Court Opinion

ID: 9487901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:29:31.182909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:33.080005
License: Public Domain

ERVIN, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Based on the evidence presented at trial, there is little doubt that Fields’ actions were appalling, but even individuals engaging in horrible acts are afforded protection under our Constitution. In focusing on the moral depravity of Fields’ actions, the majority ignores the defendant’s clear and unequivocal expression of a desire to represent himself at trial. Such an expression is readily apparent if one reviews the entire record and not merely those portions that make it easier to arrive at a predetermined conclusion. As I demonstrate below, Fields’ third letter to Judge Smith was the culmination of a progressive -dissatisfaction with his attorneys’ assistance and with the judge’s refusal to allow him to serve as co-counsel for the purpose of cross-examining his accusers. The most disturbing aspect of the majority opinion is that it establishes new Sixth Amendment law in an alternative holding, spurning any inclination towards judicial restraint. This newly created constitutional rule — that a defendant’s right to self-representation can be limited in the same way that Confrontation Clause rights can be limited under Maryland v. Craig — is wholly misguided. The court’s extension of Craig to the self-representation realm undermines the continued vitality of the Faretta doctrine. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Although the majority sketches the facts underlying this petition, I think that it is necessary to state them in greater detail, for they are central to the determination óf whether Fields expressed a desire to represent himself. In focusing on isolated statements made by Fields, the majority underestimates the extent to which Fields’ request evolved over the course of his dialogue with the district court. See Majority Opinion, at 1037 (claiming that Fields “concede[d] that this personal cross-examination was his sole purpose in representing himself’). Although Fields initially wanted to be appointed co-counsel solely for the purpose of conducting cross-examination, his correspondence with the judge — when taken as a whole — reveals other ways in which he was .dissatisfied with his counsel. This displeasure culminated in what I believe to have been an absolutely clear communication of his desire to represent himself.
*1038I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he record taken as a whole, therefore discloses only a single statement in one letter from Fields that perhaps indicated a desire to proceed pro se .... ” Majority Opinion, at 1033. Fields wrote three letters to the judge within a three month period and then spoke with the judge during a pretrial hearing held in early September 1988. If the court is truly committed to considering the record as a whole, then each of Fields’ remarks about the quality of his counsel and his desire to cross-examine the children must be taken into account.
On June 2, 1988, less than a month after he had been indicted, Fields wrote to the presiding judge in his case. The very first sentence of that letter stated: “I wish to petition the court to be appointed as co-council [sic] for defense at my trial.” His desire to participate in his own defense arose because he was unhappy with his attorneys’ ability to examine the witnesses effectively. According to Fields, he witnessed perjury at the preliminary hearing. He felt that his attorneys had not mastered the facts of the ease and the children would be less likely to lie to an individual they knew. Fields acknowledged that he still would need the advice of his appointed attorneys on technical legal matters — “I would of - course need expert legal advice as to what kind of evidence I can present and what kinds of questions I can ask and to qualify expert witnesses for me and listen for evidence which should not be considered relevant and the thousand and one other things they are .trained for.” There is no indication that the judge responded to this letter.
On August 16, Fields wrote a second letter to the judge in which he outlined some of the ways in which his attorneys were not functioning adequately:'
It is now apparent that my council [sic] cannot handle my defense and I hereby relieve them of that duty. Mr. Órdlick Labell and Mr. James Segall are-not consulting with me before asking for continuances and I protest this latest postponement most strenuously. It has always been my desire to get to court as soon as possible and I made my attorneys aware of that. Our approaches to my defense has [sic] been on divergent courses and I feel strongly that I will best [sic] served by the court appointing me a new council [sic] who is competent to handle a case of this magnitude.
Fields’ criticisms of his attorneys, regardless of whether the criticism was justified, went beyond the issue of who would conduct cross-examination. According to Fields, his attorneys were leaving him out of the decision making process and were preventing him from getting to trial at the earliest possible date. The cross-examination issue and the effectiveness of defense counsel were distinct issues in Fields’ mind. In the second page of the letter, Fields wrote the following:
I now petition the court-for a new attorney to replace Mr. Labell and Mr. Segall.
I also beg the court to let me know in' writing regarding my petition to act as co council [sic] and my petition for dental and medical services.
It is clear that Fields wanted to cross-examine the children himself, as this letter indicates. His “approach ha[d] always been to simply get the remainder of the stories from the witnesses] by questioning them myself on the stand.” The dual request made in this second letter demonstrates, however, that Fields was troubled by more than just the cross-examination issue: The desire to cross-examine his accusers increased as his disapproval of his counsel grew.
Fields apparently received a reply from the judge to the second letter, but it is not included either in the state record or in our record on appeal. Judge Smith seems to have .indicated that he would not grant Fields’ petition for new counsel and would not allow Fields to examine the witnesses at .trial. In speaking to Fields at the subsequent hearing, the judge told Fields that “[y]ou can write out your questions and give it to your lawyers if you want to do that which is what I put to you in my letter.”
On August 29, 1988, Fields-sent his third and final letter to the judge. After thanking the judge for responding to the second letter, Fields stated:
*1039I am very dismayed that my petition for new council [sic] was, not .approved. Therefore, I have no choice left but to dismiss Mr. Labell and Mr. Segall as my council [sic] and to act as my own council at the trial. I believe the law gives me that option and since I am so highly prejudiced against Mr. Labell for his incompetence and procrastination Í may , yet file a complaint against him with the Virginia Bar Assoc. I regret taking this action but I am convinced I have no choice. In July of this year the Supreme Court affirmed my right to face my accusers and I feel that that approach is the only .one that guarantees me justice. I heard perjury committed at the hearing and I believe the witnesses would not hesitate to lie again to a stranger. The stranger I am referring to would be any council [sic] asking them questions.
5{t *}S }{{ ^5 í|{ H*
I regret putting you in this position your Honor but my future is my responsibility and no one elses. My honor and reputation is my responsibility and no one elses. Without the opportunity to personally defend myself justice will not be served.
If you will have a law clerk or someone appropriate contact me I will give them a list of evidence and witnesses I need.
* * * * * *
P.S. Mr. Labell has never kept a promise to show up on schedule either, which leads me to believe he has a certain lack of intestinal fortitude, I don’t wish to see him again under any circumstances.
(emphasis added). The majority repeatedly cites to Fields’ “regret [about] taking this-action,” see Majority Opinion, at 1033, 1034, and suggests that this “reluctance” on Fields’ part somehow undermines the defendant’s desire to proceed pro se. In that part of its opinion which focuses on the defendant’s hesitancy and regret, the majority ignores Fields’ equally powerful statement that “I am convinced I have no choice [but to dismiss my attorneys].” I cannot understand how the majority can treat this statement, coupled with prior expressions of dissatisfaction with counsel, as only “perhaps” indicating a desire to proceed pro se. See id. at 1033-34.
The court held a pretrial hearing on September 7,1988, less than two weeks after the court received Fields’ third letter. The most noteworthy aspect of the colloquy between Fields and Judge Smith was the repeated insistence on the part, of the judge that Fields was “not going, to stand up here and cross-examine [his] accusers.” While such a decision may have been appropriate in a typical Maryland v. Craig dispute, in this case it failed to take into account Fields’ assertion of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Moreover, the degree to which the court abhorred the idea of Fields personally cross-examining the girls- raises the type of bias concerns that the majority acknowledges are relevant under Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Judge Smith made his feelings clear from the outset of the pretrial hearing:
THE COURT: What seems to be your problem?
THE DEFENDANT: There are several problems, Your Honor. One has been ‘no contact with my attorneys in the past. No verbal contact and—
THE COURT: Well, you indicated to me by letter that you didn’t ever want to see him again.
THE DEFENDANT: That’s true.
THE COURT: So now you’re complaining that you haven’t, seen him?
