Court Opinion

ID: 9661592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:43:36.827789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:47.443123
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
BELCHER, Judge.
The evidence has been re-examined, and it reveals the following:
The testimony of the police officers reflects that Judy Guillory told the officers, who were executing a search warrant in appellant’s apartment, that she had arrived at the apartment for the purpose of getting a shot of narcotics and had given appellant fifteen dollars so he could go and purchase two capsules of heroin, one for him and one for her, and that he would be returning shortly. She also told the officers that appellant kept his rig (narcotic paraphernalia) in a gas heater in the bathroom in the hall. The statements made by Judy Guillory were related at the trial by the officers to whom she spoke.
Judy Guillory did not testify at the trial. Also, she did not testify at the examining trial or at any pre-trial hearing. The state did not reveal Guillory’s whereabouts at the time of the trial, or undertake to account for not doing so, or show that she was unavailable; the appellant was not present when Guillory made the statements to the officers.
The bathroom was across the hall and about ten feet from the appellant’s apartment, and it was common to all tenants and anyone else entering that floor of the building. When the appellant returned, he went toward the bathroom; seeing the officers, he ran and threw two capsules on the roof of an adjoining building where they were later recovered. Appellant was arrested at the scene. Later, in the apartment, when the officers placed the paraphernalia they found on the kitchen table in the presence of the appellant, he stated, “That’s my stuff.”
The appellant did not testify or offer any defense testimony.
The appellant objected to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the officers relating the statements of Judy Guillory on the grounds that they were hearsay and that he had not been confronted by Guillory at the trial. The objections were overruled, and the appellant excepted.
For the oral statements of Judy Guillory to be admissible in evidence, it is is essential that there be proof of the existence of a conspiracy. The oral statements of Judy Guillory as related by the officers at the trial were hearsay, and under the facts of this case the hearsay statements were insufficient to establish a conspiracy.
The throwing of the capsules by the appellant and his claim of the rig in the heater do not supply the essential evidence to establish a conspiracy which is necessary to admit in evidence the hearsay oral statements of Judy Guillory under the exception to the hearsay rule.
In Clark v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 231, 254 S.W.2d 527, the evidence revealed similar *503facts to those in this case. There the evidence and the holding were:
“Peace officers had occasion to go to the farm of Leslie Mitchell to make an arrest of a certain man whose name the record does not reflect. They drove to a servant house where the man was alleged to live. Upon arriving at the servant house they saw the automobile of appellant parked near by and appellant’s young son seated therein under the steering wheel. Between the front and back seats of the automobile two sacks were found, one containing eight pints and the other twelve pints of whisky. Also, appellant’s purse was found in the car.
“The arresting officer asked the boy ‘where Pearl (appellant) was.’ He replied that she was ‘sitting in the house there reading.’ When questioned as to whether the whisky belonged to him, he replied, ‘No,’ he was ‘just driving for her.’ Upon being asked if he knew the whisky was in the car, the boy replied, ‘Sure, I know it.’
“Although the officers searched the house and premises for the appellant, she was not apprehended until some eleven hours thereafter.
“It is upon the foregoing facts that this conviction rests.
“The appellant did not testify or offer any affirmative defensive testimony.
“The trial court submitted the case to the jury upon the theory that the statements of the boy to the officers were those of a co-conspirator.
“As we understand it, it is the theory of the state that the boy’s testimony was sufficient to show that it was appellant’s whisky in the car and that his statement that he was ‘just driving for her’ and the further fact that the whisky and her purse were found in her car constitute sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
“Regardless of when proof is made of the existence of a conspiracy or the acting together, the fact remains that in order to establish a conspiracy or the acting together there must be some evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the crime, apart from the testimony of the alleged co-conspirator. 18 Tex.Jur., Evidence — Criminal Cases, Sec. 122, p. 213. The participation of another in the crime cannot be established, alone, by the declarations of third persons in the absence of the accused, and there must be evidence apart from any acts or declarations of the alleged co-conspirators which will tend to show an acting together of the parties. 18 Tex.Jur., Evidence — Criminal Cases, Sec. 121, p. 212.
“The instant facts do not meet the requirement of the rules stated, and we are therefore constrained to agree that the facts are insufficient to support the conviction.”
The original record in the Clark case has been examined and it reflects that appellant’s son, who was in the car, did not testify at the trial.
The admission of the oral statements of Judy Guillory, under the record, was reversible error.
The appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. The order of affirmance on state’s motion for rehearing is set aside and the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.