Court Opinion

ID: 9947634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:04:55.473809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:37.564152
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
      Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
      opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
      prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
      official text of the opinion.

      In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                 Decided: March 5, 2024

                    S24A0095. JENNINGS v. THE STATE.

      LAGRUA, Justice.

      Appellant Savanna Jennings was convicted of malice murder

and related charges in connection with the shooting death of her

grandfather, Otha Perrin, Sr.1 On appeal, Jennings contends that:

      1 The crimes occurred on January      3, 2018. On January 22, 2018, an
Elbert County grand jury indicted Jennings, William Peterson, and Dakota
Street for malice murder (Count 1), possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 2), felony murder (Count 3), two counts of
aggravated assault (Counts 4 and 5), possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 6), and concealing the death of another (Count
7). Peterson was also indicted for an additional count of felony murder (Count
8) and for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (Count 9).
      Peterson and Street pleaded guilty prior to trial and testified as
witnesses for the State. Jennings was tried in August 2019, and the jury found
her guilty of all counts. She was sentenced to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), five years in prison
consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 2), and ten years in prison consecutive for concealing the death of
another (Count 7). Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 were merged or vacated by operation
of law. In total, Jennings received a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole plus 15 years in confinement. Jennings filed a timely
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other-acts

evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

certain business records; and (3) her trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow,

these claims fail, and we affirm Jennings’s convictions.

      The evidence presented at trial showed that William Peterson

shot Perrin, and Jennings was a party to the crime because she

intentionally aided or abetted Peterson in the shooting or she

intentionally advised, encouraged, hired, counseled, or procured

Peterson to commit the crime. See OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3) and (4).

      Jennings and her brother lived in Elberton intermittently with

their grandparents since they were young children. In 2015, their

grandmother passed away, and Jennings and her newborn son

moved back in with Perrin the next year. During that same year,

she asked Justin Cain, the father of her son, “Would you tell me how

motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel. After holding
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on June
12, 2023. Jennings filed a timely notice of appeal, and her case was docketed
to this Court’s term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.

                                      2
to get away with killing someone?” and “Would you tell me how to

get away with killing my granddad?” Cain laughed it off, and they

did not speak about it again.

     Also in 2016, Jennings began dating William Peterson. In

March 2017, Peterson was arrested for and eventually convicted of

false imprisonment regarding an incident with Jennings. After this

incident, Jennings and Peterson did not have any contact with each

other for approximately six months. In September 2017, Jennings

and Peterson reconnected, and Jennings told Peterson that

Jennings’s great-uncle had molested her as a child and Perrin “made

Jennings forgive” her granduncle. Peterson testified that he and

Jennings “talked about . . . killing [Perrin].” But Jennings testified

that she only “discussed wanting [Perrin] dead.” At some point after

this conversation, Jennings moved to East Point, Georgia, but in

December 2017, she moved back in with Perrin. Dakota Street, a

friend of Jennings’s brother, also moved in with Perrin and Jennings

around this time.

     On December 25, 2017, Jennings and Peterson reconnected

                                  3
again at a Christmas gathering. Peterson testified that Jennings

told him something that “bothered [him]” and he “thought about it

for the next week or so.” Jennings testified that the “something” she

told Peterson was that Perrin “had pulled a gun out on me and my

son while we was in the bed because he thought we was somebody

else in the house there to rob him, and -- Oh, and that he was

touching on me.” Jennings also testified that she told Peterson she

wanted Perrin dead.

     Nine days later, on January 3, 2018—the night of the murder—

Jennings picked up Peterson and drove him to Perrin’s house.

Several witnesses gave differing accounts of what was discussed

that evening. Peterson testified that he told Jennings and Street

that he was going to kill Perrin, but “they thought he [said it in] a

joking way.” In contrast, Street testified that Jennings told him that

she and Peterson “were [going to try] to strangle [Perrin] in his sleep

. . . put a pillow case over him or a pillow over him to make it seem

like he died in his sleep.” During Jennings’s testimony, she said

Peterson made a comment early in the evening that “if [he were] to

                                  4
kill someone, [a relative’s pond] is where [he] would put them,” but

she denied asking Peterson to kill Perrin or that they talked about

killing Perrin.

