Court Opinion

ID: 9531929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:01.78988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:37.489717
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.,

(dissenting).

I
In Williams v Detroit Civil Service Commission, 383 Mich 507, 513; 176 NW2d 593 (1970), the Court "decline[d] to pass upon the question of enforcement of the [Civil Service Commission’s residency] rule by discharge of an employee, whether by the Commission or by an appointing authority.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The question addressed by this Court "is whether the Civil Service Commission has power to enforce its residency rule by vacating the position of a civil service employee who violates that rule.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In practical terms, there is no distinction between the status of a "discharged” employee and one whose position has been "vacated”. In both cases, the employment relationship is severed. While this Court seemingly concedes that both *364termination procedures produce identical results, "separation of the employee”, its analysis and disposition focus on its assertion that "discharge” and "vacation” of a position are quite "different action[s].”
The Court equates the vacation of a civil service employee’s position to the vacation of the office of. a justice or judge upon his removing his domicile beyond the limits of the territory from which he was elected or appointed.1
But even the vacation of judicial office mandated by the constitution is not self-executing. Cf. In re Kapcia, 389 Mich 306, 314; 205 NW2d 436 (1973). Until the jurisdiction of a court is properly invoked and entry of a judgment declaring the office vacant, a judge may continue to exercise his powers although he has in fact removed his domicile in violation of the constitutional provision.
Labeling a discharge a "vacation” of position does not change the issue before us.
II
The power of the City of Detroit to establish a residency requirement for its employees is not at issue in this case. Nor is there any issue concerning the newly declared duty of the city to bargain collectively on the question of residency. Detroit Police Officers Association v Detroit, 391 Mich 44; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Nor is there any issue as to the power of the city to enforce a properly promulgated residency requirement.
The sole issue is whether the Civil Service Commission of the City of Detroit has the authority to enforce a residency requirement as a continuing condition of employment.
*365The Civil Service Commission derives its powers from the Charter of the City of Detroit. The charter authorizes the commission to establish minimum hiring qualifications for prospective employees of the city.
"All applicants for offices or positions in said classified service, except those herein otherwise specified, shall pass an examination which shall be made public, competitive and free to all citizens of the United States, with speciñc limitations as to residence, age, health, habits and moral character * * * (Emphasis supplied.) Detroit Charter, Title 4, ch 2, § 11.
This Court, in considering this language in Williams, supra, rejected a challenge to the validity of a rule of the Civil Service Commission making city residence a "requirement” for municipal employees. The Court’s opinion primarily focused on claims that the residence requirement was a denial of due process, equal protection and the Michigan constitutional guarantee of enjoyment of civil or political rights.
The Court, as appears in the following excerpt from Williams (pp 513-514), also considered whether the charter conferred on the commission the authority to promulgate a residency requirement, but expressly reserved the question presently before us:
"The question of the enforcement of the rule was not before the Court of Appeals; that Court erred in raising the question and passing upon it. At issue here is the validity of a rule of the Civil Service Commission which makes city residence a requirement for municipal employees. Consequently, we decline to pass upon the question of enforcement of the rule by discharge of an employee, whether by the commission or by an appointing authority.
*366"(a) Is Rule VII within the Power Conferred by the City Charter?
"The trial judge analyzed the provisions of Rule VII and the charter, in part, as follows:
" 'The city fathers did say and the people of Detroit did enact that there might be "a limitation,” that is a condition, requirement or restriction, of "residence” so long as it is "uniform as to each kind of work or occupation.” A residence restriction applicable to each and every job, occupation or work classification within the city’s classified service would appear to be uniform as to each kind of work or occupation. In essence, Rule VII is such a restriction.’ ”
The "authority” of a judicial opinion is its reasoning.
It is apparent that the sole basis on which this Court predicated its conclusion in Williams that the power to promulgate the rule was conferred by the charter is the quoted language of § 11. The trial judge’s analysis, adopted by the Williams Court, is indisputably a paraphrase of § 11. Section 11 indisputably concerns only "applicants”, it authorizes the adoption of "specific limitations as to residence” only in connection with "examination” of "applicants”.
III
The distinction between an entrance requirement — a precondition of employment — and a continuing condition of employment was recently emphasized in Detroit Police Officers Association v Detroit, supra, p 61:
"Once an applicant has met these standards and has been hired as an employee the 'recruiting requirements’ as such do not continue to regulate his or her right to hold the job.”
*367The commission’s establishment of one continuing condition of employment implies that it may establish others. Such conditions — hours of work, method of payment, establishment of holiday, vacation and sick leave policy — are, however, generally established by the common council by enactment of an ordinance, not by promulgation of a regulation of the Civil Service Commission.
The commission’s initiative in this area is clearly beyond its authority, which is limited to
(i) classifying positions,
(ii) holding examinations "with specific limitations as to residence” — the word "with” modifies the word "examination” and, thus, the phrase "with specific limitations as to residence” relates only to examinations, not tenure of employment,
(iii) preparing an eligible list,
(iv) certifying names to the appointing authority,
(v) disapproving discharge of provisional appointees, consenting to transfer of provisional appointees,
(vi) setting aside promotions it finds were made for reasons other than the "interest of the service” and discharges, etc., "made for political or for reasons other than the good of the service”.
The appointing authority, not the commission, decides when, if at all, to discharge an employee. Rule VII, which imposes a mandate on the appointing authority and compels discharge for non-residence, exceeds the commission’s power to promulgate or enforce.2
*368IV
Section 7 of the charter confers upon the commission powers and duties "necessary to carry out the provisions hereof.” It may adopt rules "adapted to carry out the purposes of this chapter and not inconsistent with its provisions for the examination and selection of persons to fill the offices and positions in the classified service, which are required to be filled by appointment and for the selection of persons to be employed in the service of the city.”
The general residence requirement established by Rule VII as a continuing condition of employment is unrelated to the commission’s powers and duties of establishing procedures and requirements for examination and selection of employees.
V
Whatever may be the commission’s power to certify a payroll, the power is designed to assure that all hirings and promotions are made in accordance with lawful civil service requirements. If *369the commission’s power to certify a payroll can be used to effectuate other policies, then the commission could apparently refuse to certify a tardy employee or one who took an unauthorized vacation or who was insubordinate or incompetent. It is clear, however, that the commission’s refusal to certify a pay check on any such ground would be beyond its authority. The pay check certification argument begs the question.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
T. G. Kavanagh and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.

ORDER

Entered December 20,1974. — Reporter.
On order of the Court, an application for rehearing having been filed herein, the Court reaffirms its opinion and reversal of the Court of Appeals but vacates its affirmance of the trial court and remands to the Court of Appeals for further consideration, in light of the Court’s opinion at 392 Mich 195 (1974), of issues previously raised before the Court of Appeals but not discussed due to the Court of Appeals’ disposition of this matter. Costs to defendants-appellants proceedings in this Court only.

 Const 1963, art 6, § 20.

 In Delaney v Detroit Board of Fire Commissioners, 244 Mich 64, 66-67; 221 NW 283 (1928), a fire, fighter was discharged for "'intoxication and for the good of the service.’” The Civil Service Commission ordered him reinstated. This Court reversed, holding that § 18 limits the commission to the determination of two questions:
*368"(1) Was the employee discharged for political or religious reasons, or
“(2) Was he discharged for other reasons than the good of the service.”
The Delaney Court also instructed the commission not to retry the intoxication issue; the commission’s "business is to see that the departmental heads act in good faith, not to correct their judgment”:
"The board of fire commissioners has the power of appointment and the power of removal for any reason not prohibited by the charter. It alone is given jurisdiction to try the question of guilt or innocence on specific charges made against its employees.”
In Slavin v Detroit, 262 Mich 173; 247 NW 145 (1933), policemen and firemen who had been discharged as an economy measure failed in their effort to compel the city to restore them.
As to the location of the power of appointment and removal of firemen, see Delaney v Detroit Board of Fire Commissioners, supra; Slavin v Detroit, supra, p 179.
See also, Philbrick v Dust, 178 Mich 605, 607; 146 NW 175 (1914). Cf. Kane v Flint, 342 Mich 74, 79; 69 NW2d 156 (1955).