Court Opinion

ID: 1002633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:13:38.378366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:46.794771
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARY NASH, a resident of Wake
County, North Carolina,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                               No. 00-1312
HUDSON BELK COMPANY #458, of
Raleigh, North Carolina, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

MARY NASH, a resident of Wake
County, North Carolina,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                               No. 00-1867
HUDSON BELK COMPANY #458, of
Raleigh, North Carolina, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, District Judge.
(CA-99-134)

Submitted: August 31, 2000

Decided: September 27, 2000

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Mary Nash, Appellant Pro Se. Gregory Phillip McGuire, Sarah Helen
Berdahl, HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON & GREAVES,
L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In No. 00-1312, Mary Nash appeals the district court's order enter-
ing summary judgment for Defendant in an action alleging race dis-
crimination in employment. In No. 00-1867, Nash appeals the district
court order awarding Defendant, as the prevailing party, $4096 in
attorney's fees. We affirm.

In August 1998, Nash, an African-American, requested a transfer
to the china department at the Belk store where she had worked since
1987. The transfer was denied. The reason for the denial was the
belief that Nash had engaged in an improper sales transaction in 1996
when she previously worked in the china department. Nash alleged
that the transfer denial constituted race discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2 (West 1994). Because Nash provided no direct evidence of race dis-
crimination, she was required to rely on the burden-shifting method
of proof announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). However, Nash failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because the open position was not filled by someone
outside the protected class and because she did not establish that
white employees who were suspected of wrongdoing also were

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denied requested transfers. See Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of
Montgomery Community College, 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1991).

Nash also asserted in this action that there was a racially hostile
work environment at the store. This allegation was not raised in her
EEOC charge and therefore was not properly before the district court.
However, to the extent that the claim was properly before the court,
it lacked merit because Nash presented no evidence tending to show
that the incidents of harassment she identified occurred because of her
race. See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998).

A district court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's
fees and costs to the prevailing party in an employment discrimination
action. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k); see also Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Here, the district court
found that fees should be awarded to Defendant but that the request
for $8165.90 in fees was excessive. Applying the factors first identi-
fied in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974), the court awarded Defendant $4096 in fees. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees or
setting the amount of the award.

We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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