Court Opinion

ID: 9954687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:02:54.321512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:12.055834
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Mancia CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D080804

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. SWF1907394)

 EDGAR HERNAN MANCIA,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside,
Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with
directions.
          Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Edgar Hernan Mancia was convicted of second degree murder for the
killing of his brother, Daniel. The killing occurred after Mancia and Daniel
spent the day together drinking, and eventually got into a fight that was
partially witnessed by Mancia’s girlfriend, followed by Daniel’s disappearance
the next day. There were no witnesses to the killing and Daniel’s body has
never been found.
      On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Mancia asserts there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he intended to kill
Daniel. Mancia also argues that the trial court prejudicially erred when it
denied his request for juror identifying information based on comments made
by members of the jury to Mancia’s counsel after the verdict. In an argument
we do not reach, Mancia asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred by
instructing the jury that a property owner can use reasonable force in defense
of that property. As we shall explain, we agree with Mancia that insufficient
evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Mancia killed his brother with the
requisite malice. We reject Mancia’s contention that the trial court erred by
denying his request for juror identification. Accordingly, we reduce the
second degree murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter, affirm the
judgment as modified, and remand for resentencing.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Initial Disappearance
      At the time of Daniel’s disappearance, Mancia, his girlfriend J.T.,
Daniel, and the brothers’ parents lived at the parents’ home in Hemet in the
unincorporated area of Sage in Riverside County. The house is located in a
rural area on a seven-acre parcel surrounded by dirt roads and rough terrain
including thick brush, hills, gullies, and ravines. Illegal marijuana
operations are known to exist in the area. On the last day that Daniel was

                                        2
seen, the Sunday of Father’s Day 2019, Mancia and his girlfriend woke up
together at the home around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. The couple then got into a
brief argument. Shortly after, J.T. left to visit her father to celebrate the day
with him in Perris about an hour from the Mancia family home.
      Mancia’s mother, M.M., and father were also home that morning. M.M.
worked night shifts and woke up that day around 12:30 p.m. Her husband
was home and her two sons were out together, running errands in Hemet. By
all accounts at trial, the brothers had a good relationship and were close
friends. Mancia and Daniel returned home shortly after M.M. woke, and
M.M saw her sons hanging out together between 1:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.,
when she left for work. M.M. saw them leave the house in a Jeep Cherokee
owned by the family and drive up a nearby hill on the property that they
often visited for the views.
      Mancia told investigators that he and his brother had gone to town to
run errands and before returning home purchased a bottle of Remy Martin
and a 12-pack of Coors, which they started drinking on the drive back home.
According to Mancia, they drove up the hill to continue drinking away from
their parents, who did not approve of alcohol. M.M. did not talk to her sons
that day before she left for work. Mancia’s father left for his job in Ocotillo,
where he stayed during the week, around 4:00 p.m. After their parents left,
the men returned to the house and continued to drink.
      Later that evening, J.T. texted Mancia that her uncle had given her a
new puppy and Mancia responded that he wanted her to bring it home. J.T.
got home around 9:15 or 9:20 p.m. with the puppy. When she opened the
door, she saw Mancia asleep on the living room floor in just his boxer shorts,
something that was not unusual for Mancia. J.T. woke Mancia up to help her
with the new dog, but it took her several minutes and Mancia seemed

                                        3
groggy—she said he was talking but not making sense. When he finally woke
up, J.T. told Mancia to put on clothes to go outside and help her get the new
dog. Mancia resisted and they argued. Mancia was highly agitated.
      The couple walked outside, but then Mancia angrily went back inside
the house and slammed the front door, leaving J.T. outside. J.T. followed
Mancia inside, and heard Mancia throwing things in the bathroom. J.T.
heard objects falling and saw Mancia punching through the bathroom door,
causing it to splinter and break. Over the course of their two-year
relationship, J.T. had never seen Mancia act in such an aggressive,
destructive manner.
      During this commotion, Daniel came out of his bedroom next to the
bathroom. Daniel demanded to know what was going on and the brothers
exchanged harsh words. At one point during the exchange, Daniel asked
Mancia, “do you want me to fuck your shit up?” Mancia responded, “Come
on, let’s fight.” J.T. then witnessed Daniel, who was taller and heavier than
Mancia, push Mancia against the wall in the bathroom.
      J.T. was scared and went to the kitchen to grab a trash bag so she could
collect her belongings from the house and leave. J.T. had recently
contemplated ending the relationship, and Mancia’s behavior that night was
the final straw. J.T. went upstairs to the bedroom she shared with Mancia to
pack her things. She could hear the men continue to physically fight each
other downstairs. As J.T. collected her belongings, she heard the fighting
continue. Just before she left the house through an upstairs exit, J.T. looked
over the staircase and saw Mancia’s legs lying on the hallway floor. She
heard Mancia say, “I hope God saves you,” and Daniel respond that he didn’t
need saving. She also heard one of the men say the other was bleeding; she

                                      4
was unsure which brother had spoken. The argument stopped, J.T. assumed
the fight had ended, and she left in her car around 9:40 or 9:50 p.m.
      Before she left, J.T. did not see any blood and she did not witness
Daniel choking Mancia. After she left, as soon as she reached the main road,
J.T. called M.M., but did not reach her. Because of the severity of the fight,
J.T. considered calling the police, but ultimately decided not to call. J.T.
drove to her mother’s house in Perris. There, she sent Mancia a text message

apologizing for leaving during the fight, but she did not receive a response.1
That night J.T. also wrote a journal entry in her phone’s note application,
stating that she was shaken by the fight, that she was not used to that type
of “extreme” violence, and that she was concerned by it.
      M.M. returned home from work just before 4:30 a.m. early Monday.
She was eager to get home after listening to J.T.’s voicemail. When she
opened the door she saw two baskets of clean laundry flipped over in the
living room and other debris, the broken bathroom door, the lights on, and
the doors inside the house open. Neither of her sons were in the house. She
saw no blood in the house.
      After searching the house and calling her sons, M.M. heard the family’s
dogs outside barking. She went outside and saw Mancia stumbling towards
the house with his BMX bike. She thought that Mancia appeared drunk and
she smelled alcohol on his breath. She testified he was wearing blue jeans
and a black or grey sweater. Mancia asked his mother if she had seen him

