Court Opinion

ID: 9927341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 20:08:28.01737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:06.923735
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion
                           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    KATHRYN ABBOTT; AND ANDREW                            No. 84439
                    DODGSON-FIELD,
                    Appellants,
                    vs.                                                      FILED
                    CITY OF HENDERSON, AN AGENCY
                    AND/OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF
                    THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                  CLERK pt.
                    Respondent.
                                                                             CA,EF DEPU1 f CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a negligence
                    action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                    The702Firm and Michael C. Kane and Bradley J. Myers, Las Vegas,
                    for Appellants.

                    Nicholas G. Vaskov, City Attorney, and Wade B. Gochnour and Brandon P.
                    Kemble, Assistant City Attorneys, Henderson,
                    for Respondent.

                    BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

                                                    OPINION

                    By the Court, BELL, J.:
                               In Boland v. Nevada Rock & Sand Co., this court set out the
                    test for determining when an owner or occupant of land is protected frorn
                    liability for another's recreational use of that land under NRS 41.510. 111
                    Nev. 608, 611, 894 P.2d 988, 990 (1995). In that opinion, we determined
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                 NRS 41.510's protections applied to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential"
                 property.   Id. at 612, 894 P.2d at 991.    Later that year, the legislature
                 amended NRS 41.510 to apply to "any premises." We now recognize that

                 Boland has been superseded by statute to the extent Boland limited NRS
                 41.510's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. As
                 to the underlying case, we hold the district court properly found that the
                 park was covered by NRS 41.510's protection and that Appellant Kathryn
                 Abbott was engaged in a recreational activity at the time of her injury on
                 the property. We also conclude the Abbotts failed to present evidence to
                 establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Respondent
                 City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a
                 dangerous condition.     Therefore, we affirm the district court's order
                 granting summary judgment in favor of Henderson.
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                             In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott slipped while assisting her
                 youngest child on the slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson. A rubber surface,

                 called Pour-in-Place, surrounded the slide at the park playground. Abbott
                 asserts the adjacent sand was not raked level to the Pour-in-Place, exposing
                 a 90-degree drop-off of about four inches from the edge of the Pour-in-Place
                 to the ground. This drop-off was created when the original slide at Vivaldi
                 Park was replaced in 2012: Henderson employees did not bevel the edge of
                 the new Pour-in-Place to slope gently to the ground. Abbott alleges that the
                 steep drop-off of the Pour-in-Place caused her to fall and fracture her leg in
                 multiple places.
                             Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field. (collectively,

                 Abbott), filed a complaint against the City of Henderson, alleging negligence
                 arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. In its
                 answer, Henderson asserted an affirmative defense of immunity pursuant
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                    to NRS 41.510. Henderson later moved for summary judgment, asserting
                    various grounds for immunity.        In its motion, Henderson relied on
                    depositions from numerous park employees demonstrating Henderson's
                    comprehensive plan for park maintenance, including daily, weekly, and
                    monthly visits to inspect the parks for necessary repairs. Abbott opposed,
                    relying on those same depositions to demonstrate Henderson's willful
                    creation of the drop-off hazard and its knowledge that the sand meant to
                    mitigate the risk created by this drop-off was routinely and easily displaced
                    from the lip of the Pour-in-Place, exposing a trip hazard.
                                The district court found Henderson was immune from suit
                    under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and granted
                    Henderson's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the district court
                    rejected Abbott's arguments that as a residential playground, Vivaldi Park
                    fell outside the purview of NRS 41.510; Abbott's use of the playground was
                    not a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute; and Henderson acted
                    willfully when it created the drop-off and failed to properly maintain the
                    sand as necessary. Abbott appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
                    remanded. We granted Henderson's subsequent petition for review under
                    NRAP 40B and now vacate the court of appeals' order.
                                                   DISCUSSION
                                Nevada's recreational use statute provides that "an owner of
                    any estate or interest in any premises, or a lessee or an occupant of any
                    premises, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others
                    for participating in any recreational activity . . . ." NRS 41.510(1). We have
                    previously held that for the statute to apply, "(1) respondents must be the
                    owners, lessees, or occupants of the premises where [the injury took place];
                    (2) the land where [the injury took place] must be the type of land the
                    legislature intended NRS 41.510 to cover; and (3) [the injured party] must
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                have been engaged in the type of activity the legislature intended NRS
                41.510 to cover."    Boland, 111 Nev. at 611, 894 P.2d at 990.           NRS

