Court Opinion

ID: 9867785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 17:04:12.760542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:00.131210
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                VINCENT EDWARD WINSTON, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 21-0495
                               FILED 9-26-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2011-007477-002
                 The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ashley Torkelson Levine
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jesse Finn Turner
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. WINSTON
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1            Vincent Edward Winston appeals his convictions and
sentences for sexual assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, and assault. For
reasons that follow, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2           Winston and his then-girlfriend Adrienne Kitcheyan had an
“open” relationship and regularly sought out sexual encounters with other
women. Kitcheyan described Winston as an aggressive and demanding
person, admitting that “anything he wanted me to do, I would do.”

¶3            In April 2011, Winston and Kitcheyan saw Sasha1 at a gas
station asking other patrons for a ride. The couple agreed to drive Sasha to
her friend’s house and then invited her to spend time with them. The group
drove around the Phoenix area, smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol.

¶4           At some point, Sasha became impaired and vomited in the
backseat. A frustrated Winston dropped Kitcheyan and Sasha off at the
couple’s apartment and left to get more alcohol. Once inside, Kitcheyan
told Sasha to remove her clothes so they could wipe off the vomit.
Kitcheyan rubbed a towel over Sasha’s entire body, including her genital
area. Kitcheyan wrapped Sasha in a clean towel and took her to the
bedroom. Although Sasha did not explicitly refuse, she froze at Kitcheyan’s
touch and did not appear interested in sexual activity.

¶5            When Winston arrived at the apartment, he sat in a chair near
the bed. The couple poured Sasha a strong alcoholic drink, intending to
further impair her. Kitcheyan undressed and began touching Sasha’s breast
and stomach area. Sasha did not appear interested in this contact and asked
to be taken home. Winston exclaimed, “you should slap the shit out of her.”
Kitcheyan then hit Sasha in the face, and Winston hit her in the leg, grabbed
her by the throat, and moved her to the middle of the bed. Kitcheyan later

1     We use a pseudonym to protect the victim’s privacy.

                                     2
                           STATE v. WINSTON
                           Decision of the Court

admitted that, from then on, she knew Sasha had not consented and acted
only out of fear.

¶6            Winston forced Sasha to engage in oral sexual contact with
Kitcheyan while he digitally penetrated her genitals. When Winston
inserted his penis in Sasha’s genitals, she asked him to stop and insisted
that she could not engage in sexual intercourse. Sasha attempted to fight
Winston and Kitcheyan off, but they held her down until she complied. The
assault continued for what “felt like hours,” with Winston digitally
penetrating both women and ordering them to engage in oral sexual
contact.

¶7            Sasha waited for Winston and Kitcheyan to fall asleep before
running from the apartment, leaving her clothes and purse behind. Sasha
found a security guard parked nearby, told him she had been sexually
assaulted, and asked for help. When police officers arrived, Sasha was
wearing only a towel and appeared to be visibly upset. Officers took Sasha
for an examination by a forensic nurse, who observed injuries consistent
with an assault and collected swabs for DNA testing. Although Sasha
expressed some reluctance to prosecute, she cooperated with the
investigation and disclosed details of the assault.

¶8           The morning after the assault, Winston and Kitcheyan awoke
to find that Sasha had left the apartment. Winston quickly discarded
Sasha’s belongings and the vomit-stained towel in the apartment complex’s
dumpster, items that would later be retrieved by officers. When the couple
learned that officers were looking for them, they fled to Globe, Arizona.
Winston instructed Kitcheyan to lie if ever questioned by officers and claim
that Sasha had been a consenting sex worker.

¶9            In May 2011, Winston and Kitcheyan were arrested on
unrelated charges in Globe. Those charges arose after a vulnerable adult
victim reported that the couple took her to their motor home, gave her
alcohol, and touched her breast and genital area. Winston and Kitcheyan
pled no contest to vulnerable adult abuse in that case.

¶10           Officers subsequently traveled to Globe to question Winston
about the current case, and he responded by denying that he knew Sasha
or that he had engaged in any sexual activity with her. Kitcheyan admitted
to knowing Sasha but declined to answer any questions about her. Sasha
identified both suspects in a photo lineup.

¶11         Forensic scientists subjected the swabs taken from Sasha to
DNA testing, locating sperm cells on the external genital swab. Winston’s

                                     3
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

DNA profile matched the profile obtained from Sasha’s external genital
swab, as well as profiles from her chest, forehead, and circumoral swabs.
Kitcheyan’s DNA profile matched the profile obtained from Sasha’s chest
and circumoral swabs.

