Court Opinion

ID: 9734092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:17.899662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.609124
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
(concurring and dissenting). This matter involves a number of complex procedural issues. I differ with the majority on only one of those issues — the relationship between N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1, the ten-year statute of *131limitations, and N. J. S. A. 2A:14-21, the provision tolling statutes of limitations for infants and incompetents.
The pertinent statutes are as follows:
N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1
No action whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, or for any injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property, more than 10 years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction. This limitation shall not apply to any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant,, or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which the action is brought.
N. J. S. A. 2A:14-21
If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-16 to 2A:14-20 of this title or to a right or title of entry under section 2A:14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane, such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such time as limited by said sections, after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.
N. J. S. A. 2A:14-21 as it applies to infants is substantially identical to the English statute of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, enacted in 1623. That statute was declared in force in the province of New Jersey in 1728 and re-enacted by the State Legislature in 1799. Paterson’s Laws, p. 353 (1799). Smith v. Felter, 61 N. J. L. 102, 105 (Supreme Court 1897); cf. Valente v. Boggiano, 107 N. J. L. 456, 458-59 (E. & A. 1931). Hence there is no useful legislative history to guide the judiciary in its construction. Nevertheless, the legislative purpose is clear from the language of *132the statute. A child is not expected to understand or act upon his legal rights; he should not be made to suffer for failure to do so. Nor should he be penalized for the ignorance or neglect of his parents or guardian in failing to assert those rights. This legislative policy is a narrow one and not to be loosely extended beyond its statutory dimensions, Uscienski v. National Sugar Refining Co., 19 N. J. Misc. 240, 18 A. 2d 611 (C. P. 1941), but within the confines prescribed by the statute it is a strong policy, implicating as it does the duty of the State to act in its capacity as parens patriae. Cf. In re Sheehan's Estate, 290 III. App. 551, 554, 9 N. E. 2d 63, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937).
The majority properly identifies the policy considerations motivating the adoption of the ten-year statute of limitations Ante at 121. These policy considerations are little different from those motivating statutes of limitations generally. See, e. g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N. J. 267, 274 (1973). There is no reason for treating the countervailing policy considerations embodied in N. J. S. A. 2A:14-21 as being of lesser weight in comparison to N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1 than they are in comparison with other statutes of limitations. In either case, a person, when he reaches the age of majority, should be in precisely the same legal position as he would have been at the time the cause of action accrued had he been an adult. Reading N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1 and N. J. S. A. 2A:14-21 together, an infant may file suit any time until he reaches the age of majority and any time during a period thereafter equal to amount of time he would have had under N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1 had he been an adult at the time of the injury, subject, of course, to the limitations contained in N. J. S. A. 2A:14-2. Thus the infant plaintiff in this case, who was injured approximately nine years after completion of the construction and who was approximately 16 years old at the time of the injury, could have filed suit any time within a period of six years following the injury. Cf. Smith v. Felter, 61 N. J. L. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
*133It should be noted that this is not a case of the Legislature creating a novel cause of action with its own statute of limitations. In such circumstances, the tolling statute has been construed to be inapplicable. E. g., Grabert v. Central R. R. Co., 91 N. J. L. 604 (E. & A. 1918); Uscienski v. National Sugar Refining Co., 19 N. J. Misc. 240, 18 A. 2d 611 (C. P. 1941); cf. Gilette v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 91 N. J. L. 220 (E. & A. 1917). N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1, adopted as P. L. 1967, c. 59, involved merely the imposition of additional limitation on already existing causes of action.
I would hold that the claim of Kathleen O’Connor against Harrison Park, Inc. was not barred by N. J. S. A. 2A:14-1.1. The claims of her parents, which, under N. J. S. A. 2A:14-2.1, may be brought within the same period of time as her own, were also seasonably filed. Therefore I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division remanding these claims for a new trial, although not for the reasons relied upon below.
For affirmance and remandment — Justices Jacobs, Hall, Sullivan and Clifford — 4.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part — Justice Pashman — 1.