Court Opinion

ID: 9771503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:45:27.779639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:02.775764
License: Public Domain

*353McGEE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
In the present case, Jacquelyn Wiley was requested by the Welfare Unit to make monetary contributions of only $33 a month toward the financial support of her child. Over a one-year time span, these monthly payments amounted to a total of $396 for the care, feeding, and boarding of her infant. While Mrs. Wiley was obviously not wealthy, she was certainly not impoverished. She had a “cute” apartment, the financial support of her parents, the monetary aid of her boyfriend, and $500 in her savings account. As a practical matter, what did Mrs. Wiley contribute to the support of her child from July 17, 1973 to July 16, 1974? The record reveals that she paid a total of $93 toward the support of her infant during that one-year time period. Obviously, $93 will not fully support a child for one entire year; the remainder of that financial burden was therefore required to be borne by the state.
The majority relies on Cawley v. Allums, 518 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1975), as authority for its interpretation of the controlling Section 15.02(1)(E) dealing with nonsupport. I contend that Cawley has no application in the case now before us. The old adoption statute under review in Cawley was Article 46a, Section 6(a), which read in pertinent part as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of the child; provided, however, that if a living parent or parents shall voluntarily abandon and desert a child sought to be adopted, for a period of two (2) years, and shall have left such child to the care, custody, control and management of other persons, or if such parent or parents shall have not contributed substantially to the support of such child during such period of two (2) years commensurate with his financial ability, then, in either event, it shall not be necessary to obtain the written consent of the living parent or parents in such default.” [Emphasis added].
In Cawley the court was faced with the problem of determining the meaning of that portion of Section 6(a) which dealt with the two-year time period established under the failure to support provision. In construing the above statute, the court stated that “[t]he case requires a construction of the words ‘during such period of two (2) years.’ ” In order to gain insight as to the meaning of the two-year support portion set out in Article 46a, it was announced that Section 6(a) would be examined in its entirety. The court first considered Section 6(a) with reference to the uninterrupted two-year period of abandonment required in order for adoption to be allowed without the written consent of the parent due to parental desertion. In next discussing the failure to support component of Section 6(a), the court concluded that “[t]he word ‘such’ refers to the kind of time lapse required under the abandonment and desertion provision of the statute. It is ‘such’ period, meaning that it is the same kind of and is like the time requirement applicable to abandonment.” [Emphasis added]. It is evident that the court in Cawley was faced with construing the wording of a statute somewhat at variance with the one presently before us. Further, in the instant case the statutory language under consideration is clear and obviously independent of, and in no way related to, any other statutory provision such as abandonment. Since Cawley interpreted a statutory provision which differs in significant respects from the statute we are presently examining and since Cawley is factually distinguishable from the present controversy, I view that decision as having no application in the ease now before us.
The complete wording of the statute involved in the present case is: “ . failed to support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition . . . .” I believe that the Legislature intended that Section 15.02(1)(E) provide for a determination of the applicable one-year period to be considered and for an examination of the sup*354port payments made by the parent during this one-year period. Thus, the rule I would enunciate is that the number and amount of the payments made should be compared to the parents’ income and other sources of earnings throughout the entire period. Income, savings, overall financial condition, financial problems encountered and excuses should be viewed together over the entire year when a failure to support is asserted as a ground for termination. Through such an extensive evaluation it would ultimately be determined whether or not the parent failed to support the child “in accordance with his ability,” during the one-year period under consideration. The ability of an individual to pay will inevitably vary depending on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Nevertheless, unlike the majority, I would not eliminate the phrase, “in accordance with his ability,” from the operative language of the statute.
Applying the rule as previously set out, I would conclude that there is evidence of probative force to support the trial court’s finding with reference to petitioner’s failure to support under Section 15.02(1)(E). With regard to the conclusion of the trial judge that it would be in the best interest of the child if termination were ordered, I believe there is also ample evidence to support that finding. I will briefly summarize only a portion of the essential and material information as follows: The infant involved in this case was voluntarily placed with the Child Welfare Unit and remained under its care and supervision for some 17 months before this termination suit was instituted. The record shows that this was the third marriage of the petitioner which had failed and that she earlier had two other children by virtue of the prior marriages. One of these two children was left in the custody of her ex-husband and the other child had been adopted after the petitioner had voluntarily signed a document giving her consent to the adoption. The petitioner was receiving financial assistance from her parents as well as from her boyfriend and while she had also accumulated significant financial savings, only $93 in support payments were made throughout this one-year period. There was testimony to the effect that when the child had first been transferred to the care and control of the Welfare Unit, that the infant was behind in both physical development and emotional stability. It is apparent from this record that there is some evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial judge.
The problem raised in the instant case is partly due to the majority’s reliance on the Cawley rationale. With reference to Mrs. Wiley’s failure to make various support payments, the majority has stated that since she made a payment on August 6, 1973 “[t]he required period of nonsupport commenced not sooner than some time after August 6, 1973, which defeats the one-year period mandated by the Family Code.” Thus, what Cawley would seem to hold is that you may not begin the running of the one-year period of nonsupport until an initial month exists where no payment has been made. However, what is the rest of the rule as enunciated in Cawley and applied in the instant case? How has Section 15.02(1)(E) as presently drafted been interpreted by the majority? At what point in time after August 6, 1973 would the one-year time period start to run? Does the majority intend to hold that if a parent fails to make any support payments for eleven months and succeeds in forwarding a financial contribution on the twelfth month, that the running of the one-year period of nonsupport has been tolled and termination may not be allowed?
Let us assume that between the months of January 1,1975 and December 31,1975 a wealthy father or mother forwards a support payment only in the month of December. When may the one-year nonsupport time period begin to run for purposes of ascertaining whether grounds exist calling for termination? How may one full year of nonsupport ever be found to exist in such situations? Must the inattentive parents’ 11 prior failures to pay be disregarded forever? Are we to erase from existence the fact that the parent failed or refused to *355make 11 out of 12 payments simply because he manages to slip in one payment per year? Should we allow one payment to cure 11 prior deficiencies? May a neglectful parent continue to make one out of every six, or one out of every 12 payments and avoid forever the existence of a one-year period of nonsupport and thereby successfully evade termination? Is complete nonsupport for one year required before termination will be allowed? Such would seem to be the intention of the majority as their opinion states: “Just as two years did not mean nineteen months in Cawley, so also one year does not mean eight months in this case.” Thus, applying the reasoning of the majority to the single yearly payment hypothetical, termination would never be allowed as “one year does not mean eleven months.”
The statutory interpretation espoused by the majority is certainly not clear. In cases of this nature, guidance and clarity are absolutely essential to those persons affected by such rulings as well as to trial judges attempting to apply them. I would not so heavily emphasize and favor the rights of neglectful parents. The making of periodic token payments should not be allowed to create a situation in which an infant must indefinitely remain in the hands of a state welfare unit or in the care of foster homes. Children require the existence of love and environmental and emotional stability in their lives. The reasoning of the majority will not facilitate the attainment of these goals. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
GREENHILL, C. J., and DENTON and SAM D. JOHNSON, JJ., join in this dissent.