Court Opinion

ID: 9958650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 19:09:28.125144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:33.061168
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lorraine, 2024-Ohio-1343.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    CASE NO. 2023-T-0040

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                  Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

PAMELA J. LORRAINE,
                                                  Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00251
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                               OPINION

                                     Decided: April 9, 2024
                               Judgment: Affirmed in part, remanded

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

James R. Eskridge, Megargel, Eskridge, & Mullins, LLP, 231 South Chestnut Street,
Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Pamela J. Lorraine (“Lorraine”), appeals her conviction for

robbery, a felony of the third degree, from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.

        {¶2}     On March 5, 2022, Lorraine and her son, Steven Lorraine, entered Menards

in Bazetta Township in Trumbull County. During the visit, the two were observed by loss

prevention officers through the store’s video security system. The officers watched

Lorraine place a video camera in her purse and then watched her son place a phone
charger in his pants. Lorraine placed several other items in a shopping cart, and the pair

exited the store without paying for the items.

       {¶3}   Upon leaving, the loss prevention officers approached Lorraine and her son.

One of the officers asked Lorraine, who exited first, to look in her purse. When the officer

attempted to retrieve the camera from Lorraine’s purse, she pushed him away. According

to transcripts, not knowing who the loss prevention officer was, Lorraine’s son then “took

swings” at the officer, knocking his glasses off.

       {¶4}   Lorraine was indicted on April 26, 2022, on one count of robbery, a felony

of the second degree. On February 27, 2023, Lorraine entered a guilty plea to an

amended indictment of robbery, a felony of the third degree. A sentencing hearing was

held on May 24, 2023, where Lorraine was sentenced to a prison term of 30 months plus

fines and costs. Lorraine now timely appeals her conviction.

       {¶5}   In her initial brief, appellant raised the following assignments of error:

       [1.] “Appellant’s plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to

       ineffective assistance from her trial counsel, who allowed her to enter a plea of

       guilty despite there being no factual basis to support a finding of guilty.”

       [2]. “The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to a near-maximum term of

       imprisonment.”

       {¶6}   Appellant subsequently sought leave to file a supplemental brief and raised

the following additional assignment of error: “The portion of sentence imposed by the trial

court that prohibits Ms. Lorraine’s participation in any program designed to shorten her

sentence was contrary to law.”

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       {¶7}   Lorraine’s first assignment of error contends that she did not give her guilty

plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to the ineffectiveness of her trial counsel,

because there was no factual basis to support a finding of guilt.

       {¶8}   Lorraine asserts the reason she did not enter her plea of guilty knowingly,

intelligently, or voluntarily is because her trial counsel did not advise her that the State

did not have enough facts to support a finding of guilty.

       {¶9}   Lorraine’s first assignment of error is framed as a knowingly, voluntarily,

intelligently accepted guilty plea error. However, the analysis of the issues raised under

Lorraine’s first assignment of error asks this Court to review the sufficiency of the

evidence and the effectiveness of Lorraine’s trial counsel.

              ‘A guilty plea “is a complete admission of the defendant’s
              guilt.” State v. Bradley, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0070,
              2018-Ohio-1671, ¶ 6, quoting Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Therefore, a
              guilty plea “precludes a defendant from appealing the merits
              of the conviction, such that a defendant cannot claim that the
              facts do not support the conviction.” Id., citing State v. Siders,
              78 Ohio App.3d 699, 701, 605 N.E. 2d 1283 (11th Dist. 1992).’

              By knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty
              plea, appellant waived the right to require the State to prove
              each and every element of the offense * * * beyond a
              reasonable doubt. See Crim.R. 11(C)(2). As this was a guilty
              plea, the trial court was not required to determine whether a
              factual basis existed to support the plea prior to entering
              judgment. See Bradley at ¶ 7. This is because appellant’s plea
              of guilty to each and every element of the offense “provides
              the necessary proof of the elements of the crime and sufficient
              evidence to support the conviction.” Id., quoting State v.
              Isabell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-06-152, 2004-Ohio-
              2300, ¶ 16.

State v. Crew, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0028, 2021-P-0029, 2021-P-

0030, 2022-Ohio-752, ¶ 17.

