Court Opinion

ID: 9930126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:02:21.136521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:39.510854
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 6, 2024

                        S23A0810. HARPER v. THE STATE.

        MCMILLIAN, Justice.

       On August 27, 2003, a jury found Terry Harper, along with his

co-defendant Emmanuel Ruiz, guilty of murder and related charges

in connection with the shooting deaths of Joe Luhrman, David

Carty, and Tracy Glover in 2001. 1 On appeal, Harper contends that

       1 The crimes were committed on September 26, 2001. Harper and his co-

defendant Emmanuel Ruiz were indicted by a Fulton County grand jury on
October 30, 2001. The indictment charged Harper and Ruiz jointly with three
counts each of malice murder; felony murder while in the commission of an
aggravated assault; and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; as well as
one count each of possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony.
Harper and Ruiz were tried in a jury trial commencing August 20, 2003, and
both co-defendants were found guilty as charged on August 27, 2003. Harper
and Ruiz each were sentenced on August 29, 2003, to three consecutive terms
of life imprisonment for malice murder plus five consecutive years in prison on
the weapons offense. The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of
law, and the aggravated assault counts were merged for purposes of
sentencing. Ruiz’s convictions are not part of this appeal.
        Harper filed a timely motion for new trial on September 5, 2003, and the
motion was amended three times by later appellate counsel. Following a
hearing on November 7 and 10, 2022, the trial court denied the amended
(1) his right to due process was violated by the “almost 20-year

delay” between his conviction and his direct appeal; (2) the trial

court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after

the State referenced, in its opening statement, a response Harper

gave to police questioning that Harper contends was previously

excluded and “highly prejudicial”; and (3) he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and

introduce evidence that he was suffering a “severe injury” to his

dominant hand at the time of the shootings. We affirm for the

reasons set forth below.

     We recounted many of the facts in this case in our opinion

affirming the conviction of Harper’s co-defendant, Ruiz, as follows:

     Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the
     evidence established that Ruiz had been paid $2,500 by
     Joe Lurhman, the proprietor of F.J.’s Tavern, to procure
     drugs. Ruiz, however, failed to deliver the drugs and on
     the afternoon of the shooting, Lurhman made several
     phone calls to Ruiz attempting to collect his money. That
     evening, Ruiz told a friend that he intended to go to F.J.’s

motion for new trial on November 30, 2022. Harper’s timely appeal was
docketed to the August 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.

                                    2
     Tavern to kill Lurhman and everyone else in the bar. Ruiz
     and co-defendant Terry Brandon Harper entered F.J.’s
     Tavern where Harper shot and killed Lurhman and bar
     patron David Carty. Ruiz fatally shot bartender Tracy
     Glover in the parking lot as she ran from the building
     after shots had been fired in the bar. Ruiz and Harper
     returned to Ruiz’s apartment where they solicited help
     from a friend to dispose of the two murder weapons in
     nearby lakes. These were later retrieved by the police and
     identified as belonging to Ruiz.

     Later on the night of the shooting, Ruiz telephoned his
     girlfriend and told her, “somebody went up to F.J.’s
     Tavern and took everyone out.” He admitted to her that
     he shot a woman in the parking lot because she could have
     been a witness to the other shootings. Harper told others
     that he shot Lurhman and another man who happened to
     be in the bar. Each victim died of multiple gunshot
     wounds.

     At trial, Ruiz acknowledged through his attorneys that he
     shot and killed Glover as she ran through the parking lot,
     but he claimed that he “panicked” and shot her in self-
     defense.

Ruiz v. State, 286 Ga. 146, 147 (686 SE2d 253) (2009).

     In addition to the facts recounted in the Ruiz opinion, the

evidence at trial showed the following.       The friend whose help

Harper and Ruiz solicited to dispose of the guns testified at trial that

on the evening the murders took place, he drove Harper to Ruiz’s

                                   3
apartment at around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. The friend said that he, Ruiz,

and Harper drank alcoholic beverages and took Xanax. The friend

recalled that Ruiz and Harper left the apartment at around 9:00

p.m. after Ruiz received a phone call, while the friend stayed behind

and fell asleep. He was awakened sometime around 11:00 to 11:30

p.m. when Ruiz and Harper returned, stating that they needed “to

get rid of a couple of guns.” The friend drove Harper to two nearby

lakes where Harper threw out two guns, one gun into each lake, and

then the friend drove Harper home. The friend recognized the guns

because Ruiz had shown them to him before.

