Court Opinion

ID: 9687464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:28:47.448974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.607277
License: Public Domain

Rawlings, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my humble opinion the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, served to create a jury issue.
There are few known tools more dangerous than a dull, worn, temper deactivated, featherweight ax with a warped handle.
In the case at hand defendant-employer supplied just such a tool with which to split age hardened posts, and told plaintiff-employee to use that specific ax for that particular purpose because there would be staples and maybe wire and other things in the wood.
Plaintiff apparently had one thorny choice — use the old ax as directed or not work.
I find the principles of law enunciated in Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 100 N.W.2d 624, here applicable and most persuasive.
*1338In Frederick, Joe. cit., 251 Iowa 295, we said: “It is a settled rule that an employer must use reasonable care to provide and maintain for his employees reasonably stiitable and safe appliances, machinery and tools with which to work. Yon Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 118, 119, 99 N.W.2d 287, 289, and citations; Degner v. Anderson, 213 Iowa 588, 589, 239 N.W. 790; Swaim v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 187 Iowa 466, 477, 174 N.W. 384; 56 C. J. S., Master and Servant, sections 201, 206.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case, loc. cit., 251 Iowa 296, this court stated: “® * * we think assumption of risk does not appear as a matter of law and it was proper to submit this issue to the jury. It is an affirmative defense and the burden to prove it rested upon defendant. [Authorities cited] It is seldom a party who has the burden on such an issue establishes it as a matter of law. [Authorities cited].”
Also, at pages 297, 298, 251 Iowa, is this statement of applicable law:
“Since this is an action by an employee against an employer to recover for negligence plaintiff was not required to plead or prove his freedom from contributory negligence but defendant might plead and prove contributory negligence in mitigation of damages. Rule 97, Rules of Civil Procedure; Erickson v. Erickson, supra, 250 Iowa 491, 495, 496, 94 N.W.2d 728, 730, and citations. * * *.
“In considering the causal relation necessary to responsibility for negligence the general rules are set out in Restatement, Torts, sections 430 to 435. Christensen v. Sheldon, 245 Iowa 674, 682, 63 N.W.2d 892, 897, 48 A. L. R.2d 522.
“Section 431 of the Restatement says: ‘The actor’s negligent, conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.’
“We have used this language quite similar to that just quoted: ‘Nor will the fact that some other cause operates with the defendant’s negligence to produce the injury relieve the defendant if the injurious result is traceable in some material de*1339gree to Ms want of due eare [citations].’ (Emphasis added.) Swaim v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra, 187 Iowa 466, 471, 174 N.W. 384, 386 (certiorari denied 252 U. S. 577, 40 S. Ct. 344, 64 L. Ed. 725). In considering the issue of proximate cause we have frequently cited the Swaim case with approval.
“Section 435, Restatement, Torts, provides: ‘If the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.’ ”
See also O’Reagan v. Daniels, 241 Iowa 1199, 1205, 1206, 44 N.W.2d 666; Petersen v. McCarthy Imp. Co., 175 Iowa 85, 88, 156 N.W. 801; Freeman v. Wilson, Tex. Civ. App., 149 S.W. 413, 418; and Russell v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 53 Utah 457, 174 P. 633, 635.
Reasonable minds could and did in fact here conclude defendant-employer’s conduct in furnishing plaintiff a defective instrumentality with which to do the work assigned him was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.
Furthermore, plaintiff-employee may have been contributorially negligent but in this ease it, if present, could not serve to bar recovery. It would only go to mitigation or reduction of damages.
I find sufficient evidence to create a jury issue and would affirm.
Moore, J., joins in this dissent.