Court Opinion

ID: 9573998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:16.477707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.928828
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
The majority holds that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 16-8-103.6, 8A C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), the statute governing waiver of confidentiality or privilege incident to the assertion of the impaired mental condition defense. I respectfully dissent.
The defendant argues that the statute’s waiver provision prevented his attorney from investigating an impaired mental condition defense. He asserts that his attorney was unwilling to investigate this defense because he feared that the results of any psychological examination would not remain confidential. The defendant contends that as a result, his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.
*710Rather than reach the substance of this claim, the majority holds that the defendant lacks standing. The majority reasons that because the defendant did not assert the impaired mental condition defense, he could not have suffered actual injury from its alleged constitutional deficiencies. This reasoning ignores the substance of the defendant’s challenge, which is that the constitutional deficiencies of this defense prevent interested defendants from raising it. A defendant need not risk compromising his defense in order to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. See Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F.Supp. 1297, 1300 (D.Colo.1970).
To have standing, a person must show “injury in fact to a legally protected interest.” People v. French, 762 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Colo.1988). A litigant has standing to challenge a statute when the alleged constitutional defect adversely affects the litigant. People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo.1981); People v. Tumbarello, 623 P.2d 46, 48 (Colo.1981). In evaluating an individual’s standing, all of that person’s averments of material fact must be assumed to be true. Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo.1985); Friends of Chamber Music v. City and County of Denver, 696 P.2d 309, 315 (Colo.1985).
In this case, the defendant asserts an actual injury. He contends that he was convicted through a procedure that denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Whether the defendant’s sixth amendment right was violated in this case is a substantive question. By asserting the violation, however, the defendant has established standing.1 Having determined that the defendant has standing to raise his constitutional challenge, I would then reach the merits.
The defendant contends that his attorney refrained from investigating whether the defendant suffered from an impaired mental condition because he was not sure, given section 16-8-103.6, that a psychological examination would remain confidential. The defendant contends that as a result, his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. The prosecution contends that under section 16-8-103.6 the defendant only waives a claim to confidentiality of the examination to be ordered by the court pursuant to section 16-8-103.5(4), 8A C.R.S. (1989 Supp.). As far as other examinations are concerned, the prosecution contends that only the names, addresses and reports of these other examiners need be disclosed. The prosecution concludes, therefore, that the statute does not violate the defendant’s rights.
In evaluating these contentions, I would first interpret section 16-8-103.6. Section 16-8-103.6, 8A C.R.S. (1989 Supp.), provides in pertinent part that:
[a] defendant who places his mental condition at issue by ... asserting the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 ... waives any claim of confidentiality or privilege as to communications made by him to a physician or psychologist in the course of an examination or treatment for such mental condition for the purpose of any trial or hearing on the issue of such mental condition. The court shall order both the prosecutor and the defendant to exchange the names, addresses, reports, and statements of any physician *711or psychologist who has examined or treated the defendant for such mental condition.
In interpreting statutes, our primary task is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Kane v. Town of Estes Park, 786 P.2d 412, 415 (Colo.1990). In doing so, we look first to the statutory language. People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Colo.1990). The language of this section seems to imply a waiver of the defendant’s claim to confidentiality regarding any physician or psychologist consultation in preparation for trial. We should also look to the entire statutory scheme, however, to interpret this provision in a way that harmonizes it with the other elements of the relevant statutes. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). Several other provisions are relevant. Section 16-8-103.5, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1989 Supp.) provides:
(1) If the defendant intends to assert the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, he shall indicate that intention to the court and to the prosecution at the time of arraignment; except that the court, for good cause shown, shall permit the defendant to inform the court and the prosecution of his intention to assert the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition at any time prior to trial.
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(4) When the defendant indicates his intention to assert the defense of impaired mental condition, the court shall order an examination of the defendant pursuant to section 16-8-106. The court shall order both the prosecutor and the defendant to exchange the names, addresses, reports, and statements of persons, other than medical experts subject to the provisions of section 16-8-103.6, whom the parties intend to call as witnesses with regard to the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition.
Section 16-8-108, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1989 Supp.), provides:
(1) If the defendant wishes to be examined by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other expert of his own choice in connection with any proceeding under this article, the court, upon timely motion, shall order that the examiner chosen by the defendant be given reasonable opportunity to conduct the examination.
(2) A copy of any report of examination of the defendant made at the instance of the defense shall be furnished to the prosecution a reasonable time in advance of trial.
These provisions demonstrate that the statutory scheme contemplates psychiatric or psychological examinations conducted by defense experts as well as requiring a court-ordered examination. It may be, therefore, that the section 16-8-103.6 waiver of confidentiality was intended to apply to the court-ordered examinations conducted pursuant to section 16-8-103.5(4) only.
In interpreting statutes we also seek an interpretation that would avoid constitutional defects. Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 947-48 (Colo.1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 214 (1985). An interpretation of section 16-8-103.6 that would require the defendant to waive his right to confidentiality regarding conversations with a defense expert would violate the sixth amendment.2 See Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 882 (Colo.1987); Miller v. District Court of City and County of Denver, 737 P.2d 834, 838-39 (Colo.1987). I would hold, therefore, that section 16-8-103.6 was only intended to waive the privilege of confidentiality arising from communication during a court-ordered examination made for the purpose of a trial or hearing pursuant to section 16-8-103.5(4).
The issue that remains is whether the ambiguity of section 16-8-103.6 nonetheless violated the defendant’s sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Because section 16-8-103.6 is ambiguous, the defendant may have reasonably believed that he was forced to choose between asserting an impaired mental condition defense and maintaining the confi*712dentiality of any communications he might have with a psychologist. Section 16-8-103.6 thereby effectively chilled his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, I would vacate the defendant’s conviction and remand the case for retrial, with directions to allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to assert the defense of impaired mental condition.
QUINN, C.J., and KIRSHBAUM, J., join in this dissent.

. The standing doctrine is "designed to ensure that the judicial power is exercised only in the context of a case or controversy.” Colorado General Assembly, 700 P.2d at 515-16. A defendant, therefore, would lack standing to challenge section 16-8-103.6 if the impaired mental condition defense were irrelevant to that defendant's defense. The pre-trial motions filed by the defendant in this case demonstrate the seriousness of his interest in investigating this defense. Prior to arraignment the defendant filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the impaired mental condition statute. When the district court upheld the statute, the defendant requested the district court to rule whether the defendant’s communication with a psychiatrist prior to the defendant’s entry of a plea would be privileged. The district court refused to issue such a ruling. These pretrial motions also add plausibility to the defendant's claim that the statute’s ambiguity chilled the exercise of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

. U.S. Const, amend. VI.