     Ruiz’s girlfriend testified that when she got to Ruiz’s

apartment on the night of the shooting, the friend was there and she

heard him tell Ruiz that he had dropped Harper at home and “they

got rid of some guns.” The friend later led investigators to the

locations where Harper had thrown the guns, and police recovered

the weapons. Ruiz’s girlfriend testified that the day after the

shooting, Ruiz told her that he and Harper went to F. J.’s Tavern

earlier on January 26, and Luhrman got mad at Harper, threatening

                                 4
that he would “go to Stockbridge to find” Harper. She also overheard

Harper telling others that he walked into the tavern later that day

and said to Luhrman, “Now come to Stockbridge and find me,

motherf***er.” Harper said he then shot Luhrman and Carty, who

was standing there at the time.

     1. Harper first contends that the over-19-year delay between

his conviction and his direct appeal violated his right to due process

under   the   Fourteenth    Amendment       of   the   United   States

Constitution. We review Harper’s claim that his delayed appeal

constituted a due process violation under the four-part balancing

test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (IV) (92 SCt 2182,

33 LE2d 101) (1972). See Hyden v. State, 308 Ga. 218, 223 (839 SE2d

506) (2020) (“[S]peedy appeal claims are assessed by balancing the

same four factors applicable to speedy trial claims as articulated in

Barker v. Wingo.”); Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256-57 (2) (a)

(626 SE2d 102) (2006) (adopting the four-factor test for speedy-trial

claims set forth in Barker for claims asserting violation of due

process for lack of a timely appeal). Under that test, “the court must

                                  5
examine the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s

assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Morris v.

State, 308 Ga. 520, 525 (2) (842 SE2d 45) (2020) (citation and

punctuation omitted). However, in a speedy appeal claim, unlike a

speedy trial claim, the failure to show actual prejudice from the

delay is “fatal to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh

in the appellant’s favor.” Veal v. State, 301 Ga. 161, 168 (3) (800

SE2d 325) (2017), overruled in part on other grounds in Johnson v.

State, 315 Ga. 876, 889 (3) n.11 (885 SE2d 725) (2023). See also

Leslie v. State, 292 Ga. 368, 373 (7) (738 SE2d 42) (2013); Whitaker

v. State, 291 Ga. 139, 143-44 (3) (728 SE2d 209) (2012). “In

evaluating a trial court’s decision to deny a speedy appeal claim, we

must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are

clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the

trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Hyden, 308

Ga. at 224 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     The record shows that Harper was sentenced on August 29,

2003, and afterward, Harper’s first appointed appellate counsel,

                                  6
who was also one of his trial attorneys, filed a timely motion for new

trial on September 5, 2003. After filing that motion, Harper’s first

appellate counsel took no further action in his case and failed to

communicate with Harper or his family when they reached out to

him. It was not until July 10, 2014, after Harper began petitioning

the trial court, pro se, for assistance in pursuing an appeal, that he

was appointed a second appellate counsel, who filed an amended

motion for new trial on November 23, 2015. A month later, however,

on December 22, 2015, Harper filed a pro se motion asking that his

second appellate counsel be removed and that his case be “stayed,”

and on March 31, 2016, Harper’s second appellate counsel filed a

motion to withdraw. At an April 15, 2016, hearing on that motion,

the second appellate counsel informed the trial court that Harper

had initiated a bar complaint seeking to have her disbarred.2

      No further court action occurred in the case until December

     2 The second appellate counsel informed the trial court in 2021 that the

bar complaint was dismissed.
                                     7
15, 2020, when a new judge who was assigned to Harper’s case3

scheduled a status conference for January 5, 2021. During that

conference, the second appellate counsel appeared for Harper and

asked the court to grant her still-pending motion to withdraw. 4 On

February 4, 2021, the trial court granted the second appellate

counsel’s withdrawal motion and appointed Harper a third appellate

counsel. After filing two motions for continuance to allow time to

prepare a second amended motion for new trial, the third appellate

counsel filed the second amended motion on October 6, 2021. Before

a hearing could be held on the amended motion, however, Harper’s

third appellate counsel was appointed to be a judge, and he

withdrew from Harper’s representation.

