Court Opinion

ID: 9895645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 07:10:03.488817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.662112
License: Public Domain

Vacate and Affirm and Opinion Filed October 31, 2023

                                       In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00673-CV

           IN THE ESTATE OF MARIA ELENA WEBB, DECEASED

                     On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2
                              Dallas County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. PR-20-01506-2

               MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING
               Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Breedlove
                            Opinion by Justice Breedlove
         On September 15, 2023, we issued an opinion and judgment in this case

dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellee Lisa Leffingwell,

administrator of the Estate of Maria Elena Webb, subsequently filed a motion for

rehearing. We deny the motion for rehearing. We withdraw our previous opinion

and judgment. We substitute this opinion and the accompanying judgment in their

place.

         Appellant Claudia Elena Johnston challenges the trial court’s order

authorizing the sale of real property owned by her deceased mother’s estate. She

complains the trial court erred by appointing the administrator, by allowing the sale
to occur prematurely, and by failing to apply controlling partition law in Chapter

23A of the Texas Property Code. We affirm the trial court’s order.

                                          BACKGROUND

         Maria Elena Webb died intestate on December 7, 2019. At the time of her

death, she owned real property on Typhon Drive in Grand Prairie that is the subject

of this dispute.

         Webb’s three adult children—appellant Claudia,1 Cynthia Fisher, and Richard

Clifton Webb—survived her. Richard filed an application for letters of

administration and to determine heirship on February 4, 2020, in Tarrant County.

Claudia filed an application for letters of administration and to determine heirship

on May 18, 2020, in Dallas County. The Tarrant County case was transferred to

Dallas County on July 31, 2020, and the cases proceeded together. Claudia moved

into the Typhon Drive home in May, 2020.

         On October 4, 2021, the trial court granted Richard’s application for letters of

administration and appointed appellee Lisa Leffingwell as the estate’s dependent

administrator. Leffingwell filed an “Application for Sale of Real Estate and for

Authority to Enter Listing Agreement” on January 7, 2022. Leffingwell alleged it

was “necessary and advisable” to sell the Estate’s interest in the property to pay the

Estate’s expenses. Claudia filed an objection to Leffingwell’s application,

   1
       We refer to the Webb family members by their first names for clarity.

                                                   –2–
contending that sale of the Estate’s property was unnecessary to satisfy the Estate’s

obligation to the mortgage lender2 or any other claims against the Estate.

       On June 28, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Leffingwell’s application

to sell the property and Claudia’s objection. The court permitted the parties to submit

additional briefing on Claudia’s argument that Chapter 23A of the Texas Property

Code provided the exclusive method for partition of the property. See TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. §§ 23A.001–.013 (Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act) (Chapter

23A). The parties did so, and Leffingwell also filed a supplement to her application

submitting a comparative market analysis for the property that the trial court had

requested at the hearing.

       On July 1, 2022, the trial court signed an order authorizing Leffingwell to list

the property for sale for $235,000 and to sell the property in a private sale. On August

30, 2022, Leffingwell filed a “Report of Sale of Real Property” and sought the trial

court’s authorization and confirmation of the proposed conveyance to a buyer for a

final sales price of $195,000. Claudia filed an objection, contending that the trial

court should not approve the sale because the proposed sale price was less than the

amount that Claudia was “ready” to pay.

       At a hearing on September 13, 2022, the trial court heard Leffingwell’s

application and Claudia’s objections. The trial court continued the hearing to permit

   2
     On June 27, 2022, U.S. Bank N.A. filed an “Authenticated Secured Claim” stating that the total
amount owed on the mortgage was $61,024.31 as of June 1, 2022, with an unpaid principal balance of
$45,325.25.
                                               –3–
Claudia to prepare an offer for the property, but emphasized that if Claudia’s offer

was “not more than” the $195,000 offer Leffingwell had already received for the

property, the court would approve Leffingwell’s report “as it stands.”

       The trial court reconvened the hearing on September 15, 2022. Although

counsel3 appeared on Claudia’s behalf and explained that he had begun to prepare

an earnest money contract, he stated that he had questions about the amount of an

earnest money payment, the use of the sale’s proceeds, and future distribution of the

proceeds. The court responded that “I made it clear at our hearing on the—let’s see

here—9/13, I made it clear at that hearing that you were to make an offer for the full

amount.” Because Claudia failed to do so, the court granted Leffingwell’s

application, finding that “the price is a fair price given the condition of this property

and the current occupants.”

       On the same day, the trial court signed a “Decree Confirming Sale of Real

Property,” approving Leffingwell’s “Report of Sale of Real Property” and

authorizing sale of the property “upon compliance by the Purchaser with the terms

of sale.” Claudia now appeals this decree, but did not file a bond or other security to

supersede it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24 (suspension of enforcement of judgment

pending appeal).

   3
     Claudia has been represented by her spouse L. Bruce Lambert through the trial court proceedings and
on appeal.

                                                 –4–
                                                ISSUES

        In four issues,4 Claudia contends the trial court erred by rendering the

September 15, 2022 “Decree Confirming Sale of Real Property.” In her first two

issues, Claudia argues the trial court erred by failing to apply Chapter 23A in

partitioning the property. She argues that she was deprived of statutory and

constitutional rights, including the first option right under Chapter 23A to buy out

her siblings’ interests and the constitutional right of due process. See TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. § 23A.007 (cotenant buyout).

        In her third issue, Claudia contends the trial court erred by permitting a

partition sale less than one year after letters of administration were granted, in

violation of Estates Code § 360.001(a). In her fourth issue, Claudia complains that

the trial court erred by approving and confirming the sale of the property because

there was insufficient evidence to support findings that Leffingwell’s appointment

and the property’s sale were in the estate’s best interest.5 Claudia requests this Court

to impose a constructive trust and to set aside and void the conveyance.

    4
     Claudia’s second and third issues are stated identically but she asserts different supporting arguments.
Consequently, we summarize the substance of her arguments rather than quoting her statement of the issues.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) (appellate court will treat statement of the issues “as covering every subsidiary
question that is fairly included”).
    5
      Claudia’s fourth issue includes wide-ranging complaints challenging the sale as unnecessary, in
violation of statutes governing receivership, and the result of Leffingwell’s misconduct. We address these
complaints to the extent Claudia has preserved them for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (preservation of
complaints for appellate review).

                                                    –5–
          Appellee Leffingwell responds that “the sale of the house renders Claudia’s

challenge to the decree approving that sale moot,”6 that Chapter 23A does not apply

to the sale, and that “Claudia’s repeated opportunities to purchase the property

render any error in failing to follow Chapter 23A harmless.” Leffingwell also

requests her attorney’s fees, contending that Claudia’s appeal is frivolous.

                                                DISCUSSION

          A. Timing of application for sale

          We first address Claudia’s third issue complaining that Leffingwell’s

application to sell the property was premature. Section 360.001(a) of the Estates

Code provides that “[a]t any time after the first anniversary of the date original letters

testamentary or of administration are granted, an executor, administrator, heir, or

devisee of a decedent’s estate, by written application filed in the court in which the

estate is pending, may request the partition and distribution of the estate.” The trial

court granted letters appointing Leffingwell as the Estate’s administrator on October

4, 2021,7 and Leffingwell filed her oath and bond on October 18, 2021.

          Leffingwell filed an “Application for Sale of Real Estate and for Authority to

Enter Listing Agreement” three months later, on January 7, 2022. The trial court

    6
      Based on this argument, our original opinion and judgment dismissed Claudia’s appeal as moot and,
as required by the court in Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Investors, LP, 656 S.W.3d 394, 395 (Tex. 2022) (per
curiam), vacated the trial court’s judgment accordingly. In her motion for rehearing, Leffingwell now
argues that we cannot vacate the trial court’s judgment approving the sale because the judgment “is required
to vest legal title in the purchaser.” Accordingly, we address Claudia’s issues on the merits. See Alsobrook,
656 S.W.3d at 395 (“mootness on appeal requires vacatur of the underlying judgment”).
    7
        Although this order is designated as “amended,” there is no earlier order in the appellate record.
                                                      –6–
heard the application and Claudia’s objections on June 28, 2022, then signed an

order granting Leffingwell’s motion on July 1, 2022. Leffingwell filed a report of

sale on August 30, 2022. After two additional hearings, the trial court signed a decree

confirming the sale on September 15, 2022. Claudia now contends Leffingwell’s

application and the trial court’s decree were in violation of § 360.001(a) because a

year had not elapsed since the trial court granted letters of administration.

      Claudia raised this complaint in an answer to Richard and Cynthia’s petition

for partition, but only after Richard and Cynthia had nonsuited that petition. See

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010) (nonsuit renders

the merits of the nonsuited case moot from the moment the motion is filed). Further,

Claudia does not provide a record citation showing that she obtained a ruling on her

objection that the sale was premature under § 360.001. Although she filed written

objections to the proposed sale on September 13, 2022, she complained only that her

offer had not been accepted and that the proposed sale price was too low. Nor is

there any reference to Estates Code § 360.001 or a premature sale in the reporter’s

record of the hearing on Leffingwell’s report of sale. Accordingly, Claudia failed to

preserve her complaint for appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). We overrule

her third issue.

      B. Property Code Chapter 23A

      Claudia’s first two issues complain of the trial court’s failure to apply property

code Chapter 23A, the Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act, enacted by the

                                         –7–
Legislature in 2017. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.001–.013. Chapter 23A

“provides a process by which heirs can either force partition in kind or effectuate the

buyout      of undivided          interests      in    inherited      property.”      Grant       v. Heo,

No. 07-23-00041-CV, 2023 WL 5340931, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 18,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Estate of Stewart, No. 04-20-00103-CV, 2021 WL

1987541, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 19, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(same).8 A partition suit under the Chapter 23A “involves determination of two key

issues: the fair market value of the property and whether the property is susceptible

to partition in kind.” In re McClellan Creek Ranch, LLC, No. 07-19-00135-CV, 2019

WL 2238429, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

        Section 23A.003 provides:

        § 23A.003. Applicability; Relation to Other Law

        (a) In an action to partition real property under Chapter 23, the court
        shall determine whether the property is heirs’ property. If the court
        determines that the property is heirs’ property, the property must be
        partitioned under this chapter unless all of the cotenants otherwise agree
        in a record.
        (b) This chapter supplements Chapter 23 and the Texas Rules of Civil
        Procedure governing partition of real property. If an action is governed
        by this chapter, this chapter supersedes provisions of Chapter 23 and

    8
      The UPHPA was introduced in the Texas Legislature in 2017. The Author/Sponsor’s Statement of
Intent in the June 22, 2017 Bill Analysis describes the statute’s purpose in more detail, explaining that
forced partition sales of property owned by tenants-in-common can “yield[ ] far less than the property is
worth.” S. Research Center, Bill Analysis, S.B. 499, 85th Leg., R.S. (June 22, 2017). To address this
problem, the Act “provides for independent appraisal of fair market value (or alternative means of reaching
fair market value if all parties agree to that value), permits one co-tenant to buy out the others if they are
not the one who requested the partition, and sets out factors to be considered by the court in determining
whether to order partition-in-kind of some or all of the property,” according to the Bill Analysis. Id.
                                                      –8–
      the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing partition of real property
      that are inconsistent with this chapter.

