Court Opinion

ID: 9947734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 16:04:47.570807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:20.948566
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0121
                                FILED 3-5-2025

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
                         No. B8015JD201904074
                  The Honorable Rick Williams, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Your AZ Lawyer, Phoenix
By Robert Ian Casey
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer L. Thorson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.
                       Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1            Erick W. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination
of his parental rights as to R.W., his daughter, who was born in October
2020.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2           On October 27, 2020, R.W. was born substance exposed to
methamphetamine in California. California Child Protective Services had
custody of R.W. until February 2021, after which she was placed in a foster
home in Arizona so she could live with her half-siblings. When R.W. was
born, Father was incarcerated in Nevada for possessing a stolen vehicle. In
March 2021, after pleading guilty, Father received a sentence ranging from
a minimum of 19 months to a maximum of 48 months, with credit for 153
days of presentence incarceration.

¶3             Father learned about R.W.’s birth from his sister, and once he
was able to send letters from prison, he wrote a letter to the Arizona
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) in May 2021. In that letter, he said he
did “not give up [his] parental rights” and asked that DCS establish his
paternity. After confirming Father’s paternity in August the same year, a
DCS case manager wrote to Father a month later encouraging him to send
cards, letters, and pictures to R.W. Father sent DCS pictures, a couple of
cards, and a letter for R.W. in early October, which DCS acknowledged
receiving a few weeks later.

¶4            The extent and nature of Father’s contact with DCS after this
exchange is disputed. Father claimed that he sent approximately 13 or 14
letters to DCS, and attempted to call DCS numerous times but was unable
to get through. DCS, conversely, noted only three instances during these
proceedings when it received mail from Father. Father also claimed he was

1      The court also terminated R.W.’s mother’s parental rights, but she is
not a party to this appeal.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.
                        Decision of the Court

contacting R.W. through his sister, who had visits with R.W., and that
during such visits Father’s sister arranged calls between him and R.W.
Though Father testified that he informed DCS of such calls, DCS denied
knowing of them. Father admitted he stopped having these calls when his
sister stopped having visits with R.W. for at least 8 months, but he also
claimed he sent letters to R.W. during that time.

¶5             In November 2021, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental
rights based on the length of his sentence under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). A year
later, DCS amended its motion to include abandonment under A.R.S.
§ 8-531(1). In 2022, Father was moved to a prison in California for a separate
series of charges. Between October 2022 and April 2023, Father was moved
to at least four different jails or prisons. In January of 2023, a second case
manager replaced the original. Though Father claimed that he wrote to
DCS informing it of his whereabouts, the new case manager stated she had
no idea where he was, and that it was difficult to find him. When the case
manager was able to contact Father by mail in January 2023, he responded
by sending three letters at the same time.

¶6           The juvenile court held a contested termination adjudication
hearing in April 2023. Father testified about his incarceration, contact
attempts with DCS, and the contact he had and attempted to have with
R.W.     The case manager described her understanding of Father’s
communications with DCS and R.W., and testified that R.W. was doing well
at her placement and would benefit from termination.

¶7            The court found that DCS established both grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. As to the length-of-sentence
ground, the court explained that although “Father was provided
opportunities to establish and build a parent-child relationship through
DCS,” he failed to do so, and that he had been incarcerated throughout
R.W.’s life. The court also took judicial notice that Father had a pending
felony matter in Mohave County, for which there was “an active
extraditable warrant.” For the abandonment ground, the court found that
Father “failed to maintain regular contact with [R.W.] despite having an
opportunity to do so,” and he “made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with her for more than six months.” The court also
determined that termination was in R.W.’s best interests. Father timely
appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.
                        Decision of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

¶8             To terminate parental rights, a court must find (1) by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)
has been proven, and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). We will affirm the juvenile
court’s factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences support
them.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). And
we will affirm the court’s legal conclusions regarding the statutory grounds
for termination “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31. The
“clearly erroneous” standard of review means that “this finding will be
affirmed unless the appellate court determines ‘as a matter of law that no
one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.’” Id. at
481, ¶ 46 (citation omitted).

¶9             Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s legal conclusion
or related factual findings that DCS met its burden of proving the statutory
grounds under § 8-533(B)(4) (length of sentence).2 He has therefore
abandoned and waived any issues relating to the court’s ruling on the
length of sentence ground. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz.
576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (holding that mother’s failure to challenge one of
the grounds for termination constituted waiver and abandonment of any
contention that the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights
on that ground). Even if Father’s briefing can reasonably be construed as
challenging the reunification services component of the length of sentence
ground, Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574 (2021), he has not
shown the court erred.

¶10            Father argues DCS failed to make diligent reunification
efforts by not “even attempt[ing] to find Father when he was incarcerated,”
and by placing the burden on him to communicate with R.W. The record
shows otherwise.

¶11           DCS reached out to Father shortly after confirming his
paternity, offering to forward any cards, letters, and pictures from Father
to R.W. Father evidently understood how to contact DCS and to send such
materials, as he did so three times while incarcerated. These contacts
resemble those noted by our supreme court when it suggested what
incarcerated parents could do to maintain a bond with their children in

2     Father has not challenged the juvenile court’s finding that
termination was in R.W.’s best interests.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.
                        Decision of the Court

Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 17 (noting that “an incarcerated parent can
maintain a bond with a child” in several ways, including through “letters,
pictures, and gifts”).

¶12            Father suggests that DCS was not proactive enough in
locating him as he moved between correctional facilities. Though Father
contends that “DCS had the ability to locate [him] without him having to
be a willing participant” in their searching, the record does not support his
contention. The second DCS case manager testified that she had difficulty
locating Father. When she did locate him, she verified his location and
prepared a letter to send him, but by the time it was ready to send, Father
had already relocated to a different facility. The case manager further
testified that when a parent moves multiple times through a case without
providing updated contact information, it complicates DCS’s ability to
provide services. Father does not explain how, on this record, DCS’s efforts
to locate him were deficient under the unique circumstances of his
incarceration.

¶13            Because Father has not shown that DCS failed to meet its
obligation to reasonably facilitate the type of contacts contemplated under
Jessie D., we do not address Father’s argument, raised for the first time on
appeal, that DCS had a constitutional obligation to provide services before
terminating Father’s rights under the abandonment ground, § 8-533(B)(1).
See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 177, 178–79, ¶¶ 10,
16 (App. 2014) (holding that arguments not raised in the juvenile court are
generally waived on appeal); Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz.
373, 376–77, ¶ 14 (App. 2010) (“[W]e will affirm the termination if any one
of the statutory grounds is proven and if the termination is in the best
interest of the children . . . and accordingly do not address the other
statutory grounds for termination.”).

                                CONCLUSION

¶14           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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