      Harper’s third appellate counsel was replaced by Harper’s

      3 The original trial judge’s last action of record in Harper’s case occurred

when he held the hearing on the motion to withdraw in April 2016. The record
reflects that the matter subsequently was assigned to a new judge, who recused
herself on May 2, 2017, due to her “substantive involvement, during prior
employment,” in Harper’s case. It is unclear from the record when Harper’s
case was assigned to the third judge.
       4At the same hearing, Harper told the court that he had never asked for

the second appellate counsel to be appointed in the first place, asserting that
the court reporter took it upon herself to make the request on his behalf, yet
he also stated that he never had the desire to represent himself.
                                        8
current appellate counsel, who, after obtaining a continuance, filed

a third amended motion for new trial on September 29, 2022. The

trial court denied Harper’s motion for new trial, as amended, on

November 30, 2022, approximately nineteen years and three months

after the first motion had been filed.

     In denying the speedy appeal claim, the trial court considered

the Barker v. Wingo factors. As for the first factor—the length of

delay—the court found that the delay in the decision on the motion

for new trial was lengthy and thus that the first factor weighed in

Harper’s favor.

     In addressing the reason for the delay under the second factor,

the trial court divided the delay period into two parts: (1) the first

twelve years, from September 5, 2003, when the original motion for

new trial was filed, to the day the first amended motion for new trial

was filed in November 2015; and (2) the last seven years, from

November 18, 2015, when Harper decided that he did not want to be

represented by his second appellate counsel, to November 30, 2022,

                                  9
the date of the order denying the motion for new trial.5 The trial

court weighed the first period of delay in Harper’s favor and against

the State but weighed the second delay period against Harper, based

on his decision to reject his appointed counsel and ask for a stay,

which resulted in multiple requests for continuances.

      The trial court weighed the third factor—the assertion of the

right—in Harper’s favor after finding that Harper never ceased to

assert his right to appeal, by writing letters to his counsel and

petitioning the clerk of the superior court for assistance in pursuing

his appeal.

      In addressing the fourth factor, however, the trial court found

that Harper failed to show actual prejudice from the delay. Harper

      5 We note that the trial court’s order misstates the date the first amended

motion for new trial was filed by six days. It was filed on November 23, 2015,
not November 17, 2015, as the order states. The trial court also determined
that Harper decided on November 18, 2015, that he no longer wanted to be
represented by his second appellate counsel, but the first evidence of Harper’s
decision in that regard that we could locate in the record appears in his Motion
to Remove Counsel and Stay Proceedings filed on December 22, 2015.
Nevertheless, we conclude that these errors do not change our analysis in this
case because, unlike in a speedy trial claim, Harper’s failure to establish
prejudice is fatal to his speedy appeal claim, regardless of how the other Barker
v. Wingo factors are weighed. See Veal, 301 Ga. at 168.
                                       10
testified at the motion hearing that he is right-handed and that

“[r]oughly a week” before the shootings, he broke his right hand in

multiple places in a motorcycle accident. He said that his hand was

stabilized in a “half-cast” that went halfway around his arm from

the tips of his fingers to his elbow, except for his thumb. The “half-

cast” was designed to allow “some flexibility and mobility to move

[his] arm but not use [his] arm.” Harper said he was still wearing

the cast at the time of his arrest. However, his left hand was un-

casted. Harper also presented evidence that the medical records no

longer existed because the treating hospital had purged them after

ten years pursuant to “state medical record retention requirements.”

Harper testified that he told one of his trial attorneys about his

accident and the subsequent treatment of his arm.

     The trial court found that the medical records were not

material and would not have changed the outcome of his trial. The

trial court further found that the court record showed that Harper’s

trial attorneys were aware of Harper’s medical condition but chose

not to pursue a defense based on that condition. Instead, they

                                 11
asserted that Harper was not even present at the crime scene.

Specifically, at trial, counsel elicited testimony from Harper’s friend

that Harper’s hand was broken and his arm was in a brace6 on the

night of the shooting and that Harper had difficulty moving that

arm. Harper’s counsel relied on this testimony in his closing

argument to support the defense that Harper was not present

during the crimes, arguing that with his injuries, Harper would not

have been “the kind of guy you would want to bring to a fight,” and

that Harper could not have been the man whom witnesses saw run

from the bar that night and drive away because every time Harper

moved his arm, it hurt. The trial court found that the medical

records would not have aided that defense.

