Court Opinion

ID: 9893864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 19:02:42.596824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:52.647290
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13116     Document: 16-1      Date Filed: 10/30/2023     Page: 1 of 8

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-13116
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       DANNY FOSTER, SR.,
                                                          Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       WILLIAM GUILLOU,
       Det., individual and oﬃcial capacity,
       SEAN SANDLER,
       DUSM, individual and oﬃcial capacity,
       JOHN HAMILTON,
       U.S. Marshal, individual and oﬃcial capacity,
       ADAM MILTON,
       Chief of Police, individual and oﬃcial capacity,
       JEREMY DUERR,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13116

       District Attorney, individual and oﬃcial capacity, et al.,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00069-MHT-KFP
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Danny Foster, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s dismissal of his § 1983 and Bivens claims. Because the
       district court did not err in dismissing these claims for failure to
       state a claim, we affirm.
                                         I.
             Foster’s appeal arises from his arrest in February 2013.
       Foster was arrested for escaping jail, where he was serving a
       sentence for a prior conviction. Foster alleges that, in connection
       with his 2013 arrest, officers arrested him and searched his cell
       phone, truck, and person, all without a warrant or his consent.
       After his 2013 arrest, Foster was immediately ordered to start
       serving his initial sentence. He was sentenced again for murder in
       November 2017. According to Foster, he wrote the circuit clerk
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       22-13116                    Opinion of the Court                            3

       five times a month for ten years requesting a copy of the warrant
       for his 2013 arrest, searches, and subsequent imprisonment. Foster
       claims he did not receive a response until October 2020, when he
       learned that there was never a warrant.
               In February 2022, Foster brought claims against the officials
       involved with his arrest and sentencing, Detective William
       Guillou, Deputy U.S. Marshal Sean Sandler, U.S. Marshal John
       Hamilton, Chief of Police Adam Milton, District Attorney Jeremy
       Duerr, Circuit Judge Tom F. Young, Investigator Marvin Crayton,
       Lieutenant Mike Knowles, Circuit Clerk Chris May, Berry Golden,
       Sheriff David Cofield, District Attorney Amy Newsome, and five
       unknown federal agents. The magistrate judge construed Foster’s
       amended complaint as bringing the following claims under § 1983
       and Bivens 1: false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, and illegal
       searches of his person, truck, and cell phone, all in violation of the
       Fourth Amendment; a First Amendment violation for denial of
       media access; and conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.2
       The magistrate judge found that Foster’s claims of false arrest,
       illegal search, and unlawful imprisonment were untimely given
       that they were brought after the statute of limitations period. She
       also found that his First Amendment claim was meritless and that

       1 This claim originates from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau

       of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
       2 Foster also brought a malicious prosecution claim that was dismissed by the

       district court. Foster did not challenge this finding and stated that he never
       intended to bring this claim. Thus, it will not be reviewed on appeal. See
       Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004).
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13116

       his conspiracy allegations were vague and conclusory. The district
       court agreed and dismissed Foster’s claims for failure to state a
       claim. Foster appeals the dismissal order. 3
                                              II.
              We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
       failure to state a claim and failure to satisfy the statute of
       limitations. Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, 17 F.4th 1316, 1319
       (11th Cir. 2021). A complaint fails to state a claim if, after
       disregarding any conclusory allegations, no factual allegations
       remain that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
       McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting
       Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). A complaint also fails to
       state a claim if “relief is barred by the applicable statute of
       limitations.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Pro se
       complaints should be construed liberally but still must comply with
       the procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
       (1993).
                                             III.
              Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for
       constitutional violations by state officials, and Bivens does the same
       but for federal officials. Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th
       Cir. 1995). For both, the statute of limitations begins to run when

       3 Foster also alleges fraud and violations of his Ninth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

       Amendments for the first time on appeal. We disregard these claims as they
       are not properly before this Court. See Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th
       Cir. 1994).
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       22-13116               Opinion of the Court                          5

