Court Opinion

ID: 9523790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:46:56.031221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:48.064188
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case, which reverses the trial court because it failed in the giving of instructions on the essential elements of attempted murder. The trial court should be affirmed because the defendant failed to preserve any error by not objecting to the giving of the instructions and the instructions that were given were not so inadequate as to constitute fundamental error.
The defendant concedes that as a general proposition, any error in the instructions *362which are read to a jury is waived by the failure to make a timely objection. Jacks v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 611, 394 N.E.2d 166. It is also the law, as the majority and the State point out, that all instructions are to be read together and construed as a whole. Green v. State, (1982) Ind., 488 N.E.2d 266, 268.
It is necessary to set out the instructions which, when considered as a whole, list the elements of attempted murder. First, the trial court gave the following as final instruction No. 1:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: This is a criminal prosecution commenced by the filing of an Information charging Attempt, Class A Felony, against defendant Dell Ray Smith a/k/a Dell Ray Watford. The essential parts of said Information are in substance as follows, to-wit:
Vanessa Frison, being duly sworn upon her oath, says that:
On or about the 31st day of July, 1980, in St. Joseph County, State of Indiana, Dell Ray Smith a/k/a Dell Ray Watford did attempt to commit the crime of murder by knowingly striking, cutting, and stabbing at and against the body of Vanessa Frison with a knife, then and there held in the hand of the said Dell Ray Smith a/k/a Dell Ray Watford with the intent to kill the said Vanessa Fri-son and did thereby cause serious bodily injury to the said Vanessa Frison, which conduct constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the said crime of Murder.
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to-wit: Ind.Code 85-41-5-1 and Indiana Code 35-42-1-1(1), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the said Information, and under the issues thus joined, the burden is upon the State of Indiana to prove all the material allegations of the Information beyond a reasonable doubt. (emphasis added)
It also gave final instruction No. 5 which reads as follows:
I instruct you that on the 31st day of July, 1980, there was in full force and effect in the State of Indiana the following Statutes, the pertinent parts of which are as follows, to-wit:
35-41-5-1. Attempt. (a) A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of the same class as the crime attempted. However, an attempt to commit murder is a Class A felony. 35-42-1-1. Murder. A person who (1) Knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.
The defendant tendered his instruction No. 4, which was given as final instruction No. 9:
Statutes of this State were in effect on July 31, 1980, which defined the basis for eriminal liability, Among those statutes are the following:
A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct in violation of the statute defining the offense. Culpability.-
(a) A person engages in conduct "intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.
(b) A person engages in conduct "knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
(c) A person engages in conduct "recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.
(d) Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct.
*363The trial court further gave final instruction No. 6 which stated: "Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death." The jury was thus informed of the statutory elements of murder and attempt. The court told the jury what the charges were against this defendant and further advised the jury the burden was upon the State to prove all the material allegations of the information beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was told a person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct in violation of the statute defining the offense and were given definitions of "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly." The jury therefore had all of these instructions before it in addition to the one given as final instruction No. 7, which told them the State must prove the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of murder. It might have been better if the trial court had stated that this was one of the essential elements of the crime of attempted murder rather than stating generally that the essential elements of the crime of attempted murder were as the instruction stated, This was not, however, a shortcoming which amounted to fundamental error. A full understanding of the law necessary for the resolution of the issues was given to the jury and instruction No. 7, along with the other instructions, completely informed the jury about the essential elements of attempted murder.
Defendant's failure to object in any manner to the instructions given by the court, thereby denying the trial judge an opportunity to correct instruction No. 7, amounted to a waiver and no issue of reversible error is therefore presented to this Court. When taken in their entirety, the instructions correctly inform the jury as to the essential elements of attempted murder. I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs.