Court Opinion

ID: 9714757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:45:01.291897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.365129
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD, specially concurring: While I do not disagree with the conclusion that Calvin Skinner, Sr., was not acting within the scope of his official duties when the accident with plaintiff occurred, I believe a different analysis is appropriate here. Initially, I observe that, while the parties did not brief or argue the issue, I am not convinced that Skinner under these circumstances is an agent of the county. Generally, an individual county board member has no authority to act on behalf of the county. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 516, 526; Pauly v. County of Madison (1919), 288 Ill. 255, 260. Furthermore, even if Skinner were an agent of the county, he would be a nonservant agent. I believe the trial court correctly concluded that, in accordance with section 250 of the Restatement of Agency (Restatement (Second) of Agency §250 (1958)), a principal is not liable for the physical harm caused by a nonservant agent’s negligence. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §280, at 784 (1986). The rule in section 250 does not conflict with the doctrine of re-spondeat superior, but in fact complements it. Even though respon-deat superior can apply to agents, the doctrine is fundamentally rooted in the master-servant relationship; where respondeat superior is applied to an agent, the question is still whether the agent-employee was acting within the scope of his employment. (See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §280 (1986).) Because respondeat superior is dependent upon the master-servant relationship (see Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 259), the doctrine does not apply to an agent who is not also acting in a master-servant relationship. Finally, I note that the case of Holda v. County of Kane (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 522, in which no opinion was joined by a majority of the justices on the panel, does not compel a contrary conclusion. Although Justice Lindberg’s opinion in Holda spoke of the county’s “vicarious liability *** for injuries occasioned by the sheriff’s negligence,” the facts of that case reveal that the negligent acts were those committed by the “jailers” employed by the defendant county. Holda, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 526-27, 532. For the above-stated reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the county.