Court Opinion

ID: 9841253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 18:04:38.678291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:08.692519
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/21/23 Conservatorship of the Person of R.C. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

                                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 Conservatorship of the Person of
 R.C.,
                                                                  D080473
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                  (Super. Ct. No. MH116118)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 R.C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 HOSPITALS,

          Respondent,

         APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Dismissed in part as moot, affirmed in part.
         Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Gregory D. Brown, Jessica Gabriela Acuna and Jackquelyn Y.
Young, Deputy Attorneys General for Respondent, Department of State
Hospitals.
      No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
      The trial court, the Honorable Frederick Maguire, found R.C.
incompetent to stand trial after he killed two family members. In 2019, the
court appointed a public conservator (the conservator) as his conservator
under the Lanterman–Petris–Short (LPS) Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et
seq.) and determined that a secured state hospital was the most appropriate
placement for R.C. In 2021, the trial court set a hearing on an order to show
cause (OSC) as to why the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH)
should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the existing court
order that R.C. be admitted to a DSH facility. The trial court subsequently
ordered DSH to admit R.C. to a DSH facility within 60 days and continued
the OSC hearing to address whether this had occurred.
      A different judge, the Honorable Marian F. Gaston, presided over the
continued hearing, found DSH in violation of the court’s order, and
sanctioned it $1,000. After another hearing, this judge vacated both the
sanctions order and the order requiring that R.C. be admitted to DSH by a
certain date. On appeal, R.C. argues the court erred in vacating these orders.
      During the pendency of this appeal, R.C. was admitted to a state
hospital and we requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing
whether this appeal is now moot and, if so, whether any exception applies
that should preclude dismissal of the appeal. Both parties agree that R.C.’s
claim for admission to a state hospital is moot and we have the discretion to
review R.C.’s claim despite its mootness. The parties similarly concur that

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the order vacating sanctions is not moot, with the parties disputing whether
the order is appealable and R.C. asserting that the only way to evaluate the
propriety of sanctions is to address all the underlying issues on their merits.
      Ultimately, we do not disagree that seemingly interminable delays in
finding appropriate placement for gravely disabled “Murphy” conservatees
presents an issue of significant public importance. At the same time, this
particular case reflects a complex procedural history involving arguably
inconsistent orders by two different judicial officers that, in our view, makes
it an inappropriate vehicle for broad pronouncements of general applicability.
As a result, we decline to consider the merits of the order that vacated the
earlier order requiring R.C. be admitted to DSH by a certain date and
dismiss that portion of the appeal as moot. As to the court’s order vacating
sanctions, we affirm.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. R.C.’s Conservatorship
      In 2015, R.C. was charged with two counts of murder after he fatally
stabbed his grandmother and uncle. He was found incompetent to stand trial
and committed to respondent DSH at Patton (DSH-Patton) for competency
restoration. He was repeatedly treated, returned to court, and found
incompetent again over the course of three years. In January 2019, R.C. was
determined to be permanently incompetent, and discharged from DSH-
Patton to a jail facility.
      In April 2019, the trial court found R.C. was gravely disabled, making
him the subject of a “Murphy” conservatorship.1 The court appointed the

1      In general, criminal defendants who are mentally incompetent (Pen.
Code, § 1367, subd. (a)), are “referred to as incompetent to stand trial or ‘IST.’
If a defendant is found IST by the court, Penal Code section 1370 provides
that criminal proceedings ‘shall be suspended until the person becomes

