Court Opinion

ID: 9955779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:17:11.38266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.345427
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re De.R., 2024-Ohio-1183.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: DE.R., DI.R., AND DA.R.             :     APPEAL NO. C-230685
                                                  TRIAL NO. F08-566X
                                            :

                                            :        O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2024

Alana Van Gundy, for Appellant Mother,

Michael Lanzilotta, Guardian Ad Litem for Appellant Mother,

Kacy Eaves, for Appellee De.R.,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Mary M. Salyer,
Assistant Public Defender, Appellee Guardian Ad Litem for the minor children,

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jack Besignano,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job
and Family Services.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}   In this parental termination case, no one disputes that appellant Mother

loves her children and made some steps towards reunification. Unfortunately, a

variety of mental health challenges, stints of incarceration, and a refusal to more

meaningfully engage in reunification processes proved impediments that prompted

appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”) to

seek permanent custody, which the juvenile court granted. On appeal, Mother raises

three challenges to the underlying result: (1) she contests the grant of permanent

custody, (2) she raises evidentiary issues regarding certain testimony presented, and

(3) she questions the initial removal of her youngest child and the termination of her

therapeutic services. Based on a thorough review of the record, the applicable law,

and the arguments raised, we are not persuaded by any of these arguments. We

accordingly affirm the juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of the children to

HCJFS.

                                          I.

       {¶2}   This case involves Mother and her three children, De.R, Di.R., and

Da.R. Ongoing domestic violence concerns spurred the initial encounter between

HCJFS and the family. Following violent incidents between Mother and her paramour

resulting in her traumatic brain injury, HCJFS received an ex parte emergency order

of interim custody for De.R. and Di.R., and it quickly filed a motion for interim

custody, which the juvenile court granted.

       {¶3}   In October 2020, De.R. and Di.R. were adjudicated dependent. The

case plan required Mother to engage in services, including a mental health assessment,

drug testing, parenting classes, and a diagnostic assessment of functioning (“DAF”).

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

She was also required to demonstrate stable housing and income. According to

testimony at trial, during the pendency of the case, although Mother completed the

DAF, she encountered obstacles in complying with her case plan. She was incarcerated

twice, did not maintain employment from at least October 2019 through January 2022

(later obtaining employment at a pizza restaurant), and was discharged from therapy

in January 2022 for a failure to meaningfully engage in the process.

         {¶4}   In November 2020, the court placed De.R. and Di.R. in the temporary

custody of HCJFS, and in January 2021, it extended temporary custody. In March

2021, the court awarded Mother unsupervised visitation with Di.R., which it expanded

in April 2021. But the child was ultimately removed from the home during an

unsupervised visit due to neglect, and HCJFS subsequently suspended unsupervised

visitation. De.R. primarily resided in residential treatment facilities and group homes

based on a variety of mental health challenges, while Di.R. resided in foster care. In

November 2021, HCJFS filed for permanent custody of De.R. and Di.R.

         {¶5}   On March 1, 2022, Da.R. was born prematurely.           Mother hid the

pregnancy from HCJFS and received minimal prenatal care. The juvenile court

granted HCJFS’s ex parte emergency order for custody of Da.R. once the agency

discovered his birth. And a few days later, it granted HCJFS interim custody of the

child.

         {¶6}   In August 2022, HCJFS approved a home study for the children’s great

aunt. All three children were initially placed with their great aunt, but De.R.’s mental

health issues escalated, resulting in several calls to the mobile crisis center. De.R. was

eventually placed at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center College Hill Mental

Health Facility. Di.R. and Da.R.’s placement was also disrupted because HCJFS

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

learned that Di.R. was missing kindergarten. The great aunt eventually concluded that

she was no longer interested in adopting the children. Di.R. and Da.R. accordingly

returned to foster care, placed with the same foster family.

       {¶7}   In January 2023, Da.R. was adjudicated dependent. In February 2023,

the juvenile court held a trial on HCJFS’s motion for permanent custody of De.R. and

Di.R. and for its dispositional request of permanent custody of Da.R. The state called

two witnesses: Ms. Davis, a National Youth Advocate Program (“NYAP”) team lead

who served as Mother’s therapist from September 2021 through January 2022, and

Ms. McCarty, an HCJFS employee who served as the ongoing case worker. Ms. Davis

testified that Mother consistently attended therapy (during her enrollment) but that

she did not make much, if any, progress toward reunification given her refusal to

discuss her children. Ms. McCarty testified to the children’s placement history and the

agency’s ongoing concerns, including visitation, the children’s special needs, Mother’s

mental health and cognitive abilities, and her recent periods of incarceration. HCJFS

also tendered nine exhibits. Over objections from De.R.’s counsel, the court admitted

exhibits 1-4 and 6-9, which included the DAF assessment, NYAP assessments, and the

domestic violence records involving Mother’s previous partner.         These exhibits

showed Mother’s history of “mild mental retardation,” a learning disorder, “borderline

intelligence,” difficulty with short-term memory, a traumatic brain injury, and

cognitive impairments regarding memory and attention.

       {¶8}   Ultimately, in April 2023, the magistrate granted permanent custody of

all three children to HCJFS. Upon reviewing the magistrate’s decision and considering

Mother’s objections, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision. Mother now

appeals.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           II.

       {¶9}    On appeal, Mother raises three assignments of error: (1) the juvenile

court erred in awarding permanent custody, (2) the court erred when it allowed

testimony of Mother’s cognitive ability, and (3) Da.R. should not have been removed

from Mother and Mother’s therapeutic services were prematurely terminated. For

ease of the analysis, we address the first assignment of error last.

                                           A.

       {¶10} In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court erred when it admitted and relied upon testimony conveying Mother’s cognitive

ability and speculated delays. Specifically, she argues that Ms. McCarty’s statements

constituted expert testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 702, and because Ms. McCarty was

not identified as an expert witness, Mother maintains that she could not qualify to

testify in that capacity.

       {¶11} During the permanency trial, Ms. McCarty testified that: (1) the agency

had concerns regarding Mother’s “cognitive abilities and ability to meet the children’s

needs” and (2) “The psychological assessment found that [Mother] functions at a

second grade level. She [h]as sever[e] cognitive delays as well as mental health

concerns and a traumatic brain injury. I believe all three of these affect her ability to

meet the children’s basic needs, especially – and all the children’s special needs since

all three of them have special needs, including medical and mental health concerns.”

No parties objected to the admission of the first statement at trial. The attorney

appointed to represent De.R. objected to the admission of the second statement, but

Mother did not join in that objection.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶12} We typically review the court’s admission of lay testimony for an abuse

of discretion. Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787,

834 N.E.2d 323, ¶ 20 (“Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are within

the broad discretion of the trial court.”). But because Mother failed to join in the

objection, she forfeited all but plain error review. See State v. Jewett, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 11AP-1028, 2013-Ohio-1246, ¶ 40, citing State v. Crosky, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 06AP-816, 2007-Ohio-6533, ¶ 23, fn. 3 (noting an “[a]ppellant’s failure

to object, notwithstanding her co-defendant’s objection, waives all but plain error”);

Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv) (“Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as

error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * *

unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion.”). “Generally, plain error

only applies in situations in which the error ‘ “seriously affects the basic fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process[.]” ’ ” In re C Children, 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-190650 and C-190682, 2020-Ohio-946, ¶ 18, quoting In re J.W., 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-190189, 2019-Ohio-2730, ¶ 7, quoting In re Etter, 134 Ohio

App.3d 484, 492, 731 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist.1998).

       {¶13} Pursuant to Juv.R. 34(I), the rules of evidence apply during a hearing

on a motion for permanent custody. See In re A.E., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 19AP-

782, 19AP-783 and 19AP-784, 2021-Ohio-488, ¶ 46. “[L]ay opinion testimony must

be ‘rationally based on the perception of the witness. Perception connotes sense:

visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. Thus, opinion testimony under Evid.R. 701 must be

based on firsthand, sensory [] knowledge.’ ” Collier v. Bayless, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 27958, 2018-Ohio-3922, ¶ 30, quoting Sec. Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reynolds,

2d Dist. Greene No. 2007 CA 66, 2008-Ohio-4145, ¶ 17; see Evid.R. 701.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶14} Here, HCJFS did not present Ms. McCarty—the family’s case worker—

as an expert. In her capacity as case worker, Ms. McCarty observed Mother firsthand

during supervised visitation. She shared that some of Mother’s behavior during visits

generated concerns about Mother’s cognitive ability and, ultimately, her ability to care

for the children. But Ms. McCarty did not have firsthand knowledge regarding the

psychological assessment or the traumatic brain injury diagnosis to which she

testified. And further, the psychological assessment was conducted by an outside

agency, not HCJFS.

       {¶15} But with our review limited to plain error, we hold that Mother does not

satisfy this high burden. In this case, the challenged statements are cumulative of

other evidence provided at trial—including psychological reports admitted at trial (to

which Mother did not object at trial nor contest on appeal) that demonstrate her

history of “mild mental retardation,” a learning disorder, “borderline intelligence,”

difficulty with short-term memory, a history of a traumatic brain injury, and cognitive

impairments regarding memory and attention.

       {¶16} Accordingly, in light of the record, the admission of the testimony at

trial does not constitute plain error, as it largely overlaps with other admitted (and not

objected to) evidence. Therefore, we overrule Mother’s second assignment of error.

                                           B.

       {¶17} In Mother’s third assignment of error, she maintains (1) that Da.R.

should not have been removed from her care, and (2) that he was not in custody of

HCJFS for 12 months before the agency stopped her therapeutic services.

