Court Opinion

ID: 9630307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:08:02.247915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:36.363066
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
In the present case, we are requested to determine a single issue of law: whether this Court will follow the United State’s Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), in deciding whether a person who abandons contraband while being chased by police was “seized” and thus entitled to invoke the protection of Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution to suppress the contraband. Because I understand the holding in Hodari D. to be contrary to settled Pennsylvania precedent regarding seizures of persons and the doctrine of coerced abandonment, I must dissent.
Our supreme court defined the standard under which we are to review an appeal from the grant of a motion to suppress in Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, 301, 608 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1992) (citations omitted):
We begin by noting that where a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish that the challenged evidence is admissible. In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the *22suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted.
The facts of this case, when viewed in light of the above standard, reveal that on October 22, 1989, uniformed police officers Joseph Milligan and John Reinecker were on patrol in a marked police car when they observed Richard Carroll and another individual standing on the corner of Olive Street in Philadelphia. Officer Reinecker stated to Officer Milligan, without reason, that he wanted to investigate the individual standing with Carroll. Both officers exited the vehicle and approached the two men. While Officer Reinecker was speaking to Carroll’s companion, Officer Milligan approached Carroll with his hand on his gun and started to tell him to remove his hands from his pockets. Before the officer could finish his statement, Carroll turned and fled down an alley. Officer Milligan pursued Carroll, who then slipped and fell. During his fall, two brown-tinted heat-sealed packages containing a white substance dropped from Carroll’s pocket. Upon reaching Carroll, Officer Milligan drew his gun and instructed Carroll to remain face down on the ground, with his hands behind his back. Carroll was then handcuffed, arrested and searched. The search of Carroll’s pocket revealed 45 additional brown-tinted packets containing a white substance.
Following his arrest, Carroll litigated a motion to suppress the material seized by the police, claiming that the packets were dropped as the result of an illegal stop and seizure by Officer Milligan. The trial court, following a full hearing, granted Carroll’s Motion to Suppress, finding that Carroll’s loss of the packets from his pockets was the product of the coercive acts on the part of the police, who had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to stop Carroll. The Commonwealth appealed to this Court, which certified this case for en banc review.
The Commonwealth contends, and the Majority holds, that we must follow the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari, D., supra, in the *23present case to conclude that there was no seizure of Carroll under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and therefore, no constitutional principle supports suppression. In Hodari D., the police, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, approached a group of youths who immediately fled. One of the youths was Hodari D., who upon close pursuit by one of the police officers, discarded what appeared to be a rock but was later discovered to be crack cocaine. Hodari D. was then arrested. Hodari D. moved to suppress the crack as the product of his illegal seizure by police. The trial court denied the petition but the California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police seizure of Hodari D. was unreasonable and requiring that the crack be suppressed. The California Supreme Court denied appellate review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the California Court of Appeals and held that Hodari D. was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore, the cocaine was not a product of an illegal seizure subject to suppression.
In Hodari D., Justice Scalia speaking for the Court, conceded that the police officers had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop Hodari D. The Court concluded, however, relying on archaic common-law theories of arrest and the dictionary definition of seizure, that where an individual does not yield to a show of police authority, that person is not seized and therefore Fourth Amendment guarantees are simply not implicated in such an interaction. The Court in Hodari D., specifically rejected the long-held legal definition of seizure that, “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority has restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968). The Court also redefined the test for seizure as articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980) which stated: “that a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” *24The Mendenhall Court stated that the test for courts to apply to determine whether a seizure had occurred was whether “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.” Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509. The Court in Mendenhall then gave examples of what would constitute a show of authority by the police including, “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request would be compelled.” Id.
In what the Hodari D. dissent interpreted as “nothing if not creative lawmaking”, (Hodari D., 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1559, 113 L.Ed.2d at 707), Justice Scalia interpreted Mendenhall to require the police show of force as a “necessary, but not a sufficient condition” for a seizure. Hodari D. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d at 698. In order for the seizure to be effectuated under the new Hodari D. standard, the police show of force must now be coupled with submission to police authority. Hodari D. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1552, 113 L.Ed.2d at 699. No longer does the “free to leave” standard apply in determining whether a seizure has occurred. Now, whether a seizure has occurred, absent physical restraint by the police, depends upon the individual’s reaction to the show of authority by the police. Hodari D. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1559, 113 L.Ed.2d at 707 (dissenting opinion by Stevens, J.). The Court reasoned that since despite a show of force by the police, Hodari D. did not submit to police authority, he was not seized. Seizure under the new standard did not occur until Hodari D. was tackled by police officers. Therefore, Hodari D. had voluntarily abandoned the crack cocaine, and as such, the crack was lawfully recovered by police and was properly admissible as evidence.
