Court Opinion

ID: 9900394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:07.396808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.976712
License: Public Domain

268                    July 26, 2023                No. 386

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

               In the Matter of Z. M.,
                       a Child.
        DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
               Petitioner-Respondent,
                          v.
                        M. M.,
                      Appellant.
            Douglas County Circuit Court
                22JU03405; A180452

   Ann Marie Simmons, Judge.
   Argued and submitted June 12, 2023.
   Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey,
Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Robert Hansler, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General,
and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief
Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.
   AOYAGI, P. J.
   Reversed.
Cite as 327 Or App 268 (2023)                                                269

           AOYAGI, P. J.
         Mother appeals the juvenile court’s judgment
asserting dependency jurisdiction over her child, Z, and
making Z a ward of the court. Mother challenges each of the
three jurisdictional bases found by the court, as well as the
court’s ultimate ruling that it had dependency jurisdiction.1
As explained below, we agree with mother that it was error
to assert jurisdiction over Z on this record. We therefore
reverse.
          ORS 419B.100(1)(c) allows a juvenile court to assert
dependency jurisdiction over a child and make the child a
ward of the court when it finds that the child’s conditions
or circumstances endanger the child’s welfare, considering
the totality of the circumstances. Dept. of Human Services
v. C. J. T., 258 Or App 57, 61, 308 P3d 307 (2013). To estab-
lish jurisdiction, the Department of Human Services (DHS)
must prove that the child’s conditions or circumstances
“present a current threat of serious loss or injury” that is
nonspeculative and reasonably likely to be realized. Id. at
61-62. When a parent’s conduct is at issue, DHS must prove
a causal connection between that conduct and the threat-
ened harm to the child. Dept. of Human Services v. L. E. F.,
307 Or App 254, 258, 476 P3d 119 (2020), rev den, 367 Or
559 (2021).
         Our task on appeal is to “view the evidence, as sup-
plemented and buttressed by permissible derivative infer-
ences, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s dispo-
sition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was
legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” Dept. of Human
Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639, 307 P3d 444 (2013).
We rely on the court’s explicit factual findings if supported
by evidence in the record, as well as any implicit factual
findings necessary to the disposition.2 Id. at 639-40.

    1
      Mother also assigns error to the denial of her motion to dismiss at the close
of the state’s evidence, but we do not address that assignment, both because of
our disposition and because the parties seem to agree that we need not address it
in this posture.
    2
      Mother has not requested de novo review, which we have “sole discretion”
whether to provide, ORS 19.415(3)(b), and will provide only in “exceptional cases,”
ORAP 5.40(8)(c). We therefore apply the regular standard of review.
270                               Dept. of Human Services v. M. M.

          Here, in October 2020, the juvenile court asserted
dependency jurisdiction over mother’s then 10-month-old
son, C, based on mother’s admissions that she had exposed C
to domestic violence (by C’s father) and that substance abuse
interfered with her ability to safely parent C. Mother has
since failed to meaningfully engage in services for domestic
violence or substance abuse. On July 4, 2021, Z was born. Z
lived with mother for the first year of her life. DHS did at
least two assessments and found no reason to remove Z. On
July 20, 2022, mother and a man named Krueger had a pub-
lic altercation that resulted in two 9-1-1 calls. DHS removed
Z from mother’s care at that time. After a three-day trial in
October 2022, the juvenile court asserted dependency juris-
diction over Z on three bases, each of which we address in
turn.
                            ALLEGATION A
         The juvenile court found as a basis for jurisdiction
that Z “has been exposed to violence” by mother.3 That find-
ing was based solely on the July 2022 altercation, which the
court described as “a frankly quite flagrant physical alter-
cation in public with the child.” The record evidence does not
support that finding.
         There is evidence that mother was involved in a
loud verbal altercation with Krueger on a residential side-
walk in Roseburg; that mother was carrying Z on her left
hip at the time; that mother was yelling and screaming at
Krueger to leave and to get away from her; that two peo-
ple called 9-1-1; and that, upon arrival, the sheriff’s deputy
saw mother and Krueger “talking” and then walking away
from each other. There is no evidence as to the content of
the yelling and screaming that had occurred, other than
mother saying to leave and to get away from her. There is
no evidence how long the verbal altercation lasted. As for it
getting “physical,” the only evidence on that point was testi-
mony by one of the 9-1-1 callers that she saw the man “reach
    3
      DHS alleged in the petition that mother exposed Z to “domestic violence,”
but the juvenile court correctly concluded that DHS had not proved any romantic
relationship between mother and Krueger. The court found not credible mother’s
testimony that Krueger was a total stranger to her, and that finding is well sup-
ported, but there is no evidence of a romantic relationship.
Cite as 327 Or App 268 (2023)                                              271

for” the woman’s arm and the woman “pull away,” which she
described as “the only physical I saw between the two.” The
other 9-1-1 caller did not testify, and the deputy did not see
anything. As for Z, no one testified to her demeanor except
the deputy, who described Z as “fine” and observed that she
was appropriately dressed and “seemed happy.”
         On this record, the evidence was insufficient to
establish that mother had exposed Z to “violence” so as to
create a current threat of serious loss or injury to Z. It is
certainly not ideal parenting to yell and scream at another
adult while carrying a one-year-old child, to the point of two
people calling 9-1-1. Mother’s lying to the court about not
knowing Krueger also does not reflect well on her. The fact
remains that the evidence was insufficient to prove expo-
sure to “violence” as a jurisdictional basis.
                            ALLEGATION C
        The juvenile court found as another basis for depen-
dency jurisdiction that mother has another child, C, for
whom she is not a parental resource and the conditions and
circumstances that were the basis for the mother not having
custody of C, which include domestic violence and substance
abuse, have not changed or been ameliorated and interfere
with her ability to safely parent Z.
         Regarding failure to ameliorate the circumstance
that mother’s substance abuse interfered with her ability to
safely parent C, we understand the court to have made that
finding based on mother’s failure to engage in services for
substance abuse and its view that mother had “engaged in
behaviors that clearly look like substance abuse.”
         Mother was nearly 26 years old in October 2022
when the jurisdictional trial regarding Z was held. There
is evidence that mother started using methamphetamine
when she was 20 or 21 years old. In October 2020, mother
stipulated that substance abuse interfered with her ability
to safely parent C. Mother admitted at Z’s jurisdictional
trial that she continued to use methamphetamine “on occa-
sion” until mid-2021.4 In March, May, and June 2021, while
   4
     Mother also admitted to past heavy marijuana use. Mother was not asked
about more recent marijuana use, except one question to clarify that her asserted
272                               Dept. of Human Services v. M. M.

mother was pregnant with Z, mother had three urinalyses
(UAs) come back positive for amphetamines.
          At trial, mother testified that she has been clean of
methamphetamine since August 3, 2021. There is evidence in
an admitted exhibit that mother had a clean UA on August 11,
2021, although it was not discussed at trial. The record is
vague as to other UA requests since Z’s birth, except for
an instance on July 15, 2022, when DHS requested a UA,
mother agreed to it and went to DHS’s office, but mother
ultimately did not do the UA after a specific issue arose
regarding DHS protocols. Mother has offered to do a hair
follicle test, but DHS did not follow up on that offer.
        DHS did at least two assessments after Z was born
and found no basis to remove her. Multiple witnesses who
have observed mother parenting Z (specifically, two DHS
witnesses and mother’s three witnesses) testified to being
familiar with signs that someone is under the influence of
a controlled substance and to never seeing anything that
caused them to believe that mother was under the influence.
         The only witness who testified to possible evidence
of more recent methamphetamine use by mother was a DHS
employee who had monitored mother’s visits with C on and
off for two and one-half years, including after Z was born
(after which mother always brought Z to the visits).5 The
witness testified that there had been a “couple” visits where
mother had acted differently than usual, specifically “look-
ing like less engaged with the children and more so kind of
lethargic and not as active,” which are behaviors that the
witness associates with being under the influence of a con-
trolled substance. The witness was not asked and did not
say when those occasions took place, although it is reason-
able to infer that they were after July 4, 2021, given her

