Court Opinion

ID: 9489831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:25:24.040306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:44.577321
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment ought to be affirmed and join the judgment and the opinion of the court. As the opinion states, “the decision either to give or to refrain from giving an instruction on the subject [of testimony by an informant] is committed to the discretion of the district court, which is best situated to detect and deal with threats of unreliable testimony, and that appellate review is deferential.” I write separately because I fear that the majority opinion may be read as sending far too strong a message to the district courts of this circuit that their discretion is more cabined than it has been in the past or as signaling a radical departure from the practice of the past, the precedent of this circuit or, indeed, from the practice throughout most of the United States.
The law of this circuit with respect to this instruction is well established and consistent. The decision whether to give an instruction cautioning the jury with respect to the special difficulties posed by the testimony of an informant is committed to sound discretion of the trial judge. No one else is in a comparable position to make the prudential judgment as to whether such an instruction is appropriate. It is for that reason that our opinions have avoided, consistently, establishing any categorical limitations on the discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Rajewski, 526 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 2231, 48 L.Ed.2d 833 (1976); United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir.1973) (Stevens, J.) (stating that, although the refusal to give an informer instruction was not reversible error, in view of the informer’s relationship with the prosecution and “fundamental requirements of fairness,” the district court should have considered an instruction tailored to the circumstances of the case); cf. United States v. Yarbough, 55 F.3d 280, 283-84 (7th Cir.1995) (4-part test for addict-informant instruction); United States v. Hoffman, 957 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 960, 112 S.Ct. 2315, 119 L.Edüd 235 (1992) (same).1
In modern federal criminal practice, the informant defies easy stereotyping. As an undercover gatherer of evidence or information for the government, he may work for the government in a long-term capacity or in only one case. He- may have a great deal at stake in terms of his - own future in the criminal justice system or he may be free of any exposure in that regard. He may be motivated by money, by need for governmental protection or immunity for himself or family members, or by a permutation of these factors. When an informant is testifying for personal gain or advantage rather than for an independent law enforcement purpose, the jury well may need to be cautioned about the potential bias and unreliability of his self-interested testimony.
The Supreme Court, demonstrating the appropriate approach for any federal appellate court, has not been inclined to establish any categorical rules or to suggest any particular characterizations that require that a cautionary instruction be given. See Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103, 93 S.Ct. 354, 356-57, 34 L.Edüd 335 (1972) (commenting that accomplice instructions have long been used and approved, that they represent a “commonsense recognition that an accomplice may have a special interest in testifying, thus easting doubt upon his veracity”). It has simply said that, in a given case, such testimony could pose a significant danger to the fairness of the trial and, when the *255trial judge perceives such a danger, the jury ought to be cautioned. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311-12, 87 S.Ct. 408, 418-19, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757, 72 S.Ct. 967, 973-74, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). In other circuits, the giving of an informant or accomplice instruction is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Most other circuits treat informant and accomplice instructions as generally advisable and prudent, particularly when the witness’s testimony is materially uncorroborated; nevertheless, the failure to give the instructions is not automatic error. See, e.g., United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 287 (D.C.Cir.1989) (refusal to give instruction may be reversible error if accomplice testimony is uncorroborated), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1069, 110 S.Ct. 1790, 108 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646-48 (1st Cir.1987) (prudent to give instruction when the government predominantly relies on the informant or accomplice), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1739, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988); United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir.1974) (defendants are entitled to the instruction when it is requested and when the evidence implicating the defendant’s guilt is elicited solely from the informer); cf. United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 766 (6th Cir.1990) (finding that trial court that thoroughly cautioned jury concerning witness credibility and the validity of accomplice testimony did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a perjury instruction).
In United States v. House, 471 F.2d 886 (1st Cir.1973), Judge Coffin seems to have stated the consensus when commenting on the “error per se” approach of the Tenth Circuit.2 He noted that the First Circuit “prefer[s] not to take this step but preferís] to call the attention of the district courts in this circuit to the prudence of giving, whether requested or not, cautionary instructions where the government predominantly relies on informants or accomplices.” Id. He also noted that the burden is not excessive, and the benefit is substantial, to include a cautionary instruction when a ease is dominated by informant testimony. Id. at 889. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has left the decision to instruct to the trial court; it has held “that no absolute and mandatory duty is imposed upon the trial court to advise the jury by instruction that they should consider the testimony of an uncorroborated accomplice with caution.” United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1402-03 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted).
Against this background, I think it would be a serious mistake for the district judges of this circuit to read the court’s opinion today as establishing particular categories of informants whose testimony warrants the instruction and other categories of informants whose testimony does not warrant such a caution. Similarly, I think that the precise text of the instruction, when the trial judge believes that the fairness of the proceedings requires one, ought to be committed to the trial court’s discretion. There no doubt will be cases when a general cautionary instruction about the responsibility of the juror to examine the motivation of witnesses will suffice. In other cases, a more specific instruction pointing out, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged in On Lee, the special difficulties in assessing informant testimony will no doubt be indicated. Categorical imperatives established by appellate judges in advance and imposed on trial judges are entirely inappropriate in such a situation.
The case before us was a close call. The informant presented a complex bundle of characteristics for the trial judge to sort out. *256Although not facing immediate criminal proceedings himself and not in the career employ of the government, the informant was receiving compensation from the government, had concerns for his own safety, and was in need of government assistance to maintain his anonymity. He apparently also had some interest, realistic or not, about a career in law enforcement, a consideration that might have altered his motivation. Given these circumstances, the trial judge was content to choose a general cautionary instruction on the credibility of witnesses. I cannot say that this determination was beyond the range of options from which one would expect a trial judge to select in such a situation. Accordingly, his decision Ought not be disturbed.

. U.S. ex rel. Swimley v. Nesbitt, 608 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir.1979), although a habeas case, also has a thoughtful discussion of cautionary instructions.

. In the Tenth Circuit, when an accomplice’s testimony is uncorroborated and a cautionary instruction is not given, it is error per se, even if the testimony is facially consistent. Id. at 888, citing United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 742 n. 3 (10th Cir.1974).
The Ninth Circuit's position is that an informant instruction must be given when the testimony of an informant or accomplice is substantially uncorroborated, United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir.1990), and should be given to minimize unfairness, and that the failure to instruct is reversible error when the informant’s testimony constituted the main or complete evidence against the defendant and thus it would be prejudicial not to caution the jury of potentially unreliable testimony. People of Territory of Guam v. Dela Rosa, 644 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 857-58 (9th Cir.1980).