Court Opinion

ID: 9867523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 16:25:06.44133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.111988
License: Public Domain

Grover, J.
(dissenting). — The question in this case is whether, under the„provisions of chapter 482, of Laws of 1862, a valid lien can be acquired upon a vessel, her taclde, &c., by furnishing provisions and stores to such vessel at her home port, within this State, while such vessel is engaged, from time to time, in making voyages from such port to Monmouth, in the State of New Jersey, and whether such lien can be enforced pursuant to the provisions of said act, or whether the said act, so far as it provides for the acquisition and enforcement of a lien in such case, is invalid. It would seem to be clear that the act is valid for the creation of a lien. It must be so for its enforcement, because, were it not so, there would be no mode of enforcing it, and the lien, for w-ant thereof, would of necessity be a nullity.
. The act is claimed to be invalid upon the ground that it conflicts with the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction vested in the Courts of the United States. If such lien and its *15enforcement does so conflict, it follows that the Act is void; for when the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, vest exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Courts, no State Court, or officer acting under that authority, can in any manner interfere therewith.
The inquiry, therefore, is, whether creating and enforcing a lien for the collection of this debt, in this case, does conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Courts in admiralty and maritime causes.
Section 2, art. 3, of the Constitution of the United States extends the judicial power of the Government to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Section 9 of the'United States Judiciary Act of 1789 enacts that the District Courts of the United States shall have exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.
The jurisdiction of the District Courts in admiralty and maritime cases is made exclusive. The lien sought to be enforced in the present case, is not a common law remedy. It therefore follows that if enforcing the lien in the manner provided by the act, in the present case, be a proceeding in admiralty, the act is void.
It is the function of Courts of Admiralty to enforce all liens upon vessels created by virtue of the maritime law, and all such as are dependent upon or originate from that law. In respect to all such liens the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts is exclusive, and State Courts and officers cannot interfere therewith, although liens for the same cause may have been declared by State statutes, and authority to enforce the same may have been thereby attempted to be conferred upon the State Courts.
This was the point adjudged in Hine v. Trevor (4 Wallace, 555), and the only point determined which has any bearing upon the present case.
In the Moses Taylor (4 Wallace, 411) the contract was to be performed upon the high seas. It was therefore a maritime contract, and within the jurisdiction of admiralty to redress the *16injuries sustained by a breach. It was therefore held that the admiralty jurisdiction was exclusive, excepting only the common law jurisdiction reserved to the States by the Act of Congress' (supra).
These are the cases relied upon by the Appellant to show that the act of 1862 is invalid, in respect to the proceedings in the present case. An examination will show that the present case does not fall within the same principle.
In the present case the demand is for supplies furnished to the ship while lying at the dock at her home port (New York). No lien upon the vessel for such a demand is given by the maritime law of England or this country (2 Ld. Raymond, 806; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; Barque Chusan, 2 Story, 462; 1 Kent’s Com. 380, and cases there cited).
These cases show that, for such a demand, the only remedy is against the owner of the vessel, upon whose credit the goods are presumed to have been delivered.
It is then simply a case of the collection of a debt by a creditor. Over this class of cases the State authorities have plenary power.
It is for the States respectively to provide and regulate the remedies in their discretion. They may require that the creditor shall proceed according to the course of the common law,'or in such other mode as it shall provide or may deem expedient.
They may provide, as in the act of 1862 in question, that the debt may be made a lien upon any of the property of the Defendant, and may provide for the enforcement of such lien as they shall deem proper, as in the case of material-men and mechanics’ liens, and in other cases.
There is nothing peculiar to property in ships, when inHhe jurisdiction of a State, exempting it from the same liability in this respect as other property is subject to. Ships may be levied upon by execution issued by State Courts against the owners, or seized upon attachments issued in like manner.
The act of 1862 provides for creating a lien upon the vessel for the debt in the present case, and for its enforcement for its satis*17faction. This is no exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. The lien is created wholly by the local law. The maritime law, we have seen, gives none.
It is the mere remedy provided by the State for the collection of a. debt by the creditor out of the property of the debtor, and'no more interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Courts than it would had the statute provided for( a lien upon any of the other property of the debtor.
Under the rules 'adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1844, for the government of the District Courts in admiralty cases, those Courts entertain jurisdiction in rem, fouled upon the lien given by the State law, in cases like the present; and such jurisdiction was sustained by the former Court (Peyroux v. Howard, 1 Pet. 341; The Case of Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522). The exercise of this jurisdiction continued until 1858, when the rule was changed by the Court, bv providing that, in cases like the present, process should only issue in personam— thus relieving the District Courts from their duty to enforce liens created by the State laws; leaving such liens to be dealt with by the State authorities.
The lien does not depend for its validity upon the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, but upon the constitutional powers of the States to pass the acts providing for.it.
We have seen that liens under State laws were held valid by that Court, prior to the change in its rule in 1858; and they have-^ not been adjudged invalid by it in any case like the present since.
But it is said that inasmuch as the Admiralty. Courts issue process in’ personam against the debtor for the collection of debts,, like the one in the present case, and thus entertain jurisdiction,, such jurisdiction is exclusive, by the Act of Congress, of all other,, except common law remedies, for the collection thereof. But I think the Act of Congress was only designed to embrace cases, where the admiralty proceeded, according to the moré usual course-of that Court, in rem, and not to cases where it proceeded in per-sonam.
There is a reason, for excluding jurisdiction in the former which *18does not exist in the latter; viz. to avoid conflicting claims to property arising nnder conflicting j urisdictions.
That this was the object appears from ¿he saving of the common law remedies in the State Courts, in cases where the admiralty proceeds in rem. Taking away, from the States the exercise of other powers could confer no advantage upon any one. The proceedings under the act of 1862, in the present case, are similar to proceedings had under similar State statutes for a great number of years, during which their validity has not been questioned. Important rights have been acquired thereby.
This is not conclusive, but is entitled to consideration in determining their validity. My conclusion, is that they are valid in all cases where the admiralty cannot proceed in rem, by virtue of the maritime law. This leads to an affirmance of the order appealed from.
Reversed.
JOEL TIFFANY,
State Reporter.