Court Opinion

ID: 9493616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:15.474014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:55.975723
License: Public Domain

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This appeal illustrates how the Sentencing Guidelines frequently draw distinctions without differences. In this case, they seek to distinguish “brandishing” from “otherwise using.” The latter term is unhelpfully defined as something “more than brandishing” yet short of discharging the firearm in question. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment, (n. 1(g)) (1998). As the majority observes, the Application Notes for the version of the Guidelines used in this case define “brandishing” to include pointing the firearm and displaying it in a threatening manner.
However, other circuits have found that pointing firearms in a threatening manner can constitute “otherwise using” based upon the proximity of the weapon to the victim. See, e.g., United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676 (11th Cir.1999) (gun held a half-inch from the victim’s forehead is more than brandishing) (collecting cases). The District of Columbia Circuit has recently summarized the majority view of “otherwise using” in these terms:
[Wjheré a dangerous weapon is pointed at a person and some further verbal threat or order accompanies the pointing of the weapon to facilitate commission of the underlying crime, an enhancement for the use of the weapon is justified. See, e.g., United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676-77 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 705 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Fuller, 99 F.3d 926, 927 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952, 953-54 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238, 240-41 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir.1990). The underlying rationale of the majority view suggests that the key consideration is whether a gun (or other weapon) was pointed at a specific person in an effort to create fear so as to facilitate compliance with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Hernandez, 106 F.3d at 741; Fuller, 99 F.3d at 927; Gordon, 19 F.3d at 1388.
*382United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C.Cir.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1255, 146 L.Ed.2d 112 (2000) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, effective on November 1, 2000, the application note relied upon by the majority has been amended to eliminate any reference to pointing of the weapon. Instead, it now provides,
“Brandished” with reference to a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) means that all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence of the weapon was otherwise made known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the weapon was directly visible to that person. Accordingly, although the dangerous weapon does not have to be directly visible, the weapon must be present.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment, (n. 1(c)) (2000). While I am not suggesting that an application note not in effect at the time of sentencing controls the resolution of this issue, it does lend support to the less expansive reading of “brandishing” as summarized in Yelverton.
In my view, a helpful test for determining when use of a firearm progresses from “brandishing” to “otherwise using” can be found in the common law definition of criminal assault:
[Tjhere must be the commencement of an act, which, if not prevented, would produce a battery; and there must be such an attempt or offer ... as will convey to the mind of the person assaulted a well grounded apprehension of personal injury, and within such distance that harm may follow it if carried out.
6A C.J.S. Attempt or Offer § 65 (1975). In this case, it is undisputed that, in both robberies discussed by the majority, defendant pointed his shotgun at a teller and demanded money. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s statement, “There is no claim in this case that the defendant threatened to use the firearm with regard to either of the tellers or the customer.” Surely, by pointing the gun at the tellers and demanding money, defendant intended to convey the threat of dire consequences should they fail to comply; and one would certainly expect that the tellers would have a “well grounded apprehension of personal injury” under the circumstances. Defendant’s actions fulfill all of the elements of common law criminal assault. Furthermore, they fall within the fully consistent rationale of Yelverton: “whether a gun ... was pointed at a specific person in an effort to create fear so as to facilitate compliance with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate the commission of the crime.” 197 F.3d at 534.
Because I believe that the district court correctly found that defendant had “other-wised used” his firearm, I respectfully dissent.