Court Opinion

ID: 9524913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:30.645806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:18.702147
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. While the majority opinion clearly acknowledges that the decision to admit evidence of prior convictions rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, it then qualifies the significance of having this as the standard for appellate review.
The standard in testing for an abuse of discretion is a narrow one. People v Talley, 410 Mich 378; 301 NW2d 809 (1981), People v Jones, 98 Mich App 421, 432-433; 296 NW2d 268 (1980), People v Worden, 91 Mich App 666, 675-676; 284 NW2d 159, 164-165 (1979).
"Where, as here, the exercise of discretion turns upon a factual determination made by the trier of the facts, an abuse of discretion involves far more than á difference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate courts. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an 'abuse’ in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.” Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion does not follow the admonitions of this standard. Instead, it attempts to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on the basis of a "difference in judicial opinion” between the trial court and this panel. This is *343error. Rather, it should be focusing upon whether the trial court’s decision evidences "perversity of will”, "defiance” of judgment, "passion”, or "bias”.
Accepting the fact that the trial court is to consider the factors enumerated in People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), I disagree that the trial court misapplied or inadequately balanced these factors so as to evidence an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. The most that can be said is that judicial differences may exist as to the application of the Crawford factors.
To illustrate: While evidence of misdemeanor convictions is admissible only if they involve theft, dishonesty or false statement, the same is not automatically true for prior felony convictions. Numerous decisions by this Court have held that impeachment by evidence of prior felony convictions need not be limited to crimes directly related to credibility, viz.: fraud, embezzlement, perjury, false pretenses. People v Lytal, 96 Mich App 140, 151-152; 292 NW2d 498 (1980), People v Hughes, 93 Mich App 333, 337; 287 NW2d 226 (1979), People v Townsend, 60 Mich App 204; 230 NW2d 378 (1975). As a felony clearly involves "moral turpitude”, it has some probative value as to defendant’s veracity. People v Whigham, 102 Mich App 96; 300 NW2d 753 (1980).
Secondly, although evidence of similar prior convictions should be admitted with caution, People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550; 275 NW2d 253 (1979), People v Green, 86 Mich App 142; 272 NW2d 216 (1978), the literature abounds with case law recognizing that similarity does not bar per se every impeachment by evidence of a prior similar conviction. People v Jones, supra, People v Hughes, supra, People v Townsend, supra. While, in the instant case, the felony was similar, it *344surely was not the identical, or even substantially the same, offense as that charged.
Furthermore, it is significant that, although the defendant did not testify at trial, his alibi defense was developed and presented through the testimony of defense witnesses. People v Hughes, supra.
Hence, on this record, I detect nothing which would lead me to conclude that the application of the Crawford factors per se barred the impeachment by evidence of defendant’s gross indecency conviction. At the most, this record only demonstrates that "differences in judicial opinion” may exist in interpreting, applying and balancing these factors. This is not enough for this Court to reverse the trial court. We are not permitted to "second guess”. Since I find nothing so palpably or grossly violative of fact or logic as to constitute an abuse of discretion, I would affirm the trial court’s decision. I suggest that the majority opinion is actually attempting to substitute a "hard and fast rule” that evidence of similar felony convictions is ipso facto too prejudicial to overcome its probative value. Neither the rules of evidence, case law nor public policy supports this blanket preclusion approach.