Court Opinion

ID: 9929654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 23:00:56.70202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:41:12.913529
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 SHANNON AGOFSKY,

                 Plaintiff,

         v.                                               Civil Action No. 23-1511 (TSC)

 BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al.,

                 Defendant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiff Shannon Agofsky sues the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), its Director and the

Regional Director for its North Central Regional Office, and his Acting Complex Warden for

violations of the Administration Procedure Act (“APA”) and his First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Complex at Terre Haute (“FCC Terre Haute”)

in Terre Haute, Indiana. He filed a Complaint on May 25, 2023, ECF No. 1, and a Motion for

Preliminary Injunction on June 8, 2023, ECF No. 5. Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 6 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), and Defendants’

Motion to Transfer, ECF No. 16 (“Defs.’ Mot.”), which is opposed. See Mem. in Opp’n to Mot.

to Transfer, ECF No. 18 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”). For the reasons set forth below, the court will GRANT

Defendants’ Motion to Transfer. Accordingly, the court will not reach Plaintiff’s Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction in deference to the decision of the transferee court.

                                 I.     BACKGROUND

       Plaintiff claims that Defendants refused to process his request to place his wife on his

visiting list “solely on the basis” that he and his spouse—whom he met and married during his

incarceration—had no relationship prior to his incarceration. Compl. ¶ 11; Pl.’s Mot. at 1, 6–7.

                                           Page 1 of 16
As relevant to the Motion to Transfer, Plaintiff argues that BOP’s refusal violated the APA by

applying a prior relationship requirement, previously applicable only to an inmate’s friends and

associates, to immediate family members arbitrarily and without notice and comment. Pl.’s Mot.

at 1, 5–7; compare 28 C.F.R. § 540.44(a) (directing BOP staff “to compile a visiting list for each

inmate after suitable investigation” which may include “members of the immediate family,”

including an inmate’s spouse, who are to be placed on the list “absent strong circumstances

which preclude visiting”), with 28 C.F.R. § 540.44(c) (directing that the “visiting privilege

ordinarily will be extended to friends and associates having an established relationship with the

inmate prior to confinement”). According to Plaintiff, “BOP’s new policy categorically bars

visits by inmates’ spouses who did not know them before they were incarcerated, and also bars

visits by inmates’ children and siblings born after those inmates’ incarceration.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1.

       Defendants contest that the final decision imposed a prior relationship requirement on

visitation requests by immediate family members, and deny that BOP modified the substantive

regulation. Defs.’ Mot. at 1–2. They argue that the decision instead “merely upheld the

discretion of prison officials to inquire about the existence of a prior relationship as a factor in

evaluating Agofsky’s request based on safety considerations applicable to him.” Id. at 2.

Defendants claim that inquiry was consistent with the underlying regulation. Id. at 3. Plaintiff

argues that the plain text of the regulation, and BOP’s statement during a 2003 rulemaking that

“[t]he prior relationship requirement does not apply to immediate family members,” bars

expansion of the requirement making a prior relationship a prerequisite for visitation by an

immediate family member. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, 5–6; Visiting Regulations: Prior Relationship

Requirement, 68 Fed. Reg. 10656, 10658 (Mar. 6, 2003). Plaintiff also argues that whether

BOP’s request regarding his prior relationship with his spouse is “framed as a denial or a request

                                             Page 2 of 16
for more information,” it improperly applied a prior relationship requirement that BOP knew he

could not satisfy, thereby effectively denying his request. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.

                               II.     LEGAL STANDARD

        A case may be transferred to another venue “[f]or the convenience of parties and

witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The moving party “bears the burden

of establishing that transfer of the action is proper.” Smith v. Yeager, 234 F. Supp. 3d 50, 55

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127

(D.D.C. 2001)). Defendants must make two showings to justify transfer: (1) that the action

“might have been brought” in their choice of forum, and (2) that the private and public “interest

factors” weigh in favor of transfer. Ctr. for Env’t Sci., Accuracy & Reliability v. Nat’l Park

Serv., 75 F. Supp. 3d 353, 356 (D.D.C. 2014); Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F. Supp. 2d

153, 155 (D.D.C. 2007). District courts “retain broad discretion in balancing the asserted

convenience and fairness to the parties.” Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3

(D.D.C. 2006) (citing Sheraton Operating Corp. v. Just Corp. Travel, 984 F. Supp. 22, 25

(D.D.C. 1997)).

                                     III.    ANALYSIS

A.      Where the Action Might Have Been Brought

        An action “might have been brought” against a federal defendant where (1) “a defendant

in the action resides;” (2) “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is subject of the action is situated;” or (3) a

“plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1); Nat’l

Park Serv., 75 F. Supp. at 356. Because the court finds that Plaintiff resides in the Southern

District of Indiana, and no real property is involved in this action, venue is proper in that district

and the court need not reach the alternative bases. Plaintiff is currently housed in the Special
                                             Page 3 of 16
Confinement Unit at FCC Terre Haute, a special housing unit for inmates under a death sentence.

Pl.’s Mot. at 6; Defs.’ Mot. at 4. For venue purposes, a prisoner “resides” where he is

incarcerated. See In re Pope, 580 F.2d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Jordan v. US Bureau of Prisons, No. 21-cv-614-CKK, 2022 WL 579442, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 25,

2022). Plaintiff therefore resides in Terre Haute, which is located in the Southern District of

Indiana. Venue exists in the proposed transferee district.

       Plaintiff does not concede that venue would be proper in the Southern District of Indiana.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 14 (“Even assuming that venue would be proper in the Southern District of

Indiana, these considerations weigh in favor of keeping the case in this District . . .”). He

contends he had “good reason to believe he could not have brought this case in the Southern

District of Indiana,” pointing to a “virtually indistinguishable” case brought and later voluntarily

dismissed by another death row inmate at FCC Terre Haute. Id. at 15; see also Compl. ¶ 25;

Compl., Troya v. Hurwitz, No. 2:18-cv-311 (S.D. Ind. July 10, 2018), ECF No. 1. In that case, a

similar set of defendants named in their official capacities denied that venue was properly

asserted in the Southern District of Indiana. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 (citing Am. Answer of Official

Capacity Defs. at 4 ¶ 2, Troya v. Hurwitz, No. 2:18-cv-311 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2019), ECF No.

44).

       Defendants are correct that Troya is distinguishable. Unlike the Complaint here, Troya’s

complaint asserted individual capacity claims for monetary damages under Bivens. Mem. in

Reply ISO Mot. to Transfer at 4, ECF No. 19 (“Defs.’ Reply”). Troya asserted venue in the

Southern District of Indiana, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Compl. ¶ 2, Troya v. Hurwitz,

No. 2:18-cv-311 (S.D. Ind. July 10, 2018), ECF No. 1. That provision governs suits against

individuals for money damages. In contrast, actions “in which a defendant is an officer or

                                            Page 4 of 16
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color

of legal authority” are governed by 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(1). In Troya, the government,

responding on behalf of the official-capacity defendants, appropriately denied that subsection

1391(b)(2) conferred venue over the official capacity defendants. Defs.’ Reply at 3–4. As

Defendants here explain, “that denial was not an assertion that venue was improper for official-

capacity claims in the Southern District of Indiana, but that it was improper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(2) as alleged by Troya.” Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted). Consequently, the

government has not “pull[ed] the rug out from under” Plaintiff by requesting transfer to an

appropriate transferee court. Pl.’s Opp’n at 16.

B.        Private and Public Interest Factors 1

          At the second step of the transfer analysis, the court considers several factors related to

the private and public interest. Here, three of the private interest factors weigh in favor of

transfer, two weigh against, and one is neutral. One of the three public-interest factors tips in

favor of transfer, one weighs slightly against, and the other is neutral.

1
    In Starnes v. McGuire, the D.C. Circuit articulated five factors courts should consider when
     deciding whether to transfer a case brought by a prisoner incarcerated outside of the District of
     Columbia. 512 F.2d 918, 929–31 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Those factors include: (1) the prisoner’s
     difficulty communicating with counsel; (2) the challenge of transferring the prisoner; (3) the
     availability of witnesses and files; (4) the speed with which the case can be resolved; and
     (5) whether the case involves a national policy issue that may require the testimony of
     policymakers. See id. The second through fourth factors are addressed in the parties’ briefing
     insofar as they overlap with the private and public interest factors discussed below, though
     neither party explicitly addressed the Starnes factors. The threshold question of whether this
     case concerns a “national policy issue”—as opposed to the implementation of such a policy,
     see Huskey v. Quinlan, 785 F. Supp. 4, 6–7 (D.D.C. 1992)—prevents the court from evaluating
     the fifth factor. The court will assume without deciding that Plaintiff’s suit involves a national
     policy issue and nonetheless hold that transfer is appropriate where the private and public
     interest factors weigh in favor of transfer.

