Court Opinion

ID: 9883007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 00:00:25.388064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:42.087697
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30556         Document: 00516921837             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                       October 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-30556                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   Shane M. Wilkinson,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Pinnacle Lodging, L.L.C.; My Hospitality Services,
   L.L.C.; Laura Rosa; Russell Block; Yogesh Patel,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:20-CV-3427
                      ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          This civil case arises out of an employment dispute at a Hampton Inn
   between the hotel’s former manager, his supervisors, and the owner. The
   district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all the former
   manager’s claims. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30556     Document: 00516921837           Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                    No. 22-30556

                                         I.
                                        A.
          Yogesh Patel owns and operates a hotel conglomerate through two
   companies: Pinnacle Lodging, LLC, and My Hospitality Services, LLC
   (“MHS”). Russell Block is the Director of Operations overseeing Patel’s
   hotel conglomerate. One hotel owned and operated by Patel’s conglomerate
   is the Hampton Inn in Covington, Louisiana.
          In 2017, Shane Wilkinson, a white male, was hired as a front-desk clerk
   at the Covington Hampton Inn. In 2018, Block promoted Wilkinson to
   general manager of the hotel. Wilkinson received a significant pay raise along
   with the promotion.
          In August 2019, Laura Rosa, a white female, was promoted to regional
   manager for Louisiana and became Wilkinson’s direct supervisor. Rosa
   reported to Block who reported to Patel.
          Four months after Rosa began supervising Wilkinson, in December
   2019, Rosa and Block (with permission from Patel) terminated Wilkinson. In
   the months leading up to Wilkinson’s termination, Rosa (Wilkinson’s direct
   supervisor) made multiple inappropriate comments concerning race and sex
   to Wilkinson and others.
          During their first meeting, Rosa told Wilkinson—in front of one of
   Wilkinson’s subordinates, Chasity Anthony, the head of housekeeping—that
   she was going to replace Wilkinson and his staff with “Hispanics” because
   they work “cheaper and faster.” ROA.704, 521, 523. Anthony avers that
   Rosa “pretty regularly” said she was going to replace the Hampton Inn staff
   with “Mexicans” because “Mexicans work better.” ROA.704–05.
          During their second meeting, Rosa told Wilkinson that “male GMs
   don’t make good general managers and as far as [Rosa] was concerned,

                                         2
Case: 22-30556     Document: 00516921837          Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                   No. 22-30556

   [Wilkinson] shouldn’t be here.” ROA.513. Anthony, who was present, says
   she remembers Rosa saying this and that Rosa “frequently” made these
   kinds of comments to the Hampton Inn staff. ROA.846. Separately, Hilton
   inspectors came to inspect the property in November 2019 to assess
   compliance with Hilton’s corporate standards. Ahead of the inspection,
   Wilkinson told Rosa that he had learned the inspector would be a male. In
   response, Rosa told Wilkinson that this was disappointing because if the
   inspector had been a woman Wilkinson could have worn “tight pants” to
   distract her and score higher points. ROA.1038–39.
         Paul Lanclos, a Hispanic man, further testified that Rosa told him that
   she thought “Hispanic workers are better workers” and got “more
   accomplished” than non-Hispanics; that she preferred Hispanic workers to
   anyone else; and that she said to him (in Wilkinson’s presence) that
   Wilkinson was a “pioneer” in the hotel industry because “females are more
   capable” than men. ROA.1059–60. Wilkinson, Anthony, and Lanclos each
   testified that Rosa made these comments routinely over the four-month
   period that she supervised Wilkinson. Rosa denied making any of these
   comments.
         Wilkinson testified in his deposition that he complained to Block
   about Rosa’s racist and sexist comments before his termination. Block said
   he would deal with the matter, but Wilkinson never saw evidence that he did.
   Further, Anthony testified that she was present at a meeting between Block
   and Wilkinson where Wilkinson complained about Rosa’s racist comments
   regarding replacing Wilkinson and his staff with Mexicans. Anthony testified
   that Block just “laughed and changed the subject.” ROA.847. Additionally,
   the Hampton Inn’s assistant manager also testified that Wilkinson told her
   he complained to Block that Rosa was “targeting” him because of his race
   and sex around September or October 2019. ROA.874. Rosa approached

                                        3
Case: 22-30556     Document: 00516921837             Page: 4   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                      No. 22-30556

