Court Opinion

ID: 9841275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 19:03:41.094661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:57.075424
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/21/23 P. v. Hicks CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B319189

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA275712)
           v.

 GEORGE EDWARD HICKS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
      Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 _____________________________
       Appellant George Edward Hicks appeals from orders
summarily denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.61 and his request for postconviction discovery
under section 1054.9. Hicks argues, and the People concede, the
trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel after Hicks
filed a facially valid section 1172.6 petition. However, the People
argue, and we agree, the trial court’s error was harmless because
Hicks was categorically ineligible for relief based on his record of
conviction, which established Hicks acted with malice
aforethought and was the actual killer. Regarding his
section 1054.9 discovery request, Hicks has not shown he made a
good faith effort to obtain the requested materials from his trial
counsel. Accordingly, we affirm both orders.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Given the nature of this appeal, our recitation of the facts is
limited. A more detailed account of the facts can be found in our
opinion from Hicks’s direct appeal People v. Hicks (Dec. 24, 2007,
B192314) (Hicks).
       On December 4, 2004, Raymond Mitchell was standing
outside, talking to three individuals. (Hicks, supra, B192314 at
p. *1.) Hicks walked up behind Mitchell and threw gasoline at
him, then lit Mitchell on fire with a lighter. (Ibid.) Mitchell died
in the hospital two days later from pneumonia caused by burns to
his respiratory tract. (Ibid.)
       An information charged Hicks with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and alleged Hicks personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon, to wit, gasoline, during the commission of the
offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
       At trial, the prosecution put forward two theories of first
degree murder—either Hicks committed a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or, alternatively, Hicks committed murder
perpetrated by torture. The jury was instructed with CALJIC
8.10 [defining murder as a killing done with malice
aforethought]; CALJIC 8.11 [defining express and implied
malice]; and CALJIC 8.20 [defining first degree murder as a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing]. With respect to the
murder perpetrated by torture theory, the jury was instructed
with CALJIC 8.24, which read: “Murder which is perpetrated by
torture is also murder of the first degree. [¶] The essential
elements of murder by torture are: [¶] 1. One person murdered
another person; [¶] 2. The perpetrator committed the murder
with a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict
extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic
purpose; and [¶] 3. The acts or actions taken by the perpetrator to
inflict extreme and prolonged pain were a cause of the victim’s
death. [¶] The crime of murder by torture does not require any
proof that the perpetrator intended to kill his victim, or any proof
that the victim was aware of pain or suffering. [¶] The word
‘willful’ as used in this instruction means intentional. [¶]
The word ‘deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or determined
upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action. [¶]
The word ‘premeditated’ means considered beforehand.”
       The jury was also instructed on causation with CALJIC
3.40 and 3.41. The causation instructions read: “To constitute
the crime of murder there must be in addition to the death of the
victim an unlawful act which was a cause of that . . . victim’s

                                 3
death. [¶] The criminal law has its own particular way of defining
cause. A cause of a victim’s death is an act that sets in motion a
chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable
consequence of the act the victim’s death and without which the
victim’s death would not occur. [¶] There may be more than one
cause of the death of the victim. When the conduct of two or
more persons contributes concurrently as a cause of death, the
conduct of each is a cause of death if that conduct was also a
substantial factor contributing to the result. A cause is
concurrent if it was operative at the moment of death and acted
with another cause to produce the death of Raymond Mitchell. [¶]
If you find that the defendant’s conduct was a cause of Raymond
Mitchell’s death, then it is no defense that the conduct of some
other person, even the deceased person, contributed to the
death.”
      The jury convicted Hicks of first degree murder, however,
the verdict form did not indicate which theory the jury relied on.
The trial court sentenced Hicks to a term of 25 years to life.
A different panel of this division affirmed Hicks’s conviction on
appeal. (Hicks, supra, B192314 at p. *1.)
      In January 2020, Hicks filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, which was denied.
      In January 2022, Hicks again petitioned for resentencing
under section 1172.6. On a form resentencing petition, Hicks
indicated he was convicted of first or second degree murder
pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He further indicated that he could not
now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
He alleged that he could no longer be convicted under those

                                4
sections because: he was not the actual killer; he did not, with
the intent to kill, aid, abet, or assist the actual killer in the
commission of first degree murder; and he was not a major
participant in the felony and did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or
felony. Hicks requested the appointment of counsel.
        Hicks also moved for discovery pursuant to section 1054.9,
which allows certain offenders to obtain materials to prepare a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hicks sought the following
categories of materials: (1) all materials in defense counsel’s trial
files, including video footage and investigation reports; (2) all
materials in possession of the prosecution at the time of trial,
including the arrest warrant, video footage of the incident, video
footage from various locations, “still shoots” or “videos from cell
phone of government agents used to lure [Hicks]” to the scene of
the crime, “all photos of the container that was tested” by the
“finger printing crime lab,” all agreements with the attorney of
record in this case to suppress criminal records of any
prosecution witness “from the court and/or jury,” and the number
of all Black potential jurors at jury selection; and (3) all materials
used in the investigation in this case, including phone records of
the investigating detectives and all photos controlled by the
Los Angeles Police Department’s Southwest Division.
        The trial court denied Hicks’s section 1172.6 petition
without appointing counsel, finding Hicks did not qualify for
relief as the actual killer and sole perpetrator of the crime.
The trial court also denied Hicks’s section 1054.9 discovery
request on the grounds it was successive.

                                  5
                             DISCUSSION
I.     The trial court erred when it failed to appoint
       counsel, however, the error was harmless
       Hicks argues the trial court erred by denying his section
1172.6 petition without appointing counsel, requesting briefing,
and holding an evidentiary hearing. As discussed below,
we agree the trial court erred, but find the error harmless.2
       A.    Governing law
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 2, p. 6675; Senate Bill 1437) “eliminated natural and
probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding
and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The Legislature sought to ensure that murder liability was not
imposed on a person who was not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile).)
       To achieve this purpose, Senate Bill 1437 amended the
felony murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which
provides felony murder liability will attach only if the person
was: (1) the actual killer; (2) an aider and abettor who acted with
the intent to kill; or (3) a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), further limited felony murder
liability and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,

2    Hicks requested judicial notice of his record of conviction.
We deferred that ruling until we considered the merits of this
appeal. We now grant his request.

                                 6
providing: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189,
in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
       Individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine may petition to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts, if they can show they could not now be convicted of
murder because of changes in the law. (§ 1172.6; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) To apply for resentencing, an
individual must file a petition in the trial court stating that:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder[;] [¶]
[and] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)–
(3); see also § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A).)
       Upon receiving a facially valid petition, the trial court must
appoint counsel if requested by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) After the
appointment of counsel, the trial court may look at the record of
conviction to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima

                                  7
facie case for relief. (Lewis, at p. 971.) The record of conviction
allows the trial court “to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.) However,
the trial court “ ‘should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, “ ‘if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       We independently review the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for relief.
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
       B.    Analysis
       The parties agree Hicks filed a facially valid petition under
section 1172.6. Hicks’s petition alleged he was convicted of first
or second degree murder under a felony murder or natural and
probable consequences theory. He further alleged he could not
now be convicted of first or second degree murder after the
amendments to sections 188 and 189 because he was not the
actual killer, he did not act with the intent to kill in aiding and
abetting the actual killer, and he was not a major participant in
the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       Thus, upon Hicks’s filing of his facially valid petition, he
was entitled to the appointment of counsel, and the trial court’s
failure to do so was error. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)
       We review the failure to appoint counsel in the context of a
section 1172.6 petition under the harmless error standard set
forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d. 818. (People v.
Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864.) Under this standard,

