Court Opinion

ID: 9653353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:44:48.95202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:58.117188
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiff has petitioned for a rehearing, evidently believing that in the opinion heretofore rendered I stressed the word “wrongfully” in construing C. C. P. Cal. § 377. That word, however, I used only as one contained in a portion of the section itself, and did not intend to give, it any particular significance. The section applies, as before stated, to eases of death caused by wrongful act or neglect, and in no way to breach® of contract as such.
Section 1 of the federal Employers’ Liability Act (Comp. St. § 8657), to which my attention has been directed, creates rights of action for “death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of [a] carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, duo to its' negligence. * * *” Hero the word “wrongful” has been left out; but in my opinion its omission produces no different result, for the liability intended to be created, like that under the California Code, is purely one in tort.
Libelant maintains that under this- act the liability for injuries incurred by railroad employees (and seamen) in each case rises out of a contract of employment, and hence that the contractual origin of the duty said to have been violated here is immaterial. This amounts to saying that as a result of the act the law implies, as a term of the contract of employment, an agreement that the employer’s agents, officers, and other representatives will take due care not to injure the employee, and to say the least is artificial. Furthermore, the history of the act, traceable in reported eases, shows that Congress intended to add no such legal implication to tho contract.
“The federal Employers’ Liability Act is an act, as its name imports, to regulate the liability of employers, and, as its body shows, is applicable only to liability in tort for negligence. No new right of action is given; all that is done is to take away certain defenses which had come to be thought unjust. The legal liability of the employer under the act does not depend upon the terms of the contract of service, and is neither increased, nor diminished thereby.” Rounsaville v. Central Ry. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 371, 94 A. 392.
Libelant answers this by saying that the instant case actually is one of negligence, and that, because negligence results in tort, a recovery may be allowed. If such he the rule, then every negligent breach of contract must be a tort, for the decedent in this case was injured through the active fault of no one but himself, and the only affirmative duty alleged to have been omitted by respondent, depends entirely upon a contractual obligation.
 Whenever a negligent breach of contract at tho same time is also a violation of a common-law duty, if the person injured so elects an action ex delicto will lie. Hence, if tho decedent had been furnished with bad medicine or had been unsldllfully treated, there would be merit in libelant’s contention. Galveston, Houston, & Southern Railway Co. v. Hennegan, infra; Chalmers v. Southern Pacific Co. (C. C. A. 9) 8 F.(2d) 480. But an important and well-grounded distinction is made as to cases of nonfeasance in the performance of a contract, and it universally is held that a tort action may not be founded on a total omission to perform. 26 R. C. L. 758; 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 929, note. As a general rule, there must be some active negligence or misfeasance (Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Manufacturing Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N. E. 465), and I take it to be the law that even a willful neglect to perform a contract is insufficient. Arnold v. Clark, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 256.
But one authority has been discovered which is on all fours with the present case. Galveston, Houston & Southern Railway Co. v. Hennegan, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 314, 76 S. W. 452, 453. There it was held, in a carefully reasoned opinion, that where an employer fails to furnish an employee with medical attention, as he has agreed to do, the employee’s cause of action is for breach of contract, and not in tort for negligence. Cooley, Pollock, Shearman & Redfield, and Bishop are shown to be as ono upon the question. An omission to perform a contract may not be treated as negligence. The case is directly in point - and decisive.
On no theory is libelant entitled to recover, for his contract action under C. C. P. Cal. § 1582, is barred by the defense of pridr *940adjudication, and no other provision of state or federal law is applicable to his case.
Rehearing denied.