Court Opinion

ID: 9397238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 19:05:40.226499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.504799
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                   2023 IL App (4th) 220791-U                    FILED
This Order was filed under                                                        May 23, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                NO. 4-22-0791                         Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                   4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).                IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL

                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
             v.                                                )      Woodford County
  GARRETT J. GRUBBS,                                           )      No. 19TR1005
             Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Michael L. Stroh,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                  JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

 ¶1       Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction for driving while his license
                was revoked where the record established that defendant’s waiver of counsel was
                unequivocal, knowing, and voluntary.

 ¶2               Following a jury trial, defendant, Garrett J. Grubbs, was found guilty of driving

 while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2020)). The trial court sentenced

 defendant to 100 days in jail and a $100 fine. Defendant appeals, arguing that his waiver of counsel

 was not unequivocal, knowing, and voluntary. We affirm.

 ¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

 ¶4               On June 2, 2019, defendant received a traffic citation for driving while his license

 was revoked. Prior to trial, defendant made several pro se filings, including a written plea of not

 guilty, a jury waiver, and a notice of appearance stating that defendant “appear[ed] before court

 *** in search of wrong doing [sic].”
¶5             On the day of trial, November 12, 2019, defendant appeared in court without an

attorney. Defendant acknowledged that he executed and understood the documents he filed. The

trial court informed defendant that he was charged with driving while his license was revoked on

June 2, 2019, on Route 117 near Timberline Drive. The court asked if defendant understood, and

defendant responded, “I comprehend the words that you said, but I did not understand.” The court

asked what defendant did not understand, and defendant responded, “I don’t stand under your

jurisdiction, but I do comprehend.” The court again asked defendant whether he understood the

charge, and defendant responded, “No, I do not understand the charges, but I do comprehend

though.” After the court informed defendant that the offense was a Class A misdemeanor

punishable by up to a year in jail and a $2500 fine, the court asked if defendant understood.

Defendant responded, “Once again, I do not understand, but I do comprehend.”

¶6             The trial court then explained defendant’s right to a jury trial and asked if defendant

understood. Defendant replied that he did not understand but that he did comprehend. The court

noted that “ ‘comprehend’ and ‘understand’ mean the same thing.” Defendant responded, “[T]hey

do not.” The court asked defendant if he was giving up his right to a jury trial. Defendant responded

that, since there was no “verified complaint on the record and there is no controversy in the court,”

he did “not comprehend why [he] was moving forward.” Defendant also requested a probable

cause hearing. The court explained that, because defendant was charged with a misdemeanor

offense, a uniform traffic citation was the appropriate way to bring the charge, and defendant was

not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Defendant responded, “My belief [is that] it’s required to

have a probable cause hearing before we move forward with a trial.” The court asked defendant to

cite the law supporting his belief, but defendant responded, “I don’t have the law on me right now.”

The court then informed defendant that there was no such law, and defendant responded that he

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did not “consent to any of these proceedings.” The court stated, “Fine. We will have a jury trial

today.” Defendant persisted that he “must have a verified complaint for this to continue” and that

he had “the right to know who [his] accuser is” before trial. The court explained that the State

presented a witness list indicating that Officer Mitchell Stein of the Deer Creek Police Department

would be called to testify. The court offered to allow defendant to speak with Stein. Defendant

responded, “I don’t believe I need to talk to him before the trial since he is not the accuser, and

there is no accuser upon the record.” The court once again explained defendant’s right to a jury

trial and how the trial would proceed, then asked if defendant understood. Defendant responded,

“I comprehend, but I do not understand.”

