Court Opinion

ID: 9770800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:53.978525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.899282
License: Public Domain

GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Today’s decision departs from previous instances where this court has provided mandamus relief to correct a wrongful denial of discovery, and labors too hard to conclude that appeal is an adequate remedy for a party who is denied adequate discovery.
I would hold that mandamus is available to correct a trial court error which negatively and materially affects the right of aggrieved parties to adequately present their cases, whether the particular party is seeking discovery or resisting it. See Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw.L.J. 1045 (1990). In the case before us, the trial court’s denial of discovery has a material and adverse effect on the Walkers’ ability to present their case. The information they seek could impugn the credibility of key expert witnesses at trial. Because their medical malpractice claim, like all such claims, will likely stand or fall on the credibility of the expert witnesses, I would hold that the Walkers are entitled to the information they seek, and that relief by appeal is inadequate.
Discovery is the “linchpin of the search for truth,” and “[ajffording parties full discovery promotes the fair resolution of disputes by the judiciary.” State v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.1991). Today the court removes and disposes of that “linchpin” and abandons enforcement of fair and adequate discovery. Because I believe that mandamus relief should be readily available when a court allows either too much or too little discovery, I dissent.