Court Opinion

ID: 9629472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:19.196837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.754918
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part):
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that despite the lengthy delay in bringing the defendants to trial, no prejudice occurred. Over their repeated objections, defendants White and Williams were brought to trial approximately 72 days after the maximum time limits allowable under 17 A.R.S., Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 8. This was not a per se violation of the defendants’ speedy trial rights, however, because a jury had been impaneled within the time limits of rule 8.
The majority opinion properly cites State v. Ferguson, 120 Ariz. 345, 586 P.2d 190 (1978), for the proposition that fourteen days of delay, after a jury has been impaneled, approaches the outer limits of permissible delay. Although that case dealt with delays caused by the prosecution, we stated that “[djelay much longer than this would compel us to find a violation of Rule 8.” State v. Ferguson, 120 Ariz. 345, 347, 586 P.2d 190, 192.
Most of the delay in the instant case was caused by the illness of counsel for one of the three defendants. This is analogous to delay caused by the state in that it was not precipitated by the other two defendants, nor was it condoned by them. (A previous motion for severance had been denied.) When defendant Johnson’s attorney moved to continue, and counsel for Williams and White objected, the cases of Williams and White should have proceeded to trial.
Severance is not always mandated to preserve the speedy trial rights of one defendant. Because of the nature of the delay, however, and because all of the remaining parties were ready and willing to proceed to trial, severance should have been granted to preserve the applicable time limits. See 17 A.R.S., Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 8.4.e. The resulting delay so far exceeds what we have previously deemed permissible that it subverts the very purpose of rule 8 and is, in and of itself, prejudicial.
I also strongly disapprove of the trial court’s continuing the trial for ten days and allowing the jury to depart unsequestered, in order to accommodate a juror’s vacation schedule. Because the jury could not remember portions of the testimony, all of the evidence had to be read back to them, causing further delay. I feel that the combined effect of these delays prejudiced all three of the defendants and deprived them of a fair trial.
*275The majority opinion cites State v. White, 56 Ariz. 189, 106 P.2d 508 (1940) for the proposition that if no objection is made by the appellant in the trial court, the objection is waived. I agree with this statement of the law but simply add that if the error amounts to fundamental error, we are compelled to review it whether or not a proper objection was made at trial. A.R.S. § 13-4035B; State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5 (1978).
I would agree with the majority as to its handling of the remaining issues.