Court Opinion

ID: 9833846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:05:29.819344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.572992
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In deciding this case this court held that the Congress had not vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate or otherwise interfere with purely intrastate rates of traffic; and therefore it was held that the order of that commission afforded no justification to appellants for increasing such rates beyond those prescribed by the Railroad Commission of Texas.
In making that decision this court followed the South Dakota case referred to in our original opinion. That case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that court has entered its decision, holding: First, that the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to require railroads engaged in interstate commerce to pursue whatever course may be necessary to remove unjust discrimination as to interstate rates, although to accomplish that purpose it may be necessary to change intrastate rates as fixed by a state; second, to the extent that the order in that case accomplished that purpose, it must dominate and control; third, that the Interstate Commerce Commission was without power to regulate or interfere with intrastate rates that had no bearing upon the question of unjust discrimination as against interstate rates; and, fourth, that the Dakota case was not a proceeding exclusively to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, because some of the rates there involved did not come within the scope of, and therefore were not protected by, the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Applying the law thus announced to the proceeding at bar, which is an appeal from an interlocutory order restraining the appellants from putting into effect certain rates affecting numerous railroads located in various portions of the state, and without dis*889cussion or elaboration, we announce our conclusions as follows:
(1) The state court from which this ap-pel is taken had jurisdiction, because, as to some of the railroads and some of the rates, there was no competition as to interstate commerce moving to or from Shreveport, La.; also it is charged in the state’s petition that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy by which they had agreed to fix rates, tariffs, and charges in violation of the state antitrust statute. These allegations and facts conferred jurisdiction upon the state court.
(2) The facts, as disclosed by the testimony, and the judicial knowledge of the court, justified the issuance of the temporary restraining order for the purpose of preserving tlie status quo until the case was finally tried: and therefore the judgment of affirmance is correct, and the motion for rehearing is overruled.
On Second Petition for Rehearing.
Appellants have been permitted to file a second motion for rehearing, in order that tills court might consider now matter set up therein. The new matter referred to consists of an affidavit to the effect that since this case was first decided by this court the President of the United States has appointed a Director General of all the railroads in the United States, including appellants, and that, after taking possession of such roads, and on December 29, 1917, the Director General issued an order, one paragraph of which reads as follows:
“7. Existing schedules of rates and outstanding orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are to be observed, but any such schedules of rates or orders as may hereafter be found to conflict with the purposes of said proclamation or with this order shall he brought immediately by wire to the attention of the Director.”
It is contended on behalf of appellants that under this order they are required by the Director General of railroads to obey the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued July 7, 1916, and that the preliminary injunction from which this appeal is prosecuted prohibits them from doing so. It is further contended that the order of the Director General is supreme and superior to the order of the district court of Travis county, and therefore this court should reverse that order, and leave appellants free to comply with the order of the Director General.
We are of the opinion that, as presented to this court at this time, we have no jurisdiction to pass upon that question. Articles 4644 and 4645 of the Revised Statutes of this state authorize and regulate appeals from orders granting, refusing, or dissolving temporary writs of injunction, and prescribe that such appeals may be heard in the Courts of Civil Appeals, or Supreme Court, “on the bill and answer, and such affidavits and evidence as may have been admitted by the judge granting, refusing, or dissolving such injunction.” We think the language quoted limits the power and jurisdiction of this court to a consideration of the questions presented by the bill and answer and such evidence as may have been heard by the trial- judge, and that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and consider anything else.
The action of this court in affirming the action of the trial judge in granting the temporary injunction does not preclude the district court, or the judge thereof, from consideration of another motion to dissolve the injunction, and if appellants are entitled to the relief they now ask at the hands of this court, we take it for granted they can obtain that relief in the court below.
Motion overruled.