Court Opinion

ID: 9956269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:11:01.969599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.900028
License: Public Domain

J-S08014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NATHAN ALLEN WELCH                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1139 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 8, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-38-CR-0001070-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: APRIL 1, 2024

       Appellant, Nathan Allen Welch, appeals from the order entered on

August 8, 2023, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. On August 13, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one

count each of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or

transfer firearms and possession of drug paraphernalia.1       On November 9,

2022, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the aforementioned crimes.

On the same day, the trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Appellant

to an aggregate term of five to 10 years of incarceration. Important to this

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively.
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appeal, the trial court ordered Appellant’s sentence to be served concurrently

with any other sentence Appellant was serving.2           Appellant did not file

post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.         Instead, on April 17, 2023,

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. On April 18, 2023, the PCRA court

appointed counsel to represent Appellant.        On July 5, 2023, counsel for

Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court held an evidentiary

hearing on August 8, 2023. On the same day, the PCRA entered an order

denying Appellant relief. This timely appeal resulted.3

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the [PCRA] court commit prejudicial error by not granting
          [] Appellant’s petition for post[-]conviction relief because he
          failed to appreciate the significance of the plea at the time that
          it was given?

       2. Did the [PCRA] court commit prejudicial error by not finding
          that [] Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for not properly

____________________________________________

2  Appellant was on parole on an unrelated matter at the time of this guilty
plea hearing and sentencing. The trial court further explained that the instant
sentence was imposed concurrently to the sentence he was already serving,
but that his back time for violating parole could not be served concurrently.
N.T., 11/9/2022, at 21-22 (“What won’t be concurrent is whatever back time
[the Parole Board] give[s] you. Whatever hit they give you for that, they will
not give you double credit for the new sentence and the old sentence; but
once you’re done serving the back time, everything between that sentence –
everything that’s left on that sentence and this sentence, it runs concurrent
with each other.”).
3  On August 10, 2023, counsel for Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
On August 15, 2023, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Counsel for Appellant complied timely on September 5, 2023. On October 9,
2023, the PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

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         counseling him on the effect of his guilty plea on his open
         period of state [parole] supervision?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

      Appellant’s two issues are interrelated and, therefore, we will address

them together. First, Appellant suggests that the trial court, “at the time of

his plea and sentencing did not fully examine him regarding his understanding

of the full effect of his plea and sentence[.]” Id. at 11. Appellant claims that,

because he was in violation of his parole on an unrelated matter, he is required

to serve three years of imprisonment “before he would start marking his time

on this case” which has “[t]he net effect [of turning] his five (5) year minimum

sentence [] into an eight year minimum sentence.” Id. In his second issue

presented, Appellant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to

review with him what the effect of his guilty plea would have on his parole

violation.”   Id. at 12.    Appellant suggests that trial counsel’s deficient

stewardship facilitated the entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent

guilty plea which resulted in manifest injustice.     Id. at 13.    Accordingly,

Appellant asserts that he “should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and

this matter should be remanded to the lower court for further disposition.”

Id.

      We adhere to the following standards:

      In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is
      limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court's factual
      determinations and whether its decision is free of legal error. We
      apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal
      conclusions.    The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed
      unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.

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Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 303 A.3d 823, 830 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citations   and   quotations    omitted);    see    also   Commonwealth         v.

Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (“A reviewing court is bound by

a PCRA court's credibility determinations and its fact-finding, so long as those

conclusions are supported by the record.”).

      Under the PCRA,

      [t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
      the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
      that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
      place. The petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim
      is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
      basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
      and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
      the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. The
      petitioner bears the burden of proving all three prongs of the test.

      Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
      guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
      caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
      Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
      voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice
      was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
      criminal cases. Moreover, the law does not require that the
      defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a
      plea of guilty: All that is required is that his decision to plead
      guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1191–1192 (Pa. Super.

2010) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims

lacked merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/9/2023, at 26-28. Based upon

our standard of review and examination of the certified record, we agree.

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Initially, we note that prior to pleading guilty, Appellant signed a written, guilty

plea colloquy which was made part of the certified record.4 Within the written

colloquy, Appellant acknowledged that he was aware of the permissible range

of sentences that could be imposed for his aforementioned crimes, the

decision to plead guilty was Appellant’s alone, he had ample time to consult

with his attorney and was satisfied with his representation, and that no other

promises were made to persuade Appellant to plead guilty.           Written Guilty

Plea Colloquy, 11/9/2022, at 3-4. Appellant understood that the entry of his

guilty plea would establish a violation of the terms of his parole for which he

could be sentenced to prison. Id. at 4. Appellant also acknowledged that he

was entering an open plea, the trial court was not bound by the terms of the

plea agreement, sentencing was discretionary, and Appellant could receive

the maximum sentences allowed by law.              Id. at 5.     Before accepting

Appellant’s plea, the trial court orally confirmed that the agreement was for

an open plea, meaning the Commonwealth would make a sentencing

recommendation, but that the trial court was not bound by it.                 N.T.,

11/9/2022, at 6-7 (“So is that your understanding of your open plea? The

____________________________________________

4  “[A] written plea colloquy that is read, completed and signed by the
defendant and made part of the record may serve as the defendant's plea
colloquy when supplemented by an oral, on-the-record examination.”
Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782–783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (case
citation omitted), citing Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590) (“[A] plea of guilty will
not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea
disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and
consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to
enter the plea.”).

                                           -5-
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[j]udge is going to give you whatever [sentence] he wants.                  The

[Commonwealth is going to recommend five to ten [years of incarceration].

[Counsel for Appellant] may recommend something else, and the [j]udge has

to decide; is that correct?”). Thereafter, Appellant agreed to plead guilty. Id.

at 9.

        When imposing its aggregate sentence of five to 10 years of

imprisonment, the trial court first stated that the current sentence “be served

concurrently with any other sentence.”     Id. at 21.   The trial court further

explained that the instant sentence was imposed concurrently to the sentence

he was already serving, but that his back time for violating parole could not

be served concurrently. Id. at 21-22 (“What won’t be concurrent is whatever

back time [the Parole Board] give[s] you. Whatever hit they give you for that,

they will not give you double credit for the new sentence and the old sentence;

but once you’re done serving the back time, everything between that sentence

– everything that’s left on that sentence and this sentence, it runs concurrent

with each other.”).

        Moreover, the PCRA court credited trial counsel’s testimony from the

PCRA evidentiary hearing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/9/2023, at 26-28.

Trial counsel testified that there was no specific agreement that Appellant’s

instant sentence would be imposed concurrently to the back time served for

a violation of parole, because “whatever sentence he would receive [in] this

particular case would be separate and apart from any sentence he would

receive in terms of violation and resentencing on [s]tate parole.”        N.T.,

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8/8/2023, at 10. Counsel for Appellant told Appellant “it was not possible” to

impose the instant sentence concurrently with any time served as a result of

recommitting Appellant for violations of parole. Id. at 11. We will not disturb

the PCRA court’s credibility determinations that are supported by the record.

In sum, trial counsel properly explained the interplay between Appellant’s

open plea sentence with his violation of parole and counsel’s advice was within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Appellant

subsequently entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The

law simply does not require that Appellant be pleased with the outcome of his

decision to enter a plea of guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel

provided effective assistance of counsel and agree with the PCRA court that

there is no merit to Appellant’s claims under the PCRA.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2024

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