Court Opinion

ID: 9954121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:16.528798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.223149
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cunningham v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-1100.]

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MAHONING COUNTY

                                  TARON CUNNINGHAM,

                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                 v.

                               JAMAEL TITO BROWN et al.,

                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                      OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                      Case No. 23 MA 0062

                                   Civil Appeal from the
                     Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
                                 Case No. 2022 CV 00071

                                       BEFORE:
                 Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                           JUDGMENT:
                                             Affirmed.

Atty. S. David Worhatch, Law Offices of S. David Worhatch, for Plaintiff-Appellant and

Atty. James A. Climer, Atty. Frank H. Scialdone, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A.
for Defendants-Appellees.

                                     Dated: March 18, 2024
                                                                                       –2–

Robb, P.J.

       {¶1}   Appellant Taron Cunningham appeals after the Mahoning County Common
Pleas Court, in an administrative appeal, affirmed the decision of the Youngstown Civil
Service Commission, which upheld the employment termination decision made by Mayor
Jamael Tito Brown for the City of Youngstown. Previously, the trial court vacated a
commission decision and remanded for the mayor to issue a removal order that complied
with a civil service rule requiring the city to “state the reasons” for removal. The mayor
amended the removal order to specify various reasons for Appellant’s termination,
prompting Appellant’s current round of appeals.
       {¶2}   First, Appellant contends the initial trial court’s decision remanding for the
mayor to issue a compliant removal order necessarily required Appellant’s reinstatement
with back pay from the date of the first removal order until the date of the amended
removal order. He argues the failure to specify the reasons for termination in the first
removal order rendered it “void ab initio” so that he was not actually terminated until the
amended removal order added specific reasons.
       {¶3}   If this argument fails, Appellant contends the earlier remand could not
authorize amendment of the removal order to add the grounds already presented at the
first hearing because a civil service rule says “no material amendment” can be made to
the removal order after the employee appeals to the commission.             From this, he
alternatively reasons the amended removal order was improperly upheld and should be
eliminated, claiming this would entitle him to reinstatement from the date of the non-
compliant first removal order with back pay continuing through the current day.
       {¶4}   If his first two arguments fail, Appellant argues he was entitled to
reinstatement from the date of the first removal order through the date of the amended
removal order because a removal order is only effective if it is directed at an employee.
From this, he reasons he must have been an employee when the amended removal order
was issued. For the following reasons, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
                                  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
       {¶5}   In November 2017, Appellant was hired as a deputy director in the City of
Youngstown’s Community Planning and Economic Development Department. In January

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2019, the city’s law director provided Appellant with a pre-disciplinary letter disclosing the
city was considering the termination of his employment. The letter negatively referred to
his employment history and pattern of conduct at work, including an inability to adhere to
workplace policy and rules, incompetence, poor communication skills, misrepresenting
facts in the course of work, temperamental and retaliatory behavior, general
insubordination, and failing to provide sufficient guidance to employees under his
supervision.
       {¶6}    The letter then further specified the allegations under review as including
the following five category headings: (1) “Your supervisor and staff have had multiple
encounters wherein you have made statements during the course of business and later
deny the statements were made or you have parsed words and attack others and their
accounting of a conversation with you”; (2) “You have exhibited behavior characterized
as belligerent and hostile when being called to task and accountability. On several
occasions you have exhibited hostile behavior to your supervisor and staff”; (3) “You have
failed to meet critical deadlines that are mandatory from the funding agency, HUD.
Further, you do not respect or adhere to deadlines and assignments given by * * *
Department Head. You do not adhere to other department deadlines”; (4) “You have
attempted to take impermissible action or lacked an understanding of programming
creating a hindrance to the functions of the office”; and (5) “Your written and verbal
communication skills are challenging to decipher and have presented a regular
impediment to workflow.”
       {¶7}    Under each of these headings, the pre-disciplinary letter provided dated
examples. The letter also provided notice of the opportunity to be heard in writing or in
person to offer evidence and arguments. Appellant requested and attended an oral
hearing. At this pre-disciplinary hearing, the charges were reviewed while Appellant was
represented by his attorney.
       {¶8}    On March 8, 2019, the mayor issued a removal order, stating: “Upon review
of the evidence presented at your pre-disciplinary hearing and after providing you a full
opportunity to be heard, it is my decision to terminate your employment with the City of
Youngstown effective immediately.” The removal order explained the right to appeal to
the commission, and Appellant did so.

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       {¶9}     At the hearing before the commission, Appellant’s attorney challenged the
sufficiency of the removal order. A month after the hearing, a different attorney entered
a limited appearance on behalf of Appellant and moved to bifurcate the proceedings. He
asked the commission to hold a separate hearing on the merits of the termination decision
if the commission rejected Appellant’s initial argument on the deficient content of the
removal order. The commission rejected this request, pointing out the motion was filed
after the close of the hearing.
       {¶10} On July 22, 2019, the commission issued a decision affirming the city’s
termination decision.    The commission concluded the wording in the removal order
sufficiently afforded Appellant due process regarding the reasons for termination because
it referred to the evidence presented at the hearing and because he received a lengthy
list of reasons in the pre-disciplinary letter before the hearing which reasons were
reviewed “point by point” at the hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill (1985),
470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (“The tenured public employee
is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. * * * To require
more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the
government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.”). In overruling
Appellant’s challenge to the removal order, the commission observed that although the
specific reasons were not recited in the removal order, it was “incomprehensible” to argue
Appellant was unaware of the reasons for his termination and in fact he “well knew the
reasons for his termination both as a matter of substance and procedure.”
       {¶11} Appellant filed a timely administrative appeal to the trial court, resulting in
Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Number 2019 CV 1556. The first argument in
Appellant’s brief in the first trial court case alleged the removal order failed to comply with
Youngstown Civil Service Commission Rule VIII because the order failed to specify the
reasons for termination. His second argument challenged the commission’s rejection of
his request for bifurcation (wherein he sought an additional hearing on the merits of the
termination).
       {¶12} The trial court agreed with Appellant’s first argument, finding that although
Appellant may have been afforded due process as found by the commission, the removal

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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order did not comply with the commission’s rule. The court vacated the commission’s
2019 decision and remanded in order to allow the city “to issue a compliant order of
removal” and in order to “afford Appellant a full hearing should he choose to appeal” the
removal order. (2/26/20 J.E.). The trial court noted its decision (affording a second
commission appeal from the amended removal order) rendered moot Appellant’s second
argument (requesting a new hearing before the commission).
       {¶13} The trial court also addressed a request for reinstatement with back pay
contained in the conclusion of Appellant’s brief. It was pointed out a terminated civil
service employee is not entitled to damages if he would have been fired regardless of the
cited procedural defect, citing Card v. City of Cleveland, 2017-Ohio-7173, 95 N.E.3d
1066, ¶ 37-38 (8th Dist.) (refusing to elevate form over substance or obscure the real
issue of whether there were legitimate grounds for termination), citing Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). The trial court therefore
concluded the remedy requested by Appellant was not ripe, as it was not an available
remedy for the mere existence of the procedural issue found in the case.
       {¶14} On March 12, 2020, the mayor issued an amended removal order setting
out the specific reasons for termination as instructed on remand. This removal order
recited the pre-disciplinary letter’s five headings (quoted above) with dated examples
under each as contained in the pre-disciplinary letter.       The order also referred to
Appellant’s employment history, citing to three prior disciplinary actions (4/24/18 warning;
5/17/18 one-day suspension; 9/24/18 three-day suspension). Appellant appealed to the
commission.
       {¶15} Appellant also filed a motion for relief from the February 26, 2020 judgment
in the trial court while also appealing that judgment entry to this court. We dismissed the
appeal for lack of a final appealable order, opining Appellant’s substantial rights were not
yet affected by the trial court’s remand. 7th Dist. No. 20 MA 45 (6/22/2020 J.E.) (2/14/21
reconsideration denied). After our dismissal of the appeal, the trial court denied the
pending motion for relief from judgment.       Appellant’s appeal of that decision was
dismissed by this court upon pointing out his motion asked the trial court for
reconsideration and a motion for relief from judgment must relate to a final appealable
order. 7th Dist. No. 21 MA 53 (10/19/21 J.E.).

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       {¶16} After those intervening proceedings, the commission held a three-day
hearing where Appellant and city witnesses testified.        On December 15, 2021, the
commission issued a decision affirming the city’s termination decision. In doing so, the
commission rejected Appellant’s assertion that the termination was not supported by
substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.        The commission also rejected his
contention that the amended removal order violated Youngstown Civil Service
Commission Rule XII(3), which disallows a “material amendment” to the removal order
after a notice of appeal is filed with the commission.
       {¶17} Appellant filed an administrative appeal to the common pleas court, which
resulted in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Number 2022 CV 71. The case was
assigned to the same courtroom as the 2019 administrative appeal; however, the judge
recused himself, and the case was transferred to another judge. Appellant filed a motion
to consolidate the new case with the prior case. The court denied the motion, stating the
cases could not be “consolidated” because the 2019 case was closed; still, the court
pointed out the new case was considered a “refile” of the prior case. (4/26/22 J.E.). The
court also took judicial notice of and incorporated the record certified in the prior case.
(4/27/22 J.E.).
       {¶18} In his administrative appeal to the trial court, Appellant argued he should
have been reinstated with back pay as a result of the trial court’s remand judgment
because if the initial removal order was invalid for violating Rule VIII by failing to specify
reasons, then he was never actually removed. (6/23/22 Mot.); (7/27/22 Brief). As to the
amended removal order, he claimed Rule XII and his due process rights were violated by
allowing a “material amendment” to the removal order. He also argued the termination
decision was not supported by the evidence.
       {¶19} On April 18, 2023, the trial court affirmed the commission’s decision thereby
affirming the city’s termination of Appellant’s employment effective March 8, 2019. The
court found the termination decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence. The court also ruled Appellant was not entitled to reinstatement merely due to
the failure to list specific reasons in the first removal order, finding no due process
violation and no damages. On the amended removal order, the court pointed out the
mayor’s amendment was pursuant to the court’s prior remand instructions to issue a

Case No. 23 MA 0062
                                                                                                     –7–

removal order with specific reasons in compliance with Rule VIII.                       The trial court
concluded the resulting amendment was not a due process violation or a violation of Rule
XII because the addition of the specific reasons already reviewed with Appellant at the
pre-disciplinary hearing would not constitute a material amendment to the removal order
(where the initial removal order said it was based on the reasons reviewed at the hearing,
which were also disclosed in a lengthy pre-disciplinary letter).
        {¶20} Appellant filed the within appeal.1               Appellant’s brief sets forth three
assignments of error, each claiming he was entitled to reinstatement with back pay under
a different theory challenging the validity of the removal orders. As Appellant’s brief points
out, he does not challenge whether the evidence supported the termination decision
(which argument would have involved our deferential review of the prior decisions). In
replying to Appellee’s brief (jointly filed by the mayor, the city, and the commission),
Appellant claims the facts regarding his termination should not even be mentioned
because his brief challenged only the legal ramifications of the remand judgment and the
existence or the effect of rule violations in issuing the removal orders.
        {¶21} Appellant’s brief points out the standard of review for an administrative
appeal that raises purely legal issues is de novo. Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family
Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12. He believes the trial
court exceeded its authority under R.C. 119.12(M) by not acting “in accordance with law”
when considering the remedy for or ramifications of the non-compliant removal order or
the amended removal order. See former R.C. 119.12(M), now (N) (besides determining
if the commission’s decision is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence,
the trial court must determine if the order “is in accordance with law” and if not, the court
“may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law”).
                                     ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
        {¶22} Appellant’s first assignment of error alleges:

1 At the same time, Appellant filed a separate notice of appeal from the February 25, 2020 remand judgment

and the May 10, 2021 judgment denying relief from judgment; however, we dismissed that appeal as
repetitive. 7th Dist. No. 23 MA 61 (8/1/23 J.E.). We noted the cited interlocutory orders were addressed
and incorporated in the trial court’s April 18, 2023 final appealable order, which was appealed the same
day (and which resulted in the current appeal). Due to our dismissal of that appeal, Appellant’s request to
file an amended brief (with a page extension) was granted in the case at bar.

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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       “Since the judgment that vacated the Commission’s decision to affirm the Mayor’s
first removal order in the First Civil Service Appeal had the effect of simultaneously
vacating the removal order itself so that Cunningham, as a matter of law, never was
removed from his job in accordance with the City’s civil service laws, the court below erred
when it did not reverse or modify the Commission’s decision in the Second Civil Service
Appeal and require Cunningham to be reinstated with back pay and benefits at least from
March 8, 2019 through March 11, 2020.”
       {¶23} This assignment of error revolves around the city’s first removal order and
the effect of the February 26, 2020 remand by the trial court after finding that removal
order did not comply with Rule VIII. Appellant frames his argument as presenting an issue
with the following decisions: the February 26, 2020 judgment remanding for an amended
removal order while opining Appellant was not entitled to reinstatement and back pay
merely due to the lack of reasons in the removal order (and stating he could only be
entitled to this remedy if the reasons for termination were eventually found to be
unsupported by the evidence); the trial court’s denial of relief from that judgment; and the
second stage of proceedings in the commission and trial court (where he argued he was
entitled to reinstatement and back pay for the time between the two removal orders).
       {¶24} Initially, Appellant cites the following provision in section 1 of Rule VIII: “No
person in the classified service shall be * * * removed by the Appointing Authority for * * *
any other reason not connected with the proper performance of the duties of the position.”
Yo.Civ.Serv.R. VIII(1). Then, he emphasizes section 2 of the rule, which provides: “the
Appointing Authority shall furnish the involved classified employee with a copy of the * *
* removal, which shall state the reasons therefor[ ]. Such orders shall be filed with the
Civil Service Commission.” Yo.Civ.Serv.R. VIII(2).
       {¶25} Reading these sections of Rule VIII together, Appellant concludes an
employee has a substantive right to continued employment if a removal order is found to
lack strict compliance with section 2 for failing to specify the reasons for termination. He
says the mandatory language (“shall state the reasons”) is more than a procedural
requirement and thus an employee is not actually terminated by a removal order that is
not considered to be (what he calls) a “qualifying” removal order. The trial court’s
February 26, 2020 judgment found the first removal order failed to comply with Rule VIII(2)

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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and vacated the commission’s decision.2 Appellant contends the trial court’s vacation of
the commission’s decision necessarily vacated and nullified the city’s removal order,
rendering the first removal order “void ab initio” and thus non-existent. From this, he
concludes he was never actually removed (until a removal order was issued that satisfied
Rule VIII). He thus argues he was automatically entitled to reinstatement and back pay
from March 8, 2019 (the date of the first removal order) until March 11, 2020 (the day
before the second removal order, which listed the reasons for removal).
        {¶26} In response, Appellees argue a procedural rule deficiency in the removal
order, such as a lack of specific reasons, does not render the termination void or
otherwise automatically entitle Appellant to reinstatement. The parties dispute whether
various cases are distinguishable from the situation here.
        {¶27} For instance, a case cited by the trial court involved students who had been
suspended without procedural due process. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 251, 98 S.Ct.
1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). In order to recover more than nominal damages (of $1) in
an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the students were required to show they would have not
been suspended if they had received procedural due process or that they suffered an
actual injury; i.e., they could not recover merely because a procedural right was violated.
Id. at 260-261, 266-267. If it were to be established on a remand that the students would
have been suspended even if proper notice had been given, then they would not be
entitled to damages caused by the suspension. Id. at 260 (observing it would result in “a
windfall, rather than compensation” to rule otherwise). The Supreme Court specifically
disagreed with courts that expressed “a contrary view in cases where public employees
holding property interests in their jobs were discharged with cause but without procedural
due process.” Id. at fn. 15. “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or
property.” Id. at 259.

2 Appellant notes the city does not challenge the correctness of the February 26, 2020 common pleas court

judgment remanding and finding the city failed to comply with the rule requiring the statement of the charges
to state the reasons for termination (such as to argue it was sufficient for the removal order to generally say
the reason for termination was the “review of the evidence presented at your pre-disciplinary hearing”
because a detailed pre-disciplinary letter was provided before the hearing and then reviewed at the
hearing).

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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       {¶28} In an Eighth District case, the court found the city’s use of regular mail to
send a pre-termination letter failed to comply with a local civil service commission rule
requiring the letter to be personally handed to the employee or served by certified mail
“[p]rior to deeming an employee resigned for an absence.” Card v. City of Cleveland,
2017-Ohio-7173, 95 N.E.3d 1066, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (where the rule also said the letter shall
disclose a ten-day absence will be construed as a resignation unless the employee
provides a satisfactory explanation within a certain time period). The court recognized
the classified civil servant’s constitutionally protected property interest in the right to
continued public employment. Id. at ¶ 17, citing Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 539, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps.
v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 68 Ohio St.3d 175, 624 N.E.2d 1043 (1994).
However, the Eighth District concluded the termination did not violate the employee's due
process rights, noting there is no constitutional right to pre-disciplinary notice to be
provided by a certain method, as long as the employee was afforded notice of an
opportunity to be heard before her employment was terminated. Id. at ¶ 18 (where the
employee acknowledged receiving a warning letter and attended hearings without
explaining her absence).
       {¶29} The Card court pointed out the district’s precedent holds: “reinstatement
and back pay should not be awarded to a public employee for a due process violation
unless there is a finding that the discharge would not have occurred if the employee's
procedural due process rights had been observed.” Id. at ¶ 36, citing Clipps v. Cleveland,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86887, 2006-Ohio-3154 and Fritzgerald v. Cleveland Civ. Serv.
Comm., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101586, 2015-Ohio-609. “[T]o hold that a discharge is
invalid simply because there were procedural deficiencies prior to termination would
emphasize form over substance and obscure the real issue; i.e., whether there were
legitimate grounds for the employee's termination.” Id. at ¶ 38, citing, e.g., Green v.
Buckeye Lake, 5th Dist. Licking No. 01CA106, 2002-Ohio-2543, ¶ 24. Accordingly, the
Card court concluded the employee was not entitled to reinstatement as a mere result of
the city's failure to comply with the civil service rule providing “additional notice
procedures” beyond those required by due process; “where it can be established that the
employee would have been fired even if proper notice had been given, then the employee

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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is not entitled to recover damages caused by the firing.” Id. at ¶ 36-37, 42, citing Carey,
435 U.S. at 260.
       {¶30} Here, citing Carey, the trial court found Appellant was not denied due
process by the procedural deficiency in the first removal order. The court additionally
observed there was evidence to support his termination (which was before the
commission both before and after the court’s remand for a compliant removal order) and
thus no damages were sustained. Appellant attempts to distinguish the cited cases
saying he is not raising an issue with the pre-disciplinary due process he received and
instead contends he maintained a substantive right to continued employment due to the
insufficient removal order he calls a nullity. However, Appellant’s attempt to distinguish
a pre-disciplinary rule violation from a rule violation occurring upon termination is
unavailing; the application of the legal principles is not discernibly different.
       {¶31} Appellant was provided a full and lengthy pre-disciplinary notice of the
charges supporting his termination.         He appeared at an oral hearing with legal
representation where those charges were reviewed.              He was provided notice of
termination via the first removal order, which stated the reasons for his termination were
those discussed at the pre-disciplinary hearing.          He filed a timely appeal to the
commission, where he argued the removal order lacked reasons. After a full hearing, the
commission rejected this argument and affirmed the termination decision. On appeal of
that decision, a trial court vacated the commission’s decision and remanded to allow the
city to issue a rule-compliant removal order due to the perceived violation of a local civil
service rule requiring the removal order, to state the reasons for the termination. Upon
receiving the amended removal order, Appellant was provided a second opportunity to
challenge his termination through an appeal and an evidentiary hearing in the
commission.
       {¶32} Although the trial court remanded and vacated the commission’s original
decision, the judgment did not purport to vacate the removal. Just as a prisoner is not
entitled to immediate release when a sentencing judgment fails to state the method of
conviction, an employee is not entitled to reinstatement merely because a removal order
fails to list the specific reasons previously detailed in the pre-disciplinary letter and
reviewed at the pre-disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., McAllister v. Smith, 119 Ohio St.3d

Case No. 23 MA 0062
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163, 2008-Ohio-3881, 892 N.E.2d 914, ¶ 9-10 (rather the entry is merely subject to
correction on remand).      We also note the procedural issue in the administrative
proceedings did not prevent Appellant from timely appealing the removal order.
       {¶33} Contrary to Appellant’s argument that a vacated judgment is a nullity (as if
it never existed), a judgment is not rendered “void ab initio” merely because it was found
to have insufficiently stated reasons required by a rule.       For instance, it has been
explained that where the entity issuing the order has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the person, an error in exercising that jurisdiction does not render a judgment void.
See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d
1040, ¶ 18. Moreover, a remand from a reviewing court with instructions for the city to
add content to the order does not render the remanded order a nullity, as if the termination
never occurred so as to automatically reinstate the employee.
       {¶34} Finally, the fact that a civil servant may have a substantive right to continued
employment if “removed by the Appointing Authority for * * * any other reason not
connected with the proper performance of the duties of the position” (under section 1 of
Rule VIII) does not equate to a substantive right to stay employed despite termination
based on a valid reason merely because the removal order (provided to the employee
and filed with the commission) lacked certain contents described in section 2 of that rule.
Neither of the sections relied upon by Appellant provide that the employee shall retain his
position until removed in accordance with section 2. Compare Card, 95 N.E.3d 1066 at
¶ 26 (where the rule specifically said the notice must be provided by certain methods
“[p]rior to deeming an employee resigned for an absence” and still the court found the
employee was not entitled to reinstatement for the city’s violation of the rule’s requirement
on service of the notice). Upon consideration of the arguments and authorities set forth
by Appellant, we overrule the first assignment of error and conclude the argument that he
is entitled to reinstatement (with back pay) from the date of the first removal order through
the date of the amended removal order is without merit.
                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
       {¶35} Appellant’s second assignment of error, which he conditions on our
overruling his first assignment of error, contends:

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        “If the judgment entered in the First Administrative Appeal did not have the effect
of simultaneously vacating the Mayor’s first removal order itself, the court below exceeded
the limits on its remedial authority in adjudicating an administrative appeal under O.R.C.
§119.12(M) when it did not reverse the Commission’s decision in the Second Civil Service
Appeal and disaffirm the Mayor’s second removal order and instead allowed the
Commission to engage in or permit conduct on remand that the agency itself was
powerless to allow by operation of Rules VIII and XII of the City’s civil service rules.”
        {¶36} The second assignment of error is set forth in the event this court overrules
the first assignment of error by finding the first removal order was not void. Appellant
theorizes if the removal was not void for being non-compliant with Rule VIII, then its
alteration by the city’s issuance of the amended removal order was in violation of a
different rule. Youngstown Civil Service Commission Rule XII(3) contains the following
clause: “After a notice of appeal is filed with the Commission in a disciplinary matter, no
material amendment can be made to the statement of the charges made at the time of
the demotion, suspension, or removal.”
        {¶37} From this, Appellant contends the 2019 remand from the trial court could
not validly authorize the city’s amendment of the removal order to add the specific
grounds reviewed with him at the pre-disciplinary hearing because this would constitute
a “material amendment” in violation of Rule XII(3). He therefore concludes the amended
removal order was improperly upheld in the second round of appeals to the commission
and trial court. He believes this argument would entitle him to reinstatement with back
pay from the date of the first removal order (which was non-compliant with Rule VIII)
through the current day (alleging there is still no valid removal order).3
        {¶38} Initially, we observe that section 3 of Rule XII deals with “Hearings and
Appeals” before the commission, and the sentence relied upon by Appellant prohibits a
“material amendment” to the “statement of the charges made at the time of * * * dismissal.”
(Emphasis added.) The next sentences in the same paragraph state: “If the appellant
files with the removing officer a written reply to the charges, such reply may not be

3 Although the second assignment of error asks for an even longer (and continuing) period of back pay than

the first assignment of error, Appellant states we need not address the second or third assignments of error
if we sustain his first assignment of error, find the first removal order void, and reinstate him with back pay
(and retroactive restoration of benefits) from March 8, 2019 through March 11, 2020.

