Court Opinion

ID: 9409272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:28.66325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.994994
License: Public Domain

J-S20020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CARLTON RAYE BELL, JR.                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 317 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 23, 2023,
                in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000483-2020.

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED JULY 17, 2023

        Carlton Raye Bell, Jr., appeals from the order denying without a hearing

his first timely petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

        On April 1, 2021, Bell entered a negotiated guilty plea to the crimes of

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and sexual abuse of children.        Bell

agreed to the following factual basis:

               In December of 2019, Chester County police received
        information that a 14-year-old boy was having a sexual
        relationship with a 27-year-old male. On December 30th of 2019,
        Detective Joseph Walton from the Chester County Detectives
        Office interviewed the victim, who at the time was a 14-year-old
        male.

              He told the detective that he presented himself on the
        Internet as a 15-year-old, and he was - - he was in contact with
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20020-23

      [Bell], when [Bell] was 27 years old. The two had multiple
      conversations. They exchanged naked pictures of one another,
      and they made plans to meet.

            [Bell] then came driving his Jeep Wrangler to the [victim’s]
      home which was at the time in East Caln Township, Chester
      County, Pennsylvania. [Bell] picked up the victim and took the
      victim to [Bell’s] home in Pottstown. The two were there and
      made arrangements to have sexual intercourse.                 The
      Commonwealth would note that the age of consent in
      Pennsylvania is 16 years of age, and the victim at the time was
      14.

            The victim made comments about being nervous, and [Bell]
      said that he was nervous, as well, because he could go to jail for
      that they were prepared to do. The victim and [Bell] then
      proceeded to engage in oral and anal sex in [Bell’s] bedroom.
      [Bell] then brought the victim back to his home in East Caln
      Township, Chester County. This took place in 2019, the month of
      September.

            Later in January 2020, January 17th of 2020, the two then
      made arrangements to have sexual relations once again. The plan
      was for [Bell] to pick up the victim at the victim’s home, again,
      [in] East Caln Township, Chester County. When [Bell] drove his
      Jeep Wrangler to the victim’s home, he was intercepted by police
      who arrested him[.]

            After subsequent search warrants were executed, Chester
      County Detectives found images of children less than 18 years old
      having sexual contact, engaging in sexual acts. Those images
      were on [Bell’s] electronic devices in his possession, and they
      were for his sexual gratification.

N.T. 4/1/21, at 3-4. On July 9, 2022, Bell was sentenced, according to the

plea agreement, to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years of imprisonment.

He was determined not to be a sexually violent predator. Bell filed neither a

post-sentence motion nor a direct appeal.

      On August 8, 2022, Bell filed a counseled PCRA petition. In this petition,

Bell raised five distinct claims of ineffective assistance in connection with the

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entry of his guilty plea.   The Commonwealth filed an answer to the PCRA

petition on September 23, 2022. On December 21, 2022, the PCRA court

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Bell’s petition without

a hearing. Bell filed a response. By order entered January 23, 2023, the

PCRA court denied Bell’s petition. This timely appeal followed. Both Bell and

the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Bell raises the following issue on appeal:

          1. Did the PCRA court err by dismissing Bell’s petition
             without a hearing as there was a material issue of fact as
             to whether or not Bell’s guilty-plea counsel competently
             advised Bell of any possible defenses to the charges, the
             prosecution’s standard of proof and the presumption of
             innocence before making a decision, thereby inducing
             Bell to plead guilty involuntarily and unknowingly in this
             case?

Bell’s Brief at 2.

      This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition

calls for us to “determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s factual findings will

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

record.” Commonwealth v. Webb, 236 A.3d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citing Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

            The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
      a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2).] To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that

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      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted). Regarding a claim that counsel was ineffective:

             It is well-established that to succeed on a claim asserting
      the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must plead and
      prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1)
      the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
      reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or
      inaction. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (Pa.
      1987). If a petitioner fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of
      the ineffectiveness inquiry, his claim fails. Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150–51 (Pa. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation

formatting altered).

      With respect to claims that plea counsel was ineffective:

             Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the
      plea-bargaining process are eligible for PCRA review. Allegations
      of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will
      serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the
      defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the
      defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
      voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
      was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
      criminal cases.

         The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
         dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements
         for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea
         counsel, ... under which the defendant must show that
         counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
         injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing,
         involuntary, or unintelligent plea. This standard is
         equivalent to the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to
         all post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea.

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      Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super.
      2005) (en banc)[.]

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012–13 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(some citations omitted). Notably, a PCRA petitioner cannot assert grounds

for withdrawing a guilty plea that contradict his statements made under oath

in a guilty plea colloquy. Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super.

2007)).

      Here, Bell asks this Court to remand the case “so that he and his [plea]

counsel may testify at an evidentiary hearing in order to resolve the material

issue of fact concerning whether or not incompetent advice induced his guilty

plea[.]” Bell’s Brief at 3. He asserts that, had he been given competent advice

regarding the areas enumerated in his issue, “he very likely would have

elected to proceed to a jury trial.” Id. at 3-4. According to Bell, “it was an

abuse of discretion and a legal error for the PCRA court to dismiss without an

evidentiary hearing, as the record does not support its conclusions of fact and

law.” Id. at 4. We disagree.

      “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware

of what he was doing,” and “[h]e bears the burden of proving otherwise.”

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations

omitted).

              The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a
          defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that
          he lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel
          induced the lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is bound
          by the statements he makes in open court while under oath

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        and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea
        which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.

Id. On appeal, this Court evaluates the adequacy of the plea colloquy and

the voluntariness of the resulting plea by looking at the totality of the

circumstances.   Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.

Super. 2011).

     Here, the PCRA court found no merit to Bell’s claim. The PCRA court

first noted that Bell’s claims of inadequate advice were presented in a

boilerplate fashion, with no argument or supporting evidence presented in the

petition. The court further explained:

     Regardless of their lack of specificity, these assertions are belied
     by [Bell’s] oral and written statements made at the time he
     entered his guilty plea. Prior to the plea, [Bell] completed and
     signed the written guilty plea colloquy form – which sets forth in
     detail some of the very rights [Bell] asserts were not explained to
     him, including the standard of proof at trial and the cross-
     examination of witnesses.       Crucially, the following language
     appears on Page 9 of the colloquy:

        39. I have had enough time to discuss these charges with
        my lawyer, and I am satisfied with the advice that [s]he had
        given to me, and with [her] representation of me before this
        [c]ourt.

     [Bell] placed his initials next to this paragraph, indicating his
     assent thereto.

                                     ***

     Likewise, at the time he entered his plea, [the court] asked the
     following questions to [Bell]:

        THE COURT: Have you had sufficient time to discuss your
        case including the facts, the law, and any possible defenses
        with your attorney?

        [BELL]: Yes, Your Honor.

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        THE COURT: Are your satisfied with her advice and
        representation?

        [BELL]: Yes, Your Honor.

        THE COURT: I have here before me a written guilty plea
        colloquy. Did you read that, or did someone read it to you?

        [BELL]: I read it, Your Honor.

        THE COURT: And do you have any questions about anything
        contained in it?

        [BELL]: No, Your Honor.

        THE COURT: Where it says defendant, is that your
        signature?

        [BELL]: Yes, Your Honor.

        (N.T. 4/1/21, p.7).

            [Bell’s] claims in this PCRA petition are clearly contradicted
     by the answers given by [Bell] at the guilty plea hearing. He
     reviewed and signed the written guilty plea[.] He then completed
     an oral colloquy conducted by [the court] on the record[.] When
     asked if he had enough time to review the case with his attorney
     and if he was satisfied with her advice and presentation, [Bell]
     explicitly answered “yes.” Entertaining [Bell’s] claims would, in
     effect, render this entire colloquy process meaningless. He cannot
     now be permitted to assert that he was unsatisfied with the
     representation of his attorney, or that he was not informed of
     certain rights, when he specifically informed the court otherwise
     at the time he entered his plea.

Rule 907 Notice, 12/21/22, unnumbered 2 n.1

     Our review of the record supports this conclusion. A PCRA petitioner

claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel must allege

sufficient facts from which a court can determine counsel’s effectiveness.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12); see Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332

(Pa. 1981) (stating that a defendant may not argue ineffectiveness in

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vacuum); see also Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa. 2008)

(explaining that, in the absence of a sufficient proffer, a petitioner’s bare

assertions would inappropriately convert an evidentiary hearing into a “fishing

expedition”).

      Here, the only factual issues presented were created by Bell’s self-

serving statements within his PCRA petition when compared to his answers in

the written and oral plea colloquies. Moreover, Bell’s claim that his case is

similar to Commonwealth v. Moyer, 478 A.2d 469 (Pa. Super. 1984), in

which this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing, is unavailing.          In

Moyer, this Court concluded that “[o]n the state of the record, we cannot

determine what occurred between defense counsel and appellant prior to the

entry of the plea of guilty.” Moyer, 478 A.2d at 471. Here, Bell’s answers in

both his oral and written colloquies clearly establish on the record what

occurred between Bell and his plea counsel.

      Finally, Bell contends that “[t]his Court should hold that solely relying

upon the written colloquy in refuting claims that a guilty plea is involuntary or

unknowing should not be sufficient in a case like” his. Bell’s Brief at 12. This

argument ignores the fact that Bell adopted the statements from his written

colloquy during his oral colloquy with the court.

      In sum, given the totality of circumstances surrounding the entry of his

guilty plea, Yeomans, supra, the PCRA court correctly determined that Bell’s

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ineffectiveness claim lacked merit, and that an evidentiary hearing was not

warranted. We therefore affirm the order denying Bell post-conviction relief.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

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