Court Opinion

ID: 8630394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:36:43.912683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:44.946413
License: Public Domain

STORY, Circuit Justice.
The statute of descents of Rhode Island (page 222), enacts, “that when any person, having title to any real estate of inheritance, shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in equal portions to his or her kindred,” in the manner pointed out by the act. One of the clauses, applicable to the facts of the present case, is, “if there be no grandfather, *612then- to the grandmother, uncles, and aunts, on the same side, and their descendants, or such of them as there be.” Afterwards comes the following clause: “The descendants of any person deceased shall inherit the estate, which such person would have inherited, had such person survived the intestate. ” And immediately succeeds thef olio wing clause: “When the title to any real estate of inheritance, as to which the person, having such title, shall die intestate, came by descent, gift, or devise, from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children, such estate shall go to the kin next to the intestate, -of the blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended, if any there be.” Moses Dexter died seised of the estate in question intestate; he took the estate by descent from an ancestor, to whom all the parties are of the whole blood. All the claimants stand in the relation of first or second cousins to the intestate. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff is, that, under the clause of the statute last quoted, this being an ancestral estate, none but persons, who are of kin next to the intestate, can inherit; and although all the claimants are of the whole blood, yet the first cousins are alone, in the sense of the act, next or nearest of kin. The second cousins, such as Martha Howell, are not, within the clause, next of kin.
If the case stood singly upon this clause of the statute, the argument would be irresistible, for the first cousins are nearer of kin than the second. But the prior clause in the statute provides for the right of representation of all descendants. If Waite Dexter, or Waite Brown, had survived the intestate, they would doubtless have been entitled to share in the estate. By this clause the descendants, by representation, are to inherit, as their ancestor would, if the ancestor had survived the intestate. It is argued, that this clause is not applicable to special cases, like the present, but only to cases falling within the general scheme of descents traced out by the act. But there is nothing in the act itself, which leads to such a conclusion. The mere priority of the clauses in the act establishes nothing; for each is an independent canon, and must be construed to apply to all cases, to which it may, in its general sense, be applied. The clause itself is universal and absolute in its terms. It includes all cases. What ground is there for the court to narrow down its universality? Under the old law of descents, no right of representation was allowed, except as far as brothers’ and sisters’ children. The act of 1822 abolished this limitation, and allowed this right of representation ad infinitum. The clause, as to ancestral estates, is perfectly sensible and correct without any limitation. Its object plainly is to ascertain, who are of the whole blood; and when this is ascertained, the scheme of descents is the same as in common cases. In other words, the next of kin are to be ascertained by the general regulations of the act; and these provide for an indefinite representation by descendants of the person, who, if living, would have been the next of kin.
The judgment of the court is, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only one eighteenth part of the estate. Judgment accordingly.