Court Opinion

ID: 9952464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:09:08.226653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:56.925232
License: Public Domain

Reid v City of New York
               2024 NY Slip Op 30839(U)
                     March 14, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 400032/2014
                  Judge: Hasa A. Kingo
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                                       INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                                               RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:                             HON. HASA A. KINGO                                  PART                              05M
                                                            Justice
            ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------X      INDEX NO.          400032/2014
             MARGARET REID,
                                                                                                     MOTION DATE         05/15/2023
                                                         Plaintiff,
                                                                                                     MOTION SEQ. NO.         004
                                                 - V -

             THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MADISON SQUARE GARDEN,
             L.P., MSG HOLDINGS, L.P., THE MADISON SQUARE
                                                                                                       DECISION + ORDER ON
             GARDEN COMPANY, MADISON SQUARE GARDEN
             CENTER, INC.,DEFOE CORP.                                                                        MOTION

                                                         Defendant.
            ------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
            21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29, 30, 31, 32,33,34, 35, 36,37, 38,55,56,57,58,60, 61, 62,63,64, 65,
            66
            were read on this motion to/for                                                       JUDGMENT-SUMMARY

                    With the instant motion, Defendant THE CITY OF NEW YORK (hereinafter "the City"),
            moves, pursuant to CPLR §3212, for an order granting summary judgment in favor of the City,
            and for such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper. Plaintiff MARGARET
            REID ("plaintiff') opposes the motion. For the reasons stated herein, the City's motion is granted.

                     This action seeks to recover damages for personal injuries purportedly sustained by
            plaintiff on October 6, 2011. According to plaintiff, on that date, she alleges that she tripped and
            fell on the sidewalk at the northeast comer of the intersection of West 31st Street and 8th A venue
            due to a raised portion of the sidewalk.

                    The proponent of a motion for summary judgment carries the initial burden of tendering
            sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material issue of fact as a matter of
            law (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49
            NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Thus, a defendant seeking summary judgment must establish prima facie
            entitlement to such relief as a matter of law by affirmatively demonstrating, with evidence, the
            merits of the claim or defense, and not merely by pointing to gaps in plaintiffs proof (Mondello v
            DiStefano, 16 AD3d 637, 638 [2d Dept 2005]; Peskin v New York City Transit Authority, 304
            AD2d 634, 634 [2d Dept 2003]). Once movant meets the initial burden on summary judgment, the
            burden shifts to the opponent who must then produce sufficient evidence, also in admissible form,
            to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562, supra).

                    With the passage of §7-210 of the New York City Administrative Code, maintenance and
            repair of public sidewalks and any liability for a failure to perform the same, was shifted, with

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                                             Page 1 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                                            1 of 7
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 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                   INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                         RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

            certain exceptions, to owners whose property abutted the sidewalk ( Ortiz v City of New York, 67
            AD3d 21, 25 [1st Dept 2009], rev'd on other grounds 14 NY3d 779 [2009]; Klotz v City of New
            York, 884 AD3d 392, 393 [1st Dept 2004]; Wu v Korea Shuttle Express Corporation, 23 AD3d
            376, 377 [2d Dept 2005]).

                    Specifically, § 7-210 states, in pertinent part, that:

                           [i]t shall be the duty of the owner of real property abutting any
                           sidewalk, including, but not limited to, the intersection quadrant
                           for comer property, to maintain such sidewalk in a reasonably
                           safe condition ... [, that] the owner of real property abutting any
                           sidewalk, including, but not limited to, the intersection quadrant
                           for comer property, shall be liable for any injury to property or
                           personal injury, including death, proximately caused by the
                           failure of such owner to maintain such sidewalk in a reasonably
                           safe condition.. [, that] [f]ailure to maintain such sidewalk in a
                           reasonably safe condition shall include, but not be limited to, the
                           negligent failure to install, construct, reconstruct, repave, repair
                           or replace defective sidewalk flags and the negligent failure to
                           remove snow, ice, dirt or other material from the sidewalk. .. [,and
                           that ] [t]his subdivision shall not apply to one-, two- or three-
                           family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part,
                           owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential
                           purposes.

                     With the enactment of§ 7-210, it is now well-settled that an owner of property abutting a
            public sidewalk is liable for a dangerous condition upon said sidewalk even in the absence of
            affirmative acts (Martinez v. City of New York, 20 A.D.3d 513,515 [2d Dept 2005]). Despite the
            enactment of§ 7-210, the City nevertheless remains responsible to maintain certain sidewalks such
            as those abutting "one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part,
            owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes" (New York City Administrative
            Code § 7-210[c]),and is liable for defects existing on the sidewalks abutting exempt properties
            (id.). Additionally, the City remains liable to maintain the curbs abutting public sidewalks because
            § 7-210 only shifted the responsibility of sidewalk maintenance to an abutting landowner, which
            is defined as "that portion of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and
            the adjacent property lines, but not including the curb, intended for the use of pedestrians" (New
            York City Administrative Code§ 19-IOI[d]; see also Ascencio v New York City Haus. Auth., 77
            AD3d 592, 593 [1st Dept 2010] [Defendant, abutting property owner granted summary judgment
            in an action arising from an accident on a defective portion of the sidewalk when the evidence
            established that the accident occurred on the curb.]; Garris v City ofNew York, 65 AD3d 953, 953
            [1st Dept 2009]). For this reason, "section 7-210 does not impose civil liability on property owners
            for injuries that occur in city-owned tree wells" (Vucetovic v Espom Downs, IO NY3d 517,521
            [2008]), and, provided there is prior written notice of a defect existing thereon, the City remains
            liable (id.).

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                         Page 2 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                            2 of 7
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 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                    INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

                     Here, in accordance with §7-210, the City has made a prima facie showing that it is not
            liable for plaintiffs accident because the City did not own the property abutting the sidewalk, nor
            did it have prior written notice of the alleged condition. In addition, the City did not cause or create
            the alleged sidewalk condition. Indeed, based on §7-210, the operative statute, the issues
            determinative of the City's liability in the instant action are: (1) the sidewalk location of the alleged
            accident; (2) the non-City ownership of the real property abutting the location where the alleged
            accident occurred; and (3) the non-exempt building classification of the abutting property.

                    As to the first issue, plaintiffs allegations, testimony, and the accompanying photographs
            consistently pinpoint the sidewalk adjacent to the northeast comer of West 31st Street and 8th
            Avenue as the site of the purported accident (see City's Exhibits A, B, E, F, G, and K). This
            evidence sufficiently establishes that the alleged incident took place on the sidewalk bordering the
            northeast comer of West 31st Street and 8th A venue. Consequently, based on the location of the
            plaintiffs accident-a sidewalk adjacent to a non-exempt property-the City bears no liability.

                    Regarding the second and third matters, the City submits Department of Finance ("DOF")
            search records indicating that it did not own the property on October 26, 2011 (see City's Exhibit
            R). Additionally, the search reveals that the property was categorized as "Building Class U6"
            (railroad-private ownership) (id. at ,i 6). Importantly, the subject property was also not classified
            as a one-, two-, or three-family solely residential property (id.). Since the property does not fall
            under any of the exemptions outlined in §7-210, the owner of the subject property is not exempt
            from the liability-shifting provisions stipulated in said statute.

                    Plaintiffs submissions, claims, and testimony establish: ( 1) the occurrence of the alleged
            accident on the sidewalk adjacent to the northeast comer of West 31st Street and 8th Avenue; (2)
            the non-City ownership of the real property situated at the northeast comer of West 31st Street and
            8th Avenue; and (3) that the "Building Class U6" (railroad-private ownership) property is not
            exempt from the liability-shifting provisions of §7-210 due to its non-City ownership. Similarly,
            the property does not qualify as a one-, two-, or three-family solely residential property.
            Consequently, in accordance with §7-210, the "city shall not be liable for any injury to property
            or personal injury, including death, proximately caused by the failure to maintain" the sidewalk at
            the northeast comer of West 31st Street and 8th A venue.

