Court Opinion

ID: 9449412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:11:46.072462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:49.799002
License: Public Domain

LEONARD P. MOORE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Appellant, Stefano Sovich, brought a declaratory judgment action in the district court, seeking an order declaring “arbitrary and capricious” the Attorney General’s refusal to stay his deportation *31to Yugoslavia on the claim of physical persecution pursuant to Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)). The trial court granted the cross-motion by defendant District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for summary judgment. Sovich appeals.
In addition to the facts stated in the majority opinion, the record of the hearing before the Special Inquiry Officer discloses that Sovich resided in Yugoslavia from his birth in 1925 until his departure in 1956. During that period, he went to school through the fifth elementary grade and thereafter worked on his father’s farm or as a fisherman. He testified that he never belonged to the Communist Party, was never politically active, and never publicly expressed himself against Communism in his town, but privately confided his opposition to friends. He believes that one of them reported him to the authorities and he was warned early in 1956 by a local official to desist, from making such utterances and he did so desist. He conceded that while he was in Yugoslavia he was never physically harmed or mistreated and was never imprisoned or charged with any crime. Sovich expressed the fear that if he returned to Yugoslavia he would be jailed because he “escaped” 1 and because he is opposed to Communism. The Special Inquiry Officer recommended that appellant’s application be denied.
An admittedly deportable alien challenging the refusal of the Attorney General to relax deportation under Section 243 (h) has certain lines of attack available to him. He can complain that he has been denied “appropriate procedural due process” in that his application has not been given a fair consideration, that such consideration was not given in accordance with the pertinent regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, or that he was not given the opportunity to present evidence on the subject of his persecution. See Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc); Batistic v. Pilliod, 286 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 366 U.S. 935, 81 S.Ct., 1660, 6 L.Ed.2d 847 (1961); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1904, 6 L.Ed.2d 1242 (1961); Cakmar v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953). Appellant raises no such claim here. He may complain that the denial of § 243(h) relief has been actuated by “considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant”, United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 233 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1956), aff’d 353 U.S. 72, 77 S.Ct. 618, 1 L.Ed.2d 652 (1957), or that his application was denied arbitrarily or capriciously or with a complete disregard of the law and' the' facts. Blazina v. Bouchard, supra. This does not mean that denial may be set aside merely because unsupported by substantial evidence. Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra; United States ex rel. Moon v. Shaughnessy; supra.
A deportable alien is eligible for relief here only when, in the “opinion” of the Attorney General, expulsion would subject that alien to physical persecution in the country to which he must go. The courts have long recognized that the Attorney General is here deciding a political question that is solely within the competence of the executive branch. Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955) ; United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d at 395, supra; U. S. ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 774, 2 L.Ed.2d 762 (1958) ;. Blazina v. Bouchard, supra. The Attorney General has access to information,, not available to a reviewing court, with *32which to assess the political climate of a foreign country and against which to weigh the assertions, often exaggerated, of an applicant for § 243(h) relief. It is with awareness of these judicial limitations that courts have stressed the “closely circumscribed” scope of judicial review of a denial of relief under § 243 ■(h). The majority seem to recognize the validity of these principles but find that the courts can review, as a question •of law, the correctness of the standards by which the Attorney General or his delegate determines whether an applicant for § 243(h) relief would be subjected to physical persecution.
The power of the federal government to exclude aliens, to admit them only on such conditions as it seems fit to prescribe, and to expel those within its ■dominion is plenary. These powers inhere in its sovereignty and have been consistently recognized by the courts. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 22 S.Ct. 686, 46 L.Ed. 917 (1902) ; Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903) ; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952). In addition, Congress may designate such .agencies as it sees fit to carry out whatever policies of exclusion and expulsion it adopts and so long as such agencies do not transcend limits of authority or .abuse discretion reposed in them, their .judgment is not open to challenge or review by courts. Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, supra. In 1952, Congress en•acted the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), as a comprehensive, revised immigration, naturalization, and nationality code As an essential part of this legislative scheme, the Attorney General is given the responsibility of passing on the applications of aliens for the withholding or suspension of deportation.2. In passing on such applications, the Attorney General must first make factual findings as to whether the statutory prerequisites of eligibility have been met.3 The correctness of the legal standards applied in making such factual determinations are fully reviewable in the courts. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 S.Ct. 618, 1 L.Ed.2d 652 (1957); McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 224, 95 L.Ed. 173 (1950); McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Exarchou v. Murff, 265 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1959); Pagano v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Once the Attorney General finds that the alien is eligible for withholding or suspension of deportation, he must decide whether to exercise his discretion in the applicant’s favor. The statute does not restrict or specify the considerations that may be relied upon in making that decision. Relief is granted according to the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General and the standards or factors he employs will be overturned only if capricious or arbitrary. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, supra; Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 76 S.Ct. 919, 100 L.Ed. 1242 (1956). The question here concerns the scope of review of a decision of the Attorney General that involves neither the fact finding process of determining statutory eligibility nor the exercise of discretion in withholding or suspending deportation. It concerns review of the standards used by the Attorney General in determining in his opinion *33whether an alien would be subject to physicial persecution if returned to a particular country. The majority contend that this is an interpretation of a statutory norm or standard of eligibility prerequisite to an exercise of discretion and is, therefore, reviewable as a question of law as is any construction by the Attorney General of other statutory prerequisites. It is true in one sense that a finding that an alien would be subject to physical persecution is a prerequisite to discretionary action. Without such a finding, the Attorney General would be powerless to withhold deportation. But this is not the end of the inquiry.
Section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 987) amended Section 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917 (39 Stat. 890) to provide:
“No alien shall be deported under any provisions of this chapter to any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical persecution.”
Two aspects of this statutory language are noteworthy. First, the decision of the Attorney General as to whether an alien would be subjected to physical persecution on deportation is treated solely as a question of fact. Second, once such a finding is made, the withholding of deportation is mandatory. The Attorney General has no discretion in the matter. The Immigration Act of 1917 was repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The provision dealing with physical persecution is now § 243(h) of the 1952 Act. It provides:
“The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.”
The changes wrought by this new language are clear. First, the determination of whether an alien would be subject to physical persecution is not simply a decision of a factual question. It is the opinion of the Attorney General that is to control. Second, even if the Attorney General opines that an alien would be subject to physical persecution, he is authorized, not required as before, to withhold deportation.
Commenting on the change in the statutory language, this court said in United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1953):
“That section modified the language of the former statute in a manner which shows clearly, we think, that the withholding of deportation in cases where the alien fears persecution rests wholly in the administrative judgment and ‘opinion’ of the Attorney General or his delegate. The courts may not substitute their judgment for his.”
And at 395:
“The very nature of the decision he must make concerning what the foreign country is likely to do is a political issue into which the courts should not intrude. As was said in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568: ‘But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.’ ”
In Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1904, 6 L.Ed.2d 1242 (1961), the court said: :
“The 1952 changes are significant. They make clear that a decision whether an alien would be physically persecuted on return to his native country was intended by Congress to be committed solely to the judgment of the Attorney General.”
See, also, United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 774, 2 L.Ed.2d 762 (1958); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1954). *34These cases make clear that the Attorney General’s decision on whether an alien would be subject to physical persecution and his determination of whether or not to withhold deportation lie solely within his administrative judgment. The role of the courts is limited to assuring that the alien was' afforded procedural due process and that the Attorney General’s decision was not capricious or arbitrary.
The legal literature has long been concerned with the dichotomy between “law” and “fact” and the consequences on judicial review of attaching one or the other label to a particular question decided by an administrative agency.4 One of the frequently suggested tests has been that of expertness.5, This approach would have a reviewing court first consider the relative .abilities of the administrative agency and the courts to render an informed judgment on the question at issue. Although this approach has had its critics,6 it is of help here. When § 243 (h)-relief is sought, the Attorney General must determine if the applicant would be subject to physical persecution if deported to a particular country. To decide that question, the Attorney General may take into consideration the political climate of the country involved and its practices regarding, for example, the treatment of returning defectors. To this end he can utilize confidential information. Jay v. Boyd, supra. His assessment of the political conditions in the foreign country may also be necessary to determine the validity of the alien’s fears. These investigations and determinations are such that they can only be intelligently made by the executive branch. They are closely related to the conduct of our foreign relations and involve political assessments and judgments which the courts have no competence to review. The action of the majority in this case illustrates the point well. It knows nothing of the existence of Yugoslav laws making “escape” a crime. It knows nothing of the past practices of the government of Yugoslavia in punishing violators of this law even if it does exist. It knows nothing of the severity of punishment that might be inflicted on Sovich on his return to Yugoslavia. Yet it tells the Attorney General’s delegate, who we must assume has the answers to these questions, that he does not know the meaning of physical persecution.
I believe that the Attorney General . alone has the competence to give content to that phrase. Only that branch of gov.ernment to which is entrusted the safeguard of our foreign relations, and has the attendant facilities, information and experience can meaningfully gauge all the subtleties and variations of action that are designed to oppress and perse- . cute.7 The realities of a world in which *35more than half of its population live in varying degrees of political slavery (by our standards) require that the meaning of that phrase be constantly recast and re-evaluated8 by the only branch of government able to do so — the Executive.
A consideration of far greater importance here however, is the clearly expressed intention of the Congress.9 The language of the statute, especially as modified by the 1952 legislation, makes evident the Congressional purpose to grant the Attorney General the broadest possible discretion in considering applications under § 243(h). The juxtaposition of the discretionary authorization to withhold deportation and the declaration that it is the opinion of the Attorney General as to physical persecution that is determinative should conclude any search for the legislative desire. His decision should be overturned only if capricious or arbitrary.
In the delicate fields of immigration and international relations, the courts should be ever mindful of the constitutional separation of powers and not attempt to take over the function of the other two branches. The majority suggests that section 243(h) “reflected the humanitarian concern of Congress that aliens should not be expelled from our shores into the hands of totalitarian regimes unwilling to recognize even elementary standards of human decency.” Whether Yugoslavia deserves that condemnation, I am ill-equipped to decide. I would imagine that is the reason why such determinations have been left' to that branch of government which has responsibility for, and must remain sensitive to, the conduct of our foreign relations.
No judicial elaboration is required of the radical differences in criminal laws and procedures that exist between our own country and those of totalitarian states. If we are to regard every such law or procedure as a failure to provide “elementary standards of human decency”, we are indeed undertaking a gigantic task of world paternalism. This the majority would undertake. They do not like Yugoslavia’s law which imposes punishment for illegal departure from its country. Neither do I. They do not wish to have “an alien threatened with long years of imprisonment, perhaps even life imprisonment, for attempting to escape a cruel dictatorship.” Nor do I, but the decision is not ours to make. In short, despite a personal predilection to allow every person, except the criminal, who has reached our shores to remain here, it is Congress that is entrusted with fashioning our immigration policies and Congress has vested certain discretionary powers in the Attorney General.
Turning to the case at hand and applying the scope of review described above, affirmance is required. In fact, in my view, the same result is called for if we apply the scope of review contended for by the majority.
The Special Inquiry Officer concluded his recommendation that Sovich be denied § 243(h) relief with the following:
“Since the applicant was not in any way mistreated after these alleged utterances were reported to the authorities, it seems reasonable to *36believe that he would not now be persecuted therefore upon his return. While it may be true that he may be punished for his illegal departure from Yugoslavia such punishment is not the physical persecution contemplated by the statute. The statute contemplates persecution visited upon the alleged offender in the form of corporal punishment, torture or death because of race, religion or political opinion. Here the punishment which the applicant fears he might suffer would apparently be after conviction for a crime cognizable under the recognized juridical system. That is not persecution.
“I believe that the applicant has failed to establish by reasonable and probative evidence that he would be subjected to physical persecution if returned to Yugoslavia. His application should therefore be denied.”
The majority find that the standards set forth in this recommendation are erroneous. I think that a fair reading of the above excerpt demonstrates a construction of the phrase “physical persecution” that is not only not capricious or arbitrary but that is clearly correct.
The phrase “physical persecution” has been construed by the Attorney General to mean incarceration, torture or death inflicted because of one’s race, religion, or political opinions. See Matter of Kale, Adm.Dee. A-9555532 (1958); Diminich v. Esperdy, supra; Blazina v. Bouchard, supra. It has been recognized, of course, that the mode of punishment is not controlling, so that complete denial of employment can be physical persecution — if inflicted for an illicit reason. Diminich v. Esperdy, supra; Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3rd Cir. 1962). However, infliction of the punishment on racial, religious, or political grounds has to date been required. The fact that a law is harsh or restricts individual freedoms in a way inconsistent with our own beliefs does not mean that its application, without more, amounts to physical persecution. Congress recognized that all those who live under Communist regimes suffer deprivation of freedoms that we take for granted. Congress intended, however, that § 243 (h) relief would be available only to those who could show that they would be singled out and subjected to persecution because of their race, religion or political viewpoint. Here, again, the label attached to such persecution is of no significance. Penal laws punishing traditional crimes such as murder, robbery, etc., might be applied in a discriminatory fashion;10 a law forbidding unauthorized exit might be invoked only against those who fled for political reasons. Physical persecution would likewise exist, as the majority suggest, if breach of traditional or untraditional laws was prompted by persecution or fear of persecution for the proscribed reasons.
The majority lose sight of these principles when it relies on the fact that “[gjeneral prohibitions against departure from a country do not * * * define traditional crimes in Western societies.” The majority finds a crucial distinction, as far as § 243(h) relief is concerned, between escaping from a country by deserting one of its ships in a friendly country11 and escaping by fleeing across its frontier. The former is an act that civilized countries do or might forbid while only totalitarian countries limit their citizens’ rights of egress. This is true, the majority seem to feel, even *37though the law forbidding egress has no relation to race, religion or political viewpoint and is not discriminatorily applied. Thus, two aliens who fled the same Communist country because of dissatisfaction with their economic plight and who might both be prosecuted on return for unlawful departure, would find themselves in quite different positions as far as § 243 (h) relief is concerned. To me, this is an incongruous and illogical result. The determinative question here is the underlying cause of the punishment, not the mode of departure or the title of the statute under which the alien would be prosecuted. Accordingly, assuming that the appellant here will be imprisoned for his illegal departure from Yugoslavia, he must do more than show possibility of prosecution for violating a law that is not discriminatorily applied. He must demonstrate, and convince the Attorney General, that he will be prosecuted under this law because of his race, religion or political viewpoint, or as the majority suggest, that he fled the country because of this type of oppression.
The majority’s reasoning could also lead to some bizarre and undesirable re» suits. First, it would place those refugees who have fled a communist country and been granted asylum in a democratic state and then jumped ship here in a better position that those who desert a Communist vessel. It would seem wiser to discourage refugees who already have been granted one haven from deserting ships of friendly nations and flouting our own immigration laws. Further, the annual number of escapees from Yugoslavia is apparently quite substantial. Many leave Yugoslavia because of their dire economic plight. If any of them can reach our shores, under the majority decision the mere fact that they escaped would entitle them to consideration under § 243(h), a section which was intended to serve no such purpose.
Turning now to the opinion of the Special Inquiry Officer, it seems clear to me that he had the proper criteria in mind in passing on Sovich’s application. He found, first, that Sovich would not be persecuted on his return for his political or religious beliefs. Then, using the language earlier quoted, he found that imprisonment for his illegal departure which would not stem from his race, religion, or political viewpoint, did not constitute physical persecution. Although the last two sentences of the language quoted may be overly broad in that they suggest that conviction for any crime, even one related to religious or political viewpoint, would not constitute physical persecution, a fair reading of this language in context indicates that such was not the Inquiry Officer’s understanding. Tie accepts the fact, by what he states before these two sentences, that punishment, whatever its form, must be related to race, religion, or political viewpoint. This conclusion is more than amply supported by the record and should be affirmed. Reversal here, on a record as free of doubt as this, would be contrary to our Diminich holding and the standard of review there established.