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materially amended. In all cases, the issues involved shall be confined to the truth or
falsity of the allegations in the statement of the charges.” Yo.Civ.Serv.R. XII(3). Compare
Yo.Civ.Serv.R. VIII(2) (dealing with the city’s removal “Procedure” and requiring the city
to furnish the employee “a copy of the * * * removal, which shall state the reasons”).
         {¶39} One could argue the material amendment language in Rule XII(3) is
inapplicable to the removal order because the rules distinguish between the pre-
disciplinary statement of charges and the removal order.          This argument could be
supported by the fact that an employee’s filing of a pre-disciplinary reply with the city
would no longer serve a purpose upon the issuance of a removal order. On the other
hand, the rule’s reference to “statement of the charges” is modified by the phrase “made
at the time of dismissal” (suggesting it is a reference to the “copy of the * * * removal”
referred to in Rule VIII).
         {¶40} The entire paragraph in Yo.Civ.Serv.R. XII(3) was quoted by the trial court
in disposing of Appellant’s “material amendment” argument. Nevertheless, the trial court
did not voice the implications of Rule XII(3) referring to a statement of the charges and
an employee’s reply filed with the city. We also recognize that Appellees do not make
the argument that Rule XII(3)’s material amendment language is inapplicable to a removal
order.
         {¶41} In any event, the trial court properly agreed with the commission’s finding
that the amendment of the removal order made no material changes to the “statement of
the charges” made at the time of dismissal and was issued to comply with the instructions
in the original trial court’s remand order. (4/18/23 J.E. at 7). To recap, after Appellant
appealed the amended removal order, the commission rejected his argument about the
city violating Rule XII by “materially” amending the removal order. The commission
construed the first removal order as incorporating the reasons for removal by reference
to the pre-disciplinary hearing where Appellant was given a full opportunity to be heard
(on the charges reflected in the prior lengthy statement of the charges), and the
commission construed the amendment to the removal order as merely specifying the
reasons already intended to be incorporated in the first order.
         {¶42} Appellees say the commission and the trial court correctly ruled the city’s
issuance of the amended removal order was not a “material amendment” under Rule XII

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because the addition of the grounds previously provided to Appellant in no way changed
his position. (12/15/21 Commission Dec. at 8, citing Mirriam-Webster Dictionary for the
general definition of “material”). Appellees point out there was no surprise to Appellant in
the amended removal order. They emphasize Appellant had already been provided
specific reasons with dated examples in the pre-disciplinary letter, these charges were
reviewed with him and his attorney at the pre-disciplinary hearing where Appellant offered
minimal explanation, and the initial removal order informed him he was terminated based
on the evidence presented at that hearing.
       {¶43} Appellant says a purpose of the rule requiring the memorializing of the
reason for the disciplinary action is to provide a double-jeopardy-like protection to the
employee in order to prevent the city’s attempt to issue a “string of removal orders” on the
same grounds presented at a prior disciplinary action. He complains the reasons in the
amended removal order mirrored those in the letter he received before the pre-disciplinary
hearing and contends without support that any second attempt to terminate his
employment could only be based on reasons for termination different from the reasons
addressed at the pre-disciplinary hearing (and intended to be encompassed by the first
removal order). He claims the city would have been required to uncover additional prior
conduct justifying his termination in order to fire him after the remand.
       {¶44} Appellant’s interpretation would force the city into an untenable position
where they would be forced to retain, discipline free, an employee who has been proven
in pre-disciplinary proceedings to fully merit removal, merely due to a procedural error in
the removal order. The city would never be able to fire the employee for any of the
reasons that support the defective removal order.        Unless and until that employee
committed new acts of misfeasance or malfeasance, his/her past infractions would go
unpunished and his/her job would be secure. This is the very definition of promoting form
over function and is wholly unsupported by the law. Appellant’s removal order was
remanded to specifically include those reasons already provided to Appellant that
supported removal. The second removal order reflected just that. No material changes
were made and none were required.
       {¶45} A detailed statement of the charges was provided to Appellant before the
disciplinary hearing, the charges were then reviewed with him and his counsel at that

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hearing, the removal order informed him he was removed based on that evidence, and
the removal order was served on Appellant and filed with the commission. Appellant filed
a timely appeal from the first removal order. We note this is not a situation where the
employer failed to provide a removal order causing the employee to miss the deadline to
appeal to the commission. Appellant acknowledges the statement of charges, provided
to him before and at the hearing, was relied upon by the city when deciding to terminate
him. The insertion of the specific reasons from the pre-disciplinary letter into the removal
order was not a material amendment.
        {¶46} Additionally and in any event, this case was remanded from the trial court
for the city’s amendment of the removal order to comply with Rule VIII upon Appellant’s
invitation to find the commission erred by failing to require compliance with the rule. The
trial court pointed out its remand would afford Appellant a second chance for a full hearing
on the reasons for his termination before the commission if he chose to appeal the
amended removal order. This judgment placed the stage of the case back in time, before
the notice of appeal to the commission. Hence, even assuming Rule XII might apply here,
the city was not amending the removal order “[a]fter the notice of appeal” but was
amending the removal order before a notice of appeal, as specifically anticipated by the
trial court.
        {¶47} Accordingly, Youngstown Civil Service Commission Rule XII was not
violated by the city’s issuance of the amended removal order, and this assignment of error
is overruled.
                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
        {¶48} Appellant’s final assignment of error alleges:
        “Even if the judgment entered in the First Administrative Appeal did not
simultaneously vacate the Mayor’s March 8, 2019 removal order and Rule XII of the City’s
civil service rules cannot be construed to support the entry of judgment in Cunningham’s
favor in the Second Administrative Appeal, the court below nonetheless erred in failing to
require Cunningham’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits retroactively from March
8, 2019 through March 11, 2020, as the Mayor’s March 12, 2020 removal order could be
effective only if directed at an employee on the City’s payroll as of that date.”

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       {¶49} If his first two arguments fail, Appellant claims he was also entitled to
reinstatement from the date of the first removal order through the date of the amended
removal order because a removal order is only effective if directed at an employee on the
payroll. Youngstown Civil Service Commission Rule VIII(2) states the city shall “furnish
the classified employee with a copy” of the removal order. From this, Appellant concludes
an attempt to issue a removal order to a person no longer on the payroll would lack
compliance with the civil service rules. He therefore reasons that in order for the amended
removal order to be valid, he necessarily had the status of an employed civil servant on
the date of its issuance.
       {¶50} Appellees observe there is no legal authority to support this theory,
especially under the current circumstances where the amendment was made only
pursuant to court remand. Regardless, Appellees emphasize Appellant failed to raise this
argument below and thus waived it for purposes of appeal.
       {¶51} Appellant replies by contending he essentially raised the general argument
as to whether he was an employee on March 12, 2020 by claiming he was entitled to
reinstatement from March 8, 2019 through March 11, 2020. However, this claim was
based on his argument that the first removal order was a nullity.
       {¶52} The particular contention now raised in Appellant’s third assignment of error
was not raised in Appellant’s argument below. There was no indication he claimed the
second order necessarily changed his employment status by its mere issuance because
removal orders can only be issued to employees.
       {¶53} Appellant’s reply also urges the waiver doctrine is not absolute, especially
where an argument was implicit in the argument presented below, claiming the court must
necessarily resolve his status as an employee from March 8, 2019 through March 11,
2020 to decide the other issues. See Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners' Assn. v. R.E. Roark
Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993) (“When an issue of law that
was not argued below is implicit in another issue that was argued and is presented by an
appeal, we may consider and resolve that implicit issue. To put it another way, if we must
resolve a legal issue that was not raised below in order to reach a legal issue that was
raised, we will do so.”).

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       {¶54} However, the theory of a civil servant’s payroll status retroactively changing
due to the issuance of an amended removal order upon court remand was not implicit in
Appellant’s preserved arguments about (1) a violation of a rule rendering an initial removal
order void or (2) a violation of a rule prohibiting material amendments. In any event, we
note the cited Belvedere principle is discretionary with the reviewing court. See id., citing
In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (“the waiver doctrine * * * is discretionary.
In the criminal context, Crim.R. 52(B) provides that ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court’”).
       {¶55} As to the doctrine of plain error, its application requires not only an error but
also an obvious one that affected the outcome. State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-
Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 62. Plain error is a discretionary doctrine the appellate court
may choose to use but only with the utmost care in exceptional circumstances when
required to avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id. In civil cases, the plain error
doctrine is not favored and can only be utilized by a reviewing court “in the extremely rare
case involving exceptional circumstances” involving an error that “seriously affects the
basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging
the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio
St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. The alleged theory presented here was not
obvious and did not seriously affect the integrity of the underlying system at issue.
       {¶56} Regardless, Appellant’s new legal theory lacks support and is not a
reasonable reading of the rules. If the first removal order was not void (so as to render
the termination non-existent under the first assignment of error), then Appellant was not
an employee as of the March 8, 2019 date of termination. The remand judgment with
instructions to add specific reasons to the removal order did not reinstate Appellant’s
employment. And, the resulting compliance with the remand did not mean the issuance
of an amended removal order itself necessarily and retroactively returned Appellant’s
status to active employment for the time before the amended removal order’s issuance
merely because the rule to provide a removal order applies to classified “employees.”
This assignment of error is without merit.
       {¶57} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

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                      – 19 –

Waite, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0062
[Cite as Cunningham v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-1100.]

       For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellant.
       A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                     NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       This document constitutes a final judgment entry.