Court Opinion

ID: 9955880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:02:23.491252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:35.266024
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 Honegger v. Willhite CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 GREGORY W. HONEGGER, as Trustee, etc.,
                                                                                             F084599
           Petitioner and Respondent,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. BPB-21-002138)
                    v.

 CARIE R. CLINE WILLHITE et al.,                                                          OPINION
           Objectors and Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew
Kendall, Judge.
         Worthington Law, Brian P. Worthington; Hernandez & Associates, Manuel C.
Hernandez; and Law Offices of Steven Gibbs and Steven G. Gibbs for Objectors and
Appellants.
         Darling & Wilson and Joshua G. Wilson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Appellants, Carie R. Cline Willhite and Daymon A. Cline, appeal after the probate
court granted summary judgment to respondent Gregory W. Honegger, the successor
trustee of the Cline Family Trust, on a petition Honegger filed for construction of the trust
and related instructions. Appellants initially objected based on a narrow legal principle,
but eventually moved to amend the objection to challenge certain modifications to the
trust. The probate court denied the motion to amend and a request to delay the summary
judgment proceedings and ultimately granted summary judgment to Honegger, resulting
in appellants taking nothing from the trust. Appellants contend the probate court erred.
For the following reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Hal P. Cline (Hal) and Claudette Cline (Claudette)1 were a married couple who, in
2007, entered into a trust agreement regarding their marital assets. Appellants are the
only children of the marriage. The trust agreement spans nearly 70 pages. We therefore
only highlight provisions relevant to disputes between the parties in this opinion.
       Terms of the Cline Family Trust
       The Cline Family Trust was set up to be revocable during the period both Hal and
Claudette were alive. The full trust was designated as the Settlors’ Trust (Trust
Agreement). Upon the death of either spouse, the Trust Agreement would be divided into
multiple subtrusts, including a Survivor’s Trust, a Marital Trust, and a Credit Trust.
Under article 2.7 of the Trust Agreement, “Upon the death of either Settlor, this Trust
Agreement and all trusts created hereunder shall become irrevocable and unamendable,
except that the Surviving Spouse shall retain, during his or her lifetime, the rights of

1      We refer to some individuals by their first name for clarity, as several parties share the
same last name.

                                                 2.
revocation and amendment with respect to the whole of the Survivor’s Trust and all the
provisions of the Trust Agreement relating to the Survivor’s Trust.”
       The Survivor’s Trust was designed to provide the surviving spouse with income
reasonably necessary for their maintenance and support. It was funded with both
spouses’ interest in specific personal property and “that amount of the remainder of the
Balance as shall equal the Surviving Settlor’s interest therein.”
       The surviving spouse retained the right to terminate the Survivor’s Trust and to
gift portions of the trust to others. In addition, under article 4.3, subdivision (c) of the
Trust Agreement, the surviving spouse was “given a Testamentary General Power of
Appointment over the Survivor’s Trust” allowing them to “distribute all or any portion of
the principal and undistributed income of the Survivor’s Trust as the Surviving Spouse
shall appoint” upon death. Article 8.2 of the Trust Agreement defined this general power
as one that “may be exercised in favor [of] any person or Charitable organization, without
limitation.”
       Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the Trust Agreement stated the Survivor’s
Trust would convert to the Administrative Survivor’s Trust and required that the trustee
“(i) pay all taxes and expenses relating to the Administrative Survivor’s Trust,
(ii) distribute the portion of the Administrative Survivor’s Trust that the Surviving Spouse
has effectively appointed pursuant to paragraph (c) …, and (iii) distribute the balance of
the Administrative Survivor’s Trust … as provided” in additional instructions.
       The Marital Trust was to be funded with “assets equal in value to the minimum
dollar amount which if subtracted as a marital deduction from the value of the Deceased
Spouse’s gross estate … would result in the lowest federal estate tax payable after” taking
into account certain enumerated factors, with the remaining assets going to the Credit
Trust, which was functionally treated in the same manner as the Marital Trust. The net