The facts of Hodari D. are similar to the facts of the present case. Here, the police officer approached Carroll with his hand on his gun, using an authoritative tone of voice. Carroll, however, did not submit to the authority of the police *25but chose to flee. Under Hodari D., whether the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Carroll or whether a reasonable person would have felt not free to leave the scene must be ignored. In determining whether Carroll was seized, we must now only look to the individual’s response to the police show of authority. Where, as here, a person decides to flee and is pursued, no seizure has occurred, regardless of the police show of force. It is only when the police actually physically restrained Carroll, with his face to the ground, at gunpoint, will Hodari D. permit a court to find, under the Fourth Amendment, that Carroll was seized.
I will concede, as do all parties to this litigation, that we are bound to apply Hodari D. in cases arising solely under the federal constitution. Commonwealth v. Harper, 416 Pa.Super. 608, 611 A.2d 1211 (1992). However, I disagree with the Commonwealth’s contention that we are bound to apply Hodari D. to claims arising under Article 1, Section 8, absent a statement to this effect by our supreme court.
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), our supreme court articulated the process through which the courts should consider claims arising under the Pennsylvania Constitution, especially addressing concerns arising under Article 1, Section 8. There, the court stated that when interpreting provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, courts of this Commonwealth are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar provisions of the federal constitution. Id. at 388, 586 A.2d at 894. While the federal constitution establishes certain minimum levels applicable to the states, each state has the power to implement broader standards under the provisions of its state constitution. Id. at 388, 586 A.2d 894. The court, there, cited to Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977), stating:
Although we may accord weight to federal decisions where they are found to be logical and well reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, we are free to reject the conclusions of the United States Supreme Court so long as we *26remain faithful to the minimal guarantees established by the United States Constitution.
Id. at 389, 586 A.2d at 895.
Edmunds requires that four factors be briefed and analyzed by the parties in any case which implicates a provision of the Pennsylvania constitution. Id. at 390, 586 A.2d at 895 citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Those factors are:
1. the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provisions;
2. the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law;
3. related case-law from other states; and
4. policy considerations, including issues of state and local concern, and applicability with modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.

Id.

Since both Carroll and the Commonwealth have fully complied with this briefing and analysis requirement under Edmunds, this Court has the responsibility to undertake an independent analysis of the question presented under the Pennsylvania Constitution. I will now proceed with that required analysis.
First, the text of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
Security from Searches and Seizures
Section 8. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
The provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, while similar to the federal provisions in the Fourth Amendment, have been interpreted independently by our supreme court to afford greater protection to criminal defendants than those provided under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Common*27wealth v. Edmunds, supra; Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1989); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979).
Second, the history of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides insight into the independent development of the law regarding search and seizure in this Commonwealth. Article 1, Section 8 predated the drafting of the Fourth Amendment by more than a decade. Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. at 63, 470 A.2d at 466. Our supreme court indicated the significance of this provision of our constitution throughout the history of this Commonwealth in Sell when it stated:
In construing Article 1, Section 8, we find it highly significant that the language employed in that provision does not vary in any significant respect from the words of its counterpart in our first constitution. The test of Article 1, Section 8 thus provides no basis for the conclusion that the philosophy and purpose it embodies today differs from those which first prompted the Commonwealth to guarantee protection from unreasonable government intrusion. Rather, the survival of the language now employed in Article 1, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as a part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Sell at 65, 470 A.2d at 457.
In Edmunds, the supreme court further clarified that while safeguarding personal privacy is the underlying purpose for the protection of the exclusionary rule afforded to Pennsylvania citizens under Article 1, Section 8, the purpose of the protection of the exclusionary rule afforded under the Fourth Amendment is very different. There, the court indicated that:
The history of Article 1, Section 8, thus indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment, as articulated *28in [United States v.] Leon [468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ].
