Court Opinion

ID: 9851325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:39.607519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.473548
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
In Division 1 of its opinion, the majority holds that it need not address the trial court’s finding that title ripened by prescription because, “under the law in effect as of the expiration of seven years from the execution of the deed . . . , fee simple title vested absolutely in the county. . . .” In my opinion, Patterson v. Florida Realty &c. Corp., 212 Ga. 440, 443 (3) (93 SE2d 571) (1956) mandates this holding and, therefore, I concur in the majority’s judgment of affirmance. However, I am not convinced that Patterson was rightly decided or that this result was intended by the General Assembly when it enacted Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1132, 1133, § 2-A.
Although the purchaser at a tax sale receives a deed to the property, this tax deed does not vest in the purchaser absolute title to the property. Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) (316 SE2d 537) (1984). The “title” that the purchaser acquires is subordinate to the right of the defendant in fi. fa. to redeem the property, “and until the expiration of the period which the law fixes in which [the defendant in fi. fa.] might exercise this right [his] title as owner [is] not divested.” Morrison v. Whiteside, 116 Ga. 459, 462 (42 SE 729) (1902).
Under Patterson, the defendant in fi. fa. would lose his right of redemption by the mere passage of a seven-year period. However, this construction of Section 2-A fails to give effect to the entirety of the language contained in that statutory provision. By its terms, Section 2-A provided for the ripening of title under a tax deed by prescription after a seven-year period. It is a fundamental rule of construction that all of the words of a statute are to be given due weight and meaning. Boyles v. Steine, 224 Ga. 392, 395 (162 SE2d 324) (1968). Therefore, the phrase “by prescription” cannot be ignored.
Title by prescription is defined as “the right to property which a possessor acquires by reason of the continuance of his possession for *34a period of time fixed by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 44-5-160. Without possession, there can be no ripening of prescriptive title. Thus, in addition to divesting the defendant in fi. fa. of his title through timely notice of foreclosure of his right of redemption, a purchaser at a tax sale could acquire fee simple title to the property under Section 2-A “by prescription after a period of seven years. . . .” However, a purchaser who seeks to establish his title by prescription, rather than by the giving of notice of foreclosure of the right of redemption, must show his adverse possession of the property for the requisite period. OCGA § 44-5-161. See Memory v. Walker, 209 Ga. 916, 918 (2, 3) (76 SE2d 698) (1953); Carnes v. Pittman, 209 Ga. 639, 642 (74 SE2d 852) (1953); McDonald v. Wimpy, 202 Ga. 8, 12 (2) (41 SE2d 257) (1947); Smith v. Jefferson County, 201 Ga. 674, 678 (1) (40 SE2d 773) (1946).
The contrary holding in Patterson appears to be based exclusively upon the second sentence of Section 2-A, which does not specifically mention prescription. However, Section 2-A is captioned as “Title under tax deed to ripen by prescription.” “The title or caption of the act ... , while no part thereof, may always be examined by the court when the act is doubtful, for the purpose of finding the legislative intent thereof. . . .” Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 40 (6) (55 SE2d 711) (1949). Furthermore, both the first and third sentences of section 2-A specifically refer to title by prescription. In construing the statute “so as to give effect to the legislative intent a mere segment of the statute should not be lifted out of context and construed without consideration of all the other parts of the statute. [Cit.]” City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609 (2) (176 SE2d 81) (1970). Therefore, in my opinion, the second sentence of section 2-A also envisions title by prescription and review of Patterson reveals that this Court did not fully consider whether prescription had to be shown.
I also note that subsequent to the relevant time period in this case, the General Assembly has further amended the statute. OCGA § 48-4-48 now clearly provides for prescription as the only basis for the ripening of title under a tax deed in the absence of notice of foreclosure of the right of redemption. Ga. L. 1989, p. 1391, § 3.
If the 1989 amendment were applicable here, Moultrie would not have lost his right of redemption by the mere passage of a seven-year period. It is undisputed that neither the county nor its successors in interest were ever in possession of the property after the sale, since Moultrie remained in possession thereafter. Accordingly, title based on the tax deed would not have ripened by prescription as required by OCGA § 48-4-48 (a).
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this special concurrence.
*35Decided December 4, 1995.
Wiseman, Blackburn & Futrell, James B. Blackburn, Jr., for appellant.
Clyde M. Thompson, Jr., for appellee.