Court Opinion

ID: 9912502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:07:47.499947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:46.603910
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jamii, 2023-Ohio-4671.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                                   No. 21AP-330
v.                                                :             (C.P.C. No. 21CR-173)

Ashshaheed A. Jamii,                              :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on December 21, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee. Argued: Sheryl L. Prichard.

                 On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and George M.
                 Schumann, for appellant. Argued: George M. Schumann.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Ashshaheed A. Jamii, appeals from a judgment of
conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following
a jury trial in which he was found guilty of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of
felony aggravated murder, two counts of murder, and two counts of felony murder. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On January 13, 2021, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01 (Count 1), one count of felony aggravated murder in
violation of R.C. 2903.01 (Count 2), one count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A)
(Count 3), and one count of felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) (Count 4) arising
No. 21AP-330                                                                               2

from the January 6, 2021 robbery and death of Malik S. Amar. In the same indictment,
appellant was charged with one count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) (Count 5),
and one count of felony murder in violation R.C. 2903.02(B) (Count 6) arising from the
January 6, 2021 death of David W. Knox. All counts, except the aggravated robbery count,
included three-year firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145.
         {¶ 3} The matter came for trial before a jury in May 2021. Plaintiff-appellee, State
of Ohio, presented the following evidence.
         {¶ 4} Fourteen-year-old J.W. testified that on the evening of January 5, 2021, Amar
drove her to visit her friend, Z.C., who was living with appellant. Appellant was the only
person in the apartment when J.W. and Amar arrived. J.W. initially sat in a back bedroom
talking to a friend on her cell phone while she waited for Z.C. to arrive. Amar eventually
asked J.W. to join him and appellant in the living room. During a conversation between
appellant, Amar and J.W., appellant touched J.W.’s upper thigh, “[c]lose to [her] personal
area.” (May 18, 2021 Tr. Vol. I at 43.) Amar grabbed J.W.’s face and told her it was
inappropriate for a grown man to touch her in that way. Appellant accused Amar of calling
him a rapist; Amar denied that was his intent. Thereafter, appellant and Amar left the
apartment for 20-30 minutes. While they were gone, J.W. sent her friend a text message
at 10:26 p.m. that said, “[Z.C.’s] stepdad [appellant] grabbed my leg.” (Tr. Vol. I at 46.)
When Amar and appellant returned, Amar told J.W. he had discussed the touching incident
with appellant and that everything was now fine.
         {¶ 5} A short time later, Amar told J.W. he and appellant were leaving the
apartment and that she should accompany them. J.W. initially protested, but after Amar
raised his voice, she agreed to go. The three left in Amar’s car. Amar first drove to an ATM
and then to the apartment of his girlfriend, Shavonne Baker. While appellant, Amar, and
Baker conversed, J.W. excused herself and went into the bathroom. She called her best
friend, told her she did not feel safe because she thought something was about to happen,
and directed her to call police if she did not receive a text message or call from her in the
next 15 minutes. Shortly after J.W. returned from the bathroom, appellant, unprovoked,
took out a gun and pulled back the slide. Baker became upset and ordered everyone to
leave.
No. 21AP-330                                                                               3

       {¶ 6} Appellant, Amar, and J.W. left Baker’s apartment and returned to Amar’s car.
Amar told appellant he needed to “chill out.” (Tr. Vol. I at 53.) Appellant responded that
he was “messed up in the head right now” and had “a lot going on.” (Tr. Vol. I at 54.) J.W.
then asked Amar when they would be going back to appellant’s apartment; Amar stated he
had to make a couple stops before returning. Amar then drove to an apartment complex
on 5th Avenue; he went inside one of the apartments while J.W. and appellant remained in
the car. Appellant told J.W. he previously lived in the area, knew it was dangerous, and
would call a Lyft to take J.W. home. Appellant also stated, “I know what’s up. I’m not
dumb,” and “[t]hey think I’m stupid.” (Tr. Vol. I at 55.)
       {¶ 7} Amar returned to the car 10-15 minutes later accompanied by a man (later
identified as Knox) whom J.W. did not know. Amar told appellant Knox was unable to
drive and asked appellant if he could drive Amar’s car back to appellant’s apartment. After
appellant agreed to do so, Amar stated he and Knox would follow in Knox’s car. J.W. moved
from the back seat to the front passenger seat. Appellant began driving erratically, swerving
in and out of traffic, which scared J.W. J.W. noticed appellant’s gun sitting on the car’s
console. Appellant called someone on his cell phone and asked that person to forgive him.
Appellant passed the phone to J.W.; an unidentified woman asked J.W. what was going on
and why appellant was talking about forgiveness. J.W. told the woman she was Z.C.’s friend
and that she did not know what was happening.
       {¶ 8} Soon thereafter, appellant parked Amar’s car; Amar pulled Knox’s car nearby.
J.W. noticed appellant’s gun was missing from the console area. Appellant opened his car
door carrying the gun; Amar exited Knox’s car with his hands up. Appellant pointed the
gun at Amar, stated “Pow, N word,” and shot him. (Tr. Vol. I at 62.) J.W. exited the car
and ran away; she then heard another gunshot. She initially hid behind an abandoned car.
Concluding that her hiding place was not safe because appellant was armed and she was
not, she continued running and eventually hid in some bushes. She observed appellant
“looking around” while driving in circles around the area; he eventually drove away. J.W.
then flagged down a car, reported to the driver that her friend’s stepfather had just killed
two people, and asked the driver to take her home. Upon arriving at home, she told her
father what happened, and he called police. She identified appellant as the shooter from a
photograph provided by police.
No. 21AP-330                                                                                4

