Court Opinion

ID: 9772296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:13:59.426345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.354599
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice,
concurring.
The United States Supreme Court defined collateral estoppel in Ashe v. Swenson: “It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (emphasis added). While probable cause to arrest is an issue of ultimate fact in a license revocation case, it is not an issue of ultimate fact in a driving while intoxicated (DWI) case. Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). We followed Newves in Holmberg v. State, 931 S.W.2d 3, 4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). In Holmberg, we observed that probable cause to arrest is not an element of DWI; rather, it is part of a suppression hearing. Id. at 5. We reasoned that because a motion to suppress evidence is merely a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence, there are no double jeopardy consequences to such a ruling. Id. Our holding was that collateral estoppel did not preclude a DWI prosecution after a finding against the State on the ultimate fact issue of probable cause in a license revocation hearing because probable cause is not an ultimate fact issue in a DWI prosecution. Id.
The dissenting opinion’s position in this case is based on the concept that probable cause is an ultimate fact issue in a motion to suppress hearing. This position conflicts with the notion that a motion to suppress is merely a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence. See Galitz v. State, 617 *496S.W.2d 949, 952 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 133, 137-38 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no pet.). A ruling on the admissibility of evidence is a preliminary question, not an issue of ultimate fact. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 104 (entitled “Preliminary Questions” and dealing with questions of admissibility).
As in Neaves, the fact that probable cause is not an issue of ultimate fact in a DWI prosecution is dispositive of appellant’s collateral estoppel claim without examining matters such as whether the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding. 767 S.W.2d at 786. Accordingly, I would hold that appellant’s collateral estoppel claim fails because even though probable cause is a determinative issue in a suppression hearing, it is not an ultimate issue of fact.
Therefore, while I join the majority opinion’s reliance on State v. Brabson, 966 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), this concurring opinion expresses an additional reason for overruling point of error one.