Court Opinion

ID: 9634288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:12.105848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:35.369942
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00174-CV

                                          Antonio G. CANTU,
                                               Appellant

                                                    v.

               BEXAR COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and Michael Amezquita,
                                   Appellees

                      From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2021CI22041
                           Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 16, 2023

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

           In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Antonio G. Cantu attempts to appeal the trial court’s

order dismissing Michael Amezquita, Chief Appraiser for the Bexar County Appraisal District,

from his property tax suit.        Because we determine we do not have jurisdiction over this

interlocutory appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

                                             BACKGROUND

           Cantu filed a petition for review of his tax-valuation protest against appellee Bexar County

Appraisal District (“BCAD”) pursuant to chapter 42 of the Texas Tax Code. Cantu’s suit also
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named Michael Amezquita, the Chief Appraiser for BCAD, in his individual capacity as a

defendant. Cantu’s petition challenged BCAD’s valuation of his home for the 2021 tax year.

        While it is clear in his petition that Cantu asserted claims challenging the valuation of his

property under the Texas Tax Code, it is unclear whether Cantu attempted to plead additional non-

tax claims against BCAD or Amezquita. 1 For example, Cantu’s petition stated Amezquita has

increased Cantu’s property valuation every year since 2019 in retaliation for Cantu’s public

criticism of Amezquita’s job performance as Chief appraiser. Cantu also asserted Amezquita has

“acted illegally” and “[a]ll of Amezquita’s acts were intentional, malicious, willful, wanton,

obdurate, and in gross and reckless disregard of [Cantu’s] rights secured by the United States

Constitution and numerous other [f]ederal and [s]tate [s]tatutes.”                     Cantu further asserted

“Amezquita’s continuing acts of retaliation through conspiratorial acts are intentional, malicious,

willful, wanton, obdurate, and in gross and reckless disregard of [Cantu’s] [c]onstitutional right

and in violation of his oath under the Texas [t]ax [s]tatutory guarantees.”

        Among other things, Cantu’s prayer requested the trial court enter judgment: (1) adjusting

the tax valuation of his property, (2) declaring BCAD and Amezquita’s treatment of Cantu “has

been minimum capricious and arbitrary, or deliberately indifferent to Cantu’s free speech rights

and entitles Plaintiff to a refund of previously paid taxes on nonexistent property[,] or

inappropriately assessed property, if any;” and (3) “against [BCAD] and [Amezquita], jointly and

severally finding that the appraised value of the property was done in an illegal manner that

exceeds the median appraised value of a reasonable number of comparable properties

appropriately adjusted[.]”

1
  The Texas Tax Code specifically authorizes review of property valuations in the trial court through a petition for
review filed against the appraisal district; however, it does not authorize the suit to be brought against the Chief
Appraiser, Amezquita. See SPX Corp. v. Altinger, 614 S.W.3d 362, 374–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,
no pet.); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN § 42.21(b).

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                                                                                                       04-22-00174-CV

            Uncertain on whether Cantu was asserting claims in addition to his tax protest claims,

BCAD filed a “Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Defendant Michael Amezquita

Under [Texas Tort Claims Act] § 101.106(e).” The motion sought dismissal of any non-tax claims

against BCAD and dismissal of Amezquita from the suit. The trial court signed an order

“sustaining” BCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction and granting the motion to dismiss Amezquita from

the suit. Cantu appeals.

                                                      DISCUSSION

            In its motion, BCAD asserted the Texas Tort Claims Act leaves intact its sovereign

immunity for non-tax claims arising “in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes by

a governmental unit.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055(1). BCAD also asserted

“Amezquita should be dismissed summarily from this lawsuit” pursuant to the election of remedies

provision in subsection 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act.2 See id. § 101.106(e) (“If a suit

is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees

shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”).

            The trial court’s order granting BCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss

Amezquita from the suit grants two separate requests for relief: (1) BCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction

requesting dismissal for non-tax claims arising in connection with the assessment of property

taxes; and (2) the motion to dismiss Amezquita from the lawsuit entirely. 3 We must determine

2
 The prayer for relief in the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss only requested the trial court “grant the
motion and immediately dismiss its employee, Michael Amezquita[,] from the suit under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 101.106(e).”
3
    The order in its entirety states:

                 CAME ON TO BE HEARD, on February 28, 2022, Defendant, Bexar Appraisal District’s Pleas
            to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Defendant Michael Amezquita under TTCA § 101.106(e).
            After having considered the Plea and Motion, and the Response, the evidence and testimony
            presented, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the Plea to the Jurisdiction should be
            SUSTAINED and the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.

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which of the relief granted Cantu appeals, and whether we have interlocutory jurisdiction over an

order granting that relief. Compare id. § 51.014(a)(5) (emphasis added) (allowing interlocutory

appeal of an order that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of

immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of

the state”), with id. § 51.014(a)(8) (emphasis added) (allowing interlocutory appeal of an order

that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit . . .”).

       Cantu’s notice of appeal states he is giving “Notice of Appeal of the Court’s Order

Dismissing Defendant Michael Amezquita.” Cantu filed a motion to modify the trial court’s order

granting the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss Amezquita. The motion also requested

a stay of proceedings pending appeal. In this motion, Cantu states he “moves for a stay of this suit

pending appeal of the Court’s dispositive ruling dismissing Defendant Amezquita.” Finally,

Cantu’s entire opening brief focuses solely on Amezquita’s dismissal from the suit. In fact, Cantu

concedes in his brief that “[t]he sole issue is whether the trial court improperly dismissed

Defendant Michael Amezquita . . . from the pending lawsuit . . . .”

       We conclude Cantu attempts to appeal only the trial court’s order granting BCAD’s motion

to dismiss Amezquita from the lawsuit. Next, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction

over this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s order granting BCAD’s motion to

dismiss Amezquita from the lawsuit.

       “Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally only have

jurisdiction over final judgments.” CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011). “We

            THEREFORE, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Bexar Appraisal District’s Plea to the
       Jurisdiction is SUSTAINED and its Motion to Dismiss Defendant Michael Amezquita under TTCA
       § 101.106(e) is GRANTED. Consequently, Michael Amezquita, Individually, is HEREBY
       DISMISSED from this lawsuit with prejudice.

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                                                                                         04-22-00174-CV

strictly apply statutes granting interlocutory appeals because they are a narrow exception to the

general rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.” Id.

        Here, Cantu’s property tax claims against BCAD remain pending before the trial court.

The record reflects Cantu considered severing his claims against Amezquita from the pending

claims against BCAD. However, Cantu’s motion to modify and stay further trial court proceedings

expressly states “[Cantu] has decided not to pursue the severance.” Because Cantu’s property tax

claims remain pending before the trial court, and Cantu has not severed his claims against

Amezquita, the order appealed here is an interlocutory order rather than a final judgment. See

Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (internal quotation marks and

emphasis omitted) (“[A] judgment is final . . . if it actually disposes of every pending claim and

party or it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties.”). Thus,

Cantu is entitled to appeal the order granting BCAD’s motion to dismiss Amezquita only if a

statute authorizes the interlocutory appeal.

        Section 51.014(a)(5) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows interlocutory

appeal of an order that “denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of

immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of

the state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court of Texas has

interpreted this to mean “that an appeal may be taken from orders denying an assertion of

immunity, as provided in section 51.014(a)(5), regardless of the procedural vehicle used.” Austin

State Hosp. v. Graham, 347 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. 2011); see also Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr.

at Hous. v. Crowder, 349 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

(“[T]his appeal satisfies all the required elements of an appeal under section 51.014(a)(5), and this

court has appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order denying the Health Science Center’s

motion to dismiss under section 101.106(e).”). Much like the case at bar, the Graham court

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                                                                                     04-22-00174-CV

analyzed whether section 51.014(a)(5) authorizes an interlocutory appeal of an order dismissing a

state employee under subsection 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Graham, 347 S.W.3d

at 299. However, in Graham, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the state employee and

the Graham court held the state employee was entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the order

denying the motion to dismiss. Id.

       In contrast, Cantu attempts to appeal the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss

Amezquita from the underlying suit. “[T]he [l]egislature intentionally restricted the application of

[section] 51.014(a)(5) . . . by allowing interlocutory appeals only from a denial of a motion for

summary judgment . . . .” Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2007).

“[T]here is no other way to read [s]ection 51.014(a)(5) than to conclude that only an ‘individual

who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state’ may appeal an

interlocutory order denying a motion” to dismiss the individual from the suit based on an assertion

of immunity. Id. at 843. We have found no other statute authorizing appeal of an interlocutory

order granting a motion to dismiss an individual pursuant to subsection 101.106(e) of the Texas

Tort Claims Act. See Anderson v. Baker, No. 09-08-257-CV, 2008 WL 4163891, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Sept. 11, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an

interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss an individual under subsection

101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act).

       Accordingly, Cantu is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the order granting the

motion to dismiss Amezquita based on his assertion of immunity under subsection 101.106(e) of

the Texas Tort Claims Act.

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                                                                                  04-22-00174-CV

                                          CONCLUSION

       Because we do not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the order granting the

motion to dismiss Amezquita under subsection 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, we must

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are denied.

                                                 Irene Rios, Justice

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