       {¶ 9} On cross-examination, J.W. averred that she observed Amar drinking alcohol
at appellant’s apartment, but never saw him use cocaine. She further testified she initially
“didn’t think anything of it” when appellant touched her thigh; however, after Amar scolded
appellant for doing so, tensions rose between the two men. J.W. further asserted that Amar
“[got] loud” when she said she did not want to leave appellant’s apartment. (Tr. Vol. I at
82.) She further averred that Amar and appellant met with a man (Knox) at the ATM that
J.W. did not know. She also stated that she, Baker, Amar, and appellant were the only
persons present in Baker’s apartment; Knox was not there. According to J.W., Knox was
quite intoxicated when he left the 5th Avenue apartment, which presumably was the reason
Knox could not drive his car. After driving very fast and erratically, appellant pulled into a
random driveway on Fairwood Avenue and turned off the car. Amar pulled Knox’s car close
to where appellant had parked. Appellant exited the driver’s door with his gun drawn.
Amar walked toward appellant with his hands up. J.W. did not hear appellant warn Amar
not to come near him.
       {¶ 10} On redirect examination, J.W. testified that Amar did not have a gun in his
hand when he exited Knox’s vehicle. She also averred that appellant’s erratic driving after
leaving the 5th Avenue apartment complex was not because they were being chased. She
reiterated that appellant was the only person with a gun at Baker’s apartment. On recross-
examination, J.W. testified that Amar gave appellant the keys to his car before entering the
5th Avenue apartment.
       {¶ 11} Baker testified that at the time of the events at issue, Amar was her boyfriend;
she knew appellant but did not know J.W. On January 5, 2021, she and Amar had dinner
at her apartment. Amar later received a phone call and left to meet someone. At the time,
Baker did not know who Amar was going to meet; however, she later learned that Amar was
meeting Knox to provide cocaine to him. Amar returned later that evening with appellant
and J.W.; Knox was not with them. Amar told Baker about appellant touching J.W.’s upper
thigh and asked Baker if J.W. could stay with her while he took appellant elsewhere. Baker
refused and told them all to leave. Before leaving, J.W. went into the bathroom; appellant
sat on the couch. According to Baker, appellant’s “attitude and demeanor [were] totally off”
and “[h]is eyes were bloodshot red.” (Tr. Vol. I at 125.) Baker again directed the three
visitors to leave; appellant produced a gun and pulled the slide back, which caused a bullet
No. 21AP-330                                                                                              5

to eject from the chamber onto the floor. Amar told appellant to put the gun away and left
with appellant and J.W. Amar returned to the apartment briefly, but left after he and Baker
argued about appellant’s actions. Amar again left with appellant and J.W. in Amar’s car.
Baker later learned that appellant had shot and killed Amar. Subsequently, Baker was
interviewed by the police; she told them what had happened at her apartment, provided
them with the bullet that had been ejected from appellant’s gun, and identified appellant
from a photograph provided by police. Baker testified that although Amar sometimes told
people he carried a gun, he did not own a gun, did not have a gun that evening, and did not
threaten appellant.
        {¶ 12} On cross-examination, Baker admitted she called 911 because Amar was
unruly, belligerent, and drunk. She also testified that while she did not personally know
Knox, she was aware that Amar sometimes picked up cocaine and provided it to Knox for
his personal use.
        {¶ 13} Columbus Division of Police (“CPD”) Officer Jeffrey Lazar testified that he
arrived at the crime scene at approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 6, 2021. Officer Lazar
observed a running vehicle with the gearshift in drive located near a curb in front of a
residence on Fairwood Avenue. The front passenger door was open; a man with a fatal
gunshot wound to the head lay on the driveway near the vehicle. A second man with a fatal
gunshot wound to the head was seated in the driver’s seat; the man had a liquor bottle
between his legs and a baggie of cocaine in his left hand. Officer Lazar’s body-worn camera
captured the crime scene; the video was played for the jury.
        {¶ 14} Detective Mark Burghart of the Crime Scene Search Unit (“CSSU”) testified
he and other CSSU personnel took photographs and collected evidence from the crime
scene. Detective Burghart identified CSSU photographs depicting the vehicle, the bodies of
Amar and Knox,1 two spent shell casings, a black knit cap, appellant’s cell phone, a bottle
of vodka, a baggie of cocaine, and a bloody paper. Detective Burghart also identified
evidence collected from the scene, including the items depicted in the photographs.

1 State’s exhibits A24-28 depict Knox’s body as it was when CSSU arrived at the scene—slumped over in the

driver’s seat of the vehicle. State’s exhibits A43-47 show Knox’s body after he was removed from the vehicle
and positioned on the street by the coroner.
No. 21AP-330                                                                                6

       {¶ 15} SWAT Officer Mark Dilello testified he was dispatched to an address on East
Long Street to search for a vehicle reportedly stolen following a homicide. Officer Dilello
located the vehicle, which was unoccupied, in the parking lot of an apartment complex at
the Long Street address. Officer Dilello’s body-worn camera captured the scene; the video
was played for the jury. Following an inventory search, the vehicle was impounded.
       {¶ 16} CSSU Detective Nicole Prysock testified that pursuant to a search warrant,
she photographed and collected evidence from the vehicles recovered from Fairwood
Avenue and East Long Street. Detective Prysock took DNA swabs and recovered a live
round of ammunition from the vehicle recovered from East Long Street.
       {¶ 17} The parties stipulated that the Montgomery County coroner would testify
Amar died from a gunshot wound to the head and that a Franklin County deputy coroner
would testify that Knox also died from a gunshot wound to the head. The parties further
stipulated that a forensic scientist from the CPD Crime Lab would testify appellant was a
contributor to a DNA mixture recovered from the gear shift of the vehicle found on East
Long Street.
       {¶ 18} Detective Lowell Titus, the lead investigator in the case, testified that CSSU
personnel recovered no weapons during the search of the crime scene or the subsequent
processing of the vehicles pursuant to impoundment. Testing of the two shell casings
recovered from the scene revealed both were fired from the same gun. Detective Titus
further testified that during his interview with J.W., she provided details about the events
preceding and including the shooting of Amar and Knox, including identification of
appellant as the shooter. Detective Titus acknowledged that during J.W.’s initial interview
with a patrol officer she was less than forthright about the details of the events preceding
the shooting because that interview was conducted in the presence of her father and she did
not want him to know about her relationship with Z.C. Detective Titus also interviewed
Baker, who confirmed that appellant, Amar, and J.W. were at her apartment prior to the
shooting; Baker also provided the bullet she found in her apartment and identified a
photograph of appellant as the person who ejected the bullet from his gun.
       {¶ 19} Detective Titus further testified that once appellant was established as a
suspect in the murders, he filed a warrant for his arrest. Further investigation revealed that
the vehicle found on East Long Street was registered to Amar and that appellant’s driver’s
No. 21AP-330                                                                                7

license listed his address on East Long Street. Detective Titus further testified that
following appellant’s arrest, he obtained oral DNA swabs from appellant.
       {¶ 20} On cross-examination, Detective Titus averred that CPD issued the warrant
for appellant’s arrest on January 7, 2021; appellant voluntarily surrendered to the Franklin
County Jail on January 8, 2021. He acknowledged there were inconsistencies in J.W.’s
initial police interviews as to the events preceding the shootings and that she did not admit
she provided a false narrative in those interviews until her final police interview in April
2021. Detective Titus further acknowledged CPD’s investigation revealed that both Amar
and Knox had ingested cocaine, no evidence established appellant knew Knox or that he or
J.W. were aware Amar planned to go to Baker’s apartment or to Knox’s 5th Avenue
apartment, and that after leaving Knox’s apartment, Amar provided appellant the keys to
his car and asked him to drive it. Finally, Detective Titus acknowledged that Amar had $400
on his person and Knox had 2.922 grams of cocaine in his hand at the time of their deaths.
       {¶ 21} Caleb Worley, a CPD forensic firearms analyst, testified he compared the two
shell casings recovered from the crime scene to each other and the two bullets recovered
from the bodies of Amar and Knox to each other. Based on those comparisons, Worley
concluded the two shell casings had been fired from the same gun and the two bullets had
been fired from the same gun. However, without access to the gun, Worley could not
determine whether the casings and bullets were fired from the same gun.
       {¶ 22} Following the state’s presentation of evidence, appellant moved for judgment
of acquittal, pursuant to Crim.R. 29, on the basis that the state failed to sustain its burden
of proof that appellant did not shoot Amar and Knox in self-defense. The trial court denied
appellant’s motion.
       {¶ 23} After the state rested its case, appellant presented two witnesses on his behalf
—his mother, Alfrida Turner—and himself. Turner testified she resided on East Long
Street. She received a phone call from appellant just after midnight on January 6, 2021.
During the call, appellant spoke in a calm voice; however, Turner could not understand
what he was saying. Turner also spoke to J.W., who only stated she did not know what was
happening. On cross-examination, Turner indicated that the entire phone call lasted
approximately one minute.
No. 21AP-330                                                                                  8

       {¶ 24} Appellant testified that after returning home from work on January 5, 2021,
he drank a couple beers. At the time, Z.C. was living with him because Z.C.’s mother had
kicked him out of her home and he needed somewhere to live. Appellant described his
relationship with Z.C. as “like a stepson,” as appellant shared a child with Z.C.’s mother.
(Tr. Vol. II at 327.) Z.C. told appellant that his cousin, Amar, was bringing Z.C.’s girlfriend,
J.W., to the apartment for a visit. Appellant knew Amar and J.W. through Z.C. and his
mother; he and Amar were “cool” with each other. (Tr. Vol. II at 330.) Appellant directed
Z.C. to go to the store and buy food for his guests.
       {¶ 25} Amar and J.W. arrived at appellant’s apartment after Z.C. left for the store.
Amar sat with appellant at the kitchen table; J.W. went into the bedroom. Amar used
cocaine and offered it to appellant; appellant declined. Amar told J.W. to come into the
kitchen and sit at the table. Amar asked appellant to pay him the money Z.C. owed him;
appellant refused to do so. According to appellant, Amar was drunk and belligerent during
this conversation. J.W. was nervous and upset by the interaction between appellant and
Amar; in an effort to console J.W., appellant touched her hand, which was on her knee.
When J.W. pulled her hand away, appellant inadvertently touched her knee.
       {¶ 26} Amar accused appellant of touching J.W.’s leg inappropriately. Both J.W.
and appellant denied Amar’s accusation. Amar eventually conceded he was mistaken about
the touching incident. Thereafter, Amar told appellant he had lost his ATM card; he asked
appellant if he could transfer money into appellant’s bank account and then appellant could
withdraw that money from an ATM and give it to Amar.                Appellant agreed to this
arrangement. Amar insisted that J.W. accompany them to the ATM. Because he lived in a
high crime area, appellant brought his gun with him for protection.
       {¶ 27} Appellant withdrew the money from the ATM and gave it to Amar. At that
point, Knox pulled up next to Amar’s vehicle. Amar exited his vehicle and entered Knox’s
vehicle. Appellant overheard Amar tell Knox about the leg-touching incident with J.W.
Knox leaned forward, glared at appellant, and then leaned back in his seat; Knox’s actions
made appellant uneasy. Amar came back to his car and then drove to Baker’s apartment.
Upon arrival, appellant went into the bathroom. He overheard Amar tell Baker about the
leg-touching incident with J.W., which Amar described to Baker as being sexual in nature.
After appellant exited the bathroom, Amar tried to get appellant to admit that he had
No. 21AP-330                                                                                9

touched J.W. inappropriately. Amar walked toward appellant; appellant drew his gun,
pulled back the slide, and told Amar to “chill out.” (Tr. Vol. II at 345.) Appellant drew his
gun because Amar had been drinking, using cocaine, and behaving erratically. According
to appellant, he “didn’t know what [Amar] was capable of doing at that point.” (Tr. Vol. II
at 345.) Amar tried unsuccessfully to take the gun from appellant. Although Amar
indicated he had a gun, he did not produce one. Baker was upset about the confrontation
and ordered appellant, Amar, and J.W. to leave.
       {¶ 28} The three left Baker’s apartment in Amar’s car. At that point, appellant
assumed Amar would drive him and J.W. back to appellant’s apartment. Instead, Amar
drove to an apartment complex on 5th Avenue. Upon arrival, Amar parked the car, took
the car keys with him, and went inside one of the apartments. Appellant called for a Lyft to
take him home; he wanted to get out of the area because Amar had been acting strangely
throughout the evening. Appellant particularly noted Amar’s actions in driving to an
unknown location after promising to take appellant home and leaving appellant alone in
the car with J.W. after accusing him of touching her inappropriately.
       {¶ 29} A short time later, Amar emerged from the apartment with Knox. At that
point, appellant cancelled the Lyft. Knox walked to his car; Amar walked over to appellant,
gave appellant his car keys, and directed him to drive his car. Appellant initially protested,
but after Amar pushed him toward the car and again ordered him to drive, appellant
acquiesced. Amar told appellant he was not concerned that appellant had a gun because he
had a gun and Knox kept an AR rifle in his car. Appellant believed Amar’s assertions about
the guns. Appellant thought something “fishy [was] going on” because Amar told appellant
that Knox was too drunk to drive; however, Knox entered the driver’s seat of his car while
Amar sat in the passenger seat. Amar informed appellant that he and Knox would follow
him back to appellant’s apartment; after dropping off J.W., the three men would leave
together in Knox’s car.
       {¶ 30} Appellant began driving erratically in order to evade Amar and Knox.
Because he believed something bad was going to happen to him, he called his mother, and,
in accordance with the tenets of his religion, asked her forgiveness for past sins he had
committed against her. Appellant then gave J.W. his cell phone and told her to tell his
mother what was happening. Thereafter, believing he had successfully eluded Amar and
No. 21AP-330                                                                               10

Knox, appellant pulled the car into a random driveway and shut off the lights and engine.
Immediately thereafter, Knox pulled his car next to the curb close to the driveway. While
the car was still moving, Amar jumped out of the front passenger seat, left the door open,
and ran toward appellant. Appellant exited Amar’s vehicle with his gun drawn and
repeatedly warned Amar not to approach him. When appellant turned away to retrieve his
phone from J.W., Amar ran toward appellant with his right hand by his side and his left
hand extended.     When appellant turned around, Amar stated “Nah, fuck that” and
attempted to take appellant’s gun. (Tr. Vol. II at 363.) Recalling Amar’s assertion that both
he and Knox were armed, appellant shot Amar in self-defense.
       {¶ 31} After shooting Amar, appellant approached Knox’s vehicle; he realized Knox
could sho0t him through the open passenger door. When he saw Knox appear to reach for
something under the seat, appellant told him to “[f]reeze” and “[s]lowly show me your
hands.” (Tr. Vol. II at 369.) After Knox “raise[d] up real fast,” appellant shot him because
he feared Knox was going to shoot him. (Tr. Vol. II at 369.)
       {¶ 32} Appellant denied that Amar exited his vehicle with his hands up. Appellant
tried to escape from Amar and Knox before shooting them; he shot both men because Amar
had repeatedly warned him that they were armed. When he discovered a warrant had been
issued for his arrest, he immediately surrendered to police.
       {¶ 33} On cross-examination, appellant admitted he never saw Amar with a gun at
any point during the events at issue. He further acknowledged he was still sitting in the car
with the keys when Amar exited Knox’s vehicle and could have driven away. He also
admitted he left the keys in the car when he exited it to confront Amar and could have driven
away after he shot Amar. Appellant further conceded that after shooting Amar and Knox,
he did not call 911; instead, still armed, he fled the scene in Amar’s car and later threw his
gun in a trash can behind his mother’s house; he threw the gun away because he did not
want to be caught with it. He also admitted he did not surrender to police until he
discovered a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Appellant asserted he was afraid Amar
and Knox were planning to murder him because Amar believed appellant had touched J.W.
inappropriately.
       {¶ 34} On redirect examination, appellant averred he did not have sufficient time to
exit the driveway before Amar approached him. He further asserted he did not leave after
No. 21AP-330                                                                                11

he shot Amar because Knox was still in his car and appellant had been told by Amar that
both he and Knox were armed. Appellant further testified that he fled the scene after
shooting Amar and Knox because he panicked.
       {¶ 35} On recross-examination, appellant reiterated that he never observed Amar or
Knox with a gun. He acknowledged that Knox was facing forward in the car and was not
looking at him when he shot him in the right ear.
       {¶ 36} At the close of all the evidence, appellant renewed his Crim.R. 29 motion. The
trial court again denied the motion.
       {¶ 37} Following deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts and
firearm specifications.
       {¶ 38} In a sentencing entry filed June 17, 2021, the trial court merged Counts 3 and
4 with Count 2 and merged Count 6 with Count 5. The court imposed an indefinite sentence
of 8-12 years on Count 1; a life sentence with parole eligibility after 33 years (including 3
years for the firearm specification) on Count 2; and a life sentence with parole eligibility
after 18 years (including 3 years for the firearm specification) on Count 5. The trial court
ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a total aggregate sentence of life with parole
eligibility after a minimum of 59 years and a maximum of 63 years. Appellant was awarded
161 days of jail-time credit.
       {¶ 39} Appellant timely appealed and the matter was fully briefed by the parties. In
his briefing, appellant alleged four assignments of error, the fourth asserting a facial
constitutional challenge to the indeterminate sentencing scheme under R.C. 2967.271, the
Reagan Tokes Act, imposed by the trial court on Count 1. On July 22, 2022, this court sua
sponte stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court of Ohio’s resolution of State v.
Hacker, No. 2020-1496, and State v. Simmons, No. 2021-0532. On July 26, 2023, the Ohio
Supreme Court issued its decision in Hacker and Simmons, finding the Reagan Tokes Act
to be constitutional. State v. Hacker, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2023-Ohio-2535. On August 28,
2023, appellant filed a motion to lift the stay and reactivate the appeal; appellant also filed
a notice of voluntary dismissal of his fourth assignment of error. On August 29, 2023, this
court granted appellant’s motion to lift the stay and reactive the appeal. As appellant has
voluntarily dismissed his fourth assignment of error, this decision will focus on the
remaining three assignments of error set forth below.
No. 21AP-330                                                                               12

II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 40} Appellant assigns the following three assignments of error for our review:
              [I.] The verdicts of guilty as to count one, aggravated robbery,
              and count two, felony-aggravated murder, based on
              aggravated robbery, and court four, felony-murder, based on
              aggravated robbery, are not supported by sufficient evidence.

              [II.] The verdicts of guilt as to count one, aggravated robbery,
              and count two, felony-aggravated murder, based on
              aggravated robbery, and count four, felony-murder, based on
              aggravated robbery, are against the manifest weight of the
              evidence.

              [III.] The verdicts of guilt as to count three and count five,
              murder, and as to count four and count six, felony-murder,
              based on felonious assault, are against the manifest weight of
              the evidence.

III. Analysis
       {¶ 41} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are interrelated and will be
considered together. Under these assignments of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence supporting his convictions on Count 1, aggravated robbery,
Count 2, felony aggravated murder, and Count 4, felony murder.
       {¶ 42} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence
are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380
(1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, we separately set forth the relevant
standards of review.
       {¶ 43} “[W]hether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support a
conviction involves a determination of whether the state met its burden of production at
trial.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-678, 2023-Ohio-3994, ¶ 14, citing State v.
Smith, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1157, 2004-Ohio-4786, ¶ 16; State v. Frazier, 10th Dist. No.
05AP-1323, 2007-Ohio-11, ¶ 7; Thompkins at 386. In a sufficiency challenge, an appellate
court does not weigh the evidence; rather, the court determines “ ‘ “whether, after viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
Harris at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. A reviewing court
No. 21AP-330                                                                                  13

“essentially assume[s] the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and determine[s] if that
testimony and any other evidence presented at trial satisfies each element of the crime.”
Harris at ¶ 14, citing State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-142, 2016-Ohio-8272, ¶ 31,
citing State v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-889, 2008-Ohio-4257, ¶ 41. Thus, evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction where, if believed, that evidence would permit any
rational trier of fact to conclude that the state proved each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Harris at ¶ 14, citing Frazier at ¶ 7, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the
syllabus.
       {¶ 44} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of
law.” Thompkins at 386, citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486 (1955). “[A] conviction
based on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process.” Id., citing Tibbs
v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). “To
reverse a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the judgment is not sustained by
sufficient evidence, only a concurring majority of a panel of a court of appeals reviewing the
judgment is necessary.” Thompkins at paragraph three of the syllabus, applying Article IV,
Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution.
       {¶ 45} In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, a manifest weight claim “attacks the
credibility of the evidence presented and questions whether the state met its burden of
persuasion.” Harris at ¶ 15, citing State v. Richey, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-260, 2018-Ohio-
3498, ¶ 50, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 11-13, citing
Thompkins at 386-87. Although the evidence may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict,
a manifest weight challenge requires a different type of analysis. Harris at ¶ 14, citing State
v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-679, 2003-Ohio-986, ¶ 43. The weight of the evidence
concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one
side of the issue rather than the other. Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. Petty, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-
950, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 60, citing State v. Boone, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-87, 2015-Ohio-2648,
¶ 49, citing Thompkins at 387.
       {¶ 46} In considering a manifest weight claim, an appellate court sits as a
“ ‘thirteenth juror’ ” and may disagree “ ‘with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting
testimony.’ ” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs at 42. In making this
determination, an appellate court “ ‘review[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
No. 21AP-330                                                                                  14

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
       {¶ 47} Although an appellate court reviews credibility when assessing the manifest
weight of the evidence, the court must be mindful that determinations regarding witness
testimony and the weight of testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. Harris at ¶ 17,
citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. This is so
because the trier of fact is best able “ ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the
proffered testimony.’ ” Harris at ¶ 17, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio
St.3d 77, 80 (1984). A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because
the trier of fact believed the state’s version of the events over the appellant’s. State v. Gale,
10th Dist. No. 05AP-708, 2006-Ohio-1523, ¶ 19. The trier of fact is free to believe or
disbelieve all or any of the testimony provided at trial. State v Jackson, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-
973 (Mar. 19, 2002).
       {¶ 48} “ ‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins
at 387, quoting Martin at 175. Further, reversal of a jury verdict on manifest weight
grounds requires unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel
reviewing the case.     Harris at ¶ 18, citing Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio
Constitution; Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4,
citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.
       {¶ 49} Appellant first contends there was insufficient evidence to permit a rational
trier of fact to find the essential elements of aggravated robbery under Count 1 of the
indictment. That count charged appellant with aggravated robbery of Amar in violation of
R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and/or (3).
       {¶ 50} R.C. 2911.01(A) states in part:
              No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense as
              defined in [R.C. 2913.01] or in fleeing immediately after the
              attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
No. 21AP-330                                                                                  15

              (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or
              under the offender’s control and either display the weapon,
              brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it;

              ***

              (3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on
              another.

       {¶ 51} R.C. 2913.01(K) defines “[t]heft offense” to include a violation of R.C.
2913.02. Relevant here, R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (2) state in part:
              No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property * *
              * shall knowingly obtain or exert control over * * * the
              property * * *:

              (1) Without the consent of the owner * * *; [or]

              (2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the
              owner * * *[.]

       {¶ 52} In challenging his conviction for aggravated robbery, appellant first contends
there was insufficient evidence to prove he committed a theft offense under either R.C.
2913.02(A)(1) or (2) prior to killing Amar. Appellant maintains that when Amar left Knox’s
apartment building, he gave appellant the keys to his car and told him to drive it back to
appellant’s apartment while he and Knox followed in Knox’s car. Appellant maintains that
Amar’s open-ended entrustment of his car to him does not support a finding that appellant
exerted control over Amar’s car without his consent or beyond the scope of Amar’s consent
prior to Amar’s murder.
       {¶ 53} Although appellant arguably may have had Amar’s initial consent to drive his
car prior to the shooting, appellant clearly acted outside the scope of that consent when he
drove away in Amar’s car after shooting and killing him. The state’s theory of the case was
that appellant committed aggravated robbery by stealing Amar’s car after shooting him.
The state expressed this theory in its opening statement: “We only have the one aggravated
robbery count and that only applies to Malik Amar because after [appellant] shot Malik
Amar in the head, he stole his vehicle; that’s your theft offense.” (Tr. Vol. I at 21.) The state
reiterated this theory in its closing argument: “Count One is Aggravated Robbery. * * *
What we’re talking about is when the Defendant shot and killed [Amar] and then shot and
No. 21AP-330                                                                                 16

killed [Knox], but it’s the shooting of [Amar] and then taking his car. That’s all we’re talking
about here. Okay? He didn’t have permission from a dead man to take his car, okay,
aggravated robbery. * * * The murder was first, leading up to the theft.” (Tr. Vol. III at
507.)
        {¶ 54} “ ‘ “Once a person lawfully has control over property with consent, that person
cannot thereafter exert control for a different purpose. That person already has control.
Instead, what changes is whether or not the individual [acted] within the scope of the
consent.” ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Woodburn, 4th Dist. No. 18CA891, 2019-Ohio-
2757, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Roberts, 2d Dist. No. 26431, 2015-Ohio-2716, ¶ 13, quoting
State v. Dortch, 2d Dist. No. 17700 (Oct. 15, 1999). “ ‘ “If the individual begins to use the
property for something outside what the owner specifically authorized, the individual has
gone beyond the owner’s consent. The [theft] statute allows for this precise situation in
R.C. 2913.02(A)(2).” ’ ” Id., quoting Roberts at ¶ 13, quoting Dortch.
        {¶ 55} In the present case, the state presented sufficient evidence to prove appellant
committed a theft offense by exerting control over Amar’s car beyond the scope of the
consent provided by Amar. As noted above, J.W. testified that Amar gave appellant the
keys to his car and told him to drive it back to appellant’s apartment. Thus, the scope of
consent provided by Amar was limited to appellant driving the car back to his apartment.
J.W. further testified that after appellant shot Amar, he returned to Amar’s car, drove it
around the area for several minutes and then drove away. Appellant’s flight from the scene
in Amar’s car after shooting him clearly exceeded the scope of consent provided by Amar.
        {¶ 56} Appellant next argues the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove
he used a deadly weapon or inflicted serious physical harm in committing the theft offense.
We have already determined that appellant committed a theft offense when he fled the
scene in Amar’s car after shooting and killing him. Appellant’s argument essentially goes
to the issue of whether a criminal defendant “killed before he stole or stole before he killed.”
State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 571 (1997). The Palmer court found that issue to be “of
no consequence.” Id. “ ‘The victim of a robbery, killed just prior to the robber’s carrying
off her property, is nonetheless the victim of an aggravated robbery. The victim need not
be alive at the time of asportation.’ ” Id. at 571-72, quoting State v. Smith, 61 Ohio St.3d
284, 290 (1991). See also State v. Twyford, 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 354 (2002) (“This court has
No. 21AP-330                                                                               17

consistently rejected arguments that no robbery occurred because the murder victim was
already dead at the time of the theft.”).
       {¶ 57} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the state, there was
sufficient evidence upon which a trier of fact could find that appellant used a deadly weapon
in committing a theft offense and/or that he inflicted serious physical harm while
committing a theft offense. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant’s sufficiency
challenge to his conviction for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and/or (3).
       {¶ 58} Appellant next contends there was insufficient evidence to permit a rational
trier of fact to find the essential elements of aggravated felony murder under Count 2 of the
indictment. That count charged appellant with purposely causing Amar’s death while
committing aggravated robbery. R.C. 2903.01(B) states in part: “No person shall purposely
cause the death of another * * * while committing * * * aggravated robbery.”
       {¶ 59} Similar to his sufficiency challenge to his conviction for aggravated robbery,
appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felony aggravated
murder because it only arguably showed a theft offense occurring after Amar’s death.
Appellant maintains that a theft offense committed after a homicide does not meet the
requirement set forth in R.C. 2903.01(B) that the homicide must occur “while” an
aggravated robbery is being committed. Ohio law does not support appellant’s position.
       {¶ 60} The Supreme Court has held “ ‘the term “while” does not indicate * * * that
the killing must occur at the same instant as the [predicate felony], or that the killing must
have been caused by the [felony].’ ” State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404,
¶ 55, quoting State v. Cooper, 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 179-80 (1977). Nor does the law require
“that the felony must have been the motive for the killing.” Id., citing State v. Williams, 74
Ohio St.3d 569, 577 (1996). “Rather, ‘while’ means that ‘the killing must be directly
associated with the [felony] as part of one continuous occurrence.’ ” Id. at ¶ 56, quoting
Cooper at 179-80. Thus, “ ‘the term “while” means that the death must occur as part of acts
leading up to, or occurring during, or immediately subsequent to the [relevant felony].’ ”
Id., quoting Williams at 577. “ ‘The sequence of events’ may be ‘examined in light of time,
place, and causal connection’ to determine whether it ‘amounts to “one continuous
occurrence.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 441 (1998), quoting State
v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 23 (1989).
No. 21AP-330                                                                                 18

       {¶ 61} We have previously noted the evidence in support of his conviction for the
predicate felony of aggravated robbery. Similarly, with respect to felony aggravated
murder, the state presented sufficient evidence, which, if believed, established that
appellant intended to, and did, kill Amar, and then left the scene in Amar’s car. The state’s
evidence established appellant parked Amar’s car on a random residential driveway, exited
the car, and shot and killed Amar as he stood on the driveway. After killing Amar, appellant
returned to Amar’s car and drove away from the scene. When viewed “ ‘in light of time,
place, and causal connection,’ ” the situs and timing of the murder and asportation of
Amar’s car connected the offenses such that the jury reasonably could have found that the
aggravated murder “ ‘occur[red] as part of acts leading up to’ ” the aggravated robbery.
Johnson at ¶ 56 quoting McNeill at 441; Johnson at ¶ 56, quoting Williams at 557.
       {¶ 62} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the state, there was
sufficient evidence upon which a trier of fact could find appellant purposely caused Amar’s
death while committing aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant’s
sufficiency challenge to his conviction for felony aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B).
       {¶ 63} Lastly, appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to permit a rational
trier of fact to find the essential elements of felony murder under Count 4 of the indictment.
That count charged appellant with causing Amar’s death as a proximate result of
committing aggravated robbery and/or felonious assault.
       {¶ 64} R.C. 2903.02(B) states in part: “No person shall cause the death of another
as a proximate result of the offender’s committing * * * an offense of violence that is a felony
of the first or second degree.” Both aggravated robbery and felonious assault are offenses
of violence. R.C. 2901.11(C)(9). Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. R.C.
2901.11(C). As pertinent here, felonious assault is a felony of the second degree. R.C.
2903.11(A)(2); 2903.11(D)(1).
       {¶ 65} Appellant cites State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. No. 98725, 2013-Ohio-4372, ¶ 36
for the proposition that “ ‘for criminal conduct to constitute the “proximate cause” of a
result, the conduct must have (1) caused the result, in that but for the conduct the result
would not have occurred, and (2) the result must have been foreseeable.’ ” (Appellant’s
Brief at 37-38, quoting Gibson.) Appellant contends the predicate felony offense at issue is
aggravated robbery and that such “was not a ‘but for’ cause of [Amar’s] death. The ‘cause’
No. 21AP-330                                                                               19

cannot come after the ‘effect.’ An intent to commit theft formed after the death cannot be
the cause of the death. Further, death could not be the foreseeable result of a theft that had
not yet occurred.” (Appellant’s Brief at 38.)
       {¶ 66} We decline to comment on appellant’s general “proximate cause”
proposition, other than to note that appellant’s application of that proposition focuses
exclusively on aggravated robbery. Appellant does not acknowledge that the state charged
appellant with felony murder based on aggravated robbery and/or felonious assault as
alternative predicate felonies.
       {¶ 67} Here, the jury instructions set forth aggravated robbery and/or felonious
assault as alternative predicate felonies under Count 4.        Thus, the jury could have
determined the relevant predicate felony offense to be felonious assault rather than
aggravated robbery. The felonious assault statute, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), prohibits a person
from “knowingly” “[c]aus[ing] or attempting to cause physical harm to another * * * by
means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” The term “[d]eadly weapon” is defined
as “any instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specifically
adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A).
A “[f]irearm” is a “deadly weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(B)(1).
       {¶ 68} As previously mentioned, the state provided eyewitness testimony from J.W.
establishing that appellant shot and killed Amar in the driveway of a random residence. In
addition to that eyewitness testimony, the state presented evidence establishing that
responding police officers discovered Amar’s lifeless body on the driveway. The state also
presented evidence from the coroner who examined Amar’s body establishing that Amar’s
death was caused by a gunshot wound to the head. The state’s evidence further established
that a shell casing was recovered from the area near Amar’s body and the bullet that struck
Amar was recovered from his body.
       {¶ 69} When viewed in a light most favorable to the state, we find there was
sufficient evidence to convict appellant of felony murder via felonious assault, as the
evidence sufficiently established appellant caused physical harm to Amar by shooting him
with a deadly weapon and that the shooting was the proximate cause of Amar’s death.
Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction for
felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B).
No. 21AP-330                                                                                20

       {¶ 70} Appellant also contends his convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 4 were against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s manifest weight challenge is based on
essentially the same grounds raised in his sufficiency arguments. Appellant maintains that
the greater weight of the evidence establishes: (1) he did not commit aggravated robbery in
the commission of a theft offense because he had Amar’s consent to drive his car prior to
the shooting, (2) Amar’s death did not occur while an aggravated robbery was being
committed, and (3) Amar’s death was not the proximate result of the commission of
aggravated robbery. We have considered the evidence relevant to these arguments, and,
after reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the evidence weighs heavily against
appellant’s convictions, that the trier of fact lost its way, or that a manifest miscarriage of
justice has occurred.
       {¶ 71} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the state presented sufficient evidence
to support appellant’s convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 4 and that those convictions were
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.
       {¶ 72} Accordingly, appellant’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
       {¶ 73} In his third assignment of error, appellant challenges the weight of the
evidence supporting his convictions on Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6. Counts 3 and 5 charged
appellant with the murders of Amar and Knox, respectively; Counts 4 and 6, respectively,
charged appellant with the felony murders of Amar and Knox with the predicate offense
being felonious assault.
       {¶ 74} Murder is prohibited by R.C. 2903.02(A), which states that: “No person shall
purposely cause the death of another.” As already noted, R.C. 2903.02(B) proscribes
murder based on an underlying offense of violence that is a felony of the first- or second-
degree (here, felonious assault). Appellant does not dispute that he purposely shot both
Amar and Knox and that the gunshots caused their deaths. However, at trial, appellant
testified that events preceding the shootings established that he shot and killed Amar and
Knox in self-defense. Based on appellant’s testimony, the trial court instructed the jury on
self-defense.
       {¶ 75} The elements of self-defense in a deadly force case are that the defendant:
(1) was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) had a bona fide
belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and his only means of
No. 21AP-330                                                                                  21

escape from such danger was in the use of such force, and (3) did not violate any duty to
retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 14,
citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24 (2002).
       {¶ 76} Self-defense is an affirmative defense—not an element of a crime. Id. at ¶ 24.
R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) provides in part:
              A person is allowed to act in self-defense * * *. If, at the trial
              of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the
              person’s use of force against another, there is evidence
              presented that tends to support that the accused person used
              the force in self-defense * * * the prosecution must prove
              beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not
              use the force in self-defense * * *.

       {¶ 77} Thus, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) requires the state “ ‘to disprove self-defense by
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] (1) was at fault in creating the
situation giving rise to the affray, OR (2) did not have a bona fide belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm for which the use of deadly force was his
only means of escape, OR (3) did violate a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.’ ” (Emphasis
sic.) State v. Messenger, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-879, 2021-Ohio-2411, ¶ 36, quoting State v.
Carney, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶ 31. “Under [the second] prong, the
defendant must have used only that force reasonably necessary to repel the attack. That is,
he must not have used excessive force.” State v. Hall, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-137, 2023-Ohio-
837, ¶ 41, citing State v. Kean, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-427, 2019-Ohio-1171, ¶ 58. Although
“ ‘the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of self-defense has shifted to the state, the
burden of production for all affirmative defenses, including self-defense, remains with the
defendant.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 38, quoting Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, at ¶ 44,
citing State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. No. C-190379, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 14.
       {¶ 78} “ ‘A self-defense claim is generally an issue of credibility.’ ”          State v.
Lawrence, 11th Dist. No. 2022-L-110, 2023-Ohio-3419, ¶ 41, quoting State v. Olsen, 11th
Dist. No. 2022-A-0071, 2023-Ohio-2254, ¶ 57. “ ‘Disputes in credibility for the purposes of
evaluating self-defense are best resolved by the trier of fact.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Bentley,
11th Dist. No. 2022-L-076, 2023-Ohio-1792, ¶ 24. “ ‘It has been held that “a conviction is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of fact believed the state’s
version of events over the defendant’s version” and rejected the defendant’s claim of self-
No. 21AP-330                                                                                22

defense.’ ” Id., quoting Bentley at ¶ 24, quoting Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, at ¶ 49.
“When weighing witness testimony supporting a claim of self-defense, the trier of fact is
‘free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the witnesses’ and ‘is in the best position to
take into account inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and
determine whether the witnesses’ testimony is credible.’ ” Id., quoting Bentley at ¶ 24,
citing State v. Haney, 11th Dist. No. 2012-L-098, 2013-Ohio-2823, ¶ 43.
       {¶ 79} Appellant does not separately address each of the three prongs of a self-
defense claim. Rather, appellant provides the following general narrative, which, we note,
is based on his version of events. Amar acted belligerently toward him over the entire
course of the evening based on his belief that appellant had touched J.W. inappropriately.
While at Baker’s apartment, Amar became so belligerent about the touching incident that
appellant feared for his safety and brandished a firearm as a warning to Amar. Appellant
believed Amar’s assertion that he and Knox were armed, and he told J.W. that he believed
Amar and Knox meant to harm him. Amar’s and Knox’s pursuit of him while he tried to
elude them caused him to call his mother because he thought his life was in danger. After
he pulled Amar’s vehicle into the driveway, Amar approached him and aggressively
attempted to take appellant’s gun despite appellant’s warning to stay back. When Knox
reached for something under the seat of his vehicle, appellant ordered him to freeze; Knox
did not heed appellant’s warning. From this narrative, we glean appellant’s arguments to
be that he was not at fault in creating the situation leading to the deaths of Amar and Knox
and that he had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm for which the use of deadly force was his only means of escape.
       {¶ 80} The state separately addresses each element of a self-defense claim. The state
first argues that appellant was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the deaths of
Amar and Knox. In support, the state cites J.W.’s testimony that after appellant pulled
Amar’s vehicle into the driveway, he exited it with his gun drawn. Amar exited Knox’s
vehicle, unarmed, with his hands up. When Amar walked toward appellant, appellant
stated “Pow, N word” and shot him. As to Knox, the state cites appellant’s own testimony
that Knox was seated in his car, facing forward, when appellant shot him in the side of the
head. The state further references appellant’s testimony that he never observed either
Amar or Knox display a gun.
No. 21AP-330                                                                               23

       {¶ 81} The state next argues appellant did not have a bona fide belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm for which the use of deadly force was his
only means of escape. In support, the state cites J.W.’s testimony that Amar did not have a
gun in his hand when he approached appellant on the driveway as well as appellant’s
testimony that he never saw Amar or Knox display a weapon. The state further notes the
testimony of CPD personnel that no weapons were recovered from the area near Amar’s
body or from Knox’s car. The state also cites appellant’s testimony that Knox was seated in
his vehicle when appellant shot him.
       {¶ 82} Lastly, the state argues appellant violated his duty to retreat and avoid any
danger. In support of this argument, the state observes that after leaving Knox’s apartment
complex in Amar’s car, appellant chose to stop in a random driveway rather than call for
help or drive to a safe location. The state further notes appellant’s testimony that he was
still seated in Amar’s vehicle when Amar exited Knox’s vehicle and could have driven away
at that point; however, he chose to exit Amar’s car and confront Amar with his gun drawn.
       {¶ 83} The state also argues that appellant’s own testimony contradicts his
assertions that he was fearful of Amar over the entire course of the evening preceding the
shootings. Specifically, the state cites appellant’s admissions that he voluntarily rode with
Amar to the ATM, to Baker’s residence and to Knox’s apartment, cancelled his Lyft ride,
and agreed to drive Amar’s vehicle for him after leaving Knox’s apartment.
       {¶ 84} In addition to the arguments and evidence cited by the state in its brief, we
also note that appellant’s actions after the shootings tend to discredit his testimony.
Appellant drove Amar’s car away from the scene, destroyed evidence by throwing his gun
in a trash can, and did not call police immediately to report that he had shot two men in
self-defense.
       {¶ 85} Having reviewed the entire record, weighed the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considered the credibility of witnesses, we conclude the jury did not lose its
way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding that the state, beyond a
reasonable doubt, disproved that appellant was not at fault in creating the situation leading
to the shooting deaths of Amar and Knox, that appellant had a bona fide belief he was in
great bodily harm necessitating the use of deadly force, and that appellant did not violate
the duty to retreat or avoid the danger. Accordingly, the manifest weight of the evidence
No. 21AP-330                                                                           24

supported appellant’s convictions for murder and felony murder with respect to both Amar
and Knox.
      {¶ 86} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
      {¶ 87} Having overruled appellant’s three assignments of error, and appellant
having voluntarily dismissed his fourth assignment of error, we hereby affirm the judgment
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                     Judgment affirmed.
                    BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and MENTEL, J., concur.