                41.510(3)(a)(1) provides an exception to immunity where landowners
                participate in "[w]illful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a
                dangerous condition, use, structure or activity."      Because Henderson's

                ownership of the park was uncontested, we consider whether the district
                court properly concluded that Vivaldi Park is the type of property covered
                by the statute, that Abbott's activities qualified as recreational activities,
                and that Henderson did not intentionally create a hazard constituting
                willful conduct.

                Standard of review
                            This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Wood
                v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary
                judgment is only appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light
                most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to
                any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
                of law. Id.; see NRCP 56(a). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, Martin
                v. Martin, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 520 P.3d 813, 817 (2022), as are questions
                involving statutory interpretation. Webb u. Shull, 128 Nev. 85, 88, 270 P.3d
                1266, 1268 (2012).
                The plain text of NRS 41.510 prouides no limitation on the type of land
                appropriate for protection
                            In two published opinions, this court has considered the type of
                land the legislature intended to cover under NRS 41.510. First, in Brannan
                v. Nevada Rock & Sand Co., this court considered a landowner's liability for
                injuries suffered when a plaintiff rode a motorcycle in "an uninhabited area

                of desert." 108 Nev. 23, 24, 823 P.2d 291, 291-92 (1992). In Brannan, this
                court applied the statute to occupiers of "open land." Id. at 25, 823 P.2d at
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                    292. In 1995. in Boland, this court considered an injury that occurred in a
                    small mining basin and engaged in a land-type analysis, concluding "the

                    intent of the legislature is that the property be used for recreation." 111
                    Nev. at 612, 894 P.2d at 991.      This court then held that to establish
                    immunity under NRS 41.510, "the type of property should be rural, semi-
                    rural, or nonresidential." Id.

                                After the Boland decision, the legislature made two significant

                    changes to the text of NRS 41.510. First, the legislature expanded the kinds
                    of owners eligible for immunity from "an owner, lessee or occupant of
                    premises" to "an owner of any estate or interest in any premises, or a lessee
                    or an occupant of any premises." 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 311, § 1, at 790.
                    Second, the legislature expanded the list of eligible recreational activities
                    from nine covered activities to at least twenty. Id. These changes remain
                    in effect in the current statute. See NRS 41.510.
                                When the legislature alters a statute, that alteration "must be

                    given effect by the courts." Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Just. Ct. of Reno Twp.,
                    64 Nev. 138, 164, 178 P.2d 558, 571 (1947). By its plain text, NRS 41.510
                    now applies to "any premises." See Young v. Nev. Garning Control Bd., 136
                    Nev. 584, 586, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020) ("[W]e will interpret a statute or
                    regulation by its plain meaning unless the statute or regulation is
                    ambiguous."). Accordingly, we determine that the statute has superseded
                    Boland's land-type limitations holding, and we now clarify that NRS 41.510
                    protections can apply to any premises.
                                Abbott's assertion that the land at issue must be undeveloped
                    is belied by the plain language of the statute, which expressly contemplates
                    immunity for injuries caused by structures. See NRS 41.510(1) (providing

                    that landowners owe no duty to protect or warn recreational users of "any

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                hazardous condition, activity or use of any structure on the premises"); see
                also Valenti v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 131 Nev. 875, 879, 362 P.3d

                83, 85 (2015) (holding when a statute's plain meaning is clear, this court
                will not go beyond the text). Given the plain language of the statute, the
                district court properly concluded that Vivaldi Park is a premises included
                in NRS 41.510's statutory protections.
                Abbott was engaged in a recreational activity when she injured herself at
                Vivaldi Park
                            While the legislature did not include any limiting language
                with respect to the type of land eligible for protections, it did enable other
                constraints to immunity, namely, limiting protections to injuries incurred
                during participation in a "recreational activity." The legislature defined
                Cirecreational activity" through a nonexhaustive list:

                                  (a) Hunting, fishing or trapping;
                                  (b) Camping, hiking or picnicking;
                                  (c) Sightseeing or viewing or enjoying
                            archaeological, scenic, natural or scientific sites;
                                  (d) Hang gliding or paragliding;
                                  (e) Spelunking;
                                  (f) Collecting rocks;
                                  (g) Participation in winter sports, including
                            cross-country skiing, snowshoeing or riding a
                            snowmobile, or water sports;
                                  (h) Riding animals, riding in vehicles or
                            riding a road, mountain or electric bicycle;
                                  (i) Studying nature;
                                  (j) Gleaning;
                                  (k) Recreational gardening; and

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                                   (1) Crossing over to public land or land
                             dedicated for public use.
                   NRS 41.510(4).
                             We are convinced walking and assisting a child playing on a
                   playground is similar to picnicking, hiking, riding a bicycle, and crossing
                   over public land. Courts in several other jurisdictions have concluded that
                   walking is a recreational activity sufficient to provide recreational use
                   protections.' Likewise, Curran v. City of Marysville concluded a child's
                   "playground activity" was a recreational activity sufficient for protections
                   in consideration of "the ever broadening effect of the Legislature's
                   amendments to the statutory language." 766 P.2d 1141, 1143-44 (Wash. Ct.
                   App. 1989).     Federal circuit courts have similarly suggested that
                   recreational activities are defined broadly.2 See Leigh-Pink v. Rio Props.,
                   LLC, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 48, 512 P.3d 322, 328 (2022) (where "the plain
                   language of a statutory term is in accord with the term's definition at
                   common law, we elect to interpret them similarly"). Finally, the Nevada
                   Legislature made clear through both the plain text and legislative history

                         1See Wringer v. United States, 790 F. Supp. 210, 212-13 (D. Ariz.
                   1992); Lewis v. City of Bastrop, 280 So. 3d 907, 910 (La. Ct. App. 2019);
                   Richard v. La. Newpack Shrimp Co., 82 So. 3d 541, 546 (La. Ct. App. 2011);
                   Moskalik v. Mill Creek Metroparks, 50 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015);
                   Lasky v. City of Stevens Point, 582 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
                         2See Palmer v. United States, 945 F.2d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991)
                   (determining that a plaintiff who entered a park to watch his
                   granddaughter's soccer game exuded behavior "consistent with relaxation
                   and recreation," such that Hawaii's recreational use statute applied);
                   Schneider v. United States, Acadia Nat'l Park, 760 F.2d 366, 368 (1st Cir.
                   1985) (concluding that drinking coffee was a recreational activity for
                   purposes of Maine's recreational use statute; reasoning that la]ny number
                   of clearly recreational activities suggest themselves, from bird-watching to
                   sunbathing, to playing ball on the beach").
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                      that the enumerated list is expansive. See Hearing on A.B. 313 Before the
                      Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Leg. (Nev., Apr. 6, 1995) (emphasizing
                      the nonexhaustive nature of the list). Accordingly, we conclude that Abbott
                      was engaged in "recreational activities" as contemplated by NRS 41.510.
                                 Abbott's suggested application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
                      or the principle that words are known by the company they keep, does not
                      change our conclusion. To the extent principles of noscitur a sociis support

                      a reading of "recreational activity" as one that requires undeveloped space
                      or use of land in its natural state, that reading is contravened by the express
                      text of the statute, which contemplates immunity for injuries associated
                      with the "use of any structure on the premises." NRS 41.510(1). Walking
                      or assisting a child playing on a playground would be considered
                      recreational both under the comrnon law and under interpretations of
                      analogous recreational use statutes from other jurisdictions. We see no
                      reason to depart from these authorities.       Walking or assisting a child
                      playing on a playground constitutes a recreational activity under NRS

