Court Opinion

ID: 9946848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 17:00:49.502764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.644880
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12991   Document: 90-1    Date Filed: 03/01/2024   Page: 1 of 45

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12991
                         ____________________

        ADVANCE TRUST & LIFE ESCROW SERVICES, LTA,
        As Securities Intermediary for Life partners
        Position Holder Trust, on behalf of itself
        and all others similarly situated,
                                                              Plaintiﬀ,
        WORTH JOHNSON,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court              22-12991

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-01290-MHH
                           ____________________

        Before GRANT, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               This class action involves a dispute over a life insurance
        policy issued to Plaintiff Worth Johnson (“Johnson”) by Defendant
        Protective Life Insurance Company (“Protective”) in South
        Carolina. While the procedural history is complicated, Johnson is
        now the sole remaining named plaintiff. Johnson brought on his
        behalf and others’ the second amended complaint (the
        “complaint”), which alleges only a breach of contract claim under
        the policy.
               The district court granted Protective’s motion for judgment
        on the pleadings, concluding Protective did not breach its
        insurance contract as a matter of law. The primary issues on appeal
        concern the interpretation of the policy under South Carolina law.
        We begin by setting forth the complaint’s allegations and the
        policy’s relevant terms.
                               I.   POLICY TERMS
               In 1988, Protective issued a universal life insurance policy
        (the “policy”) to Johnson in the face amount of $100,000. Johnson’s
        policy conferred a death benefit with a savings or investment
        component, known as the “account value” or “policy value.” The
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        22-12991              Opinion of the Court                        3

        savings component allows policies to be a tax-advantaged savings
        vehicle, earning interest on the policy value. Here is how it works.
        A.    Net Premium
               In a schedule, the policy sets Johnson’s premiums at $900 per
        year. The policyholder is permitted to pay premiums more
        frequently or in greater sums. The policy then permits Protective
        to deduct “expense charges” from the premium, which yields a
        “net premium.” Johnson’s policy lists these “expense charges”:
              The percentage of premium expense charge is 5.00%
              of each premium payment.
              The monthly expense charge per $1000 (which
              applies during the first 12 policy months) is $ .00.
              The monthly expense charge per $1000 of increase
              (which applies during the first 12 policy months
              following an increase) is $ .26.
              The monthly administrative charge is $4.00.
        (Font altered.) In this regard, the policy defines “Net Premium” as
        the “premium payment less the percentage of premium expense
        charges shown in the Policy Schedule.” Johnson does not
        challenge Protective’s calculation of the “expense charges” or the
        net premium.
        B.    Policy Value
              The policy also permits Protective to make monthly
        deductions from the net premium, which yields the “Policy Value.”
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

        And the Policy Value is the money that accrues interest at a
        guaranteed interest rate set in the policy. It is through this process
        that the investment component of Johnson’s policy grows in value.
        The Policy Value increases each month by one month’s interest
        less the monthly deduction.
        C.    Monthly Deduction for Cost of Insurance
              In turn, the policy defines the “Monthly Deduction” from
        the net premium. This monthly deduction “is the sum of the
        following four items,” which are listed as:
              (1) The cost of insurance and the cost of additional
              benefits provided by riders for the policy month.
               (2) The monthly expense charge applicable to the
               Initial Face Amount. This charge applies only the first
               12 policy months. . . .
              (3) The monthly expense charge applicable to any
              increase in face amount. This charge applies only to
              the first 12 policy months following the day on which
              an increase becomes effective. . . .
              (4) The Monthly Administrative Charge shown in the
              Policy Schedule.
        (Emphasis added.) Johnson does not challenge items 2-4 (the
        monthly expense and administrative charges).
              Johnson does contest item 1, the “cost of insurance” charge.
        The formula for that charge states:
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                         5

              The cost of insurance is determined at the end of each
              policy month as follows:
              (1) divide the death benefit at the beginning of the
              policy month by the sum of 1 plus the guaranteed
              interest rate;
              (2) reduce the result by the amount of policy value
              (prior to deducting the cost of insurance) at the
              beginning of the policy month;
              (3) multiply the difference by the cost of insurance
              rate as described in the Cost of Insurance Rates
              section.
        (Emphasis added.) Johnson submits that “[u]nder this formula, a
        lower COI rate directly translates to a lower monthly COI charge.”
        The only part of this formula in dispute is the cost of insurance rate
        (the “COI rate”).
        D.    COI Rates
              Johnson’s policy has three main sections about the COI rate.
        His policy initially has a “Table of Guaranteed Maximum Insurance
        Rates” for each “attained age” from age 0 to age 94. (Font altered.)
        Johnson was 43 when he purchased his policy in 1988. His Table’s
        guaranteed maximum monthly COI rate was 0.322 for his age of
        43.
               As Johnson grew older, his Table’s listed COI rate generally
        increased. By age 65, his Table shows a monthly COI rate of 2.122,
        over a 500% increase. Johnson’s Class Period begins on August 13,
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        6                     Opinion of the Court               22-12991

        2012. We thus list the monthly COI rates after that date, which
        increased from 2.543 at age 67 in 2012 to 5.912 at age 76 in 2021—
        a 132% increase:
                    TABLE OF GUARANTEED MAXIMUM
                           INSURANCE RATES
                  MONTHLY RATE PER $1,000 EXCLUDING
                              RIDERS
                                       ...
                                   [JOHNSON’S]
              [YEAR]              ATTAINED AGE              RATE
              [2012]              67                        2.543
              [2013]              68                        2.773
              [2014]              69                        3.023
              [2015]              70                        3.303
              [2016]              71                        3.621
              [2017]              72                        3.986
              [2018]              73                        4.405
              [2019]              74                        4.872
              [2020]              75                        5.377
              [2021]              76                        5.912
        Johnson does not challenge the Table’s monthly COI rate scale.
        Later on, his policy states that the guaranteed maximum COI rates
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        22-12991                Opinion of the Court                          7

        “are equal to the 1980 CSO male and female mortality rates as
        applicable, adjusted to reflect [the insured’s] underwriting class.”
        (Font altered.) Other than this Table, Johnson’s policy does not
        contain any other COI rate scale.
                Instead, Johnson contends that insurers, like Protective,
        “typically create an internal table of projected, non-guaranteed
        COI rates,” and “when a policy is issued, an insured is ‘assigned’ to
        an initial COI rate table or scale that lays out a set of COI rates that
        cover the life of the insured.” Johnson represents that “[t]his initial
        COI table is not shared with the [insured] owner.” We refer to
        Protective’s internal set of monthly rates covering the insured’s life
        as Protective’s “internal COI rate scale.”
               Johnson does not allege what rates Protective chose in its
        internal COI rate scale at inception in 1988 to cover his life. Rather,
        Johnson’s main complaint is that Protective never changed and
        redetermined its internal COI rate scale “a single time” during the
        Class Period that began on August 13, 2012, even though
        nationwide mortality rates had declined during that period.
              Notably though, Johnson does not allege that Protective
        used an internal COI rate scale with rates that exceeded the
        guaranteed maximum rate. And he does not claim on appeal that
        Protective breached its contract by using a COI rate scale that
        exceeded the guaranteed maximum rate.
              Johnson’s policy also contains two other COI rate sections.
        One section, entitled “Cost of Insurance Rates,” states:
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                         22-12991

