Court Opinion

ID: 9964634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 16:00:40.666894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.107116
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8024       Document: 010111040603    Date Filed: 04/30/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       April 30, 2024
                            _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
     SADDLETREE HOLDING, LLC,

          Plaintiff - Appellant,

     v.                                                     No. 23-8024
                                                   (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00089-NDF)
     EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY;                              (D. Wyo.)
     MARKEL SERVICE, INC.,

          Defendants - Appellees.
                         _________________________________

                                ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                            _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

          This appeal arises from Evanston Insurance Company and Markel Service

 Incorporated’s denial of insurance coverage for damages sustained to Saddletree

 Holding LLC’s building in eastern Wyoming. Saddletree subsequently brought three

 claims against Evanston and Markel: (1) breach of contract, (2) substantive bad faith,

 and (3) procedural bad faith. Following discovery, the parties cross moved for

 summary judgment as to all asserted claims.

 *
  This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
 of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8024      Document: 010111040603         Date Filed: 04/30/2024      Page: 2

        The district court entered judgment in favor of Evanston and Markel and

 dismissed the case with prejudice. Saddletree appealed. Because we agree the

 insurance defendants were entitled to summary judgment, we affirm.

                                      I. Background

        For purpose of this appeal, all inferences are construed in the light most favorable

 to Saddletree based on the summary judgment record developed in the district court.

        On May 7, 2019, Saddletree filed an insurance claim for damages sustained to its

 building located in Upton, Wyoming (the Building). Aplt. Br. 11. The Building was

 used as a community events center. Following a winter of heavy snowfall, Saddletree

 discovered that the Building’s steel support columns had buckled two or more inches and

 the roof had deflected downward approximately six inches. The Building was insured by

 Evanston; Markel was the claims processor.

        During claims processing, Defendants retained an engineer who inspected the

 Building. Defendants’ engineer determined that the damage was the result of the

 Building’s inadequate “design[] and/or construct[ion].” App. 701. Evanston disclaimed

 coverage pursuant to a Policy exclusion precluding damage caused by “hidden or latent

 defect[s]” or “any quality in property that causes it to damage or destroy itself.” Id. at

 746–48 (Because “the loss sustained to your building was caused by improper design and

 construction we unfortunately are unable to consider this claim[.]”).

        Saddletree did not contemporaneously contest the denial. Instead, it sued its

 builder, Dreams Carports & Buildings, Inc. To support that suit, Saddletree requested

 Defendants turn over their engineering report. They declined. So Saddletree retained its
                                               2
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 own engineer, who “determined that the original design is deficient[.]” App. 849.

 Saddletree’s engineer also noted “[i]t is very fortunate the structure has not collapsed

 based on the levels of deficiencies determined.” Id. (emphasis added). On March 23,

 2021, the district court entered default judgment against Dreams and awarded Saddletree

 over $2.2 million in damages, a judgment that Saddletree is still attempting to collect.

        On July 8, 2021—more than two years after Saddletree filed its insurance claim—

 Saddletree’s new counsel wrote to Defendants, again requesting that they turn over their

 engineering report. Defendants disclosed the report on August 10, 2021. Around two

 months later, Saddletree wrote to Defendants demanding that Evanston reverse its

 coverage denial pursuant to, among other things, the Policy’s “Collapse” provision. Aplt.

 Br. 15. Defendants responded that the Policy did not provide coverage under that

 provision because the Building had not collapsed. App. 853–55.

        Between January 16, 2022, and March 17, 2022, the parties each commissioned

 supplemental engineering reports addressing the cause and nature of the damage.

 Unsurprisingly, Saddletree’s supplemental report supported its theory that the Building

 had abruptly collapsed (so as to arguably permit coverage) and Defendants’ did not.

 Relying on their supplemental engineering report, Defendants again disclaimed coverage.

 Shortly thereafter, Saddletree sued Defendants for breach of contract and substantive and

 procedural bad faith.

        The district court entered summary judgment for Defendants on all Saddletree’s

 asserted claims. It first determined that the breach of contract claim was barred by the

 Policy’s two-year contractual limitations period. Second, it determined that the parties’

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 dueling expert reports rendered Defendants’ coverage denial “fairly debatable”—

 precluding Saddletree’s claim for substantive bad faith. Finally, because Saddletree

 proffered no evidence of recoverable economic damages, it determined that Saddletree

 could not sustain its procedural bad faith claim. So finding, it dismissed the case with

 prejudice.

