Court Opinion

ID: 9930817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 19:03:41.699926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:43.179348
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Lopez CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B326081

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. BA438338)
         v.

TONI LOPEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed
in part and remanded.

      Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Toni Lopez (defendant) appeals
the order denying in part her petition filed pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6. Both parties agree the trial court correctly
granted vacatur of defendant’s 2016 attempted murder conviction
but erred in refusing to fully resentence her on the remaining
charges. We agree and reverse in part and remand with
instructions.

                           BACKGROUND
      In 2015, defendant was charged with one count of
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 7)1
with the allegation a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury
to the victim within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1). Two counts of second degree
robbery (§ 211; counts 5 & 6) and one count of misdemeanor
receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 4) were also
alleged. As to count 5, it was alleged that a principal was armed
with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). In count 6, it was
alleged that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury to the victim
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d)
and (e)(1). It was further alleged pursuant to section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1)(C), that the crimes alleged in counts 4, 6 and 7
were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to

1     All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

                                 2
promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members.
       After trial had begun, a plea agreement was reached under
which defendant pled no contest to counts 5 and 7. As to count 5,
defendant admitted the gang allegation and a firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and
(e)(1). Defendant was then sentenced to a 23-year prison term
comprised of three years for second degree robbery, plus 10 years
for the gang enhancement and 10 years for the firearm
enhancement. A concurrent seven-year term for the attempted
murder was also imposed. The remaining counts were dismissed.
       On June 1, 2022, defendant filed a petition for vacatur of
her attempted murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant
to former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2 The trial court
appointed counsel, ordered the prosecution to file a response, and
after several continuances a hearing on the petition was held on
October 10, 2022. The trial court and the parties agreed
defendant was entitled to vacatur of her attempted murder
conviction and to resentencing. The court then vacated and
dismissed the attempted murder conviction, but reinstated the
original sentence of 23 years in prison after concluding that since
defendant received a sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea, the
court had no jurisdiction to do otherwise.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

2    Section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no
change in text effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We will refer to the section by its new numbering only.

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                             DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends and the People agree that the trial
court erred in not resentencing defendant.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2019, amended the laws pertaining to felony murder
and murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The bill also eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843) and significantly narrowed the felony-murder exception to
the malice requirement for murder (see §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957). A
procedure for those convicted of attempted murder to seek
retroactive relief if they could not now be convicted under the
amended laws was provided and later extended to attempted
murder convictions. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; see § 1172.6, subd.
(a).)
       “‘In construing any statute, we first look to its language.
[Citation.] “Words used in a statute . . . should be given the
meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language
is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is
it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the
Legislature . . . .”’” (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 972.)
Under the plain wording of section 1172.6, if the charging
document allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
regardless of whether the attempted murder conviction was

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entered following trial or whether the defendant accepted a plea
offer in lieu of a trial, the relief of section 1172.6 was available.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) Indeed since the prosecution
stipulated to vacatur of the attempted murder conviction and the
trial court agreed defendant could not now be convicted under
any current viable theory of attempted murder, the statute
required the trial court to recall the original sentence and
resentence defendant “on any remaining counts in the same
manner as if [she] had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(1)-(2).)
       Though the trial court acknowledged the above provisions,
it relied on People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps),
People v. Pixley (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1002 (Pixley), and People v.
King (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 783 (King), which both parties here
agree are inapplicable to resentencing under section 1172.6.
       Stamps was a direct appeal after a negotiated plea, seeking
remand due to a change in the law allowing a trial court to strike
a five-year serious felony enhancement in the interest of justice.
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 692; see § 1385.) The California
Supreme Court remanded the case so the trial court could
consider whether to exercise its newly conferred discretion to
strike the enhancement; but the court also held that if the trial
court did so, the prosecution could withdraw from the plea or the
court could withdraw approval of the plea (Stamps, supra, at
pp. 705-706), explaining that when a negotiated plea is
withdrawn, “‘“the court cannot ‘proceed to apply and enforce
certain parts of the plea bargain, while ignoring’ others.
[Citation.] Instead, the court must restore the parties to the
status quo ante”’” (id. at pp. 706-707).
       As both parties argue, Stamps is distinguishable from the
instant case. Stamps was decided under section 1385, a

