Court Opinion

ID: 9672911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:02:43.837056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.984716
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice
(specially concurring
with the basic opinion by Justice VOGEL).
Generally, where the Legislature adopted a federal statute there is a presumption the Legislature intended to accomplish purposes and objectives similar to those of the Congress which enacted the law. Also, where the statute has been construed by the feder*247al courts before the Legislature adopted the statute it is presumed that the Legislature adopted the statute with the construction placed upon it by the federal courts. However, where the statute adopted has not been interpreted and construed by the federal courts at the time of the enactment by the Legislature, subsequent interpretation or construction by the federal court will not be controlling but may be persuasive.
In those instances, where material and substantive changes are made by the Legislature in adopting a federal statute the presumption that the Legislature intended to accomplish the same purposes and objectives as the Congress is no longer valid. Substantive changes can easily, and probably do, indicate different purposes and objectives than those intended by the Congress when it initially enacted the law.
In this respect, § 12.1-32-09, subsections (1) and (2), North Dakota Century Code, are substantially different from 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 1(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).
The North Dakota Act, in part, provides as follows:
“1. A court may sentence a convicted offender to an extended sentence as á dangerous special offender in accordance with the provisions of this section upon a finding of any one or more of the following:
a. The convicted offender is a dangerous, mentally abnormal person. The court shall not make such a finding unless a presentence report, including a psychiatric examination, concludes that the offender’s conduct has been characterized by persistent aggressive behavior, and that such behavior makes him a serious danger to other persons.
b. The convicted offender is a professional criminal. The court shall not make such a finding unless the offender is an adult and the presentence report shows that the offender has substantial income or resources derived from criminal activity.” Section 12.1-32-09(1)(a) and (b), NDCC. [Emphasis added.]
Initially, it is noted that the Federal Act defines and treats a “special offender” separately from a “dangerous offender,” whereas the North Dakota Act defines both a “special offender” and a “dangerous offender” as one, namely a “dangerous special offender.” In addition, the North Dakota Act does not contain provisions similar to subsections (f) and (g), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575, of the Federal Act.
But more importantly, § 12.1-32-09(1)(a) provides that
“The court shall not make such a finding unless a presentence report, including a psychiatric examination, concludes that the offender’s conduct has been characterized by persistent aggressive behavior, and that such behavior makes him a serious danger to other persons.”
The significant point is that the court may not make such a finding unless the presen-tence report, and the psychiatric examination, concludes that the person is a dangerous offender. No reference is made to the notice filed under subsection (3) of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, or the information submitted by the prosecution on the hearing pursuant to the notice.
Similarly, subdivision (1)(b) relies almost exclusively upon the presentence report to show that the convicted offender is a professional criminal. Again, no reference is made to the notice filed by the prosecutor or the information developed at the hearing.
The reference to the presentence report without making reference to or incorporating the notice filed by the prosecutor and the subsequent hearing suggests that the court, independent of any notice filed by the prosecutor, may make a finding that the defendant is a dangerous special offender if the court can so find from the presen-tence report and a psychiatric examination independent of the notice that may have been filed by the prosecutor and the eviden-tiary hearing held pursuant to such notice.
*248Because these or similar provisions are not found in the Federal Act, it is doubtful that the following statement in United States v. Edwards, 379 F.Supp. 617 (Fla.1974), applies to the North Dakota Act.
“But the statute prohibits an enhanced sentence unless the government seeks it and requires that to obtain enhancement the Government must file an information prior to trial.”2
In this connection, we should note that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (1977), referred to United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977), and concluded that the dangerous special offender statute does not create new and distinct criminal charges, but rather provides for increase in penalty for the offense itself.
We should also note that United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977), held that the government has the right to appeal from the trial court’s refusal to entertain the petition that the offender is a dangerous special offender. North Dakota, however, does not have this review provision as is found in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575.
It cannot be overlooked that in this state sentencing has always been a judicial function and has never been surrendered or delegated to some other legal body or office.
