Court Opinion

ID: 9451069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:05:38.734515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:33.654297
License: Public Domain

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
In overturning these judgments in favor of one injured seaman and the surviving dependents of another, the court, I submit, takes too narrow a view of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 78 S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958). That case emphasizes that an “accommodating scope” must be given to the word “agents” in order to effectuate the purposes of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.1
We are dealing here with no simple case of “independent contractor.” As Sinkler teaches, a finding that the cab owner was an independent contractor does not end the inquiry. He may still be an agent within the FELA if he is an integral part of the employer’s enterprise and is performing an “operational activity,” particularly a statutory obligation due an employee. We must consider *424the nature of the employer’s business, the relationship of the so-called independent contractor to the employer, and the character of the duty owed by the employer to the two seamen which was being carried out by the driver at the time of the collision.
What may have seemed at common law to be a self-evident proposition — that an employer is immunized from liability to his employee for an independent contractor’s negligence — no longer necessarily prevails since the enactment of the FELA.2 To prevent “erosion” of this law by “narrow and niggardly construction,” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507-509, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1956), we are admonished by Sinkler to take a broad view of the “operational activities” test.3 We must strive to envisage the entire pattern of acitivies performed for Texaco by the two “taxicab” owners, John Abhiram and Willie Chattergoon, rather than isolating and focusing on one single incident— the trip on which the seamen were injured — as though it were unrelated to other events and to Texaco’s total enterprise. The carriage in question was not a casual transaction. It was part of an established system in the conduct of the defendant’s business.
Texaco, Inc., through a wholly owned subsidiary, maintains an oil refinery at Pointe-a-Pierre on the island of Trinidad. Texaco’s vessels regularly visit there, take on cargoes from the refinery and embark for various ports. On April 17, 1963, the S.S. TEXACO WISCONSIN, one of the defendant’s tankers, was loading a cargo of oil, intending to proceed via the Panama Canal to San Diego, California, when two of the crew, Hopson and Reynolds, became ill. The master concluded that they should not continue on the voyage as they required more expeditious treatment. He decided to arrange for their discharge and repatriation. For this purpose it was necessary for the master and the ill crewmen to present themselves to the American consul at Port-of-Spain, 38 miles from Pointe-a-Pierre; for under the law only the consul is authorized to discharge an American seaman in a foreign port.
Texaco maintained a fleet of automobiles for use chiefly within the confines of the refinery; but for the carriage of persons and documents beyond the refinery enclosure it had a standing arrangement with two cab owners, John Abhiram and Willie Chattergoon. Each handled about half of this Texaco business, which consisted of frequent trips to Port-of-Spain, the capital and principal city of Trinidad.4 They also made trips to Texaco’s infirmary, located about five miles from the refinery. Texaco availed itself of this service exclusively and regularly — “quite a lot” according *425to Texaco’s shipping agent. One of the taxicab owners testified that he made two or three trips a week carrying documents or personnel to Port-of-Spain for Texaco.
On the occasion in question one of these, Abhiram, was selected by the husbanding agent of the tanker to take the master and the ill crewmen to the consul.5 On the way, the cab collided with a bus; Reynolds was killed and Hopson seriously injured. The question of the cab driver’s negligence was contested in the District Court but, the jury having found that his negligence was the cause of the collision, Texaco does not dispute the point in this court.
It is conceded that the two crewmen were still in the ship’s service at the time of the collision. It is not denied that 46 U.S.C.A. § 682 strictly requires any discharge of a crewman in a foreign port to be made by a consular officer. The proposition the appellants advance, and which the court accepts, is that the ride on which the sick crewmen were being taken, in the company of the master, for the purpose of having them discharged by the consul and ultimately repatriated, was “simply a collateral activity,” not an operational activity, and had “nothing to do with the actual operation of a ship,” or as alternatively stated, was “not a part of Texaco’s enterprise.” To these restrictive characterizations I cannot consent.
It was indeed, as the majority opinion points out, not a daily task to transport sick seamen to the consul; but how significant is this ? That on this particular occasion the passengers were a master and his ill seamen, while at other times the arrangement with Abhiram and Chat-tergoon was used to carry persons who were not sick and not expected to be discharged from service, is not a meaningful distinction. The answer turns on the nature of the habitual journeys of Abhiram and Chattergoon on behalf of Texaco, not on the frequency with which seamen happen to fall ill and are taken ashore, whether for treatment nearby, or for discharge and repatriation with a view to treatment arranged for them elsewhere.
Abhiram and Chattergoon served Texaco regularly as the overall needs of the company required. In amplification of his testimony that Abhiram and Chatter-goon were used “quite a lot,” Carte further commented that “this car [Ab-hiram’s] is used by us from day to day * * * ”; and noted that the various ships’ captains “used those cars all the time.” In particular, when a Texaco ship was to put in at a port requiring prior consular certification, these drivers were used to take the necessary documents to the appropriate consulate in Port-of-Spain. The same arrangement was utilized whenever crewmen on Texaco’s ships became ill and required treatment in Texaco’s infirmary.6
Texaco’s ships could not sail without consular certifications, and Texaco was required to .provide medical care for its ill seamen. Thus these activities were clearly an essential part of its total shipping enterprise, and bringing the master and the sick seamen to the consul that morning falls within the term “opera*426tional activity.” This term is not limited to the manipulation of the ship’s gear. It includes the recruitment of the crew and furnishing of maintenance and cure to seamen when ill. It is no undue extension of the term to include the transporting of seamen to the consulate preparatory to their discharge for repatriation. Caring for these ill seamen was no less an operational activity because it was not to be performed aboard the vessel.7
The fortuitous circumstance that the shipowner maintained its own vehicles for some purposes and had steady arrangements with two taxicab owners to run various errands between the pier and the consul’s office, which is located at a somewhat greater distance, instead of using its own vehicles for all purposes, should not alter the responsibility of the ship. When a seaman becomes ill he is particularly in the master’s care. In fact, the very trip that resulted in tragedy was an essential preliminary step in the performance of the inescapable duty of maintenance and cure.8
There is no valid ground on which to distinguish the instant case from Carney v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 316 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1963). There the defendant railroad had a project near Youngstown, Ohio, on which the plaintiff was working. Rather than transfer the worker to Youngstown — where he could pay his own expenses — the railroad agreed to pay his room and board at the local YMCA. This arrangement with the railroad accounted for no more than 3% of the use of the Y’s facilities. The employee was injured when he fell from a negligently maintained bed in the Y, and the railroad was held responsible on the theory that the Y was its agent. The court said:
“[I]n supplying those services to plaintiff by arrangement with the railroad, [the Y] was performing operational activities of plaintiff’s employer * * *. He was there under the specific agreement with his employer that he would retain his out of town status and that the railroad would pay for his living expenses.” 316 F.2d at 279.
It is noteworthy that Carney could sleep in the Y or not, as he desired, while Hopson and Reynolds had no voice in the selection of the means used to effectuate their discharge and repatriation.
Nor can Texaco be absolved on the ground that it did not stand to “benefit” from taking Hopson and Reynolds to the consul, for it cannot possibly be maintained that the performance of its statutory duty to the men was not beneficial to it. Surely no test of operational activity is acceptable which inquires only whether the employer is directly benefited and rules out whatever benefits the employees. It is enough that the employer benefits from the employees’ services as members of the crew. An employer will not be permitted to say that only what brings him direct profit is covered by the law, disregarding his concomitant obligation to the employees. The stark simplicity of the proposed test is insensitive to the underlying policy of the FELA and the Jones Act.9
*427Within our own circuit, the transportation of workmen to and from their place of employment was recently held to be an “operational activity.” Leek v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 200 F.Supp. 368, 370 (N.D.W.Va.1962). The case was not appealed. There a railroad employee was permitted to recover under FELA for injuries sustained through the negligent operation of a taxicab provided by the railroad to take employees home at the end of the day. Similarly, taking the ill seamen to the consul for discharge and repatriation is an operational activity without which a ship cannot function as the statute requires. There is no legally significant difference between the transportation of an employee by an employer when he is released for the day and the transportation of crewmen preparatory to their discharge. Indeed, if there were any distinction, the present case would seem the stronger of the two.
