Court Opinion

ID: 9726594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:58:59.788035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.970555
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I believe that plaintiffs established questions of fact about whether (1) the claimed depression in the sidewalk rendered the sidewalk no longer reasonably safe, (2) the ice or snow on which Valeria Haliw fell was a “natural accumulation,” and *313(3) her injuries were proximately caused by the sidewalk’s condition.
The majority’s resolution of these factual disputes is an impermissible invasion into the province of the finder of fact. Because the issues should be left for the finder of fact, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that upheld the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
i
In the proceedings below, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). It argued that summary disposition was proper because the natural accumulation doctrine barred plaintiffs’ claim, and there was no defect in the sidewalk in question. Plaintiffs retorted that there were questions of fact whether the sidewalk was defective because the depression in it created an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow. Therefore, they contended, the natural accumulation doctrine has nothing to do with the case.
In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court stated:
The Court-. It seems [plaintiff] does have someone who seems to have expertise — a great deal of expertise who is saying it is a year-aroimd defect, not just an accumulation of ice and no defect if it is a constant problem and he is going to testify to that, and if that — from that this Court’s specific perspective raises an issue of fact, you are saying that by a preponderance that doesn’t meet the standard?
I am not disposed to agree with your position on that, so you have something else you would like to make me aware of regarding why this isn’t something that a jury must listen to?
*314[.Defendant’s counsel]: I have nothing else with regard to the expert, your honor. . . .
The Court-. . . . [T]his Court does believe that plaintiff has shown — this fact issue has been raised by provisions raised by the expert and his credentials and you [defendant] may provide your own expert, but if a finder of fact should have the opportunity, then, to weigh the issues in this case, and I will deny the motion for summary disposition.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that the natural accumulation doctrine barred plaintiffs’ claim.1 It reasoned:
Defendant’s argument fails, however, because plaintiffs do not allege that Valeria Haliw fell because of a natural accumulation of ice and snow. Rather, plaintiffs claim that the fall was caused by an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow resulting from a depression in the sidewalk. Thus, in addition to the presence of snow and ice, plaintiffs allege that there was a defect in the sidewalk itself, and therefore their claim is not barred by the natural accumulation doctrine. [Slip op, pp 1-2 (citation omitted).]
The appellate court disagreed, also, with defendant’s position that the alleged defect was insufficient to support the imposition of liability. It reasoned that a factual dispute existed whether the sidewalk where Valeria Haliw fell was reasonably safe for public travel. It rejected as unpersuasive defendant’s argument disputing plaintiffs’ evidence, explaining that a court “may not assess credibility or determine facts when considering a motion for summary disposition.” Id. at 2.
*315H
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision concerning a summary disposition motion de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) where a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim. See Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). In reviewing it, the court considers the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion is granted if the documentary evidence shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Courts may not determine facts on a motion for summary disposition. Questions of fact must be settled by the finder of fact. See Zamler v Smith, 375 Mich 675, 679; 135 NW2d 349 (1965); Miller v Miller, 373 Mich 519, 526; 129 NW2d 885 (1964).
ni
A government agency has a statutory duty to keep highways under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair so that they are reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. MCL 691.1402(1). At least in a municipal setting, a “highway” is defined to include sidewalks. MCL 691.1401(e).
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiffs’ claim falls within the “highway exception” to governmental im*316munity found in MCL 691.1402(1). Nevertheless, the majority determines that summary disposition in favor of defendant is proper. It reasons that the “claimed depression in the sidewalk was not an independent defect . . . .” It asserts, also, that the natural accumulation of ice or snow on the sidewalk does not give rise to an actionable breach of defendant’s duty. Ante at 299.
I agree that the presence of a natural accumulation of ice or snow does not, itself, constitute a breach of the municipality’s statutory duty. However, it is debatable whether the accumulation in the present case can be deemed “natural.” A determination whether the sidewalk was in “reasonable repair” is a precursor to the issue whether the accumulation was natural, which is a precursor to application of the natural accumulation doctrine.2 Therefore, a proper resolution of this case must begin with a decision whether, as a question of fact, the sidewalk was in “reasonable repair.”
