Court Opinion

ID: 9962084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 17:01:00.420401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:49.237912
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 22 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADRIANA RUIZ-                                   No. 22-1544
                                                    22-2038
GUERRERO; ALFREDO GUERRERO-
RUIZ; GENESIS GUERRERO-                         Agency Nos.
RUIZ; HAILIE GUERRERO-RUIZ,                     A208-308-750
                                                A208-308-753
             Petitioners,                       A208-308-751
                                                A208-308-752
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                      Argued and Submitted March 26, 2024
                              Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and SELNA, District Judge.**

      Lead Petitioner Adriana Ruiz-Guerrero and her minor children are citizens

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
of Mexico who entered the United States on July 9, 2015.1 Ruiz-Guerrero petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her

appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). She also petitions for review of the BIA’s order denying her

motion to reopen removal proceedings due to a lack of jurisdiction.

      We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its

legal conclusions de novo. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th

Cir. 2022). Under the substantial evidence standard, “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

abuse of discretion. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.

      1.    Deficient Notice to Appear. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in

denying Ruiz-Guerrero’s motion to reopen. Ruiz-Guerrero received an initial

Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that lacked the time, date, and location of the removal

proceeding. But the NTA was supplemented with a notice that fully complied with

1
 Ruiz-Guerrero’s minor children are rider petitioners who filed independent
applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Ruiz-Guerrero does not
argue that the grounds of her children’s claims differ from hers.

                                       2                                  22-1544
the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, the initial, defective NTA

did not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).

See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022) (en

banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 755 (2023) (holding that “§ 1003.14(a) is a

nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule”).

      2.     Denial of Joinder. The IJ denied Ruiz-Guerrero’s motion to join her

and her co-petitioner children’s cases with those of her husband and adult son. The

BIA reasoned that Ruiz-Guerrero was not prejudiced by the denial of joinder

because (1) the BIA did not reach the IJ’s adverse credibility finding that Ruiz-

Guerrero argued would have been avoided with joinder and (2) her husband had

not appealed the denial of his asylum claim. That conclusion was not erroneous.

      Ruiz-Guerrero’s argument that the BIA’s ruling conflicted with the Supreme

Court’s holding in Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021), is inapposite. That

case rejected the “deemed-true-or-credible rule,” which required a reviewing court

to assume the truth or credibility of a petitioner’s factual contentions in the absence

of an explicit adverse credibility finding by the agency. Id. at 364–65. Here,

though, the IJ did make an explicit adverse credibility finding, so Ming Dai’s

holding has no bearing. Additionally, the BIA did not reach the IJ’s credibility

finding in its affirmance. Ruiz-Guerrero’s arguments to the contrary are

unpersuasive.

                                         3                                    22-1544
      3.     Asylum and Withholding of Removal.

      The IJ found that Ruiz-Guerrero and her children had not suffered past

persecution, and Ruiz-Guerrero did not meaningfully challenge that finding before

the BIA. Therefore, Ruiz-Guerrero’s argument as to this finding is unexhausted,

precluding our review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Szonyi v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d

1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A petitioner’s failure to raise an argument before the

BIA generally constitutes a failure to exhaust . . . .”); Santos-Zacaria v. Garland,

598 U.S. 411, 416, 424 (2023) (holding that the statutory requirement for

exhaustion is non-jurisdictional, but that ordinary rules of forfeiture apply).

      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s analysis of Ruiz-Guerrero’s four

proposed particular social groups: (1) “ex-employee in a legitimate business owned

by a cartel, where the respondent has inadvertent knowledge of the cartel’s

workings,” (2) “crime witnesses,” (3) “police oppression,” and (4) “kinship.” See

Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating that, for purposes

of asylum and withholding of removal, a petitioner must establish membership in a

cognizable particular social group). There is no evidence that Ruiz-Guerrero or her

children belong to the first two groups, because they did not show that they worked

for the cartel-owned business or witnessed any crimes. The proposed groups based

on “police oppression” and “kinship” are not cognizable because they lack

sufficient particularity. See Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020)

                                         4                                    22-1544
(explaining that a proposed particular social group must be “defined with

particularity,” among other requirements).

      We may not, and do not, consider Ruiz-Guerrero’s argument that the BIA

applied an improper legal test for its nexus determination because the BIA did not

rely on an absence of nexus. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829

(9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the

grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation omitted)).

      4.     Protection Under CAT. A petitioner seeking withholding of removal

under CAT must show that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured by

or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or

other person acting in an official capacity if she were removed Mexico. See 8

C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.18(a). Country conditions evidence of generalized

crime and gang violence is insufficient to establish future threats of torture. See

Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[Petitioner] has not

shown a greater risk to [her] than any other Mexican national deported from the

United States such that torture would be ‘more likely than not’ in [her] case.”).

      Here, the record does not compel the conclusion that Ruiz-Guerrero is more

likely than not to be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of, or at the

instigation of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity in

Mexico. Ruiz-Guerrero does not contend that she or her children were tortured in

                                          5                                     22-1544
the past. Likewise, Ruiz-Guerrero has not shown any official consent,

acquiescence, or instigation in relation to her fears about the cartel that employed

her husband. Finally, it appears, as the agency noted, that Ruiz-Guerrero’s family

could relocate within Mexico to avoid conflict with the cartel. See Tzompantzi-

Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[I]n assessing eligibility for

CAT relief, the agency must consider the possibility of relocation—without regard

for the reasonableness of relocation that is considered in other types of applications

(asylum and withholding of removal under the INA).”).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         6                                   22-1544