Court Opinion

ID: 9893607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 21:00:29.224311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:45.752715
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1058       Doc: 54         Filed: 10/26/2023    Pg: 1 of 22

                                                PUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                 No. 23-1058

        JOHN DOE,

                              Plaintiff – Appellant,

                      v.

        JANE DOE,

                                 Defendant – Appellee.
        ------------------------------

        FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION; PROFESSOR EUGENE VOLOKH,

                              Amici Supporting Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:22-cv-00500-D-BM)

        Argued: September 19, 2023                                    Decided: October 26, 2023

        Before AGEE, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion in which Judge Agee
        and Judge Wynn joined.

        ARGUED: Kara L. Gorycki, NESENOFF & MILTENBERG, LLP, New York, New York,
        for Appellant. Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew T. Miltenberg, NESENOFF & MILTENBERG, LLP,
        New York, New York, for Appellant. James M. Weiss, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh,
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        North Carolina, for Appellee. Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic,
        UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae.

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        THACKER, Circuit Judge:

               John Doe (“Appellant”) filed this civil action alleging claims for defamation, abuse

        of process, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

        and civil conspiracy against Jane Doe (“Appellee”) after Appellee accused Appellant of

        sexual assault. When Appellant filed his complaint, he also filed an ex parte motion to

        proceed using the pseudonym “John Doe,” rather than his real name. The district court

        denied the motion. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

        in doing so, we affirm.

                                                        I.

               Appellant began his undergraduate studies at Tulane University in August 2018 and

        was on track to graduate in May 2022 prior to the events giving rise to this lawsuit. 1

        Appellant had an ongoing but not steady, “uncommitted, casual relationship” with a

        woman he calls “Sue Roe” in Fall 2019, and at various points in Spring and Summer 2021.

        J.A. 8. 2 In August 2021, Appellant and Sue Roe left a bar together, went to Sue Roe’s

        house, and engaged in what Appellant alleges was consensual sex. Afterward, Appellant

        told Sue Roe that they “may regret that later,” which made her cry. Id. at 9. After

        apologizing, Appellant went to sleep but was awakened at some point later by Sue Roe’s

        housemate, who asked him to leave.

               1
                   We recount the facts here as Appellant alleged them in his Complaint.
               2
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

                                                         3
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               In September 2021, Appellant “matched” on Tinder with Appellee. Several months

        later, Appellant invited Appellee to his fraternity party, which they attended on January 29,

        2022. Appellee then texted Appellant on February 2, 2022, to wish him a happy birthday.

        Around midnight that night, Appellant asked Appellee if she “wanted to hang out,” to

        which she responded that she did. J.A. 13. The two went to Appellant’s house to have

        consensual sex, and Appellant walked Appellee home the next morning. On the night of

        February 3, Appellant went to a bar with his friends and met up with a woman he identifies

        as “A.H.” Id. Appellant and A.H. left the bar together and “[u]pon information and belief,

        [Appellee] saw [Appellant] talking to A.H. at the bar and heard that he and A.H. went home

        together.” Id. at 14.

               Appellant alleges that after Appellee learned he went home with another woman on

        February 3, Appellee set off on a campaign to disseminate false allegations against him.

        Appellant alleges that on February 4, Appellee told one of Appellant’s friends that

        Appellant had “engaged in nonconsensual sexual activity” with her. J.A. 14. “[B]y

        February 6th, false rumors had begun spreading around school alleging that [Appellant]

        sexually assaulted a female student” and Appellant had been told about the rumors and

        social media posts 3 by several people. Id. at 14–15. On the evening of February 8,

        Appellant received a text message from Appellee accusing him of sexually assaulting her

        and calling him “a predator and repeat offender.” Id. at 15.

               3
                Appellant does not allege that any post actually identified him but says there was
        “an indication” in one post that it was referring to him. J.A. 14.

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               The following day, Appellant discussed the allegedly false claims with multiple

        friends, and two of his friends called Appellant’s “parents to tell them it was not safe for

        [Appellant] to be on the Tulane campus.” J.A. 15. On February 10, Appellant’s mother

        flew to Tulane to help Appellant pack and take him home. Appellant withdrew from

        Tulane on February 11, 2022.

