Court Opinion

ID: 9772026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:05:13.370306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.638803
License: Public Domain

SPECTOR, Justice,
dissenting.
The summary judgment evidence in this case does not negate causation as a matter of law.
The record reflects that at the time Sue Allbritton’s injury occurred, the forces generated by the fire in question had not come to rest. Rather, the emergency situation was continuing. The whole area of the fire was covered in water and foam; in at least some places, the water was almost knee-deep. All-britton was still wearing hip boots and other gear, as required to fight the fire. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Allbritton, I agree with Justice Cornyn that the pump defect was both a “but-for” cause and a substantial factor in bringing about *786Allbritton’s injury, and was therefore a cause in fact.
This case is markedly different from the two main cases on which the majority relies: Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1991), and Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.1968). In each of those cases, a defendant’s negligence simply created a condition that attracted an individual to the scene, where a negligent third party inflicted an injury. Here, in contrast, there was no negligent third party. To whatever extent Allbritton’s own negligence may have contributed to her injury, a jury should be allowed to allocate comparative responsibility.
Because Union Pump has failed to establish its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, I dissent.