Court Opinion

ID: 9716993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:55:42.09876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:50.546691
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE NASH delivered the opinion of the court: In its petition for rehearing the State requests we address the issue of defendant’s “standing” to challenge the entry of the apartment in which he was arrested and the drugs seized. Although we considered that issue to have been implicitly determined by our opinion, we will do so. In Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421, and United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547, the court held that only one whose fourth amendment rights have been violated may benefit by the exclusionary rule and may do so if a governmental invasion occurred in an area in which he had a personal legitimate expectation of privacy. The court rejected its prior holding in Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725, that a “target” defendant against whom a search had been directed or one who was legitimately on the premises searched had an automatic “standing” to contest the legality of the search. We then consider whether under the Rakas-Salvucci standards defendant had such an expectation of privacy in the apartment entered and searched that he may claim the protection of the fourth amendment. The State contends that as defendant was not on his own premises only the tenants, Donald and Theresa Smith, could seek to suppress the fruits of the search which we have deemed to have been unreasonably conducted. As noted in our opinion, the record discloses that the defendant stayed in the Smith apartment occasionally, kept clothes there and paid rent to the Smiths. The record also discloses that on being released after his arrest defendant listed the apartment building address as his own address on the bail bond form which he then executed. It is also apparent he was alone in the apartment when he admitted agent Polan to it although Theresa Smith returned prior to the entry by the other officers. While the United States Supreme Court in Rakas rejected the broad “legitimately on the premises” standard set down in Jones, it found that the holding in Jones would have remained the same under its facts. The court noted that whether one had a recognized property interest in the premises was not dispositive, as a person can also have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the fourth amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion. (Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 142, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 400, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430.) In Jones the defendant was present during the search of an apartment of a friend who had given him permission to use it. He kept a suit and shirt at the apartment and had slept there “maybe a night,” but his home was elsewhere. While the lessee of the apartment was not present at the time of the search and Jones was then its only occupant, the court considered he had a legitimate expectation of privacy which entitled him to the protection of the fourth amendment.  It seems apparent in the present case that Seybold’s status in the Smith apartment exceeded that of a casual guest or visitor and that it was essentially similar to that of the defendant in Jones. This court has held that a defendant has “standing” to contest police entry of his employer’s premises (People v. Davis (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 557, 559-60, 407 N.E.2d 1109, 1112), and in People v. Wilson (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 637, 640, 408 N.E.2d 988, 991, it was noted that an occupant of a motel room is entitled to the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. We conclude on the record before us that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment and could thus assert the protections of the fourth amendment. While this case was heard in the trial court under the broad Jones standard, on review we must not apply the standards set forth in Rakas-Salvucci which apply retroactively. (See People v. Beroukas (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 990.) We have assumed the record is complete as to this issue as the State has not requested the case be remanded for a further evidentiary hearing. We adhere to our opinion, and the petition for rehearing will be denied. Petition for rehearing denied. LINDBERG and REINHARD, JJ., concur.