Court Opinion

ID: 9692428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:53:54.0619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.457650
License: Public Domain

RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice,
dissenting on motion for rehearing.
I agree with the majority opinion except in overruling the State’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a causal connection between Luxemburg’s speech and the decision not to renew his appointment. The majority opinion correctly recites, and the parties all agree, that we review the sufficiency of the evidence in light of the charge submitted, the relevant portion of which was set forth in question 5 and its accompanying instruction (the “instruction”):
Do you find that Leon Luxemburg has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the employment actions taken against him by Defendant(s)?
A substantial or motivating factor need not be the only reason for the action(s) taken, if any. There may be more than one reason for the employment actions taken against Dr. Luxemburg. If you find that those actions, if any, would not have occurred but for Dr. Luxemburg’s allegations of fraud and cover-up regarding the National Science Foundation proposal and/or allegations of discrimination, then you will find that Dr. Luxemburg’s statements were a substantial or motivating factor in the employment actions taken against him.
Whether this question and instruction are correct according to Hinds1 is of no consequence here since we are not reviewing the submission for charge error. Similarly, regardless of what meaning the term “substantial or motivating factor” may have in the case law, its only meaning to the jury and our sufficiency review is that provided in the instruction, if any. Therefore, our task is simply to discern the causation standard set forth in the instruction and then assess whether the evidence was sufficient to prove it.
The third sentence of the instruction instructs the jury to find causation if it determines that the employment action would not have occurred but for Luxemburg’s allegations. But what does this sentence mean if the jury does not find such a but-for connection? The majority opinion concludes that it does not require a but-for connection, but apparently only includes it illustratively as something (but not the only thing) that would constitute a substantial or motivating factor. If. the majority is correct that the third sentence does not require a but-for standard, then: *428(1) that sentence is merely advisory; (2) the instruction fails to define, or thereby limit the scope of, the appropriate causation standard2; (3) the jury was authorized to decide the undefined “substantial or motivating factor” causation requirement according to whatever standard it chose (or none at all); and (4) there is no definition of “substantial or motivating factor” by which a sufficiency review can be conducted in this case.
Although I agree that the instruction was poorly phrased, I do not read it as loosely as the majority. Rather, I believe the “If you find ..., then you will find.... ” language is tantamount to saying, “If you do not find ..., then you will not find.... ” and, accordingly, that the third sentence of the instruction required a but-for standard of causation. Moreover, because I do not believe that the evidence identified in the majority opinion is sufficient to satisfy a but-for standard, I would sustain the State’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove causation.

. See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex.1995) (holding that correct causation standard is whether employer’s action would not have occurred when it did had the employee's protected communication not been made).

. Nor do the first two sentences of the instruction resolve the issue because they are consistent with either a but-for or a less than but-for standard. See Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633-36 (distinguishing between sole cause standard and but-for standard adopted).