Court Opinion

ID: 9593414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:22.571689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:36.805288
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring.
I join Justice Arabian in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal in favor of defendant. Unlike Justice Arabian, however, I do not resolve this case on the meaning of a provision of the Harbors and Navigation Code. Instead, I conclude that it is properly resolved under settled principles governing the defense of implied assumption of risk that California courts have followed for more than 50 years.
This case presents a classic example of implied assumption of risk: plaintiff, an experienced water-skier, skied barefoot and backward in a narrow tree-lined channel where he had skied before; he owned the boat and the rope towing him, he selected the site and the speed; and he knew that this manner of skiing prevented him from crossing from one side of the boat to the other to avoid colliding with overhanging tree branches. Plaintiff’s voluntary decision to engage in an activity that he knew to be dangerous should bar him from suing the ski boat driver for the harmful consequences resulting from the choice plaintiff made.
. We granted review in this case and its companion, Knight v. Jewett, ante, page 296 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (hereafter Knight), to decide the fate of the implied assumption of risk defense in light of our adoption of a system of comparative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393] (hereafter Li). No single view has garnered a majority.1 As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Knight, I adhere to the traditional approach to implied assumption of risk under which a plaintiff’s voluntary choice to confront a known risk will bar recovery in an action for negligence. The doctrine of assumption of risk recognizes that liberty implies responsibility and that respect for choices freely made is enhanced, not diminished, when one who voluntarily confronts a specific, known risk is precluded from shifting to another the costs of an injury that is the direct result of that choice.
The justices who joined the plurality opinion in Knight do not accept my conclusion that, in its traditional form, the defense of implied assumption of *352risk survived Li. Instead, as I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in Knight, supra, ante at page 324, they propose to recast assumption of risk from a defense involving the plaintiff’s implied consent to confront a specific, known risk into a determination of the presence or absence of duty. Under the plurality’s approach, the separate concepts of duty of care (an element of the plaintiff’s case) and assumption of risk (an affirmative defense) are somehow thought to be the same thing. Only in those situations in which the Knight plurality concludes that the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff would the plurality bar recovery. In situations in which the defendant does owe the plaintiff a duty of care, however, the plurality would recognize only a partial defense indistinguishable from the doctrine of comparative fault. But the Knight plurality’s approach fails to take into account cases like this one, where a duty is imposed by statute on the defendant.
Thus, because of their conclusion that assumption of risk is nothing more than the absence of duty, the justices forming the plurality in Knight, ante, are in this case forced to take positions that defy either logic or common sense. Bothered by the result he would be compelled to reach under the analysis he embraced in Knight, Justice Arabian here misconstrues a provision of the Harbors and Navigation Code to hold that the statutory duty imposed on ski boat drivers to avoid collisions does not extend to the skiers they tow, but protects only third parties and their property. As construed by Justice Arabian, the statute imposes on defendant ski boat driver a duty to avoid injury not to the water-skier he towed, but to the tree with which the water-skier collided. The Chief Justice and Justice George, on the other hand, bound by their correct conclusion that the statutory duty runs to the skier being towed, must disregard the risk assumption implicit in plaintiff’s freely made choice to engage in conduct he knew to be dangerous.2
The facts of this case well illustrate the flawed approach advanced by the Knight plurality and, in my view, demonstrate convincingly why the courts of this state should continue to do what they have done for the past 50 years: apply the doctrine of implied assumption of risk in its traditional form as a complete defense in an action for negligence.
*353I
Plaintiff Larry C. Ford decided to water-ski barefoot and backward in the Warren Cut Slough, a narrow channel in the Delta area of Contra Costa County. Jack Gouin, Ford’s friend, agreed to drive the boat to which the 95-foot tow rope would be fastened. Ford owned the boat and the rope; he gave the driving instructions, including the speed, which was about 40 miles per hour. Ford had skied barefoot and backward some 50 times, but he had not yet learned to cross the wake, and so he could ski only on the left side of the boat.
