Court Opinion

ID: 9386324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 06:07:25.337105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:05.646033
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 5, 2023

                                            S  In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-21-00379-CV

 DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND HEALTH
             AND HOSPITAL SYSTEM, Appellant
                           V.
                SHERI KOWALSKI, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                                 Dallas County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03723-E

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                         Before Justices Smith, Miskel, and Kennedy1
                                  Opinion by Justice Smith

          Appellant Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health and Hospital

System (Parkland) brings this interlocutory appeal2 challenging the trial court’s

denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Because appellee Sheri Kowalski presented

    1
      Justices Leslie Osborne and David Schenck were originally members of this panel and participated in
oral argument; however, they did not participate in the issuance of this opinion. Justice Emily Miskel
succeeded Justice Osborne after her resignation from the Court, and Justice Nancy Kennedy succeeded
Justice Schenck after his term expired. Justices Miskel and Kennedy have reviewed the briefs and the
record before the Court.
    2
        See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element of

her claims for disability discrimination and retaliation,3 we affirm.

                                               Background

        Kowalski was employed by Parkland as the Director of Finance from January

12, 2016, through February 18, 2018. On December 20, 2017, she requested a

keyboard tray, mouse tray, and for her monitors to be lowered to help alleviate neck

and back pain. Her direct supervisor, Christine Putz, who was the interim Senior

Vice President (SVP) of Finance, approved the request but then forwarded it to the

Director of Talent Acquisition in the Office of Talent Management (OTM), which

was Parkland’s human resource department. In her email, Putz asked whether OTM

and Occupational Health needed to be involved and noted that Kowalski had “pre-

existing back and neck issues . . . so there isn’t any question down the road.” From

there, Occupational Health and Employee Relations were brought in, as well as

CareWorks, Parkland’s third-party leave management administrator that processed

reasonable accommodation requests pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).

        Despite the workspace request already being approved by Putz, the Director

of Employee Relations characterized the request as a “reasonable accommodation

    3
     Although Parkland’s brief on appeal also addresses claims for failure to accommodate and for a pattern
and practice of discrimination, as did its plea to the jurisdiction, Kowalski has not treated either as a stand-
alone claim. After reviewing the record and the briefs, we find the only claims before us are Kowalski’s
claims for disability discrimination and retaliation and, thus, limit our review to those claims.
                                                     –2–
complaint,” and Kowalski was ultimately required to have a physician fill out an

ADA accommodation request assessment form and return it to CareWorks.

Kowalski tried to explain that she was not making an accommodation complaint

based on a disability and that her issues were not pre-existing but was advised that,

in order to receive her request, she was required to go through the accommodation

process. Kowalski returned the ADA form to CareWorks on January 16.

      On January 17, 2018, a nurse from Occupational Health emailed Kowalski a

Computer Workstation Ergonomic Self-Evaluation form and scheduled an

ergonomic appointment and evaluation for the afternoon of January 19.

Occupational Health completed the evaluation and, a few minutes later, Putz

escorted Kowalski to OTM where she was notified that her position had been

eliminated due to a restructuring of the finance department. She was asked to pack

her things and was escorted out of the building. In a letter dated January 19,

Kowalski was notified that she could apply for any open position for which she was

qualified, including a newly created Controller position. She was also offered a

severance package that would be available when her employment officially ended

on February 18. Kowalski did not sign and return the release agreement or apply for

the Controller position.

      On March 13, 2018, Kowalski filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that Parkland discriminated and

retaliated against her because she requested a keyboard tray and Parkland treated it

                                        –3–
as a complaint and then terminated her. She then brought suit against Parkland

alleging that it violated the Texas Labor Code by discharging her and discriminating

against her because of disability. She also alleged that Parkland retaliated against

her and had a pattern and practice of disability discrimination.

      Parkland filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-

evidence motion for summary judgment arguing that it was immune from liability

because Kowalski could not establish the prima facie elements of her claims and

Parkland’s evidence conclusively negated the claims. Kowalski responded and, after

a hearing, the trial court denied Parkland’s plea and motions for summary judgment.

Parkland timely pursued this appeal and raises two issues for our review: (1) whether

the trial court erred in overruling Parkland’s objections to Kowalski’s inadmissible

summary judgment evidence and considering that evidence in ruling on Parkland’s

plea; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Parkland’s plea to the

jurisdiction.

                Pleas to the Jurisdiction and Governmental Immunity

      To invoke the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege

facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex.

Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A plea to

the jurisdiction is an appropriate procedural vehicle by which a party may challenge

a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d

547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999).

                                         –4–
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, such

as here, the court considers the evidence submitted when resolving the jurisdictional

issue. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. “If the evidence creates a fact question

regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the

jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 227–28.

However, if the evidence related to the jurisdictional issue is undisputed or fails to

raise a fact question as to jurisdiction, the trial court rules on the plea to the

jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at 228.

