Court Opinion

ID: 9409887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 19:05:23.764895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:54.321303
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/19/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                   DIVISION ONE

                            STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 YISROEL GOLDSTEIN et al.,                 D081587

         Petitioners,                      (San Diego County
                                           Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00016638-
         v.                                CU-PO-CTL)

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
 DIEGO COUNTY,

         Respondent;

 SAN DIEGO GUNS, LLC,

         Real Party in Interest.

       ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Kenneth J. Medel, Judge.
Petition granted.
       Artiano Shinoff, Daniel R. Shinoff, Sheldon Ostroff, and Maurice A.
Bumbu, for Petitioners.
       No appearance for Respondent.
       Law Offices of Adrienne D. Cohen, Adrienne D. Cohen and Sean R.
Ferron, for Real Party in Interest.
      In this litigation arising from the April 2019 shooting at the Chabad of
Poway synagogue, the plaintiffs in two consolidated lawsuits against San
Diego Guns, LLC (San Diego Guns) seek a peremptory writ of mandate
directing the trial court to vacate its ruling that granted summary
adjudication to San Diego Guns on plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking to
recover against San Diego Guns based on the doctrine of negligence per se.
Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence per se is that San Diego Guns violated
California law in selling the 19-year-old shooter a rifle. According to
plaintiffs, the shooter did not qualify for the then-existing exception that
allowed a person under the age of 21 to be sold a rifle if that person possessed
a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” (Former Pen. Code, § 27510,

subd. (b)(1).)1
      The trial court granted summary adjudication based on its conclusion
that the shooter’s hunting license was valid and unexpired in April 2019 even
though, on its face, the license stated that it was “Valid 07/01/2019 to
06/30/2020,” i.e., for a period beginning more than two months after San
Diego Guns sold him the rifle. The trial court distinguished between the time
period “when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for purposes of hunting,” which
began on July 1, 2019, and the time period when “the license is valid for
purposes of sale of the weapon,” which, according to the trial court, began
when the license was issued in April 2019.
      As we will explain, the meaning of the statute’s reference to a “valid,
unexpired hunting license” is ambiguous. However, in light of the
Legislature’s subsequent enactment of section 16685, which clarifies that “a
valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license . . . for which

1    Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
                                        2
the time period authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has
commenced but not expired,” the trial court erred in concluding that the
shooter’s hunting license was valid for the purpose of purchasing a firearm.
We accordingly grant plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate.
                                         I.
                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        On April 27, 2019, 19-year-old John T. Earnest opened fire with an AR-
15 style semiautomatic rifle at the Chabad of Poway synagogue, killing one
person and wounding others. The rifle was sold to Earnest by San Diego
Guns.
        As relevant here, two groups of plaintiffs (Plaintiffs), who were present
at the Chabad of Poway synagogue on the day of the shooting, filed lawsuits
against San Diego Guns. Plaintiffs’ two lawsuits were subsequently

consolidated, along with two others.2 Among the causes of action asserted by
Plaintiffs against San Diego Guns were claims of negligence that depended
on the doctrine of negligence per se.
        To understand Plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence per se, some
background is required. Evidence Code section 669 “codifies the common law
doctrine of negligence per se” and “allows proof of a statutory violation to
create a presumption of negligence in specified circumstances.” (Elsner v.
Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 927.) Under that provision, “The failure of a
person to exercise due care is presumed if: [¶] (1) He violated a statute,
ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; [¶] (2) The violation proximately
caused death or injury to person or property; [¶] (3) The death or injury

2     The Plaintiffs who bring this petition for writ of mandate are the
plaintiffs in Goldstein v. Earnest et al. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2020,
No. 37-2020-00016638-CU-PO-CTL) and Almog v. Earnest et al. (Super. Ct.
San Diego County, 2021, No. 37-2021-00022519-CU-PO-CTL).
                                         3
resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or
regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) The person suffering the
death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons
for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.”
(Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a).) The presumption may be rebutted if the
defendant shows that it “did what might reasonably be expected of a person
of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to
comply with the law.” (Id., subd. (b).) “ ‘[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is
not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that
affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.’ ” (Turner v.
Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534.)
      In April 2019, California law prohibited a licensed gun dealer, such as
San Diego Guns, from selling, supplying, delivering, or giving possession or
control of a firearm to any person under 21 years of age unless a specific
statutory exception was applicable. (Former § 27510.) Although Earnest was
19 years old at the time, San Diego Guns sold the rifle to Earnest based on its
belief that Earnest qualified for the exception set forth in former
section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). Under that exception, San Diego Guns was
permitted to sell, supply, deliver, or give possession or control “of a firearm
that is not a handgun to a person 18 years of age or older who possesses a
valid, unexpired hunting license issued by the Department of Fish and
Wildlife.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The AR-15 style rifle purchased by Earnest was
indisputably “not a handgun,” and thus Earnest was eligible to purchase it
under the exception set forth in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) if he

possessed a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” (Ibid.)3

3     Section 27510 was amended as of January 1, 2020 to remove

                                        4
      Earnest paid for his rifle at San Diego Guns on April 13, 2019. He then
obtained a hunting license on April 15, 2019, which he presented to San
Diego Guns on April 16, 2019, when he completed the required paperwork for
the transaction. The hunting license consisted of a single piece of paper,
which stated that it was an “ANNUAL HUNTING LICENSE [¶] Valid
07/01/2019 to 06/30/2020.” After a background check and the 10-day waiting
period required by law, Earnest took possession of the rifle from San Diego
Guns on April 26, 2019.
      Plaintiffs alleged in their operative complaints that the doctrine of
negligence per se applied because San Diego Guns violated former
section 27510 when it sold the rifle to Earnest. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged
that the exception in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) allowing a
person under 21 years of age to buy a rifle was not applicable because
Earnest did not possess a “valid, unexpired hunting license” (former § 27510,
subd. (b)(1)) at the time San Diego Guns sold him the rifle.
      San Diego Guns filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, for summary adjudication against Plaintiffs. San Diego Guns

“semiautomatic centerfire rifle[s]” from the exception set forth in subdivision
(b)(1) for a person under the age of 21 who possesses “a valid, unexpired
hunting license.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 737, § 3.) Thus, under current law, an AR-
15 style semiautomatic centerfire rifle would no longer fall under the
exception in subdivision (b)(1) for someone with “a valid, unexpired hunting
license,” but certain other types of firearms still qualify. Specifically, the
current version of section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) states that the prohibition
on selling, supplying, delivering, or giving possession or control of a firearm
to any person under 21 years of age “does not apply to or affect the sale,
supplying, delivery, or giving possession or control of a firearm that is not a
handgun, semiautomatic centerfire rifle, completed frame or receiver, or
firearm precursor part to a person 18 years of age or older who possesses a
valid, unexpired hunting license issued by the Department of Fish and
Wildlife.”
                                        5
argued that Plaintiffs would not be able to successfully rely on the doctrine of
negligence per se to show a breach of duty of care because the exception set
forth in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) permitted San Diego Guns to
sell the rifle to Earnest. According to San Diego Guns, the exception applied
because Earnest had a validly issued and unexpired hunting license when he
purchased the rifle in April 2019. In their opposition, Plaintiffs argued that
(1) the hunting license was not valid and unexpired because it stated, on its
face, that it did not become valid until July 1, 2019; and (2) even if the
hunting license was “valid” within the meaning of former section 27510,
subdivision (b)(1) when it was issued to Earnest on April 15, 2019, San Diego
Guns sold the rifle to Earnest before that date because it accepted payment
from Earnest for the rifle on April 13, 2019.
      In a January 10, 2023 minute order, the trial court granted summary
adjudication on what it identified as the “theory of ‘negligence per se’ ” pled in

Plaintiffs’ complaints.4 The trial court concluded that a hunting license
“validly issued” is a “valid, unexpired hunting license” as that term is used in
former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). As the trial court explained, the face
of the hunting license “states when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for
purposes of hunting,” but not “for purposes of sale of the weapon.” The trial
court ruled that San Diego Guns complied with section 27510 because
Earnest’s hunting license was validly issued and was not expired, even

4     In the summary judgment/summary adjudication motion that it filed
against Plaintiffs, San Diego Guns also challenged one of the other
consolidated lawsuits, Peretz v. San Diego Guns, LLC (Super. Ct. of San
Diego County, 2020, No. 37-2020-00047963-CU-PO-CTL), on the same basis.
As to the Peretz plaintiff, the trial court granted summary judgment because
negligence per se was the sole theory of liability alleged against San Diego
Guns in the Peretz lawsuit. The plaintiff in the Peretz lawsuit filed a notice of
appeal but is not participating in this writ proceeding.
                                         6
though it could not yet be used for hunting.5 The trial court also rejected
Plaintiffs’ contention that the sale of the rifle took place when Earnest paid
for the gun on April 13, 2019, prior to issuance of the hunting license on April
15, 2019. Relying on the definitions of “sale” in the Commercial Code (Cal. U.
Com. Code, § 2106, subd. (1)) and the Revenue and Taxation Code (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 6006, subd. (a)), the trial court ruled that “[t]he ‘sale’ here was
not simply the acceptance of the money, but the transfer of the purchase,”
which occurred on April 26, 2019, after Earnest obtained the hunting license.
      Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandate on February 14, 2023,
requesting that we direct the trial court to vacate its summary adjudication
ruling on the causes of action that depend on the doctrine of negligence per

5      In its minute order, the trial court sustained all of San Diego Guns’
objections to the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their
opposition. Plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling, although they point out
that the trial court failed to rule on their request that it take judicial notice of
two statutes and one legislative history document, two of which were also the
subject of San Diego Guns’ evidentiary objections. Regardless of the trial
court’s failure to rule, we take judicial notice, on our own motion, of the
legislative history and statutory provisions that Plaintiffs submitted, to the
extent they are relevant. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a), (c), 459.) In the
course of our analysis, we will discuss those and certain other legislative
history materials that are relevant to our interpretation of former section
27510, subdivision (b)(1) but were not submitted by the parties. We judicially
notice those items on our own motion. (See Gananian v. Wagstaffe (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9 [“We may take judicial notice of legislative
history materials on our own motion.”].) Plaintiffs also point out that
although they filed objections to evidence submitted by San Diego Guns, the
trial court did not rule on those objections. “[I]f the trial court fails to rule
expressly on specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections
have been overruled, [and] the trial court considered the evidence in ruling on
the merits of the summary judgment motion.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010)
50 Cal.4th 512, 534.)
                                         7
se. On March 16, 2023, we issued an order to show cause why the relief
Plaintiffs seek should not be granted.
                                         II.
                                  DISCUSSION
A.    Standard of Review
      “[A] ruling on a motion for summary adjudication is reviewed de novo.”
(Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 273.) Further, “ ‘[t]he
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this court reviews
de novo.’ ” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 662.)
B.    Interpretation of Former Section 27510, Subdivision (b)(1)
      Our resolution of this writ proceeding turns on the meaning of the
phrase “valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510,
subdivision (b)(1). We must decide whether, for the purpose of the former
statute, a hunting license is “valid” (1) only beginning on the date printed on
the face of the license, showing the date that the license can first be used for
hunting; or (2) as of the date that it is issued, even if it cannot yet be used for
hunting. Put another way, does the statutory use of the term “valid,
unexpired hunting license” mean a license that currently allows the person
holding it to engage in hunting, or does it mean a license that has been
validly issued and is not yet expired?
      “Our goal in construing a statute is ‘to determine and give effect to the
intent of the enacting legislative body.’ [Citation.] ‘ “We first examine the
words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute
should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in
their statutory context.” [Citation.] If the plain, commonsense meaning of a
statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] If,

                                         8
however, the statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we ‘may
consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils
to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory
scheme encompassing the statute.’ ” (Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd.
No. 1 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 482, 490 (Holland).)
      Turning to the statutory language, the meaning of the phrase “valid,
unexpired hunting license” is not clear. It is reasonable to understand the
phrase to mean a license that is currently “valid” for hunting. But it is also
reasonable to understand it as meaning a license that has been validly issued
and has not yet expired. There are good arguments for either interpretation
when only the words themselves are consulted. For one thing, if the
Legislature meant to refer to a validly issued hunting license, why did it
choose to use the word “valid” and the word “unexpired” to describe the
hunting license, when the single word “unexpired” would just as well have
described a hunting license that had been validly issued but had not yet
expired? In that light, a “valid” license would tend to mean something more
than merely an “unexpired” license, such as a license that is currently valid
for hunting. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010 [“interpretations
that render statutory terms meaningless as surplusage are to be avoided”].)
On the other hand, one of the common meanings of the word “valid” is
“having legal efficacy or force.” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary (2023)
 [as of July 19, 2023],
archived at .) It is possible that the
Legislature intended this definition of the word “valid,” and that it
accordingly wanted to specify that the hunting license had to be a document
with legal efficacy in that it was properly issued.

                                        9
      Because the statutory language is ambiguous, we must consider other
tools of interpretation. (Holland, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 490.) The parties
have not supplied us with any of the legislative history materials from Senate
Bill No. 1100, which enacted the former version of section 27510, subdivision

(b)(1) that was operative in April 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 894, § 1.)6 We have,

6      San Diego Guns submitted the legislative history for a different
statutory provision, which, like former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1),
attaches legal significance to the fact that a person seeking to acquire a
firearm possesses a hunting license. Specifically, under California law, a
person who wants to obtain a firearm generally must have a firearm safety
certificate. (§ 31615.) However, under section 31700, subdivision (c), “a valid
hunting license that is unexpired” will be treated as a substitute, except as to
handguns. San Diego Guns relies on legislative history indicating that this
provision was enacted because a person who obtains a hunting license has
passed an educational course with safety information that is “more extensive
than that in the safety certificate education component.” The legislative
history of section 31700, subdivision (c) is inapposite here. It does not show
the Legislature’s purpose in requiring a “valid, unexpired hunting license” for
the exception applicable to persons under the age of 21 in former
section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). Nor does it shed any light on the meaning
of the term “valid, unexpired hunting license” in that provision. At most, it
shows that one reason the Legislature might include a hunting license
exception when enacting legislation is because a person who has a hunting
license has taken an educational course that includes firearm safety
instruction.
       Even were we to find the legislative history submitted by San Diego
Guns to be applicable here, we note that some of the language that San Diego
Guns identifies in the legislative history of section 31700, subdivision (c) is
more consistent with Plaintiffs’ contention that a “valid, unexpired hunting
license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) means a license that is
currently valid for engaging in hunting. Specifically, San Diego Guns quotes
a legislative analyst as stating that, under section 31700, subdivision (c),
persons “with valid current-season hunting licenses” would be exempted from
the generally applicable safety certificate requirement. (Italics added.)
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 683 (2013-2014 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 2013, p. 1.) That would appear to describe a

                                      10
on our own motion, consulted the available legislative reports and analyses
from Senate Bill No. 1100, but none of them suggest a definition for the term
“valid, unexpired hunting license.” Nor does that legislative history
specifically set forth the Legislature’s purpose in creating the hunting license

exception for persons under the age of 21 to purchase certain firearms.7 The
legislative history identifies some of the general policies behind Senate Bill
No. 1100. However, when we attempt to apply those general policy goals we
obtain no definitive answer as to whether San Diego Guns, on the one hand,
or Plaintiffs, on the other, have the correct interpretation of the phrase
“valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1).
For example, we could look to the observation in the legislative history that

license that currently permits the license holder to participate in hunting for
the current season, rather than a hunting license that has been validly issued
but does not allow hunting until the upcoming hunting season.

7      To support its interpretation, San Diego Guns cites to the discussion in
a now-vacated Ninth Circuit opinion. (Jones v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th
704, 727, opn. vacated on rehg. (9th Cir. 2022) 47 F.4th 1124 (Jones).) That
case cited to the federal district court’s discussion purporting to describe the
Legislature’s purpose for enacting the exception set forth in former
section 27510, subdivision (b)(1), as well as for subsequently removing
semiautomatic centerfire rifles from the weapons that may be purchased
under that exception. The Ninth Circuit quoted the district court as saying
that “California’s objective is ‘to increase public safety through sensible
firearm control and limit access to certain firearms for some Young Adults
with proper safety training.’ ” (Jones, at p. 727 [quoting Jones v. Becerra
(S.D.Cal. 2020) 498 F.Supp.3d 1317, 1330].) That discussion does not
materially advance our understanding of the specific meaning of the phrase
“valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1).
Not only did the district court fail to provide any citation to the relevant
legislative history documents in describing the Legislature’s purpose (Jones
v. Becerra, at p. 1330), the district court’s broad description of the legislative
intent, whatever its source, does not resolve the specific question of statutory
interpretation that we address in this opinion.
                                       11
some persons between the ages of 18 and 20 engage in “ ‘impulsive or reckless
behavior.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1100
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2018, p. 3.) That fact would
support interpreting the phrase “valid, unexpired hunting license” to require
that a young person wait until hunting season has commenced to obtain a
firearm in order to prevent impulsive and reckless firearm use. On the other
hand, Senate Bill No. 1100 was intended, generally, as “taking proper steps
toward public safety.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1100 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2018, p. 3.) In light of
that general purpose, it could be argued that in creating the exception for a
“valid, unexpired hunting license,” the Legislature was most interested in
making sure that a person under the age of 21 had taken the educational
course that is required before obtaining a hunting license, which includes
firearm safety instruction. (Fish & G. Code, § 3050, subd. (a)(3); Jones,
supra, 34 F.4th at pp. 727-728, opn. vacated on rehg. [describing the value of
a hunter education course in promoting public safety with respect to firearm
use for persons under the age of 21].) Taking that view, it would not matter
that the license is not yet valid for engaging in hunting. None of these

observations are dispositive.8

8      For the first time at oral argument, counsel for San Diego Guns
advanced another argument for the view that, at the time Earnest purchased
the rifle in April 2019, the Legislative intent was for “a valid, unexpired
hunting license” to mean a license that had been issued but not yet expired.
Specifically, counsel for San Diego Guns argued that any other meaning
risked creating a statute that was unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although making that
argument, counsel also stated that we did not need to reach the
constitutional issue. Regardless of whether the constitutional issue could
have any relevance here, we will not address it because it was raised for the

                                      12
      As Plaintiffs point out, however, effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature clarified the meaning of “a valid and unexpired hunting license”
as that term is used in the relevant part of the Penal Code that deals with
the control of deadly weapons. Newly enacted section 16685 states, “As used
in this part, a valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license
issued by the Department of Fish and Wildlife . . . for which the time period
authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has commenced but not

expired.”9 (§ 16685, Stats. 2021, ch. 250, § 5, italics added.) A legislative
committee report states that the new law was proposed specifically in light of
Earnest’s purchase of the rifle he used during the shooting at the Chabad of
Poway synagogue. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.) “In 2019, a 19 year
old illegally purchased a semiautomatic centerfire rifle from a dealer with
[a]n invalid hunting license and tragically opened fire at a synagogue in
Poway, CA. . . . [¶] This bill will address the outstanding circumstances
uncovered in Poway, ensuring that background checks are done
comprehensively so the same mistakes do not happen again.” (Ibid., italics
added.)

first time at oral argument. (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990
[“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue
raised initially’ at oral argument.”]; Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348,
356, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is not required to consider any point made for
the first time at oral argument, and it will be deemed waived.”].)

