Court Opinion

ID: 9514514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:05.57543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.509071
License: Public Domain

VON WALD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
[¶ 39.] I agree with the majority on issue one, but disagree on issue two that the injunction ordered by the circuit court was an abuse of discretion.
[¶ 40.] Our function on review is not to determine whether the Court would issue the same type of injunction, but to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion in issuing an injunction. An abuse of discretion “refers to a discretion exercised to an end or *177purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” Maryhouse, Inc. v. Hamilton, 473 N.W.2d 472, 474 (S.D.1991). The majority did not believe the trial court abused its discretion in issuing an injunction, but believed the type of injunction ordered was an abuse of discretion because of the outweighing harm to Peska. The question of balancing the equities need not even be addressed in this case, but even if it was, I do not believe requiring removal of the cabin was an abuse of discretion.
[¶41.] The trial court did not need to weigh the equities between the parties because South Dakota has recognized that the “relative hardship” test does not apply when the defendant acted willfully and with full knowledge of the .plaintiff’s rights and the consequences which might ensue. Foley v. City of Yankton, 89 S.D. 160, 230 N.W.2d 476, 479 (1975) (citing Wilson Concrete Company v. County of Sarpy, 189 Neb. 312, 202 N.W.2d 597 (1972)). See also Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 139 P.2d 976, 980 (1943) (holding that one who deliberately violates building restrictions placed upon his lot ... cannot avoid a mandatory injunction on the theory that the loss caused by it will be disproportionate to the good accomplished).
[¶42.] Thé injunction requiring Peska to remove his cabin may be harsh, but it is warranted because Peska was warned of this possible remedy. Before Peska commenced any construction, he received a letter from Warder, Harksen’s attorney, which pointed out the restrictive covenants applicability to his property, and advised him that if he constructed on the property, Harksen would enforce the covenants by all legal and equitable means including, but not limited to in-junctive relief. After Peska began construction, he was served with the summons and complaint in this matter, but continued to build for three additional months. Peska was clearly on notice that the covenants existed and that they would be enforced, yet he chose to ignore the warnings. Therefore, this Court should not be weighing the hardship to Peska if the injunction is enforced against the benefit gained to Harksen.
[¶ 43.] Furthermore, the majority only looks at the harm suffered by Harksen while they should be looking at the harm suffered by every other cabin owner in the Slate Creek development, many of whom are named parties joining in Harksen’s request for relief, and any other person trying to enforce restrictive covenants. The purpose of this restrictive covenant was to prevent nuisances, to prevent impairment of the attractiveness of the property, and to maintain thé desired tone of -the community. The majority’s holding breeds instability into the law of property by permitting Peska’s cabin to remain as is, which cabin was knowingly built in violation of a restrictive covenant. Is this Court, by placing a simple restriction of not allowing Peska to sell the cabin for the remainder of the restrictive covenant, encouraging others to intentionally violate covenants in anticipation of some minimal restrictions? Many other landowners in the Slate Creek development could build in contravention of the restrictive covenants with little deterrence and completely destroy the covenant’s purpose. ,
[¶44.] Under SDCL'21-8-14(3), a permanent injunction may be granted where it would be necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. Other present and future Slate Creek landowners could build new cabins in violation of the restrictive covenants causing a multiplicity of litigation. Even though the injunction requiring Peska to remove his cabin would be a substantial loss to him, it is the only reasonable injunction the circuit court could have imposed to prevent future landowners from ' building homes in violation of the restrictive covenants. If the Court considers the fact that Peska could have verified whether or not he was violating the covenant before building, could have halted the building process once this action was started, and considers the potential floodgates of litigation that will be opened by not requiring removal of the cabin, the equities are not disproportionate to the mandatory injunction instituted by the circuit court.
[¶45.] The appropriate injunction is one that will stop the wrongful action or undo a wrongful act to conform to the covenant. The covenant stated that no more residences may be built on this particular parcel of *178property. Therefore, if a residence is built in contravention of this covenant, the only appropriate injunction is to require the violator to move the residence or tear it down. Peska’s purpose in building the cabin was to have a summer home in Slate Creek in the Black Hills irrespective of the restrictive covenant, and the majority is not stopping him from doing that. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion and its injunction should be enforced.