Court Opinion

ID: 9744368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:32.520166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.813436
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I disagree with the decision of my colleagues. The majority fails to give proper credit to the relationship this case has to the original venue and fails to apply the proper standard of review. This case has a stronger relationship to the plaintiffs’ chosen venue than is asserted in the majority decision, and it is more closely tied to the original venue than the two cases most heavily relied upon by the defendant and my colleagues. Gardner v. International Harvester Co., 113 Ill. 2d 535, 499 N.E.2d 430 (1986); Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 730 N.E.2d 524 (2000). The majority discounted the most notable of these distinctions by stating: “We do not believe that the plaintiffs’ purchasing the cars in Madison County or the paint allegedly delaminating in Madison County sufficiently constitutes some part of the transaction.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 345; cf. Gardner, 113 Ill. 2d at 537, 499 N.E.2d at 431 (the original venue was St. Clair County, but the farming accident occurred in Macon County); Lake County Riverboat L.P., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 955, 730 N.E.2d at 533 (the plaintiff was not a licensed riverboat casino operator in the original venue and did not receive any constitutional injury there). In contrast to the majority’s unsupported statement, it is generally recognized that venue is proper where matters occurred that the plaintiff has the burden of proving as a part of the cause of action. See Lake County Riverboat L.P., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 952-53, 730 N.E.2d at 531 (establishing the standard but finding that no injury occurred in the chosen venue); see, e.g., Tipton v. Estate of Cusick, 273 Ill. App. 3d 226, 228, 651 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1995) (the county where the plaintiff ingested prescription drugs was a proper venue even though the prescription and dispensation of drugs took place in another county); see also Southern & Central Illinois Laborers’ District Council v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 1117, 772 N.E.2d 980, 984 (2002) (“third-party dealings that have a definite and direct bearing on the cause of action may be considered a part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose”). The majority also applies an incorrect standard of review. Relying on Reichert v. Court of Claims, 327 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393, 763 N.E.2d 402, 405 (2002), vacated on other grounds, 203 Ill. 2d 257 (2003), the majority contends that if the facts are not disputed, the review of the circuit court’s decision should be de novo. The application of this standard is incorrect. The established standard is to give the trial court broad discretion when analyzing and weighing questions regarding venue and to allow the decision to stand absent an abuse of discretion. See Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 102 Ill. 2d 250, 261, 464 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (1984); see also Southern & Central Illinois Laborers District Council, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 772 N.E.2d at 983 (declining to accept the Reichert standard). The application of an abuse-of-discretion standard is consistent with the role of the appellate court to ensure an objective, rational decision by the circuit court while not substituting its judgment for that of the original court. Southern & Central Illinois Laborers’ District Council, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 772 N.E.2d at 983; Niepotter v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 632, 636, 707 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (1999). The majority supplants the circuit court’s decision without allowing the underlying court the discretion it is due. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.