Court Opinion

ID: 9393154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 16:05:42.979179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.407528
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                     CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                             MAY 9, 2023
                                                                      STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2023 ND 84

Nodak Insurance Company,                                 Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company,               Defendant and Appellant
      and
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company; Samuel Hamilton;
Gordon Williams, individually and as
parent and next friend of H.W., a minor;
and Dawn Hustad and Kris Meduna,
individually and as parents and next
friends of A.M., a deceased minor,                                     Plaintiffs

                                 No. 20220114

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial
District, the Honorable Kirsten M. Sjue, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice. Justice Tufte filed a dissenting opinion.

Scott K. Porsborg (argued) and Austin T. Lafferty (appeared), Bismarck, ND,
for plaintiff and appellee.

Klay C. Ahrens (argued) and Joseph M. Barnett (appeared), Edina, MN, for
defendant and appellant.
            Nodak Ins. Co. v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co.
                              No. 20220114

Bahr, Justice.

[¶1] Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Family”) appeals
from a judgment after the district court granted summary judgment to Nodak
Insurance Company (“Nodak”) and denied, in part, summary judgment to
Farm Family. We conclude the automobile policy Farm Family issued to its
insureds had not “ceased” under the policy language and remained in effect at
the time of the April 2019 motor vehicle accident. We affirm.

                                      I

[¶2] This case arises out of an April 6, 2019 motor vehicle accident. The
following facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed.

[¶3] Samuel Hamilton is the son of Bruce and Diana Hamilton. At the time
of the April 2019 accident at issue, Samuel Hamilton was a resident of North
Dakota, and his parents were residents of Montana. Before the accident, Farm
Family issued an automobile insurance policy to Bruce and Diana Hamilton
with an effective policy period of October 19, 2018 to April 19, 2019. The Farm
Family policy was initially negotiated and issued to the Hamiltons in Vermont.
The policy insured a 2011 pickup truck. The policy provided bodily injury
liability coverage limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.

[¶4] After moving to Montana, the Hamiltons obtained an insurance policy
from Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Mountain
West”) that also insured the 2011 pickup truck. The Mountain West policy had
a policy term that ran from December 2, 2018 to June 2, 2019 and provided
bodily injury liability coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per
accident.

[¶5] In April 2019, Samuel Hamilton was driving the insured 2011 pickup
truck in Williams County. Samuel Hamilton reportedly ran a stop sign while
intoxicated and struck a vehicle driven by H.W., in which A.M. was a
passenger. As a result of the accident, H.W. was seriously injured and A.M. was

                                      1
killed. Nodak insured the vehicle H.W. and A M. occupied at the time of the
accident.

[¶6] Nodak commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration Farm Family’s automobile policy was in effect at the time of the
April 2019 accident, Farm Family’s policy cannot be retroactively cancelled,
and the vehicle driven by the insureds’ son was not an “underinsured motor
vehicle” under North Dakota law. Farm Family answered and denied Nodak’s
claims. Farm Family asserted its policy effectively ceased or terminated on
December 2, 2018 because its named insureds, Bruce and Diana Hamilton,
obtained the insurance policy through Mountain West. Based on the policy
language, Farm Family asserted its policy was not in effect at the time of the
accident.

[¶7] Nodak moved the district court for summary judgment, and Farm
Family made a cross-motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court
entered an order granting Nodak’s motion in part, concluding the Farm Family
policy was in effect and provided coverage for the vehicle driven by the
insureds’ son, Samuel Hamilton, at the time of the accident.

[¶8] After further briefing and a hearing, the district court entered a second
order on the summary judgment cross-motions. The court declared the 2011
pickup truck driven by the named insureds’ son was not an “underinsured
motor vehicle” and Farm Family and Mountain West must share pro rata in
paying the loss. A final judgment was entered.

