Court Opinion

ID: 9941978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 13:05:51.565376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.081046
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-260

                               Filed 20 February 2024

Edgecombe County, Nos. 19 CRS 51756-60

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

DAVID NEAL COX

      Appeal by Defendant from Judgments rendered 15 July 2022 by Judge L.

Lamont Wiggins in Edgecombe County Superior Court.            Heard in the Court of

Appeals 29 November 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Tamara
      S. Zmuda, for the State.

      Thomas, Ferguson & Beskind, LLP, by Kellie Mannette, for Defendant-
      Appellant.

      HAMPSON, Judge.

                      Factual and Procedural Background

      David Cox (Defendant) appeals from Judgments rendered upon convictions for

three counts of statutory sex offense with a child under 15, five counts of sex offense

by a parent, and two counts of statutory sex offense with a child by an adult. The

Record before us, including evidence presented at trial, shows the following:
                                         STATE V. COX

                                       Opinion of the Court

       The alleged victim in this case is Margaret.1               Defendant moved in with

Margaret’s mother in 2007. They married in 2008. At that time, Margaret was eight

years old, and her four siblings also resided in the house. At trial, Margaret testified

Defendant sexually abused her on numerous occasions between 2011 and 2016, when

she was between the ages of eleven and sixteen years old. According to Margaret,

when she was sixteen years old and began dating, Defendant stopped sexually

abusing her, but he continued to molest and grope her until she was 19. Throughout

this time, Margaret did not report the abuse to anyone.

       Margaret’s grandmother testified she was suspicious of Defendant’s behavior

when Margaret was young based on her observations of Defendant with Margaret at

the grandmother’s pool. After observing Defendant forcibly kiss Margaret several

times, her grandmother privately brought up the incident and asked her if everything

was alright. Margaret responded that everything was alright.

       At trial, Margaret testified she first reported Defendant’s abuse after

witnessing what she believed was grooming behavior by Defendant toward

Defendant’s granddaughter who was three or four years old at the time. At that point,

it had been eight years since Defendant’s abuse began. Margaret testified she first

disclosed Defendant’s abuse to her grandmother, grandfather, and then-boyfriend.

Margaret’s grandmother then called the police. The following day, Margaret reported

1 A pseudonym chosen by the parties pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 42(b).

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                                         STATE V. COX

                                       Opinion of the Court

the abuse to her mother. To corroborate her account, Margaret then showed her

mother where Defendant kept a penis pump and lubricant, which only he and

Margaret knew about.

       On 26 September 2019, Defendant was indicted for three counts of statutory

sex offense with a child under fifteen, five counts of sex offense by a parent, and two

counts of statutory sex offense with a child by an adult. Defendant’s trial began 11

July 2022. In addition to Margaret’s testimony, Margaret’s cousin, Reagan,2 testified

about two prior encounters she had with Defendant. According to Reagan, when she

was approximately fourteen years old, Defendant had stopped her from going up the

stairs at Margaret’s house. Defendant then moved her tank top and told Reagan she

had a “nice tan line.” Reagan did not report this incident at the time. A few months

later, Reagan was swimming at Margaret’s grandmother’s house and was wearing a

two-piece bathing suit. Reagan testified she was on her way to the bathroom when

Defendant blocked her from entering. Defendant then moved Reagan’s swimsuit

bottom to a point where she felt uncomfortable and again commented she had a “nice

tan line.”   According to Reagan’s testimony, she reported this incident and the

previous one to her parents later that day.

       The State presented Beth Bruder Dagenhart, the Children’s Advocacy Center

Program Director at Southmountain Children and Family Services, as an expert

2 A pseudonym chosen by the parties.

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                                   STATE V. COX

                                 Opinion of the Court

witness. The State asked to tender Dagenhart as an expert in the following fields:

         “[i]nterpretations of interviews of children who are suspected
         victims of sexual abuse. Profiles of sexually abused children. . .
         delayed reporting or delayed disclosure. What those reasons are
         based on her knowledge, training, and experience for a delay in
         disclosure. . . Denials of sexual abuse. And then finally common
         grooming practices, what constitutes grooming, and common
         grooming practices employed by child abusers.

Defendant responded, “That’s a complicated tender but we will go ahead and

stipulate, Your Honor, to her being an expert in forensic interviewing.” The trial

court then ordered the witness tendered “in the areas as stated by counsel for the

State and upon stipulation of the defendant.”       Dagenhart’s testimony explained

generally what constitutes grooming, common grooming practices, denials of abuse,

triggering events for disclosure, and delayed disclosure. Dagenhart did not testify

about Margaret or offer any opinion about the present case.

      On 15 July 2022, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty on all

counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 1176 to 1471 months of imprisonment.

