Court Opinion

ID: 9896593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 19:04:07.02504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.541030
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                            DIVISION SIX

CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION                 2d Civ. No. B320153
AND INDUSTRIAL                        (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-
MATERIALS ASSOCIATION,                       00527805)
                                         (Ventura County)
     Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF VENTURA,

     Defendant and Respondent;

LOS PADRES FORESTWATCH
et al.

     Interveners and Respondents.

                                        2d Civ. No. B320174
VENTURA COUNTY                        (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-
COALITION OF LABOR,                          00527815)
AGRICULTURE AND                          (Ventura County)
BUSINESS,

     Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
COUNTY OF VENTURA,

  Defendant and Respondent;

LOS PADRES FORESTWATCH
et al.

  Interveners and Respondents.

       Here we decide that a county ordinance creating a wildlife
migration corridor does not violate the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act or the California Environmental Quality Act.
       The California Construction and Industrial Materials
Association and the Ventura County Coalition of Labor,
Agriculture and Business (Project Opponents) separately
petitioned for writs of mandate to require the County of Ventura
(County) to vacate an ordinance (the Project) creating overlay
zones to protect wildlife migration corridors in rural portions of
the County.
       The Project Opponents claim the Project violates the
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA) (Pub. Res.
Code, 1 § 2710 et seq.) and the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.). The trial court denied the
petitions.
       We consolidate the appeals and affirm.

      1 All statutory references are to the Public Resources Code

unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
                                FACTS
                    Permitting Prior to the Project
       Prior to the adoption of the Project, the County’s non-
coastal zoning ordinance required a conditional use permit (CUP)
for all mineral resource development.
       The County’s general plan required that to obtain a CUP
the applicant must show among other matters: the proposed
development is consistent with the County’s general plan and
ordinances; the proposed development will not be obnoxious or
harmful; the proposed development will not be detrimental to the
public interest, health, safety, convenience, or welfare; and the
proposed development complies with CEQA and all other
applicable laws.
       The general plan also stated the policy that “[a]pplications
for mineral resource development shall be reviewed to assure
minimal disturbance to the environment . . . .” The general plan
includes a specific policy for the preservation of wildlife migration
corridors.
                              The Project
       Prior to the Project, the County had no standards or
regulations specifically governing wildlife movement corridors.
Wildlife movement issues were decided through the County’s
discretionary permitting process and environmental review.
       The Project is a County ordinance creating two overlay
zones designed to preserve corridors that allow wild animals to
move freely throughout the zones. The overlay zones cover
approximately 163,000 acres of less developed areas of the
County.
       The first overlay zone is entitled “Habitat Connectivity and
Wildlife Corridors Overlay Zone.” It provides:

                                 3
       “The general purposes of Habitat Connectivity and Wildlife
Corridors overlay zone are to preserve functional connectivity for
wildlife and vegetation throughout the overlay zone by
minimizing direct and indirect barriers, minimizing loss of
vegetation and habitat fragmentation and minimizing impacts to
those areas that are narrow, impacted or otherwise tenuous with
respect to wildlife movement. More specifically, the purposes of
the Habitat Connectivity and Wildlife Corridors overlay zone
include the following:
       “a. Minimize the indirect impacts to wildlife created by
outdoor lighting, such as disorientation of nocturnal species and
the disruption of mating, feeding, migrating, and the predator-
prey balance.
       “b. Preserve the functional connectivity and habitat quality
of surface water features, due to the vital role they play in
providing refuge and resources for wildlife.
       “c. Protect and enhance wildlife crossing structures to help
facilitate safe wildlife passage.
       “d. Minimize the introduction of invasive plants, which can
increase fire risk, reduce water availability, accelerate erosion
and flooding, and diminish biodiversity within an ecosystem.
       “e. Minimize wildlife impermeable fencing, which can
create barriers to food and water, shelter, and breeding access to
unrelated members of the same species needed to maintain
genetic diversity.” (Italics omitted.)
       The second overlay zone is entitled “Critical Wildlife
Passage Areas Overlay Zone.” It provides: “There are three
critical wildlife passage areas that are located entirely within the
boundaries of the larger Habitat Connectivity and Wildlife
Corridors overlay zone. These areas are particularly critical for

