Court Opinion

ID: 9914106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:02:53.08044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:09.614199
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Dec 29 2023, 8:41 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria Bailey Casanova                                  Theodore E. Rokita
Casanova Legal Services, LLC                              Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Tyler Banks
                                                          Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                          General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William S. Sloan,                                         December 29, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2250
        v.
                                                          Appeal from the
State of Indiana,                                         Johnson Superior Court
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       The Honorable
                                                          Douglas B. Cummins, Judge

                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          41D03-1912-F1-22

                             Opinion by Senior Judge Robb
                       Chief Judge Altice and Judge Brown concur.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 19
      Case Summary and Issue
[1]   William Sloan appeals his conviction of three counts of child molesting,

      challenging the admission of evidence seized from his home pursuant to a

      search warrant. Sloan contends the trial court erred by admitting the evidence

      because the probable cause affidavit supporting the warrant omitted a material

      fact and did not establish a sufficient nexus between him and the alleged

      criminal activity. We conclude the affidavit sufficiently established probable

      cause for the issuance of a search warrant for Sloan’s residence, and we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In 2019, Detective Brian Swisher of the Greenwood Police Department was

      assigned to the investigations division where he dealt with internet crimes

      against children. The detective used software on a computer in his office that

      allowed him to monitor downloads associated with child pornography.

      Through the use of this software, he discovered an IP address offering a file that

      appeared to contain child pornography. He downloaded and viewed the file to

      confirm his suspicion. The detective then determined that the IP address was

      registered to AT&T, that it was located in Greenwood, and that the account

      was in Sloan’s name.

[3]   Prior to Detective Swisher moving forward with his investigation, he was

      notified that another officer and a representative from the Department of Child

      Services were going to Sloan’s residence to respond to an allegation of

      molestation against Sloan by his step-daughter. Concerned about the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023     Page 2 of 19
      destruction of evidence, the detective prepared and submitted a probable cause

      affidavit to obtain a search warrant for Sloan’s residence. The warrant was

      issued, and the residence was searched. Evidence seized during the search

      included two videos of Sloan engaged in sexual activity with his step-daughter.

[4]   The State charged Sloan with three counts of child molesting. At trial, the

      videos were admitted over Sloan’s objection, and he now appeals the propriety

      of their admission.

      Discussion and Decision
      A. Technical Background
[5]   Because cases involving technology often contain technical terms and because

      an understanding of the principles involved is vital to understanding the issue

      and arguments before the Court, we begin with an overview of such terms.

[6]   The term “IP address” is short for Internet Protocol address, and it is a unique

      number assigned to every device that connects to the internet. See Internet

      Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Beginner’s Guide to Internet

      Protocol (IP) Addresses 4, 2 (2011) https://www.icann.org/resources/files/ip-

      addresses-beginners-guide-2011-03-04-en [https://perma.cc/FM65-D25M] (last

      visited December 15, 2023). When an individual purchases internet service

      from an internet service provider (“ISP”), the ISP assigns a unique IP address to

      the individual. Office of Legal Education, United States Department of Justice,

      Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in

      Criminal Investigations 65 (2009) https://www.justice.gov/criminal-

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023   Page 3 of 19
      ccips/ccips-documents-and-reports [https://perma.cc/R7MD-N8UV] (last

      visited December 15, 2023); see also ICANN Guide at 4, 6, 11.

[7]   This case also involves BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing network.

      “P2P software is readily available on the internet and often free to download.”

      Ex. Vol. p. 15, Defendant’s Ex. F (PC Aff.). When P2P software is running on

      a device that is connected to the internet, the user can download digital files

      from and share files with other users on the same or compatible P2P networks.