     Still   another   account   came   from   Jennings’s   cellmate,

Samantha White, who claimed Jennings told her “pretty much

everything” about the murder. White testified that Jennings told her

that Jennings “hyped [Peterson] up about [Jennings] being molested

as a child” and Peterson was “angry about somebody[] molesting

[Jennings] when she was younger and touching her in inappropriate

ways.” Jennings also told White that “they had joked about it before,

about killing [Perrin], but up until that night . . . she didn’t think

that they meant it.”

     Street testified that on the night of Perrin’s murder he “texted

[Jennings] to see what was going on.” Specifically, Street sent

Jennings a message via Facebook that asked whether Peterson was

“still doing it,” which Street explained meant whether “they were

going to strangle or smother [Perrin] in his sleep.” Jennings

responded, “No texting.”

                                  5
     That evening, Peterson obtained Perrin’s gun from Perrin’s

bedroom. Jennings said she was asleep when this happened but she

remembered waking up at some point, seeing Peterson “playing with

[Perrin’s] gun,” “cuss[ing] him out,” and falling back asleep. Street,

however, testified that when Peterson was checking the gun to make

sure it was loaded, they were in Jennings’s bedroom, and she was

present and “on her phone.”

      Peterson went into Perrin’s bedroom and shot him “until the

gun was empty.” Jennings testified that she was awoken by the

sound of four or five gunshots, but she said that when Peterson came

into her room and told her that he shot Perrin, she thought he was

joking and she went back to sleep. Peterson, likewise, testified that

Jennings had “no clue” he was going to shoot Perrin.

     After the shooting, Peterson took the gun apart and burned the

stock of the gun in a barrel in Perrin’s backyard before wrapping

Perrin’s body in his mattress cover. Jennings testified that she woke

up and saw Peterson wrapping Perrin’s body, at which point she

realized the murder had occurred. Jennings testified that she did

                                  6
not call 911 because Peterson threatened her. Instead, she drove

Peterson to his relative’s property on Wahatchee Creek Road, where

he hid the rest of the gun underneath a house on the property.

Jennings then drove Peterson to work. A short time later, Peterson

called Jennings and asked to be picked up. Jennings picked up

Peterson from work and brought him back to Perrin’s house, where

they both spent the night.

     The next day, Peterson dragged Perrin’s body outside and

placed it in the trunk of Perrin’s car. Peterson and Street drove to

the property on Wahatchee Creek Road, and Peterson dumped

Perrin’s body into a pond on the property. Peterson then told

Jennings and Street “to come up with a plan.” Jennings decided to

fabricate a story that Perrin left the house for a car transmission

and did not come back. Peterson spent the night at Perrin’s house,

and Jennings drove him home the next day. Several days later,

Peterson told a cousin, “Me and [Jennings] killed her grandpa.”

     Approximately four days after Perrin’s murder, on January 7,

Jennings and Street went to the Elbert County Sheriff’s Office (the

                                 7
“ECSO”) and reported Perrin missing, stating that he went “to get a

transmission, and he never came back.” A deputy told them to

return the next morning if Perrin did not come home that night.

     The next morning, Jennings and Street went to the ECSO and

gave written statements, stating that Perrin left home on January

4 to look for a transmission and had not come back. But later that

same day, both Jennings and Street admitted that Peterson shot

Perrin on the evening of January 3.

     Street offered to show police where Perrin’s body was located,

and he directed police to the property on Wahatchee Creek Road,

where Perrin’s body was retrieved from a pond. After Perrin’s body

was recovered, Lieutenant Adam Moss obtained a search warrant

and searched Perrin’s house, where a .22-caliber projectile was

recovered from underneath Perrin’s bed.

     Later that day, Peterson was arrested for Perrin’s murder.

Peterson initially told police that Jennings or Street killed Perrin,

but he later admitted that he killed Perrin and said that Jennings

offered him a red truck in exchange for killing Perrin.

                                  8
     The next day, Jennings was arrested. After she was advised of

her Miranda2 rights, she directed police to the abandoned house on

Wahatchee Creek Road where Peterson hid Perrin’s gun. From

underneath the side of the house, police recovered a .22-caliber rifle,

missing its wooden stock. While on the property, Jennings stated

that Peterson hid the gun the night Perrin was killed, but Peterson

did not dispose of Perrin’s body on the property until the next day.

