Court Opinion

ID: 9584050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:11.871868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:52.674780
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent from the holding of the majority opinion. The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah, Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1984). I believe that the factual differences warrant a different result and that the appellant is entitled to further hearing before his parental rights can be effectively terminated by application of the statutory presumption of abandonment.
As we discussed at length in Wells, supra, the requirements of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-4 are facially valid under the due process clauses of the federal and Utah Constitutions. However, nothing we said in Wells undermines the fundamental proposition, relied upon by this Court in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, et al., Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), that the statute may be unconstitutionally applied. The test must be whether fundamental fairness has been preserved in the application of the statute to a given constellation of facts.
Unlike the unwed father in Wells, the appellant here, who had asserted his interest to the mother throughout the pregnancy and had repeatedly asked her to marry him, was not informed of her intent to release the child for adoption until after it was too late for him to meet the statutory filing deadline. Furthermore, the appellant had no knowledge of his statutory obligation, nor was he advised of its existence, unlike the father in Wells. He publicly acknowledged paternity throughout the pregnancy and personally informed the adoption agency of his opposition to adoption and desire for custody.1 He attempted to sign the child’s birth certificate before the child left the hospital (but was prevented from doing so by the natural mother’s failure to consent), and he filed a notice of paternity within hours of learning of the statutory requirement (which he discovered upon consultation with an attorney) and within five days of the child’s birth. No adoption petition had been filed, and the child was less than a week old when appellant commenced court proceedings. Unlike the paternal claimant in Wells, who had benefit of legal counsel and who knew of his statutory obligation well in advance of birth but nevertheless took no steps to secure his rights until it was too late, appellant here behaved throughout in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, committed father.
Utah’s registration statute was designed to facilitate permanent and secure placements for newborn children whose unwed fathers take no steps to identify themselves promptly and acknowledge paternity. It was not created to encourage a “race” for placement to cut off the rights of fathers who are identified and present, but who are hours late in registering their claims because of ignorance of their statutory obligation. I believe that to apply the statutory bar against appellant in these circumstances contravenes all notions of fairness and due process under article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and under the federal Constitution. Everyone connected *757with these circumstances knew that this father wanted to assert his rights, and he in fact attempted to do so by every means known to him. This constellation of facts is entirely different from that in Wells and from the usual case of the nonpresent, unidentified, or indifferent unwed father, against whom the statutory bar was intended to operate in order to protect the needs of newborn infants and prospective adoptive parents.
The majority opinion mistakenly insists that the protection of appellant’s rights advocated herein would “promote litigation in a number of adoption cases” and discusses at some length the damage and potential disruption that would result. I share the majority’s commitment to permanency and stability in newborn placements. I believe it erroneously claims that a mechanical application of the statute, without regard for fundamental fairness, such as has occurred here, will prevent litigation and promote stability in the vast majority of adoptive settings. Under our statutory scheme, notice of adoption proceedings must be sent to all unwed fathers who have registered their interests. Those fathers are fully entitled to the right to consent to the adoption or to withhold consent, unless neglect, abuse or abandonment has been shown, just as are unwed mothers. It is interesting to note that under our system the first time anyone is obligated to check for a father’s acknowledgment with the Bureau of Vital Statistics is “in the adoption proceeding,” U.C.A., 1953, § 78 — 30—3(d), which cannot be heard by the trial court until the child has resided with the prospective adoptive parents for six months.
Thus, the potential for “disruption” is a part of the statutory scheme itself, and denying this appellant a hearing he would have been entitled to automatically if he had known of his obligation and filed 24 hours earlier does not promote any problems not already inherent in the statute. The majority appears to characterize Utah’s statute in almost a punitive light, as being designed to cut off in stringent fashion the rights of all unwed fathers as quickly as possible because “illegitimate children born each year contribute disproportionately to many of the serious social problems with which society must cope.” On the contrary, the statute appears to have been designed to cut off the rights of unknown, uncaring and uncommitted unwed fathers in order to protect the adoption process. In contrast, the rights afforded unwed fathers who comply with the statute appear to be coextensive with those of unwed mothers, thus belying any punitive intent by the Legislature. The unusual degree of disruption that this opinion’s rationale might cause in this case would be a function of the trial court’s failure, which I believe was erroneous, to treat this appellant as having substantially complied with the statute. This failure is the cause of the long delays necessary for resolution of these difficult legal issues, none of which are attributable to the appellant and none of -which are likely to arise frequently in the routine operation of the statute and the adoption process. Our holding in Wells demonstrates that only in the rarest of circumstances are unwed fathers likely to be able to raise legitimate claims regarding the application of the statute. I believe such circumstances were shown in this case.
Appellant’s rights as a natural parent should not have been foreclosed on these facts without a hearing on the question of the termination of those rights. Since the majority opinion does not permit such a hearing, I will not discuss the procedural context of the standards for termination that I believe would be applicable.
Having disqualified himself, Justice Oaks took no part in the final decision of this case.

. The actions of L.D.S. Social Services, in concert with those of the mother, served to deprive appellant of his opportunity to claim his parental rights by complying with the statute. Although L.D.S. Social Services knew through its counselor that appellant opposed adoption and desired custody, it made no effort to advise him of the forthcoming release of the child for adoption or of the registration requirements of the statute. Nor, as we have noted, did the mother tell appellant of her intent to release the child in time for him to comply.