Court Opinion

ID: 9854956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:26.593309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.477106
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice.
We granted an application for interlocutory review filed by petitioner Troy Anthony Davis in this capital habeas corpus proceeding, and posed the following question:
Whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the habeas petitioner’s motion for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing in this matter, and, if so, whether such discretionary abuse is likely to result in substantial error at the evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer.1 This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5 (426 SE2d 844) (1993). Thereafter, petitioner’s trial counsel withdrew, and the Georgia Appellate Practice and Educational Resource Center, Inc. (“Resource Center”) *836undertook his representation and began a search for volunteer counsel.2
In March 1994, the Butts County Superior Court signed petitioner’s execution warrant. Having been unsuccessful in its attempts to secure volunteer counsel, Resource Center staff attorney Jeffery Ertel filed a skeletal petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution on petitioner’s behalf. The stay was granted on March 15, 1994. In April 1995, the habeas corpus proceeding was assigned to a judge, and a status hearing was conducted on July 20, 1995. At that hearing Mr. Ertel informed the court that efforts to secure volunteer pro bono counsel for petitioner had been unsuccessful. The court responded that Mr. Ertel would remain responsible for petitioner’s representation unless replaced by substitute counsel; and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled for November 21, 1995.
On August 28, 1995, the executive director of the Resource Center filed a notice of withdrawal of Mr. Ertel as named counsel, and a motion for continuance of the November 21, 1995 hearing, or alternatively for withdrawal of the Resource Center as counsel of record. As grounds for the motion, it was shown that the Resource Center had lost all of its federal funding (seventy percent of its operating budget) because Congress had not appropriated funds for the twenty-one death penalty resource centers nationwide for fiscal year 1996; attorney Ertel had notified the executive director in early August that due to the funding crisis he was forced to obtain employment elsewhere and is precluded from working on Resource Center cases; and that six of the Resource Center’s eight attorneys were either forced to resign or were discharged due to lack of funds, leaving a staff of two attorneys, an investigator, an administrative assistant, and a caseload consisting of eighty death-row inmates. The State opposed the motion for continuance.
One of the remaining Resource Center attorneys filed a supplemental motion for continuance explaining that “this drastic measure was necessary” due to attorney Ertel’s unavoidable and unanticipated departure, the similar loss of the investigator assigned to this matter, and because undersigned counsel had no previous contact with petitioner’s case and could not ethically and competently represent him at the November 21 hearing. A continuance was requested until March to allow the present staff to become familiar with the record *837and attempt to secure volunteer counsel.3
On October 19, 1995, the habeas court entered an order denying the request for a continuance and requiring that the hearing commence as scheduled on November 21, 1995. Because the Resource Center’s previous efforts to secure counsel had been unsuccessful, the court did not believe granting a continuance “will guarantee” that volunteer counsel will be found. A certificate of immediate review was issued and this Court granted petitioner’s application for interlocutory appeal from that order.
The habeas court based its ruling on the prior inability and present unlikelihood of securing volunteer counsel. We acknowledge that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not apply in habeas corpus proceedings. McCorquodale v. Stynchcombe, 239 Ga. 138 (1) (d) (236 SE2d 486) (1977). Neither is there a right to appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding. Stephens v. Balkcom, 245 Ga. 492 (3) (265 SE2d 596) (1980). But the gravamen of petitioner’s argument was that he was represented by counsel, that he relied on this representation, and the request for continuance was made to enable substitute counsel to adequately inquire into and present his constitutional claims.
Attorney Ertel’s announced departure in early August left the remaining staff with less than two months to familiarize themselves with a complex record, and to present the necessary evidence to competently support petitioner’s constitutional claims. The loss of funding and consequent diminution in staff occurred at a critical time in the habeas proceedings, and was not the result of any action or inaction on the part of the Resource Center. Given these unique and dire circumstances, we agree that the Resource Center simply could not provide adequate representation without a continuance. Rather than prejudice the state, a continuance would advance its interests in ensuring that the habeas proceeding is litigated thoroughly and competently in the first place. The interests of justice require that the Resource Center be given a realistic opportunity to adequately prepare for the hearing. Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that under the highly unusual facts of this case the habeas court abused its dis*838cretion in denying the requested relief and that such abuse is likely to result in substantial error at the evidentiary hearing. See generally Hardwick v. Gooding, 233 Ga. 322 (210 SE2d 794) (1974); Johnson v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 548 (192 SE2d 900) (1972).
We recognize that the habeas court has broad discretion in controlling its calendar and further that the court is bound by statutory mandates with respect to disposition of first-time filed death penalty habeas corpus petitions.4 We reiterate that our ruling today is limited to the peculiar facts of this case, and we admonish counsel who undertake representation in these matters that the trial court is vested with wide discretion in managing its court calendar, and that unpreparedness or the lack of due diligence alone will not suffice to require the granting of a continuance.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who concur specially, and Hunstein, Carley and Hines, JJ., who dissent.

 He was also convicted of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault (two counts) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

 The Resource Center was established in 1988 through joint efforts of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the State Bar of Georgia, the Georgia Attorney General, and the state and federal judiciaries to provide expert assistance to attorneys who volunteer to represent indigent, death-sentenced inmates in post-conviction proceedings. It subsequently expanded its staff enabling it to provide direct representation to death row inmates.

 The plight of the Resource Center was further explained in its motion:
The Resource Center cannot complete the necessary review of files and investigation to file an Amendment to the [habeas corpus] Petition by November 2, nor adequately prepare for and conduct an evidentiary hearing on November 21. Neither of the two attorneys remaining at the Resource Center have had any involvement in Mr. Davis’ case. Both undersigned counsel and [the remaining investigator] maintained a full case-load at the time funding was cut and other employees left the office. Thus, both attorneys have had to assume responsibility for the cases of six other attorneys, in addition to their own cases. The same is true of the only investigator ....

 See Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, OCGA § 9-14-44 et seq. (Ga. L. 1995, p. 381); and in response thereto, Uniform Superior Court Rule 44 (the primary purpose of which is to avoid unnecessary delay and guarantee the expeditious progress of capital habeas corpus cases through state courts).