Court Opinion

ID: 9369767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 18:00:44.927866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.977338
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 20-12609
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        BENJAMIN SMITH,

                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00305-ELR-CMS-1
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                20-12609

                             ____________________

                                   No. 20-12773
                             ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                          Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        BENJAMIN SMITH,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00305-ELR-CMS-1
                            ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               In 2018, Benjamin Smith, a prior convicted felon, was
        arrested on an outstanding warrant. At the time of his arrest, he
        had a firearm in his possession. As a result, a grand jury indicted
        him for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
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        20-12609              Opinion of the Court                      3

        18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). A jury convicted Smith as charged,
        and the district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal
        under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) to 235 months’
        imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release.
               The main issue we must address in this appeal is whether
        the district court erred in concluding that Smith’s prior Georgia
        convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rob, aggravated
        assault, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery qualify as
        violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. Additionally, we
        address Smith’s arguments that (1) the district court erred in
        denying Smith’s motion for a new trial; (2) the government
        committed prosecutorial misconduct by misstating the law during
        closing argument; (3) the district court abused its discretion in
        denying Smith’s counsel’s motion to withdraw; and (4) the district
        court erred in enhancing Smith’s sentence under the ACCA
        without submitting his prior convictions to the jury. After review
        and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that Smith’s
        convictions for Georgia aggravated assault with intent to rob,
        Georgia aggravated assault, and Georgia criminal attempt to
        commit armed robbery do not qualify as violent felony predicates
        for purposes of the ACCA enhancement. Because Smith does not
        have three qualifying predicate convictions, the ACCA
        enhancement cannot stand. Therefore, we vacate Smith’s sentence
        and remand for resentencing. We affirm as to the other issues.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

                                  I.     Background
                In August 2018, a grand jury in the Northern District of
        Georgia indicted Smith on one count of possession of a firearm by
        a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Prior to trial,
        Smith filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude details of his
        prior convictions at trial and seeking redaction of these prior
        convictions from the indictment. He offered to stipulate that prior
        to the instant charged offense, he had sustained a felony conviction.
        The district court granted his motion and accepted the parties’
        stipulation. Smith’s trial began in February 2019, but the district
        court declared a mistrial due to improper prejudicial testimony
        from the State’s first witness.
              In May 2019, between the mistrial and the retrial, the
        government obtained a superseding indictment. The superseding
        indictment alleged as follows:
              On or about April 27, 2018, in the Northern District
              of Georgia, the defendant, BENJAMIN SMITH,
              knowing that he had been previously convicted of at
              least one of the following offenses:

                  (1) Theft By Shoplifting, on or about April 6,
                  1998, in Fulton County Superior Court,
                  Atlanta, Georgia;

                  (2) Aggravated Assault, on or about January 4,
                  1999, in Fulton County Superior Court,
                  Atlanta, Georgia;
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        20-12609              Opinion of the Court                        5

                   (3) Aggravated Assault, on or about February
                   6, 2009, in Fulton County Superior Court,
                   Atlanta, Georgia; and

                   (4) Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted
                   Felon, on or about March 23, 2010, in Fulton
                   County Superior Court, Atlanta, Georgia;

              each of which was a crime punishable by
              imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, did
              knowingly possess the following firearm in and
              affecting interstate and foreign commerce: a Smith
              and Wesson, .38 caliber revolver, in violation of Title
              18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and
              924(e)(1).

               Smith filed a motion to strike the language in the
        superseding indictment that he knew that he had been previously
        convicted of a felony. He acknowledged that the government
        added this language in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision
        in the then-pending case Rehaif v. United States, which presented
        the question of whether knowledge of one’s prohibited status was
        an element of a § 922(g) offense. However, because Rehaif was still
        pending, Smith argued that the knowledge of status language
        should be struck as mens rea about one’s status was not an element
        of the offense. The district court granted Smith’s motion and
        struck the challenged language from the indictment, finding that
        mens rea of one’s status was not an element of the offense.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       20-12609

               At trial, officers with the Atlanta Police Department’s
        (“APD”) Fugitive Unit testified that in April 2018, a warrant issued
        for Smith on an unrelated matter. The officers learned that Smith
        was a mobile mechanic and arranged a meeting with Smith near a
        local AutoZone under the guise of a needed car repair. Officers in
        unmarked vehicles went to the designated location to meet Smith
        on April 27, 2018. The officers pulled into the parking lot and
        approached Smith wearing tactical vests bearing the words
        “Atlanta Police Department,” announced that they were APD, and
        instructed Smith to get on the ground. Smith’s girlfriend was inside
        Smith’s vehicle in the passenger seat. Smith attempted to flee in
        his vehicle, but he was blocked in. Smith exited his vehicle and
        attempted to “grab a gun with a sock on it” 1 from his waistband.
        Smith then dropped to one knee and tossed the gun under his
        vehicle. After a brief struggle, the officers took Smith into custody
        and seized the gun.
              In his defense, Smith’s counsel argued that Smith did not
        know where the gun under his car came from and that he did not
        possess a gun.2 In support, Smith’s counsel presented testimony
        from the AutoZone manager where Smith was arrested that the
        area experienced frequent crime and people often loitered and
        dumped items in the parking lot.

        1 Officers described the gun as being in a “dirty sock” with “the barrel sticking
        out of it.”
        2 Smith did not testify in his defense.
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        20-12609                  Opinion of the Court                               7

              The parties stipulated that Smith had been previously
        convicted of a felony. The government also introduced, over
        Smith’s objections, certified copies of Smith’s prior conviction for
        possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of Georgia
        law. The district court instructed the jury that the prior conviction
        was not to be used to determine whether Smith was guilty of the
        present charged offense, and was
               admitted and may be considered . . . for the limited
               purpose of assisting [the jury] in determining whether
               the defendant had the state of mind or intent
               necessary to commit the crime charged in the
               indictment, the defendant acted according to a plan
               or in preparation to commit a crime, or the defendant
               committed the acts charged in the indictment by
               accident or mistake.

         The government then called Smith’s parole and probation officer,
        who testified that Smith was released on parole on March 30, 2011,
        for his Georgia conviction for possession of a firearm by a
        convicted felon. After the close of the evidence, the jury found
        Smith guilty as charged. 3
              Sixteen days after the guilty verdict, the Supreme Court held
        in Rehaif that to convict a defendant of violating § 922(g), “the

        3 For the first time on appeal, Smith takes issue with the government’s closing
        argument. We discuss the closing argument at issue in greater detail below
        when addressing Smith’s claim.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

        Government must prove both that the defendant knew he
        possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant
        category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v.
        United States, 588 U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). Smith filed
        a motion for a new trial, arguing that, in light of Rehaif, a new trial
        was warranted because the jury was not instructed on an essential
        element of the offense and the evidence was insufficient to sustain
        his conviction. The government opposed the motion, noting that
        it attempted to add knowledge of Smith’s felon status to the
        superseding indictment and introduce evidence on this point, but
        Smith successfully opposed its efforts—thus, inviting the error.
        Alternatively, the government argued that there was sufficient
        evidence to prove Smith knew of his felon status at the time he
        possessed the firearm in question.
               The district court denied the motion for a new trial. It
        concluded that (1) “there [was] an abundance of evidence
        demonstrating that [Smith] was well aware of his felony status at
        the time he possessed a gun”—including that prior to that date, he
        had pleaded guilty in two cases to the charge of possession of a
        firearm by a convicted felon; and (2) “based on [Smith’s] own
        argument to redact language indicating his knowledge of his felony
        status, the interest of justice would dictate that [he] not be
        permitted to now benefit from the [c]ourt’s ruling in his favor.”
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        20-12609                   Opinion of the Court                               9

               Prior to sentencing,4 the United States Probation Office
        prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which
        indicated, in relevant part, that Smith was subject to the ACCA
        sentencing enhancement because he had at least three prior
        unspecified convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug
        offense. 5 Smith objected to the enhancement, arguing that he did
        not have three qualifying violent felony convictions.
                In response, the government argued that Smith had five
        potentially qualifying ACCA violent felony predicate convictions
        (all from Georgia): (1) a 1999 conviction for aggravated assault;
        (2) a 2009 conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob; (3) a
        2009 conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery;
        (4) a 2010 conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer;
        and (5) a 2014 conviction for obstruction of law enforcement.

        4 Smith’s court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw, and Smith filed a pro
        se motion supporting the motion to withdraw and requesting appointment of
        new counsel prior to sentencing. The district court denied the motions
        following two hearings. We discuss these motions and the district court’s
        rulings in more detail below when addressing Smith’s challenge to the denial
        of these motions.
        5 At the time of Smith’s conviction, a violation of § 922(g) carried a statutory
        maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2019). The
        ACCA, however, mandated a minimum 15-year sentence if a defendant
        convicted of a § 922(g) offense has three or more prior convictions for a
        “violent felony” and/or “a serious drug offense.” Id. § 924(e)(1).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  20-12609

               At sentencing, the district court overruled Smith’s objection
        to the ACCA enhancement and found that Smith, “based on his
        priors, [was] an armed career criminal.” The district court did not
        elaborate on its reasoning or explain on which of Smith’s prior
        convictions it relied. The district court sentenced Smith to 235
        months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years’ supervised
        release. This appeal followed.
                                    II.    Discussion
                Smith raises five issues on appeal: (1) the district court erred
        in denying his motion for a new trial based on Rehaif; (2) the
        government committed prosecutorial misconduct by misstating
        the law during closing argument; (3) the district court abused its
        discretion in denying Smith’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and
        appoint new counsel for the sentencing phase; (4) the district court
        erred in imposing the ACCA sentencing enhancement; and (5) the
        district court erred in enhancing Smith’s sentence under the ACCA
        without submitting his prior convictions to the jury. We address
        each argument in turn.
                   A. Denial of Smith’s Motion for a New Trial
                Smith argues that the district court erred in denying his
        motion for a new trial based on the Supreme Court’s intervening
        decision in Rehaif, which held that knowledge of one’s prohibited
        status is an element of a § 922(g) offense that the government must
        prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 139 S. Ct. at 2200. He maintains
        that a new trial is warranted because the district court did not
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        20-12609                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        instruct the jury on the knowledge of status element and there was
        insufficient evidence to prove his knowledge of his status.
                We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new
        trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247,
        1259 (11th Cir. 2017). “In evaluating whether specific trial errors
        warrant a new trial, we apply the harmless-error standard found in
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.” Id. Under that rule, “a new trial is warranted
        only where the error has caused substantial prejudice to the
        affected party (or, stated somewhat differently, affected the party’s
        substantial rights or resulted in substantial injustice).” Id.
        (quotation omitted).
               Under § 922(g)(1), it is “unlawful” for anyone “who has been
        convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment
        for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm, and an
        individual who “knowingly” does so is subject to punishment by
        fine or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 6 In Rehaif,
        the Supreme Court held that a “prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2) [requires] the Government [to] prove both
        that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew

        6 At the time of Smith’s conviction, the penalty for violating § 922(g) was
        codified in § 924(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2019). In 2022, however,
        Congress amended § 924, and the penalty for violating § 922(g) is now codified
        in § 924(a)(8). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) (2022). For ease of reference, we refer
        to the statutory provisions in effect at the time of Smith’s conviction and
        sentence.
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                     20-12609

        he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from
        possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
               Here, the district court did not instruct the jury on the
        knowledge of status element. 7 Nevertheless, Smith is not entitled
        to a new trial because he cannot show that the error affected his
        substantial rights. Jeri, 869 F.3d at 1259. We have held that, when
        reviewing whether Rehaif errors affected a defendant’s substantial
        rights, courts “may consult the whole record.” United States v.
        Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted);
        United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We
        may consult the entire record when considering the effect of an
        error on appellants’ substantial rights.”). “[I]t is particularly
        important for appellate courts to relive the whole trial

        7 Although we do not decide this issue on invited error grounds, we note that
        Smith arguably invited the error of which he now complains. The record
        demonstrates that the government added a knowledge-of-felon-status
        element to the superseding indictment to “avoid a potential appellate issue”
        should the Supreme Court hold—as it did—that knowledge of one’s status is
        an element of a § 922(g) offense. But Smith successfully moved to have this
        language struck from the indictment. He also successfully moved to exclude
        references to his prior convictions. Both of these choices were clearly
        “strategic decision[s]” for purposes of trial, but now he complains that
        reversible error occurred because the very information he sought to have
        struck from the indictment was not presented to the jury. See United States
        v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “a criminal
        defendant may not make an affirmative, apparently strategic decision at trial
        and then complain on appeal that the result of that decision constitutes
        reversible error”).
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        20-12609                   Opinion of the Court                                13

        imaginatively and not to extract from episodes in isolation abstract
        questions of evidence and procedure.” Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021
        (quotation omitted).
                There is ample evidence in the record showing that Smith
        knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the
        firearm in question. First, at trial, the government introduced a
        certified copy of one of Smith’s convictions for possession of a
        firearm by a convicted felon in Georgia in 2010. 8 This prior
        conviction clearly demonstrates that it is implausible that Smith
        was unaware of his felon status in 2018 at the time of the
        underlying offense.
               Second, aside from the certified conviction, Smith’s PSI
        indicates that he had multiple felony convictions and that he served
        seven years in custody for a 1999 Georgia aggravated assault
        conviction and over a year in custody for a 2010 fleeing or
        attempting to elude law enforcement conviction. As we previously
        explained, “[m]ost people convicted of a felony know that they are

        8 Contrary to Smith’s argument, the fact that the district court instructed the
        jury that it could not consider the conviction in determining whether Smith
        was guilty of the present felon-in-possession charge does not limit our ability
        to consider this information on appellate review. As part of our inquiry into
        whether the alleged error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, we consider
        the whole record, including evidence that was available but not presented at
        trial. See United States v. McLellan, 958 F.3d 1110, 1119–20 (11th Cir. 2020);
        Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021. Where there is clear evidence that the defendant knew
        of his prohibited status, he is not entitled to a new trial. McLellan, 958 F.3d at
        1119–20.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

        felons. And someone who has been convicted of felonies
        repeatedly is especially likely to know he is a felon.” United States
        v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citation
        omitted). Thus, had the issue been contested at Smith’s trial,
        Smith’s prior felony convictions would have provided the
        government powerful evidence that he knew he was a felon.
                Third, although not admitted during the trial, the record
        includes recorded phone calls between Smith and his girlfriend
        after Smith was arrested that demonstrated his knowledge of his
        status. In those calls, Smith told his girlfriend that she was “going
        to basically have to take one for the team, because [Smith] can’t go
        down for this crime because [Smith was] a convicted felon.”
               We have held that a defendant could not show that a Rehaif
        error affected his substantial rights under similar circumstances.
        See United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (holding that the jury could have inferred defendant’s knowledge
        of felon status based on the defendant’s stipulation that he was
        previously convicted of a felony coupled with a jail call in which
        defendant implied knowledge of his status); Moore, 954 F.3d at
        1337–38 (holding that the record clearly established both
        defendants knew of their felon status where both defendants had
        prior federal convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm
        and had served lengthy sentences); Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021–22
        (holding that the record established that the defendant knew of his
        felon status because the defendant had eight prior felony
        convictions and admitted at sentencing that he had served 18 years
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        20-12609                   Opinion of the Court                                15

        on a prior conviction). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
        its discretion in denying Smith’s motion for a new trial based on
        Rehaif.
                                       B. Closing Argument
               For the first time on appeal, Smith argues that the
        government committed prosecutorial misconduct when it stated
        during closing argument that a convicted felon is never allowed to
        possess a firearm. 9 Smith asserts that the government misstated
        the law because a felon is allowed to assert a justification defense
        to a felon-in-possession charge. And he maintains that he was
        prejudiced by this misstatement of law “because he argued to the
        jury that he was unaware of what was happening when officers
        surrounded him.”
               The record demonstrates that, during closing argument,
        Smith argued that when he encountered the officers, he was at the
        location for a lawful purpose, believing that he was meeting
        someone to perform a car repair, and that he did not comply with
        the officers’ directives because he did not recognize that they were
        police officers. Smith also argued to the jury that he never

        9 Because Smith did not object to the government’s closing argument, we
        review for plain error only. United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1238 (11th
        Cir. 2010). “Plain error requires (1) an error, (2) the error is plain or obvious,
        and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights. The plain error rule
        should be used sparingly, and a conviction should be reversed only if a
        miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” Id. (quotation and internal
        citation omitted).
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        16                    Opinion of the Court               20-12609

        possessed the firearm found under his car. Instead, he merely
        “parked over an item that looked like trash in an area where trash
        was common.”
              In response, the government argued that:
              [w]hether the defendant knew they were law
              enforcement or not [was] completely irrelevant. It
              [did not] matter what he [knew] with regard to who
              was coming to encounter him that day. He can’t
              have a firearm. Whether he thought it was law
              enforcement [made] no difference. He can’t possess
              a firearm. He is a previously convicted felon. What
              he knew about [the identity of the officers was] not
              an issue that [was] relevant to whether he knowingly
              possessed a firearm.

        Smith did not object to the government’s closing argument.
               Prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial only “if we
        find the remarks (1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the
        defendant’s substantive rights. We must examine the statements
        in the context of the trial as a whole and assess their probable
        impact on the jury.” Frank, 599 F.3d at 1238 (quotation and
        internal citation omitted). “When the record contains sufficient
        independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.” United
        States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1096 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
        omitted).
              Smith cannot show that any error occurred because the
        government did not misstate the law. The government’s
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        20-12609               Opinion of the Court                      17

        statement that Smith could not possess a firearm because he was a
        felon is legally accurate. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“It shall be
        unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any court
        of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
        year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
        ammunition[.]”). While a justification defense is an affirmative
        defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge, United States v. Deleveaux, 205
        F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000), Smith raised no such defense.
        Instead, he argued throughout the trial that he never had a gun and
        that the gun was already in the parking lot when he unknowingly
        parked over it. Therefore, the government did not misstate the law
        or otherwise prejudice Smith’s defense when it stated that Smith
        could not possess a firearm.
               Moreover, it is well-established that “[a] prosecutor is
        entitled to make a fair response to defense counsel’s arguments,”
        and Smith’s counsel opened the door to the government’s
        statements during closing by arguing that the reason Smith did not
        comply with the officers’ directives is that he did not know who
        they were. Frank, 599 F.3d at 1238. Accordingly, Smith has not
        demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under plain error review.
                      C. Denial of Smith’s counsel-related motions
               Prior to sentencing, Smith’s court-appointed counsel filed a
        motion to withdraw stating, without further elaboration, that “[a]
        conflict has arisen between counsel and Mr. Smith that constitutes
        a breakdown of their ability to communicate about the case.”
        Smith also filed a pro se motion requesting appointment of new
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        18                        Opinion of the Court                      20-12609

        counsel, asserting that his current trial counsel did not have his
        “best interest” in mind and “lack[ed] in many areas of being a good
        defense attorney.” 10
               The district court held two ex parte hearings on the motions
        with only Smith and his counsel present. At the hearings, when
        asked to elaborate on the “breakdown in communication,” counsel
        declined to do so, stating “I hesitate to say much more because I do
        think it will eventually come to a point of violating his right to
        confidentiality.” When asked for his position, Smith stated that he
        did not feel that counsel had his “best interest” in mind, and he
        noted that he had filed numerous pro se motions during the trial
        proceedings because counsel was not taking certain actions that
        Smith felt needed to be taken. Smith asserted that if he had “an
        effective relationship with [his] counsel, then counsel should
        adhere to what it is that [he had] to say.” Smith also emphasized
        that he had asked counsel (unspecified) questions that she had not
        been able to answer.
              The district court denied the motions, explaining that it did
        not hear “what [it] felt rose to the level of an issue that warranted
        removing counsel.” Additionally, the district court noted that it

        10 The record reflects that throughout the trial proceedings Smith filed
        numerous pro se pleadings and requested ex parte communications with the
        district court, even though the district court instructed him that he could not
        file pro se pleadings because he had counsel. In some of these pro se filings,
        Smith expressed a general disagreement with his counsel and counsel’s
        strategy.
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        20-12609               Opinion of the Court                       19

        had reviewed a list of Smith’s questions that he asserted were
        unanswered by counsel and did not find anything of concern or
        that indicated an ineffective assistance of counsel. The district
        court emphasized that “bringing on new counsel unfamiliar with
        this case at this point would do much more harm to Mr. Smith than
        good.”
                Smith argues that the district court applied the wrong
        standard and abused its discretion in denying his counsel’s motion
        to withdraw and his request for appointment of new counsel for
        the sentencing phase. He contends that instead of evaluating
        whether there was “good cause” for appointing new counsel, the
        district court erroneously evaluated whether counsel had been
        ineffective. He maintains that had the district court applied the
        good cause standard, it would have appointed new counsel based
        on the clear breakdown of relationship between Smith and his trial
        counsel.
               “Although the Sixth Amendment [of the United States
        Constitution] guarantees counsel, it does not grant defendants the
        unqualified right to counsel of their choice. An indigent criminal
        defendant for whom counsel has been appointed does not have a
        right to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good
        cause.” United States v. Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2018)
        (alteration in original) (quotation and internal citation omitted).
        “Good cause . . . means a fundamental problem, such as a conflict
        of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an
        irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.”
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

        United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (quotation omitted).
               Where, as here, the district court conducts an inquiry into
        the merits of a motion for the withdrawal of counsel and
        appointment of new counsel, we review the district court’s ruling
        for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314,
        1343 (11th Cir. 1997). “A district court abuses its discretion if it
        applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an
        unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in
        making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
        erroneous.” United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1270
        (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).
                In determining whether the district court abused its
        discretion, we consider “(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the
        adequacy of the court’s inquiry into [the] merits of the motion; and
        (3) whether the conflict was so great that it resulted in a total lack
        of communication between the defendant and his counsel thereby
        preventing an adequate defense.” Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1343. We
        require a “serious breakdown in communications”—more than a
        client’s mere displeasure with his lawyer’s performance—before
        we can conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
        denying a motion to withdraw. Id.
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        concluding that there was not a “total lack of communication
        between the defendant and his counsel thereby preventing”
        effective representation at the sentencing hearing. Joyner, 899 F.3d
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        20-12609                  Opinion of the Court                            21

        at 1205 (quoting Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1343). The district court
        held two ex parte hearings and provided both Smith and his
        counsel an opportunity to explain their respective concerns with
        the attorney-client relationship. Smith’s counsel declined to
        elaborate further out of confidentiality concerns. And Smith
        himself referred only generally to his distrust in his counsel,
        disagreement with her strategy throughout the trial, and his belief
        that counsel did not have his “best interest” in mind. “But we have
        held that a defendant’s general loss of confidence or trust in his
        counsel, standing alone, is not sufficient for good cause to demand
        new appointed counsel.” Id. at 1205–06 (alterations adopted)
        (quotation omitted).
               There was no evidence presented that there was a total lack
        of communication between Smith and his counsel. Rather, the
        record is clear that Smith was in communication with his counsel
        about various matters and simply did not like the answers (or, at
        times, no answer) he received in response to his inquiries. To be
        sure, Smith’s statements during the ex parte hearings indicate that
        he was unhappy with his trial counsel, but there was no indication
        that “they were unable to communicate in [a] manner that would
        allow for effective representation at the sentencing hearing.”
        Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1343. 11 Accordingly, the district court did
        not abuse its discretion in denying these motions.

        11 Contrary to Smith’s contention, the district court did not apply the wrong
        standard in evaluating the motion to withdraw and request for new appointed
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                        20-12609

                              D. The ACCA Enhancement
              Smith argues that the district court erred in enhancing his
        sentence under the ACCA for several reasons, including that he
        does not have three qualifying predicate offenses. Smith is correct.
               As noted previously, during the relevant time period, a
        violation of § 922(g) carried a statutory maximum of ten years’
        imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2019). The ACCA, however,
        mandates a minimum 15-year sentence if a defendant convicted of
        a § 922(g) offense has three or more prior convictions for a “violent
        felony” or “a serious drug offense.” Id. § 924(e)(1). In this case, we
        must determine whether Smith had three prior convictions that
        qualify as violent felonies. We conclude that he does not.
               We begin with the language of the statute. The ACCA
        defines a “violent felony” as:
                any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
                exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile
                delinquency involving the use or carrying of a
                firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
                punishable by imprisonment for such term if
                committed by an adult, that—

        counsel. “[T]he exception for good cause protects the right to effective
        assistance of counsel; if good cause exists, a defendant no longer has effective
        representation.” Joyner, 899 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d
        at 1271). Thus, the district court’s conclusion that it did not find anything that
        indicated ineffective assistance of counsel was simply another way of stating
        that Smith failed to establish good cause.
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        20-12609                    Opinion of the Court                                23

                       (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                threatened use of physical force against the person of
                another; or

                      (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use
                of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
                presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
                another[.]

        18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Subsection (i) contains the
        “elements clause,” while subsection (ii) contains the “enumerated
        crimes” clause and the “residual clause.” 12 United States v. Owens,
        672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). This case involves only the
        elements clause.
               “Under the [ACCA’s] elements clause, ‘use’ requires active
        employment of physical force.” United States v. Moss, 920 F.3d
        752, 756 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9
        (2004)), opinion reinstated, 4 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
        “[P]hysical force means violent force—that is, force capable of
        causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id. (quoting
        Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)); see also
        Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 553 (2019) (same). Thus,
        to qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause, a

        12 In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause as
        unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597–602
        (2015). In holding that the residual clause was void for vagueness, the Court
        clarified that it did not call into question the validity of the elements clause or
        the enumerated crimes clause. Id. at 606.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

        conviction must be predicated on the intentional use, attempted
        use, or threatened use of physical force. Moss, 920 F.3d at 756.
                We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as
        a violent felony offense under the ACCA. Id. at 755. We must
        evaluate each prior conviction to determine if it qualifies as a
        violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. To do so, we
        employ a particular framework known as the “categorical
        approach.” United States v. Oliver, 962 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.
        2020). The categorical approach focuses solely on the elements of
        the statute of conviction, not the defendant’s underlying conduct
        (i.e., the facts). See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600
        (1990); see also Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504–06 (2016).
        When examining whether a conviction qualifies as a violent felony
        under the elements clause, the categorical approach requires that
        courts focus only on the statutory elements and “presume that the
        conviction rested upon the ‘least of the acts criminalized’ by the
        statute.” Oliver, 962 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder,
        569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)). “If the ‘least of the acts criminalized’
        by the statute of conviction has an element requiring ‘the use,
        attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
        person of another,’ then the offense categorically qualifies as a
        violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause.” Id. (quoting
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        20-12609                   Opinion of the Court                                25

        United States v. Davis, 875 F.3d 592, 597 (11th Cir. 2017)); see also
        Moss, 920 F.3d at 756. 13
                The government argued below that Smith had five
        potentially qualifying felony convictions (all from Georgia): (1) a
        1999 conviction for aggravated assault; (2) a 2009 conviction for
        aggravated assault with intent to rob; (3) a 2009 conviction for
        criminal attempt to commit armed robbery; (4) a 2010 conviction
        for obstruction of a law enforcement officer; and (5) a 2014
        conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. The
        district court found that Smith qualified as an armed career
        criminal, but it did not state on which convictions it relied in
        making that determination. Smith maintains that none of the
        proffered offenses qualify as predicates under the ACCA’s elements
        clause. We examine each in turn and conclude that only two are
        qualifying violent felonies.

        13 We alter our approach, however, when the statute of conviction is
        “divisible,” meaning the statute lists multiple, alternative elements, effectively
        creating multiple crimes. Moss, 920 F.3d at 756. When dealing with a divisible
        statute, we employ the modified categorical approach, which “allows us to
        look at a limited class of documents—known as Shepard documents—to
        determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.”
        Id. (quotation omitted); see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 25
        (2005) (specifying the documents a court may consider under the modified
        categorical approach). Under this approach, after looking at Shepard
        documents to determine which of the alternative statutory elements a
        defendant was convicted under, we then apply the categorical approach to
        that particular offense. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013);
        Moss, 920 F.3d at 756.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

             i.    Obstruction of a law enforcement officer convictions
                   (2010 and 2014)
                Smith’s claim that his 2010 and 2014 Georgia convictions for
        obstruction of a law enforcement officer do not qualify as violent
        felony predicates is squarely foreclosed by binding precedent. In
        United States v. Brown, 805 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015), we
        held that felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer under
        Georgia law is categorically a violent felony for purposes of the
        ACCA. Although Smith maintains that Brown was wrongly
        decided, we are bound by Brown under the prior-panel-precedent
        rule. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (explaining that under the prior-panel-precedent rule “a prior
        panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
        it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the
        Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc”). Accordingly,
        Smith has two qualifying predicate violent felonies.
             ii.   Aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction (2009)
               Next, we consider Smith’s 2009 aggravated assault with
        intent to rob conviction. In Georgia, “[a] person commits the
        offense of simple assault when he or she either . . . (1) [a]ttempts to
        commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) [c]ommits
        an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of
        immediately receiving a violent injury.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a). At
        the time of Smith’s conviction, Georgia’s aggravated assault statute
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        20-12609                 Opinion of the Court                          27

        provided that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault
        when he commits a simple assault:
                   (1) With intent to murder, to rape, or to rob;

                   (2) With a deadly weapon or with an object,
                       device, or instrument which, when used
                       offensively against a person, is likely to or
                       actually does result in serious bodily injury; or

                   (3) A person or persons without legal justification
                       by discharging a firearm from within a motor
                       vehicle toward a person or persons.

        O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) (2009); 14 see also Moss, 920 F.3d at 757
        (explaining that Georgia’s aggravated assault statue has two
        essential elements—(A) simple assault as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-
        5-20(a)(1) or (2), and (B) an aggravating factor listed in § 16-5-
        21(a)(1), (2), or (3)).
               Both Georgia’s simple assault and aggravated assault
        statutes are divisible. Moss, 920 F.3d at 757. Accordingly, we may
        employ the modified categorical approach to determine which
        elements formed the basis of Smith’s offense of conviction. Both
        parties agree that “intent to rob” under § 16-5-21(a)(1) is the
        relevant aggravating factor. But because aggravated assault is
        simple assault plus an aggravating factor, we must also determine

        14 The Georgia legislature has since amended the statute to add a fourth
        aggravator that is not relevant here. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(3) (2016).
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12609

        whether the aggravated assault was based on simple assault under
        O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) or (a)(2). However, because the
        government failed to produce any Shepard documents related to
        Smith’s conviction in the district court, we cannot determine on
        which version of simple assault Smith’s aggravated assault
        conviction was based. Therefore, the modified categorical
        approach ends here, and we must assume that Smith’s aggravated
        assault with intent to rob conviction is based on the least of the acts
        criminalized under the simple assault statute—i.e., “[c]ommit[ting]
        an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of
        immediately receiving a violent injury.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a);
        Moss, 920 F.3d at 758; Oliver, 962 F.3d at 1316.
               In Moss, however, we held that simple assault under § 16-5-
        20(a)(2) does not satisfy the intentional use of force requirement of
        the ACCA’s elements clause because it can be committed with a
        mens rea of recklessness. Id. at 757–58. And while Smith’s appeal
        was pending, the Supreme Court took up the issue and held that
        “[o]ffenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent
        felonies under [the] ACCA” because “[t]hey do not require . . . the
        active employment of force against another person.” Borden v.
        United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021).
               Accordingly, the only way that this conviction can qualify as
        a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA is if the intent to rob
        aggravating factor adds the necessary element of intent to use
        “violent force,” or “force capable of causing physical pain or injury
        to another person.” Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation
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        20-12609               Opinion of the Court                        29

        marks omitted). If it does not, then the conviction does not
        categorically qualify as a violent felony.
               In examining the “intent to rob” aggravating factor, we must
        consider how Georgia defines the crime of robbery. See Johnson
        v. State, 696 S.E.2d 396, 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“Aggravated
        assault with intent to rob requires the reasonable apprehension of
        receiving bodily injury and proof of the intent to rob the victim.”
        (quotation omitted)). Under Georgia law, a person commits
        robbery “when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of
        another from the person or immediate presence of another” either
        “(1) [b]y use of force; (2) [b]y intimidation, by the use of threat or
        coercion, or by placing such person in fear of immediate serious
        bodily injury to himself or to another; or (3) [b]y sudden
        snatching.” O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a). Although Georgia’s robbery
        statute is divisible, United States v. Harrison, 56 F. 4th 1325, 1335–
        36 (11th Cir. 2023), because there are no Shepard documents in the
        record, we apply the categorical approach and we must assume
        Smith intended to commit the least of the robbery acts
        criminalized. Sudden snatching is clearly the least of the three
        robbery acts criminalized.             See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a).
        Consequently, our analysis is limited to a Georgia aggravated
        assault conviction with intent to rob by sudden snatching.
               Georgia courts have explained that although “force is
        implicit in sudden snatching,” the only force required is “that effort
        necessary for the robber to transfer the property taken from the
        owner to his possession.” Copeland v. State, 754 S.E.2d 636, 639
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        30                        Opinion of the Court                     20-12609

        (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (quotation omitted); King v. State, 447 S.E.2d
        645, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“Robbery by sudden snatching is
        where no other force is used than is necessary to obtain possession
        of the property from the owner, who is off his guard, and where
        there is no resistance by the owner or injury to his person.”
        (quotation omitted)). That amount of force, the Supreme Court
        has suggested in dicta, 15 would not satisfy the ACCA’s elements
        clause. See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555 (contrasting Florida’s
        robbery statute—which qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s
        elements clause—with its robbery by sudden snatching statute,
        under which it is “unnecessary to show . . . that the defendant used
        any amount of force beyond that effort necessary to obtain
        possession of the money or other property,” and suggesting the
        latter would not satisfy the ACCA’s elements clause (quotations
        omitted)).
               Additionally, a review of Georgia cases reveals that the
        Court of Appeals of Georgia routinely affirms robbery by sudden
        snatching convictions involving substantially less force than that
        capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. See,
        e.g., Anderson v. State, 834 S.E.2d 369, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)
        (affirming robbery by sudden snatching conviction where victim’s
        car keys fell from his pocket onto the ground and defendant

        15 See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
        “there is dicta, and then there is Supreme Court dicta” and that “dicta from
        the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside”).
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        20-12609               Opinion of the Court                      31

        grabbed the keys from the ground in the victim’s presence and
        refused to return them); Brown v. State, 710 S.E.2d 674, 677–78
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming robbery by sudden snatching
        conviction where defendant took the victim’s wallet out of a
        shopping cart while the victim was several feet away and the victim
        yelled for defendant to stop); Sweet v. State, 697 S.E.2d 246, 248–
        49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming robbery by sudden snatching
        conviction where defendant opened cash register drawer at
        restaurant and took money while the cashier’s back was turned but
        she heard the drawer open and suspected the defendant was
        stealing money); King, 447 S.E.2d at 647 (affirming robbery by
        sudden snatching conviction where defendant grabbed six cartons
        of cigarettes off a checkout counter and ran out of the store while
        the clerk’s attention was on something else). Thus, the force
        required to commit a robbery by sudden snatching in Georgia is
        not by necessity “violent force—that is, force capable of causing
        physical pain or injury to another person.” Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at
        552 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). Therefore, the
        “intent to rob” element of aggravated assault—at least when that
        intent is based on robbery by sudden snatching—does not provide
        the intentional use of force requirement necessary to satisfy the
        ACCA’s elements clause.
              Accordingly, Smith’s 2009 aggravated assault with intent to
        rob conviction does not categorically qualify as a violent felony
        under the ACCA’s elements clause.
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        32                        Opinion of the Court                    20-12609

             iii.   Aggravated assault conviction (1999)
               Smith’s 1999 aggravated assault conviction does not qualify
        as a violent felony. As discussed above, in Moss, we held that
        aggravated assault predicated on simple assault under § 16-5-
        20(a)(2) does not satisfy the intentional use of force requirement of
        the ACCA’s elements clause because it can be committed with a
        mens rea of recklessness. Id. at 757–58; see also Borden, 141 S. Ct.
        at 1825, 1834 (holding that “[o]ffenses with a mens rea of
        recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA”
        because “[t]hey do not require . . . the active employment of force
        against another person”). Accordingly, because aggravated assault
        can be predicated on a mens rea of recklessness, this offense does
        not qualify under the ACCA’s elements clause. 16
             iv.    Criminal attempt to commit armed robbery conviction
                    (2009)
              Finally, we turn to Smith’s 2009 Georgia criminal attempt to
        commit armed robbery conviction. Smith argues that this
        conviction does not qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the
        ACCA because (1) criminal attempt in Georgia does not include as
        an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and

        16 Both parties conceded at oral argument that, in light of the Supreme
        Court’s intervening decision in Borden, this offense no longer qualifies as a
        violent felony.
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        20-12609                  Opinion of the Court                             33

        (2) armed robbery under Georgia law does not necessarily require
        the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.
              Under Georgia law, “[a] person commits the offense of
        armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes
        property of another from the person or the immediate presence of
        another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or
        device having the appearance of such weapon.” 17 O.C.G.A. § 16-

        17 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that “Georgia’s armed
        robbery statute clearly contemplates that the offensive weapon be used as a
        concomitant to a taking which involves the use of actual force or intimidation
        (constructive force) against another person.” State v. Epps, 476 S.E.2d 579,
        581 (Ga. 1996) (quotation omitted). The Court reasoned that
               [a] taking accomplished by force or intimidation is the
               “distinguishing characteristic” of robbery—the “gist” of the
               offense. The force necessary for robbery is actual violence or
               intimidation exerted upon the person robbed, by operating
               upon his fears—the fear of injury to his person, or property, or
               character. Intimidation is that terror . . . likely to create an
               apprehension of danger, and induce a person to part with his
               property for the safety of his person. Intimidation is that act
               by the perpetrator which puts the person robbed in fear
               sufficient to suspend the free exercise of his will or prevent
               resistance to the taking. A threat by a perpetrator to inflict
               harm constitutes the requisite force or intimidation if that
               threat of harm induces the victim/possessor of property to
               relinquish possession. However, if the person in possession of
               the property voluntarily yields possession of the property to
               the robber, that is, consents to the taking of the property, an
               essential element of robbery, force, is missing.
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        34                         Opinion of the Court                      20-12609

        8-41(a). An “offensive weapon” for purposes of Georgia’s armed
        robbery statute means a “deadly weapon.” Long v. State, 700
        S.E.2d 399, 402 (Ga. 2010).
               In Georgia, a person “commits the offense of criminal
        attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs
        any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission
        of that crime.” O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1; see also Howell v. Georgia, 278
        S.E.2d 43, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that criminal attempt
        requires (1) the intent to commit the specific crime, (2) the
        performance of some overt act towards the commission of that
        crime, and (3) a failure to complete the crime).

        Id. at 580–81 (quotation and internal citations omitted). In other words, “[a]n
        element of armed robbery is that the taking be effectuated with force, either
        actual or constructive (intimidation).” Wilson v. State, 448 S.E.2d 184, 185
        (Ga. 1994) (emphasis in original). And “[w]hen the Code speaks of force, it
        means actual violence; and when it speaks of intimidation, it still means force;
        not actual and direct, but exerted upon the person robbed, by operating upon
        his fears—the fear of injury to his person, or property, or character.” Alford
        v. State, 418 S.E.2d 397, 398 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (quotation omitted) (emphasis
        added). The use of violent force required by Georgia’s statute suggests that
        substantive Georgia armed robbery would categorically qualify as a violent
        felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. See Porter v. United States, 959
        F.3d 800, 802–04 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that Georgia armed robbery
        categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA). However,
        whether substantive Georgia armed robbery is a violent felony is not the
        question before us. Smith was convicted of criminal attempt to commit armed
        robbery; therefore, we must decide whether the offense of criminal attempted
        armed robbery in Georgia categorically qualifies as a violent felony.
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        20-12609              Opinion of the Court                      35

               While Smith’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
        addressed attempt crimes in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. __,
        142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(c)’s elements clause—which is nearly identical to the ACCA’s
        elements clause. Id. at 2020–21. In reaching its decision, the
        Supreme Court explained that a completed Hobbs Act robbery can
        be committed by means of actual or threatened use of force. Id. at
        2020. Therefore, the government could secure a conviction for
        attempted Hobbs Act robbery by proving “two things: (1) [t]he
        defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property
        by means of actual or threatened force, and (2) he completed a
        ‘substantial step’ toward that end.” Id. The Supreme Court
        reasoned that “whatever a substantial step requires, it does not
        require the government to prove that the defendant used,
        attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against the
        person or property of another.” Id.
               Here, similar to a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery, a conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed
        robbery in Georgia may be secured by proving beyond a
        reasonable doubt that (1) a defendant intended to take the
        “property of another from the person or the immediate presence
        of another by use of an offense weapon, or any replica, article, or
        device having the appearance of such weapon,” and (2) took a
        substantial step toward that objective. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a),
        16-4-1. As discussed above, completed armed robbery in Georgia
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        36                       Opinion of the Court                    20-12609

        may be committed by the threatened use of force, Epps, 476 S.E.2d
        at 580–81, which means that a conviction for criminal attempt to
        commit armed robbery in Georgia could be secured based on an
        attempt to threaten to use force. Post-Taylor, we have held that
        “where a crime may be committed by the threatened use of force,
        an attempt to commit that crime—i.e., an attempt to threaten—
        falls outside the elements clause.” Alvarado-Linares v. United
        States, 44 F.4th 1334, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, because
        criminal attempt to commit armed robbery in Georgia may be
        committed by an attempt to threaten, it is not categorically a
        violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause.
               Consequently, Smith has only two qualifying violent
        felonies, and the ACCA enhancement cannot stand.18
        Accordingly, we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
                                     III.    Conclusion
              Based on the above, we affirm Smith’s conviction and the
        non-sentencing issues he raises. However, we vacate his sentence
        and remand for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

        18 Smith also argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence
        under the ACCA without submitting his prior convictions to the jury—a claim
        which he acknowledges is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
        523 U.S. 224 (1998). Because the ACCA enhancement does not apply, we do
        not reach this issue.