Court Opinion

ID: 9853222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:44:41.267988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.041532
License: Public Domain

Steinle, J.
(dissenting). Analysis of the legislative history of the 1953 amendment of sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., indicates that said amendment was enacted to sanction situations comparable to those in such cases as Budke v. Holvick (1949), 255 Wis. 293, 38 N. W. (2d) 479, Trapino v. Trapino (1951), 260 Wis. 137, 50 N. W. (2d) 467, and Ullman v. Freye (1953), 263 Wis. 199, 56 N. W. (2d) 821, wherein this court held that the failure of technical observance of the two-year notice of injury provided in the statute was not fatal. In the Budke Case it was held that the notice of injury, although technically defective because the copies of the notice had not been signed manually by the claimant, was nevertheless valid because there had been substantial compliance with the requirement of the statute as to signature of the claimant. In the Trapino Case it was held that the personal service of the notice of injury outside the state constituted sufficient compliance. In the Ullman Case the notice had failed to state the date of the injury, but it was held that because such date was easily ascertainable, there had been sufficient compliance.
In no case has this court recognized the validity of the mailing of the notice of injury as a proper substitute method for the personal service of the notice. Whenever such matter was presented for this court’s consideration, it was held that mailing of the notice or the correspondence between the parties with respect to the claim, did not dispense with the requirement of the personal service thereof. See Beyer v. Seymer (1946), 249 Wis. 257, 24 N. W. (2d) 616, Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (1905), 124 Wis. 120, 102 N. W. 336, Lockman v. Steensland (1921), 174 Wis. 570, *338183 N. W. 676, and Olson v. Stella Cheese Co. (1948), 254 Wis. 62, 35 N. W. (2d) 220.
In view of the consistent determination by this court in such regard over a period of many years, it appears to me that only a definite and clear-cut expression by the legislature declaring a change of such policy, would warrant a different construction. The amendment in question does not specify that mailing of the notice may be substituted for the personal service thereof.
Under the amendment the declared purpose of the provision in the statute relating to the service of a notice within two years, is (a) to prevent the prosecution of claims after the investigation of the facts upon which they are based, shall have become difficult, and (b) the notice shall not be deemed insufficient if it substantially advises the person to whom it is addressed of the principal facts upon which the claim is based. As to the first of such considerations it seems plain that the legislature intended that the statute limit the time within which the notice was to be served. In Maurer v. Northwestern Iron Co. (1912), 151 Wis. 172, 173, 138 N. W. 636, when referring to the manner of serving a notice of injury, this court said :
“While not a statute of limitation, in the technical sense, it is so near akin thereto as to be classed therewith and called ‘a statute in the nature of a statute of limitation.’ Meisenheimer v. Kellogg, 106 Wis. 30, 81 N. W. 1033; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003; Malloy v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 109 Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130.”
Manifestly by its declaration in the 1953 amendment of the statute the legislature intended to lend continued approval of the court’s determination that the statute was “in the nature of a statute of limitation.” Actually statutes of limitation are statutes of repose,- — one of the purposes of which is to suppress stale claims from springing up at great dis*339tances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death, or removal of witnesses. See 53 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions, pp. 902, 903, sec. lb. (1).
It thus appears that by its declaration of purpose in this regard, the legislature meant to emphasize the absoluteness of the requirement that there be compliance within the time provided.
Under the other part of the declaration of purpose appearing in the amendment, it seems plain that the legislature meant that technical defects with respect to content of the notice would not be fatal providing that there was sufficient compliance.
In Trapino v. Trapino, supra, it does not appear that this court would have approved the delivery of the notice of injury had it been mailed.
In view of these considerations, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination.