Court Opinion

ID: 9745668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:16:49.580318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:03.943034
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER delivered the opinion of the court: We have denied the Petition for Rehearing in this cause in which the holding of a Michigan Court has been brought to our attention. There it was held that a customer rental endorsement in substantially the same language as in this case did not serve to enlarge personal coverage to a customer driver. (Gulach v. Jerry Davidson Buick, Inc. (1968), 10 Mich.App. 238, 159 N.W.2d 168.) The Michigan Court saw fit to apply a strict technical-legal interpretation, and whether they were presented or considered the question of an ambiguity being created is not disclosed from their opinion. In our consideration of the matter, although the Michigan case was not cited to us, we realized that by applying a strict technical interpretation, we could ignore what the endorsement purported to do but did not do because of the manipulation of words, and excuse Universal from coverage in the case. In its policy Universal displayed, by numerous pages of fine print, its ability to be specific with reference to exclusions, definitions, conditions and limits of liability. It, however, did not choose in its endorsement to be so specific about the exclusion of rental customers; this, in an endorsement which when read separately purported to cover exactly the customer-rental situation which was aUeged in the First Amended Complaint, and admitted for the purpose of the motion by Universal. In fact the endorsement was titled “Customer Rental”.  A contract of insurance, like any other contract is arrived at as a result of the meeting of the minds of the insurer and the insured, and since the insurers draft the policies and endorsements and have experts to do so, and the insureds take what they get, or purport to get, at a cost which for all practical matters is not negotiated but imposed by insurers upon them, with only the choice of being insured or not insured, if any possible ambiguity exists, it must be construed against the insurer. We are not willing to charge the inexpert lay persons such as Regency with tlie responsibility of making or procuring independent technical legal opinions regarding what coverage they are buying, and believe they and the public whom they desire to protect are entitled to rely on language which purports to cover. We do not condone the practice of purporting to cover, that which by technical interpretation is not covered, by one who displays its expertise in dealing with a non-expert in routine business affairs. Universal has again called to our attention that Regency is not complaining here about Universal’s interpretation. We find this unpersuasive in view of the fact that the interests of Regency would now be best served by it, and any other interpretation would serve to make its loss record less desirable and thus result in increased premiums. They would hardly be expected to contend against their best financial interest, and from this record have obviously placed protection of their interest in the hands of their insurer, Universal. They, of course, had no choice but to be a defendant in these proceedings, and are compelled to cooperate with their insurer, if they seek protection. G. MORAN and CREBS, JJ., concur.