Court Opinion

ID: 9704915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:51:45.679281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.470141
License: Public Domain

ROWLEY, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s finding that the trial court’s preclusion of cross-examination of the parties’ minor child, Laura Sutliff, requires us to vacate the court’s order and *203remand the case so that appellant may cross-examine Laura.
Based on the trial court’s familiarity with the case and the parties, I find that the ruling, if error, is harmless. A party is entitled to a fair hearing, not a perfect one. To constitute reversible error, a ruling on evidence must be not only erroneous, but harmful to the party complaining. Anderson v. Hughes, 417 Pa. 87, 208 A.2d 789 (1965). In reviewing a finding of contempt, this Court places great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial court. Mellott v. Mellott, 328 Pa.Super. 200, 476 A.2d 961 (1984); Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 322 Pa.Super. 400, 469 A.2d 682 (1983). In the present case, Judge Sheely has presided over all custody matters between the parties, including: 1) extensive hearings before the original custody order was entered and in response to appellee’s first petition for contempt; 2) he has spoken with Laura and allowed her to be cross-examined before amending the original custody order for the second time, and 3) held an extensive hearing on appellee’s third petition for contempt during which both parties testified as did appellee’s present wife and Laura. See slip op. at pp. 1 & 5. Given Judge Sheely’s knowledge of the case, we should be especially careful to defer to his ruling.
The majority emphasizes that the lack of cross-examination of Laura prejudices appellant because it is unclear whether appellant encouraged Laura to visit with appellee. Because I do not read Judge Sheely’s order and opinion as basing his finding of contempt on appellant’s failure to encourage visitation, I cannot agree that the court’s ruling merits remanding the case. The order of April 4, 1986 states that the court found as a fact that appellant “let it up to her daughter to decide if she will make any visits with her father.” The order for visitation required that appellant have Laura “ready and prepared to make the visits on the times indicated____” By allowing Laura to decide whether she wished to visit with her father, appellant failed to have her “ready and prepared” to visit with her father *204and created the impression with Laura that she did not have to obey an order of court which the child was subject to. Appellant thus willfully failed to have Laura “ready and prepared” for the visits and it was this action by appellant that the trial court based its finding of contempt upon. Therefore, appellant’s inability to cross-examine Laura on whether she was “encouraged ” to visit her father would not alter the finding that appellant was in contempt of the trial court’s previous order.
Lastly, the order appealed from reveals that the trial court did not “fine ” appellant for her contemptuous behavior; instead, the court ordered her to pay $250 on account of appellee’s counsel fees. The present case is similar to Mellott v. Mellott, supra, except for the assessment of counsel fees. In Mellott, the trial court acknowledged that the mother was not complying with its order concerning the father’s visitation rights with the parties’ minor children in the manner that the court intended. However, instead of finding the mother in contempt, the trial court clarified and expanded its order.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s order.