Court Opinion

ID: 9853209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:44:31.584441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:42.813994
License: Public Domain

Upon Rehearing.
On November 8, 1957, the following opinion was filed:
Knutson, Justice.
A rehearing was granted in this case because of plaintiffs insistence that we w.ere in error in holding that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, as a possible ground for finding defendant Zak negligent, a violation of the so-called “slow speed” statute (M. S. A. 169.15). Basically, it is plaintiff’s contention on this rehearing: (1) That it was not error to submit the “slow speed” statute without qualification; that plaintiff did not request submission of the statute; and that, if Zak desired a qualification of it, it was his duty to request the court to so qualify this statute; (2) that the court did sufficiently qualify the statute; (3) that the exception taken by Zak to submission of the statute at all was insufficient to preserve his right to review the propriety of the court’s failure to qualify the application of the statute; and (4) that Zak owed a different duty to plaintiff than to defendant Turner and that the “slow speed” statute was properly submitted as far as plaintiff was concerned.
In a reconsideration of these questions, it is necessary to have in mind *13what action Zak did take to protect his record. While the record before us faüs to show what transpired in conferences between counsel for the respective parties and the court, counsel here, on oral argument and in their briefs on rehearing, have, with commendable frankness, agreed that prior to delivery of the court’s charge to the jury all counsel conferred with the court about the applicability of the “slow speed” statute among other things. According to both counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant Zak, it seems to be agreed that counsel for plaintiff did not request submission of the “slow speed” statute but did state to the court that he thought it was relevant. Counsel for defendant Turner stated that he wanted the statute given as part of the court’s charge. Counsel for Zak thereupon informed the court that if the statute was given he would except to it, which he did after completion of the court’s charge. It would seem, therefore, that in a consideration of the matters now before us on rehearing we may assume that the court was advised prior to delivery of its charge to the jury that defendant Zak objected to the giving of the statute at all, and the record does show that he did except to it after the court’s charge. It would make little difference who requested the instruction if it was prejudicial error to give it. The court informed the jury that one of the claims of plaintiff was that Zak was negligent in driving at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic. The statute was applied in favor of plaintiff as well as defendant Turner. The impact upon the jury was the same, and the error was prejudicial, no matter who formally requested the instruction.
In this argument on rehearing and in her brief, plaintiff erroneously proceeds on the theory that in our original opinion we held that it was proper to instruct the jury on the “slow speed” statute. We did not so hold. We held that under the facts of this case it was improper to give the statute unless it was qualified in such a way that, before the jury could apply it, it must be found that facts existed upon which the statute could operate. If, on a new trial, evidence should be adduced showing that Zak, after he had entered the intersection and had made his turn onto the highway, was on the highway long enough before defendant Turner turned out into plaintiff’s lane so that he *14had had a reasonable opportunity to acquire the speed of the normal traffic on the highway, then it would be proper for the court to instruct the jury that in such event they might find negligence from a violation of the statute.
It must be kept in mind that the “slow speed” statute and the right-of-way statutes governing the right of defendant Zak to enter the intersection do not operate as adjuncts of each other. As we have pointed out in our original opinion, if Zak had a right to enter the intersection, it was the duty of other approaching traffic to so reduce their speed as to permit him to safely make such entry. The “slow speed” statute could not come into play until the statutes governing his right to enter the intersection had ceased to operate. In other words, by the time he had been on the highway sufficiently long to acquire the speed of the normal traffic thereon, there no longer would remain any question as to his right to enter the intersection. Conversely, as long as the question did remain as to his right to enter the intersection, it could not be said that he had been on the highway a sufficient length of time so that the “slow speed” statute would have any application. Under the trial court’s instruction, the jury could well have found that, even though Zak had a legal right to enter the highway, he still could be found negligent for a violation of the “slow speed” statute even though he had not been on the highway long enough so that he had become part of the normal stream of traffic. To so hold would deprive Zak of the rights he had when he lawfully entered the intersection. This, we held, was prejudicial error.
Plaintiff next contends that it was incumbent upon Zak to request a qualification of the application of the statute if he desired to have it qualified. We think not. It was error to give it at all under the evidence in this case unless qualified. Zak not only advised the court before delivery of its instruction that he would except if it was given but did except after it was given. We do not think that he should be required to do more. In Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co. 72 Minn. 41, 46, 74 N. W. 1022, 1023, 40 L. R. A. 661, 663, we said:
“'•!= * * Counsel called the court’s attention specifically to the particular part of the charge excepted to, embodying it verbatim in his exception. We do not think he was required, under the circumstances, to *15go further, and explain to the court the reasons why the charge was erroneous.”3
Here, Zak informed the court that he objected to the giving of the statute at all, and he excepted to its being given to the jury. If plaintiff or defendant Turner were of the opinion that there was evidence in the case justifying the submission of this statute, it was incumbent upon them to request it, as Turner did. Plaintiff acquiesced in its submission. If it was to be given by the court at all, it was incumbent upon the court to explain to the jury when and how it could be applied.4 Zak had done all that he should be required to do in calling the court’s attention to his objection and his exception to giving the statute at all. While the error here was with respect to fundamental law or a controlling principle, the result would be the same even if it were considered only a verbal error for the reason that the court was advised, before the instruction was given, that Zak objected to giving the statute at all.
Finally, plaintiff claims that Zak owed a different duty to plaintiff than to defendant Turner and that, even if it was error to give the “slow speed” statute as to Turner, it was not error as to plaintiff. We do not believe that this contention is tenable. Either the “slow speed” statute applied as to both or it had no application. Plaintiff asks us in effect to hold that, even if Zak was not negligent under the “slow speed” statute as to Turner and even if he had a legal right to enter the intersection, still he could be held negligent as to plaintiff undei the statute even though he had not been on the highway long enough to acquire the speed of the normal traffic thereon. We do not believe that the statute can be given such construction. A “slow speed” statute is intended to apply to vehicles traveling in the normal stream of traffic.5 It is intended for the protection of those traveling in the same *16direction as the slow vehicle as well as those approaching from the opposite direction. Here, it had no application until Zak had entered the normal stream of traffic; that is, until he had a reasonable opportunity to acquire the speed of such traffic. When that occurred, it applied equally for the protection of Turner and plaintiff. To hold otherwise would deny Zak the rights given him by the statutes relating to his right to enter the intersection if he did so in accordance with law, as we pointed out above. This we have also discussed in our original opinion.
After a reconsideration of the matters now submitted, we adhere to our original opinion.

See, also, Kollodge v. F. and L. Appliances, Inc. 248 Minn. 357, 80 N. W. (2d) 62.

Kollodge v. F. and L. Appliances, Inc. 248 Minn. 357, 80 N. W. (2d) 62.

Apparently that is the construction placed upon the statute by the Department of Highways of the State of Minnesota. In Minnesota Driv*16er’s Manual, p. 22, we find the following:
“If you drive at such a slow speed that you interfere with or block the normal flow of traffic, you encourage other drivers to take chances in passing you, which endangers both yourself and the other drivers using the highway.
“It is unlawful for you to needlessly drive at such a slow speed as to hold up or block normal movement of traffic. This does not apply when slow speed is necessary due to special conditions or because of the type of vehicle you may be operating.” (Italics supplied.)