Court Opinion

ID: 9467630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:52:43.333722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:26.364413
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I cannot agree that the evidence before the district court was sufficient to raise a genuine doubt as to the competence of Chavez to plead guilty. With respect, therefore, I file this brief dissent.
Dr. Meyer, the psychiatrist conducting the examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244, described Chavez as “alert” and “oriented” and found “no evidence of delusions or hallucinations .. . [or] psychosis.” Concluding that Chavez was competent to stand trial, Dr. Meyer reported that Chavez understood the charges against him and was able to cooperate with his counsel.1
The second psychiatric report before the district court was the one filed by Dr. Levy, a psychiatrist appointed to assist the defense upon its motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). That report addressed the question of competency to stand trial and competency at the time the offense was committed. It found no mental incapacity in either regard, and confirmed the results of Dr. Meyer’s prior examination.
Dr. Levy concluded in part:
The defendant was alert, correctly oriented, cooperative, and appeared to be of at least average intelligence. His affect seemed appropriate to the situation and he showed no indications of a thought disorder. There were no delusions, hallucinations, loosening of associations, or tendencies toward concrete thinking. He seemed to have no impairment of his intellectual functions. He was aware of his serious drug problem; he seemed desirous of receiving help and he appeared to have adequate judgment.
In my opinion the defendant is quite well able to understand the charges and has the capacity to cooperate with counsel in the preparation and presentation of a defense. I conclude therefore that he is currently able to proceed with trial and sentencing.2
In judging the defendant competent, moreover, Dr. Levy was aware of Chavez’s past treatment for mental illness and had reviewed two 1971 psychiatric reports — one of which found Chavez legally insane at the time of a previous offense due to drug use, the other reaching a contrary conclusion.
The two psychiatric reports, combined with the district court’s own observations as to Chavez’s participation in the proceedings, made it unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine competence to plead guilty, and thus the defendant’s due process rights were not denied. Spikes v. United States, 633 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1980); Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 849, 100 S.Ct. 99, 62 L.Ed.2d 64 (1979). The record amply indicates that the district court had no reason to believe that Chavez suffered from a mental illness that substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented and to understand the consequences of his plea.
I am puzzled by the majority’s reference to the district court’s statement — to the effect that Chavez was competent at the rule 11 hearing — as a finding rather than an indication of a judicial determination of competence. See Majority opinion, ante at *1262p. 1257. While it is true that the court accepting the guilty plea failed to make an express finding of Sieling competence, this court has held specifically that such a failure does not amount to a denial of due process. Spikes v. United States, supra, 633 F.2d at 146 n.3. In Spikes for example, after reviewing a record of the rule 11 proceeding, the panel ruled that an “implicit” finding of Sieling competence had been made. It is anomalous that a similar implicit finding is not made here, where instead of a panel reading a cold transcript, the same judge who accepted the guilty plea ruled at the habeas proceeding that he indeed had found Chavez competent in the prior hearing.3
Since the majority prefers to characterize the district court’s statement as a finding rather than an implicit indication that a judicial determination of competence had been made their review is not limited by the clearly erroneous standard, but is comprehensive. See Majority opinion, ante at p. 1257. In my view, however, under either standard of review it is clear Chavez was competent to plead guilty.
The evidence relied upon by the majority, when explored in greater detail, is not convincing. Chavez’s firing of his attorney was a proper exercise of his rights and is not necessarily evidence of incompetency. Darrow v. Gunn, supra, 594 F.2d at 771. The most important point in the case is that there had been a psychiatric finding of insanity in 1971, although the finding was accompanied by a contemporaneous psychiatric report reaching a contrary conclusion. In this case, however, the district court had before it current reports which indicated competency. The mere existence of a previous finding of incompetency is not grounds for requiring the trial court to hold a competency hearing, and we have so held even when the determination of incompetency was made in proceedings ancillary to the criminal transaction for which the defendant was being tried. United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1980). Our recent holding in Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981) is to the same effect.
The “history of antisocial behavior” cited by the majority is in fact the defendant’s prior criminal record; and it is hardly surprising, at least to me, that an addict, with a record for previous crimes of violence, has “poor insight and judgment.” Surely such observations bear little weight in the decision to place a defendant in the class of offenders who are of doubtful mental competence. Chavez has an all too familiar history of drug addiction leading to violent crimes. It is not a history that demands a competency hearing before the district court conducts a rule 11 hearing for the entry of a guilty plea.

. The majority states correctly that Dr. Meyer did not specifically address the question of the defendant’s competency to enter a guilty plea. The report was addressed, rather, to competency to stand trial. There appears to be growing doubt, however, that the standards for competency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty should be stated in any different terms. See Bolius v. Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 988 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Comment, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard, 1974 Duke L.J. 149, 168-74.

. While Dr. Levy did note that further records could lead to an alteration of [his] opinion,” the remainder of the report, documented with extensive analytical observations, overwhelmingly indicated a belief in the defendant’s competence.

. Moreover, in Spikes, the district court denied the habeas motion on the basis of the standard governing competence to stand trial rather than the standard of Sieling competence — an error not deemed fatal by the Spikes court. Here, by contrast, the district court adopted the correct standard, but the majority nevertheless choose to overrule its finding.