Court Opinion

ID: 9555281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 15:01:07.062053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:09.513997
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1882    Document: 34     Page: 1   Filed: 08/11/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                 WILLIAM B. JOLLEY,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
              DEVELOPMENT,
                  Respondent
            ______________________

                        2022-1882
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in Nos. AT-3330-17-0060-I-1, AT-4324-17-0235-I-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: August 11, 2023
                  ______________________

    WILLIAM B. JOLLEY, Brunswick, GA, pro se.

     EBONIE I. BRANCH, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

  Before LOURIE, PROST, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1882    Document: 34     Page: 2    Filed: 08/11/2023

 2                                             JOLLEY v. HUD

 PER CURIAM.
      William B. Jolley appeals a Merit Systems Protection
 Board (“Board”) decision affirming denial of his claims that
 he was (1) denied an opportunity to compete under the Vet-
 erans Equal Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”) and
 (2) discriminated against based on his military service in
 violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and
 Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
      Mr. Jolley is a preference-eligible veteran who retired
 from a Field Office Director (“FOD”) position at the Depart-
 ment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) in
 Boise, Idaho. App’x 2. 1 HUD later placed dual announce-
 ments under both merit promotion procedures and HUD’s
 delegated examining authority for an FOD position in
 Charleston, West Virginia. App’x 2. The application re-
 quired at least one year of specialized experience with dis-
 aster preparedness and recovery at the GS-14 level. App’x
 47, 50. After Mr. Jolley applied, a human resources spe-
 cialist determined that he was not qualified because his re-
 sumé did not demonstrate any experience with disaster
 preparedness or recovery. App’x 3.
     Mr. Jolley then submitted a Freedom of Information
 Act request to HUD. After reviewing this request, HUD
 communicated to Mr. Jolley that it had erroneously consid-
 ered him not qualified during the application process.
 App’x 3. HUD later determined, however, that it properly
 concluded Mr. Jolley was not qualified but offered him pri-
 ority consideration for any future FOD position in Charles-
 ton. App’x 3.

     1  “App’x” refers to the appendix attached to the gov-
 ernment’s informal brief.
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                               3

      HUD narrowed its consideration to two candidates for
 the FOD position and selected one. App’x 56. Mr. Jolley
 filed a motion before the Board that discussed the qualifi-
 cations of the final two candidates. App’x 59. He acknowl-
 edged that one candidate demonstrated the requisite
 disaster recovery and preparedness experience, App’x 62
 ¶ 6, but he argued that the selected candidate lacked it.
 Although the selected candidate’s resumé detailed her dis-
 aster preparedness and recovery qualifications: “Coordina-
 tion of agency and statewide policies for disaster recovery
 plans for proper administration of offices, data, and contin-
 uation of services in the event of such issues,” App’x 62 ¶ 7,
 Mr. Jolley argued that she was not qualified because disas-
 ter preparedness experience can come only after there is a
 disaster, App’x 62 ¶ 9.
     Mr. Jolley exhausted his agency remedies by submit-
 ting a VEOA complaint challenging his nonselection for the
 Charleston FOD position to the Department of Labor
 (“DOL”). App’x 3. After an investigation, DOL concluded
 that the evidence did not support his VEOA allegations, so
 Mr. Jolley appealed to the Board. Mr. Jolley raised a
 USERRA claim during the proceedings before the Admin-
 istrative Judge (“AJ”), so the AJ separately docketed a new
 case for his USERRA claim and treated the two separately.
 App’x 8–9.
     In the VEOA case, the AJ determined Mr. Jolley’s re-
 sumé reflected that he was not qualified for the FOD posi-
 tion. Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. AT-330-17-
 0060-I-1, 2017 WL 3980895 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 8, 2017). Mr.
 Jolley claimed he submitted a different resumé with his ap-
 plication to HUD than the one included in the agency rec-
 ord before the AJ. Compare App’x 53 (resumé HUD
 presented to the Board), with App’x 54 (resumé Mr. Jolley
 presented to the Board). The AJ determined neither re-
 sumé contained any information that would demonstrate
 experience with disaster preparedness and recovery, let
 alone at the GS-14 level. The AJ further found that Mr.
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 4                                             JOLLEY v. HUD

