Court Opinion

ID: 9960116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 14:07:26.618455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:11.344659
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1467-22

DENNIS BENIGNO,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF
THE STATE COMPTROLLER,
and ROBERT SHANE, in his
official capacity as Custodian of
Records of the NEW JERSEY
OFFICE OF THE STATE
COMPTROLLER,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

                   Argued December 18, 2023 – Decided April 15, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson, DeAlmeida, and Berdote Byrne.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1728-22.

                   Jonathan Frederic Cohen argued the cause for appellant
                   (Plosia Cohen LLC, attorneys; Jonathan Frederic
                   Cohen, of counsel and on the briefs).
            Elizabeth Diane Kern, Deputy Attorney General,
            argued the cause for respondents (Matthew J. Platkin,
            Attorney General, attorney; Raymond Robinson
            Chance, III, and Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorneys
            General, of counsel; Elizabeth Diane Kern, Deputy
            Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      The Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) began an investigation into

plaintiff's company, NJ Criminal Interdiction LLC d/b/a Street Cop Training

(Street Cop Training), as a part of its review of various law enforcement reforms

pursuant to the Police Accountability Project. Plaintiff, as Chief Executive

Officer of Street Cop Training, served a request for documents on the OSC

regarding the investigation, pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA),

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of access (CLRA). The OSC

denied the request because it sought large quantities of documents concerning

ongoing investigations into plaintiff's company and various other law

enforcement training institutions.   Plaintiff then filed a verified complaint

against the OSC for lack of access, arguing his requests were unlawfully denied

and he was entitled to their production. The trial court dismissed the complaint,

finding the requests were overbroad and improper, the requested records were

subject to the ongoing investigation exception to OPRA, and plaintiff's interest

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in the records was insufficient to satisfy a CLRA claim. We agree with the trial

court and affirm.

                                       I.

      We glean the following facts from the record. On March 3, 2022, the OSC

launched the Police Accountability Project "to review whether promised reforms

in policing have been implemented and are working," as well as to "examine

how New Jersey [police] departments are 'detecting and addressing

inappropriate officer conduct' . . . ." The OSC sent a request to plaintiff for

various documents relating to Street Cop Training. Plaintiff called the OSC to

obtain more information regarding the reason for the request and was told the

OSC was unable to disclose whether Street Cop Training was the target of an

ongoing investigation, if there was an investigation, or what the investigation

concerned.

      Plaintiff then filed a complaint on June 7, 2022, alleging the OSC failed

to establish the relevance of the requested documents, exceeded its statutory

authority, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated plaintiff's

civil rights pursuant to the State Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights

Act. The complaint sought to enjoin the OSC from compelling plaintiff to

produce the documents, declare that the Police Accountability Project could not

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regulate plaintiff's private business, restrain the OSC from making future

document requests from plaintiff without establishing relevance, and grant

plaintiff attorney's fees. Plaintiff refused to comply with the document request

until its complaint was adjudicated.

      In response, the OSC served plaintiff with a subpoena for the same

documents. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash the subpoena and defendants filed

a cross-motion seeking plaintiff's compliance. The trial court issued an order

denying plaintiff's request to quash the subpoena and granted the motion to

compel.

      On August 8, 2022, plaintiff served an OPRA request on defendants,

seeking:

            1. Subpoenas issued by the Police Accountability
            Project or other subpoena . . . from November 1, 2021,
            until present;

            2. To the extent not produced in response to [the above
            request], all subpoenas issued by the [OSC] to a private
            vendor since the creation of the [OSC];

            3. Requests for the production of documents issued by
            the Police Accountability Project . . . from November
            1, 2021, until present;

            4. Documentation, correspondence, or other records in
            the possession of the Police Accountability Project or
            the [OSC] that relates to recent reforms in police

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            training as referenced in the March 3, 2022 press
            release issued by the OSC; and

            5. Emails, text messages and other correspondence
            between . . . [OSC]. . . and . . . owners, agents or
            representatives of private police training, education
            and/or accreditation providers/consultants between
            November 1, 2021 and present.

      OSC's custodian of records responded to plaintiff's OPRA request via

email, stating:

            As an initial matter, to the extent your request seeks
            records you may already possess, we are not obligated
            to provide such records to you again.

                  ....

