Court Opinion

ID: 2964816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:32.543581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:34.477413
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2084
                                  HUGH G. PILGRIM,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                           THE TRUSTEES OF TUFTS COLLEGE,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                       Aldrich and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            William F.  Green with  whom  Robert A.  Rossi was  on brief  for
       appellant.
            David  C. Henderson  with  whom Victoria  L.  Botvin and  Nutter,
       McClennen & Fish were on brief for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                    July 10, 1997
                                ____________________

                      ALDRICH, Senior Circuit  Judge.  Plaintiff Hugh  G.
            Pilgrim ("Pilgrim") commenced this journey, pro se, with a 24
            page complaint  of  employment discrimination  containing  19
            counts, his  opponents being  the Trustees  of Tufts  College
            ("Tufts") 
                     and 
                        several 
                                named individuals.  After a number of not
            now 
               relevant 
                        steps he ended, with counsel, with 6 counts, some
            old, some new, and with Tufts as the sole adversary.  At  one
            time or another he faced the following procedures -- a motion
            to 
              dismiss; 
                       multiple motions to strike; and defendant's motion
            for summary  judgment.   On his  own part  Pilgrim moved  for
            summary judgment.  In  due course the court denied this,  and
            granted all of Tufts' motions.  We affirm.
                                   I.  Background
                      We take  the facts favorably  to plaintiff, or,  if
            against 
                   him, 
                        if 
                          not 
                              rebutted.  Pilgrim was an African-American,
            a native of Barbados.  He had many qualifications, for which,
            in November  1987,  he became  employed as  an  environmental
            research analyst in Tufts Center for Environmental Management
            ("CEM").    In  January of  1989  his  promotion  to  Program
            Development Analyst brought him under the supervision of Kurt
            Fischer ("Fischer"), a white male.  In April of 1990  Fischer
            gave Pilgrim an  "inconsistent" performance rating.   Despite
            Pilgrim's 
                     request for the full account, Fischer did not supply
            it 
              until 
                    July 30.  The writing was even more negative than the
            oral review. Fischer required Pilgrim to sign for its receipt
                                         -2-

            without 
                   any 
                      opportunity 
                                  either to read or discuss.  Under Tufts
            policy 
                  Pilgrim should have been allowed  to discuss a negative
            review 
                  with 
                       the 
                          next 
                               level of management, in this case, William
            Moomaw ("Moomaw") a director of CEM and Fischer's supervisor.
            Moomaw, however, refused to meet with Pilgrim.
                      Beginning in June of 1990, Fischer began   imposing
            disciplinary  restrictions  on  Pilgrim.  These  included   a
            requirement 
                       that, 
                             for 
                                a 
                                  three week period, he submit daily logs
            recording all of his activities (including telephone calls in
            and 
               out, 
                    and 
                        all meetings held), and that he submit in advance
            abstracts 
                     of 
                        papers intended for publication or acceptance for
            presentation at conferences.   He was also denied funding  to
            attend professional  conferences.   Fischer  imposed  further
            disciplinary  restrictions   in  September  1990,   including
            reimplementation 
                            of 
                              the 
                                  daily log requirement and an order that
            Pilgrim cease participating  in an ad hoc committee on  race,
            justice and the environment.
                      According to Pilgrim's affidavit, during the period
            Fischer supervised Pilgrim,  he called  him "space  pilgrim,"
            "lazy" and accused him of "shifting positions all the  time."
            Pilgrim took these comments as racial slurs.
                      On 
                        September 
                                  24, 1990, Pilgrim initiated an internal
            grievance  procedure  alleging  discrimination  by   Fischer.
            Pilgrim's  claims were  initially  evaluated  by  Moomaw  who
            subsequently informed  Pilgrim by  letter that  there was  no
                                         -3-

