Court Opinion

ID: 9861917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:54:30.379373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:47.882087
License: Public Domain

T. M. KavaNagh, J.
(dissenting). Defendants are serving terms in prison as a result of guilty pleas entered on January 9, 1963, to a charge of second-degree murder.
On February 15, 1965, defendants filed with the trial court motions to vacate their pleas and set aside their convictions and requested a new trial. The motions were denied by the circuit judge.
An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied on April 21, 1966, for lack of a meritorious question for review. This Court on December 29, 1966, granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal. 378 Mich 745.
Defendants and one James Armstrong were charged with first-degree murder, pursuant to the statute1 which permits such a charge where a killing-results during armed robbery. The participant .James Armstrong, who actually robbed a store and killed one of the employees, pled guilty to the charge of first-degree murder.
After Armstrong pled guilty on January 9, 1963, the prosecuting attorney moved to amend the information filed against the two defendants herein so as to change the charge from first- to second-*143degree murder. This amendment was concurred in by the defense counsel and the trial judge. To this second-degree murder charge defendants pled guilty and were sentenced.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in accepting their pleas of guilty to murder in the second degree, arguing they could only be guilty of murder in the first degree or guilty of no crime at all. CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548) reads as follows:
“All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or any other ldnd of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be murder of the first degree, and shall be punished by solitary confinement at hard labor in the State prison for life.” (Emphasis supplied.)
CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549) reads as follows:
“All other hinds of murder shall be murder of the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the court trying the same.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The distinction between accessories and principals to crimes has been abolished in Michigan. CL 1948, § 767.39 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.979). This statute reads as follows:
“Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*144The amended information for murder in the second degree pursuant to CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549) was filed January 9, 1963, and read as follows:
“Be informed that Eddie Collins and Alfred Collins, heretofore, to wit: on or about the 23rd day of June, in the year 1962, at the city of Flint, in'said Genesee county, feloniously, unlawfully, but not with premeditated and calculated malice, did kill and murder one Ann Kelush, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Michigan.”
The second contention of defendants is that the pleas of guilty were not made freely, understandingly and voluntarily, without undue influence, compulsion or duress and without a promise of leniency, as required by GCR 1963, 785.3, and therefore their pleas of guilty should have been set aside and a new trial ordered.
Defendants’ third contention is that the trial court erred in convicting the defendant Eddie Collins of a crime in which he was not a participant.
The trial court before permitting the amended information to be filed, and before accepting the pleas of guilty, discussed with the prosecuting attorney the legal questions involved. He concluded that, in reliance upon the cases of People v. Treichel, 229 Mich 303, and People v. Wright, 315 Mich 81, he would permit the filing of the amended information and accept the pleas.
The language in People v. Treichel, supra, relied upon by the trial court, which the court believed authorized it to accept the second-degree murder plea, is as follows (p 307):
“While the statute constitutes murder committed in the perpetration of burglary as in the first degree, *145it does not exclude all lesser degrees if the evidence loarrants.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Treichel defendants contended the trial court should have instructed the jury to confine their deliberations to first-degree murder and, if unable to convict of murder in the first degree, they must find defendants not guilty. Of this Justice Wiest said (p 307):
“The information charged murder without specifying method, or means, or circumstances, and, under the information, murder in either degree, or manslaughter, might he found.”
Justice Wiest further stated (p 308):
“We think the evidence left the question of degree and the included crime of manslaughter to the jury and the court avoided instead of committed error in so submitting it. In People v. Utter, 217 Mich 74, we held (p 86):
“ ‘A simple information charging the common-law essentials of murder may he laid, and the jury convict of any degree which the proof establishes.’ ”
We note the information in the instant case charged statutory second-degree murder rather than common-law murder. Therefore, the Treichel Case, supra, and other cases charging common-law murder do not apply in this case.
We consider first the acts of defendant Alfred Collins to determine whether the evidence against him warrants a conviction of second-degree murder.
Alfred’s participation was summed up by the trial judge at the sentencing of this defendant and, if true, indicates first-degree murder:
“You conceived, planned and urged the commission of this offense. I am convinced that James was chosen for the actual holdup because his identity *146was not as well known as yours, lie having arrived only about three weeks before from Terrill, Arkansas. He was furnished with the gun by you. When James lost his nerve at the Koenig Market, he was by encouragement or even coercion made to continue to the Kelush Market to continue the plan to hold up a store and get some money.
“When the crime was complete and Mrs. Kelush was dead on the floor of the store, you took $26 of the $30 and gave $4 hack to Armstrong and then you even turned your back on Armstrong and gave him no aid after you discovered that something had happened.
“My conclusion is that without you this crime would never have occurred; and at all times, from the time of the formation of the plan until its execution at the Kelush Market, it was you who kept the plan going.
“My opinion is that moral guilt is greater in you than it is on James Willie Armstrong, the man who pulled the trigger.”
In the case of People v. Repke, 103 Mich 459, Justice LonNg, writing for the Court, said (p 470):
“The verdict of the jury in the present case is in form that of murder in the first degree, and the direction of the court that they must so find, or acquit the respondent, was proper under the evidence. Any other instruction than this, under the facts and circumstances shown, would have been very improper, as there was no evidence warranting a different direction, and no circumstances which would lessen the degree. It was a willful, deliberate murder, perpetrated by lying in wait, and the statute itself fixes the degree.”
In People v. Nunn, 120 Mich 530, Justice Long, again writing for the Court, said (p 535):
“If the respondent was guilty at all, it was of murder in the first degree, and nothing short of *147that. The jury were left to determine his guilt or innocence, and the court properly instructed them that, if they found him guilty, it must be of murder in the first degree.”
In People v. Utter, 217 Mich 74, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for a homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery. Proofs were confined to that crime and the Court held that no reasonable inference of any other degree of murder could be drawn. The Court held there was no error in the charge to the jury — that their verdict should be murder in the first degree or not guilty— stating (p 86):
“While murder is defined by statute in this State, and the hilling of a human being under specified circumstances made murder in the first degree, it also includes the common-law definition and, where appropriate, a simple information charging the common-law essentials of murder may be laid, and the jury convict of any degree which the proof establishes.”
The Court further stated, after discussing holdings of other jurisdictions (p 88):
“While the authorities in other jurisdictions are not entirely harmonious upon this question we think sound reasoning supports the foregoing views, to which this Court is in effect committed. Defendant was charged with statutory murder, committed by acts and under circumstances declared by statutory definition to constitute murder in the first degree, to which the testimony was confined with no evidence from which a reasonable inference of any other degree could be drawn.”
Justice Kelly, writing for this Court, in People v. Hearn, 354 Mich 468, examined many of our earlier cases, including some of those mentioned above, and concluded (p 474):
*148“There were no reasonable grounds for the jury to find defendant guilty of a lesser degree, and there was a total absence of evidence to support the theory that defendant was guilty of the included offenses rather than murder in the first degree.”
He held that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge as to included offenses.
Justice Dethmers wrote for the Court in People v. Dupuis, 371 Mich 395, also reviewing the early cases, including the Hearn Case. Dupuis was a case where defendant was charged under the felony-murder statute2 when he committed a homicide while in the perpetration of a robbery. Justice Dethmers held that since the charge against defendant was murder in the first degree, the jury’s announced verdict of “guilty as charged” was a proper verdict. The failure of the jury to determine the degree pursuant to the statute was not error as the latter part of the statute defined as first-degree murder all murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery.
Prom the summary of the trial judge we conclude that the defendant Alfred Collins, if guilty of any murder, was guilty of murder in the first degree. "We hold that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty to murder in the second degree.
We now turn to the acts of defendant Eddie Collins. Quoting from the record on the sentencing of this defendant, a statement was made by Mr. Norgren, who was appointed counsel for Eddie Collins, which reads in part as follows:
“Armstrong in particular, who was the trigger-man, and who faced a mandatory life imprisonment sentence, of course, had nothing to lose in his statements, of course, both before and after sentencing, but I would like to quote from his statement that he *149made to the police after lie was picked up and this was made on June 27, 1962, on page 4 of that particular statement. This reference was to the events preceding the holdup when Alfred and Armstrong were in the apartment planning this particular robbery and he was asked this question:
“ ‘Was there any conversation with Eddie Collins relative to this holdup that was to take place?’ and the answer was: ‘No.’
“Then later on he was asked: ‘What was Eddie’s part supposed to be?’
“ ‘Nothing. He just went. He was just in the ear.’ ”
Of this and other statements the trial court said:
“What Mr. Norgren has said about your participation and degree of participation is certainly borne out in the entire case; it’s borne out by the probation department report; it’s borne out completely.
“It’s unfortunate that you do have the passive personality that you have. It’s unfortunate in the sense that you were led into this, and this, of course, I think increases the degree of moral guilt attached to your brother Alfred; this is the older brother, and the older brother, with a dominant personality, who pulled you into this offense. This, of course, is an additional factor to be weighed and was weighed in the sentence imposed upon Alfred, that which Alfred has subjected you to by virtue of his inconsideration and his lack of respect for the law. You went along; but according to all the evidence in the case, did not actively participate; and as Mr. Nor-gren says, I do not know whether you would have actively participated had you been asked, but your degree of guilt is certainly much less than Alfred’s.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We conclude on this record that Eddie Collins could not be guilty of second-degree murder, and therefore the trial court erred in accepting his plea *150of guilty. However, if it is found that he procured, counseled, aided or abetted in the commission of this crime, he is guilty of first-degree murder; if it is not so found, he is guilty of no crime.
A new trial should, he granted in each case, so we need not discuss the other issues raised on appeal.
The judgments of conviction should be reversed and set aside and new trials granted.
Sotjeis and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kava-NAGH, J.

 CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548).

 Homicide committed in perpetration of one of the enumerated felonies. CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548).