Court Opinion

ID: 9853604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:50:58.313508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:55.350935
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which affirms, with indicated modifications, the judgment against defendant White Motor Corporation (White). I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the judgment against White’s codefendant Southern Pacific Company (Southern Pacific) is supported by substantial evidence. In my opinion the majority’s attempt to substitute evidentiary volume for evidentiary relevance is unavailing. Whether viewed “singly” or “cumulatively,” the random record of miscellany cited by the majority fails to establish any basis for Southern Pacific’s liability, either through its own direct negligence, or through its relationship with its subsidiary, Pacific Motor Trucking Company (PMT).
I fully accept the well settled rules that appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited, and that all presumptions favor a jury’s verdict. Nonetheless, in order to sustain a judgment against appellate scrutiny, the supporting evidence must at least be “of ponderable legal significance” and “must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” (Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [247 P.2d 54].) As I explain, the majority points to no such evidence against Southern Pacific.
Throughout the trial plaintiff’s principal contention was that the defective design and improper maintenance of the White tractor’s steering mechanism were the cause of his injuries. No evidence whatever appears in the record that any negligent acts or omissions of Southern Pacific in the maintenance of its railyard, rolling stock, or endplates contributed to the accident. There was testimony that the surfaces and elevation of the flatcars in question were uneven, and that Southern Pacific, on occasion, had used “bent” endplates. However, the testimony *64of plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Youngdahl, on this evidence established only that the tractor’s power steering systems should have been strong enough to withstand the stresses produced by the loading operations, a fact the majority also appears to concede.
The majority states that a plaintiff’s foreman had brought the “defective” endplates to Southern Pacific’s attention and had recommended their repair. If true, this would be at least some evidence that continued maintenance of the endplates in a warped condition was direct negligence on the part of Southern Pacific. With due respect, however, I suggest that the majority seriously mischaracterizes the record. The foreman testified generally that he reported to Southern Pacific “defects” in its equipment when he observed them; the only example of a “reported defect” that he could recall, however, was a damaged brake arm. In another portion of his testimony, the foreman acknowledged observing uneven rail car heights and bent endplates; however, he never characterized these conditions as defective or unsafe, nor did he testify he had reported them to Southern Pacific.
Plaintiff, in short, never established on this record how Southern Pacific should have managed differently any property under its direct control in order to avoid the mishap. Since plaintiff’s complaint emphasized the theory that his injury had been caused by Southern Pacific’s negligent maintenance of its railroad cars, we must deem significant his omission to introduce any evidence on this issue at trial.
The record reflects that PMT had contracted with Southern Pacific to load and unload Southern Pacific’s trains in the latter’s Los Angeles yard, and that PMT’s negligence in maintaining the subject White tractor was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Generally, liability is not imposed upon a parly for the negligence of an independent contractor engaged by the parly. (Williams v. Fairhaven Cemetery Assn. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 135, 139 [338 P.2d 392]; Green v. Soule (1904) 145 Cal. 96, 99 [78 P. 337]; Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 881 [110 Cal.Rptr. 511]; West v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 296, 299 [59 Cal.Rptr. 286]; see Golden v. Conway (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 948, 956-957 [128 Cal.Rptr. 69].) The majority has accepted plaintiff’s argument that an exception to the foregoing general rule of nonliability should be recognized in the instant case because Southern Pacific (1) exercised detailed control over the manner in which PMT performed its work, and (2) selected and furnished to PMT the defective vehicle. (McDonald v. Shell Oil Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 785, 791 [285 P.2d 902]; Hard *65v. Hollywood Turf Club (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 263, 274-275 [246 P.2d 716].) In my opinion the argument cannot be sustained.
PMT’s loading operations necessarily conformed to Southern Pacific’s train schedules and business needs, thereby governing time, place and circumstance of the loading process. Furthermore, Southern Pacific, under its contract with PMT, could cause the discharge of PMT employees and had the right to inspect PMT’s books.
However, . . ‘[t]he general supervisory right to control the work so as to insure its satisfactory completion in accordance with the terms of the contract does not make the hirer of an independent contractor liable for the latter’s negligent acts in performing the details of the work ....’” (Williams v. Fairhaven Cemetery Assn., supra, 52 Cal.2d atp. 139.) Here, and this is crucial, the contract gave Southern Pacific no right to supervise PMT’s methods of operation, nor does the record suggest that Southern Pacific in any manner attempted to exercise such supervision or control. (McDonald, supra, at p. 791.) There is, for example, no evidence that Southern Pacific selected the tractor to be used in a particular operation, governed shift schedules, or designated how PMT employees were to be deployed; all these functions were apparently retained by PMT.
No Southern Pacific personnel were at the scene in either an operational or supervisorial capacity when the accident occurred, nor was there any purpose which would have been served by their presence. The evidence that PMT was Southern Pacific’s wholly owned subsidiary and that most of PMT’s work involved Southern Pacific’s rolling stock adds nothing to plaintiff’s case. The fact that PMT’s tractors displayed the words “Southern Pacific” tells us nothing about the critical right to, or exercise of, control or supervision over the operational details of the work. Significantly, plaintiff and the majority studiously refrain from contending that PMT’s close corporate relationship with Southern Pacific makes either entity the “alter ego” of the other. Unaided by this doctrine, evidence of that relationship, standing alone, permits no inference that Southern Pacific in fact controlled the activities which led to plaintiff’s injury. Southern Pacific neither had the contractual right to exercise control, nor attempted in fact to assert any control over the loading operations.
Nor does the record permit any inference that Southern Pacific was directly responsible for the purchase or maintenance of the defective tractor. Under the contract, Southern Pacific, as part of its costs of PMT’s *66services, agreed to and did reimburse PMT for the purchase and maintenance of PMTs equipment. However, this does not mean that Southern Pacific itself “furnished” or maintained the equipment. In many business arrangements there are contracts in which parties guarantee some or all of a contractor’s costs of operation; contractual provisions for reimbursement and “cost plus” formulae are a frequent and familiar commercial means of achieving this goal.
At trial all the evidence was to the effect that PMT was solely responsible for the selection, purchase, repair, maintenance and deployment of the tractors. There is no suggestion in the record that Southern Pacific or its employees were aware of any defect which produced plaintiff’s injuries.
In summary, the record is devoid of evidence that Southern Pacific had either actual or potential control over the details of the work in question, or that it negligently furnished defective equipment or created any working conditions which caused plaintiff’s injuries.
I would affirm the judgment against White, and would reverse the judgment against Southern Pacific with directions that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be granted.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied September 27, 1978. Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.