Court Opinion

ID: 9897232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:01.166713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.096976
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 02 2023, 9:14 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
George M. Plews                                           Karl L. Mulvaney
Christopher E. Kozak                                      Margaret M. Christensen
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP                          Dentons Bingham Greenbaum
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     LLP
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Patrick E. Hofer
                                                          Clyde & Co US LLP
                                                          Washington, D.C.

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tom James Company, et al.,                                November 2, 2023
Appellant,                                                Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-PL-106
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
Zurich American Insurance                                 The Honorable Heather A. Welch,
Company,                                                  Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D01-2004-PL-13613

                                 Opinion by Judge Bailey
                           Judges Tavitas and Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                            Page 1 of 23
      Bailey, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Tom James Company and some of its subsidiaries (collectively, “Tom James”)

      filed a lawsuit against Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”),

      seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage of a commercial

      property insurance policy. Tom James now appeals the trial court order

      granting Zurich’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issues
[3]   Tom James raises the following four restated issues:

              I.       Whether Zurich waived its right to raise a personal
                       jurisdiction defense.

              II.      Whether the trial court lacked specific personal jurisdiction
                       over Zurich under the “minimum contacts” analysis.

              III.     Whether Zurich consented to personal jurisdiction by
                       executing documents to transact business in Indiana per
                       Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4(7).

              IV.      Whether Zurich consented to personal jurisdiction in the
                       “Jurisdiction Clause” of the insurance policy between it
                       and Tom James.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023         Page 2 of 23
      Facts and Procedural History
[4]   Tom James is a worldwide, fully integrated clothing manufacturer that

      manufactures and sells clothes at locations around the world. It is incorporated

      and headquartered in Tennessee. Tom James has an executive office located in

      Indianapolis, Indiana. Tom James’ executive officers and members of its board

      of directors are located in offices in Tennessee, Indiana, and Maryland. The

      remaining plaintiffs are subsidiaries of Tom James, and none of them are

      located or incorporated in Indiana.

[5]   Zurich is an insurance company incorporated in New York, with its principal

      place of business in Illinois. Zurich issues insurance policies to customers

      across the United States, including Indiana. Zurich has executed a power of

      attorney appointing an Indiana agent for service of process in Indiana.

[6]   In 2019, the Tennessee office of insurance broker Arthur J. Gallagher Risk

      Management Services, Inc. communicated with Zurich on behalf of Tom James

      to obtain the “Zurich EDGE Global Policy” (“the Policy”), which is the policy

      at issue in this lawsuit. Tom James’ Appendix (hereinafter, “TJ App.”) v. II at

      81. The “First Named Insured” in the Policy is “Tom James Company,”

      whose address is stated as “263 Seaboard Lane, Brentwood, TN, 37067.” Id. at

      88. The Policy was issued to Tom James in Tennessee.

[7]   The Policy generally insures “against direct physical loss of or damage caused

      by a Covered Cause of Loss to Covered Property.” Id. at 89. The Policy also

      provides coverage for “actual Time Element loss … result[ing] from the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023       Page 3 of 23
      necessary Suspension of the Insured’s business activities at an Insured

      Location.” Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted). Appendix E to the Policy is a

      “Schedule of Locations” that identifies the reported business income of many

      Tom James locations and whether business interruption coverage was

      purchased for each location. Id. at 148. The schedule includes over 120

      locations around the world and many cities in the United States. It lists one

      location in Indiana at 8470 Allison Pointe Boulevard in Indianapolis. For that

      location, the appendix lists “NCP” for the reported business income and

      business interruption loss limit. Id. at 149. The Policy provides in its definition

      section that “NCP” means “No Coverage Provided.” Id. at 143. Many other

      locations, including the Tennessee location identified in the Policy’s

      declarations, are covered for business interruption loss. The Policy also

      contains a clause entitled “JURISDICTION[,]” which states, in full: “Any

      disputes arising hereunder will be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of a

      court of competent jurisdiction within the USA.” Id. at 131.

[8]   On April 10, 2020, Tom James filed a complaint against Zurich in the Indiana

      trial court. The complaint alleged that Tom James is incorporated in Tennessee

      and that Marion County, Indiana is the preferred venue under Indiana Trial

      Rule 75(A)(10) because Tom James “has an executive office” in Marion

      County. Id. at 67. The complaint did not allege any location as Tom James’

      headquarters and/or principal place of business. The complaint stated the

      facility location and state of incorporation for each of the named plaintiff

      subsidiaries, none of which are in Indiana. The complaint alleged that Zurich’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023       Page 4 of 23
       principal place of business is Illinois and that Zurich “does business” in

       Indiana.1 Id.

