Court Opinion

ID: 9734680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:42:39.333338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:27.827845
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the order entered by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) and to remand this case for the purposes indicated in the majority’s order. *1068Respectfully, I disagree with the reasoning that the majority espouses to support its decision to vacate and remand. More fundamentally, however, I dissent because the majority raises sua sponte the question of whether the Commission possessed the power to determine whether Petitioner complied with the Settlement Agreement between the parties to resolve the employment discrimination complaint filed by Christine Seliga.
In its supplemental brief, the Commission argues that the majority has improperly raised an issue concerning the Commission’s power to conduct an administrative hearing to determine Petitioner’s compliance. Notwithstanding the majority’s acknowledgement that the Commission’s position is not without merit and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has admonished this Court about confusing the Commission’s “power” with its “jurisdiction” to act in a particular case, the majority nevertheless asserts that “on the spectrum between ‘power’ and ‘jurisdiction,’ we believe the Commission’s authority to conduct a hearing on an alleged breach of a predetermination settlement agreement is closer to a subject matter jurisdictional issue. In any event, in the interest of finality, we shall avoid this largely semantic issue and render a decision on the issue of jurisdiction, which is the important issue in this case.” Opinion at 1061, n5. To the contrary, the issue is not one of semantics; rather, it is one of law.
This case does not involve the Commission’s lack of jurisdiction over the general subject matter involved, ie., resolution of employment discrimination complaints within the Commonwealth; instead, it involves the majority’s disregard of the Commission’s rational interpretation of its regulations and disregard of the statutory powers granted to the Commission to attempt to eliminate employment discrimination. See Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (Act), Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 960; Commission Special Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure (Special Rules), 16 Pa. Code § 42.73. Thus the majority has erred by proceeding on an issue that it raised sua sponte in direct contravention of admonishments by the Supreme Court not only in Riedel v. Human Relations Commission of Reading, 559 Pa. 34, 739 A.2d 121 (1999), but also more recently in Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole), 580 Pa. 174, 860 A.2d 25 (2004).
In Riedel the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s order and remanded the matter, noting the local human relations commission’s argument that this Court improperly sua sponte raised and addressed the issue of whether the commission exceeded its authority by enacting and enforcing an ordinance provision making it unlawful for any person to, inter alia, coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the ordinance. The commission indicated that the appellee had not raised the issue in his brief to the trial court, in his statement of matters complained of on appeal or in his brief to this Court. In agreeing with the commission, the Supreme Court found that this Court’s sua sponte ruling on the ordinance was not a jurisdictional determination but instead involved the commission’s authority to act. The court reiterated the distinction between an agency’s authority to act and its jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction and power are not interchangeable although judges and lawyers often confuse them — Hellertown Borough Referendum Case, 354 Pa. 255, 47 A.2d 273 (1946). Jurisdiction *1069relates solely to the competency of the particular court or administrative body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs. Power, on the other hand, means the ability of a decision-making body to order or effect a certain result.
Delaware River Port Auth. v. PA. Public Utility Commission, 408 Pa. 169, 178, 182 A.2d 682, 686 (1962); see also Beltrami Enterprises, Inc. v. Commonwealth of PA, Dep’t of Environmental Resources, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 72, 632 A.2d 989, 993 (1993) (fact that administrative agency may not have power to afford relief in particular case presented is of no moment to determination of its jurisdiction over general subject matter of controversy).
Riedel, 559 Pa. at 39-40, 739 A.2d at 124. The Supreme Court explained that the commission clearly possessed jurisdiction over the general subject matter at hand in Riedel, just as the Commission in the case sub judice clearly has jurisdiction over the general subject matter before it, i.e., whether unlawful employment discrimination has occurred. The Supreme Court concluded in Riedel that this Court improperly reversed the trial court on the basis of a waived issue that had been raised by this Court sua sponte. Because the issue presented did not raise the local commission’s jurisdiction, this Court could not properly sua sponte raise the issue under the jurisdictional exception to the waiver rule.
