Court Opinion

ID: 9420609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:22.877217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.188297
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
If this were a case where those who claimed protection under the First Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President, the filching of documents from public files, the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like, I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and immorality. This case was argued as if those were the facts. The argument imported much seditious conduct into the record. That is easy and it has popular appeal, for the activities of Communists in plotting and scheming against the free world are common knowledge. But the fact is that no such evidence was introduced at the trial. There is a statute which makes a seditious conspiracy unlawful.1 Petitioners, however, were not *582charged with a “conspiracy to overthrow” the Government. They were charged with a conspiracy to form a party and groups and assemblies of people who teach and advocate the overthrow of our Government by force or violence and with a conspiracy to advocate and teach its overthrow by force and violence.2 It may well be that indoctrination in the techniques of terror to destroy the Government would be indictable under either statute. But the teaching which is condemned here is of a different character.
So far as the present record is concerned, what petitioners did was to organize people to teach and themselves teach the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books:3 Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (1924); Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848); Lenin, The State and Revolution (1917); History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B.) (1939).
Those books are to Soviet Communism what Mein Kampf was to Nazism. If they are understood, the ugliness of Communism is revealed, its deceit and cunning are exposed, the nature of its activities becomes apparent, and the chances of its success less likely. That is not, of course, the reason why petitioners chose these books for their classrooms. They are fervent Communists to whom these volumes are gospel. They preached the creed with the hope that some day it would be acted upon.
*583The opinion of the Court does not outlaw these texts nor condemn them to the fire, as the Communists do literature offensive to their creed. But if the books themselves are not outlawed, if they can lawfully remain on library shelves, by what reasoning does their use in a classroom become a crime? It would not be a crime under the Act to introduce these books to a class, though that would be teaching what the creed of violent overthrow of the Government is. The Act, as construed, requires the element of intent — that those who teach the creed believe in it. The crime then depends not on what is taught but on who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech turn not on what is said, but on the intent with which it is said. Once we start down that road we enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every citizen.
There was a time in England when the concept of constructive treason flourished. Men were punished not for raising a hand against the king but for thinking murderous thoughts about him. The Framers of the Constitution were alive to that abuse and took steps to see that the practice would not flourish here. Treason was defined to require overt acts — the evolution of a plot against the country into an actual project. The present case is not one of treason. But the analogy is close when the illegality is made to turn on intent, not on the nature of the act. We then start probing men’s minds for motive and purpose; they become entangled in the law not for what they did but for what they thought; they get convicted not for what they said but for the purpose with which they said it.
Intent, of course, often makes the difference in the law. An act otherwise excusable or carrying minor penalties may grow to an abhorrent thing if the evil intent is present. We deal here, however, not with ordinary acts but with speech, to which the Constitution has given a special sanction.
*584The vice of treating speech as the equivalent of overt acts of a treasonable or seditious character is emphasized by a concurring opinion, which by invoking the law of conspiracy makes speech do service for deeds which are dangerous to society. The doctrine of conspiracy has served divers and oppressive purposes and in its broad reach can be made to do great evil. But never until today has anyone seriously thought that the ancient law of conspiracy could constitutionally be used to turn speech into seditious conduct. Yet that is precisely what is suggested. I repeat that we deal here with speech alone, not with speech plus acts of sabotage or unlawful conduct. Not a single seditious act is charged in the indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because two men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling proportions. That course is to make a radical break with the past and to violate one of the cardinal principles of our constitutional scheme.
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the high service it has given our society. Its protection is essential to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas releases pressures which otherwise might become destructive. When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations apart.
Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith. We have founded our political system on it. It has been the safeguard of every religious, political, philosophical, economic, and racial group amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is cheap and false; we have trusted the common sense of our *585people to choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. This has been the one single outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality. We have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised minority than to let them vent their spleen. We have above all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures of the world.
There comes a time when even speech loses its constitutional immunity. Speech innocuous one year may at another time fan such destructive flames that it must be halted in the interests of the safety of the Republic. That is the meaning of the clear and present danger test. When conditions are so critical that there will be no time to avoid the evil that the speech threatens, it is time to call a halt. Otherwise, free speech which is the strength of the Nation will be the cause of its destruction.
Yet free speech is the rule, not the exception. The restraint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear, on more than passionate opposition against the speech, on more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is allowed. The classic statement of these conditions was made by Mr. Justice Brandéis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376-377,
“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger ap*586prehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there he time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to he applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” (Italics added.)
*587I had assumed that the question of the clear and present danger, being so critical an issue in the case, would be a matter for submission to the jury. It was squarely held in Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 244, to be a jury question. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the Court, said, “Whether the statement contained in the pamphlet had a natural tendency to produce the forbidden consequences, as alleged, was a question to be determined not upon demurrer but by the jury at the trial.” That is the only time the Court has passed on the issue. None of our other decisions is contrary. Nothing said in any of the nonjury cases has detracted from that ruling.4 The statement in Pierce v. United States, supra, states the law as it has been and as it should be. The Court, I think, errs when it treats the question as one of law.
Yet, whether the question is one for the Court or the jury, there should be evidence of record on the issue. This record, however, contains no evidence whatsoever showing that the acts charged, viz., the teaching of the Soviet theory of revolution with the hope that it will be realized, have created any clear and present danger to the Nation. The Court, however, rules to the contrary. It says, “The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score.”
That ruling is in my view not responsive to the issue in the case. We might as well say that the speech of *588petitioners is outlawed because Soviet Russia and her Red Army are a threat to world peace.
The nature of Communism as a force on the world scene would, of course, be relevant to the issue of clear and present danger of petitioners’ advocacy within the United States. But the primary consideration is the strength and tactical position of petitioners and their converts in this country. On that there is no evidence in the record. If we are to take judicial notice of the threat of Communists within the nation, it should not be difficult to conclude that as a political party they are of little consequence. Communists in this country have never made a respectable or serious showing in any election. I would doubt that there is a village, let alone a city or county or state, which the Communists could carry. Communism in the world scene is no bogeyman; but Communism as a political faction or party in this country plainly is. Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that it has been crippled as a political force. Free speech has destroyed it as an effective political party. It is inconceivable that those who went up and down this country preaching the doctrine of revolution which petitioners espouse would have any success. In days of trouble and confusion, when bread lines were long, when the unemployed walked the streets, when people were starving, the advocates of a short-cut by revolution might have a chance to gain adherents. But today there are no such conditions. The country is not in despair; the people know Soviet Communism; the doctrine of Soviet revolution is exposed in all of its ugliness and the American people want none of it.
How it can be said that there is a clear and present danger that this advocacy will succeed is, therefore, a mystery. Some nations less resilient than the United States, where illiteracy is high and where democratic traditions are only budding, might have to take drastic *589steps and jail these men for merely speaking their creed. But in America they are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold. The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them powerful.
The political impotence of the Communists in this country does not, of course, dispose of the problem. Their numbers; their positions in industry and government; the extent to which they have in fact infiltrated the police, the armed services, transportation, stevedor-ing, power plants, munitions works, and other critical places — these facts all bear on the likelihood that their advocacy of the Soviet theory of revolution will endanger the Republic. But the record is silent on these facts. If we are to proceed on the basis of judicial notice, it is impossible for me to say that the Communists in this country are so potent or so strategically deployed that they must be suppressed for their speech. I could not so hold unless I were willing to conclude that the activities in recent years of committees of Congress, of the Attorney General, of labor unions, of state legislatures, and of Loyalty Boards were so futile as to leave the country on the edge of grave peril. To believe that petitioners and their following are placed in such critical positions as to endanger the Nation is to believe the incredible. It is safe to say that the followers of the creed of Soviet Communism are known to the F. B. I.; that in case of war with Russia they will be picked up overnight as were all prospective saboteurs at the commencement of World War II; that the invisible army of petitioners is the best known, the most beset, and the least thriving of any fifth column in history. Only those held by fear and panic could think otherwise.
This is my view if we are to act on the basis of judicial notice. But the mere statement of the opposing views indicates how important it is that we know the facts before we act. Neither prejudice nor hate nor senseless *590fear should be the basis of this solemn act. Free speech— the glory of our system of government — should not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil advocated is imminent. On this record no one can say that petitioners and their converts are in such a strategic position as to have even the slightest chance of achieving their aims.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The Constitution provides no exception. This does not mean, however, that the Nation need hold its hand until it is in such weakened condition that there is no time to protect itself from incitement to revolution. Seditious conduct can always be punished. But the command of the First Amendment is so clear that we should not allow Congress to call a halt to free speech except in the extreme case of peril from the speech itself. The First Amendment makes confidence in the common sense of our people and in their maturity of judgment the great postulate of our democracy. Its philosophy is that violence is rarely, if ever, stopped by denying civil liberties to those advocating resort to force. The First Amendment reflects the philosophy of Jefferson “that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.”5 The political censor has no place in our public debates. Unless and until extreme and necessitous circumstances are shown, our aim should be to keep speech unfettered and to allow the processes *591of law to be invoked only when the provocateurs among us move from speech to action.
Vishinsky wrote in 1938 in The Law of the Soviet State, “In our state, naturally, there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press, and so on for the foes of socialism.”
Our concern should be that we accept no such standard for the United States. Our faith should be that our people will never give support to these advocates of revolution, so long as we remain loyal to the purposes for which our Nation was founded.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS.
There have been numerous First Amendment cases before the Court raising the issue of clear and present danger since Mr. Justice Holmes first formulated the test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52. Most of them, however, have not involved jury trials.
The cases which may be deemed at all relevant to our problem can be classified as follows:
Convictions tor contempt of court (non-jury): Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367.
Convictions by state courts sitting without juries, GENERALLY FOR VIOLATIONS OF LOCAL ORDINANCES: Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290; Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315.
Injunctions against enforcement of state or local laws (non-jury) : Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 *592U. S. 233; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496; Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586; West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624.
Administrative proceedings (non-jury) : Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118; American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382.
Cases tried before juries for violations of state LAWS DIRECTED AGAINST ADVOCACY OF ANARCHY, CRIMINAL syndicalism, etc.: Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583; or for minor local offenses: Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268.
Federal prosecutions before juries under the espionage ACT OF 19 17 FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I: Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239. Pierce v. United States ruled that the question of clear and present danger was for the jury. In the other cases in this group the question whether the issue was for the court or the jury was not raised or passed upon.
Federal prosecution before a jury under the espionage ACT OF 19 17 FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II: Hartzel V. United States, 322 U. S. 680. The jury was instructed on clear and present danger in terms drawn from the language of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, supra, p. 52. The Court reversed the conviction on the ground that there had not been sufficient evidence for submission of the case to the jury.

 18 U. S. C. § 2384 provides: “If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the *582Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.”

 54 Stat. 671,18 U. S. C. §§ 10,11.

 Other books taught were Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (H. R. Doc. No. 619, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.), and Program of the Communist International.

 The cases which reached the Court are analyzed in the Appendix attached to this opinion, post, p. 591.

 12 Hening’s Stat. (Virginia 1823), c. 34, p. 84. Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927), p. 95, states: “This idea that the limit on freedom of speech or press should be set only by an actual overt act was not new. It had been asserted by a long line of distinguished thinkers including John Locke, Montesquieu in his The Spirit of the Laws (‘Words do not constitute an overt act’), the Rev. Phillip Furneaux, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson.”