Court Opinion

ID: 9529840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:45.21829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.788546
License: Public Domain

MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
The state has moved for full-court reconsideration of the single-judge order entered on June 28, 1996, granting Ozenna’s motion to accept his late-filed notice of appeal. I join my colleagues in concluding that Ozen-na’s motion to accept a late-filed appeal should be granted under the authority of Appellate Rule 502(b).
In chapter 79, section 21, SLA 1995, the legislature amended Appellate Rule 521 — the rule allowing any other appellate rule to be relaxed “where a strict adherence to [the rule] will work surprise or injustice”. As amended by the legislature, in litigation involving the validity of a criminal judgement or sentence, Rule 521 “does not authorize an appellate court ... to allow [a] notice of appeal [or] a petition for review or petition for hearing to be filed more than 60 days late”.
The State contends that the legislature, by enacting this amendment to Rule 521, clearly expressed its intention that no criminal appeal should be filed more than 60 days late. I disagree.
*642Appellate Rule 502(b) is the provision of the appellate rules that expressly governs extensions of time. Rule 502(b) declares that an appellate court can extend any time limit fixed by the appellate rules, and can validate any act performed outside the established time limits, upon a showing of good cause.
Because Appellate Rule 502(b) and Appellate Rule 521 were enacted simultaneously (by Supreme Court Order 439, effective November 15, 1980), they presumedly are not redundant. Examination of the two rules bears this out; they address different concerns. Rule 502(b) allows time limits to be relaxed when good cause is shown. In cases where there is no good cause (for example, cases of unexcused attorney neglect), Rule 521 nevertheless allows time limits to be relaxed to prevent injustice.
The legislative amendment to Rule 521 does not forbid all extensions of time exceeding 60 days in criminal cases. Rather, chapter 79, section 21 expressly states that “this rule” — that is, Rule 521 — does not authorize extensions of more than 60 days in criminal eases. The legislature was silent regarding Rule 502(b). From this, one can reasonably conclude that the legislature did not intend to forbid all extensions of time exceeding 60 days, but rather intended to forbid an extension of time exceeding 60 days if the moving party failed to demonstrate good cause— because it is only when there is no good cause for the extension that Rule 521 must be invoked.
Moreover, even assuming that the legislature had clearly expressed its intention to forbid any and all extensions of time exceeding 60 days, the fact remains that the legislature did not alter Appellate Rule 502(b). Rule 502(b) continues to authorize extensions of time without the 60-day limitation.
The State argues that, where legislative intention is clearly expressed, court rules must be harmonized with the legislature’s desire. This argument was squarely rejected in Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).
The litigation in Nolan involved a recent legislative revision of the law governing class actions. A new statute, AS 23.10.130(b), clearly provided that the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations only with respect to the named plaintiffs, not the entire class. Civil Rule 23, on the other hand, incorporated the rule that the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations with respect to all class members, whether or not they were specifically named in the lawsuit. Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1040-42.
When the legislature enacted AS 23.10.130(b), they did not comply with the procedural requirements established in Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963), for altering a court rule. Because the statute failed to meet those procedural requirements, the supreme court held that the statute had no effect on the rule. Even though the legislature had clearly expressed its intention to adopt a contrary rule regarding the statute of limitations, the supreme court held that the legislature’s intention was irrelevant:
In Alaska, [the supreme court] is given exclusive, initial power to make rules governing practice and procedure[,] and we need not look to the legislature’s intentions to discern whether it has attempted to prescribe a different procedure than that contained in a court rule, unless the legislature has acted in the requisite manner to change a rule. Here the legislature plainly intended not to allow the tolling, but [that statute, because it is procedural,] need not be given effect.
Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1046.
Thus, I join the court’s decision to allow Ozenna to file a late appeal for two reasons. First, because Appellate Rule 502(b) and Appellate Rule 521 address different concerns, the legislature’s decision to restrict the courts’ authority under Rule 521 does not indicate a concurrent intention to restrict the courts’ authority under Rule 502(b). Second, even if the legislature had plainly expressed its intention to forbid any criminal appeal or petition from being filed more than 60 days late, the legislature took no action to amend Appellate Rule 502(b). Under Leege and Nolan, Rule 502(b) remains unaffected by chapter 79, section 21, SLA 1995.