Court Opinion

ID: 9485924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:33:57.190154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:26.875345
License: Public Domain

*1580MAYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the district court abused its discretion when it granted Cedarapids’ motion to exclude reference to the earlier case of Mendenhall v. Astec Industries, Inc., 13 USPQ2d 1913, 1988 WL 188449 (E.D.Tenn.1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 299 (Fed.Cir.1989), addressing the validity of the ’904 and ’905 patents. The trial court purportedly based its exclusion of the proffered evidence on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. But it erred in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the potential for prejudice by not considering precedent and by making impermissible presumptions about the ability of the jury to evaluate the evidence.
The admission of evidence is a procedural matter, but the type of evidence at issue here, a prior adjudication of patent “validity,” is of a kind directly related to patent law. So while the precedent of the Eighth Circuit controls as to purely procedural matters, see Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574, 223 USPQ 465, 471 (Fed.Cir.1984), the law of the Federal Circuit informs our decision as well because the matter is uniquely pertinent to patent law. See Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858, 20 USPQ2d 1252, 1259 (Fed.Cir.1991). A trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is entitled to great deference, and will not be reversed absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, United States v. Abodeely, 801 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir.1986); such an abuse has been amply shown in this case.
We have uniformly held that evidence of prior holdings' of validity is to. be given weight in subsequent proceedings, though not necessarily preclusive effect. Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711, 218 USPQ 969, 974 (Fed.Cir.1983); Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 723, 16 USPQ2d 1923, 1926 (Fed.Cir.1990). The Supreme Court also recognized the value of such evidence in Radio Corporation of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7, 55 S.Ct. 928, 930, 79 L.Ed. 163 (1934), when it said that if there is a prior decision upholding a patent, that decision is persuasive in a second suit where the evidence is essentially the same.
Stevenson said that “the doctrine of stare decisis is generally an inappropriate one in patent litigation,” but it also said, “To be sure, a prior holding of ‘validity’ should be given weight in a subsequent suit on the issue of ‘validity.’ ” 713 F.2d at 711, 218 USPQ at 974. A prior decision is not “to be ignored.” Id. at 711, 218 USPQ at 975. Stevenson relied on the rule in American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 384 F.2d 813, 815, 155 USPQ 119, 120 (7th Cir.1967), that the “infringer has the burden of showing that there is a material distinction between his ease and the prior case holding the patent ‘valid.’ ” 713 F.2d at 711 n. 5, 218 USPQ at 974 n. 5. This court subsequently has clarified the notion that a prior holding of validity does not “strengthen” the presumption of validity or change the burden on the infringer to establish invalidity, see Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Industries, Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627, 223 USPQ 584, 588 (Fed.Cir.1984), but Stevenson did adopt the essence of Rovico, that a prior holding of patent validity is to be given weight. That has never been questioned. The amount of weight to accord the earlier decision will vary, of course, depending on the amount and quality of additional prior art or other evidence that is produced in the subsequent suit. 713 F.2d at 711 n. 5, 218 USPQ at 974 n. 5 (citation omitted). “If, however, the record in the second suit is substantially identical to the record produced in the first suit, then it is extremely likely that the court will give its prior holding stare decisis effect.” Id. It goes without saying that application of this principle contemplates that such prior holdings are to be before the later court so their weight can be assessed.
There is no difference between our case and Stevenson and Gillette just because in those cases the prior litigations included appellate judgments accompanied by prece-dential opinions, and in ours the judgment affirming the district court in Mendenhall v. Astec was accompanied by an opinion in non-precedential form. An opinion is nonprece-dential when the court decides that publication will not “add[ ] significantly to the body of law.” Fed.Cir.R. 47.8(b). But though *1581opinions designated as nonpreeedential may not be cited as precedent, nothing in the rule precludes use of a judgment of affirmance; that is precedential. All Mendenhall tried to do was use the prior case from the district court, and would advert only to this court’s judgment affirming. Our rule on prece-dential opinions does not lessen the legal effect of a judgment, and a decision not to issue a precedential opinion implies nothing at all about the trial court’s opinion. This court affirmed the judgment of the district court in Mendenhall v. Astec. Accordingly, it is perfectly proper, and consistent with the Stevenson line of cases, for Mendenhall to put the opinion of the district court and this court's judgment of affirmance before the jury.
Mendenhall also needed the evidence to attack the credibility of Cedarapids’ patent law expert who Cedarapids admitted was its most important witness, and who testified for approximately 22f¡ hours. The evidence of the earlier adjudication might well have enhanced the testimony of a counter-expert hired by Mendenhall to refute Cedarapids’ expert. Mendenhall’s expert’s testimony in contradiction of the conclusions of Cedarapids’ expert would likely not be of the same calibre and impact as would evidence that a federal district judge, objective and disinterested, came to the opposite conclusion after examining the same or very similar evidence as Cedarapids’ expert. The jury was entitled to know as well that he did not even examine the Mendenhall v. Astec case or opinion, while Mendenhall’s expert did, and used it to support his own independent conclusions. See Fed.R.Evid. 705 (“The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data [supporting the opinion] on cross-examination.”). Cedarapids’ assertion that this evidence would have been irrelevant to the cross-examination of its expert is simply insupportable. There was no other evidence available to Mendenhall that would have been as effective to attack this witness’ credibility while bolstering the credibility of its own expert. See Charter v. Chleborad, 551 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir.1977) (where claim rests in part on the credibility pf an expert, exclusion of evidence asserted to counter impeachment of the expert affects a substantial right of the party).