                                 8
we determine whether the petitioner can show a reasonable
probability he would have achieved a more favorable result
absent the error. (Id. at p. 864.) We will find the failure to
appoint counsel harmless if the record of conviction establishes
the petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887,
893; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       Here, Hicks cannot show a reasonable probability he would
have achieved a more favorable result had the trial court
appointed counsel. The record of conviction conclusively
established Hicks was ineligible for relief as the jury instructions
and verdict demonstrated he was the actual killer and acted with
malice aforethought or an equally culpable mens rea. Hicks was
the sole perpetrator of the crime and there was no evidence,
argument, or instruction that would suggest another individual’s
involvement. Generally, this finding is sufficient to find a
petitioner ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of
law. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 230 [finding
petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the
record established he was the actual killer and sole perpetrator of
the crime].) Further, in addition to establishing Hicks was the
actual killer, the record of conviction also established Hicks acted
with malice aforethought or the intent to torture, i.e., the intent
to inflict extreme pain to exact revenge or for some other sadistic
purpose. The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of
first degree murder—either Hicks committed a willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing or he committed murder perpetrated by
torture. Under either theory, the jury found Hicks acted with
malice aforethought or with an intent to torture or potentially
both. If the jury found Hicks guilty of a willful, deliberate, and

                                 9
premeditated killing, it must have concluded Hicks acted with
express malice, i.e., the intent to kill. If the jury agreed with the
prosecution’s second theory, that is, Hicks committed murder
perpetrated by torture, it must have concluded Hicks acted with
the intent to torture, which despite the changes to sections 188
and 189, remains a statutorily listed type of first degree murder.
(§ 189, subdivision (a) [“All murder that is perpetrated by means
of . . . torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree”].)
Therefore, Hicks is ineligible for relief as a matter of law under
section 1172.6 because he could still be convicted of first degree
murder under amended sections 188 and 189. (See Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 827–828.)
         Hicks’s lengthy briefs essentially put forward two
responses to the unavoidable conclusion the jury found he was
the actual killer. First, he asserts he still comes within the ambit
of section 1172.6, because it is likely the jury found him guilty
under an imputed malice theory because the prosecution’s theory
of murder perpetrated by torture did not require a finding that he
acted with the intent to kill. Thus, Hicks argues, although the
jury was not instructed on felony murder liability, his first degree
murder conviction rested on a theory akin to felony murder
where malice was imputed to him based solely on his
participation in a crime, here, torture. Second, Hicks asserts the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish he was the
actual killer. Hicks argues the facts demonstrate the connection
between his act of setting Mitchell on fire and Mitchell’s death
two days later from pneumonia is too attenuated in light of recent
case authority, which held the actual killer must be the

                                 10
individual who personally killed the victim. Neither argument
has merit.
      Regarding his first argument, Hicks is correct that the jury
instructions and the verdict form leave open the possibility the
jury convicted Hicks of first degree murder even if it did not find
he acted with the intent to kill. Assuming the jury adopted the
prosecution’s theory of murder perpetrated by torture, it may
have only found Hicks acted with implied malice given an
essential element of murder perpetrated by torture is the
defendant murdered the victim, with murder being defined as
any killing done with express or implied malice. (See CALJIC
No. 8.10 [defining murder as a killing done with malice
aforethought], CALJIC No. 8.11 [defining malice as either
express or implied], CALJIC 8.24 [defining the essential elements
of murder perpetrated by torture].) Thus, it is possible Hicks was
convicted of first degree murder based on a finding of implied
malice, i.e., the killing resulted from an intentional act; the
natural consequences of which were dangerous to human life; and
which was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger
to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. (CALJIC
No. 8.11.)
      This possibility, however, does not entitle Hicks to relief
under section 1172.6 for two reasons. First, implied malice
murder remains a valid theory of liability notwithstanding recent
changes in the law. This is because imputed malice and implied
malice are distinct concepts. Implied malice is based on a
defendant’s own mens rea, whereas malice “imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” is based on
vicarious liability for a killing committed by another person.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997,

