Court Opinion

ID: 9721202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:51:25.483721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.960411
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Achor, C. J.
As stated in the majority opinion, in which I concur, appellant was convicted of burglary. He had been committed to the Central State Hospital for the Insane under §22-1207, Burns’ 1950 Replacement. At the time of the offense he had, in the opinion *463of the superintendent, sufficiently recovered to be released on furlough. Prior to the trial in this case an inquiry was had under §9-1706a, Burns’ 1956 Replacement, as a result of which it was determined that appellant had comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense. Nevertheless, in the absence of a complete discharge, the presumption remained that the psychosis for which he was committed continued to exist. State ex rel. Quear v. Madison Circuit Court (1951), 229 Ind. 503, 506, 99 N. E. 2d 254.
It is asserted that, under the facts presented, it was the duty of appellant’s counsel to enter a special plea of insanity under §9-1701, Burns’ 1956 Replacement. This assertion is grounded upon the rule that it is the duty of counsel, “. . . Having undertaken such defense, ... to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.” Canon 5, Canons of Professional Ethics. See also: Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics.
However, it occurs to me that this rule — like every other rule — must be applied with reason. The rule does not require that an attorney assert a defense permitted by law which would, in his judgment, operate to the detriment of his client.
The facts presented indicate that appellant’s attorney may have concluded that the presumption that his client remained insane could not be maintained when subjected to the light of fact. Furthermore, he was confronted by the fact that if he caused his client to plead insanity he would thereby open the gate to an almost unlimited exploration into the life of his client. The facts thus exposed might militate strongly against the accused.
Therefore, it occurs to me that we cannot, under the facts presented, say as a matter of law that appellant *464was not. afforded his constitutional right to competent counsel under §13, Article 1 of our Bill of Rights, or that he was denied due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.