Court Opinion

ID: 9576564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:00.608206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:00.147242
License: Public Domain

*353FINNEY, Chief Justice:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it overrules Gilmore v. State, 314 S.C. 453, 445 S.E.2d 454 (1994), and grants petitioner a new trial, but I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930).
The majority’s decision to overrule King is predicated on the assertion that the “modern general reasonable doubt charge ... instructs the jury to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant.” In State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), we urged the trial courts of this State to limit the jury charge defining reasonable doubt to “the kind of doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.” Id., 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375. I find no “endorsement” of Justice Ginsburg’s suggested reasonable doubt charge in State v. Darby, 324 S.C. 114, 477 S.E.2d 710 (1996). In Darby, we noted in footnote 1 that the trial judge gave an instruction derived from the Ginsburg suggested charge, and further stated “some courts have expressly approved this charge as the definition of reasonable doubt to be given within their jurisdiction.” Id., 324 S.C. at 116, 477 S.E.2d at 711 (emphasis added). This Court did not either expressly or impliedly approve the charge derived from the Ginsburg suggested charge. We merely held that the reasonable doubt charge was not erroneous. See also State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 508 S.E.2d 857 (1998) (in footnote 12, Court recites alternative versions of reasonable doubt charge, noting neither is mandatory, and that the trial judge may decline any definitional charge).
In my view, a general charge on the definition of reasonable doubt is explicitly distinct from an instruction on the application of the principle of reasonable doubt where lesser included offenses are involved. The recent changes in the jury charge definition of reasonable doubt do not alter the necessity of the King charge. That charge does not define reasonable doubt, but instead instructs the jury on the application of this fundamental principle of criminal law in a case where the defendant faces charges of both greater and lesser included offenses. I am persuaded that the ends of justice require that where there is doubt as between the greater or lesser included *354offenses, a jury must be instructed that such doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant as to the lesser included offense. Hence, the King charge remains an indispensable part of our criminal jurisprudence.
For the reasons given above, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.