                The monthly cost of insurance rate is based on sex,
                attained age, and rate class of the Insured and on the
                policy year. Attained age means age nearest birthday
                on the prior policy anniversary. Monthly cost of
                insurance rates will be determined by us, based on
                our expectations as to future mortality experience.
                Any change in the monthly cost of insurance rates
                will be on a uniform basis for insureds of the same
                class such as age, sex, rate class, and policy year.
                However, the cost of insurance rates will not be
                greater than those in the Table of Guaranteed
                Maximum Insurance Rates, shown in the Policy
                Schedule.
        (Emphasis added.)           Another section, entitled “Non-Dividend
        Paying,” states:
                This policy does not pay dividends and does not share
                in our surplus or profits. Any change in insurance
                rates or interest rates will be prospective and will be
                subject to our future expectations as to mortality and
                interest.
        (Emphasis added.) The parties dispute the meaning of the above
        policy terms. We thus set forth their contentions and the contract
        issues on appeal. 1

        1 Other plaintiffs and other Protective policies were originally part of this case.

        One policy included an endorsement that is not in Johnson’s policy.
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        22-12991                Opinion of the Court                          9

               II.   CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ISSUES
               Although Protective’s internal monthly COI rate scale never
        exceeded the Table’s guaranteed maximum monthly rates,
        Johnson claims the policy contractually obligated Protective to
        reassess, redetermine, and reduce its internal COI rates when by
        2012 nationwide mortality had improved.
               Specifically, Johnson’s complaint alleges that Protective
        breached its contract because: (1) the policy’s language required
        Protective to reassess and redetermine its COI rates based on
        exclusively “improved mortality expectations and experience”;
        (2) nationwide mortality rates improved at 1% per year during the
        Class Period; (3) Protective thus must have “enjoyed significantly
        improved mortality experience and expectations”; but
        (4) Protective never redetermined COI rates “a single time” and
        wrongly continued to use its initial COI rate scale that considered
        other factors, including its expenses and lapse rates. His complaint
        also contains an alternative breach of contract theory: Protective
        did elect to redetermine and actually change its monthly COI rates
        during the Class Period, but wrongfully ignored its expectations as

               In the “Cost of Insurance Rates” section in the Policy to which
               this endorsement is attached, we state that monthly cost of
               insurance rates will be determined by us, based on our
               expectations as to future mortality experience. . . .
               Any change in our scale of cost of insurance rates will be based
               solely on our expectations as to future mortality experience.
        (Emphasis added.) This endorsement is not relevant because this case now
        involves only Johnson’s policy.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

        to future mortality experience. Johnson complains that his
        “monthly mortality charges have increased from $124.61 in 2012 to
        $285.90 in 2019” and his “monthly COI rates have increased by
        more than 100%.”
                Protective responds that Johnson’s complaint fails to state a
        breach of contract claim because: (1) the policy does not impose a
        contractual duty requiring that Protective reassess and
        redetermine its COI rates “based on” exclusively its “expectations
        as to future mortality experience”; (2) the policy does not preclude
        Protective from using its internal COI rate scale assigned to cover
        Johnson’s life until age 94, as long as Protective does not exceed the
        guaranteed maximum monthly COI rates in the policy’s Table; and
        (3) the policy does not preclude Protective from considering other
        factors impacting its COI rates.
                This appeal presents these contract interpretation issues.
        First, after setting at inception its internal COI rate scale to cover
        Johnson’s life, did Protective have a contractual duty to reassess
        and redetermine that COI rate scale during the Class Period?
              Second, even if Protective had a contractual duty to reassess
        and redetermine its COI rate scale, whether the policy (1) requires
        Protective to redetermine its COI rate based on exclusively its
        “expectations as to future mortality experience” and (2) precludes
        Protective from considering any other factors.
               And third, whether Protective could ignore its expectations
        as to future mortality when it chose or elected voluntarily to
        reassess and redetermine its COI rates.
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        22-12991                Opinion of the Court                         11

                   III.   PRECEDENT ABOUT COI RATES
               The parties agree that South Carolina law governs the
        interpretation of Johnson’s policy. See Bah. Sales Assoc., LLC v.
        Byers, 701 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If the parties litigate
        the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, we will
        assume that that law applies.”). The parties, however, do not cite,
        and we have not located, a South Carolina appellate court decision
        involving a life insurance policy with COI rates.
               Yet, our Court and two other circuits have interpreted
        universal life policies with COI rates. See Anderson v. Wilco Life Ins.
        Co., 17 F.4th 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Georgia law);
        Slam Dunk I, LLC v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 853 F. App’x 451, 452
        (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (applying Florida law); Norem v.
        Lincoln Beneﬁt Life Co., 737 F.3d 1145, 1147-49 (7th Cir. 2013)
        (applying Illinois law); Vogt v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 963 F.3d 753,
        761 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying Missouri law). We review these
        decisions before turning to South Carolina law.
        A.     Anderson v. Wilco Life Ins. Co. (11th Cir. 2021)
               In Anderson v. Wilco Life Insurance Co., the policy referenced:
        (1) an “[a]ctual monthly” COI rate; (2) a “guaranteed monthly”
        COI rate; and (3) a “current monthly” COI rate. 17 F.4th at 1340-
        43. How our Court used rules of contract construction to interpret
        the COI rate terms is instructive.
               Similar to Protective’s Table, Wilco’s Table of guaranteed
        COI rates listed the attained age and the maximum possible COI
        rate, which generally increased each year. Id. at 1343. The dispute
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                22-12991

        involved the paragraph below that Table, that said “[a]ctual
        monthly” COI rates “will be determined . . . based on the policy
        cost factors described in your policy,” as follows:
              The cost of insurance rates shown above are based on
              the Commissioner’s 1980 standard ordinary male
              mortality table, age last birthday. Actual monthly cost
              of insurance rates will be determined by the
              company based on the policy cost factors described in
              your policy. However, the actual cost of insurance
              rates will not be greater than those shown above.
        Id. (emphasis added and font altered). Wilco’s policy also had a
        “Cost of Insurance” section with a formula for the monthly COI
        charge that included a multiplier for the monthly COI rate. Id.
              Wilco’s COI Rate section then diﬀerentiated between “the
        guaranteed” and “the current” monthly COI rates:
              The guaranteed monthly cost of insurance rates for
              the policy are based on the insured’s sex, attained age
              and premium class on the date of issue. Attained age
              means age on the prior policy anniversary except
              when this policy is issued when it means age last
              birthday prior to policy date. These rates are shown
              on a Policy Data Page.
              Current monthly cost of insurance rates will be
              determined by the Company. The current monthly
              cost of insurance rates will not be greater than the
              guaranteed monthly cost of insurance rates which are
              listed on a Policy Data Page.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        13

        Id. at 1344 (emphasis added). Even though her policy said the
        “current monthly” COI rate “will be determined by the Company,”
        the plaintiﬀ focused on the paragraph below the COI rate Table,
        which said the “actual monthly” COI rates “will be determined by
        the Company based on the policy cost factors described in your
        policy.” Id. at 1343-45 (font altered).
               The Wilco plaintiﬀ argued (1) the only “cost factors described
        in [the] policy” were those associated with the guaranteed monthly
        COI rate, which were “sex, attained age, and premium class” and
        (2) therefore, “the policy required Wilco to base her current
        monthly rate” also “on her age, sex, and premium class.” Id. at
        1341, 1344-45. Wilco countered that its policy unambiguously gave
        it “discretion to set the current monthly rate provided that the
        amount [did] not exceed the guaranteed monthly rate.” Id. at 1345.
                In aﬃrming the dismissal of plaintiﬀ’s complaint, this Court
        held that under Georgia law, the policy “unambiguously gives
        Wilco the discretion to set [plaintiﬀ’s] current monthly rate, so long
        as that rate does not exceed the guaranteed monthly rate.” Id. at
        1346. We acknowledged that the plaintiﬀ stressed that the policy—
        i.e., the paragraph under the Table—provided that the “[a]ctual
        monthly” COI rate “will be determined by the company based on
        the policy cost factors described in your policy.” Id. at 1347
        (quotation marks omitted). However, we pointed out that “the
        policy never mentions policy cost factors in conjunction with the
        current monthly rate.” Id. The only factors mentioned in the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

