Court Opinion

ID: 9953240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 17:03:02.617767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:51.829727
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

             IVONNE ODRIOZOLA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

                                         v.

              JENNIFER L. PAGE WOOD, Defendant/Appellee.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 23-0295
                                FILED 3-21-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. CV2021-009254
               The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Law Office of Larry A. Zier, PC, Scottsdale
By Larry A. Zier
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Ahwatukee Legal Office, PC, Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix
By Ryan McCarthy, David Onuschak II, Jonathan Barnes Jr.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
                        ODRIOZOLA, et al. v. WOOD
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1            Ivonne Odriozola and Brianna Odriozola (collectively “the
Odriozolas”) appeal the superior court’s grant of summary judgment on
their negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claims stemming
from a motor-vehicle accident that killed Josue Odriozola. Because the
Odriozolas did not proffer facts necessary to establish a NIED claim, we
affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Jennifer Wood was driving her vehicle when she stopped at a
stop sign and waited for several vehicles to pass. As she turned left, her
vehicle collided with Josue’s motorcycle.

¶3           Ivonne (Josue’s wife) and Brianna (Josue’s adult daughter)
were traveling in a vehicle further ahead along the same road as Josue’s
motorcycle when the accident occurred. The Odriozolas did not see the
accident. Instead, Ivonne checked her side view mirror and noticed that
Josue was no longer following her vehicle. She then made a U-turn and
traveled back the way she came. When the Odriozolas approached the
accident scene, they saw Josue lying on the ground. Josue was then
transported to a hospital, where he died from his injuries.

¶4           The Odriozolas sued Wood for wrongful death and NIED.
Wood accepted an offer of judgment on the wrongful death claim and
moved for summary judgment on the NIED claims. Following oral
argument, the superior court granted Wood’s motion, finding that “[t]here
are no genuine issues of material fact that [the Odriozolas] were not in the
‘zone of danger’ and did not witness the subject accident.”

¶5           The Odriozolas timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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                       ODRIOZOLA, et al. v. WOOD
                          Decision of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

¶6           The Odriozolas argue that the superior court erred by
granting summary judgment after concluding that they were not in the
zone of danger and had not witnessed Josue’s injury. We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Santorii v. MartinezRusso, LLC, 240 Ariz. 454, 456,
¶ 6 (App. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¶7             To establish a NIED claim, a plaintiff must have (1) witnessed
an injury to a closely related person, (2) suffered mental anguish manifested
as a physical injury, and (3) been within the zone of danger so as to be
subjected to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm created by the defendant.
Quinn v. Turner, 155 Ariz. 225, 227 (App. 1987); see also Keck v. Jackson, 122
Ariz. 114, 115–16 (1979). Here, the Odriozolas did not meet their burden of
establishing these elements.

I.     Zone of Danger.

¶8            The Odriozolas posit that a reasonable juror could have
concluded that they were within the zone of danger when the collision
occurred. But NIED liability “applies only where the negligent conduct of
the actor threatens the other with emotional distress . . . arising out of fear
for his own safety, or the invasion of his own interests.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 313 cmt. d (1965); see also Quinn, 155 Ariz. at 229 (absent
controlling authority, this court follows the Restatement). Thus, a plaintiff
cannot recover “unless she was herself in the path of the vehicle, or was in
some other manner threatened with bodily harm to herself.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 313 cmt. d (1965).

¶9             In this case, Ivonne could not have feared for her own safety
because she admitted that the first time she saw Wood’s vehicle “was after
it had already collided with [Josue].” And Brianna admitted she was “never
in any fear of being injured” and “never thought the other driver was going
to hit [her].” And because the Odriozolas neither saw nor heard the
accident when it happened, they could not have feared for Josue’s safety
when the accident occurred. Thus, the superior court did not err by
concluding that the Odriozolas were not in the zone of danger.

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                       ODRIOZOLA, et al. v. WOOD
                          Decision of the Court

II.    Witnessing an Injury.

¶10            The Odriozolas next assert that the superior court erred by
finding that they had not witnessed “the subject accident.” They argue that
witnessing “an injury” to a closely related person during or after the
accident suffices to establish this element of a NIED claim. But under the
Restatement, “the defendant is subject to liability if the third person is a
member of the plaintiff’s immediate family, and the peril or harm to such a
person occurs in the plaintiff’s presence.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §
436 cmt. f (1965); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Connolly ex rel.
Connolly, 212 Ariz. 417, 423, ¶ 23 (App. 2006) (“[A NIED] plaintiff’s injury
is due to the unique experience of having witnessed, at such close range as
to be in the ‘zone of danger,’ the event that caused the injury to the other
person.”).

¶11          Here, Josue was not harmed in the Odriozolas’ presence. As
noted above, the Odriozolas admitted they did not see the event that caused
Josue’s injury, and instead saw only the aftermath of the accident.
Accordingly, the superior court did not err by finding that the Odriozolas
had not “witness[ed] the subject accident” and thus had not witnessed the
injury.

III.   Costs.

¶12            The Odriozolas request their costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-331, -
332, -341, -342, and under ARCAP 21. Because they have not prevailed on
appeal, we deny their request.

                              CONCLUSION

¶13          Because the Odriozolas were not in the zone of danger and
did not witness an injury to Josue, the superior court did not err by granting
Wood’s motion for summary judgment on the Odriozolas’ NIED claim.
Accordingly, we affirm.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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