Court Opinion

ID: 9958565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 16:12:13.654276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.193958
License: Public Domain

J-S08024-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAMON LUIS RODRIGUEZ                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1215 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 24, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0003367-2019

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED: APRIL 9, 2024

       Ramon Luis Rodriguez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered, following a bench trial, for his convictions of persons not to

possess, use, manufacture, control sell or transfer firearms; firearms not to

be carried without a license; possession of a small amount of marijuana; sun

screening and other materials prohibited (window-tint violation);1 and other

summary offenses. After careful review, we affirm.

       The trial court described the facts underlying the instant appeal:
       On June 14, 2019, Officer Nathan Scott (“Officer Scott”) of the
       Exeter Township Police Department was in uniform and in a
       marked vehicle parked at Monocacy Hill Road and 422 westbound
       in Exeter Township. Notes of Testimony, … January 28, 2022
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 3925(a); 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(31); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).
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       (“N.T.”), at 5-6. At 2:44 a.m., Officer Scott observed a white
       Buick commit [] traffic violations[, discussed further below,] and
       initiated [a] traffic stop. Id. at 6-7, 21-22. [Appellant, the sole
       occupant,] was operating the Buick but was not the registered
       owner. Id. at 7, 30.

              Prior to Officer Scott approaching the Buick, [Appellant]
       placed the Buick’s keys on top of the roof. Id. at 7-8. As he
       walked towards the vehicle, Officer Scott noticed that there were
       several air fresheners in the vehicle’s vents and a small black
       plastic bag on the passenger seat that contained cylindrical
       objects. Id. at 8. Based on Officer Scott’s prior experience, he
       recognized these objects as items commonly used to package
       narcotics, including marijuana. Id. at 8-10, 35. He smelled an
       odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Id. at 8, 10.

             Officer Scott asked [Appellant] for his license, registration[,]
       and insurance information. Id. at 10. In response, [Appellant]
       stated that he did not have a license and didn’t want to cause any
       trouble. Id. He told Officer Scott that he could search
       [Appellant’s] vehicle. Id. [Appellant] opened the glove box to
       obtain the requested documentation. Id. When he opened the
       glove box, Officer Scott observed a clear mason jar containing
       marijuana flakes. Id. at 10-11. Officer Scott asked [Appellant]
       to exit the vehicle. Id. at 11. He noticed that [Appellant] had a
       bulge in his front left pocket and asked him about it. Id.
       [Appellant] stated that it was a “stack,” a word commonly used to
       describe $1,000.00. Id. at 11, 32. [Appellant] pulled out the
       money and showed Officer Scott. Id. at 11.

             After Officer Scott saw [Appellant’s] money, he asked
       him for consent to search the vehicle. Id. [Appellant]
       agreed. Id. at 11, 22-23. [Appellant] admitted that there would
       be some marijuana in the vehicle. Id. at 12. Officer Scott
       searched the Buick with the assistance of Officer Auman.2 Id. at
       13-14. During the search, Officer Scott found, among other
       things, five tubes [containing] marijuana inside the black plastic
       bag on the passenger seat. Id. at 12. Officer Auman discovered
       a white t-shirt on the right side of the front engine compartment
       and notified Officer Scott. Id. at 14-15, 26. Officer Auman used
       gloves to unwrap the white t-shirt and discovered [a] black plastic
____________________________________________

2 Officer Auman’s first name is not provided in the transcript.

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     bag. Id. at 15, 29. The bag was similar to the black plastic bag
     previously observed by Officer Scott on the vehicle’s passenger
     seat. Id. at 15. A handgun was found inside of the plastic bag.
     Id. It was seized and sent to the Pennsylvania State Police
     laboratory for processing. Id. at 16-17, 35.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 1-3 (emphasis and footnote added). Officers

arrested Appellant and charged him with the above-described offenses.

     When Officer Scott checked, he determined Appellant did not have a

license to carry a firearm.   Officer Scott discovered that in 2005, Brian

Shuffelbottom (Shuffelbottom) had reported the firearm found in the Buick as

stolen. Shuffelbottom did not know Appellant, and Appellant did not have

Shuffelbottom’s permission to possess the firearm.

     Pursuant to a search warrant, police obtained a DNA sample from

Appellant. DNA from the firearm matched three individuals:

     [Appellant] was unable to be excluded as a potential contributor
     to the mixture. The DNA profile was 7.5 quadrillion times more
     likely to have originated from [Appellant] and two unknown
     individuals than if it had originated from three other unknown
     individuals.    [Appellant’s] DNA profile was a major
     component of the DNA profile on the gun.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 4 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

     Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial suppression motion on February 3,

2021. On February 8, 2021, the suppression court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on Appellant’s motion. The court denied the motion on April 7, 2021.

Suppression Court Order, 4/7/21.

     On January 28, 2022, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. That same

day, the trial court convicted Appellant of the above-described offenses. On

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April 24, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate three and

one-half to seven years in prison. With the trial court’s permission, Appellant

filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion on July 17, 2023,3 which the trial

court denied on July 31, 2023. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the

trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

   Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

   1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s Omnibus
      Pretrial Motion.

   2. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
      establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements for … Person
      Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or Transfer
      Firearm.

   3. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
      establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements for … Receiving
      Stolen Property.

   4. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
      establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements for … Firearms
      Not to be Carried Without a License.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant (1) filed his petition to file a nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion

within 30 days of his judgment of sentence; and (2) the trial court granted
the petition within 30 days of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Capaldi,
112 A.3d 1242, (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[A] post-sentence motion nunc pro
tunc may toll the appeal period, but only if two conditions are met. First,
within 30 days of imposition of sentence, a defendant must request the trial
court to consider a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. … Second, the trial
court must expressly permit the filing of a post-sentence motion nunc pro
tunc, also within 30 days of imposition of sentence.” (emphasis in original;
citations omitted)). Appellant further complied with the trial court’s order
requiring his nunc pro tunc motion to be filed within 30 days of the date the
last of Appellant’s requested transcripts is filed. See Trial Court Order,
5/23/23. Accordingly, the appeal is properly before us for disposition.

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   5. Whether the verdict against Appellant for … Person Not ToPossess,
      Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or Transfer Firearms, was against
      the weight of the evidence.