     On appeal, Harper takes no issue with the trial court’s findings

under the first and third factors of the Barker v. Wingo test. As to

the second factor, Harper does not contest that the trial court

     6 Harper provided no evidence to show how the “half cast” he described

at the motion hearing differed from a “brace” or was not encompassed by that
term.

                                    12
properly weighed the first twelve years of delay against the State,

but he argues that the court erred in weighing the final seven years

against him and not the State. However, we need not address

Harper’s arguments relating to the third factor because even if we

assume that the trial court should have weighed all nineteen years

and three months of delay against the State, as Harper argues, we

agree with the trial court that Harper’s failure to show actual

prejudice under the fourth factor is fatal to his claim that the delay

in his appeal resulted in a due process violation.

     “In determining whether an appellate delay violates due

process, prejudice, unlike in the speedy trial context, is not

presumed but must be shown.” Veal, 301 Ga. at 168 (3) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And in a case involving appellate delay,

“where prejudice is clearly lacking, we will not reverse a conviction,

even if the other factors favor the defendant.” Norman v. State, 303

Ga. 635, 642 (5) (814 SE2d 401) (2018). See Veal, 301 Ga. at 168 (3).

Moreover, this Court has determined that

     the prejudice necessary to establish a due process

                                 13
      violation based on post-conviction direct appeal delay is
      prejudice to the ability of the defendant to assert his
      arguments on appeal and, should it be established that
      the appeal was prejudiced, whether the delay prejudiced
      the defendant’s defenses in the event of retrial or
      resentencing.

Chatman, 280 Ga. at 260 (2) (e). Moreover, “appellate delay is

prejudicial when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the

delay, the result of the appeal would have been different.” Id. at 260-

61 (2) (e) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      Harper argued below, and on appeal, that the appellate delay

prejudiced his ability to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance

based on his counsel’s failure to introduce medical records showing

injuries to his hand at the time of the shootings because the medical

records are no longer available.7 He further asserts that the

      7 Harper asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his

trial attorneys’ failure to obtain and use the medical records at trial, as well as
their failure to ask for certain jury instructions. In addition to his claim of
prejudice resulting from the lack of the medical records, Harper also asserts
on appeal that because both of his trial attorneys were deceased by the time of
the motion hearing, the delay prejudiced his ability to pursue his
ineffectiveness claims because he could not question his counsel about their
decisions at trial. He raised this argument at the hearing on the motion for
new trial in connection with the ineffectiveness claim concerning the medical
records, but he did not raise the claim with regard to the claims addressing the

                                        14
unavailability of the records would prejudice his ability to mount a

defense based on his injuries if he were to receive a new trial.

      To establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance, Harper has the burden of satisfying both prongs of the

test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

      First, [Harper] must show counsel’s performance was
      deficient by showing counsel made errors so serious that
      he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to him
      by the Sixth Amendment. [In doing so, Harper] must
      overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s
      conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable

jury instructions.
      Because Harper failed to assert such a claim of prejudice in the trial
court regarding his attorneys’ failure to request the jury instructions, we need
not address the inability to question trial counsel about the jury instructions
as evidence of prejudice on appeal. See, generally, Johnson v. State, 300 Ga.
459, 461 (2) (796 SE2d 272) (2017) (claims asserted for the first time on appeal
“are waived and need not be considered by this Court”). And we are
unpersuaded by Harper’s claim of prejudice on this ground in connection with
his ineffectiveness claim based on the medical records. In addressing Harper’s
ineffectiveness claim on that ground in Division 3 below, we assume for
purposes of analysis that Harper’s attorneys were deficient in failing to obtain
and to introduce the medical records, yet we nevertheless conclude that the
claim is meritless because Harper failed to show prejudice under Strickland,
466 U. S. at 687 (III). Thus, the absence of Harper’s trial counsel’s testimony
concerning the medical records did not prejudice his ability to pursue that
claim.

                                      15
      professional conduct.8 Second, [Harper] must show the
      deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which
      requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious
      that they likely affected the outcome of the trial.

