Court Opinion

ID: 9730580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:16:49.12139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.619188
License: Public Domain

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the Department met its burden of proving that reasonable suspicion existed to stop Axt’s vehicle. I further believe that substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) conclusion that Officer Kuhn had probable cause to believe Axt was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a public road. Therefore, I would sustain the Department’s issues, reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment reinstating the ALJ’s order authorizing the Department to suspend Axt’s driver’s license.
The background facts are as follows:
At around 2:30 a.m. on October 27, 2007, two Arlington police officers saw Axt driving a car in a restricted jail parking lot that is marked with signs declaring the area to be for authorized personnel only. The parking lot is also controlled by an access gate, but that night the gate was malfunctioning and allowed entry and exit to any vehicle. Axt’s car was already through the gate before the officers noticed it. Axt appeared to be lost and had a difficult time backing and reversing his car to exit the area.
The police officers approached the car while it was still in the jail parking lot and directed Axt to stop. Officer Joseph Balsa noticed that Axt had red, glassy eyes, was slurring his speech, and appeared disoriented. The officer also detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Axt admitted that he had just come from a bar down the street. Officer Balsa and the other officer detained Axt for field sobriety testing and called Officer Travis Kuhn to administer the tests. Officer Kuhn determined that Axt was intoxicated, arrested Axt, and after warning Axt of the consequences of refusing a breath test, requested that he provide a breath specimen. Axt refused, and the Department subsequently suspended his driver’s license.
Axt requested an administrative hearing regarding the suspension. The ALJ concluded that Axt was legally detained and issued an order upholding the suspension of Axt’s driver’s license. Axt appealed the ALJ’s decision to the trial court, complain*742ing that the evidence did not support the ALJ’s conclusions that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Axt’s vehicle and probable cause to believe that Axt had operated a vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. The trial court reversed the ALJ’s decision, holding that there was neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. This appeal followed.
Administrative license revocation cases are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review.1 The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the ALJ’s decision was correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the ALJ’s action.2 The court may not substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence for that of the ALJ and must uphold the ALJ’s finding even if the evidence preponderates against it so long as enough evidence suggests the ALJ’s determination was within the bounds of reasonableness.3 If there is evidence to support the ALJ’s findings, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld.4 Any evi-dentiary ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the ALJ’s findings.5 The burden for overturning an agency ruling is formidable.6
At a license suspension hearing, the Department bears the burden of proving: (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person; (2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; (3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and subsequently asked to submit to a breath or blood test; and (4) the person refused to submit to the breath or blood test.7 There is no dispute in this case regarding the last two requirements. Accordingly, I focus on whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions that reasonable suspicion existed to stop Axt’s vehicle and that probable cause existed to believe that Axt was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.
The Department argues in its first issue that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Axt because they reasonably believed Axt may have been committing the offense of criminal trespass when he entered the restricted parking lot.8 Axt asserts, and the majority holds, that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop because the Department did not offer evidence to support every element of criminal trespass. I agree with the Department.
The Department is not required to show an offense was actually committed or to *743prove every element of a specific offense to establish reasonable suspicion, but only that the officer reasonably believed a crime was in progress.9 To justify an investigative stop, the officer must have specific and articulable facts from which he can reasonably surmise that the detained person may be associated with a crime.10 In other words, the officer must reasonably suspect that (1) some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, (2) the detained person is connected with the unusual activity, and (3) the activity is related to a crime.11 Circumstances which raise a suspicion that illegal conduct is taking place need not themselves be criminal; they only need to include facts which render the likelihood of criminal conduct greater than it would be otherwise.12
After reviewing the administrative record, I believe that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasonable suspicion holding. Two police officers observed Axt driving a motor vehicle in a restricted jail parking lot at around 2:30 a.m. Although the gate to the parking lot was malfunctioning and allowed entry and exit to any vehicle, the parking lot was marked with signs declaring the area to be for authorized personnel only. Axt’s late-night presence in a jail parking lot, where signs warned that the area was closed to the public, warranted the officers’ suspicion that Axt was criminally trespassing.13 I would, therefore, sustain the Department’s first issue.
In its second issue, which the majority does not reach because of its disposition of the Department’s first issue, the Department argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Officer Kuhn had probable cause to believe that Axt was driving while intoxicated in a public place. Axt does not dispute that he was driving while intoxicated. Rather, Axt contests the ALJ’s determination that probable cause existed to believe Axt was driving while intoxicated in a public place because, he argues, (1) the jail parking lot was not a public place and (2) neither officer saw him driving before he entered the jail parking lot.
Under section 724.042 of the Texas Transportation Code, in a driver’s license suspension hearing, the ALJ must determine “whether probable cause existed to believe ... [the license holder] was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.”14 The Department did not have to prove that Axt was in fact driving while intoxicated in a public place, but only that there was probable cause to believe that he had been driving in a public place while intoxicated.15 Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense.16 Probable cause deals with probabilities and requires more than mere sus*744picion, but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.17
Officer Kuhn’s report and probable cause statement indicates that (1) upon his arrival at the jail parking lot, Officer Kuhn was informed that Axt admitted that he had just come from a bar down the street, (2) Officer Kuhn immediately noticed that Axt had slurred speech, trouble balancing, and an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath and person, (3) Officer Kuhn administered Standardized Field Sobriety Tests including the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, which showed five out of six clues of intoxication, the Walk and Turn test, which demonstrated four out of eight clues of intoxication, and the One Leg Stand, which showed three out of four clues of intoxication, and (4) during the field sobriety tests, Officer Kuhn observed that Axt had difficulty balancing and repeatedly failed to follow instructions. Officer Kuhn reported that he had probable cause to arrest or detain Axt because of Axt’s “slurred speech, odor of alcoholic beverage emitted from breath and person, [and] difficulty balancing,” as well as the results of the sobriety tests. In addition, Officer Balsa observed that Axt had red, glassy eyes.
Based on this record, I would hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the officers had probable cause to believe Axt was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a public road. While the officers did not specifically observe Axt driving on the public road before he entered the jail parking lot, they could have reasonably inferred that Axt became intoxicated at the bar and then drove to the jail parking lot using public streets.18 There was no indication of any alcohol in the car, and Axt admitted to the officers on the scene that he had just come from a bar down the street. Thus, the ALJ did not err in holding that the officers had probable cause to believe that Axt had been driving in a public place while intoxicated.19 I would, therefore, sustain the Department’s second issue.20
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment reinstating the ALJ’s order authorizing the Department to suspend Axt’s driver’s license.

. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174(2) (Vernon 2008); Mireles v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex.1999).

. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).

. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131; Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 962 S.W.2d 207, 215 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).

. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Stacy, 954 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).

. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Pruitt, 75 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Pucek, 22 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).

. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

. A person commits criminal trespass if he enters or remains on property or in a building of another without effective consent and he had notice that the entry was forbidden or he received notice to depart but failed to do so. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); Martinez v. State, 29 S.W.3d 609, 611-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd).

. Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(op. on reh'g).

. Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

. Reyes v. State, 899 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (citing Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)).

. See Rue v. State, 958 S.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14lh Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042(2)(A).

. See id.

. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

. Id.

. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Hirschman, 169 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied); Stagg v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 81 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).

. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993) ("In determining whether probable cause existed for the arrest, we examine the cumulative information known to all the officers who cooperated in the arrest.”) (citing Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985)).

.Because of my disposition of the Department's first two issues, I would not need to reach its third issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.