Court Opinion

ID: 9925387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 17:03:30.212306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.863624
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Jan 19 2024, 8:53 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES C.H.
EDGEROCK DEVELOPMENT, LLC                                  GARMONG & SON, INC., AND
Maggie L. Smith                                            SIGNWORKS, INC.
Darren A. Craig                                            Peter S. French
Frost Brown Todd LLP                                       Jeffrey D. Stemerick
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Neil R. Peluchette
                                                           Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ZPS                                Indianapolis, Indiana
WESTFIELD, LLC
Nathaniel M. Uhl
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jenny R. Buchheit                                          FOX CONTRACTORS CORP.
Adam M. Alexander                                          Robert W. Eherenman
Ice Miller LLP                                             Melanie L. Farr
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Haller Colvin PC
                                                           Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT FIRST
BANK RICHMOND                                              ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI
Scott J. Fandre                                            CURIAE INDIANA
David M. Johnson                                           CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
Krieg DeVault LLP                                          INDIANA BUILDERS
Mishawaka, Indiana                                         ASSOCIATION, AND
                                                           ASSOCIATED GENERAL
James E. Carlberg                                          CONTRACTORS OF INDIANA,
Nathan T. Danielson                                        INC., IN SUPPORT OF
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP                                  APPELLEES
Indianapolis Indiana
                                                           Joseph M. Leone
Ronald L. Cross                                            Michael F. Drewry
Boston Bever Forrest Cross & Sicmann                       Sean T. Devenney
Richmond, Indiana                                          Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
                                                           Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
INDIANA BANKERS ASSOCIATION IN
SUPPORT OF APPELLANT FIRST BANK
RICHMOND

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                         Page 1 of 56
Thomas W. Dinwiddie
Daniel R. Kelley
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

EdgeRock Development, LLC;                                 January 19, 2024
ZPS Westfield, LLC; First Bank                             Court of Appeals Cause No.
Richmond,                                                  22A-PL-1968
Appellants/Cross-Appeal                                    Appeal from the Hamilton
Appellees/Defendants/Counterclaim                          Superior Court
Plaintiffs),                                               The Honorable David K. Najjar,
                                                           Judge
        v.                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           29D05-1912-PL-11500
C.H. Garmong & Son, Inc. and
Signworks, Inc.; and Fox                                   Consolidated with Court of
Contractors Corp.,                                         Appeals Cause No. 22A-PL-1993

Appellees/Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,

and
Fox Contractors Corp.,
Appellee/Cross-Appeal
Appellant/Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant.

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                    Page 2 of 56
      Case Summary
[1]   EdgeRock Development LLC (“EdgeRock”) contracted with C.H. Garmong &

      Son, Inc. (“Garmong”), Fox Contractors Corp. (“Fox”), and Signworks

      (“Signworks”) to complete the “Trails of Westfield” (the “Project”), a

      commercial building project along State Road 32 in the City of Westfield (the

      “City”). The Project included work that was to be completed on five different

      parcels of land, which were owned by three different entities. EdgeRock owned

      two of the parcels, which were secured by a mortgage that had been executed in

      favor of First Bank Richmond (“First Bank”). ZPS Westfield, LLC (“ZPS”)

      owned two of the parcels and contracted directly with EdgeRock for the work

      that was to be completed on its land in connection with the Project and paid its

      financial obligations outlined in its contract with EdgeRock in full.

[2]   EdgeRock, however, failed to satisfy its financial obligations under its contracts

      with Garmong, Fox, and Signworks, all three of which sought to encumber

      certain parcels connected with the Project with mechanic’s liens and filed

      breach-of-contract actions against EdgeRock. After finding, inter alia, that the

      mechanic’s liens filed in connection with the Project were valid and had priority

      over a portion of First Bank’s mortgage interest in EdgeRock’s property, the

      trial court entered judgment against EdgeRock and in rem judgments against

      EdgeRock’s and ZPS’s property. The trial court also determined that

      EdgeRock was entitled to recover certain road-impact fees (the “RIF Funds”)

      that had been paid in connection to the Project by the City.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 3 of 56
[3]   ZPS and EdgeRock challenge the trial court’s determinations regarding the

      validity of Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens. ZPS also challenges the

      inclusion of uninstalled material in Signworks’s mechanic’s lien against its

      property as well as the propriety of the prejudgment interest awarded to

      Signworks. First Bank challenges the trial court’s determination that the

      mechanic’s liens had priority over part of its recorded mortgage interest.

      EdgeRock challenges various summary judgment rulings made by the trial

      court, and multiple parties challenge the trial court’s determination that

      EdgeRock is entitled to receive the RIF Funds.

[4]   We conclude that (1) both Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens against ZPS’s

      and EdgeRock’s property are invalid; (2) the cost of uninstalled material should

      not have been in included in Signworks’s mechanic’s lien on ZPS’s property

      and ZPS should not have been ordered to pay prejudgment interest to

      Signworks; (3) to the extent that priority questions remain, First Bank’s

      mortgage interest, in its entirety, has priority; (4) the trial court did not err in

      making the challenged summary judgment rulings; and (5) distribution of the

      RIF Funds is stayed pending a ruling by the Hamilton Commercial Court in a

      related matter regarding the priority of the secured interests in the funds and

      any future ruling from this court regarding the RIF Funds should be consistent

      with that of the Hamilton Commercial Court. We further conclude that the

      trial court erred in denying First Bank’s request for attorney’s fees but that no

      party is entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees. In addition, we note

      that EdgeRock has not challenged the judgments against it relating to the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024          Page 4 of 56
      breach-of-contract claims brought by Garmong, Fox, and Signworks, and our

      conclusions relating to the validity of the mechanic’s liens do not alter those

      judgments against EdgeRock in any way. Pursuant to our above-stated

      conclusions, we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse

      in part, and remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History
      I.      Initiation of the Project
[5]   In 2015, EdgeRock and its investors purchased numerous separate parcels of

      undeveloped land totaling seventeen acres along State Road 32 in the City. The

      parcels were subsequently divided into Lots 1 through 5 as depicted below:

      Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 5 p. 82. The five lots were then zoned as follows:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 5 of 56
            •    Lot 1 was zoned for retail business (and would eventually become a
                 Starbucks);
            •    Lot 2 was zoned for retail business (and would eventually become a Penn
                 Station and Forum Credit Union);
            •    Lot 3 was zoned for retail business (and would eventually become a Crew
                 Carwash);
            •    Lot 4 was zoned for multi-family apartments; and
            •    Lot 5 was zoned for retail business.

      EdgeRock sold Lots 1 and 2 to ZPS in 2017, and, at some point, sold Lot 3 to

      Dahm No. 49, LLC (“Dahm”).1 EdgeRock maintained ownership of Lots 4

      and 5.

[6]   After purchasing Lots 1 and 2, ZPS contracted with EdgeRock to build two

      structures and install related infrastructure on its property. ZPS’s development

      agreement for the construction and infrastructure on its property called for ZPS

      to pay EdgeRock a total of $1,720,000.00. It is undisputed that ZPS paid the

      entire amount it owed to EdgeRock, making its final payment in August of

      2018.

[7]   EdgeRock then contracted with Garmong to perform not only the work on

      ZPS’s property, but also work on the properties owned by EdgeRock and

      Dahm. The total EdgeRock-Garmong contract amount was $3,253,390.00.

      The EdgeRock-Garmong contract broke down the cost of Garmong’s work into

      two categories: “Lots 1 & 2” totaling $1,172,114.00 and “Infrastructure”

      totaling $1,730,284.00. Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 240. The contract also

      1
          Dahm was not a party to the underlying litigation and does not participate in this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                             Page 6 of 56
      included $110,000.00 in contingency funds and an eight percent management

      fee ($240,992.00) payable to Garmong. Garmong later submitted several

      change orders, including Change Order 3 in the amount of $434,528.00, which

      included work on Lot 3. ZPS was not a party to the EdgeRock-Garmong

      contract. Fox had a subcontract with Garmong, which included work on all

      five lots.

[8]   As part of the Project, the City contracted with EdgeRock to build 175th Street

      (which would run to the north of Lots 4 and 5 and to the south of Lots 1, 2, and

      3) and install related infrastructure (the “175th-Street Project”). The 175th-

      Street Project was to be funded, at least in part, by RIF Funds issued by the

      City. The 175th-Street Project included “17.6 acres,” with ZPS’s property

      making up 10.2% of the total acreage of the project and EdgeRock’s property

      making up 58.6% of the total acreage. Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 9 p. 36. The

      remaining acreage came from Dahm’s property. EdgeRock contracted directly

      with Fox to complete the 175th-Street Project, which included building 175th

      Street and installing related infrastructure. The EdgeRock-Fox contract was for

      a total of $1,831,008.25. ZPS was not a party to the EdgeRock-Fox contract.

      Its sole involvement was quitclaiming certain land needed to construct 175th

      Street to the City.

[9]   In September of 2018, EdgeRock contracted with Signworks to install two signs

      on ZPS’s property for a total price of $115,521.33. ZPS was not a party to the

      EdgeRock-Signworks contract.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 7 of 56
       II. Issues with Payment/Garmong’s First Mechanic’s
           Lien
[10]   As the Project moved forward, EdgeRock’s payments to Garmong became

       somewhat sporadic. EdgeRock paid invoices that had been submitted by

       Garmong on December 11, 2017, April 17, 2018, and June 1, 2018. EdgeRock

       did not pay invoices that were submitted by Garmong on March 7, 2018, June

       20, 2018, July 30, 2018, August 24, 2018, September 25, 2018, and October 30,

       2018. On December 4, 2018, following five months of nonpayment from

       EdgeRock, Garmong filed a notice of intention to hold a mechanic’s lien, and

       recorded a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $2,140,722.51. The lien was

       recorded on December 5, 2018 (the “2018 Garmong Lien”).

