Court Opinion

ID: 9646640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:49.36163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.001390
License: Public Domain

MARTIN
(dissenting).
The majority opinion in this cause predicated an affirmance of the summary judgment of the trial court on the proposition that the insurer had cancelled the policy of insurance in issue prior to the occurrence of the loss on July 20, 1952. Under provision 20 of the policy in issue is found this clause:
“This policy 'may be canceled by the company by mailing to the named insured at the address shown in this policy written notice stating when not less than ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. * * * ”
The policy reveals that the application therefor was executed by Mrs. L. N. Coffee, 3001 East 4th Street, Lubbock, Texas, the wife of William Coffee. The alleged cancellation in issue was mailed by the company to Mr. L. N. Coffee, 3001 East 4th Street, Lubbock, Texas on May 26, 1952.
On the issue of proper mailing of the cancellation notice, the admissions of the insurer on file in the cause reveal that on March 26, 1952, Mrs. L. N. Coffee advised Tom Lehr, an agent of insurer, to transfer the insurance coverage of the policy in issue from a 1949 Ford to a 1952 Chevrolet. It is further admitted by insurer that on such date Mrs. L. N. Coffee likewise advised Tom Lehr, the agent for insurer, to change her address in the policy from “3001 East 4th Street, Lubbock, Texas” to “General Delivery, Lubbock, Texas.” In conjunction with the above admissions, it is further shown that the agent for the insurer prepared “Form-R-42”, changing the coverage under the policy from the 1949 Ford to a 1952 Chevrolet. Further the insurer’s agent, Tom Lehr, in such “Form-R-42”, changed the address of Mrs. L. N. Coffee to General Delivery, Lubbock, Texas. The insurer admits that its agent, Tom Lehr, mailed the original of this “Form-R-42 to insurer. Since insurer’s agent, Tom Lehr, prepared the above “Form-R-42”, changing the insurance policy coverage from a 1949 Ford to a 1952 Chevrolet and also changing the address of the insured to General Delivery, Lubbock, Texas and mailed such form to the insurer, it is a reasonable presumption that such “Form-R-42”, prepared by the company, constituted a rider or change of the coverage and provisions of the policy in issue. Since the actual policy as issued to *312insured is apparently not in the record but only a like copy to that issued, it cannot be ascertained whether ‘'Form-R-42” was attached to the original policy as a rider or was a separate contract or agreement. But it is not material whether such form was a rider or a separate contract as prepared by insurer. The notice of change of address as well as change of insurance coverage on automobiles, either became a part of the policy as a rider or was a separate contract of the insurer and binding on it. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co., 5 Cir., 49 F.2d 121, Syls. 1-4.
The above facts are fully corroborated by additional facts and presumptions based thereon as presented in the affidavit of insurer’s agent, Jack Walding, which states:
“On October 16, 1952, Allstate Insurance Company declared void from its inception Policy No. W-518806.”
The affidavit reveals that such notice was sent insured approximately three months following the collision in issue. Walding’s affidavit further reveals that the notice of the company declaring the policy in issue void frpm its inception was mailed to “Mrs. L. N. Coffee, General Delivery, Lubbock, Texas.” The affidavit of Walding. therefore evidences that the company recognized its own “Form-R-42”, as a rider on the policy and as effecting a substitution for the original address shown in the face of the policy. Further, such affidavit by insurer’s agent leads to the reasonable presumption that since the insurer, approximately three months following the collision in issue, sent to Mrs. L. N. Coffee a notice that the policy was void from inception, it recognized no prior notice of cancellation had been given under the terms of the policy as to effecti-vate a cancellation of the same. Also, the binding effect of “Form-R-42” was recognized by the insurer in its mailing to insured at the address given in such Form of the notice as to the policy being void from inception. The facts above detailed are either conclusive as a matter of law on the issue of non-cancellation of the policy, or, they, at least, present an issue of fact as to whether the insurer through its agent changed the coverage in the policy and the address of insured by a rider or contract binding on it. It is admitted that the alleged notice of cancellation was only mailed to the former address and not to the address shown in “Form-R-42”.
“Notice of cancellation by insurer must be in accordance with the provisions of the policy or statute, strict compliance therewith being necessary, and all ambiguities in the notice will be resolved in favor of insured.” 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 450b (1), p. 86. Brewer v. Maryland Cas. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 532, Syl. 6.
But, overall, it must be kept in view that the judgment in issue is a summary judgment. It is not the province of the trial court nor of this Court to determine whether the facts have been proven definitely by proper affidavits or other instruments but merely to determine if there are any issues of fact to be tried. The entire record has not been discussed in this dissent but only the issue pertinent to the majority opinion rendered in the cause. If the cancellation of the policy was ineffectual then the issue of invalidity of the policy by reason of fraudulent statements being made in the application therefor becomes an issue. It is apparent that issues as to false and fraudulent representations being made in procuring the policy of insurance must be predicated on fact elements and appellant is entitled to a trial of the cause on its merits and not by affidavit.
“The duty of the court hearing the motion for summary judgment is to determine if there are any issues of fact to be tried, and not to weigh the evidence or determine its credibility, and thus try the case on the affidavits. * * * As said in the case of Kaufman v. Blackman, Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 422, 428, writ refused, N.R.E., ‘The underlying purpose of Rule 166-A was elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses; not being intended to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing on the merits of any real issue of fact.’ The *313burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of any material fact is . upon the movant, and ‘All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment.’ ” Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, at page 931.
The summary judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial on its merits.