THE DEFENDANT:' I had no use for him. If they weren’t coming over, what the heck were they doing; and when he did come over, I wasn’t asked my opinion on what had happened in the case or how I should be approached for the defense. They had already gone off their paths, and my opinions or thoughts just weren’t relevant in that.
THE COURT: You haven’t got á legal degree have you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Don’t you think these two attorneys are better suited for what ought to be brought up on your case and what ought not to be brought up?
*1040THE DEFENDANT: In some respects.
THE COURT: You can forget about my allowing you to cross-examine these complaining witnesses — these young children. I’m not going to allow that under any circumstance.
THE DEFENDANT: Well then, there won’t be . any justice in this courtroom.
THE COURT: Well, I can’t help that, my friend. If you don’t think there’ll be, there won’t be, but you’re not going to cross-examine the people you’re accused of sexually abusing.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I believe the Supreme Court gave me that right, your ' Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I’m the Supreme Court in your trial, and you’re not going to cross-examine those children. You can write out your questions and give it to your lawyers if you want to do that which is what I put to you in my letter. That’s fine, but you’re not going to stand up here and cross-examine your accusers. You have a right to see your accusers and hear ■them testify in front of you, and you have a right to cross-examination, but you don’t have a right to do it yourself.
THE DEFENDANT: I understood that I really was — a front — that I had the right to confront them, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You’re going to confront them through your lawyer; and any questions you want your lawyers to ask, you can write it out and give it to them.
THE DEFENDANT: I’ve already seen these children commit.perjury, Your Hon- or, and it’s something they’re going to do with a stranger because they know that that stranger does not have all the facts or know who all the other witnesses were that were present under certain circumstances.
THE COURT: Well, that’s your responsibility to get that to your lawyer so that they can properly cross-examine, but I’m ruling on that right now. You can go to Richmond on that point because you’re not going to cross-examine in my court any child that you’ve allegedly sexually abused.
At no point during the hearing did Judge Smith consider Fields’ desire to cross-examine the children in light of Fields’ independent request to proceed as his own counsel. Judge Smith convinced himself, without the benefit of a Craig hearing, that any scenario which would place Fields in the position of cross-examiner would not' be entertained.
THE COURT: To allow him to stand up here as a father and as a defendant, question a thirteen year old, which is the one I have in front of me — I don’t know what— whether the other ones are or not — is inconceivable. I can’t think of putting a child any more ill at ease than to have her own defendant father who she’s accused of sexually abusing her standing up here and questioning her.
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I say something?
THE COURT: No. I don’t want to hear anymore from you. I want you to cooperate with them, Mr. Fields, because if you don’t, it’s only going to — it’s a detriment; and I’m ruling right now that you’re not going to be allowed to question these children.
The discussion then moved on to other matters pertaining to trial.
II.
“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Because “the right to be represented by counsel is preeminent,” United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 (4th Cir.1985), proper invocation of the self-representation right requires a defendant to “clearly and unequivocally declare[ ] to the trial judge that he want[s] to represent himself and [does] not want counsel.”1 Far-*1041etta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Although we have been instructed to “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the right to counsel, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), at a certain point a defendant’s “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” requires this court to respect his or her decision. Id. The facts of this case do not present á Brewer -type scenario in which officers clearly manipulated an escaped mental hospital patient into providing them with key information outside the presence- of his counsel. There were no “Christian burial speeches” given in Fields’ case;' proceeding pro se was his idea. Neither the court nor defense counsel persuaded him to waive his right to counsel, and his letters and conversation with the judge make clear that he recognized the potential pitfalls of dismissing his attorneys.
A preliminary question, over which the majority opinion labors mightily, is the standard under which we review the question of whether Fields clearly and unequivocally invoked his Faretta right. The majority begins by reformulating Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), from a straightforward case explaining why the voluntariness of a confession is not a question of fact entitled to deference under § 2254(d). into an elaborate test to be used in distinguishing between questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law, an undertaking certainly never stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Indeed, I find it difficult to discern from the Miller opinion the very elements of the test that are relied on so heavily by the majority. The factors to which the majority refers are not from the central analytic discussion of Miller, but rather are from a section discussing what the Court termed “practical considerations.” Id. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 453.
