Court Opinion

ID: 9671692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:42:07.336815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.552722
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in instructing the jury over objection "that bad faith is equated with 'duplicity or deceitful conduct,’ or 'concealment . . . .1
I write separately because I am unable to agree with the definition of bad faith set forth in the opinion of the Court and other observations in the opinion.
The opinion states: "we define 'bad faith’ for instructional use in trial court as arbitrary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a duty.”2
The terms "arbitrary, reckless, indifferent” have varying meanings depending on the context.
It has been said that some authorities hold that the term "reckless” means "no more than 'negligent,’ while others hold that [the term means] 'wantonness or bordering on willful,’ and there is also a meaning between these two extremes.” 76 CJS, p 63. The same encyclopedia states that the term has been held in particular cases to "imply mere inattention to duty; thoughtlessness; indifference; heedlessness; carelessness; and nothing more than mere negligence.” Id.
In City of Wakefield v Globe Indemnity Co, 246 Mich 645, 653; 225 NW 643 (1929), this Court said that an "arbitrary refusal to settle for a reasonable amount, where it is apparent that suit would result in a judgment in excess of the policy limit, *141indifference to the effect of refusal on the insured . . . would tend to show bad faith.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Court thereby indicated what kind of "arbitrary” or "indifferent” conduct would tend to show bad faith. To instruct a jury in the abstract that arbitrary or indifferent conduct would tend to show bad faith, without reference or regard to particular circumstances, could readily cause jury misunderstanding and lead to erroneous results.
Nor can I agree that "intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a duty” may always be equated with bad faith. An insurer may properly put its interests ahead of the interests of the insured, and thus intentionally disregard the interests of the insured; it may act out of a "selfish purpose or by a desire to protect its own interests at the expense of its insured’s interest,”3 as long as it does not act in bad faith. If an insurer could not in any circumstance place its interests ahead of those of its insured, if it is obliged in all circumstances to subordinate its interests to the interests of its insured, then an insurer would be obliged in all cases to pay policy limits lest it expose the insured to any risk whatsoever of a judgment in excess of policy limits.
I also question cataloging a list of factors developed in cases the record in which this Court has not examined or ruled upon; the factors are necessarily taken out of context and may not adequately explain limitations implicit in the particular circumstances in which the factor was held to be relevant. Also, there has not been adversary briefing in this Court on the question whether all the factors enumerated in the opinion of the Court evidence bad faith.
*142If the Court is of the opinion that it is appropriate to instruct a jury concerning specific factors, it should, I believe, require the judge to add that merely because there is evidence tending to show the presence of a factor does not necessarily mean that there was bad faith. Further, if the jury is instructed on factors that tend to show bad faith it should also be instructed on factors that tend to countervail such a finding — the specific factors that tend to show an absence of bad faith.
Finally, if the jury is instructed on factors, the judge should be required or encouraged to incorporate into the instruction the gist of the last paragraph of part i of the opinion of the Court, viz.:
In applying any factors, it is inappropriate in reviewing the conduct of the insurer to utilize "20-20 hindsight vision.” The conduct under scrutiny must be considered in light of the circumstances existing at the time. A microscopic examination, years after the fact, made with the luxury of actually knowing the outcome of the original proceeding is not appropriate. It must be remembered that if bad faith exists in a given situation, it arose upon the occurrence of the acts in question; bad faith does not arise at some later date as a result of an unsuccessful day in court.
Absent a statement in the opinion of the Court requiring or encouraging the judge to so balance the instruction to the jury, the judge may not understand that he should incorporate in the instruction the gist of the foregoing language quoted from the opinion of the Court.

 Ante, pp 135-136.

 Id., p 136.

 Id., p!37.