Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:54.707724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.638655
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1618

                                  CHRISTINE KELLEY,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                           NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                        ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
                          THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Margaret  J.  Palladino,   with  whom  Tamara  E.  Goulston,   and
            _______________________                ____________________
        Sherburne,  Powers  & Needham,  P.C.,  were on  brief  for petitioner,
        ____________________________________
        appellant.
            Christopher W. Young, Attorney, with whom Frederick L.  Feinstein,
            ____________________                      _______________________
        General  Counsel,  Frederick C.  Havard,  Supervisory  Attorney, Linda
                           ____________________                          _____
        Sher,  Associate  General Counsel,  and  Aileen  A. Armstrong,  Deputy
        ____                                     ____________________
        Associate  General Counsel,  National Labor  Relations Board,  were on
        brief for respondent, appellee.
            Jay  M. Presser, Audrey  J. Samit,  and Skoler,  Abbott & Presser,
            _______________  _________________      __________________________
        P.C., on  brief  for intervenor,  appellee Dun  & Bradstreet  Software
        ____
        Services, Inc. 

                                 ____________________

                                    March 26, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.  This appeal concerns
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            the requirements  for  filing unfair  labor practice  charges

            with   the   National   Labor  Relations   Board   ("Board").

            Plaintiff-appellant Christine Kelley ("Kelley")  seeks review

            of  a  Board  order  dismissing  her  unfair  labor  practice

            complaint  against  intervenor-appellee   Dun  &   Bradstreet

            Software ("DBS"),  her former employer.   The Board dismissed

            Kelley's  complaint for failure to serve a copy of the charge

            underlying the  complaint  within the  six-month time  period

            prescribed by  section 10(b) of the  National Labor Relations

            Act  ("Act"),  29 U.S.C.    160(b).    We affirm  the Board's

            decision.  Jurisdiction stems from 29 U.S.C.   160(f).

                                          I.
                                          I.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      DBS, a company which develops  and markets computer

            software, employed Kelley  at its Framingham,  Massachusetts,

            facility until April  1993.   On April 12,  1993, Kelley  was

            terminated from her  sales representative position.   Shortly

            after her termination, Kelley  retained counsel to  represent

            her  in an unlawful termination suit against DBS.  Kelley, by

            her counsel, sent an August 30, 1993, letter to DBS alleging,

            inter  alia, that  it terminated her  because she  engaged in
            _____  ____

            concerted activities  with  other employees  to dissuade  DBS

            from changing its food service provider.  The letter demanded

            a $120,000.00 settlement,  stating that the  settlement offer

                                         -2-
                                          2

            would  be withdrawn if DBS failed to respond by September 17,

            1993.  It also notified DBS of Kelly's intent to pursue legal

            remedies in the event of failed negotiations.  

                      After postponing,  at DBS's  request,  the date  by

            which a  response to the  settlement offer was  due, Kelley's

            attorney  contacted DBS  regarding  the  initiation of  legal

            proceedings  against it.    On September  27, 1993,  Kelley's

            attorney  informed  DBS   that  she   would  commence   legal

            proceedings to ensure that Kelley complied with the six-month

            statute  of limitations  prescribed by  section 10(b)  of the

            Act.   On October  1, 1993, Kelley's  attorney discussed  the

            procedures for filing unfair  labor practice charges with the

            Board information officer for Region 1 and specifically asked

            whether her  client was  responsible for  serving DBS  with a

            copy of the charge filed against it.  The information officer

            informed  her that the regional  office would mail the charge

            to DBS.  

                      On October  6, 1993,  Kelley filed an  unfair labor

            practice charge  with the Board's regional office, contending

            that  DBS terminated her  in violation of  section 8(a)(1) of

            the  Act, 29  U.S.C.    158(a)(1), which  makes it  an unfair

            labor practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain, or

            coerce employees in the exercise  of the rights guaranteed by

            [the Act]."  29 U.S.C.    158(a)(1).  Neither Kelley  nor her

            attorney served or attempted to serve  DBS with a copy of the

                                         -3-
                                          3

            charge.  And due to personnel changes in the regional office,

            the Board did not mail DBS a copy of the charge until October

            13, 1993, one day after  the six-month statute of limitations

            prescribed by  the Act  elapsed.   An  amended charge,  which

            appellant filed on  July 7, 1994, was  served on DBS  July 8,

            1994.  See  Truck Drivers & Helpers  Union v. NLRB, 993  F.2d
                   ___  ______________________________________

            990, 1000 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993)("A complaint based on a timely

            filed  charge may be amended to include other allegations . .

            . .").

