Court Opinion

ID: 9955515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:13:19.539007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.766401
License: Public Domain

108                        March 21, 2024                          No. 6

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Petitioner on Review,
                              v.
                 JULIO CESAR VILLEDA,
                   Respondent on Review.
                (CC 19CR08759; 20CR10192)
        (CA A175679 (Control); A175680) (SC S070188)

   En Banc
   On review from the Court of Appeals.*
   Argued and submitted November 9, 2023.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender, Criminal Appellate Section.
    James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Gary Walter Higgs.
   Rosalind M. Lee, Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Also on the
brief were Stacy M. Du Clos, Nora E. Coon, and Daniel C.
Silberman.
    Shenoa Payne, Shenoa Payne Attorney at Law PC, Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.

______________
   * Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Oscar Garcia, Judge. 324
Or App 502, 526 P3d 1213 (2023).
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                           109

  BUSHONG, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
110                                            State v. Villeda

         BUSHONG, J.
         A jury convicted defendant of two domestic violence
offenses, acquitting him on more serious charges, including
rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his domestic partner. Before
trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror stated that she
did not think that she could be fair and impartial because
she had several close friends who had been sexually assaulted
and that would influence her if she sat on the jury. The trial
court denied defendant’s request to excuse that prospective
juror for actual bias after hearing her responses to additional
questions posed by the court and the prosecutor. The prospec-
tive juror did not sit on the jury that decided the case because
defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse
her. In appealing his convictions, defendant contended that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s
for-cause challenge to that juror. The Court of Appeals agreed
and further concluded that the error was prejudicial because it
resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. State v. Villeda,
324 Or App 502, 526 P3d 1213 (2023).
        We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge
for cause, but we conclude that the error did not prejudice
the defendant “in respect to a substantial right” as required
for reversal under ORS 131.035. As explained below, the
error did not interfere with defendant’s right to a fair trial
before impartial jurors, and whatever impact the error may
have had on how defendant used his peremptory challenges
did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
                     I. BACKGROUND
A. Standard of Review
         We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to
a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Fanus, 336
Or 63, 83, 79 P3d 847 (2003), cert den, 541 US 1075 (2004).
Because the trial court has the advantage of observing the
juror’s demeanor, a trial court’s decision on a challenge for
cause “is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed
absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. The trial court’s
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                        111

discretion, however, is limited by the law that governs chal-
lenges for cause for actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(g) (defin-
ing actual bias);1 ORS 136.210(1) (adopting ORCP 57 D(1)(g)
standards for jury selection in criminal cases); State v.
Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998) (describing
abuse of discretion standard). The fact that a juror “has
preconceived ideas about a matter relevant to the case is
not determinative.” Barone, 328 Or at 74. Rather, the test
“is whether the prospective juror’s ideas or opinions would
impair substantially [their] performance of the duties of a
juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evi-
dence presented in court.” Id.
B.    The Jury Selection Process in This Case
         The relevant facts—involving the steps taken by
the trial court during the jury selection process, also known
as voir dire—are procedural and undisputed.
         At the start of the jury selection process, the court
read the charges in the indictment and asked if any of the
prospective jurors had personal views about this type of
case—involving allegations of domestic violence, including
charges of rape, sodomy, and physical assault—that might
affect their ability to be fair and impartial jurors. Juror 155
raised her hand. When defense counsel asked juror 155 why
she might not be able to be fair and impartial, she stated, “I
have several close friends who have been sexually assaulted
or raped” and “that would influence how I would participate
in this.” When asked to explain further, juror 155 stated,
“Well, I think generally when I hear about cases of sexual
    1
      ORCP 57 D(1)(g) provides that challenges for cause may be taken for actual
bias. The rule defines actual bias as
     “the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that satisfies the court,
     in the exercise of sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the issue impar-
     tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging
     the juror. Actual bias may be in reference to the action; either party to the
     action; the sex of the party, the party’s attorney, a victim, or a witness; or a
     racial or ethnic group of which the party, the party’s attorney, a victim, or a
     witness is a member, or is perceived to be a member. A challenge for actual
     bias may be taken for the cause mentioned in this paragraph, but on the trial
     of such challenge, although it should appear that the juror challenged has
     formed or expressed opinion upon the merits of the cause from what the juror
     may have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain
     the challenge, but the court must be satisfied, from all the circumstances, that
     the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try the issue impartially.”
112                                                State v. Villeda

abuse or rape, I tend to give credibility to the survivor. And,
so, while I can still presume that [defendant] is innocent, I
think my natural inclination is [to] stand with the survivor.”
          When defense counsel asked the juror if she could
put that view aside, she stated, “I’m not sure if I could put
it aside.” Defense counsel then asked the juror if she had “a
reasonable doubt about [her] ability to be fair to [defendant]
in this case,” and she replied, “Yes.” Defense counsel then
asked the court to excuse juror 155 for cause.
         The court did not immediately rule on that request.
Instead, the court spoke to the pool of prospective jurors
about the role of the jury, explaining that, although the cir-
cumstances of the case might remind a person of their own
life experiences, that does not necessarily mean that the
person cannot be a fair and impartial juror. The court then
asked juror 155 the following question:
       “Do you think you could put those feelings aside * * *
   and be neutral, fair when you hear the evidence here * * *
   and then if it’s creeping back, wait, I know I have these
   feelings, but I can’t let them—no, no, I got to listen. I got to
   be fair to both sides * * *.
      “And then hear the evidence and then follow the law
   as I give it to you and just in essence, you know, to be fair.
   I mean, do you think you could do that * * * if you were a
   juror in this case?”
Juror 155 replied:
       “Yes, I think so. I think, again, that my natural inclina-
   tion would be to lend more support to the victim survivor,
   but I think I could check my biases and my past under-
   standing of these issues.”
At that point, the court permitted questioning of the pro-
spective jurors to continue.
        Later, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors
if anyone believed that a woman would not lie about being
raped. Juror 155 raised her hand and confirmed that her con-
cern was the same as what she previously explained. Juror
155 also indicated that she agreed with defense counsel’s
statements that a woman would not lie about being raped
by someone that she was in a relationship with, and that a
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                          113

woman would not lie “in court” about being raped. Defense
counsel then asked juror 155 if she thought she would be a
good juror for this case, and she replied that she thought she
would be “biased” or “really emotional.”
         The court and prosecutor then inquired further:
       “THE COURT: Ma’am, * * *we gave you a chance to hear
   other folks* * *? And again, you know, you heard my defini-
   tion of what we’re looking for, everybody here * * * to be fair
   and * * * kind of keep * * * those emotions aside if you can* * *.
   So, do you think, ma’am, that you can do it in this case?
       “[JUROR 155]: I don’t think I could keep my emotions
   to the side. Even just being in the room is just difficult.
      “THE COURT: And would those emotions not allow
   you to be fair to one side.
     “[JUROR 155]:        Yeah. I don’t think they would allow
   me to be fair.”
         The court then allowed the state to inquire further:
       “[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. [Juror 155], I can
   see you’re getting a little upset, and I totally understand.
   The good news is that we’re not here to decide whether or
   not rape is a crime. There are certainly—it’s a crime within
   the books, and there are other heinous crimes that defi-
   nitely happen in the courthouse that * * *would be hard to
   listen to. There’s child abuse. There’s murder. And nobody
   is asking you not to be a human when you’re hearing that.
   The question is when the judge tells you that, you know,
   you’re to follow the law and to weigh the evidence as it’s
   presented, do you think that’s something you could do?
      “[JUROR 155]: To weigh the evidence as it’s presented?
      “[THE PROSECUTOR]:            Mm-hmm. The evidence and
   the law as its presented.
      “[JUROR 155]:      Yes.”
        Defense counsel again challenged juror 155 for
cause, and the court denied the challenge. The court also
denied defense counsel’s request for additional peremptory
challenges. At the end of the jury selection process, defense
counsel used one of defendant’s six peremptory challenges
to excuse juror 155 and used the other five peremptory
114                                                           State v. Villeda

challenges to excuse other prospective jurors. Defense coun-
sel did not challenge for cause any of the jurors who were
eventually seated on the jury, although counsel did state
that the defense would have used peremptory challenges to
excuse jurors 128 and 305 if two more peremptory challenges
had been available.2 Defense counsel did not challenge those
jurors for cause, contend that they did not qualify as fair and
impartial jurors, or explain why he would have excused those
jurors peremptorily if he had more peremptory challenges.
         At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defen-
dant guilty of endangering a person protected by an order
under the Family Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 163.192, and
assault in the fourth degree constituting domestic violence,
ORS 163.160(2). The jury found defendant not guilty on the
other charged offenses, including rape, sodomy, and sexual
abuse of his domestic partner.
         Defendant appealed his convictions, and the Court
of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court abused
its discretion in rejecting defendant’s for-cause challenge to
juror 155, Villeda, 324 Or App at 512, and that the conse-
quence of that error “was to force defendant to use a peremp-
tory challenge, effectively reducing the number of peremp-
tory challenges available for other prospective jurors.” Id.
at 514. That amounted to prejudice within the meaning of
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,
the court reasoned, in part based on this court’s description
of “prejudice” in State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 577, 789 P2d
1352 (1990). Thus, the court concluded that “prejudice arises
from the erroneous rejection of a for-cause juror challenge if,
as here, the defendant makes a record that a lost peremp-
tory challenge would otherwise have been used against a
juror who sat.” Villeda, 324 Or App at 514.
                             II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant’s Challenge for Cause Based on Actual Bias
         In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant has the
right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” Or Const, Art I, § 11.
That right “is a matter which is and should be guarded
    2
      Juror 305 sat on the jury that decided the case. Juror 128 was empaneled to sit
on the jury but was later released due to illness and replaced by an alternate juror.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                  115

zealously by the courts, and the courts should guarantee
that juries consist of impartial persons.” Lambert v. Srs. of
St. Joseph, 277 Or 223, 230, 560 P2d 262 (1977). “The test
of a juror’s disqualification [for actual bias] is the probabil-
ity of bias or prejudice” as determined by the trial court.
Montez, 309 Or at 575; see also State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455,
474, 17 P3d 1045 (2000) (stating that the trial court deter-
mines excusal for actual bias “by looking at the totality of
the potential juror’s voir dire testimony to discern whether it
suggests the probability of bias”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
         In considering the totality of the circumstances,
we have explained that a court must give more weight to
a juror’s unprompted statements of bias, and less weight to
any statements made in response to statements or leading
questions by counsel or the court designed to “rehabilitate”
a juror who had disclosed a preexisting bias. For example,
in Lambert, at the beginning of the jury selection process in
a medical malpractice case, one prospective juror indicated
that he knew one of the defendant doctors and stated that
he would be biased in favor of that doctor. 277 Or at 226.
Because the plaintiffs had exhausted their peremptory chal-
lenges, that juror was seated on the jury, which returned a
verdict for the defendants.
          On appeal, we reversed, concluding that the trial
court should have excused that juror for cause because his
“substantial probability of bias” deprived the plaintiffs “of
the right to have their issues determined by an impartial
juror.” Id. at 231. We explained that the trial court’s fail-
ure to excuse the juror for cause amounted to “a manifest
abuse of the discretion vested in the court,” because a juror’s
“[i]nitial reactions or answers given in voir dire without
undue debate and confinement of issues should be afforded
much greater weight in determining [the juror’s] true frame
of mind.” Id. That is because “[e]arly answers or reactions
more truly indicate the juror’s frame of mind as opposed to
later generalized statements that the juror would be fair.”
Id. Thus, we concluded that answers given by a juror early
in the jury selection process—before any efforts at reha-
bilitating the juror—must be given “[s]pecial emphasis” or
116                                                          State v. Villeda

“particular significance” in assessing a prospective juror’s
actual bias. Id.
         We apply the same principles in criminal cases. For
example, in State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 531, 789 P2d 1326
(1990), a capital case, we held that a trial court did not err in
excusing one prospective juror for actual bias where, “[w]ith-
out equivocation, [the juror] explained his views and the effect
that they would have on his ability to be an impartial juror
at the beginning of his voir dire testimony.” The defendant
in Nefstad argued that the trial court had erred in excusing
the prospective juror for cause because the defendant had not
been “given a chance to rehabilitate [the juror] on issues the
trial court felt provided a legal basis for exclusion” in violation
of his statutory and constitutional rights. Id. We disagreed,
noting that ORS 136.210(1) gave the defendant a statutory
right to examine prospective jurors as to their qualifications,
and the defendant’s counsel had been given two opportunities
to question the juror. Id. at 531-32. Moreover, we explained,
examining a juror is different from rehabilitating the juror,
because “the purpose of the voir dire examination was inves-
tigation, not persuasion.” Id. at 533. We therefore concluded,
“ ‘[w]hen it satisfactorily appears from the examination of a
person called as a juror that [they possess] such a state of
mind that [they] cannot try the issues impartially, the intro-
duction of further testimony would be superfluous.’ ” Id. (quot-
ing State v. Miller, 46 Or 485, 487, 81 P 363 (1905)).3
          Thus, we recognized in both Lambert and Nefstad
that (1) a party does not have a right to rehabilitate a biased
juror; (2) a juror’s unprompted statements of bias should be
given special weight; and (3) attempting to persuade a juror
that they could be fair despite their expressed biases inter-
feres with the court’s effort to assess whether the prospective

     3
       We also noted that the statements of another prospective juror in Nefstad
“were equivocal” and that that juror had “given admittedly contradictory
responses” regarding his personal views about the death penalty. Id. at 536, 538.
We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing that
juror for actual bias because the juror’s voir dire testimony, taken as a whole,
“established that his views on the death penalty would have interfered substan-
tially with and impaired his performance as a juror in accordance with his oath
and the court’s instructions.” Id. at 538. We explained that a prospective juror in
a capital case “may be excused on [those] grounds without violating the defen-
dant’s right to an impartial jury.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                       117

juror’s “probability of bias” is sufficient to excuse the juror
for cause.
         Legal scholars and empirical studies support those
conclusions. One commentator observed that juror reha-
bilitation “gets little support from social science research
as a method to ensure impartial juries.” Kathleen Wright,
Friends and Foes in the Jury Box: Walls v. Kim and the
Mission to Stop Improper Juror Rehabilitation, 53 Mercer
L Rev 929, 941 (2002) (examining the practice of juror reha-
bilitation in Georgia in the context of a specific case).4 Other
research has confirmed what we recognized in Lambert:
Juror “rehabilitation” is ineffective at best and likely detri-
mental to the court’s goal of ensuring that all jurors are fair
and impartial.5 See Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of
the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 Ga L Rev 1471, 1487
(2003) (noting that judicial rehabilitation of jurors is a com-
mon tool that is used to increase the efficiency of trials and
advocating for “close scrutiny” of the practice of juror reha-
bilitation); Barbara O’Brien & Catherine Grosso, Judges,
Lawyers, and Willing Jurors: A Tale of Two Jury Selections,
98 Chi Kent L Rev 107, 112 (2023) (noting that, “[w]hen
jurors say something to suggest a bias of any sort, judges
often attempt to rehabilitate that juror” but concluding that
that effort is ineffective in addressing juror bias); Jessica M.

     4
       In the case addressed by the Wright article, Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga App
259, 259, 549 SE2d 797, 799 (2001), aff’d, 275 Ga 177, 563 SE2d 847 (2002), the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that some trial judges attempt to “rehabilitate”
jurors by asking them if they can set aside their biases and decide the case solely
on the evidence and the law, and then retain “these purportedly rehabilitated
jurors.” The court explained that “the better practice is for judges * * * to remove
such partial jurors, even when the question of a particular juror’s impartiality is
a very close call.” Id. 250 Ga at 260, 549 SE2d at 799.
     5
       Several commentators have noted that juror rehabilitation is especially inef-
fective when it is done by a judge. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian
Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire,
the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv L & Pol’y Rev 149, 160
(2010) (stating that “empirical research suggests that potential jurors respond more
candidly and are less likely to give socially desirable answers to questions from law-
yers than from judges” (citing Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 Law & Hum Behav 131
(1987))); Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative
Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 Law & Hum Behav 212, 213 (2010)
(describing an empirical study that revealed that, “not only do venirepersons pro-
vide less candid information to judges than to attorneys, but also judges elicit inac-
curate information from venirepersons due to their choice of questions”).
118                                                         State v. Villeda

Salerno, John C. Campbell, Hannah J. Phalen, Samantha
R. Bean, Valerie P. Hans, Daphna Spivack & Lee Ross, The
Impact of Minimal Versus Extended Voir Dire and Judicial
Rehabilitation on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in Civil Cases, 45
Law & Hum Behav 336, 336 (2021) (noting that “[j]udicial
rehabilitation did not reduce the biasing impact of their pre-
existing attitudes on case judgments but did result in mock
jurors reporting that they were less biased, despite evidence
that judicial rehabilitation did not actually reduce their
bias” (emphasis in original)).6
         As one study explained, “[i]n a typical juror reha-
bilitation, the judge asks jurors individually, in front of
the remaining panel, whether they can set aside bias they
have already confessed and be fair. Social science evi-
dence strongly [suggests] * * * that jurors confronted with
this question from the bench almost invariably say, yes.”
Wright at 941-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those
results support this court’s conclusion in Lambert that a
juror’s unprompted statements regarding bias must be
given “much greater weight” than statements made after
the court or counsel attempt to “rehabilitate” the juror by
asking whether the juror can set aside her bias and be fair.
277 Or at 231. Posing close-ended questions to “rehabilitate”
a juror is an ineffective way to discern a juror’s actual biases
and achieve the goal of selecting a fair and impartial jury.
         In this case, the trial judge gave greater weight to
juror 155’s responses to the judge’s questions, and, to some
extent, the prosecutor’s follow-up question asking the juror
if she could set aside her expressed bias and be fair, than
to her initial, unprompted statements of bias. The trial
court’s reliance on the juror’s responses to those questions
and its failure to give “much greater weight” to the juror’s
unprompted statements about her bias at the start of the
jury selection process exceeded the range of discretion
    6
      Although this case involves a juror’s express, rather than implicit, bias,
commentators have noted that juror rehabilitation is especially ineffective to
address a juror’s implicit bias. See Bennett at 160 (stating that the question
often asked by judges to rehabilitate a juror—Can you be fair and impartial in
this case?—“does not begin to address implicit bias, which by its nature is not
consciously known to the prospective juror”); id. (noting that “the trial judge is
probably the person in the courtroom least able to discover implicit bias by ques-
tioning jurors”).
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                 119

afforded under Lambert. Accordingly, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155.
B.   Whether the Error Is Grounds for Reversal
         In criminal cases, an error is grounds for rever-
sal only if it “has prejudiced the defendant in respect to a
substantial right.” ORS 131.035; see also State v. Davis, 336
Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (stating that, under Article
VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, this
court “must affirm a judgment, despite any error commit-
ted at trial, if, after considering all the matters submit-
ted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment ‘was such
as should have been rendered in the case’ ”). In Davis, we
explained that assessing whether there is little likelihood
that an error affected the outcome is the “constitutional test
for affirmance despite error.” 336 Or at 32.
         Although ORS 131.035—whether the error “has
prejudiced the defendant in respect to a substantial right”—
is worded differently, we noted in Davis that the constitu-
tional analysis “is similar to” the analysis required by stat-
utes that “preclude reversal of a judgment for trial error in
the absence of a demonstration that the error affected the
substantial right of a party.” 336 Or at 29 n 7. In another
case, we cited both provisions without identifying any
meaningful difference between them, and no party in this
case contends that there is any difference between the stat-
utory and constitutional standards. See State v. Dulfu, 363
Or 647, 676, 426 P3d 641 (2018) (citing Or Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 3, and ORS 131.035 in determining whether
an error was harmless). Accordingly, in this case, our con-
clusion that the erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause
challenge did not prejudice defendant in respect to a sub-
stantial right as required for reversal under ORS 131.035
also means that there was little likelihood that the error
affected the outcome, consistent with the constitutional test
for affirmance despite error described in Davis.
        The state contends that the erroneous denial of
defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155 was not prejudi-
cial under State v. Megorden, 49 Or 259, 88 P 306 (1907), and
120                                                          State v. Villeda

Barone. We stated in Megorden that the erroneous denial of
a challenge for cause to a juror excused peremptorily is not
prejudicial unless “the challenger was compelled to accept
an objectionable juror.” 49 Or at 263-64. We concluded in
Barone that peremptory challenges “have no constitutional
significance in and of themselves, and the fact that a defen-
dant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury does
not offend the right to a fair trial.” 328 Or at 72-73. The
state contends that an “objectionable juror” for purposes
of Megorden is a juror who should have been excluded for
cause, and that any “loss” of a peremptory challenge in this
context cannot be prejudicial under Barone unless the error
deprived a defendant of his right to a fair trial.
         Defendant counters that the erroneous denial of his
for-cause challenge was prejudicial because it caused him to
use a peremptory challenge on juror 155 that he otherwise
could have used on one of two other jurors that he identi-
fied at the time, and one of those jurors served on the jury.
Defendant argues that this “loss” of a peremptory challenge
is prejudicial automatically under Highway Commission
v. Walker et ux, 232 Or 478, 485, 376 P2d 96 (1962), and
that we confirmed that presumption of prejudice in Montez.
Alternatively, defendant contends that our prior cases have
treated any juror that a party would have excused peremp-
torily as an “objectionable juror” for purposes of Megorden,
making the erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause chal-
lenge in this case prejudicial because it forced him to accept
an “objectionable juror” that he would have been able to
excuse peremptorily if the court had not denied his for-cause
challenge.7
         The state disagrees with defendant’s understanding
of Megorden and suggests that we should overrule Walker if
we conclude that it conflicts with this court’s decisions in
Megorden and Barone. As we shall explain, we conclude that
the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s challenge
to juror 155 for cause did not “prejudice the defendant in
respect to a substantial right” as required for reversal under
    7
      Defendant assigned error solely to the trial court’s decision not to excuse
juror 155 for cause. Defendant did not separately assign error to the trial court’s
“rehabilitation” statements during voir dire. Accordingly, we are not called upon
to decided how prejudice is to be evaluated in that circumstance.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                  121

ORS 131.035. To reach that conclusion, we need not overrule
Walker because the error in that case is different than the
error in this case.
          We begin with defendant’s argument that his “loss”
of a peremptory challenge is presumed to be prejudicial
under Walker. In that condemnation action, both parties
had a statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges.
After each party had exercised two peremptory challenges,
the plaintiff—the State Highway Commission—declined to
use its final challenge on any of the 12 jurors that had been
seated on the panel. Defendants then exercised their third
peremptory challenge, and a new juror was seated. The state
then attempted to exercise its third peremptory challenge
on the new juror, but the trial court ruled that the state had
waived its third peremptory challenge by declining to exer-
cise it on any of the jurors on the previous panel. The only
issue on appeal was whether “the trial [court] erred when
[it] refused to permit the state to exercise its third peremp-
tory challenge.” Walker, 232 Or at 481.
         To resolve that question, we cited the general rule
that applies when the parties “exercise their peremptory
challenges alternately, beginning with the plaintiff and con-
tinuing until one of them is satisfied with the jury as it is
then constituted and waives his next challenge.” Id. at 484.
When that occurs, we explained, a peremptory challenge
“waived by either party upon its becoming satisfied with
the jury as then constituted may later be exercised upon
a juror who is called to the box subsequent to the time the
challenge was waived.” Id. We concluded that the trial court
had erred because it did not allow the state to exercise its
third peremptory challenge “upon a juror who [was] called
to the box” after the state had passed on the 12 jurors who
had been seated on the previous panel. Id. We said that the
error “should be deemed prejudicial automatically” because,
otherwise, the statutory right to three peremptory chal-
lenges “is an empty one.” Id. at 485.
          Thus, the error that was presumed prejudicial in
Walker was the trial court’s determination that the state
had “waived” one of the three peremptory challenges allot-
ted to it by statute. The error in this case is different. Here,
122                                                         State v. Villeda

we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155. But
the trial court did not find that defendant had “waived” any
of the six peremptory challenges allotted to him by stat-
ute, as in Walker. Because defendant was able to use all six
peremptory challenges allotted to him by statute, the error
in this case is different from the error that we presumed to
be prejudicial in Walker.
         In addition, we determined in Baker v. English, 324
Or 585, 932 P2d 57 (1997), that Walker’s presumptive preju-
dice rule should be limited to the circumstances presented
in that case. In Baker, we noted that Walker had identified
“a narrow exception to the general principle that a party’s
rights ordinarily are not substantially affected by an error
that likely did not affect the outcome of the case,” but we
indicated that Walker’s “per se rule specifically for the pur-
pose of analyzing error pertaining to peremptory challenges
* * * should not be interpreted to reach beyond that context.”
Id. at 592 n 6. Accordingly, we decline to extend Walker’s
per se rule beyond the context of that case. Thus, the only
error pertaining to peremptory challenges that will be
“deemed prejudicial automatically” under Walker is errone-
ously denying a party the number of peremptory challenges
allotted by statute. See also State v. Durham, 177 Or 574,
164 P2d 448 (1945) (holding that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error “in denying [the] defendant the right of
peremptory challenge” when the court refused to allow the
defendant any peremptory challenges in selecting a jury for
sentencing under Oregon’s Habitual Criminal Act).8
        There is no such error here. Defendant used all six
of the peremptory challenges allotted to him by statute,
and he does not contend in this court that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow him more than six peremptory
     8
       The Habitual Criminal Act applied in Durham was a 1927 statute that pro-
vided for an enhanced sentence of up to life imprisonment for a felony conviction
if the defendant had three prior felony convictions. The trial court in Durham
empaneled a jury at the time of sentencing to consider whether defendant had
been convicted of the requisite four felonies (including the current charge), but
the trial court determined in that special proceeding that defendant “was not
entitled to any peremptory challenge[s].” 177 Or at 579. This court reversed, con-
cluding that the legislature did not intend to deny defendant the right of peremp-
tory challenge when it enacted the Habitual Criminal Act. Id. at 581.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                 123

challenges. Defendant contends, however, that he was effec-
tively denied the use of six peremptory challenges because
he was “forced” to use a peremptory challenge on juror 155,
leaving him with only five peremptory challenges to use on
other jurors. Defendant argues that we confirmed in Montez
that such a “loss” of a peremptory challenge is grounds for
reversal. We disagree with both contentions.
         The erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause chal-
lenge did not “force” him to use a peremptory challenge on
juror 155. Peremptory challenges are granted by statute “as
[a] matter of favor” or as a “privilege” to litigants. State v.
White, 48 Or 416, 425, 87 P 137 (1906). A peremptory chal-
lenge is something that a party may “use at [the party’s]
own discretion.” State v. Humphrey, 63 Or 540, 544, 128 P
824 (1912). Denying a for-cause challenge does not “force” a
party to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror it had
challenged for cause because a party might choose not to use
a peremptory challenge to excuse that juror. For example, in
Humphrey, the defendants chose to leave on the jury a juror
that they had previously challenged for cause, even though
they still had peremptory challenges available at the end of
jury selection. Id. at 544-45 (noting that the defendants had
challenged six jurors for cause, used peremptory challenges
to excuse five of those jurors, and did not use “any of the
remaining seven peremptory challenges allowed them by
statute” to excuse the other juror that they had challenged
for cause).
         If we assume that defendant’s objective was to
accomplish what he would have accomplished if the trial
court had dismissed juror 155 for cause—removing that
juror from the jury—then the only way he could accomplish
that result was to use one of his peremptory challenges to
remove that juror. As explained below, we have described
that use of a peremptory challenge as “curing” the error,
but we have never described it as a prejudicial denial of a
substantial right. Defendant argues that we “confirmed” in
Montez, a capital case, that an erroneous denial of a chal-
lenge for cause is prejudicial error where a party uses one
of the allotted peremptory challenges to excuse the juror
in question, leaving it with one less peremptory challenge
124                                           State v. Villeda

to exercise on other jurors. That argument relies on our
“exhaustive discussion of the merits” of a for-cause chal-
lenge to a prospective juror in Montez, suggesting that we
undertook that discussion because we were “apparently sat-
isfied that the prejudice issue did not present an easy way
out.” But defendant reads too much into the fact that we
reviewed the merits of the for-cause challenges in Montez.
         There, the defendant contended that the trial court
erred in excluding two prospective jurors who had expressed
opposition to the death penalty, and in denying the defen-
dant’s for-cause challenges with respect to two other pro-
spective jurors who had expressed support for the death
penalty. The defendant argued that those decisions “denied
him his right to an impartial jury” in violation of the Oregon
and United States Constitutions. Montez, 309 Or at 573. We
began our discussion on the merits of the defendant’s chal-
lenge to one of those prospective jurors with the observation
that, “[b]ecause [that juror] did not serve on the jury, the
only ‘prejudice’ to [the] defendant was that [the] defendant
had no remaining peremptory challenge to later excuse
[another prospective juror], who did serve on the jury.” Id. at
577.
         Stating that “the only ‘prejudice’ ” to the defendant
was the fact that he had no remaining peremptory chal-
lenge to excuse a different juror does not mean that we had
decided that the error was prejudicial. Ultimately, we found
no basis in the record “to conclude that the trial court’s
decision not to excuse [that prospective juror] for cause was
reversible error.” Id. at 593. We further concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion “in refusing to excuse
[the other juror] for cause.” Id. at 594. Because we found
no error in the trial court’s denial of any of the defendant’s
for-cause challenges in Montez, it was not necessary for us
to decide whether any error was prejudicial. See Parks v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 347 Or 374, 384, 227 P3d 1127 (2009) (the
fact that the court previously mentioned without deciding
an issue “simply reflects” that we “had no reason to consider
the issue”).
         Defendant alternatively contends that, because the
error in this case resulted in seating a juror that he would
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                     125

have excused peremptorily, it was prejudicial under Megorden,
because he was “compelled to accept an objectionable juror.”
49 Or at 263-64. Defendant asserts that our case law has
recognized that any juror whom a party would have excused
peremptorily is an “objectionable” juror for purposes of estab-
lishing prejudice under Megorden. But, as explained below,
none of the cases cited by defendant held that an “objection-
able juror” for purposes of Megorden is a juror whom a party
would have excused peremptorily if another challenge had
been available. We begin our discussion of those cases with
Ford v. Umatilla County, 15 Or 313, 16 P 33, reh’g den, 15
Or 323, 16 P 38 (1887), which does provide some support for
defendant’s argument.
         The plaintiff in Ford sued Umatilla County for
damages after a bridge collapsed while plaintiff was driving
his team of horses and a wagon across it, killing two horses,
and badly damaging his personal property. During jury
selection, plaintiff’s counsel argued that jurors who were
taxpayers in Umatilla County should be excused for implied
bias. The trial court generally agreed and excused several
prospective jurors on that basis.9 The county then sought
to excuse a juror for cause on the same grounds; plaintiff
objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, deny-
ing the county’s for-cause challenge. The county then used
a peremptory challenge to remove that juror and contended
on appeal that the trial court had committed reversible error
in denying its challenge for cause. This court disagreed,
concluding that the county, “having afterwards challenged
the juror peremptorily, thereby waived [its] challenge for
cause.” 15 Or at 322. The county moved for rehearing, but
the court adhered to its ruling, noting that the only reason
given for excusing the juror for cause was that he was a tax-
payer in Umatilla County. The court explained that “being
a tax-payer of the county interested him in deciding in [the
county’s] favor” so the county “must have had other reasons
for objecting to his sitting.” Ford v. Umatilla County, 15 Or
    9
      Unlike actual bias, a challenge for cause for “implied basis” is based solely
on a prospective juror’s relationship to the parties involved, prior involvement in
the case, or interest in the outcome of the case. See ORCP 57 D(1)(c) - (f) (listing
reasons). The Ford court did not explain why it thought that being a taxpayer of a
county that had been sued for damages gave rise to implied bias; taxpayer status
would not be a basis for a challenge for cause for implied bias under current law.
126                                             State v. Villeda

323, 325-26, 16 P 38 (1887) (on petition for rehearing). Under
those circumstances, the court continued, the county “was
not compelled to resort to a peremptory challenge in order
to exclude the juror for grounds for which he had been chal-
lenged for cause.” Id. at 325. Rather, the court concluded, if
a party chooses to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a
juror for reasons other than the reasons given for challeng-
ing the juror for cause, the party “should be deemed to have
waived his right to insist upon the former objection.” Id. at
326.
        The court then stated:
   “If the grounds of the challenge for cause had been of such
   a nature as would have been likely to prejudice the juror
   against [the county], and [the county] had been put to its
   peremptory challenge in order to exclude him, there would
   be more reason for claiming that the error was prejudicial.”
Id. (emphasis added). But the court went on to explain that,
“under the circumstances, as they exist, no such presumption
can be drawn.” Id. Given that context, the statement that
there would be “more reason” to find prejudicial error under
circumstances not presented in that case is clearly dicta and,
as our subsequent cases (discussed next) demonstrate, we
have never adopted that dicta in determining whether using
a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror who should have
been excused for cause makes the error prejudicial.
         In some cases, we have indicated that using a
peremptory challenge to excuse a juror who should have
been excused for cause “cures” the error. See, e.g., Humphrey,
63 Or at 544 (“It is well settled that, although the court sit-
ting in the trial of the cause may have erred in overruling
a challenge for cause, yet the error is cured by the exercise
of a peremptory challenge against the juror in question.”);
Twitchell v. Thompson, 78 Or 285, 289, 153 P 45 (1915)
(where plaintiff used peremptory challenges to excuse jurors
that plaintiff had challenged for cause, any claim that the
court erred in denying the for-cause challenges was “dis-
posed of” by the decision in Humphrey); State v. Layton, 174
Or 217, 234, 148 P2d 522 (1944) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause
challenges to two jurors because defendant removed those
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                    127

jurors peremptorily, so “[i]f any error was committed, it was
cured by the exercise of the peremptory challenges”).
         Other cases have framed the issue in terms of waiver
or lack of prejudice, but none followed the dicta in Ford. For
example, in State v. Rathie, 101 Or 339, 349, 199 P 169 (1921),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brewton, 238
Or 590, 395 P2d 874 (1964), we stated that “[i]t is the rule in
this state that error of the court in refusing to allow a chal-
lenge to a juror for cause is waived if the party objecting,
after exhausting his peremptory challenges, accepts with-
out objection other jurors to complete the panel.” In State v.
Douglas, 310 Or 438, 441-42, 800 P2d 288 (1990), we con-
cluded that, where the defendant exhausted his peremptory
challenges to remove a juror whom he had challenged for
cause, there was a “lack of demonstrated prejudice” because
the defendant had failed to show “that the final jury panel
was inappropriate in any way.”10
          Two other cases cited by defendant merely apply the
principle established in Humphrey that an erroneous denial
of a challenge for cause is not prejudicial error if the defen-
dant does not exhaust the allotted peremptory challenges.
See Mount v. Welsh et al, 118 Or 568, 579, 247 P 815 (1926)
(stating that “[t]he rule in this jurisdiction” is that “until
a defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted, [they
are] not in a position to complain of the overruling of [their]
challenge for cause to any particular juror who afterwards
serves on the panel”); State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 158, 800
P2d 288 (1990) (holding that, where a defendant “did not
exhaust his statutory allocation” of peremptory challenges
and did not establish “that any member of the jury panel
that actually decided his guilt should have been excused for
cause[,]” defendant has failed “to identify any prejudice that
may have resulted from the ruling [on a challenge for cause]
even if it were error”).
         Thus, none of the cases that defendant cites held that
an “objectionable juror” for purposes of determining prejudicial

    10
       Rathie’s characterization of a party’s failure to object to any remaining
jurors for cause after exhausting all peremptory challenges as a “waiver” was
discarded in Douglas, where we stated that Megorden “more accurately described
the reason for the rule, which is a lack of demonstrated prejudice.” 310 Or at 441.
128                                           State v. Villeda

error under Megorden is a juror whom a party would have
excused peremptorily. Although dicta in Ford suggests other-
wise, no other case has adopted that position. To the contrary,
our recent cases have suggested—also without expressly hold-
ing—that an “objectionable” juror for purposes of determining
prejudicial error under Megorden is a juror who would have
been excused for cause. For example, in Douglas, after quot-
ing the “objectionable juror” rule in Megorden, we concluded
that there was no prejudicial error absent a showing that “the
final jury panel was inappropriate in any way.” 310 Or at 442.
Although we did not explain in Douglas what we meant by
“inappropriate,” we had earlier stated in Farrar that any error
in denying a for-cause challenge was not prejudicial, in part,
because defendant did not show “that any member of the jury
panel that actually decided his guilt should have been excused
for cause.” 309 Or at 158 (emphasis added).
         That statement suggests that an “objectionable” or
“inappropriate” juror for purposes of determining prejudice
is a juror who should have been excused for cause. That is
what happened in Lambert. There, as noted above, we con-
cluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiffs’ challenge for cause to a juror based on his
actual bias. That juror sat on the jury that decided the case
because the plaintiffs had exhausted their peremptory chal-
lenges. We concluded that the trial court’s error was preju-
dicial, because, by allowing a juror who should have been
excused for cause to sit on the jury, the court “deprived [the
plaintiffs] of the right to have their issues determined by an
impartial juror.” 277 Or at 231.
         Our observation in Farrar and our conclusion in
Lambert are supported by other cases that describe peremp-
tory challenges as a tool that can be used to help avoid
infringing upon a party’s right to a fair trial with impartial
jurors. None of those cases suggests that, when a party uses
one of its allotted peremptory challenges to excuse a juror
when the party might have preferred to use the challenge
to excuse a different qualified juror amounts to prejudice
to a substantial right. For example, we stated in Barone
that peremptory challenges “have no constitutional signif-
icance in and of themselves.” 328 Or at 72. We explained
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                   129

that peremptory challenges help “guarantee the impartial-
ity of the jury that sits on the case,” but “the fact that a
defendant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury
does not offend the right to a fair trial.” Id. at 72-73. And,
as we stated in Humphrey, “the law has provided not only
challenges for cause, but also those peremptory to enable the
defendant to protect his right to a fair and impartial jury.” 63
Or at 545 (emphasis added). That suggests that, although a
defendant certainly has a “substantial right” to a fair trial
with impartial jurors, denying a defendant the opportunity
to seat a juror that the defendant would prefer over another
qualified juror is not prejudicial to any substantial right.11
         That suggestion is supported by our description of
the nature of peremptory challenges in Megorden, where we
framed the issue as follows: “The simple question, after the
peremptory challenges are exhausted, is: Is the jury which
finally tries the case impartial?” 49 Or at 264 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). If so, we explained, there is no prej-
udicial error because “[a]ll that the [c]onstitution, all that
the law, requires and demands is a trial by an impartial
jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We further
explained that “[t]he right to challenge is the right to reject,
not to select, a juror. If from those who remain, an impartial
jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is
maintained.” Id. (quoting Hays v. Missouri, 120 US 68, 71,
7 S Ct 352, 30 L Ed 578 (1887)).12
    11
       The conclusion that a party does not have a protected “right” to seat
one qualified juror over another is supported by the well-documented abuse of
peremptory challenges for racially discriminatory purposes, which led Arizona to
abolish them entirely. See Arizona Supreme Court Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug 30,
2021) (amending rules of criminal and civil procedure to eliminate peremp-
tory challenges); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 102-03, 106 S Ct 1712,
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not
end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges entirely.”). Other states have limited the use of peremptory challenges
for the same reason. See Willamette University College of Law Racial Justice
Task Force, Remedying Batson’s Failure to Address Unconscious Juror Bias in
Oregon, 57 Willamette L Rev 85 (2021) (calling for reform and describing court
rules adopted in Washington and California that specify presumptively invalid
reasons for exercising peremptory challenges).
    12
       The Megorden court cited with approval its then-recent decision in State
v. White, 48 Or 416. In White, we held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in excusing two jurors for cause—and seating two new jurors—after the
defendant had used all his peremptory challenges. We explained that the fact
130                                                            State v. Villeda

          That position is also supported by our more recent
decision in Barone, a capital case, where we rejected the
defendant’s argument that the erroneous denial of his chal-
lenges for cause was prejudicial. Although the denial of
those challenges resulted in the defendant using peremp-
tory challenges “that he could have used to exclude other
jurors who were objectionable to him, who did remain on
the jury,” he was not required to accept a juror who should
have been excused for cause. 328 Or at 72. We acknowledged
that, if the trial court had excused the challenged prospec-
tive jurors for cause, the defendant “would have used his
peremptory challenges differently and, as a result, would
have been tried by a jury with a different membership.” Id.
But, we explained, the state and federal constitutions do
not give a defendant “a right to exclusive control over the
composition of the trial jury.” Id. Rather, peremptory chal-
lenges help “guarantee the impartiality of the jury that sits
on the case.” Id. Thus, although those challenges play a role
in ensuring an impartial jury, they “have no constitutional
significance in and of themselves, and the fact that a defen-
dant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury does
not offend the right to a fair trial.” Id. at 72-73.
         In summary, as explained above, an error is
grounds for reversal only if the error prejudiced the appel-
lant in respect to a substantial right.13 Even if we pre-
sume that defendant effectively “lost” a peremptory chal-
lenge when the trial court denied his for-cause challenge
to juror 155, peremptory challenges “have no constitutional

that a party had exhausted his peremptory challenges before a juror was excused
for cause “invaded no right” of that party, because a peremptory challenge “is
not aimed at disqualification, but is exercised upon qualified jurors as a matter
of favor to the challenger.” Id. at 425 (quoting O’Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 67
Mich 560, 562, 35 NW 162, 163 (1887) (emphasis added)). Thus, we held that, if a
party “has exercised the privilege [of peremptory challenges] to the extent given
by the statute, it cannot be alleged as error that qualified jurors are afterwards
drawn or placed in the panel.” Id. The reason, we explained, is that the party’s
“right to have his case tried before a fair, impartial and qualified jury remains
unimpaired[.]” Id.
     13
        In light of our conclusion that the trial court’s error in denying defendant’s
for-cause challenge was not prejudicial in respect to a substantial right, we do
not think it is necessary to remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether
the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant defendant an additional
peremptory challenge, as he asserted in his second assignment of error in the
Court of Appeals.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)                                                      131

significance in and of themselves.” Barone, 328 Or at 72.
Peremptory challenges also have no statutory significance
in and of themselves other than the right to use the number
of peremptory challenges allotted by statute.14 Defendant’s
statutory right to use six peremptory challenges is a right
“to reject, not to select, a juror.” Megorden, 49 Or at 264.
Thus, any error in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge
to juror 155 meant, at most, that defendant lost the ability to
reject another qualified juror that he would have preferred
to excuse from the jury. That “loss” was not prejudicial to
defendant in respect to a substantial right, as required for
reversal under ORS 131.035.15
         That conclusion is consistent with our cases holding
that an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible
error only if a juror who decided the case was not fair and
impartial. It is also consistent with the nature and purpose
of peremptory challenges as a tool to help protect the funda-
mental right to a trial to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant
does not contend that any of the jurors who decided this case
were not fair and impartial. Accordingly, the trial court’s
error in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to juror 155
was not prejudicial to defendant in respect to a substantial
right.
                           III.    CONCLUSION
        We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s chal-
lenge for cause to juror 155 on the grounds of actual bias
but conclude that that error is not grounds for reversal
     14
        Defendant does not contend that peremptory challenges have any stat-
utory significance in and of themselves other than as recognized in our prior
cases. But as we have explained, the only statutory significance of peremptory
challenges that we have recognized is the right to use the number of peremptory
challenges allotted by statute.
     15
        To be clear, we are not saying that the only right that would be considered
a “substantial right” under ORS 131.035 is a right that affects a party’s right to
a fair trial or is otherwise constitutionally significant. Statutory rights may also
be “substantial” for purposes of ORS 131.035. For example, as explained above,
we held in Walker and in Durham that erroneously refusing to allow a party
to exercise the number of peremptory challenges allotted by statute would be
deemed prejudicial error. But an erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge is not
prejudicial under ORS 131.035 where the challenged juror is excused perempto-
rily unless the error affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial before impartial
jurors.
132                                       State v. Villeda

under ORS 131.035 because it did not prejudice defendant
in respect to a substantial right.
        The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.