The Warren Cut is approximately 170 feet wide, but a sandbar near the place of the accident narrows the main channel to a width of 120 feet. Across the main channel from the sandbar, large tree branches overhang the water. Ford hit a branch of one of these trees, and suffered serious injuries. Witnesses estimated that the tree branch Ford hit extended 10 to 35 feet into the channel.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, defendant Gouin submitted declarations by an accident reconstruction expert stating that the driver of the tow boat could have navigated no closer than 20 feet to the sandbar, leaving only 65 feet between the boat and a 35-foot overhanging branch. The expert calculated that a skier using a 95-foot rope and skiing at a 35.4-degree angle would be 55 feet from the boat’s extended midline, a distance that would increase to 67.2 feet at an angle of 45 degrees. Under these calculations, there was at best little room for error; someone skiing at a 45-degree angle would be directly in the path of a 35-foot overhanging branch, even when the tow boat was as close as possible to the sandbar on the opposite side of the channel.
In response to Gouin’s motion for summary judgment, Ford did not offer any evidence to dispute the measurements and calculations made by the defense expert. Ford did submit his own declaration. Although he had testified during his deposition that he did not remember the accident at all, he said in his declaration that at the time of the accident he was “not skiing more than a 45 [degree] angle” and “most likely” was skiing within an angle of 35 degrees from the boat’s midline. He also said that Gouin “drove too close to the shore on one side” (that is, too close to the overhanging tree branch).
Ford also submitted the declaration of champion water-skier Tom Huey. Based on his personal familiarity with the Warren Cut, Huey expressed his opinion that it was a “reasonably safe area in which to ski barefoot and *354backward.” According to Huey, the boat driver must steer a safe course and watch out for the skier.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Gouin. On plaintiff Ford’s appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that, by planning and engaging in activity that left only the narrowest margin for error, Ford had impliedly assumed the risk of being injured should Gouin veer slightly off course and thereby cause Ford to collide with an overhanging tree branch.
II
My dissenting opinion in the companion case of Knight v. Jewett, supra, ante at page 324 describes the traditional definition and principles underlying the implied assumption of risk defense that has been established by a long line of California cases, and explains in some detail why the defense survives this court’s decision in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804. Because, in my view, this case is governed by the principles that I discussed in Knight, I repeat that discussion here.3
In California, the affirmative defense of assumption of risk has traditionally been defined as the voluntary acceptance of a specific, known and appreciated risk that is or may have been caused or contributed to by the negligence of another. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [265 P.2d 904]; see Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 375, 384-385 [240 P.2d 580].) Assumption of risk may be proved either by the plaintiff’s spoken or written words (express assumption of risk), or by inference from the plaintiff’s conduct (implied assumption of risk). Whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the specific risk, and voluntarily chose to encounter it, has generally been a jury question. (See 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 1110, p. 523.)
The defense of assumption of risk, whether the risk is assumed expressly or by implication, is based on consent. (Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service (1963) 60 Cal.2d 266, 271 [32 Cal.Rptr. 193, 383 P.2d 777]; see Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 68, p. 484.) Thus, in both the express and implied forms, the defense is a specific application of the maxim that one “who consents to an act is not wronged by it.” (Civ. Code, § 3515.) This consent, we have explained, “will negative liability” (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 161; see also Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 488, 498, fn. 10 [102 Cal.Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043] [“In assumption of the risk the negligent party’s liability is negated . . . .”]), and thus provides a complete defense to an action for negligence.
*355The elements of implied assumption of risk deserve some explanation. To establish the defense, a defendant must prove that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted a risk with knowledge and appreciation of that risk. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 161.) The normal risks inherent in everyday life, such as the chance that one who uses a public highway will be injured by the negligence of another motorist, are not subject to the defense, however, because they are general rather than specific risks. (See Hook v. Point Montara Fire Protection Dist. (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 96, 101 [28 Cal.Rptr. 560].)
