Court Opinion

ID: 9930494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 23:01:40.583341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:27.988636
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/24 Metoyer v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

ERIN METOYER,                                                   B320785

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 20STCV05424
         v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et
al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Serena R. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.

      McElroy Parris, Stephen McElroy; Law Offices of Richard
R. Bredlau, Richard R. Bredlau; The Ehrlich Law Firm and
Jeffrey I. Ehrlich for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell and Melinda Cantrall
for Defendants and Respondents.

                                 _______________________
       This case arises from a collision between plaintiff Erin
Metoyer, who was driving his motorcycle at nearly 100 miles per
hour in an illegal street race on 230th Street, and one of three
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) patrol cars driving
from the opposite direction in a staggered formation. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the three LASD
deputies driving the patrol cars, on the grounds that they were
immune from liability under Government Code section 820.21 and
Vehicle Code section 17004. The court found vicarious immunity
for the County of Los Angeles under section 815.2.2
       Metoyer appeals from the judgment in favor of defendants,
contending the trial court erred in finding immunity. We may
affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on any
ground supported by the record. The parties agree that
appellant’s act of street racing is a hazardous recreational
activity within the meaning of section 831.7, and we do as well.
Appellant contends there is a triable issue of fact concerning
whether the gross negligence exception to that section applies,
while respondents contend appellant has forfeited this claim by
failing to plead gross negligence with sufficient particularity. We
agree with respondents and so affirm the judgment.

1    Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2     Section 815.2, subdivision (b) provides: “Except as
otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an
injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”
(§ 815.2, subd. (b).)

                                 2
                        BACKGROUND
      On the night of May 4, 2019, LASD’s Carson station
received a report of street racing around 230th Street in the City
of Carson. This was not a novel event. Deputies were dispatched
to the area every weekend. The section of 230th Street between
Banning Boulevard and Utility Way was an industrial area
known for street racing.
      That night, LASD Deputies Dillon Reyes, Christopher
Yockey and Everaldo Brito responded to the street racing call,
each in his own patrol car. Deputy Yockey described the call as a
routine, non-emergency call. Deputy Yockey estimated that he
had been called to the area weekly during the 18 months he had
been at the station. The same was true for Deputy Reyes.
       According to Deputy Brito, the Department’s instructions
were to get them to disperse, “not to chase them, not to
apprehend, just pretty much disperse.” According to Deputy
Yockey, the protocol was to safely direct everyone out of the area.
      According to Deputy Reyes, the three met on Utility Way
near 230th Street to plan how to disperse the street racing group.
Deputy Brito testified that the three deputies did not stop, and
their only plan was to “get there, see what [we] have.” As
described by Deputy Reyes, the plan was to have all vehicles turn
west onto 230th Street and drive west in order to disperse the
group toward Banning Boulevard, due to construction on
Wilmington Avenue, which was to the east.
      The deputies drove in a convoy down Utility Way to 230th
Street, with Reyes in the lead, followed by Yockey, followed by
Brito. The deputies turned right onto 230th Street in a staggered
formation, with Deputy Reyes driving west in the east bound
land, Deputy Yockey roughly even with Reyes but in the

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westbound lane. Deputy Brito was in the rear, straddling the
centerline between the eastbound and westbound lanes. None of
the patrol cars had their overhead lights on. Deputy Brito did
not have his headlights on, only his parking lights. Deputy
Yockey believed he had his headlights on.
       On May 4, 2019, the street races on 230th Street began at
Banning Boulevard and went to Utility Way. This was a distance
of about a quarter mile. Seconds before the deputies turned onto
230th Street, appellant began his race against another
motorcyclist. Thus, as appellant began racing, he was driving
towards the deputies, or viewed differently, as the deputies
turned onto 230th Street they were driving toward the racers.
       Analysis of surveillance video, other video and vehicle data
by appellant’s expert shows the patrol cars were accelerating and
were travelling over 40 miles per hour when the collision
occurred. Specifically, Deputy Brito’s vehicle was travelling at
about 61 miles per hour one second before the collision. He then
braked, reducing the speed to about 48 miles per hour at the
moment of collision.
       Appellant testified that he did not see the LASD vehicles
until halfway through his race when they turned on their
overhead lights. He estimated that he was 20 to 50 feet from the
vehicles when the lights appeared. Appellant testified that he
swerved and avoided a collision with the vehicle driven by
Deputy Reyes, and swerved again to avoid the vehicle driven by
Deputy Yockey. Appellant lost control of his motorcycle and
collided with the rear vehicle driven by Deputy Brito.
       It is essentially undisputed that appellant was travelling at
about 100 miles per hour at the time of the collision and was
severely injured by it.

                                 4
                           DISCUSSION
       “A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when
‘all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’ ” (F & H Construction v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 364, 370.) More specifically, when the
moving party is the defendant, the court determines whether
defendant has produced evidence showing one or more elements
of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. If so, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material
fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Hamburg v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 503.)
       “We review the trial court’s summary judgment rulings de
novo, viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff as
the losing party, liberally construing the plaintiff’s evidentiary
submission while strictly scrutinizing the defendant’s own
showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in
the plaintiff’s favor.” (Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438.)
       We are “not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons, if
any, supporting its ruling; we review the ruling, not the
rationale.” (Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 935, 951.) We may affirm the trial court’s ruling
on any ground supported by the record. (Jimenez v. County of
Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.)

