Court Opinion

ID: 9669012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:36:36.379857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.295931
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 139. (dissenting). Section 904.04(2) of the rules of evidence clearly and explicitly states that, with some limited exceptions, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that [the person] acted in conformity therewith."
¶ 140. The exclusion of other acts evidence is based on the fear that, if allowed to focus on an accused's character, the trier of fact might punish the accused for being a bad person regardless of his or her guilt of the crime charged or might infer that the accused has a propensity to commit certain acts and acted according to his character in committing the act charged.1
¶ 141. As Justice Bradley has written, Wisconsin's other acts jurisprudence "consistently reveals that courts may freely permit prior acts evidence in child sexual assault cases to show the defendant's propensity to abuse children."2 This case is part of that jurisprudence eroding the evidentiary rule. I disagree with this erosion, and Justice Bradley, Justice Bablitch, and I *446have called for the court to stop pretending to adhere to Rule 904.04(2) and to acknowledge forthrightly that it sanctions the use of propensity evidence in child sexual assault cases.
¶ 142. I urge the court to adhere to Justice Bradley's sound counsel:
Rather than endeavoring to stretch beyond repair the definitions of the acceptable purposes under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), the majority should simply lay all its cards on the table and acknowledge that it is sanctioning the blanket use of propensity evidence in child sexual assault cases. However, the majority maintains its refuge under the cloak of the very statute it simultaneously erodes.
An honest and forthright approach by the majority would serve us all better than perpetrating the artifice of adherence to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). Because the majority engages in legal gymnastics to justify the admission of propensity evidence in contravention of the statute, I dissent.3
¶ 143. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.

 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 781, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985). See also Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 291, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).

 State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶ 108, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606 (Bradley, J., dissenting).

 Id., ¶¶ 109-110.