Court Opinion

ID: 9893498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:08:04.002365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:17.620979
License: Public Domain

- 393 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                      RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 393

               Juli Ann Radmanesh, appellee, v.
              Kourosh C. Radmanesh, appellant.
                               ___ N.W.2d ___

                   Filed October 27, 2023.   No. S-22-826.

1. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony: Appeal and Error. In a marital
   dissolution action, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the
   record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the
   trial judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court’s determina-
   tions of alimony and property division.
2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an
   appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations
   based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent con-
   clusions with respect to the matters at issue.
3. ____: ____. When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers
   and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed
   the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
4. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
   reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
   ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
   submitted for disposition.
5. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In a dissolution of marriage
   proceeding, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows a court to
   order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of
   property as may be reasonable.
6. Property Division: Alimony. The purpose of alimony is to provide for
   the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when
   the relative economic circumstances make it appropriate. The purpose
   of property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between
   the parties.
7. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an
   appellate court does not determine whether it would have awarded the
                                      - 394 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                         RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 393

      same amount of alimony as the trial court did, but whether the trial
      court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial
      right or just result. An appellate court is not inclined to disturb the trial
      court’s award of alimony unless it is patently unfair on the record.
 8.   Divorce: Alimony. In weighing a request for alimony, the court may
      consider all the property owned by the parties when entering the decree,
      whether accumulated by their joint efforts or acquired by inheritance.
 9.   Judgments: Appeal and Error. As a general proposition, an appellate
      court does not require a district court to explain its reasoning.
10.   Alimony. The primary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for
      a reasonable period of time necessary for that individual to secure his or
      her own means of support. Ultimately, the duration of an alimony award
      must be reasonable.
11.   ____. Alimony should not be used as a tool to equalize the parties’
      incomes or to punish one of the parties. However, a disparity of income
      or potential income might partially justify an alimony award.
12.   Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The purpose of assigning a date
      of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is
      equitably divided.
13.   Divorce: Property Division: Appeal and Error. Generally, the date
      upon which a marital estate is valued should be rationally related
      to the property composing the marital estate and the property being
      divided. The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial
      court’s discretion.
14.   Property Division. Marital debt includes only those obligations incurred
      during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties. This is a flexible,
      fact-specific standard.

  Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie
A. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

  Liam K. Meehan, of Wagner, Meehan & Watson, L.L.P., for
appellant.

  April M. Lucas, Joy Kathurima, and Tracy Hightower-
Henne, of Hightower Reff Law, L.L.C., for appellee.

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
                              - 395 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                   RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 393

  Funke, J.
                       I. INTRODUCTION
   Husband appeals from a decree of dissolution, arguing that
the district court for Sarpy County, Nebraska, erred in award-
ing wife alimony and an equalization payment and in equally
dividing student loans for the parties’ children. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm the decree.

                     II. BACKGROUND
   Kourosh C. Radmanesh (Cyrus) and Juli Ann Radmanesh
were married in 1991. During the marriage, the parties had
twin children born in April 2000. The parties separated in or
around August 2018. In July 2021, Juli filed a complaint for
dissolution of marriage. The parties’ children had reached the
age of majority by the time of the trial.

                             1. Trial
   At the trial, Cyrus and Juli were the only witnesses. The tes-
timony and evidence pertinent to the issues raised on appeal is
summarized below. Additional facts will be introduced, where
relevant, in our analysis of the parties’ arguments on appeal.

