Court Opinion

ID: 9852227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:48.971288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.415855
License: Public Domain

Sears, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
My review of the record leads me to conclude that the Caveators failed to offer sufficient evidence to overcome the Propounder’s motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial. Therefore, I believe that the trial court erred in denying those motions, and I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance in this case.
The evidence of record shows that the Propounder and Cook were married for 53 years, and that Cook was well known in the Griffin community as a very strong-willed, independent, and sometimes overbearing individual. In February 1998, Cook suffered a stroke *190that required his hospitalization for several months. In August 1998, Cook changed the terms of his will to make a more generous bequest to the Propounder, his wife, than he had previously devised, and to make a less generous bequest to the Caveators, his children by a former marriage, than he had previously devised. Cook died in January 1999, approximately five months after executing his new will.
The record shows that the stroke’s impact upon Cook was primarily physical, as it left him confined to a wheelchair and made it difficult for him to perform certain physical tasks. As a result of his physical impairment, Cook suffered some depression, for which he was prescribed standard anti-depressant medication. The record does not show, however, that Cook suffered any mental impairment as a result of his stroke. In fact, Cook’s personal physician testified that Cook’s mental acuity was unimpaired by the stroke, and that the stroke caused no change whatsoever in Cook’s mental abilities. Other witnesses’ testimony established that even after his stroke, Cook remained firmly in control of his affairs, and (to quote one witness) continued to “rule the roost” at his home and in his business affairs.
This evidence is consistent with the testimony of those who witnessed Cook execute his new will. One witness to the will testified that he had known Cook for more than 40 years, and that before executing the will, Cook read its terms aloud and stated, “that’s what I want.” Another witness to the will testified that she had known Cook “for a long time,” that he was clearly of sound mind when he executed the will, and that he did so voluntarily. Similarly, the attorney who drafted Cook’s new will testified that he had known Cook for more than 40 years, and that when he met with Cook to discuss the terms of the new will, Cook explained to him that the Propounder had been his wife for 53 years and was entitled to a more generous bequest than the Caveators were entitled to receive.1
Because the right to make a will is extremely valuable, a high standard must be applied in order to deprive a testator of that right.2 Undue influence upon a testator can be found to exist only if such influence constrained “a person into doing that which his [or her] best judgment tells him not to do and deprives him of his free agency and substitutes the will of another person for his own.”3 Stated differently, undue influence must be tantamount “either to deception or to *191force and coercion, destroying free agency.”4 Undue influence can invalidate a will only if it operates on the mind of the testator at the time he executes the document.5 Evidence of undue influence over the mind of a testator at any other time is largely irrelevant and cannot invalidate a will.6 Moreover, this Court has long held that “the indulgence of [the] mere suspicion of undue influence cannot be allowed”7 to supplant direct evidence on the issue.8
In this appeal, the Caveators based their claim of undue influence upon: (1) speculation that the Propounder had attempted to influence Cook to change his will against his own wishes; and (2) the presumption that the Propounder’s spousal relationship with Cook allowed her to exert such influence. Not only are these insufficient grounds for a claim of undue influence, the record is void of any evidence to show that the Propounder actually exerted undue influence over Cook at the time he executed his new will.
The Caveators’ chief witnesses were two medical experts who testified that they had reviewed Cook’s medical records and theorized that an individual such as Cook, who was suffering from certain physical ailments, might have experienced some delusion as a result of those ailments. However, the record shows that these experts had never examined Cook and had never even met Cook before his death. Rather, their testimony was based entirely upon Cook’s medical records, which were created several months before the new will was executed. As such, this evidence was irrelevant to the issue of whether Cook was under undue influence at the time he executed the new will.9 As noted above, evidence concerning one’s susceptibility to undue influence at any time that is remote to the execution of a will has no bearing on whether the will should be invalidated.10
Two witnesses also testified on behalf of the Caveators that they overheard the Propounder tell Cook that he should change his will to benefit her, and one of those witnesses testified that he overheard an argument between Cook and the Propounder concerning whether Cook should change his will. However, this evidence does not support the conclusion that Cook changed his will due to the Propounder’s undue influence. Nothing in our case law stood to prevent the Pro-pounder - who was, after all, Cook’s wife - from discussing the terms *192of Cook’s will with him.11 In fact, Georgia law permitted the Pro-pounder to exercise her influence in order to seek a beneficial bequest from Cook,12 so long as Cook was able to choose between following his original testamentary intentions or acceding to the wishes of Propounder.13 As explained above, the evidence in this case shows that Cook was capable of making that choice at the time he executed his new will.
As noted in a preeminent treatise on Georgia law, it is entirely permissible for spouses to make entreaties to one another with regard to the dispositions of their respective wills:
The relation of a husband to his wife with whom he has lived many years is such that undue influence is difficult to conceive even where the greatest persuasion and importunity have been exercised . . . [and] the mere fact that the second wife is made a large beneficiary or the sole beneficiary to the exclusion of the children of the former marriage does not raise the presumption of undue influence.14
This Court has previously recognized that spouses may consult each other with regard to their respective wills,15 and even attempt to influence one another with regard to the dispositions made therein.16 As stated by this Court more than a century and a half ago:
With respect to a will alleged to have been obtained by undue influence . . . it is not unlawful for a person, by honest intercession and persuasion, to procure a will in favor of himself or another; neither is it, to induce the testator, by fair and flattering speeches; for though persuasion may be employed to induce the dispositions in a will, this does not amount to influence in the legal sense. If a wife . . . has gained such an ascendancy over her husband, and so rivaled his affections that her good pleasure is a law to him, such an influence can never be a reason for impeaching a will made *193in her favor, even to the exclusion of the residue of his family. Nor would it be safe to set aside a will, on the ground of [undue] influence . . . [or] advantage taken of the testator by his wife, although it should be proved that she possessed a powerful influence over his mind and conduct in the general concerns of life.17
Decided July 16, 2001
Reconsideration denied September 17, 2001.
Stated in more contemporary terms, it is permissible for spouses to discuss their wills with each other, to state their opinions regarding each other’s testamentary dispositions, and to seek favorable bequests from each other. Spouses can influence each other with regard to important issues such as estate planning and testamentary dispositions. To characterize that influence as “undue” is contrary not only to well-established precedent from this Court, but also to sound public policy.
In conclusion, I believe that the majority opinion gives undue credence to the speculation upon which the Caveators’ claims are based.181 also believe that the evidence submitted by the Caveators fails to show that the Propounder used deception, force or coercion in order to destroy Cook’s free agency, thereby procuring a will by undue influence.19 In fact, the Caveators’ evidence is largely irrelevant to the issue of whether Cook was under undue influence at the time he executed his new will.20 Finally, I believe that the majority errs by failing to view this case in the context of a spousal relationship.21 Once this appeal is viewed within the proper context and according to this Court’s own directives concerning the burden that must be carried to establish the existence of undue influence, it is clear that Propounder was entitled to either a directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent, and I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.
*194Howard P. Wallace, for appellant.
Shepherd & Johnston, William G. Johnston III, for appellees.

