Court Opinion

ID: 9705117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:56:57.9473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.100700
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Unlike my colleagues, I cannot say that the trial court’s pretrial inquiry was sufficient to meet the strictures of Monroe-Farrell. A more searching inquiry would have revealed the inadequacies in trial counsel’s performance as subsequently disclosed in the hearing under D.C.Code § 23-110, which the trial court found to be constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Even on the basis of the pretrial record developed, it appears that counsel was “unprepared to give effective representation at trial, [and] appellant was constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new counsel.” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 762 (D.C.1978).
During the Monroe-Farrell hearing, appellant made the following complaints to the trial court about his counsel’s representation: (1) that counsel had pressured him to plead guilty;1 (2) that counsel was not acting as his advocate and had failed to agree on a defense;2 (3) that he was not ready for trial because he had not received information he thought pertinent to his case;3 (4) that counsel had left securing the witnesses and evidence to him;4 (5) that trial counsel had not reviewed the information appellant gathered; (6) that counsel was not concerned about his well-being, the presumption of innocence, and investigating his defense;5 (7) and that counsel lacked vigor, zeal and concentration.6 *1289I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court could conclude reasonably that appellant was complaining about the disagreement over plea bargaining alone. Rather, appellant expressed dissatisfaction that counsel’s only strategy was to enter a plea, instead of preparing a defense.7 Moreover, defense counsel expressed his own uncertainty about being prepared to proceed to trial when it took a series of questions from the court before defense counsel would state unequivocally that he was prepared to represent appellant at trial within the required standards of professional responsibility.8
Although the Monroe-Farrell inquiry was lengthy, the trial court failed to “ascertain the concrete steps taken by counsel in preparation of the case and to evaluate their sufficiency under the circumstances.” See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 819 (D.C.1978). Specifically, the trial court did not focus on appellant’s claim that his counsel had not investigated the case or prepared a defense. Instead, the court directed its attention to counsel’s reasons for not seeking a continuance and appellant’s claim of lack of preparation for trial based on his failure to receive a police report from Prince George’s County. The court’s remaining inquiry, concerning discovery, witnesses, physical evidence, investigation of the crime scene, and counsel’s failure to file pre-trial motions, eon-sisted of standard questions to which the court did not insist upon specific answers. Such a routine inquiry “ ‘[left the] judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision [as to defense counsel’s preparedness for trial].’ ” Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 761-62 (D.C.1978) (quoting von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)). The court’s inquiry failed “to determine at the time of the defendant’s complaint ‘the truth and scope’ of his allegations.” Matthews v. United States, 459 A.2d 1063, 1065 (D.C.1983).
While the scope of the inquiry depends upon the circumstances in each case, this court has identified criteria for determining whether counsel’s preparation falls within the range of competence required by defense counsel in a criminal case, none of which were fully met here. The criteria include:
(1) whether counsel conferred with the defendant as often as necessary and advised him of his rights, (2) whether counsel elicited from the defendant matters of defense and then ascertained if any potential defenses were unavailable, and (3) whether counsel conducted both a factual and legal investigation sufficiently in advance to permit reflection and to determine if matters of defense could be developed.
*1290Matthews, 459 A.2d at 1065 (citing Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 821). The consideration of each criterion in turn reflects the flaws in the court’s Monroe-Farrell inquiry.
First, although the court inquired about, and counsel informed the court that he had conferred with appellant about trial issues between 10 and 15 times and had spoken with him between 30 and 40 times, the trial court did not question whether that time was devoted to preparing a defense, as opposed to plea discussions. Since appellant claimed that counsel had not developed a defense, had left investigation to him, and had not reviewed his “paperwork,” the court failed in its responsibility to elicit information to determine whether appellant’s allegations about counsel’s failure to prepare to defend were true. Counsel admitted that he had not informed appellant initially of his rights because appellant had previously given a lengthy statement to police. However, the court did not inquire whether counsel informed appellant of his rights at any time.
Second, despite appellant’s allegations that counsel had not “overlooked” his “paperwork” until the day of trial and had not developed a defense, the trial court did not inquire into the type of investigation counsel undertook in an effort to establish a defense or to ascertain the viability of any defense. Such an inquiry would not have required the court to “evaluate the strategic options open to an attorney ... or to otherwise engage in speculative judgments[ ]”, but it would have allowed the court to “evaluate the[ ] sufficiency [of counsel’s preparation] under the circumstances.” Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 819. The trial court elicited no information about the “concrete steps taken by counsel in preparation of the case.” Id. Instead, it accepted counsel’s general assertions that witnesses had been contacted and that two investigators had been hired. The trial court was not informed of whether appellant provided counsel with defense leads or whether any such leads were investigated by counsel.
The third criterion, which focuses on whether counsel has made a factual and legal investigation sufficiently in advance to permit reflection and to determine if a defense could be developed, was not met. The court’s inquiry revealed that counsel had failed: (1) to investigate the crime scene, (2) to subpoena a particular police report, (3) to file a motion to suppress appellant’s lengthy statement to the police, (4) to subpoena defense witnesses, and (5) to prepare for voir dire and opening statements. Nevertheless, the court found counsel’s explanations for his omissions to be satisfactory, and it never questioned the extent of counsel’s actual preparation. The trial court inquired only generally about such matters as whether counsel had sought discovery and whether there were issues of identification. Although the court asked counsel whether he had time to prepare, it did not ask whether he actually had prepared for trial. The trial court’s failure to elicit the information required by Matthews and to “ascertain the concrete steps taken by counsel in preparation of the ease,” Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 819, shows that the Monroe-Farrell inquiry was not “sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” Nelson, supra, 601 A.2d at 591.9
In my view, reversal is warranted in this case because the Monroe-Farrell inquiry was inadequate and because the record of that hearing demonstrates that trial counsel was not prepared “ “within the normal range of reasonable competence demanded of attor*1291neys in criminal cases.’ ” McFadden, supra, note 8, 614 A.2d at 18. Therefore, appellant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the integrity of the adversarial trial process was undermined. See Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 819. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. The following are examples of appellant’s efforts to inform the court about his own decision to defend the case and his counsel's attempt to persuade him to enter a plea of guilty while failing to discuss with appellant defense strategy:
[F]rom day 1 [my attorney] has represented me, from day 1 I was arrested, he has always wanted me to cop a plea.
:£ ‡ * * * *
When I lost my job, [my attorney] conveyed to me to again accept the plea offer.... He strongly urged me to accept it.... From day 1 I decided to fight_" (emphasis added).
* & * * * *
[My attorney] — seems as though he’s been working with the Government to plea bargain. He's not talking about any defense, he's always talked to me about settling, plea bargain, (emphasis added).