            . . . [P]lease be advised that OSC can neither confirm
            nor deny the existence of records in response to all five
            items of your OPRA request. . . . Furthermore, to the
            extent that any such records of investigations exist,
            your request must nevertheless be denied under
            N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a), which exempts from access
            records related to an ongoing investigation . . . .

            Please be further advised that [i]tems [two], [three],
            [four], and [five] of your request must be denied as
            improper and overbroad. OPRA does not allow a
            blanket request for every document a public agency has
            on file or a wholesale request for general information.
            . . . Because these requests fail to identify specific
            records, and [i]tems [two] and [four] in particular
            would require the [c]ustodian to conduct research to
            determine whether a subpoena was issued to a "private

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             vendor" or a record "relate[s] to recent reforms in police
             training," these requests must be denied.

             Item [five] of your request is also denied . . . [because
             r]equests for correspondence under OPRA must
             identify the individuals or accounts to be searched and
             be confined to a discrete and limited subject matter.
             . . . Because your request fails to identify any subject
             matter, it must be denied.

             You have also requested the above documents under the
             common law right of access. That request is denied
             because OSC's interests in protecting confidential
             documents from disclosure, to the extent any such
             documents exist, outweighs your interest in accessing
             such records.

      On October 4, 2022, plaintiff filed a second verified complaint and order

to show cause. He alleged his requests were valid and should have been granted

pursuant to OPRA and the CLRA.           The OSC moved to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint.

      The trial court issued a detailed written opinion, finding OPRA's

exception regarding an on-going investigation applied to preclude production of

the requested records, and, even without the exception, the requests were

impermissibly overbroad. The trial court also found plaintiff's CLRA claim

failed because release of the records was not in the public interest. Accordingly,

the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.

                                        II.

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      On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred: (1) in holding that its

requests were overbroad and subject to the ongoing investigation exemption; (2)

in failing to review the documents in camera or compelling defendants to

produce an index; (3) in ignoring defendants' misuse of the Glomar 1 response;

and (4) in its analysis of the common law right of public access.

      We apply a plenary standard of review from a trial court's decision to grant

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v.

Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Sickles

v. Cabot Copr., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005)). No deference is

owed to the trial court's conclusions.      Ibid.   Similarly, "'[t]he trial court's

determinations with respect to the applicability of OPRA are legal conclusions

subject to de novo review.'" K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super.

337, 349 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J.

Super. 371, 379 (App. Div. 2009)).

      1. The OPRA Request.

1
   When an investigating authority gives a "noncommittal response" which
neither confirms nor denies the existence of an investigation, it "has come to be
known as a Glomar response and had its origin in Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d
1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976)." N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's
Off. (BCPO), 447 N.J. Super. 182, 196 (App. Div. 2016).

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                                        7
      "[T]he general purpose of OPRA is to 'maximize public knowledge [of]

affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils

inherent in a secluded process.'" Ciesla v. N.J. Dep't of Health and Senior

Servs., 429 N.J. Super. 127, 136-37 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Mason v. City of

Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)). In other words, OPRA seeks "to promote

transparency in the operation of government." Paff v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor's

Off. (Paff III), 235 N.J. 1, 16 (2018) (quoting In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n

Obligation, 230 N.J. 258, 276 (2017)).        As such, OPRA provides that

"government records shall be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or

examination by the citizens of this State, with certain exceptions, for the

protection of the public interest.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Although OPRA defines

"government record" broadly, "this broad definition is tempered by a number of

exceptions within OPRA itself." McGee v. Twp. of E. Amwell, 416 N.J. Super.

602, 614 (App. Div. 2010).

            A. The Ongoing Investigation Exception.

      Among these exceptions is the "ongoing investigation" exemption, also

known as the "investigation in progress" exemption. N.J.S.A. 47:1A -3. This

exception requires a public agency to show: (1) the requested records "pertain

to an investigation in progress by any public agency[;]" (2) disclosure will "be

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inimical to the public interest[;]" and (3) the records were not available to the

public before the investigation began. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of

Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 573 (2017) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a)).

      The trial court correctly determined the records were covered by the

ongoing investigation exemption because defendants proved all three prongs of

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a). Prong one requires the records sought "pertain to an

investigation in progress by any public agency[,]" a standard met by the OSC's

probe into the effectiveness of the Police Accountability Project. N.J.S.A.

47:1A-3(a). The OSC announced this project to "examine how New Jersey

[police] departments are 'detecting and addressing inappropriate officer

conduct,' whether their training programs meet [S]tate mandates and how they

are fulfilling their obligation to publicly disclose data and documents."

