Court Opinion

ID: 9941907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 11:09:32.878555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.434382
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00414-CV
     ___________________________

  IN THE INTEREST OF C.W., A CHILD

  On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 233-726200-22

  Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. INTRODUCTION

         Appellant, the father of C.W. (Father), appeals from a judgment terminating his

parent–child relationship with C.W.1 In three issues, Father challenges the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the two endangerment predicate

conduct grounds found by the trial court and the evidence supporting the legal and

factual sufficiency of the trial court’s best-interest finding.   See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (b)(2). We affirm.

                                   II. BACKGROUND2

         Mother and C.W. tested positive for methadone and marijuana when Mother

gave birth in June 2020.3 Father––a registered sex offender––was at the hospital

when C.W. was born, and even though the Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) opened an investigation, Mother and Father were allowed

to take C.W. to the home they shared. According to Father, the three received

Family-Based Safety Services from the Department until Mother took C.W. away

from him. While the family was still living together, the Department had opened

       C.W.’s mother (Mother) did not appeal the trial court’s judgment, which also
         1

terminated her parent–child relationship with C.W.

        We present a general summary here and include a more detailed factual
         2

discussion in our analysis of Father’s issues.

         When C.W. was born, Father was fifty-nine years old and Mother was twenty-
         3

seven.

                                            2
another investigation but lost contact with Mother. Mother and C.W. were placed on

the Department’s Child Safety Check Alert List (CSCAL), which is “a list of children

who were referred to[,] or the[ir] families were reported to[,] CPS or CPI, [who] either

lost contact with them or could not find them.”4

      In late May 2022, the month before C.W.’s second birthday, police officers

encountered Mother walking with C.W.5 down the side of the access road or shoulder

of a highway in Dallas County. The police contacted the Department. Mother told

the Department investigator who interviewed her that she had been walking down the

road in an attempt to reach her drug treatment classes. Mother said that she had gone

to inpatient rehab in mid-March 2022, had stayed for sixty-five days, and was

discharged successfully. After her discharge, she had gone to a shelter but was kicked

out for being on methadone treatment.6

      4
       CPI, or Child Protective Investigations, “examines reports of child abuse or
neglect to determine if any child in the family has been abused or neglected.”
https://www.dfps.texas.gov/Investigations/default.asp. CPS, or Child Protective
Services, provides in-home services to children and families and foster care. See
https://www.dfps.texas.gov/Child_Protection/; see also In re M.M., No. 02-21-00153-
CV, 2021 WL 4898665, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, pets. denied)
(mem. op.) (noting that Our Community Our Kids (OCOK) provides these services
in Tarrant County).
      5
       Mother had been “push[ing]” C.W. Although no witness expressly said so, the
context of the evidence suggests that C.W. was in a stroller.
      6
        It is unclear where C.W. was living while Mother was in rehab or how he came
to be in Mother’s possession in late May 2022. Father later told his psychologist that
Mother had “snuck into the home and took [C.W.] away.”

                                           3
      Mother told the Department investigator that she had been “in a domestic

violence relationship” with Father, who had “threatened her several times[; had]

attempted to hit her with [a] car[;] . . . and [had] throw[n] things, such as wrenches and

other tools, at her.” Mother also said that Father “was very aggressive towards her;

that he would hit her and tie her with ropes; . . . and [that he had] . . . threaten[ed] to

kill her family members if they did not tell him where she was.”

      Mother memorialized these allegations in an affidavit that was notarized and

later admitted into evidence at the termination trial. In the affidavit, Mother stated

that she wanted C.W. to be placed in “temperantly custod[y]” [sic] because she was

scared for his safety, as well as her own. Mother wrote, Father “wants me dead [and]

is not afraid to go back to prison for murdering me[;] next time he sees me he will put

a bullet through my head.” According to Mother’s statement, Father had tried to hit

her with a wrench and hammer to prevent her from leaving the home with C.W.,

broke her phone to prevent her from calling the police, convinced her to drink

alcohol until she blacked out, forced her to shave his body so that he could pass a hair

follicle test, and tried to run her over and kill her “for kidnapping his son.” Mother

wrote that the house they had lived in was full of bed bugs and that Father was a

hoarder. She also opined that Father wanted her dead so that he could get full

custody of C.W.

      C.W. was removed from Mother’s custody and placed in foster care. Although

the Department investigator called Father at least twice in the couple of days after the

                                            4
removal, he could not reach Father. Dallas County CPS staff worked on the case

until January 2023, when the case was transferred to Tarrant County and OCOK took

over conservatorship services.

      While the case was pending, Mother struggled with relapses and was in and out

of rehab. She attended visits with C.W. only sporadically. Father completed many

court-ordered services and consistently visited C.W., but he never allowed the

Department to confirm the condition of his home, never acknowledged his role in the

circumstances that led to C.W.’s being found by the side of the road with Mother,

tried to get Mother to recant her statements about his being abusive, continued to

enable Mother’s drug use, thwarted the Department’s attempts to contact her, and

never showed the ability to provide C.W. with a stable home. The Department

ultimately chose to seek termination of the parent–child relationship between C.W.

and his parents.

      After a trial to the court, the trial court found that Father had endangered C.W.

pursuant to Subsections (D) and (E) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) and that

Father had in the past been convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (L).     The trial court also found that termination of the

parent–child relationship between Father and C.W. was in C.W.’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). Father appealed.

                                           5
                                    III. DISCUSSION

       Father’s first two issues in this appeal challenge the legal and factual sufficiency

of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings7: (1) that Father

“knowingly placed or knowingly allowed [C.W.] to remain in conditions or

surroundings which endanger[ed C.W.’s] physical or emotional well-being” and

(2) that Father “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [C.W.] with persons who

engaged in conduct which endanger[ed C.W.’s] physical or emotional well-being.” In

his third issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

prove that termination of his parent–child relationship with C.W. is in C.W.’s best

interest.

A. Standard of Review

       In a suit to terminate a parent–child relationship brought by the Department,

the Department must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that

the parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1);

and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N.,

602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce

in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the

       7
        Although the predicate conduct ground required to terminate the parent–child
relationship was satisfied by the trial court’s finding that Father has a past conviction
for aggravated sexual assault––which Father does not challenge––we nevertheless
review whether the evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s endangerment
findings because they could have collateral consequences for Father. See In re N.G.,
577 S.W.3d 230, 234–36 (Tex. 2019).

                                            6
allegations sought to be established.”       Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; Z.N.,

602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and

demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

       To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw inferences,

but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder settled any

evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done

so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved,

and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id.; In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a

reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

       If we determine that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or

conviction that the Department proved the challenged finding, then the evidence is

legally insufficient. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

       When determining whether the evidence supporting the termination of a

parent–child relationship is factually sufficient, we must perform “an exacting review

of the entire record.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we

give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them with our

                                             7
own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to

decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the

Department proved the challenged finding. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a

firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d

at 18–19.

B. Applicable Law

      Here, the trial court found that Father had endangered C.W. pursuant to

Subsections (D) and (E) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E). To endanger a child in accordance with the statute

means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or

physical health. In re G.F., No. 02-21-00267-CV, 2022 WL 524138, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D), we examine evidence about the child’s

environment to determine if the environment caused the physical or emotional

endangerment. Id. For example, a parent’s conduct in the home—such as illegal drug

use or drug-related criminal activity—can create an environment that endangers a

child’s physical and emotional well-being. Id. Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E), we

ask whether evidence shows that the parent’s conduct directly resulted in the child’s

endangerment.    Id.   The behavior must constitute a voluntary, deliberate, and

conscious course of conduct but need not be directed at the child; we may infer the

                                          8
specific danger to the child’s well-being from the parental misconduct alone. Id.

Courts may consider conduct that occurred outside the child’s presence or after the

child’s removal by the Department. In re C.L.-F., No. 02-22-00021-CV, 2022 WL

2353091, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“Generally, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability

endangers the [child’s] physical and emotional well-being . . . .” In re B.K., No. 02-21-

00175-CV, 2021 WL 5848769, at *8 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Dec. 9, 2021, pet.

denied) (mem. op.).

       Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). And evidence probative of a Subsection

(b)(1) ground may also be probative of best interest. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239,

250 (Tex. 2013).         In reviewing best-interest evidence, we consider nonexclusive

factors that the factfinder may apply:

• the child’s desires;

• the child’s current and future emotional and physical needs;

• the current and future emotional and physical danger to the child;

• the parenting abilities of those seeking custody and programs available to assist
  them;

• the parties’ plans for the child, including the stability of the proposed home or
   placement;

                                             9
• the parent’s acts or omissions suggesting that the existing parent–child relationship
   is inappropriate; and

• any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

C. Application

      1. Endangerment

      As previously noted, the trial court found, pursuant to Subsection (L) of Family

Code Section 161.001(b)(1), that Father had “been convicted . . . under . . . Penal

Code . . . Section 22.021 (aggravated sexual assault),” based on the evidence of his

prior convictions for sexually assaulting his prepubescent stepdaughters. Thus, to

terminate Father’s parent–child relationship with C.W., the trial court did not have to

find any other predicate conduct ground before determining whether termination of

that relationship was in C.W.’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.

2003). But when a parent challenges a Subsection (D) or (E) finding, due process and

due course of law demand that we address the finding and detail our analysis. N.G.,

577 S.W.3d at 235; see also In re C.W., 586 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. 2019) (relying on

N.G.); In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2019) (relying on N.G.). Thus, we will

address whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove at least one of

the endangerment grounds. See In re G.W., No. 02-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 4545568,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                           10
              a. Circumstances at Time of Removal

      The Department investigator who first interviewed Mother at the time of

removal testified that C.W. appeared to be unkempt, and he was dirty. He did not

have any shoes, and he “appeared to be hungry.” Mother told the investigator that

she had a history of drug use8 and mental-health problems: “[s]evere depression,

bipolar, anxiety, and PTSD.”

              b. Department Case Management and Father’s Admissions

      A Dallas County CPS supervisor talked with both Father and Mother on

September 19, 2022, almost four months after the removal.           Mother told the

supervisor that she was in drug treatment at that time but that she would not be clean

on a drug test because “she was still using.” Mother said that she had started using

heroin again because C.W. was in foster care, but she opined that “she would be able

to kick . . . her heroin addiction” if C.W. was placed with her. This statement

concerned the CPS supervisor because “a person under the influence isn’t completely

competent.”

      Father told the supervisor, Mother “doesn’t use in the home,” which sounded

to the supervisor as if “he acknowledge[d] her drug use, but [didn’t have] any

concerns with it.” The CPS supervisor was concerned that Father was minimizing the

effect of Mother’s drug use and was another adult who did not “seem [to] have the

      8
       Mother admitted that she had used heroin while pregnant with C.W.

                                         11
protective capacity to ensure [C.W.’s] safety.” Father reported to the Department that

he was a registered sex offender.

      While Dallas County CPS was still working on the case, Father completed a

psychological evaluation. He told the psychologist that he had five children, two of

whom were adults, “and possibly one more.”           In October 2022, two of those

children––both under the age of two––were in foster care in Tennessee.9 Father told

the psychologist that in May 2022, the same month C.W. and Mother were found by

the side of the road in Dallas County, his wife10––who was at that time pregnant with

his youngest child––had an affair and left him,11 taking their toddler to Tennessee

with her.

      9
        By the time of trial, the Tennessee case was closed, and the children were
living with their maternal grandmother. According to Father, the Tennessee court did
not terminate his parental rights to those children, but he did not have visitation with
them. He later admitted that the trial court’s order in that case prohibited him from
having visitation with those children.
      10
        Father’s wife and Mother are not the same person, nor is Father’s wife the
mother of the stepdaughters he sexually assaulted. Father testified that he began his
sexual relationship with his wife in 2020––the year C.W. was born––when she was
twenty years old. According to Father, although “[t]he courts and the adoptive
mother” alleged that his wife had cognitive delays, she “is very intelligent” and “as
smart as she wants to be.” He did admit that, “possibly,” she was easily manipulated;
he claimed to have “rescued her from an abusive relationship with her ex-boyfriend.”
Father was still married when his youngest child was born in Tennessee.
      11
        It is unclear when Father and his wife married or where Father’s then-
pregnant wife and toddler were living before C.W.’s removal from Mother in Dallas
County. Father’s first child with his wife was born in May 2021, when C.W. was ten
months old, and his second child with his wife was born a year later, almost a week
after C.W.’s removal from Mother’s custody in Dallas County.

                                          12
       Father explained to the psychologist how he met Mother: “[H]e [had] found

[Mother] on the brink of death in a drug-infested area and took her into his home and

helped her to get treatment at a methadone clinic.” He acknowledged that Mother

“had a history of heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine use,” and he asserted

that she had “histrionic personality disorder[12] and . . . issues with anger control” and

that “[s]he became physically aggressive when he would not give her money for

drugs.”13    Father professed not to know that Mother was using heroin in

February 2022, before C.W.’s removal, but he also said Mother was “engaging in

prostitution” at that time.14

       Father told the psychologist that he had smoked marijuana from ages thirteen

through twenty-five and that he had stopped using it while in prison for the next

       12
         According to the psychologist, people with histrionic personality disorder “are
very attention seeking, [and] they may dress provocatively, engage in sexual behaviors
with strangers, [and] always want to be the center of attention. Most of the behaviors
are extreme and in – they’ll do anything to receive attention or affection.”

        The psychologist testified at trial that Father appeared to have “fathered
       13

children [with] women who have significant issues with drug use with the reported
intention of helping them overcome their addictions, and it also appeared that by
engaging in those relationships he enabled . . . the women by providing them the
financial means to purchase drugs.”

        Father reported these facts to the psychologist. It is unclear whether Father
       14

denied knowing about Mother’s purported prostitution.

                                           13
twenty-three years; however, in 2020––after he had completed parole15––he had

started smoking it again recreationally.16

       Based on Father’s psychological testing, the psychologist made the following

recommendations to the Department: (1) that C.W. “remain in foster care indefinitely

and . . . that reunification was not advised at the time, given [Father’s] history of drug

use and the prior aggravated child sexual assault charge[s]”; (2) that Father “complete

a psychiatric evaluation to rule out any additional disorders”; (3) that Father

“participate in drug counseling to address his marijuana use”; (4) that Father undergo

random drug testing; (5) that Father participate in anger management counseling;

(6) that Father “participate in individual counseling to address family relational

concerns, anger control issues, and his poor coping and problem-solving skills”; and

(7) that Father continue taking parenting classes and follow his service plan.

       Mother told the Dallas County CPS caseworker during the investigation “that

she was willing to do whatever she needed to do to get [C.W.] back, whether it was

with her or [Father], but she would not want him placed in the home with both of

them together.” Mother explained that when she and Father were together, the

       According to Father, he was initially released from confinement in 2018, but
       15

he had gone back to prison for a parole violation related to forgetting to charge his
monitoring device.

        Although Father claimed to have completed court-ordered drug counseling by
       16

the time of trial, the Department had received confirmation only that he had initiated
that service. While the case was pending, he had one diluted drug-test sample, which
was presumed positive, but the other five of his drug tests were negative.

                                             14
environment was “toxic” and violent.17 She told the caseworker that Father was

violent and controlling.

      When the caseworker talked with Father in October 2022, he told her that

Mother was in “inpatient detox treatment.” Father was upset about the case with his

children in Tennessee and was trying to get a copy of his drug test. While discussing

his choices in women, Father told the caseworker that he was “a stupid man who has

a poor choice in women; [he would] try to take them in to get them help.” Father

acknowledged that the women he tried to help were usually drug addicts. These

statements concerned the caseworker because she did not think that any woman

Father would bring around C.W. would “be a good choice of a mother figure or an

adult role” in C.W.’s life. The caseworker also tried to speak with Mother at the drug

treatment center but was told that Mother had checked herself out.

      The caseworker talked to Father again several months later. Father denied that

any domestic violence had occurred in the home. “He reported that he blamed

himself for always trying to help [Mother] and nurse her back to health only for her to

get out of the frying pan and back into the fire again, and that he was sorry that [C.W.]

had to go through this.”

      The caseworker and Father also discussed the potential placement of C.W. with

Mother’s sister in South Carolina. Father did not support that placement, but he

could not provide any alternative placements whom he trusted with C.W. During the

      17
        Mother never recounted any specific instances of abuse to the caseworker.

                                           15
conversation, Father sent the caseworker a screenshot of the Texas Penal Code

section defining the offense of extortion; the caseworker understood the reference to

mean that Father “believed that [C.W. had been] stolen from him and that [C.W.]

should have been placed with him at the beginning of the case.” Father also told the

caseworker that the Department was “keeping” C.W. because it was “getting money”

for him.

      In March 2023, Father told the Tarrant County OCOK permanency specialist

that he knew where to find Mother, but he refused to give her address because “it was

a home full of dangerous street gangsters on the west side of Fort Worth.” He

offered to “catch her, if he could, before the next court hearing.” In April 2023,

Mother was admitted to the hospital for an overdose and a staph infection. Mother

told the permanency specialist at that time that she had no place to live after her

eventual discharge, no cell phone, and no transportation.          Mother told the

permanency specialist that Father had physically and sexually abused her when she

lived with him, that some of the abuse had happened in front of C.W., that Father had

forced her to have sex with other men, and “that he was a lonely man who frequented

prostitutes off of Las Vegas Trail in Fort Worth and brought them back to his home.”

      Despite numerous attempts by the permanency specialist to visit and observe

Father’s home––and despite his being ordered by the trial court to allow his home to

be inspected “for safety and appropriateness”––Father refused to allow her to inspect

it and evaded her attempts to make appointments to do so. In the month before trial,

                                         16
the permanency specialist communicated with both Father and Mother. Father called

the permanency specialist and told her that Mother was in rehab, but he refused to

give her the rehab’s telephone number or address because he “didn’t want [Mother] to

have any further issues or affects.” He said that “he had been advising [Mother] on

what to do.”18 Mother called the permanency specialist a week later. She said that she

had lost the permanency specialist’s phone number and that when she had asked

Father for it, he purposefully gave her a wrong number. Mother told the permanency

specialist that Father’s home “was in complete disarray” and that he was angry with

Mother for not returning to Tarrant County to help him clean it. Mother also told the

permanency specialist that Father had “told her not to talk to [OCOK] about what

was going on” at the time of C.W.’s removal and that the permanency specialist was

“evil.”

                c. Father’s and Mother’s Trial Testimony

          According to Father, when he first met Mother, she was sick, hungry, and “in

pretty bad shape.” He fed her and bought her medicine. Father denied everything

Mother wrote in her affidavit when C.W. was removed. For example, he claimed that

he did not try to run over her with a car; instead, he drove around her, giving her a

wide berth, and she slipped and fell while trying to run away from him. Father had

           Mother’s continued contact with Father was concerning to the Department.
          18

                                           17
helped Mother get into rehab multiple times and had talked to her the night before he

testified.

       Father testified that the only trouble he had with working a service plan was

getting vouchers turned in so that he could start the required services. Nevertheless,

he claimed to have completed a psychological evaluation, parenting classes, individual

counseling, and drug and alcohol treatment.19 Father stated, “I completed every

service they asked for.” After paying for and completing services he had found

himself, Father found out that OCOK would not accept those services toward his

plan requirements. He then engaged in OCOK-approved services and paid for them

with his own money.

       Father testified that when OCOK inspected his home after C.W.’s birth, they

“hinted” that it was cluttered, but he had straightened what OCOK had asked of him.

When asked whether his home was livable for a small child at the time of trial, Father

answered, “The child would be isolated to the liv[]able areas. I have baby gates and

items to keep him . . . safe.” He denied being a hoarder and said that he was “a

collector” instead.

        According to the OCOK permanency specialist, Father had completed
       19

domestic-violence class, individual counseling, and parenting classes. But she did not
get confirmation that he had completed drug and alcohol counseling, and Father gave
her no proof of financial stability, nor did he allow her to inspect his home. Thus, she
believed Father had not alleviated any of the Department’s concerns that were present
when C.W. first came into care.

                                          18
      Mother testified via Zoom from a drug treatment center in Houston. She was

scheduled to be released the week after trial to an eighteen-month intensive program

in the Houston area. Mother did not testify at trial about what she had told the

Department representatives throughout the case––that Father was violent to her and

used drugs. Mother thought that the Department’s petition to terminate Father’s

parent–child relationship with C.W. should be denied and that C.W. would be safe

with Father. Regarding the condition of Father’s house,20 she testified,

      He tries to keep everything clean, he really does. He tries to work on it.
      He feels like he needs extra help, sometimes, you know.

             The only thing I say about that is he needs to work on -- stop
      getting things like antiques, you know what I mean, off the side of the
      road, and just sell it.

            I mean, it’s not -- I think it’s a good place for [C.W.] to go to.
      He’s got a room cleaned up. But the house needs to be worked on.

