Court Opinion

ID: 9913802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 20:02:17.943269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:55.631383
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/28/23 In re T.R. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re T.R.,                                                    B322616

 a Person Coming Under the                                     (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                            Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01327)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 JOSE R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charles Q. Clay, Judge. Affirmed.
     Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      _____________________

       Jose R. (Father) asks us to reverse the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings, including that he and J.M. (Mother) each
physically abused their then-15-year-old daughter, T.R., and that
Father failed to protect T.R. from Mother’s physical abuse.
Father likewise appeals the court’s order removing T.R. from his
custody, requiring Father to participate in counseling and
parenting classes, and restricting his visits with T.R. to one hour
per week of monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting. Father
finally claims we should reverse because the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to
adequately inquire of maternal extended family members
whether T.R. was an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).1 Mother is
not a party to this appeal.2
      As we describe below, we consider only some of Father’s
jurisdictional challenges due to issues of standing. We conclude
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s assertion of
jurisdiction and the removal order, that Father forfeited his

      1 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same
for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such
as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In
re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
      2 Mother filed a no-merit brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H.
(2009) 47 Cal.App.4th 835. Her appeal, case No. B321286, was
dismissed in March 2023.

                                 2
challenge to the case plan, and that the court’s visitation orders
were not an abuse of discretion. Finally, although DCFS did not
comply with its duty of initial ICWA-related inquiry under
Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 224.2, subdivision (b), this
error was harmless. We thus affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     The Family and Child Welfare History
       We recite only those facts necessary to our disposition.
Mother and Father were born in El Salvador and met there in
2002. The family migrated to the United States in 2007 or 2009,
after T.R. was born.
       In March 2022, T.R. lived with Mother, Father, eight-year-
old brother John R., and three-year-old sister A.R. T.R.’s adult
half-sister, Ana M., lived with maternal grandmother
intermittently since 2008. Mother had agreed to let Ana live
with maternal grandmother due to Ana’s allegations that Father
had sexually abused her.
       In November 2017, DCFS received a report that nearly
nine years prior, when the family lived in El Salvador, Father
abused Ana, T.R., and John. The reporter was unaware of
current abuse, and the referral was evaluated out as historical.
       In February 2018, DCFS received two referrals concerning
the family. Ana, then approximately 16 or 17 years old, was on
psychiatric hold. Mother did not want Ana to return to live with
maternal grandmother. Ana threatened to commit suicide if she
were forced to live with Mother. The reporter stated Father

      3 All unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

                                 3
sexually and emotionally abused Ana when the family resided in
El Salvador. Ana also witnessed domestic violence between
Mother and Father but denied abuse of the other children. A
dependency matter was opened, and the juvenile court sustained
an allegation that Mother emotionally abused Ana by involving
her in Mother’s conflict with maternal grandmother. In October
2019, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with a home of
parent order.
B.     Events Giving Rise to the Section 300 Petition
       On March 22, 2022, DCFS received a referral that two days
earlier Mother had been drunk and yelled at Ana and T.R.,
calling them useless and parasites, and threw several objects at
them.
       On March 29, 2022, DCFS received a report that T.R. was
concerned about a social worker speaking with her because,
among other things, Mother would hit T.R. if she told the truth.
The report included that T.R. was developing an eating disorder
and had made suicidal statements.
       A social worker interviewed T.R. at a police station. T.R.
stated Mother hit her for every little thing, including when her
parents argued and T.R. did not side with Mother. T.R.
acknowledged she had suicidal thoughts a few months ago,
including cutting her veins or throat, because her parents said
they would change but did not. T.R. claimed her parents argued
a lot but could not remember when they last did so. During an
argument, Mother told Father that he “like[d] [T.R.] because
[she] is getting pretty.” Mother last hit T.R. on March 26, 2022,
because T.R gave Mother pink salt instead of white salt. Mother
hit T.R. with a closed fist to the head, and T.R. developed a bump
as a result. Father was not home at the time, but John and A.R.

                                4
saw Mother hit T.R. and cried for Mother to stop. T.R. also
stated that a week prior, Mother kicked her thigh. T.R. could not
recall the details of this incident but stated she had a bruise as a
result. T.R. stated Father either was not present when Mother
hit her, or when he was present did nothing to intervene.
       According to T.R., Father last hit her in January 2022
because he believed she failed a biology test. He punched her
approximately five times with a closed fist. Mother did not
observe the incident. T.R. stated her parents do not hit A.R. or
John.
       A police officer observed a dime-size, light green bruise on
T.R.’s left upper thigh, a linear one-inch scar on her forehead, a
healed scar on her cheek, and a mark on her hand. T.R. stated
the forehead scar was from Thanksgiving 2021, when Mother
threw a ruler at her, although T.R. did not recall why. A slap by
Mother caused the scar on her cheek. According to the police
report, an officer also felt a bump on the back of T.R.’s head.
       T.R. claimed she would use a kitchen knife to kill herself if
she went back home with her parents. The parents agreed to a
safety plan for T.R. to stay with maternal grandmother.
       Ana, who had stayed at Mother and Father’s home for over
a month, confirmed she saw Mother hit T.R. a lot. The last time
was on March 27, 2022. T.R. had been using Ana’s cell phone to
text friends, and Mother slapped T.R. hard on the shoulder.
Mother also hit T.R. approximately two weeks earlier because
Ana and T.R. were sharing clothes. Ana observed Mother grab
T.R. by the hair and slap T.R. in the face. She also reported that
when T.R. was sleeping, Mother slapped T.R. on the face, grabbed
T.R. and threw her on the floor, and kicked T.R. approximately
five times. Ana could not recall when or why this incident

                                 5
happened. Ana reported Father hit T.R. with a belt but did not
know why, or where on her body he struck her.
       John denied witnessing any fighting amongst family
members. He also denied being hit with objects or witnessing
physical discipline of T.R. or A.R. To discipline John, the parents
restricted phone or television use. He stated he liked living with
his parents and felt safe. Neither John nor A.R. had any marks
or bruises on their bodies.
       A.R. told the social worker that Mother and T.R. fought
approximately three times. A.R. pointed to her cheek and
forearm and said T.R.’s name and the Spanish word for blood.
A.R. denied that Mother fought with her, Father, John, or Ana.
       Father stated that he disciplined the children by restricting
cell phone or television use. He acknowledged that years ago, he
hit T.R. with a belt, but was not sure when or why. Father stated
that with respect to T.R.’s biology test, he slapped T.R. on her
upper thigh and buttock with an open hand and twice gave her a
slight push on the back with an open hand. Father stated he
stopped Mother from hitting T.R. multiple times and intervened
approximately twice a week. Father believed Mother needed help
with anger management. He denied seeing marks or bruises on
T.R.’s body and noted he would not allow that. He believed the
last time Mother hit T.R. was a month prior, related to T.R.
sharing Ana’s clothes, and that Mother also had disciplined T.R.
for cutting T.R.’s clothing to shorten it. He acknowledged it was
possible that Mother was jealous of T.R. as Mother was
possessive of Father. He believed Ana and maternal
grandmother manipulated T.R. because they wanted T.R. to live
with them. He denied any substance abuse or domestic violence.
He admitted that he touched Ana inappropriately once when

                                 6
John and Ana were sitting with him on the sofa. Father reached
for John and accidentally touched Ana.
       Mother believed Ana influenced T.R. to falsify allegations of
abuse and self-harm. Mother denied hitting T.R. daily, kicking
her in the thigh, or hitting her in the back of the head with a
closed fist. Mother admitted she slapped T.R. on the shoulder
with an open hand a few weeks ago because T.R. was
disrespectful and screamed at Mother when Mother told her not
to share clothes with Ana. Mother also acknowledged that
approximately a year prior, she hit T.R. with a belt for cutting a
shirt and a sweater into crop tops. Mother and Father each
stated that T.R. scarred her forehead as a result of falling off a
mechanical bull at a party approximately four years ago.
       Mother said Father did not hit T.R. or the other children to
discipline them, and did not know whether Father hit T.R. with
respect to her biology test. Father hit Mother approximately 12
years ago, but there was currently no violence between them.
       Maternal grandmother stated that she observed Mother hit
T.R. “on some occasions,” but not to the extent it left marks or
bruises. She witnessed Mother slap T.R. on the shoulder two
weeks prior.
       Two neighbors stated the family sometimes played loud
music but that they never heard fights or screaming.
       T.R. told a forensic evaluator that Mother caused the bruise
on her right thigh, scars on her forehead and cheek, and the
mark on her hand. The evaluator reported that some of the
statements about how T.R. sustained these injuries were not
consistent with the marks, but that T.R. was consistent
throughout the interview in describing Mother’s abuse.

                                 7
      Although the parents originally agreed to have T.R. stay
with maternal grandmother for a few days, they changed their
minds because they believed maternal grandmother and Ana
were influencing T.R. Instead, the parents identified maternal
second cousin, Erika C.4 as a person to care for T.R. during the
safety plan. Erika agreed to have T.R. stay in her home. Father
agreed that, if needed, he would live elsewhere until the family
completed services and reunified.
       The social worker went to T.R.’s school to discuss the safety
plan with her. T.R. indicated she did not want to be placed with
Erika because she was concerned her parents would go to Erika’s
home. The social worker explained T.R.’s parents would not be
permitted to contact her or Erika, and T.R. believed Erika would
follow that guideline. While the social worker was at the school,
maternal grandmother texted the social worker multiple times,
claiming T.R. would kill herself if she were not placed with
maternal grandmother. The social worker explained T.R. was not
expressing suicidal ideations. Erika and Mother separately
reported maternal grandmother telephoned them. According to
Erika, maternal grandmother threatened to report to the police
that T.R. had been kidnapped and was going to kill herself.
According to a police call log, Ana and maternal grandmother
called law enforcement. Erika showed the police proof of custody,
and the police determined T.R. was not in any danger and there
was no evidence of a crime. The following day, T.R. reported she
felt safe in Erika’s home and denied any suicidal ideations. She
identified a maternal aunt, Esmerelda, as someone who she
would want to live with if she could not live with maternal

      4 DCFS also referred to Erika as Edith S.

                                 8
grandmother. Mother and Father stated they did not want T.R.
to live with maternal grandmother, Ana, or Esmerelda due to
longstanding, hostile family dynamics.
       On April 3, 2022, maternal grandmother reported to DCFS
that T.R. was with a family member who could not handle T.R.’s
suicidal ideations and eating disorder. Maternal grandmother
indicated she wanted T.R. to live with her.
       On April 5, 2022, the day the safety plan was to expire,
T.R. stated if she could not live with maternal grandmother, she
would kill herself. The juvenile court removed T.R. from her
parents and placed her with Erika. T.R. informed the social
worker that she wanted to be emancipated.
       DCFS did not recommend that T.R. be placed with
maternal grandmother. Maternal grandmother and Ana kept in
regular contact with T.R. through a cell phone that maternal
grandmother gave to her. During these contacts, they told T.R.
that she would live with them, which the social worker believed
created instability and confusion for T.R.
C.    The Petition
      On April 7, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition,
alleging Mother physically abused T.R. (count a-1), Father
physically abused T.R. (count a-2), Father failed to protect T.R.
from Mother’s abuse (count b-1), Mother failed to protect T.R.
from Father’s abuse (count b-2), and that Mother emotionally
abused T.R. (count c-1).5

      5 The petition further alleged that T.R.’s siblings John and
A.R. were at risk due to Mother’s and Father’s physical abuse of
T.R. and their failure to protect T.R. (counts j-1, j-2). Father did

                                  9
D.     Detention Hearing
       At the April 12, 2022, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found that DCFS had demonstrated a prima facie case for
dependency jurisdiction. It detained T.R. from both parents, and
ordered that the parents have one hour per week of monitored
visits with her in a therapeutic setting. It granted DCFS
discretion to liberalize the visits to a minimum of two visits for
two hours per visit.
E.    Jurisdiction and Disposition
      1.    The Report
      In her statements following the detention hearing, T.R.
continued to maintain Mother had physically abused her and
recounted some of the previously reported abuse with additional
details. With respect to the incident relating to T.R. wearing

not appeal from any findings or orders made in John’s or A.R.’s
cases. His notice of appeal refers only to T.R.’s case number; the
caption of Father’s opening brief likewise refers only to T.R.’s
case number and identifies only T.R. as the subject of the appeal.
The appellate record includes only the minute order of the
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders relating to T.R.
and not the two siblings. Father did not file a reply brief
disputing DCFS’s argument that he did not appeal John’s and
A.R.’s cases. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 773-774 [an
appellant may “tacitly concede” an argument made in a
respondent’s brief by failing to respond].) Whether Father’s
action and inaction as to T.R. had any impact on her siblings is
therefore not before us and does not impact our resolution of
T.R.’s appeal. We thus decline to address Father’s arguments
concerning the section 300, subdivision (j) allegations and limit
our discussion to T.R.’s case.

