Court Opinion

ID: 9681805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:56:52.169482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.963436
License: Public Domain

SHANNON, Justice.
I dissent.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19, § 18(b), provides, as to premise defects, that “. . . the unit of government shall owe to any claimant only the duty owed by private persons to a licensee on private property . . .” The question in the case is then, one of defining the duty owed by the licensor to a licensee.
*223The trial court concluded, and the majority of this Court has agreed, that the duty to warn a licensee of a condition on the premises arises if the . . licensee knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that such licensees will not discover or realize the danger.” 1 (emphasis added)
I am unable to agree that the above statement is the law in Texas. The general rule is that a licensor owes a licensee a duty only with references to wilful, active, or wanton negligence. Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941), Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950). An exception to the general rule is in that situation wherein the licensor has knowledge of a dangerous condition, and the licensee does not, a duty arises on the part of the licensor to warn or make the condition reasonably safe. Gonzalez v. Broussard, 274 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Civ.App.1954, writ ref’d n. r. e.). See Bass v. Cummings, 415 S. W.2d 438 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
In Gonzalez, the danger to the licensee was actually known to the licensor. The licensee, a child, broke his leg when he stumbled over a rock located on a playground provided at the licensor’s premises. Justice Pope in the opinion noted in that connection, “There also was proof that the owner knew of the presence of the rocks in the area; that he had on many occasions seen them . . . ”
Gonzalez conforms to the generally recognized rule that the duty to warn licensees of dangerous conditions arises only in those instances wherein the licensor knows of the condition likely to cause injury. See Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (U.S.Ct. of App., 10th Cir., 1952), Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 152 A.2d 20(1959), 55 A.L.R.2d 525, et seq., Prosser, Law of Torts, § 60, p. 380 (4th ed. 1971).
The duty imposed by § 342 of the Restatement of Torts 2d, and espoused by the majority, in effect, obliterates the common law distinctions between invitees and licensees and imposes on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 569 (1968). In some states the courts have deliberately abolished those distinctions. Rowland v. Christian, supra, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969), while other courts have retained them. Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 402 F.2d 332 (U.S.Ct. of App., 1st Cir., 1968). See 32 A.L.R.3d 510, et seq. Such a change may, or may not, be desirable in Texas,2 but it is not the office of this Court, nor the trial court, to approve such an abrupt departure from a rule so firmly established in the jurisprudence of this State. See Buchholz v. Steitz, 463 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.Civ.App., 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is particularly so in this case in view of the fact that the Legislature must have had purpose in deliberately choosing to limit the liability of the State with respect to premise defects.
The judgment is bottomed upon the finding of fact by the trial court that, “The State of Texas, through its servants, knew or should have known of the dangerous conditions of the floors . . . ” From a review of the evidence, I am of the opinion that the trial court could well have concluded that the State, through its serv*224ants, should have known of that condition. However, that finding is inadequate to support the judgment, since a showing of actual knowledge is required. The record contains no evidence to support the finding that the State or its agents knew of the dangerous condition.
The law, defining the duty owed a licensee by a licensor, is clear; equally clear is the obligation of this Court to apply that law. I would reverse the judgment and render judgment for appellant.

. The conclusion of law of the trial court concerning the licensor’s duty to the licensee is obviously taken from American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 342 (1965).

. Many legal scholars, Dean Page Keeton among them, believe that the distinctions betwee'n invitees and licensees should bo abolished. Southern Methodist University ; Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Torts, 25 S.AV.L..T. 1, 5 (1971), see also the secondary materials cited in Rowland v. Christian, supra.