Court Opinion

ID: 9759365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:13:58.217008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.448134
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent. On June 26, 1978 — the date upon which the Supreme Court decided Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) — defendant had not yet exhausted all avenues of direct judicial review to which he was entitled by Rule of Court. In fact, five days prior to Franks we granted the petition for certification filed on his behalf. The strictures of Franks should therefore be applicable to the facts of this ease, notwithstanding that both the issuance of the challenged warrant and the trial judge’s ruling preceded the Supreme Court’s decision. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary is predicated upon a misunderstanding of caselaw dealing with the problem of retroactivity in Pourth Amendment contexts, and places a judicial imprimatur upon the conduct of police officers who in bad faith have perjured themselves before magistrates charged with the solemn duty of issuing search warrants.

*576
I

As the majority emphasizes, the Franks decision squarely overruled this Court’s holding in State v. Petillo, 61 N. J. 165 (1972), cert. den., 410 U. S. 945, 93 S. Ct. 1393, 35 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1973). As such, Franks clearly changed the law-regarding the permissibility of a criminal defendant’s challenge to a facially sufficient search warrant. The question to be decided is whether, and to what extent, this “new” rule should be given retrospective application.
Supreme Court holdings dealing with the retroactive effect to be accorded decisions expanding the rights of criminal defendants have not followed a uniform path. In certain contexts, the Court has ruled that “new” constitutional doctrines limiting the actions of state agents are retroactive only in the sense that they govern the rights of the parties to the overruling case itself, but not those of other defendants who have been victimized prior to the announcement of the new rule. See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 95 S. Ct. 2313, 45 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1975) (legality of border searches); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967) (right to counsel at pretrial lineup). In other situations, a new constitutional rule has been held applicable to all cases pending direct judicial review at the time the new rule was handed down. See, e. g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965) .(application of “exclusionary rule” to the states); State v. Nash, 64 N. J. 464 (1974) (prohibition against imposition of more severe sentence following appeal). Finally, certain “new” rules have been held to apply even to those cases in which final judgment has been entered and all avenues of direct judicial review have been exhausted. See, e. g., Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2, 84 S. Ct. 80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U. S. 214, 78 S. Ct. 1061, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1269 (1958) (free transcript to indigents appealing criminal convictions).
*577The federal Constitution itself neither prohibits nor requires that expansions of the rights accorded criminal defendants be given retrospective application. See, e. g., Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 651, 91 S. Ct. 1148, 1151, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388, 394 (1971); Linkletter, supra, 381 U. S. at 629, 85 S. Gt. at 1737, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 608. Rather, in each case a court must weigh and balance the competing considerations militating in favor of or against any particular form of retroactivity. The major criteria which must guide the resolution otf such a question are:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
[Stovall, supra, 388 U. S. at 297, 87 S. Ct. at 1970, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 1203]
See, e. g., Williams, supra, 401 U. S. at 652, 91 S. Ct. at 1152, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 394; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 728, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 1778, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 889 (1966); Linkletter, supra, 381 U. S. at 636, 85 S. Ct. at 1741, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 612; State v. Nash, supra, 64 N. J. at 471. In my view, a consideration of each of these factors leads to the conclusion that the Franks doctrine should be applicable to the facts of this, and every other, case in which all avenues of direct judicial review were not exhausted prior to the date on which Franks was decided.
A

