Court Opinion

ID: 9703497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:58:58.341365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.568616
License: Public Domain

*471PASHMAN, J.,
dissenting.
In holding the appellants’ application improper, the majority has misconstrued the scope of proceedings under N.J.S.A. 1:7—1 et seq. I therefore respectfully dissent.
N.J.S.A. 1:7—1 et seq. provides a special procedure for challenging a statute on the ground that it “was not duly passed by both houses of the Legislature, or approved by the Governor or otherwise made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution.” N.J.S.A. 1:7-1. The Attorney General or two or more citizens of the State may apply to the Appellate Division of Superior Court for an adjudication of these narrow procedural issues. N.J.S.A. 1:7-1, -4. It is well settled that the claims which may be brought in such proceedings are limited to “the machinery of enactment”: passage by the Legislature, approval by the Governor, and completion of any other steps “required by the Constitution.” In re Freygang, 46 N.J.Super. 14, 17 (App.Div.1957), aff’d 25 N.J. 357 (1957); see In re Application of Lamb, 67 N.J.Super. 39 (App.Div.1961), aff’d 34 N.J. 448 (1961); In re Application of McGlynn, 58 N.J.Super. 1, 13 (App.Div.1959); In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 130 N.J.L. 123, 124 (Sup.Ct.1943); In re Borg, 123 N.J.L. 104, 106 (Sup.Ct.1939). If the court finds that a law has not been duly enacted, the Governor is required to issue a proclamation of nullity which is “filed, published and printed with the laws” and must be “judicially noticed and received in evidence in all courts * *.” N.J.S.A. 1:7-6.
Appellants’ application to the Appellate Division states that Chapter 84, Laws of 1977, N.J.S.A. 56:10-13 to -15, was not enacted in conformity with constitutional requirements. They assert that the law, “by virtue of [its] restrictive content[,] * * constitutes private or special legislation.” Since the public notice constitutionally required of proposed private or special legislation, see N.J.Const. (1947) Art. IV, § 7, par. 8, was not given, the applicants claim that the law is void. The Attorney *472General contends that his “concession” that Chapter 84 was not enacted as special legislation precludes the Appellate Division from exercising jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1.
The character of the legislation determines the proper procedures for its enactment. If a bill is designed to raise revenue, it must originate in the General Assembly. N.J.Const. (1947) Art. IV, § 6, par. 1. Special laws regulating the internal affairs of a municipality or county require a local petition before legislative passage. N.J.Const. (1947) Art. IV, § 7, par. 10. All special legislation—including Chapter 84, according to appellants—requires prior “public notice of the intention to apply therefor, and of the general object thereof” to be given in a manner specified by statute. N.J.Const. (1947) Art. IV, § 7, par. 8; see N.J.S.A. 1:6-1 et seq.
Since the constitutional “machinery of enactment” differs according to whether the legislation is special or general, the Appellate Division must determine the category in which Chapter 84 belongs before considering whether it was “made effective as law in the manner required by the Constitution,” N.J. S.A. 1:7-1. The Attorney General has acknowledged that the law was not enacted with the additional procedures required for special legislation. This concession becomes pertinent, however, only if the Appellate Division, looking beyond “the nomenclature adopted by the Legislature,” In re Freygang, 25 N.J. at 358, finds those procedures to have been necessary in this case. If it so holds, it must declare the law to be void. N.J.S.A. 1:7-3.
The majority recognizes that in 1:7-1 proceedings, courts have found it necessary to consider whether legislation is special or general to determine whether proper enactment procedures were followed. Ante at 469; see In re Freygang, supra; In re Miller, 122 N.J.L. 176 (Sup.Ct.1939). It attempts to distinguish those decisions by describing appellants’ contention, that Chapter 84 is a special law, as the “only question” left “standing alone” in the case. Ante at 467.
*473Contrary to the majority’s view, this claim does not stand alone. It accompanies appellants’ uncontested assertion that the procedures for enacting a special law were not followed. The fact that the Attorney General has chosen not to dispute this latter allegation does not alter the essential nature of appellants’ attack. The challenge clearly addresses “the procedure of making laws,” In re Application of McGlynn, 58 N.J.Super. at 13, and is therefore within the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction. Nothing in the statute itself or prior caselaw requires that the issues raised in an application be contested. See N.J.S.A. 1:7—4 (“[T]he Attorney General may * * * defend on behalf of the State.” (emphasis added)); In re Jaegle, 83 N.J.L. 313 (Sup.Ct.1912) (petition unopposed).
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Freygang and Miller is completely unpersuasive. In both cases, as here, the alleged failure to comply with notice requirements applicable to special laws was not in dispute. Freygang, 46 N.J.Super. at 19. (“It is not denied that many of the municipalities failed to comply with these requirements [for passage of a special law].”); Miller, 122 N.J.L. at 178 (“[I]t is stipulated * * * by the Assistant Attorney-General * * * that notice of intention to ‘apply for the passage of’ [the special law] had not been served * *.”). Yet in both cases, the courts proceeded to a determination on the merits. Nothing less should occur here.
Simply stated, appellants contend that the “machinery of enactment” actually employed was not that which should have been employed. Therefore, although there is no dispute regarding how the statute was enacted, the Appellate Division must determine what should have occurred, and rule accordingly. Relying on neither logic nor precedent, however, the majority has disregarded the Legislature’s intention that the Appellate Division provide direct, expeditious review of the enactment process free from the traditional requirements of standing. See N.J.S.A. 1:7-2, -3, -5 & -6. I would hold that appellants are *474entitled to proceed under N.J.S.A. 1:7-1 et seq. and would therefore vacate the Appellate Division’s dismissal of their application.
Justice SCHREIBER joins in this dissenting opinion.
For vacation and transfer—Justices SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD and POLLOCK—3.
For vacation—Justices PASHM AN and SCHREIBER—2.