Court Opinion

ID: 9526985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:26:32.024237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:20.853790
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority opinion totally ignores the fact that the St. Cloud police had probable cause, independent of the invalid traffic warrants, to arrest Hoven and seize and search his vehicle. This independent basis for the arrest was established by police testimony and asserted by the prosecution at the Rasmussen hearing.1 Given this independent justification Hoven’s ini*855tial arrest, rather than being pretextual as the majority opinion concludes, was lawful. See State ex rel. Law v. District Court, 276 Minn. 324, 150 N.W.2d 18 (1967) (power to arrest without a warrant may validate an arrest pursuant to a warrant where the warrant itself is defective). Hoven’s initial arrest being lawful, it follows from the circumstances surrounding the arrest that the seizure of marijuana at the impoundment lot was lawful. It also follows, under the facts and circumstances of this case, that Hoven’s consent was voluntary. I would therefore affirm the conviction.
Probable cause to arrest Hoven and seize his truck can be garnered from information the police had concerning Hoven’s reputation and a tip from a reliable informant, the details of which were confirmed by independent police investigation. With respect to defendant’s reputation, the police had prearrest information from several sources indicating that Hoven was involved in drug activities. First, Hoven’s name had come up in several drug investigations conducted by the St. Cloud police. Second, the police had obtained information from an agent of the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension connecting Hoven with illicit drug traffic. Third, police knew that Hoven had been arrested previously for possession of marijuana. Finally, a private citizen had contacted the police and expressed his concern that Hoven was involving his brother in drugs. This evidence of reputation is entitled to some weight in the probable cause determination. State v. Nolting, Minn., 254 N.W.2d 340 (1977). See State v. Bogar, 280 Minn. 191, 158 N.W.2d 501 (1968). It is true that reputation evidence alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). Reputation evidence supported by other information, however, may establish probable cause. State v. Nolting, supra.
That “other information” here is an informant’s tip, corroborated by independent police investigation. Information furnished by an informant may be sufficient to establish probable cause, provided the information satisfies the two-pronged test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969): the information must include facts and circumstances indicating (1) that the police officer was justified in believing that the informant was credible or the information reliable, and (2) that the informant obtained his information regarding the alleged criminal activity in a reliable manner. See State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228, 235, 195 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1972).
Turning to the informant’s credibility first, the facts clearly establish that the informant was credible. A police officer testified that the informant had worked with the St. Cloud police department for approximately a year and a half, and had given the St. Cloud police information that had resulted in approximately 8 drug-related arrests and convictions. This prior reliability is sufficient to establish an informant’s credibility. See State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 200 N.W.2d 403 (1972).
With the informant’s credibility established, the facts and circumstances known to the police still must indicate that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. Here the informant’s tip related that Hoven was in St. Cloud preparing to leave for Iowa that day, that he would be driving a pickup truck with Iowa license plates, and that he would have drugs obtained at one of two locations on the west side of St. Cloud in his possession. While the informant did not indicate how he obtained his information, the police nevertheless were justified in concluding that an informant obtained his information in a reliable manner because, prior to the arrest, they were able to corroborate independently the details of the informant’s statement.
The leading case sustaining a warrantless arrest based on prearrest corroboration of the details of an informant’s statement is Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). Draper involved a situation where a reliable informant particularly described the anticipated *856arrival by train of a designated individual who would be carrying heroin. Based on this description the police set up surveillance of the train station. The police observed a man who matched the description given by the reliable informant and effected a warrantless arrest. A search incident to that arrest discovered the heroin predicted by the informant. The Court, in sustaining the arrest on the grounds of probable cause, stated that the officer had personally verified every facet of the information given by the informant except whether he had accomplished his mission.
“[W]ith every other bit of [the informant’s] information being thus personally verified, [the officer] had ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that the remaining unverified bit of [the informant’s] information — that Draper would have heroin with him — was likewise true.” 358 U.S. at 313, 79 S.Ct. at 333, 3 L.Ed.2d at 332.
We likewise have sustained findings of probable cause where police have corroborated the details of an informant’s statement prior to making an arrest. See, e. g., State v. Radil, 288 Minn. 279, 282, 179 N.W.2d 602, 604 (1970); State v. Purdy, 278 Minn. 133, 141, 153 N.W.2d 254, 259-60 (1967). Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Spinelli majority, relied on Draper in stating that a reasonable inference could be drawn from such detailed information that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.2
The informant’s statement in this case is just as persuasive as in Draper. Likewise the corroboration in this case is just as convincing as in Draper, especially in view of Hoven’s reputation. The corroboration through observation and by other matters within the officer’s knowledge justified an inference that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. First, the informant specifically identified Hoven by name and Hoven was known by the St. Cloud police. Second, the informant told the police that Hoven would be driving a pickup truck with Iowa plates and would be obtaining drugs at either of two locations on the west side of St. Cloud. Although the record does not reveal whether the informant specifically identified either location, the officer dispatched to locate Hoven observed a truck bearing Iowa license plates in front of the residence of another person whose name had come up in connection with drug activity. When the police officer located the truck, he ran a license check which revealed that the truck was registered to a salvage operation in Iowa. Because the police officer had prior knowledge that Hoven was associated with a salvage yard in Iowa, he placed the truck under surveillance. The officer then observed someone get in the truck and drive away. The officer followed the truck and visually identified the driver as Hoven. It was not until this point that the police had corroborated the informant’s statement that Hoven was in St. Cloud, that he would be driving a pickup truck bearing Iowa license plates, and that he would be leaving for Iowa that day. As in Draper, supra, the police had personally verified every facet of information given by the informant except whether Hoven “had accomplished his mission.” The informant’s statement being fully corroborated, the police had probable cause to arrest Hoven.