The Purpose of the Franks Rule

The majority states that the sole purpose of the Franks doctrine, and indeed the exclusionary rule in general, is that of deterring illegal police conduct. Since any perjury that may have been committed is already a fait accompli, the argument goes, this goal will not be served by suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the Howery warrant.
*578The majority’s argument in this regard is faulty in at least two respects. First, it is not the case that deterrence is the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule. Time and again, the Supreme Court has emphasized that this rule is also designed to uphold “the imperative of judicial integrity.” United States v. Peltier, supra, 422 U. S. at 536-538, 95 S. Ct. at 2316-2317, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 380-382; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 659, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1693, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1092 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680 (1960). See generally, Mote, “Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1977). Illegally obtained evidence is not suppressed merely to provide state agents with a disincentive to violating individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. Its admission at trial is also prohibited in order that the integrity of the judicial process not be tainted through use of the fruits of crime in order to secure a conviction.1 In the now famous words of Justice Brandéis:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the govern*579ment will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. * * * If tbe government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto bimself; it invites anarchy. * * * [T]o declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal * * * would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944, 959-960 (1928) (Brandéis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting) ]
Instead of discussing this “judicial integrity” purpose of the exclusionary rule, the majority takes refuge in Justice Rehnquist’s observation that decisions expanding individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights have never been accorded even limited retroactive effect. See United States v. Peltier, supra, 422 U. S. at 535, 95 S. Ct. at 2316, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 380. The majority, however, fads to recognize that one of the principal rationales underlying these “prospective” Fourth Amendment decisions is not present in a FranTcs-tjpe situation.
Almost every case in which a new rule has been applied purely prospectively has involved a situation in which policemen reasonably believed in good faith at the time of a search or seizure that their conduct was in accordance with the law. Admission of the fruits of those searches at trial has therefore been deemed not to violate the “imperative of judicial integrity,” even though decisions subsequent to the searches have held that the conduct engaged in by the law enforcement officers was not permitted by the Constitution. See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, supra; Williams, supra; Stovall, supra.2
*580In the present case, one would, be hard put to conclude that Detective Morris reasonably believed in good faith that knowingly swearing to the truth of false statements was in accordance with the law. State v. Petillo did not legitimize perjury. Nor did Franks resurrect it as a crime. False swearing was illegal when the Howery affidavit was executed, it was illegal when Howery was brought to trial, and it remains illegal today. Thus, irrespective of the controlling weight of Petillo when the search warrant was obtained, Detective Morris would not have been acting in accordance with the law if he swore falsely before the magistrate.
The majority’s “deterrence” argument is also flawed in that it assumes that the deterrence rationale itself will not be served by retroactively applying the Franks doctrine. It is true, as the majority emphasizes, that any perjury3 that may have been committed by Detective Morris is already a fait accompli. This result, however, will obtain in any situation in which illegally seized evidence is sought to be introduced at trial — even if the policeman involved has deliberately defied a controlling Fourth Amendment decision in order to obtain that evidence.
*581What the majority fails to perceive is that the “deterrence” which the exclusionary rule is designed to achieve is not simply the deterrence of the particular past act challenged at a suppression hearing. Rather, the rule is designed to deter all policemen from in the future acting contrary to the law. In certain Eourth Amendment contexts, this goal will not be served by according retroactive effect to a “new” ruling. This is so because at the time the police conduct occurred, the policemen reasonably believed in good faith that such conduct was wholly legal. See, e g., United States v. Peltier, supra, 422 U. S. at 536-538, 95 S. Ct at 2316-2317, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 380-382; Williams, supra; Stovall, supra, 388 U. S. at 299-300, 87 S. Ct. at 1971, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 1205. In the present case, however, false swearing was illegal when Detective Morris executed the Howery affidavit. Thus, if Morris lied before the magistrate, suppression of the evidence seized as a direct result of his perjury will serve the goal of deterring all policemen from using illegal means to obtain evidence.
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that both the “judicial integrity” and “deterrence” goals sought to be achieved by the exclusionary rule will in fact be furthered by applying Pranks to the facts of this case. Moreover, both goals will be disserved if Franks is not so applied in that policemen who have in bad faith perjured themselves before magistrates will be rewarded for their efforts.
B

The Extent of Reliance by Law Enforcement Authorities Upon Petillo

The majority states that “there can be no doubt of the reliance in this jurisdiction on the now-overruled Petillo decision.” Ante at 570. In support of this proposition, it points out that both the trial court and the Appellate Division relied in good faith upon that ease when denying Howery the right to challenge the facially sufficient search warrant.
*582Unfortunately, it is not the reliance of the lower courts upon an overruled decision which is of central relevance in a retroactivity determination. "Were such the case, then no overruling decision would ever be applicable even to the parties involved in the overruling case itself. Rather, what is of major importance is the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities — i. e., the police, not the judges — upon the overruled decision. The reasoning underlying this inquiry is that state agents should not be penalized for complying in good faith with “prevailing constitutional norms” at the time a search was conducted. See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. at 536-538, 95 S. Ct. at 2316-2317, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 380-382; Stovall, supra, 388 U. S. at 299-300, 87 S. Ct. at 1971, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 1205; Johnson, supra.
As discussed in Part A supra, however, any perjury that may have been committed by Detective Morris cannot be said to have derived to any degree from a good faith reliance upon Petillo. That ease merely held that a criminal defendant could not attack the validity of a facially sufficient search warrant. It did not legitimize false swearing.
C

Effect On the Administration of Justice

The majority states that retroactive application of Franks would be detrimental to the administration of justice in that “[i]t would require courts to delve into the allegations of what would doubtless be a considerable number of defendants, to the effect that police officers had lied in affidavits long stale.” Ante at 571. To the extent that the majority’s remarks pertain to cases in which final judgment had been entered and all avenues of direct judicial review were exhausted prior to the Franks decision, I agree. Any other conclusion'would likely inundate our lower courts with a deluge of petitions supported by such “stale” evidence.
*583This consideration, however, should not stand in the way of applying the Franks doctrine to those cases which were still pending direct review at the time Franks was decided. Such cases will doubtless not be considerable in number. Moreover, allegations of perjury will not be predicated upon stale evidence. Finally, new trials will not necessarily be mandated in even these few instances. Rather, only if the trial judge, after conducting a Franks inquiry, determines that the evidence must be suppressed will the conviction of any defendant need to be overturned.4
According this degree of retroactive effect to Franks is especially compelling in view of the fact that it will support both the “judicial integrity” and “deterrence” purposes of the exclusionary rule. Further, it will not — as will the majority’s holding — place our imprimatur upon the conduct of police officers who have disobeyed the law by swearing falsely before magistrates.
II
Despite its ruling that Franks is not here applicable, the majority examines the record below in order to establish that defendant’s convictions would stand even were he permitted to attack the search warrant in question. A careful reading of that record, however, demonstrates that the majority’s analysis is deficient in many material respects.
It is undisputed that the note seized by Detective Morris at John Clark’s residence read “It’s OK, give Dave (2). Rich.” In his affidavit, however, Morris swore that “found *584in the possession of John Clark, was a note signed ‘Richie’ telling Clark to give Dave two bundles” (emphasis supplied). The majority admits this is “troublesome” but attaches no significance whatsoever to the fact that the word “bundles” did not appear in the note. In its view, a consideration of the note in light of all attendant circumstances would in any event have led the magistrate to conclude that “(2)” referred to two bundles of heroin.
The main “attendant circumstance” upon which the majority bases its conclusion —- i. e., that inculpatory evidence was in fact located at Howery’s residence ■ — ■ was not, however, known until after the warrant was secured and the search conducted.5 Aside from those portions of the Morris affidavit which were allegedly sworn to falsely, the only “circumstances” linking Howery to heroin were statements in the affidavit that (1) Dave Townsend had sold heroin to Noel Agostini on August 1, 1973, and had driven to the point of sale in a car registered in Howery’s name; and (2) Howery and Townsend “have been seen together at known narcotics spots.” In my view, these circumstances alone were hardly sufficient to convince a magistrate that “(2)” referred to two bundles of heroin. It is noteworthy that at Howery’s trial, Townsend testified that the “(2)” denoted two cases of liquor.
This error on the majority’s part is, however, small in comparison to the deficiencies extant in its analysis of How-ery’s second allegation of false swearing. In his affidavit, Detective Morris swore that “John Clark told me on August 1, 1973, that, Richard Howery customarily keeps a quantity of Heroin at his residence.” The majority correctly holds that this statement was material to a finding of probable cause. Nevertheless, by means of arbitrary ad hoc “factfinding,” it concludes that any misrepresentation present in the affidavit *585was not the product of “bad-faith, perjurious conduct,” but instead derived from an innocent “misunderstanding” between Clark and Morris. Ante at 57T-575.
The manner in which the majority found these “facts” is somewhat puzzling. At Howery’s trial, Clark testified that he did not tell Morris that Howery kept narcotics in his home. Morris testified that Clark had indeed given him such information. Erom this testimony, the majority concludes that the challenged portion of Morris’ affidavit was the product of an innocent misunderstanding on Morris’ part. This conclusion is reached despite the fact that the majority did not observe Morris’ demeanor at the time he uttered the above testimony, and hence is in no position to judge his credibility. See State v. Singletary, 80 N. J. 55, 62-63 (1979). The majority appears to find it inconceivable that Detective Morris may have sworn falsely on the stand — a possibility which, of course, would require that this case be remanded to the trial judge for a Franks hearing.
More importantly, while engaging in its ad hoc “fact” finding, the majority completely ignores the fact that at trial Howery requested and was denied permission to call additional witnesses in order to substantiate his allegations of perjury. If Franks is to have any significance, at the very least a defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence in support of his cause before his petition is ruled upon. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary not only does disservice to the Eourth Amendment, it also “makes a mockery of ‘due process’ ” of law. In re Farber, 78 N. J. 259, 285 (1978) (Pashman, J., dissenting), cert. den. 439 U. S. 997, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1978).
Accordingly, I would remand this case for a Franks hearing at which defendant may attempt to substantiate his allegations of perjury. If he fails in this elndeavor, the convictions will stand. Should he be successful, however, his convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
*586For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Clieeoed, Soheeibee and Handles — 5.
For remandment — Justice P ashman — 1.

The majority asserts that “the United States Supreme Court has eschewed any substantial reliance on the [judicial integrity] rationale in determining the scope of the application of” the exclusionary rule. Ante at 569. In support of this proposition, the majority cites Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) — a case which, unlike the present matter, was not concerned with the question of retroactivity. In United States v. Peltier, supra — a case which is the Supreme Court’s most recent retroactivity decision — the majority took great pains to emphasize that the police conduct there involved did not violate the “imperative of judicial integrity.” See 422 U. S. at 536-538, 95 S. Ct. at 2316-2317, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 380-382. This justification of the policemen’s actions would have been wholly unnecessary had the Justices been of the view that the “judicial integrity” rationale of the exclusionary rule was no longer viable.

At first glance, it might appear that the Supreme Court’s decision in Linkletter, supra, departs from this principle inasmuch as the police there involved knew at the time of the search that their conduct was illegal. Upon closer analysis, however, it can be seen that Linkleitter is wholly consistent with the “judicial integrity” rationale discussed above. Unlike Peltier and Williams, the issue confronted by the Court in Linkletter was whether a new Fourth Amendment *580doctrine should be applied to cases in which all avenues of direct judicial review had been exhausted prior to the announcement of the new rule — not whether a new rule should merely be apnlied to cases pending direct review at the time the new rule was pronounced. Despite the bad faith of the police, the Court determined that the administration of justice would be seriously eroded if the new ruling were applied to the “thousands of cases that were finally decided” before the new rule was announced. Linkletter, supra, 381 U. S. at 636, 85 S. Ct. at 1741, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 612. In this case, as in Peltier and Williams, defendant merely seeks to have a new ruling applied to those few cases pending judicial review at the time the new ruling was announced.

By the terms “perjury” and “false swearing,” I mean to refer to the type of conduct condemned in Franks — that is, a false statement made knowingly, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. See 438 77. 8. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684, 57 L. Ed,. 2d at 682.

It should also be noted that in many cases a full Franks hearing will not be necessary. Such a hearing is required only if the defendant can make a substantial preliminary showing of perjury. He must allege “deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth,” and those allegations must be supported by an offer of proof. Finally, the misstatements claimed to be false must be material to the extent that when they are excised from the affidavit, that document no longer contains facts sufficient for a finding of probable cause.

it is well established that “[a] search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.” United States v. DiRe, 332 U. S. 581, 595, 68 S. Ct. 222, 228, 92 L. Ed. 210, 220 (1948).