                     In addition, generally a municipal defendant bears no liability under a defect falling within
            the ambit of §7-201(c)(2) of the New York City Administrative Code, "unless the injured party
            can demonstrate that a municipality failed or neglected to remedy a defect within a reasonable time
            after receipt of written notice" (Poirier v City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310, 313 [1995]). Even
            when there is evidence that the municipality had prior written notice of a defective condition,
            liability for the same is obviated upon evidence that the same was repaired prior to a plaintiffs
            accident (Lopez v Gonzalez, 44 AD3d 1012, 1013 [2d Dept 2007] [Municipal defendant granted
            summary judgment because, inter alia, while it had prior written notice of the condition alleged, it
            had repaired it and no further written notice existed at least 15 days prior to plaintiffs accident]).
            An exception to the foregoing exists, however, where it is claimed that the municipal defendant
            affirmatively created the condition alleged to have caused plaintiffs accident, in which case, the
            absence of prior written notice is no barrier to liability (Elstein v City ofNew York, 209 AD2d 186,
            186-187 [1st Dept 1994]; Bisulco v City of New York, 186 AD2d 85, 85 [1st Dept 1992]). A

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                          Page 3 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                            3 of 7
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 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                   INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                         RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

            plaintiff seeking to proceed on a theory that the municipality created the defect alleged, however,
            must establish that the defective condition was improperly installed so as to bring the defect out
            of the ambit of ordinary wear and tear (Yarborough v City ofNew York, IO NY3d 726, 728 [2008];
            Oboler v City ofNew York, 8 NY3d 888, 890 [2007]). Stated differently, the proponent of a claim
            that a municipal defendant created a dangerous condition must establish that work performed by
            the municipal defendant was negligently performed such that it "immediately result[ed] in the
            existence of [the] dangerous condition" alleged (Yarborough IO NY3d at 728, supra [internal
            quotation marks omitted]).

                     Prior written notice laws are strictly construed, and their words are to be given neither "an
            artificial, forced or unnatural meaning," (Zigman v. Town of Hempstead, 120 AD2d 520, 521 [2d
            Dept 1986]), nor "a strained interpretation to defeat their obvious intent" (Freeman v. County of
            Nassau, 95 AD2d 363, 364 [2d Dept 1983]). There must be evidence that the City was provided
            with prior notice of the specific defect involved, and not merely a similar condition (see D 'Onofrio
            v. City of New York, 11 NY3d 581 [2008]; Belmonte v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 759 NYS2d 38 [1st
            Dept 2003]).

                    Here, the City has established, prima facie, that it did not receive prior written notice of the
            subject condition involving a raised sidewalk located at the northeast comer of West 31st Street
            and 8th Avenue. Indeed, because of plaintiffs allegations and testimony, the New York City
            Department of Transportation ("DOT") conducted two segment searches, as well as a pedestrian
            ramp search for records pertaining to the subject location (see City's Exhibits M, N, 0, P, Q).
            Indeed, Talia Stover, a DOT employee, performed two segment searches for two years prior to
            and including October 26, 2011, the date of plaintiffs alleged incident, for the sidewalk located at
            8th Avenue between 31st Street and 33st Street, and for the sidewalk located at 31st Street between
            75 Avenue and 8th Avenue (see Record Search Affidavit, City's Exhibit M and DOT Search
            Results, City's Exhibits N and 0). Additionally, Danny Garcia, another DOT employee, performed
            a search for records for the pedestrian ramp located at the northeast comer of 8th A venue and West
            31st Street ( comer of Penn Plaza), for two years prior to and including October 26, 2011 (see
            City's Exhibits P and Q). Even if the permits revealed were to be construed as providing prior
            written notice, which they did not, it is well-established that permits merely issues by the DOT do
            not constitute prior written notice (see Meltzer v. City ofNew York, 156 AD2d 124 [1st Dept 1989];
            Levberg v. City of New York, 282 AD2d 239,242 [1st Dept 2001]); Bolanos v. City of New York,
            29 AD3d 455,456 [1st Dept 2006]).

                    Likewise, the corrective action requests, inspections, and complaints revealed in the DOT
            searches show that the City did not receive prior written notice of the subject condition. A review
            of the combined one-hundred twelve (112) inspections contained in the search reveal that all the
            inspections were either for work performed at locations other than that of plaintiffs accident
            location, related to different conditions than that alleged by plaintiff, work was not started, or
            resulted in a passing condition. Accordingly, these records show that the City did not receive prior
            written notice (see City's Exhibits N and 0).

