Court Opinion

ID: 9961888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-20 21:00:33.747593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:09.447725
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4561

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        HAROLD LAMONT PARKER,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:14-cr-00344-WO-1)

        Submitted: April 8, 2024                                          Decided: April 19, 2024

        Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
        PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
        Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Harold Lamont Parker appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised

        release and sentencing him to 21 months’ imprisonment without an additional term of

        supervised release. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

        386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but

        questioning whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. The Government has declined

        to file a brief. Although notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Parker has

        not done so. We affirm.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will

        affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly

        unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly

        unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.

        Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). “A revocation sentence is procedurally

        reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering

        the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable

        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A

        revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for

        concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed. See United States v.

        Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006).

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               “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as

        it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement

        of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks

        omitted). Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable do we

        then determine whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Moulden,

        478 F.3d 652, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007). Although “we must consider the extent of [any]

        variance from the [policy statement] range,” we will not vacate a defendant’s sentence just

        because we conclude a different sentence might have been appropriate. See United

        States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021).

               We conclude that Parker’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively

        reasonable.   Although the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing

        Guidelines policy statement range, it considered the relevant statutory factors and gave

        sufficiently detailed reasons for the sentence imposed, expressly noting Parker’s repeated

        inability to abide by the conditions of his supervised release and his blatant disregard for

        the law.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no

        meritorious grounds for appeal.      We therefore affirm the district court’s revocation

        judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Parker, in writing, of the right to petition

        the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Parker requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Parker.

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              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                  AFFIRMED

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