Court Opinion

ID: 9375422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 18:03:17.98954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.728253
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 L.V. v. E.C. CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 L.V.,                                                                D080046

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 20FL005185C)

 E.C. et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jinsook Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
         Cage & Miles and John T. Sylvester for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Bickford Blado & Botros and Andrew J. Botros for Defendants and
Respondents.
         Plaintiff and appellant L.V. appeals a family court judgment denying
her petition to be determined a third parent to her granddaughter, A.C.
under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c).1 The court based its ruling

1    All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise specified.
on its conclusion that L.V. failed to establish presumed parent status of A.C.
under section 7611, subdivision (d), because L.V. had not demonstrated that
she openly held A.C. out as her own. L.V. does not bring a substantial
evidence challenge to the court’s finding. Instead, L.V. contends the court
committed reversible error when it applied what L.V. calls an “antiquated”
approach to the requirement that she “openly hold out” A.C. as her natural
child. According to L.V., rather than requiring her to “pretend [A.C.] was her
own natural child in her community, modern authority holds the statute
requires her to treat [A.C.] as her child by committing herself to parental
responsibilities.” L.V. argues her commitment to parenting A.C. was
undisputed and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in finding she
failed to hold out A.C. as her own.
      We conclude the court correctly interpreted and applied section 7611,
subdivision (d)’s holding out requirement. While L.V. argues a party seeking
presumed status can admit and acknowledge she is not a biological parent
without losing presumed status, performance of parental responsibilities
alone does not entitle a person to presumed parent status. The ultimate
issues are whether the party seeking presumed status demonstrated a
commitment to the child and established a fully developed parental
relationship.
      Contrary to L.V.’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not rely
solely on whether L.V. publicly declared A.C. as her own. Rather, the court
concluded L.V. was a caring grandmother who performed many parental
duties and had a deep and loving grandparent bond with A.C., but failed to
establish a parental relationship with A.C. The judgment is affirmed.

                                       2
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      L.V. filed a petition to be determined a parent of A.C. under section
7611, subdivision (d), on the basis that she received A.C. into her home and
openly held out A.C. as her natural child.
      In support of her petition, L.V. alleged that A.C.’s mother E.C. (Mother)
and father J.C. (Father) did not care for A.C. for the first five years of life.
L.V. declared that as soon as A.C. was born in October 2014, she began caring
for A.C. four days per week. The evidence showed that when Mother and
Father began to have problems in April 2016, Mother and A.C. moved in with
L.V. and her husband. Mother and A.C. moved back in with Father in
September 2016 until Mother and Father separated in June 2017. During
this time, L.V. helped care for A.C. approximately two to three days per week
and one or two overnights. Mother and A.C. moved back in with L.V. from
June 2017 to December 2018. Mother and A.C. lived on their own in a rental
from December 2018 to May 2019. They moved back in with L.V. until
November 2019, at which time Mother remarried and moved herself and A.C.
in with her new husband, D.S. In January 2020, Mother and Father decided
to end L.V.’s contact with A.C.
      L.V. testified that her bond with A.C. was a “very strong, loving,
mother-daughter bond, grandmother. I’m both to [A.C.]” She did not tell
A.C. that she was her mother because A.C. was autistic and telling A.C. that
she was no longer her grandmother would have “devastated her.” L.V.
introduced herself to A.C.’s teachers as A.C.’s grandmother and never
introduced herself as A.C.’s parent. She also referred to herself as A.C.’s
grandmother on her public Facebook posts. However, she testified that she
would call A.C. “mija,” which means “my daughter” in Spanish. She testified
A.C. called her “Mama Two, Grandma.” According to L.V., Mother

                                         3
acknowledged that L.V. was A.C.’s mother in one text, which read “Great
team work, [A.C.’s] mom.” Mother testified that she never intentionally
referred to L.V. as A.C.’s mom and the text was a typo where she meant to
say “Great team work with [A.C.], mom.”
      L.V. claimed she co-parented A.C. with Mother and Father. She picked
up and dropped off A.C. at school and brought A.C. to see doctors, which L.V.
characterized as “parental duties,” but testified that she did these at Mother’s
behest. Mother also set the schedule for when L.V. would watch A.C. L.V.
testified that she never attended A.C.’s back to school nights, Individualized
Education Plan (IEP) meetings, or parent-teacher conferences.
      L.V.’s husband testified that while Mother and A.C. were living with
them, L.V. dressed and fed A.C., took her to and picked her up from school,
woke her up in the morning, and put her to bed at night. He testified L.V.
developed strategies to encourage A.C.’s developmental growth and that they
had a “really unique, special bond.” He testified that in public, people would
comment as if A.C. was L.V.’s daughter. However, he had never heard A.C.
call L.V. “Mama Two.”
      Mother’s sister, L.S. testified that she did hear A.C. refer to L.V. as
“Mama Two.” She never heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her child but she did
hear L.V. call A.C. “mija,” which L.S. explained is Spanish for “my daughter.”
She testified A.C. and L.V. had a “deep and beautiful bond” and L.V. “would
play every aspect of the role of mother because she was a mother to [A.C.]”
      Mother testified she never heard A.C. call L.V. “Mommy,” “Mom,” or
“Mama Two,” or otherwise refer to L.V. as her mother. She had also never
heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her child or daughter. She acknowledged L.V.
would sometimes call A.C. “mija,” and testified that L.V. would call other
people “mija,” including younger cousins. Mother testified this is a slang

                                        4
word used in Hispanic culture that she has never interpreted to mean child.
No family members referred to L.V. as A.C.’s mother or A.C. as L.V.’s child.
      Mother testified that L.V. did not have any influence or involvement in
schooling decisions for A.C., and L.V. did not attend school events for parents.
Mother testified she took A.C. to the majority of her medical appointments,
with occasional help from L.V. or Father. Mother denied that she and L.V.
coparented A.C., but admitted they had a “system-like arrangement.”
Mother acknowledged that L.V. gave her money two to three times a month,
which she understood to be reimbursements for groceries and money that
L.V. borrowed from her, not child support.
      Father testified he never heard A.C. call L.V. “Mommy,” “Mom,” or
“Mommy Two,” and had never heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her daughter.
Other family members including Mother’s second husband D.S., Father’s
father (A.C.’s paternal grandfather), L.V.’s brother’s wife (L.V.’s sister-in-
law), L.V.’s brother’s daughter (L.V.’s niece), and L.V.’s son (Mother’s brother)
testified that L.V. did not call A.C. her daughter, nor did A.C. refer to L.V. as
her mother, and they understood that L.V. was A.C.’s grandmother, not
Mother.
      Mother and Father both testified that A.C. had not asked about L.V.
since they “cut off” contact in January 2020.
      The court issued a statement of decision concluding: “The evidence
establishes that [L.V.] was a doting grandmother and, like many other
grandmothers, generously assisted in the rearing of her grandchild. Despite
her deep and loving grandparent bond with [A.C.], the court concludes that
she did not assume a parental relationship with [A.C.] such that she could be
deemed to have openly held out [A.C.] as her child.” The court noted the
requirement that a party seeking presumed parent status prove that she

                                        5
openly held out the child as her natural child “looks at the extent and nature
of the claimed parental relationship; it does not require that the person
seeking parental status to have represented that the child is their biological
child.” Citing In re Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 139-140 (Bryan D.),
the court stated that “[i]n the context of a grandparent-grandchild biological
relationship . . . the ‘holding out’ prong requires more than the performance
of ‘all parental responsibilities.’ ”
      Under a subheading titled “[L.V.’s] bond with her grandchild,” the court
acknowledged credible evidence of the close bond between L.V. and A.C. as
well as “undisputed testimony” that L.V. shared in the child rearing duties
during the times that A.C. was living with her. The court stated “[n]o one
disputes that [L.V.] was a loving and involved grandmother who played a
significant role in [A.C.’s] life.” However, the evidence “failed to establish by
a preponderance, that the relationship exceeded a close and special
grandparent-grandchild bond and became a parental relationship.” Under
this subheading, the court found the testimony that A.C. called L.V.
“ ‘Momma [Two]’ ” lacked credibility given testimony about A.C.’s verbal
abilities due to her autism. The court also rejected L.V.’s contention that
Mother referred to her as “ ‘Aria mom,’ ” and found that the testimony
applying “mija” as a literal declaration that A.C. was L.V.’s daughter lacked
credibility.
      Under a subheading titled “The extent of [L.V.’s] assumption of
parental responsibilities,” the court acknowledged that L.V. performed many
parental duties for A.C., and stated “that alone does not create a parental
relationship, any more than being a nanny creates a parental relationship.”
The court noted L.V. cared for A.C. at Mother’s request and permission, and
occasionally obtained medical care for A.C. with the knowledge and at the

                                        6
direction of Mother. Also, while L.V. did much of the driving to school for
A.C., Mother “executed parental responsibilities” such as enrolling A.C. in
school, attending IEP sessions, and attending parent-teacher conferences and
school events for parents. The court concluded “Mother received significant
childcare help from [L.V.] but acted as the primary parent for [A.C.] at all
times.”
       Under a subheading titled “Friends, relatives, and school staff
understood [L.V.] to be [A.C.’s] grandmother rather than de facto parent,” the
court stated “[n]ot surprisingly, the general perception of the people’s in
[L.V.’s] and [A.C.’s] community matched the underlying reality of their
grandparent-grandchild relationship.” The court noted L.V. posted public
social media communications referring to A.C. as her granddaughter and
Mother as A.C.’s mother, and L.V. presented no evidence regarding any
communications in which she discusses her role as A.C.’s parent.
Additionally, L.V.’s close relatives understood she was a grandparent to A.C.
rather than a grandmother raising A.C. as her own child, which the court
weighed more heavily than L.V.’s testimony that she did not correct
strangers when they assumed A.C. was her daughter. The court also noted
teachers and staff at A.C.’s schools understood L.V. to be a grandmother
assisting in pickups rather than a person playing the role of a parent in
A.C.’s life.
                                 DISCUSSION
       As identified by L.V., the sole issue in this appeal is whether the court
erred in its interpretation of section 7611, subdivision (d)’s “holding out”
requirement. Review of the trial court’s legal interpretation of the statute is

                                        7
subject to de novo review.2 (S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031
(S.Y.).)
      Section 7611, subdivision (d) provides that a person is presumed to be
the natural parent of a child if “[t]he presumed parent receives the child into
their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.”
      According to L.V., there is an “antiquated” approach to the holding out
standard, which requires a public display of admitted parentage. She
contends this view wrongly denies presumed parent status to those who
demonstrate a parent-child bond, despite publicly acknowledging a different
biological reality. L.V. refers to the “modern” approach to the holding out
requirement as one that emphasizes “parentage in action, rather than
words,” focusing on commitment to the child even if the person does not
publicly claim or pretend to be the child’s biological parent.
      L.V. argues the court erred in applying the “antiquated” approach by
relying solely on her failure to publicly claim A.C. as her own child. She
further contends she satisfied the modern approach when she undertook
significant parental responsibilities for A.C. L.V. argues that under the
modern application of the holding out requirement, the court abused its
discretion in finding that she did not hold out A.C. as her own because it was
undisputed that she shared in child-rearing duties and was committed to
parenting A.C.

2     The court’s factual finding that L.V. did not hold out A.C. as her
natural child is subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. (S.Y.,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031.) L.V., however, does not contend that
there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the court’s finding and
instead challenges only the court’s legal interpretation of the holding out
requirement.
                                        8
      As an initial matter, we disagree that there is an “antiquated”
approach to the holding out requirement that focuses on a public display of
admitted parentage. Citing Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043,
Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, and In re Spencer W. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1647 (Spencer W.), L.V. argues that the “antiquated”
approach to the holding out requirement derives from antiquated notions of
legitimacy and paternity, and focused on unwed biological fathers’ words and
the community’s perception of those words. According to L.V., by openly and
publicly admitting paternity, the father could establish their willingness to
assume full responsibility for the child. These cases did involve an unwed
biological father’s claim to his child, however, Michael H. and Kelsey S. did
not analyze presumed father status under section 7611, subdivision (d)’s
holding out requirement. In Michael H., the trial court determined that the
father was not a presumed father under section 7611 and the father did not
challenge that conclusion on appeal, instead asserting a constitutional right
to his child. (Michael H., at p. 1052.) In Kelsey S., it was undisputed that the
father openly held out the child as being his own, but he was not a presumed
father because he did not physically receive the child into his home.
(Kelsey S., at p. 825.)
      In Spencer W., the court concluded that the father’s “actions, as a
whole, were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that [he] ‘openly and
publicly admit paternity.’ ” (Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1653-
1654, first italics added.) The court noted that the father claimed paternity
to his family and friends but was unwilling to claim paternity when there
might have been some cost to him, and the father failed to take steps to place
his name on the birth certificate or establish paternity by legal action.
However, in analyzing the “holding out” requirement, the court also

                                       9
considered facts such as the father’s failure to assume financial obligations
for child support, and the father’s “indifference toward establishing or
maintaining a parental relationship” with the child during the years that the
father was in prison. (Id. at p. 1654.) The court applied the reasoning that
“presumed father status is earned based on a commitment toward developing
a ‘substantial familial relationship to the child.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1654-1655.)
Thus, the court looked beyond the father’s words or public acknowledgment of
paternity, ultimately considering whether the father showed a commitment
to and established a parental relationship with the child.
      We also disagree that the “antiquated” approach has been applied as a
bar to “prevent willing parental figures from claiming parentage, simply
because they recognized the biological reality that they were not, in fact, the
child’s natural parent.” L.V. contends two cases, In re Jose C. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 147 (Jose C.) and Bryan D., were wrongly decided and
“suggest the presumed parent should not only have acted like a parent, but
publicly pretended to be one, despite knowing this was not the truth.” She
further contends that this approach, which shifts the focus away from
commitment to parental responsibilities, persists in a handful of cases, citing
R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760 (R.M.) and In re D.A. (2012)

204 Cal.App.4th 811 (D.A.).3
      We agree that Jose C. and Bryan D. appear to weigh heavily evidence
that the party seeking presumed status did not publicly claim to be the
child’s parent and that the child and others knew that the party seeking
presumed status was not the child’s parent. (See Bryan D., supra,

3     L.V. also cited In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, however, the trial
court’s presumed parent finding was not an issue on appeal in that case. (Id.
at pp. 9, 18.)
                                        10
199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 139-140 [“undisputed that grandmother performed all
parental responsibilities for him. However, there was no evidence that
grandmother was openly holding Bryan out as her son, rather than as her
grandson. Both grandmother and Bryan indicated that grandmother was
like a mother, or acted as his mother. But in all of the interviews of Bryan,
he referred to grandmother as his grandmother, not his mother. . . . [¶] . . .
Even if Bryan at some point believed grandmother was his mother, this was
no longer true, and had not been true for years”]; Jose C., supra,
188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163 [“grandfather acted as the functional
equivalent of Jose’s father . . . but that alone does not satisfy the test for
presumed father status. . . . [¶] . . . Jose (and everyone else) knows he is not
grandfather’s son, and grandfather has never suggested to anyone that he is
Jose’s father. Consequently, grandfather cannot qualify as a presumed
father”].)
      We do not agree, however, that Jose C. and Bryan D. suggest that the
determining factor is whether the party seeking presumed status publicly
claimed to be the child’s parent in the face of a different biological parentage.
Rather, this reflects the reality that there is a difference between a
grandparent performing parental responsibilities as a grandparent versus as
a parent—i.e., whether the grandparent established a parental relationship.
(See Jose C., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 162 [“Many people may perform the
function of a parent at various points in a child’s life, including grandparents,
stepparents, foster parents, extended family members, and so on. Doing so
does not make any of them a presumed parent”].) Whether the party seeking
presumed status publicly claims to be the child’s parent, and whether the
child and the community perceive the party seeking presumed status to be
the child’s parent are facts that courts properly consider in assessing the

                                        11
distinction. This is further demonstrated by the cases that L.V. claims
perpetuate Jose C.’s and Bryan D.’s approach.
      In R.M., the court stated, “[w]hen determining whether the person has
met the statutory requirements of receiving the child into his or her home
and openly holding the child out as his or her own, the court may consider a
wide variety of factors, including the person’s provision of physical and/or
financial support for the child, efforts to place the person’s name on the birth
certificate, efforts to seek legal custody, and the breadth and unequivocal
nature of the person’s acknowledgement of the child as his or her own.
[Citation.] No single factor is determinative; rather, the court may consider
all the circumstances when deciding whether the person demonstrated a
parental relationship by holding out the child as his or her own and assuming
responsibility for the child by receiving the child into his or her home.” (R.M.,
supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774, italics added.) In affirming the trial court’s
finding that R.M. was the child’s presumed father, the court considered the
fact that R.M. and the mother openly referred to the child as R.M.’s daughter,
which was corroborated by R.M.’s brother, pastor, and neighbor. (Id. at
p. 781). The court also considered facts beyond any party’s verbal
acknowledgment of R.M.’s relationship with the child, such as the fact that
R.M. was at the hospital assisting the mother when the child was born, R.M.,
the mother, and the child participated in family events and recreational
outings, and attended church together as a family unit, and R.M. named the
child as his beneficiary on his life insurance policy. (Id. at pp. 780-781.) The
court concluded that “all this evidence together” supports a finding that R.M.,
the mother, the child, and the community at large “all perceived the
relationship between RM and Child as a father-daughter relationship.” (Id.
at p. 781.)

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      The court in D.A. concluded the record contained no evidence that the
party seeking presumed father status met the requirements of receiving the
child into his home and openly holding the child out as his natural child.
(D.A., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 814.) The court reasoned that the
appearance of his name on the child’s birth certificate did not constitute
evidence that he openly and publicly admitted paternity because he did not
sign the birth certificate. (Id. at p. 827.) That does not mean, however, that
the court considered a public claim of paternity to be the determining factor.
Rather, the unsigned birth certificate did not constitute evidence that could
satisfy the holding out requirement and the record contained no other
evidence that could satisfy the requirement. Notably, the party seeking
presumed status moved in with the mother just two weeks before and moved
out two weeks after the child was born. After he moved out and before the
child was detained at six months old, he watched the child overnight on some
unspecified number of occasions while the mother “was out partying.” (Ibid.)
Thus, it appears there was simply no evidence of a fully developed parental
relationship.
      Just as we disagree that there is an “antiquated” approach to the
holding out requirement, we disagree that there is a “modern” approach.
According to L.V., the “modern” approach emphasizes parentage in action,
rather than words, focusing on commitment to the child even if the person
does not publicly claim or pretend to be the child’s biological parent. As
explained above, the cases that L.V. cites as applying an “antiquated”
approach do not treat public claims of parentage as determinative, but rather
as a fact to be considered, along with other facts. The cases that L.V. cites as
applying a “modern” approach still consider public claims of parentage as a
relevant fact, as well as other facts. (See In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th

                                       13
1202, 1211 [presumed father applicant openly acknowledged T.R. as his
daughter, provided financial support, and received her in his home; however,
these positive factors were outweighed by conduct antithetical to a parent’s
role]; In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 61 [in concluding the evidence
more than satisfied the requirements of section 7611, subdivision (d), the
Court of Appeal observed the party seeking presumed status provided
Nicholas with significant financial support over the years, consistently
referred to and treated Nicholas as his son, was the “ ‘only father Nicholas
has ever know[n],’ ” and Nicholas had “ ‘a strong emotional bond’ ” with him;
issue considered by California Supreme Court was whether under section
7612, subdivision (a), a man loses this status as a presumed father by
admitting he is not the biological father]; Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005)
37 Cal.4th 108, 122 [the party seeking presumed parent status acted as a
coparent with the biological mother for a substantial period of time, gave the
children at issue and her biological child the same surname, breast-fed the
children, claimed the children as her dependents on her tax returns, and
testified that she considered herself to be the children’s mother]; In re M.R.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 899 [the presumed father always viewed the child
as his son and always held him out as such to others, the child was treated as
part of the presumed father’s family not only by him but also his wife and
extended family, and the child viewed him as his father]; S.Y., supra,
201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034 [concluding that S.Y. was the presumed parent of
the children that her former same-sex partner, S.B. adopted, the court
considered that S.Y. helped care for the children since birth, displayed
pictures of S.B. and the children at work for everyone to see, brought S.B.
and the children to work-related functions typically attended by family,
attended school events, baseball games, and practices, named the children as

