Court Opinion

ID: 9481006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:05:14.902033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:02.734070
License: Public Domain

TACHA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I share the majority’s concern that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) is a potential health hazard. I cannot agree, however, that such exposure rises to the level of an eighth amendment violation. There is no evidence that Clem-mons’s health has been adversely affected by cigarette smoke from his cellmate. Moreover, society itself is struggling to balance the rights of smokers and nonsmokers at the present time.
I find no basis in eighth amendment jurisprudence for forcing on prison officials, or conversely favoring nonsmoking prisoners with, a constitutionally-mandated health standard that is as yet not enjoyed by those persons living and working outside the prison walls. I find that the majority’s effort to engraft a constitutional dimension onto this controversial societal issue constitutes a challenge to the basic purpose of the eighth amendment and the proper role of the federal judiciary. In the immortal words of Chief Justice Marshall, “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). The majority has forgotten this cornerstone commandment of constitutional jurisprudence.
I.
The Supreme Court in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), clearly laid out the eighth amendment analysis governing this case:
[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are totally without penological justification.
No static test can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.... Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views of judges ... [b]ut ... should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent ... [ojbjective indicia [may be] derived from history, the action of state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries.
452 U.S. at 346-47, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).
Contrary to the majority’s position, see maj. op. at note 7, the eighth amendment does not sweep so broadly as to include possible latent harm to Clemmons’s health. This court has previously held that the “core areas” of any eighth amendment claim are shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, medical care, and adequate clothing. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 & n. 8 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981); see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (conditions of confinement in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), violated eighth amendment because of serious deprivations of basic necessities of life); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836-39 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“deprivations” that trigger eighth amendment scrutiny are deprivations of essential human needs — food, shelter, health care, and personal safety). Clemmons’s complaint that he is forced to share a cell with a smoker does not implicate any of these core eighth amendment areas, see Ramos, 639 F.2d at 566 & n. 8, nor does exposure to ETS “deprive [Clemmons] of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” *871Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399; Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 836-39.
If Clemmons’s claim colorably touches the most peripheral edge of a core eighth amendment area, it would be the area of adequate medical/health care. Clem-mons’s complaint of exposure to ETS, however, simply does not rise to the level of “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s serious illness or injury, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (severe back pain and high blood pressure), nor is it comparable to the situation where prison conditions are so horrible that there is an immediate and substantial danger to the health and safety of the inmates, e.g., Ramos, 639 F.2d 559 (substandard conditions of shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, and medical care); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir.1977) (191% overcrowding resulting in substandard living conditions). The deliberate indifference standard for medical care requires that the inmate’s illness or injury be a serious one, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92; Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 n. 4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2624, 110 L.Ed.2d 645 (1990), for example: four knife stab wounds, Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.1990), broken bones rendering limbs useless or the plaintiff unconscious; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir.1989) (cracked hipball joint); Brown, 894 F.2d 1533 (broken foot); Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.1990) (neck trauma), symptoms of a heart attack, Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1990) (chest pains, shortness of breath, dizziness), or chronic illness, White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir.1990) (epilepsy); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir.1990) (schizophrenic with suicidal tendencies). Clemmons does not have a serious medical need; he has alleged no adverse physical symptoms from cigarette smoke. Clemmons’s complaint regarding ETS is simply of a different order of magnitude from those cases which have found an eighth amendment violation due to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
The majority’s conclusion that Clemmons has introduced a genuine issue of material fact supporting a claim under the eighth amendment due to the “unreasonable risk of debilitating” effects from ETS is nothing short of surprising. In Rhodes, the Supreme Court solidly rejected the argument of Justice Marshall, who would have found an eighth amendment violation whenever prison conditions “if left unchecked, [would] cause deterioration in [the prisoners’] mental and physical health.” Id. 452 U.S. at 375, 101 S.Ct. at 2414 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Eight justices found that although 38 percent overcrowding and double-celling in fifty-five square foot cells were not desirable, these conditions did not “inflict unnecessary or wanton pain,” id. at 348, 101 S.Ct. at 2400, were not “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes,” id., and did not rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation. See id. at 348-50 & n. 15, 101 S.Ct. at 2400-01 & n. 15; id. at 366-68, 101 S.Ct. at 2409-10 (Brennan, J., with Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring). In light of Rhodes, the majority’s reliance on a broad reading of Ramos’s and Battle’s “healthy habilita-tive environment” language is misplaced. Accordingly, I would find that requiring Clemmons to share a cell with a smoker does not create a genuine issue of material fact implicating a core area protected by the eighth amendment. See Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 837-39 (“If the necessities are provided, then the Eighth Amendment has been satisfied_”).
