Court Opinion

ID: 9829718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:33:18.09778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:58.402540
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
 It is true that in the amended motion for new trial, filed December 21, 1921, plaintiff prays that “the verdict (italics ours) rendered in this cause on the 16th day of December, 1921,” be set aside, etc. He does not specifically pray that the judgment be set aside. The judgment is “entered as of *130December 16, 1921,” thereby indicating that it was, in fact, rendered at a later date and ordered entered as of December 16th. The trial court overruled the motion and in such order designated the instrument as a motion for new trial. Apparently the counsel for both sides so regarded it, and we have concluded that we must so regard it, in spite of the fact that the pleader used “verdict” where he should have used “judgment.” Moreover, under Rev. St. arts. 1990 and 1991, where a case has been tried upon special issues, a motion for new trial is not necessary to perfect an appeal. Stubblefield v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 720, and cases cited.
A motion for new trial may be in the discretion of the trial court considered, though filed more than two days after judgment. See George v. Taylor, 55 Tex. 97, and Alridge v. Mardoff, 32 Tex. 205, construing article 2023, Rev. St. Moreover, this is an amended motion for new trial, and evidently was filed in lieu of an original motion, which was probably filed within the two days. We think the objection to our considering appellant’s second assignment should be overruled, especially coming at this late hour, on motion for rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, appellee’s counsel argues vigorously and forcefully that the testimony elicited by counsel for appellee from its witness Mrs. H. E. Carlisle was not hearsay; that the witness in her ánswer was only summing up the inferences she drew from the acts, words, and conduct of Perez and Mr. Kirby. He quotes the following extract from Dove v. Coleman (Tex. Civ. App.) 234 S. W. 917, 918, to wit:
“The general rule is that, when the motive or intent or belief of any person is a material fact, direct testimony as to such motive, intent, or- belief is competent, and a further fundamental rule of evidence is that a party may testify as to matters explanatory of fact's in evidence, or of inferences therefrom” — citing authorities.
But the trouble is that in the instant case the motive, intent, or belief of the witness was not a material fact, and the testimony as to what the witness believed Mr. Kirby thought was not material or admissible.
 But irrespective of the question as to the admissibility of this testimony, the majority still adhere to the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment for the reasons set out in the original opinion. They are of the opinion that the appellant is not precluded from attacking the sufficiency of the evidence merely because he did not ask for a peremptory instruction. Electric E. & B. Co. v. Ablon, 110 Tex. 235, 218 S. W. 1030, by Supreme Court. He does not claim on this appeal that a peremptory instruction should have been given, but that a new trial should have been granted, because the evidence tends to show that Allcock, the agent of the bank who received the deposit of the certified check, must have known that the plaintiff signed his name by mark. No reason is given for the failure to secure his testimony, nor is there any other evidence in the record to overcome the presumption that he did know such fact, and that thereby the defendant below was charged with notice of such fact.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.