Court Opinion

ID: 9387731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 20:00:56.295911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.216626
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12833     Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12833
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       KIMBERLY K. SISIA,
       Individually and on behalf of others
       similarly situated,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
       INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12833

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02376-ELR
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Georgia’s renewal statute can rescue previously filed claims
       from statutes of limitations if the claims are sufficiently similar and
       have not been decided on their merits. Because Sisia met these
       requirements for some—but not all—of her claims, we affirm in
       part and reverse in part.
                                         I.
              Kimberly Sisia alleges that she was injured in a 2009 car
       crash. Her insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile
       Insurance Company entitled her to “reasonable medical expenses
       incurred for bodily injury.” Sisia sought treatment for her injuries,
       including $4,853 in chiropractic care and $3,195 for physical
       therapy. She claims that State Farm only paid for $1,254 of the
       charges, leaving $6,794 unpaid.
               To resolve this appeal, we must analyze three complaints.
       Sisia first sued State Farm in 2012 in Georgia state court—her
       original complaint. A year later, Sisia filed a “First Amended
       Complaint” in the same case. After State Farm moved for
       summary judgment on the original complaint and to dismiss the
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       22-12833                   Opinion of the Court                                3

       second, the state court issued a somewhat counterintuitive ruling.
       It dismissed all the claims in the amended complaint but allowed
       what remained in the original complaint to continue, deciding that
       Sisia had not “abandoned her original Complaint when she filed
       the First Amended Complaint” but instead “intended to further
       expand her claims.”
              In parsing the complaints, the state court found differences
       between the claims. In its view, the amended claim (although
       entitled “Breach of Contract”) alleged only that the insurance
       policy language was “illusory.” The court decided the policy
       language matched “applicable statutory language,” so it dismissed
       any claim “that the policy language at issue is ‘illusory’” on the
       merits. It also dismissed the state law class action count and a count
       for attorneys’ fees. But the court reasoned that the original claim—
       which the court characterized as a claim “to recover her medical
       damages under the policy”—presented issues of material fact. This
       claim for medical expenses survived the court’s order.
              For some reason, the state action stalled. In 2021—about
       nine years after first suing—Sisia voluntarily dismissed the case and
       refiled in federal court. But she faced a hurdle: Georgia has a six-
       year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. 1 O.C.G.A.
       § 9-3-24. To get around this limitation, Sisia relied on Georgia’s

       1 Whether Sisia’s theory of breach of private duty sounds in tort does not affect
       our analysis because tort actions have an even shorter limitations period. See
       O.C.G.A § 9-3-33.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12833

       renewal statute, which permits a plaintiff to dismiss a case and refile
       in federal court “within the original applicable period of limitations
       or within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal.”
       O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a).
              The federal district court still dismissed the case as time-
       barred. It decided that Sisia’s “current breach of contract claim
       constitutes an attempt to revive the previously adjudicated”
       illusory policy claim from her amended complaint. As a result, it
       also denied as moot Sisia’s motion for class certification. The court
       later denied both her motion to reconsider and motion to amend
       her complaint. Sisia now appeals.
                                         II.
               We review de novo the application of a statute of
       limitations. United States v. Maher, 955 F.3d 880, 884 (11th Cir.
       2020). We review a court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration
       or for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Marti v. Iberostar
       Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L., 54 F.4th 641, 646 (11th Cir. 2022);
       Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d
       1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
                                        III.
              Under Georgia law, a “properly filed renewal action stands
       on the same footing as the original action.” Coen v. Aptean, Inc.,
       356 Ga. App. 468, 470 (2020) (quotation omitted). So “if a renewal
       action is properly filed within six months after dismissal of the
       original action, it remains viable even though the statute of
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       22-12833                  Opinion of the Court                             5

       limitation may have expired.” Id. (quotation omitted). No one
       disputes that Sisia refiled within six months after she voluntarily
       dismissed her state case.
              Instead, the parties debate the effect of the state court’s
       dismissal of the amended complaint. Georgia’s renewal statute
       contains a logical constraint: it cannot revive cases or claims that
       were previously “decided on their merits.” 2 Patterson v. Douglas
       Women’s Ctr., P.C., 258 Ga. 803, 804 (1989). In fact, a suit or claim
       is “void and incapable of renewal” if “there has been a judicial
       determination that dismissal is authorized.” Hobbs v. Arthur, 264
       Ga. 359, 360 (1994). But if the renewed and original case are
       “substantially the same both as to the cause of action and as to the
       essential parties,” the statute permits renewal. Coen, 356 Ga. App.
       at 470 (quotation omitted).
              That background provides a deceptively simple rule for this
       case: whatever claims the state court dismissed from the amended
       complaint may not be renewed, but any claim substantially similar
       to the original complaint may be renewed in this federal action.
       See Hobbs, 264 Ga. at 360 (noting that a case may be renewed

