Court Opinion

ID: 9585141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:46.193488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:30.825633
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree entirely with the opinion of the majority, I feel that the complexity of the issues and the divergent prior opinions of this Court as to the meaning of contributory negligence and assumption of risk require further elaboration.
1. “ ‘Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Unlike assumption of risk, the defense does not rest upon the idea that defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff.’ Prosser, [Law of Torts (4th ed.), p. 440]. ‘Closely allied to the doctrine of contributory negligence is the rule of “avoidable consequénces,” which denies recovery for any damages which could have been avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Both rest upon the same fundamental policy of making recovery depend upon plaintiff’s proper care for the protection of his own interests, and both require of him only the standard of the reasonable man under the circumstances.’ Prosser, supra, at 422; see Harper and James, [Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Ch. XXI], at 1231.” Osburn v. Pilgrim, 246 Ga. 688, 695 (273 SE2d 118) (1980).
Contributory negligence is comprised of two separate and distinct defenses. See Savannah Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559, 562 (2) (64 SE 680) (1909); Savannah, Fla. &c. R. Co. v. Stewart, 71 Ga. 427, 428 (2) (1884); Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 673-674 (6) (16 SE2d 214) (1941). “[F]irst the plaintiff must at all times use ordinary care for his own safety; that is, he must not by his own negli*163gence (or consent) proximately cause his own injuries; and second, the plaintiff must use ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the defendant’s negligence when it is apparent or when in the exercise of ordinary care it should become apparent. . . . Comparative negligence is applicable only when the jury has not found either the negligence of the plaintiff or that of the defendant to be the sole proximate cause. [Cits.]” Whatley v. Henry, supra at 674; see also Edwards v. Trammell, 187 Ga. App. 22, 24 (369 SE2d 288) (1988); Leonardson v. Ga. Power Co., 210 Ga. App. 574, 576 (436 SE2d 690) (1993). “Comparative negligence by the plaintiff is that negligence which joins with the negligence of the defendant in proximately causing the injuries of the plaintiff and goes in reduction of the amount of recovery in proportion that the negligence of the plaintiff compares with that of the defendant, resulting, by reduction, in a bar of recovery when the negligence of the plaintiff is equal to or greater than that of the defendant.” (Emphasis omitted.) Whatley v. Henry, supra at 674.
No one has a duty to anticipate the active negligence of another. Poppell v. Smutney, 106 Ga. App. 480 (127 SE2d 335) (1962); Economy Gas &c. Co. v. Kinslow, 74 Ga. App. 418 (39 SE2d 899) (1946). Further, the plaintiff has no duty to avoid the active negligence of another until such negligence has, in fact, occurred and is known by the plaintiff, or by the plaintiff’s exercise of ordinary care and diligence should have been apparent to him. Newman v. Collins, 186 Ga. App. 595, 596 (1) (367 SE2d 866) (1988) (physical precedent only); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Clark, 122 Ga. App. 237, 240 (5) (176 SE2d 596) (1970).
2. Assumption of the risk occurs “ ‘[w]hen a person knowingly and voluntarily takes a risk of physical injury, the danger of which is so obvious that the taking of such a risk, in and of itself, amounts to a failure to exercise ordinary care and diligence for his own safety, he cannot hold another liable for injuries proximately caused by such action even though the injuries may be in part attributable to the negligence of such other person.’ ” Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 518-519 (1), (2) (299 SE2d 704) (1983); see also City of Winder v. Girone, 265 Ga. 723, 724 (2) (462 SE2d 704) (1995); Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 258 Ga. 263, 267 (367 SE2d 796) (1988); Fountain v. Thompson, 252 Ga. 256, 257 (312 SE2d 788) (1984); Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 669-670 (88 SE2d 6) (1955); Newman v. Collins, supra at 596.
“Testing a known peril acts as a transition between the concepts of avoidance and assumption of the risk. ‘One who recklessly tests an observed and clearly obvious peril is guilty of lack of ordinary care,’ Brooks v. Douglas, 154 Ga. App. 54, 58 (2) (267 SE2d 495) (1980) ([physical precedent only]), and is guilty of such negligence ‘which will be deemed the proximate cause of [the] resulting injury, and, in *164the absence of wilful or wanton misconduct by the defendant, will preclude recovery/ Laseter v. Clark, 54 Ga. App. 669, 670 (1) (189 SE 265) (1936).” Newman v. Collins, supra at 596.
