Court Opinion

ID: 9465291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:41:45.995254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:05.399729
License: Public Domain

CHOY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part; dissenting in part:
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion affirming appellant King’s conviction.
However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion vacating the judgment of conviction as to appellant Deal. The majority holds that:
1. The indictment was fatally defective in failing to charge that Deal lacked authorization to distribute or dispense cocaine, an essential element of the offense charged.
2. The district court erred in ruling that Deal did not meet his burden of production on the issue of the applicability of the medical exception, and in not placing the burden of proof of that issue on the Government.
3. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the issue of lack of authorization constituted plain error.
I. Sufficiency of the Indictment
I conclude that it was not necessary to charge lack of authorization in the indictment. As a medical exception under 21 U.S.C. § 822(b), lack of authorization was not required to be included in the indictment. 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) states in part:
It shall not be necessary for the United States to negative any exemption or exception set forth in this subchapter in any complaint, information, indictment or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this subchapter
(Emphasis added.)
Before the Government assumed the burden of proof on the medical exception carved out in § 822(b), it was imperative that Deal first introduce sufficient evidence to place the applicability of the medical exception in issue. Section 885(a)(1) further requires that “the burden of going forward with the evidence with respect to any such exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit” (in this case, Deal).
Since the Government could not anticipate whether Deal would present sufficient evidence to claim the medical exception, the issue of lack of authorization could only become an element of the offense after the indictment, and only if Deal sustained the burden of production.
Even assuming lack of authorization is an essential element of the offense, the indictment must be read in common sense manner. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839, 97 S.Ct. 111, 50 L.Ed.2d 107 (1976). The fact that Deal was named in the indictment as an M.D. and charged with the criminal dispensement of cocaine “in violation of Section 846, Title 21, United States Code” surely implies that he did so for other than a medical purpose.
In my opinion the indictment was sufficient.
II. Burden of Production
I would hold that Deal failed to meet the burden of production imposed on him by 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1).
*967Under United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1975), the presumption of lack of exception embodied in § 885(a)(1) is violative of due process only if its application would be irrational based on the facts proved. After an analysis of Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973), Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), and Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943), the court in Black concluded that
once sufficient facts have been shown to render the statutory presumption of guilt irrational as applied to those particular facts, the presumption may not then be used to justify imposition of a further burden of production or to deprive the accused of a factual determination upon the disputed issue — the government must then prove its case.
Id. at 870 (emphasis added). Thus, § 885(a)(1) — although captioned “burden of proof’’ — was interpreted as defining only an initial burden of production, satisfaction of which placed upon the Government the burden of proving nonapplicability of the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. Accepting the above-quoted statement from Black as the criterion used in shifting the burden of proof, I conclude that Deal did not present sufficient facts “to render the statutory presumption of guilt irrational.” The facts of Black are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case.
In Black, the Government’s own evidence showed not only that the defendant “was a medical practitioner . . . duly registered with the Attorney General to dispense controlled substances,” but also “that the controlled substances were transferred pursuant to a writing purporting to be a prescription, and that the transfers were to patients at a clinic where Black was the attending physician.” Id. at 870-71. In Deal, no evidence was introduced to indicate that the dispensation of cocaine was pursuant to prescriptions, or that it was to Deal’s patients. In fact, his own testimony at trial indicated the opposite.
Even if Deal had successfully introduced evidence establishing his status as a medical practitioner registered to distribute controlled substances, his professional status alone would not have been sufficient prima facie to rebut the presumption of nonappli-cability of the medical exception imposed by § 885(a)(1).
As a Schedule II controlled substance under 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) (1977), cocaine may not be dispensed “without the written prescription of a practitioner, except that in emergency situations, as prescribed by the Secretary by regulation after consultation with the Attorney General, such drug may be dispensed upon oral prescription . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 829(a). Since Deal testified that he did not dispense the cocaine pursuant to prescriptions, then even assuming he had introduced his controlled substances registration, he failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim to the medical exception.
Thus, since “sufficient facts” were not shown to render the statutory presumption of lack of exception irrational, Black, 512 F.2d at 870, the burden of proof was not shifted to the Government on this issue.
III. Absence of Jury Instruction on Authorization
Instructions to the jury on the issue of lack of authorization would have been warranted only if Deal had introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of nonapplicability to him of the medical exception. In Part II, supra, I have concluded that he did not.
The majority opinion indicates that the introduction of Deal’s controlled substances registration would have been sufficient of itself to rebut the presumption of lack of exception; thus, the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence was an abuse of discretion. Indeed, my Brothers Ely and Hall so hold despite the fact that no objection was made by Deal to this evidentiary ruling on appeal. However, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to exclude the registration. The delivery of cocaine without a *968prescription was not an authorized activity even for one who had a registration (see Part II, supra). Deal’s own testimony established that his supplying of cocaine to Lasher, Fredericks, and Shaw was not pursuant to prescriptions. Therefore, the medical exception was unavailable, and the registration was irrelevant.
Even assuming that the trial court acted outside its discretion on this issue, Deal failed to introduce sufficient other evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of lack of exception.
Nonapplicability of the medical exception thus did not become an element of the offense to be proved by the Government. Accordingly, it was not plain error for the trial court to exclude jury instructions on this issue.
IV. Deal’s Other Contentions
Deal’s other contentions, which the majority opinion does not reach, are in my opinion without merit. Since it would serve no useful purpose to discuss them here, I do not.
I would affirm Deal’s conviction, as well as King’s.