Kilpatrick v. State, 308 Ga. 194, 201 (7) (839 SE2d 551) (2020)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

      Although the over-19-year delay in Harper’s appeal was

extraordinarily long and troubling, we agree with the trial court that

Harper has failed to establish that it resulted in a violation of due

process because he did not show a reasonable probability that he

would have prevailed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

if the delay had not resulted in the destruction of his medical

records.

      Harper’s trial attorneys were aware of his injury, and they

elicited testimony that his injury and the treatment affected his

      8 Here, although both of Harper’s trial attorneys were deceased by the

time of the motion hearing, “[e]ven where . . . trial counsel is no longer available
to testify regarding the manner in which he conducted appellant’s defense at
trial, appellant must still overcome [the] presumption” that counsel’s trial
decisions were in the reasonable range of professional conduct. Green v. State,
302 Ga. 816, 819 (2) (b) n.3 (809 SE2d 738) (2018) (citation and punctuation
omitted); Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 561, 564 (2) (769 SE2d 307) (2015) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
                                        16
right arm’s mobility. They then used that evidence to support a

defense, not based solely on that injury, but rather on the absence

of any physical or other direct evidence showing that Harper had

anything to do with the crimes or that he was even present at the

time of the shootings. 9 Harper’s counsel argued during his closing

that Harper’s injuries made it unlikely that he would have been

solicited to participate in the crimes or that he could have been the

man witnesses saw drive away from the scene.

      Moreover, the evidence Harper’s attorneys presented at trial

showed that Harper may have been hampered in firing the gun used

to shoot Luhrman and Carty, given his injury and the brace. But

Harper presented no evidence to support an inference that the

medical records could have shown anything beyond that. Harper

presented no evidence – not even evidence showing how the gun was

fired – to suggest that Harper would have been unable to operate

the weapon, when he had an uninjured left arm and hand and the

      9 Defense counsel expressly informed the trial court that this was their

chosen defense strategy at an ex parte bench conference during the trial.
                                     17
half-cast allowed some movement in his right arm and thumb.

      Therefore, even assuming that Harper’s trial attorneys were

deficient for failing to obtain10 and introduce the medical records at

trial, Harper did not show that the records could have supported a

defense that he was incapable of firing the gun or successfully

bolstered his trial counsel’s defense strategy at trial. Accordingly, he

cannot show that if he had the medical records, he would have met

the prejudice prong under Strickland and prevailed on his claim of

ineffectiveness of counsel. See Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga.

400, 409 (4) (b) (845 SE2d 643) (2020) (ineffectiveness claim fails

where defendant failed to show that the evidence trial counsel failed

to obtain and review contained exculpatory evidence raising a

reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to use it at

trial, the results of the trial would have been different); Shank v.

      10 Harper indicates that he is relying on only an assumption that his

counsel failed to obtain the medical records based on Harper’s testimony at the
motion for new trial hearing that his counsel never showed him any records
and on a lack of depth in his counsel’s cross-examination of the friend who
described Harper’s injuries. Because both trial attorneys are deceased and
Harper did not otherwise secure an affidavit or sworn statement, that
assumption can neither be confirmed nor rebutted. Nevertheless, even
assuming that counsel failed to obtain the records, Harper’s claim fails.
                                      18
State, 290 Ga. 844, 848 (5) (a) (725 SE2d 246 (2012) (claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails where appellant did not show

that further investigation by counsel would have resulted in any

significant exculpatory evidence and thus could not establish

prejudice resulting from allegedly deficient investigation). As a

result, Harper has not carried his burden of proving “a reasonable

probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would

have been different.” Chatman 280 Ga. at 260-61 (2) (e) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion

by the trial court in denying the motion for new trial on this ground.

See Hyden, 308 Ga. at 224 (3).

     2. Harper next asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for

mistrial after the State referenced what Harper describes as

previously excluded and “highly prejudicial statements” he made to

police. “Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the trial

court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that

discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is

                                 19
essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Wilkerson

v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 249 (3) (892 SE2d 737) (2023).

     The record reflects that Harper filed a motion for a Jackson-

Denno 11 hearing on January 22, 2003, alleging that he “may have

been interviewed by several agents of law enforcement . . . while he

was both in-custody and a suspect of the crime for which he is

charged, in regards to the crimes that he is alleged to have

committed” and asking for a determination of whether the

statements were admissible. At the subsequent hearing on that

motion, the State called a sergeant with the Atlanta Police

Department, who testified about a statement Harper made in a

police car after his arrest and after he was read his Miranda 12 rights.