Implicit in the majority opinion, however, is the suggestion that the police had probable cause at an earlier time and should have obtained a warrant either before attempting to locate the truck or after placing it under surveillance. I strongly disagree. Prior to locating the truck the police did not have sufficient information to establish probable cause. The only information they had was that supplied by the informant’s tip and Hoven’s reputation. The infor*857mant’s tip, however, would not have supported an application for a search warrant because the tip contained no statement of the underlying facts and circumstances from which a judge might conclude that the informant had obtained his information in a reliable manner. See Aguilar-Spinelli, supra. Clearly, reputation evidence would not cure this defect.
Nor were the police after having located the truck unreasonable in setting up surveillance. Prior to identifying Hoven the police had not yet corroborated a critical element of the informant’s tip — that Hoven was the driver of the truck. Absent Ho-ven’s identification the nexus between Ho-ven and the contraband was missing. Although it could be argued that there was sufficient corroboration of the informant’s tip which, together with evidence of Ho-ven’s reputation, would have supported an application for a search warrant, I cannot fault the police for maintaining surveillance until the informant’s tip was fully corroborated.3 “* * * [Pjrobable cause is not to be evaluated from a remote vantage point of a library, but rather from the viewpoint of a prudent and cautious police officer on the scene * * *State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 264, 121 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1963). Clearly, when Hoven drove the truck away the police had probable cause to arrest him and seize the truck and search it apart from the traffic warrants.
Because probable cause culminated when Hoven was driving away, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to dispense with the warrant requirement. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). Here the police had probable cause to believe the truck was being used at the time of the arrest for an unlawful purpose — to carry drugs. See United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8 Cir. 1973). Therefore, the police not only had an independent basis for Hoven’s arrest, but also, because of the exigent circumstances surrounding the arrest and seizure, could have searched Hoven’s truck at the scene for evidence of the crime.4 Therefore a subsequent war-rantless search at the impoundment garage also would have been proper. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, supra. The fact that the police chose instead to seize the truck is not constitutionally significant. Id. In any event the police were lawfully in a position to observe the marijuana in the back of the truck. It therefore follows that its seizure was lawful and that it was properly admitted into evidence.
The marijuana so observed and seized also played another role in that Hoven, upon being confronted with the marijuana, “consented” to a further search of the truck. But because of the lawfulness of the seizure, defendant’s consent was not the product of, or compelled by, the circumstances surrounding an illegal arrest, but instead was the product of a lawful arrest. Therefore the question is not whether Ho-ven’s consent was tainted by the illegal arrest but whether, under all the facts and circumstances, Hoven’s consent was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). I believe that the state has met its burden in proving that Hoven’s consent was freely and voluntarily given. Hoven consented to the search after being informed by the police that they intended to secure a search *858warrant. During this same conversation the police informed Hoven that he had a right to remain silent, that he had a right to discuss the matter with an attorney, and that he had a right to refuse a consensual search. Notwithstanding those admonitions, Hoven signed a voluntary consent form and thereafter directed the police to the location of additional contraband in the truck. I therefore conclude that the contraband seized was properly admitted into evidence and would affirm Hoven’s conviction.
I cannot help but add some further comments. Nothing in the record supports the inference drawn by the majority opinion that the police engaged in a deliberate attempt to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. After Hoven’s initial arrest, the arresting officer requested, and was given, permission to search Hoven’s truck. When the officer began to open a suitcase, Hoven withdrew his consent, whereupon the officer immediately stopped the search. Before the search was actually conducted the police made sure that Hoven understood his right to refuse to consent, even to the point of trying to dissuade him from consenting, before they proceeded to search the truck without a warrant. I am at a loss to understand how such police conduct can be interpreted as an attempt to conduct an “otherwise illegal search.”
I am more troubled, however, by the majority opinion’s characterization of the “arrest” pursuant to the traffic warrants as pretextual. The warrants were issued before the police were informed of Hoven’s suspected activity which led to his arrest. In addition the police were informed that Hoven was leaving town that day. Under these circumstances the police had a duty to arrest Hoven pursuant to the outstanding arrest warrants. Had Hoven been a private citizen suspected of no other illegal activity, the police could have effected a custodial arrest and conducted a limited search of Hoven’s person. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). The police also might have impounded the truck and inventoried its contents. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); City of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 218 N.W.2d 697 (1976). Yet as I understand the majority opinion would impose greater burdens on the police when they are dealing with suspected felons than with other citizens.
I would affirm the trial court.
PETERSON, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice KELLY.
SCOTT, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice KELLY.
OTIS, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice KELLY.

. The trial court did not rule on the state’s alternative ground for the arrest. Instead, the court assumed the arrest pursuant to the invalid traffic warrants was unlawful but concluded that Hoven’s “consent” to the search of his vehicle was voluntary.

. It could be argued that the Spinelli Court’s treatment of Draper limited the applicability of police corroboration of the details of information supplied by an informant to the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, i. e., whether the informant was credible. See Mr. Justice White’s concurring opinion in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 423, 427-29, 89 S.Ct. 584; McCarr, Minnesota Practice, § 120. I agree with then Judge Blackmun, now Mr. Justice Blackmun, that Draper retains its viability. See United States v. Mitchell, 425 F.2d 1353 (8 Cir. 1970). Accord, United States v. Young, 567 F.2d 799 (8 Cir. 1977).

. Even assuming, arguendo, that the police had probable cause to arrest Hoven, it would not follow that the failure to obtain a warrant invalidates any subsequent seizure: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant is not obtained at the first practical moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the «time of the arrest. [Citations omitted.] The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation’s necessitating prompt police action.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2472, 41 L.Ed.2d 325, 338 (1974) (plurality opinion).

. “The existence of exigent circumstances is determined as of the time of seizure rather than as of the time of [the] search.” United States v. Young, supra, 567 F.2d at 802.