Court Opinion

ID: 9394668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 12:04:52.690224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.563963
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-256

                                 Filed 16 May 2023

Columbus County, No. 20 CVS 1273

MAURICE DEVALLE, Petitioner,

             v.

NORTH CAROLINA SHERIFFS’ EDUCATION AND TRAINING STANDARDS
COMMISSION, Respondent.

      Appeal by Respondent from order entered 22 November 2021 by Judge James

Gregory Bell in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2

November 2022.

      The McGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for petitioner-appellee.

      North Carolina Fraternal Order of Police, Amicus Curiae Brief, by Norris A.
      Adams, II, for petitioner-appellee.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ameshia
      Cooper Chester, for respondent-appellant.

      MURPHY, Judge.

      Where the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards

Commission revoked Petitioner’s justice officer certification for lack of good moral

character based on his conduct in 2016, the Commission could not deny Petitioner’s

certification indefinitely where the only recent evidence to support the denial was his

demeanor on cross examination during the contested-case hearing and Petitioner

presented sufficient evidence that he rehabilitated his character. We affirm the trial
          DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                    Opinion of the Court

court’s order on judicial review reversing the Commission’s final agency decision and

ordering that it issue Petitioner his justice officer certification retroactive to the date

of application.

                                    BACKGROUND

       Petitioner Maurice Devalle served with the North Carolina State Highway

Patrol for nineteen years.      Respondent North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and

Training Standards Commission (“the Commission”) had certified Mr. Devalle as a

justice officer during that time, since November 1998.          Prior to April 2017, Mr.

Devalle received only one disciplinary action by the Highway Patrol in the form of a

written warning.

       The Highway Patrol received a tip in November 2016 that Mr. Devalle was at

his residence in Wake County while he was supposed to be on duty in Wayne County.

The Highway Patrol conducted an internal investigation following the tip.             The

Highway Patrol learned Mr. Devalle had falsely reported he resided within the

mandated-20-mile radius of his duty station in Wayne County, when he in fact lived

44 miles away, in Wake County. On 11 November 2016, Highway Patrol personnel

traveled to Mr. Devalle’s Wake County home while he was scheduled to be on duty

and found him there dressed in plain clothing.             Mr. Devalle admitted that, on

occasion, he would drive home for lunch and then stay home “for extended periods of

time while he was on-duty . . . .” Mr. Devalle acknowledged he knew this conduct

violated Highway Patrol Policy.

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          On 24 April 2017, the Highway Patrol terminated Mr. Devalle’s employment

and, four days later, notified the Commission of Mr. Devalle’s termination and the

above conduct. The Commission revoked Mr. Devalle’s justice officer certification as

a result of the report effective 24 April 2017.1

          In August 2017, Mr. Devalle began working as a school resource officer for East

Columbus County High School and applied that same month once again for justice

officer certification with the Commission through the Columbus County Sheriffs’

Office.       On 29 January 2019,2 the Commission notified Mr. Devalle that it had

reviewed his application for certification and denied his certification indefinitely. The

notification indicated to Mr. Devalle his denial was due to him “[n]o longer possessing

the good moral character required of all justice officers.”3

          On 20 March 2019, Mr. Devalle filed a request for a contested case hearing in

the Office of Administrative Hearings. On 3 December 2019, Mr. Devalle’s case came

on for hearing before administrative law judge Melissa Owens Lassiter.                             The

Commission only presented evidence of the 2016 conduct that led to Mr. Devalle’s

termination. Mr. Devalle presented two witnesses at the hearing, the Sheriff of

Columbus County and school principal of East Columbus County High School, his

          1
          Mr. Devalle’s termination from the Highway Patrol and initial loss of certification in April
2017 are not at issue in this appeal.
        2 Mr. Devalle remained employed at East Columbus County High during this period.
        3 The Commission also denied Mr. Devalle’s certification for the Class B misdemeanor of

“Willfully Failing to Discharge Duties,” but suspended the denial. This ground is not at issue on
appeal.

