Court Opinion

ID: 9713449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:15:36.184702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.871943
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice, specially
concurring.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion for the reasons set out hereinafter.
*248The primary issue involves two statutes which appear to be in conflict. The first statute is North Dakota Century Code § 50-24.1-08, which provides as follows:
“The statute of limitations shall not run against claims of the state of North Dakota for repayment of medical assistance provided under this chapter.”
This section was enacted through Ch. 447, 1975 S.L., and became part of Ch. 50-24.1, which was initially enacted through Ch. 7 of the Special Session of 1965. The basic Act was designed to provide medical care and service to persons whose income and resources were insufficient to meet such costs and to provide preventive, rehabilitative and other services to families or other individuals to retain or attain capability for independence or self-care.
The effective date of the Act was dependent upon the date when federal funds would become available for the purposes outlined in the Act. From the Act as originally enacted and subsequent amendments, there is little doubt that the Legislature intended that whenever certain people met the basic requirements and qualifications they would be eligible for these benefits. It was not a pick-and-choose situation for the Department of Human Services. The Legislature later provided that the human services department be subrogated to any right of recovery for money expended which became the law through Ch. 455, S.L.1977. The subrogation provision was replaced with an assignment provision under which the state acquired rights of recovery on insurance or whatever the applicant or recipient may have had. This became law through Ch. 492, S.L.1981.
I must assume that the provisions of NDCC § 50-24.1-08 applied to all subsequent amendments to Ch. 50-24.1 and provides as follows:
“The statute of limitations shall not run against claims of the state of North Dakota for repayment of medical assistance provided under this chapter.”
This is the statute which is in conflict with NDCC § 26-41-16 which, after setting our various limitations of actions from subsections (1) to (4) under certain conditions, provides as follows:
“1. . . .
“2. . . .
“3. . . .
“4. The time period limitations prescribed in this section shall govern all actions for basic and optional excess no-fault benefits under this chapter notwithstanding any limitation prescribed elsewhere in the laws of this state.”
This became law through Ch. 265, S.L.1975, with an effective date of 1 January 1976.
If NDCC § 26-41-16(4) were to have the meaning and effect that it prevails over NDCC § 50-24.1-08, then I would ask the question: How can a legal exception be made regarding the provisions of NDCC § 28-01-25,1 which in effect extends or tolls the statute of limitations under certain conditions for minors and certain persons?
If NDCC § 26-41-16(4), specifically the language “notwithstanding any limitation prescribed elsewhere in the laws of this state,” overrides the provisions of NDCC § 50-24.1-08, then why does not that language serve to override the provisions of NDCC § 28-01-25? I do not agree that § 26-41-16(4) overrides either § 50-24.1-08 or § 28-01-25.
*249In comparing these two statutes, we must take into account the intent of the Legislature. NDCC § 1-02-09 in essence provides that whenever two or more statutes passed during the same session are irreconcilable, the one latest in date of final passage shall govern. Also, NDCC § 1-02-08 provides:
“Except, as otherwise provided in section 1-02-07, whenever, in the same statute, several clauses are irreconcilable, the clause last in order of date or position shall prevail.”
This is a clear indication that the latest in time (not only by days) prevails. Both statutes received final legislative action on the last day of the 1975 Session. Assuming the Legislature does things in an orderly fashion, and I believe we must make that assumption, and if we were to ask the Legislature we would receive a resounding “Yes, we do things in an orderly fashion.” Section 26-41-16(4), Ch. 265, House Bill 1214, S.L.1975, according to the House Journal, was signed by the Speaker on page 1772 and signed by the President of the Senate on page 1774.
Sections 50-24.1-08, Ch. 447, House Bill 1515, S.L.1975, according to the House Journal, was signed by the Speaker on page 1774 and by the President of the Senate on page 1776.
If these entries are correct, and we have no reason to question them, then, pursuant to the provisions of NDCC § 1-02-09 and § 1-02-08, NDCC § 50-24.1-08 was last acted upon by the Legislature and prevails over NDCC § 26-41-16(4).
Also, by taking into account § 1-02-07, which provides that a special statute prevails over a general statute, I reach the same result even though both statutes are in a broad sense special statutes. In my opinion, § 26-41-16 has a broader and more general application than § 50-24.1-08, which has a narrower or a more special application and therefore prevails under the provisions of § 1-02-07.
The underlying purpose and intent of NDCC § 50-24.1-08 is to further the provisions of Ch. 50-24.1, which has been set out earlier herein. In this respect, NDCC § 50-24.1-07 provides, among other things, that in certain instances if the recipient of a certain age dies, leaving a spouse or a minor child, recovery will be delayed or estopped for a period of time. It then sets up procedures to be followed. If § 26-41-16 were to prevail it would actually prevent recovery under those conditions because of the time elements spelled out.
Furthermore, the applicant for medical benefits and assistance under Ch. 50-24.1 has reason to believe that an assignment takes place with the application and will no longer pursue any insurance claims, thinking that whatever claim he or she may have had was assigned. The department of social services has reason to rely upon the provisions of the statute and is most likely preoccupied with providing services rather than with actions to recoup or recover under the subrogation or assignment by law.
NDCC § 26-41-16(4) is more concerned with the individuals filing a claim or bringing an action to recover insurance payments and does not have a limited specific purpose given to it by the Legislature. It applies and is limited to “all actions for basic and optional excess no-fault benefits.” It is not a law that governs under every conceivable situation, but only for the basic and optional excess no-fault provisions. True, the assignment takes on a similar color, but nevertheless recovery or recoupment is by an assignee or subrogee under the law, a person who is or was obligated to provide certain medical benefits. If the applicant meets the requirements, benefits are to be paid. NDCC § 50-24.1-08 specifically provides that the statute of limitations shall not run against claims of the state (Human Services Department) for medical assistance provided under this statute. It is very specific and greatly limited. Even if it were contended that “substantial doubt exists as to which of the two limitations statutes is applicable, the longer period will [would] be applied” Sprecher v. Magstadt, 213 N.W.2d 881, 883 (N.D.1973).
Taking into account the time of passage, the applicable rule of law and the obvious legislative intent and purpose of Ch. 50-24.-*2501,I am compelled to conclude that the Legislature intended that the statutes of limitations do not apply to claims of the state for payments made under Ch. 50-24.1, and in this respect § 50-24.1-08 is a special statute, whereas § 24-41-16(4) is not as specific and applies to all actions for basic and optional excess no-fault provisions.
I agree with the result of the majority opinion that the basic judgment of the trial court be reversed with directions that the statute of limitations does not apply to claims arising under the provisions of NDCC Ch. 50-24.1.
VANDE WALLE, J., concurs.

.Section 28-01-25, as is pertinent, in essence provides:
“If a person who is entitled to bring an action other than for the recovery of real property, or for a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape is:
1. Under the age of eighteen years;
2. Insane; or
3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life, at the time the cause of action accrues, the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. However, the period within which the action must be brought cannot be extended more than five years by any such liability except infancy, nor can it be extended in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases.”