Court Opinion

ID: 9942090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 15:06:40.114579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:40.391506
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                       STATE V. BLACKHAWK

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                  STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                  V.

                                 RYAN J. BLACKHAWK, APPELLANT.

                             Filed February 20, 2024.     No. A-23-501.

       Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: JODI L. NELSON, Judge. Affirmed.
       Kristi J. Egger, Lancaster County Public Defender, and Sarah J. Safarik for appellant.
       Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Jacob M. Waggoner for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and BISHOP, Judges.
       PIRTLE, Chief Judge.
                                        I. INTRODUCTION
         Ryan J. Blackhawk appeals his seven convictions and sentences in the Lancaster County
District Court, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charges, his
sentences are excessive, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Based on the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
                                        II. BACKGROUND
       On January 11, 2023, Blackhawk was charged by information in the district court with
seven counts, including: two counts of assault by strangulation, third degree domestic assault, third
degree assault, first degree criminal trespass, criminal mischief (more than $500 but less than
$1,500), and resisting arrest. The first count of assault by strangulation and the third degree assault
charge alleged that Rebecca Faustino was the victim. The second count of assault by strangulation
and the third degree domestic assault charge alleged that Angel Lyons was the victim.

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        Blackhawk waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial was held on May 19, 2023.
Prior to the start of the trial, a discussion took place regarding a plea offer the State had made and
Blackhawk rejected.
        The evidence at trial showed that Faustino and Lyons were friends and on August 21, 2022,
Lyons came to stay with Faustino at her apartment for a few days. At some point, Lyons asked
Faustino if Blackhawk could also stay at Faustino’s apartment and Faustino agreed. Lyons and
Blackhawk were in a relationship and had six children together.
        On August 25, 2022, Faustino, Lyons, and Blackhawk went shopping and Faustino and
Lyons went to a nail salon. During this time, the three of them were drinking alcohol. They returned
to Faustino’s apartment later in the day. Faustino was in her bedroom and Lyons and Blackhawk
were in the living room when Faustino heard a loud noise. Faustino testified that she came out of
her bedroom and saw Lyons laying back in the recliner with Blackhawk on top of her with his
hands around her neck. Blackhawk was choking her and also punching her. Faustino testified
Lyons was crying and could not breathe; she was also making a “gurgle” noise and could not
scream. Faustino testified that she thought Blackhawk was going to kill Lyons. Faustino reacted
by jumping on Blackhawk and pushing him off Lyons. Lyons began “crying and gasping,”
“choking,” and “coughing.”
        After Faustino jumped on Blackhawk, Blackhawk started hitting her in the jaw and chest
while she was on the floor. When she was able to stand up Blackhawk pushed her into a wall, and
she hit the back of her head, cracking the drywall. He also punched her and kicked her. She fell to
the floor, lying on her back. Blackhawk got on top of her and wrapped both hands around her neck.
Faustino testified that she was in pain and could not breathe, and she felt like she was going to
pass out. She also testified that her heart was beating fast, and she felt pressure in her eyes. She
was able to get away and called the police, as well as her friend Laura Nunez. Blackhawk saw
Faustino calling for help and locked himself in the bathroom.
        Nunez arrived at the apartment within minutes. She and Faustino kicked the bathroom door
down and removed Blackhawk from the apartment. They locked the door and called the police.
        While they were waiting for the police to arrive, Blackhawk crashed through the window
of Faustino’s ground level apartment. He landed on top of Faustino and started hitting her. The
police arrived shortly after Blackhawk came through the window.
        Nunez testified about what happened after she arrived at Faustino’s apartment, and it was
generally in agreement with Faustino’s testimony. She testified, however, that Blackhawk was in
one of the bedrooms when she first entered the apartment and when he came out, he was aggressive
and intoxicated. He slapped Lyons and then locked himself in the bathroom. Nunez testified she
kicked the door open and got Blackhawk to leave the apartment. Moments later he jumped through
the window into the apartment.
        Faustino described Lyons’ injuries following the incident and pictures of Lyons taken
shortly after the incident were entered into evidence. Faustino testified that Lyons’ hair had been
pulled and “ripped out,” her lip was swollen, and her gums were bleeding. Faustino further testified
that Lyons had a hickey on her neck prior to the incident, but there were other red marks on her
neck and bruising on her chin that was not there before Blackhawk strangled her. She also had a
bruise on her cheek and her earring was ripped out of her ear.

