Court Opinion

ID: 9364133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 16:03:18.06726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.961332
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 18, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-1012
                      Lower Tribunal No. F15-25089
                          ________________

                               Peter Arnold,
                                Appellant,

                                     vs.

                           The State of Florida,
                                Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Miguel M. de
la O, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
          Peter Arnold appeals from a final order revoking his probation, claiming

that the trial court erred in denying Arnold’s motion to suppress his

videotaped, sworn statement to the police. Finding no reversible error, we

affirm the denial of Arnold’s motion to suppress and the final order of

probation revocation. Arnold also appeals the final order imposing sentence,

claiming that the trial court, by conducting the March 26, 2021 sentencing

hearing via the Zoom videoconferencing platform,1 violated his procedural

due process right 2 to be physically present at the hearing. Because the

record does not show that the trial court conducted the requisite balancing

test, weighing Arnold’s due process right to be physically present at

sentencing against the State’s competing interests in holding the proceeding

remotely, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

     I.      RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1
   As discussed in more detail, infra, the remote sentencing hearing
conducted below occurred while the Florida Supreme Court’s administrative
order temporarily suspending court rules that “limit or prohibit the use of
communication equipment for the remote conduct of proceedings” was still
in effect. See In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the
Florida State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC20-23, Amend. 9 (Feb. 17,
2021).
2
    See Amend. XIV, U.S. Const.; Art. 1, § 9, Fla. Const.

                                          2
        In May 2016, Arnold pled guilty to two counts of battery (counts I and

II), two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (counts III and

IV), and third-degree grand theft of a vehicle (count V). The trial court

sentenced Arnold to time served on counts I and II, and to three years of

probation on counts III, IV, and V.

        In August 2018, Arnold’s probation officer filed an affidavit of violation

of probation alleging that Arnold had violated numerous conditions of his

probation that are not relevant here. The relevant Third Amended Affidavit

of Violation of Probation alleged further that Arnold had violated the

conditions of his probation by committing second-degree murder with a

weapon and by possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.

        Prior to the probation revocation hearing, Arnold moved to suppress

his videotaped, sworn statement to the police, claiming that his Miranda3

waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily given. After holding an evidentiary

hearing on Arnold’s motion to suppress, the trial court entered a detailed

order denying the motion. Following a probation revocation hearing4 the trial

3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
  Both the hearing on Arnold’s motion to suppress and the probation
revocation hearing were held via the Zoom videoconferencing platform. In
this appeal, as below, Arnold presents no constitutional challenges with
respect to those hearings being conducted remotely.

                                         3
court determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Arnold had

committed two willful and substantial violations of the terms of his probation

by committing second-degree murder and possessing a firearm as a

convicted felon.

     Arnold thereafter moved to continue the sentencing date for his

probation revocation violations until the conclusion of his jury trial on the

second-degree murder and gun possession charges. Arnold also filed an

“Objection to Remote Sentencing,” arguing that conducting his sentencing

hearing via the Zoom videoconferencing platform violated Arnold’s

procedural due process right to be physically present in the courtroom for

sentencing. On March 24, 2021, the trial court entered separate orders

denying Arnold’s motion to continue the sentencing and overruling Arnold’s

objection to the remote sentencing proceeding.

      On March 26, 2021, the trial court conducted Arnold’s remote

sentencing hearing via the Zoom videoconferencing platform. Other than the

trial judge, all participants at the hearing appeared remotely, with defense

counsel and Arnold appearing from different locations. The sentencing

hearing transcript confirms that the only constitutional objection raised at

sentencing was Arnold’s procedural due process right to be present in the

courtroom.

                                      4
          The trial court sentenced Arnold to fifteen years in prison for counts III

and IV, and to five years in prison for count V, the sentences to run

consecutively, and with credit for time served. Arnold timely filed this appeal.

    II.      ANALYSIS

          A. The Motion to Suppress 5

          We need not decide whether the trial court erred in denying Arnold’s

motion to suppress because, even if the court erroneously admitted Arnold’s

videotaped, sworn statement into evidence at the probation revocation

hearing, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Williams

v. State, 976 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“To establish harmless

error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

contribute to the conviction. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.

1986). ‘Application of the test requires an examination of the entire record by

the appellate court including a close examination of the permissible evidence

on which the jury could have legitimately relied, and in addition an even

5
 “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts
must accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s determination
of the historical facts, but must independently review mixed questions of law
and fact that ultimately determine the constitutional issues arising in the
context of the Fourth Amendment.” Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754, 758
(Fla. 2003). Such rulings are also subject to harmless error analysis. See
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 609 (Fla. 2001).

                                           5
closer examination of the impermissible evidence which might have possibly

influenced the jury verdict.’ Id.”).

      The State presented substantial evidence at the probation revocation

hearing conducted below, including: (i) the testimony of the victim’s girlfriend,

who testified that Arnold had a gun in the victim’s home and that she

overheard a loud argument between Arnold and the victim; (ii) the testimony

of the victim’s brother, who also testified that Arnold had a gun in the victim’s

home and that he heard an altercation between Arnold and the victim,

followed shortly by a gunshot and Arnold saying “that’s what you get”; (iii)

Arnold fled the scene immediately after the shooting; and (iv) the individual

who Arnold claimed was the actual shooter, and who was apprehended by

the police two minutes after the shooting, did not test positive for gunshot

residue. The State’s considerable testimonial and forensic evidence, along

with the multitude of exhibits introduced below, was competent, substantial

evidence for the trial court to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that Arnold had possessed a gun and committed second-degree murder, and

to revoke Arnold’s probation. See Robinson v. State, 907 So. 2d 1284, 1287

(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“The proper standard for finding a new law violation is

whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the probationer

committed the charged offense or offenses. ‘Proof sufficient to support a

                                       6
criminal conviction is not required to support a judge’s discretionary order

revoking’ probation.” (quoting Robinson v. State, 609 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1992) (citations omitted))).

      Arnold’s defense theory was that he was present at the scene but that

he was not the shooter. Importantly, his sworn statement to the police

detective was not a confession. Rather, Arnold steadfastly maintained his

innocence for the shooting death of the victim, naming another individual

who lived at the victim’s residence as the perpetrator of the crime, giving the

detective a detailed account of what Arnold claimed to have occurred before,

during and after the shooting. But for the introduction of his sworn statement

into evidence at the probation revocation hearing – Arnold did not testify

therein – the fact finder would have had very little probative evidence before

it to support Arnold’s theory of events. 6

      Thus, without reaching the issue of whether the trial court erred by

denying Arnold’s suppression motion, given the significant incriminating

evidence against Arnold, we conclude that any error in the introduction of

Arnold’s sworn statement at the probation revocation hearing was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla.

6
 We note that the prosecutor did not rely on Arnold’s sworn statement during
closing argument.

                                        7
1994) (“[G]iven the significant amount of other incriminating evidence in this

case, we would find that the admission of Stein’s statements constituted

harmless error.”).

      B. The Remote Sentencing Hearing7

      Arnold next argues that the trial court’s conducting Arnold’s probation

violation sentencing hearing via the Zoom videoconferencing platform, over

Arnold’s objection, constituted a due process violation. When the trial court

enters an order revoking a criminal defendant’s probation, the defendant

generally has a due process right to be physically present in the courtroom

at the ensuing sentencing hearing. See Thompson v. State, 208 So. 3d 1183,

1187-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180(a)(9) (“In all prosecutions

for crime the defendant must be present[8]. . . at the imposition of sentence.”).

Nonetheless, “[t]he concept of due process is not rigid or static, but flexible

and dynamic.” Clarington v. State, 314 So. 3d 495, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

“Whether a proceeding comports with fundamental principles of due process

7
  “We review a claim of deprivation of procedural due process de novo.” I.T.
v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 338 So. 3d 6, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).
8
  A defendant “is present” for the imposition of sentencing “if the defendant
has a meaningful opportunity to be heard through counsel on the issues
being discussed” and the defendant either “(1) is physically in attendance for
the courtroom proceeding;” or “(2) waives physical attendance in writing or
on the record . . . , the court accepts the waiver, and the defendant appears
by audio-video communication technology.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180(b)(1)-(2).

                                       8
depends on, and is informed by, the attendant circumstances and a

balancing of the competing interests at stake.” Id.; Tuttle’s Design-Build, Inc.,

753 So. 2d 49, 51 (2000) (“[R]ather than articulating a laundry list of specific

procedures required to protect due process, the United States Supreme

Court has emphasized that the protection of due process rights requires

balancing the interests of the parties involved.”).

      The instant remote sentencing hearing occurred while the Florida

Supreme Court’s Administrative Order AOSC20-23 suspending rule 3.180’s

physical presence requirement was still in effect. Importantly, though, the

Order stated in its Guiding Principles that “[t]he presiding judge in all cases

must consider the constitutional rights of crime victims and criminal

defendants and the public’s constitutional right of access to the courts.”

Further, the Order clearly required the trial court, when faced with a

constitutional challenge to a remote sentencing proceeding, to ensure that

the remote proceeding would not infringe upon the defendant’s constitutional

rights:

             E. Other Trial Court Proceedings. Trial court proceedings
      that are not addressed under Section III.A.(1) or III.D. shall be
      conducted as follows during Phase 1 and Phase 2. If in-person
      conduct of the proceeding is required below, the proceeding may
      be conducted in person only if the circuit or a county within the
      circuit is operating in Phase 2 pursuant to Fla. Admin. Order No.
      AOSC20-32, as amended, in a manner that is consistent with the

                                       9
     circuit’s operational plan, or as otherwise authorized under
     Section III.B(5)(a). or IXA.(2).

                  ....

            (3) All other trial court proceedings shall be conducted
     remotely, except that a proceeding shall be conducted in person
     if the chief judge or presiding judge, in consultation with the chief
     judge, determines that remote conduct of the proceeding:

            a. Is inconsistent with the United States or Florida
            Constitution, a statute, or a rule of court that has not been
            suspended by administrative order; or

            b. Would be infeasible because the court, the clerk, or other
            participant in a proceeding lacks the technological
            resources necessary to conduct the proceeding or, for
            reasons directly related to the state of emergency or the
            public health emergency, lacks the staff resources
            necessary to conduct the proceeding.

            Chief judges shall take all necessary steps to ensure that
      the above-listed proceedings are conducted to the fullest extent
      feasible, consistent with the guidance established in this section.

(Emphasis added). Faced with Arnold’s contemporaneous procedural due

process challenge to the trial court remotely conducting Arnold’s sentencing

proceeding, the trial court, under the attendant circumstances then

presented, was required to balance Arnold’s due process right to be

physically present in the courtroom for sentencing against the State’s

“significant interest in ensuring the effective and expeditious administration

                                      10
of justice” and “the necessities created by the threat to public health and

safety posed by the novel Coronavirus.” Clarington, 314 So. 3d at 507.9

      Rather than balancing the parties’ competing interests under the

circumstances presented to ensure that the instant remote proceeding would

comport with due process, the trial court overruled Arnold’s objection to the

remote sentencing proceeding primarily because the court did not see

anything “unique about this case that requires an in person sentencing” and

Arnold “[was] in the same position as anyone else who [was] accused of

violating their probation and the hearing occurs remotely.” Our record does

9
  In Clarington, this Court denied a defendant’s petition seeking to prohibit
the trial court from remotely conducting an October 16, 2020 probation
violation hearing. Florida was then in the throes of a public health emergency
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. This Court determined that the trial
court’s conducting the proceeding remotely – in which the defendant would
not be physically present in the courtroom and each participant would be at
separate locations – would not violate the defendant’s constitutional due
process rights. 314 So. 3d at 507. Because of its procedural posture, though,
Clarington expressly declined to address whether the defendant would have
the constitutional right to be physically present in the courtroom at
sentencing. Id. at 509, n.16.

      In Gonzalez v. State, 343 So. 3d 166, 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), this
Court concluded that the trial court’s conducting an un-objected to
sentencing hearing on September 21, 2020, immediately following
revocation of the defendant’s probation, did not constitute fundamental error.
Here, Arnold preserved his due process challenge to the remote sentencing
hearing by filing an objection thereto in the lower court.

                                     11
not reflect that the trial court engaged in the analysis, or made the express

findings, contemplated by the Order before proceeding with Arnold’s remote

sentencing hearing. We, therefore, are compelled to reverse the sentencing

order and remand for further proceedings.

     Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

                                     12
                                        Peter Arnold v. The State of Florida
                                                        Case No. 3D21-1012
GORDO, J., specially concurring.

      I concur in the majority opinion and fully agree with my colleagues that

reversal is required. At the outset, it is important to note that while courts at

large were faced with incredible challenges during the pandemic, under the

guidance of our Chief Justice and Chief Administrative Judges throughout

the state, as well as conscientious trial judges, cases were often handled

extremely effectively while ensuring rights were properly afforded, despite

the difficulties presented.

      I write separately to highlight my concern regarding a common

occurrence during the pandemic that ought to send chills through those

properly vested with ensuring that constitutional and due process rights be

afforded, even in difficult times.

      During the proceedings in this case, which occurred in March of

2021 10, the defendant—who was facing up to thirty years in state prison—

asked to be physically present in the courtroom and objected to appearing

by Zoom at the sentencing hearing. In response, the trial court articulated

10
   At that time, schools in Miami-Dade were fully open, international airline
travel was common and everyday retail businesses such as barber shops
and salons were operating. In fact, the Miami-Dade County Courthouse
resumed holding in-person jury trials the following Monday.

                                       13
that he had spoken to the administrative judge regarding the case and

advised the parties of the following:

            I did go up the chain of command here. I didn’t make
            it past [the administrative judge], who asked me one
            simple question. She said, what is unique about this
            case that requires an in person sentencing, as
            opposed to just a general objection to remote
            sentencings. I said, I didn’t see anything in the order
            that was unique to Mr. Arnold. He’s in the same
            position as anyone else who is accused of violating
            their probation and the hearing occurs remotely.

      In my view, this analysis is completely inverted and contravenes the

approach trial judges ought to take when faced with whether a specific

emergency should continue to infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights.

While the Florida Supreme Court’s Administrative Order AOSC20-23

suspended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180’s physical presence

requirement during the pandemic, that Order specifically proscribed that

“[t]he presiding judge in all cases must consider the constitutional

rights of crime victims and criminal defendants and the public’s

constitutional right of access to the courts.” In re Comprehensive COVID-19

Emergency Measures for the Florida State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No.

AOSC20-23, Amend. 9 (Feb. 17, 2021) (emphasis added).

      Under the United States and Florida Constitutions, a defendant has the

constitutional due process right to be physically present at a sentencing

                                        14
hearing. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No

person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any

criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.”); Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d

901, 907 (Fla. 2012) (“One of the most basic tenets of Florida law is the

requirement that all proceedings affecting life, liberty, or property must be

conducted according to due process, which includes a reasonable

opportunity to be heard.”); Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla.

2000) (“[A defendant’s] right to be present is based upon the long-standing

principle that a defendant in a criminal case has a fundamental right,

guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of Florida, and

explicitly provided in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be present

at sentencing, a critical stage of every criminal proceeding.”); Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (finding “a defendant is guaranteed the

right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to

                                      15
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the

procedure”).

      Further, the right to be physically present encompasses the

fundamental premise that the jurist who is passing sentence upon a person

ought to be in the physical presence of the corpus itself. See Doe v. State,

217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (“The requirement of physical presence,

. . . would be meaningless if the judicial officer, or the finder of fact and

ultimate decision-maker, is not also present in the hearing room.”); Brown v.

State, 538 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. 1989) (“[T]he presence of a judge during

trial is a fundamental right.”); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988)

(“[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face

confrontation between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair trial in a

criminal prosecution.’” (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965))).

