Court Opinion

ID: 9570439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:12.705948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:51.904014
License: Public Domain

Goodloe, J.
(dissenting)—I disagree that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. I would accept the recommendation of the hearing officer that respondent Gary W. Rentel be suspended for 15 months and placed on 10 years' probation. This sanction adequately protects the public, the administration of justice, and the legal profession.
The majority posits the issue in this case as follows: "What is the appropriate sanction for an attorney who, while addicted to alcohol and cocaine, misappropriates more than $26,000 of client funds over a 10-month period?" Majority opinion, at 281. By stating the issue in this posture the majority ignores a significant aspect of this case—Rentel's rehabilitation. The majority's only statement is that "[t]he hearing officer also noted respondent's apparently successful treatment at CareUnit and his involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous and Cocaine Anonymous." Majority opinion, at 279. This is only part of the story.
Rentel voluntarily sought and received treatment for his alcoholism and chemical dependency. On July 7, 1983, Rentel was admitted as a patient to the Kirkland CareUnit for treatment of diagnosed alcoholism and drug addiction. Fellow Tacoma attorneys partially paid for this treatment. Rentel successfully completed a 28-day in-patient program under the supervision of Sandra Counts, M.D., Logan Baldwin, an alcohol counselor, and Dr. Joseph Zohn, a psychologist. Rentel was considered a model patient and assisted other patients. He completed after care treatment positively, which included attending counseling on a weekly basis for 12 weeks. As of August 1984, when the hearing was held, Rentel was an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous and Cocaine Anonymous, attending meetings 4 to 5 times per week and had also continued his weekly counseling sessions. Rentel had also become Director of the Care-*291Unit Alumni Association. He volunteers his time in helping with intervention with new patients and speaking to groups for purposes of educating them as to the terrible consequences of alcoholism and drug addiction.
Rentel has been employed since October 12, 1983, as a mortgage banker. He has successfully coped with the stress and demands of the job. He has been sober and straight since 1983. The testimony before the Disciplinary Board indicates that the prognosis for Rentel is good. His continued voluntary involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous, and the CareUnit are indications that Rentel will be likely to sustain a remission from his prior addictions.
An important consideration which the majority fails to consider is: What recognition, if any, do we give to the rehabilitative efforts that an attorney has made to overcome alcoholism and chemical dependency? I believe we should give such rehabilitation serious consideration and great weight. With this in mind I move to the analytical framework proffered by the majority.
Contrary to the majority, I believe that an analysis of the four questions recommended by the ABA Sanctions Committee warrants the conclusion that disbarment is not the appropriate sanction. The four questions are: (1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate? (2) What was the lawyer's mental state? (3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct? (4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
I agree with the majority that the respondent violated ethical duties of a serious nature. I disagree, however, with the majority's analysis of Rentel's mental state. The majority states that during his addictions respondent appeared to function as a competent attorney. Further, it notes that one psychiatrist stated "that respondent's ability to distinguish between his money and his client's money was not totally impaired." Majority opinion, at 285. This leads the majority to conclude "that respondent took $26,000 over a 10-month period with knowledge of what he was doing." Majority *292opinion, at 285.
This conclusion is inconsistent with a consideration of all the evidence. The record indicates that when confronted by a partner with an allegation of misappropriation, Rentel reviewed the file and discovered that he had in fact taken the client's funds. He then obtained counsel following which they reviewed all of his files and discovered further evidence of misappropriation. This implies that Rentel was not aware that he had taken client funds until he discovered he had done so upon a self-instigated review of his files.
The record also includes the testimony of Sally Hartley, a counselor at the CareUnit, who gave the following description as to the effect of alcoholism:
I'm thinking specifically of what we call a short-term memory loss while drinking as Gary was doing on a daily basis. We call that maintenance drinking. And black-outs are very common. They may last for a short time such as 15 minutes, they may go on for—a person may be in and out of an alcoholic black-out for days. During that time, a person does think, performs. One patient I know, who was a professor, got up and lectured and the person does not recall having done [so].
The way it has been explained to me is that the memory cells are so sedated that they do not record so there is no recollection of what has been said or done, even though the person is walking, talking, seems rational to others.
Report of Proceedings III, at 48-49. Hartley further testified as follows:
As a recovering alcoholic myself, I have done many things in alcoholic black-outs. ... I recall many times when I would make promises to do things and would be astonished to find out that I had obligated myself to do something and had no recollection whatever of having done so. None.
I have seen this with countless alcoholics and it's a phenomena that is hard for nonalcoholics to believe exists.
Report of Proceedings III, at 55.
*293Dr. Sandra Counts, Medical Director at CareUnit, testified that alcohol and cocaine addiction can alter perceptions of reality. An altered perception of reality
can take the form of delusions which are thoughts that people have which are unreal or about things that are not in reality or they take the form of hallucinations which are hearing things, seeing things, feeling things, alter[ed] perceptions of what's in the environment.
Report of Proceedings III, at 105.
Dr. Joseph Zohn, a licensed psychologist who worked at CareUnit at the time Rentel was there, testified that Rentel said that he was not sure of what had happened insofar as his misappropriation of client funds was concerned. Report of Proceedings III, at 138. Zohn further testified:
[I]t seemed so self evident that it happened because [Rentel] was addicted, he was using, there seemed to be a lot of confusion in his life and with the decisions that he made. And, if I'm not mistaken, there was mismanagement of funds across the board pretty much, even in his personal bill paying and other things, too.
Report of Proceedings III, at 138.
The hearing officer and the Board found that the alcohol consumed by Rentel during 1981, 1982, and part of 1983 severely impaired his judgment. Further, Rentel's addiction to alcohol and cocaine substantially affected his perception and conscious control of reality. I believe the evidence indicates that Rentel's perception of reality may have been so distorted that he reached conclusions that were obviously not correct. It is apparent from the evidence that Rentel was suffering from a severe illness. This illness dominated his being for a crucial period of time with devastating effects. Unlike the majority, I am unable to conclude that Rentel misappropriated client's funds with knowledge of what he was doing.
The third concern expressed by the ABA Sanctions Committee is the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. I agree that Rentel's actions did cause serious financial injury, and injured the *294legal profession as well. However, he has taken steps toward reparation. At the time of the hearing at least four clients had received the money owed to them. Rentel also had entered into an agreement with his old firm for the purpose of assuring that clients from whom moneys had been misappropriated would be paid the moneys due. Further, any sanction we impose could make complete reparation a prerequisite to Rentel's practice of law. As for the injury suffered by the legal profession, this has been, in part, ameliorated by Rentel's active involvement in helping fellow alcoholics and cocaine addicts achieve recovery. Such efforts to help others reflect well on the legal profession.
The last question set forth by the ABA Sanctions Committee is a consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors. The proposal by the ABA Sanctions Committee lists 13 mitigating factors:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) fuff and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(l) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Std. 9.3, at 15 (1986). In this case at least eight of the above mitigating factors are present, among them an absence of a prior disciplinary record, a timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full cooperation with the bar, physical and mental impairment, and, most importantly, interim rehabilitation.
The sole mitigating factor that the majority looks at is *295alcoholism, stating:
We have, on occasion, held that alcoholism is a mitigating circumstance in misappropriation cases. We emphasize here, however, that alcoholism is only a mitigating factor, and will only be considered as such in certain circumstances; it does not excuse an attorney's misconduct.
(Footnote omitted.) Majority opinion, at 286-87. The majority then discusses respondent's cocaine addiction. The majority, in effect, treats Rentel's cocaine addiction as an aggravating factor. The majority infers that the difficulty a "recovering" cocaine addict has staying off cocaine warrants the conclusion that lawyers succumbing to a cocaine addiction should be disbarred automatically. I do not believe this is the proper perspective or approach.