The United Stated Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct. The Leon majority also made clear that, under the Federal Constitution, the exclusionary rule operated as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”
Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 394-395, 586 A.2d at 897 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
With these historical differences in mind, I now turn to the law of seizure and coerced abandonment as it has evolved in this Commonwealth.
In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969), our supreme court first adopted the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). There, the court specifically articulated the reasonable suspicion standard, under which the police may seize an individual without probable cause. In Hicks, the court stated that, for such a precautionary seizure and search to be legitimate, there must first exist on the part of the police a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot and that the seized person is armed and dangerous. Id. 434 Pa. at 158-159, 253 A.2d at 279-280. This test for whether a “Terry stop” is legitimate remains the standard in this Commonwealth today and has been specifically adopted under Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992).
Our supreme court addressed the issue of coerced abandonment in Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973). The facts of that case, as stated by the Jeffries court are:
On the afternoon of November 6,1970, four police officers in an unmarked police automobile observed Jeffries walking along a public street in Pittsburgh. One officer testified *29that when Jeffries saw the officers, he ‘quickened his pace.’ Upon seeing him do so, the officer left the police vehicle and started to pursue Jeffries, who then began to run. While giving chase, the officer observed Jeffries throw a cigarette package under an automobile parked along the street. Shortly thereafter, the officer overtook Jeffries and directed him to stand against a wall. At that moment the other officers arrived on the scene and they were told by the officer, who apprehended Jeffries, to “hold him one minute.” The officer then recovered the cigarette package from underneath the parked vehicle, and it was found to contain several foil-wrapped packages of a substance later determined to be heroin.
Jeffries at 322, 311 A.2d at 916.
Jeffries contended that his abandonment of the contraband was the direct result of his illegal seizure by the police. Our supreme court agreed, holding that flight in and of itself does not constitute probable cause for arrest. The court also held that Jeffries’ flight did not give officers reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure under Terry, supra, stating: “Thus, it is clear the police had no right to ‘arrest’ or ‘seize’ Jeffries and the action of the police in chasing him and subsequently arresting him was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right.” Jeffries, 454 Pa. at 325-326, 311 A.2d at 917.
In Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 373, 378 A.2d 835, 840 (1977), our supreme court adopted the standard which Pennsylvania courts now apply in determining what amount of force constitutes a “seizure.” The court put forth the test for whether an individual was seized as whether “a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” Jones at 373, 378 A.2d at 840.
The issue of coerced abandonment was again addressed by our supreme court in Commonwealth v. Barnett, 484 Pa. 211, 398 A.2d 1019 (1979). There, officers on patrol in an unmarked police car observed Barnett walking down the street with his hands in his pockets. When Barnett noticed the *30police officers, he ducked behind a parked car. The officers then stopped the car, whereupon Barnett ran. The officers chased Barnett, who discarded a pistol and ammunition during the pursuit. Barnett was subsequently apprehended, arrested, and charged with various firearms offenses and other crimes. The trial court suppressed the gun and the bullets as products of an unlawful seizure. Our supreme court upheld the suppression order stating:
Under these circumstances, the suppression court was correct in finding that the officers did more than merely approach appellee for questioning. The police conduct here amounted to a coercive factor which was the main reason that appellee abandoned the weapon.
Barnett at 216, 398 A.2d 1019.
The Pennsylvania courts have consistently applied the tests articulated in Hicks, Jeffries, Jones, and Barnett when determining whether a police show of authority constitutes a seizure, whether the seizure was made with probable cause or reasonable suspicion and whether contraband abandoned while police were approaching or pursuing an individual was the product of an illegal seizure. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178,103 S.Ct. 830, 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482, 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388 Pa.Super. 187, 565 A.2d 177 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84, 480 A.2d 254 (1984).
This Court has addressed Hodari D. in several cases in which individuals had abandoned contraband during an interaction with the police. In Commonwealth v. Harper, 416 Pa.Super. 608, 611 A.2d 1211 (1992), a panel of this Court was presented with the issue of whether a person who discarded items of clothing, in which contraband was found, while being pursued by police was “seized” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In Harper, we were constrained to follow the dictates of Hodari D. for Fourth Amendment purposes and concluded that no seizure had occurred during the police chase of the defendant. In that case, however, no claims were made under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
*31There, Judge Beck writing for our Court described the reasoning in Hodari D. to be a marked departure from the generally recognized principles used by the federal courts to determine whether a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Harper, 416 Pa.Super. at 613, 611 A.2d at 1215-1216. In that case, we specifically examined the Hodari D. Court’s rejection of the standard for determining whether a seizure has occurred, which was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mendenhall, supra., and Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). This is the same standard adopted by our supreme court in Jones, supra. In Harper, the radical change made by Hodari D. in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was illustrated by citation to a comment in 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, p. 89-90 (2d ed. 1987, Supp.1992), which states:
What the Court in Hodari D. ought to have recognized is that the “not free to leave” concept of Mendenhall-Royer has nothing to do with a particular suspect’s choice to flee rather than submit or with his assessment of the probability of successful fight. But instead, as the dissenters lament, the majority “concludes that the timing of the seizure is governed by the citizen’s reaction, rather than by the officer’s conduct.” In this sense as well, Hodari D. is inconsistent with established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including principles emphasized in the very cases relied upon by the majority----in Michigan v. Chesternut, the Court reiterated that in determining whether a Terry stop has occurred, it is necessary to utilize a standard that “allows police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Such is certainly not the case in Hodari D., for what would otherwise be a groundless and thus illegal Terry seizure becomes conduct totally outside the Fourth Amendment merely because of the suspect’s nonsubmission.
Harper, 416 Pa.Super. at 618, 611 A.2d at 1216.
In Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 415 Pa.Super. 313, 609 A.2d 540 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 609, 618 A.2d 400 (1992), Judge Kelly, without joinder, cited Hodari D. to hold that *32since Peterfield, the arrestee, did not submit to the police show of force, he could not be considered “seized” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In that case, Peterfield made a claim that, under Article 1, Section 8, he had been illegally seized when he abandoned the contraband, and that all fruits of that seizure should be suppressed. Judge Kelly, however, refused to consider Peterfield’s claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution because he had not complied with the briefing requirements put forth in Edmunds, supra, that would enable a court to separately analyze such a claim. Id. 415 Pa.Super. at 321, 609 A.2d at 543-544. In Peterfield, the second judge concurred in the result only, and the third judge dissented.
In In the Interest of Barry W, 423 Pa.Super. 549, 621 A.2d 669 (1993) (en banc), this Court again discussed Hodari D. and its divergence from established Pennsylvania precedent but found Hodari D. to be inapplicable to that case, as the issue before the court was not whether a seizure had occurred but whether flight alone could justify reasonable suspicion by the police to forcibly detain the appellant.
While Hodari D. has been discussed in other decisions by this Court, this is the first time the issue of whether Hodari D. should be applied in the context of a state constitutional claim has been placed squarely before us. Under the third requirement in Edmunds, a court interpreting a provision of the state constitution should inform itself of the decisions in sister states regarding the adoption of a newly promulgated rule under the United States Constitution with regard to similar provisions contained in the state constitutions of those jurisdictions. I will now undertake that inquiry.
There has not been uniform acceptance or rejection of Hodari D. in other jurisdictions which have faced the issue of whether Hodari D. should become the standard under the constitutions of those states.
In State v. Doss, 254 N.J.Super. 122, 603 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 130 N.J. 17, 611 A.2d 655 (1992), the New Jersey Superior Court was not faced directly with the issue of *33whether Hodari D. should be applied under the constitution of that state. However, the court clearly stated that the holding in Hodari D., “that pursuit of a suspect by the police was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’” was not a permissible conclusion under New Jersey law, as police may only chase a suspect after they have formed “at least an ‘articulable suspicion’ that [the suspect] was or had been engaged in the commission of a criminal offense.” Id 254 N.J.Super. at 127-128, 603 A.2d at 104-105.
In People v. Holmes, 585 N.Y.S.2d 718, 181 A.D.2d 27 (1992), the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division considered whether that state should adopt the holding of Hodari D. as applicable to a claim under the New York State Constitution. The facts of Holmes are similar to the facts of the present case. There, police officers recognized the appellant as an individual who had previously been arrested on drug charges. The police officers, without reasonable suspicion that the appellant was armed or in the process of committing a crime, called to the appellant and gave chase when the appellant turned and fled. During his flight, Holmes discarded a bag containing narcotics, which was recovered by the police after Holmes’ apprehension. Holmes moved to suppress the narcotics as the fruit of an illegal seizure.
