Court Opinion

ID: 9545429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:12:14.738099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:45.976667
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the analysis by the majority leading it to the conclusion that “a separate instruction focusing upon the plaintiffs implied assumption of risk is no longer proper in negligence actions” and that “the jury instructions in negligence cases involving personal injuries resulting from normal risks of a sport * * * should focus upon the plaintiffs burden to prove the elements of negligence (especially the defendant’s duty and breach of duty causing plaintiffs injury) in order to hold the defendant liable.” I also concur in the holding by the majority that the instruction given in this case was improper and should not have been given.
I do not concur, however, in the further holding by the majority that plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial because of the error in the giving of that instruction for the reason that plaintiffs exception to the instruction was not sufficient. If this were a subject on which the law has been well settled, I would agree with the majority. As evident from the opinion by the majority, however, this is not a subject on which the law has been well settled. On the contrary, even decisions by this court on the subject of assumption of risk have been confusing, if not conflicting.
At the very least, plaintiffs exception was sufficient to raise the question whether the risks which are either assumed by the plaintiff or which are risks as to which defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff must be risks whih are either obvious risks or risks which were known to the plaintiff (as contended by plaintiff), or whether such *305risks include any risk “inherent” in the sport (as contended by defendant and as held by the trial court in giving its instruction in this case).
Consistent with that contention at the time of trial, plaintiffs primary contention on appeal to the Court of Appeals was that the instruction was in error “because it failed to limit assumed risks to inherent risks which are necessary to the sport as properly conducted and which are known or obvious,” citing Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, 280 Or 647, 651, 572 P2d 620 (1977), among other cases and authorities. The primary basis for the decision by the Court of Appeals was also that “the participant assumes only those risks which are necessary to the sport and are known to him.” (48 Or App at 113). Similarly, the primary basis for defendant’s petition for review was that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a ski area operator owes the skier a duty to protect him from risks that are not only inherent in the sport, but obvious to the skier unless he actually knew of the particular risk.
Thus, whether stated in terms of risks assumed by a skier or risks as to which a ski area operator has no duty to the skier, the question raised by plaintiffs exception at the time of trial, by plaintiffs appeal to the Court of Appeals, by the decision of that court and by defendant’s petition for review, was the question whether such risks must be obvious risks or risks known to the skier (as contended by plaintiff), or whether such risks include all risks which are inherent in the sport (as contended by defendant).
This was the question which both parties asked this court to decide and was the question which provided the primary reason why this court allowed defendant’s petition for review because of its public importance. The opinion by the majority, however, refuses to address and decide this question upon the ground that plaintiffs exception was insufficient to an instruction which the majority holds to have been erroneous.
For reasons previously stated, I believe that plaintiffs exception was sufficient to raise this question, and I must respectfully dissent from the refusal by the majority to decide this question.