                                 4
facilitating wildlife movement due to any of the following: (1) the
existence of intact native habitat or other habitat with important
beneficial values for wildlife; (2) proximity to water bodies or
ridgelines; (3) proximity to critical roadway crossings; (4)
likelihood of encroachment by future development which could
easily disturb wildlife movement and plant dispersal; or (5)
presence of non-urbanized or underdeveloped lands within a
geographic location that connects core habitats at the regional
scale.”
       The Project also amends the County’s general plan and
other ordinances to carry out its purpose.
       The state geologist sent the County two letters opining that
SMARA requires a statement of reasons for permitting a
“proposed use” that would threaten the potential to export
minerals in designated areas. (§ 2762, subd. (d)(1).) 2 The County
refused to do so on the ground that SMARA’s requirement for a
statement of reasons does not apply to the Project.

      2 Section 2762, subdivision (d)(1): “If an area is classified
by the State Geologist as an area described in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (b) of Section 2761 and the lead agency either has
designated that area in its general plan as having important
minerals to be protected pursuant to subdivision (a), or otherwise
has not yet acted pursuant to subdivision (a), then prior to
permitting a use that would threaten the potential to extract
minerals in that area, the lead agency shall prepare, in
conjunction with preparing, if required, an environmental
document required by Division 13 (commencing with Section
21000), a statement specifying its reasons for permitting the
proposed use, and shall forward a copy to the State Geologist and
the board for review.”

                                 5
                              Procedure
      The Project Opponents brought separate petitions for a writ
of mandate ordering the County to set aside its approval of the
Project and to comply with SMARA, CEQA, and the CEQA
guidelines (Guidelines). 3 They also sought a declaration that the
County violated SMARA, CEQA, and the Guidelines in approving
the Project.
      The County opposed the petitions on the grounds that 1)
SMARA does not apply; 2) if SMARA applies, the Project
Opponents have failed to show prejudice from the failure to
comply; and 3) the Project is exempt from CEQA.
      The trial court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of
the administrative record only. The court found for the County
and denied both petitions. The Project Opponents appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
                             I. SMARA
      The Project Opponents contend the County violated
SMARA.
      In 1982 the State Mining and Geology Board designated 10
sectors within the County as areas of regionally significant
mineral resources. (§ 2761, subd. (b)(2).) Section 2762,
subdivision (d)(1), provides in part, “[P]rior to permitting a use
that would threaten the potential to extract minerals in [a
designated] area, the lead agency shall prepare . . . a statement

      3 The administrative regulations implementing CEQA,

which are authorized by section 21083, are set forth in the
California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq. All
references to “Guidelines” are to those administrative
regulations.

                                 6
specifying its reasons for permitting the proposed use, and shall
forward a copy to the State Geologist and the board for review.”
       The County argues it was not required to comply with the
subdivision because it was not “permitting a use” and the Project
would not “threaten the potential to extract minerals.” (§ 2762,
subd. (d)(1).)
       The meaning of “permitting a use” is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. (Cleveland National
Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
1021, 1041.) In ascertaining the Legislature’s intent, we begin
with the words of the statute, assigning them their ordinary
meaning. (Ibid.) If the words of the statute are not ambiguous,
the plain meaning governs. (Ibid.) The meaning of “permitting a
use” is a question of first impression.
       The trial court interpreted “permitting a use” broadly to
include changes in permitting requirements. The court concluded
that, under its interpretation, the Project is governed by SMARA.
       We presume that had the Legislature intended section 2762
to include changes in permitting requirements, it would have
said so. We also presume that when the Legislature said
“permitting a use,” it meant what it said. It did not mean simply
changing permitting requirements that may have the potential
for changing what uses are permitted.
       The Project Opponents argue that the Project permits a
“use,” namely a wildlife corridor. But the use is by wildlife. We
are confident that wildlife is loath to seek permission from the
County. It pretty much goes where it will. The Project sets
standards for future developments that might interfere with the
movement of wildlife. That is not permitting a use.

                                7
      That the state geologist sent two letters to the County
opining that the County must issue a statement of reasons is
irrelevant. The plain wording of section 2762 does not require a
statement of reasons.
      In any event, the Project Opponents are seeking traditional
mandate. Traditional mandate requires that the petitioner show
prejudice resulting from the public agency’s action. (California
Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1449.) To show prejudice, the Project
Opponents must show it is reasonably probable that they would
have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the
alleged error. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
548, 574.)
      The reason for the Project is stated in the ordinance itself:
“[T]o preserve functional connectivity for wildlife and vegetation
throughout the overlay zone.” The public had ample opportunity
to comment on the Project through the legislative process. The
Project Opponents commented on the Project; so did numerous
other members of the public. The state geologist was aware of
the Project and commented that it threatens the extraction of
mineral resources. The County was well aware of the comments
by members of the public and the position taken by the state
geologist when it approved the Project. Even had the County
given the state geologist a formal statement of reasons, nothing
in SMARA gives the state geologist the power to stop or modify
the Project. Nothing in the record shows it is reasonably
probable that the Project Opponents would have obtained a more
favorable result had the County issued a statement of reasons.

                                 8
                               II. CEQA
                         Statutory Background
       The first step in an environmental analysis is to determine
whether an activity qualifies as a “project” within the meaning of
CEQA. Not everything a local agency decides to do is a project
subject to CEQA. CEQA generally applies “to discretionary
projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public
agencies.” (§ 21080, subd. (a).) It is undisputed that the Project
at issue here qualifies as a project within the meaning of CEQA.
       If an activity is determined to be a project, the next phase
of inquiry is to determine whether the project is exempt from
CEQA. Our Legislature has created a number of statutory
exemptions (§ 21080, subd. (b)) and has directed the Secretary of
the Natural Resources to create further exemptions for projects
that have been determined not to have a significant impact on
the environment (§ 21084, subd. (a); see Guidelines, § 15300 et
seq.)
       Exemptions created by such regulations are called
“categorical exemptions.” (Guidelines, § 15354.) In addition to
statutory and categorical exemptions, there is a “common sense”
exemption “[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there is no
possibility that the activity in question may have a significant
effect on the environment.” (Id., § 15061, subd. (b)(3).)
       Where a project is found to be exempt from CEQA, no
further environmental review is necessary. (Muzzy Ranch Co. v.
Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372,
380.) If a project is not exempt, environmental review must
proceed. (Id. at pp. 380-381.)

                                 9
                            Exemptions
      Here, in approving the Project, the County relied on the
“common sense” exemption and Classes 7 and 8 categorical
exemptions.
      “Class 7 consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies as
authorized by state law or local ordinance to assure the
maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource
where the regulatory process involves procedures for protection of
the environment. Examples include but are not limited to
wildlife preservation activities of the State Department of Fish
and Game. Construction activities are not included in this
exemption.” (Guidelines, § 15307.)
      “Class 8 consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies, as
authorized by state or local ordinance, to assure the
maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the
environment where the regulatory process involves procedures
for protection of the environment. Construction activities and
relaxation of standards allowing environmental degradation are
not included in this exemption.” (Guidelines, § 15308.)
      In reviewing an agency’s decision that a project is within a
categorical exemption, we determine only whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence. (Aptos Residents Assn. v.
County of Santa Cruz (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1046.)
      There can be no rational dispute that the Project qualifies
as an action taken by the County to “assure the maintenance,
restoration or enhancement of a natural resource.” (Guidelines,
§ 15307.) Nor can it be disputed that the Project involves
“procedures for the protection of the environment.” (Guidelines,
§ 15308.) The Project falls squarely within the plain language of
the Classes 7 and 8 exemptions.

                                10
       There is more than ample evidence to support the finding of
an exemption. The evidence includes studies and other
documents citing the need to preserve wildlife corridors and the
establishment of development standards compatible with wildlife
movement, as well as preservations by experts.
       The Project Opponents argue that the Project does not
assure the protection of the environment because it may have
adverse impacts. They speculate that if local mining is
prohibited, necessary building materials such as rock aggregate
may need to be transported from a distant area, thus increasing
pollution created by the transportation.
       But nothing in the language of the Project prohibits the
extraction of minerals. Speculation that it could have that effect
is not evidence. Even if such speculation could be considered
evidence, the substantial evidence rule would require that we
treat the evidence as lacking verity. (GHK Associates v. Mayer
Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 872.)
       Moreover, the language of the exemptions does not require
the agency to show its project assures the protection of the entire
environment. The plain language of the Class 7 exemption only
requires the agency to show the Project assures the protection of
“a natural resource.” (Guidelines, § 15307.) The County has
abundant evidence to support that finding. Wildlife is “a natural
resource” that is entitled to protection. (See Guidelines, Appen.
G, § IV subd. (d) [providing a checklist of factors to consider the
environmental impacts of a project including whether the project
will “[i]nterfere substantially with the movement of any native
resident or migratory fish or wildlife species or with established
native resident or migratory wildlife corridors, or impede the use
of native wildlife nursery sites”].)