In Miller, the Court found that whether a confession was voluntary was a mixed question of fact and law, and thus not subject to the § 2254(d) presumption. Id. at 112-18, 106 S.Ct. at 451-53. I do not read Miller to enunciate the test the majority adopts.2 I *1042merely note that on many similar matters, courts have found it proper to characterize the matter as a mixed question of law and fact, as they involve “the application of-.a legal standard to a , particular set of facts.” TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2133, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976). In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a waiver of the right to counsel, which is intertwined with the assertion of the right to self-representation, was a question of federal law not subject to the presumption of § 2254(d). In doing so, it noted that
the question of waiver was not a question of historical fact, but one which, in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires “application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.... ” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 [73 S.Ct. 437, 446, 97 L.Ed. 469] (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 403-04, 97 S.Ct. at 1242. There is no dispute over the facts of the case; the contents of the letters and the hearing are the sum and substance of the material facts. Whether these facts disclose a clear and unequivocal intention by Fields sufficient to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to waive the right to counsel .and proceed prose is a question of law, not a question of fact. As with the voluntariness of a confession, whether a defendant in a criminal proceeding has clearly and unequivocally chosen not to accept the assistance of counsel and to proceed instead by representing himself is a question that has had a “uniquely legal dimension.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 452.
Even if I were to accept the proposition that § 2254(d) imposes a presumption of correctness as to this particular determination, however, the presumption is not irrebuttable, and a review of the facts clearly discloses that the “factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). Although the majority valiantly attempts to support its conclusion that Fields did not express his desire to exercise his Faretta right by quoting small pieces of the record, there can be no reasonable conclusion from a full review of the facts but that Fields explicitly expressed his right to represent himself.
A steady progression can be noted in the three letters that Fields sent to the judge. In the first, he indicated his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and asked to be appointed co-counsel. In the second, written , after he had not received any response from the judge, he expressed a desire to obtain new counsel and repeated his request to act as co-counsel. Importantly, both letters referred to other concerns that Fields had with his counsel beyond the cross-examination issue. The judge responded'by stating that he was not going to replace current counsel and that Fields would only be able to participate in the cross-examination of witnesses through his counsel. In his third letter, Fields then stated a new position explicitly: “I am very dismayed that my petition for new council [sic] was not approved. Therefore, I have no choice left but to dismiss Mr. Labell and Mr. Segall as my council [sic] and to act as my own council [sic] at the trial.” This was not bluster, as the majority seems to believe; that Fields was serious is quite evident from other parts of this letter, in which he informed the judge that “I regret putting you in this position Your Honor but my future is my responsibility and no one elses. My honor and reputation is my responsibility and no one elses. Without the opportunity to personally defend myself justice will not be served.” He also noted: “If you will have a law clerk or someone appropriate contact me I will give them a list of evidence and witnesses I need.” Thus, there can be no other conclusion but that, after being rebuffed in his attempt to obtain counsel more to his liking, Fields decided that his best course would be to act as his own counsel. That he was forced to take this position as a fallback does not detract from the fact that Fields explicitly conveyed a desire to represent himself. Cf. United States v. Rob *1043inson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir.1990) (finding that the “fact that some of Robinson’s statements of his preference to proceed pro se were accompanied by expressions of his feeling ‘forced’ to do so does not render these statements equivocal)”; Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1442 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant’s desire to invoke self-representation right was not unequivocal just because it was impelled by his dislike of his particular attorney; defendant properly invoked right through statement that “[i]f I can’t have another lawyer, I will have to go pro per [sic]”).
At key points in its opinion the majority overstates Fields’ hesitation about relieving his counsel from duty. Twice, within one three paragraph space, the majority quotes . Fields as having stated that he “regret[ted]” dismissing his counsel. Majority Opinion, at 1033, 1034. The majority ignores the remainder of the very sentence in which Fields expressed this regret, in which he stated, quite emphatically: “I am convinced I have no choice.” At no point does the majority make its motives clearer than when it places its own spin on Fields’ statement that the Supreme Court recently “affirmed' [his] right to face [his] accusers.” According to the majority, “[t]his suggests that [Fields] may have been thinking about simply crpss-examining personally the witnesses against him, rather than proceeding pro se.” Majority Opinion, at 1033. I believe that it is far more likely that Fields had independent reasons for dismissing his counsel aside from the cross-examination issue. Fields’ very next statement after expressing his desire to dismiss Labell and Segall was that he was “highly prejudiced against Mr. Labell for his incompetence and procrastination.” The merit of these criticisms is of no concern to this court. All that matters for purposes of this appeal is that Fields articulated an express dissatisfaction with his counsel.
The majority offers no evidence to support its claim that Fields did not really mean what he said. Moreover, it appears as though the majority is deserting the “clear and unequivocal” test on which it relied so heavily in other portions of its opinion. It is a real stretch on the majority’s part to read so much into two rather simple statements. Finally, Fields’ expression of reluctance to serve as co-counsel came in his first letter to the -trial court. At no point after that initial correspondence did Fields ever claim that he was reluctant to proceed pro se. Nearly three months passed between the court’s receipt of Fields’ first letter and receipt of his third letter, in which he clearly stated that he wished’to dismiss his counsel. As his counsel continued to fall short of his expectations, Fields grew more and more dissatisfied and, apparently, increasingly convinced that he needed to handle his defense himself.
Both Judge Smith and Labell recognized that Fields had- expressed a desire to represent himself. Labell told the judge that Fields “would like' to represent himself with us as mere legal advisors,” assuming that he would not be permitted to serve as co-counsel for the purposes of cross-examining his accusers. In response, Judge Smith acknowledged that he was under a similar impression, but concluded he was “going to keep both of you in as attorneys.” Essentially, representation was forced upon Fields even though all relevant actors knew the defendant wanted to act as his own counsel.
The majority makes much of the fact that. the pretrial hearing opened with a discussion regarding the competency of the lawyers, suggesting this demonstrates that Fields had abandoned his desire to represent himself. But one aspect of self-representation is that the defendant must waive the right to the assistance of counsel, and before a court can .find such a waiver, it must determine that the waiver is made knowingly.
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). The judge’s comments to Fields *1044asking whether Fields had a legal degree and whether he thought the lawyers would do a better job seem to be part of the normal waiver colloquy that occurs after the threshold Faretta invocation has been made. See, e.g., United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir.) (“The district judges also should develop on the record the educational background, age and general capabilities of an accused_” (internal quotation and citation omitted)), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988); Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.1990) (“Once the right to self-representation has been invoked initially, the trial court must conduct a hearing or engage the defendant in a colloquy to ensure that the defendant’s decision is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”). Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertions, every indication is that both the trial judge and Fields’ lawyers understood that Fields wished to represent himself. That he did not subsequently succeed in doing so cannot be laid at Fields’ feet for failing to be clear about what he wanted, but instead must be laid at the feet of the judge, who told Fields once in a letter and at least five times during the pretrial hearing that Fields would not be allowed to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself in order to examine the main witnesses at his own trial.
Fields clearly expressed his desire to represent himself, both in the third letter he wrote to the judge and in the subsequent hearing. All the evidence demonstrates that •the participants understood what Fields wanted as well. Through an unfortunate selectivity in its recounting of events, the majority attempts to cloud the issue, but any careful reading of the facts demonstrates the error of that view.
