Court Opinion

ID: 9620146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:39:13.32197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:55.029353
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent. The judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed. That court correctly concluded that Penal Code section 190.2 (sometimes hereafter section 190.2) under Proposition 114 prevails over the identically numbered provision under Proposition 115.
At the June 5, 1990, Primary Election, the voters approved a legislative initiative amendment designated on the ballot as Proposition 114—3,435,095 *993(71.1 percent) in favor and 1,395,087 (28.9 percent) against. (Supp. to Statement of Vote, Prim. Elec. (June 5,1990) p. 13.) The initiative dealt with section 190.2. On June 6, the statutory provision as enacted by this measure became effective. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)
At the same election, the voters approved an initiative constitutional amendment and statute designated on the ballot as Proposition 115— 2,690,115 (57 percent) in favor and 2,026,600 (43 percent) against. (Supp. to Statement of Vote, Prim. Elec. (June 5,1990) p. 13.) This initiative also dealt with section 190.2. The day after the election, the statutory provision as it appears in this measure purportedly became effective. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)
Article II, section 10, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution (hereafter article II, section 10(b)) provides that “If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.”
The threshold question—which will prove to be dispositive—is this: Do Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2 conflict?
Section 190.2 defines the special circumstances that render first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty, and also fixes the conditions of liability for such murderers. Put simply, it expressly authorizes the ultimate sanction in specified situations, and impliedly prohibits it in all others. Further, in the specified situations, it delineates the requirements for responsibility depending on the nature of the murderer’s precise conduct.
Proposition 114’s section 190.2, in substantive part, expands the coverage of the peace-officer-murder special circumstance in the statutory provision as it was originally enacted by broadening the definition of “peace officer.” (Prop. 114, § 16, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(7).) Otherwise, it essentially adheres to the original enactment.
Proposition 115’s section 190.2 purports to make more, and more extensive, changes. For example, it would:
(1) Remove the requirement that special circumstances must be “charged” and “specially” found. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a).)
(2) Extend the witness-killing special circumstance to witnesses in juvenile proceedings as well as those in criminal proceedings. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(10).)
*994(3) Expressly require intent to kill for the prosecutor-murder and judge-murder special circumstances. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(11), (12).)
(4) Expand the felony-murder special circumstance to cover felony-murder/mayhem and—what is alleged here—felony-murder/rape-by-instrument. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(x), (xi).)
(5) Remove the requirement of proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain from the torture-murder special circumstance. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)
(6) Establish that the liability of an actual killer under a special circumstance does not require intent to kill, unless the special circumstance specifically so states. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (b).)
(7) Establish that for the special circumstances generally, the liability of an aider and abettor requires intent to kill. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (c).)
(8) Establish that for the felony-murder special circumstance specifically, the liability of an aider and abettor does not require intent to kill, but only reckless indifference to human life and major participation in the underlying felony. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (d).)
Proposition 115’s section 190.2, however, does not purport to make any substantive change in the peace-officer-murder special circumstance. (Prop. 115, § 10, affecting Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(7).)
In view of the foregoing, only one answer can be given to the question whether Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2 conflict. That answer is, and must be, affirmative.
For present purposes, we need consider only the felony-murder/rape-by-instrument special circumstance, which is alleged here. As stated, Proposition 114’s section 190.2 defines the special circumstances that render first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty. Only the situations specified therein allow the ultimate sanction. They do not include felony-murder/rape-by-instrument. Hence, death is barred under such facts. Similarly, Proposition 115’s section 190.2 defines the special circumstances that render first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty. Only the situations specified therein allow the ultimate sanction. These do include felony-murder/rape-by-instrument. Hence, death is permitted under such facts.
*995It is axiomatic that two provisions conflict when one authorizes what the other prohibits. That is the case here. As shown, Proposition 115’s section 190.2 permits the death penalty for felony-murder/rape-by-instrument. By contrast, Proposition 114’s section 190.2 bars that punishment in the same situation.
Therefore, under article II, section 10(b), the following result is mandated as between the conflicting provisions: Proposition 114’s section 190.2, which received a higher vote, must prevail over Proposition 115’s section 190.2, which received a lower vote.
The majority conclude to the contrary. In essence, they seek to avoid the mandate of article II, section 10(b) by simply denying the existence of the conflict.
At the threshold, the majority “construe ‘provision’ [under article II, section 10(b)] to mean a paragraph (or a numbered subpart of a paragraph) of a measure." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 988, fn. 5.) The interpretation is gratuitous. One might just as reasonably—or unreasonably—read “provision” to refer to a clause, phrase, or even a single word, if the result desired so demands. The interpretation is also unpersuasive. We usually take “provision” to mean a section of a measure—like section 190.2 in this proceeding. I see no reason to depart from that understanding here.
The majority then assert in substance that Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2 are not “comprehensive schemes” and may not be characterized as “competing” but rather as “complementary” or “supplementary.”
Whether these terms carry any determinate meaning is not clear. They seem to function as little more than conclusory labels. But to the extent that they do have content, they cannot reasonably be applied in the manner of the majority. It is plain that Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2 each fully and exclusively regulate the subject of death eligibility for first degree murderers. Hence, each must be termed a “comprehensive scheme.” Further, whereas Proposition 115’s section 190.2 permits the death penalty for felony-murder/rape-by-instrument, Proposition 114’s section 190.2 bars that punishment in the same situation. Therefore, the two versions of the statutory provision must be deemed “competing.” They certainly cannot be considered “complementary” or “supplementary.” The majority all but declare that the two measures were presented to the voters as such. The implication is without support.
The majority also focus their discussion on the specific amendments proposed by Proposition 114.
*996But the fact remains that the voters enacted Proposition 114’s section 190.2 in its entirety and not merely its specific amendments. I can find no principled means to deny operative force to the whole but to grant it to the parts.
The majority’s analysis here effectively establishes, and ultimately depends on, the following “canon of construction”: In a situation such as this, we presume that the legislative body intends the amendment to the statutory provision but not the statutory provision itself. Such a rule cannot be sound. Applied here, it would compel the conclusion that the voters intended only the following under Proposition 114: “. . . or her ... or her . . . 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, . . . 830.37, . . . 830.5a,. . . or her. . . sueh the . . . sueh the .. . or her ... or her ... or her . . . sueh the . . . such the .. . or her ... or her . . . fireman firefighter ... or her . . . sueh the . . . sueh the. . . fireman firefighter. . .orher. . .orher. . . ero/. . .orshe. . . or her . . . r-as .As . . .or her . . . paragraphs paragraph . . . .” (Ballot Pamp., Prop. 114, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) p. 29.)
The majority then assert in substance that those who proposed the enactment of section 190.2 as it appears in Proposition 114 and those who voted for its passage did so under “compulsion” of article IV, section 9 of the California Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that “[a] section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended.”
Any “compulsion” of this sort is more apparent than real. It is also immaterial. The drafters could certainly have included in Proposition 114’s section 190.2 each and every amendment contained in Proposition 115’s section 190.2. They chose not to do so. Similarly, the voters could surely have rejected Proposition 114 in favor of Proposition 115. They too chose not to do so.
As they reach their conclusion, the majority declare that the dispositive question is whether the voters intended Proposition 114’s section 190.2 to prevail over Proposition 115’s section 190.2. That is simply not the case. When, as here, the provisions conflict, there simply is no question of intent. Article II, section 10(b) mandates that Proposition 114, which received the higher vote, “shall prevail” over the Proposition 115, which received the lower.
The majority ask: What is the intent of the voters when they amend a statute and then, under “compulsion,” reenact the statute as amended?
*997The answer is simple and manifest: To amend the statute and reenact it as amended.
Here, the voters had the same intent as to both Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2—to amend and reenact. The two provisions, however, conflict. Proposition 114’s received the higher vote. It prevails.
In substance and effect, the majority “assume[] that because a majority of voters approved both initiatives, they intended that both take effect to the greatest extent possible. This assumption, however, is incapable of proof. That some voters would have been satisfied with the adoption of either proposition does not suggest that they wanted both, or that the same voters cast a majority of the affirmative votes for each initiative.” (Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 760 [274 Cal.Rptr. 787, 799 P.2d 1220], italics deleted.)
Indeed, on the peculiar facts here, the majority’s “assumption” appears capable of disproof.
At the November 6, 1990, General Election, which immediately followed the June 5, 1990, Primary Election, the voters were presented with an initiative constitutional amendment and statute designated on the ballot as Proposition 129. This initiative would have expressly enacted section 190.2 incorporating the specific amendments of Proposition 115 as well as those of Proposition 114. (Prop. 129, § 15.) The measure failed—5,192,742 (72.37 percent) against and 1,982,369 (27.63 percent) in favor. (Certified Statement of the Vote, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1990) p. 61.)
This is evidence—not compelling perhaps, but persuasive nonetheless— that the voters did not intend that both Proposition 114’s section 190.2 and Proposition 115’s section 190.2 take effect to the greatest extent possible.
It could perhaps be argued that the voters did not specifically intend to reject Proposition 115’s section 190.2 in rejecting Proposition 129, but only one or more of the many other provisions contained in that measure. But it could also be argued that the voters did not specifically intend to adopt Proposition 115’s section 190.2 in adopting Proposition 115 itself, but only one or more of the many other provisions contained in that measure.
*998In conclusion, because I am of the view that Proposition 114’s section 190.2 prevails over Proposition 115’s section 190.2, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied August 20, 1992. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.