Court Opinion

ID: 9941186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 01:01:21.367439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:20.233886
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30659        Document: 00517065913             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/15/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                               February 15, 2024
                                      No. 22-30659
                                     ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Meko R. Walker,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 3:22-CV-2011
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Meko Walker moved the district court to vacate his prison sentence
   under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that his trial counsel was
   constitutionally defective. The district court denied Walker’s motion. We
   AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30659      Document: 00517065913          Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-30659

                                         I.
          On October 4, 2017, Thomas Goodin FedExed a package from
   California to Brittany Gix in Monroe, Louisiana. The package was wrapped
   in birthday paper. A drug dog flagged the package, so an officer obtained a
   warrant and searched it. The officer discovered roughly a pound of
   methamphetamine. Police set up a controlled delivery. On October 5 at about
   3:40 PM, an officer dressed as a FedEx driver left the package on Gix’s
   doorstep. Gix retrieved the package and took it into her apartment. Forty-
   five minutes later, Walker arrived at Gix’s apartment, went inside, and
   reemerged holding the package. When Walker got into his car, officers
   arrested him.
          Officers then questioned Gix and searched her phone and apartment.
   Gix told officers the package came from her uncle, Tyrone Johnson, and that
   it contained a present for his daughter. When officers asked Gix why her
   uncle would send a present to her instead of directly to his daughter, Gix said
   she was “really close” to her uncle and “would do anything for” him. In fact,
   the officers’ search revealed the package came from Goodin and that Gix
   communicated extensively with Goodin about the package leading up to its
   delivery.
          Walker, too, was in frequent communication with Goodin. On August
   28, 2017, Goodin texted Walker his new phone number. Walker entered
   Goodin’s number into his contacts under the name “Trouble.” At 2:56 PM
   on the day of the delivery, Walker and Goodin spoke on the phone for almost
   five minutes. Eleven minutes later, Walker and Goodin spoke on the phone
   again, this time for a minute and a half. At 3:10 PM, Goodin texted Walker a
   picture of Goodin’s FedEx shipment receipt, which contained Gix’s address.
   The receipt also showed Goodin paid over $100 to ship the package. Goodin

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   called Walker again at 4:36 PM, but by that time Walker was already in police
   custody.
            Several weeks later, Goodin was arrested by Monroe Police in an
   unrelated traffic stop. Goodin had additional birthday-wrapped packages
   containing methamphetamine in his car.
            Gix and Walker were indicted on two counts related to the October 5
   delivery incident: (1) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
   distribute methamphetamine and (2) attempted possession with intent to
   distribute methamphetamine. Goodin was indicted on the conspiracy count
   and on additional counts of possession with intent to distribute
   methamphetamine and PCP. The Government tried the defendants jointly,
   and a jury found all three guilty as charged. The district court sentenced
   Walker to 144 months of imprisonment.
            Walker appealed. He contended the Government admitted
   insufficient evidence to prove he knew the package contained
   methamphetamine. We rejected Walker’s argument and affirmed his
   conviction. See United States v. Goodin, 835 F. App’x 771, 777–79 (5th Cir.
   2021).
            Walker then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court
   arguing his conviction should be vacated because his trial counsel was
   constitutionally defective. Specifically, Walker argued his counsel (1) failed
   to object to certain statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument, (2)
   failed to advise Walker of his constitutional right to testify, and (3) failed to
   file a motion to sever Walker’s trial from that of his co-conspirators. The
   district court rejected all three arguments without holding an evidentiary
   hearing, and it denied Walker a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
            Walker timely appealed the district court’s order, and a judge of this
   court granted Walker a COA on his right-to-testify and motion-to-sever

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   arguments. We accordingly have jurisdiction to consider Walker’s appeal.
   See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Walker may appeal the district court’s denial
   of his request for an evidentiary hearing as a “corollary” to his appeal of the
   district court’s order denying him relief on his constitutional claim. See
   United States v. Davis, 971 F.3d 524, 534 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
   We review the district court’s denial of Walker’s ineffective-assistance claim
   de novo, United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2020), and its
   denial of Walker’s request for an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion,
   United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008).
                                             II.
                                             A.
           Walker’s ineffective-assistance claim is only viable if his counsel’s
   allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.
   Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 1 To demonstrate prejudice, Walker
   must show a “substantial, not just conceivable,” likelihood that the result of
   his trial would have been different absent his counsel’s alleged errors.
   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) (citation omitted); see also id.
   (noting a substantial likelihood is something short of, but quite close to,
   “more-probable-than-not”). The district court did not hold an evidentiary
   hearing on Walker’s claim, so in evaluating prejudice “we take as true the
   sworn allegations of fact set forth in [Walker’s motion] unless those
   allegations are merely conclusory, contradicted by the record, or inherently
   incredible.” Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation

          _____________________
          1
             Walker contends he need not demonstrate prejudice to succeed on his right-to-
   testify argument because counsel’s interference with defendant’s right to testify
   constitutes a structural error. That argument is foreclosed. See, e.g., United States v.
   Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 453, 456 (5th Cir. 2002).

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                                    No. 22-30659

   omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286
   (2017).
          Taking all Walker’s sworn, plausible allegations as true, we (1) explain
   there is no substantial likelihood that counsel’s alleged failure to inform
   Walker of his right to testify affected the result of Walker’s trial. Then we
   (2) explain there is no substantial likelihood that counsel’s failure to file a
   motion to sever affected the result of Walker’s trial.
                                         1.
          Walker contends his counsel performed deficiently by failing to
   inform him he had a constitutional right to testify. And Walker contends he
   was prejudiced by that failure because, if his counsel had informed him of his
   right to testify, he would have testified, and it is “reasonably probable” that
   the jury would have believed his testimony. To substantiate this argument,
   Walker submitted an affidavit explaining he would have testified: that he had
   no communication with Goodin in the weeks leading up to October 5; that
   Goodin called him on October 5 to ask if he would pick up a birthday present
   from Gix and deliver it to his daughter; that he agreed; that Goodin texted
   him a picture of Goodin’s FedEx shipment receipt, which contained Gix’s
   address; that shortly after, Goodin texted him to ask if he received the
   address; and that he had no knowledge the package contained drugs until
   after he was arrested.
          We accept as true Walker’s assertion that his counsel failed to inform
   him he had a constitutional right to testify, and that Walker would have
   testified if his counsel had informed him of his right to do so. And we assume
   counsel’s failure to inform Walker of his right to testify made counsel’s trial
   performance constitutionally deficient. Even so, Walker’s right-to-testify

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                                         No. 22-30659

   argument fails because he cannot show a substantial likelihood that his
   testimony would have affected the result of his trial.2 That is for two reasons.
           First, if Walker had testified, he would have opened himself to
   impeachment by evidence of his past convictions for burglary, attempted
   theft by fraud, theft greater than $1,500, and possession of PCP. ROA.1380-
   81; see Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). So “putting [Walker] on the stand probably
   would have done more harm than good.” United States v. Harris, 408 F.3d
   186, 192 (5th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th
   Cir. 2002) (finding no prejudice for denial of defendant’s right to testify, in
   part because defendant’s testimony would have allowed prosecution to
   introduce “his extensive criminal record and drug use . . . into evidence”);
   United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 2012) (similar).
           Second, Walker’s proposed testimony is not credible. Walker’s
   affidavit is obviously self-serving. It also fails to make sense of the record. For
   example, the record reflects that Walker and Goodin spoke on the phone
   twice on October 5, but Walker’s affidavit accounts for only one of those
   calls. Additionally, the first phone call lasted almost five minutes. It is
   difficult to see why it would have taken so long for Goodin to ask Walker to
   pick up a package from one location and deliver it to another. More
   fundamentally, Goodin texted Walker a picture of his FedEx receipt, which
   showed Goodin paid over $100 to overnight ship the package. Walker fails to
   explain why he was not suspicious that Goodin paid over $100 to overnight
   ship a birthday present. Cf. ROA.598; 611 (FedEx clerk testifying she was
   “kind of baffled” by Goodin’s decision to pay “over $100” to overnight ship

           _____________________
           2
             We need not accept Walker’s conclusory assertion that there is a reasonable
   probability the jury would have believed his testimony. See Owens, 483 F.3d at 57–58. We
   are required to accept only (1) that Walker would have testified and (2) that his testimony
   would have included the factual assertions contained in his affidavit.

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                                    No. 22-30659

   a gift). Walker similarly fails to explain why he was not suspicious that
   Goodin would ship his daughter’s birthday present to someone other than his
   daughter. Further, Walker’s affidavit suggests Goodin and Walker spoke just
   twice—both times apparently by happenstance—from the time Walker was
   released from prison on February 21, 2017, to the date of the incident on
   October 5, 2017. Walker’s affidavit does not explain why, in light of their
   sparse and apparently unintentional communication, Goodin would ask him
   to serve as Goodin’s courier.
          On all these points Walker’s testimony “would have been subject to
   vigorous and, in all likelihood, damaging cross-examination.” United States
   v. Araujo, 77 F. App’x 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Thus, we think
   it is highly improbable that Walker’s incredible, self-serving testimony would
   have been persuasive to a jury. See id. (defendant not prejudiced by denial of
   right to testify where “aspects of [his] proposed testimony appear[ed]
   incredible”).
          In sum, Walker has failed to carry the “heavy burden” of
   demonstrating he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged infringement of his
   right to testify because he has not shown a substantial likelihood that his
   testimony would have affected the result of his trial. Wines, 691 F.3d at 605.
   His right-to-testify argument accordingly fails.
                                         2.
          Walker next contends his counsel performed deficiently by failing to
   file a motion to sever his trial from Goodin’s trial. And Walker contends he
   was prejudiced by this failure because if his counsel had filed a motion to
   sever, the district court may have granted the motion, which may have
   resulted in Goodin testifying on Walker’s behalf, which may have resulted in
   Walker’s acquittal. To substantiate this chain of maybes, Walker submitted
   an affidavit prepared by Goodin in which Goodin expressed: that he desired

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                                     No. 22-30659

   to testify on Walker’s behalf; that he would have testified he merely asked
   Walker to deliver a birthday present for his daughter, not to deliver
   methamphetamine; and that Walker had no knowledge there was
   methamphetamine in the package. Goodin did not testify in Walker’s defense
   because Goodin’s counsel told him any testimony he offered on Walker’s
   behalf could harm his own defense.
          Even assuming Walker’s counsel was deficient for failing to file a
   motion to sever, Walker’s argument fails because he cannot show a
   substantial likelihood that a motion to sever would have affected the result of
   his trial. That is because in all likelihood, the district court would have denied
   the motion.
          “The federal judicial system evinces a preference for joint trials of
   defendants who are indicted together because joint trials promote efficiency
   and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of
   inconsistent verdicts.” United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 821 (5th Cir.
   2012) (citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, “[i]t is the rule” that
   persons indicted together are tried together. Id. That rule is “especially
   strong when the defendants are charged with committing the same
   conspiracy,” as Walker and Goodin were. United States v. Featherson, 949
   F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1991). So in a case like Walker’s, “[s]everance is
   proper only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
   specific trial right of one of the defendants[] or prevent the jury from making
   a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” United States v. Mitchell, 484
   F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
          Walker claims he was entitled to a severance because he desired to call
   Goodin, a co-defendant, as a witness on his behalf in accordance with his
   Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. See U.S. Const. amend.
   VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have

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   compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”). Severances for
   that reason are allowed only if the defendant can show an “indication” that
   his co-conspirator would actually testify in the event of a severance. United
   States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 625 (5th Cir. 2007).
           Goodin’s affidavit does not meet that standard. Goodin makes clear
   he feared self-incrimination. And Goodin faced the same self-incrimination
   risk with or without severance. Rather, on Goodin’s own theory, he only
   would have testified on Walker’s behalf if (1) the hypothetical severance was
   granted, (2) Goodin went to trial first, and (3) Goodin was convicted first. 3
   That kind of conditional offer to testify does not require a severance. See
   United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1038 (5th Cir. 1996) (collecting
   cases). And given the general rule for jointly trying co-conspirators like these,
   it is highly unlikely the district court would have granted a motion to sever
   on these facts. In fact, Gix did file a motion to sever—and the district court
   denied it. Why? Because it is “the rule . . . that persons indicted together
   should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases,” and “[h]aving one
   trial, (instead of two), would obviously be in the interest of judicial
   economy.” ROA.1498–99.
           Thus, Walker has failed to show a substantial likelihood that his
   counsel’s failure to file a motion to sever affected the result of his trial
   because he has not shown a substantial likelihood that a motion to sever
   would have been granted. His motion-to-sever argument accordingly fails.

           _____________________
           3
             Goodin’s affidavit contains no sworn assertion that Goodin would have made an
   unqualified offer to testify on Walker’s behalf had Walker filed a motion to sever. So we are
   not required to assume Goodin would have made such an offer.

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                                      No. 22-30659

                                           B.
          Finally, Walker argues the district court abused its discretion by
   denying his § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. But a
   district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a prisoner’s § 2255
   motion if “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
   that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see, e.g., United
   States v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992). As we have explained,
   the motion and the files and the records of Walker’s case conclusively show
   Walker was not prejudiced by his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance
   at trial. The district court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by denying
   Walker an evidentiary hearing.
          AFFIRMED.

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