Court Opinion

ID: 9688923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:12:31.066217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:02.665446
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(dissenting).
I join with Justice Russell Anderson and Justice Page in dissent, but I write separately to emphasize my concern for the departure the majority opinion represents from the clear legal principles established by this court so recently in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997) and State v. Johnson, 598 N.W.2d 680 (Minn.1999). In a nutshell, for two principle reasons the analysis of the majority simply does not support its conclusion.
First, the majority reviews at length Busse’s DWI violations in an apparent effort to characterize him as a public threat because of his propensity for driving while intoxicated. But he has paid his price for those offenses, and while tantalizing to snare the unwary1 into believing that he once again is before the court for this predilection, he is not. The sole charge against him before the court now is driving after cancellation of his license as inimical to public safety. The reason the majority would prefer to focus on driving while drinking charges however, seems quite obvious. The majority claims that in Johnson we did not intend to preclude looking at the substantive aspects of a prior offense to determine whether it raises heightened public policy concerns as to the offense currently before the court, and that our language in Johnson was “decidedly tentative” in that respect. I disagree. Our ruling in Johnson was clear and unequivocal — we held that because the prior offense carries its own sanction, fairness dictates it not again be used to determine the sanction for the current-and substantially different — matter before the court, Johnson, 598 N.W.2d at 684. Our language in Johnson was a warning that the very step the majority is now taking *97could — and in the majority ruling now does — lead to sanctioning Busse for a second time for his driving while drinking offenses. The majority’s analysis is particularly perverse when it relies on Stone: “[W]e follow Stone’s direction to also consider the extent to which the activity directly threatens physical harm.” If it followed Stone’s direction however, it would come to just the opposite conclusion, because the “activity” here was driving after cancellation-conduct that hardly threatens physical harm. It is noteworthy that the arresting officer apparently did not think so either, as he did not arrest Busse at the time he observed him driving, but rather hours later when Busse was sitting benignly as a passenger in a car driven by a friend. There is no evidence of alcohol involvement on either occasion.
Second, the majority fails to answer the point we made in State v. Johnson and repeated in the dissents in which I join: if, as we held in State v. Stone, a tribal member is not subject to state traffic laws requiring a driver’s license while driving on his reservation, under what possible reasoning can that tribal member be subject to state traffic laws for driving after cancellation of his unneeded license? I assert that if this question cannot be answered, and from the failure of the majority to answer it, it appears that it cannot, then the fundamental principle of the majority’s logic fails, because the “crime” as to which he is charged is not a crime at all.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Stringer.
ANDERSON, Russell A., Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Stringer.

. The majority apparently takes some umbrage for language in this dissent, characterizing it as "dramatic.” So be it. When respected colleagues stray so far from established jurisprudence, as does the majority, drama is the appropriate antidote to catch their conscience. "The play’s the thing Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.” William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 2, sc. 2.