Court Opinion

ID: 9697592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:22:39.439813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:00.402863
License: Public Domain

*717
Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

In my view, the holding of Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F. 2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971), should be applied retroactively so as to grant relief in the present case. Long v. Robinson held that the application of Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Cum. Supp.), Art. 26, § 70-1 (c), and Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1949 ed.), § 240 (b), which placed juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 under the “adult” jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of Baltimore while juveniles of the same age in the counties were under the “juvenile” jurisdiction of the circuit courts, was a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The petitioner should be granted a declaration that his prior burglary convictions are null and void and an order directed to the clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore to expunge the records of his convictions.1
The majority suggests that petitioner, in seeking to have Long v. Robinson applied to cases prior to May 15, 1969, is asking us to overrule our prior decision in Franklin v. State, 264 Md. 62, 285 A. 2d 616 (1972). However, no question of overruling the Franklin decision is presented in this case. While dicta in Franklin suggested that May 15, 1969, should be the determinative date for applying Long, the case did not involve one who had committed an offense and whose *718conviction had become final prior to May 15, 1969. The offense for which Franklin was convicted occurred on July 15, 1969, and this Court held that under Long, the Criminal Court of Baltimore had no jurisdiction to try him.
As the majority points out, beginning with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and continuing in numerous subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has held that certain constitutional rulings should not be retroactively applied in criminal litigation. With respect to most situations where the question arises, the Court has held that whether a constitutional ruling should be applied retroactively to criminal cases is governed by a “three pronged test,” summarized in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 296-297, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1969-1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and all subsequent cases as follows:
“Our recent discussions of the retroactivity of other constitutional rules of criminal procedure make unnecessary, any detailed treatment of that question here. Linkletter v. Walker, supra; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra [382 U. S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966)]; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra [384 U. S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966)]. ‘These cases establish the principle that in the criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims, “the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective . . . where the exigencies of the situation require such an application” . . . .’ Johnson, supra, 384 U. S., at 726-727, 86 S. Ct., at 1777. The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, as I understand the Supreme Court’s opinions, there are circumstances where constitutional *719holdings are to be applied retroactively to criminal cases without regard for the analysis or criteria of Linkletter v. Walker and Stovall v. Denno. One circumstance in which a constitutional ruling should be given full retrospective effect is where the ruling declared no new principle of constitutional law, overruled no prior authority, but merely applied settled constitutional principles to a particular type of situation. Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 247-248, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 496, 88 S. Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968). Another circumstance where the Linkletter and Stovall principle of nonretroactivity has no application is where the constitutional holding.in question would have prevented the criminal trial from taking place — where the conduct would not have been subject , to the criminal prosecution and punishment. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, 93 S. Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973).
These principles compel the conclusion that Long v. Robinson should be applied retroactively in the present case. First, that case did not overrule any prior authority and did not announce any new principles of constitutional law, but merely applied settled equal protection principles to strike down a discriminatory practice in Baltimore City. Second, under the holding in Long v. Robinson, petitioner’s criminal trial and punishment should not have taken place. Instead, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner should have been proceeded against and, if found to have been delinquent, dealt with as a juvenile without suffering a criminal conviction and the subsequent disabilities which such conviction imposes. Third, even if the “three prong test” of Linkletter v. Walker, Stovall v. Denno, and subsequent cases is pertinent here, I believe that the application of the Linkletter and Stovall criteria requires that full retroactivity be accorded the holding in Long v. Robinson.
I.
Under the Supreme Court’s cases, whether a particular judicial decision on a constitutional issue should be applied *720prospectively or retroactively, depends in the first instance on whether or not the decision declared a new principle of constitutional law. If it did announce a new principle, then other considerations for determining whether it should be applied retroactively, such as the three prong test set forth in Stovall v. Denno and other cases, may become relevant. But if the judicial ruling in question did not represent a departure from settled principles, it should be given full retroactive effect regardless of other considerations.
That the principle of nonretroactivity only comes into play in connection with decisions declaring new doctrine has been made clear by the Supreme Court on many occasions. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra, a civil antitrust action, the Supreme Court held that it did not have to decide whether the principle of nonretroactivity should be applied beyond the area of criminal law to certain antitrust decisions because those decisions did not involve a “novel” issue and did not overrule earlier cases. The Court there stated (392 U. S. at 496, emphasis supplied):
“The theory of the Court of Appeals seems to have been that when a party has significantly relied upon a clear and established doctrine, and the retrospective application of a newly declared doctrine would upset that justifiable reliance to his substantial injury, considerations of justice and fairness require that the new rule apply prospectively only. Pointing to recent decisions of this Court in the area of the criminal law, the Court of Appeals could see no reason why the considerations which had favored only prospective application in those cases should not be applied as well as in the civil area, especially in a treble-damage action. There is, of course, no reason to confront this theory unless we have before us a situation in which there was a clearly declared judicial doctrine upon which United relied and under which its conduct was lawful, a doctrine which was overruled in favor of a new rule *721according to which conduct performed in reliance upon the old rule would have been unlawful. Because we do not believe that this case presents such a situation, we have no occasion to pass upon the theory of the Court of Appeals.
“Neither the opinion in Alcoa [United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)] nor the opinion in American Tobacco [American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 66 S. Ct. 1125, 90 L. Ed. 1575 (1946)] indicated that the issue involved was novel, that innovative principles were necessary to resolve it, or that the issue had been settled in prior cases in a manner contrary to the view held by those courts. In ruling that it was not necessary to exclude competitors to be guilty of monopolization, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied upon a long line of cases in this Court stretching back to 1912. 148 F. 2d, at 429. The conclusion that actions which will show monopolization are not ‘limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial’ was also premised on earlier opinions of this Court, particularly United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 116, 52 S. Ct. 460, 76 L. Ed. 999 (1932).”
In Desist v. United States, supra, the issue was whether the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), should be applied retroactively, and the petitioner’s initial argument for retroactivity was that Katz had not overruled any prior case. The Court, however, held that it was “compelled to decide whether” Katz's “application should be limited to the future” because Katz represented a “clear break with the past,” and had overruled Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928). The Court in Desist explained (394 U. S. at 247):
“We are met at the outset with the petitioners’ contention that Katz does not actually present a *722choice between prospective or retroactive application of new constitutional doctrine. The Court in that decision, it is said, did not depart from any existing interpretation of the Constitution, but merely confirmed the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between ‘trespassory’ searches and those in which there was no physical penetration of the protected premises.”
And the Court continued (394 U. S. at 247-248, emphasis supplied):
“But this contention misconstrues our opinion in Katz. Our holding there that Goldman and Olmstead ‘can no longer be regarded as controlling,’ 389 U. S., at 353, 88 S. Ct., at 512, recognized that those decisions had not been overruled until that day. True, the principles they expressed had been modified. The belief that an oral conversation could not be the object of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ had not survived. And in Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, we had cautioned that the scope of the Fourth Amendment could not be ascertained by resort to the ‘ancient niceties of tort or real property law.’ 365 U. S., at 511, 81 S. Ct., at 682. But the assumption persisted that electronic surveillance did not offend the Constitution unless there was an ‘actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’ While decisions before Katz may have reflected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of the constitutional validity of electronic surveillance, the Court consistently reiterated those tests and declined invitations to abandon them. However clearly our holding in Katz may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past, and we are thus compelled to decide whether its application should be limited to the future. ”
*723See also Chevron Oil Company v. Hudson, 404 U. S. 97, 106, 92 S. Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (“the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law . . . .”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U. S. 192, 197-198, 206-207, 210-211, 93 S. Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (both the plurality opinion of the Chief Justice and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
Consequently, the Supreme Court cases in the criminal law area which have considered whether a decision should just be applied prospectively all involve decisions which overruled or which were inconsistent with earlier decisions on the particular issues involved. For example, Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 278, 92 S. Ct. 916, 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1972); Arsenault v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 393 U. S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U. S. 2, 89 S. Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968); and Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2, 84 S. Ct. 80-81, 11 L.Ed.2d 41 (1963), all dealt with whether the right to the assistance of counsel at various stages in state criminal proceedings, announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), should be applied prospectively only. Gideon, of course, had overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942). The case which first announced the rule of nonretroactivity for certain constitutional holdings in criminal cases, Linkletter v. Walker, supra, was concerned with whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which had overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949), should be applied retroactively. In Tehan v. United States, 382 U. S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966), the issue was whether Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), which, when coupled with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), overruled Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223 (1947), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908), should be applied retroactively. The remaining cases dealing with the retroactivity of constitutional decisions in the criminal law area have similarly concerned decisions *724overturning previous decisions and announcing new constitutional principles.2
*725Moreover, the language and reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in the cases applying the so-called “three prong test” to determine whether a constitutional ruling should be applied retroactively, confirm that any consideration of nonretroactive application is limited to a decision announcing new constitutional doctrine. For example, in Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U. S. at 624, after discussing the Austinian view of judicial decisions and *726its adoption in the more recent Supreme Court cases (as opposed to the so-called Blackstonian view reflected in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178 (1886)), the Court stated:
“Implicit in such an approach [the Austinian view] is the admission when a case is overruled that the earlier decision was wrongly decided. However, rather than being erased by the later overruling decision it is considered as an existing juridical fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided under it are not to be disturbed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The reasoning of the Court underlying the nonretroactivity principle, throughout its opinion in Linkletter, was that “decisions though later overruled, ‘are law none the less for intermediate transactions’ ” (381 U. S. at 625); that the “ ‘past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration’ ” (ibid.); and that “the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior to Mapp is ‘an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored’ ” (id. at 636).
The very manner in which the three prong test for determining nonretroactivity was set forth in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U. S. at 297, which is the formulation set forth in all of the subsequent cases dealing with the issue, shows that the rule of nonretroactivity has application only where a new constitutional doctrine is announced. To repeat, the Court stated in Stovall:
“The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Williams v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 651:
“In Linkletter v. Walker ... we declined to give complete retroactive effect to the exlusionary rule *727of Mapp v. Ohio .... Relying on prior cases, we firmly rejected the idea that all new interpretations of the Constitution must be considered always to have been the law and that prior constructions to the contrary must always be ignored.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court’s decision just this past term in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 95 S. Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975), confirms that the rule of nonretroactivity for constitutional adjudications depends initially on whether the decision in question has announced a new constitutional principle. The issue in Peltier was whether Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), was to be applied retroactively. Almeida-Sanchez had held that a search of an automobile without a warrant and without probable cause, conducted twenty-five miles from the Mexican border by border patrol agents, violated the Fourth Amendment so as to require the exclusion of the evidence resulting from the search. The majority opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, had held in Peltier that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the holding in Almeida-Sanchez, not because of any considerations of retroactivity or nonretroactivity, but because “Almeida-Sanchez overruled no prior decision of this [the Supreme] Court and instead ‘reaffirmed well-established Fourth Amendment standards.’ ” (422 U. S. at 533.) The dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit, while “expressing some doubt about the applicability of the old law-new law test as a precondition to retroactive analysis,” nevertheless “concluded that Almeida-Sanchez had announced a new constitutional rule,” overruling a uniform course of decisions by several United States Courts of Appeal upholding the statutory authority and administrative regulations upon which the border patrol agents relied. (422 U. S. at 534.) Consequently, the dissenters in the Ninth Circuit believed that retroactivity was to be determined by the three prong test summarized in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U. S. at 297.
*728The Supreme Court in Peltier reversed, not on the ground that “the old law-new law test” was not applicable as a 'precondition to retroactive analysis, but on the ground that prior to “Almeida-Sanchez, roving border patrol searches under sec. 287 (a)(3) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1357 (a)(3)] were upheld repeatedly against constitutional attack” by the United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 540. The Court’s opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, disagreeing with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan that the “decision in Almeida-Sanchez . . . presents no question of prospectivity” because it did not constitute “ ‘ a sharp break in the line of earlier authority’ ” (id. at 544), pointed out that the border patrol agents had acted “in reliance upon a validly enacted statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval” and that parties may “reasonably rely upon . . . legal pronouncements emanating from sources other than this Court.. . .” (Id. at 541-542.) The majority opinion of the Court thus treated the exclusionary rule decision in Almeida-Sanchez as representing a “new constitutional principle . . . [to] be accorded only prospective application” under the test applied in Linkletter v. Walker, supra, and other similar cases. (Id. at 535.)
While Peltier makes it clear that a “new constitutional principle” for purposes of the rule of nonretroactivity need not always stem from the overruling of a prior United States Supreme Court decision, and while the majority and dissenting opinions in Peltier disagreed over the nature of the lower federal court decisions involved and the extent to which border patrol agents could have justifiably relied on them {id. at 540-542), nevertheless the majority opinion did appear to reaffirm that the question of nonretroactivity only arises with respect to decisions declaring new constitutional doctrine.
It is entirely reasonable to limit consideration of the Linkletter and Stovall rule of nonretroactivity to those decisions declaring a new constitutional principle or doctrine. For example, at the time of the defendant’s trial in Linkletter, *729the admission at the trial of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was proper under Wolf v. Colorado, supra. It was only the later change in authoritative decisions, coming with Mapp v. Ohio, supra, that in retrospect cast doubt upon the propriety of the admission of the evidence. But where there is no change in the applicable constitutional doctrine, and the defendant’s criminal conviction violated constitutional requirements then recognized to be in effect, the defendant’s conviction was improper at the time it occurred. Absent a knowing waiver of his then existing constitutional right at the time of his trial, traditional principles would permit him to challenge his conviction later in a collateral proceeding on the constitutional ground. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 341 A. 2d 388 (1975).3
Moreover, where a decision announces no new constitutional principle, there is no basis for the argument that public officials “relied” upon the “old” constitutional principle. Finally, where a decision involves merely the application of settled constitutional principles to a particular practice, there is much less justification for public officials to complain about the effect of the decision upon the administration of justice.
Long v. Robinson, supra, declared no new constitutional doctrine, overruled no prior authority, but merely applied long established principles under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down an arbitrary and discriminatory practice in Maryland.4 Pursuant to local law, youths between the ages of sixteen *730and eighteen who were charged with committing an offense in Baltimore City were initially brought before the criminal court and tried and punished as adult criminals, whereas under the public general law of the State, youths between the ages of sixteen and eighteen who were charged with committing the same offense elsewhere in Maryland were initially brought before the juvenile court and, absent a waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, were tried and dealt with as juveniles, without suffering a criminal conviction and its attendant disabilities. Judge Watkins’s opinion in Long v. Robinson indicates that the State suggested no rational basis or reasonable justification for the distinction. In fact, the evidence of the State officials, reviewed in the Long v. Robinson opinion, was to the effect that there was no basis for distinguishing between sixteen and seventeen year olds who committed offenses in Baltimore City and those who committed offenses in other parts of the State. 316 F. Supp. at 27-30. Moreover, nothing in the history of the discriminatory practice, or the history of juvenile proceedings in Maryland set out in the majority opinion in this case, suggests any reasonable ground for the discrimination.
The only basis for the discrimination suggested by the majority in the instant case is that “the youth of Baltimore City were regarded by the General Assembly as reaching that state of maturity where they should be prosecuted as adults two years earlier than their peers in the remainder of the State.” This, however, could not have been the basis or rationale for the different treatment, because the distinction was. not dependent upon whether the defendant was a “youth of Baltimore City” or a resident elsewhere in the State. Whether a sixteen or seventeen year old was criminally prosecuted or treated as a juvenile for committing a “criminal” or “delinquent” act depended upon where the offense was committed, not upon where in the State the youth resided. Code (1974), § 3-818 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Code (1957, 1966 Repl. Vol., 1969 Cum. Supp.), Art. 26, § 70-4 (1); Code (1957, 1963 Repl. Vol.), Maryland Rule 901. In Long v. Robinson *731itself, one of the plaintiffs in the federal court, who was facing trial as a criminal defendant in the then Municipal Court of Baltimore City, was a sixteen year old resident of Howard County who happened to be temporarily in Baltimore City for a medical appointment when he allegedly committed an offense in Baltimore City. 316 F. Supp. at 24.
While the cases applying the equal protection clause have indicated that there is a wide toleration for territorial distinctions within a state, nevertheless the state’s authority is limited to drawing “reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within its borders.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28, n. 66, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294, n. 66, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (emphasis supplied). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”) (emphasis supplied); Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 389, 325 A. 2d 398 (1974) (“. . . the Maryland cases seem to require a rational basis for territorial discrimination as between different parts of the State.”) (emphasis supplied); Horowitz and Neitring, Intrastate Equal Protection 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 787 (1968). Almost forty years ago this Court stated with respect to the requirements of the equal protection clause, Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 269-270, 183 A. 534 (1935):
“Nor, apart from any other consideration, is there any rational basis for the territorial classification made by the act, for there is no such difference in the conditions existing within the state outside of Baltimore City and those within its limits, in reference to the business of paper hanging, which would make the pursuit of it in the city a menace to the public health and safety but harmless beyond its limits. It is, of course, well settled that the legislature may restrict the application of statutes to localities less in extent than the state ... as the exigencies of the several parts of the state may require. But broad as that power is, it may not be used to deprive the citizens *732of one part of the state of rights and privileges which they enjoy in common with the citizens of all other parts of the state, unless there is some difference in conditions in the territory selected and that not affected by the statute, sufficient to afford some basis, however slight, for the classification.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Since there was no reasonable ground or basis for the distinction between youths committing offenses in Baltimore City and youths committing offenses elsewhere in the State, the striking down of this discriminatory practice •in Long v. Robinson clearly represented an application of well-settled equal protection principles to the facts of a particular case.5 Long v. Robinson announced no new constitutional doctrine and, consequently, should be given full retroactive effect without regard to the criteria set forth in Stovall v. Denno and Linkletter v. Walker.6
II.
Another circumstance in which a constitutional ruling should be applied retroactively to a criminal matter, independently of the Linkletter, Stovall, etc. analysis, is where the ruling would have prevented the criminal trial from taking place, or the type of punishment from being imposed.
While the principle that certain constitutional decisions should only be applied prospectively has on occasion been invoked in other areas,7 for the most part this principle of nonretroactivity is limited to matters of' procedure in the *733course of criminal proceedings, from investigation and arrest through trial and disposition. For example, probably a majority of the cases holding that constitutional rulings should not be applied retroactively have involved the exclusionary rules designed to enforce compliance with the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Several other cases where the Court was concerned with whether or not constitutional rulings should be given retroactive effect have involved aspects of the right to counsel at different stages of the criminal process. The remaining cases applying the Linkletter and Stovall analysis to criminal matters have involved other procedural rights under the Bill of Rights or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that certain types of cases, not involving questions of procedure arising during the criminal proceedings, are not susceptible to the analysis of Linkletter, Stovall, and similar cases. In Robinson v. Neil, supra, 409 U. S. at 507-508, the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated (emphasis supplied):
“We do not believe that this case readily lends itself to the analysis established in Linkletter. Certainly, there is nothing in Linkletter or those cases following it to indicate that all rules and constitutional interpretations arising under the first eight Amendments must be subjected to the analysis there enunciated. Linkletter itself announced an exception to the general rule of retroactivity in a decision announcing that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), would be given prospective effect only. Linkletter, and the other cases relied upon by the Sixth Circuit, dealt with those constitutional interpretations bearing on the use of evidence or on a particular mode of trial. Those procedural rights and methods of conducting *734trials, however, do not encompass all of the rights found in the first eight Amendments. Guarantees that do not relate to these procedural rules cannot, for retroactivity purposes, he lumped conveniently together in terms of analysis. For the purpose and effect of the various constitutional guarantees vary sufficiently among themselves so as to affect the necessity for prospective rather than retrospective application.
“Linkletter indicated, for instance, that only those procedural rules affecting ‘the very integrity of the factfinding process’ would be given retrospective effect. 381 U. S., at 639, 85 S. Ct., at 1743. In terms of some nonprocedural guarantees, thr test is simply not appropriate. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), for example, this Court held that in the situation there presented imposition of the death penalty was not constitutionally permissible. Yet, while this holding does not affect the integrity of the factfinding process, we have not hesitated to apply it retrospectively without regard to whether the rule meets the Linkletter criteria. E.g., Walker v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 753.”
The Court in Robinson v. Neil went on to hold that Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 90 S. Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), which had held that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited separate state and municipal prosecutions for the same offense, was to be given full retroactive application because the Waller ruling would have prevented the state criminal trial and conviction from taking place at all. The Court, although pointing out that the distinction which it was drawing was not “ironclad,” explained (409 U. S. at 509, emphasis supplied):
“The guarantee against double jeopardy is significantly different from procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter line of cases to have *735prospective effect only. While this guarantee, like the others, is a constitutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial. A number of the constitutional rules applied prospectively only under the Linkletter cases were found not to affect the basic fairness of the earlier trial, but to have been directed instead to collateral purposes such as the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, Mapp v. Ohio, supra. In Waller, however, the Court’s ruling was squarely directed to the prevention of the second trial’s taking place at all, even though it might have been conducted with a scrupulous regard for all of the constitutional procedural rights of the defendant.”
See also Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U. S. at 437, n. 1, that “[t]here can be no doubt of the ‘retroactivity’ of the Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland,” 395 U. S. 784, 88 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), holding the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to state criminal proceedings.
Again in United States v. United States Coin and Currency, supra, 401 U. S. at 722-724, the Court held that a constitutional ruling which would have stopped the trial and punishment from taking place, should be applied retroactively. Marchetti v. United States, supra, 390 U. S. 39, and Grosso v. United States, supra, 390 U. S 62, had, in overruling earlier cases, held that the criminal conviction of gamblers who asserted their privilege against self-incrimination as a ground for not complying with certain aspects of the federal gambling tax law, was constitutionally precluded. United States v. United States Coin and Currency, supra, held that Marchetti and Grosso also precluded the forfeiture of the gambling proceeds, and should be applied retroactively on the ground that the conduct was constitutionally immune from punishment. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, the Court said (401 U. S. at 723, emphasis supplied):
*736“Unlike some of our earlier retroactivity decisions, we are not here concerned with the implementation of a procedural rule which does not undermine the basic accuracy of the factfinding process at trial. Linkletter v. Walker . . . ; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott . . . ; Johnson v. New Jersey . . . ; Stovall v. Denno .... Rather, Marchetti and Grosso dealt with the kind of conduct that cannot constitutionally be punished in the first instance. These cases held that gamblers in Angelini’s position had the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the face of the statute’s command that they submit reports which could incriminate them. In the absence of a waiver of that right, such persons could not properly be prosecuted at all.”
