Court Opinion

ID: 9881074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:03:55.797725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.807763
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Russell CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084646
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF400150)
                    v.

 SIDNEY RAYBURN RUSSELL,                                                                  OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
         Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A.
White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                      INTRODUCTION
       Defendant Sidney Rayburn Russell arranged to be alone with 12-year-old D.A.
and then used his arms and legs to restrain her as he rubbed her vaginal area through her
clothes and rubbed his penis against her back. A jury convicted defendant of forcible
lewd acts upon a child, and the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 75 years to
life under the “Three Strikes” law.
       On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient that he touched
D.A. when D.A.’s testimony established that defendant only touched her pubic area
rather than her vagina as alleged in the information, (2) the evidence of defendant’s
restraint of D.A. during the touching was insufficient to establish the touching was
forcible, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior sexual
convictions from 1992 under Evidence Code section 1108, and (4) the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior convictions.
       We reject defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
                            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The District Attorney of Tulare County filed an information on July 13, 2021,
charging defendant with forcible lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1);1
counts 1, 2) and alleged that defendant was a habitual sexual offender (§ 667.71), had a
prior conviction, a circumstance pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1) of the
alternate sentencing scheme of the “One Strike” law (§ 667.61), and had several prior
“strike” convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–
(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
       A jury convicted defendant of both counts of forcible lewd acts on a child on
May 17, 2022. After defendant waived his right to a jury trial regarding his prior
convictions, the trial court found the allegations to be true. The trial court sentenced

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2.
defendant to two concurrent terms of 75 years to life in prison under the Three Strikes
and “Habitual Sexual Offender” laws (§§ 667.71, 1170.12) and two stayed terms of
25 years to life in prison under the One Strike law. The court also ordered defendant to
pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a suspended
$300 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), a $500 habitual sex offender fine
(§ 290.3), a $1,000 child abuse prevention restitution fine (§ 294, subd. (a)), and
$60 criminal conviction (Gov. Code, § 70373) and $80 court operations (§ 1465.8)
assessments.
          Defendant timely appealed on July 18, 2022.
                                               FACTS
          D.A. testified that she was 14 years old and lived with her mother, Susan A., and
brother, Z.A., in a mobile home park at the time of defendant’s trial. D.A. attended
classes for special needs children. In July 2020,2 D.A. was sitting outside with Susan and
Z.A. looking at the stars at approximately 8:00 p.m., and defendant stopped by on his
bicycle and asked Susan for a cigarette. During the conversation, defendant asked Susan
for permission to take D.A. for a bicycle ride, an activity D.A. used to do with her father.
Susan gave permission, and D.A. rode on defendant’s bicycle seat while defendant sat in
front of her peddling. Susan would not let D.A. ride her own bicycle because it was
getting dark, and her bicycle did not have a light on it. Defendant rode around the mobile
home park and stopped at a brick wall and fence located in front of a vacant house.
Although defendant told D.A. that he was out of breath, he did not seem to be out of
breath.
          Defendant leaned against the brick wall and told D.A. to come to him and
instructed her to sit on his lap. Defendant moved his legs and locked them so that D.A.
was unable to move her legs. Defendant then gripped her by wrapping his arms around

2         Subsequent references to dates are to dates in the year 2020, unless otherwise stated.

                                                  3.
D.A.’s chest. His hands were still when they were wrapped around her chest. D.A. asked
defendant what he was doing, but defendant was breathing heavy, shaking, and did not
respond. D.A. told defendant to stop and to let her go, but defendant told her to relax.
Defendant was holding her so tightly that she could not move even though she tried.
       D.A. testified that she thought defendant was trying to sexually abuse her and
attempted to break free. She was scared and thought defendant must be crazy because
she was only 12 years old, and defendant was 42 years old. She tried to pull defendant’s
hands off her, but she was too weak. She also tried to kick him off, but defendant’s legs
were locked, and defendant tightened his legs and squeezed her legs harder.
       D.A. testified that when defendant put his arms around her, he touched her “vagina
area” over her clothes and shook a lot. When asked to describe it later in her testimony,
D.A. described that defendant’s hand was resting on her vagina area and his body was
still. She thought he was trying to rub her vagina area because defendant used his hand to
rub across the upper portion of her vagina that was not between her legs, and then he
rubbed downward. D.A. tried to pull defendant’s hand away, but he continued to rub the
area. Defendant’s legs and hands trembled.
       D.A. could also feel defendant’s penis on her back, and defendant was poking her
with it and trying to hump her, but he could not get far because she was wearing clothes
and she moved her body forward and away from it. Defendant asked D.A. if she could
feel “it” while he was touching her back with his penis. His arms were still wrapped
around her lower waist.
       D.A. told defendant to leave her alone and tried to break free. Defendant told her
to stop squirming. When she tried to pull away, defendant pulled her back by grabbing
her sweater. She fell back into defendant’s lap, but defendant’s hands were hanging
away from her and he could not wrap them around her. Defendant used his legs to
squeeze her harder and trap her. She tripped as she tried to free herself, fell to the
ground, scratched her leg, and started to cry.

                                              4.
       At that same time, Susan called defendant, and defendant told D.A. to stop crying
and to act normal. Defendant appeared nervous and worried and told D.A. to tell Susan
that she was fine. After the call, defendant angrily asked D.A. why Susan would call
him. Defendant took D.A. home, but she did not tell Susan what happened until later. It
was a few days after the incident when D.A. told Susan that defendant had touched her in
her vagina area, upper leg, and near her ribs.
       D.A. met defendant approximately three days before the incident when he stopped
by her home and asked Susan for a cigarette. Defendant and Susan flirted, and D.A.
thought he would be good for their family. Defendant returned later to their home and
brought bicycles for D.A. and Z.A. D.A. also remembered taking food to defendant’s
home and saw defendant while watching fireworks at the mobile home park.
       Susan testified that she met defendant and his friend, Cory R., as they were riding
bicycles past her home in the mobile home park. She provided defendant a cigarette and
they talked for approximately 45 minutes. Defendant returned the next day to visit Cory,
and Susan spoke with him again. She may have introduced D.A. and Z.A. to defendant at
that time. She spoke with defendant for an hour or two and again later when he returned
that evening. Susan thought that defendant was “cool” and that they would date, but
defendant appeared to lose interest despite her attempts to make sexual advances with
him.
       Susan accompanied defendant to his house to get his laundry the next day, and
then did his laundry at her residence. Susan and her children visited defendant’s house
another day, and defendant offered to give the children bicycles. She picked up the
bicycles from defendant’s house at a later time. D.A. told her that defendant had come
over early one morning while she was sleeping and took D.A. for a bicycle ride.
       One night, D.A. asked if defendant could take her for a ride on his bicycle, and
Susan gave her permission. Susan became nervous when they did not return and decided
to call defendant. She thought defendant sounded out of breath, and defendant said that

                                             5.
he had hurt his leg and would be home soon. Susan did not notice anything out of the
ordinary when defendant and D.A. returned.
       On July 4, Susan joined her children and defendant at a location in the mobile
home park where people had gathered to watch fireworks. D.A. was sitting on
defendant’s lap. Susan called D.A. to her, ascertained that D.A. was fine, and D.A. went
back to sit on defendant’s lap. Defendant convinced Susan to ride his bicycle, and she
left to ride around the park for five or 10 minutes.
       Thereafter, Susan was speaking with D.A.’s therapist and expressing concern
about whether D.A. would talk to Susan if anyone hurt D.A. when D.A. interrupted and
asked to talk to Susan. D.A. told Susan about the incident with defendant, and Susan
immediately contacted the police.3
       D.A.’s older brother, Z.A., met defendant when he was having a cigarette with
Susan. Z.A. got a bad feeling about defendant when defendant gave them the bicycles.
On July 4, while watching fireworks, D.A. sat on defendant’s lap while defendant rubbed
her shoulders, but Z.A. was too scared to voice his concerns. Z.A. heard D.A. ask
defendant to stop hanging on her, but she did not move off his lap. Defendant stopped
rubbing D.A.’s shoulders as Susan approached them. Defendant convinced Susan to try
riding defendant’s bicycle, and Z.A. followed Susan on foot, leaving D.A. with
defendant.
       Z.A. testified that D.A. took a 20-minute bicycle ride with defendant one evening,
and Susan and Z.A. became concerned that they were gone that long. When D.A.
returned, she got off the bicycle on the wrong side, which indicated to him that something
had happened, and went to her room.

3       Officer Cole Sinatra testified that he was dispatched to respond to the call on July 8, and
Officer Michael Morgantini spoke with Susan that same day, the day she reported the incident to
police.

                                                6.
       Cory lived at the same mobile home park as Susan and her children. He met
defendant there while walking one day and they became friends. Cory knew defendant
for about a month and was with him during fireworks on July 4. Cory was at Susan’s
house with defendant and Susan’s children just before the fireworks. Cory, defendant,
and the children bicycled to a location to see the fireworks, and Susan arrived later. Cory
saw defendant leaning against a post and hugging D.A. from behind her in a way that a
romantic couple would do. Defendant’s behavior became less affectionate towards D.A.
when Susan arrived.
       A week or two later, Cory was riding bicycles with defendant, and defendant “just
took off” when they saw two police cars arriving in the area.
       Officer Morgantini was a detective assigned to sexual assault and child
molestation cases in July. Morgantini interviewed defendant after his arrest on July 15.
The recorded interview was played for the jury. When initially questioned regarding
D.A.’s allegations, defendant said that “nothing happened,” and that he had never been
charged with molesting a child. Defendant said that he been bicycling with D.A. on the
back of his seat but had to take a break when he got a cramp. Defendant claimed that he
was only trying to be a friend and purchased the bicycles for the children because they
did not own any.
       When Morgantini told defendant that he knew the assault had occurred and wanted
to know if D.A. had given him any signals, defendant responded, “I first met her. She
kept saying, ‘I want to go to your house .…’ [E]ven said this in front of her mother.… I
was supposed to go over the next morning to pick them up, pick her up .… Uh, uh. I’m
not taking her over there ‘cause a little girl like that don’t belong over there around me,
around other guys .… So I didn’t, nothing ever happened.”
       Defendant then admitted that “she hugged me. I hugged her. That’s it. Far as it
went.” He denied that his hands touched D.A.’s vagina. Defendant claimed that they
hugged face to face. Defendant claimed that D.A. reminded him of his daughter, and he