      About a year after Richard’s Fort Worth suit was transferred to Dallas,

Richard and Cynthia filed an “Original Petition for Partition by Sale” in Probate

Court No. 2 requesting partition under Chapter 23A. They nonsuited their petition,

however, after Leffingwell’s appointment. Claudia did not respond or answer the

petition until after Richard and Cynthia filed the nonsuit. Accordingly, there was no

live pleading requesting partition under Chapter 23A after Richard and Cynthia’s

nonsuit on January 11, 2022. See Travelers Ins. Co., 315 S.W.3d at 862.

      Nonetheless, Claudia argued in three subsequent hearings on Leffingwell’s

applications for sale that Chapter 23A was the exclusive method for partitioning the

property among Webb’s heirs. At the hearing on June 28, 2022, the court questioned

“whether or not I have to follow the statutory scheme [in Chapter 23A] if there is an

administration.” The court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefing on the

subject. Neither party found any authority on the question.

      On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err by continuing to proceed

under the Estates Code to consider and grant Leffingwell’s application to sell the

property, for several reasons. First, both Claudia, in Dallas, and Richard, in Fort

Worth, filed applications for letters of administration and to determine heirship.

Each requested to be appointed administrator. These competing applications were

resolved by the trial court’s appointment of Leffingwell as administrator of the estate

                                         –9–
in October 2021.9 In contrast, there was no live pleading requesting relief under

Chapter 23A.

         Second, there was evidence that Claudia neither offered to purchase the

property herself nor permitted prospective buyers to view the property while she was

living there. Leffingwell testified10 at the September 13, 2022 hearing that after the

court granted her authority to sign a listing agreement and to list the property for

$235,000, she was unable to do so because Claudia “would not consent or sign a

tenant agreement to allow a lock box to be put on the property and to allow others

to view the property.” Accordingly, Leffingwell proceeded to obtain offers “from

various investors who were willing to purchase the property [sight] unseen.”

Claudia’s counsel cross-examined Leffingwell on these and other matters, including

whether or not Claudia had already made an offer for the property and whether

Leffingwell had given her time to do so. Leffingwell testified that she received an

email from Claudia’s counsel about Claudia’s desire to purchase the property.

Leffingwell testified that she delayed signing the listing agreement for

approximately three weeks to allow Claudia time to make an offer, but Claudia did

not do so.

    9
     Although the trial court’s order recites that the matter was heard, the appellate record does not include
a reporter’s record of a hearing on Leffingwell’s appointment.
    10
        Although Claudia argues that “no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was admitted” before the
trial court approved the sale, the record reflects that Leffingwell testified in narrative form at the September
13, 2022 hearing after counsel for all parties stated they had no objection to her doing so, subject to cross-
examination. After Leffingwell’s direct testimony, Claudia’s counsel conducted cross-examination and the
court posed additional questions.
                                                    –10–
      Third, the trial court granted Claudia additional time to prepare and submit an

offer to purchase the property before ruling on Leffingwell’s application to approve

the $195,000 sale, overruling Richard and Cynthia’s objection “to a continuation of

[Claudia’s] attempts to purchase this home.” Before making its final ruling

confirming the sale, the court reconvened the hearing and determined that Claudia

had not made any offer to purchase the property. Accordingly, the relief Claudia

contends she would have received under Chapter 23A—the right to purchase

Richard’s and Cynthia’s interests in the property—was afforded to her. For these

reasons, we overrule Claudia’s first and second issues.

      C. Appointment of administrator and necessity of sale

      In her fourth issue, Claudia complains of Leffingwell’s appointment and the

propriety of the sale. Citing Chapter 64 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code and related authority, Claudia argues that appointment of a receiver was not

warranted and sale of the property was not necessary. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 64.001–64.108 (Chapter 64, Receivership); In re Estate of

Martinez, No. 01-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 1442100, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court erred by appointing receiver

under Chapter 64 where evidence was insufficient to show danger of loss, removal,

or material injury to estate property). The trial court, however, appointed Leffingwell

as administrator of the estate and approved the property’s sale under Chapters 301

and 356 of the Estates Code, not under a Chapter 64 receivership. See TEX. EST.

