Court Opinion

ID: 9529122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:47.294619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:41.153590
License: Public Domain

CRONE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the intent-effects test provides the appropriate analytical framework for addressing ex post facto claims under the Indiana Constitution. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378-79. However, when I weigh the seven factors listed in Mendoza, Martinez, I reach a different conclusion regarding whether the Ordinance at issue is unconstitutional as applied to Dowdell. *572The first consideration is whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint. In contrast to the "significant affirmative obligations" of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the Ordinance here requires no affirmative action on the part of a sex offender. Cf. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 374-77, 379-80 (outlining the litany of duties that have arisen as the Act has expanded in breadth and scope). The Ordinance simply prohibits a sex offender from entering park properties in Jeffer-sonville. While this prohibition constitutes a restraint, it is neither highly intrusive nor does it impose additional "severe stigma." Moreover, an exemption mechanism is available. The Ordinance need not fully and forever ban Dowdell from engaging in social or familial activities. It merely limits the location for such activities absent a demonstration of good cause. In my view, this first factor does not clearly favor treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive when applied to Dowdell.
Turning to the historical punishment factor, I concur with the reasoning 8 in Doe v. Town of Plainfield, though I do so without using the clearest proof standard. The Ordinance's prohibition is not akin to banishment. Dowdell is not permanently expelled from the entire Jeffersonville community; rather, he and other sex offenders are restricted from a subset of that community. 893 N.E.2d at 1134-35. Further, I do not liken the ban to a condition of probation because a waiver of the exclusion does exist. Accordingly, the see-ond factor does not favor treating the ef-feets of the Ordinance as punitive when applied in this case.
As in Wallace, I would conclude that the third factor, scienter, "slightly favors" treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive when applied here.
The fourth factor asks whether the Ordinance's operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, community protection, and condemnation. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381. I have no reason to believe that the Ordinance was passed for purposes of retribution, also known as vengeance for its own sake. See id. at 382. I am also not convinced that the prospect of being restricted from city parks would be a substantial deterrent to a person contemplating a sex offense. Nonetheless, a law's deterrent aspects do not automatically make it punitive-particularly where there is a rational relation to a non-punitive purpose. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. I see no rehabilitative purpose to the Ordinance, and none has been offered. As for community protection, the Ordinance's restriction is not a true sequestration as incarceration would be. Finally, additional condemnation may occur, if at all, only if an offender seeks an exemption. On the whole, the fourth factor does not favor treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive when applied to Dowdell.
As per Wallace's dictates, the fifth factor, application only to criminal behavior, supports the conclusion that the Ordinance is punitive in effect as to Dowdell See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 382.
Moving to the sixth factor, Dowdell concedes that the Ordinance advances a legitimate, regulatory purpose: the protection of members of the community who use public parks from sex offenders. Noting that the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and high, our su*573preme court similarly concluded that public safety was a valid non-punitive goal. Id. at 382-88. I agree with the majority that this factor clearly favors treating the effects of the Ordinance as regulatory and non-punitive. Op. at 570.
Last, I examine the excessiveness factor, which a number of courts give the greatest weight. In concluding that the seventh factor favored treating the effects of the Sex Offender Registration Act as punitive, our supreme court explained:
In this jurisdiction the Act makes information on all sex offenders available to the general public without restriction and without regard to whether the individual poses any particular future risk. Indeed, we think it significant for this excessiveness inquiry that the Act provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure. - Offenders cannot shorten their registration nor notification period, even on the clearest proof of rehabilitation.[footnote omitted] Thus, the non-punitive purpose of the Act, although of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render as non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping.
Wallace, 905 N.E,2d at 384 (emphases added). In marked contrast, there is a mechanism by which Dowdell and other sex offenders can receive some relief9 from the Ordinanee's restriction. In addition, I do not view the Ordinance to be nearly as onerous as the broad and sweeping Act.10
In Jeffersonville, an offender is free to seek an exemption from the Ordinance. Further, if a City Court judge in his/her discretion determines that a sex offender has not shown good cause to merit a waiver of the Ordinance's park exclusion, an offender is not without redress. Presumably, an offender is free to appeal the denial of his application for an exemption. Here, for instance, Dowdell apparently applied, was denied twice, and is appealing the 2008 denial. I do not know if the judge viewed Dowdell's subsequent convie-tions of battery and domestic violence as good cause for the denials, or if the judge relied on other facts. I also cannot say, as applied to Dowdell, the more recent convictions would be improper considerations as perhaps they evidence continued inability to conform to the laws of our state. However, the appeal of the denial constitutes the proper avenue to determine good cause.11 In any event, I conclude that the seventh factor does not favor treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive as applied to Dowdell.
*574To summarize, of the seven factors identified as relevant to the inquiry of whether this Ordinance has a punitive effect despite legislative intent that it be non-punitive, I find that one supports the conclusion that the Ordinance is punitive in effect as to Dowdell, and one slightly favors treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive when applied here. The remaining five, including the excessiveness factor, point in the other direction. Accordingly, I would conclude that as applied to Dowdell, the Ordinance does not violate Indiana's constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. The predominantly non-punitive nature of the Ordinance convinces me that there is no violation of Article I, section 24 of the Indiana Constitution. Consequent ly, I would affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City.

. Incidentally, even if transfer was not pending in Doe, we would not be bound by it as we would if it had been authored by our supreme court. Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Different panels of the Court of Appeals may reach different conclusions.

. I am somewhat troubled by the limited nature of the available exemption.

. Parks are a discretionary resource provided by many but not all municipalities, and their usage is hardly a core value or integral to a person's participation in the polis as a citizen. Certainly, the limitation on park usage provided by the ordinance is not as onerous as other limitations imposed on convicted felons such as forfeiture of the right to possess firearms or disenfranchisement. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 633 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (concluding that statute prohibiting serious violent felon from possessing a firearm does not violate constitutional right to bear arms), trans. denied; Teer v. State, 738 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (concluding that serious violent felon statute as applied did not violate ex post facto prohibition), trans. denied; Taylor v. State Election Bd. of State of Ind., 616 N.E.2d 380 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (discussing disenfranchisement as well as disqualification for office).

. I am not bothered by the fact that good cause is not specifically defined in the Ordinance. To anticipate and detail every particular situation that could constitute good cause would be an exercise in legislative futility.