Court Opinion

ID: 9916378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 21:05:05.116391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:12.474532
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 220115-U

                                  Order filed January 9, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0115
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 17-CF-1153
                                                        )
      JASPER J. JOHNSON,                                )       Honorable
                                                        )       Sarah-Marie Francis Jones,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Albrecht and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) There was sufficient evidence presented to support defendant’s first degree
                  murder conviction. (2) Trial counsel provided effective assistance.

¶2          Defendant, Jasper J. Johnson, appeals his conviction for first degree murder. Defendant

     contends that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) trial

     counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to move to suppress or object to the admission

     of a significant portion of his police interview. We affirm.
¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          On October 4, 2017, the State charged defendant, by superseding indictment, with first

     degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2016)) and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon

     by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a), (e)). The indictment alleged that defendant, “without lawful

     justification, shot Kia Johnson with a handgun, knowing such an act created a strong probability

     of death or great bodily harm,” causing her death.

¶5          On July 19, 2021, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to many redactions

     to defendant’s approximately 13-hour interrogation video and presented contested redactions to

     the court. Specifically, the parties agreed to redact references to a specific domestic battery

     between defendant and Kia, various reports of domestic occurrences from Kia’s family members

     and neighbors, detectives’ accusations of abuse, and defendant’s prior criminal history and gun

     use. The parties recorded approximately 35 agreed redactions on a written transcript of the

     interrogation. The court addressed the parties’ contested redactions, including defendant’s request

     to redact additional statements discussing his prior misuse of BB guns resulting, in one instance,

     in the shooting of Kia; any reference to committing a prior crime against Kia; and defendant’s

     statements regarding going to prison for committing a crime against his “own woman.” Defense

     counsel did not object to statements by defendant following “situations where the detective is

     engaging in some sort of interrogation techniques to try to get the defendant to try to change his

     story, and the defendant maintains that it was an accident throughout.” The court granted

     defendant’s redaction request regarding defendant going to prison for committing a crime against

     Kia and denied redactions relating to defendant’s use of BB guns, and statement that defendant

     “never thought this would have went this far. We were just fucking around, I’ll leave it like that.”

     The total redactions removed amounted to roughly 22½ minutes from the recorded interview.

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     Following the redactions, the interrogation video was edited into 13 clips, each approximately one

     hour long. The cause proceeded to a jury trial.

¶6          Samuel Price testified that on June 5, 2017, he was employed as a security officer at an

     apartment complex. At approximately 8:50 a.m. defendant approached Price and said, “I shot my

     girl.” When Price called 911, he told dispatch that defendant said he “just shot his girl” and

     defendant “ran off” back into the building. On cross-examination, Price agreed that defendant

     “seem[ed] stressed out” and described defendant’s behavior as “need[ing] some help.”

¶7          Joliet Detective David Jackson testified that at approximately 9 a.m. on June 5, 2017, he

     received a report of a shooting and later interviewed defendant. During Jackson’s direct

     examination, the State admitted People’s exhibit No. 16, the 13 individual, one hour clips of

     defendant’s interview. The court broke up the viewing of the interview by offering breaks between

     the clips. Defendant stated that he had been drinking alcohol for the three days preceding the

     shooting and had smoked marijuana with Kia that morning. Defendant and Kia were standing

     approximately five to six feet apart. Defendant explained that he was playing with a firearm when

     he heard a “POW!” and the firearm “went off.” Defendant knew there were two bullets in the

     cylinder located in nonadjacent chambers but did not know their specific location. Defendant

     denied intentionally aiming and shooting the firearm at Kia and asserted that the shooting was a

     “freak accident.” Initially, defendant thought that Kia was “playing.” After shooting Kia,

     defendant tried to stab his neck with a knife and shoot himself. Defendant used his hands to mimic

     a stabbing motion. Defendant indicated that the knife was “dull” to explain why he had no marks

     or other injuries on his neck. Defendant yelled for help and called 911. While on the phone with

     dispatch, defendant tried to “stab” himself. Defendant also indicated that he drank alcohol and

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     liked to play with firearms. Defendant described one prior incident where he accidentally shot Kia

     with a BB gun.

¶8          Throughout the interview, defendant repeatedly stated that (1) he yelled for help, called

     911, and told dispatch that he “just shot [his] girl”; (2) the shooting was an “accident”;

     (3) defendant was “playing” with the firearm, and did not know that he shot Kia; (4) he “did not

     want [Kia] to die” and denied being mad at or having an argument with Kia; (5) he attempted

     suicide following the shooting; (6) he stayed with Kia to ensure she was okay; (7) he asked about

     Kia’s welfare; (8) he loved Kia; and (9) Kia had previously told defendant not to play with

     firearms.

¶9          In the interrogation, Jackson informed defendant that (1) Kia was alive, and stated

     defendant purposely shot her; (2) witnesses heard defendant and Kia arguing, furniture moving,

     and defendant say, “drop the knife” before the shooting; and (3) ballistics evidence did not

     corroborate defendant’s version of events, and instead showed that defendant pointed the firearm

     at Kia. Jackson repeatedly told defendant that he had “no reason to lie” and that he was not trying

     to “trick” defendant. Jackson accused defendant of “lying” and challenged defendant’s version

     that the shooting was an accident. Specifically, Jackson accused defendant of “whooping” Kia,

     being a “cold-blooded murderer,” “murder[ing]” Kia, making a “conscious decision to pull the

     trigger,” “plann[ing]” to murder Kia, “point[ing] the gun at [Kia],” and “put[ting] the gun to [Kia’s]

     head.” When detectives exited the interview room, defendant continued talking and spoke in

     “soliloquies.” During these speeches, defendant professed that the shooting was an accident and

     expressed regret for playing with the firearm and killing Kia. Defendant indicated that he loved

     Kia. Following the publication of the videos, Jackson testified he did not observe any marks,

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       puncture wounds, or injuries on defendant’s neck consistent with stabbing himself with a knife.

       The State admitted photographs of defendant that corroborated Jackson’s observations.

¶ 10          On cross-examination, counsel questioned Jackson regarding his characterization that the

       conversation with defendant was an interview instead of an interrogation. Eventually, Jackson

       acknowledged that, in an interrogation he “aggressively” investigated a “particular set of facts.”

       At the start of the interrogation, Jackson assured defendant that he was “there to help” that Jackson

       would not “lie” to or “trick” defendant. Jackson denied becoming argumentative with defendant

       but conceded that he “had to match [his] intensity to [defendant’s] intensity.” When counsel asked

       whether Jackson considered calling, “somebody a liar repeatedly and telling him that he is lying

       and has been lying all day” was argumentative, Jackson responded that it could be. Jackson

       conceded that at times during the interview he could have been belligerent and hostile toward

       defendant but could not answer whether he had been disrespectful. Eventually, Jackson admitted

       to lying to defendant but adamantly refused to categorize certain statements, such as telling

       defendant Kia was alive and said that defendant shot her, as fabricated evidence. Jackson indicated

       that many questions were unsupported by evidence and sought to elicit a particular response from

       defendant. Specifically, there was no evidence that (1) defendant “intentionally put the gun to

       [Kia’s] head,” (2) Kia pulled a knife on defendant, (3) defendant and Kia were arguing or that the

       furniture had been moved before the shooting, and (4) Kia had been beaten. Counsel asked

       numerous questions of Jackson regarding the lack of evidence for Jackson’s conclusion that

       defendant’s purposefully shot Kia. Counsel highlighted that defendant never admitted to

       “point[ing] the gun at Kia, knowing that he was pointing the gun at Kia, and *** pull[ing] the

       trigger,” and claimed to have never fired the firearm before shooting Kia.

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¶ 11           Jackson found no evidence of premeditation or motive to murder Kia on defendant’s

       cellular phone. Jackson believed that defendant’s mental health diagnoses were unimportant and

       unrelated to determining what happened to Kia. Defendant maintained that he was playing with

       the firearm by “spinning the cylinder,” “cocking the hammer,” and “pulling the trigger” when the

       firearm “went off.” Defendant consistently stated that the shooting was an accident beginning with

       his first communication with Price through the end of the interview. Jackson stated that in the first

       four to five hours of the interrogation, defendant had no shirt until someone provided him a blanket.

       During the entirety of the interrogation defendant did not have shoes, was only provided a single

       bag of chips for food and was not permitted to call his grandmother after repeated requests.

¶ 12           Justin Barr, a forensic scientist, testified that he examined the firearm that defendant fired.

       Barr identified the firearm as a revolver with a rotating six-chambered cylinder, a “half notch

       safety,” and a “rebound safety.” Both safeties were intended to prevent an “accidental[ ] or

       unintentional[ ]” firing and were properly working. Following a test fire, Barr determined that the

       firearm operated, in that to discharge, “the trigger ha[d] to be pulled.” The firearm had both a

       single-action and double-action trigger. The single-action trigger required a pull weight of 5½ to

       6 pounds. The double-action trigger required a pull weight of 13 to 13½ pounds. On cross-

       examination, Barr stated that he could not say that the weapon “couldn’t misfire in the future or in

       the past[.]”

¶ 13           The parties stipulated that, during Kia’s autopsy, bullet fragments were removed from her

       temple, scalp, and brain. The parties also stipulated that a forensic examination of defendant’s cell

       phone and dispatch records showed that defendant did not call or otherwise communicate with 911

       on June 5, 2017.

                                                         6
¶ 14          Dr. Michael Humilier, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed Kia’s autopsy and

       determined that Kia died of a gunshot wound to her head. Humilier observed gunshot wound

       stippling around the wound, indicating that the bullet was fired from within 18 to 24 inches from

       Johnson. Also, Humilier determined that Kia had used marijuana prior to her death. On cross-

       examination, Humilier stated that “[t]he appearance of the stippling looks as if the gun [was]

       pointed from behind toward the left side of her head ***.” Humilier observed no other injuries,

       defensive wounds, or evidence to indicate that Kia had been involved in a fight or been beaten.

¶ 15          In closing argument, defense counsel asserted that while defendant was responsible for

       Kia’s death, the jury must determine defendant’s criminal culpability. Specifically, counsel argued

       that the State failed to prove that defendant “knowingly pointed the gun at Kia, knowingly pulled

       the trigger, and did so intentionally[.]” Counsel supported this position by identifying defendant’s

       statements from his interview that he did not know Kia was shot, where Kia was located when the

       gun went off, did not “deliberately point” the firearm at Kia, “did not intend to shoot” Kia, and

       was not “purposely holding the gun.” Defendant saw Kia on the floor and thought she was

       “playing.” Counsel argued that “[i]n 13 hours, [defendant] did not change his story. No matter

       what Detective Jackson tried to do.” Counsel also highlighted that defendant never said that he

       “pointed that gun at [Kia],” or “wanted the gun to go off” at any point during the interview. Counsel

       argued that nothing defendant said regarding “what happened that day reflect[ed] either the spirit

       of malice or an expression of an intentional, deliberate act. It was *** carelessness.” Counsel

       repeatedly referenced defendant’s unwavering assertions that the shooting was unintentional,

       despite the questionable tactics that Jackson used to question defendant.

¶ 16          The court provided the jury instructions for first degree murder and the lesser included

       offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court also instructed the jury that only they are “the

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       judges of the believability of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to the testimony of each

       of them.” The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and two counts of unlawful use

       of a weapon by a felon. The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and imposed a sentence

       of 48 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

¶ 17                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18                                      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 19          Defendant first argues on appeal that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a

       reasonable doubt, where it failed to prove that defendant “knowingly aimed” the firearm at Kia

       and “knowingly pulled the trigger.” In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must

       determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would

       permit any rational trier of fact to find that the State proved the elements of the offense beyond a

       reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). “This standard of review does not

       allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions

       involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232

       Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). “[I]t is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of

       the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the

       evidence.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298 (1976). We will not retry a defendant and must allow

       all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510,

       ¶ 42. Additionally, “the trier of fact is free to believe part of one’s testimony without believing all

       of it.” People v. Spaulding, 68 Ill. App. 3d 663, 675 (1979).

¶ 20          To prove defendant guilty of first degree murder, the State needed to prove that defendant

       (1) “perform[ed] acts which caus[ed] the death” of Kia, and (2) “kn[ew] that such acts create[ed]

       a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to” Kia. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,

                                                         8
       Criminal, No. 7.01 (approved Jan. 30, 2015) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 7.01); 720 ILCS 5/9-

       1(a)(2) (West 2016). Here, defendant does not dispute that he caused Kia’s death or possessed a

       weapon unlawfully. Therefore, we will only address the element disputed by defendant—that he

       intentionally caused Kia’s death.

¶ 21           When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and drawing all

       reasonable inferences, we cannot say that the State failed to meet its burden of proof. Specifically,

       the State proved that defendant knew that the firearm contained two bullets, that he “play[ed]”

       with the firearm by spinning the cylinder, cocking the hammer, and pulling the trigger, knowing

       that Kia was near him. The firearm was within 18 to 24 inches of Kia’s head when it was

       discharged. Together, this evidence established that defendant used a firearm in a manner that

       caused the death of Kia, knowing that “such acts create[ed] a strong probability of death or great

       bodily harm to” Kia. See IPI Criminal No. 7.01; 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (a)(2) (West 2016).

¶ 22           In light of the evidence that directly rebutted defendant’s version of events, including that

       defendant did not know where Kia was located while the gunshot stippling evidence showed that

       they were in close proximity; both triggers required weight to be used to discharge the firearm; the

       two safety mechanisms on the firearm were properly working therefore making a misfire unlikely;

       photographs showed no marks or injuries where defendant stated he had attempted to stab himself

       with a knife; and there was no record of defendant calling 911 when he claimed to have spoken to

       dispatch, the jury was not persuaded by the consistency with which defendant claimed that the

       shooting was an accident and was entitled to reject the defense. See People v. Logan, 352 Ill. App.

       3d 73, 80-81 (2004) (a trier of fact is free to accept as much or as little as it pleases of a witness’s

       testimony); see also In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60 (a trier of fact is not required to

       search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise those explanations to a

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       level of reasonable doubt). Given the totality of these facts, we find the State proved defendant’s

       guilt of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 23                                   B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 24           Defendant contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to move to

       suppress or object to the admission of a significant portion of his police interrogation. Specifically,

       defendant asserts that the video, which included deceptive interview techniques, was “repeated so

       consistently as to impermissibly bolster the State’s case.”

¶ 25           To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) counsel’s

       performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudiced defendant’s

       case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Under the first prong, the reviewing

       court must give deference to counsel’s conduct within the context of the trial and without the

       benefit of hindsight. People v. King, 316 Ill. App. 3d 901, 913 (2000). As such, defendant must

       overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s action or inaction was the result of sound trial

       strategy. People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). Under the second prong, defendant must

       show that, but for counsel’s deficient representation, there is a reasonable probability that the result

       of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 149. “A reasonable probability is a probability

       sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Each case

       involving a videotaped interrogation must be decided on its own facts while viewing the statements

       of both the police and defendant in the context of the entire video and against the evidence offered

       at trial. See People v. Dunbar, 2018 IL App (3d) 150674, ¶¶ 52-54; see also People v. Hardimon,

       2017 IL App (3d) 120772, ¶¶ 34-39.

¶ 26           Here, defendant cannot establish that trial counsel provided deficient representation for

       failing to move to limit or object to the majority, or all, of the interrogation. Initially, we note that

                                                          10
       the majority of redactions were by agreement of the parties, which limited the references to

       defendant’s prior criminal history, prior domestic occurrences between defendant and Kia, as

       reported by defendant and Kia through police reports and speaking to Kia’s family members and

       neighbors. Additionally, counsel moved to redact several additional portions of the video,

       including statements from defendant and Jackson. Regarding the remainder of the interview,

       counsel argued that defendant maintained that it was an accident despite Jackson’s relentless

       efforts that included lies and deception. During pretrial motions, counsel asserted his intention to

       admit instances of defendant’s interview where Jackson exhibited aggressive interrogation

       techniques and defendant maintained his story. Then, counsel cross-examined Jackson in a manner

       consistent with this theme, where he highlighted Jackson’s aggressive and deceptive interrogation

       techniques and the lack of evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant premeditated the

       murder or shot Kia purposefully.

¶ 27          Additionally, counsel elicited testimony portraying Jackson in an unfavorable light, where

       Jackson appeared evasive and unwilling to answer counsel’s questions, Jackson indicated that he

       believed defendant’s mental health diagnoses were unimportant, and Jackson provided defendant

       with limited resources during the entirety of the interrogation. In closing argument, counsel used

       the length of the interview and Jackson’s aggressive techniques in support of his defense that the

       shooting was accidental. The scope of the interrogation was an integral piece of counsel’s trial

       strategy to support the defense that the shooting was an accident, and thus, the State could not

       prove that defendant intentionally caused Kia’s death. Thus, in this case, showing the video

       capturing the interactions between Jackson and defendant, and the questions posed by Jackson

       gave context to defendant’s repeated explanation for the murder. See Dunbar, 2018 IL App (3d)

       150674, ¶¶ 52-54; People v. McCallum, 2019 IL App (5th) 160279, ¶ 56 (Police officer’s opinions

                                                       11
       and observations regarding defendant’s guilt during an investigation are generally admissible for

       their “effects on the defendant, to provide context to the defendant’s responses, or to explain the

       logic and course of the officers’ interview or investigation.”). In light of defendant’s admission to

       shooting Kia, we find that counsel’s decision regarding the extent with which to present

       defendant’s interview was one of sound trial strategy and objectively reasonable. See King, 316

       Ill. App. 3d at 913; see also Houston, 226 Ill. 2d at 144. Because defendant cannot establish

       deficient performance, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. Strickland, 466 U.S.

       at 694.

¶ 28             In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s attempt to analogize this case to

       Hardimon, 2017 IL App (3d) 120772, ¶¶ 36-37. In Hardimon, we found that a portion of

       defendant’s interview was highly prejudicial and impermissibly bolstered the State’s case.

       Hardimon, 2017 IL App (3d) 120772, ¶ 37. We specifically took issue with the statements that

       included detectives accusing defendant of being the perpetrator and defendant repeatedly denying

       those accusations, detectives “goad[ing]” defendant to confess, exaggerating evidence against

       defendant, indicating that defendant faced a lengthy prison sentence, and insisting that they were

       not “lying.” Id. ¶ 36. As a result, we found counsel ineffective for failing to move to redact any

       portion of the video. Id. ¶ 37. In contrast, here, counsel exhibited clear trial strategy in the portions

       of defendant’s interview that he moved to redact and admit. Supra ¶¶ 26-27. In the admitted

       portions, counsel highlighted Jackson’s aggressive interview techniques and questionable

       treatment of defendant as well as the persistence of defendant’s story. Supra ¶¶ 26-27. Moreover,

       Jackson explained that many of the questions posed to defendant were unsupported by evidence

       and asked to elicit a particular response. Supra ¶ 10; see People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 450

       (1992) (a confession obtained by deception does not invalidate a confession as a matter of law). In

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       light of the evidence presented in this case, counsel’s evident trial strategy, and the court’s

       instruction that the jury is responsible for determining the credibility of witnesses and are

       presumed to have followed that instruction, we find the present case distinguishable. See People

       v. Sims, 2019 IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 49 (“Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions provided

       by the trial court.”).

¶ 29                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30           The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 31           Affirmed.

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