Court Opinion

ID: 9386069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 13:10:55.131829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.891290
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Chaney, Raphael and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              JESUS LAMONT TURNER
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1328-21-2                                   JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
                                                                                  APRIL 11, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
                                             W. Reilly Marchant, Judge

                              (Maureen L. White, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
                              on brief.

                              Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury convicted Jesus Lamont Turner (Turner) of first-degree murder in violation of Code

              § 18.2-32, malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51, and two charges of using a firearm

              in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. On appeal, Turner argues that the

              evidence was insufficient to identify him as one of the perpetrators. For the following reasons, this

              Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                                                          BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party” in the trial court. McGowan v.

              Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
(2018)). We “regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. (citing Gerald, 295 Va. at 473).

        In May 2019, brothers Jaquan Evans (Jaquan) and Temon Evans (Temon) were at a park

playing basketball with Tony Carter (Tony) when a group of about five armed men approached

them and lined up on the side of the basketball court. Jaquan ran away from the court while Tony

ran to get his handbag near the side of the court. Tony then stood off the court beside Temon.

Temon testified that he saw that the other men all had guns. Temon heard one of the armed men

say, “[T]hat’s the boy that he shot at.” Tony then removed a gun from his bag, and the other men

all started shooting in the direction of Tony and Temon. Tony fired back twice in self-defense and

in defense of his one-year-old child and his child’s mother.

        During the shooting, a bullet struck and killed bystander M.D.,1 the nine-year-old cousin of

Temon and Jaquan. Another child, 11-year-old J.M., was also shot. J.M.’s gunshot wounds were

treated at the hospital, and he survived.

        At trial, Tony and Jaquan identified Turner as one of the men who approached them on the

basketball court. Temon did not identify Turner as a perpetrator. Jaquan testified that one man in

the group was “clutching” in his waistband what Jaquan believed to be a gun, and he identified

Turner as that man. Jaquan also testified that Tony was the only person he actually saw with a gun.

        On cross-examination, Jaquan acknowledged that at the prior trial of Turner’s co-defendant,

Jermaine Davis (Davis), he testified that he did not recognize Turner at all. Jaquan also

acknowledged that at Davis’s trial—six months before Turner’s trial—he identified Davis, whom he

knew from high school, as the only man he saw clutching a gun in his waistband. Jaquan testified

that he also recognized another man in the group as someone he knew from high school, whom he

        1
         For the sake of the victims’ and their families’ privacy, the victims are identified in this
opinion by their initials.
                                                -2-
identified as Quinshawn Betts (Betts). On re-direct examination, Jaquan acknowledged that at the

prior trials of Davis and Betts, he testified that he saw at least three men “clutching” as if they had a

gun, and he identified Davis and Betts as two of the men clutching guns.

        When Tony was called to testify, he refused to answer the Commonwealth’s questions until

the court ordered him to answer and advised him that he could be found in contempt for refusing to

answer. When the Commonwealth pointed Turner out in the courtroom and asked, “Do you know

the defendant,” Tony responded, “Nope.” But Tony subsequently clarified that he recognized

Turner but did not “know” him as he knows his family and friends. Tony also testified that he

recognized Turner as someone called “J.T.” who “grew up around the same neighborhood.” Tony

initially testified that he did not remember whether he saw Turner in the park on the day of the

shooting. But after reviewing his prior testimony to refresh his recollection, Tony testified that at

the time of the shooting, he recognized Turner in the group who approached him on the basketball

court and “locked eyes” with him.

        When Tony repeatedly gave non-responsive answers to the Commonwealth’s questions, the

trial court allowed the Commonwealth to question him as an adverse witness. Subsequently, at

Turner’s request, the trial court instructed the jury that “[y]ou shall consider the fact that [Tony]

made prior statements inconsistent with his testimony in this case only for the purpose of showing

his contradictory testimony.”

        After the Commonwealth rested its case, Turner moved to strike and argued, in relevant

part, that the evidence was insufficient to identify Turner as one of the perpetrators. In support of

his motion to strike, Turner argued to the trial court that “[Tony] did not identify Jesus Turner,

J.T., . . . as having been at the park at any given time. In fact, he said exactly the contrary. He

didn’t see the person. He didn’t recall.” Turner further contended:

                [Tony] did not identify Jesus Turner as having been out there, having
                seen him that day, or any such testimony until the Commonwealth
                                                  -3-
                attorney, as a last resort, asked Your Honor to qualify him and
                examine him as an adverse witness. That’s the only reason that they
                did it.

                        When they did it, Your Honor instructed them that the only
                evidentiary value that such testimony would have is to discredit him.
                It would be for impeachment purposes and not to establish that
                whatever he said on a prior occasion was true. It was only at that
                point that there was any mention made by [Tony] that he saw J.T. out
                at the park on that day.

                        ....

                [H]e simply didn’t say anything identifying Jesus Turner as having
                been at the park, having a firearm and firing a firearm until after he is
                qualified as an adverse witness.

Turner also argued that Jaquan’s testimony identifying Turner was inherently incredible. The trial

court explicitly rejected Turner’s contention that Jaquan’s testimony was inherently incredible and

denied the motion to strike.

        The jury convicted Turner on all charges. In accordance with the punishment fixed by the

jury, the trial court sentenced Turner to active incarceration for a total period of 33 years: 20 years

for first-degree murder, 5 years for malicious wounding, 3 years for using a firearm in the

commission of murder, and 5 years for using a firearm in the commission of malicious wounding.

This appeal followed.

                                              ANALYSIS

        Turner argues on appeal solely that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was one

of the perpetrators because Jaquan was the only witness who identified him, and his testimony

was inherently incredible. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

a criminal conviction, this Court “reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, as the prevailing party at trial, and considers all inferences fairly deducible from

that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 66 (2014) (quoting Allen v.

Commonwealth, 287 Va. 68, 72 (2014)). At issue on appeal is “whether any rational trier of fact
                                                  -4-
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va.

672, 676 (2010)). The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed “unless it is plainly wrong or

without evidence to support it.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 56, 62 (2021) (quoting

Austin v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 60, 65 (2012)); see also Code § 8.01-680.

       On appellate review, this Court defers to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations unless

the witness’s testimony is “inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it

unworthy of belief.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (quoting Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 315 (2011)). “Determining the credibility of witnesses who give

conflicting accounts is within the exclusive province of the jury, which has the unique opportunity

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300,

304 (1993).

       “A legal determination that a witness is inherently incredible is very different from the

mere identification of inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony or statements. Testimony may be

contradictory or contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible

as a matter of law.” Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626 (citing Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362,

415 (2006)). Similarly, a motive to lie does not make a witness’s testimony inherently

incredible. See id. at 627. Instead, all such circumstances are appropriately weighed and

“resolved by the fact finder,” as part of the overall credibility determination, not the appellate

court on review. Id. at 626 (quoting Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011));

Juniper, 271 Va. at 415 (holding that a witness’s delay in reporting knowledge of a case or

inconsistencies in testimony are “appropriately weighed as part of the entire issue of witness

credibility, which is left to the jury to determine” (emphasis added)).

                                                 -5-
        Turner’s sufficiency argument is predicated on his contention that Jaquan was the only

witness who identified Turner as one of the perpetrators. 2 Although Turner acknowledges that

Tony was an eyewitness to the shooting, Turner contends that Tony “never identified Jesus

Turner as one of the men present and/or shooting at the park on the day in question.” However,

Turner’s contention is contradicted by the evidence. Tony testified that he “locked eyes” with one

of the perpetrators whose face he recognized from having grown up in the same neighborhood.

Tony further testified that this perpetrator was called “J.T.,” and he identified Jesus Turner as this

perpetrator. Although Tony initially testified that he did not remember whether he saw Turner in

the park on the day of the shooting, he subsequently identified Turner as one of the perpetrators

after reviewing his prior testimony to refresh his recollection. The Commonwealth eventually

questioned Tony as an adverse witness, and the trial court instructed the jury that Tony’s prior

inconsistent statements could only be considered as showing his contradictory testimony. But

Tony’s identification of Turner as one of the perpetrators was not a prior statement inconsistent with

his testimony in this case. Tony affirmatively testified at Turner’s trial that Turner was one of the

perpetrators. Thus, even if Jaquan’s identification of Turner is disregarded, Tony’s testimony

provided a sufficient factual basis to support the jury’s finding that Turner was one of the

perpetrators.

        2
            Turner’s single assignment of error states:

                  The trial court erred in upholding Turner’s convictions for murder,
                  malicious wounding and the use of a firearm in each of those
                  offenses because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Jesus
                  Turner was present at the time of the offenses as only one witness
                  identified him as being there and his testimony inherently
                  incredible.

(Emphasis added).
                                                  -6-
       Even if Jaquan’s in-court identification of Turner as one of the perpetrators was

uncorroborated, the record does not justify a finding that Jaquan’s testimony is inherently

incredible. Turner contends that Jaquan’s testimony was “‘manifestly false’” because Jaquan was

“exceedingly distressed” about the shooting of his cousin, M.D., and this motivated him to identify

“anyone who he thought might be involved to account for her death.” Turner argues that this

explains why Jaquan testified that Turner was the only one with a gun but inconsistently testified at

co-defendant Davis’s trial that he saw Davis with a gun. However, a motive to lie does not render a

witness’s testimony inherently incredible. See Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626. And it was within the

province of the jury to resolve conflicts in Jaquan’s testimony because the inconsistencies did not

render his identification of Turner inherently incredible. See Lea, 16 Va. App. at 304.

                                          CONCLUSION

       The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Turner was one of the

perpetrators. Therefore, this Court affirms Turner’s convictions.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

                                                -7-