Court Opinion

ID: 9409769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:00:48.743035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.276371
License: Public Domain

21-2867
UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation

                        United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Second Circuit

                                         August Term 2022

                                  Argued: November 18, 2022
                                    Decided: July 19, 2023

                                             No. 21-2867

            NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA.,

                                               Plaintiff,

                                                    v.

                             UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC.,

                           Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                    v.

                                 EVA AIRWAYS CORPORATION,

                                 Third-Party Defendant-Appellee,

                                              DOES 1–10,

                                     Third-Party Defendants. ∗

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of New York
                          No. 20-cv-2818, Edgardo Ramos, Judge.

∗
    The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
Before:       JACOBS, LOHIER, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges.

       Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern
District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA
Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district
court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS now
appeals, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on
both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention. We hold that
UPS has failed to allege the in-state injury required for specific jurisdiction in New
York, that the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction, and that
the record does not establish that EVA consented to personal jurisdiction in light
of the Convention or its contract with UPS. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

       Judge Lohier concurs in a separate opinion.
                                    ________

                                            MARK P. ESTRELLA, Countryman &
                                            McDaniel, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for
                                            Appellant.
                                            CHRISTOPHER CARLSEN, Clyde & Co. US
                                            LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
                                            ________

NATHAN, Circuit Judge:

       The Montreal Convention, a multilateral treaty which entered into force in

2003, governs claims arising out of the international transportation of persons,

baggage, and cargo by air. 1 The treaty includes jurisdictional articles providing

where such claims can be brought. This appeal presents a question of first

1Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,038.

                                               2
impression: whether the Montreal Convention confers personal jurisdiction. In

particular, we must determine whether by enabling actions arising under the

treaty to be brought in the courts of certain countries, the Montreal Convention

provides those courts with personal jurisdiction over the parties. Consistent with

our decisions interpreting the Montreal Convention’s predecessor, we conclude

that it does not. The Montreal Convention’s jurisdictional provisions place a limit

on when courts of the United States, as opposed to courts of other signatory

nations, may exercise jurisdiction over a claim arising under the treaty. Under U.S.

law, this is referred to as treaty jurisdiction, which is a form of subject-matter

jurisdiction. The Montreal Convention does not, however, alter our domestic

personal jurisdiction requirements, which must be independently established.

      Because the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction, and

because Appellant has not otherwise established a basis for personal jurisdiction

over Appellee in this action, we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

                                         3
                                BACKGROUND

      This case began with the shipment of 24 pallets of vitamins from Chicago to

South Korea. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA insured

the vitamins, and UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. contracted for them to be

carried by EVA Airways Corporation, an airline headquartered in Taiwan. EVA

carried the shipment on non-stop flights from Chicago to Taiwan and then from

Taiwan to South Korea.      The vitamins allegedly arrived damaged, and this

litigation ensued.

      In April 2020, National Union sued UPS in the Southern District of New

York, asserting that UPS breached its duties as a common carrier under the

Montreal Convention. UPS did not assert lack of personal jurisdiction as an

affirmative defense against National Union’s action for damages.         Facing a

potential adverse judgment, UPS filed a third-party complaint against EVA in

January 2021, seeking indemnity and contribution. EVA timely filed an answer in

February 2021, in which it asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative

defense.   EVA requested a pre-motion conference on the issue of personal

                                         4
jurisdiction in March 2021, and then moved to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction in April 2021. In its opposition to the motion, UPS argued that the

district court could assert specific personal jurisdiction over EVA either under

New York’s long-arm statute, pursuant to the Montreal Convention, or pursuant

to a consent theory of personal jurisdiction. In a footnote, UPS suggested that

EVA’s delay in moving to dismiss may also constitute forfeiture. UPS conceded

that the district court in New York lacked general jurisdiction over EVA.

      On October 18, 2021, the district court (Ramos, J.) granted EVA’s motion to

dismiss and terminated EVA as a third-party defendant. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

of Pittsburgh, PA. v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 20-cv-2818, 2021 WL 4868583

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2021). The court reasoned that UPS did not establish jurisdiction

under New York’s long-arm statute and that the Montreal Convention’s

jurisdictional provisions relate to subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal

jurisdiction. Id. at *2–3. The court also rejected UPS’s forfeiture argument because

EVA promptly raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in its answer and requested

a pre-motion conference. Id. at *1 n.1.

                                          5
       On November 17, 2021, UPS filed a notice of appeal from the October 18

order, which the district court docketed as a notice of interlocutory appeal. While

this appeal was pending, UPS and National Union entered into a settlement

agreement. On August 18, 2022, the district court entered a final order dismissing

the case pursuant to a joint stipulation between National Union and UPS.

                                   DISCUSSION

I.   Appellate Jurisdiction

       Before deciding whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over

EVA, we must address whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Following

oral argument, we issued an order directing the parties to submit supplemental

briefing addressing whether UPS appealed from a final decision of the district

court, and if not, whether we could nevertheless exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Both UPS and EVA maintain that we have appellate jurisdiction. We agree.

       Generally, we may exercise jurisdiction only over appeals from “final

decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “An order that adjudicates . . .

the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the remaining parties[] is not a final

                                          6
order unless the court directs the entry of a final judgment as to the dismissed

claims or parties ‘upon an express determination that there is no just reason for

delay.’” Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, 235 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2000)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). The district court’s October 18 order granting

EVA’s motion to dismiss was not a final order because it did not resolve National

Union’s claims against UPS and the district court did not direct entry of a final

judgment as to EVA under Rule 54(b). Accordingly, UPS’s appeal was premature.

Nevertheless, the district court’s order of dismissal on August 18, 2022, prior to

our hearing the appeal, adjudicated the rights of all remaining parties and thereby

“cured any jurisdictional infirmity” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Smith ex rel. Smith v.

Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2002).

      Still, our jurisdictional inquiry does not end there. Appellants in civil cases

must file the requisite notice of appeal “within 30 days after entry of the judgment

or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (emphasis added); see Siemon v.

Emigrant Savings Bank (In re Siemon), 421 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2005) (observing

that Rule 4(a)’s time limit is “mandatory and jurisdictional”). Here, UPS’s notice

                                           7
of appeal was filed nine months before the final order was entered. However, “a

premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of

appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the

appellee suffers no prejudice . . . even if the final judgment was not itself

appealed.” Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Riffle, 617 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). EVA explicitly concedes that it has suffered no prejudice.

Therefore, we treat UPS’s premature notice of appeal “as if it had been timely

filed” after the district court entered final judgment. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch.

Dist., 298 F.3d at 172.

      Having satisfied ourselves of our own jurisdiction to decide this appeal, we

turn to whether the district court properly concluded that it lacked personal

jurisdiction over EVA.

II. Personal Jurisdiction

      In an appeal from a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, we review

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.

Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2004). UPS bears the

                                           8
burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over EVA, though we construe the

pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to UPS and resolve all doubts

in its favor. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34–35 (2d Cir.

2010).

         UPS claims that the district court could assert personal jurisdiction over

EVA based on New York’s long-arm statute, the Montreal Convention, EVA’s

consent in light of the Convention, and EVA’s alleged forfeiture of a personal

jurisdiction defense. As a threshold matter, UPS’s forfeiture argument is without

merit. A defendant may “forfeit its objections to personal jurisdiction by failing to

raise them timely in the answer or in an initial motion,” Brown v. Lockheed Martin

Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)), but here, EVA

did raise its objections to personal jurisdiction in its answer as is expressly

permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). Because the defense was timely made, we

address UPS’s arguments regarding personal jurisdiction pursuant to New York’s

long-arm statute, the Montreal Convention, and EVA’s consent.

                                           9
      A. New York’s Long-Arm Statute

      Specific personal jurisdiction exists in suits “arising out of or related to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., 521 F.3d

122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). For a federal court to exercise specific

jurisdiction, there must be a statutory basis for jurisdiction and the exercise of

jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process requirements. Licci ex

rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2012). Though

many state statutes extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the

Constitution—thereby merging the statutory and constitutional inquiries—New

York’s long-arm statute does not reach so far. Id. at 60–61.

      Section 302(a)(3) of New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3),

which UPS identifies as the statutory basis for specific jurisdiction, is “more

stringent than any constitutional requirement.” Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d 592,

597 (1997); see Best Van Lines v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 2007). Section

302(a)(3) confers jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when five elements are met:

      (1) The [plaintiff stated a colorable claim that the] defendant
      committed a tortious act outside the state; (2) the cause of action arose

                                          10
      from that act; (3) the act caused injury to a person or property within
      the state; (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have
      expected the act to have consequences in the state; (5) the defendant
      derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
      commerce.

Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2006)

(citing LaMarca v. Pak–Mor Mfg. Co., 735 N.E.2d 883, 886 (N.Y. 2000)).

      UPS failed to allege the third element under Section 302(a)(3), which

requires that the tortious act caused injury to a person or property within New

York. The injury underlying this action—the damage to the pallets of vitamins—

could not have occurred in New York, given that EVA transported the vitamins

from Chicago to South Korea, stopping only in Taiwan. UPS argues that the cargo

damage is not the relevant injury because it does not seek compensation for the

vitamins; rather, it seeks indemnification and contribution for the damages it paid

to National Union, which resulted from this New York-based litigation. In other

words, UPS’s grievance is that it was sued (and had to pay up) in New York.

      UPS‘s argument is counter to our precedent. For the purposes of Section

302(a)(3), “[t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused

                                            11
the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are felt by the plaintiff.”

Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation

omitted). Here, the “injury” asserted by UPS is the cost of litigating the underlying

lawsuit in New York and exposure to a New York court judgment. But “[t]he

occurrence of financial consequences in New York . . . is not a sufficient basis for

jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) where the underlying events took place outside New

York.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In Whitaker, we held that an attorney

claiming his former client and an out-of-state corporation conspired to deprive

him of legal fees could not establish an in-state injury because although the

attorney tendered the legal services in New York and felt the economic impact of

not receiving payment in New York, the alleged conspiracy occurred out-of-state.

Id. at 209. Though Whitaker was not decided in the context of a third-party

complaint, the same principles apply. Indeed, “the location where the resultant

damages are felt” is particularly ill-suited to be the situs of injury in the impleader

context where, as here, the third-party plaintiff did not raise a personal jurisdiction

challenge to the underlying suit.      As Judge Buchwald observed in a nearly

                                           12
identical case, if prospective liability were sufficient to establish in-state injury,

then Section 302(a)(3)’s in-state injury requirement “would always be satisfied” for

third-party defendants in such cases. Royal & Sun All. Ins. PLC v. UPS Supply Chain

Sols., Inc., No. 16-cv-09791, 2018 WL 1888483, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2018).

      Because New York’s long-arm statute does not authorize personal

jurisdiction over EVA in this action, we need not decide whether exercising such

jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process. See Best Van Lines,

Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that we proceed to the

constitutional prong of the analysis “[i]f, but only if” we conclude that there is a

statutory basis for personal jurisdiction).

      B. The Montreal Convention

      Next, we must answer whether the Montreal Convention provides a

separate basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over EVA in this action. The

Montreal Convention sets forth the types of claims that can be brought relating to

international air carriage. It is well established that the treaty “preempt[s] state

law and provide[s] the sole avenue for damages claims that fall within the scope

                                              13
of [its] provisions.” Cohen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 13 F.4th 240, 246 (2d Cir. 2021). The

treaty also includes jurisdictional provisions dictating where such claims can be

brought. Pointing to these jurisdictional provisions, UPS argues that in enabling

certain nation-states’ courts to adjudicate a claim arising under the treaty, the

Montreal Convention provides those courts with personal jurisdiction over the

defendant against whom the claim is brought. By this logic, UPS contends that

because the treaty authorizes it to bring a third-party claim against EVA for

indemnification and contribution, and because it authorizes courts in the United

States to hear that third-party claim, we should interpret the Montreal Convention

to establish personal jurisdiction over EVA in this action.

      For the reasons explained below, we hold that the Montreal Convention’s

jurisdictional provisions speak only to treaty jurisdiction as a form of subject-

matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Montreal Convention

does not confer personal jurisdiction on United States courts in actions arising

under the treaty. The power to assert jurisdiction over a claim is distinct from the

power to assert jurisdiction over a party, which must be separately established.

                                           14
       “The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins

with its text.”     Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008).          The Montreal

Convention’s primary jurisdictional provision, Article 33, provides that “[a]n

action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory

of one of the States Parties . . . before the court of” [1] the carrier’s domicile, [2] the

carrier’s principal place of business, [3] the place where the contract was made, [4]

the place of destination, or [5] in certain actions, a passenger’s principal and

permanent residence. Montreal Convention art. 33(1)–(2). Article 33 also dictates

that “[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of

the case.” Id. art. 33(4).

       Where one carrier (the “contracting carrier”) contracted with a party to

provide air carriage and a different carrier (the “actual carrier”) performed the

actual carriage, the Montreal Convention permits either carrier to implead the

other in the event that it is sued. See id. art. 45 (authorizing “the defendant carrier

[to] seek to have the remaining carrier joined in the proceedings according to the

procedural requirements of the forum in which the action is brought”). A special

                                             15
jurisdictional provision, Article 46, applies in actions involving carriage arranged

by a contracting carrier. Article 46 provides that such actions “must be brought,

at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either

before a court in which an action may be brought against the contracting carrier,

as provided in Article 33, or before the court having jurisdiction at the place where

the actual carrier has its domicile or its principal place of business.” Id. art. 46. In

effect, Article 46 expands Article 33’s list of fora to encompass both the contracting

carrier’s and actual carrier’s domicile and principal place of business.

      An examination of this treaty text leads us to conclude that its jurisdictional

provisions pertain to treaty jurisdiction. In the United States, federal courts have

subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the Montreal Convention

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction

over “all civil actions arising under . . . treaties of the United States.” Articles 33

and 46 operate as a limit on this treaty jurisdiction. By stating where a damages

action “must be brought,” the provisions delimit which nation-states’ courts can

hear a claim arising under the treaty. Specifically, the provisions dictate that for

                                           16
the courts of a given nation-state to have jurisdiction over a claim arising under

the treaty, the nation-state must be both one of the “States Parties” to the

Convention and one of the fora listed in Article 33 (or Article 46, when applicable).

Therefore, in a damages action governed by the Montreal Convention, if the

United States is not one of the designated fora, then courts in the United States

cannot exercise treaty jurisdiction over the action.

      To begin, nothing in the text of the Montreal Convention says or implies that

it gives rise to personal jurisdiction—that is, a court’s power to exercise control

over a particular party. While Articles 33 and 46 state that actions “must be

brought” in one of the specified fora, they do not state that the courts of those fora

must entertain such actions without regard for other potential barriers to

jurisdiction. To the contrary, as noted above, Article 33 specifies that “[q]uestions

of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the case.”

Montreal Convention art. 33(4). Likewise, while Article 45 allows a defendant

contracting carrier to implead an actual carrier, or vice versa, the provision

explicitly states that “the procedure and effects” remain “governed by the law of

                                           17
the court seised of the case.” Id. art. 45. The inclusion of these clauses indicates

that while the Montreal Convention permits claims arising under the treaty to be

brought in particular nations, it does not guarantee plaintiffs the unconditional

right to litigate in those nations’ courts. Rather, the treaty expressly leaves room

for nation-states to impose their own venue, jurisdictional, or other procedural

requirements. We conclude that personal jurisdiction is such a requirement.

      Looking beyond the text itself, precedent also supports our conclusion that

the Montreal Convention’s jurisdictional provisions do not pertain to domestic

personal jurisdiction. We interpret the Montreal Convention’s provisions “in

accordance with case law arising from substantively similar provisions of its

predecessor, the Warsaw Convention.” Cohen, 13 F.4th at 245. That is because

although the Montreal Convention—which was drafted in 1999 to replace the

Warsaw Convention—improved upon essential aspects of its predecessor, the

drafters tried “to retain existing language and substance of other provisions to

preserve judicial precedent relating to other aspects of the Warsaw Convention, in

order to avoid unnecessary litigation over issues already decided by the courts

                                          18
under the Warsaw Convention and its related protocols.” Id. at 244 (quoting S.

Exec. Rep. No. 108–8, at 3 (2003)). Although our precedent interpreting the

Warsaw Convention is not binding, it constitutes strongly persuasive authority in

this case because Article 33(1)’s predecessor provision—Article 28 of the Warsaw

Convention—is similar to Article 33(1) in both language and substance. 2

       Our cases interpreting Article 28 hold that “[c]ompliance with Article 28(1)

gives a nation treaty jurisdiction over the claim, so that the nation is an appropriate

site for litigation,” but “domestic jurisdiction and venue questions still may require

further analysis.” Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 863 F.2d 1, 1 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphases

added); see also Benjamins v. Brit. Eur. Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1978)

(same); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).

In Smith, we explained:

       [I]n a Warsaw Convention case there are two levels of judicial power
       that must be examined to determine whether suit may be maintained.

2Article 28 provides: “An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which
the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.” Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air art. 28(1), Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014.

                                                 19
      The first level . . . is that of jurisdiction in the international or treaty
      sense under Article 28(1). The second level involves the power of a
      particular United States court, under federal statutes and practice, to
      hear a Warsaw Convention case—jurisdiction in the domestic law
      sense.

452 F.2d at 800 (footnote omitted). In a footnote expounding on the meaning of

“domestic law” jurisdiction, we elaborated that “in personam jurisdiction . . . is also

an important element of the power of a court to decide a case.” Id. at 800 n.4.

      In reaching this interpretation of Article 28, we principally relied on the text

of the Warsaw Convention. Article 28 contained a clause stating that “[q]uestions

of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is

submitted,” which we read to indicate that Article 28 “leave[s] for domestic

decision questions regarding the suitability and location of a particular Warsaw

Convention case.” Smith, 452 F.2d at 801 (quoting Warsaw Convention art. 28(2)).

The same analysis applies to Article 33 of the Montreal Convention, which

includes a near-identical clause. See Montreal Convention art. 33(4).

      We also interpreted Article 28 in light of its surrounding provisions. Article

32 of the Warsaw Convention, which prohibited parties from contracting to alter

                                           20
“the rules ‘as to jurisdiction,’” underscored “the mandatory nature” of Article 28.

Smith, 452 F.2d at 801 (quoting Warsaw Convention art. 32). The fact that the treaty

prohibited parties from altering its jurisdictional requirements implied that those

requirements pertained to something that parties generally lack the power to

decide among themselves—namely, subject-matter jurisdiction. Article 49 of the

Montreal Convention contains an analogous prohibition on altering jurisdictional

rules, which similarly suggests that the new treaty’s jurisdictional provisions do

not concern a type of jurisdiction, like personal jurisdiction, that parties can waive.

See Montreal Convention art. 49 (providing that contracts and agreements

“altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void”).

      In sum, based on our analysis of the Montreal Convention’s text and our

Warsaw Convention precedent, we conclude that the Montreal Convention speaks

to jurisdiction only in the treaty sense. In cases arising under the Montreal

Convention, personal jurisdiction must be separately established in accordance

with domestic laws and practice.

                                           21
      C. Consent

      In addition to its primary claim regarding the Montreal Convention, UPS

puts forth a related consent-based theory of personal jurisdiction. First, UPS

argues that by choosing to do business as an international air carrier governed by

the provisions of the Montreal Convention, EVA consented to the personal

jurisdiction of any court in which a party properly brings a Montreal claim against

EVA. “Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an

individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.” Corporación Mexicana

De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832

F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)). However, our conclusion that the

Montreal Convention’s jurisdictional provisions do not confer personal

jurisdiction necessarily defeats this consent-based theory. EVA could not have

consented to personal jurisdiction by agreeing to be governed by the treaty’s terms

because those terms do not themselves concern personal jurisdiction.

                                         22
      Second, we are also unpersuaded to the extent UPS argues that because EVA

knew the Convention would govern their contract and UPS would have a right to

implead EVA under Article 45, EVA tacitly agreed to suit (and personal

jurisdiction) wherever UPS impleads EVA.         That consent argument rests on

principles of contract law rather than on conferral of jurisdiction by the Montreal

Convention. “Parties can consent to personal jurisdiction through forum-selection

clauses in contractual agreements.” D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103

(2d Cir. 2006). But UPS has not come close to showing a meeting of the minds as

to EVA’s consent to jurisdiction. Indeed, it hasn’t even put a copy of the contract

in the record.

                                 CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                          23
LOHIER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

      I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to emphasize that,

while UPS failed to meet its burden of showing a “meeting of the minds” in this

case, Majority Op. at 23, our decision does not deﬁnitively foreclose a contract-

based theory of consent to personal jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention.

There may be cases in which the defendant carrier impliedly or expressly

consented to personal jurisdiction in, for example, “the court of the domicile of

the carrier” or “the court at the place of destination” by doing business as an

international air carrier governed by the treaty. See Montreal Convention, art. 33.