Court Opinion

ID: 9960082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:01:56.760433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.107039
License: Public Domain

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                  Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

                    MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL v. 1188
                     STRATFORD AVENUE, LLC, ET AL.
                              (SC 20754)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.*

                                            Syllabus

         The plaintiff financing company sought to recover damages from the defen-
            dants, a limited liability company and its principal, D, for breach of
            contract in connection with the defendants’ alleged failure to make
            payments under a motor vehicle lease agreement. After the defendants
            were defaulted for failure to appear, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s
            motion for judgment and rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff.
            Less than four months later, and more than two years after the plaintiff
            had commenced its action, the defendants moved to open and set aside
            the default judgment pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 52-212). In
            an affidavit accompanying the motion to open, D attested that the vehicle
            in question had serious defects that made it dangerous to operate and
            that the defendants had declared the lease void and returned the vehicle
            to the car dealership from which it was leased. D further attested that
            he mistakenly thought that the case had been resolved, that there were
            good defenses to the plaintiff’s action, including breach of warranties
            and misrepresentations, and that the defendants would file a counter-
            claim when the judgment was opened. The plaintiff objected, and, after
            a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to open, concluding that
            the motion had been untimely filed and had no basis. The defendants
            appealed to the Appellate Court, which acknowledged that the trial
            court incorrectly had determined that the motion was untimely but
            determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying
            the motion on the ground that it had no basis. On the granting of
            certification, the defendants appealed to this court.

         Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had
            not abused its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to open,
            and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment
            and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court’s judgment and
            for further proceedings:

           * This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this
         court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D’Auria,
         Mullins, Ecker Alexander and Dannehy. Although Chief Justice Robinson
         was not present at oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices,
         and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in
         this decision.
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               Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
         The legal standard set forth in § 52-212 (a) for opening default judgments,
         pursuant to which a movant must establish that a good defense existed
         at the time the trial court rendered judgment and that the movant was
         prevented from asserting that defense because of mistake, accident, or
         other reasonable cause, applies when the motion to open is timely filed,
         that is, within four months of the date the trial court rendered judgment,
         whereas, once that four month window has lapsed, the trial court has
         the inherent authority to open a judgment when the movant establishes
         that the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, or,
         under certain circumstances, when newly discovered evidence exists to
         challenge the judgment.

         In the present case, it was undisputed that the trial court’s timeliness
         determination was incorrect because the defendants had timely moved
         to open the judgment within four months of the date the trial court
         rendered it, and this court could not conclude that this critical error did
         not affect the trial court’s determination as to which legal standard to
         apply in ruling on the merits of the motion or did not adversely impact
         the trial court’s exercise of discretion under the proper legal standard.

         Although it was unclear which legal standard the trial court had applied
         in concluding that there was no basis for the motion to open, the trial
         court’s application of either standard constituted an abuse of its dis-
         cretion.

         Specifically, if the trial court’s decision that the motion was untimely
         led it to deny the motion on the ground that the defendants had failed
         to establish that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress, or mutual
         mistake, its decision would have been unfounded both because the
         motion was timely and there was no discussion or mention by the trial
         court of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, and if the trial court determined
         that the motion was untimely and also had no basis because the defen-
         dants had failed to satisfy the two part test prescribed by § 52-212 (a),
         then its decision would have resulted from the application of an incorrect
         legal standard, that is, the standard applicable to timely filed motions
         to open.

         Moreover, the trial court’s misapprehension of the timeliness of the
         motion impacted not only which legal standard to apply, but also its
         consideration of whether the defendants had satisfied § 52-212 (a).

         Accordingly, the trial court’s decision whether to grant the defendants’
         motion to open was founded on an improper subsidiary determination,
         namely, its erroneous determination that the defendants’ motion was
         untimely, reversal of the Appellate Court’s judgment was necessary
         because an injustice apparently occurred, and, on remand, the defendants
         were entitled to an evidentiary hearing, before a different judge with a
         correct understanding that the defendants’ motion was timely filed, at
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                   Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
             which they will have the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of § 52-
             212 (a).
                         (Two justices dissenting in one opinion)

                Argued November 15, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

                                     Procedural History

           Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
         and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
         the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the defen-
         dants were defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter,
         the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee,
         granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and ren-
         dered judgment for the plaintiff; subsequently, the court
         denied the defendants’ motion to open and set aside the
         judgment, and the defendants appealed to the Appellate
         Court, Bright, C. J., and Moll, J., with Prescott, J., dis-
         senting, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and
         the defendants, on the granting of certification,
         appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
           Daniel D. Skuret III, with whom was Patrick D.
         Skuret, for the appellants (defendants).
             Gary J. Greene, for the appellee (plaintiff).

                                           Opinion

            D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, the defendants,
         Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Ave-
         nue, LLC (company), appeal from the Appellate Court’s
         judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of their
         motion to open the judgment rendered in favor of the
         plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. On appeal, the
         defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly
         concluded that the trial court had not abused its discre-
         tion by denying their motion to open as untimely and
         with no basis, even though the defendants timely filed
         their motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the
         Appellate Court’s judgment.
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                 Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

         The Appellate Court’s opinion aptly recites the facts
       and procedural history required to resolve this appeal;
       see Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Ave-
       nue, LLC, 213 Conn. App. 739, 280 A.3d 120 (2022);
       which we summarize along with other undisputed facts
       in the record. In 2012, the defendants entered into a
       motor vehicle lease agreement (agreement) with a deal-
       ership in Fairfield for a 2013 Mercedes-Benz (vehicle).
       Dizenzo signed the agreement on his company’s behalf
       and also in his individual capacity as guarantor. The
       agreement provided that the defendants would make
       monthly lease payments to the plaintiff.
         In February, 2017, the plaintiff brought the underlying
       breach of contract action against the defendants, alleg-
       ing that they had stopped making the lease payments
       due under the agreement. Neither defendant filed an
       appearance. The plaintiff moved to default the defen-
       dants for failure to appear, which the trial court clerk
       granted. The plaintiff then moved for judgment and for
       an order of weekly payments. On May 13, 2019, the
       court granted the motion and rendered judgment for
       the plaintiff in the amount of $11,734.61, and awarded
       the plaintiff postjudgment interest at the annual rate of
       8 percent pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. The
       court further ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff
       $35 each week. The plaintiff sent a notice of this judg-
       ment to the defendants.
         Less than four months after the court rendered judg-
       ment for the plaintiff, the defendants, on July 29, 2019,
       moved to open the judgment pursuant to General Stat-
       utes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212.1 The defendants contended
       that the ‘‘vehicle continuously [had] serious defects
          1
            All references to § 52-212 are to the 2019 revision of the statute. Addition-
       ally, although the defendants titled their motion, ‘‘motion to set aside judg-
       ment,’’ and did not expressly cite any supporting legal authority, it later
       became clear that § 52-212 was the basis for their motion. The plaintiff does
       not contend otherwise.
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         with [it] which made operating it dangerous’’ and that
         the required repairs would have taken several months
         to complete. The defendants declared the lease void
         and left the vehicle with the dealer because the vehicle
         could not function properly. As a result, the defendants
         claimed that they had to expend additional funds to
         secure a replacement vehicle. The defendants further
         asserted that, ‘‘when they were sued in 2017, [they]
         mistakenly thought this matter was resolved, and [they]
         did not hear anything else until June of 2019 when [they]
         received notice of judgment.’’ The defendants further
         claimed that they ‘‘ha[d] good defenses to the plaintiff’s
         claim based on breach of warranties and misrepresenta-
         tions and [would] file a counterclaim . . . when the
         judgment is [opened].’’ The defendants supported their
         motion with Dizenzo’s affidavit, in which he repeated
         these claims essentially verbatim.
            The plaintiff objected to the motion to open, claiming
         that the defendants had neither alleged nor demon-
         strated good cause as to why the court should open
         the judgment and had failed to offer any valid defenses
         or affirmative claims against the plaintiff’s cause of
         action. The plaintiff further contended that the defen-
         dants ‘‘should not be permitted to sit on their rights for
         over two years during the pendency of this case and
         now attempt to open the judgment.’’
           Pursuant to the defendants’ request, the court con-
         ducted a hearing for the parties to present oral argu-
         ments on the motion. The court initially questioned
         whether the defendants had timely filed the motion
         to open within four months from when judgment was
         rendered, as § 52-212 requires. The courtroom clerk and
         the defendants’ counsel accurately reported to the court
         that the July 29, 2019 motion to open was filed within
         four months of the court’s rendering judgment on May
         13, 2019, and the court responded: ‘‘So, we are barely
         in time.’’ The defendants’ counsel then explained the
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              Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

       basis for the motion. Specifically, he contended that
       the defendants had taken no action in response to this
       lawsuit because the plaintiff accepted the vehicle’s
       return, the plaintiff had informed them that this action
       was not going to go forward, and the plaintiff waited
       two years to attempt to collect the judgment against
       the defendants. The defendants’ counsel further argued
       that the defendants were seeking to open the judgment
       to conduct discovery and to file a counterclaim against
       the plaintiff based on problems with the vehicle. The
       plaintiff’s counsel denied the defendants’ version of
       events, contending that the defendants’ prospective
       claims and defenses would be time barred because the
       lease agreement was signed in 2012, and their problems
       with the vehicle were immaterial because the plaintiff
       was only the ‘‘financing entity,’’ not the car dealer. When
       the court expressed concern that Dizenzo’s affidavit
       might not suffice to support the motion to open, the
       defendants’ counsel requested a one week continuance
       to present evidence at an evidentiary hearing to support
       the motion. The court did not expressly rule on the
       defendants’ request for a hearing. Rather, at the end
       of hearing, the court orally denied the motion on the
       grounds that ‘‘[i]t’s untimely and it has no basis.’’ The
       same day, the court issued a written order denying the
       motion, stating: ‘‘Motion is untimely with no basis.’’

          The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court,
       claiming, among other things, that, because their motion
       to open had been timely filed, the trial court abused
       its discretion in denying the motion. Mercedes-Benz
       Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra, 213
       Conn. App. 748, 750. The plaintiff agreed that the trial
       court incorrectly had determined that the defendants’
       motion was untimely but argued that, in denying the
       motion, the court nevertheless properly exercised its
       discretion because the defendants had failed to satisfy
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         the two part test to determine the timeliness of motions
         to open under § 52-212 (a). Id., 748–49.
            In a split decision, the Appellate Court affirmed the
         trial court’s denial of the motion to open. Id., 740, 755.
         The majority acknowledged that the trial court incor-
         rectly had determined that the motion to open was
         untimely. Id., 750. The majority nevertheless held that
         the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying
         the motion to open on the additional ground that the
         motion ‘‘ ‘ha[d] no basis’ ’’; id.; because the motion to
         open and Dizenzo’s affidavit failed to establish the sec-
         ond prong of the § 52-212 (a) test, namely, that the
         defendants’ failure to appear and raise a defense was
         excused by reasonable cause. Id., 753. Specifically, the
         majority concluded that the defendants’ mistaken belief
         that the matter was resolved did not suffice to establish
         ‘‘reasonable cause’’ to excuse their failure to take any
         action in response to the pending action. Id. Judge Pres-
         cott dissented, contending that the trial court’s
         improper timeliness determination likely tainted its
         decision on the merits of the motion to open and that
         it was unclear which standard the trial court had applied
         when it concluded that the motion had no basis. Id.,
         755–56. In Judge Prescott’s view, the defendants ‘‘are
         entitled to have that motion adjudicated by a trial court
         that is not laboring under the misapprehension that the
         motion was late.’’ Id., 756. This certified appeal
         followed.2
             We granted certification on the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court
             2