[9]    The complaint further alleged that, as a result of the COVID pandemic, many

       Tom James locations around the world were ordered to close, and those

       closures had downstream ripple effects, causing disruptions and financial losses

       up and down Tom James’s entire worldwide supply chain. The complaint did

       not allege loss in any specific location(s). The complaint sought a judgment

       declaring the scope of Zurich’s obligation to pay Tom James for its losses under

       the Policy.

[10]   On May 18, 2020, Zurich filed a notice of removal of the lawsuit from state

       court to federal court based on alleged diversity of citizenship. On May 22,

       Zurich filed in federal court its motion to dismiss the claims of all the Tom

       James subsidiary plaintiffs, but not the claims of Tom James Company itself,

       based on an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction. On that same date, Zurich

       also filed in federal court its answer and affirmative defenses to Tom James’

       complaint. In its answer, Zurich referenced its separately filed motion to

       dismiss and stated, “By filing this Answer, Zurich American does not waive its

       right to assert lack of personal jurisdiction of this Court as to any Plaintiff except

       1
         The complaint also states that Zurich is incorporated in Delaware. However, Tom James does not dispute
       the trial court’s factual finding that Zurich is incorporated in New York.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                          Page 5 of 23
       as to Tom James Company.” TJ App. v. II at 168 (emphasis added). As its

       “Thirteenth Defense,” Zurich stated:

               The claims asserted, and/or relief sought, by Plaintiff Tom James
               Company against Defendant are or may be barred, in whole or in
               part, due to additional defenses that cannot now be articulated by
               Defendant based on the information it has to date concerning
               Plaintiff Tom James Company’s claims. As such, Defendant
               reserves its right to supplement this Answer and raise additional
               defenses as may become applicable upon further amplification of
               Plaintiff Tom James Company’s claims and discovery of
               information presently unknown to Defendant.

       Id. at 180.

[11]   On June 9, 2020, the federal district court ordered Zurich to show cause why

       the action should not be remanded back to state court due to a lack of the

       federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. On

       June 24, Tom James filed in federal court a motion to remand the cause back to

       state court and its response to Zurich’s motion to dismiss. In its response, Tom

       James asserted that it “is an Indiana citizen” because, although it is

       incorporated in Tennessee, it “has executive offices” in Indiana. Zurich’s

       Appendix (hereinafter, “Z App.”) at 16.

[12]   On November 13, 2020, the federal district court granted Tom James’ motion

       to remand the matter back to state court. On December 10, 2020, Zurich filed

       in state court its motion to dismiss the claims of all plaintiffs, including Tom

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023       Page 6 of 23
       James Company, for lack of personal jurisdiction.2 At the same time, Zurich

       filed its own similar lawsuit in a Tennessee state court.3 A lengthy discovery

       dispute ensued. Following discovery on the issue of jurisdiction, on June 1,

       2022, Tom James filed its brief in opposition to Zurich’s motion to dismiss.

       Following a hearing at which it heard argument on the motion to dismiss, the

       trial court issued its December 19, 2022, order granting Zurich’s motion and

       dismissing the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review
[13]   Personal jurisdiction presents a question of law that we review de novo. Boyer

       v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 508 (Ind. 2015). However, “whether personal

       jurisdiction exists can depend upon factual determinations concerning a

       defendant’s contacts with the forum state—in which case the challenger bears

       the burden of disproving personal jurisdiction.” Id. When the trial court issues

       findings of jurisdictional facts, we review those findings for clear error. Id. at

       509. That is, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and

       whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We may reverse the trial court’s

       2
         In the alternative, Zurich sought dismissal based on forum non conveniens. The trial court never reached that
       defense because it dismissed the cause due to a lack of personal jurisdiction.
       3
        Zurich’s Tennessee action sought a judgment declaring the scope of Tom James’ coverage under the
       Policy. That action has been stayed pending this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                               Page 7 of 23
       factual findings “only when the record contains no facts to support them either

       directly or indirectly.” Id.

[14]   Tom James does not challenge the trial court’s extensive factual findings

       regarding jurisdiction; rather, it asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of

       law when it dismissed this action due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus,

       our review is de novo.

       Waiver
[15]   As an initial matter, we address Tom James’ assertion that Zurich waived its

       right to assert a personal jurisdiction defense when it filed in federal court its

       answer that only raised the lack of personal jurisdiction as to the plaintiff

       subsidiaries. It is possible to waive a claim of personal jurisdiction. See Stidham

       v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Ind. 1998). However, we find no such

       waiver here.

[16]   A challenge to personal jurisdiction may be raised either as an affirmative

       defense in the answer or in a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule

       12(B)(2). Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 508 n.1; Ind. Trial Rule 12(B); see also T.R.

       12(H)(1)(b);4 T.R. 6(C) (providing that a Rule 12(B) motion alters the time for

       4
           T.R. 12(B)(1)(b) provides, in relevant part:

                 (1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process,
                 insufficiency of service of process, or the same action pending in another state court of this state is
                 waived to the extent constitutionally permissible: … (b) if it is neither made by motion under this
                 rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(A) to be
                 made as a matter of course.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                                   Page 8 of 23
       service of a responsive pleading). Here, in the state court, Zurich raised the

       challenge to Tom James’s personal jurisdiction in its timely motion to dismiss.5

[17]   However, Tom James contends that Zurich waived its personal jurisdiction

       challenge as to the Tom James Company (as opposed to the plaintiff

       subsidiaries) when it filed an answer in federal court that only challenged

       personal jurisdiction as to the subsidiaries. First, we note that the waiver of

       personal jurisdiction to which Tom James points specifically provided that it

       applied only to a waiver of personal jurisdiction in federal court. See TJ App. v.

       II at 168 (“By filing this Answer, Zurich does not waive its right to assert lack of

       personal jurisdiction of this Court as to any Plaintiff except as to Tom James

       Company.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 180 (stating an affirmative defense

       reserving the right to supplement the answer and “raise additional defenses as

       may become applicable upon further amplification of Plaintiff Tom James

       Company’s claims and discovery of information presently unknown to

       Defendant”). Tom James points to no reason why a personal jurisdiction

       waiver may not be limited to the jurisdiction of the court in which it is filed.

       Therefore, under the plain terms of Zurich’s personal jurisdiction waiver, it

       applied only to the federal court’s jurisdiction regarding Tom James Company.

       5
         We note that Zurich gave written notice of the removal to Tom James, at that point making the removal
       effective and ceasing all proceedings in the state court until remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Moreover, the
       time for filing an answer and/or Rule 12(B) motion in state court was suspended during the removal of the
       suit to federal court. See Arkla Indus., Inc. v. Columbia St. Partners, Inc., 95 N.E.3d 194, 199 (Ind. Ct. App.
       2018), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                                Page 9 of 23
[18]   Second, even if Zurich’s answer in federal court had not specifically limited its

       waiver of personal jurisdiction to that court, we would not find waiver. Tom

       James has failed to provide any Indiana authority holding that an answer filed

       in federal court is automatically deemed to have been filed in state court upon

       remand. See Citizens Nat’l Bank v. First Nat’l Bank, 331 N.E.2d 471, 476 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1975) (not requiring, on remand, the refiling in state court of a motion to

       dismiss that had been filed in the federal court on removal, but failing to state a

       general rule that any pleading in federal court is automatically deemed filed in

       the state court on remand). Rather, the United States Supreme Court has noted

       that it is for the state court to determine on remand what is to be done with the

       pleadings filed in the federal court on removal. Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U.S. 187,

       190-91 (1884) (“It will be for the state court, when the case gets back there, to

       determine what shall be done with pleadings filed and testimony taken during

       the pendency of the suit in the other jurisdiction[, i.e., federal court].”).

[19]   We find the instant case to be similar to Arkla Indus., Inc. v. Colum. St. Partners,

       Inc., where a panel of this Court held the defendant’s answer filed in federal

       court on removal was not considered to be an answer in state court upon

       remand. 95 N.E.3d 194, 198-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. That is,

       despite the filing of an answer in the federal court on removal, the defendant’s

       time to file an answer or Rule 12(B) motion in the state court on remand had

       not expired. Id. Thus, the defendant in Arkla had not waived a venue claim in

       state court on remand simply because it had not raised such a claim in the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023         Page 10 of 23
       answer it had filed in federal court on removal. Id.6 The same is true here. As

       the trial court—in its discretion—determined, Zurich’s answer in federal court

       was not deemed to have been filed in state court, and Zurich did not waive its

       personal jurisdiction claim as to Tom James Company simply because it did not

       raise such a claim in its answer in federal court.

[20]   Moreover, as the trial court found, it would be unfair to hold otherwise,7 given

       Tom James’ own true but critically incomplete statement in its complaint that it

       had “executive offices” in Indiana. TJ App. v. II at 66. As we discuss below,

       the location of Tom James’ “principal place of business” is relevant to whether

       Zurich “reached out” to an Indiana citizen and thereby created “minimum

       contacts” within Indiana for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ford

       Motor Co. v. Montana Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., -- U.S. --, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).

       The “principal place of business” is normally the place where the corporation is

       headquartered and/or where its “officers direct, control, and coordinate the

       corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). By

       omitting the highly relevant facts that it is headquartered in Tennessee and that

       its officers/board members are located not just in its “executive offices” in

       6
         The non-binding, out-of-state authority cited by Tom James is not to the contrary. See State v. Hess Corp.,
       982 A.2d 388, 392 (N.H. 2009) (holding “the effect to be given pleadings filed in federal court before a case is
       remanded [to state court] is for state courts to determine”).
       7
         The trial court did not find, as Tom James asserts, that Zurich was allowed to “withdraw its waiver” as to
       Tom James Company. Appellants’ Br. at 25. Rather, it held that Zurich never waived personal jurisdiction
       as to Tom James Company to begin with because the answer filed in federal court was not deemed to have
       been filed in state court.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                               Page 11 of 23
       Indiana but also in Tennessee and Maryland, Tom James’ complaint

       misleadingly suggests its principal place of business is Indiana—a misleading

       suggestion Zurich appears to have relied upon when it failed to include Tom

       James Company in its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in

       federal court. Tom James provides no cogent reason why it should benefit from

       its own true but critically incomplete statements relevant to jurisdiction.

[21]   Zurich did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense against Tom James

       Company through its answer filed in federal court.

       Specific Personal Jurisdiction
[22]   Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s “power to impose judgment on a

       particular defendant.” Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 509. Our analysis begins with

       Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A), which discusses activities that may support

       jurisdiction. Id. Our Supreme Court has interpreted the “catch all” provision

       of that rule8 as reducing the “‘analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of

       whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the federal Due

       Process Clause.’” Id. (quoting LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967

       (Ind. 2006)).

               More specifically, before an Indiana court can properly assert
               personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause of
               the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that the defendant have

       8
         That provision—as amended in 2003—states: “In addition, a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction
       on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the United States.” T.R. 4.4(A).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                           Page 12 of 23
               “certain minimum contacts with the state such that the
               maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
               play and substantial justice.” [LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857
               N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006)] (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326
               U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Minimum
               contacts include acts defendants themselves initiate within or
               without the forum state that create a substantial connection with
               the forum state itself. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
               462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); see also Anthem
               Ins. Cos., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1235
               (Ind.2000), superseded on other grounds by LinkAmerica…. Consistent
               with this longstanding precedent, Indiana courts will employ
               caution and exert potentially coercive legal authority only over a
               defendant who has the requisite minimum contacts to Indiana.

       Id.

[23]   This “minimum contacts” analysis for personal jurisdiction involves two

       concepts: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. In re Estate of Baker, 837

       N.E.2d 603, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234).

       General jurisdiction exists if the defendant’s contacts with the state are so

       “continuous and systematic” that the defendant should “reasonably anticipate

       being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, … even if causes of

       action are unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.”

       LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967. The United States Supreme Court has

       recognized that, for a corporate defendant, “the place of incorporation and

       principal place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler

       AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted).

       Here, Zurich is incorporated in New York and has its principal place of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023       Page 13 of 23
       business in Illinois; thus, neither party claims general personal jurisdiction

       exists here.

[24]   Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction requires not only a showing

       that the defendant has minimum contacts with the state but also that the

       plaintiff’s claims “ar[o]se out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford,

       141 S.Ct. at 1025 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, specific

       jurisdiction involves a two-step analysis. First, there must be a showing that the

       defendant “deliberately reached out beyond its home” and into the forum state

       “by, for example, exploiting a market in the forum [s]tate or entering a

       contractual relationship there.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[25]   Second, even when the first step has been shown, “the plaintiff’s claims …

       ‘must [also] arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.”

       Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582

       U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).

               In other words, there must be “an affiliation between the forum
               and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an
               occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
               subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear [Dunlop Tires
               Operations, S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S. [915,] 919 [(2011)] (internal
               quotation marks and brackets omitted). For this reason, “specific
               jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or
               connected with, the very controversy that establishes
               jurisdiction.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Bristol-Myers, 255 U.S. at 262. “When there is no such connection, specific

       jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023         Page 14 of 23
       activities in the State.” Id. at 264 (emphasis added); see also Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at

       511 (holding the defendant must have “minimum contacts and connections

       within Indiana that create or contribute to the controversy at hand” and “arise

       from [the defendant’s] own conduct within or directed into Indiana”).

[26]   Zurich certainly has reached into the State of Indiana to do business and

       “exploit” the market here; it has issued insurance policies totaling billions of

       dollars to many entities located in Indiana. Ford, 141 S.Ct. at 1025. However,

       Zurich’s insurance policy with Tom James is not one of those. Tom James is

       not a corporate citizen of Indiana, it is not headquartered in Indiana, and its

       principal place of business is not Indiana.9 Furthermore, the Policy that forms

       the basis of Tom James’ lawsuit was not entered into or issued in Indiana but in

       Tennessee. And, critically, Tom James’ claims against Zurich have absolutely

       nothing to do with Indiana in particular or Zurich’s contacts here. Tom James’

       claim under the Policy for its losses related to COVID was submitted by its

       Chief Financial Officer in Tennessee and did not allege any loss that is specific

       to Indiana. Indeed, although the Policy provides coverage for many locations

       throughout the United States, it clearly states that it does not provide insurance

       9
         Tom James does not contend otherwise on appeal. See Appellants’ Br. at 51 (acknowledging that “Tom
       James Company may formally be a Tennessee ‘citizen’ by virtue of its incorporation papers and its brick-and-
       mortar headquarters”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                           Page 15 of 23
       coverage for loss of business income at Tom James’ one and only Indiana

       location.10

[27]   The fact that Zurich did not insure any Tom James location in Indiana is what

       distinguishes this case from those cited by Tom James for the proposition that

       “‘a company with insurance obligations in a state … has submitted to the

       jurisdiction of the state’s courts’ on suits to enforce those obligations.”

       Appellant’s Br. at 53 (quoting Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827,

       833 (11th Cir. 1992). Unlike the instant case, those cases involved claims about

       insurance contracts covering residents and/or locations in the forum state. See

       McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (noting the contract was

       delivered in the forum state, the premiums were mailed from the forum state,

       and the insured was a resident of the forum state); Olivier, 979 F.2d at 833

       (noting the insurance company insured operations in the forum state). Tom

       James has pointed to no authority stating that an insurance company is subject

       to specific jurisdiction for claims arising from insurance policies issued out-of-

       state to out-of-state residents simply because the company has issued unrelated

       insurance policies in the forum state.

       10
          We note that considering whether an Indiana location is covered by the insurance policy at issue is not
       “confus[ing] liability and jurisdiction,” as Tom James claims. Appellant’s Br. at 54. Whether the Policy
       relates to any location in Indiana is relevant to the jurisdictional question of whether Tom James’ insurance
       claims “arose” out of any action Zurich took in Indiana. See Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 508 (“[W]hether personal
       jurisdiction exists can depend upon factual determinations concerning a defendant’s contacts with the forum
       state.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                             Page 16 of 23
[28]   In fact, the United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the “view that

       a state court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide corporation … on any

       claim, no matter how unrelated to the State or [the corporation’s] activities

       there.” Ford, 141 S.Ct. at 1027, n.3; see also Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930, n.6

       (“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the

       exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.”); Matlin v. Spin

       Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting “[w]e cannot simply

       aggregate all of a defendant’s contacts with a state—no matter how dissimilar in

       terms of geography, time, or substance—as evidence” that the alleged injury

       arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities).

[29]   In short, no party to this lawsuit is a citizen of Indiana, the Policy was not

       entered into in Indiana, and the claimed injury did not arise in Indiana. Zurich

       did not “reach out” to Indiana to enter into the Policy at issue in this case, and

       Tom James’ claims under the Policy do not arise out of or relate to Zurich’s

       contacts with Indiana. Ford, 141 S.Ct. at 1025. There is no specific personal

       jurisdiction in Indiana.

       Consent to Personal Jurisdiction through State Law
[30]   Tom James asserts that, even if there would not otherwise be specific

       jurisdiction, Zurich consented to such jurisdiction when it complied with

       Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4(7). Tom James essentially asserts that

       compliance with that statute operates as a consent to jurisdiction even as to

       insurance contracts that are not made within Indiana or with residents of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023       Page 17 of 23
       Indiana. We disagree, as our Supreme Court has specifically held otherwise

       regarding a prior statute that used exactly the same statutory language as is used

       currently in Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4(7). See Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v.

       Carter, 222 Ind. 557, 54 N.E.2d 944 (1944).

[31]   Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4 applies to foreign insurance companies wishing

       to do business in the State of Indiana. To do so, the company must execute the

       specified listed documents, one of which is “[a] duly executed power of

       attorney … which constitutes and appoints an [Indiana resident] … as the

       insurance company’s agent … upon whom … all lawful process in any action in

       law or equity against it shall be served.” Ind. Code § 27-1-17-4(7). That statute

       further provides, in relevant part, that “such power of attorney shall continue in

       force and be irrevocable so long as any liability of the insurance company remains

       outstanding in this state.” Id. (emphasis added). Tom James maintains that the

       emphasized language means any insurer who executes the required documents

       to do business in Indiana thereby consents to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts.

       In support of its claim, Tom James engages in a lengthy analysis of the

       legislative history of Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4(7). However, there is no

       need to resort to an analysis of legislative history as the language of the statute

       itself is unambiguous.

[32]   As our Supreme Court has stated,

               [o]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and
               give effect to the Legislature’s intent. The best evidence of that
               intent is a statute’s text. The first step is therefore to decide

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023          Page 18 of 23
               whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously
               on the point in question. When a statute is clear and
               unambiguous, we must apply the plain and ordinary meaning of
               the language. There is no need to resort to any other rules of
               statutory construction. As a result, we need not delve into
               legislative history if no ambiguity exists.

       Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012) (citations omitted).

[33]   Here, our Supreme Court has already discussed the plain meaning of the

       relevant statutory language. In Carter, the Court was called upon to interpret

       the language of a precursor to Indiana Code Section 27-1-17-4(7) that involved

       exactly the same language at issue in the instant case; i.e., that the power of

       attorney executed by the insurance company “shall continue in force and be

       irrevocable so long as any liability of the insurance company remains

       outstanding in this state.” 54 N.E.2d at 565. The Court held that the “intent

       and design” and “obvious purpose” of the statute “was to bring the insurance

       company within the jurisdiction of the courts of the state for the purpose of

       actions arising out of contracts made within the state or with residents of the state.” Id.

       at 566-67 (emphasis added). In reaching that holding, Carter relied upon Morris

       & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1929), which “involved

       substantially the same question” and where the Court held that “[t]he language

       of the appointment [of the power of attorney] and of the statute under which it

       was made plainly implies that the scope of the agency is intended to be …

       limited” to “controversies growing out of transactions within the state.” Id. at

       565-66; Cf. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. --, 143 S.Ct. 2028, 2037 (2023)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023              Page 19 of 23
       (holding a foreign corporation consented to jurisdiction when it complied with

       a Pennsylvania law that expressly stated that registration and qualification as a

       foreign corporation shall permit state courts to “exercise general personal

       jurisdiction” over the corporation).

[34]   As our Supreme Court held, the statutory language clearly applies only to

       “actions arising out of contracts made within the state or with residents of the

       state.” Carter, 54 N.E.2d at 566-67. Because the purpose of the specific

       statutory language at issue is unambiguous, we need not consider the statutory

       legislative history. And, since the insurance contract at issue in this case was

       not made within the state or with residents of the state, Zurich did not consent

       to jurisdiction in this case by registering an agent in compliance with Indiana

       Code Section 27-1-17-4(7).11

       Consent to Personal Jurisdiction through Contract
[35]   Finally, Tom James asserts that Zurich consented to personal jurisdiction in the

       Policy’s “Jurisdiction Clause.” That provision states, in full: “Any disputes

       arising hereunder will be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of a court of

       competent jurisdiction within the USA.” TJ App. v. II at 131. Tom James

       11
           In its reply brief, Tom James also addresses whether Zurich’s alleged consent to suit violates the dormant
       commerce clause. However, as we hold Zurich did not consent to suit by complying with the applicable state
       law, we need not address that issue. Moreover, the dormant commerce clause issue was not raised in the
       trial court below, and Zurich only addressed it briefly in a one-sentence footnote in its appellate brief.
       Therefore, even if it were not moot, we would not address the issue of the dormant commerce clause. See
       Plank v. Cmty. Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (“[A]ppellate review presupposes that a
       litigant’s arguments have been raised and considered in the trial court.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                             Page 20 of 23
       maintains that the words “court of competent jurisdiction” mean any United

       States court that has subject-matter jurisdiction. Zurich contends that the

       phrase means a court that also has personal jurisdiction.

[36]   The resolution of the question is governed by our opinion in George S. May

       Intern. Co. v. King, where we addressed the meaning of this exact phrase. 629

       N.E.2d 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. King involved an employment

       contract dispute where, as in the instant case, the contract contained a provision

       that lawsuits regarding certain claims could be brought “in any court of

       competent jurisdiction.” Id. at 259. As is the case here, the parties disputed

       the meaning of “court of competent jurisdiction.” In settling this dispute, we

       noted:

                [I]t has long been held that in construing a written instrument,
                we give technical words and terms of art their technical meaning.
                We presume that the parties know the technical meaning of the
                language they use in a formal instrument and have adopted that
                meaning. Thus, in construing a formal contract we must give the
                words contained therein their ordinary legal significance unless it
                is clear from the contract as a whole that it was highly
                improbable that the parties attached to the words their legal
                significance.

                The phrase “[any] court of competent jurisdiction” is a term of art
                which has acquired so definite a meaning in the law that we cannot give
                a contrary interpretation to the phrase especially in a formal instrument.
                Nothing in the contract here indicates anything other than that
                the parties intended to adopt the ordinary legal significance of the
                phrase “any court of competent jurisdiction,” and, therefore, we
                will apply the technical meaning of the phrase. A court of
                “competent jurisdiction” is any court which has jurisdiction over the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023              Page 21 of 23
                defendant (personal jurisdiction), jurisdiction over the particular case,
                and jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and is thus
                competent to render a binding judgment in the case.

       Id. at 262 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); but cf. Ace Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am.

       Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (reaching a different

       interpretation of the phrase “court of competent jurisdiction” as used in a

       “Service of Suit” clause of an insurance policy); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,

       794 F.2d 710, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).

[37]   There is nothing in the Policy clearly indicating a “high probability” that the

       parties intended the words “court of competent jurisdiction” to have any

       meaning other than its ordinary legal significance, i.e., any court (in the United

       States) with both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.12 See id. As the

       Indiana trial court did not have personal jurisdiction, Zurich did not consent to

       be sued in that court.13

       12
          Nor does the interpretation applying that ordinary legal significance to the term “court of competent
       jurisdiction” render the Jurisdictional Clause meaningless, as Tom James argues. Rather, that Clause, by its
       plain terms, was intended to limit lawsuits to courts in the United States, as opposed to the courts of other
       countries where a cause of action might arise in Tom James’ world-wide business.
       13
          Tom James asserts that the Jurisdiction Clause of the Policy must be construed against Zurich, the insurer
       who drafted the Policy. Appellant’s Br. at 29-30 (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind.
       1996)). However, as Kiger itself acknowledges, we construe an insurance policy against the insurer only
       where the terms are ambiguous. 662 N.E.2d at 947. “[I]nsurance policy provisions are ambiguous only if
       they are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” G&G Oil Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Cont’l W. Ins.
       Co., 165 N.E.3d 82, 87 (Ind. 2021) (emphasis original) (quotations and citation omitted). And, as already
       discussed, this Court held in King that the phrase “‘[any]court of competent jurisdiction’ is a term of art
       which has acquired so definite a meaning in the law” that it is not susceptible to more than one reasonable
       interpretation “unless it is clear from the contract as a whole that it was highly improbable” the parties
       intended that interpretation. King, 629 N.E.2d at 262.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023                               Page 22 of 23
       Conclusion
[38]   Zurich did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense in the answer it filed after

       removal to federal Court and before remand to state court. This matter was

       properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, as the claims do not arise

       out of or relate to Zurich’s minimum contacts with Indiana, and Zurich did not

       consent to personal jurisdiction by either complying with Indiana law or

       entering into the Policy with Tom James.

[39]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-106 | November 2, 2023      Page 23 of 23