Court Opinion

ID: 9563774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:46:54.342385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.453783
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Wholly disregarding all applicable court rules and controlling case law, the majority artificially extends the time for filing enumerations of error to at least the time of oral argument and reverses the valid death sentence imposed in this case in which the appellant pled guilty to the malice murder of Regina Dates and the other crimes listed in footnote one of the majority opinion. Because I cannot countenance such a misuse of appellate authority, I am compelled to dissent.
1. Our rules require that appellants and cross-appellants in both criminal and civil cases file their enumerations of error “within 20 days after” the docketing of their cases. Supreme Court Rules 10 and 19. See also OCGA § 5-6-40 (authorizing court rules regarding time for filing appellate briefs). This time constraint ensures fairness to opposing parties and promotes meaningful oral argument. Upon request, this Court, at its discretion, may extend the time for filing enumerations of error. Supreme Court Rule 12. See also Pittman v. State, 273 Ga. 849, 850 (4) (546 SE2d 277) (2001) (where this Court granted a motion to allow a supplemental enumeration of error after *622the deadline for filing an initial brief had passed). However, Henry did not request an extension of time, despite the fact that he filed his second enumeration of errors months after the deadline imposed for filing his appellate brief and only four days before oral argument. Even if Henry had sought an extension, granting such a request would be improvident and unfair for the same reasons underlying our refusal to permit the expansion of enumerations of error at oral arguments. See Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 771 (31) (546 SE2d 472) (2001). Clearly, the rules of this Court become meaningless when they are not enforced against a party who does not comply with them, and who does not even request an exception to them. Nevertheless, the majority, by ignoring Henry’s complete disregard of the established rules of this Court, apparently adopts a novel and unworkable unpublished rule whereby additional enumerations of error may be filed at any time prior to oral argument in all cases.
The Court today also completely misconstrues or ignores the holding in Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58 (414 SE2d 5) (1992). Lynd makes it clear that issues not raised in a timely fashion on appeal will be treated as entirely waived, except when the limited exception of plain error applies. Lynd v. State, supra at 60 (8). The source of the plain error rule in death penalty cases is the Unified Appeal Procedure (UAP) IV (B) (2), which states the following:
The Supreme Court shall review each of the assertions of error timely raised by the defendant during the proceedings in the trial court. .. regardless of whether error is enumerated in the Supreme Court. However, except in cases of plain error, assertions of error not raised on appeal shall be waived. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, “[i]n Georgia[,] there is a . .. rule, applicable in death penalty cases only, which allows for appellate review of assertions of error not raised on appeal in cases of plain error. [Cits.]” (Emphasis in original.) Owens v. State, 263 Ga. 99, 101 (2) (428 SE2d 793) (1993). “Except in cases of ‘plain error,’ assertions of error not timely raised on appeal are deemed waived. [Cits.]” Hittson v. State, 264 Ga. 682, 690 (15) (449 SE2d 586) (1994), overruled on other grounds, Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 220 (2), fn. 2 (526 SE2d 560) (2000). “If assertions of error ‘not raised’ are waived, it follows that assertions of error not timely raised are also waived.” (Emphasis in original.) Lynd v. State, supra. Therefore, in a Georgia death-penalty case, a claim of error that is raised below, but not timely asserted on appeal, is nevertheless reviewed under the plain error standard. The majority apparently confuses the applicable plain error rule in Georgia with the much broader and more lenient federal rule “allowing for appellate review *623of assertions of error raised for the first time on appeal where the asserted error affects substantive rights ....” Owens v. State, supra. Where, as here, the defendant in a death-penalty case in Georgia preserves an issue below, but then fails to raise it in a timely fashion on appeal, our review clearly is limited to a plain error standard. Hittson v. State, supra.