       {¶18} Mother failed to raise these issues in her objections to the magistrate’s

decision granting permanent custody of Da.R. to HCJFS. Consequently, she waived

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

all but plain error review. In re L.S., 5th Dist. Richland No. 2022 CA 00054, 2022-

Ohio-3811, ¶ 36; Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv). As noted above, we generally limit plain error

to “situations in which the error ‘ “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of the judicial process[.]” ’ ” In re C Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-190650 and C-190682, 2020-Ohio-946, at ¶ 18, quoting In re J.W., 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-190189, 2019-Ohio-2730, at ¶ 7, quoting In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d

at 492, 731 N.E.2d 694.

       {¶19} Regarding the removal issue, at the interim custody hearing, Mother

stipulated that she did not oppose the request for interim custody.             She was

represented by counsel at this hearing, and based on the record, we have no reason to

believe the stipulation was not knowing and voluntary. The court relied on this

stipulation (along with the evidence provided and the best interest of the child) in its

decision to grant interim custody to HCJFS. Thus, the removal of Da.R. does not

constitute plain error.

       {¶20} Turning to the termination of Mother’s therapeutic services, she

contests that HCJFS stopped her therapy sessions before the birth of Da.R. Although

Mother does not explicitly challenge the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts finding, we

interpret this issue as an argument that HCJFS failed to make reasonable efforts

towards reunification under R.C. 2151.419.

       {¶21} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.419(A)(1), HCJFS must make “reasonable efforts

* * * to make it possible for the child to return safely home.” “ ‘In a reasonable efforts

determination, the issue is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether

it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard under the statute.’ ” In re J.L., 1st

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Dist. Hamilton No. C-210586, 2022-Ohio-2885, ¶ 16, quoting In re Wayne Y., 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1259, 2008-Ohio-245, ¶ 18.

       {¶22} Mother insists that HCJFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite

her with Da.R. because it terminated her therapeutic services in January 2022, prior

to Da.R.’s birth in March 2022. Mother initially engaged in the therapeutic services

coordinated by HCJFS, but after her first therapist left, she refused to discuss her

children during therapy. Her second therapist testified that her progress stalled, and

that there was not substantial enough progress for her to remain in the program based

on the boundaries created by Mother. Because Mother refused to discuss her children

and HCJFS no longer believed reunification was possible, it terminated her

therapeutic services.     HCJFS continued to provide visitation services, case

management, and bus cards. Mother does not explain how she would have engaged

differently in therapeutic services following the birth of Da.R., and she was

incarcerated for two periods following Da.R.’s birth, which made it difficult for her to

engage in the services HCJFS offered, such as visitation. Ultimately, surveying this

record, the magistrate found that HCJFS made reasonable efforts aimed at

reunification.

       {¶23} Based upon this record, we see nothing that satisfies the high burden of

plain error based on the removal of Da.R. or the termination of certain services. Thus,

we overrule Mother’s third assignment of error.

                                          C.

       {¶24} Turning to the ultimate termination decision, Mother contests the

juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody of De.R., Di.R., and Da.R. to

HCJFS, challenging the best interest finding on both sufficiency and manifest weight

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

grounds. “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of appeals

should affirm a trial court when ‘ “the evidence is legally sufficient to support the []

verdict as a matter of law.” ’ ” Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-

Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386,

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). And

when reviewing a grant of permanent custody to HCJFS, we “tak[e] a fresh look at the

evidence to see whether it clearly and convincingly supports the court’s decision.” In

re M/E, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200349, 2021-Ohio-450, ¶ 8, citing In re C Children,

1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-190650 and C-190682, 2020-Ohio-946, at ¶ 8.

       {¶25} When reviewing for manifest weight, however, this court “must weigh

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses,

and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must

be reversed and a new trial ordered.” In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶

14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶

20. In weighing the evidence, we “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor

of the finder of fact.” Id., citing Eastley at ¶ 21.

       {¶26} After successfully obtaining temporary custody following an R.C.

2151.353(A)(2) abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication, HCJFS sought permanent

custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(A). The juvenile court should only grant an agency’s

motion for permanent custody if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1)

one of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (e) is satisfied, and (2) it is in

the child’s best interest, pursuant to the factors listed in subsection (D)(1). See R.C.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2151.414 (B)(1), (D)(1); In re F.B., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200320, 2020-Ohio-5610,

¶ 17-18.

        {¶27} On appeal, Mother contests only the second prong of the permanent

custody analysis—whether the juvenile court’s finding that awarding HCJFS

permanent custody of the children is in the best interest of the children. The first

prong—one of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e)—was clearly

satisfied for De.R. and Di.R. as the children were in the temporary custody of HCJFS

for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period when the agency filed the

motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody.                     See R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d). At the time of filing, Da.R. had not been in HCJFS custody for 12

months, and based on the evidence contained in the record, it is unclear if any of the

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) conditions were satisfied regarding Da.R. But because Mother

does not advance this argument, we must limit our review to the second prong.

