Court Opinion

ID: 9579933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:01.278906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:54.021348
License: Public Domain

CRISWELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In order for a business entity to be considered the statutory employer of a subcontractor or its employees, it must be “engaged in or conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof_” Section 8-48-101(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Yol. 3B).
Traditionally, the Colorado courts have drawn a distinction between subcontracted activities which are directly related to the alleged employer’s primary business pur*325pose and other subcontracted activities which, while necessary to the accomplishment of that primary purpose, are, nevertheless, merely ancillary or incidental thereto. Compare Campbell v. Black Mountain Spruce, Inc., 677 P.2d 379 (Colo.App.1983) (the work of planing of the lumber is a part of the business of producing finished lumber for sale) and Melody Homes, Inc. v. Lay, 44 Colo.App. 49, 610 P.2d 1081 (1980) (a security system is a “necessary part of the building process” and is “not incidental to the main objective of erecting residential structures”) with Pioneer Construction Co. v. Davis, 152 Colo. 121, 381 P.2d 22 (1963) (the repair of vehicles used to haul materials is not a part of the highway construction business); Meyer v. Lakewood Country Club, 122 Colo. 110, 220 P.2d 371 (1950) (the repair of a private sewer system, although necessary for continued use of the facility, is not a part of a country club’s “underlying business”); and American Radiator Co. v. Franzen, 81 Colo. 161, 254 P. 160 (1927) (the regular, bi-monthly washing of windows at a radiator factory is “not part of the business of manufacturing and selling heating systems”).
In this case, the majority concedes that the janitorial services here involved, which did not differ in any significant way from the janitorial services deemed necessary for the operation of most businesses or business offices, did not “contribute directly” to the employer’s primary business purpose of producing computer equipment. This being so, plaintiffs activities were not, in my opinion, a part of the “work” of the defendant’s “business” within the meaning of § 8-48-101(1), but were mere incidental or ancillary activities. See American Radiator Co. v. Franzen, supra.
Thus, it is unnecessary, in my view, to consider the extent to which the contract between defendant and plaintiff’s real employer may have vested some control over plaintiff’s work in defendant (it being con-cededly less than that required for a finding of a common law master-servant relationship), or the regularity with which such activities were to be performed, or defendant’s past practice in using its own employees to perform such activities (it had not).
The trial court’s conclusion, which the majority affirms, means that every business or business office making use of janitorial services on either a lease or contract basis shall be considered to be the statutory employer of the persons rendering such services. Since I am convinced that the legislative intent of § 8-48-101(1), as that intent has been judicially declared over the years, does not countenance such a result, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.