Court Opinion

ID: 9846490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:42:16.84098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:35.245350
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion refusing to enforce the Board of Medical Examiners’ (the Board’s) administrative subpoena. The subpoena sought records from a physician, S. Crawford Duhon, regarding his use of a device referred to as “INTERRO.” I would find that, based on the documentary evidence in the record, the Board had authority under the statute to issue the subpoena in this case. I also disagree with the majority’s holding that it is necessary to remand the case to the trial court in order to determine whether the subpoena constituted a reasonable seizure under our decision in Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980). I would find that the subpoena is enforceable against Du-hon.
Section 12-36-104, entitled “Powers and duties of board,” allows the Board to issue subpoenas that are enforceable by the district court only “in connection with any investigation (whether before or after a formal complaint is filed pursuant to section 12-36-118) or hearing.” § 12-36-104(l)(b) (parenthetical material in original). Section 12-36-118 prescribes the disciplinary procedures to be followed by the Board. Thus, the plain language of the statute links the authority to issue subpoenas under section 12-36-104 to investigations performed in conjunction with the disciplinary functions of the board under section 12-36-118 and expressly permits an administrative subpoena to be issued before or after a formal complaint is filed.
Under section 12-36-118, an informal process precedes filing of a formal complaint. This informal process is triggered when the Board or an outside individual initiates a written complaint, section 12-36-118(4)(a), or when the Board has been notified that disciplinary actions have been taken against a physician by a hospital or pursuant to professional review; when a medical malpractice judgment or settlement has been entered against a physician; or when a physician has resigned from a hospital for medical misconduct. § 12-36-118(4)(b)(I) to -(IV).
Once a written complaint has been filed, the Board is required to notify the physician of the complaint by certified mail and then to assign the case to an inquiry panel for “investigation” after the physician has had twenty days to respond. § 12-36-118(4)(a).10 When this investigation is complete, the Board determines whether a formal complaint should be filed. § 12-36-118(4)(c).
*151The case before us has not proceeded beyond the informal stage because Duhon challenged the Board’s subpoena before a determination to file a formal complaint was made. The record reveals that the Board’s subpoena was issued in full compliance with the procedures prescribed by section 12-36-118(4)(a) for investigation prior to the filing of a formal complaint. The Board initiated a written complaint against Duhon based on his use of the INTERRO device. Duhon received notification of the Board-initiated complaint on July 26, 1990, he responded to the complaint in a letter dated October 1, 1990, and the Board’s subpoena was issued on November 14, 1991. The Board was thus authorized to issue the subpoena pursuant to section 12-36-104.
Because I would find that the Board had statutory authority to issue the subpoena under the facts of this case, I would decline to address whether the Board has either statutory or inherent authority to issue subpoenas at any other time and I express no opinion concerning the majority’s identification of other circumstances in which the Board is authorized to issue subpoenas.
In addition to asserting that the Board’s subpoena was unauthorized under section 12-36-104(a)(l), Duhon also contends that the subpoena constituted an unreasonable seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals found that it could not rule on this issue “without a copy of the written complaint” and remanded to the trial court. The majority affirms the court of appeals ruling. I disagree with the majority that remand is necessary to decide this issue.11
An appellate court is as competent as a trial court to review documentary evidence and to apply the law thereto. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Municipal Subdistrict, 198 Colo. 352, 355, 610 P.2d 81, 83 (1979). In this case, the notice sent to Duhon is the written complaint and both the subpoena issued by the Board and the complaint received by Duhon are part of the record.12 This documentary evidence clearly demonstrates that the subpoena met the Charnes requirements.
In Charnes, we adopted the test set out by the Supreme Court to determine when an administrative agency’s subpoena of records is a reasonable seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. We held that:
an administrative agency’s seizure of records is a reasonable seizure if (1) the investigation is for a lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information sought is relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the subpoena is sufficiently specific to obtain documents which are adequate but not excessive for the inquiry.
612 P.2d 1117, 1122 (citing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946)).
Under section 12-36-118(5), the Board is authorized to discipline physicians for unprofessional conduct. As relevant here, “unprofessional conduct” is defined as:
An act or omission constituting grossly negligent medical practice or two or more acts or omissions which fail to meet generally accepted standards of medical practice, whether the two or more acts or omissions occur during a single treatment *152of one patient, during the course of treatment of one patient, or during the treatment of more than one patient.
§ 12-36-117(l)(p). In this case, the notice of complaint supplied to Duhon specified that Duhon’s use of the INTERRO device was under investigation because “use of the IN-TERRO as a diagnostic device without confirmation of test results by another, medically established product or procedure constitutes substandard care and subjects the license holder to disciplinary action.” Therefore, a subpoena was issued for a “lawfully authorized purpose” because it sought information concerning whether Duhon’s methods of diagnosing and treating patients met these generally accepted standards of medical practice.
Furthermore, the information requested by the subpoena was relevant to this inquiry. The subpoena requested:
The complete office records for all patients in which the INTERRO device was used as a diagnostic tool by Dr. S. Crawford Duhon, MD, for the time frame of January 1, 1991 through November 13, 1991.
Patient files are relevant to determining whether a physician’s methods meet generally accepted standards because they document those procedures and methods utilized by the physician.
I would find that the subpoena also was sufficiently specific to meet the final prong of the test. In order to assess the use of the INTERRO device by Duhon, the Board needed documentation concerning its use. The subpoena did not ask for all of Duhon’s files, nor did it ask for the files of all patients for which he had utilized the device. Instead, it targeted only documents concerning recent use of the INTERRO device. It is difficult to imagine how the documents requested in the subpoena could be more closely tailored to the scope of the inquiry.
Under this analysis, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the district court order enforcing the Board’s subpoena.
ROVIRA, C.J., and VOLLACK, J., join in the dissent.

. Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, I do not read the statute to require a response by the physician before the Board may initiate an investigation pursuant to § 12-36-118(4)(b). Seemaj. op. at-.

. The majority remands the case for determination of whether the Board referred the case to an inquiry panel prior to issuing the subpoena as required under section 12 — 36—118(4)(a) and whether the subpoena satisfied the Charms criteria based on the contents of the complaint. Maj. op. at-. Absent any evidence to the contrary, agencies are presumed to have regularly pursued their authority. People v. Gallegos, 692 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Colo.1984). With respect to the Board's compliance with subsection (4)(a), Du-hon has not rebutted this presumption by introducing any evidence that the Board failed to refer his case to an inquiry panel. Accordingly, Duhon did not raise a material issue of fact for determination by the trial court on this question.

. As the Board points, out the notice and the written complaint in this case are one and the same. Section 12-36-118(4)(a) does not require that the written complaint and the notice of the complaint be two separate documents. If the complaint had come from a third party, two documents would have been produced: the written complaint filed with the Board and the Board's notice forwarding the complaint to the physician. In this case, the complaint was Board-initiated, so a written complaint separate from the notice was not necessary.