Court Opinion

ID: 9733370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:05:18.013234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:40.859836
License: Public Domain

KENNETH M. ROMINES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Even this small case, containing only six pages of transcript and two exhibits, contains enough legal fodder to feed a law school exam.
Initially, the record was compiled before a traffic commissioner followed by a hollow review by a Circuit Judge. I cannot find any provision of Article V of the Missouri Constitution which dictates this procedure.1
Secondarily, when does a conviction occur for the purposes of use by the respondent: on the date of conviction of a defendant by a jury, or ten years later when an Appellate Court gets around to dismissing the appeal? I submit that a Circuit Court could recognize and remedy this very case using equitable principles, but it is not to be.
Thirdly, what is the use and application to be given § 302.1602, on our facts?
Lastly, what is the application to be given § 302.600 — euphemistically known as the Driver License Compact?
In each of these four areas are wonderful warrens to pursue legal rabbits — I shall limit my chase to the third and fourth areas, with a feint to area two.
§ 302.160 reads:
When the director of revenue receives notice of a conviction in another state or from a federal court, which, if committed in this state, would result in the assessment of points, the director is authorized to assess the points and suspend or revoke the operating privilege when the accumulated points so require as provided in § 302.304.
My reading of these words combined with a review of the cases written pursuant to this section3, when read in conjunction with § 302.600 convinces me that § 302.160 applies only to Missouri drivers when they venture into other states or onto Federal Lands; the cases deal specifically with Missouri drivers.
As the facts in this case show, appellant was a Kentucky licensed driver when he was convicted after jury verdict, in 1996: thus § 302.160, supra, did not, and could not apply to appellant. Missouri had no license to revoke.
During the appellate interregnum in Kentucky, appellant, moving on with his life, crossed the river in 2004, surrendered his Kentucky license to Missouri and obtained a Missouri License.
Kentucky, in 2006, disposed of the appeal and appellant paid a fine to Kentucky of Four hundred and eighty-six dollars and fifty cents. A Kentucky bureaucrat, then having obtained appellants address, informed the Respondent of the ten year old conviction — resulting in the suspension before us.
To apply § 302.160, supra, to these facts exceeds the intent of the statute. The statute applies to a Missouri driver who was a Missouri driver when the incident occurred. If the statute goes further substantial constitutional concerns arise — not to mention simple jurisdictional concerns. *469It would also be nice if we showed Full Faith and Credit evidentiary concern as opposed to relying on the e-mails of this case.
The majority, relying on Carlson v. Fischer, 149 S.W.3d 603 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) and West v. Director of Revenue, 184 S.W.3d 578 (Mo.App. S.D.2006), holds that appellant may not collaterally attack his Kentucky conviction. Of course, as a general proposition a foreign conviction can be collaterally attacked.4 Here, appellant does not collaterally attack the Kentucky conviction. The attack made is that the Director had no legal authority to suspend his license.
Indeed, why have a “Driver License Compact” (§ 302.600) if it was the Legislative intent to have § 302.160 cover this factual situation? Appellant was a Kentucky driver, the Director had no authority to suspend.
Whatever the impact of § 302.600 might be, it need not be considered. Though counsel for the Director moved the Commissioner to take Judicial Notice of the Compact, and the Commissioner did— there is nothing in this record- — and nothing in the Historical and Statutory Notes to § 302.600, — nor does this writers research reveal — as to where and when the Kentucky legislature agreed to become members of the Compact. Simply put, the Driver License Compact does not apply in this Case — Kentucky is not a member.5
The action of the Director suspending Appellant’s license in Missouri should be reversed.

. In the Interest of B.T., 218 S.W.3d 575, 576 n. 1 (Mo.App.F.D.2007)

. All statutory references are to RSMo (2000)

. West v. Director of Revenue, 184 S.W.3d 578 (Mo.App. S.D.2006) Carlson v. Fischer, 149 S.W.3d 603 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) Callahan v. Director of Revenue, 878 S.W.2d 826 (Mo.App. E.D.1993) Allen v. LaPage, 579 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.App. E.D.1979) Farnsworth v. Director of Revenue, 573 S.W.2d 135 (Mo.App.1978) Schuiling v. Scott, 493 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App.1973)

. Phillips v. Fallen, 6 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Mo. banc 1999)

. Schuetz v. Con., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 753 A.2d 915 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2000) and Hughes v. Ohio Bur. Of Motor Vehicles, 79 Ohio St.3d 305, 681 N.E.2d 430 (1997)