Court Opinion

ID: 9406560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-01 06:00:25.160998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.274133
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ALEXANDER M. SMITH,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          DC-1221-17-0664-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                         DATE: June 30, 2023
       HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Alexander M. Smith, Washington, D.C., pro se.

           Vinayak S. Nain, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges ar e not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective March 6, 2016, the agency appointed the appellant to the
     competitive-service position of GS-13 Senior Policy Advisor in the Family and
     Youth Services Bureau (FYSB), subject to a 1-year initial probationary period.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 30. Effective December 2, 2016, the agency
     terminated the appellant for postappointment reasons. Id. at 22-25. After filing a
     whistleblowing complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and
     receiving OSC’s closeout letter, the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal with
     the Board challenging his termination. IAF, Tab 1 at 4-5, 8.
¶3         The administrative judge issued an order, informing the appellant of the
     standard for establishing jurisdiction over an IRA appeal and directing him to file
     a statement detailing the elements of his claim, including a list of each protected
     disclosure that he was asserting and why he believed that each disclosure was a
     contributing factor in a claimed personnel action. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant did
     not respond to the order.        After the record on jurisdiction closed, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
                                                                                       3

     jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID).   She found that the appellant
     failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he mad e a protected disclosure, ID
     at 6-8, and that the appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before
     OSC, ID at 8-12.     The appellant has filed a petition for review disputing the
     initial decision, and submitting additional documentary evidence.      Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.

                                        ANALYSIS
¶4         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts his
     administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
     (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
     protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),
     and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
     agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A). Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014).
¶5         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge denied him his
     right to a hearing, and he submits additional evidence that he claims he did not
     submit below because it can only be understood in the context of hearing
     testimony.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4, 17-33.           We have reviewed this
     newly-submitted evidence, and we find that the appellant has not shown that it is
     either new or material.       See Okello v. Office of Personnel Management,
     112 M.S.P.R. 563, ¶ 10 (2009) (stating that the Board will not consider evidence
     submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing t hat it is
     both new and material); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). All of the evidence predates the
     initial decision, and the appellant appears to acknowledge that he had it in his
     possession before the initial decision was issued. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 17-33; see
     Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).          Although the
     appellant states that he was waiting to submit this evidence at a hearing, the
     administrative judge explicitly informed him that he must establish jurisdiction
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     on the written record and that he would not receive a hearing unless he did so.
     IAF, Tab 3 at 7-8; see Spencer v. Department of the Navy, 327 F.3d 1354, 1356
     (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that an appellant is entitled to a hearing in an IRA
     appeal only if he establishes jurisdiction over his appeal); Graves v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016) (same). Rather than waiting
     for a hearing, the appellant could have explained the import of this evidence in
     the jurisdictional brief that he was ordered to file but did not do so. Nor does any
     of this evidence appear to warrant a different outcome from that of the initial
     decision. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
¶6        Much of the petition for review consists of a verbatim replication of the
     appellant’s initial appeal submission, which was his only other filing in this
     appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-11, 14-16; IAF, Tab 1 at 9-15. To this extent, we
     find that the appellant is merely registering his disagreement with the initial
     decision. See Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R. 129, 133-34 (1980).
     Nevertheless, in light of the jurisdictional nature of the issues, we have reviewed
     the administrative judge’s findings.     See Simnitt v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 5 (2010) (recognizing that the issue of jurisdiction is
     always before the Board and may be raised at any time during a Board
     proceeding).
¶7        We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant appears to be
     arguing that he made two protected disclosures—the first concerning FYSB’s lack
     of “adequate knowledge in the areas of family planning, education, and
     parenting/perinatal health services for homeless youth,” and the second
     concerning     FYSB’s   lack   of   “proper   guidance    and   standards    around
     ‘evidence-based’ programs and [need] to improve Title V programs, ensuring
     they are trauma-informed, evidence-based, and medically accurate.” 2 IAF, Tab 1

