Court Opinion

ID: 9945035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 21:03:08.767707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.319084
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 P. v. Hammond CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                 F083530

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Kern Super. Ct. No. BF165964A)

                    v.                                                    ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                                           AND DENYING REHEARING
 DARNELL JAMES HAMMOND,
                                                                          [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
           Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:

      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 1, 2024, be modified as
follows:
      1.      On page 6, the first paragraph is deleted. Deletion of this paragraph will
              require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes.

         2.        On page 6, the second full paragraph, beginning “Surveillance footage
                   showed” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:

                          Surveillance footage then showed a Saturn Ion1 stop in front
                   of the Quality Gas market front door, facing north towards Panama

1 It was stipulated by both the prosecution and defense “the tan Saturn Ion and the black
Nissan Altima ... are believed to be the vehicles used in the commission of the crimes ...
on October 14th, 2016,” and “[t]he black Nissan Altima belongs to Jim Thomas
Langston’s girlfriend,” and that Langston’s “DNA was not located in the tan Saturn Ion,
but it was located near the seat belt locking mechanism in the black Nissan Altima. It is
unknown when Mr. Langston’s DNA was transferred to the black Nissan Altima.”
             Street, with three masked men exiting and entering the store. One
             suspect was armed with a Mac-11 assault pistol, wearing a black
             glove and a white glove, and black and white Nike shoes. Defendant
             was armed with a black nine-millimeter handgun and wore white
             gloves, white Nike shoes, and a “New York Yankees” beanie.
             Givan, the third heavy-set suspect, was not armed. Langston
             remained in the Saturn throughout the extent of the robbery and
             ensuing homicides.

      3.     On page 6, the third full paragraph, beginning “Upon entering the market,”
             is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:

                      Upon entering the market, defendant and Givan headed to the
             back of the counter where Juan was located, and the other suspect
             pointed his firearm at Heriberto, who was standing in front of the
             counter, and demanded money. During this exchange, Heriberto
             pulled out a handgun, but was shot by the other suspect. Heriberto
             fell to the ground and was also shot by defendant. Defendant then
             turned towards Juan, who was on the floor behind the counter, and
             shot him as well.2 Rigoberto fell to the ground and stayed there until
             the men left.

      4.     On page 7, the first full paragraph is deleted and the following paragraph is
             inserted in its place:

                    The other suspect then ran out of the store and got into the
             Saturn, which sped off. Defendant and Givan then left on foot.
             However, defendant returned to pick up cash trays from inside the
             market. Moments later, defendant exited the market and was seen
             by witnesses running away from Quality Gas, armed with a pistol,
             and carrying two cash trays. He was left behind.
      5.     On page 7, delete the second full paragraph.

      6.     On page 8, line 6, the word “Hammond” is replaced with
             “defendant” so the sentence reads:

             Fidel later identified defendant as the individual in his yard in a six-
             pack lineup.

2      Defendant, the suspect with the two white gloves, wore a dark facemask with a
small design near his chin, dark Nike brand shoes with a white logo, and a black
sweatshirt with a white undershirt.

                                             2.
       Except for the modifications set forth herein, the opinion previously filed remains
unchanged. The modifications do not alter the judgment. Defendant’s petition for
rehearing is denied.

                                                                            FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

                                            3.
Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Hammond CA5 (unmodified opinion)

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F083530
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF165964A)
                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
 DARNELL JAMES HAMMOND,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
         Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and John
Merritt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         On September 21, 2021, a jury convicted defendant Darnell James Hammond of
the premeditated first degree murders of Heriberto Aceves and Juan Aceves (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, counts 1 & 2),1 and found true all enhancements and allegations.2
Subsequently, defendant was sentenced to two indeterminate terms of life without the
possibility of parole, plus 50 years to life, and a determinate term of 10 years.
       On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when
it admitted statements to Detective Anderson after he unequivocally invoked his right to
remain silent pursuant to Miranda,3 during both his first and second interrogations; and
(2) he is entitled to the benefit of newly enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which amended the language of section 186.22, and added
section 1109 requiring bifurcation of the trial of gang enhancements and substantive gang
offenses from that of the underlying offenses upon a defendant’s request. Specifically,
defendant argues the changes made by Assembly Bill 333 require dismissal of both his
gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and the gang-murder special circumstance
allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The People concede the amendments to section
186.22 apply retroactively and that the gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) must
be dismissed, but argue the changes made by newly enacted section 1109 do not apply
retroactively. Regardless, the People contend defendant is not entitled to reversal of his
convictions because he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to bifurcate the gang
enhancements. The People further contend the changes made by Assembly Bill 333 do
not apply to the gang-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), because any
change would constitute an unconstitutional amendment to Proposition 21. During the
pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court held that “Assembly Bill 333’s definition of
‘criminal street gang’ to the gang-murder special circumstance does not

1      All further references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
2      As we discuss further below, defendant was also convicted and sentenced to
additional offenses and enhancements.
3      Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

                                              2.
unconstitutionally amend section 190.2(a)(22).” (People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561,
580, italics added (Rojas).)
       Lastly, in supplemental briefing, defendant contends this case should be remanded
to allow for him to make a record at a Franklin4 hearing, even though he was sentenced
to two indeterminate terms of life without the possibility of parole, and the abstract of
judgment must be amended to strike the section 1202.45 parole revocation fine.
       We accept the People’s concession, vacate the sentence, and remand for
resentencing. Further, based on Rojas, we conclude the entirety of Assembly Bill 333
applies retroactively to defendant’s case and, as to all offenses, reverse the section
186.22, subdivision (b)(1) enhancements, and as to counts 1 and 2, reverse the gang-
murder special circumstance allegations pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22).
On remand, the People are not foreclosed from retrying defendant on both the gang
enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance allegations, and the trial court
can address the Franklin issues. The other claims lack merit. In all other respects, we
affirm the judgment.
                                STATEMENT OF CASE
       On August 9, 2021, the Kern County District Attorney filed a first amended
information charging defendant with two counts of premeditated first degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, count 1 (Heriberto) & count 2 (Juan)) with the special
circumstances he committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), he was engaged in
the commission or attempted commission of a robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(A) & (G)), and that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the
murder was committed in furtherance of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)); two counts of
robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c), counts 3 & 4); active participation in a gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(a), count 5); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd (a)(1), count 6); and

4      People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).

                                              3.
unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm, to wit, a handgun in public (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3),
count 8). As to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, the information further alleged both a gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm enhancement (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.5, subd.
(a)). Finally, as to all offenses, the first amended information alleged a prior strike
offense for attempted robbery (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 211, 664)
and a prior serious felony offense (§ 667, subd. (a)).5
       On September 21, 2021, a jury convicted defendant on all remaining counts and
found true all remaining enhancements and allegations. As to the alleged prior strike and
serious felony offense, the trial court in a bifurcated trial found true that defendant
suffered a prior conviction for a violation of section 211/664, as alleged in the
information. On October 7, 2021, a jury in the penalty phase of the trial sentenced
defendant to life without the possibility of parole.
       Subsequently, as to count 1, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of life without the possibility of parole, plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and five years for the prior serious
felony offense (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus a 10-year term for the gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but stayed the 10-year term pursuant to section 654. As to count
2, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of life without the
possibility of parole, plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and five years for the prior serious felony offense
(§ 667, subd. (a)), to be served consecutive to count 1, plus a 10-year term for the gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), but stayed this 10-year term pursuant to section 654.
As to count 3, the trial court imposed the upper term of five years, doubled to 10 years

5      Prior to the jury trial, the People dismissed both count 5 (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and
count 8 (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3)) in the furtherance of justice. Further, as to count 6, the
People dismissed the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) for insufficient
evidence.

                                              4.
because of the prior strike, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) and 10 years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but stayed this
sentence pursuant to section 654. As to count 4, the trial court imposed the upper term of
five years, doubled to 10 years because of the prior strike, plus 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and 10 years for the gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but stayed this sentence pursuant to section 654. As to count 6,
the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years, doubled to six years
because of the prior strike, plus four years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)), but stayed this sentence pursuant to section 654. The trial court also imposed a
parole revocation fine of $300 pursuant to section 1202.45, but suspended the fine
pending successful completion of parole.
                                 SUMMARY OF FACTS

    I.   The Prosecution Case-in-Chief
         Heriberto and his two sons Juan and Jesus ran the Quality Gas, gas station and
market, on the southwest corner of Main Street6 and Panama Road in Lamont, southwest
of Bakersfield. Rigoberto,7 a friend of Jesus, also worked at Quality Gas.
         A.    The Robbery/Murders and Subsequent Getaway8
         On Friday morning, October 14, 2016, at approximately 9:30 a.m., codefendant
Langston entered the Quality Gas market, and was observed on surveillance footage
cashing his payroll check and then leaving. Langston wore a black hat with a white
cursive “W.”

6        Main Street is also referred to as Weedpatch Highway.
7       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their
first names or initials. No disrespect is intended.
8      The underlying facts of the robbery and murders are from both testimony and
surveillance footage admitted during the trial.

                                              5.
      Shortly after leaving the store, Langston saw a dark colored Saturn Ion with three
occupants following him and he eventually stopped. They asked if he would drive them
to Quality Gas in exchange for $200. The three individuals were later identified as
defendant Hammond, “Tiny,” and “Baby Goo.”9 Langston later told officers the three
individuals threatened him and were armed. He admitted he was asked to “[b]asically”
be their getaway driver. He agreed to drive the three to Quality Gas. Langston also told
officers he left his Nissan parked on Collision Avenue, about four blocks north of Quality
Gas, and drove the three suspects in the Saturn Ion10 to Quality Gas.
      Surveillance footage showed the Saturn stop in front of the Quality Gas market
front door, facing north towards Panama Street, with three masked men exiting and
entering the store. The suspect referred to as “Tiny” was armed with a Mac-11 assault
pistol, wearing a black glove and a white glove, and black and white Nike shoes.
Hammond was armed with a black nine-millimeter handgun and wore white gloves,
white Nike shoes, and a “New York Yankees” beanie. Givan, the third suspect, was not
armed. Langston remained in the Saturn throughout the extent of the robbery and
ensuing homicides.
      Upon entering the market, Hammond and Givan headed to the back of the counter
where Juan was located, and Tiny pointed his firearm at Heriberto, who was standing in
front of the counter, and demanded money. During this exchange, Heriberto pulled out a
handgun, but was shot by Tiny. Heriberto fell to the ground and was also shot by

9      Detective Richard Anderson testified “Baby Goo” or “Big Dirt” was Myron
Givan. Law enforcement believed Givan was the heavy-set suspect seen in the
surveillance footage. We will refer to “Baby Goo” as Givan throughout this opinion.
10      It was stipulated by both the prosecution and defense “the tan Saturn Ion and the
black Nissan Altima ... are believed to be the vehicles used in the commission of the
crimes ... on October 14th, 2016,” and “[t]he black Nissan Altima belongs to Jim Thomas
Langston’s girlfriend,” and that Langston’s “DNA was not located in the tan Saturn Ion,
but it was located near the seat belt locking mechanism in the black Nissan Altima. It is
unknown when Mr. Langston’s DNA was transferred to the black Nissan Altima.”

                                            6.
Hammond. Hammond then turned towards Juan, who was on the floor behind the
counter, and shot him as well.11 Rigoberto fell to the ground and stayed there until the
men left.
       Tiny then ran out of the store and got into the Saturn, which sped off. Hammond
and Givan then left on foot. However, Hammond returned to pick up cash trays from
inside the market. Langston eventually picked up Givan and drove him and Tiny to
Collision Street to switch cars.
       Moments later, Hammond exited the market and was seen by witnesses running
away from Quality Gas, armed with a pistol, and carrying two cash trays. He was left
behind.
       During this incident, Jose N. and Modesto N. were stopped at a red light at the
corner of Main Street and Panama Road when they heard gunshots coming from the
convenience store. Jose told Modesto he “heard gunshots, and he was like, ‘I did too.’
[They] glanced everywhere to see where it was and [they] couldn’t see until [they] s[aw]
the people coming out of the store.” Two or three people exited the convenience store
and Jose observed one individual “running on Panama.” Jose called 911 and followed
the individual who ran “eastbound on Panama and northbound on Carnation [¶] … [a]nd
then turned left on Lana Street.” The individual wore a black hoodie sweatshirt and “had
a gun on his [¶] [l]eft hand” and a cash register “in the other hand.” Jose then observed
the individual take off his black hoodie sweatshirt and “thr[o]w it in the yard” of the
house at “the corner of Carnation and Lana Street.”
       Fidel C. lived at a residence on Panama Road in Lamont. On the morning of the
robbery, Fidel observed an African-American man trying to hide in middle of his front
yard. The man wore “all black ... a black hoodie and a white tank top.” “[H]e was, like,

11     Hammond, the suspect with the two white gloves, wore a dark facemask with a
small design near his chin, dark Nike brand shoes with a white logo, and a black
sweatshirt with a white undershirt.

                                             7.
scared or trying to hide, trying to get away.” “He [then] just walked around the yard, and
then he got in one of the cars that were parked out front” — a black Lexus. Fidel’s
stepfather then came out and told the man to leave. The man wanted Fidel to hide him,
“but [he] told him [he] couldn’t.” Subsequently, the man “took of his sweater and he
threw it on the ground and he left[,]” but eventually came back and took the sweater with
him. The man then ran eastbound. Fidel later identified Hammond as the individual in
his yard in a six-pack lineup.
       B.     Police Investigation
       Law enforcement personnel arrived on scene shortly after the shootings and found
“several subjects were pointing eastbound down Panama Road yelling, ‘He’s going that
way.’ ” Deputies began searching the area for the suspects and were notified by a
resident at a Lana Street address “that they had seen or saw a subject running into that
yard.” Deputies arrived at the residence and located a shed next to a detached garage.
Defendant was found hiding inside the shed “squatting on his hands and knees.” He was
arrested. He was unarmed, wore a white tank top with dark colored pants, and was not
wearing shoes. However, deputies located a pair of Nike shoes next to defendant.12
Further, deputies located over a thousand dollars “in a rolled up mesh – piece of mesh”
inside the shed. One of the $100 bills had either “a blood stain or a blood drop.”13
       Deputies also searched the inside of the market and located both Heriberto and
Juan’s bodies.14 Further, deputies found a payroll check made payable to codefendant
Langston for $137, and two pistols. The first pistol, a nine-millimeter caliber semi-

12     Lieutenant Richard Anderson testified the suspect in the surveillance with the
white gloves and handgun was the only suspect wearing the Nike shoes seized next to
defendant.
13    Criminalist G. Sugimoto analyzed the blood and testified that it was highly
probable the DNA found on the bill belonged to Juan Aceves.
14     Both Heriberto and Juan died from multiple gunshot wounds.

