Court Opinion

ID: 9581398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:31.558155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:55.115376
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting.  If the majority view is correct, one is led to wonder why the Georgia CPA, fashioned after the Federal rules, provided in Code Ann. § 81A-112 (b) (6) that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can he granted.” If this petition after opportunity for amendment by the plaintiff and her failure to strike the allegation that the defendant's agents returned to the home of the deceased for the purpose of killing him, can be held not subject to a motion to dismiss, we may as well write off the provision of law providing for the dismissal of a claim. There has been so much attention paid to notice pleadings, discovery, pre-trial proceedings, etc., discussed in the majority opinion, that the facts and principles applicable to this case have been ignored as insignificant or inadvertently overlooked. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45, 46 (78 SC 99, 2 LE2d 80) construes the Federal law which we copied. It said: “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state *502a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Let us apply that law to this case. The plaintiff on a trial, if one had been had, could not have proved a case, and cannot now, so long as her petition contains the allegation that the agents returned for the purpose of killing the deceased. It is wishful thinking to say that under this allegation the stated purpose coidd be turned into one amended in the mind of the thinker to mean “returned to kill him if the circumstances require it in self-defense.” What the Supreme Court says is, “if you cannot prove a case under the statement of your claim as you have stated it in your pleading, and have had an opportunity to withdraw it by amendment and you refused, your petition must be dismissed.” There is no question of construction of pleadings under the old law “against the pleader,” even if some cases say so. Specific allegations displace general ones in such cases as this, such as a general allegation of agency, under logical rules of construction, and not under a rule of construction against a pleader.
The CPA did not wipe out or destroy the law in Georgia to the effect that a party to an action is bound by material allegations made in his pleadings so long as they remain in his pleadings. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Smith, 91 Ga. App. 632, 634 (86 SE2d 640); Carter v. Gen. Finance &c. Corp., 96 Ga. App. 423, 426 (2) (100 SE2d 99); Community Loan &c. Co. v. Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Corp., 96 Ga. App. 586, 588 (2) (100 SE2d 602); Grigsby v. Fleming, 96 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1) (101 SE2d 217); Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 203 (8) (45 SE2d 666); Mitchell v. Arnall, 203 Ga. 384, 386 (8) (47 SE2d 258); Corr v. Corr, 213 Ga. 699, 701 (100 SE2d 922); Brittain v. Reid, 220 Ga. 794, 797 (2) (141 SE2d 903); plus citations in all the above cases. So, at the time the motion to dismiss in this case was granted, the plaintiff could not prove a case of liability against the defendant. There follow some examples of holdings from Federal jurisdictions which illustrate the proposition that a claim is subject to dismissal when the statement of a claim is deficient in spite of the “notice pleading,” etc., arguments. In Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 FSupp. 203 (DCNY, 1942), it was held that *503the plaintiff’s contradictory pleadings are to be construed in favor of the defendant: Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Ettman 120 F2d 837 (CCA Mo. 1941) (314 U. S. 660); Wise v. City of Chicago, 308 F2d 364 (1) (372 U. S. 944); L. S. Good & Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 263 FSupp. 635 (12); Package Closure Corp. v. Sealwright Co., 4 F. R. D. 114; Edelman v. F. H. A., 251 FSupp. 715; Leggett v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 178 F2d 436 (6); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 38 F. R. D. 499 (2), citing Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U. S. 104 (5 SC 788, 29 LE 105); Robbins v. Zabarsky, 44 FSupp. 867 (4); De Loach v. Crowley’s, Inc., 128 F2d 378; Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F2d 629 (CCA Ill. 1940) and cit., aff’g. 30 FSupp. 173, cert. den., 311 U. S. 700 (61 SC 138, 85 LE 454); Josephson v. Joslin, 38 F. R. D. 344 (1); Brewington v. R. C. A., 210 FSupp. 204; Smith v. Cushman Motor Works, 8 F. R. D. 221 (3); Maddox v. Shroyer, 302 F2d 903 (CADC 318); Schaefer v. Macri, 196 F2d 162 (CA 9th Cir.) (344 U. S. 832).
The agents could not be found to be on their master’s business under the allegations now contained in the petition. “Every person shall be liable for torts committed by . . . his servant, by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same shall be by negligence or voluntary.” Code § 105-108. (Emphasis supplied.) There being no allegation in the present complaint that the tort was committed by the employer’s command, the employer’s liability, if any, must arise out of the commission of the tort “in the prosecution and within the scope of his business.” In determining this liability, the test is “not whether the act was done during the existence of the employment, but whether it was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the master’s business for accomplishing the ends of his employment.” McGhee v. Kingman & Everett, Inc., 49 Ga. App. 767, 768 (2) (176 SE 55) and cit.
