Court Opinion

ID: 9582373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:25:57.817287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:43.398945
License: Public Domain

Browning, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Court in this case upon the ground that the evidence was such that it presented a factual question to be determined by a jury *288whether the plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of contributory negligence.
It is perhaps the most fundamental! principle of our system of jurisprudence that questions of fact are to be determined by a jury, and questions of law by a court. It is true also that a court will not hesitate to set aside a verdict of a jury where there is no evidence to support it, or where it is against the plain preponderance of conflicting evidence. Also, this Court has said, as has many others, that where the governing facts are not disputed and are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from them, the questions of primary and contributory negligence are for judicial determination as matters of law. Wood, Executor v. Shrewsbury, 117 W. Va. 569, 186 S. E. 294. It is my opinion that, upon the facts in this case, reasonable minds could draw more than one conclusion from them, particularly since it is well established that a jury has the right to draw reasonable inferences from the facts which are developed before it during the trial. In Bowers v. Brannon, 141 W. Va. 435, 90 S. E. 2d. 342, this Court said: “* * * However, a decision as to where the province of a jury ends, and that of a court begins, upon questions of fact, must be determined by the evidence in each case. Many well established principles are helpful. If there is no evidence to support the verdict of a jury, or if it is against the plain preponderance of conflicting evidence, it must be set aside. If reasonable men cannot disagree upon the facts, a matter of law arises for the court, but learned judges sometimes do not agree as to whether the facts in a particular case are such that reasonable men could reach only one conclusion therefrom. There is no rule or principle of law that can serve as a definite guide post to point the way to a specific line of demarcation in this nebulous realm where the rights, duties and responsibilities of a court and jury meet. * * *” This Court has also stated that when a litigant comes to it with a verdict of a jury, approved by the trial court by entering judgment thereon, he is in the strongest position known to the law.
*289In this case, the Court has held as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, by remaining in the automobile of the defendant, because of two things: the drinking of beer by the driver and the excessive speed at which the car was driven during the evening. This record does not disclose the amount of alcohol that is contained in a bottle of beer, which the Legislature of this State has designated as “non-intoxicating”, although it may be conceded, as this Court has said, that the Legislature cannot make a beverage non-intoxicating by so stating in a statute. The defendant testified flatly to the effect that he was “not intoxicated”, but that he “felt” the effects of the beverage which he had consumed. In this regard, I think it is worthy of noting that no witness except the defendant testified as to the drinking of beer on that evening by the defendant, or as to his condition with regard to intoxication either before or after the accident who did not state that the defendant and the deceased were sober. One witness so testified who observed these two young men shortly before the fatal wrecking of the automobile. The defendant testified that he ate his supper and met the deceased at about 7:30 P. M. on this particular evening, and that they left the Town of Wayne together at aibout 8:30 P. M. The distance from Wayne to Zip’s place, where the defendant and the deceased purchased three bottles of beer each which they later drank in their automobile on the way to Huntington, is “4 or 5 miles.” The witness Jackie Smith testified that the accident occurred “just after midnight”. The witness Ernest Smith testified that the accident occurred “about 15 or 20 minutes after” midnight. This evidence is undisputed. During the evening, at a time which is not fixed, each of these young men drank a bottle of beer and ate a hamburger sandwich at a restaurant in the City of Huntington. The only thing they drank thereafter, except a bottle of beer that was drunk within minutes prior to the accident, was a bottle of coca-cola each at another place at which they stopped. There is no evidence in this record, not even by the defendant himself, that his driving was affected in any *290way by the beer which he drank, and I think the jury could have reasonably inferred that the beer, which the defendant drank during a period of approximately three and a half to four hours before the accident occurred, would not have affected his driving at the time of the wreck.
In Darling v. Browning, et al., 120 W. Va. 666, 200 S. E. 737, Judge Maxwell, in referring to Adams v. Hutchinson, 113 W. Va. 217, 167 S. E. 135, stated that: “there was much drinking of intoxicating liquor.” It will also be noted from a casual reading of the facts in Hurt, Executor v. Gwinn, 142 W. Va. 259, 95 S. E. 2d. 248, that there was much more drinking of hard liquor than there was in the Adams case.
It was a question for the jury whether the defendant, because of the beer which he had consumed, suddenly raced down Bloss Hill toward Dickson Crossing at a speed of 70 miles an hour when he refused to categorically state in his testimony that he had ever driven at that rate of speed with the deceased in his automobile prior to that time.
Jurors, in determining the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses, may take into account their common general knowledge and experience as men in the ordinary affairs of life. Head v. Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45, 26 L. Ed. 1028. Mr. Justice Field, in the Head case, supra, stated: “While they [jurors] cannot act in any case upon particular facts material to its disposition resting in their private knowledge, but should be governed by the evidence adduced, they may, and to act intelligently they must, judge of the weight and force of that evidence by their own general knowledge of the subject of inquiry.” In order to support the conclusion of the majority that the plaintiff’s decedent was contribu-torily negligent as a matter of law, the Court must infer from the evidence that the defendant drove at excessive speeds, at hazardous places, after consuming a sufficient amount of beer to feel the effects thereof, and that plaintiff’s decedent voluntarily remained in the *291automobile under those circumstances. This, I submit, in the instant case, constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury. An inference is nothing more than a permissible deduction from the evidence. Cogdell v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 132 N. C. 852, 44 S. E. 618. That a fact is true does not alone support an inference that a party has knowledge thereof; an inference being a deduction to be drawn from facts proved, not a conclusion based on suspicion alone. People v. Peloian, 95 Cal. App. 96, 272 P. 304.
On direct examination, these questions were asked the defendant and he made these answers: Q: “Now, Donald, what is the general character of the road over those travels [sic] from here into Huntington on Route 52 and on Route 75 and also on Route 60 from Huntington down to Catlettsburg? How would you describe the road generally over that area?”, A: “Well, it is fairly curvy.”; Q: “Does it or does it not cover hilly or semi-mountainous country?”, A: “There are a few hills.”; Q: “Now Donald, at the time of the accident why were you driving that fast and during the evening before?”, A: “Sometimes you just want to drive fast.”, Court: “I can’t hear you.”, A: “Just wanted to drive fast.” The defendant also testified that “at various times” that evening he “judged” he drove his automobile at a rate of speed of 65 miles an hour, and that the decedent was sitting in the front seat with him. The defendant does not say at what places on the journey that he “judged” he drove at a speed of 65 miles an hour. He does not state that he drove at such speed on the “curvy” or “hilly” roads. Of course, the jury, being residents of Wayne County, knew that Route 60 between Huntington and Catlettsburg, Kentucky, where a substantial part of the driving was done that evening, traverses no hills and is a major east-west highway through this State. Perhaps those were facts “resting in their private knowledge” which they could not, or at least should not, have considered in weighing the evidence. Nevertheless, the jury could have reasonably inferred, and from their *292verdict it must be assumed that they did so infer, that the operation of the automobile at excessive speed did not occur on the “hilly” portion of the journey.
Upon cross-examination these questions were asked the defendant, and he made these answers: Q: “Did you observe your speedometer much that evening?”, A: “Not too often.”; Q: “Well, how can you tell how fast you were going?”, A: “At which time?”; Q: “Well, your top— You stated before your top speed that evening before you came to the scene of the accident was sixty-five. How do you know that would be a fact?”, A: “Well, I am accustomed to driving and I just judged — .”; Q: “Did you just estimate that?”, Mr. Jenkins: “Let him finish his answer. Go ahead and finish your answer.”, A: “I judged my speed was about that from previous driving.”; Q: “That is just an estimate on your part, isn’t it?”, A: “That is an estimate.”; Q: And it is an estimate that on the way to Huntington you were driving fifty when you crossed the dip, is that not true?”, A: “That’s right.”
There is no evidence that the deceased knew that the automobile in which he was a passenger was travelling at an excessive speed at any time during the evening. The defendant testified to no incident that occurred prior to the wrecking of his automobile on the crossing that would indicate to the deceased that he was in danger. On the contrary, the defendant stated that he obeyed all traffic regulations, such as stopping at signal lights, with the exception, of course, of judging that he drove at various times at a rate of speed as high as 65 miles an hour. It is my opinion that the evidence in this case presented a factual question for jury determination as to whether the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wayne County.