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                                     Opinion of the Court

superiors, where Mr. Devalle was employed as a school resource officer.                 Both

individuals testified in depth to the effect that Mr. Devalle currently had good moral

character. The administrative law judge found:

              68. . . . . [The Commission] failed to present any evidence
              concerning any activities involving [Mr. Devalle] that took
              place more recently than 2016. While four witnesses from
              the [Highway] Patrol testified regarding [Mr. Devalle’s]
              dismissal from the Patrol, none of those witnesses
              possessed any first-hand knowledge of how [Mr. Devalle]
              has conducted himself in terms of truthfulness or
              conformance with policies while [presently] employed as a
              deputy sheriff in Columbus County. None of those
              witnesses opined that [Mr. Devalle] lacked good moral
              character, either generally, or to serve as a deputy sheriff
              in this State.

(Transcript citations omitted).      By proposal for decision filed 3 June 2020, the

administrative law judge recommended a conclusion that the evidence at the hearing

“rebutted the finding by [the Commission] that Petitioner lacks the good moral

character required of a justice officer.” The administrative law judge recommended

this was a result of the testimony by Mr. Devalle’s superiors establishing that Mr.

Devalle “has rehabilitated his character since 2017.”

       By final agency decision signed 6 October 2020,4 the Commission rejected the

administrative law judge’s proposal and concluded instead that the evidence before

the administrative law judge showed Mr. Devalle “currently does not possess the good

       4
       Alan Cloninger, Chairman, North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards
Commission.

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                                        Opinion of the Court

moral character required to continue certification as a deputy sheriff.”                        The

Commission accepted and found the testimony of Mr. Devalle’s present character to

be credible and believable. The Commission found, however, that Mr. Devalle lacked

candor and truthfulness while testifying on cross examination at the contested case

hearing, and therefore concluded he lacked the good moral character required for

justice officer certification.      The Commission denied Mr. Devalle’s certification

indefinitely as a result.5

       On 3 December 2020, Mr. Devalle filed a petition for judicial review of the

Commission’s final agency decision in Columbus County Superior Court.                           The

Commission filed a motion to dismiss and brief in opposition.

       On 22 November 2021, the trial court concluded the record established that

Mr. Devalle “presently has good moral character to serve as a Deputy Sheriff,” and

reversed the Commission’s final agency decision.                 The trial court ordered the

Commission to grant Mr. Devalle’s application for certification effective and

retroactive to August 2017. The Commission appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       The Commission advances several arguments on appeal challenging the trial

court’s reversal of its final agency decision. The Commission first argues the trial

       5  The Commission denied the certification indefinitely based upon Mr. Devalle’s “lack of good
moral character.” The Commission denied Mr. Devalle’s certification for a suspended sanction of five
years for the commission of the Class B offense of willful failure to discharge duties.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

court erroneously concluded Mr. Devalle’s petition for judicial review provided

sufficient notice to the Commission of Mr. Devalle’s exceptions to its final agency

decision. The Commission also argues no grounds support the trial court’s reversal

of its final agency decision under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b).          We

disagree, and affirm the trial court’s order.

      “Any person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who

has exhausted all administrative remedies . . . , is entitled to judicial review of the

decision . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 150B-43 (2021). On petition for judicial review from a final

administrative agency decision, the trial court sits as an appellate court reviewing

the administrative agency. See Rector v. N.C. Sheriff’s Educ. & Training Standards

Com., 103 N.C. App. 527, 532 (1991) (citing Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,292

N.C. 406, 410 (1977)).

      The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act defines the scope of a

Superior Court’s review over a final agency decision. See N.C.G.S. § 150B-51 (2021).

Subsection (b) provides:

             The court reviewing a final decision may affirm the
             decision or remand the case for further proceedings. It may
             also reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights
             of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
             findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

             (1) In violation of constitutional provisions;

             (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
             agency or administrative law judge;

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             (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

             (4) Affected by other error of law;

             (5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible
             under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the
             entire record as submitted; or

             (6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (2021).

      Errors asserted under subdivisions (1) through (4) of subsection (b) are

reviewed de novo. N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(c) (2021). “Under the de novo standard of

review, the trial court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment for the agency’s.” N.C. Dep’t of Env’t and Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649,

660 (2004) (quotation marks omitted). In contrast, errors asserted under subdivisions

(5) and (6) are reviewed “using the whole record standard of review.” N.C.G.S. §

150B-51(c) (2021).

