Court Opinion

ID: 9928349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 16:18:09.364395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:24.403302
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                   2024 WY 13

                                                    OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                          January 31, 2024

CITY OF LARAMIE, WYOMING,

Appellant
(Plaintiff),

v.
                                                    S-23-0062
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING and
UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING BOARD OF
TRUSTEES,

Appellees
(Defendants).

                  Appeal from the District Court of Albany County
                     The Honorable Misha E. Westby, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Thomas Szott and Korry D. Lewis of The Bernhoft Law Firm, S.C., Cheyenne,
      Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Szott.

Representing Appellees:
      Patrick J. Crank and Abbigail C. Forwood of Crank Legal Group, P.C., Cheyenne,
      Wyoming. Teresa R. Evans, University of Wyoming General Counsel, Laramie,
      Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Crank.

Representing the Attorney General’s Office Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 7.07:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; D. David DeWald, Deputy Attorney General;
      Christoper M. Brown, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Abigail C. Boudewyns,
      Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Boudewyns.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FENN, Justice.

[¶1] The City of Laramie (the City) appeals from the district court’s orders dismissing
some of its claims and granting summary judgment on its remaining declaratory judgment
claims against the University of Wyoming and its Board of Trustees (collectively the
University) pertaining to the drilling and operation of specified water wells. The City
contends the district court erred when it found legislation exempting the University from
the application of a city ordinance pertaining to the operation of those wells constitutional.
The City also asserts the district court erred when it determined the City could not enforce
a covenant in a 1965 deed, which prohibited the University from drilling one of the wells,
due to sovereign immunity. We affirm.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2]   The parties raise a number of issues, which we consolidate and rephrase as follows:

              I.    Does sovereign immunity preclude the City from
                    enforcing the restrictive covenant in the 1965 deed?

              II.   Is Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 unconstitutional as a
                    “special law” under Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming
                    Constitution?

              III. Is Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 unconstitutional as an
                   impermissible delegation of municipal power under
                   Article 3, § 37 of the Wyoming Constitution?

              IV. Can the City enforce Laramie Municipal Code
                  § 13.04.360 against the University?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] Dating back to Wyoming’s territorial days, the Union Pacific Railroad (Union
Pacific) owned large portions of land in Albany County, including all of Section 35,
Township 16 North, Range 73 West of the 6th P.M. Water sources known as the City
Springs are located underneath the southern half of Section 35, and both Union Pacific and
the City appropriated water from the City Springs under an adjudicated 1868 water right.

[¶4] On October 26, 1965, Union Pacific donated the north half of Section 35, Township
16 North, Range 73 West of the 6th P.M. to the University to be used “as a part of the
campus” of the University. The deed contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting the
premises from being used for the construction, maintenance, or operation of water wells
(the 1965 Covenant).

                                              1
[¶5] In the spring of 2019, the University filed two applications with the State Engineer’s
Office to drill two test wells: Well A and Well B. Well B is located in Section 35. The
applications were approved, and the wells were completed. In the fall of 2019, the
University filed applications with the State Engineer’s Office to convert these wells to
production wells. The applications indicated the ground water from the wells would be
comingled with other University wells and used to water athletic fields, lawns, trees,
shrubs, and flowers, on University lands, including the Jacoby Golf Course.

[¶6] In August of 2020, the City passed Laramie Municipal Code § 13.04.360 (the City
Ordinance), which provides in pertinent part:

             It is unlawful to do the following unless a franchise or permit
             is granted by the city council upon a determination that such
             franchise or permit is in the best interest of the city:

                 A. To develop, drill, construct, operate, maintain, or use
                    any water line, system, well, or works within the
                    corporate limits of the city in order to sell, distribute,
                    provide, or use nonmunicipal water (potable and/or
                    non-potable) within the city;

                 B. To interconnect any building, facility, landscape, lot,
                    premises, or structure of any kind within the corporate
                    limits of the city to any water line, system, well, or
                    works other than to the city’s water utility; or

                 C. To use any portion of the city’s streets, alleys,
                    easements, or rights-of-way, or other property owned or
                    managed by the city, for such purposes.

[¶7] In November of 2020, the State Engineer’s Office granted the University’s
applications to convert Wells A and B into production wells. The State Engineer capped
the amount of water the University could use from Wells A and B and other University
wells at 540 acre-feet annually.

