Court Opinion

ID: 9846209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:36:57.255768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:35.237997
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s decision that one of defendant’s arguments must be dismissed for appellate rules violations. Ac*44cordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion dismissing defendant’s arguments relating to the admission of the testimony by the officer regarding the “crack'pipe”.
The majority holds that defendant’s fourth assignment of error is “beyond the scope of appellate review” under North Carolina Appellate Rule 10 because the assignment of error is purportedly “broad, vague, and unspecific, and . . . fails to identify the issues on appeal.” However, “[a]n assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references.” N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1).
Defendant’s underlying assignment of error states:
The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objection as to the officer’s testimony that certain evidence constituted a “crack pipe”, as such testimony constituted an opinion as to an ultimate issue for the jury and a legal conclusion, otherwise violated the N.C. Rules of Evidence, and denied defendant due process, a fair trial and his legal and constitutional rights.
Defendant’s assignment of error is followed by an appropriate transcript reference. The heading of defendant’s argument in his brief reads as follows: “The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objection as to the officer’s testimony that certain evidence constituted a ‘crack pipe’, as such testimony violated the N.C. Rules of Evidence, and denied defendant due process and a fair trial.” This heading is followed by proper references to the corresponding assignment of error and to the record. Defendant then argues in his brief that the testimony by the officer characterizing the evidence as a “crack pipe” was inadmissible opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The majority concludes, however, that defendant’s assignment of error is so broad as to evade appellate review. I do not agree.
Defendant’s assignment of error adequately preserves his argument on appeal. The majority’s position to the contrary would require appellants to include every detail of their planned argument in the assignment of error for fear of dismissal. The case cited by the majority in support of its position, May v. Down East Homes of Beulaville, Inc., 175 N.C. App. 416, 623 S.E.2d 345 (2006), is readily distinguishable from the instant case. There, the appellant assigned error on the grounds that the trial court’s ruling was “ ‘contrary to caselaw of this *45jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 418, 623 S.E.2d at 346. The May Court noted that such an assignment was “ ‘designed to allow counsel to argue anything and everything they desire in their brief on appeal. “This assignment — like a hoopskirt — covers everything and touches nothing.” ’ ” Id. (citations omitted). This Court has dismissed similar assignments of error where the assignment has failed to state a legal basis upon which the error is based. See, e.g., Broderick v. Broderick, 175 N.C. App. 501, 502-03, 623 S.E.2d 806, 807 (2006) (dismissing assignment of error which stated simply “ ‘Plaintiff-Appellant assigns as error the following: Entry of the Order for Modification of Alimony filed October 7, 2004[,]’ ” with no legal basis given for purported error); Krantz v. Owens, 168 N.C. App. 384, 388, 607 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2005) (no legal basis stated in assignment of error).
In contrast to the assignments of error raised by the appellants in May, Broderick, and Krantz, the assignment of error raised by defendant in the present case states a defined legal basis for error. Defendant properly assigned error to and argues that admission of the officer’s testimony was inadmissible opinion testimony under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Defendant’s failure to specifically reference Rule 701 should not subject his argument to dismissal. This Court has determined that where assignments of error are technically deficient, but where understanding of the legal issues is not impeded, such assignments of error will be addressed on the merits. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 N.C. App. 595, 604, 630 S.E.2d 221, 228 (2006) (“[h]ere, although plaintiffs’ assignment of error concerning the motion to dismiss is deficient, its deficiency nevertheless does not prevent our review of the factual and legal conclusions made by the October 2004 order”).
In other cases where assignments of error have been deemed too broad, this Court has exercised its discretion under Rule 2 and addressed the argument on its merits. See, e.g., Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 191-92, 614 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2005) (electing to review the plaintiff’s appeal despite finding that the plaintiff had committed numerous rules violations, as the Court was able to determine the issues in the case on appeal and defendant was put on sufficient notice of the issues on appeal as evidenced by the filing of a brief that thoroughly responded to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal); Wetchin v. Ocean Side Corp., 167 N.C. App. 756, 758-59, 606 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2005) (stating that, “[d] espite this defect, we choose to exercise our discretion under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and address plaintiffs’ appeal on the merits”). Rule 2 of the North *46Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure allows this Court to review an appeal, despite rules violations. N.C.R. App. P. 2; see Bald Head v. Village of Bald Head, 175 N.C. App. 543, 545-46, 624 S.E.2d 406, 408 (2006). As noted in State v. Johnston,
“[Rule 2] expresses an obvious residual power possessed by any authoritative rule-making body to suspend or vary operation of its published rules in specific cases where this is necessary to accomplish a fundamental purpose of the rules . . . [and] may be drawn upon by either appellate court where the justice of doing so or the injustice of failing to do so is made clear to the court.”
Johnston, 173 N.C. App. 334, 339, 618 S.E.2d 807, 810 (2005) (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 2, Commentary (1977)). As has been previously noted by this Court, however, our Supreme Court in Viar “admonished this Court not to use Rule 2 to ‘create an appeal for an appellant^ ]’ ” Davis v. Columbus Cty. Schools, 175 N.C. App. 95, 98, 622 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2005) (quoting Viar, 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361, rehearing denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005)). Viar specifically noted that the underlying majority opinion in that case illustrated the need for consistent application of the appellate rules as it addressed an issue not raised or argued by the appellant, leaving the appellee “without notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule.” Viar, 359 N.C. at 402, 610 S.E.2d at 361.
In cases where the use of Rule 2 does not “create an appeal for an appellant[,]” however, this Court has continued to use the discretionary power vested within the Rule. See Bald Head, 175 N.C. App. at 545, 624 S.E.2d at 408 (holding that “because plaintiffs submitted their notice of errata before oral argument, and because we need not ‘create an appeal’ for appellants, we choose to review the appeal pursuant to our discretion under Rule 2”); Coley v. State, 173 N.C. App. 481, 483, 620 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2005) (holding that the decision “not to dismiss the present case for minor rules violations does not lead us to ‘create an appeal for an appellant’ or to examine any issues not raised by the appellant”).
Much like in Bald Head and Coley, review of defendant’s argument, despite any technical rules violations, would not “create an appeal” or examine an issue not raised by defendant. Rather, dismissal of defendant’s argument for such technical rules violations, when defendant’s assignment of error and brief are sufficient to direct the attention of this Court and the State to the issue on appeal, would require mandatory dismissal of all cases where a minor viola*47tion of our appellate rules has occurred, even those which neither impede the work of the Court nor disadvantage the appellant. To require the automatic dismissal of all cases for hyper-technicalities was surely not the intention of our Supreme Court in its decision in Viar, for to read the holding otherwise would eviscerate this Court’s ability to use Rule 2 to “prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interests” N.C.R. App. P. 2.
Defendant’s present assignment of error adequately preserves his argument on appeal. Any deficiency in the assignment of error does not impede appellate review or deprive the opposing party of notice. The State has fully responded to the merits of defendant’s argument in its brief on appeal. Notably, the State never argued that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. This Court could moreover exercise its discretion under Rule 2 and address defendant’s argument on its merits. I would hold that defendant’s argument relating to the admission of testimony by the officer regarding the “crack pipe” was properly preserved, and I would address the argument on its merits. Alternatively, I would exercise this Court’s discretion pursuant to Rule 2 and elect to entertain defendant’s argument.