Court Opinion

ID: 9760680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:08:15.542327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.713354
License: Public Domain

MASSEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
In my opinion the judgment of the trial court should be reversed for lack of evidence in support thereof. I would remand the cause rather than render since I believe the facts in respect to which the judgment might find support have not been fully developed, and it might even be properly said that the case was tried upon an erroneous theory by both plaintiff’s counsel and the trial court. That remand would be the proper action under the circumstances is the rule of Lanford v. Smith, 1936, 128 Tex. 373, 99 S.W.2d 593, and Jackson v. Hall, 1948, 147 Tex. 245, 214 S.W.2d 458.
There seems to be no question but that the deceased did pursue and grapple with Johnson after the “goosing”, albeit such pursuit was over a distance of only five or-six feet, or three or four steps. But for such pursuit and grappling the deceased might have died anyway (from the “goosing” and the involuntary bodily reactions resultant therefrom), but there is no evidence in the record to that effect. It might be that the involuntary bodily reactions resultant from the “goosing” included the deceased’s actions in pursuit and grappling, but there is no evidence in the record that they were so included. ,
A basic fact necessary to be found and' supported is that the injuries resulting in death were sustained while the deceased was acting within the scope and course of his employment. In view of the state of the record I am convinced that he must be treated as having engaged in horseplay when he pursued and grappled with Johnson. I recognize that it might be that the. *328injuries resulting in his death occurred prior to and independent of his actual participation in the horseplay. The evidence in the record fails to designate which of the events occasioned the injuries resulting in death, assuming it was either one or the other. Furthermore, the evidence fails to demonstrate that such injuries were the result of both of the events, if indeed the injuries resulted from their cumulative effect.
If, upon the occasion of another trial, there is a want of evidence to the effect that the deceased’s pursuit and grappling with Johnson was a part of his involuntary reaction from the “goosing”, then I believe that it would be essential to any recovery that medical testimony be introduced in support thereof. Ordinarily medical testimony is not essential in a compensation case. I concede that it would not be necessary here were it not for the fact that death might have ensued from injuries which were independently sustained as the result of horseplay. If such was the fact then there would not be any liability under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act.
I believe that under the present state of the record it is as consistent with probability that death resulted from horseplay as from the “goosing” (and the involuntary reaction which followed), — or was as likely to have solely resulted therefrom as from a combination of the two independent actions. I cannot conceive of any way to resolve this question other than by expert medical testimony, and it was not resolved in the trial below. Without such character of testimony it seems to me that the .evidence would be,evenly balanced, i. e., just as consistent with the insurance company’s theory that recovery is inhibited by the Act as it is with the contrary theory. A conflict is thus arisen, the considerations whereof are equal. I do not deem the evidence to be such that could be found to preponderant in support of a recovery.
I confess that I am unable to find any ■discussion or authorities directly upon the point. A matter of analogy, however, is considered in Texas Law of Evidence, McCormick and Ray, Second Edition, p. 66, “Burden of Proof — Presumptions”, sec. 54, “Conflicting Presumptions”, and the authorities thereunder annotated. See particularly City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 1944, Sup.Ct., Vermont, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350, 356, with its discussion and authorities.
I believe the following sentence is pertinent to the question here posed: “If an injury may result from one of two causes, for one pf which, and not for the other, the defendant is liable, the plaintiff must show with reasonable certainty that the cause for which the defendant was liable produced the result which may have followed.” 20 Am.Jur., p. 150, “Evidence”, sec. 146, “Tort Actions”.