      Prong two, requiring disclosure of the records to be "inimical to the public

interest . . . calls for 'a fact-specific analysis . . . .'" Paff III, 235 N.J. at 25

(quoting Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 576). The trial court correctly found the release

of OSC's subpoenas and any other documents relating to its investigation of

police departments as part of the Police Accountability Project "would severely

undermine OSC's investigative powers and prerogatives to force it to open its

investigative playbook to a private vendor presently under investigation."

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Further, it would be "incongruous and inimical to the public interest embodied

in the agency's mission of executive branch accountability . . . ."

      N.J.S.A. 52:15C-14(c) demonstrates the Legislature's disfavor of

disclosure of any record which would "throw[] open OSC's 'playbook' . . . ." It

provides the OSC shall comply with an OPRA request of

            access to a government record that the [OSC] . . .
            obtained from another public agency [in the course of
            an investigation] . . . provided that the request does not
            in any way identify the record sought by means of a
            reference to the [OSC's] audit or review or to an
            investigation by the State Inspector General or any
            other public agency, including, but not limited to, a
            reference to a subpoena issued pursuant to such
            investigation.

This Legislative mandate shields from public access any record which would

reference an investigation by the public agency charged with executive branch

accountability and supports the trial court's finding that prong two was satisfied.

Disclosing the means of investigating police departments for misconduct and

compliance with criminal justice reforms would severely hamper progress in a

major public project and supports a finding that disclosure of these records

would be "inimical to the public interest." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a).

      The final prong requires that the documents sought had not been

previously available to the public before the investigation began. This prong is

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                                       10
also satisfied because, at the time of plaintiff's request, all the requests related

to internal documents created in connection with the Police Accountability

Project, such as subpoenas and correspondence between defendants and the

targets of potential investigations. These records were created as part of an

investigation into the internal practices of various New Jersey law enforcement

agencies and any subpoenas or correspondences would not have existed prior to

the launching of the investigation.

            B. Overbroad and Improper Requests.

      When records sought are not subject to an exception, "agencies are only

obligated to disclose identifiable government records." Burke v. Brandes, 429

N.J. Super. 169, 174 (App. Div. 2012). "A proper request 'must identify with

reasonable clarity those documents that are desired.'" Ibid. (quoting Bent v.

Twp. of Stafford Police Dep't, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005)).

"'Wholesale requests for general information to be analyzed, collated and

compiled' by the agency are outside OPRA's scope." Ibid. (quoting MAG Ent.,

LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 549 (App. Div.

2005)). "OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency's files"

and is not "intended as a research tool litigants may use to force government

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                                        11
officials to identify and siphon useful information." MAG Ent., 375 N.J. Super.

at 546.

      As such, requests for "any and all documents" on a subject are generally

considered "overly broad." Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cnty. Utils. Auth.,

416 N.J. Super. 565, 578 (App. Div. 2010). A custodian may reject a request

that is overly broad or vague and prevent identification of the records sought.

N.J. Builders Ass'n v. N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 390 N.J. Super. 166,

181-82 (App. Div. 2007). OPRA does not require a custodian to "conduct

research among its records . . . and correlate data from various government

records in the custodian's possession." Lagerkvist v. Off. of Governor of State,

443 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting MAG Ent., 375 N.J. Super.

at 546-47). OPRA allows access to records, not information.

      We agree with the trial court that all five of plaintiff's requests are

overbroad requests for information, not records.         Plaintiff requested all

"[s]ubpoenas issued by the Police Accountability Project . . . or . . . Schuster

[;]"2 "all subpoenas issued by the [OSC] to a private vendor since the creation

of the [OSC];" all documents relating to the project from 2021 until present; and

2
  The OSC hired Jane Schuster as a Senior Advisor, "with experience with
police oversight, to lead the new 'police accountability project.'"
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all correspondence relating to the project. These types of "[w]holesale requests

for general information to be analyzed, collated and compiled" are "outside

OPRA's scope." Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 174 (quoting MAG Ent., 375 N.J.

Super. at 549); see also N.J. Builders Ass'n, 390 N.J. Super. at 172 (denying a

request as overbroad when the requestor sought "[a]ny and all documents and

data which [were] relied upon, considered, reviewed, or otherwise utilized by

any employee or staff member") (alterations in original).

