Court Opinion

ID: 9833484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:45:11.0841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:03.385965
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
All parties perfected an appeal in this case, and each has filed motion for rehearing.
We overrule the motion of appellant J. B. Atkinson for a rehearing.
We grant in part, and overrule in part, the motion of Leeper-Curd Lumber Company, hereinafter referred to as lumber company. It is granted to the extent of allowing said lumber company to recover a personal judgment against J. B. Atkinson for the full amount of its account sued upon for material furnished with which to construct *288the residence under the contract in question. Our holding that the lumber company failed to plead an equitable assignment of such fund or debt as became due Jackson Bros, from Atkinson on the contract as the work on the building progressed was error. Our holding may be excused, if such excuse is necessary, by reason of the fact that the lumber company did not brief this proposition, and for the further reason.that, in arguing the case on submission, we may have erroneously inferred that no such judgment was sought, since it was admitted that Atkinson was insolvent. However, the lumber company now rightfully contends that it have such judgment. The pleading on this issue is as follows:
“That thereafter the said defendant Jackson Bros, made a contract with the plaintiffs, through their said local manager, for lumber and building materials to be furnished for the construction of said residence, and agreed with the plaintiffs that as work progressed the owner, to wit, J. B. Atkinson, should make payments out of the amounts accruing and due to said defendants contractors, direct to these plaintiffs in payment for such lumber and building materials to be furnished by these plaintiffs. And thereafter their said local manager conferred with the said defendant Atkinson with reference to said agreement on the part of Jackson Bros., and the said Atkinson consented and agreed thereto.”
The jury found on this issue as follows:
“That Jackson Bros, verbally agreed with H. S. Willey, local manager of the Leeper-Curd Lumber Company, that J. B. Atkinson would pay direct to Leeper-Curd 'Lumber Company, for all lumber and building material furnished and to be furnished to Jackson Bros., by Leeper-Curd Lumber Company for the construction of the Atkinson residence.”
Such pleading and finding of fact by the jury conclusively establishes an equitable assignment to the lumber company of so much of the fund or debt as became due Jackson Bros, on the building contract as is necessary to pay the account in.full, since it was ascertained by this trial that Atkinson owed Jacks on Bros, as a balance on the contract and for extras/more than enough to pay the entire demand of the lumber -company. The rule is well established that an equitable assignment of a specific fund in the hands of a third person creates an equitable property in such fund. The fund assigned need not be actually in being, if it exists potentially. The following authorities conclusively support the lumber company’s claim for judgment: Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) vol. 3, § 1280, pp. 2559 to 2563; section 1283, pp. 2566 and 2567; Beaumont Lumber Co. v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. 180; Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery et al., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 181, 27 S. W. 828.
It is further decreed, in view of this holding, that Leeper-Curd Lumber Company do have judgment against J. B. Atkinson for the sum of $1,110.20 (the amount of the judgment obtained by said lumber company against Jackson Bros.), with interest thereon at the legal rate from and after November 10, 1922 (the date of the judgment of the trial court); and it is further decreed that, if -J. B. Atkinson shall pay or-- is forced to pay this judgment, or any part of it, that the amount of such payment shall be credited upon the judgment rendered herein in favor of Leeper-Curd Company against Jackson Bros.; and it is further decreed that the judgment herein rendered in favor of Jackson Bros, against J. B. Atkinson for the sum of $1,466.90, be and the same is hereby reformed so as to allow a recovery of the sum of $336.95, with interest from and after November 10, 1922, at the legal rate, being the balance due on the building contract and for extras, less the interest on the $573 for extras, from October 19, 1921, to November 10, 1922, and less the sum of $1,110.20, the'amount of the judgment obtained by Leeper-Curd Lumber Company against Jackson Bros, and J. B. Atkinson.
Jackson Bros.’ motion for a rehearing is granted in part and in part overruled. This court’s judgment in excluding at least a part of the interest allowed by the trial court upon the judgment rendered in favor of Jackson Bros, against J. B. Atkinson was erroneous. We held that all of the interest allowed by the court upon this judgment was not recoverable eo nomine, but as damages, and as such should be excluded because not supported by the verdict of the jury which found the amount Jackson Bros, were entitled to- recover. As to a part of the interest allowed, this holding is incorrect.
Jackson Bros.’ judgment consisted of two items, being the sum of $821.86 as a balance due upon the written building contract, and the sum of $573 allowed by the jury as the reasonable and fair price of labor and material as extras agreed upon to complete the building contract. As to the item of $821.86, being the balance found to be due on the written contract, “ascertaining the sum payable,” interest is recoverable eo nomine under the provisions of article 4977, Revised Statutes 1911. This being true, the court was authorized to allow interest upon the amount of the balance due on the contract without submitting the question of the amount of interest to the jury. A mere mathematical calculation would ascertain the amount of interest due. Our judgment excluding the interest upon the judgment in favor of Jackson Bros, against J. B. Atkinson is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court allowing interest is affirmed to the extent of allowing a recovery of interest at the legal rate upon the sum of $821.86, from October 19, 1921 (the date of the acceptance of the building by Atkinson), until the date of *289judgment; otherwise our judgment excluding a recovery of interest on said judgment is affirmed. City of San Antonio v. Marshall (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 S. W. 315; Ripley v. Wenzel (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 897.
Interest on the item of $573, being the amount found by the jury to be due Jackson Bros, for extra labor and material agreed upon, and not being a sum ascertainable from the contract, but dependent upon extraneous proof and a finding of the jury, as to the, amount and the reasonableness and fairness of the prices charged, is not recoverable eo nomine but as damages for wrongfully withholding payment of such sum. The contract authorized the extras, hut it did not fix the price to be paid therefor-. To the contrary it provided that the contractor would be paid for such extras a reasonable and fair price, without regard to the price fixed by the contract for work or material of a similar nature, said price to he determined by the parties. Where the question is the amount of the recovery of a sum .payable, which has been wrongfully withheld, except in the instances provided by statute, as on open account, or on a written contract “ascertaining the sum payable,” interest cannot be allowed thereon from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the date of judgment, in absence of a finding of the jury awarding interest as a part of the damages in such .case. The rule is applicable to special issue verdicts. The Verdict on special issues as to the amount recoverable constitutes the sole basis of the judgment, and the trial court is not authorized to add thereto damages not included in such verdict. This court had occasion to pass upon this question recently in the case of James 0. Davis, Agent, v. J. P. Morris, 257 S. W. 328, in which case we followed the rule announced by the Supreme Court in the cases cited in support of our opinion discussing this question. The following cases, cited by Jackson Bros., by which they seek to invoke the aid of the provisions of article 1985, Revised Statutes, as to presumptive findings of fact by trial judges in special issue cases, are not applicable to the point raised in this case. The question of the amount of the damages was not submitted to the jury in these cases, but merely the facts from which the trial court could ascertain and estimate the damages, and interest being an element of the damages, if prayed for, was rightfully assessed. Ry. Co. v. Erwin (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 662; City of San Antonio v. Pfeiffer (Tex. Civ. App.) 216 S. W. 207.
Jackson Bros, also earnestly insist that we were in error in holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion of law that the lot or premises on which the residence was constructed constituted the homestead of J. B. Atkinson and wife at the time the contract was executed. It is agreed that we properly state the law applicable to designations of a homestead; but it is insisted that the only acts of preparation on the part of J. B. Atkinson and his wife evidencing their intention to occupy the premises and the residence constructed thereon as a homestead came after the date of the contract in question. To this contention we do not agree. The record discloses testimony of sufficient acts of preparation on the part of Atkinson and wife, which coupled with their intention to occupy the premises as a home so soon as a suitable residence could be erected, as would impress it with the homestead character, before the execution of the contract with Jackson Bros. The testimony shows that some time prior to the date of the executio.n of the contract Atkinson and wife selected from a book of some character the kind of house they desired to build on the premises in question as their home. A little later they employed Moore Construction Company, a firm of architects at Brownwood, Tex., to come to Coleman, Tex., and make a survey of the lot preparatory to making such fill or grades as would be necessary in order to fit the building selected on the lot, and preparatory to making plans and specifications for the construction of the house selected on said lot. Still later, Atkinson went to Brownwood for the purpose of paying the architects their $60 fee for drawing the plans and specifications, and inspect a similar residence to the one they were preparing to construct. At a still later date, Atkinson asked for competitive bids for the construction of this residence in accordance with the plans and specifications made by Moore Construction Company, at which time Jackson Bros., so far as the record shows, first came on the-scene as bidders for the contract. It seems that all bids were rejected, but that at a later date Jackson Bros. were, awarded the contract to construct the building in accordance with the plans and specifications, with certain addenda thereto. Such acts of preparation before the execution of the contract are sufficient to impress the lot or premises in question with the homestead character. There is no hard and fast rule laid down by the authorities as to what specific acts of preparation, coupled with an intention to occupy the premises, are necessary to impress them with the homestead character; but it has been held by the Supreme Court, in the cases cited in our opinion, that the planting of shade trees, or' the digging of a well on vacant lots or premises are sufficient acts of preparation to occupy in the future as will impress such premises with the homestead characjer. That being true, we can see no material distinction in such acts of preparation to occupy and in the acts of preparation -just detailed in 'this case. The survey of the lot to ascertain the necessary fills or grades to be made in order to erect the build*290ing selected thereon, the preparation of the plans and specifications in accordance with the survey, the seeking of competitive bids on said plans and specifications were all acts of material value in the preparation of the lot to receive the building desired to be erected for the future use as a home by Atkinson and his wife. We especially think the 'acts detailed sufficient to constitute the necessary preparations looking forward to the future occupancy of the premises as a home, in view of -the holding of the court in the case of Sanguinett & Staats v. Colorado Salt Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 150 S. W. 490 (writ of error denied by the Supreme Court), to the effect that the architect was entitled to a constitutional mechanic’s lien upon the building constructed for his services.
. The motions are overruled, except as above stated.
Overruled in part, and in part, granted.