Court Opinion

ID: 9955576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 19:04:08.488166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.191703
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                 DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,              A166011
 v.
 MARIO GUADALUPE SERRANO,                       (Contra Costa County
         Defendant and Appellant.                Super. Ct. No. 05-171324-7)

        This appeal addresses whether substantial evidence supports a jury’s
findings of premeditated and deliberate attempted murder where the
defendant engages in a shootout with police immediately after crashing a
stolen vehicle in a busy intersection, and whether a trial court has discretion
to strike those findings pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c).1
We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the
negative.
        Defendant Mario Guadalupe Serrano appeals from judgment after
being convicted of 13 criminal counts, which included two counts of
premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. After the trial court
dismissed five of the six firearm enhancements found true by the jury, it
sentenced defendant to a total determinate term of 35 years 8 months and a
total indeterminate term of 30 years to life.

        1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal

Code.

                                         1
      On appeal, defendant contends the jury’s findings on counts 1 and 3,
that he acted with premeditation and deliberation in committing attempted
murder, are unsupported by sufficient evidence; the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion to consider striking the premeditation and deliberation
findings pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c); and the trial court
erroneously pronounced at the sentencing hearing that the 20-year sentence
imposed for the firearm enhancement attached to his determinate term
rather than his indeterminate term. Only defendant’s last argument has
merit. We thus issue a limited remand to permit the trial court to correct its
sentencing error with respect to the 20-year firearm enhancement
accompanying count 1 and otherwise affirm.
             PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      Following a three-day crime spree in May 2016 involving six separate
incidents, defendant was charged by amended information with: two counts
of attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer (counts 1 and 3; Pen.
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subds. (e), (f)); two counts of assault with a
firearm upon a peace officer (counts 2 and 4; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (d)(1));
felony vandalism by damaging and destroying property over $400 (count 5;
Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)); arson of property of another (count 6; Pen.
Code, § 451, subd. (d)); first degree residential burglary (count 7; Pen. Code,
§ 459); grand theft firearm (count 8; Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2)); driving or
taking a vehicle without consent (count 9; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); two
counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (counts 10 and 11; Pen. Code,
§ 246); carjacking (count 12; Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)); and fleeing a
pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly (count 13; Veh.
Code, § 2800.2). As to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged defendant personally
and intentionally discharged a shotgun, causing great bodily injury. Various

                                         2
firearm enhancements were also alleged as to counts 3, 4, 12, and 13. Trial
began on January 15, 2019.
I.    Trial.
      A.    Vandalism: May 2, 2016 (Count 5).
      Just before 5 p.m. on May 2, 2016, defendant opened the glass front
doors of the fast food restaurant in Antioch where his girlfriend, Jane Doe,
was employed. Defendant yelled something to the effect of, “This is for
[Jane],” as he smashed both doors with a metal tire iron, shattering glass
everywhere. The restaurant was forced to close for several hours and to pay
about $2,000 in repairs.
      Earlier that day, the couple returned from a trip to Southern California
to visit defendant’s daughter and other family members. During their trip,
defendant repeatedly accused Jane of cheating on him and refused to leave
her alone, even with his family present. When defendant dropped Jane off at
work that morning for her early morning shift, he accused her of lying about
having to work and refused to turn over her purse or keys.
      Later, when Jane called defendant to bring her the purse and keys, he
drove their shared car, a white Dodge Charger, to the restaurant; parked it in
the drive-through lane; locked the doors; and left. Jane and her coworkers
were forced to break the car window in order to move the car from the drive-
through lane. A tow truck had to be called to move the car back to Jane’s
house, where she lived with defendant. Jane eventually walked home from
the restaurant after work. She never spoke to defendant again and had the
locks changed on her apartment because she was afraid.
      B.    Arson: May 2, 2016 (Count 6).
      Approximately 5 p.m. on May 2, 2016, the fire department responded to
a report of a car fire in Pittsburg, less than two miles from the restaurant

