Court Opinion

ID: 9906556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 16:00:43.851207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:12.261292
License: Public Domain

22-6074
     Dong v. Garland
                                                                                           BIA
                                                                                   Schoppert, IJ
                                                                                   A206 303 859

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of December, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                     GERARD E. LYNCH,
 8                     JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 9                     BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   ZHU XIAN DONG,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                     v.                                             22-6074
17                                                                    NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                       Richard Tarzia, Esq., Belle Mead, NJ.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro,
3                                        Assistant Director; Sherease Pratt, Senior
4                                        Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
5                                        Litigation, United States Department of
6                                        Justice, Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Zhu Xian Dong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

11   China, seeks review of a February 8, 2022 decision of the BIA, affirming a

12   November 28, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied her

13   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

14   Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhu Xian Dong, No. A206 303 859 (B.I.A. Feb. 8,

15   2022), aff’g No. A206 303 859 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 28, 2018). We assume the

16   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Wangchuck v.

18   Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review an adverse

19   credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei

20   Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of

21   fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
                                              2
 1   conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 2         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 3   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

 4   responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the

 5   applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or

 6   witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such

 7   statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

 8   . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

 9   the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”       8 U.S.C. §

10   1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

11   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

12   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

13   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

14         Substantial    evidence    supports     the   agency’s   adverse    credibility

15   determination.      The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies and false

16   statements that either undercut the basis of Dong’s asylum claim—that she only

17   had one child because she was forced to have an abortion—or demonstrated that

18   she had engaged in immigration fraud. Dong’s testimony that she only had one

                                               3
 1   child because she was forced to have an abortion in 1994 was undercut by

 2   documentation of her divorce from her first husband, a visa petition that her

 3   second husband filed on her behalf, and a birth certificate that listed Dong as the

 4   birth mother for a female named Jianyi, all of which represented that she and her

 5   first husband had a second child in 1993. Although Dong testified that Jianyi was

 6   not her daughter, that explanation itself undercut her credibility by demonstrating

 7   that she had falsified documents in order to engage in immigration fraud by

 8   proffering that child as her own. The agency was not required to credit Dong’s

 9   explanations for this inconsistency.     Her testimony that she did not know

10   whether the birth certificate for that second child was real or fabricated was

11   undercut by her testimony that she and her second husband had paid someone to

12   obtain it because Jianyi desired to enter the United States. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

13   430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

14   explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

15   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”

16   (quotation marks omitted)). Her argument that the false statements were made

17   only in documents prepared by her husbands and in whose creation she was not

18   involved was not compelling because she testified that she was involved in

                                              4
 1   obtaining the false birth certificate. Further, a factfinder may rely on inconsistent

 2   statements from witnesses in determining an applicant’s credibility. See 8 U.S.C.

 3   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007)

 4   (“Decisions as to . . . which of competing inferences to draw are entirely within the

 5   province of the trier of fact.” (quotation marks omitted)).

 6         Her claim was further undermined by the testimony and asylum application

 7   of her first husband, whom she remarried after coming to the United States. Both

 8   Dong and her husband testified that he knew about the abortion before he applied

 9   for asylum in the United States, and her husband testified that he applied for

10   asylum on family planning grounds. However, he inexplicably had not included

11   the abortion in his application.    Instead, the application reflected an entirely

12   different basis for his asylum claim, with no mention of the family planning policy

13   whatsoever.

14         Finally, having questioned Dong’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied

15   further on her lack of reliable corroboration.         “An applicant’s failure to

16   corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

17   corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that

18   has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273

                                              5
 1   (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ reasonably afforded limited weight to unsworn letters from

 2   Dong’s brother and mother because they were prepared by interested parties who

 3   were not available for cross-examination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149

 4   (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that an “IJ acted within her discretion in according . . . little

 5   weight [to letters from applicant’s wife and friend] because the declarants

 6   (particularly [the] wife) were interested parties and neither was available for cross-

 7   examination”); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the

 8   agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s documentary

 9   evidence.”). And, as noted above, Dong’s husband (first and current), whom she

10   called as a witness, was reasonably determined by the IJ not to be credible. See

11   Certified Administrative Record, at 36.

12         The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration provide substantial

13   evidence    for   the   adverse    credibility   determination.         See   8   U.S.C.

14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency

15   might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him

16   credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Biao

17   Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.       The adverse credibility determination is dispositive

18   because Dong’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief were

                                                6
1   all based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57

2   (2d Cir. 2006). 1

3           For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

4   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

5                                                   FOR THE COURT:
6                                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
7                                                   Clerk of Court

    1
     In any event, Dong has waived review of her claim for CAT relief because she has not raised it on
    appeal. Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) (issues not raised on appeal are waived)
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