                                10
Ana’s clothes, T.R. stated Mother slapped her face. When Father
observed T.R. crying with her hand on her cheek, Mother
explained to Father that T.R. “was a liar and being dramatic,”
and punched T.R. on the shoulder in front of Father. With
respect to being hit in the head with the ruler, T.R. claimed
Mother threw it at her because she took too long to put away
laundry. T.R. claimed John witnessed the incident but Mother
threatened to hit him. Mother told T.R. to say she was injured
when a box of toys fell on her. T.R. also stated that Mother
kicked T.R.’s vagina while T.R. was menstruating as a form of
discipline. Mother physically disciplined T.R. daily, either by
punching her on the back, hitting her with a broomstick, or
kicking her. Mother belittled T.R., called her trash, told T.R. that
she wanted to kill her but did not want to go to jail, and said that
she regretted bringing T.R. from El Salvador. T.R. stated she
would rather kill herself than go back to her parents’ house.
        As to Father, T.R. maintained he hit her several times with
his fist for failing her biology test and because he believed she
“did something” to A.R. to make her cry. Father physically
disciplined her at least once a month with a belt. She stated that
if she accidentally broke a cup or a bottle of perfume, Father
would hit her. She did not feel safe with Father and did not want
to go back home. T.R. stated Father saw Mother hit her lots of
times, and only defended her when Mother hit her a lot and T.R.
“felt like [she] was fainting.” She claimed her siblings have seen
the abuse but will not acknowledge it because her parents bribe
them with toys. Mother also knew when Father hit T.R. but did
not intervene. T.R. told the social worker, “I had thoughts of
killing myself and once I grabbed a knife and I was going to cut

                                11
myself, but I stopped because I did not want them to see me on
the ground dead.”
       John stated he never saw Mother or Father physically
abuse T.R. and that T.R. was lying about the abuse. A.R. did not
give a meaningful statement as she was unable to focus on the
investigator’s questions. In response to the investigator asking if
T.R. ever seemed sad or afraid, A.R. stated, “no, I cannot talk
about that.”
       Mother stated she did not hit T.R. on the head or with her
fist, but she did physically discipline T.R. and as Mother put it,
“let my anger take me.” Mother explained Ana had a sexually
transmitted disease (STD), and Mother did not want T.R. sharing
Ana’s clothes until Ana had completed her treatment medication.
T.R. walked up to Mother and “yelled at her face.” Mother hit
T.R. on the arm with an open hand. She maintained she did not
slap or scratch T.R.’s face, pull her hair, or throw a ruler at her.
Mother stated she hit T.R. with a belt twice because she had
warned T.R. not to cut her clothing, but T.R. did so nevertheless.
Mother denied that T.R. was afraid of Father or that she ever
observed T.R. to be depressed or suicidal, and stated Ana and
maternal grandmother pitted T.R. against her and Father.
Mother acknowledged that she made a mistake with how she
disciplined T.R. and wanted an opportunity to rectify her errors.
As to whether Father hit T.R. with a belt or his hand, Mother
stated she was not sure and that the investigator would need to
ask Father.
       Father acknowledged that Mother hit T.R. on the shoulder
for talking back. He intervened and told both of them to calm
down. He also acknowledged Mother hit T.R. with a belt on one
occasion, but he did not recall why or when. Father denied

                                12
hitting T.R. with his fist but admitted he did push her twice
because she was not listening to him. He said he hit her one time
with a belt a few months ago. Father would not answer whether
Mother was present or aware of this incident. Father did not
allow Mother to abuse T.R. and told T.R. to call him if there were
problems when he was at work. He explained that Mother and
T.R. would “say things to each other.”
      Maternal grandmother described Mother as very aggressive
and observed Mother hit and pinch T.R. and pull her hair. She
stated Father took T.R. to the patio to spank T.R., and that he
said he spanked her “because she is dumb.” Maternal
grandmother claimed Mother coached and bribed John to deny
the abuse.
      Ana stated she had lived at the family’s home for several
months but moved out. She reiterated that Mother frequently hit
T.R. for no reason and kicked and choked her. She claimed
Mother accused T.R. of having sex with Father. Father did
“nothing” when he saw Mother hit T.R. Ana denied having had
an STD or that T.R. talked back to Mother. Ana claimed Mother
coached John to lie and that Mother and Father have been
abusing T.R. since she was eight years old.
      DCFS reported that T.R. was afraid and refused to visit her
parents. DCFS recommended the juvenile court order Mother
and Father to participate in individual counseling, family
counseling when deemed appropriate by a therapist, parenting
classes, anger management classes, and family preservation
services. It further recommended that Mother participate in a
psychiatric mental health evaluation.

                               13
      2.    The Hearing
       At the June 7, 2022 combined jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, Mother argued she physically disciplined T.R. but that
the discipline was not as extensive as DCFS had alleged. She
requested the juvenile court find there was no current risk to T.R.
and dismiss the petition. In the alternative, she asked the court
to conform the abuse allegation to proof and sustain a single
count that Mother used inappropriate physical discipline in the
past. Mother further argued removal was unnecessary as Mother
agreed she would no longer use physical discipline and would
attend counseling and programs. Father denied hitting T.R. with
his fist and requested, if the court were to sustain the abuse
allegation against him, that it amend it to reflect only that
Father inappropriately disciplined T.R. on one occasion in
January 2022 by hitting her with a belt. He further argued the
court should strike Father from counts b-1 (relating to his alleged
failure to protect) and dismiss count b-2 (relating to Father’s
alleged physical abuse). Father submitted to DCFS’s
dispositional recommendations except for one recommendation
that he participate in an anger management course. Father
agreed with Mother’s arguments that there were reasonable
means by which T.R. could be safely returned to her parents’
home.
       Counsel for DCFS and T.R. both argued that the court
should sustain all the allegations in the petition and place T.R.
with maternal grandmother. T.R.’s counsel noted that Erika “did
not want [T.R.] to be placed with her.”
       The juvenile court sustained all counts as pleaded in the
petition. It concluded returning T.R. to the home of the parents
was not an appropriate disposition, and that removal was

                                14
necessary. In that regard, the juvenile court observed the
parents’ requests that T.R. be returned home “considering the
statements that she’s made regarding her desire not to be placed
home and why,” were “puzzling.” The court ordered maternal
grandmother, Ana, and other family members, excluding Erika,
be assessed for placement. It ordered reunification and
maintenance services, including that Mother participate in a
anger management program, a parenting class, mental health
services, and family counseling when deemed appropriate by the
children’s therapist. The court ordered Father to participate in a
parenting program, individual counseling, and family counseling
when deemed appropriate by the children’s therapist. The court
further ordered that each parent have a minimum of one hour of
monitored visitation with T.R. per week in a therapeutic setting.
It granted DCFS discretion to liberalize the visits.
F.     ICWA Proceedings
       Prior to April 7, 2022, a DCFS social worker asked Mother
and Father about T.R.’s Indian status and reported that the
parents gave the social worker no reason to believe T.R. is or may
be an Indian child. On April 11, 2022, Father filed a parental
notification of Indian status form in which he indicated no
knowledge of Indian ancestry for T.R., John, or A.R. Mother filed
a form as to T.R. in which she indicated no knowledge of Indian
ancestry.
       At the April 12, 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
referred to Mother’s and Father’s forms in their presence and
concluded it did not have a reason to know that T.R. was an
Indian child. The court ordered the parents to keep DCFS, their
attorneys, and the court aware of any new information relating to

                                15
possible ICWA status. No further ICWA finding is reflected in
the record.
      On April 27, 2022, DCFS again inquired of Mother and
Father concerning Indian ancestry, and they denied any.
Nothing in the record indicates maternal grandmother, Ana, or
Erika were asked about T.R.’s possible Indian status.
G.    Notice of Appeal and DCFS’s Motion to Dismiss
      On August 9, 2022, Father filed a notice of appeal. DCFS
argues Father filed this notice one day late and thus, we should
dismiss this appeal. Because Father has demonstrated he would
have timely filed an appeal but for his attorney’s error and
diligently sought relief upon learning of the error, we deny
DCFS’s motion to dismiss. (See In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234,
258.)
H.    Post-appeal Events6
      On June 7, 2023, the juvenile court terminated
reunification services to Mother and Father. In a last minute
information filed September 21, 2023, DCFS reported T.R., then
between 16 and 17 years old, did not want to be adopted,
subjected to any legal guardianship, or live with her parents.
T.R. sought to receive the benefits of “[t]he California Fostering

      6 Because it may bear on the parties’ arguments concerning
Father’s standing and justiciability, we sua sponte take judicial
notice of the juvenile court’s June 7, 2023 minute order. We also
grant DCFS’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of
certain post-adjudication documents in the underlying matter,
including a December 6, 2022 minute order, DCFS’s last minute
information filed September 21, 2023, and an October 4, 2023
minute order.

                                16
Connections to Success Act (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg.
Sess.)), often referred to as “Assembly Bill 12,” [which] allows
nonminor dependents to remain under the juvenile court’s
dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age
21 if they comply with certain statutory requirements. (Assem.
Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) . . . .)” (In re Leon E. (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 222, 225.) DCFS requested that the juvenile
court take the scheduled section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing off calendar, and on October 4, 2023, the juvenile court
did so.
       The written case plan for Father required that he take an
anger management course. In a post-adjudication December 6,
2022 minute order, however, the juvenile court stated it had
reviewed the June 7, 2022 transcript and, “as to the order for
[F]ather to complete [a]nger [m]anagement [c]lasses[,] . . . finds
that . . . although it was listed on the case plan, the court did not
make the order on the record.”
                          DISCUSSION
A.    Procedural Issues Relating to Father’s Appeal of
      Jurisdictional Findings Against Mother
      1.    Standing
      Father’s appeal seeks to challenge whether substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings concerning
Mother’s conduct, namely her physical abuse of T.R. (count a-1),
her failure to protect (count b-2), and her emotional abuse of T.R.
(count c-1). We first address DCFS’s argument that Father lacks
standing to appeal findings that relate to Mother’s conduct as
opposed to his own.

