Court Opinion

ID: 9589668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:47:21.709085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:46.659221
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I fully agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Georgia Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91, does not confer upon Georgia courts any authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (“PWC”), the nonresident manufacturer of (allegedly) defective airplane engines, because this product liability action arises out of a plane crash in Kentucky and does not involve any tortious conduct or tortious consequences within the State of Georgia. PWC, however, contends that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over it only under the Georgia Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91. This analysis fails to appreciate the distinction between a general jurisdiction and a specific jurisdiction. It is my view that PWC is subject to a general jurisdiction in the courts of Georgia due to its continuous and systematic commercial activities in Georgia. As the trial court did not err in denying PWC’s OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (2) motion, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of reversal.
In support of its jurisdictional challenge, PWC submitted the affidavit of C. J. C. Pascoe, its Vice President, Counsel, and Corporate Secretary, who deposed that PWC is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in Longueuil, Quebec; that PWC “does not have any offices or employees in the State of Georgia [; and that virtually] all aircraft engines manufactured by [PWC] are sold FOB Longueuil, Quebec, Canada.” The Pascoe affidavit also indicates that former defendant Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of West Virginia, Inc. (West Virginia), a nonparty to this appeal, is wholly owned by United Technologies Corporation, a Delaware corporation that was never sued in this case. Similarly, the former defendant (now nonparty) P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc. (“Services”), which “has a facility in Atlanta, Georgia,” is a Delaware corporation owned by United Technologies Corporation. The plane involved was owned by a Florida corporation and had been recently used for business in Milledgeville, Georgia. On the day in question, the plane took off from Milledgeville and landed in Birmingham, Alabama, and Orlando, Florida, before the fatal crash took place in Kentucky.
Plaintiffs responded with the subsequent deposition testimony of Christopher C. J. Pascoe, who explained that PWC is in business to “design, develop, manufacture and market [and support] small gas *7turbine engines for the commuter and regional transport markets.” United Technologies Corporation owns 98 percent of the shares of PWC. In addition to his offices with PWC, Mr. Pascoe is a director in each of the affiliated corporations, Services and West Virginia. He identified a PWC advertisement from an issue of Aviation Week referring to a service station in Atlanta, Georgia, “operated by P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc., which is an affiliated company.” Mr. Pascoe affirmed that “all of the directors of . . . P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc. [are] officers of [PWC].” Mr. Pascoe also identified expense reports for PWC employees who had “visited the State of Georgia in 1990[, . . . generally] in connection with business. . . .” PWC had two engine customers in Georgia in 1990, and with one of them, Ayres Corporation, PWC “regularly [does] three to four million dollars of business a year[.]” PWC maintains in Georgia “no salesmen or distributors or consignees as such.” PWC does, however, keep approximately $120,000 of tooling and parts on “consignment with Atlantic Southeast Airlines[ . . . ] as a customer service. . . .” This was not an effort to make additional sales but was intended “primarily to keep up an established relationship.” PWC also ships spare parts to its sister corporation, Services, at the latter’s service center in Atlanta. Expense reports indicate that PWC sent employees to Georgia for the purpose of customer relations, i.e., “keeping in touch with customers and suppliers. ...” Specifically, PWC had “marketing people visiting customers in Georgia; some of them were purchasing personnel visiting suppliers in Georgia.” Mr. Pascoe identified the deposition exhibit 13 as a 1990 “Ayres Corporation purchase order, ... for PT6A-65AG engines.” He affirmed that PWC “makes . . . the engine for the King Air 100 aircraft,” the plane that crashed in this case. Contrary to PWC’s contentions, however, the fact that it is incorporated under the laws of the Province of Quebec, Canada, with its principal place of business in Quebec, does not necessarily mean that it is subject to personal jurisdiction only under the Georgia Long Arm Statute.