                   In a manner akin to the inspections, the complaints fail to furnish prior written notice. The
            Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that 3-1-1 complaints alone do not fulfill the prior
            written notice prerequisite ( Gorman v. Town of Huntington, 12 N.Y.3d 275, 280 [2009]).

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                         Page 4 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                            4 of 7
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 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                   INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                         RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

            Furthermore, the Appellate Division, First Department, has expressly upheld this principle,
            affirming that a 311-call report is insufficient to imply prior written notice to the City for the
            purpose of meeting the requirements of §7-201(c) (see Batts v. City of New York, 93 AD3d 425
            [1st Dept 2012]).

                   Upon reviewing the collective eleven (11) complaints documented in the DOT searches, it
            is evident that all the complaints pertained either to locations distinct from that of plaintiffs
            accident site or addressed entirely different conditions from those alleged by plaintiff.
            Consequently, these records indicate that the City did not receive prior written notice (see City's
            Exhibits N, 0, and Q).

                    Viewed comprehensively, the DOT records indicate that the City did not receive written
            notice concerning the condition in question situated on the sidewalk at the northeast comer of 8th
            Avenue and West 31st Street in the County, City, and State of New York prior to the purported
            incident. Each inspection and complaint, without exception, was either directed towards a location
            entirely distinct from plaintiffs accident site, addressed a defect entirely different from that alleged
            by plaintiff, or resulted in a passing grade or a "work not started" status before the accident date.
            Consequently, these records fail to sufficiently establish liability on behalf of the City and do not
            constitute prior written notice for the City.

                    Likewise, the Big Apple Maps concerning the specified location fail to exhibit prior written
            notice of the alleged sidewalk condition at that site. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has decisively
            ruled that precise notice on the map is necessary to meet the requirement of prior written notice
            (D'Onofrio v. City ofNew York, 11 NY3d 581 [2008]). Merely having a nearby defect is inadequate
            to constitute prior written notice of another defect (Leary v. City of Rochester, 67 NY2d 866
            [1986]). Given that the City lacked notice regarding the particular defect in question here, it has
            effectively demonstrated the absence of prior written notice.

                    Lastly, the Court of Appeals has determined that in the absence of documented written
            notice of a defective condition, a municipality may be held liable for affirmative negligence (see
            Poirier, 85 NY2d 310, supra). In this instance, although the City is not tasked with the burden of
            proving that it did not cause or generate the purported defect, the DOT conducted a thorough search
            for records concerning the sidewalk at the specified site. This investigation produced findings
            indicating not only that the City did not receive written notice of the condition in question prior to
            the incident date, but also that the City did not instigate or produce the alleged condition. Based
            on the outcomes of the DOT inquiry, the evidence establishes that the City did not initiate or create
            the condition present on the sidewalk situated at the northeast comer of 8th A venue and West 31st
            Street.

                    In opposition to City's prima facie showing here, plaintiff raised the following contentions:
            (1) "that there may have been additional maps or written notices filed with DOT prior to the Big
            Apple Maps from October 2003 that show the condition of the area where Plaintiff fell." (2) that
            "the City requested that DOT perform a search for documents for two years prior to date of
            incident, however, there is no time limit on prior written notice ... and it cannot be said that no
            such notice exists ... and since the City did not produce an affidavit from any individual indicating
            that no other notices were found, their motion should be denied." (3) that the City's argument that

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                         Page 5 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                            5 of 7
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 [FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 P~                                                   INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                         RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

            they did not cause or create the defect because there were no permits to the City in the search
            results, does not prove anything since "there is no evidence that a permit would even be required
            to allow a City work crew to perform work at a particular location" and that " none of the work
            indicated on the gang sheets provided by the City was accompanied by a permit issued to DOT."
            (4) "The City's claim of non-ownership of the property where the accident occurred is facially
            defective" since "it is his job to respond to FOIL requests" and "lacking from the exhibit is the
            date the search was purportedly conducted and a copy of the search results, so there is no way of
            confirming the accuracy of either the search parameters of the results."