“Taylor v. Morgan, 54 Ga. App. 426 (188 SE 44) (1936), and other cases, appear to blend or merge the two concepts of avoidance and assumption of the risk when they are separate and distinct. Assumption of risk in its simplest and primary sense means that the plaintiff has given him express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk. Owens-Ill. v. Bryson, 138 Ga. App. 78, 79 (225 SE2d 475) (1976). Also, plaintiff with knowledge of the risk may be regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to take his own chances. Id. at p. 79. In working out the distinction the courts have arrived at the conclusion that assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it. Roberts v. King, [102 Ga. App. 518, 521 (1) (116 SE2d 885) (1960)]. The doctrine of avoidable consequences does not rest upon the idea that [the] defendant is relieved of any duty toward plaintiff, but denies recovery for any damages which could have been [discovered by plaintiff or might have been] avoided by reasonable conduct on plaintiffs part. Osburn v. Pilgrim, [supra at 695]. Avoidance of the consequences involves the failure to take action to overcome defendant’s negligence after it is . . . discovered by . . . plaintiff’s exercise of ordinary care. Lanier v. Turner, 73 Ga. App. 749, 753 (38 SE2d 55) (1946). The rule which requires one to avoid the consequences of another’s negligence does not apply until he sees the danger or has reason to apprehend it. Central R. &c. Co. v. Attaway, 90 Ga. 656, 661 (16 SE 956) (1892). See Griffin v. Campbell, 112 Ga. App. 420 (2) (145 SE2d 659) (1965); Smith v. 670 New Street, 111 Ga. App. 35, 38 (140 SE2d 495) (1965); Economy Gas & Appliance Co. v. Kinslow, [supra at 420].” (Punctuation omitted.) Newman v. Collins, supra at 596-597.
For the defense of assumption of risk to be applicable to a case, there must be evidence that “the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the dangerous situation that resulted in his injury, and an appreciation of the risks associated with that dangerous situation.” Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 863 (471 SE2d 866) (1996). “ ‘Knowledge of the general danger may not be enough, and some courts require knowledge of the specific risk that caused the plaintiff’s harm. The standard to be applied is, in theory at least, a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in contributory negligence. If, because of age or lack of information or experience, he does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be taken to consent to assume it. His failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the danger is not properly a matter of assumption of risk, but *165of the defense of contributory negligence.’ Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 68, p. 487 (5th ed. 1984).” (Emphasis in original.) Beringause v. Fogleman Truck Lines, 200 Ga. App. 822, 824 (4) (409 SE2d 524) (1991). “The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff from recovering on a negligence claim if it is established that he[,] without coercion of circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not. In Georgia, a defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks. Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk, and means both actual and subjective knowledge on plaintiff’s part. The knowledge that a plaintiff who assumes a risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury. The knowledge requirement does not refer to a plaintiff’s comprehension of general, non-specific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Vaughn v. Pleasent, supra at 864; see also Smith v. Mangram, 222 Ga. App. 585, 586 (474 SE2d 758) (1996); York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga. App. 839 (459 SE2d 470) (1995); Turner v. Sumter Self Storage Co., 215 Ga. App. 92, 94-95 (3) (449 SE2d 618) (1994). “In by far the greater number of cases, the consent to assume the risk has not been a matter of express agreement, but has been found to be implied from the conduct of the plaintiff under the circumstances.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tennison v. Lowndes-Echols Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 209 Ga. App. 343, 344 (433 SE2d 344) (1993); accord Osburn v. Pilgrim, supra at 695; Stallings v. Cuttino, 205 Ga. App. 581, 582 (422 SE2d 921) (1992). Thus, although the deceased was extremely intoxicated, his conduct over the course of the evening in regard to the loading and unloading of the pistol, pointing it at others, having the pistol pointed at him, and pulling the trigger or encouraging others to do the same was clear and palpable evidence of his awareness and appreciation of the risk and consent to assume such risk of negligence that he, himself, created and encouraged by producing the pistol, loading it, and sharing the play with the pistol with others.
3. Neither Vaughn v. Pleasent, supra at 864 (1), nor Fountain v. Thompson, supra, impliedly overruled Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, supra, or Lawrence v. Edwards, 128 Ga. App. 1, 2 (3) (195 SE2d 244) (1973). However, when voluntary alcohol consumption renders the plaintiff unconscious or causes the plaintiff to black out so that his conduct appears visibly impaired, the defendant could remain liable under the last clear chance doctrine where it was obvi*166ous that the plaintiff was helpless in a position of danger and defendant through the exercise of ordinary care, after discovering the plaintiff in the position of peril, could avoid injuring him through the exercise of ordinary care and failed to do so. See Fountain v. Thompson, supra. However, the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable under the facts of this case.