                                11
       The Project Opponents’ reliance on Wildlife Alive v.
Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 (Wildlife Alive) is misplaced.
There a wildlife protection association petitioned for a writ of
mandate requiring the Fish and Game Commission to suspend
the black bear hunting season because the commission failed to
prepare an environmental impact report. In opposition, amicus
curiae argued that the hunting program came with a categorical
exemption with wording similar to the present Classes 7 and 8
exemptions. Our Supreme Court rejected the amicus argument
stating, “[W]here there is any reasonable possibility that a project
or activity may have a significant effect on the environment, an
exemption would be improper.” (Id. at p. 206.)
       Wildlife Alive was disapproved in Berkley Hillside
Preservation v. City of Berkley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1106-1109
(Berkley Hillside). There the city granted a permit to construct a
6,478-square-foot house with a 10-car garage on a steep slope.
The city found that the project was exempt from CEQA as a
single family residence in a residential zone (Class 3; Guidelines,
§ 15303) and an in-fill development (Class 32; Guidelines,
§ 15332). Opponents of the project claimed that all they needed
to defeat the exemption was a fair argument that the project
would have a potentially significant environmental effect. In
rejecting the opponents’ argument, our Supreme Court stated:
“[T]he Legislature, through the Guidelines, intended to
enumerate classes of projects that are exempt from CEQA
because, notwithstanding their potential effect on the
environment, they already ‘have been determined not to have a
significant effect on the environment.’ (§ 21084, subd. (a).) The
Guidelines implement this intent, by setting forth the ‘classes of
projects’ that the Secretary, acting ‘[i]n response to the [the

                                12
Legislature’s] mandate,’ ‘has found . . . do not have a significant
effect on the environment.’ (Guidelines, § 15300.).” (Id. at
p. 1102.)
       To defeat the categorical exemption, opponents must show
more than a fair argument that the Project may have a
significant environmental effect. (Berkley Hillside, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 1102.) Parties who oppose a categorically exempt
project because it will have a potentially significant
environmental effect must show it qualifies for an exception
under Guidelines section 15300.2. (Ibid.)
                       Exception to Exemptions
       Guidelines section 15300.2, subdivision (c), provides: “A
categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where
there is reasonable possibility that the activity will have a
significant effect on the environment due to unusual
circumstances.” “ ‘Significant effect on the environment’ means
a substantial or potentially substantial, adverse change in the
environment.” (§ 21068, italics added.)
       A party challenging the exemption has the burden of
producing evidence supporting an exception. (Berkley Hillside,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1105.) The challenge must show both
that: 1) there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will
have a significant effect on the environment; and 2) the effect is
due to unusual circumstances. (Id. at pp. 1097-1098.) In
deciding whether an exemption applies, an agency must also
consider whether an exception to the exemption applies under
Guidelines section 15300.2. (Berkley Hillside, at p. 1103.)
       As to the existence of “unusual circumstances,” the agency
serves as the finder of fact, and a reviewing court applies the
traditional substantial evidence standard. (Berkley Hillside,

                                 13
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) We resolve all evidentiary conflicts
and indulge in all reasonable interferences in the agency’s favor.
(Ibid.)
       Concerning the “reasonable possibility” part of the
exception, the question for the agency and the reviewing court is
whether there is substantial evidence to support a “fair
argument” that there is a reasonable possibility the unusual
circumstances will produce a significant effect on the
environment. (Berkley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.5th at p. 1115.)
       There is an alternative test. Where there is substantial
evidence that the Project will produce a significant effect on the
environment – not simply a reasonable possibility of an effect –
both elements of an exemption under Guidelines section 15300.2
have been met. (Berkley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.5th at p. 1105.)
       An exemption is created when under ordinary
circumstances a qualifying project will not have a significant
effect on the environment. (Berkley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.5th at
p. 1102.) Substantial evidence that the Project will have a
significant effect on the environment per se shows unusual
circumstance. (Id. at p. 1105.) We apply the deferential
substantial evidence standard to the agency’s decision in
reviewing this alternative. (World Business Academy v. State
Lands Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 499.)
                       Unusual Circumstances
       A party may establish unusual circumstances by showing
“that the project has some feature that distinguishes it from
others in the exempt class, such as its size or location.” (Berkley
Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.5th at p. 1105.) The Project Opponents
fail to make such a showing.

                                14
       The Project Opponents claim that the Project is
significantly larger than other projects in its class. But they cite
no such evidence. In fact, the cases they cite show the opposite.
The Project Opponents cite cases involving ordinances banning
plastic bags, where such ordinances were determined to qualify
for Classes 7 and 8 exemptions. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition
v. City and County of San Francisco (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 863;
Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. County of Marin (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 209.) Those projects covered entire counties. In
addition, the Class 7 exemption gives an example of wildlife
preservation activities of the Department of Fish and Game.
Those activities cover the entire state.
       The Project Opponents claim that the Project’s location
distinguishes it from other projects in its exempt class. They
point out that the Project overlays 10,000 acres of classified
mineral resources. But they cite no evidence that other projects
in Classes 7 and 8 do not overlay similar resources. Neither
mining nor ordinances that attempt to preserve wildlife are
unique to the County.
       The Project Opponents compare the Project to the Class 33
exemption. That exemption is for projects not to exceed five acres
to assure the maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or
protection of habitat for fish, plants, or wildlife. (Guidelines,
§ 15333.) But the County is not relying on the Class 33
exemption. It is relying on the Classes 7 and 8 exemptions. They
are separate exemptions and not comparable.
       The Project Opponents fail to carry their burden showing
unusual circumstances. We need not determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support a fair argument that there is a
reasonable possibility unusual circumstances will produce a

                                15
significant adverse effect on the environment. Nevertheless,
there is no substantial evidence that would support such a fair
argument.
                            Fair Argument
       The Project Opponents argue that the Project will have a
significant adverse impact because: 1) it is located on land zoned
as mineral resource protection and is adjacent to a principal
access road to an existing aggregate CUP; and 2) it has the
potential to hamper or preclude extraction of or access to
aggregate resources.
       But nothing in the Project prohibits mining or access to a
permitted mine. The potential for hampering or precluding
mining is a proposition based on speculation. The Project
Opponents point to no requirements that could not also have
been imposed under the former requirements for a mining CUP.
The former rules governing the operation for a CUP required
applicants to show the proposed development will not be
obnoxious or harmful; it will not be detrimental to the public
interest, health, safety, convenience, or welfare; and that it is
consistent with the County’s general plan.
       The County’s general plan provided that applications for
resource development shall be reviewed to assure minimal
disturbance to the environment and contained a specific policy for
the preservation of wildlife migration corridors. In deciding
whether to grant a CUP, and if so on what conditions, the County
was required to preserve wildlife migration corridors.
       Any one of those provisions would have been sufficient to
impose the same or similar restrictions and conditions on mining
as may be imposed under the Project. The Project made explicit
what was implicit in the prior law. That is not close to a fair

                               16
argument that there is a reasonable possibility the Project may
have an adverse effect on the environment.
      It follows that the Project Opponents have failed to show
the Project will have an adverse environmental effect.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
respondents.
             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                               17
                     Mark S. Borrell, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Kerry Shapiro and
Matthew D. Hinks for Plaintiff and Appellant California
Construction and Industrial Materials Association.
      Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Matthew D. Hinks and
Seena M. Samimi for Plaintiff and Appellant Ventura County
Coalition of Labor, Agriculture and Business.
      Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Jeffrey E. Barnes, Chief
Assistant County Counsel, Franchesca S. Verdin, Assistant
County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent County of
Ventura.
      University of California, Irvine School of Law
Environmental Law Clinic, and Michael Robinson-Dorn for
Interveners and Respondents Los Padres ForestWatch et al.