Court Opinion

ID: 9404323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 18:03:55.042334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.103094
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/22/23 In re A.R. CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL                                                      A164685
 SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                         (Alameda County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     Super. Ct. No. JD-
 v.                                                                   028398-02)
 M.J.,
                                                                      ORDER MODIFYING
           Defendant and Appellant.                                   OPINION AND
                                                                      DENYING
                                                                      REHEARING

                                                                      [NO CHANGE IN
                                                                      JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
         On our own motion, it is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June
6, 2023, be modified as follows:
      1. On page 7, the first sentence of the first full paragraph is replaced with
         the following sentence:

                                                               1
      In her initial opening brief on appeal, A.R. did not assert her trial
      counsel was ineffective by failing to object and by making certain
      concessions.

   2. On page 10, footnote 5, the following paragraph is added at the end of
      the footnote:

      In her petition for rehearing, A.R. asserts “this case [is] analogous to
      B.D., [in which the court concluded the minor’s] due process rights were
      violated by the trial court’s unfair limitations on trial counsel . . . .”
      (Pet. 7) To the contrary, the B.D. court concluded the Bureau violated
      the minor’s due process rights to a fair hearing by failing to include
      numerous egregious facts in the section 366.26 report, including that
      one of the foster/prospective adoptive parents had spent seven years in
      prison for a home invasion burglary, had his parental rights terminated
      as to three sons, those now-adult sons were both victims and
      perpetrators of sexual abuse against children, at least one of those sons
      lived with the foster parents and the minor, and the foster parent
      allowed his adult nephew to share a bedroom with the minor. (In re
      B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 811, 824.) There were no such
      omissions in the Agency’s report.

There is no change in the appellate judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

Date:________________                   _____________________A.P.J.

                                         2
Filed 6/6/23 In re A.R. CA1/1 (unmodified opinion)
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL                                                      A164685
 SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                         (Alameda County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   Super. Ct. No. JD-
 v.                                                                   028398-02)
 M.J.,
             Defendant and Appellant.

         The minor child, A.R., appeals from the order terminating parental
rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She maintains
the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) conducted an
inadequate adoption assessment report, denying her due process and
resulting in a finding of adoptability that is unsupported by substantial
evidence. She makes this argument in the context of an ineffective assistance
of counsel (IAC) argument, as A.R.’s attorney in the juvenile court made no
objection to the report and, in fact, conceded minor is adoptable. On appeal,

        All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
         1

Institutions Code.

                                                               1
A.R. has not demonstrated her trial counsel was ineffective in making that
concession.
      A.R. also asserts the Agency failed to comply with its duty of initial
inquiry under ICWA once her biological father was identified. We conclude
A.R. is correct on this point and remand the matter to the juvenile court with
directions that the court and the Agency comply with the inquiry (and if
appropriate) notice provisions of ICWA and related California law. 2
                                BACKGROUND
      There have been numerous appeals and petitions in this dependency
proceeding, which commenced in 2017 when A.R. was less than a year old.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we set
forth an abbreviated version of the background of the case as stated in a prior
opinion of the Supreme Court.
      “[Mother] gave birth to A.R. in 2016. At the time, [Mother] herself was
still a minor. Less than a year later, the . . . Agency . . . filed a petition under
. . . section 300 to have A.R. declared a dependent of the court. The operative
petition alleged that [Mother] had mental health concerns, such as
depression, that impeded her ability to care for her child. The juvenile court
sustained the petition. Although the court attempted to place A.R. with
[Mother], [Mother] later raised concerns about her ability to care for A.R.
while she finished high school. The court ordered A.R. placed in a foster
home while [Mother] participated in family reunification services. [¶] Several

      2  A.R.’s biological father, M.J., also appealed from the order
terminating his parental rights, as well as from an order denying a section
388 petition asking that he be elevated to presumed father status and for
visitation. After the cases were consolidated, M.J. sought dismissal of his
appeals, and we did so on February 15, 2023. Mother has not appealed from
the termination of her parental rights.

