Court Opinion

ID: 9518941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:05:31.509163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:10.657031
License: Public Domain

BRYANT, P. J., dissenting: The majority opinion sounds in the proposition that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the drain spout was not permanently attached and that for this reason he followed an improper course of conduct by resting his weight upon it while in the process of painting it. In other words, without saying so in so many words, my colleagues on the bench appear to be saying that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There is a great deal made of the fact that he knew that the defendant had not finished his part of the contract; that he knew that the drain spout had been moved from its original position; and, finally, that he knew that the porch railing was temporary. It might be asserted with equal vigor that the defendant knew that a contract for the painting had been awarded; that he knew that the painting might be commenced before he had finished his own work and that, in fact, it would be a great deal more practical if the painting was so commenced because it would be considerably easier to paint the back of the drain spout before it was permanently attached than after-wards (there is a difference between permanently attaching a drain spont and securely attaching one); and, finally, that it would not be uncommon for a painter to “lean on” or “rest his weight on” a drain spout of this nature and in this type of location, as was indicated by another painter giving expert testimony concerning what was common, in a situation of this nature, in the trade. In short, it does not appear to be self-evident that the defendant was justified, in these circumstances, in not securely attaching the drain spout; nor does it appear to be self evident that the plaintiff was careless or contributorily negligent in “leaning” on the drain spout as he painted it. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that these very facts and this very issue, i. e. contributory negligence, were squarely presented to the jury and resolved in favor of the plaintiff. At the close of the trial four special interrogatories were submitted to the jury, one of which asked: “(1) Was the plaintiff, at the time and immediately prior to the occurrence in question, in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety?” This interrogatory was answered in the affirmative and there appears to be no breach of discretion on the part of the jury in reaching this conclusion. On a cross-examination, plaintiff was asked to demonstrate to the court and jury his position as he painted. The court and jury were thus shown exactly how plaintiff was standing as he painted, where his feet were, the position of his body, and the manner in which he employed his hands just -before he fell. Furthermore, expert testimony was introduced (and properly so, Wibel v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 155 Ill App 349; Fetterman v. Production Steel Co. of Illinois, 4 Ill App2d 403, 124 NE2d 637) to the effect that the procedure followed by the plaintiff in painting the drain spout was in conformity with the customary and usual methods of painting drain spouts. Defendant has maintained that this expert testimony was erroneously admitted. However, in a tort case, custom and usage can have an important bearing on the question of contributory negligence and is a fact to be proved as any other fact and it may be the subject of expert testimony. Fetterman v. Production Steel Co. of Illinois, supra; Dickson v. George B. Swift Co., 238 Ill 62, 87 NE 59; O’Rourke v. Sproul, 241 Ill 576, 89 NE 663. In each of the cases cited by the defendant in support of his proposition that the common usage testimony should have been excluded, special circumstances existed which do not exist in the case at bar, which removed those cases from the general rule stated above. The plaintiff in this case has stated a good cause of action and his path to recovery has been cleared by a finding of the jury that he was free from contributory negligence. The well established proposition of law upon which plaintiff places his claim to recovery was stated in Fetzer v. Noel Const. Co., 175 Ill App 401, in the following manner, at page 403: “The law is well settled that a contractor whose servants are engaged upon work about which the servants of another contractor are engaged owes the duty of ordinary care in prosecuting his work in such a way as not negligently to injure the servants of the other.” See also Variety Mfg. Co. v. Landaker, 129 Ill App 630; Ziraldo v. W. J. Lynch Co., 365 Ill 197, 6 NE2d 125; Markus v. Lake County Ready-Mix Co., 6 Ill App 2d 420, 128 NE2d 370; McDermott v. Rex Elec. Co., 201 Ill App 391 (Abstract); Garrity v. Newman & Co., 202 Ill App 194 (Abstract); Lisle v. Anderson, 61 Okla 68, 159 P 278; Smith v. Brady, 121 NYS 474. The majority opinion cites several of the above mentioned cases in support of this proposition and states: “In onr opinion these authorities are not applicable to the issues in the instant case. In the cited cases the independent contractors and their employees were performing their respective contracts independently and the negligence charged in each case was for causing injury to the plaintiff therein as a result of an affirmative, active or positive act on the part of the defendant.” With due respect to my colleagues on the bench, I submit that this is not an accurate statement of the factual situations within those cases. To be sure, in McDermott v. Rex Elec. Co., 201 Ill App 391 and Ziraldo v. W. J. Lynch Co., 365 Ill 197, 6 NE2d 125, the harm causing negligence could reasonably be classified as “active.” However, in Variety Mfg. Co. v. Landaker, 129 Ill App 630, the damages resulted when a plank, which the defendant’s servants had used to span a gap, gave way and the plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor, fell to his death. In Fetzer v. Noel