Court Opinion

ID: 9576271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:22:28.56918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:11.404498
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
dissenting.
The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ assignments of error is that the trial court improperly revoked Judge Allsbrook’s order granting *217pro hac vice admission to Bruce Wilkinson and Gioretta Hall of the Gary Law Firm. The majority correctly notes that “[a]dmission of counsel in North Carolina pro hac vice is not a right but a discretionary privilege.” Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 57 N.C. App. 553, 555, 291 S.E.2d 828, 829 (1982). However, I believe it is critical to distinguish between the decision to grant admission, and a subsequent decision to revoke that privilege. I also believe it is important to stress the importance of the denial of the substantial rights of the represented party that results therefrom, in addition to the denial of the rights of its counsel.
As our Supreme Court has stated: “[0]nce [an] attorney [is] admitted under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.1], plaintiff acquire[s] a substantial right to the continuation of representation by that attorney— just as with any other attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of North Carolina.” Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 727, 392 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1990). In Goldston, a product liability case involving an AMC Jeep vehicle, the Court noted that “[depriving plaintiff of her counsel of choice, who is an alleged expert in cases of this nature, certainly exposed her to potential injury . ...” Id.
In Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992), our Supreme Court discussed the appealable nature of an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel, stating that such orders,
ha[ve] immediate and irreparable consequences for both the disqualified attorney and the individual who hired the attorney. The attorney is irreparably deprived of exercising his right to represent a client. The client, likewise, is irreparably deprived of exercising the right to be represented by counsel of the client’s choice.
332 N.C. at 293, 420 S.E.2d at 429.
Therefore, upon the entry of Judge Allsbrook’s order granting pro hac vice admission to Bruce Wilkinson and Gioretta Hall, the plaintiffs acquired “a substantial right to the continuation of representation by” them. Goldston, 326 N.C. at 727, 392 S.E.2d at 737. Goldston implies that a plaintiff has an equal right to continued representation whether counsel is admitted to practice in this State or is granted admission pro hac vice pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.1. See id.
*218In Travco, our Supreme Court held that “[decisions regarding whether to disqualify counsel are within the discretion of the trial judge and, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to disqualify will not be disturbed on appeal.” Travco, 332 N.C. at 295, 420 S.E.2d at 430 (citing In re Lee, 85 N.C. App. 302, 310, 354 S.E.2d 759, 764-65, disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 513, 358 S.E.2d 520 (1987)). The plaintiffs, therefore, contend that Judge Griffin’s order revoking the pro hac vice admission of plaintiffs’ counsel constituted an abuse of discretion. The majority rejects this contention; I, however, believe the contention has merit.
The majority recognizes that “ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action.” Calloway v. Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972). While N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.2 grants permission to “the General Court of Justice” to summarily revoke, “on its own motion and in its discretion,” admission previously granted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.1, I believe that the exercise of such discretion must be based upon some change in circumstance subsequent to the initial grant of pro hac vice admission sufficient to warrant the denial of plaintiffs’ substantial right to the continued representation by their counsel of choice. Otherwise, there appears to be nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from again seeking to have Bruce Wilkinson and Gloretta Hall admitted pro hac vice by motion before yet another judge. In other words, there must be some basis for changing the determination to grant or deny pro hac vice admission; otherwise, I see no basis for one court modifying or overruling another equivalent court.
I disagree further with the majority’s holding that, for purposes of pro hac vice admission under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.1 and the prohibition of “habitual practice” in our courts by nonresident counsel, a law firm may be treated as though it were a single lawyer, and therefore the actions of the firm may be imputed to the individual firm members. I believe this conclusion to be inequitable and unsupported by law.
In State v. Hunter, 290 N.C. 556, 227 S.E.2d 535 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 51 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1977), our Supreme Court quoted with approval language from Manning v. Railroad, 122 N.C. 824, 828, 28 S.E. 963, 964 (1898), stating that North Carolina law “forbids the courts from allowing non-resident counsel. . . from practicing habitually in our courts.” Furthermore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4.1 *219speaks of the admission pro hac vice of attorneys, not law firms. Neither this language in Hunter nor the statutory language indicates an intent to summarily deprive all members of an out-of-state law firm — whether present or future — the opportunity to appear in our state courts on a pro hac vice basis, where a single member of the firm may have appeared in our courts on multiple occasions such that a determination is made that the individual has habitually practiced law in this state. I believe the quoted language speaks to the individual “non-resident counsel,” and should not impugn to the firm the disqualification of the individual.
Judge Griffin’s order was based at least in part on his finding that “[t]he Gary Law Firm (and its members) has habitually practiced law in North Carolina,” and Judge Griffin concluded that “[t]he conduct of the Gary Law Firm and its members in North Carolina constitutes the habitual practice of law.” I disagree with the implication that a law firm, as opposed to an individual member of a law firm, may be admitted pro hac vice to practice before our courts, or that a law firm can be found to have habitually practiced law in North Carolina. To the extent Judge Griffin’s order was based upon this conclusion of law, I believe the order constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the majority concedes that Judge Griffin’s order was based in part on the erroneous conclusion that “[n]either the letter nor the spirit of G.S. 84-4.1(2) was complied with in this action,” and that Judge Griffin misapprehended Florida’s and North Carolina’s reciprocity statutes in concluding that “reciprocity of admission does not exist” between Florida and North Carolina. The sole remaining conclusion of law upon which Judge Griffin’s order can stand is that “[t]he Court is empowered by G.S. 84-4.2 in its discretion to summarily revoke pro hac vice admissions previously granted.” As noted above, I believe such discretion is not unfettered, but instead is limited to instances of changed circumstances. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.