Court Opinion

ID: 9803181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 15:24:00.703427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:49.117268
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 36] This case is before the Court on a Petition to Revoke Probation and a Petition for Discipline. I agree disciplinary counsel met his burden of proving violations of Rules 1.5(a) and 5.3(a), but respectfully disagree with the sanction imposed as a result of the new violation. I agree Kellington’s stay of suspension should be revoked, but respectfully disagree on the length of suspension imposed.
[¶ 37] Disciplinary counsel alleged violation of Rule 1.5(a), N.D.R. Prof. Conduct, that Kellington charged excessive fees. Kellington admitted that time entries for transcription, faxing and e-filing should not have been billed and were errors amount*405ing to $822.50 or less. She argues many of the transcription charges did not have a corresponding dictation charge so the client was not adversely impacted.
[¶ 38] Rule 1.5(a) specifically prohibits charging excessive fees, and Kellington charged small but inappropriate fees over an extended period in this representation. These admitted violations are sufficient to prove a violation of Rule 1.5(a), although standing alone I do not believe they warrant suspension. Majority opinion at ¶ 34.
[¶ 39] Regarding the remaining allegations that Kellington violated Rule 1.5(a), the majority concludes the findings were “sufficient” to adopt the Hearing Panel’s recommendation to discipline Kellington. Majority opinion at ¶ 15. I respectfully disagree that we are reviewing the Hearing Panel’s findings for sufficiency. Nor can I agree with the ultimate conclusion that, based on our independent examination, evidence exists for this Court to conclude Kellington has further violated Rule 1.5(a).
[¶ 40] Disciplinary counsel’s burden is to prove violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct by clear and convincing evidence. Disciplinary Board v. Hoffman, 2013 ND 137, ¶ 5, 834 N.W.2d 636 (“Disciplinary counsel must prove each alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence, which means the trier of fact must be reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove and thus be led to a firm belief or conviction.”) (quoting Disciplinary Board v. Hann, 2012 ND 160, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d 498). Rule 1.5(a) lists eight non-exclusive factors for determining whether a fee was reasonable. N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) (“The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include....”) (emphasis added); N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 cmt. 1 (“The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive.”); see Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 2002 ND 209, ¶ 12, 655 N.W.2d 60 (“Generally, a definition that uses the word ‘means’ is exhaustive, while a definition that uses the word ‘includes’ is partial and non-exclusive.”) (citing North Dakota Legislative Drafting Manual 95 (2001)); see also Americana Healthcare v. N.D. Dep’t Human Serv., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594-95 n. 2 (N.D.1994).
[¶ 41] I have separately addressed Kellington’s billing for “overhead items” like preparing proofs of service, e-filing and transcribing documents. That leaves claims that Kellington and her legal assistants engaged in $592.50 of double billings or unnecessary charges for transmittal letters and $345 of duplicative charges for routine correspondence. As part of these findings, the Hearing Panel noted, “Where Kellington’s time for ‘R & R’ of transmittal letters is not separately itemized a time of .2 hours is assumed.” (Emphasis added.) We are left guessing how much of the alleged $937.50 overcharges were “assumed” by the Hearing Panel and the record is unclear.
[¶ 42] Calling further into question the soundness of evidence supporting the recommendation for discipline, the record shows and the Hearing Panel found much of the extra law office work for which the client was charged was demanded by her. Kellington did substantial additional work at the client’s request for which the client was not billed and Kellington was not paid. The Hearing Panel also found and the record shows that the unbilled work was “substantially greater” than what even it called overbillings. The Hearing Panel further found that the client was difficult to deal with at times and that Kellington warned the client that that behavior was increasing legal fees. Specifically, those findings state:
• “The billing records and supporting documentation also demonstrate the *406substantial amount of communication Angela required and demonstrate that Amgela had Kellington working on issues which did not pertain to her divorce case which also increased legal fees (for example, the billing entries for time spent researching and communicating concerning Angela’s son’s criminal case).”
• “Billing records also demonstrate the massive amount of communication which was required due to Angela’s behavior. Exhibit R-2; Exhibit R-3 (p. 119-335). The November billing records also indicate that Kellington made Angela aware that the substantial amount of communication that was required by the attorneys was causing significant legal fees and that Angela and Shannon needed to find ways to communicate without involving their attorneys. See Exhibit R-3, (p. 315).”
• “The billing entries and supporting documentation evidence the substantial amount of pleadings and communication which were needed to meet Angela’s demands and expectations. Exhibit R-3. However, the billing records do show that there were charges for faxing, e-filing, and transcription which should not have been charged. Tr. at 103, 118. That said, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrate that there is a substantial amount of legal work which was performed on behalf of Angela that Angela was never billed which is substantially greater than the total monetary amount of the billing errors. Tr. at 118, 133, 161. The evidence also demonstrates that Kellington performed legal work outside of normal business hours at a rate of only $150, instead of the agreed, upon rate of $350. Tr. [at] 114.”
• “Angela was a high maintenance type client which appears to have increased legal fees charged at the same time that improper charges were made either through error, duplication, normal overhead costs usually incurred by lawyers being charged when such charges are the normal cost of doing business and lack of attention to detail.”
[¶ 43] Taken as a whole (and other than the admitted overbillings), I cannot conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion Kellington charged an unreasonable fee for any individual charge or in the aggregate. Kellington’s billings were not the model of law practice management, but they were not proven to be unreasonable in this litigation.
[¶ 44] The aggregate fee was approximately $20,000. This case involved a very difficult client who made demands that increased legal fees and who engaged in conduct that made the proceeding more difficult to litigate. See Dieterle v. Dieterle, 2013 ND 71, ¶ 8, 830 N.W.2d 571 (describing some of the client’s actions and misconduct). Kellington’s representation included two interim hearings and a proceeding to obtain a domestic violence protection order. This record confirms the client was difficult to deal with and, according to the Hearing Panel, required a “massive amount of communication” from Kellington and her staff.
[¶ 45] Rule 1.5 and its comment make clear that the listed factors are non-exclusive. N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) and cmt. 1. I believe client conduct that results in increased work and increased fees is not only relevant but, in a case like this, may be determinative of whether the resulting attorney’s fees were reasonable. We know that for a period of time the client demanded that she be provided with paper copies rather than electronic transmittals. That demand alone required extra work by *407both Kellington and her nonlawyer staff. That demand, along with other work the client insisted be performed, was acknowledged by the Hearing Panel to have a value of which was “substantially greater” than the total billing errors. We also know that Kellington performed significant additional work on matters unrelated to the divorce and that Kellington did not charge an agreed $350 per hour rate for after hours legal work. Taken together, this evidence fails to convince me that disciplinary counsel has proven a violation of Rule 1.5(a) for charging an unreasonable total fee beyond the improper charges admitted by Kellington.
[¶ 46] Disciplinary counsel alleged Kellington violated Rule 5.3(a), (b) and (c) by failing to fulfil her responsibility to supervise nonlawyer assistants. I agree with the majority’s analysis that violation of Rule 5.3(a) has been proven but that violations of Rules 5.3(b) and (c) have not been proven.
[¶ 47] I also agree we should not impose discipline because Kellington employed legal assistants who arguably failed to meet the guidelines. Majority opinion at ¶¶ 26-28. I would go further, however. A violation of guidelines contained in a comment to a Rule of Professional Conduct does not provide a basis for discipline. See N.D.R. Prof. Conduct Scope at 1 (“Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.”). I would so hold.
[¶ 48] In view of my agreement with the majority that Kellington has violated Rules 1.5(a) and 5.3(a) the next step is to determine appropriate discipline. I agree with the majority that we are not guided by Disciplinary Board v. Hoffman, 2013 ND 137, 834 N.W.2d 636, so that simple repayment would be adequate. Majority opinion at ¶ 32. But I do not agree with the majority that Kellington’s violation of Rules 1.5(a) and 5.3(a) warrant a 30-day suspension, even considering her disciplinary history. Concepts of proportional discipline suggest either a reprimand or a short suspension running concurrently with revocation of suspension, as discussed below, would be appropriate.
[¶ 49] Determining discipline for the new violations is coupled in this case with whether we revoke Kellington’s stayed suspension in an earlier proceeding. Staying imposition of a disciplinary suspension is relatively new in North Dakota. See Disciplinary Board v. Hardwick, 2013 ND 250, ¶ 14, 841 N.W.2d 427; Disciplinary Board v. Summers, 2012 ND 116, ¶ 14, 817 N.W.2d 363; Disciplinary Board v. Kellington, 2011 ND 241, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d 298; Disciplinary Board v. O’Donnell, 2008 ND 76, ¶ 19, 747 N.W.2d 504. Cf. In re Dvorak, 2000 ND 98, 611 N.W.2d 147 (suspension stayed 30 days to seek review by the United States Supreme Court). Other than in Dvorak, suspension from the practice of law was stayed during the lawyer’s probation. Hardwick, at ¶ 14; Summers, at ¶ 14, Kellington, at ¶ 6; O’Donnell, at ¶ 19. For the duration of the stay, the lawyer was required to make regular filings with the Disciplinary Board or was participating in a lawyer’s assistance program. See, e.g., O’Donnell, at ¶ 19. Kell-ington’s probation was similar, and this proceeding appears to be the first where disciplinary counsel has moved to revoke a stayed suspension. See Majority opinion at ¶ 7. I agree with the majority’s articulation of disciplinary counsel’s burden of proof in this revocation proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
[¶ 50] Proving a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence is easily accomplished here. One condition of probation was that “Kellington must have no further disciplinary complaints during *408the period of probation found to be meritorious.” Kellington, 2011 ND 241, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d 298. The majority and I both conclude the evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Kellington had a meritorious disciplinary complaint filed during probation. New violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, occurring both before and after she was placed on probation in the prior proceeding, have been established by a greater weight of evidence than is required to revoke Kell-ington’s probation. Her probation should be revoked.
[¶ 51] Upon revocation, we must determine the appropriate length of suspension. The majority does not answer this directly; instead suspending Kellington for 30 days in a combination of imposing new discipline and revoking the stayed suspension. I respectfully disagree with the adequacy of that action as it relates to revocation of the stayed suspension. I made plain in the 2011 proceeding that I thought a 90-day suspension was appropriate and that staying the suspension was ill-advised. See Kellington, 2011 ND 241, ¶19, 809 N.W.2d 298 (Crothers, J., dissenting). I continue to believe principles of graduated and proportional discipline require revocation of the stay and imposition of suspension for the full original 90 days. That is especially true when viewed in the context of this disciplinary proceeding, which is Kellington’s eighth since 1996. See id. at ¶ 16 (Crothers, J., dissenting).
[¶ 52] Daniel J. Crothers