                                         2
months later, the court entered an order terminating reunification services.”
(In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 243–244.)
      “At the [section 366.26] hearing, the court . . . turned to the question of
whether to permanently sever [Mother’s] parental rights. [Mother’s] attorney
urged the court instead to apply the beneficial parental relationship
exception to the termination of parental rights. ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The court rejected that argument and entered an order terminating
[Mother’s] parental rights” in June 2019. (In re A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 244.)
      We dismissed Mother’s appeal from the order terminating her parental
rights as untimely. The Supreme Court granted review, and reversed and
remanded the case, concluding when parents’ “court-appointed attorneys
have failed to timely file a notice of appeal of an order terminating parental
rights, parents whose rights have been terminated may seek relief based on
the denial of the statutory right to the assistance of competent counsel.” (In
re A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 257.)
      On remand, we addressed the appeal on the merits, considering
whether the trial court erred in concluding the beneficial relationship
exception to terminating parental rights applied. We concluded “ ‘the
juvenile court did not have the benefit of the guidance provided in [In re]
Caden C. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,]’ and as a consequence considered improper
factors in determining whether the parental benefit exception applied.” (In re
A.R. (Aug. 20, 2021, No. A158143) [nonpub. opn.].) We therefore remanded
the matter to the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.26 hearing in
conformance with the principles articulated in Caden C. . . . and taking into
consideration the family’s current circumstances. . . .” (In re A.R., supra,
A158143.)

                                         3
      A few days after that opinion was filed, alleged father M.J. came
forward, and DNA test results later showed a 99.99 percent probability he is
A.R.’s biological father.3 He filed a section 388 petition seeking elevation to
presumed father status and visitation with A.R., which the juvenile court
denied. M.J. told a social worker he had no “Native American Ancestry in his
family of which he is aware.”
      The Agency filed a section 366.26 report in January 2022 again
recommending termination of parental rights and adoption. The report also
stated that in January 2020, Mother gave birth to A.R.’s half-brother, who
“remains in the mother’s care.” A.R. had been placed “out of home” with her
initial foster mother, P.T., since February 2018. In August 2019, the current
foster mother, Z.T., “joined the foster family and moved in,” and the foster
mothers married. P.T. and Z.T. were designated as prospective adoptive
parents in November 2019.
      In December 2021, about a month before the second section 366.26
hearing, A.R.’s foster parents separated after P.T. was “briefly arrested” for
allegedly striking Z.T. in the face. Z.T. obtained a restraining order,
separated from P.T., and plans to divorce. An “[e]mergency [r]esponse [u]nit”
investigation was closed as “unfounded.”
      Z.T. “remains committed to adopting [A.R.], and [A.R.] continues to
state that she wants to remain there and has no worries about it, although
she misses the former caregiver. . . .” Z.T. has three biological sons and has
adopted before, has been employed as a social worker for a foster family
agency, and has no criminal record or protective services history. A.R. told
the social worker “she feels safe with her caregiver and wants to stay there.”

      3 Mother had identified another man, C.G., as the father, but had
given A.R. the surname of the man she was dating when she was pregnant.

                                        4
      At the time of the report, A.R. was five years old and in kindergarten.
She was generally in good physical health. She had been diagnosed with
eczema, for which she was treated with hydrocortisone cream, and sleep
difficulties, for which she was taking Clonidine. She also had been prescribed
eyeglasses for astigmatism.
      A.R. also had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and had
been receiving intensive therapy for up to 30 hours a week from the Center
for Autism Related Disorders (CARD) program. Her autism symptoms—
aggression, repetitive behaviors, and minimal cooperative play—“are
apparent at home and day care, and at the CARD program.” However, at
school she “doesn’t exhibit these symptoms as much” and providers and
caregivers attribute her improvement to the “intensive therapy” she has
received from the CARD program. The program goals for A.R. were
“reduction in negative behaviors including aggression, screaming and Pica
symptoms, and an increase in positive skills such as communication, social
skills, following directions, and engagement.”
      A.R. “previously had met qualifications for Global Developmental Delay
diagnosis in October of 2018 and was supported by an IEP [(Individual
Education Plan)] and attended a special education classroom for one
academic year.” At her last IEP meeting in March 2021, it was determined
that she “no longer met qualifications.” Her kindergarten teacher reported
A.R. “is a ‘self-starter, smart, social, makes eye contact, does well with
schoolwork, is on task, and usually does well with transitions.’ ” She “knows
her colors, knows the alphabet, and can count and write her name.”
      The report described A.R. as a “busy, curious[,] and sometimes shy
young girl who loves to draw colorful pictures. . . . She is better at engaging
with people she knows than with unfamiliar people. For example, with her

