Court Opinion

ID: 9947383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 18:10:43.11386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.113212
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCree, 2024-Ohio-777.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                    JUDGES:
                                                 Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P. J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
                                                 Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs-
                                                 Case No. CT2023-0035
RICHARD McCREE

        Defendant-Appellant                      OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                      Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                              Pleas, Case No. CR2023-0667

JUDGMENT:                                     Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                       March 4, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                        For Defendant-Appellant

RONALD L. WELCH                               RICHARD D. HIXSON
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                          3808 James Court
JOHN CONNOR DEVER                             Suite 2
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                          Zanesville, Ohio 43701
27 North Fifth Street, P. O. Box 189
Zanesville, Ohio 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                   2

Wise, J.

      {¶1}   Appellant, Richard McCree, files this appeal from the Sentencing Judgment

Entry of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas dated May 26, 2023 [nunc pro

tunc]. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶2}   The following facts are adduced from the pleadings, the transcript of the

plea of guilty, and the sentencing hearings.

      {¶3}   On September 11, 2022, R.A.M. was found deceased in the back seat of

his vehicle located at the beach access parking lot of Dillon State Park, Muskingum

County, Ohio. Drug abuse instruments were found in the back seat by his body, and the

Muskingum County Coroner was called to examine the body. The coroner performed a

“steel fusion toxicologist mouth test” which indicated that the decedent died as the result

of an overdose of cocaine and a separate overdose of fentanyl – 40 times the amount of

fentanyl to cause death.

      {¶4}   Law enforcement began an investigation and discovered four different

“Cash App” transactions from the decedent to a Shelby Mourer.

      {¶5}   Further investigation led police investigators to determine that Mourer was

the last person to see R.A.M. alive. She was arrested, read her Miranda1 rights and

agreed to talk with detectives.

      {¶6}   She admitted to being with R.A.M. and used his “Cash App” money to buy

crack cocaine from a man known to her as “Mississippi”. She smoked some, later met

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                  3

up with R.A.M. at the Super 8 Motel, and the pair drove separately to the Dillon State

Park area.

      {¶7}   R.A.M., according to Mourer, was not acting right, his speech was slurred

and he wasn’t finishing his sentences. He climbed into the back seat of his vehicle and

Mourer thought he was “obviously overdosing”. She left R.A.M. in the back seat of his

vehicle and exited the Park in her own vehicle.

      {¶8}   Mourer identified a BMV photo of Appellant-Defendant Richard McCree,

aka “Mississippi”, as the person who supplied her with the crack cocaine. She told

detectives McCree had been supplying her with crack cocaine for two to three years and

that he lived on Hedgewood in Zanesville. She provided messages which corroborated

her statements and described a shed behind his residence which contained a couch,

digital scales and narcotics-related items.

      {¶9}   Six days later, law enforcement conducted a controlled buy by using a

confidential informant (CI) who communicated with McCree via Facebook Messenger.

McCree informed the CI that while he was at work, he had $100 worth of crack cocaine

at his house on Hedgewood. The CI sent McCree $40 via “Cash App” and then took

$60 in marked bills to the house on Hedgewood. When the CI arrived, he called McCree,

who directed him to a 2006 green Chevrolet pickup truck on the premises. The CI

retrieved the crack cocaine from a pocket in a pair of pants in the truck and left the $60

in marked bills.

      {¶10} The crack cocaine was retrieved from the CI and tested positive as a

cocaine base or crack cocaine.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                    4

      {¶11} McCree instructed his ten-year old daughter to bring him the money from

the truck and she did so, even though she was scared.

      {¶12} Two days later, after a search warrant was authorized, law enforcement

went to the Hedgewood home where they arrested McCree and seized items from the

home, including baggies. McCree’s ten-year-old daughter was interviewed and

confirmed that her father asked her to retrieve the money from the truck and she did so.

      {¶13} After his arrest, McCree was interviewed by law enforcement and admitted

to trafficking the drugs to the CI, sending his daughter to retrieve the money from the

truck, and receiving “Cash App” moneys from sales on September 10, September 14

and September, 17, 2022.

