Court Opinion

ID: 9387673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:07:40.802031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.969393
License: Public Domain

J-S06044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                 v.                              :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    GUSTAVO A. RENDON                            :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :      No. 780 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 11, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-36-CR-0002160-2020

BEFORE:        STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                                FILED: APRIL 18, 2023

        Appellant Gustavo A. Rendon appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County following his

conviction by a jury on two counts of rape of a child, one count of statutory

sexual assault, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a

child, four counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child, two counts of

sexual assault, four counts of aggravated indecent assault (complainant less

than 13 years old), one count of aggravated indecent assault (complainant

less    than    16    years   old),   two      counts    of   incest,   two   counts   of

photograph/film/depiction on computer sex act-child, five counts of indecent

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S06044-23

assault (person less than 13 years of age), and five counts of corruption of

minors.1 After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was

charged with various sex offenses in connection with the abuse of his biological

children between August 2003 and March 2010 at various locations in

Lancaster and Berks County in Pennsylvania. On November 1, 2021,

Appellant, who was represented by counsel, proceeded to a jury trial.

       At trial, Appellant’s ex-wife, R.R., testified she married Appellant in

1991, and she filed for divorce in the summer of 2021. She and Appellant

have six biological children: L.E.R. (born in 1995), L.R.R. (born in 1997),

B.L.R. (born in 1999), A.R.R. (born in 2002), B.E.R. (born in 2006), and K.R.

(born in 2008).       The family moved to Pennsylvania in 2003 to join an

anabaptist church, Ephrata Christian Fellowship, in Lancaster. N.T., 11/1/21-

11/3/21, at 115. The family lived on Millstone Drive in Lancaster from 2003

to the fall of 2007, Slouch Drive in Mohnton from the fall of 2007 to the

summer of 2008, and Pleasant Valley Drive in Denver from the summer of

2008 to the fall of 2011.

       R.R. testified she homeschooled the six children while Appellant worked

different construction-related jobs outside of the home. Id. at 119-20. She

noted Appellant sometimes took one child with him when he was working, and

____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3122.1, 3123(b), 3125(b), 3124.1, 3125(a)(7),
3125(a)(8), 4302, 6312(b), 3126(a)(7), and 6301(a)(1), respectively.

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the children “went on different outings with him.” Id. at 120. She further

noted he sometimes took the children separately to church, as well as watched

them in the home at times when she was not at home. Id. R.R. indicated

that, during the fall of 2007, she stayed in Tennessee for five days to help her

parents. Id. at 123. She also regularly attended “sisters’ meetings at church”

by herself or with a few of her children. Id. R.R. testified she suffered from

various illnesses, which “oftentimes” required her to “stay in bed.” Id. at 121.

      R.R. denied she ever saw Appellant sexually abuse any of the children.

Id. at 122. She also denied that, from 2003 to 2010, any of the children told

her they were being abused. Id. She indicated that, from late 2008 into most

of 2009, Appellant was “gone from the home” for work. Id. at 124. She

noted that when he returned to the home after this nine-month absence he

was often angry and unpredictable. Id. R.R. sought help from the church,

and on March 27, 2010, after Appellant met with church leaders, he came

home and began burning items, which were stored in his private office. Id.

at 125. R.R. became afraid and called church leaders, who arrived at the

home and escorted Appellant away from the home. Id. Although he asked

to return, R.R. did not permit Appellant to return to the family home after

March 27, 2010. Id.

      R.R. testified she continued to communicate with Appellant, who

provided financial support for her and the children. Id. at 126. The children

had no contact with Appellant after March 27, 2010, until April 7, 2020, when

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L.R.R. confronted Appellant with allegations that he had sexually abused her

in the past.   Id. at 127, 132. R.R. testified that L.R.R. had not spoken to

Appellant in the prior ten years.      Id. at 132. In response to L.R.R.’s

allegations, Appellant decreased the family’s financial support. Id.

