Court Opinion

ID: 9532575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:44.26407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.204467
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). The majority states “the judgment was silent as to any intended income tax consequences.” Simultaneously, the majority recognizes that trial courts are obliged to consider income tax consequences in a property stipulation, Wetzel v. Wetzel, 35 Wis.2d 103, 110, 150 N.W.2d 482 (1967), and that the trial court in this case was aware that income tax considerations played a significant role; yet the majority concludes that the judgment unambiguously allocates to Jean Wright the income tax liability for the payments made by William to Jean. I cannot agree, and would find the judgment ambiguous as to the tax consequences of the payments to Jean Wright. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the circuit court for a determination of the original intent of the judgment.
Judgments are to be construed in the same manner as other written instruments, Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 67 Wis.2d 477, 482, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975), and are to be construed as of the time of entry. Childs v. Dahlke, 160 Wis. 184, *264192, 151 N.W. 378 (1915). If reasonably or fairly susceptible to different constructions, a written instrument is ambiguous. Lemke v. Larsen Co., 35 Wis.2d 427, 432, 151 N.W.2d 17 (1967).
Section 71(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that periodic payments are income to the ex-wife if they are received after a decree of divorce and in discharge of the husband’s “legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.” This section “contemplates a payment made in pursuance of the husband’s obligation of support and not in satisfaction of some property rights of the former spouse.” Van Orman v. C.I.R., 418 F.2d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 1969).
Under Section 71(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, installment payments discharging an obligation to pay a principal sum specified in the decree are not to be treated as “periodic payments” within the meaning of Section 71(a) unless the decree provides that the principal sum “is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree,” in which case the amount received constitutes a “periodic payment” with the meaning of Section 71 (c) (2) “to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum.”
Therefore, to be includable under Section 71 in the gross income of the wife, the principal sum must be payable in installments over a period in excess of ten years and must be in discharge of an obligation of maintenance imposed under the decree of divorce because of the marital relationship. If includable in the gross income of the wife, the payments may be deducted by the husband. IRC Section 215v
Admittedly, the judgment is silent with regard to its tax consequences. But silence cannot be equated with *265unambiguity, especially where we have stated “it seems more proper to presume the trial court followed the holding of Wetzel v. Wetzel than that it did not.” Seiler v. Seiler, 48 Wis.2d 400, 406, 180 N.W.2d 627 (1970). Fears that this analysis allows ambiguity to be found whenever an instrument is silent on a particular point are exaggerated, for we can find support in the record that the point at issue here, the income tax consequences, was considered in the statement of the stipulation in open court.
In my view, the judgment is fairly susceptible to different constructions. Although installment payments executing the “property settlement” were to be made over a period greater than ten years, the trial court took the specific step of denying alimony. The decree of divorce, at least on its face, imposes no obligation of maintenance. Here Jean Wright had a sufficient personal estate to accommodate her support, and the court recognized this in approving that portion of the stipulation which provided there would be no alimony. Because the parties had been married nineteen years, Jean was entitled to the portion of their accumulated estate in the sum of $228,000. I do not think it unreasonable to view the judgment as intending that Jean Wright receive $228,000 as a division of property, free of income tax liability. Nor is it entirely unreasonable to view the judgment as contemplating a division of property on the basis of the parties’ respective property ownership at the time of divorce, plus payments for Jean’s maintenance to be made over a period of ten and one-half years. As noted by the United States Court of Appeals, this is “a close and difficult case.” Wright v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 543 F.2d 593, 598 (1976).
Because I would find ambiguity in the original judgment, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court. While normally the circuit court’s later judgment favoring Jean Wright should not be disturbed if the “great weight and clear *266preponderance of the evidence is not against the circuit court conclusion,” Rotter v. Rotter, 80 Wis.2d 56, 61, 257 N.W.2d 861 (1977), the circuit court’s hearing did not address ambiguity in the original judgment and instead considered Jean Wright’s current financial position, tax liability, and health. That is inconsistent with Childs v. Dahlke, supra. Accordingly, I would remand this case with directions that the circuit court hear evidence as to the original intent of the judgment.