Court Opinion

ID: 9620041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:37:30.992522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:00.458803
License: Public Domain

AREND, Justice
(dissenting).
The Uniform Partnership Act1 provides, in pertinent part, that:
“(1) A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.” 2
“In determining whether a partnership .exists, these rules shall apply:
“(1) Except as provided by Section 16 [§ 28-1-28 herein], persons who are not partners as to each other, are not partners as to third persons.” 3
I note at the outset that the court does not hold that the findings made below support a conclusion (not reached below), with respect to Innes’ liability, of partnership by estoppel under section 28-1-28, ACLA 1949.
The word “association” implies a voluntary act within the meaning of section 28-1-11. It is the intent to do the things which constitute a partnership that determines whether that relationship exists - between persons.4 The statute also requires co-ownership of a business.5 It is not necessary that there be co-ownership of specific property6 but there must be co-ownership of the profits in some certain proportions.7
The burden of establishing the partnership was upon the plaintiff;8 and since there wás no written agreement in evidence, the proof had to be clear and convincing.9
The view that I take of the evidence 10 in this case makes any further discussion of the law of partnership unnecessary. The course of conduct followed by Innes, as shown by the. evidence, did not provide the basis for anything more than sheer speculation on the part of the trial court. It can be argued that Innes’ conduct was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that he had an interest in the profits of the mining venture. But his conduct was equally consistent with the undisputed evidence that Nelson was his friend. In such a situation judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party upon whom rests the burden of sustaining one of these inferences as against the other,11 and this is especially true when the burden is that of producing evidence which is clear and convincing.
*180I would set aside the trial court’s findings, express and implied, and would reverse the judgment appealed from and order that a decree be entered for the defendant Innes.

. Sections 28-1-1 through 28-1-65, AOLA 1949.

. Section 28-1-11, AOLA 1949.

. Section 28-1-12, AOLA 1949.

. See Associated Piping and Engineering Co. v. Jones, 17 Cal.App.2d 107, 61 P.2d 536 (1936), a case decided under the Uniform Partnership Act as enacted in California Corporations Code, §§ 15001-15045 (West 1955).

. Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 529, 162 A. 305 (1932).

. In re Kennedy’s Estate, 321 Pa. 225, 183 A. 798 (1936).

. Mechan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 12 S.Ct. 972, 36 L.Ed. 835 (1892); Westcott v. Gilman, 170 Cal. 562, 150 P. 777, 779 (1915).

. Swanson v. Siem, 124 Cal.App. 519, 12 P.2d 1053 (1932); Powell v. Powell, 181 Ore. 675, 184 P.2d 373, 381 (1947).

. Sullivan v. Schellinger, 170 Cal.App.2d 111, 338 P.2d 462 (1959).

. I do not view the evidence as including the extra-judicial statements made by Baxter to the effect that Innes was a partner. Such evidence is inadmissible in the absence of other evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case of partnership with respect to Innes. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1078, at 123-25 (3d ed. 1940).

. See Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 339, 53 S.Ct. 391, 77 L.Ed. 819, 823 (1933); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.Supp. 397, 450 (D.D.C.1946), reversed on other grounds, 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).