Court Opinion

ID: 9768961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:00:03.122896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:20.729057
License: Public Domain

PAUL PRESSLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Peaceful picketing and leaf letting are expressive “speech” activities protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). However, “the First Amendment' does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). A state may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon all expression, whether written, oral or symbolized by conduct. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1984). Such restrictions are valid if they “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177, 103 S.Ct. at 1707 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)).
There are many reasons why this injunction should be dissolved. In the labored majority opinion there are numerous wordings and assumptions which are invalid, but it will do no good to dissect its verbosity as the particular facts are such that it would be most surprising if the majority opinion would be used as authority for other cases. Suffice it to say that the language of the injunction is overbroad in that it covers Craig Anderson, Gary Loth and Joseph Pesl, who were not shown to have been on the premises during the demonstrations. It enjoins unnamed directors, officers and members of Right to Life Advocates, Inc. who were not shown to have been on the premises during the demonstrations. Its effect is to prohibit all forms of demonstrating, picketing and counseling, as well as all forms or methods of communication, on any subject. Thus it operates as a prior restraint on free expression activities unrelated to this, lawsuit. In addition, the language operates to restrict “entering or trespassing” without regard to the owner’s interests, including the possible giving of his consent. The record indicates that the owner tacitly consented to the activities of the appellants. The appellants received no notice of any policy of the owner against allowing protestors on the premises until after the demonstrations had ceased. Finally, the language is vague in that “to physically confront” is not defined and to “intimidate” and to “harrass” do not present a clear standard of restraint. This injunction is overly broad and vague. It is neither a reasonable restriction on expression nor is it narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The injunction should, therefore, be dissolved.