                                        –11–
CODE ANN. Ch. 301 (Application for Letters Testamentary or of Administration);

Ch. 356 (Sale of Estate Property). It was within the trial court’s discretion to do so.

See, e.g., Pine v. deBlieux, 360 S.W.3d 45, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,

pet. denied) (trial court has broad discretion in determining person’s suitability to

serve as executor or administrator); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Bentley, No. 14-19-00324-CV,

2021 WL 1307296, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (court of appeals reviews probate court’s action in either confirming or

setting aside sale of estate’s real property for abuse of discretion).

      Leffingwell filed a verified “Application for Sale of Real Estate and for

Authority to Enter Listing Agreement” in which she stated that it was necessary and

in the Estate’s best interest to sell the property to pay expenses and claims against

the Estate. After Claudia objected to the application, the trial court heard the matter

and signed an order authorizing the sale. As we have discussed, Claudia’s objections

arose from the trial court’s failure to proceed under Chapter 23A, and the trial court

did not err by overruling them.

      Further, Claudia initiated this lawsuit by requesting administration of the

estate and her own appointment as administrator. Richard also sought appointment

as administrator. The trial court resolved these competing requests by appointing

Leffingwell, “a third-party administrator,” based on a finding that “it is in the best

interest of Decedent’s estate to appoint a neutral, third-party administrator.” See

Pine, 360 S.W. 3d at 47. On appeal, Claudia details complaints about Leffingwell,

                                         –12–
citing another lawsuit she has filed against Leffingwell arising from the sale of the

property and other matters outside the appellate record. The record does not reflect

that Claudia obtained a ruling on these complaints; accordingly, nothing is presented

for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. For these reasons, we overrule Claudia’s fourth

issue.

         D. Request for attorney’s fees

         Leffingwell argues she is entitled to recover her attorney’s fees because

Claudia’s appeal was frivolous. TEX. R. APP. P. 45. “An appeal is frivolous if, at the

time asserted, the advocate had no reasonable grounds to believe judgment would

be reversed or when an appeal is pursued in bad faith.” See D Design Holdings, L.P.

v. MMP Corp., 339 S.W.3d 195, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). “The

decision to grant appellate sanctions is a matter of discretion that an appellate court

exercises with prudence and caution and only after careful deliberation.” Owen v.

Jim Allee Imports, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 276, 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

“Although imposing sanctions is within our discretion, we will do so only in

circumstances that are truly egregious.” Id. “[A]n issue’s lack of merit does not

necessarily equate to bad faith.” Byrd v. Hutton, No. 05-19-01191-CV, 2020 WL

4013150, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 16, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

         One of Claudia’s primary complaints is the trial court’s failure to apply

Chapter 23A—a uniform act not adopted in Texas until 2017—to the property’s sale.

See Uniform Partition of Heirs’ Property Act, May 19, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch.

                                          –13–
297, § 1, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 572 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.001–

.13). Although the trial court permitted supplemental briefing on this issue before

ruling, the parties did not locate any controlling Texas case law. We conclude

Claudia’s appeal was not wholly frivolous, and we deny Leffingwell’s request for

sanctions.

                                  CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s September 15, 2022 “Decree Confirming Sale of Real

Property” is affirmed.

                                          /Maricela Breedlove/
220673f.p05                               MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                          JUSTICE

                                       –14–
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

IN THE ESTATE OF MARIA                       On Appeal from the Probate Court
ELENA WEBB, DECEASED,                        No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. PR-20-01506-
No. 05-22-00673-CV                           2.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Breedlove. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                             and Reichek participating.

     In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE our
September 15, 2023 judgment.

      The trial court’s September 15, 2022 Decree Confirming Sale of Real
Property is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee Lisa Leffingwell, Dependent Administrator for
the Estate of Maria Elena Webb, Deceased, recover her costs of this appeal from
appellant Claudia Elena Johnston.

Judgment entered this 31st day of October, 2023.

                                      –15–