                      Despite the untimely service of the initial charge,

            the Board's General Counsel issued a complaint against DBS on

            July 20, 1994.  See id.  The complaint, which was accompanied
                            ___ ___

            by  notice of  a  November 7,  1994,  hearing on  the  claims

            brought  against  DBS,  alleged  that   Kelley's  termination

            violated  section 8(a)(1)  of  the Act.     Pursuant  to  the

            Board's complaint, DBS filed an answer admitting in part, and

            denying in  part, the  complaint allegations and  raising the

            affirmative defense that Kelley's action was time-barred.  On

            October 5, 1994, DBS  filed a joint Motion  to Dismiss and  a

            Motion for Summary Judgment  with the Board, maintaining that

            Kelley's complaint should be dismissed because the underlying

            charge,  though timely  filed, was served  one day  after the

            six-month limitations  period  established by  statute.    On

            October  17, 1994, both the General  Counsel and Kelley filed

            briefs  opposing  DBS's motion,  contending  that the  demand

                                         -4-
                                          4

            letter sent to DBS  provided actual notice of the  charge and

            that  section 10(b)  should  be equitably  tolled because  of

            DBS's  delay  in  responding  to the  settlement  demand  and

            Kelley's reliance on  the information officer's  statement of

            Board  procedure.   DBS filed  a reply  brief on  October 21,

            1994.  

                      On  October 31,  1994,  the Board  issued an  order

            transferring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to Show

            Cause why DBS's motion should  not be granted.  On April  27,

            1995,  a  three-member  panel  of the  Board  concluded  that

            Kelley's complaint should be dismissed for failure to serve a

            copy of the charge within  the six-month period section 10(b)

            prescribes.  Emphasizing the statutory policy against holding

            respondents liable for conduct occurring more than six months

            earlier,  the   Board  found  that  there   are  "no  special

            circumstances  present  in this  case  that  would warrant  a

            conclusion   that  the  statutory   service  requirement  was

            satisfied."   It  noted that  neither Kelley nor  the General

            Counsel  alleged  that  DBS  attempted to  evade  service  or

            fraudulently  conceal  the  operative  facts  underlying  the

            alleged violation.  See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861
                                ___ ________________________________

            F.2d  746, 752  (1st Cir.  1988).   It also  noted that  both

            section 10(b)  and section  102.14 of  the Board's  Rules and

            Regulations, 29 C.F.R.   102.14, place primary responsibility

            for  effectuating  timely  service  on  the  charging  party,

                                         -5-
                                          5

            rejecting claims  that the  statute should be  tolled because

            Kelley detrimentally relied on the Board employee's statement

            of procedure.  

                                         II.
                                         II.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                      We  are faced with two issues on appeal.  The first

            involves section 10(b)'s charge-content requirements and asks

            us  to consider  whether a  demand letter  mailed to  a party

            within  the statute  of  limitations period  provides  actual

            notice  within  the meaning  of the  Act.   The  second issue

            concerns the  circumstances under which  equitable principles

            may  appropriately  be  employed   to  toll  section  10(b)'s

            limitations  period.   Appellant argues  that the  August 30,

            1993, settlement  letter sent  to DBS provided  actual notice

            within the meaning of  the Act and, in the  alternative, that

            her reliance  on the  Board employee's information  and DBS's

            delay in  responding to her settlement  offer warrant tolling

            of the statute.  

                      Both the Board and DBS, as intervenor, contend that

            the Board correctly dismissed  Kelley's claim as time-barred.

            They  assert  that  Kelley  did not  effectuate  constructive

            service  within the  meaning  of the  Act  and maintain  that

            neither DBS's conduct nor  the misinformation provided by the

            Board  employee  and  detrimentally  relied  upon  by  Kelley

                                         -6-
                                          6

            warrant tolling of the statute.  It is well-established that,

            absent  special circumstances, unfair  labor practice charges

            must be both  filed and  served within six  months after  the

            date of the alleged  statutory violation.  See NLRB  v. Local
                                                       ___ ______________

            264, Laborers' Int'l  Union of N. Am., 529 F.2d 778, 783 (8th
            _____________________________________

            Cir. 1976); see also  NLRB v. Warrensburg Bd. &  Paper Corp.,
                        ___ ____  ______________________________________

            340 F.2d 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1965)("Only proof of extraordinary

            circumstances  will cause  the reviewing  court to  find that

            strict  compliance  with  the  Board's  regulations  was  not

            required.").  

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                      When  reviewing unfair  labor  practice orders,  we

            review  the  Board's  interpretation   of  the  Act  and  its

            requirements for a "'reasonably defensible construction'" and

            review the Board's application of its rules "'for rationality

            and consistency with  the Act.'" NLRB v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co.,
                                             ___________________________

            909 F.2d 963, 971 n.10  (7th Cir. 1990)(citing cases),  cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied sub nom. Clipper City Lodge No. 516 v. NLRB, 498  U.S.
            ______ ___ ___  __________________________________

            1083 (1991); see also  Truck Drivers, 993 F.2d at 995.  While
                         ___ ____  _____________

            "we will not  'rubber stamp'" Board decisions, NLRB  v. Int'l
                                                           ______________

            Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 952, 758 F.2d 436, 439 (9th Cir.
            ________________________________

            1985),  we "must  enforce  the  Board's  order if  the  Board

            correctly applied the law and if the Board's findings of fact

            are  supported by  substantial  evidence on  the record  as a

            whole."  Penntech Papers, Inc. v.  NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22 (1st
                     ______________________________

                                         -7-
                                          7

            Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)(citing cases); Union
                   _____ ______                                     _____

            Builders, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995); see
            ______________________                                    ___

            also 29  U.S.C.    160(f)("[T]he findings  of the  Board with
            ____

            respect  to questions  of  fact if  supported by  substantial

            evidence  on the record considered  as a whole  shall in like

            manner  be conclusive.").  Absent a  finding that the Board's

            application of section  102.14 was "so arbitrary as to defeat

            justice," we are  obligated, by  the deference  traditionally

            accorded the  Board and  its rules  and  regulations, not  to

            disturb the Board's decision.   Father & Sons Lumber  & Bldg.
                                            _____________________________

            Supplies  v. NLRB, 931 F.2d  1093, 1096 (6th  Cir. 1991); see
            _________________                                         ___

            NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484
            ________________________________________________________

            U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Strickland v. Maine Dep't of Health and
                                  _______________________________________

            Human  Services, 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116
            _______________                             _____ ______

            S. Ct. 145 (1995). 

                    Enactment and Administration of Section 10(b)
                    Enactment and Administration of Section 10(b)
                    _____________________________________________

                      Section 10(b)  operates as an  ordinary statute  of

            limitations, subject  to recognized equitable  doctrines, and

            not as a  jurisdictional restriction.   Zipes v. Trans  World
                                                    _____________________

            Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.  385, 395 n.11 (1982)(citing cases);
            ______________

            see NLRB v.  Crafts Precision  Indus., Inc., 16  F.3d 24,  26
            ___ _______________________________________

            (1st  Cir.  1994); NLRB  v.  Silver Bakery,  Inc.  of Newton,
                               __________________________________________

            Massachusetts,  351  F.2d 37,  39  (1st  Cir. 1965).    First
            _____________

            enacted as part  of the Wagner Act, Act of  July 5, 1935, ch.

            372, 49 Stat. 449  (1935), without a specific time  limit for

                                         -8-
                                          8

            filing  and serving  charges, the  section 10(b)  proviso was

            amended  to include  a  six-month statute  of limitations  in

            1947.  Laborer's Int'l  Union, 529 F.2d at 781-85;  see Taft-
                   ______________________                       ___

            Hartley Act Amendments,  Act of  June 23, 1947,  ch. 120,  61

            Stat. 136.  In pertinent part, section 10(b) provides:

                      Whenever  it is  charged that  any person
                      has engaged in or is engaging in any such
                      unfair  labor practice, the Board, or any
                      agent or  agency designated by  the Board
                      for  such purposes,  shall have  power to
                      issue and  cause to  be served upon  such
                      person a complaint stating the charges in
                      that respect, and containing a  notice of
                      hearing  before the  Board  or  a  member
                      thereof, or before  a designated agent or
                      agency, at  a  place therein  fixed,  not
                      less than five days after  the serving of
                      said  complaint:     Provided,  That   no
                                           ________
                      complaint  shall  issue  based  upon  any
                      unfair labor practice occurring more than
                      six  months prior  to  the filing  of the
                      charge with the Board  and the service of
                      a  copy thereof  upon the  person against
                      whom such charge is made 
                      . . . .

            29  U.S.C.   160(b).   Congress added the  time limitation to

            discourage dilatory  filing of unfair labor  practice charges

            and to "bar  litigation over past events  'after records have

            been   destroyed,   witnesses   have  gone   elsewhere,   and

            recollections  of the events in  question have become dim and

            confused .  . . .'"  Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
                                 ________________________________________

            NLRB,  362 U.S.  411, 419  (1960)(quoting H.R. Rep.  No. 245,
            ____

            80th  Cong., 1st Sess. 40); see Silver Bakery, Inc., 351 F.2d
                                        ___ ___________________

            at 39.  Under current law, the section 10(b) period begins to

            run when the "aggrieved individual  has actual notice that an

                                         -9-
                                          9

            unfair labor practice has been committed."   Esmarck, Inc. v.
                                                         ________________

            NLRB,  887 F.2d  739,  745  (7th  Cir.  1989).    An  adverse
            ____

            employment decision provides such notice.  Id. at 745-46.    
                                                       ___

                      Congress entrusted the Board with  broad discretion

            for  interpreting  the  Act  and  adjudicating  unfair  labor

            practice claims.  See generally Commercial Workers Union, 484
                              _____________ ________________________

            U.S.  at 118-22; NLRB v.  Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.,  396 U.S. 258,
                             ____________________________

            262-63  (1969).   To effectuate  the purposes of  the section

            10(b) proviso, the  Board has promulgated  a series of  rules

            and  regulations.   See  29 C.F.R.  ch.  I, pt.  102  (7-1-95
                                ___

            Edition); see also  29 U.S.C.    156 ("The  Board shall  have
                      ___ ____

            authority . . .  to make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules

            and regulations as may be  necessary . . . .").   Chief among

            these is section 102.14, which provides: 

                      Upon  filing  of a  charge,  the charging
                      party shall be responsible for the timely
                      and proper service of a copy thereof upon
                      the  person against  whom such  charge is
                      made.  The  regional director will,  as a
                      matter of course,  cause a  copy of  such
                      charge  to  be  served  upon  the  person
                      against  whom the charge  is made, but he
                      shall   not   be    deemed   to    assume
                      responsibility for such service.

            29  C.F.R.     102.14 (1995);  see  also  29  C.F.R.    101.4
                                           ___  ____

            (1995)(investigation of charges)("[T]imely  service of a copy

            of the charge .  . . is  the exclusive responsibility of  the

            charging  party and not  of the Regional  Director.").  Under

            section  102.14,  charging  parties  such as  appellant  bear

                                         -10-
                                          10

            primary responsibility for  service of unfair labor  practice

            charges.   While standard  Board operating procedure dictates

            that regional  offices serve charged  parties with a  copy of

            the  charge  filed against  them,  charging  parties such  as

            Kelley must  ultimately ensure  timely service.   Charges are

            timely if mailed or  personally served within the limitations

            period.    See  29 C.F.R.     102.113(a);  see  also West  v.
                       ___                             ___  ____ ________

            Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38 n.3 (1987).  
            _______

                      In  light of  the 1947  amendments made  to section

            10(b) and Congress's intent to place practical time limits on

            the  investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices,

            Laborer's  Int'l Union,  529  F.2d at  782-83,  we hold  that
            ______________________

            section 102.14 is both a rational and reasonable exercise  of

            the  Board's discretion  and rulemaking  authority.   Section

            102.14  comports   with  the  congressional   policy  against

            subjecting  charged parties  to suits  brought more  than six

            months  after  the  occurrence  of an  alleged  unfair  labor

            practice.   We do not  think it unreasonable,  given this and

            the Board's rather liberal  construction of the section 10(b)

            proviso,  to place  the  ultimate  responsibility for  timely

            service  on the shoulders of  the party who  sets the Board's

            adjudicatory procedures  in motion.  See NLRB  v. Wiltse, 188
                                                 ___ _______________

            F.2d 917, 926  (6th Cir.),  cert. denied sub  nom. Ann  Arbor
                                        _____ ______ ___  ____ __________

            Press v. NLRB, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
            _____________

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      Because we find that section 102.14 is a reasonable

            exercise  of the Board's  authority, appellant's  request for

            relief may  only be  granted if  appellant complied  with the

            statute by  providing  constructive  service  of  her  charge

            within the section 10(b) period  or the circumstances of this

            case are such that an application of equitable  principles is

            warranted.  We  now consider  whether, on the  facts of  this

            case, either ground for tolling the statute exists.   

                Actual Notice and Section 10(b)'s Service Requirement
                Actual Notice and Section 10(b)'s Service Requirement
                _____________________________________________________

                      Appellant  maintains that  she  complied  with  the

            spirit,  if  not  the  letter,  of  section  10(b)'s  service

            requirement  and  that   the  Board,  therefore,  erroneously

            dismissed her complaint.  More specifically, she asserts that

            the August 30,  1993, demand letter provided  DBS with actual

            notice of the  charges against it.   Both the  Board and  DBS

            reject this contention.  

                      The  basic  proposition  that  actual  notice  of a

            charge may, in certain circumstances, satisfy section 10(b)'s

            requirements is undisputed.  See Hospital & Service Employees
                                         ___ ____________________________

            Union v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1986).  Congress
            _____________

            did  not intend unfair labor  practice charges to  be held to

            the  same "standards  applicable to a  pleading in  a private

            lawsuit."   NLRB  v.  Fant Milling  Co.,  360 U.S.  301,  307
                        ___________________________

            (1959).   The purpose  of  a charge  is  to set  the  Board's

            investigative  machinery in  motion,  not to  provide a  full

                                         -12-
                                          12

            explication of the allegations leveled against  a party.  Id.
                                                                      ___

            Charges  are generally recorded  on a blank  form provided by

            the Board's  regional office, see  29 C.F.R.    101.2 (1995),
                                          ___

            and function  primarily as  a mechanism for  extracting early

            and concise statements  of the positions held  by the charged

            and charging  parties. See Service Employees  Union, 798 F.2d
                                   ___ ________________________

            at 1249; 29  C.F.R.   101.4.  Complaints,  on the other hand,

            are  designed  to  give  notice  of  the  substantive  issues

            underlying a  charge.  Service  Employees Union, 798  F.2d at
                                   ________________________

            1249; see 29 C.F.R.   102.15 (1995).  
                  ___

                      Nonetheless, we  are not at all  persuaded that the

            August  30,  1993,  demand letter  satisfies  section 10(b)'s

            service  requirements.  First, despite appellant's assertions

            to the contrary,  it is  not settled that  charge filing  and

            service  may  be  accomplished  by  two  different  documents

            containing  similar information.   The Board's  Statements of

            Procedures and Rules and Regulations clearly require  service

            with  a copy  of the  charge actually  filed with  the Board.

