Court Opinion

ID: 9918389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 20:02:05.657179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:27.598758
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/24 P. v. Johnson CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Siskiyou)
                                                            ----

THE PEOPLE,                                                                                  C096938

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. SCCR-CRF-
                                                                                       2020-946-1)
         v.

SHANADOA WAYNE JOHNSON,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

                                          SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
         A jury found defendant Shanadoa Wayne Johnson guilty of multiple crimes
arising from his schemes to defraud homeowners, primarily elderly homeowners, of
thousands of dollars under the guise of performing driveway or roof repair work on their
homes. The jury’s findings of guilt included four counts of first degree burglary as
defined in Penal Code section 459, subdivision (a), (statutory section citations that follow
are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) with true findings that each burglary
(1) was committed when a person other than an accomplice was present in the residence,
as described in section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) (person-present findings); and (2) was
committed against a victim who was an elder as defined in section 667.9, subdivision (a).

                                                             1
Other findings of guilty included, but were not limited to, 12 counts of grand theft from
an elder under section 368, subdivision (d), various violations of the Business and
Professions Code that govern the lawful provision of contracting services, and findings
that the defendant had misappropriated construction funds in violation of section 484b.
The jury also found the defendant guilty of other offenses not directly related to his
interactions with the homeowners.
       The court sentenced the defendant to a combined total term of 21 years in prison.
       On appeal, the defendant raises three arguments. First, he argues that one of his
convictions for grand theft of an elder under section 368, subdivision (d), is not supported
by substantial evidence and must be reversed. The defendant reasons the grand theft
finding was not supported because the victim’s grandson successfully stopped payment
on the check the victim wrote payable to the defendant, and, thus, the defendant never
received any money from that victim.
       Second, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated
his constitutional rights by permitting the People to introduce evidence of prior
uncharged bad acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The defendant
says the evidence ought to have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
       Third, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his request to have the trial court strike the person-present findings on the first-degree
burglary charges.
       We are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments.
       In reviewing the record of this case, we note the trial court misidentified the
convictions on two counts when it pronounced its sentence, and we asked the parties their
views on how we should resolve this error on appeal. The defendant argues we must
remand the case for resentencing on those two counts. The People argue we can correct
the error on appeal. We agree with the People.

                                              2
                        FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
          Facts

                  Schemes to Defraud

          The convictions at issue in this matter are based on testimony recounting 10
separate instances in which the defendant or an associate of his approached a homeowner
at their home about doing work on or near their driveway or their roof. In most of the
incidents, the homeowners were elderly.
          The defendant would demonstrate his legitimacy as a contractor and the trust of
the homeowners by various means, including but not limited to, providing contractor’s
license numbers that later proved not to be his, falsely representing he had worked on the
property before or was related to a person who had worked on the property before who
had since retired, hinting the owner should be able to recognize him from a prior
interaction, supplying a business card, or suggesting he could do good work at a very
good price. The defendant would then charge the homeowner thousands of dollars for
the work he promised to do, and then not do all the work promised, and/or do an
extremely poor job of what he did do, often damaging property in the process.
          In some instances, when a homeowner refused to pay the defendant the full
amount he expected for the work, he would confront them angrily and make threats to
seek legal redress or harm their reputation.
          Experts who examined some of the defendant’s work testified the work had a
value that was a small fraction of what he charged in some instances and no value in
others.
          In his interactions with the victims, the defendant sometimes worked with persons
identified as Wayne Johnson, Brandon Johnson, and Elesia Kay Faill.
          The following three incidents, which are central to our analysis of two of the three
issues raised in this appeal, are illustrative.

                                                  3
              Driveway Work for M.B.

       The following facts are taken from the testimony of M.B. and roofing and paving
expert Ronald Powers.
       M.B. was born in October 1930.
       On July 29, 2020, the defendant went to M.B.’s home and asked her about doing
some paving work on her driveway. M.B. asked the defendant if he was John Rhoades’s
son. John Rhoades had done some previous work on her driveway. The defendant said
he was Rhoades’s son, and explained he was not with his “dad” because his “dad” had
retired. The defendant’s representation that he was Rhoades’s son gave M.B. confidence
in defendant’s work.
       The defendant told M.B. what work he would do, and M.B. thought he sounded
legitimate.
       The defendant arrived at M.B.’s home in a single pick-up truck that looked like it
might have been rented; there was a woman in the truck.
       That day, M.B. wrote and gave the defendant a check for $8,700 as a first payment
for work to be performed.
       Thereafter the defendant put some material on the driveway, but he didn’t clean
the whole driveway or cover it.
       The same day, the defendant came back and said he had done some additional
work at the bottom of M.B.’s driveway, and he told M.B. that work was for an additional
amount. M.B. told the defendant she could not write him another check that day and
asked if she could write it after she had a chance to get to the bank and withdraw more
money. The defendant said he would come back on a later date.
       When the defendant came to M.B.’s house around August 4, 2020, she told him
she had a check for him. The defendant asked M.B. if she would mind combining the
amounts from the two checks into one. So, M.B. wrote a check that combined the $8,700

                                            4
with the additional amount the second check would have been for. After doing some
more work, the defendant came back and asked for the new check. The new check was
for the combined amount of $13,000. The defendant was not supposed to keep the
$8,700 check, and M.B. did not intend for the defendant to have the $8,700 in addition to
the $13,000. But defendant did not return the $8,700 check. The defendant and M.B.
were inside her house for five to seven minutes when she gave him the $13,000 check.
       Later, when M.B. received her bank statement, she learned that the defendant had
cashed both checks. M.B. called her bank and tried to put a stop payment on the $8,700
check, but she was not able to do so.
       M.B. tried to reach the defendant when she realized he had the $8,700, but could
not reach him. Thereafter, M.B. called the sheriff.
       M.B. described the work the defendant did on her driveway as a “mess” that
resulted in discolored brick. She had expected the defendant to coat the entire driveway,
but instead he splashed a substance all over, including on a red brick walkway, spilled
some gravel with “black . . . sticky stuff” over some cracks caused by trees, and left bare
concrete where she had expected some coating.
       Ronald Powers was accepted by the court as an expert in roofing and paving. He
testified that, in February 2022 he visited M.B.’s home. He could not see that any work
had been done on the driveway and there was no sealant when he looked at it. He
estimated that any work that might have been done on M.B.’s property had zero value.

              Roofing Work for J.B. & I.B.

       The following facts are taken from the testimony of J.B., Jr., I.B.,1 Ronald Powers,
and Jason Hamdan, accepted by the court as an expert in tax fraud, tax evasion, financial
investigation, and banking records.