1     The Attorney General states that at 2:47 a.m. Mancia read the text
message from J.T. The record, however, does not support this factual
allegation. While on the witness stand, the lead investigator reviewed the
text message records from Mancia’s phone. He testified that People’s exhibit
65 or 66, which are printouts of activity on Mancia’s phone, showed a “read
receipt” of the text from J.T. The documents, however, do not contain this
information.
                                        5
waiting by the side of the road. He said he was waiting for either her, Daniel,
or J.T. to come home. Mancia told his mother he did not know where Daniel
was. M.M. was worried about Daniel, whose Toyota Corolla was also
missing. She thought he could be drunk driving. M.M. called and texted
Daniel again, but got no response.
      According to M.M.’s testimony, Mancia and M.M. went back into the
house, and Mancia laid down on his parents’ bed. He told his mother he was
hurting and kept touching his neck and upper chest. M.M. noticed red marks
on his neck and swelling on his face. Mancia told his mother that he and
Daniel had been in a fight and that when he woke up he “was on the floor and
[he] felt like [he] was choking.” M.M. then went into Daniel’s room, where
she found his cell phone. M.M. walked around the property to see if she could
find Daniel, who was known to drive to other parts of the property when he
was upset.
      When she didn’t find him, M.M. began calling police stations and
hospitals in the area. M.M. also called Daniel’s work, where he was expected
at 6:00 a.m. that morning. Daniel’s coworkers told M.M. that Daniel had not
arrived and they were concerned because it was out of character for him to be
late. M.M. then drove to the home of family friends who lived in San Jacinto,
where Daniel and Mancia would sometimes stay the night. The house was
dark and M.M. did not see Daniel’s car, so she returned home.
      Later that morning, around 10:30 a.m., a citizen notified Riverside
County sheriff’s deputies that Daniel’s Corolla was abandoned at an
intersection about five miles from the Mancia home. Deputies drove to the
scene and noticed the car was locked, the right front tire was flat, and the
right side of the car was parked against an embankment. A .308 caliber
bullet casing was later found under the front passenger floor mat of the car.

                                       6
      From the Mancia house to where the Corolla was located, there were
several different available routes to travel by car or bicycle. One investigator
opined that there were at least four access points to the Mancia home from
where the Corolla was located. The jury was shown a video depicting one
way to drive from the Mancia residence to the Corolla, along with videos
depicting the drive back to the Mancia residence in both daytime and
nighttime conditions. An investigator opined that a Corolla could traverse
this route even though there were potholes and some bumpy parts of the
road. In addition, a sheriff’s deputy testified that a BMX bike could navigate
from the Mancia house to where the Corolla was found. A deputy also opined
that a BMX bike could fit in the back seat of the Corolla if a seat was pushed
forward.
      After the sheriff’s deputies found the Corolla, they determined it was
registered to a person with the last name Mancia, whose address was the
Mancia family home. The deputies went to the home around 11:00 a.m. and
Mancia answered the door. He was confused, but did not seem panicked,
fearful, or surprised. Mancia told the deputies that Daniel usually drove the
vehicle and that Daniel had not come home the prior night.
      When M.M. got back from San Jacinto, Mancia told her the sheriff’s
deputies had found the Corolla, but not Daniel. M.M. grew more concerned
and Mancia suggested they should call someone to help find Daniel. M.M.
called her brother, a police officer in central California, and he called the
Riverside sheriff’s department to initiate a missing person report. M.M.’s
brother told her Daniel’s Corolla would be impounded if it was not moved, so
she, J.T., and Mancia went to pick up the car using a spare key. The three
looked around the area for Daniel or any sign of him. While Mancia changed

                                        7
the tire, M.M. and J.T. continued to search the area, and then they brought
the car back home.
      Later that day, Mancia and J.T. drove the family’s Jeep Cherokee to get
the puppy, which she had left at her parents’ house. The puppy was bleeding
from a cut, and nonhuman blood was later found in the Jeep. Mancia and
J.T. also found Daniel’s wallet in the Jeep. Sometime later, M.M. had Mancia
remove and replace the bathroom door. In the days and weeks that followed
his disappearance, Daniel’s family, friends, and law enforcement conducted
extensive searches for him, which included handing out and posting flyers,
search parties, and the use of drones, helicopters with heat sensing
capabilities, offroad vehicles, and trained dogs.
2. Additional Investigation & Arrest
      On the second day after Daniel’s disappearance, friends and other
family members came to the family’s home to help the Mancias look for
Daniel. In the evening, law enforcement officers arrived at the Mancia home.
The officers investigated the house. Sometime before law enforcement
arrived, M.M. went into Daniel’s bedroom and found her ATM card, which
she had given him, in a pair of his pants on the floor. M.M. testified that one
of the three sets of keys for the Toyota Corolla was missing. M.M. also told
law enforcement that Daniel was supposed to leave for a planned vacation to
Mexico with his uncles the next day, and he would not want to miss the trip.
Investigators determined that there were no transactions on any credit cards
or banking accounts tied to Daniel after the night of the fight.
      While at the house, law enforcement located Mancia’s BMX bike to the
right of the front door leaning up against the house. They found a pair of tan
pants in Mancia’s hamper that had a small amount of blood on the lower legs.
Blood was also found on the rear bumper of the Jeep. The blood was not

                                        8
visible to the eye and was discovered after a forensic technician applied a
chemical reactant to the area. A criminalist who performed DNA analysis of
the blood samples testified that his testing showed strong evidence that the
blood on the Jeep came from a child of M.M. and her husband, and also that
Mancia was excluded as the source of the blood, indicating the blood was
Daniel’s. The blood on the pants did not result in any DNA identification.
      The investigation also showed that the Mancias had multiple guns at
the residence. During the search of the property, sheriff’s deputies found a
bolt action .308 caliber rifle, which belonged to Mancia’s father, under a tree
on the southwest corner of the property. According to one of the
investigators, if a .308 rifle is fired, the shell does not eject—it stays inside of
the gun, and there was no shell inside the rifle. No shell casing or blood was
found near the rifle. Mancia’s father told investigators that the rifle should
not have been in that location and was usually stored in his bedroom.
      In Daniel’s room, investigators found a .22 caliber rifle, various types of
bullet casings, and ammunition. In the parents’ bedroom, investigators found
a file case under the bed with two boxes of .22 caliber ammunition, a .22
caliber rifle, and a pellet gun. In addition, they found shell casings and live
ammunition for the .308 caliber rifle along with two boxes of ammunition for
a .40 caliber handgun.
      A neighbor of the Mancias who lived approximately 400 feet away
heard a gunshot around 11:00 p.m. the night of the brothers’ fight. The
neighbor testified he thought the gunshot came from a couple hundred feet
away, north of the Mancias’ house. When he heard the shot, he went outside
with his own gun to inspect but he did not see anything in the area. He also
testified that it was not unusual to hear gunfire in the area. The neighbor
testified he had familiarity with firearms due to his 26-year military career,

                                         9
and that he believed that the gunshot came from a small caliber rifle or a
handgun, not a .308 caliber rifle.
      At the Mancia residence, investigators asked Mancia to come to the
Riverside Sheriff’s station for questioning. He agreed, and was interviewed
by investigators over the course of several hours, beginning just after
1:00 a.m. The interview was recorded and played for the jury. It took place
in two parts, the first session of questioning was an hour in length and the
second 45 minutes. After the first part, the investigators determined that
Mancia would be arrested for the murder of his brother. Before the second
part, he was read his Miranda rights.
      During the interview, Mancia told the investigators in detail about the
afternoon that he and Daniel had spent together that Sunday. They went
together to Hemet, where Daniel got a haircut and Mancia went to Wal-Mart.
The brothers then purchased a bottle of Remy Martin cognac and some Coors
beer and headed back home. They started drinking beer on the drive home,
and then once home continued drinking together in the Jeep out on the hill.
      Mancia said they returned to the house after their parents left for
work, and eventually got very drunk. Both went to sleep or passed out before
J.T. arrived. Mancia passed out on the living room floor and Daniel went to

his room.2 He repeatedly told investigators his memory of the events was
very foggy and that he had been intoxicated. Mancia said that J.T. woke him
up and they got into an argument, then he went into the bathroom and
punched the door. Mancia said that Daniel then came out of his room and
charged Mancia, throwing him against the bathroom wall. The fight

2     Mancia also told the investigators that Daniel was a heavy drinker and
drank every day. He said that Daniel had become aggressive in the past nine
months and his parents had noticed a change in behavior, which Mancia
attributed to Daniel’s increased drinking.
                                        10
continued into the hallway and living room, where Daniel got on top of
Mancia and started choking him. Mancia said he lost consciousness and
awoke several hours later, with his hands above his head. Mancia said he
snuck out of the house, wearing only his boxer shorts and without his cell
phone, grabbed his bike from a shed and hid on the property for two hours
until his mom returned. Mancia explained that he hid because he was scared
and confused.
      When the investigators pressed Mancia for more details about the fight
with his brother, Mancia said that when he woke there were dishes, forks,
and spoons everywhere, which made no sense to him. When asked about
J.T.’s comment that she heard one of the men say there was blood, Mancia
said he did not remember this and he “didn’t grab anything to hurt [his]
brother.” The investigators pressed him for more information about what
happened to Daniel, and Mancia repeatedly stated that he did not know.
      Eventually, Mancia admitted that he had grabbed forks from the
kitchen, which Mancia said enraged Daniel further, and that Mancia was
swinging at Daniel with the forks. He denied swinging a knife at Daniel.
Mancia told the investigator that he “went for the dishes. All the things in
the dishes, I grabbed them. There were knives, forks, everything. ... And I
just–I use[d] ‘em as my guards and I got tooken down, I got choked out. I
woke up and no brother and no [J.T.] and yes, I think I made a mistake.”
Mancia said it was possible that he had injured his brother and that he may
have had a knife, but he continued to state that he did not know where
Daniel went or where he could be. He said he did not intend to injure Daniel,
he just wanted to protect himself. Mancia also admitted he and Daniel were
“more drunk” than he initially said.

                                       11
      During the interview, investigators had Mancia remove his shirt and
they observed injuries to his face, arms, torso, neck, and back. Mancia also
had swelling on both eyes, an orbital fracture, bruising on the left side of his
neck and below his clavicles, and a bruise to his left shoulder. There were
numerous scratches on his chest, back, arms, legs, and buttocks, which
sheriff’s deputies testified were not consistent with punching a door, or the
altercation Mancia described with Daniel. Photographs taken of Mancia,
which were admitted into evidence, showed small cuts and scratches on his
arms, legs, chest, and back. One investigator opined that, based on his
experience in the military hiking through desert terrain, it looked like many
of Mancia’s cuts were caused by desert brush. A physician assistant who
treated Mancia after his arrest for the orbital fracture, testified that she
noted in her chart at the time of treatment that Mancia “denied loss of
consciousness.”
      An FBI special agent with expertise in analyzing cell phone data,
investigated the cell phone records of Mancia the night of Daniel’s
disappearance and testified as an expert for the prosecution. He reviewed
data from Mancia’s cell phone between the hours of 8:30 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
the night of the brothers’ fight, and hypothesized where the device was in
relation to the location of the Mancia home and where the Corolla was found.
He opined that based on his analysis, it was likely that Mancia’s phone was
located near where the Corolla was found around 3:00 a.m. and then near the
Mancia residence around 4:20 a.m. He also testified there was no activity on
the phone from around 8:30 p.m. until 3:00 a.m., which he suggested could
mean the phone was powered off during that time. The agent also testified
that rugged, hilly terrain can affect the accuracy of cell phone location data.

