Court Opinion

ID: 9369011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:08:43.991996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.155613
License: Public Domain

J-S36033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMES CALVIN HAMLETT, JR.                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 177 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 12, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0014824-2015

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

        James Calvin Hamlett, Jr., appeals from the order dismissing, without a

hearing, his first and timely petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, Hamlett contends

that his trial counsel engaged in two discrete instances of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Thereafter, Hamlett asserts, as a discovery claim, that

the PCRA court erred by not ordering the Commonwealth to produce his cell

phone, which was, and continues to be, apparently held by law enforcement.

As it allegedly contains GPS-tracking information, possibly leading to

exculpatory evidence, Hamlett seeks this cell phone for inspection and/or

forensic examination. After a thorough review of the record, we find no validity

to any of Hamlett’s averments and affirm.

____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S36033-22

     By way of background, Hamlett,

     who was sixty-one years old at the time of the crimes, met [the
     victim] when he gave her a ride in his jitney[, an unlicensed taxi].
     Over time, [Hamlett] became friends with [the victim] and her
     family. On September 16, 2015, [Hamlett] took [the victim], then
     thirteen years old, to a Pittsburgh Pirates game. After the game,
     [Hamlett] took [the victim] to a restaurant, and, at approximately
     midnight, the two left for [the victim’s] home.

           Instead of driving [the victim] home, [Hamlett] drove to
     several neighborhoods while the two chatted. At some point, [the
     victim] fell asleep, and woke up after 2:00 a.m. [The victim]
     panicked and asked if her mom knew where she was. [Hamlett]
     reassured [the victim] that he had spoken to her mother, and was
     taking [the victim] to the home of [Hamlett’s] daughter.
     Eventually, [Hamlett] declared that he had changed his mind and
     that he would take [the victim] home.

           [Hamlett] drove back to [the victim’s] neighborhood, but
     took the vehicle to an alley with woods on one side and an
     abandoned house on the other. [The victim] was scared and
     opened the door to leave, but [Hamlett] promised that he would
     take her home. [The victim] closed the door, and [Hamlett]
     grabbed her jacket, causing [the victim] to try and leave through
     the passenger door. [The victim] screamed for help, but [Hamlett]
     grabbed her hooded sweatshirt and hair and told her to “shut the
     f*** up or I will knock you the f*** out.” N.T. Vol. I, 6/24-28/16,
     at 53. [Hamlett] allowed her to go outside to use the bathroom,
     and dragged her back to the vehicle in a headlock. At some point
     during these events, [Hamlett] placed something sharp against
     her neck which caused pain.

           Back inside the vehicle, [Hamlett] told [the victim] to take
     off her clothes. [Hamlett] inserted his finger into her vagina and
     kissed her breasts. He pulled his pants down and appeared to
     pleasure himself. Eventually, [Hamlett] told [the victim] that he
     loved her too much and could not “do this.” He told her to put her
     clothes on, then drove her home.

           [The victim] immediately told her mother, who called the
     police. [The victim] went to a hospital, where a rape kit was
     performed. Photographs were taken, one of which depicted a fresh

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        mark where [Hamlett] had pushed the object into her neck.

              Due to the foregoing, [Hamlett] was charged with unlawful
        restraint of a minor, two counts of aggravated indecent assault,
        simple assault, indecent assault, attempted rape, terroristic
        threats, and kidnapping of a minor. The jury convicted [Hamlett]
        at all counts. [Hamlett] was thereafter sentenced to three
        mandatory minimum sentences of life imprisonment, which
        applied due to his two prior convictions for sexual crimes.

Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 1172 WDA 2016 at *1-3 (Pa. Super., filed Sept.

11, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (some alterations).

        In his direct appeal before this Court, Hamlett challenged the sufficiency

of the evidence related to one of his aggravated indecent assault convictions,

see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(2), as well as the sufficiency of evidence utilized

against him in proving unlawful restraint. Hamlett also contested the

admission, at trial, of the victim’s forensic interview as a prior-consistent

statement and, too, the legality of his three mandatory life sentences.

        We found that, because the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the victim was less than thirteen years of age at the

time of the assault, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of a first-

degree graded felony.1 However, we also determined that the Commonwealth

had presented sufficient evidence establishing Hamlett’s guilt, beyond a

reasonable doubt, as to the lesser-included second-degree felony charge of

aggravated indecent assault, which was not dependent on that thirteen-years-

____________________________________________

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b).

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of-age threshold. After making these findings, we remanded the case for

resentencing solely at that aforementioned aggravated indecent assault

conviction. In all other respects, we affirmed Hamlett’s judgment of sentence,

finding no validity to his other claims.