                                11
1004–1005; see also Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 828.) Hicks
claims that malice was “imputed” to him based on his commission
of torture, but that misapprehends the distinction between
implied and imputed malice. There were no other participants in
Mitchell’s murder, and the jury was not told it could find Hicks
acted with implied malice based on his participation in some
other crime. Rather, the finding of implied malice was based on
the evidence Hicks was actually aware of and consciously
disregarded the grave risk to life when he doused Mitchell in
gasoline and set him on fire. Thus, malice was not imputed to
him within the meaning of section 188. (See People v. Roldan, at
pp. 1004–1005; see also People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
437, 442.)
       However, even if we assume Hicks was convicted of murder
perpetrated by torture and the jury found he acted with implied
malice, he would still not be entitled to relief because the jury
also had to find Hicks acted with “a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a
living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion,
persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.” (CALJIC No. 8.24.)
Our Supreme Court has held this mental state is “more than
malice” as it is “ ‘the cold-blooded intent to inflict pain for
personal gain or satisfaction,’ ” which is why that mens rea will
support a first degree murder conviction in the absence of an
intent to kill. (People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 453, 464; see
also People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271; People v.
Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546.) Because Senate Bill 1437
sought to limit murder liability to those individuals who
personally acted with malice aforethought, it does not follow that
it also limited murder liability for those individuals who acted

                               12
with a more culpable state of mind. (See People v. Brown, at
pp. 462, 465–466 [discussing how the statute defining first degree
murder perpetrated by torture has remained substantially
unchanged for over a century]; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 827 [explaining Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of the natural
and probable consequences doctrine was meant to limit murder
liability to those principals who personally acted with malice
aforethought].)
       Hicks’s second argument—that he was not the actual killer
because “Mitchell did not die directly from the burn injuries”—is
also not persuasive. Indeed, the argument merely attempts to
relitigate facts already decided against Hicks, specifically,
the jury’s conclusion Hicks murdered Mitchell by dousing him
with gasoline and setting him on fire, which caused burns to
Mitchell’s respiratory tract, leading to his death from pneumonia.
“The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or
attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of section
[1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for allegedly
erroneous prior factfinding. . . . The purpose of section [1172.6] is
to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189
with respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a
do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ”
(People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
       Hicks cites to People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123
(Garcia I), People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1 (Lopez), and
People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64 (Vang) to argue whether
he was the actual killer remains disputed.

                                 13
       In Garcia I, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 123, the defendant and
his coperpetrators committed a home invasion robbery. (Id. at
p. 129.) During the course of the robbery someone taped the
victim’s nose and mouth, causing him to suffocate and die. (Id. at
p. 136.) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 730, requiring the prosecutor to prove defendant “did an act
that caused the death of another person” during the commission
of the robbery. (Garcia I, at p. 144.) The prosecutor argued to
the jury that it could find defendant was the actual killer if it
found defendant merely handed the tape, “the instrumentality of
death,” to a coperpetrator. (Id. at p. 149.)
        On appeal, the defendant challenged the jury’s felony
murder special circumstance finding, arguing the jury could have
found he was the actual killer even if he did not personally kill
the victim if the jury found he committed any act in the chain of
events that led to the victim’s death. (Garcia I, supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) The appellate court agreed and
reversed the special circumstance finding, concluding the
instructions combined with the prosecutor’s argument allowed
the jury to convict the defendant on an invalid legal theory,
specifically, the jury could convict defendant as the actual killer
even if he took no part in the taping of the victim’s face. (Ibid.)
Garcia I held an “actual killer” must have “personally killed” the
victim, not merely “ ‘did an act that caused the death of another
person.’ ” (Id. at pp. 151, 155.)
       In Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th 64, the defendant was
arguing with his wife, and she fled in her car. (Id. at p. 69.)
The defendant followed her, forced her to stop, and coerced her
into his vehicle. (Ibid.) As the defendant drove away, his wife
jumped from the moving vehicle and died. (Ibid.) The trial court

