Court Opinion

ID: 9476199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:49:53.646682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:10.752663
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Although the result seems harsh, Texas’ employment-at-will doctrine bars recovery by appellee Linda Aiello. Aiello’s employment with United Air Lines, Inc. (“United”) was for an indefinite period of service and, contrary to the jury’s finding, was covered by no express contractual agreement dealing with procedures for discharge. Thus, Aiello was an employee-at-will. According to the at-will doctrine, United could terminate Aiello’s employment at any time, with or without cause.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in the early case of East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, held that employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause. 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). The courts of Texas have strictly adhered to this holding.1 The Texas Su*1203preme Court’s recent decision in Sabine Pilot Service v. Hauck re-affirmed the at-will doctrine as expressed in East Line & R.R.R. Co. 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.1985), even though it concluded public policy requires “a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine”. This narrow exception covers “only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.” Id. at 735. It is inappropriate for this Court to decide inconsistently with such recent definitive state authority.
Even more recently, in Joachim v. AT & T Information Sys., the Fifth Circuit applied the at-will doctrine. 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1986). In Joachim, the plaintiff was terminated for failure to meet a sales quota. The employee argued that he was subjected to job discrimination, including termination, because he is a homosexual. The AT & T personnel handbook, summarizing company policies, provided that sexual preference would not be used as the basis for termination or for job discrimination. However, this court viewed the employee handbook as giving no express contractual right to the employee and as imposing no concomitant obligation on the employer. Hence, guidelines in the employee handbook did not alter the employee’s status as an employee-at-will who had no basis for challenging his discharge under Texas law.
The Joachim court cited the Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). The Reynolds court held that absent an express reciprocal agreement dealing with procedures for discharge, employee handbooks “constituted no more than general guidelines” and did not create contractual rights in the employees. Id. at 539. The court in Joachim stated that the situation in Joachim was identical to that in Reynolds. The Joachim court continued, “[ajppellant Joachim cites no Texas cases rejecting Reynolds', indeed, he cannot since there are none.” Id.
Reynolds suggests that an employee’s at-will status cannot be altered by an implied agreement. Any such agreement must be express. Later cases follow this principle. In Totman v. Control Data Corp., an employee brought a wrongful discharge action and attempted to rebut the employer’s summary judgment motion by referring to an employee handbook. 707 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986, no writ). The appellate court stated that the employee could not recover under Texas law because he failed to show the trial court an express agreement or written representation dealing with procedures for discharge of employees. Since he did not show such an express agreement, the employee retained his at-will status. Id. at 744.
Similarly, in Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., a discharged employee alleged an employee manual represented that no employee could be dismissed except for good and sufficient cause. 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The court, however, viewed the company manual as creating only an “implied” agreement. Id. Citing Reynolds, the court stated that employee handbooks, unaccompanied by an express agreement dealing with procedures for discharge of employees, do not create contractual rights regarding those procedures. Id. The employee showed no such express agreement.
The issue of employee benefit booklets was also raised in Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 665 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Molder, an employee terminated after 28 years with the company filed suit and argued that the employee handbooks should have been admitted into evidence as proof of an employment contract between the employee and his employer. The court likened the handbooks to those found in Hurt v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 444 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1969, no writ). In Hurt, the court decided that unsigned employee benefit booklets are insufficient memoranda of a contract of employment and do not satisfy the statute of frauds. 444 S.W.2d at 344-45. Of the *1204Hurt decision, the court in Molder noted that:
In Hurt, the court emphasized that none of the written material contained statements as to the type of work to be performed, or the wages to be paid. The court held that the employee benefit booklets were not directed towards contractually binding the employees, but were designed to retain the employees by their interest in the profits and benefits ____ The court held that these references indicated that the employment of the appellant was terminable at will.
665 S.W.2d at 175-76. Since the handbooks in Molder were similar to those found in Hurt, the Molder court decided that the handbooks clearly implied a terminable-at-will arrangement. 665 S.W.2d at 177.
Texas case law, with no present exceptions, holds that even if United had no reason for its discharge of Aiello, the discharge would still not be wrongful under Texas’ employment-at-will doctrine.2 If Aiello had expressly contracted with United for a definite period of employment, the cases indicate the at-will doctrine would not apply. The time period for Aiello’s employment, however, was indefinite. Further, United’s employee handbooks “constituted no more than general guidelines.” I cannot find any similarity between the cases cited by the majority, which involved express oral contracts, and the present case, which glaringly lacks an express promise to Mrs. Aiello. Moreover, unlike the majority, I find no Texas authority which countenances an “implied” employment contract as an exception to the at-will doctrine. To so hold creates a probably fatal breach in the wall Texas has erected in favor of employers. Thus, Aiello was an employee-at-will who has no basis for challenging her discharge under Texas law.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. In Texas, however, any exception to the employment-at-will doctrine has been very narrow. Statutorily-created exceptions in Texas include: discharge based on filing a worker’s compensation claim, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8307c (Vernon 1967 & Supp.1986): discharge based on membership or nonmembership in a union, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5207a (Vernon 1986); discharge based on active duty, in state military, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5765 § 7A (Vernon 1986); discharge based on jury service, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5207b (Vernon Supp.1986); *1203discharge based on discrimination, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5221k § 1.02 (Vernon Supp.1986).

. See also Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l v. Maurer, 675 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1984, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.App. — Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); United Transp. Union v. Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r. e.).