Court Opinion

ID: 9703825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:09:26.429354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.028472
License: Public Domain

R. L. Tahvonen, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by my colleagues. However, I am of the opinion that the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the statutory blood-alcohol level presumptions.
The instruction, CJI 15:2:03, is premised upon MCL 257.625a; MSA 9.2325(1). The applicable version of the statute provided that a driver’s blood-alcohol level was admissible "in a criminal prosecution pertaining to manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, while the driver is alleged to have been under the influence of intoxicating liquor”. The statute further provided that the "amount of alcohol in a driver’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person’s blood, urine or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions”. 1980 PA 515, effective April 1, 1981. It is evident to me that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute both authorizes the admission of the blood-alcohol evidence and renders the presumptions applicable in this manslaughter case.
The fact that the blood sample was taken pursuant to a search warrant does not, in my view, change this result. The statute does not suggest a distinction between samples obtained by implied consent and those obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Moreover, there is nothing in the case law, which in general construes earlier and significantly different versions of the statute, which supports the distinction. Finally, neither logic nor reasons support applying the presumptions in im*355plied consent cases and not applying them in search warrant cases. How the sample was obtained simply has nothing to do with the legal significance or evidentiary value of the blood-alcohol level.