            See,  e.g.,   29  C.F.R.      101.4,   102.14.    Appellant's
            ___   ____

            observation that the Board's  Statements of Procedures do not

            require charges to be filed on a specific form has no bearing

            on this.   See 29 C.F.R.   101.2.   But even if service could
                       ___

            be  accomplished with  a charge  which differs  from the  one

            filed  with  the Board,  we find  that  the August  30, 1993,

                                         -13-
                                          13

            demand  letter  lacks the  specificity typically  required of

            charges brought pursuant to the Act.  

                      The  August 30,  1993,  letter advances  a host  of

            claims against  DBS, which  include  unfair labor  practices,

            gender discrimination, and violation of the Federal Equal Pay

            Act,  29 U.S.C.   206(d)(1), the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42

            U.S.C.   2000e  et seq., and  the Massachusetts Equal  Rights
                            __ ____

            Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93,    102, 103.  It does not focus on

            the section 8(a)(1) violation and, thus, does not comply with

            the  Board's requirement  that charges  provide a  "clear and

            concise statement  of  the  facts  constituting  the  alleged

            unfair  labor practices  affecting  commerce."   29 C.F.R.   

            102.12  (1995).  Moreover, it did not, as the Board correctly

            notes, provide notice  that a charge was  actually filed with

            the Board.   Because the letter was  mailed more than a month

            before appellant filed  her charge, it  only notified DBS  of

            the possibility that a charge would be filed.  Compare Bihler
                                                           _______ ______

            v. Singer Co., 710  F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983)(letter  discussing
            _____________

            possibility  of legal action not  an EEOC charge).   This, we

            think, falls short of what section 10(b) contemplates. 

                      The Ninth Circuit's decision  in Hospital & Service
                                                       __________________

            Employees  Union  v. NLRB,  798  F.2d 1245  (9th  Cir. 1986),
            _________________________

            provides  no leverage  for appellant's  position.   While the

            Ninth Circuit  did hold that actual  notice satisfies section

            10(b)'s service  requirements, 798  F.2d at 1249,  it reached

                                         -14-
                                          14

            that  conclusion  on the  basis of  a  set of  facts entirely

            different from  the one with which we are now presented.  The

            court  disregarded  the  fact  that the  charges  were  never

            received by  the employer in that case  because the complaint

            was both  issued and served within  the six-month limitations

            period and there was  no claim of prejudice to  the employer.

            Id. at 1249.  In contrast, both the charge and the  complaint
            ___

            in this  case  were issued  after  the section  10(b)  period

            elapsed.   Additionally,  the employer  in Service  Employees
                                                       __________________

            Union, after  hearing from an unofficial  source that charges
            _____

            had been  filed, contacted the Board  about the investigation

            into its  employment practices within the limitations period.

            Unlike  DBS,   which  did  not  formally   learn  that  Board

            proceedings  had been  initiated against  it until  after the

            six-month period prescribed by the Act had run, that employer

            received actual notice within the meaning of section 10(b). 

                      For  the reasons  just stated,  the other  cases on

            which appellant  seeks to rest  her argument, Buckeye  Mold &
                                                          _______________

            Die Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1990), and Freightway Corp. and
            _________                                ____________________

            Kaplan  Enter.,  Inc.,  299  N.L.R.B. 531  (1990),  are  also
            _____________________

            inapposite.  Buckeye, a case decided by the Board, explicitly
                         _______

            adopts  the  Ninth Circuit's  reasoning in  Service Employees
                                                        _________________

            Union.   Buckeye, 299 N.L.R.B. at 1053.  Accordingly, it does
            _____    _______

            not  reach cases in which  the charge and  complaint are both

            filed  and  served outside  of  the limitations  period.   It

                                         -15-
                                          15

            stands for the narrow holding that noncompliance with section

            10(b)'s requirements for charge filing can be cured by timely

            service  of  a  complaint.   Id.    Appellant's  reliance  on
                                         ___

            Freightway also falls short of the mark.  That case held that
            __________

            service  of  an   unsigned  copy  of  a   charge  within  the

            limitations  period  satisfies  the statute  because  section

            10(b) neither requires  that the original signed charge nor a

            signed copy of  that charge  be mailed to  the party  against

            whom the  allegations were made.  Freightway, 299 N.L.R.B. at
                                              __________

            531.    It does  not,  however, address  whether  service and

            filing can be accomplished by different original documents or

            what the contents of each document should be.  

                      That Kelley's charge was  served only one day after

            the section 10(b)  deadline makes this a hard case.   DBS was

            not  seriously  prejudiced   by  Kelley's  untimely  service.

            Nevertheless, we are unwilling to stretch  existing precedent

            to  find that  DBS  had actual  notice  of the  charge  filed

            against  it when  appellant  has failed  to  comply with  the

            requirements  for  charge content  and  has  not cleared  the

            hurdle of  demonstrating that either her  charge or complaint

            was  filed  within  the  limitations  period.    The  Board's

            conclusion that appellant did not comply with section 10(b)'s

            service requirements,  in spirit  or letter, is  supported by

            the  record.   See Simon v.  Kroger Co., 743  F.2d 1544, 1546
                           ___ ____________________

            (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1075 (1985)("We find
                              _____ ______

                                         -16-
                                          16

            that the intent, spirit, and plain  language of section 10(b)

            require  that a complaint be both filed and served within the

            six month limitations period.").  
                                              

                  Equitable Estoppel And Tolling Under Section 10(b)
                  Equitable Estoppel And Tolling Under Section 10(b)
                  __________________________________________________

                      Section  10(b)'s statute  of limitations  period is

            subject to  equitable modification.   Zipes, 455 U.S.  at 395
                                                  _____

            n.11.  Two alternate,  though closely related, doctrines have

            been  developed to  resolve  the relatively  small number  of

            cases  in   which  equitable  modification   is  appropriate:

            equitable estoppel and equitable tolling.   Kale, 861 F.2d at
                                                        ____

            752;  see also Guidry  v. Sheet Metal  Worker's Nat'l Pension
                  ___ ____ ______________________________________________

            Fund, 493 U.S.  365, 376 (1990)("[C]ourts should  be loath to
            ____

            announce  equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or

            prohibitions  that  are  unqualified  by  statutory  text.");

            Earnhardt v.  Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico, 691  F.2d 69,  71
            __________________________________________

            (1st Cir. 1982)("Courts have taken a uniformly narrow view of

            equitable exceptions to . .  . limitations periods.").   They

            are appropriate only to  avoid injustice in particular cases.

            See Heckler v.  Community Health  Services, 467  U.S. 51,  59
            ___ ______________________________________

            (1984);  see also  Cerbone v.  Int'l Ladies  Garment Worker's
                     ___ ____  __________________________________________

            Union, 768 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1985).    
            _____

                      Courts invoke equitable estoppel when a defendant's

            conduct causes  a plaintiff  to delay  bringing an  action or

            pursuing a claim he or  she was entitled to initiate  by law.

            Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g,  Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 61  (2d Cir.
            __________________________________

                                         -17-
                                          17

            1986).   In  the  section 10(b)  context,  it is  most  often

            applied when  a plaintiff's  untimely filing is  caused by  a

            defendant's deceptive  conduct or by  reasonable reliance  on

            the  defendant's  misleading representations  or information.

            See, e.g., Barnard Eng'g Co.,  Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 226 (1989);
            ___  ____  ________________________

            see also Kale,  861 F.2d at  752; Lavery  v. Marsh, 918  F.2d
            ___ ____ ____                     ________________

            1022, 1028 (1st Cir.  1990).  It  is not employed unless  the

            plaintiff  relies  on  his  or her  adversary's  conduct  and

            changes his or  her position  for the worse.   See  Community
                                                           ___  _________

            Health  Services,  467 U.S.  at 59;  see also  Precious Metal
            ________________                     ___ ____  ______________

            Assoc., Inc.  v. Commodity  Futures Trading Comm'n,  620 F.2d
            __________________________________________________

            900, 908 (1st Cir. 1980)(citing Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d
                                            ___________________

            27, 30 (1st Cir. 1945)).  

                      Equitable  tolling,  in  contrast,  encompasses   a

            broader  range  of conduct,  Kale, 861  F.2d  at 752,  and is
                                         ____

            "appropriate  only  when  the  circumstances  that   cause  a

            plaintiff to miss a  filing deadline are out of his  [or her]

            hands."  Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1266 (8th Cir.
                     _____________________

            1990),  cert. denied, 498 U.S.  1026 (1991).   Cases in which
                    _____ ______

            the  equitable tolling  doctrine  is invoked  are most  often

            characterized  by some  affirmative misconduct  by the  party

            against  whom it  is  employed, such  as  an employer  or  an

            administrative  agency.   Id.   Courts  generally weigh  five
                                      ___

            factors in assessing claims  for equitable tolling: "(1) lack

            of  actual  notice of  the  filing requirement;  (2)  lack of

                                         -18-
                                          18

            constructive  knowledge  of   the  filing  requirement;   (3)

            diligence in pursuing one's  rights; (4) absence of prejudice

            to  the defendant;  and (5)  a plaintiff's  reasonableness in

            remaining  ignorant of  the notice  requirement."   Kale, 861
                                                                ____

            F.2d at 752-53 (citing cases).    

