Court Opinion

ID: 9833364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:39:30.397642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.027666
License: Public Domain

*293On Motions for Rehearing.
Both sides have presented motions for rehearing, which have been given careful consideration; but it is concluded that the original judgment herein reversing and remanding this cause for another trial was correct, and should be adhered to.
It may be- — in view of the respective criticisms of the parties to different recitations therein — that there were some inaccurate expressions in this court’s opinion then delivered; for instance, the appellees contend that this court was in error in reciting that the expression, as used in the special issues, “at the railroad crossing in question” meant “where the tracks of the railroad crossed Bellaire Road”, whereas in fact the “railroad crossing” “covered all that part of the public highway from the point where it touched the property line of the railroad company on one side until it passed over and beyond the railroad company’s property line On the opposite side of the tracks.”
It may be conceded that this is correct; but still it self-evidently appears that there could have been no sufficient time left, when the train was running from 50 to 70 miles per hour, and the truck was moving from 8 to 10 miles per hour.
The appellant, in its turn, objects to this court’s use of the phrase that it was “unable to hold the pleadings and evidence did not give rise — potentially to a cause involving the doctrine of discovered peril”, insisting:
“The mere potential raising of an issue does not satisfy the requirement that a special issue must be supported or raised actually by the evidence in order to warrant its submission to the jury.”
Likewise, for the sake of argument at least, it might be conceded that there was inaccuracy in this respect also; but, just as appellees’ criticism did not go to the soundness of the court’s holding, neither does the quoted one from appellant, nor is it entitled to a rendition of this cause for that, or any other reason, because, as this court’s former opinion otherwise recited, there was evidence for the appellees sufficient to raise an issue for the jury over whether the sort of discovered peril it declared upon in the pleadings quoted from in this court’s original opinion existed. That being so, the holding originally made to the same effect is here now reiterated, that the appellees thereby became entitled to a correct submission of that issue —when so properly raised by both their pleading and their proof — to the jury.
Without undertaking to recapitulate, or even to make a full resume of it, a substantial statement of it may be thus made:
“From appellant’s plat of the intersection, and the measurements reflected thereon, it is established that -the farthest the deceased and his truck could ever have been from the appellant’s track after get-' ting on the paved highway was 80; feet. That when the truck was 80 feet from the track the driver could see a locomotive approaching from his left for a distance of 580 feet, and, conversely, the engineer on the locomotive could see the truck for a like distance; that when the truck was 50 feet from the track and the locomotive 925 feet from the truck, the truck operator could see the locomotive, and the engineer of the locomotive could see the truck, and •that when the truck was 30 feet from the track and the locomotive 1285 feet from the truck, each of the parties could see the vehicle being operated by the other.”
Mr. N. S. Jenkins, the engineer operating its train, testified on direct examination :
“That he saw the truck as it approached the crossing. That at approximately 400 or 500 feet from the crossing he saw the truck, and the truck in his opinion was 40 or 50 feet from the crossing at that time; he thinks the truck was going slow. That he was operating the train at a speed of around 40 to 50 miles an hour as he approached the crossing.
“That when he said that when he first saw the truck he was 400 or 500 feet from the truck, that was just his opinion. That after seeing the plat, and the set up, it might be that he was as far as 900 feet from the truck when he first saw it. That he might have been 400 or 500 feet from the truck when he first saw it or he might have been as far as 900 feet. That when he first saw the truck approaching the rails he made no effort to slacken the speed) of his train.”
The appellant’s witness, Mr. H. J. McKenzie, an employee of the appellant, testified on cross-examination:
“That he was. on the train at the time of the collision. That he didn’t hear any whistle blown before the collision. That from a point 50 feet north of the center of the appellant’s track a person in a truck *294could see a locomotive approaching’ from the east a distance of 925 feet, and, conversely, an engineer in a locomotive could see the truck for an equal distance.” Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Kopinitsch, 114 Tex. 367, 268 S.W. 923.
Pursuant to these conclusions, the motions for rehearing under review will both be refused.
Motions for rehearing refused.