Court Opinion

ID: 9895538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 18:09:43.184933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:55.752524
License: Public Domain

J-S25003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  PETER P. COYLE                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ALLENTOWN PARKING AUTHORITY,                 :   No. 459 EDA 2023
  RIVERVIEW LOFTS ALLENTOWN                    :
  AND RIVERVIEW LOFTS                          :
  ALLENTOWN, LLC

              Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2022-C-1755

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2023

       Appellant Peter P. Coyle appeals pro se from the order granting the

petition to open the default judgment filed by Appellees Riverview Lofts

Allentown and Riverview Lofts Allentown, LLC1 (Riverview) and dismissing

Appellant’s complaint. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting

Riverview’s petition to open the default judgment and abused its discretion in

dismissing Appellant’s complaint. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history

of this matter as follows:

       Appellant rented an apartment unit at 114 W. Allen Street,
       Allentown, PA, owned by Riverview Lofts Allentown, LLC, [and]
____________________________________________

1 We note that Appellant has not appealed the order dismissing the complaint

against Allentown Parking Authority.
J-S25003-23

     Riverview Lofts Allentown (collectively “Riverview”). The dispute
     began as a relatively simple landlord-tenant matter concerning
     [Appellant’s] failure to pay rent to Riverview in the late summer
     of 2021 . . . .

     On February 14, 2022, [Appellant] filed a complaint in the Lehigh
     County Court against Riverview docketed to No. 2022-C-0328
     alleging: (1) breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair
     dealing, (2) anticipatory breach of contract/covenant of good faith
     and fair dealing, and (3) negligence arising out of the landlord-
     tenant dispute. After several pre-trial motions were decided
     against [Appellant], he voluntarily withdrew the complaint on July
     29, 2022, by filing a praecipe to withdraw and discontinue that
     stated inter alia, “I wish to discontinue the case.”

     However, and prior to the withdrawal of the first complaint,
     [Appellant] filed a second complaint against Riverview and
     Allentown Parking Authority (“APA”) on March 21, 2022, at Lehigh
     County Docket No. 2022-C-0606. The second complaint alleged
     causes of action for: (1) actual breach of contract/covenant of
     good faith and fair dealing, and (2) negligence arising out of the
     landlord tenant dispute and the towing/impounding of
     [Appellant’s] vehicle. [Appellant] also filed for a preliminary
     injunction      requesting      to   enjoin       [Appellees]     from
     towing/impounding his vehicle. On April 27, 2022, [Appellant]
     voluntarily filed a praecipe to withdraw his complaint and petition
     for injunctive relief, thereby ending the litigation in case No. 2022-
     C-0606.

     In [Appellant’s] separate appeal from an MDJ judgment in favor
     of Riverview docketed to Lehigh County Docket Number 2022-C-
     0434, Riverview filed a complaint seeking a money judgment and
     possession against [Appellant]. [Appellant] subsequently filed an
     answer and counterclaim against Riverview and the APA related
     to impoundment of his vehicle. Following [Appellant’s] failure to
     appear for a compulsory arbitration hearing and following a
     hearing before the court pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1303(a)(2) and
     Leh.R.C.P. 1303(e), Riverview obtained a judgment for money
     and for possession against [Appellant].            Relevant to the
     disposition in the instant matter, [Appellant’s] counterclaims for:
     (1) actual breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair
     dealing, [] (2) negligence, (3) breach of [quiet] enjoyment, (4)
     nuisance, and (5) abuse of process were dismissed. Not only did
     [Appellant] fail to appeal that order, final on July 6, 2022, or seek

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      to open the judgment, but his motion to reconsider was denied by
      this court on August 22, 2022.

      On August 24, 2022, [Appellant] filed the within action docketed
      to 2022-C-1755 against Riverview and APA, alleging: (1) actual
      breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2)
      unlawful eviction, (3) negligence, (4) breach of quiet enjoyment,
      (5) nuisance and (6) abuse of process.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/19/23, at 1-2.

      [The complaint was] personally served on Riverview October 28,
      2022. On November 22, 2022, Riverview filed a motion to dismiss
      under Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 contending [Appellant’s] complaint was
      frivolous. While Riverview’s motion to dismiss remained pending,
      [Appellant] filed two (2) separate praecipes on November 29,
      2022 to enter judgments by default against Riverview. By petition
      filed on December 7, 2022, Riverview sought to strike and/or open
      the judgments. Accordingly, by order dated December 9, 2022,
      the court opened and struck the default judgments entered
      against Riverview. On January 19, 2023, Riverview’s motion to
      dismiss was granted.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/23, at 1-2.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

      1. Did the court err in granting Appellees’ petition to open/strike
         the default judgment issued against them?

      2. Did the court err and abuse its discretion in dismissing
         Appellant’s complaint under rule 233.1?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting

Riverview’s motion to open/strike the default judgment. Id. at 14-15. With

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respect to the motion to strike, Appellant asserts that Riverview failed to file

an answer or preliminary objections and that the trial court erred in concluding

that Riverview’s motion to dismiss was a “responsive pleading.” Id. at 15.

Additionally, regarding the petition to open the default judgment, Appellant

asserts that Riverview failed to “include a copy of the complaint, preliminary

objections, and/or a copy of the complaint,” as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.1.

Id.

      Initially, we note that “[a] petition to open a default judgment and a

petition to strike a default judgment seek distinct remedies and are generally

not interchangeable.” Stauffer v. Hevener, 881 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa. Super.

2005) (citation omitted).

      “An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment implicates

the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues regarding the operation of

procedural rules of court present us with questions of law. Therefore, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”           Dig.

Commc’ns Warehouse, Inc. v Allen Invs., LLC, 223 A.3d 278, 284 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      A petition to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer to the
      record, and must be granted whenever some fatal defect appears
      on the face of the record. When deciding if there are fatal defects
      on the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a
      judgment, a [trial] court may only look at what was in the record
      when the judgment was entered. Importantly, a petition to strike
      is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a
      complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that
      affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner,

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      as a matter of law, to relief. Importantly, a petition to strike does
      not involve the discretion of the trial court.

Oswald v. WB Public Square Assocs., LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793-94 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting altered).         In other words,

“[t]he standard for ‘defects’ asks whether the procedures mandated by law

for the taking of default judgments have been followed.” Roy v. Rue, 273

A.3d 1174, 1182 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

      Conversely, “a petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the

equitable powers of the [trial] court.” Dig. Commc’ns Warehouse, Inc.,

223 A.3d at 285 (citation and brackets omitted). This Court has explained:

      The decision to grant or deny a petition to open a default judgment
      is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not
      overturn that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion or
      error of law. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error of
      judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or
      misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable,
      or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill[-]will, as shown
      by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

Id. (citation omitted and formatting altered).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b)(2) states that if a petition

to open a default judgment is filed within ten days after the entry of a default

judgment on the docket, then “the court shall open the judgment if one or

more of the proposed preliminary objections has merit or the proposed answer

states a meritorious defense.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(2); see also Boatin v.

Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 427-29 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining that if a petitioner

meets the two requirements set forth in Rule 237.3(b)(2) and files a petition

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to open within ten days and states a meritorious defense, he “does not need

to satisfy the common law requirement that he provide a reasonable excuse

for the failure that led to the judgment by default”).

      In order to assert a meritorious defense, a party must assert a defense

that, if proven at trial, would entitle the party to judgment in its favor. Reid

v. Boohar, 856 A.2d 156, 162 (Pa. Super. 2004). This Court has held that

“broad averments . . . are sufficient to plead a meritorious defense.” Attix v.

Lehman, 925 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Here, in granting Riverview’s motion to open/strike the default

judgment, the trial court stated:

      A review of the record reveals that, prior to entry of the default
      judgment, [Appellees] filed a responsive pleading in the nature of
      a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 and therefore entry
      of a default judgment was not proper. Thus, the default judgment
      is stricken. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.4(a)(2) (judgment shall be
      stricken without issuance of a rule where defect of record
      constitutes ground for striking a default judgment). Further,
      Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(2) provides that if a petition for relief from a
      default judgment, as [Appellees] did in this case, the court shall
      open the judgment if the proposed responsive pleading, in this
      case the motion to dismiss, has merit.

