Court Opinion

ID: 9964722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 17:11:53.36312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.990628
License: Public Domain

J-S40012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAVIER ORTEGA                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3102 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 16, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-39-CR-0001708-2019

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED APRIL 30, 2024

       Appellant Javier Ortega appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his conviction for rape of a child.1 Appellant raises claims concerning

the weight of the evidence, after-discovered evidence, his designation as a

Sexually Violent Predator (SVP), and the lifetime registration requirements

under Subchapter H of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act2

(SORNA). We affirm.

       The underlying facts and procedural history are well known to the

parties. Briefly, Appellant was charged with rape of a child and other offenses

based on allegations that he sexually abused his then-thirteen-year-old

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c).

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
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stepdaughter (M.M.) on multiple occasions in 2015. The matter proceeded to

a bench trial in 2021, during which both the victim and Appellant testified.

Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant guilty of rape of a child.

      On June 16, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen to thirty

years’ incarceration, followed by three years of probation. Appellant was also

designated as an SVP, and ordered to comply with Subchapter H’s lifetime

registration requirements.      Appellant subsequently filed a timely post-

sentence motion, which was ultimately denied.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

      On appeal, Appellant raises multiple issues, which we have reordered as

follows:

      1. Whether the verdict of guilty to the charge of rape of a child
         was against the weight of the evidence?

      2. Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial based upon after-
         discovered evidence?

      3. Whether the trial court erred by designating [A]ppellant as a
         sexually violent predator?

      4. Whether that portion of the sentence imposing SORNA
         registration requirements should be vacated because
         [Subchapter H] violates both the Pennsylvania and federal
         Constitution in the following ways:

            a. Whether [Subchapter H] denies [A]ppellant due process
               under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it creates
               an irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of
               enumerated offenses “pose a high risk of committing
               additional sexual offenses” depriving those individuals of

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              their fundamental right to reputation without notice and
              an opportunity to be heard?

          b. Whether [Subchapter H] denies [A]ppellant procedural
             due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
             to the United States Constitution because it unlawfully
             restricts liberty and privacy without notice and an
             opportunity to be heard?

          c. Whether [Subchapter H] violates substantive due
             process under the state and federal Constitutions, U.S.
             Const. Amend. XIV; Pa. Const. Art I, §1, because SORNA
             deprives individuals of inalienable rights and fails to
             satisfy strict scrutiny?

          d. Whether the recent amendment to SORNA, Revised
             Subchapter H, is in all material respects identical to
             SORNA and therefore a punitive law?

          e. Does [Subchapter H], as a penal law, violate the
             separation of powers doctrine because it usurps the
             exclusive judicial function of imposing a sentence?

          f. Whether [Subchapter H] contravenes the 5th, 6th and
             14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and
             the corresponding protections of the Pennsylvania
             Constitution because as a criminal punishment, SORNA
             cannot be imposed without due process, notice and
             opportunity to contest its imposition, and ensuring that
             each fact necessary to support the mandatory sentence
             and a sentence beyond the authorized statutory
             maximum is submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
             reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey,
             530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States,
             []570 U.S. 99 (2013)?

          g. Whether the imposition of lifetime sex offender
             registration for all Tier III offenses under [] Subchapter
             H, is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
             eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
             Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania
             Constitution?

          h. Whether Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration
             pursuant to []Subchapter H, is illegal as it is not a
             sentencing alternative authorized by Section 9721 of the

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               Judicial Code and the trial court therefore lacked
               authority to impose such a sentence?

            i. Appellant’s sentence of lifetime registration pursuant to
               SORNA is illegal as the statutory maximum for a rape of
               a child under Section 3121 (e)(1) of the Crimes Code is
               forty (40) years.

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7 (some formatting altered).

                          Weight of the Evidence

      Appellant argues that the verdict for rape of a child was against the

weight of the evidence. Id. at 63. In support, Appellant contends that “the

Commonwealth’s case stands on the uncorroborated testimony of a single

witness[]” who “gave testimony of acts that could not have occurred in the

places and at the times she alleged without anyone else knowing.” Id. at 65.

Specifically, Appellant asserts that although the victim stated that the abuse

occurred over a protracted period of time, “[t]here was no physical or medical

evidence confirming the complainant’s claims of sexual abuse[]” and that

although there were several other individuals in the residence at the time

when the acts of abuse allegedly occurred, the Commonwealth failed to

present any of those individuals to corroborate the victim’s allegations. Id.

at 65-66. Finally, Appellant also notes that there was testimony that Appellant

“worked many days and hours of the week or had been away from the home

for months at time[,]” which “is not only inconsistent with the frequency of

sexual assaults, [but also] makes it almost impossible given the victim’s claim

that she was sexually assaulted 3 to 5 times a week over a period of 3 or more

years.” Id. at 66.