   Wilkinson after he complained to Block about her and said, “[y]ou’re not
   getting rid of me.” ROA.1041–42.
          Wilkinson’s termination letter, written by Rosa and Block, includes
   four reasons for his termination: Wilkinson purportedly failed to contribute
   to rate management; failed to complete some of the tasks required prior to a
   corporate inspection in November 2019; threatened to quit twice; and lacked
   overall hotel knowledge. Wilkinson testified that he refused to sign the
   termination letter because it was inaccurate.
                                          B.
          Wilkinson sued Rosa, Block, Patel, Pinnacle Lodging, and MHS
   (collectively, “Pinnacle”), alleging the following claims: (1) race, sex, and
   national-origin discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII,
   Section 1981, and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law
   (“LEDL”) against Pinnacle Lodging and MHS; (2) retaliation under Title
   VII, Section 1981, and the LEDL against Pinnacle Lodging and MHS;
   (3) whistleblower    retaliation    under     the    Louisiana   Environment
   Whistleblower Act (“LEW”) and the Louisiana Whistleblower Act
   (“LWA”) against Pinnacle Lodging and MHS; (4) race discrimination,
   hostile work environment, and retaliation under Section 1981 against Laura
   Rosa; and (5) retaliation under Section 1981 against Patel and Block.
          The district court found that Wilkinson proffered direct evidence of
   race and sex discrimination. But the court granted summary judgment to
   Pinnacle anyway. Wilkinson timely appealed.
          We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
   Pinnacle. See Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. SCD Mem’l Place II, LLC, 25 F.4th
   283, 285 (5th Cir. 2022). And we apply the same summary judgment
   standard on appeal that the district court applied below. Id.

                                           4
Case: 22-30556     Document: 00516921837           Page: 5   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                    No. 22-30556

                                        II.
          We (A) reverse on Wilkinson’s discrimination claims, (B) affirm on
   Wilkinson’s hostile work environment claims, and (C) vacate on Wilkinson’s
   retaliation claims and Louisiana Whistleblower claims.
                                        A.
          First, Wilkinson’s discrimination claims. Title VII, § 1981, and LEDL
   discrimination claims are all analyzed under the Title VII framework. See
   Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir.
   2017) (§ 1981); La Day v. Catalyst Tech, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir.
   2002) (LEDL).
          Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to “fail or refuse to hire or
   to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
   individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
   of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
   national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may prove
   discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Wallace
   v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001). “If the plaintiff
   presents only circumstantial evidence, then she must prove discrimination
   inferentially using the three-step McDonnell Douglas” burden-shifting
   framework. Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, LLC, 778 F.3d 473,
   475 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation omitted). But if the plaintiff
   proffers direct evidence of discrimination, there is no need to resort to
   McDonnell Douglas because, by definition, direct evidence “proves the fact
   of intentional discrimination without inference or presumption.” Portis v.
   First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, 34 F.3d 325, 328–29 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation
   and quotation omitted).
          Direct evidence discrimination cases are “rare.” Equal Emp.
   Opportunity Comm’n v. Ryan’s Pointe Houston, LLC, No. 19-20656, 2022 WL

                                         5
Case: 22-30556      Document: 00516921837          Page: 6    Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                    No. 22-30556

   4494148 at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2022) (quoting Rutherford v. Harris Cty., 197
   F.3d 173, 180 n.4 (5th Cir. 1999)). That is because it will be the rare case
   where “statements or documents” will “show on their face that an improper
   criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole basis, but a basis—for the
   adverse employment action.” Eaglin v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 801 F. App’x
   250, 255 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting
   Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005)).
          To determine whether comments in the workplace constitute direct
   evidence of discrimination, this Court looks to four factors: “whether the
   comments are (1) related to the plaintiff’s protected characteristic;
   (2) proximate in time to the challenged employment decision; (3) made by an
   individual with authority over the challenged employment decision; and
   (4) related to the challenged employment decision.” Etienne, 778 F.3d at 476;
   accord Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222. “Comments that do not meet these [four]
   criteria are considered ‘stray remarks,’ and standing alone, are insufficient to
   defeat summary judgment.” Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d
   374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010). A court’s “ultimate focus” in applying this direct-
   evidence test “is on whether the comments prove without inference or
   presumption that [the protected characteristic] was a basis in employment
   decisions’ at [the plaintiff’s workplace].” Herster v. Bd. of Sup. of La. State
   Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 187 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted).
          Turning to the comments at issue in this case, Rosa told Wilkinson
   that she wanted to replace him and his staff with “Hispanic” employees
   because they “work cheaper and faster”; and Rosa said, “male GMs don’t
   make good general managers, and as far as [she was] concerned, [Wilkinson]
   shouldn’t be here.” ROA.1100–01.
          We agree with the district court that Rosa’s comments to Wilkinson
   meet each of this Court’s four direct-evidence criteria. First, the comments

