Court Opinion

ID: 9777903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:27:48.1514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.402786
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority, at the onset, states this is a summary judgment appeal, but does not, in my opinion, apply summary judgment analysis. For example, the summary judgment was not granted on the basis of either the release or the assignment, yet the majority states the trial court should have granted it on those bases. This final pronouncement simply highlights the majority’s flawed analysis.
The sole point of error urged by appellant is the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment based upon the statute of limitation because Texas would recognize that there exist separate and distinct causes of action for the separate and distinct diseases of mesothelioma and asbestosis. There is no doubt that Graffagnino v. Fibreboard Corp., 776 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.1985), held there could be but one cause of action based upon the exposure whether or not all the injuries have become manifest at the time the cause of action arose. This court, however, is not bound to accept a federal court’s erroneous interpretation of Texas law. See Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Malone Serv. Co., 712 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). Graffagnino’s single-cause-of-action holding was criticized by Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.), modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.1986), and, contrary to the majority’s inference, the court’s modification of its original opinion did not soften the criticism. Hagerty pointed out the flaw in applying the single-cause-of-action rule to an injury which had not manifested itself. Once there has been some toxic exposure, a claimant must file suit within the statute of limitations, yet he can only recover for those injuries which, in reasonable medical probability, resulted from the exposure.
There can be no doubt that Texas follows the well reasoned “discovery rule.” Further, the open courts provision of our state constitution prevents the cutting off of a cause of action before the party knows or reasonably should know that he is injured. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1984). Appellant produced competent summary judgment evidence that mesothelioma and asbestosis are two separate and distinct diseases. Appellant’s expert stated there was only a 9% chance that someone with asbestosis would contract mesothelio-ma. Therefore, there is only a possibility and not a probability that someone with asbestosis will contract mesothelioma. In a summary judgment proceeding, evidence favorable to the non-movant must be taken as true. Waggoners’ Home Lumber Co. v. Bendix Forest Prod. Corp., 639 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1982, no writ). This summary judgment medical evidence is what distinguishes this case factually from *577Graffagnino which based its holding on Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.1985). In Gideon, the only medical evidence was that there was greater than a 50% risk of developing cancer after an asbestos exposure.
The majority cites three Texas cases, none on point. Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. McCarty, 94 Tex. 298, 60 S.W. 429 (1901) and Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 123 Tex. 592, 72 S.W.2d 583 (1934) are both cases involving releases, while First Nat’l Bank of Grapevine v. Nu-Way Transp., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), is a conversion case applying a two-year statute of limitation.
Many sister jurisdictions have recognized that a separate and distinct cause of action exists for separate and distinct diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir.1986) (applying New Jersey law); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C.Cir.1982); In re Moorenovich, 634 F.Supp. 634 (D.Me.1986); Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F.Supp. 671 (D.D.C.1981); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 399 N.W.2d 1 (1986); Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303 Md. 213, 492 A.2d 1286 (1985); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla.1986); Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 498 A.2d 1126 (Del. Super.Ct.1985), aff'd, 503 A.2d 192 (Del.1986); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985).
Unlike the majority, I do not believe that Gideon and Graffagnino correctly interpreted and applied Texas law, or are they controlling. Our supreme court has properly held that the legislature could not, under our state constitution, enact a statute that deprives a litigant of a cause of action prior to a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong. Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 923; Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.1985). Neither the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nor this court, for that matter, can do what the Texas legislature could not. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.