Court Opinion

ID: 9366693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 18:08:09.705104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.336762
License: Public Domain

J-S01005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.S.L., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: L.L., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1123 WDA 2022

              Appeal From the Decree Entered September 8, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 12A-2022 O.C.

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: JANUARY 27, 2023

        L.L. (Father) appeals from the September 8, 2022 decree that granted

the petition filed by B.S.T. (Mother) seeking the involuntary termination of

Father’s parental rights to T.S.L. (Child), the parties’ minor child. After review,

we affirm.

        The trial court summarized the factual findings of this case as follows:

              [Child] was born [in October of 2014,] while Mother and
        Father were still living as a couple in the state of Illinois. They
        moved to Brookville early in 2016, where Father soon found
        himself facing a DUI charge. While on probation for that offense,
        he incurred additional criminal charges that, aggregated with his
        probation violation, earned him a sentence of 2-4 years in prison.
        He and Mother permanently separated while he was incarcerated.

             Released on January 3, 2020, Father moved to Clarion with
        his mother. That arrangement lasted for approximately 2 1/2
        months, during which time Mother took [Child] nearly every Friday
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     to spend the weekend with his [F]ather and grandmother. It
     concluded when Father was arrested on new charges in Clarion
     County. When he was next released on bail in January of the
     following year [2021], he moved to Strattanville and resumed
     living with his mother. Again[,] aided by Mother’s willingness to
     provide transportation, he then resumed regular weekend visits
     with [Child], which he took advantage of for the next six months.
     In July of 2021, however, he decided to relocate to the state of
     Iowa and has had no contact with [Child] since.

           When he left for Iowa, Father was under the impression
     based on a tentative conversation with Mother that he would get
     custody of [Child] for part of the summer and that Mother would
     drive the boy halfway to Iowa every month or two to spend the
     weekend. They did not talk about it again. Father texted several
     times between then and December [of 2021,] asking to speak with
     [Child], but Mother either ignored [Father] or said [Child] was
     unable to talk each time.

           After months of accepting Mother’s silence, Father sent her
     a Facebook message reminding her about their supposed custody
     arrangement and again asking to speak with his son. They
     exchanged a series of messages immediately thereafter, the last
     in which Mother indicated that she no longer considered Father to
     be part of the boy’s family.

            When Mother would not cooperate with him, said Father, he
     enlisted his mother to intervene on his behalf. His mother did not
     take the witness stand to corroborate that averment, though, and
     she did not purport to be speaking on behalf of anyone but herself
     when she texted Mother on March 22, 2022. Furthermore, the
     [grandmother’s] failure to correct Mother when she said that
     neither of them had reached out since August—with the exception
     of the messages Father sent in December—indicated that she did
     not contest that timeline.

            Credibility determinations aside, what Father’s own
     testimony established was that texting and Facebook Messenger
     were the only media he utilized to attempt to maintain a
     relationship with [Child]. Armed with a mailing address as of
     December [2021], he did not send a single card, letter, or gift.
     His excuse was that he did not trust that Mother had given him
     her actual address. He said he knew that either [Mother’s] mother
     or daughter lived there, though, which means he knew that its

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     resident had access to [Child] and could have delivered any cards,
     letters, or gifts he sent.

            Father also had access to the court system or could have
     returned to Pennsylvania at any time to be with his son. Driven
     by his decision to violate the conditions of his bail and take refuge
     in the state of Iowa, however, Father did not deem either to be a
     viable option. He testified that he did not know whether the court
     would entertain a custody petition while there was a warrant out
     for his arrest, and it was the fear of being detained on that warrant
     that kept him from returning of his own volition. Clarion County,
     he reasoned, was not likely to bring him back from Iowa to be
     prosecuted for a couple of misdemeanors. He thus felt safe there.

