Court Opinion

ID: 9787413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:16:06.289439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.671860
License: Public Domain

BOUDREAU, J.,
dissenting in Part I, concurring in Part II and with the assumption of original jurisdiction and the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
11 I respectfully dissent to Part I of the majority's opinion. In my view, 10 0.$.1999, § 7307-1.2(C)(2) does not apply to adults. I concur, however, with Part II of the opinion and with the assumption of original jurisdiction and the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
12 The material facts of this case are straightforward. Robert Wayne Rotramel was nineteen years old when he allegedly kidnapped two young girls (a seven-year-old and a twelve-year-old), murdered the younger one and raped and sodomized the older one. Earlier in his life, Rotramel had been adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding that is not related to his alleged murder, rape and sodomy of the young girls. Petitioner sought a court order releasing all of Rotramel's juvenile court records and law enforcement records. The trial court released redacted versions of Rotramel's Adjudication Journal Entry and Disposition Journal Entry, but did not release any other records.
I
Title 10, section 7807-1.2(C)(2) does not apply to adults.
{3 While juvenile court records and law enforcement records are generally confidential, there are exceptions. The question in this case is whether the exception at 10 0.$.1999, $ 7307-1.2(C)(2) applies to Rotra-mel, who has a juvenile record but was an adult at the time he allegedly committed the crimes of murder, kidnapping and sodomy. The C(2) exception provides that "[the confidentiality requirements of subsection A of this section for juvenile court records and law enforcement records shall not apply: ... upon the charging of an individual pursuant to Section 7806-1.1 of this title" 10 O.S. 1999, § 7307-1.2(C)(2).
T4 In my view, the language of the (C)(2) exception is unambiguous and applies solely to individuals 18 to 17 years old, not to adults, who are charged with one of the crimes enumerated in 10 0.98.1997, § 7306-1.1. The (C)(2) exception expressly refers to § 78306-1.1, which is Oklahoma's reverse certification statute. By its express terms, § 7806-1.1 applies solely to individuals 13 to 17 years old who are charged with committing one or more of the crimes enumerated *849therein prior to January 1, 1998.1 The (C)(@Q) exeeption has nothing to do with adults who are charged with committing one or more of those enumerated crimes.
{5 The majority opinion attempts to ere-ate an ambiguity in the language of the (C)(2) exception and then manufactures legislative intent to support its proposition that the exception applies to both juveniles and adults. In search of an ambiguity, the majority points to the Legislature's use of the word "individual" rather than the word "juvenile" in the (C)(2) exception. According to the majority opinion, the Legislature's use of the word "individual" is evidence of the Legislature's intent that the (C)(2) exception applies to both juveniles and adults.
1 6 In my view, the reason for the Legislature's use of the word "individual" instead of "juvenile" is much less obscure. The statutory definition of "juvenile," at 10 0.9$.2000, § 7301-1 .3(4), excludes individuals who are charged pursuant to § 7306-1.1. Certainly it would make no sense for the Legislature to specifically exclude a class of persons from the definition of "juvenile" and then refer to these same individuals as juveniles in the (C)(2) exception. Moreover, had the Legislature intended a single subsection of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code to apply to crimes committed by adults, contrary to every other section of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, it certainly would have expressed this intent in a more explicit manner than simply substituting the word "individual" for the word "juvenile."
17 The majority also argues that if the (C)(2) exception did not apply to adults, it would create an "absurdity." According to the majority, if the (C)(2) exception did not apply to adults, then the exception would make public the complete juvenile record of an individual 183 to 17 years old who is charged with a crime enumerated under § 7306-1.1, but would maintain the confidentiality of the complete juvenile record of an adult charged with the same crime.
{8 The majority's argument is premised on an unexamined assumption that the (C)(2) exception makes public the complete juvenile record of anyone charged with a crime enumerated in § 7306-1.1. In my view, a proper reading of the (C)(2) exception is that the only records to be opened are those records pertaining to the current charge. In other words, the exception treats only the individual's current conduct as a public matter. It is clear the Legislature knows how to designate a juvenile's complete court record when it so intends. For example, in § 7306-2.5(C)(1), the Legislature refers to "the complete juvenile record of the accused." If the Legislature intended the (C)(2) exception to open up the complete juvenile record of an individual, it could easily have done so with the same or similar language.
T9 Accordingly, the exception does not "expose a juvenile and cloak an adult," but merely treats the court records of an individual who is "considered" an adult under § 7306-1.1 the same way the court records of an adult are treated.
110 Even assuming, arguendo, that the language of the (C)(2) exception is ambiguous, the Legislature's clear intent is that the exception does not apply to adults. The true interpretation of ambiguous language in a statute may be found by resort to the subject matter, and the language of a statute must be read in a sense which harmonizes it with the subject matter. Board of Education of Burbank Independent School Dist. No. 20 v. Allen, 1945 OK 18, 195 Okla. 209, 156 P.2d 596. Another rule of construction provides that different parts of a statute reflect light upon each other, and statutory provisions are regarded as in pari materia where they are part of the same Act. Taylor v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 1999 OK 44, 981 P.2d 1253. Section 7807-1.2(C) contains seven separate exceptions to the confidentiality requirements of subsection (A). A review of the other six exceptions in § 7307-1.2(C) reveals that each of them indisputably applies to individuals under the age of 18.2 The majority opinion has rested its construction upon the (C)(2) exception alone, isolating it from the other exceptions. The (C)(2) exception should be construed in part materia *850with the other six exceptions in the statute. The other six exceptions shed light on the Legislature's intent with respect to the (C)(2) exception and indicate that it does not apply to adults.