The majority's approach is wrong because it presents the posture that an attorney with a drug problem seeks help at his peril, since public knowledge of that problem will result in disbarment. We should encourage those members of our profession with alcohol and chemical dependencies to overcome their addictions and, accordingly, we should take rehabilitation into serious consideration when determining the appropriate disciplinary action. To do otherwise does not provide the addicted attorney incentive to do anything other than hide and prolong the damage.
The majority emphasizes that while alcohol is legal, cocaine is not. Even though this distinction is of concern, the use of cocaine is not conduct involving moral turpitude. See In re Chase, 299 Or. 391, 702 P.2d 1082 (1985). Further, its use is a major problem in our society that threatens all segments of the population, and the legal profession is no exception. See Cocaine Blues, 72 A.B.A. J. 25 (May 1, 1986). I believe we should focus on helping those who slip into the grasp of this insidious drug by encouraging solutions. We should help the members of the legal profession who have cocaine and alcohol addictions overcome their addictions and once again become contributing members of society and the profession of law.
A number of courts have given an alcoholic attorney's *296efforts to rehabilitate serious consideration in determining that disbarment was not the appropriate sanction when alcoholism was a causation in the misconduct warranting the severest sanction. See, e.g., In re Barry, 90 N.J. 286, 447 A.2d 923 (1982); In re Driscoll, 85 Ill. 2d 312, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981); Tenner v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 617 P.2d 486, 168 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980); In re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1977); In re Lewelling, 244 Or. 282, 417 P.2d 1019 (1966). These cases emphasize that consideration is not given the attorney because he or she is an admitted alcoholic, but rather consideration is given to a bona fide recovered or arrested alcoholic who has demonstrated his or her present fitness to continue in the practice of law. Walker, at 456. This same consideration should be given to chemical dependent attorneys who rehabilitate themselves and who are presently fit to practice law.
The majority cites In re Driscoll, supra, for the proposition that alcoholism is a mitigating factor, not an excuse. In that case the alcoholic attorney's professional conduct was so serious as to normally result in disbarment. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, was impressed by the attorney's efforts to overcome his alcoholism and his exemplary life before and after the incident charged and determined disbarment was inappropriate. The Driscoll court stated, at page 315:
The legal profession and the courts have begun to acknowledge the problem presented by alcoholic, or, as they are sometimes referred to, "impaired," attorneys. We must find ways to help them and induce them to rehabilitate themselves. That problem, however, is no longer presented in this case, because respondent has already largely rehabilitated himself. And because respondent, on his own initiative, has overcome his active alcoholism and restored himself to a stable, more or less normal, condition, there is no need to keep him from practicing law during a period of temporary disability due to alcoholism. If he were now unfit to practice law, he would presumably remain so indefinitely, and the proper response to protect the public from further injury *297would be to disbar him or suspend him until further order.
The majority indicates that it believes Rentel is likely to suffer a relapse because less than 20 percent of cocaine addicts stay off the drug for more than 1 year. See Cocaine Blues, at 26. It appears the majority has chosen to ignore the record in determining Rentel will be unlikely to sustain a remission from drug and alcohol abuse. All of the persons involved in Rentel's rehabilitation agree that the prognosis is very good. Dr. Zohn testified that " polydrug" users have just as good, and oftentimes a better chance at recovery than single drug abusers. No one can guarantee that a formerly addicted person will remain free of alcohol or drugs for the rest of his or her life. The record, however, reflects Rentel is currently free of his addictions. He has been performing in exemplary fashion in his social life and in his career, and he has taken it upon himself to help others with a similar problem. Should Rentel be allowed to resume the practice of law, nothing suggests that henceforth he will not properly discharge his professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. See majority opinion, at 282.
This case is analogous to Driscoll. The mitigating factors which led the Illinois Supreme Court in that case to determine suspension rather than disbarment was the appropriate sanction are present in this case. Rentel's addictions are not an excuse. However, his rehabilitation is an indication that his bad judgment will not be repeated now that his cravings are controlled. Rentel's rehabilitation is pertinent to our determination of the appropriate sanction. Given his rehabilitation, I believe there is no need to disbar Rentel and that a 15-month suspension with a probationary period is the appropriate sanction.
