Court Opinion

ID: 9654813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:52:05.758337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.844302
License: Public Domain

KLINGEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court holding The City of San Antonio’s Ordinance No. 33259, amending the City’s Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance by rezoning and reclassifying Lots 1 and 2, Block 8, New City Block 3264, from “A-— Single Family Dwellings” to “D — Apartments,” to be null and void, and permanently enjoining the City from granting any permit for the construction on said lots of any structure or permit for any use of said land other than as allowed under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of said City within the areas therein classified “A— -Single Family Dwellings.”
The subject property is two vacant lots located at the intersection of San Pedro Avenue and West Summit Street. Plaintiff, Mrs. Kent N. Hunt, owns a home in the immediate vicinity of such property, her property being located at 321 West Summit Street, in the middle of the block, across the street from the property sought to be rezoned. In 1938, the City of San Antonio enacted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance in which ordinance both blocks were classified as “A — -Single Family Dwellings.”
In 1959, a group of doctors applied for a special exception to the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for a parking lot for *954non-commercial parking of vehicles on the lots here involved, which was granted by the City, but this order was declared null and void by the District Court of Bexar County on December 29, 1959. In January of 1965, Dr. Henry N. Leopold and Dr. James R. O’Neill made an application to the City to reclassify the two lots from “A— Residence District” to “D — Apartment,” and on May 6, 1965, the City Council after a hearing passed Ordinance No. 33259 so reclassifying such lots.
There are certain legal principles which guide us in passing on the validity of the ordinance here in question. A city ordinance is presumed to be valid, and this presumption applies to amendatory zoning ordinances as well as original comprehensive zoning ordinances. In either case, the courts have no authority to interfere unless the change is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and they will not interfere unless it appears that the ordinance represents a clear abuse of municipal discretion. If reasonable minds may differ as to whether or not a particular zoning ordinance has a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, no clear abuse of discretion is shown and the ordinance must stand as a valid exercise of the city’s police power. If the issue of validity is fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere. An “extraordinary burden” rests on one attacking the ordinance to show that no conclusive or even controversial or issuable facts or conditions existed which would authorize the governing board of the municipality to exercise the discretion confided to it. This query presents a question of law, not a question of fact. If there is an issuable fact as to whether the ordinance makes for the good of the community, the fact that it may be detrimental to some private interests is not material. City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477 (1955); City of El Paso v. Donohue, 163 Tex. 160, 352 S.W.2d 713 (1962); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.) 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Sup.1970); City of Lubbock v. Whitacre, 414 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.); City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism’d, correct judgmt.).
The question before this Court is whether under the record there was any issuable fact or conditions which would authorize the City Council to' exercise its discretion in the manner here complained of. In making our determination thereof, the question is not whether the City Council actually heard sufficient evidence to support its order, but whether there existed sufficient facts to justify the entry thereof. If, under the entire record, there were issuable facts which tend to establish that the City Council did not abuse its discretion in rezoning the property here involved, its action must stand as a valid exercise of its police power.
The rezoning of the property here involved was recommended for approval by the City Planning Commission. There was testimony before the City Council as reflected by the minutes of the council meeting at which the amendatory ordinance was enacted, which minutes were introduced in evidence, that the structure to be erected on the lots here involved would be in keeping with the entire neighborhood, would have adequate off-street parking, and would not create any traffic hazard. It was stipulated in the trial that in connection with the hearing before the City Council on May 6, 1965, when the amendatory ordinance was enacted, notices thereof were sent to all neighbors, with seven being returned in favor of the proposed zoning change and none in opposition; and that at a previous hearing several months earlier, fifteen notices were sent out to neighbors, with five of such notices being returned in favor of the zoning change and three against; and that such notices were still in the City’s file and were carried over to the May 6, 1965, hearing.
Plaintiff was the only witness in the trial court. She testified that the area involved *955is a residential area and has been for many years; that some homes have been built in this area in recent years; that reclassifying such property would cause parking problems, in particular in front of her home. She also testified that there is a doctors’ clinic situated at the northwest corner of San Pedro Avenue and Summit Street, and that since 1959 a parking lot has been constructed adjacent to the doctors’ clinic, which property is “catty-cornered” from the lots here involved; that there is a parking lot for the Laurel Theater in the block immediately south of and on the same side of the street as the property sought to be rezoned; that Mark Twain Junior High School is immediately to the west of the subject property, and that there has been an increased enrollment in such school. She further testified that San Pedro Avenue has been widened to four lanes, and that the traffic on San Pedro Avenue is substantially heavier than in 1959.1 A map of the area introduced in evidence shows all property to the west of the subject property to be zoned “D — Apartments.” Other adjacent areas are zoned “F — Local Retail.” It appears from such map and the testimony that in this immediate area there are parking lots, apartments, stores, a theater, a doctors’ clinic, other commercial properties, and numerous garage apartments, including garage apartments in the block where the subject property is located and in the block where plaintiff resides.
Plaintiff relies heavily on Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704 (1950). There is little analogy to the facts in that case and those in this case. In Weaver, the City Council had rezoned a lot 150 feet by 300 feet, comprising approximately one-fifth of the area of the block completely surrounded by single family residences and a substantial distance from any commercial uses. In the case before us, blocks immediately to the south and west of the subject property are zoned “F — Local Retail” and “D — Apartments,” and there are various commercial properties in the immediate area, including a theater, parking lots, a medical clinic, and apartments. We do not regard Weaver as applicable.
Under the record before us and the authorities hereinbefore cited, we hold that the plaintiff failed to meet the “extraordinary burden” required of her of showing that no controversial or issuable facts or conditions existed which would authorize the city council to exercise its discretion in rezoning the subject property in the manner here complained of, and that the trial court erred in holding the ordinance in question null and void.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that plaintiff take nothing.

. In Clesi v. Northwest Dallas Improvement Association, Tex.Civ.App., 263 S.W.2d 820, writ ref’d n. r. e., the Court said:
“But aside from all other considerations, only those familiar with Inwood Road since its widening in 1952 can envisage the tremendously increased volume of traffic that has ensued; evidencing without more, such a change of conditions as to constitute a reasonable basis for the rezoning under attack.”