“To invoke his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta a defendant does not need to recite some talismanic formula hoping to open the eyes and ears of the court to his request.” Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1616, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987). While that may be the rule of the Eleventh Circuit, the new rule of the Fourth appears to be to the contrary. Absent a Zen-like persistence in uttering a single mantra, or the ability to spout crisp legalese with full citation to binding authority, a defendant’s desire to represent himself will not be respected. The right to represent oneself before a jury of one’s peers is the bedrock of the Sixth Amendment, for “the right to defend is personal.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41. The trial court’s aversion to Fields conducting cross-examination prevented it from giving Fields’ self-representation claim sufficient consideration. I am afraid that in trying to protect these children, a majority of this court also closed its eyes to Fields’ invocation of his right to represent himself. The fact that this court does not like the consequences flowing from an application of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights does not justify its taking a defendant’s request to represent himself any less seriously.
III.
I am most disturbed by the court’s decision to use this ease as the vehicle by which it could reconsider the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s right to self-representation. Holdings in the alternative are suspect, because they enable the court to address controversies not necessary for the proper resolution of the case, and thus fly in the face of judicial restraint. That the court should write constitutional law in the alternative is particularly troubling in light of the fact that we generally avoid reaching constitutional questions whenever possible. Having concluded that Fields did not invoke his self-representation right, there was no reason for the court also to determine the extent to which the right to self-representation can be limited in the same manner that Confrontation Clause rights are limited under Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). The majority could have affirmed the district court’s denial of this habeas petition without analyzing the case under Craig. Although styled as an alternative holding, Part III of the majority opinion — and the constitutional question with which it wrestles — is the raison d’etre of this en banc consideration of the case.
The constitutional discussion undoubtedly comes as a complete surprise to the parties in this case. The issue was not raised in the original briefs and, although we asked for *1045supplemental briefing, the court did not ask the parties to include a discussion of the constitutional question. As a result, the parties’ briefs focus on the questions originally debated, i.e., whether Fields invoked his Far-etta right and what standard of review should be employed in answering that question. Furthermore, the extent to which Confrontation Clause analysis should be applied to the self representation setting was dealt with only briefly'at oral argument. Nevertheless, with no briefing and virtually no oral argument on this point, the court has taken upon itself to raise and answer a constitutional question not necessarily implicated by the facts of this case.
Because the parties never presented this appeal as one of constitutional moment, I am reluctant to address the Confrontation Clause issue. Unlike the, majority, however, which makes binding circuit law through-the use of an alternative holding that, borders on dicta, I recognize that what follows holds no precedential value. Nonetheless, because I believe the majority’s view of this constitutional matter is completely in error, I feel compelled to respond.
In one sweeping sentence, the majority collapses the distinction between rights under the Confrontation Clause and the right to self-representation. Nowhere in its discussion of the Confrontation Clause does the majority acknowledge the most glaring difference between Maryland v. Craig and Fields v. Murray — that only one of these defendants wished to proceed with the benefit of counsel. Craig was never in jeopardy of losing his right to cross-examine witnesses. His attorneys were present to conduct such an examination on his behalf. As a result, his rights under the Confrontation Clause could never be completely eviscerated. The worst-case scenario for Craig was not being allowed to face his accusers personally. Denying Fields the right to proceed pro se, however, not only meant that his right to represent himself would not be respected, but also meant that he would not be permitted to conduct' cross-examination in the way he saw fit. The trial court’s repudiation of Fields’ Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had a domino effect unparalleled in the Craig setting. The stark differences between Craig and this case make it difficult for me to understand how the majority can assert so boldly that “[i]f a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right can be limited in the manner-provided in Craig, we have little doubt that a defendant’s self-representation right can be similarly limited.” Majority Opinion, at 1035. The most troubling aspect of this assertion is that it appears to be based on little more than the fact that Faretta did not garner the vote of more than six justices and that self-representation rights are not explicitly provided for by the Sixth Amendment, as are Confrontation Clause rights. Id.
As an initial matter, the majority gives insufficient respect to the self-representation right, ignoring the historical underpinnings of the right as discussed in Faretta. See 422 U.S. at 821-32, 95 S.Ct. at 2534-40. The Faretta Court clearly stated that the right of self-representation is the foundation upon which the rights explicitly -guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment rest. A defendant’s right to assistance of counsel exists primarily to ensure that a defense can be conducted in the most effective manner possible:
.The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. ... Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation — to make one’s own defense personally — is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused, for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.
