Court Opinion

ID: 9562817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:34:06.931223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:32.532577
License: Public Domain

*913ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This is but another narcotics case where the only issue is the constitutional validity of police actions leading to the defendants’ arrest. Here, neither the prosecutor nor defense lawyers adequately assisted the trial judge at the suppression hearing. The trial judge was left with the burden of reaching the proper result based upon skeletal motions and less than a full presentation of the facts necessary to determine the suppression issues. In my view, the defendants’ motions to suppress contained insufficient factual and legal allegations to provide the prosecution and the trial court with fair notice of the defendants’ contentions. I would therefore remand the case to the trial court with directions to deny the motions to suppress.
Defendant Jansen’s “Motion to Suppress Search of Home” contained only the following conelusory statements:
Defendant, being a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure, moves to suppress for use as evidence all items obtained by said search and seizure and all other evidence obtained as a result thereof on the ground that the property was illegally seized without a search warrant and otherwise in violation of C.R.S. § 18-3-101 et seq., Rule 41 of Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Defendant Richard Kosse moved to suppress “any and all physical evidence” on the ground that it was “the product of an illegal search and seizure.” We have not previously addressed in detail the sufficiency of a motion to suppress. See People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo.1982) (in context of veracity challenge to warrant affidavit, motion to suppress must specify which statements in the affidavit will be challenged). However, “shotgun” conelu-sory motions such as those filed by the defendants are disfavored. Courts outside of Colorado have required that a motion to suppress be sufficiently specific to provide adequate notice of the defendant’s contentions to the prosecution and the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Desjardins, 401 A.2d 165, 169 (Me.1979) (“suppression movant must articulate in his motion with sufficient particularity the specific reason on which he bases his claim ... so that the court will recognize the issue to be decided”); State v. Johnson, 16 Or.App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053, 1057 (1974) (“motion to suppress should be as reasonably specific as.possible under the circumstances in order to give the state as much notice as possible of the contentions it must be prepared to meet at a suppression hearing”).
Neither of the motions to suppress alleged that the police officers illegally entered the house in Evergreen. Nor did the motions allege any connection between the officers’ initial observations and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. No testimony was presented on either issue. Indeed, the defendants did not present any testimony at the suppression hearing. It is therefore understandable that the focus of concern at the suppression hearing was the validity of the search warrant. Having established that the warrant was facially valid and properly executed, the prosecution rested. Defense counsel then raised the subject of the initial entry for the first time:
Defense counsel: The Court has not heard evidence here today what the probable cause was to enter that house without a warrant....
The court: That is not the issue before me at this time. The issue before me is the search warrant....
Clearly, both the prosecution and the trial court were not informed by the motions to suppress that the defendant sought to challenge the search on the basis of the officers’ initial entry into the home.
In my view, the prosecution satisfied its burden of showing probable cause to search the home by proof of a facially valid warrant. People v. Gouker, 665 P.2d 113 (Colo.1983). It was then incumbent upon the defendants to establish that the search was in some manner unlawful. The de*914fendants failed to do so, and I would, accordingly, remand the case to the trial court with directions to deny the motions to suppress.