     Lieutenant Moss recovered a cell phone belonging to Jennings

from Perrin’s car. Jennings’s phone did not contain a contact for

Peterson, and the phone’s messages and call log contained no

mention of Peterson.

     While Jennings was in jail awaiting trial, she befriended Carlie

Minervino, another inmate. Minervino testified that Jennings said

she was in jail because “she had her granddaddy killed.” 3 Because

Minervino was going to be released soon, Jennings asked Minervino

to buy a phone once she was released, download an app, and create

     2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
     3 Jennings denied she told Minervino that she planned to kill Perrin.

                                     9
fake text messages between Jennings and Peterson. Jennings wrote

the messages to be created on a piece of paper and gave them to

Minervino, who stored the paper in a Bible. Minervino, however, left

the Bible (and the fabricated messages) behind when she was

released from jail. After Minervino was released, Jennings

repeatedly called her from jail to ask if she had created the

fabricated messages. Jennings’s jail phone calls were monitored by

Lieutenant Moss, who got a search warrant for the Bible and found

the messages. The messages generally portrayed two conversations

between Jennings and Peterson, one on the evening of the murder

and one a few days later, in which Peterson took responsibility for

killing Perrin and Jennings expressed shock and anger that he had

done so.

     At trial, White, Jennings’s cellmate, testified that Jennings

would “go back and forth” on why she wanted Perrin dead, offering

reasons that included Perrin “had touched” Jennings when she was

younger, Perrin “was strict on her,” and she needed money and was

either a beneficiary of Perrin’s life insurance policy or she would

                                10
obtain half of everything Perrin owned. Jennings testified she

“didn’t know [she] was a beneficiary [of Perrin’s life insurance

policy]” prior to Perrin’s death, claiming she learned that she was a

beneficiary in the discovery provided by the State. Jennings also

testified that she would often write checks for Perrin, with his

consent, “[l]ike if he was driving or something, he would tell [her] to

write to the check for him.” She further testified that sometimes

Perrin would gift her money and have her write the check to herself.4

     1. Jennings contends that the trial court abused its discretion

under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) in admitting other-acts

evidence in the form of Perrin’s bank records, implying that

Jennings stole from Perrin. We conclude, however, that this

evidence was intrinsic, and we see no abuse of discretion in its

admission. See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24 (3) (860 SE2d 509)

(2021) (“Because the evidence was intrinsic, it was outside the reach

of Rule 404 (b).” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     4 The State introduced Perrin’s bank records, evidencing that 14 checks

were made out to Jennings from Perrin’s checking account in an amount
totaling over $7,000.

                                    11
     “‘Intrinsic evidence’ is defined as evidence that (1) pertains to

an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of

transactions as the charged offense; (2) is necessary to complete the

story of the crime; or (3) is inextricably intertwined with the

evidence regarding the charged offense.” Abbott v. State, 311 Ga.

478, 482 (2) (858 SE2d 696) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

     [E]vidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining
     the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly
     admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the
     charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an
     account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story
     of the crime for the jury[.] . . . And this sort of intrinsic
     evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places
     the defendant’s character at issue.

Heade, 312 Ga. at 25 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted;

emphasis supplied). “In assessing whether evidence is necessary in

this context, we have noted that ‘necessary’ is not used in a strictly

literal sense, but rather, refers to what evidence is reasonably

necessary for the State to complete the story of the crime.” Abbott,

311 Ga. at 483 (2) (citation and some punctuation omitted).

                                  12
Additionally, “there is no bright-line rule regarding how close in

time evidence must be to the charged offenses . . . for that evidence

to be admitted properly as intrinsic evidence.” Harris v. State, 310

Ga. 372, 381 (2) (b) (850 SE2d 77) (2020).

     In this case, the evidence showed that Perrin’s checking-

account balance dwindled from an average monthly balance of

approximately $20,000 in March 21 through July 17, 2017, to $88.05

in late December 2017, through a combination of cash withdrawals

and drawn checks. From July through October, 14 checks were made

out to Jennings from Perrin’s checking account in an amount

totaling over $7,000. 5 Jennings testified that Perrin gifted her

money and allowed Jennings to write checks out of Perrin’s checking

account to herself. The State, however, argued that Jennings stole

the money from Perrin without his knowledge or consent.