This case cannot be distinguished from Hittson, in which the defendant objected in the trial court, but did not raise the issue on appeal until three days prior to oral argument. Likewise, Henry raised the issue of the State’s argument regarding his future dangerousness just four days prior to oral argument in this Court. Under Lynd and its progeny, this untimely enumeration is deemed waived, except for the limited plain error review to which Henry is entitled under the UAP based on his objection at trial. This Court has defined that limited review as follows:
“Plain error” is that which is “so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice” or which “seriously affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.” [Cit.]
Lynd v. State, supra at 61 (8), fn. 2. See also Hittson v. State, supra at 691 (15). Accordingly, I dissent to the majority’s application of the obviously incorrect standard of review in this case.
2. Even assuming, however, that plain error is not the appropriate standard of review, the majority does not even acknowledge, much less apply, existing relevant case law in its analysis of the State’s argument that Henry would represent a danger to others in prison. The majority concludes that the admissible evidence of the crimes for which Henry was convicted does not authorize such a closing argument by the District Attorney. However, the only authority cited for that proposition is a special concurrence by a single Justice. Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 789-791 (505 SE2d 4) (1998) (Fletcher, P. J., concurring specially). The new rule which the Court now creates directly contradicts the actual holding of the majority opinion in Pye, even though, until today, we have followed that holding in subsequent cases. Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 54 (36) (572 SE2d 583) (2002); Jones v. State, 273 Ga. 231, 234 (4) (539 SE2d 154) (2000). Indeed, the special concurrence in Pye would have constituted a dissenting opinion except for its author’s conclusion that the alleged error was not reversible. Nevertheless, without offering any explanation, the majority ignores the clear holding of Pye.
In Pye, just as in Henry’s case, the prosecutor’s argument that the defendant would kill a corrections officer was based entirely on the evidence concerning the crimes for which Pye was convicted in the *624guilt/innocence phase of the trial. “That Pye could harm a prison guard is a reasonable inference, considering that he had been convicted of several violent crimes, including murder.” Pye v. State, supra at 788 (19). Henry’s case is indistinguishable from Pye, because Henry’s crimes suggested the possibility of future violence in prison just as much as Pye’s crimes did. The evidence shows that, in order to obtain money and avoid arrest, Henry selected the victims based on their vulnerability, planned to kill them, watched them for three days, impersonated a federal law enforcement officer, entered the victims’ home and bound them, strangled one victim to death, and directed his wife to kill the other. Therefore, the State’s closing argument regarding Henry’s possible future dangerousness was clearly a reasonable evidentiary inference. If the evidence in this case did not raise a reasonable inference of future dangerousness, I submit that it is not possible to make such a showing as will convince a majority of this Court in any death-penalty case.
Decided November 8, 2004.
Furthermore, “[a] trial judge sitting alone is presumed to know the law. [Cit.]” Crossley v. State, 261 Ga. App. 250, 252 (582 SE2d 204) (2003). Therefore, we must presume that the trial judge in Henry’s case was at least as capable as the jury in Pye of remaining objective in the face of the State’s use of its “considerable latitude in imagery and illustration in making its argument. [Cit.]” Pye v. State, supra at 788 (19). Moreover, the State’s argument could not have had an adverse impact on the fact finder’s consideration of any residual doubt at sentencing, since Henry pled guilty. See Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 788 (32) (450 SE2d 680) (1994).
Under all of the circumstances, I submit that it is highly probable that, if the trial court did err, the error did not contribute to the sentence of death. Thus, even assuming that the majority correctly applies the less stringent standard of review, the State’s argument regarding future dangerousness did not constitute reversible error. Accordingly, the alleged error could not possibly meet the higher, correct plain error standard. In this connection, the majority apparently would concede that the plain error standard is not met, particularly since even the special concurrence in Pye v. State, supra at 791, agreed that there was not any reasonable probability that the same future danger argument there changed the result in the sentencing phase. Therefore, regardless of which standard of review is appropriate, the death sentence in this case should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
*625Holly L. Geerdes, Patricia F. Angelí, Steven M. Frey, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mitchell P. Watkins, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.