Court Opinion

ID: 9911944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 15:01:20.04319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:49.510717
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                     HACKEL, KIRKBY, and GROSS
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                        Douglas B. MOSLEY
                Staff Sergeant (E-6), U.S. Marine Corps
                               Appellant

                             No. 202200178

                        _________________________

                        Decided: 21 December 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                             Military Judge:
                    Glen Hines (Arraignment and Plea)
                          Nick Henry (Motions)

 Sentence adjudged 18 May 2022 by a general court-martial convened at
 Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, consisting of a military judge sitting
 alone. Sentence approved by the convening authority: confinement for
 30 months, reduction to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and a
 bad-conduct discharge.

                            For Appellant:
                Captain Kimberly D. Hinson, JAGC, USN

                             For Appellee:
                    Major Mary Claire Finnen, USMC
                Lieutenant Rachel Noveroske, JAGC, USN
               United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                             Opinion of the Court

                          _________________________

       This opinion does not serve as binding precedent under
             NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2(a).

                          _________________________

KIRKBY, Judge:
   A military judge sitting alone as a general court-martial convicted Appel-
lant pursuant to his pleas. Appellant pleaded guilty to seven specifications of
wrongful possession and distribution of controlled substances in violation of
Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 1
    Appellant asserts three assignments of error [AOE] which we reorder as
follows: (1) the adjudged sentence is inappropriately severe; (2) Appellant was
subjected to pretrial restriction tantamount to confinement and is entitled to
day-for-day credit against his sentence to confinement, and; (3) Appellant was
denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorneys neither filed a writ-
ten motion nor presented evidence of restriction tantamount to confinement.
We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

                               I. BACKGROUND

    In 2021, Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] agents initiated an
investigation into allegations that Appellant wrongfully possessed and distrib-
uted controlled substances. Over the course of the investigation, NCIS agents
conducted three controlled buys of drugs from Appellant. On 1 September
2021, immediately following the third purchase, NCIS agents detained Appel-
lant and his command placed him into pretrial confinement onboard Camp
Lejeune. Two days later, Appellant’s command turned him over to civilian au-
thorities pursuant to an arrest warrant for possession of cocaine and opiates.
Appellant was thereafter detained at the Onslow County jail under civilian
control until 13 December 2021 when he was returned to military control. Ap-
pellant’s command then placed him on pretrial restriction from 13 December
2021 until 18 May 2022, the date of his court-martial. This 156-day period
forms the basis for Appellant’s second and third AOEs.

   1 10 U.S.C. § 912a.

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               United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                             Opinion of the Court

    On appeal, Appellant claims that he “spent five months in [his] barracks
room virtually 24/7,” that “[he] was not assigned any work,” and that [he] was
not allowed to have contact with anyone except the OOD or [his] chain of com-
mand. 2 Appellant’s Commanding Officer set the following conditions of re-
striction:
           a. Restriction is on weekdays, weekends and holidays. You
       are required to maintain a squared-away uniform, and a fresh
       shave at all times. The OOD will conduct an inspection on you
       during check in. At no time will you be in civilian attire while on
       restriction.
          b. You are restricted to Building FC 550, room number 103.
           c. The Officer of the Day (OOD) is to know your whereabouts
       at all times. You should be in one of four locations; at the Battal-
       ion headquarters for check-in, laundry room, designated sleep-
       ing quarters, or smoking area. This does not allow you to be in
       another Marine’s or Sailor’s room.
           d. You will sign in with the OOD (BLDG FC520G) in the
       proper uniform as indicated by the times on your restriction pa-
       pers. Failure to sign in at designated times will be considered a
       violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
           e. You will obtain permission from OOD to attend church ser-
       vices on base, to go to the nearest PX (for health and comfort
       items only), to conduct physical training on weekends (for not
       more than one hour each day), and to go to the nearest mess hall.
       All meals while on restriction will be in the mess hall only. You
       will be escorted by the OOD when going to the nearest PX. Dur-
       ing physical training, you will wear either Marine Corps PT gear
       (green on green) or boots and utes.
          f. Alcohol consumption or possession while on restriction is
       prohibited.
            g. Sign-in with the OOD ends at 2145. This does not mean
       restriction is over for the night. After 2145 you are authorized to
       be in your designated living quarters only. Failure to comply will
       be considered a violation of Article 134 and 92 of the UCMJ.

