Court Opinion

ID: 9644036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:47:05.949283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:07.694114
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT,
Judge, dissenting:
The appellant, Adam Cunningham, following non-jury trial, was convicted of retail theft and criminal conspiracy. After post-trial motions were denied, and sentence imposed, appellant filed the instant direct appeal to our Court raising two claims of alleged error: (1) that the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (2) that the lower court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest. I find neither of appellant’s claims to be meritorious and would affirm the judgment of sentence.
The record shows that during the afternoon of August 6, 1974, a store detective for a department store in Willow Grove, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, observed appellant and one Delores Odom together in the women’s sportswear department from a distance of approximately ten to fifteen feet. The detective saw appellant pick up approximately ten pairs of pants and put them over his arm and then, with Miss Odom, leave the store without attempting to pay the cashier for the items of clothing. The detective followed the two and saw them get into a black over yellow Dodge automobile in which a male driver was waiting. As the trio proceeded south on York Road, the detective wrote down the license plate number and called the Upper More-land Township police giving them the description of the *310vehicle and the three occupants, the license plate number, and advised them of the direction in which the vehicle was traveling. The Upper Moreland police then broadcast the above information over the police radio and notified surrounding areas as well, since the vehicle had last been seen heading south on York Road toward Abington Township.
Within less then five minutes, an officer of the Upper Moreland Township Police Department, was directed over the radio to proceed to the department store to speak with the store detective. While en route, a few minutes later, the Upper Moreland officer was informed over the radio that the car had been stopped by Abington Township police officers. He picked up the store detective at the store and they proceeded to the intersection at Fairway, Harte and York Roads, approximately two miles away. As they arrived on the scene, an officer of the Abington Township Police Department was removing the three occupants from the vehicle. The store detective identified the three people as the perpetrators of the theft. The clothing, found in the vehicle was identified as being that which appellant had taken from the store. The clothing was lying in plain view on the back seat and on the floor in the front of the vehicle. Some of the items of clothing still had the department store price tags attached to them. The clothing was removed from the vehicle and placed in the Upper Moreland patrol car, and the vehicle was moved to the side of the road and secured. At the request of the Upper Moreland officer the three subjects were placed under arrest and put into the Abington Township patrol car, whereupon they were transported back to Upper Moreland Police Department for processing. At trial, the Commonwealth proved all of the above, as well as offering positive identification of appellant by the officers and the store detective.
In his first claim, appellant contends that he was not brought to trial within the prescribed time period of 180 days following the filing of the criminal complaint as required by Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The record indicates that while the criminal *311complaint was filed on August 6, 1974 and trial was held on September 4, 1975, the circumstances occurring between those dates compel the finding that Rule 1100 was not violated in this case. Records show that the appellant’s trial was originally scheduled for January 15,1975 and was called for trial on that date, well within the 180 days required by the Rule. Section (b) of Rule 1100 provides: “For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial”. Unfortunately, the appellant did not appear for his trial that day.
The appellant offered testimony that he had been found guilty and sentenced in Philadelphia County sometime in November, 1974 on charges of disorderly conduct. He was sentenced to 30 days in custody. As a result of such conviction, he was also found in violation of probation and as a result, had an IIV2 to 23 month sentence added to the disorderly conduct sentence. During all such proceedings and during the time he was serving such sentences in the Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia, appellant was listed and known by the name Frederick Duffan.1 During the time of such imprisonment, appellant never contacted the court or defense counsel to indicate his whereabouts or unavailability for trial. He also never exercised his right to seek speedy trial of the charges against him, while in a term of imprisonment, pursuant to 19 P.S. § 881, which permits prisoners to demand such timely dispositions of outstanding indictments. Efforts were made by the Commonwealth, within the initial 180 days after criminal charges were filed, although subsequent to the call for trial on January 15, 1975, to find the appellant so he could be tried. However, appellant’s conduct in using a plethora of false names, apparently frustrated attempts to determine his whereabouts. In view of the fact that the case was called for trial within the initial 180 day period, I find no violation of Rule 1100. As appellant did not seek speedy trial through other means statutorily availa*312ble to him during his period of incarceration, I find his trial to have been timely held.
Next, appellant contends the lower court erred in refusing to suppress evidence which appellant claims was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest. The appellant reasons that he was only convicted of misdemeanors2 and that he thus could not have been arrested without a warrant. We recently rejected a similar argument in highly analogous circumstances in Commonwealth v. Mayer, 240 Pa.Super. 181, 362 A.2d 407 (1976). There, as here, an officer stopped and then arrested occupants of an automobile which automobile and occupants fit a well detailed description from a police radio broadcast. Such broadcast informed the officer that the occupants had just been involved in a “theft”. As in Mayer, the record in the instant case clearly shows that the arresting officer had reasonable cause, based on the broadcast, to believe that a felony may have been committed and was justified in stopping the car. The plain view of the department store clothing, with fresh tags, in the car certainly justified the arrest. The actual conviction of a misdemeanor cannot defeat the existence of probable cause to support the initial stop and arrest. The appellant’s second claim of error should therefore be dismissed as lacking in merit.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
WATKINS, President Judge, and CERCONE, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Frederick Duffan is, according to appellant’s testimony in the instant case, his correct name. It is apparent however that he has used the name Adam Cunningham and many other names in his history of contacts with our criminal justice system.

. Retail theft is a misdemeanor of the first degree when the merchandise involved has a value of over $100.00. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3929. Conspiracy charges are defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 and have the same grading and degree in these circumstances as the retail theft charge. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 905.