Court Opinion

ID: 9566290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:36:09.683654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:33.431334
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Chief Justice,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I accede to that part of today’s pronouncement which defers the “fact-dependent” mootness issue to the trial court for determination. The court also reverses the trial court’s dismissal of the indigent plaintiffs’ (prisoners’) quest for assistance of counsel to redress certain transgressions alleged to have been committed by prison officials. I agree with the court’s conclusion that the allegations below lack the specificity necessary for granting extraordinary relief. Unlike the court, instead of remanding the two consolidated cases to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to clarify “the nature of their claims of denial of access to the courts,” I would direct today that the trial court conduct an inquiry into the existence of “special circumstances” which might entitle the prisoners to an appointment of legal counsel under the due process 1 and open access-to-court2 clauses of the Oklahoma constitution, as well as under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
The indigent plaintiffs seek the appointment of legal counsel to prosecute civil actions against prison officials for, among other things, wrongful confiscation of property. The event is alleged to have contributed to plaintiffs’ denial of access to the courts. Assistance of counsel is constitutionally mandated from the first critical stage of a criminal proceeding through the initial appeal.4 This is the so-called per se rule. It is inapplicable here. “Neither the Sixth-Amendment nor the Fourteenth-Amendment jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court makes a State responsible, under a per se rule, for providing counsel to indigent prisoners such as these plaintiffs, who make confinement-related complaints of the correctional authority's conduct that oversteps permissible bounds.”5 I would hence fashion today a new state fundamental-law norm for special or exceptional circumstances — a rule which would engender principles very similar to those applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vitek v. Jones.6
In Vitek the Court held that the involuntary transfer of a state prisoner to a mental hospital “constitute[s] the kind of deprivation[ ] of liberty that requires procedural protections.”7 Those protections include the assistance of counsel for inmates whom the state seeks to treat involuntarily as mentally ill.8 Although the special circumstances rule for providing counsel is restricted to matters involving a liberty interest, and these prisoners’ complaint here is premised in part upon confiscation of property, I would nonetheless afford the plaintiffs a post-remand special-circumstances inquiry because the alleged violations of property rights are so inextricably intertwined with their confinement-related restrictions of access to court that a liberty *679interest must necessarily be deemed to stand implicated. The state would not have had ready access to the plaintiffs’ property had they not been incarcerated.9
Special — or exceptional-circumstance inquiries have been ordered for federal-court litigants in forma pauperis who requested counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).10 The existence of circumstances calling for provision of counsel turns on (a) “the type and complexity of the case” and (b) “the abilities of the individuals bringing it.” 11 For example, appointment of counsel was found to be warranted in a ease where the fro se litigant had a colorable claim but lacked the capacity or skills adequately to present it.12
Under the standards I counsel today and those advanced by me in Cumbey,13 once a lawyer is appointed, he (or she) may be required to provide services without compensation as part of the lawyer’s annual public service duty.14 If the trial judge should on remand of this cause determine that counsel’s services are constitutionally necessary, and if either prisoner should ultimately prove to be successful, counsel fees might be awardable against the state.15 Generally, though, in meritorious cases I would opt for the immediate appointment of counsel whose compensation *680source would be ascertained at the litigation’s end, just as in criminal cases where both the quantum and source of compensation is determined after services have been completed. In the event a prisoner’s civil action is found to have been commenced in bad faith, he (or she) could be ordered to pay the court-appointed lawyer out of prison funds, if necessary.16
In sum, I would remand the two cases now before the court for a special — or exceptional-circumstances inquest in an effort to ascertain whether court-assigned counsel for the indigent plaintiffs is either their state or federal constitutional due under Art. 2 §§ 6 and 7, Okl.Const., or under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

. Art. 2 § 7, OkI.Const., provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

. Art. 2 § 6, OkI.Const., provides:
"The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." (Emphasis added.)

. The pertinent provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are:
"* * * No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
"* * *" (Emphasis added.)

. Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54, 82 S.Ct. 157, 158-159, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-690, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2443-2445, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974).

. Cumbey v. State, Okl., 699 P.2d 1094, 1099 (1985) (Opala, J., dissenting).

. 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980).

. Vitek v. Jones, supra note 6, 445 U.S. at 494, 100 S.Ct. at 1264.

. Vitek v. Jones, supra note 6, 445 U.S. at 496-497, 100 S.Ct. at 1265-1266.

. The following allegations, which the court’s opinion lists, support my conclusion that the prisoners’ liberty interest in gaining meaningful access to the courts is necessarily implicated by their property-related complaints: 1) "prison authorities confiscate the plaintiffs’ property as punishment for the plaintiffs’ efforts in petitioning the courts,” 2) “prison authorities improperly credit funds to the plaintiffs’ institutional trust accounts so that the plaintiffs will not be classified as indigent but the money in said accounts is not available for the prisoners to spend for litigation costs,” and 3) “the plaintiffs have a 'property right’ to a specific amount of time to spend in the law library and such is being denied to them.”

. The terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provide: “(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” (Emphasis added.)

. Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982).

. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir.1978). See also Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir.1984), where the court held that the denial of the arrestee-plaintiff's request for counsel deprived him of “a fundamentally fair trial.” In Whisenant, the special circumstances included 1) “a colorable claim” based on his custodians’ "deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs,” 2) a plaintiff who was "ill-equipped to represent himself or to litigate a claim of this nature" and 3) "sharp conflicts” between the parties’ versions of the events, making the case's outcome largely dependent upon a test of credibility.

. See supra note 5.

. For an explanation of a lawyer’s public service duty see State v. Lynch, Okl., 796 P.2d 1150, 1170 n. 31 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Branch v. Cole, supra note 11 at 266-267, where the court noted that
”[a]ttorneys admitted to practice in the federal courts of this circuit are or ought to be bound in the discharge of their duties as court officers by ethical precepts similar to those set out in the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility: '... The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer_ (EC 2-25) * * * ’ ” (Emphasis added.)

.The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 941 provide:
“A. The defendant in any civil action brought in any court of this state by any state agency, board, commission, department, authority or bureau authorized to make rules or formulate orders shall be entitled to recover against such state entity court costs, witness fees and reasonable attorney fees if the court determines that the action was brought without reasonable basis or is frivolous. * * *
B. The respondent in any proceeding brought before any state administrative tribunal by any state agency, board, commission, department, authority or bureau authorized to make rules or formulate orders shall be entitled to recover against such state entity court costs, witness fees and reasonable attorney fees if the tribunal or a court of proper jurisdiction determines that the proceeding was brought without reasonable basis or is frivolous; provided, however, if the tribunal is required by law to act upon complaints and determines that the complaint had no reasonable basis or is frivolous, the tribunal may assess the respondent’s costs, witness fees and reasonable attorney fees against the complainant. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
See Tulsa Tribune v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n, Okl., 768 P.2d 891, 897-898 n. 10 (1989) (Opala, J., dissenting).

. See 23 O.S.Supp.1986 § 103, whose terms provide:
"In any action for damages for personal injury except injury resulting in death, or in any action for damages to personal rights the court shall, subsequent to adjudication on the merits and upon motion of the prevailing party, determine whether a claim or defense asserted in the action by a nonprevailing party was asserted in bad faith, was not well grounded in fact, or was unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Upon so finding, the court shall enter a judgment ordering such nonprevailing party to reimburse the prevailing party an amount not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for reasonable costs, including attorneys fees, incurred with respect to such claim or defense.” (Emphasis added.)