Court Opinion

ID: 9526790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:24:05.358372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:07.127053
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

{concurring).

¶ 58. I join the mandate, but I return once again to this court's approach(es) to statutory interpretation. It is important, as I have written before, that litigants, *671lawyers, legislators, courts, and the people of Wisconsin know and understand our approach to legislative interpretation.1
¶ 59. This opinion makes what I consider a significant advance in explaining what the court is actually doing in statutory interpretation.21 think, however, it will be difficult to understand and apply parts of this opinion because it works at cross purposes in several respects. For example, the opinion strongly emphasizes textualista but broadens textualista to include many matters the plain meaning folk (including those on this court) have rejected. It recognizes that the purposes of the legislation should be considered in interpretation but refuses to consider the consequences of different interpretations as an aid to interpretation (hut does consider the consequences right in this opinion).
¶ 60. The most significant advance is that the court at long last abandons its too-oft quoted but erroneous aphorism that to determine the intent of the *672legislature3 "if a statute is ambiguous, the reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute."4
¶ 61. This opinion correctly concludes that a court resorts to the scope, context, and purpose of the statute without having to declare an ambiguity in the *673statute.5 The majority opinion states: "[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history."6 The trick in understanding and applying this sentence is to give meaning to the phrase "ascertainable from the text and *674structure of the statute itself." "Ascertainable," "text," and "structure of the statute itself' have elasticity. From my perspective that is a saving grace.
¶ 62. Our cases have been inconsistent in stating whether an ambiguity must be declared7 before a court examines the terms, of a statute in relation to the scope, history, context, and subject matter of the legislation, the spirit or nature of the act, the evil intended to be remedied, the general object sought to be accomplished, and the consequences.8 The majority opinion now sepa*675rates "history" from the other listed sources of legislative intent, without defining history, and discusses only legislative history. Before a court uses legislative history, a court must declare the statute ambiguous, according to the majority opinion.
¶ 63. I part company with the majority opinion when it declares that extrinsic sources (not defined)9 such as legislative history may be used only when the statutory language is ambiguous10 or when the legislative history supports (but does not contradict) the plain meaning of the statute.111 have criticized this approach *676to plain meaning, ambiguity, and legislative history before.12 Language is often ambiguous;13 the distinction between "plain" and "ambiguous" is in the eye of the *677beholder;14 and both words too often are conclusory labels a court pins on a statute, making its decision appear result-oriented.15
¶ 64. I have argued that a court may examine history without declaring an ambiguity16 and that a court "must engage in an analysis of both the evidence that supports a given interpretation as well as the evidence that contradicts a given interpretation."17
¶ 65. The majority opinion does not attempt to define "history" or "extrinsic sources" other than by mentioning legislative history and does not attempt to explain what it means by legislative history as an extrinsic source.18
¶ 66. Legislative history, especially legislative committee reports and the congressional record, has gotten a bad reputation in recent years in federal circles because legislative history may be manufactured by both proponents and opponents of the legislation, and often every position can be buttressed by something in the federal legislative history.19 Nevertheless, legisla*678tive history that is well understood and carefully weighed can help a court understand a statute.20
¶ 67. Legislative history at the state level differs from federal legislative history. For one thing, there is a lot less legislative history in Wisconsin than at the federal level, and manufacturing of legislative history is a less well-known and less perfected skill here.
¶ 68. I write to alert the reader to the numerous forms of "history" this court has relied upon in past statutory interpretation cases, with and without a declaration of ambiguity, and to remind the reader that not all forms of "history" are legislative history or of equal value in determining the meaning of a statute.21 Some types of history are further removed from the legislative process than others. My position is that history, including legislative history, can be one part of the mix in statutory interpretation.
¶ 69. Here is a nonexhaustive list of various forms of "history" that have been and will be helpful in interpreting a statute. The majority opinion appears to *679set forth a global approach to statutory interpretation but is silent about use of the following sources of statutory interpretation:
1. Nonstatutory Provisions. The legislature often adopts provisions that appear in the session laws but not in the compiled statutes.22 Non-statutory provisions often set forth statements of legislative findings, intent, or purpose, or rules of construction.23 These nonstatutory provisions have the force of law and aid the court in interpretation of statutes.24
2. Statutory history. An historical note appears in the Wisconsin Statutes after each statutory section, tracing its history since 1970.25 History notes in the current volumes of the Wisconsin Statutes cover the period from 1971 to date. The Revisor of Statutes publishes a separate volume, Wisconsin Annotations, which contains a history *680from 1848-1970.26 By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over time, a court may infer intent.27
3. Prefatory Notes (Analysis) to Bills. Wisconsin Stat. § 13.92(l)(b)2 provides that the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) shall "prepare in plain language an analysis of each original measure, to be printed with the measure when it is introduced."28 The purpose of the analysis is to clearly and objectively describe, in understandable language, the substance and effect of a legislative proposal so that legislators are adequately advised about the legal effect of the proposal.29 The Prefatory Note (Analysis) is distributed to all legislators and appears in the bill jacket available at the LRB30 and on microfiche at the State Law Library.31 A court should use great care befóte relying on a Prefatory Note (Analysis) because the bill may be changed after the Note has been prepared. Notes are not *681prepared or updated for amendments. Courts have relied on this useful history.32
4. Judicial Council Materials. The Judicial Council was created in 1951.33 It drafts rules for the court and laws for the legislature. The Judicial Council notes appear with the text of the rules and laws in the Wisconsin Statutes,34 but neither the court nor the legislature ordinarily adopts the Notes as part of the statute or rule.35 *682Courts have used the Notes to aid in interpretation of a statute.36 Materials generated by the Judicial Council beyond the Notes are available at the State Law Library, the State Historical Society, and the Legislative Reference Bureau and on web sites.37
5. Joint Legislative Council Materials. The Joint Legislative Council was created in 1947.38 It consists of legislators39 and functions through study committees that include legislators and public members.40 The study committees investigate various subject areas at the request of the legislature or the Council, and offer their recommendations in bill form to the Council.41 The Council proposes legislation to the legislature.42 *683When proposing legislation, the Joint Legislative Council typically includes explanatory notes in the bill. These notes are often available in Wisconsin Statutes.43 Courts rely upon the Council's explanatory notes when examining history.44 Materials produced by the Joint Legislative Council and its committees, in addition to the Notes, including minutes of the meetings and summaries of testimony, are available at the office of the Joint Legislative Council, the Legislative Reference Bureau, and the State Historical Society in Madison. The staff of the Joint Legislative Council also prepares information bulletins that are available at the LRB.45
6. Legislative Committee Records. In addition to the committees that report to the Joint Legislative Council, various legislative committees hold hearings and propose legislation. The committees do not keep verbatim or summary records of committee deliberations or testimony presented. The Legislative Council collects the materials submitted to these committees and keeps the materials in its office in Madison.46 Committee materials may also be deposited at *684the Wisconsin Historical Society, and the Historical Society may also have papers deposited by individual legislators.47
7. Records of Special Legislative Committees. At times the legislature creates special study committees to propose legislation. These committees may have published reports and documents available for public inspection which this court has used in statutory interpretation.48
8. Bill Drafting Records. Each bill, resolution, and joint resolution introduced since 1927 has its own drafting record. A drafting record contains all written materials, letters, and memoranda given to or created by a legislative drafting attorney in the process of drafting a bill, resolution, or subsequent amendment.49 Although the drafting records are by-products of the drafting process and are not designed to document legislative intent, the records may indicate legislative intent, and bill drafting records, including the fiscal impact statements,50 have often been used *685by courts.51 Bill drafting records are available on microfiche at the LRB, the State Law Library, and the State Historical Society in Madison, and the Milwaukee Public Library and the Marquette University Law Library in Milwaukee.52 The staff of the LRB also prepares very helpful information bulletins that are available at the LRB.53
9. Legislative Journals. Each house publishes its own journal that provides a procedural record of legislative action including roll call votes, messages from the governor, and occasionally, other communications. Wis. Stat. § 13.17. The journals are organized by date. The journals can be found in the LRB library collection for legislative sessions since the territorial period.54
10. Bulletin of Proceedings. The Bulletin of Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature contains procedural histories for all introduced proposals, a subject index, and a listing of the statutory sections affected by the session laws.55 The Bulletin is organized by bill number and is available in the LRB library collection.56
*68611. Governor's Study Committees. The Governor may create a committee on a particular subject to make recommendations and to draft proposed legislation necessary to implement those recommendations.57 The LRB and the State Historical Society catalog materials published by state agencies, including reports of governors' task forces and committees.58 Courts have considered these reports in determining legislative intent.59
12. Governor's Veto Message. If the governor vetoes a bill, the governor must:
[R]eturn the bill, together with the objections in writing, to the house in which the bill originated. The house of origin shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the bill.60 Wisconsin courts have considered the veto message when examining the meaning of a statute.61
13. Cases Interpreting the Statute. Courts have often referred to prior cases interpreting the statute.
*687¶ 70. I agree with the approach the Canadian courts take. In Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton, [2002] 58 O.R.3d 37, ¶ 18, the court of appeal for Ontario wrote as follows:
The modern approach to statutory interpretation calls on the court to interpret a legislative provision in its total context. The court should consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning.... The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory interpretation....
This approach is supported by Bapoo v. Co-Operators General Ins. Co., [1997] 36 O.R.3d 616, ¶ 8, where the court of appeal for Ontario wrote as follows:
The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose and produce a reasonable and just meaning. Professor Sullivan described the modern approach in the following passage:
"There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms if (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; (c) its accept*688ability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just." (internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of Canada repeatedly endorses this approach. It did so recently in R. v. Glandue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 706, where it wrote:
As this court has frequently stated the proper construction of a statutory provision flows from reading the words of the provision in their grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose of the statute, and the intention of Parliament. The purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament, in particular, are to be determined on the basis of intrinsic and admissible extrinsic sources regarding the Act's legislative history and the context of its enactment ....
¶ 71. My view is that "proper statutory interpretation requires that a court take a comprehensive view toward determining legislative intent."62
¶ 72. This approach is not new. It is based on Wisconsin precedent. This court stated in 1871 that the plain meaning rule is part of a broader, more comprehensive view toward statutory interpretation. The court explained:
*689[T]he true rule for the construction of statutes is, to look at the whole and every part of the statute, and the apparent intention derived from the whole, to the subject matter, to the effects and consequences, and to the reason and spirit of the law, and thus, to ascertain the true meaning of the legislature, though the meaning so ascertained may sometimes conflict with the literal sense of the words.63
Without this comprehensive approach, this court risks usurping the legislative role and substituting its judgment for the legislature's intent. It is only through complete analysis and weighing of available materials that we can ascertain the meaning of a statute and effectuate legislative intent.
¶ 73. For the reasons set forth above, I write separately to discuss statutory interpretation.

