Court Opinion

ID: 9730529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:14:53.196132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.252864
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the use against appellant of a vial of sleeping pills obtained without a valid consent was harmless error. I dissent and would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
The theory of the prosecution was that appellant, her daughter, her paramour, and her daughter’s boyfriend conspired to murder the victim, appellant’s husband. The two women supposedly placed sleeping pills in the victim’s beer. After the victim fell asleep, the men allegedly killed him and disposed of his body.
The principal evidence of appellant’s claimed participation in this crime is the testimony of her daughter that the two placed sleeping pills in the beer. The daughter also identified a vial of pills as sleeping pills appellant had in her possession at the time of the crime. The daughter read from the label of the bottle, “Mrs. Irma Garcia. Take one *428capsule at bedtime for sleep.” The vial was not admitted into evidence.
The majority concludes that this vial of pills was obtained during an unconstitutional search of appellant’s home. With this conclusion, I agree. The majority asserts, however, that this error was harmless. With this conclusion, I cannot agree.
To be harmless, a constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E. g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1968). Further, it is the Commonwealth which has the burden of demonstrating such harmlessness. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 177, 305 A.2d 715, 719 (1973). I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this error could not have “contributed to the verdict” of the jury. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391,-, 383 A.2d 155, 164 (1978). Indeed, it is highly likely that this error did affect the verdict.
The testimony of appellant’s daughter that appellant placed sleeping pills in the victim’s beer was uncorroborated by testimony. The only evidence to corroborate it was the vial of pills. Appellant’s daughter was subject to intense cross-examination, especially on the subject of her mental stability. Disbelief of the daughter’s testimony would have been particularly reasonable because the theory that the two men simply killed the victim while he was in a natural sleep would also have accounted for the murder. The vial of pills with appellant’s name on it was the only physical evidence indicating that appellant had access to the sleeping pills she allegedly placed in the victim’s beer. .
Thus, a juror who might not have believed the daughter’s story without some extrinsic corroborating evidence might well have believed the story after seeing the vial. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that presentation of the vial of pills to the jury was harmless.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.