Court Opinion

ID: 9565579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:23:53.070601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.696729
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. It is analytically weak and portends a disturbing trend whereby this Court holds criminal defendants strictly accountable for failing to make timely objections or failing to follow proper procedure while at the same time this Court does not apply the same rigid standards to the prosecution.
I agree with that part of the majority opinion which states “we conclude that the order of acquittal is not appealable under I.A.R. 11(c).” However, since there can be no appeal from the acquittal, all other issues raised on appeal are rendered moot. Therefore, I cannot concur with the majority’s assertion that an appeal made pursuant to the provisions of I.A.R. 11(c)(4) must be heard by this Court where an acquittal has been entered. The majority quotes I.A.R. 11(c)(4) as providing that “an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from ... an order granting a motion to suppress evidence.” A logical reading of this “mandatory” language would be that the “right” to an appeal exists only where a case remains at issue. Where, as here, no case remains at issue, the “right” to an appeal is completely without meaning. For this Court to proceed, at this time, to address a moot issue not only wastes judicial resources but brings this Court into the business of issuing advisory opinions, a practice of which I do not approve. Further, I disagree with the majority’s analysis regarding whether the trial court erred in hearing the suppression motion.
The majority concludes that “[ijt is abundantly clear that none of the requirements for exemption from the rule’s [I.C.R. 12] filing requirement have been met.” The majority remarks that “a court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements of the rule,” presumably concluding that the court’s actions resulted in an enlargement of the filing requirements in the present case. It is of course clear that defense counsel was unable to satisfactorily explain his reason for the delay in bringing the motion. From that fact, however, the majority mistakenly concludes that good cause did not exist for the court to hear the motion. The majority’s interpretation of I.C.R. 12 is both grudging and narrow. In fact, I.C.R. 12 permits the court to hear a suppression motion when there has been excusable neglect, which counsel was unable to establish, or when good cause otherwise exists, which the court sua sponte found to be the case.1 *890The district court concluded that even though defense counsel had been unable to establish good cause for the delay in filing the motion, good cause to hear the motion nonetheless existed because Alanis should not have to go through trial and then raise the issue of counsel competency on appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief simply because her counsel had not been conscientious.2
The majority complains that when defense attorneys bring suppression motions “at the last minute,” the prosecution is unfairly deprived “of the opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits of the movant’s arguments.” While I appreciate the majority’s concern on this, point and strongly disapprove of intentional delaying tactics, I think the majority’s conclusion is too hastily drawn. First, a trial court could grant a continuance, as the prosecutor urged the court to do in the present case. Second, assuming the trial court refuses to order a continuance if one is requested, the prosecution should not blithely proceed with trial, as was done in the present case, but instead should seek a writ of prohibition from this Court. In the case at bench, upon being informed by the district court that the suppression motion would be heard, the prosecution failed to seek a writ of prohibition, staying the proceedings and ordering the court not to hear the suppression motion.3 It need not be determined here whether this Court would have ordered such relief had it been petitioned; however, under the facts of this case, such a petition would have been proper. Here, the prosecution believed that evidence which was the subject of the suppression motion was essential to its case. The prosecution knew that if the trial court were to hear the suppression motion, there was a chance that the evidence might be suppressed. The prosecutor indicated that he thought the district court was acting in excess of its jurisdiction in hearing the motion. When a party is of an opinion that a court is in the process of acting in excess of its jurisdiction, the obvious procedure is to petition for a writ. A writ of prohibition would have resolved the question; it should have been filed prior to the jury being impaneled.
The majority opinion did not address the issue of whether the district court properly concluded that the challenged evidence was the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The Court’s ruling today seems only to hold *891that the district court erred in hearing the motion when it did; however, it would seem that should a second trial ensue,4 the suppression motion advocated might be made anew inasmuch as the State has already agreed to and advocated for such a procedure. The prosecutor argued, “I think it might be proper to allow counsel to raise the objection at trial rather than at a motion in limine, which would at least give us an opportunity of having a little more time.” The prosecutor’s statements were in keeping with a basic tenant of a free society that the State should not simply seek to convict but should also strive to ensure that justice is done. Clearly, if the evidence were the fruit of an unlawful arrest, it should be excluded. The State should not be permitted to convict a criminal defendant on the basis of illegally obtained evidence.
The majority also claims, “it can in no way be said in the present case that the State acquiesced in or consented to defendant’s delayed filing of the motion to suppress, or to the trial court’s decision to hear the motion.” However, by not informing the district court that if it proceeded with the hearing the prosecution intended to petition for a writ, and by asking the district court to proceed with the hearing the following day, the prosecution surely did waive its right to later object. The prosecutor asserted that he was prepared to go ahead with the trial and would argue the suppression motion on the merits if given time to prepare a response. He stated:
The State is not prepared at this particular moment to go ahead with arguments on the merits unless we’re absolutely forced to. I think it might be proper to allow counsel to raise the objection at trial rather than at a motion in limine, which would at least give us an opportunity of having a little more time. But to have the evidence ruled out now after the defense counsel has had the opportunity to make this motion and has had two trial settings to prepare it, we would not be adverse to continuing the trial again if the court were so disposed to protect the defendant’s rights and to give the Court [sic] ample opportunity to consider the merits, if that’s an opportunity that the court wishes to pursue. I think that avenue would be appropriate. But otherwise, we would ask the Court [sic] to dismiss the motion, to delay the motion, until such time as the State proffers ■the evidence, or to continue the trial. (Emphasis added.)
The district court responded:
I’ll certainly give you more time. I’m not going to continue the trial, Jon ... but I will hold off on the ruling on the motion until the evidence is offered, and that will give you more time to check it out.
Later that day, the district court and the prosecutor engaged in the following exchange:
THE COURT: With respect to the motion to suppress, I’ll give you an option, Jon, which ever way you’d like to do it. We can reargue it at 9:00 o’clock in the morning or wait until the evidence is offered, and then on the objection of defense counsel we could argue it at that time. (Emphasis added.)
MR. ANDERSON: We’ll argue it in the morning.
THE COURT: So we’ll proceed with the trial and then argue it in the morning....
With the prosecution’s acquiescence, voir dire of the jury was conducted and the jurors were sworn.
The majority’s conclusion that, “delaying arguments on the motion merely to the next morning cannot be said to have given the State adequate time to prepare,” fails to recognize the fact that the district court offered the prosecution the precise option it had earlier requested — of waiting to hear the motion until the evidence was present*892ed at trial, and the prosecution chose to proceed the following morning. Hence, the prosecution limited its own preparation time.
The prosecutor’s “objection” to the district court’s decision to hear the suppression motion was, at best, equivocal. The thrust of the prosecutor’s objection was that the untimely filing made an adequate response difficult. Yet, when the district court offered the prosecution the option of responding to the motion the next morning or at the time the evidence was offered at trial, the prosecutor did not avail himself of the additional time to respond but instead chose the former option. The prosecutor at no point represented to the district court that if it proceeded to hear the suppression motion during trial that the prosecutor would appeal the judge’s decision to hear it on the ground that it was not timely filed. Moreover, the prosecutor never represented to the district court that if it granted the suppression motion during trial that the prosecution would be unable to go forward with the evidence, not having sufficient remaining evidence to prosecute the case. Rather, the prosecutor represented to the district court that if the court would postpone hearing the motion and afford the State additional time to prepare to address it, the State would proceed with the prosecution. Implicit in this representation was the promise that when the motion would be heard the prosecutor would address it on its merits. At the time of the hearing, the prosecutor did not develop or present any response rebutting the defendant’s version of the arrest and taping of the challenged statement. He did not refute the defendant’s contention that the statement was the fruit of an allegedly unlawful arrest. Rather, he relied solely on his pre-trial position that the court should not hear the motion at all because it had not been timely filed. I fail to understand why, if the State intended to take this position all along, the prosecution encouraged the district court to postpone hearing the motion until after the trial had commenced, on the seeming pretext that such a delay would provide the State with more time to prepare a response. In my view, even assuming the district court erred in finding good cause to hear the motion, the prosecution obviously acquiesced in the court’s decision by agreeing to prepare to discuss the motion on its merits if the trial court would afford it more time, which it did. And, as I have explained above, the prosecution did not avail itself of the option presented by the district court affording additional preparation time — an option the prosecution had previously urged upon the court. Having acquiesced, the State is in no position to raise the error on appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that a criminal defendant cannot appeal from errors to which the defendant has not objected or in which he or she has acquiesced. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985). It is only fair that the same rule should apply with equal force to the State. It has been said that the overriding concern in a criminal prosecution is that justice shall be done. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Regretably, the majority’s highly circumscribed interpretation of I.C.R. 12 cannot be said to have been guided by that principle. This tendency toward prosecutorial favoritism does not further the interest of justice; it denigrates it.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. In oral argument before the district court, even the prosecutor argued that a continuance might be in order or that the motion should be heard when the evidence was sought to be introduced at trial "to protect the defendant’s rights." *890Protection of a defendant's rights might well fall within the rubric of “good cause."

