Court Opinion

ID: 9404485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 05:07:11.642234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.609092
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re L. A. Decker, Minor.                                           June 22, 2023

                                                                     Nos. 363531, 363563
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2019-002052-NA

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Petitioner removed respondent-mother’s biological child from her care because she had her
parental rights terminated to three other children in Florida, substance-abuse issues, mental-health
issues, and she left the child with newly met individuals for extended periods of time. Petitioner
also removed the same child from respondent-father’s care because he had abandoned the child
after he was incarcerated. The trial court terminated the parental rights to both respondents. We
affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         Respondent-father was incarcerated when the child was 14-months old, and he stated that
he left the child in the care of respondent-mother along with $160,000 in cash, a home, and some
vehicles. Since his incarceration, however, respondent-father did not have any contact with the
child until this case, and respondent-mother was no longer living in the house that respondent-
father had left for her.

        Petitioner provided both respondents with separate treatment plans to help rectify their
barriers to reunification with the child. Respondent-mother’s treatment plan included parenting
classes, a parenting monitor, parenting-time visits with the child, random-drug screens, individual
and family therapy, and psychological and psychiatric evaluations over a two-year period.
Respondent-father’s treatment plan included substance-abuse therapy, telephone visitations with
the child, and parenting classes. Respondent-father’s plan considered that he was incarcerated for
conspiracy to distribute certain drugs and money laundering, until his release date in 2027.
Respondent-father testified, however, that his earliest release date was June 2024, if he was able
to receive a compassionate release for the elderly.

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        Respondent mother was able to comply partially with her treatment plan. She sought
individual therapy and parenting classes voluntarily, and she was able to complete a psychiatric
and psychological evaluation. Despite her efforts, however, she was unable to benefit from the
services because her participation with family therapy was terminated when she missed multiple
appointments. Further, respondent-mother cancelled every home-inspection appointment with
petitioner and she failed to verify that she had suitable housing or a stable income to support the
child.

        Additionally, respondent-mother missed 27 of the 100 offered parenting-time visits with
the child. Petitioner reported that respondent-mother’s inconsistent attendance had a negative
impact on the child, as he would get anxious and distressed regarding whether respondent-mother
would show up. When respondent-mother did attend her parenting-time visits with the child, she
would often make promises that she could not keep or discuss past traumatic incidents with the
child after being told that she could not do that.

        Regarding respondent-father, petitioner reported that he did not complete the parenting
classes as they were not offered in the prison in which he was incarcerated. He was able to
participate in classes for coping and changing his behavior, which he did complete. Respondent-
father did not demonstrate that he benefitted from those classes, however, as he broke the rules for
the prison in which he was incarcerated and lost phone privileges as a result. Consequently,
respondent-father missed five months of phone calls with the child. Further, respondent-father
had not financially or materially supported the child since he was incarcerated, even though he
stated that he left respondent-mother and the child with $160,000, a home, and some vehicles.
Respondent-father’s plan to support the child was to live on money that he believed he would
receive from a pending lawsuit.

        It was reported that the child was doing well with his caregiver during the pendency of the
case, and the caregiver had expressed a desire to adopt the child. The child was up to date on his
immunizations and was able to receive oral surgery for several teeth that had extreme cavities.
Petitioner reported that the child did not have a bond with respondent-father because respondent-
father had been incarcerated since the child was 14-months-old. There was a bond between
respondent-mother and the child, but that relationship became strained when respondent-mother
did not consistently attend her parenting time visits. It was reported that the child was bonded
with his caregiver, who provided him stability and permanency.

        The trial court terminated respondents’ parental rights to the child more than 25 months
after the initial dispositional order was entered. The trial court found that there was clear and
convincing evidence to support the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), and respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (h), and (j). Additionally, the trial court found that the child needed
permanency, stability, and finality to this situation and, thus, termination was in the child’s best
interests.

       Both respondents now appeal.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

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                                  A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

        Both respondents argue that the trial court erred when it found statutory grounds to
terminate their parental rights. “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings
and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App
701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to
support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In
re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

       MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provides as follows:

               (3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
       finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

                                               * * *

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

        MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is appropriate “when the conditions that brought the children into
foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage
of a variety of services.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710 (cleaned up).

       There were more than 182 days between the initial dispositional order for each respondent
and the final termination hearing. Therefore, the 182-day statutory period was satisfied.

        Regarding respondent-mother, the conditions that led to the adjudication of the child from
her care included her inability to parent the child appropriately as well as her mental-health issues.
Respondent-mother’s treatment plan included parenting classes, a parenting monitor, parenting-
time visits with the child, random-drug screens, individual and family therapy, and psychological
and psychiatric evaluations over a two-year period. The record demonstrates that respondent-
mother was inconsistent with her participation in the services that she was provided. She did not
consistently attend her parenting-time visits with the child, and she did not complete her therapy
sessions as referred by petitioner. Petitioner’s caseworkers also reported that respondent-mother
did not show any improvement in her parenting skills because she would discuss inappropriate
topics with the child during the visits that she did attend, and she would make the child promises
that she would not, or could not, keep.

        Given respondent-mother’s inconsistent engagement with the services that she was
provided, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In
re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33. “[T]he totality of evidence amply” supports that respondent “had
not accomplished any meaningful change” in the conditions that led to adjudication because she
had not addressed the conditions that led to her mental-health concerns and she continued to have

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difficulty parenting the child by not consistently attending the parenting-time visits. In re
Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Therefore, the record supports that the
trial court did not clearly err when it found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent-
mother’s conditions continued to exist.

        Regarding respondent-father, the conditions that led to the adjudication of the child from
his care included his abandonment of the child. Respondent-father’s treatment plan included
substance-abuse therapy, telephone visitations with the child, and parenting classes. Even though
respondent-father was limited in his ability to complete some of the treatment plan because he was
incarcerated, his behavior while incarcerated resulted in him losing phone privileges to
communicate with the child. Additionally, respondent-father was unable to provide financial care
for the child while he was incarcerated. The record demonstrates that respondent-father was not
consistent in his effort to maintain contact with the child, and we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33. Therefore,
the record supports that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent-father’s conditions continued to exist.

       Because one statutory ground for termination is established for each respondent, “we need
not consider whether the other grounds cited by the trial court also supported the termination
decision.” In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

                                      B. BEST INTERESTS

        Both respondents further argue that the trial court erred by finding that the termination of
their parental rights was in the best interest of the child. “Once a statutory ground for termination
has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it
can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144
(2012). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).
The trial court’s ruling regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315
Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is
evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33.

        “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. With respect to the child’s best interests, this Court
places its focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. “In deciding
whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the
parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and
the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App
at 41-42 (cleaned up). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence,
the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the
child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303
Mich App at 714.

        Regarding respondent-mother, there was no dispute that respondent-mother had a bond
with the child. During the pendency of the case, however, respondent-mother failed to demonstrate

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that she could provide the child with permanency and stability as evidenced by her inconsistent
parenting-time visits. Further, respondent-mother was unable to verify that she had appropriate
housing suitable for the child, or an income that would support the child’s needs.

        This is in contrast with the child’s caregiver, who was able to provide the child’s basic
needs as well as give the child permanency and stability through adoption. Similar to the bond
that the child has with respondent-mother, it was also reported that the child was bonded to the
caregiver. Respondent-mother’s unwillingness to take consistent steps to demonstrate that there
would be finality to her barriers to reunification demonstrates that the termination of her parental
rights was in the child’s best interests. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42.

        Regarding respondent-father, petitioner reported that the child had no bond with him
because respondent-father had not been in the child’s life since the child was 14-months old.
Respondent-father also failed to demonstrate that he would be able to communicate with the child
after respondent-father’s behavior resulted in his loss of phone privileges while incarcerated.
Further, respondent-father did not demonstrate that he could provide the child with stability and
permanency because he did not have a consistent plan to care for the child upon his release from
incarceration.

       This is again in contrast to the permanency, stability, and bond that the child’s caregiver
was giving the child. Respondent-father’s inability to take consistent steps to demonstrate that
there would be finality to his barriers to reunification demonstrates that the termination of his
parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at
41-42.

        Given the evidence presented in this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33. Therefore, the record supports
that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by a preponderance of evidence that termination
and adoption was in the child’s best interests.

                                       C. GUARDIANSHIP

        Lastly, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by not placing the child in a
guardianship that would have allowed respondent-father to be reunited with the child upon his
release from incarceration. Respondent-father did not raise this issue in the trial court and, thus,
it is unpreserved for appellate review. This Court reviews an unpreserved issue for plain error
affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). An error
affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 9. “When plain error
has occurred, reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction
of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. (cleaned
up).

        A guardianship may only be considered when a child cannot be returned to a parent, but
termination is “clearly not in the child’s best interests.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859
NW2d 208 (2014). According to MCL 722.873(c), a child is eligible to receive guardianship
assistance only when reunification and placement of the child for adoption are not appropriate

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permanent options. In this case, the child’s caregiver testified that she was willing to adopt the
child, and the trial court found that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests as stated above. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to consider guardianship
did not affect the outcome of the proceedings and respondent-father’s argument is without merit.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

        The trial court did not err when it found clear and convincing evidence that a statutory basis
existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights because both respondents displayed inconsistent
participation to rectify their barriers to reunification. Similarly, a preponderance of the evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s
best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                              /s/ Anica Letica

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