Court Opinion

ID: 9595878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:43:56.912209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:31.412699
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s decision that the record lacked sufficient evidence to prove a “changed use” of appellant’s property. The critical issue at trial was whether the nature of appellant’s property had changed so that it no longer complied with the conditional use permit. The conditional use permit provided for outdoor servicing and storage of vehicles customary to the motor vehicle sales and servicing business. I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment that appellant had violated the conditional use permit by retaining an excessive number of inert and non-mobile automobiles.
This court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Champion v. Frazier, 977 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Mo.App.1998). Appellant testified that he was accumulating more cars than he could sell. Appellant also testified that in 1979, when the conditional use permit was issued, he had eight vehi*823cles stored on the property, all of which were obscured from view. However, in the 1990’s, that number began increasing, and by the time of trial, appellant estimated that forty vehicles were stored upon the property. These vehicles were clearly visible from the street, and at least one neighbor had complained of their unsightliness. The deputy building commissioner testified that tree saplings and weeds were growing through the vehicles and the base of one vehicle had been rusted out. A majority of these vehicles were non-functioning. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that there was a changed use of the property and appellant’s business no longer conformed to the requirements of the conditional use permit.
The majority concedes that a conditional use permit remains in effect until its provisions are violated. See also 83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning and Planning, section 959 at 803 (1992). The majority also concedes that a municipality seeking to revoke a conditional use permit has the burden of proving the basis for revocation of that permit. Nigh v. City of Savannah, 956 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Mo.App.1997). In my opinion, the respondent has met this burden by proving that the nature of the property has changed. The trial court did not err in terminating the conditional use permit.
On the issue of state licensure, the majority opinion acknowledges that the record does not reflect the nature of appellant’s claim. Notwithstanding the lack of a record, the majority goes on to determine that the City caused appellant to lose his state dealer’s license by improperly refusing to certify appellant met the statutory criteria. I believe we do not have jurisdiction to decide this issue.
A motor vehicle dealer must seek certification that his established place of business is bona fide. Section 301.560.1(1) RSMo (Supp.1998). A police officer must certify the application, guaranteeing that it complies with the requirements dictated in section 301.560.1(1). Id. If the license holder has failed to establish or maintain a bona fide place of business, the department of motor vehicles may refuse to renew the license. Section 301.562.1 RSMo (Supp.1998). The licensee shall have the right to appeal the decision of the department in the manner provided in chapter 536 RSMo. Section 301.562.3 RSMo (Supp. 1998). Proceedings for review may be instituted by fifing a petition in the circuit court of proper venue within thirty days after the mailing or delivery of the notice of the agency’s final decision. Section 536.110.1 RSMo (1994).
On November 29, 1994, appellant’s state motor vehicle dealer’s license was “disapproved” by a local police officer. The disapproving officer never indicated the reasons for denying certification. On December 7, 1994, the Motor Vehicle Commission sent a notice to appellant, explaining that he needed to obtain certification by a qualified police officer on his application. The notice also required appellant to make four more motor vehicle sales in order to renew for 1995. Based upon the record, it appears appellant took no further action and simply let his license lapse without contesting or appealing the Commission’s decision.
Appellant never filed a petition for review. He merely challenged the denial of the license three years later. Failing to timely file the petition for review deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Director of Revenue, State of Mo. v. Rauch, 971 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo.App.1998). When the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court can do nothing more than exercise its inherent power to dismiss. Id. As such, we do not have jurisdiction, nor did the circuit court have jurisdiction, to resolve this issue.
Moreover, even if we had subject matter jurisdiction, none of the entities rejecting the license, namely the state, the Department of Revenue, or the Motor Vehicle Commission, were joined as parties to these proceedings. The failure to join an indispensable party to litigation is so fun*824damental and jurisdictional as to require its consideration by this court whether raised by the parties or not. Steiner v. Vatterott, 973 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Mo.App.1998). Since no arm of the state was joined as a party, we cannot assert jurisdiction over the state’s denial of the motor vehicle dealer’s license.
Finally, I believe we do not have jurisdiction to require the City of Festus to issue appellant a City Business License. Nor should the City of Festus be hable to appellant on his counterclaim for damages for the denial of that license.
Section 31-90 of the City Code of Festus states, in part,
[t]he appeals to the Board of Adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved ... by any decision of the building inspector. Such appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time, as provided by the rules of the board, by filing with the building inspector and with the board a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof.
The majority reads this provision as providing for an optional remedy, rather than a mandatory remedy, with the Board of Adjustment and allowing for attack in the present case. I disagree. The decision to appeal may be optional; however, the means of appeal are mandatory and exclusively delineated in the city code.
Appellant’s City Business License was denied on January 16, 1995. Immediately thereafter, he requested an “informal” meeting with the Board of Adjustment so they could “define their position.” The Board wrote back, indicating their policy against informal meetings and suggesting that appellant contact City Hall to begin formal application procedures. Appellant neither began formal procedures nor filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Adjustment. Instead, he raised the issue three years later in the counterclaim in this case. It is a well settled principle of law that administrative procedures must be exhausted before other relief may be granted. Lewis v. Roskin, 823 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo.App.1992). Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to grant additional relief. The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s counterclaims seeking an injunction requiring issuance of a City Business License and concomitant damages.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.