Court Opinion

ID: 9586458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:11:25.592319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:45.744041
License: Public Domain

Sharp, J.
While the complaint filed in this action was in general terms and some facts left to inference, it nevertheless stated an enforceable cause of action. At worst, it could only have been a defective statement of a good cause. Defendant’s proper remedy was by a motion to make the complaint more definite. In demurring, counsel for defendant followed the practice mentioned by Barnhill, C.J., in Davis v. Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 56 S.E. 2d 43. “When, as is often the case, counsel resort to a demurrer, rather than a motion to make more definite, to challenge the sufficiency of the statement of a good *124cause of action and the defect may be cured by amendment, the courts will allow the amendment rather than dismiss the action.”
However, in this case, the judge, by consent, sustained the demurrer “for the reasons set out in the demurrer.” His judgment, even though the complaint was not demurrable, became the law of the case. Nothing else appearing, the new complaint having been filed more than twelve months “after the inception of the loss” the action would be barred for failure to comply with G.S. 58-176. Holly v. Assurance Co., 170 N.C. 4, 86 S.E. 694; Rouse v. Insurance Co., 203 N.C. 345, 166 S.E. 177; Boyd v. Insurance Co., 245 N.C. 503, 96 S.E. 2d 703; Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E. 2d 700; Davis v. Rhodes, supra; Stamey v. Membership Corporation, 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E. 2d 282. The Court will take judicial notice of the filing date of the amended complaint; it judicially knows its own records- in the suit being tried. Harrell v. Lumber Co., 172 N.C. 827, 90 S.E. 148; Webb v. Eggleston, supra; Massenburg v. Fogg, 256 N.C. 703, 124 S.E. 2d 868. In this case we think something else appears.
At the time counsel for both defendant and plaintiff consented that the demurrer be sustained, the twelve months had already expired and, unless the complaint could have been amended so- that the amendment related back, counsel for plaintiff would have been giving away his client’s law suit. This, of course, he had no right to do, and we presume that he no more intended to give away his law suit than counsel for defendant thought he did.
It is implicit in his Honor’s judgment, and the somewhat unusual procedure, that counsel’s consent that the demurrer be sustained was intended merely as a device to make the original complaint more definite and certain. This was the only relief to which defendant was then entitled, -and the consent of both counsel that the demurrer be sustained implied their consent to the amendment. Permission to amend was included in the order sustaining the demurrer without obj ection by defendant.
A provision in a standard fire insurance policy that action on it must be commenced within twelve months after inception of the loss is contractual. It is, therefore, subject to waiver or estoppel. Strong’s N. C. Index, Vol. 2, Insurance, § 87; Dibbrell v. Insurance Co., 110 N.C. 193, 14 S.E. 783; Meekins v. Insurance Co., 231 N.C. 452, 57 S.E. 2d 777; Boyd v. Insurance Co., supra.
Affirmed.