Court Opinion

ID: 9695373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:16:44.308828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:39.325293
License: Public Domain

*562LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
Despite protestations to the contrary, the majority effectively excises the phrase “upon a proper showing” from Section 204(b) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-204(b) (supp. pamphlet 1981-82). This is especially surprising in light of the majority’s citation of, and alleged reliance upon, the rule of construction that every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to a 11 of its provisions. Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(2) (supp. pamphlet 1981-82).
The critical passage of Section 204(b) reads:
The Attorney General may appeal the decision of the agency by filing a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court in such manner as is provided for appeals from final orders of government agencies pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 763 (relating to direct appeals from government agencies) and may include in the petition a request for a stay or supersedeas of the implementation of the rule or regulation which upon a proper showing shall be granted, (emphasis added).
The majority holds that “such a [proper] showing requires the Attorney General merely to establish that he has satisfied the procedural prerequisites dictated by Section 204(b).” (At 676). Just exactly what are “the procedural prerequisites” dictated by Section 204(b)”?
Most assuredly, these “procedural prerequisites” include filing the petition for review “in such manner as is provided for appeals from final orders of government agencies pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 763” which “may include a request for a stay.” This section of the Judicial Code confers jurisdiction in the instant matter to the Commonwealth Court. Accordingly, the “manner as is provided for appeals”, including a request for a stay, consists of the rules of appellate practice and procedure governing appeals to the Commonwealth Court from final determinations of government agencies. Thus, the Attorney General’s petition for review and request for a stay must comply with the requirements of Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Judicial *563Review of Governmental Determinations) and Chapter 17 (Effect of Appeals; Supersedeas and Stays), respectively.
Pa.R.A.P. 1781 delineates the procedural prerequisites to the grant of a stay pending action on a petition for review:
(a) Application to government unit. Application for a stay ... of an order or other determination of any government unit pending review in an appellate court on petition for review shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the government unit.
(b) Contents of application for stay or supersedeas. An application for stay ... of an order or other determination of a government unit, . .. may be made to the appellate court or to a judge thereof, but the application shall show that application to the government unit for the relief sought is not practicable, or that application has been made to the government unit and denied, with the reasons given by it for the denial, or that the action of the government unit did not afford the relief which the applicant had requested. The application shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute the application shall be supported by sworn or verified statements or copies thereof. With the application shall be filed such parts, if any, of the record as are relevant to the relief sought.
(c) Notice and action by court. Upon such notice to the government unit as is required by Rule 123 (applications for relief) the appellate court, or a judge thereof, may grant an order of stay . . . upon such terms and conditions, including the filing of security, as the court or the judge thereof may prescribe....
It is apparent that this rule contemplates application for a stay to be brought first to the government unit and requires the application to show either why such procedure would not be practicable, that the application was denied, or the reasons why the action by the government unit on the application for stay did not afford the requested relief. The Attorney General’s application for stay in the instant case fails to make any of these showings. Moreover, the applica*564tion makes no showing of the “reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied upon”, other than the bare legal assertion that the Commonwealth Attorney’s Act mandates granting the stay merely upon the Attorney General’s application. No facts are set forth in the Attorney General’s application that would justify the court’s granting the stay pursuant to the discretion vested in it under Pa.R.A.P. 1781(c) (“the appellate court . . . may grant an order of stay . .. upon such terms and conditions ... as the court or judge thereof may prescribe.”)
The majority interpretation would reduce the “proper showing” merely to the demonstration that the Attorney General reviewed the rule or regulation for legality and notified the appropriate parties. Such an interpretation totally ignores the requirement that the petition for review, including the request for stay, must be in the manner provided for appeals from final orders of government agencies. The majority voices concern with the “difficulty” of defining the nature and extent of that discretion since these questions were not specifically addressed in Section 204(b). However, this “difficulty” is no more or less than in any case involving an application for a stay under Pa.R.A.P. 1781. Accordingly, in order to give effect to all of the provisions of Section 204(b), I would affirm the denial by the Commonwealth Court of the Attorney General’s application for a stay.
I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s discussion of “shall” versus “may”. It is quite clear that “shall be granted” is conditioned upon the Attorney General’s “proper showing”. Indeed other “shall” provisions of Section 204(b) are similarly conditional. For example, “[i]f the Attorney General determines that a rule or regulation is in improper form, not statutorily authorized or unconstitutional, he shall notify . . . the agency affected, the Office of General Counsel, and the General Assembly. . . . ” It would be absurd to argue that the use of “shall notify” requires the Attorney General to make a determination that the rule or regulation was in improper form, not statutorily authorized or unconsti*565tutional, yet the logic of the majority would suggest such an interpretation. If the Attorney General makes a proper showing, then the court shall grant his request for a stay— even though “shall” is mandatory, the condition must first be satisfied. Appellee’s interpretation does not, therefore, as the majority asserts, require “us to ignore the mandatory connotation usually attributed to the word ‘shall’.” (At 677).
Finally, the purpose of the provision in question is no mystery. The majority maintains that unless its interpretation is correct, the Attorney General’s right to request a stay serves no purpose. The purpose is obvious — it confers authority upon the Attorney General to petition for review and request a stay or supersedeas where the governmental unit ignores his advice. Without such an authorization, the Attorney General would have no standing to pursue such review.
FLAHERTY and McDERMOTT, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.