I also point out that in Heath the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the merits of the claimant’s appeal because this Court improperly raised sua sponte an issue that had not been raised by the employer in that workers’ compensation case. The Supreme Court disagreed with this Court’s conclusion that the “personal animus” exception was in fact jurisdictional. The Supreme Court explained the following:
“[T]he test for determining whether a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter is the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs.” [Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 376 Pa. 305, 309, 102 A.2d 170, 172 (1954) ] (emphasis in original). In other words, we determine whether “the court had power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it was unable to grant the relief sought in the particular case.” Id.
Heath, 580 Pa. at 180-181, 860 A.2d at 29.
Petitioner raised four issues in the present appeal before the Court, all essentially related to whether Petitioner would suffer undue hardship if it had to comply with the Settlement Agreement. At no time did Petitioner challenge the Commission’s jurisdiction, which is clear, and at no time did Petitioner challenge the power of the Commission to act under 16 Pa.Code § 42.73. It is obvious from a cursory review of Supreme Court precedent that the issue raised sua sponte by the majority goes to the power of the Commission to act, not to its jurisdiction.1
*1070Next, I disagree with the majority’s decision to take a clearly rational and longstanding Commission regulation, supported by statutory law and case law, see Mechensky v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 192, 578 A.2d 589 (1990), and then redefine it and reject the Commission’s interpretation of its regulation. The majority reasons that because the Settlement Agreement is not a “consent order” the Commission should have “resumed” a merits hearing and eventually entered whatever order that it deemed appropriate.
Section 42.73 of the Special Rules provides as follows:
§ 42.73. Reconsideration of adjustment.
(a) A party shall have the right to petition the Commission to consider whether another party has complied with the terms of adjustment or settlement, or both.
(b) A party may file a petition under this section regardless of whether a finding of probable cause has been made in the case.
(c) The Commission will consider the petition and take whatever action it deems necessary or appropriate, as justice may require; except that the Commission will not, in any case, enforce an adjustment or settlement which is not in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
Section 10 of the Act, 43 P.S. § 960, provides in pertinent part:
The complainant, the Attorney General or the Commission may secure enforcement of the order of the Commission or other appropriate relief. When the Commission has heard and decided any complaint brought before it, enforcement of its order shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in court, together with a transcript of the record of the hearing before the Commission, and issuance and service of a copy of said petition as in proceedings in equity.
The Commission is correct in explaining that 16 Pa.Code § 42.73 governs procedure to be followed when a party complains about non-compliance with the terms of a settlement agreement, whereas Section 10 of the Act governs only when the Commission has entered an order in a case that may be enforced only in judicial proceedings. The Commission did not enter an order to resolve the employment discrimination complaint filed by Seliga. Rather, it resolved Seliga’s complaint through the mechanism of a Settlement Agreement, and consequently Section 10 has no applicability. The sole issue before the Commission pertained to Seliga’s reconsideration request to obtain Petitioner’s compliance, which resulted in the Commission’s hearing to determine the facts related to Petitioner’s alleged non-compliance and ultimately in the Commission’s February 1, 2005 final order directing Petitioner to pay Seliga back pay and imposing other remedies for non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement.
To implement the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the legislature delegated power to the Commission to “adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and regulations to effectuate the policies and provisions of [the] act.” Section 7(d) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 957(d). In reviewing Commission decisions, this Court may not *1071reject the Commission’s interpretation of any rule or regulation that it has lawfully adopted and may not substitute that interpretation with the Court’s own judgment or notion of how a rule or regulation should be interpreted. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973) (reviewing court is not free to substitute its discretion for that of an administrative agency acting within its statutory powers).
Consistent with its statutory mandate the Commission is required under Section 9(b) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 959(b), to encourage parties to enter predetermination settlement agreements and under Section 9(c), 43 P.S. § 959(c), to endeavor to eliminate unlawful discriminatory practices by “conference, conciliation and persuasion.” The Commission correctly notes the legislature’s intent for resolution of discrimination complaints through the settlement process and, in concert therewith, intent for the Commission to use its authority to decide whether a party has complied with a settlement agreement and to take whatever action is necessary to gain compliance. Accordingly, the procedure followed in the case sub judice was statutorily sanctioned and was in accordance with Me-chensky.
