Court Opinion

ID: 9904876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 13:09:19.177268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.192867
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                       San Antonio, Texas
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00545-CR

                                         Santos Javier LOPEZ,
                                               Appellant

                                                     v.

                                         The STATE of Texas,
                                               Appellee

                    From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2020-0276-CR
                             Honorable Roland Andrade, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 22, 2023

AFFIRMED

           After a jury trial, Santos Javier Lopez was convicted of arson and sentenced to fifteen years

of imprisonment and a fine of $5,000. On appeal, he argues the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his conviction. We affirm.

                                                 DISCUSSION

           When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
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(1979); Griffin v. State, 491 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The jurors are the exclusive

judges of the facts and the weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147,

150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The jury, as the sole judge of credibility, may accept one version of

the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s testimony. Rivera v. State,

507 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). We may not re-evaluate

the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, we resolve any

inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000); see also Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

(“When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the

conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.”).

        Further, a criminal conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. Merritt v. State,

368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct

evidence in establishing guilt,” and “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish

guilt.” Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hooper v. State,

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “Each fact need not point directly and independently

to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances

is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

        The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the state’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the

state’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant

is tried.” Id.

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                                                                                        04-22-00545-CR

            As authorized by the indictment, to prove Lopez was guilty of arson, the State was required

to prove that he, with intent to damage or destroy a habitation, started a fire, knowing that the

habitation was located on property belonging to another, namely GEO Group, Inc. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 28.02(a), (d)(2). At trial, there was evidence that Lopez, an inmate at the GEO Val Verde

Detention Center covered a GEO camera with toilet paper and participated in a jail riot in which

fires were set. Lopez concedes on appeal that the State demonstrated that he, acting alone or as a

party, set fire to the GEO facility, with the intent to damage it. He disputes that the State proved

that the damaged habitation was located on property belonging to another, namely, GEO Group,

Inc.

            In an arson prosecution, “[t]he allegation of ownership is merely to indicate and identify

the subject of the crime, and the title to the property is not in issue.” Banks v. State, 143 Tex. Crim.

61, 64, 157 S.W.2d 360, 361 (1941). It “is permissible to charge ownership in the person who was

in actual possession and control thereof.” Id. Accordingly, the Texas Penal Code does not restrict

the definition of “owner” to title holders; instead, an “owner” for purposes of the Penal Code

“means a person who: (A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or

not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor; or (B) is a holder in due course

of a negotiable instrument.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(35). “Possession,” in turn, “means actual

care, custody, control, or management.” Id. § 1.07(a)(39). Thus, under the Texas Penal Code, the

definition of owner is “expansive” and “give[s] ownership status to anyone with a rational

connection to the property.” Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also

Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (“The Legislature [has] recognized

the concept that there are many types of possessory interests in property besides ownership in

title.”).

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                                                                                       04-22-00545-CR

       Because of the Penal Code’s expansive definition, in arson prosecutions, a deed need not

necessarily be admitted in evidence for there to be sufficient evidence of ownership. See Tinker v.

State, 77 Tex. Crim. 506, 179 S.W. 572 (1915) (explaining that possession of property was

sufficient to show ownership in arson prosecution and evidence of a deed was not necessary).

Ownership may be proven through other means, including evidence of (1) possession through care,

custody, or management, or (2) a right to possession superior to that of the defendant. See Eaton

v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (explaining that the State may prove ownership

under the arson statute by presenting evidence of title; possession; or a right to possession superior

to that of the defendant). Further, when an owner “is a single entity rather than a natural person,

the better practice may be to allege the single entity, such as Hewlett Packard, as the actual owner.”

Garza, 344 S.W.3d at 414. An employee of the entity may then give evidence of ownership. Id.

       Here, there was evidence that at the time of the offense, GEO Group, Inc. had possession

of the habitation through its care, custody, and management of the detention center. Tara Carrasco,

who was employed with GEO Group, Inc. as a correctional officer, testified that on the day of the

incident, she was working as shift captain at the GEO Val Verde correctional facility where the

riot occurred. She testified that as shift captain, she oversaw the Val Verde correctional facility on

behalf of GEO Group, Inc. She described the detention facility where the fire occurred, including

where the correctional officers sat to monitor the inmates. She testified that a “shakedown” (a

search of the inmates’ living areas) had occurred during the shift prior to her being on duty.

According to Carrasco, “[a]s part of GEO policy, if [the inmates] have anything in excess, be it

extra uniforms, extra socks, anything that’s not accounted for in policy, it’s considered contraband

. . . and it falls under excessive amounts.” She testified the inmates on the day in question “were

upset because they were not—they did not receive back their extra items.” Carrasco explained that

every item the inmates have in their possession, including everything from their clothing, bedding,

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                                                                                     04-22-00545-CR

to personal hygiene objects, were given to them and that it was GEO policy to confiscate any

excess items for safety reasons. Also admitted in evidence was a picture of the facility where the

fire occurred. The picture shows on the wall of the housing pod a sign bearing the GEO corporate

logo, which was in clear view of all inmates who resided in the pod. From the above evidence, a

rational factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the offense,

GEO Group, Inc. was in possession of the habitation through its care, custody, and management

of the detention center. See Eaton, 533 S.W.2d at 35 (holding evidence that a person had the duty

of controlling, auditing, and overseeing the operation of the property was sufficient to show he

was in possession of property for purposes of arson prosecution). Thus, we hold the evidence is

legally sufficient to show the damaged habitation was located on property belonging to another,

the GEO Group, Inc.

                                          CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

                                                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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