Court Opinion

ID: 9556061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:04:09.251965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.727151
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 Cal. Regional Water Quality Control etc. v. Balcom Ranch CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 CALIFORNIA REGIONAL                                          2d Civil No. B311434
 WATER QUALITY CONTROL                                      (Super. Ct. No. 56-2017-
 BOARD OF LOS ANGELES,                                       00505151-CU-JR-VTA)
                                                               (Ventura County)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 BALCOM RANCH,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Balcom Ranch, a general partnership, appeals the
judgment and order requiring it to pay $167,400 in attorneys fees
to the California Regional Water Quality Control Board of Los
Angeles (the Water Board) after appellant was found in contempt
for failing to comply with a subpoena issued by the Water Board.
Appellant contends the Water Board is not entitled to recover its
fees because it did not prevail in their dispute regarding a
protective order, because the Water Board, through inaction,
abandoned and voluntarily dismissed the administrative
proceeding, because there is no statutory basis for a fee award
and because awarding fees would be inequitable. Each of these
contentions is without merit. We affirm.
                    Facts and Procedural History
       The Water Board assessed an administrative civil liability
(ACL) penalty of $193,850 against appellant in 2011 because
appellant failed to timely comply with requirements for testing
wastewater discharge from its irrigated commercial agriculture
operations. Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate,
contending the penalty was excessive and violated its due process
rights because the Water Board did not give enough
consideration to its ability to pay the penalty and remain in
business. In June 2015, the trial court vacated the penalty and
remanded the matter to the Water Board to hold an
administrative hearing at which it would reconsider appellant’s
ability to pay a civil penalty.
       In April 2016, the Water Board’s prosecution team issued a
revised ACL recommending a penalty of $51,045. It later issued
a subpoena duces tecum to appellant and three of its partners
requiring the production of financial records, the partnership
agreement and related organizational documents, and documents
related to property owned by the partnership. Appellant objected
to the subpoena on several procedural grounds and declined to
produce responsive documents without a protective order.
       Negotiations over the terms of that order were not
successful. In October 2016, the Water Board’s hearing panel
overruled most of appellant’s objections to the subpoena but
granted its motion to quash the production of tax returns. The
hearing panel rejected the proposed protective order and directed
appellant to produce responsive documents by November 2016.

                                2
       Appellant failed to produce any documents in response to
the Water Board’s order. About five months later, the Water
Board’s hearing panel found appellant in contempt based on its
refusal to comply with the subpoena.
       The Water Board filed the instant action to confirm and
enforce its contempt citation in April 2017. Appellant responded,
arguing in the trial court that it would produce some of the
responsive documents subject to a protective order. In July 2018,
16 months after the Water Board issued its contempt citation, the
trial court entered a tentative order overruling appellant’s
objections to the subpoena and confirming the contempt citation.
The trial court encouraged the parties to continue negotiations
over a protective order.
       In February 2019, seven months after its tentative ruling,
the trial court entered an order confirming the contempt citation.
This order found that the Water Board’s subpoena was
“authorized, lawful and valid,” that its order denying a protective
order was “lawful and valid” and that appellant had no
“substantial justification” for its refusal to comply with the
subpoena. It further found that appellant’s refusal to comply
with the subpoena “constitutes contempt.” Because appellant
was “guilty of contempt,” the trial court ordered its general
partner Mark Brown imprisoned until appellant produced
responsive documents. It further ordered appellant to pay a
$1,000 fine and to pay the Water Board’s “reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in connection with this contempt
proceeding.”
       About two months later, the trial court entered a protective
order submitted by the Water Board. In March and July 2019,
appellant produced some responsive documents and filed written

                                3
responses to the subpoena. In its responses, appellant stated it
did not possess many of the requested documents, including a
written partnership agreement or any documents relating to the
partners’ rights and responsibilities. Appellant and its general
partners also refused to submit affidavits, required by the
subpoena, attesting that they had produced all responsive
documents in their possession. At a status conference in June
2019, the trial court concluded appellant had substantially
complied with the subpoena. It also ordered appellant and its
partners to provide the requested affidavits.
        The Water Board filed a motion to set the amount of its
attorney fee award in August 2020. In December, the trial court
awarded the Water Board fees of $167,400. Notice of entry of
judgment was served in May 2021 confirming that appellant was
guilty of contempt and was required to pay $167,400 in attorney
fees to the Water Board and a $1,000 fine.
                          Standard of Review
         We review the award of attorney’s fees for abuse of
discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
1095; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140,
152–153.) As our Supreme Court has explained, the trial court is
in the best position to judge the value of legal services rendered
in the courtroom and its judgment regarding those services will
not be disturbed unless we, as the reviewing court, are convinced
that it was clearly wrong. (PLCM Group, Inc., supra, at p. 1095,
quoting Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) “An abuse of
discretion occurs if, in light of the applicable law and considering
all of the relevant circumstances, the court's decision exceeds the
bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice. . . . We
presume that the court properly applied the law and acted within

                                 4
its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows otherwise.
[Citations.]” (Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
151, 158.)
                              Discussion
       Water Board as Prevailing Party. Appellant contends it
declined to produce documents in response to the subpoena
because the Water Board refused, without any valid basis, to
agree to a protective order. The trial court eventually entered
one covering documents appellant designated as confidential.
Appellant contends the Water Board is not entitled to recover its
attorney fees because it did not prevent entry of the protective
order.
       Appellant waived review of this issue when it failed to seek
timely review of the February 2019 contempt order. The
questions of whether the Water Board had a valid basis to deny a
protective order or whether its contempt citation should be
enforced were conclusively decided by the trial court in its
February 2019 order. The trial court ordered appellant to pay
the Water Board’s attorney’s fees because it found appellant’s
refusal, “without substantial justification” to comply with the
Water Board’s “authorized, lawful and valid” subpoena
constituted contempt.
       This order is “final and conclusive.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1222.) It is not appealable, but could have been reviewed by a
timely petition for writ of mandate or certiorari. (People v.
Gonzales (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816; Imuta v. Nakano (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 1570, 1584, fn. 18.) Appellant did not file a timely
writ petition and no extraordinary circumstances exist to excuse
the delay. (Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 109, 114; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.

                                 5
Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 694, 701.) Consequently,
appellant forfeited review of question whether the Water Board is
entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. (Grant v. List &
Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 997.)
       Statutory Basis for Fee Order. Appellant contends there is
no statutory basis for the order directing it to pay the Water
Board’s attorney fees. It is mistaken. First, we note appellant
forfeited appellate review of this issue because it did not
challenge the statutory basis for the fee award in the trial court.
(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506,
548.) Had the issue been preserved for review, however, we
would reject it. The fee award is authorized by Government Code
section 11455.20 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1218.
       When the Water Board’s hearing panel found appellant in
contempt, it followed the enforcement procedure provided in
Government Code section 11455.20. It forwarded the contempt
citation and its certification of the facts justifying the citation to
the trial court. The trial court issued an order to show cause why
appellant “should not be punished for contempt.” (Id., subd. (a).)
When the order to show cause and the Water Board’s certification
of facts were served on appellant, the trial court had jurisdiction
over the matter. (Ibid.) At that point, “The same proceedings
shall be had, the same penalties may be imposed, and the person
charged may purge the contempt in the same way, as in the case
of a person who has committed a contempt in the trial of a civil
action before a superior court.” (Id., subd. (b).) In other words,
once the trial court served its order to show cause, it conducted
the contempt proceeding as it would any other direct contempt.
(Parris v. Zolin (1996) 12 Cal.4th 839, 850.)

                                  6
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a)
provides that the punishment for contempt is a fine of up to
$1,000, imprisonment for up to five days, or both. “In addition, a
person who is subject to a court order as a party to the action . . .
may be ordered to pay to the party initiating the contempt
proceeding the reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by
this party in connection with the contempt proceeding.” (Ibid.)
Government Code section 11455.20, subdivision (b) empowers the
superior court to impose the same penalties for contempt “as in
the case of a person who has committed a contempt in the trial of
a civil action before a superior court.” Here, the trial court
followed that directive when it relied on Code of Civil Procedure
section 1218 to order the payment of attorney’s fees and costs.
       Abandonment of Administrative Proceeding. Appellant
contends the Water Board is not entitled to recover its fees
because it pursued the contempt citation long after it abandoned
the revised ACL and the effort to assess a penalty against
appellant for its initial refusal to comply with the waste water
discharge requirements. This contention is based on the Water
Board’s listing appellant on its agenda for two closed session
meetings held in April and July, 2019. The record, however,
contains no evidence as to what occurred during these closed
session meetings, as they are confidential. We do not know what,
if anything, occurred in the closed sessions. As a consequence, we
cannot conclude the Water Board decided during one or both of
those sessions to abandon the revised ACL.
       The Water Board’s failure to hold a prompt hearing on the
revised ACL is also not evidence that it abandoned the matter
because the delay was occasioned by appellant. At appellant’s
insistence, the trial court’s June 2015 order required the Water