   6. Whether the verdict against Appellant for … Receiving Stolen
      Property, was against the weight of the evidence.

   7. Whether the verdict against Appellant for … Firearms Not To Be
      Carried Without a License, was against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (issues reordered; numerical designations added).

                                SUPPRESSION

      In his first issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his omnibus pretrial

suppression motion on several bases, which we address in turn. Id. at 47.

Appellant initially argues Officer Scott lacked probable cause to stop

Appellant’s vehicle for a window-tint violation. Id. Appellant states Officer

Scott initiated the traffic stop at 3:00 a.m. Id. at 48. Appellant points out

Officer Scott’s testimony that his police cruiser was parked perpendicular to

Appellant’s vehicle; Appellant’s vehicle passed Officer Scott’s marked police

cruiser at about 50-70 miles per hour; and Officer Scott could view Appellant’s

vehicle only for a few seconds. Id. According to Appellant,

      [g]iven the surrounding circumstances, it is unlikely [Officer
      Scott] could form probable cause [to determine that] the tint on
      the windshield and/or side windows was too dark to see through
      and that [Appellant] violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).

Id.

      Appellant also challenges Officer Scott’s traffic stop for a high-beam

headlight violation under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306(a).       Appellant’s Brief at 49.

According to Appellant, Officer Scott was in a stationary vehicle and not driving

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toward Appellant. Id. Further, Appellant asserts Officer Scott presented no

testimony regarding any vehicle approaching Appellant. Id. Appellant directs

our attention to Officer Scott’s concession that Appellant was not required to

deactivate his high beams when passing the officer’s stationary, perpendicular

vehicle. Id. Appellant argues, because Officer Scott lacked probable cause

for the vehicle stop, the stop was illegal and all evidence found during the

subsequent search must be suppressed. Id. at 50.

      Our review is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d

1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Because the Commonwealth

prevailed before the suppression court,

      we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
      much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
      when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
      suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record,
      [the appellate court is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse
      only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where … the
      appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on
      allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions
      are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
      determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the
      facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject
      to [ ] plenary review.

Id. “[I]t is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility

of witnesses,” and “the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part

or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A.2d

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151, 157 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted). Importantly, our review is

limited to the suppression record. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013).

      The “Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I,

Section   8    of    the   Pennsylvania    Constitution   protect   individuals   from

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d

889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). “To secure the right of citizens to be free from

[unreasonable] intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement

officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their

interactions        with   citizens   as    those   interactions     become       more

intrusive.” Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 563 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Pennsylvania Courts recognize three types of interactions between police and

citizens: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a custodial

detention. Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1154 (Pa. Super.

2017).

      A mere encounter between police and a citizen need not be
      supported by any level of suspicion, and carr[ies] no official
      compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or to respond. An
      investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
      of detention … requires a reasonable suspicion that criminal
      activity is afoot. A custodial search is an arrest and must be
      supported by probable cause.

Id.

      “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth

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v. Luv, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “[A] police officer has

probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code

violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d

1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      “Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause

necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information

possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the

circumstances.” Newsome, 170 A.3d at 1154 (citation omitted).

      An appellate court must give weight to the specific, reasonable
      inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience
      and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered
      collectively, may permit the investigative detention. We are
      mindful of the fact that,

         the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our
         inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly
         indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of
         innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further
         investigation by the police officer.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      In order to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop, “an

officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to

reasonably suspect a violation of the” Vehicle Code; the standard “is an

objective one, based on the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth

v. Shaw, 246 A.3d 879, 883 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted).

      The Motor Vehicle Code provides that,

      [w]henever a police officer ... has reasonable suspicion that a
      violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a

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       vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
       vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
       identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or
       to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
       believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). An en banc panel of this Court explained,

       [t]raffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of criminal
       activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
       authority of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a stated investigatory
       purpose. In effect, the language of Section 6308(b) — to secure
       such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
       necessary to enforce the provisions of this title — is conceptually
       equivalent with the underlying purpose of a Terry4 stop.

       Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
       driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
       to the suspected violation. In such an instance, it is [i]ncumbent
       upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at
       the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable
       cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of
       some provision of the Code.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)

(footnote added; citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Cf.

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (stating that to

conduct a non-investigative stop for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, a

police officer must have probable cause to believe an offense has occurred).

       Here, Officer Scott stopped Appellant’s vehicle for a suspected

window-tint violation. Section 4524(e)(1) provides as follows:

       No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening
       device or other material which does not permit a person to see or

____________________________________________

4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).

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      view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or
      side window of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).

      In Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263 (Pa. Super. 2021), this

Court addressed the cause necessary for a traffic stop for a window-tint

violation:

      [I]n our view, the appropriate quantum of cause necessary
      to validate a traffic stop based on a violation of section
      4524(e)(1) is dependent on the specific facts of each case.
      In some situations, ... a probable cause standard will apply
      because the officer’s testimony establishes that a window-tint
      violation was immediately apparent to the officer, and no further
      investigatory purpose was served by the traffic stop. In other
      cases ..., a reasonable suspicion standard could apply because the
      officer’s testimony demonstrates that he or she stopped the
      vehicle to get a closer and/or unobstructed view of the windows,
      in further investigation of whether the tint violates section
      4524(e)(1). Accordingly, our decision today should not be
      read as precluding application of a reasonable suspicion
      standard to a stop for a window-tint violation, if the specific
      facts of the case demonstrate that an investigatory
      purpose was served by the stop.

Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 269 n.2 (emphasis added).

      In Prizzia, this Court determined that the circumstances required the

officer to have probable cause to stop the vehicle:

      While on patrol, [Pennsylvania State Trooper Anthony Spegar]
      observed a vehicle on the road with windows tinted to the degree
      that [he] could not see the operator inside the vehicle.
      Trooper Spegar testified that prior to initiating a traffic stop, he
      followed [the appellant’s] white Scion TC for a period of time and
      at no distance could he see through the side, front, [or] passenger
      windows. Trooper Spegar further testified that in his experience
      as a Pennsylvania State Trooper, he is aware that at the distances
      from which he observed [the appellant’s] vehicle prior to
      conducting a traffic stop, manufacturer-installed tint would not

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       render the windows too dark to see through. Based on his
       observations, Trooper Spegar conducted a traffic stop of [the
       appellant’s] vehicle based on illegal window tint.

Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 265 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Applying

a probable cause standard, we agreed Trooper Spegar had probable cause to

stop the appellant’s vehicle:

       Trooper Spegar testified that the windows on [the appellant’s]
       vehicle were so darkly tinted that he could not see inside. This
       testimony was corroborated by still photographs entered into
       evidence at the suppression hearing, which showed that “at
       certain angles, the side panel windows on [appellant’s] car [were],
       indeed, darkly tinted to a degree that seeing through [the] same
       [was] difficult, if not impossible.” Trooper Spegar’s testimony,
       and the corroborating evidence, demonstrated that the trooper
       could not see through [the appellant’s] windows, thus establishing
       probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of section
       4524(e)(1).

Id. at 269-70 (citations omitted).

       By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Green, 298 A.3d 1158 (Pa. Super.

2023) (unpublished memorandum),5

       the circumstances warranted application of a reasonable suspicion
       standard. At the suppression hearing, [Pennsylvania State]
       Trooper [Matthew] Shiner testified that at 9:50 a.m. on March 4,
       2020, he parked his vehicle at a crossover to observe southbound
       traffic on Interstate 279. Trooper Shiner parked perpendicular to
       the interstate, with the front of the police vehicle “facing the two
       lanes of traffic[.]” As [a]ppellant’s Chevrolet Impala drove past,
       Trooper Shiner observed the vehicle’s front windshield, driver’s
       window[,] and left passenger window. According to Trooper
       Shiner,

____________________________________________

5   See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be
cited for their persuasive value).

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            [a]s the vehicle passed my location, I observed the vehicle
            to have not [sic] factory window tint dark enough where I
            was unable to see any occupants within the vehicle as it
            passed my location.

      Unlike the trooper in Prizzia, Trooper Shiner did not follow the
      vehicle for further investigation prior to the traffic stop.

      … Trooper Shiner’s traffic stop served a valid investigatory
      purpose. Trooper Shiner testified:

            As I approached the vehicle, I was still able to ascertain
            that the window tint was still dark enough I was unable to
            observe anybody inside, at which point [appellant] did roll
            down his driver’s side window at which time I engaged him
            in conversation.

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 7-8) (citations and emphasis omitted).

      Here, at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the

testimony of Officer Scott. N.T., 2/8/21, at 4. Officer Scott testified that on

July 14, 2019, at about 2:44 a.m., he parked his marked patrol vehicle in the

area of Monocacy Hill Road and State Route 422. Id. at 6. He stated, “I was

stationary, so if I was looking at 422, I was like a T and I was visible. I always

park my car visible to oncoming traffic.” Id. 6-7. At around 2:44 a.m., Officer

Scott observed

      a Buick sedan, at the time I believe it was like white or cream
      color with heavy tinted windows[,] pass[] my location. Also[,]
      when they approached and passed my location, they still had their
      high beams on.

Id. at 7.     According to the officer, “there is one streetlight there at that

location as well as a residential house at that location that had lights outside.”

Id. When the Buick passed by Officer Scott’s location, he could not see into

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the vehicle’s windows, with the aid of the street light or his police unit’s front

running lights. Id. Regarding the window tint, Officer Scott explained that

when Appellant drove past him, he could see tint on the two driver’s side

windows. Id. at 37.

      Officer Scott pulled his police cruiser out from its parking spot and, after

the following Appellant for less than a mile, Officer Scott effected a traffic stop.

Id. at 7, 9, 30. Before Officer Scott exited his police cruiser, “the driver of

the vehicle at the time rolled down his window and placed his keys, which is

unusual, on top of the roof of the white or tan Buick.” Id.     Officer Scott then

approached the passenger side of the Buick.             Id.   As he approached

Appellant’s vehicle,

      the back rear windshield was so dark I couldn’t even see through.
      Also, the … rear passenger window was so dark I couldn’t see
      through.

 Id. at 36-37.

      Instantly, as in Green, our review confirms Officer Scott’s vehicle stop

served a valid investigatory purpose relevant to Appellant’s suspected

window-tint violation. See Green, 285 A.3d 907, 2022 Pa. Super. Unpub.

LEXIS 2091, *10-11 (unpublished memorandum at 8).                 Accordingly, we

conclude Officer Scott’s traffic stop required reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle

Code violation. Shaw, 246 A.3d 879, 883.

      Applying the reasonable suspicion standard, Officer Scott testified that

he observed a Buick pass his patrol vehicle with heavily tinted windows on the

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driver’s side. N.T., 2/8/21, at 7, 37. Officer Scott could not see through the

windows.     Id. at 37.      Thus, Officer Scott’s traffic stop was supported by

reasonable suspicion of a window-tint violation.           See Green, supra.

Appellant’s challenge to the initial traffic stop, based upon a lack of probable

cause, warrants no relief.6

       Appellant next argues “the search of the vehicle was improper due to

the invalidity of the consent.” Appellant’s Brief at 50 (capitalization modified).

Appellant claims Officer Scott “did not conduct the search during a legal police

interaction.” Id. Appellant concedes he

       gave consent to search the car but then, after Officer Scott told
       [Appellant] he’d seen marijuana residue, [Appellant] asked if he
       could get the marijuana out himself. This was an express action
       that, to a reasonable fact finder, may constitute the withdrawal of
       consent….

Id. at 51. Appellant asserts, “While Officer Scott testified he told [Appellant]

he did not have to consent to the search, that was not in the police report.”

Id. Appellant additionally points to Officer Scott’s inquiry about the money in

Appellant’s pocket prior to his consent to search.       Id.   Appellant claims,

considering the circumstances, his consent was invalid. Id. at 52.

       We observe,

       [b]oth the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
       and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
       individuals, their homes, their papers, and their effects and
____________________________________________

6 As we conclude the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a

window-tint violation, we need not address whether Officer Scott had probable
cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a high-beam violation.

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     possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. For a
     search to be lawful, police must first obtain a warrant, supported
     by probable cause, from a neutral and detached magistrate. A
     search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable
     and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an
     established exception applies.

     One of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement is a
     consensual search.      [W]e have long approved consensual
     searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to
     conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.
     Although a warrantless, but consensual, search is constitutionally
     permissible, obtaining consent is an investigative tool utilized by
     law enforcement. It allows police to do what otherwise would be
     impermissible without a warrant. As a consent search is in
     derogation of the Fourth Amendment, there are carefully
     demarked limitations as to what constitutes a valid consent
     search.

