Court Opinion

ID: 9634453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:13:20.453686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:03.213798
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring.
The most startling aspect of this case is that the Commonwealth’s explanation in defense of the introduction of the testimony relating to appellant’s conduct at a prior lineup would, if accepted, constitute even more grievous error than the one that the majority addresses.
The Commonwealth admits in its brief that the purpose sought to be achieved by the introduction of appellant’s obstreperous conduct during the unrelated lineup was to prove that the appellant had engaged in a course of conduct designed to evade detection of guilt. The law is settled in Pennsylvania that evidence of. flight, or of other means adopted by a defendant to avoid detection, with respect to the crime charged, is admissible evidence tending to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt of that crime. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Holland, 480 Pa. 202, 389 A.2d 1026 (1978) (altered appearance of defendant admissible); Commonwealth v. Sanabria, 478 Pa. 22, 385 A.2d 1292 (1978) (flight); Commonwealth v. Faulcon, 450 Pa. 414, 301 A.2d 375 (1973) (flight); Commonwealth v. Osborne, 433 Pa. 297, 249 A.2d 330 (1969) (flight); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964) (flight). While the conduct of the appellant during the earlier lineup may well have supported an inference of guilt of the crime for which the lineup was then being conducted, it was totally irrelevant as *7to his complicity in the instant incident. Since none of the persons involved in the present offense were present at the lineup in question, it is absurd to suggest that his conduct at the proceeding reflected a consciousness of guilt for the instant crime.
However, the fact that this evidence was clearly irrelevant in the instant crse is not the only evil caused by its admission. Even more serious, if we accept the Commonwealth’s analysis, the jury was lead to believe that this lineup was part of the investigation in this case. Pursuing this reasoning a step further, his conduct at that lineup could properly be interpreted as a consciousness of guilt for this offense.
While, as the majority believes, the jury may have been perspicacious enough to have discerned this attempt to fool them, the Commonwealth astonishingly maintains the contrary.
“It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses.” ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution and Defense Function, § 5.6(a) (Prosecution Function) (Approved Draft 1970) at 119. While this evidence was not “false evidence” in the sense in which perjured testimony would be considered false evidence, this testimony was introduced for the same purpose for which perjured testimony would be proffered, to wit, to mislead the jury and to create a false impression that the evidence of appellant’s conduct at the lineup was relevant to the issue of his guilt of the crime as charged in this case. Thus, if the prosecutor was of the belief that this testimony was accepted by the jury as being related to this trial, it was their obligation to correct that misapprehension. Certainly they cannot be permitted to rely upon this misinterpretation. We are bound by the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 364, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) which states that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of materially false testimony may not stand and a prosecuting attorney has an *8affirmative duty to correct testimony which he knows to be false. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 806 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977); Commonwealth v, Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 362 A.2d 217 (1976); Commonwealth v. Moehring, 445 Pa. 400, 285 A.2d 487 (1971); Commonwealth v. Alston, 430 Pa. 471, 243 A.2d 404 (1968).
I, therefore, agree that a new trial must be awarded.