Court Opinion

ID: 9909430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 15:06:11.98285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:22.137220
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1760-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY WHITE a/k/a
ANDRE PINARD,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted September 12, 2023 – Decided December 13, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Rose.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 13-12-3098.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Amanda Gerilyn Schwartz, Deputy
                   Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Anthony White appeals from a November 29, 2021 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on

appeal, we affirm but do so for somewhat different reasons than those expressed

by the PCR judge. See Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199

(2001) (recognizing an appellate court may affirm for other reasons because

"appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions").

                                       I.

      In 2014, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree theft by deception,

N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 and -2; second-degree theft by extortion, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 and

-2; and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), by defrauding a

woman of more than $200,000. The trial judge granted the State's motion for a

discretionary extended term as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -3(a),

and sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of twelve years, subject to

the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(13), on the extortion

conviction. We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence on direct appeal.

State v. White, No. A-1555-14 (slip op. at 8-19) (App. Div. June 15, 2016).

      We incorporate by reference the evidence adduced at trial, which is set

forth at length in our prior opinion. Id. at 1-6. In summary, in January 2013,

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defendant met Linda 1 in Atlantic City through mutual acquaintances. Id. at 1.

Within days of meeting, defendant convinced Linda that two high stakes

gamblers "had propositioned him with a business venture to invest in a new

'production company.'" Id. at 2. Linda signed a contract "guaranteeing her 25%

return on her investment" but defendant removed the documents from Linda's

hotel room. Ibid.

        Thereafter, Linda gave large sums of money to defendant after

withdrawing cash from her bank account and Revel Hotel's global cash access

machine. Id. at 2-3. Apparently suspicious of the activity, Revel Hotel security

questioned Linda. Id. at 3. "Linda told security that the cash was an investment,

and gave them defendant's name, but refused to cooperate further."            Ibid.

Thereafter, defendant declined to take money from Linda on the casino floor.

Ibid.

        But a week later, defendant told Linda that during "a big drug bust . . . .

police had confiscated $40,000 Linda had given him" and "she would need to

give him another $40,000." Id. at 3-4. Linda continued to honor defendant's

requests for money. Id. at 4. When her funds were depleted, Linda asked her

1
 Consistent with our prior opinion, we use only the victim's first name to protect
her privacy. White, slip op. at 1.
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parents for money. Id. at 5. "By that time she had given defendant $233,672.

She had drained over $100,000 from her bank accounts, borrowed $49,000

against her credit line, and had also given defendant $73,000 she had been given

by her parents." Ibid.

      The following month, Linda "gave defendant her tax return money, as well

as additional monies that had been wired to her by her mother." Ibid. After that

exchange, defendant touched Linda's legs and when she refused his advances,

defendant punched her legs causing her to sustain bruises.          Id. at 5-6.

Ultimately, Linda realized "she had been 'bamboozled'" and reported defendant's

conduct to law enforcement. Id. at 6. In the judgment of conviction, the trial

judge noted defendant "preyed upon a young, immature, susceptible woman in

order to scam and scheme her out of hundreds of thousands of dollars ."

      Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR. Thereafter, assigned counsel

filed a supplemental brief on his behalf. Defendant raised a litany of issues,

claiming he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Among other arguments, defendant argued trial counsel ignored his theory and

presented a defense that varied from the information he provided her. Defendant

further claimed trial counsel failed to call witnesses who would have

corroborated his account. In essence, defendant argued:

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           [Linda] was giving [him] money as part of a gambling
           arrangement and the arrangement turned into a
           romantic entanglement and sexual activity between the
           two. When [Linda] discovered that . . . [d]efendant was
           still sexually involved with his former girlfriend,
           Yenesis [Vega], [Linda] became sad, upset, and
           enraged. At that point [Linda] wanted nothing to do
           with . . . [d]efendant and began demanding that he pay
           her back all the money she gave him that unfortunately
           was lost while gambling. [Linda] had threatened . . .
           [d]efendant that she would call the police and make up
           lies about him to get him into trouble.

     Defendant's PCR submission included copies of emails between defendant

and trial counsel concerning defendant's theory and his proposed witnesses.

Also included were three reports authored by trial counsel's investigator,

memorializing separate interviews conducted by trial counsel and the

investigator with three defense witnesses:   defendant's cousin, Scott Yates;

defendant's father, Anthony Bailey; and defendant's on-again, off-again

girlfriend, Vega. Defendant did not, however, annex to his PCR submission

sworn statements of any of the three witnesses supporting his "romantic

entanglement" theory.