     First, consent must be voluntarily given during a lawful police
     interaction. For a finding of voluntariness, the Commonwealth
     must establish that the consent given by the defendant is the
     product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the
     result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne
     — under the totality of the circumstances.

     If consent is given voluntarily, the ensuing search must be
     conducted within the scope of that consent. The standard for
     measuring the scope of an individual’s consent is one of objective
     reasonableness. We do not ascertain the scope of consent from
     the individual’s subjective belief or the officer’s understanding
     based on his or her training and experience, but based on what ...
     the typical reasonable person would have understood by the
     exchange between the officer and the suspect.

Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 861-62 (Pa. 2018) (citations,

footnotes, and quotation marks omitted).

     Officer Scott testified at the suppression hearing that he had over 260

hours of criminal interdiction training.     N.T., 2/8/21, at 5.   Officer Scott

explained he (a) was “one of the first guys to attend” the Pennsylvania State

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Police Safe Highways Initiative Through Effective Law Enforcement and

Detection (SHIELD)] Program; (b) has taken “various search and seizure

classes, drug identification classes”; and (c) “served with the Berks County

Narcotics Task Force since 2017.”              Id.   Officer Scott stated he received

training, through the SHIELD and Desert Snow7 programs, about the

       criminal element of traffic stops, different behaviors that are
       present during those traffic stops that individuals inside that
       vehicle will present to you. How people in criminal activity will
       conceal … contraband, anything from large amounts of money to
       illegal firearms to narcotics, retail theft organizations, also sex
       trafficking, anything that’s criminal.

Id.

       Officer Scott testified that, upon stopping Appellant’s vehicle, he

observed that Appellant was on

       one of his phones that he had because I observed multiple phones.
       But he was, I believe, Face[-]Timing or Skyping or chatting with
       a female on his phone.

       ….

       On the passenger seat on top there was a corner-store bag …, it’s
       a small, plastic, midsized plastic bag that was knotted and pretty
       tight, and inside that I could make out that there was a tube
       cylinder containers [sic] inside there. Also around the vents on
       the front dash area were several air fresheners. [Officer Scott]
       also noticed an odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.

N.T., 2/8/21, at 10-11. Officer Scott explained,

____________________________________________

7 “Desert Snow is the most requested and longest running criminal interdiction

training program in North America.”              https://www.desertsnow.com/ (last
accessed March 21, 2024).

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       from previous arrests, people would contain or conceal illegal
       narcotics and contraband inside those cylinders, but at that
       moment in time I wasn’t sure if there was anything illegal
       inside those tubes.

Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

       Officer Scott described what next transpired:

       I asked [Appellant] for his license, registration, insurance. At that
       moment he stated that he did not have his license8 and also stated
       that he was just trying to get to this girl’s house … in Reading, and
       he didn’t want no problem and I could search the vehicle if I
       wanted to.

       ….

             … [Appellant] reached over to his glove box and I believe
       was looking for his registration and insurance paperwork. …
       [W]hen he opened it up, I observed a small mason jar, clear glass,
       and inside of it a small amount of shake, which is commonly
       referred to as marijuana.

Id. at 14 (emphasis and footnote added).           Around the time Officer Scott

observed the mason jar, his supervisor, a police sergeant, arrived at the

scene.      Id. at 38.   The sergeant pulled his marked police cruiser directly

behind Officer Scott’s vehicle. Id. at 15.

____________________________________________

8 Officer Scott later confirmed,

       initially [Appellant] told me from the beginning of the stop that his
       license was suspended, but at that time, … I advised him that I
       wasn’t going to tow the vehicle ….

N.T., 2/8/21, at 41.

                                          - 17 -
J-S08024-24

       Officer Scott asked Appellant to walk to the front of Officer Scott’s

vehicle. Id. at 16-17. As they walked, Officer Scott advised Appellant that

Appellant could not drive the Buick, as he had no license, but police would not

tow the vehicle.      Id. at 16, 41-42.        Additionally, while standing next to

Appellant’s vehicle, Officer Scott had observed

       a large bulge … in [Appellant’s] left or right front pocket. I believe
       he was wearing jeans at the time. So when [Appellant] stepped
       out [of the vehicle,] I asked him what it was. He had a stack,
       which is commonly referred to as United States money, and also
       a thousand, specifically.

Id. at 15. Officer Scott testified,

       [Appellant] was facing his vehicle in front of my vehicle in between
       his Buick and my police vehicle, and then at that moment in time
       I asked him again if I could search his vehicle.

Id. at 16. Appellant again consented to a search. Id. at 17.

       Officer Scott told Appellant that he had observed what appeared to be

marijuana on the Buick’s driver’s side floor.         Id. at 43.   Appellant asked

whether he could retrieve the marijuana, but Officer Scott denied the request.

Id. At that time, Officer Scott advised Appellant that he was not required to

consent to the vehicle search. Id. at 44.

       Officer Scott described what next transpired:

       I had [Appellant] stand with my supervisor in front of my police
       vehicle9 and I began to search the vehicle. [On the driver’s side,
       Officer Scott observed] on a key fob on [Appellant’s] keys there
       was a small metal cylinder tube, which in my past experience and
____________________________________________

9 According to Officer Scott, he and two other uniformed officers were at the

scene. N.T., 2/8/21, at 38.

                                          - 18 -
J-S08024-24

      past arrests, people usually have them to conceal small amounts
      of illegal narcotics … or also people with pills will have them,
      whether they are prescribed or not, they will put them in there as
      well. I started to open that up and found four white circle pills
      inside of it.

      ….

      [Inside t]he glove box was the small glass mason jar with a little
      bit of marijuana shake inside.

            Inside the center console there was one or two tube
      cylinders, one of them had I believe marijuana inside. Also, there
      was another tube cylinder in there that at that time I believe was
      alleged codeine, which is a controlled substance.

             And then also in the black bag on the passenger seat was
      five or six cylinder tubes, two or three of them had marijuana and
      two or three of them had at that time I believed alleged codeine.

Id. at 19-20 (footnote added). Officer Scott testified he identified the pills by

means of the application, “Pill Finder.” Id. at 19. Officer Scott also found

codeine in liquid form. Id. at 20.

      Officer Scott continued:

      And then also continuing to search the vehicle rear passenger floor
      there was another black plastic bag. Inside that bag there were
      four new cell phones, brand new with cell phone numbers written
      on the outside of the boxes, Tracfones, disposable phones. Also,
      there was two flip phones inside that same bag, again, Tracfones
      or GoPhones.

           … [I]n the rear trunk area I recovered a Narcan nasal spray,
      1.4 milligrams of nasal spray back there unused.

Id. at 20.

                                     - 19 -
J-S08024-24

       From under the Buick’s hood, Officer Scott retrieved “a white T-shirt on

top of the front left compartment bay area, which would be the fuse box or

air filter.” Id. at 21. As described by Officer Scott,

       [t]here was a white T-shirt wrapped around it on that most outer
       layer, and then inside that was, again, black plastic bag consistent
       to the other two plastic bags that were inside the vehicle. And
       then once that bag was opened up, we recovered a 1911 [.]45
       handgun with wooden grips, and the whole gun was mainly
       chrome ….

Id.10 Upon inquiry, Officer Scott discovered the gun was reported stolen in

2005. Id. at 21-22, 27. Appellant was legally prohibited from possessing a

firearm, and had no license for the firearm. Id. at 22.

       Officer Scott then placed Appellant under arrest and advised Appellant

of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). N.T.,

2/8/21, at 22. After being advised of his rights, Appellant admitted to owning

the “weed and other stuff inside the vehicle[.]” Id. Appellant claimed he did

not know about the existence of the handgun found under the hood. Id. at

22-23.

       As stated above, the vehicle search resulted from a lawful traffic stop.

See Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 861-62 (requiring that consent be given during a

lawful police interaction).

____________________________________________

10 OfficerScott testified that another officer, Officer Auman, discovered the
firearm. Id. at 23. Officer Auman arrived around five minutes after Officer
Scott stopped Appellant’s vehicle. See id. at 38.

                                          - 20 -
J-S08024-24

      The evidence further established that Appellant consented to a search

of his vehicle immediately upon being asked for his license, insurance, and

registration. N.T., 2/8/21, at 14. The suppression court found that Appellant

“told Officer Scott that he could search the Buick” before being asked to exit

his vehicle or being questioned about marijuana or the bulges in Appellant’s

pockets. Suppression Court Opinion, 4/7/21, at 3 (Findings of Fact, ¶ 10).

As detailed above, this finding is supported by the evidence of record. The

suppression court correctly observed that Appellant’s “consent to search

eliminated the need for the Commonwealth to establish exigent circumstances

prior to searching the Buick.” Id. at 10. Further, the record confirms no other

officers were present when Appellant initially consented, and there were no

coercive conditions causing Appellant’s initial and subsequent consent. Under

these circumstances, we agree Appellant validly consented to Officer Scott’s

vehicle search. See Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 861-62.

      Also in his first issue, Appellant challenges the “scope” of his consent for

the vehicle search. Appellant’s Brief at 52. Appellant concedes he did not

raise this issue before the suppression court. Id. However, he asserts that

he preserved it in his post-sentence motion for reconsideration. Id.

      As   this   Court   has   explained,    “appellate   review   of   an   order

denying suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under

which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be

considered on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272-73

                                     - 21 -
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(Pa. Super. 2006) (emphasis added). As Appellant did not present this claim

to the suppression court, it is waived.            See id.   Appellant’s first issue,

challenging denial of his suppression motion, merits no relief.

                        SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his conviction of persons not to possess firearms. Appellant’s Brief

at 24, 29, 33.      Appellant concedes that at trial, he stipulated to his prior

conviction of “an enumerated offense that prohibits him from possessing a

firearm.”11 Id. at 25. Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to prove he

actually or constructively possessed the firearm. Id. at 26. Appellant asserts

a police officer found the handgun “in the front engine compartment of the

vehicle [Appellant] was driving.”         Id.   Appellant asserts officers found no

accessories for firearms in the car or on his person. Id. at 27. According to

Appellant,

       [t]he handgun was not accessible to [Appellant] at any point of
       the events on June 14, 2019. Instead, it was in a plastic bag
       wrapped in a T-shirt in the vehicle’s engine compartment.
       Additionally, it was clear the vehicle did not belong to [Appellant]
       and the Commonwealth presented no evidence that it had even
       spoken to the vehicle owner to further investigate….

Id. at 26-27. Appellant claims the absence of the vehicle owner’s testimony

“should not mean the certainty of possession by” Appellant. Id. at 27.

____________________________________________

11 Appellant stipulated to a prior conviction of possession with intent to deliver

controlled substances, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), an enumerated offense
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2).

                                          - 22 -
J-S08024-24

      Appellant acknowledges the presence of a DNA mixture on the firearm.

Id. He observes, “[t]he partial DNA profile that was obtained … was consistent

with [the] mixture of three individuals, and [Appellant] could not be excluded

as a potential contributor.”   Id.    Notwithstanding, Appellant directs our

attention to testimony from the Commonwealth’s DNA expert that,

      while [the expert] could not testify with certainty as to whether
      the touch sample she analyzed was from primary or secondary
      transfer, it is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, beyond a
      reasonable doubt, the DNA wasn’t deposited on the firearm by
      secondary transfer….

Id. at 27-28. Without citation, Appellant claims,

      it was clear from the photograph of the evidence taken by police
      that they were not careful with regard to possible contamination
      or secondary transfer between items that were collected from
      [Appellant] and the firearm….

Id. at 28. Appellant further points out the lack of evidence regarding how

police handled the seized items during their investigation. Id.

      Our Supreme Court has stated,

      When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court
      must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable
      inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most favorable
      to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish
      all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It
      [is] incumbent upon the Superior Court to consider all of the
      evidence introduced at the time of trial, and apparently believed
      by the fact finder, including the expert’s testimony. In applying
      this standard, … the Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence … and the trier of fact,
      while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
      the proof, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

                                     - 23 -
J-S08024-24

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Pa. 2007) (citations

omitted). “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted).

     Crimes Code Section 6105 provides, in part, as follows:

     A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in
     subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless
     of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in
     subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
     manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell,
     transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).    Appellant conceded his prior conviction of an

enumerated offense. Appellant’s Brief at 25.