       2 The “decided on their merits” limitationapplies as much to claims as cases;
       otherwise, claims could be “miraculously revived as long as they are re-filed
       within six months of dismissal of the entire case”—an “absurd result.”
       Anderson v. S. Home Care Servs., Inc., No. 13-0840, 2017 WL 10574069, at *2
       (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2017) (quotation omitted).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-12833

       “unless and until the trial court enters an order dismissing a valid
       action”).
              Here is the complication: all three complaints share similar
       elements. As the district court recognized, the federal complaint
       mentions (more than once) legal arguments similar to those Sisia
       advanced as part of her claim that the policy was “illusory.”
       Because the state court dismissed this claim on the merits, it is
       ineligible for renewal.
               At the same time, Sisia’s original claim for unpaid medical
       expenses survived. And in this respect, the federal complaint is
       “substantially the same” as the original. The original describes
       Sisia’s policy, her accident, and State Farm’s alleged refusal to pay
       for her medical expenses. So does the federal complaint. To
       recover these expenses, Sisia pressed three theories: “Breach of
       Contract,” “Breach of Private Duty,” and “Breach of Duty of Good
       Faith and Fair Dealing.”
              The Georgia Supreme Court has emphasized for over a
       hundred years that the renewal statute is “remedial in nature; it is
       construed liberally to allow renewal where a suit is disposed of on
       any ground not affecting its merits.” Hobbs, 264 Ga. at 360; see
       also Clark v. Newsome, 180 Ga. 97, 100 (1935); Cox v. Strickland,
       120 Ga. 104, 112 (1904). Sisia’s original and amended complaints
       are not models of clarity—if anything, they are models of
       confusion. The complaints often conflate causes of action and
       argument, forgo common pleading conventions, and haphazardly
       deploy legal vocabulary. Yet Sisia dismissed her medical expenses
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       22-12833                   Opinion of the Court                                7

       claim voluntarily. The merits of her case—whether State Farm
       owed her money under the contract—were never adjudicated.
       Given the “remedial” nature of O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) and its liberal
       construction, Sisia could thus renew her claim for medical expenses
       using the three theories of recovery explicitly set forth in her
       federal complaint. 3
              But because the state court already dismissed the amended
       complaint, Sisia may not renew any legal theory or claim that the
       policy is “illusory.” That has been decided on the merits. To the
       extent that the federal complaint tries to revive this theory, we
       affirm the district court’s conclusion that it is time-barred.
               Finally, we agree with the district court that Sisia’s renewed
       medical expenses claim is not otherwise barred by claim
       preclusion. Under Georgia law, the “entry of a judgment as to one
       or more but fewer than all of the claims” is not a final judgment
       and so may not invoke claim preclusion, unless the court expressly
       says otherwise. Wise v. Ga. State Bd. for Examination,
       Qualification & Registration of Architects, 244 Ga. 449, 449 (1979)
       (quotation omitted). 4 Here the medical expenses claim remained
       pending until Sisia voluntarily dismissed it. No final judgment
       exists and claim preclusion is unavailable.

       3 The legal sufficiency of these three theories is not before us on appeal.

       4 A federal court applies state law when asked to give preclusive effect to a
       state court judgment. Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 441 F.3d 1306, 1308
       (11th Cir. 2006).
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       8                    Opinion of the Court              22-12833

                                *     *     *
               We AFFIRM only the dismissal of any “illusory policy”
       theory in this case and REVERSE the court’s dismissal of Sisia’s
       other claims. We DISMISS as MOOT Sisia’s appeals of her motion
       to reconsider and motion to amend her complaint. We REMAND
       for the court to consider Sisia’s motion for conditional class
       certification and for further proceedings consistent with this
       opinion.