                                        5
foster family, school classmates, and peers at daycare, she is able to make eye
contact, have a conversation, and engage in play. She can still be upset by a
child she does not know asking her to play in a playground. She still has
triggers which can send her spiraling into a tantrum at a moment’s notice;
however, she is usually able to be consoled by her caregivers or providers. . . .
She can still be impulsive and can be aggressive with peers without warning,
but this doesn’t occur often.”
      At the hearing, a social worker testified she had included information
about the incident between the caregivers in the Agency report because it
was “a change in the child’s circumstances.” It did “not impact [A.R.’s]
adoptability,” and she was “still adoptable.”
      Following the hearing, the juvenile court found A.R. was not an Indian
child, and no further notice was required under ICWA. The court also found
there was no “substantial beneficial relationship” with Mother and that A.R.
was adoptable, observing “she has some health issues . . . [b]ut there is
nothing in the record that shows a child who has Autism, and this child in
particular, is not adoptable.” The court terminated the parental rights of
both mother and biological father M.J.
                                 DISCUSSION
The Adoptability Finding
      A.R. maintains the Agency’s “Adoption Assessment Report” submitted
for the section 366.26 hearing was inadequate, and consequently, no
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability.
      As we observed at the outset, A.R.’s trial counsel did not object to the
adequacy of the assessment. Indeed, she affirmatively stated at the hearing
she was “not disputing that [A.R.] is adoptable.” She further urged that if the

                                        6
court terminated parental rights, it “grant the status of p[ro]spective
adoptive parent to [Z.T.].”
      In her opening brief on appeal, A.R. did not address the consequences
of her trial court’s failure to object and concessions. She later filed a
supplemental brief, in which she concedes “[a]t no stage did trial counsel
expressly object to the substance of the Agency’s section 366.26 report nor did
she expressly object to the trial court’s finding that A.R. was adoptable.” She
asserts that, to the extent her trial counsel did not preserve the issue of the
asserted inadequacy of the Agency’s section 366.26 and resulting lack of
evidence to support the finding of adoptability, her counsel was ineffective.
      “In general, the proper way to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is by writ of habeas corpus, not appeal. [Citations.] However, an
ineffective assistance claim may be reviewed on direct appeal where ‘there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation’ for trial counsel’s action or
inaction.’ (People v. Pope [(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412,] 426[4].)” (In re Dennis H.
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98, fn. 1 (Dennis H.).)
      “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency
proceedings, a [litigant] ‘must demonstrate both that: (1) his [or her]
appointed counsel failed to act in a manner expected of reasonably competent
attorneys acting as diligent advocates; and that (2) this failure made a
determinative difference in the outcome, rendering the proceedings
fundamentally unfair in that it is reasonably probable that but for such
failure, a determination more favorable for [the minor’s] interests would have
resulted.’ [ Citations]. In short, appellant has the burden of proving both
that his [or her] attorney’s representation was deficient and that this

      4 Overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Delgado (2017)
2 Cal.5th 554, 559.

                                        7
deficiency resulted in prejudice.” (Dennis H., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 98,
capitalization omitted.)
      In this case, A.R.’s juvenile court counsel did not simply fail to object—
she expressly conceded that A.R. was adoptable. A.R. has not demonstrated
this was not the action of a “reasonably competent [counsel] acting as [a]
diligent advocate[],” nor has she shown there “ ‘simply could be no
satisfactory explanation’ for trial counsel’s action or inaction.’ ” (Dennis H.,
supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 98 & fn. 1.) The readily apparent “satisfactory
explanation” for the concession is that A.R. was, indeed, adoptable.
      The adoptability issue at a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the
dependent child, e.g., whether his or her age, physical condition, and
emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. (In re
Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649 (Sarah M.).) “[I]t is not
necessary that the child already be in a potential adoptive home or that there
be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ ([In re] Jennilee T.
[(1992)] 3 Cal.App.4th [212,] 223, fn. 11. . . .)” (Ibid.) But, the existence of a
prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a
dependent child, constitutes evidence that the child’s age, physical condition,
mental state, and other relevant factors are not likely to dissuade individuals
from adopting the child. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s
willingness to adopt generally indicates the child is likely to be adopted
within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by
some other family. (Id. at pp. 1649–1650.)
      “[I]n some cases a minor who ordinarily might be considered
unadoptable due to age, poor physical health, physical disability, or
emotional instability is nonetheless likely to be adopted because a prospective
adoptive family has been identified as willing to adopt the child. Where the

                                         8
social worker opines that the minor is likely to be adopted based solely on the
existence of a prospective adoptive parent who is willing to adopt the minor,
an inquiry may be made into whether there is any legal impediment to
adoption by that parent. . . . In such cases, the existence of one of these legal
impediments to adoption is relevant because the legal impediment would
preclude the very basis upon which the social worker formed the opinion that
the minor is likely to be adopted.” (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1650–1651, italics added.) But where, as here, “the social worker’s
opinion that [the minor is] likely to be adopted was not based solely on the
foster mother’s desire to adopt,” but on a collection of factors, no inquiry need
be made into whether there is any legal impediment to adoption by that
parent. (Id. at p. 1651.)
      “ ‘General suitability to adopt is a subjective matter which does not
constitute a legal impediment to adoption. If inquiry into the suitability of
prospective adoptive parents were permitted in section 366.26 hearings, we
envision that many hearings would degenerate into subjective attacks on all
prospective adoptive families in efforts to avoid termination of parental
rights. Such a result is not envisioned by the statutory scheme.’ ” (Sarah M.,
supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)
      In any event, the evidence before the court overwhelmingly showed
A.R. was adoptable, demonstrating both a “satisfactory explanation” for, and
a lack of prejudice from, trial counsel’s concession. A.R. was a generally
healthy child who was doing well in school, doing well socially, and doing well
in her foster home. Although she had been diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder, she was doing well academically, had made significant progress
due, in part, to intensive therapy, and was no longer eligible for an IEP. As
to factors specific to A.R., the report indicated she was in generally good

                                        9
health, but had been diagnosed with developmental delays and was on the
autism spectrum. Her teacher reported she was “ ‘a self-starter, smart,
social, makes eye contact, does well with schoolwork, is on task, and usually
does well with transitions.’ ” There was no evidence that A.R.’s other
behaviors, such as “not respond[ing] when talked to” by unfamiliar people or
“respond[ing] with her head turned away or get[ting] angry that the person is
talking to her” make her unadoptable. Foster parent Z.T., already designated
as the prospective adoptive parent, remained committed to adopting A.R.
even though she and her wife had separated.5 A.R. stated she felt safe there
and wanted to stay with Z.T. The Agency’s conclusion A.R. was adoptable

      5  A.R. also claims the assessment of Z.T. as a prospective adoptive
parent was inadequate because “[t]he Agency seemingly ignored the impact
of the December 6, 2021, incident on the question of adoptability.” Although
that incident was not relevant to A.R.’s adoptability, the Agency specifically
addressed it, and indicated Z.T. “remains committed to adopting [A.R.],” and
A.R. told the child welfare worker she “feels safe with her caregiver and
wants to stay there.” In short, the incident had no effect on the factors
specific to A.R. that made her adoptable.
       A.R. further asserts the juvenile court erred in sustaining the Agency’s
relevancy objections to her questions about P.T. and Z.T., thereby preventing
her counsel from “examin[ing] the Agency’s witnesses to test the sufficiency
of the Agency’s claim that A.R. was adoptable” and violating her due process
rights. As the court observed “the issue before the Court at a .26 is is the
child adoptable, not who is going to adopt the child, not who is going to make
a promise of visitation about the child.” (See Sarah M., supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1650–1651.) Moreover, the trial court is “vested with
wide discretion in determining the relevance of evidence,” but “has no
discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d
660, 681.) A.R has not shown any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, let alone error of constitutional magnitude. (See
Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147 [“The due
process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant
probative value to the issue before the court.”].)

                                       10
was not based solely on Z.T.’s desire to adopt A.R., but on A.R.’s own qualities
and characteristics.
      In sum, A.R. has failed to show there could be no reasonable
explanation for her trial counsel’s actions or to demonstrate prejudice based
on the claimed ineffectiveness of counsel.
ICWA Inquiry
      There is no dispute the Agency did not contact any extended family
members on M.J.’s (the biological father) side of the family; in fact, there is no
evidence the Agency or court even had M.J. fill out an ICWA-020 form
regarding Indian ancestry. The Agency maintains, however, that its duty
was extinguished when M.J. reported no known Indian heritage and
identified no family member who would have more information. “ ‘Following
changes to the federal regulations concerning ICWA compliance, California
made conforming amendments to its statutory scheme regarding ICWA,
effective in 2019. [Citation.] In D.S., the court explained that the resulting
clarification of law, found in part in section 224.2, “creates three distinct
duties regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the
[Department]’s initial contact with a minor and his family, the statute
imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may
be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that initial inquiry
creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the
[Department] ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id.,
subd. (e). . . .) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3
apply. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437,
italics omitted (H.V.).)

                                        11
      “ ‘At the first step, “[s]ection 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a
child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department,
such as the [Agency], the duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to,
asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting
child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ ” ’ ”
(H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.)
      The Agency concedes recent cases have concluded a child welfare
agency has a “duty to investigate a child’s possible Indian ancestry where a
parent denies such ancestry.” In In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, the
mother of A.C. completed an ICWA form by checking a box indicating none of
seven listed factors regarding Indian ancestry applied. (Id. at p. 1013.)
Father’s form also stated, “ ‘Note: This form is not intended to constitute a
complete inquiry into Indian heritage. Further inquiry may be required by
the Indian Child Welfare Act.’ ” (Ibid.) The court concluded the agency in
that case “failed to comply with its ‘obligation to make a meaningful effort to
. . . interview extended family members to obtain whatever information they
may have as to the child’s possible Indian status.’ ” (Id. at p.1015.)
      In In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421 (Antonio R.), the father’s
whereabouts were unknown, and mother checked the box on a parental
notification of Indian status form stating she had “ ‘no Indian ancestry as far
as I know.’ ” (Id. at p. 427.) At the detention hearing, the court asked the
paternal grandmother whether father had “any Indian ancestry ‘that [she is]
aware of’ ” and she responded “ ‘No.’ ” (Ibid.) About two months later, the
Department reported that “the paternal great-grandmother denied having
Indian ancestry on her side of the family,” and Mother indicated “to her
knowledge Father had no Indian ancestry.” (Ibid.) Father first appeared at

