Court Opinion

ID: 9795292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:24:37.125628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:06.579437
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I dissent in part because I do not agree that a finding of intentional discrimination is a matter as to which the Personnel Board was entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge who heard the evidence. It is not entirely clear to me whether the majority holds that a finding of intentional discrimination is in the nature of a conclusion of law and is therefore subject to de novo review generally, or merely that it is a type of finding or conclusion as to which an agency may substitute its own judgment for that of a hearing officer. In either case, however, because I consider a finding of intentional discrimination to be a finding of historical fact, as to which the Board is bound unless it is clearly erroneous, I disagree.
Although employment discrimination is designated an unfair employment practice by statute in Colorado, see § 24-34-402(1)(a), 7 C.R.S. (2001), we have held that our statute closely parallels its federal counterpart in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and have expressly adopted the order and allocation of proof required for employment discrimination claims filed pursuant to that Act. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Big O Tires, Inc., 940 P2d 397, 400 (Colo.1997) (expressly adopting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 LEd.2d 668 (1978)). The ultimate question of intentional discrimination-whether the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the employer are merely a pretext-is the last step in a three-step analysis, requiring first that the employee establish a prima facie case of discrimination and second, that the employer come forward with nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. See Bodaghi v. Dep't of Natural Res., 995 P.2d 288, 297-99 (Colo.2000).
While a finding of intentional discrimination is the ultimate determination establishing an unfair employment practice, it is clearly a matter of historical fact and must be treated as such by a reviewing body. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 LEd.2d 518 (1985) (finding of intentional discrimination in Title VII context is finding of fact and shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)). Rather than involving policy or legal considerations, the question whether an employer has intentionally discriminated is one of subjective intent. An employee must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate rea*1254sons offered by the employer were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Such a finding will rest primarily on a determination of the credibility of the witnesses. Id. In entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court may not merely preempt the ultimate factfinder or substitute its own finding of fact. It may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
The identical, three-step analysis applies to a challenge of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n. 18, 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 181 L.Ed.2d 884 (1995); Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 591 (Colo.1998) ("In considering the proper standard of review, we seek guidance from Title VII cases," citing Batson ). In Batson, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Amderson v. Bessemer City for the proposition that a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact, entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. 530 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Likewise, we have found it to be "well settled that the trial court's determination in the third step of the Batson analysis of actual racial discrimination is an issue of fact to which we afford due deference and review only for clear error." Valdes 966 P.2d at 590; see also People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 191 (Colo.1993) (same).
Rather than holding that a finding of intentional discrimination is a conclusion of law, if the majority intends only that an administrative agency can decide matters of historical fact for itself, as long as they are ultimate rather than intermediate issues, its holding nevertheless contravenes prior holdings of this court that limit factfinding to bodies receiving evidence. With regard to the role of hearing officers in the process of administrative adjudication, section 24-4-105(15)(b), 7 CR.S. (2000), distinguishes "findings of evidentiary fact," from "ultimate conclusions of fact," and permits the former to be set aside by an agency on review only where they are "contrary to the weight of the evidence." We have consistently construed the latter conclusions, however, as including only conclusions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, which are usually phrased in the language of a controlling statute or legal standard. See State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Colo.1994). Evidentiary findings of a hearing officer, by contrast, are binding on an agency in its review function as long as they are adequately supported by the record. Blaine v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. Re No. 1, 748 P.2d 1280, 1288 (Colo.1988). "To permit the board to make new findings of evidentiary fact would contravene the underlying statutory scheme by transferring the hearing officer's responsibility for making factual determinations, which determinations are necessarily based on an evaluation of the eredibility of witnesses and often require a weighing of conflicting evidence, to an administrative board which has neither seen nor heard the testimony of the witnesses." Id.
To the extent that the majority treats a finding of intentional discrimination as a matter of fact, then its holding permits the board to determine a matter of historical fact without bearing or seeing the testimony of the witnesses. On the other hand, to the extent that it treats a finding of intentional discrimination as a matter of law, it radically departs from the precedent of both this court and the United States Supreme Court and upholds the Personnel Board's conclusion of law as being supported by sufficient evidence in the record, without separately deciding the matter of law de novo. Because I consider the ALJ's finding of an absence of intentional discrimination to be a finding of fact that was entitled to deference by the Board, I would uphold reversal of the Board's decision to set it aside.
Justice KOURLIS joins in the dissent and the concurrence.