       III. First Bank Mortgage
[11]   During late 2018 or early 2019, EdgeRock sought financing from First Bank “to

       refinance the existing mortgages” on the planned development “and pay for the

       construction work” that had thus far been completed. Ultimately, EdgeRock

       received a $4,900,000.00 commercial loan from First Bank “to reimburse for

       land development expense[s] and payoff existing mortgages on Lots 4 and 5.”

       Ex. Vol. 19 p. 125. In return, First Bank received a mortgage interest on Lots 4

       and 5 (the “First Bank Mortgage”); an assignment of EdgeRock’s interests in an

       agreement with Citizens Wastewater of Westfield, LLC; a secured interest in

       the RIF Funds; and guaranty from EdgeRock’s executives, Austin Dalton and

       R. Birch Dalton. First Bank’s loan documents included: (1) a UCC financing

       statement signed by EdgeRock, granting the Bank a security interest in the RIF

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024   Page 8 of 56
       Funds; (2) a Security Agreement executed by EdgeRock, granting First Bank a

       security interest in the RIF Funds; and (3) a UCC financing statement filed with

       the Indiana Secretary of State, covering collateral including the RIF Funds.

[12]   The First Bank Mortgage was duly recorded on February 25, 2019. It is

       undisputed that proceeds from the loan were distributed as follows:

                 Amount                 Purpose
                 $2,140,722.51          Payment to secure release of the 2018 Garmong
                                        Lien
                 $250,000.00            Payment of Blocked Interest Account Funds (used
                                        for payment of loan interest)
                 $45,431.00             Payment of loan origination fee
                 $3500.00               Payment of appraisal fee
                 $1000.00               Payment of appraisal review fee
                 $46.00                 Payment of fee for flood determination
                 $23.00                 Payment of wire and UCC filing fees
                 $9269.00               Payment of various title company charges
                 $165.00                Payment of recording charges
                 $2,028,443.62          Payment to Acquisition Lenders to secure release
                                        of the Acquisition Mortgage
                 $15,000.00             Payment of EdgeRock’s legal fees
                 $5000.00               Payment of insurance premium
                 $401,399.87            Payment to EdgeRock

       The amounts tendered to the Acquisition Lenders equaled the amounts

       remaining due under their respective acquisition promissory notes and served to

       secure release of the Acquisition Mortgage. Following Garmong’s receipt of

       the $2,140,722.51, the 2018 Garmong Lien was released.

[13]   A condition of the First Bank Mortgage had been that First Bank would

       “receive a first priority mortgage on Lots 4 and 5.” Tr. Vol. 6 p. 117. First

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024         Page 9 of 56
       Bank had not been made aware prior to the closing of the First Bank Mortgage

       that Garmong “had an outstanding claim for work performed of over $1 million

       in addition to the Garmong mechanic’s lien of $2.1 million that was being paid

       off at the closing.” Tr. Vol. 6 p. 117.

       IV. Continued Issues with Payment
[14]   Garmong submitted an invoice to EdgeRock on November 19, 2018, in the

       amount of $299,155.84. This invoice had not been included in the 2018

       Garmong Lien because the due date for payment had not passed as of the date

       that the lien had been recorded. EdgeRock did not pay this invoice. Garmong

       submitted another invoice to EdgeRock in the amount of $643,886.80 on

       January 23, 2019. EdgeRock did not pay this invoice.

[15]   According to the terms of its subcontract with Garmong, Fox was to receive

       $1,315,000.00. According to the terms of its direct contract with EdgeRock,

       Fox was to receive $1,831,008.25. Fox was not paid in full for its work done

       under either contract.

[16]   Signworks submitted invoices to EdgeRock on November 29, 2018, January 28,

       2019, and April 17, 2019. EdgeRock, however, did not make any payments to

       Signworks outside of its initial $3000.00 deposit.

       V.      The Mechanic’s Liens
[17]   On June 24, 2019, Signworks recorded a mechanic’s lien against Lot 1 in the

       amount of $48,992.29 and a separate mechanic’s lien against Lot 2 in the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024   Page 10 of 56
       amount of $59,039.04. On August 30, 2019, Fox recorded mechanic’s liens—

       each in the sum of $1,213,228.23—against ZPS’s Lots 1 and 2 and EdgeRock’s

       Lots 4 and 5. On September 4, 2019, Garmong recorded mechanic’s liens

       against Lots 4 and 5 in the amount of $1,009,055.62. The next day, Garmong

       recorded mechanic’s liens against Lots 1 and 2 in the same amount. On

       September 10, 2019, Fox recorded additional mechanic’s liens against Lots 1, 2,

       4, and 5, each in the amount of $500,053.43. Litigation under cause number

       29D05-1912-PL-11500 (“Cause No. PL-11500”) soon followed.

       VI. Lien Foreclosure Proceedings
[18]   On December 9, 2019, Garmong filed suit under Cause No. PL-11500 against

       EdgeRock, ZPS, First Bank, Fox, and Signworks, seeking to foreclose its

       mechanic’s liens and alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and

       damages. On March 4, 2020, Fox filed cross-claims against EdgeRock and

       ZPS, seeking to foreclose its mechanic’s liens and alleging breach of contract,

       unjust enrichment, and violation of personal liability notice. On March 10,

       2020, Fox filed a third-party complaint against the City in which it indicated

       that it had named the City “as a party to assert any interest it may have in the

       Edge[R]ock Property and/or ZPS property.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 3 pp.

       152, 153. On May 29, 2020, Garmong requested leave to amend its complaint

       to dismiss its claims against Signworks and to add Signworks as a plaintiff to its

       complaint. The trial court granted Garmong’s motion and Garmong filed an

       amended complaint listing Signworks as a plaintiff rather than a defendant.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024    Page 11 of 56
       Counterclaims were subsequently filed against Garmong by EdgeRock and

       Fox. The trial court scheduled trial starting on January 21, 2021.

       VII. The RIF Funds
[19]   On February 19, 2021, the City filed a motion for interpleader, in which it

       sought “an order requiring the deposit of funds with the Court, declaring that

       [the City] has satisfied its obligation under the [RIF] Credit Agreement, and

       that its property is not encumbered by any parties to this matter, and ordering

       its dismissal with prejudice.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 16 p. 12. The City

       claimed that it “is in no position to determine how much should be disbursed to

       each party that completed work on 175th.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 16 p. 15.

       Fox responded claiming that it “is the only party in this lawsuit which

       performed any work and supplied any materials for the construction of 175th

       Street and the relocation of the Anna Kendall Drain [(the “Drain”)]. Fox is

       entitled to all of the funds that will be interpleaded by [the City].” Appellants’

       Jt. App. Vol. 16 p. 28. First Bank also claimed to be entitled to the RIF Funds.

       While ZPS did not assert a formal claim for the RIF Funds in Cause No. PL-

       11500, it asserted a priority interest in the RIF Funds in a separately filed

       lawsuit in the Hamilton Commercial Court, under cause number 29D02-2107-

       PL-5088 (“Cause No. PL-5088”). This lawsuit, which was filed on July 20,

       2021, remains pending.2

       2
           The proceedings in the commercial court action were stayed by order of the court on June 21, 2022.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                            Page 12 of 56
       VIII.            Competing Motions for Partial Summary
                        Judgment
[20]   On May 7, 2020, EdgeRock filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On

       December 7, 2020, ZPS filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Ten days

       later, the trial court issued an order holding all motions for summary judgment

       in abeyance until trial began on January 21, 2021.

[21]   On January 28, 2021, following the first two days of trial, the trial court issued

       an order informing the parties that it would “consider summary judgment

       motions prior to the next hearing date on April 9, 2021.” Appellants’ Jt. App.

       Vol. 16 p. 77. The trial court further ordered that

               The parties are given until February 12, 2021[,] to file any new or
               amended motions for summary judgment. The parties shall be
               given until March 15, 2021[,] to file any responses to summary
               judgment motions. A hearing will be set for the Court to hear
               arguments on all summary judgment motions on March 24,
               2021[.]

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 16 p. 77. Signworks, Fox, and Garmong moved for

       partial summary judgment on February 12, 2021. Also on February 12, 2021,

       ZPS and EdgeRock filed amended motions for partial summary judgment.

       IX. The Trial Court’s Orders
[22]   On April 7, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting Garmong’s motion for

       partial summary judgment and denying EdgeRock’s motion for partial

       summary judgment. In this order, the trial court found that Garmong’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 13 of 56
       mechanic’s liens against EdgeRock’s property were valid and that summary

       judgment relating to Change Order 3 was improper because a material dispute

       remained as to whether Change Order 3 had been approved by EdgeRock. The

       trial court further found that the 175th-Street Project and the relocation of the

       Drain were never part of the EdgeRock-Garmong contract; the consequential

       damages waiver barred EdgeRock’s claim for rent abatement, loss of future

       business, and tortious interference with banking relationships; EdgeRock’s

       tortious interference claims are barred by the waiver; and rent abatement paid

       to ZPS is barred by the waiver.

[23]   On April 28, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying

       in part ZPS’s motion for partial summary judgment. In this order, the trial

       court found that ZPS was entitled to summary judgment on the unjust

       enrichment claims brought by Garmong and Signworks. The trial court found

       that summary judgment relating to the validity of Garmong’s and Fox’s

       mechanic’s liens filed against ZPS’s property was improper because issues of

       material fact remained as to whether the liens were valid, specifically whether

       the liens were overstated. In denying summary judgment on the question of

       whether the mechanic’s liens were valid, the trial court found, as a matter of

       law, that Fox’s mechanic’s lien had been timely filed. The trial court further

       found that ZPS was entitled to summary judgment on Garmong’s, Signworks’s,

       and Fox’s requests for attorney’s fees, stating that it is undisputed that ZPS had

       paid EdgeRock “all that it was obligated to pay under the terms of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 14 of 56
       Development Agreement,” and, as a result, “Garmong, Signworks, and Fox

       may not recover attorney’s fees” from ZPS. Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 83.

