Court Opinion

ID: 9540368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:15:12.453192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:53.706882
License: Public Domain

PRATT, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court of the United States in holding that it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant in this case said, 335 U. S. 520-524, 69 S. Ct. 277:
“Their airbrakes were defective; for this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following at about the same rate of speed and operated by an employee looking in another direction crashed into the train; all of these circumstances were inseparably related to one another in time and space. The jury could have found that decedent’s death resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances.” (Italics added.)
The words “any or all” justify the conclusion that that court believed the question of sole proximate cause was one for the jury. We, of course, are bound to follow that Supreme Court decision. The jury might, if it believed the evidence justified such a conclusion, find any one of the above sets of circumstances the cause of the death — and, we can reasonably conclude that they found that following the train upon a track-car without looking where he was going, was the sole cause of his death, as they found a “no cause of action” verdict.
In its discussion of instruction no. 16, however, I think the prevailing opinion has over-emphasized an abstract interpretation of the wording. I know of no more careless way of driving the track-car, or any vehicle, for that *18matter, than driving in one direction and looking in another. It seems to me that it is so “palpably dangerous that an employee using reasonable care for his own safety would not choose that method” — borrowing the expression of the prevailing opinion. To reason that one driving behind a train, but not looking where he was driving, might not know that it was dangerous to do so, is to attribute to that driver an intelligence considerably below normal in this mechanical age. The prevailing opinion attacks the reference to driving of deceased “with his back to the freight train” as not supported by the evidence. It is true that in this trial, as distinguished from the first one, the testimony does not expressly state that he had his back to the train; but the record does show that the witnesses in the trial court in open court demonstrated what they meant as to his position, and that demonstration is not described in words in the record. It seems clear, however, that all witnesses agree the two on the track-car were not looking where they were going. The actual position of their backs was immaterial — it was a question of whether or not they were keeping a proper lookout to protect themselves. Their failure to do so is what excited the men in the caboose of the train who tried to attract their attention in time to prevent the collision. I do not believe the jury was misled in any way by the instruction; nor was it prejudicial to plaintiff under the circumstances.
Now to the separation agreement. Mrs. Lucus, when on the witness stand, testified that she was positive that her husband would return to her some day — that she was keeping up the home with that thought in mind. It does not appear from the evidence that she contemplated ever trying to force him to live up to the decree of separate maintenance. To incorporate that thought in an instruction, then, would be to submit a question to the jury without evidence to support it. The decree of separate maintenance did not require Mrs. Lucus to insist upon its enforcement. The *19theory of the ease was that Mr. Lucus would return. The court instructed upon future expectations and that was sufficiently detailed to cover the case absent proof of an intent to force payments from him.
The judgment should be affirmed.