     Jennings argues that the bank records did not advance the

“proffered motive” that Jennings had Perrin killed because she was

     5 There were also multiple checks made out to another person; the State

acknowledged in closing argument that “Jennings wasn’t the only person who
was taking advantage of Otha Perrin.”

                                    13
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. But Jennings fails to

acknowledge that the State argued Jennings’s “financial motive

[was] Otha Perrin’s empty bank account[] and the insurance policy.”

During closing argument, the State argued that the bank records

showed that Jennings relied on Perrin financially (whether Perrin

was gifting Jennings money or Jennings was stealing from him) 6 and

that Perrin “had almost no money left in his bank account” prior to

his murder. The State then referenced Jennings’s testimony that she

was the beneficiary of Perrin’s life insurance policy and argued the

dual financial motives of the “empty bank account[] and the

insurance policy.” White testified that Jennings “would go back and

forth” on why she wanted Perrin dead, but she “talked about the

money, the life insurance policies, that everything would be hers and

her brother’s.” The jury would have been authorized to infer that

once Perrin’s checking account was depleted in December 2017,

Jennings convinced Peterson to kill Perrin in early January 2018 so

     6 The State argued both that Jennings “was taking advantage of” Perrin

and that he was “generous” and “helped her out.”

                                    14
that she could obtain the proceeds of Perrin’s insurance policy and

also his personal and real property. In fact, Jennings admitted that

she started driving Perrin’s Cadillac, as opposed to her own car,

after he was killed. Thus, Perrin’s bank records were admissible as

intrinsic evidence because the records were necessary to complete

the story of the crimes and helped explain Jennings’s financial

motive. See Abbott, 311 Ga. at 483 (2) (concluding that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in classifying evidence that the

defendant stole from the victim in the weeks leading up to her

murder as intrinsic because it “formed part of the chronology of [the

defendant’s] crimes leading to the murders, offering insight into his

motive”). See also McKelvey v. State, 311 Ga. 34, 40 (3) (855 SE2d

598) (2021) (evidence of prior crime was properly admitted as

intrinsic evidence where it pertained to chain of events leading to

charged crimes and helped explain the defendant’s motive).

     Jennings also contends that any probative value of the bank

records was substantially outweighed by their prejudice and thus

the records should have been excluded under OCGA § 24-4-403

                                  15
(“Rule 403”). See State v. Harris, 316 Ga. 272, 278 (3) (888 SE2d 50)

(2023) (“Intrinsic evidence must also satisfy Rule 403.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Under Rule 403,

     [r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
     is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
     prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
     or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
     needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

     Id. at 278 (3). “[A]ll inculpatory evidence is inherently

prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs

probative value that the rule permits exclusion.” Middlebrooks v.

State, 310 Ga. 748, 751 (854 SE2d 503) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

     Here, the bank records were not unfairly prejudicial. The

records themselves did not show that Jennings was stealing from

Perrin. But see Carter v. State, 317 Ga. 689, 694 (2) (895 SE2d 295)

(2023) (“The prejudicial effect of evidence is unfair if it has the

capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground

different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an undue

tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,

                                 16
though not necessarily, an emotional one.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). In light of the high probative value of the bank records,

evidencing Jennings’s financial motive, we conclude that the

probative value of Perrin’s bank records was not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Abbott, 311 Ga. at

483 (2) (where the defendant’s stealing from the victim “formed part

of the chronology of [the defendant’s] crimes leading to the murders,

offering insight into his motive,” probative value of that evidence

was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

     2. Jennings contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting certain Facebook messages between Jennings and

Street. Jennings argues the messages should have been excluded

because they did not fall within the statutory hearsay exception for

business records under OCGA § 24-8-803 (6) and because Facebook’s

declaration did not meet the standard for self-authenticating

business records under OCGA § 24-9-902 (11). The messages at issue

showed Street sending Jennings a message on the night of the

                                 17
murder that said, “He still doing it,” and Jennings immediately

responding, “No texting.” Street explained in his testimony that his

message “He still doing it” was intended to ask Jennings whether

Peterson was still planning to kill Perrin that night, as they had

previously discussed.

     Jennings failed to object on these grounds at trial, so we review

the admission of these records for plain error only. 7 See Stafford v.

State, 312 Ga. 811, 820 (3) (b) (865 SE2d 116) (2021) (“Because [the

defendant] did not make a specific objection at trial to the admission

of the statements on the grounds now asserted in his appeal, we

review these claims only for plain error.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).