1 I.B.’s testimony was taken during a preliminary hearing and read at trial.

                                             5
       J.B., Jr.,’s parents are J.B. and I.B. J.B. was born in February 1930, and I.B. was
born in January 1935. J.B., Jr., J.B., and I.B. own a home together.
       I.B. testified that in late May or early June 2020 the defendant came to the B.’s
home to discuss doing some work. The defendant first asked I.B. about doing work on
her driveway, but she said no to that. When I.B. mentioned she had some leaks in the
house, the defendant said he used to do roofing, could fix the leaks in her roof, and that
he was wonderful at that type of work. He gave I.B. an estimate to fix leaks, replace
things on the roof, do some fixing around the chimney and windows, and things like that.
The defendant said that somebody else would charge I.B. twice as much for the same
work. The defendant did not tell I.B. he was a contractor, but I.B. relied on the
defendant’s representations that he knew what he was doing and would do a good job.
I.B. spoke with the defendant in her house.
       The defendant gave an initial estimate of $14,000 for the work, but when the elder
B. said no, he offered $10,500. While in the house, the defendant asked for a check for
$9,800 to cover materials. I.B. wrote the defendant a check for $9,800, but then did not
give it to the defendant, instead putting it on a table in the room of the house where she
and the defendant were talking when she realized she did not have enough money in her
checking account to cover the amount of the check. She did not intend for the defendant
to have the check for $9,800 because, as she told him, she did not have enough money in
her account to cover the $9,800 check.
       I.B. spoke with J.B., who was in the bedroom, and then they both wrote checks to
come up with close to the $9,800 amount, and I.B. paid the defendant with those. J.B.
wrote a check to the defendant for $4,600. I.B. wrote another check for $3,900. I.B.
realized the combined checks were a little less than the requested amount and said they
would make it up later when more work was done.
       After the defendant left, I.B. realized she could no longer find the first check she
had written for $9,800, and she never saw it again.

                                              6
        After the work started, at I.B.’s insistence, the defendant wrote up a contract
reflecting the $10,500 estimate. The document mentions asphalt, though that is not
something I.B. wanted. A contract J.B., Jr., reviewed identified tasks to be performed as
resealing windows, repairing the roof with 3-tba asphalt roofing, sealing a joint near the
garage and office area, replacing some eave boards on the backside of the house, fixing
eave boards, coating vents, refurbishing the chimney, applying a clear shield to the entire
roof, applying Copper-Green to a bad board, and reinsulating eaves.
        After the work started, the defendant came into the home and told I.B. the work
was costing more, and J.B. wrote an additional check for $2,000. J.B. and I.B. wrote
additional checks to the defendant and to a Wayne Johnson, who they believed was the
defendant’s brother, and who was supposed to do some mold and insect work in the
home. A third man sometimes was present who carried tools and ladders outside the
home.
        All the checks I.B. and J.B. wrote, including the one for $9,800, cleared and the
money came out of the accounts the checks were drawn on. In all, I.B. says $24,100
came from her bank account, though the estimate for the work had been for $10,500.
        I.B. testified that the last time she saw defendant was the day she told him her son
would be coming to check all the work.
        I.B. did not have the chance to inspect any work done by the defendant until after
he was gone. She doesn’t believe he did any of the work he was supposed to except fix a
leak by the chimney. Some of the things I.B. testified the defendant had promised to do
included replacing more things on the roof, and fixing a leak caused by some rot near the
entry. Instead, I.B. testified, he just nailed a board back by the door that she had wanted
fixed or replaced and painted some things white, which she characterized as “horrible
looking.”
        J.B., Jr., looked at the work after it was done. He could clearly see that much of
the work that was to be done had not been done. When the defendant did not show up to

                                              7
work on the house again, J.B., Jr., tried to reach the defendant using a number the
defendant had given I.B. When the defendant did not answer J.B., Jr.,’s calls, J.B., Jr.,
tried texting the defendant. They exchanged some texts, but the defendant did not always
respond, and when the defendant responded his answers were “unusual.” For example,
one response was just a number, an asterisk, and a period.
       When J.B., Jr., discovered that a missing check had been cashed, he called law
enforcement. His actions included filing a complaint with the sheriff’s department
regarding the $9,800 check.
       Ronald Powers also examined the B.’s property in February 2022. At trial, he
looked at photos J.B., Jr., had taken of the work around June 12, 2020. He observed
some black spray applied to rotted roof boards that should have been repaired, and he
opined that black spray had no value and was not the correct way to fix the boards. He
saw screws applied to some boards where the wood ought to have been replaced. He
testified the use of the screws had no meaningful value. He saw some white spray paint
applied to the house where a hole remained. This work had no value. He saw some nails
applied to the underside of the roof, and he opined there was no value to that work. He
saw some other places where screws had been applied at no real value. He did see some
Copper-Green applied in a closet, but there was no meaningful value to what had been
sprayed. He also observed some Copper-Green sprayed on the roof, where it appears it
was held down by a two-by-four or a couple pieces of wood that made up a similar size,
which is not an appropriate way to fix a roof. He noted the wood might cost $25, but the
work that had been done had no value. He saw a white spray of some sort that may have
partially filled some nail holes but had no value and which did nothing to remediate rust
in the holes.
       He also saw some black and white paint along the roof that may have cost
something but did not benefit the house. He saw some type of mastic applied to a joint.
He saw some mastic sprayed around the skylight that may or may not have been a proper

                                             8
form to use on the skylight. He saw paint sprayed around part of the chimney. He
thought this painting was maybe worth $20 in parts and labor. He opined that some black
substance applied to the chimney flume was worth maybe $20. Some mastic applied
underneath the rock around the chimney that could have been an effort at some water
proofing was possibly worth $30. He observed a small amount of asphalt applied to the
roof that may have stopped a leak, that was worth about $20. He observed some black
substance applied to a vent that maybe cost $20 or $30. He assigned similar material and
labor costs to some black paint applied directly to the roofing and another spot of paint.
He noted that with these values, the material costs would have been very small, and most
of it would go towards labor.
        When Powers inspected the skylight and a pipe himself in February 2022, cracks
had opened up and the material that he had observed in J.B., Jr.,’s photos appeared to
have washed away, rendering that work worthless. He saw no evidence of resealed
windows. He saw no new pieces of 3-tab asphalt. He saw no sealing on the joint to the
office/garage. He did not see a clear seal applied to the roof. The Copper-Green he saw
applied was in the closet. The insulation under the boards of the eaves looked like it had
been there awhile—i.e., it was not new.
        In all, Powers estimated the work done at the B.’s was worth at most $200.
        Jason Hamdan a criminal investigator for the California Franchise Tax Board,
investigated the tax matters in this case. His investigation included reviewing bank
records he obtained through a search warrant. He saw over $20,000, including the checks
for $9,800, $3,900, and $4,600 going into the defendant’s accounts through the checks
written by J.B and I.B.

               Driveway Work for J.H.

        The following summary is taken from the testimony of J.E.

                                              9
       J.E. takes care of his grandfather, J.H. who was born in September 1924. J.H. was
98 at the time of trial. J.E. acts as his grandfather’s fiduciary and has power of attorney
over his financial and medical matters. J.E. lives with his grandfather.
       In March 2020, the defendant came to J.H.’s house and saw the defendant putting
some chemical on the asphalt driveway. J.E. asked J.H. who was in the driveway, and
J.H. told him it was a guy from the seal company.
       Prior to the day J.E. encountered the defendant, Precision Paving had replaced the
asphalt on J.H.’s driveway. The amount that J.E. and J.H. had paid Precision Paving for
the asphalt included a sealant. Precision Paving had indicated they wanted to let the
asphalt settle before applying the seal. After workers from Precision Paving finished
paving they said they would come back at no additional cost to put the sealant on.
       At the time the defendant appeared at the house, Precision Paving had not yet
come back to apply the sealant.
       J.E. approached the defendant and said, “I understand you’re from Precision
Paving.” The defendant said that, yes, he was from Precision Paving. Pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation, the defendant has never been employed by or in any way affiliated
with “Precision Asphalt.”
       We note that, at first, J.E. testified about “Precision Paving” doing the prior work.
But when the stipulation concerning the defendant’s prior association with “Precision
Asphalt” came into evidence, the People started using the name “Precision Asphalt.” J.E.
didn’t seem to quibble with the use of “Asphalt” instead of “Paving.”
       J.E. saw a woman in a pick-up truck when he was at J.H.’s house.
       Once he looked at the driveway, J.E. didn’t think it looked right, and he tried to
reach Precision Paving but was unable to contact them.
       Later, on March 25, 2020, the defendant came into the house and gave J.E. and
J.H. an invoice. J.E. and J.H. were present and maybe six to seven feet away from the
defendant. J.E. had opened the door to the defendant.

