Court Opinion

ID: 9940045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:01:29.273254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:19.013567
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11618   Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 02/13/2024    Page: 1 of 7

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11618
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       MARIO ALBER CRUZ-APARICIO,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A200-264-803
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11618     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 02/13/2024    Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-11618

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, AND LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Mario Cruz-Aparicio petitions for review of the order of the
       Board of Immigrations Appeals (“BIA”) aﬃrming the Immigration
       Judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of re-
       moval, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
       Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
       Punishment (“CAT”). Cruz-Aparicio raises separate challenges to
       the denial of each of his three claims, and we consider each in turn.
                                        I.
               We review the decision of the BIA, and we review the IJ’s
       decision as well to the extent the BIA expressly adopted it. Moham-
       med v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008). We re-
       view legal questions, including our own jurisdiction, de novo. Farah
       v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2021).
              An asylum application must be ﬁled within one year of a
       non-citizen’s entry into the United States, but the agency may con-
       sider an untimely application if the non-citizen is able to show “ei-
       ther the existence of changed circumstances which materially af-
       fect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circum-
       stances relating to the delay in ﬁling an application.” Immigration
       and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a)(2)(B), (D), 8 U.S.C.
       § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). However, “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to
       review any determination of the Attorney General” as to the time-
       liness of the application or the existence of changed or
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       23-11618               Opinion of the Court                         3

       extraordinary circumstances. INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).
       “[Section 1158(a)(3)] divests us of jurisdiction to review decisions
       of whether an alien complied with the one-year time limit, or
       whether extraordinary circumstances were present to justify un-
       timely ﬁling of the asylum application.” Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d
       762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007). We have held that, when the BIA reaches
       a decision based on two independent grounds and we are barred
       from reviewing one of those grounds on a jurisdictional basis, we
       also lack jurisdiction to review the other ground based on the advi-
       sory opinion doctrine. Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1290-91
       (11th Cir. 2014), abrogated in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria
       v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023).
              We do not have jurisdiction to review Cruz-Aparicio’s chal-
       lenge to the denial of his asylum application as untimely.
       Cruz-Aparicio does not challenge the BIA’s alternative denial of his
       asylum application on the merits, but, even if he did, we would be
       jurisdictionally barred from reviewing it because we lack jurisdic-
       tion to review the timeliness ﬁnding.
                                        II.
               “Whether an asserted group qualiﬁes as a ‘particular social
       group’ under the INA is a question of law.” Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). “When an appellant fails
       to oﬀer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.” Sepulveda
       v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). This in-
       cludes when an appellant only makes a passing reference to an is-
       sue. Id.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11618

               A non-citizen is entitled to withholding of removal under
       the INA if he can show that his “life or freedom would be threat-
       ened in [the] country [of removal] because of [his] race, religion,
       nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
       opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). “[T]o satisfy
       the ‘on account of a statutorily protected ground’ requirement, the
       applicant must prove that the protected ground ‘was or will be at
       least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.’” Perez-Zen-
       teno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
       INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).
              The phrase “particular social group” is not deﬁned in the
       INA, but we have deferred to the BIA’s formulation of the criteria
       for when a group qualiﬁes. Id. A particular social group needs to
       possess a shared characteristic, which “‘must be one that the mem-
       bers of the group either cannot change, or should not be required
       to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
       consciences.’” Id. at 1309 (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 211, 233
       (BIA 1985)). “[A] particular social group also must be ‘deﬁned with
       particularity’ and be ‘socially distinct within the society in ques-
       tion.’” Id. (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA
       2014)). “Regarding particularity, the BIA has said that ‘[t]he [pro-
       posed] group must . . . be discrete and have deﬁnable boundaries --
       it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diﬀuse, or subjective.’” Id.
       (alterations and omission in original) (quoting In re W-G-R-, 26 I. &
       N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2014)). Further, a group “cannot be circularly
       deﬁned by the persecution of its members”; instead, the group
       members “must share a narrowing characteristic other than their
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       23-11618               Opinion of the Court                          5

       risk of being persecuted.” Alvarado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 984 F.3d 982,
       989 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted) (quoting Amezcua-Preci-
       ado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2019)). The
       group must exist independently of the risk of persecution to avoid
       particular-social-group persecution becoming “catch all” for any
       persecution that does not ﬁt within the other protected grounds.
       Id.
              Cruz-Aparicio asserted that he would be persecuted on ac-
       count of membership in two particular social groups, one based on
       his family and the other based on being a returnee to Mexico after
       more than a decade living in the United States. We conclude that
       he has abandoned any challenge to the ﬁnding that he has failed to
       establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and his fam-
       ily-based social group, which is dispositive of that portion of his
       claim for withholding of removal. As to the rest, the BIA correctly
       concluded that his returnee-based social group was not cognizable
       under the INA.
                                        III.
              We review administrative ﬁndings of fact for substantial ev-
       idence. Farah, 12 F.4th at 1321. Under the substantial evidence test,
       “we will not disturb an immigration judge’s factual ﬁndings so long
       as they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative ev-
       idence on the record considered as a whole.’” Jathursan v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 17 F.4th 1365, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lopez v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 914 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019)). “‘[W]e review the record
       evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11618

       draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.’” Hasan-
       Nayem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 55 F.4th 831, 842 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting
       Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005)). “[W]e
       reverse factual ﬁndings ‘only if the record compels reversal, and the
       mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is in-
       suﬃcient to justify reversal.’” Id. (quoting Jathursan, 17 F.4th at
       1372).
              To satisfy the standard for CAT relief, an applicant must “es-
       tablish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tor-
       tured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.
       § 208.16(c)(2). “The evidence must demonstrate that the applicant
       will be speciﬁcally and individually targeted for torture.” K.Y. v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 43 F.4th 1175, 1181 (11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in origi-
       nal).
              Further, the torture must be “by or at the instigation of or
       with the consent or acquiescence of a public oﬃcial or other per-
       son acting in an oﬃcial capacity.” Id. § 208.18(a)(1). “Acquiescence
       ‘requires that the public oﬃcial, prior to the activity constituting
       torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his
       or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.’”
       Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004)
       (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)). A government does not acquiesce
       to persecution simply because it failed to catch the perpetrators of
       persecution. Id. at 1243. It does not acquiesce to torture so long as
       it combats it in some way, even if it is unsuccessful in its attempts.
       Id.
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       23-11618               Opinion of the Court                        7

              Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and Immigra-
       tion Judge’s denial of Cruz-Aparicio’s application for CAT relief be-
       cause the record does not compel the ﬁnding that it is more likely
       than not that he will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence
       of the Mexican government if he is removed to Mexico.
             PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.