     “To show plain error, an appellant must show that (1) the

alleged error was not affirmatively waived, (2) it was obvious beyond

reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected the appellant’s substantial

     7 Prior to trial, Jennings objected to the presentation of the Facebook

records only on the basis that presenting the business records without a
witness violated her substantive due process rights under the United States
and Georgia Constitutions. She made no objection concerning OCGA §§ 24-8-
803 (6) or 24-9-902.

                                    18
rights, which ordinarily means showing that it affected the outcome

of the trial.” Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 106 (891 SE2d 866) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “This Court does not have to

analyze all elements of the plain-error test where an appellant fails

to establish one of them.” Rutland v. State, 315 Ga. 521, 524 (883

SE2d 730) (2023). Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in

admitting the Facebook records, we conclude that Jennings has

failed to satisfy the third prong of the plain-error analysis, requiring

her “to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did

affect the outcome below.” Ruthenberg v. State, 317 Ga. 227, 231 (2)

(892 SE2d 728) (2023).

     The other evidence introduced at trial included Jennings

testifying that she had twice “discussed wanting [Perrin] dead” to

Peterson. She further testified that Peterson told her that “if

somebody ever F’d with [her], then he would kill them” and that

Jennings told Peterson that Perrin “was touching on [her].” She also

admitted that when she told Peterson that she wanted Perrin to die,

Peterson responded, “I got you.” A week later, she picked Peterson

                                  19
up from his home and brought him to Perrin’s house, and Peterson

killed Perrin that evening. Peterson testified that he did not know

why he killed Perrin, but he admitted that he told police that

Jennings “offered” him a “red truck” to kill Perrin.

     Jennings testified that, after Peterson killed Perrin, she drove

Peterson to the abandoned house where he disposed of the gun and

then drove him to work. Approximately three days after Perrin was

killed, Peterson told his cousin, “Me and [Jennings] killed her

grandpa. We shot him, like, seven times.”

     After Jennings was arrested, she shared a cell with White, who

testified that Jennings told her that Jennings “hyped [Peterson] up

about being molested as a child” before Peterson shot Perrin. White

also stated that Jennings explained that she, Peterson, and Street

wrapped up Perrin’s body and dumped it in a pond. Additionally,

Jennings attempted to convince another inmate at the jail to

manufacture messages between Jennings and Peterson to make it

appear as though she did not want Perrin dead.

     Given the other strong evidence at trial, Jennings cannot show

                                 20
that the introduction of the Facebook messages (Exhibits 70 and 71)

between her and Street likely affected the outcome of the trial court

proceedings, particularly since Street testified about the content of

the messages. Thus, Jennings cannot satisfy the third prong of the

plain-error test, and this claim fails. See Williams v. State, 316 Ga.

304, 314 (4) (888 SE2d 60) (2023) (any error in admitting hearsay

was harmless given the strength of the evidence identifying and

inculpating the defendant and the cumulative nature of the hearsay

testimony).

     3.    Jennings     contends    that    her    counsel      provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by (a) failing to preserve her

objection to Perrin’s bank records, (b) failing to preserve her

objection to the Facebook records, and (c) failing to (i) preserve an

objection to the exclusion of her domestic-violence expert and (ii)

failing to timely disclose her expert.

     To prevail on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Jennings      must   demonstrate   both    that   her   trial   counsel’s

performance was professionally deficient and that she was

                                   21
prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313 Ga.

57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To

establish deficient performance, Jennings must show that trial

counsel performed her duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

     is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong
     presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the
     appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this
     presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no
     reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did,
     or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In
     particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy
     may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if
     they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
     attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Jennings must

prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for her trial

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.

See Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a

                                  22
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy

one.” Id. at 62-63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an

appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of

the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine

the other prong.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d

346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a)   Jennings      contends        that   her   counsel   provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to preserve her

objection to the admission of Perrin’s bank records. But Jennings

also argues that “[t]rial counsel appears to have preserved objections

to . . . [Perrin’s bank records] . . . so as to receive merits review.” We

agree that counsel preserved her objection to the introduction of

Perrin’s bank records by objecting at trial, and we have reviewed

Jennings’s enumeration of error pertaining to the admission of those

records in Division 1 (a). Thus, we conclude that counsel was not

deficient, and this claim fails. See Salvesen v. State, 317 Ga. 314,

321 (4) (893 SE2d 66) (2023) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim

                                    23
based on purported failure to preserve errors where trial counsel

properly preserved his argument by making a timely objection

below).

     (b) Jennings contends that her trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to preserve her

objection to the Facebook records between Jennings and Street.

Pretermitting whether counsel performed deficiently, 8 we conclude

that Jennings cannot show prejudice. “Again, to prove prejudice, [a

defendant] is required to show that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Ingram v. State, 316 Ga. 196, 205 (1) (a) (887 SE2d 269) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     “The prejudice step of the plain-error standard is equivalent to

the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”

Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 711 (4) (b) (808 SE2d 671) (2017). As

explained in Division 2, there was strong inculpatory evidence

     8 As explained in Division 2, trial counsel preserved an objection to the

Facebook records, but not on the grounds asserted on appeal.

                                     24
admitted at trial and Street testified about the contents of the

Facebook messages. Thus, Jennings cannot show a reasonable

likelihood that the result of her trial would have been different had

counsel preserved an objection to the Facebook records under OCGA

§§ 24-8-803 (6) and 24-9-902 (11). Accordingly, this claim fails. See

Ingram, 316 Ga. at 205-206 (1) (a) (concluding that trial counsel’s

failure to object was harmless in light of the strong evidence of guilt).

     (c)   Jennings     contends     that    her    counsel    provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by (i) failing to preserve her

objection to the exclusion of her domestic-violence expert and (ii)

failing to timely disclose her expert under OCGA § 17-16-4. We

conclude that Jennings preserved her objection to the exclusion of

her expert and that the claim for failing to timely disclose the expert

fails because Jennings cannot establish prejudice.

     At trial, Jennings called Lieutenant Derek Scott with the

Athens-Clarke County Police Department to testify and asked

whether “as part of [his] training and experience,” he “learned about

what’s known as the cycle of violence.” The State objected, and

                                   25
Lieutenant Scott was questioned outside the presence of the jury,

testifying that he had no firsthand knowledge of the details of the

case. The State then argued that Jennings was attempting to

present an expert without providing notice under OCGA § 17-16-4

and that, if Lieutenant Scott was not an expert witness, his

testimony was inadmissible “because a lay witness cannot testify to

an opinion unless it relates to facts of the case that they have

firsthand knowledge of.” The trial court ultimately excluded

Lieutenant Scott’s testimony, citing Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281 (824

SE2d 346) (2019), for the proposition that “this [C]ourt has

consistently upheld the exclusion of evidence of a defendant’s

diminished mental condition when offered to support other defenses

or to negate the intent element of a crime.” Jennings’s trial counsel

objected to the trial court’s ruling, and the court permitted counsel

to proffer Lieutenant Scott’s testimony on the record for the limited

purpose of preserving the objection on appeal.

     Regarding the delayed reporting of sexual abuse, Lieutenant

Scott’s proffered testimony was that:

                                 26
     With sex crimes, generally when it’s like kids involved,
     they don’t want to talk about it because, first of all, they
     don’t think that anybody’s going to believe them. It’s
     pretty hard to say that, you know, a father-type figure, a
     mother-type figure that everybody respects in the family
     is doing something that’s evil to somebody. So there’s a lot
     of fear with that, or they have made comments about it,
     and they’re just rejected. So then they just – They
     withhold it. There’s many reasons, but a lot of it is just
     about manipulation and control.

He also said that people sometimes delay reporting sexual abuse

“because they fear that the loss of . . . financial resource[s] would

occur.” Specifically for “a child that’s been raised by [a] grandparent

. . . everything is supplied to them by their parent or grandparent,

so depending on their ages, they don’t see that there’s an outlet.

They don’t see that there’s an opportunity to go anywhere else

because that’s all they know.” After Lieutenant Scott testified, the

trial court reiterated that its ruling was based on Virger, and counsel

maintained her objection.

