Court Opinion

ID: 9839521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:02:04.379973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:17.155741
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2001    Document: 37    Page: 1    Filed: 08/15/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                FLEET ENGINEERS, INC.,
                  Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

                            v.

         MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
                  Defendant

                     TARUN SURTI,
                   Defendant-Appellant
                  ______________________

                   2022-2001, 2022-2076
                  ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Michigan in No. 1:12-cv-01143-PLM,
 Judge Paul L. Maloney.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: August 15, 2023
                  ______________________

    GEORGE THOMAS WILLIAMS, III, McGarry Bair PC,
 Grand Rapids, MI, for plaintiff-cross-appellant.

    TARUN SURTI, Brentwood, TN, pro se.
                ______________________
Case: 22-2001      Document: 37    Page: 2    Filed: 08/15/2023

 2       FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and STOLL, Circuit
                           Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
    Tarun Surti appeals from decisions of the United States
 District Court for the Western District of Michigan in
 which he was awarded damages for infringement of U.S.
 Patent RE44,755 (the “’755 patent”) 1 by Fleet Engineers,
 Inc., but was denied other claimed relief. See Fleet Eng’rs,
 Inc. v. Mudguard Techs., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-01143, 2021 WL
 9057803 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2021).
     In particular, Surti appeals from (1) a decision exclud-
 ing certain evidence from trial, (2) an order narrowing the
 issues of infringement to a subset of the asserted claims,
 (3) grants of judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) in favor
 of Fleet on claims of induced and contributory infringe-
 ment, (4) portions of the jury verdict on infringement and
 damages, (5) failure to award attorney fees, and (6) failure
 to grant a permanent injunction.
    Fleet cross-appeals, asserting that (1) the district court
 erred in not additionally granting JMOL in its favor on
 Surti’s claims of direct infringement and that (2) the jury
 verdict on direct infringement was not supported by sub-
 stantial evidence.

     1   The ’755 patent is a reissue of U.S. Patent
 8,146,949 (the “’949 patent”), the original patent of interest
 in this case. The asserted claims of the ’949 patent are
 identical to corresponding claims in the reissued ’755 pa-
 tent. The original filings by the parties in this litigation
 predated the reissue, and thus some of the underlying rec-
 ord and arguments refer to the ’949 patent as the asserted
 patent. We refer to the asserted patent using the reissue
 number.
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC         3

    For the following reasons, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
    Surti and Fleet have been locked in acrimonious litiga-
 tion over mudflaps and Surti’s ’755 patent for over a dec-
 ade.
      The ’755 patent relates to a “mud flap for preventing
 spray from the wheel of a vehicle on a wet roadway from
 impairing the vision of drivers of other vehicles.” ’755 pa-
 tent, col. 1 ll. 12−15. Traditional mudflaps are often con-
 structed from solid panels of rubber material. Id. col. 1 ll.
 21−27. As a vehicle moves, air resistance can cause the
 mudflap to lift or “sail,” allowing a spray of water and de-
 bris to reduce the visibility of the driver behind the vehicle
 equipped with the mudflap. Id. col. 1 ll. 16−27. The mud-
 flaps described in the ’755 patent purport to solve that
 problem using a series of vertical slots or channels through
 which air can flow. The invention thus purports to “sepa-
 rate[] air, water and road debris thrown up by a tire or
 wheel and direct[] the water and debris to the ground while
 allowing the air to pass through the air outlets.” Id. col. 4
 ll. 19−22. Claim 1 of the ’755 patent recites:
       1.    A mudflap for preventing spray from a
       wheel of a vehicle on a wet roadway from im-
       pairing the vision of drivers of other vehicles,
       comprising a vertically extending flap which
       is mounted to the rear of the wheel with a
       front side of the flap facing the wheel and a
       rear side facing away from the wheel, a plu-
       rality of laterally spaced, vertically extending
       vanes defining a plurality of vertically extend-
       ing channels on the front side of the flap for
       directing water and debris from the wheel in
       a downward direction toward the ground and
       not to the rear or sides of the flap, and verti-
       cally extending slotted openings in the chan-
       nels of a size permitting air to pass through
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 4        FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

