Court Opinion

ID: 9589931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:17.568569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:23.214742
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I concur fully in Justice Sears’ dissent. I write separately to emphasize the inherent unfairness in the approach taken by the majority. The majority’s opinion opens the doors of Georgia’s courts to any citizen of this country who wants to divorce and to obtain an unfair advantage over his or her spouse in the division of marital property. All any citizen need do is leave his or her marital home, take any or all assets of the couple, move to Georgia and file for divorce in six months. The non-resident spouse is then forced to litigate his or her claim to those marital assets in a foreign jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court seemed to foreclose such unfairness in the divorce context a generation ago by refusing to allow easily obtained Nevada divorces to cut off property rights of nonresident spouses.1
Additionally, 20 years ago in Shaffer v. Heitner2
 3the United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of “fairness” in all exercises of state court jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the Court held that “quasi in rem” jurisdiction must be treated like “in personam” jurisdiction and subjected to the “minimum contacts” analysis of International Shoe Co. v. Washington3 and its progeny.4 Here, husband seeks *820to adjudicate only his and his wife’s interests in real and personal marital property in Georgia. Thus, any judgment would be “quasi in rem” because it seeks to “secure [his] pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of [his wife].”4
5 Husband does not seek an “in rem” judgment against property in Georgia. “In rem” jurisdiction, such as a quiet title action against all the world, exists to determine “the interests of all persons in designated property”6 Because this is a “quasi in rem” case, the court must have personal jurisdiction over both parties to adjudicate their interests in the property.
The wife lacks any semblance of minimum contacts with this state: she has never lived here and she did not participate in the decision of her husband to acquire property in this state.7 Therefore, the courts of this state are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction over her to determine her interests in marital property, real and personal, that her husband happened to bring with him from Louisiana or purchase once he arrived in Georgia. Forcing the wife to litigate her interests in marital assets wherever her husband happens to relocate violates “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”8 Therefore, I strongly dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (68 SC 1213, 92 LE 1561) (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U. S. 416 (77 SC 1360, 1 LE2d 1456) (1957).

 433 U. S. 186 (97 SC 2569, 53 LE2d 683) (1977).

 326 U. S. 310 (66 SC 154, 90 LE 95) (1945).

 433 U. S. at 212.

 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 246, n. 12 (78 SC 1228, 2 LE2d 1283) (1958).

 Id.

 Compare Williams v. Williams, 433 A2d 1316 (N.H. 1981) (New Hampshire court had personal jurisdiction over non-resident wife where husband and wife jointly built house in New Hampshire and wife spent several months of every year for eight years with husband in New Hampshire); Hann v. Hann, 421 A2d 607 (N.J. Super. 1980) (personal jurisdiction over non-resident husband where parties jointly built two houses in New Jersey during marriage and since separation, husband had traveled to New Jersey to check on wife and threaten her).

 International Shoe, 326 U. S. at 316.