Court Opinion

ID: 9673962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:12.336553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:38.221437
License: Public Domain

*304HOLLINGSWORTH, J.
This is an appeal from a conviction in the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction by which defendant-appellant (hereinafter designated as defendant) was adjudged to pay a fine of one hundred dollars for violation of Section 11785, Mo. R. S. A. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. The two questions for determination are whether (a) the facts support the verdict and (b) whether that part.of the section under which defendant was convicted is violatiA^e of the constitutional rights of defendant as guaranteed it under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Missouri.
Section. 11785, enacted in 1897 (Laws 1897 [Section 1] p. 108), reads: “Any person entitled to vote at any election in this state shall, on the day of such election, .be entitled to.absent himself from any services or employment in which he is then engaged or employed, for a period of four hours between the times of opening and closing the polls; and such voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty: Provided, however, that his employer may specify the hours during which such employee may absent himself as aforesaid. Any person or corporation who shall refuse to any employee the privilege hereby conferred, or shall discharge- or threaten to discharge any employee for absenting himself from his work for the purpose of said election, or shall cause any employee to suffer any penalty or deduction of wages because of. the exercise of such privilege, or who shall, directly or indirectly, violate the provisions of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, * *
The information, as originally filed, charged defendant in count one with refusing to permit its employee (Fred C. Grotemeyer) to absent himself from his employment for a period of four hours *305between the time of opening and closing of the polls on the general election day of November 5, 1946; in count two with penalizing him by deducting from his salary the amount of his earnings for the time he was absent from his work on that day. Defendant’s conviction under count two is the basis of this appeal. For a history of the case prior to this appeal, see State v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 220 S. W. 2d 782.
Defendant, a Missouri corporation, operated a manufacturing plant in the City of St. Louis and its products “moved in interstate commerce”. Fred O. Grotemeyer was and for several years prior to November 5, 1946, had been in its employ. He was a member of Local No. 1, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which had a contract with defendant covering wages, hours and other working conditions of its employees. A work week consisted of forty hours, divided into five eight hour days. Grotemeyer was paid on an hourly basis at the rate of $1.60 per hour for each hour worked. His work day began at 8 :00 a. m. and closed at 4:30 p. m., with a lunch period of thirty minutes from 12:00 to 12:30 noon. He was to receive pay only for hours actually worked. The rules of defendant provided that no employee, except in cases of sickness or emergency, should be absent from work without permission.
On the day prior to the general election of November 5, 1946, Grotemeyer, who was qualified to vote in that election, asked permission to absent himself for a period of four hours between the beginning and end of his scheduled work day “to do campaigning, to vote and to get out the vote”. This specific request was refused, but defendant on that day posted on its bulletin board a notice permitting all employees on the day shift (including Grotemeyer) to take time oft' to vote at 3 :00 p. m., on November 5th. This was one and one-half hours earlier than Grotemeyer’s work day normally Would end, but it did permit him to absent himself from his employment for four consecutive hours between the opening and closing of the polls, which were 6 :00 a. m. and 7:00 p. m. On November 5th, Grotemeyer absented himself from his employment at 3:00 p. m. and thereafter voted. He was paid by defendant only for those hours worked on November 5th, to-wit: six and one-half hours, or the time from 8:00 a. m. to 3:00 p. m., less the thirty minute lunch period.
One hundred fifty-eight of defendant’s employees worked at an average hourly rate of $1,089 from 8:00 a. m. to 4:30 p. m.; fifty-eight employees worked at an average hourly rate of $1.03 from 7:0O a. m. to 3:30 p. m., and seven employees worked at an average hourly rate of $.8646 from 7:00 a. m. to 3:00 p. m. The total amount of wages paid all employees for not working, if all took four hours off from the scheduled work day to vote, would be $951.42, and four hours of production loss amounting to $7138.00 would have resulted. In April, 1949, there were 230,600 hourly-paid employees in the State of Mis*306souri engaged in manufacturing industries and 729,600 employees in non-manufacturing industries, and the average hourly earnings of these employees in manufacturing industries was $1,302.
Defendant’s first contention is that under the agreed statement of facts no violation of Section 11785 was shown. Its argument runs in this wise: “It is not charged defendant threatened to discharge or did discharge Grotemeyer or subject him to any penalty or deduction of wages earned because of the exercise of the privilege of voting. Grotemeyer was paid the amount due him for the work he did for Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. He was not penalized for voting or for taking time off for voting. ’ ’
This contention is not sound. It is the clear intendment of the act that the employee shall be paid during his authorized absence as though he had worked. Otherwise, of course, there could be neither penalty nor deduction. It would be an impossibility for the two necessary elements of the offense, to-wit: absence from work and deduction of wages during such absence, ever to come into coexistence under defendant’s contention. Regardless of the validity of the act on constitutional grounds, its meaning is clear and the deduction of one and one-half hours from Grotemeyer’s wages was a violation of its terms.
The grounds on which defendant challenges the constitutionality of Section 11785 are: (1) violation of the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States, as defined in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution of the State of Missouri, as defined in Section 10 of Article I; (2) denial of the equal protection of the laws to all persons within its jurisdiction, as defined in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri; (3) impairment of the obligation of contracts as guaranteed by Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States and Section 13 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri; and (4) violation of Section 28 of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri of 1875, and of Section 23 of Article III of the Constitution of Missouri of 1945, which provide that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. (There is another general claim of unconstitutionality which we consider inadequate and which is disposed of later herein.).
The state contends defendant has not properly raised the question of constitutionality. Each of these grounds, with the exception mentioned, was set forth with particularity in a timely motion to quash, the motion for new trial, and in defendant’s brief. That is sufficient. Section 4125, Mo. R. S. A.; State v. Hammer, 333 Mo. 40, 61 S. W. 2d 965, 966. Especially is this true where it Is evident from the entire record that the only issue before either the trial court or this court, except that the facts did not support the verdict, was *307the constitutionality of that part of the section under which defendant was charged. City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 685, 216 S. W. 2d 475, 477.
It is apparent that Section 1.1785 is violative of the due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions unless its enactment is within the police power of the State.
The State has placed in its brief a tabulation of statutes, dealing with the right of employees to absent themselves on election days. Sixteen states make it unlawful for the employer to dock the employee’s wages during such absence, to-wit: Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia and AVyoming. Colorado and Utah statutes provide that there shall be no dockage except when the employee is paid by the hour. Six states authorize absence of the employee on election days, with no provision for payment of wages. Illinois and Kentucky statutes relating to the same subject matter have been held unconstitutional. A New York statute has been held constitutional.
Defendant strongly relies upon the case of People v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N. E. 155, 28 A. L. R. 610. It held unconstitutional a statute similar to Section 11785 on grounds that it deprived the employer of its property without due process of law, denied equal protection of the laws and was an unreasonable abridgement of the right to contract. That opinion was written in 1923. It is interesting to note that in 1944, the same court, referring to its .1923 opinion, commented: “It is urged that the State may not take private property nor money for a private use * * *, and the case of People v. Chicago, M. and St. P. R. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N. E. 155, 158, 28 A. L. R. 610, is cited in support of such contention. * * * However, this [pay-while-voting] statute, re-enacted and amended from time to time, still contains this provision providing for the right of any citizen to be paid for the time consumed in exercising his right to vote. * * * The growing complexity of our economic interests has inevitably led to an increased use of regulatory measures in order to protect the individual so that the public good is reassured by safeguarding the economic structure upon which the good of all depends.” Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 56 N. E. 2d 754, 757.
Defendant also cites the case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 204 S. W. 2d 973, in which the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held a pay-while-voting statute of that state unconstitutional. The decision in this case was based on the 1923 Illinois decision. It extols at great length the sanctity of the voting privilege and holds constitutional that part of the statute giving the employee the right to absent himself for a period of four hours on election day, but condemns as violative of due process the part making it a misdemeanor to withhold his wages for so doing.
*308The opinion states: “The Commonwealth makes the contention that onr legislative authority had a right, under the exercise of its police power, to adopt the law in- question, since its adoption was in the interest of the general welfare of the public. * * * However, we have said that the legislative authority may not, under the guise of promoting public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business. City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 284 Ky. 684, 145 S. W. 2d 851. And it is always appropriate to remember that the police power is not. without its limitations, since clearly it may not unreasonably invade and violate those private rights which are guaranteed under either federal or state constitution. 11 Am. Jur. 992.” Thus, the opinion goes from premise to conclusion, with no statement of the reasoning by which it was reached. It is not helpful.
As against the Illinois and Kentucky cases, the state cites the case of People v. Ford Motor Co., decided by Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in 1946, 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 697. That case held constitutional a New York statute which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse an employee the privilege of voting or to deduct from his wages for exercising the privilege. We quote portions of it:. “The statutes in question, in force for more than half a century, deal directly with a detail as to the exercise of the elective franchise — -a subject matter which, under our form of government, is in itself a primary act of sovereignty. To take measures to insure the full and free performance of that act is therefore in the interest of the general welfare, and as such may be said to call forth ‘society’s natural right of self defense’ which is inherent in sovereignty itself and which has been generally termed the police power. * * *
“An employer-employee relationship may be said to have in it such a power of dominance on the part of the employer as is capable of thwarting the wholesome exercise of the right to vote at an election. The fact that such abuses have occurred is historical. To avoid such evils, to encourage the right of suffrage, to keep it pristine and render it efficient — all this pertains to the public welfare and, in the attainment of those objectives, the burden which the statutes cast upon all in the role of an employer is one lawfully placed in a design for the common good, and the burden is so slight that it may not be said to be unduly oppressive. That the burden may bear unequally does not render its placement unlawful. ’ ’
A precise definition of police power is not found. “It is not susceptible of circumstantial precision because none can foresee the ever-changing conditions which call for its exercise. Moreover, it has been held that these conditions render it inadvisable, to define the power accurately.” 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 246, pp. 970, 971.
‘■‘Judge- Cooley says that the police power of a state ‘embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the state, *309but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others,’ and the courts have quoted this definition with approval many times. Finally, it has been said that by means of this power the legislature exercises a supervision over matters involving the common welfare and enforces the observance,' by each individual member of society, of the duties which he owes to others and to the community at large.” Id. § 247, pp. 972, 973.
Discussing police power, this court said in Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808, 818, 203 S. W. 2d 734, 739: “Section 3, Article I, states that the police power of the state remains exclusively in the people; and Section 3, Article XI, provides that ‘the exercise of the police power of the state shall-never be surrendered’. It is a familiar principle that ‘the state constitution is not a grant of power, but only a limitation, as far as the legislature is concerned’; and, therefore, except for the limitations imposed thereby ‘the power of a state legislature is unlimited and practically absolute’. 11 Am. Jur. 894, Sec. 193.”
The police power of the state is frequently invoked in legislation relating to the economic and physical welfare and safety of employees and the public in general, all of which are an expense to the employer or the manufacturer; and such legislation is uniformly held constitutional in principle. Some of them are: workmen’s compensation laws, unemployment compensation laws, semimonthly payment of wage laws, minimum wage and hour laws, Sunday labor laws, and the great multiplicity of safety and health laws. See cases referred to in State v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra, 1. c. 784; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245; Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279, 109 A. L. R. 1293; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112.
If the economic and physical welfare of the citizenry is within the police power of the state, then political welfare merits its protection also. The right of universal suffrage is the attribute of sovereignty of a free people. We accept as a verity that “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty”. For the vast majority the only opportunity to exercise that vigilance is in the polling place.
“That every citizen should be given both the right and the opportunity to vote is a matter of public interest, and any law having for its purpose the guarantee of such right and opportunity should be upheld if it is possible to do so. Such we take it was the legislative purpose of the enactment of Section 11785. And the purpose or legislative intent was not to financially enrich the voter or to place an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the employer. * * *” State v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra, 1. c. 785.
*310Appellant argues that: ‘ ‘ The Company is deprived of property of two kinds under this Statute. It is deprived of tangible property, that is, money that it is forced to pay to its employees for work not performed and for which the Company receives nothing. * * * If all employees were granted four hours off with pay from the scheduled work day it would cost the Company in this case $951.42 by way of pay to its employees and an additional sum of $7138.00 for loss of production.”
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the act is thereby rendered unconstitutional. The figures quoted above have little probative value. They do not show, nor is there any evidence tending to show — either percentage-wise or otherwise — , their relationship to the overall cost of defendant’s products.
In a well documented article on the subject of “Pay While Voting” in the Columbia Law Review of 1947, page 140, the writer makes this statement: “Whatever may be the wisdom of pay while voting statutes, they do not appear so arbitrary or unreasonable as to violate due process requirements. The burden imposed on the employer is relatively slight and the interest subserved, the right to vote, relatively high. ’ ’
When we consider the infrequency with which elections are held in comparison with the total working days in a calendar year, we cannot say as a matter of law that the economic burden placed on employers by this statute is unreasonable.
To secure the free and open elections guaranteed by our State Constitutions (Constitution of 1875, Sec. 9, Art. II; Constitution of 1945, Sec. 25, Art. I), the' General Assembly enacted legislation (Laws 1893, p. 157) to prevent corrupt practices in elections. Section 11785 was not in that act, but in, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 108) it was amended to include the present Sections 11785 to 11787. The Legislature, in effect, thereby declared that in order to more adequately secure free and open elections it was expedient to require employers to afford their employees not only an opportunity to vote but also that they might exercise that right without penalty or deprivation of wages.
In determining whether a statute is constitutional it is not the province of courts to determine its wisdom or adequacy. “The basic principles that courts only look to the constitutionality of legislation, and not to its propriety, justice, wisdom, necessity, expediency, or policy have constantly been applied in cases involving police regulations. If an act had a real and substantial relation to the police power, then no matter how unreasonable or how unwise the measure itself may be, it is not for the judicial tribunals to avoid or vacate it upon constitutional grounds.” 11 Am. Jur. § 306, p. 1089.
“If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may constitutionally rest the court must assume that the legislature had such fact in mind and passed the act pursuant thereto. All facts necessary to sustain the act must be taken as conclusively found by *311the legislature, if any such facts may be reasonably conceived in the mind of the court. * * * ‘Nor do the courts have to be sure of the precise reasons for the legislation, or certainly know them, or be convinced of the wisdom or adequacy of the laws. ’ ’ ’ Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 1147, 125 S. W. 2d 23, 31.
We conclude that the provisions of Section 11785 are within the police power of the state and do not violate the due process clauses of either the Federal or State Constitutions.
Defendant invokes the last clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution which forbids any state to deprive any person the equal protection of the laws (and refers to Section 14, Article I, Constitution of Missouri as a corollary). The cases cited in its brief support the principle announced in the amendment, but they are not decisive of the question involved here. They are: Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254; Frost v. The Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. Ed. 483; State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507; State v. Empire Bottling Co., 261 Mo. 300, 168 S. W. 1176; Ex Parte French, 315 Mo. 75, 285 S. W. 513; State v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 725, 173 S. W. 2d 902.
Defendant’s argument is: “It is submitted that the statute in question violates this constitutional guarantee in that it singles out as a class those who employ labor as against those who do nbt. It even goes further to single out one part of the labor-employing class; namely, those who employ labor on an hourly paid basis as opposed to those who employ labor paid by the week or the month. ’ ’
The courts have often decided that the classification of the relations of employers are proper and necessary for the welfare of the community. Truax v. Corrigan, supra. When all persons within the purview of a statute are subjected to like conditions, then they are afforded equal protection of the law. Stone v. City of Jefferson, 317 Mo. 1, 293 S. W. 780; Hull v. Baumann, 345 Mo. 159, 131 S. W. 2d 721; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. State of Missouri, 348 Mo. 725, 155 S. W. 2d 107. * * as long as the law operates alike on all members of a class * * * it is not subject to any objections that it is special or class legislation.” 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 478, p. 144.
Section 11785 is singularly free from the criticism levelled against it by this assignment. It applies with complete uniformity of duty and privilege, respectively, to all employers and to all employees, without regard to the method of computing their compensation. This contention is ruled against defendant.
Defendant contends that Section 11785 violates Section 10, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States and Section 13, Article I, of the Constitution of Missouri. These sections forbid legislation impairing the obligations of contracts.
