Court Opinion

ID: 9523117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:36:13.868823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:34.211317
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I disagree that arbitrator Caliendo’s second decision and arbitrator Akemann’s findings and decision are inconsistent. Of utmost importance is to point out arbitrator Caliendo’s decision concerns temporary disability while arbitrator Akemann’s decision addresses permanency. With respect to the majority’s reliance upon arbitrator Caliendo’s “description” of claimant, that is exactly what it appears the arbitrator stated, a “description.” The one statement referred to by the majority should not be taken in isolation. As that decision states, “At issue is the extent of Petitioner’s temporary disability.” Arbitrator Caliendo’s decision does address the extent of claimant’s temporary disability concerning his left knee, neck, right shoulder, and lower back. In his second decision, Caliendo found that on September 12, 1991, Dr. Clark released claimant to return to work; that on July 23, 1992, Dr. Morgenstern released claimant to return to work; and that the preponderance of the medical evidence shows that petitioner can, in fact, work. Arbitrator Caliendo also found that as a result of an examination by Dr. Kranzler on June 30, 1994, Kranzler did not elicit “any objective findings to substantiate the petitioner’s current complaints of pain to his back. Dr. Kranzler noted several inconsistencies and found ‘no reason to limit [petitioner’s] work activities on the basis of his back examination.’ Dr. Kranzler’s findings are credible when taking into consideration prior diagnostic studies of the back which have resulted in essentially normal findings.” Additionally, Caliendo found that claimant refused to cooperate with respondent’s vocational rehabilitation program: “Dr. Clark, Petitioner’s own physician, once questioned Petitioner’s efforts when he wrote on September 12, 1991: T really feel it would be most important for [Petitioner] to go back to work and to try and get on with it instead of looking for disability which I am beginning to feel is the major thrust behind all of this situation (PX3).’ ” Although the majority accepts claimant’s testimony that he could not speak English, Caliendo found claimant “not a particularly credible witness” including his ability to speak “basic English.” Arbitrator Caliendo’s second decision refers in several paragraphs to the inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony, found him not credible, found that he would not cooperate with the rehabilitation consultant, found that his own physician, Dr. Clark, questioned his efforts to work, and found that, as Caliendo stated, the doctor indicated he should try to go back to work instead of looking for disability, which, the doctor stated, he was “beginning to feel [was] the major thrust behind all of this situation.” With respect to the back injury, arbitrator Caliendo found that Dr. Kranzler examined the claimant and did not elicit any objective findings to substantiate the claimant’s complaints of pain to his back. The doctor noted several inconsistencies and found no reason to limit the claimant’s work activities on the basis of his back examination. Since claimant’s move back to Puerto Rico in 1997, he acknowledges he has not sought any type of work. Contrary to claimant’s argument and the majority decision, there is no inconsistency between arbitrators Akemann and Caliendo insofar as the second decision of Caliendo is concerned. In his second decision, October 25, 1995, Caliendo stopped the TTD at a date prior to the hearing date, stating that “the petitioner is able to secure employment and is not entitled to maintenance or further vocational rehabilitation from the respondent.” I do not understand how Caliendo and Akemann, as arbitrators, were inconsistent in their decisions. As the majority states, arbitrator Akemann found “ ‘no objective evidence [existed] of *** injury to the Petitioner’s head, neck, low back or right shoulder as a result of the *** accident.’ ” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 605. This finding by arbitrator Akemann is consistent with arbitrator Caliendo’s second decision when Caliendo found “the Petitioner is able to secure employment and is not entitled to maintenance or further vocational rehabilitation from the Respondent.” TTD was stopped by Caliendo on September 7, 1993. The majority determines that because the Commission awarded medical expenses for claimant’s neck, right shoulder, and back, the Commission is inconsistent in determining “such treatment failed to support an award.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 606. This logic escapes me. That the arbitrator described the injury and authorizes the payment of medical bills does not foreclose a finding of no permanent injury. The Commission has simply awarded expenses for medical treatment but did not find permanency. The majority cites Heller Financial Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Co. in adopting the law of the case doctrine. The issue here, the extent of claimant’s injuries as “described” by arbitrator Caliendo, is not the law of the case. A review of his second decision makes it clear the statement was not and is not the law of the case. Even if we accept the “description” statement as law of the case, that isolated sentence does not determine the permanency question. The detailed findings of Akemann concerning the medical evidence and his findings as affirmed by the Commission and confirmed by the circuit court make it clear the issues of TTD, impairment and medical expenses have been addressed. As to TTD, Caliendo’s 1995 decision terminated TTD on September 7, 1993. Finally, the majority remands this case to the Commission. I am at a loss to know what the Commission should do on remand. It has already found there is no objective evidence of neurological or orthopedic injury to the head, neck, lower back, or right shoulder. The Commission decision affirming the award of arbitrator Akemann of 40% loss of use of the left leg as confirmed by the circuit court should be affirmed.