The defense of implied assumption of risk depends on the plaintiff’s “actual knowledge of the specific danger involved.” (Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service, supra, 60 Cal.2d 266, 274.) Thus, one who “knew of the general danger in riding in a bucket of the mine owner’s aerial tramway, did not assume the risk, of which he had no specific knowledge, that the traction cable was improperly spliced.” (Id. at p. 272, italics added, referring to Bee v. Tungstar Corp. (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 729, 733 [151 P.2d 537]; see also Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 542-543 [103 Cal.Rptr. 120].) A defendant need not prove, however, that the plaintiff “had the clairvoyance to foresee the exact accident and injury which in fact occurred.” (Sperling v. Hatch (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 54, 61 [88 Cal.Rptr. 704].) “Where the facts are such that the plaintiff must have had knowledge of the hazard, the situation is equivalent to actual knowledge and there may be an assumption of the risk . . . .” (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d at 162.) Indeed, certain well-known risks of harm may be within the general “common knowledge.” (Tavernier v. Maes (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 532, 546 [51 Cal.Rptr. 575].)
As set forth earlier, a person’s assumption of risk must be voluntary. “The plaintiff’s acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant’s tortious conduct has left him [or her] no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to Q[] (a) avert harm to himself [or herself] or another, or [][] (b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him [or her].” (Rest.2d Torts, § 496E, subd. (2); see also Curran v. Green Hills Country Club (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 501, 505-506 [101 Cal.Rptr. 158].)
This requirement of voluntariness precludes assertion of the defense of assumption of risk by a defendant who has negligently caused injury to another through conduct that violates certain safety statutes or ordinances such as those designed to protect a class of persons unable to provide for their own safety for reasons of inequality of bargaining power or lack of knowledge. (See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 430-431 [218 P.2d 17] [violation of fire-safety ordinance]; Fonseca v. County of *356Orange (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 361, 366, 368 [104 Cal.Rptr. 566] [violation of safety order requiring scaffolding and railings at bridge construction site]; see also Mason v. Case (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 170, 177 [33 Cal.Rptr. 710].) Thus, a worker who, to avoid loss of livelihood, continues to work in the face of safety violations does not thereby assume the risk of injury as a result of those violations. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, § 2801; Fonseca v. County of Orange, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 361.) In such cases, the implied agreement upon which the defense is based is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
Our 1975 decision in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, marked a fundamental change in California law governing tort liability based on negligence. Before Li, a person’s own lack of due care for his or her safety, known as contributory negligence, completely barred that person from recovering damages for injuries inflicted by the negligent conduct of another. In Li, we held that a lack of care for one’s own safety would no longer entirely bar recovery, and that juries thereafter should compare the fault or negligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendant to apportion loss between the two. (Id. at pp. 828-829.)
Before it was abolished by Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, the defense of contributory negligence was sometimes confused with the defense of implied assumption of risk. Although this court had acknowledged that the two defenses may “arise from the same set of facts and frequently overlap” (Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service, supra, 60 Cal.2d 266, 271), we had emphasized that they were nonetheless “essentially different” (ibid.) because they were “based on different theories” (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158,161). Contributory negligence was premised on alack of due care or, stated another way, a departure from the reasonable person standard, whereas implied assumption of risk has always depended on a voluntary acceptance of a risk with knowledge and appreciation of that risk. (Id. at pp. 161-162; Gonzalez v. Garcia (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 874, 878 [142 Cal.Rptr. 503].)
The standards for evaluating a plaintiff’s conduct under the two defenses were entirely different. Under contributory negligence, the plaintiff’s conduct was measured against the objective standard of a hypothetical reasonable person. (Gonzalez v. Garcia, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 874, 879.) Implied assumption of risk, in contrast, has always depended upon the plaintiff’s subjective mental state; the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff actually knew, appreciated, and voluntarily consented to assume a specific risk of injury. (Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 243-245 [53 Cal.Rptr. 545, 418 P.2d 153].)
*357We said in Li, albeit in dictum, that our adoption of a system of comparative fault would to some extent necessarily impact the defense of implied assumption of risk. (Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 826.) We explained: “As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact is made up of at least two distinct defenses. ‘To simplify greatly, it has been observed . . . that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant’s negligence, plaintiff’s conduct, although he [or she] may encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory negligence .... Other kinds of situations within the doctrine of assumption of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him [or her]. Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant’s duty of care.’ [Citations.] We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.” (Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 824-825, original italics.)
Although our adoption in Li of a system of comparative fault eliminated contributory negligence as a separate defense, it did not alter the basic attributes of the implied assumption of risk defense or call into question its theoretical foundations, as we affirmed in several cases decided after Li. For example, in Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199 [142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609], we said that “one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby.” (At p. 204; see also Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal.3d 389, 406 [143 Cal.Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155] [acknowledging the continued viability of the assumption of risk defense after the adoption of comparative fault].) Thereafter, in Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362 [182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822], we reiterated that “the defense of assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff voluntarily undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by defendant’s conduct.” (At p. 375, fn. 8.)
The Courts of Appeal directly addressed this issue in several cases, which were decided after Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, and which considered whether, and to what extent, implied assumption of risk as a complete defense survived our adoption in Li of a system of comparative fault. The first of these cases was Segoviano v. Housing Authority (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 162 [191 Cal.Rptr. 578] (hereafter Segoviano).
In Segoviano, the plaintiff was injured during a flag football game when an opposing player pushed him to the ground as the plaintiff was running *358along the sidelines trying to score a touchdown. Although the jury found that the opposing player was negligent, and that this negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury, it also found that the plaintiff’s participation in the game was a negligent act that contributed to the injury. Applying the instructions it had been given on comparative negligence, the jury apportioned fault for the injury between the two players and reduced the plaintiff’s award in accord with that apportionment. (Id. at p. 166.)
To determine whether the jury had acted properly in making a comparative fault apportionment, the Segoviano court began its analysis by distinguishing those cases in which the plaintiff’s decision to encounter a known risk was “unreasonable” from those in which it was “reasonable.” (Segoviano, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 162, 164.) In so doing, Segoviano relied on this court’s language in Li [] that a plaintiff’s conduct in “unreasonably” undertaking to encounter a specific known risk was “a form of contributory negligence” that would be merged “into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault.” (Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 824-825.)
The Segoviano court defined an “unreasonable” decision to encounter a known risk as one that “falls below the standard of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise to avoid injury to himself or herself under the circumstances.” (Segoviano, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 162, 175, citing Rest.2d Torts, § 463.) The Segoviano court cited a person’s voluntary choice to ride with a drunk driver as an example of an “unreasonable” decision. (Id. at p. 175; see Gonzalez v. Garcia, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 874, 881; Paula v. Gagnon (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 680, 685 [146 Cal.Rptr. 702].) Because an “unreasonable” decision to risk injury is neglect for one’s own safety, the Segoviano court observed, a jury can appropriately compare the negligent plaintiff’s fault with that of the negligent defendant and apportion responsibility for the injury, applying comparative fault principles to determine the extent of the defendant’s liability. (Segoviano, supra, at pp. 164, 170.)
By contrast, the plaintiff’s decision to play flag football was, in the Segoviano court’s view, an example of a “reasonable” decision to encounter a known risk of injury. Although the risk of being injured during a flag football game could be avoided altogether by choosing not to play, this did not render the plaintiff’s decision to play “unreasonable.” (Segoviano, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 162, 175.) Rather, the court said, a person who participates in a game of flag football is not negligent in doing so, because the choice does not fall below the standard of care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise to avoid being injured. The Segoviano court concluded that such cases, in which there is no negligence of the plaintiff to compare with the negligence of the defendant, cannot be resolved by comparative fault apportionment of the plaintiff’s damages. (Id. at pp. 174-175.)
*359The Segoviano court next considered whether the defense of implied assumption of risk, to the extent it had not merged into comparative fault, continued to provide a complete defense to an action for negligence following our decision in Li (supra, 13 Cal.3d 804). The court asked, in other words, whether a plaintiff’s voluntary and nonnegligent decision to encounter a specific known risk was still a complete bar to recovery, or no bar at all.
In resolving this issue, the court found persuasive a commentator’s suggestion that “ ‘it would be whimsical to treat one who has unreasonably assumed the risk more favorably . . . than one who reasonably assumed the risk ....’” (Segoviano, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 162, 169, quoting Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last—By Judicial Choice (1976) 64 Cal.L.Rev. 239, 262.) To avoid this “whimsical” result, in which “unreasonable” plaintiffs were allowed partial recovery by way of a comparative fault apportionment while “reasonable” plaintiffs were entirely barred from recovery of damages, the Segoviano court concluded that our decision in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, must mean that the defense of implied assumption of risk had been abolished in all those instances in which it had not merged into the system of comparative fault, and that only express assumption of risk survived as a complete defense to an action for negligence. (Segoviano, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 162, 169-170.) The Segoviano court thus held that the defense of implied assumption of risk “plays no part in the comparative negligence system of California.” (Id. at p. 164.) Various Court of Appeal decisions soon challenged this holding of Segoviano.
One decision characterized Segoviano's analysis as “suspect.” (Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 793, 800, fn. 4 [202 Cal.Rptr. 900].) Another case disregarded it entirely in reaching a contrary result (Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 714 [211 Cal.Rptr. 668] [“Where assumption of the risk is not merely a form of contributory negligence,” it remains “a complete defense.”]; accord, Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 176, 183 [229 Cal.Rptr. 612]; Willenberg v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 185, 186-187 [229 Cal.Rptr. 625]). And in Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 104 [243 Cal.Rptr. 536] (hereafter Ordway), the court rejected Segoviano outright, holding instead that “reasonable” implied assumption of risk continued as a complete defense under the newly adopted system of comparative fault.
The Court of Appeal that decided Ordway, supra, interpreted Li's reference to a form of assumption of risk under which “ ‘plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him [or her]’ ” (Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 824) as describing a doctrine that the *360Ordway court termed “reasonable” implied assumption of risk. This doctrine, the Ordway court concluded, was unaffected by Lis adoption of a system of comparative negligence and remained a complete defense after Li. (Ordway, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 103-104.) According to Ordway, a plaintiff who voluntarily and reasonably assumes a risk, “whether for recreational enjoyment, economic reward, or some similar purpose,” is deemed thereby to have agreed to reduce the defendant’s duty of care and “cannot prevail.” (Id. at p. 104.)
After concluding that the defense of implied assumption of risk remained viable after this court’s decision in Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, the Ordway court discussed the preclusive impact of the defense on the facts of the case before it. Ordway involved a negligence action brought by a professional jockey who had been injured in a horse race when another jockey, violating a rule of the California Horse Racing Board, crossed into the plaintiff’s lane. The court first noted that professional jockeys must be aware that injury-causing accidents are both possible and common in horse racing, as in other sports activities. (Ordway, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 111.) The court observed that although the degree of risk to be anticipated would vary with the particular sport involved, a plaintiff may not recover from a coparticipant for a sports injury if the coparticipant’s injury-causing actions fell within the ordinary expectations of those engaged in tire sport. (Id. at pp. 111-112.) On this basis, the Ordway court held that the plaintiff jockey’s action was barred.
Other decisions by the Courts of Appeal that have addressed implied assumption of risk have followed Ordway, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 98. (Nunez v. R’Bibo (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 559,562-563 [260 Cal.Rptr. 1]; Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1477-1478 [255 Cal.Rptr. 755]; King v. Magnolia Homeowners Assn. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1316 [253 Cal.Rptr. 140].) In my view, Ordway was correct in its conclusions that the defense of implied assumption of risk survived this court’s adoption in Li (supra, 13 Cal.3d 804) of a system of comparative fault, and that the defense remains a complete bar to recovery in negligence cases in which the plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily consented to encounter a specific risk.
Ordway was also correct in its observation that the terms “unreasonable” and “reasonable” are confusing when used to distinguish the form of implied assumption of risk that has merged into the system of comparative fault from the form that has not so merged. As Ordway suggested, the reasonable/ unreasonable labels would be more easily understood by substituting the terms “knowing and intelligent,” for “reasonable,” and “negligent or careless” for “unreasonable.” (Ordway, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 105.)
