Court Opinion

ID: 9777836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:25:35.094681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.000985
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
concurring in the denial of the State’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing.
After carefully re-examining the issue in this case, I am now of the opinion that this *616case was correctly decided on original submission. However, the majority opinion on original submission fails to define the crucial phrase “reviewable rulings of the trial court”, Boozer v. State, No. 402-82, slip op. at 6, quoting Ortega v. State, 668 S.W.2d 701, 705, no. 10 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), and therefore fails to give the bench and bar adequate guidance in determining whether appellate courts will permit retrials in cases where the State requests, but does not receive, a charge which correctly sets for the State’s burden of proof under the indictment and facts of the case.
The thrust of the problem in the instant case is that the State acquiesced in a jury charge which required it to corroborate the testimony of its key witness — corroboration which the State was unable to supply. Evidence presented at trial that the witness was or was not an accomplice as a matter of law is of no moment to our consideration, because the State has historically been free to voluntarily shoulder a greater burden of proof in a criminal trial than is required by the Texas Penal Code.1 Since the State did not complain at trial about the burden of proof allocated' by the jury charge, we can only presume that the State volunteered to shoulder the burden of producing corroboration of the testimony of the witness Wilson.2
As I see it, the function of Art. 36.15, Y.A.C.C.P. from the State’s standpoint is that it permits the State to notify the trial judge that the jury charge requires the State to prove more than is minimally necessary under the indictment and the evidence to obtain a conviction. If the State does not avail itself of this opportunity at trial, it can only be presumed on appeal that the State volunteered to shoulder a greater burden of proof — and the State must be held to that burden on appeal when the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.3
When the State does make known its complaint to the trial judge concerning the burden allocated to it by the charge, it not only allows the trial judge to correct the charge then and there, but also notifies appellate courts that the State is not volunteering to shoulder any greater burden of proof than is required by the indictment and the evidence presented in the case. If the State has pursued this course but the trial judge nonetheless insists on making the State shoulder a greater burden of proof than required by law, and on appeal the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, I would hold that all rulings on the State’s requested special charges pursuant to Art. 36.15, supra, are reviewable. If it is determined on appellate review that the trial judge erred in charging the jury and that the error in the charge is the cause of the insufficiency of the evidence, I would always call that error “trial error,” thus permitting the State to retry the de*617fendant, provided the State complies with Art. 36.15, supra. It follows that I vehemently disagree with the implication in the majority opinion that the jury charge cannot be reviewed on appeal unless the defendant raised the issue.4
It is axiomatic that the State cannot initiate the appellate process in a criminal case. Art. V, Sec. 26, Texas Constitution. However, “when the convicted defendant initiates the appellate process, he sets in motion the whole procedure including the right of the State to seek discretionary review under certain conditions.” Todd v. State, 661 S.W.2d 116, 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Onion, P.J. concurring).
Thus, I don’t think that reviewing the State’s requested special charges is even remotely tantamount to allowing the State to appeal. The function of the requested special charge on appeal in the sufficiency context is to allow the appellate court to determine whether the evidence is insufficient because the State “bit off more than it could chew”, or because the trial judge erroneously forced the State to prove something which was not necessary under the law nor under the evidence adduced at trial. In either situation, the decision to reverse or affirm is based on the charge as given to the jury. Only the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence occasions appellate review of the State’s requested special charges, and then the purpose of review is solely to determine whether a retrial is permitted under Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). Allowing the State, in fact even encouraging the State, to prevent a defendant from obtaining appellate relief to which that defendant is not constitutionally entitled is simply not the same as allowing the State to appeal from an adverse outcome in the trial court.
I therefore concur in the decision of the majority of this Court to deny leave to file the State’s Motion for Rehearing in this cause, but I find regrettable the failure of the majority opinion on original submission to elucidate its meaning of “reviewable rulings of the trial court.”
MILLER, J., joins.

. For example, in Ortega v. State, 668 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), the State alleged and attempted to prove that the defendant acted with the intent to fraudulently obtain property and services. Allegation and proof of either property or services is sufficient to support a conviction under the Credit Card Abuse statute. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.31(b)(2). Since the State acquiesced in a jury charge which increased its burden of proof beyond what was minimally required by the applicable penal provision, it was held to that burden on appeal. Consequently, this Court unanimously ordered an acquittal for Ortega. See also McClure v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 650, 296 S.W.2d 263 (1956); Maples v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 478, 63 S.W.2d 855 (1933); Smith v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 511, 298 S.W. 286 (1927).

. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P. permits the defendant, but not the State, to object to matters in the jury charge. The State’s only vehicle for lodging its complaints concerning the jury charge with the trial judge is the requested special charge authorized by Art. 36.15, V.A.C.C.P.

.I observe that the cases chronicled in fn. 1, ante, deal with situations wherein the State expressly increased its burden of proof by its pleading, and then acquiesced in the court's charge to the jury concomitant with the same. The instant case differs in the sense that, although the State did not expressly increase its burden by pleading the law of accomplice testimony, it nevertheless acquiesced in the court’s charge to the jury which did increase the burden by instructing that the witness Wilson was an accomplice as a matter of law. In both instances, the State, however, assumes a greater burden of proof.

. “Much ado has been made by the parties as well as the Court of Appeals, about whether the evidence adduced at trial supported submission [emphasis in original] of the court’s instruction that the witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. We, however, see no occasion to review the evidence for that purpose under appellant's sole ground of error raised originalty on appeal" At 610 [emphasis added.]