                                      II

[¶9] Our standard for reviewing summary judgment is well established:

      Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt
      resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there
      are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can
      reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to
      be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary
      judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues
      of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

                                      2
      matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was
      appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be
      given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably
      be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether
      the information available to the district court precluded the
      existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the
      moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district
      court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law
      which we review de novo on the entire record.

Borsheim Builders Supply, Inc. v. Manger Ins., Inc., 2018 ND 218, ¶ 7, 917
N.W.2d 504 (quoting Forsman v. Blues, Brews & Bar-B-Ques, Inc., 2017 ND
266, ¶ 9, 903 N.W.2d 524).

                                     III

[¶10] Farm Family argues the district court erred in determining the
automobile policy it issued to its named insureds was in full force and effect
and provided coverage on the 2011 pickup truck at the time of the April 2019
accident.

[¶11] “Insurance policy interpretation is a question of law, which is fully
reviewable on appeal.” Dahms v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 ND 263, ¶ 8, 920
N.W.2d 293 (quoting Borsheim, 2018 ND 218, ¶ 8). “This Court independently
examines and construes the insurance contract on appeal to decide whether
coverage exists.” Id. We construe policy language to give effect to the parties’
mutual intention at the time of contracting:

      We look first to the language of the insurance contract, and if the
      policy language is clear on its face, there is no room for
      construction. If coverage hinges on an undefined term, we apply the
      plain, ordinary meaning of the term in interpreting the contract.
      While we regard insurance policies as adhesion contracts and
      resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured, we will not rewrite a
      contract to impose liability on an insurer if the policy
      unambiguously precludes coverage. We will not strain the
      definition of an undefined term to provide coverage for the insured.
      We construe insurance contracts as a whole to give meaning and

                                       3
      effect to each clause, if possible. The whole of a contract is to be
      taken together to give effect to every part, and each clause is to
      help interpret the others.

Dahms, at ¶ 8 (quoting Borsheim, at ¶ 8) (emphasis added).

[¶12] Farm Family contends the material facts are undisputed and this case
involves interpretation of its policy. The policy contains the following language:

      10. CANCELLATION OR NONRENEWAL OF THIS POLICY
                  ....
           If other insurance is obtained by you on your insured car,
           similar insurance afforded under this policy for that car will
           cease on the effective date of the other insurance.

            If different requirements for cancellation and nonrenewal or
            termination of policies are applicable because of the laws of
            your state, we will comply with those requirements.

[¶13] Farm Family argues this policy language is clear and unambiguous and
its policy effectively “ceased” on December 2, 2018, which is the date their
named insureds obtained an alleged “similar” policy of insurance through
Mountain West. Farm Family argues because its policy “ceased,” it follows the
policy was not in effect at the time of the April 2019 accident and cannot
provide coverage on the vehicle the named insureds’ son was operating at the
time of the accident. Farm Family asserts the term “cease” is clear and
unambiguous. Farm Family further contends the “termination by substitution”
or “cancellation by substitution” doctrine is well-grounded in insurance law
and dispositive.

[¶14] The preliminary issue on appeal is whether, in the context of the
automatic termination clause at issue, the language “similar insurance” means
the other insurance obtained by the insureds is similar only “in type” or similar
“in type and in amount.” We hold it is the latter. In construing automatic
termination clauses, other courts have also held insurance policies differing in
the amount of coverage provided are not considered “similar insurance.” See,
e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Victoria, 576 N.W.2d 118, 120-21 (Iowa 1998);
Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 671 A.2d 798, 800 (R.I. 1996); S.C. Farm

                                        4
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Courtney, 536 S.E.2d 689, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000),
aff’d on different grounds, 563 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 2002); Motors Ins. Corp. v.
Bodie, 770 F. Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Cal. 1991).

[¶15] For example, in Victoria, 576 N.W.2d at 120-21, the court held policies
with differing limits of liability were not “similar” under an automatic
termination clause. In rejecting the insurer’s argument policies with different
limits were “similar,” the court explained:

      It might well be the understanding of an insurance professional
      that these policies are similar. However, to an average policy buyer,
      a policy with substantially lower limits would not likely be viewed
      as “similar.” When the consequences of buying a similar policy are
      so serious as to cause an automatic termination, an insured should
      be informed as to what constitutes “similar” coverage. We have
      said that, [w]hen interpreting ambiguous words in insurance
      contracts, the language should be interpreted from the viewpoint
      of an ordinary person, not a specialist or expert.

Id. at 120 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court, determining an
ambiguity existed, construed the policy in favor of the insured, stated the
differences included the disparate liability limits, and concluded the policies at
issue were not “similar” for purposes of the automatic termination clause. Id.
at 121.

[¶16] In Martin, 671 A.2d at 801, the court held the disparity in coverage
between two policies providing uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage was
sufficient to preclude the interpretation the two policies were similar
insurance. In that case, one policy provided coverage in the amount of $300,000
per accident, while the other policy provided coverage in the amount of
$100,000 per person with a $300,000 limit per accident, resulting in a
difference in the total amount of damages recoverable. Id. Likewise, in
Courtney, 536 S.E.2d at 693, the court held when a second, subsequent
automobile insurance policy differs in both the amount of coverage and the
kind of coverage provided, the policies will not be held to be “similar” under an
automatic termination provision. Id.

                                        5
[¶17] In Bodie, 770 F. Supp. at 550, a federal district court held as a matter of
law the automatic termination provision was “not plain and clear”:

      The provision only operates to terminate “similar insurance
      provided by this policy” in the event that “you [the insured] obtain
      other insurance on ‘your covered auto.’” “Similar” is not defined by
      the policy and may be used in English to mean the “same” or
      “identical” though it is defined as “showing some resemblance;
      related in appearance or nature; alike though not identical.”
      American Heritage Dictionary 1206 (1979).1 It is difficult to
      imagine being called upon to interpret a more imprecise term. This
      inherent vagueness fully justifies the conclusion that the term
      “similar” is ambiguous. Under applicable rules of interpretation,
      therefore, the court cannot interpret “similar” to mean “showing
      some resemblance” for that would be to resolve the ambiguity in
      favor of the insurer.

Id. at 550 & n.1 (stating in footnote 1, “The full usage note in the American
Heritage Dictionary provides: ‘Similar is often misused in nontechnical
contexts where same or identical would convey the sense actually intended.’”).
The court held the two insurance policies at issue, while providing for
automobile insurance, were not “similar” as a matter of law because the
policies contained different limits for third-party liability. Id. at 550-51. See
also Hodgdon v. Barr, No. CV 940048077S, 1996 WL 798748, *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 26, 1996) (concluding “the phrase ‘similar insurance’ contained in the
automatic termination provision of the [automobile insurance] policy requires
comparability both as to type and amount of liability coverage”); 1 Auto. Liab.
Ins. 4th § 8:7 (October 2022 Update) (“The ‘automatic termination’ requirement
of ‘similar insurance’ may not be met if the policy limits of the new policy are
substantially less than the older policy limits, and where the term ‘similar’ is
not defined in the policy, it has been held ambiguous and, therefore,
inapplicable to subsequent acquired policies containing lower limits of
coverage.”).

[¶18] We find the above authorities instructive. When coverage hinges on an
undefined term, we apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the term in
interpreting the contract. We also regard the insurance policy as an adhesion

                                       6
contract, resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured. See Dahms, 2018 ND
263, ¶ 8.1 The policy at issue does not define “similar insurance.” Thus, we
apply the ordinary meaning of “similar,” which means “having characteristics
in common: strictly comparable” and “alike in substance or essentials.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1161 (11th ed. 2005); see also
American Heritage Dictionary 1141 (2d Coll. ed. 1985) (defining “similar” as
“[r]elated in appearance or nature; alike though not identical”). We conclude
the language “similar insurance” in the Farm Family policy means the other
insurance obtained by the insureds is similar “in type and in amount.”

[¶19] Farm Family asserts Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Gentile, 102
F. App’x 737 (2d Cir. 2004), and Providence Washington Insurance Company v.
Advance Auto Rental, Inc., 1994 WL 401325, *3 (Sup. Ct. Conn. Jul. 15, 1994),
are “directly on point” and demand a different result. However, neither Ohio
Casualty nor Providence Washington addressed insurance provisions requiring
“similar insurance.” The termination provision in Ohio Casualty terminated
the policy if the insured purchased “any other insurance policy” with respect
to the automobile. 102 F. App’x at 738 n.1. The policy in Providence Washington
similarly terminated the policy “on the effective date of any other insurance
policy you purchase with respect to any automobile designated in both
policies.” 1994 WL 401325, at *3 (emphasis added). Thus, neither case
addressed policies terminating coverage based on the purchase of “similar
insurance.” The phrase “similar insurance” is substantively different and
significantly more restrictive than the phrase “any other insurance policy.”

[¶20] Farm Family cites one case involving an automatic termination
provision based on “similar insurance.” Stith v. Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc.,
541 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (“If other insurance is obtained on

1 We note courts in both Montana and Vermont apply similar rules to construe insurance policies. See
Kilby Butte Colony, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 403 P.3d 664, 668 (Mont. 2017) (quoting
Mecca v. Farmers Ins, Exch., 122 P.3d 1190, 1191 (Mont. 2005)) (“‘Courts give the terms and words
used in an insurance contract their usual meaning and construe them using common sense. Any
ambiguity in an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured and in favor of extending
coverage.’”); Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Muller, 249 A.3d 24, 27 (Vt. 2020) (“Disputed terms must be
accorded ‘their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.’ . . . [A]mbiguity is construed against the
insurer.”).

                                                 7
your insured car, any similar insurance afforded under this policy for that car
will cease on the effective date of the other insurance.” (emphasis added)).
However, in that case the court did not interpret the “similar insurance”
language. Rather, it addressed the interplay between the “automatic
termination” clause and the “other insurance” clause in the policy, concluding
“in situations where the ‘automatic termination’ clause does apply, the ‘other
insurance’ clause is simply inoperative.” Id.

[¶21] The remaining issue is whether the Mountain West policy is “similar
insurance” in type and in amount to the Farm Family policy. Under the
undisputed facts of this case, this Court concludes, as a matter of law, the Farm
Family policy and the Mountain West policy do not provide “similar insurance,”
i.e., insurance that is “strictly comparable” or “alike in substance or essentials.”
An essential part of automobile liability insurance is the amount of coverage.
A policy providing bodily injury liability coverage limits of $250,000 per person
and $500,000 per accident and a policy providing bodily injury liability
coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident are not
strictly comparable or substantively alike. We do not need to and do not decide
today how much difference there must be in liability coverage for two policies
to constitute similar insurance. We also do not need to and do not decide today
how other differing aspects of insurance policies, such as deductibles and
premiums, impact the consideration of whether two policies are similar. We
simply hold, as a matter of law, that a policy providing bodily injury liability
coverage limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident and a policy
providing bodily injury liability coverage limits of $100,000 per person and
$300,000 per accident are not similar insurance as used undefined in Farm
Family’s policy.

[¶22] On the undisputed facts, the automobile policy Farm Family issued to
its insureds had not “ceased” and was in effect at the time of the April 2019
motor vehicle accident because the policy language required “similar
insurance” for the policy to “cease on the effective date of the other insurance.”
The other policy issued to the insureds by Mountain West had different policy
limits and, therefore, was not “similar insurance” under the automatic
termination clause at issue.

                                         8
[¶23] In its order, the district court addressed choice-of-law, the Farm Family
policy’s “out-of-state” insurance provision, and N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-09. Because
our decision is based on the plain language of the Farm Family policy’s
“cancellation or nonrenewal” provision’s use of the phrase “similar insurance,”
we find it unnecessary to address the district court’s analysis regarding choice-
of-law, the Farm Family policy’s “out-of-state” insurance provision, and
N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-09. Rather, we affirm the judgment because “[a] correct
result will not be set aside merely because the district court relied on a
different reason for its decision.” PHI Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnston Law Office,
P.C., 2020 ND 22, ¶ 34, 937 N.W.2d 885 (quoting City of Gwinner v. Vincent,
2017 ND 82, ¶ 12, 892 N.W.2d 598).

[¶24] Based on the plain language of the “cancellation or nonrenewal”
provision, we conclude the Farm Family policy was still in effect at the time of
the accident. The provision required the other insurance obtained be “similar
insurance” afforded under the policy. We conclude as a matter of law “similar
insurance” as used in the provision means similar “in type and in amount.” The
two policies did not provide “similar insurance” in that the reduction of liability
limits from $250,000/$500,000 (Farm Family policy) to $100,000/$300,000
(Mountain West policy) is not “similar insurance” so as to effect cessation under
the provision.

                                       IV

[¶25] We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and deem them
either without merit or unnecessary to our decision. The judgment is affirmed.

[¶26] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Douglas A. Bahr

Tufte, Justice, dissenting.

[¶27] I respectfully dissent.

                                        9
[¶28] I agree with the majority that the dispositive issue here is the meaning
of the term “similar insurance” in the Farm Family policy’s cancellation
provision. The provision at issue reads: “If other insurance is obtained by you
on your insured car, similar insurance afforded under this policy for that car
will cease on the effective date of the other insurance.”

[¶29] The majority determines the plain meaning of “similar insurance”
requires similarity in “type and amount.” In United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Victoria,
which the majority found instructive, the Iowa Supreme Court speculated that
“[i]t might well be the understanding of an insurance professional that these
policies are similar. However, to an average policy buyer, a policy with
substantially lower limits would not likely be viewed as ‘similar.’” 576 N.W.2d
118, 120 (Iowa 1998). I agree to the extent that an “average policy buyer” would
consider two policies to be less “similar” as a reduction in coverage limits
becomes larger. For example, if the first policy provides coverage limits ten
times higher than the second policy, the plain and ordinary meaning of “similar
insurance” may compel the conclusion that the two policies are not similar,
even if the other terms are identical. If the first policy provides coverage limits
three times the limits in the second policy, the question is closer and one might
want to know whether an average policy buyer would consider the second
policy to be a reasonable substitute for the first. But this contrived example is
too simple because it ignores the inescapable fact that differences in coverage
are associated with differences in premiums. An average policy buyer would
not pay the same premium for a policy providing one-third the coverage limits.
In life, and in minimally functioning markets, there are always tradeoffs.
Above the legal minimums required by state law, average policy buyers will be
faced with tradeoffs in which higher coverage limits will require higher
premiums, and higher deductibles will require lower premiums. To know
whether two policies are “similar insurance” would require some assessment
about whether an average policy buyer would view them as reasonable
substitutes, or perhaps whether an insurance agent would quote them to a
prospective buyer as plausible alternatives. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin,
671 A.2d 798, 801 (R.I. 1996).

                                        10
[¶30] I believe the majority opinion and several of the authorities it relies on
err by viewing “similar insurance” as a binary choice in which the second policy
either is similar or is not similar. Most significantly, these decisions appear to
stand for the proposition that a reduction in coverage limits between the first
policy and the second policy renders the second policy not “similar insurance”
with respect to the first. Majority, at ¶ 24; Victoria, 576 N.W.2d at 120
(rejecting argument that “insured can obtain lower limits of liability under a
second policy and still have ‘similar’ coverage”); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Courtney, 342 S.C. 271, 273, 536 S.E.2d 689, 690 (Ct. App. 2000) (policy
limits reduced from 100/300 to 15/30), aff’d on other grounds, 349 S.C. 366, 563
S.E.2d 648 (2002). These decisions strongly suggest that if the second policy
had higher limits, it would be “similar insurance” and trigger the cancellation
of the first policy. In my view, if the second policy is similar to the first, then
the first has to be similar to the second. Stated another way, if a $300,000 limit
policy is “similar insurance” with respect to a $100,000 limit policy, then that
same $100,000 limit policy must also be “similar insurance” with respect to the
$300,000 limit policy. Similarity must be a two-way street. Part of the problem
here is that the plain meaning of “similar” signals a relative comparison where
two things are more similar to each other than they are to other things. For
example, one might say policy A is more similar to policy B than it is to policy
C. Two policies covering the same risks and the same vehicles will be similar
in some ways and different in others. This vague term does not permit us or a
policy holder to reliably determine how alike two policies must be in limits,
premiums, deductibles, or other factors to flip the switch and cancel an earlier-
acquired policy. A person obtaining insurance coverage naturally trades off the
cost of premiums against the coverage type and amount and the deductible.
Above the minimum coverage required by law, insurance agents quote and
insurance buyers consider a range of coverage types and amounts.

[¶31] I would consider the plain meaning of “similar insurance” from the
perspectives of both buyers and sellers of insurance policies. Although “similar”
implies that the two insurance policies share some common characteristics, it
does not provide a clear standard or level of similarity required for the clause
to take effect, nor does it specify what characteristics are essential to the
determination. In the market for insurance policies, buyers consider both cost

                                        11
and benefits when comparison shopping. To fairly consider the plain meaning
of “similar insurance” to buyers and sellers in this market, we must consider
at least coverage limits, deductibles, and monthly premiums. For years, we
were reminded in advertisements that fifteen minutes could save you fifteen
percent or more on auto insurance. It would seem that insurance policies are
advertised more frequently on price than on coverage limits. But even if we
consider the ordinary meaning of “similar insurance” to require consideration
of all significant policy terms, the word “similar” is inherently vague in this
and many other contexts. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 415 S.C. 137, 148,
781 S.E.2d 137, 143 (Ct. App. 2015) (noting several jurisdictions had concluded
the term “similar” in insurance contracts is “inherently vague,” “elastic,”
“ambiguous,” “broad,” and “insufficiently precise”).

[¶32] This policy states: “If other insurance is obtained by you on your insured
car, similar insurance afforded under this policy for that car will cease on the
effective date of the other insurance.” It is undisputed that the Hamiltons
obtained “other insurance” on their “insured car.” The threshold comparison
required by this cancellation provision does not ask whether the second policy
with lower limits is “similar insurance,” as the majority and many of the cited
authorities read it. Rather, in terms of the policy, if “you” obtain “other
insurance” on “your insured car,” the question is what, if any, “similar
insurance” is provided by the first policy as compared to the second. If the first
policy provides similar insurance, that coverage ceases on the effective date of
the other insurance. Even applying the one-way street interpretation of
“similar insurance,” the street runs the other way. The majority should be
asking whether the higher-limit first Farm Family policy is similar to the
Mountain West policy, and not whether the Mountain West policy is similar to
the Farm Family policy.

[¶33] Rather than attempting to supply precision to the inherently vague term
“similar” by deciding whether the reduced policy limit here is substantial
enough to make the two policies not “similar,” I would apply the sensible rule
adopted by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Acknowledging that “similar
insurance” may mean either “similar in kind” or “similar in kind and amount,”
the court strictly construed the policy in favor of the insured and adopted the

                                       12
meaning that would preserve coverage. Franklin v. Kimberly, 1997 WL 379173,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1997), cited in Courtney, 342 S.C. at 276 n.3. In
doing so, the court held “that the insurance coverage in the two policies is
similar only to the extent of the amount of coverage in the second policy.” Id.
There, as here, the initial policy had a relevant limit of $250,000, and the
second policy had a limit of $100,000. The result of the court’s decision was
that the second policy terminated the coverage of the first policy only to the
extent of the second policy’s limit.

[¶34] Jerod E. Tufte

                                      13