Court Opinion

ID: 9710471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:22.064239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.089097
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is an important case which should prompt a vital judicial decision on the application of the Domestic Abuse Act. See Minn.Stat. § 518B.01 (1986). As applied in this case, the Act involves a process which is in glaring conflict with appellant’s constitutionally protected interests in liberty and privacy. The trial court decision should be reversed. Because the constitutional questions in the case have state-wide impact, and are likely to recur unless resolved by a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the case begs for review by that judicial body. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 117, subd. 2.
1. Domestic Abuse Act.
It should be noted at the outset that the Domestic Abuse Act is a vital part of Minnesota family law. These cases typically involve nearly helpless victims, including spouses and children who are severely hurt. The Act provides unique and critical remedies in cases where abuse occurs within a family. Thus, for example, although the juvenile law in Minnesota makes no provision for temporary removal of an abusive parent from the family home, that remedy exists under the Domestic Abuse Act. Similarly, the Act grants an abused spouse the remedies of police assistance and other emergency relief, benefits not fully available in a dissolution case, and covering cases where a spouse elects not to seek marriage dissolution or legal separation. I would urge nothing to diminish the availability of remedies under the Act. This opinion calls for due process in Domestic Abuse Act cases, but the prescription need not diminish the availability of appropriate relief under the Act. What is called for is nothing more than the simplest reform, the exercise of care in assessing the facts of the case, and the discipline of the trial court in preparing reasonably adequate written findings of fact.
It is among the evident purposes of the Domestic Abuse Act to provide for important relief in summary proceedings. The need for summary proceedings inevitably suggests that the proceedings can be handled through pre-printed forms which can be completed with check marks and a signature. This same tendency has been observed in juvenile delinquency cases, child protection cases, and involuntary commitment. Until recent years, there was also a tendency in dissolution cases to determine important issues with boiler plate findings and conclusions, or with no findings at all. The tendency to determine cases with forms may be laudatory in terms of the goal for judicial efficiency, but the aim for efficiency can never rightfully dominate the aim for justice and fair play.
It is noted later in this opinion that the courts have immense powers under the Domestic Abuse Act. This is also true in other judicial proceedings that deal with personal and family welfare. What the courts do in these cases has immediate and long-standing effects in matters which are of the deepest importance to the individuals who are involved in the cases. When mistakes are made, and when fair play is not demonstrated to everyone involved in the proceedings, immense damage is often done.. It is because of the great powers of the courts in these cases that due process is vital. No matter how good is the will of those who try to resolve personal and family problems, and no matter how tragic are the consequences of failing to act, we should abandon the delusion that there are not equally painful consequences in mistaken, or careless or arbitrary legal dealings on personal and family welfare issues.
*6322. Trial court proceedings.
In her petition for relief, respondent alleged the occurrence of serious threatening remarks by appellant on two occasions in September 1986. Proper notice was given for a hearing to be conducted on October 16, 1986, and both parties appeared before the trial court referee on that date.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the referee and a judge signed a pre-printed order for protection. The form includes this printed provision: “THE COURT FINDS: THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ACT[S] OF DOMESTIC ABUSE.” The printed form makes no provision for other findings.
The record does not include sufficient evidence to justify the trial court’s conclu-sory finding. Respondent was not asked to describe the evidence cited in her petition for relief. Moreover, she was not even asked to repeat the allegations in the petition nor to affirm that they were true. Appellant repeatedly denied that the allegations were true. A single admission by appellant did not indicate an act of abuse. It is evident that the trial court made its finding solely by sizing up the manner of appellant’s talking in the court room. This summary of the fact finding process is better appreciated if it is detailed.
(a) Petitioner’s allegations.
Respondent said nothing in the hearing regarding the occurrences contained in her petition for relief. The record includes this single relevant item:
THE COURT: What would you like to say, if anything, Mrs. Hall. You don’t have to. I have read what you said. Is there anything you’de like to add. We don’t want to start an argument.
The trial court referee did not stop to permit respondent’s answer to its questions. Without interruption, the referee asked respondent about the relief she wanted, and the respondent answered solely on the subject of relief she sought.
(b) Appellant’s responses.
Early in the hearing, this exchange led to appellant’s response:
THE COURT: Did you get these papers, Bob?
MR. HALL: Yes, I did, your Honor. THE COURT: Did you have a chance to read them over?
MR. HALL: You bet.
THE COURT: Do you have anything to say?
MR. HALL: I do.
Appellant then spoke more than a dozen sentences which described the difficulties of the family in recent years. Evidently referring to the allegations in the petition, appellant testified they were “fictitious” and “a smear tactic to make it look like I’m an unfit father.” He repeated, “I deny it.”
