Court Opinion

ID: 9698537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:52:52.564252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.760864
License: Public Domain

JON P. WILCOX, J.
¶ 74. {dissenting). I join the majority opinion insomuch as it holds that an officer's subjective belief that his or her safety or the safety of others is in danger is not a prerequisite to a valid *34protective search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Majority op., ¶ 30. I also agree with the majority that "[b]ecause an objective standard is applied to test for reasonable suspicion, a frisk can be valid when an officer does not actually feel threatened by the person frisked or when the record is silent [regarding the officer's actual belief]." Majority op., ¶ 23. I also agree with the majority that there should not be a per se rule justifying a search anytime an individual places his hands in his pockets contrary to police orders. Majority op., ¶ 48.
¶ 75. However, I agree with Justice Crooks' dissent and would hold that under the totality of the circumstances present in this case there were sufficient articulable, objective facts to provide the arresting officer with a reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been armed. See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶ 33, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795; State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 209, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995).
¶ 76. The pertinent inquiry in a Terry analysis is whether under the totality of the facts present, the officer could reasonably suspect that the individual with whom he is dealing is armed. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209. As the Court in Terry stated: "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. As noted by the majority, if objectively, a reasonable person would suspect that a person is armed, the individual officer's subjective belief is inconsequential. Majority op., ¶ 23. An officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. A reasonable belief is not even required; all that is required is that *35the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209.
¶ 77. Utilizing the above standards I would hold that the search of the defendant was justified under the totality of the circumstances present at the time the defendant was frisked. In evaluating the reasonableness of the search, the court must "look to the totality of the circumstances known to Officer [Rivera] in determining whether an officer in his position would reasonably suspect that [Kyles] might be armed." Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209-10. This court in Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211-12, held that the fact that a search is conducted in a "high crime" area is one factor to be considered in evaluating the legitimacy of a search. In Morgan, we found the search to be reasonable where the officer characterized the area as " 'a fairly high-crime-rate area.'" Id. at 212-13. Further, in State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 77, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999), the court noted that the high-crime reputation of the area where the search was conducted constituted a factor contributing to the legitimacy of the search. Here, the officer described the area as "pretty active" in terms of criminal activity. Thus, the location where the stop occurred here is a factor supporting the reasonableness of the search.
¶ 78. This court has also recognized that the time of day when the stop occurs is a relevant factor to consider. In McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 20, we noted that an increasing number of assaults on police officers occur between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. See also, Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211 (accord). In McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 32, this court stated that "[w]e have consistently upheld protective frisks that occur in the evening hours .. . ." Here, the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was pulled over at approxi*36mately 8:45 p.m. on December 23. Therefore, the time of day when the defendant was frisked is a factor supporting the reasonableness of the search. Further, in McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 32, we recognized that "at night, an officer's visibility is reduced by darkness and there are fewer people on the street to observe the encounter." Here, while there was testimony that the intersection where the stop occurred was well lit in one of the corners, the area where the stop occurred was a dark area. Given the time of night, this is an additional factor that supports the legitimacy of the search.
¶ 79. Moreover, this court has recognized that overt nervousness is a factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a search. Id., ¶ 29; Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 214. While the arresting officer testified that the defendant was nervous, he stated that the defendant was not unusually nervous. However, the majority agrees with the State that the defendant's nervousness needs to be evaluated in light of the defendant's actions in repeatedly placing his hands in his pockets. Majority op., ¶ 57. Further, the majority aptly notes that " 'an otherwise inexplicable sudden movement toward a pocket or other place where a weapon could be concealed [or] an otherwise inexplicable failure to remove a hand from a pocket[]'" is a factor that oftenjustifi.es a frisk. Majority op., ¶ 42 n.33 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a) (3d. ed. 1996)). In McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 37, this court explained that "during the course of the frisk, McGill kept reaching for his pockets, despite being told by the officer not to. . . . [This fact,] combined with his twitchy hand movements and his general nervousness, reinforced the officer's reasonable belief that the defendant was concealing something, perhaps a weapon, in that pocket." We stated that McGill's *37twitchy hand movements and nervous behavior "in particular justified the officer's suspicions about the presence of a weapon and supports the reasonableness of the frisk." Id., ¶ 31.
¶ 80. The majority notes that the defendant repeatedly placed his hands inside his pockets in a "nervous habit," as he walked towards the back of the vehicle, even after the officer directed the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. Majority op., ¶ 70. The majority recognizes the need of law enforcement officials to see the hands of individuals with whom they are dealing and notes that this concern is heightened when individuals refuse to comply with an officer's request to remove their hands from their pockets. Majority op., ¶ 41. Given that the defendant here repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets in a nervous fashion during a four to eight second interval — more than enough time to brandish and fire a handgun — this factor weighs heavily in favor of the legitimacy of the search.
¶ 81. Finally, when asked about whether he could see a bulge in the defendant's coat, the officer stated that the coat was "so fluffy you couldn't see the bulge." The State argues and the majority agrees that the fact the defendant was wearing a large fluffy coat is a factor to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances present. Majority op., ¶ 53. The fact that the defendant was wearing a coat large enough to conceal a weapon without exhibiting a visible protrusion supports the reasonableness of the search.
¶ 82. While each factor the majority identifies may not, by itself, be sufficient to justify the search, each factor weighs in favor of finding that the search was reasonable. Here, the officer confronted two individuals in a pretty active crime area at night in a *38relatively dark portion of an intersection. The defendant was wearing a coat that was large enough to conceal a weapon without any visible protrusion. The defendant was walking to the rear of the vehicle and disregarded the officer's directions by repeatedly placing his hands inside his pockets in a nervous fashion over a four-to-eight-second interval. I believe that "[a] reasonably prudent officer in possession of these facts would be warranted in the belief that his suspect may be armed and presently dangerous." McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 33.
¶ 83. The only factor weighing against the legitimacy of this search is that the officer did not consider the defendant to be "menacing." Majority op., ¶ 71. However, as the majority discusses at length, this factor is not dispositive. Majority op., ¶ 39. The majority states that "[w]e are not persuaded that the two key factors emphasized by the State, the size of the overcoat and the defendant's placement of his hands in his pockets. . . were sufficient to create [a] reasonable suspicion. . . that the defendant was armed and dangerous." Majority op., ¶ 72. However, regardless of what factors the State "emphasized," I believe that under the totality of the circumstances, the following factors taken together validate the search: 1) the late hour of the day; 2) the relative darkness of the area where the search occurred; 3) the amount of criminal activity in the area; 4) the defendant's nervousness; 5) the defendant's persistent disobedience of police orders by placing his hands in his pockets as he approached the rear of the vehicle; and 6) the fact that the defendant's coat was large enough to conceal a weapon without any visible indication of such.
*39¶ 84. The fact that the search here was justified is apparent because this court in Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 215, upheld a search under more benign conditions:
In Morgan, two officers on patrol at 4 a.m. in what was described as a "fairly high-crime area" observed a car driving in and out of an alley. The car had expired license plates, and the officers pulled it over. The driver was unable to produce his license and appeared nervous. We upheld the officers' decision to frisk the driver based upon the totality of those facts.
McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 25. Applying the objective Terry analysis, I would hold that there were sufficient facts to provide the arresting officer with a reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been armed. McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶ 33. Under the totality of circumstances present here, an individual in Officer Rivera's position would reasonably suspect that Kyles might have been armed. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209-10.
¶ 85. For the reasons discussed, I dissent.
¶ 86. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this dissenting opinion.