           the openings to the rear of the flap and pre-
           venting water and debris from doing so.
     Id. col. 4. ll. 40−52.
     This case is now on its second appeal. Our decision in
 the first appeal, which provides a more fulsome summary
 of the facts and procedural history through 2019, set forth
 how Fleet, a manufacturer of products for the trucking in-
 dustry, brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment
 that its mudflaps do not infringe the ’755 patent, and that
 the patent was invalid. See Fleet Eng’rs, Inc. v. Mudguard
 Techs., LLC, 761 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Fleet I”).
 Surti counterclaimed, asserting claims of patent infringe-
 ment, breach of contract, and misappropriation of trade se-
 crets. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary
 judgment, the district court granted Fleet’s motion of non-
 infringement as well as finding it not liable for an alleged
 breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.
 J.A. 422−46. Surti appealed and we held that unresolved
 factual issues precluded summary judgment on the issue of
 direct infringement. Fleet I, 761 F. App’x at 992−94. We
 also affirmed the court’s finding that Surti failed to present
 evidence of a contract between Surti and Fleet, and thus
 upheld summary judgment on the contract-based claims.
 Id. at 994. Finally, we held that the district court did not
 err in granting summary judgment in favor of Fleet on the
 claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. at 994−95.
     On remand, a jury evaluated infringement of claims 1,
 2, 5, 8, 9, and 13 of the ’755 patent by two subsets of Fleet
 products, referred to as the Group A and Group B products.
 See J.A. 53−54. Both product groups, shown below, include
 openings that are angled at approximately 45 degrees, sep-
 arated into four quadrants. The Group A products further
 contain vertical ridges and openings at or near the bottom
 of the mudflap, while the products in Group B do not.
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC          5

 J.A. 53.
      At the close of evidence, but before the verdict, Fleet
 moved for JMOL on Surti’s claims of direct, induced, con-
 tributory, and willful infringement. J.A. 942−46. The dis-
 trict court granted Fleet’s motion as to induced and
 contributory infringement, holding that there was no evi-
 dence in the record to support either theory of liability, but
 declined to enter JMOL as to direct infringement and will-
 fulness. J.A. 1091−92. The jury ultimately found that alt-
 hough Fleet’s Group B products did not infringe the
 asserted claims of the ’755 patent, the Group A products
 did. J.A. 54. That infringement, however, was not found
 to be willful. Id., 56. The jury declined to award lost profits
 and instead awarded damages based on 4% of the gross
 sales of the Group A products, amounting to an award of
 $228,000. J.A. 1, 57. Surti appealed. Fleet cross-appealed.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                          DISCUSSION
     Surti raises multiple challenges on appeal. He first con-
 tends that the decision excluding certain evidence from
 trial constituted an abuse of discretion. In addition, he
 challenges an order narrowing the infringement issues to
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 6     FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 a subset of claims in the ’755 patent. He further asserts
 that JMOL, granted in Fleet’s favor on claims of induced
 and contributory infringement, was in error. He also con-
 tends that portions of the jury verdict on infringement and
 damages were unsupported by substantial evidence. Fi-
 nally, he challenges the denial of attorney fees as well as
 the failure to enter a permanent injunction. Fleet’s cross-
 appeal asserts that the district court erred in not addition-
 ally granting JMOL in its favor on Surti’s claims of direct
 infringement and that the jury verdict on direct infringe-
 ment was not supported by substantial evidence. We ad-
 dress each argument in turn.
                                I
     We turn first to Surti’s assertion that the district court’s
 exclusion of witness testimony and evidence was an abuse
 of discretion. According to Surti, the court “blocked [evi-
 dence pertaining to] the history of the case prior to the lit-
 igation date,” including testimony from Surti himself, as
 well as from a mold manufacturer, an injection molder, and
 an engineer who designed original part drawings. See Ap-
 pellant’s Br. ¶ 4; see also J.A. 709−11 (Surti’s evidentiary
 motion), J.A. 5−8 (order denying Surti’s evidentiary mo-
 tion).
     We review evidentiary rulings under the law of the re-
 gional circuit, here the Sixth Circuit. See SSL Servs., LLC
 v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
 Under Sixth Circuit law, evidentiary decisions are re-
 viewed for abuse of discretion and should only be reversed
 if they have caused more than harmless error. McCombs
 v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 2005). “An abuse
 of discretion occurs if the district court relies on clearly er-
 roneous findings of fact, applies the wrong legal standard,
 misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a con-
 clusion, or makes a clear error of judgment.” Miller v.
 Countrywide Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2013)
 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC           7

     Under that standard, Surti’s arguments can best be un-
 derstood as asserting that the district court made a clear
 error of judgment in excluding evidence. According to
 Surti, the excluded testimony and evidence was “very im-
 portant for the Jury to know.” Appellant’s Br. ¶ 4. Abuse
 of discretion, however, is a highly deferential standard.
 And a party’s opinion that excluded evidence was relevant,
 or even important, is insufficient to overturn a court’s de-
 cision excluding that evidence. As the court explained, the
 identities of the witnesses that Surti wished to testify on
 his behalf were not disclosed until years after close of dis-
 covery and his additional excluded evidence did not appear
 to be relevant to the asserted claims of patent infringe-
 ment. See J.A. 6−8. We agree and see no clear error of
 judgment. We therefore conclude that it was not an abuse
 of discretion for the court to exclude those witnesses and
 that evidence from the record.
                                II
     Surti next asserts that the district court erred in nar-
 rowing the infringement inquiry to only six of the ’755 pa-
 tent’s 25 claims. In particular, according to Surti, the court
 “totally ignored” his “pleading for his ’755 claim no. 19 that
 was properly filed and timely identified.” Appellant’s Br.
 ¶ 5. Fleet does not substantively address that issue in its
 response.
     It is clear, however, that the district court did not ignore
 claim 19. Rather, it thoroughly evaluated the filings to
 identify the asserted claims after we suggested it do so in
 Fleet I. See 761 F. App’x at 993−94; J.A. 659−62. Moreover,
 although Surti refers to his assertion of claim 19 as “timely
 identified,” that cannot be the case, because, as discussed
 below, claim 19 did not exist before the deadlines to amend
 the pleadings or the chart of asserted claims passed.
     Surti’s allegation amounts to a suggestion that the dis-
 trict court abused its discretion in declining to amend the
 scheduling order to allow for the assertion of claim 19. But
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 8     FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 a scheduling order may only be modified “for good cause
 and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
 “The primary measure of Rule 16’s good cause standard is
 the moving party’s diligence in attempting to meet the case
 management order’s requirements.” Inge v. Rock Fin.
 Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
 marks omitted). “We review for abuse of discretion a dis-
 trict court’s decision to amend its scheduling order to allow
 a late filing.” Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc.,
 426 F.3d 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2005).
     At the outset of this litigation, the district court issued
 a Case Management Order (“CMO”) setting a March 1,
 2013 deadline for motions to amend the pleadings. See Dis-
 trict Court Docket No. 13 at 1. The CMO also required
 Surti to “file and serve a disclosure, listing each claim of
 the patents-in-suit that [he] contends have been infringed.”
 Id. ¶ 3.a. Surti subsequently timely filed a disclosure as-
 serting that Fleet “infringed claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 13” of
 the ’949 patent. See District Court Docket No. 20 at 1. The
 CMO further required the parties to provide a “comprehen-
 sive chart” denoting “all claims of each patent-in-suit that
 [Surti] will contend at trial has been infringed.” CMO ¶ 3.c;
 see also District Court Docket No. 27 at 2 (confirming
 Fleet’s understanding that Surti asserted infringement of
 ’949 patent claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 13). By mid-2013, the
 deadlines to amend the pleadings and the CMO, and the
 deadline to submit the chart of asserted claims had all
 passed, although the CMO allowed the parties to further
 “amend or modify the disclosures in the chart for good
 cause shown.” CMO ¶ 3.c.
    Thereafter, on February 11, 2014, the ’949 patent reis-
 sued as the ’755 patent. J.A. 104. Claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and
 13 were not amended during reissue and remained un-
 changed, although the ’755 patent further contains claims
 not originally present in the ’949 patent, including claim
 19. Compare J.A. 102−03 (’949 patent claims 1−17) with
 J.A. 112−13 (’755 patent claims 1−25). Fleet subsequently
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC        9