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       {¶10} Lorraine does not deny that she committed a theft offense. “The element of

force (or harm) differentiates robbery from theft.” State v. Muncy, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2011-A-0066, 2012-Ohio-2830, ¶ 19. Lorraine contends that her theft did not rise to the

level of a robbery. In Lorraine’s brief, counsel asserts, “[t]he state’s factual basis did not

allege that Ms. Lorraine used or threatened the use of force against another in committing

a theft offense as is required by R.C. 2911.02(A)(3).” However, Lorraine waived her ability

to appeal sufficiency when she entered her guilty plea, and the trial court was under no

obligation to determine if a factual basis existed to support the plea. Crew, supra at ¶ 17.

       {¶11} A guilty plea also precludes an appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel,

with an exception to where a plea was not given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

State v. Cleavenger, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0036, 2020-Ohio-73, ¶ 18.

              ‘As a general proposition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
              stated that “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of
              events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Id.,
              quoting State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d
              351, 1992-Ohio-130 (citation omitted). “Consequently, if a
              criminal defendant admits his guilt in open court, he waives
              the right to challenge the propriety of any action taken by the
              court or counsel prior to that point in the proceeding unless it
              affected the knowing and voluntary character of the plea. This
              also includes a waiver of any action which may have resulted
              in a ‘deprivation’ of a constitutional right that did not affect the
              knowing and voluntary character of the plea.” Id. (Citation
              omitted).

              ‘The mere fact that, if not for the alleged ineffective assistance
              of counsel, the defendant would not have entered a guilty plea
              is not sufficient to establish the requisite connection between
              guilty plea and the ineffective assistance. * * * Rather,
              ineffective assistance of trial counsel is found to have affected
              the validity of a guilty plea when it precluded a defendant from
              entering his plea knowingly and voluntarily.’ State v. Bean,
              11th Dist. No. 2008-G-2839, 2009-Ohio-682, at ¶ 11, citing
              State v. Madeline, 2002-Ohio-1332, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS

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              1348, at *10 (citations omitted); State v. Smith, 11th Dist. No.
              2007-T-0076, 2008-Ohio-1501, at ¶ 27 (citation omitted).

State v. Davies, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-121, 2009-Ohio-2793, ¶ 8-9.

       {¶12} Lorriane’s contention that she would not have entered a guilty plea if not for

the ineffective assistance of counsel is not enough to establish that her plea was not given

knowingly and voluntarily. Id.

       {¶13} “T]his [C]ourt reviews de novo whether the trial court accepted a plea in

compliance with Crim.R. 11. State v. Dundics, 2016-Ohio-1368, 62 N.E.3d 1013, ¶ 10

(11th Dist.).” State v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, 175 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.).

       {¶14} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) provides in relevant part:

              (2) In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of
              guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally *
              * * and doing the following:

              (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
              voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
              and of the maximum penalty involved * * *.

       {¶15} During the February 27, 2023 plea hearing, the following exchange

occurred as the trial court explained to Lorraine what the State was required to prove:

              THE COURT: I have before me a Finding of a Guilty Plea to
              an Amended Indictment charging you with Robbery, a felony
              of the third degree. Is that your signature?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

              THE COURT: Anyone make promises to get you to plead
              guilty here today?

              THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

              THE COURT: * * * If this case were to proceed to trial, the
              State would have to prove what you did, in attempting or
              committing a theft offense, or in fleeing immediately after the
              attempt or offense, did use or threaten the immediate use of
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Case No. 2023-T-0040
              force against another, here in Trumbull County, Ohio. The
              penalty for this offense is 9, 12, 18, 24, 30, or 36 months and
              up to a $10,000.00 fine. Do you understand that?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

       {¶16} During the sentencing hearing held on May 24, 2023, this additional

exchange occurred when Lorraine began to deny that she stole anything from Menards

on May 5, 2022:

              THE DEFENDANT: * * * I did not steal. They got no
              merchandise off me. I was not looking – like, if you see the
              video, I had a party light –”

              THE COURT: Well, ma’am, that is irrelevant at this point in
              time because you have pled guilty to Robbery, a felony of the
              third degree. * * *

              THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

              THE COURT: Are you contesting it? Do you not want to plead
              guilty?

