Court Opinion

ID: 9714579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:40:42.764921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:27.202935
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the written order in the present case is insufficient to support a finding of contempt, I disagree with its conclusion that the report of proceedings shows contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Direct criminal contempt of court is " ' "conduct which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or derogate from its authority or dignity, thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute.” ’ ” (People v. Simac (1994), 161 Ill. 2d 297, 305, quoting People v. L.A.S. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 539, 543, quoting People v. Javaras (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 296, 299; see also R. Johnston & K. Bry, An Overview of Illinois Contempt Law: A Court’s Inherent Power and the Appropriate Procedures and Sanctions, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 223, 224 (1993).) A finding of direct criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an act and an intent. (People v. Griffith (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 21, 23.) Both of these elements are satisfied where the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt a voluntary act by one who knows or reasonably should know that the act is wrongful. (Griffith, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 23.) In determining whether an individual is guilty of criminal contempt, a reviewing court may consider provocation or legal error by the trial court. People v. Coulter (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021. Although essential to the orderly administration of justice (Si-mac, 161 Ill. 2d at 305), the contempt power is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.’ ” (Simac, 161 Ill. 2d at 306, quoting Cooke v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 517, 539, 69 L. Ed. 767, 775, 45 S. Ct. 390, 396.) As our supreme court has stated: "The power to adjudge guilt and impose punishment without proof or examination, and without plea, trial or issue exists in no other situation or proceeding. It is an exception to our constitutional guarantees which we would regard as intolerable in any other proceeding or for any other purpose. It is readily susceptible of abuse and fraught with danger not only to personal liberties but to the respect and confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a power is universally recognized as essential to an orderly and effective administration and execution of justice, it should be exercised with utmost caution ***.” People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 258, 263. Viewed in the light of these principles, the report of proceedings in the present case does not support the trial court’s finding of contempt. The only remark by contemnor that is even arguably contumacious is his statement "I am going to reserve my rights. You can warn me all you want to.” This statement, however, must be considered in context: it followed three unprovoked outbursts of anger by the trial court which even the majority candidly characterizes as "sarcastic and inappropriate.” Additionally, as the majority acknowledges, contemnor’s legal position — that it was improper for Judge Hogan to hear the motion for substitution of judges for cause— was absolutely correct. See People v. Brim (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 245, 249. Thus, the record shows that when contemnor (acting as his own attorney) was held in contempt, he was attempting to defend a correct legal position. Instead of according contemnor’s legal argument the serious consideration it merited, Judge Hogan responded with gratuitous, unwarranted outbursts of rancor. Contemnor’s response, "I am going to reserve my rights. You can warn me all you want to,” was neither an affront to the court’s dignity nor a hinderance to the court’s function, given the circumstances. (See People v. Bertelle (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 831, 834 ("[i]f it can be shown that the underlying conduct constituted a good-faith attempt by the attorney to represent his client without hindering the court’s functions or dignity, a finding of direct contempt will be reversed upon review”).) Moreover, the record demonstrates that the remarks contemnor made after he was found in contempt ("[mjake sure you get copies of the transcript” and "[y]ou should have applied for a different profession”) were directed toward contemnor’s counsel, not the court. Thus, these remarks cannot be the basis of the contempt order. Relevant case law also mandates reversal of the trial court’s contempt finding. People v. Hanna (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 98, ignored by the majority, is particularly instructive. There, the contemnor was a pro se defendant in a robbery case. During argument on a motion, the trial court found the contemnor to be in direct contempt of court on the basis of the following statement: " 'The way things are going now my side ain’t ever going to be heard — uh—but I’m going to get it — I’m going to get it on the record. I’m going to make a record, because I know what happened. This Court has messed up so much already it’s pathetic.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Hanna, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 99. The appellate court in Hanna held the above statement to be insufficient to support a finding of contempt. The court stated: "an isolated, disparaging statement not made in loud voice or boisterous manner but offensive to the sensibilities of the judge, although embarrassing to the court and derogating from its dignity, is not contempt.” Hanna, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 99, citing In re Little (1972), 404 U.S. 553, 30 L. Ed. 2d 708, 92 S. Ct. 659; see also People v. Ziporyn (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1059 (reversing trial court’s finding of contempt; citing Little and Hanna with approval). Hanna is analogous to the present case. Here, as in Hanna, we are faced with a contempt finding against a pro se defendant in a criminal case who aggressively insisted upon making a complete record and preserving his rights. Likewise, as in Hanna, the record before us does not indicate that contemnor’s comments were made in a loud or boisterous manner. The majority’s statement that "[t]he trial judge personally observed contemnor’s mannerisms and heard the tone of his voice” is misleading. (276 Ill. App. 3d at 945.) While it is true that Judge Hogan observed contemnor and heard his voice, nothing in the record indicates contemnor’s mannerisms or tone of voice was disrespectful. Thus, the majority’s suggestion that these factors support the finding of contempt is improper. Additionally, while the majority believes contemnor’s statement seriously derogated from the court’s authority, the record reveals that it was an isolated remark whose chief effect was to offend Judge Hogan’s sensibilities. This is not a sufficient basis for a finding of contempt. See Brown v. United States (1958), 356 U.S. 148, 153, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, 596, 78 S. Ct. 622, 626 (trial courts "must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice”); Craig v. Harney (1947), 331 U.S. 367, 376, 91 L. Ed. 1546, 1552, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 ("[jjudges are supposed to be men [and women] of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate”). In sum, I cannot agree that contemnor’s actions amounted to conduct which was intended to hinder the court’s administration of justice or to derogate from its authority. On the contrary, the record shows only that defendant, acting as his own attorney, vigorously argued a correct legal position and responded in an understandable manner to injudicious comments by the trial court. As one panel of the appellate court has aptly stated: "The power to punish for direct contempt is an extraordinary power and should be exercised with utmost caution. In this unfortunate case, that power was exercised with abandon.” People v. Powell (1993), 248 Ill. App. 3d 164, 168. Thus, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s ruling finding defendant in contempt. I concur with the majority’s holding that the case must be remanded for the entry of a proper written order. I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.