Court Opinion

ID: 9771997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:04:36.534629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.116713
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the summary judgment proof properly before the trial court raised a material issue of fact as to causation, and the case must be remanded. I write separately only because I disagree with the majority’s discussion of the last sentence of Rule 166a(f), Tex.R.Civ.P.1 In my view, there is nothing mysterious about the use of the word “reversal” in Rule 166a(f), and its proper interpretation is both straightforward and fair. Therefore, there is no basis to suggest or *391imply that Rule 166a(f) may not be applied in an appropriate ease. This just isn’t such a case.
Before the 1986 enactment of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, there was no general rule for appellate preservation of error in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, to the extent preservation rules could be found in the rules, they were contextually located and frequently phrased in terms of “reversal.” For instance, the charge preservation rules were and are found in the charge rules, and Rule 278 provides that the “[fjailure to submit a question shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment, unless its submission, in substantially correct wording, has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment-” Tex.R.Civ.P. 278 (emphasis added). That the last sentence of Rule 166a(f) speaks only in terms of “reversal” is not mysterious. Neither is it unfair in its operation.
If a party moves for summary judgment, and there is a defect in the form of his supporting affidavits or attachments, the burden is on the non-movant to specifically point out the defect by a proper objection at a time when the movant can amend or otherwise cure the defect. See Tex.R.Cxv.P. 166a(f). If the non-movant properly objects, and the trial court erroneously overrules the objection, the non-movant may raise the incorrect ruling on the objection as a ground for reversing the summary judgment. Id. If the non-movant fails to object, he may not raise the defect in the form of the affidavits or attachments as a ground for reversal. Id. Indeed, the last sentence of Rule 166a(f) is simply a codification of the supreme court’s holding in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex.1962). Therefore, unlike the majority, I believe the last sentence of Rule 166a(f) fully comports with “traditional concepts of legal fairness” on appeal — the burden is on the party seeking reversal to bring forward a record demonstrating that she “presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desires the court to make,” as well as “a ruling upon the party’s request, objection or motion.” Tex.R.App.P. 52(a); Tex.R.App.P. 50(d); see generally Timothy Patton, SUMMARY Judgments in Texas §§ 6.09[1], 6.09[3] (Butterworth 1992) (written objection and ruling required to preserve complaint as to defect in form).
Rule 166a(f) thus expressly precludes reversal absent a timely objection. But that is not the situation here. Knetsch does not seek reversal on the ground of a formal defect in Dr. Gaitonde’s summary judgment proof. Rather, he seeks a reversal because Dr. Kogan’s affidavit raises a material issue of fact as to causation. It is Dr. Gaitonde who seeks an affirmance of the summary judgment on the ground that the defects in Dr. Kogan’s affidavit and the missing attachments render the affidavit incompetent to raise a material issue of fact. It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Gaitonde did not object to Dr. Kogan’s affidavit on any ground. The real issue before us, therefore, is whether Knetseh’s failure to attach the documents upon which Dr. Kogan relies is a waivable formal defect or a non-waivable substantive defect.
In my view, the failure to attach the documents upon which an expert’s affidavit relies is a purely formal and, therefore, waivable defect. Cf. Youngstown, 363 S.W.2d at 234 (“The deficiencies which [Youngstown] now urges appear to be purely formal, and it may be assumed that they would have been corrected upon proper exception in the trial court.”) Accordingly, while I agree with the Ceballos2 majority that the last sentence of Rule 166a(f) applies only in cases in which a reversal is sought because of a defect in the form of an affidavit or attachment, I do not agree that the failure to attach supporting documents is a non-waivable substantive defect. Likewise, while I disagree with the Ceballos dissent that the last sentence in Rule 166a(f) applies equally in cases in which the movant seeks affirmance, I agree that the defect is a waivable defect of form.
*392In short, Dr. Kogan’s affidavit was properly before the trial court and, because it raises a material issue of fact, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.

. “Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend.” TexR.CivP. 166a(f).

. Ceballos v. El Paso Health Care Sys., 881 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1994, writ denied).