Court Opinion

ID: 9678263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:15:12.897406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:03.070956
License: Public Domain

GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion regarding its analysis of Mar-low Johnson’s (hereinafter, “Johnson”) Batson challenge. I would vote to reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the first *386point on appeal and grant Johnson a new trial.
In his first point on appeal, Johnson alleges the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State’s peremptory strike of Venireperson Lockhart, an African-American. Johnson believes the State’s strike was motivated by race and thereby denied Venireperson Lockhart’s right to equal protection under the law. Johnson argues the State mischaracterized Venireperson Lockhart’s response, there were similarly situated white venireper-sons selected for the jury panel, and the State used five of its six peremptory strikes to strike African-Americans.
“Under the Equal Protection Clause, a party may not exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror solely on the basis of the juror’s gender, ethnic origin, or race.” State v. Hampton, 163 S.W.3d 903, 904 (Mo. banc 2005')(quoting State v. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Mo. banc 2002)). Missouri courts employ a three-step process to resolve a Batson challenge. “First, the defendant must raise a Batson challenge with regard to one or more specific venirepersons struck by the [Sjtate and identify the cognizable racial group to which the venireperson or persons belong.” Hampton, 163 S.W.3d at 904 (quoting Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468; State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992)). Second, the party making the peremptory strike must articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. This explanation “is deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, and if it would result in a disproportionate removal of minority venirepersons.” State v. Hopkins, 140 S.W.3d 143, 148 (Mo.App. E.D. 2004). In the third step, “the defendant must demonstrate the [S]tate’s proffered reasons were merely pretextual and that the strike was racially motivated.” State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 712 (Mo. banc 2004).
This Court will reverse the trial court’s determination on a Batson challenge only upon a showing of clear error. State v. Williams, 159 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Mo.App. S.D.2005); State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo. banc 1998). “A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 651.
The majority’s opinion rests upon the Western District’s opinion in State v. Bass, 81 S.W.3d 595 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). However, the underlying facts of Bass do not correspond to the instant case, and I believe the majority’s rebanee on Bass is misplaced. In Bass, the “record reflected] that the appellant did not raise ... the issue [to the trial court] of whether [the venireperson] had actually given the voir dire response relied upon by the State for its strike.” Bass, 81 S.W.3d at 611. There was no uncertainty from the record in Bass “that both the prosecutor and the appellant’s trial counsel believed that [the venireperson] had answered affirmatively when asked whether she had faced any problems with her children that she could not solve.” Id. Both the prosecutor and appellant’s counsel were arguing under the same mistaken impressions regarding the venireperson’s answers. The issue of mistake as to the venireperson’s answers was neither discussed nor resolved. Since the appellant failed to lay the foundation for a finding of pretext, she was not allowed to challenge the State’s explanation on appeal. Id. This fact pattern is not analogous to the one at bar.
In this case, the State used five of its six peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans. The majority refers to the fact that the racial composition of the entire panel and selected jury is unclear from *387the record, using a statement from the State’s brief to buttress its position. Since the racial composition of the venirepanel and selected jury is not borne out by the record, it is improper to rely upon one of the advocates’ briefs alone for accurate information regarding a contested issue. The record does reveal that after defense counsel made his Batson challenge, the State was able to readily identify twelve Caucasian venirepersons who were available to strike but who were not stricken.
The majority opinion argues Johnson’s claim of pretext in his Batson challenge should not be reviewed because it was not raised in his motion for new trial. I disagree. Johnson’s motion for new trial states, “The [trial court] further erred in overruling [Johnson’s] Batson challenges to the State[’s] peremptory strikes of ... [Venireperson] Lockhart 452 in that the strikes were racially and gender motivated. The State’s reasons were pretextual. This violated the equal protection rights of the jurors to serve on a jury.” Clearly, Johnson preserved his argument that the State’s reasons were pretextual by raising it in his motion for new trial. I would find the trial court erred in not analyzing the issue of pretext. Such analysis should have included a review of the court reporter’s transcript. In this case, such review would have revealed the comments the State attributed to Venireperson Lockhart were in fact attributable to another venire-person.
There are four factors to consider when determining whether the State’s proffered reasons were pretextual. “The first factor is the presence of ‘similarly situated white jurors who were not struck.’ ” Id. (quoting Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468).1 This factor is crucial in determining pretext. Id. The record reveals the State failed to strike two white jurors: (1) one of whom was dissatisfied with the police’s actions after crimes with his home and car and held the belief that he would hold the State to a higher burden of proof in an accomplice case, and (2) the other held a long criminal record. According to the State’s mistaken impressions about Veni-reperson Lockhart, she was dissatisfied with the police’s actions on her case and the police “bungled” her case. Therefore, from the State’s perspective of striking similarly situated venirepersons, the State passed over two similarly situated white venirepersons to peremptorily strike Veni-reperson Lockhart.
