Court Opinion

ID: 9950866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 21:11:06.469831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:00.386484
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Contempt of Wallace, 2024-Ohio-966.]

                            COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                          EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                             COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE CONTEMPT OF                                     :
CARILLIA WALLACE
                                                      :      No. 112836
[Appeal by Carillia Wallace in the matter
styled: State v. Ronnell Priah]           :

                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

              JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
              RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 14, 2024

           Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                               Case No. CR-22-667501-A

                                             Appearances:

              Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
              Attorney, and Owen Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting
              Attorney, for appellee.

              Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
              Robert B. McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for
              appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

               Appellant Carillia Wallace appeals the trial court’s order finding her in

contempt of court for disruption of proceedings and fining her $100. Because the

trial court found Wallace in direct contempt for disrupting court proceedings,
affirmatively stated the reason it found Wallace in contempt in a journal entry, and

imposed a reasonably commensurate punishment for the contempt, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On May 10, 2023, Carillia Wallace was present in the courtroom on the

date trial was set in State v. Priah, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-667501. Before

beginning trial, the assistant prosecuting attorney informed the trial court on the

record that the victim had not appeared for trial and requested the trial be

continued. The state confirmed that a subpoena had been served on the victim but

the state was not seeking a warrant for the victim’s arrest. The following then

occurred:

       THE COURT:         Okay. It will be continued at the prosecutor’s
                          request.
       A SPECTATOR:       Oh, my God.
       THE DEPUTY:        You can step out.
       THE COURT:         No. Bring her forward. Ma’am, for disrupting
                          these proceedings, the Court finds you in contempt
                          and you’re ordered to pay $100 and costs.
       THE WITNESS:       Okay. Is that it?
       THE COURT:          You need to pay it before you leave.
       THE WITNESS:       My purse is here. My purse is right there.
       THE COURT:         You caused a scene in the courtroom, I’ll find you
                          in contempt again. It will be continued at the
                          prosecutor’s request.

             The trial court then addressed counsel and set a date for a final

pretrial.

             The trial court journalized the finding of contempt, stating:
        Carillia Wallace is held in contempt of court for disruption of
        proceedings. Carillia Wallace is fined $100.00. Carillia Wallace is to
        pay fine before release. Carillia Wallace is remanded.[1]

                            LAW AND ARGUMENT

                      Wallace’s Assignments of Error

               Wallace raises the following assignments of error in this appeal, which

read:

        ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
        The trial court erred and violated Carillia Wallace’s state and federal
        due process rights when it convicted her of a crime without legally
        sufficient evidence.

        ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
        The trial court erred in failing to articulate any findings of fact or factual
        basis for the contempt conviction.

        ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
        The trial court erred in failing to afford Ms. Wallace an opportunity to
        allocute prior to imposing a sentence for contempt

        ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
        The trial court erred by imposing an illegal sentence.

               For clarity, we address the assignments of error out of order.

                          Relevant Law and Standard of Review

               The trial court found Wallace in contempt of court for “disruption of

court proceedings.” A trial court has the inherent power “to punish the disobedience

1 The record reflects that Wallace paid the $100 fine.
                                                     Although Wallace paid the fine, she
did so involuntarily to avoid being placed in custody. Accordingly, we do not find this
appeal moot. In re Contempt of Morris, 110 Ohio App.3d 475, 479, 674 N.E.2d 761 (8th
Dist.1996).
of the court’s orders with contempt proceeding.” Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d

192, 194, 459 N.E.2d 870 (1984). A court also has statutory authority to find persons

in contempt of court under R.C. 2705.01, which reads that

      [a] court, or judge at chambers, may summarily punish a person guilty
      of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to
      obstruct the administration of justice.

                Direct contempt occurs when a person misbehaves “in the presence of

or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice.” In re

Gonzalez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81831, 2003-Ohio-1960, ¶ 11.

                Because a court has the authority to summarily punish a contemnor for

direct contempt, “procedural due process rights are inapplicable * * *.” State v.

Fortson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79501, 2002-Ohio-1, citing In re McGinty, 30 Ohio

App.3d 219, 507 N.E.2d 441 (8th Dist.1986). Accordingly, a court need not provide

the contemnor a hearing or notice. Id., citing In re Gonzalez, 70 Ohio App.3d 752,

591 N.E.2d 1371 (8th Dist.1990). Regarding the punishment that may be imposed

for direct contempt, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

      In imposing punishment for acts of direct contempt, courts are not
      limited by legislation but have the power to impose a penalty
      reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. (State v.
      Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, paragraph four of the syllabus,
      approved and followed.).