               Although Appellant was unaware at the time, Appellee had filed a report against

        Appellant with Tulane’s Case Management and Victim Support Services 4 office on

        February 6, 2022. And on February 11, the day Appellant withdrew from Tulane, both

        Appellee and Sue Roe filed formal Title IX/Sexual Misconduct reports against Appellant.

        “Both reported having consensual sex with [Appellant], falling asleep, and waking up to

        him engaging in sexual activity.” J.A. 18. Tulane investigated the reports and interviewed

        both Appellee and Sue Roe. Appellant alleges that Appellee’s statement to Tulane

        investigators was false, defamatory, and contradicted by other evidence, and that Appellee

        conspired with Sue Roe and submitted false evidence in the course of the investigation.

        Tulane found Appellant responsible for sexual misconduct and expelled him from the

        university on May 8, 2022.

               4
                 The Case Management and Victim Support Services office offers support to
        Tulane students on a range of academic and non-academic issues, including medical needs,
        drug or alcohol abuse, and behavioral health concerns. The office also provides support to
        Tulane students who have been victims of crimes such as sexual assault, intimate partner
        violence, stalking, and hazing. Tulane University, Case Management and Victim Support
        Services, https://cmvss.tulane.edu/; https://perma.cc/KB2D-GGRJ (last visited Oct. 25,
        2023).

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               On December 8, 2022, Appellant filed this civil action against Appellee 5 in the

        United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In the Complaint,

        Appellant alleges claims for defamation, abuse of process, tortious interference with

        contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Appellant seeks

        relief in the form of a “declaration that [Appellee] defamed [Appellant]” as well as

        compensatory and punitive damages on each claim. J.A. 40–41.

               On the same day he filed his Complaint, Appellant filed an ex parte motion for leave

        to proceed using a pseudonym along with a supporting memorandum. In his motion,

        Appellant asked only “for leave to proceed under pseudonym,” S.J.A. 1, 6 and his

        supporting memorandum reacknowledged that he sought “an Order granting permission to

        file a Complaint in the above-captioned matter as a pseudonymous Plaintiff.” J.A. 43.

        Therefore, while Appellant’s supporting memorandum noted that Jane Doe and Sue Roe

        were pseudonyms and that “all students shall be identified herein by pseudonym as well,”

        id., the district court construed the motion only as one to allow Appellant to use a

        pseudonym for himself -- not as a motion for leave to use pseudonyms for Jane Doe, Sue

        Roe, or anyone else. After considering the applicable factors as set out by this court, the

        district court denied Appellant’s motion.

               Appellant timely noted this appeal.

               5
                The Complaint identifies Appellee only as “Jane Doe” and does not reveal her
        legal name or other identifying characteristics.
               6
                  Citations to the “S.J.A.” refer to the Supplemental Joint Appendix filed by the
        parties in this appeal.

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                                                      II.

               “The decision whether to permit parties to proceed anonymously at trial is one of

        many involving management of the trial process that for obvious reasons are committed in

        the first instance to trial court discretion.” James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.

        1993). Therefore, we review the district court’s decision only for abuse of discretion.

               We have described three ways a district court can abuse its discretion in considering

        motions to proceed by pseudonym. First, a district court abuses its discretion when it acts

        with “a failure or refusal, either express or implicit, actually to exercise discretion, deciding

        instead as if by general rule, or even arbitrarily, as if neither by rule nor discretion.” James,

        6 F.3d at 239 (citation omitted). Second, a district court abuses its discretion when it fails

        to “adequately [] take into account judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise”

        of discretion. Id. (citation omitted). And finally, a district court abuses its discretion when

        its reasoning “is flawed by erroneous factual or legal premises.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                                      III.

               Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), a civil complaint “must name all

        the parties.”   The rule recognizes “the general presumption of openness of judicial

        proceedings,” which has a basis both in common law and in the First Amendment. See

        James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246,

        265–66 (4th Cir. 2014). We have explained that “[p]seudonymous litigation undermines

        the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings” because “[t]he public has an interest in

        knowing the names of litigants, and disclosing the parties’ identities furthers openness of

        judicial proceedings.” Public Citizen, 749 F.3d at 274 (internal citations omitted).

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               Nevertheless, district courts may, in their discretion, allow pseudonymous litigation

        because “privacy or confidentiality concerns are sometimes sufficiently critical that parties

        or witnesses should be allowed this rare dispensation.” James, 6 F.3d at 238 (emphasis

        supplied). To warrant this relief, the circumstances must be “exceptional.” Pub. Citizen,

        749 F.3d at 273.

               In James, we set out five nonexhaustive factors for district courts to consider when

        deciding motions to proceed by pseudonym:

                      (1) “[W]hether the justification asserted by the requesting party
                      is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend
                      any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive
                      and highly personal nature”;

                      (2) “whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical
                      or mental harm to the requesting party or even more critically,
                      to innocent nonparties”;

                      (3) “the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought
                      to be protected”;

                      (4) “whether the action is against a governmental or private
                      party”; and,

                      (5) “relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from
                      allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.”

        6 F.3d at 238. We have also clarified that “a district court has an independent obligation

        to ensure that extraordinary circumstances support such a request by balancing the party’s

        stated interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any prejudice that

        anonymity would pose to the opposing party.” Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 274.

               Appellant’s memorandum in support of his motion briefly addressed each of the

        James factors, and the district court considered each of Appellant’s arguments in its order

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        denying the motion. Nevertheless, Appellant argues the district court abused its discretion

        by (1) determining that the James factors weighed against anonymity, (2) failing to

        consider irreparable harm to his reputation, and (3) failing to balance Appellant’s privacy

        interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. We address

        each argument, beginning with the James factors.

                                                     IV.

                                                     A.

               The first James factor is “[w]hether the justification asserted by the requesting party

        is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to

        preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.” James v. Jacobson,

        6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993). In his motion, Appellant argued that the underlying facts

        in the case relate to allegations of sexual assault and, “in light of the nature of this case,

        private and intimate details regarding the lives of John Doe and Jane Doe will be at issue.”

        J.A. 47. He also noted that, in bringing this lawsuit, he “seeks to minimize the harm of

        Jane Doe’s claims,” “prevent further harm,” and “clear [his] good name.” Id. Therefore,

        he argued, “the interests at play here are of a highly sensitive nature” such that this factor

        should weigh heavily in favor of granting his motion. Id. He also argued that he should

        be allowed to proceed by pseudonym because “[i]f [he] is required to disclose his identity

        in this litigation, the harm would already be done. [Appellant’s] name will forever be

        publicly associated with allegations of . . . sexual misconduct.” Id.

               The district court accepted Appellant’s arguments on this factor and determined that

        Appellant desired to proceed by pseudonym “in order to preserve his privacy in a matter

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        that is highly sensitive and highly personal,” J.A. 57, rather than “merely to avoid the

        annoyance and criticism that may attend litigation,” James, 6 F.3d at 238. In doing so, the

        district court explained that “[n]umerous district courts have recognized a plaintiff’s

        interest in preserving privacy where the allegations concern sexual assault.” J.A. 57. The

        district court cited several cases where plaintiffs were allowed to proceed by pseudonym

        when they were suing their universities, or officials at their universities, for due process

        violations resulting from Title IX investigations. See, e.g., Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &

        State Univ., No. 7:21-cv-378, 2022 WL 972629, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2022); Doe v.

        Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 583, 592–94 (E.D. Va. 2016);

        Painter v. Doe, No. 3:15-cv-369, 2016 WL 3766466, at *6 (W.D.N.C. July 13, 2016); Doe

        v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 40 (W.D. Va. 2016). Therefore, the district court held that the

        first factor favored allowing Appellant to proceed by pseudonym.

               On appeal, Appellant agrees that the district court’s determination on this factor was

        correct.   But he takes issue with the fact that the district court made no express

        determination as to the weight of this finding. But we have only required that district courts

        consider the James factors, and we have not prescribed any particular weight to any

        individual factor.    Rather, we have entrusted district courts to consider each case

        individually to discern which factors should -- in their discretion -- weigh most heavily.

        See James, 6 F.3d at 242–43. The district court considered this factor, and we find no

        abuse of discretion in its failure to note the particular weight it attributed to it.

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                                                    B.

