Court Opinion

ID: 9493895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:22:35.823563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:05.583898
License: Public Domain

PAEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Galindo-Gallegos’ admissions of alien-age and being in the United States illegally should not have been suppressed, as well as with the majority’s analysis of the evidentiary and aggravated felony issues. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s assertion that this stop “was public for the reason that mattered; no alien had reason to fear abuse by an officer and an unscrupulous officer would have *735been deterred from using illegitimate means.... ” Maj. op. at 732 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). I doubt that the mere presence of other suspected illegal aliens offered Galindo-Gallegos much solace or protection. Nonetheless, I concur because, in my view, the agents’ detention of Galindo-Gallegos and the rest of the group near the border constituted a permissible Terry1 stop. The detention was brief and the limited restraint was reasonable under the circumstances. Because the agents’ questions did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), Galindo-Gallegos’ answers were admissible.
Border Patrol agents may briefly stop individuals based on reasonable suspicion that the individuals are aliens in this country illegally, id. at 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, in order to investigate the circumstances that provoked that suspicion. Id. at 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Officers are not required to read suspects their Miranda2 rights prior to questioning them during a Terry stop. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir.1983). As long as the detention in this case did not exceed the limited bounds of a Terry stop and the questions were “ ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation,’ ” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868), then Galindo-Gallegos’ admissions should not be suppressed.
The most vexing question is whether Miranda warnings were required after Galindo-Gallegos tried to run away from the officers, was chased and caught, and was brought back, made to sit in a circle, and questioned. Maj. op. at 730. One might suspect that, after being caught and returned to the circle, Galindo-Gallegos did not feel free to leave. There is no per se rule, however, that physical detention converts an investigatory stop into a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982) (“A brief but complete restriction of liberty if not excessive under the circumstances, is permissible during a Terry stop and does not necessarily convert the stop into an arrest.”). We have approved of Terry stops that include handcuffing the suspect during questioning, see id. at 1289-90; United States v. Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (9th Cir.1999); ordering a suspect to he prone on the ground, or placing the suspect in a police vehicle, see Allen v. Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir.1987), and United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983)). It is not out of the bounds of a Terry stop, under appropriate circumstances, to order suspects to sit on the ground in a circle. Furthermore, we have approved of more significant restraint during a Terry stop when suspects have fled. See Meza-Carrales, 183 F.3d at 1123-24.
The fact that the Border Patrol agents stopped the fleeing suspects and brought them back to the circle also did not transform the detention into a custodial interrogation. During an investigatory stop, officers are authorized to physically move suspects if necessary. Of particular relevance is our decision in Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822 (9th Cir.1987). There, we held that a permissible investigative stop included “taking [a suspected alien] by the arm, [leading] her to an area where other suspected aliens were being held[,]” not permitting her to leave that area to use a telephone, and “warning] her that if she moved again [the officer] would tie her hands.” Id. at 825, 827-28. The stop in this case involved no more physical restraint than that involved in Martinez. In sum, Galindo-Gallegos was not in custody, or under arrest, merely *736because he had been caught and returned to the group for questioning.
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brignoni-Ponce, Border Patrol agents may question suspected illegal aliens “about their citizenship and immigration status, and ... may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances.... ” 422 U.S. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574. The questions the agents asked Galindo-Gallegos in this case were what country he was from and whether he had a legal right to be in the United States. Maj. op. at 729. Those questions were directly related to the agents’ reason for stopping the group in the first place, a suspicion that they were illegal aliens. Furthermore, the agents “used no threats of force, unnecessary delays, exaggerated displays of authority or other coercive tactics” in their questioning. United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that there was no arrest when suspect was moved from his own truck to a police car). The agents’ questions were permissible and the district court’s order denying Gal-indo-Gallegos’ motion to suppress was proper.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).