Court Opinion

ID: 9588337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:33:02.657505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:14.238246
License: Public Domain

Kaul, J.,
(dissenting): I cannot agree with the statement shown as item No. 12 of the syllabus and therefore respectfully dissent from the holding expressed therein and from those portions of the opinion relating thereto. Also, my views concerning the holdings stated in items Nos. 7 and 8 of ihe syllabus differ to some extent from the corresponding expressions of the court with respect thereto. I fully agree with the other ten holdings itemized in the syllabus.
Briefly, the pertinent portions of K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d, as construed herein, require that an affidavit of disqualification must be made by a party litigant and contain facts and reasons which give fair support for the belief that on account of the bias or prejudice of the judge the affiant cannot obtain a fair trial. The statute further provides, as construed, that upon the filing of the affidavit the administrative judge shall at once transfer the action to another judge for a hearing as to the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
The purpose of K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d is to afford either party to any action an efficient, convenient and prompt means of disqualifying a judge on any of the five grounds enumerated in subsection (b) upon the filing of a legally sufficient affidavit alleging any of the grounds enumerated. The test of legal sufficiency is simply whether the affidavit meets the requirements of the statute. In my view the affidavit in the instant case is insufficient because (1) it does not contain the express statements required by the *399statute and (2) it is based on a ground not specified, i. e., personal bias or prejudice against attorneys.
The statute requires that the party filing the affidavit state that he has cause to believe and does believe that on account of the personal bias, prejudice or interest of the judge he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial. Here the affiant says he believes bias and prejudice on the part of the judge exist and that he is of the opinion that such would make it difficult for us to have a fair trial. The plain language of tihe statute clearly contemplates a positive, unequivocal belief on the part of affiant that he cannot obtain a fair trial as opposed to a mere opinion that he believes bias might make a fair trial difficult. The language requiring an affiant to state that he has cause to believe, and does believe, clearly reflects this legislative intention.
The mere opinion of a party that he cannot obtain a fair trial is not a statement of belief. Perhaps the affiant would be willing to burden the obligation of his oath by stating positively his belief and the reasons therefor that he cannot obtain a fair trial, but he has failed to do so here. The deficiency is more than a mere technicality. The purpose of the statute, which I believe to be meritorious, is to afford a party, who has a positive belief of personal bias or prejudice, an efficient and prompt means of securing tihe disqualification of the judge in question. To accomplish tihe end sought — expeditious disqualification — the allegations could not be subjected to a test for truthfulness, thus as a safeguard, the legislature carefully required that a positive statement of his personal belief and the facts and reasons therefor be imposed as a burden on the oath of tihe party. To require anything less would in effect make the statute operate as a peremptory disqualification. The effect of accepting as legally sufficient the affidavit filed herein is to circumvent tihe safeguard of exposure to a charge of prejury, which I believe the legislature intended as evidenced by the carefully worded requirements of the statute.
The affidavit in the instant case merely recites tihat the party has read the affidavit of his attorney and that the contents thereof have been fully explained and for that reason he believes personal bias and prejudice exists. He refrains from saying that he believes the contents of tihe attorney’s affidavit to be true, nor does he state any facts or reasons of his own knowledge which would support a personal belief of bias or prejudice. The allegations do not relate to a personal bias against the affiant.
*400The facts and reasons necessary to support a belief of bias and prejudice on the part of a judge have been considered in hundreds of cases dealing with the subject. This general statement, which seems to be a consensus of judicial opinion on the subject, appears in 48 C. J. S., Judges, § 82:
“Bias or prejudice of a judge, to disqualify him, must be an actual bias of a character calculated to sway his judgment seriously. Generally it must be directed against a party to the cause, rather than against the cause itself, and must arise other than from the judicial proceedings before him.
“It is actual existence of prejudice on the part of a judge, not the mere apprehension of it by a party which disqualifies. Further, the disqualifying prejudice of a judge does not necessarily comprehend every bias, partiality, or prejudice which he may entertain with reference to the case, but must be of a character calculated to impair seriously his impartiality and sway his judgment, and must be strong enough to overthrow the presumption of his integrity. . . .” (pp. 1058, 1059.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In the early case of City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. * 622, Justice Brewer put it succinctly:
“. . . It is not sufficient that a prima facie case only be shown, — such a case as would require the sustaining of a challenge to a juror. It must be strong enough to overthrow the presumption in favor of the trial judge’s integrity, and the clearness of his presumptions. . . .” (p. * 627.)
I believe what has been said fully demonstrates that the affidavit herein is legally insufficient when measured by the requirements of the statute, and this holds true even though the attorney’s affidavit is vicariously implanted therein. There is nothing recited in the attorney’s affidavit, that supports a claim of personal prejudice against the party. It merely recites a series of adverse rulings and in-court statements by the judge which are claimed to support a belief of bias and prejudice against the attorney. There is no mention of any out-of-court statements or actions of the judge that would indicate antipathy toward either the party or his attorneys.
As stated in the opinion for the court, K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d expressly requires the affidavit to be filed by the party. There is no reference in the statute to bias or prejudice against the attorney, and it should be noted the affiant makes no positive statement that the bias or prejudice purportedly shown by the attorney’s affidavit is of such a degree that it would operate to establish a personal bias or prejudice against the party-affiant. Whether to include bias or prejudice against an attorney together with personal bias or prejudice against a party was a matter of legislative choice. Some legislatures have done so, i. e., Minn. St. Anno., § 542.16, *401others have not, i. e., Aiiz. Rev. St. Anno., § 12-409 (A). The Kansas legislature elected not to include personal bias or prejudice against an attorney as a ground for invoking the special procedure provided by 20-311d. The wisdom of the choice is not for our consideration. In a comprehensive statistical survey and discussion of statutes dealing with the subject in Vol. 48 Oregon Law Review, commencing at page 311, the staff at page 404 recognized the matter of legislative choice and recommended that bias against a party’s attorney be included in the contemplated Oregon statute:
"Two related questions will be discussed together here. The first is whether the prejudice which may be alleged as a ground of disqualification should be limited to bias against the party, only as is often the case, or whether it should also include bias against a party’s attorney. The staff recommends that a statute include provisions for the latter. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is of interest to note that while the Arizona statute does not include attorneys, it has been construed so as to permit an attorney to file an affidavit of bias and prejudice on behalf of a client (Consolidated Carpet Corporation v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz. App. 429, 477 P. 2d 548), but bias and prejudice against an attorney has been held to be insufficient as a ground for disqualification under the Arizona statute. (Liston v. Butler, 4 Ariz. App. 460, 421 P. 2d 542.)
There is respectable authority for the proposition that bias and prejudice against an attorney in the absence of bias directed against the litigant himself is not a ground for disqualification of a judge, in fact the federal courts, and what appears to be a numerical majority of state courts, adhere to this view. (23 A. L. R. 3d, Anno., p. 1416.) Generally in cases in which bias toward an attorney is recognized, it must be shown to be of such degree as to adversely affect the client. (23 A. L. R. 3d, Anno., [b], [c], pp. 1423-1426, inch)
The exercise of legislative choice in the matter is demonstrated in Kansas by the fact that attorneys were expressly included in providing for disqualification of judges on the ground of relationship (K.S.A. 20-311).
Since the legislature has exercised its choice, I believe, whether desirable or not, it would be presumptuous to add bias and prejudice against an attorney to the grounds for disqualification, which are specifically expressed and enumerated in K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d.
My views of the scope of 20-311d are not intended to project the *402idea that a judge should never be subject to disqualification if he refuses to recuse himself after a showing of personal bias and prejudice against an attorney to such a degree as to be presumed to adversely affect the client’s interest. Such bias to be relied on as a ground for disqualification should be shown to be of the character of genuine antipathy or of such character as to rob the court of the degree of impartiality required by law. (State v. Himes, 160 Fla. 757, 36 So. 2d 433, 23 A. L. R. 3d, Anno., pp. 1416-1426 [6] and [c].) The legislature simply did not see fit to afford the expedient procedure of 20-311d as a remedy for this circumstance.
I do not read K. S. A. 20-311 and K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d as indicating total legislative preemption in the area of specifying grounds and establishing procedures for the disqualification of judges. This court has the inherent authority and the responsibility of securing a fair trial for all citizens of this state, regardless whether a method or ground is legislatively prescribed. Appellate review or an original proceeding such as the instant action are always available to secure that end. If impelling reasons appear for the disqualification of a judge to afford a fair trial, this court is not without a remedy whether legislatively prescribed or not. (See In re Estate of Hupp, 178 Kan. 672, 291 P. 2d 428, and cases cited therein.) The extraordinary remedy provided by 20-311d is available only when grounds specified under subsection (b) are alleged in compliance with the express provisions thereof.
Technically the record does not reveal “blanket disqualification” in all future actions in which petitioner’s attorneys might appeal. However, the instant action is brought in the nature of a class action and the relief prayed for is the restraint of defendant from participating in any of the more than eighty cases involved. Although the decision herein will not operate on future cases filed by the attorneys in question, the approval of the affidavit herein has the practical effect of a “blanket disqualification.” A discussion of the principles involved and the valid reasons for refusing to recognize “blanket disqualifications” may be found in the cases of Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So. 2d 650 (Fla., 1956); and Clawans v. Waugh, 10 N. J. Super. 605, 77 A. 2d 519. See, also, 23 A. L. R. 3d, Anno., p. 1426.
The statute does not provide for “blanket disqualification” in all cases in which a party might appear. Attorneys are not even mentioned. The impact upon the district court system of this State will *403be far reaching if affidavits such as that filed herein are permitted to work what is in effect a “blanket disqualification” in all cases in which an attorney might appear. There is fair reason to believe that this would create havoc in a two-judge judicial district and chaos in a one-judge district.
The legislature recognized the need for an expedient disqualification procedure, but at the same time was fully aware of the far reaching impact upon judicial administration in this state that might be brought about by the enactment of a loosely worded statute readily subject to application far beyond its intended scope. The result was an expedient, efficient procedure limited in application to one or more of the specific grounds enumerated, alleged under oath in terms expressly required by the statute.
For the reasons stated I find the affidavit herein legally insufficient to bring about a disqualification of defendant under the provisions of K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 20-311d.