As provided by the Florida Supreme Court “[a] judicial officer should be

physically present to preside over any matter that could lead to the ‘massive

curtailment of [an individual’s] liberty.’” Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027 (quoting

Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). Further, Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.180 defines presence as the defendant being

“physically in attendance for the courtroom proceeding,” which necessarily

includes the right to be physically present at sentencing.

                                     16
     It is therefore clear that under the United States and Florida

Constitutions the defendant has the right to be physically present. That right

of course may be abridged based on something unique that is occurring,

even perhaps a pandemic. 11 But the ability to infringe upon a defendant’s

constitutional right hinges on some showing by the government that

abrogation of the preference for physical presence is necessary under the

circumstances. See T.H. v. State, 2022 WL 16703183, at *5 (Fla. 2d DCA

Nov. 4, 2022) (“The burden of persuasion is upon the party seeking to

abrogate the preference for physical face-to-face confrontation.”); cf. Roman

Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 208 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2020) (Gorsuch,

J., concurring) (“Even if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this

pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical.”).

     The crux of the recurring ill in my view is that courts throughout the

pandemic have equated virtual presence with that of physical presence.

There is no doubt that Zoom hearings have proven to be an asset to the

courts, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.        But “technological

changes in the courtroom cannot come at the expense of the basic individual

11
  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (“[The
Framers] were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. By
replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing
tests, we do violence to their design.”).

                                     17
rights and freedoms secured by our constitutions.” Harrell v. State, 709 So.

2d 1364, 1372 (Fla. 1998). Courts have recognized that virtual presence is

not equal to physical presence for substantive matters. See Maryland v.

Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“‘Live’ closed-circuit

television testimony, however—if it can be called hearsay at all—is surely an

example of hearsay as ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony,’ which can be

employed only when the genuine article is unavailable.”); Harrell, 709 So. 2d

at 1368 (“We are unwilling to develop a per se rule that would allow the vital

fabric of physical presence in the trial process to be replaced at any time by

an image on a screen. Perhaps the ‘virtual courtroom’ will someday be the

norm in the coming millennium; for now, we do not conclude that virtual

presence is the equivalent of physical presence for the purposes of the

Confrontation Clause.”); Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure

8.100(A), 796 So. 2d 470, 475 (Fla. 2001) (“Not simply allowing, but

mandating that children attend detention hearings conducted through an

audio-visual device steers us towards a sterile environment of T.V. chamber

justice, and away from a system where children are aptly treated as society’s

most precious resource.”).

      As Justice Scalia emphatically wrote “a purpose of the Confrontation

Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their accusations in the

                                      18
defendant’s presence—which is not equivalent to making them in a room

that contains a television set beaming electrons that portray the defendant’s

image.      Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual

constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.”

Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia,

J.). While this discussion addresses Confrontation Clause issues focused

on adversarial examination during testimony, much of its concerns transfer

for purposes of sentencing proceedings and physical presence at critical

stages of the proceedings.

      Today, common sense understanding of remote technology and social

media interactions demonstrates the depersonalizing aspects of acting or

speaking via a remote box at a significant distance from the individual being

affected.   It is far more impactful to be in the physical presence of an

individual and pronounce a curtailment of their rights as opposed to doing so

in their virtual presence—which is often merely an image of their face

appearing in some box on a screen. During sentencing, it is not only the

defendant who is afforded the opportunity to speak, but victims, next of kin

and the court. These are not small matters. The drafters of our founding

documents fundamentally recognized that what stood between a citizen and

his government or its overreach were the rights afforded to every citizen

                                     19
under our Constitution. I cannot think of a more serious matter in which those

rights must be afforded than in a situation where a man will be deprived of

his liberty for the next thirty years.

      In sum, I view the trial court’s inquiry as misplaced. The question is

NOT—what is special or important about this defendant or his case

warranting his entitlement to be physically present? Rather, the question

IS—what necessity exists at this time to deprive this defendant of his

fundamental right to be physically present at a proceeding effecting his

liberty?

                                         20