Court Opinion

ID: 9704019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:19:00.766436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:54.745445
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
POPOVICH, J.:
¶ 1 Because I conclude that the trial court did not misapply the holdings of Bolus and DiNicola, I must respectfully dissent from the Opinion of the learned Majority.
¶ 2 At the outset, I note that the Majority discusses in great detail the testimony offered by Trooper Fagley on direct examination regarding Lettau’s lack of cooperation with' his investigation and the allusions drawn by the Commonwealth therefrom regarding Lettau’s guilty knowledge. Given that the transcript of trial reveals that Lettau failed to object to Trooper Fagley’s direct examination testimony, I would find that whatever prejudice that accrued to Appellant from the jury’s consideration of this testimony could not be reviewed by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Elrod, 392 Pa.Super. 274, 572 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1990) (even issues of constitutional dimension may be waived if not presented to trial court) (citation omitted). Further, my review of the record indicates that Trooper Fagley’s direct examination testimony did not indicate that Lettau attempted to remain silent prior to his arrest. In my view, Trooper Fagley’s direct examination testimony regarding his conversation with Lettau was limited to the level of cooperation that he provided to Trooper Fagley in the course of his investigation. As such, I would not conclude, as does the Majority, that the testimony of Trooper Fagley “effectively shredded [Lettau’s] presumption of innocence on no sounder a basis than his refusal to volunteer information to a state trooper.” Majority Opinion, at 12-13.
¶ 3 Based upon my finding that Lettau waived his challenge to Trooper Fagley’s direct examination testimony, I would also find that the Commonwealth’s attempts to impeach Lettau’s credibility with Trooper Fagley’s rebuttal testimony were proper pursuant to Bolus and DiNicola. It is without question that Lettau took the stand in his own defense and, therefore, that he “opened the door” to the possibility that his credibility would be impeached by the Commonwealth’s reference to his pre-arrest silence. See Bolus, 680 A.2d at 844. In my view, this principle applies with even greater force in the present case because Lettau’s direct examination version of the conversation that he had with Trooper Fagley diverged greatly from Trooper Fagley’s version and because, on cross-examination, Lettau testified that he was “very cooperative” with Trooper Fag-ley’s investigation. See N.T. Trial, 4/26/2007, at 127. Therefore, it is my belief that Lettau’s 5th Amendment rights were not violated by the introduction of Trooper Fagley’s rebuttal impeachment testimony. See Bolus, 680 A.2d at 844; see also DiNicola, 866 A.2d at 336.
¶4 I also must disagree respectfully with the Majority’s characterization of the Commonwealth’s impeachment of Lettau on cross-examination, and its subsequent use of Trooper Fagely as a rebuttal witness as “cleav[ing] much too closely to the very inference of guilt that our Courts *369have so long struggled to avoid that insistence by an accused in maintaining his silence is in fact a ‘badge of guilt.’ ” See Majority Opinion, at 367 (citing Turner, 454 A.2d at 539) (quoting Haideman, 296 A.2d at 767 (Pa.1972)). In essence, the Majority concludes that the Commonwealth acted so unfairly in concentrating its case on impeaching Lettau’s testimony rather than on proving the elements of the offenses charged that it obviated Lettau’s presumption of innocence. In my view, this conclusion raises the specter of a violation of Lettau’s rights under the 14th Amendment itself, not his rights under the 5th Amendment or a combination of the rights secured by the two Amendments under the doctrine of selective incorporation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colavita, 920 A.2d 836, 843 (Pa.Super.2007) (explaining that government action that is so fundamentally unfair as to taint fairness of trial violates Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment). Nevertheless, my review of the record indicates that Lettau has failed to present this argument to the trial court or to this Court. Rather, I observe that his arguments sound only in 5th Amendment jurisprudence and his attempts to distinguish Bolus and DiNicola. Consequently, I would not, as does the Majority, base a finding of trial court error in the present case upon “fundamental fairness” concerns. See, e.g., Elrod, 572 A.2d at 1232.
¶ 5 As such, I dissent.