Court Opinion

ID: 9592740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:16:39.226376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:17.665901
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 2 of its Ipinion that the testimony of the social worker that the mother be*276lieved the victim was admissible. The majority reaches this determination “since defense counsel had the opportunity to confront the mother and cross-examine her under oath as to whether or not she did in fact believe the victim. . . .” (Majority Opinion, p. 273) The problem with this analysis is that even the mother would not have been able to testify as to whether or not she believed the victim. “A witness can neither be impeached nor sustained as to credibility by allowing another witness to testify as to his individual opinion upon this question.” Savannah &c. R. Co. v. Wideman, 99 Ga. 245 (3) (25 SE 400) (1896). See also Kennard v. State, 180 Ga. App. 522, 524 (3) (349 SE2d 470) (1986). Even “[a]n expert witness may not testify as to his opinion of the victim’s truthfulness. [Cits.]” State v. Oliver, 188 Ga. App. 47, 50 (2) (372 SE2d 256) (1988). Thus, it was error to allow the social worker to testify that the mother believed the victim. Because I cannot find any basis for holding this error to be harmless, I must respectfully dissent to the affirmance of the judgment of conviction.
Decided March 15, 1991
Rehearing denied March 26, 1991.
Newton & Howell, Griffin E. Howell III, for appellant.
W. Fletcher Sams, District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.