Court Opinion

ID: 9521990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:27.88907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:10.045827
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Samuels does not contend that submitting his claim to the grievance procedures of the DOC, as contemplated by Indiana Code § 11-11-1-2 (Burns Code Ed. Repl. 2003) would be a futile gesture based upon *693the denial of his claim by the DOC on two occasions. However, it may well be the fact giving Samuels entitlement to judicial review of the denial.
Instead, Samuels asserts that his claim is “non-grievable” because it “pertains to ‘state law.’ ” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4. Samuels is claiming that he is entitled to educational credit time pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3.3 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.2005) by reason of having obtained a “diploma from a high school correspondence curriculum” in Coral Gables. Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3.3(a)(3)(B) does not state that the high school diploma obtained must be from an “accredited” school. Although I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(c) specifies that DOC is to “establish admissions criteria and other requirements for programs available for earning credit time under subsection (b),” that statutory delegation is applicable only to the programs enumerated under (b). Those enumerated programs do not include obtaining a “high school diploma.” That provision for credit is contained under subsection (a). Accordingly, I conclude that there is an absence of an accreditation requirement for the obtaining of a high school diploma.
While it seems logical to require some accreditation or recognition by a governmental body, in order to prevent affording credit for an arguably “fraudulent diploma from some ‘diploma mill,’ ” that requirement is not contained in the law as it exists. Appellee’s Br. at ll.3
In this context, the claim of Samuels requires examination and interpretation of “state law” and is therefore non-grievable. For this reason, I would hold that Samuels did not fail to exhaust available administrative remedies and that dismissal of the appeal on that ground is inappropriate.4

. Certainly, the General Assembly is well within its prerogative to cure the omission which I perceive to exist, whether that omission was intentional or merely inadvertent.

. I would note that a different panel of this court, in Fuller v. Meloy, 848 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), reviewed a trial court denial of a petition for review of the Department of Correction determination concerning credit time for completion of a vocational education program. There was no showing in that case that the inmates had "exhausted their administrative remedies” as we require in this case.