[¶8] In the following months, the City and the University discussed the City’s concerns
about the University’s operation of Wells A and B and the potential application of the City
Ordinance to the University, but they were ultimately unable to reach a resolution. In
March 2021, the legislature passed what became Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126
(LexisNexis 2021). 2021 Wyo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 93, § 1. The statute reads:

               (a) Subject to title 41 of the Wyoming statutes and

                                             2
              notwithstanding any municipal or county ordinance, the
              University of Wyoming may:

                   (i) Develop, drill, construct, operate, maintain and use any
                  water line, system, well or works on property owned by the
                  university for the purposes of distributing, providing and
                  using nonpotable water on property owned or leased by the
                  university for miscellaneous use where water is to be used
                  for landscape watering, lawns, athletic fields, trees, shrubs
                  and flowers;

                   (ii) Connect a building, facility, landscape, lot, premises
                  or structure owned by the university to any water line,
                  system, well or works operated, maintained or used by the
                  university.

                (b) No city or county shall restrict or prohibit the university
              from developing, drilling, constructing, operating, maintaining
              or using any water system independent of the city’s or county’s
              water system.

[¶9] The legislature also amended Wyoming Statute § 15-7-701, which gives a city the
authority to grant the right to construct, maintain, and operate waterworks within the city
to a corporation, by adding subsection (d). 2021 Wyo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 93, § 1. The new
subsection reads: “Nothing in this article shall be construed to restrict, prohibit or otherwise
affect the rights of the University of Wyoming under W.S. 21-17-126.” Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 15-7-701(d) (LexisNexis 2021).

[¶10] The City filed this action in June 2021 seeking the following relief: 1) a declaration
it has the right to enforce the 1965 Covenant and prohibit the University from producing
water from Well B without the City’s consent; 2) a declaration Wyoming Statute § 21-17-
126 is unconstitutional; 3) a declaration the University has to comply with the City
Ordinance; 4) a declaration the City has the right to prohibit the University’s pipeline from
crossing the City’s right-of-way from the State for its transmission line or 30th Street
without its consent; and 5) a preliminary injunction preventing the University from
producing water from Wells A and B while the suit was pending.

[¶11] The University moved to dismiss all the City’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.). The district court entered an order
dismissing four of the City’s claims. The district court found Wyoming Statute § 21-17-
126 was constitutional under both Article 3, § 27 and Article 3, § 37 of the Wyoming
Constitution. The district court also found the City failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies before the Office of State Land and Investments, Board of Land Commissioners,

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so its claims regarding whether the University could cross the City’s transmission line right
of way had to be dismissed. The district court also found the City failed to allege the
University planned to cross 30th Street in order to connect the new wells to its existing
irrigation system, so this claim had to be dismissed.1 The only two claims that survived
the motion to dismiss were: 1) whether the City had the right to enforce the drilling
restrictions contained in the 1965 Covenant as a third-party beneficiary,2 and 2) whether
the University had to comply with the City Ordinance.

[¶12] After the district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, the University filed
four counterclaims. The University alleged: 1) the City did not have the authority to
regulate the University, which was a constitutionally created sovereign entity; 2) the City
did not have statutory authority to pass the City Ordinance; 3) the City had no standing to
be granted declaratory relief because it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before
the State Engineer related to any alleged interference with its water rights caused by Wells
A and B; and 4) Wyoming Statutes §§ 21-17-126 and 15-7-701(d) expressly prohibited the
City from regulating the University’s use of non-potable water to irrigate University lands.

[¶13] The University moved for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 or for judgment
on the pleadings under W.R.C.P. 12(c) on all its counterclaims and on the City’s two
remaining claims. The University argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
all its counterclaims and the City’s remaining claims because the City Ordinance was not
enforceable against the University, and the City could not enforce the 1965 Covenant
because the University enjoyed sovereign immunity from breach of contract actions at the
time the deed was executed. The City filed its own motion for partial summary judgment
on the University’s second counterclaim, arguing it had both constitutional and statutory
authority to pass the City Ordinance.

[¶14] The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding the
City’s action to enforce the 1965 Covenant could only be brought through an action for
breach of contract. The district court ruled the City could not enforce the 1965 Covenant
because the University had sovereign immunity from suits for breach of contract in 1965.
Therefore, even if the City could establish it was a third-party beneficiary to the contract,
it could not assert a right the original party to the contract did not possess.

1
  The City did not appeal the dismissal of its claim pertaining to the crossing of 30th Street. However, if
we find Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is constitutional, the City asks us to find it would not apply to the
University’s proposed water system. The City asserts Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 only applies if the
University’s water system is completely “independent” of the City’s water system, and the University’s
proposed water system does not satisfy this criterion because it would involve placing a pipeline under 30th
Street. We cannot find anywhere in the designated record where this argument was raised below, so we
will not address it. In re VS, 2018 WY 119, ¶ 25, 429 P.3d 14, 21–22 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting In re ECH,
2018 WY 83, ¶ 21, 423 P.3d 295, 302 (Wyo. 2018)) (holding we will not address issues not raised below).
2
  The district court found the issue of whether the University was a third-party beneficiary to the deed was
not ripe to be decided at the motion to dismiss stage of the case.

                                                     4
[¶15] Turning to the City Ordinance, the district court found the issue was resolved by the
passage of Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126. Under that statute, the University did not have
to comply with the City Ordinance because the statute specifically prohibited the City from
enforcing the ordinance against the University. The district court granted the University’s
motion for summary judgment on this issue and denied the City’s motion for partial
summary judgment regarding the validity of the City Ordinance. This appeal timely
followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶16] The City asks us to review the district court’s decisions dismissing certain claims
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and granting summary judgment on other claims under
W.R.C.P. 56. We review a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Allred v.
Bebout, 2018 WY 8, ¶ 29, 409 P.3d 260, 268 (Wyo. 2018). When reviewing a motion to
dismiss, we examine the same materials and apply the same standards as the district court.
Id. (quoting Moose Hollow Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2017 WY
74, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d 1027, 1033 (Wyo. 2017)). “[W]e accept the facts alleged in the
complaint or petition as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Id. (quoting Moose Hollow Holdings, LLC, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d at 1033).

[¶17] “The question of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law over which
this Court exercises de novo review.” Hardison v. State, 2022 WY 45, ¶ 5, 507 P.3d 36, 39
(Wyo. 2022) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, ¶ 7, 391 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo.
2017)) (italics removed). “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we will resolve
any doubt in favor of constitutionality.” Id. (quoting Vaughn, ¶ 7, 391 P.3d at 1091). As
the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute, the City bears the heavy burden of
“clearly and exactly” showing the statute is unconstitutional. Id. (citing Michael v.
Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 1995)).

[¶18] Similarly, “[w]e review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo.”
Falkenburg v. Laramie Inv. Co., Inc., 2023 WY 78, ¶ 5, 533 P.3d. 511, 514 (Wyo. 2023)
(quoting Wilcox v. Sec. State Bank, 2023 WY 2, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d 277, 284 (Wyo. 2023)).
“We give no deference to the district court’s ruling, evaluate the same materials, and apply
the same standards as the district court.” Id. (citing Wilcox, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d at 284). When
reviewing a summary judgment ruling, “[t]he record is assessed from the vantage point
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give a party opposing summary
judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record.”
Id. at ¶ 6, 533 P.3d at 515 (quoting Wilcox, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d at 284). The burdens of the
respective parties in supporting or opposing summary judgment are well established:

              The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
              establishing a prima facie case and showing there is no genuine

                                              5
              dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
              judgment as a matter of law. Once that burden is met, the
              opposing party is obligated to respond with materials beyond
              the pleadings to show a genuine issue of material fact. When
              the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of
              persuasion, it establishes a prima facie case for summary
              judgment by showing a lack of evidence on an essential
              element of the opposing party’s claim.

Id. (quoting Wilcox, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d at 284).

                                        DISCUSSION

   I. Does Sovereign Immunity Preclude the City from Enforcing the Restrictive
      Covenant in the 1965 Deed?

[¶19] The City asserts the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor
of the University regarding the enforcement of the 1965 Covenant because, under the law
that existed in 1965, the University only enjoyed sovereign immunity when performing
“governmental” functions not “proprietary” functions. The City argues the operation of a
water well is a proprietary function, particularly when it is used to water a golf course that
generates fees. As such, the City contends the University does not have sovereign
immunity, and we should remand this case for a trial on the issue of whether the City may
enforce the 1965 Covenant. The City admits it did not raise the governmental versus
proprietary argument below. However, it asserts we should consider this issue for the first
time on appeal because the issue of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional.

[¶20] The University argues we should not consider the governmental versus proprietary
argument because the City waived this issue by not raising it below. Typically, we decline
to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless the issue raises a jurisdictional
question or is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered. In re VS, 2018 WY
119, ¶ 25, 429 P.3d at 21–22 (quoting In re ECH, 2018 WY 83, ¶ 21, 423 P.3d at 302).
“We follow this rule because ‘it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court for reasons that
were not presented to it, whether it be legal theories or issues never formally raised in the
pleadings nor argued to the trial court.’” Fowles v. Fowles, 2017 WY 112, ¶ 28, 402 P.3d
405, 412 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4,
¶ 19, 367 P.3d 619, 624 (Wyo. 2016)). In this case, the issue of sovereign immunity was
raised below, although the governmental versus proprietary argument was not. As the
moving party, the University had the burden of showing it was entitled to invoke sovereign
immunity to prevent the enforcement of the 1965 Covenant. See W.R.C.P. 56(a);
Falkenburg, 2023 WY 78, ¶ 5, 533 P.3d. at 514. Due to the law that applies to the 1965
Covenant, we are required to analyze the City’s governmental/proprietary argument to
determine if the University met this burden.

