Court Opinion

ID: 9409426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 12:08:15.396875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.535325
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-23-00079-CR

                                 The State of Texas, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                    Jason Nassour, Appellee

               FROM THE 299TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
       NO. D-1-DC-21-904035, THE HONORABLE KAREN SAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Jason Nassour was charged with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence

and with conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate physical evidence.          See Tex. Penal Code

§§ 15.02, 37.09. Before trial, Nassour’s co-defendant filed a motion in limine, which Nassour

joined. The trial court granted the motion in part, and the State appealed that ruling. Because we

do not have jurisdiction over the State’s appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                        BACKGROUND

               Nassour and his co-defendant, were indicted for the offenses of tampering with or

fabricating physical evidence and for conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate physical evidence.

See Tex. Penal Code §§ 15.02, 37.09.

               After being charged, Nassour’s co-defendant filed a pretrial application for writ of

habeas corpus and motions to dismiss, challenging the indictment and arguing that his
prosecution was preempted by the federal Privacy Protection Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-

2000aa-12. Nassour’s co-defendant also filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court

issue an order prohibiting and precluding the State from arguing or introducing evidence

regarding certain “enumerated matters (and any and all variations thereof).” Nassour joined the

motion in limine and the defendants argued in support of it jointly. Of significance to this appeal

were five matters pertaining to the defendants’ legal rights and duties regarding video footage

that is the subject of the tampering and conspiracy charges. Additionally, the defendants’ joint

memorandum in support of the motion incorporated the previously filed motions and again

asserted federal-preemption arguments.

               When responding to the motion in limine, the State argued that the motion was

not really a motion in limine because it rehashed arguments made in the prior motions seeking to

dismiss the case and because it sought to prevent the State from presenting its theory of the

offense and accompanying evidence to the jury. In their reply to the State’s response to the

motion in limine, the defendants explained that they were not seeking to suppress the State’s

evidence and instead were seeking a preliminary determination “subject to reconsideration by the

[trial court] at any[ ]time during the course of a trial.” They also asked the trial court to order

that “the State must approach the bench on each of the aforementioned items to seek the Court’s

authorization before introducing evidence or making arguments . . . inconsistent with the

paragraphs of” the motion in limine. The parties submitted under seal agreed stipulations of fact

and evidentiary exhibits for the trial court to consider when making its ruling.

               After considering the parties’ arguments presented in their filings and made

during a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted the motion with respect to five of the enumerated

matters but denied the motion as it pertained to the remaining three matters. The trial court

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explained that the granting of the motion in limine was proper because there are “some factual

issues out there” that may arise at trial that require the trial court to “hear evidence or . . . decide

further.” The trial court stated that the effect of its ruling was “exactly what a motion in limine

does” and that it was “the proper remedy because it’s just saying we’re going to wait and see to

some extent” whether the evidence is ultimately admissible. Further, the trial court noted that it

had not granted and was not granting the motions to dismiss the indictment.

               Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order partially granting the motion

in limine “without prejudice to the State’s right to first approach the bench and seek leave of

Court to take any action, including the introduction of evidence, that might be inconsistent with

the Court’s pretrial, preliminary ruling.” Further, the trial court explained as follows: “It is the

Court’s intent and ORDER that the prosecution can and must approach the bench and seek a

definitive ruling, as of that time, before taking any action contrary to the scope of [the] Motion In

Limine . . . and this ORDER, which includes the subject matter of each and every stipulated fact

contained in the” stipulation of facts filed at the pretrial hearing. Additionally, the trial court

directed the State to inform its witnesses that they could not answer any question in

contravention of the order “without the State first approaching the bench and requesting the

Court to reconsider the order.”

               The State appealed the trial court’s order granting, in part, defendants’ motion

in limine.

                                           DISCUSSION

               The State is entitled to appeal an order in a criminal case only when authorized by

law. Tex. Const. art. V, § 26. “The State’s authority to appeal in criminal cases is granted by

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Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” State v. Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d 347, 350

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01. “The purpose of the statute is to

permit the pretrial appeal of erroneous legal rulings which eviscerate the State’s ability to prove

its case.” State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 895–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As relevant here,

the State may appeal a trial court ruling that dismisses an indictment or grants a motion to

suppress or an order that acts as the functional equivalent.        Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.

44.01(a)(1), (5); State v. Trinidad, No. 04-05-00550-CR, 2006 WL 2612230, at *1–2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Sept. 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(explaining that appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider appeal of ruling on motion in

limine if motion is in substance motion to suppress). Article 44.01 does not list a motion in

limine as a type of order from which the State may appeal, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01,

and the State does “not have the authority to appeal from the granting of a motion in limine,”

Trinidad, 2006 WL 2612230, at *1. “The mere label attached either to the defendant’s motion or

to the trial court’s order ruling on same cannot determine its appealability.” State v. Moreno,

807 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

                When the order being appealed is not one of the types listed in article 44.01 and

does not provide the effect of one of those orders, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to

consider an appeal of the ruling. See State v. Gault, ––– S.W.3d ––––, Nos. 01-22-00157, -

00364-CR, 2022 WL 4830811, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2022, no pet.

and orig. proceeding). “Whether [appellate courts] have jurisdiction is a question of law, which

[appellate courts] review de novo.” Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d).

                                                4
               Here, whether we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order turns on

whether the challenged order granted a motion to suppress, as the State argues, or a motion in

limine, as Nassour argues. For the reasons discussed below, the challenged order granted in part

a motion in limine. See State v. Chody, No. 03-23-00080-CR, 2023 WL 3512601, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Austin May 18, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding

that same Order that is currently challenged, was partial grant of motion in limine and dismissing

for want of jurisdiction).

               A motion in limine “is a motion requesting that the opposing party be directed to

approach the trial court before offering certain types of evidence, asking certain questions, or

otherwise going into particular areas before the jury.” Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 655

(Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). Although there are similarities between a motion in limine

and a motion to suppress, “[t]he principal difference between the two is that the ruling on a

motion in limine is a preliminary ruling only, and the party making the motion must still object

when the evidence is offered during the trial,” whereas a motion to suppress “is a definitive

ruling, and the party is not required to object when the evidence is offered.” Carlisle v. State,

818 S.W.2d 156, 158–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

               In support of its argument that we have jurisdiction, the State argues that the trial

court’s order effectively constituted a dismissal of the indictment or the granting of a motion to

suppress because: (1) the arguments made by the defendants in support of the motion in limine

incorporated the federal preemption arguments made in their earlier motions to dismiss the

charges; (2) the trial court stated during the pretrial hearing that the Privacy Protection Act

applied; and (3) the trial court’s ruling eviscerated the State’s ability to prove its case. These are

the same arguments presented by the State and rejected by this Court in Nassour’s

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co-defendant’s appeal. See Chody, 2023 WL 3512601, at *3–5. For the same reasons explained

in detail there, we also conclude that we do not have jurisdiction here.

               Specifically, although the defendants’ motion in limine used the same arguments

from their previous motions to dismiss, it also made clear that the relief being sought was

different. Their reply to the State’s response specified that they were seeking “a preliminary

determination . . . subject to reconsideration . . . at any time,” that the State be directed not to

mention or present evidence regarding the listed matters, and that the State be directed to

approach the trial court for approval before introducing evidence or making arguments

inconsistent with the motion in limine. The trial court explained that it was granting in part the

motion in limine and denying the motions to dismiss, although based on similar arguments,

because it needed to hear the evidence and see what issues would arise. The trial court’s order

directed the State to approach the bench to seek a definitive ruling before presenting evidence or

discussing the topics covered by the motion in limine and informed the State that it may ask the

trial court to reconsider its ruling. For these reasons, we conclude that the State is attempting to

appeal a trial court order granting in part a motion in limine. See State v. Kaiser, 822 S.W.2d 697,

701 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “controlling factor in determining

the nature of an appeal is the legal effect of the trial court’s ruling”); Trinidad,

2006 WL 2612230, at *1–2 (treating motion in limine as motion to suppress where motion

requested that trial court prohibit admission of evidence and where trial court explained in

hearing that its ruling suppressed evidence). Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the

State’s appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a); Gault, 2022 WL 4830811, at *4–5.

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                                           CONCLUSION

               Having determined that we do not have jurisdiction in this case, we dismiss the

State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                             __________________________________________
                                             Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Smith

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: July 13, 2023

Do Not Publish

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