Court Opinion

ID: 9429213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:00.723757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:17.896706
License: Public Domain

*750Justice Brennan,
concurring.
The Court holds today that the National Labor Relations Board may not enjoin the prosecution of a state-court lawsuit unless the suit lacks a “reasonable basis,” ante, at 743, and, further, that to find that the suit lacks a reasonable basis on factual grounds the Board must find that there is no “genuine issue of material fact,” ante, at 744-748. For me, those are no delphic pronouncements. They are standards that take their content from the basic structures of federal and state— and of administrative and judicial — authority over labor disputes, and they should not be read in an artificial way that ignores their provenance.
It is important to remember that our focus in this case is on the function of judicial review. On the one hand, the National Labor Relations Act constitutes the Board, and not this Court, the principal arbiter of federal labor policy.
“Here, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board’s special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 798; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, [313 U. S. 177,] 194, and of ‘[appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases’ from its special understanding of ‘the actualities of industrial relations.’ Labor Board v. United Steelworkers, [357 U. S. 357,] 362-363. ‘The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting *751legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.’ Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87, 96.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963).1
Thus, in reviewing the Board’s construction of the Act and the remedy it has provided to effectuate the purposes of the Act, our task
“[is] not to interpret that statute as [we think] best but rather the narrower inquiry into whether the [NLRB]’s construction was ‘sufficiently reasonable’ to be accepted by a reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U. S. 60, 75 (1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court to find the agency’s construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981).
On the other hand, this Court’s responsibility for interpretation of the labor laws comes particularly into play when the Board’s exercise of its broad mandate to develop federal labor policy has constitutional resonances. I do not suggest that a constitutional issue surfaces directly in this case. But *752we have often observed that Congress left much unsaid as to the effect of federal labor law on the delicate relationships between institutional policy and individual rights, and between State and Federal Governments, without intending to exercise the full measure of its constitutional power to regulate those relationships. See, e. g., Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 488 (1953). In construing how far the Act goes in depriving workers and employers of rights they would otherwise have under state law, we have often sought guidance from basic constitutional norms, on the theory that in the absence of more specific evidence they supply the surest indication of what Congress intended.
It is in this spirit that the “reasonable basis” and “genuine material dispute” standards must be understood. They are phrases that encapsulate a complex judgment as to what limits a court may infer on the Board’s broad authority to set federal labor policy and to vindicate that policy by enjoining prosecution of a state lawsuit.2 More specific meaning can be derived from close attention to the particular constitutional considerations upon which they are based.
We have recognized a right under the First Amendment to seek redress of grievances in state courts. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972). Congress can and does pre-empt some.state causes of action by providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain types of disputes, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a); 40 U. S. C. § 270b(b), but such complete pre-emption is not lightly implied. We have also held that Congress has not completely pre-empted the right to sue in state court for defamation that occurs in connection with a labor dispute. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966). Accord*753ingly, it is appropriate to infer in a case implicating First Amendment rights, as here, that Congress did not intend to authorize the NLRB to enjoin the prosecution of an unpre-empted state-court lawsuit, even if the plaintiff’s subjective intent is to frustrate the operation of federal labor law, except where the plaintiff’s First Amendment interests are at their weakest — where the suit is without a reasonable basis in fact or law. However, as the Court makes clear, ante, at 741, 749, the Board’s ability to enjoin prosecution of a state suit is not the measure of its ability to determine that such prosecution constitutes an unfair labor practice or of its ability to provide other remedies to vindicate federal labor policy. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 733 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (“failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication”). As to the necessity and the scope of these remedies, the Board is entitled to a high degree of deference.3
Somewhat different concerns affect the standards and procedures by which the Board makes its “reasonable basis” determination. While the Constitution protects a person’s right to file and to prosecute a lawsuit in state court, it does not guarantee that state law, rather than federal law, will provide the ground for decision. In fact, with regard to labor disputes, federal pre-emption of state law is the rule, not the exception. That pre-emption may be accomplished by congressionally authorized administrative action as well as by legislation. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Even in areas where state law is not pre-empted, there may be a federal overlay— as with defamation actions like the one involved in this case, *754which are limited by a federal requirement that malice be proved. See Linn, supra, at 61.
Nor does the Constitution guarantee that particular questions of fact will be decided by a state jury. To the extent that a litigant has an “interest in having the factual dispute resolved by a jury,” ante, at 745, that interest is completely derivative from the State’s interest in providing a particular cause of action with particular procedures. Yet that “State’s right” may be pre-empted by federal law whenever Congress or its authorized agent determines that the federal interest in labor relations, in industries affecting commerce, requires different rules.
“[W]hen it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 288 (1971).
See also San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 242-243 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters, supra, at 490-491.
That is not to say that Congress has authorized the Board to disregard altogether state-created rights to jury determinations on factual issues and to state-court rulings on state law that has not been pre-empted. Linn and its progeny make clear that it has not. The NLRA requires some accommodation of state interests; the question is how much. The most reasonable inference to draw from the structure of state-federal relations in this area is that the Board may enjoin prosecution of a state lawsuit if, in addition to whatever other findings are required to decide that an unfair labor practice has been committed, it determines that controlling *755federal law bars the plaintiff’s right to relief, that clear state law makes the case frivolous, or that no reasonable jury could make the findings of fact in favor of the plaintiff that are necessary under applicable law. I can understand the phrase “genuine material disputes,” ante, at 749, no other way. With regard to questions of fact, which are crucial in this case, see ante, at 746, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), provides an analogy for the proper allocation of fact-finding authority to those charged with protecting federal rights. A state lawsuit may be regarded as having no reasonable basis if no reasonable factfinder could give a verdict for the plaintiff. Even if a State has some interest in entertaining frivolous lawsuits or providing unreasonable juries, that interest need not prevent swift, effective vindication of federal labor policy.
The scope of our review of the procedures the Board uses to accomplish its mission is limited, and the constitutional constraints on them are attenuated. Unless the agency goes entirely beyond its statutory mandate, violates its own procedures, or fails to provide an affected party due process of law, we have no role in specifying what methods it may or may not use in finding facts or reaching conclusions of law and policy. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 548-549 (1978). The Court acknowledges this and notes that “we leave the particular procedures for making reasonable-basis determinations entirely to the Board’s discretion.” Ante, at 745, n. 11. Specifically, the Board may take evidence, although it need not do so in every case, nor would it be wise to do so in every case. Ibid.
Thus, the Board retains broad power to deal with the ways in which resort to judicial process may be used as a “powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation,” ante, at 740. There is no constitutionally privileged method of harassing or punishing those who exercise rights protected by §§7 and 8 of the NLRA. The Board may not enjoin prosecution of an unpre-*756empted state lawsuit unless it finds that the suit has no reasonable basis, and it may not decide that a suit has no reasonable basis in fact if a reasonable jury could view the facts differently. But it may take other measures which have less direct impact on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and it may investigate the matter to the full extent it deems necessary to vindicate the federal interest in protecting participants in labor disputes from coercive state-court lawsuits.

 As was said of the Federal Election Commission in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 37 (1981), the NLRB is also “precisely the type of agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded.” It is “vested . . . with ‘primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act,’ ” and it is provided with “ ‘extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers.’” Ibid. “It is authorized to ‘formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act.’” Ibid. See also NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266-267 (1975).

 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, astutely observed that interpreting the National Labor Relations Act involves “a more complicated and perceptive process than is conveyed by the delusive phrase, ‘ascertaining the intent of the legislature.’” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 239-240 (1959).

 Reasonable people could differ over the wisdom of deciding that a nonfrivolous suit which is withdrawn, or in which the plaintiff ultimately does not prevail, constitutes an unfair labor practice, see ante, at 749, but that is a question of labor policy for the Board to decide in the first instance.