Court Opinion

ID: 9908279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:17.552002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.569496
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                           NO. 2023-CA-0995-WC

TRANE CO.                                                        APPELLANT

                 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                       ACTION NO. WC-22-00148

GEOFFREY HAMMONS;
HONORABLE PETER GREG NAAKE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD                                                             APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: The sole issue on appeal is whether the Workers’

Compensation Board (the Board) erred in affirming the Administrative Law
Judge’s application of the three-multiplier, KRS1 342.730(1)(c)1.2 After our

review, we find no error and affirm the Board.

                On February 4, 2022, the Appellee, Geoffrey Hammons, filed a Form

101/Application for Resolution of an injury claim against his employer, the

Appellant, Trane Co., alleging a January 7, 2022, cumulative trauma injury to

multiple body parts. The case was litigated. The parties submitted medical proof

from Dr. Sajadi, a treating orthopedic surgeon; from Dr. Cancian, who examined

Hammons at the Defendant’s request; and from Dr. Gilbert, who examined

Hammons at the Plaintiff’s request.

                On February 14, 2023, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered

an Opinion, Award and Order, as follows in relevant part:

                       Hammons began working at the Trane
                manufacturing plant in 1985, and ceased working due to
                a plant-wide layoff in January 2022. Over a period of
                nearly 37 years, Hammons worked on several lines in the
                plant, which assembles large air-handling Heating
                Ventilation and Air-Conditioning units. . . .

                       Hammons testified his work on the large line and
                his work using the Salvagnini machine were strenuous.
                These jobs began approximately ten years before the end
                of his career at Trane. While working the large line, he
                lifted beams with other workers and handled large panels
1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
  The statute provides in relevant part that “[i]f, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the
physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury,
the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three (3) times the amount
otherwise determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection . . . .”

                                                 -2-
of sheet metal. His work using the Salvignini [sic]
machine included repetitive heavy lifting of panels which
were large and difficult to handle . . . .

      Ultimately, Hammons stopped working at Trane
because of a plant-wide shut down. . . .

After he was laid off in January 2022, Hammons had left
shoulder replacement surgery.

       The Plaintiff alleged an injury to his left shoulder
as a result of cumulative trauma. . . . Dr. Sajadi
performed a shoulder joint replacement surgery of
Hammons’ left shoulder in 2022. . . .

...

After carefully considering the evidence of record the
ALJ is persuaded that Hammons’ left shoulder
degeneration was caused by his repetitive work at Trane.
Dr. Sajadi’s testimony is persuasive that the
glenohumeral joint degeneration in Hammon’s [sic] left
shoulder caused the need for left shoulder replacement
surgery. Therefore the ALJ concludes that Hammons
suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act to his
left shoulder, resulting in left shoulder replacement.

...

       The ALJ finds that Hammons has a 22%
permanent impairment to the body as a whole as result of
his left shoulder injury and surgery, relying on Dr.
Cancian’s testimony concerning impairment rating
applying the [American Medical Association] A.M.A.
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th
Ed.

...

                             -3-
       Under KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) an employee who
does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type
of work that the employee performed at the time of injury
due to that injury is awarded a three (3) times
enhancement of his benefit for permanent partial
disability otherwise determined under KRS
[342.]730(1)(b). . . .

       In order to apply the statute, the language of the
statute and the pertinent case law requires the ALJ to
analyze the actual tasks the employee performed prior to
the injury, and compare them to the limitations of his or
her physical capacity which result from the work-related
injury. Voith Industrial Services, Inc. v. Gray, 516
S.W.3d 817 (Ky. App. 2017).

       Dr. Cancian’s testimony concerning restrictions
Hammons should observe as a result of his left shoulder
surgery were that he perform no overhead work,
including reaching above shoulder, no reaching to
shoulder level, no holding the arm in abduction or
flexion, no pulling and pushing of more than 20 pounds
up to 4 times an hour, lifting and carrying limited to 20
pounds 3 times an hour, and single arm upper extremity
work using contralateral arm for light work only. Dr.
Gilbert’s testimony was consistent in that he found
Hammons unable to perform the work he had performed
at Trane.

       The ALJ is persuaded by the opinion report of Dr.
Cancian and finds that the restrictions he described
prevent Hammons from performing the jobs he
previously performed at Trane due to his left shoulder
injury. Specifically, Hammons testified that he lifted 40
to 50 pound metal panels repetitively to place them in
racks for the Salvagnini machine. Comparing the
restrictions Dr. Cancian assigned to the job Hammons
performed, the ALJ finds that Hammons does not retain
the physical capacity to perform the type of work he was
performing at the time of his injury. Further, the ALJ

                            -4-
             relies on the report of Dr. Gilbert to find that Hammons’
             left shoulder injury was caused by repetitive trauma at
             Trane, and that therefore the restrictions resulting from
             his left shoulder injury and surgery are due to the work-
             related injury.

             Accordingly, the ALJ awarded the three-multiplier under KRS

342.730(1)(c)3.

             On February 27, 2023, Trane filed a Petition for Reconsideration and

argued that the ALJ erred in applying the three-multiplier. Trane explained that on

the Form 101, Hammons had listed January 7, 2022, as the injury date, which was

his last date worked. But, at that time production had ceased at Trane, and

Hammons was working as part of the clean-up crew. Trane argued that in

awarding the three-multiplier, the ALJ erroneously relied upon the requirements of

Hammons’s job in operating the Salvagnini machine. Trane also argued that

Hammons had offered no evidence that he was incapable of performing the duties

involved in clean-up crew.

             By Order rendered on March 20, 2023, the ALJ denied Trane’s

Petition as follows in relevant part:

                    The Defendant argues that the Opinion, Award and
             Order contains patent error in applying KRS
             342.730(1)(c)(1), the “triple multiplier,” because the last
             job the Plaintiff performed for the Defendant was the
             clean-up crew after the plant had shut down. The
             Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence
             to prove that Hammons could not perform the job of
             clean-up, and therefore the triple multiplier cannot be

                                         -5-
applied to enhance his award. In its argument, the
Defendant applies an interpretation of KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1) to mean that the “date of injury,” when
applied to a cumulative trauma claim, is the date the
claimant last worked. The Defendant does not cite any
authority for its interpretation.

KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) states:

      If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain
      the physical capacity to return to the type of work
      that the employee performed at the time of injury,
      the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be
      multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise
      determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
      ...

       The term “date of injury” when used in the context
of a cumulative trauma claim may have several meanings.
The date of injury may mean “date of manifestation” in
the context of applying a statute of limitations argument,
because KRS 342.185 now provides that the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date the employee is told
by a physician that the cumulative trauma injury is work-
related. That date may be after the employee has stopped
working, and therefore the same definition cannot
logically be applied to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) when that
statute refers to the time of injury. The “date of injury”
listed by the Plaintiff on his Form 101 was his last date of
work at Trane and was probably intended to mean the date
of his last injurious exposure to cumulative trauma.

       Significantly, 342.730(1)(c)(1) does not refer to
the date of injury but refers to the “time of injury.”
By definition, a cumulative trauma injury does not
occur on a single date, but occurs gradually, over a
long period of time, and may be the result of a series of
traumatic events which occur at different times.
Therefore, the legislature probably did not intend to
restrict the meaning of the phrase “the type of work

                            -6-
performed at time of the injury” to refer only to the work
performed on the date of last exposure in the context of a
cumulative trauma claim.

    The ALJ’s finding with regard to the cause of
Hammons’ left shoulder injury was:

      The ALJ is persuaded that the type of work
      Hammons performed for Trane for many years, in
      particular the repetitive reaching and lifting of
      metal panels and use of assembly machines,
      resulted in degeneration of his left shoulder
      glenohumeral joint greater than what would be
      expected of a man Hammons’ age had the work
      been less strenuous. (Opinion Award and Order,
      p. 17).

       A worker who can no longer perform all of his
required job tasks lacks the ability to return to the “type of
work” performed at the time of injury. See, e.g., Miller v.
Square D Co., 254 S.W.3d 810, 813-814 (Ky. 2008)
(holding “it seems more likely that the legislature
intended for the phrase ‘the type of work that the
employee performed at the time of injury’ to refer broadly
to the various jobs or tasks that the worker performed for
the employer at the time of injury rather than to refer
narrowly to the job or task being performed when the
injury occurred”). See also Ford Motor v. Forman, 142
S.W.3d 141, 145 (Ky. 2014) (“When used in the context
of an award that is based upon an objectively determined
functional impairment, ‘the type of work that the
employee performed at the time of injury’ was most likely
intended by the legislature to refer to the actual jobs that
the individual performed.”).

       Again, KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) refers to the type of
work performed at the time of the injury, not on the
date he last worked for the Defendant. The time of the
injury includes the type of repetitive work performed by
the Plaintiff which caused his injury. The ALJ finds that

                             -7-
                 because the repetitive reaching and lifting of metal panels
                 in the assembly of Trane products was part of the work
                 that Hammons performed at the time of the injury, and
                 Hammons cannot perform that type of work due to his
                 injury, the “triple-multiplier” of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1)
                 applies to his award.

(Bold-face emphases added.)

                 Trane appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed

the ALJ by Opinion and Order3 entered on July 28, 2023, as follows in relevant

part:

                        Trane does not contest that Hammons’ left
                 shoulder condition and need for surgery was caused by
                 work-related cumulative trauma. There is no appeal
                 relating to the statute of limitations or notice. Here, the
                 sole issue on appeal is the enhancement by the three-
                 multiplier pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. The crux of
                 the matter is whether Hammons’ move from the
                 Salvagnini machine when production ceased to working
                 on the cleanup crew until the plant closed, prohibited the
                 award of the three-multiplier.

                 ...

                 [T]he time of injury referred to in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1
                 must logically refer to the type of work that caused the
                 cumulative trauma, and not just work that was
                 performed on a specific date. Trane has offered no
                 authority for its position that the “time of injury” for
                 purposes of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 enhancement in injury
                 claims allegedly caused by cumulative trauma must
                 strictly relate to the work Hammons was performing on
                 his last day of work. . . .

3
    The Order denied Trane’s request for oral argument.

                                                -8-
                   The Board believes the analysis of the case law
             when awarding a three multiplier in this cumulative
             trauma claim is correct. The type of work performed
             by the claimant must not be viewed in a vacuum as to
             what he was doing on his last day of work. Substantial
             evidence supports the ALJ’s application of the three-
             multiplier as there was a permanent alteration in
             Hammons’ ability to return to his pre-injury work.

(Bold-face emphases added.)

             In this appeal, Trane makes the same argument that it had made

before the Board; i.e., that the ALJ abused his discretion in awarding the three-

multiplier based upon the requirements of Hammons’s job operating the Salvagnini

machine. Trane claims that the physical requirements of the cleanup-crew job

should dictate the legal analysis. Once again, Trane has cited no authority to

support its position. “Assertions of error devoid of any controlling authority do not

merit relief.” Koester v. Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Ky. App. 2019).

             The standard of our review is “to correct the Board only where [this]

Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or

precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause

gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.

1992). We perceive no such error in the case before us. To the contrary, we agree

with the Board that the sound reasoning of the ALJ was correct.

             Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s July 28, 2023, Opinion Affirming

and Order.

                                         -9-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Donald J. Niehaus         McKinnley Morgan
Lexington, Kentucky       London, Kentucky

                        -10-