Court Opinion

ID: 9762929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:58.110996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:37.735038
License: Public Domain

KINKEADE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the statute of frauds bars Stuart T. Gerstacker’s causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, and promissory estoppel in this oral good-cause-for-termination agreement with Blum Consulting Engineers, Inc. I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment granted to Blum.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In our case, although Gerstacker claims that Blum agreed that he would not be laid-off due to an economic down-turn and as long as Gerstacker’s performance was satisfactory, his petition requests damages for eighteen months and shows he expected to be employed longer than one year at the time he and Blum entered into the alleged agreement. Gerstacker’s petition requesting eighteen months of damages provides a reason*852ably clear method of ascertaining the length of Gerstacker’s alleged contract to be for a term longer than one year. Gerstacker’s petition pleads facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action. Since Gerstacker claims damages for an oral employment contract that cannot be performed in one year, it is barred by the statute of frauds.
Pleadings are generally not evidence for summary judgment purposes. See American Motel, Inc. v. Johnson, 610 S.W.2d 143, 143 (Tex.1980); Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex.1971). However, a party may plead himself out of court. Alice Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Halleman, 775 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ). A party may plead facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action. Id.; see Schroeder v. Terns & Pacific Ry. Co., 243 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1951, no writ).
In Halleman, the plaintiff corporation repaid a personal loan of the defendant and sought collection from the defendant eleven years after the loan was repaid. The record consisted of plaintiffs petition and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the statute of limitations and the issue on appeal was whether the statute of limitations was a bar to the plaintiffs cause of action. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment holding that appellant’s pleadings acknowledged the transaction occurred more than four years prior to the filing of the lawsuit and therefore the statute of limitations barred collection of the debt. Halle-man, 775 S.W.2d at 870. The court recognized that a party may plead himself out of court. Id. at 870. A plaintiff may plead facts which affirmatively negate his cause of action. Id. In such an instance, it is proper to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id., Texas Dep’t of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex.1974).
In our case, Gerstacker’s petition pleads damages for eighteen months which affirmatively negates the existence of a contract performable in one year. Gerstacker, like the plaintiff in Halleman, pleaded himself out of court. I would hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against Gerstacker because his claim of breach of contract violated the statute of frauds as a matter of law.
Gerstacker and the majority argue that our holding in Hardison v. A.H. Belo, 247 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1952, no writ), supports a different result. In Har-dison, this Court held that an oral contract to employ the plaintiff as long as his work was satisfactory was not barred by the statute of frauds. However, Hardison was decided before Schroeder and Hall. If Schroeder and Hall did not overrule Hardison, they seriously eroded its efficacy. The result in Schroeder and Hall’s language that we can use “any reasonable method of ascertaining [duration of performance]” compels a different result than in Hardison. This Court did not have the benefit of either Schroeder or Hall’s reasoning when it decided Hardison. I do not agree with Gerstacker or the majority that Hardison is controlling authority in this case.
The majority states that Gerstacker’s claim for damages showed nothing about his intent at the time of the alleged oral modification of his at-will employment. The pleadings clearly show Gerstacker’s intent that he thought he had a job for at least eighteen months. The majority’s holding allows anyone to claim that their alleged oral agreement was for an indefinite term at the time it was made. Those terms would only become definite when the claim is made in a lawsuit like this. Clearly, the type of rule outlined by the majority ignores the very reason we have a statute of frauds.
Based on Schroeder and Hall, I would conclude that Gerstacker’s petition provides a reasonable method of ascertaining the duration of Blum’s oral agreement, eighteen months. Enforcement of an eighteen month oral agreement is barred as a matter of law by the statute of frauds because it could not be performed within one year. See Miller v. Riata Cadillac, Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1974). Because Gerstacker’s oral agreement had an implied duration of eighteen months, its enforcement is barred by the statute of frauds.
*853PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.1965), the Texas Supreme Court expressed thé doctrine of promissory estoppel as follows:
A promise wMch the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and wMch does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Id. at 96. Promissory estoppel is an exception to the statute of frauds only when the promise is to sign a written agreement wMch itself complies with the statute of frauds. Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex.1982); “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex.1972); Mann v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 854 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ).
In our case, the exception is not present. Gerstacker makes no allegation that Blum promised to reduce Ms agreement to writing. I would hold that the statute of frauds bars enforcement of Gerstacker’s defensive plea of promissory estoppel.
FRAUD
When the statute of frauds bars recovery under breach of contract, the plaintiff may not recover what he would have gained had the promise been performed by casting Ms contract cause of action in tort. Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antomo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In determining whether contract or tort duties are breached, we look to the substance of the cause of action and not necessarily the manner in wMch it was pleaded. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986). The nature of the injury most often determines wMch duty or duties are breached. Id. When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of the contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone. Id.
In our case, Gerstacker casts Ms breaeh-of-contract cause of action alternatively as fraud. He seeks recovery for eighteen months of wages and Ms expenses and costs in seeking new employment. Based on the same oral promise and breach by Blum, Ger-stacker attempts to alternatively enforce the promise. Because the statute of frauds bars Gerstacker’s breach-of-contract cause of action, I would hold it also bars Gerstacker’s fraud cause of action based on the same promise.
The Texas Supreme Court in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 879 S.W.2d 47, 52 n. 8 (Tex.1994), recently stated in a footnote that they were not reaching the issue of whether at-will-employment status may be modified orally or whether the statute of frauds bars oral modification. In tMs case, the modification was both oral and for a period exceeding one year. Because I would hold the statute of frauds bars Gerstacker’s claims as a matter of law, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment..