Court Opinion

ID: 9536015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:53:13.259588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:25.525992
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice, Retired,
dissenting.
I concur in the cogent analysis of Justice Cardine regarding the confusion engendered by the instructions given which poorly differentiate, if at all, first-degree murder, Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-101 (Cum.Supp.1992), from second-degree murder, Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-104 (1988).
Additionally, I do not agree with this court’s summary disposition of the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement *769officials to disclose the existence of an eyewitness until the middle of the trial. In the circumstances of this case, where the conduct of the parties at the time and place of death is critical, the testimony of any eyewitness may mean a life-time difference to the surviving participant. In my opinion, the deliberate non-disclosure of the investigatory interviews, which would have revealed the existence of the eyewitness, constitutes a clear due process violation. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
The failure of the prosecution to identify another witness in a timely fashion served justice no better. Under a totality of the circumstance review, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the prosecution’s failure to disclose the existence of the witness denied the accused due process rights. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. The relevant issue was avoidance of an unfair trial. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935).
I particularly object to the use of Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo.1990) for its reanalysis of fundamental United States Supreme Court principles to justify the decision here. See Gale, 792 P.2d at 590, Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Gale was a case where, with reasonable certainty, an innocent man was convicted by a combination of perjury, informal immunity, local community politics, and scapegoating. The decision of this court, in that appeal, provides no benefit to the direction of justice within the Wyoming legal system. The innocent was convicted and the guilty left free of responsibility, in at least two cases, after a decade-long course of criminal conduct. The use of Gale, with its mutative injustice, demonstrates that what happened here is likewise unjustified if Gale is used for a citation of authority.
Failure to fairly and realistically enforce the Brady concepts, which occurred in Gale and is now reoccurring here, can only exacerbate a condition of excused criminality, including perjury, which constitutes a dry rot, if not a facial erosion, of the entire justice delivery system.
Law enforcement officers should never lose a complete list of witnesses gathered at the scene of a crime. The due process violation created by the disappearance of such a document of identification is highlighted when that loss is first revealed to the defense during trial.
Furthermore, I remain concerned about the expanded use of hearsay as a believable evidentiary resource when such testimony can never be subjected to direct cross-examination. The unjustified use of hearsay and greater reliance on extraneous evidence, including bad acts and reputation, take the justice delivery system further from the truth into subjective, non-factual, jury evaluation and decision making processes. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo.1986); Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo.1965).
Consequently, I dissent in the decision to affirm this conviction.