                             (a) Alimony
   For the 4 years before the trial, Juli worked at a retail store,
earning approximately $40,000 annually. She contributed to
an employer-sponsored retirement plan while working in that
position. Juli testified that her monthly expenses were approxi-
mately $4,000. Juli requested alimony of $1,000 per month for
5 years from Cyrus.
   Juli testified that she inherited approximately $160,000 from
her father’s estate, mostly in stocks, after separating from
Cyrus, but before the trial. She further testified that most of
that inheritance was initially placed in a savings account, and
the rest was placed in her checking account or used to pay
expenses. The parties agreed that the funds in several of Juli’s
accounts were from her inheritance.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 393

   Cyrus testified that he was a consultant in the telecommuni-
cations industry and that he owned his own firm. He testified
that he made between $10,000 and $140,000 per contract. He
further testified that his income varied annually depending on
the length and location of the contracts. For example, docu-
mentation admitted into evidence showed that Cyrus earned an
average of $106,000 annually between 2009 and 2013, and an
average of $20,000 annually between 2014 and 2018. Cyrus
testified that for his most recent contract, from 2019 to 2021,
he earned $143,000 to $145,000 annually. Cyrus testified that
he had not worked since 2021 and that he was paying his bills
with his savings. Cyrus further testified that he had bid for new
contracts, but to no avail.
   Juli, however, suggested that Cyrus was responsible for his
unemployment. The district court admitted into evidence a
copy of an email and text message sent from Cyrus to the par-
ties’ children. Therein, Cyrus stated that although his current
contract was ending, he had been offered a full-time job, con-
tingent on his being vaccinated for COVID-19. Cyrus stated
that he was willing to get the vaccine “if Juli suspend[ed] the
divorce case” until the children graduated from college. Cyrus
stated that he had communicated this to Juli, along with other
“incentive[s]” that she would receive if she suspended the
divorce. Cyrus further stated that if Juli did not agree, he “will
not get the COVID19 vaccine and after 12/31/21 he will be
unemployed and [give] no support for the family in 2022 and
beyond.” According to Cyrus, Juli did not agree to his terms.
Thereafter, Cyrus told his children he would be unable to pro-
vide for them because he was “volunteering” not to get the
vaccine required for the job.
   Cyrus also testified that he was 65 years old at the time of
the trial and that he would like to work until he was 70 years
old or older. He then confirmed that he intended to work for
the next 5 years at least if he was able. He stated that once
he retired, he would rely on Social Security benefits to pay
his expenses, benefits which he expected to be approximately
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 393

$4,000 a month. Cyrus had not contributed to any retirement
account, and evidence at the trial showed that his monthly
expenses were estimated to be approximately $4,000. He also
had other bills and miscellaneous expenses. Cyrus argued
against any obligation for spousal support for Juli.

                    (b) Equalization Payment
   Juli testified to her ownership and the value of multiple
bank accounts, credit card accounts, and retirement accounts
that were separate from an IRA holding her inherited funds.
She also testified that she owned a vehicle. Juli requested that
the district court divide all marital property equally. Juli also
requested that the previously mentioned inheritance from her
father’s estate be deemed nonmarital property and not included
in the valuation of the marital estate.
   Cyrus agreed with Juli’s classification of the inherited funds
and did not request any of those funds nor Juli’s retire-
ment funds.
   The district court admitted into evidence a marital estate
distribution worksheet proposed by Juli. The proposed distri-
bution listed the value of the parties’ assets and debts. All the
assets and debts for both parties were valued between July 4
and November 1, 2021.
   Cyrus argued that Juli’s proposed distribution of assets
incorrectly valued his bank account. According to his testi-
mony, as well as the proposed distribution and bank account
statements, the account had a balance of $115,100 as of
August 2021. However, Cyrus testified that by the time of the
trial, the value of the account had depleted to approximately
$52,000 because he had been unemployed and had used the
account for expenses. Cyrus did not offer any documentary
evidence to support his testimony that the account had been
depleted since the divorce filing. Nor did he dispute any of
the evidence or testimony presented by Juli about the value
of the remainder of the parties’ marital estate. The total
value of the proposed marital estate, as set forth by Juli, was
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 393

$96,403.51, and her proposed distribution via equalization
payment was $53,200.29.

