Court Opinion

ID: 9739885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:22:53.236119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.475284
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I take exception only with my colleagues’ treatment of the question of this court’s jurisdiction. As the majority correctly indicates, the trial court’s Rule 304(a) order is deficient in that it fails to recite a finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement. The majority concedes that there exists no precedent for reaching the merits of an appeal brought pursuant to defective Rule 304(a) findings. In my opinion, the rule itself provides sufficient ground for dismissing this appeal and bears repeating in pertinent part: “If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. *** In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.” (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) The purpose of the rule “is ‘to prevent piecemeal appeals and the uncertainty which exists when a final judgment is entered on less than all the matters in controversy.’ ” (Lurz v. Panek (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 179, 181, 519 N.E.2d 1110, quoting Hamer v. Lentz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 692, 695, 508 N.E.2d 324; see also First National Bank v. Lewis (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 160, 516 N.E.2d 552; Mares v. Metzler (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 881, 409 N.E.2d 447, 450, quoting Petersen Brothers Plastics, Inc. v. Ullo (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 625, 630, 373 N.E.2d 416, 420; Blanchette v. Martell (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 368 N.E.2d 458.) In the absence of just reason, all parties and the judiciary are better served by a prompt disposition of the entire suit without awaiting the outcome of a premature appeal. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is ample precedent to hold the anxious litigant to the strict letter of the rule. (See, e.g., Lurz v. Panek, 166 Ill. App. 3d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1110; Hamer v. Lentz, 155 Ill. App. 3d 692, 508 N.E.2d 324; First National Bank v. Lewis, 163 Ill. App. 3d 160, 516 N.E.2d 552.) In First National Bank, plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed for incomplete Rule 304(a) language: “Although the [trial] court expressly found no just reason to delay enforcement of the order, there was not mention of its appealability.” 163 Ill. App. 3d at 162, 516 N.E.2d at 553. In Lurz v. Panek, defendant’s appeal was dismissed as well. The court on review concluded that, although the trial court’s statement expressed the understanding that the order appealed from was “a final and appealable” decree, “the absence of the enforcement language in the court’s statement contravenes the requirements of Rule 304(a).” 166 Ill. App. 3d at 182. Finally, in a setting similar to Lurz, the court in Hamer v. Lentz dismissed plaintiff’s appeal, stating: “Plaintiff argues that this [‘final and appealable’] language ‘comes close’ to the Rule 304(a) finding, apparently equating the word ‘final,’ and the trial court’s ‘intention’ to make the order ‘final’ to expedite his FOIA action, with the word ‘enforceable.’ We do not agree with plaintiff’s construction of this language. As we stated in E.M.S. Co. v. Brandt (1968), 103 Ill. App. 2d 445, 448, 243 N.E.2d 695, the absence of a Rule 304 finding in a judgment — for whatever reason — leaves the judgment final but unenforceable and unappealable. Additionally, as we observed in Rauscher v. Albert (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 485 N.E.2d 1362, a Rule 304(a) finding is a two-pronged determination, requiring an express written finding of both enforceability and appealability, and it is not the trial court’s finding that renders a judgment final; rather, the trial court renders a final judgment enforceable and a final judgment appealable. *** [S]ince the order appealed from in the instant case lacks the express enforcement language required by Rule 304(a), plaintiff’s appeal must be dismissed.” 155 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 508 N.E.2d at 326. In ignoring sound precedent and glossing over the language and purpose of Rule 304(a), the majority purports to find significance in the June 29 order’s recitation of the correct supreme court rule number. Taking the majority’s new construction to its logical conclusion, it would now appear that appellate jurisdiction may be conferred simply by reciting that “pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a), an appeal may be taken from the order of {daté).” I do not believe that it is within the authority of this court to so defeat our supreme court’s rules of appellate jurisdiction. The language of Rule 304(a) is mandatory and precise, not directory or generic — its purpose, salutary, not cavalier. The rule is not unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the ride should be, and until today has been, applied strictly. The trial court’s June 29, 1987, order lacks the requisite finding of enforceability and cannot, in my opinion, confer appellate jurisdiction. The trial court’s June 9 order denying defendants’ numerous post-dismissal motions remained subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the suit. (The record on appeal fails to support the majority’s allusion to an order of June 4. In fact, the erroneous June 4 date was injected by defendants when they presented the order that was signed by the court on June 29.) Lacking appellate jurisdiction, it is our duty to dismiss the appeal. Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 436, 440, 490 N.E.2d 1252,1253. Lastly, given the posture of this case, I can perceive of no reason to anticipate that defendants would have prevailed in an attempt to obtain a corrected Rule 304(a) order. Prior to defendants’ presentment of the defective order, Lawyers Title had indicated its willingness to proceed promptly on an amended complaint. The amended complaint still pends in the circuit court, and defendants have presented no compelling policy arguments for pursuing a review of the earlier dismissed cause of action. I dissent from the majority decision for the reason that this appeal should have been dismissed posthaste without reaching its merits.