Court Opinion

ID: 9782041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:52:18.951931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:45.293243
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Court of Appeals Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T8 I concur with the court's decision holding that Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-207(4) (1998) does not confer jurisdiction upon this court to consider a constitutional challenge to the statute.
T 9 I respectfully dissent from today's decision to assert jurisdiction over this action, and thereby examine petitioners' underlying substantive claim, pursuant to this court's extraordinary writ authority.
1 10 In the instant case petitioners do not argue that the Hieutenant governor improperly counted the number of signatures, nor do they argue that the lieutenant governor somehow improperly designated certain signatures to the wrong counties. In fact, after accepting that the lieutenant governor properly discharged her duty under the law, thereby performing the only clear duty before her, petitioners argue that the law as written violates their constitutional equal protection and first amendment rights.
111 I agree that the court has the discretion to determine constitutional claims in the context of an extraordinary writ. However, " Tthe granting of the writ [of mandamus] is always a matter of discretion with this court and never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant." Renn v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 971 (1967)); see also Mueller v. Crockett, 63 Utah 479, 227 P. 270, 273 (1924). I am not, however, convinced of the wisdom of doing so in this case. This court has previously sounded a cautionary note about such an exercise. "The validity of an objectionable statute should be litigated in an appropriate civil action between adversary parties, and in our opinion a petitioner for a writ of mandamus may not require the court to declare such statute unconstitutional in that proceeding. . . ." Mueller, 227 P. at 273.1
112 My concern with the majority's approach is that without a present clear duty to act, an extraordinary writ does not appear to be the proper vehicle to provide petitioners with the relief that they seek. 'We have held that
{alssailing a solemn act of the Legislature on the grounds that it is unconstitutional always presents a serious question. When a mere ministerial officer is requested to perform an act which involves the necessity of his assuming that a statute preserib-*1069ing his duties is unconstitutional, it becomes doubly serious, and in such case the duty may not be clear or reasonably free from doubt. If it is not clear or reasonably free from doubt, he should not be compelled to perform the act by a mandamus proceeding.
Mueller, 227 P. at 274 (per curiam).
[183 I believe that our exercise of such authority should only occur " 'when the claimant has demonstrated that he or she has no adequate alternative means of obtaining that relief sought and is clearly and indisputably entitled to such relief?" Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 969 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Dacoron v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 115, 119 (1998)); see also State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704, 710 (1999) (per curiam) (stating "constitutional challenges to legislation are normally considered in an action originating in a court of common pleas rather than an extraordinary writ action filed [in the supreme court]"). While I am not unsympathetic to petitioners' plight, I do not conclude that petitioners have demonstrated, at a minimum, they are so clearly and indisputably entitled to the relief requested that this court's extraordinary writ authority should be invoked.
1 14 We have previously opined that "there may be cases in which the constitutional question is so clear and free from doubt, and the relief demanded so meritorious, that the court in the interest of justice should exercise its discretion by granting the writ.2 Mueller, 227 P. at 273-74. I do not believe that this is such a case.3 I would dismiss the writ and provide petitioners the opportunity to pursue a declaratory action in the district court.
{ 15 Accordingly, I dissent from the decision to accept jurisdiction and address the constitutional question that has been presented.
1 16 Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT does not participate herein, and Justice WILKINS does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and WILLIAM A. THORNE sat.

. "[If the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704, 710 (1999). This view is not, however, universally applied and has been the basis of dissent. ''The distinction is between the use of the writ to enforce a duty that is prospective in the sense that it is to be performed in the future, ... and the use of the writ to create a duty that never existed...." People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner, 32 Ill.2d 539, 208 N.E.2d 561, 568 (1965) (Schaefer, J., dissenting).

. I disagree with the majority's reliance on Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277, 480 P.2d 467 (1971). While the Nelson court did address the constitutionality of a statute within the context of an extraordinary writ, it did so without the appropriate level of caution suggested in Mueller. See Mueller, 227 P. at 272-73.

. This has the additional advantage of permitting a trial court to establish a clear record upon which a constitutional analysis may be performed.