It is impossible to determine from the complaint exactly what the scope of the master’s business was, since this is not alleged. Even assuming that the defendant’s agents were acting within the scope of their master’s business in their initial visit to the decedent’s premises, however, as is alleged and which must be *504accepted as true on motion to dismiss, this does not demand the same conclusion with regard to their subsequent visit, on which the decedent was killed. The master is not liable for acts of his servants while they are stepping aside from the duties of their employment, and is subsequently liable only if his servants, after stepping aside, have resumed and are again engaged in the conduct of their master’s business. Palmer, Phinizy & Connell v. Heinzerling, 34 Ga. App. 544, 545 (3) (130 SE 537); Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781 (1) (181 SE 498).
Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that the defendant’s servants or agents engaged in an “argument and dispute” with the plaintiff’s decedent on their initial visit, “and thereafter left said home of Herman Charles Hunter and armed themselves with weapons, and returned to said home of Herman Charles Hunter for the purpose of killing him.” (Emphasis supplied.) Code Ann. § 81A-108 (f) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619; Ga. L. 1967, pp. 226, 230) provides as follows: “All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” The identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has been construed so as to resolve all doubts or ambiguities concerning the meaning of or intendment of the pleader’s language in favor of the claim attempted to be stated when the complaint is attacked by a motion to dismiss the action. Porter v. Karavas (CCA 10), 157 F2d 984. The above allegation, however, is neither doubtful nor ambiguous, and is susceptible of but one meaning, i.e., that the purpose of the second visit of the defendant’s servants was to kill the plaintiff’s decedent.
Since, as has been said, it is not alleged that this wilful tort was committed by the command of the defendant corporation, the only other way by which the defendant might be held liable (other than by his express or implied consent, which is not alleged) would be to accept as controlling the general allegation that the act of premeditated murder was done by the agents within the scope of their authority. While such a general averment of agency is ordinarily sufficient, it must yield to specific allegations which negative the general allegation, which then becomes merely a conclusion of the pleader. Plumer v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 58 Ga. App. 622 (199 SE 353); Heath v. Atlanta Beer Distributing Co., 56 Ga. App. 494 (193 SE 73).
*505The proposition that premeditated murder could be within the scope of the business of a corporation is repugnant to reason, justice and the whole body of our law. “Corporations are creatures of the law, and their powers are limited.” First Nat. Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 135 Ga. 614, 616 (69 SE 1123, 32 LRA (NS) 550). It would be an anomaly for the law, as the creator, to endow its corporate creature with the power to do unlawful acts, which are by definition contrary to and destructive of the very nature and existence of the creator, law. Our statutory provisions with regard to corporations are replete with requirements that they can be chartered to conduct only lawful business. See Code Ann. §§ 22-1802 (h) (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex Sess., pp. 214-216; Ga. L. 1965, pp. 602, 603); 22-1827 (f) (Ga. L. 1937-38 Ex. Sess., pp. 214, 222, 223); 22-1828 (g), 22-1828 (h) (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., pp. 214, 223). “[N]o charter of a sanely conducted corporation authorizes unlawful or negligent acts.” City of Columbus v. Webster, 51 Ga. App. 270, 277 (180 SE.512). “Ill will and hatred are born and nurtured in the brain and breast of man, not in an inanimate corporation.” Heath v. Atlanta Beer Distributing Co., 56 Ga. App. 494, 497, supra. A charter authorizing the commission of wrongful homicide might as well denominate the corporation, “Murder, Inc.” Nor could such a power be implied under the so-called “common powers” of corporations. Code § 22-703; Code Ann. §§ 22-1827, 22-1828, supra. An illustration of one aspect of this principle is seen in the prohibition of corporations’ practicing law. Code § 9-402 (Ga. L. 1931, p. 191); Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 520 (4) (162 SE 796).
Hence, murder could not be within the scope of the business of any legally formed corporation, either under its charter or otherwise. Had the complaint alleged to the effect that the decedent was killed while the agents were engaged in the conduct of their master’s business, a cause of action might have been stated. By alleging a purpose which could not have been within the scope of the defendant corporation’s lawful business, however, the complaint shows as a matter of law that the liability, if any, for the tort was that of the individual employees, rather than of their corporate employer. Therefore, the court did not err in *506its judgment dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I am authorized to state that Judges Deen, Quillian and Whitman concur in the foregoing dissent.