Court Opinion

ID: 9560699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:48.236993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:06.467488
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court and parties misunderstood the applicable burden of proof. Under I.C. § 37-2744(d)(2), the trial court must find, as a condition precedent to forfeiture, that the property (here money) was used, or intended for use, in violation of the controlled substances act. Thus, there is no rebuttable presumption that money, simply found in proximity to drugs, is forfeitable.1
Unfortunately, and worse yet, improperly, the majority remands the case for the taking of new evidence. The government, as a result, will get yet another bite at the forfeiture apple. We should simply reverse and order that Mr. Campbell be sent a check for $10,300, with interest. Why? Because the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution on stipulated facts. Both parties agreed that no witnesses would be called and that no evidence would be submitted. Such is a long recognized prerogative of litigants, and the trial court acquiesced in the procedure. Yet Justice Bakes and those who join his opinion will not let the parties live with their agreement. Instead, they are forced to come back to court. Justice Bakes is willing to surmise that at the time of the trial court proceedings, “Campbell may have been incarcerated in a federal penitentiary ... and thus not available as a witness.” Slip Op. at 8 (emphasis added). Equally true, however, he may not have been. Such impure and unadulterated appellate speculation has no place in appellate review. Just as well to surmise that truth of the matter is that the prosecutor was too busy to be bothered, or was fearful as to how his witnesses would stand up. That would be equally improper. We simply do not know why the facts were stipulated, other than that counsel licensed to practice in Idaho knew what the case was about, knew what admissible evidence was available, and in a commendable effort at conserving judicial resources entered into an appropriate stipulation, and provided the trial court with briefs. The majority’s zeal to encourage the forfeiture has blurred the boundaries distinguishing the judicial robe and the prosecutorial hat.
Where, as here, the record consists solely of documentary evidence, and all of the facts necessary for resolution have been stipulated, this Court can make an independent review of that cold record. See Shipley v. Cook, 109 Idaho 537, 538, 708 P.2d 942, 943 (Ct.App.1985) (interpretation of written instruments presents question of law); General Dynamics v. Zantop Airlines, 147 Ariz. 92, 708 P.2d 773 (App.1985) (where finding of trial court is based entirely on documentary evidence, appellate *49court may make 'independent decision); Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, 237 Kan. 536, 701 P.2d 954 (1985) (Supreme Court is in just as good a position to interpret documents as trial court); Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 680 P.2d 343 (1984) (same); Budget Systems v. Seifert Pontiac, 40 Colo.App. 406, 579 P.2d 87 (1978) (reviewing court not bound by trial court’s interpretation of written documents).
The parties agreed to submit the issue on stipulated facts. Now, on appeal simply because the law as applied to the facts prevents the state from appropriating a large sum of private money, it ill-behooves Justice Bakes to lead a majority into rewarding the prosecutor who is not responsible for the language of the statute the right to start in anew and have a second trial where he can put in new evidence, which Bakes, J., is willing to assume is in existence. The rule has always been otherwise. A party puts in all the evidence which he has been able to muster and that is it. Any additional evidence brought in later must come in under the rubric of “newly discovered.”
The evidence now in the record does not support the inference that Campbell planned to buy drugs with the money locked in the safe. No money exchanged hands. Rather, drugs, the possession for which Campbell has already been punished, were exchanged for information. Similarly, the record is barren of evidence indicating that Campbell received the money from the sale of drugs. Neither the safe nor the house contained records of drug transactions. Cf. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 785, 735 P.2d 1089,1096 (Ct.App.1987) (conviction for intent to distribute marijuana upheld where defendants made bookkeeping entries of drug transactions in notebooks). Not a scintilla of evidence was proffered that drugs were bought by or sold to Campbell. Simply put, no nexus exists between the money in the safe and an intent on Campbell’s behalf to buy or sell drugs with it. Accordingly, the record cannot sustain the bare finding that the $10,300 was used, or intended for use, in violation of the act.
Thus, unless additional evidence upon remand shows use or intent to use the money to buy or sell drugs, the trial court must find for Mr. Campbell as a matter of law because the government will have failed to carry its burden of proof. Also, I seriously doubt that the government can force Mr. Campbell to testify in order to get additional evidence. Forfeiture proceedings are essentially criminal in nature because their primary purpose is to deter and penalize the commission of an offense. State v. Spooner, 520 So.2d 336 (La.1988); State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La.1983). Consequently, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the government from forcing Campbell from testifying on remand. It seems only fair, moreover, that if the government is going to get another chance to show that the money was used or intended for use in violation of the act, Campbell should also have another chance to argue the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute.
The can of worms opened by the majority’s remand does little to spare the judicial resources of the district court. This is especially true because the government must proffer additional evidence linking the $10,300 with a showing that Campbell used or intended to use it to buy or sell drugs. Without testimony from Campbell, it is very unlikely the government can carry its burden of proof. The remand is unnecessary.
HUNTLEY, J., concurs.

. Idaho Code § 37-2744 was amended after the events in this case transpired. 1986 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 286, p. 714. The statute now permits a forfeiture without a finding of use or an intent to use as mandated by subsection (d)(2) prior to amendment. The constitutionality of the amended act is suspect. State v. Spooner, 520 So.2d 336 (La.1988).