Court Opinion

ID: 9814167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 23:39:53.916272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:01.658772
License: Public Domain

Kilbane, J.,
concurring in judgment with separate opinion.
On this appeal from an order of Judge Lillian J. Greene, I concur in the judgment because I cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by the majority. R.C. 4123.90 prohibits an employer from discharging, demoting, reassigning, or taking any punitive action against an employee “because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.” An employee who seeks to establish a claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90 states his prima facie case when the complaint “alleges that the employee [ (1) ] was injured on the job, [ (2) ] filed a claim for workers’ compensation, and [ (3) ] was discharged by that employer in contravention of R.C. 123.90.” Wilson v. Riverside Hosp. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 8, 18 OBR 6, 479 N.E.2d 275, syllabus; Kilbarger v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co. (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 332, 337-338, 697 N.E.2d 1080, 1083-1084.
The majority concludes that, “[w]hile it is true that [Markham] was injured on the job and filed a workers’ compensation claim, appellant did not produce any evidence that he was fired because he filed the claim. Thus, appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge.” I disagree. In order to avoid summary judgment on his prima facie case, Markham had to produce evidence, of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C), to support his claim. As the majority’s rendition of the “uncontroverted” facts indicates, Markham did satisfy this burden. Despite the fact that Markham’s “patient work update” issued by his treating physician indicated that he should refrain from lifting his right arm, the “light duty” assignments EMJ offered to Markham included maintenance in the warehouse, and painting and spackling the outside front of the building— assignments that most likely would require Markham to lift his right arm. The fact that EMJ did not decrease his pay and later supplied Markham with a “helper” to perform his “light duty” tasks does not negate his claim. Rather, these facts counter Markham’s assertion that EMJ engaged in punitive behavior that culminated in his dismissal. Because these facts go to the weight of the *498evidence, EMJ did not sustain its burden to show that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact.5
Because Markham made out his prima facie case, the burden shifted to EMJ to show a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Kilbarger, 120 Ohio App.3d at 338, 697 N.E.2d at 1083-1084. As the majority acknowledges, EMJ satisfied this burden when it showed that it discharged Markham for his failure to disclose information about his criminal record as requested on his employment application. Once EMJ satisfied this burden, the burden then shifted to Markham to show that this “reason” for discharge was merely pretextual. Id. Markham failed to make such a showing; rather, he claimed that the investigation EMJ conducted after he exhibited (what EMJ found to be) suspicious behavior violated the spirit of R.C. 4123.90. R.C. 4123.90 should not be used as a shield to protect an employee from his otherwise blatant dishonesty about his criminal record in his application for employment. For this reason, I would overrule his first and second assignments of error and affirm the judge’s grant of summary judgment on Markham’s R.C. 4123.90 claim.
With regard to his third assignment of error, Markham failed to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under R.C. 4112.02(A), i.e., that he was discharged without just cause because of a handicap. The majority opinion correctly sets forth the elements of the prima facie case:
“In order to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the person seeking relief must demonstrate (1) that he or she was handicapped, (2) that an adverse employment action was taken by an employer, at least in part, because the individual was handicapped, and (3) that the person, though handicapped, can safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question.” Hood v. Diamond Products, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 298, 658 N.E.2d 738, syllabus, following Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 279, 25 OBR 331, 496 N.E.2d 478; accord Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 571, 697 N.E.2d 204, 205-206.
In the instant matter, Markham’s failure to present evidence tending to show that EMJ’s reason for discharge,'ie., undisclosed criminal record, was pretexual also established that the discharge was with good cause for purposes of his R.C. 4112.02 claim and, thus, precluded recovery for handicap discrimination. In other words, regardless of whether he suffered a “handicap” as defined by R.C. 4112.01(A)(13), or EMJ considered him a “disabled person” as defined by Ohio *499Adm. Code 4112-5~02(H),6 Markham failed to satisfy the second element of his prima facie case showing that he was fired, at least in part, because of his “handicap.” Even if Markham’s handicap discrimination claim did not fail on the second element, it failed on the third element because he presented no evidence to show that he could safely and substantially perform the essential functions of any of the positions EMJ offered with the reasonable accommodation of a helper, nor is there anything to show that he suggested additional or other reasonable accommodations. See Darovich v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Feb. 24, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75859, unreported, 2000 WL 217766.
As the foregoing analysis shows, an employee’s failure to sustain his burden on any one of the three elements disposes of his handicap discrimination claim.
Because EMJ did not challenge below and has not challenged here Markham’s allegation that he suffered from a handicap, the majority goes too far in adopting the holding of Kemo v. St. Clairsville (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 178, 186, 714 N.E.2d 412, 417-418, and concluding that Markham’s injury did not constitute “a physical impairment which substantially limited a major life activity,” i.e., “work,” because “the degree of [Markham’s] impairment was [not] of such nature and severity, or of such duration or expected duration, or of such permanent or long-term impact as to render him substantially limited in performing routine labor duties.” The law does not require permanency or long-term impact of the handicap. In fact, it does not require that the employee suffer a handicap at all.
As Ohio Adm. Code 4112-02-05(H) points out, a “disabled person” is one who (1) suffers from a disability as defined in R.C. 4112.01(A)(13), (2) suffered from a disability at one time and no longer suffers from the disability, but is treated by his employer as suffering from the disability, or (3) is regarded as disabled by the employer. See Maloney v. Barberton Citizens Hosp. (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 372, 378, 672 N.E.2d 223, 226-227. As a result, if the employer perceives the employee as “disabled” or suffering from a handicap, the employee is “handicapped” for purposes of R.C. 4112.02(A) regardless of whether the employee suffers from a handicap as defined by R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). In addition, Markham showed through his own testimony and his treating physician’s “patient work update” that the shoulder injury did, in fact, substantially impair his ability to accomplish the assigned tasks.7 The legitimacy of his claimed impairment was question for the jury.
*500Because Markham failed to satisfy the second and third elements of his prima facie handicap discrimination claim, I would affirm the judge’s grant of summary judgment. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, Markham’s shoulder injury did not qualify as a “handicap” for purposes of R.C. 4112.01(A)(13).8

. Moreover, the mere fact that Markham had filed other workers’ compensation claims does not, as the majority decision insinuates, automatically confute the legitimacy of his present injury.

. " 'Disabled person’ includes any person who presently has a disability as defined by division (A)(13) of section 4112.01 of the Revised Code or any person who has had a disability as defined by division (A)(13) of section 4112.01 of the Revised Code, who no longer has any functional limitation, but who is treated by a respondent as having such a disability, or any person who is regarded as disabled by a respondent.”

. This, of course, then relates to both the third element of his claim, i.e., whether he could safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job and whether he could do so with or without reasonable accommodation.

. I also disagree in pari with the dicta contained in footnote 3, because the expiration of the ninety-day statutory limitations period does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neal v. Maniglia (Apr. 6, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75566, unreported, 2000 WL 354767 (Kilbane, J., dissenting).