In opposition to defendant’s summary disposition motion, plaintiffs introduced a report from their expert, Theodore Dziurman. Dziurman noted that his inspection of the sidewalk revealed the following:
The second and third slabs north of the driveway [the site where plaintiff fell3] had settled about 2 inches. Water would accumulate in this depression.
*317He then recited what he thought transpired in this case:
Based on [plaintiff’s] deposition transcript, she most likely slipped on an “unnatural” accumulation of ice which caused her to fall. However, on the date of the accident, there was also a trip hazard at the same location ....
... I believe that [plaintiff’s] apparent slip and fall occurred due primarily to “defects in the walking surface.” Due to either poor compaction of the “base” material beneath the sidewalk and/or due to past tree root growth, at least 2 of the sidewalk slabs at this location had settled resulting in an unnatural depression in the sidewalk.
Finally, Dziurman summarized his findings as follows:
There were several defects in the sidewalk in front of 36225 Arlene, Sterling Heights, Michigan, in January of 1996. These defects had existed for several years. The most significant defect was a settlement of two slabs resulting in a depression that would pond water or ice in a 2 or 3 square foot area. This depression was not normal and if the sidewalk sections had been properly constructed and maintained, there would not have been a depression in the sidewalk sections noted on January 29, 1996 which created an unnatural accumulation of ice.
Based on weather data for January of 1996, there was a source and proper temperatures to allow ice to form. In the A.M. of January 29, light snow had obscured the ice. As [plaintiff] walked along the public sidewalk in front of 36225 Arlene, her foot accidentally landed on the unnatural accumulation of unseen ice causing her to slip and fall. . . .
*318The defects in the walking surface allowed ice to form and these defects were the proximate cause of [plaintiff’s] accident. [Emphasis added.]
In support of its motion, defendant argued that the report was insufficient to create a factual dispute regarding the sidewalk’s condition. Also, it introduced testimony from the homeowner nearest the sidewalk, who stated that there was nothing dangerous about the sidewalk absent snow or ice. Plaintiffs countered with Dziurman’s testimony that the sidewalk, without snow or ice, “could be dangerous” to pedestrians or bicyclists who were not expecting a depression.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties below, a jury could infer that the sidewalk’s depression rendered it out of “reasonable repair.”4 Thus, a question of fact existed whether defendant breached its statutory duty under MCL 691.1402. See Miller, supra at 525 (Souris, J., concurring), citing Grand Trunk R Co v Ives, 144 US 408, 417; 12 S Ct 679; 36 L Ed 485 (1892), stating that “[u]nless a judge can properly say that all reasonable men would agree from the undisputed evidentiary facts that there was or was not negligence, the issue must be submitted for jury determination . . . ,”5
*319The factual dispute regarding whether the sidewalk was in reasonable repair consequently creates a question of fact whether there was a “natural accumulation” in this case. See Navarre v Benton Harbor, 126 Mich 618, 619-620; 86 NW 138 (1901), holding that whether the defendant city breached its statutory duty to keep its sidewalks in reasonable repair must be left for the jury. In that case, the evidence justified the jury’s inference that the sidewalk’s “depressed condition . . . was such as to induce the formation of ice in unusual quantities . . . .”6 Therefore, by determining that the sidewalk was not defective and that this case concerns a “natural accumulation” of ice or snow, the majority has impermissibly invaded the province of the factfinder. See Zamler, supra at 679; Miller, supra at 524.
Alternatively, the majority asserts, even if the depression in the sidewalk rendered it no longer reasonably safe, the natural accumulation of ice or snow here “effectively vitiated the unsafe condition.” Ante at 311, n 10. This assertion is flawed because it is based on a premise that the accumulation here was *320“natural.” Again, the question of fact regarding the defective nature of the sidewalk precludes making such a determination. See Zamler, supra at 679.
Finally, the majority states that summary disposition for defendant is appropriate because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the claimed depression was the proximate cause of the fall under Hopson, supra. The trial court made no findings regarding proximate cause. The parties never argued this issue. Instead, their arguments concerned whether the sidewalk was in reasonable repair and whether the natural accumulation doctrine applied. Therefore, I believe it improper to decide the instant matter on proximate cause grounds. See Miller, supra.7
Nevertheless, given the evidence presented below, particularly although not exclusively Dziurman’s report, a factual dispute exists whether Valeria Haliw’s injuries were proximately caused by the condition of the sidewalk. Thus, defendant is not entitled to summary disposition on this basis, either.8
IV
Plaintiffs established a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the sidewalk at issue was in rea*321sonable repair. Consequently, there is also a question of fact whether Valeria Haliw slipped on a “natural accumulation” of ice or snow and whether her injuries were proximately caused by the sidewalk’s condition. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the trial court’s denial of defendant’s summary disposition motion.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 5, 1999, (Docket No. 206886).

