Court Opinion

ID: 9799794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 07:38:25.302155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:45.162493
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring.
[¶ 16] I agree the domestic violence advocate in this case exceeded the participation allowed by this Court’s administrative rules. I write separately to note that the advocate’s participation went far beyond the intended scope of N.D. Sup.Ct. Admin. R. 34; that there was serious misconduct of the advocate beyond the unauthorized practice of law; and that there *135are permissible methods for judicial officers to seek the truth in hearings such as this when neither party is represented by counsel.
[¶ 17] When Rule 34 was originally proposed, there was significant opposition to the rule because of concerns that domestic violence advocates would be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In response to these concerns, Bonnie Pala-cek, the executive director of the North Dakota Council on Abused Women’s Services, wrote to the Supreme Court, stating:
Since 1979, domestic violence advocates have been providing three services to victims which relate to the Protection Order process:
1) We have been assisting them in filling out petitions for the Orders by explaining what a petition is, how it moves through the court system, and what the various items mean;
2) We have been sitting with victims in courtrooms, sometimes at the front of the room at the counsel table;
3) We have been responding to requests for information from the judge.
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We are asking an affirmation of what we have been doing since 1979. We are not asking an extension of that role.
[¶ 18] To the extent there may be any ambiguity, testimony addressing the proposed administrative rule demonstrates that the role of domestic violence advocates in this process was to be a limited one. Administrative Rule 34 was not intended to allow domestic violence advocates to speak on behalf of victims, introduce evidence, or examine witnesses. In this case, the advocate prepared legal documents, conducted direct and redirect examination of Nichole Francis during a hearing, introduced evidence, and asserted objections. The advocate’s actions went far beyond the scope of the rule.
[¶ 19] In addition, there was serious misconduct on the part of the advocate beyond merely impermissible participation in the proceedings. The advocate at the second court date misled the court by telling the judge it was the respondent who had requested the continuance at the first time set for the hearing. The record reflects It was the advocate who sought the continuance at the first hearing time, and the judge never asked the respondent whether he had any objection to the continuance. At the outset of the second hearing time, the respondent advised the court he had secured legal representation — giving the name of the firm — but needed time for the lawyer to be present. Were it not for the advocate’s misrepresentation to the court, it is likely a continuance would have been granted in the interest of justice at the second scheduled time for the hearing.
[¶ 20] Finally, I would suggest, as the United States Supreme Court suggested in Turner v. Rogers, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), there are better ways to secure justice through neutral engagement by the judge or referee. Neutral engagement — where the judge explains, inquires, and clarifies — may provide the “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” that comply with the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2518. See also Richard Zorza, Turner v. Rogers: Improving Due Process for the Self-Represented, National Center for State Courts, Future Trends in State Courts 2012, available at http://nesc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref' collection/accessfair/id/239; Judge Gary Clingman, The Self Represented Litigant in Your Court-A Quandary, National Judicial College News (Jan. 13, 2014), http:// www.judges.org/news/news011314.html. The process employed in this case, one-*136sided advocacy and use of a detached-judicial model, appears to result, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, in “an asymmetry of representation that would ‘alter significantly the nature of the proceeding1 ” that “could make the proceedings less fair overall.” See Turner, at 2519. Simply stated, provided the respondent is given “adequate notice of the importance of [issues], fair opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court findings,” the judicial officer can explain the law, make inquiry, and clarify in a neutral manner in order to do justice within the framework of the law. See id. at 2520.
[¶ 21] DALE V. SANDSTROM