Court Opinion

ID: 9736537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:59:04.887374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.264024
License: Public Domain

*438Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Arnold:
The Orphans’ Court Act of 1951, §301, 20 PS §2080.301, and §702, 20 PS §2080.702, did not enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court, being merely declaratory of prior law insofar as questions not standing directly in the way of distribution. See Statutory Construction Act, Section 52 (4), 46 PS §552, and §81, 46 PS §581, and Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Central Brewing Company, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 543, 15 A. 2d 723; Department of Highways of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 376, 14 A. 2d 611.
The decisions under the prior statutes establish that the orphans’ court has power to determine questions standing directly in the way of distribution. See Dundas’s Appeal, 73 Pa. 474. “When the share of one who is apparently entitled is claimed by another, such claim must be established in the proceeding for distribution . . .”: McGettrick’s Appeal, 98 Pa. 9, 12.
In the instant case nothing stands in the way of distribution to Miss Keller under the second and only probated will. The agreement is not an assignment and she executed no deed of assignment. Nor did she charge any part of her estate (inherited under the second will) with the 65% which Way had agreed to take out of his estate under the first Avill. Cf. Murphy’s Estate, 258 Pa. 38, 101 A. 935; Purman Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 56 A. 2d 86; Stinson’s Estate, 143 Pa. Superior Ct. 512, 18 A. 2d 678. When she probated the second will, with the consequent order of the Orphans’ Court of Centre County, the probate became final, and forever afterwards it Avas the last will and testament of the decedent.
Way filed his account as executor under the first will, but whether as administrator c.t.a. or de son tort he does not state. In any event he had no authority *439to do anything with the balance for distribution except to pay in accordance with the second will, and then sue Miss Keller in the common pleas for breach of her agreement.
Nothing stood in the way of distribution by Way as fiduciary since there was no assignment of any part of the fund to him, nor any charge by Miss Keller of any payment to him out of the fund. If the agreement means anything it means that Way pays to Miss Keller 35% of Ms share under the first will. Since the first will failed he cannot now perform.
Actually the situation is one in which the Orphans’ Court of Centre County undertook to award damages to Way for the failure of Miss Keller to perform her contract with him. Ordinarily the orphans’ court has no jurisdiction to determine distribution between living parties under an agreement made by them. This can be determined only by a jury trial. Cf. Murphy’s Estate, 258 Pa. 38, 101 A. 935. This claim of Way is not founded on any contract with the decedent. Instead it is between two living parties. Here a dispute exists whether Miss Keller was induced to execute the agreement by fraud or under a misapprehension of the facts. She constantly objected to the reception of the agreement in evidence: first that the orphans’ court had no power to decide the issue, and second that there was fraud. The issue is whether Miss Keller had a constitutional right to have that question submitted to a jury. In DiPaola Estate, 350 Pa. 408, 39 A. 2d 519, the appellant there cited the administrator of a decedent’s estate to deliver to her all of the decedent’s personal property claimed as a gift causa mortis from the decedent. It appeared from the evidence that the administrator and the alleged sole next of kin had entered into a binding written agreement two days after the death, whereby the decedent’s estate would be di*440vided among the parties to the agreement. The orphans’ court found that there was no fraud, accident or mistake in the execution of such agreement. At the time of the signing of the agreement, all the personal property was in the possession of the administrator, except one diamond ring which was in the appellant’s possession. The Court held: “In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake the written and sealed agreement of persons of full age and under no legal disabilities may not be disregarded. The appellant has, by the execution of the agreement, precluded herself from the relief which she seeks. The petition was properly dismissed.” But the Court added that “it is also clear that this is not the appropriate proceeding in which to distribute a decedent’s estate ” which must await the audit; that the petition was without notice to creditors or other interested parties and would be without legal effect. (Italics supplied). In other words, in the DiPaola Estate the assets of the decedent were in the hands of his administrator, and the petitioner-appellant sought to get these assets out of the estate and into her own hands. She was barred by virtue of the agreement which she signed. Thus the orphans’ court had jurisdiction to determine whether the claim of the appellant was a bar to the distribution, and held that it was not.
Nor was there an estoppel here. The second will was offered for probate only 14 days after the probate of the first will and a citation issued on Way. Hence there was no deleterious change of position by the appellant. Nor did Miss Keller’s exception to Way’s distribution and the request for the appointment of au auditor raise an estoppel. She was forced to file exceptions to the distribution, and she had a right to ask for the appointment of an auditor to pass upon the questions. She constantly raised the question that *441the orphans’ court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the agreement. I accordingly dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Hobace Steen joins in this dissenting opinion.