Court Opinion

ID: 9709585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:51:51.644387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.342362
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The lower court determined that the time of issuance was purposely misdated by the magistrate. The majority concludes that this finding is not supported by the evidence presented during the suppression hearing. This conclusion is based upon what is perceived to be a discrepancy between *218the findings of fact in the lower court’s opinion and the isolated statement made by Judge Louik. The majority chooses to adopt the statement as the finding of the suppression court, rather than the findings which are set forth in the opinion.
The scope of appellate review should be. limited to a determination of whether or not the findings of fact are supported by the record. Reversal of a lower court’s findings should not rest upon a perusal of the record which discloses a statement that seemingly contradicts those findings.1 The majority concludes, as did the Superior Court, that the evidence did not support a finding that the warrant was misdated purposely. This conclusion depends entirely upon a determination, which is contrary to that of the suppression court, that the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses was credible. The question of credibility is solely for the factfinder, who has a unique opportunity to observe a witness. We should not substitute our assessment for that of the suppression judge.
The majority further justifies its affirmance of the Superior Court’s order by suggesting that the Appellant has not been prejudiced, and the police officers did not benefit from the post-dating of the warrant. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 2005(d) requires a search warrant to “direct that the search be executed within a specified period of time, not to exceed two (2) days from the time of issuance.” As indicated in the Comment to the rule, subparagraph (d) is a limitation on reasonableness of the delay between the issuance and service of a search warrant. Therefore, the time of issuance is critical. Where, as here, the suppression court has determined that the time of issuance was purpose*219ly misstated, the validity of the warrant is affected. The danger which exists in misstating the time of issuance is readily apparent. Although the two-day limitation is not extended facially, the practical effect is to extend the time to execute the warrant when the actual time of issuance was prior to the time stated on the warrant. The fact that the warrant was not properly issued in this case might not have come to light but for the fortuity of circumstances which lead the Appellant to inquire into the time of issuance. For this reason, I cannot agree with the majority that no harm arose from the magistrate’s actions.
I respectfully dissent.

. In any event, review of the entire record does not disclose the discrepancy perceived by the majority. Rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that the date of issuance was an inadvertent error, Judge Louik stated that the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth contradicted this contention because it was admitted that the application for a search warrant was improperly executed and that the magistrate testified he had fixed the next morning as the time for the issuance of the search warrant because he was informed that the warrant would be executed at that time. (N.T. pp. 38-40)