Court Opinion

ID: 9691091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:08:26.290079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:10.138220
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the outcome the court reaches in this case because clearly the affected area was relatively small, it was already significantly degraded environmentally and there was evidence to suggest that the proposed development would, in fact, lead to an improvement of the environmental quality of the area, I write separately to express my belief that the statutory scheme is fully adequate to instruct on how its policies should be enforced, and that the Wacouta test and the “modified-Wacowia ” test the court endorses inappropriately restrict the definition of material adverse effect on the environment in a manner that the legislature did not intend.
The legislature’s “paramount concern” in enacting section 116B was the “protection of [the state’s] air, water, land and other natural resources ⅜ * Minn.Stat. § 116B.04. Accordingly, the conduct violating the statutory purposes is very broadly defined — “any conduct which materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment” is deemed sufficient to trigger the statute. Minn Stat. § 116B.02, subd. 5; see also id. § 116B.04. The broad statutory protection against the whole range of environmental harms is in striking contrast to the four-part test announced in Wacouta, with its much narrower focus on whether rare or critical plant or animal populations will be affected by the proposed action — a much too restrictive approach that can lead to absurd results. Development will often have a material impact on the environment despite the fact that the resources harmed are not rare, irreplaceable or critical in the sense that the development will lead to the permanent loss of entire plant or animal populations in the affected area. Yet under Wacouta, the destruction of a lake’s entire population of game fish would not necessarily be deemed a material adverse effect on the environment if the lake could be restocked with fingerlings the following year; an entire mature forest could be stripped if the property could be replanted with saplings of the same species. Surely, this is not what the legislature intended when it set out to “create and maintain within the state conditions under which human beings and nature can exist in productive harmony * * Minn. Stat. § 116B.01.
The court of appeals premised its adoption of the four-part test in Wacouta on the notion that to do otherwise would “construe MERA as prohibiting virtually all human enterprise.” State ex rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow, 510 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn.App.1993). That is simply not the case. Under the statutory scheme, a finding that a particular development will have a material adverse effect on the environment does not mean that the development is prohibited; it *269merely shifts the burden to the party proposing the development to show that there is no “feasible and prudent alternative” to the contested action. Hence, there was no need for the court to fashion a test designed to narrow the clear and broad language of the statute.
We need not necessarily co-opt Justice Stewart’s famous definition of obscenity — “I know it when I see it,” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197, 84 S.Ct. 1676,1683,12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) — to realize that certain concepts are not amenable to precise definition and must therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis. Whether an action will “materially adversely affect the environment” is one such determination. A “material” effect is one “of real importance or great consequence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1392 (1961). A great many actions undoubtedly have an important effect on the environment despite the fact that they do not harm rare or critical species and the determination of whether the adverse environmental effects of a proposed course of action are “material” is therefore not reducible to a mechanical four-part test focusing on the harm to such species. Rather, determinations of this nature are better made on the facts of each particular case, keeping in mind the broad environmental protection the statute was intended to provide. This court and others have recognized as much in the past. See, e.g., Freeborn County by Tuveson v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 226-28, 210 N.W.2d 290, 296-97 (1973) (stating that the court is not justified in grafting exceptions upon the broad, comprehensive language of MERA, holding that highway project that would disturb the peace and solitude of a natural marsh would have a material effect on the environment); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d 445, 449-51 (7th Cir.1985) (interpreting National Environmental Policy Act provision requiring environmental impact statements for actions having “significant” environmental impact, stating that “[t]he statutory concept of ‘significant’ impact has no determinate meaning”), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055, 106 S.Ct. 1283, 89 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986).
In the court’s attempt to soften and modify the Wacouta standards in this ease, it seems to recognize that the four-part Wacouta test applied by the lower courts does not adequately reflect the broad wording of the statute and therefore adds an additional consideration: “[t]he quality and severity of any adverse effects of the proposed action on the natural resources affected.” I fail to see, however, how directing courts to consider the “quality and severity” of the adverse effects of an action sheds any further light on what will constitute a “material” effect on the environment. The determination of whether an effect is “material” — i.e., important or of consequence — necessarily involves a consideration of the quality and severity of the effect. As such, the court has taken what should be the sole consideration under the statute and turned it into merely one part of a five-part test. Despite the court’s admonition that the modified-Wdpouta standards are intended as a flexible guideline and that each factor need not be met, the new test will no doubt create a tendency, in all but the most severe cases of environmental degradation, for courts to rely on the absence of the other four factors in holding that MERA does not apply. As a result, a statute that was intended to provide broad based environmental protection whenever feasible will be increasingly construed to apply to only the most rare or fragile ecosystems. '
The object of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn.1995) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16). The words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved usage and, where the legislature’s intent is clearly manifested in the plain language of a statute, the court is not free to read restrictions into the statute. See Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.1995); Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 139, 42 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1950). The introductory provisions of section 116B make it clear that, in enacting MERA, the legislature intended to bestow upon citizens a broad right to challenge development having an adverse effect on environment. Accordingly, the legislature determined that any “material” ad*270verse impact on the environment would be sufficient to trigger the statute. The five-part test endorsed by the court narrows the common definition of “material” as well as the broad policy goals underlying the statute in a manner clearly unintended by the legislature.
Finally, while I agree with the court’s conclusion that the evidence offered by Schaller with respect to allegations that the noise ordinance would be violated was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that such a violation is “likely,” I wish to underscore that all environmental impact statements are, by their very nature, predictions of future impact on the environment and are therefore somewhat speculative. We therefore should admit of a high tolerance for the speculative nature of predictions of the impact of proposed conduct on the future of our environment and claims should be dismissed only where, as here, the evidence is insufficient to show even a reasonable basis for concluding that the future harm will come to pass.