                      (c) Student Loan Debt
   The parties testified that their children were both attend-
ing college and expected to graduate in the spring of 2023.
The children’s college tuition was paid for by a combination
of scholarships, grants, and federal student loans. The student
loans were incurred in Juli’s name. Neither party introduced
any evidence documenting the details of the loans, but both
testified about them.
   Juli testified that she applied for the loans on behalf of
the children and that she took out the loans in only her name
because she was the one who helped the children with their
college applications and facilitated their education. Juli further
testified that the loans were initially incurred in July 2018
before the children started school, and every July thereafter,
most recently in 2022. She also testified that before she took
out the first loans in 2018, she and Cyrus had a conversation
about the loans and that Cyrus agreed to incur the loans. She
further testified that for the next couple years, she and Cyrus
had similar discussions about incurring more student loans
before each school year, but that for the final year, she applied
for the loans without conferring with Cyrus. However, Juli
testified that it was her understanding based on her earlier dis-
cussions with Cyrus that he knew the loans would be taken out
each year if there was a remaining balance on their children’s
school tuition after their scholarships and grants were applied.
Juli testified that there was $110,000 in student loan debt and
requested that the debt be divided equally between Cyrus
and her.
   Cyrus conversely testified that Juli “didn’t consult with
[him]” about the student loans, but, rather, she “went and just
applied for it.” Cyrus testified that Juli did not tell him that
she had obtained the loans until after the fact. Cyrus stated
that he wanted his children to be “accountable” for their own
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 393

education by paying off their own loans after they graduated.
At the same time, Cyrus testified and provided documentary
evidence to show that he regularly sent money to both children
for school-related expenses. He further explained that he paid
for his son’s room and board—approximately $20,000 annu-
ally—directly to the college. Cyrus ultimately stated that he
believed Juli should be entirely responsible for the student
loans because she did not consult with him “in the beginning”
and “she didn’t get [his] opinion.”

                   2. District Court Decree
   The district court entered a decree of dissolution on October
5, 2022. The decree stated that “[t]he Court was able to assess
the credibility of the parties and the weight to be given to their
testimony . . . . The Court ultimately give[s] greater weight to
the testimony of [Juli].”
   As relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the decree ordered
that Cyrus pay Juli alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month
for 60 months. In support of the alimony award, the decree
stated the following:
      The evidence showed that [Cyrus] contemplated his
      unemploy[ment] as a means to thwart these proceedings
      . . . . There was no evidence received to show [Cyrus]
      was unable to work at this time nor any evidence to
      show that he . . . attempted to find work. He did, how-
      ever, testify that at 65 years old, he intends to work for
      the next five years before he considers retirement when
      he will collect social security. As such, the Court finds
      that alimony is appropriate in this case and that [Cyrus]
      has the ability to pay.
   The decree also ordered that Cyrus pay Juli $53,200.29
as an equalization of the parties’ nonretirement assets. The
decree further ordered that each party keep the personal prop-
erty in his or her possession and that Juli was awarded
the video games located in a storage unit. The court also
adopted and attached to the decree Juli’s proposed marital
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                    RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 393

estate distribution. Finally, the decree ordered that the student
loans incurred in Juli’s name were “taken out by the parties
for the benefit of [their] children” and will be equally divided
between the parties.

                 3. Cyrus’ Motion to Alter
                      or for New Trial
   Cyrus timely filed a motion to alter the judgment or, alter-
natively, for a new trial. Juli objected, and at a hearing on
the matter, Cyrus raised several of the arguments that he now
raises on appeal. The district court denied the motion.
   Cyrus appealed, and we moved the case to our docket. 1

                III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Cyrus assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1)
awarding Juli alimony, (2) awarding Juli a $53,200.29 equal-
ization payment, and (3) classifying the student loans incurred
for the parties’ “adult children” as marital debt subject to
equal division.

                IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1-3] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 2 This
standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations
of alimony and property division. 3 In a review de novo on
the record, an appellate court is required to make independent
factual determinations based upon the record, and the court
reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the
matters at issue. 4 When evidence is in conflict, the appel-
late court considers and may give weight to the fact that the
1
  See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
2
  See Karas v. Karas, 314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473 (2023).
3
  Id.
4
  Id.
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                    RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 393

trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one
version of the facts rather than another. 5
   [4] A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or
rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in
matters submitted for disposition. 6

                         V. ANALYSIS
   [5] Cyrus’ appeal raises issues of alimony and the clas-
sification and division of property following the dissolution
of the parties’ marriage. In a dissolution of marriage proceed-
ing, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows a court
to order payment of such alimony by one party to the other
and division of property as may be reasonable. 7 What con-
stitutes a reasonable alimony award and division of marital
property depends on the facts of each case, but to make that
determination, a court may consider, among other things, the
circumstances of the parties, the duration of the marriage,
and the history of the contributions to the marriage by each
party, including contributions to the care and education of
the children. 8
   [6] While the criteria for reaching a reasonable alimony
award and division of property may overlap, the two serve dif-
ferent purposes and are to be considered separately. 9 Section
42-365 explains that “[t]he purpose of alimony is to provide
for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the
other when the relative economic circumstances . . . make
it appropriate.” Conversely, “[t]he purpose of property divi-
sion is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the
5
  Parde v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023).
6
  Karas, supra note 2.
7
  See id.
8
  See § 42-365.
9
  See id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                      RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 393

parties.” 10 With these principles of reasonableness and equity
as our guide, we turn to Cyrus’ assignments of error.
                            1. Alimony
   Cyrus argues that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding Juli alimony because it failed to consider Juli’s recent
inheritance, Cyrus’ age, and generally Juli’s lack of a need for
alimony as compared to Cyrus’ ability to pay. We find no abuse
of discretion here.
   [7] In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court
does not determine whether it would have awarded the same
amount of alimony as the trial court did, but whether the trial
court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a sub-
stantial right or just result. 11 Further, an appellate court is not
inclined to disturb the trial court’s award of alimony unless it
is patently unfair on the record. 12 Again, the ultimate criterion
is one of reasonableness. 13
                      (a) Juli’s Inheritance
   [8] Cyrus claims that the inheritance Juli received after
the divorce filing, but before the divorce decree, should have
precluded her from being awarded alimony. Cyrus is correct
that although property accumulated and acquired by a spouse
through an inheritance should generally not be considered
property part of the marital estate, 14 a court can certainly
consider inheritance when deciding to award alimony. 15 As
stated previously, the division of marital property and the
award of alimony are separate inquiries under § 42-365. The
fact that property is inherited and therefore excluded from
division in a dissolution proceeding does not prevent the
10
   Id.
11
   Karas, supra note 2.
12
   Dooling v. Dooling, 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019).
13
   Id.
14
   See id.
15
   See Ainslie v. Ainslie, 249 Neb. 656, 545 N.W.2d 90 (1996).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                     RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                         Cite as 315 Neb. 393

income it generates from being considered when determining
alimony. 16 In weighing a request for alimony, the court may
consider all the property owned by the parties when enter-
ing the decree, whether accumulated by their joint efforts or
acquired by inheritance. 17
   We take Cyrus’ argument that the district court did not
“consider” or “acknowledge” Juli’s inheritance in awarding
alimony 18 to mean either that the decree was silent as to the
inheritance or that the district court failed to give the inherit­
ance adequate weight as compared to the other reasons for
awarding alimony. Neither argument has merit.
   [9] Although the decree does not state that the district court
considered Juli’s inheritance in awarding her alimony, neither
does it state that the inheritance was disregarded. Generally,
we do not require a district court to explain its reasoning. 19
The parties spent considerable time at the trial testifying about
Juli’s inheritance. They also offered numerous exhibits show-
ing the balance of several of Juli’s accounts, some of which
the parties agreed derived from her inheritance. As such, we
do not find anything in the record to suggest that the district
court was not cognizant of Juli’s inheritance when it awarded
her alimony.
   As to the weight given to Juli’s inheritance, Juli testified
that she received $160,000 in inheritance from her father’s
estate and that approximately $120,000 of inherited funds
were initially placed in a savings account before being divided
among different retirement and bank accounts. However, the
record is unclear as to exactly how much of the inherited funds
Juli had in which accounts and whether the accounts that held
inherited funds generated income. Upon our review of the
record, the most that can be said is that at or near the time of
16
   See id.
17
   Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874 N.W.2d 17 (2016).
18
   See brief for appellant at 15.
19
   Brumbaugh v. Bendorf, 306 Neb. 250, 945 N.W.2d 116 (2020).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                    RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 393

