Court Opinion

ID: 9536401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:59:23.490749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:25.222850
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
TSUKIYAMA, C. J.
On the basis of the evidence in this case, I find it impellent to express my disagreement with the court in respect to the specific issue of contributory negligence.
The position which I take is compatible with the theory advocated and advanced by the majority in Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203, and by the minority in the rehearing of that case, 48 Haw. 22, 395 P.2d 365.
Upon examination and analysis of the evidence, I am persuaded to the conclusion that the instant case is perceptibly much stronger than the Young case insofar as it bears on the issue of contributory negligence. Here, the testimony of plaintiff was that she had full knowledge for a period of four months of the existence of the road-shoulder defects which allegedly caused her to fall and injure herself, and that because of such awareness, when she left her home on the particular evening, she deliberately wore low-heeled sandals. Plaintiff further testified that *548she walked out at night “very infrequently,” but admitted she did walk in front of the Donald Duck about twenty-six times at night.1
There is no quarrel with the general accepted rule of law that where a motion for a directed verdict is interposed, if the evidence and inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom are such that reasonable persons in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment may reach different conclusions upon the issue of negligence or contributory negligence, the motion should be denied and the issue submitted to the jury. Such pronouncement has been repeatedly made by this court. The difficulty which has confronted the courts lies in the proper application of this principle to the peculiar facts of each case. Human judicial tribunals are not endowed with the power of divina*549tion and cannot with mathematical precision predetermine whether or not reasonable persons viewing the same state of facts may reach different conclusions. The element of speculation is inescapable.
Courts are, therefore, prone to take the easy way out, so to speak, by laying undue emphasis upon the theory that reasonable men might reach different conclusions.
Obviously, the courts in every jurisdiction have been plagued by the difficulty of resolving the factual aspects of the question of contributory negligence as indicated by the inextricable contrariety of rulings in respect to the application of the law governing the submission of the issue to the jury.
In the case at bar, the record does not disclose any evidence as to who constructed the roadshoulder which leads to the parking area under the control of the Donald Duck Drive Inn. Ostensibly, the opening from Hapiolani Boulevard, a public highway, into the area is to accommodate the customers by serving as a means of ingress and egress to and from the restaurant. Incidentally, it appears that the motoring public also enters the area for the purpose of making temporary stops or turn-arounds. There is a dearth of evidence that defendant, the City and County of Honolulu, constructed the roadshoulder or even tended the same; nor is there any evidence that any other person has been injured at or near the same place or that any complaint has even been made to the city. While the absence of such evidence does not as a matter of law affect the degree of care required of a city to keep public roads, sidewalks and roadshoulders in a reasonably safe condition, it does bear upon the question of whether or not it had actual or constructive notice of defects.
The city government owns hundreds of miles of sidewalk areas, both improved and unimproved and interspersed with roadshoulders and private driveways. It *550would be an unconscionable burden on the city to be required to keep them immaculately free from all holes and depressions. A municipality is not an insurer against accidents upon public roadways and byways.
Upon the record it appears that the instant case proceeded on the issue, among others, of whether or not defendant was negligent in not maintaining the particular roadshoulder in a reasonably safe condition. Evidently, the parties did not overtly controvert the question of defendant’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the alleged defects but left the same to inferences drawn from the general circumstances disclosed by the evidence.
It is well established that, though the city disclaims actual knowledge, the city can be charged with constructive knowledge or notice of defects. Where defects patently dangerous are allowed to remain unattended for an unreasonable length of time, the city must answer for the consequences of the neglect. Where, however, as in this case the alleged defects consisted of visible cracks on a roadshoulder used primarily to serve the customers of a private restaurant and where the person claiming damages for personal injuries admits that she had full knowledge of the defects over a period of four months, the conclusion is impelling that her own inattention, tantamount to negligence, contributed proximately to her fall and consequent injuries. It is as much a pedestrian’s duty to exercise reasonable precaution to avoid injury as it is the city’s to keep public areas in a reasonably safe condition.
The principle of law which governs the degree of care required of defendant applies equally to plaintiff. The degree of care as a matter of law does not change, but the amount of care necessary to constitute ordinary or reasonable care varies with the particular factual circumstances of each case. See Kellett v. City and County, 35 Haw. 447.
*551It is noted that plaintiff, here, lived in an apartment house adjacent to the Donald Duck Drive Inn and that on the particular evening when she left home wearing low-heeled shoes, the weather was dry and the street light near the roadshoulder was on. It is also observed that the exhibits in evidence show that the entire length and breadth of the roadshoulder was not bespattered with holes, but there were visible holes or cracks scattered over a few spots and the remaining areas were patently free from defects.
As stated, in negligence cases the degree of care required remains fixed, the law being predicated upon the reasonably prudent man rule. But the amount of care required varies for it is a fair presumption that a reasonably prudent man with a background of familiarity with particular hazai’ds existing on a roadway would exercise a greater amount of care by circumventing the known hazardous spots. There is no indication that plaintiff, here, exercised or endeavored to exercise any greater amount of care. She testified: “Well, I was walking along Kapiolani Boulevard on the shoulder of the road where the sidewalk would be if there was one. I walked around the fence that separated the apartment house from Donald Duck Drive Inn, and there were a lot of cars in the Drive Inn, and I walked in a line — I was behind the cars on the shoulder of the road, and I caught my foot in the hole and fell, and I hit my head and my side.”
The foregoing observation finds support in the fact that the trial court, seemingly concerned at the state of the evidence, instructed the jury as follows: “A pedestrian traveling at night, with knowledge of defects in the way, is required to use care in proportion to the danger; and when he has a choice of a safer way, due care for his own protection requires that it should be taken.”
It is my view that the issue of plaintiff’s contributory *552negligence should have been resolved by the court as a matter of law and that the rejection of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was error. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the court’s holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to direct a verdict in favor of defendant. I concur, however, in the court’s determination of the remaining issues involved in this appeal.

 Tr. pp. 189-190:
“Q You told us, Mrs. Chambers, that ever since you moved to 2832 or 2838 Kapiolani Boulevard that you were aware of the holes in the pavement, is that correct?
“A Yes, I was.
“Q And that is for approximately four months ?
“A Yes. That is why I quit wearing high heels.
“Q On how many occasions would you say you walked in front of Donald Ducks to get to and from your property?
“A I walked there quite frequently but very infrequently at night.
“Q Very infrequently at night?
“A Yes.
“Q How many times is very infrequently?
“A Not very often.
“Q How many times?
“A I don’t know how many times but not once a night.
“Q Fifty?
“A I lived there four months. I don’t know if I did go out walking very often at night.
“Q Fifty times too much?
“A Yes, I would say so.
“Q About 25?
“A That is better. Probably that.
“Q Twenty-six?
“A All right, 26.
“Q And you were quite aware of the holes and the lumpty condition? “A Yes, I was.
“Q That night were you paying any attention to the holes?
“A Yes, I was but it was dark and the black top was black, and there were so many holes that I fell in one.”