Court Opinion

ID: 9411106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 19:15:37.248575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:04.152941
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00586-CV

                       IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF Robert HAMPTON

                     From the 81st Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. CVW2000455
                            Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting:          Irene Rios, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 19, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Robert Hampton appeals the trial court’s judgment declaring him a sexually violent

predator and civilly committing him. We affirm the judgment.

                                            BACKGROUND

           In 1990, Hampton pleaded guilty to one charge of rape and one charge of sodomy of a

fourteen-year-old girl, C.B., in Jackson County, Oregon. The Oregon court sentenced Hampton to

three years’ probation. Hampton’s probation was subsequently revoked, and he spent six months

in an Oregon state jail.

           In 1995, Hampton pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of his four-year-old daughter, L.H., in

Oregon. He was again sentenced to three years’ probation, and his probation was again revoked,
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leading to a six-month jail sentence. During the trial in this case, Hampton admitted that he

“absconded” from Oregon after the second revocation.

       In 1996, in a case involving an eleven-year-old girl, R.S., Hampton pleaded no contest to

aggravated sexual assault of a child and injury to a child in Wilson County, Texas. The Wilson

County court sentenced Hampton to thirty-five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. Hampton was serving that sentence at the time of the trial in this case.

       On July 13, 2020, the State of Texas filed a petition alleging that Hampton was a sexually

violent predator as defined by Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. On June 13,

2022, a Wilson County jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hampton was a sexually violent

predator, and the trial court signed a final judgment and order of civil commitment consistent with

the jury’s verdict. Hampton filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Hampton

now appeals.

                                             ANALYSIS

                             Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code establishes procedures for the civil

commitment of persons found to be “sexually violent predators.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.153. “A person is a sexually violent predator for the purposes of [Chapter

841] if the person: (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a behavioral

abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a). “A person is a repeat sexually violent offender” if he

has been “convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence is imposed for at

least one of the offenses[.]” Id. § 841.003(b). A “behavioral abnormality” that will support a

sexually violent predator finding is “a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s

emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to

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the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.” TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(2). “The U.S. Supreme Court requires the State to prove

that a respondent has ‘serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior’ in order to civilly commit

him under any SVP statute.” In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 552 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 543 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).

       Hampton does not challenge the jury’s finding that he “is a repeat sexually violent

offender.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.003(a)(1), (b). However, he argues the evidence

presented at trial was factually insufficient to support a behavioral abnormality finding. See id.

§§ 841.003(a)(2), 841.002(2).

       In reviewing such a factual sufficiency challenge to a sexually violent predator finding, we

must “determine whether, on the entire record, a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is” a sexually violent predator as defined by Chapter 841. In

re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tex. 2020). We “may not usurp the jury’s role

of determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony,” and we

must presume the jury “resolved disputed evidence in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder

could do so.” Id.; see also In re Commitment of Brown, 656 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2022, no pet.) (jury may disregard testimony it does not find credible). We may not reverse the

finding on factual insufficiency grounds unless the “evidence contrary to the finding is so

significant in light of the entire record that the factfinder could not have determined beyond a

reasonable doubt that its finding was true[.]” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 668.

                                           Application

       At trial, the jury heard testimony from Hampton and a forensic psychologist, Jason

Dunham. The jury also saw records of Hampton’s Oregon and Texas convictions.

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       Hampton testified that he began committing crimes when he was a teenager and that he

had been arrested multiple times for crimes such as burglary, public intoxication, and forgery. He

told the jury he had used and sold drugs, that he had problems with alcohol and committed crimes

while he was drinking, and that he had been convicted of furnishing alcohol to C.B. and two other

minors. He testified he had been “clean and sober” since he went to prison in 1996. He admitted,

however, that he had “tasted alcohol” during his time in prison even though he knew he was not

allowed to drink. He also admitted that he had been subject to disciplinary action approximately

fourteen times during his twenty-seven years in prison.

       Hampton acknowledged that he had been convicted of sexual offenses against C.B., L.H.,

and R.S. He told the jury that he pleaded guilty to the charges involving C.B. “because I did that.”

He also claimed, however, that he believed C.B. was over eighteen at the time and that he did not

remember any details of the assault on her. He told the jury that he did not believe he would have

assaulted C.B. if he had not been drinking and using drugs at that time. While Hampton admitted

that he pleaded guilty to the charges involving L.H. and no contest to the charges involving R.S.,

he claimed he did not remember assaulting either L.H. or R.S. He acknowledged that he gave

alcohol to both C.B. and R.S. before the events that led to his convictions. He also conceded that

he gave so much alcohol to R.S. that he was ultimately convicted of injury to a child.

       Hampton denied that he is sexually attracted to underage girls. He testified that he was

“[a]bsolutely ashamed” of his offenses and that he had “really matured in prison[.]” He also

testified that he had completed a nine-month sex offender treatment program, as well as several

religious programs and courses in prison.

       Dunham testified that he performed a “behavioral abnormality assessment” that included a

two-and-a-half-hour interview with Hampton; a review of “[p]olice reports, victim statements,

court documents, prison records”; a conversation with Hampton’s sex offense treatment provider;

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and standard psychological tests. Dunham also considered “protective factors” in his evaluation,

such as Hampton’s age and his completion of a sex offender treatment program. Dunham told the

jury that during his career as a forensic psychologist, he had performed 288 similar evaluations in

Texas and another 68 evaluations in Washington.

       Dunham testified that it was important for him to review records of Hampton’s past

behavior because “you look at patterns of behavior. If you’re looking to see what’s going to happen

in the future, look at what’s happened in the past.” He noted that “the more information and the

more things that are consistently lining up in the past, the more accurate you feel about what you

believe is going to happen in the future.”

       Based on his evaluation, Dunham diagnosed Hampton with pedophilic disorder, which he

described as a “sexual deviance” that caused Hampton to be sexually attracted to children. Dunham

testified that sexual deviance like pedophilia is generally a congenital or acquired condition, and

he opined that the condition had affected Hampton’s emotional and volitional capacity to safely

function in society. He explained that many people who are sexually attracted to children are never

diagnosed with pedophilia because those people are able to “control their desires. They control

what they’re aroused to if they know that it’s wrong or they’ll get in trouble for [it].” He explained

that Hampton, in contrast, “has acted on his thoughts. He has acted on his desires, and he’s

offended against children based on that condition that he has.” He noted that Hampton had

committed sexual offenses against children multiple times, even after he had been prosecuted and

punished for those actions. Dunham opined that Hampton would sexually assault children again if

he were released.

       Dunham also diagnosed Hampton with antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy,

which he identified as “an extreme version of antisocial personality disorder.” He described

antisocial personality disorder as manifesting in “lawbreaking behavior, like a consistent pattern

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of violating the laws of society, the norms of society, the rights of others[.]” As support for his

conclusion that Hampton met the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, Dunham

noted Hampton’s “nonsexual and sexual criminal history” going back to his teenage years. He

testified that Hampton’s documented parole and probation violations were “very significant”

because those violations showed that Hampton was not “able to follow the most structured of rules

that are out there.” Dunham described antisocial personality disorder as “persistent” and stated the

disorder “changes over time but it doesn’t go away.” He noted that Hampton’s antisocial

personality disorder appeared to have “changed as he’s gotten older but it hasn’t gone away.”

       Dunham evaluated Hampton under the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, which he

described as “pretty much mandated in our profession to measure how psychopathic somebody

is.” Dunham told the jury that “the higher somebody is in psychopathy,” the more likely that person

is to reoffend. He noted that Hampton scored a twenty-eight, which he identified as “within the

high range.” Dunham testified that Hampton’s level of “criminal versatility” was an important

factor in his score, because “six or more categories [of criminal offenses], that’s like the highest

you can rate that item of psychopathy.” He explained that Hampton’s records showed “eight

different categories” of criminal offenses.

       Dunham testified that it is rare for a person to have both pedophilic disorder and a high

range of psychopathic traits. He testified that where, as here, a person “meets the criteria for

pedophilia and they’re not just antisocial but psychopathic, that’s a pretty dangerous

combination . . . they’re at risk for seriously harming children and in this case I’ve seen that.”