                                       3
where Jane worked. The responders found a white Dodge Charger registered
to defendant and Jane ablaze. It appeared that the car had been abandoned
and that brake lines and lines within the engine compartment had been cut.
A blood droplet was found on the driver’s side door, and there was a strong
gasoline odor inside the passenger compartment although the gas tank was
not damaged. Based on its investigation, the fire department determined the
fire was intentionally set by igniting gasoline inside the passenger
compartment.
      C.    Residential Burglary: May 2–3, 2016 (Counts 7–9).
      In May 2016, Kit S. lived in a rural area in Clayton. The weekend of
May 1, 2016, she left town on a business trip. Her white Chevrolet truck was
parked outside her house. She also had two guns, stored in a bedroom of her
house.
      On May 4, 2016, around 7:30 p.m., deputy sheriffs were dispatched to
Kit’s house to contact the owner of a vehicle that had been involved in a
series of crimes. The deputies saw broken windows and a ladder leading to
the balcony. They entered the house and found it ransacked. Pictures had
been ripped off the walls, and there were piles of bullets around the house.
Windows and a sliding door had been screwed shut and butcher knives placed
by the windows. Furniture had been moved to impede access into and out of
the house, and blood was everywhere.
      After returning from her trip, Kit found a wallet in her house
containing defendant’s driver’s license, Jane’s debit card, an appointment
reminder card with defendant’s name on it, a pay stub, and a prom
photograph of defendant. She also found that one shotgun and her white
truck were missing.

                                       4
      D.    Shooting at an Inhabited Dwelling: May 4, 2016
            (Counts 10–11).
      On May 4, 2016, just before 11 a.m., defendant drove to the drive-
through window of the fast food restaurant where Jane worked and asked the
employee at the window whether Jane was there. Although the employee
told him no three times, defendant pulled out a gun and asked to “come in to
get her.” The employee ran to hide, while telling a coemployee that
defendant was outside with a gun. The pair ran with several other
employees into the freezer, where they tried to call the police but did not have
cellular reception.
      While they hid, about four gunshots were fired into the restaurant’s
large-paned glass windows in front of an area designated as the children’s
play space. An employee who was between the restaurant’s lobby and play
space was hit on his cheeks and left pectoral with three “little balls” that
caused markings and swelling. The physical evidence, including a shotgun
cup and an expended shell, proved the shots came from a shotgun loaded
with bird shot. Defendant was later identified in a dashboard camera video
of the incident as the driver of a white truck.
      Just after 11 a.m. on the same day, a neighbor of Jane’s cousin was
outside his house on Beacon Street in Pittsburg. The neighbor witnessed a
man in a white truck pull up in front of Jane’s cousin’s house and exit the
truck with a shotgun. This man, later identified as defendant, shouted
“cabrón” and shot through the front window of Jane’s cousin’s house before
returning to the truck and leaving.
      E.    Carjacking: May 4, 2016 (Count 12).
      In the early evening of May 4, 2016, T.L., a high school student, and
several friends were “hanging out” in a rural area on Franklin Canyon Road,
taking photographs. A white truck arrived and parked about 40 feet away.

                                        5
Defendant got out of the truck and approached with a shotgun “in a ready
position . . . .” Defendant asked T.L. for the keys to his 1997 BMW, and T.L.
complied. Defendant warned the group not to call the police and said he
would be back. He then drove off in the BMW toward the entrance of
eastbound Highway 4. One of T.L.’s friends called 911.
      The police arrived and searched the white truck that defendant left
behind, finding several spent ammunition shells and rounds of live
ammunition.
      F.     Fleeing the Police, Assault with a Firearm, and Attempted
             Murder: May 4, 2016 (Counts 1-4, 13).
      Around 6 p.m. on May 4, 2016, Officers Smith and Duggar of the
Antioch Police Department were on patrol in separate marked police cars.
Both officers responded to a report of defendant’s driving a stolen BMW near
Auto Center Drive and Pittsburg–Antioch Highway. Officer Smith, parked in
an industrial lot, saw the stolen BMW with no license plates and began
following it. Once Officer Duggar arrived, both officers activated their
overhead lights.
      Defendant sped up to 60 to 80 miles per hour as he drove erratically,
southbound on Auto Center Drive. Although it was rush hour, defendant did
not stop at a single red light as he entered Century Boulevard. At some
point, Officer Smith lost sight of defendant. However, as he approached the
intersection of Leland and Loveridge Roads, Officer Smith saw a light-colored
Chevrolet Suburban in the middle of the intersection with major damage.
The BMW had run the red light and collided with the Suburban and another
car before colliding with some street signage and coming to a stop on the
north side of the intersection. Officer Smith saw defendant standing outside
the crashed BMW using the car door as concealment as he pointed a firearm
in the officer’s direction.