Trial Ct. Order, 12/9/22.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

      In this matter, on November 22, 2022, Riverview filed a motion
      to dismiss in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 contending [that
      Appellant’s] pro se complaint was frivolous and a decision on the
      motion to dismiss remained pending when [Appellant] entered his
      default judgments. Riverview’s motion to dismiss averred that the
      prior actions commenced by [Appellant] and later withdrawn or
      disposed of by court action were virtually identical to the claims
      made by [Appellant’s] in the instant matter, and therefore

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     Riverview’s motion to dismiss set forth a viable defense to
     [Appellant’s] claims, despite the lack of a filed answer.
     Additionally, Riverview pled the same in support of their petition
     to open or strike the default judgments.

     While Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(a) provides a petition to open a default
     judgment must have a verified copy of the answer attached, the
     comment interpreting that rule supports the proposition that relief
     from the entry of a default judgment may still be available even
     though a petitioner fails to attach a verified copy of the answer to
     the petition. The 2016 Explanatory Comment to Rule 237.3
     provides, in pertinent part[:]

        The purpose of Rule 237.3 is to give a litigant who promptly
        responds to the entry of a judgment under this rule the
        ability to prosecute or defend a case. The rule does not
        achieve its purpose if a litigant is barred from doing so by a
        technical requirement.

     Further, the Superior Court has granted relief to a petitioner who
     failed to attach a verified answer to its petition. Boatin v. Miller,
     955 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2008) . . . ([concluding that
     b]ecause the allegations in [the d[efendant’s petition appeared
     elsewhere in the record, [the d]efendant’s failure to attach a
     verified copy of the answer to its petition as per local rule would
     not constitute a basis to deny relief under Rule 237.3). As noted
     by the Superior Court, “looking exclusively at the answer attached
     to a petition to open a default judgment when deciding if there is
     a meritorious defense [would be] an ‘overly strict interpretation of
     [Rule] 237.3.’” Stauffer v. Hevener, 881 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa.
     Super. 2005) [(citation omitted)].

     In this matter, Riverview filed a motion to dismiss prior to the
     entry of the default judgments and thus had a meritorious defense
     pending at the time the default judgments were entered, i.e., that
     [Appellant’s] complaint was frivolous. To find otherwise would
     allow [Appellant] to frustrate the stated purpose of Pa.R.C.P.
     233.1; to prevent pro se litigants from filing serial lawsuits of
     questionable merit and spare defendants the need to defend
     spurious claims. See Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, Comment.[fn1]
        [fn1] This court respectfully submits that the case of Rivers

        End Animal Sanctuary and Learning Center, Inc. v.
        Eckhart, 253 A.3d 1220 (Pa. Super. 2021) is
        distinguishable. Unlike the situation in the instant matter,
        [the defendant in] Eckhart not only failed to attach a

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          proposed answer to his petition to open, the petition was
          materially defective, averring merely boilerplate assertions
          and conclusions of law and lacked any basis upon which a
          court could exercise its discretion. Riverview’s petition to
          open, however, averred a viable defense to [Appellant’s]
          claims in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 233.1; namely that all
          of [Appellant’s] claims be dismissed as frivolous based upon
          [Appellant’s] previously raised and virtually identical claims
          that were either dismissed or withdrawn. Accordingly,
          Riverview’s motion to dismiss placed [Appellant] on notice
          that the claims in his complaint were contested, and the lack
          of an attached answer should not, under these unique
          circumstances, disqualify [Riverview] from relief to
          challenge a default judgment.

Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4.

      Following our review of the record, we find no error of law by the trial

court in granting Riverview’s motion to strike the default judgment. See Dig.

