Court Opinion

ID: 9537363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:16:44.107821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:31.740201
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
To my way of thinking, the mere fact that the original tort-feasor may become derivatively liable in an increased amount because of the negligence of a physician subsequently treating the injured plaintiff, on account of that negligence being an outgrowth of the original wrong, does not necessarily compel the conclusion that therefore the release of the original tort-feasor should ipso facto operate as a release of such allegedly negligent physician.
I note in the quotation from 41 Am.Jur. in the opinion of the majority the following language:
“ * * * especially where the release expressly includes all claims for medical, surgical and related expenses * ⅜ * a
From the mere facts that the original tort-feasor involved here was a hospital and present defendant is a physician, it is not to be inferred that such physician was the agent of the hospital. Plaintiff was merely an employee of hospital. After injury, *1009quite independently of hospital, she employed defendant doctor to treat and operate upon her person.
The release involved herein, by its terms, runs only to the hospital. It does not contain any reference to medical, surgical and related expenses. The omission from the release of such items, together with the fact that the physician was not mentioned, weakens his claim of release. A jury might well infer that the parties did not intend for the physician to be released.
The section from 41 Am.Jur. above referred to further states:
“It has been held, too, that the question of the intent of the parties as to the scope of the release is an issue of fact to be determined, like all such issues, by the weight of competent evidence.”
In 40 A.L.R.2d 1077, Release, § 2, it is said:
“The underlying value purported to be served by the general rule is that there should not be double recovery for the same injury.”
The defendant physician seeks to substitute a rule of law for the factual defense of double recovery.
The fact that plaintiff could possibly have obtained full compensation from the hospital for all injuries does not establish that she has been so compensated. It would be a matter of proof as to whether she has been fully compensated by the hospital for all injuries.
In Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 A. 602, the court said that the injured plaintiff’s testimony was admissible even though it contradicted the terms of the release; that the release in and of itself was not a bar to an action against the physician.
In 50 A.L.R. 1110, Release, referring to a Missouri case, the author states:
“The court held that, since the plaintiff had shown no intention in the instrument to release the defendant (physician), the agreements did not operate as a bar to the action.”
The courts of'Minnesota and New Jersey have changed positions as to this point. They now hold that a release of the original tort-feasor does not necessarily release the physician. A.L.R. Supplement Service, 1960, page 2843, Release.
The California court in Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal.2d 654, 150 P.2d 876, held that the release of the original wrongdoer did not release the physician unless the injured person received full compensation for all injuries.
I believe the better rule to be that a release of the original tort-feasor should not necessarily operate to release a physician who has been negligent in subsequent treatment of the person injured unless the parties so intended, or the consideration paid for the release constitutes full compensation for all injuries.
In my opinion, the trial court should have empanelled a jury, and taken testimony as to whether the intention of the parties was that the physician be released and as to whether plaintiff had been fully compensated for her injuries.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.