Throughout the provisions of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, no statement is found which clearly provides that the court may not entertain the question whether or not the offender is a dangerous special offender unless a notice of petition has been filed by the prosecutor as provided for in subsection (3) of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, and in view of the specific language found in subdivisions (a) and (b) of § 12.1-32-09(1), discussed earlier herein, it is difficult to conclude that the court may not consider whether or not the defendant is a dangerous special offender without first having had a petition or notice filed by the prosecutor as provided for in subsection (3). Such a construction would place the court at the whim of the prosecutor who already has made the deliberate decision whether or not to prosecute and under what specific charge.
The position of the various provisions of the Act may be of some significance. The Federal Act states, or leads off, with the provisions found in subsections (3) and (4) of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, whereas the North Dakota provision leads off with subsection (1), which provides that the court may sen*249tence a convicted offender to an extended sentence as a dangerous special offender in accordance with the provisions of this section upon a finding of any one of the conditions set out later in subsection (1).
The position of these various provisions could well be a clue as to what the North Dakota Legislature intended. Specifically, whether or not the notice referred to in subsection (3) filed by the prosecution is essential or necessary before the court may entertain the question whether or not the defendant is a dangerous special offender is uncertain. The position of the various provisions in the North Dakota Act seems to indicate that the court may consider a defendant a dangerous special offender without a notice filed by the prosecutor.
But, be that as it may, under the due process concept, notice would have to be given to the defendant to permit him to refute any statements found in the presen-tence report and psychiatric examination upon which the court may rely. No independent notice from the notice filed by the State’s Attorney was given by the court. However, no provision is made for the court to give a notice.
A further anomaly arises from the use of the term “court” or “the court” as used throughout the provisions of subsection (3) prior to the 1977 amendment, which was enacted without an emergency clause. (This case was tried prior to 1 July 1977.)
The term “court,” in this state, generally refers to the judge. However, the following sentence creates a question as to what is actually meant by the term “court.”
“In no case shall the fact that the prosecuting attorney is seeking sentencing of the defendant as a dangerous special offender be disclosed to the jury, or be disclosed, before any plea of guilty or verdict or finding of guilt, to the presiding judge without the consent of the parties.” § 12.1-32-09(3), NDCC. [Emphasis added.]
Here the specific term “presiding judge” is used, as distinguished from “the court.” The subsection continues:
“If the court finds that the filing of the notice as a public record may prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, it may order the notice sealed and the notice shall not be subject to subpoena or public inspection during the pendency of such criminal matter, except on order of the court, but shall be subject to inspection by the defendant alleged to be a dangerous special offender and his counsel.” [Emphasis added.]
This raises the question: How can the court find that the filing of notice may prejudice fair consideration of the pending criminal matter if the term “court” does not refer to a judge? Conceivably, the term “the court” may refer to a judge other than the presiding judge, but in North Dakota this could create a considerable problem because generally the presiding judge3 is the court, unless it were concluded that a judge would periodically go from county to county to determine whether or not a notice that the defendant is a dangerous special offender has been filed with the court. As stated earlier, in North Dakota the term “court” refers to the judge and would include the presiding judge. Which raises the question: How else, then, can the court determine whether or not a notice will prejudice the fair consideration of the criminal matter unless the judge looks at the notice and makes the determination? In addition, if the judge is to look at the notice to make the determination, how then can it be kept from the judge who will also be the presiding judge at the trial?4
Individually as members of the court, or collectively, we must always be concerned with due process. The procedures provided *250for in subsections (3) and (4) of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, were presumably designed to provide and assure due process, but that does not mean that due process may not be provided for by other statutory procedure.
However, the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) seem to suggest that other procedures are to be employed for several reasons. As has been mentioned earlier, no reference is made in subdivision (1) to the notice previously mentioned in subsection (3). In addition, subsections (1) and (2) refer to the presentence report and psychiatric examination which normally will not be available to the prosecuting attorney until after the trial. This is significant because of the requirement of the notice of “setting out with particularity” why the prosecuting attorney believes the defendant to be dangerous. Assume the information contained in the presentence report and psychiatric examination are not contained in the statement with the notice. Does this mean that the notice is invalid? I would think not, but a strict interpretation of the statute would produce such a result.
The principal objective of any proceedings of the kind under consideration is to give adequate notice to the defendant so that he may have an opportunity to introduce counter-evidence or otherwise refute the claim that he is a dangerous special offender.