In that statement, Harper denied any knowledge of the crimes.

After hearing the sergeant’s testimony, the trial judge said that the

statement to the sergeant “is not admissible, and further stated that

“[n]one of this is admissible. I mean, any statement they made is not

     11 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
     12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

                                    20
admissible.” But the trial judge later said that he was “thinking out

loud” and that “the thing is not closed yet, but that’s – I’m just telling

you that’s where I’m going with that.”

     When asked at the motion hearing whether the State intended

to introduce Harper’s statements that he did not know anything, the

prosecutor replied that his plan was to obtain a ruling as to whether

the statements Harper made were voluntary and then “strategically

make a decision” as to whether to introduce them at trial. Later,

when the sergeant who testified about the statement he took from

Harper was excused as a witness, the trial court asked the

prosecutor whether he intended to use “that,” and he replied, “no.”

     The prosecutor then announced that there were other

statements by Harper and that the State had a detective available

to testify about a different statement. The prosecutor decided not to

present that detective’s testimony about those other statements at

the Jackson-Denno hearing, because the testimony would have been

“more of the same.” The trial court agreed that the State should not

“plow the same field.” But as explained further below, the prosecutor

                                   21
did allude to one of those other statements at trial, which is what

gave rise to the mistrial motion.

     On the second day of the hearing, the trial court’s staff attorney

asked if there had been any ruling on the Jackson-Denno issue. The

trial judge replied, “There is no mention of any denial of anything,

unless the defendants want to bring that up themselves. But the

State is not going to be allowed to say anything about that. So I grant

the Jackson-Denno motion.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, the

trial court never issued a written order on the motion.

     At trial, which took place about eight months later, during the

State’s opening statement, the prosecutor referred to a statement

that Harper made to the detective who was not called to testify at

the motion hearing. The prosecutor told the jury that Harper said

that he did not know anything about the crimes because he was

getting “plastered drunk” and smoking marijuana that day with

Ruiz and the friend who testified at trial. The prosecutor further

asserted that Harper said they were celebrating at Ruiz’s

apartment, and when Harper became so drunk he was “physically

                                    22
ill,” the friend drove Harper home. Harper’s trial attorney objected

and when the jury was removed, he argued that the statements the

prosecutor had referenced were ruled inadmissible at the Jackson-

Denno hearing and the prosecutors also had indicated that they

were not going to use them at trial. Harper’s attorney then moved

for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor referenced a

statement that the prosecutors earlier said they were not going to

use, that the trial court indicated it would not allow into evidence,

and that introduced bad character evidence about Harper’s illegal

use of marijuana. Counsel then added that, although he was seeking

a mistrial, as a “b[are] minimum” he was asking for a curative

instruction.

     The trial court called the jury back in and gave a curative

instruction to disregard the prosecutor’s reference to Harper’s

statement.13 Afterward, Harper’s trial attorney asserted that he did

     13 That instruction was as follows:

     I’m instructing you that any statement made by the Assistant
     District Attorney about any statements that Mr. Harper made
     there when they went out to the apartment, some police official got

                                     23
not believe the court’s instruction cured the problem and renewed

his prior motion. The attorney said that his objection went to the

whole instruction and specifically to the issue of character. The

judge then told the jury, “I’m instructing you that that statement

about illegal drug use is not to be considered by you in any way,

shape, or form; and that Mr. Harper is presumed to have good

character….”14 The judge asked Harper’s attorney if that was

     Mr. Harper and allegedly talked to him, and the D.A. has just
     related statements that Mr. Harper allegedly said to the police
     officer. I’m instructing you to disregard that. You are not – you are
     not to consider that in any way, and I have already told you what
     these lawyers say in these opening statements is not evidence in
     this case.

     You understand what I’m saying? And I’m instructing you, you are
     to disregard any statement by the district attorney about any
     statements made by Mr. Harper to the police initially. And I’m
     instructing you to disregard that and not to consider it in this case,
     and that’s the court’s instruction. . . .

     And, Ladies and Gentlemen, any statements about any statement
     that Mr. Harper allegedly – you are to erase any reference to that
     in this case until further notice.

     Has anybody got a problem with that? Anybody going to be unable
     to do that? And let the record reflect no hands are raised.

     14 The trial court later noted,

     Well, the record will reflect what I told the jury. I gave them an
     instruction, and the record won’t reflect the tone of my voice, but I

                                       24
“sufficient,” and the attorney replied that it was an instruction in

line with the law, but he was still renewing his motion. «V.7-367»

The trial judge then directed the prosecutor to proceed with his

opening statement.

     At the conclusion of the State’s opening, Harper’s other trial

counsel renewed the motion for mistrial on the ground that the

defense premised its opening on the prosecutors’ representation that

the statement mentioned in the State’s opening would not be used

at trial. The trial judge replied that a hearing would be necessary to

get “a definitive ruling” on the admissibility of the statement

referenced by the prosecutor in opening because “[he did not] think

one was ever made.” Following an ex parte conference in chambers

between the trial judge and defense counsel regarding how the

statement affected the defense’s theory of the case, and without

holding a further evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that

     forcefully instructed them that they are not to consider this. I went
     over the character part of it and all of it. So that is excluded, and
     they indicated they would follow that instruction, and that’s all I
     can say.
                                      25
Harper’s statements were “out” because the record reflected that the

judge said at the motion hearing that “those statements more than

likely wouldn’t come in.” Nevertheless, the trial court denied the

motion for mistrial, and Harper’s attorney proceeded with his

opening statement.

     Harper contends on appeal that because the statement at issue

had been orally excluded from evidence and the prosecutors had

“unequivocally” stated that they would not seek admission of the

statement, the prosecutor acted in bad faith in including it in his

opening statement and the mistrial should have been granted.

     Although it is true that a prosecutor should limit his opening

statement to a recitation of what he expects the evidence will show,

see Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 122 (4) (702 SE2d 151) (2010),

“[a] conviction will not be reversed if the opening statement was

made in good faith, and the trial court instructs the jury that

opening statements are not to be considered as evidence during

deliberations.” Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 705, 709 (6) (733 SE2d

280) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial court

                                26
instructed the jury in both its preliminary and final instructions

that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence and further

instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s description of

Harper’s prior statement.

     Additionally, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding that the trial prosecutors acted in good faith

and did not knowingly violate any trial court ruling. The State was

not represented at trial by the same prosecutors who appeared at

the Jackson-Denno hearing. Rather, two new prosecutors were

assigned to the case a few days before the trial began. The

prosecutor who gave the opening statement said at trial that he was

unaware that the statement he referenced had been excluded, and

if he had known that it was, he never would have mentioned it. In

fact, the record contains no clear pretrial ruling excluding the

statement. The trial court’s oral rulings on the admissibility of

Harper’s statements to police were ambiguous, and no written order

was ever entered. Even the trial judge did not think that a pretrial

ruling “was ever made” on the statement used in the prosecution’s

                                27
opening. Moreover, Harper has not pointed us to, nor could we

locate, any representation in the record by the prosecutors that they

did not intend to use that statement at trial, although the

prosecutors did represent that they would not use the statement on

which they presented testimony at the Jackson-Denno hearing.

     In addition, this Court has determined that “the trial court can

negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced

evidence by prompt curative instructions rather than by granting a

mistrial.” Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 44, 49 (4) (829 SE2d 121) (2019).

See Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 504 (3) (c) (591 SE2d 784) (2004)

(“[Q]ualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the

instructions of the trial court.”). The trial court gave thorough and

prompt curative instructions in response to Harper’s motion for

mistrial. Under these circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion

by the trial court in denying the motion for mistrial. See Simmons,

291 Ga. at 709 (6).

     3. Finally, Harper asserts that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and

                                 28
introduce medical evidence of the injury to his dominant hand.

However, as explained above in Division 1, even if we assume for

purpose of analysis that Harper’s counsel were deficient in failing to

obtain the medical records, Harper has failed to show a reasonable

probability that the result of his trial would have been different if

those records were introduced into evidence. For these same

reasons, Harper’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See

Reed v. State, 314 Ga. at 538 (2); Chatman, 280 Ga. at 261 (2) (e)

(recognizing that the prejudice required to show ineffective

assistance of counsel under Strickland and the prejudice required to

establish a due process violation resulting from a delayed appeal are

“akin” to one another).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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