Defendant gave oral Notice of Appeal in open court.

                             Appellate Jurisdiction

      The trial court rendered Judgment and sentenced Defendant on 15 July 2022.

The Record also reflects written Judgments signed by the trial court on 15 July 2022,

but these Judgments are neither file-stamped nor certified by the Clerk. Rule 4 of

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides appeal from a judgment

rendered in a criminal case must be given either orally at trial or by filing written

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                                             STATE V. COX

                                          Opinion of the Court

notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving copies thereof upon all

adverse parties within fourteen days after entry of judgment. N.C.R. App. P. 4 (2023).

Here, the Record reflects the written Judgments were signed by Judge L. Lamont

Wiggins on 15 July 2022, and Defendant gave oral Notice of Appeal in open court on

15 July 2022. There is no dispute between the parties that Judgments were in fact

entered and Defendant’s oral Notice of Appeal was timely. Therefore, this Court has

appellate jurisdiction over this appeal.3

                                         Issues Presented

         The issues are whether the trial court (I) plainly erred by failing to exclude

evidence of Defendant’s prior conduct; (II) expressed an impermissible opinion in its

qualification of Dagenhart as an expert witness; (III) plainly erred by admitting

Dagenhart’s expert testimony; and (IV) erred by precluding defense counsel from

arguing the possible penalty Defendant faced if convicted.

                                               Analysis

    I.      Evidence of Prior Acts

         Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error by failing to exclude

Reagan’s testimony under Rule 404(b) because the incidents Reagan described were

3 Nevertheless, we urge all parties in future to comply with Rule 9(b)(3) of the North Carolina Rules

of Appellate Procedure, which provides: “Every pleading, motion, affidavit, or other document included
in the printed record should show the date on which it was filed and, if verified, the date of verification
and the person who verified it. Every judgment, order, or other determination should show the date
on which it was entered.” N.C.R. App. P. 9(b)(3) (2023).

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                                     STATE V. COX

                                   Opinion of the Court

not sufficiently similar to the conduct alleged in this case. Because Defendant did

not object to the challenged testimony at trial, our review is limited to plain error.

N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2023) (“In criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by

objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any

such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when

the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to

plain error.”).

       “For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a

fundamental error occurred at trial.” State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723

S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citation omitted). Further, “[t]o show that an error was

fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of the

entire record, the error ‘had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant

was guilty.’ ” Id. (citing State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)

(citation omitted)). Thus, plain error is reserved for “the exceptional case where, after

reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a ‘fundamental error,

something so basic, so prejudicial . . . that justice cannot have been done,’ or ‘where

[the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the

accused[.]’ ” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting United States v.

McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in original).

       Here, even if we were to assume without deciding the trial court’s admission of

evidence regarding Defendant’s prior conduct was error, in light of the substantial

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                                    STATE V. COX

                                  Opinion of the Court

evidence of Defendant’s guilt, Defendant failed to establish the jury would probably

have reached a different result had the evidence not been admitted. Thus, any such

error would not amount to plain error.

         In this case, it was undisputed Defendant was Margaret’s stepfather, they

were not married, Defendant was in a parental role with respect to Margaret, and

they lived in the same home at all relevant times in this case. Thus, the only element

in dispute for each charge was the sexual act. At trial, Margaret testified with

specificity about multiple instances of sexual abuse by Defendant from the time she

was eleven to sixteen years old. Margaret’s testimony recounted specific details about

the time, place, and manner in which Defendant abused her.          Further, several

witnesses corroborated Margaret’s testimony, including Margaret’s grandmother and

boyfriend, both of whom offered specific instances of concerning behavior Defendant

exhibited toward Margaret. Finally, Margaret recounted revealing Defendant’s penis

pump and lubricant hidden beneath a ceiling tile in the bathroom to her mother,

which she testified only she and Defendant knew about. This too corroborated her

testimony. Based on this substantial evidence, we cannot conclude the jury would

have probably reached a different result absent the challenged testimony. As such,

Defendant has failed to meet his burden under the plain error standard.

Consequently, the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to exclude the

challenged evidence in the absence of an objection by Defendant.

   II.      Expert Witness Qualification

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                                     STATE V. COX

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Defendant contends the trial court erred by expressing an impermissible

opinion during its qualification of Dagenhart as an expert witness. “The judge may

not express during any stage of the trial, any opinion in the presence of the jury on

any question of fact to be decided by the jury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1222 (2023).

Further, “[i]n instructing the jury, the judge shall not express an opinion as to

whether or not a fact has been proved and shall not be required to state, summarize

or recapitulate the evidence, or to explain the application of the law to the evidence.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1232 (2023). “In evaluating whether a judge’s comments cross

into the realm of impermissible opinion, a totality of the circumstances test is

utilized.” State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 207, 491 S.E.2d 641, 649 (1997) (quoting State

v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 155, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995)). “[A] trial court generally

is not impermissibly expressing an opinion when it makes ordinary rulings during

the course of the trial.” State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 355, 595 S.E.2d 124, 140 (2004)

(citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]rial courts act as a gatekeeper in determining

admissibility of expert testimony[.]” State v. Walston, 369 N.C. 547, 551, 798 S.E.2d

741, 745 (2017).

      Here, the State questioned Dagenhart regarding her background and

qualifications before tendering her as an expert witness. The State offered Dagenhart

as an expert in interpretation of interviews of children who are suspected victims of

sexual abuse, profiles of sexually abused children, delayed reporting or delayed

disclosure, denials of sexual abuse, common grooming practices, and what constitutes

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                                    STATE V. COX

                                  Opinion of the Court

grooming. Defense counsel responded: “That’s a complicated tender but we will go

ahead and stipulate, Your Honor, to her being an expert in forensic interviewing.”

The trial court ordered the witness “tendered in the areas as stated by counsel for the

State and upon stipulation of the defendant.”

      Contrary to the State’s assertion, Defendant did not stipulate to Dagenhart’s

qualification as an expert in the full list of areas recited by the State. Defendant

specified he stipulated only to Dagenhart’s expertise in forensic interviewing.

However, the trial court was still within its discretion to qualify Dagenhart as an

expert in the remaining areas listed by the State. See State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 74-

75, 733 S.E.2d 535, 539-40 (2012). Still, the trial court made an ordinary ruling in

the course of the trial in its gatekeeping role. Walston, 369 N.C. at 551, 798 S.E.2d

at 745. The trial court made no extraneous statements or comments with respect to

Dagenhart’s qualifications.

      We have distinguished between cases in which the defendant is herself

qualified as an expert in the jury’s presence, Galloway v. Lawrence, 266 N.C. 245,

250-51, 145 S.E.2d 861, 865-66 (1966), from cases in which the person tendered as an

expert was not the defendant and the expert’s testimony did not address the ultimate

question to be decided by the factfinder. In re Lee, 69 N.C. App. 277, 289-91, 317

S.E.2d 75, 82-83 (1984). Here, Dagenhart was qualified in areas relevant to the case,

but her expertise did not determine the ultimate question for the jury—whether

Defendant had abused Margaret.        Further, Dagenhart never testified as to her

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                                     STATE V. COX

                                   Opinion of the Court

opinion on Margaret’s credibility or whether Margaret had been abused. In fact, the

State clarified at the outset of its direct examination of Dagenhart that she had not

spoken with Margaret.

          [Counsel for the State]: Now, Ms. Dagenhart, this is a case where
          you didn’t do a forensic interview in this case; is that correct?

          [Dagenhart]: That’s correct.

          [Counsel for the State]: And you’ve never interviewed [Margaret]
          or talked to her or anything about this; right?

          [Dagenhart]: No. I have not.

This exchange underscores the purpose of Dagenhart’s testimony was provided to

give the jury context to understand and evaluate Margaret’s account, not to suggest

what the jury should find. Thus, the trial court did not express an impermissible

opinion by qualifying the expert witness in the areas listed by the State. Accordingly,

we conclude the trial court did not err.

   III.   Admission of Expert Witness Testimony

      Defendant contends the trial court plainly erred by allowing Dagenhart to

testify generally rather than applying her expertise to the facts of the case. The

admission of expert testimony is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702. In

2011, our General Assembly amended Rule 702(a) to mirror Federal Rule of Evidence

702(a) as amended at that time. State v. Hunt, 250 N.C. App. 238, 244, 792 S.E.2d

552, 558 (2016). “It follows that the meaning of North Carolina’s Rule 702(a) now

mirrors that of the amended federal rule.” Id. (quoting State v. McGrady, 368 N.C.

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                                      STATE V. COX

                                    Opinion of the Court

880, 884, 787 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2016)). “And when the General Assembly adopts language

or statutes from another jurisdiction, ‘constructions placed on such language or

statutes are presumed to be adopted as well.’ ” McGrady, 368 N.C. at 887, 787 S.E.2d

at 7 (quoting Sheffield v. Consol. Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 427, 276 S.E.2d 422, 437

(1981)).

      Rule 702(a) provides:

           If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist
           the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
           in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
           experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
           of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:
               (1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.
               (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
           methods.
               (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods
           reliably to the facts of the case.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2023). Federal and state jurisdictions alike allow

an expert to testify generally. On this issue, the 2000 Advisory Committee Notes to

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 state:

           Yet it might also be important in some cases for an expert to
           educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever
           attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the
           case. . . The amendment does not alter the venerable practice of
           using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general
           principles. For this kind of generalized testimony, Rule 702
           simply requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testimony
           address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted
           by an expert; (3) the testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony
           “fit” the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000 Advisory Committee Notes).

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                                    STATE V. COX

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Here, the expert witness Dagenhart testified generally about the clinical

meaning of the term “grooming” in the abuse process, delayed reporting of abuse, and

common grooming practices, all of which were relevant to the jury’s understanding of

issues in the case. Under the above criteria in the 2000 Advisory Committee Notes,

Dagenhart’s general testimony on each of these issues was appropriate to give the

jury necessary information to understand the testimony and evaluate it.          First,

Dagenhart was qualified by the trial court as an expert in grooming practices, delayed

reporting, and forensic interviewing, among other things. These areas are outside of

common knowledge, thus expertise can assist the factfinder. Based on the Record

before us, there is no evidence Dagenhart’s testimony was not reliable. Moreover, the

Defendant did not object or call into question Dagenhart’s testimony at trial. Finally,

Dagenhart’s testimony clearly fits the facts of the case. During the State’s case in

chief, Margaret repeatedly used the term “grooming” to describe Defendant’s abusive

behaviors toward her and identified specific behaviors she believed were grooming.

She further testified she had learned about the term grooming and how to identify

potential grooming when she was training to be a lifeguard, and that knowledge had

helped her understand Defendant’s abuse. Defendant questioned Margaret on cross-

examination regarding her delay in disclosing the abuse.           Thus, Dagenhart’s

testimony explained important general concepts of abuse to the jury that were

relevant to the case.   Therefore, consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

Dagenhart’s general testimony was admissible under N.C. Rule of Evidence 702(a).

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                                      STATE V. COX

                                   Opinion of the Court

Consequently, the trial court did not err by admitting Dagenhart’s testimony.

   IV.      Possible Penalty Argument

         Defendant argues the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection to

defense counsel stating a guilty verdict on any of the charges would be a life sentence

for Defendant during closing argument. “Ordinarily, the control of jury arguments is

left to the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court’s rulings thereon will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Jones,

339 N.C. 114, 158-59, 451 S.E.2d 826, 850 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 115

S.Ct. 2634, 132 L. E. 2d 873 (1995) (citations omitted). Abuse of discretion may be

found “only upon a showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have

been the result of a reasoned decision.” Jones, 347 N.C. at 213, 491 S.E.2d at 653

(citation omitted).

         “In jury trials the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the

jury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-97 (2023). Our Supreme Court has interpreted this

provision to mean “[c]ounsel may. . . read or state to the jury a statute or other rule

of law relevant to such case, including the statutory provision fixing the punishment

for the offense charged.” State v. Lopez, 363 N.C. 535, 539, 681 S.E.2d 271, 274 (2009)

(quoting State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 273, 204 S.E.2d 817, 829 (1974)). However,

counsel may not do so in a way that asks the jury “to consider the punishment as part

of its substantive deliberations[.]” State v. Wilson, 293 N.C. 47, 57, 235 S.E.2d 219,

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                                     STATE V. COX

                                   Opinion of the Court

225 (1977). These rules “are meant to assure that the evidence a jury hears and

considers is reliable.” Lopez, 363 N.C. at 541, 681 S.E.2d at 275.

      Here, during closing argument, defense counsel told the jury “conviction of any

of these charges will practically be a life sentence. . . You know, the judge can’t give

probation. These sentences are all—[.]” At that point, the State objected, and the

trial court sustained the objection and struck the argument. Unlike the cases above

and those relied on in the parties’ briefs, in this case defense counsel did not read the

statute nor attempt to give a precise sentence range for each offense for which

Defendant was charged.       In fact, defense counsel did not frame the potential

punishment in terms of years, but rather in terms of its impact on Defendant—that,

based on Defendant’s age, a conviction on any of the charges would effectively mean

he would spend the rest of his life in prison.

      Rather than merely informing the jury of the statutory penalties associated

with the charges, defense counsel implied Defendant should not be convicted because

the punishment would be severe—in other words, “counsel was asking the jury to

consider the punishment as part of its substantive deliberations and this he may not

do.” Wilson, 293 N.C. at 57, 235 S.E.2d at 225. Thus, defense counsel’s statement

improperly commented upon the statutory punishment to sway the jury’s sympathies

in its substantive deliberations. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by sustaining the State’s objection to the statement.

                                     Conclusion

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                                 STATE V. COX

                               Opinion of the Court

      Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude there was no error in

Defendant’s trial.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges ARROWOOD and GRIFFIN concur.

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