Court Opinion

ID: 9405196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 19:01:46.546649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.229032
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0138p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 MICHAEL SHANE MCCORMICK, SR.,
                                                            │
                            Petitioner-Appellant,           │
                                                             >        No. 22-5587
                                                            │
        v.                                                  │
                                                            │
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                  │
                                Respondent-Appellee.        │
                                                            ┘

  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.
      Nos. 6:16-cr-00056-2; 6:19-cv-00198—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.

                                    Argued: June 15, 2023

                               Decided and Filed: June 27, 2023

               Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

                                     _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ARGUED: Lawrence D. Rosenberg, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., Anna Williams, WEST
VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lauren Tanner Bradley,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Lawrence D. Rosenberg, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Lauren Tanner
Bradley, Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington,
Kentucky, for Appellee.
                                     _________________

                                            OPINION
                                     _________________

       THAPAR, Circuit Judge.       Since his lawyer didn’t file a notice of appeal, Michael
McCormick moved to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the motion, and we affirm.
 No. 22-5587                        McCormick v. United States                             Page 2

                                                 I.

       McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to four offenses involving drugs or
guns. For these crimes, the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence. McCormick
didn’t appeal.

       Instead, ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As
relevant here, McCormick claimed that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to file
a notice of appeal. After holding an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge recommended
denying the motion. The district court agreed and adopted the report and recommendation.
McCormick timely appealed.

                                                 II.

       To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, a petitioner must show that counsel’s
performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). We focus on the first requirement: deficiency. Our review of counsel’s conduct is
“highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Put differently, we must “indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. Here,
that means McCormick must show: (1) counsel disregarded express instructions to file an
appeal, or (2) counsel should have consulted McCormick about an appeal but didn’t. Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477–78 (2000). McCormick hasn’t shown either.

       First, the district court found that McCormick hadn’t instructed counsel to file an appeal.
We review that factual finding for clear error. Neill v. United States, 937 F.3d 671, 675 (6th Cir.
2019). In other words, we defer so long as the finding is “plausible on the record as a whole.”
United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022). And on this record, the
finding is plausible. According to McCormick’s own testimony, he told his counsel that he
wanted to appeal under only two conditions: if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was
treated fairly” at sentencing. R. 456, Pg. ID 1650–51. So counsel told McCormick that if he felt
he was being treated unfairly, he’d have to expressly tell counsel to file an appeal.
 No. 22-5587                       McCormick v. United States                             Page 3

       Neither of those conditions were met. Since McCormick pled guilty, there was no trial.
Thus, the first condition wasn’t met. And the district court found that the second condition
wasn’t met either. That factual finding wasn’t clearly erroneous.

       McCormick and his counsel disagree about what was said after sentencing. Counsel
testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an
appeal. McCormick says that he did, after telling his counsel, “You was no help.” R. 456, Pg.
ID 1653. Both stories couldn’t be true, so after hearing the testimony and reviewing the record,
the magistrate judge found counsel more credible. The district court agreed.

       That choice wasn’t clearly erroneous considering McCormick’s admission that his
memory had faded. To be sure, before McCormick pled guilty, he and counsel had contemplated
the possibility of an appeal. But contemplating an appeal, without more, doesn’t satisfy either of
the conditions McCormick himself set out for when he wanted to appeal. Thus, there were “two
permissible views of the evidence,” so the district court’s choice between them couldn’t have
been clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

       McCormick raises two alternative arguments, one factual and one legal. The factual
argument gets the same clear-error review described above, but we review the legal argument de
novo. Neill, 937 F.3d at 675–76.

       First, McCormick challenges the district court’s factual finding that counsel consulted
McCormick about an appeal. That finding was based on McCormick’s own testimony that
counsel consulted him, which the district court credited. R. 456, Pg. ID 1652 (“Q. Did [counsel]
ever come to you and talk with you and tell you what the risks, rewards were for appealing? A.
Yes.”); see McCormick, 2022 WL 2528240, at *7.

       Now, McCormick argues the district court shouldn’t have credited his testimony on this
point since it discredited his testimony on other points. McCormick claims that, instead, the
court should have credited counsel’s testimony that he didn’t consult with McCormick. But that
argument fails for the same reason as his last factual argument: the district court had to decide
between two plausible stories, so its choice couldn’t have been clearly erroneous. See Anderson,
470 U.S. at 574. A district court can surely accept a party’s own testimony about whether
 No. 22-5587                         McCormick v. United States                           Page 4

counsel consulted him, especially when that testimony is against his own interest. After all, a
party generally won’t make statements against his own interest unless he believes they’re true.
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). In any event, counsel testified that he
and McCormick discussed an appeal on multiple occasions, further bolstering the district court’s
conclusion.

       Next, McCormick’s legal challenge.           He claims that counsel was ineffective for
consulting him before sentencing rather than after. In other words, McCormick claims that
counsel was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. But the Constitution doesn’t impose
any such obligation. In fact, just the opposite.

       The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to guarantee criminal
defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. But
that right doesn’t prescribe rigid, technical rules. Id. at 688–89. That’s because the Sixth
Amendment doesn’t set a trap for the unwary lawyer; rather, it “ensure[s] that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.” Id. at 689.

