Court Opinion

ID: 9376733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 18:00:52.129378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.684349
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 3 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTIAN ALEXIS LOPEZ-VARGAS,                  No.    18-71736
AKA Christian Alexis Lopez,                            18-72820

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A205-319-852

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted February 21, 2023**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Christian Alexis Lopez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of two Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decisions. The first denied

Lopez-Vargas’s application for cancellation of removal, and the second denied his

motion to reconsider the first order and reopen his removal proceedings to apply

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
for asylum, withholding of removal, protections under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT), and adjustment of status. To the extent that we have jurisdiction, it

is under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

      1. We lack jurisdiction over the initial denial of cancellation of removal, and

we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Vargas’s

motion to reconsider the issue. Generally, “[t]his court lacks jurisdiction to review

the merits of a discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal.” Szonyi v.

Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 896 (9th Cir. 2019). “Although we retain jurisdiction to

review due process challenges, a petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that

Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in

constitutional garb.” Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001).

“Thus, to invoke our jurisdiction, a petitioner must allege at least a colorable

constitutional violation.” Id. Lopez-Vargas argues that the BIA violated his due

process rights by determining that the record of proceedings—which omitted part

of his wife’s testimony—was sufficient to adequately review the Immigration

Judge’s (IJ) decision to deny his application for cancellation of removal. However,

“[t]o establish a due process violation, a petitioner must show that defects in

translation prejudiced the outcome of the hearing.” Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d

1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). Lopez-Vargas has not made that showing, and we are

thus divested of jurisdiction over the BIA’s initial order denying cancellation of

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removal. See Torres-Aguilar, 246 F.3d at 1271.

      Next, we review Lopez-Vargas’s second challenge of the BIA’s decision

declining to reconsider cancellation of removal for an abuse of discretion. See

Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). This claim fails, however,

as Lopez-Vargas did not identify any factual errors in the agency’s discussion of

his cancellation claim, and he has not shown that any omitted testimony would

have changed the agency’s determination. Accordingly, the BIA’s decision was

not an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Singh v. Ashcroft, 367

F.3d 1139, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2004).

      2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Vargas’s motion to

reopen to apply for asylum and withholding of removal. Lopez-Vargas asserts that

his father-in-law was killed by the cartel. He also asserts that his mother’s family

will harm him if he returns to Mexico because they resent his mother’s opposition

to their cartel involvement. “[I]n some circumstances, a family constitutes a social

group for purposes of the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes.” Molina-

Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). But Lopez-Vargas does not

identify any particular social group on account of which he fears persecution,

vaguely noting only that he fears persecution based on his relationship to his

father-in-law and mother. And he has not shown any harms to his family that

“create a pattern of persecution closely tied to” him or otherwise establish

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persecution based on his family status. Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411,

414 (9th Cir. 1991). Lopez-Vargas similarly fails to articulate how his claim that

he was kidnapped and beaten by gang members because he was from the United

States amounts to persecution on account of his membership in a particular social

group. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“‘[R]eturning Mexicans from the United States,’ . . . is too broad to qualify as a

cognizable social group.”). Because Lopez-Vargas has not established that he

belongs to a cognizable particular social group, he has not set forth a prima facie

case of eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, and the BIA thus did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch,

816 F.3d 1226, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2016)

      3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Vargas’s motion

to reopen to apply for CAT protections. Lopez-Vargas stated that the BIA abused

its discretion in determining that he did not establish prima facia eligibility for

protections under CAT, but he did not provide any argument to support that

contention—mentioning nothing about the likelihood of torture with the consent or

acquiescence of the Mexican government. He has thus failed to demonstrate that

the BIA’s decision was an abuse of discretion.

      4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen the

proceedings to enable Lopez-Vargas to apply for adjustment of status. Before the

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BIA, Lopez-Vargas asserted a new argument that he is not inadmissible as an alien

who is present without being admitted or paroled because he “was admitted from

Mexico when an officer allowed the car in which he was a passenger to enter the

United States after the driver spoke with the officer.” See Lezama-Garcia v.

Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 528 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Quilantan, 25 I. & N.

Dec. 285, 291 (BIA 2010)). However, Lopez-Vargas previously conceded

removability. Moreover, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted

unless . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and

could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c). Lopez-Vargas did not make that showing, as the nature of his entry

was certainly discoverable at the earlier proceedings.1

      DENIED.

1
 To the extent that he blames his former attorney for these errors, he has not
complied with the In re Lozada requirements for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).

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