Court Opinion

ID: 9665880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:45.709436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.868239
License: Public Domain

M. J. Shamo, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The essential issue in the instant case is whether force or coercion occurred so as to satisfy MCL 750.520e(l)(a); MSA 28.788(5)(l)(a). The facts of this case do not fit any of the definitions of force or coercion included by the Legislature in MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f). However, the definitions included in MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f) are not exclusive. People v McGill, 131 Mich App 465; 346 NW2d 572 (1984).
The majority relies on the statement of the McGill Court that a finding of force or coercion may be based upon a showing that the defendant’s actions were sufficient to create a reasonable fear of dangerous consequences. McGill, supra at 472. However, the majority ignores the McGill Court’s statement, albeit in dicta, that
[w]e do not hold here that the type of actual conduct described in the instant case will always satisfy the "force or coercion” element. Were the victim older or had the undesired touching occurred in a place from which the victim could easily leave or from which she could summon help, a fear of dangerous consequences might not be deemed reasonable and an atmosphere of coercion *83might not exist. Each case must be examined on its own facts to determine whether force or coercion is indeed present. [McGill, supra at 474-475.]
Our Supreme Court in People v Patterson, 428 Mich 502, 525; 410 NW2d 733 (1987), stated:
The Legislature specifically required force or coercion to convict a defendant of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct where the defendant is charged as this defendant was charged in the information. If the Legislature had wanted to make all unconsented-to sexual contact punishable, with or without force, it should have said so. It may yet do so.
In the instant case, the majority distinguishes Patterson but ignores the warning from Justice Brickley in his concurrence, p 532, where he stated:
The fact that the result of the majority opinion leaves unprotected, under some narrow circumstances, an unpermitted and unconsented to sexual touching1 —a result that may or may not have been intended and that we may or may not agree with — does not license us to distort a clear, specific, and unambiguous criminal statute.
The facts of the instant case do not establish that force or coercion was utilized to accomplish the unwanted touching of the victim by defendant. The instant case parallels the dicta from McGill and that of Justice Brickley in Patterson. The victim was seventeen years old, the undesired touching occurred in a place from which the vie*84tim could easily leave or from which she could summon help. Also, the undesired touching was unaided and unabetted and accomplished by surprise.
The magistrate abused his discretion in binding over defendant for trial. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the information and dismissing the complaint against defendant.
I would affirm.

 Such an unpermitted, but unprotected, touching would seem to occur when it is unaided or unabetted and accomplished by surprise or concealment.