            In Father’s absence, [S.T.] (Stepfather) has … assumed the
     parental role abdicated by Father. [Stepfather] and [Child] have
     a lot of fun together riding dirt bikes, working with their farm
     animals, and practicing sports. Stepfather is much more than a
     playmate, though; he also takes his stepson to practices, attends
     his games, helps him with his homework, and supports him
     financially. As Mother testified, in fact, they do everything
     together. Having taken that active approach, Stepfather has
     earned a place of importance in [Child’s] mind. The boy enjoys
     spending time with Stepfather and looks to him as a father figure.
     Though he is still “Steve” at home, … [Child] identifies him to other
     people as “my dad,” has begun spontaneously to sign [“T.”] as his
     last name, and wants Stepfather to adopt him and become his
     full-time father.

           [Child] does remember Father but does not ascribe any
     special significance to him. Father once gave him a wallet he still
     uses, and he continues to associate the gift with its giver. It is a
     neutral association, though; the memory does not trigger emotion
     or prompt him to ask about Father. While he used to talk about
     their visits during the first half of 2021 and ask when the next
     would occur, … Father is not someone to whom he seems to give
     much, if any, thought at this point.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/8/2022, at 1-3 (footnotes and citations to the

record omitted) (emphasis in original).

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      Following the filing by Mother of the parental termination petition, the

court held a hearing on August 30, 2022. Mother and Father both attended

the hearing with counsel, and both testified. Child was also represented by

counsel and by a guardian ad litem. Additionally, the court heard testimony

from Stepfather and from Mother’s seventeen-year-old daughter, K.N. The

court then issued its decree and opinion on September 8, 2022, granting

Mother’s petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

      After the court issued its September 8, 2022 decree terminating Father’s

parental rights, Father filed a timely appeal and a statement of errors

complained of on appeal. In his brief, Father sets out the following issues for

our review:

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit a
         revers[i]ble error of law when it held that the statutory grounds
         for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights had been
         established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1) by
         concluding that Father, for a period of at least six (6) months
         immediately preceding the petition for involuntary termination
         of parental rights[,] had failed or refused to perform parental
         duties?

      2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit a
         revers[i]ble error of law when it held that the statutory grounds
         for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights had been
         established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1) by
         concluding that Mother had not prevented Father from
         performing … parental duties, for a period of at least six (6)
         months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for
         involuntary termination of parental rights?

      3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit revers[i]ble
         error of law when it held that terminating Father’s parental
         rights would best serve the needs of [C]hild?

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Father’s brief at 6.

            Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases
      implicate[s] the following principles:

            In cases involving termination of parental rights:
            “[O]ur standard of review is limited to determining
            whether the order of the trial court is supported by
            competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave
            adequate consideration to the effect of such a decree
            on the welfare of the child.”

      In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.D.T.,
      Jr., 934 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 68,
      950 A.2d 270 (2008)).

            Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
            insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
            decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
            a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
            to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
            supported by competent evidence.

      In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc),
      appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (internal
      citations omitted).

            Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
            of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
            witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
            resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
            is on the party seeking termination to establish by
            clear and convincing evidence the existence of
            grounds for doing so.

      In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa. Super. 2002)
      (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. 2010).

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      We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated

analysis.

      Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
      must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
      rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
      party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination

of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.

2009).      However, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one

subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm.

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

      With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

      Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
      rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
      emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
      A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles
      such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

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     inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we
     instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and
     status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
     on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in
     cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
     child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,
     946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent
     of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
     circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

     As noted above, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide:

     (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

           (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
           at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
           the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
           relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
           or failed to perform parental duties.

               ***

      (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

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      In In re Z.P., this Court provided direction relating to what

considerations need to be addressed when reviewing a trial court’s decision to

terminate parental rights under various subsections of 2511(a). Specifically,

relating to subsection (a)(1), the Z.P. Court stated:

      A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1)
      where the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish
      parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at
      least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition.
      In re C.S., [761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (emphasis in
      original)]. The court should consider the entire background of the
      case and not simply:

            mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
            The court must examine the individual circumstances
            of each case and consider all explanations offered by
            the parent facing termination of his … parental rights,
            to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
            the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
            termination.

      In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
      denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (citing In re D.J.S.,
      737 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 1999)).

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.

      In regard to Father’s first issue, he claims that although Mother asserted

that Father had no contact with her or Child from March or April of 2021

through December of 2021, she later admitted that Father and grandmother

attempted to contact her and Child during that time. Essentially, Father claims

his lack of performing any parental duties at that time should be attributed to

Mother’s denial of any contact between him and Child. Thus, Father claims

that this failure was because of Mother’s actions, not his. In particular, Father

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points to discussions between him and Mother related to his having periods of

partial custody once he relocated to Iowa, which did not occur due to Mother’s

refusal to permit contact and was contrary to the regular contact Father had

had before his move. Therefore, Father argues that he did not fail or refuse

to perform parental duties. Rather, when Father did not have regular contact

with Child, he asserts it was because of his incarceration or Mother’s actions

preventing his involvement with Child.

      Similarly, in Father’s second issue, he argues that the court incorrectly

determined that Mother had not impeded his ability to perform parental duties.

In support of this position, Father relies on In re B., N.M., wherein this Court

stated that “[w]here a non-custodial parent is facing termination of his or her

parental   rights,   the   court   must    consider   the   non-custodial   parent’s

explanation, if any, for the apparent neglect, including situations in which a

custodial parent has deliberately created obstacles and has by devious means

erected barriers intended to impede free communication and regular

association between the non-custodial parent and his or her child.” Id. at

855-56.    Additionally, Father cited reasons Mother gave for not allowing

contact, such as safety concerns, but which appeared to Father as a demand

for financial support.     Moreover, Father asserts that Mother was fine with

contact between Father and Child when Father lived in Pennsylvania, but that

she used his move to Iowa to sever all contact.

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      Father’s first two issues both relate to subsection (a)(1) with the thrust

of his first argument dealing with the trial court’s determination that Father

failed or refused to perform his parental duties. The second issue likewise

deals with a failure to perform parental duties but is based on the trial court’s

conclusion that Mother’s actions did not prevent Father from performing his

parental duties. In its opinion, the trial court provided its response to Father’s

first two issues, stating:

             Could Mother have made things easier for Father? Could
      she have commuted halfway to Iowa every month or two so that
      Father could see [Child] without the fear of being arrested? Sure
      she could have. As a result of his own choices, though, Father
      was the out-of-custody parent, which made it his responsibility to
      pursue a relationship with [Child]. At no time did it become
      Mother’s duty to actively facilitate it, and it was quickly evident
      after Father moved that she was not going to cooperate with the
      purported “plan” that would afford him weekend visits even while
      he was living in Iowa. By his own admission, it was clear from her
      last Facebook massage in December that Mother no longer
      deemed him to be part of [Child’s] family, at which point it became
      wholly unreasonable for him not to do more as a father, whether
      that meant returning to Pennsylvania or petitioning the court from
      his distant location. Afraid that either would require him to face
      the consequences of his decision to become a fugitive, he instead
      chose electronic media as his only manner of seeking contact with
      [Child] and contented himself with blaming Mother for “keeping
      [Child] from him.” It was he, however, who had artificially limited
      his options, and nothing but his own self-interest kept him away
      from his son.

            Face-to-face visits and telephone calls were not the
      exclusive means by which Father could have kept in touch with
      [Child], either. Mother gave him a mailing address in December,
      and while he doubted whether he would find her there, he knew it
      belonged to one of her close relatives, which means he knew it
      was an avenue by which he could reach out to his son. Depending
      on when in December the parties’ Facebook exchange occurred,
      that meant Father had between 3 and 4 months before Mother

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       filed the petition to terminate his parental rights; he had a window
       of 3-4 months to reach out to [Child] directly while still remaining
       well outside of Clarion County. He did not.

              When Mother stopped making parenting easy for him,
       Father simply quit trying and allowed someone else—Stepfather—
       to take his place both physically and emotionally. Perhaps he
       continues to feel affection for [Child], and perhaps he imagined
       that visitation would resume when he eventually returned to
       resolve his criminal charges in Clarion County. Intention without
       action is insufficient to preserve parental rights, though. As the
       above-recited precedent makes clear,[1] Father’s parental
       obligation did not end when Mother stopped cooperating with him.
       It was his duty to act affirmatively even after it became more
       difficult to maintain a place of importance in his son’s life. In
       failing to do so, he failed to perform parental duties in excess of 6
       months prior to when Mother filed this subject petition and
       thereby made it possible for Mother to sustain her burden of proof
       under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1).

TCO at 4-5.

       We agree with the court’s determination.       Based on its findings and

credibility determinations, the court concluded that Father refused or failed to

perform his parental duties for a period of at least six months prior to the filing

of the petition to terminate his parental rights. Father’s entire argument is

____________________________________________

1 In re Adoption of T.M., 566 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 1989), is one of the
decisions cited by the trial court in its opinion. Specifically, the T.M. case
states:

       Parental duty does not require the impossible, but may encompass
       that which is difficult and demanding. A parent may not yield to
       every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith interest
       and effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of
       his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances.

Id. at 1258 (quoting In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 641 (Pa. 1977)). See
also In re E.M., 908 A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. 1989).

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essentially     an   attack   on   the   trial    court’s   findings   and   credibility

determinations.       However, after our thorough review of the record, we

determine that the record supports the court’s findings, and it did not abuse

its discretion in arriving at its conclusion. Therefore, Father is not entitled to

relief.

          Father’s third issue concerns subsection (b), which relates to what would

best serve “the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of

the child” under the standard of best interests of the child.           23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(b). Father argues that because the trial court does not provide a citation

or discussion relating to Section 2511(b) in its opinion, it has not completed

the second part of the bifurcated process. Although Father acknowledges that

the court references the best interests of the Child, he contends that the court

relies on its own conclusion that Child does not want a relationship with Father,

which Father claims is not based on any testimony or evidence provided by

Child.      Additionally, Father again relies on Mother’s actions he claims

prevented him from interacting with Child or with Father’s other children, a

fact Father claims was not even mentioned by the court.

          Again, Father is attempting to refute the trial court’s findings and its

conclusion that Mother met her burden of proof. Specifically, the court stated:

                 Mother likewise demonstrated that terminating Father’s
          parental rights would be in [Child’s] best interests. The boy is
          happy with the life he has led in Father’s absence. In all relevant
          respects, Stepfather has established and fostered a parent-child
          relationship with his stepson, who now wants Stepfather to
          become in reality the father he already deems him to be and for

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      the two of them to share the last name [“T.”]. Conversely, the
      bond that once existed between Father and [Child], if it still exists
      at all, has been weakened to the degree that terminating Father’s
      rights will not prove detrimental to the boy. Once eager to share
      the details of their visits and curious about when they would next
      see one another, [Child’s] references to Father became fewer and
      fewer until he eventually stopped mentioning him at all. See In
      re. K Z. S., 946 A.2d at … 760 … (providing that courts deciding
      termination petitions must consider whether a natural parental
      bond exists between child and parent and whether termination
      would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship).

            Thus[,] satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that
      Father’s conduct warrants termination of his parental rights and
      [Child’s] needs will best be served by that result, the [c]ourt will
      enter an effectuating decree.

TCO at 5.

      Although in its discussion relating to subsection 2511(b) and despite the

lack of a citation to that subsection, it is evident that the court was directing

its findings and conclusions to that subsection in its opinion, particularly

mentioning the weakening of any bond that had previously existed between

Father and Child. Thus, we again conclude that the trial court’s decision is

supported by the record. Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve Child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly terminated

Father’s parental rights to Child and we affirm the September 8, 2022 decree

granting Mother’s termination petition.

      Decree affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2023

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