Court Opinion

ID: 9422584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:03:27.425333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:34.329223
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Black joins,
dissenting.
I think this case presents only a single federal question: did the order of the Maryland Court of Appeals granting a new trial, limited to the issue of punishment, violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection? 1 In my opinion an affirmative answer would *93be required if the Boblit statement would have been admissible on the issue of guilt at petitioner’s original trial. This indeed seems to be the clear implication of this Court’s opinion.
The Court, however, holds that the Fourteenth Amendment was not infringed because it considers the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and the other Maryland cases dealing with Maryland’s constitutional provision making juries in criminal cases “the Judges of Law, as well as of fact,” as establishing that the Boblit statement woüld not have been admissible at the original trial on the issue of petitioner’s guilt.
But I cannot read the Court of Appeals’ opinion with any such assurance. That opinion can as easily, and perhaps more easily, be read as indicating that the new trial ■ limitation followed from the Court of Appeals’ concept of its power, under § 645G of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Md. Code, Art. 27 (1960 Cum. Supp.) and Rule 870 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, to fashion appropriate relief meeting the peculiar circumstances of this case,2 rather than from the view that the Boblit statement would have been relevant at the original trial only on the issue of punishment. 226 Md., at 430, 174 A. 2d, at 171. This interpretation is indeed fortified by the Court of Appeals’ earlier general discussion as to the admissibility of third-party confessions, which falls short of saying anything that is disposi-*94tive of the crucial issue here. 226 Md., at 427-429, 174 A. 2d, at 170.3
Nor do I find anything in any of the other Maryland cases cited by the Court .{ante, pj 89) which bears on the admissibility vel non of the Boblit statement on the issue of guilt. . None of these cases suggests anything moré relevant here than that a jury may not “overrule” the trial court on questions relating to the admissibility of evidence. Indeed they are by. no means clear as to what happens if the jury in fact undertakes to do so. In this very case, for example, the trial court charged that “in the final analysis the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts, and the verdict in this case is entirely the jury’s responsibility.” (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, uncertainty on this score is compounded by the State’s acknowledgment at the oral argument here that the withheld .Boblit statement would have been admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt.4
In this state of uncertainty as to the proper’ answer to the critical underlying issue of state law, and in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not in terms *95address itself to the equal protection question, I do not see how we can properly resolve this case- at this juncture. I think the appropriate course is to vacate the judgment of the State Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further consideration in light of the governing constitutional principle stated at the outset of this opinion. Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551.

I agree with my Brother White that there is no necessity for deciding in this case the broad due process questions with which the Court deals at pp. 86-88 of its opinion.

 Section 645G provides in part: “If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings, and any supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.” Rule 870 provides that the Court of Appeals “will either affirm or reverse the judgment from which the appeal wras taken, or direct the. manner in which it shall be modified, changed or amended."

 It is-noteworthy that the Court of Appeals did not indicate that it was limiting in any way the authority of Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 76 A. 2d 729. In that case two defendants were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder. Each admitted participating in the felony but accused the other of the homicide. On appeal the defendants attacked the trial court’s denial of a severance, and the State argued that neither defendant was harmed by the statements put in evidence at the joint trial because admission of the felony amounted to admission of guilt of felony murder. Nevertheless the Court of Appeals found an abuse of discretion and ordered separate new trials on all issues..

 In response to a question from the Bench as to whether Boblit’s statement, had it been offered at petitioner’s original trial, would have been admissible for all .purposes, counsel for the State, after some colloquy, stated: “It would have been, yes.” ”