Commc’ns Warehouse, Inc., 223 A.3d at 284. As noted by the trial court,

because Riverview filed a motion to dismiss, entry of a default judgment was

improper on the face of the record. See Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a) (stating that a

defendant may file a motion dismiss a complaint as frivolous “[u]pon the

commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common

pleas . . .”)

      Additionally, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

granting Riverview’s petition to open the default judgment.           See Dig.

Commc’ns Warehouse, Inc., 223 A.3d at 284. As noted by the trial court,

Riverview filed a timely petition stating a meritorious defense. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

233.1 (permitting a defendant to move for dismissal of a frivolous complaint

filed by a pro se plaintiff).   Further, although Riverview did not attach an

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answer or preliminary objections to its petition, the allegations of fact stated

in the petition appeared elsewhere in the record. See Boatin, 955 A.2d at

427-29 (vacating the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s petition to

open and explaining that, although the defendant did not attach an answer or

preliminary objections to the petition, the petition set forth a meritorious

defense); cf. Eckhart, 253 A.3d at 1223-24 (concluding that the trial court

erred in opening a default judgment because the defendant failed to attach an

answer or preliminary objections and the petition to open did not provide a

meritorious defense). Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, we

conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Riverview’s petition to open

the default judgment.

                           Dismissal of Complaint

      In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

dismissing his complaint as frivolous under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1.        Appellant’s

Brief at 20. With respect to the lawsuits that Appellant initiated at 2022-C-

0328 and 2022-C-0606, Appellant contends that he withdrew those cases “to

consolidate a stronger defense and counter offense against Appellees in 2022-

C-0434.” Id. at 28. Appellant also argues that although the trial court entered

a judgment of non pros as to his counterclaim at 2022-C-0434, the entry of

non pros does not preclude him from filing a new action raising the same

claims. Id. at 23. Further, Appellant argues that his claims at 2022-C-0434

were never fully resolved, as the trial court did not consider the issues raised

in Appellant’s untimely motion for reconsideration.        Id. at 25.     Finally,

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Appellant claims that Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 is unconstitutional as applied to him,

and that “it would be in the best interest of all parties to allow [Appellant] to

have the capability to recover damages without the need to increase his

damages by hiring a representative.” Id. at 29.

      Riverview responds that the trial court properly concluded that dismissal

was appropriate under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1. Riverview’s Brief at 16. In support,

Riverview argues that Appellant is a “pro se plaintiff [] alleging related claims

which he raised, pro se, in the 2022-C-0328 complaint, the 2022-C-0606

complaint, and the 2022-C-0434 counterclaim against related defendants

which have all already been resolved.” Id. Additionally, Riverview contends

that all of Appellant’s “perceived wrongs . . . concern the alleged breach of a

landlord tenant lease, the improper towing/impounding of Appellant’s vehicle,

and Appellees’ use of proper procedural process to enforce their claims in

evicting Appellant” and “Appellant’s pleadings against the same defendants

[in each case] are nearly repeated verbatim.” Id. at 17. Riverview concludes

that “the record supports that all of Appellant’s claims, either raised by him,

or in response to Appellees’ claims, were either previously voluntarily

withdrawn by Appellant, or adjudicated by court proceedings” and that

therefore, “the trial court was proper in finding that all of Appellant’s prior

claims against Appellees had been ‘resolved.’” Id.

      When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

233.1, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 834 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).

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      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1 “limits the ability of pro se

plaintiffs to prolong litigation through the filing of serial complaints after the

claims they allege have been resolved.” Id.

      The Rule provides, in relevant part:

      (a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se
      plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a
      motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

         (1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims
         which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the
         same or related defendants, and

         (2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a
         written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.

      Rule 233.1 is intended to address duplicative pro se litigation.        The

explanatory comment to Rule 233.1 states:

      It has come to the attention of the Supreme Court that certain
      litigants are abusing the legal system by repeatedly filing new
      litigation raising the same claims against the same defendant even
      though the claims have been previously adjudicated either
      through settlement or through court proceedings. New Rule 233.1
      provides relief to a defendant who has been subjected to this type
      of repetitive litigation. While attorneys are subject to the rules of
      disciplinary procedure, no analogous rule exists to curb this type
      of abuse when done by a pro se party.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 cmt.