      Id. On BitTorrent, users create a torrent file for the digital file they wish to

      share on the network. Id. Torrent files are small files that contain information

      about the available digital file and provide a method for downloading the digital

      file. Id. Each particular torrent file is associated with a unique identifier known

      as an “infohash.” Id. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island explained these

      networks as:

              When a person uses these types of file-sharing services, it is akin
              to “leaving one’s documents in a box marked ‘free’ on a busy city
              street.” In order to use a peer-to-peer network, an individual
              must download software for the program. Peer-to-peer networks
              use hash values to verify the content of electronic files that are
              available for copying. Hash values—commonly referred to as
              “electronic fingerprints”—consist of “a string of numbers that,
              for all practical purposes, uniquely identifies a digital file” and
              will change any time a file is altered. Over time, law
              enforcement and other entities have identified and confirmed that
              certain hash values contain child pornography.

      In re Austin B., 208 A.3d 1178, 1181 (R.I. 2019) (internal citations and footnote

      omitted).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023       Page 4 of 19
      B. Search Warrant Affidavit
[8]   The probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant alleged that:

          • On July 1, 2019, Detective Swisher was conducting an investigation on
            the BitTorrent network looking for users sharing child pornography.

          • The detective focused his investigation on a device using the IP address
            99.9.229.7 because it was offering a torrent file that was identified by an
            infohash associated with child pornography.

          • Using a computer that was running investigative BitTorrent software, the
            detective connected to the device at IP address 99.9.229.7 and
            downloaded directly from that device and IP address the file that was
            being offered and was named “boy girl sex 6yo.avi.”

          • Detective Swisher viewed the downloaded file and confirmed it
            contained child pornography.

          • In October 2019, the detective used an online database that provides
            geolocation of IP addresses to determine that the IP address 99.9.229.7
            was registered to ISP AT&T and was located in Greenwood.

          • A subpoena was sent to AT&T for subscriber information for IP address
            99.9.229.7 during the time period on July 1, 2019 in which the detective
            downloaded the file. AT&T responded that the IP address was at that
            time and date assigned to Sloan at an address in Greenwood. Through
            another online search, the detective confirmed Sloan’s address.

      C. Pre-Trial Motions
                                                    1
[9]   Sloan requested a Franks hearing for the purpose of determining the

      truthfulness of certain statements in Detective Swisher’s affidavit, specifically

      1
       In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that a hearing is required when the defendant
      “makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
      disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit[.]” 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct.
      2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). If the defendant proves the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023                               Page 5 of 19
       the time of the download of the suspect file. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp.

       197-99. Sloan also moved to suppress all the evidence seized from his home as

       a result of the search warrant. He listed five reasons the search was improper:

       (1) the application for the search warrant included false and misleading

       representations and/or omissions and stale information; (2) the warrant was

       overly broad; (3) the State failed to substantially comply with the statutory

       requirements to obtain a warrant electronically; (4) in executing the warrant,

       the officers exceeded its scope; and (5) in executing the warrant, the police

       unlawfully entered the home without properly knocking and announcing their

       presence. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 214-15. Following a hearing, the

       trial court denied Sloan’s motions, and the evidence was admitted at trial over

       his objection.

       D. Analysis
[10]   Sloan argues that admission of the evidence was improper because the search

       warrant used to seize the evidence was not supported by probable cause. He

       asserts the warrant was invalid because it failed to inform the issuing court of

       the possibility that someone other than himself, on a device not belonging to

       him, could have used his Wi-Fi to connect to the internet and offer the file

       containing images of child pornography. Sloan further claims that, because of

       search warrant must be voided where, “with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s
       remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause[.]” Id. at 156.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023                                Page 6 of 19
       this possibility, any nexus between himself or a device at his residence and the

       criminal activity was insufficient to support a search warrant.

[11]   We observe that Sloan framed the issues below differently from how he frames

       them on appeal. Consequently, whether he raised this issue to the trial court is
                                2
       subject to dispute. Nevertheless, as the State does not raise a waiver argument,

       and because we prefer to resolve matters on their merits instead of on

       procedural grounds, Littleton v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2011), we address the issue as presented.

[12]   When a defendant challenges the propriety of a search following a completed

       trial, the issue is one of whether the trial court properly admitted the evidence.