                                              Page 5 of 16
         As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether BOP changed its policy at all. Supra at

2–3. 2 Plaintiff contends that BOP implemented a new policy that expands Section 540.44(c)’s

prior relationship rule for friends and associates so that it also applies to immediate family

members covered by Section 540.44(a). Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Defendants counter that BOP’s decision

“did not state that a prior relationship was a prerequisite for a spouse to be permitted to visit, but

only that a prior relationship was a factor that can be considered as part of the Warden’s exercise

of discretion to approve or deny visitors.” Defs.’ Mot. at 11–12; see also Decl. of Todd Royer

¶ 9, ECF No. 16-2 (“I have regularly denied visitation requests for spouses . . . if there appears to

be a security or safety risk, and whether or not the spouse had a prior relationship with the

inmate (i.e., one that pre-dates incarceration) is relevant to that assessment.”).

         In determining whether agency practice has changed, this court “independently review[s]

the administrative record.” Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C.

2019). Official agency action, statements by agency officials, and agency correspondence may

be informative in this inquiry. See Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914,

924–29 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Am. Bar Ass’n, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 26–33. Consequently, without the

complete administrative record, this court is not equipped to rule on that question. And to the

extent the answer to that question determines where the claims arose, and whether this case

involves a national policy decision, Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the

court will assume without deciding that Defendants have not shown those factors to weigh in

favor of transfer, cf. Yeager, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 55. The court nonetheless concludes that transfer

is warranted.

2
    The court is not required to accept Plaintiff’s legal conclusions—including whether BOP
    altered its policies—as true. Black Lives Matter D.C. v. Trump, 544 F. Supp. 3d 15, 28
    (D.D.C. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Buchanan v. Barr, 71 F.4th 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

                                            Page 6 of 16
         1.      Private interest factors
         The private interest factors the court considers when deciding whether to transfer a case

include: “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) where the

claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of witnesses, particularly if

important witnesses may actually be unavailable to give live trial testimony in one of the

districts; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.” Bergmann v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 710

F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (D.D.C. 2010).

                 i.      The parties’ choice of forums

         With regard to the first factor, courts typically accord “substantial deference” to the

plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id. But the court gives “substantially less deference when the forum

preferred by” a plaintiff “is not his home forum.” Jordan, 2022 WL 579442, at *6 (internal

quotation omitted). For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s home forum is the Southern

District of Indiana, not this District.

         Courts also give less deference to the plaintiff’s forum choice when “most of the relevant

events occurred elsewhere.” Bergmann, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (quoting Greene v. Nat’l Head

Start Ass’n, 610 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75 (D.D.C. 2009)). 3 The weight of Plaintiff’s choice is

“weakened” where—as here—“there is an insubstantial factual nexus between the case and the

plaintiff’s chosen forum.” Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 856 F. Supp.

2d 186, 192 (D.D.C. 2012) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff argues that his choice of forum

warrants deference even though it is not his home forum because it is a forum with substantial

3
    At this juncture, the court perceives a distinction between evaluating where “most of the
    relevant events occurred” (the test for evaluating Plaintiff’s forum choice) and where “the
    decision-making process occurred” (the test for determining where Plaintiff’s claims arose). In
    this posture, the court can determine the former from the pleadings, but, for the reasons
    explained above, cannot determine the latter without the administrative record.

                                             Page 7 of 16
connection to the controversy. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. He argues that the Complaint “centers around

BOP decision-making on matters of systemwide policy that occurred at headquarters in D.C.,”

and that the final agency decision was made in Washington, D.C. Id. Defendants argue that,

outside of the fact that the final agency decision was issued by the BOP’s Central Office in

Washington D.C., the District of Columbia has few if any factual ties to this case. Defs.’ Mot. at

22.

