Court Opinion

ID: 9929911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:06:28.223391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:33.560923
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Kalvitz, 2024-Ohio-392.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                HENRY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 7-23-11
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

GREGORY R. KALVITZ,                                       OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 7-23-12
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

GREGORY R. KALVITZ,                                       OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeals from Henry County Common Pleas Court
                    Trial Court Nos. 23 CR 0011 and 23 CR 0021

         Judgment in Case No. 7-23-11: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part

                         Judgment in Case No. 7-23-12: Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: February 5, 2024

APPEARANCES:

         Jeffrey P. Nunnari for Appellant

         Gwen Howe-Gebers for Appellee
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} In these consolidated appeals, defendant-appellant, Gregory R. Kalvitz

(“Kalvitz”), appeals the July 5, 2023 judgments of conviction and sentence entered

against him in the Henry County Court of Common Pleas, after Kalvitz entered

negotiated pleas of guilty in two separate trial court cases. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part in one of the cases, and affirm in the

other case.

                                   Background

       {¶2} As reflected by filings in the records before us, these cases stemmed

from an educational neglect case that was reported in late 2022 to the Henry County

Job and Family Services agency, involving Kalvitz’s young daughter, E.K. Because

E.K.   was    not   attending   school   as    required,   the   agency   began   an

investigation. Kalvitz refused to cooperate in that investigation, and threatened an

agency caseworker with physical harm. Charges of Contributing to the Unruliness

or Delinquency of a Child were subsequently filed against Kalvitz and E.K.’s

mother, and both parents were court-ordered to produce the child to be interviewed

by Job and Family Services, which the parents failed to do. After several

unsuccessful attempts to get the parents to voluntarily produce the child, a judge

granted temporary custody of E.K. to Job and Family Services and ordered that law

enforcement take physical custody of the child to effectuate that temporary custody

                                         -2-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

order. Officers with the Henry County Sheriff’s Office went to Kalvitz’s residence

and, while the child was not located there, evidence of drug manufacturing was

discovered. A search warrant was obtained and a subsequent search of the property

revealed a marijuana grow operation in Kalvitz’s outbuilding. It was also

discovered that Kalvitz had tampered with his electrical meter in order to avoid

being charged for all the electricity he was using to grow the marijuana.

       {¶3} In Case Number 7-23-11 (Case Number 23CR11 in the trial court), a

five-count indictment was returned against Kalvitz on January 27, 2023, charging

him as follows: Count 1 – Illegal Cultivation of Marijuana, a second-degree felony

in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A) and (C)(5)(e); Count 2 – Having Weapons While

Under Disability, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3); Count 3

– Interference with Custody, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C.

2919.23(A)(1); Count 4 – Menacing, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of

R.C. 2903.22(A) and (B); and Count 5 – Endangering Children, a third-degree

felony in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(6). Count 1 also contained forfeiture

specifications relating to a firearm, an ATV, two campers, and an assortment of

other personal property.

       {¶4} On February 1, 2023, an arraignment was held and Kalvitz pled not

guilty to all counts in the indictment. At that time, the trial court formally appointed

attorney Christopher Zografides to represent Kalvitz. The trial court also set

discovery deadlines, scheduled a pretrial, and set a trial date for April 4, 2023.

                                          -3-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       {¶5} In Case Number 7-23-12 (Case Number 23CR21 in the trial court), a

single-count indictment was filed against Kalvitz on February 22, 2023, charging

him with Theft, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(2).

       {¶6} On March 1, 2023, an arraignment was held in the new case and Kalvitz

pled not guilty to the indictment. As in the earlier case, the trial court formally

appointed attorney Christopher Zografides to represent Kalvitz. The trial court also

set discovery deadlines, scheduled a pretrial, and set a trial date for June 20, 2023.

       {¶7} On March 6, 2023, Kalvitz waived his right to a speedy trial until June

20, 2023 in the first case. The jury trial in that case was then rescheduled for June

20, 2023.

       {¶8} On March 14, 2023, Attorney Zografides filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel in both cases, asserting that “[b]ased upon discussions as well as actions, an

impasse has been reached which makes it impossible for counsel to continue

representing the defendant.” (Docket Nos. 23 and 15, respectively).

       {¶9} On March 14, 2023, Kalvitz filed a pro se motion in the earlier case

requesting that a number of specified things be provided to him in discovery, stating

that he was now representing himself. On March 17, 2023, Kalvitz filed a similar

motion in the second case.

       {¶10} On March 17, 2023, the trial court granted Attorney Zografides’

motions to withdraw as counsel, and appointed attorney Scott Coon to represent

Kalvitz in both cases.

                                         -4-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       {¶11} On March 28, 2023, Attorney Coon filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel in both cases, requesting leave to be excused from the cases “due to a

conflict of interest that has arisen through his representation of the Defendant.”

(Docket Nos. 34 and 25, respectively).

       {¶12} On March 30, 2023, the trial court granted Attorney Coon’s motions to

withdraw. The trial court then appointed attorney Danny Hill to represent Kalvitz

in both cases.

       {¶13} On April 11, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment entry in each case,

noting that a pretrial had been held on April 10, 2023, at which time the defendant

indicated he was going to file a motion to suppress. In those entries, the trial court

scheduled a final pretrial and motion hearing for June 13, 2023 in both cases.

       {¶14} On May 26, 2023, Attorney Hill filed a motion to suppress evidence in

the second case.

       {¶15} On June 2, 2023, Kalvitz filed a pro se, handwritten document titled

“Conflict of Interest” in both cases. In that four-page document, Kalvitz first stated

that his prior attorney had accused Kalvitz of making a death threat against the trial

judge, although Kalvitz claimed the threat had really been made by another inmate

in the jail. In that pro se document, Kalvitz then suggested that he should receive a

lighter sentence for saving the life of the trial judge in light of the threats that had

been made against her. In the document, Kalvitz stated that he knew where both the

prosecutor and the judge lived, which Kalvitz alleged created a conflict of interest

                                          -5-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

that would deprive him of a fair trial. On that same date, Kalvitz also filed a pro se

motion in both cases requesting that his bond be reduced. In yet a third pro se filing

on June 2, 2023, Kalvitz requested that a different attorney, of his choosing, be

appointed to represent him in the two pending cases.

       {¶16} On June 8, 2023, Attorney Hill filed a motion to suppress evidence in

the first case.

       {¶17} On June 15, 2023, an order signed by Chief Justice Sharon Kennedy

of the Ohio Supreme Court was filed in both cases, appointing a new judge to sit by

assignment in the cases.

       {¶18} On June 15, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment entry reflecting that

a suppression hearing had been scheduled for June 13, 2023, but that the hearing

was continued at the request of the defendant. The court ordered that a pretrial

would be held on June 15, 2023 in order to determine whether Kalvitz would be

retaining his own attorney or representing himself.

       {¶19} On June 15, 2023, the parties again appeared in open court, and Kalvitz

entered negotiated pleas of guilty that resolved both cases. Specifically, in the

earlier case, Kalvitz pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, amended to a charge

of Illegal Cultivation of Marijuana, a third-degree felony, and he pled guilty to

Counts 4 and 5 as originally indicted. Kalvitz also admitted to the facts alleged in

the forfeiture specifications in Count 1, agreeing to forfeit the specified property. In

exchange, the state agreed to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 in that indictment. In the

                                          -6-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

second case, Kalvitz pled guilty to the single-count indictment. Pursuant to the

terms of the negotiated plea arrangement, the parties also agreed to a two-year prison

term on Count 1 in the first case, with the sentences on all other counts to be served

concurrently with that two-year term. The State of Ohio also agreed to not

recommend a prison sentence in the case pending against Jessica Downing,

Kalvitz’s co-defendant and the mother of his child.

       {¶20} A sentencing hearing was then held in both cases on that same date.

Pursuant to the sentencing agreement reached by the parties, Kalvitz was sentenced

in the first case to two years in prison on Count 1, to six months in jail on Count 4,

and to one year in prison on Count 5, with those sentences to be served concurrently

with each other, and also concurrent with the sentence in the second case, in which

Kalvitz was sentenced to a 12-month prison term. In the earlier case, it was also

ordered on the record that Kalvitz be sentenced to a mandatory term of post-release

control of not less than one and no more than three years. In the July 5, 2023 entry

journalizing the conviction and sentence in that case, the trial court ordered that

“[t]he defendant shall be subject to post release control of up to three (3) years [.]”.

(Docket No. 60).

       {¶21} On July 18, 2023, Kalvitz filed a pro se notice of appeal in both

cases. On that same date, the trial court filed an order appointing appellate counsel

to represent Kalvitz in the two cases. Kalvitz’s appeals were subsequently

consolidated by this Court for purposes of briefing and argument.

                                          -7-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       On appeal, Kalvitz raises two assignments of error for our review.

                            First Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and
       voluntarily entered.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s sentences are contrary to law.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶22} In the first assignment of error, Kalvitz argues that his guilty pleas in

the two cases were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Specifically, Kalvitz

asserts that remarks made by the trial judge sitting by assignment in the cases

resulted in coercing Kalvitz to plead guilty, thereby negating the voluntariness of

the guilty pleas.

       {¶23} With regard to the voluntariness of a guilty plea when allegations are

made on appeal that the plea resulted from coercion or improper pressure on the part

of the trial court, this Court recently noted in State v. Bodine, 3d Dist. Hardin No.

6-23-03, 2023-Ohio-2197, as follows:

       “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
       made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74
       Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). A plea, if coerced or
       induced by promises or threats renders the plea involuntary. State v.
       Lawson, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-18-20, 2018-Ohio-4922, 2018 WL
       6446476, ¶ 20.

       With respect to a judge’s participation in the plea-bargaining process,
       the Supreme Court of Ohio has cautioned that “the judge’s position in
       the criminal justice system presents a great potential for coerced guilty
       pleas and can easily compromise the impartial position a trial judge
                                         -8-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       should assume.” State v. Byrd, 63 Ohio St.2d 288, 292, 407 N.E.2d
       1384 (1980). Judicial participation is strongly discouraged, but it does
       not render a plea per se involuntary; rather, the “ultimate inquiry is
       whether the judge’s active conduct could have led the defendant to
       believe he could not get a fair trial, including a fair sentence after trial,
       and whether the judicial participation undermined the voluntariness
       of the plea.” Lawson at ¶ 20. We consider the record in its entirety to
       determine the voluntariness of the plea. Id. citing State v. Jabbaar, 8th
       Dist. Cuyahoga, 2013-Ohio-1655, 991 N.E.2d 290, ¶ 29.

Id., at ¶¶ 7-8.

       {¶24} In the instant case, we begin our analysis of the first assignment of error

by reviewing the proceedings, and specifically the interactions between the trial

court and Kalvitz, that preceded the guilty pleas at issue.

       {¶25} The record reflects that on June 13, 2023, the parties were in court for

a previously scheduled hearing on the motions to suppress filed by Kalvitz. Prior

to commencing the suppression hearing, the trial judge introduced himself and noted

the procedural status of the cases on the record. The trial court then informed

Kalvitz that the court was not inclined to accept a plea agreement once a suppression

hearing had been held, which was apparently also the position of the State of

Ohio. Kalvitz responded by saying that he was not ready to move forward with the

suppression hearing. Kalvitz then went on at great length, claiming that he had not

had sufficient contact with his court-appointed attorneys, that he had been unable to

subpoena the officers and view the evidence that he had requested in his prior pro

se motions, that his family had not been able to reach his attorney, that he was being

denied effective counsel, and that the trial court was “withholding exculpatory

                                           -9-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

evidence in this case, violating the Brady Rule.” (6/13/23 Tr., 3). Kalvitz concluded

his harangue by asking to represent himself, or to be released from jail so that he

could retain private counsel.

       {¶26} In response, the trial court noted that Kalvitz had so far been

represented by three different attorneys, that his actions and statements reflected an

attitude that may account for the difficulties with his attorneys, and that self-

representation was very rare. Kalvitz repeated his request for time to explore

retaining a lawyer, which the trial court then granted, ordering that the hearing be

continued. At that time, Kalvitz’s counsel noted for the record that he had met with

Kalvitz in the jail extensively, and discussed with him the motion to

suppress. Kalvitz’s attorney stated that he had explained to Kalvitz that the issues

Kalvitz was concerned with were trial issues, and that Kalvitz was seeming to have

a hard time understanding that. Counsel further noted that he had, in fact, spoken

with his client’s father on the phone and explained the same things to him.

       {¶27} Kalvitz proceeded to again speak at length, asserting that he was

unprepared to handle his own case and arguing that he needed to be released on

bond in order to obtain counsel and prepare for the suppression hearing. The

prosecution then lodged an objection as to any reduction in bond, noting that the

state had reason to believe that Kalvitz had been violating the order that he have no

contact with his codefendant, and asserting that Kalvitz was a flight risk and had

attempted to flee before. Kalvitz argued in response that he had not tried to flee,

                                        -10-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

that he simply had tried to take his daughter out of county to find a different

children’s services agency and that he had always intended to get back in contact

with the courts locally. He additionally noted that he had not taken the child out of

state, but just to Cleveland. The trial court then stated that the bond would not be

modified and that “[i]f I were to address the bond, I’d probably increase it, based on

your attitude.” (6/13/23 Tr., 12). The trial court concluded the proceeding by

scheduling a status hearing in the cases for two days later, and urged caution to

Kalvitz on the issue of self-representation, explaining several potential problems

that can arise and telling Kalvitz he would be advised further about those issues at

the next hearing, should he still wish to represent himself.

        {¶28} On June 15, 2023, the parties were back in court for a pretrial

conference, which began by the trial judge asking Kalvitz if different counsel had

been hired, to which Kalvitz replied, “not yet.” (6/15/23 Tr., 2). The trial court

asked if it was still Kalvitz’s desire to represent himself or if he was willing to

proceed with his present counsel, and Kalvitz stated, “As of this moment I’m going

to proceed and see how it goes.” (Id.). The trial court indicated that was fine, and

explained that they now needed to reschedule the suppression hearing and set a new

trial date.

        {¶29} After scheduling those dates, the trial court addressed Kalvitz

regarding the status of plea negotiations in the cases, encouraging him to weigh the

two-year sentence that he had been offered by the prosecution pursuant to a

                                        -11-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

negotiated plea agreement against the potential sentence of ten or twelve years that

he might face if convicted following trial, once all the facts were known. Kalvitz

replied, “I think we can do a little better than that Your Honor.” (6/15/23 Tr., 4). The

trial court then reiterated the notice that had been given to Kalvitz at the last pretrial

concerning the fact that no plea deal would be accepted after that day.

       {¶30} In response to that, Kalvitz began lodging another litany of complaints

about the charges against him, the investigation relating to his daughter, and stated

that the whole affair was a malicious action on the part of the sheriff who wanted a

reason to check Kalvitz’s residence for marijuana plants. The trial judge stopped

Kalvitz, saying the court had heard enough, but Kalvitz continued to interrupt the

court. The trial judge warned Kalvitz to stop speaking out of turn, telling him to

speak with his attorney, who could then speak to the court. Kalvitz responded to

that by saying that he wanted to address the conflict of interest of the prosecutor due

to the death threat against her, arguing that the prosecutor had a conflict of interest

and needed to step off the case because Kalvitz knew where the prosecutor

lived. Kalvitz pointed out that the prior judge handling the case had stepped down

for the same reason, after a death threat against her had been made. Kalvitz then

asserted that the prosecutor had a family member in Lucas County, which he alleged

would pose some type of conflict with the visiting judge, who was also from that

area. Kalvitz then began arguing that because the wife of the visiting judge was the

                                          -12-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

Lucas County Prosecutor, that presented another conflict of interest in the case and

that a change of venue was necessary.

       {¶31} The trial court explained to Kavlitz that it was well established that the

judge did not have a conflict of interest due to his wife being a prosecutor unless

she was involved in a case over which the judge was presiding. The trial court

explained to Kalvitz that, in any event, the procedure would be to file a motion with

the Ohio Supreme Court and the Chief Justice then would review the conflict

issue. The trial court then added, “I don’t think [the Chief Justice] will, but I would

hope she’d remove me so you could have a different judge, because I’m already

tired of this case and I’ve only been in court twice[.]” (6/15/23 Tr., 7). Kalvitz

began speaking again of the death threats made against the prior judge on the case

and the current prosecutor at their residences, but the trial court asked Kalvitz to

speak no further at that point, and adjourned the proceedings until the suppression

hearing could be held on July 28, 2023. Court was recessed at 10:39 a.m.

       {¶32} The record next reflects that the trial court unexpectedly reconvened in

the two cases at 11:57 a.m. on that same date, June 15, 2023. The trial judge noted

for the record that he had been called back after leaving the building earlier in the

morning, and was told that there had been a potential negotiated plea or pleas

discussed. The trial court asked if someone could tell the court what the potential

plea arrangement was. The prosecutor then set forth the details of the negotiated

                                         -13-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

pleas that had been worked out in the two cases, and defense counsel confirmed the

accuracy of that recitation.

       {¶33} The trial court then addressed Kalvitz at length, confirming that he was

43 years old, had graduated high school, and could read and write the English

language. The trial court outlined in detail the charges to which Kalvitz would be

pleading guilty, the potential penalties, the jointly stipulated sentence that would be

imposed pursuant to the plea arrangement, and the other consideration being granted

by the prosecution in exchange for the guilty pleas, all of which Kalvitz readily

indicated that he understood. The trial court explained the constitutional rights

Kalvitz would be waiving by pleading guilty and Kalvitz expressed his

understanding of those issues. Kalvitz was specifically asked, “Now other than

what we have talked about here, has there been any other promises or threats made

to you to get you to enter these pleas of guilty today?”, and Kalvitz replied, “No,

just the deal we spoke about.” (6/15/23 Tr., 14-15).