      Under the whole record standard of review, the trial court reviews the whole

record to ensure “the administrative agency’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence.” Rector, 103 N.C. App. at 532. The question before the trial court was

whether there was “substantial evidence to support a finding” essential to the

agency’s determination.    In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 65-66 (1979).       “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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                                   Opinion of the Court

support a conclusion and ‘is more than a scintilla or a permissible inference.’” Rector,

103 N.C. App. at 532 (marks omitted).

      “When this Court reviews an appeal from the [S]uperior [C]ourt reversing the

decision of an administrative agency, our standard of review is twofold and is limited

to determining: (1) whether the [S]uperior [C]ourt applied the appropriate standard

of review and, if so, (2) whether the [S]uperior [C]ourt properly applied this

standard.” McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 246, disc. review denied, 365

N.C. 198 (2011); see also Powell v. N.C. Crim. Justice Educ. Training Stds. Comm’n.,

165 N.C. App. 848, 851 (2004) (citation and marks omitted) (“The appellate court

examines the trial court’s order regarding an agency decision for error of law.”).

                  A. Adequacy of Petition for Judicial Review

      We first address the Commission’s argument that Mr. Devalle’s petition for

judicial review lacked sufficient notice to the Commission of the specific exceptions

Mr. Devalle took to its final agency decision. We conclude the trial court properly

denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss Mr. Devalle’s petition for judicial review

on this ground.

      Section 150B-46 of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act governs

the contents of a petition for judicial review over an administrative agency’s final

decision. N.C.G.S. § 150B-46 (2021).       It requires only that “[t]he petition shall

explicitly state what exceptions are taken to the decision or procedure and what relief

the petitioner seeks.” N.C.G.S. § 150B-46 (2021). “‘Explicit’ is defined in this context

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                                  Opinion of the Court

as ‘characterized by full clear expression: being without vagueness or ambiguity:

leaving nothing implied.’” Gray v. Orange County Health Dept., 119 N.C. App. 62, 70

(quoting Vann v. N.C. State Bar, 79 N.C. App. 173, 173-74 (1986)), disc. review denied,

341 N.C. 649 (1995).

      Mr. Devalle’s petition for judicial review in this case took exception to the

Commission’s finding “that [Mr. Devalle] lacked the good moral character required of

every justice officer under 12 NCAC 10B .0303(a)(8).” Mr. Devalle complained that

the Commission found the only evidence regarding Mr. Devalle’s current moral

character to be “credible, honest, and believable,” but that the Commission

nonetheless concluded Mr. Devalle lacked the requisite moral character. Moreover,

Mr. Devalle cited our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dillingham, 188 N.C. 162

(1924), and asserted that the sanction of revocation for an indefinite period may

continue only “so long as the stated deficiency exists.” Mr. Devalle thus excepted “to

particular findings of fact, conclusions of law, or procedures.” Kingsgrab v. State Bd.

of Barber Examiners, 236 N.C. App. 564, 570 (2014), disc. review denied, 368 N.C. 244

(2015). He then prayed that the trial court “[r]everse the portion of the Final Agency

Decision that determined that he continues to lack good moral character,” and that

the court “[r]einstate [his] justice officer certification[.]” We conclude this filing

adequately stated the exceptions Mr. Devalle took to the Commission’s final agency

decision—i.e., an erroneous finding of Mr. Devalle’s present lack of good moral

character—and that Mr. Devalle was seeking a reversal thereof. See James v. Wayne

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         DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                   Opinion of the Court

County Board of Education, 15 N.C. App. 531, 533 (1972) (citing In re Appeal of

Harris, 273 N.C. 20 (1968) (“Our Supreme Court has held that the primary purpose

of the statute is to confer the right of review and that the statute should be liberally

construed to preserve and effectuate that right.”).          Moreover, although the

Commission was not required to file a response to the petition for judicial review, see

N.C.G.S. § 150B-46 (emphasis added) (“Other parties to the proceeding may file a

response to the petition within 30 days of service.”), the Commission did file a brief

in opposition, which was extensive and which addressed the various exceptions raised

in Mr. Devalle’s petition for review and argued their inadequacy. We agree with the

trial court that the Commission was “in no way blindsided by a lack of notice or

detail,” and conclude Mr. Devalle’s petition for review was “sufficiently explicit to

have allowed effective judicial review.” Gray, 119 N.C. App. at 71 (brackets omitted).

                                B. N.C.G.S. § 150B-51

      We next address the Commission’s argument the trial court erred in reversing

its final agency decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) on the grounds it was

unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record and that the

Commission erred as a matter of law. The trial court held that, “[u]nder a correct

interpretation of the good moral character rule, [Mr. Devalle] presently has good

moral character sufficient for certification as a Deputy Sheriff.” The trial court

rendered additional findings of fact to the effect that “[t]he credible and persuasive

testimonies by Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson demonstrated that [Mr.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Devalle] has restored his character so that he now possesses the good moral character

required to continue to be certified as a deputy sheriff.”

      The Commission addresses each of subdivisions N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(3)-(6)

and argues that, because the administrative law judge had found Mr. Devalle lacked

“candor and sincerity” on cross examination during the contested case hearing, the

trial court erred in reversing its final agency decision in that it was not entered upon

unlawful procedure (N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(3)) or based upon an error of law (N.C.G.S.

§ 150B-51(b)(4)), and that it was otherwise supported by substantial evidence

(N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(5)) and not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion

(N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(6)). Mr. Devalle maintains the trial court’s order should be

affirmed because the Commission failed to present sufficient evidence that his 2016

conduct amounted to “a severe case” of bad moral character warranting indefinite

denial, “particularly in light of the evidence of rehabilitation, and that his present

character is good.”

      Mr.    Devalle   maintains    the    Commission        erroneously   distorted   the

administrative law judge’s “credibility determinations and [failed] to give deference

to her role as the fact-finder and [that] this conduct amounts to arbitrary and

capricious decision making on the part of” the Commission.

      We agree with the trial court and conclude the Commission did not abide by

its own good moral character standard when it denied Mr. Devalle’s justice officer

certification indefinitely. The Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious,

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                                   Opinion of the Court

and its denial was unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm the trial court’s

order reversing the Commission’s final agency decision.

      Chapter 17E of the North Carolina General Statutes, as well as our

Administrative Code, grant the Commission the authority to certify, revoke, suspend,

or deny justice officer certifications in North Carolina based on certain qualifications,

which the Commission is permitted to establish. See N.C.G.S. §§ 17E-1, -4 (2021); see

also Strong’s North Carolina Index 4th § 30 (2021) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 17E-1, -4 (2021)

(“The commission was created to deal with the training and educational needs of

sheriffs and deputy sheriffs and has the power, among other things, to establish

minimum educational and training standards and to certify persons who have met

those standards.”). Article 12, Chapter 10B of our Administrative Code provides, in

relevant part:

             (b) The [Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards]
             Commission shall revoke, deny, or suspend the
             certification of a justice officer when the commission finds
             that the applicant for certification or the certified officer:

             ....

                    (2) fails to meet or maintain any of the employment
             or certification standards required by 12 NCAC 10B
             .0300[.]

12 NCAC 10B .0204(b)(2) (2021).

      Subdivision .0301 provides that “[e]very Justice Officer employed or certified

in North Carolina shall”:

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                                     Opinion of the Court

               be of good moral character as defined in: In re Willis, 288
               N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 (1975), appeal dismissed 423 U.S.
               976 (1975); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854
               (1940); In re Legg, 325 N.C. 658, 386 S.E.2d 174 (1989); In
               re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906); In
               re Dillingham, 188 N.C. 162, 124 S.E. 130 (1924); State v.
               Benbow, 309 N.C. 538, 308 S.E.2d 647 (1983); and later
               court decisions that cite these cases as authority[.]

12 NCAC 10B .0301(a)(9) (2021). Accordingly, our State’s caselaw defines the concept

of good moral character. See 12 NCAC 10B .0301(a)(9).

      The requirement that an applicant maintain good moral character means

               something more than the absence of bad character. It is
               the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should
               have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
               means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
               upright character ordinarily would, should or does. Such
               character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following
               the line of least resistance, but quite often in the will to do
               the unpleasant thing, if it is right, and the resolve not to do
               the pleasant thing, if it is wrong.

In re Rogers, 297 N.C. at 58 (quoting In re Applicants for License,191 N.C. 235 (1926)).

“Character thus encompasses both a person’s past behavior and the opinion of

members of his community arising from it.” Id. Further, “whether a person is of good

moral character is seldom subject to proof by reference to one or two incidents.” Id.

“[W]hen one seeks to establish restoration of a character which has been deservedly

forfeited, the question becomes essentially one ‘of time and growth.’” In re Willis, 288

N.C. 1, 13, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 976 (1975) (quoting In re Dillingham, 188 N.C.

162 (1924)).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

      While vague, the “good moral character” standard is not “an unconstitutional

standard.” Id. at 11. “The right to establish such qualifications rests in the police

power—a power by virtue of which a State is authorized to enact laws to preserve the

public safety, maintain the public peace and order, and preserve and promote the

public health and public morals.” In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 5 (1906).

