Court Opinion

ID: 9771373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:40:11.106327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.943743
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Walker
joined by Justices Calvert and Smith dissenting.
In my opinion Article 6079c is a special law regulating the affairs of counties and therefore unconstitutional under the provisions of Article 3, Section 56, of the Texas Constitution. As pointed out in the majority opinion, all counties in the state are authorized by general statute to issue tax bonds for the acquisition and improvement of land for use as county parks. Article 6079c confers upon not more than fourteen of these political subdivisions the additional power to obtain funds for improving their county parks by issuing revenue bonds. To come within the classification established by the statute a county must: (1) border on the Gulf of Mexico, and (2) have within its boundaries at least part of an island suitable for park purposes. The primary and ultimate test of whether it is a general or special law is whether there is a reasonable basis for this classification, and whether the law operates equally on all within the class. If the classification is not based on a reasonable and substantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance bearing a proper relation to the purpose of the statute, ft is a special law. Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 148 Texas 537, 227 S.W. 2d 791.
1.
In upholding the classification made by the statute, the majority state that the words “such public parks or park” in Section 2 necessarily refer to parks located on islands situated in the Gulf of Mexico as indicated by Section 1. The statute does not so provide. In the first place, Section 1 does not require that *34the qualifying island be in or even near the Gulf of Mexico. An island in a river or inland lake will suffice if it lies within the boundaries of the county and is found by the Commissioners Court to be suitable for park purposes. In the second place, it is clear that the Legislature intended to authorize an eligible county to exercise the powers granted thereby in the operation and financing of all its county parks and not merely those located on islands.
It should be noted that authority to issue revenue bonds is not the only power conferred upon a,n eligible county. The statute also provides for the creation and prescribes the powers and duties of a Board of Park Commissioners. As originally enacted in 1949, it dealt only with the latter subject. This earlier law also applied only to a county which bordered on the Gulf of Mexico and had an island suitable for park purposes within its boundaries, but the Legislature did not limit the jurisdiction of the Board to parks located on islands. Section 1 provided that any county which came within the classification might “for the purpose of equipping, maintaining and operating any1 public park or parks owned by said county” confer upon the Board of Park Commissioners authority to equip, maintain and operate such park or parks. The emergency clause recited that “there is great need for such boards to maintain and operate county parks located on islands and other places located in such courts ties.” Acts 1949, 51st Leg., p. 408, ch. 218.
The additional power to issue revenue bonds for the improvement of county parks was conferred upon eligible counties when the statute was amended in 1951. Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., p. 486, ch. 304. Under the terms of the present law it is clear that reenue bonds may be issued for the development of any county park that can be operated by the Board of Park Commissioners. I cannot believe that in adopting the 1951 amendment the Legislature intended that boards which had previously been operating county parks located anywhere in their respective counties should thereafter be concerned only with island parks and have no power to procure the issuance of revenue bonds for the improvement of parks in other locations. Section 2 does speak of “such county parks or park,” but substantially the same phrase was used at least six times in the original act and was merely carried over into the amended statute therefrom. Even if this were not so, I would be unwilling to attribute to the Legislature an intention' to authorize the creation of a county park board *35that was not to have jursidiction over all parks owned and operated by its county unless such limitation on the authority of the board was expressed in clear and unequivocal language.
The caption and emergency clause of the 1951 amendment show, moreover, that it was the purpose and intention of the lawmakers to enlarge rather than restrict the powers of the Board and to permit revenue bonds to be issued for improving any park owned by an eligible county. According to the caption the Legislature was amending the prior statute by “providing for and increasing the powers of Park Board” and “providing for the obtaining of funds by Board of Park Commissioners and authorizing them to issue revenue bonds to finance the acquisition of permanent improvements and other facilities connected with or incident to any park or parks for any one or more purposes.” The emergency clause states that the “legislation is designed to provide an efficient method of financing and operating the facilities of public parks in eligible counties.”
In my opinion the legislative intent is clear and the statute authorizes the issuance of revenue bonds for the improvement of any public park owned by an eligible county whether located on an island or elsewhere in the county. Relator conceded in oral argument that if this is its meaning and effect, the law is unconstitutional. The latter conclusion is inescapable, because the problems and needs of one county in the development of interior parks are not different from those of another county simply because the former may border on the Gulf of Mexico and have an island suitable for park purposes within its boundaries. Under the provisions of Art. 6079c Cameron County may issue revenue bonds for developing one of its parks on the Hidalgo County line, while Hidalgo with an adjoining park on its side of the line could not defer the cost of similar improvements except by issuing tax bonds as provided in Art. 6081e. Obviously there is no substantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance of the two counties or their parks that might constitute a reasonable basis for the classification.
2.
My conclusion would not be different if the statute merely authorized an eligible county to issue revenue bonds for improving parks located on islands in the Gulf of Mexico. Large numbers of people are also attracted to the mountains of West Texas, to the large inland lakes, and to other sections of the state. The majority reason that the classification is valid be*36cause the island beaches are undeveloped and have remained so largely because of their distance from and inaccessibility to large centers of population. Assuming for the moment that this difference in situation or circumstance bears a proper relation to the purpose of the statute, a classification based thereon would undoubtedly be reasonable. This is not, however, the line drawn by the present law. The statute does not apply to all counties having natural attractions and ideal park locations that have remained undeveloped because of their distance from and inaccessibility to large centers of population. Instead the little group that may enjoy the special privileges and powers conferred thereby is fixed for all time by the geographical characteristics specified therein. The situation of counties in West Texas and other parts of the state having suitable but remote sites which should be developed as county parks is not substantially different from that of the coastal counties, but the law does not now and cannot hereafter apply to the former no matter how great their need may be. It simply does not operate equally upon all members of the class which possess the characteristics to which the majority point in upholding an entirely different classification.
3.
In the third place, it is my view that the difference in situation or circumstance of the coastal counties with island parks is not so related to the issuance of revenue bonds for park improvements as to constitute a reasonable basis for the classification made by Art. 6079c. The majority seem to be particularly concerned, as I think they should be, over the fact that the law does not even embrace all coastal counties with suitable park sites near the ocean. It is said, however, that island locations have remained undeveloped because of their remoteness from and inaccessibility to large centers of population while mainland beaches are generally near population centers. The question then arises as to the relationship between this difference and the right to obtain funds for park improvements by means of revenue rather than tax bonds. Unless the issuance of revenue bonds is more feasible or appropriate in one situation than the other, the difference does not afford a proper basis for the classification. The majority do not face this question and apparently take it for granted that the classification must be upheld if any difference can be found no matter how irrelevant the same may be to the purpose of the statute.
The revenue bond method of financing is practicable only *37when net revenues derived from the operation of the establishment will be sufficient to retire the bonds as they mature. Where the facilities provided and the opportunities for recreation are substantially the same, it is reasonable to suppose that a park located near great centers of population will be patronized by many more people than one situated in an isolated and inaccessible area. On the basis of the differences noted in the majority opinion, therefore, the financing of park improvements by means of revenue bonds is more likely to be feasible for a mainland park than for one located on an island.
Aside from the question of feasibility, a grant of authority to one county to develop its island park by means of revenue bonds when its neighbor is required to issue tax bonds to borrow funds for making the same improvements on a mainland site, can be justified only if the former will probably serve a higher proportion of nonresidents who pay no local taxes. Relator recognizes this when it argues that a properly developed Gulf island park is quite different from an ordinary park in that the former is patronized by many people who do not reside in the county while the latter is used largerly by local inhabitants. It does not, however, suggest any difference in island parks that might cause them to attract a greater number of nonresidents than a mainland park located on the Gulf and near large centers of population.
A coastal county with no suitable island may have a park site on the coast that is even more desirable and attractive to visitors from other counties than an island location in an adjoining county. The ntimbers of both residents and nonresidents that use the facilities of each will depend upon various circumstances that have no relationship to the difference on which the statutory classification is based. There certainly is no reason to believe that the island park will serve more nonresidents simply because it is situated in a remote and inaccessible area.
As pointed out by McQuillen, the courts have declared time and again that geographical distinctions should not control the classification. McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed. 1949, Vol. 2, p. 100, Sec. 4.59, note 94 and authorities there cited. In most cases as here geographical characteristics simply are not related in any way to the subject or purpose of the statute. It obviously is not necessary to the successful or useful operation of a public park that it be located on an island. The mere fact that a county borders on the Gulf of Mexico or has a park on an island has no real bearing on the feasibility, pro*38priety or need for financing its development by the issuance of revenue bonds instead of tax bonds, and the powers conferred upon eligible counties will often be equally or even more appropriate to the improvements of parks located in inland counties or on the mainland near the coast. We thus have a grant of special privileges to a select group of counties without any reasonable basis for the classification.
For all the reasons state, I would deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Opinion delivered July 8, 1959.

. — Emphasis throughout this opinion is supplied by the writer.