. Sovich has failed to refer this eourt to any Yugoslav statute making unlawful departure a punishable act or to any Yugoslav practice of punishing those who flee the country,

. Sections 243(h) and 244(a). See, also, Sections 245(a) and 249(a).

. For example, under 244(a) : whether the alien has applied for relief within five years after the effective date of the statute; whether he last entered the United States more than two years prior to June 27, 1952; whether he is deport-able under any law of the United States and is not a member of a class of aliens whose deportation could not have been suspended by Section 19(d) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended. Under § 249(a) : whether the alien entered the United States prior to June 28, 1940; has had residence in the United States continuously since such entry.

. See, e. g., Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941) ; Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, 55 (1927) ; Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission, 93-98 (1924).

. See, e. g., Landis, The Administrative Process, 152-153 (1938).

. See Brown, Law and Fact in Judicial Review, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 899, 926-927 (1943).

. The background and decision of Matter of Kale, Adm.Dee. A9 555 532 is instructive on this point. A number of contentions raised by Yugoslav nationals in proceedings before the Service led the Commissioner of Immigration in October 1956 to defer further action until the Service was able to collect reliable information as to conditions in Yugoslavia. The decision in the Kale case, rendered after the investigation was completed, was forwarded to Regional Commissioners with instructions that decisions as to all Yugoslav crewmen who had entered since 1945 and had been in Yugoslavia at some time since that date should be “based upon the criteria” stated therein. The decision discussed the political climate of Yugoslavia* in some detail. See Judge Friendly’s opinion in Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244, 246-247 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844, 82 S.Ct. 875, 7 L.Ed.2d 848 (1962). The procedure utilized by the Commissioner in this instance indicates the resources required to ascertain the political facts in a foreign country and demonstrates well the need for professional judgment in evaluating the probable consequences of these facts.

. The statute itself makes clear that the Attorney General is required to keep under review those cases in which § 243(h) relief is granted. Since he is to withhold deportation “for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason [physical persecution]”, he must be continuously alert to developments in the country involved and in the alien’s position vis-a-vis those developments.

. Compare Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 70, 105-107 (1944) arguing that the function of the court reviewing administrative decisions is to search for “legislative intention”. When Congress lays down general standards for an administrative agency to follow, the agency has the function of filling in the interstices and giving content to that standard. If the agency has stayed within the bounds of the exercise of discretion fixed by Congress, the courts are not to substitute their judgment for that of the agency:

. Consider the recent reports that only Jews are punished for violation of certain Russian laws defining commercial crimes.

. This was the situation in Diminich v. Esperdy, supra. Diminich, as Sovich here, had shipped out from Yugoslavia, deserted his vessel in Italy, shipped as a seaman and again deserted his vessel in New York. His testimony before the Hearing Commissioner was quite similar to Sovich’s. He feared that he would be imprisoned for desertion and that he would have “diifieulties” if returned. This Court held that incarceration for a violation of the Yugoslav law was “reconcilable with generally recognized concepts of justice.” 299 F.2d at 246.