Court Opinion

ID: 9894869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 15:00:38.912064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:54.006717
License: Public Domain

22-2037-cv
     Lorefice v. State of New York

                                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                         FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER
     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
     SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
     FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
     CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
     EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
     ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
     ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
 2   Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
 3   3rd day of November, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5           PRESENT:          JON O. NEWMAN,
 6                             EUNICE C. LEE,
 7                             ALISON J. NATHAN,
 8                                      Circuit Judges.
 9           ------------------------------------------------------------------
10           ALAN LOREFICE
11
12                             Plaintiff-Appellant,
13
14                      v.                                                         22-2037-cv
15
16           STATE OF NEW                 YORK,       NEW YORK STATE
17           DEPARTMENT                    OF           ENVIRONMENTAL
18           CONSERVATION,
19
20                          Defendants-Appellees.
21        ------------------------------------------------------------------
22   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                            MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman &
23                                                                       Associates, Goshen, NY.
24
25   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                              JOSEPH M. SPADOLA, Assistant
26                                                                          Solicitor General (Barbara D.
27                                                                          Underwood,     Solicitor   General,
28                                                                          Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor
29                                                                          General, on the brief), for Letitia
30                                                                          James, Attorney General of the State
31                                                                          of New York, Albany, NY.
32
 1          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

 2   New York (D’Agostino, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 5          Plaintiff-Appellant Alan Lorefice appeals from an August 18, 2022 judgment of the district

 6   court (D’Agostino, J.) granting the State of New York’s (“State”) and the New York State

 7   Department of Environmental Conservation’s (“DEC”) (collectively “Appellees”) motion for a

 8   judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted judgment in Appellees’ favor pursuant to

 9   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the grounds that Lorefice failed to plead a plausible

10   gender discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

11   § 2000e et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history,

12   and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

13                                           BACKGROUND

14          Lorefice filed a complaint against the State and the DEC on December 21, 2021, alleging

15   that Appellees engaged in gender stereotyping in violation of Title VII when he was terminated

16   from his job at the DEC. According to the complaint, Lorefice was employed by the DEC as a

17   biologist for 20 years before he was terminated in November 2020. In 2018, Lorefice invited DK,

18   a woman who worked in his office, on a hike and she “declined in a polite manner.” Complaint at

19   3, Lorefice v. New York, No. 21-CV-01367, 2022 WL 3577102 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022).

20   Lorefice’s feelings for DK developed, and from the spring through the fall of 2019, he sent her

21   numerous Facebook messages, to which she did not reply. These messages, while not sexual in

                                                      2
1    nature, were expressions of affection towards DK and also “proposed a life together.” Id. at 5.

 2          DK apparently was unaware of these Facebook messages until October 2019, when she

 3   stumbled upon all of them at once. This made her uncomfortable, and she reported Lorefice to her

 4   supervisor, who immediately suspended Lorefice. According to the complaint, Lorefice then

 5   participated in a disciplinary arbitration where the DEC claimed he had demonstrated a pernicious

 6   pattern of pursuing women he met at the workplace. Several years earlier, Lorefice had pursued

 7   another co-worker at the DEC and was told to halt communication with her. The arbitrator found

8    Lorefice guilty of the majority of the charges involving DK, including sexual harassment, and

 9   recommended he be terminated.         The DEC adopted the arbitrator’s recommendation and

10   terminated Lorefice accordingly.

11          Lorefice’s complaint alleges a violation of Title VII, arguing that his termination was “a

12   stereotypic response to [his] conduct” and that the DEC wanted “to show fake solidarity with the

13   ‘me too’ movement.” Id. at 2. Essentially, he claims that the DEC’s response to his conduct was

14   “gender stereotypic” because it assumed that “as a male, [Lorefice] is aggressive and could not

15   control himself” and that “a female is timid and unable to speak up for herself.” Id. at 7.

16          The district court dismissed Lorefice’s claims on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). The

17   court noted that to survive dismissal, a Title VII plaintiff simply must provide “plausible support

18   to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Lorefice, 2022 WL 3577102, at *5 (quoting

19   Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015)). However, the district

20   court concluded that Lorefice’s complaint “fails to allege any facts that support even a minimal

21   inference of gender stereotyping.” Id. The district court then declined to grant Lorefice leave to

22   amend his complaint on the grounds that it would be futile and that he did not comply with the

                                                      3
 1   court’s individual rules and practices. Lorefice timely appealed this judgment. 1

 2                                     *                          *                          *

 3           On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court reviews the judgment of the district

 4   court de novo. Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2021). The

 5   standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion is “identical to that [for granting] a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

 6   for failure to state a claim.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020) (brackets

 7   in original) (quoting Patel v. Contemporary Classics, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001)). While it

 8   is true that the court must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor,” Selevan v. N.Y.

 9   Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[t]hreadbare

10   recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

11   suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

12   544, 555 (2007)).

13           Title VII gender discrimination claims are analyzed under a burden shifting framework

14   where a plaintiff must show that the circumstances leading to an adverse employment action “give

15   rise to an inference of gender discrimination.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d

16   Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). In a Title VII

17   discrimination case, the plaintiff must “allege two elements: (1) the employer discriminated against

18   him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 85. Sex

19   stereotyping is a form of gender discrimination, as Title VII was “intended to strike at the entire

     1
      The Appellees also asked the district court to find that the State of New York was not a proper defendant and to
     consider the Arbitration Opinion in deciding the 12(c) motion. On appeal, Appellees ask this Court to consider the
     Arbitration Opinion as well. As this request is mooted upon the case being disposed of solely on the pleadings, we
     decline to address this issue.

                                                              4
 1   spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Price

 2   Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).

 3           It is true that “the complaint need not give plausible support to the ultimate question of

 4   whether the adverse employment action was attributable to discrimination.” Littlejohn v. City of

 5   New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015). However, it must allege a nonconclusory factual

 6   basis for the discrimination claim that is sufficient to nudge the claimed inference of discriminatory

 7   intent “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87 (quoting Twombly,

 8   550 U.S. at 570).

 9           Lorefice did not plead any nonconclusory facts to support the claim that his termination

10   was based on gender discrimination. He pointed to no statements, remarks, or even actions

11   (besides his termination itself) that would indicate any person at the DEC was stereotyping him

12   because of his gender.        Nor does Lorefice allege that the arbitrator engaged in gender

13   discrimination or stereotyping in recommending his termination. Lorefice argues that if the Court

14   construes his complaint most favorably towards him, finding that the DEC had no valid grounds

15   to terminate him, then the Court must conclude that the DEC engaged in gender stereotyping.

16   Citing to the proposition that a woman can be fired for being too masculine or too feminine,

17   Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 44–45, he contends that if he did not engage in sexual harassment, then the

18   DEC “must have believed that a male who had a strong interest in a female he met at work was

19   unfit to work . . . [because] he could not be trusted to . . . leave . . . his feelings of affection for her

20   at the door.” Appellant’s Br. at 12–13.

21           Even assuming, arguendo, that Lorefice did not engage in sexual harassment, this does not

22   give rise to an inference that he was terminated because of a gender stereotype. As the district

                                                          5
 1   court noted, Title VII does not “prohibit all arbitrary employment practices.” Lorefice, 2022 WL

 2   3577102, at *5 (quoting Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)).

 3   Lorefice does not cite to, nor are we aware of, any case law in which an employee’s termination

 4   due to an erroneous accusation of sexual harassment by itself gives rise to an inference of gender

 5   stereotyping. Moreover, this Court has held that when the plaintiff “has produced no substantial

 6   evidence from which we may plausibly infer that her alleged failure to conform her appearance to

 7   feminine stereotypes” was the reason for the adverse employment action against her, “her Title

 8   VII claim based upon a gender stereotyping theory must fail.” Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398

 9   F.3d 211, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,

10   883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). Lorefice provides no factual support for the theory that Appellees

11   either viewed him as an aggressive male or that this was the basis for his termination. Cf. Price

12   Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (holding that gender stereotyping existed when supervisors stated

13   plaintiff acted in a “macho” fashion and suggested that she should “walk more femininely”); Back

14   v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting “that

15   stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and employment” provided

16   evidence of gender stereotyping).

17          Additionally, Lorefice’s assertion that the DEC had no grounds to terminate him beyond

18   gender stereotyping is belied by his own complaint, where he concedes he sent messages to DK

19   proposing a life together, made her feel uncomfortable, and had previously engaged in similar

20   behavior towards another coworker. This conduct itself provided reasons for the DEC to terminate

21   Lorefice, independent of however the DEC may have viewed him in relation to his gender.

22   Whether or not his actions amounted to sexual harassment is not for this Court to decide, as Title

                                                     6
 1   VII claims are not appropriately used to collaterally attack any adverse employment decision.

2           In analyzing Lorefice’s request to amend his complaint, this Court reviews the district

3    court’s decision denying leave to amend as futile under a de novo standard. See Balintulo v. Ford

4    Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2015).      A proposed amendment is deemed futile when it

5    “could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 164–65. As an initial matter, Lorefice had the

6    opportunity to amend after the motion to dismiss was filed. Lorefice, 2022 WL 3577102, at *6.

7    But he stated in his opposition to that motion that he “has not sought to amend his complaint” and

8    did not seek to do so. Id. Further, the district court found that “the DEC had valid grounds to

9    terminate” Lorefice and that his briefing provided no information as to how he would amend his

10   complaint to correct the deficiencies already identified by the district court. Id. This Court agrees.

11   Therefore, the district court was correct in concluding that granting Lorefice leave to amend his

12   complaint would be futile.

13                             *                       *                      *

14          We have considered Lorefice’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

15   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

16

17                                                  FOR THE COURT:
18                                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
19

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