Court Opinion

ID: 2964044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:32.91445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:35.501827
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                              _________________________

          No. 93-2246

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  LUIS A. SANTIAGO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                   [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte,* U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________
                                 ____________________

               George F. Gormley, with  whom John D. Colucci and  Gormley &
               _________________             _______________      _________
          Colucci, P.C. were on brief, for appellant.
          _____________
               Luis A. Santiago on supplemental brief pro se.
               ________________
               Helene  Kazanjian,  Assistant United  States  Attorney, with
               _________________
          whom Jay  P. McCloskey, United  States Attorney, and  Jonathan R.
               _________________                                ___________
          Chapman,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  were on  brief, for
          _______
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 1, 1996

                                 ____________________

          *Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.  A jury empaneled  in the United
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          States District Court for the  District of Maine found defendant-

          appellant Luis A. Santiago guilty of a single count of conspiracy

          to  possess and  distribute  heroin, 21  U.S.C.    846,  and  the

          district  court sentenced him as a career offender.  Santiago now

          challenges his conviction and sentence.  We affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    We  limn the facts in  the light most  congenial to the

          verdict,  consistent  with record  support.    See, e.g.,  United
                                                         ___  ____   ______

          States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1991).
          ______    _____

                    The overarching conspiracy  that the government charged

          in the indictment  and attempted to  portray at trial  pirouetted

          around Wilfredo  Figueroa, a Lawrence, Massachusetts drug dealer.

          Figueroa began his career as a  purveyor of cocaine.  In 1991, he

          shifted his  attention to heroin.   He soon built up  a roster of

          approximately  fifteen clients,  all from  Maine.   In  a typical

          transaction  a client  would call  Figueroa from  Maine, order  a

          certain  quantity of heroin, and then sojourn to Lawrence to take

          delivery.    Occasionally a  client  would  appear on  Figueroa's

          doorstep   without  any   prearrangement,   and  Figueroa   would

          improvise.

                    In  effect, Figueroa acted  as a  middleman (or  so the

          jury could have found).   From October 1991  forward, he had  two

          suppliers:  Angel  Soto and the  appellant.  Figueroa  patronized

          Soto as his principal  supply source but turned to  the appellant

                                          2

          whenever  Soto could  not fill  an order.   Furthermore,  some of

          Figueroa's  clients  preferred the  "brand"  of  heroin that  the

          appellant carried,  and Figueroa invariably used  Santiago as his

          source of supply whenever a client ordered that brand.1

                    When  Figueroa asked  for  heroin, the  appellant would

          either  deliver  the  drugs   personally  or  arrange  for  their

          delivery.    All  the  deliveries took  place  in  Massachusetts.

          Figueroa (who cooperated with the government and testified at the

          trial)  stated  that he  purchased an  average  of fifty  bags of

          heroin a day from the appellant  at $15 apiece, often on  credit.

          Although the appellant claims that he never met any of the retail

          customers,  the government  presented evidence  that contradicted

          this   assertion;  and,  moreover,  Figueroa  testified  that  he

          informed the  appellant  that all  his clients  were coming  from

          Maine to Massachusetts to buy heroin.

                    Figueroa's  involvement in  the drug  trade followed  a

          hallowed family  tradition.   His uncle, Roberto  Figueroa, dealt

          drugs in Maine.  Blood may be thicker than water, but it is by no

          means  thicker  than self-interest.    When lawmen  closed  in on

          Roberto Figueroa's operation he threw his nephew to the wolves in

          hopes of mitigating his own punishment.   To help set the  snare,

          Roberto  ordered 130 bags of heroin from his compliant nephew and

          demanded delivery in  Maine.   The appellant sold  fifty bags  of

                              
          ____________________

               1Santiago  (who  wrapped  individual  doses  of   heroin  in
          plastic)  and Soto (who used paper  bags) packaged their products
          differently.   Clients identified their preference  for one brand
          over another by reference to the packaging.

                                          3

          heroin to Figueroa and  Soto supplied the remainder.   On January

          15, 1992, Figueroa  and Soto  exchanged the drugs  for cash at  a

          designated  rest  area  alongside  the Maine  Turnpike  and  were

          promptly arrested.  The  authorities apprehended the appellant in

          Massachusetts and, without objection,   removed him to Maine  for

          trial.   He  was  convicted and  sentenced in  due course.   This

          appeal ensued.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                       Analysis
                                       Analysis
                                       ________

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                             Sufficiency of the Evidence
                             Sufficiency of the Evidence
                             ___________________________

                    The appellant   who is represented by fresh  counsel on

          appeal     argues  that  the  government  presented  insufficient

          evidence  to justify a conviction.   Since the  appellant did not

          preserve  a  sufficiency  challenge  by moving  for  judgment  of

          acquittal at the close of all the evidence, see Fed.  R. Crim. P.
                                                      ___

          29, our  review is limited  to the prevention of  clear and gross

          injustice.   See United States v.  Taylor, 54 F.3d  967, 975 (1st
                       ___ _____________     ______

          Cir.  1995); United  States v. McDowell,  918 F.2d  1004, 1009-10
                       ______________    ________

          (1st Cir. 1990).

                    To  determine a  sufficiency challenge,  we customarily

          inquire  whether the evidence, taken  in the light most favorable

          to the government   a perspective that requires us to draw  every

          plausible inference in line with the verdict and to resolve every

          credibility conflict in the  same fashion   permitted  a rational

          jury  to find each essential element of the offense of conviction

                                          4

          to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Olbres,  61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
             ______                                _____ ______

          522 (1995); Maraj, 947 F.2d at  522-23.  In a conspiracy case, as
                      _____

          in virtually  any other  criminal case,  the government can  meet

          this  burden by either  direct or circumstantial  evidence, or by

          any  combination thereof.   See  United States v.  Echeverri, 982
                                      ___  _____________     _________

          F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir.  1993); United States v. David,  940 F.2d
                                          _____________    _____

          722, 735 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1046 (1992). 
                                    _____ ______

                    The  appellant's sufficiency  challenge  is lacking  in

          merit.  Under the statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C.    846, it was

          incumbent  upon the  government to  establish that  the appellant

          agreed with Figueroa (and,  according to the indictment, possibly

          "other  persons"), at  least tacitly,  to commit  the substantive

          crime     heroin  distribution,  see  21  U.S.C.     841(a)(1)  &
                                           ___

          (b)(1)(C)    which constituted the object of their agreement, and

          that he  thereafter participated in the  conspiracy knowingly and

          voluntarily.   See Echeverri, 982  F.2d at 679.   The record here
                         ___ _________

          satisfies those criteria.

                    To  be sure,  the appellant  makes an  impassioned plea

          that the evidence shows no  more than a buyer-seller relationship

          between  him  and  Figueroa.   We  agree  with  the premise  that

          underlies this  plea:  a buyer-seller  relationship, simpliciter,

          is an insufficient predicate for a finding that the buyer and the

          seller are guilty as coconspirators.  See, e.g., United States v.
                            _________________   ___  ____  _____________

          Mancari, 875 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the sale
          _______

          of drugs  in small  quantities is inadequate,  without additional

                                          5

          evidence, to support a finding of conspiracy to distribute  drugs

          to others because  the seller could reasonably  believe that such

          purchases  are intended for the  buyer's personal use).   But the

          premise provides the  appellant no  safe harbor on  the facts  of

          this case.   While a scenario in which  A sells to B (who resells

          to C, D,  E, and F) may signify that A  and B are related only as

          vendor  and vendee, such a  scenario may also  signify a broader,

          more imbricated relationship.  See, e.g., United States v. Moran,
                                         ___  ____  _____________    _____

          984 F.2d 1299, 1303 (1st Cir. 1993).  Knowledge and intent are at

          the core of  the issue.   Thus, the  question in such  a case  is

          whether the evidence surrounding the transaction(s) is sufficient

          to allow a fairminded jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

          A knew that B was reselling the drugs, and intended to facilitate

          the resales.  See id.
                        ___ ___

                    The evidence here, taken in the light most congenial to

          the verdict,  establishes that the relationship  between Figueroa

          and Santiago contained  enough elements  of "[c]ommon  knowledge,

          interdependence, [and] shared purpose," id., to support a finding
                                                  ___

          that  they  were coconspirators.    Figueroa  testified that  the

          appellant had  actual knowledge of  the follow-on sales  to Maine

          residents.   Two  of  Figueroa's customers  testified that  on at

          least one occasion  the appellant  made a delivery  of heroin  to

          Figueroa's home and met some of his clients.

                    The foregoing testimony  was amply corroborated by  the

          circumstantial evidence.  The appellant sold  Figueroa quantities

          of drugs  (fifty bags per  day) well beyond  the outer limits  of

                                          6

          personal  use amounts and packaged them in a manner suggestive of

          intended  resale.    The  regularity  of  the  transactions,  the

          quantities  of heroin,  the  amounts of  money involved,  and the

          financial  terms (especially the  appellant's extension of credit

          to Figueroa),  taken  together, form  a sturdy  foundation for  a

          finding  that the  appellant and  Figueroa had  at least  a tacit

          agreement  to distribute the heroin to third parties.  Since they

          acted  upon that  tacit  agreement (or  so  the jury  could  have

          found), the appellant's conviction is sustainable by any measure.

          Surely, it does not work an injustice.2

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                                        Venue
                                        Venue
                                        _____

                    The  appellant next  asserts that  he was  tried  in an

          improper venue because he never committed a crime in the District

          of  Maine.   This assertion  is baseless.   It is  settled beyond

          peradventure  that  venue is  a personal  privilege which  can be

          waived.   See Fed.  R. Crim. P.  18; see also  Charles A. Wright,
                    ___                        ___ ____

          Federal Practice  and Procedure   306  (2d ed. 1982).   Here, the
          _______________________________

          appellant  consented to  his removal  and to  the holding  of the

          proceedings in Maine.   He submitted to trial there  without ever

          contesting venue.  He has, therefore, waived the right to raise a

                              
          ____________________

               2The appellant also claims  that the evidence fails to  show
          that he  conspired to distribute the  drugs in Maine.   We reject
                                                      ________
          this  claim for the reasons  discussed in Part  II(B), infra, and
                                                                 _____
          for  the  added  reason  that  the  indictment  charges   a  drug
          distribution conspiracy that took place in "Maine, Massachusetts,
          and elsewhere," unanchored to a single locale.

                                          7

          venue-based challenge  to his conviction.3  See  United States v.
                                                      ___  _____________

          Cordero, 668 F.2d  32, 44-45  (1st Cir. 1981);  see also Fed.  R.
          _______                                         ___ ____

          Crim.  P. 12(b)(2) (mandating waiver of  most defenses that could

          have been, but were not, raised prior to trial).

                    In all events, the  argument fails on the merits.   The

          venue  requirement is  designed to  prevent a  criminal defendant

          from having to defend himself  in a place that has  no meaningful

          connection to the  offense with which he is charged.   This court

          held in United  States v. Uribe,  890 F.2d 554  (1st Cir.  1989),
                  ______________    _____

          that  in a  conspiracy case  venue is  proper in any  district in

          which an act in  furtherance of the charged conspiracy  has taken

          place,  even  if  a  particular  coconspirator  was  not  himself

          physically  present  in that  district.   See  id. at  558.   The
                                                    ___  ___

          actuation  of a  drug distribution  conspiracy culminates  in the

          sale and delivery of  the controlled substance.  Thus,  any place

          in which the culmination  occurs provides a lawful venue  for the

          prosecution of the offense.  See id.
                                       ___ ___

                    In  this  instance,  the conspirators  distributed  the

          heroin  to Maine  residents knowing that  it would  be introduced

          into Maine and consumed there for the most part.  Moreover, on at

          least one occasion the  appellant's cohort, Figueroa,  personally

          delivered  heroin  to   a  Maine  locus  in  furtherance  of  the
                              
          ____________________

               3The appellant's attempt to blunt this waiver by citing  the
          alleged ineffectiveness of his  trial counsel is unavailing.   We
          have  consistently  held    and  today  reaffirm    that,  absent
          exceptional   circumstances  (not  now   present),  a   claim  of
          ineffective assistance of counsel  cannot debut on direct appeal.
          See  United States  v. Mala,  7 F.3d 1058,  1063 (1st  Cir. 1993)
          ___  _____________     ____
          (collecting cases), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1839 (1994).
                              _____ ______

                                          8

          conspiracy (or so the jury could have found).  This single, overt

          act, taking place in Maine, is itself sufficient to sustain venue

          in the District  of Maine.  See id. at  558-59; Cordero, 668 F.2d
                                      ___ ___             _______

          at 43.

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                                       Variance
                                       Variance
                                       ________

                    The appellant claims a prejudicial variance between the

          indictment  and  the  proof,  and  also  claims  that  there  was

          injurious spillover  from  certain evidence  regarding  a  second

          conspiracy  (of  which  he was  not  a  member).   Because  these

          exhortations  are raised for the  first time on  appeal we review

          them only for plain error.   See United States v. Arcadipane,  41
                                       ___ _____________    __________

          F.3d 1, 6 (1st  Cir. 1994).  A close look assures  us that, under

          the  jurisprudence of  plain error,  neither allegation  requires

          reversal.

                    We start  by addressing the allegation  that a variance

          existed  between the indictment and the evidence.  The genesis of

          the  claim  is as  follows.    Near the  end  of  the trial,  the

          attorneys presented a stipulation to the court.   The stipulation

          confirmed that the  contraband seized from  Figueroa in Maine  at

          the time  of  the denouement  comprised eighty-one  bags "of  the

          paper  type"  and fifty  bags "of  the  plastic type."    But the

          stipulation  erroneously described the  drugs as marijuana rather

          than  heroin.  It seems  likely that no  one noticed the misnomer

                                          9

          for  the  court accepted  the  stipulation  without comment,  and

          during closing  arguments each  side specifically  identified the

          bags as containing  heroin.   The appellant now  claims that  the

          obvious  error in  the stipulation  is a  variance  sufficient to

          warrant vacation of the conviction.  We do not agree.

                    The  key  datum  surrounding  a claim  of  variance  is

          whether the  purported variance is sufficiently  severe to affect

          the substantial  rights of the accused.  See id. at 6-7.  Passing
                                                   ___ ___

          the  point of whether a  criminal defendant ever  can predicate a
                                                      ____

          claim of variance on the introduction of evidence to which he has

          stipulated, the claimed variance is more apparent than real.  The

          record  discloses  that  the  reference  to  "marijuana"  was  an

          isolated  event.   The  indictment, the  opening statements,  the

          trial testimony,  the summations,  and the district  court's jury

          instructions all spoke exclusively  and unambiguously of heroin  

          not  marijuana.    Moreover,  there  is   nothing  in  the  trial

          transcript that suggests any basis for a claim that the appellant

          was either misled or surprised   and he has not broached any such

          theory in his appellate briefs.

                    A criminal defendant  is entitled to a  fair trial, not

          necessarily a perfect  one.  Viewed in  the context of  the whole

          record, the misstatement  is at  worst the type  of minor  defect

          that cannot plausibly be said to impact a defendant's substantial

          rights.   See, e.g., United  States v. Fermin  Castillo, 829 F.2d
                    ___  ____  ______________    ________________

          1194, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (reaching a similar conclusion when

          the indictment  misstated  the  name  of  the  bank  that  issued

                                          10

          material  documents and  mischaracterized the  purpose for  which

          these documents  were used).   Since the  stipulated misstatement

          did not deprive the appellant of his due,  plain error is plainly

          lacking.

                    In  a related vein,  the appellant  raises an  issue of

          spillover from one  conspiracy to  another.  We  find this  claim

          hard  to follow.  In virtually all cases involving allegations of

          prejudicial spillover the trial  involves more than one defendant

          or more than  one count.  See, e.g., United  States v. Wihbey, 75
                                    ___  ____  ______________    ______

          F.3d  761, 774-75 (1st Cir.  1996); United States  v. Boylan, 898
                                              _____________     ______

          F.2d  230, 248  (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  498 U.S.  849 (1990).
                                       _____ ______

          Here, however, the appellant stood trial alone on a single charge

            and the only evidence admitted at the trial was evidence deemed

          relevant  to his guilt  or innocence on  that charge.   Thus, the

          claim of prejudicial spillover is a non sequitur.

                    In  a vain  effort  to overcome  this incongruity,  the

          appellant suggests that his  dealings with Figueroa were entirely

          distinct from Soto's dealing with Figueroa, and that the evidence

          anent the  Soto-Figueroa dealings "spilled  over" and  prejudiced

          the jury against  him.  This  view misconceives both  the law  of

          conspiracy and the rules of evidence.  It is settled that members

          of a conspiracy need not all know each other, work  side by side,

          or  otherwise march  in lockstep.   See,  e.g., United  States v.
                                              ___   ____  ______________

          Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161, 1191 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
          _________                                       _____ ______

          S. Ct. 2714  (1994); United States  v. Rivera-Santiago, 872  F.2d
                               _____________     _______________

          1073, 1079  (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 & 493 U.S. 832
                                  _____ ______

                                          11

          (1989).    The  government's  theory  here,  as  limned  in   the

          indictment and  bill of particulars, posited  a single conspiracy

          with  Figueroa as a  linchpin.  The  court permitted  the jury to

          hear  the evidence of Soto's  involvement on that  basis, for the

          most part without objection.  We discern no error in the district

          court's  reception  of  the evidence.    See  Fed.  R. Evid.  401
                                                   ___

          (defining relevancy); see also United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d
                                ___ ____ _____________    _______

          1158,  1168 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying abuse of discretion test to

          admission of evidence).

                                          D.
                                          D.
                                          __

                                      Sentencing
                                      Sentencing
                                      __________

                    The  appellant's final  claim is  that the  lower court

          improperly   applied  the  career  offender  guideline,  U.S.S.G.

           4B1.1,  to his case.   Because this supposed  bevue involves the

          sentencing  court's  interpretation  of a  guideline,  we  afford

          plenary review.  See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st
                           ___ _____________    ______

          Cir. 1994).  The guideline states:

                    A defendant  is a career offender  if (1) the
                    defendant was at least  eighteen years old at
                    the  time of  the  instant offense,  (2)  the
                    instant  offense of  conviction  is a  felony
                    that  is  either a  crime  of  violence or  a
                    controlled  substance  offense,  and (3)  the
                    defendant  has  at  least  two  prior  felony
                    convictions of either a crime of  violence or
                    a controlled substance offense.

          U.S.S.G.  4B1.1 (Nov. 1992).   The question before us  is whether

          the appellant's predicate  offenses crossed the two-prior-felony-

          convictions threshold established by  4B1.1.

                    The  appellant's criminal  record  as disclosed  in the

                                          12

          presentence investigation  report included  (1) a  conviction for

          assault and  battery against a  police officer, (2)  a conviction

          for  assault and battery with  a dangerous weapon  (a work boot),

          (3) multiple convictions on narcotics charges (including a charge

          of  distributing heroin) stemming  from a single  arrest on March

          20,  1990,  and  (4)  another  set  of  multiple  convictions  on

          narcotics-related  charges (including  possession of  heroin with

          intent to distribute) stemming  from a second arrest on  April 9,

          1990.  The  two drug arrests occurred within a  few weeks of each

          other and they were eventually consolidated for sentencing.   The

          appellant claims  that this consolidation rendered  the crimes we

          have listed under  items (3)  and (4) "related  cases" and  meant

          that  they had to be treated as  a single offense for purposes of

           4B1.1.  See  U.S.S.G.  4A1.2(a)(2)  & comment. (n.3).   He  also
                   ___

          argues that because he  received a sentence of under  one year on

          each  of  the assault  and battery  convictions, neither  of them

          constitutes  a cognizable  predicate  offense.   Inasmuch as  the

          appellant's  second argument  is clearly  erroneous, we  need not

          address the question of whether the two sets of narcotics charges

          constitute  separate predicate offenses under the career offender

          guideline.

                    U.S.S.G.   4B1.2(1)  defines  a crime  of  violence  in

          pertinent  part  as  "any  offense  under  federal or  state  law

          punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that . .

          .  has as an element the use .  . . of physical force against the

          person of another."   The appellant contends that neither  of his

                                          13

          prior convictions for assault and battery satisfy the requirement

          of being  "punishable by  imprisonment for  a term  exceeding one

          year" since  he received a  six-month sentence on  each occasion.

          The guideline, however,  does not  speak in terms  of a  judicial
                                                                   ________

          judgment  (the length of the sentence meted out), but, rather, in

          terms   of  a   legislative  judgment  (the   maximum  punishment
                          ___________

          applicable to the offense).  See  U.S.S.G.  4B1.2, comment. (n.3)
                                       ___

          (Nov. 1992) (explaining that a "'[p]rior felony conviction' means

          a prior  . . . conviction  for an offense punishable  by death or

          imprisonment for a term exceeding one  year, regardless of . .  .

          the actual sentence imposed"); see also United States v. Sanchez,
                                         ___ ____ _____________    _______

          917 F.2d 607, 615 (1st Cir. 1990) (reaching the same conclusion),

          cert.  denied, 499  U.S. 977  (1991).   The offenses  occurred in
          _____  ______

          Massachusetts,  and assault  and battery  was punishable  in that

          commonwealth at  the time by  imprisonment of up  to two-and-one-

          half years.   See Mass. Gen. L.  ch. 265,   13A (1990).   Seen in
                        ___

          this light,  the appellant's convictions for  assault and battery

          constitute predicate  offenses within  the purview of  the career

          offender guideline.4  Thus,  the sentencing court did not  err in

          treating the appellant as a career offender.

                              
          ____________________

               4The appellant argues that  the later conviction for assault
          and battery  with a dangerous  weapon should be  excluded because
          the  "weapon" was  a pair  of work  boots.   We  do not  see what
          possible difference flows from this distinction.  For one  thing,
          we take  a categorical approach  to the examination  of predicate
          offenses in order to determine whether they meet the requirements
          of the career offender guideline.  See, e.g.,  Winter, 22 F.3d at
                                             ___  ____   ______
          18.  For another thing, assault and battery is no less a crime of
          violence  because the  assailant  stomps his  victim rather  than
          assaulting him in some more traditional manner.

                                          14

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                    We  need go no further.  The other assignments of error

          are patently meritless and do not warrant discussion.  The record

          reflects,   without   serious   question,   that   the  appellant

          experienced  a fair  trial  in a  proper venue,  and that  he was

          lawfully convicted and sentenced.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          15