      Following a granted petition for allowance of appeal that was filed with

our Supreme Court, wherein that Court ultimately affirmed our disposition of

his direct appeal, Hamlett was resentenced. Specifically, Hamlett received

three concurrent life sentences as well as two concurrent ten-year terms of

probation, to be served consecutive to his life sentences. Hamlett did not file

a post-sentence motion or notice of appeal after resentencing.

      Hamlett filed the present PCRA petition within one year of his

resentencing. Ultimately, his petition was dismissed without a hearing.

Hamlett timely appealed from this dismissal, and the relevant parties have

complied with their obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925. As such, this matter is ripe for review.

      On appeal, Hamlett asks:

      1. Were his post-conviction filings sufficient as to the issue of pre-
         trial preparation to demonstrate that his ineffective assistance
         of counsel claim had arguable merit?

      2. Were his post-conviction filings sufficient as to the issue of a
         specific hearsay objection to demonstrate that his ineffective
         assistance of counsel claim had arguable merit?

      3. Did the PCRA court err by not ordering the Commonwealth to
         produce his cell phone for inspection and/or forensic
         examination?

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See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.2

       Preliminarily, we note our well-settled standard of review in an appeal

stemming from a PCRA petition’s dismissal: “[w]e review a ruling by the PCRA

court to determine whether it is supported by the record and is free of legal

error. Our standard of review of a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations

omitted). “The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no

support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Bishop,

266 A.3d 56, 62 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

       As Hamlett’s first two issues aver that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel, we employ the following precepts:

       We presume counsel's effectiveness, and an appellant bears the
       burden of proving otherwise. To establish ineffectiveness of
       counsel, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove: [(1)] his
       underlying legal claim has arguable merit; [(2)] counsel's actions
       lacked any reasonable basis; and [(3)] counsel's actions
       prejudiced him. Failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness
       test requires dismissal of the claim. Arguable merit exists when
       the factual statements are accurate and could establish cause for
       relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a
       legal determination.
____________________________________________

2 Hamlett’s statement of questions involved does not separate, nor specifically
identify, issues one and two, but merely asks whether sufficient facts were
pled to show arguable merit as to his undefined ineffective assistance of
counsel contention. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Such a description is likely
violative of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116(a), which requires
a concise statement “expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case[.]”
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). However, because the headings and argument contained
later in his brief discretely identify his ineffective assistance challenges, we
will overlook this infirmity as “fairly suggested” by the overarching question
that was originally posed. Id.

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Commonwealth v. Urwin, 219 A.3d 167, 172 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) (brackets and emphasis added). As to

what constitutes prejudice, our Supreme Court has stated: “a defendant

raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is required to show actual

prejudice; that is, that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that

it could have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 315 (Pa. 2014)

(citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Hamlett’s first ineffective assistance claim asserts that trial counsel

never prepared him to testify at trial, which is bolstered through the inclusion

of an in-text picture from trial counsel’s file, wherein “prep Hamlett

testimony,” contained within a checklist of other actionable items, is not

crossed off. Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19 (all other enumerations in that checklist

were crossed off). Hamlett concedes, however, that there is “no reported case

where there’s been a determination that counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for failing to prepare their client to testify[.]” Id., at 19; but see

Commonwealth v. Drass, 718 A.2d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 1998) (dismissing

an inadequate preparation claim, within the context of ineffective assistance,

on prejudice grounds).

      Despite this acknowledgement, Hamlett believes he presented factual

averments within his PCRA petition that could establish bases for relief,

specifically illuminating that “(1) Hamlett corroborated the Commonwealth’s

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evidence; (2) Hamlett affirmed consciousness of guilt; and (3) Hamlett

focused attention to imagery of ‘little people’ frequenting the backseat of his

car in a desperate attempt to normalize the fact of the complainant being in

the backseat–the alleged place of the assault.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20 (record

citations   and   emphases   omitted).   Hamlett    contends    that   “testimony

preparation would’ve gone a long way to keep [himself] from digging a deeper

hole[.]” Id.

      We note that Hamlett’s three examples, listed above, are nothing but

bald and editorialized assertions as to the context of his testimony at trial. In

his brief, Hamlett, without elaboration or citation to analogous authority,

merely cites to his PCRA petition. It strains credulity that Hamlett’s singular

sentence dedicated to his apparently deficient testimony is somehow self-

proving of prejudice. While, expanding further, the PCRA petition contains at

least two arguably relevant record citations, see Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, 10/17/21, at 12-13, there is still very little development of the ultimate

points he was tasked with demonstrating, namely prejudice and arguable

merit. Based on these deficiencies, this ineffective assistance claim could be

waived. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d

766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (requiring an appellant to present sufficiently

developed arguments, which, too, contain citations to the record and legal

authorities. If this Court is impeded from conducting meaningful review,

certain issues may be waived). However, given our conclusion that Hamlett

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has failed to demonstrate arguable merit to his ineffective assistance

assertion, we decline to find waiver.

