Court Opinion

ID: 9905517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:04.681521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.863716
License: Public Domain

J-S36031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  ALFONZO A. POWELL, ON BEHALF OF :            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  M.P.                            :                  PENNSYLVANIA
                                  :
                Appellants        :
                                  :
           v.                     :
                                  :
  NADIA SANFORD                   :
                                  :
                Appellee          :                No. 707 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered February 28, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                    Domestic Relations at No(s): 2211V7016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, Alfonzo A. Powell (“Father”), on behalf of M.P. (“Child”),

appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common

Pleas, under the Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Act,1 in favor of Appellee,

Nadia Sanford (“Mother”). We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

The parties are the parents of Child, who was born in October 2015. After

Child’s birth, the parties divorced. Mother obtained primary physical custody

of Child, and Father received partial physical custody on weekends.         On

November 7, 2022, Father filed a PFA petition, on behalf of Child, against

Mother. In the PFA petition, Father alleged that Child told him that Mother

____________________________________________

1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
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had hit Child on the arm, and Child was afraid of Mother. Based upon these

allegations, the court issued a temporary PFA order and scheduled a hearing

on the matter.

     On February 28, 2023, the court held the PFA hearing.          The court

summarized Father’s testimony as follows:

        [Father] testified that on November 6, 2022, [Child] told
        him that [Mother] had hit him on the arm that day and that
        he was afraid of [Mother]. [Father] testified that in the past
        he has seen bruises on his son “numerous times” and that
        he has “called DHS a lot of times” even though prior to
        November 6th, [Child] “wouldn’t come forward and tell
        [Father] what happened, and so prior to that, [Father]
        couldn’t do anything.”      [Father] introduced photos of
        [Child’s] arm, which were later admitted into evidence.
        When asked if the photos of [Child’s] arm were taken on
        November 6th, [Father] stated that the photos were taken
        on August 29, 2022, and were unrelated to the filing
        incident. The first image, marked P-1, shows a close-up of
        a bruise on [Child’s] forearm. The second photo, marked P-
        2, shows a full body image of [Child] standing with his arm
        outstretched with what appears to be the same bruise as P-
        1.

        [Father] testified about a text message he received from
        [Child] in January 2023. [Father] stated that the text
        message said, “Daddy, please help me,” with crying emojis.
        … [Father] stated that [Child] told [Father] that he was
        scared [Mother] was going to “get him” when she got home
        because he broke a mirror when kicking a ball in the house.
        [Father] testified that when he picked up [Child] for his
        custodial time that week, he asked [Child] if [Mother] had
        hit him. [Father] testified that [Child] told [Father] that
        [Mother] had not hit him.

        [Father] testified that [Child] texted him on January 24,
        2023 that he was leaving [Mother’s] house and never
        coming back. [Father] testified that [Child] sent [Father] a
        video of [Child] leaving [Mother’s] house walking alone with
        no coat on. This video was admitted into evidence. [Father]

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         testified that he called [Child] and asked him what was
         wrong and told [Child] that he was coming. [Father] stated
         that [Child’s] half-sister[, M.A.-R.,] had, by that time, come
         out of [Mother’s] house and had taken [Child’s] phone, so
         [Father] went to [Mother’s] house and knocked on the door.
         [M.A.-R.] would not let [Father] in, so [Father] called the
         police. When the police arrived, [Father] asked them to
         check on [Child]. The police spoke to [Child] and let
         [Father] speak to [Child]. [Father] testified that [Child] told
         [Father] that he was afraid [Mother] was going to beat him
         because he did not zip up his coat after getting off of the
         school bus. [Father] claimed that when he picked [Child]
         up for [Father’s] custodial time that Friday, [Child] told
         [Father] that when [Mother] arrived home on January 24th
         “she kept hitting him, and smacking him, and hit him in his
         head” and beat him with a wooden brush. [Father] did not
         testify to or offer any evidence of physical injury to [Child]
         as a result of this incident. [Father] testified that he filed a
         police report the next day. [Mother] objected to the police
         report being entered into evidence, and the objection was
         sustained.

         [Father] testified that he had a PFA order against [Mother]
         while they were married. [Father] testified that [Mother]
         tried to hit [Child] during [the parties’] marriage. [Father]
         recalled that, more than four years ago, [Mother] “almost
         smashed [Child’s] arm out of his socket trying to get him
         away from me when I was protecting [Child] from her.”

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/5/23, at 2-4) (internal footnote and record

citations omitted).

      Father then called Child to testify. The court began by questioning Child

to determine whether he was competent.

         The [court] established that [Child] knew a truth from a lie.
         The [court] then asked, “So when your mom told you that
         you wouldn’t be going to school, and you would be coming
         here; did she tell you why you were coming here?” [Child]
         answered, “I forgot.” The [court] continued to ask if [Child]
         knew why he was in court today, and again [Child]
         responded, “I really don’t remember.” The [court] asked

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           [Child], “Do you think that we’re here to talk about school?”
           [Child] responded, “Yeah.” The [court] asked [Child] a few
           more questions, and [Child] continued to indicate that he
           thought he was in court to talk about school.

(Id. at 4) (internal record citations omitted).

        The court found Child incompetent to testify. Nevertheless, the court

gave Father a last chance to establish competence. Father’s counsel asked

Child if Child knew where he was, and Child shook his head to indicate that he

did not know. (See N.T. PFA Hearing, 2/28/23, at 57). Counsel asked if Child

knew if he was in a courtroom, and Child nodded his head to indicate that he

did know. (Id. at 57-58). Counsel asked if Child knew why he was in the

courtroom, and child shook his head to indicate that he did not know. (Id. at

58). Counsel asked if anyone told Child why he was in court, and Child said,

“No.” (Id.) Following counsel’s questions, the court excused Child from the

courtroom. Before Child left the courtroom, the court permitted counsel to

ask Child one more question, and counsel asked whether Child was afraid

“right now.” (Id. at 59). Child shook his head to indicate he was not afraid.

(Id.)

        Thereafter, Mother testified that she “never struck [Child].” (Id. at 65).

When asked if she knew how Child got bruises on his arm, Mother noted that

“[Child] is a wild child. He jumps off things and, you know, jumps around.

This is how he got those bruises, I’m assuming.” (Id. at 60). Mother admitted

that she suffers from a “mood disorder,” but she insisted that it does not cause

her to “go into a fit of rage.” (Id. at 63-64). Mother then called M.A.-R., her

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13-year-old child from another relationship, who denied seeing any conduct

by Mother that threatened Child’s safety. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court found that Father had not met his burden of proof. Consequently,

the court vacated the temporary PFA order and dismissed the action without

prejudice.

      On March 20, 2023, Father timely filed a notice of appeal. That same

day, the court ordered Father to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal. Father filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on

April 6, 2023.

      Father now raises two issues for our review:

         Did the court abuse its discretion by ruling that [Child] was
         not competent to testify?

         Did the court abuse its discretion by not considering the
         testimony of [Father]?

(Father’s Brief at 3).

      In his first issue, Father argues the evidence of record supports a

conclusion that Child was competent to testify. Father insists that Child is

“highly intelligent … with the capacity to communicate, to observe events and

accurately recall observations, and to understand the necessity to speak the

truth.” (Id. at 19). Father complains that “[t]he fact that [Child] did not

know why he was in court or that neither of his parents told him why [Child]

was in court in no way as a matter of law justifies a judicial ruling that [Child]

was incompetent as a witness.” (Id.). Father concludes that the court abused

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its discretion in finding that Child was incompetent to testify. We disagree.

      “[T]he purpose of the [PFA Act] is to protect victims of domestic violence

from the perpetrators of that type of abuse and to prevent domestic violence

from occurring.” Diaz v. Nabiyev, 235 A.3d 1270, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(quoting Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 921 (Pa.Super. 2013)).

          Questions concerning the admission or exclusion of
          evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court
          and may be reversed on appeal only when a clear abuse of
          discretion was present. In Snyder v. Snyder, [629 A.2d
          977 (Pa.Super. 1993)], the court held that a person filing a
          [PFA] petition will not be rigorously limited to the specific
          allegation of abuse found in the [p]etition. The court further
          held that in light of the purpose of the Act to prevent
          imminent harm to abused person(s), some flexibility must
          be allowed in the admission of evidence relating to past acts
          of abuse.

Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting

Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa.Super. 2004)) (some internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “In light of the protective purposes

of the act, it [is] within the trial court’s discretion to hear any relevant

evidence that would assist it in its obligation to assess the [complainant]’s

entitlement to and need for a [PFA] order.” Diaz, supra at 1273 (quoting

Miller on behalf of Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa.Super.

1995)).

      “Although    witnesses   are   generally   presumed   to   be   competent,

Pennsylvania law presently requires that child witnesses be examined for

competency.” Interest of K.B., 265 A.3d 818, 821 (Pa.Super. 2021).

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        As we have recently reiterated, this Court historically has
        required that witnesses under the age of fourteen be subject
        to judicial inquiry into their testimonial capacity.         A
        competency hearing of a minor witness is directed to the
        mental capacity of that witness to perceive the nature of the
        events about which he or she is called to testify, to
        understand questions about that subject matter, to
        communicate about the subject at issue, to recall
        information, to distinguish fact from fantasy, and to tell the
        truth. In Pennsylvania, competency is a threshold legal
        issue, to be decided by the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 302-03, 25 A.3d 277, 289-90

(2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     Instantly,   the   court   provided      the   following   explanation   for   its

competency determination:

        Here, [Child] answered most of the questions he was asked
        nonverbally by shaking or nodding his head.         [Child]
        repeatedly indicated that he did not know and/or did not
        remember what he was called to testify about. [Child] was
        suggestible to leading questions, repeating the phrasing of
        the question back to the [court] verbatim.

                                   *      *     *

        At times [Child] started nodding only to shake his head (and
        vice versa). For example, the following exchange occurred
        between [Father’s counsel] and [Child].

           [COUNSEL]:           [Child], do you know where you
           are?

           [THE COURT]:      Indicating for the record, [Child] is
           shaking his head, “No.”

           [COUNSEL]:      Do you know                if   you’re   in   a
           courtroom or—do you know that?

           [THE COURT]:         [Child]    is   shaking      his—he      is
           nodding, “Yes.”

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         [Father’s counsel] further questioned [Child]:

            [COUNSEL]:         All right. Do you have any idea why
            you’re here in this courtroom? No?

            [THE COURT]:    Indicating for the record, [Child is]
            nodding his—shaking his head, “No.”

            [COUNSEL]:         And no one has told you why?

            [CHILD]:           No.

            [COUNSEL]:         No? Okay.

         Although [Child] had the ability to understand the questions
         and frame somewhat appropriate answers, [Child]
         presented as unsure and susceptible to suggestion. In
         combination with his hesitance and uncertainly, [Child’s]
         suggestibility was indicative that he did not have the
         maturity to answer questions accurately and truthfully.
         [Child] was unable to establish a consciousness of the duty
         to speak the truth, as the judge observed that he was not
         meaningfully aware that he was in a courtroom and he could
         not answer questions intelligently. This was immediately
         apparent when [Father’s] attorney asked his first two
         questions     when    attempting     to    establish    witness
         competency. Although the child first testified that he didn’t
         know where he was, when [Father’s] attorney asked if he
         was in a courtroom, the child nodded his head—suggesting
         he would agree to leading questions. [Child] did not know
         what he was called to testify about or why he was in court.
         [Child] stated that he could not remember why he was in
         court, even though he had been told why he would be there.
         Combined with his age and immaturity, [Child’s] lack of
         understanding about the fact that he was at trial, that he
         was being called to testify, and the significance of telling the
         truth in court demonstrated that [Child] was not a
         competent witness.

(Trial Court Opinion at 11-13) (internal record citations omitted).

      Our review of the record supports the court’s analysis.          The court

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properly considered Child’s capacity to perceive the nature of the events about

which he was called to testify.          Based upon Child’s responses, the court

determined that Child’s hesitance, uncertainty, and suggestibility indicated

that Child lacked the maturity to answer questions accurately and truthfully.

See Hutchinson, supra. On this record, we cannot say that the court abused

its discretion in finding Child incompetent to testify. See Buchhalter, supra.

Accordingly, Father is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

       In his second issue, Father emphasizes his own testimony from the PFA

hearing, where he testified that Child reported physical abuse perpetrated by

Mother. In addition to this testimony, Father reiterates that he offered text

messages that confirmed Child’s complaints about abuse.             Father baldly

asserts that the court did not give enough weight to his evidence. On this

basis, Father concludes that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the

PFA petition.2 We disagree.

       “Assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to

their testimony is within the exclusive province of the trial court as the fact

____________________________________________

2 In the argument section for his second issue,     Father also claims that this
Court “must vacate the orders issued by the trial court because the court
modified the shared legal custody provision of the custody order while at the
same time stated that it was not making a decision on custody modification.”
(Father’s Brief at 19). Nevertheless, Father did not include this claim in his
Rule 1925(b) statement. (See Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 4/6/23, at 1-2).
Therefore, this argument is waived. See Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 511
(Pa.Super. 2021) (reiterating that failure to raise specific challenge in concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal results in waiver).

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finder.” S.G. v. R.G., 233 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting S.W. v.

S.F., 196 A.3d 224, 230 (Pa.Super. 2018)). “In reviewing the validity of a

PFA order, this Court must… defer to the [trial] court’s determination of the

credibility of witnesses at the hearing.” C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272,

1276-77 (Pa.Super. 2019).

       Instantly, Mother unambiguously denied hitting Child on November 6,

2022. (See N.T. PFA Hearing at 60). Mother also denied striking Child with

a brush on the subsequent occasion mentioned by Father.          (Id. at 61).

Mother’s testimony was corroborated by M.A.-R., who denied seeing any

conduct by Mother that threatened Child’s safety.3 (Id. at 73-74). The trial

court was free to credit Mother and M.A.-R.’s testimony. See S.G., supra.

Because the record supports the court’s credibility determinations, we decline

Father’s invitation to reweigh the testimony in his favor. See C.H.L., supra.

Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

Date: 11/28/2023
____________________________________________

3 Prior to her testimony, the court questioned M.A.-R. and deemed her
competent. (See N.T. PFA Hearing at 69-72).

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