Court Opinion

ID: 9642145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:49:56.648411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:43.637158
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. PennDOT’s demolition of the bridge spanning 1-95 caused the City of Chester no harm. Indeed, the demolition benefitted the City by eliminating ambulatory access to a deteriorated, dangerous railroad bridge already closed to vehicular traffic by the City. Like the unanimous Commonwealth Court en banc, I would hold that the City is entitled to no compensation for PennDOT’s demolition of the 1-95 bridge.
The 1-95 bridge in controversy was built approximately two decades ago by PennDOT to preserve the flow of traffic on a local City street severed by 1-95. This street, Finland Drive, provided residents with convenient ambulatory and vehicular access to the City’s Crozer Park. With the 1-95 bridge installed, residents wishing to enjoy the park could travel north on Finland Drive, crossing the 1-95 bridge and *401then a wooden bridge owned by the B & 0 Railroad spanning the railroad company’s tracks. Residents could also gain access to Crozer Park by way of other city streets, approximately ten to twelve blocks from Finland Drive.
The wooden railroad bridge, built in 1885, began to deteriorate stnerely because of age, fires, and vandalism. In 1971, well before PennDOT’s demolition of the 1-95 bridge, the City engineer closed the wooden bridge to vehicular traffic. A few pedestrians continued to use the unsafe structure. Although the record indicates that the City had informally requested the railroad to make repairs to the bridge, the City took no affirmative measures to preserve the wooden bridge as a viable, safe means of access to Orozer Park.
Thus, when PermDOT demolished the 1-95 bridge in 1976, it interrupted only pedestrian travel over the unsafe wooden structure. As the Commonwealth Court observed, “[t]he 1-95 bridge led in effect for a number of years to a dead end.”
Controlling here are this Court’s cases Involving a condemnor’s alleged inter feienee with access to property. It is well-settled under .Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code that
“where the result of a condemnor’s action is to compel the allegedly affected property owner to travel a short distance farther to reach the system of streets going in a specific direction, this slight inconvenience is not compensable. See. e. g., Spang & Co. v. Commonwealth, 281 Pa. 414, 126 A. 781 (1924); Department of Highways Appeal (Mitchell Condemnation Case), 209 Pa.Super. 288, 228 A.2d 53 (1967).”
Commonwealth v. Hession, 430 Pa. 273, 278, 242 A.2d 432, 434 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049, 89 S.Ct. 685, 21 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969). A fortiori, where as here the only result of the condemnor’s action is to interrupt unsafe ambulatory access to City property, no more than a “slight inconvenience” has occurred. Indeed, because access was unsafe, the condemnor’s action has, if anything, inured to the City’s *402benefit. An award of compensation in these circumstances is nothing short of a windfall.
The majority would depart from well-settled principles of compensation found in the Eminent Domain Code, and permit the City as much as $875,000, on the ground that the City “has an obligation to provide roads and other essential services to its citizens.” 434 A.2d at 703-704. See generally Pa. Gas & Water Co. v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 428 Pa. 74, 236 A.2d 112 (1967). On this record, revealing the City’s continuing failure to maintain Finland Drive as a means of access to Crozer Park, the majority’s assertion in no respect supports its result. For even if the City were obliged to maintain access to Crozer Park by way of Finland Drive, the record indicates that the City has been woefully remiss in fulfilling its obligation. Surely the City should not be permitted to recover an eminent domain award where this alleged obligation has not been fulfilled.
The majority’s remand for a determination of whether “the city would be willing to spend its own funds to replace the railroad bridge in some form ...” serves only to highlight its error. The Eminent Domain Code and our cases are clear that the only relevant inquiry is the “before and after” value of the property as a result of the condemnor’s action. See Act of June 22, 1964, P.L. 84, § 602, 26 P.S. § 1-602(a) (Supp.1980); Brown v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 159 A.2d 881 (1960). What the condemnee “would be willing” to do is irrelevant.
The unanimous Commonwealth Court en banc correctly applied the Eminent Domain Code and controlling case law and its order should be affirmed.