                                               3.
income from the Marital and Credit Trusts was to be paid in at least quarterly installments
to the surviving spouse.
       The surviving spouse was permitted to draw principal from the Marital Trust as
necessary. In addition, under article 4.4, subdivision (b) of the Trust Agreement, the
surviving spouse was granted a Testamentary Limited Power of Appointment that was
executed in the same way as the Testamentary General Power of Appointment. Unlike
the Testamentary General Power of Appointment, however, the Testamentary Limited
Power of Appointment could “be exercised only in favor of the holder’s spouse, issue or a
Charitable Organization.”
       Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the Trust Agreement stated the Marital
Trust would convert to an administrative form and required that the trustee “(i) pay all
taxes and expenses relating to the Administrative Marital Trust(s), (ii) distribute the
portion of the Administrative Marital Trust(s) that the Surviving Spouse has effectively
appointed pursuant to paragraph (b) …, and (iii) distribute the balance of the
Administrative Marital Trust(s) … as provided” in additional instructions. A similar
structure covered the Credit Trust.
       Additional instructions provided that the remaining balances identified in step (iii)
would be divided “by right of representation, into separate trust shares, one trust share for
each of Settlors’ children then living.” The Trust Agreement then provided additional
distribution instructions should the children and/or any grandchildren fail to survive the
settlors.
       Claudette’s Death, Hal’s Exercise of Appointments, and Hal’s Death
       In 2014, Claudette died. This triggered the creation of the subtrusts. On
September 8, 2020, Hal died. On October 16, 2020, Honegger’s counsel mailed a notice
pursuant to Probate Code section 16061.7 to appellants. The notice included a copy of
the Trust Agreement and two instruments showing Hal had exercised his Testamentary

                                             4.
General and Limited Powers of Appointment prior to his death. The first exercise of
these powers was dated July 11, 2020. The document, containing handwritten notes,
purported to transfer one-half of the entire trust (meaning the collection of all subtrusts)
to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and the other one-half to Sandra Crosby,
identified as Hal’s niece. The handwritten additions were dated and initialed, and the
document was signed and dated by Hal and witnessed by Honegger’s counsel and one
Vincent Oddo. The second exercise was dated July 20, 2020, and included the same
instructions but without any handwritten additions—essentially a restatement of the first
exercise. The second exercise was signed and dated by Hal and notarized.
       Honegger’s Petition
       On February 17, 2021, Honegger filed a petition to determine construction of a
trust and for instructions to the trustee pursuant to Probate Code section 17200,
subdivision (b)(1) and (4) (the petition). The petition provided a brief background and
history related to the Trust Agreement before outlining the events leading to the petition.
According to the petition, Hal executed an exercise of power of appointment on July 11,
2020. It further alleged the Trust allowed such an appointment based on the General and
Limited Powers of Appointment. Hal allegedly “did not want his children to receive
anything” and attempted to leave his estate to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. Hal
then modified the attempt to leave half to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and half
to Sandra Crosby but did not specify from which trusts these payments would be made.
       In a declaration submitted with the petition, counsel who prepared documents
relating to this action stated, “There was no opportunity to prepare a document that would
specifically identify that the one-half of the estate” going to St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital would come from the Marital and Credit Trusts and that “the other one-half of
the trust estate” would come from the Survivor’s Trust. Similarly, the declaration stated
that “the handwritten change to the Exercise of Power of Appointment” should be

                                              5.
interpreted in that manner and that the relevant shares “will be equal since Hal failed to
divide the assets of the Trust into the required subtrusts … following Claudette’s death.”
Honegger thus requested that the “assets of the Survivor’s Trust, comprising one-half of
the combined Trust assets, be distributed to Sandra Crosby,” the “assets of the Marital
Trust, if any, and the Credit Trust, comprising one-half of the combined Trust assets, be
distributed to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital,” and that the court instruct
Honegger to so act. Honegger attached a copy of the Trust Agreement, the purported
exercise of the appointment, and other relevant documents to the petition.
       Appellants’ Objection and Additional Procedural History
       Appellants objected to the petition on April 27, 2021. Their objection asserted the
distribution plan constituted a decanting under Probate Code section 19507 et seq. and
that Honegger had failed to comply with aspects of that statutory scheme. Appellants
then requested a continuance of the hearing on the petition to permit proper service under
the statutory scheme and requested that an amended petition be filed that complied with
the statutory requirements. In addition, appellants requested an accounting that showed
the amounts properly contained in each subtrust and requested that the court require
Honegger to brief whether the court can “add language” concluding Hal properly sought
to disinherit his children “based upon the written power of appointment.” Finally,
appellants sought information on whether Honegger’s counsel should be disqualified and
requested the court “provide instructions … regarding whether a proposed exercise of the
decanting power is permitted … and is consistent with the fiduciary duties of the
authorized fiduciary.”
       In June 2021, Honegger replied to the objection. In that reply, Honegger argued
the objection did not challenge any material allegation in the petition because there was
no exercise of the decanting power being alleged. Honegger further argued appellants
could not assert affirmative relief in their objection, were not entitled to an accounting

                                              6.
because they were not beneficiaries, could not force Honegger to account for Hal’s
conduct as trustee, should be required to file their own petition to seek any relief, and
lacked standing to challenge counsel’s role in the case.
       Subsequently, in December 2021, Honegger moved for summary judgment.
Honegger attached the two documents showing the purported execution of Hal’s powers
of appointment and a declaration from counsel explaining how the changes and signing
took place, but not the underlying Trust Agreement. Rather, Honegger argued that
appellants’ objection did not challenge the underlying facts asserted in the petition and,
thus, those facts could be relied upon by the probate court to summarily resolve the case.
The probate court was thus requested to take judicial notice of the petition and objection.
       Appellants opposed the motion for summary judgment on February 10, 2022.
However, the basis for the opposition was a claim that “a continuance is necessary to
allow [appellants] to obtain additional essential evidence.” Appellants alleged that
certain discovery had not been completed which was needed to oppose the summary
judgment motion and requested a continuance pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c. In arguing for a continuance, appellants noted that several changes were
made to the trust when Hal was nearing the end of his life and when Sandra Crosby was
his caregiver: that Hal had not properly separated Claudette’s portion of the trust and that
Sandra Crosby had become the beneficiary of the trust in that time. Appellants alleged
this showed a potential lack of capacity. Appellants also claimed discovery was
necessary to determine what part of the trust assets had been Claudette’s, as it was
unclear whether Hal “even had the ability to completely take away her intended
beneficiaries to give all of her assets to a charity.”
       Around the same time, appellants filed an ex parte motion to compel discovery.
This motion noted that discovery had first been requested around December 2021 and a
meet and confer regarding perceived inadequacies in the responses was sent on

                                               7.
January 27, 2022. Appellants alleged the discovery at issue was relevant in part due to
the fact the petition sought to validate changes to the trust, and in part because of
potential issues of undue influence regarding Hal’s exercise of his powers of
appointment. Honegger opposed, arguing the discovery requested was not relevant to
any issue that had been raised in the case. Honegger alleged this was so because
appellants had not challenged any material facts in the petition and had been so informed
early in the case.
       The probate court held a hearing on the ex parte portion of the discovery motion.
At that hearing, the court ordered a brief continuance of the summary judgment hearing
and set the hearing on the discovery motion for the same day. The court additionally
ordered appellants to refile their motion to continue summary judgment and file any
motion to continue the trial in time to hear that motion with the discovery and summary
judgment motions. Any request by appellants to amend their opposition to the petition or
file any other actions was to be completed in time to have those heard at the same time.
       In response to this order, appellants refiled their motion to continue summary
judgment and sought to file an amended objection to the petition. In this amended
objection, appellants alleged facts “controverting [Honegger’s] factual allegations or
assumptions,” including claims Hal did not properly exercise his powers of appointment
in part because he was subjected to undue influence and in part because he was under
hospital care at that time. Appellants included several allegations of fact supporting their
claims of undue influence and improper behavior by Sandra Crosby prior to Hal’s death.
       The Hearing and the Probate Court’s Order
       On March 30, 2022, the probate court heard all of the matters discussed above.
Appellants argued their discovery motions first, alleging they needed discovery to
properly respond to the summary judgment motion. Appellants contended the discovery
was relevant to their desire to have the court consider Hal’s capacity, meaning, “whether