      Hamlett fails to discuss the import of the colloquy he gave at trial. That

colloquy expressly refutes any notion that he did not have sufficient time to

consult with trial counsel about his rights and ability to provide testimony:

      THE COURT: You have met with [counsel] on many occasions, you
      have had the opportunity to ask him questions and discuss with
      him your rights as a [d]efendant in a criminal case, the discovery
      and evidence in this case and the charges that you are facing, the
      statutory maximum, all of that; is that correct?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And you have also discussed with him your trial
      strategy; is that correct?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And he has given you his advice regarding all of these
      matters and you have considered that advice; is that true?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: Has he discussed with you your right as a
      [d]efendant to remain silent?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And you understand that as a [d]efendant the burden
      of proof is on the Commonwealth and you need do nothing. You
      cannot be compelled to testify and you do not have to present a
      defense or testify?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: You have also discussed with him your absolute right
      to testify if you choose to do so?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

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     THE COURT: And you understood that if you testify that it would
     be under oath and subject to cross-examination as the other
     witnesses have?

     [HAMLETT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: With regard to your trial strategy in this case, you
     have ample opportunity to discuss that with [counsel] as well and
     he has given you his advice with regard to whether or not he
     believes that you should present a defense or testify; is that
     correct?

     [HAMLETT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And you have considered all of that?

     [HAMLETT]: Yes.

N.T., 6/24-28/2016, at 154-56. After Hamlett then proceeded to speak with

counsel off the record, the colloquy continued:

     THE COURT: … Hamlett, you have had occasion to talk with
     [counsel] before just now. You have spoken with him several
     times regarding this issue; is that true?

     [HAMLETT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And so your last minute discussion with him is just a
     final confirmation of your thought process, but it is not the only
     opportunity that you have had to discuss whether or not you wish
     to testify with your attorney; is that true?

     [Hamlett]: Yes. We have talked about it a bunch of times.

     THE COURT: So this morning’s decision is not one that you are
     making spur of the moment but one that you have actually
     engaged in long discussions and thoughts over a period of time,
     is that true?

     [HAMLETT]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And what decision have you made?

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      [HAMLETT]: I am going to testify.

      THE COURT: You do intend to testify?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

      THE COURT: And you have made this decision having had a full
      opportunity to discuss it with [counsel] and considering his advice,
      but it is your decision and not his; is that true?

      [HAMLETT]: Yes.

Id., at 156-57. A few moments later, Hamlett stated on the record that he

was satisfied with “the services” that his counsel had provided to him and that

all decisions he was making were through his own volition and after full

consultation with counsel. Id., at 158-59.

      Based on the contents of the colloquy, wherein Hamlett repeatedly

indicated that he was fully apprised of the dynamics of testifying on his own

behalf, we are unable to see how his underlying claim has any merit, as any

departure would be a contradiction of his own words. Moreover, Hamlett fails

to discuss this colloquy in his brief and has provided no compelling basis to

deviate from his express satisfaction with his counsel as well as his statements

demonstrating his complete knowledge of what it would specifically mean to

testify. In the absence of any reason to deviate from what he stated before

the court at trial, we find no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel

argument in this domain.

      In his second ineffective assistance claim, Hamlett takes issue with one

of the questions asked by the Commonwealth during his cross-examination,

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as it “put into the minds of the jury an unsubstantiated fact that Hamlett’s

wife was surprised of Hamlett’s going to the Pirates game with the [victim].”

Appellant’s Brief, at 21-22 (citing PCRA petition). Hamlett believes that the

question implied he was conniving and had improper motives. See id., at 22.

       The question, replicated in full: “[s]o if your wife had told the police that

she was surprised that you had gone to the game with [the victim] would you

be surprised by that?” N.T., 6/24-28/2016, at 227 (coming immediately after

being asked and responding “yes” to the question of whether Hamlett told his

wife that he was going to the baseball game with the victim). When Hamlett

indicated that he would be surprised by his wife’s statement, this latter,

leading question that was allegedly hearsay, attacked his character for

truthfulness, i.e., showing that he had bad character. See Appellant’s Brief,

at 23 (citing PCRA petition).

       Other than providing one citation to authority, which vaguely discusses

the relevance of character evidence, see id., at 24, it is unclear how Hamlett

concludes that this previously identified question “was more than just a

singular, errant admission of hearsay. This was a leading question that painted

[him] in an unfair light.” Id.3 Furthermore, Hamlett does not provide any clear

indicia that there was, in fact, hearsay admitted into the record, therefore

____________________________________________

3 Hamlett’s argument confusingly blends hearsay concerns with problems
associated with the admission of character evidence without clearly
distinguishing between the two subjects.