        policy—the insured’s “sex, attained age, and premium class”—
        relate to the guaranteed monthly COI rate. Id.
               Despite this sentence—that “[a]ctual monthly” COI rates
        “will be determined based on the policy cost factors described in
        your policy”—the Wilco Court concluded the policy language was
        not ambiguous. Id. at 1348-49. Citing Georgia law, we explained
        that: “[e]ven a policy which is susceptible to two reasonable
        meanings is not ambiguous if the trial court can resolve the
        conﬂicting interpretations by applying the rules of contract
        construction.” Id. at 1348 (quotation marks omitted and
        alterations adopted). Applying those rules, the Wilco Court
        reasoned that “the speciﬁc provision about the current monthly
        rate”—i.e., “the current monthly rate is determined by the
        company, with no mention of factors”—controlled to the extent it
        was inconsistent with the paragraph about the “[a]ctual monthly”
        COI rate under the Table, stating it “will be determined by the
        Company based on to-be-described policy cost factors.” Id. at 1347.
               We also rejected the plaintiﬀ’s claims that (1) the policy’s use
        of “based on” was reasonably susceptible to an exclusivity
        interpretation and (2) the cost factors—sex, attained age, premium
        class—in the guaranteed-rate sentence could be grafted on the
        current monthly rate. Id. We found plaintiﬀ’s argument
        “untenable” because (1) it would mean the guaranteed/current
        monthly rates “would be calculated in the exact same way,” (2) “it
        destroys the guaranteed/current monthly rate distinction,” and
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        22-12991                   Opinion of the Court                                 15

        (3) it would render the phrase in the COI rate section—“will be
        determined by the Company”—“superﬂuous.” Id. at 1348-49.
               When read as a whole, the policy demonstrated that “Wilco
        was required to calculate[] Anderson’s guaranteed monthly rate
        based on her age, sex, and premium class, but that this rate was
        distinct from the current monthly rate, which Wilco had discretion
        to set at any level, so long as it did not exceed the guaranteed
        monthly rate.” Id. at 1346-47.
        B.      Slam Dunk v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. (11th Cir. 2021)
              Our Court has addressed another universal life policy with
        language quite similar to Protective’s. In Slam Dunk I, LLC v.
        Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., the plaintiﬀ’s policy stated the
        monthly COI rates “are determined by [the insurer] based on its
        expectations as to future mortality experience.” 2 853 F. App’x at
        452-53. The full COI rate section, however, stated:
                The Monthly Cost of Insurance Rates are based on
                the Insured’s Attained Age, the type of beneﬁt, the
                Class of Insured and whether premiums for that
                Insured are paid directly to [Connecticut General] or
                through payroll deductions. The Monthly Cost of
                Insurance Rates are determined by [Connecticut
                General] based on its expectations as to future
                mortality experience. Adjustment in the Monthly

        2 Unpublished opinions, like Slam Dunk, “are not precedential, so they do not

        bind us . . . to any degree.” Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1346 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (citing 11th Cir. R. 36-2). We discuss Slam Dunk only because the
        parties’ appellate briefs heavily focus on it.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-12991

              Cost of Insurance Rates may be made by
              [Connecticut General] from time to time, but not
              more than once a year, and will apply to Insureds of
              the same class. Under no circumstance will the
              Monthly Cost of Insurance Rates for Life Insurance
              ever be greater than those shown in the Table of
              Guaranteed Maximum Life Insurance Rates. Such
              guaranteed maximum rates are based on the
              Commissioners 1980 Extended Term Table (age last
              birthday) and 4% eﬀective annual interest.
        Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
               Our Court aﬃrmed the dismissal of the plaintiﬀ’s complaint
        and rejected “a reading of the [] policies that focuses only [on] one
        sentence to the exclusion of all others.” Id. at 454. “We must read
        the contract as a whole and cannot sever the single sentence
        highlighted by [the plaintiﬀ] from the remainder of the COI
        provision.” Id. While one sentence “mentions future mortality
        experience as a basis for establishing the COI rate,” the
        “immediately preceding sentence” establishes that “the COI rates
        are also based on ‘the Insured’s Attained Age, the type of beneﬁt,
        the Class of the Insured and whether premiums for that Insured are
        paid directly to [Connecticut General] or through payroll
        deductions.” Id. We reasoned that a reading of the policy that
        required monthly COI rates to be exclusively based on the insurer’s
        expected future mortality experience would ignore the
        immediately preceding sentence. Id.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                         17

               We also reasoned that “[n]othing about the plain and
        ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘based on’ connotes exclusivity,”
        and “nothing about it implies the list that follows is exhaustive.” Id.
        at 455. This Court pointed out that “[h]aving been used twice to
        refer to diﬀerent factors, the phrase ‘based on’ cannot connote
        exclusivity without leading to an absurd or internally inconsistent
        result.” Id. We therefore “decline[d] to adopt Slam Dunk’s
        proposed interpretation because to do so would rewrite the []
        policies.” Id. We ruled that this policy interpretation was “most
        consistent with Florida contract law.” Id.
              Our Slam Dunk decision also relied on the Seventh Circuit’s
        Norem decision, which we discuss.
        C.     Norem v. Lincoln Beneﬁt Life Co. (7th Cir. 2013)
               In Norem v. Lincoln Beneﬁt Life Co., the plaintiﬀ asserted that
        the defendant Lincoln (1) was obligated to calculate its COI rate
        “based on the insured’s sex, issue age, policy year, and payment
        class” and (2) breached its contract by considering other factors,
        including expected policy lapse rates, agent commissions, and
        anticipated death beneﬁt costs. 737 F.3d at 1147-48. The policy
        value had a monthly cost of insurance deduction, calculated as
        follows:
               1. Divide the death beneﬁt as of the prior monthly
               deduction day by 1.003273739 [;] 2. Subtract the
               policy value as of that prior monthly deduction day
               less the policy fee and less the cost of insurance of any
               beneﬁt riders attached to this policy; 3. Multiply the
               results by the current cost of insurance rate divided
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

               by 1,000. The cost of insurance rate is based on the
               insured’s sex, issue age, policy year, and payment
               class. The rates will be determined by us, but they
               will never be more than the guaranteed rates shown
               on Page 5.
        Id. at 1147 n.2 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
               Aﬃrming summary judgment for the defendant Lincoln,
        the Seventh Circuit held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
        phrase “based on” does not imply “exclusivity.” Id. at 1150. The
        Seventh Circuit ﬁrst noted that the policy did not deﬁne the phrase
        “based on.”      Id. at 1149.        Next, the Court turned to
        Merriam-Webster’s deﬁnition of the word “base”: “(1) ‘a main
        ingredient;’ (2) ‘a supporting or carrying ingredient;’ (3) ‘the
        fundamental part of something.’” Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster’s
        Collegiate Dictionary, 101 (11th ed. 2007)). The Court stated that
        “[o]ther deﬁnitions are in accord: (1) ‘[s]omething on which a thing
        stands or by which it is supported;’ or (2) ‘[t]he principal ingredient,
        the fundamental element.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
        Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol. I, 192 (6th ed. 2007)).
               The Seventh Circuit concluded that none of these
        deﬁnitions supported plaintiﬀ Norem’s proposed interpretation—
        that “base” or “based on” implies “exclusivity.” Id. at 1149-50.
        Therefore, “neither the dictionary deﬁnitions nor the common
        understanding of the phrase ‘based on’ suggest that Lincoln Beneﬁt
        is prohibited from considering factors beyond sex, issue age, policy
        year, and payment class when calculating its COI rates.” Id. at 1150.
        The Seventh Circuit also noted that (1) the policy included a table
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        19

        of “guaranteed maximum rates” and (2) it was undisputed that
        “Norem’s COI rates have remained unchanged and have also never
        exceeded these guaranteed maximums.” Id.
               According to the Seventh Circuit, the policy’s COI rate
        provision “is most reasonably read as a description of those
        components of the COI rate relevant to an individual insured.” Id.
        at 1152. The Seventh Circuit remarked that it was industry practice
        for insurers to consider numerous factors in setting COI rates, and
        that the speciﬁcs of Lincoln’s formula were proprietary and not
        disclosed to policyholders. Id. at 1150. The Court stated it was
        “logical” the policy would spell out factors speciﬁc to the insured
        without providing a precise list of all factors it would consider. Id.
               The Court also observed that the sentence immediately after
        the “based on” clause states that “[t]he rates will be determined by
        us but they will never be more than the guaranteed rates shown on
        Page 5.” Id. The Court reasoned that “[t]his sentence makes clear
        that Lincoln Beneﬁt will utilize its own formula to determine the
        rates, subject to the limitation that they cannot exceed the
        guaranteed maximum rates.” Id. It determined that interpreting
        the “based on” provision “as informational gives meaning to the
        provision as a whole.” Id.
               Additionally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “the only
        express limitation is found in the explicit guarantee that the COI
        rates never be more than the listed maximum rates.” Id. To the
        Court, the policy was best read as containing two parts: “ﬁrst, an
        explanatory clause listing key components of the COI rate; and
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        20                    Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

        second, a guaranteed rate that allows a policyholder to see the
        maximum COI charge that could be deducted from his policy
        value.” Id.
               The Seventh Circuit also distinguished other district court
        cases involving a “based on” clause that referred to “mortality
        experience” and a lawsuit focused on “an increase” in COI rates
        despite declining mortality. Id. at 1153-54. Plaintiﬀ Norem had not
        claimed or demonstrated that the insurer’s COI rates “are ‘utterly
        divorced’ from mortality.” Id.
               Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found “the reasoning of the
        cases advanced by Lincoln Beneﬁt” convincing. Id. at 1155. The
        Seventh Circuit said: “These cases hold generally that absent a
        promise to use a speciﬁc formula when calculating a COI rate, an
        insurer is not bound to consider only those factors listed in a COI
        provision.” Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]his
        interpretation comports with the common understanding of the
        phrase ‘based on’ and is also the most reasonable way to construe
        the language of the COI provision as a whole.” Id.
              After Norem, the Eighth Circuit in Vogt disagreed with the
        Seventh Circuit. So we review Vogt.
        D.    Vogt v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. (8th Cir. 2020)
               In Vogt v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., the Eighth Circuit
        concluded “based on” was ambiguous, should be construed against
        State Farm, and read to imply exclusivity of the listed factors. 963
        F.3d at 761-64 (applying Missouri law). Once again, the policy
        terms were the crux of the lawsuit.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        21

               In 1999, Vogt purchased his life insurance policy, but
        surrendered it in 2013 for its policy value. Id. at 761. Dissatisﬁed
        with the COI fees, Vogt brought breach of contract and conversion
        claims as part of a class action. Id. Vogt alleged State Farm used
        non-listed, non-mortality related factors to calculate its COI rate.
        Id.
               State Farm’s policy allowed monthly deductions for “(1) the
        cost of insurance, (2) the monthly charges for any riders, and (3) the
        monthly expense charge.” Id. The COI rate provision stated:
              [The Monthly Cost of Insurance] rates for each policy
              year are based on the Insured’s age on the policy
              anniversary, sex, and applicable rate class. A rate class
              will be determined for the Initial Basic Amount and
              for each increase. The rates shown on page 4 are the
              maximum monthly cost of insurance rates for the
              Initial Basic Amount. Maximum monthly cost of
              insurance rates will be provided for each increase in
              the Basic Amount. We can charge rates lower than
              those shown. Such rates can be adjusted for projected
              changes in mortality but cannot exceed the maximum
              monthly cost of insurance rates. Such adjustments
              cannot be made more than once a calendar year.
        Id. Vogt claimed State Farm (1) may set its COI rates based on the
        enumerated mortality factors of age, sex and rate class but
        (2) breached its policy by “using non-enumerated factors unrelated
        to a policyholder’s mortality risk,” that “included taxes, proﬁt
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

        assumptions, investment earnings, and capital and reserve
        requirements.” Id. Because State Farm included non-mortality
        factors in its COI rates, Vogt asserted that “State Farm deducted
        from the monthly premium payments more than what the policy
        stated would be included in the COI fees.” Id.
               The district court granted plaintiﬀ Vogt’s motion for
        summary judgment as to liability, concluding the policy was
        ambiguous and should be construed against State Farm. Id. at
        761-72. After a trial as to damages, a jury returned a $34 million
        verdict in the plaintiﬀ class’s favor. Id. at 761. State Farm appealed.
                Applying Missouri law, the Eighth Circuit aﬃrmed the
        summary judgment grant and the damages verdict in favor of the
        plaintiﬀ class, and held that, “at the very least the phrase [‘based
        on’] is ambiguous.” Id. at 763. The Eighth Circuit explained that
        the policy “contains no deﬁnition for the phrase ‘based on,’ so we
        rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase.” Id. As
        opposed to dictionary deﬁnitions, the Court relied on how a
        reasonable person would read the policy language, concluding:
               [A] person of ordinary intelligence purchasing an
               insurance policy would not read the provision and
               understand that where the policy states that the COI
               fees will be calculated “based on” listed mortality
               factors that the insurer would also be free to
               incorporate other, unlisted factors into this
               calculation.
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        22-12991                  Opinion of the Court                              23

        Id. at 763-64. The Eighth Circuit noted that the Seventh Circuit’s
        Norem (1) concluded “based on” did not imply “exclusivity of
        factors” but (2) “acknowledge[d] that other courts have reached the
        opposite conclusion.” Id. at 764. The Eighth Circuit stated that the
        fact that several courts “have examined the issue in very similar
        circumstances and have reached diﬀering conclusions supports the
        conclusion that the phrase is ambiguous.” Id.
               The Eighth Circuit observed that State Farm was free to
        draft the policy language to unambiguously give it the freedom to
        collect a COI fee based on unenumerated factors, but it did not. Id.
        The Eighth Circuit concluded that “the phrase ‘based on’ in the
        COI provision is at least ambiguous and thus must be construed
        against State Farm.” Id. 3
               In addition to addressing COI rates, these circuit court
        decisions illustrate the importance of contract interpretation
        principles. We now set forth South Carolina’s contract law.
                        IV.     SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
               Courts in South Carolina “have a long history of formalistic
        interpretation with respect to all contracts and have repeatedly
        held that the ‘[i]nsurance policies are subject to general rules of