Nonetheless, “[s]uch a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal

views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and

discriminatory denial . . . .” Konigsberg v. State, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).

      In 2011, the Commission, in a different case, issued a final agency decision in

which it summarized its operating framework for determinations of lack of good

moral character and the appropriate corresponding sanctions. See Royall v. N.C.

Sheriffs’ Educ. And Training Standards Comm’n., Final Agency Decision, 09 DOJ

5859 (5 January 2011).     The conduct at issue in Royall involved the petitioner

releasing to the public sensitive information he obtained about ongoing investigations

through his service with the Yadkin County Sheriffs’ Office on certain social media

websites. The administrative law judge who heard the evidence in the contested case

hearing recommended a finding of a lack of good moral character by the petitioner

and, as a result, recommended his certification be revoked for four months.

      Despite the administrative law judge’s recommendations, the Commission

concluded there was no factual or legal basis to support a finding the petitioner

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                                  Opinion of the Court

presently lacked the requisite good moral character to warrant his revocation. The

Commission explained:

            6.     While having good moral character is an ideal
            objective for everyone to enjoy, the lack of consistent and
            clear meaning of that term within the [Commission’s] rule,
            and the lack of clear enforcement standards or criteria for
            application of the rule, renders enforcement actions
            problematic and difficult.

            7.    Because of these concerns about the flexibility and
            vagueness of the good moral character rule, any suspension
            or revocation of an officer’s law enforcement certification
            based on an allegation of a lack of good moral character
            should be reserved for clear and severe cases of misconduct.

            8.     Generally, isolated instances of conduct are
            insufficient to properly conclude that someone lacks good
            moral character. . . . . The incident alleged in this case is
            insufficient to rise to the required level of proof to establish
            that Petitioner Royall lacks good moral character. Under
            In Re Rogers, a single instance of conduct amounting to
            poor judgment, especially where there is no malice or bad
            faith, would not ordinarily rise to the high level required to
            reflect a lack of good moral character.

            ....

            11.    The totality of the facts and circumstances
            surrounding Petitioner Royall’s conduct, in light of his
            exemplary history of good moral character and
            professionalism in law enforcement, does not warrant any
            finding that Petitioner Royall lacks good moral character.
            The substantial evidence of Petitioner’s good moral
            character is clear and compelling.             Sheriff Jack
            Henderson’s description of Petitioner Royall is very telling:
            “He’s the kind of guy, if he’s cutting a watermelon, he’ll give
            you the best piece.” Therefore, the evidence demonstrates
            that there is no proper basis for revocation or suspension
            of Petitioner’s law enforcement certification.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             ....

             13.    The totality of the facts and circumstances
             surrounding Petitioner Royall’s conduct, in light of his
             otherwise exemplary history of good moral character and
             professionalism in law enforcement, do not warrant or
             justify revoking or suspending Petitioner’s law
             enforcement certification. There has been no violation of
             [the Commission’s] good moral character rule.

Royall v. N.C. Sheriffs’ Educ. And Training Standards Comm’n., Final Agency

Decision, 09 DOJ 5859 (5 January 2011) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). It

appears the Commission viewed the petitioner’s social media activity and postings in

Royall to constitute “a single instance of conduct.”

      Here, as the trial court noted, instead of investigating Mr. Devalle’s current

moral character, the Commission relied solely on Mr. Devalle’s conduct in 2016 which

led to his termination of employment from the Highway Patrol.

      The Commission characterized the testimony concerning Mr. Devalle’s present

moral character as follows:

             21. Despite knowing that [Mr. Devalle] had been working
             as a deputy sheriff for two and a half years, [the
             Commission’s Probable Cause Committee] did not
             interview the Columbus County Sheriff or the school
             principal for whom [Mr. Devalle] served as a school
             resource officer since August 2017. [The Commission’s
             Probable Cause Committee] had no knowledge of what Mr.
             Devalle did while working as a school resource officer or
             how he discharged his duties as a school resource officer.

             ....

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                        Opinion of the Court

   54. At hearing, [Mr. Devalle] attempted to justify his
   working from home while on duty by stating that a “very,
   very small percentage'” of his job duties involved being on
   patrol. However, [Mr. Devalle] completed weekly reports
   of daily activity claiming approximately 40% of his time
   was spent on patrol in Wayne County.

   55. The transcripts of [Mr. Devalle’s] statements to the
   Patrol’s Internal Affairs on [15 November] 2016, [18
   November] 2016, and [27 March] 2017 corroborate [Mr.
   Devalle’s] above cited admissions. They also provide
   substantial statements of [Mr. Devalle] made closer in time
   to the events in question, shedding light on facts that [Mr.
   Devalle] allegedly no longer recalls.

   ....

   69. Steadman Jody Greene is the Sheriff of Columbus
   County, Whiteville, North Carolina. [Mr. Devalle] works
   for Sheriff Greene as a deputy in the capacity of the school
   resource officer. ln this capacity, [Mr. Devalle] is armed
   with both lethal and non-lethal weapons. [Mr. Devalle]
   serves at the pleasure of the Sheriff.     At the time of
   hearing, Sheriff Greene had just been released from the
   hospital and voluntarily came to testify that [Mr. Devalle]
   does a fine job for him and how important [Mr. Devalle] is
   to his agency.

   70. When Sheriff Greene hired [Mr. Devalle], he was aware
   that [Mr. Devalle] had been dismissed from the [Highway]
   Patrol. [Mr. Devalle] had told him. Sheriff Greene is
   satisfied that [Mr. Devalle] has good moral character.
   Given the importance of the school resource officer, Greene
   must place someone in that position upon which he has a
   special trust and confidence. Sheriff Green has that special
   trust and confidence in [Mr. Devalle]. He hired [Mr.
   Devalle] based upon the principal, school board members,
   parents and students all recommending him and not based
   upon the past. Sheriff Greene is satisfied that [Mr.
   Devalle] had performed his duties “above and beyond.” If

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                        Opinion of the Court

   [Mr. Devalle] was unable to serve as a deputy, it would
   negatively impact Greene’s force.

   71. Based on [Mr. Devalle’s] service as a deputy sheriff,
   Sheriff Greene has no hesitation as to [his] truthfulness or
   ability to tell the truth.

   72. Jeremiah Johnson is the principal at East Columbus
   High School in Lake Waccamaw, North Carolina. Johnson
   knows [Mr. Devalle] in two capacities: as the school
   resource officer at East Columbus High School and as an
   assistant football coach and track coach at that school.
   [Mr. Devalle] has served, and continues to serve, in those
   capacities since 2017. Johnson has had the opportunity to
   watch [Mr. Devalle] perform those duties “every day” that
   school is in session. Johnson described [Mr. Devalle], in
   performing his duties as a school resource officer, as
   “dedicated to the school, dedicated to the students,
   dedicated to the staff. He comes to school - comes to work
   every day, is there to serve and protect. He’s part of my
   administrative team. He’s almost my right-hand man.”

   73. When asked whether he had had an opportunity to form
   an opinion as to [Mr. Devalle’s] character, Johnson said,
   “He is an awesome person. He is an awesome man. And
   I’m not just saying that for me, I’m saying that for my kids
   at my school.” When asked whether [Mr. Devalle] had ever
   committed any act that would cause Johnson to doubt [his]
   capacity to be truthful, Johnson answered, “No.”

   74. Mr. Johnson has no doubt, based on what he’s observed
   from [Mr. Devalle], that [Mr. Devalle] does not lack the
   character necessary to serve as a school resource officer at
   Johnson’s high school. Johnson would not have permitted
   [Mr. Devalle] to serve as an assistant football coach and
   track coach, in addition to serving as a school resource
   officer, if he had any doubts about [Mr. Devalle’s]
   character.

   75. Mr. Johnson opined that if [Mr. Devalle] was no longer
   able to serve East Columbus as a school resource officer,

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DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                       Opinion of the Court

   the lack of [Mr. Devalle’s] presence would make the school
   less safe.

   76. Johnson also spoke of the strong professional bond that
   exists between himself as principal and [Mr. Devalle] as
   the school resource officer.     Johnson thinks that [Mr.
   Devalle] is the best school resource officer he has ever
   worked with and as a school administrator, Johnson has
   trained many SROs. He opined that interaction with the
   students would suffer tremendously if [Mr. Devalle] was
   not at East Columbus High. “These kids, they look up to
   him.” Johnson explained how [Mr. Devalle] has helped
   other students such as buying shoes for kids, bought lunch
   for kids, and given them food. . . .

   ....

   79. Neither [the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee]
   nor [the Commission] presented any evidence at hearing
   regarding [Mr. Devalle’s] performance of his duties as a
   Columbus County deputy sheriff. [The Commission] failed
   to present any evidence concerning any activities involving
   [Mr. Devalle] that took place more recently than 2016.
   While four witnesses from the Patrol testified regarding
   [Mr. Devalle’s] dismissal from the Patrol, none of those
   witnesses possessed any first-hand knowledge of how [Mr.
   Devalle] has conducted himself in terms of truthfulness or
   conformance with policies while employed as a deputy
   sheriff in Columbus County.      None of those witnesses
   opined that [Mr. Devalle] lacked good moral character,
   either generally, or to serve as a deputy sheriff in this
   State.

   ....

   81. During his case in chief, [Mr. Devalle] presented
   significant evidence demonstrating that [Mr. Devalle] has
   rehabilitated and rebuilt his career since 2016 and 2017
   while working as a school resource officer at East
   Columbus High School. Such evidence showed that [Mr.
   Devalle] has exhibited highly favorable traits, including

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         DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                 Opinion of the Court

            but not limited to helping, teaching, and serving as positive
            role models for students at East Columbus High School not
            only as a school resource officer, but as a coach in two
            sports. Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson opined that
            [Mr. Devalle’s] absence from their respective entities would
            have a negative impact on their workplaces. The scope and
            magnitude of [Mr. Devalle’s] character traits, as witnessed
            by Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson, qualify as
            extenuating circumstances which the [Commission] should
            consider in determining whether [Mr. Devalle] possesses
            the good moral character required of a justice officer.

The Commission further concluded:

            24. Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson testified that
            [Mr. Devalle] has rehabilitated and rebuilt his character,
            since being fired by the [Highway] Patrol, and as a deputy
            sheriff, and as school resource officer and coach at East
            Columbus High School. Greene and Johnson testified that
            for two and a half years, [Mr. Devalle’s] service as a deputy
            sheriff has been nothing but exemplary both of that service
            and of [Mr. Devalle’s] character while engaging in that
            service. Such testimony was credible, honest, and
            believable.

      Despite the above credible evidence of Mr. Devalle’s present moral character,

the Commission found that, while testifying on cross examination before the

administrative law judge, Mr. Devalle

            exhibited a lack of candor and sincerity during cross-
            examination by [the Commission’s] counsel. During [the
            Commission’s] questions, [Mr. Devalle] was evasive and
            feigned a lack of memory or confusion in response to [the
            Commission’s] questions about [Mr. Devalle’s] conduct
            with the [Highway] Patrol in 2016. [Mr. Devalle] remained
            evasive and elusive even after having his recollection
            refreshed with his prior statements. In contrast, [Mr.
            Devalle] readily recollected circumstances from this period,
            when questioned by his own counsel, without having to

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           DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                  Opinion of the Court

              review any materials.

The Commission therefore concluded that “the most recent demonstration of [Mr.

Devalle’s] character was the hearing itself[,]” and denied Mr. Devalle’s certification

for a lack of moral character.

      We agree with the trial court these findings and conclusions do not conform

with the standard the agency applied in Royall. By failing to apply the same standard

to similarly situated individuals, the record in this case is one “which indicates

arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious application of the good moral character

standard” by the Commission. In re Willis, 288 N.C. at 19.

      The administrative law judge who heard the evidence in this case found and

concluded the following regarding Mr. Devalle’s conduct at the contested case

hearing:

              69. At hearing, [Mr. Devalle’s] testimony exhibited a lack
              of candor and sincerity during cross-examination by [the
              Commission’s] counsel.        During [the Commission’s]
              questions, [Mr. Devalle] was evasive and feigned a lack of
              memory or confusion in response to [the Commission’s]
              questions about [Mr. Devalle’s] conduct with the [Highway]
              Patrol in 2016. [Mr. Devalle] remained evasive and elusive
              even after having his recollection refreshed with his prior
              statements. In contrast, [Mr. Devalle] readily recollected
              circumstances from this period, when questioned by his
              own counsel, without having to review any materials.

              70. During his case in chief, [Mr. Devalle] presented
              significant evidence demonstrating that [he] has
              rehabilitated and rebuilt his career since 2016 and 2017
              while working as a school resource officer at East
              Columbus High School. Such evidence showed that [Mr.

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         DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                  Opinion of the Court

             Devalle] has exhibited highly favorable traits, including
             but not limited to helping, teaching, and serving as positive
             role models for students at East Columbus High School not
             only as a school resource officer, but as a coach in two
             sports. Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson opined that
             [Mr. Devalle’s] absence from their respective entities would
             have a negative impact on their workplaces. The scope and
             magnitude of [Mr. Devalle’s] character traits, as witnessed
             by Sheriff Greene and Principal Johnson, qualify as
             extenuating circumstances which the [Commission] should
             consider in determining whether [Mr. Devalle] possesses
             the good moral character required of a justice officer.

      The administrative law judge concluded that “[e]ven given [Mr. Devalle’s] cross-

examination testimony at hearing, the totality of the evidence rebutted the finding by

the Probable Cause Committee that [Mr. Devalle] lacks the good moral character

required of a justice officer and showed that [Mr. Devalle] has rehabilitated his

character since 2017[,]” and that the “credible and persuasive testimonies by Sheriff

Greene and Principal Johnson demonstrated that [he] has restored his character so

that he now possesses the good moral character required to continue certification as

a deputy sheriff.” (Emphasis added).

      As the Commission made clear in its statement of the applicable law in Royall,

it would only be cases of severe conduct that may serve as the basis for a finding of

lack of good moral character and, where evidence of rehabilitation is presented, the

question becomes one of time and growth.            Neither the Commission nor the

administrative law judge made a finding in this case that Mr. Devalle’s conduct with

the Highway Patrol in 2016 was severe, and the Commission made a finding

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            DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                          Opinion of the Court

concerning rehabilitation.          The Commission found Sheriff Greene and Principal

Johnson’s testimony was “credible, honest, and believable” and that Mr. Devalle had

“rehabilitated and rebuilt his character.”

        In view of the Commission’s findings that Mr. Devalle has rehabilitated his

moral character since the 2016 conduct and the lack of a finding or substantial

evidence that Mr. Devalle’s conduct on cross examination was severe, pursuant to the

Commission’s own standard expounded upon in Royall, we agree with the trial court

the Commission erred and applied an arbitrary and capricious decision to Mr.

Devalle. The evidence and findings fail to show severe misconduct amounting to a

lack of good moral character as a matter of law. See In re Rogers, 297 N.C. at 58

(“Whether a person is of good moral character is seldom subject to proof by reference

to one or two incidents.”); Rector, 103 N.C. App. at 532 (quotation marks omitted)

(“Administrative agency decisions may be reversed as arbitrary or capricious if they

are patently in bad faith, or ‘whimsical’ in the sense that they indicate a lack of fair

and careful consideration or fail to indicate any course of reasoning and the exercise

of judgment.”).6 We agree there is a lack of substantial record evidence to support

the Commission’s conclusion Mr. Devalle presently lacks the good moral character

        6 In Royall, the Commission held “[t]he substantial evidence of [the petitioner’s] good moral
character [was] clear and compelling” in light of Sheriff Jack Henderson’s “very telling” description
of the petitioner that “He’s the kind of guy, if he’s cutting a watermelon, he’ll give you the best piece.”
Jeffrey Gray Royall v. N.C. Sheriffs’ Educ. and Training Standards Comm’n., Final Agency Decision,
09 DOJ 5859 (2011).

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         DEVALLE V. N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUC. & TRAINING STANDARDS COMM’N

                                   Opinion of the Court

required of justice officers in North Carolina warranting indefinite denial of his

certification, see Rector, 103 N.C. App. at 532 (quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he whole

record rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence

supporting the Board’s decisions, to take into account whatever in the record fairly

detracts from the weight of the Board’s evidence.”), and affirm the trial court’s order

reversing the Commission’s decision and ordering it issue Mr. Devalle his justice

officer certification retroactive to August 2017.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Mr. Devalle’s petition for judicial review provided adequate notice to the

Commission, and the Commission applied a heightened good moral character

standard to Mr. Devalle than that which it has previously enumerated when it denied

his justice officer certification indefinitely such that its decision was arbitrary and

capricious. The Commission’s denial was further unsupported by substantial

evidence. We affirm the trial court’s order reversing the Commission’s final agency

decision. The Commission’s imposition of the sanction of a five-year denial and

suspension thereof for five years for willfully failing to discharge duties was not

appealed and is thus binding on the Commission.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judges TYSON and WOOD concur.

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