Court Opinion

ID: 9849988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:30.398585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.960731
License: Public Domain

Rodman, J.,
concurring in result: This cause has been considered on two prior appeals. In the 'appeal from the judgment of nonsuit (245 N.C. 687), it was decided that the prior recordation of the deed to defendant made a prima jade case of ownership and in the absence of evidence which would invalidate the deed to defendant, plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
I understand the decision on the first appeal (244 N.C. 313) to hold that all of the evidence given by the witnesses offered' by plaintiff for the purpose of invalidating the deed to defendant is competent and, when so considered, the evidence is not as a matter of law sufficient to defeat the title vested in defendant by prior registration of the deed from the common source.
Plaintiffs, at the hearing before Judge Frizzelle, offered for the purpose of establishing their superior title the identical testimony considered by this Court When the case was here in 1956 (244 N.C. 313). No other evidence was offered. The evidence is not subject to differing inferences which a jury might draw therefrom. The effect *496to <be given to that testimony is a matter of law. We held in effect that it was not, when all was considered/, sufficient to establish plaintiffs’ superior title. Since the evidence on which plaintiffs now rely has in effect been adjudged insufficient to establish plaintiffs’ superior title, it follows, I think, that the conclusion reached by Judge Frizzelle is correct. Hence I vote to affirm.
Bobbitt, J., dissenting. In Hayes v. Ricard, 245 N.C. 687, 97 S.E. 2d 105, this Court affirmed a judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered at the elose of plaintiffs’ evidence. Thereafter, plaintiffs, under G.S. 1-25, commenced the present action.
The former, and present actions are essentially the same. There is substantial identity as to the respective parties and the pleadings raise the same issues. Indeed, to invoke G.S. 1-25, there must be such identity.
“The time is extended because the new action is considered as a continuation of the former action, and they must be substantially the 'Same, involving the same parties, the same cause of action, and the same right; and this must 'appear from the record in the case, 'and cannot be shown by oral testimony.” McIntosh, N. C. Practice & Procedure, § 126; Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N.C. 514, 518, 35 S.E. 2d 623, and cases cited.
A motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit under G.S. 1-183 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 512, 73 S.E. 2d 320; Gantt v. Hobson, 240 N.C. 426, 431, 82 S.E. 2d 384. The sole adjudication made by a judgment of involuntary non-suit is that the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain plaintiff’s alleged cause of action. The purpose of G.S. 1-25 is to afford the plaintiff ¡an opportunity, upon a new trial, to offer evidence in addition to that offered in the first trial and thereby cure the deficiency on account of which the judgment of involuntary non-suit was entered.
“It seems to be settled in this jurisdiction that a judgment of non-suit is not res judicata as to a second action unless it is made to appear that the second action is between the same parties, on the same cause of action, and upon 'Substantially the same evidence.” Pemberton v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 188, 90 S.E. 2d 245, and cases cited. As stated by Denny, J., in the Pemberton case: “. . . the evidence to be considered on such motion (.to dismiss on the .ground that a judgment of nonsuit in a former action was res judicata) may not be limited to the evidence that was .adduced in the former trial, but contemplates a consideration of all the evidence adduced in support of the allegations of the respective complaints. It is only by a consideration of all such *497evidence that the court may determine whether 'or not the evidence in both trials was substantially the .same.” Hence, in the Pemberton case, it was held -that the motion to dismiss, if made prior -to the hearing of the evidence at .the trial of the second action, was premature.
As stated by Higgins, J., in opinion on said prior appeal: “After introducing the Ricardi deed, ‘for the purpose of attack’ the plaintiffs offer nothing by way of attack. They contend the deed on its face, regardless of the time of registration, is insufficient to' defeat the plaintiffs’ title.” Absent evidence to support plaintiffs’ allegations that the Ricard deed was without consideration and was never delivered, this Court held plaintiffs’ evidence insufficient. The primary -question now is whether plaintiffs are entitled to attack the Ricard deed by offering evidence to support their .allegations that it was in fact without -consideration and was never delivered.
The judgment of Judge Frizzelle is based solely on his finding or ruling that the prior judgment of involuntary nonsuit estopped plaintiffs from offering evidence upon trial of the present action to attack the Ricard deed. The ground assigned for this finding or ruling is that plaintiffs had opportunity to offer such evidence upon trial of the former action but did not do so. This, in my opinion, is -a misapprehension of the applicable law. The judgment should be vacated and the cause remanded for trial. S. v. Grundler, 249 N.C. 399, 402, 106 S.E. 2d 488, and cases cited.
We are not concerned with the procedure where a judgment which, ■in terms, adjudicates the respective rights and liabilities of the parties, is pleaded as res judicata. A judgment of involuntary nonsuit, as indicated above, does not so adjudicate. Where a judgment of invol-tary nonsuit is pleaded as res judicata, the approved practice is to proceed to trial. When the evidence has been introduced, then, but not until then, the court determines whether the evidence offered by plaintiff is substantially the same -as that offered at the trial in which the judgment of involuntary nonsuit was entered. Pemberton v. Lewis, supra, and cases cited.