        3 Johnson cites Mirkin v. XOOM Energy, LLC to support his argument that the

        “will be . . . based on” language creates a duty to change rates. See generally
        931 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2019). Besides not involving a life insurance policy,
        Mirkin is inapplicable because it was not disputed that the consumers had to
        pay a variable rate for energy purchases and that XOOM had an ongoing
        contractual duty to base its variable rates on supply costs. See id. at 175–77.
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

        contract construction.’” Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 757 S.E.2d
        399, 406 (S.C. 2014) (quoting Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 310
        S.E.2d 814, 816 (S.C. 1983)). Contract language in an insurance
        policy must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Williams v.
        Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 762 S.E.2d 705, 709-10 (S.C. 2014); Bell, 757
        S.E.2d at 406; Sloan Constr. Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 236
        S.E.2d 818, 819 (S.C. 1977). “Where the contract’s language is clear
        and unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract’s
        force and effect.” Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting McGill v.
        Moore, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (S.C. 2009)).
               When a policy does not define a term, South Carolina courts
        consider dictionary definitions as helpful tools to ascertain its plain,
        ordinary, and common meaning. See Super Duper Inc. v. Pa. Nat’l
        Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 683 S.E.2d 792, 796 (S.C. 2009); Barkley v. Int’l
        Mut. Ins. Co., 86 S.E.2d 602, 604 (S.C. 1955); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut.
        Ins. Co. v. Oates, 588 S.E.2d 643, 646 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
               “The construction of a clear and unambiguous contract is a
        question of law for the court to determine.” Williams, 762 S.E.2d
        at 710. It is also “a question of law for the court whether the
        language of a contract is ambiguous.” Id. (quoting S.C. Dep’t of Nat.
        Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (S.C. 2001));
        McGill, 672 S.E.2d at 574.
               An insurance contract is read as a whole document so that
        one may not create an ambiguity by pointing out a single sentence
        or clause. Schulmeyer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 579 S.E.2d 132,
        134 (S.C. 2003) (quoting Yarborough v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 225
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                       25

        S.E.2d 344, 348 (S.C. 1976)); McGill, 672 S.E.2d at 574. “Whether a
        contract is ambiguous is to be determined from examining the
        entire contract, not by reviewing isolated portions of the contract.”
        Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710. “The meaning of a particular word or
        phrase is not determined by considering the word or phrase by
        itself, but by reading the policy as a whole and considering the
        context and subject matter of the insurance contract.” Schulmeyer,
        579 S.E.2d at 134; Yarborough, 225 S.E.2d at 349.
               A contract “is ambiguous when it is capable of more than
        one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent
        person who has examined the context of the entire integrated
        agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages
        and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or
        business.” Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710 (quoting Hawkins v.
        Greenwood Dev. Corp., 493 S.E.2d 875, 878 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)).
               “If the court decides the language is ambiguous, however,
        evidence may be admitted to show the intent of the parties, and the
        determination of the parties’ intent becomes a question of fact for
        the fact-finder.” Id. (citing Hawkins, 493 S.E.2d at 878-79).
        “Ambiguous or conflicting terms in an insurance policy must be
        construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
        insurer.” Id. (quoting Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Homestead Indus.,
        Inc., 456 S.E.2d 912, 915 (S.C. 1995)). For ambiguous contracts,
        “[c]ourt[s] will look to the reasonable expectations of the insured
        at the time when he entered into the contract.” Bell, 757 S.E.2d at
        407.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                22-12991

               If a form insurance contract is ambiguous, contra proferentem,
        which construes ambiguity against the drafter (i.e., the insurer),
        applies as a rule of last resort. Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710; Waters
        v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 617 S.E.2d 385, 388 (S.C. Ct. App.
        2005) (“After a consideration of extrinsic evidence, the jury is to
        resolve all remaining ambiguity in favor of the insured.”).
              We now apply South Carolina law to Johnson’s policy.
                 V.     ALLEGED DUTY AS TO COI RATES
              The first issue is whether after initially setting its monthly
        COI rate scale in 1988 to cover the life of Johnson, Protective had
        a contractual duty or obligation to reassess and redetermine that
        COI rate scale during the Class Period, when by 2012 nationwide
        mortality had improved.
                Johnson contends this sentence, in the middle of one of the
        three COI rate sections, imposed that requirement: “Monthly cost
        of insurance rates will be determined by us, based on our
        expectations as to future mortality experience.” Johnson argues
        that the “will be determined” phrase obligates Protective to
        reassess and recalculate its monthly COI rates when mortality risks
        significantly improve. He claims that “will” is a mandatory, not
        permissive word and creates a contractual command. Johnson
        distinguishes “will” from “may” and “might.”
              As to time of performance, Johnson asserts this contractual
        duty applies “as often as every month,” but, at a minimum,
        “periodically,” and those “precise intervals at which Protective’s
        COI rates ‘will be determined’” are a fact question. Johnson
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        22-12991                 Opinion of the Court                             27

        submits that we “need not reach the issue of how frequently this
        periodic duty arises,” but must decide at this stage only that such a
        contractual duty exists.
               Protective replies that Johnson reads the “will be
        determined” phrase in isolation and out of context. Protective
        asserts that phrase, read with the rest of the sentence, the entire
        paragraph, and the policy as a whole, merely acknowledges
        Protective’s ability or capacity to choose its monthly COI rates in
        the future. Protective contends the policy leaves it to Protective to
        determine whether and when to change its monthly COI rates in
        the future, subject to the requirement that “any change” not
        exceed the guaranteed maximum monthly COI rates in Johnson’s
        policy’s Table. Indeed, those guaranteed maximum monthly COI
        rates (1) are listed in great detail in the policy’s monthly COI rate
        Table, (2) thoroughly covered the life of Johnson specifically for
        each year from age 0 to 94, and (3) thus are known by him as the
        policyholder at inception.
               Regarding the “will be determined” phrase, both parties cite
        pieces of dictionary definitions of “will.” Our review of them
        reveals “will” has more than one ordinary or common meaning,
        making context key to our contract interpretation.4

        4 “Many words have more than one ordinary meaning.       The fact is that the
        more common the term . . . the more meanings it will bear.” ANTONIN SCALIA
        & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 70
        (2012).
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

               For example, the American Heritage Dictionary defines
        “will” as (1) “[u]sed to indicate simple futurity” and (2) “[u]sed to
        indicate capacity or ability,” but also as (3) “[u]sed to indicate
        requirement or command.”              Will, AMERICAN HERITAGE
        DICTIONARY        OF    THE      ENGLISH     LANGUAGE        ONLINE,
        https://perma.cc/YUU5-SULL.
               Merriam-Webster defines “will” as (1) “used to express
        futurity” and (2) “used to express desire, choice, willingness,” but
        also as (3) “used to express a command, exhortation, or
        injunction.”           Will,      MERRIAM-WEBSTER          ONLINE,
        https://perma.cc/S2BB-BV6G.
               Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines
        “will” as (1) “used to express capability or sufficiency” but also as
        (2) “used to express a command, exhortation, or injunction.”
        WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2616-17 (3rd
        ed. 1961).
               Webster’s New World Dictionary, from 1988, defines “will”
        as (1) “used to express expectation or surmise” and (2) “used to
        express possibility,” but also as (3) “used to express determination,
        compulsion, or obligation.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
        OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1528 (3d ed. 1988).

                The Oxford English Dictionary defines “will” as
        (1) “[e]xpressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency: can, may, be
        able to, be capable of ——ing,” but also as (2) “[e]xpressing
        determination, wish, or intention to bring about some action,
        event, or state of things in the future: intend to, mean to.” Will,
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        22-12991                   Opinion of the Court                                29

        OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://perma.cc/BNY6-
        EHMR.
              When common words, like “will,” have different meanings,
        courts “must use the context in which a given word appears to
        determine its aptest, most likely sense.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
        A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
        Appendix A, 418 (2012). In the same vein, South Carolina law
        provides that the meaning of a word is not always determined by
        the word alone, but “by reading the policy as a whole and
        considering the context and subject matter” of the policy.
        Schulmeyer, 579 S.E.2d at 134.
               Accordingly, let’s consider the phrase in the context of the
        complete sentence. The sentence broadly leaves the monthly COI
        rate to be determined in the future “by us” (Protective) based on
        “our expectations.” (Emphasis added.) This surrounding language
        does not bespeak a mandatory obligation to another party. In this
        context, “will” seems to be used as merely a future tense verb as to
        what Protective may choose to do in the future. 5

        5  Johnson, quoting § 27.3(b) of Bryan Garner’s The Redbook, argues that
        “[g]enerally speaking, contractual promises are well expressed with will.”
        However, the topic of § 27.3(b) is entitled the “Ambiguous ‘shall,’” and § 27.3(b)
        explains how “contracts often use the word [shall] in as many as four or five
        different senses.” BRYAN GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE
        562, § 27.3(b) (4th ed. 2018). Section 27.3(b) reviews how “[s]ometimes its
        sense is indeed mandatory”; “sometimes it means ‘may’”; and “sometimes it
        is merely a future-tense verb.” Id. The same can be said for “will.”
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

                An examination of the entire paragraph yields this meaning
        too. The very next sentence states: “Any change in the monthly
        cost of insurance rates will be on a uniform basis for insureds of the
        same class such as age, sex, rate class, and policy year.” (Emphasis
        added.) “Any change” suggests no change is required by
        Protective, but is possible in the future. And the inclusion of the
        “uniform basis” term is informative. If the policy language in the
        first sentence was a mandatory contractual command, then all such
        life policies had that obligation and there would be no need for that
        “uniform basis” term. On the other hand, if Protective has the
        ability or choice to make a “change” in its internal COI rates, it will
        do so uniformly for other insureds with the same age, sex, rate
        class, and policy year. The need for this uniformity clause makes
        more sense if Protective has the ability, not a mandatory
        obligation, to reassess and “change” its internal COI rates set at
        inception.
                This reading of the “will be determined” phrase is reinforced
        by the policy as a whole. Other provisions set forth highly specific
        and detailed guaranteed maximum monthly COI rates for the life of
        Johnson from age 0 to 94. In contrast, Johnson’s isolated relied-upon
        sentence does not contain a formula or table for calculating COI
        rates in the future. The most reasonable reading of that sentence
        in context is that Protective has the capacity, ability, choice, or
        possibility to determine its internal COI rates in the future, as long
        as it does not exceed that guaranteed maximum monthly COI rate.
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        22-12991              Opinion of the Court                       31

               Tellingly too, the “will be determined” sentence omits any
        clue as to when the alleged mandatory duty to reassess internal
        COI rates would have to be performed. Even Johnson
        acknowledges that his policy does not specify in this isolated
        sentence, or anywhere else, the precise intervals at which
        Protective’s COI rates will be redetermined; he instead argues
        “those precise intervals are a fact question.”
               Although Protective’s internal COI rate scale is applied
        monthly as part of the monthly cost of insurance charge, Johnson
        is careful not to stress that Protective must redetermine the COI
        rate each and every month. Think about this though. If this
        sentence is read, as Johnson suggests, to impose a contractual
        command “as to the monthly COI rate,” then that obligation would
        be monthly. It would not be periodic, i.e., stop one year, skip over
        a few years, and then start again in the Class Period. The text
        Johnson relies on does not support Johnson’s periodic theory.
               For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded that the “will
        be determined” phrase read in context mandates that Protective,
        each month or even periodically, reassess and redetermine its
        internal monthly COI rates set at inception for the life of Johnson.
                    VI.    POLICY TERM: “BASED ON”
               Alternatively, let’s assume that Protective had a contractual
        duty to reassess and redetermine its COI rate scale each month or
        periodically. The next question is whether the policy (1) requires
        Protective to redetermine its monthly COI rates based on
        exclusively its “expectations as to future mortality experience” and
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

        (2) precludes Protective from considering any other factors.
        Johnson’s main theory underlying his breach of contract claim is
        that (1) “based on” connotes exclusivity and (2) Protective breached
        its contractual duty by not redetermining its monthly COI rates
        based on exclusively its “expectations as to future mortality
        experience.”
               As noted above, the circuit courts are split on the meaning
        of the “based on” term as to COI rates. Some concluded that
        “based on” does not mean solely or exclusively and granted
        judgment for the insurance company. Slam Dunk, 853 F. App’x at
        455; Norem, 737 F.3d at 1155; see also Wilco, 17 F.4th at 1347; Thao
        v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 549 F. App’x 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2013)
        (applying Norem). These decisions ruled that it is not reasonable to
        read “only,” “exclusively,” or “solely” into the term “based on.”
        Slam Dunk, 853 F. App’x at 454; Norem, 737 F.3d at 1150-51.
               The Eighth Circuit, however, determined that “based on”
        connotes exclusivity, or is “at least ambiguous.” Vogt, 963 F.3d at
        763. The Eighth Circuit construed the term against the defendant
        insurer and granted judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.; see also
        Meek v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 3d 923, 933-34 (W.D. Mo.
        2023). And some district courts concluded that “based on” is
        ambiguous and denied an insurer judgment as a matter of law. See,
        e.g., PHT Holding II LLC v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., ---
        F. Supp. 3d ----, 2023 WL 3714746, at *9-10, 17 (S.D. Iowa May 27,
        2023) (summary judgment motion); Fine v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co.,
        627 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1158-60 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (motion to dismiss);
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        33

        McClure v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818-22 (D.
        Ariz. 2022) (summary judgment motion); see also Fleisher v. Phx. Life
        Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 3d 456, 470-74, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding
        “based on” connotes exclusivity, or is at least ambiguous, but
        granting summary judgment to the insurer for other reasons).
                Johnson’s policy does not define “based on” used in the COI
        rate section. We thus begin, under South Carolina law, with the
        term’s plain and ordinary meaning. See Williams, 762 S.E.2d at
        709-10. As discussed above, South Carolina courts consider
        dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning
        of a term. See Super Duper Inc., 683 S.E.2d at 796; Barkley, 86 S.E.2d
        at 604; Oates, 588 S.E.2d at 646. Generally, dictionaries define
        “base,” not “based on,” so we start there.
               Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines “base” as:
        (1) “a main ingredient”; (2) “a supporting or carrying ingredient”;
        or (3) “the fundamental part of something.” WEBSTER’S NINTH
        NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 133 (1986).
              Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “base” as: (1) “the
        fundamental or main part” and (2) “the principal or essential
        ingredient.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
        ENGLISH 114 (3d ed. 1988).
                The Oxford English Dictionary defines “base” as: (1) “[a]
        ground for an action or attitude; an underlying reason or
        justification” and (2) “[t]he main or most important ingredient or
        element, to which other things are added or from which another
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        34                     Opinion of the Court                22-12991

        thing is derived.” Base, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
        https://perma.cc/WA97-ZEFW.
               The American Heritage Dictionary defines “base” as “[t]he
        fact, observation, or premise from which a reasoning process is
        begun.” Base, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
        LANGUAGE ONLINE, https://perma.cc/D7VC-QT84.
               These definitions are consistent with the dictionary entries
        our Court approved in Slam Dunk, which defined “base” as “a main
        ingredient,” “a supporting or carrying ingredient,” “the
        fundamental part of something,” “[s]omething on which a thing
        stands or by which it is supported,” and “[t]he principal ingredient,
        the fundamental element.” See Slam Dunk, 853 F. App’x at 454-55
        (discussing Seventh Circuit’s cited dictionary entries in Norem);
        Norem, 737 F.3d at 1149 (applying Illinois law); see also Thao, 549
        F. App’x at 537 (applying Wisconsin law and following Norem).
               We agree with Slam Dunk and Norem that “based on” does
        not mean “exclusively on” or “solely on.” Johnson’s complaint
        alleged that Protective’s policy required it to base its monthly COI
        rate “exclusively” or “solely” on its “expectations as to future
        mortality experience.” Because the policy does not have that
        requirement, the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson’s
        breach of contract claim to the extent it relied on an allegation of
        “exclusivity.”
               So far, the above contract issues are premised on Johnson’s
        allegation that Protective did not reassess and redetermine its
        monthly COI rates “a single time” during the Class Period.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        35

        Johnson makes a different allegation for his final breach of contract
        theory, which we address.
              VII.   IGNORING MORTALITY EXPERIENCE
                As his final breach of contact theory, Johnson contends that
        (1) Protective actually did choose to reassess, and did redetermine,
        its internal COI rate scale during the Class Period, (2) as to such
        redeterminations, the policy required Protective to use its
        “expectations as to future mortality experience,” (3) but Protective
        violated the policy by ignoring its “expectations as to future
        mortality experience” in making its redeterminations.
                Protective responds this breach of contract theory is not
        properly before our Court. Protective asserts Johnson did not
        argue this theory below and is precluded from raising it on appeal.
        See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding
        legal theories not raised before the district court may not ordinarily
        be raised for the first time on appeal).
               After review, we conclude Johnson did not forfeit this
        breach of contract theory. Johnson’s complaint expressly alleges
        that during the Class Period, Protective conducted “periodic
        redeterminations, and continuous mortality review.” Despite
        these redeterminations, Johnson’s complaint expressly alleges that
        his “monthly COI rates have not been determined based on
        Protective’s improving mortality expectations, and the results of
        Protective’s new mortality reviews during the Class Period are
        being ignored to the detriment [of] the members of the Class.”
        Johnson’s complaint also (1) describes his current COI rates as
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

        “wildly divorced from current expectations of future mortality
        experience” and (2) alleges that Protective’s COI rates do not
        “reflect” its expectations as to future mortality experience.
               In reply, Protective emphasizes that at a hearing on its
        motion, Johnson summarized his case as primarily concerning
        whether Protective (1) had an ongoing contractual duty “to review
        and adjust its COI rates” and (2) was contractually permitted to
        consider factors other than its expectations as to future mortality
        experience. At the hearing, however, Johnson also made clear that
        he was asserting a theory of liability “that even if Protective was
        allowed to consider factors other than expectations of future
        mortality experience, . . . it did not determine its COI rates in
        accordance with the contract because it ignored its expectations of
        future mortality.”
               The record also shows Johnson stressed this breach of
        contract theory in his opposition to Protective’s motion for
        judgment on the pleadings and in his post-hearing briefing. For
        example, Johnson’s opposition brief argued that Slam Dunk was not
        dispositive of his breach of contract claim because “allowing
        Protective to consider factors such as expense and lapse is not the
        same as allowing Protective to ignore the enumerated factors.” In
        post-hearing briefing, Johnson emphasized that the complaint
        alleges “that Protective did ignore its improving mortality
        expectations and did not treat them as the ‘main ingredients.’”
                After review, we also conclude that Johnson’s complaint
        sufficiently alleges that Protective did redetermine its COI rates but
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        37

        ignored its “expectations as to future mortality experience” when
        it did so. While the policy did not require Protective to
        redetermine its internal COI rates set at inception, that’s a separate
        matter from the issue of what the policy required if Protective
        chose or elected voluntarily to reassess and change them.
               Further, in assessing Protective’s contractual duty under the
        policy, the district court erroneously cabined that duty to whether
        Protective was obligated to reassess and redetermine its COI rates,
        as opposed to also what duty Protective had if Protective chose to
        reassess and did redetermine its COI rates. While Johnson’s
        highlighted sentence in the COI rate section did not mandate a
        redetermination by Protective, that sentence in context does
        support Johnson’s alternative breach of contract theory that if
        Protective chose to, and did, redetermine its COI rates, Protective
        was obligated to consider its “expectations as to future mortality
        experience.”
               Given the COI rate section, the district court erred in
        dismissing Johnson’s breach of contract claim to the extent Johnson
        asserted Protective chose to, and did, reassess and redetermine its
        COI rate scale during the Class Period, but “ignored” its
        expectations as to future mortality experience in doing so. As
        explained above, “based on” means as a main or principal
        ingredient, and thus Protective could not ignore that factor. While
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        38                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12991

        it remains to be seen what can be proven, at this pleadings stage
        Johnson’s complaint states a breach of contract claim to that extent.
         VIII.     PROPOSED THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
               Before concluding, we address a procedural issue raised by
        Johnson as to his proposed third amended complaint. Johnson
        argues that the district court erred by not “adequately considering”
        the new factual allegations in 13 new paragraphs of his proposed
        third amended complaint (“TAC”) and by describing it as a “carbon
        copy” of the complaint. Johnson asserts that the district court
        incorrectly found his proposed TAC was a futile “carbon copy,”
        and erroneously denied Johnson’s request for leave to amend.
              Protective responds that Johnson did not file a standalone
        motion for leave to amend, and thus his request as to the proposed
        TAC was not properly before the district court. Protective points
        out that Johnson only requested leave to amend in the last two
        pages of his brief in opposition to Protective’s motion for judgment
        on the pleadings. Protective asserts the district court “never ruled
        on the misplaced request that [Johnson] made in [his] opposition.”
               As background, Johnson’s original complaint was filed on
        August 13, 2018, his first amended complaint on November 19,
        2018, and his second amended complaint on June 29, 2020, which
        was the deadline for any amendments of the pleadings. 6 On June
        11, 2021, Protective filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings.

        6 The district court had set a May 30, 2020 deadline, but it was extended to

        June 29, 2020 under the General Orders entered by the Northern District of
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        22-12991                 Opinion of the Court                           39

                On August 4, 2021, Johnson filed his 30-page opposition
        brief, to which he attached a proposed TAC. His brief asked for
        leave to amend in the last two pages. Johnson’s brief summarily
        cited Rule 15 and argued he had good cause to amend because (1)
        Protective raised Slam Dunk in June of 2021 and (2) Protective
        would not be prejudiced. Protective replied that the TAC was
        futile in any event.
               In its order granting Protective’s motion for judgment on
        the pleadings, the district court did not directly address Johnson’s
        request for leave to amend embedded in his brief. Its order
        mentions Johnson’s request in only a footnote, which describes his
        proposed TAC as a “carbon copy” of the complaint, as follows:
               The factual allegations discussed in this opinion
               appear in [Johnson’s] second amended complaint
               (Doc. 92), and [Johnson’s] proposed third amended
               complaint, (Doc. 123). The second amended
               complaint was the operative complaint when
               Protective Life ﬁled the motion for judgment on the
               pleadings now before the Court. The proposed third
               amended complaint is a carbon copy of the second
               amended complaint with one additional allegation:
                       Even if Protective [Life] Were Permitted
                       to Consider Other Unenumerated
                       Factors in Determining COI Rates, It is

        Alabama in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See General Order entered
        Apr. 13, 2020, No. 2020-04 (N.D. Ala.); General Order entered Mar. 17, 2020
        (N.D. Ala.).
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        40                    Opinion of the Court                 22-12991

