Court Opinion

ID: 9738493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:54:38.019621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.485031
License: Public Domain

FORD, P. J.
I dissent.
The resolution of the question of whether the defendant Russell voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights as defined in Miranda was within the province of the trial judge. (See People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 389 [62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202].) Officer Acuna’s statement to Russell that it might be better if he talked did not establish as a matter of law that Russell’s subsequent statement was not the product of his free and intelligent choice. (See People v. Hill, 66 Cal.2d 536, 549-550 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) In the exercise of his function of *647determining the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence, the trial judge was not precluded from finding that there was no offer or promise, express or implied, of leniency of any nature. Accordingly, the trial judge was warranted in reaching the conclusion that Russell’s response was not the product of cajolery but resulted from his choice, made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, to waive his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Since Russell’s statement was admissible, it furnished sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice. (People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322, 329 [1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].)
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 26, 1968, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Ford, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 24, 1968. MeComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.