Court Opinion

ID: 9702438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:11:26.748041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:37.466735
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, J.
(dissenting). This writer respectfully dissents. The majority opinion finds that this case was "rife with incurable prosecutorial error” and that "defendant did not enter adequate objection is of no consequence”. This writer cannot concur in such a conclusion in this instance and, *608furthermore, believes that had defendant entered proper objection, the alleged errors introduced by the prosecution would have been cured.
The alleged prosecutorial errors occurred during cross-examination of defendant and during the prosecution’s closing statement. This writer is faced with the least difficulty in finding no error in the prosecution’s closing argument. The theory of the people’s case was that defendant had been part of a plan to murder the victim by kidnapping him from an airport parking structure. This plan was apparently part of an organized crime "hit”. The evidence linking defendant to this crime was largely circumstantial and involved elaborate and extensive proofs. The trial itself lasted approximately two weeks and has been recorded in over ten volumes of transcript. The jury was properly instructed that the prosecution’s comments were not evidence. This Court has said many times that:
"For the first time on appeal defendant cites certain portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument as being so improper and prejudicial as to deny defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial.
"A prosecutor is entitled to comment on the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. He is free in final argument to relate the facts to his theory of the case. In this case, the prosecutor attempted to establish a permissible relationship between his theory and the facts in evidence. Defendant made no objection at the time the allegedly offensive statements were made. There was no request for curative or corrective instructions. Hence the error, if any, was waived.” People v Duke, 50 Mich App 714, 717; 213 NW2d 769 (1973).
People v Pacely, 51 Mich App 67; 214 NW2d 561 (1974), and People v Robert Hall, 56 Mich App 10; 223 NW2d 340 (1974). Failure to object to possible errors in the prosecution’s closing remarks, where *609curative instructions were possible, bars appellate review. People v Hall, 396 Mich 650; 242 NW2d 377 (1976), People v Robert Hall, supra, People v Humphreys, 24 Mich App 411; 180 NW2d 328 (1970). The prosecution must have reasonable latitude in arguing proper inferences to be drawn from the evidence produced at trial. See People v Davis, 57 Mich App 505; 226 NW2d 540 (1975), People v Wirth, 108 Mich 307; 66 NW 41 (1896). However, defense counsel must respond to protect the defendant and raise objection to those comments which may exceed the proper bounds of closing statements. There was no objection to the prosecution’s statements, and if they did, in fact, exceed the proper bounds of argument, they could have been cured by proper instructions.
The more difficult question involves alleged improprieties on the part of the prosecution during cross-examination of the defendant. The majority has issued a well-written opinion fully considering this question. However, this writer must respectfully disagree with their conclusion. This writer is forced to dissent on the basis that had the defendant made proper objection this error would not have risen. Early objection would have resulted in early instruction, to the prosecution not to further inquire into those subjects which defendant objected to. Furthermore, the trial court could have instructed the jury to disregard any statements of the prosecution which were not proper.
The prosecution maintained that defendant had been part of an organized plan to murder the victim essentially alleging that this was an organized "hit” for profit. Coveralls similar to those used by employees of the parking structure were to be worn by the perpetrators of the crime and a U-Haul van used to transport the victim. The *610prosecution presented evidence that defendant had rented the van, which defendant admitted at trial. Defendant was identified as being at the airport next to the van and also was seen standing next to a .38-caliber handgun which was dropped to the ground. A weapon similar to this was subsequently found in a Ford automobile in which also was found a soda pop can with defendant’s fingerprints. The victim’s death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds, including a .38-caliber bullet, although tests were unable to disclose the specific gun used. In the van were two sets of handcuffs, adhesive tape and two screwdrivers sharpened to a point. Coveralls were also found in the van which matched descriptions of those worn by two men who were struggling with the victim just prior to the victim’s death. Defendant was not positively identified as one of the men, but he did fit a very general description. The circumstantial, though substantial, evidence convinced the jury that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant now maintains, however, that the prosecution asked questions which assumed facts not in evidence and that the prosecution improperly referred to facts regarding defendant’s personal life which were not relevant to the inquiry herein.
As to the questions based on facts not in evidence, the defendant had a duty to object. Defendant maintains that the court had a duty to raise this question on its own motion. I cannot agree in this instance, however. The court should not inject itself into substituting its own ideas of trial strategy for those of the parties. This was a very emotional and lengthy trial involving complex and lengthy proofs. The implication was that there was a paid "hit” involving organized crime. The prosecution should be entitled to reasonable latitude in *611pursuing questions relating to its theory of the case. The determination of whether facts were not in evidence may have been a difficult question herein and it was incumbent upon defendant to raise this objection and not rely on the court to do so. Defendant did not properly object and there was some support for the facts allegedly assumed by the prosecution. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in not raising this question on its own and if error was committed, it was not such as to require reversal. People v Duke, supra.
Defendant also maintains that the prosecution injected irrelevant and prejudicial facts into this trial by asking certain background questions regarding defendant’s personal life. Information was adduced from defendant that indicated that he had an invalid out-of-state driver’s license under a different name, had been unemployed for a substantial length of time, had no social security number, had lived at various addresses, including that of a woman to whom he was not married, had not registered for the draft and had never paid income taxes nor even filed income tax returns. The prosecution argues now that many of these factors are relevant to motive. It is contended that the fraudulent driver’s license, the lack of employment, the lack of permanent address, the fact that defendant had no social security number and had never filed an income tax return indicates that defendant was a professional criminal and might engage in a "hit” for profit. Certainly these questions are of some relevance in this particular case. Contrast this with the recent Supreme Court cases of People v Johnson, 393 Mich 488; 227 NW2d 523 (1975), and People v Hammond, 394 Mich 627; 232 NW2d 174 (1975). In both of these cases similar *612personal information did not bear any relevance to the crimes charged. Nevertheless, we need not decide whether introduction of such evidence was error because if it was, it was not of such magnitude as to demand reversal where not properly objected to at trial and where supported by some relevance.1 Had defendant objected to such questions early, the court may well have limited inquiry into such issues, properly instructed the jury, and forbidden the prosecution to pursue such matters. We do not know strategically why counsel did not object. Yet this writer finds that defense counsel fully and very competently represented defendant at trial. Failure to object may well have been a tactical decision. Defendant’s description of the events of the day in question adduced during direct examination was, however, very weak. Defendant did not properly object to most of the questions on cross-examination and the prosecution’s case, though entirely circumstantial, was solid. If there was error, it was not such as to demand reversal absent proper objection. A careful reading of the transcript coupled with defendant’s lack of objection persuades this writer that the questions did not interfere with defendant’s having a fair trial. People v Duke, supra, at 717.
This writer votes to affirm.

 The portion of the transcript cited by the majority in footnote 2 of their opinion indicates some sort of an objection on the part of defendant. However, this writer must conclude that this brief, weak and vague attempt to limit cross-examination was insufficient to constitute a proper objection under the circumstances. People v Hicks, 70 Mich App 430; 245 NW2d 778 (1976), People v Pope, 108 Mich 361; 66 NW 213 (1896), People v Moore, 86 Mich 134; 48 NW 693 (1891).