Court Opinion

ID: 9567131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:49:14.202571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:58.776544
License: Public Domain

*288Judge Becton,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s resolution of 80CRS51100 — defendant’s conviction of receiving a stolen ring. However, believing that the sterling silver items lost their character as stolen goods when they were recovered and retained for twelve days by the police, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion finding “no error in the trial court’s submission of the issue of attempted receipt of stolen goods.” Ante, page 14. I am not persuaded, as is the majority, by the “reasoning of the Supreme Court of California, in People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465, 358 P. 2d 921 (1961)” that although it is legally impossible to receive stolen property after it has been recovered by the police or its owner, a defendant can nevertheless be convicted of attempting to receive stolen property which has been recovered by the police.
In the absence of a statute proscribing the receipt of goods that one mistakenly believes are stolen, whether stolen or not, I believe the sounder view to be that set forth in People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906) — that is, when the underlying offense is not a crime, there can be no conviction for attempting to commit that underlying offense.
The Rojas Court does correctly state the controlling principle: stolen property which the police have recovered is presumed to be “held by the police in trust for, or for the account of, the owner.” 55 Cal. 2d at 258, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 469, 358 P. 2d at 925. Stated differently:
When the actual, physical possession of stolen property has been recovered by the owner or his agent, its character as stolen property is lost, and the subsequent delivery of the property by the owner or agent to a particeps criminis, for the purpose of entrapping him as the receiver of stolen goods, does not establish the crime, for in a legal sense he does not receive stolen property.
United States v. Cohen, 274 Fed. 596, 599 (3rd Cir. 1921). This principle “had its genesis in two nineteenth century English cases. Regina v. Schmidt, L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 15 (1866); Regina v. Dolan, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 533 (1855).” United States v. Monasterski, 567 F. 2d 677, 679 (6th Cir. 1977). See also 76 C.J.S. Receiving *289Stolen Goods, § 5(a)(2). This principle has been stated by our Supreme Court in dictum in State v. Collins, 240 N.C. 128, 81 S.E. 2d 270 (1954). Although the issue in Collins was whether the goods had ever been stolen, not whether they had lost that status, the Collins Court, quoting Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 61, 163 So. 394, 395 (1935) said: “ ‘But it is essential to the crime here charged [receiving stolen property] that the goods received by defendant were stolen and retained that status until they were delivered to defendant.’ ” Id. at 131, 81 S.E. 2d at 272 (emphasis added).
The majority does not seek to apply this controlling principle of law to the facts of this case; rather, the majority suggests, on policy grounds, that “ ‘the commendably alert and efficient action of the . . . police’ ”, ante page 13, in ferreting out criminality is the polar star and the controlling consideration. The majority also suggests that the general rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State should be relaxed.
The statute under which defendant was charged makes it a crime to receive stolen goods. At some point in time, recovered goods must cease being stolen goods. See United States v. Dove, 629 F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Monasterski. I believe that “the best and only workable rule is the common law rule — viz, the goods lost their stolen character immediately upon being recovered by the owner or his agent.” Monasterski, 567 F. 2d at 681. See also United States v. Cawley, 255 F. 2d 338 (3rd Cir. 1958).
The Rojas rule which allows the police to capture and hold recovered goods for some unspecified period of time without the goods losing their character as stolen goods is unworkable. Moreover, to the extent that the police in the Rojas case were mere conduits through which the stolen goods passed immediately and directly to the defendants therein, Rojas is factually distinguishable. The Rojas Court considered the following facts, all of which occurred within one day: A theft; an arrest; a recovery of stolen goods; an agreement by the person arrested to help police catch one of the defendants; and a delivery of the recovered goods, by the person arrested and a police officer, to one of the defendants. It could almost be said that the stolen goods never left the thief s hands until it got to the defendant’s hands in Rojas.
*290The factual pattern in Rojas is not nearly as compelling as the facts in the case sub judice. In this case, the theft occurred in Winston-Salem on 5 December 1980. Stephon Johnson, the thief, was arrested when he tried to sell some of the stolen goods in Greensboro on 6 December 1980. At that time the police recovered the stolen goods. Subsequently, Johnson posted bond. He later tried to borrow money from the defendant in order to get a friend out of jail on bond. On 17 December 1980 Johnson went to court for a preliminary hearing on the theft charge. On 18 December 1980 Johnson went to the Winston-Salem Police Department and agreed with law enforcement officials to go to defendant’s place of business to try to sell defendant the sterling silver items that the police had recovered twelve days earlier.
What if Stephon Johnson had not agreed to help the police catch the defendant until the day after Stephon Johnson’s trial, some four months later, instead of the day after his preliminary hearing? Would the goods have lost their stolen character by then? Again, at some point, recovered goods must cease being stolen goods. A strained reading of the words “stolen goods” would result otherwise and would lead to unnecessary uncertainty. United States v. Monasterski, 567 F. 2d at 681.
I have not turned a deaf ear to the policy arguments advanced by the State and subsumed in the majority opinion. Indeed, because the defense of legal impossibility can create “a fringe benefit for criminals,” United States v. Egger, 470 F. 2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 954, 36 L.Ed. 2d 416, 93 S.Ct. 1931 (1973), the prosecutor’s argument that “there is just as much need to stop, deter, and reform a person who has unsuccessfully attempted or is attempting to commit a crime as who successfully completes a crime” is, as a practical matter, compelling. The defendant herein may have intended to possess goods knowing them to be stolen. We must be guided by the law, however.
Our law does not punish bad purpose standing alone, however; instead we require that mens rea accompany the ac-tus reus specifically proscribed by statute. It is one of the most fundamental postulates of our criminal justice system that conviction can result only from a violation of clearly defined standards of conduct. We must apply this principle *291evenhandedly and not be swayed by our attitudes about the moral culpability of a particular defendant. It is the function of our legislatures, not courts, to condemn certain conduct. Petitions to punish reprehensible conduct must be addressed to the Congress and not this Court. Being bound by the current statutory language, this case simply does not involve the proscribed criminal act.
United States v. Monasterski, 567 F. 2d at 683.
Nothing said herein closes the door to the State’s meritorious desire to apprehend “fences.” As suggested above the General Assembly can enact a statute to cover the activity involved in this type of case.1 Second, the State can charge “fences” with conspiracy in cases in which it can show the necessary elements of conspiracy. Third, the State can conduct a surveillance of the stolen goods until they are delivered to the “fence” and then arrest that person.
Believing that our law will not allow a conviction of attempting to receive stolen property, when the underlying offense-receiving stolen property — would not be a crime, I vote to reverse defendant’s conviction in 80CRS52198.

. The North Carolina General Assembly in its 1980-81 session had an opportunity to enact as law a bill that would have addressed the issues raised herein. Representatives Helms and Tyson introduced H.80, “Act to Codify the Crime of Attempting to Receive or Possess Stolen Property and to Preclude the Defense of Impossibility so that Fencing Operations May Be Prosecuted More Effectively.” The bill was reported unfavorably by the House Judiciary 1 Committee.