Court Opinion

ID: 9745990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:47:34.066198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.266101
License: Public Domain

HUFFMLAN, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
In this malicious prosecution case, the trial court correctly assessed the likelihood plaintiff could prevail against two sets of attorneys. The trial court properly concluded plaintiff had met its burden of proof to show likelihood of prevailing against the Naumann attorneys who filed the underlying lawsuit and who prosecuted it until the lawsuit was ultimately dismissed. The majority of this court correctly affirms the decision as to the Naumann attorneys. I agree completely with the majority as to those attorneys.
The case against the LaFave attorneys, however, does not begin to show a probability of success. The underlying case giving rise to the malicious prosecution allegation was filed by the Naumann attorneys in June 2003. The LaFave group was not involved in the filing of that lawsuit. Indeed the LaFave group first associated into the underlying case on October 5, 2004, for the limited purpose of dealing with any issues regarding mold in the apartments. Their appearance was well after the filing of the action and after all discovery responses were sent out.
The majority points out that in October 2004 the Naumann attorneys wrote to their client, Ms. Powell, confirming a conversation in which Powell had advised she wanted to dismiss her case. The case was dismissed without prejudice November 19, 2004. After some settlement discussions Powell dismissed her case with prejudice on January 20, 2005.
One might ask based upon this chronology what is it that the LaFave defendants might have done during their brief appearance in the underlying case to demonstrate a probability of proving malicious prosecution on their part. A diligent search of this record will answer the question; they did nothing save associating into the case 17 days before the client’s (Powell) wish to dismiss the action was documented. What happened in the 17 days in which LaFave was associated with the case? The answer is nothing other than filing an association of counsel.
As the majority properly notes, malicious prosecution can be shown by the commencing of the action or by pursuing the matter even if the attorney joined the case at a later time. (Paramount General Hospital Company v. Jay (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 360, 366, fn. 2 [261 Cal.Rptr. 723], disapproved on other grounds in StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1404 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682].)
*1414While the principle cited by the majority is correct, one must wonder what evidence there is in this record that LaFave did anything other than associate into the case very shortly before the decision to dismiss the lawsuit. Once again, the answer is nothing.
The majority does not cite to any evidence regarding LaFave other than their mere late association into the case for a limited purpose. Indeed the analysis supporting the majority decision to overturn the trial court’s ruling is contained in a single paragraph in an otherwise lengthy opinion. That analysis in my view is simply a bald assertion that an attorney associates into a case at his or her own peril. The principle declared by the majority without citation to authority is that an attorney is chargeable with knowledge of the defects in the case at the very moment of formal appearance.
In my view the majority opinion, if it becomes final, imposes a principle of strict liability at least for the purposes of determining whether a plaintiff has met the burden of proof to overcome an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.
This case illustrates the significant risk an attorney will take if one associates into a case even for a very limited role. The majority declares “[b]y associating into the case as cocounsel, the LaFave defendants became the proponents of all of Powell’s claims, which included a large number of claims that were untenable on their face.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1407.)
If mere association no matter how limited the purpose with nothing else added will automatically attach responsibility for errors that have gone before, then an attorney should be very reluctant to provide any assistance in a previously filed case unless that attorney is willing to assume responsibility for the prior mistakes of others.
I cannot accept the proposition that a lawyer who associates into ongoing litigation to provide a limited service and does nothing else can be said to have “pursued” a malicious prosecution.
Certainly attorneys who join a wrongfully filed case can gain responsibility for knowingly perpetuating that meritless lawsuit. I submit, however, that there must be some evidence of conduct other than signing an association of counsel form before one acquires liability for the acts which have gone before. I believe that is particularly true in this case where the only thing that happened shortly after the association by the LaFave group was that the case was dismissed. There is absolutely no showing the LaFave defendants took any action to “pursue” the underlying litigation.
The trial court correctly determined plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of prevailing against the LaFave defendants unless of course the majority’s *1415newly created doctrine of strict liability becomes the law of California. Because I believe such result is neither warranted by the law or sound policy, I therefore dissent from that portion of the opinion dealing with the LaFave defendants.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 7, 2008, and the petitions of defendants and appellants and defendants and respondents for review by the Supreme Court were denied March 19, 2008, S160268. Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that petition of defendants and respondents should be granted.