 See Whinnen v 231 Corp, 49 Mich App 371, 376-377; 212 NW2d 297 (1973), discussing the relevance of photographs to the issue of “the combination of defective construction, inadequate maintenance [of a sidewalk], and a consequent unnatural or artificial accumulation of ice or snow.”

 In the complaint, plaintiffs claimed that Valeria fell because of a depression in the sidewalk, among other things. Amia Marson, the homeowner nearest the sidewalk, testified that she helped Valeria to her feet *317after she fell and thought that she had gone down where the depression existed in the sidewalk.

 See Cornell v City of Ypsilanti, 212 Mich 540, 547; 180 NW 405 (1920), recognizing that “while a municipality is not liable, as matter of law, for slight depressions in its sidewalks, such depressions may be of such size, shape and character as to make the question one of fact” for the jury to determine. See also Williams v Bay City, 126 Mich 156, 156-157; 85 NW 458 (1901).

 See Pappas v Bay City, 17 Mich App 745, 752-753; 170 NW2d 306 (1969), where the plaintiff introduced evidence that she stepped on ice covered by snow that had accumulated in a depression of a sidewalk of at least 2-3/8 inches. The court held that this evidence created a question for the jury (1) whether the defendant city breached its statutory duty to keep *319the sidewalk in reasonable repair, (2) whether the defect, if it existed, caused the accumulation of ice, and (3) whether this was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Cf. Hopson v Detroit, 235 Mich 248, 251; 209 NW 161 (1926), where the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated in a depression in a public sidewalk. The plaintiff sued the defendant city, claiming that it was liable for breaching its duty to keep its sidewalk in reasonable repair. We held that a directed verdict in favor of the defendant city was proper because the plaintiff had failed to establish a “culpable defect in the [sidejwalk.”

 See also Whinnen, supra at 377, “[i]n almost every case whether the condition was due to a natural accumulation or an artificial or unnatural accumulation or condition is one of fact for the jury.” Cf. Woodworth v Brenner, 69 Mich App 277, 281; 244 NW2d 446 (1976), summary disposition in favor of the defendant city was proper where the only defect that the plaintiff alleged in the sidewalk was the presence of ice; the plaintiff failed to allege some defect in the sidewalk itself.

 Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Hopson is misplaced. Hopson held that there was no evidence of an actual defect in the sidewalk. See id. at 251; see also Pappas, supra at 752, stating that, to reconcile Hopson with other cases from this Court, it should be read as holding that no actual defect was shown. Hence, Hopson does not control where, as here, there is evidence of an actual defect in the sidewalk.

 See Johnson v Marquette, 154 Mich 50, 53-54; 117 NW 658 (1908), finding whether a sidewalk’s condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s iujury was a question properly left for the jury. The record showed that the sidewalk contained an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow. See also Pappas, supra at 752-753.