Court Opinion

ID: 9827381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:28:26.310992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:29.925599
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[2-5] The trade between appellant and appellee was agreed upon in November, 1910, but the deed from appellee to appellant conveying the Reagan county land was not made until the December following, and the deed from appellant to appellee conveying the Cooke county land was not made until March, 1911. Appellant took no steps to ascertain anything about- the Reagan county land until after he had conveyed the Cooke county land to appellant. He then ascertained by going to the land that it was not all good, smooth land, that it was not fenced on its west side, and that it did not have either a well, windmill, or tank on it. Thereupon he wrote appellee, complaining that the land, etc., was not as he had represented same to be, and afterwards called upon appellee to talk with him about the matter. In the motion appellant calls attention to his testimony as a witness, as follows, as to what then occurred: “When I got there I asked him if he got my letter, and he said yes, and he wrote me an answer and sent it to my attorneys, and his attorney had forbid him talking to me with regard to the land, and I told him then that the land was not as represented, and that for his own protection he ought to go back on the man he traded with, and I offered to go with him to his lawyer, and he wouldn’t do it, and I offered to take him out to the land and if it wasn’t as represented I would pay all expenses. He said that wasn’t his lookout.” It is insisted that the testimony quoted shows that appellee, when advised by appellant that the land was not as he had represented it to be, refused to talk .about it, declaring it “wasn’t his lookout,” and that his conduct in this respect, and failure to testify as a witness and disclose the source of the information he claimed to have had as to the character of the land and improvements on it, would have warranted a finding that lie had “intentionally practiced a fraud upon the appellant” It is further insisted that this view of the case is strengthened by the testimony of several witnesses who lived near the land, showing conclusively that it was not all good, smooth land, and did not have either a well, windmill, or tank on it; the argument being that appellee could not have been informed by reliable parties, as he claimed he had been, that the land was as he represented it to be, when the truth was that it was not all good, smooth land, and did not have a well, windmill, or tank oh it. But for other testimony which should be considered in connection with that appellant *376refers to, we would agree with him in the contention he makes. The land in Reagan county conveyed to appellant was known as section 69. Its west line was the east line of section 70, which adjoined it on the east. The two sections were fenced together. There was a division fence between them, but, Instead of being on the boundary line between them, it was on section 70, from 50 to 100 yards west of said boundary line. On that part of section 70 lying between said division fence and said boundary line was a well, windmill, and tank. Witnesses for appellant testified that the land was “comparatively smooth,” that it “would not be termed rough land,” and appellant himself testified that 60 per cent, of it was smooth land. This testimony we think indicates that appellee could very well have been informed by reliable men, as he claimed he had been, that the land was good, smooth land, and had a well, windmill, and tank on it. From the existence and position of the division fence such men might in good faith have concluded that the well, windmill, and tank were on section 69, and that all the-land was good, smooth land, as 60 per cent, of it in fact was. Moreover, appellant, testified that appellee “probably told him who the people were” that furnished him the information about the land, and' stated to him that he “would get the depositions of other parties” showing the character, etc., thereof, “and,” he testified, “it seems like he did.” It would seem therefore that appellee not only did not refuse to disclose the source of his information as to the land, but, on the contrary, advised appellant thereof.- And from other portions of appellant’s testimony as a witness than that referred to in his motion, it appears that he had commenced his suit against appellee at the time he testified appellee refused to talk with him; 'and it further appears that appel-lee did then talk with him about the controversy, for appellant further testified as follows: “He (appellee) just told me that you lawyers' didn’t allow him to talk to me about it, but that if it wasn’t all right he would make it good; if that land and improvements wasn’t all right he would make it good.” In view of. the testimony referred to, we think the jury would not have been authorized to infer, from the testimony appellant calls attention to, that appellee had not been informed by reliable parties that the land, etc., was as he had represented same to be, and therefore are of the opinion the testimony as- a whole was not sufficient to support a finding that appellee had “intentionally practiced a fraud upon appellant.”' However, we do not understand the law to be that appellee must have been guilty of afi intentional wrong to entitle appellant to relief by rescission. On the contrary, we understand thé rúle to be that he was entitled to such relief if he was induced to convey the Cooke county land to appellee in reliance on a false representation made by ap-pellee as to the character, etc., of the Reagan county land, notwithstanding appellee at the time he made it believed the representation to be true and was innocent of any intention to do wrong. But the false representation must not have been as to a mere matter of opinion. If the conclusion reached that the testimony was not sufficient to support a finding that appellee had not been informed by reliable parties that the Reagan county land was as he had represented it to appellant to be is correct, then we are of the opinion that the remainder of the representation was the mere expression by appellee of an opinion, and was so understood to be by appellant. Appellant testified he had engaged in the real estate business during a number of years, and, continuing, said: “He (appellee) told me that he knew nothing about it (the Reagan county land) himself personally, never had been on it, but he guaranteed it. * * *
I made the trade really on Mr. Aldridge’s guaranty; that is what I relied on. I would never have traded for the land if he had not given me this written guaranty.” This testimony, other testimony hereinbefore referred to, and that set out in the opinion of the court heretofore filed, we think, showed conclusively that appellee’s statement as to the character of the Reagan county land and the improvements on it was a mere expression of his opinion based on information obtained from other parties, and was treated as such by appellee. Because he knew nothing about the land, knew appellee knew nothing about it, and knew if he relied on appellee’s opinion merely as to its character, etc., he would not be entitled to rescind the contract he was then about to enter into, appellant, no doubt, demanded the written guaranty he referred to. That guaranty was that if the land was not as appellee had represented it to be he would “make same come up to” his representations. This, we think, meant that, if it should turn out that the land was not as represented, appellee was to pay appellant in money a sum representing the difference between the value thereof if same had been as represented and its value as it really was. In other words, we think the contract between the parties in effect was that there should not be a rescission if thé Reagan county land proved to be different from what they thought it was, but, instead, that appellant should be indemnified by appellee in money against any damage he might suffer because it was not as they believed it to be.
[6, 7] From testimony of appellant as a witness and recitals in his deed conveying the Cooke county land to appellee, it appeared that the latter as a part of the consideration for the conveyance to him assumed the payment of indebtedness of the former to third parties amounting to $6,000, secured by liens on the land. In his answer appellee'alleged that he had paid to third parties $2,185 on *377account of “incumbrances on the land.” The incumbrances referred to are not further described, but they probably were a part of those he had assumed to pay. In a supplemental petition appellant denied that appel-lee had paid anything to third parties on account of incumbrances on the land, averred, however, if he had, that the payment was a voluntary one on his part, but asserted, nevertheless, a willingness on his (appellant’s) part to repay to him any sum he had paid on account of such incumbrances. Appellant in his pleadings alleged no facts showing ap-pellee in any way to have been relieved of the obligation he had assumed to pay his indebtedness to third parties, and appellee in his pleadings said nothing about the obligation he had so assumed, unless the allegation about his payment of $2,185 on account of incumbrances on the land, mentioned above, referred to same. Neither party offered any testimony in regard to this feature of the case. In this attitude of the record, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should have been affirmed, if for no other reason, because it did not appear, if a rescission had been decreed, the parties could have been placed in the position they were in before the contract was executed, but, instead, appeared that if a rescission had been decreed and the title to the Cooke county land revested in appellant, appellee still would have been liable to the third parties for the indebtedness of appellant to them which he had assumed to pay. This view of the case is based on the ruling in Hill v. Hoeldtke (Sup.) 142 S. W. 871, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, affirming Hoeldtke v. Horstman, 12S S. W. 642, according to which appellee could not, without the consent of the owners of the indebtedness he had assumed to pay, have been relieved of liability therefor. There was no testimony showing such consent, and no offer by appellant to indemnify appellee against his liability to the owners of the indebtedness.
The motion is overruled.