Court Opinion

ID: 9717654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:07:53.912148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.529776
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in parts I, II, IV and V of the majority opinion, but dissent to the majority decision as to issue III and would reverse for a new trial.
The legal approach taken in the majority opinion in resolving in part III the question of the admissibility of appellant’s confession is faulty. It is critical to keep separate in this case the distinction between the question of waiver of rights and the question of whether the confession was voluntary, and omitting to do so here has led to a wrong decision. The two questions are clearly related. The court may focus on exactly the same set of basic facts in resolving the two questions, Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811, and the waiver standard includes the application of the traditional voluntariness standard. Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165. They are, however, discrete. The waiver standard, “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”, Johnson v. Zerbst, (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, provides a special heightened form of protection for specific constitutional rights, not provided by the voluntariness standard. That additional protection comes from the requirement that special attention be given to the extent of the parties’ knowledge. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. While considering the basic facts in this case from which one could determine the extent of appellant’s knowledge of his right to counsel, the majority nevertheless quotes the voluntariness standard from Harrison v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 677, 382 N.E.2d 920, and concludes only that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the determination “that defendant exercised his free will and voluntarily and knowingly made the confession.” This is federal constitutional error.
The rendition of the record in the majority opinion is excellent and reveals that the salient facts are without conflict and lead to but one rational conclusion, and it is that appellant’s confession was obtained in violation of the rights guaranteed appellant in Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The case on appeal resembles the recent case of Edwards v. Arizona, (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, wherein the accused made a waiver of Miranda rights and was subjected to interrogation up to the point when he invoked the right to counsel. The interrogation was stopped. The next day, however, without making counsel available to him, they returned to him, read him his Miranda rights again. He responded by saying that he wanted to talk to them. He then made an incriminating statement which the Supreme Court held was inadmissible because it had not been preceded by a voluntary waiver of counsel. The court noted that he was given an advisement of rights anew and that the resumption of interrogation on the second day had not been suggested or requested by Edwards.
*720The tape-recorded confession in the case on appeal reflects an unequivocal and totally clear invocation by appellant of his rights to counsel, when he, on the second occasion on which he asked his interrogators for the advice and presence of a lawyer during interrogation, engaged in the following dialogue:
“Q. O.K., do you want an attorney here?
A. Yea.
Q. You do want an attorney.
A. Yea, I sure do.
Q. O.K., you understand that I can’t ask you any more questions?
A. That’s right, I want an attorney-”
It is established by the witnesses including the interrogators, and stands uncontradict-ed, that the recording machine was turned off at this point. The officers testified that they could not continue questioning him because he had asked to have a lawyer present. It was done in respect for appellant’s Miranda rights. This break in interrogation is equivalent for the purpose of legal analysis to the break in interrogation which occurred in Edwards. The issue here, as in Edwards, is whether the State carried its burden of proving that appellant waived his right to counsel between the request for counsel and the resumption of interrogation.
According to the record the break in interrogation only lasted for a few minutes. Sheriff Rose testified:
“Q. Did there come a point when you turned the tape-recording off?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. After we had started into the statement we read his rights to him again. We started into it and then he made a statement of I want an attorney and like stop, like right now. He wanted it now. So I reached over and turned off the tape-recorder.
Q. What happened at that point?
A. He was like puzzled for a second, like why did you shut off the tape-recorder. I explained to him that I could no longer talk to him because he wanted an attorney right now. He advised no, you don’t understand; I want to talk to you. I want to discuss this but I want my attorney later when I go to court.
Q. Did you eventually turn the tape machine on?
A. Yes, I did. He was fidgeting around, he asked me for a cigarette. In the process of taking one cigarette I turned the tape-recording back on.
Q. When that was on, did you make sure he wanted to talk to you now and he would talk to an attorney later?
A. That’s correct.” (Emphasis added.)
With regard to this same period of time Detective Woods testified:
“Q. And was the tape-recorder turned off at any time during that statement?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And was it turned off during the questioning when the defendant was requesting an attorney?
