Court Opinion

ID: 9949486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:04:58.111025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:27.480182
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 230216-U

                                  Order filed March 11, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      In re MARRIAGE OF                      )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                             )     of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
      SHANNON RODGERS,                       )     Du Page County, Illinois,
                                             )
            Petitioner-Appellee,             )
                                             )     Appeal No. 3-23-0216
            and                              )     Circuit No. 15-D-307
                                             )
      DANIEL RODGERS,                        )     Honorable
                                             )     Kenton J. Skarin,
            Respondent-Appellant.            )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by modifying maintenance.

¶2          Respondent, Daniel Rodgers, appeals the Du Page County circuit court’s order modifying

     maintenance. Respondent argues that the court erred in its interpretation of the Second District’s

     remand order resulting in the court believing it was required to modify maintenance and that it

     abused its discretion by modifying maintenance. We affirm.
¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The parties were married in 2002. Petitioner, Shannon Rodgers, filed a petition for

     dissolution of marriage in 2015. A judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered in 2017,

     which incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided for

     respondent to pay petitioner maintenance in the amount of $4434 per month. In October 2020,

     petitioner filed a petition to modify maintenance, alleging that respondent’s increased income

     was a substantial change in circumstances. The court denied the petition and petitioner appealed.

     The Second District entered an order reversing the denial of modification and remanding for

     further proceedings. In re Marriage of Rodgers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210728-U, ¶ 2. The Second

     District stated that had the trial court applied the statutory factors to determine whether a

     substantial change occurred it would have been obvious that petitioner met her burden of

     showing it had, and that “[t]he trial court then should have determined how the maintenance

     award should be modified upon this showing.” Id. ¶ 26. It determined that respondent’s increased

     income was a substantial change in circumstances and that “the trial court should have analyzed

     the statutory factors enumerated in section 504(a) of the Act to determine whether a modification

     of [respondent’s] maintenance obligations would be appropriate.” Id. ¶ 32. The Second District

     remanded the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the parties to argue the relevant factors

     and for the circuit court to make a record of the factors supporting its decision regarding

     modification. Id. ¶ 36. The partial dissent stated that “[b]ased upon what the majority disposition

     discloses, I submit that [petitioner] has established that an increase is in order and that the case

     should be remanded, not for further findings (which appear to be preordained and erroneous), but

     a determination of the amount of the increase.” Id. ¶ 40.

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¶5          On remand, the parties filed written arguments regarding the statutory factors. The court

     issued a written order. The order noted that the Second District had concluded that petitioner met

     her initial burden of showing a substantial change in circumstance. It then stated that the

     appellate decision directed the circuit “court to reconsider the factors of 750 ILCS 5/504(a) and

     5/510(a-5) to reset the maintenance.” Although the court indicated some disagreement with the

     Second District’s order, it stated “this court is obligated to apply the appellate court’s ruling to

     the best of its ability. The appellate court directs this court to modify maintenance ***. This

     court will do so.” The order then set forth the court’s findings of fact as to the statutory factors.

     The court found that respondent’s income increased from $200,674 to $467,000. It found that

     petitioner was underemployed for the 14 months following completion of her degree and that the

     underemployment was not in good faith. Additionally, it found that petitioner’s listed monthly

     expenses of $9373 were generally reasonable and were not meaningfully challenged. The court

     also determined that petitioner had been out of the job market from age 34 to age 47, during

     which time she contributed to respondent’s career and career potential by caring for the children.

     Due to her time out of the job market, the court found that petitioner suffered an impairment to

     her present and future earning capacity but that her earning capacity improved following

     completion of her degree. Further, the court found that “the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage

     was a mirage fueled by ballooning debt.” Following the findings on the statutory factors, the

     order noted that since the appellate court already concluded that there was a substantial change in

     circumstances, it was moving “to a recalculation of Respondent’s maintenance obligation.”

¶6          The court noted it had found respondent’s income to be $467,000 and that it would use

     $35,000 as respondent’s income as that was the amount imputed to her in the initial judgment.

     The court determined that the combined income exceeded the $500,000 maximum for the

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     statutory guidelines to apply, but calculated a guideline maintenance amount for comparison

     purposes, which resulted in an amount of $11,092 per month. The court also did a calculation

     using $62,500 as petitioner’s income—the midpoint between the amounts petitioner was

     expected to make after working for a year and a half. This calculation resulted in an amount of

     $10,634 per month. The court granted the petition to modify maintenance and set it at $10,000

     per month. In doing so, the court noted it utilized its significant discretion in setting the amount

     of maintenance and in making the modification retroactive.

¶7           Respondent filed a motion to reconsider, noting that the Second District’s order did not

     require maintenance to be modified. The court denied the motion. In doing so, the court stated “I

     understand that I do have discretion once there is a substantial change as to when and how to

     address modification of maintenance.” Respondent appeals.

¶8                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶9           Respondent argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the Second District’s order as

     requiring it to modify maintenance when the order required the court to consider the appropriate

     factors in deciding whether or not to modify maintenance. Respondent further argues that the

     court abused its discretion by modifying maintenance and notes that when the court is required to

     exercise its discretion but fails to do so, the failure is an abuse of discretion. Petitioner argues the

     court properly followed the Second District’s order by evaluating the factors and determining

     whether modification was warranted. In support, she specifically references the order’s language

     that the court exercised its significant discretion in setting the amount of maintenance after

     considering the factors. Petitioner further argues that the court did not abuse its discretion by

     modifying maintenance.

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¶ 10          “When a court determines that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, it

       may modify the maintenance award, but it is not required to do so.” In re Marriage of Osseck,

       2021 IL App (2d) 200268, ¶ 48. The court must consider the statutory factors in determining

       whether to modify maintenance and, if so, under what terms. Id. The circuit court’s modification

       of maintenance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 49. “A trial court abuses its

       discretion when its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person

       would take the view adopted by the court.” Id. “There is error when a trial court refuses to

       exercise discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented.”

       People v. Queen, 56 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (1974). “ ‘[T]he effect of such a failure to exercise

       discretion must be assessed in the context of the entire proceeding [citation].’ ” People v.

       Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 224 (2000) (quoting People v. Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d 362, 379 (1990)).

       Upon remand, the circuit court is to exercise its discretion within the bounds of the remand and

       the determination of whether it has done so is a question of law. In re Marriage of Jones, 2019

       IL App (5th) 180388, ¶ 24.

¶ 11          Here, as argued by respondent, the court’s order modifying maintenance includes

       statements indicating that the court believed that the Second District required it to modify

       maintenance rather than determine whether maintenance should be modified. However,

       respondent argued in his motion to reconsider that the Second District’s order did not require

       modification and in response the court made clear that it understood it had the discretion as to

       how to address maintenance. Therefore, it does not appear that the court acted under an

       erroneous belief that it did not have discretion when it granted modification. Even if the court did

       act under the belief it had no discretion, reversal and remand is not always required and in the

       context of these proceedings it is not required here. See, Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 224.

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¶ 12          Following the Second District’s order, the circuit court set forth a detailed analysis of the

       statutory factors. Having analyzed the factors, the court determined that modification was

       warranted based on its findings, including that respondent’s income had increased substantially,

       the amount of petitioner’s monthly expenses, and the fact that petitioner had been out of the job

       market for a substantial period of time while she contributed to respondent’s career and career

       potential while caring for the children. Based on the foregoing, and in light of the Second

       District’s order which intimated that the evidence supported an increase in maintenance (see

       Rodgers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210728-U, ¶ 25-29; id. ¶ 40 (McLaren, J., partially dissenting)) we

       cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to modify maintenance was arbitrary, fanciful,

       unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have modified maintenance. Therefore, we

       conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 13                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 15          Affirmed.

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