      The trial court correctly denied plaintiff's request as "overbroad and

improper" because he sought "the entire scope of the investigation that may

relate to his company, and the inquiry would compel [d]efendants to research

and identify those records sent by . . . [Schuster] or others in furtherance of that

investigation."

            C. The Glomar Response and Vaughn Index.

      Plaintiff urges us to review the applicability of a Glomar response to

OPRA requests. However, we have previously addressed this issue and whether

a Vaughn index is always required. In BCPO, we concluded:

            [T]he obligation imposed upon the custodian of public
            records is to "promptly comply with a request" or, if
            "unable to comply," to "indicate the specific basis
            therefor on the request form and promptly return it to
            the requestor." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g); see also Gannett
            N.J. Partners[, LP v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 379 N.J.

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                                        13
            Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2005)]. Other than
            providing a "specific basis" for the inability to comply,
            the statute establishes no inflexible requirements for a
            non-compliance response. Whether an agency denies
            access to identified records or declines to confirm or
            deny responsive records exist, its reply falls within the
            category of "unable to comply" and is subject to review
            under that standard.       Therefore, we discern no
            impediment to the availability of a Glomar response
            under OPRA's plain language.

            We also reject the interpretation urged by [the plaintiff]
            that the submission of a Vaughn index is required in all
            cases in which the agency does not comply with a
            request.    Neither OPRA nor [the Freedom of
            Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59] calls for
            the production of a Vaughn index in every case in
            which access is denied. Although the use of such a log
            has become customary, courts that have considered this
            issue have cautioned that the production and review of
            a Vaughn index is not appropriate in every case.

            [BCPO, 447 N.J. Super. at 200-01.]

      A public agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records

when "its reply falls within the category of 'unable to comply[,]'" as is the case

here. Id. at 200. Defendants responded that the "OSC can neither confirm nor

deny the existence of records" requested by plaintiff. OSC's use of the Glomar

response and failure to prepare a Vaughn index was within its rights and we

decline to disturb that response on this appeal.

      2. The Common Law Right of Access Request

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      Access to public documents pursuant to the CLRA is broader than OPRA

because the CLRA encompasses a more expansive class of documents.

However, access is not automatic and, in determining whether a person has a

right of access pursuant to the CLRA, the request "must be balanced against the

State's interest in preventing disclosure." O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 218

N.J. 168, 196 (2014) (quoting Educ. L. Ctr. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 198 N.J. 274,

302 (2009) (quoting Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 46

(1995))). "In other words, [parties] requesting documents must explain why

[they] seek[] access to the requested documents." Ibid.

      To determine whether the CLRA applies, a court must follow a three-step

test. Ibid. "First, it must determine whether the documents in question are

'public records.'" Ibid. (quoting Atl. City Convention Ctr. Auth. v. S. Jersey

Publ'g Co., 135 N.J. 53, 59 (1994)). "Second, [parties] seeking disclosure must

show that [they have] an interest in the public record." O'Boyle, 218 N.J. at 196

(citing Educ. L. Ctr., 198 N.J. at 302). "The requisite interest necessary to

accord a plaintiff standing to obtain copies of public records may be either a

wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest." Drinker Biddle &

Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't of L. & Pub. Safety, Div. of L., 421 N.J. Super. 489,

499 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Educ. L. Ctr., 198 N.J. at 302 (quoting Higg-A-

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                                      15
Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 47 (1995))). Third, "once the

plaintiff's interest in the public record has been established, the burden shifts to

the public entity to establish that its need for non-disclosure outweighs the

plaintiff's need for disclosure." O'Boyle, 218 N.J. at 197. "'To gain access to

this broader class of materials, the requestor must make a greater showing than

OPRA requires, "namely," (1) the person seeking access must establish an

interest in the subject matter of the material; and (2) the citizen's right to access

must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure.'" Gannett,

254 N.J. at 257 (quoting Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 578 (quoting Mason, 196 N.J.

at 67-68)).

      It is only at that point of the analysis that courts will apply six factors in

balancing the parties' respective interests in disclosure and non-disclosure:

              (1) [T]he extent to which disclosure will impede agency
              functions by discouraging citizens from providing
              information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure
              may have upon persons who have given such
              information, and whether they did so in reliance that
              their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to
              which agency self-evaluation, program improvement,
              or other decision[-]making will be chilled by
              disclosure; (4) the degree to which the information
              sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative
              reports of policymakers; (5) whether any findings of
              public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected
              by remedial measures instituted by the investigative
              agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or

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              investigatory proceedings have arisen that may
              circumscribe the individual's asserted need for the
              materials.

              [Educ. L. Ctr., 198 N.J. at 303 (citing Loigman v.
              Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986)).]

      Initially, we reject plaintiff's argument that the trial court's failure "to

conduct an in-camera review made it impossible . . . to conduct a proper common

law right of public access analysis." Plaintiff's reliance on Rosenberg, which

states "[a] trial judge [is required] . . . to 'examine each document individually

and make factual findings with regard to why [a plaintiff's] interest in disclosure

is or is not outweighed by [the State's] interest in nondisclosure," see Rosenberg

v. State Department of Law and Public Safety, 396 N.J. Super. 565, 580 (App.

Div. 2007) (quoting Keddie v. Rutgers, State University, 148 N.J. 36, 54

(1997)), is misplaced. Our Supreme Court rejected this contention in Rivera v.

Union Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 149 (2022) ("As part of [the

Loigman] analysis, we do not require judges to review actual [documents] in

every case.    A preliminary review of the relevant factors may suffice in

individual cases.") (internal citations omitted); S. Jersey Publ'g Co. v. N.J.

Expressway Auth., 124 N.J. 478, 499 (1991) (remanding the case to "determine

if disclosure of [the relevant documents] is warranted" before deciding whether

"to conduct an in-camera review . . . to ascertain whether redaction is

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                                       17
necessary"). Thus, a trial court is not required to make an in-camera inspection

of every document in every case to determine whether the CLRA applies.

      For purposes of its motion to dismiss, the OSC conceded the requested

documents constituted "public records." However, plaintiff cannot show either

a wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest in the documents,

and, therefore, fails to satisfy the second prong of the three-part test. The Police

Accountability Project is aimed at observing police reforms of departments

themselves, not an investigation into the companies providing these services.

Finally, the possible prejudice to the OSC's investigation is an interest that

outweighs any interest plaintiff has in obtaining the requested documents.

      In reviewing the trial court's analysis of the Loigman factors, "[i]f there is

a basis in the record to do so, [the reviewing court] must generally defer to the

trial judge's determination" whether there is a common law right of access.

Rosenberg, 396 N.J. Super. at 580 (quoting Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 258

N.J. Super. 573, 588 (App. Div. 1992)); see also Hammock v. Hoffman-

LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 380 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he questions

whether to seal or unseal documents are addressed to the trial court's

discretion").

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      The trial court found factors one and two for defendants, citing the chilling

effect disclosure would have on the future willingness of vendors to comply with

requests for information about their training practices.      Courts afford great

weight to this chilling effect.          See Wilson, 404 N.J. Super. at 584

("Confidentiality serves to protect government sources of information, and

disclosure of confidential emails between the [executive branch] and a union

leader . . . would tend to have a 'chilling effect.'"). When the requestor has a

weak interest in obtaining the documents, this chilling effect controls. Ibid.

("Balancing the competing interests, [the plaintiff's] limited interest in obtaining

the documents pales against the public's strong need for confidentiality essential

to the Governor's responsibilities.").

      The trial court also found factors three and four weighed against

disclosure because "such may affect OSC's decision making in how the

investigation will proceed."     As we have discussed, the revelation of the

procedures OSC employs to conduct its investigations would seriously hamper

its ability to conduct those investigations. See N.J.S.A. 52:15C-14(c). The

decisions and deliberative processes conducted by the OSC in deciding which

vendors to subpoena and investigate, if any, go to the heart of these factors.

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Factors five and six are not applicable to this specific controversy.        Thus,

plaintiff cannot demonstrate he is entitled to access under the CLRA.

      In sum, we affirm the trial court's findings that the requested records were

subject to OPRA's ongoing investigation exemption at the time OSC responded

to the requests, which prevented their disclosure. Even if the exception did not

apply, plaintiff requests were overly broad. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

he is entitled to the records pursuant to OPRA. Likewise, plaintiff's CLRA

claims fail because he is unable to demonstrate a particularized need for the

records, and pursuant to a balancing of the interests, OSC's interest in being able

to conduct its statutory investigations outweighs any interest plaintiff may have

in the records.

      Affirmed.

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