The defense of implied assumption of risk is never based on the “reasonableness” of the plaintiff’s conduct, as such, but rather on a recognition that *361a person generally should be required to accept responsibility for the normal consequences of a freely chosen course of conduct. (See Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference (1987) 67 B.U. L.Rev. 213, 258 [“consent is neither reasonable nor unreasonable[;] [i]t simply expresses what plaintiff wants or prefers”].) In implied assumption of risk situations, the plaintiff’s conduct often defies legal characterization as either reasonable or unreasonable. Even when this is not so, and a court or jury could appropriately determine whether the plaintiff’s conduct was reasonable, the distinction to be drawn is not so much between reasonable and unreasonable conduct. Rather, the essential distinction is between conduct that is deliberate and conduct that is merely careless. Referring to “reasonable” implied assumption of risk lends unwarranted credence to the charge that the law is “whimsical” in treating unreasonable behavior more favorably than behavior that is reasonable. There is nothing arbitrary or whimsical in requiring plaintiffs to accept responsibility for the consequences of their considered and deliberate choices, while at the same time apportioning liability between a plaintiff and a defendant who have both exhibited carelessness.
In those cases that have merged into comparative fault, partial recovery is permitted, not because the plaintiff has acted unreasonably, but because the unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s apparent choice provides compelling evidence that the plaintiff was merely careless and could not have truly appreciated and voluntarily consented to the risk, or because enforcement of the implied agreement on which the defense is based would be contrary to sound public policy. In these cases, implied assumption of risk is simply not available as a defense, although comparative negligence may be.
. In those cases in which a plaintiff’s decision to encounter a specific known risk was not the result of carelessness (that is, when the plaintiff’s conduct is not merely a form of contributory negligence), nothing in this court’s adoption in Li (supra, 13 Cal.3d 804) of a system of comparative fault suggests that implied assumption of risk must or should be eliminated as a complete defense to an action for negligence. I would hold, therefore, that the defense continues to exist in such situations unaffected by this court’s adoption in Li of a comparative fault system.
Ill
Has implied assumption of risk been established as a complete defense in this case? When the facts material to assumption of risk are not in dispute, the defense can be decided by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a), (c), (f); Garcia v. Rockwell *362Internat. Corp. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1560 [232 Cal.Rptr. 490]; Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [176 Cal.Rptr. 68].)
As explained in some detail earlier, implied assumption of risk provides a complete defense to liability for a defendant’s negligence in cases involving a plaintiff’s participation in sports activity in spite of, or specifically to encounter, the hazards posed by the activity. Proof of the defense lies in evidence that the plaintiff’s participation in the activity was voluntary and that the plaintiff knew or must have known and appreciated the specific risk that resulted in the injury. Here, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant Gouin, applying the bar of assumption of risk to negate his liability. Independent review of the facts offered in conjunction with the summary judgment motion (see Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 640 [222 Cal.Rptr. 293]) supports the trial court’s ruling.
As mentioned earlier, for the defense to apply, the confrontation of the specific risk must be voluntary and under circumstances showing that the plaintiff must have known of the risk. These two factors are met in this case. The voluntariness of plaintiff Ford’s decision to water ski barefoot and backward in the Warren Cut, a narrow, tree-lined channel, is not in question. He owned both the boat and the tow rope, and chose the location and the boat’s speed. And, based on the undisputed facts presented in conjunction with defendant Gouin’s motion for summary judgment, Ford must have been aware of the danger he faced in skiing barefoot and backward in that location.
Ford had skied the Warren Cut before and knew that trees along its banks hung over the waterway. He was aware that the sandbar reduced the navigable water space. He also knew that he lacked the ability to cross the wake and that he would be skiing at angles of as much as 35 degrees and perhaps even 45 degrees off the left side of the boat. Ford’s own declaration stated that he was an avid water-skier with 15 years of experience and that he had skied barefoot and backward more than 50 times. Based on Ford’s admitted familiarity with the narrow channel and his knowledge of this particular sport, he must have known he could collide with an overhanging branch if the boat that was towing him veered slightly off course as defendant Gouin, the driver of the boat, attempted to navigate it through the narrow channel at 40 miles per hour while simultaneously watching out for the skier behind him.
