Court Opinion

ID: 9859341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:46:39.673458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:35:52.247144
License: Public Domain

*361Justice LONG,
Dissenting.
As this case proves, in a hockey arena, pucks may fly off the ice and into the stands. As a result, a spectator may sustain serious injuries. Indeed, that is exactly what happened to plaintiff Denise Sciarrotta. She contends that she should have been warned of that danger so she could have made an informed decision regarding the risk. I agree.
In Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993), we set forth the standards for determining the existence of a duty. In particular, our inquiry
involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution. The analysis is both very fact-specific and principled; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct.
[Id. at 439, 625 A.2d 1110 (internal citation omitted).]
In essence, we recognize a duty where foreseeable events that pose a risk of harm require palliative action by those able to prevent the harm. Included within the scope of that duty is the obligation to warn of known or apparent dangers. La Russa v. Four Points at Sheraton Hotel, 360 N.J.Super. 156, 160-61, 821 A.2d 1168 (App.Div.2003) (citing Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 514-16, 694 A.2d 1017 (1997)). To be sure, there is no duty to warn where the circumstances are so remote that its imposition would constitute an unfair burden. Levine v. Kramer Group, 354 N.J.Super. 397, 405, 807 A.2d 264 (App.Div.2002) (holding brokers and sellers have no duty to warn of transient social conditions that arguably affect property value).
In this case, there is no need to perseverate over whether there are dangerous areas in a hockey arena or whether the operator of such a facility has a duty to secure the safety of its patrons. We have already declared that because of the potential dangers of flying pucks, a hockey arena operator has certain obligations. It must provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators who may reasonably be expected to request them and must *362actually screen any seats that pose an unduly high risk of injury from flying pucks. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof'l Baseball Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 70, 81, 881 A.2d 700 (2005) (citing Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 527, 534, 777 A.2d 380 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387, 788 A.2d 772 (2001)).
Implicit in that well-established, though limited, duty is the obligation to warn hockey patrons of the potential dangers from pucks and of the patrons’ ability to insulate themselves by requesting protected seating. Indeed, it makes no sense to devolve on the arena owner a duty to provide protected seating while keeping patrons in the dark over their right to request it. That is not a redefinition of the limited duty rule but only an explication of the patrons’ rights thereunder. Accordingly, I would require the following warning to be posted at the ticket booths and in the arena:
DURING WARM-UPS AND HOCKEY GAMES, PUCKS AND OTHER ITEMS MAY FLY OFF THE ICE AND INTO THE STANDS. UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW, A HOCKEY RINK OPERATOR MUST PROVIDE A PROTECTED AREA FOR SPECTATORS WHO CHOOSE NOT TO BE EXPOSED TO SUCH RISKS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK FOR SUCH PROTECTED SEATING, AND THE OPERATOR HAS A DUTY TO PROVIDE IT IF AVAILABLE. IF YOU DO NOT DO SO AND ARE INJURED, YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECOVER MONEY DAMAGES FROM THE OPERATOR.
That warning, which requires so little from the operator, will serve to advise patrons of their ability to protect themselves either by soliciting safe seating or by opting against attending an event in which such seating is not available. Because such a warning is in full conformity with our prior jurisprudence on the subject of duty, and because the majority has failed to recognize that it is an essential element of the limited duty rule that we have adopted, I respectfully dissent.
Justices ALBIN and WALLACE join in this dissent.
For reversal and reinstatement—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—4.
For affirmance—Justices LONG, ALBIN and WALLACE—3.