Court Opinion

ID: 9579533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:55:59.848777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:34.602034
License: Public Domain

*253SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). I do not accept that Congress may compel the United States Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as Congress believes it should be interpreted. Therefore, I conclude that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, is no more than a federal statute. I believe we remain bound by the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause announced by the Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). I therefore dissent.
Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court appeared to require a special showing when a law of general applicability interfered with the free exercise of an individual's religion. David M. Smolin, The Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Right to Active and Passive Euthanasia, 10 Issues in Law & Medicine 3, 18 (1994-95). Thus, a law of general applicability governed all citizens, regardless of their religion, subject to certain exceptions. Id. To determine whether an exception was required, the Court applied a three-part test. Id. First, the Court would determine whether the individual had a sincerely-held religious belief. Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)). Second, the Court determined whether the law of general applicability substantially "burdened" a sincerely-held religious belief. Id. at 18-19 (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217-20). Finally, if the individual showed the requisite burden on a sincerely-held religious belief, the government had to grant him or her an exemption from the law unless the government could show it had a countervailing "compelling interest." Id. at 19.
*254The Supreme Court generally interpreted the compelling interest test as requiring a balancing of the state's interests with the burden on the individual's free exercise of religion. 10 Issues in Law & Medicine at 19. Under the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court ruled against a variety of litigants. Id.
Smith upheld the application of Oregon's criminal statute to respondents' sacramental use of peyote as members of the Native American Church. 494 U.S. at 890. The majority refused to apply the compelling interest test and gave a number of reasons for rejecting the test. The author of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, interpreted prior cases as requiring that the compelling interest test be applied in cases involving "hybrid" rights. 10 Issues in Law & Medicine at 23 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82). Thus, Wisconsin v. Yoder which involved the Free Exercise Clause and substantive due process rights of Amish parents was reaffirmed.
This narrowing of the compelling interest test was greeted with horror by many academics, religious freedom litigators, and organizations concerned with religious freedom. 10 Issues in Law & Medicine at 36. Because of the number of institutions and organizations concerned in cases and debates concerning the Free Exercise Clause, there was a built-in response to Smith which resulted in the enactment of RFRA, introduced as S. 3254 and H.R. 5377 in the 101st Congress. Id. Congress stated that the purpose of RFRA was to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The "least restrictive means" test1 is arguably a more stringent test than has *255ever been employed by the Supreme Court. 10 Issues in Law & Medicine at 37. Thus, RFRA may be viewed as not merely restoring the compelling interest test but creating a new, and more restrictive, test. Professor Smolin suggests that RFRA could be construed in at least four ways. Id. at 38-39. He suggests that, "[t]he strained nature of the claim that the 'least restrictive means' test is a mere restoration creates ambiguity as to the standard of review actually created by RFRA." Id. at 38. Thus, even if we consider that we are bound by the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause imposed by Congress, we would have to resolve these ambiguities before we can decide this case.
Several federal courts and at least one state court have addressed RFRA, sometimes in "hybrid" cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Sasnett v. DOC, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995), District Judge Crabb ruled that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to pass legislation protecting the free exercise of religion to a greater degree than the Supreme Court is willing to read into the Free Exercise Clause. Section 5 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." (Emphasis added.) This construction gives the word "enforce" a *256very strained reach. Section 1983 is "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Bill of Rights. However, that statute does not attempt to force any court to construe a Bill of Rights' amendment in a way acceptable to Congress.
Judge Crabb also addressed what I believe is the crucial infirmity of RFRA; it violates the principle of federalism embodied in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Judge Crabb concluded that RFRA did not "mandate judicial invasion into any core areas of traditional state prerogative." Sasnett, 891 F. Supp. at 1320. Judge Crabb suggested that the states were free under the Act to narrowly tailor their actions to further a compelling state interest. Id. at 1320-21. In her view, Congress may impose upon the state courts a construction of the Bill of Rights' amendments which Congress favors. I do not agree that RFRA or any other act which has this effect "places only a reasonable burden on state autonomy." Id. at 1321. One need not exhaustively examine the debates of the constitutional convention to conclude that the rights of the states against the central government were zealously protected by the framers of the Constitution and the supporters of a federal Bill of Rights. I suggest that adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by the federal Congress would have been strongly opposed by the states had it been understood that § 5 of that amendment gave to Congress the power to compel state courts to interpret the Bill of Rights' amendments according to congressional philosophy.
The holdings of other courts are mixed. In Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Haw. 1995), the court took the novel approach that in enacting RFRA, Congress did not prescribe a decisional rule as to the interpretation of a constitutional provision but, rather, *257sought to protect free exercise rights to an extent greater than the Supreme Court required. Perhaps Congress can achieve such a result by enacting a federal statute, but it cannot require the Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause to be congruent with Congress's construction of that clause.
In Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 850 n.4 (Vt. 1994), the court expressed no opinion as to the constitutionality of RFRA.
In Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held that RFRA provides a statutory claim or defense to persons whose religious exercises are substantially burdened by the government. Id. at 572. The court concluded that the defendant correctional officials were not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff correctional employees' RFRA statutory claims. Id. at 576. As to the employees' free exercise claim under the New York state constitution, the court concluded that the defendants could not succeed, at summary judgment, whether the court applied a compelling state interest test or a balancing test. Id. at 579. The court, in a comprehensive footnote, analyzed the treatment that courts have given to RFRA. The court pointed out that some courts apply the compelling governmental interest test articulated in RFRA to claims brought under the First Amendment. Id. at 572 n.5. Other courts have treated RFRA as a statutory enactment and not an interpretation of the First Amendment. See id.
I conclude that we may give weight to the intent of Congress in RFRA but the Act is not applicable in our decision-making processes either as a statute or an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. I would therefore consider that we are bound by the interpreta*258tions of the United States Supreme Court and not RFRA.

 RFRA provides in part:
*255(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (emphasis added).