Court Opinion

ID: 9382906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 00:00:44.111413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.147054
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40798     Document: 00516692776        Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/28/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                                                        March 28, 2023
                                 No. 21-40798
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                              Clerk

   La’Shadion Shemwell, in his official capacity as a city council member,
   and in his individual capacity as a voter in District 1; Debra Fuller,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                     versus

   City of McKinney, Texas,

                                                          Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:20-CV-687

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         In May 2017, La’Shadion Shemwell was elected to the McKinney City
   Council. But Shemwell’s term was cut short when the voters recalled him in
   November 2020. Shemwell seeks a declaration that McKinney’s voting
   procedures are unlawful. We hold, however, that the case is moot.
Case: 21-40798     Document: 00516692776           Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                    No. 21-40798

                                         I.
                                        A.
          The City of McKinney, Texas is a home-rule municipality governed
   by its City Charter and the McKinney City Council. The Council has seven
   members: a Mayor, two Council Members at Large, and Council Members
   from Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4. McKinney, Tex., Code of
   Ordinances, part I, ch. 3, § 9 [hereinafter McKinney Code]. The four
   District Council Members are elected by single-member districts. And the
   other three seats are voted on by the entire city. All council members serve
   four-year terms. McKinney Code § 9.
          La’Shadion Shemwell (who is Black) was elected in 2017 to represent
   District 1, the only majority-minority District in McKinney. Shemwell
   campaigned to knock down a confederate statue in the town square, made
   public statements accusing McKinney police of arresting him because of his
   race, and declared a “Black State of Emergency” after a 2019 police shooting.
   Shemwell claims his activism “caused friction between [himself], the mayor
   and other council members, all of whom are white,” and motivated those
   same city officials to do everything in their power to recall Shemwell.
          By December 2019, the requisite number of voters petitioned to recall
   Shemwell. The petition was certified on January 7, 2020, and a recall election
   was scheduled for May 2, 2020. But the vote was delayed to November in
   accordance with Governor Abbott’s COVID-19 guidance. On November 3,
   2020, a majority of McKinney voters—and two-thirds of District 1 voters—
   recalled Shemwell. The election was the first and only recall effort in the
   McKinney Council’s more than sixty-year history.
          Shemwell claims that the McKinney recall election procedures violate
   the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
   Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

                                         2
Case: 21-40798       Document: 00516692776            Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                       No. 21-40798

   Specifically, he takes issue with two City Charter amendments that were
   passed in May 2019. First, McKinney voters reduced the number of
   signatures required to initiate a recall election and extended the time to
   collect signatures. McKinney Code § 145. Second, McKinney voters
   clarified that all recall elections would be voted on by all McKinney voters,
   regardless of whether the Council Member on the recall ballot represented a
   single-member district or held an at-large seat. McKinney Code § 146.
                                            B.
           This is the second of two lawsuits Shemwell filed against the City in
   2020. Shemwell filed the first on January 20, 2020, both as a council member
   and in his individual capacity as a District 1 voter. He raised substantially the
   same claims as he does in the present case and sought injunctive and
   declaratory relief. He voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit on March 13, 2020—
   two months before the initially scheduled May recall election. Soon after
   Shemwell dismissed the suit, the recall election was postponed to November
   2020.
           Then, six months after dismissing his first lawsuit and two months
   before his recall election, Shemwell filed this suit on September 13, 2020. He
   asserts the same claims, this time with an additional plaintiff—Debra Fuller,
   a Latina District 1 voter.1 The City filed its motion to dismiss on October 5,
   2020, and the district court scheduled a hearing on the motion for October
   22, 2020. The court also noted in its Order that Shemwell and Fuller had
   “inexplicably failed to file a motion for a preliminary injunction” and
   instructed plaintiffs to file a preliminary injunction motion on or before
   October 9 if they wanted the court to consider the motion at the October 22

           1
            There was also a third plaintiff—Florine Henry—but she voluntarily dismissed
   her claims on December 9, 2020.

                                            3
Case: 21-40798      Document: 00516692776          Page: 4    Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                    No. 21-40798

   hearing. Shemwell and Fuller never filed the motion. Plaintiffs later clarified
   they were no longer seeking injunctive relief regarding the November 3
   election—only declaratory relief.
          Following the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties traded
   additional briefs on issues raised at the hearing. Then, after the November 3
   recall election, the district court requested supplemental briefing on whether
   Shemwell and Fuller’s claims were moot. On September 27, 2021, the
   district court held the case moot, declined to apply the “capable of repetition,
   yet evading review” exception, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss
   without prejudice.
          Shemwell and Fuller timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
   U.S.C. § 1291. “A district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is reviewed de
   novo, as are legal questions relating to standing and mootness.” Deutsch v.
   Travis Cnty. Shoe Hosp., Inc., 721 F. App’x 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing
   Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 421 (5th
   Cir. 2013)). All well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and “viewed in the
   light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d
   322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013). And “[t]he burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1)
   motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction,” so “the plaintiff
   constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.”
   Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
                                         II.
          The sole issue on appeal is whether the November 2020 recall election
   mooted Shemwell and Fuller’s claim for prospective declaratory relief. We
   (A) explain why the November 2020 election mooted this case. Then we
   (B) hold that Shemwell and Fuller fail to satisfy the “capable of repetition,
   yet evading review” mootness exception.

                                          4
Case: 21-40798         Document: 00516692776               Page: 5      Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                          No. 21-40798

                                                A.
           Our justiciability doctrines—including mootness—are rooted in the
   Constitution. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
   “Under Article III of the Constitution this [c]ourt may only adjudicate
   actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988).
   Accordingly, “[w]hether a case or controversy remains live throughout
   litigation is a jurisdictional matter.” Empower Texans, Inc. v. Geren, 977 F.3d
   367, 369 (5th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Juv. Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936
   (2011) (per curiam). Reframed in the familiar taxonomy of standing and
   ripeness, “this means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have
   suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant
   and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna,
   523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998). Or, as the Court has sometimes articulated the interplay
   among the justiciability doctrines, “standing generally assesses whether [the
   requisite] interest exists at the outset, while the doctrine of mootness
   considers whether it exists throughout the proceedings.” Uzuegbunam v.
   Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021).
           So if a plaintiff’s stake in a lawsuit falls away, so too does our subject-
   matter jurisdiction. Shemwell lost a legally cognizable interest in this case
   when the election ended on November 3, 2020. Even after that date,
   Shemwell continued to request only prospective declaratory relief, but he no
   longer faced an “actual or imminent” injury that could be prospectively
   declared.2 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan v.

           2
             The mootness analysis would be different if Shemwell and Fuller were instead
   asking the district court to invalidate the November 2020 election. “Invalidation of a past
   election can, in some instances, be a viable remedy that will save a claim from mootness
   even if the election has passed.” Lopez v. City of Houston, 617 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2010).
   But invalidation is an “extraordinary remedy” reserved for the most “exceptional

                                                 5
Case: 21-40798         Document: 00516692776              Page: 6       Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                          No. 21-40798

   Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Shemwell—in his official
   capacity—failed to claim or prove that he was likely to run again for
   District 1, win, and face the allegedly unlawful recall provisions. And
   Shemwell and Fuller—in their capacity as voters—failed to claim or prove
   that there was more than a “abstract or hypothetical” possibility that they
   would ever vote in another recall election of a District 1 Council Member.3
   Mississippi State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 545 (5th Cir.
   2008) (quotation omitted). Especially considering that Shemwell’s recall
   election was the first and only recall effort launched in the McKinney
   Council’s more than sixty-year history, the possibility of another District 1
   recall is remote. See Lopez v. City of Houston, 617 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (“[T]his is an event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
   occur at all, which means that the claim is merely abstract or hypothetical,
   and thus too speculative to be fit for judicial review at this time.” (quotation
   omitted)).
           As such, any judgment issued after the recall election would have been
   an impermissible advisory opinion. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S.

   circumstances,” so it is likely inapplicable here, even if Shemwell and Fuller had moved for
   it. Id.
           3
             For the first time on appeal, Shemwell and Fuller assert that “[t]he possibility of
   recalling a single-district city council member would weigh heavily on any Black or Latino
   candidate considering a campaign for city council.” But to the extent that this harm is
   sufficiently concrete, particularized, actual, and imminent to support standing, such claim
   is nowhere in the complaint—which is instead entirely about the dilutive effect of the City’s
   recall provisions. Besides, it is doubtful such vague assertions would support standing
   without, for example, a statement of a Black or Latino District 1 citizen who has been
   dissuaded from running for City Council. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 (“Such ‘some day’
   intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of
   when the ‘some day’ will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury
   that our cases require.”).

                                                6
Case: 21-40798      Document: 00516692776           Page: 7     Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                     No. 21-40798

   277, 287 (2000) (“In [a moot] case, any opinion as to the legality of the
   challenged action would be advisory.”).
                                          B.
          The Supreme Court has recognized a handful of exceptions to
   mootness that apply in “exceptional situations.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17
   (1998). As relevant here, a dispute that would otherwise be moot is saved if
   it is “capable of repetition, yet evad[es] review.” See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v.
   Interstate Com. Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). The exception applies
   when (1) “the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
   prior to cessation or expiration” and (2) “there is a reasonable expectation
   that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”
   Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (quotation
   omitted). Plaintiffs must prove both to overcome mootness. Libertarian Party
   v. Dardenne, 595 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2010). If a court finds that plaintiff
   failed to meet their burden under either prong, it need not address the other.
   E.g., Empower Texans, 977 F.3d 367 (deciding only the first prong).
          The parties focus the bulk of their briefs on prong two, but prong one
   is enough to decide this case. To the extent Shemwell and Fuller’s claims
   evaded review, it was their own doing. That is true for two independently
   sufficient reasons.
          First, Shemwell never included a claim for damages. Damages are a
   form of backwards-looking relief that can prevent a claim from becoming
   moot. See, e.g., 13C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
   Practice and Procedure § 3553 (3d ed., April 2022 update)
   [hereinafter Wright & Miller]; Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009)
   (“[S]ince those who are directly affected by the forfeiture practices might
   bring damages actions, the practices do not ‘evade review.’”); Memphis
   Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (relying on the

                                           7
Case: 21-40798        Document: 00516692776         Page: 8     Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                     No. 21-40798

   availability of a damages claim to avoid addressing the mootness exceptions);
   Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 2020) (same). Shemwell did not
   even attempt to show that he incurred damages based on the City’s allegedly
   unlawful recall.
          Second, plaintiffs repeatedly abandoned their claims for injunctive
   relief—and never pursued expedited relief—between when they first filed
   suit (January 2020) and the recall election (November 2020). It is well settled
   that a party cannot sit on his or her rights and then claim the case evaded
   review. See, e.g., 13C Wright & Miller § 3553.8.2 (“The most obvious
   remedies are interlocutory injunctions, stays, and expedited appeals.”). As
   relevant here, our precedent requires that a plaintiff “diligently use the tools
   it had to get more thorough, even if not complete, review of [its] claim”
   before a court will find that the now-moot claim “evaded review.” Empower
   Texans, 977 F.3d at 371. For example, in Empower Texans Inc. v. Geren,
   plaintiffs were denied media press cards for the 86th Texas Legislative
   Session. 977 F.3d at 368. But because plaintiffs did not file suit until six weeks
   before the end of the session, delayed in seeking a preliminary injunction until
   just eleven days before the end of the session, and never moved for expedited
   review, we held that they could not “complain that the dispute has evaded
   review.” Id. at 370–73. Put simply, “A party seeking to continue litigation
   after time has run out should not be allowed to do so when it failed to use the
   time it had.” Id. at 372. Plaintiffs here so failed and therefore are so barred.
          Appellants claim their lethargy is irrelevant because some precedents
   have suggested the “evading review” prong of the “capable of repetition”
   mootness exception is “easily satisfied” in election cases. E.g., Ctr. for
   Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (“Controversy surrounding election laws . . . is one of the paradigmatic
   circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found that full litigation can
   never be completed before the precise controversy (a particular election) has

                                           8
Case: 21-40798      Document: 00516692776           Page: 9   Date Filed: 03/28/2023

                                    No. 21-40798

   run its course.”); Moore v. Hosemann, 591 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (“Election controversies are paradigmatic examples of cases that cannot be
   fully litigated before the particular controversy expires.”). We disagree.
   While it is true that the timing of elections can create litigation challenges,
   neither our court nor the Supreme Court has ever created a blanket rule for
   election cases. See Empower Texans, 977 F.3d at 370 (“We do not interpret
   [our precedent] to have established a calendar for evading review.”).
          Shemwell and Fuller twice abandoned their claims for injunctive
   relief, never pursued expedited discovery, and declined the district court’s
   sua sponte invitation to consider injunctive relief. Moreover, whereas the
   Empower Texas plaintiffs had a window of less than five months—the
   duration of the 86th Legislative Session—to assert their claims, Shemwell
   and Fuller had ten. Shemwell and Fuller cannot now avoid mootness by
   saying their claims evaded review. “When time is of the essence, a party must
   act like it.” Empower Texans, 977 F.3d at 373.
          AFFIRMED.

                                         9