Court Opinion

ID: 9852351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:03.128474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:26.142417
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
Wanda Patrick was injured when she entered the third-floor laundry room and slipped on water allegedly left on the floor by Gussie Fleming, an employee of Justice Home Care. The trial court granted Justice Home Care’s motion for summary judgment because it ruled that there was no evidence Fleming caused the water to be on the floor. From the evidence in the record, Fleming, by her own testimony, took wet clothing from the washer, shook it out over the floor, and put it into an adjoining dryer; thus, the favorable inference arose that such conduct caused water to drip onto the floor from the wet clothes being shaken and moved, since Fleming was unable to testify that she saw no water on the floor. Further, Fleming denied causing water to be on the floor, and Minnie Etheridge testified that a woman fitting Fleming’s description admitted spilling water on the floor 25 minutes after the fall, which constitutes a prior inconsistent statement.
Plaintiff contends that the Macon Housing Authority was either negligent in failing to timely inspect and remove the water, or caused the puddle to occur. The Authority maintained new washers that it knew the users believed only partially filled with water and that many users mistakenly added more water by hand to fill the washer with water to wash a full load; the Authority attempted to stop such practice, but it negligently failed to stop such dangerous practice or to avoid the danger of water on the floor through remedial means. Therefore, its negligence concurred in the alleged negligence of Fleming in spilling the water, which was reasonably foreseeable and required more frequent inspections under the circumstances, as well as corrective measures.

Case No. A01A0066

On April 24, 1997, plaintiff, while acting as a nurse for Crossroads Home Service and caring for Etheridge, a resident of McAfee *814Towers, a retirement center, entered the third-floor laundry room, carrying a basket of Etheridge’s clothes to wash. When she entered the laundry room, she did not see water on the floor near the entrance and slipped and fell in a puddle of water just inside the laundry room door.
Fleming, after washing the laundry for Ms. Lewis, a resident, left the laundry room immediately prior to plaintiff’s entry and passed plaintiff. Fleming took Lewis’ wet clothes out of the top loading washer, shook them out over the floor, and threw the wet clothes into the dryer. Fleming did not notice if water dripped on the floor and denied seeing water on the floor and causing water to get on the floor. She returned to the laundry room 20 to 25 minutes later, after the plaintiff’s fall. Although she fit the description of the woman who told Etheridge that she spilled water on the floor, she denied taking water to fill up the washer and spilling the water as she poured it into the washer.
When the plaintiff returned to Etheridge’s apartment after her fall and told Etheridge about slipping on water, Etheridge went immediately to the laundry room where she saw water on the floor, found a woman who fit Fleming’s description, and asked her if she caused the water to be on the floor. This woman told Etheridge: “Yes I did. I ain’t going to lie,” and stated that she had gotten the water: “I went down the hall and borrowed it, a pitcher, and got me some; I missed the top and it went on the floor.” Etheridge testified to the description of this woman, and it fit Fleming’s description. Thus, the favorable inference arose that it was Fleming, and the trial court failed to make such inference in the plaintiffs favor.
(a) While Fleming was an employee of defendant Justice so that it is liable for her conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior, she was not its agent for purposes of making an admission against her employer’s interest that was binding upon her employer as an exception to the hearsay rule, since she, herself, was not a defendant. OCGA §§ 24-3-33; 10-6-64; Uniflex Corp. v. Saxon, 198 Ga. App. 445 (402 SE2d 67) (1991); Southern R. Co. v. Allen, 118 Ga. App. 645 (165 SE2d 194) (1968). However, Fleming’s statement was made against her penal interest and constituted a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the res gestae exception, if made at the time of the occurrence or contemporaneous with it as an excited utterance. Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga. App. 424, 426 (504 SE2d 245) (1998); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga. App. 463, 465-466 (3) (469 SE2d 763) (1996); Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga. App. 459, 460 (436 SE2d 513) (1993). Declarations made so nearly connected with an occurrence that are deemed free from all suspicion of device or afterthought constitute a part of the res gestae and shall be admissible in evidence. However in this case, while 25 minutes after *815the occurrence has often been held to be sufficiently close to be a part of the res gestae under other circumstances, such length of time is not sufficiently close to be considered as contemporaneous with the occurrence when made by an agent, not as an excited utterance, and made to someone inquiring into the incident or investigating. OCGA §§ 24-3-3; 10-6-64; Hassell v. First Nat. Bank &c., 218 Ga. App. 231, 234 (2) (461 SE2d 245) (1995); Uniflex Corp. v. Saxon, supra at 446; Southern R. Co. v. Allen, supra at 646-647; Augusta Coach Co. v. Lee, 115 Ga. App. 511, 514-517 (154 SE2d 689) (1967); Allgood v. Dalton Brick &c. Corp., 81 Ga. App. 189, 191-192 (2) (58 SE2d 522) (1950).
Therefore, the testimony of Etheridge relating the statement made by Fleming shortly after the occurrence was hearsay and could not come into evidence under such res gestae exception.
(b) However, Fleming’s testimony was submitted for the trial court’s consideration in support of the motion for summary judgment by Justice, and Fleming denied negligently causing the water to be on the floor in her deposition. Therefore, Etheridge’s testimony that Fleming told her that Fleming had caused the water to be on the floor constituted a prior inconsistent statement that was admissible not only to impeach Fleming, but also as probative evidence in the case as to who caused the water to be on the floor. OCGA § 24-9-83; Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 318-319 (2) (496 SE2d 896) (1998); Sprouse v. State, 250 Ga. 174, 176 (296 SE2d 584) (1982); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862-863 (286 SE2d 717) (1982). Thus, such testimony was admissible both for impeachment of Fleming, which would create a jury question as to credibility, but also as substantive evidence in the case, which would cause a material conflict in the evidence, requiring denial of the motion. When a witness testifies under oath and is subject to cross-examination, a prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay and is admissible substantive evidence. Sprouse v. State, supra at 176.
(c) Further, favorable reasonable inferences as to Justice’s liability can be drawn from the evidence. Fleming testified that she saw no water on the floor when she entered the laundry room and did not look at the floor while she was there; therefore, the reasonable inference arises that any water on the floor came from her transfer of the wet clothes from the washer to the dryer when she shook them out over the floor, which she admitted doing. This inference must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, which then created a material issue of fact that Fleming, as an employee of Justice, caused water to be on the floor. This conflicts with Fleming’s sworn testimony to the contrary and creates a material issue of fact for jury determination, as well as to evidence of negligence. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).
All evidence must be construed most favorably for the respondent on a motion for summary judgment, and all inferences that may *816fairly and reasonably be drawn in support of her case must be made in her favor by the trial court. Eiberger v. West, 247 Ga. 767, 769 (1) (281 SE2d 148) (1981); Mitchell v. Rainey, 187 Ga. App. 510, 512-513 (370 SE2d 673) (1988); McCarty v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408) (1962).
Where more than one inference can be drawn from circumstantial evidence as to a material element of plaintiff’s case, a trial judge cannot make the determination as to which inference to accept, because the inference most favorable to the respondent must be drawn as a matter of law; only a trial jury can determine between competing reasonable inferences, which inference to make from the evidence before them. McCarty v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., supra at 178.
Where the plaintiff has responded to a motion for summary judgment by presenting circumstantial evidence that gives rise to a reasonable inference that a breach of duty of ordinary care occurred, summary judgment must be denied, because the trial judge must draw such inference as a matter of law. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, supra at 491; Merritt v. Athens Clarke County, 233 Ga. App. 203, 208 (3) (504 SE2d 41) (1998).

