Court Opinion

ID: 9720394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:07.264646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:29.221251
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring). Today we are asked to consider whether the conditions under which Rodney Wright provided statements to the police, i.e., deprivation of food, sleep, and contact with his attorney, require their suppression. On the basis of well-established Michigan law, I would find his waiver of the right to remain silent involuntary.
i
On March 7, 1987, about 1:00 a.m., Clifford Harrell was shot in the stomach. Rodney Wright was holding the gun when it went off. Wright had retrieved the gun from his house to break up a fight between Harrell and one of Wright’s friends, and, during the commotion, the gun was jostled and it discharged. Whether Wright deliberately fired the weapon or whether it fired accidentally is unknown.
After the shooting, Detroit police officers arrived to investigate. They talked to various witnesses who described the events leading up to the incident. On the basis of these statements, the police arrested Rodney Wright at approximately 4 o’clock in the morning. They transported him to the Fourteenth Precinct, and put him into a holding cell. Subsequently, he was transferred downtown to the homicide division after Harrell had died. His transfer occurred just before breakfast was served.
During his wait at the homicide division, the police left him alone in a room with a desk and three hard-backed chairs. Even though he had had no opportunity to sleep, the police did not offer *165him a place to rest. When officers would enter the room, Wright repeatedly asked to speak with his family — so that they would know he was safe and advise him about what to do — only to be told that the only person who could authorize contact was Sergeant George Taylor. Sergeant Taylor, however, refused him permission to make a telephone call until after Wright made a statement.
During this time, Wright decided to cooperate fully with the police. At 10:00 a.m., Sergeant Taylor escorted Wright to his office. After giving him Miranda1 warnings, he asked whether Wright wanted to make a statement and Wright agreed. He and Sergeant Taylor talked for a short time. Sergeant Taylor decided not to record this conversation and could not remember its contents when asked about it at a Walker2 hearing. After informing Wright that the statement he had given was a lie, he was placed into another smaller room. Sergeant Taylor then left to talk with other witnesses.
The witnesses apparently did not inculpate anyone sufficiently to resolve the case in Sergeant Taylor’s mind. Upon returning from these interviews, Sergeant Taylor had Wright brought to his office. Before talking to Wright, Sergeant Taylor ordered some fast-food from a local restaurant. Wright, not having eaten, asked if he, too, could purchase some food, but Sergeant Taylor ignored this request and ate his food in front of him.
After Sergeant Taylor finished eating, another officer came into his office and the two officers began interrogating Wright. Although it was several hours since they had spoken, Sergeant Taylor *166did not repeat the Miranda warnings. The officers began by telling Wright that they would charge him with "murder-one,” unless he told them something they could use to prevent that charge. Wright, in the hope that he would be allowed to speak with his family, suggested that he and another person wrestled with the gun when it discharged. After putting this version of events in writing, the police ended Wright’s isolation, allowing him to call his family and telling him that an attorney hired by his family was waiting to see him.
ii
Despite many superficial similarities, Michigan jurisprudence differs from federal jurisprudence in its requirements for a valid waiver of rights. Under federal law, a waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938); Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177; 110 S Ct 2793; 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990); Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564; 107 S Ct 851; 93 L Ed 2d 954 (1987). No single element predominates. However, Michigan jurisprudence governing the validity of waivers during interrogation focuses primarily on the coerciveness of conditions surrounding the making of the waiver;3 statements made under coercive condition, are suppressed. See, e.g., Flagg v People, 40 Mich 706 (1879); People v Stewart, 75 Mich 21; 42 NW 662 (1889); People v Dudgeon, 229 Mich 26; 201 NW 355 (1924); People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410; 102 *167NW2d 738 (1960). Where conditions did not overbear a defendant’s will, statements have been held admissible. People v Brannan, 406 Mich 104; 276 NW2d 14 (1979); People v Farmer, 380 Mich 198; 156 NW2d 504 (1968); People v Boyce, 314 Mich 608; 23 NW2d 99 (1946). Although whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent has been considered in certain cases, People v Collins, 303 Mich 34; 5 NW2d 556 (1942); People v Simpson, 48 Mich 474; 12 NW 662 (1882); People v Biossat, 206 Mich 334, 338; 172 NW 933 (1919), analysis of the conditions under which the accused made the relevant statements predominates. For example, in People v Brockett, 195 Mich 169, 179; 161 NW 991 (1917), we stated,
Proof of a confession is never admissible unless it is voluntarily made, and by the word "voluntary” is meant that the confession must be of the free will and accord of the defendant, without coercion whether from fear of any threat of harm, promise or inducement by hope of reward, or method known as "sweating.”
This approach continues to be applied. In People v Brannan, supra at 118-119, in finding a statement to be admissible, we emphasized the noncoerciveness of the circumstances under which the right to remain silent was waived.
This is not a case in which police took a person into custody, failed to inform the person of his rights, questioned him insistently until incriminating evidence or some other lever was obtained and then belatedly gave the Miranda warnings just before the virtually foregone conclusion of obtaining a formal confession. . . . Nor is this a case in which the police have isolated the defendant from counsel or have grilled the defendant in such a way that the ultimate giving of the Miranda *168warnings . . . was a meaningless gesture. [Emphasis added.]
In sum, voluntariness forms the touchstone of the inquiry concerning the validity of the waivers made while in police custody.
Many cases recognize that incommunicado interrogation — the practice of consciously isolating a suspect from all friendly contact with outsiders to coerce a waiver of the right to remain silent — can undermine a person’s will and make him highly susceptible to police assertiveness. People v White, 401 Mich 482, 495-497; 257 NW2d 912 (1977); People v Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680; 225 NW 501 (1929); People v Allen, 8 Mich App 408; 154 NW2d 570 (1967); Cf. People v Brannan, supra; People v Arroyo, 138 Mich App 246; 360 NW2d 185 (1984); People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619; 178 NW2d 94 (1970). In People v Cavanaugh, supra, the police arrested the defendant, a juvenile, and ignored his requests to speak with his family, his priest, and his attorney. They also actively interfered with his counsel’s attempts to see him. The prosecutor argued that evidence of such police tactics was irrelevant to the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver.4 This Court disagreed.
A voluntary confession of commission of an established crime is evidence long sanctioned, but a confession, extorted by mental disquietude, induced by unlawfully holding an accused incommunicable, is condemned by every principle of fairness, has all the evils of the old-time lettre de cachet, is forbidden by the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, and inhibited by the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel. [Id. at 686.]
*169That defendant was held incommunicado bears closely on the voluntariness of the waiver.
Incommunicado interrogation aifects the voluntariness of a waiver because it suggests that cooperation will be advantageous whether or not the statements are true. As Justice Cooley explained in People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615; 17 NW 78 (1883), "No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them.” Statements made under these circumstances easily may lose their quality as conscience-laden admissions of guilt, Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 156-158; 111 S Ct 486; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and become an attempt to please the interrogating officer. In addition, such interrogation turns the safeguards provided by the federal constitution into means to increase the coercive pressure on a suspect. Under federal law, when a person in custody requests counsel, interrogation must cease. Minnick v Mississippi, supra; Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981); Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Although interrogation may cease, a defendant’s isolation from friendly contact with the outside world does not; it continues unabated. Continued isolation only increases the defendant’s incentive to speak with the police and to comply with their demands. Failing to inform the defendant that retained counsel is available immediately leaves a suspect with two unpalatable options: waive the right to remain silent or wait in police custody, not knowing how long it might be before counsel arrives. Seen in this light, a waiver is not the product of a free and deliberate choice. Rather, it derives from *170a cruel Hobson’s choice imposed as a result of the conscious exclusion of friendly contact with others.
Additionally, federal law requires that the police not interfere with an accused’s attempts to contact an attorney. However, a request to speak with family members, even if the accused does not know an attorney to call, need not be honored.5 Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979); Ashurst v Marris, 914 F2d 255 (CA 6, 1990) (decision without published opinion); United States ex rel Riley v Franzen, 653 F2d 1153 (CA 7, 1981). I, of course, do not question this rule. However, like the Edwards rule, in particular circumstances, it can be destructive of values clearly protected by a long tradition in Michigan jurisprudence. For Wright, it quickly became reasonable to conclude that waiving his right to remain silent was necessary in order for him to get friendly advice because Sergeant Taylor specifically linked contact with family members to making a statement.
Incommunicado interrogation thus poses serious dangers to the voluntariness of an accused’s waiver of the right to remain silent. No issue of incommunicado interrogation can arise where the police inform a suspect that a retained attorney is present and immediately available. An accused, fully informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel present, in the exercise of his judgment may choose to proceed with or without counsel. In that circumstance, the choice belongs to and is made by the accused and not the police. Thus, the careful balance of the interests of legitimate law enforcement and the interest of individuals embodied in the Michigan Constitution remains intact._
*171Several aspects of the interrogation process suggest that Wright was held incommunicado for the purpose of coercing a waiver of the right to remain silent. Of these, the most telling is Wright’s isolation from any friendly contact with others until after he made a statement. Upon arrest, Wright sought to speak with his family. He wanted to call his grandfather whose judgment he respected and whose advice he would have followed. The police denied all these requests, at first, outright, later, indicating that after making a statement, he would be allowed to make a call. Sergeant Taylor not only did not allow Wright to call, he contacted Wright’s family, notified them that Wright was in custody, and indicated that they would have to wait to speak with him. This made it less likely that Wright would receive the advice he wanted.
While waiting Wright’s family hired attorney Thaddeus Dean to advise him. When Dean arrived at the station, he was informed that only the officer in charge, Sergeant Taylor, could allow him access to his client. Sergeant Taylor refused Dean access because Wright had not requested an attorney. This forced Dean to leave in order to seek judicial intervention. During the time Dean was gone, Sergeant Taylor took a statement from Wright, and only then was available to advise him.
Other aspects of the interrogation process evince a design to coerce a waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during questioning. When he was brought to the homicide division, Wright was placed in a small room with a table and chairs. He sat in that room for a couple of hours. When Sergeant Taylor returned, he and Wright spoke in the Sergeant’s office. At the end of this conversation, Wright was placed, still alone, in an even smaller room. He was told to wait and to be ready to tell the truth when Sergeant Taylor *172returned for him. He waited approximately five hours in that room. In addition, Wright, having been awake through the night, was fatigued and hungry. The sum of these circumstances consciously created by the police was strong pressure on Wright to make a statement so that he could speak with his family, sleep, and eat.
Because Wright was subjected to an eleven-hour incommunicado interrogation during which he was deprived of food, sleep, and contact with friendly outsiders, combined with the fact that he was not informed of available retained counsel, I would conclude that Wright never validly waived his right to remain silent during interrogation, and thus his statements should have been suppressed.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).

 This Court stated the general test for waiver in Book Furniture Co v Chance, 352 Mich 521, 526-527; 90 NW2d 651 (1958): "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The usual manner of waiving a right is by acts which indicate an intention to relinquish it, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce a belief that it was the intention and purpose to waive.”

 Cf. Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986).

 The police must honor even an ambiguous request for an opportunity to contact counsel. In some circumstances a request to speak with family members may fall within this rule.