Court Opinion

ID: 9567526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:58.374618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:39.244624
License: Public Domain

FROEB, Judge,
specially concurring:
A fundamental question concerning the controlling effect of decisions of this court is raised by Judge Wren which compels me to address the subject in a separate concurring opinion because of its importance.
In Judge Wren’s opinion, if there are conflicting decisions between departments of the court of appeals, both decisions remain the law since one department may not overrule another. The Scott and Jordan cases discussed in the majority and concurring decisions of this case are examples. I disagree with Judge Wren’s conclusion and would hold that a later decision overrules an earlier decision. Accord, Mattis & Ya-lowitz, Stare Decisis Among [Sic] the Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DePaul L.R. 571 passim (1979). In my opinion this must be the result if decisions interpreting the law of Arizona in this court are to have any effect whatsoever in declaring the law and providing guiding precedents for the superi- or courts and the citizenry of Arizona.
Recognizing that the Arizona Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law in Arizona, the court of appeals nevertheless has the duty and responsibility of declaring the law in Arizona in the absence of supreme court precedent. A great percentage of cases in this court are not reviewed by the supreme court and therefore reflect the declared law of Arizona by which trial courts, lawyers, and the citizenry are guided. In my opinion, this institutional function is rendered meaningless, even chaotic, if the last decision on a legal issue does not overrule an earlier conflicting decision.
The thesis which apparently is at the bottom of Judge Wren’s conclusion is that judges of the court of appeals exert equal authority in rendering decisions and therefore three judges in one department cannot overrule the decision of three judges in another department. I disagree. While it is true that the judges of the court of appeals exert equal authority, the voice which declares the law in this court is a single voice by statute. This is, of course, a reference to A.R.S. § 12-120(A) which states, “There is created a court of appeals which shall constitute a single court .... ”
It is not difficult to resolve this issue if a correct perspective is applied. One important consequence of a decision of the court of appeals is that it establishes precedent for the superior court to apply to litigants before it. This rule of stare decisis is “grounded on public policy that people should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.” White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, 358 P.2d 712, 713 (1961). To me, this is such a vital policy that it requires the superior court or administrative body to follow a single precedent with certainty rather than to choose which among conflicting precedents it will follow. The latter approach is untenable in every respect.1 Carried to an extreme it would mean that judges of the court of appeals exerting equal authority would by their conflicting decisions not only confuse the law but destroy precedent in the process.
If one department of the court can overrule another department, the principle of stare decisis is strengthened not weakened. It is the overruling process which gives *393meaning to stare decisis. Stare decisis is a rule of persuasion, O’Neil v. Martin, 66 Ariz. 78, 182 P.2d 939 (1947), and a court will overrule its precedent only if presented with the most cogent reasons. It operates wisely in the multi-judge court of appeals because three judges will not overrule a prior decision on the same point for other than the most cogent reasons. On the other hand, if the overruling process is not at work, what rein is there to prevent each department of three judges from simply deciding issues as they see fit at the moment, knowing that they merely record their views upon the records of the court, leaving untouched a prior conflicting decision of another department? To me, the result is a garbled judicial voice which destroys our institutional role and reduces the court to a mere case-by-case, error-correcting function based upon shifting sands of authority.
On the other hand, the principle of stare decisis is well served where one department is disposed to follow an earlier precedent except where disagreement flows from the most cogent of reasons. The stability and credibility of the court as a court is enhanced and its precedents furnish a proper guide to the superior court. Where a department decides to depart from precedent, it does so with the realization that the law changes with its ruling. Review by the supreme court is a check against serial overruling by departments in instances where judges of the court of appeals are seriously divided on an issue.
Neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the Arizona Court of Appeals has spoken directly to the issue at hand. In an opinion filed by Division One of the court of appeals, it was said, “When we disagree with a prior decision of our Court, whether rendered by our own Division or by our fellow Judges in Division Two, we should do so only upon the most cogent of reasons being presented.” Neil B. McGinnis Equipment Co. v. Henson, 2 Ariz.App. 59, 62, 406 P.2d 409, 412 (1965). Another Division One opinion states, “As a threshold matter, we note that while we would not be absolutely bound by prior Court of Appeals decisions, the principle of stare decisis and the need for stability in the law in order to have an efficient and effective functioning of our judicial machinery dictate that we consider decisions of coordinate courts as highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decisions are based upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render these prior decisions inapplicable.” Castillo v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 465, 471, 520 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1974).
There is authority from other states that a lower court, when confronted with conflicting appellate decisions in the jurisdiction in which it sits, must follow the later case. See, e.g., Moeller v. De Rose, 222 P.2d 107 (Cal.App.1950); State v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 32 N.W.2d 398 (1948); Goodman v. Mevorah, 59 N.W.2d 192, 79 N.D. 653 (1953); Tuggle v. Davies, 232 S.W.2d 16, 191 Tenn. 152 (1950); Ballard v. Ballard, 296 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Civ.App.1956). Where this rule is followed, the earlier case is overruled whether or not the later case so states. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949). As stated in one treatise:
[T]he general rule is to follow the latest decision and disregard the others. This is because the later case must be supposed to have overruled the earlier and to stand as the final expression of the court’s opinion.
Black, Law of Judicial Precedents § 70.
Although there is no difficulty in applying this rule to conflicting decisions of departments of Division One of the court of appeals, a special problem is presented by conflicting decisions between Division One and Division Two of the court of appeals. I would not apply the same rule in this instance as I believe the organization of the court dictates otherwise. All departments of Division One hear appeals from superior courts in the same jurisdictional area consisting of seven of fourteen counties. Division Two hears appeals from the other seven counties. Although A.R.S. § 12-120(A) states that the court of appeals is a “single *394court,” the same statute also creates this jurisdictional distinction. Because of this distinction, I would hold that given conflicting decisions between Division One and Division Two, the superior court must follow the decision of the division in which it is located. In my opinion, the reasons for this outweigh the argument that the court is a single court and a later conflicting decision of one division overrules an earlier decision of the other division. The fact of separate county constituencies points to a hierarchic relationship between a division of the court of appeals and the superior courts sitting within a particular division. The physical separation of Division One and Division Two makes it impossible for collegial discussion to occur, so necessary for an appellate court. This is in contrast to the continuous exchange and colloquy over legal issues which occurs between the judges of Division One who sit at one physical location. By this means the process of precedent-making and precedent-keeping within Division One is vitalized. This process is not possible and therefore does not occur between Division One judges and Division Two judges. Finally, predictability in the decisional process is greatly enhanced when it is known to the superior court that the decision of the division in which it is located will provide the controlling precedent.
It must be acknowledged, however, that an unsatisfactory side effect of conflicting decisions between divisions is that Arizona law as applied in the northern seven counties may differ on a given point from that which is applied in the southern seven counties. See Mattis & Yalowitz, supra. This is the price paid for an intermediate appellate court sitting in two divisions, however, and is not a serious problem because such relatively rare conflicts are easily resolved by the Arizona Supreme Court.
In conclusion, I would hold that between conflicting decisions of departments within Division One of the court of appeals, the last decision expresses the law and the earlier decision is overruled. By reason of the realities and practical necessities involved, I would hold that between conflicting decisions of Division One and Division Two, each expresses the law to be applied by the superior courts located in the geographical area of each respective division until overruled by the Arizona Supreme Court.

. “To apply the principle of optional selectivity by a trial court in such situation could create an anomalous situation where the trial court one week would follow one principle and the following week, a contrary principle.” Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill.App.3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1975).