Court Opinion

ID: 9481746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:30:15.152846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:32.770728
License: Public Domain

ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While concurring with the majority in its determination that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, I respectfully dissent from its determination that Davidson was denied a fundamentally fair trial when the trial court refused to sever the separate tax charges in the indictment which pertained only to the absent co-defendant Mulligan. The tax charges against Mulligan relate to income which he alleg*862edly received through his illicit narcotics dealing, evidence which in any event was admissible in connection with the conspiracy charge in which both he and Davidson were named. Thus a severance of the tax counts would in my judgment have resulted in little or no change in the evidence which was presented to the jury on the conspiracy alone.
As the majority correctly points out, we have held in United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1053 (6th Cir.1989), that “in order to justify reversal of a criminal conviction upon a district court’s denial of a motion to sever, the defendant has the burden of proving that substantial prejudice resulted from the court’s failure to grant a separate trial.” It is true here that there was a good deal of independent evidence, especially on the first day of trial relating to the tax counts and that most of that evidence would probably not have been admitted or admissible had the tax counts been severed. At the same time nothing could be more clear, even without the careful instructions given by the trial judge, than that these counts related only to Mulligan. No similar evidence of income tax evasion or even participation in that aspect of the case on the part of Davidson was even suggested to the jury and I simply fail to see in what particular there could have been such a spill-over effect upon Davidson’s case.
I am not quite certain whether the majority would have found reversible error had Mulligan been present and not tried in ab-stentia but infer from the language used that the majority was at least influenced to a good extent by this circumstance as well as the proof of the tax charges as they related only to Mulligan. I am not certain whether the majority would have found prejudice had the tax charges been severed but Mulligan still tried in abstentia with Davidson. It seems fair to conclude that the majority, however, believed that the combination of circumstances was at least enough to enable Davidson to bear his burden of proving the substantial prejudice standard under Zalman. All this seems to boil down to a difference in judgment between myself and the majority on that question. I would note that while Mulligan was not present, he was at all times represented by counsel during the trial, and that counsel actively participated in his defense thus dissipating much of the prejudice that might otherwise have attached to this factor. Conceivably it could even have favored Davidson since he could be seen by the jury as at least having the fortitude to come to court in person and face the music. More importantly, however, I simply cannot see how the highly individualized nature of the evidence concerning the tax charges could be regarded by any of the jurors as having any particular bearing upon the question of Davidson’s guilt. “[A] jury is presumed capable of sorting out evidence and considering each count and each defendant separately[.]” United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir.1987). Accordingly I respectfully dissent.