Court Opinion

ID: 9683222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:24:58.312122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.467689
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not view what the district court judge did here as an independent investigation. Rather, I would characterize the inquiry as a confirmatory follow-up to candid disclosure of extra-record knowledge regarding a frequent drug-court defendant. While the manner of the judge’s inquiry might have been better handled to avoid giving rise to the claim on appeal, I do not believe that it tainted the whole proceeding such as to warrant a new trial. I would affirm.
*254On October 4, 2000, Lorenzo Dorsey was charged by complaint with a controlled substance crime that carried a mandatory minimum sentence when committed while in possession of a firearm. On December 6, 2001, LaTerrance Paige was shot and killed on a crowded city bus in Brooklyn Park. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.2004). The gunman was apprehended in Chicago, Illinois on January 19, 2002 and subsequently indicted by a grand jury for first-degree murder on February 7, 2002. Id. at 345. Approximately two months later, Dorsey’s controlled-substance-crime bench trial began in the afternoon of April 12, 2002.
Defense witness Pearl Worthy told the district court that a former boyfriend, La-Terrance Paige, would hide weapons in the couch and that she sold the couch to Dorsey after Paige died in May 1999. The prosecutor, apparently aware of the La-Terrance Paige who had died on December 6, 2001, asked Worthy a number of questions about Paige and his death. When the prosecutor asked if Worthy knew any members of Paige’s family, defense counsel objected to the line of questioning as irrelevant. During the bench conference on the objection, the district court disclosed her familiarity with a LaTerrance Paige from drug court, stated her impression that his death was more recent, that the name was unusual and that her “guess” was that “there weren’t two.” In response, the prosecutor said “[w]ell, that is my point, Your Honor, to try to elicit some information so we can try to make a determination as to whether or not this is in fact the same person we are talking about.” The district court then independently determined that the LaTerrance Paige known from drug court died on December 6, 2001, and made that information known at the end of the day. The prosecutor said she knew that, having obtained the same information over the “noon-hour.”
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be tried before a fair and impartial judge. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). The due process clause requires that a defendant receive a “fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.”). In considering a criminal defendant’s due process claim, this court is mindful that “ ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.2002) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)).
Judges are generally prohibited from independently investigating facts in a case and “must consider only the evidence presented.” Minn.Code Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(7) cmt. Likewise, jurors are prohibited from going beyond the evidence presented to them. “The exposure of a jury to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the material.” State v. Varner, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn.2002) (quoting State v. Cox, 322 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn.1982)). Upon discovery that a juror has been exposed to potentially prejudicial material outside the trial proceedings, the normal procedure is to examine the juror in camera to ascertain the nature of the material and whether the juror can remain impartial. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. *2559; cf. State v. Drieman, 457 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.1990) (“The test is whether a prospective juror can set aside his or her impression or opinion and render an impartial verdict.”)
Here, the judge sitting as finder of fact fulfilled her obligation for candor, disclosing information that she believed might have a bearing on her ability to remain impartial. Minn.Code Judicial Conduct, Canon 3D(1) cmt. (“A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there really is no real basis for disqualification.”). That the judge verified the date of death of a recent homicide victim whose name came up at trial, in my view, was more akin to a confirmatory follow-up of an immutable fact and not an independent investigation. Cf. Harrison v. Anderson, 300 F.Supp.2d 690, 706-10, 714 (S.D.Ind.2004) (trial judge committed “forensic misconduct” in personal participation in development of pretrial proceedings, including the acquisition and presentation of his own evidence at a change-of-judge hearing); Smith v. State, 64 Md.App. 625, 498 A.2d 284, 289 (1985) (denial of due process where judge, through his law clerk, investigated allegations relating to defendant’s probation violation and relied on information gained by the investigation to revoke probation); State v. Oden, 385 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Minn.App.1986) (holding that defendant was denied a fair trial where trial court obtained defendant’s traffic record, provided the information to the prosecutor and permitted its use for impeachment); State v. Vanmanivong, 261 Wis.2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76, 89-90 (2003) (concluding the circuit court erred when it independently requested additional information from law enforcement and relied upon that information in ruling on disclosure of identities of confidential informants; but holding error harmless in the context of the case).
I am also not so sure of the majority’s assumption of the extrajudicial-source doctrine. Under Minnesota’s Canon 3D(1) and 3D(l)(a), which is similar to statutory grounds for judicial recusal found at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) (2000),1 a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to where “the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]” Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), judicial recusal is limited to bias or prejudice arising from extrajudicial sources because “the pejorative connotation of the terms ‘bias’ and ‘prejudice’ demands that they be applied to judicial predispositions that go beyond what is normal and acceptable.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).2 The extrajudicial source doctrine applies to section 455(a) as well. Id. at 552-53, 114 S.Ct. 1147.
As the Liteky author Justice Scalia noted, however, there is not much “doctrine to the doctrine.” Id. at 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147.
*256The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is not a necessary condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since predispositions developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is it a sufficient condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice. Since neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) “extrajudicial source” factor, than of an “extrajudicial source” doctrine, in recusal jurisprudence.
Id. (emphasis original). The majority acknowledges that an extra-judicial source is neither a necessary nor a sufficient ground for disqualification but nonetheless appears to suggest that source — general judicial capacity — -is determinative.
I recognize that the dichotomy between extrajudicial and intrajudicial sources has some value: “it provides a convenient shorthand to explain how courts have confronted the disqualification issue in circumstances that recur with some frequency.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 561, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, difficulties in the application of the extrajudicial-source rule include understanding where the boundary lies between an intra-judicial and extrajudicial source.
Then there are the timeliness requirements for recusal motions. While 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b) not contain specific timeliness requirements, some circuits impose a timeliness requirement upon section 455 generally, some require timeliness under section 455(a) and (b), and others draw a distinction between (a) and (b). United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1054 n. 6 (5th Cir.1989).
Inasmuch as the due process issue is dispositive in this case, I doubt that it is altogether necessary to reach the judicial disqualification issue. Under principles of judicial restraint, we generally refrain from “deciding any issue not essential to the disposition of the particular controversy before us.” Lipka v. Minn. Sch. Employees Ass’n., Local 1980, 550 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn.1996).
In summary, I do not believe Dorsey has demonstrated structural error. He has not demonstrated that the judge was actually biased, as was the case in Bracy, 520 U.S. at 901, 117 S.Ct. 1793, or that the judge’s behavior fundamentally affected the fairness of the trial proceedings. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). While the judge’s inquiry following the disclosure of extra-record knowledge might have been regrettable, I do not think it can be deemed to have deprived Dorsey of a fair trial, particularly when considered in the context of the entire proceedings, including that Dorsey made no motion for judicial recusal.

. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) provide:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding!)]

. The origin of the "extrajudicial source” doctrine is in the "pejorative connotation of the words 'bias or prejudice’ " and not in the term "personal” contained in the federal judicial disqualification statute. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51, 114 S.Ct. 1147.