Court Opinion

ID: 9742197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:08:15.791412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.369653
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 18. 0dissenting). The legislature has given trial courts the authority to place convicted defendants on probation. Wis. Stat. § 973.09(l)(a) (2003-04).1 "The court may impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate." Id. "Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof." Section 973.09(3)(a).
¶ 19. The legislature has given sheriffs the authority to release prisoners in the sheriffs care to home detention, if the prisoner agrees. Wis. Stat. § 302.425(2) and (3). The legislature has given trial courts similar authority. Wis. Stat. § 973.03(4)(a). The sheriff may transfer the prisoner between home detention and jail. Section 302.425(2).
¶ 20. The State has cited no authority permitting trial courts to impose a jail sentence which negates the sheriffs home detention determination other than the following in State v. Schell, 2003 WT App 78, ¶ 18, 261 Wis. 2d 841, 661 N.W.2d 503: "Here, the legislature has authorized sheriffs to release persons confined in county jails on home monitoring. Arguably, this undermines the court's authority to require, among other *704things, that a probationer's jail time actually be served in jail." Schell cites no authority for this assertion. The State , did not petition the supreme court to review Schell.
¶ 21. Schell examined a conflict between a court's authority to rescind its order placing a defendant on home detention and the sheriffs authority to place a defendant on home detention. In effect, the court ordered that Schell not be placed on home detention notwithstanding the sheriffs decision to place Schell on home detention. It was impossible to follow the instructions of both the sheriff and the trial court. We concluded that this situation required us to consider the doctrine of separation of powers. We held that the court's preclusion of Schell's placement on home monitoring substantially interfered with the sheriffs authority to place prisoners on home monitoring. As a result, the court's order violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Schell, 261 Wis. 2d 841, ¶ 15.
¶ 22. While we made the choice in Schell that the court invaded the sheriffs shared authority, the choice was simply that. We could have as easily concluded that the sheriffs authority unduly burdened or substantially interfered with the court's sentencing authority. However, Schell is written in stone, and I consider this issue no further. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-190, 560 Wis. 2d 246 (1997). But the conflict between the executive and judicial branches that existed in Schell is not present here.
¶ 23. The legislature has given the sheriff the authority to place prisoners on home detention, but with a limitation: The prisoner must agree to being placed on home detention. Thus, the sheriffs authority is not absolute, and whatever other circumstances exist, the sheriff may not place an unwilling prisoner on *705home detention. The legislature has not placed restrictions on prisoner's decisions to withhold consent to home detention. There is nothing a sheriff can do to place an unwilling prisoner on home detention.
¶ 24. Trial courts' authority to make and rescind conditions of probation is broad; it includes "any condition which appears to be reasonable and appropriate." Wis. Stat. § 973.09(l)(a). The power to rescind those conditions is even broader, limited only by the requirement that the court have cause to do so. Section 973.09(3)(a). The legislature has not limited the court's power to those conditions approved by the sheriff.
¶ 25. The appropriate separation of powers inquiry here is, whether the powers of two branches of government overlap, and if they do, whether one branch has unduly burdened or substantially interfered with another branch. Flynn v. Department of Administration, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 546, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998). Galecke does not meet the first requirement, let alone the second. The trial court did nothing to invade the sheriffs authority. It did not order the sheriff to do anything, and its order did not contravene a statutory authority of the sheriff as it did in Schell. Here, the two branches can exercise their given powers free of interference by the other branch. The sheriff had no expectation that he would be able to place Galecke in the home monitoring program if Galecke refused. Though the majority claims that the sheriff has "discretion to determine who participates in the home monitoring system," majority, ¶ 11 n.4, that is not the whole story. The sheriff cannot exercise discretion to force an unwilling prisoner into home detention. A court cannot interfere in discretion that a sheriff lacks. Indeed, by holding that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited the trial court from modifying the conditions of *706Galecke's probation, the majority has concluded that the executive branch may unduly burden and substantially interfere with the judicial branch's authority to modify a probationer's conditions of probation.
¶ 26. Nor do I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court lacked authority to transfer Galecke from the Outagamie County jail to the Portage County jail. As I read the majority's decision, it concludes that the State misconstrues the issue of the trial court's authority to transfer Galecke from the Outag-amie County jail to the Portage County jail as a modification of Galecke's conditions of probation. It is not the State that misconstrues the issue. The majority does not question the trial court's authority to sentence Galecke to jail as a condition of probation.2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(4)(a) clearly gives trial courts that power. But the statute goes further: "The court may also require as a condition of probation that the probationer be confined during the period of the term of probation as the court prescribes, but not to exceed one year." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 27. The majority concludes that the court ordered two sheriffs to do something. The court did no such thing. It prescribed a condition of probation, something Wisconsin trial judges do every day.
¶ 28. This issue is too important to trial courts, sheriffs, and prosecution and defense attorneys to decide without the benefit of briefing as to the meaning of "as the court prescribes" as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4)(a). Does it mean that the trial court *707can sentence a defendant to any county jail? Does the court have inherent authority to sentence to jails outside the county in which the court sits? Are trial courts powerless to do more than sentence criminals to the jail of their county? Is there a difference in trial courts' authority depending on whether they are initially setting conditions of probation or amending conditions of probation? These are important questions that should be answered after briefing. Without adequate briefing, the majority has concluded that trial courts are issuing illegal orders to sheriffs when they order, as a modification of a condition of probation, a probationer to report to the jail of the county where the probationer was sentenced. Without briefing, I cannot join that conclusion. Before I would reach a result of this sort, I would order the parties to brief the issue.
¶ 29. I conclude that the majority's constitutional analysis arrives at an unnecessary conclusion, and that its statutory analysis should be undertaken with the benefit of further briefing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.

 1 recognize that probation is not a sentence. See State Dept. of Corrections v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶ 28, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703. I use the word "sentence" to avoid repeating the more accurate but cumbersome "order a probationer confined to the county jail."