Court Opinion

ID: 9774152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:10:17.983289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:02.955812
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge
(dissenting).
The Constitution of 1845, Sec. 12 of Art. I thereof, provides that “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” The same provision was carried into and preserved in the subsequent revisions of the Constitution, including that of 1876 (our present Constitution), where it appears as Art. 1, Sec. 15 thereof.
To strengthen and fortify that constitutional provision and to guard against any waiver or destruction of or disobedience to the right of trial by jury, the legislature of this state, when it came to promulgate our first or original code, declared by Art. 26 thereof that the right of trial by jury could not be waived by a defendant in a felony case.
The same statutory provision has been incorporated in and made a part of every code enacted since that time, and appears in our present code as Art. 11 (C. C. P.).
It is apparent, therefore, that our founding fathers wanted to be sure that in this state the right of trial by (jury should not be abridged or denied and that under no circumstance would an accused be permitted to waive that right in the trial of a felony case. Up until 1931, the statute applied to all trials for a felony. At that time the inhibition against waiver was restricted to trials of felony cases when a plea of not guilty was entered.
*557So, for over a hundred years without deviation or question, the Constitution and laws of this state have prohibited waiver of trial by jury in a felony case where a plea of not guilty is entered. The constitutional and statutory provisions mentioned have not been repealed by any authority with power to do so; they remain a part of the Constitution and laws of this state.
However, by the opinion my brethren have this day delivered in this case, the constitutional and statutory provisions mentioned have been destroyed as effectively as if they had been repealed by a vote of the people or an act of the legislature. For my brethren hold that the appellant did waive his right of trial by jury and that, having done so, he could not complain thereof. Their holding marks a new and hitherto unheard-of departure from the established and recognized law of this state.
I do not agree to that conclusion, and record my dissent as follows:
The appellant, here, was on trial for rape.
After several persons had been selected, empaneled, and sworn as jurors in the case, one of that number became incapacitated to the extent that he was unable to continue on the jury. The trial court consulted with counsel for the respective parties and the appellant, in person, with the view of ascertaining if there was any objection to discharging the juror. Appellant registered no objection and agreed that he might be discharged.
The juror was discharged, and another was selected and sworn, in his stead. After the jury of twelve had been selected and sworn, the appellant was again asked if he had any objections to the jury as thus empaneled. He replied in the negative.
There is no question but that if one accused of a capital felony could waive the constitutional and statutory right to a trial by jury, the appellant has done so in this case. On the other hand, if the Constitution and laws of this state prohibit one on trial for a capital felony from waiving his right of trial by jury or of agreeing to the discharge of a juror, appellant’s waiver or attempted waiver of that right is of no force or effect and is unenforceable.
My brethren hold that the right of trial by jury may be waived and that appellant, here, did waive such right.
*558I do not agree to that conclusion, for I am of the opinion that under the Constitution and laws of this state the appellant could not waive his right of trial by jury.
The question for determination here may be stated, then as follows:
After a person has been duly selected, empaneled, and sworn as a juror in the trial of a capital felony, may the trial court, with the express consent of the defendant, excuse and discharge such juror and substitute in his place another juror without violating the Constitution- and laws of this state?
Art. 1, Sec. 15, of the Constitution of this state reads as follows:
“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency ...”
That means exactly what it says — that is, that under no circumstances or conditions shall the right of trial by jury be violated or rendered without force or effect.
Art. V, Sec. 13, of the Constitution requires that a jury in the district court be composed of twelve men. By recent amendment, the term, “men,” as there used, includes both male and female persons.
Art. 11, C. C. P., reads as follows:
“Waiver of rights
“The defendant in a Criminal prosecution for any offense, may waive any right secured him by Law except the right of a trial by a Jury in a felony case when he enters a plea of not guilty.”
So, by the Constitution and laws of this state, the right of trial by a jury of twelve persons in a felony case must remain inviolate and the defendant cannot waive that right when he pleads not guilty to the accusation against him.
The question presented for determination is not, as my brethren hold, one of waiver by the appellant. The Constitution and the statute say that such waiver cannot be granted to any *559one at any time at any place. Rather, the question here is whether the facts show that trial by jury, as known to the Constitution and laws of this state, has been denied or violated. If so, the Constitution and laws of this state prohibit a trial under such condition.
Neither the Constitution nor the statutes of this state define the phrase, “trial by jury,” as used therein. That phrase has a definite meaning in the common law — which is here applicable and controlling.
In Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 74 L. Ed. 854, 50 S. Ct. 253, we find this definition:
“That it (trial by jury) means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was adopted, is not open to question. Those elements were: (1) That the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts; and (3) that the verdict should be unanimous.”
The definition appears to be universally accepted. This court so recognized, in Randel v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 282, 219 S. W. 2d 689.
It is of paramount importance to notice that the first element of trial by jury is that the jury be composed of twelve persons, no more nor no less.
