Court Opinion

ID: 9895153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-04 21:00:47.675862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:28.509927
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-2073

        DAVID HOWARD PLOTKIN,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:17-cv-00571-TDC)

        Submitted: September 12, 2023                                Decided: November 3, 2023

        Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        David Howard Plotkin, Appellant Pro Se. Emily Rachlin, Office of the General Counsel,
        MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

                  David Plotkin appeals the district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings

        to Montgomery County Public Schools (“MCPS”) and concluding that Plotkin’s son, O.P.,

        received a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in mathematics during the third

        grade. On appeal, Plotkin argues that because MCPS did not fully implement O.P.’s

        Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), O.P. was necessarily deprived of a FAPE. For the

        following reasons, we affirm.

                  The Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) offers federal money to states in

        exchange for a commitment to provide a FAPE to all children with certain disabilities. Fry

        v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). “A FAPE means special education

        and related services that are (1) without charge, (2) meet the standards of the state

        educational agency, (3) include the appropriate level of education in the state involved and

        (4) are provided in conformity with an [IEP] as required by the IDEA.” K.I. v. Durham

        Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 54 F.4th 779, 784-85 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). The IEP is “the primary vehicle for ensuring the student receives a FAPE.” Id.

        at 785.

                  “In IDEA cases, we conduct a modified de novo review, giving due weight to the

        underlying administrative proceedings.” R.F. ex rel. E.F. v. Cecil Cnty. Pub. Schs., 919

        F.3d 237, 244 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Giving “due weight”

        means that “findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima

        facie correct, and if a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why.”

        MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). If the

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        administrative findings of fact are not regularly made, however, they are not entitled to

        deference. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Henrico Cnty. v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir.

        2005). “Factual findings are not regularly made if they are reached through a process that

        is far from the accepted norm of a fact-finding process.” Id. (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In all cases, however, “the ultimate decision as to whether the state has complied

        with the IDEA is an independent decision made by the district court.” R.F., 919 F.3d at

        245 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even so, when “making this independent decision,

        courts should not substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the

        school authorities which they review.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “Whether a state has violated the IDEA has procedural and substantive components.

        Procedurally, the state must comply with the stated requirements of the IDEA.

        Substantively, the state must offer the child a FAPE.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “A

        procedural violation of the IDEA may not serve as the basis for recovery unless it resulted

        in the loss of an educational opportunity for the disabled child.” T.B., Jr. ex rel. T.B., Sr.

        v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 573 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

        marks omitted). A procedural violation “that did not actually interfere with the provision

        of a FAPE is not enough. Rather, the procedural violation must have caused substantive

        harm. Specifically, the prospect of recovery for a procedural violation of the IDEA

        depends on whether the student’s disability resulted in the loss of a FAPE.” Id. (internal

        citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At base, the IDEA “requires an educational

        program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of

        the child's circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403.

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               First, we conclude that the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) findings were

        regularly made. Therefore, we consider the ALJ’s findings to be prima facie correct. We

        further agree with the district court that MCPS’ failure to adhere to the IEP constitutes a

        procedural violation of the IDEA.

               Plotkin argues that O.P. was denied a FAPE because his IEP was not properly

        implemented. However, the record shows that O.P. received satisfactory marks in the

        classroom, that O.P.’s test scores improved more than the average student’s scores, and

        that O.P.’s overall test scores were negatively impacted by his anxiety during testing. On

        this record, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that O.P. was not

        denied a FAPE.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision.      We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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