Court Opinion

ID: 9963039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:03:57.43587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:16.311577
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed April 24, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0285
                        Lower Tribunal No. 22-8069
                           ________________

                       Tower Hotel, LLC, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                              City of Miami,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Alan Fine, Judge.

     Zarco Einhorn Salkowski, P.A., and Robert Zarco, Michael Braunstein,
and Jacky Beda, for appellants.

      Victoria Méndez, City Attorney and Rachel S. Glorioso Dooley, Senior
Assistant City Attorney, and Marguerite C. Snyder, Assistant City Attorney,
for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      Appellants, the owners of four properties designated as unsafe by the

City of Miami’s Unsafe Structures Panel,1 appeal the trial court’s denial of

their motion for a temporary injunction against demolition. The owners allege

that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that they lacked a

substantial likelihood of success on their claims for breach of contract and

equitable estoppel, which were predicated on the assertion that the City

deliberately withheld issuance of necessary repair permits and prevented

them from being able to timely complete repairs and bring the buildings into

compliance.

                               BACKGROUND

      After all four property owners received final orders from the Unsafe

Structures Panel directing them to repair or demolish the properties, three of

the four owners entered into compliance agreements with the City, giving

them additional time to complete repairs.2 These agreements provided that

“[a]ll building permits shall be obtained and paid for within sixty (60) calendar

days after the [repair] plans have been submitted,” and all repairs must be

1
 See § 8-5, Miami-Dade County Code; § 10-101, City of Miami Code.
2
 The four appellants in this case are Tower Hotel, LLC (located at 1460 NW
7th Street, Miami), Piedra Villas, LLC (located at 2614 SW 8th Street, Miami),
El Shopping, LLC (located at 300 SW 12th Avenue, Miami), and Beatstik,
LLC (located at 439 NW 4th Avenue, Miami). Beatstik did not enter a
compliance agreement with the City.

                                       2
completed within a limited time after issuance of the permits.3 Under these

agreements, the City would be entitled to proceed with demolition

immediately if the owners violated any of their time requirements, though the

owners could also request extensions of time from a building official, and the

owners were barred from undertaking any construction or repair work until

the repair plans had been submitted and approved by the City and all

required permits were obtained from the City. The agreements also included

an enforcement clause expressly providing that they are not enforceable

against the City.

      All four owners timely submitted repair plans within the time required

by the agreements (in Beatstik’s case, the repair or demolish order), and the

City promptly approved the plans as to the three owners subject to the

agreements. However, the City never issued all necessary building permits,

even after approval of the plans, and the owners were consequently unable

to obtain permits or complete repairs within the requisite time after

submission of the plans. None of the owners requested extensions of time

prior to expiration of their deadlines.

3
  Piedra Villas and El Shopping were given 90 days, and Tower Hotel was
given 180 days.

                                          3
      After the City issued stop work notices and attempted to proceed with

demolition, the owners brought the underlying complaint for breach of

contract and equitable estoppel, alleging that the City breached its own

obligations under the repair or demolish orders and compliance agreements

by failing to timely issue the necessary building permits. The trial court

initially granted a stay and an ex parte injunction against demolition, but later

dissolved the stay and injunction and denied the owners’ motion for a

temporary injunction, finding that they lacked a substantial likelihood of

success due to their failure to request extensions of time prior to the permit

deadlines. This appeal followed.

                                  ANALYSIS

      We review a trial court’s order on a motion for temporary injunction via

a hybrid standard whereby the court’s factual findings are reviewed for abuse

of discretion and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See, e.g.,

Quirch Foods LLC v. Broce, 314 So. 3d 327, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). The

party seeking the injunction must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits, (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law,

(3) irreparable harm absent entry of an injunction, and (4) that the

injunction would serve the public interest.” Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown,

LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021). “The party seeking an injunction

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must satisfy each element with competent, substantial evidence.”

Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz, 194 So. 3d 434, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

      We agree that the owners’ inability to enforce the compliance

agreements against the City precluded finding a substantial likelihood of

success on their breach of contract claims.4 Moreover, because Beatstik did

not enter into a compliance agreement, did not receive its permits or

complete repairs within the requisite time, and did not appeal the repair or

demolish order or request an extension of time under the City and County

codes,5 the trial court correctly denied the temporary injunction as to

Beatstik. See Frye v. Miami-Dade County, 2 So. 3d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2009) (affirming denial of temporary injunction against demolition and

finding failure to exhaust administrative remedies where owner failed to

appeal or obtain permits for repair within time specified by Unsafe Structures

4
  While the City disputes the extent to which the compliance agreements
impose an affirmative obligation for it to issue the building permits, it has
conceded that the agreements are a binding contract that modifies the time
limitations for compliance under the Miami-Dade County Code and City of
Miami Code.
5
  See § 8-5(m)–(n), Miami-Dade County Code; § 10-101(m)–(n), City of
Miami Code (providing that owners of unsafe structures may seek an
extension of time from the Unsafe Structures Panel upon a written request
and that an owner or interested party aggrieved by a decision of the Panel
may seek judicial review by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit court within
30 days of rendition of the order).

                                       5
Panel); City of Miami v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 206 So. 3d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA

2015) (same).

      However, the enforceability of the compliance agreements against the

City had no bearing on the other three owners’ likelihood of success on the

equitable estoppel claims, which were predicated not on the enforceability of

the agreements, but their reliance upon the City’s alleged representations

that it would timely approve the permits.

      The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against a
      governmental entity where (1) a property owner in good faith
      reliance (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3)
      has made such a substantial change in position or has incurred
      such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly
      inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he or she acquired.

Castro v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Code Enf’t, 967 So. 2d 230, 233–34 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2007) (granting certiorari to quash enforcement of amendments to

building code that would require demolition of illegal addition to property

where City had repeatedly issued permits encompassing property addition

and owners relied on permits as representations that addition was allowed).

Here, after the three owners subject to the agreements complied with their

initial deadline for submitting repair plans, their ability to comply with the

second deadline for permit issuance depended solely on the City’s approval,

rendering compliance functionally impossible if the City delayed the permit

issuance more than 60 days. Such a delay is exactly what the unrefuted

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timeline shows, and interpreting the agreements in such a way as to allow

the City to unilaterally prevent compliance would both be unreasonable and

render much of the agreement meaningless. See, e.g., Super Cars of Miami,

LLC v. Webster, 300 So. 3d 752, 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (describing the

“cardinal principle of contract interpretation” by which “the contract must be

interpreted in a manner that does not render any provision of the contract

meaningless.” (quotation omitted)).        Although the trial court did not

specifically address the likelihood of success on the estoppel claims, 6 it

found that the owners “have demonstrated that at least some of the

responsibility for their not being able to meet the deadlines they agreed to

falls on the City due to delays in approvals, requirements for changes to

submitted plans, and new requirements based on interim inspections.” The

extent to which these delays were in fact intentional has yet to be

established, but would not preclude application of the doctrine of equitable

estoppel at this juncture.7

6
  The trial court didn’t examine this factor because it determined as a matter
of law that the owners’ failure to seek an extension of time barred the relief
sought. We review a conclusion of law de novo, and we disagree with the
trial court’s interpretation of the contract as preventing equitable estoppel as
a matter of law.
7
  Further, “a temporary injunction is based on limited evidence developed at
a preliminary stage of the case,” so “the parties are not required to
completely prove their cases” at the injunction stage. Hasley v. Harrell, 971
So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

                                       7
      While we emphasize that “equitable estoppel . . . may only be applied

against a governmental entity under exceptional circumstances,” Castro,

967 So. 2d at 233, from the undisputed facts of the record at the time of the

injunction hearing, allowing the City to proceed with demolition based on a

reading of the compliance agreements that gave the owners no reasonable

opportunity to comply with their deadlines would be inconsistent with the

basic principles of fairness that the concept of equitable estoppel is founded

upon. As this court has previously explained:

      Stripped of the legal jargon which lawyers and judges have
      obfuscated it with, the theory of estoppel amounts to nothing
      more than an application of the rules of fair play. One party will
      not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome mat and then
      be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party
      induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is entitled to rely
      on the assurances or commitments of a zoning authority and if
      he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations,
      whether they be in the form of words or deeds. . . .

Id. at 234 (quoting Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d

1320, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Goodman v. Metro. Dade Cnty.

Unsafe Structures Bd., 480 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (granting

certiorari to quash 180-day time limit for repair of unsafe structure where

Board did not have competent evidence to support time limitation for

“extensive” repairs). Based on the record before us, the onus was on the

City after the owners fulfilled their initial obligations. The owners timely

                                       8
submitted plans, which were approved. Based on those approved plans, the

owners timely sought permits. Instead of issuing permits (or providing a

legitimate reason why permits could not be timely issued), the City ran out

the clock and then sought demolition.8 Indeed, the trial court found that at

least part of the delay was attributable to the City. Accordingly, based on the

record and the factual findings made by the trial court, the three owners

subject to the compliance agreements met their burden for a temporary

injunction based on their equitable estoppel claims.        We affirm the trial

court’s denial of a temporary injunction as to Beatstik, LLC, but, based on

the facts present here, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order and

remand for entry of a temporary injunction as to Tower Hotel, LLC, Piedra

Villas, LLC, and El Shopping, LLC.

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

8
  The City posits in its answer brief that, “As Appellants would have it, they
undertook to do no more than submit their building plans to the City and wait.”
But the stipulated timeline submitted to the trial court and part of the record
on appeal contradicts this assertion. The owners submitted the plans,
received approval, and then timely sought permits. The record also reflects
that the owners timely responded to the City at every opportunity. The record
further reflects that the City often changed its approvals of certain portions
of the plans to denials without explanation, and otherwise did not act in good
faith. It frustrates the purpose of a mitigation plan if the City can simply fail
to act and then seek a draconian remedy of demolition based on nothing
more than the owners’ inability to comply with a deadline based on the City’s
own (in)action.

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