Id. at 819-20, 95 S.Ct. at 2533 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court then elaborated upon the danger of forcing an attorney upon the unwilling defendant:
To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists.... Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is ’not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.
*1046Id. at 820-21, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34 (footnote omitted). Faretta thus focuses on the personal nature of the right to represent oneself and on the defendant’s right to formulate and execute his own defense. While the Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to the assistance of counsel in the formulation and execution of his defense, the defense must, in the end, remain the defendant’s own; That is the very essence of the right involved, and it must be honored as part of “ ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
The majority’s holding that a defendant’s Faretta right can be limited when child witnesses take the stand is inconsistent with express Supreme Court precedent. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174, 104 S.Ct. 944, 949, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), the Court defined the right to proceed pro se, in part, by the defendant’s opportunity to question witnesses:
A defendant’s right to self-representation plainly encompasses certain specific rights to have his voice heard. The pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.
These “specific rights to make his voice heard ... form the core of a defendant’s right of self-representation.” Id. at 177, 104 S.Ct. at 950. The Faretta right is eroded where “the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself’ is destroyed. Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951. This is so because
[fjrom the jury’s perspective, the message conveyed by the defense may depend as much on the messenger as on the message itself. From the defendant’s own point of view, the right to appear pro se can lose much of its importance if only the lawyers in the courtroom know that the right is being exercised.
Id. at 179, 104 S.Ct. at 951.
The majority’s most significant mistake is assuming that the self-representation right described in Faretta and Wiggins and the Confrontation Clause right analyzed in Craig are based on similar concerns. In the Faretta context, it is critical that the defense remain under the control of the accused and that the jury perceive the defendant as being in control. Rather than focusing on the defendant’s right to direct his defense, “[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 845, 110 S.Ct. at 3163. So long as this reliability is ensured, the defendant’s right to confront his accusers can be curtailed in order to satisfy important public policy concerns.
In Craig, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a.set ,of Maryland trial procedures that allowed victims of child abuse to testify in the abuse prosecution proceedings by means of closed circuit television if “[t]he judge determines that the testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the' child cannot reasonably communicate.” Id. at 841 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. at 3161 n. 1. Craig argued that the statute violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. In upholding the statute, the Court found that, although the physical presence component of the confrontation right is a core value, it is “not the sine qua non of the confrontation right.” Id. at 847, 110 S.Ct. at 3164. Thus, when necessary to further an important public policy and when the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured, the face-to-face component of the Confrontation Clause right ean be denied. The Court found this result to be permissible only because the other .components of the right, namely oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact, preserve the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause itself — the reliability of testimony. See id. at 85.1-52, 110 S.Ct. at 3166-67 (concluding that Maryland procedure did not “impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause”).
The majority’s determination that Craig essentially dictates the result in this case *1047ignores the fact that the right to proceed pro se encompasses more than the “accuracy5’ and “reliability” concerns that form the core of Confrontation Clause analysis. “The right to proceed pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense.” Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951. While the reliability of children’s testimony in the Craig setting can be assured even without a defendant’s face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses, the autonomy and dignity concerns that are an integral component of the self-representation right cannot be safeguarded unless the defendant is permitted to conduct his defense personally. Fields was not given this opportunity.
Because the right to confront one’s accuse ers and the right to self-representation are of differing natures, I do not think that the Supreme Court’s decision in Craig can be seen as casting much light on the questions raised in this ease.3 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Craig modifies the confrontation right while assuring that the underlying purpose is preserved. In this instance, preserving the underlying purpose of the self-representation right can be effectuated by modifying the procedures involved in cross-examination,4 but not by eliminating the right altogether. While the Court in Craig was careful to ensure that the reliability concerns which the Confrontation Clause aims to satisfy would not be significantly compromised by the removal of the witnesses from the same room as the defendant, I simply do not believe that we can force an attorney on to a defendant, as the majority does, and say that the self-representation right’s underlying concern with defendant autonomy can be preserved.