 Jolley’s prior experience as an FOD did not automatically
 qualify him for the FOD position in Charleston because
 each FOD position may require different skillsets. Jolley,
 2017 WL 3980895; see also App’x 57 ¶¶ 4–7. The AJ thus
 concluded that Mr. Jolley was not denied an opportunity to
 compete for the FOD position. Jolley, 2017 WL 3980895.
 The AJ also rejected Mr. Jolley’s argument that HUD vio-
 lated the VEOA by selecting an unqualified applicant, rea-
 soning that other applicants’ qualifications were irrelevant
 when Mr. Jolley himself was not qualified. Id. at n.7.
      In the USERRA case, the AJ determined that the
 Board lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Mr. Jol-
 ley did not make out a non-frivolous claim for relief. Spe-
 cifically, the AJ concluded that Mr. Jolley could not show
 that HUD discriminated against him due to his military
 service since HUD determined he was not qualified. Jolley
 v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. AT-4324-17-0235-I-1,
 2017 WL 2435161 (M.S.P.B. May 31, 2017). In the alter-
 native, the AJ determined that Mr. Jolley’s claim failed on
 the merits because his lack of qualifications meant he could
 not demonstrate that his military service was a substantial
 or motivating factor for the decision under the rule articu-
 lated in Sheehan v. Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009,
 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Jolley, 2017 WL 2435161, at n.5.
     On appeal to the Board, Mr. Jolley raised several argu-
 ments under the VEOA and USERRA. Under the VEOA,
 he challenged the determination he was not qualified, dis-
 puted the qualifications of the applicant who was selected,
 argued the AJ erred by not requiring the agency to timely
 provide the list of candidates for the Charleston FOD an-
 nouncements, argued that HUD violated 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a)
 by having a final applicant list that only included two can-
 didates, and argued that HUD violated 18 U.S.C. § 1917(2)
 by falsely reporting on the examination of the selected can-
 didate when reviewing her resumé. Under USERRA, Mr.
 Jolley challenged the conclusion that HUD did not discrim-
 inate against him, argued that HUD admitted it
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                               5

 discriminated against him through its letter stating he was
 erroneously deemed not qualified, argued that the use of
 dual announcements violated USERRA, and argued that
 the AJ erred by not requiring HUD to timely provide the
 full administrative record.
     The Board upheld the VEOA and USERRA determina-
 tions in a consolidated case. Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Ur-
 ban Dev., Nos. AT-3330-17-0060-I-1, AT-4324-17-0235-I-1,
 2022 WL 1597455 (M.S.P.B. May 20, 2022). First, the
 Board concluded that the right to compete does not pre-
 clude elimination of an unqualified candidate. Id. at *3.
 The Board agreed with the AJ’s findings that the Charles-
 ton FOD position required disaster preparedness and re-
 covery experience and that Mr. Jolley demonstrated no
 such experience. Id. Second, the Board agreed with the
 rejection of Mr. Jolley’s USERRA claim on the merits be-
 cause his lack of qualifications meant he could not demon-
 strate that his military service was a substantial or
 motivating factor in HUD’s determination that he was not
 qualified for the Charleston FOD position. Id. at *5. How-
 ever, the Board disagreed with the AJ’s dismissal of the
 USERRA claim for lack of jurisdiction, determining that
 Mr. Jolley had nonfrivolously alleged jurisdiction under
 USERRA. Id. The Board also concluded the dual an-
 nouncement did not violate USERRA and that HUD’s let-
 ter to Mr. Jolley stating he was erroneously deemed not
 qualified did not change the Board’s analysis. Id.
     The Board rejected several other challenges to the se-
 lection process, including challenges under 18 U.S.C.
 § 1917(2) and 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a), id. at *3 n.5, and chal-
 lenges to the agency’s alleged failure to include the full ad-
 ministrative record before the Board, id. at *4, *6 n.8.
    Mr. Jolley timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
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 6                                              JOLLEY v. HUD

                         DISCUSSION
     This court must affirm a decision of the Board unless
 we find it “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
 or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained with-
 out procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having
 been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
 support a conclusion.” Brenner v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
 990 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Shapiro v.
 Soc. Sec. Admin., 800 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
 “The petitioner bears the burden of establishing error in
 the [Board’s] decision.” Jenkins v. MSPB, 911 F.3d 1370,
 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans
 Affs., 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
     On appeal to this court, Mr. Jolley makes three classes
 of arguments. First, he challenges the denial of his VEOA
 claim. Second, he challenges the denial of his USERRA
 claim. Third, he asserts the Board committed several mis-
 cellaneous legal and procedural errors. We address each in
 turn.
                               A
      The VEOA requires that preference-eligible veterans
 be given an opportunity to compete for a position within
 the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). The oppor-
 tunity to compete is largely synonymous with the oppor-
 tunity to apply for a job. Abell v. Dep’t of Navy, 343 F.3d
 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This opportunity is satisfied if
 a veteran is entitled to participate in an application on the
 same grounds as other candidates. Miller v. Fed. Deposit
 Ins. Corp., 818 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016). One im-
 portant criterion for participation under the VEOA is that
 the applicant must be qualified. Lazaro v. Dep’t of Veterans
 Affs., 666 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012). An unsuccess-
 ful application is thus not a denial of an opportunity to com-
 pete, so long as the application was considered on the same
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                               7