       the “cause of action accrues.” Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238–39
       (11th Cir. 1996). This is when the “facts which would support a
       cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with
       a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Mullinax v. McElhenney,
       817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). State law
       governs the length of the statute of limitations for both § 1983 and
       Bivens claims. Kelly, 87 F.3d at 1238.
              Foster brings claims under § 1983 and Bivens against
       Defendants, some of whom are state officials and some of whom
       are federal officials. Foster does not clarify exactly which of his
       claims apply to which Defendants or which Defendants are state
       versus federal officials, and the district court did not make this
       distinction either. But because § 1983 applies only to state officials,
       and Bivens applies only to federal officials, we construe Foster’s
       § 1983 claims as applying to the state Defendants (whoever they
       may be) and his Bivens claims as applying to the federal Defendants
       (whoever they may be). This distinction, while helpful to note,
       does not ultimately make a difference in the application.
              We start first with Foster’s Bivens claims. It is worth noting
       that Bivens is not an expansive doctrine. The Supreme Court itself
       has recognized the “notable change in the Court’s approach” to
       Bivens, so much so that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a
       disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135
       (2017) (quotation omitted). Bivens has only been applied in three
       specific contexts: a Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure case, a
       Fifth Amendment discrimination case, and an Eighth Amendment
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13116

       cruel-and-unusual-punishment case. Id. at 130–31. And the
       Supreme Court has consistently rejected its application to First
       Amendment cases. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983);
       Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675; Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663–64
       n.4 (2012).
               But we need not decide whether Bivens could offer a viable
       claim here because even assuming that it does, Foster’s Bivens
       claims fail. To start, Foster’s false arrest, illegal search, and
       unlawful imprisonment claims were properly dismissed as
       untimely. The applicable statute of limitations period under
       Alabama law is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). Alabama allows
       statutory tolling for individuals suffering from certain disabilities,
       underrepresented estates, individuals absent from the state, actions
       involving nonmerchant mutual accounts, actions stayed by
       injunction or statutory prohibition, granting of letters
       testamentary or administration, and contracts during war. Id. §§ 6-
       2-8 to -14. In addition to statutory tolling, equitable tolling may be
       available in rare circumstances when a plaintiff shows “(1) that he
       has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
       extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
       filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quotation
       omitted). Extraordinary circumstances exist where there is some
       affirmative misconduct, like deliberate concealment, fraud, or
       misinformation. Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir.
       2007).
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       22-13116                Opinion of the Court                          7

              Foster argues that his false arrest, illegal search, and
       unlawful imprisonment claims were not untimely because the
       statute of limitations should have been tolled until October 2020,
       when he discovered the lack of a warrant. But the failure to
       discover this information does not fall under any of Alabama’s
       statutory tolling provisions.           Nor does it constitute an
       “extraordinary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling because
       there is no evidence of affirmative misconduct by the circuit clerk;
       all Foster alleges is a failure to respond to his requests for a copy of
       the warrant.
              By the time he was sentenced in November 2017, Foster was
       aware of the facts sufficient for his claims. The allegedly illegal
       searches and arrest occurred in February 2013, and he was
       sentenced in November 2017. Even if he did not know with
       certainty until October 2020 that there was no warrant, Foster
       clearly suspected as much based on his continuous requests for a
       copy of the warrant and thus should have known by November
       2017. By waiting until February 2022 to file his initial complaint,
       Foster failed to meet the two-year statute of limitations period. His
       claims are thus untimely.
               Foster’s First Amendment and conspiracy claims were also
       properly dismissed. For one, we are skeptical that Bivens applies to
       First Amendment claims given the Supreme Court’s treatment of
       that topic. See, e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 390; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675;
       Reichle, 556 U.S. at 663–64 n.4. But even assuming it does, Foster
       fails to sufficiently plead a First Amendment violation because he
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13116

       does not identify any precedent establishing that an officer
       preventing an arrestee’s media access violates the First
       Amendment; indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the
       opposite. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974).
       Furthermore, Foster’s conspiracy claim fails because his complaint
       broadly asserts only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy and
       lacks specific factual allegations. See McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333.
              For the same reasons that Foster’s Bivens claims against the
       federal Defendants fail, his § 1983 claims against the state
       Defendants fail. The same statute of limitations applies, and thus
       Foster’s false arrest, illegal search, and unlawful imprisonment
       claims were untimely. See Kelly, 87 F.3d at 1238. Additionally,
       Foster’s First Amendment and conspiracy claims fail because, as
       discussed, he fails to plead sufficient facts to support them.
                                  *     *      *
               The district court properly dismissed Foster’s claims for
       failure to state a claim. Foster’s claims alleging illegal searches,
       false arrest, and unlawful imprisonment are untimely, and he failed
       to allege sufficient facts to support his First Amendment and
       conspiracy claims. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.

             AFFIRMED.