Court Opinion

ID: 9960879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 15:04:32.027055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:00.870993
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                                FOURTH DISTRICT

                      VANESSA L. PRIETO, ESQUIRE,
                               Appellant,

                                        v.

                               JOANNA ROSSI,
                                  Appellee.

                               No. 4D2022-3045

                                [April 17, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; James L. Martz, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502020DR004994.

  Vanessa L. Prieto of Vanessa L. Prieto Law Offices, L.L.C., Fort
Lauderdale, for appellant.

   No appearance for appellee.

ARTAU, J.

   In this appeal, attorney Vanessa Prieto—who represented Richard Rossi
(“Former Husband”) in his divorce proceedings with Joanna Rossi (“Former
Wife”)—challenges the trial court’s order holding Prieto in contempt, and
ordering her to share equally with the Former Husband in paying Former
Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction.

    We reverse the trial court’s contempt finding against Prieto, and
corresponding sanction, because she did not violate any express provision
of either the marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) reached by the parties
during their divorce proceedings, or the agreed final judgment of
dissolution of marriage that adopted the MSA. 1

1 Former Husband initially sought review with Prieto of the trial court’s contempt

finding against him and corresponding sanction. However, Former Husband
voluntarily dismissed his appeal from the challenged contempt finding before
briefing. Our reversal of the contempt finding as to Prieto has no impact on the
contempt finding and corresponding sanction imposed on Former Husband.
                       The MSA’s Relevant Terms

    The MSA required Former Wife to “execute contemporaneously with
th[e] [a]greement,” a quit claim deed (“Deed 1”) conveying “all of her right,
title and interest in the marital residence to Former Husband.”

   The MSA directed that Deed 1 was to be retained by Former Wife’s
counsel until the happening of one of two specified events. Specifically,
the MSA provided that Former Husband “may, within twelve (12) months,
through refinance or satisfaction of the current note and mortgage, cause
Former Wife’s name to be removed from and off the current note and
mortgage encumbering the marital residence.” In that event, the MSA
authorized Former Wife’s counsel to release Deed 1 to Former Husband,
or “the closing agent” for any refinance or satisfaction of the current
indebtedness on the marital residence.

   The MSA also required Former Husband to pay Former Wife a $200,000
lump sum alimony award, with the first $85,000 to be paid to Former Wife
upon the MSA’s execution, and the balance to be paid in twelve equal
monthly installments.

   The MSA provided that, if Former Husband defaulted in paying any of
the installments due on the alimony balance owed to Former Wife, then a
second quit claim deed (“Deed 2”), conveying “all of his right, title and
interest in the parties’ marital residence” to Former Wife, would be released
by Prieto to Former Wife’s counsel “for recording” within five days of Prieto
being notified of Former Husband’s default.

    In addition, the MSA provided that, if Former Husband was unable to
refinance or otherwise satisfy the existing indebtedness on the marital
residence within the twelve-month period set forth in the MSA, then Deed
2 would be released by Prieto to Former Wife’s counsel “for recording”
within five days of the end of the twelve-month period.

   The MSA did not specify or attach any particular form to be used by the
parties in preparing either Deed 1 or Deed 2, nor did it expressly require
the joinder of the grantee spouse as a signatory of either deed.

  Lastly, the MSA included a ten-day provision to provide documents “as
may be necessary to enable the other party to effectuate” its terms.

                    Former Wife’s Contempt Motion

   Barely two weeks after the divorce proceedings were final, Former Wife

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moved to have both Former Husband and Prieto held in contempt for
allegedly violating the MSA by failing to deliver to Former Wife’s counsel a
fully executed original of Deed 1. Former Wife alleged that originals of
both deeds, which the motion asserted “were fully executed” by Former
Wife the day before the final divorce hearing, were “delivered” by Former
Wife’s counsel to Prieto in open court on the day of the hearing. According
to the motion, Prieto “represented and promised” that she would “get the
Former Husband to execute both original deeds” and return Deed 1 to
Former Wife’s counsel. Former Wife asserted in her contempt motion that,
despite numerous reasonable requests by her counsel, Prieto and Former
Husband were holding Deed 1 “hostage” and refused to deliver it.

   Former Wife argued in support of her contempt motion that “[t]he clear
and obvious terms and intent of the MSA” was for each party’s counsel to
hold fully executed originals of the deeds conveying the marital residence
to their respective clients. Former Wife also argued that the failure to
deliver the original of Deed 1 to her counsel was “a willful and flagrant
disregard” of the MSA sufficient to support a finding of contempt
enforceable by incarceration of both Prieto and Former Husband until
compliance with an appropriate purge. Former Wife asserted that an
appropriate purge should include Prieto and Former Husband both being
directed to immediately deliver the original of not only Deed 1, but also a
an original of Deed 2, “fully executed” by Former Husband, to Former
Wife’s counsel. Former Wife specifically sought an award of her reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs based on Former Husband’s and Prieto’s asserted
non-compliance with the MSA “with regard to the deeds.”

                         The Contempt Hearing

   At the contempt hearing, Former Wife’s counsel acknowledged that he
received a fully executed original of Deed 1 sometime in June 2022, which
was about four months prior to the hearing. Former Wife’s counsel
maintained that, because he “finally received it,” there was “no contempt
as it relates to that matter.” Instead, Former Wife announced through her
counsel that she therefore sought only her attorney’s fees and costs as
sanctions for having to secure custody of the original of the executed deed.

   As Former Wife’s counsel explained, he prepared the deeds to include
not only the signature of the grantor spouse, but also the signature of the
grantee spouse on each deed. In other words, Former Wife’s counsel
prepared Deed 1 to require the grantee (Former Husband) to join the
grantor (Former Wife) as signatories of the transfer of Former Wife’s
interest in the marital residence to Former Husband. Likewise, Former
Wife’s counsel prepared Deed 2 to require the grantee (Former Wife) to join

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the grantor (Former Husband) as signatories of the transfer of Former
Husband’s interest in the marital residence to Former Wife.

   Prieto testified that she provided copies of fully executed versions of
both deeds by electronic mail to Former Wife’s counsel. Prieto also made
clear that, as soon as she realized she still possessed the original of Deed
1, she immediately sent it to Former Wife’s counsel and kept the original
of deed 2 pursuant to the MSA.

   Former Husband testified that he timely made all alimony payments to
Former Wife, without default.

   Prieto argued that the MSA’s ten-day provision for providing all
documents “necessary” to “effectuate” its terms did not apply to her. She
also argued that any failure by her to provide fully executed originals of
the deeds to Former Wife’s counsel within ten days of being requested to
do so did not violate the MSA’s ten-day provision because that provision
applied only to those documents “necessary” to “effectuate” its terms and
therefore was inapplicable prior to any default by Former Husband.

                  The Trial Court’s Contempt Finding

    At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the trial court announced
“it [was] clear that the [MSA] provide[d] both in words and spirit a very
clear definition of what [was] to take place.” The trial court therefore orally
ruled that it was granting Former Wife’s motion and entering a finding that
both Prieto and Former Husband were in contempt of the MSA “relating to
the deed issue.” The trial court further ruled that Prieto and Former
Husband would equally share in paying Former Wife’s attorney’s fees and
costs incurred in litigating the contempt motion “with regard to the deed
issue.”

   Echoing the remarks made in support of its ruling at the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court stated in the written contempt order:

      The deed issue is a big deal. Any litigant, such as the Former
      Wife, who has lived through contentious litigation and had in
      the balance a deed to the marital home would be persistent,
      to say the least, to ensure that [her] rights were protected by
      [her] attorney’s holding the executed deeds that were required
      to be held and in conformity with law so that should one side
      or the other default, that deed would be immediately filed with
      the clerk of the [c]ourt and the transfer of the property would
      take place immediately.

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    In the order, the trial court found the evidence presented at the hearing
established that Former Husband had “signed the subject deed” two days
after the final divorce hearing, and that it took from January 2022 to June
2022, until Former Wife’s counsel finally “received delivery of the original
deed and the protection the Former Wife was entitled to under the MSA for
preserving her rights” in the event of the MSA’s “potential default.” The
trial court therefore awarded Former Wife her attorney’s fees and costs, to
be paid jointly by Prieto and Former Husband, as a sanction for the
contempt.

                            Appellate Analysis

   “A judgment of contempt comes to the appellate court clothed with a
presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless a clear
showing is made that the trial court either abused its discretion or
departed so substantially from the essential requirements of law as to have
committed fundamental error.” DeMello v. Buckman, 914 So. 2d 1090,
1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). However, “[t]o the extent [this] appeal involves
interpretation of the MSA, our review, as with any contract, is de novo.”
Godwin v. Godwin, 273 So. 3d 16, 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also Reilly
v. Reilly, 94 So. 3d 693, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The interpretation of
the wording and meaning of [a] marital settlement agreement, as
incorporated into [a] final judgment, is subject to de novo review.” (quoting
Kipp v. Kipp, 844 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))).

   “It is well settled that a marital settlement agreement is to be
interpreted like any other contract and is construed as a matter of law.”
Reilly, 94 So. 3d at 696 (quoting Coe v. Abdo, 790 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (Fla.
4th DCA 2001)). As such, a trial court must enforce the terms of an MSA
“when properly called upon to do so,” but has “no power to rewrite the[]
agreement” when called upon to enforce its terms. Zolonz v. Zolonz, 659
So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

   As this court observed in Kovic v. Kovic, 336 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022), “[a] judge cannot base contempt upon noncompliance with
something an order does not say.” Id. at 26 (quoting Oasis Builders, LLC
v. McHugh, 138 So. 3d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)). In addition,
“[w]hen the order that forms the basis for contempt does not ‘expressly’
require the action” for which the contemnor is held in contempt, “the trial
court fundamentally errs when finding that [person] in contempt for failure
to do that action.” Id.; see also, e.g., Godwin, 273 So. 3d at 22 (“For a
person to be held in contempt of a court order, the language of the order
must be clear and precise, and the behavior of the person must clearly
violate the order.” (quoting Reder v. Miller, 102 So. 3d 742, 743 (Fla. 2d

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DCA 2012))).

   Even if an order or judgment can be construed to mean that the court
“inherently” intended for a certain action by the contemnor to take place,
“such implied or inherent provisions of an order [or judgment] cannot serve
as a basis for an order of contempt.” Kovic, 336 So. 3d at 26 (internal
quotations and alterations in original omitted); see also, e.g., Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (“One may not be held
in contempt of court for violation of an order or a provision of a judgment
which is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its
command and direction.”).

    Here, the MSA imposed upon Prieto, by its express terms, a legal duty
to deliver a fully executed original of Deed 2 to Former Wife’s counsel only
if Former Husband either defaulted on any of the installment payments
due toward the payoff of the lump sum alimony award or failed to secure
a refinancing or satisfaction of the indebtedness on the marital residence
within the twelve-month period provided in the MSA.

    When Former Wife’s contempt motion was filed barely two weeks after
entry of the judgment adopting the MSA, Former Husband was not in
default of either of those provisions, nor was he ever found to be in default
of either of those provisions. 2 Accordingly, Prieto was not under any legal
duty to deliver Deed 2 to Former Wife’s counsel prior to any default by
Former Husband. Thus, Prieto could not have been held in contempt with
respect to Deed 2, which was the only deed inuring to Former Wife’s
benefit.

   While the MSA required delivery of those documents “necessary to
enable the other party to effectuate” the MSA, the MSA did not expressly
require Former Husband to join in Deed 1’s execution. The MSA required
only Former Wife to quit claim her interest in the marital residence to
Former Husband.

   A quitclaim deed conveys only “such interest in land as the grantor had
at the time of the making of such a deed.” Blitch v. Sapp, 194 So. 328,
330 (Fla. 1940); see also, e.g., Layne v. Layne, 74 So. 3d 161, 164 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2011) (“A quitclaim deed conveys only that interest in a property held
by the grantor at the time of the conveyance.”).

2 Prieto noted in her brief that, “since this appeal was filed, Former Husband was

unable to refinance the home within one year” and she immediately provided the
original of Deed 2 to Former Wife’s counsel in accordance with the MSA.

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   Prieto could not be required to deliver to Former Wife’s counsel what
only Former Wife was under an express legal duty to execute and deliver
to her counsel as the grantor of her interest in the marital residence. It
was not “necessary” as a matter of law for Prieto to obtain or deliver a quit
claim deed with Former Husband’s signature on Deed 1 as the grantee of
a deed inuring to his benefit, nor was there any express requirement that
Deed 1 be executed by Former Husband and delivered to Former Wife’s
counsel to “effectuate” any of the MSA’s terms.

   Moreover, Deed 1, executed solely by Former Wife and conveying only
her interest in the marital residence to Former Husband, would have
sufficed as a conveyance by quit claim deed of “all of her right, title and
interest in the marital residence to Former Husband,” which is all that the
MSA required of Deed 1. Thus, it was only Former Wife that had an
express legal duty to execute and deliver Deed 1 to her counsel, who was
required to hold it for Former Husband’s benefit. Accordingly, Prieto could
not have been held in contempt for failing to timely deliver Deed 1 to
Former Wife’s counsel.

                                Conclusion

   We therefore reverse the trial court’s contempt finding against Prieto,
and corresponding sanction, because she did not violate any express
provision of either the MSA or the agreed final judgment of dissolution of
marriage, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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