Court Opinion

ID: 9640718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:13:15.059204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:31.787949
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
The undisputed evidence shows that appellant was apprehended at the scene of the burglary, in possession of stolen goods, shortly after the offense was discovered. The complaining witness, Dr. Livesay, testified that he saw appellant actively removing the stolen equipment from the yard of his home, and when he shouted at appellant and the other man with him, both men tried to leave in their automobile.
In my opinion, this evidence was sufficient proof of appellant’s participation in the offense of burglary. See Alexander v. State, 607 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Hill v. State, 135 Tex.Crim. 567, 121 S.W.2d 996 (1938) (evidence showing juxtaposition of accused crime held sufficient to support conviction); see also Smith v. State, 96 Tex.Crim. 188, 256 S.W. 262 (1923); Osby v. State, 88 Tex.Crim. 418, 227 S.W. 322, 323 (1921); Jackson v. State, 28 Tex.Crim. 370, 13 S.W. 451 (1890).
I acknowledge that appellant, when first confronted by the police, gave an exculpa*147tory explanation of his involvement, which was generally corroborated by the testimony of the co-principal Mayo and several other defense witnesses. But the jury was not bound to believe appellant’s explanation, nor to accept the corroborating testimony of the other defense witnesses. It was for the jury to decide whether appellant’s explanation was reasonable and true. Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Smith v. State, 518 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); see also Jackson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
The testimony of the complainant, Dr. Livesay, was clear, direct, and positive. He discovered the burglary as soon as he returned home, and on the assumption that the burglars might still be on the premises, he looked outside. There, he saw appellant receiving the stolen equipment from Mayo and packing it in his automobile. In my opinion, the jury could reasonably have decided, based on this evidence alone, that appellant and Mayo had planned and executed the burglary together. See Alexander, 607 S.W.2d at 553; see also Callahan v. State, 502 S.W.2d 3, 4-7 (Tex.Crim.App.1973).
Appellant argues that Mayo’s criminal act of burglary was completed “the very second” that he entered the house, and that appellant’s later participation in the criminal activity was insufficient to establish his participation in the offense.
I disagree with appellant’s rationale. The jury was entitled to accept Dr. Live-say’s version of the incident, and to reject appellant’s story. Thus, the jury could reasonably have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was engaged in the criminal activity while the burglary was in progress and before the offense was completed.
As the court instructed the jury, a person is criminally responsible for the offense of another if, acting with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense, he aids or encourages the other person in committing that offense. Tex.Penal Code Ann. sec. 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974). In deciding whether a person is criminally responsible under the law of parties, the jury is entitled to look to events before, during, and after the commission of the offense. Morrison v. State, 608 S.W.2d 233, 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
A person may be guilty of the offense of burglary, even though he did not personally enter the burglarized premises, if he acted with another in the commission of the offense. See Clark v. State, 543 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Proof of the elements of entry and intent to commit theft, as well as of the parties’ agreement to act together in committing the offense, may be supplied by circumstantial evidence. Clark, 543 S.W.2d at 127; see also Fagan v. State, 708 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d); Draper v. State, 681 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d); Taylor v. State, 630 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, 1982, no pet.); Fantroy v. State, 474 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (agreement to act together).
Here, there was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mayo and appellant acted with a common purpose and intent in burglarizing complainant’s house, and that this understanding existed contemporaneously with the criminal offense. Compare Utardo v. State, 605 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Medrano v. State, 658 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d).
I would hold that the proof is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and would therefore overrule appellant’s first and fourth points of error.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s second and third points of error should be sustained. In those points, appellant contends that the State was bound to disprove exculpatory explanations contained in the written statements made by appellant and Mayo. The majority opinion recognizes that Tex.R. Crim.Evid. 607 abolished the so-called voucher rule, as set forth in Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). But even so, the majority concludes that the State offered no evidence to contradict *148the portions of the written statements that tended to show appellant had not been involved in the burglary. I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the evidence, because in my opinion, the State’s proof did tend to contradict appellant’s version of the incident. Rebutting the statements of appellant and Mayo, Dr. Livesay testified that he saw appellant standing outside his automobile receiving the stolen equipment from Mayo through the fence, and that when he shouted, both men jumped in the car and tried to drive away. Thus, the jury could have inferred from Dr. Livesay’s testimony that Mayo and appellant acted together in burglarizing Dr. Livesay’s home, and that they were still in the process of removing the stolen equipment when discovered by Dr. Livesay. Appellant’s only response to Dr. Livesay’s testimony was that he was “lying.” In my opinion, Dr. Livesay’s testimony tended to rebut appellant’s version of the entire incident, and the State was not bound by the exculpatory statements of appellant and his co-principal, Mayo.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.