Court Opinion

ID: 9906186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 15:01:40.080187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.460610
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 1, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0216
                                _________________________

   Robert Bowers, Jr., personal representative of the Estate of
             Charles Lewis Evans, deceased, et al.

                                                  v.

  BBH SBMC, LLC, d/b/a Shelby Baptist Medical Center; Albert
   Sterns, M.D.; Island Medical Alabama, LLC; Island Medical
    Perseus, LLC; Island Medical RTR, LLC; and Terry Short

                     Appeal from the Shelby Circuit Court
                                (CV-16-000192)

COOK, Justice.
SC-2023-0216

     This appeal primarily concerns an attorney's authority to settle

wrongful-death claims. Robert Bowers, Jr., the personal representative

of the estate of Charles Lewis Evans, deceased, challenges the summary

judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor

of Terry Short; BBH SBMC, LLC, d/b/a Shelby Baptist Medical Center;

Albert Sterns, M.D.; Island Medical Alabama, LLC; Island Medical

Perseus, LLC; and Island Medical RTR, LLC ("the defendants"). The trial

court concluded that the claims against them were barred by previously

executed general releases. The primary issue on appeal is whether one of

those previously executed releases is binding on Bowers and, thus, bars

his wrongful-death claims relating to the death of Charles Evans. For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

with instructions.

                       Facts and Procedural History

     While driving his car on January 12, 2016, Short collided with a

vehicle carrying Charles Evans, John Edward Evans, and Linda Claxton

Evans.   After   the   accident,   Linda,   Charles's   sister-in-law,   was

transported to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital ("UAB

Hospital"). Charles and his brother John were taken to Shelby Baptist

                                     2
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Medical Center for treatment. Shelby Baptist Medical Center discharged

Charles later that night.

     The next morning, on January 13, 2016, Charles collapsed at his

home and was transported by emergency medical personnel to UAB

Hospital. Around 4:35 p.m. that day, Nicholas Vocino, an attorney for the

Slocumb Law Firm, LLC, ("the Slocumb firm") filed a complaint in the

Chilton Circuit Court on behalf of John, as next friend of Charles, against

Baptist Health System, Inc., and various fictitiously named defendants.1

That complaint asserted a medical-malpractice claim under the Alabama

Medical Liability Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-480 et seq., and § 6-5-540 et

seq., as well as claims of negligence, wantonness, and recklessness. 2

     At around 8:00 p.m. that night, Charles died at UAB Hospital.

According to affidavits, Charles had four siblings and heirs at the time of

his death: John, Brenda Saylor, Stella Luna, and Doris Kornegay.

     1At the time the complaint was filed, John possessed a power of

attorney permitting him to act on Charles's behalf.

     2That complaint did not specifically name and identify Short as a

defendant. Instead, the complaint asserted the negligence, wantonness,
and recklessness claims against fictitiously named defendants described
as "those persons, firms, corporations, or other entities whose negligent,
wanton, reckless and wrongful conduct caused the aforementioned motor
vehicle collision on January 12, 2016 …."
                                    3
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     On January 14, 2016, Vocino sent a letter to National General

Insurance Company ("National General"), Short's insurer, which read, in

pertinent part:

           "I represent John, Linda and Charles Evans for injuries
     they received in an accident which occurred on January 12,
     2016. According to our investigation, your insured was at-
     fault in causing said accident and injuries. Please direct all
     future correspondence to my attention. You may contact my
     clients directly to resolve the property damage claim,
     conditioned upon any conversations with my clients being
     limited to the property damages alone with no inquiry of any
     sort concerning my client's injuries."

(Emphasis added.)3

     The letter also "advised that any and all medical release(s) which

may have previously been signed by [John, Linda, or Charles] are hereby

withdrawn, revoked, or rescinded. Moreover, if my clients have provided

any statements, whether oral or written, please provide my office with a

transcribed copy of the same."

     On February 1, 2016, Robin Lecin, an insurance adjuster for

National General, sent Vocino a letter that stated, in pertinent part:

     "Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today.

     3Although Charles was dead at the time Vocino sent the letter to

National General, Vocino represented that he was Charles's attorney. It
is undisputed that, on January 14, 2016, no estate for Charles had been
established and no personal representative had been appointed.
                                   4
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     "Mr. Short has bodily injury policy limits of $25,000 per
     person and $50,000 per accident. We are offering the policy
     limits of $50,000 to your three clients.

     "Please send me documentation of John Evans and Linda
     Evans'[s] injuries and a copy of Charles Evan[s's] death
     certificate. I will also need their social security numbers."

The letter from Lecin to Vocino listed "John Evans, Linda Evans and [t]he

Estate of Charles Evans" as "Your Clients." Then, on February 18, 2016,

National General issued two checks: one to "Linda Evans and her

attorney Slocumb Law Firm LLC" for $20,000 and one to "John Edward

Evans and his attorney Slocumb Law Firm LLC" for $15,000. National

General also sent two documents entitled "RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS"

for John and Linda to sign.

     The claims relating to Charles proved more difficult to resolve.

According to Lecin, "[t]he Slocumb Law Firm represented [that] an

administrator must [first] be appointed, and [that] the Slocumb Firm

could then finalize the settlement with the administrator." On March 15,

2016, Vocino, on behalf of John, filed a petition in the Chilton Probate

Court asking that letters of administration for Charles's estate be issued

to a county administrator. The probate court appointed Bowers, a county

administrator, as the personal representative of Charles's estate.
                                    5
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     Also on March 15, 2016, Vocino, on behalf of John, as next friend of

Charles, filed a suggestion of Charles's death in the action pending in the

Chilton Circuit Court and moved to substitute Bowers, as the personal

representative of Charles's estate, as the plaintiff in the action. The

Chilton Circuit Court granted that motion.4

     Two days later, on March 17, 2016, Vocino sent Lecin a letter that

read: "I have attached the estate documentation we discussed." The letter

from Vocino listed "Charles Evans," rather than the "Estate of Charles

Evans" or Bowers, as "Our Client." Attached to the letter was the Chilton

Probate Court's order granting letters of administration to Bowers. Lecin

later confirmed that "the Slocumb Law Firm [had] provided evidence of

[Bowers's] appointment on or about March 17, 2016."

     On March 22, 2016, National General issued a third check in the

amount of $15,000 to "Robert L. Bowers Jr. Attorney Administrator for

the Estate of Charles Lewis Evans Jr. and Slocumb Law Firm LLC" and

     4Despite the substitution of Bowers, the personal representative of

Charles's estate, as the plaintiff, the subsequently filed amended
complaints and the notice of appeal also listed as a party to the action
"Charles Lewis Evans, who sues by and through his brother, custodian
and next friend, John Edward Evans, for personal injuries." However, no
issues have been raised on appeal regarding any claims asserted by John
on behalf of Charles.
                                    6
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a document entitled "RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS" relating to Charles.

Although Bowers's name appears on the back of the check issued by

National General, Bowers testified in his affidavit that he did not endorse

the check. Bowers also stated that he did not "give anyone permission to

endorse [his] name to that check" and that he has "not received any

proceeds into the Estate of Charles Evans from the check."

     On May 11, 2016, James R. Moncus, an attorney with Hare, Wynn,

Newell & Newton, LLP, filed a notice of appearance for Bowers in the

action pending in the Chilton Circuit Court. Later that day, the Chilton

Circuit Court transferred the case to the trial court.

     On September 6, 2016, John and Linda signed the releases sent by

National General. The releases regarding John's and Linda's individual

claims provided, in relevant part:

     "John [and Linda] Evans, being of lawful age, for the sole
     consideration of fifteen thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000)
     to [John] [and $20,000 to Linda] … do/does hereby … release,
     acquit and forever discharge Terry Short, Integon National
     Insurance Company,[5] … and all other persons, firms,
     corporations, associations or partnerships of and from any
     and all claims of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs,
     loss of service, expenses, and compensation whatsoever,
     which the undersigned now has[] or may hereafter accrue on

     5Integon National Insurance Company is an underwriting company

for National General.
                                     7
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     account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and
     unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal
     injuries and the consequences thereof resulting or to result
     from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or
     about 01/12/2016, at or near Maplesville AL."

     John, however, also signed a second release on behalf of "the Estate

of Charles Evans, Jr." That is, both Charles's and John's names are listed

on the signature line of that release, and the notary certified that John

had "executed the foregoing Release, … acknowledg[ing] to [her] that

Charles Voluntarily executed the same." That release purportedly

discharged all of the claims relating to Charles against Short, National

General, and "all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or

partnerships" in exchange for $15,000.

     On September 28, 2016, Moncus filed an amended complaint on

behalf of John, as next friend of Charles, and Bowers, as personal

representative of Charles's estate, in the trial court. The amended

complaint corrected the designation of "Baptist Health System, Inc." to

"BBH SBMC, LLC, d/b/a/ Shelby Baptist Medical Center." The amended

complaint also added Albert Sterns, M.D., as an additional defendant and

included more detailed allegations in support of the medical-malpractice

claims. Only Moncus was listed as "Of Counsel" on the amended

                                    8
SC-2023-0216

complaint. Then, on November 27, 2017, a second amended complaint

was filed in the trial court. The second amended complaint asserted a

wrongful-death claim based on medical malpractice against BBH SBMC,

LLC; Island Medical Alabama, LLC; Island Medical Perseus, LLC; Island

Medical RTR, LLC; and Dr. Sterns ("the malpractice defendants"). The

second amended complaint also named Short as a defendant and asserted

a wrongful-death claim based on negligence and wantonness against him.

Finally, it added as plaintiffs John and Linda, in their individual

capacities. John and Linda asserted claims of negligence and wantonness

against Short and sought damages from Short for "personal injuries

sustained in the automobile collision caused by … Short." Both Moncus

and Vocino were listed as "Of Counsel" on the second amended complaint,

which -- as noted above -- asserted new claims on behalf of John and

Linda in addition to the claims relating to Charles. 6

     Approximately seven months later, in July 2018, Short filed a

motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. In that

     6The   second amended complaint is the last document on which
Vocino is listed as "Of Counsel" on behalf of John, Linda, and Bowers,
although the defendants continued to serve their filings on Vocino
throughout the litigation. The record does not indicate that Vocino
withdrew as counsel.
                                   9
SC-2023-0216

motion, Short argued that John and Linda had released their individual

claims against Short.

     Short additionally asserted that, in September 2016, National

General had received an executed release of the claims relating to

Charles that was signed by John. According to Short, National General

had believed that John and Linda were Charles's heirs and that they

were therefore permitted under Alabama law to settle the claims relating

to Charles. More specifically, Short stated that National General had

"relied on … Vocino's assertion regarding the status of John and Linda

Evans as heirs." Short additionally noted that "the settlement check was

endorsed by Mr. Bowers." For those reasons, Short contended that "the

settlement of [the] claims [relating to Charles was] valid and bind[ing]

on [Bowers]." Short attached copies of all the checks and releases to his

motion.

     The response to Short's motion acknowledged that the releases

signed by John and Linda discharged their individual claims against

Short. Bowers, however, disputed that the releases discharged the

wrongful-death claim against Short. Specifically, Bowers acknowledged

that, before a personal representative is appointed, a wrongful-death

                                   10
SC-2023-0216

claim can be settled by the joint agreement of all of a decedent's heirs;

however, he contended that the requisite joint agreement was not present

in this case because, although Charles had four heirs, the purported

release of the wrongful-death claim against Short was signed only by

John. See Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104 (1911); see also § 6-

5-410, Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing only the personal representative of a

decedent's estate to pursue a wrongful-death claim). Attached to the

response were the affidavits of the three other heirs, who testified that

they were unaware of, and did not authorize, any settlement of the

wrongful-death claim. Thus, Bowers said, there was no joint agreement

by the heirs to settle the wrongful-death claim.

     Bowers further argued that, even if all four heirs had signed the

release addressing the claims relating to Charles in September 2016, that

release would not be binding on Bowers because, following his

appointment as personal representative of Charles's estate on March 15,

2016, only he had the authority to settle the wrongful-death claim.

Bowers alleged that he had no knowledge of the release addressing the

claims relating to Charles. As for Short's allegation that Bowers had

endorsed the settlement check, Bowers submitted an affidavit asserting

                                   11
SC-2023-0216

that he neither endorsed, nor gave anyone else permission to endorse, the

check from National General. Accordingly, Bowers argued that the

release, which did not contain Bowers's signature, and the check, which

Bowers testified he did not endorse, did not constitute a binding

settlement that precluded the wrongful-death claim against Short.

     In October 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Short's motion.

Although a transcript of that hearing is not in the record, it appears that,

at the hearing, the trial court orally ordered the parties to submit

additional briefing on the issues presented by the motion. In his post-

hearing brief, Bowers reasserted his argument that there was no binding

release of the wrongful-death claim, explaining that Short had "failed to

produce a valid and enforceable release signed by Mr. Bowers, the only

individual with legal capacity to bind Charles's estate." In Short's post-

hearing brief, he argued that National General had negotiated the

settlement in good faith and that "it is inequitable to allow [Bowers] to

disavow the terms of the settlement and release agreements in favor of

the pending litigation without evidence Mr. Short or his insurer

participated in any nefarious conduct related to the settlements." Short

noted that he had not been added as a defendant to this lawsuit until

                                    12
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"almost two years after the accident giving rise to this suit, and more

than a year after [National General had] reached a settlement." He

alleged that, because there was "no evidence [that Short] or [National

General had] negotiated the settlement agreements in bad faith, or that

either had any reason to believe the settlements were unenforceable," the

trial court should enforce the release and resolve the wrongful-death

claim against him in his favor.

     The trial court held another hearing on November 20, 2019. At that

hearing, it appears that "the court instructed the parties to gather all

documents and/or things necessary for [an] evidentiary hearing."

     After numerous hearings and additional briefing, Short filed a

notice of evidentiary material in advance of a hearing set for October 11,

2022. Short attached various exhibits to the notice, including the

correspondence between National General and Vocino, the three

settlement checks, the releases signed by John, and John's affidavit. A

transcript of the October 11, 2022, hearing is not in the record.

     The trial court scheduled another hearing on Short's motion for

November 29, 2022. In advance of that hearing, Short supplemented his

earlier evidentiary submission to add the affidavit of Lecin, the National

                                    13
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General insurance adjuster. In relevant part, Lecin testified in her

affidavit:

            "4. On or about January 13, 2016, National General …
      received notice from Nick Vocino of the Slocumb Law Firm,
      LLC, of its representation of John Evans, Linda Evans, and
      Charles Evans. … There was no express limitation of any kind
      regarding the scope of the Slocumb Law Firm's representation
      other than the property damage claim.

             "….

            "7. The settlement for the claims that could be brought
      by the personal representative of Charles Evans'[s] Estate, in
      the amount of $15,000.00, was negotiated by the Slocumb Law
      Firm for the same terms [as John's and Linda's settlements],
      specifically a full general release. The Slocumb Firm
      represented an administrator must be appointed, and the
      Slocumb Firm could then finalize the settlement with the
      administrator. On or about March 15, 2016, the County
      Administrator, Robert L. Bowers, Jr., was appointed as the
      Administrator. The Slocumb Law Firm provided evidence of
      the appointment on or about March 17, 2016. The Slocumb
      Law Firm accepted the $15,000.00 offer and full general
      release, to my understanding, with full authority on behalf of
      the Administrator of the Estate of Charles Evans. At no time
      did the Slocumb Law Firm expressly or impliedly state its
      representation of the Administrator was limited or restricted
      in any way. To the contrary, at all times I relied on Slocumb
      Law Firm's conduct and representations in negotiating this
      full general release for Mr. Short from counsel professing to
      represent the interests of the Administrator, and issued the
      settlement check in reliance on these representations on or
      about March 22, 2016. At the same time, I sent the general
      release for execution to the lawyer I believed was authorized
      to settle these claims.

                                   14
SC-2023-0216

           "8. When the Slocumb Law Firm agreed to the
     settlement amount and general release for the Administrator
     of the Estate of Charles Evans, after the creation of the Estate
     and appointment of Mr. Bowers as the administrator, I
     believed the Slocumb Law Firm had full and final authority
     to negotiate on behalf of the Administrator of the Estate of
     Charles Evans, and relied on it in issuing the settlement
     check and providing the full general release agreed upon.

           "9. The settlement check was signed by John Evans and
     the administrator. I have been told they contest their
     signatures. I have no knowledge of this, but can confirm that
     the check was fully negotiated."

(Emphasis added.)

     At the November 2022 hearing, counsel for all the parties appeared

for oral arguments on the pending legal issues. No witnesses were

presented at that hearing.

     At the hearing, Short argued that the wrongful-death claim against

him should be resolved in his favor based on the terms of the release and

Vocino's apparent authority to negotiate a settlement of that claim. Short

stated that the Slocumb firm had petitioned the Chilton Probate Court to

appoint a personal representative of Charles's estate and then had

accepted the settlement offer from National General. Acknowledging that

the Slocumb firm had "perhaps wandered outside of the purviews of its

representation," Short emphasized that "at no point in time prior had Mr.
                                   15
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Slocumb's lawyer ever expressed any type of limitations on [his] ability

to represent those claimants other than when [he] sent their initial letter

of representation," which indicated that National General could settle

only claims for property damage without dealing with the Slocumb firm.

     Short   argued that, once Bowers          was appointed      personal

representative of Charles's estate, the Slocumb firm was his agent. Short

acknowledged that "[t]he Slocumb firm negotiated [the settlement], and

then when things went haywire, … wrote us a check back." However, he

maintained his position that the release had been signed by someone at

the Slocumb firm "purporting to represent" Bowers. Because National

General had negotiated "in good faith" with the Slocumb firm, and

because the Slocumb firm had agreed to a settlement of the wrongful-

death claim against Short, Short contended, Bowers was bound by the

release.

     In response, Bowers argued that the wrongful-death claim against

Short was not barred because there was no valid release as to that claim.

Disputing Short's assertion that there had been a valid settlement of that

claim based on Vocino's apparent authority to negotiate a settlement,

Bowers argued that there was no writing from Vocino that would

                                    16
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constitute a binding settlement agreement. Bowers pointed out that

John, not Bowers, had signed the release in September 2016 and that

John had "zero authority" to settle the wrongful-death claim against

Short. Thus, Bowers argued, although there may have been a settlement

offer communicated by National General, there was no evidence

indicating that Bowers, who was solely authorized to settle the wrongful-

death claim against Short at the time, had accepted any such offer. See §

6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, according to Bowers, even if Vocino

had the apparent authority to accept such an offer, § 34-3-21, Ala. Code

1975, which addresses an attorney's general authority to bind his or her

client, requires a writing, which Bowers insisted was not present in this

case.

        At the hearing, counsel for Island Medical Alabama, LLC; Island

Medical Perseus, LLC; and Island Medical RTR, LLC, which had not

sought a dismissal or a summary judgment regarding the claims against

them, argued that the release "not only release[d] Terry Short, [but also]

… release[d] any and all other persons, firms, or corporations that may

be responsible for [Charles's] death, which would include [the

malpractice defendants]." At the conclusion of the hearing, the remaining

                                   17
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malpractice defendants noted that, if the trial court granted Short's

motion, they "would anticipate filing a summary judgment motion on the

issue of release."

      On March 7, 2023, the trial court entered a summary judgment in

favor of all defendants against all plaintiffs. The trial court's judgment

provided, in relevant part:

            "An attorney employed by the Mike Slocumb Law Firm,
      Nick Vocino, advised Short and/or his insurer, Integon
      National Insurance Company,[7] that he was the attorney for,
      among others, the Estate of Charles Evans, Jr. Pursuant to
      that representation, a negotiated settlement was reached
      which included a general release that provided that the
      Estate of Charles Evans, Jr. would release not only Terry
      Short, Integon National Insurance Company, but also 'all
      other persons, firms, corporations … from any and all claims
      of actions, demands, rights, damages … which [Estate of
      Charles Evans, Jr.] now has or may [here] after accrue on
      account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and
      unknown foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal
      injuries and the consequences thereof resulting or to result
      from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on
      January 12, 2016 at or near Maplesville, Alabama.'

            "The Slocumb Law Firm attorney negotiated for and
      reached an agreement to settle all claims of the Estate of
      Charles Evan[s], Jr. and to this end, the lawyer was clearly
      acting as the agent for the Estate of Charles Evans, Jr. After
      a review of the briefs submitted and materials filed with the
      court. There was no limitation on that representation. See

      7See note 5, supra.

                                   18
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     Malmberg v. America Honda Motor Company, Inc., 644 So. 2d
     888 (Ala. 1994).

           "Moreover, the Court considered the affidavit testimony
     of Robin Lecin, who was the adjuster for the Integon National
     Insurance Company. Such evidence clearly provides a
     settlement for all claims that could be brought by the personal
     representative of Charles Evans Estate was reached for the
     amount of $15,000.00 with the Slocumb Law Firm. This
     agreement included a full general release.

           "It is clear to the court the Slocumb attorney
     represented that he was authorized to act on behalf of the
     Estate of Charles Evans, Jr., deceased, and negotiated a
     settlement that included execution of a general release. The
     Court expressly finds and determines pursuant to Rule 54(b),
     [Ala.] R .Civ. P., that there is no just reason for delay and that
     final judgment in accordance herewith should be and is
     entered in favor of Defendants."

Bowers, John, and Linda appeal from the summary judgment in favor of

Short and the malpractice defendants.

                           Standard of Review

           "This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo.
     Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
     (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial
     court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the
     movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
     of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a
     judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue
     Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
     2004)."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 2004).

                                    19
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                               Discussion

     Although John and Linda are named as appellants, they concede,

as they did in the trial court, that they "negotiated and discharged their

individual personal injury claims against Short …." Appellants' brief at

1 n.1. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether John's and Linda's individual claims against Short were barred

by the releases each of them signed in their individual capacities, and

Short was therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those

claims. See Dow, 897 So. 2d at 1038. Accordingly, we affirm the summary

judgment in favor of Short on John's and Linda's individual claims.

     Bowers challenges the trial court's judgment for three primary

reasons. First, Bowers contends that the trial court erred in entering a

summary judgment in favor of the malpractice defendants because Short,

and only Short, moved for a summary judgment. Next, Bowers argues

that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the

enforceability of the release purporting to address the claims relating to

Charles. Finally, Bowers asserts that the summary judgment in favor of

Short was improper because, he says, under Alabama law, the release

                                    20
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was not binding on him. We address Bowers's first two arguments, which

are dispositive.

      I. Summary Judgment in Favor of the Malpractice Defendants

      Bowers argues, and the malpractice defendants do not contest,8

that the trial court erroneously entered a summary judgment in favor of

the malpractice defendants. Importantly, "Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.,

gives the nonmoving party certain rights to notice and a hearing after a

summary-judgment motion has been filed." Moore v. Prudential

Residential Servs. Ltd., 849 So. 2d 914, 926 (Ala. 2002). The purpose of

this rule is to give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond to the

motion and present evidence in its favor. Id. at 927 (citing Van Knight v.

Smoker, 778 So. 2d 801, 805-06 (Ala. 2000)). Thus, "the trial court

violates the rights of the nonmoving party if it enters a summary

judgment on its own, without any motion having been filed by a party."

Id.

      8According to the malpractice defendants, they "agree that, under

the majority's holding in [Sampson v. HeartWise Health Sys. Corp., [Ms.
SC-2022-0847, May 26, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2023)], the judgment
in their favor is due to be vacated and the case remanded …." Malpractice
defendants' brief at 4.
                                     21
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     Here, although the malpractice defendants never moved for a

summary judgment, the trial court's judgment nevertheless disposed of

all the claims against them. Thus, the trial court deprived Bowers of his

right to respond and to present evidence showing that the release

purporting to address the claims relating to Charles did not apply to the

wrongful-death claims against the malpractice defendants and was not

binding against him. See id. For this reason, we conclude that the

summary judgment in favor of the malpractice defendants should be

reversed. See id.

     II.   Summary Judgment in Favor of Short

     Bowers next contends that the trial court erred in entering a

summary judgment in favor of Short without first holding an evidentiary

hearing on whether Vocino was authorized to settle the wrongful-death

claim against Short. Short does not address this argument in his

response brief. We begin with an overview of the relevant legal principles.

     Alabama law provides that, when there is a factual dispute

regarding an attorney's authority to settle a claim on behalf of a client, a

court should hold an evidentiary hearing on that question. See, e.g., Lem

Harris Rainwater Fam. Tr. v. Rainwater, [Ms. 1210106, Sept. 30, 2022]

                                    22
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___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2022) ("[W]hen a party raises a fact-based defense to

enforcement of a settlement agreement, that defense must be resolved in

the same way other issues of fact are resolved -- by conducting a hearing

at which evidence is received and any witnesses are subject to cross-

examination." (citing Claybrook v. Claybrook, 56 So. 3d 652, 658 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2010))); J.K. v. UMS-Wright Corp., 7 So. 3d 300, 309 (Ala. 2008)

("[T]he trial court should have held a hearing to determine whether [the

client] had authorized [the] attorney to settle the case."). A trial court's

failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is, moreover, a reversible error.

See Rainwater, ___ So. 3d at ___; J.K., 7 So. 3d at 309; Benitez v. Beck,

872 So. 2d 844, 847 (Ala. 2003) (reversing a trial court's judgment

enforcing a settlement agreement when the plaintiff refuted her

attorney's authority to settle the claim and the circuit court "did not hold

a hearing and did not hear testimony or receive evidence … [to] ma[k]e a

finding of fact" with respect to the attorney's requisite authority).

     Under Alabama law, a settlement agreement negotiated by an

attorney binds the client only when the attorney acts with "'express,

special authority'" from the client or with apparent authority. Mitchum

v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 199 (Ala. 1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting

                                    23
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Daniel v. Scott, 455 So. 2d 30, 32 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)). 9 Furthermore,

"[a]n agent's apparent authority must be founded upon the conduct of the

principal and not upon the conduct of the agent." Daniel, 455 So. 2d at

33. Here, because there was a substantial factual dispute concerning

whether Vocino had express or apparent authority to enter into a

settlement of the wrongful-death claim against Short, the trial court was

required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve that dispute.

     As an initial matter, at the time the release addressing the claims

relating to Charles was executed in September 2016, Bowers was the only

person who could have expressly authorized Vocino to settle the

wrongful-death claim against Short. See Ex parte Scoggins, 354 So. 3d

429, 433 n.2 (Ala. 2021). In his response to Short's summary-judgment

     9Bowers asks this Court to hold that § 34-3-21, Ala. Code 1975,

which addresses an attorney's general authority to bind his or her client,
"does not trump or overrule longstanding Alabama precedent holding
that only the personal representative has the authority to settle a
wrongful death claim." Appellants' brief at 29 (citing Ex parte
Continental Motors, Inc., 270 So. 3d 1148, 1152 (Ala. 2018)). Although
this Court has not expressly applied § 34-3-21 to a wrongful-death claim,
we see no reason to create an exception to its application here. Alabama's
wrongful-death statute, § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, makes the personal
representative of an estate the "client" for purposes of § 34-3-21, and an
attorney, with the proper authority, has the ability to negotiate and settle
claims on behalf of a personal representative.
                                    24
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motion, Bowers asserted that he was "not aware of a settlement."

However, in the affidavit he submitted to the trial court, Bowers did not

specifically deny giving Vocino authority to settle the wrongful-death

claim against Short or assert that he did not approve of any settlement.

The parties also never deposed Vocino to determine the scope of his actual

authority. During oral argument before the trial court, moreover, counsel

for Short acknowledged that Vocino had "perhaps wandered outside of

the purviews of [his] representation" but stated that he did not "know

anything about that." Accordingly, because the evidence in the record did

not establish that Vocino had express authority to settle the wrongful-

death claim against Short, whether Bowers granted Vocino "'express,

special authority'" remains a factual question to be determined after an

evidentiary hearing. Mitchum, 533 So. 2d at 199 (quoting Daniel, 455 So.

2d at 32)).

      An evidentiary hearing was similarly required to determine

whether Vocino had apparent authority to bind Bowers to any settlement

of the wrongful-death claim against Short.

           "'The doctrine of apparent authority does not rest upon
      what one thinks an agent's authority may be, or what the
      agent holds out his authority to be; rather, the doctrine of
      apparent authority is based on the principal's holding the
                                   25
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     agent out to a third person as having the authority under
     which he acts.'"

Johnson v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 389, 394, 281 So. 2d 636,

640 (1973) (quoting Automotive Acceptance Corp. v. Powell, 45 Ala. App.

596, 601, 234 So. 2d 593, 597 (Civ. 1970)) (emphasis added).

     In entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the

trial court found that "the Slocumb attorney represented that he was

authorized to act on behalf of the Estate of Charles Evans, Jr., deceased,

and negotiated a settlement that included execution of a general release."

In support of that finding, the trial court cited the affidavit of Lecin, who

testified that she had "relied on Slocumb Law Firm's conduct and

representations in negotiating this full general release for Mr. Short."

(Emphasis added). 10 Lecin further testified that Vocino accepted the

$15,000 offer and full general release on behalf of the estate, "to [her]

understanding, with full authority on behalf of the Administrator."

(Emphasis added.) Crucially, however, Lecin did not state that her

understanding was based on any representations or conduct on the part

     10As previously noted, however, the written correspondence from

Vocino to Lecin never listed the "Estate of Charles Evans" or Bowers as
his client.
                                   26
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of Bowers, the principal in this case. Because "[a]n agent's apparent

authority must be founded upon the conduct of the principal and not upon

the conduct of the agent," Daniel, 455 So. 2d at 33, Lecin's affidavit

testimony does not definitively resolve the question whether Vocino had

apparent authority to settle the wrongful-death claim against Short.