Case No. A01A0067

Plaintiff as the servant/invitee of a tenant, Etheridge, comes within the landlord-tenant relationship. OCGA § 44-7-14; Spence v. C & S Nat. Bank, 195 Ga. App. 294, 295 (1) (393 SE2d 1) (1990). However, where the injury arises from a common area, the landlord’s liability to the tenant and the tenant’s invitee arises under OCGA § 51-3-1 and not under OCGA § 44-7-14, so that the landlord has the duty of keeping the common areas safe through the exercise of ordinary care at all times. Commerce Properties v. Linthicum, 209 Ga. App. 853, 854 (2) (434 SE2d 769) (1993). Being an invitee arising out of a landlord-tenant relationship means that the landlord must foresee the invitee’s presence in the common areas at all times and exercise the requisite reasonable care to keep such areas safe. See Paul v. Sharpe, 181 Ga. App. 443, 444-445 (1) (352 SE2d 626) (1987).
Where the tortious conduct of a third party should reasonably be foreseen by prior similar conduct putting the owner on notice of the risk of danger to invitees from such third party’s conduct, the owner has the duty to anticipate a tortious act of a third party and to exercise ordinary care to protect invitees from such danger, because from its superior knowledge of the danger caused by prior third party’s tortious misconduct, the owner must anticipate a repetition of such conduct under the facts and circumstances to protect the invitee. Foreseeability gives rise to the duty to act. Days Inns of America v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235 (454 SE2d 507) (1995); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, *817supra at 492-493 (1); McNeal v. Days Inn of America, 230 Ga. App. 786, 788 (498 SE2d 294) (1998).
Further, the Authority knew that users were causing water to get on the floor through use of the laundry room in various ways; therefore, the third party’s tortious misconduct would not constitute a supervening cause but be a concurrent proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. See Taylor v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 93 Ga. App. 766, 769-770 (92 SE2d 709) (1956). In attempting to address this danger of water on the floor, the Authority cut off the water to the laundry room sinks; kept mops in the laundry rooms for the users to get up the water that they spilled; gave warnings; and maintained floor drains. These measures evidenced a knowledge, awareness, and appreciation of the risk of danger to the elderly and disabled invitees. However, an issue arises for jury determination as to whether the Authority negligently failed to take sufficient measures to remove the danger, since the Authority failed to stop water getting on the floors by putting out rubber mats, grooving the floor to drain water quicker, and making the floor slip resistant through a rough surface. Also, the Authority was aware that some users carried water to the laundry room to fill up the new washers, which was active negligence that the Authority had a duty to prevent from recurring.
. The law has long been that when conditions make the premises unusually dangerous, the owner has a duty to continuously patrol the floors; absent such conditions making the premises dangerous, the law does not require such constant patrols. Boatright v. Rich’s, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 121 (173 SE2d 232) (1970); see also Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622 (272 SE2d 327) (1980); Anderson v. Svc. Merchandise Co., 230 Ga. App. 551 (496 SE2d 743) (1998); Fussell v. Jimbo’s Log Kitchen, 227 Ga. App. 161 (489 SE2d 71) (1997). When undertaking the duty to keep the premises safe by the exercise of ordinary care, this includes inspecting the premises to discover anticipated dangerous conditions about which the owner does not have actual knowledge and taking reasonable precautions to protect invitees from dangers foreseeable from the use of the premises. OCGA § 51-3-1; Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 740 (1) (493 SE2d 403) (1997); Freyer v. Silver, 234 Ga. App. 243, 246 (2) (507 SE2d 7) (1998). Therefore, the owner of the premises is on constructive notice of what a reasonable inspection would reveal. See Jackson v. Waffle House, 245 Ga. App. 371 (537 SE2d 188) (2000); Wesleyan College v. Weber, 238 Ga. App. 90, 94 (b) (517 SE2d 813) (1999); Freyer v. Silver, supra at 245-246 (2).
