Court Opinion

ID: 9408765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 16:09:08.78855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:46.446413
License: Public Domain

J-A07044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRANDON LITES                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 447 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0000302-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                              FILED JULY 13, 2023

       Brandon Lites (Appellant) appeals from the December 20, 2021,

judgment of sentence1 entered by the Delaware County Court of Common

Pleas after this Court vacated the trial court’s original sentence as illegal.2 In

December of 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of one count each of burglary,

attempted rape (by forcible compulsion), indecent assault (by forcible

____________________________________________

1 Appellant purports to appeal from the “[o]rder entered in this matter on the
7th of January, 2022 . . . denying the [m]otion for [r]econsideration of
[s]entence.” Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, 2/2/22. However, the appeal
properly lies from the judgment of sentence imposed on December 20, 2021.
See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super.
2001) (en banc) (“In a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the judgment
of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.”). The caption
has been corrected accordingly.

2   See Commonwealth v. Lites, 234 A.3d 806 (Pa. Super. 2020).
J-A07044-23

compulsion), criminal trespass (of an occupied structure), and simple assault.3

Upon remand for resentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of 184 to 368 months’ imprisonment. Appellant now raises challenges to the

discretionary aspects and legality of his sentence. Based on the following, we

affirm.

        The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history

as follows as follows:

               On June 24, 2014[,] Appellant entered the apartment of a
        complete stranger, [the] eighty-one year old victim. . . . Appellant
        threw her on the ground, smothered her with a pillow, exposed
        his penis and rubbed it on her, touched her in the vaginal area,
        and fractured her collarbone. Appellant ejaculated on the victim’s
        nightgown and thigh and left the apartment after the victim bit
        Appellant’s finger and screamed.         Eventually, Appellant was
        identified as the perpetrator of the crimes following a C.O.D.I.S.[4]
        search and comparison with Appellant’s DNA. Appellant was
        arrested and charged with several crimes including burglary and
        criminal trespass.

               On December 20, 2017, following a jury trial, Appellant was
        convicted of [the above-mentioned crimes]. On February 12,
        2018[,] th[e trial] court, having determined Appellant’s 1994
        burglary conviction upgraded the convictions to require imposition
        of mandatory minimum sentences, imposed judgment of sentence
        to an aggregate period of confinement in a [s]tate [c]orrectional
        [i]nstitution for a term of not less than 20 years and not more
        than 40 years.

             Following   an     appeal   from    the    February    12,
        2018[, j]udgment of [s]entence imposed in the case, on June 29,
____________________________________________

3  See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1), 901(a)/3121(a)(1),                   3126(a)(2),
3503(a)(1)(i), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.

4   C.O.D.I.S. is the acronym for Combined DNA Index System Description.

                                           -2-
J-A07044-23

     2020[, the] Superior Court decided it was “constrained to hold
     that burglary (as defined by former Section 3502(a)) is not
     equivalent to burglary (as defined by current Section 3502(a)(1))”
     and affirmed the conviction, vacated the judgment of sentence,
     and remanded for resentencing. [Lites, 234 A.3d at 819-20].1

     ________________________

        1As a result of the June 29, 2020[,] Superior Court decision
       remanding the case for resentencing, on July 14, 2020[, the
       trial c] ourt scheduled a status hearing to take place on
       August 25, 2020. At the August 25, 2020[,] status hearing,
       the case was scheduled for the resentencing hearing to be
       held on October 26, 2020. On October 8, 2020, upon
       consideration of Appellant’s request to continue the
       resentencing hearing, th[e] court rescheduled the
       resentencing to be held on December 22, 2020. During this
       time, th[e] court became unavailable due to complications
       associated with COVID-19 and on December 8, 2020[,]
       counsel for the parties requested the date of the
       resentencing be postponed until th[e] court became
       available. On November 10, 2021[,] the resentencing
       hearing was scheduled for December 20, 2021.
     ________________________

           On December 20, 2021[,] at the resentencing hearing[,]
     th[e] court imposed judgment of sentence to an aggregate period
     of confinement in a [s]tate [c]orrectional [i]nstitution for a term
     of not less than 184 months and not more than 368 months (no
     mandatory minimum sentences):

        for the Burglary ([first-degree felony]) conviction, . . . a
        minimum term of 60 months to a maximum term of 120
        months;

        for the Criminal Attempt-Rape by Forcible Compulsion
        ([first-degree felony]) conviction, . . . a minimum term of
        90 months to a maximum term of 180 months, consecutive
        to the judgment of sentence imposed for the Burglary
        conviction;

        for the Indecent Assault-Forcible Compulsion ([first-degree
        misdemeanor]) conviction, . . . a minimum term of 18
        months to a maximum term of 36 months, consecutive to

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J-A07044-23

          the judgment of sentence imposed for the Criminal Attempt-
          Rape by Forcible Compulsion conviction;

          for the Criminal Trespass ([third-degree felony]) conviction,
          . . . a minimum term of 16 months to a maximum term of
          32 months, consecutive to the judgment of sentence
          imposed for the Indecent Assault-Forcible Compulsion
          conviction;

          for the Simple Assault ([first-degree misdemeanor])
          conviction, . . . a minimum term of 12 months to a
          maximum term of 24 months, concurrent with the judgment
          of sentence imposed for the [Criminal Attempt-Rape] by
          Forcible Compulsion conviction.2

       ________________________

          2Additionally, Appellant: was found not [Recidivism Risk
         Reduction Incentive (RRRI)] or Boot Camp eligible; was
         sentenced to pay $5,245.99 restitution; was ordered to
         have no contact with the Victim in this case; was sentenced
         to complete and follow the recommendations of [Court
         Reporting Network (CRN)]/Safe Driving Classes, Substance
         Abuse Evaluation, Psychiatric Evaluation, Psychological
         Evaluation, and Psychosexual Evaluation; was required to
         comply with Megan’s Law Registration-Tier 3,[5] and was
         ordered to be given credit for any completed conditions; and
         was ordered to be credited for the time already served in
         the case from October 24, 2015 through the date of
         resentencing on December 20, 2021.
       ________________________

            On    December 29, 2021[,] Appellant filed post sentence
       motions.    On January 7, 2022[,] the motions were denied. On
       February   2, 2022[,] Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On
       February   18, 2022[,] th[e trial c]ourt ordered Appellant to file a

____________________________________________

5 In its opinion and at the December 2021 sentencing hearing, the trial court
referred to the sexual offenders registration statute as Megan’s Law. In 2012,
Megan’s Law was replaced by the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.75.

                                           -4-
J-A07044-23

        [c]oncise [s]tatement of [m]atters [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal
        under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

                On February 18, 2022, counsel for Appellant advised he was
        filing an application to withdraw in [the] Superior Court. On March
        10, 2022[,] th[e trial] court entered an order enlarging the time
        period for filing the [Rule] 1925(b) statement to [21] days
        following appointment of appellate counsel. On April 8, 2022[,
        the] Superior Court granted the application, and on April 28, 2022,
        . . . th[e trial] court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant
        for the appeal. On May 18, 2022, new counsel filed a request to
        have the time period for filing the [Rule] 1925(b) statement
        enlarged for a period of 21 days following receipt of the [n]otes of
        [t]estimony from the proceedings in this case. On August 4,
        2022[,] Appellant filed the [concise statement].

Trial Ct. Op., 9/6/22, at 1-4 (paragraph breaks added).

        Appellant now raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Whether the aggregate sentence of 184 to 368 months is an
        abuse of discretion, as it is unduly harsh and manifestly excessive,
        imposed as it was based entirely on the serious nature of the
        crime, without regard to mitigating evidence presented by [ ]
        Appellant?

        2. Whether the crimes of Burglary and Criminal Trespass merge
        for purposes of sentencing?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

        Appellant first alleges that his aggregate sentence was an abuse of the

trial court’s discretion as it was manifestly excessive. See Appellant’s Brief at

16. Specifically, he complains his sentence “contravenes” Section 9721(b) of

the Sentencing Code based on the following:6

____________________________________________

6   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

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J-A07044-23

      [T]he sentence is overly harsh and manifestly excessive, given the
      nature of the crime and the length of the sentence, where
      [Appellant] was [50] years of age at the time of sentencing, and
      the sentence will amount to a life sentence, where the sentence
      was imposed based on the serious nature of the crime alone
      without regard to the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant], and
      without    regard    to    mitigating   circumstances,     including
      [Appellant]’s support in the community, the fact that [his] prior
      convictions are old, the offenses in [this] matter were committed
      during a single incident, the behavior that constituted the offenses
      was aberrant and would not be repeated, [Appellant] made
      significant steps towards rehabilitation while confined in [this]
      matter, including constant and regular communication with a
      pastor, becoming a deacon in training and engaging in teaching
      and mentoring other prisoners, and [Appellant]’s untreated
      substance abuse and mental health issues.

Id. at 16-17.

      Appellant further asserts that although the trial court was provided with

this “substantial mitigating information, the [ ] court imposed a lengthy

sentence based primarily on the serious nature of the crime.” Appellant’s Brief

at 18. Moreover, he states the “comments made by the trial court do not

reflect any meaningful consideration of information relating to [his] character

and rehabilitative needs[.]”. See id. Appellant contends that while the court

“presided over a re-sentencing hearing during which considerable information

was introduced by Appellant, one cannot discern from the record the

sentencing court’s analysis of that information.” Id. at 19. Additionally, he

states that the court “referred back to notes on the trial and commented only

that the . . . matter is a ‘bad case[’]” and that the court’s “comments offer no

suggestion that it gave meaningful consideration to anything other than the

serious nature of the case.” Id. at 20.

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        There is no automatic right to review of a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentencing. Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa.

Super. 2018).

        Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
        discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four
        part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal [was timely-
        filed]; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
        Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied
        upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary
        aspects of sentence [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4)
        whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that
        the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. [I]f the
        appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then
        proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.

Id. (citation omitted).

        Appellant has satisfied the first three prongs of this analysis, where he

raised this challenge in a post-sentence motion,7 filed a timely appeal, and

included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-

17. Therefore, we now consider whether Appellant has raised a substantial

question for our review.

        In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court
        does not examine the merits of whether the sentence is actually
        excessive.    Rather, we look to whether the appellant has
        forwarded a plausible argument that the sentence, when it is
        within the guideline ranges, is clearly unreasonable.
        Concomitantly, the substantial question determination does not
        require the court to decide the merits of whether the sentence is
        clearly unreasonable.

____________________________________________

7   See Appellant’s Post Sentence Motion, 12/29/21, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

                                           -7-
J-A07044-23

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      This Court has previously determined that a substantial question exists

when the issue is “whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the

aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level

in light of the criminal conduct[.]” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-DeJusus,

994 A.2d 595, 598-99 (Pa. Super. 2010) (footnote omitted).           Moreover, a

claim that a court imposed an excessive sentence after not considering

mitigating circumstances raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth

v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (“[A]n

excessive sentence claim — in conjunction with an assertion that the court

failed to consider mitigating factors — raises a substantial question.”) (citation

omitted). Lastly, a claim that the court focused on a single sentencing factor

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d

473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008) (substantial claim raised where appellant claimed

“the sentencing court focused solely on the serious nature of the crime”). As

such, we interpret Appellant’s assertions to fall under these types of

substantial questions. Therefore, we may proceed to consider the merits of

his argument.

      We consider the relevant standard of review:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

                                      -8-
J-A07044-23

      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).   “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      This Court has also stated:

      [W]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider
      the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9721(b), that is, the
      protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on
      the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
      defendant. . . .

      Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide discretion in
      sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the
      appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a
      sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider
      the sentencing guidelines.

Clemat, 218 A.3d at 960 (citation omitted & paragraph break added).

      When imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider
      the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of
      the defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
      criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
      rehabilitation.

      However, where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a
      presentence investigation report . . . it will be presumed that he
      or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the
      defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
      with mitigating statutory factors.

Id. at 959-60 (citations omitted & paragraph break added).

                                      -9-
J-A07044-23

       Here, the trial court8 had the benefit of the original sentence, prior

“sentencing memorand[a],” defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum,

“psychological, psychosexual, psychiatric” evaluations, and substance abuse

evaluations. See N.T., 12/20/21, at 4; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Appellant

had a prior record score of five; the OGS for attempted rape was 11, the

offense gravity score (OGS) for burglary was nine, the OGS for indecent

assault was five, and the OGS for both criminal trespass and simple assault

was three.        See N.T. at 6; see also Commonwealth’s Sentencing

Memorandum, 2/9/18, at Appendix “A” (Sentencing Guidelines).9 The court-

imposed sentences were all at the top end of the respective standard ranges.

See N.T. at 21; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 7.            We note that “[w]here the

sentencing court impose[s] a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a

pre-sentence report, we will not consider the sentence excessive. In those

circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant

information     regarding     the   defendant’s    character   and   weighed   those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

____________________________________________

8 The trial judge was the same judge at Appellant’s original sentencing and
resentencing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9.

9 At resentencing, the Commonwealth indicated the prior guidelines were in
effect several years ago were the same. See N.T. at 19.

                                          - 10 -
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      Nonetheless,    at   sentencing,    the   trial   court   heard   from   the

Commonwealth as to its recommendation for imposing sentences that were in

the aggravated range and were to run consecutively. See N.T. at 4-8. In

seeking the imposition of consecutive, aggravated range sentences, the

Commonwealth stated several factors:

      One of them is the age of the victim, . . . that she was 81 years
      old and a vulnerable member of the community. The impact on
      the victim . . . her having to deal with this as well as her family in
      her later years of life, the lack of remorse of [Appellant], and the
      continued lack of remorse of [Appellant] and the heinousness of
      the crime[, where Appellant fractured the victim’s collarbone,] . . .
      as well as his continued incompliance and the fact that he is not a
      candidate for supervision in general.

Id. at 6. The Commonwealth further pointed out that Appellant had 16 prior

convictions, ranging from 1992 to 2011, and that his prior parole officer stated

that Appellant “was incapable of complying in 2011” and he “maxed . . . out

on his sentence at that time.”      Id.   The Commonwealth also noted that

Appellant’s prior criminal history, involved “four violent or serious crimes” and

his offenses were “escalat[ing]” in their violent nature. Id. at 7. Lastly, the

Commonwealth indicated that Appellant refused “to cooperate in the

evaluations when [they] were preparing for sentencing.” Id.

      The trial court also heard from Appellant’s counsel who did not deny that

the assault “happened” and that it was “heinous.” N.T. at 8. Counsel stated

that Appellant had “a diagnosed bipolar disorder” that had “not been

treated[,]” and he “was depressed and schizophrenic.” Id. at 9-10. Counsel

noted that Appellant served the maximum sentence for his 2011 sentence

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because he was “not willing to admit” his guilt. Id. at 9. Counsel also pointed

out that Appellant had been abused by his babysitter when he was 13 years

old, and he had “a drug and alcohol problem” in addition to “a serious mental

health problem.”    Id. at 10.   Counsel emphasized that Appellant is “very

complex person” and not someone “who is just a sociopath [and] unable to

be able to help people[.]” Id. at 11-12.

      The court was also privy to letters introduced by Appellant to show he

had support in the community, including one from an 89-year-old woman

named Clara Beasley who wrote that Appellant was “one of the nicest, kindest,

caring and loving and Christ-filled person [she had] ever met.” N.T. at 9.

Appellant’s mother, his pastor ─ Pastor Raymond Merriweather ─ and the

pastor’s wife attended the sentencing hearing in support of Appellant. Id. at

12. Pastor Merriweather testified he made Appellant a “deacon in training”

and his congregation “saw that [Appellant] was moving in a positive direction.”

Id. at 16. The pastor also stated that he was willing to support Appellant

when he is released from prison. Id. at 18.

      Appellant also invoked his right to allocution, testifying to the following:

            Your Honor, I’m actually sitting here in awe. From what I
      heard from the Commonwealth, my attorney and all the support
      that I have . . . at this particular time I would like to just allow
      everything that has been said to speak in [sic] my behalf. And at
      this particular time, . . . I don’t have anything to say except on
      [sic] all those who have known me and what they said and
      anything that has been said throughout this resentencing, and
      with that, thank you.

N.T. at 20.

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J-A07044-23

      At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court explained its rationale

as follows:

      In reviewing and preparing for the resentencing I did review all
      the notes I had including the psychological evaluations,
      psychiatric evaluation, psychosexual evaluations, substance
      abuse evaluations.      I reviewed my notes on the . . . prior
      sentencing memos, prior sentence. And basically, had to relive
      the trial again and kind of get a feel for what went on in 2015. . . .
      This was a bad case. 2018 was the sentencing, and a bad
      situation. And I did sentence [Appellant] in the aggravated range
      for the most part. In reviewing this case and hearing the
      statements of the parties I have decided to sentence [Appellant]
      as follows and these sentences . . . are in the standard range,
      upper end of the standard range for each charge.

N.T. at 20-21.

      In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court supplemented its

statements at sentencing with the following:

      Th[e trial] court considered statements proffered by Appellant
      including: Appellant has diagnosed but untreated bipolar disorder;
      Appellant was abused when he was [13] years old; Appellant has
      a drug and alcohol history; Appellant’s serious convictions are old
      and date back to the 1990s; Appellant has suicidal ideations and
      attempts; Appellant has problems “but he also has this other side
      of him that’s wonderful[.”] Appellant has significant support from
      the community; courts often consider mitigation for people with
      significant mental health issues and drug and alcohol issues;
      Appellant realizes if he [does not] admit he is likely to serve his
      maximum, but the bipolar and mania likely is a part of the reason
      why Appellant remains incapable of admitting; Appellant had
      support of the people who appeared in court. . . . Appellant
      endured more difficult conditions of confinement due to COVIDI9;
      Pastor Merriweather stated Appellant was active in the church and
      was a deacon in training and he still is willing to support Appellant.
      Appellant has made strides toward rehabilitation while confined
      and teaches bible studies to other confined individuals; Appellant
      needs mental health treatment and counseling.

                                   *     *      *

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J-A07044-23

           Having presided over the trial and the earlier court
     proceedings, and having rereviewed Appellant’s evaluations and
     considering them for resentencing, and having carefully listened
     to and discerned the Commonwealth's statement and Appellant’s
     continuing defense at the resentencing hearing, th[e] court
     conscientiously considered all the information and evidence in the
     case as it applies specifically to Appellant for purposes of
     sentencing including: the advanced age of the victim; the
     abhorrent, heinous, and serious nature of the criminal episode;
     the gravity of the offense and the impact of the crime on the
     victim, her family, and the community; the protection of the
     public; the rehabilitative needs of Appellant; Appellant’s prior
     record score of 5 and the age of the serious previous convictions;
     Appellant’s mental health issues, including previous suicide
     attempts and diagnosed but untreated bipolar disorder;
     Appellant’s history of untreated drug and alcohol abuse issues;
     the abuse Appellant endured when he was a teenager; the ardent
     support Appellant has from family and the community; Appellant’s
     steps toward his own rehabilitation while confined and the fact
     Appellant was a deacon in training and regularly attends church
     services and teaches bible studies classes mentoring other
     confined individuals; the unusually difficult conditions of
     confinement during the COVID 19 pandemic; the fact these crimes
     arose from a single criminal episode; Appellant’s contention the
     behavior that constituted the offenses was aberrant and would not
     be repeated.

           Th[e trial] court also carefully considered the sentencing
     guidelines and weighing all the information before the court
     ultimately concluded the new sentence should be a standard range
     sentence and not an aggravated range sentence. In fact, in
     determining Appellant’s new sentence, th[e] court insured all the
     sentences for each of Appellant’s convictions fall in the standard
     range of the sentencing guidelines.

           The sentence is not overly harsh and manifestly excessive,
     given the nature of the crime and the length of sentence.
     Additionally, although Appellant was 50 years of age at the time
     of resentencing, th[e trial] court does not agree the sentence will
     amount [to] a life sentence. The judgment of sentence was
     specifically designed to take into consideration the individual and
     specific rehabilitative needs of Appellant balanced against the

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      serious nature of the crimes and its impact on the victim and
      protection of the public.

             Th[e trial] court considered all the mitigating circumstances
      raised by Appellant. Th[e] court is not persuaded [by] the
      mitigating circumstances, including Appellant’s claim these crimes
      arose from a single criminal episode and the sexual assault
      behavior was aberrant and would not be repeated and Appellant’s
      argument he “cannot admit” and likely will be confined until the
      expiration of the maximum term of confinement, compel the grant
      of a lesser sentence. Although his mental illness may be a reason
      for his inability to admit his actions, th[e] court is convinced it is
      not the only reason, and the evidence in this case is overwhelming
      to support the heinous, abhorrent nature of these criminal
      convictions and the judgment of sentence. Th[e] court absolutely
      did not abuse discretion when it entered judgment of sentence
      upon Appellant. This sentence is not tantamount to a life sentence
      and it is not overly harsh or manifestly excessive and Appellant’s
      claim to the contrary is absurd. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-11 (record citations omitted & some paragraph breaks

added).

      Under our standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion with regard to Appellant’s sentence. Contrary to his argument,

it is evident from the sentencing hearing and the Rule 1925(a) opinion that

the court considered the required factors under Section 9721(b). Likewise,

the court acknowledged its understanding of the sentencing guidelines, and

articulated a sufficient statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.

      Appellant’s assertions fail for several reasons. First, the court was within

its discretion to impose consecutive sentences, even though it amounted to a

lengthy sentence. See Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571, 581 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (“[D]efendants convicted of multiple offenses are not entitled to

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a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate sentence.”) (citation omitted). Further,

we will not disturb consecutive sentences unless the aggregate sentence is

“grossly disparate” to the defendant’s conduct, or “viscerally appear[s] as

patently unreasonable.”     Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d at 599 (citation

omitted).   As the trial court pointed out in support of the imposition of

consecutive sentences: “The judgment of sentence was specifically designed

to take into consideration the individual and specific rehabilitative needs of

Appellant balanced against the serious nature of the crimes and its impact on

the victim and protection of the public.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Thus, we discern

it was reasonable for the court to impose all consecutive sentences.

      Second, contrary to Appellant’s arguments concerning the assault being

a single episode and there was mitigating evidence to support a lesser

sentence, we observe the trial court did consider substantial mitigating

evidence, including his mental health condition and need for rehabilitation.

See Trial Ct. Op. at 8. Appellant fails to recognize that the court did not accept

defense counsel’s arguments and evidence where it stated it was “not

persuaded [by] the mitigating circumstances, including Appellant’s claim

these crimes arose from a single criminal episode and the sexual assault

behavior was aberrant and would not be repeated[.]”         Trial Ct. Op. at 11.

Moreover, the court pointed out that “[a]lthough [Appellant’s] mental illness

may be a reason for his inability to admit his actions, th[e] court is convinced

it is not the only reason, and the evidence in this case is overwhelming to

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support the heinous, abhorrent nature of these criminal convictions and the

judgment of sentence.” Id.

      Lastly, it is evident from both the court’s statements at the December

2021 resentencing hearing and its Rule 1925(a) opinion that the court did not

base Appellant’s sentence primarily on the serious nature of the crime; rather,

the court considered all relevant sentencing factors — the protection of the

public, the gravity of offense in relation to impact on the victim and

community, and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant.       See 42 Pa.C.S. §

9721(b). As such, we conclude the court’s determination does not amount to

an abuse of discretion, and Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects

of his sentence fails.

      In Appellant’s argument, he also contends that the crime of criminal

trespass merges with the crime of burglary for sentencing purposes, and

therefore, his criminal trespass sentence is illegal. See Appellant’s Brief at

21. Appellant acknowledges that in Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d

399 (Pa. Super. 2012), a panel of this Court held that criminal trespass and

burglary each contain an element that the other does not and therefore, the

crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes. See id. at 402; Appellant’s

Brief at 22-23. Nevertheless, Appellant suggests “the Quintua analysis is

incomplete” because “it leaves out Subsection (b)” of the burglary statute,

which concerns a defense to prosecution for the crime. Appellant’s Brief at

23. He states:

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        It is a defense to the crime of [b]urglary if Appellant is licensed or
        privileged to enter the victim’s apartment, [18 Pa.C.S. §]
        3502](b)(3); indeed, if Appellant were so licensed or privileged,
        such entry would be excused. By virtue of the definition of an
        element of the offense set out in [18 Pa.C.S. § 10310], the lack of
        privilege or license to enter becomes an element of the crime of
        [b]urglary. As the Commonwealth would be required to eliminate
        any privilege or licensure for Appellant’s entry into the victim’s
        apartment for the crime of [b]urglary, the elements of the crime
        of trespass, (1) entry (2) without license or privilege, are found in
        the [b]urglary statute. The two offenses therefore merge for
        sentencing purposes, with [b]urglary having the added element of
        intent to commit a crime upon entry.

Id. at 24-25.

        This Court previously has explained:

              A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing
        purposes raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence;
        therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
        review is plenary.

____________________________________________

10   Section 103 of the Crimes Code defines “element of the offense as follows:

        “Element of an offense.” Such conduct or such attendant
        circumstances or such a result of conduct as:

           (1) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in
           the definition of the offense;

           (2) establishes the required kind of culpability;

           (3) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct;

           (4) negatives a defense under the statute of limitation; or

           (5) establishes jurisdiction or venue.

18 Pa.C.S. § 103(1)-(5).

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J-A07044-23

            Our legislature has defined the circumstances under which
      convictions for separate crimes may merge for the purpose of
      sentencing.

         Merger of sentences.           No crimes shall merge for
         sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single
         criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense
         are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.
         Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may
         sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

      42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9765.

         To determine whether offenses are greater and lesser
         included offenses, we compare the elements of the offenses.
         If the elements of the lesser offense are all included within
         the elements of the greater offense and the greater offense
         has at least one additional element, which is different, then
         the sentences merge. If both crimes require proof of at least
         one element that the other does not, then the sentences do
         not merge.

Commonwealth v. Hill, 140 A.3d 713, 715-16 (Pa. Super. 2016) (some

citations omitted).

      The Crimes Code defines burglary, in pertinent part, as follows:

      (a) Offense defined. A person commits the offense of burglary
      if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person:

         (1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately
         secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for
         overnight accommodations in which at the time of the
         offense any person is present and the person commits,
         attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime
         therein;

         (ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately
         secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for
         overnight accommodations in which at the time of the
         offense any person is present[.]

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J-A07044-23

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).11

        The Crimes Code defines criminal trespass, in relevant part, as follows:

        (a) Buildings and occupied structures.

           (1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
           licensed or privileged to do so, he:

              (i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously
              remains in any building or occupied structure or
              separately secured or occupied portion thereof; or

              (ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or
              separately secured or occupied portion thereof.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1).

        As mentioned above, the Quintua Court concluded that criminal

trespass and burglary each contain an element that the other does not and

therefore, the crimes do not merge for sentencing purposes. Specifically, this

Court opined:

              Examining the elements of criminal trespass, a conviction
        for that offense requires a person: (1) to break or enter into with
        subterfuge any building or occupied structure; (2) knowing he is
____________________________________________

11   The burglary statute provides:

        (b) Defense. It is a defense to prosecution for burglary if any of
        the following exists at the time of the commission of the offense:

           (1) The building or structure was abandoned.

           (2) The premises are open to the public.

           (3) The actor is licensed or privileged to enter.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(b)(1)-(3).

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J-A07044-23

        not licensed or privileged to do so. On the other hand, to commit
        burglary, a person must: (1) enter a building or occupied
        structure; (2) with intent to commit a crime therein. The plain
        language of the respective statutes demonstrates why they do not
        merge. Criminal trespass contains an element of knowledge—a
        person committing that offense must know he is not privileged to
        enter the premises. Burglary has no such knowledge requirement.
        Burglary does, however, require intent to commit a crime within
        the premises, an element that criminal trespass lacks. As each
        offense requires proof of an element the other does not, the
        sentences should not merge.

Quintua, 56 A.3d at 402 (citations omitted).

        We note that regardless of the merit of Appellant’s argument, we reject

his assertion asking us to distinguish Quintua by finding it “incomplete.”

Appellant’s Brief at 23. We are “bound by existing precedent and, therefore,

lack[ ]   the   authority   to   overturn     another   panel   decision.   See

Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that a

three-judge panel of this Court is ‘not empowered to overrule another panel

of the Superior Court’).” See Commonwealth v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 482

(Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 286 A.3d 214 (Pa. 2022). Therefore, we

are bound by Quintua, and conclude that Appellant’s merger argument must

fail.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2023

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