Court Opinion

ID: 9850736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:08.917209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.615362
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the operative statute, Minn. Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1994), is unambiguous, clearly stating the legislature’s intent. Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Determination of discriminatory practice. * * * if the administrative law judge finds that the respondent has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice, * * ⅜ the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination, compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained. In all eases the administrative law judge may also order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party who has suffered discrimination, damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney’s fees, in addition to punitive damages in an amount of not more than $8,500. Punitive damages shall be awarded pursuant to section 549.20. * * * In addition to the aforesaid remedies, in a ease involving discrimination in (a) employment, the administrative law judge may order the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination, with or without backpay * * *.
(emphasis added). These words cannot be more obvious and speak for themselves; there is no room for judicial interpretation. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1994); Arlandson v. Humphrey, 224 Minn. 49, 27 N.W.2d 819 (1947). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion, however, that because the statute does not explicitly require the trial court to provide findings as to how it arrives at its compensatory damages calculation, that the trial court thus has unlimited, unfettered discretion to award “compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained” without providing any indication as to how it got there. The majority sweeps aside persuasive precedent,1 ignores the operative term “compensatory damages” — and concludes that anything not punitive must therefore be “compensatory” in nature.
The term “compensatory damages” has a generally understood meaning just as the terms “actual damages” and “punitive damages” — also used in MinmStat. § 363.071, subd. 2 — have generally understood meanings. See Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1994) (“Words and phrases are construed * * * according to their common and approved usage.”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “compensatory damages” as “such as will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black’s Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 903 (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as “damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus*279tained — distinguished from punitive damages ”).
When civil rights plaintiffs seek “damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under Civil Rights Act of 1871). “Punitive damages aside, damages in tort cases are designed to provide ‘compensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.’ ” Id. (quoting 2 F. Harper, F. James, & 0. Gray, Law of Torts § 25.1 at 490 (2d ed. 1986)).
To that end, compensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as “impairment of reputation, ⅜ ⅜ * personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” * * ⅜ Deterrence is also an important purpose of this system, but it operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory — damages grounded in determinations of plaintiff s actual losses. E.g., 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra at § 25.3 (discussing need for certainty in damage determinations); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.1, pp. 135-136 (1973). Congress adopted this common-law system of recovery when it established liability for “constitutional torts.”
Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he basic purpose” of civil rights damages is “to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights * * Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (emphasis added); see also id. at 257, 98 S.Ct. at 1049 (“[Djamage awards under § 1983 should be governed by the principle of compensation.”).
The statutory scheme established by the legislature pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 is simple and direct: victims of unfair discrimination shall be awarded a monetary amount to compensate them for their injury, however, this amount shall not exceed three times the amount of actual damages sustained by the victim. The trial court is required to make a determination as to the victim’s actual damages, as the trial court did here, and then, determine the additional amount the discrimination victim must receive in damages in order to be fully compensated for the injury sustained. This, the trial court did not do. These additional damages cannot be a guess or a number pulled out of the air any more than a court cannot award damages in an ordinary tort or contract claim without some articulated basis for the damage award. See, e.g., Leoni v. Bemis Co., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.1977) (holding that “damages which are speculative, remote, or conjectural are not recoverable” and requiring proof of a reasonable basis upon which to approximate damages award). In the absence of specific findings as to the injury to be compensated and the amount of damages necessary to compensate that injury, I can only conclude that where the trial court doubled the actual damages without reason or explanation, it in effect awarded punitive damages.2 Under the MHRA, a separate punitive damages provision exists for this purpose, statutorily capped at $8,500. Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2. Therefore, I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the trial court’s award of double actual damages plus punitive damages did not improperly award double punitive damages.
*280Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly included backpay in its determination of compensatory damages. Again, the statute speaks clearly and without ambiguity: “In addition to the aforesaid remedies, in a case involving discrimination in ⅜ * * employment, the administrative law judge may order the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination, with or without backpay * * Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 (emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine how the statutory scheme of remedies could be clearer: a claimant under the MHRA is entitled to the general “aforesaid remedies” accorded all victims of discrimination under the MHRA, and, in addition, if the claimant is specifically a victim of employment discrimination, then the claimant may also be entitled to an award of backpay and other job related remedies.3 To sweep the specific remedy of backpay into the general category of damages, as the majority does, rewrites the legislature’s remedial scheme.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

. Baufield. v. Safelite Glass Corp., 831 F.Supp. 713 (D.Minn.1993); Melsha v. Wickes Cos., 459 N.W.2d 707 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn., Oct. 25, 1990).

. Further, the majority’s resort to analogy with provisions for mandatory trebling of damages in antitrust actions, citing DeJonghe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 171 Ariz. 341, 830 P.2d 862 (App.1991), pet. for rev. denied, (Ariz., June 16, 1992), is wholly misplaced. Treble damages are mandated by statute in antitrust actions specifically as both a punitive measure, and a means of deterring such violations by encouraging private plaintiffs to bring suit. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2544, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Texas Instr. v. Radcliffe wrterials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2333-34, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). The treble-damage provisions of the antitrust laws do not provide the trial court with discretion to determine the multiple of damages appropriate to achieve its goals. Compare Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, § 4 (1992); Minn.Stat. § 325D.57 (1994).

. Similarly, victims of housing discrimination also have specific remedies available in addition to the general remedies cited. See Minn.Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2(b).