Court Opinion

ID: 9852885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:38:19.137997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:36.284412
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
A district court is precluded from addressing a constitutional claim in a habeas petition if a state court has already rejected the claim based on an independent and adequate state ground. White v. Bowersox, 206 F.3d 776, 780 (8th Cir.2000). This includes the procedural default of a claim under state law. Id. The Supreme Court has dictated, however, “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review by [federal courts] of a federal constitutional claim.” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)). Because I believe the waiver rule in the courtroom closure context was neither firmly established nor regularly followed by Minnesota courts when Crawford’s public trial claim was deemed waived, I respectfully dissent.
When the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard Crawford’s appeal there was just one published6 appellate case, post Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), which employed the waiver rule in the context of a courtroom closure. See State v. Bashire, 606 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn.Ct.App.2000) (holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure). In State v. Anderson, No. C2-95-1087, 1995 WL 747894, at *2 (Minn.Ct.App. Dec. 19, 1995) (unpublished), the Minnesota Court of Appeals had previously noted: “the failure of a defendant to object to a closure order does not waive the issue for subsequent review, because closure affects the defendant’s substantive right to a public trial.” In contrast, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Bashire applied the waiver rule in the courtroom closure context holding: “by failing to object to courtroom closure and by agreeing to a limited closure, Ba-shire forfeited any error resulting from the absence of a finding supporting the closure.” 606 N.W.2d at 452 (emphasis added). Thus, in Bashire, the defendant waived his ability to challenge his trial courtroom’s limited closure where he failed to object and his attorney affirmatively agreed to the closure, stating: “The prose*857cutor’s concern regarding other spectators in the courtroom, I don’t have any difficulties with.” Id. at 451. Two years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this case. Relying on Ba-shire, the court held: “[b]eeause appellant did not object to the closure, appellant has waived the issue.” State v. Crawford, No. C4-01-2073, 2002 WL 31056664, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. Sept. 17, 2002) (unpublished). The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not discuss the agreement prong from Bashire, nor did it suggest Crawford had agreed to the closure. Instead, the court articulated a new version of the waiver rule, holding there is a waiver where the defendant passively fails to object to the closure. In sum, in Bashire, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the waiver rule where a defendant both failed to object to the closure and explicitly agreed to it. Then, in the instant case, the court again applied the waiver rule in the courtroom closure context, this time doing so simply because Crawford failed to object to the closure.7
Crawford argues the waiver rule in the courtroom closure context was neither firmly established nor regularly followed in Minnesota when it was applied to his case. I agree. There are at least two ways we could look at the above-cited series of cases. Neither provides for the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine to preclude federal review of this claim. By my reading, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, in the instant case, was applying a new incarnation of the waiver rule. This version, unlike the rule in Bashire, did not require the defendant to explicitly agree to closure for there to be a waiver.8 This court has held, when a new procedural rule is first announced in the state case involving a habeas petitioner, it has certainly not regularly and consistently applied the rule such that it meets the standard for an independent and adequate state ground. White, 206 F.3d at 781. In White, we explained whether or not a rule was “implicit in, and correctly derived from, Missouri’s prior precedents,” or “appear[ed] in retrospect to form part *858of a consistent pattern of procedures, it should not be applied as a procedural default if the defendant could not be deemed to have been apprised of its existence.” Id. We recognized the federal courts should not be simply gleaning a procedural rule from state precedent when the rule had not been explicitly announced previously. Thus, under White, the independent and adequate state ground doctrine should not be a bar to the district court’s review of Crawford’s claim because the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied a new version of the waiver rule to his case and there was no way for him to anticipate the court’s holding. The waiver principle, as applied, was neither firmly established nor regularly followed prior to Crawford’s case.
There is another way to view the case law. The Court suggests the Minnesota Court of Appeals was applying the waiver rule from Bashire in the instant case. Ante at 855. As noted above, however, there is no indication anywhere in the decision as to the Minnesota Court of Appeals finding Crawford having waived his right to challenge the closure because he affirmatively agreed to the closure. Even if the Crawford court was applying the rule from Bashire, however, this would constitute only the second application of the waiver rule in this context after Waller.9 One application of the rule prior to its application in the defendant’s case is not enough to render it firmly established and regularly followed. This circuit has not defined how many state court applications of a procedural rule might meet the standard for an independent and adequate state ground. As noted above, we held in White the procedural rule cannot be applied for the first time in a defendant’s state case and still meet the standard. A brief look at the language from Ford suggests one application prior to the defendant’s case would also not meet the standard. The rule must be “firmly established and regularly followed.” Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “regularly” as “at regular times or intervals,” “according to plan, custom, etc.,” or “usually; ordinarily.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 1110 (2d ed. 1999). Thus, the phrase “regularly followed” necessarily implies the rule must have been applied more than once. Likewise, the phrase “firmly established” implies the rule must have been applied repeatedly. Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “firm” as “securely fixed in place” or “unyielding to change.” Id. at 492. Use of the term “firmly” in the standard suggests the rule must have been both around for some time and remained the same despite repeated applications. Based on the plain language of the Supreme Court’s standard, the Minnesota Court of Appeal’s single application of the waiver rule in Bashire, no matter how well conceived and clearly *859presented, does not render the rule either firmly established or regularly followed. Here it is clear the Minnesota courts did not consistently and regularly apply the waiver rule in this context. Because the Crawford court altered the Bashire rule such lends further credence to the conclusion the waiver rule has not been consistently followed by Minnesota courts.
The Court suggests there is “a basic consistency in the way the Minnesota appellate courts apply the general doctrine of waiver.” Ante at 855. Our charge, however, is not to determine whether there is a “basic consistency” in the Minnesota appellate courts’ general application of the waiver rule. It is to determine whether an independent and adequate state procedural rule — in this case the application of the waiver rule in the context of a courtroom closure — was firmly established and regularly applied at the time it was applied to Crawford. White, 206 F.3d at 780 (“Procedural default of a claim under state law may constitute an independent and adequate state ground, but only if the state procedural rule is firmly established, regularly followed, and readily ascertainable.” (internal citation omitted)). Because Minnesota’s waiver rule was neither firmly established nor regularly applied in the courtroom closure context when it was applied to Crawford, I respectfully dissent.

