Court Opinion

ID: 9849689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:44:24.630377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:23.999356
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Christy Lamaine and a friend were walking along the side of the road in the evening when the inebriated probationer struck and killed both girls.
1. It was not error to deny summary judgment to probation officer Hollingshed. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that, in part, Hollingshed performed a ministerial duty negligently. If that along with proximate cause is proved, plaintiff will be entitled to relief. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753 (6) (452 SE2d 476) (1994). There is an issue of fact whether Hollingshed’s failure to fulfill any of his ministerial duties constituted a proximate cause of Christy’s death.
The scope of the probation officer’s duties is set out by law in OCGA §§ 42-8-27 and 42-8-29, as appellee points out. It is true that the statutes describe a function that is primarily in the realm of discretion. Such activity would be clothed with official immunity. Gilbert, supra; Doe v. Howell, 212 Ga. App. 305, 306 (2) (441 SE2d 767) (1994). But in addition, one of the express conditions of probation which had been imposed on the tortfeasor James Chester when he was sentenced nine months before the fatalities occurred, was that *275he was “to submit to regular/random drug/alcohol screens.”
This court order left to the discretion of the probation officer assigned to Chester the time, frequency, location, and method of such testing. But it did not leave to discretion the decision to screen or not to screen. The court order was a mandate, and in order to give integrity to the court’s sentence, it was the probation officer’s duty to require Chester’s submission to such tests. The probation officer did not have authority to decide not to screen. It was to be done on some “regular” basis. If in fact it was not done in the nine months between Chester’s sentencing in May 1989 and Christy Lamaine’s death in February 1990, a jury could find that this was a breach of a ministerial duty imposed on the probation officer as an inherent concomitant of the express condition of probation imposed on the defendant.
It is no answer to justify the omission as necessitated by the scarcity of time and resources in the probation office. While that excuse, which is not offered by appellants, may be factually true, it is irrelevant in connection with the implementation and enforcement of a court order.
Appellants respond to plaintiff’s allegation regarding screening by contending that Chester’s “ ‘regular’ [frequency] for urine screens could very well have been once a year in his discretion.” There is no evidence to back this up, and it is the defendant’s burden on summary judgment to prove that he cannot be held liable. Sherin v. Dept. of Human Resources, 229 Ga. App. 621, 625 (4) (494 SE2d 518) (1997) (official has burden of showing he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority); see Jones v. Littlejohn, 222 Ga. App. 494, 496-497 (2) (474 SE2d 714) (1996) (defendant/movant has burden of proof on summary judgment as to defense of immunity); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). If Hollingshed had discretion to choose to require drug/alcohol screens only once a year, then of course the ministerial aspect of the duty could not be shown to have been violated as the first year of Chester’s five-year probationary period had not yet expired.
But if the policy of the Department was to require screens of probationers in Chester’s shoes on some other regular basis, then a jury could find a breach of the ministerial duty. It is not unlikely that more was required. There is evidence that, when Chester was sentenced in 1989 for driving under the influence, for no insurance, for leaving the scene of an accident, and for being a habitual violator, he already had six prior DUI’s, one prior habitual violator, and two hit and runs.
2. I agree that there is no evidence which would support a finding of “express malice or malice in fact,” which would be required in order for plaintiff to recover against probation officer Hollingshed on the exception which lifts immunity for a discretionary act.
*276Decided June 11, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 6, 1998
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Kathleen M, Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, John C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
Michael J. Kramer, for appellees.