Court Opinion

ID: 9570683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:10.952633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:37.377616
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the majority opinion but write separately to stress that ten out of twelve judges of this Court have already agreed, even in situations arising before Georgia law required dealer tags to show their expiration date, that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to stop a car solely because it carried a dealer tag. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 880 (3) (547 SE2d 664) (2001). The reasoning in Berry is sound, and it requires overruling Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. 840 (440 SE2d 727) (1994) — if that case has not already been overruled by Berry.
Prior to the time that OCGA § 40-2-8 was modified to require that dealer tags show their expiration date, law enforcement officers argued that they had grounds to stop cars with dealer tags because (1) they had knowledge that some of those cars might be stolen, and (2) they wanted to check to see whether the undated tag had expired. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 696 (379 SE2d 817) (1989) (stolen); Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. at 840 (check for expiration).
In Berry a ten-judge majority expressly held that the first argument could not withstand constitutional scrutiny and therefore it overruled Watson. Eight of those same judges also held that for the identical reason, the second argument failed the same test, and that therefore Burtts should also be overruled. Indeed, Burtts was based, in part, on Watson.
In Watson this Court held that, based on an officer’s subjective knowledge that some cars with dealer tags might be stolen, the simple fact that someone was driving a car with a dealer tag was an “objective manifestation that the persons stopped may be engaged in criminal activity.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) 190 Ga. App. at 696-697. In Berry ten judges concurred in overruling that aspect of Watson. 248 Ga. App. at 880 (3). As explained by Judge Ruffin in his special concurrence, stopping apparently compliant drivers because of the danger presented that some of those drivers are engaged in criminal activity that is not observable at the time of the stop does not survive the United States Supreme Court’s balancing test in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979). That test requires balancing the intrusion of a law enforcement practice on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. at 653-654. That the decision in Berry is correct is made plain by Judge Ruffin in his footnote 17 — although it is documented that some cars are stolen more *640often than others, no one would argue that in an effort to prevent car theft, the police should be allowed to randomly stop anyone driving one of the most frequently stolen cars.
Burtts contains the identical flaw, and, moreover, it is based in part on Watson. In Burtts, the officer pulled the car over just to check to see if the dealer tag had expired. That case held that because an undated dealer tag might have expired, there was articulable suspicion of illegal operation. 211 Ga. App. 840. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional random stops of individual cars for the purposes of checking the driver’s license and the car’s registration to see if they were valid, holding:
except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
440 U. S. at 663 (VII). Automobile licenses and registrations are issued periodically and promote legitimate state interests. Id. at 658. But, even though all licenses and registrations expire periodically, that is not a sufficient basis to randomly stop drivers to make sure that their documents are up to date.
The same reasoning applies here, and in Burtts, to invalidate stopping drivers solely because they have undated dealer tags in an effort to enforce registration laws. Unless something else about an undated dealer tag (such as that it looks old, torn, or faded) suggests that it may have expired, a dealer tag, standing alone, does not provide an articulable suspicion that the tag has expired. Thus, Burtts should be overruled, specifically for cases arising prior to July 1, 2000, the effective date of the changes made to OCGA § 40-2-8 that require expiration dates on dealer tags.