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that a court must balance the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission. The district court did not compare the record of the Astee case to the evidence that would be before it in order to assess the correspondence of the previous case with this one. Indeed, there is no indication the trial court even considered the probative value of, or need for, the evidence offered on the prior adjudication of validity; this is not the balancing required by Rule 403.
The district court also erred in its analysis of the likelihood of unfair prejudice to Cedar-apids if Mendenhall’s evidence were admitted. By Rule 403 the probative value of the evidence must be “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ...” before it may. be excluded. (Emphasis added.) “ ‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Rule 403 Advisory Committee Note. The “improper basis” proposed by the court as the reason for exclusion was the possibility that the jury would ignore its duty to examine all of the evidence before it and blindly follow the conclusion of the other district court. The court said, “I’m greatly concerned that they would say, ‘Look, a federal judge has looked at these similar claims and has. said so-and-so, and we’ll just go along with that decision,’ and I think it’s an invitation for the jury to abdicate their responsibilities.... ” But a prior decision on patent validity is not the kind of “improper basis” contemplated by the rule.
The jury is presumed to take its role seriously and to carry out its fact-finding function competently and thoroughly. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (the Court presumes that jurors are “conscious of the gravity of their task” and pay close attention and carefully follow a judge’s instructions); John Guinther, The Jury in America 101-102 (1988) (concluding from empirical studies conducted by the Roscoe Pound *1582Foundation and others that juries “overwhelmingly take their duties seriously,” are open-minded, and “evidence-oriented.”). “ ‘Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled in other areas of public service.... '" SRI International v. Matsushita Electrical Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1985) (Markey, C.J., additional views) (quoting In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 430 (9th Cir.1979)). And the dismissive observation about the capabilities of the jury reflects more on the court and counsel than on the citizens who were called to interrupt their lives to resolve this case. See, e.g., Brookings Institution, Charting a Future for the Civil Jury System; Report from an A.B.A/Brookings Symposium 18 (1992) (“[N]o ease is inherently too complex for juries to decide. In our view, if juries find issues and facts too complex, it is because the lawyers have failed to present their cases clearly or judges have failed to structure the proceedings in a way that would simplify matters for the jury to understand them.”). The essential constitutional right to a jury trial is founded on the trust reposed in the jury to weigh the evidence and reach just conclusions. To assume that there is a significant danger that the jury will abdicate its responsibility by placing undue reliance on another court’s opinion is impermissible.* For the court to further conclude that the danger of the jury attaching undue weight to the evidence substantially outweighs its clear probative value and need only compounds the error.
I respectfully suggest that it is the job of a district court to guide the jury. Rule 408 requires the court to assess the likely effectiveness of a limiting instruction to the jury to alleviate any perceived danger of prejudice. Rule 403 Advisory Committee Note. That would have been the appropriate course to take here. The trial court readily could have instructed the jury that the evidence offered was not conclusive or binding but was available for such weight as the jury saw fit to give it: for example, how it might affect the bases for the conclusions of Mendenhall’s expert. See Fed.R.Evid. 705.
I see no great danger of prejudice in asking a witness about the bases of his opinions, including why he chose not to examine a prior judicial decision on the validity of the patent at issue, or asking why his conclusions on the patent are different. If the witness cannot distinguish the record he has from what has previously been examined by another court, the jury is entitled to know this in assessing his credibility. On the other hand, if the witness can provide cogent reasons, such as significant new or significantly different evidence available to him, there is no danger that the jury will misplace emphasis on the prior decision. The trial court did instruct the jury in response to a brief mention of Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., No. 80-C-6747 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 24, 1990) (in which Mendenhall also prevailed), and apparently thought it competent to obey. It escapes me why the court did not consider the possibility that a pointed instruction would have guided the jury in considering the proposed evidence.** And if in the end the jury *1583were more favorably impressed by the views of the neutral and detached district judge than by the sponsored testimony of an expert, I see no harm. Indeed one might think that is as it ought to be in a case where a prior adjudication felicitously is available.
The requested evidence was the most probative available, and precedent weighs heavily on the side of admitting it. The danger of prejudice, to the extent it exists, could have been obviated by an appropriate instruction. The trial court committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion by excluding the evidence, and denied Mendenhall a fair trial. I would vacate and remand for a new trial.

 In fact, the rules of evidence themselves exhibit greater trust in the jury by allowing the admission of judgments of prior criminal felony convictions to prove any fact essential to sustain a judgment in subsequent litigation. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(22). Evidence of prior adjudications has also routinely been allowed before a jury in complex antitrust litigation. In Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569, 71 S.Ct. 408, 414, 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951), the Supreme Court held that parties "are entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish prima facie all matters of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction and the verdict on which it was based.”

 In applying the Emich Motors "rule,” the Eighth Circuit recognized that what is important is that the jury be given adequate guidance to properly assess the evidence. In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.1952), the district court allowed the offering party to read portions of the final decree, factual findings and conclusions of law from the previous decision into the record. The court of appeals saw no error, pointing out that the trial court instructed the jury that it could not base its decision simply on the prior outcome. The court repeated the trial court's jury instruction, " ‘In admitting these findings in evidence for your consideration, you are charged that they of themselves do not establish any fact as to the activities of these defendants and held that the contention that the admission of this evi*1583dence constituted error was "wholly without merit." Id. at 853.