Court Opinion

ID: 9773298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:41:35.158726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.722297
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
GUITTARD, Chief Justice.
In his motion for rehearing appellant relies chiefly on International Security Life Insurance Company v. Russell, 473 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1971, no writ), to support his contention that there is a material difference between the original judgment, which provides for an attorney’s fee to be added to the judgment in the event of appeal, and the judgment nunc pro tunc, which provides that in the event no appeal is taken, the amount of the attorney’s fee for the appeal should be credited against the total fee allowed. We disagree with the Russell opinion because, in our view, it misconstrues the opinion of the supreme court in International Security Life Insurance Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.1971). As we understand Spray, it holds that there is no material difference between these two forms of judgment and expressly overrules previous decisions to the contrary. Our interpretation of Spray is in accordance with that expressed in Seureau v. Mudd, 515 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d n.r. e.).
*311Appellant further contends that under Tex.R.Civ. P. 306b, the time for appeal runs from the date of signing the judgment nunc pro tunc, which need not make a material change in the original judgment unless the purpose is to extend the time for appeal contrary to Tex.R.Civ. P. 5. We are not concerned with the purpose of the order, but with its effect. We adhere to our holding that if the only effect of an order nunc pro tunc would be to enlarge the time for filing a motion for new trial or appeal bond, then it has no effect, and the appeal must be taken from the original order. Support for this holding may be found in Rodriguez v. Valdez, 521 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); and see Anderson v. Casebolt, 493 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1973). In case of doubt, the appellant can perfect an appeal from both orders. The contrary holding would permit Rule 5 to be easily circumvented by nunc pro tunc orders making immaterial changes of wording that might not appear to have been made solely for the purpose of extending the time for appeal. See Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.1976).
Appellant also calls our attention to Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.1973), in which the supreme court issued a writ of mandamus setting aside as void a judgment nunc pro tunc on the ground that the change which it purported to make in the original judgment was a change of substance in the judgment as rendered rather than the correction of a clerical mistake. The court observed that in some cases relief from such invalid orders might be more easily obtained by an appeal. We do not understand this observation to mean that an appeal from a void nunc pro tunc judgment affords the appellant an opportunity to bring forward grounds for attack upon the original judgment. Under Tex.R.Civ. P. 306b, the right of appeal dates from the signing of a judgment nunc pro tunc, but if the judgment nunc pro tunc is void, an appeal from it would only establish its voidness and would leave the original judgment in effect, as did the writ of mandamus in Dikeman.
In this connection we note that one of the points in appellant’s brief raises the contention that the judgment nunc pro tunc was erroneous under Tex.R.Civ. P. 316 and 317 because it “did not correct any mistake in the record of any judgment or decree.” Appellant further complains that this judgment “does not qualify as a nunc pro tunc judgment” because it “does not disclose the ground on which the court acted.” If appellant is correct in these contentions, his appeal from this judgment nunc pro tunc does not provide an opportunity to review the original judgment. He might be entitled to have the judgment nunc pro tunc reversed and vacated, leaving the original judgment in force, but that relief would be of no consequence, since as we have held, the judgment nunc pro tunc makes no material change in the original judgment.
Appellant also moves for oral argument in support of his motion for rehearing, but we conclude that no useful purpose could be served by such argument because appellant’s, position has been adequately presented in his motion for rehearing.
Motions overruled.