“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, fn. 9 (104 SC 1868, 80 LE2d 404). Conversely, “when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, fn. 8, supra. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 473, fn. 15 (105 SC 2174, 85 LE2d 528). It is my view that, the Georgia Long Arm Statute is applicable only when the State is *8justifying its exercise of “specific jurisdiction” over the objection of a nonresident. According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, OCGA § 9-10-91 “requires that an out-of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before he can be subjected to personal jurisdiction. Where . . . it is shown that no such acts were committed, there is no jurisdiction.” Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 130 (356 SE2d 513). “The Long Arm Statute applies solely to persons who were nonresidents of Georgia at the time the act or omission complained of occurred. [Cit.]” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 600 (422 SE2d 863). But the Supreme Court of Georgia has never held that the Long Arm Statute even applies to a “general jurisdiction” circumstance. “Corporate presence can only be manifested by corporate activity and therefore a minimum contacts analysis seems appropriate.” Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733 (273 SE2d 22). Moreover, in a whole court decision, this Court recently affirmed the following proposition: “ ‘The general jurisdiction of State courts extends to transitory causes of action arising in another State, even though the plaintiff may not have been a resident of the State where the cause of action arose and the defendant may be a foreign corporation, so long as it is confined to the field from which the State itself is not excluded under the provisions of the United States constitution.’ [(Emphasis supplied.)] Louisville[ &c. R. Co. v. Meredith, 66 Ga. App. 488 (18 SE2d 51), aff'd, 194 Ga. 106 (21 SE2d 101)]. A foreign corporation is present in any place where its officers or agents transact business in behalf of the corporation under authority conferred by it. Reeves v. Southern R. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 565 (49 SE 674) (1905).” Harry S. Peterson Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 585, 586 (2), 587 (434 SE2d 778). There is “ ‘no requirement of federal due process that either prohibits (a state) from opening its courts to (a cause of action not arising out of the corporation’s activities in the state) or compels (a state) to do so. This conforms to the realistic reasoning in International Shoe v. Washington (cits.). (Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 444-446 (72 SC 413, 96 LE 485) (1952).)” (Emphasis in original.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 601, fn. 3, supra.
In the case sub judice, the evidence is undisputed that PWC markets its products, including the type of defective engine involved in this case, to Georgia customers. PWC has prepositioned spare parts and material in Georgia and sends its employees to Georgia for ongoing “customer relations,” notably on behalf of a single customer accounting for more than $3 million in annual sales. “Thus, we are not faced with an isolated transaction, but with extended activities which evidence an intention to continue business in this [S]tate. Winston Corp. v. Park Elec. Co., 126 Ga. App. 489 (191 SE2d 340). The evidence in the instant case demanded a finding that [defendant PWC] *9was ‘doing business’ in this [S]tate.” Aiken Asphalt Paving Co. v. Winn, 133 Ga. App. 3, 4 (2), 5 (2b) (209 SE2d 700). “As a matter of federal due process, the business done by [PWC] in Georgia was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Georgia to entertain the [product liability] cause of action against it, though the cause of action arose from activities [arguably] distinct from its activities in Georgia. Perkins v. Benguet &c. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 447-449 [supra]; [Cits.]” Harry S. Peterson Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 585, 586 (2b), 588, supra. See also Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245, 247 (2), 249 (414 SE2d 658).
Decided July 14, 1995
Kilpatrick & Cody, Susan A. Cahoon, Craig E. Bertschi, Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Robert D. McCallum, Jr., for appellant.
Jason T. Schneider, for appellees.
Moreover, I note that personal service of process on PWC in Quebec, “in conformity with the Law of the Province of Quebec,” is also sufficient under Georgia law. “All process may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state and, when a statute so provides, beyond the territorial limits of the state.” OCGA § 9-11-4 (f). Canada is a signatory to the 1965 Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents, which is statutory authority to effect service of process beyond the territorial limits of Georgia. Camp v. Sellers & Co., 158 Ga. App. 646, 647 (2) (281 SE2d 621). It follows that personal service abroad on a PWC vice president by an authorized Canadian process server was adequate service of process, since PWC is a foreign corporation “doing business” in Georgia but with no registered agent for service of process within the jurisdiction. OCGA § 9-11-4 (d); American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Lew Deadmore & Assoc., 127 Ga. App. 207, 210 (4) (193 SE2d 275). The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss this complaint, either under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (2) or OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (5). The majority would reverse on jurisdictional grounds, based (in my view) on a misapprehension that the Georgia Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91, is the sole authority for exercising a general jurisdiction over this nonresident corporate defendant which enjoys more than $3 million in annual sales to Georgia customers but which has not registered to do business in this State.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.