        Saddletree timely appealed, and we affirm.

                                       II. Analysis

        On denials of summary judgment, we “review the district court’s factual

 findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” La Resolana Architects,

 PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2009); Packard v. Budaj, 86 F.4th

 859, 864 (10th Cir. 2023). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are

 unsupported in the record, or if after our review of the record we have the definite

 and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” TransWestern Pub. Co. LP v.

 Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations

 omitted).

        Wyoming substantive law applies to all Saddletree’s claims. Mid-Continent

 Cas. Co. v. Circle S Feed Store, LLC, 754 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2014).

                                              4
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       A. Breach of Contract

       Saddletree does not dispute that its breach claim falls outside the Policy’s two-

 year limitations period.1 Instead, it argues Defendants were either estopped from

 raising the limitations defense or waived it. We disagree.

              1. Estoppel

       Saddletree first argues Defendants should be estopped from relying on the

 Policy’s limitations period. In Wyoming, an insurer “is estopped when the [claimant]

 is deceived; the deception occurs when the [claimant] is lulled into a false sense of

 security.” Cornhusker Cas. Co. v. Skaj, 786 F.3d 842, 855 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal

 quotations omitted).

       Saddletree argues Defendants lulled it into inaction by failing to disclose the

 engineering report until after the Policy’s limitations period ran. The necessary

 implication—though Saddletree never directly states as much—is that it would have

 sued Defendants within the limitations period had it received the report sooner.

       Saddletree’s argument fails for several reasons. First, it is directly

 contradicted by the record: Saddletree testified it had “no idea” what it would have

 done differently had it received Defendants’ engineering report sooner. App. 1015.

 That makes sense, since its own report provided all the information it needed to

 1
   Contractual limitations periods “are prima facie valid and will be enforced absent a
 demonstration by the party opposing enforcement that the clause is unreasonable or
 based upon fraud or unequal bargaining positions.” Nuhome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 81
 P.3d 940, 947 (Wyo. 2003). Saddletree identifies no evidence demonstrating that the
 Policy’s two-year limitations period was unreasonable, based upon fraud, or the
 result of unequal bargaining positions.
                                            5
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 pursue its collapse theory against Defendants within the limitations period. See, e.g.,

 id. at 849 (“All the frames are likely damaged including: i. Buckled vertical members

 at exterior walls [and] ii. Overloaded truss members throughout the framework[.])”;

 id. at 847 (discussing the “permanently deflected shape of the roof . . . .”).

 Saddletree presents no argument or facts indicating that something in the Defendants’

 engineering report would have prompted it to sue Defendants within the limitations

 period.2

       Second, Saddletree has not identified any authority indicating Defendants had

 a duty to provide their engineering report. Saddletree’s only support for this

 proposition is an alleged conversation between its former counsel and an unnamed

 individual at the Wyoming Department of Insurance. Aplt. Br. 12. But this bare,

 unsupported assertion is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Hall v.

 Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onclusory and self-serving

 affidavits are not sufficient” to defeat summary judgment.).

 2
   It also makes sense that Saddletree did not sue Defendants until after it failed to
 collect against Dreams because its own expert report confirms Defendants’ basis for
 denying coverage pursuant to the Policy’s faulty design and construction exclusion.
 App. 586 (“We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from . . .
 [f]aulty, inadequate or defective . . . (2) Design, specifications, workmanship, repair,
 construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction[.]”); id. at 848 (“[i]t
 appears unlikely that the original structure was designed by a qualified engineer . . .
 [t]he design is so terribly overloaded that it suggests no person with a technical
 knowledge of the structural design of light gage members was involved in the
 original design or construction.”).
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        Absent an affirmative duty to provide the report, Defendants did not act

 inappropriately in refusing to provide it, and that refusal did not lead to estoppel.3

                 2. Waiver

        Saddletree next argues that Defendants waived their ability to assert the

 Policy’s limitations period. Saddletree has not preserved this argument for appellate

 review, so we need not address it. App. 920–21 (merely arguing estoppel to the

 district court); United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019) (“When

 a party fails to raise an argument below, we typically treat the argument as

 forfeited.”).