the divorce proceedings, Juli had as much as $39,000 in inher-
ited funds in her checking account, $37,000 in inherited funds
in her IRA account, and $35,000 in inherited funds in one of
her savings accounts.
   While those inherited funds were assets, there was no evi-
dence presented that the funds actively generated income or
could have been readily accessed or liquidated by Juli. Taking
into consideration the limited evidence concerning Juli’s inher-
itance, we find the statutory factors relevant to an award of
alimony support the trial court’s determination.
                         (b) Cyrus’ Age
   Cyrus also argues that the district court erred in awarding
Juli alimony because of his “advanced age.” 20 In doing so,
Cyrus contends that the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ decision
in Kramer v. Kramer 21 stands for the proposition that alimony
cannot be ordered to be paid by an individual over 62 years of
age. Cyrus’ reliance on Kramer is misplaced.
   The court in Kramer did not hold that alimony could never
be awarded beyond age 62; instead, it held that a divorce
decree awarding lifetime alimony was unreasonable under the
circumstances of that case and that the award should be
reduced to a 15-year term. 22 Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself
clarified some years later in an unpublished opinion that “th[e]
reliance on Kramer for the proposition that alimony should
not be awarded after the obligor reaches 62 years of age is
improper.” 23 We agree.
   [10] This court has never suggested that there is an age at
which a party to a divorce is too old to pay alimony. Rather,
the terms of an award of alimony depend on what is reason-
able under the circumstances of each case. We have held that
20
   See brief for appellant at 14.
21
   Kramer v. Kramer, 1 Neb. App. 641, 510 N.W.2d 351 (1993).
22
   See id.
23
   Paschall v. Paschall, No. A-12-668, 2013 WL 5366330 at *3 (Neb. App.
   July 16, 2013) (selected for posting to court website).
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                    RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 393

the primary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for
a reasonable period of time necessary for that individual to
secure his or her own means of support. 24 Ultimately, the dura-
tion of an alimony award must be reasonable. 25 We find that
the 5-year duration of alimony here qualifies as such. While
Cyrus will be 70 years old when his alimony obligation termi-
nates, he testified that he “would like to work up to . . . maybe
70 plus,” then confirmed he “intend[ed] to work for the next
[5] years at least” if he was able.
                (c) Juli’s Need for Alimony Versus
                        Cyrus’ Ability to Pay
   As to Cyrus’ argument that the district court erred in award-
ing Juli alimony because it failed to consider Juli’s lack of a
need for alimony as compared to Cyrus’ ability to pay, we dis-
agree. Specifically, we do not find that the district court’s order
of alimony was an improper attempt to equalize the parties’
income, as Cyrus asserts.
   [11] Alimony should not be used as a tool to equalize the
parties’ incomes or to punish one of the parties. 26 However,
a disparity of income or potential income might partially jus-
tify an alimony award. 27 The district court found a significant
disparity in the incomes here. We find no abuse of discretion
in that conclusion.
   Cyrus testified that he could earn up to $140,000 per con-
tract. While his work appeared to have some income volatil-
ity, it is also apparent that his earning potential was several
times that of Juli’s. Over the past 20 years, Cyrus made more
than $100,000 per year numerous times. For Cyrus’ most
recent contract, he earned $143,000 to $145,000 annually.
24
   Karas, supra note 2; Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13, 911 N.W.2d 582
   (2018).
25
   Wiedel, supra note 24.
26
   See Karas, supra note 2; Simons v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 978 N.W.2d
   121 (2022).
27
   Simons, supra note 26.
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                      315 Nebraska Reports
                         RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 393

Additionally, Cyrus testified that his monthly expenses were
approximately $4,000. Juli, on the other hand, earned approxi-
mately $40,000 annually, and her monthly expenses were also
approximately $4,000. As such, the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it found that Cyrus should pay alimony to
Juli in the amount of $1,000 per month for 5 years.
    Relatedly, we find no merit in Cyrus’ argument that he is
unable to pay alimony because he was unemployed for the
6 months preceding the trial. The district court found that
Cyrus’ unemployment was voluntary and that he attempted to
use a job offer as leverage for Juli to “suspend” the divorce
proceedings. We have no basis to disagree. Cyrus argues on
appeal that he chose to not take the job offer because he did
not want to receive the COVID-19 vaccine required by the
employer. However, the record shows that Cyrus communi-
cated to both Juli and the parties’ children that he was will-
ing to “proceed with taking [the] vaccines to stay employed
. . . if Juli suspend[ed] the divorce case,” among other terms.
When Juli did not agree to Cyrus’ terms, Cyrus communicated
that he was “volunteering” to decline the vaccine and that he
would be unemployed and unable to provide for the family in
the future. Based on this evidence, we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the district court’s finding that Cyrus “contemplated his
unemploy[ment] as a means to thwart these proceedings.”
    We similarly find no merit in Cyrus’ remaining arguments
about Juli’s lack of a need for alimony and his inability to pay.
As stated previously, we do not determine whether we would
have awarded the same amount of alimony that the district
court did, but we instead only determine whether the alimony
award was an abuse of discretion. 28 The alimony award here
was reasonable, not an abuse of discretion, and we are not
inclined to disturb it. 29
28
     See Karas, supra note 2.
29
     See, id.; Dooling, supra note 12.
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                    RADMANESH V. RADMANESH
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 393

                   2. Equalization Payment
   Cyrus next argues that the district court erred in ordering
him to pay Juli a $53,200.29 equalization payment. He con-
tends that the court failed to credit him for the reduction in his
portion of the marital estate in the time between the divorce fil-
ing and the trial and that the video games in storage that were
awarded to Juli had not been included in her proposed marital
distribution. We find no abuse of discretion here.

                         (a) Valuation Date
   The district court valued Cyrus’ bank account approximately
1 month after the date of the divorce filing. Cyrus argues that
the court should have instead valued the account at the date of
the trial and that when it did not, it failed to properly credit
him for the reduction in his portion of the marital estate.
   [12,13] The purpose of assigning a date of valuation in a
dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is equi-
tably divided. 30 It is well settled that, generally, the date upon
which a marital estate is valued must be rationally related to
the property composing the marital estate and the property
being divided. 31 We have declined to tie the hands of the
district court and mandate that it must use only one particu-
lar valuation date in equitably dividing the marital estate. 32
The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion. 33
   Cyrus’ bank account was valued at $115,100 on August
11, 2021, a date and value that was supported by evidence
admitted at the trial. Cyrus did not dispute the account’s value
on the valuation date; he only testified that since then, the
account had depleted to a lesser amount. However, Cyrus did
30
   Karas, supra note 2.
31
   See, id.; Dooling, supra note 12; Rohde v. Rohde, 303 Neb. 85, 927
   N.W.2d 37 (2019).
32
   See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 31.
33
   Eis v. Eis, 310 Neb. 243, 965 N.W.2d 19 (2021).
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not introduce bank statements or other evidence to support
his assertion.
   In both Karas v. Karas 34 and Dooling v. Dooling, 35 for
example, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in valuing a spouse’s marital asset on one date, despite the
spouse’s argument that a different valuation date more accu-
rately reflected the lesser value of the asset, when the spouse
did not offer evidence of that asset’s lesser value on that date
to the court. We reach the same conclusion here and find that
Cyrus failed to adequately offer evidence of the account’s
value at or near the trial date.
   Further, all the parties’ assets and debts were valued between
July and November 2021, not just Cyrus’ account. We decline
to single out Cyrus’ most valuable marital asset and hold that
the district court should have valued it as of another date. The
district court’s valuation date was rationally related to Cyrus’
account, as well as the other property in the parties’ marital
estate. We thus cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to value Cyrus’ account near the divorce filing.

                         (b) Video Games
   There was also testimony from both parties about a stor-
age unit that held various items, including video games that
the parties valued at approximately $30,000. Cyrus paid for
the monthly costs of the storage unit, and although he testi-
fied that he would rather Juli be responsible for the costs and
items of the storage unit, save his personal property and their
children’s property, he also testified that he would continue
paying for the unit if Juli did not want any of the household
property in it. Juli testified that Cyrus could have everything
in the storage unit besides their son’s video games, which she
requested that she be awarded so that she could deliver them
to their son.
34
     Karas, supra note 2.
35
     Dooling, supra note 12.
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   Cyrus is correct that the contents of the storage unit were
not included on the proposed marital distribution worksheet. In
fact, the only mention of the storage unit in the district court’s
decree was that Juli was awarded the video games in the unit
and that she was responsible for transporting them. It is clear
from the parties’ testimony, however, that the video games were
intended for their son and that Juli planned to deliver them to
him. Cyrus’ argument that the value of the video games was
to Juli’s benefit and should have reduced the equalization pay-
ment is without merit.

                     3. Student Loan Debt
   Cyrus lastly argues that the district court erred in classifying
the student loans incurred for the parties’ children as a marital
debt that was to be equally divided between the parties. Again,
we find no abuse of discretion.
   Cyrus argues that the student loans should not have been
classified as marital debt because the loans were taken out for
the benefit of their children, rather than the parties’ benefit. He
contends that the student loans here are akin to loans taken out
by one party to a divorce for that party’s own benefit and that
Juli should be entirely responsible for the loans. Juli disagrees
and argues that the student loans were incurred for the benefit
of the parties and thus should not be treated differently than
any other debt incurred during the marriage.
   Cyrus relies on two cases from the Nebraska Court of
Appeals to support his contention that student loans are to be
considered marital debt only if the loans are disbursed for the
benefit of the marriage. In Walker v. Walker, 36 the Court of
Appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in finding student loan debt incurred during the mar-
riage to be nonmarital where the parties disputed the extent to
which the student loans were used for joint marital interests
or the obligor’s education. Specifically, the appellate court
36
     Walker v. Walker, 9 Neb. App. 694, 618 N.W.2d 465 (2000).
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held that equity required the wife to take with her the student
loan debt incurred when she obtained her law degree, as she
took with her all the benefit of the degree. 37
   In Wright v. Wright, 38 the Court of Appeals similarly held
that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not
divide student loan debt incurred by a spouse to further his
education. The trial court found that there was insufficient evi-
dence to determine an equitable amount to attribute as marital
debt because some of the debt was used to finance the educa-
tion and some of the debt was used to pay the parties’ bills.
The appellate court agreed that the record was insufficient to
determine how much of the debt was marital. 39
   Although Walker and Wright considered whether certain
student loan debt was marital debt, neither case is directly
on point with the facts of this case. The student loan debts
incurred in those cases were debts incurred for the education
of one of the parties in the divorce and not for the parties’ chil-
dren. Additionally, there was no evidence in those cases as to
an agreement of the parties concerning the debt. As such, the
two cases offer limited guidance in determining the issue now
before us.
   [14] Generally, all property accumulated and acquired by
either spouse during a marriage is part of the marital estate. 40
Exceptions include property that a spouse acquired before
the marriage, or by gift or inheritance. 41 Debts, like prop-
erty, should be considered in dividing marital property upon
dissolution. 42 It is well settled in Nebraska that marital debt
includes only those obligations incurred during the marriage
37
   Id.
38
   Wright v. Wright, 29 Neb. App. 787, 961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).
39
   Id.
40
   Karas, supra note 2.
41
   Dooling, supra note 12.
42
   See, Carter v. Carter, 261 Neb. 881, 626 N.W.2d 576 (2001); Anderson v.
   Anderson, 27 Neb. App. 547, 934 N.W.2d 497 (2019).
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for the joint benefit of the parties. 43 This is a flexible, fact-
specific standard. 44
   As summarized previously, there was competing evidence
at the trial as to whether the parties agreed to, or at least
discussed, incurring the student loans for their children. Juli
testified that before she incurred the loans, she and Cyrus dis-
cussed the loans, and that Cyrus expressly agreed to them. She
further testified that she had similar discussions with Cyrus
every year, except the year immediately prior to the divorce,
before she renewed the student loans. Cyrus conversely testi-
fied that no such discussions were had and that he did not
agree to the loans and did not know about them until after
the fact.
   The district court heard this competing evidence and deter-
mined that Juli’s testimony was more credible. In doing so,
the court concluded that the parties agreed to incur the stu-
dent loan debt during the marriage. We give weight to that
factual finding.
   In our earlier decisions dealing with classifying a debt as
marital, the facts of each case and whether the party claiming
the debt was nonmarital offered sufficient evidence at trial to
satisfy that party’s burden of proof is what drove the analysis.
Where there was no evidence, or competing evidence, as to
whether the parties agreed to incur a debt during the marriage
for their joint benefit, we have given weight to trial courts’
credibility assessments and generally found no abuse of dis-
cretion in their factual findings. 45 Again, when evidence is in
conflict, the appellate court considers and may give weight
43
   Karas, supra note 2; Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb. 196, 964 N.W.2d
   694 (2021); Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018);
   Millatmal v. Millatmal, 272 Neb. 452, 723 N.W.2d 79 (2006); Mathews
   v. Mathews, 267 Neb. 604, 676 N.W.2d 42 (2004).
44
   Vanderveer, supra note 43.
45
   See, e.g., Karas, supra note 2; Kauk v. Kauk, 310 Neb. 329, 966 N.W.2d 45
   (2021); Vanderveer, supra note 43; Fetherkile, supra note 43; Millatmal,
   supra note 43; Mathews, supra note 43.
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to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses
and accepted one version of facts rather than another. 46 As
such, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s divi-
sion of the student loan debt.
   With that determination being made, we note that, as a gen-
eral rule, absent agreement of the parties, a Nebraska district
court cannot order a party to pay child support beyond the age
of majority. 47 Nothing in this opinion should be understood to
condone the unilateral incurring of postseparation indebtedness
as a subterfuge to evade this principle.
   Cyrus’ further argument that the student loan debt could
have been treated as a nonmarital debt because it was incurred
after the parties separated is without merit. To the contrary, we
have expressly declined to adopt a rule requiring that debts
must be incurred before separation to be considered marital. 48
                     VI. CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding alimony and the equalization pay-
ment and in equally dividing the student loan debts between
the parties.
                                                   Affirmed.
46
   Parde, supra note 5.
47
   Carlson v. Carlson, 299 Neb. 526, 909 N.W.2d 351 (2018). See, Johnson
   v. Johnson, 308 Neb. 623, 956 N.W.2d 261 (2021); Windham v. Kroll,
   307 Neb. 947, 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020); Wood v. Wood, 266 Neb. 580, 667
   N.W.2d 235 (2003); Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191 (2003);
   Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Zetterman v.
   Zetterman, 245 Neb. 255, 512 N.W.2d 622 (1994). See, also, Henderson
   v. Henderson, 264 Neb. 916, 653 N.W.2d 226 (2002); Kimbrough v.
   Kimbrough, 228 Neb. 358, 422 N.W.2d 556 (1988); Meyers v. Meyers, 222
   Neb. 370, 383 N.W.2d 784 (1986); Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625,
   107 N.W.2d 407 (1961); Moore v. Bauer, 11 Neb. App. 572, 657 N.W.2d
   25 (2003); Boamah-Wiafe v. Rashleigh, 9 Neb. App. 503, 614 N.W.2d 778
   (2000).
48
   See Vanderveer, supra note 43.