Court Opinion

ID: 9720686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:39:29.960255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.626421
License: Public Domain

BROWN (G. A.), P. J.
I dissent.
The chronology of events shows that: (1) On November 13, 1973, after a full pretrial hearing on the issue of present sanity at which the reports of three court-appointed psychiatrists were considered, a pretrial judge found appellant presently sane and able to proceed to trial. The majority opinion raises no issue concerning the propriety of this ruling nor the adequacy of the evidence to support it. (2) At the close of the prosecution’s case on November 21, 1973, defense counsel made an in camera request that the trial judge reconsider appellant’s present sanity. The record indicates that prior to counsel’s request appellant had asked the court to subpoena the documents and witnesses referred to in the majority opinion. The court denied the request to reopen the sanity hearing and, in doing so, did not rely exclusively upon the prior psychiatric reports but expressly stated that the court had observed appellant during the trial. (3) During appellant’s defense case he testified as set forth in the majority opinion.
The majority raises no issue regarding the pretrial ruling nor, indeed, as to the ruling denying the request to reopen made before appellant took the witness stand. The reversal therefore is predicated upon the judge’s failure to declare a doubt sua sponte grounded upon appellant’s testimony during his defense. This necessarily involves a determination by this court that such testimony is sufficient as a matter of law to require that the trial judge should have entertained a doubt as to appellant’s present sanity and ordered a full hearing. No other case has purported to hold that such a slim showing constitutes, as a matter of law, substantial evidence requiring the trial judge to declare a doubt. It appears to be directly contrary to the holding in the leading case of People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 285 [61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228], which stated: “An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate [Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 (15 L.Ed.2d 815, 86 S.Ct. 836)] and Pennington [People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 (58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942)] more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizzare actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation] or *64statements of defense counsel that defendant is incapable of cooperating in his defense [citation] or psychiatric testimony that defendant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or such diagnosis with little reference to defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense [citation].” (See also People v. Bryant (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 901 [71 Cal.Rptr. 117].)
In People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 [58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942], substantial evidence of lack of present sanity was found in an opinion of a clinical psychologist supported by “. .. a previous diagnosis of schizophrenia and paranoia, a current diagnosis of a more paranoid condition, defendant’s current unfeigned hallucinations, and defendant’s fits of psychotic furor ... in the courthouse and during the trial; . . .” (Pennington, as characterized in People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 283.)
In People v. Humphrey (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 32 [119 Cal.Rptr. 74], the record showed that the defendant had been committed several times to mental institutions, he was hallucinating and acting in response to his hallucinations, he was unable to cooperate in psychological testing, he suffered from delusions of persecution, he had loss of memory, and he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic requiring treatment in a closed setting.
In my opinion, the majority decision injects a doubt in the mind of the trial judge who, being familiar with his duty under the law, had no doubt. It establishes an intolerable sua sponte burden upon a trial judge, and the decision is not consonant with prior directives or decisions.
The majority also relies upon the fact that the psychiatrists, who heard appellant’s direct testimony during the guilt phase of the trial in preparation for their testimony during the sanity phase, testified during the sanity phase that they had not been' fully aware of the extent of appellant’s delusional condition until they heard his testimony. However, it is noted that such knowledge did not change their opinions as to appellant’s sanity under the M’Naughton test. The majority, however, speculates that that knowledge would change the psychiatrists’ opinions as to appellant’s sanity under Penal Code section 1368. I would agree that if that change in opinion appeared in the record, a reversal would be justified. However, there is nothing in the record to support that conclusion. A reversal, therefore, is in part based upon pure speculation. If, having heard that testimony, it did in fact change the psychiatrists’ *65opinions with respect to the present sanity issue, the matter should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which case this court would not be basing its decision on guesswork.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 28, 1976.