                                             10
       The invoice was for the cleaning and application of melted rubber into cracks and
for the application of an oil-based seal at a flat cost of $6,800.
       J.E. immediately objected to the invoice, telling defendant the “this is supposed to
be for free.” The defendant told J.E. that was wrong, and the cost was “by the bucket.”
J.E. became concerned that the defendant might not really be from Precision Asphalt.
       Because J.E. believed he and J.H. were in no position to defend themselves, he
thought it best to write the check. J.E. wrote the check from an account that is in his and
J.H.’s name, but which he considers J.H.’s account and J.H. signed the check.
       J.E. gave the check to the defendant. J.E. did not actually want the defendant to
have the money, because he was concerned the job the defendant had done was not
legitimate. J.E. gave the defendant the check because he did not want to cause a
confrontation. J.E. feels he has to protect his grandfather and saw the defendant as a
stranger in their home when J.E. and J.H. could not defend themselves. J.E. felt it was
best to just give the defendant a payment and get him out of the house.
       Shortly after the defendant left, within a couple hours on the same day, rain and
hail and water that collected on the driveway washed away all the “sealant.” J.E. has
since resealed the driveway twice himself.
       The next day, J.E. contacted Adult Protective Services. He told an Adult
Protective Services employee that the defendant had tried to take financial advantage of
his grandfather. He also called the Sheriff’s Department the day he called Adult
Protective Services.
       J.E. put a stop payment on the check around midnight on March 26, 2020. No
money was taken out of J.H.’s account.
       The defendant later called J.E. and said the check did not clear, and J.E. said he
may have owed the defendant something, but not $6,800. The defendant later called J.E.
again and said that J.E. would hear from the defendant’s lawyer. J.E. responded that he
had already contacted the authorities and Adult Protective Services, and the defendant

                                              11
hung up. During one of the calls, J.E. also asked for the defendant’s contractor’s license
and the defendant refused to provide it.

Procedural Background

              Guilt Phase: Jury Findings

       The People filed the Third Amended Consolidated Information (Information) in
this action on May 17, 2022. The defendant entered pleas of not guilty to the Information
and denied its allegations.
       The Information set forth 84 counts. The Information also alleged that the
defendant had prior convictions that fell within section 1203, subdivision (e)(4), and that
there were a variety of aggravating sentencing factors. Many of the counts were
dismissed during the trial.
       A jury trial began on June 20, 2022. The court bifurcated the trial on the alleged
aggravating factors and prior convictions.
       The jury made the following findings with respect to the three fact patterns we
have described in detail above:
       With respect to M.B., the jury found that defendant was guilty of one count of first
degree burglary under section 459, subdivision (a), and it found it was true that there was
a person other than an accomplice present when the defendant committed the burglary as
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), and that the victim of the
burglary was an elder within the meaning of section 667.9, subdivision (a). With respect
to M.B., the jury also found the defendant guilty of two counts of grand theft from an
elder under section 368, subdivision (d), one count of misappropriation of construction
funds over $2,350 under section 484b, and one count of contracting without a license in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028, subdivision (a)(1).
       With respect to I.B. and J.B., the jury found that defendant was guilty on two
counts of first degree burglary under section 459, subdivision (a), and it found true that in

                                             12
both instances there was a person other than an accomplice present when he committed
the burglary within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), and that the victim
of the burglary was an elder as described in section 667.9, subdivision (a). With respect
to I.B. and J.B., the jury also found the defendant guilty of five counts of grand theft from
an elder under section 368, subdivision (d), one count of misappropriation of construction
funds over $2,350 under section 484b, and one count of contracting without a license in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028, subdivision (a)(1).
       With respect to J.H., the jury found that defendant was guilty of one count of first
degree burglary under section 459, subdivision (a), and it found true that there was a
person other than an accomplice present when he committed the burglary within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), and that the victim of the burglary was an
elder as described in section 667.9, subdivision (a). Also with respect to J.H., the jury
also found the defendant guilty of one count of grand theft from an elder under section
368, subdivision (d), and one count of contracting without a license in violation of
Business and Professions Code section 7028, subdivision (a)(1). With respect to J.H., the
jury found the defendant not guilty of diverting construction funds in excess of $2,350 in
violation of section 484b, or of a lesser included offense of diverting construction funds
under $2,350.
       As to the other alleged victims of the defendant’s criminal schemes the jury found:
       The defendant was guilty of five additional counts of grand theft from an elder
under section 368, subdivision (d) and five counts of grand theft under section 487,
subdivision (a).
       The defendant was found guilty of six additional counts of
diverting/misappropriating construction funds over $2,350 under section 484b. In one
instance, he was found not guilty of misappropriating construction funds over $2,350 as
contemplated by section 484b, but guilty of misappropriating under $2,350.

                                             13
       The defendant was found guilty of seven additional counts of contracting without
a license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7028, subdivision (a).
       The defendant was convicted of one count of use of a fraudulent contractor’s
license with intent to defraud in violation of Business and Professions Code section
7027.3, one count of advertising for construction work without a valid contractor’s
license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7027.1, subdivision (a), two
counts of charging an excessive down payment in violation of Business and Professions
code section 7159.5, subdivision (a)(3), one count of second degree burglary under
section 459, and one count of extortion in violation of section 518.
       The jury also found the defendant guilty of various offenses that are not central to
this appeal, including one count of providing false identification to a police officer in
violation of section 148.9, subdivision (a), one count of driving with a suspended license
in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a), one count of failure to file
an income tax return in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706, one
count of conspiracy under section 182, subdivision (a)(1) in relation to a scheme to
commit welfare fraud, one count of perjury in violation of section 118, subdivision (a),
and one count of the receipt of aid in excess of $950 through misrepresentation in
violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980, subdivision (c)(2). The jury
found defendant guilty of failure to appear under section 1320, subdivision (b), and found
true the special allegation that this offense was committed while the defendant was on
bail or released on his own recognizance within the meaning of section 12022.1.

               Trial on Bifurcated Issues

       The defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the bifurcated issues.
       The court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had various prior
convictions.

                                             14
       The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of various aggravating
factors, including that the victim was particularly vulnerable; that the defendant induced
another to participate in the crimes and occupied a position of leadership in the
commission of the crimes; that the manner in which the crime was carried out indicates
planning, sophistication, and professionalism; that in some of the instances the crime
involved the attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary value; that the
defendant took advantage of a position of trust to commit the offense; that the
defendant’s prior convictions as an adult and in sustained juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous and increasing in seriousness; that defendant had served a
prior prison term; that the defendant’s prior performance on probation and parole was
unsatisfactory; and that a victim was unable to defend himself or herself due to age or
significant disability within the meaning of section 1170.85, subdivision (b).
       The trial court found not true aggravating factors that the crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat to do great bodily harm or acts disclosing a high
degree or cruelty, viciousness, and callousness; that the defendant threatened a witness,
unlawfully prevented or dissuaded a witness from testifying, suborned perjury, and
illegally interfered with the judicial process; that the defendant was on probation or
parole when the crime was committed; and that the victim was an elder and dependent
adult as defined by section 368, and specifically relating to sections 502.9, 515, and 525.

              Sentencing and Appeal

       The court sentence the defendant to a total of 21 years in prison as follows:
       With respect to M.B., it sentenced the defendant to six years for the first-degree
burglary with the person-present enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21),
and struck the sentencing enhancement—but not the finding—for the section 667.9,
subdivision (a), finding that the victim was an elder. Then the trial court added a
consecutive sentence of one year for one of the two grand theft from an elder convictions.

                                             15
Applying section 654, the trial court imposed but stayed the sentence on the other
conviction for grand theft from an elder and on the conviction for the misappropriation of
construction funds over $2,350. The prison sentence for the crimes committed against
M.B. totaled seven years.
       With respect to I.B. and J.B., the trial court sentenced the defendant to a
consecutive term of one year and four months for each of the two first-degree burglary
with the person-present enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), and
struck the sentencing enhancements—but not the findings—for the section 667.9,
subdivision (a), findings that the victims were elder. The trial court then added a
consecutive one-year sentence for one of the five grand theft from an elder convictions.
Applying section 654, the trial court imposed but stayed the sentence on the other
convictions for grand theft from an elder and the convictions for misappropriation of
construction funds over $2,350. Regarding the I.B./J.B. convictions the prison sentence
totaled three years and eight months.
       With respect to J.H., the trial court sentenced the defendant to a consecutive term
of one year and four months for the first-degree burglary with the person-present
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), and struck the sentencing
enhancement—but not the finding—for the section 667.9, subdivision (a), finding that the
victim was an elder. Applying section 654, the trial court then imposed but stayed a
sentence for the grand theft from an elder conviction. As to the criminal acts against J.H.
the court sentenced defendant to one year and four months.
       The court imposed consecutive one-year sentences for each of the five counts
where the jury had found the defendant guilty of grand theft from an elder convictions.
However, in announcing the conviction on the record for one of those counts, count 48,
and in recording the count and sentence on the abstract of judgment, the trial court
misidentified the underlying offense for count 48 as a violation of section 484b, which
governs the misappropriation of construction funds.

                                             16
       The court imposed eight-month consecutive sentences for four of the five grand
theft convictions, and under section 654 imposed but stayed a sentence on the fifth grand
theft conviction.
       The court imposed and stayed, under section 654, eight-month sentences on five of
the six additional misappropriation of construction funds over $2,350 convictions in
violation of section 484b. The court erroneously treated the sixth additional conviction
for the misappropriation of construction funds over $2,350, in count 45, as a conviction
for grand theft under section 487, subdivision (a), imposed a sentence of one year, then
stayed that sentence under section 654.
       The court imposed a consecutive sentence of eight months for the second-degree
burglary conviction.
       The court imposed a concurrent three-year term for the use of a fraudulent
contractor’s license with intent to defraud count.
       The trial court imposed an eight-month consecutive sentence for failure to file an
income tax return in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706. With
respect to the other convictions not directly tied to the defendant’s schemes to defraud
homeowners, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences or stayed the sentences under
section 654.
       The trial court imposed a 364-day concurrent jail term as punishment for a variety
of offenses, including the contracting without a license conviction, that were classified as
misdemeanors.
       The trial court ordered the defendant to make various restitution payments to his
victims, and additional fines were imposed and suspended or stayed.
       The defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 30, 2022.

                                             17
                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                  Count 65 Conviction for Grand Theft of an Elder, J.H.

       In Count 65, the jury found defendant guilty of grand theft against an elder, J.H.,
under section 368, subdivision (d). The defendant argues that this finding is not
supported by substantial evidence and must be reversed, because the defendant never
actually obtained any money from J.H. since the check was canceled before defendant
could cash it. We find substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict on Count 65.

       A.     Standard of Review

       “The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well
established . . . . [Citations.] In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
. . . beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence-that is, evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-supporting the decision, and not whether
the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the
evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the
evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the
trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639.) In other words, “ ‘[a] reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018)
5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)

                                             18
       B.     Grand Theft from an Elder Adult

       Section 368, subdivision (d), calls for an additional fine for persons who commit
theft, embezzlement, forgery, fraud, or a section 530.5 (identity theft) violation when the
victim of the crime is an elder or dependent adult.
       Section 484, subdivision (a), sets forth various mechanisms through which one
may be found guilty of theft. (See also People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834,
1846 [“[I]n California, the various common law theories of theft, including
embezzlement, have been consolidated”].) For example, here the jury was instructed on
how theft might be accomplished by larceny, the use of false pretense, trick, or
embezzlement.
       “Larceny ‘is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal
property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent
to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away.’ (People v. Davis (1998)
19 Cal.4th 301, 305 [].)” (People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 639.)
       Theft by false pretense requires that “ ‘(1) the defendant made a false pretense or
representation to the owner of property; (2) with the intent to defraud the owner of that
property; and (3) the owner transferred the property to the defendant in reliance on the
representation.’ (People v. Wooten[, supra,] 44 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1842 [].)” (People v.
Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 787.)
       “The crime of theft by trick or device requires: 1) obtaining possession of property
of another by some trick or device; 2) intent by the wrongdoer to convert it to his own use
and to permanently deprive the owner thereof; and 3) transfer of possession but not title
to the wrongdoer,” and is similar to theft by false pretenses. (People v. Frederick (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 400, 417.) Where, “[t]heft by trick or device involves a transfer of
possession only; theft by false pretenses involves a transfer of title and possession.
[Citation.] Generally, if a victim gives money to a wrongdoer with the understanding that

                                             19
it will be spent for a particular purpose, title does not pass to the wrongdoer. [Citation.]
Under those circumstances, the wrongdoer may have committed the crime of theft by
trick or device.” (Ibid.)
       Under section 487, subdivision (a), except in circumstances not applicable here,
“Grand theft” as opposed to petty theft includes “theft committed . . . [¶] [w]hen the
money, labor, real property, or personal property taken is of a value exceeding nine
hundred fifty dollars ($950).” (See also § 486 [identifying the two degrees of theft as
petty theft and grand theft].) “In determining the value of the property obtained . . . the
reasonable and fair market value shall be the test.” (§ 484, subd. (a); see also People v.
Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 917 [applying valuation method to any theft punished
based on the stolen property’s value].) Under section 492, “[i]f the thing stolen consists
of any evidence of debt, or other written instrument, the amount of money due thereupon,
or secured to be paid thereby, and remaining unsatisfied, or which in any contingency
might be collected thereon, or the value of the property the title to which is shown
thereby, or the sum which might be recovered in the absence thereof, is the value of the
thing stolen.”
       To constitute a theft, the property taken, “ ‘need not . . . be retained by the
perpetrator.’ (CALJIC No. 14.02.) ‘Asportation of the property with the intention to
appropriate it is sufficient to constitute larceny even though the property may
subsequently be returned to the owner. . . . The fact that a thief is prevented by an officer
from getting away with the property, or that he may change his mind and return the
property to escape prosecution for the crime, does not relieve him from the consequences
of the theft. [Citations.] . . . [T]heft may be committed when the accused persons, with a
preconceived design to obtain and appropriate property by means of fraud or trickery,
thereby gain possession of the property, even though they do not retain or use it for their
own benefit. [Citation.]’ (People v. Post (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 511, 514 [].)” (People v.
Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 656.)

