Court Opinion

ID: 9939648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 10:10:55.838142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:44.731427
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00095-CR
     ___________________________

  MICHAEL AARON JOBSON, Appellant

                     V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4
           Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1774483R

    Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Michael Aaron Jobson appeals his sentence of 25 years’ incarceration

for failure to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 62.102. In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal

because it is outside the lawful punishment range. We agree that the trial court

imposed an illegal sentence, and we therefore reverse Jobson’s sentence and remand

for a new punishment trial.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

      Jobson was indicted for failing to comply with the requirements of the sex-

offender-registration statute, a third-degree felony. See id. art. 62.102(b)(2). In two

enhancement paragraphs, the indictment alleged that Jobson had previously been

convicted of two felony-sex-offender-registration offenses.

      Jobson pleaded not guilty to the alleged offense and not true to the two

enhancement paragraphs. The jury found Jobson guilty, found both enhancement

paragraphs true, and assessed Jobson’s punishment at 25 years’ incarceration. The trial

court sentenced him accordingly. Jobson now appeals the imposition of that sentence.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

      In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal because it exceeds

the lawful punishment range. The State concedes the point, and we agree.

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       A sentence that is outside the authorized punishment range is an illegal

sentence. O’Reilly v. State, 501 S.W.3d 722, 728–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.)

(citing Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “If a defendant’s

range of punishment is improperly enhanced, in the sense that the prior convictions

alleged do not actually support enhancement under the applicable statutory provision,

then the defendant has been sentenced in violation of the law and his sentence is

‘illegal.’” Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Ex parte Rich,

194 S.W.3d 508, 511–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). This is an unwaivable complaint

that may be challenged at any time. O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 729 (first citing Ex parte

Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); and then citing Baines v. State,

418 S.W.3d 663, 674 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). Whether a sentence

exceeds the punishment range authorized by statute is a legal question that we review

de novo. See Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Fountain v.

State, No. 03-17-00699-CR, 2018 WL 3677871, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 3,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B. Improper Punishment-Range Enhancement

       The punishment range for Jobson’s charged offense was improperly enhanced.

See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645. Jobson’s sex-offender-registration offense is a third-degree

felony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(2). The trial court’s punishment

charge instructed the jury that if it found both of the indictment’s enhancement

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paragraphs to be true, it must assess Jobson’s punishment within the range for a first-

degree felony—that is, “confinement . . . for any term of not less than 5 years or more

than 99 years or life.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32. Thus, the charge allowed the

enhancements to be “stacked” such that the first enhancement raised the punishment

range to a second-degree felony and the second enhancement paragraph raised the

punishment range to a first-degree felony. This was improper.

      The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that enhancements under

both Article 62.102(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 12.42 of

the Texas Penal Code “operate only to increase the level of punishment, not to

elevate the grade of the offense of conviction.” Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.3d 359,

363 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011)). Therefore, when, as here, an indictment alleges multiple

enhancements under Article 62.102(c) and Penal Code Section 12.42, “the first

enhancement does not raise the first offense itself to a higher grade of felony, [rather]

every subsequent enhancement . . . proceed[s] from the identical baseline, raising the

punishment to exactly the same ‘next highest degree of felony’ as the first

enhancement.” Id.

      Because both alleged enhancements should have proceeded from the same

baseline rather than being “stacked,” Jobson’s offense should have been punished as a

second-degree felony, see id., the maximum sentence for which is 20 years’

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incarceration, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33. Jobson’s 25-year sentence is thus illegal.

See O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 728–29. Accordingly, we sustain Jobson’s sole point.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

      Having sustained Jobson’s sole point, we reverse his sentence and remand this

case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.

                                                        /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 8, 2024

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