Court Opinion

ID: 9931176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:00:56.277174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:19.959359
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          FEB 8 2024
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD TERRAN FURNACE,                           No.     21-16985

                Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No.
                                                 1:16-cv-00420-DAD-BAM
  v.

B. COPE, Kern Valley State Prison; et al.,       MEMORANDUM*

                Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                     Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 8, 2024 **

Before: D.W. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

       Plaintiff Edward Furnace appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal with

prejudice of his First Amendment, equal protection, and due process claims. We

dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

       “The courts of appeals . . . have jurisdiction of appeals from all final

       *     This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Because “a ‘final decision’ is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits,’” a

“district court order is therefore not appealable unless it disposes of all claims as to

all parties . . . .” Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d

738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,

467 (1978)).

      Here, the district court dismissed all but one of Furnace’s claims with

prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district

court allowed the case to proceed solely with respect to Furnace’s unrelated

excessive force claim. Furnace then voluntarily dismissed that excessive force

claim without prejudice and filed this appeal.

      Although voluntary dismissals without prejudice ordinarily do not create

appealable final judgments, we held in James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc. that “when

a party that has suffered an adverse partial judgment subsequently dismisses

remaining claims without prejudice with the approval of the district court, and the

record reveals no evidence of intent to manipulate our appellate jurisdiction,” the

district court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss “is final and appealable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the

James exception does not apply where there is clear evidence of the parties’

attempt to “to create jurisdiction over an essentially interlocutory appeal.” Id. at

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1069; see also Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.

2003).

      The James exception does not apply in this case because there is clear

evidence of Furnace’s attempt to create jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal.

In his response to this court’s order to show cause regarding why this appeal

should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Furnace argues that “the District

Court’s dismissal gave him permission to file an interlocutory appeal” before this

court. Furnace contends that, if this court denies his response to show cause, he

“request[s] that the case be remanded to the Eastern District Court, reasserting the

[excessive force] claim [voluntarily] dismissed and returning jurisdiction there for

purposes of trial.” Furnace’s response makes clear that this is an overt attempt to

create jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal. We therefore lack appellate

jurisdiction.

      Furnace’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal (Dkt. 31) is

DENIED. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

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