               As to the second factor -- risk of harm -- Appellant argued to the district court that

        “if his identity is disclosed, [he] could be targeted for retaliatory physical or mental harm

        based solely on the accusation of sexual misconduct.” J.A. 48 (emphasis supplied). He

        pointed to “the current social climate,” as well as the fact that Appellee “spread false and

        highly damning claims . . . to classmates, friends, and Tulane’s administration.” Id. Thus,

        he argued that even a finding that Appellee did in fact defame him would not “change the

        damage done if his request for anonymity is denied” because he will have “to live with this

        public reputation” which “would be detrimental to [his] physical and mental health.” Id.

        Appellant also argued, without further discussion, that “it would be harmful to publicize

        the names of the female accusers as it would subject them to unwanted scrutiny,

        harassment, and ridicule.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 2022

        WL 972629, at *2).

               In its opinion, the district court recognized that due to “the inflammatory nature of

        sexual misconduct, the mere accusation . . . if disclosed, can invite harassment and

        ridicule.” J.A. 57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). But the district

        court determined that Appellant failed “to produce ‘evidence to support more than a mere

        general fear of retaliation or mere embarrassment.’” Id. (quoting Student A. v. Liberty

        Univ., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 3d 901, 920 (W.D. Va. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

        And the district court noted that there did not appear to be any “aggravating factors” such

        as media exposure that would endanger Appellant if his identity was known. J.A. 58.

        Finally, the district court explained that while Appellant expressed “concern[] about the

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        potential harm to Jane Doe and Sue Roe” if their identities were revealed, “that

        consideration does not affect whether the court should allow plaintiff to pursue this action

        pseudonymously.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Therefore, the court determined that this

        factor was neutral in its analysis.

               On appeal, Appellant argues that his case “is distinguishable from the garden-

        variety defamation case because it centers around false and defamatory statements made

        within the context of a Title IX disciplinary proceeding and [Appellee’s] use of that

        proceeding to exact revenge against [Appellant].” Appellant’s Opening Br. 28. And again,

        Appellant points to various courts allowing plaintiffs to proceed by pseudonym when they

        are suing their universities to challenge Title IX proceedings in order to argue that he has

        a valid privacy interest. Appellant argues it was error for the district court to find this factor

        to be neutral, rather than in his favor, because it added an “evidence requirement” that

        required him to produce evidence of more than a general fear or of aggravating factors, and

        it did not consider the risk to Appellee and Sue Roe.

               We begin with Appellant’s argument that the district court relied on an erroneous

        legal premise -- the additional “evidence requirement” -- and his argument that its

        conclusion that he had failed to supply evidence “was grounded in [an] erroneous factual

        premise” because the Complaint “alleges that [Appellant] had already experienced

        retaliation.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30–31.

               The district court was required to consider “whether identification poses a risk of

        retaliatory physical or mental harm.” James, 6 F.3d at 238. We do not find that the district

        court abused its discretion in looking for evidence of a risk beyond Appellant’s bare

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        assertion that he could be targeted for retaliation if his name were public. Other courts have

        done the same. See e.g., Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 40 (W.D. Va. 2016) (finding

        evidence of a risk of harm where the plaintiff had demonstrated that there was press

        coverage of his case in a “relatively small community”); Student A. v. Liberty Univ., Inc.,

        602 F. Supp. 3d 901, 920 (W.D. Va. 2022) (explaining that the plaintiffs “argued and

        provided evidence to support more than a mere ‘general fear’ of retaliation”); Freedom

        From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. #5, No. 07-cv-02126-MSK,

        2009 WL 2176624, at *6 (D. Col. July 22, 2009) (explaining that “the unsubstantiated

        potential for an adverse public reaction” was insufficient where the plaintiffs had “not

        presented any evidence that reflects disapproval . . . or suggests they would be the target

        of actual threats, harassment or retaliation”); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D.D.C.

        2005) (“fears of embarrassment or vague, unsubstantiated fears of retaliatory actions . . .

        do not permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym”); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch.

        Dist., 172 F.R.D. 215, 217 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (denying use of pseudonym where the record

        contained no “other factors” or “threats of violence” to support the plaintiff’s argument

        that “it has happened before, therefore it might happen here”).

               In other words, district courts routinely look for “aggravating factors” or “evidence”

        as a means to determine whether a risk of harm truly exists. Because we cannot see how a

        district court could properly weigh this factor based on nothing more than a bare assertion

        of risk, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to look for additional

        evidence or aggravating factors to corroborate Appellant’s claim.

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               As for Appellant’s arguments that the district court relied on an “erroneous factual

        premise” in determining he had not provided sufficient evidence of a risk of harm,

        Appellant points to facts he alleged in the Complaint that show he had already experienced

        retaliation. He argues on appeal that the Title IX investigation itself was retaliation; “the

        further spread of false allegations . . . is ever present”; students “across Tulane’s campus,”

        including students studying abroad, had heard the rumors; and his friends had told his

        parents it was not safe for him at Tulane, so his mom flew there to take him home. 7

        Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31. Appellant also argues on appeal that his Complaint made

        clear that he had “already suffered emotional distress, reputational harm, loss of

        educational and career opportunities and psychological damages.” Id.

               Critically, though, Appellant did not present any of these arguments to the district

        court in his motion or supporting memorandum. Instead, he argued only that “[i]f his

        identity is disclosed, [he] could be targeted for retaliatory physical or mental harm” and

        that “having to live with this public reputation would be detrimental to [his] physical and

        mental health.” J.A. 48 (emphasis suppled). The district court correctly noted that

        Appellant did not provide any evidence to support these fears, and these bald allegations

        are not sufficient.

               7
                 While Appellant’s Complaint does allege that his friends thought he was not safe
        at Tulane, he made no attempt in his motion or in this appeal to explain why revealing his
        name in this lawsuit would put him at risk. Indeed, it seems that Appellant believes his
        identity is already well known in connection with these allegations on the Tulane campus.
        Moreover, Appellant has included so many details about his identity in his Complaint that,
        arguably, he could be readily identified in any event, especially by those in the Tulane
        community.

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               Finally, Appellant argues that the district court’s determination that the second

        factor was neutral was based on an erroneous legal premise. Specifically, Appellant argues

        that the district court erred when it held that the risk to Appellee and Sue Roe if their

        identities were disclosed was irrelevant to its determination of whether Appellant should

        be allowed to use a pseudonym. Appellant argues that the risk to Appellee and Sue Roe

        was not irrelevant because district courts are expressly instructed to consider the risk to

        third parties, and he argues that he requested pseudonymity for Appellee and Sue Roe in

        his motion in order to protect them.

               Appellant’s arguments fail here too. While Appellant did use pseudonyms for

        Appellee and Sue Roe and suggested that they be identified by those names consistent with

        the Complaint, he repeatedly only asked for leave to proceed as a pseudonymous plaintiff.

        While courts are permitted to consider the risk to third parties if the party seeking

        anonymity is identified, Appellant did not argue that Appellee and Sue Roe were at risk if

        his identity was public. Rather he argued that “it would be harmful to publicize the names

        of the female accusers. . . .” J.A. 48. The district court was correct -- that consideration is

        not at issue and is irrelevant to whether Appellant should be allowed to use a pseudonym.

        It is also worth noting that Appellee does not seek anonymity herself. To the contrary,

        Appellee has identified herself using her real name in public court filings in both the district

        court and this court. 8

               Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering “risk of harm.”

               8
                   Nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal, we have not identified Appellee by name.

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                                                        C.

               The district court determined that the third factor, age, weighed against Appellant

        because “all parties are adults, and therefore not minors entitled to special protection based

        on age.” J.A. 58. Although Appellant had argued in his motion that this factor should be

        neutral because “some courts have stated that being over eighteen years old should not be

        held against a college student,” id. at 48, he does not challenge the district court’s holding

        on appeal.

                                                        D.

               For the fourth factor, whether the action is against a governmental or private party,

        Appellant recognized in his motion that he was suing a private party and that courts are

        less likely to allow anonymity in that scenario because “actions against private individuals

        may harm their reputation.” J.A. 49. Nevertheless, Appellant argued he should be

        permitted to use a pseudonym because Appellee’s identity could be protected and “the only

        information the public needs . . . is that they were all students at Tulane.” Id. In Appellant’s

        view, “this factor is neutral, at worst.” Id.

               The district court, however, disagreed and determined that the fourth factor “weighs

        significantly against allowing [Appellant] to proceed pseudonymously” because he is suing

        only a private individual. J.A. 59. “When a plaintiff accuses an individual of wrongdoing,

        ‘[b]asic fairness dictates that those among the defendants’ accusers who wish to participate

        in this suit . . . must do so under their real names.’” Id. (quoting S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n

        of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979)). The district

        court was also particularly concerned that “[i]t would be fundamentally unfair for

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        [Appellant] to be able to ‘clear his name’ and wield a potential [judgment] against

        [Appellee] but hide under a shield of anonymity if unsuccessful.” J.A. 59.

               On appeal, Appellant argues that this factor “does not carry significant weight.”

        Appellant’s Opening Br. at 33. Appellant points to several Title IX cases to claim that

        district courts have allowed plaintiffs to use pseudonyms “in cases involving private

        parties” even if they held that this factor weighed against anonymity. Id. (citing Doe v. Va.

        Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-170, 2018 WL 5929647, at *3–4 (W.D. Va.

        Nov. 13, 2018); Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:19-cv-00249, 2020 WL

        1287960, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2020); Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,

        2022 WL 972629, at *2; B.R. v. F.C.S.B., No. 1:19-cv-00917, 2020 WL 12435689, at *26

        (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2020)).

               Not so. Significantly, these cases all differ from the case at hand because the

        plaintiffs in them were suing both public universities and private individuals, and, in many

        instances, the individuals were sued in their official capacities. Even still, the courts in

        these cases all found that the fourth factor was neutral or weighed against allowing

        anonymity because of the inclusion of private parties -- the more private parties (sued in

        their individual capacities), the more likely the courts were to find that the factor weighed

        against the plaintiff. Thus, the district court’s determination here that this factor weighs

        significantly against allowing anonymity when Appellant is only suing a single individual

        is in line with all of the relevant precedent, despite Appellant’s argument to the contrary.

               In any event, Appellant does not challenge the district court’s holding that this factor

        weighs against pseudonymity -- rather, he only takes issue with the fact that the court said

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        it “weighs significantly against” anonymity. Appellant claims that this determination

        “appears to be grounded in a general disapproval of party anonymity in cases where private

        parties are involved, rather than consideration of the relevant case law and the specific

        circumstances of [Appellant’s] case.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36. Appellant cites only

        to James and does not elaborate on this argument further.

               In James, this court was concerned that the district judge acted by “general rule”

        rather than “a true exercise of discretion.” 6 F.3d at 239. The record in James indicated

        that the judge had “a flat rule of general application based upon [a] strongly felt personal

        predilection” that “no party or witness may testify at trial except under his or her true

        name.” Id. at 240. And the district court in that case had failed to conduct a “particularized

        assessment of the equities involved.” Id. at 239. No such facts exist here. The district

        court below thoroughly considered all the factors and the arguments made by Appellant

        and determined -- consistent with the weight of authority -- that suing only a private

        individual weighs against anonymity. We do not find any abuse of discretion in that

        conclusion.

                                                     E.

               Finally, as to the fifth James factor, the district court was required to consider the

        risk of unfairness to Appellee if it allowed Appellant to proceed anonymously. Appellant’s

        motion argued only that there was no risk of unfairness to Appellee because she “is well

        aware of [Appellant’s] identity, as [Appellee] was party to the investigation process

        conducted by Tulane, during which his identity was disclosed.” J.A. 49. The district court

        accepted this point, but it explained that “there are other sources of significant unfairness

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        or risk of prejudice against [Appellee].” Id. at 59. “This risk stems not only from

        [Appellant’s] use of pseudonym for himself, but also from [his] use of pseudonyms and

        initials throughout the complaint.” Id. at 59–60. The district court was concerned that

        “this pervasive anonymity could lead to difficulty and confusion for [Appellee] during

        discovery,” so it held that this factor weighed against allowing Appellant to proceed by

        pseudonym. Id. at 60.

               On appeal, Appellant argues that the district court’s concern about difficulty and

        confusion in discovery was an “erroneous factual premise” because Appellant “did not

        represent to the District Court that he was unwilling to conduct discovery using [] real

        names . . . which could easily be dealt with through a protective order.” Appellant’s

        Opening Br. at 36–37. And he argues that all individuals identified in the Complaint are

        known to Appellee.

               Once again, however, Appellant never made either of these arguments to the district

        court. Appellant’s motion failed to recognize that there could be any risk of unfairness in

        discovery -- he did not make any argument that anonymity could be dealt with in discovery

        or at trial, nor did he argue that the others in the complaint were known to Appellee. But

        the district court, knowing that it would need to manage the entire case if it granted

        Appellant’s motion, rightly noted its concerns in its order.

                                                       F.

               Considering the district court’s entire analysis of the James factors, we conclude

        that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it did not rely on incorrect factual

        or legal premises, nor did it give any indication that it was acting by general rule. Instead,

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        the district court conducted a thorough, case specific analysis when it exercised its

        discretion.

                                                       V.

                 Next, Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it “failed

        to consider a significant factor in cases brought by persons falsely accused of sexual

        assault—the irreparable harm that [Appellant’s] reputation would suffer if his identity is

        disclosed in an action through which he is seeking to clear his name.” Appellant’s Opening

        Br. at 25. Appellant bases his argument on the idea that the James factors are not

        exhaustive, and he points to other cases where courts have considered irreparable harm,

        such as in Doe v. Alger where the plaintiff specifically “argue[d] that there is another factor

        relevant to this case that weighs in favor of anonymity—irreparable harm to his name.”

        317 F.R.D. 37, 42 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2016). But here, Appellant made no argument about

        his reputation apart from the James factors, so there was no reason for the district court to

        consider it separately.

                                                       VI.

                 Appellant also argues that the district court “failed to balance [Appellant’s] interest

        in anonymity against the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings” as required by

        Public Citizen. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 39 (citing Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246,

        273 (4th Cir. 2014)). On the contrary, the district court dedicated the last two pages of its

        order “return[ing] to the Fourth Circuit’s broad admonition that [it] must balance

        [Appellant’s] stated interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in openness.” J.A.

        60–62.

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               In its order, the district court held that extraordinary circumstances that would

        warrant pseudonymity are not present here. It recognized that Appellant had argued “there

        is no public interest in the public learning his identity or the identities of others,” but noted

        that Appellant had “fail[ed] to address the risk that pseudonymous lawsuits have in eroding

        public access to proceedings.” J.A. 60. Appellant similarly argues on appeal that the

        crucial interests served by open judicial proceedings are not compromised by allowing a

        party to proceed anonymously. We have held just the opposite: “Pseudonymous litigation

        undermines the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings. The public has an interest

        in knowing the names of the litigants and disclosing the parties’ identities furthers openness

        of judicial proceedings.” Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 273 (internal citations omitted).

               Appellant’s central argument on appeal is that his case “center[s] around a

        confidential Title IX proceeding” so it is different than “the garden variety defamation

        case” and overcomes any public interest in disclosure of his identity. Appellant’s Opening

        Br. at 40. We disagree. As the district court explained, Title IX challenges have

        “considerations . . . [that] do not apply here.” J.A. 61. Specifically, in those cases, “those

        accused of sexual assault” were “su[ing] schools or universities pseudonymously when

        attacking the findings of a university Title IX investigation.” Id. “Unlike those cases,

        [Appellant] is not challenging his expulsion from Tulane or arguing that Tulane violated

        Title IX or due process during the sexual assault investigation.” Id. Instead, Appellant is

        suing only a private individual for defamation, and he seeks only declaratory relief and

        money damages against Appellee.          This case is no different than a garden variety

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        defamation case, and it does not present the exceptional circumstances necessary for

        Appellant to proceed by pseudonym.

               Finally, we fail to see how Appellant can clear his name through this lawsuit without

        identifying himself. If Appellant were successful in proving defamation, his use of a

        pseudonym would prevent him from having an order that publicly “clears” him. It is

        apparent that Appellant wants to have his cake and eat it too. Appellant wants the option

        to hide behind a shield of anonymity in the event he is unsuccessful in proving his claim,

        but   he   would    surely    identify   himself    if   he   were   to      prove   his   claims.

               The district court considered each of Appellant’s arguments, and it carefully

        balanced Appellant’s stated interests against the public’s interest in the openness of judicial

        proceedings as required by Public Citizen. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

                                                     VII.

               The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to

        proceed as a pseudonymous plaintiff.

                                                                                             AFFIRMED

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