Court Opinion

ID: 9588259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:56.770028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:46.424787
License: Public Domain

McCULLOUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
In this case defendant failed to appear for his deposition. The trial court imposed sanctions which included the payment of attorneys’ fees and court reporter costs as well as striking defendant’s pleadings regarding the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence. The majority opinion upholds the sanctions of attorneys’ fees and court reporter costs but vacates the order striking the defenses. From this ruling I dissent.
Defendant’s deposition was scheduled for 5 April 2007 at the law office of plaintiff’s counsel. The lawyers and court reporter arrived, but defendant failed to appear. Plaintiff’s attorney moved for sanctions and requested that the court “[e]nter an order striking all plead*182ings filed by defendant and rendering a judgment by default against defendant.” The trial court declined to impose the full measure of sanctions requested and instead ordered the striking of the affirmative defenses but left defendant’s denial of negligence intact.
At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, defendant recounted a rather preposterous story of having forgotten the name and address of plaintiff’s law firm; thus, he sought directions to his own lawyer’s office. No one in Washington, N.C., knew how to direct him to his lawyer’s office, which is not surprising since his attorney is from Greensboro. He never called his lawyer and eventually went home.
After defendant’s explanation and argument, the trial court decided that the appropriate sanction should be the payment of attorneys’ fees and court reporter costs as well as the striking of defenses, leaving defendant’s denial of negligence for trial.
As the majority recognizes, Rule 37 permits the trial court to impose sanctions as was done here. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(d) (2007).
In the case sub judice the trial judge declined to impose the more drastic sanction requested, that of default judgment, even though such a sanction is clearly permissible. Imports, Inc. v. Credit Union, 37 N.C. App. 121, 245 S.E.2d 798 (1978).
The majority also properly notes that the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 is in the sound discretion of the trial judge and cannot be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. In re Pedestrian Walkway Failure, 173 N.C. App. 237, 618 S.E.2d 819 (2005).
Rulings committed to a trial judge’s discretion are accorded great deference and will not be overturned unless it is shown that the decision was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
Nonetheless, the majority has freely substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The trial judge clearly exercised discretion and refused to grant the full measure of sanctions requested, limiting his order to the striking of affirmative defenses along with the monetary payments. The denial of negligence was left for trial.
In justifying its actions, the majority quotes from Imports, Inc. The quoted portion cited by the majority discusses dismissals and defaults, neither of which are present here. See id.
*183The trial judge made a discretionary decision within the range of permissible sanctions and in so doing clearly exercised his discretion as the court declined to impose the full measure of sanctions requested. Having acted in accordance with Rule 37, the trial court is entitled to be upheld. In this case I would give deference to the trial judge and uphold the sanctions imposed.