Court Opinion

ID: 9637843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:23:41.971176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:01.053061
License: Public Domain

*167CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I agree with the majority that the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (trial court) erred in dismissing the complaint filed by Mickey Miles (Miles) against Jeffrey A. Beard, Ph.D., (Beard) Secretary of Corrections, Department of Corrections (Department), individually and in his respective official capacity, and the other Respondents, on grounds that Miles failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or that Miles fails to state a cause of action in his complaint. However, I do not agree that the trial court erred in concluding that this court has exclusive original jurisdiction over Miles’ complaint.
On July 30, 2003, Miles filed with the trial court a complaint which included the following allegations. Miles is an Orthodox Jew who is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands (SCI-Laurel Highlands). (Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 5.) On the day of his arrival at SCI-Laurel Highlands, Miles submitted a request for kosher meals, but he received no response. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-7.) On January 2, 2003, Miles filed a grievance, which was forwarded to the Central Office in Harrisburg. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) There was no response from the Central Office, and, on June 18, 2003, Miles wrote a letter to Beard about the matter. (Complaint, ¶ 17.)
After waiting more than a month for Beard to act, Miles filed his complaint with the trial court. In his prayer for relief, Miles first states that he seeks kosher meals. (Complaint at 5.) Miles then states that he seeks: (1) compensatory damages; (2) punitive damages; (3) declaratory relief; (4) injunctive relief; and (5) any other relief that the court deems just. (Complaint at 5.)
The trial court dismissed Miles’ complaint, concluding, inter alia, that, because Miles sued Beard, who is an officer of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over Miles’ complaint. Subsequently, Miles filed an appeal with this court.1 The question is whether this court or the trial court has original jurisdiction over Miles’ complaint.
I. Judicial Code
Under section 761 of the Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions against the Commonwealth government, including an officer acting in his official capacity. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761. However, there are some exceptions. Relevant here, the Commonwealth Court does not have original jurisdiction over actions against the Commonwealth government in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(l)(v). Nevertheless, to the extent prescribed by general rule, the Commonwealth Court has ancillary jurisdiction over any claim that is related to a claim within its exclusive original jurisdiction. Section 761(c) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c).
Here, in his prayer for relief, Miles expressly states his desire -for kosher meals, both now and in the future. In legal terms, Miles seeks an order declaring his right to kosher meals and enjoining Beard and the other Respondents from acting, or failing to act, with respect to that right. *168Thus, because Miles seeks equitable relief against a Commonwealth officer acting in his official capacity, I submit that Miles’ equitable claims belong in this court’s exclusive original jurisdiction.
The majority concludes that this court lacks original jurisdiction over Miles’ complaint without ever considering the plain language of section 761 of the Judicial Code. Instead, the majority relies upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decisions in Stackhouse v. Pennsylvania State. Police, 574 Pa. 558, 832 A.2d 1004 (2003); Hill v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 545 Pa. 38, 679 A.2d 773 (1996); Fawber v. Cohen, 516 Pa. 352, 532 A.2d 429 (1987); and Balshy v. Rank, 507 Pa. 384, 490 A.2d 415 (1985). (See Majority op. at 165.) However, as the following discussion indicates, Hill, Fawber, and Balshy are not relevant here, and Stackhouse does not support the majority’s conclusion.
II. Case Law
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court
In Balshy, our supreme court held that the Commonwealth Court does not have original jurisdiction over actions against Commonwealth officers acting in their official capacity for money damages based upon tort liability. In Hill, our supreme court reached the same conclusion based on Balshy. In Fawber, our supreme court held that the Commonwealth Court does have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for equitable or declaratory relief because such actions are not in the nature of a trespass.
However, in none of those cases did our supreme court address whether the courts of common pleas or this court would have original jurisdiction over hybrid eom-plaints, which, as here, set forth claims in the nature of trespass and claims for equitable and declaratory relief against the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth officer acting in an official capacity. Our supreme court did address this question in Stackhouse.
1. Stackhouse
In Stackhouse, an employee filed a three-count complaint in the court of common pleas against her employer, the Pennsylvania State Police. The complaint alleged violations of her right to privacy and reputation stemming from an internal investigation. Count I of the complaint sought declaratory relief, and Counts II and III sought monetary damages. The common pleas court transferred the matter to this court, concluding that the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction over the matter. However, this court, relying upon Hill, Balshy and Fawber, dismissed the case per curiam for lack of original jurisdiction.2 The employee appealed the dismissal to our supreme court.
The question before our supreme court in Stackhouse was whether the courts of common pleas or the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction over the employee’s hybrid complaint. Our supreme court filed three separate opinions on the matter.
Three justices ruled that, to determine jurisdiction, the courts must look to the substance of the complaint, i.e., its core, rather than its form, to determine whether the complaint sets forth an action in trespass or an action in equity. Id. (Saylor, J., joined by Castille, J., and Lamb, J.). These justices concluded that the employee’s complaint sounded in trespass because the employee’s request for redress stemmed from state police officials unlaw*169fully delving into her intimate inter-personal relationships during an internal affairs investigation. The justices stated that the inclusion of a count for declaratory or injunctive relief did not transform the complaint into a complaint in equity. Thus, these justices remanded the case to the courts of common pleas. Id.
Justice Newman wrote a concurring opinion, in which she stated that it was unnecessary to re-characterize the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief as a compensatory claim to determine that the matter belonged in the courts of common pleas. Id. (Newman, J. concurring). Justice Newman explained that matters within the Commonwealth Court’s ancillary jurisdiction must fall within the court’s jurisdiction as defined by the general rule in section 761(a) of the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c) (stating that ancillary jurisdiction exists “[t]o the extent prescribed by general rule”); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) (stating the “general rule”). Justice Newman then concluded that the entire matter must be adjudicated in the courts of common pleas because Counts II and III of the employee’s complaint are outside the general jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.
Finally, three justices concluded that, pursuant to section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court unambiguously had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive relief. Stackhouse (Eakin, J., dissenting, joined by Cappy, J., and Nigro, J.). Equally clear to the justices was that the Commonwealth Court lacked original jurisdiction over the monetary claims. Faced with this “conundrum of jurisdiction,” these justices concluded that the Commonwealth Court should have pendant jurisdiction over the monetary claims until it decided whether equity should lie because there is not an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 559, 832 A.2d at 1012. The justices state that, depending on the determination of that threshold question, the Commonwealth Court would either dismiss or decide the equity claims and then transfer the remaining claims to the courts of common pleas. Id.
2. Applying Stackhouse
In my view, six of the seven justices of our supreme court would oppose the majority’s remand of Miles’ entire complaint to the trial court.
First, following Justices Saylor, Castille and Lamb, the substance, or core, of Miles’ complaint is that he is entitled to receive, and wants to receive, kosher meals. The monetary damages that Miles seeks could never provide Miles with such relief; indeed, there is nothing before us to indicate that SCI-Laurel Highlands offers kosher meals for purchase by inmates. Thus, despite the request for damages, Miles’ complaint, at its core, sounds in equity, not trespass, and belongs in this court’s original jurisdiction.
Second, following Justices Eakin, Cappy and Nigro, there can be no dispute that this court has exclusive original jurisdiction over Miles’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Moreover, these justices would hold that this court has pendant jurisdiction over Miles’ monetary claims. Thus, after this court addresses Miles’ equitable claims, this court would transfer the remaining claims for monetary damages to the courts of common pleas.
B. Commonwealth Court
Although our supreme court was divided on the proper approach for determining jurisdiction when faced with a hybrid complaint, an en banc panel of this court was able to reach a consensus in Pastore v. State System of Higher Education, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 111, 618 A.2d 1118 (1992). I *170note that the majority’s position in this case undeniably is contrary to this court’s en banc decision in Pastore. I consider Pastore here because of the limited guidance provided by our supreme court in Stackhouse.
The plaintiff in Pastore filed a complaint in one of the courts of common pleas against the Commonwealth, seeking equitable relief and damages. The court of common pleas transferred the matter to this court. This court stated, “Actions seeking injunctions against the state, even with ancillary claims for damages, constitute a familiar segment of this court’s trial jurisdiction.” Id. at 1120. However, this court recognized its jurisdictional limitations and, thus, proceeded to examine the complaint to determine its precise nature. After doing so, this court concluded that the Commonwealth Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the equitable counts of the complaint but did not have original jurisdiction over a claim sounding in trespass. Having reached those conclusions, this court decided the merits of the equitable claims and re-transferred the trespass claim to the court of common pleas. Id.
Applying Pastore here, I would conclude that this court should decide the merits of Miles’ equitable claims and, afterward, re-transfer the matter to the trial court.3
III. Indispensable Party
In addition to relying on Hill, Bolshy and Fawber, the majority concludes that this court lacks original jurisdiction over Miles’ complaint because Beard is not an indispensable party. (Majority op. at 164.) However, in reaching that conclusion, the majority does not even consider the test for determining whether a party is indispensable.
Our supreme court has stated that, to determine whether a party is indispensable, it is necessary to consider: (1) whether the party has an interest related to the claim; (2) if so, the nature of that interest; (3) whether the interest is essential to the merits of the issue; and (4) whether justice can be afforded without violating the due process rights of the party. CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 536 Pa. 462, 640 A.2d 372 (1994).
First, as the Secretary of Corrections, Beard has statutory duties related to the administration, management and supervision of the services provided by the state correctional institutions, including SCI-Laurel Highlands. See section 901-B of The Administrative Code of 1929 (Administrative Code), Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, added by the Act of December 30, 1984, P.L. 1299, 71 P.S. § 310-1. Thus, Beard has an interest related to Miles’ claim that SCI-Laurel Highlands has failed to provide him with kosher meals.
Second, pursuant to section 506 of the Administrative Code, 71 P.S. § 186, Beard, in his official capacity, has promulgated a regulation governing the conduct of his employees at SCI-Laurel Highlands with respect to the religious needs of the inmates, including Miles. Consistent with constitutional law, the regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.6 provides that the Department *171will make reasonable accommodations for religions dietary restrictions.4 Thus, the nature of Beard’s interest is an implicit allegation that he failed to enforce his own regulation when Miles informed him by letter that Beard’s employees at SCI-Laurel Highlands were not complying with 37 Pa.Code § 93.6.
Third, Beard’s interest in the Department’s employees’ complying with 37 Pa. Code § 93.6 is essential to the merits of this case because, to some extent, the merits of this case rest on the requirements of 37 Pa.Code § 93.6, and this court must give great deference to Beard’s interpretation of his own regulation. See Mirarchi v. Department of Corrections, 811 A.2d 1096 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002).
Fourth, if Miles were to prevail against Beard without this court giving Beard an opportunity to be heard concerning his failure to enforce 37 Pa.Code § 93.6, then Beard would have been denied his due process rights. Indeed, if Miles were to prevail, this court could order Beard to require the Department’s employees at SCI-Laurel Highlands to serve Miles kosher meals.5 Certainly, Beard has the right to defend his failure to take such action after he received Miles’ letter. Thus, unlike the majority, I would conclude that Beard is an indispensable party.
IV. Collateral Matters
The majority notes that cases within this court’s original jurisdiction may be appealed as of right to our supreme court. (Majority op. at 164-65.) The majority then states that, under Gossman v. Lower Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors, 503 Pa. 392, 469 A.2d 996 (1983), the efficient administration of justice is not well served when our supreme court is forced to hear collateral matters, viz., a party’s entitlement to further costs and counsel fees. (Majority op. at 164-65.) The majority concludes, “While the appeal sub judice does not concern a collateral matter, we are not convinced that where, as here, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, money damages in a 1983 type of claim, this matter cannot be adequately addressed without mandatory review by the Supreme Court.” (Majority op. at 165) (emphasis in original).
First, I vigorously object to the majority’s implication that an inmate’s lawsuit alleging the violation of the law is the equivalent of a collateral action for further costs and counsel fees. I doubt that our supreme court would equate the two. Second, having conceded that Miles’ complaint does not involve collateral matters, the majority’s reliance on Gossman is misplaced. Third, I am not aware of any rule of law that allows this court, or any other court, to overlook the laws governing jurisdiction and transfer a case to another court because that other court can “adequately address” the matter and because the complainant, who happens to be an *172inmate, should not be allowed to appeal as of right to our supreme court.
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I would rule that this court has original jurisdiction over the equity portion of Miles’ complaint and pendant jurisdiction over the damages portion.

. Miles also filed a complaint in this court's original jurisdiction, docketed at 549 M.D. 2003, which is virtually identical to the complaint he filed with the trial court. However, by per curiam order dated August 19, 2003, this court closed docket number 549 M.D. 2003.

. This court concluded that the case was a tort action in the nature of an action in trespass which fell outside this court’s original jurisdiction. See Stackhouse.

. The majority attempts to distinguish Pastore based on the fact that the plaintiff in Pastore pled separate counts. (Majority op. at 165 n. 4.) The majority states that, because separate counts are not pled here, it is not "practical” to sever the equity claims from the damages claim. Id. However, such an approach elevates form over substance. Clearly, Miles' request for kosher meals and injunctive relief is separate from his claim for money damages for the violation of his civil rights. Thus, I would not find it impractical to decide the equity claims and then transfer the case to the trial court for disposition of the damages claim.

. Section 506 of the Administrative Code states that the heads of all administrative departments are empowered to prescribe regulations for the government of their respective departments. 71 P.S. § 186. The regulation at 37 Pa.Code § 93.6 states it was promulgated pursuant to section 506 of the Administrative Code.

. The majority states that Miles seeks “absolutely no relief” from Beard. (Majority op. at 164.) I disagree. Miles seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against all Respondents and any relief that the court deems just. Thus, at a minimum, Miles seeks an order against Beard enjoining his failure to enforce the Department's regulation at SCI-Laurel Highlands. Moreover, pursuant to Miles’ general prayer for relief, this court could order Beard to take other action at SCI-Laurel Highlands, e.g., monitor its compliance with 37 Pa.Code § 93.6.