Court Opinion

ID: 9552874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:18:40.143498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:16.190868
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the judgment of reversal but do not agree with the reasoning in the majority opinion that the right of a creditor of an heir to contest a will is limited to a judgment creditor whose judgment may be a lien upon real property which would descend to the heir in case the will is set aside.
The question of whether a creditor of an heir may contest a will of the testator was settled recently by this court in Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal.2d 807 [108 P.2d 401, 133 A.L.R. 1424], a case which is not mentioned in the majority opinion. There we were considering whether the creditor of a legatee under a will could prevent the renunciation of the legacy by the legatee. We held he could and in so doing held that the case was analogous to a contest of a will by a creditor of an heir, stating (p. 814) : “A creditor who is legally entitled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may exercise the debtor’s right to contest a will even though the debtor himself does not wish to do so. (Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600]; In re Langevin’s Will, 45 Minn. 429 [47 N.W. 1133]: Bloor v. *252Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46 [84 N.E. 605, 14 Ann.Cas. 332].) If the creditor contested the will successfully it would be ironic to leave the debtor free to renounce the ensuing benefits. A debtor may be compelled not only to retain his property for the benefit of his creditors, but to dispose of it for the same purpose. There is a like obligation upon him of which he may acquit himself without hardship, to avail himself of a bequest. The denial to the debtor of the right to renounce as against his creditors in fact benefits his own economic interests as well as those of his creditors.” (Italics added.) It will be noted in the foregoing that a creditor who is legally entitled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may contest a will. In the forepart of the opinion it is stated that under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (Civ. Code, §§ 3439-3440.5) the creditor who may set aside a fraudulent transfer need not be a judgment creditor nor have a lien. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the majority opinion, a general creditor may contest a will. Furthermore, it will be noted that the Halt case cites Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600], for its statement to this effect. It was there held that a general creditor of an heir may contest a will which disinherits the heir.
I can see no justification for requiring that the judgment creditor of an heir must have a lien on real property before he can contest the will, thus placing personal property beyond his reach. There may be policy reasons for requiring that the creditor have a judgment, such as, that the probate court is an inappropriate forum to litigate the question of whether the creditor is in fact such, and the heir, his alleged debtor, is not a party to the contest proceeding. There is no reason, however, for the lien requirement. The lien is tenuous at the best as it may be wiped out if the property is sold during probate.
Finally, the holding by the majority can be made meaningless by simple action by the creditor. The right to contest a will being a chose in action, is transferable. (Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586 [150 P. 989] ; Estate of Clark, 94 Cal.App. 453 [271 P. 542].) It would appear, therefore, that a creditor may commence an action against the heir and attach his right to contest the will (Code Civ. Proc., § 542[b]) which would be substantially the same as a lien.
I would therefore hold that both a judgment creditor and a creditor of an heir who has brought an action and effected a valid attachment of the interest of the heir in his share of *253the assets of an estate has such an interest that he may contest a will which is so drawn as to deprive an heir of property that would have descended to him in the event of intestacy.
Traynor, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.
Courts have expressed many divergent conclusions in determining the “interest” which one must have to give him the right to contest a will. In my opinion, to allow either a creditor or a judgment creditor of a disinherited heir to maintain such a contest, places an obstacle in the way of the prompt settlement of estates which cannot be justified upon any sound legal principle.
A will contest is entirely the creature of statute. The sole standard established by the Legislature to determine the necessary qualifications of the person who may contest the probate of a will is stated in two phrases in the Probate Code. Section 370 permits “any person interested” to contest the will before probate. Section 380 allows “any interested person” to maintain a contest after probate if he has had no notice of a prior proceeding. No standard could be more vague and lacking in definition. What sort of interest must there be, and in what ?
The Legislature might well have used the word in the sense of a property right. Or did it limit the proceeding to a person with an expectation of pecuniary benefit? Giving effect to a broader connotation of the term, should it be construed as authorizing legal action by one who believes that the testator did not follow the highest moral principles in making provision for the devolution of his property? By common definition, interest in an estate, without qualification of the term, may mean almost anything. It could include the motivation of one of asserted good purpose having no relationship to the deceased, nor the possibility of sharing in the estate, who believes that the property should be divided differently than the will specifies.
Depending upon the phase of the law in which it is used, “interest” or “interested” assumes a multitude of meanings. “The word ‘interest’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the object of any human desire.” (Restatement of Torts, § 1.) “The word ‘interest’ is used in the Restatement of this Subject both generieally to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities and distributively to mean any one of them. The creation of *254interests may be either the creation of a new interest or the change or abolition of an existing interest.” (Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 42b.)
“In its ordinary signification among men of all classes . . . [the word ‘interest’] is broad enough to include any right, title, or estate in, or lien upon real estate. One who holds a mortgage upon a piece of land for half its value is commonly and truthfully said to be interested, to have an interest in it. . . .” (Ormsby v. Ottman, 29 C.C.A. 295 [85 P. 492, 497].) Definitions of “interest” or “interested” could be multiplied seemingly without end. (See 22 Words and Phrases p. 38 et seq.; Black’s Law Dictionary [3d ed., 1933] 996; Ballentine’s Law Dictionary [1930] 670.)
Even when applied to the comparatively narrow field of probate of an estate, the term has been given a variety of meanings. “It is an elementary proposition that the only persons authorized to contest or seek revocation of the probate of a will are those who, but for the will, would succeed in some degree to the decedent’s estate.” (In re Pepin’s Estate, 53 Mont. 240 [163 P. 104, 105].) A purchaser of an interest in the lands of the decedent was held to be a person interested in the estate. (McCarthy v. Texas Co., (Tex.Civ.App.) 235 S.W. 679, 681.) An administrator de bonis non is a party interested in the estate. (Balch v. Hooper, 32 Minn. 158 [20 N.W. 124, 125].)
“The word ‘interest’, in its ordinary, accepted meaning, embraces both a vested and a contingent interest and the word ‘interested’ is defined as ‘having an interest; having a share or concern in some project or affair; involved; liable to be affected or prejudiced; . . . not disinterested. . . .’ ” (In re Brown’s Estate, 24 Cal.App.2d 573, 575 [75 P.2d 658].) “A ‘person interested’, within the contemplation of this statute, undoubtedly means a person who has such a direct pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be impaired or defeated by the will, or be benefited by setting it aside.” (Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98 [119 N.E. 364, 366, L.R.A. 1918D 575].)
The standard adopted by Mr. Justice Shenk is that “It is his interest in the devolution of the estate which establishes the right of contest.” But with the restriction that the contestant must be one having a judgment lien, this means that, if the contest is successful, and if the real estate distributable to the debtor has not been sold during administration, and if that real estate is finally distributed to the debtor, the cred*255itor then will have a property interest in the estate of the decedent. The qualification to maintain the proceeding can be determined only after a successful contest of the will and at the time the estate is ready for distribution. Authority to intrude upon the administration of an estate, with the consequent delays and unrecoverable expense, should not rest upon such an uncertain basis.
A lien on the real property of a judgment debtor, located in a particular county may be obtained by recording an abstract of the judgment in that county. (Code Civ. Proc., § 674.) But that right does not extend to one who has obtained his judgment in another state. And no lien is obtainable upon the personal property of a debtor. To allow one to contest a will solely upon the ground that he is a judgment creditor is wholly arbitrary and rests upon a construction of “any interested person” unjustified by fundamental principles governing probate procedure. The further requirement that the judgment must be a lien upon real property which might be distributed to the heir, is a distinction which has no rational basis in either probate law or the law governing creditors’ rights.
Mr. Justice Shenk says “the interest is not necessarily confined to that of an heir who would take by succession if the will be set aside. ’ ’ But in every California ease cited by him, the contestant was one who, upon a successful contest, would take directly from the testator, either by the terms of a former will or by succession.
In Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538 [137 P. 246], the contestant was a beneficiary under a former will. Even then, contest was denied because the pleadings established that he stood to gain no more under the former will than by the one he attacked.
The contestant in Estate of Plaut, 27 Cal.2d 424 [164 P.2d 765, 162 A.L.R. 837], was a beneficiary under a former will. In Estate of Bily, 96 Cal.App.2d 333 [215 P.2d 78, 15 A.L.R. 2d 861], a debtor of the estate was denied the right to contest.
In San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal.App. 675 [10 P.2d 158], the appellant stood in exactly the same position as Jean Harootenian. Although the decision was not based upon “the pecuniary interest of a judgment creditor of the heir, ’ ’ the court said:
“Appellant has no standing to contest the will because she is not a party interested as specified by the code, section 370 of the Probate Code, formerly section 1307 of the Code of *256Civil Procedure. (See State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643].) If she could not contest the will before probate, of course she could not afterward. Appellant was not an heir of deceased nor legatee under the will. She was a mere stranger, and was not entitled to any notice of the probate proceedings.” (P. 681.)
The Heustis case cites with approval State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643], which was a proceeding in mandamus to compel the superior court to permit the state to contest a will. The state claimed under a right of escheat. It was held that the possibility of escheat was too indirect an interest upon which to base a contest.
The right to contest a will is simply a cause of action to invalidate a testamentary disposition which bars the contestant from sharing in the estate of the decedent. (Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 585-586 [150 P. 989]; Estate of Clark, 94 Cal.App. 453, 461 [271 P. 542] ; Estate of Morrison, 125 Cal.App. 504, 507 [14 P.2d 102] ; Estate of Anthony, 127 Cal.App. 186, 189 [15 P.2d 531].) I would construe “any interested person” as meaning one who, if the will of the testator were set aside, would receive directly, and not through any third person, a part of the property of the estate. If the term is to be more broadly applied, the Legislature should specifically define the qualifications of a contestant.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment should be affirmed.
Spence, J., concurred.