Court Opinion

ID: 9761920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:00:01.40591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:48:42.127482
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying a class action because the class action is inferior and unmanageable when compared to “traditional” litigation. Because I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the class action meets the superiority requirement of rule 42(b)(4), I respectfully dissent.
The majority accurately notes that we review the trial court’s grant of the certification order by applying an abuse of discretion standard of review. Health & Tennis Corp. of America v. Jackson, 928 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ dism’d w.o.j.). In applying that standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.; Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Vinson v. Texas Commerce Bank-Houston N.A., 880 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no writ); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). That a trial judge decided an issue differently than we would does not alone demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 648; Dresser Industries, Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 371. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s action, and we indulge in every presumption that would favor the trial court’s ruling. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587; Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 647; Vinson, 880 S.W.2d at 823; Dresser Industries, Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 371-72. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence. Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 648; Vinson, 880 S.W.2d at 823. Furthermore, the trial court is not limited to considering just the evidence presented but may base its certification decision on pleadings or other material in the record. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587, 592; Weatherly, 908 S.W.2d at 647; Dresser Industries, Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 376. Therefore, a trial court only abuses its discretion if there is insufficient material in the record to support its certification ruling, and this material need not be evidence. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587, 592.
The majority’s opinion concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly finding that the class action was superior to *645other available methods for the adjudication of the controversy. In reaching its holding, the majority states that there is “no evidence” in the record regarding: (1) the potential interest of potential claim members in pursuing a class action or their ability to pursue individual claims; and (2) the maturity of the claim, litigation expense, judicial resources, or manageability. As previously noted, however, the trial court was permitted to consider more than just the evidence presented, and so long as the trial court’s ruling is supported by sufficient material in the record, the ruling should be upheld. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587, 592; Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 648.
Although the class representatives did make some comments indicating a disinterest, we must view their entire statements in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587. In that light, I would conclude that there is sufficient material in the record to support the trial court’s determination that the class representatives desire to have their common interests resolved in a class action. Furthermore, since we indulge in every presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, I would presume that the absence of litigation demonstrates the claimants’ inability to pursue individual claims rather than disinterest. This presumption is supported by the low cost of the repair and the generally high cost of litigation.
With regard to the “maturity” of the claim, the trial court’s implicit finding that the claim was mature is supported by the testimony of the class representatives regarding the repeated misfirings of the gun and the existence of personal injury claims in which serious injury has resulted from such misfirings. Given the small amount of an individual claim, a presumption that litigation expenses would be prohibitive should also be indulged in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Finally, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered the issues of judicial resources and manageability in view of its own knowledge of such resources. The majority concludes, however, that the trial court incorrectly resolved those issues in favor of class action. In reaching this conclusion, the majority improperly substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court s ruling and indulging every presumption in favor of that ruling, I would conclude that there is at least conflicting evidence or material in the record regarding judicial resources and manageability. The trial court does not abuse its discretion in resolving that conflict in favor of class certification. Weatherly, 905 S.W.2d at 648; Vinson, 880 S.W.2d at 823.
In addition to the factors focused upon by the majority, the record supports the trial court’s resolution of the superiority requirement because it reflects that the class members will benefit from discovery that has been conducted and the trial court’s familiarity with the dispute. See Dresser Industries, Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 375. Finally, when class certification is ordered early in a proceeding before supporting facts are fully developed, the trial court is directed to favor maintenance of the class action because it can always modify the order later if circumstances require it. Health & Tennis Corp. of America, 928 S.W.2d at 587; Dresser Industries, Inc., 847 S.W.2d at 376. For the foregoing reasons, I would not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in following that directive based on a failure to meet the superiority requirement of rule 42(b)(4).