                                        3
conservator for him and concluded the “least restrictive placement available
and necessary to achieve the purpose of treatment” was a state hospital. In
May 2020, the conservator submitted a referral to DSH-Metropolitan but
R.C. could not be admitted to DSH-Metropolitan based on his murder charge
and was re-directed for admission to DSH-Napa. The waitlist for admission
of LPS patients to each DSH facility is based on the patient’s date of referral
by his or her conservator. R.C.’s waitlist position for DSH-Napa is based on
his original May 2020, referral date to DSH-Metropolitan. In June 2020 and
2021, the trial court granted the conservator’s petitions to extend the
conservatorship, again determining that a state hospital was the least
restrictive placement. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).)
B. The Court’s Frustration
      At a hearing on July 8, 2021, over two years after establishment of
R.C.’s conservatorship, Judge Maguire noted R.C. had not yet been
transported to DSH and “what has happened here is just totally
unacceptable.” Present at this hearing was defense counsel and county
counsel. Without giving DSH notice or an opportunity to be heard, the court
“ordered that [R.C.] be released to the State Hospital; that the State Hospital
accept him within 45 days of today. I’m going to set a hearing date in the
week before the 45 days, set a hearing date to see what the status is from the
State Hospital and to entertain and to explore all—give Counsel an

mentally competent.’ (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).)” (People v.
Edwards (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1259, 1263.) A “Murphy” conservatorship
applies to that narrow category of IST defendants who are charged with “a
felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a serious threat to the physical
well-being of another, and who do not have the prospect of a restoration of
competency.” (Conservatorship of Christopher B. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 809,
811; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(i).) It provides for a
renewable one year civil commitment. (Conservatorship of Christopher B., at
p. 811.)

                                       4
opportunity to give the Court an explanation of the remedies that they seek.”
The court asked the conservator to find a locked treatment facility for R.C.
pending his transfer to DSH and set a hearing “for us to determine what my
authority is to force [DSH] to come get him.”
      At the next hearing on August 19, 2021, county counsel informed the
court that R.C. had been rejected for placement by several in county locked
facilities and was currently being reviewed by two other locked facilities.
Defense counsel renewed her request to have R.C. immediately released from
jail to a treatment facility and requested the court set an OSC that DSH
accept R.C. The court deferred on the requested OSC to get a status from
DSH and the two locked facilities where R.C. was under review. Defense
counsel argued a violation of R.C.’s due process and equal protection rights,
with the trial court agreeing: “I couldn’t agree with you more. Okay? But
whether there are due process violations will be for someone else to make a
determination on because we’ve—I’ve heard these arguments already.”
There was no mention of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus allowing
DSH to appear and respond to these allegations of constitutional violations,
and for the trial court to formally rule on them.
C. Order to Show Cause and Additional Briefing
      On October 14, 2021, Judge Maguire set an OSC hearing as to why
DSH should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the existing
court order that R.C. be admitted to a DSH facility. DSH made its first
appearance on November 8 when it filed its response to the OSC arguing,
among other things, that the OSC was procedurally defective.
      At a hearing two days later, the court requested further briefing
whether it: (1) may order DSH to accept an individual under Murphy
conservatorship; (2) has the authority to issue a particular timeline for DSH

                                       5
to accept each individual; (3) should order placement into a less restrictive
level of placement if there are no beds available; and (4) should order
sanctions for noncompliance with those court orders if they are lawful. R.C.
filed his response on November 29, and DSH filed its reply on December 6.
      DSH’s December 6 briefing included declarations from Jennie Clay, the
clinical administrator at DSH-Napa, Michael Reyes, a nursing coordinator at
DSH-Metropolitan, and Trey Stoddard, a DSH staff services manager. Clay
stated that LPS/Murphy conservatees are referred by the county’s public
guardian to a specific facility, each facility has its own waitlist, all
conservatees are placed on the waitlist in accordance to their date of referral,
and no beds are reserved for specific counties. She indicated that
conservatees remain on the waitlist until an LPS patient is discharged to a
less restrictive placement in the community, thereby opening a bed. DSH-
Napa “has 23 LPS patients who are clinically ready to be discharged to a less
restrictive environment. However, the conservators, most County Public
Guardians, for these patients have failed to place them in the community
which further exacerbates the wait time for admissions of LPS patients from
the waitlist.”
      Clay indicated that “[t]he permissible ratio of patient to DSH staffing,
for licensing purposes, is governed by Intermediate Care Facilities (ICF)
regulations. ICF regulations establish a certain standard of care for mentally
disordered or developmentally disabled patients being cared for by nurses
and psychiatric technicians. (22 CCR § 73319 (e)(l)(A-B).) Additionally,
bargaining unit contracts state we will staff at a minimum 1:8 ratio (one staff
member per eight patients). Depending on the unit, population, and their
needs, DSH-N[apa] may staff at a higher ratio such as 1:7 or 1:6, but 1:8 is
the minimum permissible ratio.” She also indicated that DSH-Napa had to

                                         6
change its admission procedures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to
mitigate COVID-19 exposure, transmission, and infection, thus causing
delays in admissions due to outbreaks and quarantines within jails and DSH
facilities.
       Stoddard stated that the California Mental Health Services Authority
(CalMHSA), a joint powers authority of counties and cities with mental
health programs, represents the counties and cities in negotiating the
number of beds DSH will provide for LPS patients as prescribed in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 4331. Under the current Purchase of State
Hospital Beds Memorandum of Understanding (Purchase MOU), CalMHSA
negotiated at total of 556 statewide intensive treatment beds for LPS and

other conservatee commitments to DSH.2
       DSH noted that the Governor’s COVID-19 emergency orders resulted in
all LPS admissions and discharges being suspended for 90 days. DSH argued

2      Each year, every county must contract with DSH “for the number and
types of state hospital beds that the department will make available to the
county or counties during the fiscal year.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4331, subd.
(a).) “There shall be no increase in the number of beds provided to a county
or group of counties during a fiscal year unless the contract between the
State Department of Mental Health, or its successor, the State Department of
State Hospitals, and that county or group of counties is amended by mutual
agreement. Any significant change in services requested by a county shall
require amendment of the contract.” (Id. at subd. (c).)
       The Purchase MOU is the contract between DSH and San Diego
County for “Fiscal Year 2014-15 through Fiscal Year 2015-16.” Under the
Purchase MOU, DSH is required to provide 556 statewide beds for LPS
conservatees. The Purchase MOU was extended and terminated on June 30,
2020. DSH is in the process of updating this agreement. In the meantime,
San Diego County is following the terms of the Purchase MOU. As of
March 21, 2022, DSH’s census reflected a total of 736 LPS conservatees
currently housed at DSH facilities. This accounts for 180 more beds than
required under the Purchase MOU. The Purchase MOU provides that denial
of admission may be based on “the Hospital’s lack of bed capacity.”

                                      7
that the OSC should be discharged and sanctions denied because it is merely
a treatment facility and has no power to discharge conservatee patients that
are ready to be transferred and admit new conservatee patients. DSH
claimed “[i]t is unreasonable to expect that DSH could recover from an
already overburdened pre-pandemic waitlist, and a 90-day suspension
backlog, in such a short period of time. This completely ignores the ongoing
pandemic challenges to admissions and the failure of the conservators to
transfer out patients who are ready to be moved to less restrictive settings.”
D. Order Requiring DSH Admit R.C

      At the December 8, 2021 OSC hearing, DSH argued it was “a treatment
provider” and R.C.’s long period in jail needed to be “handled in a writ for
habeas corpus if necessary.” Judge Maguire acknowledged that the statutes
governing Murphy conservatorships did not require DSH admission “ ‘within
a reasonable time period,’ but I’m—I’m satisfied. It’s got to be within a
reasonable timeframe. That’s why we’re here to see if there is a justification
or not.” The court agreed with DSH that no order existed which required
DSH admit R.C. to one of its facilities The judge indicated he would issue an
order “so that you can writ me or take an appeal if you think I’m wrong,
because I think we’re in uncharted territory here. But everybody wants to
get—at least, from my perspective, I see everybody wants to get [R.C.] to
where he needs to be.” Judge Maguire subsequently issued an order for DSH
to admit R.C. to a state hospital within 60 days, stating, “I know it’s not going
to happen, but we will deal with that at a later date.” The court continued
the OSC hearing to March 2, 2022, to address whether DSH had admitted
R.C. by February 7.

                                       8
E. A New Judge Attempts to Enforce the Admission Order
      For reasons not apparent from the record, Judge Maguire did not

preside over the March 2, 2022, hearing.3 He was replaced by Judge Gaston.
Because she was not the prior judicial officer and before hearing argument,
Judge Gaston reviewed the facts with the parties. All parties agreed that
Judge Maguire had ordered R.C. be placed in DSH by February 7 and had
ordered all parties back on March 2.
      Counsel for DSH stated it provided briefing to the court in December
2021 and briefly reiterated what was in that briefing. Judge Gaston
acknowledged “those arguments were made in December.” She found DSH in
violation of the Judge Maguire’s December 8, 2021, order and imposed
sanctions of $1,000. She further ordered DSH to receive R.C. and set the
matter for a status conference and an additional OSC in the event “he’s not
been received [by DSH].” Judge Gaston also requested information from the
conservator regarding R.C.’s updated risk assessment and his required level
of care. The conservator submitted an evaluation report prepared by a San
Diego County Psychiatric Hospital staff psychiatrist recommending R.C. be
transferred to the San Diego County Psychiatric Hospital.
      On March 15, 2022, DSH filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing and
requested a stay of the trial court’s March 2 sanctions order, arguing that
Code of Civil Procedure4 section 177.5 affords parties the opportunity to be
heard before sanctions are imposed. Judge Gaston granted DSH’s motion,

3     The reporter’s transcript for the March 2, 2022, hearing lists the
Honorable Maureen F. Hallahan as the judge. We are assuming this is a
mistake because the parties represent that Judge Gaston presided over this
and all subsequent hearings and Judge Hallahan’s name does not appear
anywhere else in the record.

4     Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                       9
stayed sanctions, and continued the OSC to allow DSH “the opportunity to
make the record that they want to make.”
F. The Subject of the Appeal: the April 20, 2022 Orders
      On April 8, 2022, DSH filed briefing, declarations, and exhibits in
response to the trial court’s OSC explaining that the OSC should be
discharged and sanctions denied because it was abiding by its statutory and
contractual obligations. Specifically, DSH argued: (1) it is not obligated to
admit more LPS patients than contractually negotiated or statutorily
mandated; (2) the court order requiring a 60-day admission violates the
separation of powers doctrine; (3) the conservator is responsible for finding
appropriate treatment for R.C.; (4) Murphy conservatees are not similarly
situated as IST defendants for purposes of DSH hospital admissions; and (5)
multiple factors beyond DSH’s control have caused further delays to LPS
patient admission. DSH also pointed out “to the extent that the requesting
party argues that the conservatee’s due process rights have been violated, the
appropriate avenue to address that issue is through a writ of habeas corpus
and not through an order to show cause.”
      Clay, the clinical administrator for DSH-Napa since 2018, has been at
that location since 2007. She stated, “During my tenure at DSH, I have not
seen any cases where a court ordered DSH to admit a conservatee within a
specific period of time, without regard to the other conservatees on the
waitlist. This would be a grave mistake that would have ripple effects across
the LPS/Murphy waitlist as other counties would likely follow suit and it
would inherently prejudice the conservatees who have been waiting longer for
admission.” She indicated there is a waitlist for DSH admissions of LPS
conservatees and admissions are made on a first-come-first-served basis
based on the referral date. DSH facility has its own LPS waitlist and the

                                       10
LPS/Murphy waitlist is separate from the waitlist for other forensic patients
as individuals who are IST. For an LPS bed to become available, another
LPS conservatee must be discharged. “When an LPS patient is ready for
discharge, DSH-N[apa] reaches out to the conservator, often the public
guardian, to advise them. If placement is available, DSH immediately sends
over the placement packet and other necessary documentation to effectuate
the patient’s transfer. However, most LPS patients are waitlisted at a new
facility. Too often, these LPS patients wait so long that they grow frustrated
and begin to decompensate which further prolongs their transfer. DSH
repeatedly reminds the conservators of their conservatee’s status when they
are ready for discharge but have not been transferred.”
      As of April 2022, DSH-Napa had 34 LPS patients who were clinically
ready to be discharged to a less-restrictive environment. “However, the
conservators, mostly county public guardians, for these patients have failed
to place them in the community which further exacerbates the wait time for
LPS admissions.” The COVID-19 pandemic also negatively impacted the
waitlist.
      At the April 20 hearing, Judge Gaston listed the documents she
reviewed, including DSH’s December 6, 2021, briefing and declarations, and
the four documents submitted on April 8, 2022. She explained that she did
not review DSH’s December 6, 2021, briefing and declarations submitted for
the March 2, 2022, OSC hearing prior to issuing her order that DSH was
required to receive R.C. Judge Gaston stated: “Frankly, at our [March 2,
2022,] hearing, I didn’t know what [DSH was] talking about because I didn’t
have . . . your documents, which are very thorough.” When the judge asked
all parties whether they agreed on the facts set forth in their briefing and
declarations and whether they wanted to provide further argument on the

                                       11
legal issues, counsel for R.C., DSH, and San Diego County all submitted.
Judge Gaston then vacated her previous order that R.C. be placed in the
state hospital by a date certain as not supported by statute or the
constitution. She also vacated her order sanctioning DSH.5
      On April 25, 2022, the parties stipulated to extend R.C.’s
conservatorship for another year. His present diagnosis is schizophrenia and
stimulant use disorder. R.C. appeals from Judge Gaston’s orders vacating
sanctions and the order requiring R.C. be admitted to DSH by a certain date.
During the pendency of this appeal, R.C. was admitted to DSH.
                                  DISCUSSION
A. The Challenge to the Order Requiring DSH Admission Is Moot
      “A case is considered moot when ‘the question addressed was at one
time a live issue in the case,’ but has been deprived of life ‘because of events
occurring after the judicial process was initiated.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City
Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.) “The pivotal
question in determining if a case is moot is therefore whether the court can
grant the plaintiff any effectual relief.” (Ibid.) The parties agree the order
requiring DSH admit R.C. to a DSH facility is moot because R.C. is now in a
DSH facility and we cannot grant R.C. any effective relief. Nonetheless, we
have discretion to decide moot issues “if a pending case poses an issue of
broad public interest that is likely to recur . . . .” (In re William M. (1970) 3
Cal.3d 16, 23.)
      On the record before us, we decline to exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of this appeal. At the outset we note that after the court found

5     After the court made its orders, R.C.’s counsel advised that R.C. had
been transferred to the San Diego County Psychiatric Hospital, where he was
currently residing.

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R.C. permanently incompetent, the public conservator inexplicably waited
over one year to submit a referral to DSH. We have no information as to why
this occurred and whether it is a one-time occurrence or a habitual problem
that is likely to recur. This one year delay significantly affected R.C.’s
placement on the waiting list for admission to a DSH facility because DSH
admission is based on the individual’s referral date and each facility has its
own waitlist. Additionally, DSH is one facility in a list of facilities. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 5358, subd. (a)(2).) Based on the delay in getting R.C. referred
to DSH, his conservator could have asked the trial court to change the
placement to a “Closed (locked) Treatment Facility” even on a temporary
basis until a DSH facility had an opening. The trial court even suggested
this at the July 8, 2021, hearing.
      Second, the global COVID-19 pandemic created unique challenges
because the Governor’s COVID-19 emergency orders resulted in all LPS
admissions and discharges being suspended for 90 days. The pandemic also
required DSH to change its admission procedures to mitigate COVID-19
exposure, transmission, and infection, thus causing delays in admissions due
to outbreaks and quarantines within jails and DSH facilities.
      Finally, the procedural posture of this case is unusual and concerning.
In July 2021, Judge Maguire found the failure to admit R.C. to a DSH facility
to be “totally unacceptable.” Without giving DSH notice or an opportunity to
be heard, the court ordered DSH to accept R.C. within 45 days and set a
hearing to determine R.C.’s status and have counsel address possible
remedies. At the next hearing in August 2021, defense counsel noted that
R.C. had been rejected by several in county locked facilities and requested the
court set an OSC that DSH accept R.C. The court agreed with defense
counsel that the delay violated R.C.’s due process and equal protection rights

                                        13
but never suggested that defense counsel file a writ of habeas corpus which
would have allowed DSH to appear and address these alleged constitutional
violations, and for the trial court to formally rule on them.
      In October 2021, the trial court issued an OSC, giving DSH the ability
to appear and respond. At the subsequent hearing in December 2021,
counsel for DSH argued that it was “a treatment provider” and R.C.’s long
period in jail needed to be “handled in a writ for habeas corpus if necessary.”
The court disregarded this suggestion and ordered DSH to admit R.C. to a
DSH facility within 60 days. At a hearing in November 2021, the court
requested further briefing, which DSH filed on December 6. At the hearing
two days later, the trial court ordered DSH to admit R.C. to a DSH facility
within 60 days and continued the OSC hearing to determine whether this
had occurred.
      Judge Gaston presided over the continued hearing on March 2, 2022,
finding DSH in violation of the court’s order and imposing sanctions of
$1,000. She ordered DSH to receive R.C. and set the matter for a status
conference and an additional OSC in the event “he’s not been received [by
DSH].” But two weeks later she granted DSH’s request for an evidentiary
hearing. Following that hearing, the judge vacated both the sanctions order
and the order requiring R.C. be admitted to DSH by a certain date. In doing
so, she explained that she did not review DSH’s December 6, 2021, briefing
and declarations submitted for the March 2, 2022, OSC hearing prior to
issuing her order that DSH was required to receive R.C.
      This complicated and somewhat confused procedural history shows that
no petition for writ of habeas corpus was ever filed to challenge the basis for
R.C.’s continued confinement in jail. Instead, the issue evolved over a long
period until the trial court’s frustration led it to issue an OSC directed to

                                        14
DSH. Had a habeas petition been filed, we would have a fully developed
record addressing R.C.’s due process and equal protection challenges.
      At the December 8, 2021, hearing Judge Maguire ordered DSH to
admit R.C. to a DSH facility within 60 days even though he knew “it’s not
going to happen.” The court heard from the parties but never expressly
articulated on what statutory or constitutional basis it was issuing the 60-
day admission order to DSH. Rather, it appeared simply to determine that
the delay was unreasonable. Counsel for DSH later asked the court to “make
a record as to what authority it’s making the order on DSH.” The trial court
responded, but deflected the question regarding its authority:
         “THE COURT: They’re ordered to a state hospital, right?
         And this is the only state hospital, isn’t it? That will accept
         them—accept them by contract.

         “MS. ACUNA: I mean, specifically to the time limit of 60
         days.

         “THE COURT: I think it’s a reasonable time given the time
         that’s already elapsed. I mean, it would be close to two
         years, three years for him, but I can’t blame the state
         hospital for one year. And so, that’s the justification, in its
         entirety—from the point of referral, which should not have
         been that late, to the point of today or 60 days from today—
         kind of gives everybody enough notice. And I think two
         years—frankly, I think one year is an unreasonable time.”

      In light of all these circumstances, we cannot conclude that this case,
particularly given its unusual procedural context, presents an “issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur . . . .” (In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d
at p. 23.) Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to address R.C.’s
admittedly moot claim.

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II. Vacation of the Sanctions Order6
      R.C. contends Judge Gaston properly imposed sanctions on DSH for its
failure to comply with Judge Maguire’s initial 60-day admission order. He
asserts that Judge Gaston improperly reconsidered and revoked the
sanctions order under section 1008, requesting that we reimpose them. DSH
responds that Judge Gaston had the inherent authority to reconsider the
sanctions on her own motion. We agree with DSH, particularly given the due
process notice issues it raises.
      Subdivision (c) of section 1008 allows a court to reconsider a prior order
on its own motion based on a “change of law.” There was no change in law
between the time Judge Gaston issued the sanctions order and then vacated
the order. Nonetheless, “[e]ven without a change of law, a trial court may
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider an interim ruling.” (Pinela v.
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 237.) This authority
exists to allow trial courts to correct their own errors. (Le Francois v. Goel
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.) We review a trial court’s exercise of its
inherent authority for an abuse of discretion and, on this record, see no abuse
of discretion in the court’s reconsideration of its sanction order. (See People v.
Lujan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507.)
      On the merits of Judge Gaston’s decision to vacate her prior sanctions
order, we disagree with R.C.’s contention that we must address all the
substantive issues in this appeal to determine whether the sanctions order

6       We disagree with DSH’s argument that the order vacating sanctions is
an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable pursuant to section
904.1, subdivisions (a)(11) and (a)(12) because it does not exceed $5,000, and
the trial court has not entered final judgment. The order vacating sanctions
is an order after judgment that is appealable under section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(2).

                                       16
was properly vacated. An order imposing sanctions pursuant to section 177.5
is reviewed generally for abuse of discretion (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 977); we similarly employ the abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing an order vacating a prior sanction order. Although
this standard is highly deferential, “an abuse of discretion will be found on
appeal if a sanctions order . . . violates due process, [a] matter[ ] we decide
exercising our independent review.” (People v. Landers (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
288, 304 (Landers).)
      “ ‘Due process, as well as the statute itself, requires that a person
against whom Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 sanctions may be
imposed be given adequate notice that such sanctions are being considered,
notice as to what act or omission of the individual is the basis for the
proposed sanctions, and an objective hearing at which the person is permitted
to address the lawfulness of the order, the existence of the violation, and the
absence of good cause or substantial justification for the violation.’ ” (People
v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970 (Hundal).) The same
requirements of notice and an objective hearing must be met when the trial
court raises the issue of sanctions on its own motion. (Barrientos v. City of
Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 (Barrientos).) Such notice must be
given before the trial court makes the decision to impose sanctions. (Ibid.)7
      Here, Judge Gaston never provided DSH notice that she was
considering awarding sanctions on her own motion. At the November 2021
OSC hearing, Judge Maguire asked the parties to brief available sanctions

7     Section 177.5 provides in relevant part, “Sanctions pursuant to this
section shall not be imposed except on notice contained in a party’s moving or
responding papers; or on the court’s own motion, after notice and opportunity
to be heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.”

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for noncompliance with lawful court orders. DSH did, complaining it “was
never served with moving papers and remains unaware of the identity of the
moving party. It is unclear whether the court initiated the Order to Show
Cause on its own motion.”
      At the December 2021 hearing, counsel for DSH argued it could not be
sanctioned because it was not in violation of a prior court order. Judge
Maguire acknowledged no order existed that required DSH admit R.C. to one
of its facilities; accordingly, he issued one requiring that DSH admit R.C.
within 60 days. Then, at the March 2, 2022, hearing, Judge Gaston
sanctioned DSH on the court’s own motion without notice it would be doing so
or providing DSH an opportunity to be heard. The judge simply found she
had the authority to sanction DSH, found DSH to be in violation of a prior
order, and sanctioned it $1,000. Although very understandable given the
abrupt change in judicial officers, Judge Gaston’s failure to afford DSH notice
and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions constituted legal
error requiring vacation of the sanctions order. (Landers, supra, 31
Cal.App.5th at p. 304.) Had Judge Gaston not vacated her sanctions order,
we would have reversed such a ruling based on this due process violation.
Thus, we cannot conclude the judge abused her discretion when she vacated
the sanction order. (See Barrientos, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 [trial
court’s imposition of monetary sanctions without prior notice or opportunity
to be heard and for improper purpose was abuse of discretion].) For this

reason, the order vacating sanctions is affirmed.8

8     R.C. filed a motion to augment the record with the reporter’s
transcripts of hearings between January 25, 2022 and March 1, 2022, and on
March 10, 2022, in three matters that may have been heard with his case.
We deferred this request for consideration with the merits of his appeal.

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                                   DISPOSITION
      The appeal of the April 8, 2022, order requiring that R.C. be placed in a
state hospital by a date certain is dismissed as moot. The April 8, 2022, order
vacating sanctions is affirmed.

                                                                         DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

Based on our resolution of this appeal, these reporter’s transcripts are not
relevant and the request to augment is denied.

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