Court Opinion

ID: 9684769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:11:26.289141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.489989
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the prior holdings of this court that an automobile accident is a “transaction” within the meaning of section 25-1202, R. R. S. 1943. This question was originally decided by this court in Fincham v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N. W. 2d 137.
That opinion extensively considered the varying judicial interpretations and viewpoints. The court relied heavily upon the fact that many cases holding that an automobile accident is not a “transaction,” involved statutes in which the word “personal” qualified the word “transaction.” The opinion then distinguished previous statements by this court that the testimony referred to by the statute related to something of a “personal” nature by classifying them as dicta. It seems to us that the meaning of the word “transaction,” under any realistic definition, carries the connotation of something not involuntary, or at least not fortuitous nor accidental. The specific language of the statute “* * * transaction or conversation had between * * *” ought not to be interpreted as applying to a situation in which the parties were acting independently of each other; nor should the fact that there was an accidental collision between their automobiles transform their independent actions into a “transaction” between them. (Emphasis ours.) We simply cannot accept the conclusion that the Legislature in using the word “transaction” intended to include a fortuitous, involuntary automobile accident in which the parties were operating independently of each *245other. The dissenting opinion in the Fincham v. Mueller case points out the fact that the disqualification of witnesses is not favored, and that the “dead man’s” statute should not be extended or expanded by interpretation.
The majority opinion implies that to change the rule of the Fincham case would be judicial legislation. If judicial legislation is to be defined as “any interpretation of a statute,” then, of course, the Fincham case itself was judicial legislation. It is quite clear, however, that the rule adopted in the Fincham case was a judicial interpretation adopted by this court, and clearly subject to change by this court if and when convinced that it was erroneous. The majority opinion points out that the Legislature has not seen fit to change the statute since our original interpretation, and implies that because of that fact, what was originally judicial interpretation has now become legislation. While we recognize that affirmative action by the Legislature following a judicial interpretaton constitutes legislation, inaction by the Legislature does not amount to the same thing. There may, of course, be facts and circumstances which may be strongly persuasive as to whether the Legislature approved or disapproved a judicial interpretation by not acting on it. This does not convert judicial interpretation into legislation, nor should it make an erroneous interpretation inviolable.
For the reasons stated, we respectfully dissent.
Carter and Smith, JJ., join in this dissent.