     In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court

found that Jennings called Lieutenant Scott as an expert and that

she failed to provide the State with a summary of his opinion at least

                                  27
five days prior to trial in accordance with OCGA § 17-16-4. The trial

court concluded that Jennings failed to comply with OCGA § 17-16-

4, a different basis entirely from its ruling at trial, and that

Lieutenant Scott’s testimony was properly excluded. The trial court

also concluded that trial counsel preserved any objection relating to

the exclusion of Lieutenant Scott’s testimony.9

     (i) Jennings contends that her trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to preserve her objection to the exclusion of

Lieutenant Scott’s testimony, but as shown above, Jennings

preserved her objection. Thus, we conclude that counsel did not

perform deficiently. See Salvesen, 317 Ga. at 321 (4).

     (ii) Pretermitting whether Jennings’s trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to comply with OCGA § 17-16-4 by providing

notice of her expert, we conclude that Jennings has failed to

establish prejudice. To establish prejudice, Jennings must show that

there is “a reasonable probability that the expert’s testimony would

     9 In its order, the trial court “[f]ound that . . . trial counsel did preserve

all of the foregoing errors,” but did not make any specific findings regarding
the exclusion of Lieutenant Scott’s testimony.

                                       28
have made a difference [at] trial.” See Parker v. State, 305 Ga. 136,

141 (4) (a) (823 SE2d 313) (2019).

     Jennings argues Lieutenant Scott’s testimony was admissible

because it “would have been offered to explain why . . . Jennings

might have delayed [the] reporting [of] sexual abuse [by Perrin],

which went to her credibility on the stand.” But even assuming that

Lieutenant Scott’s testimony was admissible on this point (and that

the jury believed that Jennings delayed reporting Perrin’s sexual

abuse), Lieutenant Scott’s testimony would not have been helpful to

Jennings since it provided her with a strong motive to want Perrin

dead, i.e., Perrin had molested her. This sexual-abuse motive,

although not the motive advanced by the State, was weaved

throughout the evidence introduced at trial through Jennings’s

testimony that Perrin “was touching on her,” Peterson’s testimony

that Jennings told him that she had been molested, and White’s

testimony that Jennings said she “hyped [Peterson] up about

[Jennings] being molested as a child,” impliedly to get Peterson to

shoot Perrin. Because Lieutenant Scott’s testimony would have

                                 29
supported the theory that Jennings convinced Peterson to kill Perrin

because he had molested her, Jennings cannot show that there is a

reasonable probability that Lieutenant Scott’s testimony would

have made a difference in the outcome of her trial. See Richardson-

Bethea v. State, 301 Ga. 859, 865 (2) (804 SE2d 372) (2017)

(explaining that the standard is “whether there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the trial would have been different had

trial counsel presented the proffered evidence,” not whether an

expert’s proffered testimony “might conceivably have created some

doubt in the mind of a juror”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly,

this claim fails.

     4. Finally, Jennings contends that the combined prejudicial

effect of trial court errors and trial counsel’s deficiencies affected the

outcome of the trial. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d

808) (2020). To establish cumulative prejudice that warrants a new

trial, Jennings must show that “at least two errors were committed

in the course of the trial; and considered together along with the

entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation

                                   30
that they denied [the defendant] a fundamentally fair trial.” Talley

v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 166 (4) (875 SE2d 789) (2022).

     For the purposes of this analysis, we are assuming trial court

error in Division 2 (admission of the Facebook records), and we have

assumed the deficient performance of counsel in Divisions 3 (b)

(failure to preserve a certain objection to the admission of the

Facebook records) and 3 (c) (ii) (failure to provide notice of the

domestic-violence expert). As discussed above, the evidence against

Jennings was strong, and the admission of the Facebook records and

the exclusion of the domestic-violence expert were unlikely to have

affected the outcome of the trial because Street testified that he sent

the Facebook messages to Jennings (and explained the messages’

meaning) and the expert’s proffered testimony supported a motive

for Jennings wanting to kill Perrin. We note that Perrin’s bank

records also supported a motive for Jennings wanting Perrin dead,

and this motive was unrelated to any sexual misconduct by Perrin.

Accordingly, assuming we can combine the assumed evidentiary

error with trial counsel’s assumed deficiencies, we conclude that the

                                  31
combined prejudicial effect did not deprive Jennings of her right to

a fundamentally fair trial. See Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 367 (7)

(846 SE2d 57) (2020) (concluding that the “cumulative prejudicial

effect of the actual and assumed evidentiary errors and counsel’s

deficiencies is not sufficient to outweigh the strength of the properly

admitted evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt”).

     Judgment affirmed. All Justices concur.

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