[24]   On May 12, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying in

       part Fox’s motion for partial summary judgment. In this order, the trial court

       found, as a matter of law, that Fox’s liens on EdgeRock’s property were valid,

       but found that issues of material fact existed as to the validity of Fox’s liens on

       ZPS’s property.

[25]   Also on May 12, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting Signworks’s

       motion for partial summary judgment. In this order, the trial court found that

       Signworks’s mechanic’s liens against ZPS’s property were “valid as a matter of

       law.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 100.

[26]   Trial continued on all remaining issues. After the conclusion of trial, on May

       25, 2022, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

       judgment. With respect to Garmong’s claims against EdgeRock and ZPS, the

       trial court concluded as follows: (1) EdgeRock had breached its contract with

       Garmong; (2) Garmong was entitled to foreclose its liens on EdgeRock’s

       property; (3) Garmong’s liens on ZPS’s property were valid and were not

       overstated; (4) Garmong had not breached its contract with EdgeRock; (5) there

       was no basis for EdgeRock’s slander-of-title or fraud claims; and (6) there was

       no basis for ZPS’s slander-of-title claims.

[27]   With respect to Fox’s claims against EdgeRock and ZPS, the trial court

       concluded that EdgeRock had breached its contract with Fox. The trial court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 15 of 56
       further concluded that Fox’s mechanic’s liens against both EdgeRock’s property

       and ZPS’s property were valid and that Fox was entitled to foreclose its liens.

[28]   With respect to Signworks’s claims, the trial court concluded that EdgeRock

       had breached its contract with Signworks. As a result of the breach, Signworks

       was entitled to recover attorney’s fees from EdgeRock.

[29]   With respect to questions relating to lien priority, the trial court concluded as

       follows: (1) First Bank only had priority for the first $2,140,722.51 of its loan to

       EdgeRock; (2) mechanic’s liens take priority from the date the contractor begins

       work; (3) equitable subrogation is not compatible with the Indiana Mechanic’s

       Lien Statute (the “IMLS”) and does not apply; (4) even if equitable subrogation

       could apply, the equities favor Garmong and Fox; (5) First Bank’s equitable

       estoppel argument fails; (6) the “specific project” language of Indiana Code

       section 32-28-3-5(d) did not encompass First Bank’s entire loan; and (7) First

       Bank was entitled to the RIF Funds.

[30]   Based on these conclusions, the trial court ordered the following:

               1.     Judgment is entered in favor of Garmong and against
               [EdgeRock] on Count 3 of Garmong’s Amended Complaint in
               the amount of $943,042.64, plus interest on the balance at the
               rate of at 12% per year accruing from February 23, 2019 (the due
               date of the final invoice). The interest accrued through May 25,
               2022 is $367,709.12, making the total judgment on Count 3 of
               Garmong’s Amended Complaint as of today’s date
               $1,310,751.76, plus court costs.

               2.       Judgment in rem is entered in favor of Garmong on Count

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 16 of 56
        1 of Garmong’s Amended Complaint against [EdgeRock’s] Lots
        4 and 5 in the amount of $943,042.64, plus interest on the
        balance at the rate of at 12% per year accruing from February 23,
        2019 (the due date of the final invoice), plus Garmong’s
        reasonable attorney’s fees. The interest accrued through May 25,
        2022 is $367,709.12, making the total in rem judgment on Count
        1 of Garmong’s Amended Complaint against [EdgeRock’s] Lots
        4 and 5 as of today’s date $1,310,751.76, plus Garmong’s
        reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.

        3.     Judgment in rem is entered for Garmong on Count 2 of
        Garmong’s Amended Complaint against ZPS’s Lots 1 and 2 in
        the amount of $943,042.64[,] plus interest on the balance at the
        rate of at 12% per year accruing from February 23, 2019 (the due
        date of the final invoice). The interest accrued through May 25,
        2022 is $367,709.12 making the total judgment as of today’s date
        $1,310,751.76, plus court costs.

        4.     Judgment is entered in favor of Signworks and against
        [EdgeRock] on Count 6 of Signworks’[s] Amended Complaint in
        the amount of $93,268.37, plus interest on the balance at the rate
        of 1.75% per month from April 30, 2019 (the due date of the final
        invoice), plus reasonable attorney’s fees. The interest accrued
        through May 25, 2022 is $60,100.60, making the total judgment
        on Count 6 of Signworks’[s] Amended Complaint as of today’s
        date $153,368.97, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.

        5.      Judgment in rem is entered in favor of Signworks on Count
        5 of Signworks’[s] Amended Complaint against ZPS’s Lots 1 and
        2 in the amount of $93,268.37, plus interest on the balance at the
        rate of 1.75% per month from April 30, 2019 (the due date of the
        final invoice). The interest accrued through May 25, 2022 is
        $60,100.60 making the total in rem judgment on Count 5 of
        Signworks’ Amended Complaint against ZPS’s Lots 1 and 2 as of
        today’s date $153,368.97 plus court costs.

        6.       Judgment is entered in favor of [Fox] on its crossclaim
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024       Page 17 of 56
               against [EdgeRock] on breach of contract in the amount of
               $1,301,531.37, plus court costs.

               7.    Judgment in rem is entered in favor of [Fox] on its cross-
               claim against the [EdgeRock] Real Estate in the amount of: (a)
               $202,623.56 (the amount due under the Garmong Subcontract);
               and (b) $1,166,728.23 (the amount of due under the [EdgeRock]
               Contract), plus court costs and attorney’s fees.

               8.    Judgment in rem is entered in favor of [Fox] on its cross-
               claim against the ZPS Real Estate in the amount of (a)
               $202,623.56 (the amount due under the Garmong Subcontract);
               and (b) $1,166,728.23 (the amount of due under the [EdgeRock]
               Contract), plus court costs.…

               10. Judgment is entered in favor of Garmong and against
               [EdgeRock] and ZPS on all remaining counterclaims.

               11. Judgment is entered in favor of Fox and against
               [EdgeRock] on all remaining cross-claims.

               12.      Garmong’s mechanic’s lien on Lots 4 and 5 is foreclosed.

               13. Garmong’s mechanic’s lien on Lots 1 and 2 is
               foreclosed.…

               16.      Signworks’[s] mechanic’s liens are foreclosed.

               17. Judgment is entered for Signworks and against
               [EdgeRock] and ZPS on all remaining counterclaims.

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 pp. 178–80.

[31]   On July 20, 2022, the trial court issued four additional orders in which it

       granted Garmong’s, Fox’s, and Signworks’s requests that EdgeRock pay their

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024    Page 18 of 56
       attorneys’ fees and denied First Bank’s request for the same. On September 28,

       2022, the trial court issued an order staying the sale of ZPS’s property and

       ruling on pending motions to correct error. The trial court ordered that

       EdgeRock’s property “be sold first, with no priority for attorney’s fees.”

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 184. The trial court further ordered that “the first

       $202,623.56 collected by Garmong be conveyed to Fox”; the award of

       prejudgment interest was appropriately calculated; the RIF Funds should be

       paid to EdgeRock; and “[a]ny sums collected by Garmong, Fox, and/or

       Signworks from [EdgeRock], or as a result of the sale of the [EdgeRock] real

       estate, shall correspondingly reduce the applicable judgment amounts against

       the ZPS Real Estate.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 pp. 184, 188. The trial court

       also denied First Bank’s motion to correct error regarding its determination that

       only a portion of its mortgage interest should have senior priority and ordered

       that disbursement of the RIF Funds would be stayed pending the completion of

       the appellate process.

       Discussion and Decision
       I.      Brief Overview of the IMLS
[32]   “A mechanic’s lien is a statutory tool to help collect payment for labor and

       materials that improve real property.” Serv. Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. v. U.S. Steel

       Corp., 182 N.E.3d 840, 842–43 (Ind. 2022) (citing Premier Invs. v. Suites of Am.,

       Inc., 644 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind. 1994)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 19 of 56
               The historical origin and purpose of mechanic’s lien statutes was
               to make a property owner an involuntary guarantor of payments
               for the reasonable value of improvements made to real estate by
               the physical labor or materials furnished by laborers or
               materialmen. Thus, the purpose of mechanic’s lien laws is to
               prevent the inequity of a property owner enjoying the benefits of
               the labor and materials furnished by others without recompense.

       Premier Invs., 644 N.E.2d at 130 (internal citation omitted). Stated differently, a

       mechanic’s lien “prevents landowners from enjoying their improved property

       while those who provided the labor and materials get the shaft.” U.S. Steel, 182

       N.E.3d at 842.

[33]   Indiana has long had a statutory right to a mechanic’s lien. Id. at 842–43.

       Although the precise language of the IMLS “has differed, it has continually

       conferred broad rights on suppliers.” Id. at 843. The current version of the

       IMLS provides that

               A contractor, a subcontractor, a mechanic, a lessor leasing
               construction and other equipment and tools, whether or not an
               operator is also provided by the lessor, a journeyman, a laborer,
               or any other person performing labor or furnishing materials or
               machinery, including the leasing of equipment or tools, for:
                     (1) the erection, alteration, repair, or removal of:
                             (A) a house, mill, manufactory, or other
                             building; or
                             (B) a bridge, reservoir, system of
                             waterworks, or other structure;
                     (2) the construction, alteration, repair, or removal of
                     a walk or sidewalk located on the land or bordering
                     the land, a stile, a well, a drain, a drainage ditch, a
                     sewer, or a cistern; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024        Page 20 of 56
                    (3) any other earth moving operation;
               may have a lien as set forth in this section.

       Ind. Code § 32-28-3-1(a).

