Court Opinion

ID: 9583690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:41:15.39759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:35.641114
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, and would find the circuit court erred in refusing to allow appellant to introduce evidence of third party guilt in the guilt phase of the trial. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
The majority and I agree on the third party guilt evidence proffered by appellant. In my view, the proffer met the standard established by State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532 (1941). The majority, relying on State v. Gay, 343 S.C. 543, 541 S.E.2d 541 (2001), concludes that the third party guilt evidence was properly excluded. I find Gay distinguishable.
In Gay, the Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence of third party guilt because the State’s casé, particularly the forensic evidence, was so strong that it admitted of no “reasonable inference” regarding the defendant’s innocence. The *347present case is distinguishable from Gay in several important particulars. First, the validity of the forensic evidence was not called into question in Gay. Here, appellant presented evidence of mishandling, for example the collection of evidence at the scene using grocery bags from the victim’s kitchen, the mislabeling of samples at the lab, and the loss of all blood samples collected from the victim. Further, appellant proffered evidence that representatives of the State had admitted manufacturing blood and palm print evidence against him. Finally, unlike the defendant in Gay, appellant proffered both “proximity” witnesses and “confession” witnesses. Considering the record as a whole, the State’s evidence was not sufficient to negate the “reasonable inference” of appellant’s innocence arising from appellant’s proffer.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.