Court Opinion

ID: 9562629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:32:13.659582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:26.551344
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
The majority opinion has the effect of subjecting a non-resident to in personam jurisdiction simply by virtue of his entering into an unsolicited contract of sale with a Utah resident in a foreign jurisdiction. I deem such an extension of the doctrine of “minimum contacts” to be violative of due process.
The “minimum contacts” test was expounded in the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington1 wherein it was stated:
. . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
The court in International Shoe further explained that the standards of due process require an evaluation of the quality and nature of the defendant’s acts within the forum state, the extent to which the defendant thereby enjoyed the protection of the forum’s laws, and the relationship between the defendant’s activities in the forum and the plaintiff’s claim. The court also noted that limited or isolated activities are not sufficient in meeting the requirements of due process.
The doctrine of “minimum contacts” was further elaborated upon in Hanson v. Denckla2 in the manner following:
The main opinion concludes that defendant subjected itself to jurisdiction when it “purposefully contracted with a resident of this State . . . [and] purposefully undertook to supply goods . . . knowing or anticipating that those goods would be used in this State.”
Admittedly, the contract was the result of a “purposeful” act on the part of defendant, but an unsolicited business contact in the state of California is not to be equated with a “minimum contact” in the forum state. This is particularly true in light of the due process standards as laid down in International Shoe. As espoused therein, the quality and nature of the California contract does not lend itself to being classified as a “minimum contact” in the forum state as will support jurisdiction. On the contrary, it is not a “contact” in the forum state at all.
It is of significance that the main opinion cites no case in point which sanctions such a broad extension of jurisdiction. The search that I have conducted causes me to conclude that there are none. However, a contra view has already been expressed by this Court. In Pellegrini v. Sachs and Sons,3 the court was faced with an almost identical set of facts as are present in this case.4 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the Court had this to say: •
*253It requires but a moment’s reflection to see what practical difficulties could result if the many thousands of retailers, who sell the many thousands of products, which are transported into other states, were required to defend wherever it might be alleged that the product had arrived and caused injury. Consequently we think proper safeguards of the rights of both parties require that jurisdiction should not be predicated solely on the ground that an article sold elsewhere by a dealer may be brought into the state and cause harm.
The majority opinion leaves it most difficult to conceive of a set of facts where jurisdiction would not lie. Such a result is offensive to the basic notions of due process and is inconsistent with the sound policy which encourages commercial interchange between the states.
The main opinion also advances the thought that the “security agreement” entered into by the parties is somehow indicative of defendant's intention to seek the protection of the laws of the State of Utah in its transaction with plaintiff. In reality, the document referred to as a “security agreement” is merely the conditional sales contract of the parties which recites the terms of sale. It is not important as to whether or not it qualifies as a “security agreement” under the Uniform Commercial Code adopted in Utah5 for it was never filed in Utah or any other state.
I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

. 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

. Utah, 522 P.2d 704 (1974).

.The difference being that plaintiff therein was a resident of California when the purchase was made, then moved to Utah, and thereafter sustained loss or injury and filed suit.

. U.C.A., 1953, 70A-9-101 et seq.