Court Opinion

ID: 9808674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:46:39.315039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:07.744942
License: Public Domain

BRowsr, J.,
dissenting: I regret always to differ with my brethren, and frequently yield my judgment to the majority, *138but, with entire deference, it appears to me that their conclusion in this case is at variance with all of our oavu adjudications on the subject, as well as other recognized authorities.
The admitted facts are that plaintiff’s agent tendered to defendant at New Orleans for shipment to Waynesville, N. C., a mare of great speed, standard-bred and claimed by plaintiff to he worth at least $1,000. A few days before shipment plaintiff had paid $450 for her. When calling for bill of lading plaintiff’s agent said nothing whatever about the real intrinsic value of the mare, and there is not even a suggestion that defendant’s agent had any knowledge thereof. It is not claimed that he could have acquired such knowledge by mere observation. The mare was received as an ordinary animal, and a bill of lading issued and accepted by plaintiff’s agent without demur or objection, fixing the value of the animal at $15 and containing this paragraph: “And which amounts, it is agreed, are as much as such animals, as are herein agreed to be transported, are reasonably worth.” In consequence of such valuation the plaintiff received a much lower rate of freight than he would have received had the true value of the animal been given. There was delay in delivering the mare at Waynesville, and when delivered she was in a damaged condition. Plaintiff sues for damages, fixing them at $800. The jury assessed the damages at $356.50. .
In apt time the defendant requested, in writing, the court to instruct the jury: “That if the shipper declared the value of the mare and the carrier accepted the same in good faith as the real value, and the freight rate was based thereon, then the stipulation is valid and binding upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is now estopped to claim a greater amount than the agreed valuation in the contract.” This request was refused, and defendant excepted.
I agree fully with the general principle declared in Everett’s case, 138 N. C., 71, that a common carrier cannot be permitted to contract against loss occasioned by its own negligence. That is the law as declared by this and many other courts of this country, and is founded upon a sound principle of public policy.
Nevertheless, those tribunals,, including our own, which stand by that principle hold that common carriers may contract with their patrons in reference to the value of live stock offered for shipment, and where the value is reasonable for that species of property, it will he upheld.
This is the law as repeatedly decided by this Court. Selby v. R. R., 113 N. C., 588; Mitchell v. R. R., 124 N. C., 246; Gardner v. R. R., 127 N. C., 293. This rule is approved and recognized in the Everett case, supra, clearly decided in Jones *139v. R. R., 148 N. C., 581, and as late as last term reiterated in Winslow v. R. R., 151 N. C., 250. In Jones v. R. R. we beld tbat “A voluntary agreement by tbe shipper with tbe carrier, in consideration of a reduction in tbe rate of freight, tbat tbe valuation should not exceed $100 per bead, is valid as fixing, in good faith, a stipulated and reasonable value for tbe species of property of uncertain value, concerning which, in case of loss, tbe carrier would be without evidence.”
Again, in tbe cage of Winslow Bros., supra, we beld: “A stipulation in a bill of lading for tbe carriage of live stock, tbat, in case of loss, tbe liability of.the carrier should not exceed $100 per bead, made in consideration of reduction in freight rate, is valid.”
In Everett’s case, Mr. Justice Hoke, speaking for a unanimous Court, said: “Such agreements are upheld where the carrier, being without knowledge or notice of tbe trae value, tbe parties agree upon a valuation of tbe particular goods shipped approximating tbe average value of ordinary goods of like kind, and make such valuation tbe basis of a just and reasonable shipping rate.”
In tbe Jones case, supra, in bis concurring opinion tbe same justice repeats with approval tbe above, and says: “This rule is particularly applicable to shipments of stock in quantities, and eminently just to both parties to such contracts, affording to tbe shipper a fair and reasonable shipping rate and protecting the .carrier from exorbitant and unconscionable recoveries by reason of excessive valuations which it bad no opportunity to ascertain or to resist successfully, and for which it has received no adequate compensation. But to permit or uphold such a contract, when the loss arises from negligence, all the conditions suggested must exist. Tbe carrier must be without knowledge or notice of tbe true value; tbe valuation must be the fair average valuation of property of like kind, and it must have been made tbe basis of a fair and reasonable shipping rate.”
It appears to me tbat tbe words of my learned brother are peculiarly applicable to this transaction, and tbat counsel bad the printed page before them when they framed tbe prayer for instructions. It would seem that, if tbe standard fixed by him in tbe Everett case be applied to tbe facts of this case, tbe plaintiff should be beld to bis contract, and permitted to recover no more than tbe value bis agent accepted.
1. Tbe parties agreed upon a value, which is plainly stated in tbe bill of lading so tbat plaintiff’s agent could read it. He knowingly accepted the written contract with tbat stipulation in it, and refrained from stating to defendant’s agent tbe true value of tbe mare. It is elementary learning tbat one who *140accepts a written contract and acts under it is fixed with, knowledge of its provisions and is bound by them. Upon this principle the plaintiff, who by his agent ácoepted this bill of lading, is deemed to have been cognizant of its stipulations and to have agreed to them.
2. The carrier’s agent was without knowledge or notice of the true value of the mare. There is not a suggestion in the record that the defendant’s agent at New Orleans knew anything about the mare, that distinguished her from ordinary animals of the horse species.
We know from every-day observation and experience that the true value of a standard-bred racing horse is not apparent from mere inspection. Neither his pedigree nor record is apparent on the face of the animal. To the non-expert nothing is more deceptive than horseflesh. According to equine history, some of the most noted kings and queens of the trotting track and the turf have been very ordinary looking animals. The renowned Dexter in his earlier days is said to have sold for a very insignificant sum, and tradition says that the great Boston was an ordinary looking animal. The famous Godolphin Arab, whose descendants. have been the glory of the English turf, pulled a scavenger’s cart through the streets of Paris, and was sold for a mere song to the English nobleman whose name has been handed down to posterity because he gave it to this peerless Son of the Desert.
It was no difficult matter, therefore, to palm off on defendant’s agent this $1,000 trotter for an ordinary horse such as is shipped by railways almost every day in the year. It was not necessary to make any verbal misrepresentation in, order to deceive. The agent of the plaintiff was guilty of a legal and moral fraud which should not be tolerated much less rewarded, when he accepted a shipping contract at a valuation of $75 for a $1,000 mare, and kept his silence when he should have spoken, in order to get a much reduced freight rate. Having gotten the. rate, through the conduct of his agent, the plaintiff, although personally innocent, should be held to the contract made for him.
3. The valuation placed upon the mare in the contract is the average value of ordinary horses, such as the agent had the right to suppose plaintiff’s mare to have been.
Common observation, in the absence of any evidence, should be sufficient to convince us that this value of $75 is not merely nominal, and not intended as an evasion of defendant’s liability as a carrier. It is an average value for horses that are shipped by thousands over the railroads of the country, and if the tax books could be examined it would be seen that it is *141greater than is placed upon tbe average farm borse by tax assessors. I doubt if tbe mare in question would bave brought mucb more tban tbat at a public sale in a community tbat knew nothing about her.
4. Tbe valuation, according to tbe terms of tbe written contract, was made tbe basis of a reduced shipping rate.. It stands to reason tbat tbe carrier would charge and should receive mucb more for transporting a $1,000 race borse tban for a $100 animal. Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burrows, 2298; Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & A., 21; Hart v. R. R., 112 U. S., 339-343.
I think I bave demonstrated tbat, judged by tbe standard so recently fixed by Mr. Justice HoJce, and guaged by tbe four tests laid down by him, this transaction has every element necessary to constitute a valid shipping contract, which should be upheld.
Tbe application of the rule should not be made to depend upon tbe number of animals shipped. Tbe very reason upon which tbe rule is founded forbids it.
Tbe principle upon which tbe ruling is based is tbat ordinary shipments of goods and merchandise disclose their approximate value, and the earner’s agent by inspection can learn it, but tbat, in respect to horses and live stock generally, their value cannot be determined by ordinary inspection, and therefore tbe carrier, being without evidence as to their true value, has tbe right to protect itself against exorbitant and fictitious values by agreeing upon a value in tbe contract of shipment itself. This is a most reasonable and just rule, and if ever there was a case where the contract should be upheld, this, in my opinion, is one. To no case can the words of an impartial and able judge be more applicable than those of the late Chief Justice M cl ver are to this: “But when, as in this case, the shipper has obtained an advantage, in consideration of which he has fixed the value of the property 'shipped, the case becomes still stronger. The shipper having reaped the advantage obtained by the special contract, must, as a matter of common justice, bear the burden which such contract imposed.” Johnston v. R. R., 39 S. C., 61. I am advertent to the fact that the mare was not shipped by the plaintiff in person, but however innocent of intentional wrong he admittedly is, in law he is bound by the acts of his agent, who shipped the mare for him.
I am of opinion that the trial judge should have given the defendant’s prayer for instruction, which I have quoted above.
Walker, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion.