Court Opinion

ID: 9710253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:05:17.573398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.394108
License: Public Domain

Justice NIGRO,
concurring.
I concur in the result only. I write separately, however, first to note my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that a majority of Appellant’s claims are waived as well as the reasoning used by the majority in arriving at that conclusion. Unlike the majority, and consistent with my previous position *375on waiver under the PCRA, I would find that those of Appellant’s claims that apply the three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard as it relates to trial counsel and contain at least a boilerplate assertion that prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are not waived for purposes of the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 941-948 (2001)(re-viewing numerous claims where appellant’s discussion section addresses each prong of the ineffectiveness standard as it relates to trial counsel and at least includes a boilerplate assertion that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to raise issue). However, because I also believe that those issues raised by Appellant that are not waived are without merit, I am able to concur in the result reached by the majority.
I also note my disagreement with the majority’s commentary on the alleged tension between the PCRA’s timeliness requirements and allowing appellants to present claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal to this Court. In my view, Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 303 n. 7 (1999), in which this Court held that “a properly layered claim challenging PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness would not be waived, and can be reviewed on appeal from the denial of the PCRA petition” continues to control this inquiry. As a plurality of this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Moore,
Pursell did not in any way treat the appellant’s claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness as new claims that should have been presented in a separate PCRA petition but rather, consistent with this Court’s precedent, treated such claims of ineffectiveness as ones being presented at the first available opportunity to do so. Although Justice Castille correctly notes that Pursell was not decided under the 1995 amendments, which added the timeliness requirements to the PCRA, we fail to see how these amendments serve to alter Pursell’s clear holding that this Court may properly review claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness when it is an appellant’s first, and quite possibly only, opportunity to do so.
*376805 A.2d 1212, 1217 n. 3 (Pa.2002) (opinion announcing judgment of the Court).
That said, the complex issue of which claims can properly be reviewed by the Court on an appeal from the denial of a PCRA petition is, as noted by the majority, one that has so blatantly divided the Court in the recent past. In light of the divergent positions on this issue, I made it my usual practice and thought it least divisive to simply concur in the result in PCRA cases when my own independent review of the files resulted in an ability to at least agree with the ultimate outcome of the case. By doing so, I tried to avoid muddying the waters even more by adding to the mix yet another responsive opinion which merely reiterated my own understanding of the approach to be used when deciding which claims should or should not be deemed waived for purposes of the PCRA. However, as time passes and the issue remains unresolved, I felt the better course would be to at least offer the parties some explanation as to where it is that my approach differs from that offered by the lead opinion.