Court Opinion

ID: 9556688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 05:09:59.437494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:29.927216
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

HOLLY SWITALSKI, Personal Representative of                        UNPUBLISHED
the ESTATE OF EDWARD SWITALSKI,                                    August 17, 2023

               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 360391
                                                                   Kalamazoo Circuit Court
BRANDON W. CLEVENGER,                                              LC No. 2017-000522-NI

               Defendant-Appellee,

and

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
and HAMILTON MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

               Defendants-Appellants,

and

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

               Defendant.

Before: YATES, P.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       At issue in this case is whether plaintiff’s decedent, Edward Switalski, was “occupying”
Comstock Township Fire Department’s Vehicle 990—a Ford Expedition—when defendant
Brandon W. Clevenger lost control of his car, crashed into the Expedition, and killed then Fire
Chief Switalski. At the time of the accident, the Expedition was covered under an insurance policy
issued by defendant Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company that included $1,000,000 in

                                               -1-
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.1 The Expedition was also covered by a commercial
umbrella policy issued by defendant Employers Mutual Casualty Company with $1,000,000 in
excess coverage. The insurers argued that the UIM coverage was not applicable because Switalski
was not occupying the Expedition when he was struck. A jury unanimously concluded that Chief
Switalski was occupying the Expedition when he was struck and killed. The jury also found that
the Estate of Edward Switalski suffered $942,926 in economic damages and an equal amount in
noneconomic damages.

        Hamilton and Employers argue that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
Switalski was occupying the Expedition at the time of the accident and thus the trial court erred
when it denied their motions for summary disposition and directed verdict. Employers also argues
that it was entitled to summary disposition because the umbrella policy did not include excess
coverage for UIM benefits. We find that there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could
find that Chief Switalski was in the process of getting into the Expedition when he was struck and
killed. We further conclude that the umbrella policy provides excess coverage for all coverages
included in the underlying auto policy, including UIM coverage. We affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

       On June 14, 2017, at about 9:30 p.m., firefighters from the Comstock Township Fire
Department responded to a call about a vehicle that had left the expressway on eastbound I-94.
Chief Switalski responded to the scene in the Expedition assigned to him with his lights activated.
Chief Switalski was seen going to the back of his Expedition where he opened the rear hatch and
donned his firefighting gear consisting of a helmet, boots, pants, jacket, and safety vest. After
confirming that the scene was clear and that the scene could be turned over to the Sheriff’s
Department, Chief Switalski told the deputy chief that he was “in the clear.” The Chief walked
back to his Expedition to leave.

        At some point after Chief Switalski’s conversation with the deputy chief, Clevenger
approached the scene. Clevenger was driving his Mercury vehicle at about 90 miles an hour in the
passing lane. He tried to pass a slow-moving vehicle on the left, but the shoulder was not wide
enough, and he struck a concrete barrier. Clevenger lost control of his car, which began to swerve.
Clevenger’s car spun all the way around to face the opposite direction that he had been driving.
His car struck the rear panel of the Chief’s Expedition at about 64 miles an hour. The Expedition
began to spin counterclockwise, and Clevenger’s car also continued to rotate. The two vehicles
again collided at the rear of the Expedition. Chief Switalski was briefly pinned, and his left leg
was bent under the Expedition with such force that it was nearly severed—only a piece of skin
connected his lower leg to the remainder of his body. The force of the crash caused the two
vehicles to separate, and the Chief was thrown 30 feet down an embankment. Despite heroic
efforts to revive him, Chief Switalski died at the scene. There was evidence that the Chief was
behind the Expedition with the hatch open and was removing his gear at the time that he was
injured.

1
    Clevenger only had $20,000 in liability coverage.

                                                 -2-
        Holly Switalski, as the personal representative of her late husband’s estate, initiated this
action on behalf of the Estate against Clevenger, Hamilton, and Employers. The Estate brought a
claim against Clevenger for damages arising from the Chief’s wrongful death and claims against
Hamilton and Employers for UIM benefits. The Estate later amended its complaint to include
Farmers, which was the insurer of Chief Switalski’s privately owned vehicle.2

        Following discovery, Hamilton and Employers moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Hamilton conceded that its business automobile insurance policy applied
generally to the Expedition and to persons, such as the Chief, who were properly using the
Expedition. But Hamilton maintained that there was no UIM coverage because there was no
evidence the Chief was occupying the Expedition at the time of the accident. Hamilton stated that
the term “occupying” was defined in the policy to mean “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.” And
because the Estate was not entitled to UIM benefits, the insurers argued that excess coverage was
not triggered under Employers’ umbrella policy. The Estate argued that there was evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Chief Switalski was occupying the Expedition at the
time of impact. The trial court concluded that there was a genuine dispute whether the Chief was
in, upon, getting in, on, out, or off the Expedition and denied the motion. The insurers moved for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied.3

         Thereafter, Employers moved for summary disposition arguing that its umbrella policy did
not cover the losses at issue. Specifically, it asserted that the umbrella policy’s excess coverage
applied only to underlying insurance policies that were listed on the declarations page of the
umbrella policy. Because the UIM coverage issued by Hamilton was not listed on the declarations
page with its limit, Employers maintained there was no umbrella coverage. It also argued that the
umbrella policy excluded coverage for losses payable under uninsured or underinsured motorist
law. In response, the Estate asserted that the underlying policy issued by Hamilton included an
endorsement for UIM coverage and the overall policy was listed on the declarations page of the
umbrella policy. The Estate also maintained that the exclusion did not apply because Michigan
law did not require UIM benefits. The trial court denied Employers’ motion, concluding that the
umbrella policy included “all of the commitments set forth by the [Hamilton] policy by virtue of
its statement on the declarations page and that that would include such coverage as exists for
uninsured or underinsured motorist loss.”

       Following a 5-day jury trial, the jury unanimously concluded that Chief Switalski was
occupying the Expedition when he was struck and killed. The jury also found that the Estate
suffered $942,926 in economic damages and an equal amount in noneconomic damages. After

2
    Farmers settled with the Estate and is not a party to this appeal.
3
 Hamilton and Employers applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which a majority of this Court
denied. Estate of Switalski v Clevenger, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
September 13, 2019 (Docket No. 348793). Our Supreme Court also denied leave. Switalski v
Clevenger, 505 Mich 1022 (2020).

                                                   -3-
additions for costs and interest, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Estate against
Hamilton and Employers for $2,976,989.58. This appeal followed.

                                II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        “We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). We also review
de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict. Taylor v Kent Radiology, PC,
286 Mich App 490, 499; 780 NW2d 900 (2009). And we review de novo the proper interpretation
of an insurance agreement. Rednour v Hastings Mut Ins Co, 468 Mich 241, 243; 661 NW2d 562
(2003). We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion. Farm Bureau Ins Co v TNT Equip, Inc, 328 Mich App 667, 672; 939 NW2d 738 (2019).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that falls outside the range of
principled outcomes. Id.

                                      III. “OCCUPYING”

        Hamilton and Employers argue that the trial court erred when it denied their motions for
summary disposition, reconsideration, and directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence
to establish that Switalski was occupying the Expedition at the time of the accident. We disagree.

                                A. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

        When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court
must consider the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and may only grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact. El-Khalil, 504
Mich at 160. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (cleaned up). But “[t]he court is not permitted to assess
credibility, or to determine facts” in analyzing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). “This Court is liberal in
finding genuine issues of material fact.” Jimkoski v Shupe, 282 Mich App 1, 5; 763 NW2d 1
(2008).

        Hamilton and Employers argue that the Estate was not entitled to UIM benefits because
the undisputed evidence showed that Chief Switalski was not occupying the insured Expedition at
the time of his injury. The Legislature did not mandate the purchase of UIM benefits under the
provisions for no-fault insurance; for that reason, insurers may—but are not required to—offer the
additional coverage and may offer it in whatever form the insurer wishes to risk. Nickola v MIC
Gen Ins Co, 500 Mich 115, 122; 894 NW2d 552 (2017). Because UIM coverage is optional, the
rights and limitations applicable to UIM coverage are governed by the terms of the insurance
contract. Anderson v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, 322 Mich App 76, 84-85; 910 NW2d 691
(2017). When construing a contact, this Court gives the “words used in the contract their plain
and ordinary meaning,” which would be “apparent to a reader of the instrument.” Rory v
Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). An unambiguous contract must be
enforced as written. Id. at 468.

      Hamilton and Employers argue that the UIM endorsement only applied to an insured who
was “occupying” the Expedition when the insured suffered injuries. The contract defines

                                                -4-
“occupying” to mean “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.” The insurers maintain that the evidence
showed that the Chief was, at most, in contact with the Expedition when he was injured, which did
not establish that he was in, upon, or getting in, on, out, or off it. The Estate argued that the
evidence supported the conclusion that the Chief was either “upon” the Expedition or in the process
of “getting in” the Expedition when he was injured.

        Hamilton’s policy defines “occupying” with simple and direct language. The first two
terms—“in” and “upon”—are prepositions. In ordinary speech, the preposition “upon” is
interchangeable with the preposition “on.” See Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co (On Remand),
207 Mich App 344, 351; 526 NW2d 183 (1994), rejected not in relevant part by Rednour, 468
Mich 241 (2003). And the context makes clear that the present participle “getting” modifies each
of the subsequent prepositions (in, on, out, or off) to form participial phrases. The participial
phrases—such as “getting in”—refer to a process or sequence of actions that will result in the
person being in, on, out, or off the vehicle. Rohlman, 207 Mich App at 351 (analyzing an identical
definition of “occupying” and concluding that the term “getting” modifies each of the following
prepositions). The definition incorporates two states: the state of being in the vehicle and the state
of being upon the vehicle; it also incorporates four processes: the process of getting in the vehicle,
the process of getting on the vehicle, the process of getting out of the vehicle, and the process of
getting off the vehicle. The language is susceptible to ordinary understanding and is not ambiguous
on its face.

        We conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the Chief was “getting
in” the Expedition when he was struck and killed. Although there are no Michigan authorities
establishing a test for determining what constitutes “getting in” in the context of this definition of
“occupying” a vehicle, this Court has discussed the meaning of the no-fault provision allowing
coverage for persons “entering into” a covered vehicle as provided under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).4
As our Supreme Court has recognized, the phrases “entering into” and “alighting”—as used in the
no-fault law—have narrow meanings, which must be respected. Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490
Mich 381, 385 n 1; 808 NW2d 450 (2011). The phrase “getting in,” by contrast, is broader.

        In Ansara v State Farm Ins Co, 207 Mich App 320, 321-322; 523 NW2d 899 (1994), this
Court held that the plaintiff was in the process of entering his car when he was walking to the
driver’s side of the car. The evidence showed that the plaintiff went to his car, opened the driver’s

4
  This Court has recognized that “entering into” a vehicle constitutes a process that begins before
a person’s body crosses the threshold of the vehicle—that is, before a person begins to physically
place his or her body into the car. We have distinguished between a person walking to the vehicle
and interacting with the vehicle in some way to initiate the process of entering. See, e.g., Graves
v Collier, 335 Mich App 14, 23; 966 NW2d 229 (2020) (stating that the injured person must
ordinarily have initiated the entering process by touching the door); Hunt v Citizens Ins Co, 183
Mich App 660, 664; 455 NW2d 384 (1990) (holding that a person who has his keys in hand and
is touching the door has begun the process of entering into the car); McCaslin v The Hartford
Accident & Indemnity, 182 Mich App 419, 422; 452 NW2d 834 (1990) (holding that a plaintiff
who was struck while walking back to his car after paying for gas was not “entering into” his
vehicle because he had not yet made contact with the door).

                                                 -5-
door, sat down, started the car, and turned on the air conditioning. He got out again and walked to
the passenger’s side of the car. He then helped his wife secure their grandson in the car and walked
back to the driver’s side. On the walk back to the driver’s side, the plaintiff broke his ankle. Id.
at 321. On these facts, this Court determined that the plaintiff was in the process of entering the
car when he suffered his injury because he had interacted with the car as part of the process to
enter it. Id. at 321-322.

        The facts adduced on summary disposition in this case are akin to those that this Court
determined amounted to “entering into” a vehicle in Ansara. There was evidence that Chief
Switalski had completed his tasks at the scene and told his deputy chief that he was leaving. The
deputy chief observed the Chief walk back to the Expedition, which had been specifically assigned
to the Chief as his command vehicle. There was expert testimony that, based on the physical
evidence, the Chief was facing forward at the rear of the Expedition with the hatch open when he
was struck and injured. There was also evidence from which a jury could infer that the Chief
opened the hatch and was removing and stowing his firefighter’s gear in the Expedition when he
was struck. The jury could find that removing and stowing his gear was an essential step that
reasonably had to be performed before the Chief could move to the driver’s side door and
physically place himself inside the Expedition. Indeed, Chief Switalski’s successor, Chief
Matthew Beauchamp, testified at his deposition that Chief Switalski never wore his helmet when
driving. The evidence that the Chief had made physical contact with the vehicle—as opposed to
being in the process of walking to it—and was taking steps to stow his gear is similar to the facts
of Ansara. In both cases the injured parties interacted with the vehicle in ways that were
preliminary to, and reasonably necessary before, physically positioning themselves in the vehicle.
See Ansara, 207 Mich App at 321-322. Because there was evidence that the Chief had physically
interacted with the Expedition and begun the process of “getting in” it when he was struck, we
conclude that there was a factual dispute as to whether he was “occupying” the Expedition and
thus entitled to UIM benefits under the policy issued by Hamilton. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err by denying the insurers’ motion for summary disposition.5 And because the trial court did
not err when it denied the insurers’ motion for summary disposition, it did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the insurers’ motion for reconsideration. See Farm Bureau Ins Co, 328 Mich App
at 672.

                                     B. DIRECTED VERDICT

        For similar reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the insurers’
motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the opposing party. See Taylor, 286 Mich App at 499. We review a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing all the evidence and all legitimate
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The motion should be granted
only if a review of the evidence in that light fails to establish the claim as a matter of law. Id. “If

5
 Although the trial court did not premise its decision to deny the motion for summary disposition
based on the facts that supported an inference that the Chief was “getting in” the Expedition, it
nevertheless reached the correct result. See Varela v Spanski, 329 Mich App 58, 81; 941 NW2d
60 (2019).

                                                 -6-
reasonable persons, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, could honestly reach different conclusions about whether the nonmoving party established
his or her claim, then the question is for the jury.” Id. at 500.

        At trial, the Estate presented evidence that Chief Switalski had walked to the Expedition
and begun interacting with the storage space in the back as a prerequisite to leaving. Specifically,
there was evidence that he placed his firefighter’s helmet in the back, may have placed other gear
in the back, and had begun to remove a boot, presumably to stow it in back, when he was struck.
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to determine that Chief
Switalski was in the process of “getting in” the Expedition when he was struck and killed.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for a directed verdict. See id.
at 499-500.

                                     IV. EXCESS COVERAGE

        Employers argues that it was entitled to summary disposition because the umbrella policy
did not include excess coverage for UIM benefits. We disagree.

        “Umbrella policies provide unique coverage, often called catastrophe coverage.” Bosco v
Burmeister, 456 Mich 279, 294; 571 NW2d 509 (1997). With an umbrella policy, liability attaches
when the insured has exhausted the limits of an underlying insurance policy. Id. at 296. In this
case, it was undisputed that Chief Switalski was an insured under the umbrella policy that
Employers issued to the township. But Employers argued to the trial court that the umbrella policy
did not apply to the UIM coverage at issue because (1) the UIM coverage was not listed on the
declarations page of the umbrella policy, and (2) the umbrella policy excluded coverage for losses
payable under uninsured or underinsured motorist law.6

        Under the terms of the umbrella policy, Employers agreed to pay “on behalf of the insured
the ‘ultimate net loss’ in excess of the ‘retained limit’ because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ to which this insurance applies.” The umbrella policy applies only to bodily injury or
property damage subject to a “retained limit.” The policy defines the term “retained limit” to mean
the “available limits of ‘underlying insurance’ scheduled in the Declarations . . .” The term
“underlying insurance” is defined to mean “any policies of insurance listed in the Schedule of
‘underlying insurance’ ” (emphasis added).7 In the schedule of underlying insurance, Employers

6
  On appeal, Employers also argues that it was entitled to summary disposition because the
umbrella policy only applied to obligations that the insured becomes liable to pay to a third party.
But Employers did not raise this argument in the trial court and thus it has waived it. Tolas Oil &
Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 359090); slip op at 3. Although we have the discretion to consider issues that were
not properly preserved in the trial court, Miller v Mich Dep’t of Corrections, __ Mich App __, __;
__ NW2d __, (2022) (Docket No. 356430); slip op at 7, we must exercise that discretion sparingly
and only in exceptional circumstances. Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 233-234, 414 NW2d 862
(1987). Accordingly, we decline to address this unpreserved argument.
7
    Notably, this language looks to “policies of insurance” rather than specific coverages.

                                                  -7-
identified the underlying policy issued by Hamilton with the policy number “3E65035.” The title
page of the commercial auto policy issued by Hamilton stated that it was policy “3E65035.” The
umbrella policy plainly lists the auto policy as underlying insurance to which excess coverage
applies, which would encompass all coverages under the auto policy including UIM coverage.

        We further conclude that the exclusionary clause cited by Employers is inapplicable. It is
an insurer’s burden to establish that an exclusion negates coverage. Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich
366, 373; 852 NW2d 562 (2014). And “[e]xclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly
construed in favor of the insured.” Id. (cleaned up). Employers maintains that its umbrella policy
excluded coverage for “[a]ny loss, cost or expense payable under or resulting from any first-party
physical damage coverage; no-fault law; personal injury protection or auto medical payments
coverage; or uninsured or underinsured motorist law.” This exclusion does not exclude any and
all losses associated with uninsured or underinsured coverage; it only applies to a “loss, cost or
expense” that becomes “payable under or resulting from . . . uninsured or underinsured motorist
law.” Under the plain terms of the exclusion, the loss must be payable or result from the applicable
law. But Michigan law does not mandate payment of losses arising from an underinsured motorist.
UIM coverage is optional; it is not imposed by statute or “law.” Accordingly, this exclusion does
not apply by its own terms.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Christopher P. Yates
                                                             /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                             /s/ Sima G. Patel

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