Court Opinion

ID: 9534329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:40.549379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:18.118856
License: Public Domain

Seinfeld, C.J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. To reverse the attorney’s fee award, we must find that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 65, 738 P.2d 665 (1987); Carle v. McChord Credit Union, 65 Wn. App. 93, 111, 827 P.2d 1070 (1992). For us to make this finding, the record must show that the trial court exercised its considerable discretion on untenable grounds, for untenable reasons, or in a manifestly unreasonable fashion. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). Considering the paucity of the record before us, I believe there is no basis to conclude that the trial court’s refusal to rely on the lodestar formula was a manifest abuse of discretion.
Our primary concern in reviewing an attorney fee award is whether it was reasonable. Allard v. First Interstate Bank, 112 Wn.2d 145, 153, 768 P.2d 998, 773 P.2d 420 (1989). In making its award, the trial court must consider the factors articulated in RPC 1.5(a). One such factor is the attorney-client fee arrangement. Allard, 112 Wn.2d at 149-50. "The presence of a pre-existing fee arrangement may aid in determining reasonableness. *247" ' "The fee quoted to the client or the percentage of the recovery agreed to is helpful in demonstrating attorney’s fee expectations'when he accepted the case.” ’ ” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93, 109 S. Ct. 939, 103 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1989) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 723, 107 S. Ct. 3078, 97 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1987) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (1974))).
Here, the trial court stated, "I think I should clarify what I did before in reaching my decision on attorney’s fees — I considered all the factors that the cases require that I consider.” The trial court did not use the contingent fee arrangement as a ceiling on the amount of fees awarded, as did the trial court in Blanchard. Rather, it properly considered the attorney-client fee arrangement along with the other factors. Had it not done so, and instead relied solely on the lodestar formula as Martinez argues, it would have erred. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141, 150-51, 859 P.2d 1210 (1993).
Further, a comparison of plaintiff’s recovery to his demand is relevant and critical in awarding attorney’s fees.
"Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of . . . civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought.” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585[, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2700, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466] (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Such a comparison promotes the court’s "central” responsibility to "make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case.” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989). Having considered the amount and nature of damages awarded, the court may lawfully award low fees or no fees without reciting the 12 factors bearing on reasonableness, see Hensley [ v. Eckerhart], 461 U.S. [424,] 430, n.3, [103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937-38, n.3, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), ] or multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended ... by a reasonable hourly rate[.]” [Hensley, 461 U.S.] at 433.
*248Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-15, 113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992).
Following federal case law, the Washington Supreme Court held that the "extent of the plaintiffs success [on his discrimination claim] is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of attorney fees under a civil rights action.” Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wn.2d 558, 572, 740 P.2d 1379 (1987) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. 424). The Washington Supreme Court reiterated its reliance on this factor in Scott Fetzer.
[A] lodestar figure which grossly exceeds the amount involved should suggest a downward adjustment. . . . "[T]he lodestar method, having no relation to the amount involved, may lead to an attorney’s fee which is equal to or exceeds the judgment recovered. . . .” Bowers [ v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d 581,] 607[, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)] (Dimmick J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). While the amount in dispute does not create an absolute limit on fees, that figure’s relationship to the fees requested or awarded is a vital consideration when assessing their reasonableness.
Scott Fetzer, 122 Wn.2d at 150.
The City’s characterization of the $8,000 verdict as "only limited success” appears accurate in light of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking $4,000,000, their settlement demand of $240,000, and their argument to the jury for $295,238. Thus, the trial court’s reliance on this factor was entirely appropriate.
I share the majority’s concern for those seeking redress for discriminatory acts and agree with its interpretation of the statute’s intent. However, this is a manifest abuse of discretion case. The issue before us is not whether we would have awarded a different amount than the trial court, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. The majority’s effort to make it "financially feasible to litigate discrimination claims” ignores the fact that appellant failed to provide a complete trial record. Thus, we do not know the particular facts of this case. Furthermore, the majority’s ruling annuls the trial court’s considerable *249discretion to award attorney’s fees based on the facts of the particular case before it.
Martinez neither presents persuasive argument nor identifies any unresolved legal principles in support of his contention that the significance of this case caused the attorney’s fee award to be inappropriate. Nor does the record support the majority’s speculative statement that the "identity of the defendant made the case . . . more difficult to win.” Absent a trial record, we know few facts about the underlying incident or the procedural details.
In view of (1) the trial court’s broad discretion to determine attorney’s fees; (2) the trial court’s superior position to determine the subjective degree of success of the plaintiff; (3) the trial court’s consideration of the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a); and (4) this court’s inability to, know what evidence of discrimination Martinez presented to the jury due to the absence of a full trial record, we are not in a position to second guess the trial court’s determination of a reasonable attorney fee. Moreover, the majority’s remand for "recalculation of a reasonable fee” provides no guidelines to aid the trial court in revisiting its earlier reasoned decision.
I would affirm.
Review denied at 130 Wn.2d 1010 (1996).