                      Appellant  asserts that  grounds for  applying both

            the equitable estoppel and  equitable tolling doctrines exist

            in  this case.  We  find no basis  for appellant's contention

            that equitable estoppel is appropriate because DBS caused the

            delay  in the  filing of her  charge.    In  fact, the record

            makes it  apparent  that the  delay,  with respect  to  DBS's

            conduct at least, was caused by appellant's counsel's attempt

            to obtain  a pre-charge settlement from  DBS.  We  do not, of

            course, disparage settlement strategies  of the sort employed

            by appellant's  counsel.   Prompt disposition of  disputes is

            consistent  with  the  purposes   of  the  Act,  see  Service
                                                             ___  _______

            Employees Union, 798 F.2d  at 1249, and the interests  of our
            _______________

            legal system as a  whole.  But,  having made the decision  to

            pursue  an  early  settlement  with DBS,  appellant,  who  is

            represented  on appeal by  the same counsel  who prepared the

            August 30, 1993, demand letter and who represented her before

            the  Board, cannot  reasonably  expect  us  now to  cure  the

            defects in her settlement strategy.   Though DBS requested an

            extension beyond the September 17, 1993, settlement  deadline

            initially established  by appellant's  counsel,  there is  no

                                         -19-
                                          19

            evidence in the record  that it engaged in  deceptive conduct

            or  unfairly led  appellant to  believe  that it  intended to

            settle.   Compare  Cerbone, 768  F.2d at  48-50 (reliance  on
                      _______  _______

            settlement promise);  Kanakis  Co.,  Inc.,  293  N.L.R.B.  50
                                  ___________________

            (1989)(perjured  testimony by  defendant); see  also Dillman,
                                                       ___  ____ _______

            784  F.2d at 61.  Nothing  precluded appellant's counsel from

            initiating  Board proceedings  against DBS;  she was  free at

            every moment  relevant to  this appeal to  suspend settlement

            negotiations  and  to file  a charge  with  the Board.   That

            appellant's counsel notified DBS,  on September 27, 1993, she

            was withdrawing the settlement offer and taking steps to file

            a charge with the Board highlights this point.  

                      Appellant's position was not  substantially changed

            by the ten-day delay in filing worked by DBS's request for an

            extension of  time.   When appellant's attorney  withdrew the

            settlement offer made  to DBS, more  than two weeks  remained

            within the section 10(b) period, enough time for appellant to

            both file  a charge with the  Board and serve a  copy on DBS.

            Thus,  to the extent that this case  may involve a delay that

            was outside of  appellant's control, we find that  the record

            supports the  Board's conclusion  that it  was not  caused by

            DBS.

                      The contention  that  equitable tolling  should  be

            invoked  against the  Board,  however, presents  a  different

            question.   It  is axiomatic  that "the  grounds  for tolling

                                         -20-
                                          20

            statutes of limitations are more limited in suits against the

            government .  . .  ."   Swietlik v. United  States, 779  F.2d
                                    __________________________

            1306, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985);  see generally Falcone v. Pierce,
                                         ___ _________ _________________

            864 F.2d 226,  228-29 (1st Cir.  1988).  The  main thrust  of

            appellant's equitable tolling argument  is that the blame for

            the  untimely service of her  charge lies with  the Board and

            the  employee who failed to  inform her attorney that section

            102.14 places the ultimate responsibility  for charge service

            on the charging party.  She alleges, in  fact, that the Board

            employee specifically  instructed her attorney  not to  serve

            DBS with a copy of the charge.  

                      Although  we   agree  that  the   Board  employee's

            statement  of  Board  procedure was  incomplete  and  perhaps

            misleading, we do  not agree that the delay at  issue in this

            case can be wholly attributed to  an error on the part of the

            Board.  The record shows that the Board employee neglected to

            call appellant's  attention to  section 102.14, but  does not

            support   appellant's  contention   that   her  counsel   was

            explicitly  prohibited from  serving  DBS  with  the  charge.

            Thus,  to the extent  that the Board  did commit  an error in

            this case, it did not rise to the level of agency error which

            has required  the application  of equitable tolling  in other

            cases.   Compare Page v. U.S.  Indus., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.
                     _______ ____________________

            1977)(EEOC erroneously sent misleading letter), cert. denied,
                                                            _____ ______

            434 U.S. 1045 (1978);  Bracey v. Helene Curtis, 780  F. Supp.
                                   _______________________

                                         -21-
                                          21

            568  (N.D.  Ill. 1982)(EEOC  miscalculation of  filing date);

            Roberts v. Arizona  Bd. of  Regents, 661 F.2d  796 (9th  Cir.
            ___________________________________

            1981)(EEOC affirmatively misconstrued own regulations).   

