Court Opinion

ID: 9486116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:38:11.41343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:31.987617
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately simply to clarify what I believe to be the appropriate standard of review of the Enright issue and the outcome dictated by that standard. The majority opinion first references the abuse-of-discretion standard, then says “we need not reach the question of which standard of review is most appropriate because we conclude that no reversible error was committed,” and finally says there was “no error.” I believe we must decide which standard of review applies, because our prior case law does not suggest that the district court’s conclusory statement in this case is entirely unobjectionable.
In United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc), this Court, sitting en banc, said:
Although it is often stated that we apply an abuse of discretion standard to a district court’s evidentiary rulings, we believe this statement sweeps to broadly in regard to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which requires that specific factual determinations and legal conclusions be made in order for the evidence to be admitted. In order to admit the statement of a co-conspirator under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), it must first be determined that the conspiracy existed, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and that the co-conspirator’s statements were made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” These are factual determinations governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.
... [The district court found that the three factual components of 801(d)(2)(E) were *555met.] Based on these factual determinations, the district court concluded that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) permitted the “otherwise hearsay” co-conspirators’ statements to be received as “not hearsay.” This is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Id. at 1261 (footnote and citation omitted). Thus, ordinarily the appropriate standard of review is not the majority’s blanket abuse-of-discretion standard, but the dual standard noted in Gessa — factual conclusions reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions reviewed de novo. In this case, however, the defendants failed to object to the court’s concluso-ry finding. This failure to object waived any claim of error the defendants may allege, see Fed.R.Evid. 103, and our resulting standard of review is that of plain error, see Fed. R.Evid. 103; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, we review the alleged error to see whether it seriously affected substantial rights and had an unfairly prejudicial influence on the outcome of the case. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
Reviewing the court’s finding under the plain error standard, I find no manifest miscarriage of justice. The district court considered the Enright issue and decided that there was “clearly ... no problem” with admitting the evidence. My independent review of the record supports this conclusion. Because the defendants did not request more detailed findings on the issue, I find no plain error and thus agree with the majority that this assignment of error is unpersuasive.