¶7             The trial court informed defendant that he had the right to the assistance of counsel

and the correlated right to proceed without an attorney under the sixth amendment to the United

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI). Defendant responded, “I do not believe that that’s

what it says,” explaining, “I believe it says I have the right to counsel, but I do not believe this has

anything to do with an attorney.” The court noted that, before it could accept defendant’s waiver

of his right to an attorney, it needed to explain “a few things.” Defendant stated that the documents

he previously filed “actually state that I am here present today at court and I do not need

representation.” The court responded that it nevertheless needed “to get it on the record.” The court

explained that presenting a defense was not a simple matter of telling a story but required

adherence to rules governing the conduct of a trial. Defendant responded, “I comprehend, but I do

not understand.” The court asked defendant if he understood that a lawyer has training in trial

procedure and that by proceeding by himself, defendant would not take advantage of the

experience of a trial attorney. Defendant responded, “I do not comprehend or understand that,”

explaining that he did not understand why he “need[ed] an attorney to represent” him. The court

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clarified that defendant did not need an attorney but that he had a right to one. Defendant

responded, “Okay. I do comprehend I have a right for that, but I do not need an attorney. I’m here

present today in court.” The court informed defendant that an attorney would be appointed to

represent him if he could not afford one. Defendant responded, “I do not wish to have or—for

someone to represent me because I’m here present today.”

¶8             Defendant explained that he is “not familiar with the legal procedure of the United

States, but I am familiar with the procedure.” Defendant noted that he graduated from high school

and attended one year of college. The trial court asked if defendant understood that, by representing

himself, defendant “may allow the prosecutor to take advantage by failing to make objections to

inadmissible evidence.” Defendant responded, “I comprehend, but I do not understand.” The court

then asked if defendant understood that, by representing himself, he “may make mistakes in

questioning jurors.” Defendant responded, “Well, once again, I don’t need representation. I’m here

present today in court.” Defendant stated that he did “comprehend” that he might make tactical

decisions that produced unintended consequences. When the court asked if defendant understood

that he could not complain on appeal about the competency of his representation if he proceeded

without an attorney, defendant answered, “Once again, there is nobody representing me.”

Defendant stated that he did “comprehend” that the court would hold him to the same standard as

the State. The court asked defendant if he understood that he would not be allowed to be

represented by an attorney if he decided he wanted one once the trial started. Defendant responded,

“Once again, I do not need to be represented. I am here before the Court looking for an accuser.”

¶9             After again informing defendant of the charge and potential sentence, the trial court

asked defendant if he wanted to represent himself without an attorney. Defendant responded,

“Once again, I think that I have made it clear that there is no need for an attorney or for anybody

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to represent me. I’m here present today in court.” The court accepted defendant’s waiver of his

right to an attorney, finding it to be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Defendant then

stated that he was “not here today representing myself” but that he was “in court searching for my

accuser.” Defendant then asserted that the trial should not proceed “until there is a verified

complaint on the record.” The court told defendant to return later in the day for trial and recessed.

¶ 10           When the proceedings continued, the State informed the trial court that defendant

made “some more filings” during the recess, noting that “[i]t appears to be all stuff we have already

dealt with.” Defendant agreed that he “sent these” filings and agreed that they were the same

documents he previously filed. The court received the filings, and defendant stated that he was

“not ready to proceed until I get verified [sic] complaint on the record.” Defendant further

complained that “probable cause has not been established.” The court noted that it had “already

ruled on that” and proceeded with the trial.

¶ 11           Throughout voir dire, defendant refused to participate, noting that he did not

consent to the proceedings because there was no verified complaint or individual accusing him of

wrongdoing. Prior to the State’s opening statement, defendant noted that he wanted to state “for

the record once again that I am not representing myself. If you can explain how to represent myself,

then maybe I could understand.” The trial court then allowed the State to present its opening

statement. Defendant gave no opening statement but noted that he wanted to see a verified

complaint and “the person accusing me” of wrongdoing.

¶ 12           The State then introduced a copy of defendant’s driving abstract, showing that

defendant’s license was revoked in June 2019. Thereafter, the State called Officer Stein. Stein

testified that he was an officer for the Deer Creek Police Department. Stein was on patrol on June

2, 2019. At 8:23 p.m., Stein observed defendant driving a vehicle on Route 117, a public highway.

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Stein knew that defendant “was suspended and revoked,” so he stopped defendant’s vehicle. Stein

testified that when he “ran” defendant, he learned that defendant’s license was still revoked. The

State introduced a video from Stein’s squad car showing the traffic stop of defendant.

