Court Opinion

ID: 9834038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:15:11.217587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.151177
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
 Upon consideration of appellee’s motion for rehearing and appellant’s reply thereto, we have concluded that there was error in the original decision in holding that the letter from appellant to appellee containing shipping directions was a part of the contract and made the agreement one for delivery in Dallas. It is clear that, without considering this letter as a part of the contract, venue was not laid in Dallas county, as there was fio particular county specified in which performance was to be had, and it was only on the theory that the letter constituted a part of the contract that the conclusion was reached that venue lay in Dallas county. Commercial Credit Co. v. Ballard et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 263 S. W. 1101; Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co. v. Barronian (Tex. Civ. App.) 282 S. W. 315.
The contract was completed by the exchange of the telegrams noted, and, although while unperformed it could have been modified without a new consideration arising, still there is nothing in the original agreement stipulating that the designation by appellant of the destination of the hay should be in writing. These directions could have as well been given in person or over long .distance as by letter, and would have been as binding. The appellee did not reply to this letter of instructions, and did not in writing add anything to its existing obligation.
To hold appellee had agreed in writing to deliver the hay in Dallas by reading appellant’s letter of instructions into the contract would, in effect, impose on appellee, by implication, an obligation in writing to perform in a particular county, and this the law of venue does not permit. Allison v. Hamic (Tex. Com. App.) 260 S. W. 1037.
The place of performance must be plainly designated in writing. The only implication permissible is where performance is fixed-at a place to be found only in a particular county. Then performance in that county is implied. Russell v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 448; Cumming v. Chilson (Tex. Civ. App.) 265 S. W. 1099.
The error in the original opinion is the holding that the original contract, as evidenced by the telegrams, plainly and certainly contemplated that there would be added as a part thereof subsequent shipping instructions, and until such shipping instructions were received the contract was not complete. It was, of course, contemplated that shipping instructions would be given, but there is nothing in the original contract to indicate that these instructions should be in writing.
We have concluded that the letter of appellant merely giving directions as to the method of performance of the contract already completed cannot be ingrafted on to the agreement so as to require appellant to answer at a different place from that required under the contract as originally made.
In any event, the matter of adding the' letter of instructions as a written obligation to the agreement is certainly involved in considerable doubt and perplexity, and it is the rule that venue cannot be conferred on a strained and doubtful inference or construction.
For the reasons-stated, appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.