Court Opinion

ID: 9947561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 13:06:02.066205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.056744
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                 No. COA23-725

                               Filed 5 March 2024

Wake County, No. 19CVS8664

MIKE CAUSEY, COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Petitioner,

            v.

SOUTHLAND NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, SOUTHLAND
NATIONAL REINSURANCE CORPORATION, BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, COLORADO BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, North
Carolina Domiciled Insurance Companies, Respondents.

      Appeal by intervenor-appellant from orders entered 30 December 2022 by

Judge A. Graham Shirley II in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 23 January 2024.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Deputy Solicitor General James W.
      Doggett, Special Deputy Attorney General Daniel S. Johnson, and Special
      Deputy Attorney General M. Denise Stanford, for petitioner-appellee.

      Williams Mullen, by Wes J. Camden, Caitlin M. Poe, and Lauren E. Fussell,
      for respondents-appellees.

      Fox Rothschild LLP, by Matthew Nis Leerberg and Condon Tobin Sladek
      Thornton Nerenberg PLLC, by Aaron Z. Tobin, for intervenor-appellant.

      FLOOD, Judge.

      Intervenor-Appellant GBIG Holdings, LLC (“GBIG”) appeals from two orders

entered 30 December 2022—an order denying GBIG’s motion for a continuance to

allow discovery and an order of liquidation against Bankers Life Insurance Company
                      CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

(“BLIC”) and Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company (“CBLIC”). Our review of

the Record reveals that GBIG should not have been allowed to intervene;

nevertheless, the trial court did not err in denying GBIG’s motion to continue and

ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s

orders to clarify GBIG is not a proper party and affirm.

                      I. Facts and Procedural Background

      The case before us is one of many cases stemming from the insolvency of

several insurance companies owned by Greg Lindberg (“Lindberg”). Here, we provide

only the facts pertinent to this appeal and those relevant facts that have not

previously been addressed by this Court in Southland National Insurance

Corporation v. Lindberg, 289 N.C. App. 378, 889 S.E.2d 512 (2023).

      Respondents-Appellees      Southland       National   Insurance   Corporation

(“Southland”), BLIC, and CBLIC are licensed domestic insurers, owned by GBIG.

GBIG is wholly owned by Lindberg. On 18 October 2018, Southland, BLIC, and

CBLIC consented to be placed under administrative supervision, following concerns

from Petitioner-Appellee Commissioner of Insurance Mike Causey (“Causey”), that

the companies would be financially unable to meet outstanding obligations to their

policyholders. During the period of administrative supervision, Causey determined

that under the current investment structure, Southland, BLIC, and CBLIC lacked

the liquidity to pay their policyholders and ultimately placed the companies into

rehabilitation.

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                   Opinion of the Court

                         The Southland Liquidation Hearing

      After over two years of supervising Southland, on 21 March 2021, Causey filed

a petition for liquidation due to Southland’s insolvency. On 14 April 2021, GBIG filed

an objection to the petition for liquidation as well as a motion for continuance to allow

for discovery, prompting Causey to file a response in which he asserted GBIG lacked

standing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 (2021) to bring an objection to the petition.

On 16 April 2021, the petition for liquidation of Southland was heard and the trial

court, in granting GBIG’s motion to intervene, stated, “I do believe [GBIG] ha[s] the

right to contest [the petition].” Following the hearing, an order (the “Southland

Order”) was entered, in which the trial court found:

             10.    [Causey] contends that GBIG lacks standing to
             defend against this petition because [he] seeks a
             liquidation order based solely on 58-30-11—which does not
             mention any right to defend. However, the immediately
             preceding statute, Section 58-30-95, explicitly requires the
             [c]ourt to “permit the directors of the insurer to take such
             action as are reasonably necessary to defend against the
             petition [for liquidation],” at least for petitions arising
             under that section. The [c]ourt finds it unnecessary to
             decide whether there is a statutory right to defend against
             a petition arising solely under 58-30-100, because the
             [c]ourt will exercise its “broad supervisory power” to allow
             GBIG to contest whether [Southland] is insolvent under
             the statutory definition of insolvency[.]

             11.   [Causey] contends that only “the directors of the
             insurer,” may defend against the petition under Section 58-
             30-95(a) and therefore, GBIG does not have standing to
             defend against this petition. GBIG, in contrast, contends
             that under these circumstances, where [Southland] no
             longer has active directors, the statutory right of defense

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

             vests in GBIG as [Southland’s] sole shareholder and owner.
             [Causey] notes that as Rehabilitator he possesses the
             statutory power to exercise and enforce all rights,
             remedies, and powers of the sole shareholder, under
             Section 58-30-85 (a)(19). Again, the [c]ourt finds it
             unnecessary to decide whether GBIG may defend against
             the petition as a matter of statutory right, because the
             [c]ourt will instead invoke its broad supervisory power to
             allow GBIG to contest whether [Southland] is insolvent
             under the statutory definition of insolvency.

      Ultimately, as to the Southland liquidation petition, the trial court concluded

that GBIG would be allowed to “contest whether [Southland] [was] insolvent under

the statutory definition of insolvency” and may conduct limited prehearing discovery,

but neglected to rule specifically on whether GBIG had standing to intervene.

      On 10 June 2021, Southland, Causey, and GBIG jointly motioned to stay the

liquidation proceedings, which the trial court granted, allowing the parties to

reschedule for a later date.

      A few months later, on 3 November 2021, GBIG filed a motion seeking

authority from the trial court to propose a plan of rehabilitation for Southland, BLIC,

and CBLIC. In its order denying GBIG’s motion, the trial court found:

             Without specifically ruling on the standing issue, this
             [c]ourt noted that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 permits
             directors of the insurer to take action to defend against a
             liquidation petition, and therefore found it unnecessary to
             determine whether GBIG [ ] had standing to file an
             objection. Instead this [c]ourt exercised “broad supervisory
             power” to allow GBIG [ ] to contest whether [Southland] is
             insolvent as defined by statute for the purpose of hearing
             on that specific determination.

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

                     The BLIC and CBLIC Liquidation Hearing

      Nearly one year later, on 1 November 2022, Causey filed a verified petition for

an order of liquidation against BLIC and CBLIC, asserting that the companies were

insolvent within the meaning of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes.

At the time of filing, BLIC’s assets of $253,163,012 did not exceed its liabilities of

$345,062,743, and CBLIC’s assets of $1,369,052,180 did not exceed its liabilities of

$2,508,953,520.   Two weeks later, GBIG filed an objection to the petition for

liquidation as well as a motion for continuance to allow discovery, asserting that, as

the “parent company” of both BLIC and CBLIC, it should be allowed to present

evidence showing neither company was insolvent.

      On 21 November 2022, a hearing on GBIG’s motion for a continuance to allow

for discovery came on, during which the trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with

counsel for GBIG regarding GBIG’s participation in the matter. When asked where

the directors of BLIC and CBLIC were, counsel for GBIG stated, “[w]ell, Your Honor,

the directors were in effect disbanded when they filed liquidation.” Unconvinced, the

trial court then asked counsel for GBIG to point to a statute that disbands directors

of an insurer upon filing of liquidation, which counsel for GBIG could not do.

Eventually, counsel for GBIG conceded that, at the time the liquidation petition was

filed, both BLIC and CBLIC had directors; therefore, those directors could be in court

to defend against the petition.

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      The trial court continued questioning counsel for GBIG about whether the

Rules of Civil Procedure governed this action, asking specifically if “every petition

filed in Superior Court [was] governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure,” to which

counsel for GBIG responded, “I don’t know the answer to that question.” Answering

its own question, the trial court clarified by stating that not all petitions in superior

court are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court went on to explain

that “the Legislature has recognized that in a liquidation proceeding, [] the directors

who owe a fiduciary duty can come in and argue against [the petition],” and again

asked, “so why aren’t the directors here?” The following exchange then occurred:

             [COUNSEL]: My understanding is that the board, there
             were some directors that were in place at the time. Then
             the corporations were placed into rehabilitation. Those
             directors, I believe some of them, they’ve done nothing
             essentially since that time and would be surprised to know
             that they have any obligations at this time.

             THE COURT: Well, who are those directors?

             [COUNSEL]: I don’t know their names right off the top of
             my head.

             THE COURT: You have done absolutely no investigation[.]

      After the lengthy back-and-forth, the trial court ultimately concluded from the

bench that “when it comes to defending against an order of liquidation, the statute

only authorizes directors to do that.” The Court further stated that it presumes the

Legislature used the word “directors” to mean “directors, not anyone else.”

Apparently dissatisfied with GBIG’s lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

BLIC’s and CBLIC’s directors, the trial court stated “GBIG has made no – apparently

no investigation into” where the directors were or who they were. Ultimately, with

respect to the BLIC and CLBIC liquidation petitions, the trial court found that “GBIG

does not have standing.”

      Upon holding from the bench that GBIG lacked standing, counsel for GBIG

motioned to intervene “both as a matter of right under 24(a) and under permissive

intervention under 24(b).” After allowing GBIG’s motion, the trial court added, “[y]ou

should have made your motion to intervene some time ago.”

      On 30 December 2022, following the hearing, the trial court entered two

orders—one denying GBIG’s motion for continuance to allow for discovery (the

“Continuance Order”) and another, ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation (the

“Liquidation Order”). In the Continuance Order, the trial court stated its findings:

             110. The Court finds the General Assembly’s distinction
             between shareholders and directors is intentional and that
             the General Assembly conferred no right upon the
             shareholders of an insurer to defend against a petition for
             an order of liquidation. The absolute right to defend
             against a petition to liquidate rest solely with the insurer’s
             board of directors. Unless otherwise ordered by the [c]ourt,
             the shareholders have no such right to defend against a
             petition for an order of liquidation and may only defend
             against such action as the [c]ourt in its discretion allows.

             ....

             122. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the
             [c]ourt’s prior rulings on this issue, for the absence of all
             doubt, the [c]ourt hereby amends such interlocutory orders
             pursuant to its inherent authority to conform to this Order

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

             holding that GBIG does not have a statutory right to
             oppose the liquidation of [BLIC and CBLIC].

             ....

             158. At the hearing, GBIG orally moved to intervene in
             this matter. In its discretion, the [c]ourt grants GBIG’s oral
             [m]otion to [i]ntervene in this matter. The [c]ourt does not
             base its ruling on any finding or conclusion that GBIG has
             carried its burden under Rule 24(a) or (b) of the North
             Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure assuming that the Rules
             of Civil Procedure [a]pply. Rather, the [c]ourt allows the
             intervention in its discretion under Article 30 of Chapter
             58 of the North Carolina General Statutes to administer
             the rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings.

      Ultimately, the trial court concluded the Continuance Order by stating that,

in its discretion, it would grant GBIG’s motion to intervene “as a non-party in this

matter for the purposes of informing the [c]ourt through argument and evidence at

the hearing on the petition for liquidation.” The trial court echoed that statement

again in the Liquidation Order, finding: “At the hearing on [the Liquidation Petition]

this [c]ourt ruled that GBIG [ ], the sole shareholder of BLIC and CBL[IC] did not

have a statutory right to object to or contest the Verified Petition. Nevertheless, the

[c]ourt granted GBIG’s oral motion to intervene in the action.”

      GBIG filed timely notice of appeal from both the Continuance Order and

Liquidation Order.

                                  II. Jurisdiction

      The Continuance Order, while interlocutory, is immediately appealable under

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-278, which provides this Court may “review any intermediate

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                        CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                   Opinion of the Court

order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 1-278 (2023). The Liquidation Order constitutes a final judgment in the liquidation

proceedings against BLIC and CBLIC and is therefore appealable under N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023).

                                     III. Analysis

         On appeal, GBIG argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for a

continuance to allow for discovery and ordering BLIC and CBLIC into liquidation.

As a threshold issue, however, we must first consider whether the trial court properly

exercised “broad discretionary power” when it allowed GBIG to intervene as a non-

party.

   A. GBIG’s Participation in the BLIC and CBLIC Liquidation Hearing

         Causey argues GBIG lacks standing to intervene against the liquidation

petition because Chapter 58, Article 30 expressly states that the trial court shall

grant “the directors of the insurer to take such action as are reasonably necessary to

defend against the petition[.]” On the other hand, GBIG argues it should be allowed

to intervene because the trial court had allowed it to intervene in the past, and it has

a valuable property interest in both BLIC and CBLIC.

         When a trial court’s discretionary ruling rests on the interpretation of a

statute, constructions of those statutes are reviewed de novo. Myers v. Myers, 269

N.C. App. 237, 241, 837 S.E.2d 443, 448 (2020). Rule 1 of the North Carolina Rules

of Civil Procedure applies “in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 1 (2023).

Our Supreme Court in In re Ernst & Young, LLP held, however, that when “the

legislature has prescribed specialized procedures to govern a particular proceeding,”

the Rules of Civil Procedure “do not apply.” 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154

(2009). Finally, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there

is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe [it] using its plain

meaning.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134,

136 (1990).

      In In re Ernst & Young, our Supreme Court considered facts very similar to

the case at bar. Ernst & Young sold several tax shelters to Wal-Mart and then helped

Wal-Mart restructure to implement the tax shelters. 363 N.C. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at

152. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-258(a)(2), the Secretary of Revenue elected to

request Ernst & Young provide testimony and documents relating to Wal-Mart’s tax

shelters. Id. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at 152. Ernst & Young only partially complied,

prompting the Secretary to pursue a court order compelling it to comply with the

summons. Id. at 613, 684 S.E.2d at 152. Wal-Mart then filed both a motion to

intervene and a motion to dismiss. Id. at 614, 684 S.E.2d at 153. In its motion to

intervene, Wal-Mart claimed intervention was “the only way to assert its due process

rights under the North Carolina and United States Constitutions.” Id. at 614–15,

684 S.E.2d at 153. In its motion to dismiss, Wal-Mart claimed the case should be

dismissed for failure to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure’s

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                   Opinion of the Court

service requirements. Id. at 614, 684 S.E.2d at 153. The trial court allowed the

motion to intervene but denied the motion to dismiss.

      Upon review, our Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether the precise

language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-258(a) required the Secretary of Revenue to initiate

“a civil action as defined in the General Statutes governing civil procedure.” Id. at

617, 684 S.E.2d at 154. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that, because the

Secretary of Revenue’s initial inquiry under the statute did not explicitly involve

filing a civil complaint or initiating a civil action, the statute was a “self-contained,

specialized procedure, supplant[ing] the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 617, 684

S.E.2d at 155. The Supreme Court further concluded that “although the Court of

Appeals erred in holding to the contrary, it correctly affirmed the order of the trial

court in denying Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss.” Id. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of this Court. Id.

at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156.

      Subsequently, this Court in In re Simmons cited to In re Ernst & Young to

support the conclusion that “[a]lthough our North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure

typically ‘apply in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature[,]’ the Rules do not

apply ‘when a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.’” __ N.C. App. __, __, 893

S.E.2d 271, 273 (2023) (alternation in original) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 Rule

1). In In re Simmons, this Court considered whether the trial court erred in denying

a motion to set aside an order allowing a foreclosure sale. Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                   Opinion of the Court

272. The grantors argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion pursuant

to Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at

272. Ultimately, this Court held that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do

not apply to foreclosure proceedings because the rules were not “specifically engrafted

into the [foreclosure] statute.” Id. at __, 893 S.E.2d at 274.

      Following the precedent set in In re Ernst & Young and In re Simmons, we

note that when a statute describes a “proceeding of a civil nature with its own

specialized procedure[,]” that statute then “supplants the Rules of Civil Procedure.”

In re Ernst & Young, 363 N.C. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156. Further, following this

Court’s holding in In re Simmons, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply

only when specifically “engrafted” into a statute that describes a proceeding with its

own specialized procedure. See In re Simmons, N.C. App. at ___, 893 S.E.2d at 274.

      Here, applying the same tenets of statutory construction, the clear and

unambiguous language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 states that “[t]he [c]ourt shall

permit the directors of the insurer to take such actions as are reasonably necessary

to defend against the petition[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. Similar to the optional

authority given to the Secretary of Revenue to request documents and testimony in

In re Ernst & Young, here, the statute does not explicitly require the directors to

initiate a civil action or file a complaint. Rather, the statute only confers upon the

directors of an insurer the option to take necessary actions to defend against a

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                                    Opinion of the Court

liquidation petition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95. Notably absent from the statute

is any directive that directors shall file a civil complaint.

       For those reasons, we conclude N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 is a proceeding of a

civil nature with its own specialized procedure, and therefore, it supplants the North

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Ernst & Young, 363 N.C. at 620, 684

S.E.2d at 156. Having concluded that Section 58-30-95 supplants the Rules of Civil

Procedure, it follows that the procedure for defending against a liquidation petition

is contained in the express, unambiguous language of the statute, which grants

directors, and directors alone, the power to take necessary actions to defend against

liquidation petitions.     To hold otherwise would eviscerate the thrust of our

Legislature’s intent in enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 by allowing any interested

parties to participate in liquidation proceedings by asserting standing under N.C. R.

