Court Opinion

ID: 9789358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:35:13.362102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.103857
License: Public Domain

*1115BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 17 The outcome of this case is controlled by our recent decision in State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55. In Comer, officers arrived at a home after receiving a call from a citizen that a family fight was in progress. See id. at ¶2. The defendant opened the door and stepped out onto the porch. See id. The officers explained to her why they were there and asked if anyone else was home. See id. The defendant did not respond, but “ ‘immediately turned and walked back inside the residence.’ ” Id. The officers followed and discovered defendant’s husband who had marks on his body indicating he had been assaulted. See id. at ¶ 3. While arresting the defendant for assault, the officers also discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. See id. at ¶ 4.
¶ 18 We concluded that both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. See id. at ¶ 27. We cited several reasons why the defendant’s unexplained behavior “would cause an officer to reasonably believe there was no time to get a warrant and/or that his presence was necessary to prevent physical harm to persons or the destruction of evidence,” including the officers’ reasonable fear that defendant retreated to “immediately resume the altercation reported.” Id. at ¶ 26.
¶ 19 If, as we concluded in Comer, an individual’s unexplained behavior and retreat posed an exigent circumstance, then certainly a fight in progress qualifies as an exigent circumstance. In this case, the officers responded to a citizen’s call in the middle of the night about a “loud party or altercation.” The trial court found that the fight they witnessed was so “loud” and “tumultuous” that the occupants of the residence could not have heard a knock at the door. The officers personally observed a group of adults restrain a juvenile, who broke loose one arm and “smacked one of the [adults] in the nose.” These findings do not support the trial court’s conclusion that the officers’ war-rantless entry into the home was not justified by exigent circumstances.1
¶20 The majority argues that Comer is distinguishable and should be narrowly construed to apply only to known incidences of domestic violence. I disagree that the exigent circumstances doctrine applies only to domestic violence situations. However, even assuming, as the majority does, that Comer only applies to domestic violence, this case is not distinguishable. The difference between a simple assault and a domestic violence assault is the relationship between the parties involved. From their vantage point outside the house, the officers in this case could not know whether any of the combatants in the house were “cohabitants” as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (Supp.2002). Based on the fact that a juvenile and several adults were involved and that the altercation was occurring at a residence, it would be reasonable for the officers to assume that the altercation may have been domestic violence. Further, I cannot agree with the majority that the violence had ceased by the time the officers arrived. The officers testified to witnessing a loud, tumultuous altercation where one individual was being physically restrained and another had been struck. Even after entering the house, the officers had a difficult time getting the attention of the combatants. It is nonsensical to require officers, charged with keeping the peace, to witness this degree of violence and take no action until they see it escalate further.
¶ 21 Alternatively, we could remand to the trial court for a finding on the city’s assertion that the officers were justified in entering the house because a crime was being committed in their presence. The majority opinion does not address this argument, claiming that it was not raised before the trial court. However, the record reflects that the city did raise the issue to the trial court in the “Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Suppress.” The city alleged that “the exigent circumstances which existed included obvious violations of the law in the plain view and presence of the officers.” Because the trial court made no specific findings regarding violations of law, the case could be remanded with instructions to the trial court to address whether the *1116officers were justified in entering the home because a crime was being committed in their presence.
¶22 Accordingly, under Comer, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to suppress. Alternatively, my colleagues should remand for findings on the city’s argument that a crime was being committed in the presence of the officers.

. The officers might also have been justified in entering the residence pursuant to the emergency aid doctrine, a variant to the exigent circumstances exception. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,¶ 10, 994 P.2d 1283.