Court Opinion

ID: 9897379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:50.599657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:13.104299
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Jun 06 2023, 9:01 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Kyle Andrew Swick                                          Darryn L. Duchon
      Danville, Indiana                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                                 David W. Stone IV
                                                                 Anderson, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      H.P. and S.P.,                                             June 6, 2023
      Appellants-Petitioners,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 22A-AD-2674
              v.                                                 Appeal from the Hendricks
                                                                 Superior Court
      G.F.,                                                      The Honorable Robert W. Freese,
      Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 32D01-1904-AD-22

                                      Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                      Judges Riley and Pyle concur.

      Altice, Chief Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   H.P. and S.P. (collectively, Adoptive Parents) appeal the trial court’s order

      granting grandparent visitation to G.F. (Grandfather). Adoptive Parents
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023                            Page 1 of 9
      present several issues for our review, but we need address only one: Did

      Grandfather have standing to seek grandparent visitation rights at the time he

      filed his petition?

[2]   We reverse.

      Facts & Procedural History
[3]   K.F. (Child) was born in September 2016 to B.R. (Mother) and T.F. (Father).

      Grandfather and S.P. are Child’s biological paternal grandparents. 1 Both

      Mother and Father had serious substance abuse issues, resulting in Child

      becoming a ward of the State through CHINS proceedings at the beginning of

      2017. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) placed Child in

      relative care with Adoptive Parents during the week and Grandfather on the

      weekends. Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were terminated in September

      2018.

[4]   Following termination of parental rights, DCS continued Child’s placement in

      the homes of Grandfather and Adoptive Parents. At a CHINS hearing in

      November 2018, which Grandfather attended, the trial court ordered a plan of

      adoption. Adoptive Parents then began steps to adopt Child with the consent of

      DCS. The adoption was granted on May 17, 2019, without any notice

      provided to Grandfather.

      1
        Grandfather and S.P. were married between 1985 and 1991 and had two children – Father and another
      son. After their divorce, S.P. married H.P. in 1999, and they had a daughter in 2001.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023                            Page 2 of 9
[5]   S.P. informed Grandfather of the finalized adoption around August 2019.

      Notwithstanding the adoption, Adoptive Parents continued to voluntarily give

      Grandfather regular weekend visitation with Child. Typical visitation would be

      every weekend from Friday to Monday. Grandfather also traveled with Child

      from time to time. He formed a strong bond with Child throughout her young

      life and helped support her by providing clothing, shoes, play equipment, and

      other items.

[6]   In the years after the adoption, Child’s biological parents died – Father in July

      2021 and Mother in January 2022. Around the time of Mother’s death, though

      unrelated, Adoptive Parents began to develop concerns about Grandfather’s

      time with Child – the details of which are not relevant to our disposition of this

      appeal. The last visit they permitted between Grandfather and Child ended on

      January 10, 2022.

[7]   On April 6, 2022, Grandfather filed a Motion to Reopen Adoption and

      Intervene, arguing that he had a right to pursue grandparent visitation because

      he was not provided with proper notice of the adoption. After a contested

      hearing, the trial court granted Grandfather’s motion to intervene on June 10,

      2022. Grandfather then filed a Motion for Grandparent Visitation, which

      Adoptive Parents opposed on the merits as well as on the basis that reopening

      the adoption proceedings – nearly three years after the adoption was granted –

      was improper.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023          Page 3 of 9
[8]    The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on October 20, 2022. Then, on

       November 17, 2022, the trial court issued its order awarding visitation to

       Grandfather on alternating weekends from Friday after school until Monday

       morning, or 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., respectively, when school is not in

       session.

[9]    Adoptive Parents have timely appealed, and their request for a stay of the

       visitation order was granted by this court on November 18, 2022. The stay

       remains in effect following the denial of Grandfather’s motion to reconsider.

       Additional information will be provided below as needed.

       Discussion & Decision
[10]   Grandfather sought and obtained visitation under the Grandparent Visitation

       Act (the Act), which was enacted by the Indiana General Assembly in 1982 and

       continues to provide the exclusive basis for a grandparent to seek visitation with

       their grandchildren. See In re Visitation of B.A.A., 173 N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021). The Act is now codified at Ind. Code Chap. 31-17-5. Because it is

       in derogation of the common law, we strictly construe the Act. Jocham v. Sutliff,

       26 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. If a grandparent lacks

       standing under the Act, their petition must be dismissed. Id.

[11]   I.C. § 31-17-5-1(a)(1) provides a grandparent with the right to seek visitation if

       the child’s mother or father is deceased, and pursuant to I.C. § 31-17-5-3(b), a

       petition for grandparent visitation must be filed, if at all, before an adoption

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023            Page 4 of 9
       decree is entered. 2 For purposes of the Act, I.C. § 31-9-2-77 defines a

       “grandparent” as including: “(1) the adoptive parent of the child’s parent; (2)

       the parent of the child’s adoptive parent; and (3) the parent of the child’s

       parent.”

[12]   When Grandfather petitioned for visitation, Child’s parents – Adoptive Parents

       – were alive and well and had been parenting Child for nearly three years.

       Further, when Adoptive Parents adopted Child, Child’s biological parents were

       still alive but had no parental rights to Child. And Grandfather was no longer

       “the parent of child’s parent” once his son’s parental rights were terminated.

       See In re G.R., 863 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“In sum, at the

       moment Mother’s rights were terminated, Grandmother no longer had standing

       to pursue visitation rights as to G.R.”). Thus, by the time Grandfather finally

       got around to filing his petition for visitation, he had lacked a legally recognized

       grandparent relationship with Child for several years and no longer had

       standing to seek grandparent visitation. See Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 87

       (“Following the adoption, Sutliff remained K.J.’s grandmother biologically,

       emotionally, and morally, but at the time she filed her petition for grandparent

       visitation, she was no longer legally his grandparent.”); In re Marriage of J.D.S. &

       2
         Already-established rights under the Act survive the adoption of a child by a person biologically related to
       the child as a grandparent. I.C. § 31-17-5-9(2)(A). This provision is not at issue here because Grandfather
       had no existing grandparent visitation rights at the time of the adoption, nor had he filed a petition to pursue
       any. See Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 88 (“Because Sutliff had not sought visitation rights pursuant to section 31-17-
       5-1 prior to the adoption, no right to visitation had already been given by a court, and she had no visitation
       rights for section 31-17-5-9 to protect.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023                                     Page 5 of 9
       A.L.S., 953 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“Because she did not file

       her petition until after Father’s parental rights were terminated, Grandmother

       no longer had standing as the parent of the children’s parent, and there were no

       existing visitation rights upon which to bootstrap continued visitation in the

       wake of the adoption.”), trans. denied; In re G.R., 863 N.E.2d at 326 (biological

       maternal grandmother had no standing to bring petition after biological

       mother’s paternal rights were terminated).

[13]   Grandfather attempts to sidestep the standing issue by taking aim on the

       adoption proceedings. That is, Grandfather argues that as a person having

       “lawful custody” of Child, which he shared with Adoptive Parents during the

       CHINS proceedings, his written consent to the adoption was required and he

       was entitled to legal notice of the adoption proceedings. Grandfather reasons

       that if he received proper notice, he would have been able to timely petition for

       visitation under the Act before the adoption was granted.

[14]   Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(3) provides that “a petition to adopt a child who is less

       than eighteen (18) years of age may be granted only if written consent to

       adoption has been executed by … [e]ach person, agency, or local office having

       lawful custody of the child whose adoption is being sought.” Our Supreme

       Court has interpreted the term “lawful custody” as used in this statute to

       “encompass more circumstances and familial arrangements than court-ordered

       legal custody.” In re Adoption of B.C.H., 22 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2014). In

       explaining its broad interpretation of the term, the Court observed:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023          Page 6 of 9
               The General Assembly’s deliberate choice to require those with
               lawful custody of a child to be given notice of and an opportunity
               to withhold consent to the child’s adoption likely reflects its
               policy judgment that, in determining whether the adoption is in
               the child’s best interests, trial courts should hear from the party
               with care, custody, and control of the child in question –
               regardless of whether the party’s responsibility derives from a
               court order. Moreover, those with lawful custody of the child are
               exactly who trial judges want to hear from as they make one of
               the toughest decisions they are called upon to decide. And who
               better to know and speak to the child’s best interests than the
               person(s) functioning as the child’s parent(s). As the statute
               contemplates, a caregiver serving as a child’s lawful custodian
               needs, and deserves, to have a voice in the child’s adoption
               proceedings.

       Id. at 585-86 (emphases in original).

[15]   The determination of whether an individual has lawful custody of a child is

       fact-sensitive and must be decided case-by-case. Id. at 586. In this case, the

       trial court found that Grandfather “housed, financially supported, met the

       needs of, formed a bond with and cared for [Child] on a weekly basis.”

       Appendix at 15. Based on this consistent care and support throughout the

       CHINS proceedings and leading up to the adoption, the trial court determined

       that Grandfather shared “lawful custody” of Child with S.P. and that he had a

       right to notice and an opportunity to withhold his consent.

[16]   Adoptive Parents counter by arguing that Grandfather had not been Child’s

       primary caregiver for some time. Child had lived with Adoptive Parents since

       sometime in 2017 and only visited Grandfather on the weekends. Adoptive

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023          Page 7 of 9
       Parents seem to suggest that to be considered a lawful custodian one must meet

       the statutory definition of a de facto custodian at the time the petition for

       adoption is brought. We do not believe that the Supreme Court intended such

       a narrow construction, but we need not determine whether the trial court

       properly concluded that Child was in Grandfather’s lawful custody.

[17]   Even assuming that Grandfather was a lawful custodian of Child entitled to

       notice and an opportunity to contest the 2019 adoption, his 2022 challenge to

       the adoption decree is plainly time-barred. I.C. § 31-19-14-4 provides

       limitations on direct or collateral attacks of adoption decrees:

               After the expiration of the period described in section 2 of this
               chapter, neither a person whose parental rights are terminated by
               the entry of an adoption decree nor any other person may
               challenge the adoption decree even if:

                        (1) notice of the adoption was not given; or

                        (2) the adoption proceedings were in any other manner
                        defective.

       The outer bounds of a challenge are six months after the entry of the adoption

       decree or one year after the adoptive parents obtain custody of the child,

       whichever is later. I.C. § 31-19-14-2. Grandfather’s challenge to the adoption

       decree, nearly three years after it was entered, was far too late.3

       3
        Even after he received actual notice in August 2019 of the finalized adoption, Grandfather waited over two
       years to reopen the adoption and seek grandparent visitation. Moreover, any suggestion by Grandfather that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2674 | June 6, 2023                                Page 8 of 9
[18]   Grandfather asserts that he is not seeking to set aside the adoption and that he

       only wants to have grandparent visitation. Even so, this does not get him past

       the obstacle of the above statute of limitations. 4

[19]   In sum, we hold that Grandfather no longer has standing to seek grandparent

       visitation and that his attempt to regain standing by attacking the adoption

       decree is fruitless given the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the

       trial court erred by addressing the merits of Grandfather’s claim for grandparent

       visitation under the Act. It may very well be that continued contact with

       Grandfather is in Child’s best interests, but at this point, such a determination

       must be left to her parents, not the court.

[20]   Judgment reversed.

       Riley, J. and Pyle, J., concur.

       Adoptive Parents intentionally and fraudulently concealed the adoption until the statute of limitations had
       run is without merit, as Grandfather’s own testimony reveals that S.P. informed him of the adoption well
       within the statute of limitations.
       4
         Grandfather directs us to a case from Florida in which the Florida Supreme Court held that the
       grandparents could intervene and reopen the adoption case where they had not received notice of the
       adoption proceedings despite being interested parties due to their court-ordered visitation rights that existed
       at the time of the adoption. In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 593 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1991). Even if we found it
       helpful to look to Florida caselaw on this subject, which we do not, we note that Grandfather has ignored key
       details from that case. That is, the court held that in order to have an opportunity to assert their rights, if any,
       the grandparents “must first vacate the final judgment of adoption.” Id. at 190. The court then held that
       grandparents were permitted to “attack [the] final judgment” because they filed within the one-year statute of
       repose. Id.

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