Court Opinion

ID: 9490710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:52:23.443617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:16.459104
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
It may not matter anymore because under the 1989 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, a loss of $5,000,000-$10,000,000 would produce an increase in offense level of 14 (compared to the 12 level increase in this case), but I must dissent from the majority’s embracing an “exponential” pattern analysis nonetheless. It harks back to — and in fact relies heavily on — authority that pre-dates Koon v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), and United States v. Sablan, 114 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). See, e.g., United States v. Boula, 932 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.1991). Rather than some kind of lock-step analysis, Koon and Sabían instruct that we must give substantial deference to the district court’s discretionary sentencing determinations.
Loss that “substantially exceeds” $5 million is a recognized, if not encouraged, ground for departure under the 1988 Guidelines. See Koon, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. The Guidelines provide no explanation of what “substantially exceeds” means, but the 1988 version of § 2F1.1 capped the loss table at $5 million, and the loss in this case was $1.3 million — or 25% — more than that. The extent of departure (one level) was as conservative as possible. Given the *782deference we are expected to give to the sentencing court, I cannot say that its conclusion that $6.3 million “substantially exceeds” $5 million is unreasonable.
Otherwise, I concur.