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        Faustino also described her own injuries from the incident and pictures taken shortly after
the incident were entered into evidence. She testified that she had red marks on her ribs, chest, and
back from being punched and kicked, and a bump on her head from Blackhawk pushing her into
the wall. She also had red marks on her neck from Blackhawk choking her. She further testified
that she had red marks on her forehead, nose, and chest from the broken glass that hit her when
Blackhawk broke the window.
        Several days after the incident Faustino realized she had a cracked tooth. She also had
continuing pain from Blackhawk choking her, especially when swallowing. Lincoln police officers
took pictures of her several days after the incident which were entered into evidence. The pictures
showed bruising on her breasts, chest, neck, arm, and legs.
        Sergeant Wendi Ground with the Lincoln Police Department was one of the officers that
responded to the call on August 25, 2022. She testified about the injuries to Lyons that she
observed. She saw a red mark near her left ear, her upper lip was swollen, she had red marks on
her neck in addition to the hickeys that she had before the assault, and an injury on her cheek.
        Lincoln Police Officer Morgan Dirks was the first officer to arrive at Faustino’s apartment
on August 25, 2022. When she went inside the apartment building, she encountered Blackhawk
just outside the door to Faustino’s apartment. He was stumbling around and seemed intoxicated.
He would not answer her questions and was noncompliant with what she was asking him to do,
such as taking his hands out of his pockets. Blackhawk then tried to go back into the apartment
and Dirks grabbed onto him to prevent him from going inside. He tried to pull away from her and
was trying to talk to two people in the doorway of the apartment. He stated, “I’ll fuck you up” and
“should I fuck this bitch up.” Dirks believed that the comments were directed at someone inside
the apartment. Dirks tried to put Blackhawk in handcuffs, and he continued to pull away from her.
She eventually placed him in handcuffs and got him to sit down on the ground. Another officer
arrived to help her walk him out of the apartment building. Blackhawk was uncooperative and
continued to pull away and argued with the officers, and they had to lift him by the arms to remove
him from the building. When they got to the police cruiser, Blackhawk tried to headbutt the second
officer, but failed. He continued to be uncooperative when they put him in the cruiser.
        After Blackhawk was in the cruiser, Dirks went back to the apartment and spoke with
Faustino. She stated that Faustino was “incredibly upset” and “looked absolutely terrified.” Her
injuries at that time included bruises, swelling, and red marks on her face, chest, and arm. Her neck
was red, and she had a cut near her eye.
        Faustino was asked about the damages Blackhawk caused and she testified that in addition
to the window he broke and the crack in the wall from where she hit her head, Blackhawk also
punched her television, punched her closet door, and caused a cabinet to split. She testified that it
cost her about $1,800 to fix the damage caused by Blackhawk.
        After the State rested its case-in-chief, Blackhawk testified in his own defense. He denied
having any physical altercation with either Lyons or Faustino but admitted that he slapped Lyons.
He denied breaking the window and denied causing any damage to Faustino’s apartment. He also
did not remember being in the bathroom and the door being kicked in. He testified that his alcohol
consumption on the day in question “possibly” impaired his memory as to what happened.

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        Regarding his living arrangements, Blackhawk testified that Faustino had let him move in.
He stated that Lyons had asked Faustino if he could move in and on August 22, 2022, he moved
into the apartment where he and Lyons shared the guest room.
        At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Blackhawk guilty on all seven counts in
the information. It ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled sentencing.
        Blackhawk was sentenced in June 2023. The trial court imposed the following sentences:
count I, assault by strangulation, a Class IIIA felony, 2 years’ imprisonment and 9 months’
post-release supervision; count II, assault by strangulation, a Class IIIA felony, 2 years’
imprisonment and 9 months’ post-release supervision; count III, third degree domestic assault, a
Class I misdemeanor, 1 year imprisonment; count IV, third degree assault, a Class I misdemeanor,
1 year imprisonment; count V, first degree criminal trespass, a Class I misdemeanor, 1 year
imprisonment; count VI, criminal mischief (more than $500 but less than $1,500), a Class II
misdemeanor, 6 months’ imprisonment; and count VII, resisting arrest, a Class I misdemeanor, 1
year imprisonment. The court ordered count II to run consecutive to count I; counts III, V, and VI
to run concurrent to count I; count IV concurrent to count II; and count VII consecutive to count
II. This resulted in a term of 5 years’ imprisonment followed by 18 months’ post-release
supervision.
                                 III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
        Restated, Blackhawk assigns that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the evidence was
sufficient to convict him on all seven charges and (2) imposing excessive sentences. Blackhawk
also assigns that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his “[t]rial counsel failed to
consult with [him] on a regular basis in-person about the charges in the Information preventing
[him] from fully discussing the plea offer made and the risk of going to trial as opposed to
accepting a plea offer.”
                                  IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
        Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, and
regardless of whether the issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict, insufficiency of the
evidence, or failure to prove a prima facie case, the standard is the same: In reviewing a criminal
conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of
witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be
affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed
most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Bershon, 313 Neb. 153,
983 N.W.2d 490 (2023).
        An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an
abuse of discretion by the trial court. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision
is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice
or conscience, reason, and evidence. State v. Abligo, 312 Neb. 74, 978 N.W.2d 42 (2022).
        Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal is
a question of law. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an
appellate court decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient
to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether

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the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. State v.
Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023).
                                           V. ANALYSIS
                                    1. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
       Blackhawk first assigns that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on any of the
seven counts. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Each
charge is discussed separately below.
                                             (a) Count I
        The first charge against Blackhawk was assault by strangulation against Faustino.
Blackhawk argues the evidence was insufficient because “[t]he only evidence to support Count I
comes from . . . Faustino.” Brief for appellant at 22-23. This argument goes only to the weight and
credibility given to Faustino’s testimony by the trial court as the finder of fact, and not to any of
the elements of the crime. As stated above, in reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court
does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the
evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence
of prejudicial error, if the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the
State, is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Bershon, supra. The trial court apparently
found Faustino’s testimony credible, and we do not question the court’s reliance on her testimony.
        The evidence here, when viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to
support Blackhawk’s conviction for assault by strangulation involving Faustino. Assault by
strangulation in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310.01 (Cum. Supp. 2022), provides:
                 (1) A person commits the offense of assault by strangulation or suffocation if the
        person knowingly and intentionally:
                 (a) Impedes the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by
        applying pressure on the throat or neck of the other person; or
                 (b) Impedes the normal breathing of another person by covering the mouth and nose
        of the person.
                 (2) An offense is committed under this section regardless of whether a visible injury
        resulted.

        Faustino testified that after Blackhawk pushed her into the wall, she fell and was lying on
her back. Blackhawk got on top of her and wrapped both hands around her neck. Faustino testified
that while Blackhawk had his hands around her neck she was in pain and could not breathe, and
she felt like she was going to lose consciousness. She also testified that her heart was beating fast,
and she felt pressure in her eyes. Further, although visible injuries are not required to prove assault
by strangulation, Faustino had red marks on her neck immediately following the incident. Several
days after the incident she continued to have pain when swallowing and had bruising on her neck.
        We conclude that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to support Blackhawk’s
conviction on count I, assault by strangulation against Faustino.

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                                             (b) Count II
         The second charge against Blackhawk was assault by strangulation against Lyons.
Blackhawk argues that the evidence was insufficient because “[t]he States [sic] only evidence is
the testimony of . . . Faustino, who was not able to confirm that . . . Lyons was not able to breath
[sic].” Brief for appellant at 23. This argument again challenges the credibility of Faustino’s
testimony and fails because just like in count I, the trial court implicitly found Faustino’s testimony
to be credible.
         Faustino testified that she witnessed Blackhawk on top of Lyons in the recliner, with his
hands around her neck, choking her. Faustino further testified that Lyons was crying and could not
breathe. She was also making a “gurgle” noise and could not scream. Based on what she observed,
Faustino thought Blackhawk was going to kill Lyons. When Blackhawk was no longer on top of
Lyons, she began crying, gasping, choking, and coughing.
         Faustino also testified about Lyons’ injuries following the incident. She testified that Lyons
had red marks on her neck that were not there before Blackhawk strangled her. Ground also
testified that Lyons had red marks on her neck that did not look like they were from hickeys.
         The evidence here, when viewed and construed most favorably to the State, supports
Blackhawk’s conviction for count II, assault by strangulation against Lyons.
                                            (c) Count III
         Blackhawk next alleges that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict him
of count III, third degree domestic assault of Lyons. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323 (Reissue 2016)
provides: “(1) A person commits the offense of domestic assault in the third degree if he or she:
(a) Intentionally and knowingly causes bodily injury to his or her intimate partner; (b) Threatens
an intimate partner with imminent bodily injury; or (c) Threatens an intimate partner in a menacing
manner.” Blackhawk argues that the evidence was insufficient because “[t]he State failed to prove
bodily injury to . . . Lyons.” Brief for appellant at 24. We disagree.
         The evidence shows that Lyons was injured. Faustino testified that Lyons’ hair had been
pulled and “ripped out,” her lip was swollen, and her gums were bleeding. She had bruising on her
chin and cheek, and her earring was ripped out of her ear. As previously discussed, Lyons also had
red marks on her neck that were not present before the incident. In addition, Ground testified Lyons
had a red mark near her left ear, a swollen upper lip, and an injury on her cheek.
         We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Blackhawk’s conviction for count
III, third degree domestic assault of Lyons.
                                            (d) Count IV
       Blackhawk next alleges that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of count IV, third
degree assault against Faustino. He argues the evidence is insufficient because “[a]gain, the State’s
main evidence that this assault occurred is from the testimony of . . . Faustino herself” and “[he]
denied any physical altercation between himself and . . . Faustino.” Brief for appellant at 24. This
argument fails because again it challenges the credibility of witnesses’ testimony. The trial court
apparently found Faustino’s testimony credible and Blackhawk’s testimony not credible. An
appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or

