Court Opinion

ID: 9732344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:16:46.777604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:42.293446
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority correctly frames the issue in this appeal as being “whether the trial court erred in permitting a witness to testify as to his discussion with an out-of-court declarant who told the witness about a conclusion contained in the report which was prepared by experts who were not called to testify at trial.” Op. pg. 455-456. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the stability of the under-bridge inspection truck was the central factual issue to be resolved by the jury in this case. To the contrary, it is this misperception that occasions the majority to reach a result which, in my judgment, is totally unwarranted. For the *460reasons that follow, I am of the view that the objection raised is at best harmless error and, therefore, does not warrant the grant of a new trial. I would affirm the judgment entered by the trial court and affirmed by the Superior Court.
The jury in this case was never confronted with the question of the stability of the truck itself. Both the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, Commonwealth Utility Equipment Corporation (“Commonwealth Utility”), agreed that it was pressure against the wall that caused the truck to fall into the ravine. This point was clearly charged to the jury and no exception was taken to that aspect of the charge.
Now, then, the two experts, Mr. Meese, in behalf of the Plaintiff, and Mr. Shields, in behalf of the Defendant, Commonwealth Utility, interestingly enough as you observed, they both conclude that this machine or this unit went into the ravine because some beam on it was pressing against the bridge wall. So they both say that that is why it went into the ravine.
(N.T.) pg. 1671.
Further in the charge the trial court stated:
..., as I said, they both agree that it was pressure against the wall that caused the truck to go into the ravine.
(N.T.) pgs. 1672, 1673.
The issue that was placed before the jury, as framed by the court in the charge, was as follows:
The difference between them is that Mr. Meese testified, testifying for the Plaintiff, said that it had already tilted to such a degree from some other cause prior to that pressure on the wall of the bridge, that the cable holding the electric wires had been crushed against the bridge, and this caused the electrical system to go berzerk [sic], and thus caused some beam or beams, whatever, to push against the wall. He said he didn’t know necessarily what caused it to tilt in the first instance, but he gave as his opinion that it would have been from one of two *461different causes. You can see the equipment was found in the ravine with the bed of the truck broken, and I understand that he said that that could have broke apart while the truck was standing on the bridge or that the interlock system or the spring lockouts — it’s been called by two different or two other more different terms during the trial — would have come loose partly. In that connection, of course, it is pointed out by Mr. Shields, speaking for the Commonwealth Utility Equipment Corporation, you would regard that as farfetched. It is conceded that the interlock was properly fastened while the truck was on the bridge. At some point that he could not consider it to be within the realm of reason to say that it disengaged itself, and then reengaged itself completely as it was found in the ravine. The interlock was in proper position there. Nor did he, in response to Mr. Meese's view about the possibility of the truck bed breaking, think it was within the realm of likelihood or reasonable possibility that the bed of the truck would just break while it was standing on the bridge, and then of course,____ The difference being that Mr. Shields says that it was the same pressure that initiated the original tilting. It was the same thing, so to speak.
(N.T.) pgs. 1671-1673.
The majority obfuscates the distinction between the stability of the truck and the true issue that was being contested at trial. As the charge indicates, and no exception was taken to that portion of the charge, it was uncontested that the truck was stable as it sat on the bridge at the time of the accident. The question at issue was what caused it to become unstable and to fall over the edge of the bridge. The experts agreed that the truck was initially stable and that some type of outside force caused the vehicle to topple off the bridge. Plaintiffs-appellants did not assert the claim that an inherent instability of the truck was an issue. The testimony of the plaintiffs-appellants did not expressly or impliedly suggest that the bridge inspection unit was unstable.
*462As the above quoted portion of the charge indicates, Mr. Meese, plaintiffs-appellants’ expert, suggested two possible theories as to why the otherwise stable truck tipped over. Thus the introduction of Mr. Gaetano’s statement as to the truck being stable was not contradictory of any position offered by plaintiffs-appellants, but rather corroborative of a fact that plaintiffs-appellants did not contest. If we accept its hearsay quality in the case against plaintiffs-appellants, it would clearly amount to no more than harmless error.
Moreover, I am not satisfied that there was not a valid exception to the hearsay rule that would permit this evidence in the instant trial. The trial court permitted this testimony as an admission against appellants’ co-party plaintiff, the City of Pittsburgh.1 Admissions against interest are always competent as against the declarant, and Mr. Gaetano was a City employee at the time of the reported conversation. See G. Henry, Pennsylvania Evidence § 71 (4th Ed.1953); 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1048 (Chadbourne rev. 1972).
Under the rationale of this Court in McShain v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 338 Pa. 113, 12 A.2d 59 (1940), it would be improper to permit this type of evidence where the effect of the admission would severely prejudice a co-party. However, we note that this objection is not the one focused upon by the majority in granting relief in this case. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the evidence in this case does not severely prejudice plaintiffs-appellants, and, finally, the objection would be unavailing because it was not properly preserved. Once plaintiffs-appellants’ objection to the testimony was overruled, it was then incumbent upon them to at least attempt to mitigate the perceived damage by seeking limiting instructions. No such request was made. See Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, *463426 A.2d 595 (1981); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
I, therefore, am constrained to dissent.

. The statement made by Mr. Gaetano, a representative of the City, clearly was contrary to the City's position at trial. The City, a co-plaintiff, was seeking damages from Commonwealth Utility alleging that the equipment which it had purchased was defective.