Court Opinion

ID: 9896208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 19:09:20.309956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:18.598423
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Galvez Villavicencio, 2023-Ohio-4072.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                             :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                       :
                                                               No. 111970
                 v.                                        :

HERNAN GALVEZ VILLAVICENCIO,                               :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                      :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 9, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-660371-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Dominic Neville, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 The Law Office of John T. Forristal, and John T. Forristal,
                 for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Hernan Galvez Villavicencio (“Galvez”) appeals his misdemeanor

conviction of assault, entered following a jury trial, claiming the trial court erred by

precluding him from impeaching the victim during the cross-examination regarding
her conduct following the alleged assault. For the following reasons, we vacate the

conviction and remand for a new trial on the misdemeanor charge.

               Galvez and the victim dated for several months before the altercation

leading to the current charges. One weekend, the victim, who claimed Galvez was

an alcoholic, brought food, beer, and sangria to Galvez’s apartment to spend the

weekend with Galvez, along with the victim’s two children. Galvez and the victim

had one glass of sangria each as they watched television and listened to music. The

victim’s children had trouble sleeping, so the victim stayed with them in a second

bedroom for a short period. Galvez retired to his bedroom.

               Sometime during the overnight hours, Galvez unlocked the victim’s

cell phone (both shared each other’s passwords) and saw a text message between the

victim and her soon-to-be ex-husband, the father of the victim’s children. The text

message troubled Galvez, although the trial court precluded Galvez from testifying

as to the contents at trial. According to the victim, who was inexplicably permitted

to testify as to the content of the messages, “[i]t was just pictures of the kids. I went

[on] a trip to Puerto Rico. I sent pictures of me, the kids, my birthday, just messages

between two parents.”

               The victim and Galvez’s version of events differed. According to the

victim, at some point during the early morning hours, she heard Galvez audibly

crying in his bedroom and she went to investigate. Upon entering, she discovered

that Galvez was upset about the text messages and he “immediately started hitting”

her. According to the victim, Galvez was intoxicated and he punched her for
15 minutes before she was able to escape. The victim told the jury that she thought

Galvez was going to kill her and harm her children. She also testified that Galvez

locked his door to prevent her from escaping by pushing the button on the door

handle, but she managed to get the door open eventually and call for emergency

assistance after punching Galvez in the forehead several times.

               During the state’s case in chief, Galvez attempted to impeach the

victim’s testimony through several methods, all of which were precluded by the trial

court. The victim testified that she feared Galvez and ceased all contact with him as

of the date of the incident. Defense counsel attempted to ask the victim about her

sustained contact with Galvez through text messaging and emails following the

incident in order to discredit the victim. In addition, Galvez intended to question

the victim about her involvement in a scheme to beat and rob Galvez two days after

the incident — the victim allegedly lured Galvez to her home where her ex-husband

beat Galvez severely enough to put him in the hospital. The victim then went to

Galvez’s apartment to retrieve some items, some of which Galvez alleged were his

possessions. According to the victim’s trial testimony, she did not intend to ruin

Galvez’s career (he was a television reporter for a local news outlet), but her

subsequent actions, according to Galvez, indicated that she intended to get him fired

because he was breaking off their relationship. Galvez argued this was the reason

that the victim called police on the night of the incident and inflated the events.

               The trial court precluded the questioning, claiming that the defendant

“can’t create motive after the fact.” That statement was never explained. The state’s
position was that the line of questioning was not relevant to the elements of the

assault charge, but the state never discussed or demonstrated how the evidence was

irrelevant or inadmissible as impeachment evidence.

              According to Galvez’s trial testimony, when the victim entered the

room, he told her their relationship was over while he was seated on his bed. The

victim, angered by the statement, came at him and punched him in the forehead one

time, causing a visible wound on his forehead. Galvez tried to stand up but was

prevented by the victim, who grabbed his wrist causing visible bruising. The victim

continued slapping Galvez before she exited the room and called the police. He

denied hitting her in return. Galvez also testified that the door did not lock in the

manner in which the victim claimed during her testimony.

              When police officers arrived, they were unable to determine who the

aggressor was. The officers left any charging decisions to the prosecutor’s office.

The police officers documented Galvez’s and the victim’s injuries, but none of the

officers indicated that Galvez was intoxicated. Galvez sustained observable bruising

around his wrist and a wound to his forehead that caused blood to drip down his

face. The victim had a puffy mark near her left eye, faint marks on her upper arm,

and one bruise on her upper thigh, all of which she attributed to Galvez’s assault.
               Upon that evidence, the jury found Galvez guilty of misdemeanor

assault but acquitted him of the felony kidnapping charge. Galvez was sentenced to

an 18-month term of community control. This appeal timely followed.1

               In the first assignment of error, Galvez claims that the trial court erred

by precluding him from attempting to impeach the victim in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to confront his accuser.

               Galvez claims that under general principles derived from the state

and federal Constitutions, he was wrongly precluded from attempting to impeach

the victim’s credibility through her conduct following the assault, which included

allegations that she intended to ruin Galvez’s career. According to Galvez, the Ohio

Constitution, Article I, Section 10, secures a defendant’s right to confront his accuser

and when “a trial court denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confront a

witness against him, the error is reviewed de novo.” State v. Gonzales, 151 Ohio

App.3d 160, 2002-Ohio-4937, 783 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.).

               The state responds that the incident regarding Galvez being lured to

the victim’s ex-husband’s home where Galvez was attacked was irrelevant to the

assault charge since it occurred after the altercation between Galvez and the victim

underlying the indictment in this case. Citing Evid.R. 611 and 616, the state

maintains that the trial court did not err in precluding the evidence of the attack on

      1 Initially, Galvez’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), claiming there were no
nonfrivolous issues to substantiate an appeal. Upon review, the originally assigned panel
concluded otherwise and new counsel was appointed to prosecute the appeal.
Galvez that occurred two days after the events because the evidence was not

impeachment evidence and a motive to fabricate her assault story could not be

proven with evidence of the victim’s conduct following the assault. The state did not

address Galvez’s argument with respect to the trial court’s preclusion of evidence

pertaining to the victim’s continuous contact with Galvez following the incident.

               The state’s reliance on Evid.R. 611(B) in defense of the trial court’s

decision is perplexing. Galvez intended to cross-examine the victim on her motive

to claim he was the aggressor based on evidence that the victim intended (and took

steps) to ruin his career after he threatened to break off their relationship, which

occurred on the night of their altercation. Under Evid.R. 611, “[c]ross-examination

shall be permitted on all relevant matters and matters affecting credibility.” That

rule supports Galvez’s contention that he was permitted to impeach the victim’s

credibility based on her conduct following the assault, which according to Galvez,

tended to discredit the victim’s trial testimony, such as her fear of Galvez trying to

kill her or the victim cutting off contact with him following the incident.

               On this point, the state’s sole argument is that the impeachment

evidence is not relevant to proving the elements of the assault as charged and,

therefore, the questioning was properly excluded. This misses the point.

               There are two aspects of the right to cross-examination established by

Evid.R. 611(B): a party “shall be permitted” to inquire into all “relevant matters” and

also all “matters affecting credibility.” The phrase “matters affecting credibility” is

not modified by the term “relevant.” Evid.R. 611(B) simply provides that parties
have the right to challenge a witness’s credibility. But in order to determine the

scope and admissibility of that impeachment, one must review the specific

evidentiary rules pertaining to the various methods of impeachment.               The

admissibility of impeachment evidence does not depend on the evidence being

relevant to prove the elements of the charged conduct.

               For example, under Evid.R. 609(A)(3), a party is permitted to attack

a witness’s credibility with evidence that the witness was convicted of a crime

involving dishonesty or false statement, despite the fact that the conviction is not a

fact of consequence for the purposes of proving the criminal conduct underlying the

indictment. The relevancy of impeachment evidence extends well beyond evidence

tending to prove the elements of the crime. The state’s reliance on the relevance

discussion for the purposes of defining the scope of a cross-examination is

misplaced.

               According to Galvez, under Evid.R. 616(A), a defendant is permitted

to impeach a witness, including the victim, by showing their bias, prejudice, interest,

or any motive to misrepresent, which can be demonstrated through examination of

the witness or through the introduction of extrinsic evidence. Galvez attempted just

that at trial but was precluded from examining the victim based on the trial court’s

conclusion that a defendant “can’t create motive after the fact.” It is not clear how

that rationale applies to Evid.R. 616(A). It has long been held that “[t]he exposure

of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the

constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” (Emphasis added.) State v.
Rapp, 67 Ohio App.3d 33, 36, 585 N.E.2d 965 (4th Dist.1990), citing Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

               It is understandable that a trial court would seek to keep distinct

criminal acts separate for the purposes of trial to avoid needless confusion or

intermingling of irrelevant conduct. This is especially pertinent to the allegations

that the victim’s ex-husband beat Galvez two days after his altercation with the

victim. Nevertheless, the victim’s alleged conduct in facilitating the subsequent

event bears on the victim’s credibility with respect to her trial testimony and her

motivation to testify against Galvez in his criminal proceedings. Although there is

no direct connection between her testimony and her conduct subsequent to the

events underlying the criminal action against Galvez, such as cases in which a

codefendant is questioned regarding his motivation to testify against a codefendant,

a connection to the victim’s credibility nonetheless exists for the purposes of

impeachment evidence.

               Although the incident between Galvez and the victim and her ex-

husband occurred two days following the altercation underlying these criminal

charges, it occurred before the victim testified at trial. The evidence of the victim’s

complicity and motivation to assault Galvez, which could be connected to her motive

to seek a criminal conviction against Galvez, was not created after the fact. See, e.g.,

State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 152, 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996) (a witness’s pending

charges or plea deal are admissible to demonstrate bias of the witness). Galvez’s

argument is based on his belief that he can demonstrate that the victim called the
police officers on the night of their altercation because the victim intended to have

him fired after he stated his intention to break off his relationship with the victim,

who days earlier filed for divorce from her ex-husband. The preclusion of all

inquiries into the impeachment material violated Galvez’s right to a fair trial.

Although the trial court has some discretion to “impose reasonable limits on cross-

examination based on a variety of concerns, such as harassment, prejudice,

confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, repetitive testimony, or marginally

relevant interrogation,” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 480, 739 N.E.2d 749

(2001), it cannot preclude the impeachment inquiry altogether.              See, e.g.,

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

               In this case, the evidence of the victim’s continued contact with

Galvez following the conduct giving rise to the criminal charges and her alleged

involvement in the incident with her ex-husband were permissible forms of

impeachment evidence.          As Galvez maintained, that incident potentially

demonstrates a preexisting motive for the victim to potentially exaggerate her

description of events during her testimony. At the least, Galvez has demonstrated

that he was entitled to explore that motivation through impeachment of the victim

during cross-examination. Although the trial court could limit the extent and

breadth of that inquiry, it could not altogether preclude it.2

      2 The state has not claimed that harmless error precludes the reversal.   We shall
not sua sponte entertain that discussion.
              Galvez’s conviction for the misdemeanor assault is reversed, and the

matter remanded for a new trial on that count.

              This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR