Court Opinion

ID: 9909942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 17:02:50.1418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:19.493397
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 189
                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                      No.   CR-22-696

                                                 Opinion Delivered:   December 14, 2023

 FREDRICK JONES                          APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
                               APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                         [NO. 60CR-20-2061]
 V.
                                                 HONORABLE WENDELL GRIFFEN,
                                                 JUDGE
 STATE OF ARKANSAS
                                 APPELLEE AFFIRMED.

                              JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

       The Pulaski County Circuit Court convicted appellant Fredrick Jones of first-degree

murder, first-degree battery, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of

cocaine with the purpose to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing, and felon in

possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison for first-

degree murder, sixty years in prison for first-degree battery, and an aggregate term of forty

years on the remaining convictions, to be served concurrently. For reversal, Jones argues that

the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss on the charges of first-degree

murder and first-degree battery. We affirm.

                                            I. Facts

       Jones waived his right to a jury trial and was tried before the circuit court. At trial,

evidence was presented that on April 25, 2020, Thelton Smith, Sr., was shot while driving

down his street. The following day, his daughter, Montrell Smith, called 911 because she saw
the man whom her father had identified as the person who shot him. She then called 911 a

second time when she saw the man get into his van and drive off, and she followed him until

the police arrived and attempted to pull him over. Smith identified Jones in court as the man

who was the subject of her 911 call.

       Retired Officer Rodney Blocker testified that he was a patrol officer on duty with

the Little Rock Police Department on April 26, 2020. He responded to a dispatch call at

approximately 12:04 p.m. that day because Smith reported that she had spotted Jones driving

a green Chrysler Town and Country van. Officer Blocker saw the van at the intersection of

12th Street and South Rodney Parham and attempted to make a felony traffic stop in relation

to the previous day’s shooting. Jones initially stopped at a traffic light, but when Officer

Blocker ordered him to turn off his vehicle, Jones refused and fled in his van southbound on

John Barrow Road. Officer Blocker turned on his siren and began to pursue Jones. Officer

Blocker testified that during the pursuit, he reached a speed of ninety-three miles per hour.

Jones failed to stop at a red light at the intersection of West 36th Street and John Barrow

Road, and his vehicle struck a white Toyota Sienna van occupied by Jose and Virginia

Hernandez. Officer Blocker’s dash camera recorded the pursuit and collision, and that

footage was played at the bench trial.

       The Hernandezes’ van caught fire on impact, and the police were able to remove

them from the vehicle before it exploded. They were taken by ambulance to Baptist Hospital,

where Mr. Hernandez died during surgery as a result of internal bleeding. Mrs. Hernandez

suffered three broken ribs and a broken shoulder.

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       Jones’s van was disabled as a result of the collision, and he became trapped under the

dashboard and had to be removed by EMTs. Inside Jones’s van, officers discovered a loaded

rifle, a medicine bottle containing a white rock-like substance, and a shaving bag “containing

some drug paraphernalia, what appeared to be rock cocaine, and also a scale.” Police

subsequently obtained a search warrant for Jones’s van and discovered a second firearm inside

it. The white rock-like substances were later determined to be cocaine. Additionally, the

State introduced sentencing orders reflecting Jones’s prior felony convictions.

       At the close of the State’s case, Jones moved to dismiss the charges against him. As to

first-degree murder, he argued that the State had failed to prove that Mr. Hernandez’s death

occurred “in furtherance of ” Jones’s fleeing from police. On first-degree battery, Jones argued

that the State had failed to prove that Mrs. Hernandez’s injuries occurred “in the furtherance

of ” his fleeing from police. The circuit court denied Jones’s motions. After informing the

court that the defense did not intend to call any witnesses, Jones renewed his motions, which

the circuit court again denied. It found him guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree battery,

simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of cocaine with the purpose to

deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing, and felon in possession of a firearm. Jones

was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for first-degree murder, sixty years’

imprisonment for first-degree battery, and an aggregate term of forty years’ imprisonment

on the remaining convictions, to run concurrently. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       On appeal, Jones argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss

the charges of first-degree murder and first-degree battery. A motion to dismiss at a bench

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trial, like a motion for directed verdict at a jury trial, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Gill v. State, 2015 Ark. 421, at 3, 474 S.W.3d 77, 79. The test for determining

sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports

the verdict. Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty

and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere suspicion

or conjecture. Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79. On appeal, this court views the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered.

Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79.

       In the present case, Jones committed first-degree murder if he “commit[ted] or

attempt[ed] to commit a felony; and [i]n the course of and in the furtherance of the felony

. . . [he] cause[d] the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Supp. 2019).

Jones committed first-degree battery if he committed a felony, and, in the course of and in

furtherance of the felony, he caused serious physical injury to any person under

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-13-201(a)(4)(A), (B)(1) (Supp. 2019). Here, fleeing was the felony underlying each of

these charges. A person commits felony fleeing when, knowing that his immediate arrest is

being attempted by a duly authorized law-enforcement officer, he flees from the officer by

means of a vehicle and causes serious physical injury to any person as a direct result of fleeing

from the law-enforcement officer. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125(a), (d)(3) (Supp. 2019).

       With regard to his motions to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder and first-

degree battery, Jones argues that the State failed to establish that those crimes were

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committed “in furtherance of” the offense of felony fleeing. Citing several out-of-state cases,

Jones asserts that the ordinary and accepted meaning of “in furtherance of” is to “advance”

or “promote.” He concedes that “his conduct in driving a vehicle at a high rate of speed

and driving through a red light was done to advance or promote his flight from a police

officer” but argues that “colliding with the victims’ vehicle and causing their respective

death and serious physical injury did not advance or promote his commission of felony

fleeing.”

       We have rejected a similar argument in Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, 516 S.W.3d

727. In that case, Noble was convicted of first-degree felony murder with commission of a

terroristic act as the underlying felony. On appeal, Noble challenged the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his murder conviction, arguing that under the facts there, he did not

shoot and kill the victim “in furtherance of” the commission of the terroristic acts because

the State failed to prove that the murder was committed to facilitate the terroristic acts. Id.

at 3–4, 516 S.W.3d at 730. In Noble, this court distinguished Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421,

731 S.W.2d 756 (1987), in which “[t]he court reversed because the felony-murder statute

could not be read to encompass the facts, which clearly showed that Parker entered the

[victim’s] house, which was the felony, with the sole purpose to commit murder.” Noble,

2017 Ark. 142, at 4, 516 S.W.3d at 730 (citing Parker, 292 Ark. at 425, 731 S.W.2d. at 758).

We stated that “the killings [in Parker] could not be in furtherance of a burglary because the

burglary was only a means of achieving the murders.” Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731. This

court clarified in Noble that “to be convicted of felony murder, the defendant must have an

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intent or objective to commit the underlying felony as opposed to the primary goal of

murder.” Id., 516 S.W.3d at 731. The court held that

       after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
       that there was substantial evidence that Noble “in the course of and in furtherance
       of” committing the terroristic acts of shooting at an occupied vehicle with the intent
       to cause property damage, caused the death of [the victim]. Thus, unlike Parker . . .,
       the death occurred “in the course of and in furtherance of” the felony, as opposed
       to the felony occurring “in the course of and in furtherance of” the murder. Noble
       had an independent objective to commit terroristic acts, and his intent related to the
       acts of terrorism, not to murder. See Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 177–78, 264 S.W.3d
       498, 503 (2007) (“[T]he culpable intent or mens rea relates to the crime of the
       underlying felony . . . and not to the murder itself.).

Id. at 5–6, 516 S.W.3d at 731.

       Our holding in Noble governs the present case. Here, Jones had the culpable intent,

or mens rea, to commit the crime of felony fleeing, as opposed to the primary goals of murder

and battery. Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731. The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in

the light most favorable to the State, established that Jones had the intent to flee, and “in

the course of and in furtherance of” that flight, he caused Mr. Hernandez’s death and Mrs.

Hernandez’s serious physical injuries. Thus, because substantial evidence supports Jones’s

convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree battery, we hold that the circuit court

properly denied his motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                      III. Rule 4-3(a)

       Because Jones received a life sentence, this court, in compliance with Arkansas

Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), has examined the record for all objections, motions, and

requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Jones. No prejudicial error has

been found.

       Affirmed.

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       David Sudduth, Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for

appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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