Court Opinion

ID: 9680556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:33:43.504835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.236916
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result only because Appellant’s objection to the admission of the complainant’s oral statement was insufficient. Appellant objected on the grounds that “the proper predicate’s not been laid for the attempt to subvert the hearsay rule.” An objection preserves only the specific ground cited.1 A general objection *596is not sufficient to apprise the trial court of the complaint urged and thus preserves nothing for review.2 Here, Appellant did not inform the trial judge of the specific foundation requirement that the prosecution had not satisfied.3 In addition, Appellant did not object to the admission of the oral statement on the grounds of a denial of confrontation, which would have raised a constitutional question. Accordingly, I would overrule Appellant’s second issue as not preserved.
I am particularly concerned, however, that we generally have lost sight of the real meaning of an “excited utterance” that would invest clear hearsay with such “indicia of reliability” as to justify its admissibility.4 Under earlier Texas criminal law, what we now refer to as an “excited utterance” was called a “spontaneous exclamation.” In our civil law, it was generally referred to as a “res ges-tae” statement. Because we no longer have separate bodies of civil and criminal rules of evidence, we cannot ignore the guidance given in civil cases in our analysis of excited utterances. For a witness’s statement to be admissible as res gestae, it must have been shown to be a spontaneous reaction to an exciting event.5 The circumstances must have been such as to create a reasonable presumption that the statement was the spontaneous utterance of thought created by or out of the occurrence itself.6
It is not sufficient for a witness to state, “She seemed excited to me.” Testimony that the declarant seemed “somewhat upset” at the time she uttered the statement would never have satisfied the requirement that the declarant be “in the grip of violent emotion,” rendering her incapable of fabrication.7 Moreover, a statement that is a mere narrative of a past event does not qualify as an excited utterance, even if it is made immediately following the event. “The circumstances must show that it was the event speaking through the person and not the person speaking about the event.”8
I do not agree, therefore, with the majority that the complainant’s oral statement to Officer Yarnel satisfied the requirements for admission as an excited utterance. Nevertheless, because Appellant did not properly preserve his complaint, I concur in the result.

. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. *5961466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999); Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 237 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1157, 115 S.Ct. 1115, 130 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1995).

. Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310, 317-18 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

. See Harris v. State, 565 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1978).

. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).

. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310, 310 (Tex.1966); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Griffith, 575 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.1963); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Mungia, 602 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).

. King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486, 491-92 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 238, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982).

. First Southwest Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied); see also City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259, 262 (1944); Malone v. Foster, 956 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997), aff'd, 977 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.1998).