
               Amber testified that Kirby often came over to Brandon’s house
               and that it would not be unusual to find Kirby’s clothing there,
               and Detective Jones testified that Brandon and Kirby shared
               clothing and that the white shoes belonged to Kirby.

       Id. at 588.

[25]   I do not disagree that, in this technological era, potential for digital

       manipulation exists, but it does not exist in this case. I whole heartedly agree

       that the proponent of evidence must comply with Evidence Rule 901(a):

               To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an
               item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient
               to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it
               is.

       I believe that here the State produced sufficient testimony to authenticate the

       Security Footage and to convince the trial judge, as gatekeeper, that the

       evidence should be admitted. Once the proponent met its burden to support
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024       Page 13 of 23
       admissibility, the opponent had the opportunity to challenge both the

       foundational support for admission and introduce any evidence of

       manipulation. But any such challenge was unsuccessful in this case. And at

       that point it becomes a matter of weight rather than admissibility of the

       evidence.

[26]   Certainly, the jury, once given a particular exhibit, can factor into its evaluation

       the common knowledge that digital manipulation is possible; but of course, if

       the exhibit was found by the gatekeeper to be altered or manipulated, it would

       be totally excluded from their view. As in Kirby, here the State adequately

       dispelled concerns of distortion or manipulation. Ultimately, the quality of the

       evidence was adequate to establish a foundation. The jury was then free to

       weigh the evidence. I am not persuaded that the trial court, in its role as

       gatekeeper, abused its discretion.

[27]   For these reasons, I concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024      Page 14 of 23
       May, Judge, concurring in result.

[28]   I concur in full with the majority’s analysis of the jury instruction issue, but I

       must concur in result only with the majority’s handling of the admission of the

       Security Footage. My reading of the transcript leads me to conclude Irwin did

       not waive his silent-witness theory objection to the admission of the Security

       Footage during Lieutenant Porfidio’s testimony, and I do not believe the

       Security Footage could have been sufficiently authenticated by Lieutenant

       Porfidio to be admissible under the silent-witness theory. Nevertheless, I

       believe admission of the Security Footage constituted harmless error, and I

       therefore concur with the majority’s affirmation of Irwin’s convictions.

       1. Waiver
[29]   First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Irwin waived his argument

       regarding admission of the Security Footage by advancing a different argument

       on appeal than he made before the trial court. At Irwin’s trial, the State initially

       offered the Security Footage into evidence while questioning Detective Patton.

       Irwin stated: “Judge, I’m going to object. These are essentially business records

       of the landlord and he’s not [here] to authenticate that. There’s no business

       records of [sic] affidavit, so on that ground I’m going to object.” (Tr. Vol. III at

       33.) The State responded to Irwin’s objection by asserting: “I believe that the

       silent witness theory of admissibility is applicable to this particular video.” (Id.)

       The trial court then ruled:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024       Page 15 of 23
               Well, I would have to agree with – I understand the State’s
               position, but even under the silent witness theory, we have to
               have some authentication and here the camera is under the
               control of the landlord presumably. He’s not here to testify.
               We’ve got [sic] no testimony that it was presented unaltered from
               the landlord to Officer Patton’s boss and then to him. Without
               that sort of authentication, I’m not going to permit it. Also,
               when you say that Officer Patton observed, he did observe
               periodically, but I don’t recall him testifying that he observed
               everything that is in the video.

       (Id. at 33-34.) While the majority asserts that Irwin “did not mention the silent-

       witness theory or its foundational requirements in his objection,” (Maj. op. at ¶

       14), the trial court specifically addressed the Security Footage’s admissibility

       under that theory in initially sustaining Irwin’s objection during Detective

       Patton’s testimony.

[30]   When the State offered the Security Footage for a second time while

       questioning Lieutenant Porfidio, Irwin objected on the basis that Lieutenant

       Porfidio had not personally reviewed the exhibit to ensure that it contained the

       same video footage the landlord showed Lieutenant Porfidio “and also on the

       ground previously regarding the business records affidavit. He may have gone

       through the system, but in terms of actually maintaining the records, this

       officer was not in charge of doing that. That was the landlord.” (Tr. Vol. III

       at 67) (emphasis added). With this objection, Irwin put the trial court on notice

       that he was objecting to the Lieutenant’s ability to authenticate the video in a

       manner that would render it admissible as a silent witness. Moreover, the trial

       court understood that Irwin had made such an objection because the court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024     Page 16 of 23
       stated: “This time I think there’s been a sufficient authentication to warrant the

       admissibility of Exhibit Seventy-seven (77). The objection’s overruled.” (Id. at

       68.) Because Irwin raised the objection to the admission of the Security

       Footage at trial that he presents on appeal, I disagree with the majority’s

       conclusion that Irwin’s argument is waived. See, e.g., Bush v. State, 929 N.E.2d

       897, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (defendant’s objection at trial was sufficient to

       preserve argument for appeal).

