Court Opinion

ID: 9910337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:05:11.986238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:18.396305
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 8, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1519-MR

DONNA MOORE                                                          APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-01614

CHARLSEY SCHROYER                                                      APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Donna Moore, filed a negligence complaint

against the Appellee, Charlsey Schroyer, after she tripped and fell on the sidewalk

outside Schroyer’s rental property. The circuit court granted Schroyer summary

judgment on the basis that she did not breach any duty owed to Moore. Moore

now appeals. Following review of the record and all applicable law, we affirm.
                                     I. BACKGROUND

             Schroyer owns and leases out several homes in the Coventry

Subdivision of Lexington, Kentucky, including 2549 Milsom Lane. In the early

summer of 2019, Schroyer was looking for a new tenant to lease the Milsom Lane

property and had placed a “For Lease” sign in the property’s front lawn. Moore’s

daughter lives one street over from the Milsom Lane property and thought Moore

might be interested in it. On June 16, 2019, Moore and her husband along with

their two grandchildren walked down the street to look at outside of the Milsom

Lane property. As she was leaving, Moore’s foot caught on what she described as

a “lip” on the sidewalk at the northeast corner of the Milsom Lane property

causing her to fall to the ground.

             On May 5, 2020, Moore filed a negligence complaint against Schroyer

seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries she

allegedly suffered in the fall. Moore asserted that Schroyer had a duty to inspect

her property for dangerous conditions “such as the poorly maintained sidewalk

area” and take reasonable precautions to protect Moore and others from such

dangerous conditions.

             Following discovery, Schroyer filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that homeowners do not owe the public a common law duty to keep

sidewalks in good repair or to warn the public of dangerous conditions thereon.

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Schroyer further pointed out that even though Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Government (“LFUCG”) Ordinance §17‐148 requires property owners to repair or

replace defective sidewalks abutting their property, the Kentucky Supreme Court

has long held that such repair ordinances do not impose a duty as between the

property owner and the public.

             Moore responded that a chief difference between her case and the

opinions relied on by Schroyer is that the sidewalk in question was located on

Schroyer’s lot and Coventry Subdivision’s Deed of Restrictions requires

homeowners to maintain the sidewalks on their lots. She also asserted that

Schroyer owed her a heightened duty of care exceeding that owed to just any

member of the public because she was a business invitee who was enticed onto the

property by the “For Lease” sign.

             The circuit court carefully examined the parties’ arguments

considering binding appellate case law. Ultimately, after doing so, the circuit court

concluded that Kentucky’s common law places the duty to maintain public

sidewalks on the municipality or urban government and that neither LFUCG’s

ordinances nor Coventry’s Deed of Restrictions created a duty for Schroyer to

maintain the sidewalk for Moore’s benefit notwithstanding her status as a business

invitee. This appeal followed.

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                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03.

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue

of material fact in dispute.

                 “An appellate court’s role in reviewing a summary judgment is to

determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact

exist[ed] and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Feltner v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 2018). The standard of

review for an appellate court is de novo because only legal issues are involved.

Isaacs v. Sentinel Ins. Co. LTD., 607 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Ky. 2020).

                                         III. ANALYSIS
                 In this case, the circuit court held that Schroyer was entitled to

summary judgment on Moore’s negligence claim. It reasoned that under the

circumstances, even assuming the facts in a light most favorable to Moore, it could

not be proven that Schroyer breached any duty she may have owed to Schroyer in

relation to the sidewalk. On appeal, Moore argues that the circuit court erred

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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because (1) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether LFUCG had a

duty to maintain the sidewalk; and (2) Moore was a business invitee to whom

Schroyer owed a heightened duty of care.

             “[S]treets and sidewalks are established and maintained primarily for

purposes of travel by the public and uses incidental thereto and not inconsistent

therewith. The public has the right to the unobstructed use of a sidewalk.” Terrell

v. Tracy, 229 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Ky. 1950) (citations omitted). “The general rule is

that no common-law duty rests upon the owner or occupant of premises abutting

on a public street to keep the sidewalk in repair.” Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of

United States v. McClellan, 149 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. 1941) (citations

omitted).

