Court Opinion

ID: 9943136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:51.491619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:09.785140
License: Public Domain

J-A29010-23

                                   2024 PA Super 32

  IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  OF: L.C.J.W., A MINOR                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.M.G., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 688 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
                              23 in Adoption

  IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  OF: L.R.W., A MINOR                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.M.G., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 689 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
                           23A in Adoption 2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED: February 22, 2024

       A.M.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders that involuntarily terminated

her parental rights to her children L.C.J.W. and L.R.W., born in May 2016 and

September 2021, respectively.1 We affirm.

       The underlying facts of these cases are as follows. Erie County’s Office

of Children and Youth (“OCY”) first became involved with the family in May

2016, when L.C.J.W. was born drug-exposed and placed in a neonatal

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of the children’s father      (“Father”) were terminated on
May 26, 2023, and he did not appeal.
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intensive care unit.      Mother was evaluated for substance abuse and other

mental health concerns, underwent a treatment plan, and resumed care of

him the following year. OCY received another referral due to substance abuse

fifteen months later, with services again provided without court involvement

until the case was closed in September 2020.

       Thirteen months later, newborn L.R.W. was transported to Children’s

Hospital of Pittsburgh on October 7, 2021, after nearly suffocating when

Mother placed him on a mattress in her bedroom and left him unattended.

OCY obtained an emergency order to remove him from his parents’ care when

they failed to take him to follow-up appointments necessary to monitor for

liver failure. During the October 29, 2021 removal, OCY observed week-old

burn marks on L.R.W.’s hands and feet. Mother reported that a space heater

had fallen and landed on him, and no medical attention was sought. 2          On

November 23, 2021, the court adjudicated L.R.W. dependent and set a goal

of reunification.    At the parents’ request, L.R.W. was placed with Mr. and

Mrs. Burroughs, who were cousins of Mother.         The court established a

permanency plan that required Mother to, inter alia, continue drug and alcohol

treatment, undergo a mental health assessment, submit to urinalysis testing,

obtain and maintain income and safe and stable housing, participate in all

____________________________________________

2 Ultimately, both Mother and Father pled guilty to endangering the welfare of

a child in connection with this incident. See N.T. Hearing, 5/11/23, at 10.

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recommended medical appointments and follow-ups for L.R.W., and remain in

weekly communication with OCY.

      At the initial permanency review hearing, the court found that Mother

had minimally complied with the treatment plan. It changed the permanency

goal to return to parent concurrent with adoption and entered a similar

treatment plan regarding compliance with drug and alcohol and mental health

treatment, participating in L.R.W.’s medical care, and maintaining at least

weekly contact with OCY.

      Shortly before that hearing, OCY filed a dependency petition regarding

L.C.J.W. after learning that Mother had accidently sent a text to the Burroughs

offering to trade suboxone for cocaine. L.C.J.W. was placed in protective care

on February 23, 2022, and adjudicated dependent on March 8, 2022, based

upon frequent tardiness and absences from virtual school classes and speech

services, as well as Mother’s continuing substance abuse, refusal to submit to

screenings or to release the results to OCY, and failure to maintain

communication with OCY.      Similar treatment and permanency plans were

established, as well as directions to participate in an agency-approve domestic

violence program and in mental health services.        The initial permanent

placement goal was return to parent concurrent with adoption.         L.C.J.W.

joined L.R.W. in kinship placement with the Burroughs.

      On May 25, 2022, the court held the initial permanency review of

L.C.J.W. and second review for L.R.W.        The court found Mother to be

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moderately compliant, maintained the same concurrent permanent placement

goals, and reiterated the aforementioned goals for Mother. A permanency

review hearing in November 2022 yielded similar findings, plans, and goals.

Mother and Father did progress to unsupervised weekend visits with the

children, at which OCY aides would appear “for pop-ins.”3       N.T. Hearing,

5/11/23, at 15.

       On February 4, 2023, the Burroughs rushed L.R.W. to the hospital with

second-degree burns on his feet and a bruise on his cheek that he sustained

while the children were on a weekend visit with Mother and Father. The court

continued the scheduled review hearing and entered an order precluding

either parent from having any form of contact with the children.          On

February 26, 2023, Mother was treated at St. Vincent’s Medical Center for an

intentional overdose and spent the following week in a mental health ward in

Clarion. At the subsequent permanency review hearing on March 8, 2023, the

court granted the request of the children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to

change their permanency goal to adoption.

        OCY filed its petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights as to

L.C.J.W. and L.R.W. on March 2, 2023.            See Petition for Involuntary

____________________________________________

3 At more than one such pop-in, six-year-old L.C.J.W. attempted to conceal,

and then lied about, playing the notoriously violent video game Grand Theft
Auto, an activity that both parents and L.C.J.W. knew was to have been ceased
because the child had begun acting out aggressive behaviors at school and at
home. See N.T. Hearing, 5/11/23, at 14-15.

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Termination (L.C.J.W.), 3/2/23, at 18; Petition for Involuntary Termination

(L.R.W.), 3/2/23, at 17. The court held a hearing on the petitions on May 11,

2023.4     The court heard testimony from Rachel Lynch, the initial OCY

caseworker; Rachel Campbell, the OCY caseworker assigned when the

children’s goals were changed to adoption; Karin Wickwire, a pediatric acute

care nurse practitioner; Dr. Adeliade Eichman, a pediatrician in the child

advocacy division of UPMC Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh; and Mother.

       Ms. Lynch testified that Mother’s lack of follow-through with services,

the ongoing concerns with her substance abuse and mental health, and her

continued refusal to acknowledge “the significance of the child welfare history

[and] the injuries being sustained” resulted in her failure to remedy the

conditions that led to the placement of the children.      See N.T. Hearing,

5/11/23, at 22.           Ms. Lynch acknowledged that Mother       had made

improvements in her ability to provide discipline and to have an appropriate

level of attention to the children, but maintained that she had not fully

remedied the concerns. Id. at 46, 49-50. For example, on April 23, 2023,

between the filing of the termination petitions and the hearing, police became

involved when Mother “was suicidal and had some paranoid behaviors.” Id.

at 22-23.    Further, Mother made excuses for the incidents that led to the

____________________________________________

4 Both children were represented by the same GAL.    Before the hearing, the
orphans’ court granted a motion filed by the GAL requesting the appointment
of counsel for L.C.J.W. because she had determined that his legal interests
contradicted his best interests. See In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017).

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children’s placement rather than acknowledging her responsibility, such as

blaming L.C.J.W. for knocking the space heater onto L.R.W. instead of taking

accountability for having the heater on a counter above his swing. Id. at 24-

25. Additionally, Mother did not appear for all scheduled drug screenings and

had tested positive for methamphetamine at the hospital during her most

recent relapse. Id. at 56.

      Ms. Lynch indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Burroughs had been a constant in

the children’s lives since L.R.W.’s placement with them when he was an infant.

Although L.C.J.W. had a relationship with Mother and expressed excitement

for visits, he engaged appropriately with Mr. and Mrs. Burroughs, respected

their authority, and sought comfort from them when distressed. Id. at 29.

      Ms. Campbell offered more information about the children’s placement

in the Burroughs home, a two-parent household with no other children

present.   Id. at 86.   Mr. and Mrs. Burroughs had been meeting all of the

children’s needs, such as taking L.R.W. to speech therapy and follow-up visits

for his most recent burn injuries, and L.C.J.W. to therapy for post-traumatic

stress resulting from his experiences in his parents’ home. Id. at 87-88. Both

children have positive relationships with their caregivers, with L.C.J.W. being

particularly close to Mr. Burroughs. Id. at 86. Ms. Campbell testified that she

would be concerned if the children were removed from the Burroughs’s home

because it was the only one that L.R.W. has ever known, and L.C.J.W. feels

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safe there, having indicated that he would like to stay in the Burroughs home

if he does not return to Mother. Id. at 89-90.

      Conversely, Ms. Campbell indicated that the children would not be

negatively impacted if Mother’s rights were terminated. L.C.J.W. in particular

had been doing very well in the two months of no contact with his parents but

had been triggered into reliving his trauma when he received a gift of a teddy

bear that included an audio recording of Mother and Father. Id. at 90-94.

Overall, Ms. Campbell opined that both children’s needs for permanency,

stability, and safety would best be served by terminating Mother’s parental

rights. Id. at 94.

