Court Opinion

ID: 9847672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:01.138454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:26.581772
License: Public Domain

MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant was charged in bills of indictment with two counts of possession of cocaine and two counts of having achieved the status of an habitual felon. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of searches of his vehicle and his person, as well as statements which he made to the police. After a hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of cocaine and subsequently entered a plea of guilty to one count of having achieved the status of an habitual felon. The remaining habitual felon charge was dismissed. He appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a minimum term of 168 months and a maximum term of 211 months imprisonment. We find no error.
*27The evidence presented at the suppression hearing and at trial tended to show that at around 12:15 a.m. on 2 December 2004, Officer Brett Maltby was on patrol in a high crime area of downtown Asheville where a number of bars are located. Officer Maltby was driving a marked patrol car and was behind defendant’s vehicle, a 1993 Ford Taurus, which was stopped at a red traffic light. When the light turned green, defendant remained stopped for approximately thirty seconds before making a left turn. Based upon his training and experience, Officer Maltby considered that the delayed reaction to the green light was an indicator that the driver of the vehicle may be impaired. Officer Maltby initiated a stop of the vehicle to determine whether, in fact, the driver was impaired.
Officer Maltby approached defendant and asked for his license and registration. Defendant’s breathing was rapid and he was shaking. Officer Maltby smelled a slight odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath. Defendant said that he did not have his license and gave Officer Maltby a name and birth date. Officer Maltby returned to his patrol car to conduct a check of the name and birth date to determine if defendant had a driver’s license and to check for outstanding warrants. He determined that the information which the defendant had given him was not correct. Officer Maltby then returned to defendant’s vehicle and asked him to step out of his vehicle. Officer Maltby observed an open container of alcohol partially concealed in a paper bag. Officer Maltby placed defendant in investigatory detention, handcuffed him due to his nervousness and inability to explain his identity, and walked him back to the patrol car. Defendant then disclosed his real name, and Officer Maltby was able to determine that his driver’s license had been suspended. Officer Maltby began to write a citation for possession of an open container of alcohol and driving while license revoked.
Officer Dwight Arrowood arrived at the scene to assist Officer Maltby. At Officer Maltby’s direction, Officer Arrowood searched the interior of the Taurus and recovered a crack pipe and a Brillo pad, which is sometimes used as a filter for a crack pipe. Officer Maltby then began to, write a citation for possession of drug paraphernalia when defendant said he would do anything to get out of the situation and offered to purchase narcotics. He told Officer Maltby that he had purchased crack cocaine earlier that day from a person known as “One-Arm Willy.” Maltby was familiar with “One-Arm Willy” and agreed to void the citations he was writing if defendant would make a controlled buy from his drug dealer.
*28Officer Maltby stored defendant’s vehicle, took him to the police station, and secured the assistance of an undercover narcotics officer, Officer Lauffer. Defendant agreed to go to the residence of One-Arm Willy and purchase a $20 rock of crack cocaine. The officers explained that defendant would be searched prior to leaving the police station, that he would accompany Officer Lauffer to the residence, purchase the crack cocaine and return immediately to the officer’s car. He would then be returned to the police station where he would be debriefed and searched a second time.
Defendant successfully purchased a crack rock from the dealer and turned it over to Officer Lauffer, who gave it to Officer Maltby when they returned to the police station. Officer Maltby then began to debrief defendant, inquiring as to what he had seen in the house for the purpose of obtaining and executing a search warrant. Officer Maltby searched defendant and found a small rock of crack cocaine concealed in defendant’s pocket. Defendant told Officer Maltby that he had gotten a “front” from One-Arm Willy for the second rock of cocaine. He then “asked [Officer Maltby] if he could just have the rock of crack cocaine back.” Officer Maltby refused and concluded that the defendant was not sufficiently reliable to be used as a confidential informant to support a search warrant of the dealer’s home. Officer Maltby took defendant home and subsequently charged him with possession of crack cocaine.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized by the officers as a result of the Vehicle stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, as well as statements which he made to Officer Maltby. We have carefully considered his arguments and conclude the evidence was properly admitted.
On a motion to suppress, we review a trial court’s findings of fact to determine if there is competent evidence to support them. State v. Brewington, 170 N.C. App. 264, 271, 612 S.E.2d 648, 653 (2005) (citation omitted). The trial court’s findings upon conflicting evidence are accorded “great deference upon appellate review as it has the duty to hear testimony and weigh the evidence.” Id. If the findings are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal. State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 661, 617 S.E.2d 1, 12 (2005). The conclusions of law which the court draws from those findings are fully reviewable. Id. at 662, 617 S.E.2d at 13.
*29Defendant first challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence related to Officer Maltby’s traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle. He argues that Officer Maltby had neither probable cause nor a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant and therefore it was error to admit evidence resulting from the stop. We disagree.
A police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). “Reasonable suspicion” requires that “[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). All the State is required to show is a “minimal level of objective justification, something more than an ‘unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ” Id. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989)). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the officer possessed a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. Id. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70.
The trial court found that on 2 December 2004, defendant stopped at an intersection and “remained stopped for some 30 seconds without any reasonable appearance of explanation for doing so.” This finding is amply supported by competent evidence and thus binding on appeal. See State v. Parker, 137 N.C. App. 590, 598, 530 S.E.2d 297, 302 (2000). Based on this finding, the trial court concluded the following:
[T]he Court concludes that from the totality of the circumstances that [sic] a reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the Defendant existed to warrant Officer Maltby’s stop of the Defendant’s vehicle in view of its prolonged existence at this intersection without any reason for doing so.
When considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court’s findings provide the requisite objective justification from which a conclusion can be drawn that a reasonable suspicion existed to warrant Officer Maltby’s stop. From defendant’s thirty- second delay, Officer Maltby made a rational inference that defendant might be impaired. This inference was based on Officer Maltby’s training and experience, as reflected by his testimony.
*30Q: Based upon your training and experience, do you have an opinion as to whether or not that sort of delayed reaction could usually involve an impaired substance or driving while impaired?
A: Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Q: Can you articulate that?
A: People’s reaction is slowed down. A red light turning green and hesitating for 30 seconds definitely would be an indicator of impairment.
Defendant, however, cites State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 135, 592 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2004), in which this Court held that a driver’s eight to ten second delayed reaction at a traffic light did not give the officer a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. This Court predicated its holding on the multitude of reasons a motorist’s attention may be diverted for such a quick span of time. Id. at 134, 592 S.E.2d at 737. The instant case is distinguishable in that the length of defendant’s delay at the traffic light, at thirty seconds, was three times longer than the delay in Roberson. A thirty second delay goes well beyond the delay caused by a motorist’s routine distractions, such as changing a radio station, glancing at a map or looking in the rear view mirror. See People v. Kelly, 802 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (finding a twenty second delay at a traffic light to be an unreasonable period of time to react to the stop light change and to ascertain it to be safe to proceed). As a result, Officer Maltby was confronted with a far greater likelihood that the driver might be impaired.
The trial court did not err in ruling that Officer Maltby had an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant may be impaired and properly performed a Terry stop of defendant’s vehicle. Therefore, the evidence seized as a result of the stop was properly admitted.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress any statements he made after he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car because Officer Maltby failed to properly advise him of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). “ ‘It is well established that Miranda warnings are required only when a [criminal] defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.’ ” State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App. 107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (quoting State v. Patterson, 146 N.C. App. 113, 121, 552 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2001)). The United States *31Supreme Court has defined “interrogation” as “[a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspectf.]” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980). “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment^]” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.
During the trial, the prosecutor asked Officer Maltby about events which occurred after he had placed defendant in his patrol car:
Q: Did you then proceed to write the Defendant a citation for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Okay. And did the Defendant say anything to you in response to your writing those citations?
Defense Counsel: Objection, Your Honor, prior motion.
The Court: Overruled.
A: I asked the Defendant how long he had had a habit. At that point the defendant stated for a number of years. He said he just recently started back with his habit because of recent legal problems and troubles.
Defense Counsel: Objection, move to strike, Your Honor.
The Court: The motion is allowed. Members of the jury, do not consider that last response of the witness.
Our Supreme Court has held “where the trial court immediately sustains the defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s comment and instructs the jury to disregard the offending remark, the impropriety is cured.” State v. Garner, 340 N.C. 573, 593, 459 S.E.2d 718, 728 (1995) (citing State v. Maynor, 331 N.C. 695, 417 S.E.2d 453 (1992); State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 400 S.E.2d 413 (1991)). Assuming, arguendo, that it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to suppress defendant’s response to this particular question, any error was cured by the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to strike and prompt instruction to the jury not to consider the statement.
As for defendant’s statements regarding his willingness to participate in the controlled buy, the trial court found that those statements were made “without any questions being asked.” Officer Maltby’s direct examination continued:
*32Q: Officer Maltby, did the Defendant at some time initiate a conversation with you, not in response to any question that you might have asked—
Defense Counsel: Objection, leading, Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
Q: —not in response to any question you may have asked him, regarding the charges that you were writing?
A: Yes. He advised there’s no way that he could hold another charge, to be charged with something of this magnitude, and advised that he would do anything and everything to try to help himself out in this matter.
Defense Counsel: Objection. Move to strike.
The Court: The motion is denied. The objection is overruled.
Q: What did he say with regards to what he could do to help?
A: He said he knew several different locations where he could go back and purchase narcotics. He advised one location through a gentleman in West Asheville on 70 Howard Street by the name of — nickname of One-Arm Willy.
Q: And did he say that he had been to One-Arm Willy’s recently?
A: He did. He said he had recently purchased crack at One-Arm Willy’s house as recently as that day.
Q: I’m going to ask you to try to raise your voice just a little bit.
A: I’m sorry. Repeat. He did advise that he had been to One-Arm Willy’s house and had been there as recently as that day to purchase crack.
Q: Did he indicate whether or not he had smoked that crack?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: And what else did he say about One-Arm Willy in connection with his pleading with you to help out with the charges?
A: He advised again that he would do absolutely anything to help himself out to — to get rid of these charges that I had on him during this vehicle stop.
*33Officer Maltby testified that defendant volunteered the statements spontaneously without prompting or questioning. The trial court concluded that these statements were “voluntarily made, not as a result of any questions being asked of [defendant].” The trial court’s conclusion is supported by the findings of fact. The holding in Miranda does not apply to voluntary statements and, therefore, the motion to suppress the statements was properly denied. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.
Finally, though defendant has assigned error to the admission of evidence regarding Officer Maltby’s search of his person after defendant returned from the controlled buy, he has not specifically argued it in his brief and the assignment of error could be taken as abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006). In any event, the defendant did not raise the issue of the search of his person in his argument to the trial court and we will not consider it on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); see State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003).
No error.
Judge TYSON concurs.
Judge CALABRIA dissents with a separate opinion.