Court Opinion

ID: 9397823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 16:09:09.922139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.968319
License: Public Domain

J-S13019-23

                                   2023 PA Super 90

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    QUISEAN BARNES                             :   No. 1066 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0007051-2021

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                    FILED MAY 26, 2023

        The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the trial court’s order

granting suppression of a statement to police and evidence seized following

an investigative stop of Quisean Barnes’ (Barnes).1 After careful review, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

        The trial court summarized the evidence presented at the suppression

hearing:

        On July 20, 2021, Officer [Marc] Kusowski and his partner were
        on patrol on the 3000 block of N. 8th Street in Philadelphia. [N.T.,
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth has certified that the suppression order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (permitting
the Commonwealth to “appeal as of right from an order that does not end the
entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the
order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”).
J-S13019-23

      2/15/22, at] 7. According to Officer Kusowski, this area is an
      “extremely high-crime area” and is a “notorious area for
      shootings.” Id. at [] 8. He also stated that they “routinely man
      a [radio patrol car (RPC)] to sit at either 8th and Clearfield or
      Garrett and Clearfield and they are not to be moved.” Id. While
      on patrol, Officer Kusowski and his partner [were] traveling
      northbound on 8th Street, approaching Clearfield, when Officer
      Kusowski observed a crowd of about five or six people on the
      northeast corner of 8th and Clearfield. Id. at [] 7[.] Officer
      Kusowski testified that it appeared to him that once they saw the
      patrol vehicle, “they began to scatter and walk away in separate
      directions.” Id. at [] 8.

              [Barnes] began walking southbound, towards the patrol
      vehicle with at least one other male. Id. Officer Kusowski
      believes that the crowd was scattering because of the mere
      presence of his patrol vehicle. Id. After the crowd scattered,
      Officer Kusowski exited his vehicle to see if he could make
      observations outside of his patrol vehicle, see if someone had a
      gun, or see if someone discarded narcotics or a firearm. Id. at []
      8-9. As he stepped out of his vehicle, he saw [Barnes] again
      walking southbound. Id. at 9. He illuminated his flashlight to see
      if he could observe anything on [Barnes’s] person. Id. Next,
      Officer Kusowski exited his vehicle and when he did so, [Barnes]
      fled. Id. Officer Kusowski testified that he did not activate any
      lights, sirens, or even engage in a conversation with [Barnes]. Id.
      [Barnes] fled[] approximately ten feet, where there was a vacant
      lot full of bramble. Id. Officer Kusowski stated that he did pursue
      [Barnes] into the lot. Id. Once [Barnes] tripped over some
      bramble, Officer Kusowski ordered [Barnes] to stop and put his
      hands up. Id. [Barnes] complied with the orders. Id.

             During the pursuit, Officer Kusowski noticed that [Barnes]
      had a “black shoulder bag” that resembled a fanny pack. Id.
      While detaining [Barnes], Officer Kusowski’s partner asked
      [Barnes] if he had a gun in the bag. Id. As Officer Kusowski goes
      to frisk the bag, [Barnes] stated that he had a gun in the bag. Id.
      at 10. Further, [Barnes] told the officers that he did not have a
      permit to carry and that he was on probation. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/22, at 1-2.

                                     -2-
J-S13019-23

     Police arrested Barnes, who filed a pretrial suppression motion on

September 17, 2021.      On March 21, 2022, after a hearing, the trial court

granted Barnes’s motion, suppressing his statements and the evidence seized

by police during the investigative stop.       Trial Court Order, 3/21/22.      The

Commonwealth     filed   this   timely   appeal.    The   trial   court   and   the

Commonwealth have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     The Commonwealth presents the following issue:

     Did the [suppression] court err in concluding that police did not
     have reasonable suspicion to stop [Barnes] when he fled from the
     officers in a high-crime area?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

     We first observe our scope and standard of review:

     When reviewing an order granting a defendant’s motion to
     suppress evidence, “we are bound by that court’s factual findings
     to the extent that they are supported by the record, and we
     consider only the evidence offered by the defendant, as well as
     any portion of the Commonwealth’s evidence which remains
     uncontradicted, when read in the context of the entire
     record.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 615 Pa. 395, 42 A.3d
     1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). “Our review of the legal
     conclusions which have been drawn from such evidence, however,
     is de novo, and, consequently, we are not bound by the legal
     conclusions of the lower courts.”         Id. (citation omitted).
     Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited
     to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression
     hearing. See In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.
     2013).

     Further, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 provides that “[t]he Commonwealth
     shall have the burden ... of establishing that the challenged
     evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.”
     Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). Specifically, the Commonwealth has the
     burden of “establish[ing] by a preponderance of the evidence that
     the evidence was properly obtained.” Commonwealth v.

                                         -3-
J-S13019-23

      Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
      omitted).

Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 331-32 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      The Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s conclusion that police

“did not have reasonable suspicion to stop [Barnes].” Commonwealth’s Brief

at 10 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/22, at 4).              In support, the

Commonwealth cites cases holding that presence in a high-crime area coupled

with unprovoked flight establishes reasonable suspicion that criminal activity

is afoot.    Id. at 11-12.   According to the Commonwealth, the evidence

established Barnes’s presence in “an extremely high—high-crime area.” Id.

at 12 (quoting N.T., 2/15/22, at 8). The Commonwealth directs our attention

to Officer Kusowski’s testimony that he patrolled the area “all the time” due

to violence. Id. (citation omitted). The Commonwealth asserts:

      The area was so bad that the police “routinely” designated an
      officer “to sit” on one of the street corners in a police car in an
      attempt to stem the violence.

Id. (quoting N.T., 2/15/22, at 8).

      The Commonwealth states that as the officer and his partner drove down

the street, people who were standing on the corner began to “scatter, or walk

away in different directions, when they spotted the approaching police car.”

Id. at 12.    Barnes walked toward the officers’ car.         Id. at 11-12.   The

Commonwealth observes that Barnes fled when Officer Kusowski “turned on

his flashlight and began to get out of his car.” Id. at 13.

                                     -4-
J-S13019-23

      Once [Barnes] fled unprovoked from the officers and did so in “an
      extremely high—high-crime area,” … the officers had a reasonable
      suspicion to stop him. Accordingly, they were entitled to pursue
      him. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 154 A.3d [813,] 819 [(Pa.
      Super. 2017)] (“[b]ecause police possessed reasonable suspicion,
      their pursuit of [the defendant] was lawful”).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. The Commonwealth disputes the trial court’s

conclusion that “Officer Kusowski did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop

[Barnes]” and the court “properly suppressed the evidence” as contrary to the

law. Id. (citing Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/22, at 4). We agree.

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, incorporated

to states by and through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, protect

citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV

The Fourth Amendment provides:

      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
      papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
      shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
      probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
      describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
      be seized.

Id. Similarly, Article I, Section 8 provides:

      The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
      possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
      warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
      issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
      probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
      the affiant.

Pa. Const. art. 1, § 8.

      This Court has explained:

                                     -5-
J-S13019-23

     The law recognizes three distinct levels of interactions between
     police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an
     investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see
     Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968);
     and (3) a custodial detention.

     A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
     between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
     by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
     it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond and therefore
     need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.

     In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official
     compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has
     elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of
     unlawful activity.

     Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and
     conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to
     be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
     This level of interaction requires that the police have probable
     cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is
     committing a crime.

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (citations, quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

     Regarding an investigatory stop:

     [T]he question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time
     of an investigatory detention must be answered by examining
     the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was
     a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
     stopped of criminal activity. These circumstances are to be
     viewed through the eyes of a trained officer.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

     In making this determination, we must give due weight ... to the
     specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw
     from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the

                                     -6-
J-S13019-23

      circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of
      only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,
      even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
      warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 957 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations

and quotation marks omitted); accord Thomas, 273 A.3d at 1197.