             There are two instances when a duty is imposed upon the abutting

landowner regarding a public sidewalk. One of these occurs when the owner’s

affirmative conduct, or negligence rising to the level of a nuisance, causes the

defect. Thus, the owner of property abutting on a public sidewalk is only liable to

“persons injured in consequence of a dangerous condition of the sidewalk created

by some affirmative act of the owner or by some act of negligence on his part

constituting a nuisance.” Id. at 732.

             The other situation arises when a city ordinance places an obligation

on an abutting property owner to keep a public sidewalk in good repair. Such an

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ordinance only creates a duty from the landowner to the city for costs of

maintenance and repair, however, and does not establish any duty to sidewalk

travelers or liability for their injuries. Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 632-

34 (Ky. 1990).

             Moore asserts that the above-cited authorities are distinguishable

because it was clear in those cases that the cities were responsible for maintenance

of the sidewalks in question where they abutted public streets. She argues that the

only “proof” Schroyer offered to support “her argument that Milsom Lane is

‘maintained’ by the LFUCG, and therefore, constitutes a “public street,”’ was an

inadmissible PDF printout of a screenshot from the LFUCG Street Finder website.

Whether the PDF is admissible, however, is not dispositive.

             We can take judicial notice that Milsom Lane is located within the

boundaries of LFUCG. Commonwealth v. Roark, 641 S.W.3d 94, 96, n. 2 (Ky.

2021) (“Courts will take judicial notice of the geography of the state and location

of cities therein.”). The fact that the public street and the sidewalk abutting it are

within LFUCG’s boundaries makes it responsible for their maintenance. No

formal adoption by LFUCG is necessary. City of Ashland v. Cummings, 240 S.W.

63, 64 (Ky. 1922) (“[U]pon the annexation of the territory, Church street became a

public street of the city without other formal action on its part, with the consequent

duty on the part of the city to use ordinary care to maintain the sidewalk thereon in

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a reasonably safe condition for public travel.”); see also City of Pioneer Village v.

Bullitt Cnty. ex rel. Bullitt Fiscal Court, 104 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Ky. 2003).

              Moore’s last argument that her status as an invitee was considered and

rejected by this Court in Brooks v. Seaton Place Homeowners Association, Inc.,

522 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Ky. App. 2017). There, the plaintiff in the underlying

action, Frances Brooks, fell on a sidewalk as she was leaving a yard sale hosted at

the Greenwell residence. Brooks filed suit against the Homeowner’s Association,

its directors, and the Greenwells. We upheld the circuit court’s summary judgment

order in favor of the Greenwells even though Brooks was an invitee having been

enticed onto the property by the Greenwells’ yard sale.

              [P]articipation in a yard sale is not the kind of affirmative
              conduct or negligence that could result in a duty’s [sic]
              being imposed upon the Greenwells with respect to a
              public sidewalk. In fact, there was no evidence presented
              to indicate that the Greenwells had made any use of the
              sidewalk upon that occasion or that they had taken any
              action with respect to passage of pedestrians on the
              sidewalk. Consequently, the trial court did not err by
              concluding that the Greenwells did not owe Brooks a
              duty of care with respect to her use of the public
              sidewalk.

Id. at 875.

              While the “For Lease” sign may have enticed Moore onto the

property, there is nothing in the record which suggests that Schroyer was using the

sidewalk in any extraordinary manner to lure potential tenants to the property or to

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enhance their interactions with the property. While Moore may have used the

sidewalk to access the property as an invitee, she was using it no differently than

any other member of the public. As such, Schroyer did not owe Moore a

heightened duty. Farley v. Lexington Roller Mills Co., 54 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Ky.

1932).

                                 IV. CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Fayette Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jonathan B. Fannin                         Elizabeth Winchell
Sarah E. Boggs                             Lexington, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky

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