       Bulthuis v. State, 17 N.E.3d 378, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The trial

       court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of

       discretion. Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.

       denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Paul v. State,

       971 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[13]   Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1,

       section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require probable cause for a search

       warrant to issue. Casady v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1181, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

       2
        In its order denying Sloan’s motion for a Franks hearing and to suppress the evidence, the court refers to
       defense counsel’s mention that an “unknown individual(s) may have ‘piggy backed’ off the IP address in
       question.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 5.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023                             Page 7 of 19
       trans. denied. Probable cause is a fluid concept that is incapable of precise

       definition and that must be decided based on the facts of each case. Id. “In

       deciding whether to issue a search warrant, the issuing magistrate’s task is

       simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

       circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that evidence

       of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Crabtree v. State, 199 N.E.3d 410,

       415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[14]   In turn, the reviewing court’s duty is to determine whether there was a

       substantial basis for the warrant-issuing judge to conclude that probable cause

       existed. Casady, 934 N.E.2d at 1189. Although the reviewing court applies a de

       novo standard of review, we give significant deference to the issuing judge’s

       determination and focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the

       totality of the evidence support the finding of probable cause. Crabtree, 199

       N.E.3d at 415. “In determining whether an affidavit provided probable cause

       for the issuance of a search warrant, doubtful cases are to be resolved in favor of

       upholding the warrant.” Id. Likewise, we will not invalidate warrants by

       interpreting probable cause affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a

       commonsense, manner. Rios v. State, 762 N.E.2d 153, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

       1. Omission of Information

[15]   On appeal, Sloan claims Detective Swisher erroneously omitted from his

       affidavit the material information that “he did not know whether the device

       from which the video was downloaded was inside [Sloan’s] house, outside the

       house, or even on the property.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. In other words, Sloan
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023       Page 8 of 19
       asserts the detective should have informed the issuing court of the possibility

       that someone other than Sloan could have accessed his internet connection and

       made the child pornography file available for download. This appears to be the

       first occasion for this Court to address this specific issue.

[16]   A probable cause affidavit must include all material facts, which includes facts

       that cast doubt on the existence of probable cause. Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d

       708, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. When the State has failed to

       include a material fact, we determine the validity of the warrant by considering

       collectively the omitted information and the information contained in the

       affidavit. Id.

[17]   For a warrant to be invalid due to omission of information from an affidavit,

       the defendant must establish (1) that the affiant engaged in deliberate falsehood

       or reckless disregard for the truth in omitting the information and (2) that

       probable cause would no longer exist if the omitted information were

       considered by the issuing judge. Darring v. State, 101 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2018). This rule “protects only against omissions that are ‘designed to

       mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would

       mislead,’” the issuing judge. Keeylen v. State, 14 N.E.3d 865, 877 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Colkley, 899 F.2d

       297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990)), clarified on reh’g, 21 N.E.3d 840, trans. denied.

[18]   Here, Sloan makes no attempt to establish that Detective Swisher engaged in a

       deliberate falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth when he failed to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023          Page 9 of 19
       include the information in his affidavit. Further, we cannot agree with Sloan’s

       suggestion that the possibility that some unidentified individual was

       conceivably able to access his internet connection and offer the download is a

       “material fact” that is crucial to the determination of probable cause. This

       notion is sheer speculation that lacks any factual underpinning.

[19]   We are not alone in our assessment of this theory; other courts have also

       considered and rejected this argument. Most notably, in People v. Hayon, 62

       N.Y.S.3d 754, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017), the defendant was charged with 94

       counts of possession of a sexual performance by a child. The authorities

       executed three search warrants and seized computers and other devices

       containing child pornography from both the defendant’s home and office. He

       moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the warrant application was deficient

       “because it failed to explain to the court the ‘realistic possibility’ that someone

       other than defendant, such as a ‘neighbor, a visitor or someone outside the
                                                                                              3
       premises’ could have used defendant’s unsecured IP address . . . .” Id.

       (emphasis added). Classifying this argument as “extremely weak,” the court

       stated:

               His argument rests on the idea that because anything is possible,
               the warrant court must exclude every alternative theory to a

       3
        An internet subscriber’s unsecured or non-password protected internet connection allows a person in the
       vicinity of the home—standing on the sidewalk in front of the house, for example—to access and use the
       subscriber’s internet connection without a password and while under the disguise of the subscriber’s IP
       address. See Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining meaning of unsecured Wi-Fi
       network).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023                         Page 10 of 19
               certainty, a view that is inconsistent with the meaning of
               probable cause. In an often-quoted description of probable
               cause, the United States Supreme Court bluntly stated, “[i]n
               dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies,
               we deal with probabilities” (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
               160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 [1949]). “The affidavit
               need not contain information providing certainty that the objects
               sought will be found in the search . . . but rather whether the facts
               and circumstances taken as whole gave the magistrate probable
               cause to believe that the desired items would be found in the
               search” (United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 [10th Cir.
               1977], cert. denied 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S. Ct. 893, 54 L. Ed. 2d 798
               [1978] ).

       Id.; see also U.S. v. Featherly, 846 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2017) (defendant challenged

       affidavit by claiming it contained deliberate falsehood that kept issuing judge

       from considering possibility that someone else in trailer park had connected to

       his modem without his knowledge and used his internet connection to share

       child pornography; court noted that while unknown user conceivably could

       connect to another’s modem through unsecured wireless network, record did

       not reflect that defendant had such a network and held that connection between

       IP address and modem at internet subscriber’s residence was sufficient to justify

       search).

[20]   Likewise, the record here does not reflect whether Sloan’s internet connection

       was unsecured but given the facts and determination in both Hayon and

       Featherly, it is of no moment. The affidavit did not need to exclude every

       hypothesis of Sloan’s innocence to establish sufficient probable cause for the

       warrant; rather, it needed to demonstrate to the issuing judge that, given all the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023      Page 11 of 19
       circumstances, there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be

       found in a particular place. Crabtree, 199 N.E.3d at 415. Sloan has failed to

       establish the detective omitted any material fact that would have left probable

       cause in doubt.

       2. Nexus

[21]   Indiana Code section 35-33-5-2 incorporates the principles of protection against

       unreasonable searches and seizures and details the information to be included

       in a search warrant affidavit. The statute provides in relevant part:

               [N]o warrant for search or arrest shall be issued until there is filed
               with the judge an affidavit:

               (1) particularly describing:

                        (A) the house or place to be searched and the things to be
                        searched for; or

                        (B) particularly describing the person to be arrested;

               (2) alleging substantially the offense in relation thereto and that
               the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that:

                        (A) the things sought are concealed there; or

                        (B) the person to be arrested committed the offense; and

               (3) setting forth the facts known to the affiant through personal
               knowledge or based on hearsay, constituting the probable cause.

       Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(a) (2014). Accordingly, “a probable cause affidavit is

       required to establish a logical connection, or nexus, between the suspect and the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023         Page 12 of 19
       location to be searched.” Rader v. State, 932 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2010), trans. denied.

[22]   Sloan acknowledges that Detective Swisher’s affidavit established a nexus

       between the downloaded file and his IP address and between his IP address and

       his residential address. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. However, based on the chance

       that someone else accessed his internet connection to make the file available, he

       asserts the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the file and any person

       or device at his address. Id. at 18-19. We thus restate the question posed here

       as whether identification of a specific IP address that is being used to make

       child pornography available and the physical address to which the IP address is

       linked creates a sufficient nexus to support a search warrant for that physical

       address, despite the possibility that an individual other than the subscriber may

       have been using the IP address. As with Sloan’s related first argument, this

       Court has not yet addressed this precise question. However, several federal and

       state courts have had occasion to do so and have rejected it.