        But even if we did reach it, we would conclude that Defendants did not waive

 their reliance on the Policy’s limitations period. Saddletree, citing Cornhusker,

 asserts that “an insurer’s conduct of not timely disclaiming coverage, and standing by

 silently and acquiescing in the insured’s conduct in contravention of a policy

 exclusionary provision will be held to have waived the terms of the policy.” Aplt.

 Br. 31.

 3
   Saddletree also argues Defendants are estopped from relying on the limitation
 provision because they engaged in post-deadline claims communication and handling
 regarding the Building’s “collapse” without raising the limitations period. Aple. Br.
 25–30. But the limitations period only bars plaintiffs from suing—not from
 continuing to pursue a claim for benefits. App. 581 (“No one may bring a legal
 action against us under this Coverage Part unless . . . [t]he action is brought within
 two years after the date on which the direct physical loss or damage occurred.”).
 Defendants’ continued claim processing after the suit-filing deadline does not
 preclude their later reliance on the limitations period.
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           Saddletree overreads Cornhusker. The portion of Cornhusker Saddletree cites

 states:

                 a liability insurance carrier, which assumes and conducts
                 the defense of an action . . . with knowledge of a ground of
                 forfeiture or noncoverage under the policy, and without
                 disclaiming liability or giving notice of a reservation of its
                 right to deny coverage, is thereafter precluded in an action
                 upon the policy from setting up the ground of forfeiture or
                 noncoverage as a defense. In other words, the insurer’s
                 unconditional defense of an action . . . constitutes a waiver
                 of the terms of the policy and an estoppel of the insurer to
                 assert the defense of noncoverage . . . . [I]t is not necessary
                 for the [defended party] to show prejudice in such a
                 situation because he is presumed to have been prejudiced
                 by virtue of the insurer’s assumption of the defense.

 786 F.3d at 852–53 (citing New Jersey Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. McGillis, 42

 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1930)) (emphasis added).

           Cornhusker stands for the proposition that an insurer cannot assume the

 unconditional defense of an insured—despite knowing of a basis for noncoverage—

 only to later assert noncoverage under the policy. The core principle is that an

 insurer cannot “lull” an insured into thinking its claim is being defended, only to later

 deny coverage once the limitations clock to sue the insurer has run. Id. at 852–53,

 855. But that is not what happened here. Defendants never assumed Saddletree’s

 defense or otherwise indicated they would provide coverage. They denied coverage

 from the beginning.

           Saddletree, moreover, has proffered no evidence that Defendants were aware

 of and disregarded its “abrupt collapse” theory as a basis for coverage when making

 their initial denial. Indeed, Saddletree did not raise this coverage theory until after

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 the 24-month limitations period had run. See Rogers v. Wright, 366 P.3d 1264,

 1277–78 (Wyo. 2016) (waiver requires the waiving party intentionally relinquish a

 known right). Saddletree did not even make a second request for Defendants’

 engineering report until 29 months after the reported date of loss—which, perhaps

 coincidentally—was after Saddletree learned Dreams was judgment proof. And

 Saddletree did not ask Defendants to provide coverage under the Policy’s collapse

 provision until 33 months after the reported date of loss. Once it did, Defendants

 timely considered and reasonably rejected Saddletree’s claim. See infra (II)(B).

                                          ***

       Defendants are entitled to rely on the Policy’s two-year limitations period.

 Because the undisputed facts demonstrate Saddletree’s breach claim is barred by the

 limitations period, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for

 Defendants.4

       B. Substantive Bad Faith

       Saddletree next argues the district court erred by granting summary judgment

 in Defendants’ favor on its substantive bad faith claim.

       “The test used in determining whether a claim was denied in bad faith is an

 objective one which questions whether the validity of the denied claim was not fairly

 4
  Because we conclude the district court properly entered summary judgment in
 Defendants’ favor, we do not reach Saddletree’s argument that it is entitled to an
 entry of summary judgment for breach of contract under the Policy’s abrupt collapse
 provision. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of
 course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon
 below.”).
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  debatable.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo.

  1994). “A claim [is] fairly debatable when a reasonable insurer would have denied or

  delayed payment of benefits under the facts and circumstances.” Ahrenholtz v. Time

  Ins. Co., 968 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo. 1998) (citing McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,

  789 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1990)).

        “[I]f a realistic question of liability does exist, the insurance carrier is entitled

  to reasonably pursue that debate without exposure to a claim of violation of its duty

  of good faith and fair dealing.” Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 842 P.2d 1089,

  1093 (Wyo. 1992) (citing McCullough, 789 P.2d at 860). In pursing that debate, an

  insurer “is entitled to rely on the conclusion of [] independent experts . . . unless

  there is a showing that there was collusion between the experts and [the insurer] or

  that the experts knowingly made false reports.” Id. “Conflicting opinions among

  experts regarding the cause of the [loss] is not a factual dispute and does not preclude

  granting a summary judgment on the issue of ‘fairly debatable defense.’” Id. at 1094.

        Saddletree argues the “denial of the claim was not fairly debatable” since

  “Markel knew of, or recklessly disregarded the [abrupt collapse] coverage from and

  after its initial July 27, 2019, denial of coverage.” Aplt. Br. 43. The Policy does not

  define the term “collapse,” but it does state that abrupt collapse coverage

               does not apply to . . . (a) A building . . . that is in danger of
               falling down or caving in; (b) A part of a building that is
               still standing, even if it has separated from another part of
               the building; or (c) A building that is standing or any part
               of a building that is standing, even if it shows evidence of
               cracking, bulging, sagging, bending, leaning, settling,
               shrinkage or expansion.

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  App. 589.5

         This is what the Building looked like on June 6, 2019—a month after

  Saddletree filed its insurance claim:

  Id. at 737, 742.

         And this is the Building as of January 6, 2023:

  Id. at 892.

  5
    This Policy language is consistent with Merriam-Webster’s first two definitions of
  “collapse”: (1) “to fall or shrink together abruptly and completely[;] fall into a
  jumbled or flattened mass through the force of external pressure” and (2) “to break
  down completely[;] DISINTEGRATE[.]” Collapse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collapse (last visited Apr. 22, 2024).
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        By the Policy’s terms, coverage does not apply to a building that is standing

  even if it is “cracking, bulging, sagging, bending, [or] leaning . . . .” App. 589.

  Because the Building is still standing, it is at least “fairly debatable” whether the

  abrupt collapse provision applied. Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1094.

        Defendants, moreover, promptly investigated Saddletree’s collapse theory

  once Saddletree raised it by retaining, and relying on, an independent expert. Aple.

  Br. 15–16. On January 16, 2022, Saddletree’s expert opined that the Building’s

  internal steel members buckled in a “nearly instantaneous unzipping type of

  collapse.” App. 858 (emphasis added). Defendants’ expert provided a supplemental

  report on March 17, 2022, which opined “the yielding and buckling . . . occurred

  gradually as snow accumulated on the roof and was not an instantaneous or abrupt

  failure.” Id. at 860 (emphasis added). While these reports conflict on their face as to

  both the speed and nature of the failure, “conflicting opinions” between experts does

  not preclude granting summary judgment. Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1093–94 (An insurer

  “is entitled to rely on the conclusion of [] independent experts” while pursuing a

  coverage debate.).

        Both because it is “fairly debatable” whether the Building “collapsed” for

  purposes of coverage, and because Defendants were entitled to rely on their expert

  engineering report in making their coverage determination, id., we affirm the district

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  court’s entry of summary judgment for Defendants as to Saddletree’s substantive bad

  faith claim.6

           C. Procedural Bad Faith

           Lastly, Saddletree challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment

  for Defendants on its procedural bad faith claim. We affirm both because

  Defendants’ conduct does not constitute procedural bad faith as a matter of law and

  because Saddletree has not identified recoverable damages necessary to sustain its

  claim.

                  1. Conduct

           Procedural bad faith requires an “egregious level of misconduct . . . .”

  Cornhusker, 786 F.3d at 859 (demonstrating the requisite level of insurer misconduct

  is a “high hurdle[.]”). Potential bases for procedural bad faith claims include:

                  Deliberately misrepresent[ing] policy provisions to defeat
                  coverage; ma[king] oppressive demands or impos[ing]
                  burdensome requirements not contained in the policy;
                  retaliat[ing] against the insureds in any way; unfairly
                  impos[ing] premium increases; forc[ing insureds] to
                  arbitrate or litigate, knowing that it had no substantial
                  grounds to reject the claim; requir[ing insureds] to
                  continue premium payments while it reviewed their claim;

  6
    Saddletree alleges “[t]here is evidence of collusion between” Defendants and their
  expert. Aplt. Br. 44. If properly supported, this allegation would mean that
  Defendants are not entitled to rely on their expert report. Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1093.
  But Saddletree does not identify any evidence supporting this allegation. And
  “[w]ithout a specific reference, we will not search the record in an effort to determine
  whether there exists dormant evidence which might require submission of the case to
  a jury.” Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal
  quotations omitted)); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir.
  1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived . . . .”).
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               or undert[aking] any other action for which insurers have
               been held liable in first-party bad faith claims.