                                          6
Case: 22-30556      Document: 00516921837          Page: 7    Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                    No. 22-30556

   relate directly to Wilkinson’s race and sex by negative implication. See Eaglin,
   801 F. App’x at 255–56 (involving similar comments about replacing
   employee with Hispanic employee). Second, Rosa made the comments close
   in time to the relevant employment decision—less than four months before
   Wilkinson’s termination. Third, Rosa was Wilkinson’s immediate supervisor
   who (along with Block) made the decision to terminate him. Fourth, Rosa’s
   comments “related to the challenged employment decision” because she
   said she wanted to “replace” Wilkinson and that she thought Wilkinson
   “shouldn’t be here,” respectively. See Ryan’s Pointe Houston, 2022 WL
   4494148 at *5 (concluding that there was sufficient direct evidence of
   discrimination where all four factors were met); Jones v. Robinson Property
   Group, LP, 427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005) (same). Just like in Ryan’s Pointe and
   Jones, Rosa’s comments—which meet all four of our direct evidence
   factors—make this a quintessential “direct evidence” case.
          Under this Court’s longstanding approach to direct evidence cases,
   where “the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, ‘the burden
   of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the
   evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the
   forbidden factor.’” Etienne, 778 F.3d at 475 (quoting Brown v. E. Miss. Elec.
   Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993)); accord Ryan’s Pointe, 2022
   WL 4494148, at *4 (citing Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 42 F.4th 550, 554 (5th
   Cir. 2022)).
          At this point, we part ways with the district court. After concluding
   that Rosa’s comments constituted direct evidence of discrimination, the
   district court went on to conclude that Pinnacle met its burden to show by a
   preponderance that Wilkinson would have been terminated regardless of the
   forbidden factor. For support, the district court pointed to (1) the
   “consistent” and “uncontroverted testimony” of Wilkinson’s supervisors
   and (2) the termination letter. ROA.1102–05.

                                          7
Case: 22-30556       Document: 00516921837        Page: 8   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                   No. 22-30556

          But here is the problem: The supervisors’ testimony as to the
   nondiscriminatory reasons Wilkinson was fired was neither consistent nor
   uncontroverted.
          First, Wilkinson’s supervisors inconsistently testified about why
   Wilkinson was fired. All three supervisors (Rosa, Block, and Patel) averred
   in their interrogatory answers that Wilkinson was fired for “poor job
   performance,” specifically because: (1) the Hampton Inn failed its corporate
   inspection in November 2019; (2) he failed to remediate mold in the hotel’s
   rooms; (3) he had frequent absences; and (4) he threatened to quit. In her
   interrogatory answer, Rosa added (5) “Wilkinson did not act to boost the
   morale of Hampton Inn employees.” ROA.714.
          In their depositions, however, the supervisors changed their tunes.
   Block said the “top” reason Wilkinson was fired was a new one: (6) his
   refusal to engage in “rate management.” ROA.327. Rosa flatly contradicted
   her earlier interrogatory answer at her deposition when she admitted
   Wilkinson was not fired because of the failed inspection in November 2019.
   Instead, Rosa testified that her reason for firing Wilkinson was (7) “just
   based off of his overall knowledge and his performance as a GM, and that
   would make a decision to terminate him.” ROA.714. Patel, for his part, said
   Wilkinson’s biggest performance issue was his work absences. But Block
   testified in his deposition that he had approved all Wilkinson’s absences and
   that this was not the reason Wilkinson was fired. Taken together, these
   examples demonstrate that Wilkinson’s supervisors did not testify
   consistently throughout the case about why Wilkinson was terminated.
          Second, there is record evidence contradicting the supervisor’s
   purported nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Wilkinson. Take the reasons
   one at a time: (1) As to the November 2019 corporate inspection, Wilkinson
   points to testimony from Ashley Vanderhoff, the hotel’s assistant general

                                        8
Case: 22-30556      Document: 00516921837           Page: 9    Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                     No. 22-30556

   manager, that the Hampton Inn never passed its inspection—either before
   Wilkinson’s tenure or after—because the hotel lacked the required internet
   infrastructure. (2) As to the mold problem, Patel and Rosa stated Wilkinson
   was not to blame for it. (3) As to Wilkinson’s absences, Block testified that
   he approved them and that the absences were not the reason Wilkinson was
   fired. (4) As to Wilkinson’s threats to quit, Wilkinson testified in his verified
   complaint that he made those threats to Block and only after Block refused to
   stop Rosa’s “discrimination and harassment.” ROA.81. (5) And as to
   Wilkinson’s effect on morale, two Hampton Inn employees, Chasity
   Anthony and Demille Topps, testified that Wilkinson “was a very good
   General Manager” and was “great to work with” and he always “tried to
   keep his people working and—and when they tried to quit, he tried to talk
   them out of it.” ROA.592, 841, 846.
          Further, Wilkinson counters Pinnacle’s explanations by pointing to
   the complete absence of any record of discipline the entire time he served as
   general manager. That is so despite the existence of a progressive discipline
   policy at Hampton Inn requiring two written warnings prior to termination.
          Given the inconsistencies in the supervisors’ testimony about why
   Wilkinson was fired and the contradictory evidence undercutting those
   reasons, the district court erred in holding that “any reasonable jury would
   conclude” that Pinnacle would have fired Wilkinson “absent the
   discrimination.” Etienne, 778 F.3d at 477. We therefore conclude Pinnacle
   has failed to carry its summary judgment burden and reverse the district

                                          9
Case: 22-30556       Document: 00516921837             Page: 10      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                        No. 22-30556

   court’s grant of summary judgment to Pinnacle on Wilkinson’s
   discrimination claims.1
                                             B.
           Next, the hostile work environment claims. We analyze Wilkinson’s
   federal and state hostile-work-environment claims under the Title VII
   standard. See DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2007).
           To survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim,
   a plaintiff must create genuine dispute of material fact that “(1) he is a
   member of a protected class; (2) he suffered unwelcomed harassment;
   (3) the harassment was based on his membership in a protected class; (4) the
   harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and
   (5) the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed
   to take prompt remedial action.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tx., LLC, 23
   F.4th 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
           For harassment to affect a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment, it “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
   conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
   environment.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, there is no evidence that Rosa’s
   comments negatively affected Wilkinson’s work environment at all. In fact,
   the evidence points the other way. Wilkinson himself testified that he
   “laughed at” Rosa’s comments and “moved on.” ROA.523. We have
   previously held that hostile work environment claims fail even when there
   has been severe harassment where there is a lack of evidence indicating that
   the alleged harassment interfered with the plaintiff’s work. See Brooks v.

           _____________________
           1
            Because Wilkinson prevails under our longstanding approach to direct evidence
   cases, we find it unnecessary to address Wilkinson’s argument in his reply brief that we
   should revisit that standard.

                                             10
Case: 22-30556     Document: 00516921837              Page: 11   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                       No. 22-30556

   Firestone Polymers, LLC, 640 F. App’x 393, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (concluding that (1) racial slurs and “black faces” drawn in workplace
   bathroom stalls were insufficient to sustain a prima facie case of a hostile
   work environment where, in part, there was no evidence that the drawings
   interfered with plaintiff’s work; (2) upside-down American flag to protest
   President Obama’s election was insufficient to constitute hostile work
   environment where “no evidence tied this incident to interference with [the
   plaintiff’s] work”; and (3) noose placed inside of plaintiff’s hard hat did not
   establish a prima facie case where plaintiff presented no evidence as to how
   it affected the terms and conditions of his employment). In the absence of
   evidence indicating how Rosa’s comments affected Wilkinson’s ability to
   perform his job duties, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment on Wilkinson’s hostile work environment claim.
                                           C.
          Finally, the retaliation claims. Because the district court relied on its
   erroneous analysis of Wilkinson’s discrimination claims to conclude that
   Wilkinson could not establish pretext on his retaliation claims, we vacate the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims and remand for
   the district court to reconduct the pretext analysis for Wilkinson’s retaliation
   claims.2
                                   *        *         *
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s
   judgment in part as to Wilkinson’s discrimination claims, AFFIRM in part as
   to Wilkinson’s hostile work environment claims, VACATE in part as to

          _____________________
          2
            For the same reason, we also vacate the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment on Wilkinson’s Louisiana Whistleblower claims.

                                            11
Case: 22-30556   Document: 00516921837       Page: 12   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                              No. 22-30556

   Wilkinson’s retaliation and Louisiana Whistleblower claims, and
   REMAND for further proceedings.

                                     12