                                             7.
was not thinking of touching her sexually. Morgantini accused defendant of lying and
asked him to explain why he did it. Defendant replied, “Loneliness. I’m not with a
woman.” Defendant agreed that loneliness made him decide to “advance things” with
D.A. Defendant admitted that he asked D.A., “Do you feel it?” and that he was talking
about a “[g]uy and woman [expletive] thing.” He admitted that he was pushing against
D.A. and was not in a right state of mind but denied that he had rubbed his penis on her.
Defendant claimed that he touched “her butt” and did not touch her vagina. Defendant
then admitted that he rubbed against D.A. but denied that his hands touched her vagina.
       Defendant said that the only thing he did was “push[ ], that, that one little thing,”
while she was in front of him. Morgantini asked, “So you pushed your penis against her
front, like, where her vagina is?” Defendant started to answer, “[I]t comes up,” when
Morgantini asked defendant to explain what he meant when he asked D.A. whether she
felt it. Defendant responded, “I’m not gonna go into detail about it. I don’t have to tell
you exactly what. You know what I’m talking about.” Morgantini explained that
defendant needed to be more specific, and defendant replied, “Above the vagina, not this
vagina.” Morgantini insisted that defendant explain the part of his body he referred to
when he asked, “Do you feel it?” Defendant replied, “Okay, my penis.”
       Defendant then told Morgantini that he did not have a woman and had tried to find
a girlfriend. He also said that D.A. had “come onto” him, wanted to sit in his lap, wanted
to kiss him “and stuff,” and “[i]t just happened.” Defendant admitted that he had a
problem and did not want to lie about it anymore. Defendant admitted that he was
attracted to younger girls sometimes because “they’re sweet” and “nice,” and he just
wanted someone to show him affection.
       When he took D.A. on the bicycle ride, he planned on being alone with her and to
hug her but denied that he intended to have sex with her and just wanted to feel what a
“man and a woman does when they press up against each other.” Defendant then
admitted that he hugged D.A. to make himself “horny” and rubbed his penis against her

                                             8.
     to “make myself get off, and that’s it.” Defendant agreed when Morgantini said, “And
     you’re rubbing your penis above her vagina or on her vagina squeezing her butt.”
     Defendant denied that he intended to have sex with D.A. and stated, “I took her back
     there just to get a hug, do rubbing, and release pressure, and that was it.” Defendant told
     Morgantini that D.A. “wanted to go my house and have sex, and I told her no,” so “it
     wasn’t all me.”
            Defendant offered the expert testimony of Dr. Richard Leo, a professor of law and
     psychology, specializing in police interviewing, police interrogation, psychological
     coercion, and true and false confessions. Dr. Leo discussed the factors that can lead to a
     false confession and different types of false confessions. Dr. Leo identified several
     circumstances present or techniques used by Morgantini in defendant’s interrogation that
     could give rise to a false confession, such as the officer’s presumptive bias that D.A. was
     telling the truth and defendant was guilty, minimization of defendant’s blameworthiness
     to encourage defendant to confess, suggestions that evidence existed apart from D.A.’s
     statement, contamination by providing defendant facts of the investigation, and
     psychological inducement by suggesting that D.A. could commit suicide if defendant did
     not confess.
            Dr. Leo agreed that a false confession is the exception to the rule, that the
     interrogation techniques used by police are not designed to elicit false confessions.
     Dr. Leo also testified that he did not see any particular vulnerabilities in defendant that
     increased the likelihood of a false confession.
                                            DISCUSSION

I.          The evidence of touching and use of force was sufficient to support the jury
            verdicts that defendant committed lewd acts on a child by force.
            Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions
     for committing forcible lewd acts on D.A. in counts 1 and 2, pursuant to section 288,
     subdivision (b)(1). He contends his conviction on count 1 lacked sufficient evidence that

                                                   9.
he touched D.A.’s vagina, and, as to both counts, the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he used the requisite physical force in committing the lewd acts. We
disagree.

       A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine the
entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial credible evidence from which a reasonable trier
of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) We do not redetermine the weight of the evidence or the
credibility of witnesses. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60; People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [“Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the
testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”].) We must accept logical
inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence even if we would
have concluded otherwise. (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241, overruled on
other grounds as stated in People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834.) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is
not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with
a contrary finding.” (Albillar, at p. 60.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically
impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
a conviction.” (Young, at p. 1181.)
       Section 288, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “[A] person who willfully
and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act … upon or with the body, or any part or
member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child,
is guilty of a felony.” Thus, the offense has two elements: “ ‘ “(a) the touching of an
underage child’s body (b) with a sexual intent.” ’ ” (People v. Villagran (2016)

                                              10.
5 Cal.App.5th 880, 890.) “ ‘Any touching of a child under the age of 14 violates this
section, even if the touching is outwardly innocuous and inoffensive, if it is accompanied
by the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the
victim.’ ” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404; accord, People v. Martinez
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445 (Martinez).)
       Section 288, subdivision (b)(1), further prohibits the commission of such a lewd or
lascivious act “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.” “ ‘Force, in this context, means
physical force that is “ ‘substantially different from or substantially greater than that
necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 373, 391; accord, People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 242 [“This
formulation was, and remains, an appropriate definition of the force required for an
aggravated lewd conduct conviction under section 288[, subdivision ](b), now
section 288[, subdivision ](b)(1).”].)
       “ ‘A defendant uses “force” if the prohibited act is facilitated by the defendant’s
use of physical violence, compulsion or constraint against the victim other than, or in
addition to, the physical contact which is inherent in the prohibited act.’ [Citation.] ‘The
evidentiary key to whether an act was forcible is not whether the distinction between the
“force” used to accomplish the prohibited act and the physical contact inherent in that act
can be termed “substantial.” Instead, an act is forcible if force facilitated the act rather
than being merely incidental to the act.’ ” (People v. Morales (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th
471, 480; accord, People v. Jimenez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 391; People v. Garcia
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1024.)
       The testimony of the victim of a lewd and lascivious act may be sufficient by itself
to establish the elements of the crime. (Evid. Code, § 411; People v. Westek (1948)
31 Cal.2d 469, 473; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 454.)

                                              11.
       B.     Analysis

              1.     Count 1- Touching
       Defendant argues that D.A.’s testimony was insufficient to prove that defendant
was guilty as charged in count 1 because D.A.’s testimony did not establish that
defendant touched her vagina. We disagree.
       D.A. testified that defendant touched her “vagina area” over her clothes and that
she thought he was trying to rub her vagina because he rubbed his hand across the upper
portion of her vagina area and then rubbed downward. When she tried to pull his hand
away, defendant continued to rub it. D.A. testified that she also told Susan that defendant
touched her “vagina area,” her upper legs, and near her ribs. Section 288 prohibits the
touching of an underage child’s body with a sexual intent, but nothing in the language of
section 288 restricts the manner in which contact with the minor’s body can occur or
requires that specific or intimate body parts be touched. (People v. Villagran, supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 890; Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 443.) D.A. testified that
defendant was shaking and poking his penis into her back while he was rubbing this area
of her body. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant touched a
part of D.A.’s body with a sexual intent. Defendant confessed to his sexual intent,
although he did not admit to touching her vagina.
       Defendant argues that the area of D.A.’s body that D.A. described was not, in fact,
her vagina. Defendant argues that “[t]he ‘vagina’ is an internal organ defined in its
ordinary usage as ‘a canal in a female mammal that leads from the uterus to the external
orifice of the genital canal.’ ” Defendant recognizes that cases involving sexual
penetration have treated the term vagina as synonymous with “female private parts” (see
People v. Paz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1037) but argues that D.A.’s description of
where defendant touched her does not even satisfy such a broad definition.
       However, our Supreme Court recognized that section 288 was written broadly and
“prohibits all forms of sexually motivated contact with an underage child.… [T]he ‘gist’

                                            12.
of the offense has always been the defendant’s intent to sexually exploit a child, not the
nature of the offending act.” (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 444.) The Martinez court
noted that “other felony sex offenses prohibit the commission of certain clearly specified
acts against nonconsenting victims of any age. (See §§ 243.4 [defining sexual battery as
‘intimate’ touching of specific body parts], 261, [rape], 286 [sodomy], 288a [oral
copulation], 289 [sexual penetration by foreign object]; [citation].) Each such provision
describes the criminal act in precise and clinical terms. When contact with or penetration
of a specific body part or cavity is required, or when use of a particular appendage or
instrument is necessary to commit the offense, this fact has been made eminently clear.”
(Id. at p. 443, sixth bracketed insertion added.) Thus, while the specificity of the act and
body part is required by the language of the statute in such other laws, any lack of
specificity in a section 288 victim’s testimony does not affect the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the crime.
       A conviction for section 288 does not require proof that defendant touched D.A.’s
vagina, but only that he touched a part of her body that she described as her vagina. D.A.
adequately described the area to which she was referring even if she did not use the
proper anatomical description. In discussing the sufficiency of generic testimony in the
context of a child’s testimony of sexual abuse, our Supreme Court described, “The
victim, of course, must describe the kind of act or acts committed with sufficient
specificity, both to assure that unlawful conduct indeed has occurred and to differentiate
between the various types of proscribed conduct (e.g., lewd conduct, intercourse, oral
copulation or sodomy).” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 316.) Since section 288
criminalizes “any touching,” D.A.’s failure to use the proper terminology for the area
defendant touched does not affect the sufficiency of evidence for conviction of that
offense.4

4       Defendant has not argued any variance between the charges and the proof at trial. We
note, however, that “[i]nconsistencies and contradictions … of child witnesses at trial is not

                                               13.
       D.A.’s testimony established that defendant used his hand to rub a part of her body
she described as her “vagina area.” The evidence was sufficient to establish that
defendant touched her as she described whether or not “vagina” was the proper term to
describe it. Defendant’s acts of rubbing D.A.’s pubic area sufficed to meet the touching
element of count 1 when examining the entire record.

                 2.    Counts 1 and 2- Force
       Defendant argues that D.A.’s testimony was insufficient to establish that he used
force to touch her body with sexual intent. We disagree.
       “[A]cts of grabbing, holding and restraining that occur in conjunction with the
lewd acts themselves” are sufficient to support a finding that the lewd act was committed
by means of force. (People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005.) The court in
Alvarez stated that the defendant’s actions of resisting the victim’s attempts to push him
away when he attempted to kiss her, holding her while he digitally penetrated her, and
continuing to put her hand on his penis whenever she moved it away were sufficiently
distinct from the lewd conduct to constitute use of force. The court concluded this
evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for committing a forcible lewd act on a
child. (Ibid.)
       Here, D.A.’s testimony established that, while she was leaning against defendant’s
lap, defendant wrapped his arms tightly around her chest and locked his legs so she could
not move her own legs. D.A. tried to kick defendant, but she testified that he would not
budge. She told the jury that defendant was holding her so tightly that she could not
move even though she tried to break free. When she tried to pull free, defendant pulled
her sweater and she fell back onto him. However, defendant could not grab her again and

persuasive of appellant’s contention that the incidents at trial were completely different from the
incidents described at the preliminary hearing. The inconsistencies went to the weight and
credibility of the testimony, not to the question of notice claimed by appellant.” (People v. Gil
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 653, 659.)

                                                14.
D.A. was able to almost free herself, but then tripped when defendant squeezed his legs
harder, and she fell to the ground.
       Given this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to find that defendant had
restrained D.A. for a period of time, using both his arms and his legs to restrict her
movement. Defendant’s restraint of D.A., using his arms and legs, is sufficiently distinct
from his actions of touching her vagina area with his hand and her back with his penis to
establish the requisite use of force for violating section 288, subdivision (b).
       Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He argues that D.A.
willingly sat on his lap when he asked her to do so and that the evidence only
demonstrated he wrapped his arms and legs around her as an embrace. Even if the
testimony could be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding that defendant did not
use force, reversal of the judgment is not warranted because D.A.’s testimony reasonably
supports the jury’s finding that defendant used force. (See People v. Albillar, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Defendant also argues that D.A. testified that defendant’s hand was
just sitting on her and, therefore, defendant was not using force to rub her vagina area.
However, D.A. testified that defendant’s hand was rubbing her at other times during the
incident and, in any event, defendant’s use of force is supported by the evidence that he
restrained D.A. with his arms and his legs, not that he rubbed D.A. with his hand. We
also reject defendant’s argument that evidence of force was insufficient because D.A.
eventually broke free of defendant after the touching occurred in light of her testimony
that she struggled unsuccessfully to free herself before she was able to break free.
       We conclude the jury’s convictions for forcible lewd conduct on a child were
supported by sufficient evidence.

                                             15.
II.          The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
             defendant’s prior convictions for sex offenses.

             A.     Background
             The prosecutor moved to admit evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108
      of defendant’s convictions in 1992 for forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), rape by a
      foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)), forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), and
      kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), which resulted in a 27-year prison term, and his conviction
      in 2019 for the sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)) of his 75-year-old aunt. The
      prosecutor’s motion explained that while defendant was residing in his aunt’s residence,
      he entered her bedroom and refused to leave. One such time, defendant demanded a hug,
      squeezed his aunt tightly, refused to let go when she requested, and rubbed against her.
      Another time, defendant placed his hand on her thigh and slid it close to her vagina.
      Defendant filed a written objection and argued that the 2019 case did not include any
      evidence that defendant was sexually gratified by his conduct.
             During hearing on the motion, the prosecutor advised the trial court that they
      would introduce evidence of the 1992 and 2019 convictions through certified court
      records that establish the dates and names of the offenses. Defense counsel objected to
      the 1992 convictions and argued that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative
      because the convictions were approximately 30 years prior to the trial and the underlying
      facts involved more serious sexual offenses and an adult victim. At a continued hearing,
      defense counsel again mentioned the remoteness of the 1992 convictions and argued that
      the convictions were dissimilar to the instant offense as it involved use of a weapon and
      sexual penetration.
             The trial court recognized that evidence of propensity to commit sex offenses is
      presumptively admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 in sexual assault and
      child molestation cases because such offenses are committed in secret and involve
      credibility contests. Balancing the probative value of the evidence in this case with the

                                                   16.
prejudicial value, the trial court found that the probative value of the evidence was strong
because defendant used force to accomplish his sexual goals against nonconsenting
victims in both the prior and instant cases. The trial court found that probative value of
the force used against the victims was not lessened even though the force in the instant
case was not the same level of violent force used in the 1992 convictions. The court
found that the 2019 conviction was not particularly inflammatory in comparison with the
instant offense, and that the 1992 convictions were not more inflammatory when
compared to committing a sex act on a child in the instant case. A juror would view both
types of crimes as “about equal.” While acknowledging that the 1992 convictions were
approximately 30 years old, the court concluded that such remoteness was mitigated
because Evidence Code section 1108 does not limit admission of this evidence based
upon when it occurred and defendant was in prison between 1992 and 2005, sentenced to
prison after two separate convictions for failing to register as a sex offender, and then
committed another sex offense in 2019.5 The potential for distraction or confusion by the
jury was nonexistent because defendant had been convicted of the prior offenses and the
jury would not feel it necessary to punish defendant in the instant case under the belief he
may not have been punished for his prior crimes. The prior crimes would be proven by
certified conviction records and take very little of the jury’s time.
       Ultimately concluding that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial, the
court ruled that the evidence was admissible but limited evidence of the 1992 convictions
to reflect “two rapes against two individuals” and excluded reference to the kidnapping
charge, use of a weapon, and infliction of great bodily injury in that case.

5       The trial court noted that defendant was convicted in 2013 and 2016, however, court
records indicate that defendant was convicted for these offenses in 2015 and 2017 and, while
originally sentenced to probation for the 2015 conviction, defendant was sentenced to two years
in prison as to each offense in 2017.

                                              17.
       B.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Defendant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence as to the 1992 convictions but does not challenge admission of the 2019
conviction.
       Evidence Code section 1108 allows the prosecution to introduce evidence that the
defendant in a sexual offense case committed other, uncharged sexual offenses as
character evidence, notwithstanding the fact that such evidence is usually inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 1101. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911
(Falsetta).) Evidence Code section 1108 “was intended in sex offense cases to relax the
evidentiary restraints [Evidence Code] section 1101, subdivision (a), imposed, to assure
that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex offenses in
evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.” (Falsetta, at p. 911.)
       Evidence made admissible by Evidence Code section 1108 remains subject to
exclusion under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352;
see Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 916–917.) The prejudice that Evidence Code
section 352 seeks to avoid is not that which “ ‘ “naturally flows from relevant, highly
probative evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 737.) Rather,
prejudice in this context evokes “ ‘ “an emotional bias” ’ ” or “ ‘ “ ‘ “prejudging” a
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1115.)
       Evidence Code section 352 generally gives a trial court discretion to “ ‘exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (People v.
Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1160, fn. 3.) As our Supreme Court explained, when a

                                             18.
defendant is charged with multiple sex offenses, the offenses “ ‘may be dissimilar
enough, or so remote or unconnected to each other, that the trial court could apply the
criteria of [Evidence Code] section 352 and determine that it is not proper for the jury to
consider one or more of the charged offenses as evidence that the defendant likely
committed any of the other charged offenses.’ ” (Id. at p. 1163.)
       We review a trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1108 for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 61.) We will not disturb a trial
court’s exercise of discretion unless the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
(People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 899–900, citing People v. Miles (2020)
9 Cal.5th 513, 587, 587–588.)

       C.     Analysis
       When evaluating the prejudicial effect of evidence of uncharged acts, courts
balance a number of factors such as “degree of certainty of its commission,” how likely it
is to distract the jury from the main inquiry, whether it is similar to the charged offense,
what sort of prejudicial impact it is likely to have on the jurors, the burden on the
defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and “the availability of less
prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as … excluding irrelevant though
inflammatory details surrounding the offense.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.)
       Here, the evidence of the uncharged acts had probative value because defendant
used force to accomplish his sexual goals against nonconsenting victims in both the prior
and instant cases, and where force is a common element in the offenses. Defendant
argues that the prior convictions are dissimilar to the instant case because defendant did
not commit an act of sexual penetration on D.A., unlike the 1992 convictions. However,
we do not find this attempted distinction compelling given that D.A. interrupted
defendant’s actions by breaking free and Susan called defendant inquiring as to the

                                             19.
whereabouts of her child. Therefore, although the charges in the instant case did not
allege sexual penetration as in the 1992 convictions, that difference is not sufficient to
detract from the probative value of the prior convictions to show defendant’s propensity
to commit the instant offense.
       Defendant posits the evidence should have been excluded because the offenses
were remote in time, occurring approximately 28 years prior to the instant crime.
However, there are no established time limits rendering uncharged sexual offenses
inadmissible because they are too remote in time. (People v. Pierce (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 893, 900.) “[T]he passage of a substantial length of time does not
automatically render the prior incidents prejudicial.” (People v. Soto (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 966, 991.) Furthermore, defendant was in prison for approximately
15 years of that time, a factor to be considered when addressing remoteness. (See, e.g.,
People v. Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 62 [no reason to exclude offenses committed 15
and 21 years before the charged crimes where defendant was in prison during much of
the intervening years]; People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 887, 901 [prior sexual
offenses 15 years before charged crimes were admissible where the defendant was
incarcerated or on parole for bulk of time between the two incidents].)
       Despite their age, defendant’s 1992 convictions are not too remote to be probative
when considering that defendant had been in custody for 15 years on the charges,
convicted of failing to register as a sexual offender in 2015 and 2017, and pleaded guilty
to sexual battery of an elderly relative the year before committing the instant offense.
Although the 1992 convictions might not have been as probative if defendant had lived a
law-abiding life since his release from prison, the age of the prior 1992 convictions under
the circumstances here did not lessen its probative value.
       Courts have allowed evidence of sexual offenses committed 30 years prior to the
charged crime. (See People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284.) “[S]ignificant
similarities between the prior and the charged offenses may ‘balance[ ] out the

                                             20.
remoteness.’ ” (Id. at p. 285, first bracketed insertion added.) “[I]f the prior offenses are
very similar in nature to the charged offenses, the prior offenses have greater probative
value in proving propensity to commit the charged offenses.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court
found the uncharged sexual offenses similar to the instant charge because defendant
committed the sexual offenses using force, thus, we reject defendant’s contention that his
1992 convictions should have been excluded because they were too remote in time.
       Defendant relies on People v. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 727 in support of his
contention his 1992 convictions were too remote in time. However, Harris is factually
distinguishable from the present case. There, the prior offense was forcible and violent in
the extreme, involving mayhem of the victim with an ice pick, but the charged offenses
involved breach of trust and non-forcible sexual fondling. (Id. at pp. 733, 738.) In the
instant case, defendant was charged with forcible lewd touching of a child and the trial
court could reasonably conclude that evidence of his prior use of force during the
1992 sexual offenses was particularly probative as disposition evidence deemed relevant
by Evidence Code section 1108.
       Proof of the 1992 convictions consisted of redacted and certified conviction
records, which took only minutes to enter into evidence and did not involve any
testimony or inflammatory details. There was no substantial danger of undue prejudice
because, while the 1992 convictions involved a dangerous weapon and penetration of the
victim, the circumstances of the prior convictions were not revealed to the jury and the
jurors would not view rape as more inflammatory than performing a sex act on a child.
“ ‘ “ ‘The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which
uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and
which has very little effect on the issues. In applying [Evidence Code ]section 352,
“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 439.)

                                             21.
              We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
       of defendant’s prior convictions for sexual offenses.

III.          The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike prior
              convictions.
              Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to
       strike his prior felony convictions pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court
       (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero).6 We reject defendant’s argument as the
       trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.

              A.     Background
              Defendant’s prison records show that in 1992, he was convicted of kidnapping,
       five counts of rape, two counts of rape with a foreign object, and oral copulation by force
       and sentenced to a term of 27 years in prison. Between 2006 and 2015, defendant was
       convicted of driving under the influence, two drug-related misdemeanors, and five
       misdemeanor counts of driving on a suspended license. Defendant’s criminal history
       indicates that he violated his probation for the misdemeanor offenses at least eight times.
       Defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sexual offender in 2015 and was
       sentenced to a three-year term of probation and one year in jail. He failed to register
       again in 2017, was sentenced to two years in prison, and resentenced to two years in
       prison for the 2015 conviction. In 2019, defendant pleaded guilty to sexual battery of an
       elderly relatively and was sentenced to a three-year probation term and 180 days in jail.
              The probation officer described the circumstances relating to the crime as
       involving a particularly vulnerable victim, who had learning disabilities and bipolar
       disorder, and involving planning and criminal sophistication in that defendant groomed
       the children by gifting them bicycles and otherwise befriending the family. Defendant

       6      A defendant’s request for this type of leniency is commonly referred to as a “Romero
       motion,” although defendants do not actually have a right to make motions under section 1385.
       (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 379 (Carmony).)

                                                     22.
performed poorly while on probation and postrelease supervision. Defendant denied that
he committed the 1992 offenses and showed no remorse for the instant offense.
       Defense counsel orally requested that the trial court strike all but one of
defendant’s prior convictions for the nine offenses in 1992 and argued that (1) the prior
strike convictions were remote in time, (2) the convictions predated the enactment of the
Three Strikes law, (3) defendant’s offenses since his release from prison were mostly
nonviolent, (4) his only prison sentence since the 1992 convictions was for failing to
register as a sexual offender, and (5) the instant offense was less violent than the 1992
offenses.
       The trial court denied the motion and found that defendant did not fall outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law considering the circumstances of defendant’s prior felony
convictions the facts involved in the instant case. The court noted that while the prior
strike convictions dated back to 1992, defendant received a 27-year sentence in state
prison. The prior offenses were very serious and involved two separate victims.
Defendant kidnapped and raped one 51-year-old victim at knifepoint. On a separate
occasion, defendant drove an 18-year-old victim to a remote location, raped her, and then
forced her to orally copulate him.
       The trial court further found that defendant’s life was not free of crime after he
was released from prison. While defendant’s many offenses of driving on a suspended
license were “relatively minor,” defendant was convicted of two different failures to
register as a sexual offender and sentenced to prison. After release from prison,
defendant was convicted of sexual battery on an elderly relative and then committed the
instant offense. The trial court considered that while the instant offense did not involve
the most severe type of lewd offense, D.A. was particularly vulnerable given her learning
disabilities and that defendant specifically ingratiated himself with the family to gain
access to D.A.

                                             23.
       The trial court exercised its discretion to deny defendant’s request to strike all but
one of his 1992 prior convictions based upon the severity of defendant’s prior crimes, the
length of time he had spent in custody, defendant’s commission of numerous offenses
since his release from custody, his commission of a sexual offense just prior to the instant
offense, and the circumstances of the instant offense.

       B.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       Section 1385 grants trial courts discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction if the
dismissal is in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
pp. 504, 529–530.) “ ‘A court’s discretion to strike [or vacate] prior felony conviction
allegations [or findings] in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in
strict compliance with … section 1385[, subdivision ](a) .…’ ” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158, third bracketed insertion added.) The Three Strikes
law “was intended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders.” (Romero,
at p. 528; accord, People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 501 [“a primary purpose of the
Three Strikes law was to restrict judicial discretion”].)
       The Three Strikes law establishes “ ‘a sentencing requirement to be applied in
every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike,’ ” unless the sentencing
court finds a reason for making an exception to this rule. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377.) There are “stringent standards that sentencing courts must follow in order to find
such an exception.” (Ibid.) In order to dismiss a prior strike conviction, “the court in
question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the
defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed
outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he
had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.”
(People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)

                                             24.
       A trial court’s decision not to dismiss a prior strike conviction is reviewed under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) The
Three Strikes law establishes that not striking a prior serious felony conviction is the
norm, and there is a “strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (Id. at p. 378.) An abuse of discretion is established
by demonstrating that the trial court’s decision was “irrational or arbitrary. It is not
enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or
more of his prior convictions.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
“Where the record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial
court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law,’ ” we are required to affirm the trial court’s ruling, “ ‘even if we might
have ruled differently in the first instance.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 378, first bracketed
insertion added.)

       C.      Analysis
       We conclude that defendant has failed to establish that the trial court’s denial of
his request to strike his prior felony convictions was outside the bounds of reason under
the facts and the law.7 We may not find an abuse of discretion unless the decision was so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. And here, it was not.
       At sentencing, the trial court found that defendant did not fall outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law because defendant’s prior crimes were very serious, involved
multiple victims, and resulted in a 27-year prison sentence. Defendant’s lengthy criminal
history involved relatively minor offenses until he was convicted of failing to register as a

7       At sentencing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should strike all but one of his
prior convictions arising from the nine 1992 offenses. Here, however, defendant argues that the
court abused its discretion in refusing strike “at least one of his remote priors.” Because
defendant’s sentence would only change if the trial court reduced his prior strikes to one, we
shall examine the trial court’s refusal to grant defendant’s request to strike all but one of his prior
convictions from the 1992 offenses.

                                                 25.
sexual offender and committing sexual battery on an elderly relative. While the instant
offense did not involve the same level of violence as the 1992 offenses, defendant’s
conduct was similarly dangerous in targeting a vulnerable child and ingratiating himself
with the family to obtain access to her.
       The trial court’s discussion of proper considerations along with the presumption
that denial of a Romero motion is a proper exercise of discretion (see Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378) support our conclusion that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
request was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s decision was not “so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) As we explain
post, defendant’s arguments do not persuade us.
       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero
motion because he would still be sentenced to 25 years to life under sections 667.61 and
667.71, a significant sentence given he was 64 years old, the instant offenses did not
involve great violence, great bodily harm, or viciousness, and his convictions since 1992
did not demonstrate an escalating seriousness.
       The trial court concluded that while defendant’s sexual offenses may not have
increased in violence over time, defendant’s current crimes evidenced a similar
egregiousness because he had targeted a particularly vulnerable victim. Additionally, we
note that defendant could more easily abuse the elderly and children without using the
same level of violence to overcome his victims. Furthermore, the lack of sexual
penetration in this case could be the result of D.A.’s escape from defendant and Susan’s
call to defendant checking up on D.A.
       Defendant also argues that his 75-year-to-life sentence is disproportionate to
penalties for other crimes, including second degree murder (15 years to life) and
aggravated mayhem (life without any minimum). However, the trial court did consider
the length of defendant’s sentence when it rejected the probation officer’s and the
prosecutor’s recommendations to sentence defendant consecutively on both counts,

                                            26.
which would have resulted in a sentence of 150 years to life. Moreover, “the Three
Strikes law was devised for the ‘revolving door’ career criminal, and was expressly
intended ‘to ensure longer prison sentences … for those who commit a felony’ as long as
they were previously convicted of at least one strike.” (People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 331–332, fn. omitted.) Based upon defendant’s history, defendant
did not have any substantial period of time where he showed he was rehabilitating
himself. The trial court correctly recognized that defendant did not fall outside the spirit
of the Three Strikes law.
       The court considered the proper criteria in ruling on defendant’s motion, and we
may not substitute our own judgment. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) The court
here applied the correct standard. (See ibid.) Even if reasonable minds could differ
about whether to strike the prior convictions in this case, this would not establish an
abuse of discretion. (See id. at pp. 376–378.) In fact, only where the relevant factors
manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable mind could differ
would the failure to do so constitute an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 378.) This is not
such a case.
       Defendant has failed to show that the trial court was either unaware of its
discretion or considered impermissible factors. We cannot say that its ruling was
irrational or arbitrary such that no reasonable person could agree with it. The record
shows that the trial court considered defendant’s arguments as well as his criminal history
and his conduct in the instant offense in declining to strike any of his prior serious felony
convictions. On the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding that his prior serious felony convictions and the instant offense fell within the
spirit of the Three Strikes law.

                                             27.
                                 DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                               HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

SMITH, J.

                                     28.