Court Opinion

ID: 9387470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 00:03:39.333994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.981263
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/17/23 In re C.G. CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 In re C.G., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.
 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
                                                                  A165310
 SERVICES BUREAU,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                  (Contra Costa County
 v.                                                               Super. Ct. No. J1800946)
 Y.G.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      Y.G. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights and finding her eight-year-old daughter C.G.
adoptable. She contends reversal is required because (1) the
court erred when it appointed a guardian ad litem for her, and (2)
the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau
(the Bureau) failed to comply with its duty of inquiry under
California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We disagree. The court
properly appointed a guardian ad litem based on Mother’s
informed consent and substantial evidence, while the Bureau’s
conceded failure to conduct the required inquiry was harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm.

                                                1
                        BACKGROUND
       This child dependency case was initiated in October 2018,
when C.G.’s older half-sister, Marilyn, reported that C.G.’s father
(Father) sexually abused her from when she was 10 years old
until she was 16. The Bureau detained C.G. and filed a
dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section
3001 that, as amended, alleged Father sexually abused Marilyn;
that C.G. was at risk of similar abuse; and that Mother failed to
protect C.G. from abuse or, due to her history of homelessness
and mental illness, to provide adequate care for her. Father was
charged with multiple felony accounts, and ultimately convicted
and sentenced to a 20-year prison term.

      Mother had seven prior child welfare referrals, four of
which resulted in investigations. She was chronically homeless
and lived on the streets. According to Father, her mental illness
prevented her from taking care of the girls.

       Father, who had two other children in Brazil, had been
granted full custody of C.G. when she was eight months old. In
2012, when C.G. was about two years old, the Bureau received a
referral alleging Mother had been placed on an emergency
psychiatric hold after physically attacking Marilyn during a visit.
Marilyn was placed in foster care with and later adopted by
Father. Mother’s parental rights to her were terminated in 2016
after reunification efforts failed.

      Mother told the social worker she lost custody of Marilyn
because she was homeless and on the streets, mentally and
physically sick, and experiencing disorientation and depression.
After that she spent about a year in New York, where she had
family. According to the social worker, however, Mother might

      1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
                                 2
have been in New York for anywhere from seven months to two
years.

      Mother returned to California and moved into Father’s
home about eight months before the events that triggered the
current dependency action. Father reported that she was
physically violent with the girls and caused “many problems.”
Their relationship was “ ‘very bad;’ ” Mother was very
temperamental and sometimes mean. Her mental illness
prevented her from taking care of the girls.

       In November 2018, C.G. was detained in foster care.
According to the Bureau’s report for the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, Mother was born in Guatemala and
immigrated to the United States in 2003. She reported having no
American Indian ancestry and completed an ICWA-020 form to
that effect. Father was born in Brazil. He has a brother and
sister-in-law who live in Richmond and speak primarily
Portuguese. Father also submitted a form stating he had no
American Indian ancestry.

      Mother had a history of visual hallucinations and had been
prescribed a medication used to treat schizophrenia. During the
current proceedings, she told the social worker she was being
treated at a mental health clinic, but the doctor she identified
had no knowledge of her. Mother said she was taking a
medication used for nerve pain, depression, and anxiety, but also
that she never had a mental health diagnosis.

       The social worker had difficulty assessing Mother because
she was inaccurate, confused details, and was unable to stay on
topic. “While it is unclear what [her] diagnosis is, it is clear she
has a developmental or mental illness that hinders her ability to
convey succinct facts about her ability to parent, and hinders her
ability to safely parent [C.G.] at this time.”

                                 3
      At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother
submitted to the allegation that she had failed to adequately care
for C.G. due to her history of homelessness and mental illness.
Father submitted to the sexual abuse of sibling allegation. The
court declared C.G. a dependent child, ordered her removed from
both parents, and granted Mother (but not Father) reunification
services and visitation.

      At the six-month review hearing, the court continued C.G.’s
out-of-home placement and extended Mother’s reunification
services for six more months.

       The 12-month review hearing took place on March 2, 2020.
According to the Bureau’s reports, Mother continued to minimize
Marilyn’s sexual abuse and its effect on her ability to reunify
with C.G. Mother alternated between denying the abuse
occurred, blaming Marilyn for initiating it, and accusing her of
making it up. Mother described Father as “ ‘[n]ot a bad guy’ ”
and told the social worker she would release him from jail if she
could.

      Mother became emotional when the social worker asked
about her living situation, pleaded for C.G.’s return, and became
angry when the social worker discussed plans for her daughter.
She had completed a parenting class and said she was attending
therapy and taking her medications, but she was unable or
unwilling to provide her psychiatrist’s name or identify her
prescriptions. She was visiting C.G. regularly.

      The social worker testified that Mother became highly
emotional during their meetings. When the discussion turned to
the sexual abuse and its impact on the Bureau’s
recommendations for C.G., she would refuse to answer questions
and “shut the meeting down.” Mother continued to blame
Marilyn for any abuse that occurred, accused her of making up
the allegations, and lacked any insight into what she would do if

                                4
C.G. reported being sexually abused. If that were to occur, the
social worker did not believe Mother would protect the minor.

      The juvenile court found there was no reasonable likelihood
Mother would be able to reunify with C.G. if provided six
additional months of services; that Mother had not made any
progress in addressing the mental health conditions that led to
the sustained allegation; that returning C.G. to her custody
would create a substantial risk of harm; and that the Bureau had
provided reasonable reunification services. The court terminated
reunification services, found by clear and convincing evidence
that a section 366.26 hearing was not in C.G.’s best interest, and
scheduled a permanent plan review hearing.

      That hearing took place on May 3, 2021. By that time, the
Bureau had changed its recommendation to adoption by C.G.’s
current foster parents. The social worker had recently suspended
Mother’s phone contact with C.G. due to inappropriate comments
(including that Mother was homeless and that they would move
to her home in Guatemala when C.G. came back to her), late
night telephone calls, and incessant text messages. Mother
continued to tell the social worker she was “ ‘not understanding’
the court process” and believed the social worker had “set a trap.”
She was unable to follow when the social worker explained the
case status and maintained that the social worker and foster
parents were plotting against her.

      C.G. wanted to be adopted by her foster parents. She was
worried Mother would keep the adoption from going through and
did not want any contact with her until Mother got help with her
mental health. She explained, “ ‘I just need a break. She is not
crazy, but she is crazy in a not normal way and I just need a
break. Yes, I need a break from her.’ ” Mother continued to deny
the sexual abuse allegations and to blame Marilyn.

     At the outset of the hearing, Mother’s attorney moved
under People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616 (McKenzie) for
                                 5
permission to withdraw as counsel. Before addressing the
request, the court questioned Mother about possible Native
American status and found ICWA did not apply. It then
proceeded to hold a hearing on the McKenzie request with only
Mother, her attorney, a Spanish interpreter, and the court
reporter present.

       Counsel stated that communications had broken down
between her and Mother and asked the court to allow her to
withdraw from the case and to appoint substitute counsel and
possibly a guardian ad litem. Mother had a guardian ad litem
during a prior dependency action, but her attorney initially
believed she did not need one for the current proceedings. Since
then, however, counsel had changed her mind. Mother had been
sending increasingly frequent ranting, angry texts at all hours
accusing counsel of not helping her. Based on these interactions
and information from the Bureau and county mental health
services, counsel had come to believe that Mother now qualified
for a guardian ad litem.

      After further questioning by the court, counsel agreed to
continue representing Mother and withdrew her McKenzie
motion. When the hearing resumed in open court, the court
turned to the question of appointing a guardian ad litem. It
explained to Mother: “If I appoint a guardian ad litem, that
means I would appoint someone to make all the decisions in the
case for you. Instead of you telling the attorney what you want,
the guardian will decide what is best for you and will tell the
attorney. [Counsel] has requested this, because she feels that
you do not understand what is going on in court, and you cannot
assist her in making decisions about how to proceed in court.”

      The court then asked, “Would you in fact like me to appoint
a guardian ad litem for you? That would be another attorney.”
Mother responded “Yes, your Honor. That will be fine. Thank
you.” The court stated “[Mother], we are going to get a guardian

                                6
ad litem appointed for you, as I just explained what that is. And
I considered her responses, and I find, based on that response,
that she does not understand the nature of the proceedings, or is
not able to communicate. I am therefore going to send that
referral over for a guardian ad litem.”

      The next permanent plan review hearing took place on
March 14, 2022. Mother’s attorney moved orally under section
388 to modify the order terminating reunification services on the
ground that Mother was working with a housing program and
had become sufficiently stable to better engage in reunification.
Mother testified that she now believed Father had molested
Marilyn and would believe C.G. were she to reported being
sexually abused. Mother loved C.G. and believed C.G. needed
her. She had not spoken with her daughter in a year and did not
know why the Bureau had become involved.

      The court denied the motion for modification, found the
beneficial relationship exception to the preference for adoption
did not apply, and found C.G. was likely to be adopted.
Accordingly, it terminated Mother’s parental rights.

                             DISCUSSION
                                     A.
      Mother contends the appointment of a guardian ad litem
was unsupported by substantial evidence and violated her right
to procedural due process. We disagree.

      In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 states the controlling
law. A guardian ad litem must be appointed if the parent lacks
the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the
proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case. (Id. at p.
910.) The parent must be given an opportunity at an informal
hearing to persuade the court the appointment is not necessary;
the court must make sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself that the
party is incompetent; court or counsel should explain the purpose

                                 7
of the appointment and the grounds for believing the parent is
mentally incompetent; and, unless the parent consents to the
appointment, the record must contain substantial evidence of the
parent’s incompetence. (Id. at pp. 910-911.)

       Here, Mother affirmatively consented to the appointment
after the court explained the reason for and effect of appointing a
guardian ad litem at the hearing. No more was required. In
these circumstances, “[i]f the parent consents to the appointment,
the parent’s due process rights are satisfied.” (In re James F.,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 910; see also In re Daniel S. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 903, 912; In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
1180, 1187.)

      Mother’s contrary arguments are not persuasive. She
suggests the court was required to question her about her mental
capacity and ability to assist in her defense. We disagree. No
law requires such questioning when the parent was afforded an
opportunity to be heard and gave informed consent to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. [Cf. In re Sara D. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 661, 670-672 [appointment violated due process
where attorney consented on parent’s behalf outside of parent’s
presence, neither court nor counsel explained the purpose of or
reason for a guardian ad litem, parent had no opportunity to
respond, and court lacked sufficient information as to parent’s
competence].)

      Mother’s assertion that the court failed to inquire whether
her attorney had discussed the implications of appointing a
guardian ad litem with her is also meritless. Mother’s experience
having a guardian ad litem in a prior dependency case doubtless
indicates some degree of familiarity with the implications of such
an appointment. In this proceeding, the court explained to
Mother that her counsel felt she did not understand the court
proceedings and could not assist counsel in making decisions. It
also explained that a guardian ad litem, if appointed, would make

                                 8
all decisions about the case instead of Mother, and would relate
them to her attorney. Nothing would have been gained by
ascertaining whether Mother’s attorney had provided the same
advisements.

      Mother also faults the court for suggesting the guardian ad
litem would be an attorney. We have no reason to believe the
person appointed to serve as guardian ad litem would not be an
attorney. Nor is there any basis to find, as Mother contends, that
she might have been led to misunderstand that the court was
simply replacing her current attorney with new counsel. To the
contrary, the trial court clearly explained that the guardian ad
litem’s role would be to decide what was best for Mother and to
inform her attorney of those decisions. So advised, Mother
consented to the appointment. There is no basis to presume she
misunderstood what she was consenting too.

