Court Opinion

ID: 9918663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 14:10:19.132781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.477048
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-22-00401-CR

                                          David HINOJOSA,
                                              Appellant

                                                 v.

                                         The STATE of Texas,
                                               Appellee

                     From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2018CR0444
                              Honorable Jennifer Peña, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 10, 2024

AFFIRMED

           Appellant David Hinojosa appeals from a murder conviction, arguing that the trial court

abused its discretion when it (1) denied his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor “struck over

counsel’s shoulder” during closing arguments and (2) admitted a mug shot for identification

purposes. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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                                          BACKGROUND

       Hinojosa was charged with murder after he shot and killed Joseph Torres at the Sugartime

Lounge. Hinojosa argued self-defense; but he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to thirty

years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division.

       At trial, the prosecutor offered a mug shot of Hinojosa for identification purposes. The

mug shot was used by Detective Duke when he investigated this murder case. He showed it to

Witnesses Joshua Garza and Laura McGill soon after the shooting, and they both signed a copy of

the mug shot, confirming that they recognized it to be a photograph of Hinojosa. Hinojosa objected

to the mug shot being introduced at trial as cumulative and suggestive of other bad acts. The trial

court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibit.

       During closing arguments, the prosecutor alleged that Defense Counsel lied to the jury

about what the surveillance video of the shooting showed. Hinojosa objected to the statement and

requested a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection and asked the jury to disregard the

comment, but it denied the request for a mistrial.

       Hinojosa appeals, and we consider his two issues: (1) whether the trial court improperly

denied his motion for mistrial during the State’s closing argument, and (2) whether the trial court

abused its discretion when it admitted his mug shot for identification after his counsel admitted

Hinojosa was the shooter and an eyewitness confirmed it. We address each issue in turn.

                   MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER ARGUMENT

A.     Parties’ Arguments

       Hinojosa argues that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his request for a mistrial

after the prosecutor alleged that Defense Counsel lied during closing argument. The State argues

that the trial court remedied the comment, and Hinojosa did not suffer reversible harm as a result.

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B.       Standard of Review

         We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing State v. Gonzalez,

855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).

C.       Law

         “When the trial court sustains an objection [to an improper argument by the State] and

instructs the jury to disregard but denies a defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the issue is whether

the trial court erred in denying the mistrial.” Faulkner v. State, 940 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d) (citing Sauceda v. State, 859 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1993, pet. ref’d)). The answer depends first on whether the State’s argument was improper. See

Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

         To determine whether an argument is improper, we consider whether the objected-to

argument falls within one of four permissible areas. Id. at 80. The four permissible areas are: “(1)

summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer to the

argument of opposing counsel; or (4) a plea for law enforcement.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d

798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

         An argument that “strikes at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel” 1 falls

outside the permissible areas for proper argument. Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 147

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).

1
  For a prosecutor to “strike over the shoulders of defense counsel” means that he has made “uninvited and
unsubstantiated accusations of improper conduct directed toward a defendant’s attorney, in an attempt to prejudice
the jury against the defendant.” Whitney v. State, 396 S.W.3d 696, 704 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d).
(citing Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g), aff’d,
193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

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       Therefore, if the State “strikes at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel,” for

example, by arguing that defense counsel has lied to the jury, then improper argument has

occurred, and the appellate court must determine whether (1) the improper argument was curable,

(2) the trial court employed curative measures, and (3) there is no reasonable possibility that the

argument contributed to the jury’s verdict. See Jackson v. State, 927 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 1996, no pet.) (citing Clarke v. State, 785 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1990), aff’d, 811 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

       In general, a trial court’s swift and simple instructions to disregard have been accepted as

appropriate and effective curative measures. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 84‒85 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004); Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 172‒73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,

pet. ref’d); Faulkner v. State, 940 S.W.2d 308, 315 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d);

Jackson v. State, 927 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no pet.). The areas that

demand the most scrutiny are factors 1 and 3 concerning the nature (whether extremely

inflammatory, offensive, or flagrant) and effect (whether indelible and incurable) of the State’s

improper argument. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 418–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). For example, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Gomez v. State identified

an argument that defense counsel was paid to manufacture evidence to be incurably inflammatory.

See Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). In that case, the trial court

erred by denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial. See id. But most improper arguments are

considered curable by a trial court’s swift and simple instruction to disregard. See Hawkins, 135

S.W.3d at 84‒85; Williams, 417 S.W.3d at 172‒73; Faulkner, 940 S.W.2d at 315; Jackson, 927

S.W.2d at 744.

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D.         Analysis

           Here, the prosecutor disputed Hinojosa’s characterization of the surveillance video that

recorded the shooting, stating, “Now I also want to talk to you about what defense got up here and

told you, lied to you about, this timing, 19:47:05.”2 Hinojosa objected to this statement and moved

for a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the

statement, but it denied Hinojosa’s motion for mistrial.

           In determining whether the prosecutor made an improper argument, we note that referring

to Defense Counsel’s argument as a lie falls outside the permissible areas of argument. See Davis,

329 S.W.3d at 821. We conclude that the prosecutor made an improper argument, and we consider

its nature and effect. See id.

           1.       Curable

           First, we consider whether the prosecutor’s comment was curable. See Jackson, 927

S.W.2d at 744. The evidence shows that it was curable because the jury was able to watch the

disputed video for themselves and evaluate the portion that counsel disagreed about. Furthermore,

the prosecutor did not repeat or insist that Defense Counsel lied. See Williams, 417 S.W.3d at 177.

On this record, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comment was not so egregious as to overcome

the presumption that the jury would follow the trial court’s instruction to disregard. See Griffin,

571 S.W.3d at 419.

           2.       Curative Measures

           Next, in considering whether the trial court employed curative measures, we conclude that

it did when it sustained Defense Counsel’s objection to the comment and directed the jury to

disregard it:

2
    Referring to a timestamp in the Sugartime Lounge’s surveillance video.

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               THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, what the attorneys say is not
               evidence. You will get your evidence from the testimony from the
               witness stand.

               DEFENSE COUNSEL: And I ask for a ruling on the objection.

               THE COURT: Sustained. Continue.

               DEFENSE COUNSEL: Can I have an instruction to disregard
               counsel’s last statement?

               THE COURT: You can disregard the last statement.

See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 84‒85; Williams, 417 S.W.3d at 172‒73; Faulkner, 940 S.W.2d at

315; Jackson, 927 S.W.2d at 744.

       Ideally, the trial court would state more affirmatively that the jury should, must, or will

disregard the prosecutor’s improper argument. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 84‒85; Williams, 417

S.W.3d at 172‒73; Faulkner, 940 S.W.2d at 315; Jackson, 927 S.W.2d at 744. Here, we consider

that the trial court also instructed the jury not to consider the attorneys’ statements as evidence.

See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 84. As noted above, this court’s review casts the most critical eye on

the force and effect of the prosecutor’s argument that warranted an instruction to disregard. See

Griffin, 571 S.W.3d at 419.

       3.      Effect on Verdict

       Finally, we consider whether there is no reasonable possibility that the argument

contributed to the jury’s verdict. See Jackson, 927 S.W.2d at 744. We conclude that there was

not because the video at issue was available to the jury as an exhibit for their review during

deliberation to decide what characterization best fit the evidence. See Griffin, 571 S.W.3d at 420.

Accordingly, denying a mistrial was proper. See Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567. Hinojosa’s first point of

error is overruled.

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                                    ADMISSIBILITY OF MUG SHOT

A.      Parties’ Arguments

        Hinojosa argues that his mug shot from a previous arrest should not have been admitted

because it was impermissibly suggestive of other bad acts. The State argues that Hinojosa’s trial

objection was not specific enough to preserve error, the prejudicial effect of the admitted

photograph did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the photo, and any error from the

admission of the mug shot was harmless in light of the record.

B.      Standard of Review

        The standard of review for the admissibility of evidence is well-known and succinctly

stated in Gigliobianco v. State, 179 S.W.3d 136, 140 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005):

        A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse
        of discretion standard. The test for whether a trial court abused its discretion is
        whether the action was arbitrary or unreasonable. An appellate court should not
        reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

C.      Law

        The admission of a mug shot is not necessarily unfairly prejudicial. Hajjar v. State, 176

S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004); Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001). In fact, a mug shot can carry significant probative value, for example, when it is used

properly in an out-of-court identification and establishes the witness’s ability to identify the

defendant immediately following the criminal incident and not just in the courtroom. Striblin v.

State, No. 04-17-00826-CR, 2019 WL 1049233, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 6, 2019,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); cf. Boyd v. State, 472 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1971) (condemning practice of showing single photograph to prosecuting witness as

impermissibly suggestive). But under Rule 403, a mug shot may be impermissibly suggestive if

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it provides prejudicial evidence of an extraneous offense. Cervantes v. State, No. 13-17-00157-

CR, 2018 WL 6055439, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Araiza v. State, 929 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1996); Richardson v. State, 536 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).

       As this court stated in Araiza v. State:

       The admissibility of mug shots is a question of degree. At one end of the spectrum,
       it is clear that when the photograph itself establishes that it was taken by the police
       in the context of a particular case, the photograph is inadmissible in the
       guilt/innocence phase because “it tend[s] to show the commission of an extraneous
       offense and, therefore, to infringe [the defendant’s] fundamental right to the
       presumption of innocence . . . .” Richardson v. State, 536 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex.
       Crim. App. 1976) (introduction of mug shot that showed front and side view of
       defendant and depicting a sign that read “SAN ANTONIO PD P7302316 10–22 73
       7–15 AM” was reversible error). At the other end of the spectrum, it is also clear
       that when all marks identifying a picture as one taken by the police have been
       removed, the trial court does not err in admitting the photograph. Huerta v. State,
       390 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965). The issue is whether the picture
       “implies a police record.” Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. Crim. App.
       1979) (frontal and profile photographs that showed a chain around the defendant’s
       neck admissible because they did not necessarily imply a police record).

Araiza, 929 S.W.2d at 555.

       For example, in Cervantes v. State, the appellant’s mug shot was considered properly

admissible because the exhibit did not indicate that it was a mug shot: the appellant was facing

forward; the photograph was cropped around his head and shoulders; he was wearing a collared

shirt; the background was plain; and the exhibit contained no markings. See Cervantes, 2018 WL

6055439, at *7 (citing Hollis v. State, 219 S.W.3d 446, 466 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.)).

       Similarly, in Huerta v. State, any marks identifying a mug shot “were removed, and, as far

as the jury were able to determine, it might have been taken in a penny arcade.” Huerta v. State,

390 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).

       Even when a mug shot is from the case being tried, courts still prefer that all identifying

marks be removed from the exhibit. See Reyes v. State, 579 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. Crim. App.

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1979); Ware v. State, 628 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d). This is true

even if the defendant is wearing “jail clothing” in his mug shot. See Hollis, 219 S.W.3d at 466.

       But “if the mug shot was obtained from a prior offense rather than the present one, it is

frequently inadmissible.” Id. (citing Alexander v. State, 88 S.W.3d 772, 780–81 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d); Green v. State, 899 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

1995, no pet.)). “The typical concern in admitting a defendant’s mug shot is whether it provides

prejudicial evidence of an extraneous offense.” Id.

       In Alexander v. State, the court concluded that the mug shot impermissibly suggested other

bad acts because, “even with the redactions, it appears only to be what it is, a mug shot.”

Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 782. Likewise, in Richardson v. State, the court reversed and remanded

after concluding that the appellant’s mug shot was too clearly a mug shot, particularly with date

information arranged across his chest, and “tended to show the commission of an extraneous

offense.” Richardson, 536 S.W.2d at 223. It did not matter that excising the date would strain the

State’s ability to establish when the photograph was taken. See id. “[A]lthough relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.” Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 403).