 grounds as other candidates.      Joseph v. FTC, 505 F.3d
 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
      Mr. Jolley first challenges the Board’s affirmance of the
 AJ’s determination that he was not qualified for the posi-
 tion. We discern no error. Mr. Jolley argues legal error
 because USERRA, not the VEOA, provides the proper def-
 inition of qualified. USERRA defines “qualified” as “having
 the ability to perform the essential tasks of the position.”
 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9). Even if the USERRA definition ap-
 plied, we see no difference between that standard and the
 one applied by the Board, so we decline to disturb its ruling
 on that basis. Moreover, the Board relied on substantial
 evidence in determining Mr. Jolley was not qualified. Nei-
 ther resumé submitted before the Board contains any in-
 formation demonstrating experience with disaster
 preparedness or recovery. App’x 53–54.
     We also affirm the Board’s rejection of Mr. Jolley’s ar-
 gument that HUD violated the VEOA by selecting a candi-
 date he deemed unqualified. Specifically, Mr. Jolley has
 not demonstrated how his criticism of the selected candi-
 date’s qualifications renders the Board’s conclusion that he
 was unqualified as lacking substantial evidence. And “the
 VEOA does not enable veterans to be considered for posi-
 tions for which they are not qualified.” Lazaro, 666 F.3d at
 1319 (citing Ramsey v. OPM, 87 M.S.P.R. 98, ¶ 9 (2000)).
     We additionally conclude that the Board did not err by
 denying Mr. Jolley’s challenge to the opportunity to com-
 pete under 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a). 2 Since he is not qualified for

     2   Section 3317(a) requires “[t]he Office of Personnel
 Management” to “certify enough names from the top of the
 appropriate register to permit a nominating or appointing
 authority who has requested a certificate of eligibles to con-
 sider at least three names for appointment to each vacancy
 in the competitive service.”
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 8                                              JOLLEY v. HUD

 the FOD position, VEOA provisions like § 3317(a) do not
 apply. See Lazaro, 666 F.3d at 1319. Indeed, the VEOA
 states that subsection (f) (the basis for Mr. Jolley’s claim)
 “shall not be construed to confer an entitlement to a veter-
 ans’ preference that is not otherwise required by law.”
 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(3). We thus affirm the Board on its re-
 jection of the VEOA claim.
                              B
      USERRA prohibits discrimination in employment on
 the basis of military service. An employer violates
 USERRA if a person’s military service is a “motivating fac-
 tor” in the employer’s adverse action. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).
 An employee claiming a USERRA violation must make an
 initial showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
 employee’s military service was “a substantial or motivat-
 ing factor” in the employment action. Sheehan, 240 F.3d
 at 1013. If this requirement is met, the employer then has
 to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
 have “taken the adverse action anyway, for a valid reason”
 to defeat the USERRA action. Id. at 1014.
      The Board did not err by affirming the AJ’s rejection of
 Mr. Jolley’s USERRA claim. The only evidence in the rec-
 ord provides substantial evidence for the Board’s conclu-
 sion that HUD rejected Mr. Jolley’s application because he
 lacked the necessary qualifications, not due to his military
 service. Mr. Jolley’s additional argument that HUD vio-
 lated USERRA by creating a dual posting for the FOD di-
 rector is without merit and is one we have previously
 rejected. See Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1384–85 (dual announce-
 ments do not violate the VEOA); see also Jolley v. Dep’t of
 Hous. & Urban Dev., 299 F. App’x 966, 968–69 (Fed. Cir.
 2008) (extending Joseph to hold that dual announcements
 do not violate USERRA); Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
 Dev., 752 F. App’x 964, 967–68 (Fed. Cir 2018) (same). We
 affirm the Board’s rejection of the USERRA claim.
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 JOLLEY v. HUD                                               9

                               C
     The Board properly rejected Mr. Jolley’s claim that the
 AJ acted improperly by not requiring HUD to timely sub-
 mit the list of candidates for the FOD posting in the VEOA
 case and by not considering his rebuttal evidence. Mr. Jol-
 ley argues that HUD submitted the candidate list near the
 close of the record and thus that he should have had an
 opportunity to respond to the evidence under 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.59(c)(2). The evidence he sought to submit related
 to the selected candidate’s alleged lack of qualifications.
 App’x 59–63. As discussed above, Mr. Jolley has not
 demonstrated how this evidence alters his lack of qualifi-
 cations. Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion by not
 considering his rebuttal evidence.
     We further affirm the Board’s rejection of Mr. Jolley’s
 claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1917(2). 3 He alleged that HUD
 hired the selected candidate based on a political recommen-
 dation. The record lacked any evidence supporting this
 claim, so the Board relied on substantial evidence in reject-
 ing it.
     Mr. Jolley did not make his remaining arguments, in-
 cluding, for example, that HUD should have conducted a
 job analysis under 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 and that HUD must
 reorganize its field office under 42 U.S.C. § 3535(p), before
 the Board. We thus decline to consider them. 4

     3   18 U.S.C. § 1917(2) prohibits the willful and cor-
 rupt false marking, grading, estimating, or reporting on
 the examination or proper standing of an individual exam-
 ined.
     4   We also deny as baseless Mr. Jolley’s outstanding
 motion to show that the government committed fraud on
 the court. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538,
 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Fraud on the court . . . is fraud
 which is directed to the judicial machinery itself . . . where
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 10                                            JOLLEY v. HUD

                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered Mr. Jolley’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive and/or unsupported. For the
 foregoing reasons, we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.

 the impartial functions of the court have been directly cor-
 rupted.” (quoting Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713,
 718 (10th Cir. 1983)).