Court Opinion

ID: 9898210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:10.750316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:13.249030
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 LANCE RAMSAY,
                                                 No. 84625-6-I
                     Appellant,
                                                 DIVISION ONE
              v.

 WASHINGTON STATE                                UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 DEPARTMENT OF
 TRANSPORTATION; and UNKNOWN
 DEFENDANTS 1-50,

                     Respondents.

      MANN, J. — Lance Ramsay was injured while working as a Washington State

Patrol (WSP) Trooper. Because of his injuries, Ramsay collected workers’

compensation benefits and ultimately retired from the WSP. Ramsay later sued the

Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) for negligence. Ramsay

appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the negligence case. Ramsay

argues that the trial court erred because he has a right to sue the State under RCW

41.26.281, which allows members of the Washington Law Enforcement Officers’ and

Firefighters’ Retirement System Act (LEOFF), ch. 41.26 RCW to sue their employers.
No. 84625-6-I/2
Because Ramsay was not a member of LEOFF, the trial court did not err in granting

WSDOT’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

                                              I

      The facts are undisputed. Ramsay was commissioned as a WSP Trooper in

1992 and became a member of the WSP’s benefits system known as the Washington

State Patrol Retirement System (WSPRS). RCW 43.43.130.

      On December 23, 2018, Ramsay was working as part of an escort detail when he

lost control of his motorcycle and was ejected. Ramsay sustained serious injuries which

permanently altered his ability to work as a WSP Trooper. Because of his injuries,

Ramsay applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits and vocational

retraining from the Department of Labor and Industries. In August 2019, Ramsay

retired from the WSP.

      On December 7, 2020, Ramsay sued WSDOT and claimed his injuries were

caused by their negligence. The trial court granted WSDOT’s motion for summary

judgment asserting that the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), RCW 51.40.010, barred

Ramsay’s claim.

      Ramsay appeals.

                                           II

      Ramsay argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his negligence action

against WSDOT because he has a right to sue under RCW 41.26.281, which allows

members of LEOFF to sue their employers. Because Ramsay was not a member of

LEOFF, we disagree.

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No. 84625-6-I/3
                                              A

       We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck v.

Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). Summary judgment is proper

when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370; CR 56(c).

       We also review statutory interpretation de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell &

Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). “The court’s fundamental objective

is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain

on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of

legislative intent.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. To determine legislative

intent, we look to “all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes.”

Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11. Only if the statute is ambiguous and susceptible

to more than one meaning do we turn to other aids to construction, including legislative

intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12.

                                              B

       The Washington workers’ compensation system, the IIA, is typically the sole

remedy available to workers who are injured on the job. RCW 51.04.010; RCW

51.12.010. The IIA is a “grand compromise” that provides workers with swift and certain

relief in a no-fault system. Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wn.2d 391, 396, 334 P.3d 519

(2014). In exchange for speedy and certain compensation and medical treatment, the

IIA generally prohibits individuals who are injured on the job from suing their employers

in tort. RCW 51.04.010.

                                           -3-
No. 84625-6-I/4
      LEOFF, however, provides an exception to the IIA bar and allows certain law

enforcement officers and firefighters with another avenue of relief. RCW 41.26.281.

LEOFF provides members with a cause of action against governmental employers for

negligence as follows:

      If injury or death results to a member from the intentional or negligent act
      or omission of a member’s governmental employer, the member, the
      widow, widower, child, or dependent of the member shall have the
      privilege to benefit under this chapter and also have cause of action
      against the governmental employer as otherwise provided by law, for any
      excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this
      chapter.

RCW 41.26.281. The question before us is whether Ramsay was a member of LEOFF

and can benefit from the exception.

                                            1

      While Ramsay admits that he is not a member of LEOFF, he argues that he has

a cause of action under RCW 41.26.281 by virtue of his employment as a law

enforcement officer with WSP. We disagree.

       “It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that where a term is defined we will use

that definition.” U.S. v. Hoffman, 154 Wn.2d 730, 741, 116 P.3d 999 (2005). Under

LEOFF, a “member” is defined as:

      any firefighter, law enforcement officer, or other person as would apply
      under subsection (17) or (19) of this section whose membership is
      transferred to the Washington law enforcement officers’ and firefighters’
      retirement system on or after March 1, 1970, and every law enforcement
      officer and firefighter who is employed in that capacity on or after such
      date.

RCW 41.26.030(21). LEOFF defines a member “law enforcement officer” as “any

person who is commissioned and employed by an employer on a full time, fully

compensated basis to enforce the criminal laws of the state of Washington generally.”

                                          -4-
No. 84625-6-I/5
RCW 41.26.030(19). Thus, to be a law enforcement officer member under LEOFF, the

individual must be employed by an “employer” as defined in the statute.