[34]   A mechanic’s lien applies to “[t]he entire land upon which the building,

       erection, or other improvement is situated … to the extent of the right, title, and

       interest of the owner for whose immediate use or benefit the labor was done or

       material furnished.” Ind. Code § 32-28-3-2(a). Generally,

               a person who wishes to acquire a lien upon property, whether the
               claim is due or not, must file in duplicate a sworn statement and
               notice of the person’s intention to hold a lien upon the property
               for the amount of the claim:
                      (1) in the recorder’s office of the county; and
                      (2) not later than ninety (90) days after performing
                      labor or furnishing materials or machinery[.]

       Ind. Code § 32-28-3-3(a).

[35]   “The recorded lien relates back to the date the mechanic or other person began

       to perform the labor or furnish the materials or machinery.” Ind. Code § 32-28-

       3-5(b). “Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), a lien created under this

       chapter has priority over a lien created after it.” Ind. Code § 32-28-3-5(b).

       However,

               (c) The lien of a mechanic or materialman does not have priority
               over the lien of another mechanic or materialman.
               (d) The mortgage of a lender has priority over all liens created under
               this chapter that are recorded after the date the mortgage was recorded,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024         Page 21 of 56
               to the extent of the funds actually owed to the lender for the
               specific project to which the lien rights relate.

       Ind. Code § 32-28-3-5(c)–(d) (emphases added).

[36]   “A person may enforce a lien by filing a complaint in the circuit or superior

       court of the county where the real estate or property that is the subject of the

       lien is situated.” Ind. Code § 32-28-3-6(a). “A party seeking a lien must prove

       it falls within the statute.” U.S. Steel, 182 N.E.3d at 843 (citing Premier Invs.,

       644 N.E.2d at 127).

       II. Applicable Standards of Review
       A.      Summary Judgment
[37]   When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment,

       “our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court.” Webb v. City of

       Carmel, 101 N.E.3d 850, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

               We stand in the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo
               standard of review. Our review of a summary judgment motion
               is limited to those materials designated to the trial court.
               Summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated
               evidence shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and
               the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For
               summary judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it bears on
               the ultimate resolution of relevant issues. We view the pleadings
               and designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-
               moving party. Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences
               from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024       Page 22 of 56
       Id. (internal citations omitted). “The initial burden is on the summary-

       judgment movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to

       a determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to

       come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.”

       Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up).

       B.      Findings & Conclusions
[38]   In cases where the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon,

       our standard of review is two-tiered:

               [W]e first determine whether the evidence supports the trial
               court’s findings and second, we determine whether the findings
               support the judgment. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
               when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the
               evidence to support them and the trial court’s judgment is clearly
               erroneous if it is unsupported by the findings and the conclusions
               which rely upon those findings. In determining whether the
               findings on the judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only
               the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable
               inferences to be drawn therefrom.

               In conducting our review, we cannot reweigh the evidence or
               judge the credibility of any witnesses, and must affirm the trial
               court’s decision if the record contains any supporting evidence or
               inferences. However, while we defer substantially to findings of
               fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. We evaluate
               questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s
               determination of such questions.

       Roberts v. Feitz, 933 N.E.2d 466, 475–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations

       omitted, emphasis in original).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024    Page 23 of 56
       C.      Motion to Correct Error
[39]   We review an order granting or denying a motion to correct error for abuse of

       discretion. In re Paternity of V.A., 10 N.E.3d 65, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “An

       abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable

       inferences [drawn] therefrom.” Id.

       III. Analysis
       A.      Validity/Scope of Mechanic’s Liens
[40]   Both ZPS and EdgeRock challenge the trial court’s determination that

       Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens were valid. In addition, ZPS contends

       that the trial court erred by allowing Signworks to include costs for materials

       that were never installed on its property in their mechanic’s liens against ZPS’s

       property.

[41]   1.      Breadth and Scope of Mechanic’s Liens

[42]   In 1896, the Indiana Supreme Court held that

               [w]here labor is performed or materials furnished under one
               contract upon several buildings, all situate[d] upon one lot of land
               belonging to the contracting owner, the lien attaches to all the land
               for the whole value of the labor performed, and it is immaterial
               whether the contract specifies one sum for all work or separate
               amounts for each building.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024            Page 24 of 56
       Premier Steel Co. v. McElwaine-Richards Co., 144 Ind. 614, 619, 43 N.E. 876, 877–

       78 (1896) (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court

       went on to say, however, that “[i]f the work be done or materials are furnished

       upon distinct premises, the lien must be against each of the several premises, according

       to the value of the work and materials incorporated in each, and not against both for

       the aggregate amount.” Id. at 620, 43 N.E. at 878 (emphasis added). More

       recently, we have stated that

               unless, a joint lien is appropriate because work was done on, or
               materials were supplied for, more than one structure on a single
               tract of land, pursuant to one contract, a lien may not be had on
               one structure for work done on or materials furnished for a
               different structure.

       Cato v. David Excavating Co., 435 N.E.2d 597, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), overruled

       on other grounds by Johnson v. Blankenship, 688 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1997) (internal

       citations omitted).

[43]   The question before us is, when work is completed on multiple parcels of land,

       whether a mechanic’s lien can encompass all costs associated with the project

       as a whole or must be restricted in some fashion as it relates to the encumbered

       parcel. Indiana Code section 32-28-3-1(b)(2) states that

               A person … may have a lien separately or jointly … on the
               interest of the owner of the lot or parcel of land:
                      (A) on which the structure or improvement stands; or
                      (B) with which the structure or improvement is
                      connected;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024         Page 25 of 56
               to the extent of the value of any labor done or the material
               furnished, or both, including any use of the leased equipment and
               tools.

       (Emphasis added). The parties dispute the meaning of the term “connected”

       with Garmong and Fox requesting that we define the term “connected” broadly

       and ZPS and EdgeRock requesting that we apply a narrower definition of the

       term, i.e., a definition that would require common ownership of the land in

       question.

[44]   In support of its request for a broad interpretation of the term “connected,”

       Garmong points to this court’s decision in West v. Dreher, 73 Ind. App. 133, 136,

       126 N.E. 688, 689 (1920), in which we concluded that a mechanic’s lien applied

       equally to homes built on two adjoining parcels under one contract because

       “the two houses, within the mechanic’s-lien law of this State, are one piece of

       work.” However, our decision in West does not support an interpretation as

       broad as that requested by Garmong because in West, the two parcels were

       owned by the same individual, 73 Ind. App. at 134, 126 N.E. at 688, and we

       cannot say that our conclusion would have been the same if the lots had been

       owned by different individuals. Garmong also points to our decision in

       Windfall Natural Gas, Mining & Oil Co. v. Roe, 42 Ind. App. 278, 85 N.E. 722

       (1908), overruled on other grounds by Cline v. Indianapolis Mortar & Fuel Co., 65 Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024       Page 26 of 56
       App. 383, 117 N.E. 509 (1917), another case involving common ownership.3

       For its part, Fox cites to our decision in Inter-City Contractors Services, Inc. v.

       Consumer Building Industries, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 665, 373 N.E.2d 903 (1978), for

       the proposition that a mechanic’s lien could be asserted against numerous lots

       for collective work completed under a single contract. However, Inter-City also

       does not support the broad interpretation of the term “connected” favored by

       Fox and Garmong as it dealt with a single parcel owned by a single entity that

       was subsequently divided into numerous lots. Id. at 667–68, 373 N.E.2d at

       905.4

[45]   For their part, ZPS and EdgeRock assert that the cases cited by Garmong and

       Fox actually support their position, i.e., that applicable Indiana authority

       applies a narrower interpretation of the term “connected” as it requires

       common ownership. Based on our reading of the relevant Indiana authority,

       we must agree. See, e.g., Windfall, 42 Ind. App. at 280, 85 N.E. at 723

       (providing that a joint lien may be had upon work completed under a single

       contract when the parcels are connected in construction and ownership). This

       interpretation is consistent with our decision in O.J. Shoemaker, Inc. v. Board of

       Trustees of General Retirement System of City of Detroit, 479 N.E.2d 1349, 1351

       3
         While Garmong does not cite to any Indiana authority that would support the broad interpretation it is
       requesting, it does cite Deegan v. Kilpatrick, 66 N.Y.S. 628 (1900) and Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold
       Mining Co., 111 P.2d 267 (Mont. 1940). However, to the extent that Deegan and Caird can be read as
       supporting Garmong’s position, we are not bound by either case.
       4
         Fox also cites to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Phillips v. Gilbert, 101 U.S. 721 (1879), but
       that case also appears to involve common ownership of all of the land at issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                               Page 27 of 56
       (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), in which we acknowledged that “a lien may not be had on

       one structure for work done on or materials furnished for a different

       structure[.]”5 We interpret relevant Indiana authority as requiring common

       ownership before a mechanic’s lien can be levied against a parcel for work that

       has been completed on numerous parcels. Applying this interpretation to the

       facts of this case, we turn our attention to the question of whether the trial court

       erred in determining that Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens against ZPS’s

       property and EdgeRock’s property were valid.

       i.       Arguments Relating to Garmong’s and Fox’s Liens on ZPS’s Property

[46]   ZPS argues that “[t]he trial court’s finding that ZPS must pay, as part of a

       mechanic’s lien, for work performed on property ZPS does not own is

       unprecedented and inconsistent with Indiana law.” ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p.

       29. ZPS succinctly states, “Indiana law doesn’t allow a contractor to lien one

       property for work performed on another without common ownership.” ZPS’s

       Reply Br. p. 12. ZPS points out that despite having been given the opportunity

       to do so, neither Fox nor Garmong was able to prove the value of the work

       actually performed on ZPS’s property.

