Court Opinion

ID: 9417440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:15:42.404131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:42.329643
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bradley, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting.
I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case, .and will very briefly state my reasons for dissenting.
The St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company, the lessor, had full authority to make the lease of its road and works which is brought in question in the cause. The Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Company, the lessee, assumed to have power to take the lease, and had such power in Illinois by the effect of the laws of that State, and was supported in its assumption of power by the implications of several statutes of Indiana. If these implications were not sufficiently strong to amount to a grant of power, still, they were sufficient to show that the legislature of Indiana understood the power as existing and acquiesced in it. The other railroad companies, parties to the suit, who guaranteed the performance of the lease and its covenants on the part of the lessee, had the power to do so by the laws’ of Illinois, and the engagement of guaranty on *319their part was a contract entered into by them in furtherance of their through business to and from St. Louis and the States west of the Mississippi. The whole arrangement, in fact, was devised by them for the purpose of facilitating and increasing their business as integral parts- of -great trunk lines, which, in the absence of inter-State regulations of commerce made by Congress, are of the greatest utility to the business of the country.
To hold that the railroad companies of the country thus situated cannot, without acting ultra vires, make business arrangements beyond the limits of their own tracks in a country situated and divided up into States as ours is, it seems to me is to take a very contracted view of the powers and duties of these public institutions. According to the doctrine of the court, a New York or Pennsylvania company could not even have a ticket or freight agent in St. Louis for the purpose of soliciting freight and passengers to be carried on the trunk line of which it forms a part. They could not hire an office for such an agent, or, if they did, they could not be held responsible for the rent. This is carrying the doctrine of ultra vires to what seems to me an absurd extent. It is following out the English notions on that subject, which always seemed to me inapplicable to our situation and circumstances, however well suited to that compact and homogeneous country — homogeneous in government and jurisdiction. All the principal railroads in England extend across the entire country from London, in different directions, to the sea. In this country, as Congress declines to charter through lines across the States, the State governments themselves charter local roads, limited by the boundary lines of the State. In order to give the country through facilities at all, these State roads are obliged to unite their lines, and make what is called a -trunk line. The necessities of the country require it. Yet, according to the logic of the decision in this case, this is all ultra vires.
Look at it. One of our great trunk lines, extending from West to East, is composed (say) of five connected railroads, forming together a continuous line, working together under a contract which regulates their mutual rights and obligations *320in the management of the business and the distribution of its joint receipts. All this is uli/ra vires and void! One of the links of the chain is a ferry which, in consideration of extra accommodations afforded for the business of the line, is guaranteed a certain sum per armum. The guaranty is ultra vires and void!
Is this law ? It may be English law; but is it American law ? I cannot believe it. ¥e must not shut our eyes to the fact that new circumstances and conditions, of themselves, require and produce a modification of old rules, or the application of new ones.
This narrow doctrine has already been discarded by the courts, and by this court. It has become settled law, that a railroad company at one end of a trunk line may enter into contracts for the transportation of passengers and goods to any part of the line, hundreds of miles beyond its own track; and will be held liable for the fulfilment of such contracts. And yet, according to the doctrine of the opinion in this case, this is ultra vires.
But this is not all. The contract has been performed on the part of the lessor company, and the lessee and its guarantors have enjoyed the benefit of it. With what face can they now refuse to pay what they agreed to pay ? With what face can they plead incapacity to contract ? This is not a suit to compel the specific performance of the contract in future ; but to compel the payment of the money earned bj^ past performance of the contract. It seems to me that the companies concerned are estopped to deny their liability to make this payment. It is the companies themselves who make the plea, not their stockholders.
In several national bank cases, where the banks have loaned money on mortgages of land, contrary to the express prohibition of the act of Congress, and ultra vires, we have enforced the contract, leaving it to the government to call the banks to account for acting outside of their chartered powers.
Why should- not the same rule be applied to railroads, if it is thought they have exceeded their powers ; especially when no stockholder complains of the company’s action, and the ob*321ject of the suit is, to compel them to pay for a benefit actually received.
In every aspect in which the case can be viewed, it seems to me that the decree of the Circuit Court was not only just and right, but in accordance with sound principles of American law, and ought to be affirmed.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Harlan agrees with me in opinion.