Court Opinion

ID: 9649205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:44:50.093295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:08.835564
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in most of the majority opinion and in some of the results reached where I cannot fully subscribe to the reasons given for reaching them. My principal disagreement with the majority relates to a specific purpose for which taxes levied and bond proceeds may be utilized. At the outset, I should express my agreement that appellees were well advised to concede that one purpose included in the proposed petition was far too vague to form the basis for a tax levy under Amendment 18. That item was: To accomplish any or all of the improvements authorized by the Amendment No. 18 Implementing Act of 1965. Voters certainly could have no understanding of what they were being called upon to approve from such vague and comprehensive language. My reading and rereading of clause (2) with the entire amendment leads me only to the conclusion that this clause would, except for the ballot title, authorize a large city to levy a 5-mill tax, in addition to the 5-mill general purpose tax authorized by Article 12, Section 4, of our Constitution as amended by Amendment 10, and the 5-mill tax authorized by Amendment 13, for any public purpose for which the city did not already have the authority to expend taxes otherwise authorized. A look at the wording of the amendment, and particularly this clause, seems to eliminate, rather than indicate, a more limited interpretation. Purposes (1) and (2) are connected by the conjunction “or.” The use of the disjunctive militates against the application of the maxim of noscitur a sociis. 82 C. J. S. 656, Statutes, § 331. In this context, it cannot be taken to indicate that the two clauses express alternate meanings, or that the latter is explanatory of the former. More important, however, is the fact that the words “other public purposes” are followed by words limiting their meaning. If the meaning of “other public purposes” is limited by purpose (1) then we have a tremendous waste of words —a luxury we are not afforded in constitutional or statutory construction. If the reasoning of the majority is correct, then the amendment would mean the same thing with or without purpose (2). Furthermore, the words “exclusive of public charities and those now within the powers of cities to perform” would be totally unnecessary. That securing the location of factories and industries prior to the adoption of Amendment 18 was a public purpose is at least subject to serious doubt. See, e. g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411, S. W. 2d 486. But if “other public purposes” must be those having a direct connection with other purposes of the amendment then it was a useless gesture to go to the trouble to exclude charities. What possible connection could “charities,” as the word is commonly understood, have with any of the other of the purposes specifically listed in the amendment? Or what caused the draftsmen to provide for exclusion of those “public purposes” then within the powers of said cities to perform? I have been unable to find any of the powers already possessed which had to be eliminated because of their connection with securing the location of factories, industries, etc., or any of the other specified purposes. In other words, under the majority application, there would have been no “other public purpose” to be excluded. There must have been an intention to exclude something. In the next place, it is inconceivable to me that both purposes (2) and (5) would have been stated if “other public purposes” in purpose (2) was to have been limited by the words preceding it. Purpose (5) seems to me to say everything the majority says purpose (2) says. In statutory and constitutional construction, if it is possible to do so, we are bound to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase and clause, so that no word is rendered void, superfluous or insignificant or discarded as surplusage. Locke v. Cook, 245 Ark. 787, 434 S. W. 2d 598; Cupp v. Frazier’s Heirs, 239 Ark. 77, 387 S. W. 2d 328. I cannot accept the premise that my construction of this part of purpose (2) of Amendment 18 would render the listing of specific purposes superfluous. In 1929, or even today, there would be room for doubt that securing the location of factories and industries could be a public purpose without constitutional or statutory specification. The same is true with regard to advertising. Making secured loans to factories or industries was not only unauthorized, it was prohibited. Article 12, Section 5, Constitution of Arkansas. The number of public purposes that might have been accomplished would not be so broad as to cause any misgivings about the meaning of the clause. In the first place, restriction to those purposes not then within the power of such cities is a considerable limitation. In the second place, determining whether a purpose is public has never presented any problem. We have had no difficulty in defining public purposes in eminent domain and tax exemption cases. We have held that the following are public purposes: a highway approach to a proposed private toll bridge, McClintock v. Bovay, 163 Ark. 388, 260 S. W. 395; a 40-acre tract, which has been a public park, used for track meets and agricultural exhibits and keeping livestock used in working streets, Hope v. Dodson, 166 Ark. 236, 266 S. W. 68; a city dumping ground, Hudgins v. Hot Springs, 168 Ark. 467, 270 S. W. 594; impoundment of water by an irrigation company to supply surface water commercially to 5,000 acres of rice land in an area where rice farming was the principal activity, Smith v. Ark. Irrig. Co., 200 Ark. 1022, 142 S. W. 2d 509; in tax exemption cases, “public property used for public purposes” has been defined as meaning use by the public generally as distinguished from proprietary use, Yoes v. City of Ft. Smith, 207 Ark. 694, 182 S. W. 2d 683. We should have no difficulty in determining which purposes are public purposes. I do not agree that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, or ejusdem generis, the specific application of the maxim utilized by the majority, controls here. I do agree that, generally speaking, rules of statutory construction are applicable. But the maxim, or its specific application, is a rule of construction to be applied only when the legislative intent cannot be determined from the language of the statute itself. Edwards v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Moonachie, 3 N. J. 17, 68 A. 2d 744 (1949). The maxim should never be utilized to render general words meaningless because that would disregard the primary rule that effect should be given to every part of a statute, if legitimately possible, and that the words of a statute are to be taken according to their natural meaning. Mason v. U. S., 260 U. S. 545, 43 S. Ct. 200, 67 L. Ed. 396 (1923); Annot., Ann. Cas. 1914C 305; Crawford, Statutory Construction 328, § 191 (1940); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 405, § 4913 (1943); Morgan v. State, 208 Miss. 185, 44 So. 2d 45 (1950); Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1938); Edwards v. Mayor, etc., supra; United States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26, 30 S. Ct. 19, 54 L. Ed. 77 (1909); United States v. Alpers, 338 U. S. 680, 70 S. Ct. 352, 94 L. Ed. 457 (1950). The rule is not applied when the context of the statute rebuts it. See Crawford, Statutory Construction 329, § 191 (1940); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 407, § 4914 (1943). After much deliberation, and with considerable reluctance, I have come to the conclusion that I must accept the majority view as to limitations on this clause only by reason of the ballot title. In this respect, I do not follow the exact line of reasoning of the majority because I do not take the language involved to be really ambiguous. Yet, I conclude that the general rules pertaining to statutory construction in this respect should not apply to an initiated constitutional amendment. The ballot title is all that a voter sees when he marks his ballot. I agree that the average voter who cast an affirmative vote on this amendment when it was proposed would have had no idea that he was voting to authorize a property tax to pay for some public improvement only remotely connected, if at all, with securing the location or encouraging the operation of factories, industries, river transportation and facilities therefor. The importance of the ballot title on initiated measures has always been recognized in this state. When a petition for a constitutional amendment is filed, the exact title to be used must be submitted by the petitioner with the petition filed with the Secretary of State and the State Board of Election Commissioners, who, in turn, certify the title to the Secretary of State. Amendment 7, Constitution of Arkansas. In keeping with the spirit of the initiative and referendum amendment, we have gone to great lengths to insure that no measure was presented to the voters under anything other than an intelligible, honest title without any misleading amplification, omission or fallacy. Newton v. Hall, 196 Ark. 929, 120 S. W. 2d 364, Bailey v. Hall, 198 Ark. 815, 131 S. W. 2d 635; Sturdy v. Hall, 204 Ark. 785, 164 S. W. 2d 884; Washburn v. Hall, 225 Ark. 868, 286 S. W. 2d 494. We early recognized the purpose of this title and its importance in Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 43 S. W. 2d 356, 44 S. W. 2d 331, when we said: It is true that if one were to read the act itself even casually he would know that it had not been enacted that one might obtain a divorce in this state by proving a residence therein for ninety days only; but it is equally true that the great body of the electors, when called upon to vote for or against an act at the general election, will derive their information about it from the ballot title. This is the purpose of the title. We have not hesitated to strike down as insufficient any ballot title that would mislead by omission of a material fact. Shepard v. McDonald, 189 Ark. 29, 70 S. W. 2d 566; Westbrook v. McDonald, supra. Of course, it is not necessary that the ballot title constitute a complete abstract or synopsis of the proposal, if it sufficiently though concisely apprises the voters of the general purposes of the proposed law. Coleman v. Sherrill, 189 Ark. 843, 75 S. W. 2d 248; Leigh & Thomas v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S. W. 2d 104; Sturdy v. Hall, supra. The test seems to be whether the matter omitted would be misleading to the average voter. We held a title insufficient as misleading when it failed to disclose that proposed assistance to the aged and blind would be provided by a permanent general sales tax. Walton v. McDonald, 192 Ark. 1155, 97 S. W. 2d 81. Our rule of statutory construction that resort be had to the title of an act to determine the legislative intent only when the act is ambiguous is based largely upon the premises that there is no constitutional requirement that an act have a title and that the title is not a part of the act. Laprairie v. City of Hot Springs, 124 Ark. 346, 187 S. W. 442; Special School District No. 33 v. Howard, 124 Ark. 475, 187 S. W. 444. Since there is a constitutional requirement that an initiated proposal for a constitutional amendment have a ballot title, and since the purpose of the ballot title is to inform the voter when he exercises his right of suffrage, I would follow, in respect to the significance of the title, holdings in states whose constitutions require a legislative proposal to bear a title. Generally speaking, where there is a mandatory constitutional requirement that the subject of a statute be expressed in its title, the title limits the valid scope of the act and nothing can validly be included in its provisions which is not covered by a liberal construction of the title, except for means and provisions reasonably adopted to carry out and make effectual the purpose of the act. 82 C; J. S. 372, Statutes, § 220. On this basis, I agree that the “other public purpose” section should be limited. Based upon this construction, I would find authority for the construction of a convention center. I agree, however, that it could also be justified as a means of advertising the city as a means of attracting and encouraging new industries. I do not agree that the petition’s ninth purpose is authorized by Amendment 18. It is quite true that the commissioners named under that amendment may make secured loans to such factories and industries as are secured through means provided by the amendment. Still, the ninth purpose in the petition is not limited to loans to those industries, but would permit “aid” in financing industries, without restriction. The scope of the amendment is not that broad. In my opinion, it does not authorize loans to just any industry. It certainly does not permit grants, rather than loans, as the word “aid” would imply. More significantly, while Amendment 18 does amend Article 12, Section 5, to permit a city’s funds to be loaned, it does not eliminate the prohibition against donating these funds to a corporation. See Luxora v. Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R. Co., 83 Ark. 275, 103 S. W. 605, 13 L. R. A. (n. s.) 157, 119 Am. St. R. 139. There is no exemption for nonprofit corporations. Furthermore, it would substitute the discretion and judgment of the officers and directors of the corporation for that of the commissioners. The commissioners could, by this device, delegate their responsibility and authority to these officers and directors. I do not believe that this was intended. Such a result seems inconsistent with the majority opinion holding Section 5 of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-3105 (Repl. 1968) unconstitutional, with which I concur.