                                              8.
or not there was undue influence.” Appellants further argued the capacity issue was
critical to “whether or not the petition should be granted as proffered to the Court at this
point.”
          Appellants then turned to their requests to continue the summary judgment motion
and hearing on the petition, repeating that discovery was necessary to resolve the petition.
Finally, appellants argued the court should grant their request to amend their objection to
the petition. Appellants claimed they had originally thought the only way the contested
changes could be made were through the statutory decanting process, but it had since
become clear that other issues—including the failure to properly separate the trust assets
and the scope of the alleged undue influence and lack of capacity—had redefined the
nature of their objection.
          Honegger argued the requests were too little, too late, and too far afield of the
original objection to be permitted. Honegger argued appellants had known of the
assertion they had failed to place any facts in the petition at issue through their original
objection since Honegger’s reply and that the discovery responses further identified that
failure. Additionally, Honegger claimed appellants had failed to satisfy the procedural
requirements for amending their objection, the time for them to file a new objection had
passed, and without such an amendment, the court could proceed to summarily resolve
the petition based on the lack of relevant factual disputes. To Honegger, all motions
turned on whether the court granted appellants’ motion to amend their objection to the
petition. If it did not, the discovery was irrelevant, and the court could and should grant
summary judgment.
          The probate court agreed with Honegger’s argument that all of the motions turned
on whether to grant the amendment. On that first issue, the court found no showing the
amendment was proper. The court noted that appellants had failed to provide any
meaningful argument in their motion—they cited only to the relevant rule and included

                                                9.
no facts or declarations indicating “when the facts giving rise to the amended objections
were discovered and why the amendment was not made sooner.” The court further found
prejudice to Honegger in allowing such an amendment “at this stage on the eve of trial.”
From that point, the court denied the motions to amend the objection and continue the
summary judgment motion hearing and denied the discovery motion on the ground no
pleading placed relevant facts at issue and, thus, the discovery was irrelevant. Finally, the
court granted the summary judgment motion, stating there were no triable issues of
material fact and that Hal “validly exercised his general power of appointment over the
survivor’s trust … and exercised his special power of appointment over the credit trust
and the marital trust.” The court concluded that appellants “have admitted the material
allegations in the petition by failing to controvert any of the allegations in their
objection.”
       On May 11, 2022, the court entered judgment. The court made three findings:
       “1.    That … Honegger is the Successor Trustee of the Cline Family Trust [the
Trust Agreement], dated March 13, 2007 (the ‘Trust’);
       “2.    That … Hal … validly and effectively executed a power of appointment on
July 11, 2020 over his Survivor’s Trust share, comprising one-half (1/2) of the combined
Trust asset, directing distribution to Sandra Crosby.
       “3.    That … Hal … validly and effectively executed a power of appointment on
July 11, 2020 over the assets of the Marital Trust, if any, and the Credit Trust, comprising
one-half (1/2) of the combined Trust assets, directing distribution to St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital.”
       Based on these findings, the court granted the petition and ordered one-half of the
Trust Agreement assets be distributed to Sandra Crosby and the other one-half to St. Jude
Children’s Research Hospital.
       This appeal timely followed.

                                              10.
                                      DISCUSSION
       On appeal, appellants focus on two primary assertions of error. First, appellants
contend the probate court improperly granted summary judgment because Honegger
failed to meet his initial burden of production. This argument focuses upon whether
Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20 applies to objections in probate proceedings and
whether the petition’s facts were properly deemed admitted. Appellants also contend the
Trust Agreement could not be construed to permit Hal’s power of appointment if both
children were living.
       Second, appellants contend the probate court abused its discretion in denying a
continuance to conduct further discovery under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (h). This argument focuses upon whether granting such a request is
“virtually mandated” and whether the court had a duty to consider undue influence
regardless of issues raised in the objection. The argument concludes with an assertion
that if amending the objection was required, the court abused its discretion in denying the
request because there was no prejudice to Honegger.
       The general complexity of the motions and disputes raised with the probate court
along with the many underdeveloped positions presented both to the probate court and on
appeal regarding the nature of the court’s authority and the scope of the proceedings
makes the framing of this case on appeal both awkward and poorly structured. We
therefore focus our opinion in a more streamlined manner and less in direct response to
appellants’ formulation of the disputes.
Summary Judgment Principles and Standard of Review
       A trial court properly grants summary judgment when there are no triable issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment bears the initial
burden to show there is no defense to the action—that is, the “party has proved each