        An “employer” is defined by LEOFF in two ways, depending on whether the

person is a Plan 1 or Plan 2 member. LEOFF divides its members between Plan 1 for

those who joined the system before October 1, 1977, and Plan 2 for those who joined

on or after October 1, 1977. 1 The definition of a Plan 2 employer lists several entities,

only one of which has the potential to include the WSP and that is “the governing body

of any other general authority law enforcement agency.” RCW 41.26.030(14)(b). 2

LEOFF also defines a general authority law enforcement agency to specifically exclude

the WSP:

        any agency, department, or division of a municipal corporation, political
        subdivision, or other unit of local government of this state, and any
        agency, department, or division of state government, having as its primary
        function the detection and apprehension of persons committing infractions
        or violating the traffic or criminal laws in general, but not including the
        Washington state patrol.

RCW 41.26.030(18) (emphasis added).

        1 The Plan 1 employer definition is not helpful in our analysis as it applies only to those who

joined the system before October 1, 1977. Ramsay became a WSP Trooper in 1991 and was
commissioned in 1992.
         2 RCW 41.26.030(14)(b) defines “Employer” for Plan 2 members as:

          the following entities to the extent that the entity employs any law enforcement officer and/or
firefighter:
          (i) The legislative authority of any city, town, county, district, public corporation, or regional fire
protection service authority established under RCW 35.21.730 to provide emergency medical services as
defined in RCW 18.73.030;
          (ii) The elected officials of any municipal corporation;
          (iii) The governing body of any other general authority law enforcement agency;
          (iv) A four-year institution of higher education having a fully operational fire department as of
January 1, 1996; or
          (v) The department of social and health services or the department of corrections when
employing firefighters serving at a prison or civil commitment center on an island.

                                                    -5-
No. 84625-6-I/6
       Thus, under the plain defined terms in LEOFF, a “law enforcement officer” must

be employed by a defined “employer,” and the definition of “employer” excludes the

WSP. Because Ramsay was employed by the WSP, he is not a member of LEOFF.

Because only members of LEOFF can sue their employer in tort, Ramsay’s claim fails

under the plain language of the statute.

                                             2

       Ramsay relies on Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wn.2d 637, 655, 952 P.2d 601

(1998), to support his assertion that LEOFF applies to all law enforcement officers. In

Fray, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a Plan 2 member retained

the right to sue considering the legislature made Plan 2 members eligible for IIA benefits

in 1977. 134 Wn.2d at 645-48. The court determined that the legislature intended to

confer both IIA and LEOFF benefits by making Plan 2 members eligible for IIA benefits

while at the same time not restricting the right to sue. Fray, 134 Wn.2d at 648-49.

       Contrary to Ramsay’s assertion, Fray did not expand the right to sue to apply

beyond LEOFF Plan 1 or Plan 2 membership. Instead, the Supreme Court clarified

Plan II membership rights in light of the legislative history and the plain language of

LEOFF. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fray did not extend the right of members of

LEOFF to sue their employer to nonmembers. The right to sue under LEOFF is limited

to its defined members.

                                             3

       Ramsay also argues that 1971 amendments to LEOFF granted all law

enforcement officers the right to sue their employers in tort and the later adoption of the

WSPRS did not take away that right. We disagree.

                                           -6-
No. 84625-6-I/7
       First, the 1971 amendments to LEOFF did not grant all law enforcement officers

the right to sue their employers in tort. Instead, in 1971, the legislature amended RCW

41.26 to provide “members” of LEOFF the right to sue their employers in tort. LAWS OF

1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 257, § 15 (codified at RCW 41.26.281); Fray, 134 Wn.2d at

643-44 (discussing the legislative history of LEOFF). 3 At that time, the statute defined a

“member” as a firefighter or law enforcement officer who was enrolled in the retirement

system or was employed in that capacity on or after March 1, 1970. LAWS OF 1971, 1st

Ex. Sess., ch. 257, § 6(8). “Law enforcement officer” was narrowly defined to those

serving as county sheriffs or deputy sheriffs, city policy officers, town marshals, or

deputy marshals. LAWS OF 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 257, § 6(3). The definition did not

include WSP troopers.

       Second, the WSPRS is a separate and distinct retirement system from LEOFF.

See Callecod v. Wash. State Patrol, 84 Wn. App. 663, 672, 929 P.2d 510 (1997) (“The

Washington State Patrol’s disability requirements are governed by an exclusive statute

and regulations that are not tied by analogy or otherwise to the LEOFF system.”).

Because they are two distinct systems, Ramsay’s argument that the legislature intended

the right to sue provision in LEOFF to apply to the WSPRS fails. If the legislature had

intended to grant WSP Troopers the right to sue their employer, it could have done so.

       The trial court did not err in granting WSDOT’s motion for summary judgment.

        3 In those same amendments, the legislature removed LEOFF members from coverage under the

IIA and abolished all civil cause of action for personal injury against LEOFF members’ employers except
those provided for in LEOFF. LAWS OF 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 257, § 14 (codified at RCW 41.26.270);
Fray, 134 Wn.2d at 644.

                                               -7-
No. 84625-6-I/8
      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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