Court Opinion

ID: 9766221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:37:24.270802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.487149
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge
(dissenting):
While I agree that Rule 14(7) of the Lycoming County Rules of Court has not been superseded by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, I cannot agree that the lower court’s elevation of form over substance did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
Under the terms of the local rule, appellant had four days in which to file post-trial motions. Because the fourth day following the verdict was a Sunday, Rule 106, Pa.R.C.P., provides that it be excluded. Therefore, appellant had until Monday, April 22, 1974, to file post-trial motions. In fact, appellant did not file the motions until Tuesday, April 23. The lower court denied the motions as untimely filed.
Although the lower courts should certainly encourage compliance with the local rules of court, to do so in the instant case is highly inequitable. Our Supreme Court has stated that rules of civil procedure should be liberally construed and applied in order to avoid the inequity that rigid application may sometimes cause: “The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Rule 126, Pa.R.C.P.
In the instant case, appellee concedes that appellant announced his intention to file post-trial motions immediately after the return of the verdict. Furthermore, the delay of one day in filing the motions resulted from the good-faith belief of appellant’s attorney that Saturdays were not included in computing the period. In view of the extremely short period of time provided by Lycom-*496ing County for the filing of post-trial motions, this mistaken belief is an insufficient reason to deprive appellant of a disposition on the merits.
The lower court certainly had the power to entertain the motions. See, Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832, 78 S.Ct. 46, 2 L.Ed.2d 44, reh. denied, 355 U.S. 855, 78 S.Ct. 146, 2 L.Ed.2d 115. Its refusal to exercise that power unfairly prejudiced appellant.
I would reverse and remand for the disposition of appellant’s post-trial motions.
CERCONE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.