     In a written opinion, the PCR judge, who was not the trial judge, denied

relief. The judge first found certain claims were barred under Rule 3:22-4

because they could have been asserted on direct appeal. The judge nonetheless

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                                     5
considered most of the issues raised in view of the Strickland/Fritz 2 framework

applicable to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims and concluded they

lacked merit.

      Pertinent to defendant's renewed contentions on appeal, the PCR judge

found "[t]rial counsel's failure to call any witnesses was strategic and not

objectively unreasonable or deficient." Citing the investigative reports of each

witness, the judge noted Yates said he "met with [Linda] to discuss online sports

betting"; "[Linda] was interested in investing and making a lot of money"; "and

he offered to help her set up an online sports betting account or use another

account." Citing the email correspondence between trial counsel and defendant,

the judge found "trial counsel had serious reservations about calling . . . Yates

as a witness" because "online sports betting was illegal." Accordingly, Yates's

testimony about that subject "would raise Fifth Amendment issues."

      The judge summarized Vega's proposed testimony as follows: "Vega was

[defendant]'s on-again, off-again girlfriend. During the timeframe in question,

2
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (recognizing to establish
an IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was
deficient"; and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense"); State v.
Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New
Jersey).

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. . . Vega believed that [defendant] and [Linda] were dating. At one point,

[Linda] contacted . . . Vega and told her that [defendant] owed her money."

Noting Vega lived in Florida "and may not have been available to testify," the

judge nonetheless determined her account "actually corroborates [Linda]'s trial

testimony."    Accordingly, the judge found Vega's "testimony would have

supported the State's theory of the case."

      Citing the report of Bailey's interview, the judge noted he met Linda

"several times during the timeframe in question" and "[o]n one occasion, [he]

witnessed [Linda] express concern over the fact that [defendant] was losing

money at the casinos." Implicitly finding there was no evidence in the record

supporting trial counsel's reasons for not calling Bailey as a witness, the judge

reasoned given Bailey's "interest in the outcome of the case, it [wa]s plausible

that trial counsel believed that a jury would not find him credible."

      The PCR judge also rejected defendant's argument that his 2006 Colorado

conviction did not qualify as a "prior crime," and as such, he was improperly

sentenced to an extended term.      However, the judge found the conviction

"unconstitutional" because it was not the result of a knowing and intelligent

guilty plea.   For that reason, the judge found defendant was improperly

sentenced to an extended term. Accordingly, in January 2022, defendant was

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resentenced to an aggregate prison term of nine years, subject to NERA on the

extortion conviction.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

                                   POINT I

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
            SEVERAL OF DEFENDANT'S PCR CLAIMS WERE
            PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

                  1. Defendant's PCR claims were not barred under
                  R. 3:22-4(a)(1).

                                   POINT II

            AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN THAT                          HE
            RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE                      OF
            COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED                         BY
            DENYING DEFENDANT'S PCR PETITION.

                  1. Trial counsel failed to present exculpatory
                  witnesses.

                  2. Trial counsel failed to consider and
                  investigate the defenses presented to her by
                  defendant.

                  3. Trial counsel failed to object to prejudicial
                  remarks made by the assistant prosecutor during
                  both opening remarks.

                  4. Trial counsel's failure to object to prejudicial
                  testimony and evidence undermined the success
                  of defendant's direct appeal.

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                  5. As trial counsel was ineffective during plea
                  negotiations, defendant did not make an informed
                  decision when he rejected the State's plea offer.

                  6. Trial counsel's cumulative errors denied
                  defendant effective legal representation.

                                     POINT III

            THE PCR [COURT] ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
            THAT DEFENDANT WAS      NOT DENIED
            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE
            COUNSEL.

                  1. Appellate counsel was ineffective by failing
                  to argue that the prosecutor's opening and closing
                  remarks were prejudicial.

                                     POINT IV

            AS THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES                        OF
            MATERIAL    FACTS   IN   DISPUTE,                   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS REQUIRED.

                                      II.

      "We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without a hearing

for abuse of discretion." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.

2023) (quoting State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)).

Because the PCR judge did not hold an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo

both the factual inferences drawn by the judge from the record and the judge's

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legal conclusions. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div.

2020); see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013).

      When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish "by a

preponderance of the credible evidence" entitlement to the requested relief.

Nash, 212 N.J. at 541 (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). Our

rules anticipate the need to hold an evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition, "only

upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post-conviction

relief." R. 3:22-10(b). "A prima facie case is established when a defendant

demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts

alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on

the merits.'" State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting

R. 3:22-10(b)).

      To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must initially show "counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."       Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Secondly, a defendant must show by a "reasonable

probability" the deficient performance affected the outcome. Id. at 58. "A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

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                                      10
outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52).

      To satisfy the first Strickland prong, "a defendant must overcome a 'strong

presumption' that counsel exercised 'reasonable professional judgment' and

'sound trial strategy' in fulfilling his [or her] responsibilities." State v. Hess,

207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90). "[I]f counsel

makes a thorough investigation of the law and facts and considers all likely

options, counsel's trial strategy is 'virtually unchallengeable.'" State v. Chew,

179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).

      Nonetheless, "[c]ertain factual questions, 'including those relating to the

nature and content of off-the-record conferences between defendant and [the]

trial attorney,' are critical to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and can

'only be resolved by meticulous analysis and weighing of factual allegations,

including assessments of credibility.'" Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (second alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998)).

"These determinations are 'best made' through an evidentiary hearing." Ibid.

      A PCR petitioner asserting that his trial attorney inadequately investigated

a potential witness "must assert the facts that an investigation would have

revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal

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                                        11
knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Porter, 216

N.J. at 353 (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.

1999)).

      Further, criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for

a first appeal as a matter of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356

(1963). As a result, a defendant may bring an IAC claim against appellate

counsel.   Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985).       Appellate counsel,

however, is not required to present all non-frivolous claims. Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Similar to trial counsel, the appellate attorney may

use professional judgment in deciding whether to assert meritorious claims

suggested by the client. Id. at 754. The same Strickland/Fritz standard applies

to the assessment of IAC claims asserted against appellate counsel. See State v.

Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 513 (App. Div. 2007).

                                      III.

      As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the PCR judge's determination

that certain claims asserted in defendant's petition could have been raised on

direct appeal and therefore were barred under Rule 3:22-4(a)(1). See Nash, 212

N.J. at 546 (recognizing Rule 3:22-4(a) bars a petitioner from asserting a PCR

claim that could have been raised on direct appeal). Relevant here, these claims

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                                      12
include trial counsel's failure to:     conduct an investigation; terminate her

representation after her relationship with defendant deteriorated; recuse herself

because "she was nine[] months pregnant during trial"; "provide a third-party

defense"; "call certain exculpatory witnesses"; and present defendant's theory of

the case to the jury (collectively, point I claims).

      Because defendant's point I claims were not allegations of substantive

legal errors contained completely within the trial record, see State v. Quezada,

402 N.J. Super. 277, 280 (App. Div. 2008), they were not appropriate for

appellate review, see Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. Instead, defendant's challenges

to trial counsel's effectiveness claims were better suited for a PCR proceeding.

See State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 30 (2012); see also State v. McQuaid, 147

N.J. 464, 484 (1997) (recognizing "claims that differ from those asserted below

will be heard on PCR").

      Nonetheless, with the exception of defendant's argument that trial counsel

failed to investigate his claims, the PCR judge considered defendant's point I

claims on the merits and found them unavailing. Further, in her written decision,

the judge rejected defendant's remaining claims – some of which are reprised on

appeal in points II and III – that he was denied the effective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel.

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                                        13
      Having considered defendant's renewed arguments in view of the PCR

judge's decision and the applicable law, we conclude they lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the comments

that follow. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the PCR judge.

      We part company, however, with the judge's reasons for finding an

evidentiary hearing was not warranted on defendant's claim that trial counsel

failed to present the testimony of Vega and Bailey.            Unlike the email

correspondence underscoring trial counsel's reason for refraining from calling

Yates as a witness, the record does not disclose counsel's reasons for not calling

Vega and Bailey.

      Defendant maintains trial counsel rejected his theory that he was

romantically involved with Linda, and that Vega and Bailey would have

corroborated that theory at trial. Crucially, however, defendant failed to support

his claims on PCR with sworn statements of Vega or Bailey. Thus, even though

trial counsel's strategy is not readily apparent from the email exchanges,

defendant has done no more than "make bald assertions that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel." See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

      The record supports the PCR judge's findings on defendant's other claims.

Accordingly, we are satisfied from our review of the record that defendant failed

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                                       14
to make a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel

under the Strickland/Fritz test. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in

the denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. See

Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63.

      Affirmed.

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