Court Opinion

ID: 9681175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:45:19.286953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.501556
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(concurring).
I wish to limit my concurrence to the following:
The precise question here presented was decided by the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S. v. Murdock, 219 S.W.2d 159, 164, writ ref. N.R.E., Justice Sutton, for the Court saying:
“Under the seventh point we are asked to review the action of the trial court in granting a new trial after the first trial. The defendant in its brief concedes the matter of granting and refusing new trials is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and that no appeal lies from the order made granting the new trial, but it insists this court has the power now to consider the claimed error and to reverse the judgment rendered on the second trial and direct the reinstatement of the judgment first entered at the first trial. This we think may not be done. To do so would be to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. The concession disposes of the point. The right of appeal, the right to have reviewed and revised a judgment or order of a court, is a privilege only and does not exist as a matter of right but only when authorized by the Constitution or statutes. This right was once conferred, Acts 39th Leg. ch. 18, 1925, p. 45, but was revoked, Acts 40th Leg.1927, p. 75, now Art. 2249, Vernon’s Statutes.
“The power to grant new trials is inherent in the Court, and that power will not be abridged even by statute *225unless the intention to do so be apparent. Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S.W. 1079, at page 1083 (10-15), 48 A. L.R. 355.
“New trials may be granted in the interests of justice and not for errors of law only. Hagerty’s Ex’rs v. Scott, 10 Tex. 525, 526, 46 C.J. 416, Sec. 472.
“It is said to be the general rule, unless the case comes within some special statutory provisions, neither an appeal, writ of error, nor exceptions will lie from an order granting or refusing a new trial, because addressed to the discretion of the trial court, or because not a final judgment or both. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 123, p. 244 [378],
“The greater latitude is allowed the trial court in granting than in refusing new trials, since in such cases the rights of the parties are not finally settled. There are many apparent reasons why the trial court is permitted to exercise so liberally this inherent power and discretion. The trial court having the parties, the witnesses and counsel before it, and the opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct during the trial and to note all incidents occurring during its progress likely to affect the results of the trial, is better qualified to judge whether a fair trial has been had and substantial justice done than is the appellate court, it is said. Many of the considerations incident to a discussion of the question are interestingly set out by the eminent Judge in Sweeney v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 36, cited by the defendant. The many reasons that might be assigned and that are to be found in the text books and authorities may well be the explanation for the failure of the Legislature to extend the right of appeal for so long a time, and why it so soon took it away after it was given.”
Additionally and applicable to this case is Rule 326, T.R.C.P., which provides that not more than two new trials shall be granted either party because of “insufficiency or weight of the evidence.”
This rule is the equivalent • of express authority to the trial court to grant two new trials to each party for the reasons stated.
One of the grounds for granting a new trial here was “excessiveness of the verdict.” Rule 328, T.R.C.P., expressly authorizes granting new trials when damages are manifestly too large or too small.
Under Rules 326 and 328, the action of the court in granting the first motion for new trial on the ground stated was authorized and valid. It could not possibly be erroneous.