Court Opinion

ID: 9696240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:41:49.188609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:19.901244
License: Public Domain

Justice LAMB
concurring.
I join the majority in affirming the order of the Superior Court because the overwhelming evidence in this case makes the error of failing to call character witnesses harmless. In other respects, I join the reasoning of the dissent and write separately to emphasize the long-established rule that a criminal defendant may always present character evidence which is not “mere make-weight ... but it is positive evidence, and may of itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produce an acquittal.” Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017, 1018 (1890). In Cleary, the error cited was a charge to the jury which limited the use of character evidence to those cases in which there was already reasonable doubt. This Court held in Cleary that:
Evidence of good character is always admissible for the defendant in a criminal case. It is to be weighed and considered in connection with all the other evidence in the cause. It may of itself, in some instances, create the reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to an acquittal. The rule itself is not merely merciful. It is both reasonable and just. There may be cases in which, owing to the peculiar circumstances in which a man is placed, evidence of good character may be all he can offer in answer to a charge of crime. Of what avail is a good character, which a man may have been a life-time in acquiring, if it is to benefit him nothing in his hour of peril? ... The evidence of good character is to be considered with the other evidence in the case; and if it, all combined, creates a reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
Cleary, 19 A. at 1018-19.
Under Cleary, character evidence is always relevant in a criminal case. That evidence, therefore, would be admissible *298under Pa.R.E. 402: “All relevant evidence is admissible.” Relevant evidence is that which “in some degree advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima facie admissible.” Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155, 159 (1978) (citing 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 9-10 at 289-95 (3rd Ed.1940)).
The rule announced in Cleary is of ancient origin, first enunciated in Pennsylvania in Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & Rawle 336 (Pa.1817), which also set the limits by which character evidence is introduced, that is through reputation, not opinion. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 338 (“General report is general reputation. General reputation is general character.”) (Duncan, J.). See also Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 145, 147 (Pa.1879) (holding “evidence of good character is not a mere makeweight, thrown in to assist in the production of a result that would happen at all events, but is positive evidence, and may of itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produce an acquittal.”); Hanney v. Commonwealth, 116 Pa. 322, 9 A. 339, 340-41 (1887) (“fortunately for the upright man ..., we have got beyond all doubt upon this subject, and have firmly established the doctrine that evidence of good character is to be regarded as a substantive fact, like any other tending to establish the defendant’s innocence....”); Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck, 265 Pa. 251, 108 A. 635, 637 (1919) (“A man of good standing is less likely to commit crime, and evidence of good reputation may of itself work an acquittal, by creating a reasonable doubt of guilt....”); Commonwealth v. Stoner, 265 Pa. 139, 108 A. 624, 625 (1919) (“Good character ... may, in itself, in spite of evidence to the contrary, raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury and so produce an acquittal.”); Commonwealth v. Giovanetti, 341 Pa. 345, 19 A.2d 119, 126 (1941) (same holding); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 188, 436 A.2d 607, 611 n. 1 (1981) (“[a] defendant is entitled to a charge that character evidence alone may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt and justify an acquittal of the charges.”).
These cases culminated in Commonwealth v. Weiss, 530 Pa. 1, 606 A.2d 439 (1992), in which this Court held that the failure *299to call available character witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because:
In a case such as this, where there are only two direct witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and character evidence is critical to the jury’s determination of credibility. Evidence of good character is substantive, not mere makeweight evidence, and may, in and of itself, create a reasonable doubt of guilt and, thus, require a verdict of not guilty.
Weiss, 606 A.2d at 442 (citing Commonwealth v. Neely, 522 Pa. 236, 561 A.2d 1, 3 (1989)).
This Court in Weiss reversed a child sexual assault conviction and remanded for a new trial. Weiss is only distinguishable from the case at hand because in Weiss “there was no overwhelming evidence of guilt.” Weiss, 606 A.2d at 443.
Therefore, under Weiss, as stated in Cleary, character evidence is always relevant and admissible. Character evidence includes reputation for truthfulness. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 337. When prosecution witnesses dispute the testimony of the defendant, his reputation for truthfulness is in play. Weiss, 606 A.2d at 443.
Therefore, Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to call character witnesses. In this case, however, the error is harmless because of the overwhelming evidence against Appellant. Accordingly, I concur in the result.
Justice SAYLOR.
I respectfully differ with the conclusion set forth in the opinion announcing the Court’s judgment that a criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his character for truthfulness only in situations where the trait of truthfulness is relevant to the crime with which he has been charged or when his reputation for truthfulness has first been attacked by the prosecution. See Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, op. at 572-573.1 In my view, the difficulty with such an *300approach is that a trial court is foreclosed from exercising its discretion to permit character evidence where a defendant’s veracity has been challenged by means other than through reputation evidence. Indeed, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 608(a)(2) recognizes this concern by permitting evidence of truthful character where the witness’s veracity “has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 608(a)(2).
Other jurisdictions have acknowledged that the phrase “or otherwise” may include situations where the witness’s character is attacked by questions that are directed at an issue in the case, but nevertheless have the actual effect of assailing the witness’s veracity. See, e.g., Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 768 P.2d 792, 795 (Ct.App.1989); United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that a vigorous cross-examination can trigger rehabilitation where the evidence amounts to an indirect attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness); United States v. Everage, 19 M.J. 189, 192-93 (C.M.A.1985); see also John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 47 at 191 (5th ed. 1999) (“[A] slashing cross-examination may carry strong accusations of misconduct and bad character, which even the witness’s denial will not remove from the jury’s mind[;][i]f the judge considers that fairness requires it, he may permit evidence of good character, a mild palliative for the insinuation of a combative cross-examination.”); cf. State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis.2d 391, 579 N.W.2d 642, 647-49 (1998) (concluding that statements made in an opening *301statement that challenged the truthful character of a potential witness was included within the term “otherwise,” and therefore, the trial court properly admitted rehabilitative evidence). Thus, I would favor a more flexible approach, which would allow the trial court to permit rehabilitative evidence in limited situations where it believes that the witness’s character for veracity has been impugned.
As the lead opinion notes, Appellant presented an alibi defense that he was at Titus Lawnhorn’s home on the evening when the attacks occurred. See Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court, op. at 569. In support of this defense, Appellant offered the testimony of three witnesses, who testified that they were with Appellant at Lawnhorn’s home, and that Appellant had mentioned that he planned on going on a fishing trip the following day. The three witnesses further stated that, after Appellant returned from the outing, he informed them that he had been cited for fishing without a license. Appellant also presented the testimony of Anthony Williams, who stated that he had met with Appellant on the night in question to discuss plans for the fishing trip, and that he was with Appellant when he received the citation on the following day.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned these witnesses about the fishing trip and, more specifically, asked three of the alibi witnesses if Appellant had given a false name when he was initially approached by the gaming officials. See N.T. at 800-01, 810, 850. Two of the witnesses denied any knowledge, see N.T. at 801, 810, but the third, Renee Washington, testified that Appellant had told her that he had given a false name. See N.T. at 850. Appellant’s counsel did not object to any of these questions.
Appellant then took the stand and admitted on direct examination that he had initially told the officials that his name was Edward Ford, because he did not want to pay the flfty-dollar fishing fine. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Appellant about the incident:
*302[Prosecutor]: At that time, when you knew you were going to get a fine, you lied about your name, correct?
[Appellant]: Yes, I did.
[Prosecutor]: The reason that you lied about your name to these gaming officials was to get out of paying a fine, correct?
[Appellant]: Yes. I didn’t want to pay a fine.
[Prosecutor]: So you lied to get out of that; is that correct? [Appellant]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: At that point, when you lied about your name, where was Anthony Williams?
[Appellant]: Standing over to the side. Standing over to the side.
[Prosecutor]: What happened to you when you lied about your name?
[Appellant]: They put handcuffs on me after they found out. They found out Curtis Fulton.
N.T. at 894-95.2 In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
[Prosecutor]: No, [the defendant] doesn’t have to prove anything. I have the burden of proof. But when he puts on evidence, and you believe that evidence to be false, you make the decision why. Closing now. No fishing gives you a clue, gives you a window into the character of the defendant. A window which says—
[Counsel for Fulton]: Objected to. The window into the character of the defendant—
[The court]: Overruled.
*303[Prosecutor]: — gives you a clue. If he would lie to get out of a fishing ticket, what would he do to get out of getting caught in a rape, a robbery? Get his neighbors together, say you remember I was here on October 4th, don’t you....
[Prosecutor]: If you would lie about a fishing ticket, what would he do to get out of rape? Prance around, take the DNA test, turn himself in. Best offense is a good defense.
N.T. 1049-50.
Although the prosecutor did not present specific character witnesses to comment on Appellant’s bad reputation in the community for untruthfulness, the prosecutor used a specific instance of untruthfulness, with limited relevance to the crime to which Appellant had been charged, to establish Appellant’s character for untruthfulness. Given the net effect of these statements, I cannot conclude that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacks arguable merit, especially as the central issue in this case was one of credibility which turned on whether to believe the victims’ testimony or that of Appellant and his alibi witnesses. Therefore, I would remand in order for the PCRA court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant has established the requisite prejudice to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim, particularly since the PCRA judge did not preside over Appellant’s trial.
Chief Justice CAPPY and Justice NIGRO join this dissenting opinion.

. Although Appellant has not argued that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence of his character for truthfulness, because the *300trait of truthfulness is relevant to the robbery charge, I note that this Court has held that a robbery conviction involves an element of dishonesty and constitutes a crimen falsi that may be used to impeach a defendant's veracity. See Commonwealth v. Strong, 522 Pa. 445, 451-52, 563 A.2d 479, 482 (1989) (concluding that, a defendant’s robbery conviction involved an element of dishonesty tending to discredit him as untruthful and was properly admitted by the trial court for impeachment purposes); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 35-37, 438 A.2d 951, 957-58 (1981) (holding that the trial court properly determined that defendant's prior convictions for theft and robbery were admissible to impeach his credibility in a rape case, because the convictions were recent and were highly pertinent to the defendant’s veracity and credibility). I recognize, however, that such issue is not presently before the Court.

. I would note that Pennsylvania law prohibits the use of specific instances of a witness’s own misconduct for the purpose of attacking the witness's character for truthfulness, and, thus, an objection on that basis might have foreclosed the prosecutor from pursing this matter. See Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1). Rule 608(b)(1) differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), as the federal analogue gives the court discretion to permit the cross-examination of a witness concerning specific instances of misconduct when the incidents are probative of the witness's own character for truthfulness. See Pa.R.E. 608 cmt; F.R.E. 608(b).