                                14
instructed the jury that the defendant was guilty of first degree
felony murder and the special circumstance true if the defendant
committed a kidnapping; defendant intended to commit the
kidnapping; and, while committing the kidnapping, defendant
caused his wife’s death. (Ibid.)
       On appeal, defendant argued, because Senate Bill 1437
provided a defendant could only be liable for felony murder if he
was the actual killer, and his wife jumped from the vehicle of her
own volition, his conviction for first degree felony murder with a
special circumstance rested on a legally invalid theory. (Vang,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 69, 80.) The appellate court agreed,
holding that, in light of Senate Bill 1437’s intent to impose
punishment commensurate with the person’s culpability, the
term “actual killer” was intended to limit liability for felony
murder to the actual perpetrators of a killing, i.e., those persons
who personally committed the homicidal act. (Vang, at p. 88.)
The Vang court noted that the jury instructions had the same
flaw as those in Garcia I. (Vang, at p. 91.) The instructions
allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of felony murder if it
determined that defendant “caused” the victim’s death based on
general causation principles, even if it did not find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he personally committed the homicidal
act. (Ibid.)
       In Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 1, defendant was
prosecuted solely under the theory he was the actual killer and
committed the robbery alone. The jury was not instructed on
accomplice liability, aider and abettor liability, or on liability
under the theory defendant counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree or robbery. (Id. at

                                15
p. 15.) Defendant’s theory at trial was that he was neither the
actual killer nor involved in the robbery. He testified that
although he went with another individual to the victim’s
apartment, he did not kill the victim or participate in the robbery
or even enter the bedroom in which the victim was later found.
(Id. at p. 16.)
       “The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 540A that to
find defendant guilty of felony murder, it had to find he
committed robbery and ‘[w]hile committing robbery, the
defendant caused the death of another person.’ . . . The jury was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 730 that to find the robbery-
murder special-circumstance allegation to be true, the jury had to
find defendant ‘did an act that caused the death of another
person.’ . . . On the subject of causation, the trial court instructed
the jury as follows: ‘An act causes death if the death is the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would
not have happened without the act. A natural and probable
consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely
to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.’ ” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16, italics omitted.)
       The Lopez court found the record of conviction did not
establish the defendant was ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law because there was a possibility he was
not the actual killer. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.)
“The jury instructions created the possibility the jury convicted
defendant of felony murder and found to be true the robbery-
murder special-circumstance allegation without finding him to
have been the actual killer. The jury was not instructed it had to
find defendant personally killed the victim to convict him; the
jury was instructed it only had to find defendant committed an

                                 16
act that caused the victim’s death. The jury might have found
defendant, though not the actual killer, participated somehow in
the home invasion robbery, and the victim’s death was the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of an act committed in the
course of his participation. As defendant posits, ‘the jury could
have taken a realistic view of the prosecution’s circumstantial
evidence and determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
[defendant] was involved in the robbery that resulted in the
death, but that [defendant] may or may not have been the actual
killer.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Garcia I, Vang, and Lopez are distinguishable. Here, there
was no evidence of any other perpetrators as in Garcia I and
Lopez that would allow the jury to hold Hicks vicariously liable
for the acts of another. The jury was not instructed with the
felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other form of vicarious liability. Hicks was tried
as the sole perpetrator and the actual killer. Further, unlike
Vang, there was no evidence of an unusual intervening cause
that would call into question whether Hicks caused Mitchell’s
death. Even in light of changes to the felony murder rule and
natural and probable consequences doctrine, “the law is clear:
‘[A]s long as the jury finds that without the criminal act the
death would not have occurred when it did, it need not determine
which of the concurrent causes was the principal or primary
cause of death. Rather, it is required [only] that the cause was a
substantial factor contributing to the result.’ ” (People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 964.)
       Accordingly, we find Hicks was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and the trial court’s error in
failing to appoint counsel was harmless.

