Court Opinion

ID: 9775782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:59.677666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.957938
License: Public Domain

WHITMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (en *886banc) and Schoelman v. State, 644 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), support appellant’s first ground of error complaining of the trial court’s refusal to charge on criminally negligent homicide. Compare the accused’s testimony in Schoelman with appellant’s written confession in the present case. The Schoelman testimony:
Q: You really took this gun and went to that door to frighten Coe, is that correct?
A: That is correct.
Q: And by frightening him, retrieve your ring, is that correct?
A: I thought he would just give it to me. I had no intention of hurting anyone.
Q: Your intent was to point the gun at him and say, “I want my ring,” is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you did that, did you not?
A: Yes.

Q: I know you didn’t have to have any intent to fire it, you had the gun in your hand and you say it accidental-' ly went off, then you didn’t pull the trigger, Mrs. Tillery hit the gun, isn’t that what you said?
A: She grabbed.
Q: And that caused the gun to go off?
A: That’s correct.
Q: All right. But if you had intended to shoot Buford or anyone, all you had to do was pull the trigger?
A: Sir, I presumed that to be true. I never pulled the trigger on that gun, intentionally, in my life.
644 S.W.2d at 731-32.
Appellant’s written confession:
I had the gun pointed at her, and Joyce reached out toward the gun, and I inadvertently jerked and a shot went off. Joyce fell down and then I realized she was shot.
In both Schoelman and the present case, the accused pointed a gun at another person. In Schoelman, the evidence showed that the victim “grabbed” at the gun and “that caused the gun to go off.” In the present case, the evidence established that the victim “reached out toward the gun” and “a shot went off.” Thus, the critical facts are essentially the same in both Schoelman and the present case. Indeed, the facts in the present case are stronger than in Schoelman. The key to criminal negligence is found in the failure of the actor to perceive the risk. Lugo, 667 S.W.2d at 148. The evidence in the present case established that appellant acted “inadvertently.” “Inadvertent” means “inattentive.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1140 (3d ed. 1976). If appellant was “inattentive,” he failed to detect, spot, or recognize the risk. Therefore, the record establishes that appellant failed to perceive the risk. Schoel-man held that the issue of criminal negligence should have been submitted to the jury. 644 S.W.2d at 734. Likewise, a charge on criminally negligent homicide was required in the present case.
The majority goes to great lengths to tell the Court of Criminal Appeals that the court did not mean what it said in Lugo about the act of pointing a gun at a person raising the issue of, and requiring a charge on, the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. The majority fails in its efforts to distinguish Lugo. Indeed, Lugo relies on Schoelman and quotes the above testimony of the accused in the latter case. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in refusing to charge on criminally negligent homicide. Consequently, I would sustain appellant’s first ground of error and reverse and remand.
Furthermore, I would sustain appellant’s third ground of error for the reasons stated in my dissent in Thomas v. State, 629 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1981), aff'd, 638 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (en banc). Therefore, I would also reverse and remand for that additional reason.