   2 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x B.

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                  United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                Opinion of the Court

               h. You are not allowed to drive a privately owned vehicle
           (POV). You are allowed to be a passenger in a POV only when
           authorized by your chain of command. You will not rely on rides
           to get to any restriction musters. You will walk to all restriction
           musters. You will not be allowed to drive your POV until you
           complete your restriction.
               i. If your section secures from work early, you are still re-
           stricted to building 550, room 103, and all above rules apply.
              j. You will not have visitors in your room. All visitation will
           be conducted in the barracks lounges in accordance with the
           BEQ order. Visitation will be done on Sundays only from 1530-
           1730. Visitors will be limited to family members only.
               k. If you cannot make sign-in due to operational commitment
           then your Officer in Charge (OIC) or Staff Noncommissioned Of-
           ficer in Charge (SNCOIC) will call the OOD prior to check-in.
              l. If released from civilian custody, you are directed to imme-
           diately notify your OIC or SNCOIC. 3
    The military judge held three Article 39(a) sessions over the course of Ap-
pellant’s court-martial. The first session consisted of an arraignment on 15 De-
cember 2021. The Defense raised no allegations of restriction tantamount to
confinement. At the 10 January 2022 session, the parties discussed progress
with discovery issues, but again the Defense raised no motions concerning the
conditions of Appellant’s restriction.
    At the 18 May 2022 session, Appellant entered his pleas of guilty and the
military judge entered findings of guilty and announced the sentence. Imme-
diately after announcing his findings, the military judge ordered 105 days of
credit for time Appellant spent in pretrial confinement. 4 The Defense then at-
tempted to argue for 155 days of confinement credit in accordance with United
States v. Mason, stating that the time Appellant spent in restriction was tan-
tamount to confinement. 5 However, trial defense counsel offered no evidence
in support of this position, only arguing, “at the end of the case, it would be

    3 Appellant’s Mot. to Attach, App’x A.

    4 R. at 21, 79.

    5 R. at 79-80; United States v. Mason, 19 M.J. 274 (C.M.A. 1985) (summary dispo-

sition).

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                  United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                Opinion of the Court

more—the military judge will be able to see it. But I think that I was just put-
ting on the record now for your consideration.” 6 The military judge noted that
Block 8 of the charge sheet indicated Appellant served specified periods of con-
finement and restriction. With respect to the period of restriction, beginning
on 13 December 2021 and ending on the current date, the military judge stated:
     the Court will obviously consider that as a matter in mitigation
     and permit you to argue it. But I’m going to—I’m not going to—
     I’m not going [to] award any credit for any of that period at this
     time. For any of that period being tantamount to confinement such
     that there would be additional confinement credit awarded at this
     time. But if you want to raise it after presentencing evidence has
     been presented, I’ll invite you to—to renew your motion at that
     time. 7
    The military judge invited trial defense counsel to present evidence in favor
of Appellant’s motion for Mason credit following the presentencing hearing. 8
After failing to do so, the military judge queried whether Appellant had any
additional evidence, to which trial defense counsel responded, “no.” 9 It is clear
that the military judge sought to understand whether Appellant was entitled
to credit and “explicitly invited Appellant” to put on evidence. Trial defense
counsel declined to do so.
    At his court-martial, Appellant took the unusual step of entering pleas of
guilty to all seven specifications of the sole Charge without the benefit of a
plea agreement. As a result, Appellant was fully exposed to the maximum
sentence in sentencing, which included a dishonorable discharge, total forfei-
tures, reduction to paygrade E-1, confinement for 65 years, and any other
lawful punishment. In his unsworn statement, Appellant indicated that the
convening authority refused to accept a plea agreement that would include a
sentence of less than a dishonorable discharge and confinement for five

   6 R. at 80.

   7 R. at 80-81.

   8 Id.

   9 R. at 157.

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                    United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                  Opinion of the Court

years. 10 The military judge sentenced Appellant to reduction to E-1, total for-
feitures, a bad-conduct discharge, and confinement for 30 months. 11

                                    II. DISCUSSION

A. Appellant’s Adjudged Sentenced was not Inappropriately Severe

    1. Standard of Review and the Law
    The Uniform Code of Military Justice obligates a court of criminal appeals
to evaluate an appellant’s sentence independently for appropriateness. 12 The
court reviews sentence appropriateness de novo. 13 Sentence appropriateness
involves the judicial function of assuring that justice is done and that an ac-
cused gets the punishment he deserves. 14 Our review requires individualized
consideration of the particular accused based on the nature and seriousness of
the offense and the character of the offender. 15 In making this assessment, we
analyze the record as a whole. 16 Notwithstanding this Court’s significant dis-
cretion to determine appropriateness, we may not engage in acts of clemency,
which is the prerogative of the convening authority. 17

    2. Analysis
    Appellant argues that a sentence of 30 months of confinement and a bad-
conduct discharge was disproportionate to the offenses to which he pleaded
guilty. A number of factors inform us that this argument is without merit: (1)
the maximum punitive exposure for the offenses to which the Appellant
pleaded guilty included 65 years confinement and a dishonorable discharge; 18

    10 R. at 154.

    11 The military judge imposed the following sentence of confinement for each spec-

ification, all periods of which were to run concurrently: specification 1: 12 months;
specification 2: 21 months; specification 3: 30 months; specification 4: 90 days; specifi-
cation 5: 90 days; specification 6: 90 days; specification 7: 180 days. R. at 169.
    12 Article 66, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866.

    13 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

    14 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

    15 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982).

    16 See Healy, 26 M.J. at 395.

    17 Id. at 396.

    18 R. at 74.

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                  United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                Opinion of the Court

(2) the initial plea agreement apparently offered by the convening authority
and rejected by Appellant was for five years of confinement; 19 (3) the Govern-
ment at trial argued for confinement of 3 years; and (4) our own view of the
sentence as being correct in law and fact, based on the entire record. 20
   The trial defense team’s strategic decisions in this case, straddling the con-
cepts of sentence appropriateness (AOE 1) and ineffective assistance of counsel
(AOE 3), are relevant and warrant discussion at this point.
    Appellant and his trial defense team took several unusual and potentially
perilous courses of action in this case, not least of which was pleading guilty to
all charges without the benefit of a plea agreement. 21 Despite being unusual
and potentially perilous, none of these decisions were unreasonable. Rather
they appear to have been calculated, strategic and, indeed, successful. One
measure to evaluate whether counsel’s performance was deficient is, logically,
to consider the end result for Appellant and the totality of the record.
    Trial defense counsel presented a comprehensive strategy that resulted in
an adjudged sentence of confinement that was 750 months below the maximum
possible. The adjudged sentence also beat the confinement term apparently
offered by the convening authority by half—30 months less than the apparent
offer. And the military judge’s sentence was six months less than what the
Government asked for at trial; therefore, it is not difficult to recognize the
awarded sentence as just, if not favorable, to Appellant for the crimes to which
he pleaded guilty.
    In assessing the appropriateness of Appellant’s sentence, we examine the
robust sentencing evidence that includes service record documents, letters of
support, a letter regarding Appellant’s assistance with a civilian murder
case, 22 and medical records indicating that Appellant had persistent “mod-se-
vere right sided lumbosacral pain” as the result of an injury. 23 However, we
find that the seriousness of the underlying offenses is not sufficiently mitigated
by other matters to call into question the adjudged sentence. Not only was Ap-
pellant found guilty of wrongfully possessing four different controlled sub-
stances, but he also distributed over 30 grams of cocaine in the parking lot of

   19 R. at 154 (offered during the Appellant’s unsworn statement without objection).

   20 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ.

   21 R. at 27.

   22 Def. Ex. A.

   23 Def. Ex. B.

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                  United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                Opinion of the Court

the Camp Lejeune base exchange—and, on at least one occasion, he sold the
cocaine to a Marine junior to him in grade. We therefore find the military
judge’s sentence to be in-line with our own notions of justice in this case and
not inappropriately severe.
  B. Appellant Waived his Claim that his Restriction was Tanta-
mount to Confinement.