                                       6
      Officer Smith slammed on his brakes as he saw a muzzle blast from
defendant’s firearm. He immediately felt an impact to the side of his face
that felt like “having a cinder block thrown at [him].” Officer Smith felt blood
running down his face and thought he might lose consciousness. After
hearing a second muzzle blast, Officer Smith returned fire on defendant with
his pistol, shooting about three rounds through his own windshield. Officer
Smith then opened his car door, put the car into drive, waited for a break in
the gunfire, and ran toward the Suburban. Before he reached the vehicle,
Officer Smith slipped and fell. As he got up, Officer Duggar arrived and got
out of his car. Officer Duggar’s car provided cover until both men could run
behind the Suburban.
      Similar to Officer Smith, when Officer Duggar arrived at the scene, he
saw defendant standing over the doorframe of the stolen, crashed BMW with
a “long rifle-style weapon” aimed in Officer Smith’s direction. Officer Duggar
saw at least one muzzle blast aimed at Officer Smith. Then Officer Duggar
saw defendant pivot and point his gun at him, prompting Officer Duggar to
slam on the brakes. As Officer Duggar attempted to put his car into park, he
saw a second muzzle flash in his direction. He got out of the car as it
continued to roll forward. Officer Duggar then joined Officer Smith behind
the Suburban and fired at least two shots at defendant. After the officers did
not hear any shots for several seconds, they approached defendant and were
able to take him into custody.2
      The police later recovered a Remington Model 870 Wingmaster
shotgun, six shotgun shells (four fired and two unfired), and 13 expended

      2 Officer Smith received medical treatment for shotgun pellets that had

“peppered” his head. As of trial, he still suffered chronic headaches and jaw
disfunction.

                                       7
handgun rounds. Defendant’s crash and shootout with the police were
memorialized in video footage from a municipal camera that was played at
trial.
II.      The Verdict, Sentencing and Appeal.
         On February 6, 2019, the jury found defendant guilty of all counts and
found true all enhancement allegations with the following exception: As to
counts 1 and 2, the jury found the great bodily injury allegation not true but
found true the special allegation that defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm.
         At the June 21, 2022, sentencing hearing, the trial court dismissed all
firearm enhancements except for the 20-year firearm enhancement attached
to count 1 pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c). The court then sentenced
defendant on counts 1 and 3 to two consecutive 15 years to life terms, totaling
30 years to life. With respect to the remaining counts and the firearm
enhancement, defendant was sentenced to a total determinate term of
35 years 8 months. Defendant timely appealed.
                                   DISCUSSION
         Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed attempted murder with
premeditation and deliberation; (2) the trial court failed to exercise its
discretion to consider striking his premeditation and deliberation
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c) (hereinafter, section
1385(c)); and (3) the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by
incorrectly attaching the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement to
defendant’s determinate term rather than his indeterminate term. We
address each contention in turn.

                                          8
I.    Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation.
      Defendant paints his first challenge as a denial of due process, arguing
that in the absence of “constitutionally sufficient evidence” of premeditation
and deliberation, his convictions on counts 1 and 3 cannot stand.
      The standard of review when a criminal defendant challenges the
sufficiency of evidence is well established. “In evaluating a claim regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record ‘in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The standard of review is the same in cases
in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.’
[Citations.] ‘We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
      In conducting this review, “[w]e focus ‘ “on the whole record of evidence
presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence.” ’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also
be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal
of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] Instead, reversal is required only if ‘ “it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” ’ [Citation.] [¶] Given this deferential
standard of review, a ‘defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there
is insufficient evidence’ to support a conviction.” (People v. Wear (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 1007, 1019–1020.)

                                          9
      Relevant to this evidentiary challenge, the requisite state of mind for
premeditation and deliberation “ ‘is uniquely subjective and personal. It
requires more than a showing of intent to kill; the killer must act
deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to
kill before he or she completes the acts that caused the death.’ (People v.
Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166 [citations].) ‘[T]he reflection necessary to
establish premeditation and deliberation is not measured by duration of time:
“Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly, but the express requirement for a
concurrence of deliberation and premeditation excludes from murder of the
first degree those homicides . . . which are the result of mere unconsidered or
rash impulse hastily executed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wear, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1020–1021; see People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
1456, 1462–1463, fn. 8, disapproved on another ground in People v. Mesa
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 198–199 [substantial evidence review of premeditation
and deliberation is the same for murder and attempted murder].)
      Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence supporting the
findings of premeditation and deliberation because all three categories of
evidence set forth in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson) were
absent. “In Anderson, we ‘identified three categories of evidence relevant to
resolving the issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning activity,
motive, and manner of killing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, these factors are not
exclusive, nor are they invariably determinative.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Anderson was
simply intended to guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the
evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of
preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]” ’

                                      10
[Citation.]” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 242.) We consider these
categories to the extent they are relevant in this case.
      Beginning with the manner of the shooting, Officer Smith was the first
officer to arrive at the scene after defendant, driving a stolen BMW, crashed
through a busy intersection during rush hour. Officer Smith testified that he
saw defendant outside the BMW with a rifle or a shotgun perched over the
top of the car, using the door as concealment. Officer Smith could see the
gun’s barrel. He then heard a loud bang and saw a muzzle flash just before
something impacted the left side of his face that felt like being hit with a
cinder block.
      When Officer Duggar arrived, shortly after Officer Smith, he saw
Officer Smith’s patrol car on the north side of the intersection and defendant,
poised at the doorframe of the BMW, pointing a long rifle-style weapon in
Officer Smith’s direction. Officer Duggar saw at least one muzzle blast aimed
at Officer Smith before he saw defendant pivot around and point his gun at
Officer Duggar. Officer Duggar slammed on his brakes and was attempting
to put his patrol car in park when he saw a second muzzle flash in his
direction. He left his car and moved behind a Suburban, where he and
Officer Smith fired multiple shots at defendant and were eventually able to
approach defendant and take him into custody.
      Several other eyewitnesses also testified. Timothy W. was in the left
turn lane when the stolen BMW pushed into a car that then pushed into his
car after first hitting the Suburban. According to Timothy, defendant got out
of the BMW after the crash, looked at Timothy and the person next to him,
reached back into the BMW, and retrieved a gun. Defendant then held the
gun over the BMW’s roof and shot the first police car to arrive at the
intersection through the driver’s side window. As Timothy watched,

                                       11
defendant then turned his body to shoot toward a second officer who arrived
shortly after the first officer. Consistent with Timothy’s testimony, Kyle M.
saw defendant get out of his car and look around before returning to his car
to grab a gun. And Greg T. saw defendant aim his gun at multiple police
cars, shooting in one direction before shooting across the street in the other
direction.
      Physical evidence presented at trial supported the witness testimony.
Both officers’ cars sustained pellet damage from the shells fired from
defendant’s shotgun, which contained bird shot. Officer Smith’s car had
pellet damage to the driver’s side door and mirror, as well as a broken
driver’s side window. Officer Duggar’s car had pellet damage to the
windshield, front hood, and left side bumper. The shotgun that defendant
fired was a “pump-action” gun, meaning that after a shot was fired, the gun
would have to be racked from the front and back to cycle another shot shell
into the chamber for firing. Four fired shotgun shells were recovered from
the scene after the shooting ended.
      Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that
defendant racked his shotgun from front to back at least four times as he took
aim and fired, first at Officer Smith and then at Officer Duggar, a methodical
process requiring “ ‘ “careful thought and weighing of considerations for and
against the proposed course of action” ’ ”—the very hallmarks of
premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.)
In fact, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a defendant repeatedly
racks a firearm to prepare a shell for firing, takes aim, and then fires toward
two people without harboring the intent to kill them. (See ibid. [“After
[defendant’s friend] fired a few shots from the gun at the first lookout,
defendant reloaded the gun, supporting an inference that he had brought

