Court Opinion

ID: 9428286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:20.502846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.633345
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting in part.
Pennhurst is a residential institution for the retarded operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and serving a five-county area. Roughly half of its 1,200 residents were admitted upon application of their parents or guardians while the remainder were committed pursuant to court order. After extensive discovery and a lengthy trial, the District Court held that the conditions of confinement at Pennhurst violated the rights of its residents under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, state *34law,1 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and entered a detailed remedial order requiring the eventual closing of Pennhurst in favor of community living arrangements for Pennhurst’s displaced residents. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (ED Pa. 1978). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the result reached by the District Court was proper under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill) (Act), although relief under that statute had not initially been raised in that court. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en banc). The Court of Appeals determined that the Act created judicially cognizable rights to treatment and to receipt of care in the least restrictive environment, and that the right to treatment was also supported by state law. The court essentially affirmed the remedial order entered by the District Court with one significant exception.2 Finding that the legislative history did not require the abandonment of large institutional facilities, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in ordering Pennhurst to be. closed. Rather, the Court of Appeals required that each resident of Pennhurst be afforded an individual hearing before a Special Master to determine the appropriate level of institutionalization with a presumption established that community-based living arrangements were proper.
In essence, the Court concludes that the so-called “Bill of Rights” section of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010, merely serves to establish guidelines which States should endeavor to fulfill, but which have no real effect except to the extent that the Secretary of Health and Human Services chooses to use the criteria established by § 6010 in determining funding under the Act. In my view, this reading misconceives the impor*35tant purposes Congress intended § 6010 to serve. That section, as confirmed by its legislative history, was intended by Congress to establish requirements which participating States had to meet in providing care to the developmentally disabled. The fact that Congress spoke in generalized terms rather than the language of regulatory minutia cannot make nugatory actions so carefully undertaken.
I
As an initial matter, I agree that § 6010 was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, and not pursuant to its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, I agree that the Act was not intended to place duties on States independent of their participation in the program established by the Act. The Court of Appeals, in the section of its opinion concerning the exercise of a private cause of action, determined that § 6010 was passed pursuant to § 5, reasoning that since the Fourteenth Amendment included a right “ ‘to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security,’ ” 612 F. 2d, at 98, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977), congressional passage of § 6010 indicated its desire to enforce this interest.3 Congressional action under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has very significant consequences, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), and given these ramifications, it should not be lightly assumed that Congress acted pursuant to its power under § 5 in passing the Act.
*36Here, there is no conclusive basis for determining that Congress acted pursuant to § 5. Nothing in the statutory language refers to the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 6010 was but one part of a bill whose underlying purpose was to extend and modify an existing federal-state grant program. The initial program was unquestionably passed pursuant to Congress’ spending power. Moreover, § 6010 (3) is by its express terms a limitation on federal and state spending. The rights articulated in § 6010 are also cross-referenced in §6063 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), which details the operation of the grant program.4 Thus, all objective considerations connected with § 6010 and its operation suggest that Congress enacted it pursuant to its Spending Clause powers.
Of course, resolution of the § 5 issue does not determine the issue whether § 6010 was intended by Congress to have substantive consequences as part of a statute enacted under Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and in my view, the majority makes far too much of the fact that § 6010 was not passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. While this conclusion has significant ramifications for the appropriate remedy for violations of the Act, it does not follow that § 6010 was to have no impact or effect besides the mere “encouragement” of state action and created no obligations on participating States and no rights in those being served by programs maintained by a State in cooperation with the Federal Government.
II
The language and scheme of the Act make it plain enough to me that Congress intended § 6010, although couched in *37terms of rights, to serve as requirements that the participating States must observe in receiving federal funds under the provisions of the Act. That Congress was deadly serious in stating that the developmentally disabled had entitlements which a State must respect if it were to participate in a program can hardly be doubted.