       Flores-Ortega follows that pattern.         There, the Court once again rejected a rigid,
technical rule in favor of a standard that ensures the defendant understands his appeal rights.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477–81. The point is for counsel to help the defendant weigh the
pros and cons of taking an appeal. In doing so, counsel must make a “reasonable effort to
discover the defendant’s wishes”—but only if the defendant hasn’t gotten all the necessary
information from another source. Id. at 478–80. For example, counsel need not consult his
client about an appeal if the sentencing court’s instructions were clear and informative. Id. at
479–80. And if the court’s colloquy can relieve counsel of any obligation to consult, surely it’s
also relevant to whether counsel must repeat himself.

       Here, the district court’s model colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court provided McCormick written notice of his appeal
rights. The court instructed McCormick to “talk to [his] lawyer about it” and then sign it when
he was “comfortable.” R. 325, Pg. ID 984. McCormick did so and assured the district court that
he understood.     After that colloquy and counsel’s earlier consultation, McCormick knew
 No. 22-5587                             McCormick v. United States                                       Page 5

everything he needed to decide whether to appeal. That’s all the Sixth Amendment requires. See
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479–80.               Thus, counsel’s decision not to repeat himself was
permissible under the Constitution.

        Our caselaw supports this conclusion. Even without this kind of model colloquy, we
have held that counsel need not repeat information that the defendant’s already received. See
Johnson v. United States, 364 F. App’x 972, 976 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he fact that consultation
occurred in the course of the case rather than after sentencing is not determinative.”); Shelton v.
United States, 378 F. App’x 536, 539 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding it sufficient under Flores-Ortega
that “counsel met with petitioner on the day before sentencing”). The Seventh Circuit agrees.
Bednarski v. United States, 481 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 2007).1

        To be sure, we have also said, “trial counsel has a constitutional duty to consult with
clients about filing an appeal after the trial proceedings have concluded.” Smith v. State of Ohio
Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). But that
statement doesn’t bind us because it was dicta. First, it was made in passing and not critical to
the claim in the case. Smith had nothing to do with the timing of consultation. Rather, the
alleged error in Smith was counsel’s failure to give his client a copy of the appeals court’s
decision in a timely manner. Id. at 432. Second, Smith denied habeas relief, so its discussion of
counsel’s deficiency didn’t contribute to the judgment. See id. at 435–36. Thus, Smith’s isolated
statement isn’t binding. See Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 701–02 (6th Cir. 2019).

        1
          In contrast, the Third Circuit has suggested that Flores-Ortega requires post-sentencing consultation.
United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Wright, 180 F. App’x 348, 349
(3d Cir. 2006). Other circuits haven’t weighed in as clearly. The First Circuit has held that pre-sentencing
consultation was insufficient when counsel told the defendant merely that “his appeal waiver would prevent him
from filing an appeal.” Rojas-Medina v. United States, 924 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019). The Fifth Circuit has
hypothesized that “the bulk of a constitutionally satisfactory consultation” may occur before sentencing but, to our
knowledge, hasn’t ever identified such a consultation. United States v. Cong Van Pham, 722 F.3d 320, 324 n.16
(5th Cir. 2013). The D.C. Circuit has held that counsel failed to consult when it was undisputed that counsel
“advise[d the petitioner] in advance of the sentencing hearing that he would have the right to appeal” but didn’t
consult after sentencing. United States v. Taylor, 339 F.3d 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits have specifically reserved the question. Bostick v. Stevenson, 589 F.3d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 2009); Otero v.
United States, 499 F.3d 1267, 1270 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
 No. 22-5587                            McCormick v. United States                                     Page 6

        In sum, the Constitution doesn’t require counsel to repeat himself, especially when the
district court conducts a model colloquy with the defendant about appeal rights. Here, counsel
followed that commonsense rule and thus was not ineffective.2

                                                      III.

        Finally, McCormick asks us to vacate his guilty plea because he didn’t receive the benefit
of his bargain (an appeal). But there was no bargain here. A bargain requires at least two parties
to exchange promises or performance. See United States v. Simmonds, 62 F.4th 961, 967 (6th
Cir. 2023) (noting that plea agreements are like contracts). McCormick may have expected an
appeal, but the government didn’t promise him that. So there isn’t any bargain to enforce.

        McCormick doesn’t cite any authority allowing us to vacate a plea in this situation. In
fact, the cases he cites suggest we can’t. For example, Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
137 (2009), permits, but does not require, courts to vacate pleas when the government breaches
its agreement. If a defendant isn’t automatically entitled to vacatur when the government
breaches a bargained-for plea agreement, it’s not clear why McCormick would have a right to
vacatur when no one promised him anything.

        McCormick also claims he’s entitled to plea vacatur because the government forfeited
any argument against this remedy by responding to it in a footnote. It’s true that the government
responded to McCormick’s claim in a footnote. But the government wasn’t required to respond
to the argument at all. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 214 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]ppellees do not [forfeit] claims by failing to respond to appellants’ arguments on appeal.”).
And even if the government had to respond, its footnote explained why McCormick’s argument
was meritless.

        Thus, McCormick can’t get out of his guilty plea.

                                              *        *       *

        We affirm.

        2
         Because we don’t disturb the district court’s finding that counsel consulted McCormick about appealing,
we need not reach McCormick’s argument that it was unreasonable for counsel not to consult him.