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failing to demonstrate merit to his underlying claim.

      Hearsay is commonly understood to be an out-of-court statement

offered by a party “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”

Pa.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay may be admissible if such a statement is made

pursuant to one of its exceptions. See Pa.R.E. 802. Hamlett has utterly failed

to show both what the out-of-court statement, in fact, is and, too, that such

a statement was being used to demonstrate the truth of the matter it asserted.

Without any clear indication that counsel was required to object and that such

an objection would have likely been meritorious, there is no validity to

Hamlett’s claim that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel.

To the extent Hamlett argues that the Commonwealth’s question improperly

delved into issues related to character evidence, Hamlett does not provide any

credible proof that the very nature of this singular complained-of question,

when faced with the overwhelming amount of evidence employed against him

at trial, reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of proceedings.

Other than providing an undeveloped argument that this question highlighted

Hamlett’s character unfairly, we are unable to discern any clear existence, or

even arguable existence, of prejudice to the extent necessary that would be

capable of providing him with relief under the PCRA.

      In his final issue, Hamlett believes the PCRA court should have granted

his discovery request related to his cell phone, which would have then been

used for forensic examination purposes that could have served to discredit the

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victim’s testimony. See Appellant’s Brief, at 24-25.4 Specifically, Hamlett

maintains that the cell phone’s GPS data would have corroborated his route

of travel on the night of the alleged incident between him and the victim. See

id., at 25. Hamlett would have then been able to advance an ineffective

assistance of counsel argument against his trial counsel for failing to

adequately investigate the cell phone and its potentially exculpatory data. See

id.

       In his petition, Hamlett moved “for discovery to advance his claim as it

pertains to lack of investigation surrounding his cell phone. That cell phone is,

and has been, in the sole possession of the Commonwealth. It has never been

requested nor turned over to the defense. Hamlett avers it’ll contain

exculpatory evidence that’ll tend to demonstrate his innocence.” Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief, dated 10/17/21, at 19.

       Our Rules of Criminal Procedure establish that “no discovery shall be

permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after a

showing of exceptional circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). “The PCRA

____________________________________________

4The PCRA court found that Hamlett had waived this issue, believing that his
PCRA petition singularly asserted that his trial counsel had erred by not
seeking his cell phone prior to or at trial and that there was no indication
before the PCRA court that he was, now, making a discovery-based request.
See Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/22, at 5. As the Commonwealth points out,
Hamlett’s “request for discovery in the conclusion paragraph of his PCRA
petition is not a [m]otion for [d]iscovery that placed a request before the
court.” Appellee’s Brief, at 27. Given our ultimate disposition, we need not
examine whether, in fact, Hamlett filed an adequate discovery motion.

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and the criminal rules do not define the term ‘exceptional circumstances.’

Rather, it is for the trial court, in its discretion, to determine whether a case

is exceptional and discovery is therefore warranted.” Commonwealth v.

Frey, 41 A.3d 605, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Although “mere

speculation that exculpatory evidence might exist does not constitute an

exceptional circumstance,” see id., at 612, Hamlett claims that his phone

possessed GPS capabilities that would have tended to show his innocence.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 26-27.

      While is appears true that, given the PCRA court’s finding of waiver, it

“didn’t consider, or weigh … the [discovery] request in the first instance,”

Appellant’s Brief, at 27, Hamlett has (1) not shown that remand is necessary

or required; and (2) failed to demonstrate the “extraordinary” nature of his

request.

      As to the latter issue, Hamlett has not shown that he does not have

access to his own GPS data or cannot pursue the same without having to rely

upon the Commonwealth. Moreover, other than stating in passing that such

data would have corroborated his testimony, Hamlett has not proven that this

alleged corroboration would have been materially helpful, if not potentially

exculpating, so as to establish those required exceptional circumstances.

Therefore, we are left with what appears to be a speculative claim, which,

pursuant to existing precedent, does not create a condition necessitating

discovery.

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      Distilled down, Hamlett concludes that cellular GPS data, if possibly

beneficial or corroborative of travel-related testimony, inherently constitutes

an exceptional circumstance that can be sought, via discovery, during PCRA

proceedings. Much like other places in his brief, however, Hamlett has failed

to show, with any kind of authority, why a situation such as his constitutes an

exceptional circumstance demanding further discovery. Furthermore, even

excepting his lack of included authority, other than vaguely discussing his

travel in conjunction with his testimony, Hamlett has not revealed why the cell

phone data would clearly tend to prove his innocence. In the absence of any

definite showing that exceptional circumstances exist, we find no validity to

his claim that discovery should have been granted.

      With all three of Hamlett’s issues being unmeritorious, we affirm the

lower court’s dismissal of his PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2023

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