Court Opinion

ID: 9369059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 19:02:29.131773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.600640
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/23 P. v. Nixon CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B315453

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. A648471)
           v.

 LEONARD RAY NIXON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Allen J. Webster, Judge. Affirmed.
      Richard Lennon and Jennifer Peabody, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and David A.
Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                          INTRODUCTION

       Leonard Ray Nixon was convicted in 1993 of first degree
murder and other crimes relating to the death of a two-year-old
child, Dionsa Moore. The jury found true special circumstance
allegations Nixon committed the murder by means of a
destructive device and while engaged in the commission of
arson. The trial court instructed the jurors that, to find the
special circumstance allegations true, they had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Nixon was the actual killer or that he
either intended to kill a human being or, with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the actual killer, intended to aid and abet
another in killing a human being.
       In 2019 Nixon filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.61 (former section 1170.95). After this court
reversed the superior court’s order summarily denying Nixon’s
petition, the superior court again ruled Nixon failed to make a
prima facie showing he was entitled to relief, in part because the
court concluded the jury, by finding the special circumstance
allegations true, necessarily found Nixon was the actual killer or
had the intent to kill.
       In this appeal Nixon argues that the trial court improperly
engaged in factfinding when the court determined he failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility under section 1172.6
and that the jury’s true findings on the special circumstance
allegations did not establish he is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. Nixon also argues a statement in the opinion by
(a different division of) this court in his direct appeal, that the
evidence did not support that Nixon had an intent to murder, was

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
binding on the superior court as the law of the case or because of
issue preclusion. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.      A Jury Convicts Nixon of First Degree Murder and
              Finds True Two Special Circumstance Allegations
       Late one night in July 1988 Lisa Lee was preparing to put
her son Dionsa to bed in the front bedroom of her home when the
bedroom window broke. (People v. Nixon (July 8, 1994, B067902)
[nonpub. opn.] (Nixon I).) Two objects came through the window
and ignited the bed, engulfing Dionsa in flames. He died from his
injuries.
       The People filed a five-count information against Nixon and
his accomplices, Anthony Snead and Sekou Thompson. At
Nixon’s trial Detective Joe Callian of the Los Angeles Police
Department testified that, after he read Nixon his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602], Nixon
said that on the evening in question Snead told Nixon he was
going to “‘cocktail [Lee’s] house’” to recover a gold chain Lee’s
sister (and Snead’s ex-girlfriend) had taken. Nixon initially
declined to go to Lee’s house, but changed his mind. Nixon stated
that, as he got into the car with Snead and Thompson, Snead
picked up a couple of empty 40-ounce beer bottles from the
ground. Thompson drove the three men to a gas station where
Nixon said Snead filled the bottles with gasoline. Thompson
drove them to another gas station to get matches.
       Nixon told Detective Callian that when the three men
arrived at Lee’s house he and Snead got out of the car and stood
in front of the house. Nixon said he lit a book of matches as

                                 3
Snead lit and threw a “Molotov cocktail.”2 Nixon stated that he
threw the Molotov cocktail he was holding, but that he did not
know whether it went inside the house. Nixon told the detective
that he and Snead went back to the car, and Thompson drove
them away.
      A jury convicted Nixon of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1), arson causing great bodily injury (§ 451,
subd. (a); count 2), arson of an inhabited structure or property
(§ 451, subd. (b); count 3), and exploding or igniting a destructive
device or explosive causing death (former § 12310, now § 18755,
subd. (a); count 4). The jury also found true allegations Nixon
committed the murder by means of a destructive device, within
the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(6), and while
engaged in committing the crime of arson, within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The trial court sentenced
Nixon to two prison terms of life without the possibility of parole
on counts 1 and 4, and concurrent prison terms of seven and six
years, respectively, on counts 2 and 3. Another division of this
court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (Nixon I, supra,
B067902.)

      B.    The Superior Court Twice Denies Nixon’s Petition for
            Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
      In July 2019 Nixon filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Nixon alleged that he was convicted of first
degree murder under a theory of felony murder or under a
natural and probable consequences doctrine and that he could not

2     A Molotov cocktail “is a bottle filled with a flammable
liquid with a wick or rag which acts as a fuse to ignite [the]
device.” (People v. Townsend (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1155.)

                                  4
now be convicted of murder because of legislative changes to
sections 188 and 189. The People opposed the petition and
argued Nixon was the actual killer, aided and abetted the actual
killer with the intent to kill, or was a major participant in the
underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The superior court summarily denied the petition
based on facts of the case drawn from this court’s opinion in
Snead’s direct appeal, People v. Snead (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th
1088, disapproved in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th
99 (Letner and Tobin). Nixon appealed. We reversed and
directed the superior court to reconsider Nixon’s petition in light
of his (as opposed to Snead’s) record of conviction. (People v.
Nixon (January 26, 2021, B304463) [nonpub. opn.] (Nixon II).)
       The superior court set another hearing to determine
whether Nixon had made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief under section 1172.6. Nixon argued that he was not the
actual killer because his Molotov cocktail landed on the porch and
did not cause Dionsa’s death, that the evidence did not show
beyond a reasonable doubt he aided and abetted Dionsa’s murder
with the intent to kill, and that he did not act as a major
participant or with reckless indifference to human life. The
People argued Nixon was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
as a matter of law because the jury, in finding the special
circumstance allegations true, found Nixon was either the actual
killer or had the intent to kill when he aided and abetted the
murder.
       At the hearing counsel for Nixon conceded the jury
instructions for the special circumstance allegations “said that
the jury had to find intent to kill,” but he argued there was no
evidence to support the jury’s true findings. Counsel for Nixon

                                5
argued the jury reached “an emotional verdict based on the age of
the victim and the manner of death and not on law and fact.” In
other words, counsel for Nixon conceded the jury “did find under
that special circumstance that Mr. Nixon intended to kill,” but
argued the evidence did not support that finding.
        The People argued the only way for the jury to have found
the special circumstance allegations true was to find that Nixon
was the actual killer or that he directly aided and abetted Snead
with the intent to kill. Consequently, the People argued, Nixon
was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
because he could still be convicted of first degree murder under
current law.
        The superior court concluded the People’s “assessment” was
“accurate.” The court also stated that Nixon was culpable for
Dionsa’s murder and that he “certainly had the intent to kill”
because “what other kind of intent can be formulated from
throwing a Molotov cocktail, more than one, into a house.
Whether [Nixon] was successful in throwing [the bottle] into the
house or not, . . . the intent surely was to throw it into the house
and start a fire in the house. . . . Everything would suggest
. . . that if Mr. Nixon was not the actual killer, he certainly had
the intent to kill and was aiding and abetting and part of this
whole conspiracy . . . . So I just don’t think that he’s made a
prima facie case.” The superior court denied the petition, and
Nixon timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.    Section 1172.6
      Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the

                                 6
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder
exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis)).
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the People to prove
that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); that
the defendant, though not the actual killer, with the intent to kill
assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
that the defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference
to human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,”
the felony-murder special-circumstance provision. (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3); see Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
       Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on a natural and probable consequences
doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the conviction
and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could
not now be convicted of murder because of the changes the
Legislature made to the definitions of the crime. (See People v.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 957; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) If a
petition under section 1172.6 contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, at pp. 962-963; see § 1172.6, subd.

                                 7
(b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a response to the
petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       “[T]he prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,]
subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry
in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue
an order to show cause.”’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject
the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51-52.)
       “The record of conviction may include the underlying facts
as presented in an appellate opinion, the trial evidence, the jury
instructions, and closing arguments of counsel. [Citation.]
However, ‘the probative value of an appellate opinion is case
specific, and “it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion
might not supply all answers.”’” (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972;
People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 99, 102 (Ervin).) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a [superior] court should not engage in ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’
[Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and

                                  8
correctly set very low.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 51.)
        On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6 on the ground the defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing for relief, we review de novo whether the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14; Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if
the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that (1) the petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner
was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, or (4) the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was
not imputed based solely on participation in a crime.” (Lopez, at
p. 14; see §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)

       B.   Any Improper Factfinding Was Harmless
       Nixon argues that, “rather than adopt the prosecution’s
argument that [he] was ineligible as a matter of law based on the
true findings on the special circumstances,” the superior court
“engaged in improper fact-finding to deny relief at the prima facie
stage.” The superior court actually did both. The court first
adopted the prosecution’s assessment of the petition. The only
“assessment” the prosecutor provided was that, “because the jury
found that [Nixon was] either the actual killer or that he acted
with the intent to kill, he’s legally ineligible for relief.”

                                 9
       But the court went on to find facts to support its conclusion
Nixon failed to make a prima facie showing for relief because he
“had the intent to kill and was aiding and abetting and part of
this whole conspiracy.” Any error, however, was harmless
because the court accepted the prosecutor’s argument, which did
not require improper factfinding, and because we independently
conclude Nixon is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (See People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854,
864 [error in denying a section 1172.6 petition is harmless where
the record of conviction establishes the petitioner is ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law].)

      C.     Nixon Is Ineligible for Resentencing as a Matter of
             Law
       Nixon argues his record of conviction does not make him
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of
law because the trial court’s jury instructions on the special
circumstance allegations did not require the jury to find that he
was the actual killer or that he aided and abetted the actual
killer with the intent to kill. Nixon, however, forfeited this
argument by failing to make it in the superior court and, indeed,
by conceding in the superior court the jury instructions on the
special circumstance allegations required the jury to find he had
the intent to kill. (See People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437,
444 [petitioner forfeited a theory for relief in support of his
petition under section 1172.6 by not raising it in the superior
court]; People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 238-239
[petitioner forfeited the argument the superior court erred in
admitting victim impact testimony before ruling on his petition
under section 1172.6 because the petitioner acquiesced in the

                                 10
superior court’s decision to hear the statements].) But because
the question whether Nixon is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law is a purely legal question, and “to avert
any claim of inadequate assistance of counsel” (People v. Watson
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474, 483), we exercise our discretion to
address his argument on the merits.

              1.     Additional Relevant Proceedings
       The trial court instructed the jury on three theories of first
degree murder: the unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional or unintentional, or accidental, that occurs during the
commission or attempted commission of the crime of arson (i.e.,
felony murder); murder perpetrated by means of a destructive
device or explosive with malice aforethought; and co-conspirator
liability for the killing of another in furtherance of a conspiracy to
commit arson or the unlawful use of a destructive device. The
court also instructed the jury on liability for direct aiding and
abetting felony murder: “If a human being is killed by any one of
several persons engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of the crime of arson, a person who either directly
and actively commit[ted] the act constituting [arson], or who with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the
crime, and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging,
or facilitating the commission of [arson] aids, promotes,
encourages, or instigates by act or advice its commission, [is]
guilty of murder of the first degree whether the killing is
intentional, unintentional, or accidental.” The court instructed
the jurors they need not agree on which theory of first degree
murder applied, so long as each of them was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt at least one theory applied. The court did not

                                 11
instruct the jury on a natural and probable consequences theory
of first degree murder.
       On the special circumstance allegations, the trial court
instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80:
“If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first
degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following
special circumstances are true or not true: murder perpetrated by
a destructive device and murder in the commission of arson. The
People have the burden of proving the truth of the special
circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a
special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
either the actual killer, a co-conspirator, [or] an aider or abettor,
but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended either to
kill a human being, or with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of
the actual killer[,] to aid and abet another in the killing of a
human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.
On the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the
defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the
special circumstance to be true.” (Italics added.)
       In his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged
Nixon could be guilty of felony murder and as a co-conspirator
without having the intent to kill. The prosecutor argued,
however, that only one set of facts supported a conviction for first
degree murder: Nixon threw one of two Molotov cocktails that
landed inside Lee’s house. The prosecutor pointed to Lee’s
testimony that she saw “the second one flying in” and the
physical evidence suggesting Nixon’s Molotov cocktail landed

                                 12
inside the house. The prosecutor argued the Molotov cocktail
Nixon threw “was the dual proximate cause of the death of the
child.” The prosecutor never suggested Nixon could be liable for
murder solely as an aider and abettor or as a co-conspirator
under some alternative scenario.
       In connection with the special circumstance allegations, the
prosecutor argued that “two firebombs . . . led directly to the
death of Dionsa” and that Nixon threw one of them. “As the
actual killer,” the prosecutor continued, “no intent to kill has to
be shown” for the jury to find the special circumstance allegations
true. The prosecutor argued in the alternative that, “in spite of
the fact that [Nixon] is the actual killer, . . . he also had the
intent to kill.” The prosecutor listed circumstances that would
enable the jurors to find Nixon had the intent to kill when he
threw his Molotov cocktail, including that Nixon went to Lee’s
home after midnight with “fully loaded bombs,” when lights were
on in the home (including in the front room), and where there
were cars parked in the driveway. The prosecutor recounted
testimony from Lee and her sister that a person standing outside
the house at night could see shadows of people in the front room
when the lights were on inside, even through drawn shades.
       Counsel for Nixon told the jury there was no evidence
Nixon “intended to kill anyone.” For the most part, however,
counsel for Nixon argued that Nixon’s statements to Detective
Callian were coerced and manipulated, that Snead and
Thompson implicated Nixon as the “village idiot” (because of
evidence Nixon had a “borderline” intellectual disability), and
that only one bottle, not two, was thrown at Lee’s house (which
suggested Nixon did not throw a Molotov cocktail and might not
have even been present when Snead threw his).

                                13
       In rebuttal, the prosecutor recounted details from Nixon’s
statement to Detective Callian that only a participant in the
arson and murder would know. Regarding the special
circumstance allegations, the prosecutor reiterated that Nixon
was the actual killer or he had the intent to kill, either one of
which supported a true finding on the special circumstance
allegations. The prosecutor said that “if there are two bottles,
both leading to the cause of death, each [thrower] is equally
responsible for having caused the death, which makes him the
actual killer.” “[I]n the alternative,” the prosecutor argued,
“clearly anybody that would throw a Molotov cocktail into a lit
and occupied room, with the knowledge of what a 40-ounce
gasoline bottle would do when it hit as it was ignited, could have
nothing but the intent to kill the person or persons that occupied
that room. It is a lit room. It is an occupied room. It is also a
house in the middle of the night where cars are parked in the
driveway, and he chose the one occupied room, along with
Mr. Snead, to launch his bottles into.”

            2.     By Finding the Special Circumstance
                   Allegations True, the Jury Found Nixon Had
                   the Intent To Kill
       CALJIC No. 8.80 as given by the trial court required the
jury, before finding a special circumstance allegation true, to find
that Nixon was the actual killer, that he intended to kill, or that
he intended to aid and abet another in the killing of a human
being (with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the actual
killer). Nixon argues the instruction as given was ambiguous in
several ways and allowed the jury to find the special

                                 14
circumstance allegations true “without finding that he was the
actual killer or personally harbored the intent to kill.”
       To determine whether a jury instruction conveyed a legally
inadequate theory, we consider “‘“whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the
instruction.”’” (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 994; see
Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 182 [where the
defendant contends a jury instruction is ambiguous, the
reviewing court considers whether there is a “reasonable
likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied” the challenged
instruction in the way defendant asserts].) In evaluating
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood
or misapplied a given instruction, we consider the instructions as
a whole and the arguments of counsel in the context of the case.
(People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 582-583; People v. Beck and
Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 646; O’Malley, at p. 994; Letner and
Tobin, at pp. 182-183; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149,
1202; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1255-1256;
Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 109-110; People v. Bell (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1, 16.)
       Several courts have found versions of CALJIC No. 8.80
ambiguous regarding the intent required of an aider and abettor
or a co-conspirator. (See People v. Beck and Cruz, supra,
8 Cal.5th at pp. 646-647; People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 994; Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 182; Ervin,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 107-109.) For example, in Letner
and Tobin the Supreme Court held the version of CALJIC
No. 8.80 given in that case was ambiguous because (1) the
instruction told the jury “that if it determined one of [two]
defendants was the actual killer, intent to kill was not required,”

                                15
(2) the instruction also told the jury that “if it could not decide
whether one of the defendants was the actual killer or an aider
and abettor, it must find intent to kill in order to make a true
finding,” but (3) if the jury determined the defendant was an
aider and abettor, the instruction did not inform the jury of the
state of mind that was required (i.e., the intent to kill). (See
Letner and Tobin, at p. 181.) The Supreme Court stated,
however, that “the jury could draw from the instruction as a
whole the inference that an aider and abettor was required to
have an intent to kill” and that “the prosecutor presented a
correct and complete statement of the law in her arguments
following the trial court’s instructions.” (Id. at p. 182.) As a
result, the Supreme Court concluded that, “despite the ambiguity
in the instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
found one defendant was the actual killer, and then based its
special circumstance findings as to the other defendant upon an
erroneous notion that an aider and abettor need not possess the
intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 183; see Beck and Cruz, at pp. 646-647
[no reasonable likelihood the jury found a special circumstance
allegation true under CALJIC No. 8.80 without finding an aider
and abettor or co-conspirator had the intent to kill because “the
prosecutor did not argue that the jury need not find intent to kill
as to either [defendant]”]; O’Malley, at p. 994 [no reasonable
likelihood the jury misinterpreted or misapplied CALJIC No. 8.80
because “the prosecutor did not argue that the instruction
permitted the jury to find the special circumstance true on the
theory that defendant was a nonperpetrator who lacked the
intent to kill; rather, he argued that whether or not defendant
was the actual killer,” he had the intent to kill].)

                                16
       Citing Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th 90, Nixon
argues CALJIC No. 8.80 as given did not sufficiently inform the
jury “what was required in the event the jury determined that a
particular defendant was an aider and abettor,” as opposed to the
actual killer. Although the version of CALJIC No. 8.80 the trial
court gave did not make the requisite intent of an aider and
abettor (or a co-conspirator) “‘unmistakable’” (Letner and Tobin,
at p. 182), the prosecutor in Nixon’s trial clearly informed the
jurors that, to find the special circumstance allegations true, they
had to find that Nixon was the actual killer or that he had the
intent to kill. The prosecutor’s theory of the case and argument
to the jury was that Nixon (along with Snead) was the actual
killer or that, based on evidence he threw a lit firebomb into an
occupied house at night, Nixon at a minimum had the intent to
kill. The prosecutor never suggested Nixon did not have the
intent to kill or that the jury could find true the special
circumstance allegations without finding Nixon was the actual
killer or had the intent to kill. (See People v. O’Malley, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 994 [it was not reasonably likely the jury
misinterpreted or misapplied CALJIC No. 8.80 where the
prosecutor never suggested to the jury the possibility the
defendant’s accomplice intended to kill the victim and the
defendant did not but nevertheless assisted the actual killer in
carrying out the crime]; People v. Bedolla (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
535, 548 [“it was not reasonably likely that the jury
misunderstood or misapplied the challenged instructions” where
“the prosecutor’s closing argument . . . reinforced a correct
understanding of the instructions”].)
       Nixon also cites Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 90, where the
court held a jury’s true finding on a special circumstance

                                17
allegation did not establish the petitioner was ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6. (Ervin, at p. 110.) Although the court in
the underlying trial in that case instructed the jury with a
version of CALJIC No. 8.80 similar to the version the trial court
gave in Nixon’s trial, the prosecutor in Ervin “on at least three
occasions . . . appeared to conflate the felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation with the former felony-murder rule.”
(Ervin, at p. 110.) For example, the prosecutor in the trial in
Ervin stated that “if you find that a [felony] happened and
somebody was killed during the commission of it, that’s all that
matters as far as the special circumstance finding.” (Id. at p. 109,
italics omitted.) In addition, the jury in the Ervin trial found not
true an allegation the petitioner personally used a firearm in the
commission of murder, despite the prosecutor’s theory he was the
actual shooter. (Id. at p. 104.) Thus, the court in Ervin held,
“given the prosecutor’s closing argument and the jury’s
inconsistent verdicts” finding the petitioner guilty of first degree
murder but finding not true the allegation he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder, it was “possible the
jurors misinterpreted [CALJIC No. 8.80] to mean they could find
the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true if they
generally found [the petitioner] aided and abetted another in the
commission of the robbery or burglary (that ultimately led to the
killing of a human being), rather than a more specific finding
that [the petitioner] aided and abetted ‘the actual killer . . . with
the intent to kill.’” (Ervin, at pp. 108-109.) Neither of those
circumstances occurred in Nixon’s trial.
       Nixon also argues CALJIC No. 8.80 as given, which told the
jurors they could find the special circumstance allegations true if
they found Nixon “with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the

                                 18
actual killer” aided and abetted another in the killing of a human
being, allowed the jury to find the special circumstance
allegations true if the jurors found Nixon “had knowledge the
actual killer intended to commit an arson and aided and abetted
another in the commission of the arson that ultimately led to the
killing of a human being,” but did not have the intent to kill. In a
similar argument Nixon contends the version of CALJIC No. 8.80
given did not tell the jurors they had to find Nixon “had
knowledge the actual killer intended to kill and shared that
intent. Under this instruction, the jury could have found that
[Nixon] had knowledge the actual killer intended to throw a
Molotov cocktail into the house and aided and abetted him in
doing this act. This is not the intent to kill.”
       But the instruction stated that the jury had to find Nixon
had knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the “actual killer,” not
merely knowledge of an arsonist, and that Nixon had to have
intended to aid and abet another “in the killing of a human
being,” not in committing arson that led to the death of a human
being. And the prosecutor never suggested (as the prosecutor did
in Ervin) that, for the jury to find the special circumstance
allegations true, Nixon need only have intended to commit arson,
as opposed to the killing of a human being. Instead, the
prosecutor told the jurors that, to find the special circumstance
allegations true, they had to find Nixon was the actual killer or
had the intent to kill.
       Moreover, although it is conceivable the jury in Nixon’s
trial could have interpreted “with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the actual killer” to mean Nixon merely knew Snead
intended to commit arson, that interpretation does not negate the
requirement that the jury also find Nixon, if he was not the

                                19
actual killer, “intended either to kill a human being or . . . to aid
and abet another in the killing of a human being.” Because the
jury necessarily found Nixon had the intent to kill, he is ineligible
as a matter of law for relief under section 1172.6.

            3.      By Finding the Special Circumstance
                    Allegations True, the Jury Found Nixon, at a
                    Minimum, Aided and Abetted the Actual Killer
       Nixon argues the version of CALJIC No. 8.80 the trial court
gave required only that Nixon aid and abet “another” in the
killing of a human being. As a result, Nixon argues, it is possible
the jury might not have convicted him of first degree murder
under the current felony-murder rule, which requires a finding
the defendant, “with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, . . . or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) This argument fails.
       Nixon again relies on Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 90,
where the court reversed an order finding the petitioner was
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because the jury
instructions in the petitioner’s trial allowed the jury to find a
special circumstance allegation true so long as the petitioner
aided and abetted “another” in the killing of a human being, but
not necessarily the actual killer. (Ervin, at pp. 107-109.) In
Ervin, however, the petitioner participated in an armed robbery
with two other, separately tried defendants, either one of whom
might have been the actual killer. (See id. at pp. 94, 96.) Here,
the only other person who could have actually killed Dionsa was
Snead (because Thompson did not throw a Molotov cocktail), and
the People’s theory of the case was that Nixon was either an
actual killer (along with Snead) or that he aided and abetted

                                 20
Snead by throwing a Molotov cocktail at the house. Snead was
the only possible “other.” The jury could not have misapplied or
misinterpreted CALJIC No. 8.80 as Nixon suggests.

      D.    The Court’s Opinion in Nixon I Did Not Negate the
            Jury’s Finding Nixon Intended To Kill
      Nixon argues the court’s opinion in Nixon I precluded the
superior court from ruling he is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 under the law of the case doctrine and issue
preclusion. Nixon relies on the statement in the court’s opinion
in Nixon I that the “evidence in the case at bench provides no
support for Nixon’s intent to murder.”

             1.    Nixon’s Contentions in Nixon I
      In Nixon I the court addressed Nixon’s contention the trial
court “[e]rroneously failed to instruct the jury that arson felony
murder and arson special circumstance were not applicable if
[Nixon’s] intent in starting the fire was to kill.” Nixon also
contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
throwing an item constituted delivery for purposes of the special
circumstance allegation of murder by a destructive device. Nixon
did not argue substantial evidence did not support the jury’s true
findings on the special circumstance allegations. (Nixon I, supra,
B067902.)
      Here’s the background: In People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d
583 the Supreme Court held a jury could not find true a felony-
murder arson special circumstance allegation unless the
defendant had an “independent purpose” for committing arson
that was not incidental to the murder. (Id. at p. 608; see People

                                21
v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61-62 (Green).)3 Citing Clark, Nixon
argued in Nixon I the trial court should have instructed the jury
sua sponte that, to find the felony-murder arson special
circumstance true, “it must be proved that the murder was
committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the
crime of arson or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid
detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in
these instructions is not established if the arson was merely
incidental to the commission of the murder.” The court in Nixon I
held the trial court did not err in failing to give that instruction
sua sponte because “[t]he evidence . . . provide[d] no support for
Nixon’s intent to murder.” The court in Nixon I stated: “Where
no evidence indicates that [Nixon’s] sole purpose at the inception
of the plan to ‘cocktail’ the house was murder, an instruction
based on the Green doctrine cannot be called a general principle
of law closely and openly connected with the facts to the court,
and no sua sponte duty to instruct arose.” (Nixon I, supra,
B067902.)

            2.      Neither Law of the Case nor Issue Preclusion
                    Negates the Jury’s True Findings on the Special
                    Circumstance Allegations
        “‘Where an appellate court states in its opinion a principle
of law necessary to the decision, that principle becomes law of the
case and must be adhered to in all subsequent proceedings
. . . under the doctrine of the law of the case, the case may not go

3     Effective March 7, 2000, amended section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17)(M), eliminated the independent felonious
purpose requirement for the arson special circumstance. (People
v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 609, fn. 4.)

                                22
over ground that has been covered before in an appellate court.’
[Citation.] This doctrine, however, ‘does not extend to points of
law which might have been but were not presented and
determined on a prior appeal.’” (People v. Gonzalez (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 420, 434; see People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th
168, 196-197; People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 110,
fn. 7.) Issue preclusion similarly “‘precludes relitigation of issues
argued and decided in prior proceedings.’” (Gonzalez, at p. 433.)
“‘Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine [of issue preclusion]
only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the
issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to
that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must
have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it
must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.
Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and
on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is
sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the
former proceeding.’” (Id. at pp. 433-434; accord, People v. Jones
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1085.) Thus, for either the law of the
case doctrine or issue preclusion to apply, a court must have
actually considered and decided the issue.
       That did not happen here. The court in Nixon I did not
consider whether the jury necessarily determined Nixon had an
intent to kill, nor did the court consider whether substantial
evidence supported the jury’s true findings on the special
circumstance allegations. Nixon challenged only the instructions
the trial court gave and failed to give on the arson special
circumstance allegation, and the court’s opinion in Nixon I left
the jury’s true findings on the special circumstance allegations
intact. Indeed, the court in Nixon I found only that the evidence

