Court Opinion

ID: 3606089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:51:30.144987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:28.612564
License: Public Domain

The defendant was convicted in the Court of Special Sessions, in the borough of Brooklyn, of violating section 270 of the Penal Law. He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, where the judgment of conviction was reversed and he was discharged. The People, by permission, appeal to this court.
So much of the section of the Penal Law under which the conviction was obtained as is material to the question presented on appeal, reads as follows: "Practicing or *Page 342 
appearing as attorney without being admitted and registered. It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law or as attorney and counsellor-at-law for another in a court of record in this state or in any court in the city of New York, or to make it a business to practice as an attorney-at-law or as an attorney and counsellor-at-law for another in any of said courts * * * or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law as aforesaid, or in any other manner, * * * without having first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state * * *."
The defendant, at the time stated in the information, was a notary public, living at 475 Park avenue, Brooklyn, in the basement of which he had a small office for the transaction of business. Over the entrance of the office was the following sign:
        "Agency of the       |  Notary Public   |  Real Estate Operator Great Eastern Casualty Co. | Redaction of all | Loan  Insurance Broker of New York          |   Legal Papers   |   Established 1888."
On the 27th of December, 1917, one Gallo, special investigator of the state industrial commission, in company with one Geannelis, entered defendant's office and he asked them what they wanted. Gallo stated that he was selling his store, which consisted of a soda water stand, together with a stock of cigars, cigarettes, etc., to Geannelis, for a certain consideration, which was named, part of which was to be paid down and the balance in installments. Gallo also stated there was a certain amount due to the American Siphon Company on the purchase price of the soda water fountain, which Geannelis was to assume and pay. The defendant advised that Gallo give a bill of sale to Geannelis and that he give a chattel mortgage for the amount remaining unpaid. He also explained it would be necessary to file the mortgage in the county clerk's office, so that the same could be foreclosed by the city marshal in case of non-payment. *Page 343 
His suggestions as to the bill of sale and mortgage were followed and he thereupon prepared the same, for which he was paid four dollars.
It is contended that this transaction, together with the sign, amounted to a violation of the provisions of the statute quoted. I have been unable to reach this conclusion. The statute, unless something is read into it which does not there appear, is to prohibit a natural person practicing or appearing as an attorney-at-law in the courts mentioned, or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice in such courts. The defendant did neither. Clearly, the drafting of the bill of sale and chattel mortgage was not practicing or appearing as an attorney-at-law in any court. Nor did the words on the sign, "Redaction of all legal papers" indicate that he was holding himself out as entitled to practice in such courts. The words "in any other manner," upon which stress is laid, relate to what precedes them in the sentence, viz., the courts referred to. The phrase, although general in its nature, is limited and qualified by the prior specific designations. (Burks v. Bosso, 180 N.Y. 341;People v. Richards, 108 N.Y. 137.) The rule of ejusdemgeneris applies. Where the enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is held to refer to the things of the same kind. (State Board of Pharmacy v. Gasau, 195 N.Y. 197.)
At the time defendant was convicted it was not illegal, and is not now, for natural persons to draft papers usually intrusted to lawyers. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the rural districts of the state leases, deeds, bills of sale, chattel mortgages, wills and other instruments creating legal obligations are frequently prepared by laymen, notaries public and justices of the peace. Indeed, a natural person could, at the time defendant was convicted, appear for another in a Magistrate's Court, or before a justice of the peace, except in cities of the first *Page 344 
and second class, and receive pay therefor. This practice is recognized by section 271, which prohibits a person from receiving compensation for appearing as attorney in a court before any magistrate in any city of the first or second class, unless admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor in the courts of record of the state. That the legislature did not intend to prohibit such practice is apparent from the fact that at its last session it amended section 271, so that it now includes cities of the third, as well as those of the first and second class. (Laws of 1919, chap. 417.)
To give to the words "in any other manner" the legal effect suggested would prohibit a natural person anywhere in the state from drawing a legal paper of any description, or appearing in any court. This, the legislature has not yet indicated its intent to do. (See, also, People v. Title Guarantee  Trust Co.,
decided herewith.)
One of the well-settled rules of statutory construction is that statutory offenses cannot be established by implication and that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal, unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. (People v.Phyfe, 136 N.Y. 554.)
I am of the opinion that the defendant was not guilty of violating section 270 of the Penal Law; that the Appellate Division was right in reversing the conviction and discharging him; and its judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.
CHASE and COLLIN, JJ., and HISCOCK, Ch. J., in memorandum, concur with CRANE, J.; HOGAN, J., concurs with McLAUGHLIN, J.; CUDDEBACK, J., deceased.
Judgment reversed, etc. *Page 345