Court Opinion

ID: 9702037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:51:08.781959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:32.919121
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (trial court) properly denied the motion for the return of property filed by Francisco Perez (Perez) without holding a hearing to determine whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the forfeiture of property seized in Philadelphia. For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
Police in the city of Reading, Berks County, obtained a warrant for the arrest of Perez in connection with a shooting. The police learned that Perez would be at a location in Philadelphia on May 18, 2000, and faxed a copy of the warrant to Philadelphia authorities. At the time of Perez’s arrest in Philadelphia, police seized sixty-four packets of heroin, $2,176.00 in cash and a 1990 Eagle Premier Sedan.
Perez was convicted in Berks County of drug offenses related to the heroin seized in Philadelphia. Perez filed an appeal, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the charges stemming from his drug activity in Philadelphia.
Following Perez’s conviction, the Commonwealth filed with the trial court a petition for forfeiture of the $2,176.00 and the 1990 Eagle Premier Sedan. On May 25, 2001, the trial court granted the petition, and Perez did not file an appeal. On June 8, 2002, the Berks County District Attorney’s Office sold the 1990 Eagle Premier Sedan at public auction for $675.00.
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Perez, (Pa.Super., Nos. 634 & 636 MDA 2001, filed June 20, 2002), our superior court vacated Perez’s drug convictions and remanded for a new trial. Our superior court agreed with Perez that his counsel was ineffective for faffing to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the drug offenses that occurred in Philadelphia. On February 12, 2004, the Berks County District Attorney moved for entry of a nolle prosequi with respect to those drug charges, and, on February, 18, 2004, the trial court granted the motion.
On February 22, 2007, Perez filed a motion with the trial court for the return of the cash and automobile. At the hearing on the motion, Perez argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in 2001 to grant the Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture of the property seized in Philadelphia. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss Perez’s motion, arguing that Perez failed to appeal the 2001 order, and, thus, his motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. When Perez admitted his failure to appeal the order, the trial court denied Perez’s motion, concluding that the matter was res judicata. On appeal, Perez seeks a remand for a hearing on the question of jurisdiction.
I. Failure to Address Issue
Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the right to prosecute a particular suit and to obtain the relief demanded. Mid-City Bank and Trust Company v. Myers, 343 Pa. 465, 23 A.2d 420 (1942). A judgment rendered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is null and void and may be collaterally attacked at any time. *784Commonwealth ex rel. Howard v. Howard, 138 Pa.Super. 505, 10 A.2d 779 (1940). Whenever a court’s attention is called to a judgment that is null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court to strike the judgment. M & P Management, L.P. v. Williams, — Pa. -, 937 A.2d 398 (2007). A judgment that is null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot serve as a basis for res judicata. Barnes v. McKellar, 434 Pa.Super. 597, 644 A.2d 770, appeal denied, 539 Pa. 663, 652 A.2d 834 (1994).
Here, the trial court failed to address Perez’s argument that, on May 25, 2001, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the forfeiture action against the property seized in Philadelphia. If the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, then its order granting forfeiture was null and void and could not serve as a basis for res judicata. The fact that Perez failed to appeal the May 25, 2001, order and did not file his motion for return of property until 2007 is irrelevant because a void judgment cannot become valid through the lapse of time. M & P Management; see Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corporation, 449 Pa.Super. 606, 674 A.2d 1099 (1996) (stating that it is never too late to attack a judgment for want of jurisdiction). Thus, Perez deserved a ruling from the trial court on the question he posed.
By prematurely deciding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the majority has usurped the function of the trial court. Before this court can exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the trial court needs to hold a hearing to determine the facts necessary to decide whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Statutory Provisions
The courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions arid proceedings, except where exclusive original jurisdiction is otherwise vested by statute. Section 931(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 931. Thus, the question of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of statutory construction. In re: Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, — Pa. -, 936 A.2d 1 (2007). In this regard, I note that forfeitures are not favored in the law; thus, statutes allowing the forfeiture of property are to be strictly construed. In re Estate of Kostick, 514 Pa. 591, 526 A.2d 746 (1987).
A. Section 6802(a)
A petition for forfeiture “shall be filed in the court of common pleas of the judicial district where the property is located....” Section 6802(a) of the Judicial Code, a provision of the act commonly known as the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (Forfeiture Act), 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(a) (emphasis added).
Strictly construing section 6802(a) against the Commonwealth, the provision does not give the Commonwealth discretion and does not forgive filing errors. It is the law, enacted by the General Assembly. Its wording is clear and unambiguous; the word “shall” does not mean “should.” It is a requirement, not a suggestion. It is mandatory and exclusive. Thus, if the Commonwealth were to file a forfeiture petition in any judicial district other than where the property is located, the court would be unable to proceed because it would have no jurisdiction over the action.
Nevertheless, the majority holds that every court of common pleas in Pennsylvania had subject matter jurisdiction over this forfeiture action in 2001, so that the Commonwealth could have filed its petition in any court of common pleas.1 However, *785such a holding ignores the express language of section 6802(a), which does not give the Commonwealth the right to prosecute a forfeiture action in any court of common pleas in the state but, rather, gives the Commonwealth the right to prosecute a forfeiture action only in the court of common pleas where the property is located. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction relates to the right to obtain the relief demanded, Mid-City Bank, and the Commonwealth has no right to the relief demanded in a forfeiture action, i.e., the forfeiture of property, unless the property is located in the jurisdiction of the court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(a).
B. Sections 6802(f)(2)(i) and 6801(d)
The same principle is expressed elsewhere in the Forfeiture Act. Section 6802(f)(2)(i) of the Forfeiture Act states that, once a petition is filed, a court may take any action to preserve property if the failure to act will result in the property being “removed from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(f)(2)(i) (emphasis added). Section 6802(f)(2)(i) makes clear that, if property is removed from the jurisdiction of a particular court of common pleas, the property is unavailable for forfeiture.
Section 6801(d) of the Forfeiture Act states that seized property is subject to the orders of “the court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings.... ” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(d). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion that every court of common pleas in Pennsylvania had subject matter jurisdiction over this forfeiture proceeding, the definite article “the” in section 6801(d) indicates that there was only one court of common pleas with such subject matter jurisdiction.2 Indeed, for this provision to make any sense, there must be some courts of common pleas without subject matter jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding.
III. Criminal Forfeitures
Although forfeiture actions are civil in rem proceedings, and quasi criminal in nature, our superior court has held that forfeiture actions are criminal in nature when the Commonwealth seeks forfeiture of property as part of a criminal proceeding. Commonwealth v. Smith, 722 A.2d 167 (Pa.Super.1998). In such cases, our superior court has jurisdiction over appeals relating to the forfeiture order. Id.
Here, if the Commonwealth had filed its forfeiture petition as part of the criminal proceeding against Perez, our superior court’s holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Philadelphia drug offenses would have applied equally to the forfeiture of the property seized in Philadelphia. To me, there is no reason why the result should be different just because the petition of the Commonwealth was filed as a civil in rem action.
Accordingly, I would vacate and remand.

. The majority points out that, in Commonwealth v. Bethea, 574 Pa. 100, 828 A.2d 1066 *785(2003), our supreme court held that all courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction over cases arising under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. (Majority op. at -■.) Here, however, the case arose under the Forfeiture Act, not the Crimes Code.

. Subject matter jurisdiction signifies the nature of the cause of action, Mid-City Bank, and the nature of the cause of action in this case is a forfeiture proceeding. Thus, section 6801(d) speaks to the subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court of common pleas, clearly implying that seized property is not subject to orders of the courts of common pleas that lack jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings, i.e., that lack subject matter jurisdiction.