                                       12
extra ammunition as well”]; see also People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230,
1250 [where the defendant carried the fatal knife into the victim’s home, it
was “ ‘reasonable to infer that he considered the possibility of homicide from
the outset’ ”]; People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1225 [“ ‘The act
of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point blank, range “in a manner
that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target is
sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill” ’ ”].)
      While nothing more is required to affirm the jury’s findings (People v.
Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 242), we nonetheless briefly touch on another
Anderson consideration: evidence of planning. (Streeter, at p. 242.) As the
People note, when the deputies entered Kit S.’s house to investigate
defendant’s criminal activity, they found it ransacked, with windows and
doors screwed shut and knives and piles of bullets placed strategically around
the house. The furniture had also been moved in such a way to prevent
people from easily maneuvering into or around the house. Based on this
evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant had affected
a plan to conceal himself with the weapons required to attack or defend
himself effectively should the police or anyone else try to approach him. In
other words, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant had
no intent to run away or peacefully surrender to police; rather, he intended to
shoot to kill to avoid capture. (See People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 636
[upholding premeditation finding where, inter alia, defendant brought a
loaded handgun with him on the night [of the killing], indicating he had
considered the possibility of a violent encounter”].)
      Thus, for the reasons stated, we conclude there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could have found defendant guilty of premeditated
attempted murder of two peace officers beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                         13
II.   Exercise of Discretion Under Section 1385(c).
      Defendant next argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its
discretion under section 1385(c) to consider striking the jury’s premeditation
and deliberation findings. Defendant concedes the court invoked section
1385(c) to dismiss five of the six firearm enhancements, yet he insists the
court was unaware this provision also afforded it discretion to dismiss the
premeditation and deliberation findings.
      The People respond that section 1385(c) does not apply to
premeditation and deliberation findings because they are not enhancements.
We agree.
      Section 1385(c) provides in relevant part: “(1) Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance
of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others. . . .”3 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)–(2).)

      3 The California Supreme Court has granted review to consider

whether section 1385(c)’s mandate that trial courts afford great weight to
enumerated mitigating circumstances (Stats. 2021, ch. 721) creates a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless the
trial court finds dismissal would endanger public safety. (People v. Walker
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.)

                                         14
      Here, the trial court found at least three mitigating circumstances in
dismissing all but one firearm enhancement: (1) the charged enhancements
could result in a sentence exceeding 20 years; (2) the current offense was
connected to defendant’s childhood trauma; and (3) the current offense was
also connected to his mental illness. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)–(E).) Nothing in
the record reflects, however, that the court considered dismissing the jury’s
premeditation and deliberation findings based on these mitigating
circumstances. This was not error, as the statute did not require it.
      Defendant’s contrary argument hinges on his claim that the allegations
of premeditation and deliberation accompanying the attempted murder
counts constitute “enhancement[s]” within the meaning of section 1385(c).
We conclude the plain language of section 1385(c) does not support his claim.
      Whether section 1385(c) applies to a finding of premeditation and
deliberation is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo on
appeal. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.) “ ‘Under settled canons
of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the
Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We
must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary
meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s
interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ [Citations.] If the words in
the statute do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative
intent, ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the
context in which the language appears and adopting the construction which
best serves to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ . . .
If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids,
including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy.”
(People v. Arias (2008) 49 Cal.4th 169, 177.)

                                       15
      Turning to the statute at hand, “[s]ubdivision (c) of section 1385
expressly applies to the dismissal of an ‘enhancement.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
‘Ordinarily words used in a statute are presumed to be used in accordance
with their established legal or technical meaning.’ [Citation.] The term
‘enhancement’ has a well-established technical meaning in California law.
([People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)] 13 Cal.4th [497,] 526–527.) ‘A
sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the
base term.” ’ (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101 [citations], italics
omitted; [citations].)” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243
(Burke).)
      Our appellate courts have routinely rejected the argument that the
“Three Strikes” law constitutes an enhancement under section 1385(c),
concluding it is “well established” that the law is instead “an alternative
sentencing scheme for the current offense.” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 243; People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 410 (Dain).) In reaching
this conclusion, these courts have “presume[d] the Legislature was aware of,
and acquiesced in, both this established judicial definition of enhancement
and the distinction between an enhancement and an alternative sentencing
scheme such as the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] The Legislature did not
otherwise define the word ‘enhancement’ in section 1385.” (Burke, supra, at
p. 243; Dain, supra, at pp. 410–411.) Yet, “[i]f the Legislature had wanted
section 1385, subdivision (c) to apply to prior strikes as well as to
enhancements as legally defined, it would have said so.” (People v. Olay
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 67 (Olay).)

                                        16
      We conclude this same reasoning applies to premeditation and
deliberation findings.4 To begin, defendant received two indeterminate terms
of 15 years to life, one for each count of premeditated and deliberate
attempted murder of a peace officer. This sentence was imposed pursuant to
sections 187, subdivision (a), and 664. Relevant here, section 664,
subdivision (e) provides: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a),[5] if attempted

      4 Our colleagues based their conclusion that section 1385(c) does not

apply to alternative penalty schemes such as the Three Strikes law on the
plain and unambiguous language of section 1385(c), which limits the court’s
discretion to the dismissal of an “enhancement.” As such, they saw no need
to consider the legislative history. (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 244;
Dain, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 410–411.) Nonetheless, this division of
the First Appellate District in Olay examined the legislative history and
found further support for this conclusion: “The June 2021 bill analysis of
Senate Bill 81 by the Assembly Committee on Public Safety distinguished an
‘enhancement’ from ‘an alternative penalty scheme’ like the Three Strikes
law. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81, supra, as
amended Apr. 27, 2021, at pp. 5–6, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(3),
Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 898–899 [citations], and
People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101 [citations].) After making that
distinction, the bill analysis states, in no uncertain terms, that ‘[t]he
presumption created by this bill applies to enhancements . . . but does not
encompass alternative penalty schemes.’ (Assem. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81, supra, as amended Apr. 27, 2021, at p. 6, italics
added.) A more unambiguous statement of the Legislature’s intent to adopt
the legal meaning of enhancement for section 1385, subdivision (c) can hardly
be imagined.” (Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 67.) Although we agree
resort to legislative history is not required, we find this analysis persuasive.
      5 Section 664, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that “if the

crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined
in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. . . .
The additional term provided in this section for attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder shall not be imposed unless the fact that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated is charged in the
accusatory pleading and admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.”

                                       17
murder is committed upon a peace officer . . . , and the person who commits
the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace
officer . . . , the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.”
(§ 664, subd. (e).) However, “if the elements of subdivision (e) are proven in
an attempted murder and it is also charged and admitted or found to be true
by the trier of fact that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years to life.” (§ 664, subd. (f).)
          Section 664, subdivisions (e) and (f) provide alternative penalty
provisions depending on whether the underlying offense of attempted murder
of a peace officer was committed with premeditation and deliberation. As
explained in People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, in discussing a
comparable provision, “section 664, subdivision (a), prescribing a punishment
of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for an attempt to commit
murder that is ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ does not establish a
greater degree of attempted murder but, rather, sets forth a penalty provision
prescribing an increased sentence (a greater base term) to be imposed upon a
defendant’s conviction of attempted murder when the additional specified
circumstances are found true by the trier of fact.” (Bright, supra, at p. 669,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550,
fn. 6.)
          In harmony with Bright, the California Supreme Court, in People v.
Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566 (Jones), elucidated that certain statutes
(including § 186.22, subd. (b)(4)) set forth an alternative penalty provision for
the underlying felony that is distinct from providing a sentence enhancement
as punishment in addition to the base term imposed for a felony: “The

                                          18
difference between the two is subtle but significant. ‘Unlike an enhancement,
which provides for an additional term of imprisonment, [a penalty provision]
sets forth an alternate penalty for the underlying felony itself, when the jury
has determined that the defendant has satisfied the conditions specified in
the statute.’ [Citations.]” (Jones, supra, at p. 578.) “It usually does so either
by allowing a misdemeanor to be punished as a felony under the determinate
sentencing law (DSL) or[, as here,] by removing a crime from the DSL and
bringing it under an alternative sentencing scheme such as the ‘Three
Strikes’ law. Thus, we can most easily identify a penalty provision by
contrast to what it is not: an enhancement or a substantive offense.” (People
v. Escarega (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 362, 376.)
      Based on this authority, we interpret section 664, subdivisions
(a), (e) and (f) as providing alternative penalties for the offenses of attempted
murder and attempted murder of a peace officer committed with
premeditation and deliberation rather than enhancements. As such, section
1385(c) did not afford the trial court discretion to dismiss the jury’s
premeditation and deliberation findings based on the evidence of defendant’s
mitigating circumstances. Had the Legislature wanted section 1385(c) to
apply to premeditation findings as well as to enhancements as legally
defined, it would have said so. (Olay, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 67; see
People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, 593–595 [noting the court’s recent
trend in drawing a “strict distinction . . . between sentence enhancements
and penalty provisions” and calling on “the Legislature . . .to consider [this
distinction] in any future legislation on the subject”].) Defendant’s argument
thus fails.

                                       19
III.    Unauthorized Sentence: Count 1 Enhancement.
        Lastly, the parties agree the trial court erred in orally pronouncing that
the 20-year sentence imposed for the firearm enhancement accompanying
count 1 attached to defendant’s determinate term. (See § 12022.53, subd. (c)
[“a person who, in the commission of [an enumerated felony], personally and
intentionally discharges a firearm, shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 20 years”].) We also
agree.
        At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed an indeterminate term of
30 years to life for counts 1 and 3. The court also imposed a consecutive
determinate term of 35 years 8 months, a total term that included the
20-year term for the firearm enhancement that accompanied count 1. In the
abstract of judgment, however, this 20-year term is attached to defendant’s
indeterminate sentence of 30 years to life. As such, the abstract of judgment
specifies a total determinate term of 15 years 8 months and a total
indeterminate term of 30 years to life plus 20 years.
        The abstract of judgment is correct since the firearm enhancement is
attached to defendant’s indeterminate term for count 1. The oral
pronouncement, to the contrary, is incorrect to the extent it attaches the
firearm enhancement to defendant’s determinate term. Thus, because when,
as here, a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement of judgment
and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement ordinarily controls
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186), we will order a limited
remand to permit the trial court to clarify for the record that the 20-year
term for the firearm enhancement is attached to defendant’s indeterminate
term.

                                        20
                                    DISPOSITION
       This matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of
correcting the record to reflect that the 20-year sentence for the firearm
enhancement accompanying count 1 is attached to defendant’s indeterminate
term and not his determinate term. In all other regards, the judgment is
affirmed.

                                                 Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A166011/People v. Mario Guadalupe Serrano

                                            21
A166011/People v. Mario Guadalupe Serrano

Trial Court:     Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa

Trial Judge:     Nancy Davis Stark

Counsel:         Eric Multhaup, under appointment by the Court of
                      Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

                 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and
                     Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General,
                     Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy
                     Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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