Court Opinion

ID: 9659480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:47:25.887055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:08.255669
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is uncontroverted that defendant left the residential home in which he was an inmate without permission and that his misconduct occurred after he was originally sentenced. As an immediate result of this action, defendant was given a misconduct ticket and 30 days confinement by the Department of Corrections personnel. This behavior was "identifiable conduct” which could be considered by the sentencing judge in increasing defendant’s sentence without constitutional violation. It arguably shed light upon defendant’s "life, health habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities”. North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US *400711, 723; 89 S Ct 2072, 2079; 23 L Ed 2d 656, 668 (1969).
The sentencing court, however, improperly based defendant’s increased sentence on his conduct prior to the time of the original proceeding. Defendant’s criminal history was made known to the trial judge who presided at defendant’s first sentencing proceeding. Defendant’s history as a repeat offender, together with any inference to be drawn thereform that his crimes had grown "worse”, was not new information unavailable or nonexistent at the time of that first proceeding. Under Pearce, defendant’s "overall criminal behavior since the sixties” could not provide the basis for an increased sentence.
It is unclear from the record how much of the increase in defendant’s sentence was attributable to improperly considered matters. Such matters are generally hard to quantify and it is probable that the sentencing judge himself did not attribute a specific portion of the increased sentence to each factor he considered. I would therefore remand to the circuit court for resentencing.1 Although defendant requests that we reinstate his original sentence, there is little authority in Michigan to support such a remedy. But see Justice T. E. Brennan’s dissenting opinion in People v Payne, 386 Mich 84, 98-99; 191 NW2d 375 (1971), rev’d 412 US 47; 93 S Ct 1966; 36 L Ed 2d 736 (1973). Further, it has been said in this regard that "the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but *401only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness’ Blackledge v Perry, 417 US 21, 27; 94 S Ct 2098, 2102; 40 L Ed 2d 628, 634 (1974). Therefore, I am not prepared to say that no increase in defendant’s sentence was permissible.
I agree with the majority that defendant did not have the right under the circumstances of this case to be sentenced by the original circuit judge.

 In light of People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), I would urge the trial court to clearly articulate the reason for any enhanced sentence. I would also urge the trial court to recognize that the only basis appearing in the record for an enhanced sentence is the relatively minor infraction for which the defendant has already been disciplined within the penal system.