Court Opinion

ID: 9889552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 17:10:15.895722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:44.771983
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 P. v. Gutierrez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050168
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. C1807638)

           v.

 EZEQUIEL JOSEPH GUTIERREZ,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         The People appeal the order granting Ezequiel Joseph Gutierrez’s motion to
dismiss probation violations alleged against him. For the reasons stated here, we will
affirm the order dismissing the probation violations and remand the matter for further
appropriate action as to Gutierrez’s probation.
                                       I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Gutierrez pleaded no contest to charges of robbery (Pen. Code § 212.5, subd. (c))
and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code § 25850, subd. (c)(1)). He also
admitted to personally using a firearm in connection with the robbery (Pen. Code
§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and to serving a prior prison term for evading a peace officer (Pen.
Code § 667.5, subd. (b)). (We omit the facts of the offenses as they are not relevant to
the analysis and disposition of the appeal.)
         In August 2019, the trial court suspended execution of a six-year sentence and
placed Gutierrez on probation for three years, including conditions to obey all laws and to
serve 364 days in jail. Gutierrez’s probation was revoked the following month and
reinstated in December 2019. Probation was again revoked in February 2020.
       In September 2021, the probation department filed a memorandum notifying the
court that Gutierrez had been convicted of a new felony offense in San Joaquin County
and as of April 2021was serving a 32-month prison term in that case. The memorandum
alleged additional violations, including a July 2021 misdemeanor conviction in Alameda
County, and the failure to comply with probation department reporting requirements.
Gutierrez’s case was calendared the next day for arraignment on the probation violations
alleged. Gutierrez did not appear because he was in prison, and a bench warrant issued.
       In December 2021, Gutierrez made a demand to the Santa Clara County District
Attorney under Penal Code section 1381 for speedy trial of the violations alleged in this
case. The form notice stated that Gutierrez was incarcerated at the California
Correctional Institution in Tehachapi. The district attorney obtained an order to produce
Gutierrez, but on February 18, 2022, the Sheriff’s Transportation Unit informed the
district attorney that Gutierrez had been transferred to California State Prison, Solano.
That same day, the district attorney sent a letter to Gutierrez at the Solano prison
instructing him to make a new demand in light of the transfer. Gutierrez sent a new Penal
Code section 1381 notice and demand from the Solano prison, which the district attorney
received on March 15, 2022.
       The district attorney again obtained an order to produce Gutierrez and on May 6,
2022, Gutierrez appeared in the trial court and moved orally to dismiss the probation
violations. At a further hearing one week later, Gutierrez argued for dismissal of the
probation violations based on the district attorney’s failure to act on the speedy trial
request within 90 days of the first demand. The district attorney countered that it had
complied with the statute and that Gutierrez’s initial demand became invalid when he
was moved to different prison facility.

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       The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the probation violations on the basis
that the 90-day period to commence trial after receipt of the initial Penal Code
section 1381 demand had lapsed. The trial court noted that while it was not the fault of
the prosecution that Gutierrez had been transferred, the burden “should not be on Mr.
Gutierrez,” so “in fairness to the defendant[,] that is the ruling.” The ruling was limited
to Penal Code section 1381, and neither the court nor the parties addressed the
applicability of any other provision, including Penal Code section 1203.2a.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       Penal Code section 1381 states in relevant part that “[w]henever a defendant has
been convicted, in any court of this state, of the commission of a felony ... and has been
sentenced to and has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison,” and if “there
is pending, in any court of this state, any other indictment, information, complaint, or any
criminal proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced, the district attorney
of the county in which the matters are pending shall bring the defendant to trial or for
sentencing within 90 days” after the defendant “deliver[s] to said district attorney written
notice” demanding compliance with this provision. (Pen. Code § 1381, italics added.
Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) In this case, the trial court had
imposed but suspended execution of Gutierrez’s sentence. As both parties acknowledge,
section 1381 does not apply to a probation violation proceeding in which the defendant
was previously sentenced to a specific term and execution of that sentence has been
suspended. (People v. Smith (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 399, 403 [“the plain text of
section 1381 dictates that its protections apply only when a defendant ‘remains to be
sentenced’ ” and a defendant is “sentenced” when a judgment imposing punishment is
pronounced even if execution of the sentence is suspended.)
       Although the trial court was incorrect to dismiss the probation violations under
section 1381, dismissal was nonetheless required on the alternative basis advanced by
Gutierrez for the first time in response to the People’s appeal, namely section 1203.2a.
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Gutierrez notes that the probation department memorandum notifying the court of his
confinement for a new offense triggered a 60-day jurisdictional clock under
section 1203.2a, such that the court lost jurisdiction over the alleged violation several
months before the dismissal order at issue. The People agree that the court had lost
jurisdiction over the probation violations, and the parties further agree that the case
should be remanded to reinstate probation.
       Section 1203.2a “permits a defendant, who has been released on probation and
thereafter committed to prison for another offense, to request the trial court that granted
probation to revoke probation and order execution of sentence.” (People v. Hall (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 972, 979–980 (Hall).) “[S]ection 1203.2a was intended to provide a
mechanism by which the probationary court could consider imposing a concurrent
sentence, and to ‘preclude[] inadvertent imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving
the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant’ when the statutory time limits are not
observed.” (In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 999, quoting In re White (1969)
1 Cal.3d 207, 211.) Section 1203.2a “provides for 3 distinct jurisdictional clocks: (1) the
probation officer has 30 days from the receipt of written notice of defendant’s subsequent
commitment within which to notify the probation-granting court…; (2) the court has
30 days from the receipt of a valid, formal request from defendant within which to
impose sentence, if sentence has not previously been imposed…; and (3) the court has
60 days from the receipt of notice of the confinement to order execution of sentence (or
make other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed… . Failure to comply
with any one of these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction.”
(Hoddinott, at p. 999.)
       Section 1203.2a’s third jurisdictional clock is relevant here. It provides that
“[u]pon being informed by the probation officer of the defendant’s confinement … the
court shall issue its commitment if sentence has previously been imposed... . If the case
is one in which sentence has previously been imposed, the court shall be deprived of
                                              4
jurisdiction over defendant if it does not issue its commitment or make other final order
terminating its jurisdiction over defendant in the case within 60 days after being notified
of the confinement.” (§ 1203.2a.) Section 1203.2a’s third jurisdictional clock has been
applied where, as here, execution of sentence has been suspended and the defendant
placed on probation. (See, e.g., In re Mancillas (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 896, 899, 910
(Mancillas).)
       In this case, the probation department memorandum informing the trial court that
Gutierrez had been convicted of a new felony offense in San Joaquin County for which
he was serving a 32-month prison term was filed in the trial court on September 29, 2021,
triggering the 60-day jurisdictional clock. The 60-day period therefore began to run on
September 29, 2021 and it expired in November 2021, nearly six months before the trial
court’s May 13, 2022 order. Because the trial court failed to “issue its commitment”
within 60 days of receiving notice from the probation department that Gutierrez was
confined in state prison for another offense, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule
upon the violations alleged. (§ 1203.2a.) On that basis, we will affirm the order granting
the motion to dismiss, as we may affirm a ruling on appeal if it is correct “ ‘ “upon any
theory of the law applicable to the case.” ’ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929,
976, quoting D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)
       People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 158–159 held that where a
probationary period has not expired at the time an appellate court vacates an order
entered in violation of section 1203.2a, the appropriate remedy is to reinstate probation.
In Mancillas by contrast, because the probationary period had expired by the time of the
ruling on a habeas petition, we determined that probation could not be reinstated.
(Mancillas, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) It appears from the record that Gutierrez’s
probation has been in revoked status, and that the period of probation has not yet expired.
We will allow the trial court to make that calculation on remand.

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                                   III. DISPOSITION
      The May 13, 2022 order dismissing the probation violation action filed on
September 29, 2021 is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to calculate
any remaining period of probation under current law, and to take further action it deems
appropriate regarding reinstatement of probation.

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                               ____________________________________
                               Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050168
People v Gutierrez