            evidence 
                    of 
                       discrimination by Fischer.  Pilgrim proceeded with
            the  grievance.     A  grievance  committee  (sometimes   the
            "Committee")  composed of  three Tufts  faculty members,  was
            convened.  We note, in  passing, that in March of 1991,  Dean
            Anthony Cortese ("Cortese") refused to provide Pilgrim with a
            reference to  accompany his  application for  admission to  a
            workshop.  According  to Pilgrim, Cortese  told him that  the
            refusal  was based on  the fact that  Pilgrim had filed  this
            grievance.
                      In  January of  1991, the  Tufts Budget  Department
            directed  CEM to  cut its  payroll expenses  by ten  percent.
            Moomaw and two other directors decided to eliminate ten staff
            positions and  to reconfigure others.   As a result of  these
            moves, Pilgrim's  job was deemed superfluous.   A few of  the
            designated 
                      employees 
                               left voluntarily while the rest, including
            Pilgrim, 
                    were scheduled for termination.  On the advice of the
            Human 
                 Resources 
                          Department, however, Pilgrim was spared because
            of his pending grievance.  The other employees (including  an
            African-American woman who  was rehired three months  later),
            were terminated on June 10, 1991.
                      On March 27, 1991, the Committee had forwarded  the
            results of its investigation  of Pilgrim's grievance to  Jean
            Mayer ("Mayer"),  then  President  of Tufts.    When  Pilgrim
            attempted to obtain a copy of the Committee's report, he  was
            told 
                that 
                     Mayer had determined that it was "classified."  As a
                                         -4-

            result 
                  of 
                    the 
                        Committee's recommendations, however, Fischer was
            relieved 
                    of 
                       all supervisory duties and Pilgrim began reporting
            to Moomaw.
                      In July of 1991, six weeks after the new  reporting
            relationship began,  Moomaw  gave Pilgrim  an  "inconsistent"
            performance 
                       rating, 
                              repeating criticisms made by Fischer a year
            earlier. 
                     
                     Also that summer, Pilgrim applied for a promotion to
            Executive 
                     Director 
                             of 
                                the Sustainability Consortium, a position
            which was eventually given to a white female.
                      On October 2, 1991, Pilgrim filed a complaint  with
            the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination  ("MCAD")
            claiming various acts of  alleged racial and national  origin
            discrimination on the part of  Tufts.  On October 31, he  was
            notified that he would  be terminated on December 31, and  he
            amended his  MCAD complaint to reflect  the fact that he  was
            being 
                 "laid-off." 
                              
                             He 
                                filed an amended complaint in this action
            on June 2,  1994, charging, inter  alia, racial and  national
            origin-based  harassment,   failure  to   promote,   wrongful
            discharge, 
                      and 
                         retaliatory discharge1 in violation of Title VII
            1.  Not to by-pass anything, we recognize in a footnote,
            Pilgrim's retaliatory discharge claim, on the very difficult
            to make assumption that it was inferentially pleaded in his
            complaint to the MCAD.  Even assuming that amending his MCAD
            complaint as to his "laid off" status was enough to encompass
            a claim of retaliatory discharge in this action, see
            Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996)
            (construing liberally pro se plaintiff's administrative
            complaint), it is precluded by the undisputed fact that Tufts
            was not notified of the MCAD complaint until more than two
            months after Pilgrim was notified of his termination, see
                                         -5-

            of 
              the 
                  Civil 
                       Rights 
                              Act 
                                  of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq., and
            pendent state discrimination claims brought under Mass.  Gen.
            Laws ch. 151B, and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.
                                   II.  Discussion
                      Prior to  any  analysis  of  Pilgrim's  substantive
            claims, 
                   we 
                      first 
                           dispose 
                                   of several procedural grounds alleged.
            Pilgrim maintains  that the court  erred in striking  certain
            exhibits and portions of his affidavits, wrongly  disregarded
            his showing of a continuing violation which would have pushed
            back 
                the 
                    barriers 
                            of 
                               the 
                                   statutes of limitation, and abused its
            discretion  in refusing  to  admit  the  Committee's  report,
            virtually  the  only  piece  of  evidence  presented  in  his
            opposition to summary judgment.  We review seriatim.
                      A.   Motions to Strike
                      Pilgrim appeals the  allowance of Tufts' motion  to
            strike 18 of 19 documents submitted in support of his  motion
            for 
               summary 
                       judgment2 and the partial striking of "incompetent
            hearsay"  in the 19th  document: his affidavit.   One of  the
            Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st
            Cir. 1996) (requiring a plaintiff to show knowledge of
            protected conduct by employer).
            2.  Although Pilgrim is not appealing the denial of his
            motion for summary judgment, he apparently subsequently
            resubmitted some or all of these previously stricken
            documents in conjunction with his opposition to Tufts' motion
            for summary judgment and now argues that they should have
            been considered as part of the court's analysis of that
            motion.
                                         -6-