Civ. P. 24(a) (allowing a non-party to intervene of right when they have an interest

in the property or transaction) or N.C. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive non-

party intervention when the non-party’s “claim or defense and the main action have

a question of law or fact in common”).

       Where GBIG is not a director of either BLIC or CBLIC, non-party GBIG did

not have standing to intervene, nor should it have been allowed to intervene in the

liquidation proceeding simply because the trial court previously exercised its broad

discretionary power to allow it to intervene in the Southland liquidation. See N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95.

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                       CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                                  Opinion of the Court

    B. Trial Court’s Rulings on the Continuance and Liquidation Orders

      Having concluded the trial court erred when it allowed GBIG’s motion to

intervene, we next consider whether the trial court nevertheless acted properly when

entering both the Continuance Order and the Liquidation Order. GBIG argues the

denial of its motion for a continuance “prevented it from having a meaningful

opportunity to defend against the liquidation petition” and therefore, the trial court

erred in denying its motion to continue and entering the liquidation order. We

disagree.

              1. The Trial Court’s Denial of GBIG’s Motion to Continue

      An order denying a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483, 223 S.E.2d 380, 386 (1976). Under an abuse

of discretion standard, reversal is appropriate only to correct “gross abuse,” such as

where a decision “was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned

decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

      A trial court may grant a continuance if the movants have “acted with diligence

and in good faith[.]” May v. City of Durham, 136 N.C. App. 578, 581, 525 S.E.2d 223,

227 (2000). Accordingly, a movant cannot “use [its own] self-imposed delay to support

a request for a continuance.” Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 70 N.C. App. 498, 508, 320

S.E.2d 892, 899 (1984).

      Here, the trial court correctly determined that GBIG “should have made [its]

motion to intervene some time ago,” given GBIG waited two weeks after the superior

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                                     Opinion of the Court

court noticed a hearing to seek a continuance. Further, GBIG’s argument that the

denial of its motion to continue prevented it from having a meaningful opportunity to

defend against liquidation is disingenuous, given both BLIC and CBLIC had been

making detailed quarterly disclosures since being placed in rehabilitation.

      Considering GBIG waited two weeks after being noticed of the upcoming

hearing to file a motion for continuance, it would appear to this Court that GBIG’s

delay was self-imposed. For that reason, the trial court’s decision to deny GBIG’s

motion can hardly be considered “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result

of a reasoned decision.” Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.

                          2. The Trial Court’s Liquidation Order

      Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. See State v. Biber, 365 N.C.

162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). “‘Under a de novo review, the court considers

the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower

tribunal.”   State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)

(quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316,

319 (2003)). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13), an insurer is considered insolvent

when it is unable to pay its obligations when they are due or if “its admitted assets

do not exceed its liabilities[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13) (2023).

      The Record is replete with evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that

both BLIC and CBLIC were insolvent and “in such condition as to render the

continuance    of   its   business   hazardous,      financially,   or   otherwise,   to   its

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                                   Opinion of the Court

policyholders[.]”    At the time of filing the liquidation petition, BLIC’s assets of

$253,163,012 did not exceed its liabilities of $345,062,743, and CBLIC’s assets of

$1,369,052,180 did not exceed its liabilities of $2,508,953,520, rendering them both

insolvent under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-10(13). In ordering both BLIC and CBLIC

into liquidation, the trial court focused on Article 30’s purpose—to protect the

interests of thousands of policyholders in the State of North Carolina. See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 50-30-1(c) (2023).

      For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm both the Continuance Order and

the Liquidation Order and modify each order to clarify that GBIG should not have

been allowed to intervene pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95 or through the

exercise of the trial court’s broad discretionary power. See In re Ernst & Young, LLP,

363 N.C. at 620, 684 S.E.2d at 156 (concluding that, despite this Court’s incorrect

conclusion that the Rules of Civil Procedure superseded a statutory requirement,

nevertheless the order should be modified, yet affirmed).

                                    IV. Conclusion

      In conclusion, we hold that as a shareholder, GBIG should not have been

allowed to intervene and defend against the liquidation petition, as only a company’s

directors are permitted to intervene to defend under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-30-95.

Where the trial court allowed GBIG to participate, we modify both the Continuance

Order and the Liquidation Order to clarify that GBIG is not a proper party to the

action and affirm.

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            CAUSEY V. SOUTHLAND NAT’L INS. CORP.

                      Opinion of the Court

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.

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