Mother denied that Father was a hoarder, said the dishes and kitchen were “always

washed,” and that “[h]e really tries.”

             d. Analysis

      Father appears to rely on the fact that Mother was a drug addict––and

therefore in his view unreliable––to discount what she told the Department

representatives about his abusive behavior toward her in the home and about the

home’s living conditions. But Father did not object to that evidence; thus, we can

      20
        Although she had not lived there since leaving with C.W., she said Father sent
her pictures of the house.

                                          19
consider it in our analysis. See In re M.S., No. 02-20-00147-CV, 2020 WL 6066400, at

*6 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Oct. 15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). And that evidence

alone is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s Subsection (E)

finding. See, e.g., In re E.T., No. 02-22-00299-CV, 2022 WL 17172492, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Violent or abusive conduct

directed at the other parent or other people, even if it is not committed in the child’s

presence, may . . . be sufficient to show a[n endangering] course of conduct under

[S]ection 161.001(b)(1)(E).” (quoting In re A.S., No. 02-16-00076-CV, 2016 WL

3364838, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.))).21

      But even without considering that evidence, the remaining evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under

Subsection (E).    The evidence is clear and convincing––under both sufficiency

standards of review––to support the trial court’s finding that Father engaged in a

voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that subjected C.W. to a life of

      21
         Father claimed that Mother “had issues with anger control” and would
become “physically aggressive when he would not give her money for drugs.” But the
continued occurrence of the domestic violence––regardless of who was the
aggressor––can be considered in determining endangerment. See, e.g., In re A.L.H.,
624 S.W.3d 47, 57 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (noting that victim’s return to
domestic-violence relationship, “potentially subjecting the children to further
instability,” is a factor that can be considered in determining endangerment). But cf. In
re M.G.P., No. 02-11-00038-CV, 2011 WL 6415168, at *12 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
Dec. 22, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence was legally insufficient
to prove endangerment when mother was victim of domestic violence but mother had
taken precautions to protect herself and limit her abuser’s access to her).

                                           20
uncertainty and instability. While Father attempted to characterize his relationships

with much younger, vulnerable women as rescues, he fathered multiple children with

them in a short period of time––while he was still on parole and immediately

thereafter––and the evidence shows that rather than doing all he could to protect

C.W., Father instead enabled Mother’s drug dependency, resulting in her attempting

to navigate rehab and recovery while caring for C.W. Although Father appeared to be

supportive of Mother’s rehab attempts, the evidence does not show that he was

unaware of Mother’s drug use and its effects on C.W. or that he was trying his best to

provide stability for C.W. properly despite Mother’s drug issues. Cf. In re J.W.,

645 S.W.3d 726, 749–50 (Tex. 2022) (agreeing with principle that a parent’s

knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during pregnancy and corresponding failure

to attempt to protect the unborn child from the effects of that drug use can

contribute to an endangering environment and support an endangerment finding).

Father also admittedly continued to use marijuana or CBD products despite Mother’s

struggle with drug issues.22

       22
         The facts in In re M.P., on which Father relies to argue that his drug use alone
is insufficient evidence to show endangerment, are distinguishable. 618 S.W.3d 88,
106 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2020), rev’d, 639 S.W.3d 700, 703–04 (Tex.
2022) (holding that court should have deleted Subsection (D) and (E) findings from
judgment instead of remanding case to trial court). In that case, there were gaps in
the evidence, and drug use was the primary alleged danger to the child. Id. Here,
Father’s admitted marijuana or CBD use was but one fact that, when considered with
the rest of the evidence––particularly Mother’s inability to get and stay clean––showed
his failure to appreciate and change his enabling course of conduct. See, e.g., J. C.-O. v.

                                            21
      Although Father substantially complied with much of his service plan, he

remained distrustful of the Department and uncooperative so that the Department

was unable to determine if he had made lasting behavioral changes that would allow

him to provide safety and stability for C.W.; he refused to allow the Department to

evaluate whether the home in which he and C.W. would live was appropriate for a

small child; and he stayed in contact with Mother––who continued to use drugs––to

the point that he hoped that Mother would assist in caring for C.W. if he were

returned to Father. See In re G.G.-H., No. 05-23-00437-CV, 2023 WL 6225410, at *2

(Tex. App.––Dallas Sept. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a parent’s failure

to cooperate with the Department can qualify as endangering conduct). Thus, we

hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial

court’s finding under Subsection (E).

      We overrule Father’s second issue.        Because we have concluded that the

evidence is sufficient to support the Subsection (E) finding, we need not address

Father’s first issue challenging the Subsection (D) finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; In

re L.L., No. 02-23-00132-CV, 2023 WL 5767483, at *20 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth

Sept. 7, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-16-00271-CV, 2016 WL 6068263, at *7
(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 14, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                           22
      2. Best Interest

      We also conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove

that termination of the parent–child relationship with Father was in C.W.’s best

interest. That evidence is detailed below using the framework of the Holley factors.

             a. C.W.’s Desires and Needs

      C.W. was too young to communicate his desires; thus, this factor is considered

to be neutral, weighing neither for nor against the trial court’s best-interest finding.

See In re A.H., No. 02-23-00348-CV, 2024 WL 191229, at *5 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth

Jan. 18, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Although there was no evidence about his

individualized emotional and physical needs, the Department did present evidence

pertinent to a child’s general need for stability and permanency. See In re R.E., No. 02-

23-00255-CV, 2023 WL 7851701, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 16, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “[c]hildren need long-term safety and stability; providing

for a child’s physical and emotional needs is of paramount importance”).

      At the time of trial, Father purported to still be in contact with Mother; he had

failed to show that he could protect C.W. from the effects of her addiction and failed

treatment; and he had failed to acknowledge that his tendency to engage in

relationships with and impregnate women with significant problems––drug addiction,

mental-health issues, and anger or violence issues––had failed to provide stability for

C.W. In the months before trial, he had allowed a female friend to come over and

spend the night. When asked about that friend, “[I]sn’t it correct that she hasn’t seen

                                           23
her 12- and 13-year-old children in over two years,” Father answered, “I believe that is

a very bad situation with her and an abusive relationship with her husband, and that

they had falsified criminal complaints against her and had her arrested several times.

And she very much wants to see her children.” There was also evidence that Father’s

poor judgment with women extended to his idea of how C.W. should be cared for.

For example, Father admitted that he “might have, . . . maybe, possibly” proposed

marriage to his individual counselor and that he had asked her to temporarily adopt

C.W. According to Father,

      I believe she was a very good . . . person to be a surrogate mother for my
      son, and possibly help keep him in a happy, healthy home environment.

            If, you know, if I could get her to be a surrogate mother, as
      opposed to having my parental rights terminated, I believe she would
      have made an excellent choice.

      According to the permanency specialist, Father had not shown that he could

provide C.W. with a stable living environment because he had “not allowed [OCOK]

in the house; he reportedly [was] still continuing to allow dangerous individuals into

his home;[23] there ha[d]n’t been very many behavioral changes . . . even if he’[d]

completed some of his services; and there[ was] a concern about his decision-making

and judgment-making ability.” Although Father showed at visits that he loved his son

and that they were engaged, playing and eating food, there had not been “many

opportunities where” he had shown his ability to parent. The permanency specialist

      23
        It is unclear to whom the permanency specialist was referring.

                                          24
did not believe Father had shown he could meet C.W.’s emotional and physical needs:

“[W]ithout us having been able to enter the home, we can’t confirm that [C.W.] would

be placed in a safe environment. We don’t know if [Father] can financially take care

of him. We don’t know if he can cognitively take care of him.” Father had also not

shown he could protect C.W. from emotional and physical danger, and he had not

made “very many behavioral changes.”24

      The evidence regarding Father’s role in the instability of C.W.’s early life and of

Father’s resistance to, and lack of, demonstrated and lasting changes to provide

stability weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d

at 28 (noting as relevant fact that appellant had “exhibited a pattern of conduct that is

inimical to the very idea of child-rearing”); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 119 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that trial court making best-

interest finding can take into account parent’s inability to provide adequate care or

stable lifestyle as well as parent’s poor judgment); cf. L.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00635-CV, 2022 WL 1694474, at *12 (Tex. App.––Austin

May 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that pattern of continuing behavior––

      24
         Thus, the facts of this case do not show, as Father has asserted, that he had
changed or improved the circumstances that had led to C.W.’s removal from custody.
But cf. In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 823–24 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2013, no pet.)
(noting that evidence a person has recently improved her life weighs against a finding
that termination is in a child’s best interest and summarizing evidence showing that
mother in that case had made positive changes).

                                           25
domestic violence––with no appreciable change weighed in favor of finding that

termination was in child’s best interest).

              b. Danger to C.W.

       While Father admitted that he had been convicted of aggravated sexual assault

of two girls under the age of ten, he did not admit that he was guilty of those offenses.

Father also admitted that the State of Texas considers him to be at moderate risk to

reoffend. When asked whether his past convictions should be of concern, Father said

they would not be, in part because of his “severe aversion to homosexuality.”

       The psychologist did not attempt to evaluate Father’s “propensity for any other

sexual harassment towards children” because the Department did not require such

testing and because she “didn’t see a need to go any further than that.”25 However,

she did find Father’s sexual-assault convictions concerning “[b]ecause [they] would

suggest that there is a propensity for the perpetrator to harm children in the future.”

See In re S.G., No. 01-18-00728-CV, 2019 WL 1448870, at *9 (Tex. App.––Houston

[1st Dist.] 2019, pets. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that even remote-in-time

conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child was relevant to determining

whether a parent poses a danger to a child’s physical or emotional well-being).

        Father testified that in the Tennessee child-custody case, that state wanted
       25

him to complete three more years of sex offender treatment at his own expense. But
he opined, “Tennessee can’t order me to go to sex offender treatment.”

                                             26
       According to his psychological testing, Father appeared to possess poor coping

and problem-solving skills “that seemed to affect his judgment and issues of anger

control.”26 Father disagreed with the psychologist’s diagnosis of him, and he pointed

out that she had made errors in her original report, such as saying that C.W. had

tested positive for heroin at birth and had syphilis.

       According to Father, no one was living with him at the time of trial, and he had

not allowed anyone else to live in or “stay periodically in” his home since late

May 2022. When questioned by the Department about the woman he had allowed to

spend the night––and whether the police department had been called to his home

because of her––Father responded,

       I believe that CPS was coming out and alleging that we had murdered a
       one-year-old baby, and the baby was in our home. And after the second
       visit to my home I allowed the Fort Worth Police Department to come
       in and satisfy their curiosity with regards to these outlandish allegations.