. In this regard, appellant stated:
[TJoday when I produced this [complaint form], I said, ... fight on my behalf. When we were before Judge King, I tried to tell him I was not ready. Tuesday I told him I was not ready, I said because we did not come to an agreement on my defense strategy and I was still waiting on some pertinent information along with the case, (emphasis added). During the lunch break I produced this and said, 'Talk on my behalf or I will fill this out and send it to bar counsel.
When we were before Judge King, I told [him] — I was trying to get his attention and said, "Look, I'm not ready.” He told me to be quiet and he told Judge King that he was ready. Tuesday night when we talked, I told him I was not ready and I was still waiting on some pertinent information on my defense to come in.

. In response to the court's question as to why appellant thought he was not ready for trial, appellant stated, “All right. One key piece of information was a police report that I need to obtain from P.G. County.” Appellant referred to the report again when the trial court asked if there were other reasons he felt unprepared for trial: "Like I said, those are the two distinct reason — because I haven’t received the papers, and he hasn’t tried to subpoena them or anything.”

. Appellant told the trial court that:
That's the other thing I was going to say, Your Honor, its that all the information that needs to be gathered, [my attorney] had me gather it — witnesses, character witnesses, information.

. Appellant stated:
My major concern is the lack of concern for my wellbeing and the lack of concern for my counsel on innocent until proven guilty. That is my major concern, along with the initiative to take time out to overlook the paperwork to substantiate what I’m telling him beforehand. Today was the first time he looked at it at all in person briefly.

. After the trial court explained that when a client decides not to plead guilty, an attorney’s "job is to advocate before the Court and the jury with zeal and force and persuasion,” appellant responded:
*1289Like I say, that is the only thing I request, and I have serious concern with that because when we were talking at lunchtime I mentioned to [my attorney] that one of his investigators, Mr. Glydd (phonetic), he was like — he didn't even know who I was talking about. That is my only concern — the vigor and the zeal. That is my only concern, is the vigor, the zeal and the concentration. That is my only concern.

. See notes 1 and 2 supra.

. The following questions and answers between the court and counsel occurred:
Q: [Counsel], do you have any reason to believe that if this case goes to trial, you cannot represent your client with the vigor and the zeal that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires in this case?
A: Subject to one proviso, that I would need to take some amount of time to be with my wife.
******
Q: But I mean while the case is in trial, could you represent—
A: In other words, I was here if I was given some amount of time to be there?
Q: Yes.
A: I don’t see any reason why I couldn't.
Q: Well, would you? Would you represent him with the zeal and the vigor that is required of counsel under the Code of Professional Responsibility?
A: I could and it’s my — been my intention to provide such representation.
Q: And you would do so? Is that what you’re telling me?
A: I hope I would do so, yes.
Q: Well, sir, do you have some reason to think you wouldn’t?
A: No, there is no reason to think that I wouldn’t, Your Honor.

. Contrary to the government's argument, this case is similar to the situation presented in McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11 (D.C.1992), where this court reversed the judgments of conviction because of trial counsel's inadequate preparation for trial. See id. at 18. In McFadden, the trial court had failed to make a " 'substantive inquiry ... to elucidate from counsel information to rebut, or substantiate the specifics of [defendant's] complaints.' " Id. at 16 (quoting Monroe, supra, 389 A.2d at 821). However, unlike this case, counsel admitted more fully and explicitly that he had failed to confer adequately with the defendant, had not investigated the case factually or legally, had not located or ascertained the witnesses and had not determined the theory or defense as of the scheduled trial date. We reversed "because the record revealed both that the type of inquiry contemplated by Monroe did not occur ... and that there was inadequate trial preparation and consultation by counsel.” Id. at 18.