Court Opinion

ID: 9574140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:38.134647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:08.092310
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.
I concur in the judgment under the compulsion of the opinion of Justice Kaus in In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 11 [201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917]. As the author of the lead opinion in that case, I must recognize that, although labelled by its author as a concurring opinion, Justice Kaus’s opinion was a concurring and dissenting opinion in content and that it garnered the support of four justices. Insofar as it agrees with the lead opinion, the lead opinion is a majority opinion, indeed a unanimous opinion, but insofar as Justice Kaus’s opinion disagrees or goes beyond the lead opinion, it is the majority view.
Both opinions agreed that the applicable version of Welfare and Institutions Code section 9031 imposing liability upon parents for the costs of support of juvenile wards in county institutions was invalid. The lead opinion reasoned: A statute is invalid if it selects one particular class of persons for a species of taxation without rational basis. To charge the cost of state functions for public benefit to one class of society is arbitrary, and commitments of children under section 602 are to protect the public from criminal conduct by minors. The charge could not be justified on the basis of the common law duty of parents to reimburse for support codified in section 207 because that duty only applies where the parent neglects to support and *1256because section 903 provides for recovery not only of support costs but also of costs relating to confinement. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 6-10.)
This portion of the lead opinion was not challenged by Justice Kaus’s opinion; rather, it is the basis for invalidating the statute under both opinions. Accordingly, this portion of the lead opinion is the majority and unanimous opinion of the court. The Court of Appeal and the dissenting opinion in the instant case rely upon this portion of the Jerald C. lead opinion, and obviously there is nothing wrong in relying upon the unanimous portion of the lead opinion.
The lead opinion went on to conclude that denying the county any recovery of its expenses did not result in unjust enrichment of the parents, who are denied custody of their child, and that the costs incurred by the county could not properly be allocated between support costs and confinement costs because the purpose of section 602 commitments was not to provide support and maintenance. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 10-11.) Justice Kaus’s opinion concluded to the contrary that the Legislature under a proper system of allocation could charge the parents for their savings in not having to support their child, but that the applicable statute could not be construed as an appropriate allocation. (36 Cal.3d at p. 11 et seq.) As to these matters, Justice Kaus’s opinion garnered the support of a majority of the justices, and although I continue to adhere to my views expressed in the lead opinion, I am compelled, until a majority of the court rules otherwise, to accept the position of the majority in Jerald C. I cannot ignore the majority view in Jerald C. as the dissenting and Court of Appeal opinions do.
Justice Kaus, after pointing out that the lead opinion paints “with too broad a brush,” stated: “My basic theory is this: it is undeniable that equal protection principles do not permit us to saddle a tiny segment of the public with the cost of protecting society from persons who, for one reason or another, must be confined in institutions. Yet if such a person has someone who is legally responsible for supporting him with the necessaries of life— food, clothing, shelter—I see no reason why the state cannot charge the responsible party for whatever he saves by not having to support the person ‘on the outside.’ The plurality suggests that such a scheme ‘would betray a misguided sense of values.’ Perhaps so, but it is not for us to make value judgments concerning legislation which passes constitutional muster.” (36 Cal.3d at pp. 11-12, italics added and fn. omitted.)
The opinion then goes on to hold that the statute before the court could not be construed to make the proper allocation necessary to uphold it. The opinion also discusses at some length the savings issue, pointing out that incarceration, from a material point of view, may be a step up for the minor *1257in some cases and that in some the juvenile might be providing for his own support and there would be no savings.
In the instant case, the parents appealed challenging the facial validity of the statutes, relying upon Jerald C. The Attorney General countered by arguing that Jerald C. did not apply because the foster care group homes in which the minor was placed were nonsecure or nondetention foster care facilities. The majority opinion in part IV, ante, pages 1253-1254, ably answers the Attorney General’s argument, and we must address the issue of the validity of the statutes under Jerald C.
I conclude that the 1983 version of section 903 is valid under Justice Kaus’s opinion. In permitting recovery of costs of support, the section provided in part: “As used in this section, ‘costs of support’ means that portion of the costs incurred by the county in maintaining a minor that are equivalent to the reasonable expenditures required of a parent pursuant to Sections 196, 207, and 208 of the Civil Code, and does not include the expenses of incarceration, treatment, or supervision imposed for the protection of society and the minor and his or her rehabilitation.” (Italics added.) In imposing liability, the section also spoke of costs, “such as food, clothing, and medical expense.” The limitation to “reasonable expenditures” of a parent should be read to comply with the requirement that the county recovery is limited to parental savings, and the provisions relating to food, clothing and medical expenses coupled with the exclusion of expenses for incarceration, treatment, or supervision should be read to comply with the requirement of proper allocation.
Appellants did not claim that the award of $93 per month exceeded their savings or support obligation or that the evidence did not properly allocate food and clothing costs.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be reversed.

 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.