Court Opinion

ID: 9670457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:20:56.846471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.654875
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion, on the strength of section 60-435, R. R. S. 1943, now holds that a law enforcement officer, when in uniform, may stop any motorist at random at any time and at any place on the public highways, streets, or roads of the State of Nebraska without any articulable reason to suspect that he has violated any law, but simply for the avowed purpose of checking his operator’s license and vehicle registration. That holding emasculates the constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment guaranties against unreasonable search and seizure and for all practical purposes repeals the Fourth Amendment by statutory fiat. The mere pronouncement of the magic words “I wanted to check the registration and driver’s license” becomes the “open sesame” which removes all constitutional barriers to a random investigative stop of any motor vehicle at any time, any place, at the arbitrary whim of any police officer.
In the case at bar the officer’s reason to make the stop was solely to check the operator’s license, vehicle registration, and identification number. He had no other reason and there were no facts or circumstances which would justify any reasonable suspicion of the violation of any law. The majority opinion relies upon cases *349which are cited as holding that a police officer may stop an automobile for a spot check of driver’s license and car registration without any articulable suspicion that any law is being violated, or that either of such documents is invalid. Of the cases cited only that of Palmore v. United States, 290 A. 2d 573, on its facts supports such a conclusion. That case rests its holding that such a seizure is reasonable on the ground that the community has an interest in limiting the use of its highways to licensed drivers in registered automobiles. The community has an even greater interest in protecting itself against far more serious crimes but such a justification has not previously been sufficient to override the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.
On the other hand, many more cases, indirectly referred to in the majority opinion, have held such an investigatory stop to be unreasonable and arbitrary when there is no articulable reason to suspect a violation of any law. Such cases are not only more numerous, but far more persuasive. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A. 2d 875 (1973). In that case a statute also granted the right to stop a vehicle for the purpose of inspection in even broader terms than the Nebraska statute. The Pennsylvania court specifically held that the right of an individual to be free from government intrusions without apparent reason outweighed the interest of the public in insuring safety on the highways. The Pennsylvania court said: “The crux of our decision that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, goes to the Commonwealth’s argument the police need no justification to stop the vehicle. We rule before the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion. To hold otherwise would be to give the police absolute, unreviewable discretion, and authority to intrude into an individual’s life for no cause whatsoever.”
*350The Nebraska statute itself has been previously interpreted by the United States District Court for Nebraska to mean that there must be some founded grounds which draw or attract the attention of an officer to a possible violation of law. See United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D.C. Neb., 1974). Although the United States court in that case deferred from ruling bn the constitutionality of section 60-435, R. R. S. 1943, pending a determination of the issue by this court en banc, the court did say: “This Court, in considering future cases, will narrowly construe such a statute to- the extent that there must be a founded and reasonable suspicion drawing an officer’s attention in order for him to pursue a selective stop which infringes, intrudes, or molests an individual’s expectation of privacy guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.” The United States District Court also said: “It is intolerable and unreasonable to allow or authorize a police officer to stop any vehicle on a pretext or in a selective manner through the utilization of a state driver’s license statute or motor vehicle registration or safety statute, on the chance that such officer might perceive illegal activity; such an inconvenience and indignity is not outweighed by an overriding governmental interest.” It should be noted here that that case involved the same Officer Compton who is involved in this case.
No matter what views may be held on the subject of whether or not a motorist can be stopped at random for investigation of his driver’s license and registration without any reason to suspect that he has violated any law, the issue was foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court on June 30, 1975, in the case of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 43 Law Week 5028 (June 24, 1975). 422 U. S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607. Syllabus (b) of that case specifically holds: “To allow roving patrols the broad and unlimited discretion urged by the Government to stop all vehicles in the border area without any reason to suspect that they *351have violated any law, would not be ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”
That case involved a roving patrol stop of an automobile by the border patrol to question the occupants about their citizenship and immigration status. The stop was at a point approximately 65 miles north of the Mexican border. The only reason for stopping the automobile was that its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The stopping of cars without warrants in the particular area was authorized under federal statutes and current regulations of the border patrol. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that no act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution, and that an investigative stop that involves only a brief detention short of traditional arrest constitutes a seizure which must be “reasonable.” “As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.”
The Supreme Court held that because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke the suspicion. The court specifically reiterated that the stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.”
It seems patently clear that the thrust of the Supreme Court opinion is directed at random stops of a single vehicle which are made without any reason to suspect that the motorist has violated any law. The court said: “To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular *352vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. * * * Thus, if we approved the Government’s position in this case, Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they have violated any law.
“We are not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement require this degree of interference with lawful traffic.”
The majority opinion of this court was written prior to the release of the Brignoni-Ponce case but has been reaffirmed subsequent to that decision upon the ground that footnote 8 in Brignoni-Ponce states: “Our decision thus does not imply that state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding driver’s licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters.”
It seems only logical that the type of investigative stop referred to in that footnote is a fixed point or checkpoint stop and not an indiscriminate random stop of a single vehicle without reasonable suspicion. The concurrence of Mr. Justice Rehnquist and the concurrence of Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun joins, confirm that conclusion.
There is simply no logical definitive way to distinguish between the stop of an automobile made for the purpose of determining whether driver’s license and vehicular registration laws have been violated, and a stop to determine whether the laws governing entry and transportation of aliens have been violated. If any distinction can be made, it might be said that the governmental interest and the public interest in the enforcement of *353alien entry laws is greater than interest in the proper registration and licensing of vehicles and drivers.
As the Supreme Court said in Brignoni-Ponce with respect to seizures of the person involving only a brief detention short of traditional arrest, ‘ the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” It seems transparently clear that an indiscriminate random stop of a single motor vehicle without any ground for reasonable suspicion of any law violation, which can be made at the whim of any law officer, is an arbitrary interference with an individual’s right to personal security and is unreasonable within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. The initial seizure here being unconstitutional, the motion to suppress should have been granted.