Court Opinion

ID: 9676482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:25:36.358246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.669089
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority. I agree with Justice Griffin’s conclusion that § 21 is clear in that it imposes liability only upon a governmental agency with jurisdiction over a highway. However, I write separately to respond to the majority holding that the state is liable for highway design and construction defects. It is my opinion that the highway exception to Michigan’s governmental immunity statute2 encompasses only a duty of maintenance and does not include liability for the negligent design and construction of highways. Therefore, I would hold that the defendants remain shielded from liability in each of the present actions._
*19I
The governmental immunity statute codified the common-law principle of sovereign immunity. See Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 596-608; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). The current version of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq., carves out four specific exceptions to this immunity,3 one of which is §2, the highway exception. These exceptions, which authorize suits against the sovereignty, are regarded as a derogation of the common law. Hence, they are to be strictly construed. 39 Am Jur 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 346, pp 728-729. As pointed out in 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 62.01, p 113, the rule of strict construction has been most emphatically stated and regularly applied in cases where a statute makes the government amenable to suit. Accordingly, Michigan courts have generally followed this rule. See Tibor v Dep’t of State Hwys, 126 Mich App 159; 337 NW2d 44 (1983); Bennett v City of Lansing, 52 Mich App 289; 217 NW2d 54 (1974).4
*20Looking to the statute, the highway exception provides:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be as provided in section 21, chapter 4 of Act No. 283 of the Public Acts of 1909, as amended, being section 224.21 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). Emphasis added.]
In my view, the Legislature’s choice of the words, "shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair,” indicates its intention merely to impose a duty of maintenance upon the governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway. Furthermore, I interpret "maintain ... in reasonable repair” as encompassing only those repairs necessary as a result of normal highway usage. The statute does not impose a duty to repair defects in design or construction.5
If the Legislature had intended the highway *21exception to include liability for negligent highway design or construction, it could have so worded the statute. It is inappropriate to impute this additional liability by judicially amending the statute. Any statutory expansion must come from the Legislature, not this Court. Peters v Dep’t of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50, 57; 252 NW2d 799 (1977); McDowell v State Hwy Comm’r, 365 Mich 268; 112 NW2d 491 (1961).
Although the majority charges the dissenters of judicially expanding the statute, I believe the opposite is true. The highway exception imposes only a duty to "maintain the highway in reasonable repair” upon a "governmental agency having jurisdiction.” In the instant cases, the alleged negligent acts were not a breach of the duty to maintain, and the defendants did not have jurisdiction over the highways in question. Thus, notwithstanding the great lengths the majority takes to persuade us otherwise, to find the defendants guilty would be nothing short of expanding the scope of § 2 far beyond the words of the statute.
II
The majority and Justice Griffin both address *22the inequity of inferring liability upon a county for the negligence of the state. I agree. Support for this position is found in the transfer of jurisdiction over highways act, MCL 247.858; MSA 9.393(38). Specifically, subsection (4) provides:
The cost of renovation, repair or reconstruction of the highway shall be paid by the highway authority relinquishing jurisdiction except to the extent that the highway authority gaining jurisdiction is required to participate in such cost in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 51 of the Public Acts of 1951, as amended, being sections 247.651 to 247.673 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [Emphasis added.]
The language emphasized clearly establishes that the counties, as the assuming jurisdiction, would not be liable for any defect known at the time of transfer. Therefore, it would be anomalous to "penalize” them merely because the defect was not known at the time of transfer. It would be similarly inconsistent to hold the counties responsible for any damages arising from this latent defect.
While here highway jurisdiction was transferred by written agreement pursuant to MCL 247.852; MSA 9.393(32), it is reasonable to assume that the counties would not have agreed to the respective transfers had they been aware of a design defect. Therefore, the state would have had no recourse but to impose upon the counties a nonconsensual transfer pursuant to MCL 247.853-247.858; MSA 9.393(33)-9.393(38). Thus, §8(4) would have been applicable.
After pointing out that the parties were directed to file supplemental briefs on the question of legislative intent with respect to liability for road defects "in light of the transfer of jurisdiction act *23. . .,” the majority held that "the transfer of jurisdiction act has no bearing on the construction of the governmental tort liability act in the instant case.” It is ironic that while the majority found a state highway statute inapplicable in the instant case, it found that a federal funding statute6 did provide insight as to the legislative intent of the state highway exception statute. I believe that the state’s transfer of jurisdiction over highways act does, in fact, offer an accurate indication of the intent of a legislative scheme to direct responsibility for our state’s highway system. Conversely, I believe the federal funding statute cited by the majority is of little consequence to the issues being decided here.
Finally, my original contention, that the liability for negligent design and construction of a highway is not within the scope of § 2, would eliminate the possibility of a county being liable for the state’s negligence. The statute only imposes a duty to "maintain,” not to design and construct. Read with this in mind, the statute is clear in that the agency with jurisdiction is liable only for highway maintenance. Therefore, the need for judicial expansion of the word, "jurisdiction,” is unnecessary because the ordinary meaning of "jurisdiction,” as contemplated when the statute was drafted, would suffice.
Governmental agencies are shielded from liability while in the discharge of their governmental functions. Ross, supra at 625; MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). There is no dispute that the Department of Transportation was engaged in the performance of its governmental duty when it designed and constructed the highways in question. Because I feel the acts of negligent design and construction *24do not fall within the highway exception statute, the defendants should remain immune to liability.
Therefore, I would affirm summary disposition in favor of the defendants.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, C.J.

 MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).

 MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.

 MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106), and MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113).

 I acknowledge Endykiewicz v State Hwy Comm, 414 Mich 377; 324 NW2d 755 (1982), which states that the highway exception, § 2, need not be strictly construed as being in derogation of common law after the state abrogated its common-law immunity. However, this case is distinguishable.
The Endykiewicz case interprets the damages sentence of the statute which provides, “[a]ny person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property . . . may recover the damages suffered by him.” This Court said that this sentence was ambiguous; therefore, it should not be interpreted to limit a plaintiff’s damages. Thus, the dispositive issue in the case centered on the amount of damages after liability had attached. It offers no insight into whether a governmental agency is liable for the negligent design or construction of a highway. Id. at 382.
Further, I reject the argument that the state abrogated its common-*20law immunity. In fact, the Legislature codified its common-law immunity with § 7. Ross, supra at 605-606. Thus, to the extent it conflicts with this opinion, I would overrule Endykiewicz.

 In Mullins v Wayne Co, 16 Mich App 365, 375; 168 NW2d 246 (1969), lv den 382 Mich 791 (1969), the Court of Appeals stated: "[t]he specific allegation of negligence in Malloy [v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448; 43 NW 1012 (1889)], shows the duty of the road building authority goes beyond the preservation of the status quo, that it does indeed have the affirmative duty to design and construct the road and keep it 'reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.’ ”
I find Mullins distinguishable from the instant case. First, the issue in Mullins involved the county’s duty to repair county roads under *21MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121, whereas, here this Court is construing a governmental agency’s duty to maintain highways under MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). The county is not a party to either of the instant actions. Thus, MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121 is inapplicable. Second, to support the conclusion in Mullins, the Court of Appeals relied on Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458; 42 NW 50 (1889), and Malloy, supra, which were both decided twenty years before the effective date of MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121. Finally, contrary to the highways in the instant cases, the highways in Mullins, Joslyn, and Malloy never left the jurisdiction of the local authority. Therefore, I would hold that there is no duty to repair defects in highway design or construction pursuant to § 2.
I take this position notwithstanding my decision in Reardon v Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398; 424 NW2d 248 (1988). It is my belief that statutes drafted by the Legislature which govern the state highway system should be read in pari materia.

 23 USC 114.