Court Opinion

ID: 9941675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 18:01:55.470855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:51.757465
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 16 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS H. LUTGE, P.E.,                          No.    23-15057

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00585-TLT

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
TYRA HARRINGTON, J.D. and M.B.A.; et
al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of California
                   Trina L. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 9, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiff Thomas H. Lutge appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

constitutional claims brought against Tyra Harrington, Michael Carey, Mark

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Franceschi, and Scott Hunsperger of Sonoma County, California (County),1 and

denial of his requests for preliminary relief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

      1.     Substantive Due Process Claim. “[S]ubstantive due process . . . forbids

the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way

that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation

omitted). We apply the test in Washington v. Glucksberg to determine whether a

right is protected by the Due Process Clause, which includes a determination that the

right asserted is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 521 U.S. 702,

720–21 (1997) (citation omitted); see United States v. Langley, 17 F.4th 1273, 1275

(9th Cir. 2021).

      Lutge does not meet the heavy burden of establishing a substantive due

process claim. See Slidewaters LLC v. Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 F.4th

747, 758 (9th Cir. 2021). He does not have a fundamental right or liberty interest at

      1
       Harrington, Carey, Franceschi, and Hunsperger are all County employees.
Lutge vacillates between allegations against the County and the individual
Defendants throughout his brief, but only lists the individual Defendants in his
Notice of Appeal filed with the district court. See Lutge v. Harrington, No. 22-CV-
No. 22-CV-00585-TLT (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) (ECF No. 52). Consequently, we
lack jurisdiction over the County. See Le v. Astrue, 558 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (9th
Cir. 2009); see also Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir.
1988). However, for ease of reference, and because Lutge’s claims against the
individual Defendants rise and fall together, we refer to Appellees as “County.”

                                          2
stake in erecting a Crime Memorial on his property. See id. (“The right to use

property as one wishes is . . . not a fundamental right.”). Additionally, he cannot

“show that [the County’s] actions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Matsuda v. City & County of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148,

1156 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[S]tate action which ‘neither utilizes a suspect classification

nor draws distinctions among individuals that implicate fundamental rights’ will

violate substantive due process only if the action is ‘not rationally related to a

legitimate governmental purpose.’” (quoting Richardson v. City & County of

Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997))). The County repeatedly explained

that Lutge must obtain a “use permit” before proceeding with his building permits,

and the County’s use-permit requirements are related to building safety, public

nuisance, and aesthetic values. Thus, the County had legitimate reasons for blocking

his permit applications that satisfy the applicable rational basis test. See City of

Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 198 (2003) (rejecting

substantive due process claim because city engineer’s refusal to issue building

permits “in no sense constituted egregious or arbitrary government conduct”).

      2.     First Amendment Claims. Lutge failed to replead his First Amendment

claims in his operative complaint, and they are waived. See Sierra Med. Servs. All.

v. Kent, 883 F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that substantive claims raised

                                          3
on appeal and presented in the initial complaint but omitted from plaintiffs’ operative

amended complaint were waived).

      Alternatively, these claims fail on their merits. Lutge cannot show that his

failure to obtain building permits was a violation of his right to petition the

government and seek redress, nor does he explain how his building-permit

applications implicate his associational or speech interests. See WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding the application for a use-

permit did not implicate the applicant’s associational or speech interests). And

Lutge’s free speech claim fails because the County ordinances at issue are content

neutral, cf. City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 71

(2022) (A law is content based if it “single[s] out any topic or subject matter for

differential treatment,” (alteration in original), and “further[] an important or

substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech” and

do not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further those

interests,” In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 33 F.4th 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted)). The County’s zoning and use-permit requirements are related to building

safety, public nuisance, and aesthetic values and allow the County to exercise

reasonable discretion on behalf of the public welfare and safety. See City of

Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760–61 (1988) (“[L]aws of

general application that are not aimed at conduct commonly associated with

                                          4
expression and do not permit licensing determinations to be made on the basis of

ongoing expression or the words about to be spoken, carry with them little danger of

censorship. . . . [A] law requiring building permits is rarely effective as a means of

censorship.”).

      3.     Preliminary Relief. “[T]he legal standards applicable to [temporary

restraining orders (TRO)] and preliminary injunctions are ‘substantially identical.’”

Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting

Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.

2001)). A plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted). Lutge offers no viable theory linking the denial of his

permit applications to constitutional violations, nor does he show a likelihood of

suffering irreparable harm. Younger abstention also counsels against granting the

requested relief because the County’s enforcement action remains ongoing in state

court. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled

on other grounds by Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001).

      4.     Lutge’s Motions. Lutge moved to add two documents to the record on

appeal: (1) a June 15, 2023, email from the County counsel, and (2) a website

                                           5
printout of the County’s building-permit application for the property at issue. Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2) allows the court to supplement the record on

appeal “[i]f anything material to either party is omitted from or misstated in the

record by error or accident.” The documents that Lutge identifies add nothing new

to the record. Despite his assertion that the County counsel’s email “confirm[s] that

no use permit” is required, the documents simply underscore that Lutge failed to

abate the unlawful substandard structures on his property. We deny this motion. See

United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that

“except in extraordinary circumstances” the court “will not allow parties to

supplement the record on appeal”).

      Lutge also requests that the panel take judicial notice of pleadings filed in the

parallel state litigation. A court may “take judicial notice of undisputed matters of

public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v.

County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The

parallel state case is relevant to this appeal and informs our analysis. Despite

opposing judicial notice, the County itself acknowledges that “the pending state

court action would reinforce the County’s ongoing need to enforce its abatement

notices and support the district court’s dismissal of injunctive relief claims based on

the Younger abstention doctrine due to the County’s continuing enforcement action.”

Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the existence of the state court pleadings as

                                          6
publicly filed court records, but not the truth of the statements and assertions made

within those pleadings. See id.

      We deny Lutge’s request for judicial notice as to any pleadings, exhibits, and

other documents that are already included in the record on appeal. See Park v.

Aurora Loan Servs., 485 F. App’x 901, 902 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying judicial notice

as “unnecessary because the documents are already part of the district court record”).

      5.     County’s Motion. The County moved “to strike all improper references

to documents and allegations not supported by the record on appeal, as well as any

and all unsupported, immaterial and inflammatory personal accusations against

County employees,” including Lutge’s contention that the County’s safe-harbor

letter shows the County had “a pretextual intention.” The County also moved to

strike documents from Lutge’s motion for post-appeal evidence and reply brief. We

deny the County’s motion as relates to extra-record materials as moot and

unnecessary. We further deny as moot the County’s motion as relates to new

contentions made by Lutge in reply because we decline to consider these

contentions. United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). As

we do not rest our decision on any new facts raised in Lutge’s reply brief, we need

not address the County’s remaining arguments raised in its motion to strike

incendiary allegations raised in reply. See Smith v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 189 F.

App’x 663, 664 (9th Cir. 2006).

                                          7
AFFIRMED.

            8