[23]   In United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2007), the defendant was

       convicted of transmitting child pornography by means of a particular IP address

       that was assigned to him at his home address. On appeal, the defendant

       contended that the association of an IP address with a physical address does not

       give rise to probable cause to search that address. He argued that if he used an

       unsecured wireless connection, neighbors would have been able to easily use his

       internet access to make the transmissions of child pornography. The affidavit

       supporting the search warrant included the IP address, the fact that the IP

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023    Page 13 of 19
       address was assigned to Perez, and Perez’s specific physical address. The court

       determined that it was clear there was a substantial basis to conclude that

       evidence of criminal activity would be found at Perez’s physical address and

       reasoned that, while “it was possible that the transmissions originated outside of

       the residence to which the IP address was assigned, it remained likely that the

       source of the transmissions was inside that residence.” Id. at 740 (emphasis

       added). See also U.S. v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512 (3rd Cir. 2010) (agreeing with

       reasoning in Perez and holding that evidence that computer with particular IP

       address possessed or transmitted child pornography can support search warrant

       for physical premises linked to that IP address).

[24]   More recently, in Commonwealth v. Martinez, 71 N.E.3d 105 (Mass. 2017), the

       defendant appealed from his conviction of possessing child pornography.

       Martinez challenged the affidavit supporting a search warrant, claiming the

       police needed to do more to link him to the place to be searched and the items

       to be seized before a valid warrant could issue. He argued the authorities did

       not determine whether the internet connection at the apartment used a wireless

       router, and, if so, whether the wireless network required a password. As a

       result, it was possible that “someone other than the subscriber, located at a

       different physical address, was ‘joyriding’ on an unsecured wireless network

       based out of the apartment.” Id. at 113.

[25]   In its decision, the court included a helpful explanation of the evolution of the

       internet as it relates to the ability to link an individual to internet activity:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023        Page 14 of 19
               In the early days of the Internet, when a residential Internet
               subscriber went online using only a home computer connected to
               a hard-wired Internet connection, there was a very strong
               correlation between an IP address assigned to a subscriber and a
               particular computer. Now, however, many subscribers use a
               wireless Internet router, which allows multiple devices within the
               range of the router to connect to the Internet simultaneously. To
               the outside world, all of these devices will share a single public IP
               address—the one that the ISP has assigned to its subscriber. . . .
               As a result, the correlation between an Internet subscriber’s
               assigned IP address and any one particular Internet-enabled
               device may often be weaker than it once was. However, the
               correlation between an IP address and a physical address can still
               be strong, at least when the ISP has verified its assignment of a
               particular IP address to a subscriber at a specific physical address
               at a specific point in time.

       Id. at 107-08 (internal citations omitted).

[26]   The court acknowledged that, from a “technological standpoint,” if an internet

       subscriber sets up an unsecured wireless internet network, a computer outside

       of the physical address could access the internet and share child pornography

       using the subscriber’s IP address. Id. at 114. Nevertheless, the court found

       Martinez’s argument missed the mark, explaining:

               A showing of probable cause to search a place (as opposed to
               arrest a person) need not identify a specific criminal suspect—
               although frequently it does. Indeed, the critical element in a
               reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is
               suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe
               that the specific things to be searched for and seized are located
               on the property to which entry is sought. In other words, police
               need only demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the criminal
               activity under investigation, the items sought, and a place to be
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023      Page 15 of 19
               searched where the items may reasonably be expected to be
               located—independent of whether they have identified a specific
               criminal suspect. Certainly police may have an easier time
               demonstrating a sufficient nexus if they can link a specific suspect
               (e.g., the named Internet account holder) to the criminal activity.
               However, such a link is not always required.

       Id. at 113-14 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court also

       clarified that probable cause does not require a showing of certainty that

       evidence of criminal activity will be found at a particular location nor does it

       require a showing that any and all possibilities of finding the evidence

       elsewhere have been excluded. Id. at 115 (quoting Commonwealth v. Anthony,

       883 N.E.2d 918, 926 (Mass. 2008)).

[27]   The affidavit in Martinez included an IP address that was used to share child

       pornography and the subscriber’s name and residential address to which the IP

       address was assigned at the time in question. The court thus concluded that

       “[t]he temporal and geographical links between the target IP address and the

       physical address to be searched provided a substantial basis” for concluding that

       evidence connected to the suspected crime “likely would be found at the

       specified premises” and “therefore gave rise to a sufficient nexus between the

       suspected criminal activity and the residence.” Id. at 111. See also In re Austin

       B., 208 A.3d 1178 (finding search warrant valid where warrant application

       contained IP address that was being used to share images of child pornography,

       physical address linked to IP address, and subscriber’s name, even though it

       was later learned subscriber no longer lived there); Commonwealth v. Green, 204

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023      Page 16 of 19
       A.3d 469, 475 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that

       possibility that another person could have used his IP address precluded finding

       of probable cause for search warrant and finding sufficient affidavit containing

       information that child pornography had been downloaded by device using IP

       address associated with defendant’s residence), aff’d by 265 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2021).