                                  5
      Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the deputies were immune under section 831.7, which
applies to hazardous recreational activities. The trial court did
not rule on this ground, but respondents contend we should
affirm the trial court on this alternate ground. We agree.
      Section 831.7 provides: “Neither a public entity nor a public
employee is liable to any person who participates in a hazardous
recreational activity.” (§ 831.7, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b)(3)
specifically provides that “motorized vehicle racing” is a
hazardous recreational activity. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The parties
agree that section 831.7 applies to appellant’s motorcycle racing.
      In opposing summary judgment, appellant relied on
subdivision (c)(1)(E) of section 831.7 which provides an exception
to immunity for “[a]n act of gross negligence by a public entity or
a public employee that is the proximate cause of the injury.”
(§ 831.7, subd. (c)(1)(E).) To support this exception, appellant
offered an expert opinion that specifically described conduct of
the deputies was “so far below the established basic professional
standards that [it] can only be viewed as deliberately reckless
and dangerous.” Respondents objected, in part, that the
declaration was irrelevant and immaterial. The trial court
overruled all of respondents’ objections to the expert’s declaration
without elaboration.
      In their reply to the opposition, respondents stated “it
should be noted Plaintiff did not plead ‘gross negligence’ in his
Complaint, and thus should be prohibited to even raise such a
claim in his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.”

                                 6
      In his opening brief on appeal appellant correctly points out
that gross negligence need not be pleaded as a separate cause of
action. (See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007)
41 Cal.4th 747, 780–781 & fn. 58 [declining to recognize a
separate cause of action for gross negligence]; Rosencrans v.
Dover Images, Ltd. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1088 [“gross
negligence is not an independent cause of action that should have
been separately pled by plaintiffs”].) Appellant acknowledges
only implicitly that it must, however, be pled with particularity.
      It is well established that a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is framed by the pleadings. (Amezcua v. Los
Angeles Harley-Davidson, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 217, 233.)
When a plaintiff brings a tort cause of action against a
governmental entity, he or she is required to plead that cause of
action with particularity. (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 129, 138 [all such causes of action are
statutory, and the general rule is that statutory causes of action
must be pled with particularity]; see Gates v. Superior Court
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 494 [particularity rule applies to
claims against public employees].) Further, the plaintiff must
plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action falls outside any
applicable statutory immunity. (Carr v. City of Newport Beach
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1206–1207 (Carr); City of Los
Angeles, at p. 148; Nealy v. City of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
594, 602; Soliz v. Williams (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 585.)
      Here paragraph 1 of the operative complaint alleges only
that the collision was “due to the negligent and aggressive tactics
employed by all of the involved Deputies.” Paragraph 2 alleges
“All patrol vehicles involved were operated negligently by Deputy
Sheriff personnel and in violation of policy, training, and police

                                 7
practices and procedures.” Paragraph 3 alleges “Plaintiff brings
this action to recover damages caused by the negligent, wanton,
willful, and/or malicious acts” of the deputies. These are legal
conclusions. There are no factual details about the driving and so
no way to discern what the deputies did wrong. As noted in Carr,
“[M]ost of the facts on which plaintiff relies were not pled in the
complaint.” (Carr, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1206–1207.)
Gross negligence was not pled even within the negligence cause
of action.
       Because a motion for summary judgment is framed by the
pleadings, “a party cannot successfully resist such a motion based
on allegations that are not contained in the complaint.” (Heritage
Marketing & Ins. Services, Inc. v. Chrustawka (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) Where a plaintiff opposing a
summary judgment motion fails to request permission to amend
his claims, he has forfeited any right to amend and cannot rely on
matters outside the pleadings to oppose the motion. (Hutton v.
Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493
(Hutton).) Generally, a plaintiff’s opposition, separate statement
and declarations in response to a summary judgment motion are
not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Ibid.)
       Appellant contends there is an exception to the general
rule, found in FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 367 (FPI Development). In that case, the Court of
Appeal found that although the defendant opposing summary
judgment had not pled certain affirmative defenses with the
required particularity, the court would consider the factual
allegations in the defendant’s declarations and evidence to
determine if the plaintiff had adequate notice of the defense.
(Id. at pp. 384–385.) That case, however, does not assist

                                8
appellant because it is based on the moving party’s failure to
raise the pleading issue in the trial court. That is not the case
here.
       In FPI Development, the Court of Appeal noted that
plaintiff had not objected to the defendant’s evidence in support
of the defenses as immaterial. (FPI Development, supra,
231 Cal.App.3d. at pp. 384–385 [noting that plaintiff had not
demurred on this ground, but finding it not determinative].)
Here, respondents did object that the expert’s declaration
concerning negligence was immaterial (and irrelevant).3 More
importantly, respondents did openly contend that appellant had
failed to plead gross negligence; this was not true of the moving
party in FPI Development. (Id. at p. 385 [noting that plaintiffs
had not “openly challenged the adequacy of defendants’ pleading
in the trial court”].)
       Appellant does not offer any explanation for his failure to
request leave to amend his complaint. Absent unusual
circumstances not present here, an expert’s declaration is not a
substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (See Hutton,
supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)

3     As we have noted, the trial court overruled all of
respondents’ objections to appellant’s expert’s declaration on the
issue of negligence. This declaration had some bearing on other
issues in the motion, and we cannot view the court’s bare
evidentiary ruling as finding that gross negligence had been
adequately pled.

                                 9
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Appellant to pay costs on
appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

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