Court Opinion

ID: 9712170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:48:08.264798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.556665
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Achoe, C. J.
We do not concur in the majority-opinion as written.
Appellant presents two questions by this appeal: (1) Is the evidence sufficient to support the verdict, and (2) did the court commit reversible error by reason of his having given instruction numbered 18 over the objection of the appellant?
Appellant correctly contends that the age requirement (over sixteen) fixed by statute (§10-4709, Burns’ 1956 Repl.) is a necessary element of the criminal offense charged, which must be established for the purpose of determining whether the offense was an act of juvenile delinquency or a crime under the statute. Therefore, the first question with which the court is concerned is, was the evidence sufficient to support the fact that appellant was “over sixteen (16) years of age,” as prescribed by statute?
The law is well settled that, when this court is asked to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, it will not weigh evidence and determine whether each element of the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, it will consider only whether there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable inference as to each essential element of the offense may be drawn. Todd v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 85, 101 N. E. 2d 922; Christen v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 30, 89 N. E. 2d 445.
We submit that the evidence, independent of any observation of the appellant, was ample to sustain an *339inference that the appellant was “over sixteen (16) years of age” and that the inference stands uncontra-dicted. We believe that error of the majority opinion springs primarily from an erroneous application of the above rule.
The evidence on the issue of appellant’s age is as follows: One witness pointed out appellant in the court room, saying: “The man sitting right there is the man that held me up.” Other witnesses referred to appellant as a “man” they had seen in a tavern, buying and drinking beer, displaying a gun and discussing the fact of his unemployment. The word “man,” used to identify and describe the appellant generally, as emphasized by repetition in the above statement, has a universally accepted meaning. A “man” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary as “an adult male person.” We submit that, by every reasonable inference, an adult male is “over sixteen (16) years of age.”
Also, we are confronted by the fact that the jury was entitled to consider the conduct of appellant in determining his age. The inference discussed above is made stronger by the fact that appellant, a “man,” was seen in a tavern (not in the presence of his parents), where he bought several bottles of beer which he and other persons drank in the tavern. We take judicial knowledge of the fact that it is unlawful for a person under the age of 18 years to visit a tavern not accompanied by a parent (§12-613, Burns’ 1956 Repl.), and it is unlawful to sell intoxicating beverages to a person under the age of 21 years (§12-610).
Here we have a man, defined by Webster as “an adult male person,” at a place and under such circumstances where, by law, only persons over 18 years are permitted. How can it be said that there is no reasonable inference that such a person was not over sixteen years of age? *340We submit that the above evidence supports a reasonable inference that appellant was an adult, over sixteen, which- evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment. We further submit that, there being no evidence to the contrary, the evidence leads solely to such conclusion.
For the reason above stated, we believe there could havé been no reversible error in the giving of the court’s instruction numbered 18 which appellant has also assigned . as cause for reversal. The instruction is as follows:
“One of the essential elements of the offense of armed robbery is that the person charged is over the age of sixteen years and this fact, if it be a fact, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State of Indiana the same as any other fact, and in the event you find this was not proven then you- should find the defendant not guilty of armed robbery, but you are further instructed that you may observe the defendant and draw upon your observation of him in determining whether or not the defendant was a person over sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.”
We express no opinion as to the merits of the above instruction. However, under the facts before us, appellant could not have been prejudiced by the above instruction. As above stated, the evidence, apart from that authorized by the instruction, supported the fact that appellant was over sixteen years of age. This fact itself is not disputed. Therefore, any observation of the defendant for the purpose of determining his age could not have operated to his prejudice. The rule upon this issue has been stated many times by this court as follows:
-. A material erroneous instruction is presumed to have influenced the result of the trial, unless--it appears otherwise from the interroga*341tories, the evidence, or other parts of the record that the error was harmless and that under proper instructions the verdict could not have been different. Probst v. Spitznagle (1939) 215 Ind. 402, 19 N. E. 2d 263; Sweeney v. Vierbuchen (1946) 224 Ind. 341, 66 N. E. 2d 764; . . .” Flanagan, etc. Ind. Tr. & Appellate Practice, §2790, p. 374, Comment 10.
Bobbitt, J., concurs.
Note : Reported on 140 N. E. 2d 109.