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sentencing provision that does not provide resentencing and is
retroactive only to nonfinal cases. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 692, 698-699.) Section 1172.6, on the other hand, sets forth a
procedure which permits the court to retroactively recall a
sentence after the judgment becomes final. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a conviction qualifies for vacatur,
section 1172.6 requires resentencing on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1)-(2).) There is no language in the statute
requiring or permitting withdrawal of the plea.
       As King relied on Stamps to deny resentencing under
section 1170.91 to a defendant who had negotiated a plea with a
stipulated sentence (King, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 790-791),
and Pixley relied on King and Stamps to do the same (Pixley,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1005-1006), these cases are also
inapplicable here. Moreover, both King and Pixley have been
abrogated by statute (People v. Harrell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
161, 166-167) when the Legislature amended section 1170.91,
subdivision (b)(3), effective January 1, 2023, to provide that if the
once-specified criteria are satisfied, the court may resentence the
petitioner in enumerated ways, including a reduction in the term,
“regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a
trial or plea.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 721 § 1.)
       In Harrell, the appellate court found the language
ambiguous, reviewed the legislative history of the amendment,
and concluded that “the Legislature clearly intended to make
persons serving a stipulated sentence eligible for relief under
section 1170.91,” thus eliminating King’s reasoning under the
former language of the statute. (People v. Harrell, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at pp. 167-168.)
       We agree with the parties that Harris v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 (Harris), where a similar issue arose in

                                  6
relation to Proposition 47 (approved Nov. 2014), used a procedure
to retroactively reduce certain nonviolent crimes from felonies to
misdemeanors that is more helpful. (See § 1170.18, subd. (a).)
“‘When legislation has been judicially construed and a
subsequent statute on a similar subject uses identical or
substantially similar language, the usual presumption is that the
Legislature [or the voters] intended the same construction, unless
a contrary intent clearly appears.’” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 1085, 1100.)
       In Harris, our Supreme Court held that resentencing under
Proposition 47 did not allow the prosecution to withdraw from a
previously negotiated plea. (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 987-
988.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing procedure similar to
section 1172.6, applicable to those “‘serving a sentence for a
conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who
would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that
added this section . . . had this act been in effect at the time of the
offense.’” (Harris, at p. 991; see § 1170.18, subd. (a).) “The
italicized language makes it clear that the provision applies to
someone . . . who was convicted by plea [with] no exceptions and,
specifically, no exception for someone convicted by a plea that
was the result of a plea agreement. By expressly mentioning
convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all
eligible defendants.” (Harris, at p. 991, citations omitted.) As
section 1172.6 contains no exceptions to its similar provision, we
conclude that relief is similarly available to all eligible
defendants, including those who negotiated a plea in lieu of a
trial. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)
       Moreover, as noted in Harris, section 1170.18, subdivision
(b) provides that a defendant upon meeting the requirements for
relief “‘shall’ be resentenced,” and with just one exception.

                                  7
(Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 991-992.) Section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) similarly provides, but without exception, that
upon a finding of eligibility for relief “the conviction, shall be
vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (Italics added.) Harris reasoned that “[t]he
resentencing process that Proposition 47 established would often
prove meaningless if the prosecution could respond to a
successful resentencing petition by withdrawing from an
underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original charges
filed against the petitioner.” (Harris, supra, at p. 992.) So too
the resentencing process established by Senate Bill No. 1437
would be meaningless if the trial court were allowed to abide by
the vacatur mandate of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) but
refuse the statute’s mandate that an eligible defendant be
“resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       In Harris, our Supreme Court quoted its decision in Doe v.
Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 70, which “stands for the proposition
that ‘the Legislature . . . , for the public good and in furtherance
of public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the
federal and state Constitutions, has the authority to modify or
invalidate the terms of an agreement.’” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 992.) Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature codified
that rule by declaring: “The California Supreme Court held in
Doe v. Harris[, supra,] 57 Cal.4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea
agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the
state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public
good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter
into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them
from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to
apply to them”; and a plea that includes a waiver of unknown
future rights is not a knowing and intelligent plea. (§ 1016.8,

                                 8
subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2019, ch. 586, § 1.) Thus, a plea bargain that
requires a defendant to generally waive future benefits of
changes in the law that are unknown or that may retroactively
apply after the plea, is void as against public policy. (§ 1016.8,
subds. (a)(4) & (b).)
       We agree with the parties that the matter be remanded for
a full resentencing.3

                           DISPOSITON
      The order vacating defendant’s attempted murder
conviction is affirmed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to recall defendant’s sentence and to fully resentence
defendant on the remaining charges.

                                      ________________________
                                      CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________              ________________________
LUI, P. J.                            ASHMANN-GERST, J.

3     Resentencing “on any remaining counts in the same
manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced” as
provided in section 1172.6 (d)(1) means full resentencing, which
allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions, not solely a
portion of the sentence. (People v. Trent (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
33, 44, review granted Dec. 20, 2023, S282644, citing People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 & People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

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