Court Opinion

ID: 9473751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:33.212286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.762913
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge
(with whom KASHIWA and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, join), dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision, and for the reason given I write separately.
This decision turns solely on determination of the intent of Congress. Did Congress intend, when it stated:
Actions based on unacceptable performance are governed by Chapter 43 ...1
to mean that actions based on unacceptable performance are governed by either Chapter 43 or Chapter 75, at the option of the agency?
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 included implementing amendments to both Chapter 43 and Chapter 75:
§ 4303(a): Subject to the provisions of this section, an agency may reduce in grade or remove an employee for unacceptable performance.
§ 7512(D): [Chapter 75] does not apply to ... a reduction in grade or removal under [Chapter 43].
Ignoring this mandate, the court has concluded that clearer statutory language could have been used, and therefore that § 7512 must be ignored, and Chapter 75 remains inviolate. I cannot agree.
The asserted lack of clarity in the statutory language has only appeared in retrospect. The straightforward intention of the 1978 Act was blighted by delays in implementation of the performance standards required by Chapter 43, and by the appearance of loopholes, uncertainties, and gaps between the scopes of Chapters 43 and 75. The MSPB undertook to solve these problems, first by Wells v. Harris, 1 MSPB 199, 1 M.S.P.R. 208 (1979), which delayed the switch from Chapter 75 to Chapter 43 procedures until performance standards were in place, and then by Gende v. Department of Justice, 23 M.S. P.R. 604 (1984).
I agree with the analysis and conclusion of Judge Skelton’s dissenting opinion, that this case must be remanded because Chapter 43 is the exclusive procedure for performance-based actions. That analysis is logical, it is simple, and it comports with the text of the Act and with the legislative history, which states:
[N]o employee will be disciplined when performance standards and critical elements have not been adequately defined by an agency.
H.R.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). In this I agree also with the analysis in Gende of the purposes and interpretation of the 1978 Act.
I write separately to emphasize my concern about the prospective “interstitial legislation” — to quote from the MSPB’s brief in this appeal — that is set forth in Gende. That portion of Gende relates to issues not before the MSPB or this court, is of the nature of dicta, and presents issues that are not ripe for adjudication.
Changes in law and practice contrary to clear congressional intent, even when necessary to remedy perceived problems in the *853statutory scheme, require the attention of Congress and not that of the executive branch or the judiciary.

. S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2723, 2768.