      {¶14} Appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of corrupting another

with drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)((3), R.C. 2925.02(C)(1) [F2]; two counts of

trafficking in cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(a) [F5], one

with a forfeiture specification [F4]; one count of endangering children, a violation of R.C.

2929.22(A), R.C. 2929.22(E)(2)(a) [M1] and three counts of money laundering, a

violation of R.C. 1313.55(A)(1), R.C.1315.99(C) [F3].

      {¶15} Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was set for trial on

February 23, 2023.

      {¶16} On February 24, 2023, appellant appeared before the trial court and

changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of one count of corrupting another with drugs,

a felony of the second degree and one count of trafficking in drugs (cocaine) with a

forfeiture specification, a felony of the fourth degree. Appellant signed a Crim.R. 11 plea

form acknowledging the potential sentences. Plea of Guilty, Feb. 24, 2023.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                   5

      {¶17} At his plea hearing, appellant entered his plea of guilty after the trial court

advised him of the potential minimum, maximum sentences, that prison time is

mandatory, the effect of indefinite sentencing under Reagan-Tokes, and post-release

control, Plea Tr., Feb. 24, 2023 at 3-13. The trial court accepted his plea.

      {¶18} The state agreed to dismiss the other counts in the indictment and reserved

the argument on sentencing until the sentencing hearing. Plea Tr., Feb. 24, 2023 at 4.

The trial court ordered a presentence investigation. Plea Tr., Feb. 24, 2023 at 19.

      {¶19} On April 17, 2023, appellant returned to the trial court for sentencing.

Appellant received a maximum sentence of eight to twelve years on his guilty plea of

corrupting another with drugs. He received a sentence of eighteen months on his guilty

plea of trafficking in cocaine. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently for a prison

term of eight to twelve years in a state penitentiary. Appellant also received a sentence

of twelve months on an unrelated crime which is not part of this appeal. He was also

informed of post-release control. Sentencing Tr. April 17, 2023 at 14.

      {¶20} Appellant now appeals his sentence, assigning one error for review.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      {¶21} “DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF A MINIMUM

EIGHT YEARS AND A MAXIMUM OF TWELVE YEARS WAS ERRONEOUS, AS THE

RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS THAT IT

CONSIDERED THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF FELONY SENTENCING

UNDER R.C. 2929.11.”

      {¶22} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred when

it failed to consider the principles and purposes of felony sentencing when it sentenced
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                   6

him to the maximum prison term for a second-degree felony. Specifically, appellant

argues his sentence is disproportionate when compared with similar offenders with

similar crimes and therefore inconsistent with R. C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. We

disagree and affirm the trial court.

                                    Standard of Review

      {¶23} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶

 22; State v. Cottrell, 5th Dist., Muskingum No. CT2022-0061, 2023-Ohio-1391, ¶ 6.

      {¶24} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states as follows:

             (2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A)(B), or (C) of this

      section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the

      sentence or modification given by the trial court.

             The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a

      sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence

      and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.              The

      appellate court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court

      abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized

      by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

             (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings

      under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of

      section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,

      whichever, if any, is relevant.

            (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                   7

              Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof

       which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the

       extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in

       criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm

       belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. Cross v.

       Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph 3 of the

       syllabus.

              A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the

       trial court ‘considers the principles and purposes of R. C. 2929.11, as well

       as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control,

       and sentences the defendant within the permissible statutory range.’ State

       v. Padilla, 5th Dist., Tuscarawas No. 2022AP 080 0023, 2023-Ohio-1995, ¶

       13, quoting State vs. Dinka, 12th Dist., Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 and CA

       2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36.

      {¶25} As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not

provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view

that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State

v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. “Nothing in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. ¶ 42.

      {¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified the Jones opinion in State v. Bryant, 168

Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 08, ¶ 22 saying:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                  8

             ….The narrow holding in Jones is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not

      allow an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view

      that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and

      2929.12. See Jones at ¶ 31, 39. Nothing about the holding should be

      construed as prohibiting appellate review of a sentence when the claim is

      that the sentence was imposed based on impermissible considerations –

      i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11

      and 2929.12. Indeed, in Jones, this Court made clear that R.C.

