Court Opinion

ID: 9628061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:06:26.814088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:38.238138
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds:
"The evidence recited shows that defendant entered into a major part of the conspiracy in Multnomah County. *239However, a new (for defendant) and additional element was added after the parties had all entered Washington County: it was then that defendant learned for the first time that one object of the group was to take a child from a residence in that County.” 54 Or App at 238.
While I agree the evidence would support the factual conclusion recited, I disagree with the legal conclusion that defendant conspired in Washington County.
Conspiracy is defined in ORS 161.450(1), as follows:
"A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if with the intent that conduct constituting a crime punishable as a felony or a Class A misdemeanor be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.”
The statute focuses upon the conduct of an individual and his intent to perform acts, in combination with one or more persons, which constitute a particular crime. Because the statute focuses on intent to commit a particular crime, it is necessary for the state to allege and prove a specific crime was intended by the conspiracy. This is demonstrated by ORS 161.475(2), which specifies that it is a defense to the charge of conspiracy that the act intended by the agreement, if accomplished, would not be a crime.
The indictment alleged two separate conspiracies. The first count alleged the objective of the conspiracy was burglary in the first degree, i.e., to break and enter a dwelling with intent to "commit the crime of custodial interference, assault and harassment therein”; the second count alleged that the object was custodial interference by taking the child from its lawful custodian. The court submitted to the jury only the charge relating to conspiracy to commit burglary by unlawful entry with intent to commit an assault. The defense under ORS 161.475(2) that the conduct intended would not be a crime was sustained here as to the intent to commit the crime of custodial interference by the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion for acquittal. Thus, the majority’s rationale that the object of the conspiracy to get Szelap’s child was made known to defendant for the first time in Washington County does not support affirmance of his conviction for the conspiracy count regarding assault that went to the jury. In order to *240establish venue for that charge, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy to commit that particular crime was intentionally entered into by defendant in Washington County.
There is very little evidence that defendant conspired to break and enter with intent to commit assault. The only testimony regarding this conspiracy came from two of the other co-conspirators and is summarized in the majority opinion. At the first meeting, which occurred prior to defendant’s involvement, the conspirators discussed a basic plan to get Szelap’s property and his child. Spicer testified he later talked to defendant in Multnomah County and enlisted his help in giving them transportation. He testified defendant was never told what the group intended to do. The second meeting included Spicer’s girl friend, Malone, and at a later time, defendant. There was no evidence what the group discussed in defendant’s presence at VIP’s restaurant other than a plan to cut the telephone wire. Spicer testified defendant was not made aware of the burglary plan. The only other discussion regarding the planned activity occurred after the group arrived in Washington County. Defendant told the latest conspirator to join, Dave Johnson, that they were going to get Szelap’s property. This indicates defendant was aware they were going to get the personal property, but it does not establish defendant knew of or intended to be involved in an assault. Later, while they were all in the car together, Szelap mentioned they were going to get his child.
The only evidence that an assault was contemplated was the fact that Spicer and Allen had agreed to give Szelap "safe conduct” from the house to the car. This agreement was discussed in Multnomah County, but not in the presence of defendant. Dave Johnson had a club when arrested, and there was a baseball bat in the front seat of defendant’s car when he was arrested.
I conclude the state has not proven that the conspiracy, as alleged, occurred, if at all, in Washington County. The group went to Washington County to accomplish what they had agreed to do. Defendant entered the conspiracy in Multnomah County. The basic contours of the agreement may have been reaffirmed in Washington *241County. This reaffirmation is not a separate crime committed in Washington County.
Buttler, Warden, and Warren, JJ., join in this dissent.