Court Opinion

ID: 9848713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:25:50.312474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.354212
License: Public Domain

ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). For reasons similar to ones I expressed more fully in my dissenting opinion in State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 661, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976), I believe the majority has erred in its application of sec. 904.04(2), Stats., to this fact situation. I respectfully dissent.
I have read the record, and I do not find that the other offense offered in evidence here was “of a like or unique nature” to the offense charged. To prove identity the other like crimes must be so nearly identical, so unusual and distinctive, as to be like the defendant’s signature. McCormick on Evidence, sec. 190, p. 449 (2d ed. 1972). A careful study of the list in the majority opinion of the “similarities” between the offense charged and the single prior act shows that many of the points of similarity would be points of similarity between any two rape cases.
Even if one finds the prior act probative on the issue of identity (or modus operandi), I conclude the probative value of the evidence was far outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.