                                       14
beneficiaries on everything she had, went on family vacations with S.B. and
the children; also S.Y.’s parents considered and treated the children as their
grandchildren, and S.B. and the children gave S.Y. Mother’s Day cards]; In re
Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 493 [the presumed father acted as the
child’s live-in father, taking on the various duties and responsibilities
demanded of an infant’s parent, the presumed father treated the child as his
own child and the child referred to him as “Daddy,” the child was most
comfortable in the presumed father’s care, and the presumed father
reaffirmed his commitment to return to the mother and the minor on a
permanent basis].)
      While L.V. contends that the “modern” approach focuses on
commitment to the child by performing parental responsibilities, that fact is
not determinative either. That is, even if the person seeking presumed
status demonstrates a commitment to the child, that person is not necessarily
entitled to presumed status if that person does not have a fully developed
parental relationship with the child. (In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541,
544, 555 [“although J.J. may have done everything he could under the
circumstances to be a father to D.M., he must also demonstrate that he has
an existing familial bond with the child sufficient to warrant giving him
rights equal to those afforded a biological mother”; “the court did not find
that there was an existing father-son relationship between J.J. and D.M.,
without which J.J. cannot be a presumed father”].) Along the same lines,
while it is true that a person can be a presumed parent of a child while
acknowledging a different biological reality, performing parental
responsibilities alone does not entitle a person to presumed parent status.
      In sum, there are no distinct antiquated or modern approaches to the
holding out requirement. Instead, courts consider a wide range of factors as

                                       15
appropriate to the circumstances including whether the party seeking
presumed status publicly claimed to be the child’s parent, how the
community perceived the relationship, assumption of parental
responsibilities, and the parent-child bond. All these factors are informative
to the ultimate determination, which is whether the party seeking presumed
status demonstrated a commitment to the child and established a fully
developed parental relationship.
      On appeal, L.V. argues that she met the holding out requirement,
focusing only on the facts showing that she undertook significant parental
responsibilities for A.C. and therefore demonstrated a commitment to A.C.
However, more is required to obtain presumed parent status. Particularly
lacking here was a fully developed parental relationship, as the trial court
noted multiple times in its statement of decision.
      Contrary to L.V.’s characterization of the court’s ruling, the court did
not rely solely on L.V.’s failure to publicly claim that A.C. was her child.
Rather, it was one fact the court considered in weighing L.V.’s request for
presumed parent status. The court also considered L.V.’s bond with A.C., the
community’s perception of the relationship, and L.V.’s assumption of parental
responsibilities. For example, the trial court considered “credible evidence of
the close bond between [A.C.] and her grandmother,” but found that the
evidence “failed to establish by a preponderance, that the relationship
exceeded a close and special grandparent–grandchild bond and became a
parental relationship.” Whether A.C. or Mother called or referred to L.V. as
some form of “Mom,” and whether L.V. called A.C. her daughter was
informative, but not determinative in making this distinction. Likewise, the
community’s “general perception” of A.C.’s and L.V.’s relationship was not
determinative but rather “matched the underlying reality of their

                                       16
grandparent-grandchild relationship.” The fact that L.V. referred to A.C. as
her granddaughter on public social media posts was again indicative of the
relationship, but not determinative. The court also acknowledged that L.V.
performed many parental duties but correctly noted that “that alone does not
create a parental relationship, any more than being a nanny creates a
parental relationship.” We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
consideration of all of these factors in concluding that L.V. “did not assume a
parental relationship with [A.C.] such that she could be deemed to have
openly held out [A.C.] as her child.”
      We also disagree with L.V.’s contention that she would have satisfied
the holding out requirement if she had simply pretended to be A.C.’s
biological parent in public. We note an important distinction here, that
whether the party seeking presumed status pretends to be or claims to be the
child’s biological parent, or whether the community believes that the party
seeking presumed status is actually the child’s biological parent are not the
relevant facts. Rather, it is how the parties and the community perceive the
relationship that is relevant. (See S.Y., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-
1029 [“Although S.Y. referred to herself as the children’s ‘godparent,’ her
supervisor understood ‘she was in her role as the parent’ ”].) This makes
sense because where a person is so committed to a child and has developed a
parental relationship with the child such that people perceive or consider the
person to be the child’s parent even though they know the person is not
actually the child’s biological parent, that matters more than a verbal claim
of being the child’s biological parent. Said another way, whether the party
seeking presumed parent status makes public claims of being the child’s
parent, and whether the community perceives the person to be the child’s

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parent is indicative (again, not determinative) of a fully developed parental
relationship.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                             O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

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