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[¶21] “There is perhaps no common law doctrine more time honored than the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.” Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 2014 WY 3, ¶ 17, 317 P.3d
573, 578 (Wyo. 2014). “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity has its ‘roots in the ancient
common law of England which held “The King can do no wrong” and hence could not be
sued in any court of law.’” Id. (quoting Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 803 (Wyo.
1979)). As we have recognized, “the King does ‘do wrong,’ but the right to seek redress
for such wrong is determined by the policy and will of the legislative body.” Id. at ¶ 18,
317 P.3d at 578.

[¶22] The concept of sovereign immunity is embodied in the Wyoming Constitution.
Article 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution provides in relevant part: “Suits may be brought
against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.”
We have repeatedly held this provision “requires explicit legislative authorization before a
suit can be maintained against the state.” Wyo. State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, ¶ 15,
483 P.3d 840, 845 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 524 (Wyo.
1994)) (italics removed). Absent the State’s consent, no suit or claim can be made against
the State. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 2014 WY 3, ¶ 17, 317 P. 3d at 578 (quoting
Worthington, 598 P.2d at 801). Recognizing “the inherently unfair and inequitable results
which occur in the strict application of governmental immunity,” the Wyoming Legislature
abrogated the common law of sovereign immunity and authorized suits against the State in
certain circumstances when it passed the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA),
now codified at Wyoming Statutes §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-120 (LexisNexis 2023). Heimer v.
Antelope Valley Improvement, 2010 WY 29, ¶ 15, 226 P.3d 860, 863 (Wyo. 2010).
Because the deed at issue in this case was executed before the WGCA was enacted, both
parties concede this Court should apply sovereign immunity principles that predated the
WGCA. See Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1045 n.9 (Wyo. 1980) (applying common law
sovereign immunity because the WGCA was not the law of Wyoming at the time of the
facts relevant to that case).

[¶23] At the time the deed was executed in 1965, the University enjoyed common law
sovereign immunity because a suit against the University was a suit against the State.
Biscar v. Univ. of Wyo. Bd. of Trs., 605 P.2d 374, 375 (Wyo. 1980) (citing Retail Clerks
Local 187 v. Univ. of Wyo., 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 1975)). However, like all other state
or municipal entities, the University could lose this immunity if it was engaged in a
“proprietary function” rather than a governmental function. Id. at 376 (citing Nat’l Surety
Co. v. Morris, 241 P. 1063, 1067 (1925)). A proprietary function is one where the state
“places itself in the same class and on the same footing with private individuals in
connection with its property rights . . . .” Id. (quoting Nat’l Surety Co., 241 P. at 1067).
Determining whether a government entity was engaged in a governmental or proprietary
function can be difficult. Generally, if the activity is “concerned with the health and
welfare of the public at large,” or if “the activity has been undertaken at the direction of
the legislature or involves legislative or judicial discretion,” it is considered governmental.

                                              7
Id. (internal citations omitted). In addition, when the government entity is engaged in a
“constitutionally mandated” function, it is considered governmental. Id. at 377 (finding the
University was engaged in a governmental activity when it was engaged in the
constitutionally mandated function of hiring professors); see also Harrison v. Wyo. Liquor
Comm’n, 177 P.2d 397, 402–05 (Wyo. 1947) (finding the Liquor Commission was engaged
in a governmental function when it purchased liquor pursuant to its constitutional mandate
to regulate and control the sale of liquor). On the other hand, if “the activity has historically
been carried on by a private corporation, or if it generates fees” it is considered proprietary.
Biscar, 605 P.2d at 376 (internal citations omitted).

[¶24] The parties disagree about which activity this Court should look at when
determining whether the University was engaged in a governmental activity. The City asks
us to look at the University’s activity in 2019, not 1965, and find operating a well to water
the Jacoby Golf Course, which charges fees, is a proprietary function. The University
contends the Court must examine the “facts in the time frame when the action actually took
place[,]” in 1965 and not the facts regarding how the property was being used in 2019–
2023. The University contends its acquisition of the property in 1965 was “clearly
governmental,” it had absolute sovereign immunity at the time it obtained the property
from the Union Pacific, and the City cannot enforce the 1965 Covenant.