 moved to amend its complaint to reference the reissued pa-
 tent, and the district court found that good cause existed to
 do so. See District Court Docket No. 98 at 1−3. As the court
 explained, “[a]llowing Fleet Engineers to amend the com-
 plaint would not cause [Surti] prejudice as the claims in the
 amended complaint are identical to the claims in the origi-
 nal complaint, albeit against the reissue patent instead of
 the original patent.” Id. at 3.
     At no time did either party move to update the CMO or
 the chart of asserted claims to include additional claims
 added in the reissue patent, nor was there any attempt at
 showing good cause to do so. However, in filings made in
 September and October 2015, Surti asserted that Fleet had
 also infringed claim 19 of the ’755 patent. J.A. 1321; see
 also District Court Docket No. 199 at 14 (referring to “as-
 serted claims 1 and 19”); Fleet I, 761 F. App’x at 993−94
 (noting the apparent confusion that these filings raised as
 to which claims were being asserted). The district court
 subsequently issued an order clarifying that claims 1, 2, 5,
 8, 9, and 13 were the only properly asserted claims. J.A.
 476. As the court explained, “Surti’s attempt to bring
 [c]laim 19 into the dispute through his motion for summary
 judgment and his response to Fleet Engineers’ motion is
 improper.” Id.; see also id. at 661−62.
     We agree. The CMO clearly required Surti to have
 moved for an amendment to add claim 19 to the dispute,
 and to support that motion with a showing of good cause.
 He did not do so. The district court therefore did not abuse
 its discretion in determining that claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and
 13 were the only claims in dispute.
                              III
     We next turn to the district court’s decisions regarding
 granting JMOL. Surti asserts that JMOL, entered in
 Fleet’s favor on claims of induced and contributory in-
 fringement (see J.A. 9, 1091), was granted in error. Fleet,
 in its cross-appeal, asserts that the court erred in not
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 10    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 further granting JMOL to Fleet on Surti’s claims of direct
 infringement.
     We review decisions on motions for JMOL under the
 law of the regional circuit, here the Sixth Circuit. See SSL
 Servs., 769 F.3d at 1082. Under Sixth Circuit law, a dis-
 trict court’s decision to grant JMOL is reviewed de novo.
 Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Entm’t, LLC,
 974 F.3d 767, 779 (6th Cir. 2020). “Judgment as a matter
 of law may only be granted if, when viewing the evidence
 in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving
 that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is
 no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasona-
 ble minds could come to but one conclusion in favor of the
 moving party.” Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,
 736 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1003 (2005).
     According to Surti, Fleet “engaged in an ‘induced in-
 fringement’ when they co[n]tracted the manufacturing of”
 the Group A and B mudflaps “to the [m]old maker, Viking
 Tool & Engineering, and injection molder, H S Die & Engi-
 neering.” Appellant’s Br. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 4 (asserting
 that the district court “failed to recognize that [Fleet] en-
 gaged in ‘induced infringement’ by engaging [a] third party
 to manufacture the infringing mud flap”).
     A claim of induced infringement requires a showing not
 only of direct infringement, but further “that the alleged
 infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed
 specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.” En-
 plas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,
 909 F.3d 398, 407 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see
 also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (defining induced in-
 fringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) as “actively and know-
 ingly aiding and abetting another’s direct infringement”).
    As the district court earlier found when it granted
 JMOL with respect to induced infringement, there was no
 evidence in the record that Fleet knowingly induced a third
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC        11

 party to infringe the ’755 patent with a specific intent to
 encourage another’s infringement. See J.A. 9, 1091. Surti
 has not pointed to any evidence in the record that the dis-
 trict court overlooked or misinterpreted in coming to that
 determination. Without a genuine issue of material fact on
 that matter, we conclude that the court did not err in grant-
 ing JMOL in Fleet’s favor as to induced infringement.
     A claim of contributory infringement requires a show-
 ing of a sale, or an offer to sell, “a component of a patented
 machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
 material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented pro-
 cess, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
 the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
 use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple ar-
 ticle or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
 noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Nalco Co. v. Chem-
 Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     Just as the district court found in granting JMOL with
 respect to induced infringement, the court further found
 that Surti introduced no evidence that Fleet had sold a
 component of a patented combination such that it could be
 held liable for contributory infringement. See J.A. 9, 1091.
 Surti has not pointed to any evidence in the record that the
 district court overlooked or misinterpreted in coming to
 that determination. Moreover, there is no evidence in the
 record supporting a conclusion that either the Group A or
 Group B mudflaps were components or material parts of a
 patented whole as required under § 271(c). Without a gen-
 uine issue of material fact, we conclude that the court did
 not err in granting JMOL in Fleet’s favor as to contributory
 infringement.
     In its cross-appeal, Fleet asserts that the district court
 erred in not granting JMOL in its favor on Surti’s claims of
 direct infringement. In particular, Fleet asserts that nei-
 ther its Group A nor its Group B products have “a plurality
 of laterally spaced, vertically extending vanes defining a
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 12    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 plurality of vertically extending channels on the front side
 of the flap” as required by the claims of the ’755 patent. See
 Appellee’s Br. 70−79; J.A. 112−13 (providing the asserted
 claims). Fleet also argues that, although its Group A prod-
 ucts have vertical slots at the bottom edge of the mudflap,
 the “slots do not define vertically extending channels to
 route water down the face of the mudflap and off the bot-
 tom of the mudflap” and that “[n]one of the slotted openings
 (vertical or otherwise) prevent water and debris from pass-
 ing through them.” Appellee’s Br. at 75–77.
     Fleet asserted the same arguments in its original mo-
 tion for summary judgment, and the district court did orig-
 inally grant Fleet’s motion as to direct infringement. See
 J.A. 438−45. However, we overturned that grant of sum-
 mary judgment in Fleet I. As we explained then, a genuine
 issue of material fact existed as to whether or not Fleet’s
 products comprise the claimed vanes, Fleet I, 761 F. App’x
 at 992, as well as whether or not Fleet’s products meet the
 “vertically extending” limitations, id. at 993. Fleet has pro-
 vided no argument or evidence to suggest that these genu-
 ine issues of material fact did not still exist when it moved
 for JMOL. Instead, as it did in its motion for JMOL, Fleet
 argues on appeal that “there was substantial evidence in-
 troduced at trial” that its products do “not block water im-
 pinging upon [the] face” of the mudflap, but rather allow
 water and debris “to pass through the openings.” Appel-
 lee’s Br. at 76. Yet as the district court correctly identified
 when it denied Fleet’s JMOL motion, the claims do not re-
 quire that all water and debris be completely blocked from
 passing through the mudflap. J.A. 45. Rather, “[s]ome wa-
 ter and debris might pass through the slotted openings.”
 Id.
     Whether or not Fleet’s products comprised vanes and
 vertical openings that prevented a sufficient amount of wa-
 ter and debris from passing through the mudflap such that
 they infringed Surti’s patent was a question of fact for the
 jury. Given the existence of those genuine issues of
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC          13

 material fact, the district court did not err in declining to
 grant JMOL in Fleet’s favor as to direct infringement.
                               IV
     We next turn to the parties’ assertions that portions of
 the jury verdict are unsupported by substantial evidence.
 Surti contends as such for the verdicts of noninfringement
 by the Group B products, the decision not to award lost
 profits, and the finding of a lack of willful infringement. In
 its cross-appeal, Fleet asserts that the jury’s finding of in-
 fringement by the Group A products was unsupported by
 substantial evidence.
    “A determination of infringement, both literal and un-
 der the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact, re-
 viewed for substantial evidence when tried to a jury.” TI
 Grp. Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., LLC, 375 F.3d
 1126, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
     Surti first asserts that the jury verdict that Fleet’s
 Group B products did not infringe the asserted ’755 patent
 claims was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accord-
 ing to Surti, because the jury found that the Group A prod-
 ucts infringed, it should have also found that the Group B
 products infringed. Appellant’s Br. ¶ 3. The Group A and
 Group B products differ from one another in that only the
 Group A products contain vertical ridges and openings at
 or near the bottom of the mudflap. See J.A. 24, 53. Fleet
 responds that the jury could have reasonably come to its
 conclusion of noninfringement by the Group B products in
 view of (1) the absence of a vane, defined as “a relatively
 thin, rigid structure, like a blade, that is attached to an-
 other structure or surface,” (2) the absence of vertical chan-
 nels or slots, or (3) openings that are not “of a size to permit
 air to pass through the openings to the rear of the flap and
 preventing water and debris from doing so.” Appellee’s Br.
 at 30. We agree with Fleet that the jury’s determination
 that Group B products did not directly infringe the ’755 pa-
 tent was supported by substantial evidence. In particular,
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 14    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 the jury reasonably could have found that the Group B
 products lack the vertically extending vanes, channels, and
 slotted openings required by the claims.
     Surti further argues that even if the Group B products
 lacked the express structures recited in the ’755 patent
 claims, the jury still should have found infringement under
 the doctrine of equivalents. Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 3, 6; see also
 J.A. 54 (Verdict Form, finding that the Group B products
 did not infringe the asserted claims of the ’755 patent ei-
 ther “literally or under the doctrine of equivalents”).
     In determining equivalence, “[a]n analysis of the role
 played by each element in the context of the specific patent
 claim . . . inform[s] the inquiry as to whether a substitute
 element matches the function, way, and result of the
 claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays
 a role substantially different from the claimed element.”
 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
 17, 40−41 (1997). A patent owner must provide “particu-
 larized testimony and linking argument as to the ‘insub-
 stantiality of the differences’ between the claimed
 invention and the accused device or processes, or with re-
 spect to the function, way, result test when such evidence
 is presented to support a finding of infringement under the
 doctrine of equivalents.” Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress
 Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
 “Such evidence must be presented on a limitation-by-limi-
 tation basis.” Id.
    Surti does not explain how the Group B products would
 have infringed under such a standard, or why the jury’s
 verdict of noninfringement lacks substantial evidence sup-
 port. Fleet again argues that, at the very least, the jury
 could have reasonably found that the Group B products
 lack the vertically extending vanes, channels, and slotted
 openings required by the claims even when evaluated un-
 der the doctrine of equivalents. Appellee’s Br. at 48−53. In
 particular, Fleet points to the district court’s construction
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC        15

 of “vertically extending” as it pertains to the vanes, chan-
 nels, and slotted openings of the mudflap to mean “perpen-
 dicular or at a 90 degree angle to the road surface.” Id.; see
 also J.A. 215. It is undisputed that the Group B products
 comprise four quadrants with vanes, channels, and slotted
 openings all oriented at diverging 45-degree angles. A rea-
 sonable jury could have found that components oriented at
 a 45 degree angle are not equivalent to components ori-
 ented at 90 degrees. The jury’s finding that the Group B
 products do not infringe the asserted claims under the doc-
 trine of equivalents was therefore supported by substantial
 evidence.
     Surti next asserts that the jury verdict that he was not
 entitled to lost profits was not supported by substantial ev-
 idence. See Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 2 (asserting error from
 “[d]enial of proper damages award”), 3 (asserting, gener-
 ally, that the “damage awards should be calculated accord-
 ingly using proper formula and proper laws”), 6 (requesting
 that we “[a]ward the damages based on Surti being a man-
 ufacturing comp[e]titor who lost profit that he could have
 made by selling the product to the Plaintiff or to the indus-
 try”). According to Fleet, however, the jury should not have
 even been presented with the question of lost profits be-
 cause Surti was a non-practicing entity who had no lost
 profits. Appellee’s Br. at 53−55. We agree with Fleet.
     Surti never assigned his patent to any company, includ-
 ing Mudguard, where he served as president. See J.A. 156.
 Nor is there any evidence to suggest that Surti entered into
 any licensing agreement that could have provided the right
 to recover lost profits at trial. Moreover, Surti has made
 no attempt to satisfy the Panduit factors, which require a
 showing of (1) a demand for the patented product, (2) the
 absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) its
 manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the de-
 mand, and (4) the amount of profit it would have made.
 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed.
 Cir. 1995) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
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 16    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978)). The
 jury’s finding that Surti was not entitled to lost profits was
 therefore supported by substantial evidence.
    Finally, Surti asserts that the jury verdict finding that
 Fleet’s infringement was not willful was not supported by
 substantial evidence. See Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6.
 “Whether infringement is willful is a question of fact, and
 the jury’s determination as to willfulness is therefore re-
 viewable under the substantial evidence standard.” Braun
 Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir.
 1992) (citations omitted). Willful infringement must be
 proven by clear and convincing evidence and is determined
 by the totality of circumstances. Id.
    Surti asserts that, not only was Fleet’s conduct “willful
 and wanton,” but further that he should have been
 awarded treble damages in view of that conduct. Appel-
 lant’s Br. ¶¶ 2, 6. Fleet responds that the jury’s finding of
 no willful infringement was supported by substantial evi-
 dence. In particular, Fleet notes that the actions to which
 Surti points to make his assertions of willful conduct oc-
 curred two years before the asserted patent first issued.
 Appellee’s Br. at 56−58. Although, as the district court ob-
 served, the evidence establishes that Fleet was aware of
 Surti’s patent application, J.A. 30, “[t]o willfully infringe a
 patent, the patent must exist and one must have
 knowledge of it. . . . [A]n application is no guarantee any
 patent will issue . . . . What the scope of claims in patents
 that do issue will be is something totally unforeseeable.”
 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236
 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
    The evidence adduced at trial, at best, may demonstrate
 Fleet’s knowledge of Surti’s patent issuing after Fleet was
 already selling its Group A products. Yet, even so,
 knowledge of the asserted patent and evidence of infringe-
 ment, although necessary, is not sufficient for a finding of
 willfulness. Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC       17

 F.3d 964, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Rather, willfulness requires
 deliberate or intentional infringement. Eko Brands, LLC
 v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367, 1378
 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The jury was free to weigh the relevant
 evidence of record, which included evidence suggesting
 that Fleet intended to avoid patent infringement. Moreo-
 ver, even if some evidence existed to draw the opposite con-
 clusion, that does not mean that the jury’s finding of no
 willfulness was unsupported by substantial evidence.
    In its cross-appeal, Fleet argues that the jury verdict
 that its Group A products infringe the ’755 patent was not
 supported by substantial evidence. Appellee’s Br. at 76−79.
 To support that claim, Fleet repeats the arguments that it
 made in challenging the district court’s decision not to
 award JMOL in Fleet’s favor as to direct infringement. In
 particular, Fleet argues that the Group A products do not
 have vanes, vertically extended channels, or slotted open-
 ings to prevent the passage of water and debris through the
 mudflap as recited in the asserted claims.
     As construed by the district court, however, the “vanes”
 required by the claims are “relatively thin, rigid struc-
 ture[s], like a blade, that [are] attached to another struc-
 ture or surface.”      J.A. 442–43.      Neither party has
 challenged that construction on appeal. As we found in
 Fleet I, a reasonable jury could conclude that the corre-
 sponding structures in Fleet’s products are relatively thin
 and rigid and are attached as protrusions from the rear
 wall of the mudflap’s channels. Fleet I, 761 F. App’x at 992.
 We further found that a reasonable jury could find that the
 presence of some channels vertically extending across the
 bottom of the Group A products may satisfy the claims. Id.
 at 993. Moreover, Fleet’s arguments ignore that the claims
 do not require complete blockage of water and debris from
 passing through the mudflap’s openings. See J.A. 218–20
 (Claim Construction Order, noting that the “specification
 explicitly anticipates that some water and debris may pass
 through the slotted openings”). A reasonable jury could
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 18    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 have found that the Group A products prevent sufficient
 amounts of water and debris from passing through, such
 that they directly infringe the asserted claims.
     Fleet’s arguments on appeal amount to a mere disagree-
 ment with the jury’s findings. Such disagreement is insuf-
 ficient to overturn a jury verdict that was otherwise
 supported by substantial evidence.
                              V
    Surti also appeals the district court’s finding that this
 case was not exceptional and did not merit an award of at-
 torney fees, as well as the court’s decision denying Surti’s
 request for a permanent injunction. Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 2,
 6.
    A district court may, in exceptional cases, award rea-
 sonable attorney fees to the prevailing party under
 35 U.S.C. § 285. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health
 & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 548−51 (2014) (interpreting
 the phrase “exceptional cases” and setting forth basic
 guidelines for determining whether or not a request for at-
 torney fees in patent infringement cases may be granted).
 We review a district court’s decision not to award attorney
 fees under § 285 for abuse of discretion. Highmark Inc. v.
 Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 560–61
 (2014).
    As set forth by the district court, Surti has been pro-
 ceeding pro se since 2015 and has provided no evidence of
 legal fees incurred before that date. J.A. 36–39. Instead,
 the record reflects that the two attorneys who represented
 Surti between 2013 and 2015 withdrew from the case after
 not being paid for their work. J.A. 246. Surti also failed to
 demonstrate that Fleet litigated this case in an unreason-
 able manner, asserted any plainly frivolous claims, or
 made any frivolous legal arguments during the course of
 this litigation causing the case to be exceptional. We there-
 fore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC        19

 determining not to award Surti attorney fees under § 285.
     Regarding the requested permanent injunction, Surti
 asserts that the district court erred in its decision to deny
 issuing a cease-and-desist order against Fleet. Appellant’s
 Br. ¶¶ 2, 6. “The decision to grant or deny permanent in-
 junctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the dis-
 trict court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.”
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
     The district court held that Surti did not provide suffi-
 cient evidence to support the issuance of a permanent in-
 junction. J.A. 18−22; see also TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant
 Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 792 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting
 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391) (setting forth the factors considered
 in determining whether or not to issue an injunction).
     A finding of infringement does not automatically entitle
 a patent holder to a permanent injunction. eBay, 547 U.S.
 at 391−93. Although Surti may have suffered an injury
 from the sale of an infringing product, that injury was not
 one of irreparable harm. See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon
 Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
 that, in the context of patent infringement cases, there is
 no presumption of irreparable harm when a party estab-
 lishes liability for patent infringement). The district court
 did not err in determining that Surti’s injury was compen-
 sable through the reasonable royalty awarded by the jury.
     In deciding Surti’s motion for injunctive relief, the dis-
 trict court did not expressly address two of the eBay factors:
 the balance of the hardships between the claimant and the
 infringer and whether or not an injunction would serve the
 public interest. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. However, Surti
 did not independently argue those factors. See J.A. 21−22.
 The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining
 to issue a permanent injunction based only on the first two
 eBay factors.
    Moreover, the purpose of an injunction is to prevent
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 20    FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

 future infringement. See Bio-Rad Lab’ys, Inc. v. 10X Ge-
 nomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1377−78 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
 There is no evidence in the record that Fleet continues to
 sell the infringing products. See J.A. 22. It was therefore
 not an abuse of discretion for the district court to have held
 that, without evidence of future harm, Surti had not suffi-
 ciently established entitlement to injunctive relief.
                              VI
     Surti additionally makes passing references to trade se-
 crets and various contract violations. Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 3,
 6. Those issues were previously raised and decided by the
 district court years ago. We then affirmed those decisions
 in Fleet I. See 761 F. App’x at 994−95. The facts, law, and
 parties involved remain unchanged, and as Surti received
 a “‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate” those claims, “the
 contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably
 to the conclusion that” Surti is collaterally estopped from
 relitigating those issues. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
 Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1979); see also id. at 326 (“Col-
 lateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata,
 has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the bur-
 den of relitigating an identical issue with the same party
 or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by prevent-
 ing needless litigation.”).
    Surti also makes passing references to other holdings
 involving damages and district court actions, such as alleg-
 edly “block[ing] the discussion of the opinion of the Federal
 Court as well as its own Claim Construction Opinion” that
 he desires to be reviewed on appeal. Appellant’s Br. ¶¶ 4,
 6. He further raises arguments that were not presented at
 the district court level, such as that he is entitled to addi-
 tional damages “based on the mental stress this litigation
 has caused” him. Id. ¶¶ 2−4.
     We recognize that Surti is not an attorney and that he
 is not fully acquainted with court rules and appellate pro-
 cedures. However, the United States Supreme Court and
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 FLEET ENGINEERS, INC. v. MUDGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC        21

 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have instructed courts
 to enforce procedural rules even against pro se litigants
 who are not familiar with them. See, e.g., McNeil v. United
 States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (holding that the Court
 “never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil lit-
 igation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
 those who proceed without counsel”); Pilgrim v. Littlefield,
 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the lenient
 treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has lim-
 its”).
     Our law is well established that an argument must be
 properly raised in a party’s opening brief in order to be con-
 sidered on appeal. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apo-
 tex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Appeals to
 this court further operate under a general principal of for-
 feiture in view of a “failure to make timely assertion of the
 right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”
 Boeing Co. v. United States, 968 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
 (1944)). Because Surti failed to raise the remainder of his
 arguments adequately in his opening brief or at the district
 court prior to this appeal, we consider those arguments for-
 feited.
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered both parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.