Court Opinion

ID: 9561240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:46.877101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.783016
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
concurring.
The dissent of Justice Shepard compels me to sound a note of caution to those who might read it without familiarity with the statutory and case law development, which background is necessary to a proper interpretation of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). Under informed scrutiny the dissent evinces no merit.
INTRODUCTION
Today’s opinion, in which I fully join, quite correctly remands this case for the development of a record sufficient to permit the application of Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986). The decisions of this Court controlling at the time of the district court’s decision — Chandler v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 480, 660 P.2d 1323 (1983), overruled in Sterling, supra; and Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979) cert. denied 446 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 2963, 64 L.Ed.2d 839, overruled in Sterling, supra — had not required the district court to consider many facts in order to render its decision. Indeed, applying the holding of Chandler, all the court would have needed to consider was that a governmental entity was the defendant in order to find immunity from liability. As we noted in Sterling, Chandler’s holding that the government was immune when engaged in both planning and operational functions seemingly “excepts all government functions. Beyond planning a governmental action, and putting it into operation, what else does a government do in its total function of governing?” Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 227, 723 P.2d at 771.
Justice Shepard’s dissenting opinion is not so much a dissent to today’s decision, to which it devotes little attention, as it is a latter-day assault on Sterling. The majority and concurring opinions to Sterling readily answer the dissent’s substantive assertions. Nevertheless, because the dissent sounds false alarms as to potential governmental liability under Sterling, and advocates a dangerously adventuristic and activist approach to the construction of the ITCA, I feel it advisable to respond.
The dissent apparently would have this Court return to “the task of determining and enunciating policy,” as it was put in Dunbar, supra, 100 Idaho at 546, 602 P.2d at 44, without regard for the plain meaning of the language of the ITCA or for the construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on which the ITCA was patterned. At no point does the dissent so much as acknowledge the ITCA’s language, perhaps because that language is fatal to the policy the dissent would “enunciate.” Nor does the dissent properly acknowledge the federal case law which predated the Idaho legislature’s adoption of much of the FTCA. Rather, the dissent endeavors to obfuscate what are in reality unmistakably clear federal rulings regarding the key provisions of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, and 2680(a), primarily by confusing the provisions at issue in individual cases, and by characterizing the results of individual cases without examining their analyses.
*738In contrast with the dissent, a majority of this Court persists in reading the language of the ITCA and recognizing the federal constructions of the same language — constructions entrenched for over fifteen years prior to the passage of the ITCA and undoubtedly known to the Idaho legislature. Put another way, we persist in leaving the “determining and enunciating [of] policy” to the legislature.
I. PARALLEL FUNCTIONS REVISITED
The dissent asserts that neither the Idaho nor the Federal Acts intended “to create new causes of action, but rather intended only to remove the bar to liability when government agents or servants engaged in activity which would be delineated as tortious if the actor were a private individual.” What the dissent fails to appreciate is that Sterling construed I.C. § 6-903(a) to do no more than that: “[T]he language [of I.C. § 6-903(a) ] has always stated that if a private person or entity would be liable, so then, will be the government.” Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 223, 723 P.2d at 767.1
The dissent apparently persists in the Dunbar position that the ITCA intended to provide no new liability against the government at all. As we explained in Sterling, such an argument deprives the ITCA of its very purpose: “to waive the government’s traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability.” Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 377, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957), quoted in Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 222, 723 P.2d at 766.
While the government’s liability is “novel and unprecedented,” there is nothing “novel and unprecedented” about the cause of action asserted in the instant case, that of negligence. Consequently, all Sterling did was exactly what the dissent advocates today, i.e., “remove the bar to liability when government agents or servants engaged in activity which would be delineated as tortious if the actor were a private individual.” See Sterling, supra, At 222, 723 P.2d at 766.
Nevertheless, despite the apparent agreement between the dissent’s summary characterization of the ITCA’s basic purpose and that found in Sterling, the dissent clings to the Dunbar assertion that “governmental” functions without parallel in the private sector ought not be subject to liability, or, as the dissent likes to phrase it, that “it is not a tort for the government to govern.” See Dunbar, supra, 100 Idaho at 546, 602 P.2d at 44 (There the idea was expressed similarly: “We do not ascertain an intent to create a new cause of action against a governmental entity for its attempts to govern.”). Ironically, the dissent cites for support Justice Traynor’s Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). While Justice Traynor quoted the same phrase originated by Justice Jackson, his explanation of its meaning differs diametrically from the dissent’s. Justice Traynor wrote:
Although it “is not a tort for government to govern” (Jackson, J., dissenting in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57, 73 S.Ct. 956, 979, 97 L.Ed. 1427), and basic policy decisions of government within constitutional limitations are therefore necessarily nontortious, it does not follow that the state is immune from liability for the torts of its agents. These considerations are relevant to the question whether in any given case the state through its agents has committed a tort (see 3 Davis, Administrative Law (1958), § 25.11, p. 482, § 25.-13, p. 489), but once it is determined that it has, it must meet its obligations therefor.
*739Government officials are liable for the negligent performance of their ministerial duties (Mock v. City of Santa Rosa, 126 Cal. 330, 334, 58 P. 826; Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441, 444, 95 P. 895) but are not liable for their discretionary acts within the scope of their authority____ Id. 11 Cal.Rptr. at 94, 359 P.2d at 462 (emphasis added; some citations omitted).
Clearly, Justice Traynor contemplated immunity only for policy-making functions and not for “ministerial” or “operational” duties, a dichotomy indistinguishable from the discretionary function planning-operational test as found in the federal case law and adopted in Sterling. Just as clearly, Justice Traynor focused on this distinction alone, and visualized no exception to liability for “uniquely governmental” activities.
Not only is the “uniquely governmental-parallel function” exception unsupported by Justice Traynor’s Muskopf opinion, but also it is expressly rejected by the plain language of the ITCA, is inconsistent with the structure of the ITCA (as it purportedly arises out of I.C. § 6-903(a) instead of the provision on exceptions, I.C. § 6-904), runs counter to the federal case law concerning the analogous provisions of the FTCA, and defies common sense. We documented as much in the majority and concurring opinions in Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 215-23, 233-38, 723 P.2d at 759-67, 777-82. Today’s dissent offers no answer to that documentation; nor does it offer any authority or rationale for the “uniquely governmental-parallel function” test.
It is possible, though not clear, that the dissent sees support for its position in two of the federal cases it discussed, Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1983) and Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.Ct.App.1981). If so, the dissent’s reliance is misplaced.
In Jayvee, the plaintiffs, manufacturers of children’s sleepwear, alleged that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had negligently failed to follow the procedures required prior to making the concededly discretionary decision to ban garments treated with a certain flame retardant. Jayvee, supra, 721 F.2d at 387-89. Judge Bork, without either of his fellow panel members concurring in his reasoning, found those procedures to be “integral to the decision to adopt the substantive regulation” and thus an alleged abuse of discretion shielded from liability by the discretionary function exception. Id. at 389.
Alternatively, again without the co-panelists’ concurrence in his reasoning, Judge Bork posited that the CPSC was immune for wrongful acts committed in the course of its quasi-legislative or quasi-adjudicative actions in promulgating regulations, since there was no such liability in the private sector. Judge Bork was careful to stop short of the dissent’s and Dunbar’s position:
The Supreme Court has made clear its desire to avoid the “ ‘non-governmental’‘governmental’ quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). Our holding today does not draw us into this quagmire. Whether a particular action is a “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-adjudicative” one is a judicial judgment frequently made. See, e.g., infra pp. 394-395. It is a judgment involving very different factors than those employed in determining whether an action is on the “operational level” of governmental activity. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) (operating a lighthouse); Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 317-19, 77 S.Ct. 374, 375-76, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957) (fighting fires); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir.1975) (attempted stopping of a hijacking). Id. at 390.
Judge Bork apparently attempted to carve out a narrow exception to, and as a consequence probably contravened, the rule of Indian Towing that the extent to which a governmental function can be construed as *740“governmental” is irrelevant to the rule of liability under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674. Since neither of his co-panelists agreed to the proposed exception, it lacks precedential effect even in the District of Columbia Circuit. Nevertheless, even Judge Bork’s proposed rule would have no application to the instant case. Furthermore, since it postdates the ITCA’s passage, it could not have confused the drafters of the ITCA.
Judge Bork’s comment that “the entire thrust of the FTCA is in a different direction from that appellants would have us give it: ‘Uppermost in the collective mind of Congress were the ordinary common-law torts,’ ” Jayvee, supra, 721 F.2d at 392 (quoting Dalehite), and the similar comments of Judge Lumbard in concurrence, lack the breadth the dissent would attribute to them. The comments were in response to the plaintiffs’ novel theory that the CPSC ought to be held liable for failing to properly follow statutorily prescribed procedures, even though the resulting regulations were shielded by the discretionary function exception. Id. at 391-92. No such novel theory is advanced in the instant case.
The Warren case is quickly disposed of. That court simply held that police protection is a duty “owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists.” Warren, supra, 444 A.2d at 3. This holding does not conflict with that of Sterling, since in Sterling a special relationship did exist by virtue of the probation officer’s supervision of Bloom. Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 225, 723 P.2d at 769 see also id. At 243, 723 P.2d at 787 (Huntley, J., concurring). Moreover, the FTCA was not specifically discussed in Warren. And in any event, Warren, like Jayvee, post-dates the ITCA; thus, it is unpersuasive as to the legislative intent behind the ITCA.
The best the dissent manages is an attempt to discredit the leading United States Supreme Court decision which debunked the “uniquely governmental” test, Indian Towing, supra.2 Far from “neglectpng] the first step of the analysis, i.e., whether the acts complained of constituted a tort,” Indian Towing directly addressed and correctly determined that where the government “undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance [it] must perform [its] ‘good Samaritan’ task in a careful manner,” just as a private individual under like circumstances would be obligated. Id. 350 U.S. at 64-65, 76 S.Ct. at 124. The Court elaborated:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable *741under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 126-27.
The dissent complains that “not a single scrap of authority was cited” for this proposition. If the dissent is referring to the “good Samaritan” rule, then the dissent is ineffectually nitpicking. As the Supreme court noted without any reasonable dispute, the “good Samaritan rule” as stated is “hornbook tort law.” Id. at 64-65, 76 S.Ct. at 124. If the dissent is referring to the fact that the government previously had not been held liable for such negligence, then the dissent’s point is nonsensical. The Supreme Court had all the authority it needed and all that was available at the time, the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2674. That language made the government potentially liable where “a private person under like circumstances would be liable,” and not merely where private persons perform identical functions to those of the government. Of course, there was no authority predating the still new FTCA; until its passage, sovereign immunity had stood as a bar to any claim.
In arriving at this construction of the FTCA provisions establishing the bounds of governmental liability, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674, the Indian Towing Court resoundingly rejected the government’s argument that those provisions “must be read as excluding liability in the performance of activities which private persons do not perform. Thus, there would be no liability for negligent performance of ‘uniquely governmental functions.’ ” Indian Towing, supra, 350 U.S. at 64, 76 S.Ct. at 124. The Court hardly was “setting up and then destroying a straw man,” as the dissent asserts ipse dixit, but rather was responding directly to the government’s position. The government was attempting to read into the FTCA the same “non-govemmental-govemmental” distinction which the dissent would read into the ITCA. The Supreme Court, with trenchant reasoning, demonstrated there to be no basis in the FTCA or in reason for this “inherently unsound” test. Id. at 65, 76 S.Ct. at 124.3 As we explained in Sterling, neither is there any basis for it in the ITCA. Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 216, 723 P.2d at 760.
Beyond this, the dissent still cannot face up to the language of I.C. § 6-903(a) which extinguishes any possibility that the Idaho legislature intended or even left room for a “governmental” exception to liability.4 As explained in Sterling:
Presumably aware of the [Indian Towing] Supreme Court’s having equated the uniquely govemmental/parallel function test with the proprietary/governmental distinction, the Idaho legislature inserted the following language into I.C. § 6-903(a): “the governmental entity is subject to liability ... whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function____” (Emphasis added.) As Indian Towing teaches, uniquely governmental functions are bound to equate with those traditionally viewed as “governmental” functions, while those functions similar to ones performed by private persons and entities would equate with those traditionally viewed as “proprietary.” 350 U.S. at 66-67 [76 S.Ct. at 125-26]; Hall, supra, at 211, 230. But, whether or not fertile minds are able to concoct a “uniquely governmental function” that was not a “governmental func*742tion” under the law of municipal corporations misses the point; what matters is that the Supreme Court unequivocally (1) saw the proposed exception to be the governmental/proprietary distinction in disguise, and (2) rejected it. In using essentially the same language as found in the Supreme Court’s discussion of the provision of the Federal Act analogous to I.C. § 6-903(a), the Idaho legislature also must have equated a proposed “uniquely governmental function” with the proprietary/ governmental distinction, which it then expressly rejected. Accord, Hall, supra, at 220-22, 228-35; see also Ryan v. State, [134 Ariz. 308] 656 P.2d 597, 598 (Ariz.1982) (“Here the appellee-respondents urge that governmental immunity should continue in those instances where the services provided are uniquely governmental in nature. This is the old proprietary-governmental distinction in a bright new word-package.”). Sterling, supra, at 219-20, 723 P.2d at 763-64 (footnote omitted).
Curiously, the dissent approves of the Supreme Court decision which followed by two years and expressly reaffirmed Indian Towing-Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957). Rayonier bears quoting one more time:
These provisions [28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674], given their plain natural meaning, make the United States liable to petitioners for the Forest Service’s negligence in fighting the forest fire if, as alleged in the complaints, Washington law would impose liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances.
Nevertheless the Government, relying primarily on the Dalehite case, contends that Congress by the Tort Claims Act did not waive the United States’ immunity from liability for the negligence of its employees when they act as public firemen. It argues that the Act only imposes liability on the United States under circumstances where governmental bodies have traditionally been responsible for the misconduct of their employees and that neither the common law nor the law of Washington imposes liability on municipal or other local governmental for the negligence of their agents acting in the “uniquely governments” capacity of public firemen. But as we recently held in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, [100 L.Ed. 48], the test established by the Tort Claims Act for determining the United States’ liability is whether a private person would be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred. We expressly decided in Indian Towing that the United States’ liability is not restricted to the liability of a municipal corporation or other public body and that an injured party cannot be deprived of his rights under the Act by resort to an alleged distinction, imported from the law of municipal corporations, between the Government’s negligence when it acts in a “proprietary” capacity and its negligence when it acts in a “uniquely governmental” capacity. To the extent that there was anything to the contrary in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing. Id. at 318-19, 77 S.Ct. at 376-77 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
Quite obviously, Rayonier, like Indian Tomng before it, rejected the dissent’s proposed exception for “governmental” functions. Quite clearly, in the eyes' of the United States Supreme Court, as in the words of the drafters of the ITCA, see I.C. § 6-903(a), it can be a tort for the government to negligently carry out “governmental” functions.
Much more could be and has been said on the uniquely governmental-parallel function exception. For present purposes, it is enough to say that it is an exception without basis in the language of the ITCA, in the federal case law, or in reason. The best that can be said about this concocted exception is that it is now defunct.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
While the dissent apparently would affirm on the basis of I.C. § 6-903(a), it *743nevertheless takes the opportunity to assail the holding of Sterling on I.C. § 6-904(1), popularly called the “discretionary function exception.” Interestingly, the dissent offers no construction of its own for the provision but contents itself with criticising the planning-operational dichotomy. Its criticism, however, appears to be confined, to the results obtained under the federal construction in selected cases. The dissent offers nothing to refute that (1) the construction springs naturally from the language and structure of I.C. 6-904(1) and its comparable federal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) as well as from the legislative history of the latter, and (2) that it prevailed at all levels of federal jurisprudence at the time the ITCA was enacted. See Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 226-30, 723 P.2d at 770-74.5
Those few cases which the dissent believes illustrate inconsistency among the federal courts in reality do just the opposite when more closely examined. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 389 U.S. 841, 88 S.Ct. 76, 19 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967) did not involve mere allegations of “failure to protect a federal juror” as the dissent suggests, but rather involved allegations that the United States Attorney General was negligent for failing to exercise the discretion to prosecute an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (concerning the influencing, intimidating, or impeding of federal jurors). As the Court of Appeals holding reflects, Smith, supra, 375 F.2d at 248, the decision to prosecute falls neatly within the bounds of a “planning” function, as it involves “room for policy judgment and decision.” Dalehite, supra, 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968. The federal courts consistently so hold. See generally, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 note 27.