                                 17
       “Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and
doubts are resolved in its favor, only a person aggrieved by a
decision may appeal. [Citations.] An aggrieved person, for this
purpose, is one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected
by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as
a nominal or remote consequence of the decision. [Citations.]
These rules apply with full force to appeals from dependency
proceedings.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) “[A] parent
has no standing on appeal to seek reversal of the judgment based
upon an assertion that the rights of the other parent were
violated, unless appellant can also assert that he or she suffered
harm [citation].” (1 Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts
Practice and Procedure (2023) § 2.189.)
       Keeping in mind that “[w]e liberally construe the issue of
standing and resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal” (In re
Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1053), we conclude
Father has standing to challenge whether Mother physically
abused T.R. (count a-1) because it forms the basis upon which the
juvenile court found Father failed to protect T.R. (count b-1).
Father cannot have failed to protect T.R. from Mother’s physical
abuse if there was no substantial evidence Mother abused T.R. in
the first place.
       We disagree, however, that Father has standing to
challenge the juvenile court’s findings that Mother failed to
protect T.R. from Father or that Mother emotionally abused T.R.
despite his claim that such “finding[s] supported the juvenile
court’s dispositional order restricting [F]ather’s visits to
monitored visits in a therapeutic setting.” The record does not
indicate that the order restricting Father’s visits was due to
Mother’s emotional abuse or failure to protect. Instead, the order

                                18
was made because T.R. did not feel safe with Father due to his
inappropriate discipline and the dynamic between T.R. and her
parents. Accordingly, Father lacks standing to challenge the
jurisdictional findings of Mother’s failure to protect (count b-2)
and emotional abuse (count c-1).7
      Although we find Father lacks standing to challenge two of
the grounds as to Mother on which the juvenile court asserted
jurisdiction over T.R., we find the remainder of Father’s
jurisdictional challenges justiciable. The jurisdictional findings
as to Father formed a basis for the juvenile court’s dispositional
orders against Father, which he appeals. “Because reversal of
the jurisdictional finding calls into question the validity of orders
based on the finding, review of the jurisdictional finding can
grant the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 277.)
      2.     Forfeiture
      DCFS argues Father forfeited his challenge to the
jurisdictional findings concerning Mother’s physical abuse by

      7 Citing In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at page
1053, Father observes that “ ‘[u]ntil parental rights are
terminated, a parent retains a fundamental interest in his or her
child’s companionship, custody, management and care.’ ”
However, in a more recent opinion, the Supreme Court explained
that “after reunification services are terminated . . . , ‘the parents’
interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child [is]
no longer paramount.’ ” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236,
italics added.) Here, on June 7, 2023, the juvenile court
terminated reunification services. Thus, Father’s interest in
T.R.’s companionship, custody, and care is insufficient to confer
standing to challenge jurisdictional findings as to Mother.

                                  19
failing to object in the juvenile court. However, Mother argued
the juvenile court should dismiss the allegations of her physical
abuse for insufficient evidence or should conform them to proof to
state a single count of past, inappropriate physical discipline.
Thus, the juvenile court had notice of the argument Father now
makes on appeal as to Mother’s abuse, and the parties had an
opportunity to respond to it. The juvenile court rejected Mother’s
arguments, and Father’s repetition of those arguments would
have been futile. (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 725 [“a
recognized exception to forfeiture is futility”].) Accordingly,
Father is not precluded from challenging the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding of Mother’s physical abuse.
B.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Jurisdictional
      Findings of Mother’s Physical Abuse of T.R., Father’s
      Failure to Protect, and Father’s Physical Abuse of
      T.R.
      1.    Standard of Review
       We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence, which is “evidence that is reasonable,
credible and of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the
evidence or determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we
draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view
the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the
order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary
finding. [Citations.] The appellant has the burden of showing
there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support
the findings or order. [Citation.]” (In re R.V. (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)

                                 20
      2.     Analysis
       Section 300, subdivision (a), authorizes dependency
jurisdiction if a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.
Under subdivision (a), “ ‘serious physical harm’ does not include
reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks if there
is no evidence of serious physical injury.” (Ibid.) Subdivision (b)
states, in relevant part, that jurisdiction is proper if “[t]he child
has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the
following: [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent . . .
to adequately supervise or protect the child[; or] [¶] [t]he willful
or negligent failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian
with whom the child has been left.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(A)-(B).)
       Father acknowledges Mother hit T.R. with a belt or open
hand, but argues these actions were reasonable discipline and
isolated incidents, unlikely to recur. Father’s appellate argument
about Mother’s conduct, however, is contradicted by the parents’
own admissions. During DCFS’s investigation, Father stated
Mother had anger management issues, that he stopped Mother
from hitting T.R. multiple times, and that he had to intervene to
stop Mother twice a week. Mother acknowledged that in
disciplining T.R. she “let [her] anger take [her].” Moreover, T.R.
and Ana provided evidence that Mother’s physical abuse of T.R.
was not isolated or limited to reasonable discipline. They
reported that Mother hit T.R. a lot, daily, and for every little
thing, including passing the wrong salt to Mother. There was
also evidence that Mother’s discipline resulted in marks on T.R.’s

