Court Opinion

ID: 9668638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:20:07.280248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.667685
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing
Motions for rehearing have been presented by both appellant and appellee. Appellant attacks our holding that a cause of action to set aside a deed on the ground that it was executed under duress is not assignable. On reconsideration of this question, we are of the opinion that the cases cited in our original opinion do not require the holding that an express assignment of such a cause of action is invalid. The questions with which' we are concerned are discussed by the annotator in 110 A.L.R., pp. 850-853, as follows:
“The general conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that the right to sue for the rescission of a voidable transaction (and, apparently, the right to- rescind out of court) may be assigned, either by implication or by direct words, where the right is incidental to some property interest passing from assignor to assignee.
“However, the cases are in a somewhat confusing condition with ref*779erence to the question as to when the assignee (by implication or otherwise) of a right to rescind can be regarded as acquiring, or haying, a property interest sufficient to sustain the assignment. If a third party has, through a voidable transaction, acquired real or personal property, and the one thus out of possession has effectually declared an election to rescind, and tendered restoration, etc., — so as, in legal contemplation, to have rescinded the transaction, — legal title to the property is generally regarded as revesting in the latter, so that, at least according to the modern view, and in the absence of statutes affecting the case, he may transfer the property to another, who may maintain a suit to recover it. In such a case the right to rescind is, of course, not assigned, but merely the reacquired title, together with the incidental right to enforce the rescission theretofore declared.
“On the other hand, where there has been no effectual exercise of the right to rescind, and the transaction is merely voidable (of course, if the transaction were actually void, a rescission would be unnecessary, and probably impossible, in the legal sense), it seems that, in strictness, the one who parted with the property, although perhaps potentially the owner of it, has in fact no present title, nothing which conceivably he can transfer other than the right to rescind, or to sue for a rescission, and to reappropriate the property following rescission.
“It may be well to observe at this point that most of the cases give support to the proposition that a mere naked right to rescind or to sue for a rescission is not assignable. At the same time it should be noted that the general harmony of the cases in support of that proposition has not resulted in a corresponding harmony in concrete rulings; for different meanings are given to the proposition. Some of the decisions take the view, to which reference has already been made, that, before rescission occurs, the one who parted with property under a merely voidable transaction has no title thereto to assign, and hence, as is held, cannot assign the right to rescind or to sue for rescission, even though, in form, he conveys to the assignee his interest in the property, and intends thereby to part with all claim to the beneficial interest therein.
“Other decisions, on the contrary, particularly the later ones, uphold the assignability of the right to rescind a voidable transaction, where, by implication or otherwise, the assignment occurs in connection with an intended transfer of the property in the hands of the third party, or the right thereto upon rescission being accomplished. And even where the assignment is, in form, merely of a ‘claim’ or cause of action, it is, by some courts, upheld, if regarded as carrying with it the beneficial interest, or,, as is sometimes held, a share therein. This view may, of course, be said to ignore the distinction between void and voidable transactions, but it has the virtue of being based upon practical considerations, and does not lose sight of the fact that, in the last analysis, the whole question of assignability of choses in action is one of public policy.”
In Edmonds v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W. 585, 586, writ ref., the court held:
“Appellants insist that the facts stated showed that the only right acquired by appellee as assignee of the other persons ‘was to [the] bare right to file a bill in equity to set aside’ the contracts made by said persons with appellants, and they further insist that if it should be held that the assignments operated to pass any other right to appellee they necessarily also operated as an affirmance of the contracts *780by the assignors, and that appellee’s suit for a rescission of the contracts therefore was not maintainable.
“There is no doubt the rule at common law, enforced in many jurisdictions outside this state, is, as stated in 5 C.J. 892, that — ‘The assignment of a mere right to file a bill in equity for fraud committed on the assignor is void as being against public policy and savoring of maintenance.’
“The doubt we have entertained is as to whether this state, in adopting the common law (article 5492, Vernon’s Statutes), adopted the rule. We have not been referred to and have not found a case decided by a court in this state in which the question had been directly presented. But, looking to the basis for the rule, we think it has been in effect determined that it was never adopted in this state. The rule had its origin in the common-law doctrine of champerty and maintenance (Breeden v. [Frankford Marine Accident & Plate Glass] Insurance Co., 220 Mo. 327, 119 S.W. 576), which, and the reasons for it, are stated at length in 11 C.J. 231 et seq., and 5 R.C.L. 268 et seq. It has been held that the reasons for that doctrine have never existed in this state and that it has never been the law here. Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458; Stewart v. [Houston & T. C.] Railway Co., 62 Tex. 246; Perry v. Smith (Tex.Com.App.) 231 S.W. 340. If that is true, then a basis for the rule never existed in conditions here, and it would be illogical to hold that it is a part of the law of this state. We conclude, therefore, that the contention, so far as it is that appellee was not entitled to maintain the suit because of the rule referred to, should be overruled.”
The case of Gray v. Freeman, 37 Tex.Civ.App. 556, 84 S.W. 1105, 1108, held: “The rule is that mere personal actions, such as for slander, libel, assault and battery, false imprisonment, etc., die with the party, but, when the injury affects the estate rather than the person, the action for it may be assigned, and the purchaser can prosecute the action.” (Citing cases.)
We think that the Supreme Court of Texas stated the applicable rule in the case of Halbert v. Green, 156 Tex. 223, 293 S.W.2d 848, 851, as follows:
“When respondents executed the quit-claim deed they may have had an equitable right to have the deed of October 29, 1952, reformed precisely as it was reformed by the February 27th deed, but that right did not pass under the quit-claim either. In Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Edition, Vol. 7, § 3748, p. 222, we find the pertinent rule stated in this language: ‘The grantee’s cause of action to reform the deed is personal to him, and not a covenant running with the land, and will not therefore, without apt words of assignment, pass to a purchaser from the grantee under a deed which describes the same land described in the deed to his grantor.’ The rule, as stated, is supported by Norris v. Colorado Turkey Honestone Co., 22 Colo. 162, 43 P. 1024."
We have held that the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in this case for the reason that the conveyance made to appellant by his father was not shown to be fraudulent as a matter of law. Our review of the authorities cited in this opinion and in our original opinion leads us to the conclusion that the right to sue for rescission of the deed in question would not pass as an incident to the deed by which appellant’s father attempted to convey the land to appellant, without an express assignment of the cause of action. It would follow that the sale under execution of D. J. Glenney’s interest in the land would not include by implication his cause of action to set aside his deed to appellee. Since this is an appeal *781from the action of the court in sustaining a motion for summary judgment, and since •appellant in his affidavit stated that part of the consideration for his promise to pay •$200.00 or $300.00 each month to his father was the conveyance to him of this cause •of action together with all his interest in the land, despite the fact that the deed does not contain an assignment, we think the •case must be reversed to afford appellant an opportunity to show that such an assignment was made. Reese v. Davitte, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W.2d 1015, error dism. The existence vel non of such an assignment was not placed in issue by the pleadings or affidavit and, while the burden of proving an assignment rests on appellant at the trial on the merits, the failure to discharge this burden at the hearing on summary judgment does not authorize a judgment for appellee. Tigner v. First National Bank of Angleton, 153 Tex. 69, 264 S.W.2d 85.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is .■granted in part, and our original opinion is modified to conform herewith. Appel-lee’s motion for rehearing is denied.