      L.E.R. testified she has a “vivid memory” of an event, which occurred in

the living room of the family’s house on Millstone Drive during the summer

when she was turning twelve. Id. at 171. Specifically, she testified:

      My father came in and undressed me, and he had a camera that
      he took lots of pictures of me with it when I was naked. And then
      he raped me and fondled me all over and penetrated me with his
      fingers and kissed me before he picked up the camera and
      left….He forced his penis into my vagina.

Id.

      She testified that, prior to this event, when she was about eight years

old, Appellant raped, fondled, and penetrated her while they were upstairs in

the bedroom of the Millstone Drive house. Id. at 172. She testified that, after

the family moved to the house on Slouch Drive:

      [Appellant] repeatedly sexually abused [her] in the bathroom,…in
      [her] parents’ bedroom, in [her] bed, on the couch downstairs,
      [in] the living room, and in his office. He did all of the same
      things; he raped [her] and fondled [her] all over, kissed [her] all
      over, [and] penetrated [her] with his fingers.

Id. at 173.

      She testified that, after the family moved to the house on Pleasant

Valley Drive, she remembers one time when she was in her parents’ bedroom,

and Appellant “raped [her] in the bed[.]” Id. She yelled for Appellant to stop,

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but he did not. Id. at 174. L.E.R. admitted she did not tell her mother about

the abuse until the summer of 2018; however, her mother couldn’t “deal with

it.” Id. at 176. She did not speak about the abuse again until March of 2020,

when she told her sister, L.R.R., about the sexual abuse. Id. at 177. L.R.R.

told her the same things “happened to her too[.]” Id. At this point, L.R.R.

called the police to report the sexual abuse. Id.

      L.R.R. testified she has a “vivid memory” of Appellant taking her to work

with him on her eighth birthday. Id. at 199. She testified when the other

workers left for lunch Appellant “took [her] into the bathroom and took [her]

clothes off and he raped [her]. And he made [her] touch his penis….And he

put it in [her] mouth.” Id. She clarified by “rape” she meant Appellant put

his penis in her vagina. Id.

      She testified that, on a different occasion, Appellant took her to a small

building and took pictures of her while she was naked.        Id. at 200. She

testified that, on a separate occasion, Appellant took her to a “white cement

building” where Appellant, as well as other men, took turns raping her. Id.

at 201-02. The family was living at the house on Millstone Drive when the

incident at the “white cement building” occurred.       Id. at 202. She also

remembers a time when the family lived in a house on Slouch Drive and, after

the rest of her family left for church, Appellant took her “to the bathroom and

raped [her].” Id. In another incident, Appellant took her to “a car garage in

New Holland[,]” where a big guy in overalls pulled off her clothes. Id. at 203.

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The men, including Appellant, “started like raping [her]….[She] thought they

were going to kill [her].”   Id. She was ten or eleven years old when this

incident occurred. Id.

      L.R.R. admitted she did not initially tell her mother, her sisters, her

maternal grandparents, or church leaders about the abuse because she was

afraid and embarrassed. Id. at 204, 221. Appellant had convinced her the

abuse was her fault. Id. at 221. In 2018, for the first time, she told her

mother about the abuse, and her mother told her “there’s no way that ever

happened to you. If it happened to any of you guys, it was only your sister,

[L.E.R.].” Id. at 206. L.R.R. indicated in 2020 she reached out to her local

state representative, who gave her the telephone number for the Attorney

General’s Office, and she reported the abuse. Id. at 207.

      B.L.R. testified she has a memory of being in bed with Appellant in a

hotel room when she was nine years old. Id. at 252. Appellant touched her

“genitals with his hands and his mouth.     And he stuck his penis up inside

[her].” Id. She indicated there were other times he touched the inside and

outside of her genitals with his penis, mouth, and hands; however, she could

not remember when these other incidents occurred. Id. at 253. She indicated

these incidents occurred while she was living on Millstone Drive, Slouch Drive,

and Pleasant Valley Drive in Pennsylvania. Id. at 268. B.L.R. never told her

mother about the abuse because she feared her mother would be mad. Id.

at 254.