                                            11.
element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment.” (Id., subds. (a), (p)(1).)
Once the plaintiff clears this initial hurdle, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. (Id., subd. (p)(1).)
       “We review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo,
liberally construing the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and resolving
all doubts about the evidence in favor of the opponent. [Citation.] We independently
examine the record to determine whether there are triable issues of material fact and
whether the moving party is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law.” (Doe
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 732.)
Appellants Properly Challenged Factual Aspects of the Petition
       The crux of Honegger’s motion for summary judgment in this case was a claim
that appellants’ objection did not contest any material facts alleged in the petition.
According to Honegger, this failure triggered the application of Code of Civil Procedure
section 431.20, which deems all material allegations not controverted in an answer shall
be taken as true (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.20, subd. (a)).
       Honegger’s argument concedes that in order for Code of Civil Procedure
section 431.20 to apply—if it can at all2—the allegations in the petition must be
uncontested. Appellants heavily attack the application of Code of Civil Procedure

2       The parties have cited, and this court has found, no case since the Probate Code was
reenacted that applied Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20 to a probate proceeding—let alone
in a manner granting the petition against an objector without resolving the objection. We note
that application of the precursor to Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20 in probate matters did
occasionally occur prior to reenactment. (See Guardianship of Guidry (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d
426, 430.) Although we have doubts about its continued applicability, we do not need to reach
that issue and thus take no position on whether a petition can be resolved prior to the statutorily
scheduled hearing based on a summary judgment motion alleging a filed objection did not
challenge any triable issues of material fact supporting the petition. (See Prob. Code, §§ 1041
[requiring hearing be set when petition filed]; 1043 [allowing interested party to make oral
objection at time of hearing]; 1046 [requiring the court hear and determine any matter at issue
and any objection presented].)

                                               12.
section 431.20 but only tangentially imply that they challenged any particular aspect of
the petition filed. We focus on whether material facts in the petition were challenged,
however, because the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20 turns on
this point, the dispute was raised before the probate court, and on appeal, appellants have
properly alleged Code of Civil Procedure section 431.20 does not apply. We thus begin
with this initial question: Did appellants challenge any material aspect of the petition?
We conclude they did.
       Overview of the Probate Code and Related Law
       To place the petition and response in context, particularly in light of the motion for
summary judgment in this case, it is first important to outline the statutory hearing
procedures. Probate Code sections 1020 and 1021 require that petitions, objections,
responses, reports, and accounts are to be signed, verified, and filed. These requirements
are imposed in part because, under Probate Code section 1022, an “affidavit or verified
petition shall be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding.”
Whenever one of these types of documents is filed and requires a hearing, the court is
required to set and notice that hearing. (Prob. Code, §§ 1041, 1042.) An “interested
person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing”
(Prob. Code, § 1043, subd. (a)) or “may appear and make a response or objection orally at
the hearing” (id., subd. (b)). If an oral objection is made, the court must either resolve the
oral objection or grant a continuance so that the objection can be made in writing. (Ibid.)
Finally, the probate court “shall hear and determine any matter at issue and any response
or objection presented.” (Prob. Code, § 1046.) The Code of Civil Procedure fills any
procedural gaps in the Probate Code. (Prob. Code, § 1000, subd. (a).)
       “Despite Probate Code section 1022, summary judgment proceedings in probate
court are commonplace.” (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 521.) “When a
petition is contested … ‘affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as

