Court Opinion

ID: 9883639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:04:37.772322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:16.663152
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur. The majority repeats the Court of Appeals’ njistake by focusing on the rules of pleading instead of addressing Appellant’s claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. I write to explain the proper legal basis for the resolution of this case.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that article 1.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[i]f the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other post-conviction proceeding.” Thus, although article 21.07 provides that “in alleging the name of the defendant, or any other person necessary to be stated in the indictment, it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the given name and the surname,” the failure to allege a name in such a manner must be timely raised under article 1.14 or that pleading deficiency is waived.1
That said, however, the Court of Appeals confused the law pertaining to proper plead*25ing with legal sufficiency of the evidence,2 and a majority of this Court repeats that error. Article 21.07 sets forth certain pleading requirements, which are waived if not timely raised. The majority recognizes that the State’s failure to include a first name or initials, as required by article 21.07, is a matter Appellant waived by failing to raise it prior to the day of trial. What the opinion fails to explain is that legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove the offense charged is an entirely different matter.
The proper standard of review for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, allows any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We recently explained:
[Legal sjufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Such a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried ... [This standard] ensures that a judgment of acquittal is reserved for those situations in which there is an actual failure in the State’s proof of the crime[.]
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The indictment in this case alleges all of the elements of the offense charged but contains a defect in the way one of the elements is pled. Alleging “Officer” Lawson does not “state one or more of the initials of the given name and the surname,” as required by Article 21.07.4
Inclusion of the complainant’s given name or initials would be legally accurate, and would adequately describe the particular offense. Inclusion of the given name or initials would neither unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof nor unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability. Such an inclusion would also not offend federal due process requirements, as the record clearly demonstrates that Appellant had adequate notice of the complainant’s identity, including his given name. Finally, inclusion of the given name or initials would not conflict with the indictment, as the indictment did not include any given name or initials but simply omitted them. The hypothetically correct jury charge would thus include the complainant’s given name or initials. A review of the record demonstrates that the State put forth sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to find that the officer from whom Appellant fled had the given name “Craig” or the first initial “C.” For example, Officer Lawson testified that his first name is Craig. Other witnesses also testified that Officer Lawson’s given name is Craig.
I concur in the reversal of the court of appeals’ opinion, and in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the proper course of action is to remand this case to the court of appeals to address Appellant’s remaining grounds for review.

. Appellant does not claim the indictment was so deficient it failed to establish jurisdiction. Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

. While the court of appeals did not purport to do any evidentiary sufficiency analysis in its opinion, it must have performed an unwritten analysis because the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and entered an order of acquittal.

. The essential elements of the crime of evading arrest are: (1) a person (2) intentionally flees (3) from a peace officer (4) with knowledge he is a peace officer (5) who is attempting to arrest defendant and (6) the attempted arrest is lawful. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Alejos v. State, 555 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (extensive discussion of evading arrest).

.While Article 21.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the given name and the surname,” we note that it would also be sufficient to state a given name and the surname.