Court Opinion

ID: 9781550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:51:28.793662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.933100
License: Public Domain

RICE, J.,
dissenting.
The majority essentially concludes that the common law doctrine of laches survives the General Assembly’s enactment of time limitations for collateral attacks upon trial judgments in section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2004). Thus, even though the statute expressly provides that there is “[n]o limit” on when a felon may collaterally attack a class one conviction, the majority holds that the defendant is time-barred by operation of laches. Since I conclude that the express, unambiguous, plain language of section 16-5^402 evidences the General Assembly’s intent to abrogate the common law doctrine of laches as applied to collateral attacks on class one felony convictions, I respectfully dissent.
In construing statutes, this Court does not make policy decisions, but must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, looking first to the plain language of the statute at issue. E.g., Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo.2004); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo.1998). Even “[i]n the face of statutory silence, questions of interpretation are governed by legislative intent.” Williams v. White Mountain Constr. Co., Inc., 749 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo.1988) (citing Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223, 493 P.2d 651 (1972)). Ambiguity generally exists only when at least one of the statute’s terms is susceptible to multiple meanings. In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury in and for First Jud. Dist., 97 P.3d 921, 924 (Colo.2004) (citing Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246, 252-53 (Colo.1996)).
When the statute is unambiguous on its face, this Court need not look beyond the plain language, e.g., Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo.2004), because “ ‘if courts can give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words adopted by a legislative body, the statute should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said,’ ” Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1218-19 (Colo.2002) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Colo.1995)). Also, “[i]f ... a statute can be construed and applied as written, the legislature’s silence on collateral matters is not this [Cjourt’s concern....” In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d at 924 (citing PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542, 545 (Colo.1995)).
When it acts, the General Assembly is presumed to be aware of existing, applicable case law. E.g., Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 331 (Colo.2003). Of course, the General Assembly may modify or abrogate the common law, but “ ‘it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication,’ ” Vigil, 103 P.3d at 327 (quoting Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997)), because “ ‘[a] statute, general in its terms, is always to be taken as subject to ... the common law,’ ” Bradley v. People, 8 Colo. 599, 604, 9 P. 783, 786 (1886) (quoted in *392Vigil, 103 P.3d at 327). Thus, although subject to strict construction, a statute need not expressly abrogate or modify the common law to affect a change; the General Assembly must provide only a “ ‘clear expression of intent’ ” to do so. Vaughan, 945 P.2d at 408 (quoting Kristensen v. Jones, 195 Colo. 122, 124, 575 P.2d 854, 855 (1978)); see also Colorado State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 335, 296 P. 540, 542 (1931) (General Assembly may repeal common law either expressly or by enactment of inconsistent statute).
Section 16-5-402 enumerates time limitations for collateral attacks upon trial judgments. However, relevant here, “class 1 felonies” have “[n]o limit.” § 16-5-402(1). Thus, following the plain meaning of the statute’s express language as written, see, e.g., Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1218-19, a defendant convicted of a class one felony is not limited to a specific time period within which to raise a collateral attack upon his conviction; necessarily, a convicted class one felon may raise such a collateral attack at any time.
Despite the statute’s plain meaning, the majority concludes that the phrase “[n]o limit” actually means no limit in addition to that already imposed by common law laches because “there is no express implication that the equitable doctrine of laches was abrogated by the enactment of section 16-5^102.” Maj. op. at 390. I have difficulty imagining a more obvious instance of the General Assembly clearly expressing its intent to abrogate the common law. With presumed knowledge of this Court’s established laches case law, see, e.g., Leonard, 63 P.3d at 331, the General Assembly spoke with exactitude, unequivocally saying that upon enactment of section 16-5-402, class one felons are not time-barred, that is they face no time limit when collaterally attacking their convictions. By doing so, the General Assembly evidenced by clear implication its intent to abrogate the common law doctrine of laches as a time limitation on a class one felon’s ability to collaterally attack his conviction. See, e.g., Vigil, 103 P.3d at 327.
Despite the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the General Assembly may abrogate or modify the common law either expressly or by clear implication, see, e.g., id., the majority requires the General Assembly to abrogate laches “explicitly” because it has done so with the common law elsewhere in criminal statutes. See maj. op. at 390 (citing § 18-1-104(3), C.R.S. (2004) (“Common-law crimes are abolished and no conduct shall constitute an offense unless it is described as an offense in this code or in another statute of this state .... ”)). Yet, such a requirement imposes upon the General Assembly an affirmative duty in drafting and enacting criminal statutes that this Court has never before required.
Had the General Assembly intended to time-bar collateral attacks by class one felons, it easily could have imposed a limitations period, as it did for petty offenses, misdemeanors, and all non-class one felonies. § 16-5-402(1). Moreover, had it so intended, the General Assembly certainly could have adopted a more flexible limitation for class one felonies modeled after the common law doctrine of laches. Based upon the plain language of the statute, however, the General Assembly clearly intended neither limitation. By section 16-5-402(l)’s express terms, class one felons face “[n]o limit” on when they may raise a collateral attack on their convictions. Thus, the majority, in my view, replaces the General Assembly’s reasoned policy decision with that of its own.
I further find it improper to consult the statute’s legislative history, as the statute is clear and unambiguous. Nevertheless, since the statute does not expressly negate application of laches, the majority finds it necessary to examine the legislative history to determine the General Assembly’s intent. Maj. op. at 389. To my knowledge, however, this Court has never before gone so far as to find an ambiguity from nothing more than mere statutory silence. See, e.g., In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d at 924-25 (section 16-5-205.5’s silence on named party’s ability to obtain grand jury record by discovery not ambiguous, and therefore, Court did not look beyond statute’s plain language); see also Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Thompson, 861 P.2d 711, 715 (Colo.1993) (In a contract, “[sjilence does not by itself necessarily create ambiguity as a *393matter of law.”). Such restraint was prudent: a statute’s silence on a particular issue easily could be used to manufacture ambiguity where none exists in practically any case involving statutory construction.
Even with reference to the statute’s legislative history, I fail to understand how the majority can disregard the plain language of section 16-5-402(1). Indeed, the majority quotes a hearing witness stating that “ ‘there is no statute of limitations against a class one felony,’ ” prompting one lawmaker to express his concern that “the problem of delay” would persist. Maj. op. at 389 (quoting Audio tape: Hearing on S.B. 262 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 53rd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.1981) (statements of Rep. Bev Scherling and Otto Moore, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Denver County) (on file with Colorado State Archives)). The legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly ultimately made a policy decision that while some crimes should trigger a statutory time limitation on collateral attacks, class one felonies should not.
In conclusion, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous, I would apply section 16-5^102 as written, and hold that the General Assembly clearly intended no time limit on a class one felon’s ability to collaterally attack his conviction, thereby abrogating the common law doctrine of laches. If it agrees with the majority that class one felons are limited by how long they can collaterally attack trial judgments, then the General Assembly and not this Court should amend section 16-5-402 to add a statute of limitations.
I am authorized to say Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice BENDER join in the dissent.