Court Opinion

ID: 9728808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:16:51.410448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.260640
License: Public Domain

COBEY, J.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment. With all due deference to my colleagues of the majority, the court’s opinion in this case is a classic example of making a mountain out of a molehill—the molehill being *247mental suffering or mental distress. A specific sum of money for this element of damages was never sought nor mentioned in this case and counsel for the Richardsons mentioned such damages only once in his lengthy arguments to the jury.1
I believe the majority is wrong in holding that such damages should not have been considered by the jury and also in their further holding that the misconduct of counsel for the Richardsons constituted reversible error.
The majority hold that the giving of the modified BAJI No. 14.13 instruction.2 constitutes reversible error because, in their words, there was neither evidence of “severe emotional distress” nor evidence of “substantial damages” of this character. Their reliance on the cases of Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.App.3d 376 [89 Cal.Rptr. 78], and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425 [58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173], for these supposed requirements is misplaced. In Fletcher liability was based solely upon the distinct and separate tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (pp. 384-385) rather than upon, as here, the breach of an insurer’s duty of good faith to its own insured. In Crisci $25,000' of the $116,000 damage award was expressly for mental suffering (p. 427). Here, *248as the majority concedes, we do not know whether the jury’s verdicts actually included anything for this element of damages.
Furthermore, in the record before us there is some evidence, albeit slight, of mental distress upon the part of the Richardsons over unpaid bills and their borrowing funds for transportation incidental to the medical treatment of their injuries. A wronged person is entitled to recover all the detriment proximately caused him (see Civ. Code, § 3333), and a party is entitled to have a requested instruction given if there is any evidence upon which to base it, even though that evidence be slight or incpnclusive. (See Ziegler v. Santa Cruz etc. School Dist., 193 Cal.App.2d 200, 203 [13 Cal.Rptr. 912], hg. den.)
In any event, the giving of the modified form of BAJI No. 14.13 cannot be reversible error. As just indicated, in view of the general nature of the verdicts, it is impossible for any of us to determine whether this instruction had any effect on the verdicts. Therefore, we cannot say that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Employers would have been reached in the absence of this supposed error. This being the case, the supposed error cannot be reversible error. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, §- 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; Smith v. Sugich Co., 179 Cal.App.2d 299, 313 [3 Cal.Rptr. 718].)
As already indicated, I also disagree with the majority’s position that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny Employers’ motion, for a mistrial. The motion was made because at one point in the trial counsel for the Richardsons had on the counsel table, exposed to view, along with other things, a copy of an article from a legal newspaper, headlined “Didn’t Settle In Policy Limits; Ok Mental Suffering Award.” When misconduct on the part of counsel occurs during a trial, the trial court must decide whether its possibly prejudicial effect upon the jury can be cured by the immediate giving of a corrective instruction. The trial court so decided in this case after a lengthy and somewhat elaborate investigation of the attendant circumstances. Furthermore, it denied a motion for new trial based partially upon this misconduct.
It has, been said that a trial court is in a much better position than an appellate court to determine whether a verdict has been influenced by misconduct of counsel and that its conclusion of nonprejudice should not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong. (Lafargue v. United Railroads, 183 Cal. 720, 724 [192 P. 538]; see also 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Trial, § 164, p. 2984.)
*249I find no abuse of discretion in the way the trial court handled the misconduct of counsel in this case. In any event, again, if the court erred, such error cannot be reversible error for the reasons I have already given,
I view the combined damage award in this case as consisting of $2,500 in compensatory damages3 and $172,500 in punitive damages, I do not regard this award of punitive damages as excessive in view of Employers’ gross wealth of over $285,000,000 and its unconscionable conduct. (See Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 18 Cal.App.3d 266, 270-272 [95 Cal.Rptr. 678]—$1,050 actual damages, $200,000 punitive damages.)
I would affirm since I find no error, reversible or otherwise.
Petition for a rehearing was denied May 23, 1972. Cobey, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied May 23 and June 9, 1972. Cobey, J., was of the opinion that the respondents’ petition should be granted. Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 19,1972.

In his opening argument to the jury counsel for the Richardsons said:
“On top of all that she [Florence Richardson] had been put through, and was being put through daily in this case, of having the persons, the creditors call, the doctors ask her for payment, the various people along the time asking her to do something more than she could; and here continuously the consequences, on top of her injury of being unable to respond to their requests except to say she had this policy and the company was supposed to pay and they wouldn’t. I think that you can fully appreciate what the consequences are on somebody lying in a hospital bed this on of that.
“His Honor will instruct you as far as the measure of such damages with respect to the anxiety, the mental distress, the problem that this would cause, and for you to determine what evaluation this type of injury would be appropriate.
“Similarly with Walter Richardson. . . . [A]nd that to add to this, to the additional indignity that was added by the company to put him in the position of receiving calls from people to pay bills that he couldn’t pay because the company wouldn’t make their payment to him that they were obligated to. I think you can evaluate with the Court’s instructions on mental distress and on the nature of the injuries that he sustained what would be an appropriate evaluation for his claim.”

This instruction reads:
“Reasonable compensation for any . . . fears, anxiety and other mental and emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff[s] and of which [their] injury was a proximate cause....
“No definite standard ... is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in the light of the evidence.”

As so viewed, the compensatory damage award of $2,500 consists of $1,333 in additional attorney’s fees, $663.60 in costs of arbitration and $503.07 in interest for late payment of the claim.