Court Opinion

ID: 9744320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:00:50.886081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.603009
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion.
Hoffman, J.
I am unable to agree with the result reached by the majority opinion in this case.
*124From the facts set out in the majority opinion it is not disputed that both parties knew the automobile door was going to be closed. Both were in an equal position to know that appellee’s finger was in a dangerous position. Both parties had a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to avoid injury.
In Hunsberger v. Wyman (1966), 247 Ind. 369, at 374-75, 216 N.E.2d 345, at 348-49, our Supreme Court stated:
“In this case we have two parties with the same knowledge and the same opportunity for knowledge. They each have the same duty to exercise reasonable care, which includes the duty to see and appreciate what can be seen and appreciated and to avoid danger. If the appellant as he testified, had no knowledge of any peril or danger, it seems impossible that the appellee could be charged with any knowledge of peril or danger to require some other action. Appellant has been unable to point out any action, omission, or condition which could be urged as negligence that was not also fully known to the appellant himself. Since the same standard must be imposed on both parties, it cannot be said that the duties upon appellee are greater than those upon the appellant.
“In the case of Chicago, Etc. R.Co. v. Sanders, supra, [(1908), 42 Ind.App. 585, at 587-88, 86 N.E. 430], the Appellate Court stated :
. There is nothing in the evidence justifying a finding of negligence on the part of the foreman and at the same time of freedom from negligence by the appellee. Their opportunities to determine the fact were at least equal. Appellee was entirely capable of forming an intelligent judgment, and of acting upon such judgment, so that the deduction that both were negligent or that neither was, is unavoidable. The finding is not, therefore, supported by the evidence.’ ”
This reasoning applies with equal force to the case at bar since there is nothing in the evidence justifying a finding of negligence on the part of appellant and at the same time freedom from negligence by the appellee.
*125Other jurisdictions have addressed this question. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana in Zibilich v. National Food Stores of Louisiana, Inc. (1960), 120 So. 2d 291, at 292, stated:
“If defendant’s agent was negligent in closing the door when he did, his negligence, insofar as it related to the proximate cause of the accident and the resulting injuries, was of little importance when compared with the more causally connected negligence of the plaintiff, who unnecessarily or erroneously placed her finger in a most dangerous position, the jamb of the vehicle’s door; ***.” See also: Giles v. Pick Hotels Corporation (6th Cir., 1956), 232 F. 2d 887; Abent v. Michigan Cab Co. (1937), 279 Mich. 617, 273 N.W. 289.
The same reasoning should apply in Indiana.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Note. — Reported at 346 N.E.2d 607.