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      In reviewing a weight claim, this Court has explained:

      A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
      the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
      trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
      conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
      would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial court
      considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of the
      evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only “when the
      jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
      sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that
      right may be given another opportunity to prevail. The inquiry is
      not the same for an appellate court. Rather, when an appellate
      court reviews a weight claim, the court is reviewing the exercise
      of discretion by the trial court, not the underlying question of
      whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The
      appellate court reviews a weight claim using an abuse of discretion
      standard.

      At trial, the jury [is] the ultimate fact-finder and the sole arbiter
      of the credibility of each of the witnesses. Issues of witness
      credibility include questions of inconsistent testimony and
      improper motive. A jury is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies
      in the Commonwealth’s evidence in the manner that it sees fit. . .
      .

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (citations

omitted and formatting altered); see also Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129

A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted) (reiterating that the weight

of the evidence “is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all,

none[,] or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the

witnesses” (citation omitted and formatting altered)).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s weight claim as follows:

      [Appellant’s] final claim is that the verdict was against the weight
      of the evidence. [Appellant] argues M.M.’s testimony was not
      credible and was contradicted by [Appellant’s] own testimony, and

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        that there was no physical evidence proving the crime.       I find
        these allegations to be meritless.

                                  *     *     *

        The verdict in this case does not shock one’s sense of justice. I
        observed both M.M. and [Appellant] during their testimony and
        made credibility determinations. I considered and weighed all the
        evidence presented, including the conflicting testimony and the
        absence of medical evidence, and reasonably concluded [that
        Appellant] committed the crime for which he was charged. I
        submit I rendered a verdict consistent with the weight of evidence.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).

        Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claim. See Jacoby, 170 A.3d at

1080.     Although Appellant suggests that the victim’s testimony was not

credible, the trial court was “free to believe all, none[,] or some of the

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses” and we will not re-

weigh the trial court’s credibility determinations on appeal. See Talbert, 129

A.3d at 545. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                          After-Discovered Evidence

        Appellant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial based on after-

discovered evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 57-58. Specifically, Appellant refers

to alleged evidence that M.M. may have fabricated the allegations against

Appellant. Id.

        Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a new

trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence is well settled:

        [W]e ask only if the court committed an abuse of discretion or an
        error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. Discretion

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      is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error
      of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
      or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
      the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. If a
      trial court erred in its application of the law, an appellate court will
      correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 361 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      In order to be granted a new trial based on an after-discovered

evidence, a defendant must show that

      the evidence (1) could not have been obtained prior to the
      conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2)
      is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used
      solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely
      result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Id. at 363 (citations omitted). “The test is conjunctive; the defendant must

show by a preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been

met in order for a new trial to be warranted.” Id. (citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      [Appellant] claims that M.M. may have fabricated the allegations
      due [to Appellant] not allowing her to get a cell phone and that
      M.M.’s natural father, Neftali Mendez, may have influenced M.M.
      to implicate [Appellant]. These claims are based on the following
      incidents disclosed by M.M.’s younger brother, S.M., to family
      members:

         (1)   When S.M. was approximately 10 years old, just
               before the allegations in this matter were reported, he
               witnessed his sister, M.M., ask [Appellant] for a cell
               phone, which he denied to her because of her
               “behavior issues.” M.M. stormed off and slammed the
               door. Some days after this, social workers appeared
               at his school and home asking him questions about
               abuse involving [Appellant] and M.M.

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         (2)   When S.M. was approximately 6 years old, he, M.M.,
               and Mr. Mendez were in the car together when Mr.
               Mendez turned on an audio recording device and
               asked M.M. if [Appellant] ever physically touched her.
               She replied, “yes.” Mr. Mendez then asked S.M. the
               same question and told him to answer “yes.” When
               S.M. refused to say “yes,” Mr. [Mendez] became
               angry. S.M. also indicated that between the ages of
               6 and 9, Mr. Mendez told him to “always stand up for
               your sister, even if you have to tell lies.”

      First, the evidence regarding the cell phone possibly providing a
      motive for M.M. to lie is not new evidence. The issue was brought
      out at trial and testified to by [Appellant]. As such, it was not
      discovered after trial.

      Second, the evidence regarding potential influence by Mr. Mendez,
      even if believed, could have been discovered by due diligence. A
      defendant has a duty to bring forth relevant evidence on his behalf
      and cannot claim he discovered new evidence simply because he
      was not expressly told of that evidence. [Padillas, 997 A.2d at
      364]. “Likewise, a defendant who fails to question or investigate
      an obvious, available source of information, cannot later claim
      evidence from that source constitutes newly discovered evidence.”
      Id. The question of diligence becomes especially important where
      [Appellant] has a close, amicable relationship with the potential
      witness. Here, [Appellant] and S.M. had a step-parent/step-child
      relationship, they lived together, and by all accounts had a good
      relationship. [Appellant] failed to show this evidence could not
      have been discovered with exercise of due diligence.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. See Padillas,

997 A.2d at 361. As noted by the trial court, Appellant failed to meet the due

diligence prong of the test for an after-discovered evidence claim. See Trial

Ct. Op. at 10. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Padillas,

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997 A.2d at 363 (explaining that a defendant must prove each prong of the

after-discovered evidence test by a preponderance of the evidence).

                             SVP Determination

       Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to present clear

and convincing evidence establishing that he met the statutory criteria for an

SVP.    Appellant’s Brief at 56.   First, Appellant claims that there was no

evidence that his conduct was predatory and argues that “his relationship to

the victim, that of a stepfather, was not ‘initiated, established, maintained or

promoted,’ in any respect, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.

at 56. Additionally, Appellant contends that there was no evidence that he

was likely to reoffend. Id. In support, Appellant asserts that Dr. Robert M.

Stein, Ph.D.’s assessment was based solely upon court records and documents

and he did not conduct a psychological evaluation of Appellant. Id. However,

defense expert Dr. Frank Datillo, Ph.D testified that he did not agree with Dr.

Stein’s assessment that “Appellant suffers from a lifelong condition and

[further] opined that the risk of re-offense would be significantly reduced by

treatment.” Id. at 57. Therefore, Appellant concludes that he should not be

designated as an SVP.

       In reviewing an SVP designation, we must determine whether the

Commonwealth presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant

meets the statutory definition of an SVP. Commonwealth v. Hollingshead,

111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015). “As with any sufficiency of the evidence

claim, we view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light

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most favorable to the Commonwealth [as verdict winner].”           Id. (citation

omitted). Additionally, “the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part

or none of the evidence.”    Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010,

1014-15 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

      To prove a defendant is an SVP, the Commonwealth must first establish

that the defendant was convicted of a sexually violent offense.       Then the

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant has “a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes [them] likely to engage in predatory sexually

violent offenses.”   42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12.       The statute defines “mental

abnormality” as “[a] congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects

the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes

that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes

the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.” Id. The

defendant’s conduct must be “predatory,” which the statute defines as “[a]n

act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been

initiated, established, maintained[,] or promoted, in whole or in part, in order

to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.; Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74

A.3d 1034, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Geiter,

929 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      In determining whether an individual meets the definition of an SVP, the

SOAB evaluates the following factors:

      (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

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        (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

        (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to
        achieve the offense.

        (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

        (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

        (v) Age of the victim.

        (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty
        by the individual during the commission of the crime.

        (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

     (2) Prior offense history, including:

        (i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

        (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

        (iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs
        for sexual offenders.

     (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

        (i) Age.

        (ii) Use of illegal drugs.

        (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.

        (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s
        conduct.

     (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
     field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b).

     Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s SVP determination as follows:

     At [Appellant’s] SVP hearing, the Commonwealth and [Appellant]
     agreed to the admissibility of the evaluation performed by Dr.
     Stein. Additionally, [Appellant] offered the report of his own
     expert, Dr. Frank Dattilio, Ph.D., and the Commonwealth did not
     object to its admissibility.

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     As part of the assessment, Dr. Stein reviewed various documents
     related to [Appellant] and the underlying case, including the
     affidavit of probable cause, Pennsylvania State Police reports,
     Childline reports, Child Protective Services records, the SOAB
     Investigator’s report, and prison records. [Appellant] did not
     participate in the assessment.

     Dr. Stein examined all the factors required by law. Notably, Dr.
     Stein found several factors consistent with sexual deviance,
     including that [Appellant] had sexual intercourse and digital
     penetration with a 9-year-old victim; that [Appellant] was
     substantially older than the victim; that the victim considered
     [Appellant] to be her step-father; and that [Appellant] “sustained
     [a] sexual interest in a child” over a two-year period of time. Dr.
     Stein concluded [Appellant] suffers from a paraphilic disorder, a
     condition [Appellant] will likely suffer from for his lifetime, and
     that this condition over-rode his emotional/volitional control and
     would likely lead to re-offending if given unsupervised access to
     young girls.”

     Ultimately, Dr. Stein opined, within a reasonable degree of
     professional certainty, that [Appellant] “suffers from a Mental
     Abnormality/Personality Disorder” as defined under SORNA, and
     that [Appellant] engaged in predatory behavior.

     Dr. Dattilio, [Appellant’s] own expert, agreed that [Appellant]
     meets the statutory definition of a sexual violent predator, having
     opined that [Appellant] suffers from a mental disorder, namely
     pedophilia, and engaged in predatory behavior. Dr. Dattilio,
     however, disagreed that [Appellant] suffers from a lifelong
     condition and opined that the risk of re-offense would be
     significantly reduced with treatment.

     After careful consideration of Dr. Stein’s determination of a mental
     abnormality and predatory behavior, Dr. Dattilio’s similar
     conclusions, and a review of the facts of the instant matter, I
     found by clear and convincing evidence that [Appellant] was a
     sexually violent predator. The fact that Dr. Dattilio believes
     [Appellant’s] likelihood to reoffend could be reduced with
     treatment is but one factor that I considered. The weight of the
     evidence as a whole supports the SVP designation as required by
     SORNA.      As such, [Appellant’s] argument that I erred in
     designating him an SVP is without merit, and I respectfully ask
     the [Superior] Court to affirm my decision.

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Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).

      On this record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient

evidence establishing that Appellant met the statutory definition of an SVP.

See Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189.          The trial court credited Dr. Stein’s

testimony that Appellant suffers from a mental disorder and engaged in

predatory behavior. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7. We will not re-weigh the trial

court’s credibility determinations on appeal. See Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1014-

15. Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the SVP determination is meritless,

and no relief is due. See Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189; Stephens, 74

A.3d at 1038. For these reasons, we affirm.

                            SORNA Registration

      In his remaining issues, Appellant challenges his lifetime registration

requirements under SORNA.         Appellant’s Brief at 17-55.       Specifically,

Appellant claims that Subchapter H violates due process because it creates an

irrebuttable presumption, unlawfully restricts liberty and privacy without

notice and an opportunity to be heard, and deprives individuals of inalienable

rights and fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.   Id.   Appellant also argues that

Subchapter H is punitive, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is

also an illegal sentence. Id.

      Appellant’s claims “raise questions of law for which our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

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Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). In resolving such

claims, our Supreme Court has explained that

      [i]n   addressing      constitutional    challenges    to   legislative
      enactments, we are ever cognizant that “the General Assembly
      may enact laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect
      the health, safety, and welfare of society,” but also that “any
      restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional
      rights of all citizens.” In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014). We
      emphasize that “a party challenging a statute must meet the high
      burden of demonstrating that the statute clearly, palpably, and
      plainly violates the Constitution.”

Id. (some citations omitted).

      Appellant’s instant claims are identical to those raised by the defendant

in Commonwealth v. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1213-14 (Pa.

Super. 2023). In Villanueva-Pabon, this Court explained that the Supreme

Court “in Torsilieri ma[de] clear the importance of the scientific evidence as

it pertained to each of the constitutional issues raised[.]” Id. at 1217.

However, the Villanueva-Pabon Court noted that the defendant had

“produced no scientific evidence whatsoever to support his claims that

underlying legislative policy infringes on [the] appellant’s rights[.]”     Id. at

1218 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Villanueva-Pabon Court rejected the

defendant’s SORNA challenge and concluded that he had failed to demonstrate

that Revised Subchapter H “clearly, palpably, and plainly violated [the]

constitution[.]” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted).

      Here, like the defendant in Villanueva-Pabon, Appellant does not

provide any scientific evidence to support his constitutional challenge to

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SORNA. See Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1218. Therefore, Appellant

has failed to satisfy his burden to prove that the Revised Subchapter H

provisions applicable to him “clearly, palpably, and plainly” violate the

constitution. See Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 575; see also Commonwealth v.

Martinez, 2988 EDA 2022, 2024 WL 659982, at *3-4 (Pa. Super. filed Feb.

16, 2024) (unpublished mem.) (rejecting the appellant’s challenge to SORNA

and concluding that because the appellant’s claims were identical to those

raised by the defendant in Villaneuva-Pabon, “the same reasoning applies

in this case as [the a]pellant did not seek to present any evidence to support

his constitutional challenges”).3 Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/30/2024

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished non-precedential decisions

of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

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