A. It was turned off at a point right after he made a request for an attorney.
Q. And after it was turned off did either you or Sheriff Rose go to a phone or do anything to get him an attorney?
A. No. We remained seated at the desk.
Q. When the tape was turned off, you and Sheriff Rose continued to ask the defendant are you sure you want an attorney, correct?
A. No. When the tape was turned off, that was it.
Q. You didn’t ask anything else?
A. We had ended it.
Q. How long was that turned off?
A. Less than two minutes.
******
Q. Okay. What occurred right after the tape-recording or tape machine was turned off?
*721A. As soon as Sheriff Rose turned the tape-recorder off we sat back in our chair and said nothing, it was over.
Q. Did there come a time that the defendant said something to Sheriff Rose?
A. Defendant said something to Sheriff Rose.
Q. What did he say?
A. It was phrased to the effect of what happened, why did we stop.
Q. What did Sheriff Rose say to him?
A. He said, ‘Marty, you said you wanted an attorney, we can’t ask you any more questions.’
Q. What did Marty say to you?
A. His phrase was to the effect well, I want an attorney to defend me but I want to tell you what happened.
Q. What happened after that?
A. Sheriff Rose asked him if he wanted to go ahead with the statement, go ahead with the recording. He said, ‘Yes.’
Q. What happened after that?
A. I believe Sheriff Rose offered him a cigarette or Marty asked the Sheriff if he could have a cigarette and at that point turned the tape-recorder back on.” (Emphasis added.)
The tape recording recommences with the following:
“Q. Ok, Martin, you just said that you want an attorney, does that mean you want an attorney right now?
A. I’m very confused, see, I don’t want, I did it, I’m telling you I did it, you know what I’m talking about.
Q. I can appreciate that.
A. Before we turn that on, I tell you like, I did it, ok, I’m very confused, I’ve never done nothing like this before, I know I should give you a statement because there’s no way I can hide it, and if I hide it I’ll just get more time or it’ll just take longer and I know I need a lawyer, I just don’t want to mess up now and anything I say that could get me more time or anything like that, do you understand what I’m saying.
Q. Oh yea, I appreciate that.
A. Ok, so we’ll talk, I’ll give you a statement and then I’ll see a lawyer.
Q. Ok, so basically what you’re telling me now is you want to give me a statement into the case and then you want an attorney.
A. Yes.” (Emphasis added.)
Again, the question to be resolved by this Court in this jurisdiction is whether by these basic facts, the State presented evidence which would convince a reasonable trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant waived his right to counsel, i.e., that he understood that right and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. There are several reasons why my judicial response must be a resounding, no. First and foremost, appellant, at no point, states that he does not want counsel during interrogation. He says that he wants to make a statement now. He says that he wants a lawyer for his defense at trial. But at no point does he come around to saying that he does not want a lawyer for interrogation. Indeed, to the very end of this scene he maintains that he wants a lawyer, needs a lawyer, to keep from “messing up” and producing evidence or a sentence which is not deserved. Moreover, by the end of this scene he has become confused as to the scope of the right to counsel. The right is no longer a known one. At the outset of the taped session he was expressly advised that he had the right to the presence and advice of counsel during questioning. When he first stated “No, but I think I’m going to need a lawyer”, the response by the interrogator, “Ok, you don’t want to talk to us”, carried the unfair suggestion that he could not at the same time claim the right to counsel and the privilege to make a statement. This suggestion modified the former advice of the right to counsel, and was misleading and confusing. And finally, I cannot help but read this entire colloquy as showing resignation by appellant rather than relinquishment. The confession was given without the aid and *722assistance of counsel, and without a constitutionally valid precedent waiver of counsel and was inadmissible.
I would remand for a new trial to be conducted without the introduction of the tape recorded statement or the subsequent video taped statement.
HUNTER, J., concurs.