         incorrectly conclude that the trial court had not abused its discretion when
         it denied the defendants’ motion to open the judgment as untimely and
         without substance despite the fact that the motion was timely filed?’’ Mer-
         cedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, 345 Conn. 910, 283
         A.3d 505 (2022). On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendants also
         claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying their oral
         request to continue the hearing on the motion and to allow them to present
         evidence in addition to the affidavit to support their motion. Mercedes-Benz
         Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra, 213 Conn. App. 740. The
         Appellate Court rejected this claim. See id., 753–55. Although the defendants
         appear to renew this claim in their brief to this court, we need not address
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          ‘‘Whether proceeding under the common law or a
       statute, the action of a trial court in granting or [denying
       a motion] to open a judgment is, generally, within the
       judicial discretion of such court, and its action will not
       be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that
       the trial court has abused its discretion.’’ (Internal quo-
       tation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
       Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 381, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021).
       ‘‘In determining whether the trial court abused its dis-
       cretion, this court must make every reasonable pre-
       sumption in favor of its action. . . . The manner in
       which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed
       [as] long as the court could reasonably conclude as
       it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conroy v.
       Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022).
          ‘‘The court’s discretion, however, is not unfettered
       . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v.
       Neale, 197 Conn. App. 147, 157, 231 A.3d 357 (2020);
       see also Cook v. Lawlor, 139 Conn. 68, 71, 90 A.2d
       164 (1952). ‘‘[D]iscretion imports something more than
       leeway in decision-making. . . . It means a legal dis-
       cretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit
       of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to
       impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .
       [T]he court’s discretion should be exercised mindful of
       the policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits
       of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the
       litigant his day in court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Costello v. Goldstein & Peck,
       P.C., 321 Conn. 244, 255–56, 137 A.3d 748 (2016). Sound
       discretion ‘‘requires a knowledge and understanding of
       the material circumstances surrounding the matter
       . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Krevis v.
       Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817 A.2d 628 (2003).
       Additionally, an ‘‘abuse of discretion exists when a
       it because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
       the motion to open.
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         court . . . has decided [the matter] based on improper
         or irrelevant factors.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
         ted.) State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 811, 224 A.3d
         886 (2020). ‘‘[R]eversal is required where the abuse is
         manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.’’
         (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Browd,
         258 Conn. 566, 570, 783 A.2d 457 (2001).
            The threshold determination of whether a motion to
         open is timely filed is critical because it determines
         which of two different legal standards the trial court
         must apply when ruling on the motion. First, as the
         Appellate Court majority accurately noted, a timely
         motion to open is governed by § 52-212 (a), which pro-
         vides in relevant part: ‘‘Any judgment rendered or
         decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior
         Court may be set aside, within four months following
         the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the
         case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint
         or written motion of any party or person prejudiced
         thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good
         cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed
         at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the
         passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defen-
         dant was prevented by mistake, accident or other rea-
         sonable cause from prosecuting the action or making
         the defense.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev.
         to 2019) § 52-212 (a); see also Practice Book § 17-43
         (a). This rule is ‘‘motivated by the policy that [o]nce a
         judgment [is] rendered it is to be considered final and
         it should be left undisturbed by [posttrial] motions
         except for a good and compelling reason. . . . Other-
         wise, there might never be an end to litigation.’’ (Cita-
         tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
         Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 107,
         952 A.2d 1 (2008). Accordingly, to prevail on a motion
         to open timely filed within the four month window,
         § 52-212 (a) requires that the movant make a two part
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       showing: (1) that a good defense, the nature of which
       must be set forth, existed at the time the trial court
       rendered judgment, and (2) that the movant was pre-
       vented from making that defense because of mistake,
       accident, or other reasonable cause. See, e.g., In re
       Joseph W., 301 Conn. 245, 264 n.21, 21 A.3d 723 (2011);
       Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 419, 969 A.2d 157 (2009).
          Second, but missing from the Appellate Court major-
       ity opinion, is any mention of that part of the test for
       determining whether to grant a motion to open, which
       provides that, once the § 52-212 (a) four month window
       expires, the trial court has inherent authority, ‘‘indepen-
       dent of [any] statutory provisions, to open a judgment
       obtained by fraud, in the actual absence of consent, or
       by mutual mistake at any time.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group, 335
       Conn. 448, 469, 239 A.3d 272 (2020); see also Reville v.
       Reville, 312 Conn. 428, 441, 93 A.3d 1076 (2014). The
       two part test prescribed by § 52-212 (a) does not apply
       to untimely motions filed outside the four month win-
       dow. Rather, to prevail on a motion to open filed outside
       this window, a movant must establish that the judgment
       was ‘‘obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake or,
       under certain circumstances, where newly discovered
       evidence exists to challenge the judgment . . . .’’
       Flater v. Grace, supra, 291 Conn. 418; see also Reville
       v. Reville, supra, 441.
         We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
       by denying the motion to open on the grounds that it
       was untimely and that it had no basis. It is undisputed
       by the parties, as well as by the dissent in this appeal
       and both opinions in the Appellate Court, that the trial
       court’s timeliness determination was incorrect because
       the defendants’ July 29, 2019 motion to open was filed
       well within four months of the May 13, 2019 judgment
       pursuant to § 52-212 (a). Even the trial court initially
       recognized at the hearing that the motion was timely
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          filed within the four month time frame in § 52-212 (a).
          And yet, its ruling, determining that the motion to open
          was untimely, manifested a misunderstanding that it
          was filed outside the four month window contained in
          § 52-212 (a).
             We cannot conclude that this critical error did not
          either affect the trial court’s determination as to which
          legal test to apply in ruling on the merits of the motion
          or adversely impact the court’s exercise of discretion
          under the proper legal test. It is true, as the dissent
          points out, that a ‘‘trial court’s ruling is entitled to the
          reasonable presumption that it is correct unless the
          party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden
          demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) State v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1, 13, 155 A.3d 730
          (2017); see also AGW Sono Partners, LLC v. Downtown
          Soho, LLC, 343 Conn. 309, 342 n.28, 273 A.3d 186 (2022)
          (‘‘when a trial court’s memorandum of decision is
          ambiguous as to the burden of proof applied, it is the
          responsibility of the appellant . . . to move . . . for
          an articulation on that point’’). However, ‘‘[a] presump-
          tion of correctness will not carry the day when there
          is evidence that the trial court failed to follow the appli-
          cable law.’’ Mitchell v. State, 338 Conn. 66, 78, 257 A.3d
          259 (2021). Like Judge Prescott in his dissenting opinion
          in the Appellate Court, we are ‘‘unwilling to apply the
          normal presumption regarding the correctness of a trial
          court’s decision in light of the clear error of the court’s
          determination that the motion was not filed within four
          months of the date judgment was rendered.’’ Mercedes-
          Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra,
          213 Conn. App. 756 (Prescott, J., dissenting). This is
          because, although the record does not conclusively
          establish whether the trial court’s alternative determi-
          nation that the motion had ‘‘no basis’’ resulted from its
          application of the two part § 52-212 (a) legal standard,
          or the legal standard for fraud, duress, or mutual mis-
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       take, we conclude that the trial court’s application of
              3

       either legal standard constituted an abuse of discretion.
          Specifically, if the trial court’s decision that the
       motion was untimely led it to deny the motion on the
       ground that the defendants had failed to establish that
       the judgment was procured by fraud, mutual mistake,
       or duress, then its decision was unfounded both because
       the motion was timely and because there was no discus-
       sion or mention of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.
       Thus, the trial court could not have properly made such
       a determination. Alternatively, if, as the Appellate Court
       majority held and the dissent presumes, the trial court
       determined that the motion was untimely and also had
       no basis because the defendants had failed to meet the
       two part test in § 52-212 (a), then its decision resulted
       from its application of an incorrect legal standard under
       the trial court’s own reasoning. Because the two part
       test applies only to timely motions to open, we cannot
       agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court could
       have erroneously determined that the motion to open
       was untimely and yet properly applied the correct legal
       standard for timely motions to open. See State v. Jack-
       son, supra, 334 Conn. 811; Krevis v. Bridgeport, supra,
       262 Conn. 819.
         Moreover, the trial court’s misapprehension of the
       timeliness of the defendants’ motion to open not only
       impacted which legal standard to apply, but also
       whether the defendants had satisfied § 52-212. For
       example, the first part of the test requires that the mov-
         3
           To avoid the need to resort to presumptions, it would have been more
       prudent for the trial court to state the factual and legal bases for its decision,
       as required by Practice Book §§ 6-1 (a) and 64-1 (a), or for the defendants
       to seek an articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5. As we explain,
       however, under the circumstances of this case, the basis the trial court
       provided for its decision was indisputably inaccurate such that neither an
       articulation nor further explication was necessary for us to review and order
       the reversal of its decision.
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          ant establish that a good cause of action or defense
          existed at the time the trial court rendered the judg-
          ment. See Flater v. Grace, supra, 291 Conn. 419. The
          court’s discretionary determination as to whether a
          good defense existed may potentially include consider-
          ation of whether the defendants’ prospective claims
          would be time barred, or whether the passage of time
          otherwise hindered their claims. Likewise, the second
          part of the test in § 52-212 (a) requires the trial court
          to assess whether the movant established that mistake,
          accident, or other reasonable cause prevented the mov-
          ant from prosecuting the action or presenting a good
          defense. See id. This inquiry has a temporal component
          because, as the Appellate Court majority noted, depending
          on the circumstances presented, it may include consid-
          eration of the length of time that the defendants were
          prevented from asserting such a defense and did not
          appear in this action.4 See Mercedes-Benz Financial v.
          1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra, 213 Conn. App.
          751–52. In fact, the temporal component was a primary
          point of contention at the hearing. The defendants used
          the existence of the two year delay to support their
          claim that the plaintiff never intended to pursue this action.
          In contrast, the plaintiff primarily argued in opposition
          to the motion to open that the defendants had waited
          two years to contest the action. The trial court’s deci-
          sion cannot stand under these circumstances.
             4
               As the dissent correctly notes, § 52-212 requires that the ‘‘motion must
          be timely’’ and that, ‘‘the trial court, in concluding that § 52-212 was not
          satisfied, could have found that any one of these elements, or any combina-
          tion thereof, had not been established.’’ Thus, to determine whether the
          defendants had met the § 52-212 standard, the trial court was required to
          analyze whether the motion was timely, but that determination necessarily
          was infected by its lone, and erroneous, factual finding that the motion
          was untimely.
             Likewise, the determination of whether to open a judgment beyond the
          four month limitation in § 52-212 (a) based on fraud, duress, or mutual
          mistake is partially contingent on how diligent the movant was in attempting
          to discover and expose the fraud. See Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager,
          supra, 288 Conn. 107.
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              Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