      Nurse Practitioner Wickwire confirmed the multiple serious injuries

L.R.W. sustained while in the care of Mother and Father, expressed concern

“for the general safety of the caregiving situation” with them, and indicated

trepidation at the thought of placing the children back into their care. Id. at

70.   Similarly, Dr. Eichman testified to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that L.R.W.’s preventable injuries resulted from his parents lacking

“just some basic understanding of [a] child’s needs and well-being” such that

she would be concerned with any child being in their care at this point. Id. at

116-17.

      While Father chose not to testify at the hearing, Mother elected to do

so. She professed her lack of responsibility for causing L.R.W.’s most recent

burn injuries and explained that she did not travel to see him during the

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resultant hospital admission because she believed that she was not permitted

to see him. Id. at 99-100. Mother opined that her rendering of aid to weeks-

old L.R.W. when he was suffocating showed her ability to “assess the situation

calmly and handle it obviously successfully because, I mean, he was breathing

after I performed CPR.” Id. at 101. She rationalized missed appointments

for services by indicating that she had to share a phone with Father and

suffered the loss of her brother. Id. at 102. Mother expressed how much she

missed L.C.J.W. and her knowledge that he reciprocated the feelings. Id. at

104. She conceded that she was “not as close with [L.R.W.],” but suggested

that she had been able to connect with him during visits. Id.

      Mother disputed that she had only made moderate progress in pursuing

reunification, asserting that she “busted [her] butt to do every single thing

that OCY asked of [her] for a very long time[.]” Id. at 105. She regretted

her suicide attempt, calling it a “stupid decision” made “because [she] didn’t

want to live without [her] kids,” but she had resumed “getting [her] mental

health situated” and “would definitely appreciate the chance to, you know, be

able to still be their mom[.]” Id. Mother said she “would do anything basically

to do that” and believed that she “did show definite growth throughout this

progress, and [was] way better off than [she] was when [she] first started.”

Id. at 105-06.

      At the conclusion of the testimony, the GAL indicated that, since L.R.W.

was non-verbal at his young age, his legal interests did not conflict with his

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best interests. Her position was that the best interests of both children would

be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights and giving them the

permanency of adoption, which would provide them with the safe and stable

environment that they lacked with Mother.        Id. at 127.    L.C.J.W.’s legal

counsel informed the court that she had spoken with her client at length, and

it is his preference to return to the care of his parents. Id. at 126.

      The orphans’ court took the matter under advisement before granting

the petitions by orders of May 26, 2023, and Mother filed timely notices of

appeal, which this Court consolidated sua sponte.        Both Mother and the

orphans’ court complied with their respective Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) duties.

Mother presents the following questions for our consideration:

      A.    Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of
            discretion and/or error of law when it determined that [OCY]
            established, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds
            for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
            [§] 2511(a)(1)?

      B.    Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of
            discretion and/or error of law when it determined that [OCY]
            established, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds
            for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
            [§] 2511(a)(2)?

      C.    Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of
            discretion and/or error of law when it determined that [OCY]
            established, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds
            for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
            [§] 2511(a)(5)?

      D.    Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of
            discretion and/or error of law when it determined that [OCY]
            established, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds

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              for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
              [§] 2511(a)(8)?

       E.     Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of
              discretion and/or error of law when it determined that [OCY]
              established, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds
              for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
              [§] 2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 4 (apostrophes added).5

       We begin with an examination of the applicable legal principles.

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
       appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
       decree of the termination court is supported by competent
       evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
       employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
       accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
       trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
       require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
       or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
       we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
       merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
       different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
       upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
       prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
       error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
       decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
       our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
       we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
       order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
       by competent evidence.

____________________________________________

5 L.C.J.W., through his legal counsel, filed a brief relying in large part upon

Mother’s brief. The GAL submitted a letter indicating that she would rely upon
OCY’s brief. OCY, in turn, submitted a letter stating that it relied upon the
analysis offered in the orphans’ court opinion.

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In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). It

is the province of the orphans’ court to assess credibility and resolve any

conflicts in the evidence, and in doing so it “is free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence presented[.]”       In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74

(Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Hence, “if competent evidence supports

the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support

the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super.

2003) (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child. As we have explained:

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
      and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 705 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear,

direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

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      Here, the orphans’ court determined that OCY established the elements

of subsections (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) as well as subsection (b). However, it

is well-settled that “[w]e need only agree with the court as to any one

subsection of [§] 2511(a), in addition to [§] 2511(b), to affirm.”          In re

Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d at 705. Accordingly, we examine the propriety

of the court’s ruling under § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Those subsections provide

as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:
                ....

              (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
              parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
              with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
              the date of removal or placement, the conditions
              which led to the removal or placement of the child
              continue to exist and termination of parental rights
              would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

                   ....

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

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      To meet its § 2511(a)(8) burden, OCY was required to establish three

elements: “(1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent

for at least twelve months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal

or placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d

820, 832 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted).        This subsection “does not

require the court to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the

conditions that led to the placement of the children.” Id. (citation omitted).

Rather, “the relevant inquiry regarding the second prong of § 2511(a)(8) is

whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus

whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the

hearing.” Id. (cleaned up).

      In this case, there is no dispute that both L.C.J.W. and L.R.W. had been

removed from Mother’s care for at least twelve months.         On the issues of

Mother’s failure to remedy the conditions that led to the placement and

whether termination would best serve the children’s needs and welfare, the

orphans’ court found the evidence clear and convincing in favor of termination.

The court first explained:

            [Mother] failed to adequately address any of the issues that
      led to her children’s removal.          [OCY] put together a
      comprehensive plan to put [Mother] in a position to have the
      children returned to her and be raised in a safe environment.
      Parenting, drug and alcohol treatment and mental health therapy
      were all components to help [Mother] put her life in order. She
      sporadically attended programs but eventually stopped her
      cooperation. As late as February 26, 2023, [M]other’s dual drug

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      and alcohol and mental health issues came to the fore. On
      February 26, 2023, [Mother] went to St. Vincent’s Medical Center
      stating that she had overdosed. [She] admitted to intentionally
      taking all the medication she had in her possession at the Review
      Hearing on March 8, 2023. [Mother] was placed in a mental health
      ward at Clarion Hospital for a week after that hearing. This
      incident underscores that despite all the programs designed to
      help [M]other since 2016, she has failed to internalize any of the
      treatment she received, if and when she decided to attend the
      programs.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/25/23, at 27.       The court placed “little or no

credibility” in Mother’s testimony, opining that it “corroborated [OCY]’s

position that she had excuses and explanations for her behavior, but accepted

no responsibility either for her actions or omissions.” Id. Mother’s continuing

failure to “demonstrate any acceptance of her responsibility to be able to

safely parent [the] children” supported the testimony of Dr. Eichman and

Nurse Practitioner Wickwire that Mother’s household was unsafe for any child

to reside there. Id. at 26.

      Concerning the needs and welfare component of § 2511(a)(8), the

orphans’ court observed:

             L.C.J.W. was particularly traumatized by [M]other’s failure
      to provide the most essential element of parenting — protection
      of children. As noted, he has been diagnosed with PTSD stemming
      from the incidents with his little brother while under the care of
      [M]other and [F]ather. He has stated he doesn’t feel unsafe in
      their care but has expressed concerns for L.R.W.’s safety.
      Obviously[,] what occurred while the children were in their
      parents’ care has deeply affected L.C.J.W. These traumas have
      led to problematic behaviors by L.C.J.W. which are being
      addressed through therapy. These behaviors have reduced since
      visitation with the parents was stopped.

            ....

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       . . . The Burroughs are the only parents L.R.W. has known. All
       his needs are being addressed by the foster parents. He has
       healed from his injuries and is doing well. L.C.J.W. has done well
       in the Burroughs’ home as well. The trauma he has suffered is
       being addressed through trauma therapy with which the
       Burroughs are involved. Although still having behavioral issues at
       school, L.C.J.W. has stopped his aggressive and threatening
       behavior towards his peers. He has a good relationship with the
       foster parents[,] especially the dad, respects their authority, and
       seeks comfort and care from them when the situation calls for
       such. The needs and welfare of both boys would be served by
       termination of parental rights, and the criteria supporting
       termination under [§] 2511(a)(8) . . . have been met.

Id. at 27, 29.

       Mother challenges the court’s § 2511(a)(8) analysis first by contending

that the ruling was improper because “[Mother] made many attempts and

progress on addressing the conditions that led to removal.” Mother’s brief at

22. She highlights the lack of positive drug tests between March 2022 and

February 2023,6 when she had what she described as “an unfortunate

overdose incident.” Id. at 20. Mother notes that the evidence demonstrates

“a willingness to enter rehab and work her way through the ups and downs of

addressing substance abuse.” Id. Thus, she “believes that [OCY] lacks clear

and convincing evidence to demonstrate that the conditions will not be

rectified in a reasonable amount of time, as she had made acceptable progress

up to the point of the burn incident.” Id. at 22-23. Concerning § 2511(a)(8)’s

needs and welfare component, Mother merely observes that “[n]o testimony

____________________________________________

6 Some of the tests during this time frame we deemed to be positive because

Mother failed to appear to provide a sample.

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was presented leading to concerns for the educational needs of L.C.J.W. not

being sufficiently met.” Id. at 20.

      Mother’s arguments fail to convince us that the ruling of the orphans’

court pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) lacks the support of competent evidence.

First, as we noted above, the fact that L.C.J.W.’s educational needs were not

being met when he was in Mother’s care, as he was absent or tardy from

school, was among the reasons he was removed from her care for the second

time. In any event, the court’s opinion evinces that it considered L.C.J.W.’s

overall needs, with a focus upon the emotional and behavioral problems

induced by the trauma of being under Mother’s care. The court reasonably

concluded that OCY established that the needs and welfare of the children

would be best served, for purposes of subsection (a)(8), by granting the

termination petition.

      Second, Mother’s noted willingness to continue progressing toward

being able to parent L.C.J.W. and L.R.W. in a reasonable amount of time has

no bearing on a subsection (a)(8) analysis. Rather, the issue is whether, after

a full year of services, she had remedied the conditions such that she was

presently able to resume care and custody of her children. The evidence that

Mother continued to struggle with addiction and mental health and was unable

to provide a safe environment for the children fully supports the conclusion

that she was not.

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     This Court has recognized that subsection (a)(8) may appear harsh

when a parent has made progress. However, we have observed that,

     by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to
     removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
     implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
     while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
     assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
     subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
     stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
     Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
     only a short period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to
     complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
     who has been placed in foster care.

Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d at 832 (cleaned up).

     Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’ court committed no error of

law or abuse of discretion in finding that OCY proved the elements of

§ 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence.

     Turning to § 2511(b), we reiterate the governing principles:

     [C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
     placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
     welfare above concerns for the parent.

     Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
     developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
     be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
     regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
     mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
     and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
     Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

     Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
     intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
     further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
     and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
     consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
     pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster

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      parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
      the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
      always an easy task.

Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105–06 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).

      This Court has stressed that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”           In re

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up).

      It is up to the orphans’ court to consider the totality of the
      circumstances when performing a needs and welfare analysis.
      Nothing in our case law dictates that the bond between a child and
      parent must predominate over all other needs and welfare
      considerations. Instead, after ascertaining the nature and status
      of the bond and effect on the child of severing it, the orphans’
      court must weigh any pain from breaking the bond against other
      considerations as to what result serves the child’s needs and
      welfare.

Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d at 839 (cleaned up). We have held that it is “within

the discretion of the orphans’ court to prioritize the safety and security” of

children “over their bonds with their parents,” and that this Court will not

disturb such an assessment when the court’s “factual findings are supported

by the record.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, in weighing the § 2511(b)

bond considerations, “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in

mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013).

      Mother argues that “she has adequately addressed the developmental,

physical, and emotional needs of the children as well as provided for their

welfare.” Mother’s brief at 24. She cites her own testimony about “providing

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for the daily needs of her children, especially L.C.J.W.,” highlighting the

following:

             She stated that she would ride bikes, read books, sing songs
       with L.C.J.W. She bathed him, provided for his schooling needs
       during home schooling for COVID-19, provided discipline and
       attempted to work on discipline techniques such as “time-outs.”
       She believed that he responded well to her and was progressing
       over time with learning better discipline. This progress was
       substantiated by the Court Summary notes of November 30, 2022
       in which it was noted that the [Mother] had shown an
       improvement in her ability to follow through with time-outs and
       set achievable goals such as completing homework with [L.C.J.W.]
       before he can have any playtime.

Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).

       Mother also points to her testimony that “[she] and her sons have a lot

of love and affection” and a bond that was confirmed by the OCY caseworkers.

Id. at 25. Mother asserts that the bond analysis must be different for L.C.J.W.

than from his younger brother, observing the fact that he is older and had not

been physically impacted by the “safety issues” that resulted in L.R.W.’s

multiple injuries. Id. at 25-26. In sum, while Mother contends that she had

a beneficial bond with both children, she is particularly adamant that severing

her bond with seven-year-old L.C.J.W. was not in his best interests.7

       The orphans’ court offered the following explanation of its § 2511(b)

analysis:

____________________________________________

7 L.C.J.W., through his legal counsel, joins in Mother’s argument on this issue,

stressing that returning to Mother is his preference. See L.C.J.W’s brief at 2-
5.

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            When examining the emotional bond between [M]other and
      [the] children, the evidence demonstrates that such a bond is
      tenuous at best. L.C.J.W.’s destructive behaviors at school
      minimized once visits with [M]other stopped. The only parents
      L.R.W. has known are the Burroughs. [Ms.] Campbell noted some
      desire by L.C.J.W. to return to his parents. However, as noted,
      his behaviors improved once visits stopped. His trauma therapist
      thought contact with the parents was not positive. This was as a
      result of L.C.J.W. getting emotional after receiving the audio
      message from his parents in the Build-A-Bear, and the therapist
      got the recording removed. [Ms.] Campbell believes with therapy,
      L.C.J.W. will overcome any issue with termination of his contact
      with his parents. This is a case involving physical abuse and
      considering the safety needs of the children is critical. [Mother]
      has failed to remedy the conditions of lack of parenting, substance
      abuse and mental health that led to the removal and placement
      of her children. Dr. Eichman, Nurse Practitioner Wickwire, as well
      as [Ms.] Lynch, were of the opinion any child would be at risk with
      the parents in this case. L.R.W. and L.C.J.W. have developed a
      bond with the Burroughs and all their needs are being met. The
      Burroughs provide love, comfort, security and stability for both
      boys.

            The evidence demonstrated that severing contact with
      [M]other has not had any detrimental effect on the children. Not
      permitting these children to have to face the continued trauma
      and instability they have been through in their short lives is of
      paramount concern to this court. There would be no detrimental
      effect on either L.C.J.W. or L.R.W. by the termination of the
      parental relationship with [M]other.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/25/23, at 30-31 (cleaned up).

      From our examination of the record, we again discern that the court’s

ruling is supported by competent evidence and does not result from an abuse

of discretion or error of law. The orphans’ court plainly considered the totality

of the circumstances of this case, as well as the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of both children and reasonably concluded that

their interests would be best served by terminating Mother’s parental rights

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and allowing them to be adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Burroughs. As for L.R.W.,

the court aptly cited the fact that he had never had a parent-child relationship

with Mother, as he had last been in her care for more than mere visits when

he was a newborn. The court acknowledged L.C.J.W.’s bond with Mother but

found his need for safety and stability outweighed any benefit that bond

provided him. This finding is supported by the testimony concerning how well

L.C.J.W. did during the months when all contact with Mother was severed, the

negative effects that were triggered when Mother took it upon herself to

contact him via the audio recording in the teddy bear gift, and the ability of

continuing therapy to resolve any issues he may experience in the future. The

certified record thus supports the orphans’ court’s determination that, overall,

both children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs will be best

served by terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      The severance of ties between a parent and child who love each other

is always difficult.   However, a court cannot “toll the well-being and

permanency” of a child indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon the

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d

999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).           Despite her

obviously genuine love for her children, Mother’s struggles with addiction and

her mental health have rendered her incapable of providing for their needs,

particularly their safety.   Freed to be adopted, L.C.J.W. and L.R.W. will

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experience the safety, security, permanence, and support that were

previously lacking, as well as the love and affection of their adoptive parents.

      For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the orphans’ court

terminating Mother’s parental rights as to L.C.J.W. and L.R.W.

      Orders affirmed.

DATE: 02/22/2024

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