Court Opinion

ID: 9551890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:01:38.472512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:55.414577
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring). I concur with Judge Lopez’ opinion that the classifications made by the legislature are constitutional and that plaintiffs should be granted the right to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief under the Tort Claims Act. Defendants are not immune from liability under Counts I and II of plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs sued defendants for damages arising out of corporal punishment inflicted by Charles Otero, a teacher, upon Michael Garcia, a student in a public school. Plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend and plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiffs’ complaint was composed of three counts: (1) Otero, while acting in the scope of his employment, “willfully and maliciously, with intent to injure, struck MICHAEL GARCIA with his closed fist on the left side of the neck.” (2) Otero, “while in the conduct of his instruction or in the course of his authorized duties, breached his general responsibility and duty and the duty set by law and regulations, in that he negligently hit, or negligently came into bodily contact with, Plaintiff, MICHAEL GARCIA, while attempting to supervise or discipline MICHAEL GARCIA ...” (3) “ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, was negligent in employing CHARLES OTERO Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court found that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, § 41-4-1, et seq. was constitutional and the motion was well taken and dismissed the action with prejudice without leave to amend. This is reversible error. Enlow v. City of Carpinteria, 20 Cal.App.3d 956, 98 Cal.Rptr. 129 (1971); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976); Framlau Corporation v. County of Delaware, 223 Pa.Super. 272, 299 A.2d 335 (1973). Even though the Tort Claims Act is constitutional, plaintiffs, if allowed, can state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To deny plaintiffs this right is to unjustly deny plaintiffs their day in court. Section 41 — 4-4(A), N.M.S.A.1978 reads in pertinent part: A governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the scope of duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as waived by Sections 41 — 4-5 through 41^-12, NMSA 1978. [Emphasis added.] Section 41-4-3(F) defines “scope of duties”: “[S]cope of duties” means performing any duties which a public employee is requested, required or authorized to perform by the governmental entity regardless of the time and place of performance . . . [Emphasis added.] When these sections are read together, defendants were granted immunity during the time in which Otero was acting in a manner “requested, required or authorized” by the Board of Education. If Otero was not “acting within the scope of duty,” defendants were not granted immunity. Plaintiffs, to state a claim for relief, must allege that defendants were not immune from liability because Otero was not “acting within the scope of duty.” He was not “requested, required or authorized” to (1) maliciously and willfully hit Garcia with his fist under the facts of this case nor (2) negligently hit Garcia while attempting to supervise or discipline him. If the legislature had intended to grant immunity for the malicious and negligent conduct of a teacher apart from “the scope of duty,” it would have so stated. Rather, in its legislative declaration, § 41-4-2(B), it declared that: . . . Liability for acts or omissions under the Tort Claims Act shall be based upon the traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person’s standard of care in the performance of that duty The traditional concept of duty is a pure question of law for courts to decide, and once a duty is declared to exist, the question of whether the duty was in fact breached is one for the trier of the facts. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531 (1958). If Otero acted “within the scope of duty,” if he was “requested, required or authorized” to commit the acts alleged, defendants would be immune as a matter of law and the case should be dismissed with prejudice. If Otero did not act “within the scope of duty,” defendants are not immune to liability and the complaint cannot be dismissed with prejudice. It would be irrational to believe from the language used in §§ 41-4-4(A) and 41 — 4-3(F) that the legislature intended to grant immunity to defendants regardless of the severity and brutality exercised by a teacher in the school room. It would also be irrational to believe that the Board of Education “requested, required or authorized” such conduct. To do so would seriously question the invasion of the constitutional rights of students. See, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) wherein a 5-4 opinion was written in which severe corporal punishment did not violate a student’s constitutional rights. We need not resolve this constitutional issue as long as plaintiffs can state a claim for relief. By statute, a school teacher is mandated to “exercise supervision over students on property belonging to the public school .. . and while the students are under the control of the public school ...” Section 22-10-5, N.M.S.A.1978. “Teaching ... is recognized as a profession with all the rights, responsibilities and privileges accorded professions having their first responsibility to the public they serve. The primary responsibilities of this profession shall be to educate the children of this State and to improve the professional practices and ethical conduct of its members.” Section 22-10-9, N.M.S.A.1978. Otero was granted the right to exercise supervision over Michael Garcia primarily to educate him. “Supervision" can be held synonymous with “control” in the sense of “in loco parentis.” It has been so declared by statute. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill.2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976). This was a legislative determination that educators should stand in the place of a parent or guardian in matters relating to discipline. It is not derived from the Tort Claims Act and not subject to the immunity rule. The court said: ... It is this status as parent or guardian which requires a plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to impose liability upon educators. [Id. 710, 347 N.E.2d 705]. Inasmuch as plaintiffs may not be subject to the Tort Claims Act by proper pleading, the appeal should be reversed as to Counts I and II and plaintiffs granted the right to amend its complaint. Under Count III, the Board of Education was granted immunity from liability for its own negligence in retaining Otero in its employ and in not ordering him to cease and desist from the use of violence. This was a purpose of the Tort Claims Act stated in the legislative declaration. Section 41-4-2(A) states: [Government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done ... The legislature wisely intended to clothe the state and local agencies from an influx of litigation that would challenge the conduct of the members of the agencies. These boards are not responsible for any tort it commits because “each governmental entity has financial limitations within which it must exercise authorized power and discretion in determining the extent and nature of its activities.” Section 41-4-2(B). Count III did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.