Court Opinion

ID: 9674994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:38:45.88639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.619564
License: Public Domain

BARAJAS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the collateral estoppel issue in this cause. I therefore write not in disagreement, but to dispel any impression the State might have that I condone or encourage the manner in which it secured its deadly weapon finding against Appellant. The record shows that the State, having failed to secure a conviction for the offense of aggravated sexual assault by use of a firearm as alleged in the indictment, announced that it would seek an affirmative finding at punishment that Appellant used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the course of this sexual assault. The announcement by the State came at the eleventh hour and only after it was alerted by the jury of a defect in the proof of Appellant’s weapon of choice.1
It is well settled that, although a defendant is entitled to notice that the State will seek a deadly weapon finding, that notice need not appear in the indictment under which the *719defendant is ultimately tried. Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 775-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The fact that the notice must be in writing, Luken v. State, 780 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), appears to be the only firmly-held requirement embodied in this area of the law.2 For example, the Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that where the State voluntarily abandoned the portion of the indictment containing the deadly weapon allegation and made no attempt to give the defendant any further written notice, the dismissed portion of the indictment nevertheless gave adequate notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding. Grettenberg v. State, 790 S.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Even in instances where the indictment makes no mention of a weapon, the State has been allowed to submit the deadly weapon issue at the conclusion of the guilVinnoeence phase. See e.g. Luken, 780 S.W.2d at 266. Yet Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), instructs that the defendant is “entitled to notice in some form that the use of a deadly weapon will be a fact issue at the time of prosecution_” [Emphasis added].
In my view, the State has effectively, though not formally, attempted to amend the charging instrument in the present cause mid-stream after failing to present sufficient evidence to convince the jury that Appellant used a firearm in this assault.3 Because Appellant’s counsel wholly failed to object to the State’s attempt to amend its indictment, 1.e., change its pleadings, or otherwise assert error in such attempted amendment on appeal, this Court is precluded from reaching this issue. See Banda v. State, 768 S.W.2d 294, 296 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). In as much as Appellant merely addresses this issue via his collateral estoppel argument, I reluctantly concur with the majority’s disposition.

. The record shows that during its deliberations on guilt/innocence, the jury sent the trial court a note which read in pertinent part as follows:
"Why was the knife not included on the charges as a Deadly Weapon?’’

. In Mixon v. State, 804 S.W.2d 107, 109-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (Teague, J., dissenting), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decried its opinions on deadly weapon findings issued since 1981 as collectively representing a "bowl of spoiled stew."

. Clearly this was not a formal amendment to the indictment. According to Ward v. State, 829 S.W.2d 787, 793-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), an amendment to the indictment requires an actual physical interlineation. Moreover, before the State may physically alter the charging instrument, it must first request the trial court's permission via a motion for leave to amend. Id. at 793; TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 28.11 (Vernon 1989). The State did none of the above in this cause.