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Id. As

with the summary judgment standard of review, we take as true all evidence

favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any

doubts in the nonmovants favor. Id. However, we cannot disregard evidence

necessary to show context or disregard unfavorable evidence if reasonable jurors

could not disregard it. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755,

771, 793 (Tex. 2018). To create a fact question, the nonmovant must present more

than a scintilla of probative evidence on each challenged jurisdictional fact. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (setting out procedure for traditional summary judgment

motions and requiring nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of

material fact if movant establishes it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law);

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28 (explaining standard for reviewing challenge to the

existence of jurisdictional facts mirrors that of reviewing a traditional summary

                                          –5–
judgment motion; thus, plaintiff must show there is a “disputed material fact

regarding the jurisdictional issue”); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598,

600 (Tex. 2004) (“A genuine issue of material fact exists if more than a scintilla of

evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element is produced.”). More

than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence allows reasonable and fair-

minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Havner, 953

S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).

       Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over

suits against the State and certain governmental units unless the governmental unit

has consented to suit or immunity has been waived, such as under the Texas Labor

Code. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.254 (providing complainant may bring a civil

action for violation of code after exhausting certain administrative requirements);

Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 763, 770 (“The TCHRA waives immunity, but only

when the plaintiff states a claim for conduct that actually violates the statute.”).4 The

Texas Labor Code prohibits employers, including public hospital districts, from

discriminating against protected employees or retaliating against employees who

engage in protected activities.             TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.002(8)(D) (defining

“[e]mployer”       to    include     a   “state    instrumentality”),       21.051      (prohibiting

   4
      Case law continues to refer to violations of the Texas Labor Code as violations of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act or TCHRA for short. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Flores, 555 S.W.3d
656, 661 n.1 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). However, the legislature abolished the Texas Commission
on Human Rights and transferred its powers and duties to the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights
Division in 2003. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.0015; Flores, 555 S.W.3d at 661 n.1.
                                                  –6–
discrimination), 21.055 (prohibiting retaliation); Holloway v. Dall. Cnty. Hosp.

Dist., No. 05-20-01114-CV, 2022 WL 17883799, at *10 n.5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Dec. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Public hospital districts like Parkland are state

instrumentalities and subject to claims under the Texas Labor Code.”). Because one

of the purposes of the Texas Labor Code is to execute the policies of the ADA and

its amendments, we consider federal cases as well as Texas cases when deciding

employment discrimination issues. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001(3); City of Hous. v.

Proler, 437 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. 2014).

                 Parkland’s Objections to Kowalski’s Evidence

      Before we reach the question of whether the trial court erred in denying

Parkland’s plea as to Kowalski’s claims for disability discrimination and retaliation,

we must decide Parkland’s first issue in which it argues that the trial court erred in

overruling its objections to Kowalski’s inadmissible evidence and considering such

evidence when it denied the plea. Parkland specifically challenges the trial court’s

ruling as to twenty-five paragraphs of Kowalski’s fifty-eight paragraph declaration.

Parkland includes a chart in its brief, which provides the language of each paragraph

and the grounds for objection below. On appeal, Parkland argues that Kowalski’s

declaration is self-serving, conflicts with her deposition testimony, and contains

conclusory statements. However, with the exception of one paragraph, Parkland

does not explain how the trial court erred or how the law should have been applied.

                                         –7–
      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, even in a summary judgment

proceeding, for an abuse of discretion. Starwood Mgmt., LLC v. Swaim, 530 S.W.3d

673, 678 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam); Holloway v. Dekkers, 380 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); see also Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161,

163 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (“The same evidentiary standards that apply in trials

also control the admissibility of evidence in summary-judgment proceedings.”). A

trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or without regard to any

guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d

238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). Summary judgment affidavits “shall be made on personal

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall

show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f).

      We take Parkland’s general challenge to the twenty-five paragraphs to raise

an issue as to whether each paragraph was conclusory. “A conclusory statement is

one that does not provide the underlying facts to support the statement.” Holloway,

380 S.W.3d at 323. “Conclusions in an affidavit are insufficient either to support

summary judgment or to raise a fact issue in response to a summary-judgment

motion.” Id. However, as Parkland acknowledges, Kowalski also testified by

deposition, and the trial court included the following language in its order on

Parkland’s objections:

                                       –8–
             By overruling an objection made by Parkland, the Court is not
      thereby finding that it was necessary to rely upon all of the evidence
      presented in order to deny the plea to the jurisdiction and motion for
      summary judgment. Plaintiff Sheri Kowalski provided more than
      sufficient evidence for the Court to deny Parkland’s plea to the
      jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment.

            Additionally, to the extent a statement standing alone might be
      inadmissible as conclusory or an opinion, it may nevertheless be
      considered in context when based upon specific facts upon which the
      statement may be predicated.

Even if we concluded the trial court erred in overruling Parkland’s conclusory

objections, we would not reverse the trial court’s order denying Parkland’s plea to

the jurisdiction on the basis of the evidentiary rulings unless they “probably caused

the rendition of an improper judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). In our review

of Kowalski’s evidence, we did not rely upon these twenty-five challenged

paragraphs to conclude that Kowalski raised a genuine issue of material fact as to

each of her claims against Parkland. Therefore, because this evidence is unnecessary

to support the trial court’s ruling, any error in overruling Parkland’s conclusory

objections could not have resulted in an improper judgment.           See Interstate

Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001) (error in excluding

evidence that is not controlling on material issue dispositive to the case is not

reversible error).

                                        –9–
        Parkland also argues that the trial court erred in overruling Parkland’s hearsay

objection5 to paragraph 44, which provides:

               When I began reporting the discriminatory treatment to Parkland,
        Yolanda Rich, Vice President of Compliance at Parkland, told me I was
        being retaliated against and not to report the discriminatory treatment
        to Parkland’s human resource department, because reporting
        complaints to HR only makes it worse. Ms. Rich’s statement related
        directly to my disability or request for accommodation; it was close in
        time to the adverse employment action of unreasonably escalating the
        matter and treating me differently than others who made the request;
        she has authority over compliance at Parkland; and the statement
        related to the adverse employment action.

Parkland contends that Rich’s statement does not qualify as an opposing party

statement because, even if Rich made the statement, it was not made on behalf of

Parkland and was not made on a matter within the scope of Rich’s employment with

Parkland. We disagree.

        Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted and is generally not admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d), 802. However, a

statement offered against the opposing party that was “made by the party’s agent or

employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed” is

not hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(D). In deciding whether the exclusion applied

to evidence presented by an employee in response to a county’s plea to the

jurisdiction on her discrimination claim, the El Paso Court explained: “[S]tatements,

    5
      Parkland does not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to its objections that the paragraph calls for a
legal conclusion, lacks foundation, and is misleading.
                                                   –10–
such as those by the County’s human resources personnel and by [the employee’s]

supervisors, were made by agents or employees of the County on matters within the

scope of that relationship and while the relationship existed. By rule, they do not

fall within the definition of hearsay.” Cnty. of El Paso v. Aguilar, 600 S.W.3d 62,

79 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).

      Here, Parkland’s highest officer in its HR department (the Executive VP of

OTM) testified in his deposition that telling a compliance officer was one of the

multiple ways an employee could report discrimination and launch an investigation.

Thus, the record demonstrates that comments by the Vice President of Compliance

regarding discriminatory or retaliatory practices were made within the scope of her

employment with Parkland. Whether Rich made the statement on behalf of Parkland

or had the authority to make such a statement to Kowalski “might bear on the

significance of the statements alleged,” but it is “not wholly inadmissible as

hearsay.” Hawxhurst v. Austin’s Boat Tours, No. 08-19-00257-CV, 2020 WL

5094673, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Parkland’s objection to

paragraph 44 of Kowalski’s declaration. Furthermore, Kowalski testified in her

deposition without objection that she talked to Rich about the situation and Rich

believed, based on everything Kowalski told her, that Parkland had retaliated against

Kowalski. Rich also cautioned her that, based on what she had seen at Parkland,

reporting anything to human resources only made things worse. Thus, even if we

                                        –11–
disregarded this paragraph of Kowalski’s declaration, she generally testified to the

same information in her deposition.

      Finally, to the extent that Parkland challenges the trial court’s rulings on

Parkland’s objections to Michael Ballew’s declaration, the issue is inadequately

briefed, and we decline to address it on appeal. Parkland asserts that Ballew’s

declaration is conclusory twice in its brief but offers no legal argument as to why or

as to which paragraphs of Ballew’s declaration its argument applies. In its reply

brief, Parkland implies that Ballew’s declaration does not amount to competent

evidence and states it “stands on its objections to Michael Ballew’s declaration” but

again does not set out what those objections were below or offer any legal argument

as to why the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the objections. Without

proper citations to the record or any legal analysis, we are left with nothing to review.

Olsen v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 347 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2011, pet. denied).

      In sum, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by

overruling Parkland’s objections to Kowalski’s evidence. Parkland’s first issue is

overruled.

                 Kowalski’s Claim for Disability Discrimination

      The Texas Labor Code prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise

discriminating against an employee because of the employee’s “race, color,

disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051. Because

                                         –12–
direct evidence of discrimination is rare, claims often proceed on indirect or

circumstantial evidence. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. All elements of a

circumstantial-evidence discrimination claim are jurisdictional facts for which the

employee must raise a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat the

governmental employer’s plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 783–85. When evaluating

whether the employee has established discrimination based on circumstantial

evidence, Texas courts follow the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. at 782. The Texas Supreme Court

has explained the three-part framework as follows:

      If the employee can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a
      rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, which can alone
      sustain a discrimination claim. But the employer can defeat this
      presumption merely by producing evidence of a legitimate,
      nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed employment action. Once
      rebutted, the presumption disappears, and an employee lacking direct
      evidence cannot prove a statutory violation without evidence that the
      employer’s stated reason is false and a pretext for discrimination. In
      both direct- and circumstantial-evidence cases, the burden of
      persuasion remains at all times with the employee.

Id. (internal footnotes and citations omitted).

      To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must

show (1) she has a disability; (2) she is qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered

an adverse employment decision because of her disability. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 61 (Tex. 2021). “Disability” is defined as “a mental or

physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity of that

                                          –13–
individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an

impairment.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.002(6).

      “Major life activity” includes, but is not limited to, caring for oneself,
      performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
      standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
      concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. The term also
      includes the operation of a major bodily function, including, but not
      limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, and
      digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory,
      endocrine, and reproductive functions.

Id. § 21.002(11-a). The Texas Legislature amended the Texas Labor Code in 2009

to align with the ADAAA passed by Congress in 2008. Flores, 555 S.W.3d at 663.

As such, the code now instructs that the term “disability” “shall be construed in favor

of broad coverage of individuals.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.0021(a)(1). The definition

of “regarded as having such an impairment” was also added and makes clear that an

impairment is not restricted to one that limits major life activities:

      “Regarded as having such an impairment” means subjected to an action
      prohibited under Subchapter B [Unlawful Employment Practices] or C
      [Application; Exceptions] because of an actual or perceived physical or
      mental impairment, other than an impairment that is minor and is
      expected to last or actually lasts less than six months, regardless of
      whether the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
      activity.

TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.002(12-a) (internal footnote and citation omitted); see also

Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 446–47 (5th Cir. Jan. 18,

2018) (unpublished opinion) (explaining how Congress amended ADA to broaden

its protections and that amended regarded-as definition, which is substantively the

                                         –14–
same as the new definition in the Texas Labor Code, does not require a plaintiff to

show that the actual or perceived impairment limits a major life activity); Burton v.

Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2015) (ADAAA

overruled prior authority requiring plaintiff to show employer regarded her as being

substantially limited in a major life activity).

      Parkland argues that there is no evidence from which a reasonable and fair-

minded jury could conclude that Kowalski was disabled because she admitted she

did not consider herself as being disabled until she spoke with her attorneys who

changed her understanding of the meaning of disability, she presented no evidence

that she had a substantially limiting impairment, and she presented no evidence that

an impairment limited a major life activity. Parkland also argues that there is no

evidence of any record of a disability because the only medical evidence in the

record is from Kowalski’s chiropractor who determined that Kowalski was not

disabled. Lastly, Parkland contends that it could not have regarded her as disabled

because she repeatedly told Parkland that she was not disabled and was not making

an ADA complaint or request for an accommodation under the ADA or ADAAA.

      The cases Parkland relies on to support its argument that it conclusively

established Kowalski did not have a disability are all pre-2009 cases. As to the

“regarded-as” section of the disability definition, Parkland mistakenly argues that

Kowalski had to raise evidence showing that Parkland “regarded her to be suffering

from an impairment within the meaning of the TCHRA such that it substantially

                                          –15–
limited one or more major life activities” even though the definition of “regarded as

having such an impairment” expressly states “regardless of whether the impairment

limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.002(12-

a). Thus, Parkland relied on a standard that the amendments expressly rejected in

arguing that Kowalski did not have a disability. See Williams, 717 F. App’x at 447;

Burton, 798 F.3d at 230. As such, we disagree that Parkland conclusively negated

the disability element or that Kowalski failed to raise a fact question as to whether

she had a disability under the amended statute.

      The evidence shows that, when Kowalski requested a keyboard and mouse

tray, she was rerouted to OTM, Occupational Health, and CareWorks to file a formal

accommodation     request   and    follow   Parkland’s   policies   for   reasonable

accommodations under the ADA and ADAAA, including participating in an

ongoing dialogue with the appropriate Parkland representatives to determine a

reasonable accommodation and providing medical documentation supporting the

accommodation. Thus, there is evidence that Parkland regarded her as having an

impairment and directed her to follow Parkland’s ADA policies in order to receive

an accommodation for her impairment.

      Furthermore, despite the fact that Kowalski’s chiropractor indicated that

Kowalski did not have a physical or mental impairment as recognized under the

ADA, had no limitation on major life activities, and had no limitation in her ability

to perform the essential functions of her job, her chiropractor also indicated that

                                       –16–
Kowalski needed a permanent ergonomic/equipment accommodation to reduce neck

and upper back strain so that Kowalski could work more comfortably. Kowalski

testified at her deposition that her constant neck and back pain was a physical

impairment that limited her ability to drive and type at a computer all day (work)

without pain. Moreover, after CareWorks received Kowalski’s accommodation

paperwork, a nurse who processed Parkland’s ADAAA requests responded to

Kowalski (although by that time Kowalski’s position had already been eliminated)

and told her that, according to her paperwork, “[i]t appears you do have a condition

that affects major life activities so the answer would be ‘yes’ you have an

impairment, and the diagnosis would be neck and upper back strain.” CareWorks

also emailed Kowalski’s chiropractor explaining that in order to get the

accommodation, she would need to check “yes” that Kowalski does have an

impairment and include her diagnosis and treatment on the form.

       Therefore, we conclude that Kowalski presented more than a scintilla of

evidence that she had a disability as defined under the Texas Labor Code.

      Parkland does not challenge whether Kowalski was qualified for her position

as Director of Finance or that its elimination of Kowalski’s position amounts to a

material adverse employment action. See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 788–89

(“Termination is unquestionably a materially adverse employment action.”).

Parkland does, however, argue that Kowalski failed to establish that her position was

eliminated because of her disability.

                                        –17–
      To establish this causal nexus a plaintiff is not required to provide evidence

that she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than

non-disabled employees, although those are ways an employee can show

discrimination. E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 695–97 (5th Cir. 2014);

Leffel v. Valley Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 792–94 (7th Cir. 1997). She simply must

show that she was terminated because of her disability. LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 696.

Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, “[t]he ultimate burden

of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against

the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Thus, for purposes of this opinion, we will

determine whether Kowalski satisfied her ultimate burden to present some evidence

she was eliminated “because of” her disability under the third step in the McDonnell

Douglas framework instead of performing a separate analysis here. See Leffel, 113

F.3d at 793–94 (setting out the causation element as requiring proof that the

circumstances surrounding the employee’s discharge “indicate that it is more likely

than not that her disability was the reason for [the] adverse actions” and explaining

that “the nature of the proof giving rise to the requisite inference of discrimination

cannot be reduced to a formula that will serve any and all discrimination cases”).

      Under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we look to

whether the employer defeated the presumption of discrimination by coming

forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

                                        –18–
action. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. It is undisputed that Parkland produced

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action through its

Chief Financial Officer’s testimony that he created the new Controller position and

eliminated Kowalski’s position to reduce redundancy in job duties and increase

efficiency in the finance department. Therefore, we turn to the third step in the

McDonnell Douglas framework.

      Under the third step, Kowalski was required to present evidence that

Parkland’s stated reason for eliminating her position was false and a pretext for

discrimination. Id. at 782–84. To do so, Kowalski’s evidence must raise a fact issue

on the issue of discriminatory intent. Id. at 783, 785. This Court has explained that

“[t]o demonstrate the employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment

action was pretextual and discrimination was the real cause . . . , a plaintiff only need

‘show that discrimination was a motivating factor’ in the adverse employment

action.” City of Dall. v. Siaw-Afriyie, No. 05-19-00244-CV, 2020 WL 5834335, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal citations omitted).

      We conclude Kowalski satisfied her burden to raise a fact question as to

pretext. To prove that an employer’s proffered reason for the adverse employment

action is a pretext for discrimination, an employee can show that the explanation is

“false or ‘unworthy of credence,’” or that the employee is “‘clearly better qualified’

than the person selected for the position.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling

Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal footnotes and citations

                                         –19–
omitted). Richard Humphrey, Parkland’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), testified

that he was hired in August 2017 and immediately began considering a long-term

restructuring process.    Humphrey’s first priority was replacing Putz with a

permanent SVP Finance. To do that, he envisioned three options: (1) replace Putz

but upgrade the position by increasing the responsibilities, moving more functions

to report to that position, and grooming that person to become his possible successor;

(2) downgrade the SVP Finance position to a senior or executive level director and

move other functions to another direct-reporting structure; or (3) hire a permanent

SVP Finance but not immediately incorporate any restructuring. Even with these

options, Humphrey had concerns about the redundancy and inefficiency of the

multilevel reporting structure and believed that the Director of Accounting or the

Senior Director of Finance, Kowalski’s position, would also need to be restructured.

      Humphrey decided to proceed with the first option and posted the SVP

Finance position on October 2, 2017. As of late December 2017, or early January

2018, Parkland had been unable to hire someone to replace Putz, so Humphrey

decided to pursue the second option. The job description for the Controller position

was written on January 17, 2018, and the proposed restructuring—eliminating

Kowalski’s position and creating the new Controller position—was approved by the

CEO on January 19, the same day Kowalski was told her position had been

eliminated. The evidence shows that Parkland representatives were not certain as to

when the Controller position was posted, but Kowalski testified it was not posted

                                        –20–
until Saturday, January 20, the day after she was escorted out of the building.

Regardless of when the job became available, it is undisputed that neither Humphrey

nor Putz told her about the restructuring, talked with her about the possibility of

moving to the new Controller position, or even encouraged her to apply for it.

      Parkland maintains that Humphrey had decided to restructure the finance

department and eliminate Kowalski’s position before she ever requested the

keyboard and mouse tray, but the evidence does not indicate he decided to eliminate

Kowalski’s position until January, when he decided to move forward with the second

restructuring option and create the Controller position. On December 29, before he

made that decision, Putz emailed him and alerted him that Kowalski put in a request

for a workspace configuration for neck and back issues and that her neck and back

issues were pre-existing.

