Court Opinion

ID: 9742968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:23:31.857106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.082264
License: Public Domain

R.S. Smith, J. (dissenting).
I agree with the majority (at 863) that “a construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law § 240 (1).” I think the decision in this case, however, fails to apply that rule correctly, and I therefore dissent.
*865Labor Law § 240 (1) requires “contractors and owners and their agents” to furnish proper protection against elevation-related risks to workers engaged in certain construction activities. This statute, as we have interpreted it, imposes civil liability that in some ways goes well beyond ordinary liability for negligence: the duty it imposes is nondelegable—that is, even a contractor, owner or agent who did not supervise the work involved may be hable under the statute—and if the statute has been violated, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the resulting injury. The result, as judges in this state well know, has been an enormous quantity of Labor Law § 240 (1) litigation.
In one important way, however, our interpretation of the statute has not been expansive: we have never given the broadest possible reading to the words “contractors and owners and their agents.” On the contrary, we have hmited the definition of the term “agents” to those who have “authority to supervise and control [the] work” from which an injury arises (Russin v Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 318 [1981]). For example, while architects and engineers employed by an owner to work on a construction project may be the owner’s “agents” in some senses, these architects and engineers do not normally have Labor Law § 240 (1) liability (Fox v Jenny Eng’g Corp., 70 NY2d 761 [1987], affg 122 AD2d 532 [4th Dept 1986]). And prime contractors that are not general contractors are not “contractors” within the meaning of the statute as to work that has not been specifically delegated to them (Russin, 54 NY2d at 315). We have never decided, however, whether construction managers are either “contractors” or “agents” within the meaning of the statute. Appellate Division decisions are divided on this question (compare, e.g., Phillips v Wilmorite, Inc., 281 AD2d 945 [4th Dept 2001] and Loiacono v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 270 AD2d 464 [2d Dept 2000] [both holding construction managers not liable] with Kenny v Fuller Co., 87 AD2d 183 [2d Dept 1982] [holding construction manager hable]; see also Balthazar v Full Circle Constr. Corp., 268 AD2d 96 [1st Dept 2000] [holding issues of fact precluded summary judgment against a construction manager]).
The principal difference between a general contractor and a construction manager is that the former has decision-making authority, while the latter’s role is primarily advisory. A general contractor chooses the subcontractors, and is responsible for telling them what to do. Where an owner hires a construction manager, there often is no general contractor; the owner, rely*866ing on the construction manager’s advice, itself retains and supervises a number of prime contractors, no one of which is in overall charge of the job. Since the owner normally follows the advice the construction manager gives, the line between authority and advice can become blurred, and it would be unsurprising to find that the word of a construction manager, when spoken on a job site, carries considerable weight with contractors and their employees. This could be the basis for an argument that construction managers are not materially different from general contractors and should have the same liability under Labor Law § 240 (1).
But I believe—and the majority seems, in principle, to agree— that we should reject this argument and should adhere to our holding in Russin that only persons who have the “authority to supervise and control” the relevant work are statutory “agents.” Where an owner retains for itself, and does not delegate to a general contractor, the power to choose contractors and supervise the job, it is the owner, not the owner’s advisors— however well-heeded their advice might be—that should have Labor Law § 240 (1) liability. The burdens that the statute places on owners, contractors and their agents are severe; a defendant may be liable to a worker who may have been primarily at fault, even where the defendant itself had no role in supervising the task at issue, and thus was not at fault at all. It is fair to allow owners and those with whom they contract to determine, by their contracts, on whom to confer the decision-making authority that carries with it this kind of exposure.
Plaintiffs argue that, even if decision-making authority is essential to Labor Law § 240 (1) liability, Turner Construction Company should be held liable here because it “was functioning as a general contractor and/or general supervisor of the job, with overarching and complete responsibility for site supervision and safety which it actually carried out.” The majority is apparently persuaded by this argument. As I view the record, however, Turner was a typical construction manager, did not have the kind of authority that a general contractor has, and therefore should not be held liable.
A reading of the contract between Turner and the owner of the construction site shows that it was the owner, not Turner, that had decision-making authority. The most important provisions give Turner the duty to “monitor the performance of the Work,” to “conduct walk-throughs at each work site” and to “report any identified deficiencies” in the performance of *867contractors. If Turner’s employees discovered failures by contractors to perform their obligations, Turner’s duty was to “promptly notify” the architect and the owner, and to make recommendations to the architect for correcting the problem.
It is true that some phrases in the contract seem to confer more than advisory power on Turner in specific situations. The most relevant to this case is that Turner was empowered to “require compliance by the Trade Contractors with all applicable Federal, state and local statutes, rules, regulations and codes regarding safety”; but Turner was also required to “advise the Owner of any identified failure of the Trade Contractors in this regard.” The majority also relies on language requiring that Turner “immediately direct the Trade Contractors to cease work” in the event of “any unsafe practice or condition at the work site which would constitute a hazard to school children or other users of facilities or properties in proximity to the work site.” It is not clear that this provision is even relevant to practices that endangered construction workers, rather than school children and other civilians—but in any event, a few benign safety-enhancing provisions in a contract should not be a basis for imposing Labor Law § 240 (1) liability on a company whose role was primarily advisory. Plaintiffs do not claim that Turner violated any of the contract’s provisions relating to safety, but only that its authority to promote safety made it a statutory “agent.” I find the argument unpersuasive.
Nor do I think the deposition testimony of Turner’s on-site representative justifies imposing liability on Turner. The representative’s description of her functions essentially tracked the contract language. Indeed, plaintiffs complain in their brief that this witness “attempted to limit Turner’s responsibility through carefully tailored testimony.” Plaintiffs nevertheless seize on a few bits of the deposition, including the statement the majority quotes that Turner could stop “something that was improper that was being done on the job site.” This testimony need not be read as going any further than the contractual provision permitting Turner to stop work when the safety of “school children or other users” was endangered—but if the witness mistakenly understood her authority to be broader than what the contract called for, that error should not expose Turner to Labor Law § 240 (1) liability. There is no evidence that Turner ever actually did stop work on the job; the question of when it theoretically could have done so should be determined by the contract, not a witness’s description of it.
*868In sum, I see no material difference between Turner’s role and the ordinary, advisory role of a construction manager. Thus I think the principle, correctly stated by the majority, that “a construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law § 240 (1)” should lead to dismissal of the complaint.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and answer the certified question in the negative.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick and Graffeo concur in memorandum; Judge R.S. Smith dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judges Rosenblatt and Read concur.
Order affirmed, etc.