                                              20
       C.     Application to this Appeal

       In his opening brief, the defendant argued that although the check J.H. and J.E.
gave him was for $6,800, because J.E. stopped payment on the check before the
defendant could cash it, the defendant never obtained anything of value from J.E. and no
grand theft occurred. In their respondent’s brief, the People agreed with this argument.
However, neither party considered the import of section 492 in their initial brief, and we
asked both parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue addressing section 492.
       Tellingly, in his opening supplemental brief, while continuing to argue the check
had no value, the defendant makes no mention of section 492, leaving all consideration of
it for his supplemental reply. In contrast, in their supplemental briefing, the People
considered section 492 and modified their position to argue sufficient evidence supports a
finding that the stolen check was worth more than $950 and, therefore, supports a finding
of grand theft. We agree with the People.
       The check was written for $6,800. The evidence suggests that, but for J.E. having
stopped payment on the check the defendant would have been able to cash the check and
collect $6,800. That is, between the time the defendant was given the check and the time
it was canceled, “the thing stolen” consisted of a “written instrument,” and “the amount
of money due thereupon, or secured to be paid thereby, and remaining unsatisfied, or
which in any contingency might be collected thereon,” was $6,800. That J.E. managed to
cancel the check does not change that it was worth $6,800 for these hours. During that
time, the defendant possessed a wrongfully obtained check that he could have cashed for
$6,800. This was still a theft, and given the value of the check, it constituted grand theft.
(People v. Post, supra, 76 Cal.App.2d at p. 514 [“Grand theft may be committed when
the accused persons, with a preconceived design to obtain and appropriate property by
means of fraud or trickery, thereby gain possession of the property, even though they do
not retain or use it for their own benefit”].)

                                                 21
       People v. Quiel (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 674 (Quiel) and People v. Rial (1914)
23 Cal.App. 713 (Rial) are instructive on how to apply the statutes to evaluate the check
at issue in this case.
       In Quiel, supra, 68 Cal.App.2d at pages 676 and 680, the court of appeal affirmed
the defendant’s petty theft conviction. The defendant had snatched a purse that contained
two bank checks, one for $32 and one for $34, from a car. (Id. at p. 677.) However, the
defendant promptly ditched the purse which still contained the checks, and the owner
later cashed the checks. (Ibid.) In upholding the conviction, the court found there was
adequate evidence that the purse and contents had intrinsic value, reasoning, in part, that,
“[t]he evidence shows that the purse contained two bank checks for specified amounts
which were afterward cashed for their face value . . . . Proof of unpaid bank checks of
specified amounts is sufficient evidence of values of the sums ‘which in any contingency
might be collected thereon.’ (Pen. Code, § 492.) The evidence in this case shows that
the checks were subsequently cashed for their face values.” (Quiel¸ at p. 678.)
       In Rial, supra, 23 Cal.App. at pages 715 and 721, the court of appeal affirmed a
defendant’s conviction for grand larceny after he had stolen $40 cash, a bank draft for
$100, and a certificate of deposit for $5,000. In affirming the conviction, the court
explained, “It was not necessary that it should be shown that the property taken was
applied to some use by the defendant or his confederates before the crime was made out.
When defendant obtained possession of the property of the complainant through the
fraudulent means employed and with intent to deprive the owner thereof, the crime was
complete; as much so as had he snatched it from the person of complainant and starting
to run away was caught and the property taken back. The draft and certificate of deposit
at the time they passed into the defendant’s possession were valid and their value was the
sum that might have been collected thereon, as is provided by section 492 of the Penal
Code. The fact that complainant stopped payment on the five thousand dollar certificate

                                             22
of deposit after delivery, did not make the act of defendant in obtaining possession
thereof any the less criminal.” (Id. at p. 719, italics added.)
       The defendant’s efforts to persuade this court Quiel and Rial are inapposite are not
persuasive. First, he points out that Quiel and Rial pre-dated Romanowski—which noted
that section 484, subdivision (a), “requires courts to determine the value of property
obtained by theft based on ‘reasonable and fair market value.’ ” (People v. Romanowski,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914.) Second, he states the cases relied on “intrinsic value” rather
than “fair market value” to determine the value of the written instruments at issue. This
line of argument ignores that in both Quiel¸ supra, 68 Cal.App.2d at page 678 and Rial,
supra, 23 Cal.App. at page 719, the courts based their valuation of the written
instruments on a statute, section 492, that remains good law and in the chapter of the
Penal Code governing larceny, and which specifically governs the valuation of written
instruments that can be collected on. (See Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 993 [a more specific statute controls over a more general
one touching on the same subject].) In a third argument, the defendant claims Rial is a
case about obtaining money by false pretenses and not larceny, but that ignores both (1)
the nature of the means through which the defendant obtained the check at issue here; and
(2) that the Rial court specified the reasoning it applied was the same as it would in a
more traditional example of theft where someone might snatch an item from their victim.
That here the defendant secured the check by using the combined forces of false
representations and coercive fear does not make Rial’s reasoning regarding how to value
the written instrument taken any less apt.
       The defendant’s efforts in his supplemental opening brief to persuade us that the
face value of the check was not its value at the time he secured it by theft are unavailing.
To begin with, the court rulings the defendant cites for the authority that there needed to
be more evidence as to the value the check may have received under a “reasonable and
fair market value” test—possibly on the black market—are inapposite. People v.

                                              23
Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pages 905-906 and Caretto v. Superior Court (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 909, 912 considered the value of a stolen bank access card and debit
cards, which are very different from a legally drawn check. United States v. Luckey (9th
Cir. 1981) 655 F.2d 203, 204, concerned a blank dividend check taken from the bank’s
corporate trust department, which, again, is not the same as a legally drafted check with
an establish face value. People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 583, did not
concern a legal written instrument with a stated face value, but boxes of adjustable
dumbbells. Under section 492, when dealing with a legally valid instrument, the “amount
of money due thereupon” is the “value of the thing stolen.” (See People v. Caridis
(1915) 29 Cal.App. 166, 168 [section 492 “contemplates and controls the value to be
placed . . . upon written instruments which create some legal right and constitute a
subsisting and an enforceable evidence of a debt”].) Here, at the time the defendant
carried the check away, that value was $6,800.
       The cases the defendant cites in his reply fair no better because they do not
involve the taking of legally valid checks. (See People v. Cook (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d
435, 436 [stolen items were suits]; People v. Lizarraga (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 436, 437
[stolen item was a fur]; People v. Latham (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 35, 36 [stolen items
included four checkwriters, a robe, two bathing suits, a scrap book and a wheel and tire];
People v. Renfro (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 921, 922 [defendant stole telephone wire];
People v. Pena (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 102 [defendant stole leather jackets]; People
v. Sanders (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409 [alleged property theft accomplished by
recording fraudulent/forged deeds].)
       There was substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant obtained a
check from J.H. that was worth $6,800 at the time the theft was completed. The
defendant has not demonstrated the jury erred in finding him guilty on count 65.

                                            24
                                               II

                   Evidence Code Section 1101, Subdivision (b), Evidence

       Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of
five uncharged prior bad acts. There was no error.

       A.     Additional Background
              1.      Motions in Limine Regarding Prior Bad Acts and the Court’s Ruling

       Prior to trial, the People filed a motion in limine to submit evidence of defendant’s
prior bad acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The People proposed
submitting evidence of eight prior uncharged incidents involving elder theft they
characterized as “similar to the conduct for which he is charged” in this action.
       In contrast, the defendant’s motions in limine included a request to exclude
evidence of his prior bad acts under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101.
       The trial court allowed for the admission of evidence of the five most recent prior
bad acts, observing that the information could come in with respect to the issue of intent.
In stating its reasoning for its ruling, the trial court explained that in limiting the number
of incidents to five, it was balancing the potentially prejudicial impact of including the
evidence and the amount of time including it might consume with the utility of the
proposed evidence.

              2.      Stipulations

       The prior-acts evidence came in by way of stipulation and the facts can be
summarized as follows:
       Incident 1: B.C. was born in January 1935. In December 2020 the defendant told
her she needed some work done in her driveway. B.C. paid $100 for the work. The
defendant then told B.C. she needed some additional work done on the driveway, which
B.C. paid the defendant $200 to do. In the next weeks, the defendant went to B.C. again

                                              25
several times, each time telling her she needed additional work at an additional cost.
B.C. would pay him. In total, B.C. paid the defendant $55,400. In February 2021, B.C.’s
son, M.C., concluded the defendant had done no significant work on the driveway, told
B.C. to stop giving the defendant money, and called the county sheriff’s department. The
work the defendant performed involved spraying a single layer of some sealant on B.C.’s
driveway. The defendant also sprayed areas he was not supposed to, including B.C.’s
trash cans and decorative bricks and stones that lined her driveway. The sealant
remained sticky and in March 2021 would become detached with the least bit of pressure,
even though the sealant was supposed to have dried. The entire driveway was chipping.
The defendant cashed the checks B.C. wrote. According to their bank records, the
defendant’s brother, Brandon Johnson, and father, Bennie Wayne Johnson, also received
checks from B.C.
       Incident 2: S.H. was born in 1937. The defendant came to her house in January
2020, told her he had installed her roof 10 years earlier, that the roof had a 10-year
warranty, and that he had come to service the roof. The defendant told S.H. the roof
needed cleaning and an oil spray, and he did not tell her there would be a charge for this
work. The defendant did not give S.H. an invoice. The defendant asked S.H. if her
husband was still alive, and she said her husband had died six years before. The
defendant said he remembered selling S.H.’s husband the roof. S.H. left, and when she
returned a few hours later, the defendant and two others who had been with him were
gone. The defendant came back the next day and told S.H. he planned to put some
sealing foam in holes in the roof caused by animals. Again, the defendant did not tell
S.H. he was going to charge her for the work. Later that day, the defendant presented
S.H. with a bill for $9,800. S.H. had assumed the work would cost $500 to $1,000 and
told the defendant she did not have the money. When S.H. offered to pay with a credit
card, the defendant said he did not take credit cards but agreed to take $800 off the bill.
S.H. gave the defendant a check for $4,500 and asked him to wait 24 hours to cash it so

                                             26
she could transfer funds. The defendant told S.H. he would need the other $4,500 at the
beginning of the coming month. The defendant cashed the first check within 30 minutes
of leaving S.H.’s home. S.H. felt uncomfortable after the defendant left and tried to stop
payment on the check, but it was too late. An examination of S.H.’s roof found no new
roofing or sealing work had been done on the roof. The only evidence of recent work
was some type of metallic spray had been applied to the chimney grates and their mortar
bed.
       Incident 3: A.M. was born in 1924 and has difficulty seeing and hearing. In
September 2020, the defendant went to A.M.’s house and offered to repair her driveway.
A.M. paid the defendant $2,700. The defendant then offered to do additional work, for
which A.M. agreed to pay the defendant $88. Because A.M. has difficulty seeing, she
gave the checkbook to the defendant so he could write the check himself. When the
defendant went to the bank to try to cash the checks, the second of which was for
$8,800—not $88.00—the teller called A.M. to confirm the check amounts were correct.
A.M. had trouble hearing and said the amounts were correct. The teller cashed the
checks. A.M. discovered the check was for $8,800 instead of $88 after defendant cashed
it. A.M.’s friend, J.K., called the defendant for her and the defendant agreed to correct
the mistake. They never heard from the defendant again. When an employee of the Lake
County Sheriff called the number J.K. had used to reach the defendant, a woman
answered and said she had never heard of the defendant.
       Incident 4: V.R. was born in 1929 and lived alone. In August 2021, the defendant
came to her home. The defendant became emotional and said his father was dying, and
that he was having trouble carrying on the contracting business he had inherited from his
father. The defendant stated he noticed V.R.’s house could use some repairs, and he
claimed his father had previously worked on V.R.’s house. The defendant’s father,
Bennie Wayne Johnson, had never worked on V.R.’s house. The defendant convinced
V.R. to pay him $1,600 to resurface her driveway, and then he told her she had issues

                                            27
with the shingles on her roof. The defendant and two other people, including his
girlfriend Elesia Kay Faill, then sprayed an unknown substance on V.R.’s roof. The
defendant gave V.R. an invoice for $8,160 for the roof work. V.R. was surprised by the
amount, but the defendant told her he had only charged her for costs and her insurance
would cover the rest. V.R. wrote him a check for the $8,160. At some other point, V.R.
also wrote the defendant a check for $375. The Humboldt County Sheriff’s deputy who
responded to V.R.’s report inspected her roof. The deputy reported he only saw an old
roof in poor condition, and he could not tell that any work had been done for the $8,160.
       Incident 5: P.P. was born in June 1954. Her husband G.S. was born in 1963. The
defendant approached P.P. while she was in her driveway and offered to do work on the
driveway for $800. The defendant worked on the driveway for about one-and-one-half
hours. P.P. was home but G.S. was not. After the one-and-one-half-hours, Elesia Kay
Faill knocked on the door and handed P.P. an invoice for $6,000. P.P. agreed to pay
$4,000 then and $2,000 later. The defendant cashed the $4,000 check soon after
P.P. provided it. After the defendant and Faill left, P.P. and G.S. discovered defendant
had not seal coated the driveway but had just painted it black which damaged the asphalt.
The defendant and Faill also damaged another section of new asphalt a different
contractor had laid for $1,000 by parking their truck on it. When the defendant and Faill
knocked on the door to collect the remaining $2,000, the defendant stayed in the truck
while Faill went to the door. When G.S. made a reference to law enforcement, the
defendant and Faill left.

              3.     Arguments and Limiting Instructions

       The trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction regarding the prior-
bad-acts evidence. Under the instruction, the jury was only to consider the evidence if
the People had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had, in fact,
committed the uncharged offenses. If the People had met that threshold burden, the trial

                                             28
court told the jury it could then only consider it for the limited purpose of deciding if the
defendant was, in fact, the person who committed the crimes in this action; or that the
defendant acted with the intent to commit theft in this case; or that the defendant had a
motive to commit the offenses in this case; or that the defendant’s acts were not a mistake
or an accident; or that the defendant had a plan or scheme to commit the offenses in this
case.
The trial court instructed the jury that in evaluating the evidence, it should consider the
similarity between the uncharged offenses and the offenses alleged in the action. The
trial court also instructed the jury that beyond the enumerated list of reasons, the jury
could not use the evidence for any other reason except to determine the defendant’s
credibility. The trial court instructed the jury that if the jury concluded that the defendant
committed the uncharged offenses, “that conclusion is only one factor to consider along
with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is
guilty of the charged offenses. The People must still prove each charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
        The People read the stipulations describing the five prior incidents to the jury
during their opening statement and referenced the facts in them during the closing
argument.
        In closing, the defense argued, “What’s the evidence in this case? That he does
crappy work and he charges too much money for it. Doesn’t make him a criminal, makes
him a bad businessman that you wouldn’t refer to your friend. [¶] Doesn’t make him a
burglar. Doesn’t make him an extorter. Doesn’t make him a thief.”

