Court Opinion

ID: 9847128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:29.973809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.469918
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J .
I dissent on the ground that Dolson was a “citizen informant” and, hence, presumptively reliable. (See People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 761 [117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1].)
The distinctions between “citizen informants” and “police informants” were recently summarized in People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 268-269.1 “The courts have recognized a distinction between informers who are virtual agents of the police and ‘citizen informants’ who are chance witnesses to or victims of crime. The former are often criminally disposed or implicated, and supply their ‘tips’ to the authorities on a recurring basis, in secret, and for pecuniary or other personal gain. The latter are innocent of criminal involvement, and volunteer their information fortuitously, openly, and through motives of good citizenship. Because of these characteristics, the requisite showing of reliability in the case of a citizen informant is significantly less than that demanded of a police informer.
“It may therefore be stated as a general proposition that private citizens who are witnesses to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered reliable. This does not, of course, dispense with the requirement that the informant—whether citizen or otherwise—furnish underlying facts sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed and the named suspect was the perpetrator; and the rule also presupposes that the police be aware of the identity of the person providing the information and of his status as a true citizen informant. In short, probable cause will not be provided by conclusionary information or anonymous informants, but neither a previous *856demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities report their observations in detail to the authorities.” (Citations omitted.)
When he sought the warrant Officer Lord had no reason to believe that Dolson was a police informant. There was no indication that Dolson was implicated in the crimes he reported witnessing. Nor was there any indication that he had supplied tips to the police “on a recurring basis ... and for pecuniary or other personal gain.”
Dolson’s status as a parolee might be said to be some evidence of a criminal disposition. However, there was no indication that his prior conviction had been a drug offense. Nor was there any indication that it had been an offense bearing on his veracity. (Cf. People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) Moreover, this court held that a person was a citizen informant, “both as a victim and witness to the crime,” even though his information concerned the fact that he had been robbed and his companion had been murdered while they had been attempting to buy marijuana. (People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731 [117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d l].)2
Dolson did ask that his identity not be disclosed; however, he was the antithesis of an anonymous informant. He disclosed his identity to Officer Lord and told the officer how to contact him in the future. Moreover, he was available to and did testily below. The fact that a citizen does not want his safety unnecessarily jeopardized does not adversely reflect upon his reliability.
Finally, Dolson’s information was sufficiently detailed to lead a reasonable person to believe that property subject to seizure would be found on the premises to be searched. The majority do not contend otherwise.
The majority mention Dolson’s parole status and his desire not to disclose his identity unnecessarily. (Ante, p. 852.) However, I do not understand the majority to hold that these facts disqualified Dolson as a citizen informant. Rather, I understand them to hold that the affidavit was deficient because it failed to “affirmatively set forth” facts from which the magistrate could infer that Dolson was motivated by good citizenship. (Id.)
*857“Nothing [being] more impenetrable than the motivation of our actions,”3 it is not clear what showing would satisfy the majority. However, it is clear that the showing made here would have been found satisfactory under previous authority. Moreover, this proposition can be demonstrated with cases bearing a striking factual similarity to this case.
In Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418 [96 Cal.Rptr. 455, 487 P.2d 1023], the informant, a motel maid, discovered marijuana in a room she was cleaning. She had previously attended a drug demonstration class conducted by the police department at which she saw and smelled marijuana. The maid informed the motel manager of her discovery and the manager informed the police. The maid was held to be a citizen informant. (5 Cal.3d at pp. 421-422.)
In People v. Chavez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 54 [79 Cal.Rptr. 701], a man approached two police officers and informed them that he had just observed a described suspect attempting to sell marijuana to one of the informant’s friends; he added that he had seen the suspect hide the marijuana in his left sock. The officers secured the informant’s address, satisfied themselves that he could recognize marijuana, and determined that he was willing to testify in court. He was held to be a citizen informant.
In People v. Young (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 878 [90 Cal.Rptr. 924], the informant, a 13-year-old girl, told a police officer that she and her 17-year-old sister had visited the defendant at the premises for which the search warrant was later sought. The informant’s sister asked the defendant “Where is the grass?” The defendant then brought out a plastic bag of what appeared to be marijuana, rolled it into cigarettes, and, along with the sister and a third person, smoked the cigarettes. Each of them told the informant that it was “grass” they were smoking. The informants description of its odor and appearance satisfied the officer that the substance was marijuana. The 13-year-old girl was held to be a citizen informant.
In People v. Marchan (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 16 [121 Cal.Rptr. 269], an informant contacted a deputy sheriff and told him that her friend admitted having stored narcotics in her (the friend’s) home. A second informant, the first informant’s 13-year-old daughter, later told the deputy that while babysitting in the suspect’s home that day she had seen *858a suitcase containing several small plastic bags filled with a white powdery substance; she added that the suspect’s 7-year-old son had told her that the suitcase contained “dope.” Both the mother and daughter were held to be citizen informants. (47 Cal.App.3d at p. 33.)
Rounding off this representative selection is People v. Schulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809 [124 CaI.Rptr. 585], a case made more significant by the fact that the majority adopt its restatement of the law concerning citizen informants. {Ante, p. 850.) In Schulle, the informant, a 14-year-old girl named Simmons, contacted Lieutenant Roxon and informed him that her mother and stepfather smoked marijuana “continually,” had once raised marijuana plants, and presently had marijuana in their home. She added that she not only recognized the appearance and odor of marijuana but also had smoked it herself. In holding Miss Simmons to be a citizen informant, the Court of Appeal recited the test adopted by the majority and then applied it, stating: “In the instant case Miss Simmons was clearly a witness to a crime. There is nothing to show that she was an experienced stool pigeon or that she was criminally involved or disposed. The statement by Roxon that Miss Simmons told him that she has seen marijuana and recognizes its appearance and smell are not indicative of criminal activity but are consistent with her observation at her home and in the presence of defendants as narrated in her statement to Roxon. Miss Simmons’ admission to Roxon that she has smoked marijuana, although an admission of criminal activity, does not establish as a matter of law that she was a person criminally involved or disposed so as to compel the conclusion that she was not an innocent victim or bystander but a person who was motivated by something other than good citizenship.” (51 Cal.App.3d atp. 815.)
Dolson clearly being a citizen informant under applicable precedent, I would affirm the conviction.
McComb, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 29, 1976. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

I dissented in Ramey on another issue, concluding that warrantless probable cause arrests within the home are permissible in the absence of an emergency. (16 Cal.3d at pp. 277-281.)

I dissented in Hill on another ground, concluding that the harmless error doctrine is applicable to an appeal taken from a guilty plea following erroneous denial of a motion to suppress evidence. (12 Cal.3d at pp. 770-771.)

G. C. Lichtenberg, Reflections.