Court Opinion

ID: 9679938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:13:31.296736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:23.280741
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
As a general rule, appeals from terminations of term contracts are governed by Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 11.13 (Vernon 1991), *161which requires a complainant to exhaust any administrative remedies where there are disputed fact issues. Mitchison v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 S.W.2d. 769, 773 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). This Court in Mitchison noted that nothing in the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act prohibits a board of trustees from discharging a teacher for cause during the term of the contract. Id. at 773 (citing Tex.Educ. Code Ann. § 21.210 (Vernon 1972) (current version at (Vernon 1987)).
I find nothing in the record which indicates that the Board was acting beyond the scope of its authority in discharging Washington. At the very least, there is a question of fact which must be appealed to administrative authorities before it goes to the courts. Mitchison, 803 S.W.2d at 772 (citing Garcia v. San Juan, Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., 513 S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd, n.r.e.)). Also, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the Education Code must be read in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure And Texas Register Act (APTRA). Texas Education Agency v. Cypress Fairbanks I.S.D. and Lyford I.S.D., 830 S.W.2d. 88, 90 (Tex.1992) (citing Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, sec. 19(a) (Vernon Supp.1992), repealed by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 268, sec. 46(1), eff. Sept. 1, 1993). Although APTRA was repealed by the Legislature in 1993, the essence of the holding remains unaffected due to several of the Act’s relevant provisions being incorporated into the Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2001.171-2001.202 (Vernon Supp.1994).
The Government Code now clearly requires a person aggrieved by an agency decision to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.171 (Vernon Supp.1994). Further, § 2001.174 lists agency errors that may be corrected after exhaustion of administrative remedies, including decisions in violation of statutory provisions, those made upon unlawful procedure, and those made in excess of statutory authority. See Cypress Fairbanks I.S.D., 830 S.W.2d. at 90 (citing Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, sec. 19(e) (Vernon Supp.1992), repealed by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 268, sec. 46(1), eff. Sept. 1, 1993). Given the above, it seems equally clear that the legislature not only anticipated the type of complaint at issue here, but also provided explicit guidance on the procedure to be followed.
The majority holds that Washington raised a federal claim which would give the trial court jurisdiction. Her original petition alleged denial of “due process” in addition to her other allegations. However, she did not allege a “federal” due process violation, nor did she allege a Section 1983 violation as required by this court in Mitchison. See Mitchison, 803 S.W.2d at 773.
Washington also alleges she had no opportunity to amend her pleadings after Appellee filed its plea to the jurisdiction. I note that time to amend must have been available to Washington because she had time to file a written response to the plea, but for some reason failed to amend the pleadings.
In regard to Justice Draughn’s concurring opinion, I agree in principal that the trial court should not have dismissed “with prejudice.” However, that issue is not before us. No complaint is made by Appellant, therefore, error if any is not raised.
Given the above, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.