Court Opinion

ID: 9469882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:51:17.591539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:36.766746
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
Although the facts are recounted in the district court’s opinion, 482 F.Supp. at 1084-86, it is helpful to review the basis of Ortiz’s objection.
*43At 1:55 a.m., after ten hours of deliberation, and without consulting counsel, the trial judge gave the following Allen-type charge to the jury.
Court: Do all of you understand that this case is going to have to be decided and that if you do not reach a verdict the case will have to be re-tried do you understand that, and that you have all taken an oath that you will well and truly try the case before you. I have sent in the instructions have you any difficulty with that? Jury: No.
Court: I am certain that with enough deliberations that you will be able to reach a verdict. You should if you have any messages to send to your families you should write them on sheets of paper and hand them to the bailiffs. You will be sequestered until further notice. Now you may return to the jury room and deliberate upon a verdict.
(emphasis added.)
In my view this charge was far more offensive than the original Allen charge itself which was in substance
that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 157, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). Unlike the original Allen charge, the judge’s instructions here were imbalanced, contained misstatements of law and fact, and undoubtedly left the jury with the erroneous impression that they could remain locked in deliberations forever — unless a juror gave up his conscientiously held beliefs.
Defense counsel, however, made no objection to the charge after it was given (and after the damage was done) and even though it was impossible to object to the charge before it was given, Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), controls and requires my concurrence in the result.reached by the majority. Even though I must yield to stare decisis, I firmly believe that the offending charge resulted in fundamental unfairness with attending prejudice. And, with great deference, I further believe that a person serving a life sentence ought not to be deemed to have forfeited his rights to a fair trial simply because his lawyer, for whatever reason, failed to utter the magic words “I object” after the trial judge had finished his prejudicial, extemporaneous post-submission charge. In my considered opinion, technicalities such as this should not be used when a miscarriage of justice may result.