A minute later, this exchange occurred:
THE COURT: We can handle that now [referring to appellant’s concerns about visitation rights]. What concerns me, have you done something to threaten your former wife?
MR. HALL: No, other than the fact I’m going to court for custody.
THE COURT: Did these things happen? MR. HALL: No, your Honor.
There follows this exchange in the record, the single admission of appellant:
THE COURT: You weren’t verbally abusive to her?
MR. HALL: I may have. I did swear at her. [Mr. Hall proceeded to indicate the name calling he admitted.]
(c)The referee’s response.
The record includes only a single observation of the trial court referee as to his view of the facts. Addressing Mr. Hall, the court observed:
[I]f you’re talking to me the way you have been I can imagine what your talking to her is like. You don’t threaten me but I can see how you could threaten by the sort of way you talk — fast and low.
3. Trial court powers.
Proceedings under the Domestic Abuse Act involve adjudication of facts and the potential award of substantial relief. They are not merely investigative proceedings. *633Cf., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960) (deciding due process rights in a pure investigative proceeding, as compared to those rights in an adjudicative proceeding). In such proceedings, due process is mandatory. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 425-28, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1850-52, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969).
The Domestic Abuse Act makes an unusual grant of authority to the trial court.1 The powers of the court parallel those of a trial court in a dissolution case.2 In addition, however, the court can order a party to participate in treatment or counseling services, and can grant “other relief as it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household member.” Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 6(f) and (h). The statute also empowers the court to command police assistance in the execution of the order of protection. Id., subd. 9. Violations of orders constitute a criminal offense as well as contempt of court, and special police powers are granted to permit arrest and custody of a person who is believed to have violated a personal restraining order. Id., subd. 14.
4. Hearing.
According to the Domestic Abuse Act, an order for protection may issue “upon notice and hearing.” Id., subd. 6. Appellant asserts that he was denied an evidentiary hearing and claims that the proceedings here deprived him of liberty without due process of law. The majority concludes that appellant was not denied an evidentia-ry hearing. I am convinced that appellant did not enjoy the hearing contemplated by the statute, that the process was not in accord with judicial standards for similar proceedings, and that the process involved a serious violation of appellant’s constitutional rights for due process.
Appellant was not confronted with any testimony of petitioner on her allegations. He was not offered the opportunity to ask questions of petitioner. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process. *634This concept of law has been frequently announced by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963).
In addition, appellant was denied his right to present evidence. The trial court referee failed to give an opportunity for testimony of either party on the evidence that was said to constitute an act or acts of domestic abuse. To comport with the constitutional requirement for due process, a hearing must include the right of a party to present evidence on his own behalf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. at 429, 89 S.Ct. at 1852. Appellant’s opportunity to present evidence could not be left dependent upon the “unfettered discretion” of the referee. Id. It is true that we are not dealing here with denial of a request to present evidence. However, in the setting of these proceedings, the constitutional rights of appellant cannot be conditioned upon his assertiveness. Neither party was represented by counsel, and it is evident that presentations for either party would only occur to the extent an opportunity was given by the presiding referee. It is necessary in these proceedings that the responding party be given a definite opportunity to testify on the factual issues in the case.
A second proceeding occurred in this case after appellant requested that the referee’s decision, endorsed by a trial judge, be further reviewed under Rule 53.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Court. The majority reports that both parties submitted additional evidence in the review proceeding. However, I find nothing in the record here to substantiate the observation that an evidentia-ry hearing was conducted on review. In its order in the review proceedings, the trial court observed that the matter was decided on written arguments. These written arguments appear of record. Respondent’s position was written in her unsworn statement, which was evidently treated by the court as a written argument. Appellant also submitted a written argument. The only presentation of evidence was in the form of a short affidavit accompanying appellant’s written argument. In this affidavit, appellant repeated his emphatic denial of the truth of statements contained in respondent’s petition for relief. In his written statement, appellant specifically challenged the sufficiency of evidence in the case and asked, as an alternative to a decision to void the initial order, that the matter be remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. In its order in the review proceedings, the trial court unconditionally affirmed the initial order.
5. Findings.
The requirement for particularized findings has become a cornerstone of justice in Minnesota for cases involving the exercise of broad discretionary powers. This has become part of our law as a matter of judicial policy of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 267, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1971) (in view of the broad discretion of the trial court in “domestic relations cases generally,” it is “especially important” that the basis for the trial court’s decision be set forth with a “high degree of particularity”). The supreme court views particularized findings as a prerequisite to meaningful appellate review. Id. It has explained, in addition, that written findings reflecting consideration of statutory standards assure that those standards are followed and satisfy the parties that an important decision has been carefully and fairly determined. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976).