     The other evidence in the record, moreover, also does not establish

whether Bowers (1) made any affirmative representations concerning

Vocino's authority to settle wrongful-death claim against Short or (2)

knowingly permitted Vocino to represent himself as Bowers's agent in

negotiating a settlement of that claim. See Johnson, 291 Ala. at 394, 281

So. 2d at 640 (explaining that, to establish apparent authority, a third

party must prove that the principal "'"manifested indicia of having

cloaked the agent with authority"'" or that the "'principal knowingly

permit[ted] an agent to assume'" authority (citations omitted)).

     In his response brief, Short contends that National General was

entitled to rely on Vocino's authority to settle the wrongful-death claim

against Short based on Vocino's filing of a suggestion of Charles's death

and a motion to substitute Bowers, in his capacity as the personal

representative of Charles's estate, as the proper plaintiff. Short's brief at

                                     27
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28. Short, however, cites no authority for that proposition and does not

otherwise explain why Vocino could have made those filings only if

Bowers had authorized Vocino to settle the wrongful-death claim against

Short. See Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So. 2d 521, 523-24 (Ala. 1983)

("[N]otwithstanding the general rule that an attorney's authority to act

on behalf of a client ceases on the death of that client, we adhere to the

view that the attorney for a party continues to have a duty to the court

after the demise of that client and, in discharge of that duty, must inform

the court and other parties of the death.").

     Importantly, there is no evidence in the record indicating that

Short, who had not yet been named as a defendant in the litigation, knew

of Bowers's substitution as plaintiff at the time the release addressing

the claims relating to Charles was executed. Further, even if Bowers had

authorized Vocino to represent him regarding the claims against the

malpractice defendants premised on medical malpractice, that does not

amount to evidence indicating that Bowers had authorized Vocino to

represent him regarding the wrongful-death claim against Short arising

from the car accident. Although Lecin testified in her affidavit that she

was provided with a copy of the letters of administration issued by the

                                    28
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Chilton Probate Court, she did not state that she had received a copy of

an attorney-representation agreement between Bowers and Vocino or

that she had otherwise been presented with proof that Bowers, the newly

appointed personal representative, had authorized Vocino to settle the

wrongful-death claim against Short. An attorney's filing of a request for

a probate court to appoint a county administrator as the personal

representative of an estate cannot, by itself, be sufficient to justify an

agency relationship based on apparent authority. At that point in the

litigation, Bowers had no opportunity to consider, much less manifest,

whether the attorney who filed the petition for letters of administration

would be the attorney who would represent him in pursuing a wrongful-

death claim.

     Based on the record before this Court, it is impossible to discern

whether Vocino had express or apparent authority to settle the wrongful-

death claim against Short, and the trial court was required to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to establish the relevant facts. See Benitez, 872 So.

2d at 847-48. Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of

Short on Bowers's wrongful-death claim against Short is reversed, and

the case is remanded to the trial court for it to "conduct[] a hearing at

                                   29
SC-2023-0216

which evidence is received and any witnesses are subject to cross-

examination." Rainwater, ____ So. 3d at _____.11

                               Conclusion

     The summary judgment in favor of Short is affirmed with respect

to John's and Linda's individual claims. The summary judgment in favor

of Short and the malpractice defendants on the wrongful-death claims is

reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     Shaw, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

     Sellers, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion,

which Wise, J., joins.

     Bryan, J., concurs in the result.

     Parker, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

     11Because we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Short on

Bowers's wrongful-death claim against Short based on the trial court's
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, and because the lack of an
evidentiary hearing renders the record insufficient for us to determine
the remaining issues, we pretermit discussion of the other legal
argument raised by Bowers on appeal.
                                  30
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

     In concluding that the trial court was required to conduct an

evidentiary hearing on attorney Nicholas Vocino's authority to settle the

wrongful-death claim against Terry Short, the majority focuses heavily

on the conduct -- or lack thereof -- of Robert L. Bowers, Jr., the personal

representative of the estate of Charles Lewis Evans, deceased. This is,

says the majority, because traditional tenets of agency law demand that

an attorney act with " 'express, special authority' " from his or her client

to bind the latter to a settlement agreement. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533

So. 2d 194, 199 (Ala. 1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Daniel v. Scott,

455 So. 2d 30, 32 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), citing in turn other cases). In my

view, this rationale unduly elevates principles of agency law over the

realities of dealings between an attorney and a third party, unnecessarily

obligating the third party to obtain proof of actual authority from which

the third party may be far removed. See Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement of

Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 Geo. J.

Legal Ethics 543, 567 (1999).

     It is well established that "[t]he decision to settle is reserved to the

client." Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 22 cmt. d

                                    31
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(Am. Law. Inst. 2000); cf. Blackwell v. Adams, 467 So. 2d 680, 684 (Ala.

1985) (plurality opinion) (" 'An attorney may not consent to a final

disposition of his client's case without express authority.' " (quoting

Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979))).

Furthermore, this Court has long held that an attorney, solely as a result

of his employment, "is not authorized to compromise the matter of

controversy[] or to execute a release of his client's demand." Gullett v.

Lewis, 3 Stew. 23, 27 (Ala. 1830). Nevertheless, " 'an attorney of record is

presumed to have his client's authority to compromise and settle

litigation, [and] a judgment entered upon a[] [settlement] agreement by

the attorney may be set aside [only upon] affirmative proof that the

attorney had no right to consent to its entry ....' " Blackwell, 467 So. 2d at

684-85 (quoting Bradford Exch., 600 F.2d at 102) (emphasis added).

     This presumption of authority reflects "a compromise between the

practical necessity of according substantial weight to representations

made by members of the Bar and the agency rule that attorneys have no

implied or apparent power to compromise an action solely by virtue of

their employment." Aiken v. National Fire Safety Couns., 36 Del. Ch. 136,

139, 127 A.2d 473, 475-76 (1956). Moreover, use of the presumption

                                     32
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serves three important purposes. First, "[u]se of ... [the] presumption is a

recognition that, in the context of settlement agreements, the traditional

agency rule would require the third party with whom the attorney is

dealing to prove the existence of authority, and that party may be far

removed from the proof of actual authority." Giesel, supra, at 567.

Second, "[u]se of the presumption is ... recognition of the special status,

ethical and fiduciary, of an attorney." Id. at 567-68. Finally, use of "[t]he

presumption, of course, ... honors the public policy in favor of settlements

and the finality of the judicial process." Id. at 568.

      Without any discussion of this presumption, however, the majority

reverses the summary judgment in favor of Short on the wrongful-death

claim against Short and remands the case to the trial court for an

evidentiary hearing, resting its decision entirely on agency canons. The

result is correct -- an evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish the

relevant facts surrounding Vocino's authority, actual or apparent -- but

the majority's reasoning risks complicating the settlement process

between attorneys and third parties. Under the majority's rationale,

Short will be required at the evidentiary hearing to affirmatively prove

that Vocino had the authority to settle the wrongful-death claim against

                                     33
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him. Such a result will surely come as a surprise to Short's insurer,

National General Insurance Company, who had little reason to question

whether Vocino represented Bowers or had authority to settle on his

behalf. And I worry that future third parties will perceive this result as

requiring them to ignore representations made by an attorney in favor of

communicating directly with the attorney's client, placing them in the

awkward position of intruding into the attorney-client relationship and

thus needlessly convoluting the settlement process. See id. at 567.

     Achieving certainty in resolving cases is important for the efficient

administration of justice. We should be careful not to place an

unnecessary burden on third parties to double-check, if not triple-check,

that the lawyer who sent them a demand letter is truly the lawyer for the

client and has authority to bind the client to a settlement. Moreover, we

should exercise even greater caution when we risk upending a signed

release for which consideration has been provided because we now

question whether an attorney was employed by a client and whether that

attorney had the authority to settle -- questions that both the attorney

and the third party in this case believed to be answered long ago.

Accordingly, a third party should be able to rely on a lawyer's

                                   34
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representations absent some clear indication of fraud; otherwise, I fear

that we place a burden on third parties requiring explicit confirmation of

a lawyer's authority.

     In an effort to promote this Court's policy of encouraging

settlements, see, e.g., Ex parte Adams, [Ms. SC-2023-0423, Oct. 27, 2023]

__ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023) (Sellers, J., dissenting), to preserve the

sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, and to secure a client's

ultimate control over settlement decisions, I would remand this case for

an evidentiary hearing, but I would instruct the trial court to apply the

presumption that Vocino had the authority to settle on Bowers's behalf.

Therefore, only if Bowers can affirmatively disprove Vocino's settlement

authority should the trial court deny Short's motion for a summary

judgment. This presumption of authority, combined with a shift in the

burden of proof, not only ensures that third parties may rely on attorneys'

representations of their settlement authority but also protects clients

from being bound to any settlement agreements should they

affirmatively disprove having bestowed settlement authority upon their

attorneys. Accordingly, I concur only in the result to reverse the summary

                                    35
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judgment in favor of Short on the wrongful-death claim against Short and

to remand the case. In all other aspects of the majority opinion, I concur.

     Wise, J., concurs.

                                    36
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

     I concur with all parts of the main opinion except reversing the

summary judgment as to the wrongful-death claims against the parties

identified in the main opinion as the malpractice defendants. While I

agree that it was reversible error to enter a summary judgment on those

claims, I do not think Robert Bowers, Jr., the personal representative of

the estate of Charles Lewis Evans, deceased, preserved that error for

appeal. See Sampson v. HeartWise Health Sys. Corp., [Ms. SC-2022-

0847, May 26, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____, ___ (Ala. 2023) (Parker, C.J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Court should not reach

the ultimate issue of whether to reverse based on this unasserted-issue

error before answering the threshold question of whether it was

preserved for appeal via an appropriate motion to alter, amend, or vacate

under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. See Bonner v. Mahan, 537 So. 2d 460,

462 (Ala. 1988); Lay v. Destafino, [Ms. 1210383, Feb. 17, 2023] ____ So.

3d ____, ____ (Ala. 2023).

     This reasoning does not apply to the reversal of the summary

judgment as to the wrongful-death claim against Terry Short, because

that error was not unasserted-issue error. Unlike the malpractice

                                   37
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defendants, Short moved for a summary judgment, and the trial court

heard arguments on his motion. Therefore, the trial court had sufficient

notice of its possible error as to this issue before this appeal. See

Sampson, ____ So. 3d at ____ (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

                                  38