Court Opinion

ID: 9546536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:31:46.400447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:35.581255
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, J.
We dissent. While we agree with the conclusions reached in that portion of the majority opinion which holds that plaintiffs were wrongfully *604discharged from their employment, we cannot concur in the view that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the compensation specified in the contract of employment. When an attorney employed under a contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services performed by him prior to his discharge. (See concurring opinion in Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal.2d 150, 156 [124 P.2d 21]; Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A.2d 396, 136 A.L.R 226]; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779 [70 S.W.2d 671]; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 N.W. 487]; Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 [14 N.E. 46, L.R.A. 1917F 402] ; Cavers v. Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust Co., 166 Wash. 449 [7 P.2d 23] ; see also cases in 136 A.L.R. 254.) He should not be permitted to recover the fee fixed in the contract, however, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in Salopek v. Schoemann, supra. The present ease was tried and submitted to the jury upon the theory that the proper measure of damages for breach of an employment contract of this nature is the compensation fixed by the terms of the contract. In our opinion, there should be a retrial of the issue of damages for that reason. While it is true that the verdict does not award plaintiffs a sum commensurate with that provided for in the contract, it is impossible to determine how the jury arrived at its verdict in view of the theory upon which the ease was tried.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.