Court Opinion

ID: 9494380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:36:49.466872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:23.184528
License: Public Domain

McKEE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join part II B — The NCAA’s Relationship with the NYSP — fully, and without reservation. However, I concur with the discussion in part II A — Controlling Authority Theory only because I agree that we are bound by the panel’s decision in Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 198 F.3d 107 (1999, 3rd Cir.) (McKee, J. dissenting). See I.O.P. 9.1 (“no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel.”).
Inasmuch as I have previously noted why I believe that the decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988) supports the argument that there are material issues of fact as to whether the NCAA can be subject to Title IX under the Controlling Authority Theory, I will not reiterate my position here in detail. Rather, I rely upon the lengthy discussion of Tarkanian that I set forth in my dissenting opinion in Cureton. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 122-126.
There, I noted that the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the relationship between the NCAA and the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (“UNLV”) established only that UNLV was not a state actor. The *164Court left open the issue before us; whether that relationship is such as to allow the plaintiffs to succeed under a “controlling authority” theory of recovery. Nothing in my colleagues’ discussion of the issues sub judice convinces me that my reading of Tarkanian is erroneous insofar as it relates to “controlling authority” liability under Title IX. In fact, it only reinforces my belief that we incorrectly decided Cureton.
The majority relies upon the fact that “ ‘UNLV’s options [in Tarkanian] were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent.’ ” Maj. op. at 156 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n. 19,109 S.Ct. 454). However, the Court’s pronouncement must be read in context with the state action analysis it was undertaking. It does not control our inquiry into whether the NCAA is a “controlling authority.” I am not nearly as impressed as the major-, ity that the Court in Tarkanian, held that UNLV was not a state actor because it had unpalatable choices. Consider a scenario where A can impose such unpalatable consequences upon B that B has no choice but to submit to A’s will. A is controlling B. That practical reality is not altered by the theoretical possibility that B can defy A at A’s peril and pay dearly for the act of defiance. In fact, this is precisely how power and control are exercised and manifested. Other than direct administrative or legal control, I can think of no better way for one entity to control another than by making the cost of defiance so high that the controlled entity’s only realistic alternative is submission. The NCAA clearly imposed its will on UNLV in Tar-kanian and forced the university to do something that was against the will of the university’s top administrators, and which they thought was unfair. Accordingly, Tarkanian does not support denying the plaintiffs “controlling authority” theory as a matter of law. However, our holding in Cureton does. Therefore, I must concur in the majority’s opinion.