Court Opinion

ID: 9792956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:40:04.566765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:02.070859
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WEBER
dissents as follows:
As stated in the majority opinion, the issue is whether the statute of limitation for an action against an attorney based on that attorney’s alleged professional negligence, begins to run before the cause of action accrues. The issue is stated in that manner because the majority opinion relies on § 27-2-102(2), MCA, which in substance provides that the period of limitation begins when the “cause of action accrues.” In addition it relies on § 27-2-102(l)(a), MCA, which provides that a cause of action accrues when all elements of the cause exist or have occurred. I disagree with the analysis of the issue before us.
I believe the issue is whether or not the cause of action is barred under the provisions of § 27-2-206, MCA, which applies to actions for legal malpractice only and states as follows:
Actions for legal malpractice. An action against an attorney licensed to practice law in Montana or a paralegal assistant or a legal intern employed by an attorney based upon the person’s alleged professional negligent act or for error or omission in the person’s practice must be commenced within 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission ...
The majority opinion does not analyze the initial language of § 27-2-102(2), MCA, which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, the period of limitation begins when the claim or cause of action accrues ... (Emphasis supplied.)
It is § 27-2-102(2), MCA, upon which the majority opinion relies when it concludes that the plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until June 16, 1989, when plaintiff first acted on defendant’s advice to his alleged detriment — prior to that date he had no cause of action as a matter of law. This analysis in the majority opinion has failed to consider the key wording in the statute upon which it relies — “unless otherwise provided by statute” the period of limitation begins when the cause of action accrues. In the case of actions for legal malpractice, there is a specific statute which otherwise provides. I therefore conclude that § 27-2-102(2), MCA, is specifically not applicable in this case.
Clearly, § 27-2-102(2), MCA, is a provision by the legislature which applies only when it has not otherwise been provided by statute. The *202legislature here has specifically provided otherwise by statute in enacting § 27-2-206, MCA, which sets the statute of limitation for actions for legal malpractice. I conclude there is no proper basis under which the majority opinion can rely on §§ 27-2-102(2) and 27-2-102(l)(a), MCA. I therefore disagree with both the analysis and the conclusion of the majority opinion.
I further point out that the majority opinion appears to have adopted “the damage rule” without specifically so stating. In the case of Boles v. Simonton (1990), 242 Mont. 394, 398, 791 P.2d 755, 757, this Court analyzed the occurrence rule, the damage rule and discovery rule in brief, stating:
... The dispositive issue in the present case is when the statute of limitations commenced to run.
In analyzing this issue, we note that traditionally the general rule has been that a cause of action for attorney malpractice accrues when the negligent act or breach occurs, not when it is discovered (the occurrence rule). 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, § 172 (1987). Other theories include: 1) the statute of limitations begins to run when the client has sustained injury or damage (the damage rule)', 2) the statute begins to run when the negligent act is discovered or should have been discovered (the discovery rule). Annotation, “When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon Action Against Attorney for Malpractice” 32 ALR 4th 260 § 2 (1984).
Montana has statutorily adopted the discovery rule, stated in § 27-2-206, MCA... (Emphasis supplied.)
In analyzing Boles, the majority opinion states:
... the plaintiffs in Boles could not have commenced a cause of against their attorney at any time prior to their default under the contract because they had sustained no damage. If they had, their claim would have been appropriately dismissed. ...
In substance, the majority opinion here concludes that having sustained no damage, the statute of limitation had not begun to run. Without directly saying so, the majority apparently has thereby adopted “the damage rule” which as above stated in Boles points out that “the damage rule” provides that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the client has sustained injury or damage. The majority opinion then goes on to conclude that plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until June 16,1989, which was the date on which the plaintiff first acted on the advice to his detriment and “prior to this date, he had no cause of action as a matter of law.” Without *203expressly so stating, it appears to me that the majority opinion has adopted “the damage rule”.
The adoption of “the damage rule” by the majority opinion is in direct contradiction to the Montana statute, § 27-2-206, MCA, as well as in conflict with Boles and earlier cases which conclude that “the damage rule” is not applicable in Montana. I therefore dissent strongly to this adoption of “the damage rule” in Montana and in particular its disregard of the specific statute of limitation applicable to attorneys. As a result of this majority opinion, we now have two conflicting statute of limitation rules in Montana — the one prescribed by the legislature in its statute and “the damage rule” adopted in this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE joins in the foregoing dissent.