                    Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that raises a triable issue of fact, let alone any form
            of prior written notice concerning the particular defect at hand. Instead, plaintiff contends that
            "there may have been additional maps or written notices filed with DOT prior to the Big Apple
            Maps from October 2003 that show the condition of the area where Plaintiff fell," and argues that
            "there is no time limit on prior written notice ... and it cannot be said that no such notice exists ...
            and since the City did not produce an affidavit from any individual indicating that no other notices
            were found, their motion should be denied." Such language is entirely speculative and does not
            meet the plaintiffs burden in opposition, which requires the production of evidence in admissible
            form. Therefore, it is insufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding whether the City
            received prior written notice of the specific sidewalk condition.

                     Furthermore, plaintiffs argument asserting that the City conducted a search only for two
            years prior to and including the date of the incident, and that "there is no time limit on prior written
            notice ... and it cannot be said that no such notice exists" and that "there may have been additional
            maps or written notices filed with DOT prior to the Big Apple Maps from October 2003 that show
            the condition of the area where Plaintiff fell," lacks merit. The Case Scheduling Order specifically
            mandated a two-year record search, and numerous precedents outlined below affirm that a two-
            year search is adequate for the City to fulfill its obligation (see Tucker v. City of New York, 84
            AD3d 640 [1st Dept 2011] [summary judgment in favor of the City upheld where the City
            demonstrated, through a two-year search for records, that it did not create the subject defect and
            did not possess prior written notice of a tree well defect]).

                     In this case, plaintiff submitted her note of issue and certified that discovery was concluded.
            Plaintiff suggests that "there may have been additional maps or written notices filed with DOT
            prior to the Big Apple Maps from October 2003 that show the condition of the area where Plaintiff
            fell," and argues that "there is no time limit on prior written notice ... and it cannot be said that no
            such notice exists." However, this assertion is speculative and lacks any evidentiary basis to
            support it.

                    Finally, where, as here, the City makes this prima facie of a lack of prior written notice,
            the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the City engaged in work "that immediately
            result[ed] in the existence ofa dangerous condition" (Oboler, 8 NY3d at 889, supra). The burden
            of making such a showing rests with plaintiff in her opposition (Yarborough, IO NY3d at 728,
            supra). Here, plaintiff has failed her burden to offer such evidence. Indeed, the statements made
            by plaintiff amount to mere speculation unsupported by any admissible evidence, which fails to
            demonstrate any link between the claimed sidewalk condition and any City work at the location of
            plaintiffs incident.

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                         Page 6 of 7
             Motion No. 004

                                                            6 of 7
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 !FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 03/14/2024 04:51 PM!                                                   INDEX NO. 400032/2014
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 73                                                                            RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/14/2024

                   In light of the facts and evidence presented, it is clear that pursuant to §7-210, the City is
           not liable for plaintiffs accident because the City did not own the property abutting the subject
           sidewalk, did not have prior written notice of the alleged sidewalk condition, as required pursuant
           to §7-201, and did not cause and create an immediately dangerous condition for which it may be
           held liable. As plaintiff has failed to show that there are triable issues of material fact regarding
           the City's non-liability in the instant matter beyond plaintiffs speculative assertions, summary
           judgment in favor of the City is appropriate, and plaintiffs verified complaint and all cross-claims
           must be dismissed as against the City. Accordingly, it is hereby

                    ORDERED that the City's motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety, and it
            is further

                   ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing all claims
            and cross-claims against the City; and it is further

                    ORDERED that with the City's removal from this matter, the Clerk of Court is directed to
            transfer this matter to the inventory of a non-City part.

                    This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

                    3/14/2024
                      DATE                                                           HASAA. KIN
             CHECK ONE:                  CASE DISPOSED                      NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                         GRANTED         □ DENIED           GRANTED IN PART          □ OTHER
             APPLICATION:                SETTLE ORDER                       SUBMIT ORDER

             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:       INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN         FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT    □ REFERENCE

             400032/2014 REID, MARGARET vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                          Page 7 of 7
             Motion No. 004

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