Court Opinion

ID: 9832520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:58:31.504942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.625181
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee bank questions the correctness of our conclusion that authority to sign a person’s name as surety does not confer authority to sign a joint and several note as principal, and that authority to execute a note for a certain amount confers no authority to execute one for a larger amount. As additional authorities on this proposition, we cite Mechem on Agency, § 393, and Randolph on Commercial Paper, §§ 359, 360.
[7] It is also contended that, even though Connor conferred authority only to execute the note as surety, such authority is not abused by signing his name as a joint and several obligor, because, if it be known to the payee that he is in fact a surety, then he would have the same rights with respect to the payee as if the word “surety” was written after his name. When Seawell testified positively that he “only had authority from M. Connor to sign his name as surety to the note,” we can only construe such language as meaning that the note on its face should disclose the fact that Connor was surety. If any other meaning was intended, it cannot be supplied by us. We think an examination of the authorities, showing the strict construction placed upon .authority such as was sought to be exerciséd in this case, makes it clear that a person authorizing a contract showing on its face that he is a surety has not authorized one under which he would be bound to notify the payee of his real relation as surety or ■prove that the payee had knowledge théreof,' and which would bind him as a principal ■ obligor as to an innocent purchaser for value. Nor can the person chargeable with .the duty'of ascertaining what authority the agent possesses, after accepting an unauthorized contract, be heard to say that the agent was authorized to make another contract and that he is only asserting such rights as he could have asserted had the other contract been made, and therefore ño harm has been done by the agent exceeding his authority. If the agent exceeds his authority,- his contract is not binding unless ratified; and, there being no binding contract, no recovery can be had.
[8] The proposition that no actual harm was suffered by Connor has no weight. It could' as well be sáid that, when an agent *1095signs a $1,000 note when only authorized to sign a $500 note, the principal could be held responsible if sued only for $500, because he would then have suffered no injury by reason of the excess of authority on the part of his agent. Courts cannot, if a contract unauthorized by the principal is made by the agent, substitute for the same the contract which he was authorized to make.
[3] Appellee Patterson contends that the testimony of Connor on cross-examination constitutes an admission that nothing was said about the capacity in which the note should bind him, and that such admission is to be taken as conclusive evidence overcoming the positive testimony of Seawell. In support of this theory counsel cite Payne v. Railway Co. (Mo.) 30 S. W. 149, and Peary v. St Ry. Co., 162 Mo. 75, 62 S. W. 460. The question arising in these cases was one involving the right of the court to instruct as to the conclusiveness of the testimony of parties against their interest. Later Missouri cases do not bear out the broad doctrine announced in the two cases cited. See Montgomery v. Railway Co., 181 Mo. 477, 79 S. W. 934; Conner v. Railway Co., 181 Mo. 397, 81 S. W. 151; Sheperd v. Transit Co., 189 Mo. 362, 87 S. W. 1010; Jennings v. Swift & Co., 130 Mo. App. 391, 110 S. W. 21. In the case of Conner v. Railway the court said: “If it is a mere construction of phrases or expressions used by the witness in detailing his testimony as to whether the statements are favorable or unfavorable to his side of the case, then there is no necessity, nor is it error, to refuse an instruction embodying the principle in the one before us. It is simply the province of the jury, guided by the general .instruction as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be attached to their testimony, to determine the credit of such witness and the force and effect of his testimony. If a plaintiff or defendant testifying in a cause make statements which may be construed unfavorably to them, it is the province of the jury to consider them; but, unless such statement amounts to an admission of a fact material to the issue, it is not the province of the court to assume that unfavorable statements have been made and instruct the jury on that subject.” It is not necessary in this case to hold whether an express admission of a party to the suit is conclusive against him in spite of contradictions thereof ■ by other witnesses. In this case Connor gave positive testimony on direct examination, and when cross-examined gave testimony inconsistent with that first given and did not explain or correct his testimony first given. The statement on cross-examination appears to have been in answer to a leading question, and it is not an express admission either that his former testimony was false or that nothing was said about the capacity in which he was to be bound by Seawell’s act. Under such circumstances, it is the province of the jury to determine what was meant by the party and to weigh his testimony.
It is probable that, if each of the persons testifying had been required to repeat as nearly as he could the conversation occurring between them instead of stating his conclusions, some of the questions arising upon this appeal would not have arisen.
We adhere to our former opinion that the court was not justified in instructing a verdict, and overrule the motions for rehearing.