                                17
II.    Discovery motion
       Next, Hicks argues the trial court erred when it denied his
motion for postconviction discovery motion under section 1054.9.
We disagree.
       A.    Governing law
       Section 1054.9 permits individuals convicted of a serious
felony or a violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or
more to obtain postconviction discovery if they are pursuing a
postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. The permitted
discovery is limited to material in the possession of the
prosecution or law enforcement to which defendants would have
been entitled at the time of trial. (Ibid.; In re Steele (2004)
32 Cal.4th 682, 695 (Steele).)
       To obtain the discovery under section 1054.9, a petitioner
must show good faith but unsuccessful efforts to obtain the
discovery from his or her trial counsel. (Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 690.) A petitioner who can show unsuccessful efforts to
obtain items from trial counsel is entitled to receive discovery
materials that “either (1) the prosecution did provide at time of
trial but have since become lost to the defendant; (2) the
prosecution should have provided at time of trial because they
came within the scope of a discovery order the trial court actually
issued at that time, a statutory duty to provide discovery, or the
constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the
prosecution should have provided at time of trial because the
defense specifically requested them at that time and was entitled
to receive them; or (4) the prosecution had no obligation to
provide at time of trial absent a specific defense request, but to
which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial had
the defendant specifically requested them.” (Steele, supra,

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32 Cal.4th at p. 697.) A petitioner need only demonstrate a
reasonable belief that the items he requests actually exist; he
need not also prove the items’ materiality before being able to
receive the discovery. (Barnett v. Superior Court (2010)
50 Cal.4th 890, 899–901.)
       We review a trial court’s discovery order for abuse of
discretion. (Jimenez v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 824,
829–830.) When the propriety of a discovery order turns on a
question of law, we determine the issue de novo. (Ibid.)
       B.    Analysis
       As an initial matter, Hicks acknowledges that the trial
court’s order denying his motion for postconviction discovery
under section 1054.9 may only be challenged by petition for writ
of mandate. (See § 1054.9; Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 692,
fn. 2.) Nonetheless, he asks us to exercise our discretion to treat
his appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, and to reach its
merits. (See People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 936.)
In the interest of judicial economy, we will reach the merits of
Hicks’s appeal. (See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348–1350.)
       Turning to the merits, we find Hicks has not met his
burden to show he made good faith efforts to obtain the materials
from his trial counsel.
       Hicks asserts that he made an effort to obtain the records
from his trial counsel but that she merely responded that she
does not have the trial transcripts. In support of his assertion,
Hicks cites to a January 29, 2021 letter from his trial counsel
which reads in part: “In response to your request, I am providing
you with my State Bar number . . . . With respect to the trial
transcripts, I do not have them. They have to be requested of the

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court reporter who was present during the trials. Your appellate
counsel will have them. I hope this satisfies your requests.”
       At best, this letter shows that Hicks requested the trial
transcripts and nothing else. However, as summarized above,
Hicks’s discovery request goes far beyond trial transcripts.
Indeed, to the extent the materials identified in Hicks’s request
even exist, they seem to encompass everything but the trial
transcripts. Thus, Hicks cannot show he made a good faith effort
to obtain the materials from his trial counsel.
       Hicks notes that the trial court did not deny his
section 1054.9 request on the grounds that he failed to show a
good faith effort in obtaining the discovery materials from his
trial counsel, but because his request was untimely and
successive, which was improper. (See Catlin v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 302 [holding a request for postconviction
discovery under section 1054.9 cannot be denied as untimely].)
However, even if the trial court denied his request for an
improper reason, we review the trial court’s ruling, not its
reasoning, and we will affirm if the ruling was correct on any
ground. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.) Because Hicks
failed to meet his burden to show he made a good faith but
unsuccessful effort to obtain the requested materials from his
trial counsel, which is a prerequisite under section 1054.9,
the trial court properly denied the request.

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                    DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

                                     VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

                  STRATTON, P. J.

                  GRIMES, J.

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