                     Still   Dramatically      Overcharging
                     Policyholders and in Breach of Contract
        Other than this observation, the district court’s order did not
        expressly grant or deny Johnson’s request for leave to amend
        embedded in his brief.
               On appeal, Johnson emphasizes his proposed TAC was not
        a “carbon copy,” but contained “13 additional, new factual
        allegations,” “spanning seven pages.” The district court’s order
        contained parallel citations to paragraphs that were the same in the
        complaint and the proposed TAC. But there were no citations to
        the 13 new allegations in the TAC. Thus, the district court’s
        footnote characterizing it as a “carbon copy” was not correct.
               Nonetheless, the problem for Johnson is that his request for
        leave to amend was embedded in his opposition brief and was not
        properly before the district court. To properly request leave to
        amend, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: (1) file a motion
        for leave to amend and (2) “[‘]either set forth the substance of the
        proposed amendment or attach a copy of the proposed
        amendment.’” Cita Tr. Co. AG v. Fifth Third Bank, 879 F.3d 1151,
        1157 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279
        (11th Cir. 1999)).
               In Long, “the plaintiﬀ did not ﬁle a motion for leave to
        amend,” “[t]he request for leave to amend was included in the
        memorandum [plaintiﬀ] ﬁled in opposition to the motion to
        dismiss,” and plaintiﬀ “failed to attach the amendment or set forth
        the substance of the proposed amendment.” Long, 181 F.3d at 1279.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                        41

        The Long Court explained that “[f ]iling a motion is the proper
        method to request leave to amend a complaint.” Id. We stressed
        that Rule 7(b)(1) provides that “[a]n application to the court for an
        order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or
        trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the
        grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” Id.
        (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)). We held that “plaintiﬀ had ample
        time to ﬁle a motion for leave to amend but failed to do so,” and
        “the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiﬀ
        leave to amend her complaint.” Id. at 1279-80.
               Our decision in Newton v. Duke Energy Florida, LLC, is also
        instructive. See 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2018). Plaintiﬀs
        requested leave to amend in their opposition memorandum to
        defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. This Court held that “the
        request possessed no legal eﬀect for two reasons.” Id. “First, where
        a request for leave to ﬁle an amended complaint simply is
        embedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue has not
        been raised properly.” Id. (quotation marks omitted and alterations
        adopted). “Second, a request for a court order must be made by
        motion.” Id. (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
               Citing Rule 7(b), the Newton Court stated the motion must
        (1) “be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial,” (2) “state
        with particularity the grounds for seeking the order,” and (3) “state
        the relief sought.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Our Court held
        that “[p]laintiﬀs’ inclusion of the request for leave in their
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        42                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

        opposition to a motion to dismiss did not constitute a ‘motion’ and
        thus did not comply with this Rule 7(b) command.” Id.
               As to this “motion” requirement, our Court recently
        aﬃrmed a dismissal without leave to amend, relying on a plaintiﬀ’s
        failure to satisfy the ﬁrst requirement. Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd.
        of Mia.-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1236 (11th Cir. 2022). We held
        that “[w]here a request for leave to ﬁle an amended complaint
        simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue
        has not been raised properly.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
               That Johnson satisﬁed the second requirement by ﬁling a
        proposed TAC does not cure his defect as to the ﬁrst, especially
        under the circumstances of this case. On the June 29, 2020 deadline
        for amendments, Johnson ﬁled a standalone motion for leave to ﬁle
        his second amended complaint, which was granted. It was a year
        later that Johnson’s proposed TAC was attached to his opposition
        brief and his request for leave to amend came not by motion, but
        only embedded in that brief. We decline to fault the district court
        for not expressly ruling on that embedded request by granting or
        denying it. Rather, we conclude Johnson’s request for leave to
        amend embedded in his opposition brief was not properly before
        the district court.
                Johnson asserts that this ﬁrst requirement—a motion—is
        only a question of whether the request for leave to amend in his
        brief is “the functional equivalent of a motion for leave to amend.”
        (Quotation marks omitted.) We disagree. As outlined above, our
        precedent is clear that a request for leave to amend embedded in an
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        22-12991                Opinion of the Court                         43

        opposition memorandum does not properly put the issue before
        the district court.
                Johnson’s two cited cases are not on point. See United States
        v. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2018); United
        States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11th Cir. 2006).
        In both cases, the plaintiﬀ did not ﬁle a motion, requested leave to
        amend in an opposition brief, and failed to attach a proposed
        amendment or set forth the substance of the proposed
        amendment. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x at 793; Atkins, 470
        F.3d at 1362.
               These two cases, however, did not analyze the ﬁrst
        requirement of a motion. They bypassed the ﬁrst requirement and
        only “assumed” that the plaintiﬀ’s request was the functional
        equivalent of a motion and upheld the district court’s denial of
        leave to amend based on the plaintiﬀ’s failure to comply with the
        second requirement. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x at 793
        (stating our Court in Atkins “assumed that a request to amend
        included in a response to a motion to dismiss (what [plaintiﬀ] did
        here) is ‘the functional equivalent of a motion’ for leave to
        amend”); Atkins, 470 F.3d at 1362 (“Therefore, assuming that
        Atkins’s request was the functional equivalent of a motion, we
        aﬃrm the district court’s rejection thereof because it failed to
        include the proposed amendment or the substance thereof as
        required by Long.”).
              Based on our search, this Court also bypassed the ﬁrst
        requirement in other cases. See Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm
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        44                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12991

        Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1163 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
        Atkins and “[a]ssuming that [p]laintiﬀs’ requests amount to ‘the
        functional equivalent of a motion,’” but nonetheless still aﬃrming
        the district court’s rejection thereof because plaintiﬀs failed to
        include the proposed amendment or the substance thereof );
        My24HourNews.com, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 791 F. App’x 788, 803 (11th
        Cir. 2019) (“Even assuming that request was the functional
        equivalent of a motion, [plaintiﬀ] failed to attach the proposed
        amendment or set forth the substance of the proposed
        amendment, as required by Long.”).
               At bottom, it was unnecessary in these cases to address the
        ﬁrst requirement of a motion, where the plaintiﬀ had not satisﬁed
        the second requirement of attaching a proposed amendment or
        stating the substance of the amendment. The obvious (and easiest)
        route was to rule on only the second requirement.
               Here, we face the opposite situation: the plaintiff did not file
        a motion as required by our precedent and Rule 7(b), but attached
        a proposed TAC. Our precedent sets forth two separate
        requirements, and we must, and should, apply them here. See Long,
        181 F.3d at 1279; Chabad Chayil, Inc., 48 F.4th at 1236; Newton, 895
        F.3d at 1277-78; Cita Tr. Co., 879 F.3d at 1157. Because Johnson
        embedded his request in his opposition brief and did not file a
        motion for leave to amend, Johnson’s request for leave to amend
        was not properly before the district court.
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        22-12991               Opinion of the Court                       45

                             IX.   CONCLUSION
               In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s
        breach of contract claim premised on the theory Protective (1) had
        a contractual duty to reassess and redetermine, monthly or
        periodically, its COI rates based exclusively on its “expectations as
        to future mortality experience” (2) but never did so “a single time”
        during the Class Period. We affirm that dismissal on two grounds:
        (1) the policy did not impose that contractual duty and (2) even if
        Protective had such a contractual duty, Protective was not required
        to redetermine its monthly COI rates based on exclusively its
        “expectations as to future mortality experience.”
               We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s breach
        of contract claim premised on the alternative theory that
        Protective chose to, and did, reassess, redetermine, and change its
        internal monthly COI rate scale during the Class Period and
        violated the policy by ignoring its “expectations as to future
        mortality experience” when it did so.
                Finally, we find no reversible error as to Johnson’s proposed
        third amended complaint because it was not properly before the
        district court.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED.