Court Opinion

ID: 9656347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:46:56.337892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:31.908841
License: Public Domain

H. R. Gage, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing defendant’s conviction for the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant never requested such an instruction and failed to object *557when no instruction was given. He has not even raised the issue on appeal.
Defendant’s theory of the case was that the shooting was accidental. Although this defense would be successful to the charges of first- and second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, it would not be to the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Counsel’s failure to request an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may have been a conscious attempt to foreclose the possibility of any conviction should the jury believe that the shooting was an accident. In the absence of a request for an instruction, the trial court should not inject itself into what usually amounts to legitimate trial strategy on the part of either the defendant or the prosecutor. People v Herbert Van Smith, Jr, 30 Mich App 384, 388; 186 NW2d 378 (1971), rev’d 388 Mich 457; 203 NW2d 94 (1972).1
I also disagree with the majority’s raising the issue sua sponte because of its belief that justice so requires. The trial court instructed the jury on first- and second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant’s theory was that the shooting was accidental. The jury could have believed defendant’s theory and acquitted him on all charges. It did not. The jury could have believed that the killing was intentional but without mal*558ice. It did not. Its conviction of defendant for second-degree murder demonstrates that, although it may have had a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation, it had no such doubt that he acted with malice and not by accident. The majority has specifically noted that the evidence was sufficient to support both findings. Under these circumstances I fail to see how one can conclude that justice was not dispensed.
I concur with the majority’s resolution of each issue raised by defendant. I would affirm the conviction.

 Although the defendant’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court, only two justices joined in the Court’s opinion. Three justices concurred in the result only, and Justice Brennan dissented, stating:
"I must dissent. The notion that the jury has a 'right’ to be properly instructed is altogether novel. A criminal trial is concerned with the rights of the defendant If the defendant for tactical or other reasons chooses to permit the case to go to the jury on the principal charged offense, without mention of lesser included offenses, that, too, is his right.” People v Herbert Van Smith, Jr, 388 Mich 457, 462-463; 203 NW2d 94 (1972) (T. E. Brennan, J., dissenting).
See, also, People v Taylor, 44 Mich App 640, 645, fn 6; 205 NW2d 884 (1973); People v Carroll, 49 Mich App 44, 51; 211 NW2d 233 (1973), aff’d 396 Mich 408; 240 NW2d 722 (1976).