                                       12
      The defense also presented the testimony of an expert on cell phone
data analysis. He called the prosecution’s expert’s analysis into question and
opined there was not enough information to establish the locations of
Mancia’s phone during the relevant time period.
3. Trial Court Proceedings & Sentencing
      Mancia was charged with one count of first degree murder. (Pen. Code,

§ 187, subd. (a).)3 The case was brought to trial and after the prosecution
concluded its case-in-chief, Mancia filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the
evidence was insufficient to support the first degree murder charge. The trial
court granted the motion in part, ruling that there was insufficient evidence
to proceed on a theory of willful, deliberate, premeditated murder, but that
the prosecution could proceed on a second degree murder charge.
      During his closing statement, the prosecutor theorized that after J.T.
left, Mancia murdered his brother and disposed of his body with the Jeep,
then staged the Corolla to look like Daniel left on his own and rode home on
his BMX bike. The prosecutor argued Mancia then fabricated a story about
being choked unconscious, Daniel disappearing in that timeframe, and then
waking up and leaving the house in fear. To support his theory, the
prosecutor pointed to the cell phone data expert’s testimony, the blood
evidence, and the suspicious circumstances surrounding Daniel’s
disappearance and the behavior of Mancia thereafter.
      In his closing, defense counsel argued the prosecution had turned a
missing person case into a criminal one, emphasizing the lack of physical
evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory of the crime and asserting the
prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof. Mancia’s defense counsel
presented the alternative theory that Daniel left to cool down or because he

3     Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                      13
felt guilty for hurting his brother, got a flat tire, wandered drunkenly into the
desert, and then got lost, injured, or encountered a wild animal or criminals
involved in the nearby marijuana operations.
      The jury was instructed on both second degree murder and
manslaughter, and also on self-defense, imperfect self-defense, provocation,
heat of passion, and a special instruction on the use of force to protect
personal property. After its deliberations, the jury returned a verdict
convicting Mancia of second degree murder.
      Before the sentencing hearing, Mancia filed a petition seeking
disclosure of juror information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 206, subdivision (g), and 237. After a hearing, the trial court denied
the petition. Mancia also filed a motion for new trial or modification of the
verdict to voluntary manslaughter, asserting there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion. The court
sentenced Mancia to a term of 15 years to life in prison. Mancia timely
appealed from the judgment of conviction.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
                          Sufficiency of the Evidence
      Mancia asserts, as he did in his motion for a new trial or modification
of the verdict, that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict
convicting him of second-degree murder. He argues that there was no
evidence that he acted with malice, and at most the evidence showed that he
could have killed Daniel after he was provoked, and only in self-defense.
      In response, the Attorney General argues sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s finding that Mancia intended to kill Daniel or intended to do an act
the natural and probable consequences of which were dangerous to life, and

                                       14
that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s rejection of heat of passion and
imperfect self-defense theories of manslaughter. In support of these
arguments, the Attorney General points to Mancia’s anger before the
brothers’ fight, Mancia’s strength, his confession that he may have swung at
Daniel with utensils or a knife, and J.T.’s testimony that she heard one of the
men state, “you are bleeding” before she left the house.
      The Attorney General also relies heavily on circumstantial evidence
related to what may have occurred after Daniel’s disappearance, including
the blood found in the Jeep, Daniel not showing up for work and a planned
vacation and leaving his personal belongings behind, and circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Mancia disposed of Daniel’s body—like the cell
phone data suggesting his location near where the Corolla was found and the
convenience of Mancia claiming he was unconscious.
                                       A
                              Standard of Review
      In assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a
criminal conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) We “ ‘presume[] in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence[,]’ ” and we “ ‘may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the
jury.’ ” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the
testimony when determining its legal sufficiency. [Citation.] Rather, before

                                       15
we can set aside a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, ‘it
must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support [the jury’s finding].’ ” (Id. at p. 145.)
      “Given this deferential standard of review, a ‘defendant bears an
enormous burden in claiming there is insufficient evidence’ to support a
conviction. [Citation.] Nevertheless, ‘substantial evidence,’ that is, evidence
that is ‘ “ ‘reasonable ..., credible, and of solid value’ ” ’ is required, not just
any evidence. [Citation.] In particular, a reasonable inference from the
evidence ‘ “ ‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ... A finding
of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than ... a mere
speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sanford
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 84, 91–92; see also People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th
353, 360 (Davis) [“ ‘An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b).)”].)
                                           B
                                  Legal Standards
      “California law separates criminal homicide into two classes: the
greater offense of murder and the lesser offense of manslaughter. [Citation.]
Murder is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice
aforethought’ (§ 187, subd. (a)), while manslaughter is defined as ‘the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice’ (§ 192). Thus, the
‘distinguishing feature [between the two offenses] is that murder includes,
but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 252 (Schuller).) “Malice exists when ‘an unlawful homicide
was committed with the “intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow

                                          16
creature” (§ 188), or with awareness of the danger and a conscious disregard
for life.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Malice “ ‘is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take [a life]. It is implied, when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart.’ (§ 188.)” (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 964.)
“ ‘We have interpreted implied malice as having “both a physical and a
mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance
of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’
[Citation.] The mental component is the requirement that the defendant
‘knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and ... acts with a
conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 965.) Second degree murder is an
unlawful killing with malice, but without the willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation necessary for first degree murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189; People
v. Superior Court (Costa) (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
       “California law recognizes two circumstances where ‘a finding of malice
may be precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter, even when an
unlawful homicide was committed with intent to kill’ [citation]: (1) when a
person kills ‘ “ ‘in a “sudden quarrel or heat of passion” [citation], or ...
[(2) when a person] kills in “unreasonable self-defense”— the unreasonable
but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘These mitigating circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from
murder to voluntary manslaughter “by negating the element of malice that
otherwise inheres in such a homicide.” ’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 252.) “[I]mperfect self-defense, ‘obviates malice because that most culpable
of mental states “cannot coexist” with an actual belief that the lethal act was
necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.’ ”

                                         17
(Ibid.; see also People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 454 (Rios) [“provocation
and imperfect self-defense, though they do not justify or excuse an intentional
or consciously indifferent homicide, mitigate the offense by negating the
murder element of malice, and thus limit the crime to manslaughter”], italics
omitted.)
      As Mancia asserts, the prosecution bore the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he harbored an intent to kill his brother (i.e., malice),
and that if he did intend to kill, he did not do so in the heat of passion or in
self-defense. “[H]eat of passion [and imperfect self-defense have] a unique
legal function. Unlike most crime elements, [these theories do] not establish
or increase criminal culpability, but mitigate[] an intentional, unlawful
homicide, otherwise murder, to a lesser offense. For this reason, provocation
[and imperfect self-defense] ‘closely resemble[] an affirmative defense’ on
which evidence is ordinarily presented by the accused, not the People.
[Citation.] Thus, far from lightening the prosecution’s burden, [a] voluntary
manslaughter instruction require[s] the People to prove the greater offense of
murder, while ... absolv[ing the] defendant from producing evidence of
provocation [or self-defense] in order to reduce the offense to manslaughter.”
(Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 459, italics omitted.) Put more
straightforwardly, to obtain a conviction for murder, the prosecution is
required to establish “the absence of provocation, or of any belief in the need
for self-defense, in order to establish the malice element of murder.” (Id. at
p. 454, italics omitted; see also People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549
(Moye) [“ ‘[N]either heat of passion nor imperfect self-defense is an element of
voluntary manslaughter’ that must be affirmatively proven. [Citation.]
Rather, they are ‘theories of partial exculpation’ that reduce murder to
manslaughter by negating the element of malice.”].)

                                        18
                                       C
                                   Analysis
      The record before this court establishes the prosecution failed to meet
its burden to show that Mancia intended to kill his brother. The evidence
that related to Mancia’s physical conduct and state of mind that night did not
support the jury’s determination that Mancia was guilty of second degree
murder. The evidence established that J.T. woke Mancia up, that he was
belligerent with her, then went into the bathroom in a fit of rage, destroying
the bathroom door with his fist. According to J.T., when Daniel awoke to
Mancia’s frenzy, Daniel said to Mancia “I’ll fuck your shit up” then “bull-
rushed” him into the bathroom wall, breaking the towel rack behind Mancia.
      Mancia’s statements to investigators largely mirrored J.T.’s testimony.
He told the lead detective that Daniel charged him, pushed him into the
bathroom wall, breaking the towel rack. According to Mancia, Daniel
overpowered him and his last recollection was of Daniel on top of him,
choking him to the point of unconsciousness. It was undisputed that Daniel
was larger than Mancia. Daniel was 6 feet 2 inches tall and weighed
approximately 230 pounds. Mancia is 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed
between 175 and 180 pounds at the time of the fight. In addition, Mancia’s
facial injuries were consistent with his statements to detectives that Daniel
had punched him repeatedly and bruises on his neck matched his report of
being choked by his brother.
      The most damning items of evidence of the fight were J.T.’s testimony
that she heard one of the men state, “you’re bleeding,” and Mancia’s
statements that before Daniel took him to the ground he grabbed utensils,
which may have included a knife, from the kitchen and used them to guard
against his brother’s attack. Mancia admitted he swung at Daniel with the

                                      19
utensils, and under pressure from the detective also admitted he could have
injured Daniel with the utensils before he lost consciousness. This evidence,
however, does not show an intent to kill or an awareness that his conduct
placed Daniel in life-threatening danger. Further, no other physical evidence
corroborated the prosecution’s assertion that Daniel was fatally stabbed.
Likewise, while guns were found in the home, no physical evidence supported
a theory that Mancia shot his brother. Put simply, there is no evidence in the
record showing that Mancia intended to kill Daniel.
      The Attorney General points to specific circumstantial evidence he
argues shows that Mancia had the requisite mental state to be convicted of
murder. The facts he identifies, however, do not support an inference that
Mancia intended to kill. Specifically, the Attorney General relies on:
(1) Mancia’s anger with J.T. before the physical fight with his brother and his
anger during the fight; (2) Mancia’s “strong and formidable” physical stature;
(3) Mancia’s “ample opportunity to slay his brother without detection” and
dispose of the body due to the six-hour window of time between J.T.’s
departure and M.M.’s arrival; (4) Mancia’s admission that he swung utensils
(possibly a knife) at Daniel during the fight; (5) the blood on the pants found
in Mancia’s hamper, near the laundry room, and J.T.’s testimony that she
heard one of the brothers say, “you are bleeding;” (6) the blood on the rear
bumper of the Jeep and testimony from an investigator that the bumper

might have been recently cleaned,4 which, the Attorney General asserts
could show a consciousness of guilt; and (7) the presence of a rifle on the
property and the Mancias’ neighbor’s statement that he heard a gunshot.

4      An investigator testified that when the Jeep was processed for evidence
he noticed that part of the bumper where the blood was located had a sheen
on it, which he thought might have been from an attempt to clean blood off.
                                       20
      None of these facts establish an intent to kill on Mancia’s part. The
fact that he was angry at J.T. that day and at Daniel during the fight does
not speak to Mancia’s intent to kill his brother. There was no evidence that
the fight concerned anything other than Mancia’s belligerent actions in that
moment and Daniel’s anger at being awakened by Mancia. There was no
evidence that the brothers harbored any animosity towards each other at all.
Rather, the only evidence in the record concerning their relationship was that
it was loving and friendly. The fact that Mancia lifted weights and was
strong provides no insight into his mental state the night of the killing.
Likewise, the fact that Mancia was alone after the killing does not speak to
his mental state or what occurred after J.T. left the house. The blood
evidence, J.T.’s testimony that one of the brothers said the other was
bleeding, discovery of the rifle outside the house, and the neighbor hearing a
gunshot also do not explain how Daniel was killed or what role Mancia may
have played in the killing.
      With respect to Mancia’s admission to using utensils and swinging at
Daniel during the fight, these statements do not show he harbored an intent
to kill. As Mancia argues, this evidence at most shows that Mancia was
responding to Daniel’s actions and attempting to protect himself from his
brother. If the jury inferred from these statements that Mancia wanted to
kill Daniel, that inference was mere speculation. (See Davis, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 360 [“ ‘[a] reasonable inference ... “may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ... A finding of fact must be an inference drawn
from evidence rather than ... a mere speculation as to probabilities without
evidence.” ’ ”].) There was no motive or other evidence that would support
such a factual finding. In this highly unusual situation, where there is no

                                       21
body and no evidence concerning how the victim died, it is impossible to make
the jump from Mancia’s statements to investigators to the conclusion of
implied malice.
      The Attorney General also relies on Mancia’s statements about his
behavior in the six-hour time period when there were no other witnesses to
the events. This evidence includes Mancia’s assertion he was unconscious for
several hours and then when he awoke, went outside the house and hid on
the property for hours with his bike; the discrepancy between Mancia’s
statement that he was outside in his boxer shorts and M.M.’s testimony that
he was clothed; the scratches over Mancia’s body; and cell phone data the
prosecution’s expert opined indicated that at 3:00 a.m. Mancia’s phone was
near where the Corolla was found. This evidence supports a theory that
Daniel was fatally injured in the fight with his brother and that Mancia
disposed of the body, but it does not speak to the question of whether Mancia
intended to cause Daniel’s death. Because the cause of death is unknown,
and there was no evidence of a motive, the only evidence of Mancia’s state of

                                      22
mind are his own statements and J.T.’s testimony about the portion of the

fight she witnessed.5
      The Attorney General also argues that Mancia’s failure to call J.T. that
night once he realized Daniel was gone and failure to ask the sheriff’s
deputies who came to the house the following morning for help in locating
Daniel was deceitful conduct indicative of a guilty conscious. The cases the
Attorney General relies on for this assertion, however, concern defendants
who gave statements to authorities that they later admitted were false. (See
People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 335 [defendant’s false statement to
the authorities that he did not know the victim was evidence of his guilty
conscious]; and People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 188 [rejecting

5     The Attorney General analogizes People v. Scott (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d
458 to this case, and argues it supports his assertion that the jury’s verdict
finding Mancia harbored an intent to kill his brother was supported by the
evidence. The Scott court affirmed a conviction for murder where the body of
the victim was never discovered and the circumstances of the victim’s
disappearance showed she did not voluntarily leave her life behind. (Id. at
p. 464.) The similarities between Scott and the present case, however, largely
end there. In Scott, the prosecution presented a theory of intentional murder
based on the testimony of tens of witnesses who provided evidence that the
victim’s husband murdered his wife to take her fortune. The evidence
presented by the District Attorney showed that the defendant “had a motive
for doing away with his wife, he coveted her large estate, attempted to
prepare her friends for an explanation of her disappearance at some future
time, was pleased and satisfied when she disappeared, did everything in his
power to deceive her friends and the authorities in order to prevent an
investigation, promptly set about through forgeries and thefts to steal her
property, and fled the country when he feared that he would be charged with
her murder.” (Id. at p. 465.) In addition, physical evidence suggested that he
had destroyed his wife’s body in an incinerator on the couple’s property. (Id.
at pp. 471–473.) In Scott, overwhelming evidence supported the jury’s
finding that the defendant intentionally murdered his wife for her money. No
similar motive or physical evidence was presented in this case to support the
prosecution’s theory that Mancia intended to kill his brother.
                                      23
claim that court erred by giving jury instruction that making a willful, false
statement concerning the crime at issue shows a consciousness of guilt where
defendant initially denied involvement then later confessed to the crimes].)
The evidence the Attorney General points to here is not the same type of
deceitful conduct that alone gives rise to an inference of an intentional
killing.
        The Attorney General points to the facts that Daniel’s disappearance
was out of character and highly suspicious because Daniel’s personal
belongings were left at home, and he was just days from leaving for a planned
vacation to Mexico with his uncles. Like the evidence concerning Mancia’s
behavior the night of the brothers’ fight, this evidence supports the theory
that Daniel did not leave on his own accord and that he may have been killed.
But it provides no insight into how that killing occurred or Mancia’s state of
mind.
        The Attorney General also argues that the evidence supported the
jury’s rejection of manslaughter based on either imperfect self-defense or heat
of passion. This argument, however, misconstrues Mancia’s challenge to the
verdict and the law of murder and manslaughter. To convict Mancia of
second degree murder, the prosecution had the burden to produce evidence
that Mancia harbored an intent to kill Daniel and to establish the killing was
not done in the heat of passion or in self-defense. (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
p. 454.) As discussed in the prior paragraphs, no evidence presented to the
jury supported these finding. Even if the jury found Mancia not credible, and
rejected his version of events, there was nothing in the record that
established how the death occurred or Mancia’s intent to kill Daniel.
        The evidence the Attorney General asserts was sufficient to support the
jury’s rejection of an imperfect self-defense theory of manslaughter all relates

                                       24
to conduct that allegedly occurred after the killing. As discussed, this
evidence is silent as to Mancia’s mental state and how the death occurred.
Thus, even if the jury decided Mancia’s story was not plausible, there was no
other evidence from which it could infer that he harbored an intent to kill his
brother. The evidence of his actions after the alleged killing took place—i.e.,
his statements about leaving the house afraid after he woke from the
choking, not contacting authorities after he discovered his brother was gone,
and the cell phone location data proffered by the prosecution’s expert—
suggest a consciousness of guilt, but they do not speak to whether Mancia
harbored the requisite mental state to support the murder conviction. No
other evidence was presented to support this leap in logic.
      The Attorney General argues that Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th 537,
supports affirmance of the murder conviction. In Moye, the appellant was
convicted of second degree murder after admitting to bludgeoning the victim
to death with a baseball bat. On appeal, Moye argued that the trial court had
prejudicially erred by failing to “instruct the jury on a sudden quarrel/heat of
passion theory of voluntary manslaughter.” (Id. at pp. 540–541.) The trial
court instructed on imperfect self-defense, and the jury rejected the theory.
(Id. at p. 548.) After the Court of Appeal reversed, the California Supreme
Court granted review and, in a divided decision, agreed with the trial court
that there was not sufficient evidence to support the requested heat of
passion instruction. The defendant was the only witness to the killing, and
in his telling of the events on the witness stand he was not provoked to
violence by the victim’s acts but only struck to defend himself from the
victim’s attack. (Id. at p. 554.) This, in the Supreme Court’s view, showed
the appellant was acting with deliberation and reflection, which was contrary
to the theory that he killed in the heat of passion. (Ibid.)

                                       25
      The Attorney General argues “the same reasoning applies in this case,”
because, as in Moye, “the thrust of [Mancia’s] version of events was that he
acted in self-defense, not out of a heat of passion.” This argument
misconstrues Mancia’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and
incorrectly presumes that Mancia was required to establish he was acting out
of passion to negate a finding of malice. Unlike in Moye, Mancia does not
argue his conviction was wrongful because the court did not provide
instructions that would allow the jury to conclude he acted in imperfect self-
defense or in the heat of passion. Rather, Mancia asserts there was no
evidence that he intended to kill Daniel. For this reason, Moye is not
controlling. Regardless of whether Mancia was provoked by Daniel, in this
case there was no evidence to show Mancia killed his brother with malice.
The fact that he admitted to swinging utensils, even a knife, during their
fight does not by itself support a finding that he intended to kill. Under the
only facts provided to the jury about the brothers’ brawl—J.T.’s testimony
and Mancia’s recorded interviews with the investigators—Daniel’s use of the
utensils was to defend himself from Daniel’s attacks.
      The other case relied on by the Attorney General, People v. Johnston
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299 (Johnston), also does not show the jury’s malice
finding was supported by the evidence presented at trial. In Johnston, the
defendant went to his ex-girlfriend’s home at 5:00 a.m. armed with a knife,
and began banging on the doors, windows, and walls, demanding his ex-
girlfriend come outside and threatening to kill her family. (Id. at p. 1304.)
The ex-girlfriend’s mother came outside and then her brother, who
immediately engaged in a fight with the defendant. During the fight, the
defendant stabbed the brother multiple times, killing him. (Id. at p. 1305.)
After the jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, the trial

                                       26
court granted a defense motion under section 1181, subdivision 6, and
reduced the conviction to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court found that
the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict because the victim started the
fight by charging at the defendant. (Johnston, at p. 1310.)
      The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the
jury’s verdict. (Johnston, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303.) It concluded
the trial court had confused the law of heat of passion and imperfect self-
defense by concluding that the stabbing was provoked by the brother’s act of
coming outside to fight off the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1313‒1314.) The
evidence, however, showed the defendant had provoked the fight by his
actions and the court held he could not escape liability for his intentional
killing based on the brother’s reaction to the defendant’s initial provocation.
The trial court’s nullification of the jury’s verdict was improper because the
jury had rejected the heat of passion theory and concluded that the defendant
intended to kill, a finding that was supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
      Here, as discussed, and unlike in Johnston, there is no evidence in the
record that Mancia intended to kill Daniel. Indeed, there was not even direct
evidence that Daniel was killed. The Attorney General asserts that Mancia
could not have acted in the heat of passion because he instigated the
altercation with Daniel by raging in the family bathroom. Thus, he asserts,
as in Johnston, Mancia was the provoker and he could not negate malice by
claiming Daniel attacked him. Unlike the state of the evidence in Johnston,
however, in this case there is no evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that Mancia intended to kill his brother. Rather, the rage in the
bathroom by J.T.’s and Mancia’s accounts (the only evidence presented about
those moments) was related to his belligerence towards J.T. Regardless of
who provoked the fight that ensued between the brothers, the prosecution did

                                       27
not meet its burden to show Mancia intended to harm Daniel. Critically, the
burden was on the prosecution, not Mancia, to show the killing was not done
in the heat of passion, in imperfect self-defense, or in the defense of property.
(See Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 549.) Mancia’s failure to make such a
showing does not dictate a finding he harbored malicious intent. (Ibid.)
      In sum, we agree with Mancia that the prosecution did not present
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he intentionally killed
his brother. Accordingly, the conviction for second degree murder is reduced

to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.6 (See People v.
Howard (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 94, 99 [“[A]n appellate court may reduce a
conviction to a lesser included offense if the evidence supports the lesser
included offense but not the charged offense.”].)
                                        II
                   Petition for Juror Identifying Information
      Mancia contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his petition for juror identification information. He asserts that after trial,
the jury’s foreperson told defense counsel that he explained the lack of blood
evidence by his belief that “because of Daniel Mancia’s size he wouldn’t have

6     Mancia also asserts that reversal is required because the court
provided an improper jury instruction concerning the defense of property. He
argues there was no evidence to support such an instruction because Daniel
did not instigate the fight to protect the bathroom and its contents, rather
there was only evidence that he wanted Mancia to quiet down so he could
sleep. The only prejudice that Mancia contends resulted from the allegedly
erroneous instruction on the defense of property was the jury’s rejection of an
imperfect self-defense theory of voluntary manslaughter. Because we
conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the second degree murder
conviction and it must be reduced to voluntary manslaughter, there is no
remaining prejudice created by the special instruction for this court to
address. Accordingly, we do not reach this contention.
                                       28
bled out, but would have bled subcutaneously due to his fat, leaving no
external blood.” Mancia contends this information established good cause for
juror identification information to determine if the foreperson provided an
improper expert opinion that influenced the jury to return a guilty verdict.
      The Attorney General responds that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because the juror statements relied on by Mancia are inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), since they concern the
mental process of the jury in reaching its verdict. Further, the Attorney
General asserts the statements did not provide good cause for identification
information because they did not demonstrate any member of the jury relied
on outside evidence or expertise and not their own common experiences.
                                       A
                           Additional Background
      Following the verdict, Mancia filed a petition seeking the disclosure of
juror identification information to support a motion for new trial based on
alleged juror misconduct. To support the petition, Mancia’s defense counsel
filed declarations setting forth a conversation they had with several of the
jurors after the verdict was reached. According to the declarations, the jury’s
foreperson told the attorneys he believed that a “larger person” like Daniel
would only bleed internally or “subcutaneously” if stabbed, and this explained
the lack of blood evidence. The declarations also stated that other jurors
agreed with the foreperson’s opinion. Defense counsel argued that this was
evidence of juror misconduct because the jury improperly relied upon outside
evidence in the form of the foreperson’s expert opinion.
      The trial court denied the petition, finding the declarations did not
show good cause to release identification information because they did not
contain any statement supporting the defense’s assertion of juror misconduct.

                                      29
The court ruled it was permissible for the jurors to rely on their common
experience, knowledge, and beliefs about general matters of law and fact and
that nothing in the declarations suggested that the foreperson used any
extraneous source, such as specialized knowledge from a medical professional
or outside research, to conclude that a stab wound might not bleed. The trial
court also pointed to Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), and found
the disputed statements were inadmissible because they concerned the
mental processes of the jury in reaching its verdict.
                                        B
                                Legal Standards
      Code of Civil Procedure sections 206 and 237 govern the disclosure of
juror information in a criminal trial. After the recording of a jury’s verdict in
a criminal trial, the trial court must seal the “record of personal juror
identifying information,” including “names, addresses, and telephone
numbers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) Code of Civil Procedure
section 206 requires the court to inform jurors in a criminal action, prior to
discharging them, “that they have an absolute right to discuss or not to
discuss the deliberation or verdict with anyone.” (Id., § 206, subd. (a).) Once
jurors are discharged, the parties may discuss the deliberations or the verdict
with a juror, provided the juror consents to the discussion, and the discussion
takes place at a reasonable time and place. (Id., subd. (b).)
      A criminal defendant may “petition the court for access to personal
juror identifying information within the court’s records necessary for the
defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion
for new trial or any other lawful purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).)
“The petition shall be supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient
to establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal identifying

                                       30
information.” (Id., § 237, subd. (b).) Good cause requires “ ‘a sufficient
showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.’ ”
(People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 345.) “ ‘Absent a satisfactory,
preliminary showing of possible juror misconduct, the strong public interests
in the integrity of our jury system and a juror’s right to privacy outweigh the
countervailing public interest served by disclosure of the juror information
....’ ” (People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 990.)
      With respect to juror misconduct, Evidence Code section 1150 provides
that “[n]o evidence is admissible to show the effect of [a] statement, conduct,
condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was
determined.” Thus, declarations pertaining to “ ‘ “subjective reasoning
processes of the individual juror” ’ ” are inadmissible to prove juror
misconduct and “cannot be considered.” (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th
269, 301–302; see also People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1264
[“Evidence about a juror’s thought process may show what that process was,
but that process is irrelevant to any legal issue”].) “ ‘ “This limitation
prevents one juror from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by impugning
his own or his fellow jurors’ mental processes or reasons for assent or
dissent.” ’ ” (Danks, at p. 302.)
      This court reviews a trial court’s denial of a petition for the release of
juror information for abuse of discretion. (Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th
at p. 991.)
                                        C
                                     Analysis
      As the Attorney General asserts, the trial court’s decision to deny
Mancia’s petition for juror identification information was not an abuse of its

                                        31
discretion. The juror statements that Mancia relies on were inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) because they concerned
the jurors’ mental processes in reaching their verdict.
      Further, even if the statements were admissible, they did not provide
good cause for release of the information. Specifically, as the trial court
concluded, there was no indication that the foreperson relied on any
specialized training or expertise to form his opinion that Daniel could have
bled internally, explaining the lack of blood evidence at the Mancia home.
On appeal, Mancia asserts that the foreperson was a marine with training
that could have provided specialized knowledge that was improperly relied on
by the jury. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this
assertion and the trial court reasonably concluded that Mancia’s allegation of
juror misconduct was speculative. Further, the trial court reasonably
concluded that the jurors could reach the same conclusion about the lack of
blood evidence based on their own backgrounds and experiences. There was
no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mancia’s petition for juror
identification information.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified by reducing the conviction from second
degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, and it is affirmed as modified.

                                       32
The matter is remanded for resentencing for the term prescribed for the
modified judgment.

                                                         McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                     33