It would be helpful to all concerned if the Legislature would clarify and resolve some of these uncertainties and specifically provide under what conditions the court may consider the question whether or not the defendant is a dangerous offender, including the presentence report and psychiatric examination.
As to keeping the motion of the prosecution secret from the judge, the court in United States v. Holt, 397 F.Supp. 1397 (D.C.1975), had this to say:
“Did Congress intend, as Defendants maintain, that they, their lawyers and the prosecutor should know something that the judge should be kept ignorant of— that an enhanced sentence would be sought? There is no precedent in this Circuit so holding, and I find that the government’s inadvertent failure to keep its special dangerous offender notice a secret from the Court has not prejudiced the Defendants. Thus there is no reason to strike the notice.”
United States v. Sutton, 415 F.Supp. 1323 (D.C.1976) in its construction of 21 U.S.C.A. § 849, of which subsections (a) and (b) are identical to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(a) and (b), does not agree with Holt, supra.
United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975), held that the government [prosecutor] may not proceed on the theory that the defendant is a dangerous special offender without first making the necessary notice. Significantly, it did not specifically say that the trial court could not consider whether or not the defendant was a dangerous special offender without the prosecutor first having filed such notice.
The court held that the notice was inadequate and that the proceedings by the prosecutor were properly dismissed. The specific question whether or not the prosecutor could file an amended notice was not specifically or directly included in the court’s disposition of the case.
On amending notice after trial, the Sutton court, which relied upon Kelly, said that the notice could not be amended after trial. But on further analysis of the Sutton case its position is not as strong as it initially appears, particularly in view of its following language:
“Moreover, even if this Court were to allow such an amendment [after trial], it seems clear that the memorandum is just as insufficient on the question of ‘dangerousness’ as the original notice; no reasons are given as to why the government believed a longer-than-usual sentence necessary ‘for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.’ 21 U.S.C. § 849(f).” United States v. Sutton, 415 F.Supp. 1323, 1327.
The court, in United States v. Edwards, 379 F.Supp. 617 (D.C.1974), however, concluded that the notice could not be amended after the defendant was convicted. The *251court for its conclusion apparently relied upon the language “ ‘a reasonable time before trial or acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’ ” The court apparently concluded that the language “and may amend a notice” related back to the “reasonable time before trial [etc.].”
It should be noted that the procedure outlined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(a) and (b), as well as the procedure outlined in § 12.1-32-09(3) and (4), NDCC, involved two procedures and are sometimes referred to as a two-tier procedure — first the guilt of the defendant must be determined, then the determination whether defendant is a dangerous special offender is made for imposition of sentence.
I find it somewhat difficult to accept the concept that in sentencing a convicted defendant a stricter procedure is required than is required for the initial question whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
There is a significant difference between the proof required in a criminal trial and the proof required in determining whether or not the defendant is a dangerous offender after he has been convicted. At the basic trial the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas at the sentencing hearing it is the preponderance of the evidence. Section 12.1-32-09(1), NDCC, provides in part “upon a finding of any one or more of the following:” and subsection (4) in part provides, “If it appears by a preponderance of the information . . . .” As can be readily observed, neither of the two statutory provisions require the finding to be beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Holt, 397 F.Supp. 1397 (Tex.1975).
In United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1975), the court had under consideration whether or not an indictment may be amended by filing a bill of particulars. The court was of the opinion an indictment could only be changed by the grand jury, but nevertheless the court concluded that this constituted only harmless error and stated:
“The rule preventing the amendment of an indictment should be applied in a way that will preserve the rights from invasion; where these rights are not threatened, rules governing indictments should not be applied in such a way as to defeat justice fairly administered.”
Generally, objections which could have been obviated by a bill of particulars cannot be raised in the appellate court unless a motion or request for such a bill was made in the lower court. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1678(2), p. 1187; State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973); United States v. Barbato, 471 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Rodriguez, 465 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1973).
The foregoing applies to indictments or information where the defendant claims after trial that the indictment or information did not adequately inform him of the charge against him even though the indictment or information accurately charged the defendant of the crime.
The procedure for sentencing, in my view, is not entitled to any greater constitutional protection than the initial trial to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Justice dictates that where the defendant could have taken steps to cure what he claims was defective notice but did not do so, he does not now, on appeal, stand on firm ground to have the proceedings dismissed because the notice did not adequately inform him in greater particularity of the reasons why he should be sentenced as a dangerous special offender.
Where the courts have held that failure to ask for a bill of particulars constitutes a waiver if the question is raised for the first time on appeal, then certainly a procedure on sentencing which is not considered any greater than the initial trial on guilt that failure to demand greater particularity or more information before the trial court constitutes a waiver. It stands to reason that where the defendant did not request additional information or claim that the notice did not apprise him adequately of the reasons why he should be declared a dangerous *252special offender at the trial level, he is deemed to have waived his right to additional information and should not be permitted to raise the question on appeal.
If the court had relied only upon presen-tence investigation report or psychiatric examination as a result of the presentence investigation, and had notified the defendant accordingly, I would merely affirm the sentence, but it appears here that the court did not rely solely upon these items and that the prosecution introduced evidence in addition to the presentence investigation report and psychiatric examination.
We are not involved here with a situation where the defendant pleaded guilty without knowing that the prosecution was seeking to have him declared a dangerous special offender, and if he had been aware of this request he would not have pleaded guilty.
There is an additional matter of concern.
We must recognize that the notice referred to in subsection (3) of § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, upon being filed by the prosecutor becomes a public record, and as such would be available to the press unless it is sealed by the court. The sealing, in itself, could create some problems with the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press. This particular problem is mentioned only to illustrate the further problems created by § 12.1-32-09, NDCC, under consideration. This raises the question: Would it not be better if the notice were merely served upon the defendant, who could then demand more information or greater particularity? The notice served upon the defendant and any demands for greater particularity and any subsequent supplements to the original notice would all be brought to the attention of the trial judge after a plea of guilty has been received or a verdict of guilty has been reached, as the case may be.
The record does not disclose that the defendant asked for or moved for the equivalent of a bill of particulars.
On the ground that the defendant claims that he had not been adequately informed why he should be declared a dangerous offender so as to prepare a proper defense, which I believe has merit, I agree that the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to give the defendant adequate notice of the material that will be used against him in determining whether or not he is a dangerous special offender for purpose of imposing a longer sentence, and allow the defendant to present whatever evidence he thinks appropriate to refute the state’s contention.
PAULSON, J., concurs.
ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
I agree with much of what Justice SAND has said herein, especially that part which urges the legislature to re-examine the statute involved.

. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 was enacted in 1970 as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act (Pub-lie Law 91 — 452, Title X, § 1001(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 948).

. The conclusion in the Edwards case may have been the result of the Court relying too heavily upon the case of United States v. Noland, 495 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1974), which held that the trial court’s authority to impose enhanced sentences on drug offenders by reason of prior drug felony convictions was restricted to cases where the information relied upon was filed with the court and served upon the defendant before trial.
However, a careful comparison of 21 U.S. C.A. § 851, which was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-513, Title II, § 411, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1269) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 shows that there is a substantial difference.
The pertinent language in 21 U.S.C.A. § 851 is:
“No person . . shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. ...”
The pertinent provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 are:
“Whenever an attorney charged with the prosecution of a defendant . . . has reason to believe that the defendant is a dangerous special offender such attorney, a reasonable time before trial or acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may sign and file with the court, and may amend, a notice (1) specifying that the defendant is a dangerous special offender . and (2) setting out with particularity the reasons why such attorney believes the defendant to be a dangerous special offender, . . ”
It should be noted that 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 does not contain the “unless” provision found in 21 U.S.C.A. § 851 which compelled the court in Noland to conclude that unless the notice and information was filed before trial the court did not have the authority to impose an enhanced sentence.
I consider this a substantial difference.

. The term “presiding judge” is used in a different meaning than the term is used in our administrative order designating the presiding judge in each judicial district. As used above, the term “presiding judge” would be comparable to “trial judge.”

. Fortunately for North Dakota, the language “or be declared, before any plea of guilty or verdict of guilty to the presiding judge without consent of the parties” has been amended out by Ch. 128, § 1, 1977 S.L.