Court Opinion

ID: 9694237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:31:11.908236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:57.715869
License: Public Domain

*394NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
Since I disagree with the Majority that the challenged jury instruction amounted to reversible error, I respectfully dissent.
In the first instance, when evaluating jury instructions for error, the reviewing court must consider the entire charge and not merely isolated fragments. Commonwealth v. Karenbauer, 552 Pa. 420, 715 A.2d 1086, 1098 (Pa.1998). Here, as noted by the Majority, the trial court, during its charge on accomplice liability, instructed the jury that Appellees’ possession or use of an unlicensed firearm “shall be evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence.” N.T. at 432. The Majority concludes that this statement to the jury effectively relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proving that Appellees had the requisite intent to commit murder. However, as part of the same jury charge, the court instructed the jury that “it is not the defendant’s burden- to prove each defendant is not guilty. Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has the burden of proving each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 416-17. Regarding intent, the court then stated:
when deciding whether the defendant had a specific intent to kill you should consider all of the evidence regarding his words and conduct and the attending circumstances that may show his state of mind. If you believe that the defendant or an accomplice intentionally used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body .you may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you may if you choose infer that the defendant or an accomplice had the specific intent to kill.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added). Viewed in its entirety, then, I do not believe that the trial court’s charge to the jury had the categorical effect of relieving the Commonwealth of its burden of proving that Appellees’ possessed the intent required for a conviction of first-degree murder.
Even if the court’s instruction to the jury constituted error, however, I disagree with the Majority that such error is not *395subject to a harmless error analysis. The Majority relies on a non-precedential opinion handed down in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983), where the Supreme Court was equally divided on whether an erroneous jury instruction, which allowed the jury to presume intent in violation of the due process clause, could be harmless error. However, after Johnson, in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), the Supreme Court decided that a harmless error analysis applied to an erroneous instruction shifting the burden of proof as to malice, a material element of the crime charged. In so holding, the Court stated that an otherwise valid conviction generally should not be set aside if the reviewing court finds, on the whole record, that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 576, 106 S.Ct. at 3105. It emphasized that where a defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, a strong presumption arises that any errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. Id. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 3106. The Court further stated:
When a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. ... In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury.... In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: the jury has found ... ‘every fact necessary’ to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt....
Id. at 580-81, 106 S.Ct. at 3107 (citations omitted). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rose, a harmless error standard applies here.1
The circumstances of this case clearly indicate that the jury properly relied on the evidence produced at trial in finding *396that Appellees possessed the requisite intent to commit first-degree murder. The evidence presented at trial essentially pitted two conflicting versions of the events surrounding Carl Bracey’s murder. Testifying on his own behalf, Appellee Domes claimed that while he was present at the scene of the shooting, neither he nor Appellee Kelly possessed a gun during his fight with Mr. Bracey. Rather, Domes testified that he heard shots fired during the fight from an unknown source and immediately fled the scene along with Appellee Kelly. The Commonwealth, meanwhile, presented the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting who claimed that both Appellees not only had guns during Domes’ fight with Mr. Bracey but that both Appellees fired those guns at Mr. Bracey as he attempted to flee the scene of the fight. See N.T. at 79-81, 248.
The verdict returned by the jury, finding each Appellee guilty of first-degree murder, plainly establishes that they credited the Commonwealth’s version of the events over that espoused by the defense. Once it is recognized that the jury-accepted the Commonwealth’s version of the events and determined that Appellees were in fact the triggermen, as their verdict clearly reflects, it becomes evident that the jury’s finding of specific intent was driven by the evidence presented at trial and by what version of events they believed, and not by the challenged jury instruction. As in Rose, the circumstances in the instant case clearly establish, in my view, that “no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause [it].” Rose at 580-81, 106 S.Ct. at 3107.2
*397Unlike the Majority, then, I believe that the challenged instruction, if erroneous at all, is subject to a harmless error analysis under Rose. Since I find that any error committed by the trial court in its jury instructions was harmless in light of the circumstances of this case, which compel the conclusion that the challenged instruction did not contribute to the jury’s verdict, I would affirm the judgments of sentence. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 3106 (“where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed”).

. Even Appellee Domes, citing Rose, concedes in his brief that in the context of a burden-shifting presumption, “courts must engage in and inquire into the effect of the error on the verdict." Appellee's Brief at 14. Likewise, Appellee Kelly states in his brief that “assuming arguendo that there has been a due process violation, this court must now determine whether the error is harmless.” Appellee’s Brief at 13.

. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Buehl, 540 Pa. 493, 658 A.2d 771 (1995), this Court found that the defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a charge similar to the one challenged in the instant case. Like Appellees here, the defendant in Buehl claimed that the "shall” command of the charge improperly relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt. In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Court stated:
Appellant raised the defense of mistaken identity. Never did the defense assert lack of intent as a defense. Indeed, to have done so would have been futile because the evidence from which intent could be inferred was overwhelming. We find it unlikely that changing a *397single "shall” to a "may” in the context of a seventy-two page charge would have affected the jury’s finding that the three murders in question had been intentionally committed in any way.
Id. at 509, 658 A.2d at 779. Here, similar to the defense of mistaken identity raised by the defendant in Buehl, Appellees asserted that, although present at the scene of the shooting, they were not the ones who shot Mr. Bracey. Appellees’ case, therefore, clearly hinged on the identity of the shooter and not whether there was intent to kill. Since the jury's verdict demonstrates that they accepted the Commonwealth’s version of events and found that Appellees were the ones who shot Mr. Bracey, it is clear that the jury’s finding of intent was driven by the evidence produced at trial and not by the jury charge at issue here.