Court Opinion

ID: 9526925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:26:04.538091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:18.585385
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
With respect to defendant Stephens, reversal is based on failure to give an instruction regarding abandonment.
Defendants Smith and Stephens, and two others, Donald Webster and Franklin Fleming, a juvenile, decided to rob a store; defendant Smith armed himself with a handgun and defendant Stephens with a small, sawed-off shotgun; they went to rob a Goodwill store, but changed their minds and decided a book store would be the target to rob.
After being in the store for several minutes, *255defendant Smith shot and killed the store owner who was armed with a gun in his belt. Neither defendant Smith nor defendant Stephens testified. Webster, one of the original robbers, did testify.
The argument is that Webster’s testimony indicates that defendant Stephens, Webster and Fleming, abandoned the intent to rob the book store.1 Defendant Stephens says the trial court’s refusal to instruct regarding the alleged abandonment was reversible error.
In general, I accept the statement of facts of my distinguished colleagues. However, I do not agree that there was evidence of abandonment before any criminal act was committed. In my opinion, entry into the book store by defendant Stephens, with intent to rob while armed with a sawed-off shotgun concealed inside his pant leg, constituted the completed offense of attempted armed robbery or conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
I would agree with the trial court that it was legally too late for defendant Stephens to abandon his criminal intent. Furthermore, Webster’s testimony that when defendant Smith signalled him (Webster) and defendant Stephens to hold on (stay in the store), they did stay in the store for two to three more minutes during which time defendant Smith shot and killed the storekeeper, would, in my opinion, defeat any proposition that there was sufficient evidence of abandonment to require an instruction regarding abandonment. The fact that defendant Stephens, still armed with his sawed-off shotgun, did not leave the store, although he had plenty of time to leave, destroys any inference of abandonment. If he had testified, a fact issue *256regarding his intent might have been raised.2 But he did not testify. His position rests entirely on Webster’s testimony which testimony was insufficient to support the conclusion of abandonment. Under these circumstances, I would not consider it error to deny a request for an instruction regarding abandonment.
With respect to defendant Smith, reversal is based on failure to give a self-defense instruction.
Like Stephens, defendant Smith did not testify. His claim of self-defense rests upon the testimony of a police officer who testified regarding a statement Smith made after he was arrested.3 I would not believe the contents of the statement sufficient to raise a question of self-defense such as to require a self-defense instruction. The only other testimony relative to the actual killing came from Donald Webster’s aunt, who testified defendant Smith said he grabbed the victim from the back with his arm around the victim’s neck and shot the victim when he thought the victim was reaching in his pocket for a gun.
Under these circumstances, denial of a self-defense instruction did not constitute error.
This case is clearly distinguishable from People v Savoie4 where the defendant testified and claimed his gun went off by mistake. While defendant is entitled under the court rules to have the trial judge indicate to the jury his theory of his case, a trial judge need not give a full instruction regarding a subject, e.g., self-defense, where there *257is not sufficient evidence to support it. Merely asserting a possible defense is to be distinguished from whether there is enough evidence to require an instruction on a subject.
Contrary to my able colleagues, I would vote to affirm the convictions.

 A police officer testified, without objection, as to a statement allegedly made by defendant Stephens which statement does not indicate any claim of abandonment of the robbery.

 But not if he testified the same as in his alleged statement to the police officer.

 Defendant Smith first made an oral statement, the police officer wrote it down and defendant Smith signed it. Then, defendant Smith made a second oral statement, the police officer wrote it down, but defendant Smith refused to sign. It is the second statement upon which the subsequent claim of alleged self-defense rests.

 People v Savoie, 75 Mich App 248; 255 NW2d 11 (1977).