Furthermore, the majority has not identified a genuine issue of material fact supporting an eighth amendment violation under Rhodes because it cannot point to proper objective factors supporting its conclusions regarding society’s evolving standards of decency. The 1986 Surgeon General’s report, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Surgeon General’s report], heavily relied upon by the majority, does not establish a minimum constitutional standard; rather, it recommends a public health goal that society should strive to achieve, and calls for more research. Public health recommendations by medical experts — even *872the Surgeon General — do not constitute “contemporary standards of decency.” When determining contemporary standards of decency, “of greatest importance under the Constitution is the public’s attitude toward a given sanction or condition, ” Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 836-37 (emphasis in original). See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2400 n. 13 (recommendations of professional groups do not constitute constitutional minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in question); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876 n. 27, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (same); Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 837 (professional standards do not serve as constitutional benchmarks).
Looking to objective indicia of the general public’s attitude, as we must, see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47, 101 S.Ct. at 2399-2400, a review of the state legislation cited by the majority as forbidding or restricting smoking reveals that the vast majority of these laws are limited to public places, which are statutorily defined so as to exclude prisons.1 Thus, although society’s attitude as indicated by the objective factor of state legislation shows a trend toward protecting the rights of nonsmokers in public places, society has expressly rejected extending these protections to prisons and nonsmoking prisoners. The majority paves the way for the constitutionalization of a public health goal for prisoners that the vast majority of state legislatures has expressly rejected.
The fundamental error of the majority’s approach lies in the presumption that it is the duty of the courts to spearhead society’s evolving standard of decency. Rather, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it is our duty to apply society’s standard even though the standard may be “restrictive and even harsh,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399, lest we violate the injunction that “Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective view” of judges, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1139, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). The Court in Rhodes specifically cautioned against what the majority is doing here — that is, using the Constitution to reform prisons according to “a court’s idea of how best to operate a prison facility.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351, 101 S.Ct. at 2401. Although it may be unpleasant for Clemmons to share a cell *873with a smoker, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Id. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. Clemmons’s discomfort does not violate the evolving minimum standards of decency that mark our society today.
A constitutional right to a smoke-free cell would have no limits and it would open a Pandora’s box of constitutional challenges for prison administrators. ETS is not contained by bars or even walls. The 1986 Surgeon General’s report states that “[t]he data contained in this Report on the rapid diffusion of tobacco smoke throughout an enclosed environment suggests that separation of smokers and nonsmokers in the same room or in different rooms that share the same ventilation system may reduce ETS exposure but will not eliminate exposure.” Id. at xii.2 If Clemmons is successful on remand, prison administrators eventually may be forced to house smokers and nonsmokers in separate facilities to eliminate the nonsmokers’ exposure to ETS. I find no justification whatsoever for making the rights of nonsmoking prisoners paramount over the myriad of health and security concerns that prison officials must confront and balance daily. At worst, the majority opinion lays the groundwork for a constitutional burden that will be impossible for prison authorities to carry, given the well-documented state of our underfinanced and overcrowded prison systems. At best, the majority imposes an unwarranted and unprecedented constraint on the discretion of prison administrators to balance potential versus immediate health and safety concerns. As Judge Leon Higginbotham has stated, “[t]he eighth amendment does not confer upon this Court the authority to impose upon [prison administration] our notions of enlightened policy.” Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir.1988).
II.
Finally, I also am troubled by the majority opinion because it sets up a tension between the state’s reserved powers over public health, safety, and welfare and the concern of the federal courts with the constitutionally humane treatment of those imprisoned. We do not need to create such a tension; we need only decide if it is cruel and unusual punishment for a nonsmoking prisoner to be celled with a smoking one. I would find that it is not.
ORDER
Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Appellees’ petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc are granted. Judges McKay and Seymour would deny rehearing.
A supplemental briefing schedule will be set by a subsequent order.
ORDER
Appellees’ petition for rehearing was granted by order of November 14, 1990, which is ordered published. David Gottlieb of the University of Kansas Defender Project is appointed as counsel for appellant. Appellees may file a supplemental brief within twenty days of the date of this order. Appellant may file a response brief within twenty days of service of appellees’ brief. Appellees may file a reply brief within ten days of service of appellant’s response brief.

. In roughly the order cited by the majority, see Kan.Stat.Ann. § 21-4009 (1988) ("public place” defined as enclosed indoor areas open to the public or used by the general public); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25949 (1990) (eliminating smoking on public transportation vehicles); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. 22, § 1672-A(1) (1989) (smoking in shopping centers restricted); Ariz.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 36-601.01 (1986) (restricting smoking in certain public areas); id. § 36-601.02(C) (specifically exempting inmate use areas within state prisons from smoking restrictions); N.J. Stat.Ann. § 26:3D-39 (1985) ("indoor public place” defined as a structurally closed area generally accessible to the public which is not owned or leased by a governmental entity); Or. Rev.Stat. § 433.835 (1989) ("public place” means any enclosed indoor area open to and frequented by the public); R.I.Gen.Laws § 23-20.7-3 to .7-4 (1989) (restricting smoking in the workplace); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-106 (1989) (restricting smoking in public places, schools, and child care centers); Wash.Rev. Code Ann. § 70.160.010 (1989) (restricting smoking in public places); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 20-27-703 (1987) (restricting smoking in patient areas of medical facilities and on school buses); Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-14-102, 25-14-103 (1989) ("public place” defined as an enclosed indoor area used by the general public or serving as a place of work); Fla.Stat. § 386.203(1) (1986) (areas accessible to general public); Idaho Code § 39-5502 (1985) (“public place” defined as any enclosed indoor area used by the general public); Minn.Stat.Ann. § 144.413 (1987) ("public place” defined as any enclosed indoor area used by the general public or serving as a place of work); Mont.Code Ann. § 50-40-103 (1987) ("enclosed public place" defined as any indoor area, room, or vehicle used by the general public or serving as a place of work); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-5704 (1986) ("public place” defined as any enclosed area used by the general public or serving as a place of work); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2827 n. 11, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (prisons by definition are not public places). But see N.M.Stat.Ann. § 24-16-3(D) (1985) ("public place means any enclosed indoor area in a building owned or leased by the state or any of its political subdivisions.”); Alaska Stat. § 18.35.300(3) (1986) (buildings owned or leased by state or political subdivision); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 155:45(11) (1989) ("'enclosed public places’ means any enclosed, indoor area which is publicly owned or supported by tax revenues.’’).

. This diffusion charactistic merely underscores the reality that with regard to ETS, "you can run, but you cannot hide," at least not unless and until all of society foregoes smoking. Thus, even though a nonsmoker may attempt to avoid ETS by "voluntarily" leaving a smoking environment, he or she cannot escape some level of exposure. See Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.1983). To contend that the involuntary nature of Clemmons’ confinement distinguishes this case from the dilemma of the employee in Kensell ignores the fact all nonsmokers in society today are to some extent "involuntarily” exposed to ETS. What gives nonsmoking prisoners the privilege to be more insulated from ETS than the rest of society? Certainly not the Constitution.