[¶25] Our previous cases examining the proprietary/governmental distinction reviewed
the facts in the time frame when the action took place. See Town of Douglas v. York, 445
P.2d 760, 761–63 (Wyo. 1968) (evaluating whether garbage disposal was governmental or
proprietary); Bondurant v. Bd. of Trs. of Mem’l Hosp. of Converse Cnty., 354 P.2d 219,
220–22 (Wyo. 1960) (evaluating whether operating a hospital where the decedent was
injured was a governmental function); Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Equalization,
333 P.2d 700, 708–12 (Wyo. 1958) (evaluating whether municipality owned “electric light
property” in a governmental or proprietary capacity for purposes of a tax statute);
Villalpando v. City of Cheyenne, 65 P.2d 1109, 1111–16 (Wyo. 1937) (evaluating whether
a city was acting in a governmental function when its employees, who were engaged in
maintaining roads, negligently injured a motorist); Wikstrom v. City of Laramie, 262 P. 22,
23–24 (Wyo. 1927) (evaluating whether the wrongful revocation of a building permit was
a governmental function); Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 241 P. 710, 711–15 (Wyo. 1925)
(evaluating whether a city was acting in a governmental capacity when maintaining a
playground). Two cases involving contracts looked at the activity the government entity
was engaged in at the time it entered into those contracts. See Biscar, 605 P.2d at 376–77
(looking at whether the University was engaged in a governmental function when it
negotiated employment contracts with professors); Harrison, 177 P.2d at 403–05 (looking
at whether the Wyoming Liquor Commission was engaged in a governmental function at
the time it entered into a contract to purchase alcohol).

[¶26] Following this precedent and looking at the activity the University was engaged in
at the time it entered into the contract in 1965 leads to the conclusion the University was

                                               8
engaged in a governmental activity. When the University accepted the property from
Union Pacific, it did so to acquire the property to “use as part of the campus” of the
University. Article 7, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution specifically recognizes land will
be donated or granted to the University and provides that ownership of the land “shall vest”
in the University. Similarly, Wyoming Statute § 21-17-203 gives the Trustees the “powers
necessary or convenient to accomplish the objects and perform the duties prescribed by
law, and shall have the custody of the . . . property of the university.” Wyoming Statute §
21-17-204(a)(iv) gives the Board of Trustees the power to “[h]old, manage, lease or dispose
of, according to law, any real or personal estate as is conducive to the welfare of the
institution[.]” By accepting the land to be used as part of the campus, the University was
engaged in a constitutionally mandated function, which was undertaken at the direction of
the legislature, making it a governmental function. Biscar, 605 P.2d at 376–77; Harrison,
177 P.2d at 403–05. Any suit brought to enforce a covenant contained in that deed is barred
by sovereign immunity. See Biscar, 605 P.2d at 377.

[¶27] This case is different than all our previous cases because the alleged breach occurred
more than fifty years after the deed was executed. In addition, although the land is still
being used as part of the University’s campus, the activities conducted thereon have
changed. Wyoming is somewhat unique in applying the governmental/proprietary
distinction in contract actions and in applying the doctrine to the State itself and not just
political subdivisions. See generally 1 Civ. Actions Against State & Loc. Gov’t § 2:1 (Sep.
2023 Update) (“Under common-law principles, a distinction was made between
governmental functions, as to which immunity applied, and proprietary functions, as to
which governmental entities could be subject to tort liability. This distinction ordinarily
applied only to political subdivisions of the state, particularly municipal corporations, and
not to the state and its agencies.”) The doctrine is generally applied in tort cases where the
courts “examine the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed to have
arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred.” 57 Am. Jur. 2d
Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 45 (Oct. 2023 Update). If we
followed this authority, we would look at the University’s activity in 2019–2023. Doing
so does not change the outcome.

[¶28] The University is not operating the water wells to generate income or to perform an
activity historically conducted by a private corporation. The wells are used for watering
University landscaping, including athletic fields, trees, shrubs, flowers, and the Jacoby
Golf Course. The University was created by the Wyoming Constitution. Wyo. Const. art.
7, § 15. The Wyoming Constitution requires the legislature to “provide by law for the
management of the university, its lands and other property . . . .” Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 17.
As discussed above, Wyoming Statute § 21-17-203 gives the Board of Trustees the
“powers necessary or convenient to accomplish the objects and perform the duties
prescribed by law . . . .” The Wyoming Constitution also requires instruction at the
University be furnished “as nearly free as possible” and allows “any amount in addition to
the income from its grants of lands and other sources above mentioned, necessary to its

                                              9
support and maintenance in a condition of full efficiency [to] be raised by taxation or
otherwise, under provisions of the legislature.” Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 16. Watering
University landscaping falls under the University’s constitutionally mandated function of
managing University lands and property and is part of keeping it “in a condition of full
efficiency.” A portion, or even a majority of the water from these wells may be used to
water the Jacoby Golf Course, which does generate fees. However, that does not
automatically transform watering University landscaping into a proprietary activity. In
Town of Pine of Bluffs we stated:

              [W]e start with this premise: Any activity of the sovereign
              authority, or one to whom its powers are delegated, is
              presumed to be governmental; and it follows, we think, that if
              there be uncertainty as to the classification into which the
              particular activity falls, the doubt should be resolved in favor
              of its being governmental rather than proprietary, for the
              reason that the usual function of government is to act in the
              interest of the public as a whole. . . [W]here a service is
              rendered by a municipality gratuitously and for the public
              welfare generally, such service should be considered
              governmental.

