Court Opinion

ID: 9656487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:49:12.908413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.699893
License: Public Domain

SANDERS, Justice.
This is an action for workmen’s compensation brought by plaintiff as administrator of the estate of his minor daughter, Doris Marie Turner. In his petition, he alleged that the child was a dependent member of the household of McKinley King, who. was killed in the course of his employment on May 23, 1957.
The defendant insurer filed an exception of prescription and peremption of one and two years, exceptions of no cause and no right of action, and an answer denying *39particularly that the minor daughter was a dependent member of the employee’s household.
The district court overruled all exceptions. On the merits, it found that the minor was a dependent member of employee’s household and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff awarding compensation at a rate of $17.55 per week for 400 weeks. Plaintiff appealed, reurging the exceptions in the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court’s judgment. 170 So.2d 199. On application of defendant, we granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeal’s judgment “limited to the issue of prescription.” 247 La. 414, 171 So.2d 667.
Admittedly, more than six years elapsed between the employee’s death and the filing of this suit. When suit was filed, the dependent child was 12 years of age.
The defendant insurer contends that both parents of the minor child were living; that they were neither divorced nor separated; that no tutor could be appointed for her; that the father at all times was authorized to file suit in behalf of his child; hence, the claim is “forever barred” under LSA-R.S. 23:1209,1 because the suit was not filed within one year after the employee’s death.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that prescription does not run against minors, except in cases specifically provided by law; that the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Act, in LSA-R.S. 23:1234, provides that no limitation of time shall run against a minor so long as the minor has no “tutor”; that the term, tutor, does not include a father as administrator of the minor’s estate.
Article 3522 of the Louisiana Civil Code sets forth the general rule as to prescription against minors:
“Minors and persons under interdiction can not be prescribed against, except in the cases provided by law.”
LSA-R.S. 23:1234 deals specifically with limitations of time as applied to minors in workmen’s compensation proceedings:
“In case an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a minor or, *41where death results from the injury, in case any dependent as herein defined is mentally incompetent or a minor at the time when any right, privilege or election accrues to him under this Chapter, his duly qualified curator or tutor, as the case may be, may, in his behalf, claim and exercise such right, privilege or election, and no limitation of time, in this Chapter provided for, shall run, so long as such incompetent or minor has no curator or tutor, as the case may be.” (Italics ours.)
Since 1926, the courts have construed this section to mean that no limitation of time runs against a minor unless he has a duly qualified tutor. Prescription is not activated by the existence of a parent who may institute an action without formal appointment as tutor. Cashio v. Thibodeaux & Standard Acc. Ins. Co., La.App., 40 So.2d 31 (1949); Ross v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 16 La.App. 264, 133 So. 804 (1931); Wells v. White-Grandin Lumber Co., 13 La.App. 696, 129 So. 171 (1930); Wilson v. Lyon Lumber Co., 7 La.App. 169 (1927); and Gospel v. Southern Carbon Co., 4 La.App. 272 (1926), certiorari denied July 3, 1926.
In Cashio v. Thibodeaux & Standard Ins. Co., supra, the Court had before it a case, like the present one, in which both parents of the minor were living. It held that since the minor had no “duly qualified tutor,” prescription did not run until he reached the age of majority.
In Gospel v. Southern Carbon Co., supra, the Court rejected the contention that prescription ran against the minor child because the mother was authorized to represent the child without qualifying as tutor, saying:
“The situation of a minor, from the standpoint of being able to claim compensation under the act in cases where the parent for any reason neglects or declines to invoke the act in his or her behalf is the same as if the minor had no parent. „ To hold otherwise, would be to make the minor’s right depend entirely upon the will of the parent.”
In Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law and Practice, § 384, p. 501, Dr. Wex Malone, an eminent authority, states:
“Accordingly it has been held consistently that prescription does not begin running against a minor until after a tutor has been appointed. This is not affected by the fact that the minor had continuously lived with its parent who, under the Act, is authorized to institute an action on the minor’s behalf without a formal appointment as tutor.”
A comment in 24 Tulane Law Review 197, 204 sums up the law as follows:
*43“Regardless of whether a minor has'. no parents, one parent, ór both parents living who can bring a compensation suit in his behalf, the claim of a minor is not barred until one year after he is emancipated or reaches majority. i}c ijc ft
The insurer has seriously questioned the previous construction of LSA-R.S. 23:1234, particularly that in Cashio v. Thibodeaux & Standard Acc. Ins. Co., supra, a case in which both parents .of the minor child were living. We are disinclined, however, to disturb the jurisprudence on this point. The statute is explicit. It refers only to duly qualified tutor, not. to parent or administrator of a minor’s estate.^ The Legislature has seen fit to protect a minor’s right to compensation from the inaction or neglect of its parents. We do not question legislative policy: Moreover, as we have frequently said; the Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries.2
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, that the exception of prescription or peremption lacks merit.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed at defendant’s costs.
HAWTHORNE, J., dissents.

. “In case of personal injury (including death resulting therefrom) all claims for payments shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or death the parties have agreed upon the payments to be made under this Chapter or unless within one year after the accident proceedings have been begun as provided in Parts III and IV of this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in any case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from tbe time of making tbe last payment. Also, where tbe injury does not result at tbe time of, or develop immediately after tbe accident, tbe limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time tbe injury develops, but in all such cases tbe claim for payment shall be forever barred unless tbe proceedings have been begun within two years from tbe date of the accident.”

. See Danielsen v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 245 La. 450, 158 So.2d 609, and the authorities therein cited.