              THE DEFENDANT: No.

       {¶17} The record shows that the trial court accepted Lorraine’s guilty plea in

compliance with Crim.R. 11. Lorraine’s plea was given knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily. Therefore, Lorraine’s first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶18} Lorraine’s second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when

it sentenced Lorraine to the “near-maximum term of imprisonment.”

       {¶19} This Court noted recently in State v. Lamb, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2022-P-

0084, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 9-10:

              R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and
              provides, in relevant part, that after an appellate court’s review
              of the record, it ‘may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
              sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate
              the sentence and remand * * * if it clearly and convincingly
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              finds * * * [t]hat the sentence is * * * contrary to law.’ R.C.
              2953.08(G)(2)(b); State v. Meeks, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.
              2022-A-0060, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11.

              A sentence is contrary to law when it is ‘in violation of statute
              or legal regulations’ * * *.” Meeks at ¶ 11, quoting State v.
              Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649,
              ¶ 34. Thus, ‘“[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does not
              fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court
              fails to consider the purposes and principles of felony
              sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing
              factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.”’ State v. Shannon, 11th Dist.
              Trumbull No. 2020-T-0020, 2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 11, quoting
              State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705,
              2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 74; see also State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake
              No. 2017-L-028, 2017-Ohio-7127, ¶ 18.

       {¶20} Lorraine contends in her brief that her son received “only three years of

probation for the same conviction arising from the same event.”

       {¶21} The appellate court is precluded from reweighing the evidence in the record

and supplanting its judgment for that of the trial court:

              [T]he Ohio Supreme Court recently held that * * * ‘R.C.
              2953.08(G)(2)(b) * * * “does not provide a basis for an
              appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its
              view that the sentence is not supported by the record under
              R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”’

State v. Stanley, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0039, 2021-Ohio-549, ¶ 10, citing State

v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39.

       {¶22} R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 lay out the overriding principles and

purposes factors for felony sentencing.

       {¶23} R.C. 2929.11 provides in relevant part:

              (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be
              guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The
              overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the
              public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish
              the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
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Case No. 2023-T-0040
              offender using the minimum sanctions that the court
              determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an
              unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.
              To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall
              consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring
              the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
              offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense,
              the public, or both.

              (B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably
              calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony
              sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section,
              commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of
              the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and
              consistent with sentences imposed for
              similar crimes committed by similar offenders. * * *

       {¶24} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court explained:

              The Court has considered the overriding principles and
              purposes of felony sentencing and has further considered all
              relevant seriousness and recidivism factors contained in
              2929.11 and 2929.12. The Court finds that the Defendant has
              prior felony convictions and a lengthy misdemeanor record.
              The Defendant has been on community control and probation
              on multiple occasions for the past 20 years. The Defendant
              was placed in Drug Court for her last felony conviction in 2018.
              Defendant was negatively terminated and sentenced to prison
              on that offense. The Defendant has served a prior prison term.
              The offender is a high risk to re-offend. A prison term is
              proportional to the Defendant’s conduct. A prison term is
              consistent with similarly situated offenders.

       {¶25} The trial court further explained “[t]he Court has reviewed the presentence

investigation prepared by the Adult Probation Department and the record.”

       {¶26} R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require the trial court to consider factors

relevant to the offender, the offender’s conduct, the offender’s likelihood to reoffend, and

other factors as applied to the offender being sentenced. Lorraine’s assertion would have

the appellate court consider the required statutory factors as applied to her son in

comparison to hers, based on the single offense at hand. Not only is Lorraine’s assertion
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Case No. 2023-T-0040
outside of the scope of what the law permits, she is essentially asking this Court to go

outside the record and reweigh the factors supplanting this Court’s judgment for the

judgment of the trial court. We are precluded from doing so by App. R. 12(A)(1)(b) of the

rules of appellate procedure and Jones, supra ¶ 42. Lorraine’s presentence investigation

report indicates that she has a lengthy criminal history, and the sentence given is well

within the statutory range for the offense. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial

court’s sentence is contrary to law. Therefore, Lorraine’s second assignment of error is

without merit.

       {¶27} In appellant’s supplemental assignment of error, she alleges a portion of

her sentence, which prohibits her participation in any program designed to shorten her

sentence, is contrary to law.

       {¶28} Specifically, appellant asserts that she has been prohibited from

participating in the programs wherein she could earn credit toward her sentence in

accordance with R.C. 2967.193 (A)(2). Appellant concedes that she is not eligible to earn

credit under R.C. 2967.193(A)(3) due to her conviction.

       {¶29} R.C. 2967.193 (A)(2) provides in relevant part:

                 [A] person confined in a state correctional institution or placed
                 in the substance use disorder treatment program may
                 provisionally earn one day or five days of credit, * * * toward
                 satisfaction of the person's stated prison term, * * * for each
                 completed month during which the person, if confined in a
                 state correctional institution, productively participates in an
                 education program, vocational training, employment in prison
                 industries, treatment for substance abuse, or any other
                 constructive program developed by the department of
                 rehabilitation and correction with specific standards for
                 performance by prisoners or during which the person, if
                 placed in the substance use disorder treatment program,
                 productively participates in the program.

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Case No. 2023-T-0040
       {¶30} R.C. 2967.193 authorizes the department of rehabilitation and correction to

determine a prisoner’s eligibility to earn credit, to calculate the amount of credit earned,

to award that credit to the prisoner, as well as to reduce credits previously earned upon

a violation of prison rules. State v. Livingston, 2014-Ohio-1637, 9 N.E.3d 1117, ¶ 7 (1st

Dist.). See State v. Caputo, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2014-L-010, 2015-Ohio-4829, ¶ 10. R.C.

2967.193 does not provide the judiciary with a role in determining eligibility. Id. However,

a sentencing court does have the authority to determine a defendant’s eligibility to be

placed in an intensive prison program under R.C. 5120.032(B)(1)(a). A trial court can also

disapprove a defendant’s transfer into a transitional control program. Livingston at ¶ 7–9.

       {¶31} The sentencing provision at issue is as follows:

              “The Defendant is not permitted to participate in any
              Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections early release,
              transitional control, alternative housing placement, or any
              other program currently run by the Department of
              Rehabilitation and Correction or developed in the future
              designed to shorten the sentence imposed by this Court.”

       {¶32} Appellant asserts that she has been prohibited from participating in the

programs pursuant to R.C. 2967.193(A)(2) based on this language. In the instant case,

the trial court prohibits appellant’s participation in any program “designed to shorten the

sentence imposed.” This language would necessarily include the earned credit program.

While appellant is not guaranteed to be declared eligible for earned credit, the trial court

is without the authority to prohibit participation.

       {¶33} However, a review of the transcripts from the sentencing hearing

establishes that while the trial court stated, “[t]he Defendant shall not be placed on any

programming to be eligible for any early release,” the trial court also advised appellant at

sentencing:
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Case No. 2023-T-0040
              “You may be eligible one or five days of credit for each
              completed month for which you productively participate in an
              education program, vocational training, employment in prison
              industry, treatment for substance abuse and any other
              constructive program developed by the Ohio Department of
              Corrections. However, these credits are not automatically
              awarded but must be earned.”

       {¶34} This language mirrors the language contained in R.C. 2967.193(A)(3).

However, this advisement was not included in the sentencing entry.

       {¶35} “It is well settled that courts possess the authority to correct errors in

judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth. State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995),

74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163–164, 656 N.E.2d 1288; Crim.R. 36.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio

St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 18. A trial court may use nunc pro tunc

entries “to make the record reflect what the court actually decided and not what the court

might or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.” Id. citing State v.

Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 15; Crim.R. 36.

       {¶36} Because the trial court did advise appellant of the possibility of the earned

credit program at sentencing, we conclude that her sentence is not contrary to law.

However, upon review of the record, the trial court’s sentencing entry does not reflect

what the trial court decided and announced at appellant’s sentencing hearing regarding

the potential for earned credit. Therefore, this matter is remanded for the trial court to

include in its entry the language pursuant to R.C. 2967.193(A)(3) which was announced

at sentencing.

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       {¶37} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County

Court of Common Pleas, but remand for correction of the sentencing entry consistent with

this opinion.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

JOHN E. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

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