Court Opinion

ID: 9920888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:02:35.355138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:21.405142
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 In re E.T. CA2/8
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re E.T. et al., Persons Coming                               B325450
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________                                  Los Angeles County Superior
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Court No. 22CCJP03784C-D
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

I.T.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
       Four children became dependents in this case. The father
of the two youngest children levels numerous attacks at the
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders pertaining to him
and his children. We affirm. Statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
       In September 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition on
behalf of the four children. The children, and their ages as of this
filing, are Kevin (age 16), Bridget (age 11), Esmeralda (age six),
and Perla (age two). The last two are the father’s biological
children.
       The petition asserted varied grounds for jurisdiction and
pointed to conduct of the father, the mother, and the father of the
two oldest children. We do not discuss this third parent further.
This conduct included physical abuse of the two oldest children
by the father and the mother, domestic violence between the
parents, mental and emotional problems of the mother, substance
abuse by both parents, and related failure to protect allegations.
       In November 2022, the juvenile court sustained the bulk of
the allegations, declared the children dependents, removed them
from parental custody after finding both parents to be custodial,
and ordered reunification services.
       Only the father appeals.
       We reach the father’s jurisdictional challenges, despite the
existence of unchallenged findings concerning the mother,
because the findings paved the way for the challenged
dispositional orders and continue to affect the father’s parental
rights. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276–278, 282–285;
In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 237–238 (L.O.).)

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                                    I
       Typically, we review jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and reviewing the record in the light most
favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations. (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
       Instead of attacking each jurisdictional finding separately,
the father groups his challenges by category. We address each
challenge in turn, independently reviewing the statutory
construction issues the father raises.
                                    A
       The father argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to
make findings that he physically abused the two oldest children
and exposed one of them to domestic violence (counts a-6, b-3, b-
4, b-8, j-2, and j-3). He is not a parent or guardian of these
children under section 300, the father maintains, and he is not a
party to their case, so the court could not use this conduct as a
basis for asserting jurisdiction.
     This argument is mistaken. We highlight the child abuse
counts here and discuss the domestic violence counts further in
the next section.
     The father regarded the two oldest children as his biological
children, yet the evidence shows this bond did not stop him from
abusing them. These children credibly recounted the abuse the
father inflicted with his hands, his belt, his sandal, and other
objects, and the marks he left on their bodies.
     Esmeralda witnessed the father hit her siblings. And the
maternal grandmother reported the father would hit the older
children in front of the mother, who allowed it.

                                 3
     The juvenile court reasonably could conclude the father’s
conduct—his violence with the two oldest children and with the
mother in their presence—showed all the children were at a
substantial risk of serious harm. Six-year-old Esmeralda already
reported the father had hit her too. The mother’s failure to
protect some of her children from the father’s physical abuse
additionally showed all four children needed the court’s
protection.
      The father cites In re Silvia R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 337,
which does not help him. This case considered whether a juvenile
court could order nonparent relatives to counseling as part of the
disposition. (Id. at pp. 341 & 345.) That is not the issue here.
                                  B
      The father argues these same findings must be reversed for
lack of a current risk, as he had separated from the mother
months before the jurisdiction hearing, and he was no longer
involved in the mother’s household or in custody issues regarding
the two oldest children.
      We incorporate our earlier discussion of the father’s child
abuse here. As for the domestic violence counts, the record shows
the parents attacked and injured each other multiple times. For
example, police arrested the mother in March 2022 for punching
and scratching the father. At times, the father was the batterer.
Some of the violence occurred in Bridget’s presence.
      The juvenile court reasonably could conclude the risk to the
children remained despite the father’s moving out of the family
home. Indeed, the violence continued after his move: In July
2022, two or so months into the parents’ separation, hospital staff
witnessed the mother jump on the father and punch him while
Esmeralda was admitted there. Yet the father minimized this

                                4
incident and denied any history of domestic violence. He also
denied abusing the two oldest children.
       The father’s denials, the parents’ continued violence, and
their need to continue interacting while separated due to the two
youngest children reasonably could lead the juvenile court to
expect more violence and an associated risk of serious physical
harm to the children. (See § 300, subd. (b); L.O., supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 240; see also id. at p. 238 [past violent behavior
in a relationship is best predictor of future violence]; In re V.L.
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 (V.L.) [“A parent’s denial of
domestic violence increases the risk of it recurring”].)
                                   C
       The father argues the remaining failure to protect counts
concerning the mother’s mental health and both parents’
substance abuse (counts b-1, b-2, b-9) must be dismissed because
they are based on an error of law. The argument is section 300,
subdivision (b)(2), says jurisdiction cannot be premised on a
parent’s failure to seek custody orders, and that is what
happened here.
       Contrary to the father’s arguments, which he did not make
to the juvenile court, we need not employ any canon of statutory
construction to decide this issue. The challenged findings
concern the father’s failure to intervene to protect the children
from the mother, or his own inappropriate behavior, not any
inaction regarding custody orders.
       For example, the record shows the mother suffered from
untreated mental health issues, including paranoid thinking and
hallucinations. According to the maternal grandmother, the
mother had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The mother reportedly
would lock herself and the two youngest children in her car and

                                 5
wake up the children in the middle of the night to walk outside.
She at one point believed the father had molested both of his
daughters and claimed to have a recording of the inappropriate
touching; but the video showed nothing. The mother also
believed that her son helped the father meet another woman in
the family home, that her 11-year-old daughter was sleeping with
the mother’s then boyfriend, and that the son and the father had
a sexual relationship. She threatened to kill various people in
the family or close to it, including her son. Family members were
concerned about the mother’s mental health. At one point, the
father was concerned, too: he reported she was acting strange
and exhibiting paranoia.
      According to the father, he called police when the mother
was suffering a mental breakdown and assaulted him in March
2022; later he ended his relationship with her. But it seems he
took no further steps to intervene on his children’s behalf and
voiced no plans to take further steps as of the jurisdictional
hearing. Shortly before the hearing, he denied the mother had
mental health or substance abuse issues. When a social worker
told him some of the allegations regarding the mother’s mental
health, the father said he did not believe the allegations.
      The failure to protect rulings concerned action or inaction
by the father that created, or failed to remove, a serious risk to
the children. The rulings did not turn on any failure to seek
custody orders.
                                   D
      The father claims the substance abuse allegations (b-2 and
b-9) cannot give rise to jurisdiction because the record shows
nothing more than legal recreational marijuana use by both

                                6
parents that did not harm the children. This claim also is
mistaken.
       The mother had a history of methamphetamine use, which
led to an earlier dependency proceeding involving the two oldest
children. In 2022, she tested positive for marijuana multiple
times. The father also tested positive for marijuana. He had two
relatively old convictions for drug possession and for being under
the influence of drugs. Yet he denied ever using drugs or
alcohol—until later in the Department’s investigation, when he
conceded recreational marijuana use.
       The maternal grandmother reported both parents smoked
marijuana daily. She and the children could smell it. She found
marijuana inside the mother’s home when the parents lived
together.
     Bridget similarly reported her mother smoked marijuana
every day, sometimes in Bridget’s presence and in the house, and
despite Bridget’s asthma. The girl had noticed her mother
“partying more” after meeting the father. She described the
smell of marijuana and having seen her mother come home
drunk, including one time when her mother “threw up
everywhere.” Bridget observed her mother smoking from the
“glass thing” inside the house with friends; the mother would put
“green stuff” in the hole and then “fire it up” and put her mouth
on the contraption to suck it.
     The maternal grandmother, the two oldest children, and
other family members believed the mother was using drugs. The
mother told police she was using meth around the beginning of
2022. She made a similar confession to the maternal aunt,
saying she had used meth every day for about one month. The

                                7
maternal grandmother felt the mother’s drug use caused mood
changes.
      According to Bridget and a maternal aunt, the father was
aware of the mother’s drug use. Bridget noted the father “smokes
and parties” too. Kevin and the mother said the father smoked
marijuana daily when the parents were together. Kevin also said
the father would “drink alcohol until he was drunk” when he
lived with them. Sometimes the father would come home drunk
and hit Kevin.
       Jurisdiction did not hinge on the parents’ marijuana use
alone. The juvenile court reasonably could infer the parents’
substance use amounted to abuse that was tied to other
jurisdictional findings and that played a role in how the parents
treated the children. For example, it would be reasonable to
conclude from the evidence that the mother’s substance abuse
exacerbated her mental health issues. Indeed, hospital staff
suspected the mother was under the influence when she attacked
the father in July 2022. And the father believed the mother was
under the influence of some unknown substance when she
attacked him in March 2022 and when she attempted to drive
that night.
       Given the father’s dishonesty on this issue, the juvenile
court reasonably could conclude the father’s drug use was more
extensive than he reported.
      Considering the totality of the circumstances and drawing
all inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s findings, substantial
evidence underlies the court’s conclusion the parents’ substance
abuse, and the father’s failure to protect the children from the
mother’s abuse, supported jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b). Esmeralda’s and Perla’s young ages and

                                 8
concomitant need for close care and supervision bolster this
conclusion.
      Finally, jurisdiction is proper even if the parents’ conduct
had yet to injure the children seriously and even if the court
could not predict precisely how the conduct might harm them.
(L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 238; In re Travis C. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226–1227.)
                                   II
       Turning to disposition, dispositional orders require clear
and convincing evidence at the juvenile court. (§ 361, subd. (c) &
(d).) Thus, when considering the grounds for removal on appeal,
we look for substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.
(V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149, 154–155.)
       Father mounts two challenges to the disposition: he claims
insufficient evidence supports it, and the juvenile court
erroneously ignored his noncustodial status. Both claims fail.
       In addition to the evidence described above, substantial
evidence showed the mother would hit her children, and the
father knew it. Sometimes the mother used a belt. Bridget said
her mother would make her wear long sleeves, pants, and socks
to hide the bruises. Kevin also reported suffering injuries from
the mother’s blows. The maternal grandmother said the father
would “target” the two oldest children jointly with the mother.
       From all of the evidence outlined above, a reasonable trier
of fact could have found it highly probable the children would be
at risk of serious harm if returned to their parents’ care, and no
reasonable means short of removal could protect them. (See V.L.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–157.) This is true even though
the parents had separated, for the reasons we explained above.

                                9
       The father’s denial of any wrongdoing signaled that he
lacked the willingness or ability to change his behavior and that
alternatives to removal—or remedial measures to enable
placement of the children with him—would be ineffective.
       The father says we must reverse the disposition because he
was a noncustodial parent entitled to custody of his children
under section 361.2, which governs placement with noncustodial
parents. The father forfeited this argument by failing to raise it
at the trial court. His counsel did not object at the hearing when
the juvenile court explicitly found both parents were custodial.
       Even on appeal, the father has not shown section 361.2
applies. The section only comes into play where “there is a
parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the
time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume
custody of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Here, many of the
events giving rise to jurisdiction occurred while the family lived
together and thus when the father was a custodial parent to his
children.
       Further, it was unclear whether the father sought physical
custody of his children as of the disposition hearing. At this
hearing, the father’s counsel stated the father “would like to ask
for the younger two children be released back to both parents,
with them continuing to reside with the mother and the maternal
grandmother in the home that they’ve been. . . . His main priority
is for them to stay where they are. [¶] He would like them
released to both parents so that they can continue to have
custody over them, . . .” Counsel then said the father would
submit to “suitable placement,” presumably with the maternal
grandmother, “as suitable placement also allows for the children

                               10
to stay where they are, which is the father’s ultimate priority.
But he does love his daughters very much and would like them
back in his care, and so that is his request today.”
      In light of these contradictory statements, it would be
reasonable to conclude the father was not seeking to have the
children placed with him.
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm the jurisdictional findings and dispositional
orders.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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