Federal involvement in state provision of health care to those persons with developmental disabilities began in 1963 with the passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, Pub. L. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282. That statute provided funds for the construction of health care facilities and specifically encouraged the development of community-based programs.5 The Developmentally Disabled Act, technically an amendment to the Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, was passed in light of Congress’ continued concern about the quality of health care being provided to the developmentally disabled and that federal support for improved care should be increased. A central expression of this concern was § 6010, which declares by way of four congressional “findings” that:
1. Persons with developmental disabilities have a “right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation.”
2. Treatment should be designed to maximize an individual’s potential and should be provided “in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.”
3. The State and Federal Governments have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to institutions or programs that do not provide “appropriate treatment, *38services and habilitation” or do not meet minimum standards of care in six specific respects such as diet, dental care, and the use of force or chemical restraints.
4. Rehabilitative programs should meet standards designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for patients, and these standards should be appropriate to the needs of those being served, depending on the type of institution involved.6
*39As clearly as words can, § 6010 (1) declares that the developmentally disabled have the right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation. The ensuing parts of § 6010 implement this basic declaration. Section 6010 (3), for example, obligates the Federal and State Governments not to spend the public funds on programs that do not carry out the basic requirement of § 6010 (1) and, more specifically, do not meet minimum standards with respect to certain aspects of treatment and custody. Sections 6010 (2) and (4) are phrased in less mandatory terms, but the former unmistakably states a preference for treatment in the least restrictive environment and the latter for establishing standards for assuring the appropriate care of the developmentally disabled in relation to the type of institution involved. Both sections, by delineating in some respects the meaning of “appropriate” *40treatment, services, and habilitation, implement the basic rights that the developmentally disabled must be afforded for the purpose of the programs envisioned by the Act. Hence, neither section could be ignored by the Secretary in carrying out his duties under the statute.
Standing on its own bottom, therefore, § 6010 cannot be treated as only wishful thinking on the part of Congress or as playing some fanciful role in the implementation of the Act. The section clearly states rights which the developmentally disabled are to be provided as against a participating State. But § 6010 does not stand in isolation. Other provisions of the Act confirm the view that participating States must take account of § 6010 and that the section is an integral part of an Act cast in the pattern of extending aid conditioned on state compliance with specified conditions. Section 6063 (a) requires that for a State to take advantage of the Act, it must have a “plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary. . . .” Section 6063 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which is entitled “Conditions for Approval,” states that “[i]n order to be approved by the Secretary under this section, a State plan for the provision of services and facilities for persons with developmental disabilities must” be filed; and in its original form, § 6063 required the plan to satisfy the conditions stated in some 30 numbered paragraphs. The 24th specification was that the plan must “contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities ... who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected.” Any doubts that the human rights referred to in § 6063 (b) (24) corresponded to those specified in § 6010 were removed in 1978 when § 6063 (b) was amended to restate the conditions which a plan must satisfy. Section 6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) now provides:
“The plan must contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of *41all persons with developmental disabilities (especially those persons without familial protection) who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected consistent with section 6010 of this title (relating to the rights of the developmentally disabled).”
Pennsylvania has submitted a plan under § 6063, that is, a plan providing services for the developmentally disabled in Pennsylvania. The Court states that the plan has been approved and that funds have been allocated to the State. These funds will necessarily be supporting Pennsylvania’s “programs” for providing treatment, services, or habilitation within the meaning of § 6063 (b)(5)(C); and under the express terms of that section, Pennsylvania is required to respect the § 6010 rights of the developmentally disabled in its state institutions, including Pennhurst, and to give the Secretary adequate assurances in this respect. This is true whether or not Pennhurst itself directly receives any share of the State’s allocation. It should also be noted that § 6063 (b)(3)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) provides that “the funds paid to the state under § 6062 of this title will be used to 'make a significant contribution toward strengthening services for persons with developmental disabilities through agencies in the various political subdivisions of the State.” Thus, funds received under the Act were intended to result in the improvement of care at institutions like Pennhurst.7

*42
Ill

The legislative history of § 6010 confirms the view that Congress intended § 6010 to have substantive significance. Both the initial House of Representatives and Senate versions of the Act contained provisions indicating congressional concern with the character and quality of care for the developmentally disabled’. The House bill, H. R. 4005, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), did not have a bill of rights section akin to § 6010. It did, however, have a provision that required States to spend at least 10% of their respective allotments “for the purpose of assisting ... in developing and implementing plans designed to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities.” § 5 (b)(4). Debate in the House of Representatives indicated that the spending restriction was designed to promote community-based facilities to counteract the unfortunate practice of widespread institutionalization of developmentally disabled persons.8
*43The Senate version of the Act, S. 462, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), contained a separate Title II, called the “Bill of Rights for Mentally Retarded and Other Persons with Developmental Disabilities,” setting forth in extensive detail specific standards which state programs and facilities were required to meet. The impetus behind the Senate’s “Bill of Rights” was the recognition by several Senators of the tragic conditions of confinement faced by many residents of large institutions.9 An often repeated purpose of the Bill of Rights was to foster the development of community-based facilities as well as to encourage overall better care and treatment for the mentally disabled.10 At the same time, there was the realiza*44tion that institutions still had a significant role to play in the treatment of the mentally disabled.11
The Senate’s version of Title II provided two methods for the States to comply with the requirements of the Act. First, a State wishing to participate could opt to follow guidelines to be established by the Secretary under Part B of Title II. §210 (a). Alternatively, a State could decide to meet the extensive standards specified in Parts C and D relating to residential and community facilities respectively. Under the Senate bill, it was clear that the standards encompassed by the alternative procedures were not merely hortatory. That bill provided that within one year after the enactment, a State desiring funding must provide assurances to the Secretary that “each such facility or agency has established a plan for achieving compliance no later than 5 years after the date of enactment . . . .” §203 (a). After the 5-*45year period, “no residential facility or program of Community care for individuals with developmental disabilities shall be eligible to receive payments either directly or indirectly under any Federal law, unless such residential facility meets the standards promulgated under parts C or D of this title or has demonstrated to the Secretary for a reasonable period of time that it has actively implemented the requirements of part B.” §206 (a).
Following Senate and House passage, the different bills came to a Conference Committee. The resulting compromise kept the House 10% spending restriction which the Conference Report noted was “designed to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 33 (1975). The Senate’s detailed Bill of Rights was replaced by § 6010, a. comparatively brief statement of the developmentally disabled’s rights expressed in general terms. The specific mechanism of alternative compliance standards was omitted. The Conference Report set forth the following as the statement of purpose of the Conference version of the Senate’s Title II.
“The conference substitute contains a compromise which enumerates Congressional findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental disabilities. These include findings that the developmentally disabled have a right to appropriate treatment, services and habilitation ; that such treatment, services and habilitation should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and be provided in the setting that is least restrictive to his personal liberty; that the Federal government and the States have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided in programs which do not provide appropriate treatment, services and habilitation or do not meet minimum standards respecting diet, medical and dental services, use of restraints, visiting hours and compliance with fire and safety codes; *46and that programs for the developmentally disabled should meet appropriate standards including standards adjusted for the size of the institutions ....
“These rights are generally included in the conference substitute in recognition by the conferees that the developmentally disabled, particularly those who have the misfortune to require institutionalization, have a right to receive appropriate treatment for the conditions for which they are institutionalized, and that this right should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94^473, supra, at 41^42.
Following the Conference Report, the Act was passed with minimal debate.12
The Senate’s version of the Bill of Rights was hundreds of pages long and constituted an attempt to define the standards and conditions of state participation with precision and in great detail. The Conference Report makes clear that the detailed version was rejected, not to substitute a merely advisory section for an extended statement of conditions, but *47rather to substitute a generalized statement of entitlements that a participating State must respect and that would adequately meet congressional concerns without encountering the inflexibility of legislatively prescribed conditions of treatment and care. There is no basis for considering the shortened statement as intended to play a qualitatively lesser role in the scheme of the Act. Rather, the compromise is best understood as a rejection of either the need or the ability of Congress to specify the required standards in a manner resembling administrative regulations.13
IV
As previously stated, § 6010 should be understood to require a State receiving funds under the Act to observe the rights established by the provision. None of the concerns expressed by the Court present sufficient reason to avoid or overcome the statutory mandate.
It is true that the terms “treatment, services and habilitation” to which § 6010 declares an entitlement are not self-defining. But it does not follow that the participating States are free to ignore them. Under §6010 (3) (A), as already indicated, the State has an “obligation” not to spend public funds on any institutional or other residential facility that “does not provide treatment, services and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons.” If federal *48funds are to be used to support a program, the program must (1) provide for the § 6010 rights to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation; (2) observe the direction in § 6010 (2) that treatment, services, and habilitation be furnished in the least restrictive setting; (3) satisfy the minimum standards referred to in § 6010 (3) (B); and (4) follow the provisions of § 6010 (4), which offers further guidance for the participating State in furnishing the treatment, services, and habilitation to which the developmentally disabled are entitled.
Furthermore, before approving a state plan, the Secretary must assure himself that the rights identified under § 6010 will be adequately protected by the participating State. Why the language of an express “condition,” which § 6010 lacks, should be the only touchstone for identifying a State’s obligation is difficult to fathom.14 Indeed, identifying “rights” and requiring the participating State to observe them seems a far stronger indicia of congressional intent than a mere statement of “conditions.”
To argue that Congress could not have intended to obligate the States under § 6010 because those obligations would *49be large and for the most part unknown is also unpersuasive. Section 6010 calls for appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation; and, as already detailed, the remaining sections spell out, some in more detail than others, the scope of that requirement. Beyond this, however, the content and reach of the federal requirements will, as a practical matter, emerge from the process of preparing a state plan and securing its approval by the Secretary. The state plan must undertake to provide services and facilities pursuant to “standards” prescribed by the Secretary; and, as will become evident, the State’s option to terminate its statutory duties must be respected by the courts. In any event, there is no indication in the record before us that the cost of compliance with § 6010 would be “massive.” The District Court found that non-institutional facilities located in the communities would be significantly less expensive to operate than facilities like Penn-hurst. 446 F. Supp., at 1312. At best, the cost of compliance with § 6010 is indeterminate.
It is apparently suggested that § 6010 is reduced to a mere statement of hope by the absence of an express provision requiring the Secretary to cut off funds in the event he determines that a State is not observing the rights set out in § 6010. But it is clear that the Secretary may not approve a plan in the first place without being assured that those rights will be protected, and it is difficult to believe that the Secretary must continue to fund a proglam that is failing to live up to the assurances that the State has given the Secretary.
It is also a matter of substantial moment that § 6012 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) expressly conditions the approval of a plan on the State’s providing “a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities,” and that the system must “have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to insfire the protection of rights of such persons.” § 6012 (a) (2) (A). Section 6012 goes on to provide federal aid in establishing such sys-*50terns, and it seems rather plain that the Act contemplates not only ongoing oversight by the Secretary but also enforcement of the rights of persons receiving treatment through judicial action or otherwise.
It is thus not of determinative significance that the Secretary was once of the view that noncompliance with § 6010 did not provide sufficient reason to cut off funds under the Act. As the Court recognizes, the 1978 amendments have convinced him that § 6010 rights must be respected;15 but if the Secretary’s original view was correct, and I do not think it was, this would not foreclose judicial remedies sought by or on behalf of developmentally disabled persons injured by the State’s failure to observe § 6010 rights. Moreover, the Solicitor General, who is the legal representative of the United States, is of the view that the Act does create enforceable rights. In any event, this Court, as it is permitted to do, has disagreed on occasion with the administrative determination of the Secretary. See, e. g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 *51U. S. 707, 715, and n. 11 (1975); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598, 602 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286, and n. 3 (1971). See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 140-146 (1976).
V
Given my view that Congress intended § 6010 to do more than suggest that the States act in a particular manner, I find it necessary to reach the question whether these rights can be enforced in federal courts in a suit brought by the developmentally disabled. This action was brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and directly under the Developmentally Disabled Act. The Court of Appeals determined that under the factors enunciated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), an implied private cause of action existed under the Act. Subsequently, however, we held that “the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980). It is acknowledged by all parties that it is appropriate to consider the cause-of-action question in light of the intervening decision in Thiboutot.
We have often found federal-court jurisdiction to enforce statutory safeguards in grant programs in suits brought by injured recipients. See, e. g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251 (1974); Carle-son v. Remillard, supra. In essence, Thiboutot creates a presumption that a federal statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action. To be sure, Congress may explicitly direct otherwise, such as if the “governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.” Thiboutot, supra, at 22, n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 672 (1979) (§ 1983 protections apply to all rights secured by federal statutes “unless there is clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various other reasons a § 1983 action is *52inconsistent with congressional intention”) (White, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), we. held that § 1983 did not provide a basis for relief since federal habeas corpus proceedings constituted the sole remedy for challenging the fact or duration of confinement. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150, n. 5 (1970). Attempting to fit within the exception, the Pennhurst petitioners suggest that Congress intended the sole remedy for violations of the terms of the Act to be the power of the Secretary to disapprove a State’s plan. See 42 U. S. C. § 6063 (c). According to these petitioners, imposition of a private remedy would be incompatible with the overall scheme ■of the Act, especially given the amorphous quality of the asserted rights.
As a general matter, it is clear that the fact that a federal administrative agency has the power to oversee a cooperative state-federal venture does not mean that Congress intended such oversight to be the exclusive remedy for enforcing statutory rights. This Court is “most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program [s]” even if the agency has the statutory power to cut off federal funds for noncompliance. Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 420. In part, this reluctance is founded on the perception that a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 708, n. 42 (1979). In this litigation, there is no indication that Congress intended the funds cutoff, which, as the Court notes, the Secretary believed was not within the power of the agency, to be the sole remedy for correcting violations of § 6010. Indeed, § 6012 and the legislative history of the Act reveal that Congress intended judicial enforcement of § 6010. See supra, at 46; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 42 (1975) (the statutory rights established by. § 6010 “should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts”). Ac*53cordingly, I would hold that jurisdiction under § 1983 was properly invoked in these cases under Thiboutot.
VI
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings. This litigation does not involve the exercise of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as the Court of Appeals held, but is an exercise of the spending power. What an appropriate remedy might be where state officials fail to observe the limits of their power under the United States Constitution or fail to perform an ongoing statutory duty imposed by a federal statute enacted under the commerce power or the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily the measure of a federal court’s authority where it is found that a State has failed to perform its obligations undertaken pursuant to a statute enacted under the spending power. The State’s duties in the latter situation do not arise until and unless the State chooses to receive federal funds. Furthermore, the State may terminate such statutory obligations, except those already accrued, by withdrawing from the program and terminating its receipt of federal funds. It is settled that administrative oversight and termination of federal funding in the event of a State’s failure to perform its statutory duties is not the sole remedy in Spending Clause cases. “It is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use.” Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 422-423. It is equally clear, however, that the courts in such cases must take account of the State’s privilege to withdraw and terminate its duties under the federal law. Although the court may enjoin the enforcement of a discrete state statutory provision or regulation or may order state officials prospectively to perform their duties incident to the *54receipt of federal funds, the prospective force of such injunctions cannot survive the State’s decision to terminate its participation in the program. Furthermore, there are cases in which there is no identifiable statutory provision whose enforcement can be prohibited. Rosado v. Wyman was such a case, and there, after finding that the State was not complying with the provisions of the Social Security Act, we remanded the case to the District Court to “afford [the State] an opportunity to revise its program in accordance with [federal requirements]” as we had construed them to be, but to retain jurisdiction “to review . . . any revised program adopted by the State, or, should [the State] choose not to submit a revamped program by the determined date, issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies . . . .” 397 U. S., at 421-422. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974).
It is my view that the Court of Appeals should have adopted the Rosado approach in these cases. It found the State to be in noncompliance with the federal statute in major respects and proceeded to impose a far-reaching remedy, approving the appointment of a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. More properly, the court should have announced what it thought was necessary to comply with the Act and then permitted an appropriate period for the State to decide whether it preferred to give up federal funds and go its own route. If it did not, it should propose a plan for achieving compliance, in which event, if it satisfied the court, a decree incorporating the plan could be entered and if the plan was unsatisfactory, the further use of federal funds could be enjoined. In any event, however, the court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the first instance which patients should remain and which should be removed. As we recently recognized in Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979): “The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges. What is best for a *55child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case. We do no more than emphasize that the decision should represent an independent judgment of what the child requires and that all sources of information that are traditionally relied on by physicians and behavioral specialists should be consulted.” Id., at 607-608. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 429 (1979) (commitment depends “on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists”). In enacting § 6010, Congress eschewed creating any specific guidelines on the proper level of institutionalization, leaving the question to the States to determine in the first instance. A court-appointed Special Master is inconsistent with this approach.
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings.

 See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4201 et seq. (Purdon 1969).

 The Court of Appeals also overturned the District Court’s decision to require the State to find suitable alternative employment for those Pennhurst employees displaced by the order. This order is not an issue before this Court.

 Respondents Halderman and PARC suggest a number of other Fourteenth Amendment “interests” allegedly served by § 6010. See, e. g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973) (right to receive something more than no education); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 (1972) (right to be institutionalized only when the nature and duration of such treatment bears a reasonable relation to its purpose) ; O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975) (right of nondangerous persons capable of living without institutionalization to be free).

 The Act as passed in 1975 required that the state plan “contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities ... be protected.” § 6063 (b) (24). This measure was amended in 1978 to make it explicit that a State’s plan must provide assurances of its compliance with § 6010. See text, infra.

 An amendment was passed in 1967 which added a program to train professionals in community programs, as well as providing funds to support institutions, Pub. L. 90-170, 81 Stat. 527. In 1970, Congress passed a second amendment adopting a formula grant system essentially similar to the present system. The 1970 amendment also broadened the number of potential beneficiaries to include persons afflicted with various disabilities not previously covered. Pub. L. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316.

 The pertinent text of § 6010 provides:
“Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental disabilities:
“(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
“(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the.person’s personal liberty.
“(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program for persons with developmental disabilities that—
“(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons; or
“(B) does not meet the following minimum standards:
“(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the persons with developmental disabilities being served by the program.
“(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient medical and dental services.
“(iii) Prohibition of the use of physicial restraint on such persons unless absolutely necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint as a punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program.
“(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on such persons and the use of such restraints as punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program or in quantities that interfere with services, treatment, or habilitation for such persons.
“(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at reasonable hours without prior notice.
“(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may be promulgated by the Secretary.
“(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should *39meet standards which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for those served, and—
“(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of comprehensive health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services, which are at least equivalent to those standards applicable to intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded promulgated in regulations of the Secretary ... as appropriate when taking into account the size of the institutions and the service delivery arrangements of the facilities of the programs;
“(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with developmental disabilities, which assure that care is appropriate to the needs of the persons being served by such programs, assure that the persons admitted to facilities of such programs are persons whose needs can be met through services provided by such facilities, and assure that the facilities under such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and
“(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care provided by such programs is appropriate to the persons served by the programs.”
Section 6010 was amended in 1978 to add the following concluding paragraph:
“The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in findings made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all persons.” Pub. L. 95-602, § 507, 92 Stat. 3007.

 There is nothing “curious” as the Court suggests about coming to a different conclusion about the applicability of § 6011 to Pennhurst. Section 6063 (b) (5) (B) requires that the plan must provide that services are provided in an individualized manner consistent with the requirements of § 6011 relating to habilitation plans. Section 6011 requires that when any specific program in a State, including any program of an agency, facility or project, receives funds from the State’s allotment, it will have in effect individualized plans for habilitation of each individual receiving services under that program. The section goes on to specify in detail how such individualized plans shall be formulated and how they are to be oar-*42ried out and monitored. The Court asserts that Pennhurst has not been receiving federal funds under the Act, which means, I take it, that Penn-hurst has not received funds from the State’s allocation under the Act. In that event, I would not think that § 6011 would apply to Pennhurst residents. But Pennhurst is part of the State’s overall program, and the State has presented a plan and received federal funds to support its developmentally disabled program throughout the State. It must, therefore, observe the § 6010 rights of the developmentally disabled in state institutions, including Pennhurst.

 See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 9976 (1975) (remarks of Cong. Rogers) (percentage requirement would, assist in overcoming misuse of facilities caused by tendency of States to resort to institutionalization); ibid, (remarks of Cong. Carter) (treatment "should be conducted in that person’s community without unnecessarily institutionalizing him”).
It is clear that the House was concerned with many of the same factors which informed the Senate’s detailed provision which ultimately lead to the genesis of § 6010. The Court's narrow reading of the House bill is not convincing. To the extent that the House bill did not have an analogue to § 6010, comments on the bill are necessarily irrelevant to the question of the intended effect of § 6010.

 See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 16518 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“The shocking conditions at Willowbrook in New York, and many other institutions for the mentally retarded throughout the Nation which inspired the bill of rights have not ended”); id., at 16521 (remarks of Sen. Schweiker) (“The last 5 years have seen a dramatic increase in public awareness of the needs of institutionalized mentally retarded and developmentally disabled persons. This has been highlighted by scandals in many institutions, by court cases, and by the efforts of the communications media”); id., at 16516 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (“Over the past few years, the horrifying conditions which exist in most of the public residential institutions for the mentally retarded . . . have provided shocking testimony to the inhuman way we care for such persons. The conditions at . . . [the] institutions have shown beyond a shadow of a doubt that the treatment of these individuals is worse then [sic] all of us would like to admit”).

 For example, Senator Javits stated that the Bill of Rights section, an integral part of the legislation, would “establish minimum standards for residential and community facilities and agencies for the protection of the rights of those individuals needing services, while at the same time, encouraging deinstitutionalization and normalization.” Id., at 16518. In conclusion, Senator Javits identified a number of concerns shared by many of the legislators speaking on the Senate bill:
“Progress toward recognition of the basic human and civil rights of the mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled persons has been slow. The Federal Government has largely abrogated its responsibility in this regard and recently the greatest initiatives have come from our courts. ...
“Congress should reaffirm its belief in equal rights for all citizens— *44including the developmental!;/ disabled. Congress should provide the leadership to change the tragic warehousing of human beings that has-been the product of insensitive Federal support of facilities providing inhumane care and treatment of the mentally retarded. The bill of rights of S. 462 represents this new direction, and begins this reaffirmation.” Id., at 16519.
See id., at 16520 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) (Senate bill enunciated basic goal of moving away from "long-term institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities to the development of community-based programs utilizing all community resources related to treatment or habilitation of such individuals to provide comprehensive services in the home community”).