[28]   Similar rulings have been reached in State v. Aston, 125 So. 3d 1148 (La. Ct.

       App. 2013) (concluding search warrant was based on probable cause where

       supporting affidavit contained IP address of device that had shared images of

       child pornography, as well as name and physical address to which IP address

       was assigned), writ denied by 135 So. 3d 618 (La. 2014); State v. Aguilar, 437

       S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (rejecting defendant’s claim that

       supporting affidavit failed to establish nexus between child pornography files on

       computer and his residence and concluding that affidavit containing IP address

       of computer and subscriber name and address linked to IP address was

       sufficient to establish probable cause for warrant to search defendant’s

       residence); Barrett v. State, 367 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding

       affidavit sufficient to support probable cause for search warrant for evidence of

       child pornography at particular address where affidavit provided IP address and

       subscriber’s name and address associated with specific IP address).

[29]   Here, the probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant submitted to

       the court was thoroughly detailed and provided ample evidence to conclude

       that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant to search Sloan’s

       residence. In his affidavit, Detective Swisher explained peer-to-peer sharing

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023      Page 17 of 19
       networks generally and BitTorrent specifically, including the process for

       searching and downloading files on the network. He conveyed his knowledge,

       acquired through training and experience, of the dissemination, collection, and

       storage of child pornography and the behaviors of individuals involved in such

       acts. He further expressed his understanding of the role of forensic experts to

       sort and obtain information from a computer system, including concealed

       information. The detective provided background information on mobile

       devices and related terminology, as well as information on the process of

       acquiring data from these devices.

[30]   In addition, Detective Swisher specifically averred that a device using the IP

       address 99.9.229.7 was on the BitTorrent network offering a file that was

       identified by an infohash associated with child pornography. The detective

       connected to the device at IP address 99.9.229.7 and downloaded directly from

       that device and IP address the file that was being offered and was named “boy

       girl sex 6yo.avi.” He then viewed the downloaded file and confirmed it

       contained child pornography. The detective used an online database to

       determine that the IP address 99.9.229.7 was registered to ISP AT&T and was

       located in Greenwood. Information obtained from AT&T showed that the IP

       address was, at the time and date in question, assigned to Sloan at his address

       in Greenwood. The detective confirmed Sloan’s address through another

       online search.

[31]   The fundamental question is whether there was a substantial basis from which

       the warrant-issuing judge could conclude there was a fair probability that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023   Page 18 of 19
       evidence of the crime of child pornography would be found in Sloan’s

       residence. We emphasize here that probable cause deals with probabilities, not

       certainties. See Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 871 (“‘Probable cause is only a probability

       or substantial chance of criminal activity, not a certainty that a crime was

       committed.’”) (quoting Suarez v. Town of Ogden Dunes, Ind., 581 F.3d 591, 596

       (7th Cir. 2009)). Despite the possibility that an individual other than Sloan may

       have used the account, the circumstances here establish a fair probability that

       Sloan, the subscriber, committed this act and that evidence of the illegal activity

       would be found in his home. We therefore hold that facts establishing illegal

       internet activity associated with a particular IP address and assignment of the

       IP address at the time in question to a particular internet subscriber at a specific

       physical address provide a nexus between the illegal activity and the physical

       address sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant to search the

       residence at the physical address.

       Conclusion
[32]   The trial court did not err by admitting the evidence seized from Sloan’s

       residence pursuant to the search warrant because the affidavit supporting the

       warrant sufficiently established probable cause for its issuance.

[33]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2250 | December 29, 2023     Page 19 of 19