Here, thirteen jurors took the oath and were sworn in as jurors to try this case. Of the twelve first selected and sworn, only eleven served on the jury. The jury was thereby reduced to that number. The thirteenth juror who was sworn in this case became a member of the jury which rendered the verdict in this case.
The question eventually turns, then, upon the right of the trial court to discharge the juror.
Art. 622, C. C. P., provides that as and at the time each juror is selected in a trial of a capital felony case he must be sworn. Art. 623, C. C. P., provides that when jurors have been sworn in a capital case those so sworn shall be kept together *560and not permitted to separate until a verdict has been rendered or the jury finally discharged. So then, when a juror is sworn in a capital felony case he becomes and is a member of the jury. When twelve are sworn, the jury is complete.
The holding in Ellison v. State, 12 Tex. App. 557, is directly in point upon the question as to whether the discharged juror was, in fact, a member of the jury at the time of his discharge. We there said:
“It is our conclusion, and we so hold, that after a juror has been once empaneled in a felony case, it is beyond the power of the court to excuse him from serving in the case, and that in case of sickness or accident rendering it impracticable to proceed with the trial of the case before the jury as then constituted, the court should discharge that jury, and proceed to form another for the trial of the case.”
The case of Hill v. State, 10 Tex. App. 618, is there cited by the court as authority supporting that conclusion.
My brethren refuse to follow the holding in the Ellison case because the juror was excused without the consent and over the objection of the accused.
Want of consent of the accused to the discharge of the juror is therefore made the determining factor, and not whether the trial court had the power to discharge the juror.
I am at a loss to understand that reasoning, in the face of the Constitution and the statute and the holding in the Ellison case, above set out. Consent of the accused could never authorize a trial court to do that which the Constitution and laws of this state prohibit.
As supporting their conclusion that an accused may consent to the discharge of an empaneled juror in a capital felony case, my brethren cite Sterling v. State, 15 Tex. App. 249. In that case the question arose as to permitting an empaneled juror to go home and remain with his family overnight, due to illness in the family. The accused and his counsel agreed that the juror might do so if he were placed in charge of an officer. The trial court refused to agree thereto, but remarked: “If you will all agree to the discharge of .. . (the juror), he may be discharged.” Counsel for the accused agreed that the juror might be dis*561charged; the accused, himself, made no objection; and the juror was discharged.
In holding as error the action of the trial court in discharging the juror, the court restated the rule announced in the Ellison case, supra, to the effect that it was beyond the power of a trial court to excuse an empaneled juror in a felony case and that if an occasion arises where an empaneled juror must be discharged the entire jury should be discharged.
The Sterling case does not hold that an accused may waive the discharge of an empaneled juror, as my brethren suggest. In fact, it holds to the exact contrary.
My brethren cite Burton v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 234, 86 S. W. 2d 768, as supporting their conclusion that a trial court may discharge an empaneled juror in a felony case with or without the consent of the accused.
The person who had been empaneled in that case was absolutely and unequivocably disqualified from serving as a juror in the trial of any case because of his previous conviction of a felony. He could not be a juror, and no amount of swearing- or empaneling could, then, qualify him to sit as a juror in the case.
The Burton case, supra, does not touch the question hereunder consideration, nor are the cases above cited overruled therein — which would necessarily follow if the Burton case controlled the disposition of the question before us.
To my mind, it is clear, under the Constitution and laws of this state and the holdings of this court, that a trial court cannot and does not have the power or legal authority to discharge a juror who has been empaneled and sworn, as such, in the trial of a felony case. If a trial court does discharge such a juror, then all members of the jury at that time are discharged, because the jury is destroyed.
As was pointed out in the Ellison case, supra, the trial court in such cases should discharge the jury and proceed to form another. That is exactly what the trial court should have done in this case when he discharged the one juror. Consent of the appellant could not change or affect the situation.
In reaching my conclusion here, I am not unmindful of the; *562fact that courts of some of the other jurisdictions hold that an accused in a felony case may waive the right to be tried by a jury composed of less than twelve persons.
One of the cases I have in mind is that of Patton v. United States, supra. The holding in that case was based upon provisions of our Federal Constitution which do not expressly embody the language or prohibition contained in Art. I, Sec. 15, of our Constitution and in Art. 11, C. C. P.
We have no federal constitutional provision that trial by jury shall remain inviolate, nor is there a federal statute which says that the right of trial by jury cannot be waived.
In the annotation to that case (70 A. L. R. 281), it is made clear that the conclusion reached (in the Patton v. U. S. case, supra), as well as the like holding of other cases, is predicated upon the absence of a specific statute or constitutional provision prohibiting the waiver of the right to be tried by a jury composed of less than twelve persons. The same annotation calls attention to the cases which support “the rule that, in the absence of specific statutory or constitutional provisions providing for the waiver of a full jury, a defendant in a felony case cannot waive his right to be tried by a jury of twelve, and consent to a trial by a fewer number; or at least that such consent does not confer jurisdiction upon the court to proceed with such a jury, in view of state statutes and constitutional provisions preserving trials by jury.”