The majority concludes that the 10-year probationary period proposed by the hearing officer is unauthorized, would be unwieldy, and would "impose an enormous, and perhaps impossible, burden upon the bar ..." Majority opinion, at 289. While RLD 5.2 limits "probation for a fixed *298period not in excess of 2 years", there is no rule which prohibits the parties from stipulating to a longer period. In this case Rentel himself proposed the longer probationary period. I disagree that a 10-year probationary period would be unwieldy and an impossible burden. Probation is an authorized sanction and a stipulation extending the period of probation is not that onerous.
A 15-month suspension with a 10-year probationary period is also appropriate based on factors we have set forth for consideration in other attorney discipline cases. See In re Selden, 107 Wn.2d 246, 728 P.2d 1036 (1986); In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 95-96, 667 P.2d 608 (1983); In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 404, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979).
Noble posits the following factors: (a) the purpose of attorney discipline; (b) the proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct; (c) the effect of the sanction on the attorney; (d) whether the Board's recommendation is supported by the record developed by the hearing panel; and (e) the extent of agreement among Board members as to the sanction to be imposed. Noble, at 95-96.
As indicated, I believe the sanction recommended by the hearing officer adequately meets the purpose of attorney discipline. Further, while misappropriation of client funds generally warrants disbarment, this case is similar to those in which mitigating factors have resulted in a lesser sanction. See, e.g., In re Noble, supra; In re Kumbera, supra; In re Salvesen, 94 Wn.2d 73, 614 P.2d 1264 (1980). Alcoholism has been recognized as a very significant factor when the attorney has successfully sought and received treatment for the problem. Noble, at 92-93; In re Sawyer, 98 Wn.2d 584, 588, 656 P.2d 503 (1983); Kumbera, at 405.
The third Noble factor is the effect of the sanction on the attorney. A 15-month suspension with a 10-year probationary period is a sufficiently severe penalty. The Noble court stated that a 90-day suspension "reflects the serious nature of respondent's misconduct. It also recognizes, however, that respondent's transgression stemmed from a disease, rather than a deliberate and evil intent." Noble, at 98. *299Likewise, Rentel's transgressions stemmed from a disease. Nevertheless, a severe sanction is appropriate. However, I believe that sanction should be one less devastating than the sanction of disbarment.
The fourth Noble factor is not met in this case. As indicated, I do not believe the Board's recommendation is supported by the facts. Finally, although the Board's recommendation was 9 to 0,1 believe Rentel's rehabilitation is a specific reason warranting our rejection of the Board's recommendation. See In re McLeod, 104 Wn.2d 859, 865, 711 P.2d 310 (1985); In re Stock, 104 Wn.2d 273, 284, 704 P.2d 611 (1985).
Rumbera offers these factors for consideration: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) avoiding repetition by the offender; (c) the sanction's likely deterrent effect on others; (d) the maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession; and (e) insulating those who seek legal services from unprofessional conduct. Rumbera, at 404.
The previous analysis indicates that the serious nature of the misconduct by Rentel would normally warrant disbarment. However, given the circumstances indicated by the record and Rentel's impressive efforts to rehabilitate himself, factors (b) and (e) are satisfied. I believe the record indicates that Rentel is unlikely to repeat his misconduct to the detriment of those seeking legal services. Further, Ren-tel's experience, as well as a 15-month suspension and a 10-year probationary period, will act as a significant deterrent to others. This sanction will also show those outside the legal profession that serious efforts are being made to encourage the rehabilitation of alcohol and chemical dependent attorneys. The remaining Rumbera factor is the maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession. Rentel's rehabilitation, his impressive efforts to help others, and the imposition of the severe sanction recommended by the hearing officer will help insure that respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession is maintained.
*300Under the factors provided by the ABA Sanctions Committee, Noble, and Rumbera, I believe that a 15-month suspension with a 10-year probationary period is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
Dolliver, C.J., and Utter and Pearson, JJ., concur with Goodloe, J.