    1. Standard of Review and the Law.
    We review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether certain pretrial
restrictions are tantamount to confinement based on the totality of the condi-
tions imposed. 24 Conditions of pretrial restriction that are more rigorous than
necessary to ensure the presence of the accused at trial, or to prevent addi-
tional misconduct, may be tantamount to confinement and therefore entitle an
appellant to day-for-day credit for the time that he spends in pretrial re-
striction. 25

    2. Analysis
    The Supreme Court has established that waiver is the “intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right.” 26 Whether an issue is waived is
question of law we review de novo. 27 Here, the trial defense counsel mentioned
Mason credit, but did not raise the issue in a motion, opting instead to raise
the issue in Appellant’s unsworn statement. We find that Appellant waived
the issue of Mason credit at trial. Such waiver “leaves no error for us to correct
on appeal.” 28
    We therefore reject this AOE.

    24 United States v. King 58 M.J. 110, 113 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

    25 United States v. Delaney, No. 201700108, 2017 CCA LEXIS 650, at *5 (N-M Ct.

Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2017).
    26 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725. 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304

U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
    27 United States v. Haynes, 79 M.J. 17, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2019). We further note, even if

there was no waiver of this issue, failure at trial to seek Mason credit for pretrial re-
striction tantamount to confinement will constitute forfeiture, rendering the issue in-
eligible for appellate relief in the absence of plain error. Based on our de novo review,
we conclude that Appellant cannot meet his burden of establishing plain error. See
United States v. Parker, 75 M.J. 603, 611 (N-M. Ct Crim. App. 2016).
    28 See United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330, 332-33 (C.A.A.F. 2009); Haynes, 79

M.J. at 19.

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                United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                              Opinion of the Court

   C. Trial Defense Counsel were not Ineffective.

   1. Standard of Review and the Law.
    We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. 29 The Sixth
Amendment entitles criminal defendants to representation that does not fall
“below an objective standard of reasonableness” in light of “prevailing profes-
sional norms.” 30 In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in prejudice. 31 With respect
to the first prong, counsel are presumed to be competent and our inquiry into
an attorney’s representation is “highly deferential” to that attorney. 32 We em-
ploy “a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.” 33 An appellant has the heavy burden of
establishing a factual foundation for a claim of ineffective representation. 34 We
will not second-guess strategic or tactical decisions made by the trial defense
counsel unless the appellant can show specific defects in counsel’s performance
that were unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. 35
     In order to show prejudice under the second prong, an appellant “must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reason-
able probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come” 36 “Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record
is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming rec-
ord support.” 37

   29 United States v. Harpole, 77 M.J. 231, 236 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

   30 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

   31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

   32 Id. at 689.

   33 Id.

   34 United States v. Grigoruk, 52 M.J. 312, 315 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

   35 United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 475 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

   36 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

   37 Id. at 696.

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                 United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                               Opinion of the Court

   2. Analysis
   Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim rests on the premise that
trial defense counsel should have filed a motion for Mason credit. Where an
appellant attacks the trial strategy or tactics of the trial defense counsel, the
appellant must show specific defects in counsel's performance that were “un-
reasonable under prevailing professional norms.” 38
    In the face of significant changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and Manual for Courts-Martial, it is sometimes difficult to identify “prevailing
professional norms.” What was common previously may be uncommon now,
but we are reluctant, given the shifting sands of military justice, to make his-
toric practice the standard for trial defense counsel. Rather, we must look at
the reasonableness of the strategic decisions given the totality of the circum-
stances.
   Despite the waiver of the Mason credit issue, the nature of Appellant’s final
AOE necessitates further analysis in the form of a de novo review of the un-
derlying conditions of restriction.
   The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] has established that we
consider “the prior examples of such cases . . . and the factors gleaned from
them” in determining whether pretrial restriction is tantamount to confine-
ment. 39 Factors to consider include:
       [T]he nature of the restraint (physical or moral), the area or
       scope of the restraint (confined to post, barracks, room, etc.), the
       types of duties, if any, performed during the restraint (routine
       military duties, fatigue duties, etc.), and the degree of privacy
       enjoyed within the area of restraint. Other important conditions
       which may significantly affect one or more of these factors are:
       whether the accused was required to sign in periodically with
       some supervising authority; whether a charge of quarters or
       other authority periodically checked to ensure the accused's
       presence; whether the accused was required to be under armed
       or unarmed escort; whether and to what degree [the] accused
       was allowed visitation and telephone privileges; what religious,
       medical, recreational, educational, or other support facilities
       were available for the accused’s use; the location of the accused's
       sleeping accommodations; and whether the accused was allowed

