Court Opinion

ID: 9455733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:31:34.066919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:42.768593
License: Public Domain

JAMES M. CARTER and TRASK, Circuit Judges
(specially concurring):
Notwithstanding our disposition of this case in the majority opinion, we feel constrained to express our view, contrary to the holding of the Sher decision, with respect to the merits of appellant’s self-incrimination argument.
We cannot see how an intended transferee, acting under 26 U.S.C. § 5814, incriminates himself. If the intended transferee complies with the provisions of the National Firearms Act, the transfer will not be made until the transferee’s application has been approved by the Secretary or his delegate. The application will not be approved, however, unless the intended transferee has obtained a certificate from some local law enforcement official, certifying that the firearm is intended by the appellant for lawful purposes. See 26 C.F.R. § 179.99 (1968). Therefore, in a state where possession of a firearm is illegal, compliance with the Act is almost certain to abort the transfer since it is highly unlikely that any local official would issue a certificate. And if the intended transferee neither completes the transfer nor receives possession of the firearm there is no violation. Thus, the hazard of prospective incrimination is speculative and insubstantial at best.
Justice Harlan in discussing prospective incrimination in Marchetti, stated: *1035“Moreover, although prospective acts will doubtless ordinarily involve only speculative and unsubstantial risks of incrimination, this will scarcely always prove true. As we shall show, it is not true here.” 390 U.S. at 54, 88 S.Ct. at 705. Marchetti must be read against the factual background of the case, where the securing of the wagering stamp, the supplying of this information by federal agencies to state authorities, and the use in evidence of the acquisition of the stamps, clearly incriminated.