Court Opinion

ID: 9965482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:10:53.908412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.384982
License: Public Domain

J-S12036-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 VICTOR YAN                              :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 2082 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 12, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0004159-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED MAY 02, 2024

      Appellant, Victor Yan, appeals nunc pro tunc from the May 12, 2021

judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 26½ to 53 years’ incarceration,

imposed after he entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder,

conspiracy to commit murder, possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and

recklessly endangering another person (REAP). Appellant solely challenges

the discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal. After careful review, we

affirm.

      The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of

Appellant’s case, as follows:

      On October 14, 2018, Brett Berdini, “decedent,” was out with his
      girlfriend and some friends in the Chinatown neighborhood of
      Philadelphia, PA. At approximately 2:00 a.m., the couple decided
      to head home. The couple went to the area of 1033 Race Street,
      where they prepared to call for an Uber. Decedent crossed the
      street and walked in front of a vehicle driving down the street.
      The driver exited his vehicle and had a brief argument with
J-S12036-24

     decedent. Decedent’s girlfriend tried to break up the argument.
     The two men stopped arguing, and decedent and his girlfriend
     started to walk away while the driver got back into his vehicle and
     drove away.

     As the couple was walking away, a group of eleven (11)
     individuals, including Appellant, surrounded them. The group
     formed a semi-circle around the couple, who had their backs
     against a wall with no escape route. Appellant then punched
     decedent in the face. The group then violently attacked the
     couple. The fight spilled out into the middle of the street, where
     the group continued to grab, punch, kick, and stomp on decedent
     while he was on the ground. Shortly thereafter, four (4) of the
     group members left the fight; the other members, including
     Appellant, continued the fight.

     Decedent’s girlfriend tried to help him, but two (2) female group
     members attacked her. Decedent pushed one (1) of the females
     away from his girlfriend. Appellant then briefly walked away from
     the fight, but then returned carrying a knife. While the rest of the
     group continued to punch, kick, and stomp on decedent, Appellant
     stabbed decedent twice in the chest.

     The fight broke up after the stabbing and the group fled the crime
     scene. Decedent was transported to the hospital, where he died
     three (3) days later.

     A post-mortem examination was conducted on the decedent’s
     remains by Dr. Daniel Brown, M.D., of the Philadelphia Office of
     the Medical Examiner. Dr. Brown is a doctor in the field of forensic
     pathology, and he made the following findings: the decedent
     suffered stab wounds to his torso and multiple blunt impact
     injuries to his body. The cause of death was stab wounds to the
     torso, and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. These
     findings were made to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

     On January 27, 2021, Appellant entered a non-negotiated guilty
     plea to one (1) count of third-degree murder, one (1) count of
     conspiracy to commit murder, one (1) count of … [PIC], one (1)
     count of … [REAP], one (1) count of tampering with evidence, and
     one (1) count of obstruction of justice. On May 12, 2021, this
     court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 26½-53
     years[’] confinement: 12-24 years of incarceration on the third-
     degree murder charge, to run consecutively to 12-24 years of
     incarceration for the conspiracy charge, to run consecutively to
     2½-5 years of incarceration for the PIC charge. No further penalty

                                    -2-
J-S12036-24

       was imposed on the REAP, tampering with evidence, and
       obstruction of justice charges. This court also ordered Appellant
       to pay restitution in the amount $590.00.

       On May 18, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for
       reconsideration of sentence. On June 23, 2021, this court denied
       the motion. On May 9, 2022, Appellant filed a Post[]Conviction
       Relief Act petition (“PCRA”).[1] On January 31, 2023, Appellant
       filed an amended PCRA[ petition]. On July 18, 2023, Appellant
       filed a supplement to his amended PCRA[ petition]. On July 19,
       2023, Judge Scott DiClaudio granted Appellant’s PCRA[ petition],
       and his direct appeal rights were re-instated by agreement
       between Appellant and the Commonwealth.

       Subsequently, on August 9, 2023, Appellant timely filed a notice
       of appeal. On August 24, 2023, this court issued an order
       pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) for counsel to file a statement of
       errors within 21 days. On September 14, 2023, counsel timely
       filed a statement of matters complained of on appeal. This opinion
       followed.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/5/23, at 1-3 (footnote and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

       Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:

       Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion, when it
       sentenced Appellant … to a term of incarceration, which was
       manifestly excessive and unreasonable, as the sentences imposed
       for … murder – third degree and … criminal conspiracy … were in
       the standard range of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines,
       and the sentence imposed for … [PIC] was above the aggravated
       range of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, and all of these
       sentences were ordered to run consecutive to each other, despite
       the fact that there was a considerable amount of mitigation
       presented at sentencing?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).

       Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

                                           -3-
J-S12036-24

      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
      entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
      Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
      challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
      this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
         Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
         preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
         modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
         (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
         appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
         Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

      Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
      appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
      are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
      the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
      794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
      2003).

      The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
      be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
      925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
      exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
      that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
      with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
      to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
      Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

      Here, Appellant timely appealed after the court reinstated his appellate

rights, and he preserved his sentencing claims in a post-sentence motion.

Appellant also sets forth a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Thus,

                                     -4-
J-S12036-24

we will determine whether the claims raised therein constitute substantial

questions for our review.

      In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant first acknowledges that he

received sentences in the standard guideline range for third-degree murder

and conspiracy to commit murder and, therefore, he must show that the

sentences are clearly unreasonable. See Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing 42

Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2) (stating we shall vacate a sentence if we find that “the

sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case

involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable”)). Appellant also points out that he received an above-

aggravated-range sentence for his PIC offense, thereby requiring him to show

that his sentence is unreasonable to warrant our vacating it. See id. (citing

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3) (stating we shall vacate a sentence if we find that

“the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the

sentence is unreasonable”)). Appellant insists that here, his sentences are

clearly unreasonable and/or unreasonable because the court failed to take into

account “the considerable amount of mitigation presented on behalf of”

Appellant.   Id.   Appellant also contends that the court’s sentence is “not

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community[,] and

the rehabilitative needs of” Appellant. Id. at 15 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)

(directing that, in imposing a sentence, “the court shall follow the general

principle that the sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is

                                    -5-
J-S12036-24

consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life

of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the

defendant”)).    Finally, Appellant avers that the court’s imposition of

consecutive sentences resulted in a “lengthy aggregate sentence” that he will

not complete until “he is approximately 80 years old….” Id. at 15, 16. Thus,

Appellant insists that the imposition of consecutive terms resulted in an

excessive aggregate sentence.

      Initially, we will not consider Appellant’s assertion that the court failed

to consider the section 9721(b) factors.        This claim was not raised in

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and, therefore, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) Statement, 9/14/23, at 1 (stating the following, single issue: “1.

Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion, when it sentenced

Appellant Victor Yan, to a term of incarceration, which was manifestly

excessive and unreasonable, as the sentences imposed for (F1) Murder – Third

Degree and (F1) Criminal Conspiracy (to commit Murder – Third Degree), were

in the standard range of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, and the

sentence imposed for (M1) [PIC], was above the aggravated range of the

Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, and all of these sentences were ordered

to run consecutive to each other, despite the fact that there was a considerable

amount of mitigation presented at sentencing?”) (emphasis omitted); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or

not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are

                                      -6-
J-S12036-24

waived.”); Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Order, 8/24/23, at 1 (unnumbered) (warning

that “failure to include an issue in the 1925(b) statement shall result in the

waiver of any issue not preserved in accordance with [R]ule 1925(b)”); see

also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88

A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[I]n determining whether an

appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with

[Rule] 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an appellant’s obligation[.

T]herefore, we look first to the language of that order.”) (citations omitted;

some brackets added).

      In regard to Appellant’s claims that the court imposed a manifestly

excessive sentence by failing to consider mitigating factors and running his

sentences consecutively, we conclude that he has raised a substantial question

for our review.   See Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (“This Court has … held that an excessive sentence claim—in

conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question.”) (citations and quotation marks

omitted); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(“[A] defendant may raise a substantial question where he receives

consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case involves

circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly

unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence[.]”) (emphasis omitted).