       Dunham also evaluated Hampton using a test called the Static 99R. He described the Static

99R as “the most widely used test that’s being given right now, and it covers some important risk

factors” such as “[p]rior sex offenses, charges and convictions, victim characteristics.” Hampton’s

score on the Static 99R was three, which Dunham described as “within the average risk category

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of being reconvicted of a sex offense within a certain number of years.” As one of our sister courts

recently recognized, however, “civil commitments have been upheld even when the person scored

a zero on the STATIC-99R.” In re Commitment of Renshaw, 598 S.W.3d 303, 313 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (citing In re Commitment of Ramshur, No. 09-17-00286-CV, 2018 WL

6367529, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Dunham noted,

moreover, that Hampton scored a three overall even after he received a three-point deduction due

to his age. 1 Dunham testified that he believed the Static 99R score underestimated Hampton’s risk

of reoffending in the future. See id.

         Dunham described Hampton’s pattern of pedophilia and antisocial behavior as “something

that doesn’t go away. It’s lifelong.” He told the jury that based on his evaluation, he believed

Hampton had a behavioral abnormality that made him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual

violence. He reached this conclusion based on Hampton’s “pattern of behavior, the offending after

being, you know, imprisoned for sex offending in the past, having very little time in society,

reoffending back into prison or being locked up probably within a few weeks after being let out of

the Oregon prison, just being unable to control the behavior when in society.” He explained that

“most sex offenders do not reoffend” but noted that Hampton “within like a few months of getting

released from prison for a sex offense, [was] sexually offending again and in a very dangerous

way.” Dunham further noted that he had reviewed records showing both C.B. and R.S. were

unconscious when Hampton assaulted them and that both offenses occurred under circumstances

where Hampton’s actions “could be easily detected.” He also testified that based on both his

interview with Hampton and what he heard during Hampton’s trial testimony, he believed

1
  Hampton was sixty-three years old at the time of trial. Dunham explained that “[Hampton’s] age is a protective
factor, statistically” because “generally around age 60 and above you start to see some decline, especially for child
molesting.”

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Hampton tended to justify, minimize, and rationalize his past behavior. See, e.g., In re Commitment

of Brown, 656 S.W.3d at 432–33 (respondent’s “minimization of his sexual attraction to his

victims” supported jury’s sexually violent predator finding). Dunham testified these factors

showed Hampton could not control his impulses.

       Hampton complains on appeal that the evidence of his past behavior does not support a

finding that he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality. He also argues Dunham’s

testimony merely established “that Hampton has not managed his condition in the past,” and he

contends the evidence did not establish that he currently has a serious problem in controlling his

behavior. However, Dunham testified that Hampton’s pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder,

and psychopathy are “chronic,” “lifelong” conditions that do not “go away.” Dunham also testified

that the rationalizing Hampton engaged in showed Hampton “doesn’t understand” the risk he poses

to children. He opined that Hampton’s minimization of his past behavior rendered him unable to

“really move on to the next steps which would be victim empathy and relapse prevention until you

truly understand why you did what you did[.]” He added that Hampton had not shown any signs

of applying what he learned in the sex offender treatment program, explaining, “[T]here’s a wall

there that I don’t think that he’s gotten through.”

       Because the jury found Hampton was a sexually violent predator, we must presume it

credited Dunham’s testimony over Hampton’s. See, e.g., In re Commitment of King, 657 S.W.3d

16, 29–30 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied). Dunham testified that his opinions were based

on standard methodology and he explained the bases for his opinions to the jury. In re Commitment

of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 217 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). After reviewing the entire

record under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the evidence the jury could not have

reasonably credited in favor of the behavioral abnormality finding was not “so significant that the

jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [Hampton] suffered from the requisite

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behavioral abnormality that made him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” In

re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 677. Accordingly, the evidence was factually sufficient

to support the jury’s finding. See id.

       We overrule Hampton’s sole issue.

                                         CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Beth Watkins, Justice

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