Court Opinion

ID: 9962949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 09:17:54.667176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:24.055847
License: Public Domain

In the
               Court of Appeals
 Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                     No. 06-23-00097-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF L.D.W., K.A.W., AND K.L.C., CHILDREN

            On Appeal from the 6th District Court
                 Red River County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. CV05346

        Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

            On the petition of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the trial court

terminated the parental rights of Mother to her children, L.D.W., K.A.W., and K.L.C.,1 based on

statutory grounds O and P and its finding that termination was in the best interests of the

children.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (P), (2) (Supp.). The trial court also

terminated the parental rights of Father to his children, K.A.W. and K.L.C., based on statutory

grounds P and Q and its finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(P), (Q), (2) (Supp.). Mother and Father appeal the

termination of their parental rights and assert that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the findings of the statutory grounds of termination. Because the evidence

was legally insufficient to support the termination of Mother’s rights under statutory grounds O

and P, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part, and we render judgment vacating those

portions of the trial court’s order of termination relating to the termination of Mother’s parental

rights.       Because legally and factually sufficient evidence supports termination of Father’s

parental rights under statutory ground Q, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

I.          Background

            The Department removed the children from Mother’s care in May 2022, when they were

found living in a U-Haul van with Mother and her partner and Mother admitted to recently

testing positive for methamphetamine. The children were placed in Father’s care while the

1
 In order to protect the privacy of the children, we refer to them by their initials and refer to their biological parents
as Mother and Father. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
    The parental rights of the alleged father of L.D.W. were also terminated, but he does not appeal.
                                                             2
Department investigated the children’s safety. During the investigation, the Department had

difficulty contacting Father regularly, and Father gave misleading information regarding the care

of the children.

            On September 6, 2022, Father left L.D.W. in the care of the child’s adult sibling while he

went to work, even though he had been instructed not to leave them with her because of her use

of illegal drugs. A few hours later, L.D.W., who was five years old at the time, was found

walking alone along Highway 37. When Father was interviewed later that day, he admitted

using methamphetamine four days earlier. He also tested positive for methamphetamine and

amphetamine. The Department also discovered that the children had been regularly left in the

care of Mother, even though Father was instructed not to leave them unsupervised in the care of

Mother.3 The Department removed the children from their parents’ care, and subsequently filed

a petition for protection, conservatorship, and termination, which sought, among other things,

temporary managing conservatorship of the children and termination of the parental rights of

Mother, Father, and an alleged father.

            At the short final hearing held on December 11, 2023,4 Candacy Shupe, a caseworker for

the Department, testified that, to her knowledge, Mother had not participated in a service plan,

and Shupe agreed that Mother had not “done anything [she was] supposed to do.” She also

testified that the Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights because of her

failure to work the service plan and her substance use. However, she also testified that Mother

3
 In December 2021, Mother and her newborn tested positive for methamphetamine shortly after the baby’s birth.
The child was removed from Mother’s care, and the Department’s case involving Mother and the baby was active in
Lamar County at the time of the removal of the children in this case.
4
    The testimony at the final hearing consists of slightly more than forty-six pages in the reporter’s record.
                                                              3
had not been served with citation until July 21, 2023. Shupe testified that Mother had been

asked to drug test in Rockport at some time after she was served and that, on October 17, Shupe

sent her a text message asking her to submit to a drug test but received no response. She also

admitted that Mother had not been drug tested during this case.

        Regarding the service plan, Shupe testified that, from July until the time of the hearing,

she had asked Mother to do services but did not specify what services she asked her to do. She

averred that Mother was sent a copy of the service plan at an address in either Aransas Pass or

Rockport. Although Mother attended a hearing in August, Shupe testified that she did not give

her a copy of the service plan that day. She also testified that Mother had not signed the service

plan. Shupe also testified that Mother had not contacted her regarding completing services and

that she had not had any meaningful conversation with Mother about Mother coming to her

office for what she had to do to take care of her children. Clint Hocutt, with Court Appointed

Special Advocates, also testified that Mother had not reached out to him to get services or to find

out what she needed to do to have the children returned.

        Shupe testified that the Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights based on

incarceration and drug use.             She also testified that the children tested positive for

methamphetamine and that they were exposed to the drug at the house of Father’s daughter.5

Shupe testified that Father had been told that he was not to let his daughter watch the children

because of her use of marihuana and methamphetamine, but he left the children with her on

September 6.

5
 The person referred to as the daughter of Father appears to be the same person referred to as the children’s adult
sibling.
                                                        4
       The evidence shows that, during this case, Father was convicted of endangering each of

the children. Certified judgments of those convictions showed that Father was convicted on

June 12, 2023, of one count of second-degree-felony endangering a child and three counts of

state-jail-felony endangering a child.

       Father was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for the second-degree felony and to

eighteen month’s confinement for each of the state-jail felonies, with the sentences to run

concurrently.

       Father admitted that he pled guilty to the child endangerment charges because the

children tested positive for methamphetamine. Although he was incarcerated and did not know

when he would be paroled, he testified that he could be coming before the parole board in March

and that he would become parole eligible at any time after March. Mother did not testify at trial.

       After the hearing, the trial court entered its order terminating the parental rights of

Mother to the children, terminating the parental rights of Father to K.A.W. and K.L.C., and

appointing the Department as permanent managing conservator of the children. On appeal,

Mother and Father challenge the termination of their parental rights.

II.    Standard of Review

       “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional

dimensions.” In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting

Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Both [the Texas Supreme] Court and the

Supreme Court of the United States have long recognized the fundamental right of parents to

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re R.J.G., 681

                                                5
S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex. 2023). “Thus, Texas law rightly requires that, before infringing on a

parent’s right to care for and have custody of her child[ren], the State . . . must demonstrate to a

court that governmental intrusion is warranted.” Id. “The bar is—appropriately—highest when

the State seeks a judgment effecting the outright and permanent termination of the parent-child

relationship.” Id.

       “Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher

standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial.” In re E.J.Z., 547

S.W.3d at 343 (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). As a result, we must

“engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to

support the termination of parental rights.’” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500).

“[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied)).

       “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that

termination is in the child[ren]’s best interest.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In

re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that ‘degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth

of the allegations sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007); see

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). “This standard of proof necessarily affects our

review of the evidence.” Id.

                                                  6
       “In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per

curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We assume

the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable

fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably

disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re J.P.B., 180

S.W.3d at 573).

       “In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial

court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209

S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). Also, we “consider whether disputed evidence is

such that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its

finding.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the entire record, the

disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is

so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,

then the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266). “In applying this standard, ‘[a]n appellate court’s review must not be so

rigorous that the only fact[-]findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (first alteration

in original) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002)).

                                                   7
       “‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘an exacting review of the entire

record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d

at 920 (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503). However, “[o]nly one

predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination

when there is also a finding that termination is in the child[ren]’s best interest.” Id. at 923

(quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied)).

III.   Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Under Statutory Ground O Was Not
       Supported by Legally Sufficient Evidence

       A.      Termination of Parental Rights Under Statutory Ground O

       To terminate parental rights under statutory ground O, the Department must establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, that: “(1) the parent must have failed to comply with the

provisions of a court order, which (2) specifically established the actions necessary for the parent

to receive custody of the child[ren] from the Department, which serves as the permanent or

temporary conservator of the child[ren].”       In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019)

(per curiam). Under statutory ground O, “the court’s order describing the actions necessary to

obtain the return of the child[ren] must be ‘sufficiently specific to warrant termination of parental

rights for failure to comply with it.’”       In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2022)

(per curiam) (quoting In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 238). Statutory ground O “contemplates direct,

specifically required actions.” Id. at 837 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O)).

       The Texas Family Code contemplates that this specificity can be accomplished by the

trial court reviewing the service plan for the children’s parents prepared by the Department and

incorporating the service plan into the orders of the court.          See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
                                                 8
§ 263.202(b-1) (“After reviewing the service plan and making any necessary modifications, the

court shall incorporate the service plan into the orders of the court and may render additional

appropriate orders to implement or require compliance with the plan.”). Further, the service plan

“must be written ‘in a manner that is clear and understandable to the parent in order to facilitate

the parent’s ability to follow the requirements of the service plan.’” In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at

377 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.102(d)). As the Texas Supreme Court has noted, the

Texas Family Code sets out the requirements of a service plan:

       Among other things, the plan must:

               •      be specific;

               •      be prepared by the Department in conference with the parents;

               •      state appropriate deadlines;

               •      specify the primary permanency goal and at least one alternative
                      permanency goal;

               •      state the actions and responsibilities that are necessary for the
                      parents to take to achieve the plan goal during the period of the
                      service plan;

               •      state any specific skills or knowledge that the parents must acquire
                      or learn, as well as any behavioral changes the parents must
                      exhibit; and

               •      prescribe any other term or condition that the Department
                      determines to be necessary to the service plan’s success.

Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.102(a)(1), (3)–(5), (7), (8), (11)).

                                                9
            The Texas Supreme Court has made clear that, in order to terminate parental rights under

statutory ground O, the “trial court must necessarily decide that a court order is sufficiently

specific for the parent[s] to comply” with the order. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 239. As a result,

“a trial court cannot terminate parental rights for failure to comply without first considering the

order’s specificity.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 161.001(b)(1)(O)).

            Also, in considering a factual or legal sufficiency challenge to a termination under

statutory ground O, an appellate court must consider the order’s specificity. See id. If an

appellate court upholds a termination under statutory ground O without considering the order’s

specificity, it errs. Id. The examination of the specificity of the order includes the specificity of

the service plan when the trial court’s order incorporates the service plan. Id.

            B.       Analysis

            In her first issue, Mother asserts that there is factually and legally insufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s termination of her parental rights under statutory ground O because there

is neither an order nor a service plan in the record that “specifically established the actions

necessary for [her] to obtain the return of the child[ren].”                             TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O). Further, because there was no testimony as to the details of the service plan,

she argues, the Department did not prove that she failed to comply with the service plan by clear

and convincing proof.

            Even though the trial court took judicial notice of the record, Mother’s service plan was

not filed and, as a result, is not contained in the appellate record.6 Neither was the service plan

6
    The Red River County district clerk confirmed that Mother’s service plan was not filed in the records of this case.
                                                            10
introduced into evidence at trial. As the Texas Supreme Court has recently explained, “[T]he

statutory text [of ground O] permits termination only if the provision with which the parent

failed to comply was ‘specifically established’ in the written court-ordered service plan.” In re

R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 373. As a result, “[t]he predicate ground for termination under [statutory

ground] (O) cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence if premised on a plan

requirement that is unwritten, and thus supplied only by the caseworker’s oral testimony, or on

one that is written but vague.” Id.

        Nevertheless, the Department contends that the terms of the service plan were established

in its permanency report filed on May 26, 2023, under the heading “Services and Orders

Needed.” However, there is no indication in that report that the services and orders listed are

included in Mother’s service plan, and there was no trial testimony that the list was composed of

Mother’s service plan. Also, there is no trial court order that orders Mother to obtain the services

listed in that report, or that approves the list in that report, as is required of a service plan. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.202(b-1).

        Although Mother’s service plan was not filed in the record, the trial court incorporated

the service plan into its nunc pro tunc order entered after the status hearing held on October 11,

2022. As a result, a consideration of the specificity of the service plan is a necessary component

of our sufficiency analysis. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 339. Because the service plan was not

filed in the trial court’s record7 and was not introduced into evidence at trial, the trial court could

7
 The Department cites several cases in which courts of appeals have overruled sufficiency challenges to termination
of parental rights under statutory ground O when the trial court took judicial notice of its file, even though the
service plan was not introduced into evidence. However, each of those cases was decided before In re R.J.G., which
holds that the service plan must be written and cannot be “supplied only by the caseworker’s oral testimony,” and
                                                        11
not have considered whether it was sufficiently specific for Mother to comply with it. Likewise,

because the service plan is not contained in the appellate record, we cannot consider whether it

was sufficiently specific. As a result, we cannot uphold the termination of Mother’s parental

rights based on her alleged failure to comply with the service plan.8 See id. For that reason, we

before In re N.G., which requires appellate courts to consider the specificity of the terms of the service plan when it
is incorporated into a trial court’s order. In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 373; see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 239. When,
as here, the service plan is incorporated into the trial court’s order but is not contained in the record and not
introduced into evidence, the appellate court is unable to consider the specificity of the service plan. As a result, we
would err by upholding a termination under statutory ground O without considering the specificity of the service
plan. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 239.
8
 The Department also points to the temporary order entered on September 22, 2022, after the adversary hearing. In
that order, the trial court ordered Mother (1) to “submit to and cooperate fully in the preparation of the court-ordered
drug and alcohol dependency assessment,” (2) to “submit urine samples, saliva samples, or hair follicle samples, as
directed by the Department and at times to be determined by the Department, for analysis by a drug testing
laboratory,” and (3) “to comply with each requirement set out in the Department’s original, or any amended, service
plan during the pendency of this suit.” The Department acknowledges that, “[t]o issue a valid and binding judgment
or order, a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it
purports to bind.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022) (citing Luciano v.
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Tex. 2021)). It also acknowledges that the trial court did not
have personal jurisdiction over Mother until she was served on July 21, 2023. Nevertheless, the Department argues
that Mother was bound by the temporary order because the permanency hearing order entered on August 22, 2023,
stated that “all previous orders issued by [the trial] Court shall continue without modification.” Even assuming
Mother was bound by the temporary order after the entry of the August 22 order, there is no order of the trial court
entered after that date in the appellate record that specifically directed Mother to take a drug and alcohol dependency
assessment with any named provider.
          Further, in In re N.G., the Texas Supreme Court likened the specificity required of an order under statutory
ground O to that required under a contempt order in a divorce decree or child-support order. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d
at 238. It noted that, in those cases, before a parent could be held in contempt for violating an order, the order “must
‘set forth the terms of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person charged with obeying
the decree will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte
Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding)). The temporary order requiring Mother to “submit
urine samples, saliva samples, or hair follicle samples, as directed by the Department and at times to be determined
by the Department” specifies neither where and to what provider Mother was required to submit those samples, nor
the time frame within which Mother had to submit the samples. Because the order did not state what Mother was
required to do “in clear, specific and unambiguous terms” so that Mother “readily [knew] what duties and
obligations [were] imposed upon” her, we find that this order did not meet the specificity required under statutory
ground O. Id. (quoting Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d at 317). As a result, we find that there was no evidence that
Mother failed to comply with an order of the trial court that was “sufficiently specific to warrant termination of
parental rights for failure to comply with it.” In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d at 835 (quoting In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at
238).
                                                          12
find that termination of Mother’s parental rights under statutory ground O was not supported by

legally sufficient evidence. We sustain this issue.

IV.    Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Under Statutory Ground P Was Not
       Supported by Legally Sufficient Evidence

       In order to terminate parental rights under statutory ground P, the Department must show,

by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent (1) “used a controlled substance . . . in a

manner that endangered the health or safety of the child” and (2) either (a) “failed to complete a

court-ordered substance abuse treatment program” or (b) “after completion of a court-ordered

substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance.” TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). Mother asserts that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights under statutory ground P because

there was no evidence that the trial court ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse

treatment program. The Department did not brief this issue on appeal.

       On appeal, the Department does not direct us to, and we have not found, any order in the

appellate record in which Mother was ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program.

As a result, we find there is no evidence that she “failed to complete a court-ordered substance

abuse treatment program” or that, after she completed such a program, she “continued to abuse a

controlled substance.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(P). For that reason, we find that

termination of Mother’s parental rights under statutory ground P was not supported by legally

sufficient evidence. We sustain this issue.

                                                13
V.     Legally and Factually Sufficient Evidence Supports Termination of Father’s
       Parental Rights Under Statutory Ground Q

       A.      Termination of Parental Rights Under Statutory Ground Q

       In order to terminate parental rights under statutory ground Q, the Department must

show, “based on clear and convincing evidence[,] that the parent ‘knowingly engaged in criminal

conduct,’ was convicted of an offense, and will be confined or imprisoned and ‘unable to care for

the child[ren] for not less than two years.’” In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696, 697–98 (Tex.

2022) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q)). Because termination

under statutory ground Q is “based on an extended prison sentence,” “the State [may] act in

anticipation of a parent’s abandonment of the child[ren] and not just in response to it.” Id. at

698–99 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. 2003)).

       The Texas Supreme Court has “explained that the fact that a parent is serving a prison

sentence that does not expire for at least two more years ‘does not automatically meet subsection

Q’s two-year imprisonment requirement’ because ‘evidence of the availability of parole is

relevant.’” Id. at 699 (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108–09). Nevertheless, “the

fact[-]finder, ‘[a]s the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses,’ is

‘free to disregard’ the parent’s parole-related testimony, especially when it constitutes ‘barely

more than conjecture.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at

109). Further, because of the speculative nature of parole decisions, “the parent’s ‘introduction

of parole-related evidence’ establishing ‘the mere possibility of parole’ does not ‘prevent a

fact[-]finder from forming a firm conviction or belief that the parent will remain incarcerated for

at least two years.’” Id. (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109).
                                                14
       Statutory ground Q “focuses on the parent’s future imprisonment and inability to care for

the child[ren], not the criminal conduct that the parent committed in the past.” In re A.V., 113

S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. 2003). “By looking at future imprisonment and inability to care for the

child[ren], subsection Q purports to protect children whose parents will be incarcerated for

periods exceeding two years after termination proceedings begin.” Id. at 360–61.

       B.      Analysis

       Father asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support

termination of his parental rights under statutory ground Q.          He does not challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence of his commission of an offense, his conviction, or that he will be

unable to care for his children for not less than two years. Rather, he only challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence that he will be incarcerated for not less than two years.

       The evidence shows that Father was convicted on June 12, 2023, of four counts of child

endangerment and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on one count and eighteen

months’ confinement on each of the other counts, with the sentences to run concurrently. The

evidence also shows that Father had been in jail for 279 days prior to his convictions. Thus, if

Father serves his full sentence, he will be incarcerated for almost six years beyond the two-year

period under statutory ground Q.

       At trial, Father testified that he had no idea when his parole eligibility date was but that

he “could be coming back up in March” and that “any time after March 1 [he could] become

parole eligible.” He also testified that he saw the parole board “in August and they usually set it

                                                 15
off about a year but they - - anywhere between [six] and [nine] months [they would] bring you

back up.”

         As the Texas Supreme Court has noted,

         Mere introduction of parole-related evidence, however, does not prevent a
         fact[-]finder from forming a firm conviction or belief that the parent will remain
         incarcerated for at least two years. Parole decisions are inherently speculative,
         and while all inmates doubtless hope for early release and can take positive steps
         to improve their odds, the decision rests entirely within the parole board’s
         discretion.

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109 (citations omitted). In this case, although the trial court could

take into account that it was possible that Father could be released within the two-year period, it

was also free to disregard that evidence as “barely more than conjecture.” Id. As a result, the

trial court could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that Father would be

incarcerated for at least two years.

         Because the evidence shows that Father was incarcerated for almost the entirety of this

termination proceeding and faced a maximum imprisonment far beyond the two-year period

under statutory ground Q, and because he did not challenge the sufficiency of evidence

supporting the other elements of that ground, we find that legally and factually sufficient

evidence supported the termination of his parental rights under statutory ground Q.9 We overrule

this issue.

9
 Because the trial court’s finding under one statutory ground and its finding that termination was in the best interests
of the children will support the termination of Father’s parental rights, we need not address Father’s remaining issue.
                                                          16
VI.    Conclusion

       For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s order of termination in part, and we

render judgment vacating those portions of the trial court’s order of termination relating to the

termination of Mother’s parental rights. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s termination

order. See In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 383.

                                              Scott E. Stevens
                                              Chief Justice

Date Submitted:       April 15, 2024
Date Decided:         April 19, 2024

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