 See, e. g., id., at 16522 (remarks of Sen. Schweiker) (“It is now time to provide alternatives to locking persons up in institutions”); id,, at 16520 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) (“[I]n encouraging the movement to pommunity-based programs, I recognize that the need for some long-term residential programs will remain. The bill specifically provides that where institutional programs are 'appropriate, adequate support should be planned for them .so that necessary treatment and habilitation programs can be given residential patients to develop their full potential”); id., at 16516 (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (the Bill of Rights will "assist in the protection of the rights guaranteed under our Constitution for those individuals that will require institutionalization . . .”).

 Prior to final passage, Congressman Rogers stated that the revised Title II included a “brief statement of the rights of the developmentally disabled to appropriate treatment and care,” which constituted “modest requirements.” Id,., at 29309 (emphasis added). Senator Javits was more dramatic in announcing the purpose of Title II as creating a clear federal policy in favor of a right to treatment. “This ‘Bill of Rights’ explicitly recognizes that the Federal Government and the States have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to institutions or other residential programs” that do not provide adequate treatment. Id., at 29820. See also id., at 29818 (remarks of Sen. Randolph) (compromise reorganized Title II of the Senate bill “in order to reflect the essential elements which are necessary for continued improvement in the quality of care and habilitation of developmentally disabled persons in residential and community facilities”); id., at 29821 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (the compromise establishes for the first time in federal law a “basic statement” of the rights of the developmentally disabled and the Act “will assure that funds under the act will be used by the States to assist them in the deinstitutionalization process”).

 The Act also required the Secretary to review and evaluate the quality standards under various statutes and to report to the Congress on any proposed changes. See Pub. L. 94r-103, §204, 89 Stat. 504. When the Secretary’s recommendations were presented, the House took no steps to enact them into law, again demonstrating legislative unwillingness to adopt detailed uniform standards. See Developmental Disabilities Act Amendments of 1978: Hearings on H. R. 11764 before t]je House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 471-475 (1978). Congress did determine, however, to amend § 6063 to expressly require a State to provide assurance to the Secretary of its plan to comply with § 6010. See 42 U. S. C. § 6063 (b) (5) (C) (1976 ed., Supp. III).

 None of the cases cited by the Court suggest, much less hold, that Congress is required to condition its grant of funds with contract-like exactitude. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980), the Court held that there was no evidence in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended the States to assume the full costs of funding abortions once the federal funds were withheld under the Hyde Amendment. Here, there is explicit recognition in the statute and in the legislative history that Congress intended the States to provide the developmentally disabled with adequate treatment in the least restrictive environment consistent with their medical needs. The other cases cited by the Court involved situations where the Court held that Congress must indicate that it intended the States to have waived fundamental constitutional rights merely by participating in a federal program. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Employees v. Department of Public Health, 411 U. S. 279, 285 (1973) (same). The Eleventh Amendment concerns are not implicated in these cases, and the citation of Edelman and Employees is thus uripersuasive.

 The Secretary has recently announced the Department’s view that the rights enunciated by § 6010 must now be addressed by participating state plans as a result of the 1978 amendments. The explanation of the proposed rulemaking provided as follows:
“No authority was included in that Act to allow the Department to withhold funds from States on the basis of failure to meet the findings.
“The 1978 amendments, however, added a requirement to the basic State grant program that the State assure the Secretary that the rights of developmentally disabled people are to be protected consistent with [§ 6010]. The Department has decided to require that all programs authorized under the Act, except for the protection and advocacy systems, comply with [§ 6010] of the Act. The protection and advocacy systems are exempted because they are an extension of the 'Rights’ provisions and the systems do not provide services, treatment or habilitation. The Department believes that applying this policy to the other programs is within the intent of Congress. Recipients of funds under the Act are to assure the State and the Commissioner that they will provide services which comply with the requirements of [§6010]. Failure to comply with the assurance may result in the loss of Federal funds.” 45 Fed. Reg. 31006 (1980).