Court Opinion

ID: 9771768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:52:53.889894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:36.419999
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice
concurring.
I concur. I also would hold the improper admission of evidence harmful, but I differ in the analysis. As stated in the majority opinion, the test for harm is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the conviction or the punishment assessed. Green v. State, 727 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Further, the admission of improper evidence puts the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not contribute to the conviction. Foster v. State, 687 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d). To determine whether the evidence contributed to the conviction, I ask whether the “minds of an average jury” would have found the State’s case less persuasive had the testimony been excluded. Bird v. State, 692 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1238, 89 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986) (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)). See also Beck v. State, 712 S.W.2d 745, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ranson v. State, 707 S.W.2d 96,100 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 724 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
The test to1 determine whether erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction is an objective one, based upon the perception of the case by the average jury. By relying upon the pattern of deliberation of this jury and upon the notes sent by this jury, the majority creates a subjective standard not supported by the case law. The appellate court becomes a fact-finder when it attempts to discern the subjective intent of the jury. Such action exceeds the scope of appellate review.
The facts and circumstances of the individual case must be considered in determining whether harm resulted from the admission of improper evidence. Bird, 692 S.W.2d at 70. In this case, appellant was charged by information for the offense of driving while intoxicated, “in that [appellant] did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, and a controlled substance a drug, or a combination of the two into [appellant’s] body.” The court’s charge to the jury tracked the language of the information.
The arresting officer testified that he stopped appellant for speeding. Appellant was unsteady, “wobbling around,” and could not touch his nose with his index finger when the officer administered a field sobriety test. Appellant’s eyes were red and seemed bloodshot. The officer noticed a moderate odor of alcohol emanating from appellant. His speech was choppy, and according to the police officer, was “not normal speech.” The officer, based upon these facts, expressed his opinion that appellant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol and possibly drugs into his body.
The back-up officer who joined the arresting officer at the scene of the arrest confirmed this testimony concerning appellant’s behavior, and further testified to finding three cans of beer upon searching appellant’s motorcycle. The book-in officer at Lew Sterrett Justice Center testified that she found a bag of marijuana in appellant’s right sleeve when she searched him. She also testified that she smelled alcohol on his breath, that appellant’s speech was slurred, that his eyes were bloodshot and that he was acting goofy.
A fourth police officer, a technical supervisor in the Alcohol Testing Program, testified that when blood test results were .11, a person would have lost his mental and physical faculties to the point where he could not drive safely. At blood-alcohol levels of .11 a person would not be “stum*190bling down drunk,” but alcohol would have affected motor vehicle operation.
As the majority opinion states, E.H. Foerster testified, over appellant’s objection, that blood tests revealed appellant’s blood alcohol content to be .113. Foerster expressed his opinion that a person with that level of alcohol in the blood would have lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. Foerster further testified that he did not test for drugs like cocaine after the test reveals a blood alcohol content of at least .10 because a case is fileable at that point: “When someone is above a .10 that is legal intoxication in the State of Texas.”
A police officer testified, as a witness for the defense, that he had known appellant for four to five years and had seen him intoxicated. He saw appellant the night he was arrested and did not notice abnormal speech patterns, faulty balance or belligerent behavior. Based upon his observations and his experience as a police officer, he could not tell whether appellant was intoxicated or not. He did state, however, “I noticed no indication of his intoxication at the time I saw him that night.”
Appellant testified that he had a couple of beers during a three-hour afternoon football game, that he ate dinner around 6:00 or 6:30, and that he had one beer shortly after dinner. He was arrested at approximately 8:45 p.m. Appellant testified that he had not had enough alcohol that day to become intoxicated. Appellant’s wife and the relative with whom he was watching the football game also testified that appellant had only three or four beers.
During jury argument the prosecutor stated that there were three definitions of intoxication: (1) loss of normal use of mental faculties; (2) loss of normal use of physical faculties; and (3) a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or greater, “a point at which under State law all persons are deemed intoxicated.” The prosecutor then stated that intoxication could be proved by opinion evidence or scientific evidence. When reviewing the scientific evidence, she stated, “under the law in Texas, .11 is intoxicated.”
After reviewing all the facts and circumstances of this case, Bird, 692 S.W.2d at 70, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted blood test and the testimony concerning the results might have contributed to appellant’s conviction. The testimony regarding the physical manifestations of intoxication was conflicting. The jury was told by a witness and by the prosecutor that .10 was the “legal intoxication” level in Texas. The State also introduced into evidence, over appellant’s objection, blood test results showing appellant’s blood alcohol level to be .113. I would hold that the State has failed to meet its harsh burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. Foster, 687 S.W.2d at 66. I concur, therefore, in the reversal of appellant’s conviction and in remanding for new trial.