Court Opinion

ID: 9795347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:26:42.528776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:36.513936
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice,
dissenting, in which KITE, Justice, joins.
[¶ 17] I respectfully dissent because I do not agree that Securitas was entitled to summary judgment under the circumstances of this case. The parties basically agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The difference in their views is this: Which of the two of them is entitled to judgment as a matter of law? I would remand this matter to the district court, with directions that the district court further remand it to the Office of Administrative Hearings with directions that it enter summary judgment in favor of Quinn.
[¶ 18] It bears repeating here that the worker's compensation system is a constitutional compromise that is intended to benefit both workers and employers. Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 provides:
(a) No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person.
(b) Any section of this constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, for any civil action where a person alleges that a health care provider's act or omission in the provision of health care resulted in death or injury, the legislature may by general law:
(i) Mandate alternative dispute resolution or review by a medical review panel before the filing of a civil action against the health care provider.
(c) Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee. The fund or funds shall be accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may be provided by law. Monies in the fund shall be expended only for compensation authorized by this section, for administration and management of the Worker's Compensation Act, debt service related to the fund and for workplace safety pro*716grams conducted by the state as authorized by law. The right of each employee to compensation from the fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of the injuries or death. Subject to conditions specified by law, the legislature may allow employments not designated ex-trahazardous to be covered by the state fund at the option of the employer. To the extent an employer elects to be covered by the state fund and contributes to the fund as required by law, the employer shall enjoy the same immunity as provided for extrahazardous employments. [Emphasis added.]
The authors of Wyoming's Constitution also singled out workers for special protection in Wyo. Const. art 1, § 22 ("The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws caltu-lated to secure the laborer proper rewards for his service and to promote the industrial welfare of the state."). Also see Torres v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2005 WY 7, ¶ 22, 105 P.3d 101, 112 (Wyo.2005).
[¶ 19] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(b) provides: "No contract, rule, regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any lability created by this act except as otherwise provided by this act." See 8 Larsen's Workers' Compensation Law, §§ 132.03[8] (Statutes Prohibiting Waiver of Right by Agreement) and 182.04[1] (Public Interest in Full Benefits) (2006). I am not convinced that the contract between Securi-tas and the coal company has anything to do with this case, but if it does, it runs afoul of the constitutional and statutory prohibition of a contract between a worker and an employer that operates as a waiver of benefits provided by the worker's compensation statutes.
[¶ 20] The majority also rests its decision on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D), which provides that an injury, as contemplated by the Worker's Compensation Act, does not include: "Any injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the employ-H er." The majority concludes that, as a matter of law, the vehicle in which Quinn was riding was not a "vehicle of the employer." I am unable to agree that either Berg v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2005 WY 23, 106 P.3d 867 (Wyo.2005), or Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 787 P.2d 91 (Wyo.1990) speak anything more than tangentially to the circumstances of this case. I do agree that we have repeatedly held that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is not ambiguous, but we have done so in these words: "Subsection (D) is the codification of a "long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred while either going to or coming from work are not com-pensable unless the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation or has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.'" Berg, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d at 871 [Emphasis added]. My take on the facts of this case is that Securitas was, in its own fashion, providing transportation to Quinn in a vehicle "of the employer." A word of some import here is a very small word that has many meanings and usages, "of." It connotes the "agent or doer of an act or action," "the means or instrument by which an action is carried out," and "a possessive relationship," and maybe a few other things, given the context. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1565 (1986). While "of" is a word of many meanings and usages, that does not create an ambiguity. However, it does provide several avenues by which one could conclude that the vehicle in question was "of the employer."
[¶ 21] The hearing officer and the majority rely on a written contract and/or oral agreements/understandings entered into by Securitas and the coal mines it serves, as well as the fact that the mines allowed Seeu-ritas's employees to ride the buses as a "courtesy." See 1 Larsen's Workers' Compensation Low, § 15.03 (Non-Contractual or Casual Provision of Transportation) (2006) ("However, the distinction between transportation provided by contract and transportation without agreement or as a courtesy is being increasingly questioned, since the fundamental reason for extension of liability-the extension of the actual employment-controlled risks of employment-is not affected *717by the question whether the transportation was furnished because of obligation or out of courtesy."). The majority categorizes the transportation at issue as "free" and provided by the employer to employees voluntarily and without incurring any liability. I think that defies the reality of these cireumstances.
[¶ 22] My conclusion is that, as a practical matter, Securitas provided Quinn with transportation to and from work, and Quinn suffered an injury during that transport. What the agreement was between Securitas and the coal mine is of no consequence to the resolution of this case, and Securitas's extraction of what amounts to a waiver of benefits is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the governing statutes.