                                 7
Board on remand to consider appellant’s financial condition and
ability to pay before assessing a penalty against it. Appellant
then refused to provide the Water Board with any evidence
regarding its financial condition. Even after the trial court
determined the subpoena was proper and enforceable, appellant
refused to produce responsive documents or the required
affidavits. Appellant also sought and obtained from the trial
court numerous continuances and opportunities for further
briefing, delaying an administrative hearing even longer.
Appellant, not the Water Board, prevented a prompt hearing on
the revised ACL.
       Code of Civil Procedure section 583.320. Appellant
contends the revised ACL is time barred because the Water
Board did not hold a hearing on it within three years after the
trial court’s remand. Code of Civil Procedure section 583.320
provides that, if a new trial is granted “in the action” and no
appeal is taken, “the action shall again be brought to trial . . .
within three years after the order granting the new trial is
entered.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) But the proceeding on the revised
ACL is an administrative proceeding, not an “action,” within the
meaning of section 583.320. (Code Civ. Proc., § 22 [action defined
as “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice”].) Similarly, the
trial court’s order remanded the matter for the Water Board’s
further consideration of the penalty to be assessed. It did not
order a new trial. The three-year mandatory dismissal rule does
not apply.
       Timeliness of Motion to Set Attorney’s Fees. Appellant
contends the motion to set attorney’s fees was not timely because
it was not filed within 180 days of the February 2019 contempt
order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702 (b)(1).) Rule 3.1702,

                                 8
subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A notice of motion to claim attorney’s
fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in
the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for
filing a notice of appeal under [Cal. Rules of Court,] rules 8.104
and 8.108 . . . .” Rule 8.104 sets the time limit for filing an appeal
based on entry of judgment. These rules do not apply to the
Water Board’s motion to set its attorney’s fees because judgment
had not yet been entered in that proceeding. (Carpenter v. Jack
in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 466-468.)
       Laches. Appellant contends the doctrine of laches bars the
fee award because the Water Board prolonged the dispute by
continuing to raise unfounded objections to entry of a protective
order. “Laches is an equitable principle that bars certain claims
or proceedings based on a combination of unreasonable delay in
pursuing the claims and prejudice based on that delay.” (Malaga
County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 447, 462-463 (Malaga County Water).) In
appropriate circumstances, “‘the defense of laches may operate as
a bar to a claim by a public administrative agency . . . if the
requirements of unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice are
met.’” (Fountain Valley Regional Hospital & Medical Center v.
Bonta (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 316, 323.) “Notably, ‘delay alone
does not constitute laches because “[t]he policy of this state with
respect to lapse of time is [separately] embodied in statutes [of
limitation].”’” (Malaga County Water., supra, at p. 463, quoting
Brown v. State Personnel Board (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1151,
1159.)
       Appellant is not entitled to claim laches because, as we
have already discussed, it is primarily responsible for any delay.
The Water Board may have delayed drafting a suitable protective

                                  9
order. Appellant, however, is the party that insisted the Water
Board consider its present financial condition and ability to pay
before assessing a penalty on the revised ACL. Then, appellant
refused, for more than three years, to produce the very records
that would document its present ability to pay. And all of this
was occasioned by appellant’s refusal to comply with
requirements brought to its attention in January 2007.
Appellant justified its dilatory conduct based on questionable
procedural and constitutional objections to the subpoena. (See,
e.g., 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 219
Cal.App.4th 1316, 1346-1348 [privacy rights not absolute and “it
is not entirely clear to what extent legal entities other than people
. . . may assert their own privacy rights”]; Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Los Angeles Times Communications
LLC (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 808, 821 [right of privacy “‘is a
purely personal one’”].) Even after the trial court overruled those
objections, appellant failed to seek timely writ review and
delayed more than six months before achieving “substantial
compliance” with the subpoena. This delay, while unreasonable,
is not attributable to the Water Board.
       Additionally, although appellant has complained the Water
Board’s motion to set the fee award was untimely, it never
asserted that it was prejudiced by the delay. There is no claim
that memories have faded, that witnesses have disappeared, that
documents have been destroyed, or that the 10-month delay
between the February 2019 contempt order and the August 27,
2020 motion to set the fee award somehow impaired appellant’s
ability to defend itself. Delay alone does not constitute laches.
(Malaga County Water, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)

                                 10
Appellant may not avoid its liability for the Water Board’s
attorney’s fees and costs by asserting laches.
                            Conclusion
      The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal to respondent.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                              YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              11
                    Ronda J. McKaig, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Niddrie, Addams, Fuller, Singh and Rupa G. Singh; Leech,
Tishman, Fuscaldo & Lampl and Fadi K. Rasheed, for Defendant
and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant
Attorney General, Eric M. Katz, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Carol A.Z. Boyd, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.