     “When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the

Commonwealth must establish constructive possession....” Commonwealth

v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

     Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
     deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
     possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that
     possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
     defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. We
     subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control
     the contraband and the intent to exercise that control….

Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 292 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

     [A]s with any other element of a crime, constructive possession
     may be proven by circumstantial evidence. In other words, the
     Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of fact
     can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised dominion and
     control over the contraband at issue.

                                    - 24 -
J-S08024-24

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, the Commonwealth’s evidence established Appellant was the

driver and only occupant of the Buick. N.T., 1/28/22, at 6-8. At trial, Officer

Scott testified he has been a police officer for 10 years. Id. at 9-10. Pursuant

to a lawful traffic stop, Officer Scott observed several items of interest inside

the vehicle, which were several air fresh[en]ers shoved around different vents.

There was a black … small plastic bag on the passenger seat, and inside that

bag it appeared to be cylinder objects.” Id. at 8. Officer Scott testified he

had previously seen similar black bags during his prior employment as a

Philadelphia police officer. Id. According to Officer Scott, “those black bags

were commonly used at the corner stores when they would sell items.” Id.

      Officer Scott described why those bags were of interest:

      When I noticed them -- my background with the Berks County
      Narcotics Task Force since 2017, also employed with Philadelphia
      Housing Authority, so I guess you say my specialty or interest is
      narcotics, so … that drew my interest to them.

      ….

      They usually are used to package narcotics. The bigger ones are
      usually marijuana.

Id. at 8-9. Officer Scott explained,

      I have over 300 hours of drug-related training as far as drug
      recognition,   drug    interdiction,  traffic stops,   electronic
      compartments inside motor vehicles, natural compartments that
      are inside vehicles. I have been to the [SHIELD] training. Forty

                                       - 25 -
J-S08024-24

        hours had been at a natural interdiction conference. So … I would
        like to say I have a good knowledge of narcotics.

Id. at 9.    Officer Scott further noticed an odor of marijuana coming from

Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 10.

        Officer Scott asked for Appellant’s driver’s license, registration, and

proof of insurance. Id. at 10. Appellant responded he did not have a license,

did not want to cause trouble, and that if Officer Scott “wanted to search his

car, I could search his car at that moment.” Id.

        During the search, Officer Auman, assisting Officer Scott, searched the

Buick’s engine compartment. Id. at 14. At Officer Auman’s direction, Officer

Scott observed a white towel on the right driver side of the engine

compartment. Id. Inside the white towel,

        there was a white T-shirt. Once [Officer Auman] unwrapped the
        T-shirt, there was a black plastic bag. One that was consistent
        like the one found in the vehicle on the passenger side area.
        Inside that, there was a model 1911 A1 handgun. It was a silver
        handgun with brown wood grain grips.

Id. at 15. There was no ammunition inside of the handgun. Id. at 17. Officer

Scott

        walked back to where [Appellant] was standing, put handcuffs on
        him, then placed him in the rear of my police car. I also read him
        his Miranda Warnings and explained to him that he did not have
        to talk to me. I asked him if he understood English. He said he
        did, and then I asked him a couple questions.

        ….

        [Appellant] stated that the marijuana and the other narcotics and
        stuff inside the vehicle were his, but he did not know about the
        gun, and the gun was not his.

                                      - 26 -
J-S08024-24

Id. When he ran a computer check, Officer Scott found Appellant did not have

a license to carry a firearm. Id. at 19.

         Pursuant to a subsequent search warrant, Officer Scott collected for

testing a DNA sample from Appellant. Id. at 34. Officer Scott also sent the

suspected controlled substance for testing, which confirmed it was marijuana.

Id. at 20.

         The Commonwealth also presented the expert testimony of Samantha

Newhart.       Id. at 38.     Ms. Newhart testified she is employed by the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a forensic DNA scientist. Id. Appellant

stipulated to Ms. Newhart’s expert qualifications to testify about DNA analysis

and comparison. Id.

         Ms. Newhart testified she received two swabs from the seized firearm.

Id. at 42. According to Ms. Newhart, “[f]rom that piece of evidence I obtained

a DNA profile that is consistent with at least three individuals from swabs of

the gun, and it was just one mixture of three people.” Id. She explained,

         I concluded that a partial DNA profile, consistent with three
         individuals, was obtained from the swabs of the gun, … and
         [Appellant] … cannot be excluded as a potential contributor to this
         mixture.

              The DNA profile obtained from this item is 7.5 quadrillion
         times more likely if it originated from [Appellant] … and two
         unknown individuals than if it had originated from three other
         unknown individuals.

Id. Ms. Newhart testified to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Id.

at 44.

                                       - 27 -
J-S08024-24

       On cross-examination, Ms. Newhart explained that the laboratory takes

precautions to prevent cross-contamination of tested samples. Id. at 49. Ms.

Newhart was shown a police photo of the firearm next to other seized items.

Id. at 51; see Defendant’s Exhibit 3. When asked about quality control issues

with the tested samples, Ms. Newhart testified,

       [i]t’s very unlikely DNA would go from … porous to a non-porous
       item. It’s more likely that a porous item will absorb DNA from a
       non-porous item. Also, usually, friction should be applied when
       DNA is left. It does not always just show up. But based on the
       scenario, I would be cautious.

Id. at 51-52. Ms. Newhart testified, “I cannot say with confidence whether it

is a primary or secondary transfer and how much friction was applied to that

profile.” Id. at 53.

       Brian Shuffelbottom testified that he discovered his firearm was missing

in 2005 and reported it as stolen at that time. Id. at 54. According to Mr.

Shuffelbottom, the firearm seized from the Buick is the same firearm he

reported as stolen. Id. at 54. Mr. Shuffelbottom denied knowing Appellant.

Id. at 55.

       Appellant did not testify at trial. Id. Appellant stipulated to his prior

conviction of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances,12 an

enumerated offense under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2).           Appellant further

____________________________________________

12 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

                                          - 28 -
J-S08024-24

stipulated the substance seized from the Buick tested positive for marijuana.

Id. at 57.

          Under   the   totality   of   these   circumstances,   the   Commonwealth

demonstrated Appellant’s conscious control or dominion over the firearm. As

the trial court explained,

          [t]he firearm was discovered in the front engine compartment of
          the vehicle operated by [Appellant]. It was inside of a black plastic
          bag similar to the plastic bag Officer Scott observed on the front
          passenger seat that contained drugs owned by [Appellant].
          Additionally, [Appellant’s] DNA profile was a major component of
          the DNA located on the firearm. The evidence established that it
          was 7.5 quadrillion times more likely that the DNA on the gun
          originated from [Appellant] and two unknown individuals than if it
          had originated from three other unknown individuals. [Appellant]
          also stipulated to his prior convictions from 2014 for Manufacture,
          Delivery or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Delivery of a
          Controlled Substance. These offenses may be punishable by a
          term of imprisonment exceeding two years. Therefore, when
          evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the
          Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence was sufficient
          to establish that [Appellant] possessed a firearm while prohibited
          from doing so. He is not entitled to relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 7 (footnote omitted).            We agree.      When

viewed in their totality, the trial court’s findings are supported in the record,

and we discern no legal error. See id. Appellant’s second issue merits no

relief.

          In his third issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his conviction of carrying a firearm without a license. Appellant

argues that in Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super.

1982), this Court concluded the Commonwealth had failed to establish

                                           - 29 -
J-S08024-24

constructive possession of a firearm found on the left rear floor of an

automobile.13       Appellant’s Brief at 36.       According to Appellant, the

Boatwright panel concluded the Commonwealth failed to establish the

defendant’s joint constructive possession of the firearm, or that the defendant

“had the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise the control.”

Id.

       Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence that he knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possessed the firearm.

Id. Appellant alleges he was driving someone else’s vehicle; he borrowed the

vehicle to see his girlfriend; and he denied knowing of the firearm’s presence

in the vehicle. Id. at 36-37. Appellant further claims the DNA evidence did

not preclude the secondary transfer of his DNA onto the firearm. Id. at 37.

Appellant argues there is no evidence of his intent to exercise control over the

firearm, as it was found in an inaccessible area of the Buick. Id. Finally,

Appellant claims police found no other items related to the firearm, such as a

holster and bullets. Id. at 38.

       Section 6106 provides in relevant part:

       (a) Offense defined.--

____________________________________________

13 Appellant also relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wiley,

175 A.3d 1073 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum). However, only
unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their
persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2). As Wiley was filed before this date,
we do not consider it. See id.

                                          - 30 -
J-S08024-24

         (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person
         who carries a firearm in   any vehicle or   any  person
         who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,
         except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
         without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
         chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

     In Boatwright,

     [t]he Commonwealth’s evidence disclosed that, shortly after
     10:00 p.m. on April 10, 1979, Officers Charles Roller and Annette
     Roebuck responded to a radio call concerning three “suspicious”
     men in an automobile parked in front of a residence in the
     Hazelwood section of Pittsburgh. Upon arriving at the location,
     Officer Roller observed [Boatwright], who was seated in the front
     passenger seat of the vehicle, “moving towards his left rear.” The
     officer could not see [Boatwright’s] hand or arm, only a movement
     of his body. Officer Roller then opened the door of the automobile
     and asked [Boatwright] to get out. He shined a light onto the left
     rear floor of the vehicle and saw a gun.           In addition to
     [Boatwright], the car was occupied by the driver and another
     passenger who was seated in the left rear seat. The car was
     registered to the driver’s girlfriend and the gun to one Darlene
     Simpson.

Id. at 1058-59.   The Boatwright panel concluded these facts failed to

demonstrate Boatwright’s joint constructive possession of the firearm, as

     [t]he only evidence other than mere presence was Officer Roller’s
     testimony that [Boatwright] made a movement toward the left
     rear of the vehicle. This evidence cannot provide proof beyond a
     reasonable doubt that [Boatwright] possessed the firearm in
     question. Therefore, the conviction cannot be sustained.

Id. at 1059.

     Here, unlike in Boatwright, the Commonwealth presented evidence

Appellant was the only occupant of the Buick. N.T., 1/28/22, at 7. Further,

Appellant’s DNA was found on the firearm, and it was packaged in a bag

                                   - 31 -
J-S08024-24

consistent with the bags police found near Appellant inside the Buick. Id. at

15, 42. Thus, Boatwright is distinguishable on these facts.

      Furthermore, based on the evidence presented, the trial court rejected

Appellant’s claim:

      In this case, the evidence was sufficient to support [Appellant’s]
      conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license. The
      Commonwealth established that [Appellant] carried the firearm in
      the Buick when he wrapped it in a plastic bag and a t-shirt before
      concealing it in the front engine compartment. His DNA was on
      the gun and the bag he used to conceal the firearm was similar to
      the bag containing his drugs. He was not in his place of abode or
      place of business while in possession of the firearm. Lastly, the
      Commonwealth proved that [Appellant] did not have a license to
      carry the gun[]. Therefore, when evaluating the evidence in the
      light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner,
      the evidence was sufficient to establish that [Appellant]
      committed the offense of firearms not to be carried without a
      license.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 10. We agree with the trial court’s sound

reasoning and conclusion, stated above, and affirm on this basis with regard

to Appellant’s third issue. See id.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his conviction of receiving stolen property. Appellant’s Brief at 29.

Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to establish Appellant knew of the

firearm’s presence in the Buick, or that he had intentionally acquired the

firearm. Id. at 32. In support, Appellant points out his consent to the search

of the Buick, and waiver of his Miranda rights. Id. Further, Appellant asserts,

the vehicle was not registered to him. Id.

                                      - 32 -
J-S08024-24

      Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove mens rea, in that

there is no “recency” between the date the firearm was stolen and the date of

his possession. Id. at 32-33. Appellant asserts he was 13 years old in 2005,

when the firearm was stolen. Id. at 33. Under these circumstances, Appellant

claims the Commonwealth failed to prove he intentionally acquired or had

knowledge of the stolen firearm in the Buick. Id.

      The Crimes Code defines the crime of receiving stolen property as

follows:

      (a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of theft if he
      intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of
      another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has
      probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or
      disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

      (b) Definition. — As used in this section the word “receiving”
      means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the
      security of the property.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925.