                                             8.
automatic SIG Sauer, was found next to Heriberto’s body. It was believed this nine-
millimeter pistol was the firearm use by Heriberto to defend himself. The second pistol,
a .25-caliber Beretta handgun, was located in a holster inside an office next to the
checkout area. Deputies also located three spent bullets and 17 shell casings from the
scene.15 Behind the store, deputies located a dark blue beanie with a New York
Yankees’ logo.16
       Deputies also searched the surrounding area and located two white gloves, one of
which had a cash tray discarded next to it. The gloves were stained and spotted with
blood; the blood contained Juan Aceves’s DNA. Further, both gloves were tested for
DNA, and it was highly probable the gloves contained defendant’s DNA.17
       C.     Defendant’s First Interview18
       Around midnight of defendant’s arrest, Detective Richard Anderson and Detective
Tommy Robins interviewed defendant in custody at the sheriff’s department. Detective

15     Firearms Analyst C. Snow analyzed the three bullets and testified “they shared
similar class characteristics but [he] could not ID them as being fired by the same firearm
or by the firearm that [he] received.” Further, as to the shell casings, he “found all of
those shell casings to be inconclusive[;] [he] didn’t have enough individual
characteristics to be able to ID them.”
16      Criminalist B. Ramirez tested the beanie for DNA and it contained as least three
contributors, but defendant “could not be excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA
profile.” She testified Langston, Myron Gibbons, Heriberto, and Juan were excluded as a
potential contributor, and calculated that “a match between this item and [defendant] is ...
12 trillion times more likely for the African-American population.”
17     The first glove revealed “at least four people contributing their DNA” and
defendant “could not be excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA profile.”
Specifically, it was 230 trillion times more likely defendant’s profile matched the sample
than some random person in the African-American population. As to the second glove,
there were four different contributors, but defendant’s DNA could not be excluded.
Specifically, it was 1.5 billion times more likely defendant’s profile matched the sample
than some random person in the African-American population.
18     We provide a more exhaustive description surrounding these two interviews in our
discussion regarding the alleged Miranda violations.

                                              9.
Anderson read defendant his Miranda rights; defendant acknowledged he understood
these rights.
       Throughout the interview, defendant denied being involved in the robbery and
instead claimed he consumed drugs, and that everything was just a “blur” that day.
Although he admitted he was a member of the Country Boy Crips (CBC) gang, he denied
being with any of his gang associates the day of the robbery. At the conclusion of the
interview, Detective Robins collected defendant’s buccal swab.
       D.       Defendant’s Second Interview
       Approximately 36 hours later, Detective Anderson interviewed defendant a second
time at the jail. Defendant again indicated he understood his Miranda rights. Defendant
admitted the group’s goal was to steal money from the convenience store, but maintained,
“I’m no killer.” He did not plan to shoot anyone “[b]ut the two started shooting at
[him].” Defendant then shot back by firing “anywhere.”
       E.       Gang Evidence
       Both parties stipulated to the following:

       “The [CBC] are a criminal street gang as defined by Penal Code [s]ection
       186.22.

       “On May 24th, 2012, an incident occurred that led to [defendant] getting
       convicted of Penal Code [s]ections 25400(c)(6), which is the unlawful
       possession of a firearm as a felony. And [section] 186.22(a), active
       participation in a criminal street gang as a misdemeanor.

       “On November 7th of 2014, an incident occurred that led to [defendant]
       getting convicted of Penal Code [s]ection 29800(a)(1), felon in possession
       of a firearm as felony. And Penal Code [s]ection 186.22(a), active
       participation in a criminal street gang as a misdemeanor.”
                1.    Prior Contacts
       On May 24, 2012, Officer Brian Holcombe of the Bakersfield Police Department
(BPD) was patrolling a CBC area when he contacted defendant. Defendant stated “[h]e
was aware of where he was, as far as being in the traditional boundaries of the [CBC] and

                                            10.
that there were people present that were associated with that gang.” Defendant was
arrested earlier that evening for possession of a firearm “which [officers] had seen him
discard earlier that evening.”
       In December 2014, BPD Sergeant Chad Garrett contacted defendant while they
were responding to a call for service. Sergeant Garrett observed “numerous tattoos,”
specifically, “tattoos of deceased notable members of the [CBC]” and “a large ‘T’ and a
‘B’ which stood for his known moniker of Teeter Bob, among others.”
              2.     Gang Expert Testimony
       BPD Lieutenant Nathan McCauley testified as an expert in the CBC gang. He
testified the CBC’s primary activities are “[s]hooting, homicides, narcotic sales, auto
theft, burglaries, [and] witness intimidation.” McCauley knew defendant and testified
defendant’s tattoos established his loyalty to the CBC gang. He opined defendant “was
an active member of the [CBC]” gang “based ... on his history of involvement in gang
related crimes, admissions to being a gang member, tattoos on his person, and contacts
with other gang members.” Lastly, McCauley opined the underlying crimes were “done
as a combination of in association with, the benefit of, and at the direction of the [CBC]
criminal street gang.”

 II.   Defense Case-in-Chief
       Defendant testified in his defense. He testified he intended to commit a robbery,
but stated he did not want anyone to get hurt. Defendant also testified he admitted he was
inside the convenience store because he “went by everything [that Detective Anderson]
said” because the officer would not have believed him if he had told “the truth.” Overall,
defendant testified Detective Anderson scared him during the second interview, which
resulted in him admitting things that were not true.

                                            11.
          Trial counsel also called Brian Leslie who was “an expert in coercive
interrogation.” Leslie reviewed the interviews and testified the detectives used coercive
techniques against defendant.
                                        DISCUSSION

     I.   DEFENDANT DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY INVOKE HIS MIRANDA RIGHT
          TO REMAIN SILENT.
          Before trial, defendant moved to exclude his two statements pursuant to Miranda.
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted his
statements to Detective Anderson, after he unequivocally invoked his right to remain
silent pursuant to Miranda. Specifically, defendant argues that his first interview his
statements, “Are we done?” constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent.
Additionally, as to his second interview, defendant argues he unequivocally invoked his
right to remain silent on three separate occasions by telling Detective Anderson, “I can’t
talk right now.” As to both claims, we disagree.19 At the Evidence Code section 402
hearing, the trial court reviewed the recordings of the two hearings.
          A.    First Interview
          As noted above, defendant was read his Miranda rights and stated he understood
his rights. During the interview, defendant repeatedly denied his involvement in the
underlying crimes. After several minutes, defendant asked Detective Anderson, “Are we
done?” Anderson responded by continuing to question defendant and defendant then
asked two more times, “Are we done?” Anderson pushed back until defendant asked a

19      At the outset, both parties agree defendant validly waived his Miranda rights at the
beginning of the first interview, however there is dispute as to whether Detective
Anderson was required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before initiating the
second interview. (See People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1106–1107 (Ramirez),
citing to People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170–171.) As we discuss in detail
below, Detective Anderson was not required to provide defendant with a readvisement of
his Miranda rights before initiating the second interview at the jail.

                                              12.
fourth time, “Are we done?” Anderson responded, “Uh, that’s up to you. Are we done?”
and defendant replied, “Yeah.” At this point, the interview ended.
       B.     Second Interview
       Defendant was interviewed a second time approximately 36 hours later and
nodded his head in affirmation he understood his Miranda rights.20 Detective Anderson
repeatedly asked defendant, “What happened?” and defendant continued to reply, “I’m
no killer. I’m no killer.” Anderson told defendant, “This is your only time that you’re
gonna be able to help yourself” and defendant replied, “I can’t talk right now, sir. I can’t
talk right now.”
       Detective Anderson continued to question defendant. Eventually, the following
relevant exchange occurred:

       “[DETECTIVE ANDERSON]: I’m giving you an opportunity to tell the
       truth and do the right thing, [defendant]. It’s up to you to take it. Not up to
       me. I can’t – I can’t force you. It’s up to you, [defendant].

       “[DEFENDANT]: (Unintelligible) I can’t talk right now. My head hurts.
       My hair itches.”21
Defendant then admitted to being in the convenience store at the time of the robbery.
Specifically, defendant explained, “We just trying to go in get some money[,]” “[b]ut the
two started shooting at [him].” He continued by stating the individual “was trying to grab
the gun[,]” [¶] “[a]nd he shot. I didn’t even mean to shot — I just (unintelligible) I just
shot anywhere.” At the end of the interview, defendant stated he would “rather talk to a

20    Specifically, in the audio file, Detective Anderson is heard asking defendant, “You
understand your Miranda rights I read to you at the substation, right? At the
headquarters? Is that a yes? You’re nodding your head yes?”
21      Although People’s Exhibit 6A indicates that defendant said, “That’s — my air
hurts, sir,” it is clear in the recording (People’s Exhibit No. 111) defendant told Detective
Anderson, “My head hurts. My hair itches.”

                                             13.
lawyer[,]” and Detective Anderson replied, “Okay ... You’re free to go back, man.” The
interview ended.
          C.     The Evidence Code Section 402 Hearing
          Both the prosecutor and trial counsel called witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.
                 1.     Detective Richard Anderson’s Testimony
          Detective Anderson, who is six feet, four inches tall and weighs 300 pounds,
testified for the People. He testified he was trained to stop an interview if the suspect
clearly invoked his right to remain silent or obtain representation. However, he was also
trained to continue interrogating the suspect, even after a suspect invokes their right to
remain silent, so that their statements can be used for impeachment in the event the
suspect testifies in their own defense.
          Anderson first interviewed defendant around 11:00 p.m. or midnight on the same
day as the shooting. During this interview, Anderson informed defendant he was under
arrest and advised him of his Miranda rights; defendant acknowledged he understood his
rights. During that first interview, defendant continued to deny involvement in the
robbery and Anderson testified he ended the interview because “talking to [defendant]
any further would have been pointless” and he “didn’t see that pushing him would be
fruitful.”
          Two days later, Detective Anderson interviewed defendant a second time.
Anderson testified he continued to question defendant after he said, “I can’t talk to you
right now. I can’t talk to you right now” because he did not understand these statements
as a clear invocation to remain silent. He did admit that during this interview he
slammed his hand down on the table and began “yelling” at defendant causing defendant
to cry.
                 2.     Dr. Kimberly Fenn’s Testimony
          Dr. Kimberly Fenn testified for the defense as an expert on sleep deprivation’s
effects on memory and cognitive function. She is a psychology professor at Michigan

                                               14.
State University, and before testifying she reviewed other expert reports and listened to
the recordings of both interviews.
       Dr. Fenn testified a lack of sleep reduces an individual’s inhibitions, and according
to studies the brain tends to over-emphasize rewards, which leads to riskier decisions.
Further, she testified a lack of sleep can distort memories and the ability to retrieve or
recall them. In experimental settings, “after sleep deprivation individuals are four times
more likely to falsely confess to an act they did not commit than if they had slept the
night before.” Dr. Fenn opined defendant was sleep deprived during his first interview.
              3.     Brian Leslie’s Testimony
       Brian Leslie, a former police officer and consultant, testified for the defense as an
expert on interrogation techniques. He reviewed audio and video from both interviews
and opined that Detective Anderson used both “minimization” and “maximization”
techniques, which could be coercive.
              4.     Supplemental Briefing
       Defense counsel filed a supplemental brief where he argued defendant had
unambiguously invoked his right to silence multiple times during the first interview when
he asked Detective Anderson, “Are we done?” Further, he argued Anderson “reasonably
believe[ed]” defendant had unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent because the
detective ended the interview after he clarified defendant was “done speaking with the
officer.”
       As to the second interview, defense counsel, citing Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451
U.S. 477 (Edwards), argued this prior invocation was still effective because he did not
reinitiate contact with the police. Further, counsel stated the interview improperly
continued because defendant told Detective Anderson three times, “I can’t talk right
now,” which constituted an unequivocal invocation to remain silent.
       The prosecutor responded that defendant validly waived his Miranda rights and
the statement, “We’re done” was not a clear invocation to remain silent. Further, the

                                             15.
prosecutor argued Edwards only applies to situations where a suspect unambiguously
invokes the right to counsel. Lastly, the prosecutor argued a reasonable officer would not
have understood defendant’s statements, “I can’t talk right now” as unambiguous
assertions of his right to remain silent.
             5.       The Trial Court’s Ruling
       After hearing additional argument, the trial court concluded that defendant’s
statements, “Are we done?” made during the first interview were not clear invocations of
the right to remain silent. Specifically, the trial court stated the following:

              “The first issue on [defendant] -- I’m going to take them sequentially
       – is whether or not [defendant] entered a knowing and voluntary waiver to
       the rights that were given to him in his first interview. I think the knowing
       and voluntary waiver comes in in two forms. One is the fatigue issue that
       was brought up through expert witnesses. And second, whether or not there
       was an audible response on the waiver that was given -- that was recited to
       him. Whether he affirmatively responded that he understood one of the
       particular advisals. [¶] ... [¶]

              “The next question we address is whether or not the defendant
       invoked at the end of his rights -- end of the questioning. That is, in -- he
       asked the question to the detective. I believe it was Anderson. Are we
       done? To me that is clearly not an affirmative assertion or desire to end the
       interview and not a clear invocation of his rights to end the interview. And
       based upon the tone of the question and the circumstances of the
       questioning, where there was really no new information being offered to the
       questions of law enforcement and the context of the conversation, I think it
       was an expression of frustration by the defendant, if anything, that, you
       know, this is sort of pointless. It wasn’t saying, I’m done.

               “The response by Detective Anderson was interesting because it did
       essentially in a disbelieving approach summarize the story the defendant --
       the statements that the defendant had given with the sort of impression that,
       you expect me to believe this, what you’ve told me? And the detective then
       went on to say, you know, are we done? Do you expect me to believe this?
       You tell me are we done. And at that point the defendant said, we’re done.

               “Do I see this as a clear invocation of assertion of rights? No. I
       think it has reached a loggerhead in the interview and the interview
       essentially came by mutual agreement to termination.

                                              16.
              “But I certainly see the point the defense has argued in this, that
       when you have the repetition in this way and the defendant eventually
       saying, yeah, we’re done, that that’s an assertion of his rights. But in the
       overall context of how this interview played out, again, I side with
       Detective Anderson’s interpretation of it.

              “The next step that we have is the re-interview being proper
       regardless of the invocation of the defendant. The Court does wish to
       comment a little bit about the defendant’s sophistication and understanding
       of criminal processes.

               “We know that based upon his statements in the initial interview he
       was recently released from parole within a few months time. He has a
       significant criminal history that I think has been covered in other motions
       that we have addressed. And obviously has some contact -- significant
       contact with law enforcement, as well as, to me, apparent gang
       identification. If by no other means, then -- while we haven’t heard a gang
       expert on it, his tattoos and previous contact with law enforcement, as well
       as his probationary status not to have gang contact. That’s a common term
       and condition of parole -- or probation. I would assume parole as well on a
       gang -- a case involving a gang allegation conviction.

               “The defendant in the first interview, one argument is that he was
       fatigued and tired and not fully competent. The other one is that he was
       very relaxed in his interview. Did not appear to be overly stressed. And
       obviously, I think, was well aware of his rights and not intimidated by the
       situation or by the detective. And 33 hours, I think we have by mutual
       understanding, was passed, though there was some testimony it was the
       next afternoon and maybe 11 or 12 hours later, but I think everyone agrees
       factually that it was a longer period of time. If there is a dispute on that, I
       would invite some further information to clarify that. But I do think that’s
       a significant point.”
       As to the second interview, the trial court concluded defendant’s statements, “I
can’t talk right now” was not an invocation of his right to remain silent. Specifically, the
trial court stated the following:

              “The detective confirmed that he remembered his Miranda rights.
       And I would just comment societally, Miranda rights are somewhat
       engrained into society. I can’t -- the number of times I’ve heard someone
       accused of a crime comment, I wasn’t read my rights, who was not a
       criminal. In other words, someone that got stopped for driving under the
       influence or driving on a suspended license and was complaining to me in

                                             17.
        some fashion whether as a judge or as an attorney, that the cops never gave
        me my rights.

               “So I think it’s appropriate for the Court to note that in our modern
        society, we even have a verb now that didn’t exist before, Mirandized,
        regarding the advisal of Miranda, which part of American slang.

                “With that, the termination of the second interview, the statement by
        [defendant], I can’t talk right now. I believe [trial counsel] accurately
        summed up the context of the statement by [defendant]. That is, I can’t talk
        right now. My head hurts and my hair itches. But again, to me, this is not a
        clear invocation. It’s a statement of a physical condition which indicates
        that he is not in a position to talk. But again, it’s not an invocation. And
        while making this, he continued to engage in conversation with the officers.
        As such, I do find that statement is admissible.”
        D.     Applicable Law
        The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const.,
5th Amend.) To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination from the “inherently compelling pressures” of the custodial setting
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467), the high court adopted a set of prophylactic
measures requiring law enforcement officers to advise a suspect of his right to remain
silent and to have counsel present prior to any custodial interrogation (id. at pp. 444–
445).
        “When a suspect knowingly and intelligently waives the Miranda rights, ‘law
enforcement may interrogate, but if at any point in the interview [the suspect] invokes the
right to remain silent or the right to counsel, “the interrogation must cease.” ’ [Citation.]
Once the suspect has invoked, ‘a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation ....
[There is to be no] further interrogation by the authorities … unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ (Edwards,
supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48

                                             18.
Cal.4th 347, 384.) ‘In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities
through “badger[ing]” or “overreaching” — explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional
— might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself
notwithstanding his earlier request [to remain silent or] for counsel’s assistance.’ ”
(Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104.)
       A defendant who has waived their Miranda rights must make a “clear assertion”
of the right to silence or counsel before officers must cease questioning. (Davis v. United
States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 460 (Davis).) “The applicability of the ‘ “rigid” prophylactic
rule’ of Edwards requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused actually invoked his
right[s] ....’ ” (Id. at p. 458, italics omitted.) “Ambiguous or equivocal references to an
attorney or the right to silence do not require cessation of questioning. [Citations.]
Whether the defendant made an invocation is analyzed from the perspective of a
reasonable officer (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 381), and takes into
consideration the context of the statement [citation]. If ‘a reasonable officer in light of
the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the
right,’ then the officer need not cease all questioning immediately.” (Ramirez, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 1104, italics omitted.)
       “ ‘A statement obtained in violation of a suspect’s Miranda rights may not be
admitted to establish guilt in a criminal case.’ [Citation.] When evaluating the
admissibility of a defendant’s statements on appeal, we accept the trial court’s resolution
of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, and we independently determine
from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the
statements were illegally obtained.” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1,
16.) “The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment is reviewed under the Chapman standard (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24 [(Chapman)]). [Citation.] That test requires the People ‘to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

                                             19.
obtained.’ [Citation.] The standard is satisfied only if ‘[t]here is no reasonable
possibility that the verdict would have been more favorable to defendant had [the]
statements not been admitted.’ ” (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1029.)

       E.     Analysis
              1.     The First Interview
       Here, as noted above, a defendant who has waived the Miranda rights must make
a “clear assertion” of the right to silence or counsel before officers are required to cease
questioning (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460), and if “a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right,”
then the officers need not cease all questioning immediately. (Id. at p. 459, italics in
original.) For example, in Ramirez, our Supreme Court held the “[d]efendant did not
clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to silence at the end of the … interview ...
[when he] responded, ‘I don’t have nothing else to say to you guys.’ ” (Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1104.) The court found “defendant willingly participated in a long
interview with the officers[,]” and he “remained steadfast in his denials and did not
complain of the absence of an attorney, or interpose a request for one.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, “[v]iewed in context, a reasonable officer would have understood [the]
defendant’s statement to mean that he had nothing to add to his claims of innocence, not
that he was invoking his right to silence.” (Ibid.)
       Additionally, in People v. Thomas (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 987 (Thomas), the
court held the defendant’s statement, “ ‘I ain’t talking no more and we can leave it at
that,’ ” was not an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. (Id. at p. 1006,
italics omitted.) Rather in context, “it was merely an expression of momentary
frustration both with the detectives’ failure to accept [the defendant’s] repeated insistence
that he was not present during the shootings and with [the deputy’s] immediately
preceding statement [that the defendant] was ‘hiding something.’ ” (Ibid.) The court
explained the transcript of the interview showed the defendant “repeatedly expressed

                                             20.
frustration during the interview” (ibid.), and “[w]hen viewed in conjunction with his
earlier expressions of frustration during the interview,” the purported invocation “was
another expression of momentary frustration and, at most, was an ambiguous invocation
of the right to remain silent.” (Id. at p. 1007.)
       Here, defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to silence at the
end of the first interview. Defendant was advised of Miranda, waived these rights, and
then willingly participated in an hour-long interview with detectives. He repeatedly
denied involvement in the robbery and claimed to have been under the influence of drugs
at the time the crimes occurred. Detective Anderson continued to press defendant
regarding the underlying offenses, but defendant remained steadfast in his denials.
However, towards the end of the interview, Anderson specifically asked defendant about
the robbery, and defendant replied, “Are we done?” Detective Anderson continued to
probe and defendant continued to engage and stated that killing two people for money
“doesn’t mean that he’s a[n] evil person”and that it is hard for the detectives to really
understand what’s going because the detectives “didn’t grow up how [h]e grew up.”
Defendant then asked a second and third time, “Are we done?” and Anderson gave him
the option of “say[ing] you don’t wanna answer it[,]” but defendant continued to engage.
Anderson asked defendant if he was sticking to his story, “ ‘I don’t remember’ ” and
defendant continued to deflect. Anderson ended the interview after asking defendant,
“Are we done?” and defendant replied, “Yeah.”
       The statement, “Are we done?” was not a clear invocation of the right to silence.
Although Detective Anderson ended the interview after the statement was made for the
third time, he testified during the evidentiary hearing that “talking to [defendant] any
further would have been pointless” and he “didn’t see that pushing him would be
fruitful.” (See People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 944, 950 (Martinez) [The
statement “ ‘That’s all I can tell you’ ” was interpreted to mean “ ‘[t]hat’s all the
information [the defendant] had for [the officer],’ ” rather than the defendant invoking his

                                              21.
right to silence].) Similar to Thomas, the statement “Are we done?” was not an
invocation of his right to remain silent, but rather “an expression of momentary
frustration” that Detective Anderson was not accepting his repeated insistence he had no
memory of the robbery. (Thomas, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) Considering the
context of when the statements were made, defendant continued to engage with Detective
Anderson and insist he was under the influence of drugs and had no memory of the
robbery. Further, the statement could also be interpreted to mean that defendant was
simply asking Detective Anderson whether he had any additional questions for him.
Accordingly, we conclude that after defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, he did
not invoke his right to remain silent because the statement, “Are we done?” constituted
an “[a]mbiguous or equivocal reference[] ... to silence [and thus] d[id] not require
cessation of questioning.”22 (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1104.)
       Nonetheless, defendant cites to People v. Villasenor (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 42, in
support of his contention that “[e]ven if [his] reply to the detective’s question could
reasonably be viewed as an ‘expression of frustration,’ as the trial court concluded
[citation omitted], it was also an unambiguous invocation of his right[.]” (Italics
omitted.) However, Villasenor is clearly distinguishable. In Villasenor, the defendant
“told [the detective] to take him home 13 times within a matter of 14 minutes. During
this short span of time, he also tried to take his cell phone from the detective to call his
parents to pick him up [and] [w]hen this did not work, he repeatedly told the detective to
call his parents.” (Id. at p. 65.) “At one point, [the] defendant even tied his demands to
be taken home and to have his parents called to his ‘rights,’ saying, ‘I know my rights,’
prompting the detective to respond, ‘I know your rights, too, partner,’ and to which [the]
defendant replied: ‘So take me home then.’ ” (Ibid.) The court concluded that “[t]he
only right [the] defendant could possibly have been referring to is his right to end the

22     Compare with “We are done.”

                                              22.
interrogation [and] [a]lso within this 14-minute span of time, [the] defendant asked how
long he could be held without charges being filed and then asked – three times – to wait
out the 48 hours so he could then go home.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court held “a
reasonable officer in [the detective’s] position would have understood [the] defendant’s
repeated demands to be taken home, to have his parents called to pick him up, and to wait
out the 48 hours, to be an unambiguous invocation of his right to end the interrogation.”
(Ibid.)
          Here, as noted above, the only statement defendant made that could even be
considered “at most ... an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent” (Thomas,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007), was the statement, “Are we done?” Other than this
one statement, defendant responded to questioning and gave no other indication to
Anderson he wanted to end this interview. Unlike in Villasenor, defendant made no
repeated and unequivocal demands, but rather gave ambiguous responses, which became
even more ambiguous after he continued to engage with Anderson. Therefore, defendant
did not invoke his right to remain silent under Miranda.

                2.     The Second Interview
          At the outset, Detective Anderson was not required to provide defendant with his
Miranda rights before initiating this second interview with defendant. Our Supreme
Court has held “ ‘readvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is
‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.]
The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time that
has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator or the location
of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s
sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he
subjectively understands and waives his rights.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1106,
quoting People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 170.) Here, a 36-hour gap between the
first and second interview was reasonably contemporaneous with the prior waiver,

                                              23.
especially considering defendant was interviewed by the same individual, Detective
Anderson. (See People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 317 [Interrogations were
reasonably contemporaneous where there was a 27-hour gap between them]; People v.
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 434–435 (Williams) [same for 40-hour gap]; People v.
Mickle, at p. 171 [same for 36-hour gap].) Accordingly, no readvisement of defendant’s
Miranda rights were required.
       Because we conclude Detective Anderson was not required to provide defendant
his Miranda rights before initiating this second interview with defendant, we therefore
must determine whether the three separate statements, “I can’t talk right now” was a clear
invocation of his right to remain silent. “However, although our cases made clear ‘ “[a]
desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety ways,” ’ [citation], they also
made clear that ‘the words used by the suspect “must be construed in context.” ’ ”
(People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1220.)
       We find both Williams and Martinez instructive. In Williams, our Supreme Court
viewed the defendant’s statement, “ ‘I don’t want to talk about it,’ ” in context and
concluded it was not “an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent,” citing a
number of cases standing for the proposition that “ ‘[a] defendant has not invoked his or
her right to silence when the defendant’s statements were merely expressions of passing
frustration or animosity toward the officers, or amounted only to a refusal to discuss a
particular subject covered by the questioning.’ ” (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 433-
434, quoting People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 115, disapproved on other grounds
in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421; see also Thomas, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1006–1007 [viewed in the context of a number of “expressions of frustration,” the
defendant’s single statement, “ ‘I ain’t talking no more and we can leave it at that,’ ”
could be viewed as “another expression of momentary frustration and, at most, was an
ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent”].)

                                             24.
       Additionally, in Martinez, the court concluded that, in context, the statements, “ ‘I
don’t want to talk anymore right now,’ ” and “ ‘That’s all I can tell you,’ ” did not
amount to an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.
(Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 949–951.) In Martinez, a detective gave Miranda
advisements to the defendant, who agreed to an interview. (Id. at pp. 944–945.) When
the defendant said, “ ‘That’s all I can tell you,’ ” the detective ended the interrogation (id.
at p. 944), and the next morning, two other detectives met with the defendant, they
reminded him he had previously waived his Miranda rights, and then continued to
interrogate him. (Id. at pp. 944–946.) During the interrogation, the defendant said, “ ‘I
don’t want to talk anymore right now.’ ” In response, the detectives said they intended to
take a break, urged the defendant to “ ‘think about it,’ ” and said they would come back
and talk to him. (Id. at pp. 951–952.) The defendant replied, “ ‘Okay,’ ” and the
detectives resumed their questioning after a break. (Id. at p. 952.)
       Our Supreme Court concluded defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent
during the initial interrogation because the defendant’s remark, “ ‘That’s all I can tell
you,’ ” was reasonably viewed as merely meaning, “ ‘That’s my story, and I’ll stick with
it.’ ” (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 949–950.) The court further concluded the
defendant’s statement during the second interview, “ ‘I don’t want to talk anymore,’ ”
also did not amount to a clear invocation of his right to silence. (Id. at pp. 951–952.)
The court reasoned the context in which the statement is made matters. This statement
came “during the course of an interrogation,” rather than at the beginning of the
interrogation or contemporaneous to the initial Miranda advisements. (Id. at p. 951.)
The court also observed the detectives employed “ ‘good police practice’ ” aimed at
clarifying the defendant’s statement by proposing a break and encouraging him to
“ ‘think about it.’ ” (Id. at pp. 951–952.) The court reasoned the “[d]efendant could have
responded negatively and explained that he would not be interested in talking further,

                                              25.
even after a break. He did not. Instead, by saying, ‘Okay,’ he in effect agreed to allow
the detectives to return for more questioning.” (Id. at p. 952.)
       Here, at the outset, the statement, “I can’t talk right now” is not an unambiguous
invocation of the right to remain silent.23 These statements came “during the course of
an interrogation,” rather than at the beginning of the interrogation or contemporaneous to
the Miranda advisements (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 951), and it was ambiguous
because the statement had “ ‘more than one interpretation or reference’ or ‘ha[d] a double
meaning.’ ” (Anderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 781, 787.) This statement
became even more unclear when defendant continued to engage with Detective Anderson
during the entirety of the interview by responding, “I’m no killer,” “I’m only 22 years
old,” and “[I] [c]an’t do life in prison.” Although he began to cry at the four-minute
mark and continued to cry while telling Anderson, “I can’t talk right now[,]” it is clear
the emotion was related to both frustration and the feeling of remorse regarding the
underling offenses. (Thomas, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) Additionally,
Anderson gave him the opportunity to end the interview after defendant told him, “I can’t
talk right now. My head hurts. My hair itches,” when he responded:

              “This — I don’t have much time. I gotta go back. We have leads,
       we’re gonna be snatching up [Langston]. And then it will just – we’ve got
       other stuff trust me, but I want to see if — I’m giving you the opportunity
       to do the right thing now. You — this is the last card you got. After I leave
       you don’t have anything else. That’s it . We’re done. All right?”
       Detective Anderson, although not required to, had every right to clarify whether
defendant was invoking his right to remain silent. (Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp.
951–952 [“ ‘[G]ood police practice’ ” to clarify whether a defendant wants to end the
interview or continue speaking with the officers].) Therefore, we cannot confidently say
defendant’s invocation of his right to silence was “ ‘unambiguous[]’ ” from the

23     Compare with “I won’t talk right now.”

                                             26.
perspective of a reasonable officer. (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381.)
Accordingly, in light of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s, “I can’t talk right
now” responses, we conclude a reasonable officer could have understood that defendant
might be invoking his right to remain silent, but would not have understood whether he
was in fact invoking his right to remain silent. (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459.)
       F.     Harmless Error
       However, even assuming a Miranda violation occurred, we conclude defendant
was not prejudiced. As noted above, “The erroneous admission of statements obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed under the Chapman standard [citation].
[Citation.] That test requires the People ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.] The standard
is satisfied only if ‘[t]here is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been
more favorable to defendant had [the] statements not been admitted.’ [Citation.]
Because confessions, ‘ “[a]lmost invariably” will provide persuasive evidence of a
defendant’s guilt ..., the improper admission of a confession is much more likely to affect
the outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus is much more likely
to be prejudicial under the traditional harmless-error standard.’ ” (People v. Henderson,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) In People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 (Cahill), our
Supreme Court acknowledged an erroneous admission of a confession “might be found
harmless, for example, (1) when the defendant was apprehended by the police in the
course of committing the crime, (2) when there are numerous, disinterested reliable
eyewitnesses to the crime whose testimony is confirmed by a wealth of uncontroverted
physical evidence, or (3) in a case in which the prosecution introduced, in addition to the
confession, a videotape of the commission of the crime.” (Id. at p. 505.) Certainly,
People v. Cahill’s list of examples is not intended to be exhaustive, but it does exemplify
the kind of strong evidence required to satisfy the Chapman standard.

                                             27.
       Here, the evidence in this case satisfies this high standard. Most of the evidence
presented in this case falls within the list of evidence Cahill described as establishing
harmlessness. First, law enforcement located defendant hiding inside a shed in a
backyard, which was in close proximity to the convenience market where the
robbery/murders had occurred. Deputies searched defendant and located a pair of Nikes
next to him — matching the shoes worn by the suspect who was observed in the
surveillance footage with the white gloves and handgun. Further, deputies located over a
thousand dollars “in a rolled up mesh” inside the shed — one of the $100 bills had Juan
Aceves’s blood on it.
       Second, multiple surveillance videos showed the entirety of the robbery and
shootings. In the videos, the suspect wearing the white gloves shot both Heriberto and
Juan. These white gloves were later found by law enforcement in the surrounding area
where defendant was located. Further, law enforcement located a dark blue beanie with a
New York Yankees’ logo behind the convenience store, which contained defendant’s
DNA.
       Finally, multiple eyewitness’s testimony corroborated and established defendant’s
identity as the suspect seen in the surveillance footage. First, Jose N. and Modesto N.,
who were stopped at a red light at the corner of Main Street and Panama Road followed
the individual who ran “eastbound on Panama and northbound on Carnation [¶] … [a]nd
then turned left on Lana Street.” He was described as wearing a black hoodie sweatshirt
and “had a gun on his [¶] [l]eft hand” and cash register “in the other hand.” Jose then
observed this individual take off his black hoodie sweatshirt and “thr[o]w it in the yard”
of the house at “the corner of Carnation and Lana Street.” Second, Fidel C. testified he
observed defendant “t[ake] off his sweater and he threw in on the ground and left” and
later identified defendant in a six-pack lineup — corroborating both Jose N. and Modesto
N.’s testimony. As Cahill makes clear, “[A]lthough in some cases a defendant’s
confession will be the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case in support of a conviction, in

                                             28.
many instances it will be possible for an appellate court to determine with confidence that
there is no reasonable probability that the exclusion of the confession would have
affected the result.” (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 505.) This is one of those cases.
Accordingly, we conclude the confession was cumulative in light of the overwhelming
evidence establishing defendant’s culpability in the current case.

II.    ASSEMBLY BILL 333
       Assembly Bill 333 amended the language of section 186.22 to modify the showing
necessary to prove gang offenses and gang enhancements (Stats. 2021, ch. 669, § 3, eff.
Jan. 1, 2022), and added section 1109, requiring bifurcation of the trial of gang
enhancements and substantive gang offense from that of the other underlying offenses
upon a defendant’s request. (§ 1109, subds. (a), (b).)
       A.     Section 1109
       Defendant contends newly enacted section 1109 should apply retroactively to his
case and “applies to both the gang enhancement and the gang-murder special
circumstance[,]” and therefore requires reversal of his underlying convictions. The
People deny section 1109 should apply retroactively and that defendant’s claim is
forfeited because “[s]ection 1109 did not change the requirement that defendant’s request
bifurcation of gang enhancements, nor did it impose a sua sponte duty on trial courts.”
Regardless, the People contend the lack of bifurcation constituted harmless error.
       As we explain below, we agree the trial court’s failure to bifurcate pursuant to
section 1109 or under then existing law was harmless because there is no basis to
conclude bifurcation would have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we need
not consider whether section 1109 applies retroactively or the merits of defendant’s
bifurcation motion.24

24      The issue of whether section 1109 applies retroactively to cases that are not yet
final is currently under review by our Supreme Court in People v. Burgos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 550, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743.

                                             29.
              1.     Applicable Law
       “Pursuant to section 1109, subdivision (a), upon a defendant’s request, a case in
which a gang enhancement is charged under section 186.22, subdivision (b) or (d) must
be tried in separate phases. Section 1109, subdivision (b) provides that ‘[i]f a defendant
is charged with a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, this count shall be tried
separately from all other counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence as an
element of the crime. This charge may be tried in the same proceeding with an allegation
of an enhancement under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22.’ ” (People v. Ramos
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129 (Ramos).)
       Section 1109 was added because:

              “(e) “California courts have long recognized how prejudicial gang
       evidence is. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.)
       Studies suggest that allowing a jury to hear the kind of evidence that
       supports a gang enhancement before it has decided whether the defendant is
       guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions. [Citations.] The mere
       specter of gang enhancements pressures defendants to accept unfavorable
       plea deals rather than risk a trial filled with prejudicial evidence and a
       substantially longer sentence.

       “(f) Bifurcation of trials where gang evidence is alleged can help reduce its
       harmful and prejudicial impact.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 669, § 2, subds. (e), (f).)
              2.     Analysis
       Defendant’s right to bifurcation under section 1109 is purely statutory. (Ramos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1131–1133 [concluding section 1109 error was harmless
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) “ ‘Typically, a defendant who has
established error under state law must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that
in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’ ”
(People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 553; accord People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th
19, 29 [where the error “is purely one of state law, the Watson harmless error test
applies”].)

                                             30.
       Recently, in People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, our Supreme Court held the
failure to bifurcate pursuant to section 1109 is not structural error. (Tran, supra, at pp.
1208–1210.) The court also rejected the defendant’s argument the Chapman standard for
federal constitutional error applies, reasoning the admission of gang evidence in that case
was not so prejudicial that it rendered the trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ” (Tran, supra,
at p. 1209.) Instead, it evaluated the trial court’s failure to bifurcate under the Watson
standard. (Tran, supra, at pp. 1209–1210.)
              3.     Harmless Error
       In assessing prejudice under Watson, “an appellate court may consider ‘whether
the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence
supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v.
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 870, italics omitted.)
       Here, defendant argues “the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement and gang-
murder special circumstance allegations damaged [his] chance of being acquitted of
murder based on the jurors’ reasonable doubts about the reliability of [his] confession to
have been the gunman in the robbery” and that “the failure to bifurcate reduced the
possibility that the jurors would acquit [him] based on the weaknesses in the
prosecution’s case.” We disagree. First, as we discussed in detail in part I.D., ante, the
evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Second, although defendant, argues
“[t]he court’s failure to bifurcate ... resulted in [his] jury hearing an enormous amount of
extremely inflammatory evidence about the [CBC] gang and [his] allegiance to it[,]” his
gang membership was highly relevant for identity, motive, or intent under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (b). It was relevant for the jury to hear that gang members
commit robberies because “[t]hey benefit from the financial gain potentially of the
robbery itself” and that “[c]ommitting a crime in association with other gang members
helps insure you have a higher likelihood of getting away it.” Further, any potential

                                             31.
prejudice from the gang evidence was mitigated when the trial court provided the jury
with a limiting instruction regarding its consideration of the gang evidence, which we
presume it followed. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414 [“We presume that
jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate
the gang enhancement and gang special circumstance allegations. (See People v.
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051 [“Any evidence admitted solely to prove the
gang enhancement was not so minimally probative on the charged offense, and so
inflammatory in comparison, that it threatened to sway the jury to convict regardless of
defendants’ actual guilt.”].) Therefore, we affirm defendant’s conviction in its entirety.
(See People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [failure to bifurcate was harmless
under Watson standard in light of “ ‘overwhelming’ ” evidence in support of robbery
convictions, stating “[e]ven if section 1109 applied retroactively to this case — an issue
we need not and do not decide here – E.H. cannot show it is ‘reasonably probable’ he
would have obtained a more favorable result if his trial had been bifurcated”].)
       B.     Sections 186.22 & 190.2, subdivision (a)(22)
       Defendant further contends he entitled to the benefit of newly amended section
186.22 and that both the gang enhancements and gang special circumstance allegations
must be dismissed. The People concede the amendments to section 186.22 apply
retroactively and that “[u]nder these circumstances, remand is required.” However, the
People disagree that the gang-murder special circumstance allegations must be dismissed
because the Legislature could not unconstitutionally amend section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(22), created by the voters via Proposition 21. Based on our Supreme Court’s holding
in Rojas, we conclude defendant is entitled to a reversal of both his section 186.22 gang
enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(22)). (Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 580.) However, we also conclude the People are

                                            32.
entitled to retry defendant on the enhancements and gang special circumstance
allegations if they so choose.25
              1.     Gang Enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b))
       As to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, the jury found true gang enhancements (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)). At the time of defendant’s trial, “criminal street gang” was defined as “any
ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the
criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31) to (33), inclusive of
subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and
whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of
criminal gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f).) Assembly Bill 333 revised the
definition of “criminal street gang” to require that members “collectively” (no longer
“individually or collectively”) engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. (§ 186.22, subd.
(f); People v. Delgado (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1086.)
       Additionally, Assembly Bill 333 redefined “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)), a necessary requirement to proving the existence of a “criminal

25      In supplemental briefing, defendant further contends: (1) he is entitled to make a
record that may be helpful at his future youth offender parole hearing, even though he
was sentenced to two consecutive LWOP terms, and that distinguishing from individuals
sentenced to a term allowing for the possibility of parole and individuals sentenced to
LWOP violates equal protection; and (2) that the abstract of judgment must be amended
to strike the $300 parole revocation fine “because [he] was sentenced to life
imprisonment without [the] possibility of parole.” As we discuss in detail below,
defendant is entitled to a reversal of the gang-murder special circumstance findings, as
alleged in counts 1 and 2, which was the basis for the two consecutive LWOP sentence
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)). Therefore, the trial court on remand can address: (1) whether
defendant is entitled to make a record that may be helpful at a future youth offender
parole hearing pursuant to section 3051 and Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261; and (2)
whether imposition of the parole revocation fine is required. (People v. Valenzuela
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all
prior resentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”] accord, People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“‘the full resentencing rule’”].)

                                            33.
street gang” and thus a “prerequisite to proving the gang crime and the gang
enhancement.” (See § 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1); People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 816, 823.) “ ‘The offenses comprising a pattern of criminal gang activity are
referred to as predicate offenses.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 822.) At the time of
defendant’s trial, “pattern of criminal activity” meant “the commission of, attempted
commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or
conviction of two or more of the following offenses, provided at least one of these
offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses
occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed on
separate occasions, or by two or more persons.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (e).) Under this
former definition, the prosecution only had to prove that those associated with a gang had
committed at least two offenses from a list of predicate crimes on separate occasions
within three years of one another. (Former § 186.22, subd. (e); see People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 665.) It was unnecessary to prove the predicate offenses were gang
related. (Former § 186.22, subd. (e); People v. Rodriguez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
822.)
        The amended statute made several changes to the definition and limited type of
predicate offenses sufficient to prove the gang enhancement. “First, the predicate
offenses now must have been committed by two or more ‘members’ of the gang (as
opposed to any persons). [Citation.] Second, the predicate offenses must be proven to
have ‘commonly benefited a criminal street gang.’ [Citation, italics in original.] Third,
the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the date of the
currently charged offense. [Citation.] Fourth, the list of qualifying predicate offenses has
been reduced. [Citation.] And fifth, the currently charged offense no longer counts as a
predicate offense.” (People v. E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 477–478; § 186.22,
subd. (e)(1), (2).) Most notably, the new element that the predicate offenses “commonly
benefited a criminal street gang” requires that “the common benefit of the offense is more

                                             34.
than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A new subdivision (g) was also added
specifying that “[e]xamples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may
include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a
perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or
previous witness or informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
       Here, the parties agree, as do we, that Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section
186.22 apply retroactively to this this case, which is not yet final on appeal, and that
remand is required. Since the amendments to section 186.22 increase the threshold for
conviction of a section 186.22 enhancement, defendant — whose judgement of
conviction is not yet final — is entitled to the benefit of these changes to the law.
(Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.) Further, the jury was not allowed to consider
whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove a “pattern of criminal
activity” under the amended law. As noted above, the revised definition of “pattern of
criminal activity” increased the threshold of proof for the predicate offenses necessary for
the gang enhancement. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) This included the notable new
requirement of a common benefit to the gang derived from the predicate offenses, and
that benefit be more than reputational (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1) [“ ‘pattern of criminal gang
activity’ means ... the offenses commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the
common benefit of the offense is more than reputational”].) Accordingly, the gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) alleged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 must be reversed.
              2.      Gang-Murder Special Circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22))
       On counts 1 and 2, the jury also found true the gang-murder special-circumstance
allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22) was enacted as a
part of Proposition 21, an initiative measure adopted by the electorate in the March 2000
primary election. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 65.) Section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(22) makes first degree murder a capital crime if “[t]he defendant
intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal

                                              35.
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried
out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.” (Italics added.)
       Prior to Rojas, the Court of Appeal was divided as to whether Assembly Bill 333
unconstitutionally amended Proposition 21. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 232, 245, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275449 [Assembly Bill 333 did not
unconstitutionally amend Proposition 21]; People v. Rojas (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 542,
553–558, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275835 [Assembly Bill 333 did
unconstitutionally amend Proposition 21].) During the pendency of this appeal, our
Supreme Court resolved this dispute and held that “applying Assembly Bill 333’s
definition of ‘criminal street gang’ to the gang-murder special circumstances does not
unconstitutionally amend section 190.22(a)(22) [Proposition 21].” (Rojas, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 580.) Our Supreme Court’s rejection of the People’s argument that
Assembly Bill 333’s changes to the definitions of “criminal street gang” and “pattern of
criminal gang activity” unconstitutionally amended Proposition 21 requires us to vacate
the gang-murder special circumstance findings.
       Accordingly, we vacate both the gang enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)), as alleged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the gang-murder special circumstance
findings (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), as alleged in counts 1 & 2, and remand the matter to
afford the People the opportunity to retry these allegations under the current law.
(Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128.)
                                       DISPOSTION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Assembly Bill 333, we reverse both the gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), as to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the gang-murder
special circumstance allegations (§190.2, subd. (a)(22)), as to counts 1 and 2, but
conclude the People are not foreclosed from retrying defendant on these enhancements
and allegations on remand. The trial court shall also address whether defendant is

                                              36.
entitled to make a record that may be helpful at a future youth offender parole hearing
pursuant to section 3051. Thereafter, the trial court is directed to file an amended and
corrected abstract of judgment and transmit copies thereof to the appropriate authorities.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                             FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

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