Court Opinion

ID: 9771559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:14.167984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:32.948782
License: Public Domain

Thomas S. Streetman, Special Justice. This is a workers’ compensation case. We granted certiorari to review the legal basis of the court of appeals’ decision reversing the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission. See, Guffey v. Arkansas Secretary of State, 18 Ark. App. 54, 710 S.W.2d 836 (1986). The issues are two-fold: (1) did the Commission err in finding that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law (the Act) does not authorize payment of current total disability benefits after the healing period, and (2) did the Commission err in deciding the issue of permanent disability benefits. On July 27,1981, respondent, Guffey, fell and fractured his right ankle while employed as a maintenance worker for petitioner, Arkansas Secretary of State. He was paid temporary total benefits from July 28, 1981, through April 25, 1983. Dr. Jerry Thomas treated respondent for his injuries. Respondent had surgery on his foot on July 28, 1981. On April 25, 1983, Dr. Thomas stated that respondent had a fifty-five percent permanent impairment to his right foot. The Commission found that the healing period ended April 25, 1983. Based on Dr. Thomas’ April 25th rating, petitioner paid respondent fifty-five percent permanent partial impairment to the right foot as a scheduled injury under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1313(c) (Repl. 1976). Subsequently, additional surgery was performed on respondent’s foot on September 20, 1984, and he sought additional temporary benefits. At a hearing before the administrative law judge on October 26,1984, respondent claimed he was entitled to additional benefits because he had an additional period of disability from April 26, 1983 to September 20, 1984. At that hearing respondent contended that he was either permanently and totally disable'd or currently totally disabled. However, counsel for both parties agreed that the only question for decision at that time was whether respondent was entitled to current total disability benefits after April 25,1983. This was the only issue on which evidence was presented at the hearing. The administrative law judge denied current total benefits after April 25, 1983, and respondent appealed to the full Commission. The Commission affirmed the administrative law judge on the denial of current total benefits and also denied recovery for any permanent total benefits although that issue was not before the law judge. Although the Commission noted that it had previously approved current total disability awards that extended beyond the healing period, it stated that the concept of current total benefits was creating difficult problems for the Commission. In illustrating the problems, the Commission quoted from its decision in Leslie v. Sanyo Mfg. Co., WCC No. D007121 (1984): The concept or doctrine of current total disability, a term not to be found in the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act itself, has been sanctioned several times in recent years by the Arkansas Court of Appeals, (citations omitted)... Indeed, it must be candidly admitted that the concept of current total disability, which is neither mentioned nor defined in the statute and not discussed by any of the leading text writers on the subject of workers’ compensation which have been reviewed, is presenting to this Commission difficult and perplexing problems in determining its applicability. It is perhaps appropriate to observe at this point that the Commission itself for the past few years has been increasingly applying the concept of current total disability (or something akin thereto without using that particular terminology) without really defining the doctrine, without stating its specific statutory authorization, and without describing its parameters. The Commission reviewed several cases from the court of appeals supporting the award of current total disability benefits after the healing period had ended and before determination of permanent benefits. In holding that respondent was not entitled to current total benefits, the Commission found there was no statutory basis for award of current total disability benefits that extended beyond the healing period.  Was the Commission correct in holding that the Act does not provide for payment of current total disability benefits after the healing period ends? In construing the Act, it is well settled that we must liberally interpret it, resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. This court has consistently so interpreted the Act. Purdy’s Flower Shop v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575, 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977); Aluminum Co. of America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976); International Paper Co. v. McGoogan, 255 Ark. 1025, 504 S.W.2d 739 (1974). However, where the Act is clear and not subject to interpretation, we must adhere to the law as enacted. Workers’ compensation laws are entitlement legislation. These laws were enacted to create rights and benefits for injured workers and their dependents. For benefits to be awarded, they must be provided for in the Act. Our Act does not mention current total disability benefits. Neither are there any cases by this court specifically authorizing payment of current total disability benefits. There are, however, several decisions, in addition to this case, by our court of appeals which have specifically sanctioned the payment of current total disability benefits. Sunbeam Corporation v. Bates, 271 Ark. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (1980); City of Humphrey v. Woodward, 4 Ark. App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982); Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982); Bemberg Iron Works v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Pitts v. Western Electric, 15 Ark. App. 85, 689 S.W.2d 582 (1985); and Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985). However, counsel for respondent conceded during oral argument that he was unaware of legislation or cases from other jurisdictions which permit payment of current total disability benefits after the healing period ends. None of the text writers discuss the award of current (non permanent) total benefits beyond the healing period.  The concept of current total disability benefits seems to have been based on our decision in McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966) although that terminology is not expressly mentioned in that case. To the extent that McNeely has been interpreted as holding that temporary benefits, regardless of how they are denominated, may be paid after the end of the healing period, that interpretation is erroneous.  Our Act does not authorize award of current total or limited total disability benefits after the end of the healing period. If those benefits are to be provided, it will be necessary for the Arkansas General Assembly to determine the circumstances under which injured workers will qualify for those benefits. The court of appeals erred in reversing the Commission’s decision that it had no legal authority to award current total disability benefits after the end of the healing period.  The court of appeals also held that the Commission erred in deciding the issue of permanent disability benefits. We agree. At the hearing before the administrative law judge, the parties stipulated that the only issue was respondent’s status from April 26,1983, until August, 1984. The administrative law judge only decided that issue. The parties were not given an opportunity to develop the issue of permanent disability. The court of appeals correctly held that the Commission erred in deciding the permanent disability issue. Reversed and remanded. Special Justice Thomas Burke joins in this opinion. Hays and Glaze, JJ., not participating. Purtle, J., concurs.