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reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. See State v. Bershon, 313 Neb. 153,
983 N.W.2d 490 (2023).
        Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310 (Reissue 2022), “(1) A person commits the offense
of assault in the third degree if he: (a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another person.” Faustino testified that when Blackhawk had her hands around her neck she was
in pain and could not breathe. She testified that after the incident she had red marks on her ribs,
chest, and back from being punched and kicked, a bump on her head from being pushed into the
wall, and red marks on her forehead, nose, and chest from the broken glass. She also had red marks
on her neck from Blackhawk choking her. Several days after the incident Faustino realized she
had a cracked tooth. She also had continuing pain from Blackhawk choking her. The pictures
entered into evidence showed bruising on her breasts, chest, neck, arm, and legs.
        Dirks also testified that after the incident Faustino had bruises, swelling, and red marks on
her face, chest, and arm. Her neck was red, and she had a cut near her eye.
        There was sufficient evidence to meet the elements of third degree assault and support
Blackhawk’s conviction on count IV.
                                            (e) Count V
        Blackhawk alleges that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of count V,
first degree criminal trespass. A person commits first degree criminal trespass if “[h]e or she enters
or secretly remains in any building or occupied structure, or any separately secured or occupied
portion thereof, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so.” Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-520 (Reissue 2016).
        Blackhawk claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “[he] knew he
was not licensed or privileged to enter the apartment.” Brief for appellant at 25. He argues that the
evidence showed that he was living at Faustino’s apartment with her approval on August 25, 2022,
the day the incident took place. Therefore, he contends there is no evidence he knew he was not
licensed or privileged to be in the apartment.
        The plain language of “knowing” in subdivision (1)(a) of § 28-520, in the context of
entering any building or occupied structure “knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged
to do so,” imposes a subjective standard focused on the accused’s actual knowledge. State v.
Stanko, 304 Neb. 675, 687, 936 N.W.2d 353, 363 (2019). “[K]nowledge, like intent, may be
inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act.” Id.
        The evidence supports Blackhawk’s argument that he had been staying at Faustino’s
apartment with her approval for a few days prior to the incident. On the day of the incident, he was
also initially in the apartment with Faustino’s approval. However, the evidence shows during the
incident Blackhawk locked himself in the bathroom of Faustino’s apartment and Faustino and
Nunez kicked down the door and forcibly removed Blackhawk from the apartment. They then
locked the door to the apartment and waited for the police to arrive. After having been forcibly
removed from the apartment, Blackhawk would have known that he was no longer licensed or
privileged to enter the apartment. However, Blackhawk chose to reenter the apartment by crashing
through the window.
        We conclude that the knowledge element was met and there was sufficient evidence to
convict Blackhawk of count V, first degree criminal trespass.

                                                -7-
                                            (f) Count VI
        Blackhawk next alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on
count VI, criminal mischief (more than $500 but less than $1,500). Blackhawk argues the evidence
was insufficient because “[he] denied damaging the apartment in any way” and “the State did not
make a sufficient showing that the damages were valued between $500-1500, as the only evidence
they presented as to the damage amount was through the testimony of . . . Faustino without any
receipts.” Brief for appellant at 26.
        Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-519 (Reissue 2016):
                (1) A person commits criminal mischief if he or she:
                (a) Damages property of another intentionally or recklessly; or
                (b) Intentionally tampers with property of another so as to endanger person or
        property;
                ...
                (4) Criminal mischief is a Class II misdemeanor if the actor intentionally or
        maliciously causes pecuniary loss of five hundred dollars or more but less than one
        thousand five hundred dollars.

        Faustino testified regarding the damage caused by Blackhawk. She testified that he broke
the window and damaged the wall when he pushed her into it. He also damaged her television, a
closet door, and a cabinet. As a result of Blackhawk’s actions, Faustino had to pay $1,800 in
damages to her landlord, with $900 coming from her security deposit and the other $900 out of
pocket. Blackhawk’s only testimony regarding the damage was his denial that he caused any
damage or did not remember causing any damage.
        We conclude there was sufficient evidence to find Blackhawk guilty of count VI, criminal
mischief (more than $500 but less than $1,500).
                                           (g) Count VII
        Finally, Blackhawk argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of count VII,
resisting arrest. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-904(1)(a) (Reissue 2016), a person commits the
offense of resisting arrest if he or she uses or threatens physical force or violence against a peace
officer while intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent the peace officer from effecting an
arrest of the actor or another. The elements of resisting arrest are met here.
        Dirks testified that when she first approached Blackhawk in the apartment building, he
would not answer her questions and was noncompliant with her directives. When Blackhawk tried
to go back into the apartment, Dirks grabbed onto him to prevent him from going inside and he
tried to pull away from her. When she tried to put Blackhawk in handcuffs, he continued to pull
away from her and she struggled with him. After Dirks succeeded in placing him in handcuffs and
she and the other officer were walking Blackhawk out of the apartment building, Blackhawk
continued to be uncooperative and continued to pull away from them. They had to pick him up by
his arms to get him out of the building. Dirks testified that when they got to the police cruiser,
Blackhawk attempted to headbutt the second officer, but failed. Viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the State, we find the evidence indicates that Blackhawk engaged the police

                                                -8-
officers in a physical altercation by resisting Dirks’ attempts to gain control and then attempting
to headbutt the second officer.
         Blackhawk contends that the evidence is unclear at what point he knew he was under arrest.
An arrest is taking custody of another person for the purpose of holding or detaining him or her to
answer a criminal charge, and to effect an arrest, there must be actual or constructive seizure or
detention of the person arrested. State v. Heath, 21 Neb. App. 141, 838 N.W.2d 4 (2013). Verbal
advisement of an attempted arrest is not required; it is enough that the officer has begun to take
actions to effectuate physical control over the defendant. See id. Even if there was not a definitive
point at which Blackhawk was under arrest, he would have known he was under arrest when he
tried to headbutt the officer as he was in handcuffs at that time.
         We, therefore, find that the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, is such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found Blackhawk guilty of count VII,
resisting arrest.
                                     2. EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
        Blackhawk next assigns that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive and
constitute an abuse of discretion. He contends that the trial court failed to properly weigh his
minimal criminal history as well as other factors and circumstances in his life, such as how
imprisonment will be a hardship on his dependents, that he has a strong support system, and that
he has a 12th grade education and employment history.
        We first consider whether Blackhawk’s sentences are within the statutory range. Counts I
and II are Class IIIA felonies punishable by up to 3 years’ imprisonment and 18 months’
post-release supervision, and a minimum term of 9 months’ post-release supervision if
imprisonment is imposed. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2022). The court sentenced
Blackhawk to a term of 2 years’ imprisonment and 9 months’ post-release supervision on both
counts I and II. Counts III, IV, V, and VII are Class I misdemeanors punishable by up to 1 year
imprisonment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106 (Reissue 2016). The court sentenced Blackhawk to 1
year imprisonment on each of the four Class I misdemeanor convictions. Count VI is a Class II
misdemeanor punishable by up to 6 months’ imprisonment. See § 28-106. The court sentenced
Blackhawk to 6 months’ imprisonment on count VI. Blackhawk’s sentences are within the
statutory range; as such, we review the court’s sentencing determination only for an abuse of
discretion.
        In reviewing whether an abuse of discretion occurred during sentencing, an appellate court
determines whether the sentencing court considered and applied the relevant factors and any
applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. State v. Starks, 308 Neb.
527, 955 N.W.2d 313 (2021). Relevant factors in that analysis may include the defendant’s (1)
age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past
criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7)
the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.
Id.
        While these factors should instruct a sentencing court, they do not comprise a mathematical
formula that must be rigidly implemented. Id. Rather, they are among the relevant factors that may
be considered. Id. A sentence should be tailored and based on factors that fit the offender and not