Fleming testified that the coin-operated washing machines did not fill to the normal water level, which prevented a full load of clothing from being washed. She denied filling the washer with water, but testified that some other residents poured more water into the *818washer to allow a full load to be washed. The Authority claimed that the new washing machines held the same amount of water as the old machines; that the machines did not work with excess water; and that the new washers looked to the users as if they held less water. The laundry rooms had sinks, but the Authority cut off the water there to prevent washer users from getting additional water to fill the washers. The Authority was aware prior to plaintiffs fall that this practice was occurring on the fifth floor, but did not specifically know for certain that it was also occurring on the third floor, although its employee heard rumors to that effect. In response, the Authority cut off the water in the sink on the third floor and placed mops in the laundry room so that any spilled water could be gotten up immediately by any user. The Authority claimed to have posted a warning not to add water to the new washing machines, but the sign did not stay up; the Authority warned in the newsletter, “Highlight,” that no one should put water into the washers; however, Carl Ware from building maintenance denied that any warnings had been posted. Thus, the Authority had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, even though it had no actual knowledge of the presence of water on this occasion. The Authority had constructive knowledge of the dangerous practice of third persons.
The inspection schedule of the laundry room consisted of at least one inspection each day when the trash was removed. Maintenance men would go each morning into the laundry room to empty the trash can, check the room, and clean it up as necessary. However, Henderson Reeves from building maintenance claimed that he inspected the laundry rooms every hour or hour and a half throughout the day, or at least every two hours, and did so on the day of the occurrence. Ware did not know when or if Reeves inspected each laundry room, but Ware did not inspect them himself.
Retha Jones of the Authority denied that the Authority had any problems with people filling up washing machines and getting water on the floor, although she admitted to hearing rumors about these problems. The Authority expected that water would get on the floor from wet clothes being transferred from the washer to the dryer. The Authority did not treat such water on the floor as a problem, because users were expected to mop up the water themselves. There were no rubber mats on the floor, because any quantity of water was expected to go out the floor drain. Robinson v. Kroger Co., supra at 748-749. The Authority was on notice of the foreseeable risk of water on the laundry room floor from (1) users attempting to pour more water into the new washers because the new washers looked like they held less water; and (2) water dripping from the transfer of wet clothes from the washer to the dryer. In recognition of the danger of water on the laundry room floor, the Authority placed a mop for the users to use in *819getting any water up immediately, made periodic inspections each day, and maintained a floor drain. The Authority did not place rubber mats on the floor; nor did it make inspections more frequently than every hour, although users constantly used the washers and increased the risk of the presence of water on the floor and the exposure of subsequent users to the danger. We cannot hold as a matter of law that the inspection schedule was reasonable or sufficient in light of the foreseeable risks to the elderly and disabled. McConnell v. Smith &c. Mgmt. Corp., 233 Ga. App. 447, 449 (2) (504 SE2d 526) (1998).
Decided July 6, 2001
Reconsideration denied July 31, 2001
Sell & Melton, Russell M. Boston, Neil A. Halvorson, for appellant.
Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, John C. Daniel III, Richard A. Epps, Jr., Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Heather C. McGrotty, Jason P. *820King, Moore, Clarke, DuVall & Rodgers, Luanne Clarke, for appellees.
*819Periodic inspections would be insufficient to protect the user from the risk of harm, unless done frequently, because such risk is constantly present by continuous proper use with dripping clothes and possible misuse of the washers from manual filling; whether or not inspections made at one- to two-hour intervals were sufficient is a jury question. Thus, the trial court could not hold that the inspection procedure was reasonable as a matter of law under the circumstances. Shepard v. Winn Dixie Stores, 241 Ga. App. 746, 748 (527 SE2d 36) (1999); Hutchins v. J. H. Harvey Co., 240 Ga. App. 582, 585 (2) (524 SE2d 289) (1999); J. H. Harvey Co. v. Reddick, 240 Ga. App. 466, 470-471 (1) (522 SE2d 749) (1999). Whether the presence of rubber mats, a rough nonskid floor surface, or grooves in the floor to carry water to the floor drain would be necessary is a jury question as to what constitutes the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances. Robinson v. Kroger Co., supra.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said as a matter of law, where the old or the disabled were reasonably expected to be exposed to such risk, that an inspection schedule every one to two hours was representative of the exercise of reasonable care. Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune, 234 Ga. App. 815, 818 (507 SE2d 259) (1998). The owner must satisfy the owner’s statutory duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances to make the premises safe. OCGA § 51-3-1.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this dissent.