Court Opinion

ID: 9705636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:30.022876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.134839
License: Public Domain

*122DISSENT
Jackson, C. J.
I am of the opinion that specification thirty-six (36) of appellant’s motion for a new trial was well taken. Such specification reads as follows:
“36. Error of law occurring at the trial in that the court erred in overruling the objection of the defendant to a question propounded to Dr. R. E. Weitzel, a witness called on behalf of the State of Indiana, during the direct examination of said witness, and in permitting the testimony of said witness in response to said question to be admitted into evidence. The specific question, the objection of the defendant, the ruling of the court, and the answer of the witness being as follows:
“Q. What is your opinion, if any, as to how his condition will remain? What it will become?
“By Mr. Marshall.
“If the court please. I don’t think that is competent at all. That’s not at issue here today. This isn’t an action for personal injuries. It’s just an action for assault and battery. It was asked only for the purpose of prejudicing the jury.
“By the Court:
“Overruled.
“A. Of course, I haven’t seen him since September when he was discharged from the hospital, but in my opinion he will never improve satisfactorily enough, if he improves at all, to carry on any duties on his own as far as taking care of himself. In my opinion it’s a permanent injury.”
In my opinion the question was objectionable, the objection thereto should have been sustained, and the overruling of the objection permitting the answer of the witness to stand and be considered by the jury constitutes reversible error requiring the reversal of this cause.
Illinois has held in similar circumstances “. . . the evidence of the extent of the victim’s injuries was irrelevant and improper. ... We therefore are of the opinion that the defendant did not receive the fair and impartial trial to which he was entitled.” The People v. Nickolopoulos (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 185 N. E. 2d 209.
*123The only purpose of the question was to prejudice the jury and under the circumstances here delineated it undoubtedly did just that. 87 A. L. R. 2d 926, 935, 936.
The attempted justification for the admission of such evidence in the majority opinion to the effect that such evidence provided a “yardstick upon which to base such punishment” is untenable. If such a policy were to be adopted punishment would be predicated on the severity of the injury rather than statutory prohibition against an assault in a rude, insolent and angry manner.
For the above reasons this cause should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant’s motion for a new trial.