Thus, we will consider the merits of his arguments, mindful that:

                                       -7-
J-S12036-24

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Here, Appellant argues that the court imposed an excessive sentence in

light of the mitigating circumstances in his case, such as the fact that he took

responsibility for his actions and spared the victim’s family “the pain of sitting

through a trial” by pleading guilty. Appellant’s Brief at 24. Appellant also

claims that character letters submitted on his behalf showed that he “is a

loving father, friend[,] and family member.”       Id.   Additionally, Appellant

claims he “does not have a long history of prior criminal conduct or violence,

… he is willing to abide by all rules set by the Philadelphia Prison System,” and

he “was intoxicated on the night of the incident, but has never attended drug

or alcohol treatment.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant further stresses

that he “suffers from bipolar disorder,” but “has never been treated for this

illness.”   Id.   According to Appellant, these mitigating factors warranted a

lesser sentence.

      Appellant’s arguments are unconvincing. First, it is clear that the trial

court considered the mitigating factors cited by Appellant.         As the court

explains in its opinion,

      [h]ere, defense counsel introduced, and this [c]ourt considered, a
      broad range of evidence, including a pre-sentence report and a

                                      -8-
J-S12036-24

      mental health evaluation.2 Evidence also included letters of
      support, victim impact statements, sentencing memoranda from
      both the Commonwealth and Appellant, and a report from
      Appellant’s mitigation specialist. Further evidence considered
      included the fact that Appellant waived his preliminary hearing
      and entered a guilty plea, thereby accepting responsibility for his
      actions and sparing the Commonwealth and the decedent’s family
      from sitting through a trial. Finally, this [c]ourt elicited testimony
      from decedent’s family and friends and Appellant’s mother, as well
      as Appellant’s allocution testimony.
         2  [The s]entencing [c]ourt received a pre-sentence
         investigation report on March 30, 2021[,] and a mental
         health evaluation on April 28, 2021.

      This Court explicitly enumerated on the record the documentation
      that it received and reviewed prior to announcing Appellant’s
      sentence. N.T.[,] 05/12/2021, [at] 4…. This [c]ourt also asked
      both counsel if any additions or corrections were needed to the
      pre-sentence report. [Id.] Defense counsel objected to portions
      of the pre-sentence report that referenced Appellant’s prior
      juvenile arrests, conviction, and violation of probation. [Id.] This
      [c]ourt explicitly enumerated that, in determining Appellant’s
      sentence, it would not consider his prior juvenile arrests, but that
      it would consider his prior adult conviction and violation of
      probation. [Id. at] 5…. Finally, this [c]ourt carefully listened to
      testimony from decedent’s family and friends and Appellant’s
      mother, as well as Appellant’s allocution. [Id. at] 17…[,] 43…[,]
      46…. As a result, this [c]ourt sufficiently fulfilled its requirement
      in acknowledging presented evidence, thus forming the [c]ourt’s
      reasoning for imposing the sentence.

TCO at 8-9.

      It is apparent that the court considered the mitigating factors cited by

Appellant herein, and that his true complaint is that the court did not weigh

those factors as he wished. It is well-settled that “the weight accorded to the

mitigating factors or aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court is

within the court’s exclusive domain.” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6,

10 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 792 (Pa. 2022) (citation

                                      -9-
J-S12036-24

omitted); see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 175 (“That the court refused to weigh

the proposed mitigating factors as [the a]ppellant wished, absent more, does

not raise a substantial question.”).    Moreover, the trial court had, and

considered, a presentence report and a mental health evaluation; thus, “it is

presumed the court was aware of and weighed all relevant information

contained in the report along with any mitigating sentencing factors.” Velez,

273 A.3d at 10 (cleaned up). The court also heard extensive testimony and

argument detailing the mitigating factors cited by Appellant.       See N.T.,

5/12/21, at 37-42.

      Ultimately, the court had to balance those mitigating factors against the

circumstances of the case, and the gravity of Appellant’s offenses in relation

to the impact on the victim and the community.               Regarding these

considerations, the trial court heard lengthy statements from the victim’s

father, mother, and the victim’s girlfriend, who was present during the attack

that led to the victim’s death.   Each of these individuals offered vivid and

heartbreaking descriptions of the devasting impact that Appellant’s actions

had on their lives. See N.T. at 17-25 (the victim’s father’s statement to the

court); 26-30 (the victim’s girlfriend’s statement to the court); 31-36 (the

victim’s mother’s statement to the court).

      Ultimately, the court imposed standard-range sentences for Appellant’s

murder and conspiracy crimes. He has not demonstrated that those sentences

are clearly unreasonable, even in light of the mitigating factors presented in

this case.   Additionally, Appellant has not convinced us that his above-

                                    - 10 -
J-S12036-24

aggravated-range sentence for PIC, or the court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences, was unreasonable.        The court stressed in its opinion that

Appellant’s crimes were “grotesque[,]” in that he

       repeatedly punched, kicked, and stomped on decedent while he
       lay on the ground. Appellant then walked away from the fight.
       But instead of staying away, Appellant returned with a knife,
       which he used to stab decedent twice in the chest. After stabbing
       decedent, Appellant disposed of the knife by throwing it into the
       river. Appellant then fled the state of Pennsylvania and was a
       fugitive for several months before he was captured.

TCO at 11-12 (citations to the record omitted).

       The court also noted that Appellant had two prior convictions, albeit for

non-violent offenses, and that he had “violated his probation on his

convictions, which resulted in his probation being revoked and his receiving a

new probation sentence.” Id. at 12. In addition, the trial court emphasized

that

       the mental health issues raised in the pre-sentence report did not
       suggest that treatment would prevent future acts of violence. The
       evaluative summary recommended that, upon Appellant’s release
       from custody, any community supervision should include intensive
       reporting. The evaluative summary also recommended that
       supervision include ongoing home visits to verify Appellant’s
       residence and to check for weapons and drugs. Finally, the
       evaluative summary state[d] that, because of Appellant’s long
       term drug use, which began when he was a teenager, he should
       submit to frequent urine testing upon his release from custody.

Id.

       In sum, the court justified its sentencing decision by stressing that

“Appellant’s malicious act was a blatant disregard for human life[,]” as he

made the “conscious decision to introduce a knife into a fistfight, after briefly

                                     - 11 -
J-S12036-24

leaving the fight….” Id. at 13. Accordingly, “after careful consideration and

review of the totality of the circumstances,” the trial court “imposed a

sentence consummate with not only the nature of the crime, but one that is

also consistent with protecting the public and in the interest of fairness to

Appellant.” Id. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s sentencing

decision.2

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant also specifically contends that the court abused its

sentencing discretion by imposing consecutive sentences because his
aggregate, maximum term of 53 years is effectively a life sentence, and an
abuse of discretion under this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 148 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that “[a] sentence
may still be excessive regardless of the commencement of terms of
imprisonment in the standard guideline range if the upper end of the sentence
imposes a term unlikely to end during the decedent’s natural life span”).
However, Appellant did not specifically raise this claim in his Rule 1925(b)
statement and, thus, the trial court did not address it in its opinion.
Consequently, we deem this argument waived.

        Nevertheless, even if not waived, we would conclude that Appellant’s
case is distinguishable from Coulverson. There, we found Coulverson’s 90–
year maximum sentence was “clearly unreasonable” and improperly based on
the trial court’s determination that Coulverson “should spend as much of his
life in prison as the court could order, notwithstanding the tragedy and
dysfunction underlying Coulverson’s own life….” Id. Unlike Coulverson,
here, there is no indication that Appellant’s sentence was based on retribution,
or that the court sentenced him with a “fixed purpose of keeping [Appellant]
in jail for life.” Id. at 149 n.3. Thus, Appellant’s reliance on Coulverson is
misplaced, and we would conclude that no relief is due, even had he preserved
this specific claim for our review.

                                          - 12 -
J-S12036-24

Date: 5/2/2024

                 - 13 -