       In addition to the evidence detailed above, the evidence also shows that at the

time of trial, nothing had been done to alleviate the endangering circumstances that

had prompted C.W.’s removal. Mother was still unable to make lasting behavioral

changes even after multiple attempts at drug treatment, she had no stable housing or

safe housing situation, Father was still in contact with her, she was afraid for C.W. to

live with her and Father together, and Father had not allowed the Department or

        On cross-examination, the psychologist testified that Father indicated that his
       26

anger issues were that he was the victim of domestic violence in his relationships. He
denied being the aggressor with Mother.

                                            27
OCOK to assess the living conditions in his home.27 Based on all of this evidence,

there was a significant risk of emotional and physical danger to C.W. if his parent–

child relationship with Father was not terminated. See L.M., 2022 WL 1694474,

at *12.

          This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding.

                 c. Parenting Abilities, Plans for C.W., and Available Programs

          Father testified that he was unemployed and received $1,247 a month from

Social Security disability; C.W. received $200 per month from Social Security

disability. Father’s specific expenses––property taxes, utilities, car insurance, and

C.W.’s expenses––before buying food were around $1,000 per month.                   Father

believed he could financially support C.W. with his income.

          Father completed many of the court-ordered services on his plan, and he

arranged for many of them himself. However, the OCOK permanency specialist did

not believe that Father had shown the ability to make lasting changes based on those

services that would enable him to be an appropriate parent.                 The Department

caseworker testified that Father’s visits with C.W. during the case were frequent and

“good.” C.W.’s caregivers had some concerns about Father’s bringing C.W. “too

much candy,” but there were no other problems. According to the permanency

         The ad litem was concerned about the Department’s lack of access to Father’s
          27

house: “[T]he truth is, we cannot really assess if that place is safe, if his house is safe
for the child.”

                                               28
specialist, Father had not missed a visit and interacted and behaved appropriately with

C.W. Nevertheless, the Department had a “continuous concern” that Father had not

followed “the visitation rules in regards to speaking poorly against the Department,

the foster home, and others in the visits.” On one occasion, he had also overfed C.W.

“to the point where [C.W.] vomited before the evening several times.”

      Although the Department had considered Mother’s sister as a placement, she

had declined by the time of trial. Father had told the permanency specialist that he

was considering offering his brother as a placement because he could pass a

background check; however, Father ultimately determined that his brother “wasn’t

responsible.” Father also alluded to a family friend as a possible placement but never

gave the Department that friend’s information. Father testified at trial that he did not

have any family member with whom he felt it would be appropriate to place C.W.28

      Father wanted C.W. returned to his possession. He testified that C.W. “means

the world to me.” If C.W. were returned to Father, he would then make plans for

C.W.’s daycare and education. Father wanted Mother to be able to achieve and

maintain sobriety, and if she did so, he wanted the three of them to have an amicable

relationship. He hoped she would be able to get an apartment and help share in

C.W.’s care.

      28
         According to Father, he had “some very good relatives” who “don’t happen
to live in Texas and . . . don’t want to get involved in going through these legal
matters.”

                                          29
      While the case was pending, Mother told the permanency specialist that she did

not want C.W. to be adopted; she wanted him returned to her. At trial, Mother

testified that she did not want her rights to be terminated because, despite her drug

issues, she thought she was a good mom when clean. When asked whether the trial

court should allow C.W. to be placed with Father, Mother testified, “I think they

should. [Father] loves that little boy with everything in him. That’s all he talks about.

I can’t get him to stop talking about [C.W]. He loves that little boy and he will do

anything in his power to keep that little boy happy and content.”

      The permanency specialist testified that C.W. was “doing wonderful” in his

foster home, was “surrounded by love and nurturing,” was healthy, was in a Pre-K

program and was bilingual, and was “functioning and developing normally like a

regular three year old.” His foster parents could provide him a safe and stable living

environment and wanted to adopt him into their “well-bonded and connected

family.” According to the permanency specialist, “the home is very structured, [with]

two working parents[ and] siblings, and it’s just a wraparound of support in the home.

They take care of all his basic needs, educational needs, medical needs, without any

concern.” The ad litem reported that C.W. “was very bonded with his foster family”

and well taken care of. Mother testified that she had visited with C.W.29 and said he

      29
         Contrary to the OCOK permanency specialist’s testimony that Mother had
not attended any visits with C.W., Mother testified that she had attended some virtual
visits with C.W. In announcing its findings at the end of trial, the trial court noted,

                                           30
seemed to love his foster mother and that the foster family was “doing a good job

with him.”

       The permanency specialist thought that terminating the parent–child

relationship would be in C.W’s best interest:

       [C.W.] is in a very loving and stable environment with . . . adoption-
       motivated parents who adore and love him, they’re able to meet his
       needs for now and in the future, and all his needs are being taken care
       of, and to take him out of that and put him in a . . . different placement
       would not be in his best interest.

       This factor also weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding. See

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (noting that parent’s lack of concrete plan to provide emotional

or physical care for child is relevant to best-interest analysis); In re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d

294, 298 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (“[A] parent’s compliance with a service

plan does not preclude a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.); cf.

J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 (holding that when child is too young to express desires, a trial

court may consider evidence of that child’s bond with foster family).

              d. Acts and Omissions Suggesting Relationship Improper

       Father admitted placing a tracking device in a toy he gave to his children in

Tennessee and that he had a misdemeanor charge pending against him in that state for

doing so. He planned to turn himself in “at some point in the future” but would not

do so until he had “everything set up to have [C.W.] taken care of.” He admitted that

“The mother has not regularly visited or maintained physical contact with the child,
although she has done so by electronic means.”

                                            31
he had not pursued custody of his children in Tennessee because he did not want “to

try to fight CPS on two state fronts” and instead chose to focus on C.W.’s case.

      Father also admitted placing a tracking device in a birthday present that he had

bought C.W. He said he was justified in doing so because his children had been

abducted and he wanted to keep them safe. When asked if he intended to go to the

foster home’s address if his rights were terminated, he said, “I believe on Christmas I

would go and drop his bicycle off.” When asked whether he would do so uninvited,

he answered, “Santa Claus comes uninvited every year.”

      When the permanency specialist called Father in July 2023––two months

before trial––to explain why the Department had changed its goals to termination of

the parent–child relationship, Father “became angry and spoke about an

unannounced visit that [she had] made to his house.”30 According to the permanency

specialist, who is African American, when she asked Father why he would not allow

her in his house, he “responded that he is racist and he is prejudice[d] and someone,

especially [her], would never be allowed into his house.”31 When asked whether she

thought living with a “self-avowed racist” would be in C.W.’s best interest, the

      30
        When asked whether he had ever allowed the permanency specialist to see the
house, Father was evasive; he testified, she “has never scheduled an appointment. She
showed up, unannounced, during the middle of a tornado.”

     When asked if he told her he was a racist, Father said, “I believe I made a
      31

comment with regards to racism.”

                                          32
permanency specialist answered, “No,” because she thought “[i]t would affect [C.W.’s]

social and emotional development.”

       Furthermore, Father’s past convictions––although committed against children

of a different gender––are relevant to the trial court’s consideration of whether he

understood and appreciated appropriate judgment and decision-making when dealing

with children. See S.G., 2019 WL 1448870, at *9.

       We conclude that this factor likewise weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-

interest finding.

              e. Excuses for Parent’s Acts and Omissions

       According to Father, he thought the marijuana he smoked “was legal CBD and

things that they sell in the smoke shop.”

       When asked at trial what he was doing to address his racism, Father answered,

       Well, it’s very difficult in prison. You develop a lot of hatred for people
       acting in an inappropriate manner. And so you’re in there with the
       worst of the worst.

             And I mainly hate stupid people and liars. Maybe I misspoke
       when I said I was a racist. But stupidity and lying are the top two things.
       And it doesn’t matter if you’re black, white, or Mexican, or Chinese, or
       any other race on Earth.

              If you’re a liar, I hate you. And if you’re stupid -- and my
       definition of stupid is you actively passed up an opportunity to learn and
       you’re not trying to better yourself -- then I’ve got no time for you.

               I was very upset. I don’t remember the context of the
       conversations I was having with [the permanency specialist] on the day
       that I spoke that. . . .

                                            33
      Finally, Father argues on appeal that he was justified in not allowing the

permanency specialist to visit his home when she arrived unannounced as tornado

sirens were sounding. But as with Father’s other excuses, the trial court was allowed

to weigh its sincerity and reasonableness, and to determine whether it sufficed as

justification for Father’s action. See In re J.S.H., No. 04-23-00078-CV, 2023 WL

4610052, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 19, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      We hold that this factor also weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest

finding.

             f. Analysis

      The evidence shows that Father had not shown the ability to provide C.W. with

a safe and stable environment.32 Specifically, he continued to seek out questionable

      32
         The permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to
be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). Citing factors
relevant to determining––in pretrial permanency hearings––whether a parent is willing
or able to provide a safe environment, Father contends that the trial court could have
named the Department C.W.’s permanent managing conservator––rather than
terminating their parent–child relationship––with Father’s participation in further
counseling and “a later review of [his] home, his lifestyle, [Mother’s] sobriety, services
completed, [and] housing and employment after completion of her drug
rehabilitation.” See id. § 263.307(b) (listing thirteen factors); see also §§ 263.304–.305
(setting forth findings that must be made at pretrial permanency hearings); In re A.M.,
495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pets. denied) (considering
factors in best-interest determination after termination of parental rights). Many of
these statutory factors overlap with the Holley factors that we have already discussed;
to the extent they do not, they are either not applicable to our analysis or the record
contains no evidence pertinent to them. In any event, because we conclude that the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding, in large
part because of the evidence that Father had not shown the ability to provide a safe
and stable environment for C.W., we are not persuaded by Father’s argument. See In

                                            34
relationships; failed to demonstrate an understanding of why this was a problem for

C.W.; showed a lack of appropriate boundaries; had no concrete plans for taking care

of C.W. and no suitable support system in place; failed to appreciate the potential

negative effect of his recreational marijuana or CBD use on C.W.; and, even more

importantly, failed to acknowledge or make plans for the significant risk to C.W.

posed by his prior conviction. Weighing the Holley factors and the evidence in its

entirety according to the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that the

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

termination of the parent–child relationship between Father and C.W. is in C.W.’s

best interest. See Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545 (legal sufficiency standard of review); C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 18–19 (factual sufficiency standard of review).

      We overrule Father’s third issue.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Father’s dispositive second and third issues, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Dana Womack

                                                      Dana Womack
                                                      Justice

Delivered: February 15, 2024

re J.G., No. 02-21-00020-CV, 2021 WL 2966165, at *11 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
July 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                          35