In Holmes, the court held that Hodari D. overruled prior New York cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment. However, the court refused to follow Hodari D. under Article 1, Section 12, of the New York State Constitution, which provides protections against unreasonable searches and seizures similar to those provided for in Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. There, the court held that the New York Constitution provides greater protection for the privacy of its citizens against unreasonable seizures than its federal counterpart. Id. 585 N.Y.S.2d at 719-720, 181 A.D.2d at 28-32.
Similarly, in State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), the Supreme Court of Connecticut also considered the implications of Hodari D. upon a claim made under the section of the Connecticut Constitution protecting against unreason*34able searches and seizures. In that case, a police officer stopped Oquendo and his companion because the officer suspected that they could possibly be involved with neighborhood burglaries since they were wearing coats on a warm night. The police officer summoned Oquendo and requested that he produce the duffle bag he was carrying. At that point, Oquendo fled and the police officer pursued. During the pursuit, Oquendo discarded the duffle bag, containing cocaine, which was recovered by the police. Oquendo was subsequently arrested, and moved for suppression of the contents of the duffle bag, as the products of an illegal seizure.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the provisions of the constitution of that state provided greater protection for the privacy of its citizens than the federal constitution and refused to apply Hodari D. to the state constitutional claim. Oquendo, 223 Conn, at 652, 613 A.2d at 1310. The court rejected Hodari D. as providing too restrictive a definition of seizure that was inconsistent with the previous decisions of that court, despite that fact that the protections under the state constitution had always followed the path dictated by the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Id.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has also had the opportunity to address the issue of whether Hodari D. should be followed when a claim arises implicating that state’s constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161, 840 P.2d 358 (1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1849,123 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). There, the court rejected Hodari D. as inconsistent with the previous holdings of that court regarding seizures. The court stated that Hawaii has chosen to afford greater protection to its citizens by rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s requirement that physical force or submission to an assertion of authority determines whether a person has been seized. Id. 840 P.2d at 359. In rejecting the public policy implications of Hodari D., the court stated:
We cannot allow the police to randomly “encounter” individuals without any objective basis for suspecting them of *35misconduct and then place them in a coercive environment in order to develop reasonable suspicion to justify their detention. This investigative technique is based on the proposition that an otherwise innocent person, who comes under police scrutiny for no good reason, is not innocent unless he or she convinces the police that he or she is.
Id. at 365.
In State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 813 P.2d 28 (1991), the Oregon Supreme Court considered the question of what constitutes a seizure under both the Oregon Constitution and the federal constitution. While the court accepted the holding in Hodari D. for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, it defined seizure for the purposes of state constitutional questions much differently than the definition put forth in Hodari D. In defining what constitutes a “seizure” under the Oregon Constitution, the court stated:
We hold that a “seizure” of a person occurs under Article 1, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution (a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) whenever an individual believes that (a) above, has occurred and such belief is objectively reasonable in the circumstances.
Id. 311 Or. at 409, 813 P.2d at 34. This definition is similar to the standard articulated in Mendenhall, supra, and the definition of seizure which has until to the present time been followed under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
I find the reasoning of the New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Oregon courts to be both sound and persuasive. In each of these states the courts have chosen to remain with the Mendenhall “free to leave” analysis. In each of these states, as in Pennsylvania, analysis under state constitutional provisions relating to search and seizure had previously been co-extensive with the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in deciding Fourth Amendment issues relating to seizure and coerced abandonment. However due to the dramatic departure that the Hodari D. decision repre*36sents from the well-established meaning of seizure as it has developed, these state courts would not countenance such an infringement upon the privacy of their citizens.
The Commonwealth brief informs us that “other jurisdictions that have considered the Hodari D. rule that a suspect who decides to flee has not been ‘seized,’ have accepted and followed it.” Brief for Appellant at 17. It is not until its reply brief that the Commonwealth admits that some other states have rejected Hodari D., contending, without citation, that “[t]he majority of states to consider this issue have found the reasoning of Hodari D. to be persuasive.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 14.
The Majority cites to the split of authority among our sister states regarding this issue as twenty three states accepting of the reasoning of Hodari D. and five states rejecting such reasoning. However, after a thorough review of the cases cited, my research reveals that many of the cited state court decisions apply the rationale of Hodari D. only in the context of claims made under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than claims made specifically under similar provisions of the state constitution. As it is uncontested that the holding of Hodari D. must be applied to all claims arising solely under the Fourth Amendment to the ’ United States Constitution, I will address only those decisions from other jurisdictions which have held that Hodari D. should become the standard for determining whether a seizure has occurred under a state constitutional analysis.
In People v. Arangure, 230 Cal.App.3d 1302, 282 Cal.Rptr. 51 (1991), the California Court of Appeals adopted Hodari D. for the analysis of a state constitutional claim regarding seizure and coerced abandonment of contraband. The court, however, prefaced its discussion of state constitutional analysis by stating that courts in California are required to interpret state constitutional claims as controlled by Federal precedent due to the adoption of Proposition 8 in 1982, enacted as Article 1, Section 28 of the California Constitution. Otherwise known as the Truth in Evidence Clause, that section abrogates suppression of evidence seized in violation of the California *37Constitution but not the federal constitution. Hence, the court in California was required to accept Hodañ D. for the purposes of a state constitutional claim.
The Louisiana Courts have apparently split on this issue with the Louisiana Court of Appeals accepting Hodari D. for the purposes of state constitutional analysis in State v. Gainer, 591 So.2d 1328 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.1991) and then rejecting the Hodari D. analysis for a similar claim under the state constitution in State v. Tucker, 604 So.2d 600 (La.Ct.App. 2d Cir.1992), appeal granted, 609 So.2d 212 (La.1992).
In State v. Shahid, 813 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), the Missouri Court of Appeals followed Hodari D. for purposes of its state constitution but engaged in no separate state constitutional analysis, thus providing little guidance to this court.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2d 520 (1992), cited Hodari D. with approval but did not specifically adopt the Hodari D. rationale under the Idaho Constitution, as that issue had not been squarely placed before the court.
In Henderson v. Maryland, 89 Md.App. 19, 597 A.2d 486 (1991), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, addressed a claim substantially similar to the claim in the case sub judice. There, the court adopted the reasoning of Hodari D. for the purposes of the Maryland Constitution, rejecting the appellant’s claim that Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provided greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 597 A.2d at 488.
In Welfare of E.D.J., 492 N.W.2d 829 (Minn.App.1992), appeal granted, (January 15, 1993), the Minnesota Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, also adopted the reasoning of Hodari D. in interpreting what constitutes a seizure under the constitution of that state. There, the court held that while “[t]here may be compelling reasons for interpreting Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution differently than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Hodari D.,” the appellant in *38E.D.J. presented the court with no historical basis or court precedent which would permit the court a departure from the federal standard. Id. at 830-831. The court also noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court has neither accepted nor rejected Hodari D., for the purpose of determining whether there has been a seizure for purposes of the Minnesota Constitution.
Similarly, the Courts of Appeals in Ohio and Texas have adopted the standard articulated by Hodari D. under the Fourth Amendment for purposes of interpreting similar provisions under the constitutions of those states. See Ohio v. Barnwell, 1993 WL 135796 (No. 64297 Ohio App., filed April 29, 1993); Texas v. Rose, 844 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.App.1992).
There appears to be no uniform acceptance or rejection of Hodari D. among our sister states. However, several other jurisdictions have rejected Hodari D. despite the fact that their state constitutional definitions of seizure had previously been coextensive with federal law. This reinforces the principle that Pennsylvania need not adopt Hodari D. merely because our supreme court has previously interpreted the term seizure, for purposes of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in a manner consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. To the contrary, this Court has the obligation, when presented with a claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, to independently evaluate whether the protections provided to the citizens of this Commonwealth should exceed those dictated under federal law. Edmunds, supra.
The fourth requirement under Edmunds, requires that courts discuss the policy considerations involved in accepting federal precedent in the context of a claim made under the Pennsylvania Constitution. First, I view this Court’s adoption of Hodari D. as a drastic departure from the standard for what determines whether a “seizure” has occurred under the established law of this Commonwealth. See, e.g., Hicks, supra, Jeffries, supra, Jones, supra. See also Harper, supra.
Second, Hodari D. represents a standard under which police officers are unable to predict whether their actions will *39result in a seizure or will be outside the protection of Article 1, Section 8, or the Fourth Amendment entirely since whether or not a seizure occurs under Hodari D. depends not upon the actions of the police but upon the reactions of the individual involved. Justice Stevens, in describing the virtues of the Mendenhall test and the dangers of the approach now promulgated by the Hodari D. majority, cited to 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2 at 61 (2d ed. 1987, Supp.1991):
The “free to leave” concept, in other words, has nothing to do with a particular suspect’s choice to flee rather than submit or with his assessment of the probability of successful flight. Were it otherwise, police would be encouraged to utilize a very threatening but sufficiently slow chase as a evidence-gathering technique whenever they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1559, 113 L.Ed.2d at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under Hodari D., this second scenario put forth hypothetically by LaFave, supra, has been sanctioned under federal law. No longer will law enforcement authorities be required to assess the impact of their actions prior to pursuing individuals despite the lack of any reasonable suspicion that those individual may be armed or engaged in criminal activity.
Finally, in Pennsylvania, prior to the majority’s adoption of the Hodari D. rule, the pedestrian had no obligation to comply with any detention upon merely being viewed by the police. Commonwealth v. Metz, 412 Pa.Super. 100, 119, 602 A.2d 1328, 1337 (1992), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 652, 613 A.2d 558 (1992) (Kelly, J., concurring). The free citizen in a country such as ours of course retains the discretion to run, walk, crawl or stop at that moment or any other under such circumstances, and accordingly, neither the police nor the courts can draw any adverse inferences from the exercise of any such discretion. Id.; Commonwealth v. Martinez, 403 Pa.Super. 125, 128, 588 A.2d 513, 514 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 653, 608 A.2d 29 (1992). However, with this Court’s adoption of the Hodari D. standard, a citizen can enjoy the rights and protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8, only *40if that citizen immediately complies with any police directive, regardless of whether the police officer is acting without reasonable suspicion. At least one commentator has predicted that in Hodari D., the Supreme Court is on the verge of preventing citizens from walking away from police encounters. Note, California v. Hodari, D.: The Demise of the Reasonable Person Test in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 12 N.Ill.L.Rev. 463, 494 (1992).
I am unwilling to participate in adopting Hodari D. as the law under the Pennsylvania Constitution. I share the fears of Justices Stevens and Marshall that, “[i]f carried to its logical conclusion, it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten countless innocent citizens into surrendering whatever privacy rights they may still have.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1561, 113 L.Ed.2d at 710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
After a full review of the four Edmunds factors, as well as a full review of Hodari D. and previous Pennsylvania and United Stated Supreme Court precedents, I can only conclude that to adopt Hodari D. as binding on the rights of the citizens of Pennsylvania under Article 1, Section 8, of our constitution would be to overrule all existing precedent on the law of seizure in Pennsylvania. I, therefore, will not join with the Majority in its decision in this case.
Returning to the present case, I would apply the traditional standard articulated in Jeffries and Jones, supra, to the actions of the police officer in order to determine whether Carroll was “seized” for purposes of Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I would conclude that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave when, after his attempted departure from a police officer, he was pursued. When an individual who exercises his right to walk away from a police show of authority is then pursued, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was not free to leave. See Jeffries, supra.
If Carroll were “seized” at the time he fell and dropped the drugs from his pocket, under our traditional analysis, we *41would then inquire whether the police officer was acting with reasonable suspicion or probable cause. In the present case, the Commonwealth has offered no evidence that the officer who approached Carroll with his hand on his gun had a reasonable and articulable belief that Carroll might be armed or that criminal activity might be afoot. Any police detention, in the absence of such an articulable belief, renders the police actions illegal and requires suppression of all evidence which was the product of such a “seizure.” Jeffries, supra.; Martinez, supra.
As I conclude that the “abandonment” of the contraband by Carroll was the product of illegal police conduct, I would affirm the order of the suppression court. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
McEWEN, DEL SOLE and BECK, JJ. join.