State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980), paragraph one of

the syllabus.

                 A court’s finding of direct contempt is reviewed on appeal for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Lanzy (In re Christman), 2022-Ohio-1937, 190 N.E.3d
1225, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). When applying this standard of review, we are not free

to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Lahoud v. Tri-Monex, Inc., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96118, 2011-Ohio-4120, ¶ 38, citing In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio

St.3d 135, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991). “‘The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more

than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable.’” State v. Smiley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110878,

2022-Ohio-1242, ¶ 7, quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450

N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

          Disruption of Court May Be the Basis of a Contempt Finding

             Within the first assignment of error, Wallace argues that her action in

the courtroom, albeit “ill-advised,” did not rise to an act for which contempt could

be found. The state offered no position as to whether the outburst in the courtroom

was contemptuous behavior.

               The record reveals that Wallace’s outburst caused the deputy sheriff

to intervene and begin to remove her from the courtroom, was loud enough to be

heard and recorded by the court stenographer, and stopped the ongoing discussion

between the trial judge and counsel. The trial court stated in court and in her journal

entry that it found Wallace in contempt because she “disrupted the proceedings.”

               The Ohio Supreme Court noted that “if a defendant’s outburst or

other courtroom misbehavior causes a significant disruption that obstructs the

administration of justice, that behavior may be punishable as contempt of court.”

State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 1; see State
v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St.2d 312, 314, 285 N.E.2d 38 (1972), citing Nye v. United States,

313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941) (Counsel’s actions in unnecessarily repeated objections and

requests and disregard of court’s order to sit down amounted to disrespect “and to

actual interruption of the court in the conduct of its business.”). In Antenucci v.

Shaeffer, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 12605, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4122, 3-4 (Aug.

27, 1991), the court noted that “[a]n outburst in a courtroom so boisterous as to

disrupt the court’s proceedings is typical of [direct contempt.].” Accordingly, an

outburst in a courtroom that stops or disrupts ongoing proceedings of the court

could be found to be contemptuous behavior.

               The record in this case does not detail the level of Wallace’s outburst,

but the effect of Wallace’s conduct is documented within the record. Her outburst

stopped the proceedings in the courtroom. This court has found that “the power of

summary direct contempt should be restricted to a conduct that tends to impede,

embarrass or obstruct the court in the performance of its functions.” Fortson, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79501, 2002-Ohio-1.

               Our review under Wallace’s first assignment of error is limited to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining her actions

were contemptuous. Although other judges when faced with disruptions from the

gallery may restore order without invoking contempt powers, we cannot, on the

record provided in this case, find that the trial court abused its discretion for finding

Wallace in contempt for an outburst that stopped the court’s proceedings.

               The first assignment of error is overruled.
  A Court May Summarily Punish Persons Found in Direct Contempt

                Within the third assignment of error, Wallace notes the trial court

summarily punished her for contempt, but argues that pursuant to Crim.R. 32(A)(1)

she had the right to allocution before the trial court imposed punishment. The state

argues that the trial court has the power to summarily and immediately impose

punishment for direct contempt and such summary power precludes a right of

allocution.

                Wallace cites an unreported case from another district, State v. Rice,

5th Dist. Licking No. CA-2626, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 8733, 2 (Oct. 5, 1979), for the

proposition that a contemnor has the right to allocution before a punishment is

imposed. In Rice, the court found a contemnor to have a right of allocution by

finding that the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to a court’s direct contempt

proceeding. The opinion did not discuss or explain why the Rules of Criminal

Procedure would apply to a direct contempt proceeding. We are not persuaded to

follow Rice and apply the Rules of Criminal Procedure to direct contempt

proceedings.

                 The Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to courts “in the exercise of

criminal jurisdiction.” A summary finding of direct contempt under R.C. 2705.01 is

not an exercise of criminal jurisdiction because the conduct being punished is not a

criminal offense. R.C. 2901.03 reads:

      (A)      No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state
               unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code.
      (B)    An offense is defined when one or more sections of the Revised
             Code state a positive prohibition or enjoin a specific duty, and
             provide a penalty for violation of such prohibition or failure to
             meet such duty.

