Court Opinion

ID: 9774485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:22:08.299082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:09.063303
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the holding that “upon Petitioner’s motion, the Circuit Court should have corrected [the sentence that it imposed] to conform to a sentence for which Petitioner bargained and upon which he relied in pleading guilty.” In the case at bar, it is obvious that the Circuit Court imposed a sentence that it considered to be “within the guidelines.” It is also obvious that—because (1) Petitioner waited over four years to file his motion to correct that allegedly “illegal” sentence, and (2) Petitioner’s trial counsel did not object to the sentence immediately after it was imposed—neither Petitioner nor his trial counsel initially thought that the sentence was prohibited by Md. Rule 4-243. Under these circumstances, I would not limit our review to what occurred “on the record” when Petitioner entered his plea, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on the ground that the Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Petitioner “got exactly what he bargained for.”
Moreover, if the majority is correct that we are required to limit our review to what occurred during the proceeding at which Petitioner entered his guilty plea, I would hold that there are two reasonable interpretations of the term “within the guidelines:” (1) the sentencing judge’s interpretation that “within the guidelines” permitted the imposition of the maximum sentence, provided that the unsuspended portion of the sentence was not “above the guidelines,” and (2) the majority’s interpretation that no portion of the sentence could be above the guidelines. In my opinion, the fact that there are two *603reasonable interpretations is of dispositive consequence to the issue of appropriate relief. Assuming that Petitioner is entitled to some relief, he is not entitled to the relief fashioned by the majority.
When the State and the defendant have entered into an agreement for a plea of guilty on condition that the State’s Attorney will recommend a particular sentence, the defendant acquires an enforceable right to a joint submission of that agreement to the court, but the defendant does not acquire an enforceable right to the recommended sentence “unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented approves it.” Md. Rule 4-243(c)(2). Although there should be a “meeting of the minds” among the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the defendant, and the trial court, there must be a “meeting of the minds” between the defendant and the trial court. Maryland Rule 4-242(c) prohibits the court from accepting a plea of guilty unless the defendant understands the consequences of the plea. If there is a misunderstanding between the defendant and the trial court with respect to the maximum sentence that can be imposed, until that misunderstanding is resolved, neither the defendant nor the trial court should be “bound” by the plea agreement.
In the case at bar, the record shows that the Circuit Court actually approved of an agreement that—in its mind—permitted the imposition of a fifteen-year sentence, with all but six years suspended on condition that Petitioner successfully complete a period of probation. If the majority is correct in its conclusion that our review must be limited to what occurred during the proceeding at which Petitioner entered his guilty plea, the record does not show the required “meeting of the minds.” Because the Circuit Court never approved of an agreement in which—in Petitioner’s mind—no portion of the sentence could be above the guidelines, Petitioner should be entitled to the relief available to a defendant whose plea agreement has been rejected.
Maryland Rule 4—243(c)(4), in pertinent part, provides:
*604Rejection of plea agreement. If the plea agreement is rejected, the judge shall inform the parties of this fact and advise the defendant (A) that the court is not bound by the plea agreement; (B) that the defendant may withdraw the plea; and (C) that if the defendant persists in the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the sentence or other disposition of the action may be less favorable than the plea agreement.
A sentencing judge should not be required to impose a sentence that he or she never agreed to impose.