Martin v. United States, 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.1975), also exemplifies straightforward application of the planning-operational test. The Martin plaintiffs alleged the National Park Service had negligently decided to close certain garbage dumps where grizzly bears were feeding. These closings allegedly led to a bear attacking a camper. The Court of Appeals held:
We are convinced that the acts of the Park Service or Interior Department employees which Dr. Craighead said constituted negligence are within the protection of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and the discretionary function rule enunciated in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). That case held that various decisions with respect to instituting a fertilizer export program, conducting further experiments regarding the combustibility of the fertilizer, and decisions regarding bagging temperature, bag labeling, fertilizer coating and bagging material were all made at a planning rather than operational level. The case specifically states that “all employees exercising discretion” are covered by the Act. Id. at 33, 73 S.Ct. 956. The summary of the record shows that the decision to abruptly close the garbage dumps was likewise made at the planning level. Superintendent Anderson, who issues the regulations and who made the decisions of which plaintiff and Dr. Craighead complain, was making a policy judgment. Even Dr. Craighead agreed at the trial that the handling of bears is a matter of judgment and someone must apply it. Id. at 1360.
Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.1975), which the dissent implies is somehow inconsistent with the preceding two cases, is actually quite in line. Downs did not involve a policy decision to prosecute, like Smith, or an issuance of regulations like Martin, but instead involved allegations of negligence in carrying out the FBI’s policy on handling hijackings. Id. at 997. As the Court of Appeals described them, these were “operational” level ac*744tions devoid of the policy implications found in Smith and Martin.
Likewise, Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.1974) and First National Bank in Albuquerque v. United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 835, 98 S.Ct. 122, 54 L.Ed.2d 96, are readily reconciled. The Griffin plaintiffs alleged that a particular “lot” of polio vaccines had been released in violation of standards set in federal regulations; they did not challenge the regulations themselves. Griffin, supra, 500 F.2d at 1062-64. This alleged wrongdoing the Court held to fall outside the discretionary function exception. Id. at 1068-69. In contrast, the First National Bank in Albuquerque plaintiffs alleged that the Pesticides Regulation Division of the Department of Agriculture had been negligent in determining pursuant to statute and regulations the necessary warnings to accompany a certain type of fungicide. 552 F.2d at 371-72. This was a policy judgment applicable to all future lots of the fungicide, not an individual slip-up as in Griffin. The Court of Appeals effectively explained the distinction with Griffin:
Thus the statute and the regulations staked out only generalized policy standards for the precautions, warnings and directions for use. To enforce these standards, and give content and meaning to them, the agency was required to make policy judgments in evaluating the adequacy of the labeling. See Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d 293, 310 (7th Cir. [1972]); Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. [1972]). We feel this is true as to all components of the labeling complained of by the plaintiffs — the warnings, precautions and directions for use. Thus this case is unlike Griffin where scientific measurement against given specific standards was involved — not a determination in general terms for the protection of the public safety. Id. at 376 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
Of course, even if these two cases had been inconsistent, this would have posed no problem to the 1971 Idaho legislature. Like Martin and Downs, they were decided in the mid-70’s.
Whether or not the results of these cases can be characterized as inconsistent, the analyses are generally compatible. Even if they were not consistent, they would not have confused the 1971 legislature, since only one was decided prior to 1971. Moreover, they are but five of literally hundreds of decisions dealing with the discretionary function exception. Far from constituting a “crazy quilt,” these decisions apply the exception and the Dalehite, Indian Towing, and Rayonier holdings with impressive uniformity. See Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 229-30, 723 P.2d at 773-74. Of course the legislature had to be aware of the prevailing construction of this, exception (as well as 28 U.S.C. § 2674). Had the legislature disapproved of this construction, it surely would not have adopted almost verbatim the language from which the construction so readily had sprung.
At one point, the dissent goes so far as to suggest that Dalehite is inconsistent with Indian Towing and Rayonier. We have already shown, as did the United States Supreme Court in Varig Airlines, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2763-65, that these cases pose no unresolved inconsistency, so long as one realized which section of the FTCA was at issue in which part of each opinion. See Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 216-19, 723 P.2d at 760-63, see also id. at 236-37, 723 P.2d at 780-81 (Huntley, J., concurring).
In its ill-founded attempt to debunk the planning-operational test, the dissent loses sight entirely of the important function of the discretionary function exception. The dissent attacks the Dalehite holding in the following fashion:
The [Dalehite ] majority held that the specific acts of negligence, “were all reasonably made at a planning rather than an operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the government’s fertilizer program.” For example, as to the *745bagging temperature it was held, “[i]t would be possible to keep the product in the graining kettles for a longer period or to install cooling equipment. But both methods would result in greatly increased production costs and/or greatly reduced production.” Such seems to be a bizarre approach since certainly such excuses would not be heard or tolerated from private producers.
The dissent’s criticism completely misses the mark. Whether or not private producers would be held liable is irrelevant to discretionary function analysis; whether or not the governmental action involved policy judgment is the question. The thrust of the discretionary function exception is to shield the government from liability when it is involved in policy judgments affecting such matters as “production costs” and quantity of production, even if a private producer would be liable. Sterling, supra, at 230-31, 723 P.2d at 774-75. The dissent apparently is so taken with its concept of liability contingent on how “governmental” the government is behaving that it would read the discretionary function exception out of existence.
Policy judgments potentially impact upon vast segments of society. If negligently formulated, such decisions may do widespread harm. This was the case in Dalehite. The high-level decisions made in Dalehite were dictated by funding and productivity considerations and guided a nationwide, urgent governmental effort. Even so, the dissent seemingly would have thrown the government open to liability, based upon the fortuity of “non-uniqueness” as formulated in the mind of some judge. Here is the potential for “limitless” liability; here is a test — the “uniquely governmental-parallel function” test — capable of manipulation and devoid of precedents from which to draw.
In the final analysis, the dissents’ criticism of the planning-operational test is of no consequence. There is no doubt, apparently even to the dissent, that the planning-operational test did originate in Dalehite and prevail in the federal case law prior to 1971.6 To presume the legislature was unaware of this test is tantamount to presuming the legislators were illiterate.
III. HORIZONS TO LIABILITY
The dissent’s vague and conclusory claim that there is “no end or limit to the liability potential of governmental entities” ignores the clear limits found (where one would expect them to be found) within the express exceptions to the liability established in the ITCA. In fact, the limit established in the discretionary function exception may well apply in this very case. As the majority opinion explains, the city will be immune from liability for policy decisions regarding the inspection of fire hydrants and water mains. The immunity springs from the second clause of the discretionary function exception. I.C. § 6-904(1); see Sterling, supra, at 229-30, 723 P.2d at 773-74. Further, if the city’s employees acted with ordinary care and in accordance with these policy decisions in carrying them out, no liability may result, even if the policy decisions were negligently made. This immunity springs from the first clause of the discretionary function exception. Id. However, if the employees failed to use “ordinary care” in carrying out the city’s •policy (for example, by inspecting the hydrants in negligent fashion, or failing to inspect them as the city had directed), then the discretionary function exception may not afford immunity. In short, the horizons of the government’s liability are not “limitless”; rather, they are immediately before us, precisely where the legislature placed them.
The discretionary function exception affords similar answers to the dissent’s various fears.7 The dissent fears that liability may result from decisions to arrest and *746prosecute, but such decisions have been held immune under the discretionary function exception. E.g., Smith, supra, 375 F.2d at 248; see generally, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 note 27. The dissent fears liability leaping out of negligent regulation of various businesses, but under the discretionary function exception, regulatory activity involving policy judgment has been held immune. E.g., Varig Airlines, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2769; First National Bank in Albuquerque, supra, 552 F.2d at 376; see generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 notes 13 and 13a. Providing such information as weather forecasts also has been shielded from liability, see generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 note 37; again, the dissent’s fears are misplaced.
Most mistaken is the dissent’s concern that decisions constrained by budgetary considerations could result in liability. This concern is not a little ironic, since the dissent derided the Dalehite Court for taking the same concern into account. Nevertheless, as Dalehite demonstrates, policy judgments based on budgetary limitations are the epitomy of those properly delineated as “discretionary.” Dalehite, supra, 346 U.S. at 40-41, 73 S.Ct. at 970-71; Varig Airline, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2768.
As demonstrated by the Dalehite result — one with which the dissent takes issue — the construction of the discretionary function exception in Sterling may permit less governmental liability than would the dissent’s approach. Under Sterling, the discretionary function exception will shield discretionary conduct even where such conduct is not “uniquely governmental.” See Sterling, supra, at 237, 723 P.2d at 781 (Huntley, J., concurring). For example, a governmental agency engaged in the function of rehabilitating disabled and injured persons, a function readily paralleled by those of Deseret Industries and Elks Rehabilitation Hospital, arguably would be subject to liability even for “planning” decisions under the dissent’s formulation of the ITCA. Such decisions would appear to be immunized under Sterling’s construction of the discretionary function exception.8
CONCLUSION
The Sterling holding, which does no more than accept the federal case law prevailing in 1971 (and today),9 is hardly likely to have so dramatic an effect as the dissent fears. At least it will afford predictability and applicable precedent where neither previously existed. It marks the Court’s return to a reasonable and principled construction of the ITCA. This Court cannot abandon clear indicia of legislative intent in order to pursue phantom fears of impending doom.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.

. I agree with the dissent that whether or not a tort was committed is the proper beginning point to analysis under the ITCA. In Sterling, before examining the discretionary function exception, this Court devoted careful attention to the question of whether a private person would be liable under Idaho law for the sort of negligent supervision alleged in that case. Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 222-26, 723 P.2d at 766-70.

. The dissent fails to account for other Supreme Court decisions which affirmed the holding of Indian Towing including Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180, 76 S.Ct. 745, 751, 100 L.Ed. 1065 (1956), and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 198, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1038-39, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983). The most recent reaffirmance came in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2764-65, 2765 n. 10, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984).
The Varig Court did not arbitrarily reject "the application of the Indian Towing good Samaritan doctrine to the actions of the government in Varig” as the dissent suggests. Instead, the Court held that the government was immune under the discretionary function exception when deciding as a matter of policy what aspects of certain aircraft designs to inspect. Varig supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2768. Had the allegations involved negligent inspection instead of "negligence in failing to check certain specific items” in the aircraft designs — items which the government determined in its "policy judgment” need not be checked, id. at 2768-69 — then the discretionary function exception would not have applied, and the "good Samaritan” duty would have attached.

. The attempts of today’s dissent and the Sterling dissent to portray the Indian Towing decision as “perfunctory” and "terse” are laughable. The opinion is a cogently reasoned gem, a characteristic work by one of the giants of American jurisprudence. Justice Felix Frankfurter. Perhaps these dissents find it easy to fault Indian Towing in grossly general terms because they never examine (much less refute) its rationale.

. I.C. § 5-330, cited in the dissent, does not indicate the legislature’s intent to abrogate the “good Samaritan” doctrine in all circumstances, but only where persons who "offer! ] and administer! ] first aid or medical attention to any person or persons injured” in an accident. This of course would include governmental employees who rendered such aid. Obviously, this grant of immunity extends no farther than accident scenes and offerers of first aid. For example, it provides no immunity to a governmental entity charged with the supervision of persons with known dangerous propensities. Sterling, supra, 111 Idaho at 224-26, 723 P.2d at 768-70.

. The dissent’s criticism of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) ignores these sound bases for the planning-operational test, and apparently presumes that the sole criterion for liability under the FTCA ought to be whether or not "private producers” would be liable.

. The test prevails still in many federal courts. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 784 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.1986); Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir.1985).

. Of course, the other express exceptions to liability also will bar certain claims. I.C. § 6-904.

. It should be noted that the state has enacted numerous other provisions to limit its liability. The ITCA limits the dollar amount of governmental liability arising out of individual accidents or occurrences. I.C. § 6-926. Governmental entities are liable “only for the pro rata share of the total damages awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the governmental entity or its employees." I.C. § 6-903(a). Governmental entities are not liable for punitive damages. I.C. § 6-918. And governmental entities may be entitled to contribution, indemnification, and reimbursement of legal fees where “the act or omission of the employee was outside the course and scope of his [or her] employment or included malice or criminal intent.” I.C. § 6-903(d).
Also, in addition to the functions excepted from liability in I.C. § 6-904, the legislature has immunized certain governmental functions, such as deciding whether to parole or release prisoners. I.C. § 20-231.

. One advantage of this approach is that it affords the wealth of federal case law from which to draw precedent.