ln sum, I disagree with the majority’s application of Craig to the self-representation scenario. Confrontation Clause rights and the right to proceed pro se are significantly different, and, although easy analogy may make sense on the surface, the underlying distinctions dictate a different result. There is no doubt that concern for children can, and should, force accommodations of some constitutional rights; but the right with which we deal here is particularly important, not only to the defendant who is denied his right to defend himself personally against the charges brought against him, but also to our system of justice as a whole, which is made less fair by telling some defendants that they may not serve as their own defense. The rule of law is a law of rules, and the emotional response of the majority in this case will ripple far into the future, as constitutional rights, which are constitutional in nature precisely because they ought not be subject to the whim of the majority on any given day, are governed by the countervailing pressures of outside concerns.
I therefore dissent.

. Even if the majority’s three-part test could be divined from Miller, neither the second nor third prongs of this test, when applied to the facts of this case, holster the majority's position. The question facing this court is whether Fields made a clear and unequivocal statement of his desire to proceed pro se. Under the second prong of the majority’s test, the court must determine "whether observing the state trial court proceedings is important in resolving this question." Majority Opinion, at 1029. According to the majority, "[t]he clarity and unequivocality of a defendant’s expression is determined not only by the words he speaks, but by his way of speaking them and his manner, and demeanor when he is speaking.” Id. at 1033. Consideration of such additional factors converts a "clear and unequivocal”' standard into a "totality of the circumstances” analysis. I do not dispute the fact that "the same words can express different degrees of certainty depending on how they are spoken.” Id. If, however, mannerisms, voice inflection and demeanor have to be considered in order to evaluate the certainty with which a statement is made, then, by definition, that statement cannot be regarded as clear and unequivocal. If anything other than Fields’ letters to the judge and the trial transcript are needed as interpretive tools, then we will not be operating under a "clear and unequivocal” standard. This court is in as good a position to evaluate the actual statements made by Fields as was the trial court.
Deciding that this court should defer to the judgment of the state trial judge is also inappropriate under the third prong of the majority's test. Allowing Judge Smith to determine the clarity of Fields' expression of the right to represent himself poses an elevated risk of bias. Judge Smith let Fields know that "I’m the Supreme Court in your trial,” and five times within one brief, exchange with Fields, the judge repeated that Fields would not be permitted to cross-examine the children. The judge’s apparent disgust with Fields is most clear in the fifth of *1042these remarks, when he stated that “(y]ou can go to Richmond on that point because you're not going to cross-examine in my court any child that you’ve allegedly sexually abused." Judge Smith’s strong feelings about the cross-examination issue increased the risk that a decision on the self-representation matter would not be given serious independent consideration.

. The Maryland legislature, in developing a series of trial court procedures that could be used to limit a defendant's ability to confront his victims face-to-face, implicitly recognized the distinction between Confrontation Clause rights and the right to represent oneself. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3161 n. 1, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (citing Maryland Cts. & Jud. Proc.Code Ann. § 9-102(c) (1989) (noting that "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se.")).

. The trial court properly could employ special procedures that preserve the core right of the defendant to conduct his own defense while adequately protecting the welfare of the child witnesses. Among the procedures from which the trial cburt could choose, assuming that they are permitted under local law, would be: installing a screen or other barrier between the defendant and the witnesses; conducting closed sessions out of the courtroom; placing the defendant and the witnesses in separate rooms; requiring the defendant to submit his questions to the judge who, after scanning them, would read them aloud to the witnesses; and requiring the defendant to remain seated at counsel table while questioning the witnesses. So long as the jury is given a proper jury instruction in order to caution against the danger of prejudice, the trial judge is in the best position to determine which of these procedures would work best in the particular situation. Furthermore, should any of these measures be unavailing in restraining a defendant's obstreperous behavior, it remains true that a "potentially unruly defendant may and should be clearly forewarned that deliberate ... obstructive behavior may constitute waiver of his pro se rights.” United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (D.C.Cir.1972).