        B.     Underlying Statutes and Standards of Review

        Evidence Code section 1101 governs the admissibility of uncharged crimes.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), generally prohibits the admission of
“evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character,” including in the form

                                              29
of “specific instances of his or her conduct,” when that evidence is “offered to prove his
or her conduct on a specified occasion.” “The provision ‘expressly prohibits the use of
an uncharged offense if the only theory of relevance is that the accused has a propensity
(or disposition) to commit the crime charged and that this propensity is circumstantial
proof that the accused behaved accordingly on the occasion of the charged offense.’
(People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 316, [].)” (People v. Chhoun (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1, 25 (Chhoun).)
       However, Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), states that this limitation
does not prohibit, “the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime . . . when
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . . .” (See also Chhoun, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 25 [“ ‘If an uncharged act is relevant to prove some fact other than
propensity,’ such as the perpetrator’s intent or identity, or the existence of a common
plan, ‘the evidence is admissible, subject to a limiting instruction upon request.’ (People
v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 406)”].)
       Here, the defendant does not argue that the prior act evidence was not admissible
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). However, when “evidence of the
uncharged conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to be relevant for a
nonpropensity purpose, the trial court must” also determine “the evidence’s probative
value is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the
jury’ ” under Evidence Code section 352. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 26.) The
defendant argues the prior-bad-acts evidence at issue here was “extremely prejudicial”
and, therefore, fails to satisfy Evidence Code section 352’s standards for admissibility.
The defendant argues that the evidence is, in fact, so prejudicial that its inclusion violated
his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
and article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution.

                                             30
       We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence under
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 610 (Johnson).) Under this standard, “ ‘[t]he court’s ruling will
not be disturbed unless made “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ([People v. ]Powell[ (2018)] 6 Cal.5th
[136], 162.)” (Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 611.)

       C.     Application

       In considering the defendant’s argument that the prior incident evidence ought to
have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 due to its prejudicial impact, we
recognize the caution our Supreme Court provided in People v. Thompson, supra,
27 Cal.3d at page 318: “Since ‘substantial prejudicial effect [is] inherent in [such]
evidence,’ uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial probative
value. If there is any doubt, the evidence should be excluded. (See People v. Kelley [
(1967)] 66 Cal.2d [232,] 239.)” (Fn. omitted; accord People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th
380, 404, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Robertson (2012)
208 Cal.App. 965, 991.)
       The defendant argues that the “extensive” evidence presented of his uncharged
prior offenses was “exceedingly prejudicial because it reinforced the prosecution’s idea
that appellant was a serial con man or fraudster rather than just an incompetent contractor
who charged too much.” In the next paragraph, he argues that the evidence was not
necessary to show intent. Finally, the defendant argues the jury may have heard the
evidence of these uncharged offenses and been prejudiced against him because they
believed he had remained unpunished for these acts. None of these arguments are
persuasive.
       “ ‘ “ ‘[E]vidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of such
nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the information, not

                                             31
to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side
because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a circumstance, the evidence is unduly
prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate
purpose.’ ” ’ (People v. Powell[, supra,] 6 Cal.5th [at pp.] 162-163 [].)” (Johnson,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 610.) “Evidence is not unduly prejudicial ‘merely because it
strongly implicates a defendant and casts him or her in a bad light.’ (People v. Robinson
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 632[].)” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 50.)
       Here, the prior acts evidence was highly probative in demonstrating the
defendant’s intent: contrary to his argument that he is simply bad at his job, he has a
history of charging elderly “customers” for work either not performed or poorly
performed. This history reflects that when he charged the victims in this case, he had an
understanding that he was not actually providing anything of value in exchange for
payment and he intended to defraud them which goes to directly counter defendant’s
argued defense.
       The evidence presented regarding the prior bad acts were unlikely to inflame the
jury more than the facts of the crimes at issue here. While one victim in this case
testified how behavior by the defendant caused her to be afraid, and another described
him as becoming angry and engaging in what she saw as wild behavior, none of the
stipulations regarding the prior bad acts contain evidence that the targets of the
defendant’s schemes perceived him as angry or threatening. At worst, one of the
complainants of his prior acts had reported she felt uncomfortable after he did work at her
property, which more likely was a reference to suspecting she had been defrauded of
money than a reference to how defendant had made her feel when he was around her.
Though “the prejudicial effect of the evidence is increased if the uncharged acts did not
result in a criminal conviction . . . [t]he potential for prejudice is decreased . . . when
testimony describing the defendant’s uncharged acts is no stronger or more inflammatory

                                               32
than the testimony concerning the charged offense.” (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1040, 1047.)
       Additionally, the trial court’s treatment of the prior incident evidence, far from
showing an abuse of discretion, shows the court engaged in a careful balancing of the
potential impact of the evidence. To wit, it limited the incidents that could be offered to
the jury for consideration to the most recent incidents. This reflected an understanding
that the probative value of the more recent incidents would be greater, because “[t]he
close proximity in time of the uncharged offenses to the charged offenses increases the
probative value of this evidence.” (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427.)
       The trial court also included an appropriate limiting instruction regarding the use
of the prior acts evidence. Though the defendant may wish we would assume the jury
ignored this instruction, “ ‘[w]e presume the jury understood and followed the
instruction’ (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 873[].)” (People v. Sanchez
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 55.)
       On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to
exclude the prior acts evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
       Because the trial court “did not abuse its discretion under state law, defendant’s
constitutional claims also fail. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 670 [].)”
(Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 26.)

                                             III

               Section 667.5, Subdivision (c)(21), Person-Present Findings

       The defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
request to strike the section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), enhancements to the defendant’s
convictions for the first-degree burglary of M.B., I.B. and J.B., and J.H. The court did
not abuse its discretion.

                                             33
       A.     Statutory Overview and Standard of Review

       Section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), specifies that a first-degree burglary, “wherein
it is charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the
residence during the commission of the burglary,” is a violent felony. As relevant here,
“[u]nder section 2933.1, if the defendant is convicted of a violent felony listed in section
667.5, subdivision (c) and is sentenced to state prison, both pre-sentence and post-
sentence conduct credits are limited to 15 percent.” (People v. Valenti (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1184, superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 946, fn. 17, review granted Aug. 29, 2018,
S249617.)
       Trial courts have the authority to strike enhancement findings or an additional
punishment due to an enhancement finding “in furtherance of justice,” under section
1385, subdivisions (a) and (b). (See also Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
478, 490-491 (Nazir).)
       “In general, we review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to
strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (a).” (People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “A trial court may abuse its discretion where ‘its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it,’ ‘where
the trial court was not “aware of its discretion” ’ to dismiss a sentencing allegation under
section 1385, or ‘where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to
dismiss.’ ([People v. ]Carmony[ (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,] 377, 378; see People v. Tirado
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [] [a ‘court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion
is understood to have abused it’]; People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 419 [] [a
court abuses its discretion when it misunderstands the scope of that discretion].) [¶]
‘Because “all discretionary authority is contextual” [citation], we cannot determine
whether a trial court has acted irrationally or arbitrarily in refusing to strike a [sentencing]

