Court Opinion

ID: 9542387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:42.06425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:50.015493
License: Public Domain

*191RABINO WITZ, Justice
(dissenting in part).
In this appeal the State concedes that “where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the prosecution normally retains it to the exclusion of the other court as long as it is pending in that court.”1 A majority of this court has decided that application, or adoption, of this rule under the facts of this appeal is not necessary in the interest of justice. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion.
After recognizing that the appellant stood charged with the same offenses in two different courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the majority then concludes that the factual circumstances of this case do not warrant adoption of the rule. Apparently under the test articulated by the majority, the rule’s applicability is to he limited solely to the situation where both the superior and magistrate courts are “attempting simultaneously to assert their right to proceed with prosecution, so that the accused was faced with the immediate prospect of having to stand in two different courts for the same offense.” Admittedly the majority also relies upon the safeguards arising from the unified structure of Alaska’s court system and the Attorney General’s overall supervision of appointive prosecutors, as well as the unlikelihood of harrassment occurring in the future, in reaching its conclusion that the rule should not be adopted or applied in this case.
In my opinion the majority’s conception of the circumstances under which the rule should be applied is too restrictive and reliance upon the integrated features of our court system and the overall supervisory control of prosecutions by the Attorney General might well prove to be illusory from the accused’s point of view.
The underlying rationale of the rule was stated in Coleman v. State2 to be as follows :
But it is more than a mere rule of procedure. It is a substantial and valuable right guarantied [sic] by the law to a party accused of crime. It insures that he shall not twice be placed in j eopardy for the same offense; that he shall be forced to undergo but one trial, and shall not be harrassed by repeated indictments in different courts and different jurisdictions.3
The detrimental impact upon an accused (in both cost of representation and loss of time) arising out of concurrent prosecutions for the same offense is, in my view, the most cogent reason for adoption of the rule. The prejudice of an accused is no less in the situation where he is confronted with the future prospect of defending two separate prosecutions than where he is faced with the immediate prospect of having to defend prosecutions in two different courts for the same offense.
The rule that where courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense the *192court which first obtains jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of others apparently has vitality in criminal matters, and has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions.4 Adoption of the rule in this jurisdiction would not result in granting to the accused an unqualified right or privilege to be tried in the court first acquiring jurisdiction. This is made clear in State v. Howell5 where the court stated:
Where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of a criminal offense, the State has the right to elect the forum in which it will proceed. The defendant has no vested right to be tried in either of the jurisdictions, but he may not be tried in both. In most jurisdictions, it is held that if the state undertakes a trial in the court last acquiring jurisdiction, the remedy of the defendant is to enter a plea in abatement or other appropriate plea requiring the state to proceed in the jurisdiction first selected. But if no such plea is made at the first opportunity, that defense is lost.6
Furthermore, if the jurisdiction of the first court having concurrent jurisdiction has come to an end, the rule is not applicable.7
In my view adoption of the rule would in no way interfere with the prosecution’s choice of the court in which it desires to *193proceed. On the other hand its adoption would furnish a clear principle for decision whenever the district magistrate court or the superior court are confronted with such concurrent litigation issues.8
For the reasons heretofore stated I am of the opinion that the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss. I concur in the majority’s disposition of all other issues raised in this appeal.

. As indicated in tlie majority opinion, the State, although conceding the rule, further contended that appellant waived the right to invoke this rule. In my view nothing which transpired before Judge Davis at the time appellant made his motion to dismiss discloses any waiver on appellant’s part of his right to invoke this rule.

. 83 Miss. 290, 35 So. 937, 939, 64 L.B..A. 807 (1904).

. In its opinion in Coleman v. State, supra note 2, 35 So. at 939, the court also stated:
Section 1334 providing that in all criminal cases, when the courts of different counties have concurrent jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall vest in the courts of that county ‘where prosecution shall be first begun,’ is simply declaratory of a well-defined and firmly established legal doctrine. It grew out of the comity of nations, and was intended to prevent conficts between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, whether of the same or different counties or countries, and was found necessary to insure the orderly administration of the criminal laws.

. See Harmon v. State, 8 Ala.App. 311, 62 So. 438, 439 (1913), cert. denied, Ex parte Harmon, 185 Ala. 673, 64 So. 1018 (1914); Ex parte Sirmans, 94 Fla. 832, 116 So. 282, 285 (1927); People v. Speece, 367 Ill. 76, 10 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 659, 58 S.Ct. 410, 82 L.Ed. 509 (1937); Haden v. Dowd, 216 Ind. 281, 23 N.E.2d 676, 677-678 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 662, 60 S.Ct. 583, 84 L.Ed. 1009 (1940); State v. Spayde, 110 Iowa 726, 80 N.W. 1058, 1059 (1899); State v. Brannon, 6 Kan.App. 765, 50 P. 986, 987 (1897); Moren v. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 859, 76 S.W. 1090, 1091 (1003); People v. Joseph, 159 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (Sup.Ct.1956); State v. Young, 122 Or. 257, 257 P. 806, 808 (1927); State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1951) ; State v. Persons, 117 Vt. 556, 96 A.2d 818, 819-820 (1953); Page v. Johnson, 77 W.Va. 467, 87 S.E. 849, 850 (1916); Contra, Bottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (1922).

. 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1951).

. See also State v. Van Ness, 109 Vt. 392, 199 A. 759, 117 A.L.R. 415, 419 (1938). The court in Van Ness stated in part;
Then, too, the rule is one that a respondent may waive, and he does waive it unless he asserts Ms rights under it at his first opportunity and before he submits to the jurisdiction of the second court. * * * Though it is here spoken of as a plea to the jurisdiction, the special plea is in essence a plea in abatement. It does not deny the jurisdiction of the county court to try that class of cases to which this belongs, but it sets up external matters which, it is alleged, afford a sufficient reason why that jurisdiction should not be exercised in this case.
Under our Crim.R-. 12(a) pleas in abatement are abolished and may now be raised by motion to dismiss under Crim.R. 12(b) (1) which provides:
Defenses and Objections Which May Be Raised,. Any defense or objection which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.

.State v. Persons, supra note 4, 96 A.2d at 819-820.
Note: Crim.R. 43(a) provides:
The prosecuting attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.
This rule is made applicable to magistrate courts. See Magis.Crim.R. 1. In this case the prosecution should have first obtained leave of the magistrate court to dismiss the complaint against appellant before commencing the second prosecution in the superior court. If this procedure had been followed, the necessity for application of the rule would have been obviated. Although the potential abuse through the use of dismissals is possible, there are numerous instances where a court could properly grant leave to the prosecution to dismiss its complaint, indictment or information.

. Note: AS 22.15.030(7) (b) provides:
Insofar as the civil jurisdiction of the district magistrate courts and the superior court is the same, such jurisdiction is concurrent. It is conceivable that a party in a civil suit under the above statute could be faced with the prospect of having to simultaneously defend against the same cause of action in two separate forums.