       5
         In support of this interpretation, ZPS additionally cites to New England Savings Bank v. Meadow Lakes Realty
       Co., 688 A.2d 345, 348–49 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997), in which the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a
       mechanic’s lien filed against a property could not include amounts relating to work done on a different parcel
       that did not enjoy common ownership. While this case could be considered instructive in so far as its holding
       seems to be consistent with relevant Indiana authority, like the out-of-state cases cited by Garmong, it is not
       binding precedent.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                             Page 28 of 56
       a.      Garmong’s Lien

[47]   ZPS claims that the evidence established that the amount of Garmong’s lien

       includes amounts for work performed on its property, EdgeRock’s property,

       and Dahm’s property. Garmong’s Regional Manager, Mitch Hannum, who

       had been involved with calculating the amount of the lien, testified at trial as

       follows:

               Q:     And so the amount of the lien that Garmong recorded on
               [ZPS’s] property is exactly the same as the amount of the lien it
               recorded on EdgeRock’s property. Is that correct?
               A:     Yes.
               Q:     The two liens cover the same scope of work, right?
               A:     Yeah, it was one project.
               Q:     And they both include work that took place on Lots 1, 2,
               3, 4, and 5, correct?
               A:     That is correct.
               Q:     So [ZPS] owns Lots 1 and 2, but the lien that Garmong
               recorded on this property includes work that was done on Lots 3,
               4, and 5.
               A:     Yes.
               ****
               Q:     So at the time that Garmong executed the ZPS lien, it
               knew that the amount it was claiming included work performed
               on Lots 3, 4, and 5. Is that correct?
               A:     We recorded liens for the entire project. So, yes, we knew
               when we filed liens that work was done on all of the five parcels because
               we performed work on all of the five parcels.
               Q:     And the amount that you were claiming in ZPS’s lien, you
               knew at the time you executed the lien that it included amounts
               that Garmong claimed it was owed for work on Lots 3, 4, and 5.
               A:     Yes, I believe I just - I believe that’s what I just said, yes.
               Yes.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024           Page 29 of 56
       Tr. Vol. III pp. 14–15 (emphases added). In addition, Michael Preyss,

       Garmong’s Chief Financial Officer, testified that he did not know “how much

       of this $1,009,055.62 that is set forth in the mechanic’s lien on [ZPS’s] property

       relates to work performed on” ZPS’s property. Tr. Vol. III p. 224. Preyss

       further admitted that he could not “sit here telling you that X dollars went to

       this particular parcel of land and Y dollars went to this other particular parcel of

       land.” Tr. Vol. III p. 223.

[48]   ZPS claims that Hannum’s and Preyss’s testimony “unequivocally established

       that the Garmong lien on ZPS’s Property included work on property that ZPS

       did not own.” ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p. 42. Further, although Garmong asserts

       otherwise, review of the invoices referenced by Garmong’s counsel indicates

       that the invoices do not appear to have included only work that benefited ZPS’s

       property. In sum, ZPS argues that “Garmong’s executives were right:

       Garmong’s lien on ZPS’s Property includes amounts for work performed on

       Edge[R]ock’s Property and Dahm’s Property. This is fatal to Garmon’s lien

       claim against ZPS’s Property and the trial court’s Judgment enforcing

       Garmong’s mechanic’s lien against ZPS’s Property should be reversed.” ZPS’s

       Appellant’s Br. pp. 44–45. We must agree with ZPS. Based on the evidence

       presented to the trial court, we conclude that Garmong’s mechanic’s lien was

       overstated such that it included costs associated with work that had not been

       completed on ZPS’s property.

[49]   In Abbey Villas Development Corp. v. Site Contractors, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 91, 100–01

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), we noted that where a claimant has intentionally or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 30 of 56
       through culpable negligence overstated the amount due to him, such

       overstatement will render his lien void, but mere mistake will not necessarily

       render the whole lien void when it is clear that no fraud was intended and the

       claimant had not misled the defendant to his prejudice. Garmong asserts that

       to the extent that its mechanic’s lien against ZPS’s property was overstated,

       such overstatement was not intentional or the result of culpable negligence. We

       conclude, however, that the evidence demonstrates otherwise. Hannum’s and

       Preyss’s testimony unequivocally established that the Garmong’s mechanic’s

       lien included work on property that ZPS did not own, and that Garmong had

       known as much when it had filed its lien. As such, we conclude that

       Garmong’s knowing overstatement rendered its mechanic’s lien against ZPS’s

       property void.6 See Abbey Villas, 716 N.E.2d at 100–01.

       b.      Fox’s Liens

[50]   ZPS claims that the majority of Fox’s work on the 175th-Street Project did “not

       even touch Lots 1 and 2” and “it is undisputed that Fox’s lien includes amounts

       for work performed on property not owned by ZPS.” ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p.

       32. ZPS points to the trial testimony of Fox employee Don Adamson, who

       testified that he did “not know the value of the work that Fox performed on

       Lots 1 and 2 related to the 175th Street project” and that none of the line items

       charged in relation to the street construction related exclusively to work

       6
        Because we conclude that Garmong’s mechanic’s lien against ZPS’s property is void, it follows that the
       award of prejudgment interest that was awarded in conjunction with and as part of the lien is extinguished.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                            Page 31 of 56
       completed on Lots 1 and 2. Tr. Vol. IV p. 241. Adamson admitted that he had

       “no idea how to put a value on” the work Fox completed as it relates to ZPS’s

       property and that he “would have no way to know what the value of the work

       is.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 242, 243. Given the lack of evidence relating to the value

       of Fox’s work on the 175th-Street Project on Lots 1 and 2, ZPS claims that Fox

       knowingly overstated its mechanic’s liens on ZPS’s property.

[51]   The trial court appeared to acknowledge that Fox’s mechanic’s liens may have

       been overstated as it related to ZPS, finding that “even if they were [overstated],

       they were not intentionally or negligently overstated.” Appellants’ Jt. App.

       Vol. 2 p. 156. ZPS asserts that, contrary to the trial court’s finding that the

       overstatement was not intentional or negligent, given the evidence

       demonstrating that Fox had known when it had asserted the lien that the lien

       had included costs associated with work that was not done on ZPS’s property,

       its overstatement was intentional. ZPS also asserts that the prejudice in this

       regard was self-evident. We agree with ZPS on both assertions.

[52]   ZPS claims that Fox failed to prove that its mechanic’s liens represented the

       value of its work on ZPS’s property, noting that it did not bear the burden of

       disproving the value but rather that Fox had the burden to prove the value of its

       work. ZPS points to the fact that a large portion of Fox’s work was completed

       on Lot 3, which ZPS asserts provided no value to its property. ZPS also claims

       that it did not benefit from the installation of the water and sewer work as it

       already had access to water and does not tie into the new sewer line, which

       allows Lot 4 access to the sewer system. Thus, ZPS claims that “[t]his water

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 32 of 56
       line and sewer lateral work provided no benefit whatsoever, directly or

       indirectly, to ZPS’s property—yet because Fox included it in its lien against

       ZPS’s Property, the trial court’s judgment forces ZPS to pay for it.” ZPS’s

       Appellant’s Br. p. 36.

[53]   In arguing that it would be inequitable for it to bear the complete cost of the

       175th-Street Project, ZPS points to the fact that its property constitutes only

       10.2% of the property adjoining 175th Street. Fox seems to merely assert that

       its work was common-infrastructure work that benefitted all five lots, including

       ZPS’s property. Again, Adamson testified that he had “no way to know the

       value of the work” on ZPS’s property but acknowledged that the work on 175th

       Street had benefited property owned by EdgeRock and Dahm. Tr. Vol. IV p.

       243. In sum, ZPS asserts that “Fox’s inclusion of amounts in its mechanic’s

       liens that did not benefit ZPS, or for work which was not performed on ZPS’s

       Property and benefited multiple property owners, means it intentionally or

       negligently overstated its liens and thus they are void.” ZPS’s Reply Br. p. 25.

[54]   Similar to our conclusion relating to Garmong, we conclude that the evidence

       demonstrates that Fox’s mechanic’s lien included work on property that ZPS

       did not own, and that Fox had known as much when it had filed the lien. As

       such, we conclude that Fox’s knowing overstatement rendered its mechanic’s

       lien against ZPS’s property void. See Abbey Villas, 716 N.E.2d at 100–01.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 33 of 56
       ii.     Arguments Relating to Garmong’s and Fox’s Liens on EdgeRock’s Property

[55]   At the summary-judgment stage, EdgeRock, Garmong, and Fox sought

       determinations as to the validity of Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens

       against EdgeRock’s property. On April 7, 2021, the trial court determined that

       “Garmong’s mechanic’s lien on Edge[R]ock’s property is valid as a matter of

       law.” Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 71. On May 13, 2021, the trial court

       likewise determined that Fox’s mechanic’s liens, which related to both its direct

       contract with EdgeRock and the Garmong subcontract, were valid as a matter

       of law. In finding both Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens to be valid as a

       matter of law, the trial court determined that the liens had been timely filed and

       that neither Garmong nor Fox had overstated the amount of its lien. Following

       trial, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier determination that Garmong’s and

       Fox’s mechanic’s liens against EdgeRock’s property were valid.

[56]   EdgeRock argues that both Garmong’s and Fox’s liens should have been found

       invalid as a matter of law because neither Garmong nor Fox limited their liens

       to costs associated with work completed on EdgeRock’s property but included

       costs associated with work done on property owned by ZPS and Dahm.

       EdgeRock asserts that as a result of Garmong’s and Fox’s failure to separate out

       the costs associated with work done on each individual property owner’s

       property,

               [t]here are now effectively $4.8 million dollars’ worth of liens on
               lots owned by different people/entities when it is undisputed that
               the cumulative amount owed is only $1.2 million. And on top of
               that, the lien on Lot 3 has been removed altogether so that the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 34 of 56
               only lot benefiting from the work done on Lot 3 is not even in the
               mix anymore. It is inequitable to allow Fox to pursue only ZPS
               and EdgeRock without deducting the real, tangible value
               provided by their work to Lot 3.

       EdgeRock’s Appellant’s Br. p. 55.