A most exhaustive analysis of the Sinkler doctrine is found in Mangrum v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 230 Cal.App.2d 960, 41 Cal.Rptr. 536, 543-548 (Dist.Ct.App.1964). There a railroad was held liable for the negligence of a doctor retained by the employer to treat an ill employee. Although the doctor was a private practitioner on the staff of four different hospitals, received no salary from, and was subject to no control by, the railroad,10 it was held:
“[T]he doctor was engaged in an operational activity of the railroad, one necessary to carry out its franchise, * * * for a railroad cannot operate properly without a full healthy crew.” Id. at 548. (Emphasis added.)
And the railroad was required to answer for the doctor’s conduct as an “agent.” Similarly, the S.S. TEXACO WISCONSIN could not function without a healthy crew. The trip to Port-of-Spain to arrange for discharge of the ill seamen with a view to medical care was so intimately related to this function as to make it an operational activity and to make Abhiram an FELA agent.
The majority opinion prefers the reasoning of two pre-Sinkler cases to that of post-Sinkler decisions applying the “operational activities” standard. Neither of the two cases relied on by the court11 discussed the “operational activities” concept under the FELA or under the common law. Moreover, McCall is distinguishable, for the crewmen had already been discharged.12
My brethren take “judicial notice” that it is “virtually impossible for a shipowner to carry its own shore-side means of transportation from one port to another or for it to own, operate, or control shore-side transportation facilities in every port and every part of the world.” Preliminarily, it is to be noted that the defendant did have vehicular facilities at Pointe-a-Pierre, where it maintained a large refinery, shipping office, pier and other installations, and made use of its customary arrangement with Abhiram on the date of the collision.
. But more to the point, it is not unfair to suggest that a court should take judicial notice that the sick seamen were in a far less favorable position than their employer to arrange independent means of transportation to the consulate. Hop-son and Reynolds were not on a mission of their own and the choice of means was not theirs. Their dependence upon the master was not a whit less in the car than at sea.
*428The proper approach in Jones Act cases was expounded over thirty years ago by Justice Cardozo for a unanimous Court:
“[T]he act is to be liberally construed in aid of its beneficent purpose to give protection to the seaman and to those dependent on his earnings.” Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 375, 53 S.Ct. 173, 176, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1932).
This is the same philosophy taught by Sinkler. The language from Cortes which my brethren quote is, it seems to me, misapplied. The Court’s opinion did observe that “[t]he conditions at sea differ widely from those on land, and the diversity of conditions breeds diversity of duties.” The majority opinion seems to read Justice Cardozo’s words as expressing a limitation of liability when a seaman is injured on land rather than aboard ship; but the entire context of the Cortes quotation makes clear that it was meant to enlarge, not contract, the protection afforded to seamen, for immediately thereafter the Court added, significantly, that “[o]ut of this relation of dependence and submission there emerges for the stronger party a corresponding standard or obligation of fostering protection.”
This is not to say that the ship became an insurer of the seaman’s safety on the journey to the consul’s office. If injury had befallen the seamen on the way, without negligence on the part of the ship’s agent, the ship would not be liable under the Jones Act. Nor is a carrier liable for negligence committed by its independent contractor in the performance of acts that do not constitute an operational activity. But it ignores the essence of the matter to treat this undertaking in the execution of a statutory duty to employees like the simple case where a defendant has accommodatingly called a taxicab for one wishing to go somewhere on his own business.13
It is more consonant with justice and the spirit of the Jones Act for the shipowner to be held to its statutory obligation in the present action and then for it to bring suit as subrogee against Ab-hiram in Trinidad where the shipowner does business regularly, than to remit the plaintiffs to their remedy against Ab-hiram in distant Trinidad.
In summary, Texaco having arranged with Abhiram and Chattergoon to serve its transportation needs between Pointe-a-Pierre and Port-of-Spain, rather than performing this work with its own vehicles, this carriage was an operational activity no less than the switching of cars in Sinkler, the transportation by taxicab in Leek, the use of the YMCA’s beds in Carney and the doctor’s services in Mangrum.
I would affirm the judgments of the District Court.

. The standards for determining an employer’s liability under the FELA have been incorporated into the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1958).

. At common law the doctrine of respon-deat superior did not extend to cases where an independent contractor’s negligence caused an employee’s injury. This was the rule applied by the lower court in Sinkler and rejected by the Supreme Court as inappropriate in FELA cases where the independent contractor was engaged in an “operational activity” on behalf of the employer. Even at common law, however, as Justice Brennan points out in Sinkler, a number of courts recognized that merely labeling a relationship as “independent contractor” did not shield an employer from liability when the negligence arose in the performance of certain phases of the carrier’s activities.

. “[J]ustice demands that one who gives his labor to the furtherance of the enterprise should be assured that all combining their exertions with him in the common pursuit will conduct themselves in all respects with sufficient care that his safety while doing his part will not be endangered-. If this standard is not met and injury results, the worker is compensated in damages.” 356 U.S. at 330, 78 S.Ct. at 762. (Emphasis added).

. Port-of-Spain is the capital, largest city and principal port in Trinidad. The embassies of six nations — France, Germany, Netherlands, Venezuela, Lebanon and the United States — are located there, as well as High Commissions of four others — including Britain, Canada and India. See 1964-65 Statesman’s Yearbook (S. H. Steinberg ed.) p. 538;

. Ramillay Abhiram was the actual operator of his brother John’s vehicle. This circumstance does not affect the legal issue.

. Carte acknowledged on deposition that if a crew member on a Texaco ship wanted or needed medical attention it was customary for the captain to notify the ship-ing agent to arrange for treatment at the Texaco infirmary, located outside the refinery area. In fact, Hopson himself had been taken to this infirmary by cab just two days before the accident.
The majority’s analysis emphasizes the non-repetitiveness of travel to the consular offiee for the purpose of discharge and repatriation for treatment. In this view the more regular carriage of ill seamen directly to the infirmary would apparently come closer to satisfying the Sinkler test of operational activity. To my mind it draws an artificial distinction to exclude from the broad coverage of the Sinkler rule the carriage of seamen to the consul under the same arrange-meat by the same drivers in the same vehicles, for the same ultimate objective.

. The District Court stated that the case was controlled by Sinkler, and added that whether a theory of agency or nondelega-ble duty was employed, the same result would be reached. I agree that liability exists whether “agency and nondelegability” is viewed as an independent theory of liability or as a necessary emanation from the Sinkler rule.

. This is not simply a case involving the duty to provide the seamen with a safe place to work. Their illness placed an additional duty on the shipowner to provide them with medical care, and Abhiram was actually assisting in this aspect of the ship’s business.

. See Mangrum v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 230 Cal.App.2d 960, 41 Cal.Rptr. 536, (Dist.Ct.App.1964) (alternative holding), which points out that since a railroad is required to take care of its employees who are taken sick on duty — just as Texaco was required by law to care for these ill seamen — a doctor who provides such medical care benefits the employer and may be an PELA “agent,” though otherwise an independent contractor. See also O’Donnel v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 122 F.Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y.1954).

. Under the Sinkler analysis, of course, the autonomy of the third party and his “freedom from detailed supervision of its operations,” are irrelevant where operational activities of the employer are being performed. See 356 U.S. at 331, 78 S.Ct. at 763.

. McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 222 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1955); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Premeaux, 187 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Civ.App.1945).

. Judge Learned Hand’s dictum in a one-sentence concurring opinion does not foreclose inquiry under the legal standards subsequently declared by the Supreme Court.

. It is not necessary to pass on the additional ground for decision mentioned by Judge Butzner, based on section 55 of the FELA, which provides that:
“Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt himself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void * * 45 U.S.C.A. § 55 (1958). Here, we cannot say that we have a devious device calculated to avoid tort liability, for it does not appear that it was so motivated. But neither did the Supreme Court in Sinkler seek such motivation in the arrangement between the railroad and the Belt line. Section 55 does, however, evidence the firm congressional design of affording broad protection to the employees covered by the statute.