Court Opinion

ID: 9608993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:21:04.137853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:08.288486
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
dissenting:
I am of opinion that the decree of the trial court should be affirmed. For more than fifty years since the enactment of Code § 38.1-336, Acts 1906, p. 122, c. 2,-§ 28, we have repeatedly and consistently held that when a misrepresentation has been established in an application for an insurance policy, the materiality of the misrepresentation as affecting the risk to be assumed is a question for. the court.
In 1910, President Keith of this Court, an able and distinguished judge, said in Metropolitan Insurance Co. v. Hayslett, 111 Va. 107, 112, 68 S. E. 256: “Whether a representation is made and the terms in which it is made are questions of fact for the jury; but when proved we are of opinion that its materiality is a question for the courtT (Emphasis added.)
In the same year, Judge Harrison, also:an able and distinguished judge, in Continental Co. v. Lindsay, 111 Va. 389, 392, 393, 69 S. E. 344, said that it would be improper to leave to the jury the determination of the standard of what is material, and that the statute, here involved does not control when it clearly appears that the untrue representation was material to the risk.
In Talley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 111 Va. 778, 782, 69 S. E. 936, decided in 1911, Judge Harrison, again speaking for the Court, and quoting with approval May on Insurance, said: “ ‘Representations should not only be true, but they should be full. The insurer has a right to know the whole truth. And a lack of fullness, if designed, in a respect material to the risk, is tantamount to a false *586representation, and is attended by like consequences. * # ” .There it was said that the claimant having failed to communicate to the insurer the true condition of his health, the concealment was fatal to the risk, and the insured could not recover, as a matter of law.
In North River Insurance Co. v. Atkinson, 137 Va. 313, 319, 119 S. E. 46; Flannagan v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 152 Va. 38, 67, 146 S. E. 353; and Inter-Ocean Insurance Co. v. Harkrader, 193 Va. 96, 102, 67 S. E. 2d 894, we repeated the statement that where á misrepresentation has been proven, its materiality is a question for the court.
Cf. Metropolitan Insurance Co. v. Hart, 162 Va. 88, 93, 173 S. E. 769; Mutual Benefit Association v. Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325, 333, 175 S. E. 870; and Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson and Powell, 170 Va. 406, 415, 196 S. E. 629.
In 33 A.L.R. 2d, page 951, in an annotation entitled “Misrepresentation by applicant for automobile liability insurance as to ownership of vehicle as material to risk,” it is said that it is the prevailing view of the courts that a.misrepresentation regarding automobile ownership is material to the risk assumed by the insurer. To the same effect, see 5A Am. Jur., Automobile Insurance, § 16, pages 19 and 20.
The identity of the ownership of an automobile sought to be insured goes to the heart of the contract itself. Plainly, one would not insure an automobile owned by A to be used for the purposes of A, and then be held to have insured an automobile owned jointly by A and B and used by A and B as co-owners for their joint and several purposes. It does not require an expert or a mathematician to show that an automobile jointly owned by father and son creates a greater risk of liability in its operation than a car owned by only one of them.
Proof of misrepresentation of a matter that goes to the heart of an insurance contract is, in itself, proof of a material matter that affects the risk assumed. For good reasons the determination of the materiality is not left to the jury but given to the court. Continental Co. v. Lindsay, 111 Va., supra, p. 393.
Where an applicant makes a representation that his automobile is to be used for pleasure and it subsequently develops that the car had been and was being used as a taxicab, there should be no difficulty in a court determining whether the representation was material to the risk. There should be no greater difficulty where it has been represented that an automobile is solely owned by one person, where*587as in fact it is owned by two persons, in determining that the misrepresentation of ownership was material to the risk.
The statement of the late Mr. Justice Holt, subsequently Chief Justice, in 155 Va., page 964, is an expression of a most distinguished jurist, and not mere dictum, because the falsity of representation in that case was the basis upon which the insurer asked to be relieved of liability. In the absence of the materiality of such falsity, there would have been no contest.
The materiality of the risk in this case stems from the misrepresentation shown by the evidence introduced by the insurance company. One would be surprised to learn that judges of courts of record in Virginia do not know, as men and judges, that premium rates for liability insurance differ as to the nature of the risk assumed, and that representations as to ownership, the character of the vehicle, or the purpose for which it is used, are material in fixing the rates.
State Farm in this case insured George Bower against loss by reason of his ownership, maintenance and operation of his automobile. It also insured persons operating the car with the permission of the named insured; but it did not insure other persons operating it with the consent of Robert Bower without the knowledge and consent of George Bower,
It seems to me that the Virginia cases cited herein show that where it clearly appears that the misrepresentation itself is material, no further proof is required. Continental Co. v. Lindsay, 111 Va., supra. I find no Virginia case to the contrary and none is cited from any other state with the specific facts here involved.
I would adhere to the principles heretofore followed, and where a misrepresentation has been shown, leave. the determination of its materiality to the court.