The second factor in determining pretext is the “degree of logical relevance between the proffered explanation and the case to be tried.” Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d at 468. The State chose to strike Venireper-son Lockhart even though it appears she would have been a strong juror for the State. Venireperson Lockhart’s car was stolen and recovered by the police. She did not state any dissatisfaction with the police nor was her questioning extensive by either attorney; she had no responses to their questions, inter alia, regarding dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, whether a friend or family member had been arrested, or having negative feelings toward police officers. When presenting its race-neutral reasons for striking Venireperson Lockhart, the State misrepresented her comments. Defense counsel objected, attempting to correct the *388record. At this point, the State countered with additional comments attributed to Venireperson Lockhart which were actually comments made by another member of the venire panel.
The peremptory challenge brings up a tension between two of a prosecuting attorney’s ethical duties — the duty zealously to represent the client and the duty to seek justice, not merely to convict. If the enforcement of Batson is lax, then it is fairly easy for the prosecuting attorney to let the duty zealously to represent the client override the duty to seek justice. Preventing racial discrimination in jury selection is part of seeing that justice is done. But this part of justice may not be done where the prosecutor believes that justice requires conviction of the defendant, although this belief should not trump other ethical norms.
Smulls v. State, 71 S.W.3d 138, 159 (Mo. banc 2002)(Wolff, J., concurring). In this instance, I believe clearly the trial court erred in its agreement to the State’s comments.2
The third factor is “the prosecutor’s credibility based on his or her demeanor or statements during voir dire and the court’s past experiences with that prosecutor.” Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 712. The State’s explanation for preemptively striking Venireperson Lockhart was her flippant attitude toward the police. Further, the State conceded that its notes during voir dire are not always accurate in that there are times he would write down that a venireperson was a participant in a crime rather than a victim.
The final factor in determining pretext “is the demeanor of the excluded venire-person.” Id. “The nature of peremptory strikes is necessarily subjective, and where the evidence before a court is amenable to two competing views, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 659 (Limbaugh, Jr., J., dissenting). However, while falling within the trial court’s province to determine fact issues before it, it is clear from the record, in this instance, that the State was mistaken regarding which venirepersons stated they did not like the police.
“[I]t suffices to say that racial profiling, while not exactly invented by trial lawyers, is alive and well in the jury selection process .... Once the civil rights movement resulted in elimination of Jim Crow laws enforcing segregation ... the peremptory challenge continued to serve as an efficient final racial filter to ensure all-white juries.” Smulls, 71 S.W.3d at 158 (Wolfe, J., concurring). “[C]ourts should also review more closely attempts to justify peremptory strikes based upon vague references to a venireperson’s attire, demeanor, and similar attributes.” State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 550 (Mo. banc 2003)(Teitelman, J., concurring). Many times these characteristics merely expose a venireper-son to be peremptorily stricken for his or her race rather than his or her ability to serve as a juror. Id.
We do not believe, however, that Batson is satisfied by “neutral explanations” which are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear. Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless. It would take little effort *389for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote “neutral explanations” which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive. We do not believe the Supreme Court intended a charade when it announced Batson.
State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. banc 1987). Batson protections would be rendered illusory if neutral explanations or explanations with a vague reference to a venireperson’s demeanor routinely are deemed sufficient. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 550.
Further, in cases such as this, an improper strike infringes upon the right of the venireperson to perform his or her civic duty of sitting on a jury. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Davis, 835 S.W.2d 525 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992); State v. Camden, 837 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.App. W.D.1992). The proper remedy is “to quash the strikes and permit those members of the venire stricken for discriminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they otherwise would.” State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. banc 1993). “This remedy vindicates the equal protection rights both of the accused and the stricken venireperson.” State v. Hampton, 163 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Mo. banc 2005).
“In evaluating a Batson challenge, the trial court’s ‘chief consideration should be the plausibility of the prosecutor’s explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Mo. banc 2006)(quoting Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939). In light of the totality of the facts and circumstances in this case, I believe the State’s peremptory challenge was in error. “The survival of [the peremptory strike] procedure in a constitutionally permissible manner need be neither offensive nor unduly burdensome to our courts and lawyers. Whatever complications that may result are a small price to make citizen participation in our judicial process free from the taint of racial, gender-based, religious, or ethnic discrimination.” Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 942 (Price, J., concurring).
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The majority notes Johnson did not raise the argument that similarly situated white venire-persons were not struck by the State in his brief and thereby declined to address this issue. However, the majority fails to comprehend the complete Batson analysis. In analyzing whether the State’s proffered reasons for a peremptory strike are pretextual, our Court must engage in a four factor scrutiny of the proffered reasons, one of which is whether similarly situated white venirepersons were struck.

. This has further implications than just the instant case. The majority opinion states this Court must defer to the trial court’s decision regarding demeanor even when the State argues the demeanor of another venireperson rather than the venireperson at issue. This effectively would allow the State to mislead the trial court regarding a venireperson’s answers to skirt the effectiveness and rationale of Batson.