Court Opinion

ID: 9582287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:24:48.274737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:37.354844
License: Public Domain

Felton, C. J.,
concurring specially.  I think the court erred in ruling that the testimony of J. D. Noble as to what the fireman told the witness that he saw was admissible in evidence, the question dealt with in division one of the opinion. The court seems to have based its ruling on the fact that the statement was part of the res gestae and also on the theory that it was hearsay but admissible to explain conduct and ascertain motive, etc. Under the first theory the testimony was properly excluded under Weinkle & Sons v. Brunswick & Western R. Co., 107 Ga. 367 (33 S. E. 471), and Kemp v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 122 Ga. 559 (50 S. E. 465). The testimony was not admissible under the second theoiy because the statement by the fireman did not explain the conduct or illustrate the motive of the engineer under the facts of this case, as it.is not shown that the fireman communicated what he saw to the engineer. See Henderson v. State, 210 Ga. 680, 683 (82 S. E. 2d 638). The evidence was not admissible to show the substantive fact that the deceased was sitting on the tracks with his head in his hands. HixGreen Co. v. Dowis, 79 Ga. App. 412 (53 S. E. 2d 601).
On the former appeal of this case this court held that, “The evidence in this case tended to show and would have authorized the jury to find that the plaintiff’s husband suffered some mental or physical collapse which caused him to sit or lie upon the defendant’s tracks.” On the trial treated in that decision there was no objection to the testimony as to what the fireman said, dealt with above, or if objected to on the trial the objection was waived by a failure to file a cross-bill of exceptions. So, considering the above holding, even if the testimony of J. D. Noble was inadmissible, there would still be a jury issue whether the deceased’s negligence in lying on the track precludes a recovery.
I do not think that the fact that this court assumed that the testimony of J. D. Noble was admissible in view of the fact *704that no objection to it was presented to us made it the law of the case that the evidence was admissible. I do not think that the principle of the “law of the case” goes that far, especially since the) evidence involved is not indisputably hearsay as is shown by the ruling of the majority in this case. Of course, if this court had ruled expressly that the evidence was not hearsay, we could not now change that ruling.
I think that under our ruling in the former consideration of this case the court erred in directing a verdict for the railroad but I think the court properly excluded the testimony of J. D. Noble as to what the fireman stated to him.