Court Opinion

ID: 9583943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:13.894212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:00.561109
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice.
We granted the application for interlocutory review in this habeas action to consider whether a person involuntarily committed to a mental health facility following an acquittal by reason of insanity must first exhaust remedies under the criminal procedure code before seeking habeas relief. Because the mental health code specifically permits an involuntary detainee to seek habeas relief “at any time,” we conclude that exhaustion of remedies is not required and affirm the habeas court.
In 1981 David Nagel was acquitted of murder based on an insanity plea. A person found not guilty by reason of insanity must undergo a 30-day evaluation of his current mental health condition. *578Only if the trial court concludes that the defendant meets the civil commitment criteria set forth in Chapter 3 of Title 37 may the trial court order the defendant remanded to the custody of a mental health facility. Following Nagel’s acquittal, the trial court concluded that Nagel met the standard for civil commitment and Nagel has been in a Georgia mental health facility since 1981. In 1991, Nagel sought release under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).1 Following the conclusion of those proceedings and federal habeas proceedings,2 he instituted this habeas action in 1999. The appellants moved to dismiss the petition, contending that Nagel was first required to file another petition under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f).
OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) provides that the writ of habeas corpus is always available to challenge an illegal detention in a mental hospital; OCGA § 17-7-131 (f) provides that an insanity acquittee may only be discharged by the committing court under the procedures set forth in the code section and sharply limits the availability of these procedures. The reconciliation of these two provisions is “one of legislative intent, to be determined by construction of the particular statutes.”3
OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) states that a person detained in a mental health facility may “[a]t any time and without notice . . . petition, as provided by law, for a writ of habeas corpus.” The statute contains no express limitation on the provision that a person may petition for habeas corpus “at any time.” In contrast, the broad provision “without notice” is limited by the rest of subsection (a), which requires that notice be given to the committing court when a petition is made for the release of a person acquitted by reason of insanity. The failure of the legislature to craft an exception to the time requirement when it created an express exception to the notice requirement is strong evidence that it did not intend any exception.4
The dissent asserts that the phrase “as provided by law” in OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) refers to the criminal procedure code. However, because the phrase modifies the clause “may petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” it applies more logically to the law on habeas corpus than to the law on insanity acquittees. Thus, a person must follow the procedures set forth in title 9 regarding the contents and service of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.5 This interpretation is *579more logically sound than the dissent’s assertion that the legislature relied upon the phrase “as provided by law” to craft an exhaustion of remedies requirement.
Additionally, the language in OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) requiring notice to the committing court was added in 1980 when OCGA § 17-7-131 provided, as it does today, that an insanity acquittee could be discharged only by the committing court.6
7The addition of this language in 1980 demonstrates the legislature’s intent that the writ of habeas corpus should always be available to an insanity acquittee. Without the availability of the writ of habeas corpus, the state could detain a person for as long as 12 months under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f) when that person did not meet the standard for detention. Furthermore, the requirement of exhaustion would render the availability of habeas corpus relief meaningless because the 12-month time limit in OCGA § 17-7-131 (f) applies from the time of the hearing. If, for example, a court takes nine months to rule following a hearing pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 (f), a petitioner would have to complete the habeas process within three months or face a defense of failure to exhaust. The legislature no doubt recognized the substantial workload of the trial courts. Because a heavy workload could produce unfairness by delaying a ruling under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f), the legislature provided a remedy through the availability of habeas corpus relief at any time.
Finally, the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “at any time” avoids the due process concerns expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Benham v. Ledbetter.1 That case held that “refusal to accord habeas corpus relief to confinees who are able to prove at a habeas corpus hearing that they no longer meet the standards for commitment could not be defended under any principles of due process.”8 That court found it unnecessary to address the exhaustion question presented in this case “in view of the low likelihood that Georgia would deny all judicial relief to a person involuntarily confined to a mental hospital.”9 Thus, the court implicitly assumed that the state would not require exhaustion of remedies.
Richardson v. Hall10 fails to support the dissent’s position. In that case, there was no specific statute granting the availability of habeas relief. Here, OCGA § 37-3-148 (a) provides that habeas relief is available “at any time” to detainees such as Nagel.
Because the statutory scheme demonstrates the legislature’s *580intent that the availability of the writ of habeas corpus not be restricted, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Sears, Carley, and Thompson, JJ, who dissent.

 See Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150 (442 SE2d 446) (1994) (affirming the denial of relief).

 Nagel v. Osborne, 164 F3d 582 (11th Cir. 1999).

 Richardson v. Hall, 199 Ga. 602, 606 (34 SE2d 888) (1945).

 Morton v. Bell, 264 Ga. 832, 833 (452 SE2d 103) (1995) (recognizing principles of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of smother) and expressum facit cessare taciturn (if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those omitted were intended to be excluded)).

 See OCGA § 9-14-1 et seq.

 Ga. Laws 1980, p. 678 § 2 and Ga. Laws 1977, p. 1295 § 2.

 785 F2d 1480 (1986).

 Id. at 1493.

 Id.

 199 Ga. 602.