Court Opinion

ID: 9945494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 21:03:25.244296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.732221
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Johnson CA1/4
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                            A166911
 v.
                                                               Solano County
 KALEB TOMMY JOHNSON,                                          Super. Ct. Nos. FCR360120,
          Defendant and Appellant.                             FCR364306

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1
        Kaleb Tommy Johnson resolved two pending cases by pleading no
contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in
case No. FCR364306, and pleading no contest to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon as well as admitting a prior juvenile adjudication for
possessing a firearm on school grounds in case No. FCR360120. As part of
the negotiated dispositions, Johnson agreed to serve a total of four years and
eight months in prison: an aggravated four-year term on the assault
conviction and a consecutive eight-month term on the firearm possession
conviction. The disposition also called for dismissal of the balance of

        1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion and provide a limited

factual summary. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)

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unresolved charges, dismissal of a third case (No. FCR362510), and a promise
from the district attorney’s office not to file a fourth pending “firearm case”
documented in a police report. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
imposed the stipulated sentence.
      Johnson appeals, contending his upper-term sentence on the assault
conviction in case No. FCR364306 must be vacated and the matter remanded
to the trial court for resentencing under Penal Code2 section 1170,
subdivision (b) as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.),
which prohibits the imposition of an upper-term sentence unless there are
aggravating circumstances either stipulated to by the defendant or found
true by a jury or judge beyond a reasonable doubt.3 We requested and
received supplemental briefing on whether Johnson’s failure to obtain a
certificate of probable cause in case No. FCR364306 forecloses appellate
review of this claim. We conclude it does, and we dismiss the appeal.
      We briefly explain the relevant factual background. On November 29,
2022, in case No. FCR364306, Johnson pleaded no contest to assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).)
Johnson’s written plea agreement provided for “[a] sentence to the high term
of 4 years.” At the plea hearing, both defense counsel and Johnson stated in
open court that Johnson agreed to a stipulated sentence of “a high term of

      2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      3 He also filed a notice of appeal challenging his conviction in case

No. FCR360120, alleging his due process rights were violated because his
plea was not free and voluntary. This issue was not raised in Johnson’s
briefing, however, so it is forfeited. (See League to Save Lake Tahoe
Mountain v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 105 [“arguments not
raised in an opening brief are forfeited”]; Upshaw v. Superior Court (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 489, 504, fn. 7 [“ ‘ “Issues do not have a life of their own: if
they are not raised . . . we consider the issues waived” ’ ”].)

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four years.” Finding a factual basis for his plea and that his plea was free
and voluntary, the court accepted Johnson’s no contest plea.4 On December
27, 2022, the trial court sentenced Johnson to the upper term of four years in
accordance with the stipulated plea. The court expressly stated that, because
it was a stipulated sentence, it would not “go through the facts of the case”
and that the sentence was “pursuant to the agreement of the parties and
stipulation of the defendant.”
      The day after sentencing, Johnson filed two notices of appeal. In case
No. FCR364306, the notice of appeal states the appeal is “based on the
sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the
validity of the plea.” He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.5
      “The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a
trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.)
Section 1237.5 provides that no appeal may be taken from a no contest plea
without a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Mendez (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) There are two exceptions to the rule—for appeals
involving a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, or grounds arising after
entry of the plea which do not affect the plea’s validity. (People v. Shelton

      4
        Johnson also executed a waiver of rights form in which he waived his
right to appeal the conviction and expressly stipulated to the factual basis
upon which the change of plea was based. After accepting the pleas, the
court addressed Johnson directly to confirm, “sir, are you stipulating that the
Court at the time of sentencing can sentence you to a high term of four
years?” To which Johnson replied, “Yes, sir.”

      5 In contrast, the amended notice of appeal Johnson filed in case

No. FCR360120 specified “[o]ther basis for this appeal,” and attached a
certificate of probable cause.

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(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766 (Shelton); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(A)–
(B).)
        Johnson argues his appeal falls in the latter category. He asserts “a
certificate of probable cause was not required . . . because he is not
challenging the validity of his plea.” Specifically, because “he is seeking the
application of an ameliorative statutory provision,” he reasons he is “not
challeng[ing] his plea as defective when made.”
        This contention contravenes established case law. For example, in
People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, the defendant purported to not
challenge the validity of his no contest plea; rather he sought to appeal the
constitutionality of the sentence to which he agreed as part of a plea
agreement. (Id. at p. 76.) The California Supreme Court explained that “the
critical inquiry is whether a challenge to the sentence is in substance a
challenge to the validity of the plea, thus rendering the appeal subject to the
requirements of section 1237.5.” (Ibid.) The high court then distinguished
cases in which the negotiated plea deal was separate and distinct from the
sentencing. (Id. at p. 78.) In such cases, “any challenges to the sentencing
did not implicate the validity of the pleas and therefore did not require
compliance with section 1237.5.” (Ibid.) In contrast, “by contesting the
constitutionality of the very sentence he negotiated as part of the plea
bargain, defendant [was], in substance, attacking the validity of the plea.”
(Ibid.) Panizzon held the defendant’s claim was not reviewable because the
defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (Ibid.)
        Johnson urges that People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 controls and
saves his appeal. In Stamps, the California Supreme Court determined that
a certificate of probable cause was not required because the defendant sought

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application of a new ameliorative sentencing law enacted after his plea
agreement but before his case became final. (Id. at p. 692.)
      Johnson misreads Stamps. Indeed, Stamps explained Panizzon and its
progeny do not address challenges to negotiated plea agreements based “on a
subsequent change in the law.” (People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 695.) But the Panizzon line of cases continues to control challenges to
negotiated plea bargains where there has been no change in the relevant
laws since the agreement was formed and the sentence imposed. (Ibid.) That
is the case here. Johnson admits as much—conceding he is seeking the
application of an ameliorative statutory provision “in effect at the time of
sentencing.”6 As Stamps expressly stated: “[W]hen the parties reach an
agreement in the context of existing law, a claim that seeks to avoid a term of
the agreement, as made, is an attack on the plea itself.” (Ibid., italics added.)
      Here, Johnson challenges the trial court’s authority to impose an
upper-term sentence that was negotiated as part of the plea agreement
seeking application of a law already in effect when he negotiated it. He
contends “the court’s imposition of the aggravated term failed to comply with
the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b), as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567.” By contesting “the very sentence he negotiated as part of the plea
bargain,” Johnson is therefore, “in substance, attacking the validity of the
plea.” (People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 78; see also Shelton, supra,
37 Cal.4th at pp. 763–769 [“a challenge to the trial court’s authority to
impose the lid sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a

      6 Senate Bill No. 567 was passed in the 2020–2021 legislative session

and made effective January 1, 2022; Johnson was charged with assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in case No. 364306 in July
2022; Johnson negotiated his plea bargain and stipulated to a factual basis
for his plea in November 2022; and he was subsequently sentenced in
December 2022.

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certificate of probable cause”].) Accordingly, Johnson’s failure to seek and
obtain a certificate of probable cause forecloses the claim he seeks to raise
before this court.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.

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                                           _________________________
                                           SMILEY, J. *

We concur:

BROWN, P. J.

STREETER, J.

People v. Johnson (A166911)

       * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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