Construction Co., 175 Ill App 401, the defendant’s servant had placed a plank across an elevator shaft in an unfinished building under construction. This plank extended into the next shaft. The plaintiff, while riding down on an elevator in that shaft, was injured when the elevator in which he was riding struck the plank and it bounded up. In Markus v. Lake County Ready-Mix Co., 6 Ill App2d 420, 128 NE2d 370, the plaintiff was injured when a ready-mix truck slid sideways when the earth on which it was parked gave way. In Garrity v. W. J. Newman & Co., 202 Ill App 194, plaintiff was injured when he fell into a hole negligently left uncovered by the defendant’s employees. In Lisle v. Anderson, 61 Okla 68, 159 P 278, plaintiff was injured when one of the defendant’s wooden joists upon which he was standing gave way. The joist was described as “windshaken or worm-eaten.” In Smith v. Brady, 121 NYS 474, plaintiff was injured when several bags of sugar weighing approximately 350 pounds each fell on him. The bags fell because they had been left standing in such manner that the ones on top were overhanging. I fail to see how the negligence in the cases cited is any more “affirmative, active or positive” than the negligence in the case at bar. It is the defendant’s contention that despite the proposition that a contractor has a duty of ordinary care toward the employees of other contractors, as established in the Illinois cases cited above, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff and defendant were performing entirely separate and individual contracts, each emanating from the owner of the premises and that in the performance of their respective contractual duties, neither plaintiff nor defendant was obligated to provide the other with a safe place in which he might perform his work. It is his contention that the relationship between plaintiff’s employer and himself was that of licensee-licensor and that the duty of a licensor is merely to refrain from intentionally injuring his licensee. In support of this proposition he cites only three Illinois cases; Roth v. Schaefer, 300 Ill App 464, 21 NE2d 328; Purtell v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 256 Ill 110, 99 NE 899; and Ellguth v. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 Ill 343, 97 NE2d 290, all of which cite the proposition that “the owner of the premises owes no duty to exercise care to keep such premises in a reasonably safe condition to a person who may be there as a mere licensee.” I have no quarrel with this proposition but feel that it is inapplicable to the case at bar. The cases above cited were actions against the owner and controller of the premises. In the case at bar the dispute is between two independent contractors, each working under a separate contract with the owner of the premises who is not a party to the action. Aside from these three Illinois eases, defendant asserts a host of decisions from foreign jurisdictions involving disputes between independent contractors and which make the licensee-licensor as opposed to the invitee-invitor distinction and imposes a lesser standard of liability as a result of this distinction. In Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky 406, 169 SW2d 4, a painter was injured when the scaffold on which he was standing collapsed after he had asked permission from the contractor doing the carpentry work, who owned the scaffold, if he could use same for the purpose of painting a cornice which the carpenters had recently installed. The court held that the carpenter-contractor owed no duty of care to the painter who was a mere licensee in the use of his scaffolding. The identical result was reached in Pettijohn & Sons v. Basham, 126 Va 72, 100 SE 813, wherein a sheet metal worker was injured in the collapse of scaffolding which he was crossing, which also belonged to the carpenter-contractor. In Bilton v. MacKenzie, 19 DLR 633, an Ontario case, the court reached the same result when a painter was killed when a plank, upon which he was walking, belonging to the carpenters, collapsed and he fell to his death. Defendant also cites: Ryan v. Toop, et al., 114 App Div 165, 99 NYS 590; Cole v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co., 218 Mass 71, 105 NE 461; Arthur v. Standard Engineering Co., 193 F2d 903; Eddy v. Brady Plastering Co., 111 Ohio App 190, 171 NE2d 722; Wright v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 236 Mo App 872, 157 SW2d 582; Watt & Sinclair of Florida, Inc. v. Hunter, 126 Fla 750, 171 So 817; Comerford v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 170 Ohio St 117, 162 NE2d 861; Slyter v. Clinton Const. Co. of Cal., 107 Cal App 348, 290 P 643; Cohen v. Josam Const. Corp., 23 Misc2d 298, 200 NYS2d 88. In each of these cases, the plaintiff was using some agency of the defendant’s, either with or without permission, as a means of accomplishing his own job. There was some piece of equipment, erected or owned by another contractor, intended for his own exclusive use, having no relationship to the work of the “licensee,” which was appropriated by him solely for his own convenience. In the case at bar the drain spout was not an agency belonging to the defendant which was being used to accomplish the object of the plaintiff’s employment. The drain spout was the object of the plaintiff’s employment. He was not using it as an aid in accomplishing some other purpose. He was painting the drain spout itself; it was not the means to an end, it was the end, i. e., the object of his employment and, therefore, there was nothing which could be the subject of a license. In summary, it appears that the plaintiff has stated a good cause of action in that the defendant did not fulfill his duty of ordinary care to the employees of another contractor. The issue of contributory negligence was squarely faced by the jury, and properly so, and resolved in favor of the plaintiff. For these reasons, the jury verdict and the judgment of the trial court should not be upset and the decision should be affirmed.