[57]   Garmong claims that EdgeRock’s status as the developer for the Project

       subjected it to liability for the entire contract amount. Garmong asserts that if

       EdgeRock “is allowed to avoid the liens, the result is anything but equitable”

       and EdgeRock “should not be permitted to subdivide Garmong’s lien rights for

       the project to avoid paying Garmong.” Garmong’s Appellee’s Br. p. 43. Fox

       also claims that it would be inequitable for EdgeRock “to receive the benefit

       and value of Fox’s infrastructure work without having Edge[R]ock pay for it.”

       Fox’s Appellee’s Br. p. 55. While both Garmong and Fox could clearly have

       received, and in fact did receive, money judgments against EdgeRock for the

       unpaid amount due under the parties’ contracts, it does not necessarily follow

       that Garmong and Fox could assert mechanic’s liens for work done on

       another’s property against EdgeRock’s property.

[58]   The parties have not cited to any Indiana authority creating an exception to the

       common-ownership requirement that would extend EdgeRock’s liability such

       that its property can be encumbered by money owed for work done on

       another’s property by virtue of its status as the Project developer. We conclude

       that the rationale for our conclusions relating to Garmong’s and Fox’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 35 of 56
       mechanic’s liens on ZPS’s property apply equally to the liens on EdgeRock’s

       property. We further conclude, therefore, that the liens were overstated.

[59]   The evidence set forth in the preceding section establishes that both Garmong

       and Fox had known at the time they recorded their mechanic’s liens that the

       lien amounts included work that had been completed on all five parcels. Thus,

       Garmong and Fox overstated their lien amounts when they recorded their

       mechanic’s liens against EdgeRock’s property. Like their liens against ZPS’s

       property, their knowing overstatement has rendered their liens void. See Abbey

       Villas, 716 N.E.2d at 100–01. This conclusion, however, has no effect on the

       trial court’s determination that EdgeRock had breached its contracts with both

       Garmong and Fox or the resulting breach-of-contract judgments entered against

       EdgeRock.

       iii.    Signworks’s Lien

       a.      Inclusion of Costs Relating to Non-Installed Materials
[60]   ZPS also contends that the trial court erred in allowing Signworks to include

       the cost of materials purchased—but not installed on ZPS’s property— in its

       mechanic’s liens. ZPS cites to our opinion in Cho v. Purdue Research Foundation,

       803 N.E.2d 1161, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), for the proposition that a

       contractor “cannot maintain a mechanic’s lien for the value of the materials and

       equipment purchased but not installed or delivered.” See also Stanray Corp. v.

       Horizon Const., Inc., 168 Ind. App. 164, 177, 342 N.E.2d 645, 653 (1976)

       (providing that a lien can only include materials furnished to a property owner,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024   Page 36 of 56
       which means that the materials have both been ordered and delivered to the

       property owner). ZPS reiterates that because “the whole point of the

       mechanic’s lien remedy” is to prevent unjust enrichment to an owner’s

       property, [Signworks] should not be able to recover the costs of the challenged

       materials which “did not improve ZPS’s Property.” ZPS’s Reply Br. p. 32.

[61]   ZPS claims that Signworks’s mechanic’s lien for $93,268.37 included

               $27,500[.00] for what Signworks described as “materials
               presently stored.” It is undisputed that Signworks did not
               perform all of the work called for in the contract as, among other
               things, it has yet to install cabinets and toppers. These materials
               are still being stored in Signworks’[s] warehouse, where they
               remain crated and packed.

       ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p. 50 (internal record citations omitted). ZPS asserts that

       “[p]er Cho, … the value of these cabinets and toppers should not have been

       included in the Judgment; the principal amount of the judgment in favor of

       Signworks should be reduced by $27,500[.00].” ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p. 50.

[62]   Signworks argues that it can recover for the materials in question, which it

       asserts were custom-fabricated for the Project. In support, Signworks cites to

       our opinion in Jackson v. J.A. Franklin & Son, 107 Ind. App. 38, 41–42, 23

       N.E.2d 23, 25 (1939), in which we concluded that “[i]t is not always necessary

       to show that the material went into the building. Circumstances in a given case

       may be such that the owner of the building is estopped from invoking the

       general rule.” (Emphasis in original as published in the Indiana Appellate

       Court Reports). Signworks further cites to our decision in Foster Lumber Co. v.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 37 of 56
       Sigma Chi Chapter House of De Pauw Univ., 49 Ind. App. 528, 532, 97 N.E. 801,

       802 (1912), in which we concluded that “[t]he materialman is properly said to

       have ‘furnished’ the materials when he had delivered or has them ready for

       delivery at the place where he has agreed to deliver them under the contract.”

       (Internal quotation omitted). Signworks asserts that the only reason the

       materials were not installed was because EdgeRock had breached their contract.

       Thus, under the circumstances of this case, Signworks argues that it should be

       able to recover for the uninstalled materials.

[63]   We find our decisions in Cho and Stanray to be instructive on this question. In

       these cases, we concluded that materials are “furnished” when “ordered for and

       delivered.” Stanray, 168 Ind. App. at 177, 342 N.E.2d at 653 (emphasis added).

       As such, we conclude that Signworks’s mechanic’s lien was overstated to the

       extent that it included the $27,500.00 value of the uninstalled materials.

       However, unlike the Garmong and Fox liens, we do not conclude that the

       overstatement was made in a knowing or negligent fashion as there was a good-

       faith dispute as to whether the costs could be included. As such, we conclude

       that Signworks’s overstatement did not render its mechanic’s lien void. See

       Abbey Villas, 716 N.E.2d at 100–01 (providing that mere mistake in

       overstatement will not necessarily render a mechanic’s lien void when it was

       clear that there was no fraud intended). On remand, we therefore instruct the

       trial court to reduce Signworks’s mechanic’s lien to eliminate the cost of the

       uninstalled materials.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024    Page 38 of 56
       b.      Inclusion of Prejudgment Interest
[64]   ZPS also contends that the trial court erred in including an award of

       prejudgment interest in Signworks’s mechanic’s lien.

               When reviewing a decision regarding an award of prejudgment
               interest, our standard of review is for an abuse of discretion,
               focusing on the trial court’s threshold determination as to
               whether the facts satisfy the test for making such an award.
               Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. S.E. Lab Group, Inc., 644 N.E.2d
               615, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. The decision to
               award prejudgment interest rests on a factual determination and
               this court may only consider the evidence most favorable to the
               judgment. Id.

               We note that the crucial factor in determining whether damages
               in the form of prejudgment interest are allowable is whether the
               damages were ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of
               evidence and accepted standards of valuation. Id. at 618. An
               award of prejudgment interest is proper only where a simple
               mathematical computation is required. Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d
               587, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Damages that are the
               subject of a good faith dispute cannot allow for an award of prejudgment
               interest. Id.

       Bopp v. Brames, 713 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added),

       trans. denied.

[65]   While the amount owed to Signworks under its contract with EdgeRock was

       not in dispute, as it related to ZPS, ZPS and Signworks were engaged in a good-

       faith dispute regarding the amount of damages that should be included in

       Signworks’s mechanic’s lien both below and on appeal. Again, “damages that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024          Page 39 of 56
       are the subject of a good faith dispute cannot allow for an award of

       prejudgment interest.” Id. As such, we conclude that the trial court abused its

       discretion in including an award of prejudgment interest in Signworks’s

       mechanic’s lien on ZPS’s property. See Clark v. Hunter, 861 N.E.2d 1202, 1208

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that damages that are the subject of a good-faith

       dispute cannot allow for an award of prejudgment interest nor is an award

       proper when the trial court must exercise its judgment to assess the amount of

       damages).7 On remand, we instruct the trial court to remove the award of

       prejudgment interest from Signworks’s mechanic’s lien.

       B.       Priority Questions
[66]   Given our conclusion that Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens against

       EdgeRock’s property are invalid, there is no longer any question as to whether

       the liens have priority over any portion of the First Bank Mortgage because the

       liens no longer exist. Moreover, it is clear under Indiana law that the First

       Bank Mortgage has priority over the subsequently-entered judgments entered

       against EdgeRock in connection with Garmong’s, Fox’s, and Signworks’s

       breach-of-contract claims. See Huntingburg Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Griese, 456

       N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (“A judgment lien is subordinate to all

       prior conveyances and mortgages and all existing loans and equities in favor of

       7
         While the trial court abused its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest as it relates to ZPS, we again
       note that no similar good-faith dispute as to damages exists as it relates to Signworks’s breach-of-contract
       action against EdgeRock. As such, the award of prejudgment interest that was awarded in relation to
       Signworks’s breach-of-contract action against EdgeRock stands.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                              Page 40 of 56
       third persons.”). On remand, we therefore instruct the trial court to grant the

       First Bank Mortgage priority over all remaining encumbrances on EdgeRock’s

       property that are at issue in this case.

       C.      Challenged Summary Judgment Rulings
[67]   EdgeRock has challenged two of the trial court’s summary judgment rulings,

       which, if found erroneous, could potentially affect the amount of Garmong’s

       breach-of-contract judgment against it.

       1.      Change Order 3

[68]   EdgeRock asserted below that it had not approved Change Order 3 and sought

       summary judgment on the issue. In requesting summary judgment, EdgeRock

       had claimed that “Garmong could not recover amounts incurred pursuant to

       Change Order #3 because EdgeRock never approved this Change Order in

       writing as unambiguously required under the contract” and had designated

       supporting evidence. EdgeRock’s Appellant’s Br. p. 63. For its part, Garmong

       designated evidence indicating that EdgeRock had orally approved Change

       Order 3 and had paid seventy-five percent of the amount due for Change Order

       3 without complaint.

[69]   The trial court denied EdgeRock’s request for summary judgment, finding that

       issues of fact precluded summary judgment. Specifically, the trial court found

       that

               Damian Etchison and Mitch Hannum both testified that
               Edge[R]ock orally approved Change Order 3. This testimony

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024    Page 41 of 56
         contradicts [EdgeRock’s manager Birch] Dalton’s testimony and
         creates an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
         Edge[R]ock provided Garmong with the revised civil drawings
         that were prepared by Edge[R]ock’s own civil engineer and
         asked Garmong to carry out the work depicted on those revised
         civil drawings. If Garmong had not carried out Change Order 3,
         construction on the Project could not have begun. All site
         activity would have stopped after demolition.

         Edge[R]ock also paid for seventy-five percent of Change Order 3.
         When negotiating the $2.1 million payment for the release of the
         November 2018 mechanic’s lien, Edge[R]ock did not assert that
         Change Order 3 was not approved. Edge[R]ock also claims in its
         brief that the $2.1 million payment was a final payment, so
         Edge[R]ock believes it has paid for the Change Order 3 work in
         full.

         Edge[R]ock paying for the Change Order 3 work gives rise to the
         inference that Edge[R]ock approved Change Order 3. The Court
         must construe all inferences that can be drawn from the
         designated evidence in Garmong’s favor. Hughley v. State, 15
         N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). A reasonable factfinder could
         conclude from Edge[R]ock’s payment of Change Order 3 that
         Edge[R]ock approved the Change Order. Thus, there is an issue
         of fact for trial.

Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 pp. 66–67 (emphasis in original, internal record

citation omitted).8

8
  Following trial, the trial court found that Change Order 3 was valid. EdgeRock does not appear to
specifically challenge the trial court’s findings and conclusions relating to Change Order 3 in its final order,
instead focusing its argument on its belief that it had been entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                                Page 42 of 56
[70]   We agree with the trial court that the designated evidence created an issue of

       material fact as to whether EdgeRock had approved Change Order 3. The

       designated evidence established that EdgeRock had orally approved other

       change orders and had paid for seventy-five percent of the charges related to

       Change Order 3 without objection. Witness statements also provided

       conflicting evidence as to whether EdgeRock had orally approved Change

       Order 3 before the included work commenced. The Indiana Supreme Court

       has recognized that a contract providing that any modification must be in

       writing may nevertheless be modified orally. See AM General LLC v. Armour, 46

       N.E.3d 436, 443 n.3 (Ind. 2015) (citing Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d

       154, 161 (Ind. 2005)). Upon reviewing the parties’ designated evidence, the

       trial court determined that issues of material fact existed. Like the trial court,

       we conclude that the designated evidence created an issue of material fact. As

       such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to Change

       Order 3.

       2.      Scope-of-Work Question

[71]   EdgeRock and Garmong filed competing motions for summary judgment on

       the question of whether the 175th-Street Project and the relocation of the Drain

       were included in the scope of work covered by the EdgeRock-Garmong

       contract. EdgeRock claimed below that this work was included in the parties’

       contract and, because Garmong did not complete this work and EdgeRock was

       forced to contract with Fox to complete the work, EdgeRock was entitled to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 43 of 56
       credit for costs associated with this work that had been paid to Garmong. The

       trial court found, as a matter of law, that

               [t]he scope of work listed in the contract did not include the
               [175th-Street Project] or the drain relocation. These items were
               thus not removed from Garmong’s scope of work as they were
               never part of Garmong’s scope of work to begin with.
               Edge[R]ock is not entitled to a contractual credit for the [175th-
               Street Project] or the drain relocation.

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 pp. 64–65. EdgeRock argues on appeal that the trial

       court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Garmong on this issue.

[72]   The designated evidence demonstrated that the EdgeRock-Garmong contract

       provided that the contract sum was guaranteed “not to exceed” $3,255,390.00.

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 225. The scope of work included in the contract

       was detailed in Exhibit B of the contract. Exhibit B outlined both the work that

       was to be completed by Garmong and the budget for said work. The budget

       breakdown provided as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024         Page 44 of 56
Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 240. As the budget breakdown indicates,

$1,300,277.00 was budgeted for work that was to be completed on Lots 1 and 2

and $1,953,113.00 was budgeted for infrastructure work. EdgeRock asserts that

the infrastructure work included all work that was needed to complete the

175th-Street Project and to relocate the Drain. While the budget sheet does

include costs in the infrastructure portion for “Asphalt Paving,” which, in

theory, could have been part of the funds necessary to construct 175th Street,

the budget breakdown does not appear to include any costs that would appear

to apply to drain relocation as “$0” was allocated to plumbing. Appellants’ Jt.

App. Vol. 2 p. 240.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024   Page 45 of 56
[73]   In finding that the 175th-Street Project and the relocation of the Drain were not

       included in the scope of work of the EdgeRock-Garmong contract, the trial

       court noted that adopting EdgeRock’s interpretation of the included scope of

       work would require it to violate the principles of contract interpretation and to

       rewrite the parties’ contract. Specifically, the trial court determined that

               Adopting Edge[R]ock’s reading would require the Court to strike
               out the eight pages of the Guaranteed Maximum Price
               Amendment listing the scope of work. That portion of the
               Guaranteed Maximum Price Amendment would serve no
               purpose if the true scope of work was all the work depicted in the
               drawings.

               Garmong’s reading of the contract by contrast harmonizes the
               whole contract without eliminating any part of it. The only
               reading that makes the document into a cohesive whole is that
               the drawing log lists the source material for the narrower eight-
               page scope of work to be undertaken by Garmong. Garmong’s
               reading is also consistent with the drawings themselves, which
               depict a phased project. Edge[R]ock’s reading of the contract
               would eliminate the phased aspect of the Project as Garmong
               would be carrying out all phases at once.

       Appellants’ Jt. App. Vol. 2 p. 64.

[74]   We agree with the trial court that the designated evidence establishes as a

       matter of law that the 175th-Street and Drain projects were not included in the

       scope of work set forth in the EdgeRock-Garmong contract. In claiming that

       these projects were included, or that a question of material fact existed as to

       whether they were, EdgeRock points to the following pictures which it claims

       prove that drain-relocation work was “foundational work that had to be

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024        Page 46 of 56
completed at the beginning of the Project” and thus must have been included in

the EdgeRock-Garmong contract:

EdgeRock’s Reply Br. p. 22 (noting that the original pictures could be found at

Ex. Vol. 19 pp. 4, 7 but that it had added the arrows and boxes). EdgeRock

argues that these pictures, when considered together with the budget line item

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024   Page 47 of 56
       including $1,179,997.00 for earth moving, with a separate amount included for

       earth moving on Lots 1 and 2, “provide the plans for moving the stream and

       drain as part of the base contract.” EdgeRock’s Reply Br. p. 23. We disagree.

       Rather, we conclude that the pictures relied on by EdgeRock fall short both of

       proving or creating an issue of material fact as to whether that drain-relocation

       work was included in the EdgeRock-Garmong contract as they merely depict

       where the original drain was and to where it was subsequently relocated but do

       not address whether the cost was included in the EdgeRock-Garmong contract.

       Because the designated evidence falls short of either proving EdgeRock’s

       proffered interpretation or creating an issue of material fact on the question, we

       further conclude that the award of summary judgment in favor of Garmong on

       the scope-of-work question was appropriate.

       D.      RIF Funds
[75]   Noting First Bank’s secured interest in the RIF Funds, the trial court initially

       awarded the RIF Funds to First Bank. In doing so, the trial court rejected Fox’s

       claim to the RIF Funds. In its order on the parties’ motions to correct error, the

       trial court acknowledged that ZPS had filed suit against EdgeRock in Cause

       No. PL-5088 and that that action was pending. The trial court amended its

       prior order to award the RIF Funds to EdgeRock. EdgeRock claims that the

       trial court’s determination is correct because pursuant to its contract with the

       City, it is entitled to the RIF Funds.

[76]   First Bank contends that the trial court’s original order was correct with respect

       to the RIF Funds because it holds a first-priority secured interest in the RIF
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 48 of 56
       Funds. First Bank argues that the RIF Agreement was a contract between the

       City and EdgeRock and that Fox has no claims to the RIF Funds under the

       contract and that Fox’s claim on the RIF Funds is not supported by law. First

       Bank likewise argues that ZPS has no claim to the RIF Funds as it has failed to

       offer any evidence in the instant case which supports ZPS’s assertion that it has a

       secured interest in the funds. Furthermore, to the extent that Fox and others

       assert that First Bank is not entitled to the RIF Funds because it had not

       asserted a judicial claim against the funds, First Bank argues that it was not

       required to do so.

[77]   Fox contends that it is entitled to the RIF Funds. In support of its claim, Fox

       notes that it brought the City into the litigation and asserts that it was the only

       party to incur any costs associated with or do any of the work on the 175th-

       Street Project. Fox asserts that the use of impact fees, such as the RIF Funds,

       are controlled by Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1300 et seq., which indicates that

       such funds are to be used to mitigate costs directly in connection with projects

       for the construction of infrastructure, such as roads, public ways, bridges,

       drains, and drainage. See Ind. Code §§ 36-7-4-1305, -1309. Fox claims that

       because it built the 175th-Street Project but was never paid for its work, it is

       entitled to the RIF Funds. Fox argues that while other entities have claimed to

       have a right to the RIF Funds, it was the only party to assert a formal claim for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 49 of 56
       the funds in the instant lawsuit.9 Fox also argues that EdgeRock was not

       entitled to the RIF Funds because it had not incurred any costs associated with

       the 175th-Street Project. EdgeRock contests this argument, claiming that due to

       the allegedly substandard quality of Fox’s work, it had to hire another

       contractor to finish the job. Fox does not have a secured interest in the RIF

       Funds.

