Court Opinion

ID: 9797697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:27:28.820429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:48.608623
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
SCHROEDER, Justice.
This is an appeal from a Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court decision granting the United States federal reserved water rights to all unappropriated flows in the Frank Church River of No Return, Gospel-Hump, and Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Areas, and the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area (HCNRA).
I.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The United States Congress passed the Wilderness Act, Pub.L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136), in 1964, establishing the National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of congressionally designated wilderness areas. Nearly four million acres within Idaho have been designated as wilderness under the system, including the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Area, designated in 1964, the Gospel-Hump Wilderness Area, designated in 1978, and the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness Area, designated in 1980. The Hells Canyon National Recreational Area was established in 1975 by the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area Act, Pub.L. No. 94-199, 89 Stat. 1117 (1975) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg(l)-(13)) (HCNRA Act).
The United States filed claims in 1996 for reserved water rights in the Frank Church River of No Return, the Selway-Bitterroot, and the Gospel Hump Wilderness Areas (Subcase No. 75-13605) based on the Wilderness Act.1 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136. The United States also claimed all the unappropriated flows originating in the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area based on the HCNRA Act (Subcase No. 79-13597).2 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg (1)-(13). Additionally, the United States claimed reserved water rights in the Boise, Payette, Clearwater, Nez Perce, Sawtooth, and Salmon-Challis National Forests under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) (Subcase No. 63-25239). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531.
The United States, the State of Idaho and other parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in each of the subcases. The SRBA district court consolidated Subcase Nos. 75-13605 and 79-13597 along with Sub-case No. 63-25239, and issued an order granting in part and denying in part the United States’ motions for summary judgment. The SRBA district court ruled that the United States is not entitled to reserved water rights in Subcase No. 63-25239 based on the MUSYA. The decision was affirmed by this Court. United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 988 P.2d 1199 (1999). The SRBA district court held that the United States is entitled to an implied reserved water right to all unappropriated water within the Frank Church River of No Return, the Gospel-Hump, and the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Areas based on the Wilderness Act. The SRBA district court’s ruling was interpreted by this Court to include all naturally flowing water into the wilderness areas, which would invalidate subsequent appropriations of water granted under state law on water that would otherwise flow into the wilderness areas. Finally, the SRBA district court held that the HCNRA Act expressly reserved all unappropriated flows of water in tributaries to the Snake River originating *919within the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area.
On rehearing the United States indicates that it does not claim water rights to the mainstem of the Salmon River under the Wilderness Act. However, the United States does make an express reservation of water claim to the mainstem of the Salmon River under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. That claim addressed in Potlatch Corp. and Hecla Mining v. United States, 134 Idaho 912, 12 P.3d 1256 (2000). The State of Idaho, the City of Challis, the City of Salmon, Potlatch Corporation and a number of other objectors have appealed. This appeal and rehearing only concerns the claims of the United States pursuant to the Wilderness Act and the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area Act.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court applies the same standard of review as that used by the district court when originally ruling on the motion. Mitchell v. Bingham Mem’l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The determination is to be based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). However, the Court will liberally construe the facts in favor of the party opposing the motion, together with all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id.
III.
THE WILDERNESS ACT DOES NOT CREATE IMPLIED WATER RIGHTS.
As outlined by this Court in United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 988 P.2d 1199 (1999), in order to determine whether there is a basis for a federal reserved water right the Court will assess (1) whether there has been a reservation of land, and, if so (2) whether the applicable acts of Congress contain an express reservation of water, and (3) if not, whether the applicable acts imply a reservation of water. Section 2(a) of the Wilderness Act sets forth the statement of policy which must be considered in this case:
Sec. 2. (a) In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this purpose there is hereby established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as “wilderness areas,’ and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness; and no Federal lands shall be designated as “wilderness areas’ except as provided for in this Act or by a subsequent Act.
In this case it is unnecessary to determine if there has been a reservation of land since other elements necessary for a reservation of water in the United States do not exist. The Wilderness Act does not expressly reserve water to fulfill any purpose of the Act. The question is whether federal water rights must be implied in the absence of an express reservation in the Act. The United States Supreme Court has discussed the question of reserved water rights in a variety of cases.
In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576, 577, 28 S.Ct. 207, 211, 212, 52 L.Ed. 340, 346, 347 (1908), the Supreme Court considered the effect of an agreement between the United States and various Indian tribes whereby the United States acquired considerable property previously held by the tribes. The Supreme Court was interpreting a negotiated agreement intended to provide habitable land for the tribes as they moved from a *920nomadic to a pastoral way of life. The Supreme Court determined that there was an implied right to water included in the agreement for the benefit of the land retained by the tribes. To hold otherwise would have meant the tribes gave up a lot of dry land to get a little dry land which was “practically valueless” without irrigation. Id. at 576, 28 S.Ct. at 211, 52 L.Ed. at 346. The Court noted that such agreements are interpreted in favor of the tribes, considering the significant difference in bargaining power between the United States and the tribes. The Court found that the implication of a water right followed from the nature of the agreement, the negotiations leading to that agreement, and the interpretation of such agreements and treaties in favor of the tribes. Id. at 577, 28 S.Ct. at 212, 52 L.Ed. at 346.
Little about the background and principles of Winters is applicable in this ease. Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a bargained for exchange between two entities. Without the use of water, the purpose of the agreement between the United States and the tribes would be defeated. The land retained by the tribes would not be fit for habitation. In contract terms there would be no consideration for the agreement if the tribes gave up land and did not receive the benefit of water to make the land they retained habitable. To the contrary, the Wilderness Act is not an exchange; it is an act of Congress that sets aside land, immunizing it from further development. There is no principle of construction requiring the Court to interpret the Wilderness Act to create an implied water right. The opposite inference should apply. Congress could define the scope of any water right as it chose. Congress did not define a water right as a specific purpose of the Wilderness Act. “The Supreme Court has held that in cases such as this, where water is not necessary to fulfill the specific purposes of a reservation, there arises a contrary inference that the ‘United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.’” United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 3015, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052, 1058 (1978).
In State of Arizona v. State of California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-602, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 1495-1499, 10 L.Ed.2d 542, 575-579 (1963), the Supreme Court again dealt with the question of water rights for Indian Reservations. The relevant portion of the decision was in the context of litigation concerning the interpretation and effect of comprehensive Congressional action determining multiple state rights to the waters of the Colorado River. However, the Indian Reservations had been created many years before from arid land that required water to sustain human life. The need for water was apparent at the time the Reservations were created, and the inclusion of water rights was confirmed by Congressional appropriations to finance and maintain irrigating projects. Id. at 598, 83 S.Ct. at 1496, 10 L.Ed.2d at 576. Following the logic of Winters, the Supreme Court determined that the creation of the Reservations carried with it the need for water to sustain human life on those Reservations. The purpose for the creation of Reservations was clear — to provide habitable land for the Indian tribes. The necessity for water was obvious, as was the case in Winters.
In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976), the Supreme Court considered “the scope of the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine.” Id. at 138, 96 S.Ct. at 2069, 48 L.Ed.2d at 533-534. At issue in Cappaert, was “whether the reservation of Devil’s Hole as a national monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated water.” Id. at 131, 96 S.Ct. at 2066, 48 L.Ed.2d at 529-530. The Presidential Proclamation creating the national monument observed that Devil’s Hole “contains a ‘remarkable underground pool.’ ” Id. at 132, 96 S.Ct. at 2066, 48 L.Ed.2d at 530. Further, the Proclamation made these statements:
WHEREAS the said pool is a unique subsurface remnant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which in Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley Lake System, and is unusual among caverns in that it is a solution area in distinctly striated limestone, while also owing its formation in part to fault action; and
WHEREAS the geological evidence that this subterranean pool is an integral part of the hydrographic history of the Death Valley region is further confirmed by the *921presence in this pool of a peculiar race of desert fish, and zoologists have demonstrated that this race of fish, which is found nowhere else in the world, evolved only after the gradual drying up of the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish population from the original ancestral stock that in Pleistocene times was common to the entire region; and WHEREAS the said pool is of such outstanding scientific importance that it should be given special protection, and such protection can be best afforded by making the said forty-acre tract containing the pool a part of the said monument____

Id.

The Proclamation expresses the primary purpose of setting aside Devil’s Hole as a monument to preserve the pool and a unique “race of fish which is found nowhere else in the world----” The purpose of the reservation would be defeated if Devil’s Hole were deprived of sufficient water to maintain the pool. The need for water is clear from the language of the Proclamation. The Supreme Court explained: “Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created.” Id. at 139, 96 S.Ct. at 2070, 48 L.Ed.2d at 534. Cappaert involved the express reservation of a pool to preserve fish. Because the reservation of the pool was express, the only matter for implication was the amount of water necessary to maintain the pool sufficiently to sustain the fish population. “The implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.” Id. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 2071, 48 L.Ed.2d at 535.
This Court recognized the principles of Cappaert in United States v. State, 131 Idaho 468, 959 P.2d 449 (1998), involving Public Water Reserve No. 107, an executive order issued by President Coolidge which withdrew “from settlement, location, sale or entry, and reserved for public use” public land containing “a spring or water hole, and all land within one quarter of a mile of every spring or water hole located on unsurveyed public land....” Id. at 470, 959 P.2d at 451. The executive order was clear on its face that it was intended to protect springs needed for stockwatering from private monopolization. Consequently, this Court recognized a federal reserved water right for the limited purpose of stockwatering. Id. at 472, 959 P.2d at 453.
Neither Cappaert nor this Court’s decision in United States v. State support the claim for a federal reserved right in the Wilderness Act. Each involved a clear intent by the President to reserve water. Congress made no such clear expression of intent in the Wilderness Act.
In United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978), the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he Court has previously concluded that Congress, in giving the President the power to reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve ‘appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.’ ” Id. at 699, 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3013, 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1056. The Supreme Court commented: “Each time this Court has applied the ‘implied-reservation-of-water doctrine, ’ it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” Id. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1057 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court’s analysis continued:
Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law. See California v. United States, 438 U.S., at 653-670, 678-679, 98 S.Ct., at 2990-2998, 3002-3003, 57 L.Ed.2d, at 1024-1035, 1040-1041. Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress’ express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, *922that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
Id. at 702, 98 S.Ct. at 3015, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1058 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the interplay between federal and state rights when land was reserved by the federal government, stating that
[w]hen it was Congress’ intent to maintain minimum instream flows within the confínes of a national forest, it expressly so directed, as it did in the case of the Lake Superior National Forest:
‘In order to preserve the shore lines, rapids, waterfalls, beaches and other natural features of the region in an unmodified state of nature, no further alteration of the natural water level of any lake or stream ... shall be authorized.’ 16 U.S.C. § 577b (1976 ed.).
Id. at 710, 98 S.Ct. at 3019, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1063.
While the New Mexico case dealt with the Multiple Use-Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 rather than the Wilderness Act, the principles set forth are applicable to the question before this Court.
Analysis of the claim by the United States begins with the language of the Wilderness Act to determine if implied water rights must be recognized to avoid defeat of the purposes of the Act. There is nothing within the Act that compels that conclusion. Unlike the Presidential Proclamation in Cappaert which expressly reserved a pool to maintain a unique variety of fish, the Wilderness Act does not define purposes that necessitate a reservation of water. Similarly, the purpose in Winters and State of Arizona v. State of California was to provide habitable land to Indian tribes which required that there be enough water for irrigation. Each of the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court involved agreements or a statement by which a standard for quantification could be determined — enough water for human habitation or preservation of a rare fish. There is no standard by which quantification of the amount of water could be determined in the Wilderness Act. Absence of any standard for quantification is indicative of the fact that quantification was not meant to be determined. There is no language in the Wilderness Act compelling the conclusion that there must be reserved water rights to fulfill the purposes of the Act. There is no indication “that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated.” United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1057. The language of the Wilderness Act indicates that it sets aside land and prohibits its development, nothing more.
Section 4(d)(6)3 of the Wilderness Act states that “[n]othing in this Act shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water laws.” Wilderness Act § 4(d)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6). The “no claim or denial” language used in section 4(d)(6) has been included in other congressional acts dealing with the disposition of federal lands. See, e.g., Sawtooth National Recreation Area Act § 9,16 U.S.C. § 460aa-8; Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act § 4(i), 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(i); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 13(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b). In the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act Congress used the “no claim or denial” language and then expressly reserved water in another section of the Act. The language of 4(d)(6) neither establishes a federal water right nor precludes the recognition of such a right if water is otherwise reserved.
The purpose of the Wilderness Act is to prevent the development of land within the designated wilderness areas and to preserve those lands in their natural state for future generations. The Wilderness areas at issue constitute some four million acres in Idaho which receive rain and snowfall. The Wilderness Act protects the land from development. Consequently, springs, creeks and rivers cannot be disturbed while the water is in the wilderness. If the effect of the federal claim to reserved water rights in the wilderness areas were to protect the water while in *923the wilderness, the claim of the United States would be of little consequence. The components of the Wilderness Act that prevent development of the wilderness areas will preclude claimants from tapping into the water while in the wilderness. No implication of a reserved water right is necessary to prevent the withdrawal of water while in the wilderness. The significance of the claim is the effect upon appropriations of water outside the wilderness areas and the effect upon future claims to water rights outside the wilderness areas. If all naturally flowing waters since the designation of the respective wilderness areas were reserved, appropriations made since the wilderness areas were designated would be defeated, and future appropriations of waters that would flow into the wilderness would be precluded. There is nothing within the Wilderness Act that indicates that this is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Unlike the limitation on appropriation outside the national monument in Cappaert, there is no basis to conclude that the effect of the Wilderness Act was to extend beyond the borders of the wilderness areas.
Well over a quarter of a century passed before the reserved water right claim was made, during which time it is clear that appropriations of water under state law have been made upstream from the wilderness areas. This action is consistent with a review of legislative history which indicates that a reservation of water flowing into the wilderness was not in the contemplation of Congress. Prior to the adoption of the Wilderness Act, Senator Humphrey, who played a key role in the development and passage of the Act, made the following comments concerning Section 4(d)(6) of the Act:
Paragraph 5, the last in this section, contains language vital to colleagues from the West. When the first wilderness bill was being discussed, some of its opponents charged that its enactment would change existing water laws and would deprive local communities of water, both domestic and irrigation. Although this was certainly not the intention of the sponsors, it has seemed necessary to insert a short sentence to remove any doubts. The sentence added says: ‘Nothing in this act shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water laws.’
104 Cong. Rec. 11, 555 (1958).
State laws existing at the time the Wilderness Act was passed, until the present, have allowed the appropriation of water outside the wilderness areas without objection from the federal government. This is consistent with Senator Humphrey’s efforts to allay the fears that the Wilderness Act would deprive local communities of domestic and irrigation water. The Senator was seeking to assure people in the West that development could continue outside the wilderness area, not simply assure them that existing water rights would not be taken away.
A statement by Senator Humphrey in 1963 brings more closely into focus the debate that was occurring with regard to wilderness legislation:
During the 8 years in which the proposed legislation has been before Congress, many important modifications have been effected in the specific procedures for identifying and protecting certain areas of wilderness. For example, the proposal to establish a permanent national wilderness preservation council has been eliminated. The original definition of a wilderness area has been modified considerably. The regulations for the protection of wilderness areas have been revised and liberalized. Each of these changes was made because the proponents of the legislation were determined to seek a bill that recognized the need for wilderness preservation but which did not unduly hamper present land-use programs or legitimate economic, commercial, or commodity uses.
109 Cong. Rec. 5901 (April 8, 1963) (emphasis added).
This statement by the Senator does not directly address the issue before this Court, but it is clearly indicative of the attitude at work in the passage of the Wilderness Act. The creation of the wilderness was not intended to strangle the economic life from areas outside the wilderness.
Senator Frank Church, a strong supporter of the Wilderness Act, made the following *924comments in response to statements made during debate:
Finally, Mr. President, the junior Senator from Colorado has argued that the bill constitutes some sort of impairment with respect to the development of water resources within the areas affected by the bill. He has pointed out, quite correctly, the importance of water impoundments— dams, power generators, and reclamation projects — to the West. But, Mr. President, I suggest that there are two portions of the bill which adequately assure the West continued water development, and I submit that even within the wilderness system the bill does not constitute any impediment whatever.
109 Cong. Rec. 5892 (April 8, 1963) (emphasis added). Senator Church was speaking of the provisions that would allow the President to authorize some development in a wilderness area and that would allow the Federal Power Commission to license water projects within the wilderness. Clearly, Senator Church anticipated that the west would have “continued water development” above and beyond the authority he recognized to exist with the President and the Federal Power Commission.
A study of the long history of debate over the Wilderness Act leads to the conclusion that Congress could not and would not have passed a bill that implied a water right that would prevent the appropriation of water under state law beyond the boundaries of the wilderness areas. There was no more important person than Frank Church in the development of wilderness legislation. A review of the Frank Church papers brings home the reality that Senator Church would not have advocated or voted for the Wilderness Act but for his understanding that the Act would not cripple the economic growth of portions of Idaho outside the wilderness.4 The heat of the debate was over the removal from development of land and water resources within the boundaries of the wilderness areas. One cannot accept the idea that in a process as long and intense as the debate leading to the Wilderness Act that Congress entertained a secret agenda that evaded public scrutiny to defeat the application of state water law outside the wilderness areas. Nor can one believe that Congress relied upon a clear line of Supreme Court authority making it obvious that a water right would be implied. No such line of authority existed, and none has developed since the adoption of the Wilderness Act. In fact, Congress has recognized the need to reserve water in such acts as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area Act.
A clear indication of the creation of implied water rights as claimed by the United States does not exist in the language of the Wilderness Act or in its legislative history. To find such an implication hidden within the Act would run contrary to the logic of Winters, Cappaert, Arizona v. California, and United States v. New Mexico.
The holding of the district court that the Wilderness Act creates an implied water right is reversed.
IV.
THE HELLS CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA ACT EXPRESSLY RESERVED WATER TO TRIBUTARIES OF THE SNAKE RIVER ORIGINATING WITHIN THE HELLS CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA, BUT THE SRBA DISTRICT COURT MUST QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT NECESSARY TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF THE RESERVATION.
A. The United States Holds An Express Federal Reserved Water Right to the Minimum Quantity of Water Necessary to Fulfill the Purpose of the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area Act.
The Hells Canyon National Recreation Area was established in 1975 by passage of the HCNRA Act, Pub.L. No. 94-199, 89 Stat. 1117 (1975) (codified at 16 U.S.C. *925§§ 460gg(l)-(13)). The “lands and waters” of what is now the HCNRA were withdrawn from the public domain by the HCNRA Act for the purpose of “assur[ing] that the natural beauty, and historical and archeological values of the Hells Canyon area ... are preserved for this and future generations, and that the recreational and ecologic values and public enjoyment of the area are thereby enhanced....” HCNRA Act § 1(a), 16 U.S.C. § 460gg(a).
The designation of the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area under the HCNRA Act constituted a reservation of land. Additionally, Congress expressly reserved water for the HCNRA. Section 1(b) of the HCNRA Act provides:
The Hells Canyon National Recreation Area (hereinafter referred to as the “recreation area”), which includes the Hells Canyon Wilderness (hereinafter referred to as the “wilderness”), the components of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System designated in section 3 of this Act, and the wilderness study areas designated in subsection § 8(d) of this Act, shall comprise the lands and waters generally depicted on the map entitled “Hells Canyon National Recreation Area” dated September 1975, which shall be on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Chief, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture. The Secretary of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as “the Secretary”), shall, as soon as practicable, but no later than eighteen months after the date of enactment of this Act, publish a detailed boundary description of the recreation area, the wilderness study areas designated in subsection 8(d) of this Act, and the wilderness established in section 2 of this Act in the Federal Register.
HCNRA Act § 1(b), 16 U.S.C. § 460gg(b) (emphasis added). The HCNRA Act clearly states that the HCNRA is comprised of the land and waters within the area. In reserving waters within the boundaries of the HCNRA, Congress exempted from the reservation the mainstem of the Snake River and all tributaries upstream and downstream from the boundaries of the HCNRA. Section 6 of the HCNRA Act provides:
(a) No provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act [16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271 et seq.], nor of this Act, nor any guidelines, rules, or regulations issued hereunder, shall in any way limit, restrict, or conflict with present and future use of the waters of the Snake River and its tributaries upstream from the boundaries of the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area created hereby, for beneficial uses, whether consumptive or nonconsumptive, now or hereafter existing, including, but not limited to, domestic, municipal, stoekwater, irrigation, mining, power, or industrial uses.
(b) No flow requirements of any kind may be imposed on the waters of the Snake River below Hells Canyon Dam under the provisions of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act [16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271 et seq.], of this Act, or any guidelines, rules, or regulations adopted pursuant thereto.
HCNRA Act § 6(a) and (b), 16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg-3(a) and (b)(emphasis added).
The disclaimer provisions contained in section 6 apply to the mainstem of the Snake River and to tributaries of the Snake River upstream from the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area and do not include tributaries originating within the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area.
Similarly, section 6(b) disclaims a federal reserved water right to “the waters of the Snake River below Hells Canyon Dam.” HCNRA Act § 6(b), 16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg-3(b). In sum, the express reservation of water in the HCNRA Act applies only to the tributaries of the Snake River originating in the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area.
B. The United States Must Quantify the Minimum Amount of Water Necessary to Fulfill the Purpose of the Reservation.
The purpose of the establishment of the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area is set forth in section 1(a) of the HCNRA Act. That section states that the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area was established:
[T]o assure that the natural beauty, and historical and archeological values of the Hells Canyon area and the seventy-one mile segment of the Snake River between *926Hells Canyon Dam and the Oregon-Washington border, together with portions of certain of its tributaries and adjacent lands, are preserved for this and future generations, and that the recreational and eeologic values and public enjoyment of the area are thereby enhanced____
HCNRA Act § 1(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 460gg 1(a) (emphasis added).
The question presented is what quantity of water is expressly reserved absent any statutory indication? This case falls closest to Cappaert in which the President reserved a pool to preserve a rare breed of fish. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976). The Supreme Court determined that the reservation carried with it the right to sufficient water in the pool to sustain the fish and fulfill the purposes of the reservation. However, the reservation was limited to “appurtenant water sufficient to maintain the level of the pool to preserve its scientific value and thereby implement Proclamation No. 2961.” Cappaert at 147, 96 S.Ct. at 2073-2074, 48 L.Ed.2d at 539. the reasoning of Cappaert applies to this case.
The SRBA district court ruled that the United States holds an express reserved water right to all unappropriated flows originating in tributaries located within the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area with a priority date of December 31, 1975. However, the question of the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation involves a factual inquiry. The SRBA district court ruled without allowing the parties to develop a factual record. Consequently, the factual determination is not supported by competent evidence.
The SRBA district court’s decision as to the existence of an expressly reserved water right is affirmed, but the ease is remanded to the SRBA district court for quantification of the amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
V.
CONCLUSION
The determination of the SRBA district court that the Wilderness Act impliedly reserved water is reversed. The determination of the SRBA district court that the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area Act expressly reserved water to tributaries originating within the Hells Canyon National Recreational Area is affirmed, but the determination that the reservation includes all naturally flowing water is vacated. The case is remanded to the SRBA district court to determine the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation in the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area. Costs are awarded to the appellants. No attorney fees are allowed.
Chief Justice TROUT and Justice KIDWELL concur and specially concur. Justices SILAK and WALTERS dissent.

. Wilderness Act Claims: 75-13605, 75-13606, 77-12774, 77-12775, 77-12776, 81-11191, 82-11120.

. HCNRA Claim: 79-13597.

. This section was originally enacted as section 4(d)(7). The Act of October 21, 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1650 (1978), repealed former item (5) of section 4(d) and renumbered the remaining items.

. The extensive Frank Church papers are housed and catalogued a few blocks from this Court at Boise State University’s Albertson's Library. For a published guide see The Frank Church Papers: A Summary Guide by Ralph W. Hansen and Deborah Roberts. BSU, 1988. Call number E840.8C49H35.