                      41.510. We therefore agree with the district court that the land at issue is
                      eligible for protection and Abbott's activity fits within the meaning of
                      "recreational activity."
                      Henderson did not willfully or maliciously fail to guard against the
                      dangerous condition
                                  Otherwise immune entities are nevertheless liable where they
                      participate in "willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a
                      dangerous condition, use, structure or activity." NRS 41.510(3)(a)(1). This
                      court has determined willful or malicious conduct is "intentional wrongful

                      conduct, done either with knowledge that serious injury to another will
                      probably result, or with a wanton or reckless disregard of the possible
                      result." Boland, 111 Nev. at 612-13, 894 P.2d at 991 (quoting Davies v.
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                       Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 769, 602 P.2d 605, 609 (1979)). Willfulness is generally
                       a question of fact; however, where plaintiffs present no evidence of willful
                       conduct, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 613, 894 P.2d at 992.
                                    Abbott argues that Henderson willfully created the hazardous
                       condition.   Yet, willful conduct with respect to the baseline condition
                       necessary for injury is not the same as willful failure to guard against the
                       hazard. See, e.g., Kendall v. State, No. 64550, 2015 WL 1441865, at *3 (Nev.
                       Mar. 26, 2015) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding)
                       ("The record shows merely that Kendall willfully drove the vehicle and does
                       not suggest, to any degree, that he willfully or maliciously crashed the
                       vehicle or otherwise caused darnage."); In re Breen, 30 Nev. 164, 176, 93 P.
                       997, 1000 (1908) (stating where a lawyer intentionally criticized the court,
                       he did not "willfully or maliciously" bring the court into disrepute).
                                    Willfulness, here, requires "a design to inflict injury." Crosman
                       r. S. Pac. Co., 44 Nev. 286, 301, 194 P. 839, 843 (1921); see also Mitrovich v.
                       Pavlovich, 61 Nev. 62, 67, 114 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1941) (finding no willful
                       conduct when the defendant crashed the car he was driving, even though
                       the defendant lacked a driver's license, had only driven twice in his life
                       before, and had never driven on a highway). Here, Abbott failed to present
                       admissible evidence that Henderson had such a design.              Henderson
                       maintains the park: workers go to each of Henderson's parks daily to pick
                       up trash and perform regular upkeep, a park facilities maintenance person
                       inspects each park weekly, and a certified playground inspector visits each
                       playground monthly to make any necessary repairs. Contrary to Abbott's
                       assertion, the evidence before the district court demonstrated that
                       Henderson exercised some level of care with respect to the park, and Abbott
                       failed to provide any evidence of a design to cause an injury or a reckless

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                disregard to the risk of injury. See Bearden v. City of Boulder City, 89 Nev.
                106, 110, 507 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1973) ("To be wanton such conduct must be
                beyond the routine.").
                             Additionally, Abbott presented no evidence of any prior
                accidents related to the unbeveled surface, although the surface had been
                in place for over seven years. In the face of Henderson's maintenance
                procedure and the lack of any evidence that Henderson willfully or
                maliciously created a dangerous condition, no genuine dispute of material
                fact remained, and Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
                Thus, the district court properly granted sumrnary judgment in favor of
                Henderson.
                                               CONCLUSION
                             The plain text of NRS 41.510 contains no land-type limitation.
                To the extent Boland suggested otherwise, we hold Boland is superseded by
                statute. Thus, the district court properly concluded that NRS 41.510's
                protections applied to Vivaldi Park. Additionally, the district court properly
                concluded that walking and assisting a child on a park playground are
                recreational activities under the statute.        Finally, Abbott failed to
                demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City

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                of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a
                dangerous condition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
                court.

                We concur:

                                           , rl
                Cadish

                                                  J.
                Stiglich

                                                  J.
                Pickering

                                                  J.
                Herndon

                                                  J.

                 4A-A                             J.
                Parraguirre

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