333 P.2d at 711–12. Watering University landscaping is a service provided gratuitously
by the University for the benefit of the students and the public who visit the campus.
Individuals using the Jacoby Golf Course pay to use that facility, not to purchase irrigation
water. Utilizing a well to water University landscaping is a governmental function, not
proprietary. As such, the University was engaged in a governmental function in 2019–
2023, not a proprietary function, and it did not lose its sovereign immunity by drilling and
operating the water wells. We affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the City’s
claim to enforce the 1965 Covenant on the grounds of sovereign immunity.

   II. Is Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 Unconstitutional as a “Special Law” Under
       Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution?

[¶29] In its second claim for declaratory judgment, the City asserted Wyoming Statute §
21-17-126 was unconstitutional under Article 3, § 27 because it was a local or special law
“that regulates township affairs” or “that grants the University a special or exclusive
privilege and franchise.” Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution states:

              The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the
              following enumerated cases, that is to say: For granting
              divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or
              highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys or public
              grounds; locating or changing county seats; regulating county

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              or township affairs; incorporation of cities, towns or villages;
              or changing or amending the charters of any cities, towns or
              villages; regulating the practice in courts of justice; regulating
              the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police
              magistrates or constables; changing the rules of evidence in
              any trial or inquiry; providing for changes of venue in civil or
              criminal cases; declaring any person of age; for limitation of
              civil actions; giving effect to any informal or invalid deeds;
              summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries; providing for
              the management of common schools; regulating the rate of
              interest on money; the opening or conducting of any election
              or designating the place of voting; the sale or mortgage of real
              estate belonging to minors or others under disability;
              chartering or licensing ferries or bridges or toll roads;
              chartering banks, insurance companies and loan and trust
              companies; remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures; creating,
              increasing, or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of
              public officers; changing the law of descent; granting to any
              corporation, association or individual, the right to lay down
              railroad tracks, or any special or exclusive privilege, immunity
              or franchise whatever, or amending existing charter for such
              purpose; for punishment of crimes; changing the names of
              persons or places; for the assessment or collection of taxes;
              affecting estates of deceased persons, minors or others under
              legal disabilities; extending the time for the collection of taxes;
              refunding money paid into the state treasury, relinquishing or
              extinguishing, in whole or part, the indebtedness, liabilities or
              obligation of any corporation or person to this state or to any
              municipal corporation therein; exempting property from
              taxation; restoring to citizenship persons convicted of
              infamous crimes; authorizing the creation, extension or
              impairing of liens; creating offices or prescribing the powers
              or duties of officers in counties, cities, townships or school
              districts; or authorizing the adoption or legitimation of
              children. In all other cases where a general law can be made
              applicable no special law shall be enacted.

[¶30] In the order granting the University’s motion to dismiss, the district court found
Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 did not fall within any of Article 3, § 27’s enumerated cases,
and the statute addressed the University’s affairs, not “township affairs.” The district court
also found Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 did not grant the University a special or exclusive
privilege because it remained subject to the laws and regulations regarding the
development and use of groundwater under Title 41 of the Wyoming Statutes. Finally, the

                                              11
district court concluded the statute was not a special law because the University is
Wyoming’s only university, the Wyoming Constitution requires the legislature to provide
for the University’s management, and Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 applies to all cities
and counties throughout the state. The district court determined “it is nonsensical to
conclude that a law must be made ‘general,’ or applicable to a larger audience, when the
intent of the Wyoming legislature is specifically to comply with Wyoming Constitution
Article 7, Section 17 so as to manage the University and its property.”

[¶31] On appeal, the City alleges Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution is an equal
protection provision, which requires the legislature to treat similarly situated citizens or
entities equally. The City argues we should apply our three-part equal protection test set
out in Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corp. of Wyoming, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 40, 71 P.3d 717,
731–32 (Wyo. 2003), to determine the constitutionality of the statute. According to the
City, the validity of Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 depends on whether the legislature had
“a sufficient justification” to grant the University a preference over other proprietors who
operate water systems. The City asserts there is no justification for such a preference
because the University has no special constitutional status as an irrigator and the statute is
therefore unconstitutional.

[¶32] The University contends the City did not raise this equal protection argument before
the district court, and we should reject the City’s attempt to raise it for the first time on
appeal. Due to the state of the record, we are unable to determine exactly what arguments
the City made before the district court in response to the motion to dismiss. However, it is
clear the district court did not apply our three-part equal protection test in its order and
instead focused on whether the statute was a special law.

[¶33] Since the time it filed its complaint, the City has alleged Wyoming Statute § 21-17-
126 violates Article 3, § 27. We have treated Article 3, § 27 as an equal protection
provision, and we have recognized a party’s special law argument may simply mirror its
equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Baessler v. Freier, 2011 WY 125, ¶ 17, 258 P.3d 720,
727 (Wyo. 2011). Therefore, although the City’s equal protection argument may not have
been framed in those exact terms below, we will address it. An equal protection analysis
“begins with a determination of whether the classes, which the claimant alleges are treated
differently under a statute, are similarly situated.” Martin v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Laramie Cnty., 2022 WY 21, ¶ 12, 503 P.3d 68, 73 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Bird v. Wyo. Bd.
of Parole, 2016 WY 100, ¶ 7, 382 P.3d 56, 61 (Wyo. 2016)). “If the classes are not
similarly situated, there can be no equal protection violation.” Id. (citing Bird, ¶ 7, 382 P.3d
at 61). The City asserts Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 treats the University differently
than other “government entities, community colleges, [the] Wyoming Catholic College,
other schools, other proprietors of golf courses and athletic fields, [and] any other public
or private landscape irrigator.”

                                              12
[¶34] The University is a unique part of the State. As the only constitutionally created
state university, no other person, property, or entity shares the same class. Wyo. Const. art.
7, §§ 15–17. Unlike the other entities listed in the City’s brief, the legislature is
constitutionally tasked with managing the University’s land and property. Wyo. Const. art.
7, §§ 15–17. Given its unique constitutional status, there are no other individuals, colleges,
entities, etc. that are similarly situated to the University. Therefore, the City failed to
identify a classification through which similarly situated persons or entities are treated
unequally, and no further equal protection analysis is required. See generally Martin, 2022
WY 21, ¶ 12, 503 P.3d at 73 (citing Bird, 2016 WY 100, ¶ 7, 382 P.3d at 61).

[¶35] We also agree with the district court that Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is a general
law, not a special law. “[T]o constitute a general law, as opposed to a special law, there
must be some distinguishing peculiarity which gives rise to the necessity for the law as to
the designated class.” May v. City of Laramie, 131 P.2d 300, 306 (Wyo. 1942). In addition,
the statute must also apply to all cities and towns in the state to be considered a general
law. State ex rel. Keefe v. McInerney, 182 P.2d 28, 38 (Wyo. 1947). As discussed above,
the University is the only constitutionally created state university, and no other person or
entity shares the same class. There is a “distinguishing peculiarity” that gives rise to the
necessity for Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126, and it applies equally to all cities and counties
in the state. The statute does not grant privileges to some cities or counties while denying
them to others. Baessler, 2011 WY 125, ¶ 16, 258 P.3d at 726 (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 2d
Statutes § 4 (2001)). Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is a general law, not a special law, and
it does not violate Article 3, § 27. We affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the
City’s request for a declaration Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is unconstitutional under
Article 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution.

   III. Is Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 Unconstitutional as an Impermissible
        Delegation of Municipal Power Under Article 3, § 37 of the Wyoming
        Constitution?

[¶36] The City alleged Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 violated Article 3, § 37 of the
Wyoming Constitution because it gave the University the power to interfere with the City’s
municipal improvements and property, and it delegated to the University the power to
perform the municipal function of providing water to landscapes and golf courses utilized
by the public. The district court dismissed the City’s claim and found the University was
not a “special commissioner” within the meaning of this constitutional provision, and the
statute did not give the University any power to “make, supervise, or interfere with
municipal improvements or property or to perform any municipal functions.”

[¶37] The City contends the district court’s holding was legally erroneous. It claims the
district court did not need to determine whether the University was a “special
commissioner,” and it only needed to determine whether the statute delegates municipal
power to an entity beyond municipal control. The City further contends operating a water

                                             13
system is a “municipal function,” and allowing the University to operate its own water
system impermissibly interferes with the City’s ability to regulate and operate its water
system. The University argues Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 does not create some new
entity or transfer the power to interfere with municipal functions to that entity. Rather, the
statute “states that [the University] can develop a non-potable water system and that the
City cannot interfere with the exercise of that discretion.” The Attorney General asserts
the district court correctly concluded the University is not a special commissioner, private
corporation, or association, and Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 does not delegate any power
to the University which interferes with the City’s municipal water system.

[¶38] Article 3, § 37 of the Wyoming Constitution reads:

              The legislature shall not delegate to any special commissioner,
              private corporation or association, any power to make,
              supervise or interfere with any municipal improvements,
              moneys, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
              to levy taxes, or to perform any municipal functions whatever.

The plain language of this constitutional provision required the district court to determine
whether the University was a “special commissioner, private corporation or association.”
To interpret this provision any other way would render a portion meaningless, which we
will not do. See Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 520–21 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Mgmt.
Council of the Wyo. Legislature v. Jim Geringer, Governor of the State of Wyo., 953 P.2d
839, 845 (Wyo. 1998); County Court Judges Ass’n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960, 964 (Wyo. 1988);
Thomson v. Wyo. In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778, 790 (Wyo. 1982); Bower v. Big
Horn Canal Ass’n, 307 P.2d 593, 597 (Wyo. 1957); Grand Island & N.W.R. Co. v. Baker,
45 P. 494, 498 (Wyo. 1896)).

[¶39] The City does not contend the University is a private corporation or association; it
questions whether the University is a “special commissioner.” The City would have us
find any entity that is not a municipality is a “special commissioner.” We have not
interpreted this term as broadly as the City would propose. In Town of Pine Bluffs, we
found the State Board of Equalization was not a “special commissioner” because it was “a
board recognized by the constitution of this state in art. 15, §§ 9 and 10.” 333 P.2d at 705.
Like the Board of Equalization, the University is an entity recognized by the Wyoming
Constitution, and it engages in constitutional functions prescribed by law. See Wyo. Const.
art. 7, §§ 15–17. The University is not a special commissioner within the meaning of
Article 3, § 37.

[¶40] As stated in Town of Pine Bluffs, the main purpose of Article 3, § 37 is “to leave the
control of municipal functions in the hands of the duly elected officials in the
municipality.” 333 P.2d at 706. Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 does not take control of the
City’s municipal functions out of the hands of its elected officials. The statute does not

                                             14
give the University the power to interfere with any of the City’s municipal functions.
Nothing in the plain language of the statute delegates any power to the University to
interfere with the City’s “municipal improvements, moneys, property or effects,” nor does
it delegate the performance of any municipal function to the University. Wyo. Const. art.
3, § 37. Any incidental detrimental impact to the City from the University’s development
and utilization of its own landscape watering system does not equate to an unconstitutional
delegation of municipal powers or functions by the legislature.3 Wyoming Statute § 21-
17-126 pertains directly to the management of the University’s lands and property, not the
operation of any municipal water system. Nothing in the statute authorizes the University
to supply water to any other person or entity or to operate a municipal water utility. We
affirm the district court’s decision that Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 does not violate
Article 3, § 37 of the Wyoming Constitution.

    IV. Can the City Enforce Laramie Municipal Code § 13.04.360 Against the
        University?

[¶41] The City sought a declaration that the University had to comply with the City
Ordinance. In its counterclaims, the University sought a declaration that the City did not
have authority to pass the City Ordinance. Alternatively, if the district court found the City
had authority to pass the City Ordinance, the University sought a declaration it was not
subject to the ordinance. The University made these same arguments in its summary
judgment motion. In its motion for partial summary judgment, the City asked the district
court to find it had both constitutional and statutory authority to pass the City Ordinance.
In its summary judgment decision, the district court found it did not need to address the
validity of the City Ordinance because Wyoming Statutes §§ 21-17-126 and 15-7-701
prohibit the City from enforcing the ordinance against the University.

[¶42] Both the City and the University devoted portions of their briefs to the issue of
whether the City had the authority to pass the City Ordinance, and whether Wyoming
Statute § 21-17-126 completely exempts the University from complying with the City
Ordinance. However, “[t]he ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint’ is ‘if it is not necessary
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’” MH v. First Jud. Dist. Ct. of Laramie
Cnty., 2020 WY 72, ¶ 17, 465 P.3d 405, 410 (Wyo. 2020) (Kautz, J., concurring) (quoting
PDK Labs. Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
concurring)); see also Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted)
(“Fundamental notions of judicial restraint and economy counsel our consideration only of

3
 The City also asserts Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is unconstitutional because it empowers the University
to interfere with the City’s water supply by “interfering” with the City’s “senior” water rights. Wyoming
Statute § 21-17-126 specifically makes the University subject to Title 41, which sets forth procedures for
handling water rights interference claims. See, e.g., Wyoming Statute § 41-3-911 (LexisNexis 2021).
Because the University is subject to Title 41, the City has a remedy for any inference with its water rights,
and the statute does not impermissibly give the University the ability to interfere with the City’s water
supply.

                                                    15
those issues necessary to a full and proper resolution of the matter presented for review,
absent reason to believe the question is bound to arise again.”). Wyoming Statutes §§ 21-
17-126 and 15-7-701 preclude the City from enforcing the City Ordinance against the
University, therefore, deciding whether the City had the authority to enact the City
Ordinance is unnecessary. We affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the University on this claim.

                                    CONCLUSION

[¶43] The University has sovereign immunity from breach of contract actions to enforce
the 1965 Covenant. Wyoming Statute § 21-17-126 is not unconstitutional under either
Article 3, §§ 27 or 37 of the Wyoming Constitution. Wyoming Statutes §§ 21-17-126 and
15-7-701 prohibit the City from enforcing Laramie Municipal Code § 13.04.360 against
the University. Affirmed.

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