       The Alexander court considered the following Wyatt factors in concluding that the trial

court abused its discretion by admitting the appellant’s mug shot:

       (1) how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make a fact of
       consequence more or less probable—a factor which is related to the strength of the
       evidence presented by the proponent to show the defendant in fact committed the
       extraneous offense;

       (2) the potential the other offense evidence has to impress the jury “in some
       irrational but nevertheless indelible way;”

       (3) the time the proponent will need to develop the evidence, during which the jury
       will be distracted from consideration of the indicted offense;

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       (4) the force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to prove a fact of
       consequence, i.e., does the proponent have other probative evidence available to
       him to help establish this fact, and is this fact related to an issue in dispute.

Id. at 777‒78 (citing Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); accord

Gigliobianco, 179 S.W.3d at 140.

       We now consider these factors to determine whether the State’s mug shot exhibit was

relevant and appropriate or whether it “tended to show the commission of an extraneous offense”

and unfairly “infringed on [Hinojosa’s] fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.” See

Richardson, 536 S.W.2d at 223.

D.     Analysis

       1.      Summary of Relevant Case Facts

       Hinojosa’s identity as the shooter was never a disputed issue in this case. During opening

statements, Defense Counsel referred to Hinojosa as the shooter. But, as the prosecutor argued,

the State was still required to prove identity as an element. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d

156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d).

       To establish Hinojosa’s identity as the shooter, the prosecutor first showed surveillance

video from Sugartime Lounge to Witness Joshua Garza and asked him to identify the shooter in

the courtroom. Garza identified Hinojosa as the shooter. Garza testified that he had previously

seen both Hinojosa and Torres at the bar and that he also recognized another witness in the video,

Sam Monayan.

       The next day, the prosecutor examined Monayan. Monayan knew Hinojosa as a family

acquaintance and was also familiar with Torres from seeing him at the Sugartime Lounge.

Monayan testified that he saw both Hinojosa and Torres at the Sugartime Lounge on the day of

the shooting. He stated that he lent his lighter to Torres. A short time later, he heard several loud

bangs and then discovered that Torres had been shot outside on the bar’s patio. Monayan testified

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that he performed CPR on Torres and that he saw Hinojosa’s car drive away from the bar. He

stated that he gave a statement at the police station a day or two later and that he was provided

with a photograph of Hinojosa. He signed it, confirming that he knew it to be a photograph of

Hinojosa.

           When the prosecutor presented the signed photograph as an exhibit, Hinojosa objected to

it as cumulative and suggestive, stating:

                     Judge, here’s the picture, but our objection is it’s not—we stipulate
                     that it was David who shot it. To put in a mug shot opens the door
                     to extraneous conduct and the possibility of prior actions that can be
                     inferred on the part of the jury. It’s not—ID’s not an issue, and it
                     has zero probative value. 3

           The prosecutor responded, “Your Honor, it’s not clear from the photograph that it is a mug

shot. It’s a black and white—you can’t tell. And that is the photograph that he was presented. It

looks like he could be just wearing a button-up and a T-shirt. It looks like a driver’s license

photograph to me.”

           Hinojosa reiterated that identity was not an issue, and the prosecutor responded that there

was no written stipulation. The trial court asked whether the witness had not just identified

Hinojosa, and the prosecutor responded that the witness described an out-of-court identification,

“and a positive identification out of court comes first before an in-court.” Hinojosa’s objection

was overruled, and the mug shot was admitted.

           The mug shot exhibit contained a printed web address at the bottom of the page that read,

“http://wppswebprod/Booking/Adult/2010/08/09/C73045700.JPG.”                              In addition, the jury was

aware that Hinojosa was not in custody for the Sugartime Lounge shooting when Monayan

identified him to Detective Duke, meaning that Hinojosa had not been booked for the offense at

3
    This trial objection is sufficient to satisfy Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (waiver).

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issue, and the mug shot the State introduced was not from the instant case. The jury could have

easily inferred that Hinojosa’s mug shot was taken for a prior offense. See Araiza, 929 S.W.2d at

555 (“The issue is whether the picture ‘implies a police record.’”). Therefore, we evaluate the

prejudicial effect of Hinojosa’s mug shot and weigh it against the mug shot’s probative value. See

Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780 (citing Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 26).

       2.      Wyatt Factors

               a.      How compellingly did Hinojosa’s mug shot serve to make a fact of
                       consequence more or less probable?

       The assigned case detective, Detective Duke, showed Hinojosa’s mug shot to Monayan to

confirm Hinojosa’s identity. But whether Monayan’s confirmation to Detective Duke that he was

looking for the correct suspect can be considered a fact of consequence is questionable. See

Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Clinton, J., dissenting)

(distinguishing context from fact of consequence). Normally, an out-of-court identification serves

to establish that the in-court identification is reliable. See Striblin, 2019 WL 1049233, at *3. But

here, the out-of-court identification was apparently conducted with a single photograph. See Boyd,

472 S.W.2d at 127 (condemning practice of showing single photograph to prosecution witness).

This practice undercuts the reliability of the State’s evidence as an out-of-court identification. See

id.

       Based on this record, we cannot conclude that it compellingly served to prove identity. See

Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780. At best, it provided context for Detective Duke’s investigation,

which we distinguish from a fact of consequence. See Lockhart, 847 S.W.2d at 575 (Clinton, J.,

dissenting); cf. Jones v. State, 471 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (“The State may prove

the circumstances surrounding [an] arrest.”). This factor weighs against the State.

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               b.      The potential the other offense evidence has to impress the jury “in some
                       irrational but nevertheless indelible way”

       Admitting the mug shot with the booking website address information suggested to the jury

that Hinojosa had previously been arrested, which has “the potential to impress the jury in an

irrational but nevertheless indelible way.” See Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780. The mug shot

provided prejudicial evidence of an extraneous offense and implied a police record. See Cervantes

v. State, 2018 WL 6055439, at *7; Araiza, 929 S.W.2d at 555. As argued by Hinojosa, suggesting

a criminal background gives the jury a reason to question his judgment and not fully consider his

self-defense argument, even if the jury rationally knows that Hinojosa’s previous arrest should not

inform the verdict in this case. This factor also weighs against the State.

               c.      The time taken to develop the extraneous offense evidence, distracting the
                       jury from consideration of the indicted offense

       The time spent proving up the mug shot was negligible and resulted in no great distraction

of the jury’s consideration of the indicted case. See Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780.

               d.      The force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to prove a fact of
                       consequence

       We have questioned whether Hinojosa’s mug shot served to prove a fact of consequence

and reasoned that it predominately provided context for the detective’s investigation.         See

Lockhart, 847 S.W.2d at 575 (Clinton, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, we address the State’s need

for Hinojosa’s mug shot to prove identity. See Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 780.

       The mug shot was introduced through Monayan, a witness who was familiar with Hinojosa

as a family acquaintance. Monayan’s familiarity with Hinojosa spoke to the reliability of his in-

court identification, and his familiarity was not scrutinized or questioned. Even if it were,

Monayan was not the only witness to identify Hinojosa at trial.

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         The day before Monayan’s testimony, Garza identified Hinojosa as the shooter in the

surveillance video of the shooting. Then, after Monayan, a bartender from the Sugartime Lounge,

Laura McGill, identified Hinojosa as the shooter in the surveillance video. McGill knew Hinojosa

as a regular customer who always ordered Crown Royal Whisky and Coke.

         During her testimony, the prosecutor attempted to introduce another copy of Hinojosa’s

mug shot, because Detective Duke had provided her with a copy of the same mug shot to sign.

