Court Opinion

ID: 9685708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:57:48.976809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:09.702333
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
In R.N. I [450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1990) ], we held there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that R.N. was substantially likely to commit suicide and to suffer substantial deterioration in her physical health. In the present case, the trial court did not find R.N. to be suicidal. It did find a substantial likelihood of deterioration in her physical health as well as in her mental health. I agree with the majority that the evidence as to each of these findings is clear and convincing. I, therefore, concur in affirming the determination of the trial court that R.N. is a person requiring treatment.
In R.N. I, there was no evidence of any deterioration in R.N.’s physical health and the only evidence about prospective deterioration in her physical health was elicited in response to a hypothetical question. However, there was no evidence that R.N. had or would engage in the hypothetical conduct. Indeed, the expert opinion was that R.N. took good care of herself.
In this case, there is ample testimony that R.N. was not eating, sleeping or dressing properly. Dr. Gulkin explained that not sleeping and not eating properly were characteristic of maníes and that a tendency not to take care of oneself is a product of mental illness. Dr. Pryatel, like Dr. Gulkin, was not concerned about R.N.’s diabetes and hypertension, rather he was disturbed over R.N.’s poor judgment about diet, sleeplessness, constant activity and resultant exhaustion. Both experts rested their conclusions about R.N.’s physical health on her aberrant eating, sleeping and behavioral patterns. These patterns were *824characterized as manifestations of her mental disorder. The doctors testified that R.N.’s mental disorder needs treatment in order to avoid causing further substantial deterioration in R.N.’s physical condition.
R.N. continues to resist taking medication. In R.N. I, the tenor of the medical testimony was that R.N. would benefit from medication. We concluded that that was insufficient to establish that R.N. posed a serious risk of harm to self. In this case, the experts testified that R.N.’s mental condition would deteriorate without medication and that she would be unable to care for herself because of the exacerbation of her mental disorder without medication. There was also abundant testimony and emphasis in this case on the danger to R.N. and others posed by her driving a vehicle.
I am not sure whether the record in this case is so more developed than the record in R.N. I because greater care was taken or because R.N.’s condition has, in fact, changed. Following R.N. I, R.N.’s husband was hospitalized. R.N.’s daughter testified that R.N.’s condition has deteriorated since that hospitalization. In either event, I am satisfied that the trial court relied on clear and convincing evidence in finding that R.N. is a person requiring treatment. I therefore concur in affirming the order of commitment.