Court Opinion

ID: 9810032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:35.376808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:20.362153
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T 63 In Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. --, 182 S.Ct. 2455, 2475, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court decided one thing: that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. But that is all the Court decided. Although the Court held that such sentencing schemes improperly preclude judges from accounting for "the wealth of characteristics and cireumstances attendant" to a juvenile's age, id. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2467, it made no determination regarding how judges should weigh those characteristics and cireumstances. If our General Assembly wishes to exercise its legislative authority and make that determination-that is, if it seeks to respond to Miller and develop a new sentencing scheme for juveniles, whether individualized or automatic-it obviously possesses the power to do so. But it has not so acted.
64 Today, the majority, rather than the General Assembly, creates an "individualized sentencing process." See maj. op. 14. Specifically, the majority instructs judges to re-sentence juveniles and to consider their "youth and attendant characteristics" in determining whether they should spend the remainder of their lives in jail, with no possibility of release. Id. In so doing, the majority concocts an entirely new sentencing process not yet sanctioned by our General Assembly. Moreover, because Miller was silent as to the parameters of such an individualized procedure, the majority's new process is necessarily nebulous, failing to give judges any guidance in how to make such grave decisions.1 The creation of such a sentencing scheme is the province of the *973legislature. Because this court should not devise new sentencing procedures in the guise of a lawmaking body, I respectfully dissent from all but Part III of the majority's opinion. Because I agree with the majority's retroactivity analysis, I concur in Part III.
T 65 In my view, the appropriate remedy in this case is one of severance, a solution that cleanly excises the constitutionally offensive portions of Colorado's sentencing scheme. Certainly, the General Assembly may prefer a different scheme from the one that results from severance. But, as I will show, rather than affirmatively creating a new sentencing process (as the majority does), severance simply removes the problematic language and leaves the remainder of the relevant statutes intact, meaning this court need not introduce de-facto legislation. Should the General Assembly wish to substitute a different sentencing scheme, it should do so.
T66 I begin, however, with a brief overview of Miller, highlighting both what it says and, more importantly, what it does not say.
I. Miller v. Alabama
T67 In Miller, the Court considered whether the sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas, which mandated LWOP for juvenile offenders who committed homicide crimes, violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. See - U.S. at -----, 182 S.Ct. at 2460-63; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII and unusual punishments [shall not bel inflicted."). . Expanding the constitutional protections for juveniles already recognized in Roper v. Simmons, 548 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for juveniles), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 180 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars LWOP for juveniles who committed nonhomicide offenses), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars mandatory LWOP for juveniles who committed homicides. See 182 S.Ct. at 2468-69.
T68 Different from Roper and Grakam, however, the Court declined to adopt a categorical rule. See id. at ---, 182 S.Ct. at 2469 ("[We do not consider [defendants'] alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on [LWOP] for juveniles. ..."). Nevertheless, the Court appeared squeamish about sentences of LWOP for juveniles, stating that "we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Id. The Court further noted that "when given the choice, sentenc-ers impose [LWOP] on children relatively rarely." Id. at -- n. 10, 182 S.Ct. at 2471
T 69 Miller, then, is framed entirely in the negative. It forbids schemes that automatically sentence juveniles to LWOP. It provides no detail, however, as to when such an individual sentence would be constitutional. Rather, Miller simply recognizes that "children are different" and that sentencers must account for such differences. Id. at --, 182 S.Ct. at 2469. Therefore, while Miller does present a brief laundry-list of children's "hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences," id. at --, 182 S.Ct. at 2468-it offers no guidance about how to weigh such features in deciding a juvenile's punishment.
€70 With this understanding of Miller in mind, I now turn to the particulars of Colorado's sentencing scheme.
II. Colorado's Sentencing Scheme
T71 The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony. Under section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), the minimum presumptive penalty for class 1 felonies is "life imprisonment." While subsection (1)(a) uniformly applies life imprisonment as the sentencing floor for offenders who committed class 1 felonies, subsection (4) differently defines "life imprisonment" depending on both the date of the underlying felony and the status of the offender at the time of commission. See § 18-1.3-401(4)(a)-(b). As the key provisions of subsection (4) provide in pertinent part:
(a) ... As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or *974after July 1, 1985, and before July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole for forty calendar years. As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
(b)(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of ... paragraph (a) of this subsection (4), as to a [juvenile] who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony ... the district court Judge shall sentence the [Juvenile] to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of forty calendar years. ...
(II) The provisions of this paragraph (b) shall apply to persons sentenced for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.
(Emphasis added.)
. 172 Thus, under subsection (4), "life imprisonment" can mean either LWOP or life with the possibility of parole ("LWPP") after forty years. Because (4)(b) explicitly excepts juvenile offenders who committed class 1 felonies after 2006 from the provisions of (4)(a), the generalized "any person" language in (4)(a) essentially means "all adult offenders and those juvenile offenders not covered by (4)(b)." When (4)(a) is read in relation to juveniles, the first definition of life imprisonment mandates LWPP after forty years for any juvenile offender who committed a class 1 felony between 1985 and 1990, while the second definition of life imprisonment mandates LWOP for any juvenile offender who committed a class 1 felony between 1990 and 2006.2
73 Section 17-22.5-104, C.R.S. (2014), the other statutory provision relevant to this issue, mirrors these sentencing outcomes.3 Under section 17-22.5-104, which regulates parole eligibility for inmates imprisoned under a life sentence, parole eligibility is differently restricted depending on both the date of the underlying felony and the status of the offender at the time of commission. As the key provisions of subsection (2)(d) provide:
(I) No inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a class 1 felony committed on or after July 1, 1990, shall be eligible for parole. ...
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(IV) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d), /a juvenile] imprisoned under a life sentence for a class 1 felony committed on or after July 1, 2006, who was convicted as an adult {l. may be eligible for parole after the inmate has served at least forty calendar years. ...
(Emphasis added.)
174 Thus, under (2)(d), an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is either never eligible for parole (ie., he faces LWOP) or eligible for parole after forty calendar years (ie., he faces LWPP after forty years). Because (2)(d)(IV) explicitly excepts juvenile offenders who committed class 1 felonies after 2006 from the provisions of (2)(d)(I), the generalized "inmate" language in (2)(d)(I) essentially means "all adult offenders and those juvenile offenders not covered by (2)(d){IV)." When (2)(d)(I) is read in relation to juveniles, it eliminates the possibility of parole for any juvenile offender who committed a class 1 felony between 1990 and 2006. In other words, (2)(d)(I) tracks exactly the second definition of life imprisonment in section 18-1.3-401(4)(a), which also mandates LWOP for any juvenile offender who committed a class 1 felony between 1990 and 2006.
175 Therefore, both section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 contravene the rule announced in Miller because they mandate LWOP for certain juvenile offenders who committed class 1 felonies. The majority thus properly recognizes that Miller rendered these statutes unconstitutional as ap*975plied to juveniles. See maj. op. 135. The question, then, is how to cure these statutes of their unconstitutionality. I now illustrate why severance supplies both the cleanest and least invasive response to this question.
III. Severance
T76 In curing a defective statute, this court possesses the "authority and duty ... to determin[el whether severance of unconstitutional portions of the statute is viable." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d 1263, 1280 (Colo.2001), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 19, 2001). Indeed, we should apply severance where the doctrine is appropriate. See id. ("When we can, we sever any provision that we hold to be unconstitutional from those provisions that stand despite the severance." (emphasis added)). Under Colorado's general severability clause, § 24-204, C.R.S. (2014), we may sever or strike any portion of a statute held to be unconstitutional.4 Rodrigues v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 929 (Colo.1996). Because we strike as little of an unconstitutional statute as possible, preferring partial invalidation over complete invalidation, see Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 688 (Colo.2010), severance may be limited to a single word or phrase, Schutt, 914 P.2d at 929. Thus, severing portions of a statute is preferred over invalidating the entire statute unless the invalid statutory provisions are so "pervasive or inextricably intertwined with" the valid provisions that severance would render the statute incomplete. See Riverton Produce Co. v. State, 871 P.2d 1213, 1226 (Colo.1994); see also Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1362 (10th Cir.1981) (applying Colorado's general severability clause and explaining that severance "is impossible if the court determines that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent"). When deciding whether we can sever unconstitutional provisions from an otherwise valid statute, we consider two factors: (1) the autonomy of the statutory portions that remain after the defective provisions are excised; and (2) the intent of the enacting legislative body. Daill-man, 225 P.3d at 638.
T77 Here, the temporal restrictions contained in section 18-1.3-401(4)(b) and section 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(IV), which were added to the statute in 2006, cause the constitutional infirmity at issue.5 Recall that (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV) except. juvenile offenders who committed class 1 felonies after 2006 from the generalized language in (4)(a) and mandating LWOP for all offenders who committed class 1 felonies after 1990. Thus, by blocking juveniles who committed class 1 felonies before 2006 from the juvenile exception, (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV) operate to create the discrete class of juveniles whose sentences are now unconstitutional under Miller. Therefore, it is these subsections-and only these subsections-that are problematic.
T 78 Applying the two severability factors, the first supports severance because the undisturbed portions of section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 can remain constitution ally valid. The invalid temporal restrictions at issue here are not pervasive parts of either section 18-1.3-401 or section 17-22.5-104. Not only do these restrictions appear only onee in their respective statutes-and in exceptions, no less-but they are also nonessential to the overriding purpose of each *976statute to guide and constrain sentencing and parole eligibility determinations.
1 79 Nor are the invalid provisions in (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV) inextricably intertwined with the valid provisions. Recall that (4)(b) is divided into two subparagraphs, (I) and (ID). Subsection (4)(b)(I)-a multi-sentence substantive provision-creates the juvenile exception, and subsection (4)(b)(II)-a single-sentence clarifying provision-limits the group covered by the exception to juveniles who committed class 1 felonies after 2006. Although (4)(b)(I1) references (4)(b)(I), no other provision references it. Because the temporal restriction in (4)(b)(II) merely clarifies the scope of the juvenile exception established by (4)(b)(I)-which is enforceable on its own terms-it is clearly separable from the still-valid portions of section 18-1.3-401.
80 The temporal restriction in (2)(d)(IV) is similarly separable from the still-valid portions of section 17-22.5-104. Recall that (@)(d)(IV)-which is not referenced by any other provision in section 17-22.5-104-both creates the juvenile exception and limits it to felonies "committed on or after July 1, 2006." Although the language limiting the juvenile exception is buried amid the language creating the exception, removing the limiting language does not change the overriding purpose of (2)(d)(IV), which is to except juveniles from the generally applicable provisions of (2)(d)(I) that mandate LWOP. Because the temporal restriction does not inhibit the enforceability of the juvenile exception, it is not inextricably intertwined with the remaining provisions of section 17-22.5-104.
81 The second severability factor similarly supports severance, as the newly severed statutes still accord with the legislature's intent. Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted the valid portions of section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 independently of the invalid temporal restrictions in (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV), the invalid temporal restrictions may be expunged. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1982). The statutory context, which systematically subjects juveniles who committed class 1 felonies to mandatory penalties, suggests that the legislature would have enacted the still-valid portions of section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 even without the invalid temporal restrictions in (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV). Recall that section 18-1.3-401(1) establishes the minimum and maximum presumptive penalties for every class of felony. Regardless of the date of commission, the minimum presumptive penalty for all class 1 felonies is "life imprisonment" and the maximum presumptive penalty is death. Because juveniles cannot receive death sentences, see Roper, 548 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, life imprisonment is the compulsory penalty for all juveniles convicted of class 1 felonies. Although subsection (4) differently defines Tife imprisonment as either LWOP or LWPP after forty years depending on the date that the underlying felony was committed, both definitions are statutorily mandated.
T 82 In other words, section 18-1.3-401 is designed to foreclose the possibility of discretionary sentencing determinations for juveniles convicted of class 1 felonies. By simply replacing mandatory LWOP with mandatory LWPP after forty years for juveniles who committed class 1 felonies, the severed statutes align seamlessly with the broader statutory context, suggesting that the legislature would have enacted section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 without their invalid portions.
183 Finally, the legislatively defined purposes of Colorado's Criminal Code suggest that the legislature would have enacted the valid portions of section 18-1.3-401 and seetion 17-22.5-104 without the invalid temporal restrictions. Section 18-1-102.5, CRS. (2014), lists the legislatively defined purposes of the Code with respect to sentencing. One of these purposes is to "assure the fair and consistent treatment of all convicted offenders by eliminating unjustified disparity in sentences." § 18-1-102.5(1)(b). The severed versions of section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 embody this purpose by ensuring that juveniles who happened to commit class 1 felonies between 1990 and 2006-and were therefore sentenced to mandatory LWOP under the old scheme-are treated the same as juvenile offenders who were sentenced to LWPP after forty years simply *977because they happened to commit their class 1 felonies before 1990 or after 2006. Because severing the temporal restrictions in (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV) directly furthers one of the Code's basic objectives of sentencing-assuring fair and consistent treatment of convicted offenders-it is likely that the legislature would have enacted section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104 without these invalid provisions.
{84 Accordingly, I would simply apply severance to the two unconstitutional statutes at issue. In particular, I would excise the following language from section 18-1.3-401(4), as designated by strikethrough font:
(b)(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of ... paragraph (a) of this subsection (4), as to a [juvenile] who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony ... the district court judge shall sentence the [Juvenile] to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of forty calendar years....
an t has f thi hG) shall-apply-to-persons-sentenced-for-offenses-eommitted-on-or-after-July-1; 2006.%)
Analogously, I would also excise the following language from section 17-22.5-104(2)(d), as designated by strikethrough font:
(I) No inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a class 1 felony committed on or after July 1, 1990, shall be eligible for parole....
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(IV) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d), [a juvenile] imprisoned under a life sentence for a class 1 felony committed-on-or-after who-was-convieted-as-an served-at
After severing the statutes in this fashion to rid them of their invalid temporal restrictions, juveniles who committed class 1 felonies between 1990 and 2006 would be subject to mandatory LWPP after forty years.6
IV. Conclusion
185 Miller outlaws mandatory sentences of LWOP for juveniles. But it does not dictate how a state should cure such sentencing schemes, and it certainly does not articulate in any detail when it is appropriate for a state to sentence a juvenile to LWOP. Nor has our General Assembly yet provided any such details regarding juvenile sentencing post-Miller. The majority nevertheless uses Miller's unremarkable acknowledgement that juveniles are creatures of "youth and [its] attendant characteristics" to bootstrap an invented individualized sentencing process onto the Court's holding. But because the majority does not-and could not-explain how judges should weigh these characteristics, this newfangled process will necessarily be vague and uncertain. It is for the legislature, not this court, to develop such a sentencing scheme if it so desires. See United States v. Booker, 548 U.S. 220, 265, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ("Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in [the legislature's] court.").
T86 If our General Assembly wishes to revise Colorado's sentencing scheme to comply with Miller, it is well within its powers to do so. Until it acts, however, this court should rectify the scheme in the least intrusive way possible. As such, I would simply sever. the constitutionally offensive portions of the statutes as described. See supra I 84. I would thus direct the trial court to apply the revised sentencing scheme and automatically resentence both Tate and Banks to L WPP after forty years. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from all but Part III of the majority's opinion. Because I agree with the majority's retroactivity analysis, I coneur in Part IL.

. What factors, for example, should judges consider in deciding a particular sentence? Should they focus on the juvenile defendant, considering his age, intellectual capacity, and home environment? Should they account for the impact on the victim and his family? What about the manner of the crime, or the extent of the defendant's participation in it? And even if any or all of these variables are relevant, how exactly should judges weigh them? The majority cannot say. The General Assembly can.

. When referring to the date ranges provided in section 18-1.3-401 and section 17-22.5-104, C.R.S. (2014), I omit the "July 1" language going forward for simplicity.

. Although section 17-22.5-104 is not part of the criminal code and therefore does not control sentencing determinations, it is nonetheless relevant because the parole regulations outlined in section 17-22.5-104(2)(d) track precisely the sentencing outcomes outlined in section 18-1.3-401(4). Thus, to the extent that portions of section 18-1.3-401(4) are unconstitutional, the concomitant portions of section 17-22.5-104(2)(d) are also unconstitutional.

. The general severability clause applies to "any legislative act not containing a specific severability provision." People v. Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826, 830 (Colo.1972). It is applicable in this case because neither section 18-1.3-401(4) nor section 17-22.5-104 contains a severability provision pertaining to crimes punishable by LWOP. Cf. § 18-1.3-401(5) (providing that crimes punishable by death shall be punished by life imprisonment in the event that the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional).

. In the legislative declaration accompanying the amendments that added (4)(b) and (2)(d)(IV) to sections 18-1.3-401 and 17-22.5-104, respectively, the legislature expressly acknowledged that "it is not in the best interests of the state to condemn juveniles who commit class 1 felony crimes to a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole." See H.B. 06-1315, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.2006). Recognizing "the rehabilitation potential of juveniles," the legislature amended sections 18-1.3-401(4) and 17-22.5-104(2)(d) so that juveniles who committed class 1 felonies after 2006 became eligible for parole after serving forty calendar years of their life sentences. Id.

. The majority asserts that "severing anything would mean changing the application of the statute to adults as well." Maj. op. 142. But my suggested method of severance does no such thing. The only language that I would excise pertains exclusively to juveniles; following such severance, the sentencing of adults would remain unchanged.