      “[N]either the language of the Rule nor the explanatory comment

mandate the technical identity of parties or claims imposed by res judicata or

collateral estoppel; rather, it merely requires that the parties and the claims

raised in the current action be ‘related’ to those in the prior action and that

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those prior claims have been ‘resolved.’” Gray, 53 A.3d at 836 (citation and

emphasis omitted).      “A complaint is related when it deals with the same

subject matter as a previous complaint.” Coulter v. Lindsay, 159 A.3d 947,

953 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnote omitted). “A claim is resolved when there

has been a definite decision thereon.” Id. at 954 (citation omitted).

Importantly, the Rule does not require the matter to have progressed to a

final judgment on the merits. Gray, 53 A.3d at 836. Rather, an action is

“resolved” if the “pro se litigant is availed of a chance to address his claim

subject to the contractual guarantee of a settlement agreement or to the

procedural safeguards that attend a court proceeding.” Id.

      Here, the trial court addressed Riverview’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s

complaint as follows:

      Upon a review of [Appellant’s] pleadings in the prior matters, all
      perceived wrongs raised by [Appellant] concern the alleged breach
      of the landlord tenant lease, the improper towing/impounding of
      [Appellant’s] vehicle, and [Appellees’] use of process to enforce
      their claims. In fact, [Appellant’s] pleadings are nearly repeated
      verbatim, and appear to be nothing more than “cutting and
      pasting” the prior raised allegations into the subsequent pleadings
      including the complaint filed in the instant matter. Additionally,
      [Appellant’s] disputes involve the same named defendants and
      the fact that [Appellant] voluntarily withdrew his claims prior to
      the filing of the instant matter affords him no relief. See Gray,
      at 836 (“[N]either the language of the Rule nor the explanatory
      comment mandate the technical identity of parties or claims
      imposed by res judicata or collateral estoppel; rather, it merely
      requires that the parties and the claims raised in the current action
      be ‘related’ to those in the prior action and that those prior claims
      have been ‘resolved.’”).

      The record supports that all of [Appellant’s] claims either raised
      directly by him, or in response to [Appellees’] claims, have either

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      been voluntarily withdrawn by [Appellant] (Lehigh County Docket
      Nos. 2022-C-328, 2022-C-0606) or adjudicated by court
      proceedings.     (Lehigh County Docket No. 2022-C-0434).
      Therefore, all of [Appellant’s] prior claims against [Appellees]
      have been resolved. Consequently, [Appellant] is not allowed to
      again raise the same allegations against the same [Appellees] in
      the instant matter as Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 expressly prohibits this
      practice. Finally, [Appellant’s] contentions that Rule 233.1 is
      unconstitutional has been considered and rejected by the
      appellate courts. See Coulter v. Lindsay, 159 A.3d 947, 952,
      953 (Pa. Super. 2017). Accordingly, this Court will enter an
      appropriate order dismissing [Appellant’s] claims and preclude
      [Appellant] from raising his allegations against [Appellees] for a
      fourth time.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/19/23, at 3-4.

      Following our review of the record, we find no error of law in the trial

court’s conclusions. See Gray, 53 A.3d at 834. As noted by the trial court,

Appellant’s claims in the instant case are identical to the issues he raised in

prior actions involving Appellees. See Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. Further, we agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s prior claims were resolved.

See id; see also Gray, 53 A.3d at 836 (reiterating that Rule 233.1 does not

require that the prior matter proceed to a final judgment on the merits and

explaining that a case is “resolved” if the “pro se litigant is availed of a chance

to address his claim subject to . . . the procedural safeguards that attend a

court proceeding). Finally, to the extent Appellant claims that Rule 233.1 is

unconstitutional, the trial court correctly conclude that Appellant’s assertion is

meritless. See Coulter, 159 A.3d at 952-54. For these reasons, Appellant is

not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 11/7/2023

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