                                             13.
evidence at a contested probate hearing.’ [Citation.] Rather, absent a stipulation among
the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition and each fact set forth in a
supporting affidavit must be established by competent evidence. [Citations.] This rule is
consistent with the long-established rule of civil practice that ‘ “[a] party is entitled to
have received in evidence and considered by the court, before findings are made, all
competent, relevant and material evidence on any material issue.” ’ ” (In re Estate of
Lensch (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 667, 676, third bracketed insertion in original.)3
       When a petition is “contested” is not well defined. In Forthmann v. Boyer (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 977, 985, the Court of Appeal implied contestation occurs when
objections are filed and rejected a claim that discovery was proper without the filing of an
objection. Such a conclusion generally matches the dictate in Probate Code section 1022
and the established rules of civil practice that affidavits and verified petitions are only
admissible in uncontested proceedings. But, as Forthmann was focused on the point at
which discovery could be ordered, no meaningful analysis on the definition of
“contested” was included.
       In Mota v Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 351, 356, another discovery
case, the Court of Appeal explained, “A corollary of the Forthmann rule is that a
beneficiary, having filed formal objections to a trustee’s petition, may conduct discovery
relevant to those objections. Unlike the beneficiary in Forthmann, Mota’s objections
created an issue of fact to be adjudicated by the court: whether Villalobos, Marcos, and
Ponce stole money from the Trust. Accordingly, she was entitled to conduct discovery
relevant to that issue.” Although again based in discovery practices, the court’s analysis

3       We do not intend through this review of the law to resolve, nor do we express an opinion
on, whether summary judgment can be utilized to prevent the probate court from holding the
hearing contemplated by Probate Code section 1043 rather than directly resolve objections or
ancillary disputes prior to that hearing. Nor do we take any position on whether the probate
court could grant summary judgment on the underlying petition in this matter without resolving
the objection filed by appellants—even if it were deemed meritless.

                                              14.
implies that issues within a petition are contested when specifically joined, a point in line
with long-standing case law regarding the scope of a court’s obligations to resolve
disputes. (See In re Estate of Clifford (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 123, 126 [“It is ordinarily
true that all proper issues of facts joined in probate proceedings like any civil action must
be determined and that the court should adopt appropriate findings respecting such
issues.”].)
       The parties have not specifically briefed the issue of when a petition is properly
contested. But we need not resolve that issue at this time because appellants meet both
standards. We note that under the broader standard, reversal would be required because
the probate court could not have relied on the verified petition to grant summary
judgment once any form of contest was filed against the petition. Under the narrower
view, we consider whether appellants raised a challenge to any material issue contained
in the petition. As appellants did challenge a material issue contained in the petition, the
court’s conclusion there were no triable issues of material fact because appellants
“admitted the material allegations in the petition by failing to controvert any of the
allegations in their objection” was improper and reversal is required.
       Application of the Law to the Objection Filed
       The petition asserted a limited set of facts which were adopted by the probate
court when it granted summary judgment: (1) Honegger was the current trustee; (2) Hal
validly executed powers of appointment contained within the trust instrument; and (3) the
Survivor’s Trust share comprised one-half of the combined Trust assets, while the Marital
and Credit Trusts comprised the other one-half, such that the full trust could be
apportioned between Sandra Crosby and St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. In order
to prove these facts, Honegger relied upon the verified petition for information about the
trust document, affidavits of counsel regarding Hal’s intent and the status of the trust

                                             15.
assets, and documents submitted with the summary judgment motion for proof Hal
exercised his powers of appointment.
          As noted above, appellants objected on the ground that such a distribution
constituted a decanting or modification of the trust instrument for which proper notice
had not occurred. Included within this objection was a request that the trust assets be
accounted for within each subtrust and instructions regarding whether Hal could
disinherit his children from any inheritance owed to them through his appointment
powers.
          The act of decanting a trust is governed by the Uniform Trust Decanting Act.
(Prob. Code, § 19501 et. seq.) The decanting power is defined as “the power of an
authorized fiduciary … to distribute property of a first trust to one or more second trusts
or to modify the terms of the first trust.” (Prob. Code, § 19052, subd. (j).) The statutory
scheme generally covers transfers from irrevocable trusts, but expressly does not limit the
ability “to distribute or appoint property in further trust or to modify a trust under the
trust instrument, law of this state other than this part, common law, a court order, or a
nonjudicial settlement agreement.” (Prob. Code, § 19503, subds. (a), (d).) In other
words, it is a defined power granted to a fiduciary to modify an existing trust, usually to
pour funds from that trust into another, through means outside of the trust instrument
itself.
          Appellants’ objection under the decanting statutes—although inartful as stated—
challenged the trustee’s ability to make the requested distribution without satisfying the
decanting statute requirements. With the included request for an accounting of the
subtrusts, the objection necessarily challenged the ability to transfer one-half of the
proceeds to Sandra Crosby and one-half of the proceeds to St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital. This contention thus placed in dispute any assertion that Hal’s valid exercise of
his appointing powers could result in an even split of the trust assets in a manner that

                                              16.
excluded appellants. With the included request for instructions regarding Hal’s purported
disinheriting of appellants, the objection also challenged whether Hal had properly
exercised his appointment powers through his attempted split of the assets.
       The record further supports that these contentions were meaningful. The proffered
language of the Trust Agreement does not indicate that the trusts created after Claudette’s
death and used during Hal’s life would necessarily result in one-half of the assets
remaining in the Survivor’s Trust and one-half of the assets split between the Marital and
Credit Trusts. Even if initially split equally, the trust instrument states that the Survivor’s
Trust is meant to provide the surviving spouse with income reasonably necessary for their
maintenance and support while the Marital and Credit Trusts only provide quarterly
installments of net income unless principal distributions are requested. The Trust
Agreement further indicates that the settlors specifically recommended drawing from the
Survivor’s Trust first.
       Should the subtrusts not be equally funded at the time of Hal’s death, Hal’s request
to provide one-half of the total assets to Sandra Crosby and one-half of the total assets to
St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital could require modifying the terms of the Trust
Agreement. Absent modification, appellants appear to be entitled to any portion of the
irrevocable Marital and Credit Trusts that exceeds the one-half of the total assets that
could be distributed if Hal’s powers of appointment and specific split of funds were valid.
And Sandra Crosby would be entitled only to the amount of funds properly remaining in
the Survivor’s Trust up to the one-half of trust assets purportedly left to her.
       By claiming a failure to provide proper notice of a decanting and requesting an
accounting of related subtrusts, appellants, at a minimum, placed in issue whether the
appointing power could be properly exercised as Hal requested and whether properly
complying with Hal’s attempt to exercise those powers actually resulted in all trust funds
being distributed to Sandra Crosby and St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. As these

                                              17.
issues were essential to the relief requested in the original petition, there is no basis to
conclude that the petition remained uncontested such that the probate court could either
find no triable issues of material fact existed or rely upon affidavits and the verified
petition as if the proceedings were uncontested.4
       In opposition, Honegger alleges any argument that the express terms of the trust
are not subject to powers of appointment is either forfeited for failure to argue below or
merely wrong. We need not resolve this argument, however, because the underlying issue
is not whether exercise of the powers of appointment is part of the trust instrument, but
whether those powers were properly exercised under Hal’s split of assets. Even assuming
the powers of appointment are part of the trust instrument and properly allow the general
actions taken by Hal, the factual dispute regarding the propriety of Hal’s specific split of
assets and its impact on funds that would otherwise have gone to appellants remains. As
appellants properly challenged the proposed distribution through their claim that a
decanting was required to execute the requested distribution, their purported failure to
challenge the legal premise by which the distribution flowed does not prevent summary
judgment.
       Ultimately, although appellants’ objection to the petition was poorly framed, it was
minimally sufficient to challenge at least one of the core factual contentions supporting
the petition. The probate court could not, therefore, grant summary judgment to
Honegger based on the assertion appellants failed to contest any material facts alleged in
the petition. We specifically note that our opinion here is narrowly drawn. We take no

4       Because we conclude the summary judgment motion was improperly granted, we do not
reach appellants’ claims that the probate court wrongly failed to grant a continuance for further
discovery or failed to conduct a sua sponte investigation into claims of undue influence prior to
granting summary judgment. Likewise, we do not consider whether the court abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend, as no leave was required to support some of appellants’
discovery requests or to raise issues in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Finally,
by reversing the probate court’s order, we need not consider appellants’ alleged collateral attack
on the judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the Uniform Trust Decanting Act.

                                               18.
position on whether the probate court could or should permit an expansion of the current
petition, what scope of discovery is ultimately appropriate, whether appellants’
allegations of error are provable, or any other issue tangential to reversing the summary
judgment.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the probate court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to appellants.

                                                                                   HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                            19.