Court Opinion

ID: 9658658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:07:27.265856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:57.569421
License: Public Domain

MINGE, Judge
(concurring specially).
This case involves forfeiture of a motor vehicle. Forfeiture is a harsh penalty when it involves property such as a motor vehicle that has significant value and may be an economic necessity.
There are two issues on appeal I wish to address. The first is jurisdiction. I respectfully disagree with the majority on its disposition of the issue. I would not construe the statute to foreclose judicial review in the circumstances of this case. Respondent requested review within the 30 days required by law. Appellant (city attorney) had actual knowledge of the appeal. And most importantly, although the statute does require service on the city attorney, the statute does not state that the judicial system is without jurisdiction to review the forfeiture unless the service on the city attorney is within the 30-day filing deadline.
I note that the time period for the owner to challenge the forfeiture of his property is relatively short, 30 days. In some circumstances, an abbreviated forfeiture process without judicial review will raise due process concerns. We should construe laws to minimize constitutional problems.
The second issue is whether appellant was convicted of a designated offense under the forfeiture statute, Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 (2000). Because of its ruling on the first issue the majority does not reach this second issue. However, because of my contrary conclusion, I do reach the second issue.
The district court construed the phrase “designated offense” to require conviction of first-degree driving while impaired. The statute only requires a conviction of simple driving while impaired (Minn.Stat. § 169A.20 (2000)) “under the circumstances described in ” the first-degree driving while impaired statute.2 Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(d)(1) (emphasis added). The record demonstrates that respondent actually had previous driving offenses which constituted the circumstances of first-degree driving while impaired. I would reverse the district court’s determination that appellant was not convicted of a designated offense.
Based on my conclusion as to this second issue, I concur with the majority’s reversal of the district court’s determination in this matter.

. Although Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(d)(1) (2000), was amended to its current version in 2001, it still includes the phrase "under the circumstances described in.”