Court Opinion

ID: 9546122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:13.243525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:01.313654
License: Public Domain

LENT, J.
dissenting.
The issue is whether the state’s own evidence establishes the affirmative defense that the defendant “had not received notice of the defendant’s suspension * * * as required by ORS 482.570 * * *.” The majority holds that it does not. I believe that it does and therefore dissent. Before going to my *601own analysis, I desire to raise some questions concerning the majority’s use of the legislative history.
A fair reading of Representative Meeker’s testimony shows that the proponents of the 1971 legislation were concerned with the person who “might refuse a certified letter by looking at the envelope and knowing the contents.” In the case at bar, the state’s evidence shows that the envelope was never shown to the defendant.
The majority quotes from the Interim Committee on Judiciary concerning 1975 amendments. That legislative history discloses only that those favoring the amendment intended to forestall the defense where the person refused the mail, did not sign the receipt or had not kept the division advised of his current address. None of those three situations obtains here. There is nothing in that history to show that the proponents of amendment gave any consideration to the case where unidentified mail is simply unclaimed.
The majority purports to discern no difference between refusing a letter from the division and failing to claim a certified letter. The difference is obvious. The first situation, refusal, is what the statutory text was meant to reach. When the postal carrier hands an envelope from the division to the addressee and requests that the addressee sign the receipt for certified mail, the addressee can see that the letter is from the division, and he may believe that he can avoid, by refusal, service of a notice he may well expect from that agency. That is not what happened in this case.
The second situation, failure to claim mail, does not present that opportunity to the addressee. The pink slip does not identify the source of the mail which is waiting at the post office. The recipient of the pink slip does not know from whom the mail comes.
There is not one word in the legislative history quoted by the majority to indicate that the legislators gave any consideration to the situation where the addressee does not know the source of the mail.1 On the contrary, that history *602shows that they were trying to forestall any advantage to the addressee who refuses the mail or will not sign for it.
ORS 487.560 afforded an affirmative defense to the defendant who “had not received notice * * * as required by ORS 482.570.” What is it that ORS 482.570 required? The statute imposed on the division the duty to “give” notice to the person whose license is suspended. The statute commanded what the notice had to contain. For some reason not readily apparent to me, the statute, instead of telling how the division had to “give” notice, went on to describe “[s]ervice” of notice. I shall assume that the legislature meant that as the giving of notice. That being so, I agree with the majority that the state satisfies what is commanded of it by ORS 482.570 by mailing “by certified mail restricted delivery, return receipt requested.” That is not, however, the same as showing the receipt of notice.
The burden is on the defendant, if he wishes to excuse his criminal conduct, to show that he did not receive the notice. For this defendant, the state proved that fact. The majority apparently reads ORS 487.560(2) (b) where it said “as required by ORS 482.570” to mean the manner of serving notice that was described in ORS 482.570. That is not the meaning of “as required.” As I have stated above, the text of that statute was addressed to imposing a duty on the division to give notice, i.e., requiring an affirmative act of the division.
ORS 487.560(2) (b) is meaningless unless the defendant can somehow meet the test of showing that he did not receive the notice. I assume that in the ordinary course the division will mail the notice “certified mail restricted delivery, return receipt requested.” This may satisfy the state’s initial burden, but if the defendant can show that he never received the notice that the division was required by ORS 482.570 to send, defendant will successfully avoid the criminal charge. For instance, a person’s mail may have been stolen or destroyed on the day that the pink slip is left at the box. It is not impossible that the postal carrier might neglect to leave a pink slip.
In this case, the defendant received a pink slip. This did not tell him that he had mail waiting that had originated with the division. He did not refuse mail from the division. He did not refuse to sign for certified mail from the division. The *603mail was eventually returned by the postal department to the sender as being “unclaimed,” and the evidence shows that the “unclaimed” notification is used for an entirely different purpose than when the mail is “refused.”
The legislature never said that when someone received a pink slip, that he received the unidentified mail that was available at the post office to the addressee should he remember to make that trip and care to make the trip to the post office.
The state’s evidence shows that this defendant did not receive the notice required by ORS 482.570 to be given to him. I would reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

 The material quoted by the majority from testimony of the project director and from the testimony of Chief Judge Schwab does not speak at all to the issue involved in this case.