Court Opinion

ID: 9754426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:00:13.987917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.327021
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with both the majority and Chief Justice Billings that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were insufficient and erroneous. Further, I agree with, and join in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice to the extent of his conclusion that, at least under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of any duty on the part of the defendant State to maintain the traffic light for their benefit. I share his view that, on this basis, the court erred in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
*169Regardless of the above, I believe that the basis for the reversal and the reasons stated by the Chief Justice for his dissent, while they are valid as far as they go, are too narrow and limited. In my judgment, there were additional and equally strong grounds upon which the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted; likewise, there were significant errors in the court’s charge to the jury beyond the one discussed by the majority. For these reasons I feel compelled to write independently to insure that the full scope of my concern may be understood.
I. Proximate Cause
In reversing the judgment below and remanding for a new trial, the majority acknowledges and approves the earlier holdings of this Court relating to the duty of a motorist to look effectively. The opinion concludes: “A motorist is not only obligated to maintain a proper lookout, but is also presumed to have knowledge of what is in plain view.” (Emphasis added).
In support of this conclusion, the majority quite properly cites our leading cases on these points: Hastings v. Soule, 118 Vt. 105, 109, 100 A.2d 577, 579 (1953); Rich v. Hall, 107 Vt. 455, 462, 181 A. 113, 116 (1935); Beattie v. Parkhurst, 105 Vt. 91, 94, 163 A. 589, 590 (1933). Notably appropriate as applicable here is the quotation adopted by the majority from a 1968 case: a driver is presumed to see what is “within the range of his vision, and it will not avail him to say that he looked and did not see what he could not help seeing if he had looked.” Scrizzi v. Baraw, 127 Vt. 315, 319, 248 A.2d 725, 728 (1968) (citing Smith v. Grove, 119 Vt. 106, 111, 119 A.2d 880, 883 (1956); Hastings, supra, 118 Vt. at 109, 100 A.2d at 579)).
For purposes of this dissent it will be assumed, but arguendo only, that defendant did owe a duty to plaintiffs, and further that defendant was negligent in the performance of that duty. Nevertheless, before liability for a negligent act attaches, a plaintiff must prove that the act was a proximate cause of his injuries. Plaintiffs here failed completely to establish that any act of defendant, negligent or otherwise, contributed to the accident and the resulting injuries. The majority has made it so, by the simple expedient of saying it was so, or at least by saying there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question. However, in my *170view, defendant’s acts, even if negligent, were not a proximate cause of the accident.
A preliminary observation: even if the further assumption is made that defendant’s acts (assuming they were negligent) did constitute a proximate cause, it is inconceivable, on the basis of comparative negligence applied to the undisputed facts, that defendant was 75% negligent and Mrs. Roberts only 25% negligent. Such a finding here suggests strongly that the jury may have succumbed to sympathy, or “deep pocket,” or both.
The majority points out correctly that “proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.” Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14, 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974). Put another way, it is not enough for a plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. The former carries the additional burden of showing some nexus, some connection, between a negligent act of the defendant and a subsequent injury to the plaintiff. This relationship between an alleged cause and subsequent effect must be much more than the remote connection relied upon here by the majority.
Summarizing, a finding of negligence alone will not support a verdict in favor of a plaintiff; there must be a causal connection between a defendant’s negligence and the injury to a plaintiff. Brown v. Kelly, 140 Vt. 336, 338, 437 A.2d 1103, 1104 (1981); Rivers v. State, supra, 133 Vt. at 13, 328 A.2d at 399 (both citing Paquin v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 116 Vt. 466, 470, 78 A.2d 683, 685 (1951)); Cameron v. Bissonette, 103 Vt. 93, 95, 152 A. 87, 88 (1930); Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 422, 139 A. 440, 444 (1927).
A further qualification is desirable on the question of proximate cause. The word “proximate” is employed advisedly by the courts to distinguish between such a cause and one which is so remote that it is not recognized by the law for purposes of imposing liability, even though it may be a cause-in-fact of the injuries. “[T]he law regards the proximate rather than the remote cause of an injury . . . .” Woodcock’s Admr. v. Hallock, 98 Vt. 284, 290, 127 A. 380, 382 (1925). A defendant is liable for all of the injuries flowing from a negligent act “until diverted by the intervention of some efficient cause that makes the injury its own, or until the *171force set in motion by the negligent act has so far spent itself as to be too small for the law’s notice.” Id.
Without the distinction between proximate and remote causes, the scope of liability for negligence may be extended almost indefinitely as to both time and circumstance by ever-expanding causal links. To illustrate the point through a reductio ad absurdum, the mere fact that a defendant exists is a cause in fact. Thus it may be seen that negligence alone does not necessarily equate with proximate cause. Negligence speaks merely to the nature of a defendant’s act or omission; it does not, per se, make the act or omission a proximate cause.
The majority acknowledges these rules and concepts surrounding proximate cause. Having done so, however, the opinion struggles to apply them to this case by claiming that there was at least sufficient evidence on the issue of proximate cause, that it was proper to submit the question to the jury. The opinion seems to suggest that the evidence called for an evaluation in which reasonable minds could differ. Viewing the undisputed evidence, even in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this represents a triumph of legal rhetoric over everyday common sense. It is unnecessary to recite that evidence again; it is adequately reviewed in the majority opinion. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that virtually every key element is contained in the testimony of Mrs. Roberts herself, as supplemented by the photographs and plans received into evidence as exhibits. This evidence shows, beyond any fair or reasonable question, that even if the defendant was negligent, that negligence could not possibly have been a proximate cause of the accident which occurred. In this case, the malfunctioning light was simply a condition; it was not a cause.
It would be difficult to improve on the language of a New Jersey court based on a virtually identical fact pattern:
Granting plaintiff the benefit of all favorable testimony and all inferences for purposes of this motion,* the evidence reveals that the traffic signals were not operating at the time of the accident. As such, the intersection was like numerous other unregulated intersections, and both plaintiff and the other driver were required to use due care in negotiating through it. . . .
*172The fact that the accident happened at all bespeaks of a lack of due care in the use of the intersection by one or both drivers. . . .
Plaintiffs case also fails to meet the required burden of proof with regard to the issue of proximate cause .... It is difficult to see how the absence of a traffic control signal in any way contributed to the accident.
. . . [T]he driver knew the traffic light was not working and knew she was approaching what she should have considered to be an uncontrolled intersection and acted accordingly. The fact of the collision bespeaks the negligence of one or both drivers. . . . Common sense leads to the conclusion that any negligence causing the accident involved here was that of the plaintiff or the other driver or both and not of the City.
Lytle v. City of Newark, 166 N.J. Super. 191, 194-96, 399 A.2d 333, 335-36 (1979). The facts in the case before us constitute an almost eerie recapitulation of the facts in Lytle. Nevertheless, a proper application of the law established in Scrizzi v. Baraw, supra, Smith v. Grove, supra, Hastings v. Soule, supra, and other cases, leads inescapably to the same result. Mrs. Roberts knew the light was not functioning. It must be presumed that she saw the lights of the vehicle approaching the intersection from her left; her sight line in that direction was clear for a considerable distance; she was thoroughly familiar with the intersection and knew she was about to enter it, yet she did not slow down or stop before doing so; she simply went headlong into the intersection heedless of the vehicle approaching from her left. Reprising the New Jersey court, “It is difficult to see how the absence of a traffic control signal in any way contributed to the accident.” Lytle, supra, 166 N.J. Super, at 195, 399 A.2d at 336. At best it was too remote for the law to take cognizance of that fact as a proximate cause. Courts must be wary of allowing legal tags to dictate a result contrary to the common sense of a particular case.
It seems to me inconsistent and contradictory for the majority to recognize and approve the holding of this Court that “it will not avail [a party] to say that he looked and did not see what he could not help seeing if he had looked,” Scrizzi v. Baraw, supra, 127 Vt. at 319, 248 A.2d at 728, and then, on the uncontradicted evidence of a clear sight line and of the fact that the lights of the *173approaching vehicle were on, to say, in effect, that it was a question for the jury to determine as to whether Mrs. Roberts could see those lights. It is simply judicial myopia to ignore what every person blessed with eyesight knows very well: in the absence of some obstruction, and there was none here, the lights of a motor vehicle are visible at night. Contrary to Scrizzi, it has apparently availed the plaintiffs a great deal for Mrs. Roberts to say she looked but did not see what she could not have helped seeing if she had looked, or looked “effectively.” Hastings, supra, 118 Vt. at 109, 100 A.2d at 579. Moreover:
[I]t is true, also, . . . that a court cannot ignore the physical facts that are before it, and, though a witness testifies that a thing is so, his testimony will not be given credence when indisputable evidence to the contrary is before the court.
Smith v. Grove, supra, 119 Vt. at 111, 119 A.2d at 883 (citing Ellison v. Colby, 110 Vt. 431, 436, 8 A.2d 637, 640 (1939)). Once again, the majority elects to ignore established case law, which should have required a directed verdict.
Finally, whatever justification there may have been for the other vehicle to enter the intersection without stopping, cannot, or should not, be transferred vicariously to Mrs. Roberts. The latter’s negligence was her own, regardless of the negligence or lack thereof of the other driver.
A case more appropriate for a directed verdict is difficult to imagine; the motion should have been granted.
II. Jury Instruction
Since this case may be retried, I think the majority can be faulted for limiting its criticism of the jury instruction to the trial court’s failure to charge on the issue of Mrs. Roberts’ duty not only to look but to look effectively. Certainly I agree with this holding as far as it goes, but there was at least one other error in the charge that could lead to further difficulties if repeated on retrial. At one point the court instructed the jury that the State “has a duty to use a high degree of care in maintaining a controlled intersection.” (Emphasis added). In the absence of a statute, this is not the law; there is no such statute. The State’s obligation in maintaining its highways is simply to keep them in a reasonably safe condition with reference to such accidents as may *174be expected to occur thereon, Zeno’s Bakery, Inc. v. State, 105 Vt. 370, 379, 166 A. 379, 382 (1933), and to “preserve a condition of reasonable safety in their roads with reference to the amount and kind of travel they accommodate.” Morse v. Town of Richmond, 41 Vt. 435, 440 (1868). The reasonably prudent person test -is applicable. 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets & Bridges § 372, at 762-63.
It is true that the court made some subsequent references to “the way a reasonable and careful person would act . . . in the same situation.” Nevertheless, such language is in clear conflict legally with the “high degree of care” charged earlier, and might easily have confused and misled the jury.
I believe strongly that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. Beyond the fact that there was no duty shown running from defendant to the plaintiffs, proximate cause was not demonstrated by any fair preponderance of the evidence. I would therefore enter judgment here for defendant. If the matter is to be tried a second time, however, great caution should be exercised by the trial court to guard against the element of sympathy playing any part in the result. The case seems to me particularly susceptible to such a possibility. This can be accomplished in some measure at least by proper instructions to the jury which cover all the significant points of applicable law.

 For a judgment of dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiffs case. The motion was granted.