[78]   For its part, ZPS contends that it has a secured interest in the RIF Funds. It

       asserts, however, that “[g]iven the multiple interests in the RIF Funds, many of

       which were not represented or addressed in this action, and given that

       Edge[R]ock did not even assert a claim to the RIF Funds, the trial court’s

       award was erroneous and must be reversed.” ZPS’s Appellant’s Br. p. 57. ZPS

       asserts that as of May 24, 2021, EdgeRock owed ZPS $441,879.52 and that in

       relation to this debt, ZPS had secured its interest in the RIF Funds. ZPS argues

       that “[e]ntitlement to the RIF Funds should be determined by the Hamilton

       County Commercial Court, where all entitles with a secured interest in

       Edge[R]ock’s assets are parties.” ZPS’s Reply Br. p. 49. Thus, ZPS claims that

       we should “reverse the award of RIF Funds to Edge[R]ock and remand with

       instructions to the Hamilton County Clerk to continue holding the RIF Funds

       pending resolution of” Cause No. PL-5088. ZPS’s Reply Br. p. 54.

       9
        Fox classifies First Bank’s claimed interest in the RIF Funds as being a private debt obligation that was
       unrelated to the construction of 175th Street.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024                             Page 50 of 56
[79]   Given that at least one party, i.e., First Bank, has a secured interest in the RIF

       Funds, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding the RIF Funds to

       EdgeRock. However, given the allegedly competing secured interests in the

       funds, not all of which are represented in this action but all of which are

       represented in Cause No. PL-5088, we instruct the trial court to stay

       distribution of the funds in this case pending a determination of priority of the

       competing secured interests by the Hamilton Commercial Court. Moreover,

       any future rulings by the trial court regarding the RIF Funds should be

       consistent with the priority determination made by the Hamilton Commercial

       Court in Cause No. PL-5088.

       E.      Attorney’s Fees
       1.      First Bank’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

[80]   “Indiana adheres to the American rule that in general, a party must pay his own

       attorneys’ fees absent an agreement between the parties, a statute, or other rule

       to the contrary.” R.L. Turner Corp. v. Town of Brownsburg, 963 N.E.2d 453, 458

       (Ind. 2012). “[A] contract allowing for recovery of attorney[’s] fees is

       enforceable, if the contract is not contrary to law or public policy.” Holliday v.

       Crooked Creek Vills. Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 759 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2001). “A trial court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees is in the

       exercise of a sound discretion, and in the absence of an affirmative showing of

       error or abuse of discretion we must affirm the trial court’s order.” C.H. v. A.R.,

       72 N.E.3d 996, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (cleaned up). Likewise, “the amount

       recoverable for an award of attorney fees is left to the sound discretion of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024       Page 51 of 56
       trial court.” Holliday, 759 N.E.2d at 1095. “The trial court abuses its discretion

       if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

       circumstances before it.” Id. In addition, the amount of the trial court’s award

       of attorney’s fees must be supported by the evidence. Id.

[81]   First Bank requested that EdgeRock be ordered to pay its attorney’s fees on

       June 9, 2022. In its petition, First Bank asserted that pursuant to the terms of

       the parties’ mortgage and loan agreement, it is entitled to recover attorney’s fees

       from EdgeRock following a default. First Bank alleged that EdgeRock had

       defaulted on the loan agreement “as a result of, among other things,: a. after an

       extension of the maturing date, the loan matured on November 19, 2020; and b.

       the filing of mechanic’s liens by Garmong and Fox, and the failure of

       [EdgeRock] to pay those mechanic’s liens and claims.” Appellants’ Jt. App.

       Vol. 18 p. 193. First Bank asserts on appeal that its petition “fully complied

       with Indiana’s standards for awarding attorneys’ fees” and was supported by

       affidavits which included “meticulous breakdowns of the time spent working on

       Cause No. 29D05-1912-PL-011500 as well as the associated rates charged.”

       First Bank’s Appellant’s Br. pp. 48–49. The trial court denied First Bank’s

       request for attorney’s fees, without explanation, in an order dated July 20, 2022.

[82]   On appeal, First Bank argues that the trial court erred in denying its request for

       attorney’s fees. EdgeRock does not appear to challenge First Bank’s request for

       attorney’s fees. However, Garmong and Fox challenge First Bank’s request for

       attorney’s fees, claiming that “obtaining a judicial finding of default is a

       precondition to obtaining a fee award” and First Bank “did not ask the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024       Page 52 of 56
       court to find that [EdgeRock] defaulted on the note, and the trial court, thus,

       did not make such a finding.” Appellees Garmong & Fox’s Jt. Br. p. 45.

[83]   With respect to attorney’s fees, the First Bank Mortgage documents provide, in

       relevant part, as follows:

               18. COLLECTION EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES.
               On or after the occurrence of an Event of Default, to the extent
               permitted by law, Mortgagor agrees to pay all expenses of
               collection, enforcement, valuation, appraisal or protection of
               Lender’s rights and remedies under this Security Instrument or
               any other document relating to the Secured Debts. Mortgagor
               agrees to pay expenses for tender to inspect, valuate, appraise
               and preserve the Property and for any recordation costs of
               releasing the Property from this Security Instrument. Expenses
               include, but are not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees after
               default and referral to an attorney not a salaried employee of
               Lender. These expenses are due and payable immediately. If not
               paid immediately, these expenses will bear interest from the date
               of payment until paid in full at the highest interest rate in effect as
               provided for in the terms of the Secured Debts. In addition, to
               the extent permitted by the United States Bankruptcy Code,
               Mortgagor agrees to pay the reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred
               by Lender to protect Lender’s rights and interests in connection
               with any bankruptcy proceedings initiated by or against
               Mortgagor.

       Ex. Vol. 19 p. 141. The mortgage documents further provide that

               On or after the occurrence of an Event of Default, Lender may
               use any and all remedies Lender has under state or federal law or
               in any document related to the Secured Debts. Any amounts
               advanced on Mortgagor’s behalf will be immediately and may be
               added to the balance owing under the Secured Debts.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024        Page 53 of 56
       Ex. Vol. 19 p. 140.

[84]   “It is well settled that a mortgage agreement is a contract.” Cobbum v. Ameritrust

       Nat. Bank, Michiana, 580 N.E.2d 969, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). “As such, the

       individual parties have a right to define their mutual rights and obligations.” Id.

       The language agreed to by First Bank and EdgeRock does not base First Bank’s

       right to recover attorney’s fees on a judicial determination that EdgeRock has

       defaulted on the terms of the mortgage agreement, but rather merely indicates

       that attorney’s fees are “due and payable immediately” following default. Ex.

       Vol. 19 p. 141. First Bank asserts that EdgeRock has defaulted in two ways,

       neither of which any party appears to contest occurred. Given First Banks’s

       seemingly undisputed claim that EdgeRock has defaulted on the First Bank

       Mortgage, we conclude that pursuant to the terms of the First Bank Mortgage,

       First Bank adequately demonstrated that EdgeRock had defaulted on the

       parties’ agreement, and, as a result, is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the

       express terms of the mortgage agreement.

       2.      Requests for Appellate Attorney’s Fees

[85]   Garmong, Fox, and Signworks each request an award of appellate attorney’s

       fees. The IMLS provides at Indiana Code section 32-28-3-14 that “a plaintiff or

       lienholder who recovers a judgment in any sum is entitled to recover reasonably

       attorney’s fees.” “The statute also encompasses attorney’s fees associated with

       appellate proceedings.” Ambrose v. Dalton Const., Inc., 44 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2015), as clarified on reh’g, 51 N.E.3d 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.

       denied. Given that we have concluded that Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024      Page 54 of 56
       liens are invalid, we further conclude that neither is entitled to receive an award

       of appellate attorney’s fees under the IMLS.

[86]   Signworks limits its request for appellate attorney’s fees to EdgeRock, claiming

       that “[a]lthough Edge[R]ock has appealed no issues as to Signworks, this

       appeal is still part of Signworks’[s] efforts to collect the debt owed by”

       EdgeRock. Signworks’s Appellee’s Br. p. 17. Signworks does not have a

       mechanic’s lien against EdgeRock’s property and is therefore not entitled to an

       award of appellate attorney’s fees under the IMLS. Moreover, while Indiana

       Appellate Rule 66(E) provides that this court may assess damages, including an

       award of appellate attorney’s fees, if an appeal is frivolous or in bad faith, we

       “use extreme restraint when exercising this power because of the potential

       chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Kelley v. Kelley, 158

       N.E.3d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Given the complexity of the claims

       presented on appeal, we cannot say that Signworks is entitled to an award of

       appellate attorney’s fees under Appellate Rule 66(E).

       Conclusion
[87]   In sum, we conclude as follows: (1) Garmong’s and Fox’s mechanic’s liens are

       invalid as to both ZPS’s property and EdgeRock’s property, (2) the trial court

       erred in including the value of uninstalled materials in Signworks’s mechanic’s

       lien against ZPS’s property and the trial court’s in rem judgment against ZPS

       should be reduced by that amount, (3) the trial court erred in ordering ZPS to

       pay Signworks prejudgment interest, (4) the First Bank Mortgage has priority

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024         Page 55 of 56
       over all remaining encumbrances on EdgeRock’s property that are at issue in

       the instant appeal, (5) the trial court did not err in denying EdgeRock’s motion

       for summary judgment with regard to Change Order 3 or in granting summary

       judgment in favor of Garmong with regard to the scope-of-work question, (6)

       distribution of the RIF Funds is stayed pending a ruling by the Hamilton

       Commercial Court in Cause No. PL-5088 regarding priority of the secured

       interests in the funds and any future ruling from this court regarding the RIF

       Funds should be consistent with that of the Hamilton Commercial Court, (7)

       First Bank is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the terms of the

       First Bank Mortgage, and (8) neither Garmong, Fox, nor Signworks is entitled

       to an award of appellate attorney’s fees. In reaching these conclusions, we

       reiterate that our conclusions do not affect the monetary judgments entered

       against EdgeRock on Garmong’s, Fox’s, and Signworks’s breach-of-contract

       claims and those judgments remain in effect. On remand, we instruct the trial

       court to enter an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

[88]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the

       matter is remanded with instructions.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1968 | January 19, 2024     Page 56 of 56