Among the authorities supporting the rule stated above, the cases of Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 303, 106 S. W. 345, and Dunn v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 224 S. W. 893, from this court, are listed. Those cases, as well as others subsequent, announce the rule to be that, in Texas, the defendant could not waive the right of trial by jury or the fight to be tried by twelve jurors.
The State of Utah had a statute which required that the defendant in a felony case must be personally present at the trial.
It appears, in Hopt v. State of Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 28 L. Ed. 262, that the accused was not present during the selection of some of the jurors. It was insisted that he could not waive his presence at the trial. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction. I quote from that opinion:
*563“We are of the opinion that it was not within the power of the accused or his counsel to dispense with the statutory requirement as to his personal presence at the trial. The argument to the contrary necessarily proceeds upon the ground that he alone is concerned as to the mode by which he may be deprived of his life or liberty, and that the chief object of the prosecution is to punish him for the crime charged. But this is a mistaken view, as well as of the relations which the accused holds to the public as of the end of human punishment. The natural life, says Blackstone, ‘cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.’ 1 Bl. Com., 133. The public has an interest in his life and liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law. That which the law makes essential in proceedings involving the deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused; much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to object to unauthorized methods. The great end of punishment is not the expiation or atonement of the offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses-of the same kind. 4 Bl. Com., 11. Such being the relation which the citizen hold to the public, and the object of punishment for public wrongs, the Legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life and liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be personally present at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of law required by the Constitution.”
While it has been a long time since Mr. Justice Harlan uttered these words, to me they are just as true and controlling today as when he wrote them. Especially is that true in states where, as in Texas, the legislature has not seen fit to let the right to waive substantial rights in a felony case depend, solely,, upon the Constitution or upon due process, but has prohibited, by statute, the waiver of some of those rights, such as the right to be tried by a jury of twelve persons, no more no less.
It was beyond the power of the accused in the Hopt case, by reason of the statute of that state, to waive his personal presence at his trial. By the same reasoning in this case, the appellant could not waive his right of trial by jury, because the statute of this state forbids it. In my opinion, the Hopt case is direct authority supporting my conclusion.
*564It must be remembered that it is within the power of the legislature to pass all such laws as it deems proper, so long as constitutional guarantees and provisions are not violated.
There is nothing in our State Constitution that prevents the legislature from saying that one accused of a felony may not waive the right of trial by jury.
The statute (Art. 11, C. C. P.) is entirely valid and constitutes the expression of the people speaking through their representatives. It must be given the construction that the prohibition against waiver of trial by jury is a part of the framework of government.
Art. I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense (felony) unless under indictment by a grand jury.
In Hollingsworth v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 399, 221 S. W. 978, we said:
“It is the fundamental law of Texas that no man can be tried for a felony, except upon an indictment presented by a grand jury. This is prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction upon the court in the first instance.”
The prohibition contained in the constitutional provision is no more sacred or binding than is the statute (Art. 11, C. C. P.) and Art. 1, Sec. 15, Const, of Texas.
Surely my brethren would not hold that one might waive indictment in a felony case by advising the trial court that he was perfectly willing to stand trial without an indictment being first returned against him.
I am well aware of the fact that this record reveals that the appellant has committed a diabolical crime and that the verdict of the jury, under facts, was entirely authorized.
I am not able to say that appellant’s waiver of his right of trial by jury induced or brought about the verdict which was rendered herein. Nor do I suggest that had the discharged juror remained on the jury a different result would or might have been attained. The error in permitting appellant to waive his right of trial jury does not appear to have redounded to his injury in the conviction or penalty assessed.
*565On the other hand, I have an abiding conviction that no man should be condemned to death or suffer punishment at the hands of the law until and unless he has first been condemned by a trial in accordance with the Constitution and laws of this state.
The judiciary of this state, trial and appellate, has no more right to refuse to obey the law than does the humblest citizen. The Constitution and laws of this state are neither the making nor the responsibility of the judicial branch of government. It is the duty and responsibility of the judiciary to see that the guarantees contained in the Constitution are preserved and that the mandates contained in our statutes are obeyed — and this, without fear or favor. When this is done, the judiciary has fulfilled its purpose.
So far as I am concerned, this record shows that the statute of this state which says that an appellant can not waive his right of trial by jury was here violated by the trial court. This court ought not to refuse to so hold, nor should it justify or excuse that violation.
When the warden of the penitentiary of this state pulls the switch that sends this appellant to his death in the electric chair, he will be inflicting the punishment assessed and decreed at a trial in violation of the Constitution and laws of this state.
All that I can do is to enter my solemn protest, which I here do.