Court Opinion

ID: 9482710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:58:25.610574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:09.528815
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result and dissenting in part as to the rationale:
I concur in the panel opinion and in the result except for the rule it lays down for determining whether a pre-existing motive to fabricate renders inadmissible a prior consistent statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). Majority opinion (“Maj. op.”) at 1096-99. I would follow the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 139 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 1006, 79 L.Ed.2d 238 (1984), and distinguish between witness statements made before and after any plea or leniency bargaining has begun. See also United States v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931, 934 (9th Cir.1983) (“introduction of prior consistent statements made prior to plea agreement was proper”). In other words, like the Fourth Circuit, I would find a prior statement inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) if made during immunity, plea or leniency negotiations with the government because it is lacking in any probative weight to rebut a charge that the witness is motivated to falsify testimony at trial because of that same deal with the government. See 4 Jack Weinstein & Margaret Berger, Wein-stein’s EVIDENCE, 11801(d)(l)(B)[01] (1991) (“Evidence that merely shows that the witness said the same thing on other occasions when his motive was the same does not have much probative force for the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity.”). The admissibility of a post-investigation or even post-arrest statement, on the other hand — like the one Rustin made in this case — which precedes any discussions with the government about leniency, pleas, immunity or the like, may appropriately be left up to the trial judge’s general discretion in balancing its probativeness versus its prejudice under Rules 402 and 403.
Although Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not explicitly deal with the timing vis-a-vis leniency or plea negotiations of a witness’s prior consistent statement as a factor in evaluating its admissibility, common sense does not allow a judge to ignore it as a paramount consideration. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior consistent statements of witnesses are generally inadmissible hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides a limited exception to that prohibition. According to the Rule, the prior consistent statement of a witness is admissible “to rebut” a charge that her in-court testimony is not trustworthy because of an “improper motive.” 1 When the alleged motive to falsify in-court testimony is a promise from the government of leniency in exchange for the testimony, it is hardly plausible that any prior statement made during negotiations or after the leniency deal was struck could be material in rebutting that allegation. The fact that the witness said the same thing, at a time when the same alleged motive was operative, provides no counterweight to the charge that she is saying it now because of that motive. Thus, several other circuits have imposed a per se inadmissibility rule for statements made after the alleged motive for fabrication has arisen on the ground that their *1101exclusion tracks the logic of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) itself. See United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 943 n. 3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2018, 114 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991) (“evidence may be admitted under [Rule 801(d)(1)(B) ] to rebut charges of recent fabrication only when the statement in question was made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate”); United States v. Davis, 890 F.2d 1373, 1379 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1165, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990) (one of the “conditions which must be met before a prior consistent statement may be admitted as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) ... [is that the] ‘statement must have been made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate’ ”) (quoting United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir.1989)); United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.Ct. 906, 93 L.Ed.2d 856 (1987) (“better rule imposes a requirement that the consistent statement must come before the motive to fabricate existed”).
The majority, however, aligns this circuit with the minority view taken by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits “that the consistent statement need not have been made prior to the time that the alleged motive to fabricate arose” to be admissible. See United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942 n. 6 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1981). I find preferable the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d at 135, a case factually similar to this case. During cross-examination at trial Henderson’s counsel implied that a witness’s in-court testimony was “fabricated ... against Henderson in return for leniency” from the government. Id. at 138. In order to rebut that charge, the government introduced as evidence a prior statement of the witness, made to government agents after his arrest, that was consistent with his in-court testimony. Henderson argued that this prior consistent statement should have been inadmissible because the witness, having ■ already been arrested, had the same motive to fabricate when he made the prior statement. The court, following Fourth Circuit precedent “accepted the gloss on Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) that a prior consistent statement is admissible under the rule only if the statement was made prior to the time the supposed motive to falsify arose,” id., but accepted the government’s argument that because the prior statement was made before discussions for leniency began, it was not tainted with the same motive as it would have been if it were made during or after such negotiations. A witness’s statement made to government authorities after an arrest but before any indication from the government that the witness will be given favorable treatment or leniency in exchange for the testimony does in fact rebut the charge that the witness is motivated to fabricate her testimony in exchange for the lenient treatment, and thus meets the conditions for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). I would apply the same reasoning here.
Thus, I agree that the district court did not err in admitting Rustin’s prior statement, but I disagree with the majority’s adoption of a rule that would permit, albeit after a balancing exercise of probativeness versus prejudice, the admission of prior consistent statements for rebuttal purposes even when the prior statement was made at a time when the same alleged improper motive had arisen. Up to now this court has had no such rule, see, e.g., United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 670-74 (D.C.Cir.1980), and I do not believe we should adopt one now.

. Other rebuttal exceptions allowed under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are to counter a charge of "recent fabrication” or "improper influence."