Court Opinion

ID: 9580304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:54.305239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:11.960593
License: Public Domain

Deen, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
While it has been held that the speed of vehicles on occasions other than the one in question is a matter the relevance of which is largely within the discretion of the trial judge (Lovejoy v. Tidwell, 212 Ga. 750, 753 (95 SE2d 784) (1956)), proof here that a number of towns along the same route as that where the accident occurred had train speed limits of 20 or 30 miles per hour whereas the intersection in question, also within a municipality, had a limit of 55 miles per hour, without proof of identity of *671topography, traffic, and so forth, should have been excluded. That these towns had low limits which might tend to slow the train below schedule has no value in establishing that it was exceeding its speed limit at the time of the collision. "It is a general rule that in a suit for negligence, evidence of similar acts or omissions on other and different occasions is not admissible.” Williams v. Slusser, 104 Ga. App. 412 (5) (121 SE2d 796), and see Holloman v. Hopson, 45 Ga. App. 762 (8) (166 SE 45) (1932). Proof that the speed limit was different at other localities does not establish that it was disregarded at those localities, and even evidence of that fact would not establish that it was disregarded at the time and place in question.
The danger of this evidence is its tendency to persuade the jury that if the train was required to travel at a slow rate through other municipalities the defendant would be guilty of negligence as a matter of fact (common law negligence) at the intersection where the collision occurred, which is not true. It was traveling at a slower rate in other municipalities because of local ordinances, and an infraction of those ordinances would not be common law negligence but negligence per se. Thus, analogizing these situations by the admission of testimony as to other locations is like mixing apples and oranges, and in my opinion would have the effect only of confusing the jury on the question at issue. That question is whether (a) the train was going over 55 miles per hour, or (b) under the circumstances prevailing at the time and place it was traveling at a speed which constituted negligence as a matter of fact.
I believe the admission of this evidence to be reversible error.