 The approach set forth in the opinion is in many respects similar to one I have set forth in majority opinions I have authored. One difference is that the opinions I authored state that a court may use "history" in interpreting a statute. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶ 21, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349; Highland Manor Assocs. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶ 9, 268 Wis. 2d 1, 672 N.W.2d 709; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶ 25, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.

 As I have written previously, see In re Commitment of Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶ 48, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring), this court has consistently and resolutely held that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting a particular statute. It is, of course, a legal fiction to assert that there is an actual legislative "intent." See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423, 423 (1988). "It is impossible to argue that a legislative body actually has a collective, corporate intent that is somehow the sum of the individual, and often conflicting, intents of its members." Burt Neuborne, Background Norms for Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 724 (1990).
Rather, discerning and giving effect to the "intent" of the legislature is an exercise in logic in which a court determines what a reasonable person in the position of a legislator enacting the statute would have said about the legal issue presented in a given case. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 429 (1989) (arguing that searching for legislative intent does not involve looking for "a general legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see more particularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, or how it intended that question to be resolved, if it had been presented.").

 Wisconsin S. Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 57 Wis. 2d 643, 205 N.W.2d 403 (1973). See Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶¶ 44-46, 267 Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676 (Roggensack, J., concurring, joined by Wilcox, J., and Crooks, J.) (objecting to my declaring that resort may be had to scope, context, history, and purpose without a declaration that the statute is ambiguous).

 Majority op., ¶ 48.
I add the word "history" to the list. See also Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶¶ 45-47 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (urging a similar statement); Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶ 13 (court must ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the statute in relation to its context, history, scope, and objective intended to he accomplished, including the consequences of alternative interpretations).
So too can a court resort to canons of interpretation to determine the plain meaning. See Peters, 263 Wis. 2d 475, ¶¶ 27-28, 30 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (discussing use of a canon of interpretation in contrast to the position taken by the majority opinion, authored by Justice Sykes, opposing use of a canon to determine plain meaning); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using established canons of construction, the Court should ask whether there is a clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies). See also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 25-27 (1997) (endorsing the use of canons of construction in a textualist approach).
In discussing Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction, upon which the majority relies, Justice Scalia wrote: "[I]t is one of those law books that functions primarily not as a teacher or adviser, but as a litigator's research tool and expert witness — to say, and to lead you to cases that say, why the statute should be interpreted the way your client wants." Id. at 15.

 Majority op., ¶ 48.

 Compare, e.g., Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996) (ambiguity not declared); Kelley v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247-48, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992) (ambiguity declared); Wisconsin S. Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Wis. 2d 643, 205 N.W.2d 403 (1973) (ambiguity not declared); State ex rel. Klinger v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 460, 465-66, 202 N.W.2d 31 (1972) (ambiguity declared); Perry Creek Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 429, 139 N.W.2d 96 (1966) (ambiguity not declared); Scanlon v. Menasha, 16 Wis. 2d 437, 442, 114 N.W.2d 791 (1962) (ambiguity not declared); Worachek v. Stephenson Town School Dist., 270 Wis. 116, 120, 70 N.W.2d 657 (1955) (ambiguity not declared); Mundt v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R. Co., 31 Wis. 451 (1872) (ambiguity declared).

 For a discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic sources, see Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 642-43, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998).
In Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86 ¶ 15, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893, the court described "extrinsic factors [as] including the legislative object intended to be accomplished, and the statute's scope, history, context, and subject matter" (citation omitted).

 Majority op., ¶ 51.

 Id.
See also State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, n.5, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (court refuses to examine extrinsic sources if they contradict the plain language findings).
Justice Scalia, a textualist and an opponent of the use of federal legislative history, nevertheless allows the use of legislative history to avoid an absurd result. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
*676When a student at the University of Washington Law School challenged Justice Scalia to tell the audience how he would interpret a particular constitutional provision whose plain meaning was obviously unacceptable, the Justice is reported to have said, "I'm a strict constructionist but I'm not a kook."
The New York Times reported that Justice Scalia was quick to assure an audience that he might not be prepared to follow all of his criticisms of constitutional interpretation to their logical conclusion. The justice commented, "I am a textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut." Adam Liptak, In Re Scalia the Outspoken v. Scalia the Reserved, The New York Times, May 2, 2004, at 27.

 See, e.g., Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶¶ 45-57 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia views such an inquiry as "not merely a waste of research time and ink" but as a "false and disruptive lesson in the law." Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J, concurring).

 Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 52 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
Interpretive problems arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as well as the limits of our linguistic capabilities. State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), said: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."

 Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 642 n.8.

 Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 50 n.10 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc'y., 2003 WI 87, ¶¶ 45-46, 263 Wis. 2d 207, 665 N.W.2d 181 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 Id., ¶ 44 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 One commentator defines legislative history as "written materials pertaining to the legislation." See Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 161, 162 n.1 (1996).

 See, e.g., Dortzbach, supra note 18, at 190; Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting *678Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 845-46 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to be Less Common, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 979, 981 (1989).

 Justice Scalia explains his using legislative history in interpreting statutes contrary to his textualist approach as follows: "I play the game like everybody else... . I'm in a system which has accepted rules and legislative history is used. You read my opinions, I sin with the rest of them." Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity, 174-75 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988) (Justice Scalia's comments during a panel discussion) (quoted in Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 441, 442 n.4 (1991)).

 See Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 642-43; Ball v. Dist. No. 4, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 544-45, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984); Dortzbach, supra note 18, at 223.

 These provisions appear in the annotated versions of the statutes. See West's Wisconsin Statues Annotated.

 See, e.g., 1989 Wis. Act 105, § 1; 1995 Wis. Act 77, § 629; 1995 Wis. Act 290, § 17; 1995 Wis. Act 309, § 4; 1997 Wis. Act 188, § 191(8); 1999 Wis. Act 113, § 23.
The Legislative Reference Bureau discourages use of such provisions except under certain circumstances. Indeed a statement of legislative intent, purpose, or findings may not be included in a draft without the approval of the chief of the bureau. See Stephen R. Miller, Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 7.11 (2003-04).

 A. Peter Cannon, Legislative Reference Bureau, Guide to Researching Wisconsin Legislation (1998). See, e.g., Chernetski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 68, 76, 515 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1994); McLeod v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 787, 792, 271 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1978).

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 Id. The history notes also appear in West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated.

 See, e.g., Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 22-27 (examined language changed by amendments to the original bill); Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 982-83 (tracked changes to the statute).

 Wis. Stat. § 13.92(l)(b)2. Analysis is required for: (1) all bill drafts, except preliminary drafts, (2) engrossed bills, engrossed joint resolutions, and engrossed resolutions when time permits, (3) joint resolutions affecting state or federal constitution or the joint rules, and (4) resolutions affecting house rules. Miller, supra note 23, § 4.03(l)(a)l-4.

 Miller, supra note 23, §4.03(2)(a).

 To communicate with the LRB, call (608) 266-0341 or e-mail LRB_Reference@legis.state.wi.us.

 Information about the State Law Library is available on its website: http://www.wsll.state.wi.us.

 See, e.g., Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 57, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999); Chernetski, 182 Wis. 2d at 76 n.3. For other cases citing Prefatory Notes, see Miller, supra note 23, §4.03(2)(f).

 The legislature created the judicial council to
[o]bserve and study the rules of pleading, practice and procedure, and advise the supreme court as to changes which will, in the council's judgment, simplify procedure and promote a speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. Make a continuous survey and study of the organization, jurisdiction and methods of administration and operation of all the courts of the state, both courts of record and others, the volume and condition of business in said courts, the work accomplished and the results obtained. Collect, compile, analyze and publish judicial statistics. Receive, consider and in its discretion investigate suggestions from any source pertaining to the administration of justice and to make recommendations. Keep advised concerning the decisions of the courts relating to the procedure and practice therein and concerning pending legislation affecting the organization, jurisdiction, operation, procedure and practice of the courts. Recommend to the legislature any changes in the organization, jurisdiction, operation and methods of conducting the business of the courts which can be put into effect only by legislative action.
Ch. 392, Laws of 1951.

 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 19.97, 30.30, 102.23, 345.315, 751.03, 752.31, 755.17.

 See, e.g., Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d Rl, R2.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 35; State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 726, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999) (examining the judicial council committee note to 1987 S.B. 191, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.24 (West 1996)).

 See http://wsll.state.wi.us/judcoun/judcouall.html (index to State Law Library's collection). The Judicial Council materials at the State Law Library include a wealth of information. See http://wsll.state.wi.us/judcoun/jcloverview.html (overview of Judicial Council).

 Ch. 444, Laws of 1947; Wis. Stat. § 13.81 (2001-02) (originally named the Legislative Council).

 The Joint Legislative Council consists of the leadership of both houses and 10 members selected by the membership of both houses.

 The study committees appointed by the Joint Legislative Council are made up of legislators and citizens who are interested in or knowledgeable about the study topic. For more information, visit the Joint Legislative Council's website at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/facts.htm.

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 Id.

 Id.
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 34.01, 67.10, 84.30, 107.35, 112.08, 168.04, 182.70, 340.01, 611.51.

 See, e.g., Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 38-39, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816.

 Visit the Legislative Reference Bureau's website at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lrb/pubs/infobull.htm

 Joint Legislative Council, 1 E. Main St., Suite 401, Madison, WI 53703, (608) 266-1304.

 Visit the State Historical Society's website at http://wisconsinhistory.org.

 Visit the Legislative Council's website at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/publications.htm. See 1997 Wis. Act 283 § 454 (creating the Criminal Penalties Study Committee). The State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee Report is available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view 2.asp?docid=42.
Courts have relied on this report. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, ¶¶ 22-24, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 N.W.2d 872; State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, ¶¶ 40-42, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24.

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 See, e.g., Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 28.

 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶ 26 n.17, 267 Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676 (relied on drafting record); Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 29 (examined drafting instructions to support the interpretation).

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 Visit the Legislative Reference Bureau's website: http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lrb/pubs/infobull.htm

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 Id.

 In the early years of the state, the Bulletin was called the "Index" and was printed as an appendix to the Journal.

 For an example of a Governor's study committee report, see, e.g., Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization, Report to Governor Patrick Lucey (1973).

 Cannon, supra note 24.

 The court relied upon the Report of the Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization in In re C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 711, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992).

 Wis. Const. Art. V, § 10(2).

 See, e.g., Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 646; Wis. Patients Comp. Fund v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 537, 546, 342 N.W.2d 693 (1984); In re Paternity of C.A.S., 156 Wis. 2d 446, 460, 456 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1990).

 Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 50 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). See also Peters, 263 Wis. 2d 475, ¶ 34 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Cole, 2003 WI 59, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700; Courthouse Employees, Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 641-51; State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 77-82, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986); Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 451, 456, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977).

 Harrington, 28 Wis. at 59 (1871).