Court Opinion

ID: 9844589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:07.652847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.412532
License: Public Domain

*675BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
I would join in the majority opinion and add the following comments.
I.
The dissent does set forth the only finding, or as appears more likely, the only conclusion which was entered on the issue of the existence of an easement. The quoted language is merely the ultimate conclusion that Montgomery had no right-of-way, easement or use of or against Steeklein’s land. But there are no specific findings of the facts upon this issue. Because appellate review is properly directed to ascertaining whether the findings support the conclusions, and whether the evidence supports the findings, I agree with the Chief Justice that the judgment must be reversed and remanded. This Court is not a fact-finding court with regard to its appellate jurisdiction and will not peruse the record to see what findings should have been entered on the admitted evidence. It has been well-stated that findings should be made “while the evidence is still fresh in the mind of the trial judge,”1 and here we look at only a cold record, and have neither seen nor heard the many witnesses.
As I see it, the division of the Court is occasioned by non-compliance with Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P. Had this rule been complied with, it is highly likely that the Court would not be split as it is. Indeed, the need for any appeal might have been obviated. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions in this matter were drawn by prevailing counsel, presumably at the direction of the trial court,2 a common practice which has been generally indulged in for many years, even after the adoption of Idaho’s version of the Federal Rules in 1958. In Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977), this Court, taking up where it left off in In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), aligned itself with the federal courts and the many state courts which demand compliance with the rule requiring a trial judge to make his own findings and conclusions. Compton sets forth the reasoning behind the rule; nothing is to be gained by repeating here what was laid out there. Compton, of course, was handed down after prevailing counsel prepared the findings in the case at bar, and so the trial court and counsel had only the benefit of the more limited remarks made in Stibor.
In agreeing with the Chief Justice that the judgment should be reversed, I would prefer to remand the case to district court and direct that the trial judge exercise his own discretion as to whether, in view of the lapse of time, it is fair to the parties to enter findings and conclusions of his own making,3 based upon the record and his recollection of the events at trial including the demeanor of the various witnesses. If not, the district court would then be given discretion either to grant a complete new trial, or to give the parties the opportunity to present such additional testimony as might be pertinent to the issues and helpful to the court. However, so that there will be a majority of the Court, I concur in holding that a new trial shall be had upon remand.
II.
It is true that respondent Stecklein does urge in his brief that an easement by necessity was not sought or urged in the trial court.4 However, he makes no such conten*676tion as to the issue of a prescriptive easement. In fact, he leaves no doubt that the issue was presented below:
“Respondent’s case is based upon four counts. However, the controlling issue is whether or not the Appellant has the right to use a portion of the Respondent’s land in traveling between the south end of Grandview Drive and his own property located in the canyon floor to the south and west of the Respondent’s land.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 3.
The brief contains a thorough discussion of the law on prescriptive easements as applied to the evidence in this controversy. Obviously, Stecklein’s counsel recognized that the issue had been tried. He himself drafted the conclusion which the trial court signed on the issue. And both sides have argued the issue in their briefs and orally. Hence I cannot comprehend how the dissenting opinion can summarily say that the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
The dissent makes this statement regarding the issue of a prescriptive easement:
“The majority faults the trial court for its failure to enter a finding of fact specifically dealing with such alleged issue. Defendant sought no finding of fact on the issues of prescriptive easement or easement by necessity. Following the court’s issuance of its findings and conclusions no amendment was sought thereto by the defendant.”
The dissent thus implies that a party loses ground by failing to request findings, or by not seeking amendments to findings that have been entered. My view is different. I submit that the practice of requesting findings or suffering consequences for failing to do so, went by the board with the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in November of 1958. These rules replaced the former statutory code pleading and practice, and nullified the cases under that former code.
Before 1958, as older members of the bar will remember, the trial judge, on reaching a decision, asked prevailing counsel to prepare proposed findings, conclusions and a judgment, and to submit the same to adverse counsel who were, in turn, invited to submit additional findings and/or objections. When counsel could not agree among themselves, which was usually the case, there was a hearing at which the trial court settled the findings and conclusions, thus giving counsel an opportunity to be heard.
Under that former practice, as many Idaho cases demonstrate, requests for findings were required in any action tried to the court without a jury. In the federal courts, prior to the adoption of the F.R.C.P., the same requirement obtained. With the adoption of the F.R.C.P. on September 1, 1938, however, the requirement of requesting findings was abandoned. In Hill v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 104 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1939), a case following shortly thereafter, the court quoted the new Rule 52(a) and stated:
“This rule does not relieve the court of the duty to make special findings of fact and state separate conclusions of law; in fact it emphasizes that duty. But it does undoubtedly relieve the litigant from making requests for such findings.” (Emphasis added.) 104 F.2d at 696.
Jackson County, Missouri v. Alton R. Co., 105 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1939), provides a good discussion of pre-rules and post-rules practice on this matter. See also, Monaghan v. Hill, 140 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1944); Cafritz v. Koslow, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 167 F.2d 749 (1948). And see, Moore, § 52.10 at 2742.
The dissent errs, therefore, in implying that counsel must request findings. No such requirement has existed in Idaho since 1958.

. Judge Frank in United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942).

. The record gives no indication of any Memorandum Decision which could have served to guide counsel in his preparation of Findings and Conclusions. Nor does the record show in what manner the court advised counsel as to which party prevailed. The minutes indicate that the parties were given time to submit briefs.

. Acceptable procedures were set forth in Compton v. Gilmore, supra. The trial court is certainly entitled to request both parties to submit proposed findings — which should, however, be done prior to announcing which party will prevail.

. No mention is made of an easement by necessity in the complaint, the defendant’s answer or counterclaim, the answer to the counterclaim, the evidence, the findings of fact or the judgment. It is first urged in appellant’s brief.