Court Opinion

ID: 9524817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:57:30.292776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:02.889372
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment should be affirmed. However I do so for reasons different than those expressed by Judge Friedlander in the lead opinion. Specifically, the lead opinion examines the foreseeability component of duty, determines the harm was not foreseeable, and then concludes no duty exists. In my view there are at least two problems with this approach. First, foreseeability is but one of three competing factors that must be weighed and evaluated to determine the existence of a duty. See Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991) reh’g denied, (To determine the existence of a common law duty we must balance: 1) the relationship between the parties, 2) the foreseeability of harm, and 3) public policy concerns). Even assuming that the harm is not foreseeable, unless the other two components are evaluated, then the finding of no duty rests on an incomplete analysis. Second, and more important, there is no need to engage in the balancing process in the ease before us because the duty a business owner owes its invitees already has been established. “Proprietors owe a duty to their business invitees to use reasonable care to protect them from injury caused by other patrons and guests on their premises, including providing adequate staff to police and control disorderly conduct.” Muex v. Hindel Bowling Lanes, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) citing Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 769 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). Essentially, where relevant case authority dictates the existence of a duty then we may not, by examining the relationship between the parties, foreseeability of harm, and public policy concerns, reach a contrary conclusion and determine that no duty exists. In short, balancing the Webb competing factors is reserved for instances where the existence of a duty has not been previously determined or articulated. As applied to the instant case, it is clear to me that Hotel owed Ellis a duty to use reasonable care to protect him from injury caused by other patrons and guests on Hotel’s premises. The critical issue is whether Hotel breached its duty of reasonable care.
Although breach of duty is usually a matter left to the trier of fact, it can be decided as a matter of law where the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion. Richter v. Klink Trucking, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 223 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) trans. denied. Ellis contends that the duty question presented here is whether Hotel owed him a duty to protect his privacy by not disclosing Claire’s room number to Michael Wallin. However, as I have indicated the duty question is already settled. The question Ellis presents is more appropriately cast not as an issue of duty, but rather breach of duty. In other words, did Hotel breach its duty of care to protect Ellis by disclosing Claire’s room number to Wallin? I think not. For there to be a breach of duty there must be a causal relationship between the act done and the duty imposed. The act of disclosing a hotel guest’s room number, without more, bears no relationship to a hotel’s duty to protect the guest’s visitor from harm. Although under different facts, the disclosure of a guest’s room number may result in a breach of duty, such facts are not present in this case. Thus, I agree the trial court’s grant of summary judgment should be affirmed, but only because the undisputed facts show that as a matter of law Hotel breached no duty owed to Ellis.