Court Opinion

ID: 9633028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:31:43.341129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:27.308632
License: Public Domain

Andersen, C.J.
(concurring in the result) — I write separately because I believe the majority opinion’s interpretation of "mental incapacity”, as that term is used in RCW 9A.44.010(4), is unnecessarily broad.
Rape in the second degree may occur when a person engages in sexual intercourse with another when "the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being . . . mentally incapacitated”. RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b). The statute then defines "mental incapacity” as
that condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the influence of a substance or from some other cause.
RCW 9A.44.010(4).
The majority would have the trial court "bear in mind” a number of factors which are purportedly relevant in determining whether an allegedly disabled victim has a meaningful understanding of the nature and consequences of the act. of sexual intercourse.
*718In the majority’s view, these factors would be reviewed when determining whether a victim has a condition which prevents understanding of the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse.
Thus, the trial court must decide the extent of the victim’s understanding of the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse in order to determine whether the victim has a condition which prevents such an understanding. This is circular reasoning.
I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it can be interpreted to require a trial court to conduct an in-depth review of the level of an allegedly disabled victim’s understanding of the emotional impact that sexual intimacy can cause, of the possibility that such intimacy may have an effect on existing relationships, and of the extent of the victim’s knowledge of the "specter of disease and even death” associated with the possibility of pregnancy. Majority, at 712. To my view this "evaluation” is unwarranted under the facts of this case.
It is unnecessary in this case to construe the act as broadly as the majority does, for it is clear from the evidence presented to the jury, see majority, at 714-16, that the victim in this case suffered from a mental condition that prevented her "from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse”. RCW 9A.44.010(4).
Brachtenbach and Durham, JJ., concur with Andersen, C.J.