Court Opinion

ID: 9647606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:42:13.055822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:51.234464
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. As early as December 15, 1791, with the passage of the Bill of Rights, a person who is suspected of committing a crime has the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present while being questioned by the authorities. No amendment has changed the Bill of Rights nor do the courts or the various legislatures have the power to do so. In the well-known opinion of Miranda v. Arizona, 382 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court declared that an accused has the right to remain silent without having such silence used against him. The same Court emphasized and reaffirmed Miranda in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle the Court clearly and unequivocally stated, “It would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow a person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” In the present case the appellant’s election to remain silent was used against him by the lower court and this action is being sanctioned by the majority. It makes no difference to an accused whether his constitutional right is denied from the beginning or withdrawn at a later time under the guise of another procedure. The net result is the same; there might as well have been no right from the outset. It appears that the trial court had the correct insight when it stated, “ [i] t would make me feel better if you didn’t ask him about that, but if you insist, I’m going to let you do it.” The methodology or means used to bring the appellant’s silence to the attention of the jury is immaterial, the result is the same. In this instance the error could have easily been prevented by the trial court informing the prosecutor not to mention the accused’s silence. The reference to appellant’s right to remain silent was not an inadvertent slip of the tongue nor was it “fighting fire with fire.” This was simply and clearly a case where a third party was used to destroy the accused’s right to remain silent. I disagree with the rationale used to allow the introduction of such testimony under the theory that the defendant “opened the door.” Expansion of this theory might easily result in allowing such testimony to be used to prove that by committing the offense a defendant waives the right to remain silent.