Court Opinion

ID: 9725429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:47:40.360469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.226620
License: Public Domain

BLEASE, J.
I concur and dissent.
The majority opinion first suggests a basis in tort for the recovery by the real estate brokers of attorney’s fees for having been compelled to defend themselves in an action brought by their principal as a of the wrongful interference with the principal’s rights by The majority opinion states that the action against the brokers was a ‘“natural and proximate consequence’ of Sifford’s activities.” It then inexplicably extends Prentice v. North Amer. Title Guar. Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618 [30 Cal.Rptr. 821, 381 P.2d 645] to permit of attorney’s fees other than as damages in a tort action. I concur in the suggestion and dissent from the extension.
Prentice holds, as an exception to the general rule permitting recovery of attorney’s fees only as provided by statute or agreement, that attorney’s fees may be recovered as damages which are “the natural and proximate consequence” of the tort of another. (Id., at pp. 620-621.) Since Prentice is based upon tort principles, I do not upon what theory of liability the majority opinion extends Prentice beyond tort liability. The majority opinion does not explain.
The proper measure of recovery here is tort and not the unwarranted extension of Prentice.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 6, 1980. Blease, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of appellant Sifford and respondent Prather for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 17, 1980. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.