Court Opinion

ID: 9406965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 15:01:06.320196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.324299
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12240    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12240
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        NICHOLAS HAM,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00179-WFJ-SPF-2
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12240      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023     Page: 2 of 11

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12240

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Nicholas Ham appeals his 66-month sentence for
        distribution of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
        (b)(1)(C). On appeal, Ham argues that his above-advisory-
        guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable because (1) the
        district court found, without sufficient justification, that the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support his sentence and (2) his sentence
        resulted in unwarranted sentencing disparities. After careful
        review of the record, we affirm Ham’s 66-month sentence.
                                   I.     FACTS
               On September 18, 2019, 21-year-old Ham purchased what
        he believed were several bags of heroin from his supplier. Ham
        loaded some of the substance into a smoking device, smoked it, and
        then gave the device to his minor girlfriend, G.W. G.W.
        overdosed. Ham administered two doses of Narcan to G.W. and
        attempted to resuscitate her. G.W.’s friend contacted emergency
        services, who treated G.W. on the scene and then took her to a
        hospital. Law enforcement officers apprehended and arrested
        Ham. A laboratory analysis of the substance consumed by G.W.
        detected fentanyl.
               While in jail, Ham placed several relevant phone calls to his
        mother and G.W. In one phone call with his mother, Ham
        instructed her to retrieve a stash of Xanax that he had stored in a
        post office box and told her that he intended to flee if he made bail.
USCA11 Case: 22-12240     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023    Page: 3 of 11

        22-12240              Opinion of the Court                        3

        In another call, Ham and his mother discussed her progress in
        selling the Xanax to make money to pay for Ham’s attorney.
               Further, in several phone calls with his mother, Ham
        indicated that he intended to obstruct justice, either by promising
        to assault G.W. or otherwise preventing her from cooperating with
        law enforcement. Specifically, Ham declared his intent to (1) beat
        G.W., (2) kill G.W. by “spray[ing] her house” with an AR-15, and
        (3) rob G.W.’s new boyfriend and “sho[o]t up” his house. In
        addition, Ham asked his mother to persuade G.W. not to
        cooperate with authorities.
                Ham also contacted G.W. himself to try to convince her to
        lie to protect him. In one call, Ham instructed G.W. to lie in her
        deposition about his role in the overdose. In another call, Ham
        asked G.W. to skip her deposition, advising that she was required
        to attend only the trial.
               After Ham was released from jail on bail, Ham repeatedly
        called, texted, and emailed G.W., despite a court order forbidding
        him from contacting her. On March 6, 2020, G.W. recorded a
        phone call during which she twice asked Ham to stop calling her
        and Ham said, “I’m only talking to you so you don’t testify.” On
        March 9, 2020, authorities arrested Ham for violating the
        no-contact order, but Ham was released on bond that same day.
              On March 29, 2020, Ham attended a party where G.W. and
        her new boyfriend were also present. At that party, Ham “sucker-
        punched” G.W. in the face multiple times, causing her to fall to the
        ground. Ham then climbed on top of G.W. and continued
USCA11 Case: 22-12240         Document: 38-1   Date Filed: 07/05/2023    Page: 4 of 11

        4                        Opinion of the Court              22-12240

        punching her. G.W. suffered two black eyes and a concussion. A
        bystander called 911, an officer arrived on the scene, and Ham was
        arrested.
              Back in jail, Ham placed more phone calls to his mother.
        During those phone calls, Ham said (1) he “should have killed
        [G.W.’s] bitch ass” and (2) G.W. “deserved to get the fuck beaten
        out of her.” Ham also asked his mother to pay G.W. money in
        exchange for her refusal to cooperate with the prosecution.
                        II.      PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        A.    Indictment & Guilty Plea
               In June 2020, a federal indictment charged Ham with one
        count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury,
        in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
               Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ham waived his right
        to be charged by indictment and pleaded guilty to a superseding
        information charging him with distribution of fentanyl—without
        serious bodily injury—in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
        (b)(1)(C).
        B.    Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
              Ham’s PSR recommended (1) a base offense level of 12, (2) a
        two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for Ham’s several
        attempts to obstruct justice by attempting to threaten G.W. and
        convince her not to testify against him, and (3) a two-level
        reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of
        responsibility. Ham’s adjusted offense level was 12.
USCA11 Case: 22-12240          Document: 38-1         Date Filed: 07/05/2023        Page: 5 of 11

        22-12240                   Opinion of the Court                                5

              With four criminal history points, Ham’s criminal history
        category was III. Ham’s advisory guidelines range was 15 to 21
        months’ imprisonment.
        C.      Sentencing
              At sentencing, the government did not (1) request a specific
        sentence or (2) make a motion for an upward variance. Ham
        requested a sentence of time served because of the time he had
        already served (27 months) on related state charges.
              The district court found that an upward variance was
        warranted and sentenced Ham to 66 months’ imprisonment,
        followed by 5 years of supervised release.
               The district court noted that it had considered (1) the record,
        (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense, (3) the violence
        involved, (4) the need for public safety, (5) the advisory guidelines
        range, and (6) all the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). 1
              The district court explained that the upward variance was
        supported by the following: (1) the severity of the conviction;

        1 Section 3553(a) directs the court to consider (1) thenature and circumstances
        of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need
        for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
        the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the public
        from future crimes of the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed
        educational or vocational training or medical care; (3) the kinds of sentences
        available; (4) the applicable guidelines range; (5) the pertinent policy
        statements of the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted
        sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to victims.
USCA11 Case: 22-12240      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023     Page: 6 of 11

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12240

        (2) the underlying violence described in the PSR; (3) the need for
        the public to be protected; (4) the need for specific and general
        deterrence; and (5) the fact that Ham’s guilty plea to the charge in
        the information allowed Ham to avoid an adjusted offense level of
        38 that accompanied the initial charge in the indictment.
               Indeed, if Ham had been convicted of the original serious-
        bodily-injury charge in the indictment, (1) he would have been
        subject to a 20-year statutory minimum sentence, and (2) his base
        offense level would have been 38. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (“[I]f
        death or serious bodily injury results from the use of [fentanyl, the
        defendant] shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
        than twenty years[.]”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) (requiring a base
        offense level of 38 if the defendant is convicted under § 841(b)(1)(C)
        and “the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious
        bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance”).
              Ham appealed his 66-month sentence.
                               III.   DISCUSSION
               Ham contends that his above-advisory-guidelines sentence
        is substantively unreasonable. “We review the substantive
        reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, considering
        the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Oudomsine, 57
        F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). Ham “bears the burden of
        establishing that his sentence is unreasonable based on the record
        and the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
              The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient,
        but not greater than necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district
USCA11 Case: 22-12240       Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023      Page: 7 of 11

        22-12240                Opinion of the Court                          7

        court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant
        factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or
        irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
        Oudomsine, 57 F.4th at 1266.
                “We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively
        unreasonable only if we are ‘left with the definite and firm
        conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
        judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
        that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
        facts of the case.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
        1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
        A.     Sufficient Justification for 66-Month Sentence
               To begin with, Ham argues that his 66-month sentence is
        substantively unreasonable because the district court found,
        without sufficient justification, that the § 3553(a) factors support his
        sentence. We disagree. The district court clearly explained its
        reasons for imposing the 66-month sentence, and the court did so
        in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
               The record establishes that Ham (1) distributed fentanyl to
        G.W. (his minor girlfriend) who then overdosed and nearly died,
        (2) urged G.W. to lie to authorities to protect him, (3) said in
        recorded phone calls that he would beat or kill G.W. to prevent her
        from cooperating and “sho[o]t up” her new boyfriend’s house, and
        (4) “sucker-punched” and hit G.W. until she had two black eyes
        and a concussion.
USCA11 Case: 22-12240          Document: 38-1          Date Filed: 07/05/2023           Page: 8 of 11

