Court Opinion

ID: 9725816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:13:03.517341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:20.241502
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DOWNING, concurring and dissenting in part: I agree with the disposition of this case made by the majority opinion except as to part VIL I dissent from the conclusion reached therein, which holds that defendant Payne was properly convicted of both burglary and armed violence based upon the underlying felony of burglary. A. Defendant Payne’s first argument on this issue is that his convictions for both of these offenses violate the “one act-one crime” rule of People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273. He bases this argument on his claim that he committed only one physical act which could serve as the basis for the armed violence charge. The majority opinion rejects this contention on the theory that “the language of section 33A — 2 makes abundantly clear [that] two acts rather than just one are involved in the offense of armed violence: one being the commission of a felony e 0 * and the second being armed with a dangerous weapon while committing the act.” (First emphasis theirs, second emphasis added.) I have carefully examined the language of section 33A — 2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 33A — 2), and cannot agree with the majority’s reasoning. In my opinion, the crime of armed violence consists of only a single criminal “act”1 (that act being the commission of the underlying felony), which is aggravated by the presence of a “dangerous weapon.” In enacting the armed violence statute, the General Assembly’s intent (as I interpret it) was simply to provide a greater penalty against those defendants who chose to possess a dangerous weapon during the commission of a felonious criminal act of some type. The legislature did not, in my opinion, determine that possession of such a weapon in and of itself was a distinct criminal act to be dealt with under the armed violence provision.2 Rather, it determined that the degree of criminality inherent in the underlying, prerequisite act (being another felony defined at law) was greater when that act was accompanied by the mere presence of a dangerous weapon. To me, the element of the dangerous weapon contained in the armed violence provision can be analogized to the aggravated battery statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4). When a person commits a battery as defined by law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3) while using a deadly weapon, he has committed aggravated battery (par. 12 — 4(b)(1)), an enhanced penalty crime. Yet, it cannot logically be said that that person has committed two distinct physical King “acts,” each of which could support a different conviction without violating King. Instead, that person has committed a single criminal act, battery, which is aggravated by the use of a deadly weapon and becomes the crime of aggravated battery. Nevertheless, under the reasoning of the majority opinion, such a person would have committed two such acts: battery (i.e., intentionally causing great bodily harm, let us say) and use of a deadly weapon, each of which could, under the majority’s theory, support a separate and concurrent conviction. I believe that King would be violated in such circumstances, and similarly is violated under the majority’s analysis of defendant Payne’s situation. For these reasons, I must strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the King “one act-one crime” rule was not violated here with regard to defendant Payne. B. Additionally, I am convinced that the majority wrongly decided defendant Payne’s alternative contention that in this case, burglary is a lesser included offense of armed violence. A corollary, in a sense, of the King “one act-one crime” rule is that a defendant is prejudiced where he is convicted of two offenses, one of which is by definition a lesser included offense of the other. (People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566.) A lesser included offense is one of which all the elements are included in the greater offense (People v. Smith (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 298, 306, 399 N.E.2d 1289); one which is established by proof of the same or less than all of the elements of the greater offense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 2—9). The majority concludes that burglary, as charged in the instant case, is not a lesser included offense of armed violence. I note again that the armed violence charge against defendant Payne was based upon the underlying felony of burglary, that burglary having been committed while Payne was armed with a dangerous weapon. It is obvious to me that the elements of burglary (knowingly and without authority entering and remaining in, inter alia, a building with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 19 — 1), must all be proved here before Payne could be convicted of the crime of armed violence based upon that burglary. I fail to see those “elements [of burglary] that are not required for the offense of armed violence [based upon burglary]” which the majority relies upon in determining that the multiple convictions can stand. The Illinois cases cited by the majority do not, in my opinion, give any support to the majority’s conclusion. In People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535, the defendant was properly convicted of armed violence based upon aggravated battery and of attempted murder. As the supreme court noted, the elements of these two crimes are different. In People v. Smith (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 298, the defendant was properly convicted of robbery and intimidation. As the supreme court noted, these crimes have different elements, and thus intimidation could not be a lesser included offense of robbery. In People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671, cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 296, 99 S. Ct. 2858, the defendant was properly convicted of armed violence based upon intimidation and of unlawful use of weapons. As the supreme court noted, the elements of these two crimes are not the same. In contrast, here the State must prove all the elements of burglary plus the fact that that crime was committed while armed with a dangerous weapon in order to convict defendant Payne of armed violence. Thus, burglary is a lesser included offense of armed violence here. Consequently, Payne’s conviction for burglary should be reversed. I believe the majority erred in finding to the contrary.   “Act” is defined in King as “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.” 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566.    The General Assembly had already provided that certain modes of possessing certain types of weapons were illegal. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 24 — 1.