In Mechensky this Court concluded that 16 Pa.Code § 42.73 represents a proper extension of the Act, noting that the regulation allows a complainant to petition the Commission to decide whether a respondent has complied with terms of a settlement agreement and that the Commission shall take whatever action is necessary to effectuate compliance. The complainant in Mechensky entered into a settlement agreement with the employer; thereafter, the complainant alleged that the agreement was violated and then sought reconsideration pursuant to Section 42.73. The Commission conducted a hearing and ultimately concluded in its first order in June 1988 that the employer violated terms of the settlement agreement when it released information about the complainant’s termination. In its September 1989 order the Commission awarded nominal damages for the employer’s non-compliance with the settlement agreement. The identical procedures sanctioned in Mechensky were followed here, and no basis exists for overturning Mechensky or for concluding that the Commission has no statutory authority to take the necessary action in its discretion to effectuate compliance with the Settlement Agreement.
In conclusion, I note another significant position advanced by the Commission. It cites Baker v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 507 Pa. 325, 489 A.2d 1354 (1985), to support its request for the Court to consider the role that the Commission plays in the legislative scheme under the Act and to recognize the consequences of the Court’s refusal to adhere to legislative authority delegated to the Commission. In Baker the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Commission’s annual reports that were required to be filed with the legislature. The Commission refers to its annual report for the year ending June 30, 2005, showing that 1,387 discrimination claims (or 29 percent of the closed cases) were resolved through settlement agreements. Clearly, requiring the Commission to conduct full merits hearings in all 1,387 settlement agreements, if non-compliance was alleged, would adversely impact upon the Commission’s ability to resolve discrimination complaints through conciliation and persuasion, would adversely impact upon the Commission’s limited resources, see Baker, and more importantly would contravene legislative *1072purposes.2
Because the Commission properly acted in this case, its order now under review should be affirmed.

. Writing for the majority, Judge Leavitt states that the Court by per curiam order of December 15, 2005 directed the parties to file supplemental briefs with the Court addressing whether the Commission had jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement. The majority then states in response to the dissent that the majority addressed whether the Commission had the power to act because it was the Commission that raised the matter in its supplemental brief. Despite the majority’s description of how it arrived at addressing an *1070issue that was not raised originally by either party to this appeal, it is fundamentally clear that it was the Court which first raised the issue, not the Commission. The majority adopted the Court's action and, accordingly, has improperly raised sua sponte whether the Commission had the power to act as it did.

. The majority responds to the dissent’s view that if the majority's rationale applied the Commission would be required to conduct a merits hearing in each of the 1,387 cases closed by settlement agreements if non-compliance were alleged. In its response the majority references Section 42.72(b) of the Special Rules and its mechanism for entering a predetermination settlement as a consent order, thereby eliminating the need for a hearing on whether a violation of the Act has occurred. The majority assumes that a merits hearing can be avoided by the simple act of entering a predetermination settlement as a consent order under Section 42.72(b) of the Special Rules, but the majority ignores that all parties to a settlement agreement along with the Commissioners must agree to the entry of a consent order. That consent decree would be enforceable in the event of noncompliance only through an enforcement action filed by the Commission with this Court.
In any event, the majority’s analysis fails to give proper weight to the fact that Section 9(b)(4) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 959(b)(4), expressly mandates the Commission, i.e., Commission staff, "to encourage voluntary and informed predetermination settlements between parties” and that the regulation at 16 Pa.Code § 42.73, by the Commission’s wholly reasonable interpretation, governs procedure to be followed when a party complains about non-compliance with an "adjustment or settlement” agreement. Such procedure is limited only by a requirement that the adjustment or settlement be in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, with absolutely no requirement that it be entered as a consent order.