 The record shows that Cook first told the attorney that he did not want the Caveators to receive “a damn thing” under his new will, and then stated that he would leave each Caveator a $5,000 bequest, and that Propounder, who “deserved everything,” would receive remainder of his @stsit6

 Brooks v. Julian, 271 Ga. 766 (523 SE2d 862) (1999); Bohlen v. Spears, 270 Ga. 322, 324 (509 SE2d 628) (1998).

 Bohlen, supra; see Brooks, supra.

 Cook v. Washington, 166 Ga. 329, 348 (143 SE 409) (1928).

 Bohlen, supra; see Brooks, supra; Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 329 (12 SE2d 319) (1940).

 McConnell v. Moore, 267 Ga. 839, 841 (483 SE2d 578) (1997).

 McConnell, 267 Ga. at 841; Dean v. Morsman, 254 Ga. 169, 173 (327 SE2d 212) (1985).

 Brooks, supra.

 See Brooks, supra; Bohlen, supra.

 McConnell, 267 Ga. at 841.

 Furthermore, if it is true that Cook argued with the Propounder about the terms of his will, that very fact would tend to belie the Caveators’ claim that Cook was mentally incapacitated and capable of being forced to change his will against his own wishes.

 Redfeam, Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 50, p. 59 (5th ed.).

 Morgan v. Ivey, 222 Ga. 850, 852 (152 SE2d 833) (1967).

 Redfeam, supra, § 60, pp. 115-116. See Mosley v. Fears, 135 Ga. 71 (68 SE 804) (1910).

 Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 329 (12 SE2d 319) (1940) (“It is entirely proper that husbands and wives should consult each other and endeavor to meet each other’s wishes in the making of their wills”). See Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ivey, 178 Ga. 629, 641 (173 SE 648) (1934).

 Boland, supra.

 Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 (1849).

 See McConnell, supra.

 See Cook, supra.

 See McConnell, supra.

 See Redfearn, supra; Potts, supra.