      Here, the trial court recognized that unprovoked flight in a high-crime

area may establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity:

      Under Pennsylvania law, mere presence in a high crime area is
      insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. In re
      D.M II, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). However, a court could
      consider “the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area” in
      assessing the totality of the circumstances. In re D. M. II, 781
      A.2d at 1164. Further, unprovoked flight in a high crime area is
      sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop
      under both federal and state [constitutions]. Commonwealth v.
      Jefferson, 853 A.2d 404 (Pa. Super. 2004). Police officers may
      find reasonable suspicion to suspect criminal activity is afoot in a
      high crime area where an unprovoked citizen flees upon noticing
      the police. Jefferson, 853 A.2d 404; see also In the Interest
      of J.G., 860 A.2d 185 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/22, at 3. Notwithstanding, the trial court concluded

Officer Kusowski lacked reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop:

      The instant matter is distinguishable from Jefferson and In re D.
      M. In those cases, there was a either a radio call or the
      defendant abandoned and/or discarded evidence during
      the pursuit. Here, there was no radio call describing [Barnes],
      [Barnes] did not abandon evidence during the pursuit, nor did he
      flee during a lawful encounter with police. In this case, Officer
      Kusowski saw a group scatter and witnessed [Barnes] was
      southbound. As Officer Kusowski exits the car, [Barnes] began to
      run. Lastly, the gun was retrieved from [Barnes’s] bag during a
      frisk and not abandoned. Therefore, Officer Kusowski did not have
      reasonable suspicion to stop [Barnes], and this court properly
      suppressed the evidence.

                                     -7-
J-S13019-23

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/22, at 4 (emphasis added). Upon careful review, we

disagree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion.

      The trial court adds an additional factor to its reasonable suspicion

analysis, i.e., a radio call describing the suspect. See id. The case law does

not support this additional factor.     In Jefferson, this Court addressed

“whether the observation of [the] appellant in a high crime area and [his]

flight from police combine to establish the familiar Terry standard of

reasonable suspicion.”   Jefferson, 853 A.2d at 405.       We recognized that

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000),

      [t]he United States Supreme Court held that although mere
      presence in a high crime area is insufficient to support
      a Terry stop, the additional factor of unprovoked flight was
      indeed relevant. The Court ultimately concluded that the two
      factors in combination were sufficient to satisfy the Terry
      standard of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 124.

Jefferson, 853 A.2d at 406.      We further observed that the Pennsylvania

Constitution affords no additional protections:

      Following [Wardlow], it is evident that unprovoked flight in a
      high crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to
      justify a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment….

Id. at 406 (quoting D.M. II, 781 A.2d at 1164). While additional facts may

negate reasonable suspicion, Wardlow requires no additional facts to

establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, we conclude the trial court erred as a

matter of law by imposing an additional requirement to its reasonable

suspicion analysis. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 898

(Pa. Super. 2012) (recognizing the common elements between, inter alia,

                                      -8-
J-S13019-23

Wardlow, Jefferson and D.M. II, are that “the incident took place in a high

crime area and the suspect fled upon being confronted by the police or

recognizing police presence in the immediate area.”)

      Mindful of the foregoing, we review the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing in a light most favorable to Barnes. See Smith, 285 A.3d

at 331-32. Officer Kusowski testified:

      [T]hat area is an extremely … high-crime area. It is one of our
      more notorious areas for shootings. We’ve had six people shot at
      a time, four people shot, two people shot. We would routinely
      man a [radio police car] to sit at either 8th and Clearfield or Garrett
      and Clearfield, and they are not to be moved.

N.T., 2/15/22, at 8. Officer Kusowski explained that on the evening of July

20, 2021, he and his partner were on routine patrol near the 3000 block of

North 8th Street. Id. at 6-7. As the officers traveled northbound on 9th Street,

Officer Kusowski

      observed a crowd of about five to six people on the northeast
      corner of 9th and Clearfield. … It appeared to me that once they
      saw my patrol vehicle, they all began to … scatter, walk away in
      separate direction [sic].

      ….

           … [S]ince the crowd began to scatter—and I believe this was
      happening because of the mere presence of my patrol vehicle. I
      went to exit my vehicle just to see if I can, maybe, make any
      observations outside of my patrol vehicle….

            As I went to do that, … [Barnes] was walking, again,
      southbound. I believe I illuminated my flashlight just to see – any
      of the males, if I could see anything on their person. And when I
      exited my vehicle, without activating my lights or sirens, or even
      engaging anyone in conversation, [Barnes] fled[.]

                                       -9-
J-S13019-23

               He was carrying a black shoulder bag, kind of like a fanny
         pack, but more square, rectangular. He fled, maybe ten feet, …
         only a couple of houses, where there was a break between the
         houses, … a vacant lot full of bramble.

               … I did pursue him into that lot. Me and him began tripping.
         He tripped over some bramble. I ordered him to stop, put his
         hands up. He did so. He did comply. He couldn’t get back up.
         At the same time, … my partner was now with me ….

               [A]s I went to detain the male, my partner asked if he had
         a gun in the bag. Almost simultaneously, as I went to frisk it, he
         does reply yes, and I also feel a gun in that bag….

N.T., 2/15/22, at 7-9.

         This testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to Barnes, established

Barnes’s unprovoked flight, upon seeing Officer Kusowski, in a high-crime

area.      Pursuant to Wardlow, Jefferson, and D.M.II, this evidence

established reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop of Barnes.

See Washington, 51 A.3d at 898. Our analysis does not conclude at this

point.

         Barnes argues that Officer Kusowski’s investigative detention escalated

into a custodial detention. Appellee’s Brief at 11. According to Barnes:

         In response to this unprovoked flight, and only in response to this
         unprovoked flight, Officer Kusowski armed himself with a taser
         and chased [Barnes] into an empty lot. While Officer Kusowski
         had [Barnes] cornered in the lot, on his knees, he pointed the
         taser at [Barnes], ordered him stop and to place his hands up.
         [Barnes] placed his hands up around his face. At this point Officer
         Kusowski testified he was “taking [Barnes] into custody” and
         handcuffing him. (N.T., 2/15/22, at 14).

Id. Barnes claims these actions occurred at the same time Officer Kusowski’s

partner asked Barnes whether he had a firearm. Id. Barnes argues that the

                                       - 10 -
J-S13019-23

officers’ coercion and questioning took place prior to the recovery of the

firearm.    Id. at 11-12.       The trial court did not determine whether the

encounter became a custodial detention.

        An investigative detention may develop into a custodial detention.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019). “The

key difference between an investigative and a custodial detention is that the

latter involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional

equivalent of an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887

(Pa.    Super.     2009)   (emphasis     added,    citation   and   quotation   marks

omitted). This Court considers the totality of circumstances to determine if

an     encounter    is   investigatory   or   custodial.   See Commonwealth        v.

Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306 (Pa. Super. 2011).

        We have explained:

        The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the
        circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to
        constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for
        the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was
        transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether
        restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer
        showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods
        employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-20 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citations omitted).

        At the suppression hearing, Officer Kusowski testified:

        I didn’t use my taser, but I did order him to the ground with my
        taser. Although I feared that he may have been armed, it would
        not have been safe for me to point my duty weapon at anyone

                                         - 11 -
J-S13019-23

      because we’re literally tripping. So I didn’t want to pull my duty
      weapon out for fear of an accidental discharge. So I pointed my
      taser at him and ordered him to the ground.

N.T., 2/15/22, at 12-13.

      On cross-examination, Officer Kusowski further testified:

      Q. [Defense counsel:] Officer, when he’s down on his knees, with
      his hands in the air, cornered in that alley by you, obviously, he
      couldn’t go anywhere at that point?

      A. [Officer Kusowski:] No. No. Neither -- I don’t think either of
      us could have gone anywhere.

Id. at 21. Officer Kusowski explained that when Barnes fell to the ground,

the other officer ordered Barnes to put his hands up. Id. at 17. When the

other officer asked if there was a gun in the bag, Barnes replied, “Yes, sir.”

Id. at 18.

      As this Court explained, a “Terry stop” is “[a]n investigative detention

[that] occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means

of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes.”

Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (emphasis

added). Here, our review discloses that Officer Kusowski’s use of force and/or

show of authority had not escalated to a custodial detention at the time

Appellant acknowledged possessing a firearm.       Thus, the totality of the

circumstances demonstrates Officer Kusowski effected an investigatory stop

of Barnes supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.          See

Washington, 51 A.3d at 898.       Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s

order suppressing the evidence seized as a result of the investigatory stop.

                                    - 12 -
J-S13019-23

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      P.J.E. Stevens joins the opinion.

      Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2023

                                    - 13 -