Accordingly, we proceed to the best interest analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) for all

three children.

        {¶28} In conducting the best interest analysis, “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires

that a court consider all relevant factors, including those delineated in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” In re Z.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200061, 2020-

Ohio-3100, ¶ 17.     But “no single factor is given greater weight or heightened

significance.” In re P. & H., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-190309 and C-190310, 2019-

Ohio-3637, ¶ 35, citing In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816,

¶ 57.

        {¶29} The court first considered R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), which evaluates the

children’s interaction and relationship with their “parents, siblings, relatives, foster

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly

affect the child[ren].” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). The court acknowledged that Mother

loves her children, and that De.R. and Di.R. love her and are happy to see her. The

case worker testified that Da.R. has less of a relationship with Mother than the other

children because he was removed from her care shortly after birth.            The court

expressed its concerns regarding her interactions with the children given her mental

health issues, her cognitive abilities, and her struggle to understand De.R.’s mental

health needs.

       {¶30} Because of mental health concerns and an intellectual disability, De.R.

has primarily resided in residential treatment facilities or group homes since her

removal from Mother’s home. Di.R. and Da.R. reside together in a foster home. They

are bonded to each other and to their current foster parents, and they get along with

the three other children in the home. Di.R. and Da.R.’s current foster family expressed

their desire to adopt both children, and HCJFS was working to secure a group home

placement for De.R. who, at the time of trial, received in-patient mental health services

at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital.

       {¶31} Next, the court considered the children’s wishes.                See R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(b). During the trial, the attorney appointed to represent De.R.’s

interests indicated that she wished to return home to Mother. De.R., age 13, however,

changed her mind, and at the hearing on the objections, her counsel indicated that she

did not wish to return to Mother’s custody and that she supported the grant of

permanent custody to HCJFS. Di.R., age five, and Da.R., age 11 months, were too

young to express their wishes. The court acknowledged that their guardian ad litem

recommended a grant of permanent custody to HCJFS as in their best interest. See

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) (noting the juvenile court should consider “[t]he wishes of the

child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with

due regard for the maturity of the child”).

       {¶32} Turning to the custodial history of the children, see R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(c), the evidence established that De.R. and Di.R. were removed from

Mother’s home in November 2019, and at the time of trial, they had been in HCJFS

custody for three years and three months. Regarding Da.R., the evidence established

that he was placed in HCJFS care three days after his birth, and at the time of the

hearing, he had been in the custody of HCJFS for 11 months.

       {¶33} Thereafter, the court considered the children’s “need for a legally secure

permanent placement and whether that type of placement [could] be achieved without

a grant of permanent custody to [HCJFS].” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). The record

demonstrates that while Mother progressed to unsupervised expanded visitation with

Di.R. earlier in the family’s case, Di.R. had to be removed from Mother’s home during

a visit. Consequently, HCJFS terminated unsupervised visitation, and since that time,

Mother did not progress beyond supervised visitation with any of the children. Mother

was incarcerated twice during the pendency of this case, and consequently, she was

unable to visit with the children during periods of summer 2022 and winter 2023.

       {¶34} The record also details concerns regarding Mother’s mental health and

cognitive abilities, including NYAP reports from 2019 and 2020 detailing her struggles

with PTSD, depression, anxiety, paranoia, a traumatic brain injury, mood swings,

memory and attention impairment, and suspected cognitive delays. Although Mother

initially engaged in therapy, her progress stalled, and she was ultimately discharged

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

from therapy due to her lack of progress towards reunification and unwillingness to

discuss her children.

       {¶35} De.R. and Di.R. both have significant behavioral and mental health

needs and have been diagnosed with PTSD. De.R. has received care for suicidal and

homicidal ideation in numerous residential facilities throughout this case. The NYAP

reports provide that Mother lacked age-appropriate insight and judgment into the

nature of mental illness. Additionally, Da.R. has significant health needs requiring

medical appointments and physical therapy. Based on this evidence, the juvenile court

found that Mother cannot meet the needs of the children.

       {¶36} Finally, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) requires the court to consider whether

any factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) applies. The court considered all

of these factors and found none of them applied to Mother.

       {¶37} The record demonstrates that the juvenile court properly considered the

relevant statutory factors and weighed the factors to find it is in the best interest of

De.R., Di.R., and Da.R. to be placed in the permanent custody of HCJFS. Based on

these facts, the juvenile court’s best interest finding was supported by sufficient

evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we

overrule Mother’s first assignment of error.

                                    *      *      *

       {¶38} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mother’s assignments

of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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