And, in language particularly apt to the majority’s discussion in the instant case concerning the superior fact finding procedures in the criminal court, the Supreme Court in United States Coin and Currency went on (401 U. S. at 724):
“In the case before us, however, even the use of impeccable factfinding procedures could not legitimate a verdict decreeing forfeiture, for we have held that the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment. No circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity.”
Furthermore, even where the constitutional ruling would not have prevented the criminal trial, but would have prevented the imposition of the particular penalty involved, the rule of “complete retroactivity” is applicable. Thus, Walker v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 753 (1972); Stewart v. Massachusetts, supra; and other cases decided at the same time, all gave retroactive effect to the ruling in Furman v. Georgia, supra, that the imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment. For a discussion of these cases, see Robinson v. Neil, supra. See also the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Gosa v. *737Mayden, supra, 413 U. S. at 679: “But neither are we concerned, as we were in Robinson, with a constitutional right that operates to prevent another trial from taking place at all.”
Applying these Supreme Court cases to the decision in Long v. Robinson dictates that Long be given full retroactive effect. Although the majority opinion in the present case compares the procedural rights applicable in a criminal trial with those applicable in juvenile proceedings, this is simply irrelevant. Long v. Robinson was not concerned with procedural rights during a trial, but with the unconstitutionality of subjecting certain youths to criminal proceedings and criminal punishment at the same time that other youths of the same age, committing the same acts, were not subject to prosecution and punishment as criminals.9 If the ruling in Long v. Robinson were applied to petitioner, he would not have initially been subject to a criminal trial and to punishment in a Department of Correction institution. Instead, he would have been treated as a juvenile in proceedings which, as this Court has stated repeatedly, are not criminal and the “dispositions are not punishment for crime.” In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 523, 255 A. 2d 419 (1969). And see In Matter of Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 415, 194 A. 2d 88 (1963).
III.
As previously discussed, the three criteria set forth in the cases applying new constitutional rulings prospectively only, are “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Gosa v. Mayden, supra, 413 U. S. at 679; Michigan v. Payne, *738supra, 412 U. S. at 51; Desist v. United States, supra, 394 U. S. at 249; Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U. S. at 297. And see Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U. S. at 636-639. Even if the retroactivity of Long v. Robinson were to be governed by these criteria, retroactive effect should be accorded the Long ruling so as to provide relief in the present case.
The most important of the criteria for determining the retroactivity of a constitutional ruling is the purpose of the ruling. If the “purpose” test clearly points to retroactivity, the ruling is given “complete retroactive effect,” and “[njeither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.” Williams v. United States, supra, 401 U. S. at 653, and cases therein cited. See also Michigan v. Payne, supra, 412 U. S. at 55; Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U. S. 203, 204, 92 S. Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972).
Where a major purpose of a constitutional ruling does not relate to the fairness or propriety of the verdict or sentence, but has other objects such as insuring police compliance with the restrictions imposed upon them by the Fourth Amendment (e.g., United States v. Peltier, supra; Linkletter v. Walker, supra), the Supreme Court has usually limited the effect of the ruling to subsequent cases. On the other hand, where the purpose of the ruling bears most heavily upon the fairness of the adjudicatory process against a defendant, such as the right to counsel during trial (Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, supra) or the right of confrontation (Berger v. California, supra), the ruling will normally be given retroactive effect.
Typically, where a constitutional holding is aimed at the adjudicatory process itself, rather than having some extraneous object, it is said to “infect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial” (Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U. S. at 298) or the “ ‘fair determination’ of [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence” (Roberts v. Russell, supra, 392 U. S. at 294). Consequently, the Court has often used such phrases in deciding whether the “purpose” of the *739ruling points to retroactivity. The majority in the instant case, because, inter alia, it concludes that Long v. Robinson did not relate to “determining guilt or innocence” or to the “fact-finding process” at trial, and that the fact-finding process in the Criminal Court of Baltimore was better than that in a juvenile proceeding, holds that Long should be applied prospectively only.
However, the “purpose” criteria is broader than this. When the Supreme Court has referred to the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” it has meant something more than whether or not the defendant engaged in a particular action. Where a ruling cast doubt about the “verdict of guilt,” Mackey v. United States, supra, 401 U. S. at 675, it would seem that it should be applied retroactively. Moreover, if the ruling does not affect the criminal verdict but relates only to the sentencing procedure, and may have affected only the punishment imposed, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the purpose of the ruling requires retroactive application. McConnell v. Rhay, supra, 393 U. S. at 3 (“The right to counsel at sentencing . . . relates to ‘the very integrity of the fact-finding process.’ ”); Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U. S. at 523, n. 22 (a ruling striking down a jury selection procedure which related only to the sentence to be imposed or recommended by the jury, was applied retroactively on the ground that it undermined the integrity of the “ ‘process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate”).
The ruling in Long v. Robinson, while it may not have related to the fairness of the procedure for deciding whether a sixteen year old did a particular act, was directly concerned with the fairness of the guilty verdict and the sentence. Under the Long holding, petitioner would not have been subject to trial initially as an adult and, absent a w.aiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, would not have suffered a criminal conviction and punishment in an adult prison. Obviously, the Long ruling was directly related to the verdict and sentence to be imposed, and thus the “purpose” of the ruling requires that it be applied retroactively.
In another respect, the “purpose” standard dictates *740applying Long v. Robinson retroactively to grant petitioner relief. The majority opinion in the instant case seems to suggest that the only purpose in trying a youth as a juvenile in Maryland was to rehabilitate him, and that such purpose would only relate to the future. However, the Maryland Legislature has long provided that one of the “purposes” of juvenile proceedings is “[t]o remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the, consequences of criminal behavior.” Code (1974), § 3-802 (a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. This stated “purpose” in the statutes relating to juvenile proceedings clearly calls for applying Long retroactively to actions like the present one. The very relief which petitioner seeks is to remove the taint and the disabilities which he suffers, such as loss of the right to vote, because he was improperly convicted of engaging in criminal behavior instead of having been dealt with as a juvenile.
Since the “purpose” standard dictates that Long v. Robinson should be given retrospective application, the criteria of “reliance” and “effect on the administration of justice,” as previously mentioned, are not particularly relevant. However, both of these criteria also point to retroactivity.
The Supreme Court, in discussing the factor of “reliance” upon old constitutional standards, almost invariably has been referring to the reliance upon prior judicial authority setting forth or upholding the “old” standards. As discussed in Part I, supra, there was no prior authority upholding the discriminatory practice in Baltimore City. The only prior reported decision on the subject had, on equal protection grounds, invalidated the type of discrimination involved. Moreover, for the reasons also, delineated in Part I, supra, any reliance by Maryland officials on the statute authorizing the discrimination would not have been reasonable or justified, and the Supreme Court opinions have repeatedly indicated that the reliance must be “justified.” See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, supra, 392 U. S. at 295.
Turning to the effect upon the administration of justice by applying Long v. Robinson retroactively, it would seem that *741the impact would be minimal. Unlike the many cases in the Supreme Court concerned with the retroactivity of constitutional rulings in criminal cases, the impact of Long v. Robinson is local, not affecting the administration of justice throughout the nation or even the entire State of Maryland. Instead, it would only affect convictions in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, of youths between sixteen and eighteen, during a certain span of time. It would involve few people who are still incarcerated, conceded by the State at the time of oral argument in this case to be only about sixteen, and now probably fewer. Expunging the records of those improperly convicted of criminal offenses in light of Long should present no insuperable administrative burden, as the court records are all in one clerk’s office, that of the Criminal Court of Baltimore. And if expungement should turn out to present a serious administrative burden, at least those in petitioner’s position are entitled to declaratory judgments voiding their convictions, thereby restoring their right to vote and removing the other disabilities flowing from a criminal conviction.
In sum, for several reasons, I would agree with the decision in Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F. 2d 49 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U. S. 922 (1973), that Long v. Robinson should be given full retroactive effect.
Judge Levine authorizes me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.

. In his bill of complaint, petitioner sought a declaration that his conviction for the four burglaries committed after his sixteenth birthday and before his eighteenth birthday be declared null and void because the Juvenile Court did not waive its jurisdiction over those offenses before his trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. He also sought a declaration that his conviction for the two burglaries committed before his sixteenth birthday be declared null and void because, although the Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction over those offenses, no hearing was granted to him before the waiver order. In Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F. 2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a case from Maryland, held that a juvenile was entitled to a hearing and to representation by counsel at the hearing before the Juvenile Court could waive its jurisdiction. The court also held that its decision was to be applied retroactively. The petitioner, throughout these proceedings, has consistently argued that retroactive effect should be given to Kemplen as well as Long. Neither the trial court, nor the Court of Special Appeals, nor the majority opinion of this Court, has drawn a distinction between the two questions. Consequently, I shall not discuss the retroactivity of Kemplen as a separate issue. However, for essentially the same reasons set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Kemplen, 428 F. 2d at 175-178, I believe that Maryland courts should give full retroactive effect to the holding in Kemplen.

. The retroactivity of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which had overruled numerous prior cases such as Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, 78 S. Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958), and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U. S. 504, 78 S. Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523 (1958), was before the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719,86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966). See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).
In Stovall v. Denno, supra, the question was the retroactivity of United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), which, in holding that the Constitution required the exclusion of certain tainted identification evidence, had overruled the “virtually unanimous weight of [prior] authority.” (388 U. S. at 300.)
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 523, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), which held that in a capital case prospective jurors could not be excluded because they had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty, and that the ruling should be applied retroactively, overruled Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 298, 12 S. Ct. 617, 628, 36 L. Ed. 429 (1892).
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, 88 S. Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968), applied retroactively Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which had overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957), and had held that “admission at a joint trial of a defendant’s extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant violated the codefendant’s right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” (392 U. S. at 293.)
In De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 88 S. Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), the Court declined to apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), retroactively. Duncan and Bloom had in turn overruled Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597 (1900), and other “past opinions of this Court to the effect that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not applicable to the States.” (392 U. S. at 634.) See also Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U. S. 31, 95 S. Ct. 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790 (1975).
In Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 89 S. Ct. 61, 21 L.Ed.2d 212 (1968), concerning the admissibility in State trials of evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Communications Act, the Court declined to apply retroactively Lee v. Florida, 392 U. S. 378, 88 S. Ct. 2096, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1968), which had overruled Schwartz v. State of Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 73 S. Ct. 232, 97 L. Ed. 231 (1952).
Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314, 89 S. Ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 508 (1969), gave retroactive application to Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), which in conjunction with Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), overruled West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 24 S. Ct. 650, 48 L. Ed. 965 (1904), concerning the application in State trials of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 437, n. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the Court stated that Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause was applicable to the. States, should be applied retroactively. Benton had overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 *725S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937). See also Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, 93 S. Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973).
Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 91 S. Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971) , and Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 802, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), were concerned with whether Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), which narrowed the scope of permissible searches incident to arrest, should be applied retroactively. Chimel had overruled United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
Both United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 91 S. Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971), and Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971), were concerned with the retroactivity of two different applications of the holding in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, 88 S. Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968). Marchetti and Grosso had overruled United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 73 S. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. 754 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419, 75 S. Ct. 415, 99 L. Ed. 475 (1955), with respect to the applicability of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination to the registration and wagering tax requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 4401, 4411, 4412, 4901.
In Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U. S. 845, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972) , and several other cases decided at the same time, the Court applied Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), retroactively. Furman, of course, was inconsistent with a multitude of cases concerning the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of the death penalty.
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 93 S. Ct. 1966, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973), dealt with the retroactivity of the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which had overruled numerous prior cases concerning the extent of a trial judge’s discretion in re-sentencing. See 412 U. S. at 55-56.
The Court in Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U. S. 665, 93 S. Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973), considered whether to apply O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969), retroactively. O’Callahan had held that because of the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments concerning grand jury indictment and trial by jury, “a military tribunal ordinarily may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has no service connection.” 413 U. S. at 673. This holding was, in the language of Mr. Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion, a “ ‘clear break with the past’ ” and a “new approach” because the “Court long and consistently had recognized that military status in itself was sufficient for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction.” 413 U. S. at 672-673.

. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that, with respect to the retroactivity of a constitutional holding, a distinction should be made between cases on direct review from a criminal conyiction and those involving a later collateral attack upon the criminal conviction. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, supra, 401 U. S. at 651-652; Desist v. United States, supra, 394 U. S. at 253.

. While a 1967 opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, Graves v. State, No. 201, Initial Term, 1967, decided July 21, 1967, had upheld the practice, Graves was an unreported per curiam, opinion, and as such constituted no precedential authority upholding the discrimination. See Maryland Rule 1092 b.

. As pointed out by Judge Watkins in Long v. Robinson, supra 316 F.Supp. at 28-29, as long ago as 1928 the Supreme Court of Missouri invalidated on equal protection grounds a similar practice under the Missouri statutes. State v. Gregori, 318 Mo. 998, 2 S.W.2d 747 (1928).

. Even if Long v. Robinson had involved a “new" application of the requirement that no. state shall deny to any persons the equal protection of the laws, I would still doubt that it should be regarded as announcing a new constitutional principle so as to bring into consideration the Linkletter rule of nonretroactivity. Cf. United States v. United States Coin and Currency, supra, 401 U. S. at 728 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).

. E.g., the plurality opinion of the Chief Justice in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 411 U. S. at 193-210.

. See, e.g., cases discussed in fn. 2, supra.

. This, of course, distinguishes the instant case and Long from Gosa v. Mayden, supra, upon which the majority relies. Gosa was concerned with the retroactivity of O’Callahan v. Parker, supra, regarding court martial trials of non-service connected crimes. As the plurality opinion in Gosa makes clear, the question was not whether or not one was initially subject to criminal prosecution for non-service connected crimes but whether he was entitled to the procedural rights set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See 413 U. S. at 677-679.