            stricken documents was the report of the grievance committee,
            which we address separately, post.
                      Without further explanation for the disallowance of
            these documents, we  will assume that  the court's basis  for
            striking was the one stated in Tufts' motion, that the  court
            had  used to grant  an earlier motion  to strike:   Pilgrim's
            failure to certify  the documents in accordance with Fed.  R.
            Civ. P. 56(e), or his failure to state an inability to do so.
            See
               
               Fed. 
                    R. 
                       Civ. P. 56(f).  Pilgrim makes no excuses, arguing,
            instead, that  Tufts' motion to  strike was untimely,  coming
            after the 20 days allowed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).  As Tufts
            points out, however, Rule 12(f) applies only to pleadings and
            has no  applicability to  motions made  in pursuit  of or  in
            opposition to summary judgment.
                      In 
                        regard 
                               to 
                                 Pilgrim's 
                                           affidavit, we are unsure which
            of 
              the 
                  statements the court struck.  However, we will consider
            statements Pilgrim  alleges  were  made directly  to  him  by
            Fischer, Cortese, Rebecca  Flewellyn, Mayer's assistant,  and
            Kathe Cronin, the Human Resource Director, as admissions by a
            party opponent under  Fed. R. Evid.  801(d)(2).  The  alleged
            statement by Professor Gerard Gill, one of the members of the
            Committee, 
                      to 
                        Pilgrim 
                                that "race was a factor in Kurt Fischer's
            treatment 
                     of 
                        [him]" 
                              was 
                                  inadmissible hearsay against Tufts.  We
            concur with the court that all other alleged statements  were
            hearsay and therefore excludable.
                                         -7-

                                         -8-

                      B.   Continuing Violations
                      As part of  its motion to dismiss, Tufts sought  to
            limit Pilgrim's Title VII and Chapter 151B claims to  conduct
            occurring 
                     outside 
                            the 
                                parameters set by the respective statutes
            of limitation.   The court held  that any conduct alleged  to
            violate 
                   Title VII that occurred before February 4, 1991 -- 240
            days 
                prior 
                      to 
                        the 
                            MCAD 
                                 complaint -- and any conduct relevant to
            his claim under Chapter 151B occurring before June 2, 1991 --
            180 
               days 
                    prior to the MCAD complaint, could not be considered.
            See  42  U.S.C.  S  2000e-5(e);  29  C.F.R.  SS   1601.70(a),
            1601.74(a);  Mass. Gen.  Laws ch.  151B S  9.   To avoid  the
            strictures of the limitations periods, Pilgrim contends  that
            the periods should be extended due to a continuing violation.
                      In the Title VII arena:
                      [I]f  a  violation  is  of  a  continuing
                      nature, 
                             the 
                                 charge of discrimination filed
                      with the appropriate agency may be timely
                      as to all discriminatory acts encompassed
                      by the violation so long as the charge is
                      filed during the life of the violation or
                      within the statutory  period . . .  which
                      commences     upon    the     violation's
                      termination.
            Kassaye v. Bryant College, 999 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1993).
            The same holds true of Chapter 151B.  See Lynn Teachers Union
            v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrim., 406 Mass. 515,  520
            (1990).
                      A  continuing violation  may  be either  serial  or
            systemic. 
                      
                      La
                        wton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101 F.3d 218,
                                         -9-

            221 
               (1st 
                    Cir. 1996).  A systemic violation has its "roots in a
            discriminatory policy or  practice; so long as the policy  or
            practice  itself continues  into  the  limitation  period,  a
            challenger may be  deemed to have filed a timely  complaint."
            Id.
               