The demand for appropriate findings goes beyond a matter of good judicial policy. It is an established part of constitutional due process. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 369, 56 S.Ct. 747, 808, 80 L.Ed. 1209 (1936) (and cases cited therein) (due process hearing rights include “the right to introduce evidence and have judicial findings based upon it”). See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). See also Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (1976) (constitutional right of privacy requires consideration of precise stan*635dards in decisions on certain treatment of committed patients).
6. Child welfare.
Another dissenting opinion addresses the question whether the trial court had too little evidence to justify restrictions on appellant’s visitation of his children. I agree that there was no evidence showing appellant had abused his children or was likely to do so. There was no claim before the court that alleged abuse of respondent had been harmful to the children. Even if contacts between spouses were to be supervised, prompted by sufficient evidence of spousal abuse, it does not follow that there cannot be unlimited interaction between either parent, separately, and the children.
It is unclear to me whether the trial court’s order called for interference with the privacy of those occasions when the children might be in the separate company of their father. To the extent the order led to any such limitation, I agree that this would be inappropriate here, even if there were lawful findings of spousal abuse.
Appellant challenges restrictions on his visitation rights, arguing primarily that the trial court wrongfully interfered with the resolution of that issue by another trial judge in a dissolution case. Appellant’s arguments call attention to the trial court’s order on visitation rights, which presents still another serious problem of wrongful exercise of authority.
The pre-printed order for protection employed in this case grants the petitioner (respondent on appeal) the right of custody of the children, subject to appellant’s right of visitation “as follows.” The form then suggests the selection of one of three options, either
A) Reasonable and liberal with 24-hours notice to petitioner;
B) Determined and supervised by Department of Court Services (Telephone No. 292-6528).
C) Other_
Here the trial court checked the second option on the form and thereby delegated to its Department of Court Services the complete authority to determine when and where visits should occur, how they should be supervised, or whether they should occur at all.
In my opinion, the complete delegation of authority on the visitation issue, or any material issue in the case, is in gross conflict with the language and the intention of the Domestic Abuse Act. In addition, the failure to specify what relief is granted, done without any specific relevant evidence and without any findings of fact, is a further breach of due process, offending not only the rights of appellant but also the due process rights of the children. For this reason, I agree that there is an additional mandate to reverse that portion of the order for protection dealing with appellant’s visitation of the children.
7. Conclusion.
I recognize the vital laudatory purpose of the Domestic Abuse Act to permit prompt and easy access to the courts on abuse cases. This exemplary purpose, however, does not permit the grant of great powers, putting privacy interests, liberty interests and property interests at risk, without the imposition of restraint brought about through the mandate for due process. Given the importance of this issue, it is not too much to ask of Minnesota trial courts that they make decisions in these cases based on adequate findings of fact supported by competent evidence. Unless we wish to abandon the demand for employment of the rule of law, licensing wholly unfettered exercise of authority in summary proceedings, we should reverse the trial court’s decision in this case.

. According to the statute, the trial court may take the following steps in an order for protection:
(a) restrain the abusing party from committing acts of domestic abuse;
(b) exclude the abusing party from the dwelling which the parties share or from the residence of the petitioner;
(c) award temporary custody or establish temporary visitation with regard to minor children of the parties on a basis which gives primary consideration to the safety of the victim and the children. If the court finds that the safety of the victim or the children will be jeopardized by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation, the court shall condition or restrict visitation as to time, place, duration, or supervision, or deny visitation entirely, as needed to guard the safety of the victim and the children. The court’s deliberation under this subdivision shall in no way delay the issuance of an order for protection granting other reliefs provided for in Laws 1985, chapter 195;
(d) on the same basis as is provided in chapter 518, establish temporary support for minor children or a spouse, and order the withholding of support from the income of the person obligated to pay the support according to chapter 518;
(e) provide upon request of the petitioner counseling or other social services for the parties, if married, or if there are minor children;
(f) order the abusing party to participate in treatment or counseling services;
(g) award temporary use and possession of property and restrain one or both parties from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or disposing of property except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, and to account to the court for all such transfers, encumbrances, dispositions, and expenditures made after the order is served or communicated to the party restrained in open court;
(h) order, in its discretion, other relief as it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household member, including orders or directives to the sheriff or constable, as provided by this section.
Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)-(h).

. It is true, as the majority asserts, that the Domestic Abuse Act permits proceedings dealing with issues arising at the same time in a dissolution case. See Minn.Stat. 518B.01, subd. 16 (domestic abuse proceedings are "in addition to other civil or criminal remedies"). This characteristic of the proceedings increases the impact of many orders for protection, including the order in this case. Appellant contends that the order for protection in this case contradicts and undermines a trial court decision in a dissolution case, a decision rendered after a full presentation of evidence in the case. This added potential impact of the Domestic Abuse Act order enlarges the need for due process.