¶ 13           The trial court gave defendant an opportunity to question Stein, but defendant

refused to do so, asserting that he did not consent to the proceedings because there was no verified

complaint and no “probable cause upon the record.” For the same reasons, defendant also refused

to present any evidence.

¶ 14           During the jury instructions conference, defendant noted that he “comprehend[ed]”

the instructions but did not “understand” them. The trial court commented that “defendant likes to

play word games with the terms ‘understand’ and ‘comprehend’ ” and noted that defendant has

“been extremely difficult.” The court explained that defendant nevertheless “has stated he

comprehends these words.” Each time the court asked defendant if he had any objection to the

instructions tendered by the State, defendant refused to participate. Defendant also refused to

present a closing argument.

¶ 15           The jury found defendant guilty of driving while his license was revoked. At

sentencing, defendant maintained that he did not consent to the proceedings. The trial court

sentenced defendant to 100 days in jail and a $100 fine. This appeal follows.

¶ 16                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17           Defendant argues that his waiver of his right to counsel was invalid because he did

not unequivocally, knowingly, and voluntarily waive that right. Accordingly, defendant asserts

that his conviction and sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded for a new trial.

¶ 18           Defendant acknowledges that this issue is not preserved for review, but he asks this

court to review it for plain error. See People v. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190679, ¶ 81 (“[A]n

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objection and a written posttrial motion raising an issue are necessary to preserve an error for

appellate review.”). We may consider an unpreserved claim if (1) a clear or obvious error occurred

and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice

against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error

occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence at

defendant’s trial. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190679, ¶ 66. As the right to counsel is fundamental, a

claim that there was no effective waiver of counsel may be reviewed under the second prong of

the plain-error doctrine. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190679, ¶ 66. The first step is to determine

whether there was a clear or obvious error. Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190679, ¶ 66.

¶ 19           A criminal defendant has the right to represent himself in criminal proceedings

pursuant to both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. People v. Burns, 2012 IL App (4th)

110670, ¶ 11; see also U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 8. “The right of

self-representation is as basic and fundamental as [the] right to be represented by counsel.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burns, 2012 IL App (4th) 110670, ¶ 11. To represent himself,

however, the defendant’s waiver of counsel must be clear and unequivocal. Burns, 2012 IL App

(4th) 110670, ¶ 11. This requirement prevents the defendant from (1) appealing the denial of his

right to self-representation or the denial of his right to counsel and (2) manipulating or abusing the

system by going back and forth between his request for counsel and his wish to proceed pro se.

Burns, 2012 IL App (4th) 110670, ¶ 11.

¶ 20           A defendant’s waiver of counsel is governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)

(eff. July 1, 1984). People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 210662, ¶ 75. The purpose of Rule 401(a)

is to ensure that a waiver of counsel by the defendant is knowingly and intelligently made. Johnson,

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2023 IL App (4th) 210662, ¶ 76. Rule 401(a) requires the trial court to determine that the defendant

understands (1) the nature of the charge, (2) the minimum and maximum sentence, including any

penalty to which the defendant may be subject due to prior convictions or consecutive sentences,

and (3) that he or she has a right to counsel and to have counsel appointed if indigent. Ill. S. Ct. R.

401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). Strict, technical compliance with Rule 401(a) is not required. Johnson,

2023 IL App (4th) 210662, ¶ 76. Instead, “each case regarding whether there has been a knowing

and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is sui generis, requiring an evaluation of the record

as a whole, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” Johnson, 2023

IL App (4th) 210662, ¶ 76. This court will not reverse the trial court’s determination as to whether

a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel unless the trial court has

abused its discretion. People v. Woodson, 2011 IL App (4th) 100223, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion

occurs when the court’s ruling is arbitrary and without a logical basis. People v. Washington, 2016

IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 50.

¶ 21           Defendant makes no claim that the trial court failed to admonish him pursuant to

Rule 401(a). Nor does defendant raise any issue with respect to his fitness. Instead, defendant

argues that he did not unequivocally, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel,

because he was confused about the charge and sentence he faced and did not understand his right

to counsel. Defendant highlights that he stated that he “comprehended” but did not “understand”

the court’s admonishments regarding the charge he faced, his right to a jury trial, and his right to

counsel. Defendant further notes that he gave contradictory statements regarding whether he was

representing himself, as he stated both that there was “no need for an attorney or for anybody to

represent” him and that he was “not representing myself.” Finally, defendant contends that his lack

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of participation at trial supports his claim that his waiver of counsel was not unequivocal or

knowing. These arguments are unavailing.

¶ 22           We find Washington instructive. In Washington, the defendant was charged with

first degree murder for shooting and killing the victim. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198,

¶¶ 5, 12. During pretrial, the defendant asked to proceed pro se. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st)

131198, ¶ 12. The trial court informed the defendant that he was charged with first degree murder

and faced a sentence of 20 years to life imprisonment. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198,

¶ 12. The court also told the defendant he had a right to counsel and an attorney would be appointed

if he could not afford one. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 12. The defendant told the

court that he “ ‘would like to’ ” represent himself. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 12.

In the following months, the defendant appeared pro se and filed multiple motions, including one

requesting “ ‘assistance to assist in my pro se defense,’ ” which was denied. Washington, 2016 IL

App (1st) 131198, ¶ 15. The defendant also told the court that he was “ ‘receiving a lot of bias’ ”

and was “ ‘not getting any assistance.’ ” Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 15. The trial

court nevertheless informed the defendant that the case would proceed to trial. Washington, 2016

IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 15. At the next court appearance, the defendant told the court that he wanted

to represent himself but also filed another motion seeking assistance, which the court denied.

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 16. Several months later, the defendant filed a pro se

motion for substitution of judge for cause, arguing that he was not “ ‘qualified to fight’ ” and that

he needed “ ‘someone to help me present’ ” evidence. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198,

¶ 17. That motion was denied. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 17.

¶ 23           Immediately before trial, the defendant informed the trial court that he would not

participate. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 20. Accordingly, during voir dire, the

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defendant told the jurors that he was not participating in the trial and objected to “ ‘everything

pertaining to this trial.’ ” Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 21. During the defendant’s

opening statement, the defendant again noted that he was not participating. Washington, 2016 IL

App (1st) 131198, ¶ 22. During the State’s case-in-chief, the defendant made no objections to any

testimony and refused to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, noting that he was “ ‘not

participating in these proceedings.’ ” Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶¶ 23-24. The jury

found defendant guilty of murder. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 32.

¶ 24           On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that his waiver of counsel was invalid.

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 51. The appellate court rejected this argument.

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶¶ 53-54, 56. The court concluded that the trial court

substantially complied with Rule 401(a) by informing the defendant that he (1) was charged with

first degree murder, (2) faced a sentence of anywhere from 20 years to life imprisonment, and

(3) had a right to counsel and that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one.

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 53. The court then concluded that the defendant’s waiver

of counsel was valid. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 56. The court noted that after the

trial court accepted defendant’s request to proceed pro se, defendant filed several pro se motions.

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 56. The defendant then announced that he would not

participate in the trial and “proceeded to do just that.” Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198,

¶ 56. The appellate court noted that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the defendant

and “fully assess his ability to understand the proceedings”; the record also indicated that the

defendant was “literate, educated, responsive, oriented, and comprehended what was going on.”

Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 56. The appellate court explained that, from the record,

it was evident that the defendant knew what he was doing when he waived his right to counsel and

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chose to represent himself. Accordingly, the court held that defendant’s waiver of counsel was

unequivocal, knowing, and voluntary. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 56.

¶ 25             Here, prior to trial, defendant, who graduated high school and attended one year of

college, filed several documents, including a notice of appearance stating that he “appear[ed]

before court.” In accordance with that notice, defendant, on the day of trial, appeared without an

attorney. The trial court informed defendant that he was charged with driving while his driver’s

license was revoked and that he faced punishment of up to one year in jail and a $2500 fine. The

court also informed defendant of his right to a jury trial, his right to the assistance of counsel, and

the correlative right to proceed without counsel. While defendant repeatedly said that he

“comprehend[ed]” but did not “understand” many of the court’s admonishments, the court advised

defendant that these words “mean the same thing.” The court perceived defendant was being

“difficult” by engaging in “word games.” To the extent defendant argues that “comprehend[ing]”

without “understand[ing]” the court’s admonishments was evidence that his waiver of counsel was

not valid, we reject that argument. “Understand” is defined as “to grasp the meaning of.”

