Court Opinion

ID: 9376155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 21:00:40.811502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:04.633137
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1308

        JERRY GORALSKI LAMB,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        THOMAS MODLY, Secretary of the Navy; UNITED STATES; TERRENCE
        O’CONNELL; RICHARD PAQUETTE,

                            Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Lydia Kay Griggsby, District Judge. (8:19-cv-03469-LKG)

        Submitted: September 30, 2022                                Decided: February 28, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Jerry Goralski Lamb, Appellant Pro Se.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jerry Goralski Lamb appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment

        to his former employer on his retaliation claim raised pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

        Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Finding no

        reversible error, we affirm.

               We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, “applying the

        same legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in

        the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d

        344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is warranted ‘if the movant shows that there

        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

        matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine question of material fact

        exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury

        could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”         J.D. ex rel. Doherty v. Colonial

        Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts may not “weigh conflicting evidence or make

        credibility determinations.” Id. But “the nonmoving party must rely on more than

        conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or

        the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.

        Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Lamb proceeded under the familiar McDonnell Douglas * pretext framework. Under

               *
                   McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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        McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lamb needed to “show

        (1) that [he] engaged in protected activity; (2) that h[is] employer took an adverse action

        against h[im]; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the adverse activity and the

        protected action.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 578 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (cleaned up). The Navy then must proffer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the

        adverse actions. Id. Finally, Lamb had the burden to show that the Navy’s legitimate

        reason was, in fact, a pretext for intentional retaliation. Id. “Title VII retaliation claims

        must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw.

        Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013); see also Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore,

        787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Nassar does not alter the legal standard for

        adjudicating a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim.”).

               Lamb’s claim fails. Lamb alleges three adverse actions taken against him: assigning

        him an “inactive status” workload, requesting he undergo psychological evaluation, and

        suspending him for one day. He also alleges the district court applied the wrong legal

        standard and so erred in finding he had not suffered any adverse action. But even under

        Lamb’s preferred standard, he has not shown his “inactive status” workload assignment

        was materially adverse. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).

        And even if Lamb is right that requesting a psychological evaluation and suspending him

        for one-day are adverse actions, he has not shown that the purported legitimate reasons for

        these actions were pretextual. So his claim fails.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We deny Lamb’s motions to

        supplement the record and to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because

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        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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