               at 
                  222 
                     (citing 
                             Jensen
                                    v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 522 (1st Cir.
            1990)).  Pilgrim argues only for a serial violation.  This is
            one "compris[ing] a  number of discriminatory acts  emanating
            from 
                the 
                    same discriminatory animus, each of which constitutes
            a separate wrong actionable under Title VII."  Id. at 221-22.
            The  series  must  contain  a  specific  beachhead  violation
            occurring within the  limitations period.   Muniz-Cabrero  v.
            Ruiz, 23  F.3d 607,  610 (1st  Cir. 1994).   Mere  subsequent
            effects of earlier discriminatory action will not extend  the
            limitations 
                       period.  Kassaye, 999 F.2d at 606.  As a threshold
            requirement, 
                        Pilgrim must identify at least one discriminatory
            act or practice occurring after February 4, 1991.
                      Pilgrim maintains  that  Cortese's refusal  of  the
            letter 
                  of 
                     reference on March 1, 1991 and Moomaw's negative May
            1991 review establish that beachhead.  We disagree.   Pilgrim
            has  not shown  either  of  these actions  to  constitute  an
            actionable violation of Title VII or Chapter 151B.  Pilgrim's
            affidavit testimony that Cortese told him he was denying  the
            letter 
                  of 
                     reference because Pilgrim had filed a discrimination
            grievance is not of  itself evidence of, nor an admission  of
            racial 
                  or 
                    national 
                             origin bias.  Nor has Pilgrim identified any
                                        -10-

            evidence 
                    that would lend an inference of illegal motivation to
            Moomaw's review.  Thus, there is no continuing violation that
            would serve to extend the limitations period.
                      C.   Denial of Extension of Discovery Deadline
                      On 
                        April 
                              24, 
                                 1995, 
                                       the 
                                           court set December 29, 1995 as
            the deadline for  discovery.  On December 11 Pilgrim  noticed
            five  Tufts employees,  including  Fischer  and  Moomaw,  for
            depositions to be taken  in mid-January 1996.  On January  4,
            1996, 
                 Tufts 
                       objected 
                               to 
                                  the proposed depositions as being after
            the discovery deadline.  On January 9, Pilgrim  moved for  an
            extension 
                     of 
                        the deadline that the court then denied.  We will
            overturn 
                    a 
                      court's denial of a motion to extend discovery only
            for abuse of discretion.  Coyante v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth.,
            105 
               F.3d 
                    17, 
                        22 (1st Cir. 1997).  There is no such abuse here.
            Pilgrim acknowledges that his failure to ask for an extension
            prior to the deadline's expiration was an error in  judgment.
            In the  next breath, however,  he accuses  Tufts of  delaying
            delivery of  documents, without which  he could not  properly
            depose its employees.
                      We cannot agree.  First, Tufts did not, as  Pilgrim
            implies, 
                    delay in the delivery of these documents.  The record
            reflects that  an  overly broad  discovery order  by  Pilgrim
            resulted  in a motion  to quash and  finally in a  protection
            order.   Second,  Pilgrim's own  brief  tells us  that  these
            documents 
                     were 
                         delivered 
                                   on December 21, 1995, 10 days after he
                                        -11-

            noticed 
                   the 
                      depositions. 
                                    We fail to understand how Pilgrim can
            claim that he scheduled  the depositions after receiving  the
            documents and then admit  that the documents came later.   If
            there was any error here, it was Pilgrim's own.
                      D.   The Grievance Report3
                      Central  to  almost  every  substantive  ground  in
            Pilgrim's appeal  is a report  (the "Report")  issued by  the
            Committee 
                     on 
                        March 27, 1991.  When Pilgrim attempted to submit
            it as part of his summary judgment motion, the court found it
            inadmissible  as   "a  collection   of  multi-level   hearsay
            statements." 
                         We understand Pilgrim's distress at this ruling,
            the Report being his only hope of withstanding Tufts'  motion
            for summary  judgment.  On appeal,  as he did below,  Pilgrim
            contends  that  the  Report  was  not  hearsay,  but  instead
            qualifies, inter alia,  as an admission  of a party  opponent
            under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B), as an adoptive admission.
                      Rule 
                          801(d)(2)(B) 
                                      provides that "[a] statement is not
            hearsay 
                   if 
                      . 
                        . 
                         . 
                           [the] 
                                 statement is offered against a party and
            is . .  . a statement  of which the  party has manifested  an
            adoption 
                    or 
                       belief 
                             in 
                                its truth . . . ."  The burden of showing
            the manifestation is on the party offering the evidence.  Cf.
            Riccardi
                    
                    v. 
                       Children's 
                                 Ho
                                   sp. Medical Ctr., 811 F.2d 18, 24 (1st
            3.  As we noted, ante, the Report was one of the documents
            earlier stricken for lack of certification.  However, since
            the court ruled on its admissibility in its memoranda denying
            Pilgrim's motion for summary judgment, we assume this
            deficiency was repaired.
                                        -12-

            Cir. 1987).   We have identified  the correct approach  where
            documents are concerned  as asking  whether "the  surrounding
            circumstances tie the possessor and the document together  in
            some 
                meaningful 
                           way." 
                                 
                                 Un
                                   ited States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 24
            (1st  Cir. 1994).   We believe that  Pilgrim has carried  his
            burden, 
                   at 
                      least 
                           to 
                              an 
                                 extent.  The question is to what extent?
            The 
               answer 
                      is:  to the extent that the adoptive party accepted
            and acted upon the evidence.
                      "Adoption or acquiescence may be manifested in  any
            appropriate manner."  Fed. Rules of Evid., Advisory Committee
            Notes.  The Committee  was convened under Tufts'  established
            grievance procedures, and its recommendations given to Mayer.
            The  major  ones  were that  Fischer  be  relieved  from  all
            supervisory 
                       responsibilities, that Pilgrim, instead, report to
            Moomaw, and that  an independent overseer  outside of CEM  be
            appointed to monitor the new reporting relationship.
                      Tufts does not  dispute that Mayer implemented  all
            three  of these  recommendations.   In  particular,  removing
            Fischer 
                   from 
                       all 
                           supervisory duties was a serious enough action
            that 
                we 
                   cannot 
                         but 
                             think 
                                   that Mayer would not have carried this
            out unless he accepted the Report's conclusions as the truth.
            As such, his acceptance of the contents of the Report and his
            implementation of  its recommendations,  without  disclaimer,
            served as an adoption of the Report for the purposes of  Rule
            801(D)(2)(B).  We  note, however, that  while the Report  was
                                        -13-

            generated during the limitations period, most of its contents
            detail conduct that occurred prior to that period, and  hence
            barred 
                  from 
                       consideration.  We will, nevertheless, discuss it.
                      In 
                        essence, 
                                 the Committee concluded that Fischer had
            failed 
                  to 
                     give Pilgrim a fair and impartial review and that he
            had 
               exaggerated 
                          complaints about Pilgrim's performance in order
            to justify an "apparent desire . . . to terminate [him]."  It
            also  stated a  finding that  "Pilgrim appears  to have  been
            singled 
                   out 
                       for 
                          certain 
                                  types of disciplinary actions."  On the
            question  of racial  and  national origin  discrimination  it
            stated:
                      [N]o 
                          substantive evidence that Mr. Fischer
                      intended  to  discriminate  against   Mr.
                      Pilgrim on the basis of race, color, [or]
                      national 
                              origin . . . although Mr. Fischer
                      could have  been motivated by  prejudices
                      against Mr. Pilgrim.  It is plausible  to
                      the Committee that Mr. Fischer's  actions
                      were motivated by other factors, such  as
                      personality  conflicts.    However,   the
                      Committee could  not fully evaluate  this
                      component 
                               of 
                                  the grievance, as performance
                      reviews of other CEM personnel supervised
                      by  Fischer   could  not   be   obtained.
                      Therefore, 
                                the Committee could not compare
                      Mr. Fischer's  decisions with respect  to
                      performance ratings and salary increases.
                      Nonetheless,  the  Committee  finds  that
                      several 
                             of 
                                Mr. Fischer's actions . . . did
                      result 
                            in 
                               the perception of discrimination
                      by Mr. Pilgrim.  Such restrictions  could
                      have had  discriminatory impacts  to  the
                      extent that  Mr. Pilgrim  was in  several
                      instances treated differently from  other
                      professional staff at CEM.
            Having 
                  determined that this finding, along with party opponent
            admissions from Pilgrim's affidavit, compose all of Pilgrim's
                                        -14-

            evidence, 
                     we 
                        turn 
                            next 
                                 to the court's grant of summary judgment
            to Tufts.
                      E.   Summary Judgment
                      We  review grants  of  summary  judgment  de  novo,
            indulging, 
                      as 
                         must 
                             the 
                                 court below, in all inferences favorable
            to 
              the 
                  non-moving 
                            party. 
                                    Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
            74  F.3d 323,  327  (1st Cir.  1996).   Summary  judgment  is
            appropriate only  when the record,  viewed in this  favorable
            light, produces  no genuine issue  of material fact,  thereby
            entitling the moving party to a judgment as a matter of  law.
            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).   This standard is applicable even  in
            employment 
                      discrimination
                                    cases "where elusive concepts such as
            motive or intent are at issue  . . . if the non-moving  party
            rests   merely  upon   conclusory   allegations,   improbable
            inferences, and unsupported speculation."  Lehman, 74 F.3d at
            327 (quoting Medina-Munoz v.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,  896
            F.2d 5, 8 (1st  Cir. 1990)).  The  bare fact is that  Pilgrim
            failed 
                  to 
                     present evidence of the quality and type adequate to
            stave off summary judgment within the context of the familiar
            McDonnell-Douglas framework for  discrimination claims.   See
            McDonnell 
                     Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973);
            Lattimore
                     
                     v. 
                        Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 465 (1st Cir. 1996).
            Pilgrim's 
                     perception is not evidence.  The Report's deficiency
            we 
              have 
                   already referred to.  As we noted, ante, the Report is
            the 
               cornerstone upon which Pilgrim attempts to build his case.
                                        -15-

            But a close  reading of the Committee's conclusions fails  to
            provide the required inference of bias behind Tufts' actions.
            Read 
                closely 
                        in 
                          the 
                              light most favorable to Pilgrim, the Report
            concludes that  the restrictions  placed on  him resulted  in
            Pilgrim being  treated "differently  from other  professional
            staff."  In the same breath, the Committee reported that they
            were unable  to find any  "substantive evidence that  Fischer
            intended 
                    to 
                       discriminate against Pilgrim on the basis of race,
            color [or] national origin .  . . and that [i]t is  plausible
            that Mr. Fischer's actions  were motivated by other  factors,
            such as personality conflicts."
                      The 
                         only 
                              inference 
                                       that 
                                            can be drawn here is that for
            whatever 
                    reason 
                          Pilgrim 
                                  received  "different" treatment, it was
            as likely due to  a clash of personalities as anything  else.
            And although the Committee found that Fischer's behavior left
            Pilgrim 
                   with 
                        the perception he had been discriminated against,
            Pilgrim's  perception is  not  enough  to  withstand  summary
            judgment.   The relevant  inquiry here is  the intent of  the
            defendant which the Committee was unable to define.
                      Nor  do any  of statements  in Pilgrim's  affidavit
            alleged to have  been made by the defendant's employees  lend
            assistance to this uphill battle.  These statements, for  the
            most 
                part, 
                      serve 
                           to 
                              show 
                                   that Pilgrim was told by certain Tufts
            employees, first, that he would receive a copy of the Report,
            and 
               later 
                     by 
                       those 
                             same 
                                  employees, that he would not be able to
                                        -16-

            obtain a  copy because it  was "classified."   The  inference
            Pilgrim  would like  us to  draw  from this  -- that  he  was
            initially denied access to the Report because Tufts feared it
            would be damaging -- is belied by the actual contents.
                      Cortese's alleged comment that he would not provide
            a reference for  a workshop Pilgrim wanted to attend  because
            Pilgrim "filed a  discrimination grievance  against CEM  with
            Tufts," as we observed, ante, does not disclose the actuating
            motive.   As is  the  case with  virtually all  of  Pilgrim's
            evidence, it  can be construed  as supporting  the fact  that
            Pilgrim 
                   was 
                      treated 
                              differently, however, it does not show that
            this treatment  resulted from any  racial or national  origin
            bias.
                      To avoid summary judgment Pilgrim must, at the very
            least, present a single piece of evidence that would allow  a
            reasonable juror  to infer this  bias.  He  has not done  so;
            accordingly, 
                        his claims must fail.  The orders of the district
            court are
                      Affirmed.
                                        -17-