                                 23
did not indicate Nixon’s “sole purpose at the inception of the plan
to ‘cocktail’ the house was murder.” (Nixon I, supra, B067902,
italics added.)
       We acknowledge that the court in Nixon I also stated “[t]he
evidence . . . provide[d] no support for Nixon’s intent to murder,”
which at first glance seems inconsistent with the jury’s finding
that Nixon had an intent to kill. The significance of the court’s
statement in Nixon I, however, must be considered in context and
in light of the scope of the court’s analysis. The purpose of the
rule in Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1 was to prevent a jury from
finding a felony-murder special circumstance true when the
underlying felony was merely incidental to murder. (See People
v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1026 [Green stands for the
proposition that, “when the underlying felony is merely incidental
to the murder, the murder cannot be said to constitute ‘a murder
in the commission of’ the felony and will not support a finding of
felony-murder special circumstance.”].) If the evidence suggested
the defendant had an “independent purpose” to commit murder,
the court under Green had to instruct the jurors that they could
not find a felony-murder special circumstance allegation true
unless the People proved the defendant “harbored an
independent felonious purpose as to [the underlying felony].”
(Ainsworth, at p. 1026.)
       Thus, the court’s analysis in Nixon I was limited to the
question whether there was evidence showing Nixon had an
independent purpose to commit murder such that the trial court
had a duty to instruct under Green, and the court’s statement
regarding Nixon’s intent to commit murder was essentially an
inartful way to say there was no such evidence. In other words,
the court in Nixon I was stating that, because there was no

                                24
evidence murder was Nixon’s sole and independent purpose, the
trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to give a Green
instruction. (See People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 903
[“[c]oncurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony
will support a felony-murder special circumstance”; it is “when
the underlying felony is merely incidental to a murder that we
apply the rule of Green”]; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
pp. 608-609 [Green rule does not apply where the defendant has
“independent, albeit concurrent, goals” of murder and arson]; see
also People v. Thomas (Jan. 26, 2023, No.
S161781)       Cal.5th    ,     [2023 WL 408958, p. 26]
[“A concurrent intent to rob and to kill will support the special
circumstance allegation: ‘The question is “whether the defendant
had a ‘purpose for the [robbery] apart from murder.’”’”].) The
statement in the Nixon I opinion Nixon relies on does not
undermine the jury’s unchallenged findings that Nixon intended
to kill when he threw a Molotov cocktail at an occupied house at
night.
       Nixon argues People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393
compels the opposite result. The court in Cooper held “a trial
court cannot deny relief in a section [1172.6] proceeding based on
findings that are inconsistent with a previous acquittal when no
evidence other than that introduced at trial is presented.” (Id. at
p. 398.) In Cooper the jury in the petitioner’s trial acquitted him
on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Id. at
p. 397.) But the superior court in that case denied relief under
section 1172.6 based in part on the court’s belief the petitioner
“possessed and fired a gun” in the commission of first degree
murder. (Id. at p. 398.) The court in Cooper reversed the order
denying the petition and directed the superior court to consider

                                25
whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
petitioner was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 for
reasons other than those related to whether the petitioner used
or possessed a firearm. (Ibid.) Cooper is distinguishable because
the superior court did not find Nixon was ineligible for
resentencing for a reason that was inconsistent with the jury’s
findings.

                           DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

                                    SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             HOWARD, J.*

*
      Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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