Court Opinion

ID: 9786591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:58:54.74226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.562251
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s decision that the matter relating to Respondents Janice Lynn King, Rosemary Denise Price, and Pro Se Advocates should be remanded to the Commissioner. I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision as to Respondent David Martin Price. First, because the second removal notice rendered the Commissioner’s orders arising from the December 5 hearing void, those orders are void as to all of the Respondents, including David Martin Price. Second, I disagree with the issuance of a permanent injunction against David Martin Price. I would remand the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings as to all of the Respondents.
The majority concludes that Commissioner Lively was not authorized to conduct the December 5 hearing before United States District Court Judge Julie A. Robinson’s second remand, I agree. The removal statute is clear on this point, upon the proper filing of a notice of removal to federal court, “the State court shall pro*398ceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (After receipt of a certified copy of the remand order, “[t]he State court may thereupon proceed with such case.”).
Moreover, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that any state court proceedings conducted after the filing of a removal notice are void. “There is all but unanimity on the proposition that ... a state court adjudication, while a removal petition is pending in federal court, is void, even if the federal court subsequently determined that the case is not removable.” Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Rub, 481 N.W.2d 451, 456 (N.D. 1992). The filing of a removal notice suspends the jurisdiction of the state court until the case is remanded and, thus, any proceedings in state court in the interim are void ab initio, even if removal is found to have been improper. Lewis v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, 266 Va. 513, 518, 587 S.E.2d 697 (2003); see also 14C Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3737, pp. 384-87 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that a significant number of cases hold that once removal is effected, any subsequent proceedings in state court are considered coram non judice even if the removal is subsequently found to have been improper and the case is remanded to state court); Annot., Effect, on Jurisdiction of State Court, of 28 USCS § 1446(e), Relating to Removal of Civil Case to Federal Court, 38 A.L.R. Fed. 824, 830 (notice of removal stays further proceedings in state court, “[tjhus, it is said that upon removal, the state court is without jurisdiction to proceed further in the removed civil matter, and that any actions taken by the state court in contravention of this prohibition are Void,’ ‘a nullity,’ ‘without effect,’ ‘of no force,’ or ‘without jurisdiction’ ”).
Applying this well-settled law, the majority determines that because the second removal attempt was pending at the time of the December 5 hearing, the Commissioner should not have proceeded with that hearing. The majority also determines that any actions taken by the Commissioner while the second removal notice was pending are void. Accordingly, the majority concludes that “[bjecause of the December 5 hearing alone, we are required to refuse to adopt Commissioner Lively’s orders and to remand for *399further proceedings before him . . . .” The majority, however, reaches this conclusion only as to Respondents Janice Lynn King, Rosemary Denise Price, and Pro Se Advocates. With respect to David Martin Price, the majority rejects only the Commissioner’s findings and orders with regard to the Kansas Consumer Protection Act and, thus, essentially adopts the Commissioner’s conclusions as to the allegations concerning unauthorized practice of law. Moreover, the majority issues an injunction against David Martin Price that virtually mirrors the injunction issued by Commissioner Lively.
I disagree with this result. Logically, how can the Commissioner’s orders entered as a result of the December 5 hearing be held to be void as to only some of the Respondents when it is a jurisdictional issue? If the state proceedings were stayed pending remand, it was stayed as to all of the Respondents and, accordingly, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to proceed. Thus, any action taken against the Respondents during that time are void as to all of them. See Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 154, 601 N.E.2d 720 (1992) (When a case is removed from state court, “the entire action, including all of the parties and their claims, is transferred to the Federal court.”); Lewis, 266 Va. at 517-18; cf. Preston v. Kaw Pipe Line Co., 128 F.2d 162, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1942).
The majority justifies this result with its determination that David Martin Price engaged in the unauthorized practice of law before this court. Based thereon, the majority issues a permanent injunction against David Martin Price. I have two objections to that injunction. First, I do not believe it is appropriate for this court to determine sua sponte that David Martin Price’s statements during oral argument constituted the unauthorized practice of law and, based solely thereon, issue a permanent injunction against him without providing him with any notice and an opportunity to be heard on this point. Under our Code of Civil Procedure, even a temporary injunction cannot issue without reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Cf. K.S.A. 60-905(a) (“No temporaiy injunction shall be granted until after reasonable notice to the party to be enjoined and an opportunity to be heard.”); see also 42 Am. *400Jur. 2d, Injunctions § 243 (although temporary restraining orders may be issued without notice, “notice and an opportunity to be heard are always required in the case of final and permanent injunctions.”).
I am not prepared to prejudge whether David Martin Price engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during oral argument before this court. Instead, I believe that fundamental fairness and procedural due process require that Price be afforded a full and meaningful opportunity to address whether his actions constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The best forum for this process would be before the Commissioner, whom we have vested with the power and authority to conduct hearings, make factual determinations, and submit recommendations to this court in this matter. I note that the oral argument in this case was recorded and would be available to the parties and the Commissioner as needed to address this issue.
Second, as Judge Buser notes in his dissent, the injunction issued against David Martin Price is not limited to the finding that Price’s arguments before this court constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Although the injunction prohibits David Martin Price from “appearing in any Kansas legal proceeding in a representative capacity for another,” it goes further, prohibiting Price from
“taking any action intended to assist nonmembers of the state bar of Kansas in the presentation of any legal matter; from preparing or aiding in the filing of any pleading or legal document in a Kansas controversy or legal proceeding, except when doing so solely on his own behalf; and/or from counseling or advising any nonmember of the state bar on any legal matter whatsoever.”
As an original proceeding, the Commissioner’s findings and conclusions are advisory only; this court has the duly to examine the record, find the facts, and make its own conclusions of law. State, ex rel, v. Schmitt, 174 Kan. 581, 585, 258 P.2d 228 (1953). The fact that the Commissioner’s orders are void would not necessarily preclude this court from reaching its own conclusions and entering appropriate orders based on its examination of the facts established in the record. Herein lies the rub: there are no established facts in the record before this court. Commissioner Lively’s injunction was not based on factual findings that the Respondents did any of the *401things enjoined, but was issued solely as a sanction for the failure to participate in discovery and to appear before the Commissioner in this matter. Thus, there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that David Martin Price did any of the things for which he is now enjoined.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would remand the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings as to all of the Respondents.