¶12           The State charged Winston with five counts of sexual assault,
class 2 felonies, one count of kidnapping, a class 2 felony, one count of
sexual abuse, a class 5 felony, and two counts of assault, class 3
misdemeanors. Kitcheyan, who the State charged as a co-defendant,
entered a plea agreement. As part of that agreement, she agreed to testify
at Winston’s trial.

¶13           Winston waived his right to counsel and elected to represent
himself in a 20-day jury trial. The victim testified at trial, as did Kitcheyan.
Additionally, the State presented expert testimony about the DNA results
and the victim’s forensic nurse examination. Winston called two defense
experts to challenge that evidence.

¶14          The jury found Winston guilty as charged. After finding
Winston had at least two prior felony convictions, the superior court
sentenced him to an aggregate term of 78.75 years’ imprisonment. Winston
timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Testimony Regarding the Victim’s Religious Faith.

¶15            Winston argues that the State improperly emphasized the
victim’s religious faith, thereby bolstering her credibility. Because Winston
failed to object to the testimony at issue, he is not entitled to relief absent
fundamental error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018). To
establish fundamental error, Winston must show error that (1) went to the
foundation of his case, (2) denied him a right essential to his defense, or (3)
was so egregious as to deny the possibility of a fair trial. Id. at 142, ¶ 21.
Under the first two prongs, he must also show prejudice. Id.

¶16           During Sasha’s trial testimony, she acknowledged an initial
reluctance to seek prosecution. On cross-examination, Winston asked
Sasha to explain this hesitancy and she stated that her religious faith
allowed her to feel empathy for her perpetrators. Winston questioned
Sasha about her mental health, eliciting testimony that she experienced
depression and “grandiose delusions.” Sasha explained that her religious
faith caused her to place unfounded trust in others and to believe that even

                                       4
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

damaging events are “part of God’s plan,” which some may find
delusional.

¶17            On redirect, Sasha clarified that her use of the term delusional
did not mean she had inaccurately perceived the assault. She explained
that her religious faith made her act in ways that seemed counter-intuitive
or illogical. At the close of Sasha’s testimony, a juror posed a question on
the topic, and Sasha repeated that her religious faith led her to place
unwarranted trust in her perpetrators. Later, in closing argument, the State
explained that Sasha’s hesitancy in seeking prosecution stemmed from a
religious belief that all people are inherently “good.” The State argued that
Sasha’s statement about delusional thinking did not mean she hallucinated
the assault, but that she believed it to be part of “God’s plan.”

¶18           Testimony regarding a witness’s religious beliefs is
inadmissible for the purpose of bolstering their credibility. Ariz. R. Evid.
610; see also Thomas, 130 Ariz. at 436 (noting the Arizona Constitution’s
“direct prohibition” against eliciting such testimony) (citation omitted). We
have held, however, that where religious faith evidence “is probative of
something other than veracity, it is not inadmissible simply because it may
also involve a religious subject as well.” State v. Stone, 151 Ariz. 455, 458–
59 (App. 1986) (finding religious faith evidence admissible to provide
context for the witness’s identification of the suspect); State v. Crum, 150
Ariz. 244, 246 (App. 1986) (finding religious faith evidence admissible to
prove the defendant’s method of gaining access to victims). Moreover, the
admission of objectionable testimony does not result in error if the
defendant “opens the door to further inquiry.” State v. Garcia, 133 Ariz. 522,
525–26 (1982).

¶19            Here, Winston sought to weaken Sasha’s credibility on cross-
examination by focusing on her initial reluctance to seek prosecution and
what she referred to as “grandiose delusions.” Sasha explained that her
counter-intuitive behavior, placing trust in and feeling empathy for her
perpetrators, stemmed from her religious faith. This opened the door to
further clarification from the State on redirect, specifically to contextualize
Sasha’s behavior and negate any implication that she hallucinated the
assault. See Garcia, 133 Ariz. at 525–26. Here, the religious faith evidence
helped explain why the victim got into a car with strangers, felt she could
trust them, and later felt hesitant to seek punishment. Such testimony was
“probative of something other than veracity.” See Stone, 151 Ariz. at 458.
We find no error, fundamental or otherwise.

                                      5
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

II.    Alleged Prosecutorial Error.2

¶20           Winston argues the State committed prosecutorial error by (1)
presenting religious faith evidence and (2) denigrating defense experts by
focusing on their compensation and appealing to jurors as taxpayers.
Winston did not object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial error at trial,
so we review solely for fundamental error. State v. Arias, 248 Ariz. 546, 555,
¶ 31 (App. 2020). To warrant reversal, prosecutorial error must have “so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶21            The State may not appeal to the “emotions, prejudices, or
passions” of the jury to obtain a guilty verdict. State v. Acuna Valenzuela,
245 Ariz. 197, 222, ¶ 109 (2018). That said, counsel is given “wide latitude”
in offering closing argument, State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 436–37 (1970),
impeaching witnesses on cross-examination, State v. Torres, 97 Ariz. 364, 366
(1965), and presenting “fair rebuttal to areas opened by the defense,” State
v. Alvarez, 145 Ariz. 370, 373 (1985). The use of “excessive and emotional
language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal” in
arguing their case to the jury. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. at 437.

       A.     The State’s Use of Religious Faith Evidence.

¶22            As addressed above, the State must not make “deliberate
references” to the victim’s religious faith to bolster the “inherent
believability” of their version of events. Thomas, 130 Ariz. at 435–37 (finding
reversible error where the State argued the victim should be believed
because of her “religious, moralistic” upbringing). Here, the State did not
use the challenged testimony to argue Sasha should be believed based on
her religious faith. The State presented fair rebuttal to Winston’s questions
on cross-examination, using the testimony to explain Sasha’s behavior
before, during, and after the assault. See Alvarez, 145 Ariz. at 373; Gonzales,
105 Ariz. at 436–37. We find no error.

       B.     The State’s Treatment of Defense Experts.

¶23           The State’s experts testified about the results of the DNA
testing and forensic nurse examination. In turn, Winston called two defense

2      Winston does not allege that the prosecutor acted in violation of the
ethical rules. We therefore frame our discussion in terms of prosecutorial
error rather than misconduct. See In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458, 469–70,
¶¶ 46–47 (2020).

                                       6
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

experts to challenge their methods and findings. Winston’s DNA expert
testified that he disagreed with the State’s experts and did not find
conclusive results linking Winston to the assault. But the expert had not
conducted the full scope of available testing and used an older, less
sensitive instrument to develop his results. Winston’s other expert, a
forensic nurse, criticized aspects of the physical examination and the DNA
analysis, and she noted a lack of injury to Sasha’s genital area. But the nurse
conceded that the physical examination conducted at the direction of law
enforcement officers followed Arizona protocol, and that not all sexual
assaults result in injury. Both of Winston’s experts testified that they were
paid $250 per hour for their testimony.

¶24           On cross-examination, the State elicited testimony from
Winston’s DNA expert that “Arizona taxpayers” would pay him
approximately $58,000 for his testimony. The expert agreed that the people
“sitting here” paid for his fees but added that it was the same people paying
the State’s salary, as well as the “millions of dollars that are spent every
day” on criminal investigations. The State asked whether the expert
provided Winston with a list of questions for trial, asking if this was akin to
writing his “own paycheck.” The expert explained that he only wanted to
help Winston educate the jury on the science behind his findings. The State
questioned the expert about his laboratory’s lack of accreditation and
outside proficiency testing, asking if “the fox is looking after the henhouse.”
The expert stated he had “no idea” what that meant, and the State moved
on to another line of questioning.

¶25           Later, in closing argument, the State criticized the findings of
Winston’s DNA expert, highlighting his economic benefit, bias toward the
defense, use of expensive trial tactics, and lack of accreditation and
oversight. Similarly, the State argued Winston’s forensic nurse “will be
paid a considerable fee for her testimony,” arguing she had a bias for the
defense. In Winston’s closing argument, he countered that the State used
its “unlimited amount of resources” to investigate and prosecute this case.

¶26           Recognizing ethical limits to the State’s cross-examination of
defense experts, our courts have found it improper for the State to “attack
the expert with non-evidence, using irrelevant, insulting cross-examination
and baseless argument designed to mislead the jury.” In re Zawada, 208
Ariz. 232, 237, ¶¶ 14–16 (2004). The State is barred from intimating “that an
expert is unethical or incompetent without properly admitted evidence to
support it.” State v. Bailey, 132 Ariz. 472, 479 (1982). Similarly, the State
should refrain from suggesting, absent supporting evidence, that an expert
“colluded with the defense to fabricate” results or “reached conclusions

                                      7
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

merely for pecuniary gain.” State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶¶ 31–32 (2011).
The State, however, may cross-examine an expert regarding compensation,
id. ¶ 29, highlight potential biases, Bailey, 132 Ariz. At 478, and challenge
“the validity of their opinions,” City of Tucson v. LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. 413,
417 (App. 1968).

¶27           Here, to the extent the State questioned the defense experts in
a way that challenged their opinions and potential biases, we find no error.
The bulk of the State’s remarks fell within the scope of proper cross-
examination and closing argument, with the State attacking the weaknesses
in the expert’s testing methods and emphasizing any conclusions that
aligned with the State’s case. See LaForge, 8 Ariz. App. At 417. While the
State underscored compensation, the State did not argue that experts
colluded with the defense or received payment to fabricate an exculpating
conclusion. See Manuel, 229 Ariz. at 7, ¶¶ 31–32. These comments fell
within the “great latitude” afforded counsel in impeaching the credibility
of witnesses and presenting closing argument. See Torres, 97 Ariz. at 366.

¶28            The State concedes, and we agree, that the prosecutor’s appeal
to the jurors as taxpayers was improper. Other jurisdictions have likewise
found such remarks to be improper. See United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d
1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing prosecutor’s appeal to jurors as
taxpayers as “highly improper”); State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St. 3d 329, 334 (1999)
(recognizing prosecutor’s comment that defense expert had been paid by
taxpayers as improper); McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 157 (1984)
(recognizing prosecutor’s comment that defense expert “had been paid for
at county expense by such persons as the jurors themselves” to be “highly
improper”).

¶29           Nevertheless, the State’s emphasis on the role of taxpayers in
compensating experts here did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as
to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Hughes, 193 Ariz.
at 79, ¶ 26. The testimony revealed that many aspects of the case required
taxpayer funds, including compensation for experts on both sides, law
enforcement, and counsel for the State. Any comment by the State
regarding the cost of defense experts to the county and taxpayers had
support in the evidence, and likely cut both ways in impacting the
credibility of witnesses for the State and defense. The superior court
instructed the jury that statements made by counsel are not evidence, and
we presume that the jury follows the court’s instructions. See State v. Newell,
212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). Thus, the error here did not rise to the level
of fundamental, prejudicial error.

                                      8
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

III.   Preclusion of Certain Comments on Winston’s Innocence.

¶30           Winston contends that the superior court abused its
discretion by preventing him from informing the jury of his innocence in
opening statements and closing argument. We review such rulings for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 182, ¶ 22 (2019); State v.
Prewitt, 104 Ariz. 326, 333 (1969).

¶31           Although Winston chose not to testify, he made speaking
objections and declarative statements throughout trial, injecting his own
version of events, pleading his innocence, and discussing precluded
evidence. Before opening statements, the superior court warned Winston
that he could discuss what the evidence would show, but could not give
declarative statements like, “I’m innocent.” Nonetheless, in Winston’s
opening statements, he proclaimed, “I am innocent and I will prove it” and
accused the State of charging “an innocent man.” In closing argument, he
argued, “I am innocent” and “I am falsely accused and charged with the
crimes I did not commit.” The court sustained the State’s objection to facts
not in evidence, explaining that Winston could only discuss the evidence
and provide his opinion. Later, without objection, Winston repeatedly
argued the evidence supported his innocence, painted the victim as a liar,
and claimed “mistakes” in the investigation could “send an innocent man
to prison.”

¶32            A defendant is entitled to make opening statements and
closing argument. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 19.1(b)(3),(7). Opening statements
provide the defendant an opportunity to advise the jury of his theory of the
case and give context for the evidence to be admitted at trial. State v.
Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. 114, 116, ¶ 9 (2016). Closing argument allows the
defendant to persuade the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt, “sharpen
and clarify the issues,” and highlight any weaknesses in the State’s case.
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). Such remarks, however, are
not without limits. A party’s opening statements should contain only facts
that will be supported by evidence, Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 10, and
closing argument should contain only facts that have been introduced in
evidence, State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 68 (1983).

¶33           The superior court did not abuse its discretion here.
Throughout trial, Winston used speaking objections and declarative
statements to present his theory of the case—that the victim lied and he did
not commit the assault. Within the scope of opening statements and closing
argument, Winston repeated these assertions, impugning the victim’s
character and claiming the State charged an innocent man. When not

                                       9
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

directly tied to evidence presented at trial, such assertions exceeded the
scope of proper opening statements and closing argument. Winston could
not use opening and closing remarks as an opportunity to testify without
being subject to cross-examination. See State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 331
(1994) (“[D]efendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules
as an attorney.”); Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 216–17, ¶ 71 (noting that
counsel may not use closing argument to convey personal beliefs or testify
about facts not in evidence).

¶34           Moreover, the court allowed Winston to assert his innocence
throughout trial, many times without objection or constraint. The court’s
modest limitation on Winston’s remarks during his opening statements and
his closing argument did not negate the presumption of innocence or
prevent him from proclaiming his innocence. In the context of substantial
evidence of Winston’s guilt, a minimal restraint on his opening statements
and closing argument, even assuming error, did not affect the verdicts. See
State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993) (noting that we will affirm a
defendant’s convictions despite error if the State establishes “beyond a
reasonable doubt[] that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict”).

¶35            We further reject any claim of structural error. The relatively
minor limit placed on Winston’s opening statements and closing argument
did not, as Winston suggests, violate his autonomy in deciding how to
present his own defense or impose negative consequences based on his
decision to represent himself. Winston presented his chosen defense,
calling expert witnesses, providing extensive argument to the jury, and
asserting his innocence. Any constraint on Winston’s remarks did not reach
the level of severity needed to establish structural error. See Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (“We have found structural errors
only in a very limited class of cases.”); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
310 (1991) (defining “structural error” as a “defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds”).

IV.    Admission of Co-Defendant’s Plea Agreement.

¶36           Winston claims that the superior court erred by allowing the
State to introduce his co-defendant’s plea agreement, which referred to
events occurring in Globe.        He claims the language constituted
impermissible other-act evidence under Rule 404(b) and (c), which the court
had precluded.

¶37          Before trial, Winston opposed admission of other-act
evidence related to the Globe case, which would ordinarily preserve the

                                      10
                            STATE v. WINSTON
                            Decision of the Court

issue for appeal, State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475–76 (1986). But that rule
applies only if the superior court denied the challenge; the issue is not
preserved where, as here, the court sided with the defendant and the State
allegedly violated the court’s order without objection. Id.; see also State v.
Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 421, ¶ 22 (1999). Because Winston reviewed the plea
agreement and stipulated to its admission, he waived any challenge to its
presentation to the jurors. See State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 10 (1989). We
thus review only for fundamental error. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, 142,
¶¶ 12, 21.

¶38           The State moved in limine to admit other-act evidence related
to the Globe case under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b) and (c).
Winston objected, arguing the evidence would be misleading and unduly
prejudicial. The superior court denied the State’s motion and precluded
any mention of the other acts associated with the Globe case. The court
noted that the State could refer to Winston and Kitcheyan travelling to
Globe, where they were eventually arrested, without discussing the other
case.

¶39             Kitcheyan testified for the State, admitting to her role in the
assault. She admitted to entering a plea agreement, a condition of which
required her to speak with officers and testify at trial. The State moved to
admit the plea agreement as an exhibit, which contained language that
Kitcheyan agreed to speak about “the events giving rise to this case” and
testify at trial “about these events and related events in Globe, Arizona.”
No other portion of the plea agreement referred to Globe. Upon reviewing
the plea agreement, Winston conceded that the exhibit “could be admitted.”
Without mentioning the other case, Kitcheyan testified that the couple fled
to and were arrested in Globe.

¶40           Generally, other-act evidence is inadmissible unless offered
for a non-propensity purpose or to show an aberrant sexual propensity to
commit the charged crimes. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2), (c). The
introduction of otherwise inadmissible other-act evidence does not require
reversal if the record discloses no reasonable probability the “evidence
materially affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396,
406, ¶ 38 (App. 2000); see also State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32 (2000).
This is especially true when any reference to such evidence was brief and
inadvertent, State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601–02 (1993), and the evidence
was neither emphasized nor mentioned in closing argument, State v. Wood,
180 Ariz. 53, 64 (1994). We have previously held that an isolated and
“relatively innocuous” reference to a defendant’s criminal history or

                                       11
                           STATE v. WINSTON
                           Decision of the Court

unrelated criminal case does not result in reversible error. State v. Bailey,
160 Ariz. 277, 280 (1989).

¶41            Here, aside from admitting the plea agreement as an exhibit
during Kitcheyan’s testimony, the State did not emphasize or rely on the
plea agreement’s reference to Globe. On this record, we conclude that the
brief and inadvertent mention of events occurring in Globe did not affect
the outcome of trial. See Jones, 197 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 34. First, the phrase
“related events” did not suggest that Winston had a separate criminal case
in Globe, especially given that portions of the current case (including
Winston’s instruction to Kitcheyan to lie if questioned by the police)
occurred in that jurisdiction. Second, nothing from the record shows the
State intentionally inserted the phrase to circumvent the superior court’s
preclusion order. Id. at 304, ¶¶ 31–33 (finding unsolicited testimony that
the defendant had been in jail did not require a mistrial). While the
reference to Globe should have been excised from the plea agreement
before trial, the vague and nonprejudicial nature of the language did not
result in fundamental error. See Stuard, 176 Ariz. at 600–02 (finding brief,
yet improper reference to prior incarceration did not constitute
fundamental error).

                              CONCLUSION

¶42          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Winston’s convictions
and sentences.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

                                       12