Court Opinion

ID: 9646702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:08:31.067469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:11.398360
License: Public Domain

LAGARDE, Justice,
concurring.
I wholly concur in the result reached by Justice Rowe; however, I must disagree with that portion of the opinion which concludes that “[t]he evidence in the present case shows probable bad faith on the part of the State in withholding the evidence.” In my judgment, the record in this case does not support such a conclusion. To the contrary, the record reflects an implied finding of good faith by the trial court, sufficiently supported by the record; consequently, I am unwilling to disturb that finding on appeal. See Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 336 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (Jackson v. Denno hearing).
It is true that the trial court’s granting, on November 24, 1986, of paragraph eight of the discovery motion, required, by the express language thereof, that the State allow inspection of all tangible evidence expected to be admitted at trial. It is further true that State’s Exhibit Number 134, an undated note, re-assembled from folded and tom pieces of paper which were found in State’s Exhibit No. 1, the blue box opened by King’s father-in-law, was not disclosed to the defense until it was offered into evidence by the State on rebuttal during the course of the trial.
At the time of the offer, however, in response to objections raised by the defense, the trial court called upon the State to explain its failure to have previously disclosed the exhibit. The lead prosecutor, and the prosecutor shown by the record to have actively participated in the pre-trial hearing at which paragraph eight of the discovery motion was granted, informed the court that he had understood the defense motion to require disclosure of tangible evidence the State would offer in its case in chief. He further informed the trial court that in a conversation that he had had with the defense counsel, ten days before trial, that the defense counsel had specifically told him that he, the defense counsel, was only interested in items that the State intended to offer in its case in chief. Although present when this statement was made to the court, the defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor’s account of their conversation, nor did he challenge the prosecutor’s good faith.
Assuming, without deciding, that rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure applies and precludes enforcement of such an agreement, as the dissent suggests, I find this to be irrelevant as to whether or not such an agreement can be considered by the court on the issue of good faith. In this record, there is no dispute as to the prosecutor’s account of his conversation with the defense counsel. It stands uncon-troverted. In this uncontroverted statement, I find support for the trial court’s *521implied finding of good faith. In my judgment, this support is not undercut, as the dissent suggests, by the later argument of a second prosecutor, who, in response to the argument of defense counsel that State’s Exhibit No. 134 was a suicide note, not a murder note, explained to the jury the State’s tactical decision to hold the note for rebuttal. Invited by the defense’s argument that the State really didn’t believe it was a murder note or it would have introduced it in its case in chief, the prosecutor simply explained the State’s tactical decision to offer the exhibit on rebuttal. It should be remembered that this argument was made by the State who understood the court’s order to be limited to its case in chief. The trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibit No. 134 implicitly credits the State’s explanation, and further implicitly finds that the State acted in good faith. I find no inconsistency here so as to conclude that the State acted in probable bad faith.
The lead prosecutor informed the court that he understood the defense motion to go only to tangible items the State intended to offer in its case in chief. Because defense counsel limited his request of the State to items it intended to offer in its case in chief, it is reasonable to conclude that this re-inforced the prosecutor’s understanding that the scope of the motion, which had been prepared by defense counsel, was limited to the State’s case in chief. By this qualification or limitation, the defense allowed the State the opportunity to withhold State’s Exhibit 134 until rebuttal, and to do so, in my judgment, in good faith. Had defense counsel not so limited or qualified his request at the time the State sought to carry out the court’s order, as the prosecutor understood it to be, this understanding would no doubt have been clarified at that time. Had the court adhered to its broad discovery order, State’s Exhibit No. 134 would no doubt have been turned over to the defense and perhaps the State’s tactical decision would have been different. However, that did not occur. Consequently, I do not find support in the argument of the prosecutor for a finding of probable bad faith on the part of the State.
There is nothing in this record to reflect that, had the lead prosecutor not understood the motion to be limited to the State’s case in chief, and had defense counsel not qualified or limited his request, thereby re-inforcing the prosecutor’s understanding that the trial court’s order was so limited, State’s Exhibit No. 134 would have been withheld from earlier disclosure to the defense, or that it would have been, as a tactical decision, withheld until rebuttal.
For the foregoing reasons, I decline to join Justice Rowe in concluding that the State acted in “probable bad faith” in failing to disclose State’s Exhibit No. 134. Because the record, in my judgment, sufficiently supports the trial court’s implied finding of good faith by the State, I conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit No. 134 into evidence.
Finding no reversible error, I would affirm.