. Under the holding of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) a defendant in order to succeed with a claim of ineffective representation must show the existence of a reasonable probability, but for defense counsel’s errors, the result would have been different. This is a very difficult standard to meet. It is naive to think that a criminal defendant in a post-conviction relief proceeding raising the issue of counsel competency where counsel failed to bring a suppression motion which should have been granted is in nearly as advantageous a position as a criminal defendant whose suppression motion is heard prior to or at the time of trial. Prior to trial or during trial, a criminal defendant only need show that the evidence sought to be suppressed is the fruit of the police illegality. If the State is unable to purge the taint of the illegality, the evidence will be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). After trial, even if the defendant can make that showing, it will be to no avail unless that defendant can also meet the much higher standard of the "no conviction but for the admission of the evidence” test.

. I.C. § 7-401 provides: The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.
I.C. § 7-303 provides: The writ (of mandate) must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon affidavit, on the application of the party beneficially interested.
In the case at bar, it was clearly important that the issue of whether the trial court could properly hear the suppression motion be resolved prior to the swearing and impaneling of the jury so that there would be no question as to whether the state could proceed before the trial commenced. Under these facts, the prosecutor should not have proceeded to trial and should not have acquiesced in the swearing and impaneling of the jury but instead should have sought a prohibitive writ when the trial court said that it would hear the motion.

. As the jury had been sworn, jeopardy had attached and a second trial would therefore seem to be precluded. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 662 P.2d 1135 (1983). Again, the majority evades discussion of this issue.