Court Opinion

ID: 9682260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:37.621956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.472571
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. Although I do agree with the majority that neither the August 5, 1996 order nor the September 9 or 10, 1996 order actually states that Boatmen’s is entitled to the Appellants’ proceeds from the sale of the land, I believe the chancellor’s order of August 5 says everything except that and, thus, I dissent. I believe that between the written order of August 5 and the chancellor’s spoken rulings from the bench during the hearing on July 16, 1996, that it was understood that Boatmen’s had a valid judgment lien on Appellants’ portion of the real property and that it was entitled to the proceeds of the sale of Appellants’ share of the land. Additionally, I believe, contrary to the majority opinion, that the issue surrounding Boatmen’s judgment lien was collateral to the action before the chancellor, which was an action in partition. An order may nonetheless be final for purposes of appeal provided that the only matters remaining in the trial court are collateral to or independent of the merits of the action or otherwise not an integral part of the action. This court has defined “collateral action” as “action that does not make any direct step toward final disposition of the merits of a case, will not be merged in the final judgment, is not an ingredient of the cause of action, and does not require consideration with the main cause of action.” Marsh & McLennan of Arkansas v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 184, 900 S.W.2d 195, 198 (1995) (quoting Pledger v. Bosnick, 306 Ark. 45, 50, 811 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3034 (1993), reversed on other grounds, State v. Staton, 325 Ark. 341, 925 S.W.2d 804 (1996)). Such collateral and ministerial orders need not be final for purposes of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54 nor Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2. Pledger, 306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d 286. Also to be considered when determining whether a judgment is final is whether the order appealed from otherwise terminates the action as it was requested by the moving parties in the complaint on the issue of the suit. Id. Applying the definition of “collateral action” set out above, it would appear that Boatmen’s claim of a judgment Hen on the property owned by Appellants, which was sold pursuant to Appellees’ action in partition, would be collateral to the subject of the controversy, which was the partition of the land itself. Boatmen’s claim is independent to the merits of the action, as it concerned only the distribution of the proceeds of the partition sale. The claim certainly does not appear to be integral to the merits of the case, and this is evidenced by the chancellor’s ruling during the hearing in which Boatmen’s was allowed to intervene. The chancellor stated that Boatmen’s claim really did not have anything to do with the merits of the lawsuit. The chancellor noted further that she had already decided everything that needed to be decided in the action for partition before Boatmen’s intervened in the action. The majority reasons that because the proceeds of Appellants’ share of the land would not satisfy Boatmen’s claim, Boatmen’s was thus a necessary party entitled to intervene in order to protect its right to enforce the remaining amount of the judgment against the purchasers of the land, Appellees. This is an interesting interpretation in light of the fact that the August 5 order entered by the chancellor reflects: 4. Intervenor by and through its attorney announced at the hearing that it would release any Hen it has on the subject property (so that the purchasers at the sale may take the property free and clear of any judgment hen) upon intervenor[’s] receipt of the proceeds to which [Appellants] would have been entitled had there been no hen. Apparently, Boatmen’s had previously agreed that it would accept AppeHants’ proceeds from their portion of the property sold as satisfaction of its judgment against AppeHants, at least as far as the AppeHees-purchasers were concerned. Arguably, Boatmen’s would stfll retain its Hen against AppeHants on that portion of the judgment that remained unsatisfied, as the judgment Hen was against aH property owned by AppeHants within Pulaski County, Arkansas. In sum, it appears to me, as it did initiaHy to the chanceUor, that Boatmen’s claim is coUateral to the subject matter of the suit, which was the partition sale of the land. This is especiaHy apparent since the bank did not intervene until after the property had been sold, and the action in partition had been completed. Moreover, it was not necessary for Boatmen’s to intervene in the partition action in order to protect its judgment against Appellants. For the stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.