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/understand

(last visited May 2, 2023). Similarly, “comprehend” is defined as “to grasp the nature, significance,

or     meaning      of.”    Merriam-Webster        Online      Dictionary,     https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/comprehend (last visited May 2, 2023). The court was in the best position

to determine whether defendant was obstructing the proceedings by attempting to differentiate

words of the same meaning. Where the court had the opportunity to observe the defendant and

“fully assess his ability to understand the proceedings,” we will not disturb the trial court’s

determination that defendant was merely being “difficult.” Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198,

¶ 56. Further, when there was any question as to whether defendant understood his rights, i.e.,

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when defendant stated that he neither understood nor comprehended an admonishment, the court

took care to provide additional explanation until defendant agreed that he did “comprehend.”

¶ 26           The trial court also thoroughly explained the risks associated with proceeding

without an attorney, including that defendant would need to adhere to rules governing the conduct

of a trial, the prosecutor might take advantage of defendant’s failure to object to inadmissible

evidence, defendant might make a mistake in questioning jurors, and the court would hold

defendant to the same standard as the prosecutor. Defendant informed the court that he did

“comprehend I have a right” to counsel but that there was “no need for an attorney or for anybody

to represent me.” The court accepted defendant’s waiver of counsel, finding that it was knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently made. We cannot say that the court’s determination was an abuse of

discretion. Like Washington, the record established that defendant was literate, had some college

education, was responsive and oriented, and “comprehended what was going on.” Washington,

2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶ 56. Although defendant did little to represent himself at trial, the

record shows that this stemmed not from a lack of understanding of the charge or his right to

counsel but from defendant’s unwillingness to participate based upon his incorrect belief, despite

the court’s attempts to convince him otherwise, that a “verified complaint” and probable cause

hearing were required. The fact that defendant pursued a poor defense does not mean that he failed

to understand his right to counsel or the charge against him. See Khan, 2021 IL App (1st) 190679,

¶¶ 69-70 (holding the pro se defendant’s repeated attempts to dismiss charges against him during

trial was not evidence that he failed to understand charges; the defendant simply pursued a “poor

defense,” believing that charges had previously been dismissed, “and would not accept any

explanation otherwise”). “A defendant ‘need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer

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in order [to] competently and intelligently *** choose self-representation.’ ” People v. Hood, 2022

IL App (4th) 200260, ¶ 77 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).

¶ 27           Defendant’s argument that his seemingly contradictory statements about whether

he was representing himself established that he did not understand his right to counsel is similarly

unpersuasive. Defendant explicitly told the trial court that he comprehended that he had a right to

counsel. Despite the court’s extensive admonishments about the risks of proceeding without an

attorney, defendant repeatedly assured the court that he did “not need an attorney,” that there was

“nobody representing me,” and that he did “not need to be represented.” In accordance with that

sentiment, defendant made additional pro se filings immediately prior to trial and then refused to

participate once trial started. At no point did defendant explicitly or even implicitly request an

attorney. We conclude that defendant understood his right to counsel and the effect of waiving that

right. See Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198, ¶¶ 12, 15, 17, 56 (record on the whole

established that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid despite the defendant’s contradictory

statements that he “ ‘would like to’ ” represent himself but that he wanted “ ‘someone to help

me’ ”).

¶ 28           Our review of the record establishes that defendant, a literate, oriented, and

responsive high school graduate with some college education, understood his right to counsel and

grasped what was occurring by waiving that right. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court

abused its discretion in finding defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel to be valid. Therefore,

because we find no clear or obvious error, there can be no plain error.

¶ 29                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30           For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 31           Affirmed.

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