11 Finally, in interpreting the (C)(2) exception, the majority opinion treats § 7806-1.1 as merely a descriptive list of crimes. Actually, § 7806-1.1 is much more than that. It not only enumerates certain crimes which, if committed by an individual between 183 and 17, result in the individual being considered an adult for purposes of prosecution, it also gives those under-age individuals substantial procedural and substantive protections to which adults are not entitled. § 7306-1.1(A)(D). For instance, it requires that the accused be detained in a jail cell or ward entirely separate from prisoners who are adults. It requires service of the information on the parent or guardian. It allows the trial court, at the preliminary hearing stage of the adult criminal proceeding, to certify the individual as a child. While I agree with the majority that $ 7806-1.1 is not technically a "charging statute," the (C)(2) exception clearly is more than a descriptive list of crimes.
T12 It might be sound public policy to open the complete juvenile record of an individual charged with a serious crime, especially in a case as heinous as this But the responsibility for fashioning public policy rests with the Legislature, not this Court. I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent the majority concludes the (C)(@) exception applies to both children and adults.
II
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to release all of Rotramel's records pursuant to 10 O.S. § 7807-12(G).
[13 Juvenile courts may release juvenile court records and law enforcement records upon a determination that a compelling reason exists for disclosure and that the release is necessary for the protection of a legitimate public or private interest. 10 0.8. § 7807-1.2(G). The trial court must.conduct an individualized case-by-case review of the records, giving due regard to the confidentiality of the records and the privacy of the persons identified in the records. Id.
T 14 The majority correctly concludes that the standard of review on appeal for the release of such records is generally recognized as that of abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court makes a clearly erroncous conclusion and judgment, against reason and evidence. CNA Ins. Co. v. Krueger, Inc., 1997 OK 142, 949 P.2d 676. In my view, the majority opinion correctly concludes that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to release all of Rotramel's juvenile court ree-ords and law enforcement records pursuant to 10 0.8. § 7807-1.2(G).
115 Petitioner articulated a compelling reason to release Rotramel's records. This case implicates, in a direct and concrete manner, an issue of serious public concern, ie., the efficacy of the juvenile system. Access to Rotramel's records will afford the public an opportunity for free and open discussion of a critical function of government in a case where an adult with an unexpunged juvenile record is alleged to have become a repeat offender shortly after being released from juvenile court supervision.
T16 The public policy of maintaining the confidentiality of juvenile court records and law enforcement records exists primarily to allow the juvenile system to rehabilitate juveniles and afford them a fresh start after they *851have passed through the juvenile system and become adults. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979). In that sense, the policy protects juveniles' privacy so they can "start over" when they are adults. Rotramel, however, is charged with committing, at age 19, murder, rape and sodomy, after having been adjudicated delinquent for forcible sodomy when he was 14 years old. He will not be rehabilitated by the juvenile system. Thus, the public policy of protecting his privacy so he can start over when he reaches adulthood no longer applies to him.
17 However, a trial court must also consider the privacy of other persons identified in the juvenile court records. The privacy interests of victims and other persons can be protected by redacting their names and other identifying information.
118 Accordingly, I agree that this Court should assume original jurisdiction and grant a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to release all of Rotramel's juvenile court records and law enforcement records. However, I would require the trial court to redact the names and other identifying information of other persons whose privacy interests might be harmed by disclosure.
19 I am authorized to state that Justice Lavender joins in the views expressed herein.

. Youth who commit offenses on or after January 1, 1998, are governed by the Youthful Offender Act, 10 0.$.1997, §§ 7306 2.1-2.12.

. The first two exceptions pertain to individuals between 13 and 17 years of age who are treated as adults for purposes of prosecution-whether certified as an adult under § 7303-4.3 or consid*850ered an adult under § 7306-1.1. The third exception is for traffic violations committed by individuals under 18. (It would be nonsensical to construe the third exception as applying to adults. Since records of adult traffic violations are not confidential, there is no need for an exception to confidentiality). The fourth exception is for individuals 14 or older who have previously been adjudicated delinquent and who subsequently come before the juvenile court on a new delinquency matter after July 1, 1995. The fifth exception is for individuals who are adjudicated delinquent for committing a delinquent act that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony offense that is a crime against the person or would be a felony offense involving a dangerous weapon. The sixth exception is for the arrest records of a juvenile arrested for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a , felony. The seventh, and last, exception is for violations of the Prevention of Youth Access to Tobacco Act, 37 O.S. §§ 600.1, et seg.