Court Opinion

ID: 9725746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:08:03.480682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:35.841630
License: Public Domain

JANES, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment insofar as it reverses the trial court’s order and remands the case for redetermination of attorney fees and costs. The application to this case of Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6 creates obvious inequities; their repetition can be prevented only by the Legislature.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusions (reached without discussion) concerning the litigation activities which the trial court may properly consider in fixing the amount of attorney fees and costs to be recovered by Surety. The trial court should not be required to limit its award to those of Surety’s attorney fees and costs which are attributable to the interpleader cause of action in Surety’s amended cross-complaint. Section 386.6 expressly allows the interpleading party his reasonable costs and attorney fees “incurred in such action.”
The “action” mentioned in section 386.6 is not limited to an action commenced by a complaint in interpleader but includes also actions commenced against a defendant who—as here—subsequently files a cross-complaint in interpleader. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 386, 386.5.) In other words, section 386.6 authorizes a discretionary award of attorney fees and costs incurred in the overall action.
Another matter bears mention. The award of $1,061.30 is excessive in a respect not mentioned in claimants’ briefs or by the majority opinion; it includes attorney fees and costs incurred by Surety not only in this action but also in other related actions. The instant action was commenced against McClaran and Surety on April 10, 1973; Surety answered and cross-complained for declaratory relief and for indemnification against McClaran on June 20, 1973. By an amended cross-complaint, an interpleader count was added November 15, 1973. In support of its subsequent motion for attorney fees and costs, Surety *832submitted to the court a computer print-out showing the attorney fees and costs incurred by Surety between May 23, 1973, and January 30, 1974, inclusive. The total costs ($61.34) and attorneys’ fees ($928.50) shown on the print-out did not include any attributable to filing notice of, and arguing, the motion itself. The declaration of one of Surety’s attorneys broadly stated that the print-out was of Surety’s costs and attorneys’ fees incurred “in this matter.” The same attorney, however, submitted points and authorities wherein he informed the trial court that the print-out included attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Surety not only in this action but also in independent actions filed against it by claimants Rebeiro, Walters, and the Division, as well as in an independent interpleader action commenced by Surety wherein Sweeney successfully demurred on the ground that the instant action was pending. After that demurrer was sustained, Surety filed its cross-complaint in the instant case.
The computer print-out did not differentiate between Surety’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action and those incurred in the three independent—albeit related—actions. Nevertheless, since the court awarded $61.30 in costs and $1,000 in attorneys’ fees after a hearing at which no additional evidence was submitted, the conclusion is inescapable that the court relied heavily upon the print-out and supplemented it with attorneys’ fees attributable to counsel’s giving notice of and argument of the motion itself. The award therefore included attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Surety in the three other actions, whereas Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6 expressly limits the award to the interpleading party’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in “such” action—i.e., the action wherein the motion under that section is made. Just as a court is not authorized to create exceptions to the operation of a statute (Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469, 476 [304 P.2d 7]), likewise it is not a court’s function to enlarge upon the enactment (Kirkwood v. Bank of America (1954) 43 Cal.2d 333, 341 [273 P.2d 532]).
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 24, 1976.