       In any event, the decision to appoint a guardian ad litem
would withstand review even without Mother’s consent based on
the substantial evidence that she was mentally incompetent to
proceed without one. Mother has a long history of mental health
problems that have prevented her from parenting her children,
including hallucinations, erratic moods, and violent behavior
resulting in a psychiatric hold. The social worker noted early in
these proceedings that these problems prevented her from
effectively communicating about her ability to parent. Later, in
advance of the May 3 permanent planning review hearing,
Mother told the social worker she did not understand the court
process, did not understand why she could not reunify with C.G.,
and believed the social worker “set a trap” and did not want her
to reunify. Each time the social worker attempted to explain the
case status, Mother was unable to follow the conversation and
maintained the social worker and foster parents were plotting
against her.

                                9
      At the McKenzie hearing, Mother’s counsel reported she
was unable to converse with Mother without her becoming upset
and angry and using abusive language. Mother did not believe
her attorney and did not believe counsel was doing anything for
her. Despite her attorney’s initial assessment, Mother’s behavior
and information from the Bureau and county mental health
department had convinced her that a guardian ad litem was
required.

      In response to questioning by the court, Mother said that
even with the help of a Spanish interpreter she had difficulty
understanding her attorney. The court noted that Mother’s
responses showed she neither understood the nature of the
proceedings nor was able to communicate with counsel.
Substantial evidence supports the determination, so we will not
disturb it.

                                B.

      Mother asserts the court and Bureau failed to fulfill their
duties to inquire into C.G.’s possible Native American lineage as
required by California law implementing ICWA. The Bureau
correctly acknowledges the error, but contends it was harmless.
We agree.

       ICWA establishes minimum standards for courts to follow
before removing Indian children from their families and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) Under California’s implementing
legislation and rules of court, the juvenile court and the child
welfare agency have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire of all potentially interested persons whether a child for
whom a dependency petition has been filed is or may be an
Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(a); In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 174.) This duty
“includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
                                10
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child
abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)

        The Bureau concedes it violated this duty of inquiry when
it failed to ask Father’s brother about possible Native American
ancestry. Because the duty to inquire of a child’s extended family
members is imposed by California law, the error is reversible only
if it was prejudicial. (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421,
433 (Antonio R.).)

       The appellate courts are presently divided on what showing
of prejudice warrants reversal for ICWA inquiry errors (see
Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435); the issue is
currently pending in Supreme Court. (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 769, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) For
present purposes, we will accede to Mother’s request to follow the
relatively strict standard stated in Antonio R.

       Rejecting approaches taken by other courts that require
some affirmative showing of prejudice to support reversal,
Antonio R. held that “in determining whether the failure to make
an adequate initial inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the
information in the hands of the extended family members is
likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an
Indian child, not whether the information is likely to show the
child is in fact an Indian child.” (Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.
App.5th at p. 435; compare, e.g., In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [reversal required where record indicates
there was readily obtainable information likely to bear
meaningfully upon whether child is an Indian child]; In re A.C.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069 [reversal required where
parent shows that, if asked, he or she would in good faith have
claimed Native American ancestry].)

      It may be, as Antonio R. predicts, that error will in most
circumstances be prejudicial under its test. (Antonio R., supra,
                                  11
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) But not so here. A child is an Indian
child if and only if he or she “is either (a) a member of an Indian
tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and
is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4); see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).) In this
case, undisputed evidence established that Mother and Father
are, respectively, from Guatemala and Brazil. Under these
circumstances the Bureau’s inadequate inquiry could not
conceivably have made a difference; there is no possibility that
C.G. is or may be a Native American child or, accordingly, that
questioning her extended family members would be “meaningful”
in making that determination. (See Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.
App.5th at p. 435.) We are satisfied the ICWA error does not
require conditional reversal for further inquiry.

                          DISPOSITION
      The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

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                                         ______________________
                                         BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
LANGHORNE, J.*

A165310

     * Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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