9    “This part” in the statutory language refers to Part 6 of the Penal Code,
Control of Deadly Weapons. Section 27510 falls under Part 6.
                                       13
      The definition of a “valid and unexpired hunting license” in

section 16685 is the same definition advanced here by Plaintiffs.10
Specifically, a hunting license is “valid” and “unexpired” only if it can
currently be used to engage in hunting. Therefore, the question we must
address is the extent to which the definition in section 16685 is applicable to
determine the meaning of former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1).
      The general rule is that unless the Legislature expressly states
otherwise, or it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature must
have intended a retroactive application, a newly enacted statutory provision
applies prospectively only. (McClung v. Employment Development Dept.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475 (McClung); Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841.)11 However, our Supreme Court has also
explained that “[a] statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing
law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Carter v.
California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter).) “We
assume the Legislature amends a statute for a purpose, but that purpose
need not necessarily be to change the law. [Citation.] Our consideration of
the surrounding circumstances can indicate that the Legislature made
material changes in statutory language in an effort only to clarify a statute’s
true meaning. [Citations.] Such a legislative act has no retrospective effect
because the true meaning of the statute remains the same.” (Western

10     Plaintiffs identified section 16685 to the trial court in their opposition
briefing, but the trial court’s ruling did not mention that provision.

11    Although not relevant here, it is also presumed that the Legislature
intended that “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or
reducing criminal liability . . . applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at
the time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 852, citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745.)
                                        14
Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western
Security).)
      “In determining whether a statute clarified or changed the law, we give
‘due consideration’ to the Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute.
[Citation.] The Legislature’s declaration of an existing statute’s meaning,
while not dispositive, is a factor entitled to consideration. [Citation.] We look
to ‘the surrounding circumstances’ as well as the Legislature’s intent when
determining whether a statute changed or merely clarified the law.” (In re
Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 184.) “Ultimately, the
interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power the
Constitution assigns to the courts. . . . Nevertheless, the Legislature’s
expressed views on the prior import of its statutes are entitled to due
consideration, and we cannot disregard them.” (Western Security, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 244.) However, “[a] declaration that a statutory amendment
merely clarified the law ‘cannot be given an obviously absurd effect, and the
court cannot accept the Legislative statement that an unmistakable change
in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its
original terms.’ ” (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 473.)
      One circumstance indicating the Legislature intended to clarify an
existing statute rather than to change the law “ ‘is when the Legislature
promptly reacts to the emergence of a novel question of statutory
interpretation[.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘An amendment which in effect construes and
clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the
meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after
the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the statute. . . .
[¶] If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the
interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a

                                       15
legislative interpretation of the original act . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Carter, supra,
38 Cal.4th at p. 923.) Viewing a new statutory enactment as an attempt to
clarify the meaning of an existing statute is especially warranted when, as
here, the meaning of relevant language in the existing statute is plainly
ambiguous. (Id. at p. 930 [noting the significance of the “ambiguity that
existed in the language and legislative history of” the existing statute]; In re
J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1479-1480 [when the language of a voter-
adopted ballot initiative was ambiguous and there were “solid arguments
both for and against” a certain interpretation, the Legislature’s enactment
clarifying the ambiguity was a clarification of existing law, not a change].)
      Here, although the legislative history did not specifically use the word
“clarify” in describing the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 16685, it
stated that the purpose of newly enacted section 16685 was to “further define
a valid and unexpired hunting license.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19,
2021, p. 2, italics added.) The legislative history unmistakably set forth the
view that, at the time Earnest bought his rifle in 2019, the exception set forth
in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) already required that the person
obtaining the weapon must have a hunting license that was currently valid
for engaging in hunting. Specifically, the legislative history stated that in
the Chabad of Poway shooting, “[t]he shooter obtained a semi-automatic
firearm, despite being under the age of 21, with a hunting license that was
not yet valid.” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 2021, p. 2, italics added.)
According to the legislative history, San Diego Guns’ sale of the rifle to
Earnest was a “mistake[ ]” because the hunting license was “invalid.” (Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as

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amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.) The legislative history also quoted the view of
a group in opposition to the legislation, the California Rifle and Pistol
Association, stating that under the law as it existed at the time, a “valid”
hunting license is one that can currently be used for hunting: “[D]o we really
need legislation to define what a valid hunting license is? Doesn’t the date
printed on the license do that?” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 5.)12
      As in the cases where a recent appellate court opinion made the
Legislature aware that a preexisting statute was in need of clarification (see,
e.g., Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 930; Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th
at pp. 241-242), the circumstances surrounding the then-recent Chabad of
Poway shooting brought to the Legislature’s attention that, unless clarified,
there was a risk that the term “valid and unexpired” hunting license would
continue to be misapplied in a manner that the Legislature did not intend.
By “ ‘promptly react[ing] to the emergence of a novel’ ” question of statutory
interpretation (Carter, at p. 923) regarding the term “valid and unexpired
hunting license,” the Legislature enacted section 16685 to clear up the
ambiguity and prevent any further mistakes like the one made in selling the

rifle to Earnest.13 Therefore, in light of the legislative history, coupled with

12    If nothing else, the statement by the California Rifle and Pistol
Association shows that we would not be giving “an obviously absurd effect”
(McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 473) to section 16685 in concluding that the
Legislature intended it to clarify the already-existing meaning of a “valid”
and “unexpired” hunting license.

13     Although the version of section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) that was in
force when San Diego Guns sold the rifle to Earnest in 2019 is no longer
effective, the Legislature’s clarification of the term “valid and unexpired
hunting license” in section 16685 is relevant to influence future conduct

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our view that the term “valid, unexpired hunting license” in former
section 27510 is ambiguous, we conclude that in enacting section 16685, the
Legislature intended to clarify the meaning of the term “valid, unexpired
hunting license” in former section 27510, rather than to change the law.
      Applying section 16685 to inform our interpretation of former
section 27510, the undisputed facts establish that Earnest did not possess a
“valid, unexpired hunting license” in April 2019 when San Diego Guns sold
him the rifle. Earnest’s hunting license did not become valid until it could be

used for engaging in hunting on July 1, 2019.14 Accordingly, the trial court
erred in ruling in favor of San Diego Guns on its motion for summary
adjudication on the causes of action that were based on the doctrine of
negligence per se.

because the current version of the statute contains a different exception that
applies to a person under the age of 21 who possesses a “valid, unexpired
hunting license.” (§ 27510, subd. (b)(1).) In addition, the Penal Code
currently refers to a “valid” and “unexpired” hunting license as an exception,
except for handguns, to the requirement that a person purchasing a firearm
have a firearm safety certificate. (§ 31700, subd. (c).)

14    Because we rule in favor of Plaintiffs based on our conclusion that
Earnest’s hunting license was not valid until July 1, 2019, we need not, and
do not, address Plaintiffs’ argument that the sale of the rifle occurred on
April 13, 2019, when Earnest paid for it (and before he obtained a hunting
license on April 15, 2019), rather than on April 26, 2019, when he took
possession of the rifle.
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                                DISPOSITION
      Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to
vacate that part of its January 10, 2023 order that grants summary
adjudication to San Diego Guns on Plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking relief
based on the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs
in this writ proceeding.

                                                                      IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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