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      B.L.R. indicated that in 2020 her mother asked her if she had anything

she wanted to say to the police. Id. at 256. B.L.R. testified she did not want

to tell her mother whether she had anything to say to the police; however,

she told her sister, L.R.R., that she wanted to speak to the police.        Id.

Thereafter, B.L.R. reported the sexual assaults to the police. Id.

      A.R.R. testified she has “strong memories” from when the family lived

in a house on Pleasant Valley Drive.     Id. at 274. She remembers several

occasions when she was seven or eight years old when Appellant would “take

his fingers and he would feel up in [her] vagina” while she was in bed at night.

Id. at 275. She also has a memory of being in the church’s nursery with her

pants off, and Appellant’s hands were feeling her all over. Id. She admitted

she never told her mother about the sexual abuse because she was scared,

and she never told her maternal grandparents because she was ashamed. Id.

at 276, 281.    A.R.R. testified that, in April of 2020, L.R.R. asked her if

Appellant had ever “done anything” with her. Id. at 277. A.R.R. answered

affirmatively, and she then spoke to the police. Id.

      B.E.R. testified she has a memory from when the family lived on

Pleasant Valley Drive. She was wearing a white dress with red flowers. Id.

at 301. Appellant lifted her dress and touched her all over. Id. B.E.R. never

told anyone about the incident because she was “embarrassed, and [she]

didn’t want people to know that happened to [her].” Id. at 304.

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      Danielle Harvey, a sexual assault counselor and educator, testified

victims have varied reactions to sexual abuse. Id. at 317. Child victims tend

to be less willing to disclose the sexual abuse, as do victims who are isolated

from others. Id. at 320-21. She testified that, “[e]specially with children,

the more often the abuse occurs, the more they begin to think of it as normal.

When…somebody experience[s] abuse from a young age on a regular basis,

it becomes as normal as brushing your teeth.” Id. at 321.

      Julie Stover, a women’s health nurse practitioner at LGH Penn Medicine,

testified she saw B.L.R., B.E.R., and A.R.R. on April 14, 2020. She noted that

the victims, as well as their mother, declined to have Nurse Stover conduct a

gynecological examination upon the victims. Id. at 348. In any event, Nurse

Stover testified that, given the amount of time that had passed from when the

sexual assaults occurred, she would have expected to see “a normal exam[.]”

Id. at 350.

      Pennsylvania   State   Police   Trooper   Corey   Wardrop   testified   he

interviewed L.E.R. and L.R.R. in early 2020. They disclosed they had been

“abuse[d] at the hands of their father[, Appellant].” Id. at 363. He indicated

he asked L.E.R. and L.R.R. to ask their sisters if they had also been abused

by Appellant. Id. at 364. After he was informed A.R.R., B.L.R., and B.E.R.

had memories of being abused, he arranged for them to be interviewed at the

Children’s Alliance in April of 2020. Id. at 365.

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        Trooper Wardrop testified that, on approximately April 24, 2020, he

arrested Appellant, and after Appellant waived his Miranda2 rights, the

trooper interviewed him.        When the trooper confronted Appellant with the

allegations made by his children, Appellant had no answer. Id. at 385.

        At the conclusion of all testimony, the jury convicted Appellant of the

offenses indicated supra.        Thereafter, following the preparation of a pre-

sentence investigation report, as well as an assessment by the Sexual

Offender Assessment Board, Appellant, who was still represented by counsel,

proceed to a sentencing hearing on April 11, 2022. The trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate of 63½ years to 155 years in prison, as well as

found Appellant to be a sexually violent predator.

        Appellant filed a timely counseled post-sentence motion presenting a

weight of the evidence claim, and the trial court denied the motion on April

20, 2022.     This timely counseled appeal followed, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been met.

        On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

        1. Did the Commonwealth commit prosecutorial misconduct by
           implying that the jury would have to recite the verdict directly
           to the victims and tell them they are liars if there is an
           acquittal?
        2. Did the trial court err in failing to issue a proper curative
           instruction after the prosecutor implied that a not guilty verdict

____________________________________________

2   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

                                           -9-
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         would require the jury to specifically confront the victims and
         call them liars?
      3. Did the trial court err in entering a judgment of guilty, where
         the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence
         produced at trial on every count?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (suggested answers omitted).

      Appellant’s first and second issues are intertwined. Specifically,

Appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

argument when he suggested that, if the jury acquitted Appellant, the jurors

would have to face Appellant’s accusers and tell them they had lied about the

sexual abuse.    He further contends the trial court’s jury instruction was

inadequate to cure the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s improper

statements.

      Our standard of review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during

closing arguments to the jury is whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2018).

      [W]ith specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
      a closing statement, it is well settled that any challenged
      prosecutorial comment must not be viewed in isolation, but rather
      must be considered in the context in which it was offered. Our
      review of a prosecutor’s comment and an allegation of
      prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a
      defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Thus, it is well
      settled that statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during
      closing argument will not form the basis for granting a new trial
      unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to
      prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
      toward the defendant so they could not weigh the evidence
      objectively and render a true verdict. The appellate courts have
      recognized that not every unwise remark by an attorney amounts
      to misconduct or warrants the grant of a new trial. Additionally,
      like the defense, the prosecution is accorded reasonable latitude,

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      may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to
      the jury, and may advance arguments supported by the evidence
      or use inferences that can reasonably be derived therefrom.
      Moreover, the prosecutor is permitted to fairly respond to points
      made in the defense’s closing, and therefore, a proper
      examination of a prosecutor’s comments in closing requires review
      of the arguments advanced by the defense in summation.

Id. at 835-36 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615

(Pa.Super. 2016)). See Commonwealth v. Clancy, 648 Pa. 179, 192 A.3d

44, 62-63 (2018) (endorsing a two-part test to review a prosecutor’s remarks:

(1) whether the substance of the remarks relate to the elements of the crimes

charged, the evidence presented, and constitute a fair and reasonable rebuttal

to the defense’s arguments, and (2) whether the unavoidable effect of the

remarks was to prejudice the jury against the defendant); Commonwealth v.

Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501, 544 (2005) (“Prosecutorial misconduct

will not be found where comments were based on the evidence or proper

inferences therefrom or were only oratorical flair.”) (citations omitted)).

      Moreover, “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under a harmless

error standard.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1106-07

(Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). A trial court may issue a curative

instruction to remove taint unless after a review of all the circumstances it

determines that a curative instruction would be insufficient, warranting the

extreme remedy of a mistrial. Id.

      In the case sub judice, the prosecutor relevantly stated the following

during closing argument:

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            So, let’s talk about the elements and the crimes and what
     facts you are given to support the elements. I said this in opening.
     Your job is to determine the facts, apply them to the elements of
     the crimes.
                                   ***
            [W]e didn’t just give you the five girls and rest our case.
     This is the most important thing. I don’t want you to listen to me
     or believe me because I say so, because they are the
     Commonwealth’s victims, because I believe them or the trooper
     believes them. That’s not what I want at all. I want you to look
     at this other evidence that we gave you, look at the objective
     reasons why these kids should be believed in this case. That’s
     what I want to offer.
                                 ***
           The fact that we have five victims, what you are going to
     eventually have to decide is, are all five of them lying and is he
     the only one telling the truth?
                                 ***
            Which brings me to my next point; your observations of
     them. And this is maybe the most important one. So [Defense]
     Counsel spent a lot of time picking and choosing random slices of
     their testimony mashing them together on a Power Point and
     saying they’re obviously lying. This is not how this works. That’s
     why it’s so important that we don’t do this by video, we don’t do
     this by submitting an affidavit of a sworn statement. You guys
     have to see them, and you have to see them from start to finish.
     So, I ask you, who do you see up here? Who were those five girls?
     Were they five masterminds who committed a number of crimes
     up until and including perjury for no reason in front of you, that
     concocted this scheme for no reason? Is that what you saw?
                                 ***
           So, I told you in opening that your job here is
     straightforward and simple. And I didn’t say to you, it’s easy. It’s
     never easy making a decision in cases like this. But your analysis
     is easy. If you guys believe all five of those girls got up here
     and lied to you, I want you to go back there and find him
     not guilty. As a matter of fact, I want you to come back out
     here. They will be sitting there. I want you to say, I heard
     your story, [L.E.R.], you are a liar; [L.R.R.], liar; [B.L.R.],
     you’re a liar; [A.R.R.], you’re a liar; [B.E.R.], you’re a liar.
     The only way you find this man not guilty is if 12 of you

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      agree on that, because it’s the bottom line. Someone is
      telling you the truth, and someone is not. So is that what you
      guys want to believe? Do you want to believe that’s what you
      saw? Or do you want to believe you saw five girls get up here one-
      by-one and talk about something that was unimaginable and
      horrific, talk about their life, their life as a child, their daily life
      being sexually abused by their father?...Now you guys have a
      choice. Your choice is, what do you want to believe?

N.T., 11/1/21-11/3/21, at 443, 448-50, 458-60 (bold added).

      At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s closing argument, defense counsel

objected to the above-bolded excerpt and requested the trial court give a

curative instruction. Id. at 461-62. Specifically, defense counsel contended

the prosecutor improperly suggested that, if the jury acquitted Appellant, they

would have to “confront or face these girls in the courtroom,” and the trial

court should give a curative instruction “so the jury knows that’s not a thing.”

Id. at 461. The trial court indicated it would “add something to [the jury]

instructions.” Id. at 462.

      Thereafter, during its instruction to the jury, the trial court relevantly

provided the following:

             [I]t’s not the attorneys’ recollection, it’s not my recollection;
      it is your recollection that controls. You are not bound by any
      argument which in any way reflects the attorneys’ personal beliefs
      as to what the evidence is or what the evidence shows.
                                    ***
            As judges of the facts, you are the sole judges of the
      credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. This means you
      must judge the truthfulness and accuracy of each of the witness’s
      testimony and decide whether to believe all, or part or none of
      that testimony.
                                    ***

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            The opinions of counsel are not part of the evidence, and
      you should not consider them as such….It is the right and duty of
      each attorney to discuss the evidence in a manner that is most
      favorable to the side that he or she represents.
                                  ***
           You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the facts, and it will
      be your responsibility to consider the evidence, to find the facts
      and applying the facts as you find them, to decide whether the
      defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
            Your decision in this case, as in every case, is a matter of
      considerable importance. Remember it is your responsibility as
      jurors to perform your duties and to reach a verdict based upon
      the evidence as it was presented during the trial….You should keep
      your deliberations free of any bias or prejudice.        Both the
      Commonwealth and the defendant have the right to expect you to
      consider the evidence conscientiously and to apply the law as I
      have outlined it for you.
            Your role as a juror is to render a true and correct verdict
      based upon the facts as you find them to exist and the applicable
      law. Your verdict should be unbiased and free from any passion.
      Your verdict is not intended to serve as a sign or a signal or
      message to anyone else, nor is it designed to confront any
      witnesses from which you may or may not have heard in this case.
      In arriving at a verdict, you should not concern yourself with any
      possible future consequences of your verdict, including what the
      penalty might be should you find the defendant guilty.

Id. at 464, 466, 472, 489-90.

      After the trial court gave this instruction, defense counsel objected on

the basis the instruction did not adequately address the prosecutor’s closing

statements suggesting the jurors would have to confront the victims after they

rendered their verdict.   Id. at 492.     The trial court responded that its

instruction addressed defense counsel’s concerns and, to the extent defense

counsel disagreed, he “had an exception” on the record. Id.

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      Here, in addressing Appellant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as

well as whether the trial court’s instructions adequately ameliorated potential

prejudice, the trial court relevantly indicated the following:

            In this matter, the Commonwealth’s case largely rested
      upon the credibility of the testimony of five of Appellant’s
      biological children, who were claiming sexual abuse at the hands
      of their father. Accordingly, the theory of the defense was to
      forcefully attack the credibility of the [five] victims. As such,
      Appellant’s [defense] counsel largely based his closing argument
      on potential inconsistencies and plausibility claims regarding the
      testimony of each of the five victims. In response thereto, during
      his closing argument, the attorney for the Commonwealth
      discussed the fact that there were five testifying witnesses, the
      specific detailed nature of their disclosures, and rebutted defense
      counsel’s allegations of purported inconsistencies in the
      statements of the [five] victims.         The currently challenged
      commentary of the prosecutor was clear[ly] offered to
      demonstrate to the jury that the decision in this matter rested
      heavily upon a credibility determination as to the witnesses
      presented by the Commonwealth witnesses.              Although this
      commentary was offered with oratorical flair, it was offered in
      direct response to the arguments made by Appellant’s [defense]
      counsel and did not rise to the level of prejudicing the jury,
      forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward [Appellant]
      so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render
      a true verdict. Accordingly, [the trial court] concludes that the
      commentary did not deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial.
                                   ***
             [In any event,] [f]ollowing the closing argument for the
      Commonwealth at trial, counsel for Appellant offered an objection
      [regarding] the commentary discussed above. At such time,
      defense counsel argued that the prosecutor implied that if there
      was an acquittal, the jury would have to face the victims in the
      courtroom. Counsel requested a curative instruction so as to
      clarify to the jury how the verdict would be delivered. Counsel for
      Appellant renewed his objection following the [trial] court’s final
      instructions. Although, for the reasons noted above, the [trial]
      court did not deem the commentary of the prosecutor to be of an
      objectionable or prejudicial nature, the court did offer a clarifying
      instruction to the jury [as indicated supra].

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                                    ***
             In this matter, the totality of the [trial] court’s charge to the
      jury, including the excerpt noted above, clearly instructed the jury
      that their verdict was to be free from any bias or prejudice and
      must not serve to confront any involved individual….[Thus,] this
      claim must fail.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/14/22, at 7-9 (citations to record omitted).

      We agree with the trial court’s sound reasoning and conclude Appellant

is not entitled to relief. See Jones, supra. Initially, we note that it is clear

from the record that credibility was a principal concern in this case.           The

Commonwealth’s case focused on the victims’ side of the story with defense

counsel attempting to discredit them. During closing argument, defense

counsel contested at length the credibility of the victims, and thus, the

prosecutor was able to appropriately respond. As the trial court suggested,

the prosecutor’s comments represented a vigorous response to the defense

within the bounds of permissible oratorical flair, and in any event, the

prosecutor’s comments did not have the unavoidable effect to prejudice the

jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility in such a manner as

to impede their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true

verdict. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/14/22, at 7-8; Clancy, supra.

      Further, we note that, even if the prosecutor’s comments were

prejudicial, “the cumulative effect of [the trial court’s] instructions was to

remove any prejudice that might otherwise have inured by the prosecutor’s

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[statements].” Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711, 730

(1998) (citations omitted).

      Specifically, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we conclude the trial

court’s jury instruction ameliorated any suggestion by the prosecutor that, if

the jury acquitted Appellant, they would have to confront the victims and tell

them they had lied about the sexual abuse.         Simply put, the trial court

informed the jury that, in rendering their verdict, they should be unbiased and

free from any passion; their verdict would not serve as a sign, signal, or

message; their verdict was not designed to be a confrontation of a witness;

and they should not concern themselves of any possible future consequences

of their verdict. N.T., 11/1/21-11/3/21, at 490. The jury is presumed to have

followed these instructions. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 660 A.2d

68 (Pa.Super. 1995). Thus, we find Appellant is not entitled to relief as to his

first and second appellate issues.

      In his final issue, Appellant contends the jury’s verdicts are against the

weight of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant avers the victims’ testimony

was incredible since, if their accusations against Appellant were true, it “would

amount to a massive family coverup or unheard idle blindness to horrific

events by one human being to another.” Appellant’s Brief at 26. Appellant

contends that, since the victims admitted they did not tell anyone, including

each other or their mother, about any alleged sexual abuse until many years

after Appellant left the home, their testimony is incredible. Id. at 26-27.

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       Appellant further contends it defies logic that the victims were

repeatedly raped by Appellant, yet no one in the household every witnessed

any such incidents. Id. at 27-28. He also notes there is no physical evidence,

including testimony related to blood or fluid on the children’s bedsheets,

supporting the victims’ rape allegations.          Id. at 28-29.   Thus, Appellant

contends the jury’s verdicts are against the weight of the evidence.3

       When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply

the following precepts.       “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and

to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert,

129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quotation marks and quotation

omitted). Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are

matters for the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910,

917 (Pa.Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our

judgment for that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra.

       Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial

court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the

post-sentence motion; this Court does not review the underlying question of

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See id.

____________________________________________

3Appellant adequately preserved his weight claim in his post-sentence motion,
as well as his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
607; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
      reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
      conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
      the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
      of justice.

Id. at 546 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a defendant to

prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so

tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the

court.” Id. (quotation marks and quotation omitted).

      Here, in rejecting Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court

relevantly indicated “the Commonwealth relied upon the testimony of

numerous witnesses in support of the charges filed against Appellant.” Trial

Court Opinion, filed 7/14/22, at 10. For instance, the victims’ mother, R.R.,

testified the victims, who were children at the time of the abuse, were often

in Appellant’s sole care. Id. Further, R.R. testified that, when Appellant left

the family home for the final time, he “burned and destroyed items from his

home office, which had previously been off limits to every other family

member.” Id. Moreover, after L.R.R. first confronted Appellant about the

sexual abuse, he decreased his financial support of the family. Id.

      The trial court further noted that each victim testified in specific detail

about the sexual abuse perpetrated upon them by Appellant. Id. at 11-14.

The victims, who were homeschooled, testified about their childhood isolation,

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as well as their fear of Appellant. As the trial court noted, the Commonwealth

presented the expert testimony of a sexual assault counselor and educator,

Ms. Harvey, who explained the reasons children often fail to disclose sexual

abuse in a timely manner, if at all. Id. at 13. As to physical evidence of

abuse, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Nurse Stover indicating

that such evidence often does not exist in sex abuse cases, particularly when

such abuse is disclosed years later.

      In sum, the trial court indicated:

             Based upon the volume and specificity of the evidence
      presented at trial by the Commonwealth, Appellant has failed to
      demonstrate that the verdicts are so contrary to the evidence as
      to shock one’s sense of justice. It is clear that the jury, as finder
      of fact, chose to find the Commonwealth’s evidence to be credible.
      Accordingly, Appellant’s claim in this regard fails.

Id. at 14.

      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. Talbert, supra. We note

the jury was free to determine the weight to be given to each witness’s

testimony, as well as reject Appellant’s theory that the victims made up the

allegations of sex abuse. Further, the jury was free to weigh what effect, if

any, the absence of physical evidence had as to the credibility of the victims’

testimony regarding the sex abuse. Appellant requests that we re-weigh the

evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, we

decline to do so as it is a task that is beyond our scope of review.          See

Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating

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that “[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder

of fact”). Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellant’s weight of the evidence

claim.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

      Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2023

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