Court Opinion

ID: 9672297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:14.951236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.278134
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting on rehearing). The majority claims, the present case to be excepted, that it has the power to fine or imprison for civil contempt any circuit or county or municipal judge in this state who violates a rule in its Code of Judicial Ethics. These rules range from banning cameras in courtrooms1 to requiring a judge to report the income and assets of his wife and children.2
It is not to be denied that, by statute, every court of record and every judge of such court in this state'pos*543dsesses a definite, but limited, power to punish for civil contempt.3 But such statute limits the power of courts to punish for civil contempt to misconduct “. . . by which the rights or remedies of a party in an action or proceeding pending or triable in such court . . . may be defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced . . . .”4 Thus such statute relates and limits the application of punishment for civil contempt, not to violations of a judicial rule, but to actions or proceedings pending or triable in court. The writer would hold the power of civil contempt limited by the statute, and the situation here to be outside the limits of such statute.
However, the majority additionally claims that “independently of statute,” all courts in this state “. . . have an inherent power to hold in contempt those who disobey the court’s lawful orders.” The writer does not find in state or federal constitutions any such grant of an awesome and unlimited power of trial courts or appellate courts to fine or jail those judges who violate its rules. Instead, the writer finds this court as having applied sec. 295.01, Stats., and having recognized its limits as to impositions of penalties in civil contempt cases. In this very term of court, in a case where a trial court went beyond the limits of the civil contempt statute in imposing liquidated damages for violation of a court injunction, this court set aside the penalty imposed as not statutorily authorized.5 If the statute controls impositions of civil contempt penalties by trial courts for violations of their orders, it ought control impositions of penalties by an appellate court for violation of its orders. What is sauce for one ought to be sauce for the other.
Moreover, when this court established the sanctions that were to be imposed for a violation of a rule in its *543ejudicial ethics code, it provided for only four possible penalties: (1) Removal from office; (2) suspension from office; (3) reprimand; and (4) censure.6 As to the first two such sanctions, removal or suspension, this court gave the judicial commission only the power to make recommendations to this court.7 As to the third and fourth of the possible sanctions, it decreed that such judicial commission could either reprimand or censure, but subject to review by this court.8 It was these four sanctions, plus retirement for disability,9 and only these four, that were made applicable to all appellate and trial judges in this state.10
However, only two of the four sanctions were made immediately effective. As to the sanctions of removal or suspension from office, this court then made clear that: “These-sanctions require constitutional amendment.”11 Thus, under the rules then promulgated, only the penalties of reprimand or censure are set forth as immediately effective and available as penalties for violation by a judge of a code rule. Unless a trial judge is to hold court in his prison cell, it is difficult to see how imprisonment for contempt is not an equivalent to suspension from office. If constitutional amendment is required to validate a suspension from office for a rule violation, it is submitted that constitutional amendment, or at least legislative authorization, must precede the imposition of the at least equally onerous consequence of imprisonment for a rule violation. Even if there were an “inherent power” basis for such jailing or fining of a rule violator, it is submitted that the rule of court adding such sanction *543ffor a violation of a rule in the ethics code should be amended in the same manner in which it was adopted. This would include holding a public hearing following public notice, as our rules provide.12 A memorandum opinion attached to a denial of a motion for rehearing is not the way in which a court code or administrative rule should be altered, or the sanctions it establishes broadened. At the least, until the Code of Judicial Ethics is properly amended, this court ought be limited to the sanctions listed in the rules it has established and promulgated.
The following opinion was filed March 1, 1976.
Per Curiam.
Charles E. Kading has failed to file a financial disclosure report for the year ending December 31, 1974. By this repeated refusal he has defied the mandates of this court in In re Honorable Charles E. Kading, Judge of County Court, Branch No. 1, Jefferson County, Wisconsin. This failure is a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics.
Because this challenge to Rule 17 and the Code of Judicial Ethics has been considered by this court to be a good-faith test case the court has chosen not to regard Kading’s failure to file the report as contumacious. A new report for the year ending December 31, 1975, is due to be filed on or before March 15, 1976. A willful failure to again comply with the provisions of Rule 17 in regard to this report may expose him to being held in contempt of this court.
*544Therefore, it is ordered that Charles E. Kading is severely reprimanded for willfully failing to file the required financial disclosure report for the year ending December 31,1974.

 Rule 14, Code of Judicial Ethics (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 252, 262, 153 N. W. 2d 873, 155 N. W. 2d 565.

 Rule 17, In the Matter of the Amendment of Code of Judicial Ethics (1974), 63 Wis. 2d vii.

 Sec. 295.01, Stats., Contempt power of courts and judges.

 Id.

 Getka v. Lader (1976), 71 Wis. 2d 237, 238 N. W. 2d 87.

 Code of Judicial Ethics (1972), 52 Wis. 2d vii, pages viii-ix.

 Id. at pages viii-ix, Rule 8.

 Id.

 Id. at page ix, Rule 10, this court noting: “Retirement for disability assumes enabling' legislation therefor.”

 Id. at page ix, Rule 12.

 Id. at page ix, footnote*.

 See. 251.18, Stats., providing: “. . . All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant hereto. No rule modifying or suspending such statutes shall be adopted until the court has held a public hearing with reference thereto. The court may establish days certain in each year at which dates the public hearings shall be held. Said hearings shall be held at 1:30 o’clock *544in the afternoon, or at such other time as the court shall direct. Notice of public hearings shall be given by publication of a class 3 notice, under ch. 985, the expense of the publication to be paid out of the state treasury. Notice shall also be given in the official publication of the state bar of Wisconsin, said notice to be published not more than 60 days, not less than 30 days, before the date of hearing. . . .”