Court Opinion

ID: 9846080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:34:19.100119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.057387
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court because it is consonant with the precedent of this circuit and therefore constitutes the applicable rule of decision under the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent. I write separately to suggest, respectfully, that, as our court strays more and more from the view of the majority of circuits and from the view of the agency charged with the administration of the statute on an important question threatening the even-handed application of the immigration law, the time has come for higher appellate authority to determine whether the rest of the Nation now should follow our view or whether we should re-join the rest of the Nation. See Supreme Court Rule 10.
The central issue in this case is the interpretation of the “door-closing” provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). That section provides that;
no court shall have jurisdiction to review any decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.1
This circuit initially took the position that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar applied to challenges of discretionary decisions only when the IJ was exercising discretion that had been granted by statute; we did not apply the door-closing provision to bar jurisdiction over exercises of discretion conferred only by regulation. *570See Singh v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar review of an IJ’s denial of a motion to reopen immigration proceedings).
We since have reversed course, however, beginning with our decision in Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir.2007). In Ali, the petitioner sought review of an IJ’s decision to deny his motion to continue his removal proceedings, which he had sought so that he could pursue adjustment of his immigration status. The petitioner argued that the door-closing provision did not divest us of jurisdiction because, by its terms, that provision precluded review only of decisions or actions that are committed to the Attorney General’s discretion by “this subsection” of the statute: that is, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1381. The immigration statute makes no mention of motions to continue; the IJ’s discretion to grant a continuance arises not from the statute but from a regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. The petition argued that, therefore, the door-closing provision does not apply to review of an IJ’s decision to deny a motion to continue. Although the Government agreed with the petitioner’s position, we nevertheless rejected it. We reasoned that, although the discretion to grant or deny a continuance was not conferred by statute, the authority to do so stemmed from 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, which “confers upon immigration judges the authority to conduct removal proceedings.” Ali, 502 F.3d at 660. Without explicitly overruling Singh, we concluded that this statutory nexus was sufficient to trigger the door-closing provision. We reached this conclusion in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that the IJ’s final determination on an application for adjustment of status is unreviewable by the courts: “Adjustment of status determinations are unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); the IJ’s continuance determination is interim to Ali’s contemplated adjustment of status application, and interim orders entered along the road to an unreviewable final order are themselves unreviewable.” Ali, 502 F.3d at 661.2 In subsequent cases, we have extended our holding in Ali to bar review of not only motions to continue, but also motions to reopen. See Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618, 620-21 (7th Cir.2008); Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534, 536-39 (7th Cir.2008);3 Jezierski v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.2008).
Our broad interpretation of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s scope puts us on the distinct minority side of an intercircuit split over the applicability of the door-closing provision to claims challenging the exercise of discretion granted by regulation rather than by statute. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have reached the same conclusion that we have in the context of a denial of a continuance. See Yerkovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir.2004); Onyinkwa v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2004). Every other circuit, as well as the Attorney General, has reached the opposite conclusion: that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only bars review of decisions made in the exercise of discretion *571conferred by statute — specifically 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1381. See Lendo v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 441 n. 1 (4th Cir.2007); Alsamhouri v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 117, 122 (1st Cir.2007); Zafar v. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1360-62 (11th Cir.2006); Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 232-33 (3d Cir.2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir.2006); Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir.2006); Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 633-34 (6th Cir.2006); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 528-29 (9th Cir.2004). The majority of circuits read section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to bar review only where both the authority and the discretion to make the decision were granted by statute. Hence, these eight circuits, and the Attorney General, have concluded that the courts do have the authority to review decisions on motions to continue and motions to reopen, because the discretion to grant or deny them is conferred not by statute but by regulation.
Notably, no other circuit has determined, as we did in Kucana, that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is a bar to our review of the denial of a motion to reopen in an asylum case where the decision affects the alien’s right to review of substantive decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals that are based on a mistake or misunderstanding of the factual basis of a claim— decisions that the Supreme Court has analogized to motions under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 401, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995); see also Kucana, 533 F.3d 534, 539-40 (Ripple, J., concurring dubitante). In fact, even the Tenth Circuit, which agrees with us that motions to continue are not reviewable, has drawn the line at motions to reopen. See Ntiri v. Gonzales, 227 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (“We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen, at least where judicial review of the underlying order is not precluded.” (citing Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (10th Cir.2004))).
The immigration laws of the United States should be administered even-handedly across the entire Nation. No attribute of sovereignty rests in a federal circuit to go its own way and subject individuals to treatment different from what they would receive from the United States Government in any other part of the Country. This principle is especially true in areas such as immigration and asylum law where decisions of the administrative process affect so drastically the course of the human lives impacted by the decision. I respectfully suggest that the holdings of Ali and its progeny should be re-examined before their dominion is spread even further afield.
Turning briefly to the facts of this case, I believe that Mr. Patel preserved his due process claim, which we have jurisdiction to hear because it is a constitutional claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Jezierski, 543 F.3d at 890 (noting that a claim alleging insufficient notice in violation of due process would be reviewable by this court). However, because the IJ determined, as a matter of fact, that the Government had in fact sent the notice to the address supplied by Mr. Patel and since there was sufficient evidence to support that determination, I do not believe that this contention can survive the deferential review that we owe the IJ on such a fact-bound conclusion.4 Accordingly, I would *572deny Mr. Patel’s petition on the merits rather than dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.

. Section 1158(a) pertains to asylum relief; it is not implicated in this case because the IJ never made a decision about Mr. Patel's eligibility for asylum.

. One might question whether this reasoning has any force in the context of asylum proceedings, final decisions about which are subject to judicial review. See Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir.2008) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, we subsequently have held that the door-closing provision applies with equal force to discretionary decisions made during asylum proceedings. See Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618, 620-21 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that section 1252(a)(2)(b)(ii) bars review of an IJ’s denial of a motion to reopen asylum proceedings); Kucana, 533 F.3d at 536-39 (same).

. In Kucana, we finally did overrule Singh explicitly, in part because we recognized that its holding was "not tenable” after our decision in Ali. Kucana, 533 F.3d at 537-38.

. Among other things, the IJ noted that Mr. Patel admitted in his first motion to reopen that he lived at “4 Wedgewood Lane, Miller Place, Long Island City, N.Y. 11764, until December 31, 1998.” A.R. 135. This was the address to which the notice was sent. This admission contradicts Mr. Patel’s argument before the BIA and before this court that he never lived in Long Island City. The IJ also found that a return receipt for the notice was signed by someone with the surname Patel.
*572As for Mr. Patel’s claim that he submitted a change-of-address form to the INS when he moved to Chicago in 1999, the IJ’s decision to disbelieve it is also supported by substantial evidence. The only proof that Mr. Patel provided to show that he submitted the form was his own affidavit and a photocopy of a postmarked envelope, which he later admitted was forged. The IJ acted reasonably in finding that Mr. Patel had fabricated this claim.
In short, the evidence in the record supports the IJ’s finding that proper notice was mailed to the last address that Mr. Patel provided. This is all that due process requires. Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2004).