Court Opinion

ID: 9407017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 17:01:16.093671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.896995
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 5 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   22-50253

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00477-PA-1

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM *
JORGE DE LOS SANTOS,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted June 30, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant Jorge De Los Santos pleaded guilty to possession of child

pornography and was sentenced to forty-six months imprisonment and a lifetime

term of supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment and now seeks

to modify a supervised release condition that restricts where he can reside.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      As part of his plea agreement, De Los Santos agreed to a supervised release

term that prohibited him from “resid[ing] within direct view of school yards, parks,

public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or other

places primarily used by persons under the age of 18.” Shortly before his sentencing

hearing, the district court informed the parties that it was considering imposing a

residency restriction prohibiting him from residing within 2,000 feet of such venues,

rather than the direct view restriction they agreed on. Over De Los Santos’s

objection, the district court imposed the 2,000-foot restriction. De Los Santos

appealed, and our court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by imposing the 2,000-foot restriction. See United States v. De Los

Santos, 827 F. App’x 757, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Roughly a month after completing his term of imprisonment, De Los Santos

filed a motion to modify the terms of his supervised release, asking the district court

to change the 2,000-foot residency restriction to a direct view restriction. The district

court denied the motion, and De Los Santos now appeals that decision. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and review for an abuse

of discretion. United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2014). We

affirm.

      De Los Santos first claims that the district court abused its discretion by

refusing to modify the 2,000-foot restriction. When considering a motion to modify

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a supervised release condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), a district court must

consider relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A supervised release

condition must be reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, “involve[] no greater

deprivation of liberty than is necessary,” and be “consistent with the pertinent policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also

United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court

applied the correct standard and did not abuse its discretion.

      Relying on the particular facts of this case, the district court had a reasonable

concern that De Los Santos should not reside at places where children would

frequently walk by. De Los Santos admitted that he is attracted to children in public.

He possessed a significant amount of child pornography, could not control his urges,

and had a long history of viewing and collecting child pornography. And given the

short period that he had been on supervised release, it was unclear how he would

perform on supervised release and what might cause him to reoffend. The district

court reasonably believed that an objectively measurable 2,000-foot restriction

would better protect children and provide better guidance to De Los Santos regarding

where he can live than would a direct view restriction.

      Although the distance restriction makes housing harder to find, it does not

infringe on De Los Santos’s liberty more than reasonably necessary to accomplish

the sentencing goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation. Considering the

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particular circumstances of this case, the distance-based restriction is not

substantively unreasonable. See In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 1042 (2015); United

States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Collins,

684 F.3d 873, 892 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined that the 2,000-foot restriction should not be modified at this

time. 1

          De Los Santos also claims that the district court committed procedural error.2

Each of his arguments fail. First, the district court considered anew the § 3553(a)

factors and whether the 2,000-foot restriction was substantively reasonable in light

of existing caselaw and De Los Santos’s particular circumstances. The district court

did not plainly err or prejudice De Los Santos by referencing our court’s previous

decision. Second, it is not clear that De Los Santos had a right to allocution during

his modification hearing, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c), but even assuming he did, he

was not prejudiced by not having the opportunity to speak. And third, the district

court did not plainly err by relying on undisclosed factual information provided by

the probation office. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c).

1
  As for Carrasco’s argument that the residency restriction is unconstitutional,
“illegality of a condition of supervised release is not a proper ground for
modification.” United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002).
2
  Because he failed to raise these challenges before the district court, we apply the
plain error standard of review. United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th
Cir. 2009).

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      Because De Los Santos has failed to establish that the district court abused its

discretion or plainly erred when it denied his motion to modify his supervised release

conditions, we

      AFFIRM. 3

3
 De Los Santos’s motion asking this court to update the record and to take judicial
notice is denied.

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