Court Opinion

ID: 9566635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:29.82169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:48.228215
License: Public Domain

MYSE, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion finding that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive. Although the majority cites the correct standard of review, it misapplies that standard in reviewing the jury’s award of damages.
A jury has broad discretion in determining the monetary amount to which a plaintiff is entitled because of a defendant’s misconduct. Makowski v. Ehlenbach, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 42, 103 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1960). Here, the jury and the court had an opportunity to hear the evidence, view the witnesses, and evaluate the effect of L-P’s conduct upon Zinda and *294his wife. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony is for the trier of fact to determine. Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 299, 305-06, 347 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1984). A damage award is to be sustained if there is any credible evidence to support it, and all evidence must be construed in a light most favorable to the jury’s determination. Springen v. Ager Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 19 Wis. 2d 487, 489, 120 N.W.2d 692, 693. This is particularly true when a damage award has been made by a jury and approved by the trial court. Id.
Notwithstanding these standards of review, the majority does what the law forbids. The majority speculates as to what was in the jury’s mind when it made the damage award and concludes that the reasons the majority believes underlie the jury’s decision do not justify the jury’s award. The reasons underlying a jury’s decision are not matters subject to speculation. Rather, the duty of an appellate court is to search the record for credible evidence to sustain the jury’s decision. Id. A reviewing court is not permitted to examine either the reasons the jury acted as it did or the propriety of those reasons.
A damage award made by a jury after a full and fair trial must be reviewed with deference. An award for an invasion of privacy will frequently not be based upon objective medical symptoms, but on the offensive nature of a defendant’s conduct. Section 895.50(4), Stats., provides that compensatory damages arising from an invasion of privacy "are not limited to damages for pecuniary loss ....” A plaintiff may recover damages for the emotional distress and the personal humiliation caused by the invasion of privacy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 652H (1977). An award of $50,000 for the invasion of privacy is not *295so shocking that it must be set aside as a matter of law.
The jury also awarded $50,000 for defamation. Once again the majority concludes as a matter of law that this is excessive. The value of a person’s reputation is difficult to determine. As lago said to Othello:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
Shakespeare, Othello, Act. III, sc. 3, line 155.
In reviewing a damage award granted by a jury, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Badger Bearings, Inc. v. Drives & Bearings, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 659, 670, 331 N.W.2d 847, 854 (Ct. App. 1983). Apparently, the majority has determined that a person’s good name and reputation for honesty is not worth $50,000. Although under the majority’s value system a lesser amount may properly reflect the value of this very intangible asset, the majority is not privileged to superimpose its value system on the jury.
The mere fact that Zinda has not suffered grievous physical injury requiring thousands of dollars of special damages in no way diminishes the value attached to one’s good name and reputation. In Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 659, 318 N.W.2d 141, 152 *296(1982) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974)), the court noted:
Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.
See also Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 179, 188 N.W.2d 494, 497 (1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 623 (1977).
I suggest that the majority has erroneously applied the standard of review and has superimposed their value system on the jury. This is not the function of an appellate court. I would sustain the jury’s award of damages.