                                    21
body. The police observed a bruise on T.R.’s thigh and a bump on
her head, which T.R. stated was from Mother kicking and hitting
her. Further, when asked about whether Mother abused T.R.,
A.R. said her sister’s name and pointed to her arm and chin while
saying, “blood.” Although there is some suggestion that T.R.,
Ana, and maternal grandmother exaggerated the abuse, it is not
the function of a reviewing court to make credibility
determinations or reweigh the evidence. (In re R.V., supra, 208
Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) The record thus contains substantial
evidence that Mother physically abused T.R.
       Turning to Father’s failure to protect T.R. from Mother’s
abuse, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
determination that Father failed to protect. Although Father
claimed that he intervened, other witnesses (including T.R.
herself) said that Father did little to intervene unless T.R. was
about to become unconscious from the abuse. Again, it is not our
function to make credibility determinations or reweigh competing
evidence. (In re R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.)
       As to the findings of Father’s own physical abuse of T.R.,
Father acknowledged that he hit her with a belt a few months
prior to the initiation of the dependency proceedings and that he
pushed her twice for failing her biology test. Although Father
argues his physical discipline was measured, isolated, and
unlikely to recur, the evidence before the juvenile court included
T.R.’s statements that Father hit T.R. more frequently and
violently and for reasons beyond her control. For example, T.R.
stated that Father hit her five times with a closed fist for failing
her biology test, used a belt on her approximately once a month,
hit her if he thought she did something to A.R., and hit her when
she accidentally broke things like a glass or a perfume bottle.

                                22
Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
jurisdictional finding that Father physically abused T.R.
C.    The Dispositional Orders
      1.    Substantial Evidence Supported T.R.’s Removal from
            Father
        To remove a child from parental custody, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of five
grounds exists pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). (In re
V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) Of relevance here, “[o]ne
ground for removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to
the child’s physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-
being if he or she were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means to protect the child.” (Ibid., citing § 361, subd.
(c)(1).)
        “[W]hen there is a substantial evidence challenge [to a
finding subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard],
the reviewing court must determine whether the record contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find the existence of that fact to be highly probable.” (In re V.L.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 149; see Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996 [“when reviewing a finding that a
fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true”].)
        Here, the same evidence that supported the jurisdictional
findings against Father constituted substantial evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s order removing T.R. from Father’s
custody. T.R. suffered physical injuries from Mother’s abuse,

                                 23
from which Father failed to protect her. Moreover, T.R.’s suicidal
ideations and her refusal to visit with Father indicated that
Father’s physical abuse and failure to protect T.R. from Mother’s
physical abuse negatively impacted her emotional well-being.
T.R. indicated she did not feel safe with Father, repeatedly stated
she did not want to return home, and even threatened to kill
herself if she were required to do so. Thus, the trial court did not
err in removing T.R. from Father’s custody.
      2.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ordering
            Monitored Visitation in a Therapeutic Setting
       Father argues that instead of a minimum of one hour of
monitored visitation per week in a therapeutic setting, the
juvenile court should have ordered “unmonitored visits twice a
week for two hours each visit, or in the alternative, monitored
visits in a non-therapeutic setting.” “ ‘Visitation shall be as
frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.’
[Citation.] The power to regulate visits between dependent
children and their parents rests with the juvenile court and its
visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion.” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.) We
may not disturb the juvenile court’s visitation orders unless the
court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 113.)
       Father first argues the court’s visitation order was not
warranted because he reasonably disciplined T.R. and any
incident of abuse was isolated and unlikely to recur. We reject
this argument as inconsistent with the court’s jurisdictional
finding of Father’s physical abuse, which substantial evidence
supported.

                                24
       Next, Father argues that although T.R. “was mildly
depressed, she was not suffering severe emotional damage under
the code and did not need a therapist present.” Father claims
unmonitored, longer, and more frequent visits were necessary to
rebuild his bond with T.R.
       An order limiting visitation to a therapeutic setting is not
limited only to situations where a minor is experiencing severe
emotional damage. Visitation in a therapeutic setting here was
rationally related to T.R.’s best interests; even if T.R.’s depression
is mild, she had recently expressed suicidal ideation related to
Father and Mother’s treatment of her. Additionally, at the time
of the court’s visitation order, T.R. remained afraid of her parents
and refused to visit with them at all. Father’s suggestion at the
dispositional hearing that T.R. be returned to the parents’
custody demonstrated a lack of insight into T.R.’s emotional
fragility. Thus, monitored visitation with later increases in
frequency and duration of the visits as T.R.’s level of comfort with
her parents increased was appropriate, and the court granted
DCFS discretion to liberalize the visits. Father has not
demonstrated the juvenile court’s visitation order was arbitrary,
capricious, or absurd.
      3.    Father Forfeited His Objections to the Case Plan
      Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering counseling and parenting classes. At the dispositional
hearing, however, except for anger management courses, Father
submitted to DCFS’s case plan recommendations, which included
Father’s participation in individual counseling, family counseling
when deemed appropriate by a therapist, and parenting classes.
Thus, Father forfeited his objection to the order that he
participate in counseling and parenting classes. (In re N.M.

                                 25
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 [“submitting the dispositional
issue based on the social worker’s recommendation . . . precludes
the parent from challenging the evidence to support the
dispositional order”].) Father’s argument relating to the anger
management classes is moot because the juvenile court clarified
that its June 7, 2022 dispositional orders did not require Father
to take anger management classes.
D.    DCFS’s Failure to Fulfill Its Initial Duty of ICWA
      Inquiry Was Harmless
      The juvenile court and DCFS “have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a [section
300] petition . . . has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.”8
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This “duty to inquire begins with the initial
contact” by DCFS. (Ibid.) Additionally, section 224.2,
subdivision (b) states, in part, that “[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking . . . extended family members [and] others who
have an interest in the child . . . whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child . . . .” Under ICWA, the term “ ‘extended family
member’ ” is “defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person
who has reached the age of [18] and who is the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or

      8 An “Indian child” is an unmarried person under 18 years
of age who is (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe
or (2) is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe
and is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized
tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting
federal definitions], subd. (b) [expanding the age range stated in
the federal definition to include persons over 18, but under 21,
years of age].)

                                 26
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
        Father argues DCFS did not conduct an adequate inquiry
under section 224.2, subdivision (b) because it did not ask
maternal grandmother, Ana, or maternal second cousin Erika
about T.R.’s possible Indian heritage. DCFS concedes it did not
fulfill this duty. We agree: the record does not disclose any ICWA
inquiry of these maternal extended relatives.
        As prior decisions make clear, in the view of our division,
DCFS’s failure to inquire of such extended family members does
not result in automatic reversal. (See In re Adrian L. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 342; In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009; In re S.S.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575; In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
502.) Ordinarily, we evaluate the record to determine whether
“ ‘the probability of obtaining meaningful information is
reasonable in the context of ICWA.’ ” (In re Darian R., supra, at
p. 509, quoting In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 744.) Information available from extended family members
must be both “readily obtainable,” and “likely to bear
meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child.” (In re
Benjamin M., supra, at p. 744.) In making this determination,
we have rejected “a wooden approach to prejudice” (In re A.C.,
supra, at p. 1017) and refused to require further inquiry when,
based upon the particular circumstances presented by the record,
it is apparent “that additional information would not have been
meaningful to the inquiry” (In re Benjamin M., supra, at p. 743;
see, e.g., In re S.S., supra, at p. 582).
        Here, the three maternal extended family members at issue
were readily available to DCFS. However, the family’s
immigration to the United States from El Salvador

                                27
approximately 15 years ago, before T.R. was born, makes it
highly unlikely that T.R. is an Indian child. The “ ‘definition of
“Indian child” ’ ” is not based on ancestry, but rather “ ‘on the
child’s political ties to a federally recognized Indian Tribe, either
by virtue of the child’s own citizenship in the Tribe, or through a
biological parent’s citizenship and the child’s eligibility for
citizenship.’ ” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984,
1009.) Because both parents were born in El Salvador and the
family did not come to the United States until 2007 or 2009 after
T.R. was born, it is not reasonably probable that Mother or her
parents were a member of a federally recognized tribe in the
United States. (In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355, 365 [where
the father was born in Mexico, the possibility that a paternal
ancestor was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe was
too speculative to support reversal based on agency’s failure to
inquire of paternal relatives], review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S276056.) Because there is no reasonable probability that
additional inquiry would have yielded meaningful information,
DCFS’s failure to inquire of maternal extended family members
was harmless. (See In re Darian R., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 509-510.)

                                 28
                          DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P.J.

                               29