Court Opinion

ID: 9587757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:56.70056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:32.614164
License: Public Domain

De MUNIZ, J.,
concurring.
I agree that this case must be reversed and remanded, but not for the reasons stated by the majority. Petitioner assigned error to the dismissal of his petition and his amended petition, arguing, first, that he has stated claims for post-conviction relief. I agree. Although inartfully stated, the petitions state facts and grounds that, if proven, could entitle him to post-conviction relief. The majority does not address the sufficiency of the claims. Instead, it apparently concludes that, whether the petitions state a claim for relief or not, counsel must be appointed for an indigent petitioner.1
However, there is a significant difference between an inartful claim and a frivolous one, and I do not agree that, irrespective of the merits of a post-conviction relief petition, a trial court cannot dismiss the petition without first appointing counsel.2 Post-conviction is a civil proceeding, and ORS 138.590 establishes a procedure for the appointment of counsel for that proceeding. Because the statute authorizes appointment of counsel for a post-conviction proceeding, there must necessarily be an initial determination that a petition states a claim for post-conviction relief. The responsibility for making that determination is with the trial court.
As we noted in McClure v. Maass, 110 Or App 119, 124, 821 P2d 1105 (1991), rev den 313 Or 74 (1992), the first step in the proceeding is the filing of the petition, and the petitioner has the burden to show that there are grounds for relief:
“The plain meaning of [ORS 138.590(2) and (3)] shows that the order appointing counsel follows the filing of the petition *578for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, not his subsequently appointed counsel, has the duty to file the petition. Concomitant with the duty to file the petition is the duty to select the issues that petitioner wants to litigate.
“Obviously, appointed counsel may seek to amend the petition to allege petitioner’s claims more artfully or to include additional meritorious issues that the petitioner did not discover. However, once appointed, post-conviction counsel is not obligated to scour the record to unearth every conceivable challenge to the lawfulness of petitioner’s conviction or sentence. The responsibility for discerning and selecting the issues for litigation rests with the petitioner.” (Emphasis in original.)
The majority’s holding that the statutes mandate that counsel must be appointed, irrespective of the merits of a petitioner’s claim, has the effect of turning a post-conviction proceeding into a second appeal with an attendant right to appointed counsel. I do not believe that, in enacting the post-conviction remedy, the legislature intended any such result. The post-conviction statutes do not mandate that counsel be appointed for every indigent petitioner, and ORS 138.590 does not preclude a post-conviction court from dismissing a frivolous claim before making that appointment.

 The trial court did not take any action on petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel.

 ORS 138.525, enacted by the 1993 legislature, expressly grants a post-conviction court the authority to dismiss, sua spohte, a meritless petition. The statute applies to petitions filed after November 4, 1993, and does not apply to this case.