“clean” date of August 3, 2021, did not “include” marijuana. Given the absence
of any arguments about marijuana use at trial and on appeal, and the juvenile
court’s silence regarding mother’s marijuana use, we do not understand the court
to have considered marijuana use as relevant to dependency jurisdiction of Z.
    5
      It is unclear whether some of the visits monitored by the witness occurred
after Z’s removal (that is, in the three months before trial), such that mother
would have been visiting both C and Z. In any event, Z was present at all visits
after her birth.
Cite as 327 Or App 268 (2023)                             273

reference to “the children.” It is unknown whether they were
after August 3, 2021.
        Mother has not meaningfully engaged in substance
abuse services, despite repeated referrals by DHS.
          On this record, we conclude that the juvenile court
erred in finding that mother had failed to ameliorate the
circumstance that her substance abuse interfered with her
ability to safely parent C, so as to create a current threat of
serious loss or injury to Z. It is certainly true that mother
has almost entirely failed to engage in services for substance
abuse. The court was understandably concerned, given that
reality, that mother might not actually be clean. But there
is only a wisp of evidence of even the possibility of mother
using methamphetamine in the 14 months before trial, and
there is no evidence of use of a nature or degree that would
create a current threat of serious loss or injury to Z. See
Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. B., 291 Or App 226, 236,
418 P3d 56 (2018) (discussing cases in which we have rec-
ognized that a parent’s substance abuse alone does not give
rise to dependency jurisdiction and that DHS must prove
that a parent uses substances “in a way that puts the child
at risk of serious harm” (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also State v. Reed, 339 Or 239, 245, 118 P3d 791 (2005)
(disbelieving a witness’s testimony “does not add anything
affirmative to the state’s evidence”).
        As for domestic violence, the juvenile court also
found that mother had failed to ameliorate the circumstance
that she exposed C to domestic violence, so as to create a
current threat of serious injury or loss to Z. That finding
appears to have been based entirely on mother’s failure to
engage in services for domestic violence victims.
        The record shows that mother has had three adult
romantic relationships in which she was assaulted by her
partner. The first was before she had children. The sec-
ond was C’s father, and, in October 2020, mother admit-
ted to exposing C to domestic violence, which is one basis
for dependency jurisdiction of C. The third was Singleton.
There is no evidence of domestic violence during that rela-
tionship, which ended around May 2021, but in August
274                       Dept. of Human Services v. M. M.

2021, Singleton assaulted mother in a parking lot, mother
obtained a restraining order, and Singleton is currently in
prison.
         Despite repeated referrals by DHS, mother has not
meaningfully engaged in domestic violence services. At the
same time, there is no evidence that Z faces a current threat
of serious loss or injury from mother’s past as a victim of
domestic violence. For example, there is no evidence that
mother has contact with any of her past partners, is cur-
rently in a violent romantic relationship, or has exposed Z to
domestic violence.
         Ultimately, as to both substance abuse and domes-
tic violence, as much as one might wish that mother would
engage in the services offered to her—both for her own ben-
efit and for the benefit of C and Z—this record simply does
not support jurisdiction of Z based on mother’s failure to
ameliorate the circumstances that brought C into care.
                     ALLEGATION D
         The juvenile court found as another basis for juris-
diction that, “[d]espite having participated in services
designed to improve [her] parenting skills, [mother] is
unable to demonstrate that she can safely parent the child.”
The parties agree that, as tried and decided, allegation D is
effectively duplicative of the other allegations and need not
be separately addressed. We agree and, for the same rea-
sons already discussed, conclude that allegation D was not
proved as a basis for dependency jurisdiction.
                       CONCLUSION
        In sum, the juvenile court erred in asserting depen-
dency jurisdiction over Z on the three bases that it did,
considered individually and together. Although we share
the juvenile court’s concerns regarding mother’s failure to
engage in services, this evidentiary record was insufficient
to establish a current threat of serious loss or injury to Z
from mother’s conduct. On this record, we reverse the juris-
dictional judgment as to Z.
        Reversed.