      (C)    This section does not affect any power of the general assembly
             under section 8 of Article II, Ohio Constitution, nor does it
             affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ
             any sanction authorized by law to enforce an order, civil
             judgment, or decree.

               Accordingly, Crim.R. 32.1(A)(1) is not applicable to direct contempt

proceedings because the act of being punished is not a criminal offense. The trial

court, although it could have, need not have granted Wallace the ability to allocute

before imposing summary punishment.

               The third assignment of error is overruled.

             The Punishment Imposed Was Not Unreasonable

               In her fourth assignment of error, Wallace argues that if her actions

could be considered contemptuous, the punishment imposed was unreasonable.

The state argues that the fine was reasonable. Wallace conceded that a $100 fine is

small but complains that the trial court’s order that she not leave until the fine was

paid was the imposition of a “literally indeterminate period in jail.”

               Where direct contempt is found, the court has “the power to impose

a penalty reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense.” Kilbane, 61

Ohio St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Punishment for

direct contempt may include a fine or confinement in jail. See, e.g., Warren v.
DeMarco, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0052, 2004-Ohio-3191, ¶ 3 (ten-day jail

sentence appropriate for disruption of court proceedings).

               Wallace provides no precedent or support for the proposition that a

trial court cannot remand a contemnor until a fine is paid. The state argues that the

trial court’s imposition of a $100 fine for contempt and an order not to leave until

the fine was paid was both proportionate to the disruption caused and reasonable

under the circumstance. In this case, the trial court imposed a fine but did not

impose a jail sentence. The condition of payment before leaving was not per se

unreasonable, especially where the court had the power to impose a jail sentence for

the disruption of proceedings. See, e.g., DeMarco at ¶ 3.

               The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

  The Trial Court’s Journal Entry Was Sufficient to Allow for Review

                Within her second assignment of error, Wallace notes that a court

is required to provide a factual basis for a finding of contempt and enter that basis

on the journal. She argues that the trial court did not do so in this case. The state

argues that the conduct for which Wallace was found in contempt was stated in the

journal entry and in court.

               In Smiley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110878, 2022-Ohio-1242, the

contemnor argued that the trial court erred by failing to articulate any findings of

fact or factual basis for the finding of contempt. Id. at ¶ 5. In Smiley, the journal

entry read in relevant part, “Defendant in contempt of court. Defendant to do

additional 30 days at disposition. Hold placed.” Id. at ¶ 4. This court reversed the
contempt finding “[b]ecause the trial court’s judgment of contempt failed to contain

a complete recitation of the facts upon which its finding of contempt is based, this

court cannot reach the merits of Smiley’s appeal.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing In re Summers,

9th Dist. Summit No. 24981, 2010-Ohio-5993. In Summers, the Ninth District

Court of Appeals similarly reversed a finding of contempt where “the trial court’s

order [did] not reflect what conduct led to its summary contempt finding.”

Summers, 2010-Ohio-5993, at ¶ 7. The court explained the necessity of findings

because “it is critical for the reviewing court to be able to examine the precise facts

upon which the trial court based its summary contempt finding.” Id. at ¶ 6.

               In contrast to the entries appealed in Smiley and Summers, which

contained no information as to the contemptuous conduct, the journal entry in this

case states the reason for the finding of contempt: “Wallace is held in contempt of

court for disruption of proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) The journal entry finding

Wallace in contempt, although bereft of description, affirmatively states the reason

for the contempt finding. Moreover, the conduct was reflected in the record on

appeal. As such, the journal entry appealed in this case does not preclude our

review.

               The second assignment of error is overruled.

   III.   CONCLUSION

               The trial court’s finding of contempt for Wallace’s outburst that

stopped the court’s proceedings was not an abuse of discretion, and the journal entry

finding Wallace in contempt affirmatively stated the reason for the contempt finding
and did not preclude appellate review. The trial court did not error by not providing

Wallace with the opportunity to allocute because the trial court had both the

inherent and statutory authority to summarily punish an act of direct contempt. The

$100 fine for contempt and order not to leave until the fine was paid was

proportionate to the disruption caused and reasonable.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR