Court Opinion

ID: 9717424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:03:22.419817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:17.554012
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOMER, dissenting: The majority has established a simple, bright-line jurisdictional test for postconviction petitions filed after the applicable limitations period. Under this test, the failure of a petitioner to allege “at the outset” facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence will result in a dismissal of the petition. Presumably, as a result of this decision, petitioners will hereafter be precluded from amending or supplementing their petitions in the trial court with factual allegations showing the absence of culpable negligence. Furthermore, since jurisdiction can be determined by examination of the petition, appeals taken from trial court adjudications of late-filed petitions must be dismissed even when the issue of the petition’s timeliness was not considered by the trial court. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding because I believe it misconstrues the pertinent statutes, represents a significant departure from current practice, and will lead to injustices. In the instant case, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. The trial judge did not consider whether the petition was timely filed. Only after the defendant appealed the trial court’s dismissal did the State raise its jurisdictional challenge. In response, the defendant asserts, inter alia, that the delay in filing her petition was not due to her culpable negligence. I am in agreement with much of the majority’s analysis. The majority aptly notes that a defendant’s failure to file her postconviction petition within the limitations period established in section 122 — 1(c) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is a jurisdictional bar to the action. 725 ILCS 5/122—1(c) (West 1996); People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392, 402, 648 N.E.2d 260, 267 (1995). Further, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, stipulated to, or consented to by the parties. People v. Stenson, 296 Ill. App. 3d 93, 95, 694 N.E.2d 204, 205 (1998). Therefore, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, in any court, directly or collaterally, by the parties or on the court’s own motion. Stenson, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 95, 694 N.E.2d at 205. I further agree with the majority that the State may properly challenge our jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s appeal in the instant case. The record shows that the defendant’s postconviction petition was filed beyond the time limitation established by section 122—1(c) of the Act, and the petitioner did not allege in the petition a lack of culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122—1(c) (West 1996). However, in dismissing the defendant’s appeal, the majority has illadvisedly precluded the defendant from asserting her claim of lack of culpable negligence. While this court, as a court of review, is unable to consider the defendant’s contentions as to her lack of culpable negligence, the trial court could do so. Accordingly, I would remand the cause to the trial court for its determination of whether the defendant is able to allege facts showing that the delay in filing was not due to her culpable negligence. See People v. Montgomery, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 598 N.E.2d 400 (1992). In support of its holding, the majority has concluded that “an untimely postconviction petition is fatally flawed if it fails to contain any allegations that the delay was not due to the petitioner’s culpable negligence.” (Emphasis omitted and added.) 304 Ill. App. 3d at 290-91. However, the statute actually provides that postconviction proceedings shall not be commenced after the deadline, “unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” (Emphasis added). 725 ILCS 5/122—1(c) (West 1996). I think it significant that the legislature (1) focused on the allegations of the petitioner as opposed to those of the petition and, further, (2) expressly authorized the trial court to exercise its discretion in allowing amendments to post-conviction petitions. 725 ILCS 5/122—5 (West 1996). In practice, it appears that trial courts have generally permitted petitioners the opportunity to amend untimely petitions with allegations of their lack of culpable negligence. Frequently, the issue arises during second-stage proceedings after the State has filed a motion to dismiss the petition based upon its untimeliness. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 293 Ill. App. 3d 113, 114-15, 687 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (1997) (where the trial court permitted the defendant to file an affidavit and conducted a hearing to determine whether filing delay was not due to defendant’s culpable negligence); People v. Lee, 292 Ill. App. 3d 941, 942, 688 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1997) (where the trial court considered the defendant’s subsequent affidavit in ruling on the State’s motion to dismiss). I believe such liberal construction of the statute to be warranted, especially considering that postconviction petitions are often filed by uneducated, pro se petitioners. The focus of the court’s inquiry should be on whether the petitioner can, not whether she did, allege facts showing that the delay was not due her culpable negligence. Under the majority’s holding, diligent petitioners who have suffered a substantial denial of a constitutional right will be denied justice solely because of an initial failure to allege a lack of culpable negligence in their late-filed petitions. The majority’s reliance on People v. Reed, 42 Ill. 2d 169, 246 N.E.2d 238 (1969), and People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988), is misplaced in this instance because the factual situations in those cases are distinguishable. In Reed and Bates, unlike in the instant case, the trial court dismissed the postconviction petitions as untimely. The majority has not cited, and I have not discovered, any reported decision in which a court of review has determined that a postconviction petition was untimely when that issue was not raised in the trial court. For these reasons, I would remand the cause to the trial court to determine whether the defendant is able to sufficiently allege facts showing the delay in filing her postconviction petition was not due to her culpable negligence. Only after such a determination has been made should we proceed to rule upon the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal.