Court Opinion

ID: 9742249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:09:12.344376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.492440
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of Issue 1 (public posting of notice of the petition for bond issuance) and Issue 3 (re-monstrative petitions disqualified by the Porter County Auditor). However, I am unable to agree with the majority’s resolution of Issue 2 as it relates to the timeliness of the remonstrative petitions filed on May 27, 1980. I conclude that the trial court properly determined the 30-day period for filing remonstrative petitions. The period began to run for filing these petitions on April 24, 1980, when notice of the petition for the bond issuance was republished. Thus, the Porter County Auditor should not have disqualified the remonstrative petitions filed on May 27, 1980.1
As stated by the majority, the appropriate body of a political subdivision must give notice by publication of a petition for bond issuance filed by taxpayers under IC 1976, 6-l.l-20-4(a) (Burns Code Ed.). If the political subdivision decides to issue the bonds, it must give notice by publication of its decision under IC 1976, 6-l.l-20-5(a) (Burns Code Ed.). Under IC 6-l.l-20-4(a), publication of notice must be effected “one  time” in the manner prescribed in IC 6-l.l-20-4(c). Under IC 6-l.l-20-5(a), notice must be published “once a week for two  weeks” also in the manner prescribed in IC 6-l.l-20-4(c). Thus, the political subdivision must give two types of notices when a petition for bond issuance is filed, and it decides to issue the bonds. This dual publication of notice requirement is the subject of Issue 2 of this appeal.
The confusion over the timeliness of the May 27, 1980 remonstrative petitions is a direct result of the failure of the Board of County Commissioners and the Porter County Auditor (County) to strictly adhere to the notice provisions of IC 6-l.l-20-4(a). The error was created by the County’s use of what has been referred to as a “combined notice form.” In an amicus curiae brief filed by the Porter County Agricultural Society (Fair Board), this Court is informed that the use of a “combined notice form” is a well-established practice used to satisfy the dual publication of notice requirement of IC 6-1.1-20 — 4(a) and IC 6-1.-l-20-5(a). The Fair Board provided the following summary of the use of the “combined notice form”:
“In an effort to satisfy this dual notice requirement, law firms serving as bond counsel to governmental bodies issuing general obligation bonds, began utilizing a document commonly known as a ‘combined notice form.’ The combined notice form, which has remained virtually un*428changed since 1937, consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph informs the public that a petition has been filed by more than 50 owners of taxable real estate requesting the issuance of bonds for a particular purpose, not to exceed a specified amount. The first paragraph further gives notice that remonstrances against the issuance of bonds may be filed with the county auditor in the manner and within the time provided by Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20-4 (formerly Burns Ann. Stat. § 64-1910).
“The second paragraph of the combined form notifies the public that the governmental entity has determined to issue bonds in a specified amount for the purpose stated in the first paragraph. It further contains a statement to the effect that objections to the issuance of bonds may be made pursuant to Ind.Code § 6-1.1-20-5 (formerly Burns Ann.Stat. § 64-1915).
“The third paragraph merely sets out figures indicating that the proposed issuance will not cause the entity to exceed the legal limit on its bonded indebtedness.
“The combined notice form is used for both posting and publishing. That is, the notice is posted in three public places and is also published in the necessary newspapers. Although the substance of the first paragraph need only be published once, the entire combined notice is reprinted in the newspapers on two consecutive weeks because the statutory provision to which the second paragraph is directed must be published on two occasions. It is precisely this practice of publishing a combined notice form on two consecutive weeks which the trial court in the present case has suddenly and erroneously ruled invalid, notwithstanding the fact that such has been the practice continuously throughout Indiana since 1937.”
Notwithstanding the Fair Board’s observation that the “combined notice form” has become entrenched as an essential tool in the practice of Indiana bond law, its use must be discontinued. The “combined notice form” used by the County in the present case resulted in the County’s failure to strictly adhere to the statutory directives of IC 6-1.1-20 — 4(a), which requires the publication of notice only once. The republication of notice on April 24, 1980, could have had the effect of misleading those taxpayers who first learned of the petition for bond issuance through the second notice. The April 24 notice, which was identical to that first published on April 17,1980, appeared in two Porter County newspapers as follows:
“NOTICE OF PETITION FOR AND DETERMINATION TO ISSUE BONDS
“Owners of the taxable real estate in Porter County, Indiana, are hereby notified that a petition has been filed by more than fifty owners of taxable real estate in said County requesting the issuance of bonds of the County in an amount not exceeding $2,900,000.00 for the purpose of procuring funds to be applied on the cost of construction of a new Porter County Fairgrounds Complex on property currently owned and used by Porter County located at the intersection of State Road 49 and Division Road, Washington Township, Porter County, Indiana, together with the incidental expenses to be incurred in connection therewith and on account of the issuance of bonds therefor. Remonstrances against the issuance of said bonds may be filed with the County Auditor by owners of taxable real estate in said County in the manner and within the time provided by I.C. 6-1.1-20-4.
“The taxpayers of Porter County are further notified that the Board of Commissioners and County Council of said County have determined to issue bonds of the County in the amount of $2,900,000.00 for the purpose of procuring funds to be used as above stated. Said bonds are to bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding 10% per annum, (the exact rate or rates to be determined by bidding), and are to be payable serially over a period of approximately 10 years from the date of issuance thereof unless the *429same are made redeemable prior to maturity. Objections to the issuance of said bonds may be made under the provisions of I.C. 6-1.1-20-5 by ten or more taxpayers filing a petition in the office of the Auditor of Porter County in the manner and within the time prescribed by law, which petition, if any, will be heard and considered by the State Board of Tax Commissioners in the manner provided by law.
“The net assessed valuation of taxable property in Porter County, as shown by the assessment made in the year 1978 for state and county taxes collectible in the year 1979, is in the amount of $487,493,-670.00, and the outstanding indebtedness of the County, exclusive of the above mentioned bonds, is in the amount of $2,725,000.00.
“Dated this 11th day of April, 1980.
Dorothy M. Lenburg,
Auditor of Porter County by E. Chester,
Adm. Asst.”
(emphasis added, parentheses original)
A taxpayer who wished to file a remon-strative petition after reading the April 24 notice would have referred to IC 6-1.1-20-4(a) as directed by the italicized section of the notice. Upon examining the statute, the taxpayer would have discovered that he or she had to file a remonstrative petition “[wjithin thirty [30] days after the notice is given.” The objecting taxpayer would have also discovered that the County was required to give notice of the bond petition only “one [1] time.”
On the other hand, the taxpayer who had no knowledge of the first notice could have reasonably inferred from the second notice that he or she had thirty days in which to file a remonstrative petition. It would be inherently unfair for the thirty-day period to commence from the date of the first publication of notice because the taxpayer who had no knowledge of the first publication of notice would be lulled into believing that he or she had a full thirty days in which to respond. The political subdivision’s affirmative act in republishing a notice that should have been published only once caused the taxpayer to fail to file a remonstrative petition within thirty days of the first publication of notice.
Indiana law on an entity’s duty to abide by the notice provisions of a statute is clear:
“When a formal notice is required to be given, it should give the necessary information, and if a statute or rule of court indicates the terms to be used in the notice, a substantial compliance therewith is essential.
“Mere informalities, irregularities, or immaterial defects do not vitiate notices as long as they give the necessary information and do not mislead, and defects in some notices may be waived.” (footnotes omitted, emphasis added)
22 I.L.E. Notice § 5, at 149-50 (1959). The County’s unnecessary republication of notice could have misled taxpayers into a false awareness of the time limitation in which to file remonstrative petitions. The County’s error transcends the classification of its act as a “mere informality, irregularity, or immaterial defect.” Rather, it ventures into the sphere of a fatal defect that has the propensity to mislead. The provisions of the statute relating to the publication of notice must be followed. It has been observed:
“Publication of notices may be authorized by statute, and the statutes providing in what newspapers legal notices must be published must be followed. A notice, advertisement, or list, authorized or required to be published by law, must be published with the frequency and for the period prescribed by law.” (footnotes omitted)
22 I.L.E. Notice § 6, at 151 (1959); see also, 66 C.J.S. Notice § 18g, at 667 (1950). The rules of construction require if “there is any ambiguity in the terms of a notice, rendering its meaning doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the person giving the notice.” 66 C.J.S. Notice § 19a, at 668 (1950). Insofar as the reference to IC 6-1.-*430l-20-4(a) in the April 24 notice was misleading and created an ambiguity as to the time limitation in which a taxpayer could file a remonstrative petition, the ambiguity must be construed against the County. The trial court properly determined the thirty-day time limitation commenced from the date of the second publication of notice.
It may not appear at first blush that there is anything inherently unfair about exceeding the notice requirements of a particular statute. One may rhetorically ask, “Can too much legal notice ever be given?” An analysis of the factual situation presented in this appeal answers the question in the affirmative. Notice above and beyond that required by statute becomes improper when it has the effect of misleading those to whom notice is given.
It may also be asserted that the unnecessary republication of notice actually conferred a benefit upon those taxpayers who had no knowledge of the first publication of notice. Those taxpayers are in effect given a “second chance” to remonstrate. However, when notice is published only once as required by statute and taxpayers do not see the notice, it is through no fault of the County that the taxpayers missed their opportunity to remonstrate. The situation changes, however, when the County, through its own failure to abide by a statute, misleads taxpayers into believing that they have a full thirty days in which to file remonstrative petitions. The taxpayers’ omission is directly attributable to the County’s misfeasance.
The majority’s vehement insistence upon “a great need for finality” and its ominous prediction of an ad infinitum filing of re-monstrative petitions are unfounded if the political subdivision in question strictly adheres to the notice provisions prescribed by statute. The specter of never-ending remonstrances would be defeated soundly if political subdivisions would deviate from the well-established “tradition” of using “combined notice forms" and cast the forms aside. Bond counsel should delete the first paragraph of the “combined notice form” when notice is published the second week to satisfy the requirements of IC 6-1.1-20— 5(a).
I conclude the trial court did not err in finding the May 27, 1980, remonstrative petitions were timely filed and should have been accepted by the Porter County Auditor. However, as observed by the majority, the result of this appeal would not be altered if the May 27 petitions were counted. The remonstrators would not have a “greater number of owners of real property subject to taxation” in opposition to the issuance of the bonds, as required by IC 6-1.1-20 — 4(b). Thus, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I reiterate my concurrence in the majority’s disposition of Issue 3 as it relates to the Porter County Auditor’s disqualification of three remonstrative petitions. It is clear that page two of Counterpart 14 and pages one and two of Counterpart 19 do not include the proper verification affidavits required by IC 6-l.l-20-4(a). However, the dispute over the validity of Counterpart 32 (or 32A, whichever it is) may be resolved in a more effective manner. Under IC 6-1.1— 20 — 4(a), remonstrative petitions must be “verified.” The majority concludes Counterpart 32 was not verified properly because it bore no signature identifying the notary. However, it appears that the notary’s signature was made on the line above the line reserved for the notary’s signature. The affidavit otherwise contains all the essential information found on notarized documents, such as the notary’s seal, the notary’s county of residence, the expiration of the notary’s commission, and the date when the affidavit was signed before the notary.2 I would view the affidavit as being properly notarized.
Counterpart 32 should be disqualified based on the affiant’s failure to comply with Trial Rule 11(B), which provides:
*431“(B) Verification by affirmation or representation. When in connection with any civil or special statutory proceeding it is required that any pleading, motion, petition, supporting affidavit, or other document of any kind, be verified, or that an oath be taken, it shall be sufficient if the subscriber simply affirms the truth of the matter to be verified by an affirmation or representation in substantially the following language:
T (we) affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representation^) is (are) true.
(Signed)_’
“Any person who falsifies an affirmation or representation of fact shall be subject to the same penalties as are prescribed by law for the making of a false affidavit.” (parentheses original)
The Indiana Supreme Court, relying on TR. 11(B), recently invalidated an affidavit in which the affiant failed to affirm the truth of the matter to be verified. State ex rel. Hodges v. Kosciusko Circuit Court (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1231. The Court stated:
“While petitioners swore that they made certain statements, they did not swear that the statements they made were true.”
402 N.E.2d at 1232. The verification affidavit attached to Counterpart 32 contained the same defect found in the affidavit in Hodges. There is no affirmation of the truth of the affidavit’s contents. Therefore, Counterpart 32 was properly disqualified.

. The trial court extended the thirty-day filing period by three days since the thirtieth day fell on a weekend that was followed by the Memorial Day holiday.

. The form of notarization is established by statute. See, IC 1976, 33-16-2-9 (Burns Code Ed., 1980 Supp.). However, the statute does not affect the validity of any documents notarized before July 1, 1982. IC 33-16-2-9(b).