Court Opinion

ID: 9602020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:51:20.407188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:00.199328
License: Public Domain

*593Clarke, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur with the judgment of the majority because of the remoteness of the original injury to the subsequent injury.
In my view Maxey v. Hospital Authority, supra, states a proper rule of law, but I would distinguish it from this case. The holding in Maxey was predicated upon the unambiguous language of release as it related to the parties who were released. In Maxey, the released parties were those named in the release plus “all the world.” In the case before us there is a similar absence of ambiguity as to the parties released in that the form makes reference to the named partjes and “all other persons, firms and corporations.”
I do not believe, however, that the release in this instance is so unambiguous as to the event from which a claim might arise as to prohibit the offering of parol evidence concerning intent. The claims released here are those which are “resulting or to result, or sustained or received by me...” through the automobile accident. The passage of time between the automobile wreck and the surgery complained of, taken together with the independence of the two events and the difference in their effects, raises a question in my mind as to whether the result of the surgery was also the result of the automobile accident.
For the reasons stated, it is my opinion that parol evidence should be admitted to explain the intent of the parties in executing the release agreement.