Court Opinion

ID: 9403508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:01:46.595509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.455343
License: Public Domain

21-6066
     Traore v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Wright, IJ
                                                                           A205 817 313

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of June, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              REENA RAGGI,
 8              RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 9              BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   DRISSA SOULEYMANE TRAORE,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                       v.                                      21-6066
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                      Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq., New York,
 2                                        NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                        General; Holly M. Smith, Assistant Director;
 6                                        Jesse D. Lorenz, Trial Attorney, Office of
 7                                        Immigration Litigation, United States
 8                                        Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
 9
10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Drissa Souleymane Traore, a native and citizen of Mali, seeks

14   review of a January 13, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming an October 19, 2018,

15   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

16   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

17   (“CAT”). In re Drissa Souleymane Traore, No. A205 817 313 (B.I.A. Jan. 13, 2021),

18   aff’g No. A205 817 313 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 19, 2018). We assume the parties’

19   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

20         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. See

21   Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). We review factual findings

22   for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d

23   191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless

                                              2
 1   any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

 2   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, “the applicant [must]

 4   present credible testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and establish that

 5   his fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d

 6   Cir. 2004); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). A “fear may be well-founded even if

 7   there is only a slight, though discernible, chance of persecution.” Diallo v. INS, 232

 8   F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000). But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid

 9   support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang v. INS,

10   421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). An applicant can satisfy his burden with evidence

11   that “he . . . would be singled out individually for persecution” or evidence of “a

12   pattern or practice” of persecution of “similarly situated” individuals within the

13   home country. 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).

14         Traore, who came to the United States in 2008, asserted a fear of future

15   persecution from the Malian military and from terrorist groups. He alleged that

16   he opposed a 2012 military coup and that his uncle, who was a member of the

17   military at the time, had been killed because he also opposed the coup. Traore

18   alleged that he would be targeted because of his own opposition and because he

                                                3
 1   would investigate his uncle’s death. He also asserted that he was opposed to

 2   terrorism, and that terrorist groups had targeted his cousin, a doctor, and forced

 3   him to treat only Muslims.

 4          The agency did not err in concluding that Traore failed to demonstrate a

 5   well-founded fear of future persecution by either the Malian government or

 6   terrorists. Traore was in the United States at the time of the coup, is therefore not

 7   similarly situated to his uncle, who was a member of the military at the time of the

 8   coup and opposed it. See 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Traore did not explain what

 9   he would do to inquire into his uncle’s death, nor did he present evidence either

10   that anyone would have an interest in harming him if he did inquire, or that

11   anyone has been harmed for inquiring into the deaths of family members who

12   served in the military. On this record, the IJ reasonably concluded that he did not

13   establish that his fear was more than “speculative.” Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at

14   129.

15          Similarly, Traore did not establish that his political opinions would subject

16   him to persecution in Mali. He testified that he was politically outspoken in Mali

17   before he left in 2008, but conceded that he suffered no past harm on that basis and

18   had not been politically active in the United States. Moreover, country conditions

                                              4
 1   evidence reflects that the leader of the 2012 coup was arrested, that civilian control

 2   of the military has been partially restored, and does not reflect the persecution of

 3   individuals opposed to the coup. Therefore, Traore did not meet his burden of

 4   establishing a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his political opinion.

 5   See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138,

 6   157–58 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure

 7   to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to

 8   support the agency's challenged decision.”).

 9         The IJ also reasonably concluded that Traore failed to demonstrate a

10   well-founded fear of future persecution from terrorist groups in Mali. Traore is

11   not similarly situated to his cousin because he is not a doctor, he is not from

12   northern Mali, and he did not express an intent to live in northern Mali;

13   accordingly, he failed to produce evidence he would be singled out as his cousin

14   was. See 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Further, the record does not reflect terrorist

15   activity in Bamako, where Traore lived, nor does it reflect persecution of members

16   of the Senufo ethnic group or of those who are perceived as being insufficiently

17   Muslim. The evidence did not reflect that he would be singled out or that there is

18   a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly-situated people. See Jian Xing

                                               5
 1   Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 157–58.

 2         The agency’s determination that Traore failed to establish a well-founded

 3   fear of future persecution is also dispositive of withholding of removal and CAT

 4   relief, which require a greater likelihood of persecution or torture. See Lecaj v.

 5   Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

 6         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

 7   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

 8                                          FOR THE COURT:
 9                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10                                          Clerk of Court

                                               6