Court Opinion

ID: 9687080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:15:38.886222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.136142
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). The majority has relied upon a decision of this *442court and a decision of the court of appeals to reach a conclusion that, under the facts of this case, is inappropriately grotesque and contrary to an unmistakable mandate of the legislature. If the law is construed as the majority has construed it, the words of Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist are pertinent, "If the law supposes that... the law is a ass, a idiot."
I also join in the dissent of Justice WILLIAM A. Bablitch.
I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. Bablitch joins in this dissent.
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent, adopting the reasoning of the court of appeals. The circuit court could grant visitation to Debbie Williams under sec. 767.245(1) because the requirements of the statute as construed in Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 415 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1987), are satisfied: The family unit was no longer intact and an underlying action affecting the family had been previously filed. Permitting Debbie Williams to petition for visitation serves the legislative intent underlying the statute.
For the reasons stated above, I dissent.
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). The relevant statute in this case is clear and unambiguous: "Upon petition by a . . . stepparent. . . the court may grant reasonable visitation rights if the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child." Section 767.245(1), Stats. This case is about the right of a stepparent to be heard by a court. Despite the clarity of this statute, despite the stepparent, along with the father, actively parenting the child for six years, and despite the child's father naming the stepparent as legal guardian in his Last Will, the majority *443denies the stepparent, Debbie Williams, an opportunity to petition the court for visitation rights. Neither she, nor the child, can even be heard. Harsh. Unnecessary. Absurd.
It is a harsh result for the child. Brad has had three important adult figures in his life: his father, who he lost to brain cancer when he was eight years old; his stepmother, who parented him from age 2 to his father's death, 6 years later; and, his mother who obtained legal custody upon the death of Brad's father. Having had his father taken from him by his father's untimely death, this decision deprives Brad of one of the two remaining important adults in his life, and does so without ever allowing a circuit court to determine what is in his best interest, and without ever allowing Brad himself, now eleven years of age, to tell a court what he thinks about all of this.
It is an unnecessary result. Neither statutory law nor our own case law compels this result. To the contrary, statutory law, on its face, compels an opposite result. Section 767.245, Stats., unambiguously states that any "stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child ..." may petition the court for reasonable visitation rights. The majority in this case denies the stepparent from even petitioning the court. To reach this result, the majority relies on previous Wisconsin cases which grafted onto the law two conditions which must be satisfied to seek nonparent visitation to which the statute on its face never refers: (1) an underlying action affecting the family unit has previously been filed; and (2) the child's family is nonintact. See Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 549, 415 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1987); In re Interest of Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 1020-23, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991). The majority *444depends on both conditions. Even if I agreed with the majority that these two conditions must be present for the statute to be operative, I conclude that both conditions were met. As to the first, the majority says that "[n]o underlying action affecting the family exists in this case." In re the Marriage of Sally Ann Cox v. Debbie Williams, Majority op. at 439.1 agree with the court of appeals that when Debbie petitioned for visitation under sec. 767.245(1) an underlying action affecting the family unit had been filed. As to the second condition, the majority says "after Dan's death, Brad's family was intact." Id. at 440. Intact? The family Brad knew since he was two years old, his father and stepmother, had come apart due to his father's death. This is intact?
It is an absurd result. Even the majority is forced to admit that had Debbie commenced divorce proceeding with Dan prior to Dan's death, a petition for visitation pursuant to sec. 767.245, Stats., would be appropriate. Id. at 440-441. If that absurdity is the law, and it is so long as the majority says it is, the results would be laughable if they were not so tragic. The majority is telling stepparents to file divorce proceedings against their spouse, even if they never intend to follow through on the divorce, in order to protect their right to be heard by a court of law with respect to visitation of a stepchild. The legislature could never have intended such an absurd result. I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan joins in this dissent.