Court Opinion

ID: 9578772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:14.678786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:24.001930
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice,
concurring:
I agree the circuit court properly denied petitioner’s application for postconviction relief (PCR) but write separately because I disagree with the majority opinion’s methodology.
Petitioner’s first PCR application was disposed of prior to our decision in Brown v. State, 306 S.C. 381, 412 S.E. (2d) 399 (1991). After Brown was decided, petitioner filed this action claiming Brown was a change in the law entitling him to maintain a successive PCR application. Since I believe Brown was wrongly decided, I would simply overrule it. This decision renders moot the change in the law issue.
The general rule is that while there is no obligation to inform a guilty plea defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea, once one undertakes to give such advice, and that advice'is a basis for the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, it must be correct. E.g., Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E. (2d) 338 (1989). Brown represents an unwarranted deviation from this rule in that it holds misadvice from the trial judge at a plea proceeding automatically invalidates the plea, without regard to whether that misadvice or misstatement in any way influenced the defendant’s decision to plead. In my opinion, Brown should be overruled and the denial of petitioner’s successive PCR application affirmed.