Court Opinion

ID: 7968625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 00:53:02.194718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:34:42.886294
License: Public Domain

Canty, J.
On February 29, 1892, the plaintiff Gibb was the owner in fee simple of the premises in question, subject to a mortgage of $1,200, held by the plaintiff Hilles. On that day defendant issued a policy of insurance insuring Gibb to the amount of $2,000, for three years from and after that day, against loss by fire to the buildings on the premises, loss, if any, payable to Hilles as her interest may appear; but providing that if, in case of loss, the insurer is not liable to the mortgagor or owner, it shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee under her mortgage, and, upon paying the full amount due on the mortgage, shall receive an assignment of' it. This mortgage clause also provided that the policy should not be invalidated as to the mortgagee by any act of the owner, or by any change in the title or ownership of the premises.
On February 28, 1893, there was a loss by fire amounting to $1,462.62. The plaintiffs brought this action to recover this loss. The case was tried by the court -without a jury, and judgment was ordered in favor of Hilles for $1,200, the amount of her mortgage, and in favdr of Gibb for the balance of said amount of the loss. From the judgment entered thereon, defendant appeals.
The appellant concedes that the plaintiff Hilles is entitled to recover, but contends that a breach occurred, prior to the fire, which avoided the policy as to Gibb; that he is not entitled to recover; and that defendant is entitled, on payment to Hilles of the amount of her mortgage, to be subrogated to her rights under the mortgage. The policy contains the following provisions: “This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void * * * if any change other than by the death of an insured take place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of insurance (except change of occupants without increase of hazard), whether by legal process or judgment, or by voluntary act of the insured, or other-wise.”
It is found by the court: That on March 23, 1892, plaintiff made a contract in writing with one Maggie J. Kelly whereby he sold and agreed to convey to her the premises, consisting of five lots, by deed *273of warranty, on prompt and full performance by her of the agreement, and she agreed to pay therefor the sum of $2,500, — $300 cash, and $1,000 in installments of $50 every sixty days thereafter until paid, the balance to be paid by her in assuming said mortgage,— she to have possession of the premises until default in payment; and in case of such default she agreed to surrender possession on demand, and that the agreement should be void at the option of the vendor. That at and from the time of making the policy of insurance, until the time of making the contract of sale, the buildings had been unoccupied, and that, on the making of said contract of sale, said Kelly entered into the possession of the buildings and prem- ■ ises, and occupied the same until the time of the fire, and made all her payments during that time, and was not in default in any manner upon said contract.
It is contended by appellant that, by the transactions with Kelly, there took place a change in the interest, title, and possession of Gibb, and the condition against any such change was broken, and the policy avoided as to him. It seems to us that there was a breach in the condition against any change of interest. It is not claimed by respondents that there was any waiver of this condition, and the authorities cited by counsel are nearly all cases where the breach claimed was not of a condition against a change of interest, but a change of title. It is held by the great weight of authority that, where the condition is against any change in the title, there is no breach unless there is a change in the legal title, — that, as long as the insured retains the legal title and an insurable interest in the premises, the policy is not avoided by a transfer of the equitable title- or of equitable interests; but we cannot apply this doctrine to a condition against any change of interest. The terms are not synonymous, as contended by counsel. The word “interest” is broader than the word “title,” and includes both legal and equitable rights. It is not necessary to consider the question of the change of possession, except so far as it has an influence on the change of interest by strengthening and fortifying the interest acquired by Kelly. This disposes of the case.
The plaintiff Hilles is entitled to judgment for the sum awarded her, but upon payment of the same the defendant is entitled to be subrogated to her rights under her mortgage, and the defendant is *274entitled to judgment against the plaintiff Gibb that he take nothing by this action. The judgment appealed from should be reversed, ...... 3 to enter judgment in conformity with this opinion. A
Gileillan, C. J., absent on account of sickness, took no part.
(Opinion published 61 N. W. 137.)