          It is therefore manifest that the court’s erroneous
       timeliness determination impacted its decision as to
       whether to open the judgment. Although we do not
       frequently upset a trial court’s discretionary rulings, we
       must do so when the court’s determination is predicated
       on a misapprehension of fact or law. See, e.g., Reville
       v. Reville, supra, 312 Conn. 450 (trial court abused its
       discretion in denying motion to open on basis of ‘‘uncon-
       ventional analysis’’ and improper subsidiary determina-
       tion); Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,
       310 Conn. 640, 653–54, 81 A.3d 200 (2013) (trial court
       abused its discretion in denying motion to intervene
       because its decision was predicated on improper legal
       determination that motion was time barred); Collins v.
       Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 266 Conn. 12, 49, 836 A.2d
       1124 (2003) (trial court abused its discretion in denying
       motion for class certification because it failed to apply
       proper legal standard); Burton v. Browd, supra, 258
       Conn. 571 (Appellate Court abused its discretion in
       dismissing appeal because its decision was founded
       on incorrect fact that plaintiff had failed to move to
       substitute defendant’s estate in trial court); State v.
       Sierra, 213 Conn. 422, 436, 568 A.2d 448 (1990) (trial
       court abused its discretion in admitting evidence because
       it failed to perform necessary legal test). Here, the trial
       court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion because
       it was founded on an improper subsidiary determi-
       nation.
          Finally, reversal of the Appellate Court’s judgment is
       required because an injustice appears to have been
       done. See, e.g., Burton v. Browd, supra, 258 Conn. 570.
       We agree with the sentiment of Judge Prescott, expressed
       in his dissent in the Appellate Court, that, ‘‘regardless
       of the ultimate merits of the defendants’ motion to open
       . . . they are entitled to have that motion adjudicated
       by a trial court that is not laboring under the misappre-
       hension that the motion was late.’’ Mercedes-Benz
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                   Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

          Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra, 213
          Conn. App. 756 (Prescott, J., dissenting). On remand,
          the defendants must have the opportunity to meet the
          two part test in § 52-212 (a) at an evidentiary hearing
          before a different judge with a correct understanding
          that the defendants had timely filed their motion to
          open.5 The trial court should consider the evidence sub-
          mitted by the parties and decide in the proper exercise
          of its discretion whether to open the judgment ‘‘mindful
          of the policy preference to bring about a trial on the
          merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure
          for the litigant his day in court.’’ (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C., supra,
          321 Conn. 256.
            The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
          the case is remanded to that court with direction to
          reverse the trial court’s judgment and to remand the
          case to that court for further proceedings in accordance
          with this opinion.
            In this opinion McDONALD, ECKER, ALEXANDER
          and DANNEHY, Js., concurred.

            5
              The need for an evidentiary hearing on remand is evidenced by the
          dissent’s consideration of the substance of the defendants’ motion to open.
          Although the dissent artfully marshals counsels’ arguments made at the
          original hearing, essentially none of those circumstances was established
          by evidence because the trial court had only Dizenzo’s affidavit; indeed,
          there was a critical factual dispute at the hearing concerning the basis for
          the defendants’ motion to open. Specifically, the parties’ counsel at the
          hearing disputed whether, when, in what manner, and by which entity
          Dizenzo was informed that the lawsuit was not going forward. On remand,
          the parties will have the opportunity to submit evidence with respect to all
          of the substantive elements of § 52-212 (a).