      2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits appellate courts to reverse or modify sentencing

      decisions that are ‘otherwise contrary to law.’ Jones at ¶ 21, quoting R.C.

      2953.08(G)(2)(b). This Court also recognized that ‘otherwise contrary to

      law’ means ‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’ Id ¶

      34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed. 1990). Accordingly, when

      a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are

      extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that

      sentence is contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of issues are

      therefore reviewable. Id. ¶ 22.

                                         Analysis

     {¶27} In this case, appellant concedes that his prison term of eight to twelve years

for a felony of the second degree is within the statutory range. R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a).

However, he argues that his sentence is contrary to law because his sentence is “not

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

R.C. 2929.11(B). To support his claim, he cites three cases out of Muskingum County
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                  9

and argues that the defendants in those cases committed similar or even more egregious

crimes, yet received a lesser sentence than the one imposed upon him. Appellant’s brief

at 9-10.

      {¶28} Appellant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, and he made no

similar argument to the trial court below. The information he now presents here is not

part of the record. We have often noted that “the record cannot be enlarged by factual

assertions in the brief.” State v. Buck, 5th Dist., Muskingum No. CT2023-0003, 2023-

Ohio-2824, ¶ 23.

      {¶29} Appellant’s argument would fail even if we were to consider the merits.

      {¶30} A felony sentence should be proportionate to the severity of the offense

committed, so as not to “shock the sense of justice in the community.” State v. Chafin,

30 Ohio St.2d, 13, 17, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972); R.C. 2929.11(B); State v. Ewert, 5th Dist.,

Muskingum No. CT2012-0002, 2012-Ohio-2671, ¶ 33.

      {¶31} The record here does not support appellant’s contention that his sentence

is disproportionate to the crime he committed. His co-defendant received a similar

sentence – eight years. Sentencing Tr. at 9. As noted by the trial court, his crime led to

the death of another human being. So, too, he used his ten-year-old daughter to facilitate

the crime. Sentencing Tr. at 11-12.

      {¶32} Simply pointing out cases with different results from the same county does

not establish a record of inconsistency. State v. Hodge, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 09 CA 23,

2010-Ohio-2717, ¶¶ 17-18.

      {¶33} A trial court is not expected to research prior sentences before reaching a

sentencing decision. R.C. 2929.11(B) requires consistency. “Consistency requires a trial
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                                   10

court to weigh the same factors for each defendant, which will ultimately result in an

outcome that is rational and predictable, but not necessarily identical.” State v. Buck,

supra, ¶ 23. Consistency does not require the trial court to keep a running tabulation of

her or his prior sentences on all persons convicted of the same offense with the same

number of prior convictions. Two defendants convicted of the same offense could very

well properly be sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. State v. Zwelling, 5th Dist.,

Muskingum No. CT2006-0055, CT2006-0051, 2007-Ohio-3691, ¶¶ 43-44.

      {¶34} In this case, there is no evidence the trial court’s sentence was

constitutionally disproportionate. As already stated, while appellant received the

maximum sentence for a second-degree felony, it is within the statutory range for a felony

of the second degree.

      {¶35} Notably, the trial court ran his sentence to trafficking in drugs concurrently

and granted leave for the State of Ohio to dismiss six counts of the indictment.

      {¶36} In giving the maximum sentence, it considered the pre-sentence

investigation and noted the seriousness of the harm caused – the death of another person

and appellant’s use of his ten-year-old daughter to facilitate the drug sale.

      {¶37} We hold that because the facts of the three cases appellant rely on in

support of his claim of a disproportionate sentence were not part of the record below, his

argument fails.   We also find that even if the record had been preserved, appellant’s

argument would fail, given that the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0035                                            11

limits reasonably calculated to achieve the principles and purposes of sentencing and

was not based on considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R. C.

2929.11 and R. C. 2929.12. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

     {¶38} For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas,

Muskingum County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Delaney, P. J., and

Gwin, J., concur.

JWW/kt 0228