   38 United States v. Perez, 64 M.J. 239, 243 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   39 United States v. Calderon, 34 M.J. 501, 506 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991).

                                         10
                 United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                               Opinion of the Court

          to retain and use his personal property (including his civilian
          clothing). 40

    Our consideration of the conditions of the restriction order in light of the
factors the CAAF identified leads us to conclude that Appellant experienced
restriction, not confinement. The nature of the restraint was primarily moral.
Nothing in the record indicates that the period of restriction involved physical
barriers (i.e., locked doors), personnel assigned to watch or monitor Appellant,
or other controls that physically restrained Appellant. 41 Additionally, Appel-
lant makes no claim that his privacy was ever interfered within the restriction
area. Finally, while both the hours of visitation and who could visit Appellant
were restricted, the record does not indicate that Appellant’s communications
were otherwise limited.
   The physical boundaries of Appellant’s restriction primarily included his
two-person barracks room, the battalion headquarters for check-in, the bar-
racks laundry room, and the smoking area. Additionally, Appellant could seek
permission to attend church services, shop at the Base Exchange, perform
physical training, and dine at the mess hall. Appellant does not claim—and
the record provides no evidence to suggest—that any such requests were ever
denied or limited.
    Both the sign-in requirements 42 and the sign-in contingency 43 of the re-
striction order contemplate that Appellant would perform normal military du-
ties while on restriction. While Appellant alleges that he “spent five months in
my barracks room virtually 24/7” and “[he] spent nearly every hour of every
day confined to [his] barracks room,” Appellant makes no allegation that such
isolation was mandated or forced. 44 While Appellant also claims he was told by
his sergeant major and staff noncommissioned officer in charge that “they did

   40 United States v. Smith, 20 M.J. 528, 531-32 (C.M.A. 1985) (cited favorably
in United States v. Guerrero, 28 M.J. 223, 225 (C.M.A. 1989)).
   41 Recognizing that an escort was required when Appellant went to the Base Ex-

change.
   42 Appellant’s Mot. to Attach, App’x A, Para. D. We note however that the corre-

sponding sign-in sheet has initials indicating only 11 days and one morning where the
Appellant complied with the requirement and there is no evidence in the record to the
contrary.
   43 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x A, para. K.

   44 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x B., at 3.

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                   United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                                 Opinion of the Court

not want [him] around other [M]arines,” there is nothing in the record indicat-
ing Appellant was given any such order. 45 Indeed while Appellant states, “I
was required to adhere to all conditions in the restriction order,” that notion is
contradicted by Appellant’s unsworn statement at trial. 46 In his statement, Ap-
pellant described being early to check-in, 47 discussing his case with members
of his command, 48 and having internet access. 49 We therefore give more weight
to the language contained in the restriction order: “If your section secures from
work early…” in finding that Appellant’s duties were not negatively affected
by restriction.
    Appellant was required per the restriction order to sign in with the OOD.
However, despite the clearly written warning of potential legal consequences
for failing to sign-in, the evidence attached by Appellant on appeal, and seem-
ingly known to trial defense counsel, shows Appellant signed in on a total of 11
days (plus one 0700 muster). 50 There is no evidence of additional sign-ins or of
punitive action taken against Appellant for failing to sign in for more than 140
other days claimed by Appellant in the AOE. We find this to be indicative of
the nature of Appellant’s restriction and a fact that weighs against Appellant’s
argument.
    We recognize the written order required Appellant to be in uniform for most
of the period in question, although the record again suggests strict compliance
with this provision was not enforced. 51 We also consider that Appellant was
prohibited from using his own vehicle and possessing or consuming alcohol.
Further, we consider that Appellant’s telephone and computer, including in-
ternet access, 52 use were not restricted, nor was his access to defense counsel.
We note, too, that Appellant’s case strategy prolonged the period of restriction
prior to his guilty plea. 53

   45 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x B., at 2.

   46 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x B., at 2.

   47 R. at 152

   48 R. at 153.

   49 Id.

   50 Appellant Mot. to Attach, App’x B., at 3.

   51 Trial defense counsel declaration dtd 26 July 2023.

   52 R. at 153.

   53 Id.

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                 United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                               Opinion of the Court

    After conducting our analysis, we find Appellant’s conditions were more
akin to restriction than confinement. 54
     The CAAF has held “[a]n attorney’s decision to forgo taking actions that
likely would be futile is not deficient.” 55 As we have found that the conditions
on Appellant were more akin to restriction than to confinement, a Mason credit
motion would likely have failed. The strategic and tactical decision made by
trial defense counsel to have Appellant raise this issue in his unsworn state-
ment was reasonable under the totality of Appellant’s case and we decline to
find that it constitutes deficient performance.
    Additionally, the Strickland test requires a finding of prejudice. Appellant
must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 56 In
this case that prejudice would have to be a “reasonable probability” that the
factfinder's decision would have been different. 57 As discussed, based on the
evidence available in the record as a whole, we are not convinced that there is
a reasonable probability that the Military Judge would have awarded Mason

    54 See King, 58 M.J. at 111-12 (holding that restriction to dormitory, dining facility,

squadron building, and defense counsel’s office; reassignment to cleaning and manual
labor duties; requirement to muster twice per day; and inability to use the gym was
not tantamount to confinement); United States v. Guerrero, 28 M.J. 223, 224-25
(C.M.A. 1989) (holding that restriction to barracks room, latrine, chapel, mess hall and
other places of duty; requirement for an NCO escort; and requirement to muster “every
30 minutes until normal ‘lights out’” was not tantamount to confinement); Parker, 75
M.J. at 610-11 (holding that restriction to base with permission to visit exchange, gym,
on-base food establishments, and other base facilities with an escort; requirement to
muster every two hours during the day; prohibition against receiving visitors; and re-
assignment to routine administrative functions was not tantamount to confinement);
United States v. Patterson, 201600189, 2017 CCA LEXIS 437, at *23-25 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 30 Jun 2017) (holding restriction to specific areas; strict muster require-
ments; requirement for an NCO escort when leaving the barracks; prohibition on the
use of alcohol, recreational activity centers and on the operation of a privately owned
vehicle; and prohibition against visitors was not tantamount to confinement); Wash-
ington v. Greenwald, 20 M.J. 699, 700 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (holding restriction to company
area, dining hall, place of duty, and chaplain's office during the day and his room at
night; requirement to muster every hour when not at work; and requirement for an
escort to travel anywhere after duty hours was not tantamount to confinement).
    55 United States v. Palacios Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 329 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citing Vieux v.

Pepe, 184 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 1999)).
    56 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

    57 Id. at 695-96.

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               United States v. Mosley, NMCCA No. 202200178
                             Opinion of the Court

credit. Rather, as discussed supra, we are more convinced that the decision of
the Defense not to file such a motion was based on all the available evidence,
the lack of probability of success, and the strategic decision to use the infor-
mation regarding restriction to influence the military judge’s sentence to the
benefit of Appellant.
     Finally, as previously discussed, Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge
and specifications. Appellant makes no claim that his plea would have been
any different because his trial defense counsel did not raise a motion for Mason
credit. As our analysis above should make clear, the wisdom of the reasonable
tactical decision of the trial defense team is not one we either doubt or question.
Appellant and his trial defense team made reasonable and successful strategic
decisions that garnered a favorable sentence given the offenses, evidence, and
totality of the circumstances. Appellant has failed to meet any of the require-
ments to prove his trial defense counsel were ineffective.

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 58
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK. K JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   58 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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