Court Opinion

ID: 9739043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:07:45.89455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:44.597426
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The activities of the defendant in the instant case did not justify an investigative stop under the principles articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It is true, as the majority notes, that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution permits officers to temporarily stop citizens for investigative purposes if the officer has “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, — U.S. -, *828109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In this case the “suspicious activity” consisted of defendant leaving the highway shortly after making eye contact with a passing state trooper; the trooper being unable to see any trace of the defendant’s vehicle as he drove by the Tower Systems Road where the defendant had turned off, and the defendant’s re-entering the highway shortly thereafter. From these relatively innocuous actions the trial court concluded, and the majority agrees, that the defendant engaged in evasive actions designed to avoid contact with the state trooper. Having labeled the defendant’s acts evasive, the majority’s analysis proceeds syllogistically: the defendant’s acts were evasive; evasive acts justify investigative stops; ergo, an investigative stop was justified here. Neither the fourth amendment nor the decisions of the United States Supreme Court permit this kind of conclusory analysis where the most fundamental of every citizen’s rights is involved, the right to be left alone by the state. See Olmstead v. United, States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (the makers of the constitution “conferred as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2848, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting.)
While the legality of the acts which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot will not constitutionally preclude an investigative stop, the sheer number and frequency with which literally millions of similar acts are committed by the traveling public for entirely innocent reasons sheds light on the reasonableness of the suspicion of those acts. Therefore, I take exception to the majority’s second premise, that evasive actions justify investigative stops.
The majority cites one case in support of its legal proposition that evasive actions alone may justify investigative stops, Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984). The Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez simply does not support that proposition. While the defendants in Rodriguez did engage in evasive actions, they were not stopped for purpose of the fourth amendment until after they had clearly misidentified themselves to authorities. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5-6, 105 S.Ct. at 310-311. The evasive actions in Rodriguez were not the only circumstances arousing suspicion. Thus, Rodriguez does not support an investigative stop in the fact situation before us. Ironically, the majority quotes Professor LaFave, who makes it quite clear that everyday, garden variety avoidance of the police ' does not justify an investigative stop. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 448-451 (second ed.1987). The majority opinion offers no authority other than Rodriguez to support its position nor does it respond to the cases from our sister jurisdictions, cited by the court of appeals, which have held that no reasonable basis exists for an investigative stop based on evasive actions standing alone. See State v. Johnson, 439 N.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Minn.App.1989); see also LaFave, supra § 9.3(c), at 450-451 (and cases cited therein). In light of the authority against the court’s decision today, the right of citizens to be let alone by the state should prevail. While we may be reluctant to endorse the court of appeals’ rule that evasive actions standing alone may never support an investigative stop, nevertheless, that rule comes closer to accurately stating the import of existing case law than does the opinion of the majority. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.