       2. Security Footage’s Admissibility
[31]   I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the State provided sufficient

       evidence to authenticate the Security Footage.” (Maj. op. at ¶ 15.) While my

       colleague notes there is no suggestion the Security Footage was manipulated,

       (J. Bailey concurring at ¶ 3), it is still the burden of the party proffering the

       evidence to prove its authenticity, not the burden of the opposing party to

       disprove authenticity. See Ind. Evid. R. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of

       authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce

       evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent

       claims it is.”).

[32]   The majority concludes Lieutenant Porfidio’s testimony provided an adequate

       foundation for admission of the Security Footage because:

               (1) the security system was located in a locked room; (2) the
               landlord was the only person with access to that room; (3) the
               landlord did not alter the footage; (4) Lieutenant Porfidio
               downloaded the Security [sic] system on the day of the arrest;
               and (5) there was no way the Security Footage could have been
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024        Page 17 of 23
               manipulated when Lieutenant Porfidio downloaded it from the
               security system.

       (Maj. op. at ¶ 15.) However, the majority’s analysis ignores that while

       Lieutenant Porfidio reviewed the Security Footage when the landlord showed it

       to him, the landlord was the one responsible for operating and maintaining the

       security system. Lieutenant Porfidio did not testify regarding when the security

       system activated, whether the time-and-date stamp on the footage was accurate,

       or whether the system had proven itself to be reliable in the past. Presumably,

       the landlord exercised control over the recording process in the operation of his

       business and could attest to the accuracy of the footage, but the State did not

       call the landlord as a witness. Without testimony from a sponsoring witness

       who possessed such knowledge, I would hold the State failed to lay an adequate

       foundation for admission of the Security Footage and, therefore, the trial court

       abused its discretion by admitting it. See, e.g., Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236,

       246-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (photographs of surveillance footage were

       inadmissible when the sponsoring witness did not have knowledge of the

       security system, did not exercise control over the recording process, and could

       not attest to the accuracy of the footage).

[33]   While not noted in the majority opinion, I recognize that in Kirby v. State

       another panel of this court held that testimony from two investigating officers

       satisfied the authentication standard required for the admission under the silent-

       witness theory. 217 N.E.3d 575, 589 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In that

       case, Kenneth Kirby set his sister’s house on fire. Id. at 579. After the fire

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024       Page 18 of 23
       department extinguished the fire, Kirby’s sister showed police footage recorded

       by her backyard security camera. Id. at 580. Kirby’s sister told the police that

       she would give them a copy of the footage, but she did not follow through on

       her promise and stopped cooperating with law enforcement. Id. The police

       were never able to obtain a copy of the backyard security camera footage. Id.

[34]   At trial, the State sought to introduce testimony from the two investigating

       officers regarding their observations of the video, and Kirby objected pursuant

       to the silent-witness theory on the ground that the testifying officers did not lay

       a proper foundation for the authenticity of the video. Id. at 581. The trial court

       overruled Kirby’s objection and admitted the officers’ testimony. Id. The panel

       affirmed the trial court’s admission of the officers’ testimony and concluded the

       State laid an adequate foundation for the officers to testify regarding their

       observations from the video. Id. at 588. The panel noted the officers were able

       to testify regarding the placement of the cameras in the backyard and only a

       short period of time passed between when the arson occurred and the officer’s

       review of the surveillance footage. Id. Kirby pointed out that one of the officers

       “admitted that he did not know ‘the way the DVR operates’” and the second

       officer testified that he observed the timestamp on the video was inaccurate. Id.

       In rejecting Kirby’s first concern, the panel noted that “home security cameras

       are widely accessible to the public and are not technically complicated to the

       average user. A lack of understanding regarding the inner mechanics of a home

       security DVR system does not necessarily render the footage stored therein

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024      Page 19 of 23
       unreliable.” Id. With respect to Kirby’s second concern, the panel wrote that

       “it is not unheard of for a security camera’s internal clock to be inaccurate.” Id.

[35]   I view Kirby as watering down the authentication threshold for admitting

       evidence under the silent-witness theory, and I think that is unwise. A

       technology’s increasing prevalence and relative lack of complexity does not

       diminish our need to ensure that evidence derived from that technology is

       accurate. An authenticating witness must be familiar enough with a security

       system’s operation to assure us of its accuracy even if the person cannot give a

       detailed description of precisely how the security system operates. This requires

       at least some familiarity with the particular security system that recorded the

       subject footage. See, e.g., McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 562 (Ind. 2018)

       (hotel manager’s testimony sufficiently authenticated security footage when the

       manager recognized the hotel’s lobby in the footage, explained the process for

       ensuring the security system maintained an accurate time-and-date-stamp,

       explained the system recorded continuously, and explained how footage from

       the system could be retrieved).

[36]   In addition, while the accuracy of the timestamp in Kirby was not particularly

       material, we should not disregard an inaccurate timestamp too readily. In the

       instant case, the State argued guests “coming at odd times of night” to Irwin’s

       apartment was circumstantial evidence of drug dealing. (Tr. Vol. III at 128.)

       The reviewing officer in Kirby knew the timestamp was inaccurate because he

       reviewed the footage shortly after the events depicted in the footage, but if

       secondhand information from an investigating officer is all that is necessary to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024      Page 20 of 23
       authenticate security footage, the risk that an erroneous timestamp or like error

       will go undetected becomes increasingly likely, along with the associated risk

       that the State may rely on the error to obtain a conviction. Moreover, I find

       lowering the bar necessary to establish the authenticity of surveillance footage

       to be particularly unwise in an age when continuously evolving technology

       makes video manipulation easier. See Stott, 174 N.E.3d at 247 (“It is no secret

       that it is increasingly easier in today’s digital age to manipulate or distort

       images.”); see also Tonya Riley, The Technology 202: New Video Editing Technology

       Raises Disinformation Worries, Washington Post, June 10, 2019,

       https://perma.cc/JB6J-2V65. I am concerned the majority opinion in the

       instant case erodes that standard.

       3. Harmless Error
[37]   Nevertheless, “[a]n error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the

       substantial rights of a party. The harmless-error analysis is a practical one[.]”

       Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotation marks

       omitted). It requires reversal only when the trial court’s errors “affect the

       essential fairness of the trial.” Id. The improper admission of evidence is

       harmless if it is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, and we will not

       reverse a conviction based on the improper admission of evidence if there is

       such substantial evidence of guilt that we are satisfied there is no substantial

       likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Pelissier v.

       State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024       Page 21 of 23
[38]   Here, Irwin challenges the trial court’s admission of surveillance footage

       recorded by a stationary camera that was trained on the area outside of Irwin’s

       apartment. The Security Footage showed substantial foot traffic to and from

       Irwin’s apartment. It also showed Irwin wearing a red and black backpack and

       retrieving items from the backpack. These two facts are significant because

       Detective Patton testified that substantial foot traffic is indicative of drug

       trafficking and because, when police recovered the backpack while executing a

       search warrant at Irwin’s apartment, it contained drugs, drug paraphernalia,

       and firearms. However, officers surveilled Irwin’s apartment for three weeks

       prior to searching it. During this time, Detective Patton personally observed an

       uncommon number of visitors to Irwin’s apartment, and Detective Patton saw

       Irwin carrying the red and black backpack. Thus, admission of the Security

       Footage was simply cumulative of Detective Patton’s testimony.1

[39]   In addition, there was other substantial evidence of Irwin’s guilt. During their

       period of surveillance, officers pulled over three vehicles leaving Irwin’s

       apartment and discovered small quantities of methamphetamine during each of

       those traffic stops. Lawrence was one of the people the officers pulled over, and

       she told the officers Irwin was selling drugs out of his apartment. When the

       officers executed the search warrant at Irwin’s apartment, they found

       1
         The Security Footage did show guests arriving at Irwin’s apartment at times when officers were not actively
       surveilling him. However, given Detective Patton’s testimony that he observed substantial foot traffic to and
       from Irwin’s apartment, the fact that such activity continued at times when officers were not actively
       watching Irwin was not particularly material.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024                            Page 22 of 23
       methamphetamine, cocaine, fentanyl, marijuana, a large amount of cash, and

       drug paraphernalia. Thus, substantial evidence outside of the Security Footage

       demonstrated Irwin was dealing drugs. See Ladd v. State, 710 N.E.2d 188, 191

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s intent to

       deliver, such as possession of a large quantity of drugs, large amounts of

       currency, scales, plastic bags, and other paraphernalia, as well as evidence of

       other drug transactions, can support a conviction”). Therefore, I would hold

       admission of the Security Footage was harmless error at most because it was

       cumulative of other evidence properly admitted and there was other substantial

       evidence of Irwin’s guilt. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 190 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022) (trial court’s admission of testimony regarding cell phone records

       and cell phone location data was harmless at most because it was cumulative of

       other evidence and there was substantial other evidence of defendant’s guilt),

       reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[40]   I do not believe Irwin waived his objection that the State failed to sufficiently

       authenticate the surveillance footage, and I agree with Irwin that the State’s

       foundation was insufficient. However, I do not believe we should reverse

       Irwin’s convictions because of the substantial other evidence of Irwin’s guilt.

       Therefore, I respectfully concur in result.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-501 | February 28, 2024      Page 23 of 23