     2
      “Title V” refers to Title V of the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271,
     49 Stat. 620, 629-34 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. chapter 7, subchapter V). The
                                                                                        5

     at 10; ID at 6-7. However, we also agree with the administrative judge that the
     appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that either of these disclosures
     was protected.    ID at 6-8, 10-11.     A protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) is a disclosure of information that an employee reasonably believes
     evidences any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gr oss mismanagement,
     a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
     to public health and safety. Armstrong v. Department of Justice, 107 M.S.P.R.
     375, ¶ 16 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Department of
     Labor, 2022 MSPB 9. As the administrative judge correctly found, the appellant
     failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his disclosures meet this standard.
     The appellant’s disclosures, as he describes them, contain at most vague and
     conclusory allegations    of   wrongdoing    that   are   not   covered   under   the
     Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). ID at 7-8; see Rzucidlo v. Department of
     the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17 (2006); Mc Corcle v. Department of
     Agriculture, 98 M.S.P.R. 363, ¶ 21 (2005).
¶8        Furthermore, it appears to us that the appellant’s disclosures are essentially
     policy disputes that reflect his own ideas for reforming the agency’s grant
     programs, IAF, Tab 1 at 10-13, but the Board has found that the WPA is not
     meant to be used as a weapon in arguments over policy, O’Donnell v. Department
     of Agriculture, 120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 14 (2013), aff’d, 561 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir.
     2014). For example, the appellant believed that the agency should provide further
     guidance to grant applicants on how to show that their education programs are
     “medically accurate” and their research is “evidence based,” as required by
     42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2), (5). IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 9-12. He also recommended that the
     agency expand its knowledge base by conducting additional research or a
     literature review on “the unmet needs of runaway and homeless youth in the areas
     of family planning, education, and parenting/perinatal health services.” Id. at 10,

     Title V programs at issue here appear to be the “sexual risk avoidance education”
     programs authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 710.
                                                                                         6

      12.   However, even if the appellant reasonably believed that these measures
      would be efficacious, we find nothing to indicate that he reasonably believed that
      the agency was committing gross mismanagement by not adopting them. IAF,
      Tab 1 at 12; see Johnson v. Department of Justice, 104 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 16 (2007)
      (indicating that gross mismanagement does not include management decisions
      that are merely debatable).
¶9          Nor has the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably
      believed his disclosures evidenced a gross waste of funds. Although the appellant
      believes that the agency’s $75 million grant programs would benefit from
      additional research and guidance, IAF, Tab 1 at 12-13, his disclosures were about
      how these programs were being administered—not about their cost, see Embree v.
      Department of the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996).
¶10         Nor has the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably
      believed his disclosures evidenced a substantial and specific danger to public
      health and safety. The appellant asserts that, absent his proposed measures, the
      Title V grant programs “may be completely ineffective, or even harmful to
      specific youth populations.” IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 9-12. However, the appellant has
      not identified the “specific danger” that he is concerned about. His speculation
      that some unnamed harm may befall targeted youth populations through some
      unnamed mechanism if his suggestions are not adopted does not amount to a
      disclosure of a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. See
      Schoenig v. Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 10 (2013).
¶11         Finally, the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that he
      reasonably believed that his disclosures evidenced an abuse of authority. 3 The
      appellant alleges that various agency officials abused their authority in several
      respects, but he does not argue that these alleged abuses of authority were the
      subject of any disclosures.    IAF, Tab 1 at 13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 11-14.
      3
        The appellant does not argue that his disclosures evidenced a violation of any law,
      rule, or regulation, nor do we see any indication that they might have.
                                                                                            7

      Rather, it appears that he is intending to show that these officials had retaliatory
      motive and that the stated reasons for terminating him were pretextual. These
      matters have no bearing on the jurisdictional issue but instead go to the merits of
      the case and the agency’s affirmative defense.         See generally Carr v. Social
      Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).            We find the
      appellant’s allegations in this regard to be immaterial because the Board must
      first address the matter of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the
      appeal. Schmittling v. Department of the Army, 219 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (Fed.
      Cir. 2000).
¶12         The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that he
      failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the OSC because his
      complaint lacked sufficient detail to give OSC an adequate basis to pursue an
      investigation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3; ID at 8-12. However, in light of the analysis
      above, we find it unnecessary to reach this issue and we decline to do so.
      Because the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that he engaged in
      activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i), B, C, or D, we
      agree with the administrative judge that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this
      appeal, and we affirm the initial decision on that basis. 4            See Layton v.
      Department of the Army, 112 M.S.P.R. 549, ¶ 17 (2009), aff’d, 392 F. App’x 875
      (Fed. Cir. 2010).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

      4
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        8

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, t he Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to revie w your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                   9

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                10

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir cuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your

6
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
                                                                                     11

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
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      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.