Court Opinion

ID: 9782638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:00:50.430021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:06.822762
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
Dissenting.
{1 I dissent from the opinion of the Majority because service was not achieved in this case, and because it is unjustifiable to grant the police unchecked power to use fraud to evade the statutory protections securing the constitutional rights of our citizens.1 I also dissent to affirming the sentences in this case as they are grossly disproportionate and excessive by any legitimate standard. Indeed, the sentences here are excessive, in my opinion, even under the non-standard by which this Court typically "reviews" sentences.
[ 2 The Majority devotes one paragraph to its summary conclusion that because a return of service was filed along with the inventory of the search, Darity failed to establish deficient service and failed to meet his burden on the motion to dismiss. This conclusion is wholly inconsistent with the facts in the ree-ord. Darity was not served with the warrant prior to the search. Rather, without judicial oversight, Agent Alford organized a "ruse" to lure Darity from his home and initiate a search without Darity's knowledge or presence. As part of the ruse, Officer Willis arranged for Darity to leave his home and go to his place of business. Once Darity arrived, Willis called the search team and gave them the go-ahead to search the private residential property. The search team conducted an initial search of all buildings on the Darity property, looking in all places in which a person could be found, including in cabinets, in closets and under beds. The police found marijuana and seales during this search. Officer Willis was instructed that, while the search was proceeding, he should not inform Darity about the search warrant. Though the Majority calls this initial search a "protective sweep," our firm precedent ree-ognizes that the execution of the warrant oceurs, and the search commences, once the police cross the threshold of a citizen's *739home.2 The police accomplished much more than crossing the threshold in this case. They entered the home forcibly and executed the search warrant.
T8 Lacking a factual basis to conclude service of the search warrant was achieved, the Majority writes a new exception to the legislatively mandated service requirement; an exception that is bound to swallow the rule. The Majority today holds that police may use fraud and deception to actively lure an individual from his home, so as not to serve a warrant upon the individual prior to executing the warrant. The Majority puts no restrictions on this power of deception, such as a requirement that the police have a good faith basis that the suspect is armed and dangerous or that some other exigent cireumstance exists. Nor does the Majority require judicial oversight. This unbridled exception contravenes over fifty years of statutory law and judicial precedent.
T4 To justify this result, the Majority attacks a straw man, never directly confronting the real issue raised in this appeal. The straw man is a rule requiring personal service of a search warrant on a suspect, even if the suspect is not at home. The Majority refers to this construct as the "strict rule of personal service" and contrasts this "strict rule" to the more flexible approach that accommodates the realities of law enforcement, as set out in our case law.3 However, Darity does not advocate the "strict rule of personal service" that the Majority so effectively rebuts. Nor do I. The Majority opinion, simply put, resolves a non-issue.
15 Darity argues, and I strongly recommend, that statutory protections ensuring the constitutional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, established by our Legislature and interpreted consistently by this Court, be respected and maintained.4 "[Where personal service [on a person present, and in control of the premises] is possible the same should be made and substituted service should not be resorted to."5 Service should be made prior to the *740execution of the search.6 An announcement by the police that they possess a warrant does not satisfy the service requirement; a signed copy of the warrant must be provided to the person in control of the premises.7 If a person absents himself from his home, of his own free will, or hides himself in the home, making himself unavailable, this Court will not hold the police captive and prevent the execution of a warrant.8 However, to permit police to cause a person to exit his home, and then argue that service could not be achieved because the person was not home is a clear abandonment of the rule requiring service.9 The remarkable distinction is one of nonfeasance and malfeasance.
T6 From the straw man to a monumental leap, the Majority attempts to justify its decision to allow police to use fraud to circumvent service requirements by citing this Court's precedent permitting police to use deception to obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The Majority focuses on two cases, Swink v. State and Carr v. State.10 Neither case permits the result advocated by the Majority. Indeed, a close reading of both eases supports the rejection of the Majority decision today.11
T 7 In Swink, defendant invited undercover officers to his home for a party, and after discussing future drug sales with the officers, handed them a bag of speed. Swink was then arrested. This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, emphasizing that the officers (1) were invited into the home and (2) did not conduct a search of the home. Because the officers never exceeded the scope of their invitation, and only participated in the activities offered by Swink, no intrusion occurred. The reasoning of Swink demonstrates the error of the Darity Majority:
In short, [Swink ] involves the exercise of no governmental power to intrude upon *741protected premises; the visitor was invited and willingly admitted by the suspect. It concerns no design on the part of a government agent to observe or hear what was happening in the privacy of a home; the suspect chose the location where the transaction took place. It presents no question of the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling; the only statements repeated were those that were willingly made to the agent and the only things taken were the packets ... voluntarily transferred to him. The pretense resulted in no breach of privacy; it merely encouraged the suspect to say things which he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who would be interested in purchasing [drugs].12
1[ 8 In Carr, the police conducted an undercover buy of liquor from a home prior to executing a valid search warrant on that home. In the course of the undercover buy, the police were invited into the premises by defendant's wife. After completing the purchase, the police served the warrant on the wife and then executed the warrant.13 The Majority "see[s] no important difference between the diversion used here and the artifice used in Carr." 14 The critical distinctions missed by the Majority are that in Carr, the police were invited into the home, there was no breaking of any sort, and the warrant was served upon a person in control of the premises, pursuant to Oklahoma law, prior to the search of the premises.
9 The Majority cites compelling concerns relating to officer and citizen safety. These concerns are implicated each time a warrant is served and a search executed. Recognizing, as we did in Edwards v. State, that one of the purposes of serving a warrant is to address safety concerns, and "to lessen the likelihood of resistance to the search and that such interested party may know that the search is by authority of law," 15 the Majority reasons that by causing a person to leave the premises and avoiding service altogether, the police avoid dangers resulting from "unnecessary confrontations" like the tragic shootings of Oklahoma Highway Patrolmen, the Waco massacres and Ruby Ridge.16 The *742leaps before "if" and between "then" define the flaws in the Majority reasoning. Safety is not the only goal of service, nor is this unchecked grant of power to the police necessary to ensure safety.
« 10 Respecting the constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches of their persons, their homes and their property is another critical goal of the service requirement. "The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for centuries been protected by every court in the English speaking world, from Magna Charta down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the limits of governmental power in our own republic." 17 Service protects citizens from the harsh intrusion of the State by providing an opportunity to defend against errors in warrants,18 or to minimize the intrusion of a search by opening doors and locks and by pointing out evidence.19
111 Thus, while serving a warrant of any kind is dangerous, as is much of the work of law enforcement, there must be a balancing of the dangers involved against the rights of persons to be secure in their homes. Our statutes provide for prior service of a search warrant if the resident is home. Similarly, the Legislature addressed concerns about the balance between safety and fourth amendment protections in the context of our knock and announce law. Rather than abandon the knock and announce requirement, the Legislature expanded the avenues for police to seek exception to the knock and announce obligation.20 This Court kas and should continue to look to Section 1228 and the larger statutory scheme concerning warrants and service, when interpreting the law of service under Section 1227.21 Section 1228 provides a reasonable, non-burdensome alternative to this Court's engaging in policymak-ing or to police disregarding their statutory obligations: police should submit their basis *743for concluding that exigent cireumstances exist to a neutral, detached magistrate and obtain written permission in the warrant to avoid the service requirement.22 Neither the State nor the Majority proffer any reason why this requirement is burdensome.
{12 I write also to express my belief that the sentence imposed upon Darity, life on the Possession with Intent to Distribute charge consecutive to forty years on the Trafficking charge, and one year on the Paraphernalia charge, is excessive considering the facts and cireumstances of this case. At age forty-two this was Darity's first arrest; the quantity of drugs possessed speaks of a lower level dealer; the Pastor and fifty-nine members of Darity's church testified at a sentencing hearing, in person or by petition, to Darity's changed, benevolent character; and the professional tasked by the State to make a sentencing recommendation asserted that "a shorter term of incarceration or a split sentence would not tend to depreciate from the seriousness of the erime(s)." The jury possessed none of this information when it recommended the sentence it did. The punishment imposed is not consistent with this nature of the crime committed or the facts presented at the Darity sentencing.23 We have the authority to make modifications in the interest of justice, where justice demands, and we should do so here.
1 13 For the all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Courts have opened a Pandora's box by sanctioning police lies. The "ends justify the means" rationale employed by most courts is very difficult to limit, and thus, the circumstances of "permissible deceit" have increased. So too has the evidence of "unlawful deceit." How does a law enforcement officer accept a message that it is permissible to lie to obtain evidence, but not permissible to lie in a suppression hearing when the conviction or release of a murderer is in the balance. Empirical studies demonstrate that police are lying both in and out of court. See Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 Ind. L.J. 835, 836, 868-871 and n. 6 (2008) (citing studies and reports including Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Dep't of New York, Commission Report 36 (1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. 75, 107 (1992)(detailing survey of prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges and concluding that perception is that perjury by police is present in approximately 20% of cases); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. LRev. 1016, 1050-51 & n. 129 (1987)(detailing result of survey of Chicago narcotics officers and their experience with perjury, including belief of 76% of respondents that officers shade facts in suppression hearings to establish probable cause)). The consequences penetrate deep into the criminal justice system, as the authority of the courts and legitimacy of their rulings are based largely on integrity and trust. "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
This case, however, is about more than the state of where we stand. This case expands the power of the police to use deceit to avoid a statutorily mandated protection of a constitutional right. This case allows the police to lie with no neutral objective checks, no balances, and no justification.

. See Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 5, ¶ 30, 128 P.3d 521, 537 (finding that tactical team's entry to secure residence, to serve an arrest warrant, and to arrest defendant, so that the search could proceed safely several hours later, was "the initial execution of the search warrant ..." and holding that "service of the search warrant begins once an officer crosses the threshold for the purpose of beginning the search or for securing the residence for a later search").

. See, for ex., Majority Opinion at 8 (citing State v. Walker, 1950 OK CR 118, 92 Okla.Crim. 247, 222 P.2d 766, 768) (The strict rule of personal service for which Appellant contends in this case was also rejected expressly in Walker, supra, where the Court held that personal service was not required on the ferant, in whose name the searched rooms were registered, because the tenant "was at no time present when the search was made or appeared on the scene while the same was in progress.") (emphasis in added in Majority). The obvious problem with the Majority's analogy to Walker, is that Darity was present at his home when the police initiated contact. He was present and then, because of police action, left the premises. The clear difference between Walker and this case is that the police were in no way responsible for Walker's failure to obtain service. In Darity, the police were directly responsible. See also Majority Opinion at 13 ("This Court has never held that the Constitution or the Oklahoma Statutes require personal service of a warrant on someone who is not present within the premises to be searched, and we decline to take this extraordinary step now.").

. 'It is true ... of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out in a case depends on where one goes in. It makes all the difference in the world whether one approaches the Fourth Amendment as the Court approached it in [its prior decisions on the importance of Fourth Amendment protections} or one approaches it as a provision dealing with a formality. It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a requirement for a piece of paper." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S.Ct. 430, 436, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

. Pennington v. State, 1956 OK CR 98, ¶ 12, 302 P.2d 170, 174.
The Majority implies that the Court's holding in Pennington is somehow less persuasive because the Pennington Court relied in part on 37 ©.$.1951, § 84, a prohibition statute repealed in 1959, to inform its interpretation of 22 O.S.2001, § 1227. The repeal of 37 0.8.1951, § 84 has no effect on 22 0.9.2001, § 1227.
The Pennington Court applied rules of statutory interpretation to derive the intent of the Legislature in 1951, at the time Section 1227 was passed. The rules teach us that where one statute is silent on a contested issue it is appropriate *740to look to a more specific, related statute and read the two together, to derive legislative intent and harmonize the greater statutory scheme. In looking to other statutes, the Court is, in essence, interpreting the intent of the Legislature at a fixed time. This Court does not have the authority io change its interpretation of a statute every time it suspects the Legislature's policy may have changed.
Adhering to our longstanding interpretation of Section 1227 is no different than our continuing to rely on case law that has been reversed "on other grounds." The reason for repealing 37 0.$.1951, § 84, the abolition of prohibition, does not implicate the Legislature's policies regarding personal service. Indeed, this Court considered and explicitly rejected such an argument in Knowlton v. State, 1978 OK CR 11, ¶ 7, 574 P.2d 1059, 1062 (citing Pennington v. State, 1956 OK CR 98, 302 P.2d at 174, Howe v. State, 1947 OK CR 64, 84 Okla.Crim. 279, 181 P.2d 571 and 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 83(F) (concluding that "there is no significant distinction between the search of a car for contraband liquor and one for stolen property [and the general rules for the service and execution of the warrant should be the same in both situations)). See also Brumfield v. State, 2007 OK CR 10, ¶ 12, n. 19, 155 P.3d 826, 832 (favorably citing Pennington ).
In over fifty years of interpreting Section 1227 this Court has found no basis to distinguish the rules for executing a warrant for liquor and a warrant for drugs, and the Court does not attempt to state a basis in this case.

. Thompson v. State, 1949 OK CR 78, 89 Okla.Crim. 383, 208 P.2d 584, 586.

. Walker v. State, 1950 OK CR 118, 92 Okla.Crim. 247, 222 P.2d at 768-69 (citing Dawson v. State, 1946 OK CR 118, 83 Okla.Crim. 263, 175 P.2d 368, 370 (finding search illegal even though officers possessed a valid warrant because warrant was not served upon defendant]); Denton v. State, 1937 OK CR 103, 62 Okla.Crim. 8, 70 P.2d 135.

. Thompson v. State, 1949 OK CR 78, 89 Okla.Crim. 383, 208 P.2d at 586 (finding no violation where defendant not served prior to execution of warrant because defendant was hidden away in bed); Rochon v. State, 2008 OK CR 1, ¶ 11 and n. 2, 176 P.3d 362, 365 (affirming denial of motion to suppress where police allowed defendant to leave from his home and executed warrant without first serving defendant, where defendant's leaving was not related to any police involvement).

. Such a conclusion is certainly inconsistent with this Court's holding that "[the statutory restrictions surrounding the serving of a warrant in connection with the search of the house of an accused ... should be strictly observed." Brumfield, 2007 OK CR 10, ¶ 13, and n. 24, 155 P.3d at 832, and n. 24 (quoting Kelso v. State, 1953 OK CR 30, 97 Okla.Crim. 215, 260 P.2d 864, 866) (concerning violations of 22 O.S.2001, § 1228).

. Swink v. State, 1976 OK CR 219, 554 P.2d 795 and Carr v. State, 1952 OK CR 112, 96 Okla.Crim. 16, 248 P.2d 251.

. I will not respond to each of the many cases string-cited by the Majority, but none of those cases stand for the proposition asserted any more than the Swink or Carr cases.

. Swink v. State, 1976 OK CR 219, ¶ 8, 554 P.2d 795, 798 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212, 87 S.Ct. 424, 428, 17 L.Ed.2d 312). Citing Swink, the Majority argues that no Oklahoma law requires that police always deal truthfully with targets of criminal investigations. This is irrelevant. Oklahoma law does require personal service to be made upon a person in control of a premises prior to execution of a search warrant. Moreover, 22 O.S.2001, § 1240 makes it a crime for a police officer to exceed his authority in executing a search warrant. Arguably, the officers in this case violated Section 1240 as they possessed no authority to conduct the search without prior service of the warrant.

. Citing Carr v. State, 1952 OK CR 112, 96 Okla.Crim. 16, 248 P.2d 251, the Majority stresses that personal service of the warrant on Darity was not required because he was not present when the warrant was executed. Darity never argued that the police would have to serve him, rather than someone else in control of the home, because he was the person charged with the contraband found in the home. Unlike in Car, only Darity was home prior to the police executing the warrant. The police caused Darity to leave his home, and consequently, no one was home to receive the warrant, open the locks, point out the evidence, or assist in anyway in minimizing the intrusion of the police.

. Majority Opinion at 736. In Carr, like in Swink, the deception perpetrated related to the identity of the officers, and did not vitiate the voluntary and consensual nature of the sale of contraband. K is as illegal to sell contraband to police as it is to sell contraband to a civilian. Carr v. State, 1952 OK CR 112, 96 Okla.Crim. 16, 248 P.2d at 252 (citations omitted). Critical in Carr and in Swink was the fact that defendant consented to the intrusion, and the consent was not exceeded.

. Edwards v. State, 1951 OK CR 162, 95 Okla.Crim. 37, 239 P.2d 434, 437 (citations omitted).

. Majority Opinion at 736. The references to Waco and Ruby Ridge do little to advance this debate. Each of these terrible tragedies arose out of a series of very complicated facts. Extensive Federal hearings were held in each instance, to review the flawed decision making leading up to the shootings. Neither case was thought to have been caused by law enforcement lacking tools of lawful trickery. Furthermore, in each case, respecting the full protections of the law, or obtaining clear, official approval to act in the alternative, would have been the safest path for law enforcement, as severe scrutiny of all decisions was inevitable.
At Ruby Ridge, law enforcement was attempting to serve a bench warrant on Randy Weaver, who failed to appear at a court date. Weaver had become increasingly distrusiful of the government, and had not left his cabin in months. Law enforcement engaged in an extensive, expensive surveillance, lasting months, and ultimately cost*742ing upward of $13,000 a week, hoping to bring Weaver to justice. Guns In American Society, An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture and the Law 509 (Gregg Lee Carter ed.2003). See generally U.S. Department OF Justice, Office OF Professional Responsibility, Report on Ruby Ridge (June 10, 1994), available at http://www. byington.org/Carl/ruby/rubyl.htm. In the end, law enforcement had a choice to continue surveillance, or confront Weaver in his home. Today many question the choice made to confront the family. It is noteworthy that deception was employed as a tactic over the course of the investigation and prosecution in Ruby Ridge. This may have actually increased the level of distrust on the part of Weaver, and decreased his willingness to leave his home peacefully.
In Waco, the ATF chose to execute an arrest and search warrant together, in a large scale raid to disarm the militarized compound. The ATF called press to attend the event. This was the largest scale operation in the history of the ATF. Why they proceeded as they did surely involved many factors. There is no question that informants and other lawful deceptive tactics were employed during the course of the investigation, and no allegation that the ATF was hampered in any way by not having more deceptive tactics available to them. In fact, there is much speculation that the ATF could have arrested Koresh while he was off the compound but choose not to do so.
See, e.g., Joel Rosenbloom III, Waco: More than Simple Blunders?, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1995, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/waco/blunders.html. What should have been learned from all of these examples is that overly aggressive and marginally legal police action puts police officers at great risk and often leads to tragedy and ruined lives. It is critical that police follow the law in executing search warrants. As I note in this writing, our statutes specifically provide for ways to assure the safety of officers, where exigent circumstances exist, with judicial oversight.

. Dawson v. State, 1946 OK CR 118, 83 Okla.Crim. 263, 175 P.2d at 369-370.

. Evans v. State, 2007 OK CR 13, ¶ 3, 157 P.3d 139, 141 (wrong address and description in warrant) and Goble v. Saffle, No. 03-6116, 188 Fed.Appx. 723, 2006 WL 1901022, *3-4 (10th Cir. July 12, 2006)(unpublished)(same).

. Rochon v. State, 2008 OK CR 1, ¶ 11 and n. 2, 176 P.3d at 365, and n. 2.

. See 22 O.S.Supp.1999, § 1228(1).

. See Thigpen v. State, 1931 OK CR 232, 51 Okla.Crim. 28, 299 P. 230, where this Court looked to Section 2883, Comp. St.1921, the precursor to 22 0.$.2001 § 1228, to interpret legislative intent relating to service of search warrants. Thigpen was recently cited favorably by this Court in Brumfield v. State, 2007 OK CR 10, ¶ 2, n. 19, 155 P.3d at 832. See also Brumfield at ¶ 12-15, 155 P.3d at 832-833 (describing the Court's consistent use of the exclusionary rule to enforce violations of 22 O.S.2001, § 1228 where no exigent circumstances existed). See also, supra, note 5.

. In the present case, Agent Alford did not inform the magistrate about any unique concerns he had relating to Darity. There was no specific allegation that Darity was dangerous, possessed weapons, or was prone to destroy evidence. There was no expressed concern for other persons on the property. There was no request to omit the knock and announce rule. There was no request to avoid or delay service by getting Darity off of the property.

. In effect, the sentence imposed is a life sentence for a man of forty-two years. It is noteworthy that the Legislature enacted mandatory life sentences for convictions of trafficking after two prior felonies. 63 0.$.2001, § 2-415(D)(3). Imposing the sentence recommended by the jury, the trial judge stated "[i)f the penalty is excessive that would be up to the Court of Criminal Appeals."