                                                -9-
merely the crime. Id. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment that
includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.
        At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had considered the presentence
investigation, the nature and circumstances of the crimes, and Blackhawk’s history, character, and
condition.
        The evidence showed that Blackhawk was 35 years old at the time of sentencing. His
criminal history includes two convictions for driving without an operator’s license, obstructing a
peace officer, three convictions for minor in possession of alcohol, delivery or intent to deliver a
controlled substance, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated-second offense in Iowa. On the
Level of Service/Case Management Inventory assessment, Blackhawk scored in the high-risk
category to reoffend. Blackhawk scored in the medium high-risk range on the Domestic Violence
Offender Matrix, indicating that abuse will likely continue and possibly escalate in severity and
frequency.
        The trial court relied upon the appropriate factors in fashioning Blackhawk’s sentences and
there is nothing in the record to suggest that it relied on irrelevant or inappropriate considerations.
It is not this court’s function to conduct a de novo review and a reweighing of the sentencing
factors in the record. See State v. Starks, supra. Instead, it is enough for us to conclude that the
trial court’s reasons for Blackhawk’s sentences are not clearly untenable and do not unfairly
deprive him of a substantial right and just result. Id. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in sentencing Blackhawk. This assignment of error fails.
                              3. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
         Blackhawk’s final assignment of error is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
in that his “[t]rial counsel failed to consult with [him] on a regular basis in-person about the charges
in the Information[,] preventing [him] from fully discussing the plea offer made and the risk of
going to trial as opposed to accepting a plea offer.”
         When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, as is
the case here, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective
performance which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the issue
will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. See State v. Miranda, 313
Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023).
         To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his or her
counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the
defendant’s defense. State v. Miranda, supra. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient,
the defendant must show counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in criminal law. Id. To show prejudice under the prejudice component of
Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his or her
counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v.
Miranda, supra.
         An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal when the claim alleges
deficient performance with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination

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of whether the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a
petition for postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim was brought before the appellate
court. Id. When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appellant
is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make specific allegations of the
conduct that he or she claims constitutes deficient performance by trial counsel. Id.
         Once raised, an appellate court will determine whether the record on appeal is sufficient to
review the merits of the ineffective performance claims. The record is sufficient if it establishes
either that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to
establish prejudice as a matter of law, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified as a part
of any plausible trial strategy. Id.
         Blackhawk contends that the record is insufficient to resolve his claim on direct appeal.
We disagree. Blackhawk’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves the communication
with his counsel regarding the plea offer. Before the bench trial began on May 19, 2023, the court
asked if there were any pretrial matters. The State indicated that it wanted the plea that was offered
to Blackhawk on the record. The State set forth the conditions of the plea that had been offered to
Blackhawk, stating that the plea had been available until 2 p.m. the day before trial, and Blackhawk
declined the offer.
         Blackhawk’s counsel then indicated that he received the plea offer from the State and went
to the jail on May 17, 2023, 2 days before trial, to discuss the plea offer with Blackhawk.
Blackhawk told counsel he did not want to accept the offer. Blackhawk’s counsel stated that he
left the offer open and called Blackhawk the next day, the day before trial, to ask him again about
the plea offer. After the call, Blackhawk wanted to think about the offer. Within 30 minutes after
Blackhawk and his counsel spoke on the telephone, Blackhawk contacted his counsel’s office and
indicated he was not accepting the offer.
         Blackhawk agreed at trial with his counsel’s account of what took place regarding the plea
offer. The court then specifically asked Blackhawk if he was aware that an offer had been made
and that it would expire at 2 p.m. the day before trial. The court also asked him if he had rejected
the plea offer. Blackhawk responded “yes” to both questions.
         We conclude that the record refutes Blackhawk’s allegation that trial counsel was
ineffective, as trial counsel met with Blackhawk in person to discuss the plea offer and then talked
with him on the telephone before the plea offer expired. The record establishes that trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient and, therefore, Blackhawk’s final assignment of error fails.
                                         VI. CONCLUSION
        For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Blackhawk’s convictions and sentences. We
further conclude that the record before us is sufficient to address Blackhawk’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and we find that it fails.
                                                                                        AFFIRMED.

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