      This Court has recognized,

      [g]uilty knowledge (like all culpable mental states) may be proved
      by circumstantial evidence.          See [Commonwealth v.]
      Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307, 314 [(Pa. 2008)]. “Often, intent cannot be
      proven directly but must be inferred from examination of the facts
      and circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Pond, 846
      A.2d 699, 707 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “When
      examining the totality of the circumstances to determine if there
      is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the
      requisite mens rea, we must, as with any sufficiency analysis,
      examine all record evidence and all reasonable inferences
      therefrom.”     Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
      omitted). In conducting our assessment, we stress again that we
      must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth as the verdict winner. Pruitt, 951 A.2d at 313.

                                    - 33 -
J-S08024-24

      The trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
      and the weight of the proof, is free to believe all, part, or none of
      the evidence. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 577 Pa. 194, 843
      A.2d 1203, 1211 (Pa. 2003).

Commonwealth v. Newhart, 994 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Instantly, the trial court rejected Appellant’s sufficiency challenge:

      As set forth above, [Appellant] was found to be in the possession
      of a firearm owned by Shuffelbottom. [Appellant] hid the firearm
      inside of the front engine compartment and took the additional
      steps of wrapping it in both a plastic bag and t-shirt to further
      conceal the weapon.          Clearly, [Appellant’s] actions were
      consistent with his knowledge that this firearm was illegal
      contraband and took steps to hide it. His DNA was on the gun and
      the bag he used to conceal the firearm was similar to the bag
      containing his drugs. Also, [Appellant] was a person prohibited
      from legally obtaining a firearm and would have needed to turn to
      illegitimate means to acquire a firearm. Therefore, when
      evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence was sufficient
      to establish that [Appellant] committed the offense of receiving
      stolen property. He is not entitled to relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 9; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that a

defendant’s flight from police or concealment may be “admissible as evidence

of consciousness of guilt.”). The trial court’s findings are supported in the

record and we discern no error in its analysis and conclusion. See Trial Court

Opinion, 10/17/23, at 9. We therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court’s

above-stated rationale as to this issue. See id.

                        WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

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       Appellant’s remaining three issues challenge the verdicts as against the

weight of the evidence.14 We address Appellant’s weight challenges together.

       In his fifth issue, Appellant contends his conviction of person not to

possess firearms was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief

at 38. Appellant claims the trial court “did not give proper weight to parts of

the testimony.” Id. at 39. In particular, Appellant challenges the weight the

court afforded to Ms. Newhart’s testimony regarding whether the seized items,

photographed together at the police station “could cause enough friction to

transfer DNA to create a partial sample such as the one they collected.” Id.

at 39. According to Appellant, Ms. Newhart could not give a definitive “yes”

or “no” answer, and expressed caution about “quality control.” Id.

       Appellant asserts Ms. Newhart acknowledged the sample was “not a

high-quality sample, which means it was a touch sample.”        Id. at 39-40.

Further, Ms. Newhart could not opine as to when the DNA was deposited. Id.

at 40.     Appellant thus argues the Commonwealth failed to prove that

secondary transfer did not occur, and further provided no evidence of how the

evidence was handled by police. Id. Appellant directs our attention to the

lack of “chain-of-custody” testimony of record. Id. Appellant claims the trial

____________________________________________

14 Appellant preserved his weight claims in his post-sentence motion.

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court abused its discretion by failing to assign appropriate weight to the lack

of this evidence. Id. at 41.

      In his sixth issue, Appellant argues his conviction of receiving stolen

property is against the weight of the evidence. Id. Appellant again asserts

the trial court should not have afforded more weight to Ms. Newhart’s

testimony “regarding the possibility of secondary transfer.”       Id. at 42.

Appellant asserts,

      The record is clear that Officer Scott and Officer Auman touched
      the handgun with gloves, but the Commonwealth did not establish
      during the trial that the Officers changed their gloves after that
      interaction. They continued to collect evidence and transport the
      handgun along with items such as the stack of money found on
      [Appellant’s] person. Therefore, it is equally as likely that a
      secondary transfer occurred[,] as the Commonwealth did not
      supply the [c]ourt with a detailed chain of custody and procedures
      taken by the Officers to prevent contamination ….

Id. at 43.

      In his seventh issue, Appellant claims his conviction of firearms not to

be carried without a license is against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 44.

Appellant argues the trial court

      did not give proper weight to the fact the vehicle was not
      [Appellant’s] and the location of the firearm, did not give proper
      weight to the DNA expert evidence regarding secondary transfer,
      and did not give enough weight to the evidence presented that
      [Appellant] was cooperative with police ….

Id. at 44. Appellant again claims he did not know about the gun’s presence

in the Buick. Id. Appellant contends the DNA sample does not definitively

prove he handled the weapon. Id. at 45.

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     This Court has explained,

     [a] new trial may be granted on the ground that the verdict is
     against the weight of the evidence only where the verdict was so
     contrary to the evidence that it shocks the trial court’s sense of
     justice. Our review of the denial of a motion for a new trial based
     on weight of the evidence is limited. We review whether the
     trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the
     verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, not
     whether the verdict, in this Court’s opinion, was against the
     weight of the evidence.

            Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
            and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
            give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
            advanced by the trial judge ....        One of the least
            assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
            lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not
            against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Weitzel, 304 A.3d 1219, 1226-27 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(emphasis added; citations omitted).

     To determine whether a trial court’s decision constituted a
     palpable abuse of discretion, an appellate court must examine the
     record and assess the weight of the evidence; not however, as the
     trial judge, to determine whether the preponderance of the
     evidence opposes the verdict, but rather to determine whether the
     court below in so finding plainly exceeded the limits of judicial
     discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the [fact-finder].
     Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
     court has acted within the limits of its judicial discretion.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

     Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight challenges:

     [A]s set forth above in this [c]ourt’s analysis of the sufficiency of
     this evidence[,] this [c]ourt was presented with a case upon which
     to convict [Appellant]. This [c]ourt determined the credibility of
     the witnesses and, when assessing the weight of the evidence,

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      believed the evidence presented by the prosecution and rendered
      a guilty verdict. Therefore[,] the verdict was consistent with the
      evidence presented and did not shock anyone’s sense of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 11.

      Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, we are precluded from reweighing

the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Clay,

64 A.3d at 1055.      Discerning no abuse of the trial court’s discretion,

Appellant’s challenges to the verdicts, as against the weight of the evidence,

merit no relief.   See id.; see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/23, at 11.

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/9/2024

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