Court Opinion

ID: 9751786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:04:11.761548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:59.268896
License: Public Domain

SILLS, P. J., Concurring.
I fully concur in the lead opinion but write separately because the term “binding mediation” is relatively new in the legal lexicon and because it is a deceptive and misleading term. Given that *1626numerous court rules empower the judiciary to require attendance and good faith participation in a settlement conference1—the old fashioned term for mediation—lawyers may easily think that the term “binding mediation” simply means they are compelled to attend and participate; that’s all. They may not realize the term might be interpreted to mean that if a settlement is not reached, then, puff, the mediation becomes an arbitration.
I also write separately to more clearly register the oxymoronic character of the concept of “binding mediation.” As lawyers we should use precise language—that is our tradition. A fuzzy PR phrase like “binding mediation” is not worthy of us.
As all of us on this panel noted in Vedanta Society of So. California v. California Quartet, Ltd. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 517 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 889], the authors of text (whether legislation, novels or settlement agreements) “generally do not want to contradict themselves—and when they do, their whimsy should be relatively obvious from the text (e.g., ‘The sun was shining on the sea/Shining with all his might . . . And this was odd, because it was/The middle of the night.’ ” (Id. at p. 527, fn. 11.) I can think of nothing more self-contradictory than “binding mediation.” Mediation is by definition a voluntary process which achieves a voluntary result, and is meaningful in distinction to “arbitration” in its very voluntariness. Or, to put it with more bite—mediation is distinctive from arbitration in its inherent lack of consequences. You go to mediation, you like it, you don’t, you settle, you don’t, no big deal.
Now, granted, persons can voluntarily agree to a process which yields a result out of their control—the roulette table comes to mind. But when the result of some sort of adjudication is “binding,” it is “binding” precisely because it is the product of a public (court) or private (arbitration) decision maker ultimately backed up by the government. A private decision maker with “binding” power is called an arbitrator. A private decision maker who simply tries to have parties come to some voluntary agreement is a mediator. A mediator with binding power is an arbitrator, not a mediator. (See Knight et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group 2005) ¶ 3:12.1, p. 3-4 [“Parties sometimes authorize the mediator to render a binding decision in the event an impasse is declared with respect to settlement negotiations. The dispute resolution procedure then becomes, in effect, an arbitration.”].)
*1627Unfortunately, the term “binding mediation” has come into existence because the Madison Avenue and MBA types have taken over what we once called “private judging.” Now we call it “alternative dispute resolution” because that is a softer and gentler term and implies that the parties will have their disputes resolved in a way that is mutually satisfactory; not that they will receive a decision from a judge which one of the parties will not like. “Private judging” implies a quasi trial process with all of the tension of a courtroom and the acrimony of litigation. Although, “alternative dispute resolution” is virtually the same thing, it sounds softer. Likewise, “settlement conference” is also a forbidden term. The public relations people like “mediation” because mediation implies that your matter or dispute will be resolved to your satisfaction. The term “settlement conference” sounds like a committee meeting where people get together and talk about a settlement, but nothing might happen. That of course is unacceptable after the parties have spent a lot of money to schedule the meeting. Another term that the public relations people don’t like is “arbitration,” because arbitration implies that a decision will be made and not necessarily a decision one or both of the parties may like. Hence, “binding mediation” has come into existence because it is kinder and gentler. But as this case demonstrates, it is half-baked arbitration.
The California Rules of Court define mediation as a process in which a mediator assists the parties in “reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.” (Rule 1620.2(a).) And the voluntary aspect of mediation is further underscored in rule 1620.3: “A mediator must conduct the mediation in a manner that supports the principles of voluntary participation and self-determination by the parties.” The rule goes on to prohibit mediators from “coercing any party to make a decision or to continue to participate in the mediation.” (Rule 1620.3(c).)
Besides the self-contradictory nature of the phrase, the “hybrid”2 concept of a “mediation” which fails to reach a mutually acceptable settlement and then turns into an arbitration where the mediator is also the arbitrator can have unexpected consequences. One of these consequences is that the use of “binding mediation” may actually retard settlement. Judges and lawyers with extensive experience in conducting settlement conferences know that the person conducting the conference frequently hears things from the lawyers *1628that he would be never hear were he the trial judge or arbitrator. For example, a lawyer might tell a mediator that his client doesn’t recognize his exposure and cannot get him to understand the downside of his case. The lawyer will ask, “You can help, I think he will listen to you.” Another lawyer might tell a mediator that he can possibly get another $50,000 if the other party will only come down another $100,000 on their demand. Or, both lawyers might tell a mediator what they candidly think their case is worth but ask the mediator to explain to each party the exposures they face so as to get movement toward settlement. But no lawyer in his right mind would ever tell such things to a mediator if he thought it was possible the mediator might become the arbitrator.3 For that very reason, rule 1620.7(g) requires a mediator to exercise “caution” when combining mediation with other alternative resolution processes and to do so only with the “informed consent of the parties.” And, if the mediation can become an arbitration, each party must be given opportunity to select “another neutral” to conduct the ensuing proceedings.
Another, perhaps more ominous consequence of the hybridization of mediation and arbitration may be damage to the very quality of justice yielded by the process, in effect having the worst of both worlds—hence rule 1620.7(g)’s admonition to mediators to “exercise caution in combining mediation with other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes.”
As rule 1620.3 emphasizes, mediations are supposed to reflect a truly voluntary process. They have the advantage that, by definition, they reflect the consent of the parties.
And for their part, arbitrations have the epistemological advantages of a truly adversarial process. Each side has an incentive to present its best case, and the result will not necessarily give either side everything it wants.
But contrast those two ideals with the process contemplated in the very case before us: Parties submit “bids” in the form of settlement offers (and some written argument), and the mediator/arbitrator then selects one. Talk about roulette wheels. What was contemplated here was not “mediation” but simply a low-quality arbitration.
*1629The stipulation we have before us obviously did not comply with the requirement of rule 1620.7(g) that parties have the right to “select another neutral” when mediation is “combine[d]” with “other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes.” Whether rule 1620.7 governs this case, however, is an issue which we have spared ourselves because we decide it on contract grounds: By using the term “binding mediation” the language of this contract is unenforceably vague.
Thus, in my view, regardless of whether this dispute is governed by the California Rules of Court, only a clearly written agreement signed by the parties can set forth a process whereby an unsuccessful settlement conference (or mediation) morphs into a de facto arbitration. The key to approval of such agreement is clarity of language and informed consent. We have neither here.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 28, 2006.

 E.g., California Rules of Court, rules 212 and 222. All further references to any court rule are to the California Rules of Court.

 One Rutter Practice Guide describes “binding mediation” as a “ ‘hybrid’ ” but doesn’t elaborate. (See Friedman et al, Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2006) I 1:333 [“Mediation is typically nonbinding (although the parties might agree to a ‘hybrid’ binding mediation). This form of dispute resolution is particularly suitable to landlord-tenant disputes . . . .”].)

 We thus may be doing to mediation what Justice Kennard warned stipulated reversals would do to the process of settlement on appeal. (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 288-291 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)