Court Opinion

ID: 9742697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:18:13.007999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:34.969484
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
dissenting.
In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer the majority relies upon United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lowe (1991) Ind.App., 583 N.E.2d 164 (Chezem, J., dissenting) which was followed by the same district in Inman v. Farm Bur. Ins. (1992) Ind.App., 584 N.E.2d 567. I believe that the majority in Lowe was sufficiently wrong to require my dissent to the majority herein and to any further application of Lowe.
In 1987 our legislature determined that automobile insurers should make available uninsured/underinsured motorist protection to their clients in amounts equal to the insured's own bodily injury limits, rather than the minimum coverage limits that had previously applied. It therefore amended IC 27-7-5-2, 4 & 5 to accomplish that goal effective January 1, 1988.
While rules for statutory construction abound and often apparently justify reaching different results, there is consensus that our primary goal is to determine and implement the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Superior Const. Co. v. Carr (1990) Ind., 564 N.E.2d 281. There are normally two problems, however, in doing that. In states like Indiana that preserve no legislative debate and comment we must often speculate as to why particular provisions may have been enacted. Secondly, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, oftentimes there is no precise legislative intent because the legislature simply did not contemplate the conflict that has arisen. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, pp. 14-15.
Despite these impediments it seems to me very clear that our legislature in enact*952ing these 1987 amendments intended that commencing January 1, 1988, insurers were to offer uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage to their policy holders in the liability amounts that the policy holders had elected for their own coverages for bodily injury and property damage. Indeed the motivation was sufficiently strong that the legislature chose a scheme which mandated providing coverage at those limits unless the insured expressly rejected such coverage in writing.
With this backdrop it seems to me wholly incongruous for the Lowe court to have interpreted the amendments as drawing a distinction between policies issued to new customers for the first time and to which the amendments would apply, and theretofore issued policies as they came up for renewal, to which the amendments would have no application. The court accomplished this by noting the legislature had provided that the amendment would apply to "policies first issued after December 31, 1987."
Upon the stated premise that the statute was clear and unambiguous and that the legislature therefore "obviously" did not intend the statute to apply to all policies issued after December 31, 1987, thé court reached its conclusion.
I would suggest that what the legislature meant by its "first issued" language is not at all clear and unambiguous. It could, and I believe should, be interpreted as having meant that while the amendment would not be applied while the policy was in term and the premium had already been determined and likely paid, it was to apply as soon as those policies came up for renewal in 1988. It further appears to me that the latter interpretation would much more clearly accord with the apparent legislative intent in adopting these amendments, and I would so hold.
In addition, while the policies in question here were negotiated, written and delivered in Ohio to the Friars headquarters, it is clear that the vehicle in question was registered and regularly maintained in Indiana for operation in Indiana. Under these circumstances I would find as the court did in Krstich v. United Services Auto. Assoc. (1991 N.D.Ohio) 776 F.Supp. 1225 that the policies were nevertheless issued for delivery in Indiana within the meaning of the application statute, IC 27-7-5-2.
I would reverse the summary judgment and therefore I dissent.