                                        12
the jurisdictional hearing about two months later and denied having Indian
ancestry. (Ibid.) Four months later, at the disposition hearing, the maternal
grandmother, maternal aunts, and a maternal uncle were present in the
courtroom, but no one asked whether the minor may have Indian ancestry.
(Id. at p. 428.) At the selection and implementation hearing, the maternal
grandmother was questioned under oath, but was not asked whether the
minor may have Indian ancestry. (Ibid.) The court terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights. (Ibid.)
      On appeal, the court concluded the Department failed “to satisfy its
initial duty of inquiry as to maternal extended family members, and the
court[] fail[ed] to ensure that the Department met its duty.” (Antonio R.,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) “Thus, the record does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply.” (Ibid.)
      In this case, the only evidence of any ICWA inquiry by the Agency or
court as to M.J. was that M.J. told a social worker he had no Native
American ancestry “of which he was aware.” There was no evidence in the
record the Agency or the court had M.J. fill out the ICWA-020 form. Nor is
there any evidence the Agency searched for or could not locate M.J.’s
extended family members or made any attempts to question them about
Indian ancestry. The Agency was aware of the whereabouts of some paternal
relatives, given that M.J. stated in his declaration filed in support of his
section 388 motion that he lived with A.R.’s paternal grandparents, and that
A.R. had “a large paternal family.” The record also shows that M.J.’s father
(A.R.’s biological grandfather) appeared at a remote hearing on M.J.’s section
388 petition but was not asked about Indian ancestry. Indeed, he was denied
a request to speak.

                                       13
      “[R]ecent appellate jurisprudence has adopted a continuum of tests for
prejudice stemming from error in following California statutes implementing
ICWA ranging from a per se rule that any error is always prejudicial, to a
test advocated by the dissent finding no prejudice unless the appealing
parent makes a proffer that interviewing extended family members would
yield information about potential Indian ancestry.” (In re A.C., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.) “The rule at one end of this continuum is one that
mandates reversal: If the Department’s initial inquiry is deficient, that
defect necessarily infects the juvenile court’s ICWA finding and reversal is
automatic and required (the ‘automatic reversal rule’). [Citations.] Under
this test, reversal is required no matter how ‘slim’ the odds are that further
inquiry on remand might lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile
court. (Antonio R., [,supra, 76 Cal.App.5th] at p. 435.) The rule at the other
end of the continuum is one that presumptively favors affirmance: If the
Department’s initial inquiry is deficient, that defect will be treated as
harmless unless the parent comes forward with a proffer on appeal as to why
further inquiry would lead to a different ICWA finding (the ‘presumptive
affirmance rule’). (In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1065, 1071. . . .) [A]
third rule lies in between: If the Department’s initial inquiry is deficient, that
defect is harmless unless ‘the record indicates that there was readily
obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether
the child is an Indian child’ and that ‘the probability of obtaining meaningful
information is reasonable’ (‘the readily obtainable information rule’). (In re
Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744. . . .)” (In re Dezi C. (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 769, 777–778, rev. granted Sept. 21, 2022 (Dezi C.).)
      Dezi C. introduced a fourth approach. In Dezi C., the appellate court
held that ICWA inquiry error “is harmless unless the record contains

                                       14
information suggesting a reason to believe that the child may be an ‘Indian
child’ within the meaning of ICWA such that the absence of further inquiry
was prejudicial to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding.” (Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) “For this purpose, the ‘record’ includes both the
record of proceedings in the juvenile court and any proffer the appealing
parent makes on appeal.” (Ibid; In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984,
1014 (Ezequiel G.) [adopting Dezi C. approach].) Unsurprisingly, the parties
disagree on which standard to adopt. A.R. contends the error is reversible
per se, while the Agency, in turn, urges that of Dezi C./Ezequiel G.
      In Dezi C., the Agency made the following ICWA inquiry. “In
December 2019, mother and father told a Department social worker that they
had no American Indian heritage. The next day, mother and father filled out
ICWA-020 forms, and checked the box indicating that they had no American
Indian heritage ‘as far as [they knew].’ At the hearing on whether to initially
detain the children, mother and father told the juvenile court that they had
no American Indian heritage. [¶] While investigating the allegations in this
case, the Department’s social workers spoke to father's parents (the paternal
grandparents), mother’s parents (the maternal grandparents), father’s
siblings, mother’s siblings, and one of father’s cousins. The social workers did
not ask any of these individuals whether mother, father, or the children had
any American Indian heritage.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 776.)
On appeal, the court observed it was “undisputed that the Department’s
initial inquiry was deficient,” but found the error harmless under its newly
formulated “reason to believe” standard. (Id. at p. 776, 779.)
      Similarly, in Ezequiel G., the Court of Appeal found any error
harmless. Both parents “unequivocally denied Indian ancestry,” parents
were in “contact with their extended families, and thus the possibility that

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they might unknowingly be members of a tribe appears trivially small,” and
mother had “not identified any evidence in the record that would support an
inference that she or the children’s fathers might unknowingly be members of
an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.)
      We need not choose between the competing standards, as the record in
this case is not of the same caliber as the records in Dezi C. and Ezequiel G.
Even applying the Dezi C. standard, there is “reason to believe” further
inquiry might lead to a different result because the Agency’s ICWA inquiry as
to M.J. and his extended relatives was so deficient. Unlike in Ezequiel G.,
the record does not show that M.J. unequivocally denied Indian ancestry.
(Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) The only evidence about any
inquiry of M.J. or his family is the social worker’s statement in the Agency
report that indicates M.J. told a social worker he had no “Native American
Ancestry in his family of which he is aware.” (Italics added.) Nor does the
record show M.J. or his extended family members were asked any of the
relevant questions, as set forth in the ICWA-020 form, about A.R.’s potential
Indian status. The record does not reflect that the Agency or court had M.J.
fill out an ICWA-020 form6, and he was not questioned about possible Indian
ancestry or status at the hearings at which he appeared. The ICWA-020

      6  “At the first appearance by a parent . . . and all other participants in
any dependency case . . . and at each hearing that may culminate in an order
for foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement or adoptive placement, as described in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 224.1(d)(1) . . . the court must: [¶] (A) Ask each participant
present whether the participant knows or has reason to know the child is an
Indian child; [¶] (B) Instruct the parties to inform the court if they
subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an
Indian child; and [¶] (C) Order the parent, Indian custodian, or guardian, if
available, to complete Parental Notification of Indian Status (form ICWA-
020).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(A)(2)(A)-(C).)

                                       16
form sets out seven questions about the minor’s possible Indian status,
including whether “[o]ne or more of my parents, grandparents, or other lineal
ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized tribe,” and whether
the parent is a “resident of or . . . domiciled on a reservation, rancheria,
Alaska Native village, or other tribal trust land.” (ICWA-020 Parental
Notification of Indian Status form,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/icwa020.pdf [as of June 6, 2023].)
These questions are not answered in a general response that there is “no
“Native American Ancestry in his family of which he is aware.” The Agency
likewise did not follow up on “readily obtainable information” by interviewing
his family members, at least one of whom appeared at a hearing but was
denied a request to speak. On balance, we conclude the Agency should have
at least required M.J. to fill out the ICWA-020 form, and should have
questioned father’s relatives for whom it had or could readily obtain contact
information, and that the failure to do so was prejudicial.
      “[R]equiring an adequate initial inquiry be conducted and documented
in the record should not translate into an exhaustive inquiry to ensure ‘[n]o
stone is left unturned.’ ” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 603.) We
conclude, however, it would not be unduly burdensome for the Agency to
require M.J. to complete an ICWA-020 form, and conduct a minimum inquiry
of father’s extended family members who are readily identifiable and for
whom it has contact information. (See id., at p. 620 [“Agencies and lower
courts are, by now, on very clear notice of the problems caused when little to
no inquiry is made. While we are not persuaded that compliance with section
224.2 will prove onerous once agencies provide a record of their efforts for the
juvenile court to review, we may not interpret the law to relieve either one of
their burden of complying with the plain directives of the statute.”].)

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                               DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to
order the Agency to comply with the inquiry and documentation set forth in
section 224.2 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481 as to the biological
father’s family. If after determining an adequate inquiry has been made, the
court finds ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and
proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court
finds, instead, that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding shall be
immediately reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s order terminating
parental rights is affirmed.

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                                          _________________________
                                          Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Bowen, J.*

**Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A164685, In re AR

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