Court Opinion

ID: 9685992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:12:39.343113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:12.357359
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). Respectfully, I must dissent.
I believe that the lower court ruling that would have permitted the prosecutor to impeach the defendant by reference to a 1963 felony in a 1977 trial was an abuse of discretion. The 14 years that separated these two offenses, the fact that they are similar in nature, the fact that the defendant was only 18 years of age when he was convicted of the second-degree murder and the fact that since that time he had led a socially acceptable, crime-free life, had obtained a bachelor’s degree from Wayne State University and had entered into a master’s degree program at Eastern Michigan University, indicate to me that the prejudicial nature of this evidence far outweighed its probative value. People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 335; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294, 301-303; 193 NW2d 363 (1971).
Further, I find significant in this case the fact that the defendant did not take the stand and testify on his own behalf. In cases where a defendant does not take the stand it is difficult to assess the impact of a trial judge’s decision to permit impeachment of that defendant by reference to a prior felony. Nevertheless, where the case against *343a defendant is close, as here, the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify for fear of impeachment by evidence of prior convictions may require that the impeachment evidence be excluded. Gordon v United States, 127 US App DC 343; 383 F2d 936 (1967).
No eyewitness to the bank robbery could identify the defendant as one of its perpetrators. Only Officer Wilcox, who momentarily caught a glimpse of the driver of the automobile in which the bank robbers made their getaway, could do so. Thus, the case against the defendant turned in great part on the credibility of this police officer’s identification. The events that occurred to the defendant on the day of the robbery and prior to his arrest are uniquely within his knowledge. The prejudice to him of not being able to tell his side of the story at trial is obvious. Therefore, I would find that the trial court committed reversible error in its ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress.