Court Opinion

ID: 9647420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:35:51.732649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:49.002453
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The appellee’s request for increased child support was filed only two months following the divorce decree. The initial decree provided for child support of $250 per month. The modified decree more than doubled that amount, requiring monthly payment of $505. The chancellor in the case at bar imputed an income of $25,000 to the appellant, in his absence, on the basis of testimony regarding a few alleged, isolated, expenditures. This figure was pure speculation, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that this is most likely the appellant’s true income. See Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc. v. Todd, 316 Ark. 785, 875 S.W.2d 67 (1994). More importantly, there was absolutely nothing to show that the appellant’s income had increased from the time of the original order. This flies in the face of the fundamental law governing such proceedings: it is assumed that the chancellor correctly fixed the proper amount in the original decree, and a change of circumstances from those obtaining at the time of the original decree must be shown before a court may modify an order regarding child support. Roland v. Roland, 43 Ark. App. 60, 859 S.W.2d 654 (1993). It may be argued that a change of circumstance could be found based on the need for psychological counselling for the children. However, the inescapable fact is that the chancellor based the increase in child support squarely upon a finding of increased income. The chancellor stated from the bench that his finding of changed circumstances relating to child support was based on his estimate of á “$25,000 a year income, which would translate into support of $505.00 per month.” There is no evidence of any circumstance that would permit the fact-finder to conclude that the appellant’s income had doubled during the short period between the original order and the modified order. Although our sympathies may be with the appellee, we should not permit them to totally obscure the requirements of the law. Furthermore, we certainly are not penalizing anyone. The case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial so that both parties can produce evidence which actually shows the true financial picture, and I respectfully dissent. Robbins, J., joins in this dissent.