        8                           Opinion of the Court                         22-12240

              When sentencing Ham, the district court expressly stated
        that it had considered (1) the record, (2) the nature and
        circumstances of the offense, (3) the violence involved, (4) the need
        for public safety, (5) the advisory guidelines range, and (6) all the
        § 3553(a) factors. 2
                In varying upward, the district court relied on the following:
        (1) the severity of the conviction; (2) the underlying violence
        described in the PSR; (3) the need for the public to be protected;
        (4) the need for specific and general deterrence; and (5) the fact that
        Ham’s guilty plea to the charge in the information allowed Ham to
        avoid an adjusted offense level of 38 that accompanied the initial
        charge in the indictment. Accordingly, the district court
        sufficiently explained its reasoning for its sentence.
               Ham also takes issue with the district court’s consideration
        of the 20-year statutory minimum penalty that he would have
        faced if he had been convicted of the initial charge in the
        indictment. In deciding what sentence to impose, a district court
        may consider the penalty related to uncharged conduct. See, e.g.,
        United States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 836 (6th Cir. 2010); United
        States v. Reif, 920 F.3d 1197, 1199 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v.

        2 While violent behavior and uncharged conduct are not factors set forth in
        § 3553(a), they are appropriate considerations when a district court reviews
        the history and characteristics of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Butler,
        39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] sentencing court may impose an
        upward variance based upon uncharged conduct as it relates to the history and
        characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need to promote respect for the
        law, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-12240      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 07/05/2023     Page: 9 of 11

        22-12240               Opinion of the Court                        9

        James, No. 20-12459, 2021 WL 2909729, at *4 (11th Cir. July 12,
        2021) (unpublished) (“[T]he penalty related to uncharged conduct
        can be helpful in assessing what sentence to impose.”). Moreover,
        Ham’s 66-month sentence is almost 15 years below that statutory
        minimum, which also indicates the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in sentencing Ham.
        B.    No Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity
               Ham also asserts that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable based on the disparity between his sentence of 66
        months’ imprisonment and sentences imposed on other
        defendants that distributed fentanyl to customers who overdosed
        or died. We disagree.
               Section 3553(a)(6) is concerned with unwarranted disparities
        in sentencing among federal defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
        When evaluating alleged sentencing disparities, we ask “whether
        the defendant is similarly situated to the defendants to whom he
        compares himself.” United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338
        (11th Cir. 2015).
               Ham has not shown that any of the cases he cites involve
        situations like his, where the defendant—in addition to distributing
        fentanyl—obstructed justice, declared his intent to harm or kill the
        victim, and physically attacked the victim. Those aggravating
        factors contributed to Ham’s above-advisory-guidelines sentence.
        Instead of citing cases with the same or similar aggravating factors,
        Ham merely cited other cases where the defendant distributed
        drugs, the victim suffered serious bodily injury or died, and the
USCA11 Case: 22-12240      Document: 38-1       Date Filed: 07/05/2023      Page: 10 of 11

        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-12240

        defendant received a lower sentence than Ham did. Without more
        information on those other cases, Ham has not shown those
        defendants are similarly situated to him. United States v. Docampo,
        573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A well-founded claim of
        disparity . . . assumes that apples are being compared to apples.”
        (quotation marks omitted)).
               But even if Ham had shown that the other defendants were
        similarly situated to him, that would not mean his sentence was
        substantively unreasonable. The district court was required to
        consider the § 3553(a) factors and was permitted to impose a
        different sentence based on the application of those factors to
        Ham’s specific case. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52, 128 S. Ct.
        586, 598 (2007) (“It has been uniform and constant in the federal
        judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every
        convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study
        in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes
        magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” (quotation
        marks omitted)). Consistent with that responsibility, the district
        court detailed specific facts about Ham and his conduct that led the
        court to conclude that a sentence of 66 months was reasonable. See
        United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A district
        court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only
        be a reasonable one.” (quotation marks omitted)).
                                    *      *       *
              For these reasons, we conclude that Ham’s 66-month
        sentence is substantively reasonable. We therefore affirm.
USCA11 Case: 22-12240   Document: 38-1   Date Filed: 07/05/2023   Page: 11 of 11

        22-12240           Opinion of the Court                    11

              AFFIRMED.