To decide whether plaintiff assumed the risk in this case, the lead and dissenting opinions dispute whether defendant’s operation of the tow boat violated a duty imposed by Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, *363subdivision (d) (hereafter section 658(d)).4 In my view, the injury-causing conduct (plaintiff’s as well as defendant’s) ran afoul of this statute. That fact, however, is not dispositive on the issue of assumption of risk. Rather, under the traditional analysis governing the assumption of risk doctrine, the existence of section 658(d) merely raises the question whether it is the type of safety enactment that would preclude defendant Gouin from asserting assumption of risk as a defense barring plaintiff Ford from recovering damages in his negligence action. It is not.
Whether a particular statute comes within this exception to the assumption of risk bar depends on the public policy declared by that statute. (Shahinian v. McCormick (1963) 59 Cal.2d 554, 565 [30 Cal.Rptr. 521, 381 P.2d 377].) As mentioned previously, statutes within this exception commonly are those intended to protect classes of persons unable to protect themselves. (See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 431 [218 P.2d 17]; King v. Magnolia Homeowners Assn. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1316-1317 [253 Cal.Rptr. 140].) The Restatement Second of Torts explains the rule as follows: in cases involving tortious conduct by a defendant in violation of a statute, a plaintiff’s assumption of risk will bar recovery unless imposing the bar “would defeat a policy of the statute to place the entire responsibility for [the] harm . . . on the defendant.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 496F.)
The policy that underlies section 658(d) is one aimed at preventing towed water skis, aquaplanes, and similar devices, and their riders, from colliding with other persons or objects. That policy would not be defeated by placing responsibility for the harm on a plaintiff whose injuries resulted from the plaintiff’s own choice of location and manner of water-skiing. Accordingly, section 658(d) does not preclude application of the assumption of risk defense in this case.
The defense of implied assumption of risk is most appropriately applied when the evidence shows an implied agreement that “the defendant will engage in certain conduct the plaintiff desires if the plaintiff will waive liability should the defendant prove to be negligent.” (Rosenlund & Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California (1986) 20 U.S.F. L.Rev. 225, 244.) Here defendant Gouin engaged in conduct that plaintiff Ford desired: At Ford’s request, Gouin drove Ford’s boat so that Ford could water-ski barefoot and *364backward through a narrow channel, between a sandbar on one side and overhanging tree branches on the other. Gouin’s evidence established that Ford voluntarily chose to engage in this activity with knowledge and appreciation of its specific risk. Ford offered no evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on any element of the defense of assumption of risk.
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the evidence submitted in connection with the summary judgment motion established as a matter of law the complete defense of implied assumption of risk. On that basis I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Panelli, J., and Baxter, J., concurred.

Three justices embrace the primary/secondary approach to implied assumption of risk, three justices adhere to the traditional consent approach, and one justice would openly abolish the doctrine.

The conclusion reached by the Chief Justice and Justice George here stands in sharp contrast to their resolution of the companion case of Knight and further demonstrates why consideration of the plaintiff’s decision to engage in risktaking is superior to the duty approach. Here, the existence of a statutory duty would, under these justices’ view, compel a jury trial on the question of defendant ski boat driver’s liability despite plaintiff water-skier’s knowing and voluntary choice to engage in highly dangerous activity. In Knight, however, where the injured plaintiff was merely a participant in a casual, recreational game using a child’s “peewee” football, these same justices bar the plaintiff’s recovery by concluding that the defendant owed plaintiff no duty to avoid the conduct that caused her injury—defendant’s unexpectedly aggressive manner of play.

The remainder of the discussion in part II is quoted from Knight v. Jewett.

Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, subdivision (d) prohibits the operation or manipulation of a “vessel, towrope or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with, or strike against, any object or person.” A violation of the provision is a misdemeanor. (Harb. & Nav. Code, § 668, subd. (c).)