Court Opinion

ID: 9786275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:52:17.613456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.738197
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, J.,
specially concurring, with whom LEHMAN, C.J., joins.
[¶15] I write separately to address several matters not touched upon by the Court's opinion. First, in the State's briefing a question is raised whether Clingman's appeal of the district court's April 12, 2000, order denying his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea is properly before the Court. The State does not question that Clingman has properly and timely perfected his appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence which was filed March 6, 2000; his notice of appeal from that judgment and sentence was timely filed April 6, 2000, and expressly referenced the March 6 judgment and sentence. The State points out, however, that Clingman did not file a notice of appeal from the district court's order dated April 12, 2000, which denied his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
[T16] Responding to the State's argument on this point, Clingman asserts that he filed his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea on March 8, 2000, when the district court retained jurisdiction over his case, and before he filed his notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence. He further asserts that his notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence encompasses all of the district court's interlocutory rulings, including that court's post-notice of appeal order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. I am not so sure. His assertion that his April 6 notice of appeal from the March 6 judgment and sentence encompasses the district court's later April 12 order denying his March 8 motion to withdraw his guilty plea strikes me as inherently illogical. He does not support his assertion with pertinent authority.
[¶17] The time for appeal commences to run from the date of entry of judgment. WRAP. 2.08(b). In a criminal case, the running of the time for appeal is not terminated by the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. W.R.A.P. 2.03(a); Jessen v. State, 622 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo.1981). An order denying a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a final appealable order. W.R.A.P. 1.05(c); and see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384 (Wyo.1996); Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292 (Wyo.1995); and Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20 (Wyo.1993). Because Clingman did not appeal the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order. 'That *31result, of course, has no adverse effect on Clingman's properly and timely perfected appeal of the March 6, 2000, judgment and sentence. In that appeal, he raises the same substantive issue that he raised in his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, namely, whether the State breached the plea agreement upon which Clingman relied when he pleaded guilty to one charge of indecent liberties.
[¶18] I now turn to that issue. In the State's briefing, it weakly implies that Cling-man has waived the issue of the State's breach of the plea agreement because he "made no objection to the State's arguments at the sentencing hearing." The State does not, however, develop the point with either cogent argument or supporting authority. Although this Court has no precedent directly on point, "(olur general rule is that we will not consider issues not raised in the court below. There are only two exceptions to that rule: when the issue raises jurisdictional questions or it is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered." Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo.2000) (citations omitted). In the usual case, the litigants in the district court are in the best position to know if error has occurred. They are expected to apprise the district court of the perceived error by means of the appropriate objection together with the supporting reasons. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 519 (Wyo.1982), overruled on other grounds, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo.1998). Having been so apprised, the district court is able to consider the objection and the perceived error in the context of the immediate situation and make an informed ruling. That would seem to be especially efficacious in a situation like the one here, where the prosecutor's alleged breach of a plea agreement by way of remarks made in a sentencing hearing occurs before the very eyes of the court. Having said that, it should be asked whether the prosecutor's alleged breach of a plea agreement "is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered" even though the defendant failed to raise the issue in the district court. That seems to be given in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971):
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. - Those cireumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.
Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
[¶19] Because both the State and the defendant, as well as this Court in its opinion, rely on authority of the Tenth Cireait Court of Appeals for the standard of review to be applied in this appeal, it should be noted in passing, before leaving this issue of waiver, that a split of authority exists in the federal cireuits concerning the waiver issue in the plea agreement breach context. United States v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 1167, 1170 n. 2 (10th Cir.2000), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 893, 148 L.Ed.2d 799 (2001). The Tenth Cireuit holds that a defendant who fails to raise in the district court the prosecutor's alleged breach does not waive that issue on appeal. Id. at 1170. That court identifies the breach claim as a question of law to be afforded de novo review. Id.
[¶ 20] If we are going to adopt the Tenth Circuit's standard of review, let us be clear what it is:
We apply a two-step analysis to determine if the government breached a plea agreement: "(1) we examine the nature of the government's promise; and (2) we evaluate this promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the guilty plea was entered." United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.1998). Principles of general contract law guide our analysis of the government's obligations under the agreement. See id. Thus, in assessing whether the government has breached the agreement, we look to the express terms of the agreement and construe any ambiguities against the government as the drafter of the agreement. See id.; United States *32v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1999). This court also has explained that:
The government breaches an agreement not to oppose a motion when it makes statements that do more than merely state facts or simply validate facts found in the Presentence Report and provides a legal characterization of those facts or argues the effect of those facts to the sentencing judge.
Brye, 146 F.3d at 1211 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Peterson, 225 F.3d at 1170-71.
[T21] A prosecutor who drafts a plea agreement containing the terms found in the one we review today should pay particular attention to two principles of this standard: (1) the court looks to the express terms of the plea agreement and construes any ambiguities against the government as the drafter of the agreement; and (2) the government breaches such an agreement when it provides a legal characterization of facts found in the presentence report or argues the effect of those facts to the sentencing judge.
[¶22] In the record of the case we review today, there is a presentence report and a report from the defendant's psychological evaluators. They contain facts suggesting criminal behavior of the defendant in addition to that which forms the basis of the one charge of indecent liberties to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Further, they contain facts suggesting the defendant was mini-malizing his behavior and not yet facing up to it, When asked by the sentencing judge about these reports, the defendant did not object to their contents. Because the plea agreement called for the prosecutor to modify the charging information to reflect only the one count of indecent liberties, and he did so, arguably the facts surrounding that single charge established the boundaries beyond which the prosecutor could not safely stray. But for the defendant's failure to object to the contents of the above-mentioned reports, the prosecutor was on thin ice in commenting on the facts contained in those reports. That the prosecutor might not be able to comment on those facts does not mean that the sentencing judge cannot independently know about and consider them in imposing sentence. Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987). The point is, however, if the government has promised to comment about only "the facts of this particular case," perhaps an ambiguous phrase, the court may confine such comments to the facts surrounding the single count in the modified information. A prosecutor who strays from such confinement needlessly risks much. For example, in Santobello, the government's breach of the plea agreement was inadvertent, and the sentencing judge strongly declared he was not influenced by the prosecutor's remarks; nevertheless, the court reversed and remanded the conviction. 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499. In the words of the morning roll-call police sergeant in the old television show "Hill Street Blues," let's be careful out there.