      Additionally, the evidence does not show that the Controller position was

actually a downgraded position of the SVP Finance position as Humphrey testified.

The new organizational chart attached to Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction includes

a SVP Finance position and the new Controller position. And, the evidence shows

that Putz remained the SVP of Finance until June 29, 2018. Thus, it was not until

almost July, five months after Kowalski’s position had been eliminated, that the SVP

Finance position was eliminated, which was the position Humphrey was primarily

focused on when restructuring the department.

                                       –21–
      Parkland representatives testified that Kowalski was not eliminated for

performance reasons, and Humphrey even testified that he was looking for Kowalski

to apply for the Controller position. However, he also testified that he had limited

interactions with her, she seemed unengaged in meetings, he was concerned about

her initiative, nothing sparked his interest in moving her to an expanded role, and he

had no idea about her qualifications or education. “An employer’s inconsistent

explanations for an employment decision ‘cast doubt’ on the truthfulness of those

explanations.” Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2017).

      Instead of discussing the position with Kowalski, Humphrey invited a

candidate who applied for the SVP Finance position in December 2017, but was not

qualified for that position, to apply for the Controller position. In response to an

interrogatory, Parkland answered, “In January, Mr. Humphrey decided to hire Ms.

Lee into a lower-level position as the Controller, so that she could grow into the SVP

Finance position.” Thus, the evidence shows that it would have been futile for

Kowalski to apply since Humphrey had already decided who to place in the new

position before Kowalski’s employment with Parkland ended.

      The evidence also shows that Kowalski talked with the VP of Revenue Cycle

about coming on board in Patient Financial Services, but he decided not to bring her

on board after talking with Humphrey. This evidence, along with Humphrey’s

knowledge of Kowalski’s disability and his shifting and inconsistent explanations

                                        –22–
regarding Kowalski and the Controller position, create a fact issue as to whether

Humphrey’s reason for Kowalski’s elimination is credible.

      In addition, several Parkland employees, including those in upper

management, agreed that Kowalski was qualified for the Controller position.

Although Parkland disputes it, we conclude that Kowalski presented some evidence

that she was “clearly better qualified” than the person Parkland hired for the

Controller position. See Burrell, 482 F.3d at 412. Kowalski was a Certified Public

Accountant (CPA), a mandatory requirement for her position as Director of Finance

but listed only as “preferred” for the newly created Controller position even though

it was structured to be a level higher than the Director of Finance position. The

person Humphrey preselected for the Controller position did not have a CPA license.

At the time of her job elimination, she was handling responsibilities that went above

and beyond her job description and caught several errors in the department. Being

a current employee of Parkland at the time of the restructuring also gave Kowalski

significantly more experience in, and knowledge of, Parkland’s policies and

procedures as compared to hiring a person outside of Parkland. The evidence also

showed that, after the restructure, Parkland had to hire another person to handle some

of the duties and responsibilities that Kowalski was doing before she was eliminated.

      Although not direct evidence that Parkland discriminated against Kowalski

specifically, Ballew’s testimony that Parkland had a pattern and practice of

discrimination lends support to Kowalski’s claim that Parkland’s reason for

                                        –23–
terminating was pretext for discrimination. Ballew is the former Director of Patient

Financial Services at Parkland. He worked at Parkland for eighteen years, and his

last day of employment was June 13, 2019. Ballew’s testimony on this issue is as

follows:

         6. I personally observed that Parkland’s pattern and regular practice
      was to make false statements and claims about persons with medical
      conditions in an effort to justify terminations. I regularly attended
      meetings in which this was the express discussion of senior vice
      presidents, directors, managers, and supervisors. Parkland regularly
      terminated employees because of medical conditions based on pretext
      used to cover up the discrimination. This occurred for years, up to and
      including the time that Ms. Kowalski was terminated.

      ....

          8. I personally observed employees terminated from medical
      conditions and retaliated against if they complained. I personally heard
      managers say that they were terminating employees because of medical
      conditions and because the employees complained about being treated
      differently because of a medical condition. At least 10 to 15 employees
      who criticized and complained to management were later fired.

         9. It is part of Parkland’s culture to terminate employees under the
      pretense of a “reduction in force” those who complained or were
      disabled. It is openly discussed among Parkland employees that this is
      the easiest way to get rid of employees who complained or are disabled.

      Based on the record before us, we conclude that Kowalski presented more

than a scintilla of evidence on each challenged jurisdictional fact of her disability

discrimination claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Parkland’s

plea to the jurisdiction as to Kowalski’s claim for disability discrimination.

                                        –24–
                          Kowalski’s Claim for Retaliation

      The Texas Labor Code also prohibits an employer from retaliating or

discriminating against an employee who “(1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2)

makes or files a charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” TEX. LAB. CODE §

21.055. “A retaliation claim is related to, but distinct from, a discrimination claim,

and one may be viable even when the other is not. Unlike a discrimination claim, a

retaliation claim focuses on the employer’s response to an employee’s protected

activity, such as making a discrimination complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d

at 763–64. Like with discrimination claims, the McDonnell Douglas framework

applies when the employee is seeking to prove a retaliation case with circumstantial

evidence. Id. at 764, 782.

      To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that (1)

she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she experienced a material adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and

the adverse action. Id. at 782. The causation standard for establishing a prima facie

case under the McDonnell Douglas framework “is not onerous and can be satisfied

merely by proving close timing between the protected activity and the adverse

action.” Id.

      Parkland argues that Kowalski failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation because she did not engage in a protected activity as defined by the labor

                                          –25–
code and, even if she did, there is no evidence of a causal link between that protected

activity and her position being eliminated. We first determine whether Kowalski

presented evidence that she engaged in one of the protected activities listed in section

21.055.

      The evidence shows that Kowalski did not file a charge with the EEOC until

after her job was eliminated and she was no longer employed by Parkland.

Therefore, Parkland’s alleged retaliation cannot be in response to her making or

filing a charge with the EEOC. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.055(2). Kowalski also

presented no evidence that she testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing prior to her discharge. See id. § 21.055(4). The two

remaining protected activities are “opposes a discriminatory practice” and “files a

complaint.” See id. § 21.055(1), (3). Although the ADA prohibits retaliation against

simply making an accommodation request, the Texas Labor Code is not so broad.

Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 58–59. The supreme court has explained that, in order for an

accommodation request or complaint to count as protected activity under the Texas

Labor Code, it must have alerted the governmental entity to the plaintiff’s belief that

disability discrimination was at issue. Id. at 59–60. “‘Magic words’ are not required

to invoke the TCHRA’s anti-retaliation protection.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at

786. But the employee must do more than complain of discrimination; her complaint

must indicate that the discrimination was motivated by her disability. See id. at 786–

87.

                                         –26–
      Here, the evidence shows that, on January 5 and 7, 2018, Kowalski

complained to Putz about the process she was having to go through and that Haley

Evans (or Haley King), a Risk Manager who handled worker’s compensation claims

and told Kowalski that she could just request a keyboard tray from facilities, did not

have to go through a similar process. Putz then forwarded Kowalski’s concerns to

Vishal Bhalla, the Director of Client & Talent Experience. On January 8, Bhalla

emailed the Director of Employee Relations and told him that Kowalski was “not

initially looking for disability – now she is being asked to do so” and informed him

that “there seems to be inconsistency between how another employee was treated vs

this one.” Although there is no evidence that Kowalski’s complaint was further

escalated up the chain of command or treated as a complaint of discrimination by

Parkland such that Parkland investigated it, we conclude this evidence is more than

a scintilla to raise a fact question as to whether Kowalski was engaged in a protected

activity. Her complaint essentially claimed that she was being regarded as disabled

when she was not and that she was being forced to go through a more extensive

process to obtain a keyboard tray than others who had similar medical issues.

      The timeline of Kowalski’s complaint to management on January 5 and 7 and

thereafter being eliminated on January 19 also satisfies her burden to establish prima

facie evidence of a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.

See id. at 782 (burden to establish prima facie evidence of causation element can be

satisfied by proving close timing between protected activity and adverse action). We

                                        –27–
acknowledge that “[c]arrying out a previously planned employment decision is no

evidence of causation” even at the prima-facie stage. Id. at 790. However, as

discussed above, Parkland’s evidence does not conclusively establish that

Humphrey made the decision to eliminate Kowalski’s position before she made a

disability discrimination complaint. Instead, the evidence shows that Humphrey’s

main concern was replacing Putz, an interim executive, with a permanent employee.

Humphrey first decided to replace Putz with another SVP of Finance but was unable

to fulfill that position. He then decided to pursue his second option, which was to

create the Controller position. The goal in creating that position was still to replace

Putz; however, the Controller position did not immediately replace Putz as she

remained interim SVP until June, five months after the Controller position was

posted. Additionally, Humphrey testified that he was considering eliminating one

of two positions, but the record does not show that he chose Kowalski’s position

until sometime in January 2018, after Putz alerted him to Kowalski’s request for a

keyboard and characterized her pain as preexisting and after Kowalski complained

to management about how she was being treated.

      As discussed above in relation to Kowalski’s discrimination claim, Parkland

presented evidence that it eliminated Kowalski’s position due to a reduction in force

and not because it retaliated against her. Therefore, Parkland’s evidence defeated

any presumption of retaliation, and Kowalski was required to come forward with

some evidence raising a fact issue on retaliatory intent in order to survive Parkland’s

                                        –28–
jurisdictional plea to her retaliation claim. Id. at 764. Under this third part of the

McDonnell Douglas framework, “the employee must prove the adverse action would

not have occurred ‘but for’ the protected activity.” Id. at 782–83, 790 (applying

“but-for” standard because parties advocated it should apply); see also Siaw-Afriyie,

2020 WL 5834335, at *6 (“Until the supreme court requires otherwise, we follow

our own precedent and evaluate TCHRA retaliation claims under a but-for causation

standard.”).

      In evaluating but-for causation evidence in retaliation cases, we
      examine all of the circumstances, including temporal proximity
      between the protected activity and the adverse action, knowledge of the
      protected activity, expression of a negative attitude toward the
      employee’s protected activity, failure to adhere to relevant established
      company policies, discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly
      situated employees, and evidence the employer’s stated reason is false.

Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 790.

      Here, the evidence shows that the temporal proximity—14 days—between the

protected activity (January 5) and the adverse action (January 19) was “very close.”

See id. (“Temporal proximity is relevant to [but-for] causation when it is ‘very

close.’”). Additionally, although Parkland argues that the procedure Kowalski was

required to complete was the procedure required for all workspace accommodations,

the evidence shows that many of those involved in trying to help Kowalski receive

a keyboard and mouse tray did not know Parkland’s protocol. It was not until the

request reached the Director of Employee Relations in OTM that Kowalski was

directed to contact CareWorks regarding her “reasonable accommodation

                                        –29–
complaint.” Furthermore, at least three other employees had submitted a request for

a keyboard tray and, after Occupational Health performed an ergonomic evaluation,

they each received a keyboard tray within a couple weeks of their request. Unlike

Kowalski, they were not required to submit ADA accommodation forms or be seen

by a physician.

      This evidence shows that Parkland did not consistently apply the same process

in order to accommodate an employee’s need for ergonomic evaluation and

workspace reconfiguration due to some sort of pain or discomfort while working at

his or her desk. Moreover, Jim Dunn, the Executive VP of OTM at the time,

reviewed the emails regarding Kowalski’s request for a keyboard and mouse tray

and testified in his deposition that it looked like it was a miscommunication that

blew up to something bigger and it seemed to him that it was something that could

have been resolved very quickly.

      As set out above in our discussion regarding Kowalski’s discrimination claim,

there is also evidence that shows Humphrey’s proffered reason for eliminating

Kowalski’s position was false. Additionally, Kowalski testified that she explained

her situation to Rich who was the VP of Compliance. According to Kowalski, Rich

told her that she was being retaliated against and that reporting the discriminatory

treatment to Parkland’s human resource department only makes things worse. In

addition to Ballew’s statements in his declaration set out above describing

Parkland’s pattern and practice of eliminating employees’ jobs when they suffered

                                       –30–
from a medical condition or disability and complained about the way they were being

treated, Ballew testified to the following in his deposition:

      You don’t - - at Parkland, you don’t report on leadership, or you get - -
      you get rifted. If - - if you create an issue with leadership at Parkland,
      then you’re basically signing your own death warrant, because it’s only
      a matter of time before they eliminate your position, and you’re gone.
      So if - - if you value your position, you know, if you have a family to
      feed, if you’re relying upon income and insurance, you don’t do that.
      And that’s always been the case my entire 18-year career at Parkland.
      That is the culture.

He also testified in his declaration that “[i]f Parkland did not want to retaliate against

someone, the regular practice when positions were being repurposed was to give the

person affected prior notice and allow them the opportunity, and even request them

to stay in the repurposed position.”

      Based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented, we conclude

that Kowalski carried her burden to produce some controverting evidence of a

retaliatory motive for the elimination of her position and, therefore, the trial court

properly denied Parkland’s plea to the jurisdiction with respect to Kowalski’s claim

for unlawful retaliation under section 21.055. Parkland’s second issue is overruled.

                                       Conclusion

      Kowalski presented more than a scintilla of evidence of each challenged

jurisdictional fact as to her claims for disability discrimination and retaliation.

Therefore, having overruled Parkland’s issue challenging the trial court’s rulings on

its evidentiary objections and concluding that Kowalski satisfied her burden of proof

                                          –31–
at this stage of the litigation, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Parkland’s

plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment.

                                           /Craig Smith/
                                           CRAIG SMITH
                                           JUSTICE

Miskel, J. dissenting.

210379F.P05

                                       –32–
                                    S
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

 DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL                         On Appeal from the County Court at
 DISTRICT D/B/A PARKLAND                        Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
 HEALTH AND HOSPITAL                            Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03723-
 SYSTEM, Appellant                              E.
                                                Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
 No. 05-21-00379-CV           V.                Justices Miskel and Kennedy
                                                participating.
 SHERI KOWALSKI, Appellee

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial court
is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee SHERI KOWALSKI recover her costs of this
appeal from appellant DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A
PARKLAND HEALTH AND HOSPITAL SYSTEM.

Judgment entered this 5th day of April 2023.

                                         –33–