                                              34
allegation without considering the legal principles and policies that should have guided
the court’s actions.’ (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)” (Nazir, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.)
       B.     Analysis
       Here, the defendant makes three arguments in support of his position that the trial
court abused its discretion. We disagree with each.
       First, he argues that there was no actual violence, or even a potential for violence,
in the three burglaries at issue here. He suggests that the burglaries here were not
“typical” burglaries, where a person breaks and enters a dwelling and there is an
attendant risk that a resident will grab a weapon. He argues he was unarmed, that the
offenses occurred in broad daylight, and that he never physically threatened anyone.
       The inclusion of “occupied burglary” on the list of violent felonies contained in
section 667.5, subdivision (c), demonstrates a legislative understanding that the crime
presents a potential and increased risk for violence which “justifies increasing the
offender’s sentence” even if “it does not necessarily imply the offender will be
predisposed to commit acts of violence.” (See Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960,
988.) Courts have found a section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), enhancement “ ‘does not
require the use or threat of force. Indeed, the crime does not require any contact between
the defendant and the occupant. The mere presence of a nonaccomplice in the dwelling is
sufficient. Further, knowledge that a dwelling is occupied is not an element of occupied
burglary. Thus, a burglary may qualify as an occupied burglary under . . . section 667.5[,
subdivision ](c)(21) even though the defendant had no contact with the occupant and
thought no one was present in the home during the burglary.’ (Doe v. Saenz, supra, at
p. 987.)” (People v. Munguia (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 103, 110.)
       While the burglaries at issue here may not have been what he sees as “typical,”
contrary to the defendant’s argument, they were not devoid of the potential for violence.
Specifically, J.E. testified he had his grandfather, J.H., write a check to the defendant

                                             35
because he did not want to cause a confrontation, and J.E. believed he and J.H. were in no
position to defend themselves if the situation escalated. Moreover, the trial court found
that the victims of defendant’s crimes were particularly vulnerable. Additionally, the
testimony of other witnesses gave credence to J.E.’s concerns. One witness testified that
in one interaction, the defendant got very angry and “was kind of wild” and raised his
voice and started gesticulating in the driveway. Though she stated she was not
necessarily afraid when this happened, she was concerned about his behavior. Later she
parked her car in front of her gate so defendant and those who appeared to be with him
could not get back through her gate. A few days later she put a metal chain and padlock
on the gate.
       Another witness testified to defendant repeatedly showing up at her gate and
angrily waving his arms around as part of his efforts to extract a payment from her and
her husband. The witness testified to being traumatized by the defendant’s behavior and
how his behavior contributed to the decision of her and her husband to eventually install
a security camera at the gate. In this context, the trial court could have reasonably
concluded the presence of the victims in their residences during the burglaries presented
the potential for violence that which supports the trial court’s decision here.
       Second, the defendant argues that section 2933.1 was designed to protect the
public from dangerous repeat offenders, and that purpose is sufficiently addressed by the
lengthy prison sentence of “at least a decade” that the defendant would serve even if the
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), enhancements were struck.
       Third, the defendant argues that even if he needs rehabilitation, that need can be
met with a prison sentence of 10 or more years.
       Neither the second nor third argument is an argument that meets the standard for
demonstrating an abuse of discretion. They are simply arguments that it would not have
been unreasonable if the court had made a different ruling. Yet it was neither irrational
nor arbitrary for the trial court to make a ruling that suggested it had concluded the aims

                                             36
of section 2933.1 and rehabilitation could be better served if the enhancement findings,
and thus the longer required sentence, remained in place. (See Nazir, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) Additionally, in raising these arguments, the defendant makes
no suggestion that the trial court considered factors it could not in declining to strike the
findings, and the decision does not lend itself to the conclusion that the trial court was
unaware of its discretion. (See ibid.)

                                              IV

                              Corrections to Sentencing Errors

       We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing regarding how this court
should remedy errors the trial court made when it sentenced the defendant on counts 48
and 45. The defendant argues that we must remand this matter to the trial court so that it
can exercise its discretion and resentence the defendant on the two misidentified counts.
The People counter we can simply correct the error on appeal because these errors were
clearly clerical in nature.
       “It is well established that a sentence which is the result of clerical error (in the
sense of inadvertence, though committed by the judge) may be corrected at any time, by
the trial court or the reviewing court.” (People v. Menius (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1290,
1294-1295.) Here, the sentencing errors were clearly inadvertent errors born of a
sentencing judge having to wade through a long list of convictions while announcing the
sentence. Moreover, the consistency with which the judge applied specific sentences to
specific guilt findings makes it easy to determine what sentence the trial court would
have imposed had it not misspoken.
       With respect to count 48, on which the jury convicted the defendant of grand theft
of an elder, while the court may have misidentified the underlying offense as a violation
of section 484b, the court imposed the same sentence—an unstayed one-year consecutive
sentence—that it had for the remaining four counts of grand theft from an elder when

                                              37
there was no finding of guilt for a greater crime stemming from the same acts. In
contrast, the trial court imposed and stayed eight-month sentences for the section 484b
convictions it correctly identified during sentencing. In short, with count 48, the trial
court appears to have misspoken when it identified the underlying crime, but it sentenced
the defendant as if it had labeled the count correctly during sentencing. All that needs to
be done to correct this is to amend the judgment and abstract to clarify the sentence is for
a section 368, subdivision (d) (grand theft from an elder) conviction.
        With Count 45 determining what the trial court would have done but for the
inadvertent error made during sentencing takes an additional step, but we are no less
certain what the result would have been. With count 45, the jury found the defendant
guilty of misappropriating construction funds over $2,350 under section 484b. During
sentencing, the trial court (1) erroneously labeled the count as a grand theft violation
under section 487, subdivision (a), and (2) applied a sentence for the count as if the count
was a grand theft count. That is, the court imposed a sentence of one-year and stayed it
under section 654, where, on all the other convictions for misappropriation of
construction funds over $2,350, the court imposed and stayed eight-month convictions.
We note that with the remaining section 484b offenses, the defendant was convicted of
and sentenced to serve unstayed time for either grand theft from an elder (§ 368, subd.
(d)) or first-degree burglary (§ 459, subd. (a)) due to the same actions.
        In contrast, here the same actions resulted in a conviction of an unstayed sentence
for grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a), i.e., not of an elder). However, the trial court’s pattern
of imposing and staying an eight-month sentence for the section 484b convictions leaves
us with no doubt that, but for the clerical error, the trial court meant to do the same thing
here.
        We observe that the net result of us correcting these errors is that (1) the
defendant’s unstayed sentence remains unchanged; and (2) the total stayed sentence is
reduced by only four months.

                                              38
                                        DISPOSITION
       We affirm the trial court’s guilt findings. We remand in part with instructions to
the trial court to correct the clerical errors addressed in this opinion that it made in
sentencing the defendant and correcting the abstract of judgment accordingly. The
judgment should reflect that on count 45, the defendant is being sentenced for violating
section 484b by misappropriating construction funds over $2,350, and the sentence for
that count is eight months, stayed under section 654. The judgment on count 48 should
reflect that the defendant is being sentence to an unstayed term of one year for the grand
theft of an elder conviction under section 368, subdivision (d).

                                                   HULL, J.

We concur:

EARL, P. J.

ROBIE, J.

                                              39