       Defendants have the better argument. Even if Plaintiff prevails on his argument that BOP

constructively amended its regulations, he admits that the Bureau did not “formally announce a

revision to Section 540.44(a)” in its decision regarding his visitation request. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4

n.1; Defs.’ Reply at 3. He argues it was Terre Haute’s Warden who required proof of a prior

relationship, contravening BOP’s systemwide regulations. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Plaintiff contends

that BOP’s Regional Director and Central Office “explicitly endorsed and adopted the Warden’s

response.” Id. But on that theory, the decision to change the regulation was initially made in

Terre Haute, by the Warden, not by national policy makers in Washington who merely

“endorsed” his decision. See id. “While undoubtedly some APA claims may be brought in this

District by plaintiffs residing in other jurisdictions, once challenged, there commonly must be

more of a connection to this District than the axiomatic denial of the third stage of an

administrative appeal by the BOP Central Office.” Jordan, 2022 WL 579442, at *7. It is

“settled law” in this District that “mere involvement on the part of federal agencies, or some

federal officials who are located in Washington D.C. is not determinative.” State v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, 304 F. Supp. 3d 56, 64 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Shawnee Tribe v. United

States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2002)). “[I]nstead, there must be a ‘real connection

between the District of Columbia and this litigation’ that goes beyond the presence of federal

                                           Page 8 of 16
agency officials who are ‘generally regulating and overseeing the [administrative] process.’” Id.

(quoting Shawnee Tribe, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 26) (alteration in original). On this record, Plaintiff

has not shown more than general regulation and oversight by BOP when it “affirmed the

Warden’s demand for proof of prior relationship.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.

       By contrast, Defendants argue that their choice of forum is more closely tied to the

factual allegations and claims in this case. Defs.’ Mot. at 23. For the reasons explained above,

the court agrees. Defendants’ choice of forum also weighs in favor of transfer because the

proposed transferee district is Plaintiff’s home forum. Supra at 3–4. While the first factor

weighs against transfer, the second weighs more heavily in favor.

               ii.    Where the claims arose

       “In cases brought under the APA, courts generally focus on where the decisionmaking

process occurred to determine where the claims arose.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA,

675 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 (D.D.C. 2009). If the administrative record ultimately shows that BOP

implemented a new policy allowing BOP staff to consider prior relationships among immediate

family members—when they could previously only consider a prior relationship for friends and

acquaintances—Plaintiff may well persuade the court that the relevant decision to constructively

amend BOP’s regulations occurred at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C. Pl.’s Mot. at 1,

18–19; see Royer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2013) (transfer

inappropriate in APA challenge where inmate pleaded BOP policy effectively amended existing

rules and “issues of national policy or decisions made by national officials” were relevant);

Accurso v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 17-cv-2626-APM, 2018 WL 4964501, at *1–2 (D.D.C.

Oct. 15, 2018) (transfer inappropriate where plaintiff challenged national policy classifying

Buddhist meditation objects as congregate, rather than personal, religious items and Warden

                                           Page 9 of 16
made “straightforward decision based on the classification scheme devised by BOP

policymakers” which did not involve the “exercise of discretion by the Warden or involve the

application of policy to circumstances unique to Plaintiff.”).

       But if Defendants ultimately show that the relevant regulation did not abrogate local

wardens’ discretion to consider a prior relationship in evaluating security concerns raised by

immediate family members, the Warden’s discretionary decision applying BOP regulations to

Plaintiff’s circumstances would likely locate the claims in the proposed transferee district. See

Jordan, 2022 WL 579442, at *7; cf. Accurso, 2018 WL 4964501, at *2. For the reasons

explained above, the court cannot rule on the predicate question on this record and will assume

without deciding that this factor weighs against transfer. Supra at 6.

               iii.    Convenience of the parties, witnesses, and ease of access to sources of
                       proof

       Taking the last three private interest factors together, Defendants argue that the

convenience of the parties and witnesses and the ease of access to sources of proof are not

relevant because the court’s review “will likely be confined to an administrative record that has

already been developed.” Defs.’ Mot. at 24 (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff has requested

a hearing on his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and the government argues that if a hearing

is held, holding it in the proposed transferee district where most witnesses work and reside would

be more convenient. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No. 5; Defs.’ Mot. at 24. Defendants also

note that if Plaintiff is required to appear before this court, it would cause a “tremendous

financial burden to transport him, with the highest level security designation,” from the Southern

District of Indiana to this District. Defs.’ Mot. at 24; see also Metcalf v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

530 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[G]iven the difficulty of transferring plaintiff for

purposes of pursuing this litigation, the Court concludes that transfer to the United States District

                                           Page 10 of 16
Court for the Southern District of Indiana is both convenient for the parties and is in the interest

of justice.”).

        Plaintiff agrees that the court’s review will likely be confined to the administrative record

and that any future hearing or trial is unlikely. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. He asks the court to afford

these factors “little weight” and to disregard Defendants’ burden arguments. Id. He argues that

if additional fact discovery is necessary, “relevant witnesses and evidence are likely to be in

Washington, D.C., where BOP decision-making with regard to systemwide policy and Plaintiff’s

request took place.” Id. But Plaintiff contradicts this position by requesting a hearing and

seeking to “cross-examine Mr. Royer regarding his declaration and related issues,” and to “put

on additional evidence to dispute the factual contentions in the declaration” if the court considers

it. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7 n.5. Royer is the Camp Administrator of the Terre Haute Complex and

presumably resides in or near Terre Haute. Persuasive authority in this District holds that “[t]he

most critical factor to examine under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is the convenience of the witnesses.”

Michigan Welfare Rts. Org. v. Trump, 600 F. Supp. 3d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2022). The court thus

finds that the convenience of the parties and witnesses weighs in favor of transfer. See id.; see

also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D.D.C. 2006) (even if testimony

from national policy makers becomes relevant, “any inconvenience to [the government] is offset

by the fact that they [are] the party requesting the transfer”). The court agrees with the parties

that access to proof is irrelevant or neutral. See Wyandotte Nation v. Salazar, 825 F. Supp. 2d

261, 271 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[I]n this digital age of easy and instantaneous electronic transfer of

data, the Court does not find that the ‘ease of access to sources of proof’ factor carries any

weight in the transfer analysis.”).

                                           Page 11 of 16
       2.      Public interest factors
       The public interest factors include: (1) the transferee forum’s familiarity with the

governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and

transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Bergmann,

710 F. Supp. 2d at 75. The strong local interest in deciding this controversy in the Southern

District of Indiana weights these factors in favor of transfer.

       The first factor is neutral because “all federal courts should have the requisite familiarity

with federal law.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewel, 74 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing In re

Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also W.

Watersheds Project v. Pool, 942 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Judges in both districts are

presumed to be equally familiar with the federal laws governing this dispute, and thus this factor

is not germane since no state law claims are at issue.). Defendants argue that the proposed

transferee court “might be more familiar with this particular APA case only because nearly all

inmates, housed at Terre Haute Complex like Agofsky, file their grievances with the court in the

Transferee District, and therefore that Court is used to handling each specific circumstance

related to inmates at Terre Haute Complex.” Defs.’ Mot. at 25. Plaintiff argues that no local or

unique circumstances are raised by his suit. Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. While it is true that courts in this

District consider “whether one circuit is more familiar with the same parties and issues or related

issues than other courts,” State, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 68, it appears that two iterations of the

“virtually indistinguishable” suit by Daniel Troya were brought in both the Southern District of

Indiana and this District. Defs.’ Reply at 4–6. While the proposed transferee court may be more

familiar with potential witnesses who live and work at FCC Terre Haute and the procedures that

govern the complex, the court cannot say that the transferee court is more familiar with these

parties and these issues.

                                           Page 12 of 16
        With regard to the second factor, the court is not moved by the purported faster resolution

in this court versus the Southern District of Indiana. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. While Plaintiff is

correct that the median time from filing to disposition for civil cases in the Southern District of

Indiana is greater than this court’s median time of 4.7 months, the gap is not as wide as Plaintiff

suggests. See U.S. District Court— Federal Court Management Statistics, September 2023,

available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2023.pdf

(median time to disposition for civil cases in Southern District of Indiana 9.6 months). “Such

statistics, stripped of any context, do not tell the court much about the relative congestion and

complexity of the districts' respective dockets.” Accurso, 2018 WL 4964501, at *3. Nor do they

consider the particular docket of this court and its upcoming trial calendar. Nonetheless, the

court acknowledges that this factor weighs against transfer.