. It should be noted unpublished appellate decisions in Minnesota are not precedential. See Minn.Stat. § 480A.08.

. Since Crawford, the Minnesota’ Court of Appeals has continued to apply the waiver rule as it was articulated in Bashire. See State v. Delacruz, No. A03-129, 2004 WL 193058, at *4 (Minn.Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (finding no waiver where the defendant failed to object to a courtroom closure but did not explicitly agree to the closure); State v. Campbell, No. A06-539, 2007 WL 1121284, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. April 17, 2007) (unpublished) (holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney). These cases are irrelevant to our inquiry, however, as this court must decide whether the state procedural rule was firmly established and regularly followed in Minnesota when the rule was actually applied to Crawford. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. 850 ("[A]n adequate and independent state procedural bar to the entertainment of constitutional claims must have been 'firmly established and regularly followed’ by the time as of which it is to be applied.”); Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir.2006) ("The procedural rule relied upon by the state court must be firmly established, regularly followed and readily ascertainable when it was applied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

. The Court concludes, based on the extremely limited record, that Crawford affirmatively agreed to the closure here thus meeting the standard for a waiver under Bashire. Ante at 855-56. Although the Court recognizes there is no explicit agreement in the record, it concludes defense counsel must have agreed to the closure off the record because the record contains a discussion regarding who should be present during the minor victim's testimony. I am unwilling to preclude federal review of Crawford's constitutional claim based entirely on conjecture. Nevertheless, this court is not charged with undoing the Crawford court's misapplication of Bashire. We must simply determine whether the waiver rule, as applied in Crawford's case, was firmly established and regularly followed.

. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not recently spoken to the waiver issue in this context. In State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199 (Minn.1995), the Minnesota Supreme Court’s seminal decision regarding a trial court's obligations prior to a courtroom closure under Minn.Stat. § 631.045, the court did not reach the waiver issue because the colloquy concerning the closure was off the record and it was unclear whether or not the defendant had consented to or objected to the closure. Id. at 201. The Court points to State v. Weigold, 281 Minn. 73, 160 N.W.2d 577, 579-80 (1968), where the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the waiver rule when the defendant did not object to a state-requested closure at trial and the defendant’s counsel specifically agreed to the closure. Ante at 855, n. 5. Because this opinion was written long before the enactment of Minn.Stat. § 631.045 and the Supreme Court’s articulation of the public trial right in Waller, it does little to inform how the Minnesota Supreme Court would presently apply the waiver rule in this context.