       {¶34} At the trial court’s request, Kalvitz set forth the facts upon which his

pleas of guilty were based, with the prosecutor adding a couple details for

clarification. The trial court then reviewed the written plea of guilty forms, which

Kalvitz acknowledged having previously reviewed with his attorney and having

signed. After Kalvitz indicated that he had no questions concerning the negotiated

pleas of guilty, the trial court accepted the pleas. At the request of defense counsel,

because of the agreed-upon sentence, the cases then proceeded directly to a joint

                                         -14-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

sentencing hearing. After both defense counsel and Kalvitz were permitted to, and

did, make statements relating to sentencing, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon

two-year aggregate prison sentence in the cases.

       {¶35} On appeal, Kalvitz asserts that the trial court’s participation in the plea

negotiation process, combined with disdain displayed by the trial judge toward

Kalvitz, served to coerce the guilty pleas in these cases. After carefully examining

the trial judge’s role in the proceedings and considering the totality of the record,

we find that the trial court’s conduct did not coerce Kalvitz’s guilty pleas.

       {¶36} With regard to what Kalvitz characterizes as “disdain” toward him by

the trial court, the record reflects that the trial judge was perhaps at times frustrated

with Kalvitz, particularly when Kalvitz appeared at the previously scheduled June

13, 2023 suppression hearing and indicated that he was not prepared to go forward

because he wanted yet another new attorney or, alternatively, to represent himself.

While the trial court did note at that time that Kalvitz was “difficult” and seemed to

have an “attitude”, such comments were not an inaccurate evaluation of Kalvitz’s

ongoing issues with his appointed counsel and reflect a no-nonsense approach by

the trial court in handling certain comments and demands by Kalvitz that were

patently unreasonable. More importantly, notwithstanding the trial court’s frank

assessment of the situation, the court granted Kalvitz the requested continuance of

the suppression hearing and appropriately urged caution concerning self-

representation.

                                          -15-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       {¶37} As to Kalvitz’s claim regarding the trial court’s “participation” in the

plea negotiations, the record reflects that such involvement was primarily limited to

informing Kalvitz that there was a deadline for accepting a plea agreement and in

discussing the potential sentence that would result from entering a negotiated plea.

The trial court never expressly discouraged a trial, nor did the court indicate that a

trial would be futile or unfair.

       {¶38} In evaluating Kalvitz’s arguments on appeal, we note that trial courts

in Ohio, unlike federal courts and many courts in other states, may participate to

some extent in plea negotiations. State v. Elliott, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190430,

2021-Ohio-424, ¶ 9, citing State v. Vari, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07-MA-142, 2010-

Ohio-1300, ¶ 20 (“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and a number of courts

in other states prohibit participation by a judge in plea bargain negotiations.”);

compare State v. Byrd, supra, 63 Ohio St.2d at 293 (“Although this court strongly

discourages judge participation in plea negotiations, we do not hold that such

participation per se renders a plea invalid under the Ohio and United States

Constitutions.”). Thus, a trial court may weigh in on a material term of a plea

agreement. State v. Elliott, supra, citing State v. Bonnell, 12th Dist. Clermont No.

CA2001-12-094, 2002-Ohio-5882, ¶¶ 8–13 (affirming the trial court’s participation

in plea negotiation where it was involved in the discussions and promised not to

impose a prison sentence).

                                        -16-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       {¶39} Kalvitz argues that the trial judge himself extended a plea offer to

Kalvitz, based on the trial court commenting at the start of the June 15, 2023 status

conference that, “[B]efore I knew all of the facts I overruled the prosecutor the other

day and made an offer to you, of two years. If you’re convicted of all of these things

I’m not sure what the sentence is and again I’m not sure of all of the evidence but

some of the evidence has been disclosed in the motion to suppress. Um, you could

be looking at ten or twelve years.” (6/15/23 Tr., 3). While the court’s comment

could have perhaps been more precisely worded, it is clear from the overall record

that the trial judge was merely explaining to Kalvitz that, if negotiated pleas were

entered, the court was inclined to impose a two-year sentence, even if the prosecutor

had initially advocated for more time in pretrial discussions between counsel for the

parties and the court.

       {¶40} Likewise, while Kalvitz suggests that the trial court put undue pressure

on him to plead guilty by referencing the potential sentences he faced should he

proceed to trial, “[t]here is no prohibition against a trial judge discussing the

different penalties associated with the plea as opposed to the penalties if convicted

of all the courts of the indictment.” State v. Jabbaar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98218,

2013-Ohio-1655, ¶ 34. “‘[W]hen the trial court labors to make sure that a defendant

understands the charges against him and the possible penalties, this assurance does

not amount to an infringement on the constitutional right to a voluntary plea.’” Id.,

                                         -17-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

quoting State v. Carmicle, 8th Dist. No. 75001, 1999 WL 1000525, *3 (Nov. 4,

1999).

         {¶41} We also consider the voluntariness of the guilty pleas here in light of

the change of plea hearing held on June 15, 2023. The record of that proceeding

reflects, as noted above, that the trial judge had left the courthouse after concluding

the pretrial status conference held on the record earlier that morning, and was then

called upon to return because a negotiated plea agreement had been reached by the

parties in the court’s absence. After court reconvened later that morning, but prior

to accepting Kalvitz’s guilty pleas, the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11

and advised Kalvitz of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading

guilty. The record of the change of plea hearing reflects no hesitation on Kalvitz’s

part in entering the guilty pleas at that hearing. Further, Kalvitz was specifically

asked whether the guilty pleas were the result of any promises or threats having

been made against him, and Kalvitz indicated that the only inducement for his guilty

pleas was the negotiated plea agreement itself.

         {¶42} Finally, we note that Kalvitz was represented by counsel at all times

relevant to his claims here, and that the negotiated pleas of guilty entered by Kalvitz

were highly favorable to him.

         {¶43} In summary, based on our review of the entire record, we find nothing

demonstrating that the trial court’s conduct coerced or undermined the voluntariness

of Kalvitz’s guilty pleas.

                                         -18-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

       {¶44} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                             Second Assignment of Error

       {¶45} In the second assignment of error, which relates solely to Case Number

7-23-11, Kalvitz asserts that the trial court erred in the term of post-release control

that was imposed as part of the sentence. Specifically, Kalvitz argues that the

imposition of up to three years of post-release control renders his sentence contrary

to law, as the controlling statute provides for two years of post-release control for

the offenses of which Kalvitz was convicted. Upon review, we find that Kalvitz is

correct.

       {¶46} The imposition of post-release control is governed by R.C. 2967.28.

Under that statute, post-release control may be either mandatory or discretionary,

and the length of the post-release control term varies, depending upon the offense

for which an offender is being sentenced.

       {¶47} R.C. 2967.28(B) provides for the imposition of mandatory post-release

control in certain instances, stating that “[e]ach sentence to a prison term * * * for a

felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense,

or for a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony

sex offense shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of

post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from

imprisonment.” R.C. 2967.28(B) then further sets forth the length of the term of

                                         -19-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

mandatory post-release control that must be imposed for offenses of the level or

type specified. See R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) through (B)(4).

       {¶48} R.C. 2967.28(C) provides for the imposition of discretionary post-

release control in certain other instances, stating that “[a]ny sentence to a prison

term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division

(B)(1) or (4) of this section shall include a requirement that the offender be subject

to a period of post-release control of up to two years after the offender’s release

from imprisonment, if the parole board * * * determines that a period of post-release

control is necessary for that offender.”

       {¶49} In the case at issue, Kalvitz was convicted and sentenced for two

felonies, Illegal Cultivation of Marijuana and Endangering Children, both being

felonies of the third degree. However, as neither of those third-degree felony

offenses for which Kalvitz was sentenced is an offense of violence as defined in

R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) or a felony sex offense, R.C. 2967.28(B) is not applicable

here. Accordingly, Kalvitz was subject to being sentenced to a discretionary term

of post-release control of up to two years pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(C), not the

mandatory term of post-release control of up to three years that the trial court

imposed.

       {¶50} The second assignment of error is sustained as to Case Number 7-23-

11.

                                           -20-
Case No. 7-23-11 and 7-23-12

                                  Conclusion

      {¶51} In Case Number 7-23-11, having overruled the first assignment of

error but sustained the second assignment of error, the judgment of the Henry

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case

is remanded for resentencing, limited to the proper imposition of post-release

control. See State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238.

      {¶52} In Case Number 7-23-12, having found no error in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Henry County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                         Case Number 7-23-11:
                                                              Affirmed in part,
                                                               reversed in part.

                                                         Case Number 7-23-12:
                                                                   Affirmed.

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

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