Court Opinion

ID: 9449161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:59:36.940236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:44.405764
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
The District Court dismissed appellant’s complaint which alleged that appellant’s decedent was killed by a motor vehicle while crossing a street. The only negligence attributed to the District' of Columbia was failure to provide a traffic control device at that intersection. The issue posed is thus not one of fact, but *352one of law, i. e., whether the District’s failure to establish a traffic control device may be raised by a private litigant in a tort action against the District. We hold that issue may not be so raised.
Congress has authorized the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to promulgate such rules and regulations regarding the designation of arterial and boulevard highways and to provide such traffic control devices as “are deemed advisable.”1 Pursuant to the legislative authority the Commissioners have designated certain intersections for the installation of traffic control signals and have provided the hours during the day and night such signals shall operate. The establishment of such a general traffic control plan is essentially legislative in character and is the result of the Commissioners’ exercise of discretion and judgment. To argue that failure to exercise a discretionary authority is negligence serves only to underscore the legislative character of the authority. Whatever defects there may be in the doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability, the doctrine is sound in this context.2 The District of Columbia cannot be held liable when the alleged negligence involved would require a jury to examine the reasonableness of this sort of discretionary quasi-legislative determination made by the Commissioners 3 pursuant to authority vested in them by Congress.
In Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19, at 20-21, 6 S.Ct. 923, at 924, 30 L.Ed. 75 (1886), the Supreme Court stated that “The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopting a general plan of drainage, and determining when and where sewers shall be built, of what size and at what level, are of a quasi judicial nature, involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and large discretion, and depending upon considerations affecting the public health and general convenience throughout an extensive territory; and the exercise of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and adoption of the general plan or system of drainage, is not subject to revision by a court or jury in a private action for not sufficiently draining a particular lot oí land. * * * ”
Appellant next contends that her complaint alleges a claim for relief within the exception to the general rule of municipal immunity with regard to the obligation to keep streets in a safe con*353dition after being put on notice of a defect. See, e. g., Booth v. District of Columbia, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 241 F.2d 437 (1956) and cases cited therein. We cannot agree. The eases relied upon by appellant to support her “street safety” contention all involved physical defects, obstructions or failure to maintain proper lighting. The decision to repair a street after the city has been put on notice is a ministerial as distinguished from a discretionary function.
Affirmed.

. § 40-603 (f), D.C.Cocle Ann. (1961) — “The commissioners may establish and designate arterial and boulevard highways, regulate the speed of vehicles thereon, and provide for the .equipment of any street, road, or highway, with control lights and/or other devices for the regulation of traffic, and make such other regulations with respect to the control of traffic as are deemed advisable.

. Appellant makes a vigorous attack on the doctrine of sovereign immunity citing cases in which various state courts have judicially modified that ancient doctrine. But this jurisdiction, while having some attributes of the states, is governed by Congress and that body in adopting the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1947 consciously excluded the District from its provisions. We must also take notice that as recently as 1960 the District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act, 74 Stat. 519, was enacted making a limited modification of immunity as to the operation of vehicles owned or controlled by the District. While the courts of this jurisdiction no doubt have a certain flexibility in interpreting the existing exceptions to the doctrine, general abolition of the rule as it prevails here is not, in light of this background, something to be undertaken by the judiciary. See Wilson v. District of Columbia, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 179 F.2d 44 (1949); Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 225 F.2d 38 (1955); Calomeris v. District of Columbia, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 226 F.2d 266 (1955); cf. Scull v. District of Columbia, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 104, 250 F.2d 767 (1957); Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 262 F.2d 714 (1958). As we said in Wilson v. District of Columbia, supra, 86 U.S.App.D.C. at 31, 179 F.2d at 47, “Adequate reformation can be achieved only by legislation.” (Quoting Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich.L.Rev. 41, 56).

. This complaint does not present a claim that the municipality installed and then failed to maintain a traffic device at an intersection.