Court Opinion

ID: 9397213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 19:01:41.79482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.372650
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10771    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10771
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       COLEMAN WARNOCK,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus

       WARDEN, FCI RAY BROOK,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
USCA11 Case: 22-10771    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023   Page: 2 of 9

       22-10771              Opinion of the Court                      2

                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03002-AT
                          ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Coleman Warnock, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
       appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241
       petition, which challenged a prison disciplinary proceeding that
       resulted in his loss of good-time credit. Because, however, the
       record in this case does not provide us with an opportunity to
       meaningfully review the issues on appeal, we vacate and remand
       for the district court to develop the record more fully.
                                       I.
              The relevant background is this. Warnock is serving a 180-
       month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to
       manufacture and distribute phencyclidine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
       §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(c)(2). On December 12, 2020, Officer M.
       Pierce accused Warnock of possessing a cellphone in violation of
       prison rules and initiated disciplinary proceedings. Warnock’s
       hearing notice listed his charges as: “possessing a hazardous
       tool/refusing to obey an order,” corresponding to prison code
       violation numbers 108 and 307, respectively. An incident report
       described the conduct giving rise to Warnock’s charges, including
       what the officer saw Warnock do and how Warnock responded to
       his orders. At the hearing, the Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”)
       found insufficient evidence that Warnock had possessed a
USCA11 Case: 22-10771     Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023    Page: 3 of 9

       22-10771               Opinion of the Court                       3

       cellphone on December 12 in violation of code number 108.
       Instead, the DHO found that Warnock had committed the
       prohibited acts of “Destroying and/or disposing of any item during
       a search, code 115” and “Refusing to obey an order of any staff
       member, code 307.” The DHO sanctioned him with, among other
       things, the loss of 54 days of good-time credit.
               Warnock brought the instant suit under § 2241 to challenge
       the DHO’s decision. Relevant here, Warnock argued that: (1) he
       tried to exhaust his administrative remedies after the hearing, but
       prison officials conspired to prevent him from meeting the
       necessary deadlines to do so; (2) he did not receive adequate notice
       of the hearing and the charges against him because, as he told
       officials at the time, he was not given the incident report 24 hours
       before the hearing; (3) he was improperly denied the services of a
       staff representative at the hearing, which he needed to help him
       present potentially exculpatory security camera footage; and (4) no
       evidence at the hearing indicated that he had destroyed an item
       during a search or disobeyed an order, especially since the DHO
       found insufficient evidence that he had wrongfully possessed a
       cellphone, it made no sense to punish him for destroying a phone
       he never had, and he was not charged with destroying an item
       during a search.
             A magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation
       (“R&R”) determining that Warnock had failed to exhaust his
       administrative remedies and that his claims also failed on the
       merits. After Warnock lodged objections to the R&R, the district
USCA11 Case: 22-10771      Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 05/24/2023     Page: 4 of 9

       22-10771                Opinion of the Court                         4

       court issued an order disposing of the case. The court first found
       that Warnock had made a “colorable argument” that he made a
       diligent effort to exhaust his administrative remedies but still failed
       to do so, through no fault of his own. Nevertheless, the court went
       on to hold that Warnock’s DHO hearing was constitutionally
       adequate. It found that Warnock was given sufficient notice of the
       hearing, even if he did not receive a copy of the incident report,
       when he received a hearing notice and a notice of inmate rights
       before the hearing. The district court also found that, assuming
       Warnock had requested a staff representative for the hearing, he
       was not entitled to one because he was not illiterate and the issues
       were not particularly complex; however, the district court did not
       address whether he was entitled to a representative to help with
       the video surveillance footage. Finally, it found that Officer
       Pierce’s report that he saw Warnock with a cellphone, which the
       DHO deemed more credible than Warnock’s statements,
       established “some evidence” of the code violations for which he
       was sanctioned.
              This timely appeal follows.
                                         II.
              Challenges to the execution of a sentence, rather than the
       validity of the sentence itself, are properly brought under § 2241.
       Antonelli v. Warden, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). This
       includes relief from sanctions received as a result of prison
       disciplinary proceedings. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d
       467, 469, 475–76 (11th Cir. 2015). When reviewing the denial of a
USCA11 Case: 22-10771      Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 05/24/2023    Page: 5 of 9

       22-10771               Opinion of the Court                         5

       § 2241 habeas petition, we review de novo questions of law and for
       clear error factual findings. Andrews v. Warden, 958 F.3d 1072,
       1076 (11th Cir. 2020). We review de novo whether relief is
       available under § 2241. Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279,
       1280 (11th Cir. 2006).
              This Court has long held that the district court should give
       a sufficient explanation of its rulings so as to allow us an
       opportunity to engage in meaningful appellate review. See Danley
       v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090, 1091 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Clay v.
       Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 957–58 (11th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases
       “urg[ing] the district court to state the reason for its decision and
       the underlying predicate”). In doing so, we’ve stressed that it is the
       “responsibility of the district court in the first instance” to review
       the record and the applicable caselaw. Danley, 480 F.3d at 1092.
       Moreover, we’ve vacated for additional reasoning when the district
       court did not make necessary factual findings or explain its legal
       conclusions. See, e.g., id.; In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315,
       1317 (11th Cir. 2003).
                                        III.
              The Due Process Clause demands that an individual receive
       due process of law before being deprived of a protected liberty
       interest. Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir.
       1985). In the prison context, the Supreme Court has held that
       inmates have a liberty interest in good-time credit, and due process
       requires that a prisoner receive these protections before his good-
       time credit is revoked: (1) 24 hours’ written notice before a
USCA11 Case: 22-10771      Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 05/24/2023     Page: 6 of 9

       22-10771                Opinion of the Court                         6

       disciplinary hearing; (2) the opportunity, consistent with
       institutional safety goals, to call witnesses and present evidence in
       his defense; (3) help from a fellow inmate or the prison staff, if the
       inmate is illiterate or if the issue is sufficiently complex; and (4) a
       written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
       and reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
       U.S. 539, 564–66, 570 (1974). In elaborating on the function of the
       notice requirement, the Supreme Court has explained that it is to
       “give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense
       and to clarify what the charges are, in fact.” Id. at 564. On this
       basis, the Court in Wolff struck the oral notice procedures that had
       been used by the Nebraska prison system, in part, because in some
       instances, the inmate “first receive[d] notice of the actual charges
       at the time of the hearing.” Id.
              Applying Wolff, we’ve held that the Due Process Clause
       entitles inmates to notice not only of the disciplinary charges
       themselves and the dates of the alleged offenses, but also to notice
       of the facts necessary to defend against the charges. See Dean-
       Mitchell v. Reese, 837 F.3d 1107, 1112, 1113 n.5 (11th Cir. 2016). In
       Dean-Mitchell, we rejected a warden’s arguments that an inmate
       had sufficient information about the charges against him based on
       a hearing notice -- which identified “only the alleged violations
       (‘Refusing an order of a staff member/Threating another with
       bodily harm’) and the date of the offenses,” and lacked any “factual
       information regarding the incident” -- where it was disputed
       whether he received the incident report. Id.
USCA11 Case: 22-10771     Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023    Page: 7 of 9

       22-10771               Opinion of the Court                       7

              Since Wolff, the Supreme Court has held that the Due
       Process Clause requires that the record of a disciplinary hearing
       need only contain “some evidence” supporting the hearing
       decision, since the “fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due
       Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of
       prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” Superintendent
       v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447, 456 (1985). Determining whether there
       is “some evidence” in the record to support a disciplinary charge
       does not “require examination of the entire record, independent
       assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the
       evidence,” but merely assessment of whether there is “any
       evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
       by the disciplinary board.” O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1213
       (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–56).
              Here, Warnock has raised several due process claims arising
       out of his prison disciplinary proceedings, but on the record before
       us, we are unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of these
       issues. See Clay, 762 F.2d at 957–58; Danley, 480 F.3d at 1092. As
       we see it, Warnock’s claims all seem to stem from an issue that has
       not yet been developed in the record -- that is, how he was
       sanctioned at his disciplinary hearing for a code violation that he
       was not charged with.
             According to the hearing notice found in the record, initially
       Warnock was charged with “possessing a hazardous tool/refusing
       to obey an order,” pertaining to prison code violation numbers 108
       and 307, respectively. However, at the hearing, the DHO made a
USCA11 Case: 22-10771     Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 05/24/2023    Page: 8 of 9

       22-10771               Opinion of the Court                        8

       written finding, without elaborating, that the officer’s statement in
       the incident report that Warnock had possessed a cellphone on
       December 12 “did not adequately support the code 108, Possession
       of a Hazardous Tool.” Consequently, the DHO dismissed “[t]he
       code 108.” The DHO found instead that Warnock had “committed
       the prohibited act[s] of Destroying and/or disposing of any item
       during a search, code 115, and Refusing to obey an order of any
       staff member, code 307.” The DHO then noted that Warnock was
       sanctioned with 40 days’ loss of good-time credit based on code
       violation 115 and 14 days’ loss of good-time credit based on code
       violation 307.
              From this limited information, we glean that the DHO
       found that Warnock had destroyed something during the incident
       in question, but we do not know what, nor whether that matters.
       It also appears that Warnock faced a new charge (code violation
       115) at some point during the proceedings, but we do not know
       when it was added, when he received notice of it, or how the
       change may have shaped his defense at the hearing. Further, the
       DHO’s notations suggest that the different charges carried different
       sanctions, but, again, we do not know how the sanctions for his
       original charges varied from the sanctions he actually received.
             In short, the record does not appear to contain important
       information that would shed light on critical aspects of Warnock’s
       proceedings.     Without more, we cannot determine how
       Warnock’s due process rights were affected, if at all. We, therefore,
       remand for the district court to develop the record more fully on
USCA11 Case: 22-10771         Document: 25-1         Date Filed: 05/24/2023         Page: 9 of 9

       22-10771                   Opinion of the Court                                9

       this issue and any other issues that might inform its due process
       analysis. See Danley, 480 F.3d at 1092; In re Ford Motor Co., 345
       F.3d at 1317. We note, moreover, that the district court did not
       resolve whether Warnock satisfied the exhaustion requirement
       before bringing suit, and leave it to the district court to determine
       on remand whether it should do so, in addition to or instead of
       considering the merits. See Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 475
       (recognizing that while a prisoner must exhaust his administrative
       remedies before seeking relief under § 2241, the district court may
       skip the issue if it is easier to deny a petition on the merits). 1
               VACATED AND REMANDED.

       1 On remand, however, the district court need not address Warnock’s claim
       that the BOP’s intentional interference with his administrative proceedings
       constituted an independent violation of his constitutional rights. For one
       thing, this claim is not cognizable under § 2241; it should be brought under §
       1983. See Antonelli, 542 F.3d at 1352 (holding that a § 2241 petition challenges
       the execution of a sentence). Moreover, we are unaware of any precedent
       holding that due process entitles a prisoner to an administrative appeal process
       to challenge disciplinary sanctions. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,
       1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an inmate’s due process claim based on the
       BOP’s failure to enforce regulations creating prison grievance procedures,
       since “an inmate has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in access” to
       those procedures); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) (“State-
       created procedural rights that do not guarantee a particular substantive
       outcome are not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even where such
       procedural rights are mandatory.”) (quotations omitted).