Court Opinion

ID: 9493485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:09:35.449422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:52.154877
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his juror bias claim and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Petitioner did not “fairly present” his Sixth Amendment claim to the Ohio state courts, as well as with the majority’s disposition of Petitioner’s Brady claim.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution’s failure to timely produce evidence of the victim’s prior rape allegations violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The majority concluded that Petitioner did not fairly present his Sixth Amendment claim to the Ohio state courts and as a consequence, waived the claim for federal habeas review. A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief “fairly presents” the substance of each claim to state courts, as required, by citing applicable provisions of the Constitution, federal decisions using constitutional analysis, or state decisions employing constitutional analysis in similar fact patterns. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 606-07 (6th Cir.2000). Because Petitioner cited the Sixth Amendment in his state court appeal, and because the Ohio Court of Appeals understood that Petitioner was asserting his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness as evidenced by the language used in its opinion, I believe that Petitioner “fairly presented” his confrontation claim to the Ohio state courts. I therefore believe the majority should have reached the merits of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim.
Although the majority is correct in concluding that Petitioner procedurally defaulted on his Brady claim, a review of Petitioner’s claim is not foreclosed so long as he can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). A petitioner can generally demonstrate cause if he can present a substantial reason to excuse the default. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1994). In Murray v. Carrier, the Supreme Court stated that “the existence of cause for procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” 477 U.S. 478, 486-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Thus, inef*688fective assistance of counsel can constitute cause.1 See id.
Petitioner argues that the refusal of his appellate counsel to raise a Brady violation on his direct appeal resulted in ineffective assistance of appellate counsel thereby constituting cause for the procedural default. Although tactical choices regarding issues raised on appeal are properly left to the sound professional judgment of counsel, see United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir.1990), based upon the factual circumstances of this case, and the lack of overwhelming evidence against Petitioner, it was below the objective standard of reasonableness for appellate counsel not to raise a Brady violation on Petitioner’s direct appeal.
As the record indicates, the two prior allegations of rape did not come to light until after the first day of trial. The victim alleged that she had been raped by her girlfriend’s boyfriend in April of 1988 and by a thirty-eight year old man in June of 1988. Due to the untimely disclosure of this evidence by the government, Petitioner was unable to determine the veracity of the victim’s allegations. As a result, the trial court refused to allow the prior rape allegations into evidence to impeach the credibility of the victim because under the Ohio Rape Shield Law, the prior rape allegations could not be brought out at trial unless they were false. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02(D). Because Petitioner’s appellate counsel was aware of the untimely disclosure by the government and the resulting prejudicial repercussions to Petitioner, it was objectively unreasonable for Petitioner’s appellate counsel not to raise a Brady claim on direct appeal. Petitioner’s appellate counsel thus rendered ineffective assistance of counsel constituting cause to excuse the default. See Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that appellate counsel who failed to raise a Brady claim rendered petitioner ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 486-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639.
Turning to the actual prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice standard, it is well established that a prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence that is favorable and material to the issue of guilt violates a defendant’s right to due process. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Here, the record does not allow for a determination of whether Petitioner was actually prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to raise the Brady claim because the record is insufficient to determine whether the prior rape allegations were false. Defense counsel did not request an in camera hearing. However, had an in camera hearing been requested and had it yielded a finding that the alleged victim’s rape allegations against two other men were false, then a Brady violation occurred because Petitioner was denied the use of “evidence that [could have been] used to impeach the credibility of a witness[,]” see Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir.1999), thus resulting in actual prejudice to Petitioner. Inasmuch as it is not possible to determine the veracity of the victim’s prior rape allegations on the record before us, I would remand to the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to *689determine whether the prior rape allegations were in fact false. If so, Petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to raise the Brady violation claim, thereby providing a sufficient basis to excuse his procedural default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
In addition, if the prior rape allegations were found to have been false, I would find Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser was violated but for this Court’s recent holding in Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 735-40 (6th Cir.2000). In a case such as this, where the physical evidence is far from compelling, and the determination of guilt or innocence turns upon the credibility of the victim and the accused, it is all the more important that a defendant have the right to confront his accuser.
For the foregoing reasons, I would conditionally grant the habeas petition by ordering the Petitioner’s release unless the State on remand conducts an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prior rape allegations were actually false. If the rape allegations are proven false, Petitioner’s application for the writ should be granted and a new trial ordered.

. The Supreme Court recently held that when a petitioner relies upon an ineffectiveness of counsel claim as cause to excuse his procedural default, the ineffectiveness of counsel claim must itself have been exhausted before the state courts in order to comply with the commands of Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, — - —, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 1591-92, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). In the case at hand, pursuant to Petitioner's Murnahan motion, he presented his claim that his appellate counsel grossly erred in failing to raise his Brady claim to the trial court; he appealed that decision to the Ohio Court of Appeals; and filed an application for leave to appeal the court of appeals decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, but his application was denied. Therefore, Carpenter has been satisfied in that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. See 529 U.S. at —, 120 S.Ct. at 1592.