Court Opinion

ID: 9453930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:29:15.203115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:53.027061
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Pablo Elizarraraz, stands convicted in the District Court at Austin of knowingly failing, neglecting, and refusing to perform a duty required of him under the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, in violation of Title 50 United States Code §§ 456(j) and 462(a).1 We affirm.
Elizarraraz was born January 13, 1941 in George West, Texas. In 1956 he became a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses. He has formal education through the eighth grade. On January 15, 1959, he registered with his local draft board. On the following August 11, he was classified 1-0, conscientious objector. Over four years later, on October 7, 1963, he submitted to the Armed Forces physical examination and was found to be acceptable for military service. On December 13, 1963, while he was living in Corpus Christi, the draft board, in writing, submitted to the registrant three types of civilian work at the Texas State Hospital at Austin deemed appropriate in lieu of military induction.
In response thereto the draft board received a letter from Elizarraraz, as follows:
“I appreciate the offer that was offered to me to perform a type of civilian work at the State Hospital. My religion and my conscience does not permit me to perform any type of civilian work. I do respect my country and what it stands for, but I still have to stay within God’s laws. Your truly, Pablo Elizarraraz.”
This written refusal to work in lieu of induction stood up for nearly two years, until May 13, 1965. Elizarraraz was then duly directed to report to the Texas State Hospital at Austin to do hospital work.2 He reported as directed, but *900upon arrival he refused to sign an employment form required of all individuals who go to work at that institution. He then left the hospital without entering upon, doing, or performing any work. Indictment, conviction, and sentence followed.
Mr. Elizarraraz testified in his own defense. Among other things he stated:
"I met this lady, that I identified myself to her, and she said that she was already waiting for me, and that she had already had a notice from the Draft Board, and she gave me an application and told me to walk out in the hall and fill it out, and so I told her that I had already explained it to my Draft Board in San Benito, my reason for not filling out the application, [emphasis supplied] and that they still directed me here to Austin, and told me to talk to that lady, or whoever it was over here.”
This testimony was followed by these questions and answers:
“Q. Did the order tell you to go to work at the Austin State Hospital ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you at that time, and are you now willing to work at the Austin State Hospital?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Would you explain why it is to the jury and His Honor, please, that you cannot in your conscience fill out the application ?
A. Well, the main thing is that I couldn't compromise myself on doing a job that would be — well, keeping me from my religious services, and at the same time— well, sometimes by violating God’s principles, that, I mean, I would believe, honestly believe it was a violation of God’s law.
Q. All right, sir. If you could go out to the Austin State Hospital and go to work without filling out the application, would you be willing to do so?
A. Yes, sir, I would.
Q. Would you do it today?
A. Yes, sir, I would.
**•***•»
Q. Mr. Elizarraraz, before you left for Austin you told the local Draft Board that you would not fill out any application; is that right?
A. Yes, sir, and I—
Q. You also told the local Draft Board in that letter that is on page 37 [of the exhibits in evidence] that your religion and conscience does not permit you to perform any type of civilian work; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You didn’t say anything in that letter about an application, though, did you?
A. No, sir, I didn’t.
Q. All right. And you stated that to sign the order would mean that you would be agreeing to compromise your position, to sign the application.
A. I believe so, yes, sir.
Q. You said that to Mr. Eisenberg just now, did you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have also stated that it is a violation of God’s law to fill out the application form; is that right ?
A. No, sir, not the application itself, no, sir.
Q. All right. Is it a violation of God’s law for you to perform work that you are ordered to do *901by the United States Government, or any Government?
A. It depends upon the work, yes, sir, I would say.
Q. Well, is this civilian work at the Austin State Hospital, is it a violation of your creed to perform that work when ordered to do so by the United States ?
A. That particular job, you mean?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, I don’t think so.
Q. What would you do if they told you you had to work on Sunday ? Would — let’s say you are out there, and you haven’t signed any application, and they told you that, “Today you are going to have to work on Sunday;” what would you do?
A. Well, that would — I would have to tell them my conditions [emphasis supplied] and I had those meetings I had to attend.”
With particular reference to a meeting with the Draft Board on February 27, 1964, the appellant testified as follows:
“Q. And you were informed of your rights and the purpose of the meeting, were you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you at that time stated you refused to agree on any type of work you would be willing to perform in lieu of induction, as you felt it would be in direct conflict with your religious work?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You told them that, didn’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Elizarraraz contends on appeal that the Government failed to meet its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly failed, neglected, and refused to report to the Austin State Hospital and to perform two years of civilian work in lieu of military service. At the heart of the matter, he urges that he did not fail or neglect or refuse to work but that he only refused to fill in the application form presented to him when he appeared at the Hospital and that such refusal cannot constitute a violation of the statute. We find this contention to be without merit. The appellant freely admitted that he knew before he went to Austin that he would be expected to fill in a job application and that before he left San Benito he told his Draft Board that he would not fill in such an application. He admitted that there was nothing in the application form which violated “his duty to God”, even if that had been a justifiable excuse for not filling it in and signing it, cf. United States v. Kime, 7 Cir., 1951, 188 F.2d 677, cert, den., 342 U.S. 823, 72 S.Ct. 41, 96 L.Ed. 622. The decisive factor of the case is that when the registrant was first offered civilian work in lieu of induction he categorically stated that “My religion and my conscience does not permit me to perform any type of civilian work”. Pri- or to trial, he ever afterward adhered to that attitude. We entertain no doubt that the requirement to do civilian work must, of necessity, carry with it the performance of any and all acts, such as appropriate record keeping, reasonably incident to that status.
It is most impressive that although the appellant was ably and energetically represented by appointed counsel at his trial below and on this appeal, the “application form”, whatever its contents, was apparently considered to be so devoid of any legal significance that it was not offered in evidence at the trial in the District Court. Therefore, it is not a part of the record here.
From the evidence in this record it was clearly within the province of the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Elizarraraz’s refusal to fill in the form was simply a pretext in furtherance of his previously declared resolution not to do the civilian work required by law. Actually, so far as we know or can tell, *902the “application form” was, in fact, not a request for work, if we strip the matter of semantics. It was not within the contemplation of the parties that he was applying for a job; he was being assigned to a job. Everybody so understood it, including the balky assignee.
It is true that Elizarraraz at the trial testified that he would be willing to work at the hospital if he did not have to fill in and sign the application form, but this assurance was limited by his further testimony that if he began work without filing such an application he would feel free, at his personal discretion, to prescribe the conditions upon which he would perform assignments.
The requirement to do civilian work in lieu of military induction cannot be frittered away by such defenses as those raised on this appeal.
It is next contended that the District Court committed reversible error when it overruled an objection to the following argument of the prosecutor in his summation to the jury:
“ * * * Our country has gone to war now in two World Wars, as they are called, engaged right now in a conflict that in some instances staggers the imagination as to the number of men involved, the number of men that are giving their lives each day. The Government in this case regarding Pablo Elizarraraz has not asked him to place his life in jeopardy, has not asked him to go to boot camp, to shine his shoes, to drill, to march — ”
The objection to this argument was couched in this language:
“Your Honor, I want to object to this line of argument. There is no question, this man is entitled to his Constitutional protection as a conscientious objector. Any argument to the effect of what he — what the Constitution affords him and what the statutes afford him is not the question in this case. It is whether or not he failed, refused and neglected to report to the Austin State Hospital out here.”
In the first place, there is no constitutional right to exemption from compulsory civilian duty in lieu of military service, Wood v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 373 F.2d 894. Appellant did not complain to the trial judge that the argument was prejudicial or that it was calculated to inflame the jury. He did not move for a mistrial.
We therefore must consider this specification under the plain error rule. We hold that the argument, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, did not constitute reversible error. It contained no opprobrious denunciation of Elizarraraz. It simply alluded to that which is common knowledge — contrasting that which the registrant could lawfully have been compelled to do had it not been for the grace extended by Congress to those who conscientiously object to military service.
One of the judges is of the view that the conviction ought to be reversed because, it is said, the application contained an unconstitutional loyalty oath. The majority is unwilling to consider this question because the accused form is not in the record and the objection was never raised below or in the briefs or oral arguments here. This issue, if there be one, should first be considered, if the appellant wishes to pursue it, in appropriate proceedings instituted under 28 U.S.C., section 2255.
It might be further noted that if this appellant is genuinely willing to perform the duty required of him by law he still has an opportunity to convince the District Judge of that fact pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Affirmed.

. The Grand Jury Charges:
That on or about June 2, 1965, PABLO ELIZARRARAZ was a male person subject to service under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, who had duly registered under said Act with Texas Local Board No. 16, San Benito, Texas, and had been classified as a conscientious objector (1-0), and had been notified of said classification; and that on or about May 28, 1965, the said PABLO ELIZARRARAZ was duly ordered by Texas Local Board No. 16, San Benito, Texas, to report to said local board where he would receive instructions to proceed to the Austin State Hospital, Austin, Texas, within the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas, to perform civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety and interest, and the said PABLO ELIZARRARAZ was further ordered to report for employment at the Austin State Hospital and to remain in employment there for twenty-four (24) consecutive months or until such time as he was released or transferred by proper authority, and the said PABLO ELIZARRA-RAZ did knowingly fail, neglect and refuse to perform a duty required of him under the provisions of said Act in that he knowingly failed, neglected and refused (1) to accept the employment available at the Austin State Hospital, and (2) to remain in said employment for a period of twenty-four (24) consecutive months or for any period whatsoever, pursuant to the order of the local board; in violation of Title 50, United States Code Appendix, Sections 456(j) and 462(a).

. We do not burden this opinion with a recitation of all the administrative actions, letters, notices, and orders of the *900Local Board in this case. We have carefully examined the record and find that the Regulations were scrupulously complied with.