*312Freedom of contract is always qualified by valid police regulations. “This power under the Constitution to restrict freedom of contract has had many illustrations. That it ma3r be exercised in the public interest with respect to contracts between employer and employee is undeniable. Thus statutes have been sustained limiting employment in underground mines and smelters to eight hours a day * * *; in limiting hours of work of employees in manufacturing establishments * * *; and in maintaining workmen’s compensation laws * * *. In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression. * * *” West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703, 108 A. L. R. 1330.
In the case of Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 348 Mo. 1085, 156 S. W. 2d 898, 899, this court quoted with approval from Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 202,, 31 S. Ct. 164, 169, 55 L. Ed. 167, as follows: “It is obvious, from the many decisions of this court, that there is no such thing as absolute freedom of .contract. Contracts which contravene -public policy cannot be lawfully made at all; and the power to make contracts may in all cases be fegulated as to form, evidence, and validity as to third persons. The power of government extends to the denial of liberty of contract to the extent of forbidding or regulating every contract which is reasonably calculated to injuriously affect the public interests. ’ ’
Having determined that the subject matter of Section 11785 is within the police power of the state, that it is not shown as a matter of law to be unreasonably burdensome, and that it is calculated to protect the general welfare of the people, we hold it does not unconstitutionally impair the obligations of the contract between defendant and its employees.
Is the act, of which Section 11785 is a part, in contravention of Section 23, Article III, Constitution of 1945? This provision was also in the Constitution of 1875 as Section 28, Article IY. It provides that “no bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title”. Section 11785 is an amendment to the “corrupt practice act” of 1893 (Laws 1893, p. 157). The title of the original act is: “AN ACT to prevent corrupt practices in elections, to limit the expenses of candidates, to prescribe the duties of candidates and political committees, and provide penalties and remedies for violation on [of] this act”. No fault is found with the title of the original act.
The complaint is that the sections added by an amendatory act of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 108), one of which is now Section 11785, were *313not germane to the subject matter of the original act; and that, inasmuch as the amendatory act of 1897 adopted by reference and without change the title of the original act, the new subject matter thus added is not clearly expressed in its title.
“If the title of an original act is sufficient to embrace the provision contained in an amendatory act, it will be good, and it need not be inquired whether the title to the amendatory act would, of itself, be sufficient.” State ex rel. Drainage District v. Hackmann, 305 Mo. 685, 701, 267 S. W. 608. See also Young v. County of Greene, 342 Mo. 1105, 119 S. W. 2d 369, and cases therein cited.
We, therefore, look to the title of the original act to determine whether the subject matter of the amendatory act is “germane to and within the scope of the general purpose of the bill (original act) as 'declared in its title and which, although not set forth in the particulars expressed in the title, are not out of harmony with them”. Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S. W. 2d 543, 548. See also Edwards v. Business Men’s Assur. Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S. W. 2d 82, 83.
Section 11785, by its terms, makes it a crime for an employer to deny its employees the privilege of absenting themselves from their work on election days and a crime to dock their wages if they do. In essence, therefore, the employer who practices the acts condemned by the statute, as did defendant, is guilty of “corrupt practices in elections”, which is the first definitive phrase of the original act. We will not further labor the matter. The title of the amendatory act, by its reference to the original, is sufficient.
Finally, it is urged that Section 11785 is in conflict with 11786 and is, therefore, unconstitutional “in that, if defendant should conform with the provisions of Section 11785, it would then necessarily be in violation of Section 11786, R. S. Mo. 1939”. We are pointed to no constitutional provision to support the contention, and we find none. The assignment is insufficient to raise the question. State ex rel. Karbe v. Bader, 336 Mo. 259, 78 S. W. 2d 835.
The contention, however, obviously is without merit. Section 11786 provides: “It shall not be lawful for any corporation * # * to induce or persuade any employee * * * to vote or refrain from voting for any candidate, or on any question to be determined or at issue at any election. * * *” Section 11785 is directed at the employer who refuses to give the employee time to vote or penalizes him if he takes the time. • Section 11786 is directed at the employer inducing or persuading the employee how to vote. They are not in conflict.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Dalton, Leecly and Tipton, JJ,, concur; Hyde, J., dissents in separate opinion; Vandeventer, Special Judge, dissents in separate opinion and concurs in dissenting opinion of Hyde, J.; Gonhling, J., dissents and concurs in *314separate dissenting opinions of I-Iyde, J., and Vandeventer, Special Judge.