Court Opinion

ID: 9962918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 07:20:27.777418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:57.414231
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed April 19, 2024

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00761-CR

                  LAQUONCY DESHARD ELLIS, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court
                           Kaufman County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 21-10841-86-F

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
                           Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Laquoncy Deshard Ellis appeals his conviction for evading arrest with a

vehicle.   Appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense, and a jury assessed

punishment at thirty-eight years’ confinement. In a single issue, appellant argues

the trial court abused its discretion by allowing testimony during the punishment

phase of trial concerning an unadjudicated extraneous offense to support an

enhanced punishment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      In November 2021, appellant was charged by indictment with evading arrest

with a vehicle. At trial in July 2022, appellant entered a guilty plea, and the case
proceeded to a jury trial on punishment. Kaufman County sheriff’s deputy William

Kennedy testified he was conducting patrol just after midnight on September 9,

2021. Kennedy attempted to initiate a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle after

observing appellant had a confirmed expired registration and “was swerving back

and forth within the lane of traffic he was in.” As soon as Kennedy, in his clearly

marked police vehicle, turned on his lights, appellant sped up. Per policy, Kennedy

requested and received authorization from his supervisor to begin a pursuit and,

utilizing lights and siren, followed appellant at speeds in excess of a hundred miles

per hour. During the chase, Kennedy observed appellant throw what appeared to be

a gun and “two, possibly three bags of powder” out the passenger side window. The

audio radio communications and visual dash cam recordings of the pursuit were

published to the jury after being offered and admitted without objection. Appellant

was detained and subsequently arrested after the vehicle came to a forced stop due

to highway construction.

       While pausing the dash cam video, the prosecutor elicited Kennedy’s

testimony that, after the pursuit, he learned he “had prior dealings with [appellant] a

little bit before that.” Specifically, Kennedy testified that “Terrell PD was involved

with a pursuit” of appellant a “couple months before”; there was a “be on the

lookout” for appellant, and Kennedy spotted him; and “Terrell PD attempted to stop

[appellant] and he fled.” Appellant did not object to this testimony and established,

through limited cross examination, that this was the only prior direct dealing

                                         –2–
Kennedy had with appellant. At the conclusion of the punishment phase, the jury

sentenced appellant to thirty-eight years’ confinement. This appeal followed.

      In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing Kennedy to testify “that he suspected the [appellant] committed another

extraneous offense and bad act without the support of even an arrest warrant” and

asserts Kennedy’s testimony did not “meet the standard of evidence beyond a

reasonable doubt.”

      To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present “to the trial

court a timely request, objection, or motion” stating the specific grounds for the

desired ruling if not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). In fact,

almost all error—even constitutional error—may be forfeited if the appellant failed

to object. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Because

appellant did not raise his objection to Kennedy’s testimony at trial, he presents

nothing for this Court to review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

      Even if we were to address appellant’s argument that Kennedy’s testimony

did not establish Kennedy’s “prior dealings” with appellant relative to the prior

pursuit, we review rulings on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of

discretion standard. Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

We will find a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence to be reversible

error when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles and appellant

has been harmed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356,

                                        –3–
365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1990). Because the erroneous admission of evidence does not rise to the level

of constitutional error, we look only to see if an appellant’s substantial rights have

been affected in determining whether an appellant has been harmed by such

evidence. See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In

making this determination, we consider the entire record, including the nature of the

evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the error and its relationship to

other evidence. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We

also may consider the parties’ trial theories, the court’s instructions to the jury, and

the parties’ closing arguments. Id. We will find the error to be harmless when the

record provides us a “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had

but a slight effect.” Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365 (citation omitted).1

        Appellant’s complaint is that Kennedy’s testimony did not “meet the standard

of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jury charge at punishment instructed

the jurors as follows:

        The defendant is on trial solely on the charge contained in the
        indictment. The State has introduced into evidence acts other than the
        one charged in the indictment. With reference to those other acts, if
        any, you are instructed that said evidence was admitted only for the
        purpose of assisting you, if it does, in determining the proper
        punishment to be assessed against the defendant for the offense charged
        in the indictment. You cannot consider said testimony or evidence for
        any purpose unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

    1
     In reviewing the entire record, we note that appellant stipulated to the enhancement paragraphs for
felony assault and felony DWI. In addition, evidence was offered relative to ten prior convictions, admitted
without objection and published to the jury.
                                                   –4–
      defendant committed such other act or acts, if any were committed. If
      you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, you can consider the evidence
      only for the purpose allowed and for no other purpose.

Article 37.07, section 3(a) of the code of criminal procedure provides that the jury,

at the punishment phase, may consider extraneous offenses committed by the

defendant if the court deems them relevant to sentencing and the jury finds beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offenses. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 37.07(3)(a). Absent contrary evidence, we presume jurors

understood and followed the trial court’s instructions in the jury charge. Taylor v.

State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

      Here, appellant entered a guilty plea to the charged offense, and the charge at

punishment instructed the jury to find appellant guilty. To the extent the trial court

permitted Kennedy’s testimony concerning his “prior dealings” with appellant,

including Kennedy’s testimony that appellant “fled” from Terrell police, the charge

instructed the jury not to consider testimony or evidence of acts other than the

charged offense for any purpose unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt

that appellant committed such other act or acts. Appellant has not rebutted the

presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions in this regard. See

id. Based upon the entire record before us and the nature of the unobjected-to prior

convictions, we conclude appellant’s substantial rights were not affected by the

admission of Kennedy’s testimony. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271–73. We overrule

appellant’s single issue.

                                         –5–
      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          /Bonnie Lee Goldstein//
220761f.u05                               BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
Do Not Publish                            JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                       –6–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

LAQUONCY DESHARD ELLIS,                      On Appeal from the 86th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Kaufman County,
                                             Texas
No. 05-22-00761-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. 21-10841-86-
                                             F.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Goldstein. Justices Molberg and
                                             Pedersen, III participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 19th day of April, 2024.

                                       –7–