                      The  emphasis placed  on the allegations  of agency

            error  obscures the fact that appellant fails to meet all but

            one of the equitable  tolling requisites.  Although appellant

            did not receive actual notice of section 102.14, we find that

            she did have constructive notice  of it and its  requirements

            because she was  represented by  counsel at the  time of  the

            delayed service to DBS.  Courts generally impute constructive

            knowledge  of filing  and service requirements  to plaintiffs

            who, like  appellant, consult with an  attorney. See Jacobson
                                                             ___ ________

            v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 565, 569 (D. Minn. 1983);
            _____________________

            see also Lopez v. Citibank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.
            ___ ____ _______________________

            1987); Edwards  v. Kiser Aluminum  & Chem.  Sales, Inc.,  515
                   ________________________________________________

            F.2d  1195,  1200 n.8  (5th  Cir. 1975);  Leite  v. Kennecott
                                                      ___________________

            Copper Corp., 558 F.  Supp. 1170, 1174 (D. Mass.),  aff'd 720
            ____________                                        _____

            F.2d 658  (1st Cir.  1983).   Appellant's  attorney had  full

            access to the  Board's rules and  regulations and could  have

            initiated  service on  DBS within  the section  10(b) period.

            That she  was unfamiliar  with Board  regulations, in  and of

            itself, is not an  excuse for failure to comply  with section

            10(b)'s  requirements.  NLRB v. Washington Star Co., 732 F.2d
                                    ___________________________

            974, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984).   The general rule is  that "those

            who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and

                                         -22-
                                          22

            may  not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to

            law."   Community Health Services,  467 U.S. at  63; see also
                    _________________________                    ___ ____

            Falcone, 864 F.2d at 230; Kale, 861 F.2d at 754.  
            _______                   ____

                      Our   holding   that  appellant   had  constructive

            knowledge  of the  Board's rules  and regulations  is further

            supported by the duration  of the representation she enjoyed.

            Jacobson,  573  F. Supp.  at  570  ("[T]he  duration  of  the
            ________

            attorney-client relationship  .  . .  is  the key  factor  in

            determining  whether equitable tolling  should apply.").  The

            record    reveals    that   appellant    received   extensive

            representation over an extended period of time.   Appellant's

            attorney wrote and mailed the  August 30, 1993, demand letter

            to DBS,  contacted the Board about its  procedures, filed the

            charge with  the Board, and then  later represented appellant

            during  Board   proceedings.     We  are  not   persuaded  by

            appellant's   attempt  to  characterize  the  assistance  she

            received as  "limited."  This is  not a case in  which a mere

            technicality   prevents   a   layperson   from   successfully

            navigating a  complicated regulatory process.  Compare Vanity
                                                           _______ ______

            Fair Mills, Inc.,  256 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1981); Abbott  v. Moore
            ________________                             ________________

            Business Forms,  Inc., 439  F. Supp.  643 (D.N.H.  1977); see
            _____________________                                     ___

            also Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 525-27 (1972).  Nor   are
            ____ _______________

            we persuaded by  the argument appellant makes  with regard to

            the  two remaining equitable tolling factors.   While we take

            note  of   the  fact   that   attorneys  frequently   contact

                                         -23-
                                          23

            administrative  agencies  about their  rules  and regulations

            directly,   we  cannot  agree   that  appellant's  attorney's

            reliance  on  the  information  provided  by  the  Board  was

            reasonable.  We think it plain that an attorney's reliance on

            oral information, provided  over the telephone and  by a low-

            level  employee, is  not  reasonable.   See Community  Health
                                                    ___ _________________

            Services, 467 U.S. at 65; Falcone, 864 F.2d at 230-31.   Such
            ________                  _______

            information, almost by definition,  is not nearly as reliable

            as simply looking  up the  text of a  regulation.   Community
                                                                _________

            Health Services, 467 U.S. at 65.  We also think it plain that
            _______________

            appellant failed  to exhaust the options  for compliance with

            the

                                         -24-
                                          24

            section 10(b)  proviso.   Neither appellant nor  her attorney

            made any  attempt to mail or personally deliver a copy of the

            charge to  DBS.   In fact,  they failed  even to  contact the

            Board about the  status of the  charge after it was  filed on

            October  6, 1993.   Had  they done  so, they might  have been

            alerted to the problem with the charge and might have avoided

            the section 10(b) violation.

                      That no real prejudice flowed to DBS as a result of

            the   untimely  filing  lends   some  appeal  to  appellant's

            argument.    The  effect  of  the  Board's  order  dismissing

            appellant's  complaint is that the merits of her unfair labor

            practice  claim  against  DBS  will never  be  decided.    We

            appreciate the  difficulty this poses for  appellant, but are

            mindful  of the  Court's  holding in  Baldwin County  Welcome
                                                  _______________________

            Center v. Brown,  466 U.S.  147 (1984), that  the absence  of
            _______________

            prejudice  "is  not an  independent  basis  for invoking  the

            [equitable tolling] doctrine and sanctioning  deviations from

            established procedures."   Id. at  152.  We  hold, therefore,
                                       ___

            that the Board properly  refused to invoke equitable estoppel

            and tolling in this case.      
                                         

                                         III.
                                         III.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      For the reasons stated above, the  order dismissing

            appellant's complaint  for untimely service of  the charge is

            affirmed.    Because  there  are  no  outstanding  issues  of
            ________

                                         -25-
                                          25

            material fact, the Board  properly granted DBS's joint Motion

            to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.

            No costs to either party.
            No costs to either party
            ________________________

                                         -26-
                                          26