Hinojosa objected to the mug shot with McGill’s signature as cumulative, and the objection was

sustained. The prosecutor then asked McGill whether she had identified Hinojosa’s photograph

to Detective Duke and whether he was the same individual as the shooter in the surveillance video.

She responded that she did, and that it was.

         This same colloquy used to elicit contextual testimony about Detective Duke’s

investigation from McGill would have been appropriate for Monayan as well. Not only did the

prosecutor have more than sufficient evidence to prove the uncontested element of identity, but

the prosecutor did not need to introduce Hinojosa’s mug shot with the booking URL in the exhibit’s

footer to prove that Detective Duke knew who his suspect was. This factor weighs against the

State.

         Based on our assessment of the Wyatt factors under Rule 403, we conclude that the

prejudicial effect of Hinojosa’s mug shot from a previous arrest clearly outweighed its probative

value. See id. It was an abuse of discretion to admit the mug shot exhibit.

         3. Harm Analysis

         “Having found error, we must conduct a harm analysis to determine whether the error calls

for reversal of the judgment.”     See id. at 778.      Because the error is evidentiary, i.e., not

constitutional, we will disregard it unless we determine that it has affected Hinojosa’s substantial

rights. See id. at 779 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2); accord Ellison v. State, 494 S.W.3d 316, 327

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(Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d). For our determination, we review the entire record for

evidence that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. See

Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 779; Gigliobianco, 179 S.W.3d at 145.

       The jury’s verdict turned on whether the jury believed that Hinojosa acted in self-defense

when he shot Torres. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a); Tidmore v. State, 976 S.W.2d 724,

728‒30 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. ref’d). The jury watched and had access to the surveillance

video of the shooting; it heard testimony from an eyewitness; and it heard testimony from

individuals at the bar who were familiar with Hinojosa and Torres and who witnessed the aftermath

of the shooting.

       The surveillance video is in color and offers a clear, well-lit view of the incident. But the

quality of the video is pixelated and relatively distant, it provides no sound, and Hinojosa’s back

is to the camera when he shoots Torres. As a result, Hinojosa argued that the video failed to

adequately capture Torres’s potentially threatening gestures.

       Hinojosa relied on McGill’s testimony that Torres was known to instigate altercations

when he drank alcohol and on the medical examiner’s testimony that Torres’s ocular fluid reflected

a .306 vitreous alcohol concentration. Hinojosa also relied on witness testimony that Torres was

“mean mugging” patrons at the bar when he walked in with his date. He argued that there were

beer bottles on the picnic table where Torres was sitting with his date at the time of the shooting,

and Torres could have used the bottle to assault him.

       Torres’s date, Ayanna Smith, was the eyewitness to the shooting. When she testified, she

described a day of accompanying Torres from the bar to various drug deals and back to the bar

again to drink, listen to music, and smoke cigarettes. Smith testified that she and Torres were not

romantically involved but were coworkers at a call center and friends outside of work. Smith

stated that she and Torres became acquainted with Hinojosa at the bar, and that Hinojosa

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exchanged phone numbers with her and offered to be a methamphetamine contact for her.

Surveillance video shows the three individuals sitting inside the bar, casually conversing—McGill

testified that she heard the men engaging in some verbal one-upmanship. Surveillance video also

shows them sitting outside at a picnic table together during the day. Smith explained that she and

Torres spent some of their time inside the bar and then some of their time outside on the bar’s patio

to smoke because smoking was not allowed inside the bar.

        The prosecutor asked Smith, “So, how is it that your friend [Torres] gets shot?” Smith

responded, “[Hinojosa] shot him.” The prosecutor attempted to follow up, but Smith did not

elaborate:

                Q.     And what’s happening before [Hinojosa] shoots him?

                A.     Y’all have the video.

                Q.     And we’re going to play it. I just want to know what—

                A.     Thank you.

                Q.     —you remember about it.

                A.     Okay. Well, that’s as far as it’s going to get.

                Q.     That’s what you remember?

                A.     I mean, all I can say is we were at the picnic table, and he shot him. What
                       do you want me to say?

        On cross-examination, Hinojosa asked Smith what she drank at the bar and whether she

agreed that drugs and alcohol could have affected her perception. Smith stated that she drank four

Fireball whisky drinks, and she agreed that drugs and alcohol could have affected her perception.

She also stated that she “snuck a little bit” of methamphetamine in the bathroom after Hinojosa

offered it to her.

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       Despite Smith’s reluctance or inability to be more descriptive about the moments

surrounding the shooting, the patio surveillance video from immediately before the shooting

corroborates her testimony. The video shows an outside patio with a single picnic table in view.

The camera’s view is perpendicular to the table. Torres and Smith are the only two people at the

table. Both are seated on the bench nearest the camera. They are seated about an arm’s length

apart, and both are facing in the direction of the camera. Both have their backs to the table. Torres

is seated on Smith’s left.

       Torres stands up and walks around towards the other side of the table. While his back is

towards the camera, he appears to take a bottle from the table with his left hand, transfer it to his

right hand, and toss it to his right in a sideways motion, with the bottle moving off-camera. Torres

then walks back around the table to the same side as Smith. He again sits on the table, facing the

camera, to Smith’s left. From this point, Torres remains seated on the table in the same position.

       Hinojosa appears from off camera, approaching Torres from Torres’s left. The two men

shake hands. Hinojosa is standing with his back to the camera, facing Torres, and to Smith’s left.

Hinojosa is within arm’s length of the bench. Then Hinojosa shifts his weight, and Torres slaps

his own chest with his hands. Hinojosa ambles in front of Torres while Torres hunches and rests

his hands on his knees. Hinojosa shifts his weight backward and forward, moving his head and

his hands like he is saying something to Torres. Torres puts his hand on the beer bottle next to

him on his right, and then tilts his head to the left, like he is spitting on the ground. Hinojosa

moves his hand to his right hip, moving his shirt up. He lightly paces or rocks back and forth.

While facing Torres, he repositions his body by turning his right side away from Torres, and he

appears to put his left hand on Torres’s left upper arm. Then Hinojosa moves his right hand from

his right hip and points his hand at Torres. Torres slumps over and rolls to his right on the table,

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where he then lies face down. Hinojosa turns and walks off the patio with what appears to be a

gun in his right hand. Smith runs into the bar. Hinojosa’s car can be seen driving away.

           Reviewing the evidence as a whole, we conclude that it defeats Hinojosa’s self-defense

argument. See Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 779. First, the surveillance video shows an exchange

where Hinojosa maintains control through his body language and by standing in front of where

Torres is seated. Next, there is no evidence of any threatening gestures by Torres; there is no

evidence of any action by Torres for which deadly force would have been a reasonable and

proportionate response. See Tidmore, 976 S.W.2d at 728. While we have recognized and

articulated the danger in suggesting to the jury that Hinojosa had been previously arrested, 4 the

jury benefited from the State’s collection of evidence depicting and describing the shooting. The

State’s evidence weighed heavily against Hinojosa’s argument that it might have been reasonable

for him to shoot Torres, and it outweighed the prejudicial effect of the State’s mug shot exhibit.

See Gigliobianco, 179 S.W.3d at 145. We therefore conclude that Hinojosa’s substantial rights

were not affected, and we overrule his second point of error.

                                                  CONCLUSION

           Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Hinojosa’s

request for a mistrial after the prosecutor made an improper argument. The improper argument

was curable; the trial court took steps to remedy it; and there was no reasonable possibility that it

contributed to the jury’s verdict. Admitting Hinojosa’s mug shot from a previous arrest was error

because it suggested an extraneous offense. Nevertheless, the evidence against Hinojosa’s self-

4
    See Alexander v. State, 88 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. ref’d).

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defense argument outweighed the prejudicial effect of the mug shot, and Hinojosa’s substantial

rights were not affected. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                  Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Do Not Publish

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