  Ahrenholtz, 968 P.2d at 951 (citing Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1097).

        In Hatch, for example, the Wyoming Supreme Court found procedural bad

  faith where “the insureds were required to file a 275-page inventory of household

  items and ‘were told that they must list how many cornflakes were left in the cereal

  box before the fire, and how much salt was in the salt shaker.’” Cornhusker, 786

  F.3d at 859 (citing Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1098). At bottom, “unless it is evident that the

  insurer performed no form of satisfactory investigation, a procedural bad-faith claim

  will not be viable.” Id. (emphasis added).

        Saddletree disputes the sufficiency of the investigation and conduct collateral

  to it. Specifically, it argues Defendants are liable for procedural bad faith for (1)

  initially refusing to turn over their engineering report and (2) allegedly not disclosing

  that the Building was unsafe to occupy during the winter months. We disagree.

        Regarding the former, neither Saddletree (nor the district court) ever identified

  any legal authority requiring Defendants to have disclosed their engineering report.

  Supra (A)(1). Regarding the latter, Defendants have identified evidence in the record

  that Saddletree’s sole member—David Gose—accompanied Defendants’ engineers

  during their initial inspection of the Building. Aple. Br. 9. Following the inspection,

  Mr. Gose testified he “lock[ed] the doors” because the inspectors “said that the

  structure of the building was too weak.” App. 544. From that point on, the

  Building’s only use has been for Gose’s personal storage. Id.

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         We conclude as a matter of law that this conduct fails to exhibit the “egregious

  level of misconduct” typifying bad faith. See, e.g., Cornhusker, 786 F.3d at 859;

  Hatch, 842 P.2d at 1097–98.

                2. Economic Damages

         Independently, the district court also correctly concluded that Saddletree

  cannot sustain its procedural bad faith claim because it failed to identify economic

  damages flowing from Defendants’ alleged conduct. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v.

  Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1046–49 (Wyo. 1998). Damages available for procedural

  bad faith claims include damages for harm to pecuniary interests and damages for

  emotional distress. Id. at 1046.

         Saddletree does not specifically articulate its damages theory (although on

  appeal it does disavow seeking emotional distress damages). Aplt. Br. 49–52. Here,

  as it did before the district court, it generally avers an entitlement to contract

  damages ostensibly owed under the Policy, profits lost because the Building cannot

  be operated as intended, and costs incurred to install temporary shoring. See id. But

  these damages are either foreclosed by our earlier conclusions or incidental to the

  loss itself—not Defendants’ handling of the claim—meaning they are not recoverable

  as a remedy for procedural bad faith. See Shirley, 958 P.2d at 1046–49. See also

  Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d

  1228, 1235 (Wyo. 1996) (Barring recovery in tort economic damages which are

  recoverable under a governing contract).

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                 3. Subrogation

          Finally, Saddletree argues it is entitled to its attorneys’ fees spent litigating

  against Dreams on the theory that Defendants should have provided the disputed

  coverage and later sought subrogation against Dreams. Aplt. Br. 52–53. Saddletree

  offers no authority in support of the position that an insurer is required to provide

  reasonably disputed coverage, only later to seek subrogation, to avoid liability for

  procedural bad faith.

          Moreover, even if its Dreams’ attorneys’ fees were recoverable as relief for the

  procedural bad faith claim it asserts against Defendants, recovering those fees here

  would require an intermediate finding that Saddletree was both entitled to coverage

  and that it was Defendants’ wrongful conduct in denying coverage that caused

  Saddletree to sue Dreams in the first place. That proposition is self-defeating at least

  because Saddletree admitted it has “no idea” whether it would have sued Defendants

  in place of Dreams even had it received their expert report sooner. App. 554–55,

  1015.

          Without economic damages Saddletree cannot sustain its claim. See Shirley,

  958 P.2d at 1046. We affirm the district court.

                                              ***

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        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary

  judgment in Defendants’ favor on all Saddletree’s asserted claims.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                            Circuit Judge

                                           17