Court Opinion

ID: 9702226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:01:42.926849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:35.229453
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the Legislature must have intended to protect the property interest of a drug peddler in , addition to that of his innocent spouse because it did not expressly provide for the termination of the estate of tenancy by the entirety. I respectfully disagree. The legislative history traced by the majority demonstrates that the Gener*191al Assembly of Maryland has been strict in its use of forfeiture as a weapon in the war against drug merchants. The Legislature originally declined to include specific protections for innocent co-owners or holders of security interests, an approach entirely consistent with the common law concept that forfeiture is not an additional punishment against an individual, but an in rem action against the offending article. See Director of Fin., Pr. Geo’s Co. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 618-19, 465 A.2d 450 (1983). Because the action is against the property, the innocence of the owner is no defense. Id. at 618, 465 A.2d 450; State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 694, 284 A.2d 233 (1971).
When the Legislature later decided to afford relief to an innocent owner, it did so carefully. It prohibited forfeiture entirely in the case of an innocent owner of a common carrier or vehicle for hire, and in the case of an unlawful possession of an innocent owner’s conveyance. Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Yol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 297(a)(4)(i) & (ii). As to all other innocent owner situations, however, it prohibited forfeiture only “to the extent of the interest” of that owner. Art. 27, § 297(a)(4)(iii). The intent of the Legislature with respect to an innocent co-owner is clear. Forfeiture of the conveyance is not prohibited, but the interest of the innocent co-owner must be protected.
I am persuaded that the statute may be interpreted to give full effect to the legislative intent, notwithstanding that the vehicle in this case was owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety. The majority points out that an entireties estate ordinarily may not be severed or terminated by the unilateral act of either spouse during coverture. That does not mean, however, that the Legislature may not provide for loss of the property or termination of the tenancy as a result of acts or omissions by one spouse, and that is precisely what the Legislature has accomplished by providing for forfeiture of property under certain circumstances.
The key point to be made here is that when an order of forfeiture is entered, the tenancy is destroyed because title *192passes immediately to the appropriate governmental authority. Certainly that was the case when the innocent owner defense did not exist, and a culpable spouse could defeat the tenancy by acts that subjected the vehicle to forfeiture. It is no less the case when forfeiture continues to be permitted, but the interest of an innocent co-owner is protected.
Where there is an innocent co-owner, the vehicle should be sold and the interest of that owner protected by an appropriate distribution of the proceeds. Where there is an innocent lienholder, the sale will be accomplished by that party. Although tenants by the entirety are seised of the whole and not of equal portions, we have recognized the presumption that each owns half upon termination of the tenancy.1 Meyers v. Loan & Sav. Assn., 139 Md. 607, 614, 116 A. 453 (1922). See also Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 231, 49 A.2d 454 (1946); Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 450-51, 122 A. 635 (1923). The innocent co-owner is entitled to one-half the net proceeds of sale remaining after the payment of the balance of the recorded encumbrance.
The consequences of the majority holding may not be of great economic significance in this case. The motor vehicle is subject to a lien, and the interest of the culpable spouse may not be substantial. However, the principle established today is equally applicable to the seizure of a jet aircraft used for the smuggling of drugs. If such an aircraft is owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, and if the spouse of the smuggler can demonstrate his or her innocence, nothing could be forfeited—not the aircraft —not even the smuggler’s interest in the aircraft.
I would reverse.
MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, J., have authorized me to say that they join in this dissenting opinion.

. The presumption does not apply when property is being characterized as nonmarital or marital for the purpose of granting a monetary award. Rather, the source of the funds used to acquire the property is considered. Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 271-72, 477 A.2d 1163 (1984).