        Finally, the third and “most importan[t]” public interest factor favors transfer. Bourdon

v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298 (D.D.C. 2017). As a general

matter, courts have “a strong interest in having plaintiff’s claims ‘resolved in the locale where

they arise’” and so look to the location “of the operative events.” Treppel v. Reason, 793 F.

Supp. 2d 429, 439-40 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 944 F.

Supp. 13, 19 (D.D.C. 1996)). That remains true even where, as here, a plaintiff invokes federal

law or argues that a national policy is at stake. See, e.g., City of W. Palm Beach v. United States

Army Corps of Engineers, 317 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.D.C. 2018); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey,

437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2006). Courts in this District have transferred cases challenging

both conditions of incarceration and those conditions’ underlying policies to the facility’s

district, reasoning that while the “existence of a national policy issue . . . is a factor to be

considered,” where a “Plaintiff raises claims ‘related to his particular circumstances,’” it is

                                             Page 13 of 16
primarily “the implementation of policy . . . at issue,” and “venue is more appropriately laid” in

the district of incarceration. Huskey v. Quinlan, 785 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Starnes,

512 F.2d at 929).

        Courts consider a wide variety of factors to determine whether a controversy is local in

nature, including “where the challenged decision was made; whether the decision directly

affected the citizens of the transferee state; the location of the controversy, . . . whether the

controversy has some national significance; and whether there was personal involvement by a

District of Columbia official.” Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 308. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s injuries arose in the proposed transferee district, and that the security considerations

underlying whether Plaintiff’s spouse may visit him raise safety and security threats that are

clearly relevant to the transferee district. Defs.’ Mot. at 26. Plaintiff argues that “this is a case

largely about policymaking by D.C.-based officials that has potentially national implications,”

and therefore the third factor “tips sharply against transfer.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 22 (quoting Stewart

v. Azar, 308 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (D.D.C. 2018)).

        Plaintiff’s argument rests on the premise that BOP officials wrought a wholesale change

to BOP regulations. But, as explained above, the court cannot assess whether BOP changed its

practice without evaluating the administrative record. Supra at 6. Regardless, it is clear that

Plaintiff’s requested remedy will affect the Warden’s discretion in conducting investigations that

impact the safety and security of the communities surrounding FCC Terre Haute and the

complex itself. Defs.’ Mot. at 18, 21, 26. It is equally clear that Plaintiff’s injuries arose in

Terre Haute, and that his requested remedy will be felt in Terre Haute. See Bourdon, 235 F.

Supp. 3d at 309 (“Plaintiff asks this Court to compel action—the approval of Plaintiff's petition

for his wife—that would occur in Florida.”). As explained above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated

                                            Page 14 of 16
that officials residing in the District of Columbia were personally involved in the challenged

decision. See Jordan, 2022 WL 579442, at *7 (requiring “more of a connection to this District

than the axiomatic denial of the third stage of an administrative appeal by the BOP Central

Office”); see also State, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 64. Taken together, these factors weigh in favor of a

local controversy, and the court weighs this most important factor toward transfer.

                                          *       *         *

       The D.C. Circuit has warned courts to “examine challenges to . . . venue carefully to

guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia.”

Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). On this record, the court is not

persuaded that the requisite ties to this District outweigh those to the transferee court even if

Plaintiff ultimately proves that Defendants instituted a national policy change. The court has

carefully weighed the private and public interest factors and finds that while the balance is not

heavily tilted, it nonetheless weighs in favor of transfer.

       Finding that this case could have been brought in the Southern District of Indiana and

that the private and public interest weighs in favor of transferring the case there, the court will

grant Defendants’ motion to transfer. Accordingly, the court will not address the merits of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and will deny the motion without prejudice to it

being refiled in the transferee court. See Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 309.

                                            Page 15 of 16
                               IV.    CONCLUSION

       For the reasons above, the court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Transfer, ECF No.

16, and DENY without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 5. A

corresponding Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: February 2, 2024

                                              Tanya S. Chutkan
                                              TANYA S. CHUTKAN
                                              United States District Judge

                                       Page 16 of 16