Court Opinion

ID: 9867792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 17:04:24.714304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:52:29.591614
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/26/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                           (Yolo)
                                            ----

 In re the Marriage of JENNIFER and ALAN                               C095193
 SIMONIS.

 JENNIFER SIMONIS,                                          (Super. Ct. No. FL-2015-1273)

                  Respondent,

          v.

 ALAN SIMONIS,

                  Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alpine County, Daniel P.
Maguire, Judge. Affirmed.

        Barth Daly and Thomas W. Barth for Appellant.

      Weintraub Tobin Chediak Coleman Grodin Law Corporation, Brendan J. Begley
and Audrey A. Millemann for Respondent.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of parts I, III, IV, and V of the Discussion.

                                              1
                               SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
       Jennifer and Alan Simonis were married for 27 years and separated in September
2015. For clarity, we will refer to the parties by their first names when referring to them
individually. While married the parties ran a farm where they grew crops, and they
raised cattle.
       Evidence presented at trial suggests Jennifer bore some recordkeeping
responsibility for the farm operations during the parties’ initial period of separation, and
Alan maintains Jennifer was in control of accounting for marital assets for at least a
month after the parties separated. But other than this early period of control over
accounting records, between the date of separation and the date of trial on reserved issues
to divide the community estate approximately five years later, Alan retained control of
the three main non-real estate assets that belonged to the community: cash on hand, crop
income from 2015 crops, and a herd of cattle we and the parties refer to as the TCB Herd.
       In the time during which Alan controlled the assets, he commingled the cattle,
cash, and income with his separate property. Alan also made payments on various
community debts using commingled funds. At trial in 2020, the trial court looked to
long-established precedent regarding the tracing of commingled assets during marriage,
found that Alan had failed to meet his burden to trace his separate property interest in the
cattle or his use of separate property to pay down community debts, and divided the bulk
of the community estate accordingly. The court made no specific order regarding the
value of the cash on hand or the 2015 crop income, but it noted the court’s continuing
jurisdiction over unadjudicated assets and liabilities under Family Code section 2556
(statutory section citations that follow are found in the Family Code unless otherwise
stated) when ruling on posttrial motions.
       On appeal, Alan argues the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied case law
regarding how to characterize the separate and community interests in commingled assets

                                              2
and payments on community debts. He argues that an aggregate tracing analysis—where
the court would total up all cash derived from the three non-real estate assets and
compare that to the total he paid on community debts to identify his separate property
payments on debts without regard to when debts were paid—is an appropriate tracing
analysis here.
       Additionally, Alan argues that the trial court ought to have determined the value of
the non-real estate community assets at the date of separation. He argues that the court
contributed to its own inability to calculate a value for those assets at the date of
separation in how it managed the admission of evidence about the value of community
assets during the trial, be that in its questioning of Alan or in its treatment of possible
documentary evidence in possession of both parties.
       In short, Alan seeks to persuade this court that the trial court should have ignored
precedent regarding the tracing obligations of spouses claiming a separate property
interest in commingled funds and (1) calculated a value of the three community assets at
the date of separation; (2) added those values up; (3) subtracted that total from the total
amount that he paid towards community debts using commingled assets during the parties
period of separation regardless of when those debts were paid and if there were
community assets available to pay some of the debts at the time those debts were paid;
(4) treated that difference as representing the total amount of separate property he paid
towards community debts post separation; and (5) divided the remaining assets of the
community estate relying on that calculation. Additionally, Alan asks this court to find
the trial court abused its discretion in not seeking the admission of evidence during trial
that would support his unprecedented theory for dividing the community estate.
       Finally, Alan argues the trial court committed legal error when it made a
postjudgment order for the release of certain proceeds to Jennifer from Jennifer’s
counsel’s trust account. The proceeds were from the sale of a parcel of real property the
community had owned.

                                               3
       We affirm the judgment and postjudgment order to release funds.

                     FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

       Proceedings Pre-Judgment

       We refer to cattle owned by the parties at the time of separation other than the
TCB Herd as the “Original Herd.” Pursuant to a stipulated order filed November 3, 2015,
Alan was awarded the Original Herd for a price of $722,244, for which he owed Jennifer
$361,122.
       The community property also included real property in Madison, California, which
we refer to as the “505 Property” and real property in Esparto, California, which we refer
to as the “Road 85 Property.”
       At some point in the action, the parties agreed that any debts Alan incurred post
January 1, 2016, would be Alan’s sole responsibility, and any crops planted after January
1, 2016—and any income from them—would be Alan’s separate property and
responsibility.
       On April 17, 2018, the trial court entered an order regarding the distribution of
funds from sale proceeds of the 505 Property. The order outlines various payments and
credits to be awarded to each of the parties. Among the credits identified were credits
Alan would receive from Jennifer because he had used some of his separate income to
make payments on community debts. These credits totaled $642,281. However, the
credits, as well as charges and other items identified in the order, remained “subject to
reallocation as between the parties when the court [held] an evidentiary [hearing] on all
remaining disputed credits/charges/offsets/claims between the parties” at a later date.
       The trial court held a trial on reserved issues in June and July of 2020. Jennifer
was represented by counsel at trial. Alan appeared in pro. per.
       Following the trial, Jennifer’s counsel informed the trial court that the Road 85
Property had sold. The net sale proceeds were $2,086,646.77.

                                             4
       On November 16, 2020, the trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed
statement of decision. Both parties filed objections to the tentative decision. Notably, for
our purposes, Alan, then represented by counsel, argued (1) that the TCB Herd was
distinct from the Original Herd; (2) that the TCB Herd was sold off by “on or about May
18, 2016,” with all proceeds totaling $402,075.58 paid toward the repayment of an
outstanding Tri Counties Bank loan; and (3) that the “total of community debts paid by
[Alan] . . . after separation” exceeded the “total value of community funds received by
[Alan] on or after [the] date of separation, exclusive of the value of the TCB Herd.”
       In December 2020, the parties entered a stipulated order to have the Road 85
Property net sale proceeds held in Jennifer’s counsel’s trust account pending further order
of the court. In April 2021, the trial court presided over a hearing regarding the proposed
statement of decision and other matters. Following the hearing, Jennifer’s counsel
prepared a proposed judgment packet and presented it to Alan’s counsel. Alan’s counsel
objected to language in the proposed judgment that would have released funds from the
sale proceeds to Jennifer upon entry of judgment.
       In a later filing, Alan clarified that his objection was to language that he believed
would release to Jennifer his share of the proceeds from the sale of the Road 85 Property.
Among other reasons stated in his objection, Alan argued that he should be able to use
the funds, at his discretion, as part of a cash deposit to stay the enforcement of the
judgment pending appeal under Code of Civil Procedure sections 917.1, subdivision (b),
995.210, 995.730, and 995.710, subdivision (a).

       Decision and Judgment

       On August 2, 2021, the trial court entered a judgment on the reserved issues. The
judgment contained orders regarding spousal support, the division of property, and the
payment of attorney fees and costs.

                                              5
       In the first amended final statement of decision attached to the judgment, the trial
court began by setting out what it believed was the governing law applicable to
characterizing assets retained and then disposed of by Alan following the parties’
separation.
       The court stated that when community and separate property are commingled,
each type of property will retain its character so long as the components of the
commingled assets can be adequately traced to their community and separate sources.
Citing In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 823, the court identified two
primary tracing methods for tracing commingled property, the “direct tracing” method
and the “family living expense tracing.” “Under the ‘direct tracing’ method, the disputed
asset . . . is traced to the withdrawal of separate property funds from the commingled
account. This method requires specific records reconstructing each separate and
community property deposit, and each separate and community property payment as it
occurs.” (In re Marriage of Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) “Under the ‘family
living expense’ or ‘recapitulation’ method, it is assumed that family living expenses are
paid out of community property funds. [Citations.] Payments may be traced to a
separate property source by showing community income at the time of the payments or
purchase was exhausted by family expense, so that the payments or purchase necessarily
must have been made with separate property funds. (See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778,
783 []; [citation].) The recapitulation must be sufficiently exhaustive to establish not
only that separate property funds were available to make the payments, but that they were
actually used. [Citations.] As with direct tracing, the record must demonstrate that
community income was depleted at the time the particular asset was acquired. (See v.
See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 783; [citation].)” (In re Marriage of Braud, supra,
45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823-824.)
       The trial court observed that without sufficient tracing commingled assets will be
deemed community assets, and it noted the critical duty this evidentiary obligation places

                                             6
on a spouse who wishes to claim as their separate property an asset which has been
commingled with community assets.
       The trial court then applied these standards to make findings on the community or
separate nature of various assets and debt payments at issue in the proceedings.
       For example, the court noted that the Original Herd and TCB Herd had been
physically commingled, and that this had placed a burden on Alan to provide a tracing
analysis to the extent he wanted to claim a portion of the commingled herds was his
separate asset. The court noted that in a response to the trial court’s tentative decision
and proposed statement of decision Alan had offered a tracing analysis in which he
attempted to show that all of the TCB Herd was sold by May 2016 to satisfy a
community debt and that all community property assets he held were “dwarfed” by the
community debts he paid. The court stated, “[t]he upshot of [Alan’s] claim is that he
necessarily used his separate property to pay numerous community obligations, because
the community assets were either already sold to satisfy a community debt (as to the
cattle), or insufficient to meet the community’s debt (as to the cash and farming
proceeds).”
       The court was not persuaded. First, the court found there was insufficient
evidence to fully support Alan’s claim that all the TCB Herd was sold to pay community
debts, implicitly finding there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that no
community proceeds were available from the sale of the TCB Herd to either acquire
additional assets or make payments on community debts. In so doing, the court observed
that (1) no evidence was offered that demonstrated the TCB Herd had, in fact, constituted
a net total of 193 heifers at purchase, as Alan had claimed; (2) there was insufficient
evidence that cattle sold to pay the Tri Counties Bank loan were from the TCB Herd as
opposed to from the Original Herd; and (3) Alan’s tracing analysis of cattle did not
account for 20 heads of cattle Alan had gifted his sons.

                                              7
       Second, the court found fault in Alan’s recapitulation analysis. It observed that a
recapitulation analysis requires proof that the community assets were exhausted at the
time the purchase or payment at issue was made. The court noted that while respondent
might have identified the date the TCB Herd was sold off, he never identified “(much less
proved)” a date when the cash on hand at separation and 2015 crop income were
exhausted.
       With respect to the community debts he paid, Alan did not “systematically analyze
them and show they were made after exhaustion,” which the court stated the law requires.
       The trial court made clear that Alan’s tracing analysis was faulty because rather
than providing a transaction-specific analysis, Alan was seeking credit for all post
separation payments made because “in toto, the community debts he paid exceeded the
community assets he held.” The trial court explained that this type of aggregate analysis
had been rejected in See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at page 782, in which our Supreme
Court had concluded that to demonstrate an asset acquired during marriage was separate
property because it was acquired with separate funds, the party seeking to establish the
separate nature of the acquisition using recapitulation would need to demonstrate
community expenses exceeded community income at the time of acquisition.
       The trial court stated that while See v. See may have applied to the acquisition of
property and in this case the parties are concerned with the payment of community debts,
“the same principle applies.” The trial court stated that, under this requirement of time-
specific analysis, if Alan wished to follow the recapitulation approach, Alan would need
to show that all community property in his possession was exhausted when he paid each
community debt. Observing Alan had not done this, the court concluded his tracing
analysis failed.
       The trial court then made additional findings about specific claims the parties
made as to the nature of assets, funds received postseparation, and payments made on
various debts. These included:

                                             8
• A finding that because Alan had failed to trace whether particular animals
   of the commingled herds were separate or community when sold, all
   proceeds from cattle sales would be treated as community property.
• A finding that the then-current herd of wagyu cattle were community
   property, because Alan had failed to offer a valid tracing analysis to show
   they were purchased with separate property.
   We note that, in his fairly lengthy introduction in which he makes
   numerous representations about the facts demonstrated, the proceedings
   below, and the findings of the trial court without offering a single citation
   to the record, Alan suggests Jennifer’s counsel wrongly argued—and by
   accepting the arguments the trial court wrongly concluded—that the wagyu
   cattle were community property even though they are a different breed of
   cattle than the community TCB Herd, which was made up of angus cattle.
   But the trial court’s conclusion isn’t based on the idea that the herds may
   have mated and produced more cows, it is based on the conclusion that
   Alan commingled community and separate funds and did not provide the
   level of tracing required to show he bought the wagyu cows with his own
   separate property.
• A finding that while Alan had provided some evidence that he had made
   the payments identified in the April 17, 2018, order, he had failed to
   demonstrate he made those payments with his separate property and,
   therefore Alan owed Jennifer $642,280 for unproven credits for
   disbursements made on the sale of the 505 Property.
• A finding that neither party had provided the court with sufficient evidence
   to calculate the amount possibly due to one party or the other from the
   2015 crop income, and since both parties had borne record-keeping

                                  9
               responsibilities regarding those funds at some point, that no order could be
               made to divide those proceeds.
       In its judgment, the court concluded Alan owed Jennifer a combined total of
$1,245,056.26, to be recovered from his share of the proceeds of the sale of the Road 85
Property, with additional amounts owed to the extent the amount would not be covered
by his half of the proceeds. The court ordered all sale proceeds from the Road 85
Property to be held in Jennifer’s attorney’s trust account upon close of escrow until they
cleared, at which point counsel was to release $850,000 to Jennifer from her share of the
net sale proceeds. Remaining proceeds were to be issued to Jennifer upon entry of the
judgment. Additionally, the judgment included an order that stayed the enforcement of
the judgment pending the earlier of Alan filing a notice of appeal or the time to file a
notice of appeal expiring, but it ordered that $193,000 in funds be released to Jennifer
forthwith notwithstanding the stay.

       Alan’s Motions Challenging the Judgment

       On September 14 and 15, 2021, Alan filed a motion for new trial, a motion to
vacate the judgment, and a motion to set aside the judgment and statement of decision.
The court heard and denied all three motions at an October 18, 2021, hearing, during
which it provided an oral statement of its findings, orders, and reasoning, which it
incorporated into its findings and the order after hearing.
       In the ruling, the court addressed challenges Alan had made to the judgment due to
the court’s failure to make findings regarding cash on hand on the date of separation, and
to ascertain the amount of 2015 net crop income. With respect to cash on hand on the
date of separation, the court observed, “[n]o party asked the Court to determine the
amount . . . . And in any event, [Alan] has not shown that there’s sufficient evidence to
make such a finding.” Regarding the 2015 crop income, the court stated, “[t]he parties
did not present the Court with sufficient evidence to calculate the net 2015 crop income.

                                             10
Family Code Section 2556 allows parties to file post trial motions to, quote, ‘obtain
adjudication of any community asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the
judgment.’ ”
       The court also addressed Alan’s arguments that it had improperly rejected his
aggregate tracing analysis. In a well-reasoned analysis, the court ruled, “[Alan] notes that
the Supreme Court case [See v. See] that rejected aggregate tracing analysis arose in the
context of asset commingling during marriage, while this case involves asset
commingling after separation. [¶] This appears to be a novel issue, and neither side has
cited authority regarding the proper procedure for post separation tracing in this context.
However, this Court believes its original conclusion remains correct for two reasons.
       “First, aggregate tracing seems especially inappropriate in the post separation
environment. The holder of the community assets acts as trustee and has a duty to
properly account for the disposition of community assets. That duty is especially
important in the adversarial context arising after separation. It seems incongruous to
lessen the accounting burden after separation.
       “Second, there is insufficient evidentiary records even for an aggregate tracing
analysis as to each of the three community asset classes held by [Alan]: the cattle, cash
on hand, and net crop 2015 income.
       “The Court does agree with [Alan] that the family expense presumption applies,
but it does not change the result because of the evidentiary and legal deficiencies just
noted.”
       On November 2, 2021, Alan filed a notice of appeal challenging the judgment and
the trial court’s rulings on his motions to vacate the judgment.

       Jennifer’s Postjudgment Motion

       On November 4, 2021, Jennifer filed a motion in which she asked the trial court to
interpret the judgment and the parties’ stipulation to deposit Road 85 Property escrow

                                             11
proceeds into Jennifer’s counsel’s trust account, for declaratory relief, and to order
Jennifer’s counsel to release $1,044,646.77 in Road 85 Property sale proceeds from his
trust account to Jennifer.
       According to a declaration filed with the motion, Jennifer’s counsel believed that,
under the judgment, he was required to release the $1,044,646.77 that then remained in
his trust account from the Road 85 Property sale proceeds to Jennifer. However, he had
received communications from Alan’s counsel demanding he release almost all of the
remaining funds to Alan or deposit them with the court as part of an undertaking by Alan
on appeal.
       On February 7, 2022, the court granted Jennifer’s request for an order for her
counsel to release the funds to her. It ordered her counsel to release the funds to her on
March 18, 2022.
       Alan filed a notice of appeal of the February 7, 2022, order on March 4, 2022. On
March 14, 2022, Alan filed a petition for writ of supersedeas seeking to stay the trial
court’s order to release the funds. We denied the petition.

                                        DISCUSSION

                                              I

      Preliminary Matters: Lack of Exhibits; Jennifer’s Request for Judicial Notice

       In his statement of facts, while trying to characterize the parties’ property interests,
and in arguing there is at least a margin of certainty about the income the community
received post separation, Alan frequently cites to trial exhibits. He also argues the trial
court abused its discretion, in part, by (1) failing to properly manage the introduction of
documentary evidence Alan had available at trial, and (2) in allowing Jennifer to
withdraw certain evidence. We do not have the exhibits Alan cites in these statements
and arguments.

                                              12
       In his notice of appeal of the November 2, 2021, decision, Alan elects to proceed
with a clerk’s transcript. In the section of the form notice designating the record where
an appellant identifies exhibits to be included with the clerk’s transcript, Alan listed four
exhibits, Exhibits A-D, which do not include many of the exhibits to which Alan refers in
his briefing, e.g., Exhibits 515(d) and 501.29. According to our records, Alan also did
not file in the superior court a notice designating exhibits to be transmitted to this court
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.224.
       Trial exhibits not transmitted to the court of appeal are not part of the appellate
record, and we do not consider them. (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1438, 1447, fn. 4.)
       Jennifer filed a request for judicial notice, seeking judicial notice of pages from
the benchguide, Handling Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants: Benchguide for
Judicial Officers. Alan did not oppose the request. Judicial notice of the existence of the
guide by this court is permissible under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivisions (b) and
(h), and 459, subdivision (a). We grant the request.
       On September 5, 2023, Alan sought to file two motions to augment the record.
We accepted the motions and grant them.

                                              II

                                 Tracing Property Interests

       Alan argues the trial court applied the wrong analytical framework when assessing
his tracing of community and separate assets, and the use of those assets to satisfy
community debts. He essentially takes the position that in applying the recapitulation
analysis requirements articulated in See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778 and its progeny, the
trial court committed legal error, because the standards articulated in those cases apply to
tracing community property and separate property during marriage, and “substantially
different . . . guiding legal principles” apply in “tracing the exhaustion of community

                                              13
funds during separation to pay community debts.” Specifically, Alan takes issue with the
trial court’s requirement that tracing be done using a “ ‘transaction-by-transaction’ ” or
“ ‘time specific’ ” analysis instead of by aggregating total community assets and total
community expenses post separation and comparing the two. We do not agree with that
argument.

        A.    Standard of Review

       Alan frames his argument as a legal one: he claims the trial court applied
incorrect legal standards for tracing community and separate property during a period of
separation, and that, therefore, the standard of review is de novo. In contrast, Jennifer
argues that trial courts have the discretion to select which tracing methods they employ,
and that we should review the trial courts selection here under an abuse of discretion
standard. We will treat this question as a legal one subject to de novo review.
       “ ‘ “Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their resolution is reviewed
independently.” ’ ” (Dyanlyn Two v. County of Orange (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 800,
808.) Here, Alan is functionally asking us to decide if a rule articulated in case law that
prohibits the use of a specific form of tracing analysis to characterize property acquired
and expended during marriage was properly used by the trial court here to prevent the use
of that tracing analysis in characterizing property acquired and expended during a period
of separation. (See In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 95 [finding that
a wife’s argument on appeal that California law permits only two tracing methods to
overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property
is a legal issue or a mixed issue in which the legal issue predominates and subject to de
novo review].)

        B.    General Principles Regarding the Tracing of Commingled Assets

       “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever
situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is

                                             14
community property.” (§ 760.) Statutory exceptions include property acquired by gift,
bequest or devise, or descent; and rent, issues, or profits from separate property earned
during the marriage. (§ 770.)
       When a married person commingles their separate property with community
property, “the mere commingling of separate property and community property” does not
change the status of the property interests. (In re Marriage of Braud, supra,
45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 822-823.) However, “if the separate property and community
property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective
contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund will be deemed
community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section
760.” (Id. at p. 823.)
       California case law has long held that the community property presumption
applies to property acquired during the marriage from an account or fund in which the
spouse has commingled their separate funds with community funds, but if the funds used
to purchase the property at issue can be traced to separate property the purchased
property will be deemed separate property. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975)14 Cal. 3d 604,
611-612.) The burden of proving separate funds were used to acquire the property—in
order to overcome the community property presumption—is on the spouse asserting the
acquired property’s separate status. (In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d
426, 441.)
       As recognized by the trial court, California courts generally recognize two
methods for tracing separate and community property interests in comingled funds:
“direct tracing” or “family living expense tracing,” which is also called the
“recapitulation” method. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 612; In re
Marriage of Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) “Direct tracing” requires specific
records reconstructing each separate and community property deposit, and each separate
and community property payment as it occurs. (In re Marriage of Braud, at p. 823.) The

                                             15
“recapitulation” method requires showing that community income was exhausted by
family expenses at the time the purchase or payment at issue was made. (Id. at pp. 823-
824.)
        Notably, in See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pages 781, 782-783, our Supreme Court
reversed a trial court judgment that had allowed a husband to claim a separate interest in
all property acquired during the marriage that existed at the time of the divorce on the
grounds “that a proven excess of community expenses over community income during
the marriage establishes that there has been no acquisition of property with community
funds.” That is, the Court rejected a theory that was based on aggregating all income and
all expenses during the marriage in favor of the recapitulation method’s requirement to
demonstrate an exhaustion of community funds by family expenses at the time the
property at issue was acquired. (Id. at p. 783.)
        In In re Marriage of Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at page 96, the court
recognized that strict adherence to either “direct tracing” or “[r]ecapitulation” might not
be the only permissible means for tracing under California law. However, the tracing
methods the court allowed for in Ciprari did involve an expert looking at every
transaction made from commingled funds, and that method credited the community with
securities purchased within individual accounts when community funds were available
within the purchasing accounts at the time the purchases were made. (Id. at pp. 92-93.)
That is, while the method may not have given the community credit for the purchase of a
security when there were no community funds in the purchasing account despite the
existence of community funds in other accounts, the method still relied on detailed
analysis that carefully examined the funds available to acquire an asset in the account
used for that acquisition at the time the acquisition was made.

                                             16
       C.     The Application of Tracing Methods to Calculate Epstein Credits
       In In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84, our Supreme Court
recognized that, “ ‘as a general rule, a spouse who, after separation of the parties, uses
earnings or other separate funds to pay preexisting community obligations should be
reimbursed therefor out of the community property upon dissolution.’ ”
       In In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252,
1281, when it remanded a matter for the purpose of identifying the extent to which
separate property was used to make community payments post separation, the court
discussed the burden a spouse who commingled funds would be under to prove the
separate property nature of payments made on community debts post separation. The
husband and wife in In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252,
1257-1259, had been separated for 12 years by the time there was a trial to divide their
assets, during which time the husband had continued to manage their joint finances and
make payments from funds containing commingled funds. One of the issues on appeal
was whether the trial court had erred in ordering the husband to be reimbursed by the
community for payments he made to benefit the community and the wife after separation.
(Id. at p. 1280.) The wife argued the trial court had improperly relied on the husband’s
expert—who had formed his opinion without knowing if the husband had used his
separate funds to make the payments at issue—to calculate the amount of reimbursement.
(Id. at pp. 1280-1281.) The court of appeal found the wife’s argument had merit,
reversed the trial court’s decision, and remanded the trial court to reconsider. (Id. at
pp. 1280, 1282.)
       In discussing tracing requirements on remand in In re Marriage of Prentis-
Margulis & Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at page 1281, the court of appeal quoted In
re Marriage of Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pages 822-823, for the proposition that
while the mere commingling of property does not alter the nature of property interests, if

                                             17
respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the whole of the commingled
mass will be deemed community property. The court then discussed possible tracing
methods to be used on remand, and stated, “a spouse who has commingled community
and separate funds can defeat the presumption with evidence, employing traditional
family law tracing methods, such as direct tracing or the family expense method of
tracing. (See In re Marriage of Mix[, supra,] 14 Cal.3d [at p.] 612 []; In re Marriage of
Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058–1059 [].) Thus, to obtain reimbursement for
any postseparation payments made from his commingled accounts, [husband] should
employ one of these tracing methods.” (In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis,
supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281-1282.)

       As such, case law supports a finding that similar rules apply to tracing the use of
commingled property both before and after spouses separate. Appropriately detailed
tracing methods include direct tracing and a family expense/recapitulation method (In re
Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281-1282),
and aggregate tracing methods do not satisfy a spouse’s burden for detailed tracing when
claiming a separate property interest (See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 781, 782-783).
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that Alan could not satisfy his tracing
burden simply by showing the total community debts he paid in the five years between
separation and trial exceeded the total community assets he held post separation.

       D.     Alans’s Efforts to Distinguish See v. See Do Not Persuade

       Alan’s attempts to convince us See v. See’s reasoning should not apply in the
postseparation context are unavailing.
       First, he points to language in See that highlights the rights to property held by a
spouse during marriage and presumptions that property acquired during the marriage
belongs to the community, implying the importance of detailed as opposed to aggregate
accounting is diminished once spouses separate. (See See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at

                                             18
pp. 782-783.) But a spouse’s equal interest in a community estate—and in the income
and proceeds obtained from the use of assets in the community estate—does not vanish at
the date of separation. Their interest in making sure their share of the estate is being
fairly accounted for and credited remains equally strong while the other spouse retains
control of community property in the period after they separate and before the courts
enter a judgment dividing the estate. (See In re Marriage of Koppelman (1984)
159 Cal.App.3d 627, 634-635, overruled on other grounds in In re Marriage of Fabian
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 440, fn. 13.) For example, if sales proceeds from the TCB Herd or
2015 crop income were used to pay community debts or to acquire other income
generating assets, Jennifer has an equal interest in credit given for those payments and the
income generated from acquired assets. If Alan was not required to meet his burden to
trace the amount of those proceeds or where they went, it would subject Jennifer to a risk
of losing the benefit of her equal share without sufficient accounting even though Alan
had been the one to control the assets.
       Second, Alan (1) points to language in See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pages 784-
785, regarding the then existence of a presumption that the use of separate property to
pay community expenses was a gift; and (2) notes that in In re Marriage of Smith (1978)
79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746-747, the court concluded that gift presumption should not apply
postseparation. The implication of Alan’s argument is that if the gift presumption is
different postseparation, the tracing burden should be different too. But in the portions
Alan cites of both See and Smith the courts were considering the interaction of the gift
presumption and a rule that a spouse should not be entitled to reimbursement for separate
funds used to pay community costs during marriage absent an agreement. The cited
portions were not regarding how a spouse would need to trace their separate property
interests in commingled funds to prove the amount of reimbursement to which they were
entitled.

                                             19
           Third, Alan suggests that the resulting “failure to provide reimbursement”
following its finding that Alan has failed to satisfy his tracing duty results in the violation
of the court’s duty to order an equal reimbursement of the community estate at
dissolution. But, as demonstrated by the contrast between one of the cases Alan relies on
to support this argument, In re Marriage of Ramsey & Holmes (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th1043, and this one, this argument ignores precedent regarding the nature
of tracing burdens identified in See and its progeny and the impact of a party claiming a
separate stake in commingled funds failing to meet that tracing burden.
           In In re Marriage of Ramsey & Holmes, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at page 1045, a
husband challenged the trial court’s determination of a community interest in the family
home. The husband asserted the court used an incorrect number in calculating the value.
(Ibid.) He alleged the error was caused by his former wife’s failure to submit sufficient
evidence to calculate the correct number. (Ibid.) At trial the husband had not submitted
the evidence because he believed it was the wife’s burden. (Ibid.) As a result, the trial
court had made its determination about the value of the community interest in the home
without detailed evidence regarding the breakdown of certain payments made towards the
home’s mortgage and performed a final calculation using assumed numbers that were
estimated using incomplete information. (See id. at p. 1050 [the trial court stated it had
not received a breakdown of how payments were allocated among “ ‘taxes and interest,
whatever you’re talking about’ ” and was only provided an estimate of the average
monthly mortgage payment, and that it “ ‘went with what it had and that’s all there
is’ ”].)
           On appeal, the husband argued the trial court had used the wrong number and that
its decision must be reversed. (In re Marriage of Ramsey & Holmes, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1050-1051.) The wife argued that the husband had forfeited the
argument by failing to present evidence on the correct numbers. (Id. at p. 1051.) The
court of appeal agreed that the trial court had used incorrect numbers, and then

                                               20
considered the question of forfeiture. (Ibid.) The court of appeal concluded the
appropriate remedy was to reverse and remand with directions. (Id. at p. 1052.) The
court offered three reasons for its disposition. (Ibid.) First, it found forfeiture—as urged
by the wife—inappropriate given husband had pointed to the absence of evidence needed
to establish the correct numbers during trial. (Ibid.) Second, it stated that once it was
established that a “community property interest existed, the family court was obligated to
determine the value of that interest and divide it equally.” (Ibid.) The court observed
that, in this instance, “both spouses had an equal interest in ensuring that the court had
sufficient information with which to fulfill its judicial responsibility.” (Ibid., italics
added.) Finally, the court observed that, given the court’s obligation to identify the
community property interest, the court should have required the parties to submit the
additional evidence it needed when that information was readily available to one of the
parties. (Ibid.) In short, the finding in In re Marriage of Ramsey & Holmes, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th 1043 rested heavily on the fact that both parties had failed in their shared
burden to provide evidence regarding the value of a particular asset.
       In contrast, here precedent has established who has the tracing burden when it
comes to commingled assets, has recognized that sometimes the spouse with that burden
will fail to sufficiently identify separate and community interests, and has stated
commingled assets will be deemed community assets when tracing is insufficient. Here,
it was Alan’s burden to trace separate and community interests in the commingled herds
and the payment of community debts using separate or community funds from
commingled sources. (See In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281; See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 784 [“The husband may
protect his separate property by not commingling community and separate assets and
income. Once he commingles, he assumes the burden of keeping records adequate to
establish the balance of community income and expenditures at the time an asset is
acquired with commingled property”].) Case law has established that “ ‘[I]f the separate

                                               21
property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that
the respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund
will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property
presumption of section 760. [Citation.]’ (In re Marriage of Braud[, supra,]
45 Cal.App.4th [at pp.] 822–823 [].)” (In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis,
supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281, italics added.) Once the trial court found Alan had not
met his tracing burden, it properly treated commingled assets as community assets, and
debt payments from those assets as community payments. (See In re Marriage of Braud,
supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 822-823 [if separate and community interested cannot be
traced in a commingled asset, treat the whole as community].) The trial court then
equally divided assets in the community estate given this proper treatment of assets and
debt payments.
       Finally, citing section 2626, Alan argues courts have “broad discretion to order
reimbursement of separate property used to pay preexisting community obligations
during separation,” and that there are no cases that address the application of the “family
expense presumption” (which is applied in a recapitulation analysis) to determine a
spouse’s right to reimbursement for the payment of community debts during a period of
separation.
       Section 2626 does not support Alan’s characterization of the trial court’s
discretion as “broad” in this context. What the statute says is, “[t]he court has
jurisdiction to order reimbursement in cases it deems appropriate for debts paid after
separation but before trial.” (Italics added.) The words “broad discretion” do not appear
in this unambiguous declaration of a court’s jurisdiction to order reimbursement. “Courts
may not insert words or add provisions to an unambiguous statute. . . . ‘In construing
this, or any, statute, our office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains,
not to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of
it language it does. We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention

                                              22
that does not appear in its language.’ (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th
243, 253 [].)” (Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1172-1173.)
       As to Alan’s arguments regarding a lack of case law regarding the use of the
“family expense presumption,” this statement sweeps too broadly. While it does not
contain an exhaustive analysis, In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at pages 1281-1282, provides it is appropriate to rely on the two
standard tracing mechanisms to ascertain the nature of funds used to pay down
community debts postseparation and pre-trial. Additionally, in In re Marriage of
Koppelman, the court recognized that “[t]he spouse who controls community property
assets occupies a position of trust which is not terminated as to assets remaining in his or
her hands after separation. ‘It is part of his fiduciary duties to account to the wife for the
community property when the spouses are negotiating a property settlement agreement.’
[Citations.] [¶] When a trustee spouse has commingled separate and community funds
and assets so that it is impossible to ascertain and identify each source, the commingled
whole will be presumed to be community property.” (In re Marriage of Koppelman,
supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 634-635.) Together, these cases support a conclusion that
the detailed tracing analyses required of commingled funds should also be applied to the
expenditure of comingled funds postseparation.
       The trial court did not err in finding an aggregate analysis could not meet Alan’s
tracing burden.

                                              III

                         Valuation of Assets at Date of Separation

       Alan argues the court erred in failing to make ultimate findings about the value of
community assets—the cash on hand, the TCB Herd, and the 2015 crop income—at the
date of separation. Alan states that the judgment “in favor of Jennifer” rests, in part, “on
the court’s conclusion that insufficient evidence was presented to reach ultimate findings

                                              23
of fact on the value of the three principal community assets at [the] date of separation, the
TCB herd of cattle, cash on hand, and 2015 . . . crop income.”
       Alan’s argument ignores statutory commands regarding the valuation of
community property and mischaracterizes the trial court’s conclusions.
       Under section 2550, in a dissolution proceeding, “the court shall, either in its
judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the parties,
or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division,
divide the community estate of the parties equally.” Under section 2552 “[f]or the
purpose of division of the community estate upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation of the parties, except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall value the
assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial.” (Italics added.) Under
subdivision (b), “[u]pon 30 days’ notice by the moving party to the other party, the court
for good cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and liabilities at a date
after separation and before trial to accomplish an equal division of the community estate
of the parties in an equitable manner.” Here, there was no motion filed by either party to
value the three community assets at the date of separation.
       Alan’s argument that the court needed to determine the value of the community
property as of the date of separation in order to equally divide the community estate is,
quite simply, contrary to the statutory mandate of section 2552, subdivision (b).
       Additionally, the trial court’s judgment “in favor of Jennifer”—in which it rejected
Alan’s arguments that he used large amounts of separate funds to pay community debts—
does not rest on a finding that there was insufficient evidence about the value of the three
assets on the date of separation. Rather, as detailed above, the trial court’s conclusion
rested on the correct application of judicial precedent regarding a spouse’s duty to trace
separate and community assets that are commingled if that spouse wishes to claim a
portion of the commingled mass as their separate property. The court found Alan had
failed to meet his burden.

                                              24
        The portion of the record Alan cites to support his claim that the trial court’s
award rests on a finding there was insufficient evidence about the value of the cash on
hand, cattle, and crop income at the date of separation does not support his position. In
this portion of the record, where the court recited its ruling on the record as to why it was
denying Alan’s posttrial motions, the court, having stated aggregate tracing seemed
particularly inappropriate in the post separation, said there were “insufficient evidentiary
records even for an aggregate tracing analysis as to each of the three community asset
classes held by [Alan].” In making this statement, the court neither stated that an
aggregate tracing analysis would have been appropriate nor indicated that if it used an
aggregate analysis it would have needed to deviate from section 2552, subdivision (b)’s
requirements and valued those assets at the date of separation as opposed to closer to the
date of trial.
        To the extent Alan’s position is that some ultimate value—be that a value assigned
on the date of separation or based on what the community took in for them—needed to be
assigned to the various assets to divide them equally, the trial court did not shirk this
duty. As to the cattle, having determined the herds were commingled, that Alan could
not trace his separate interests in the commingled herd, and therefore that the entire
commingled herd was community property based on See v. See and its progeny, the trial
court identified proceeds received for the sale of cattle and determined the value of the
remaining herd and divided it. To the extent the court found there was insufficient
evidence to determine the amount of cash on hand and 2015 crop income, in ruling on
Alan’s posttrial motions, it clarified that section 2556 left open a path for the parties to
obtain adjudication of community assets not previously adjudicated in a judgment.
        Alan’s arguments in his reply brief do not help him here.
        First, Alan argues the parties understood the need to define community assets at
the date of separation, citing the April 17, 2018, order and stating the parties had agreed
the income received from the crop in the first quarter of 2016 would be a community

                                              25
asset. But reaching an agreement at to the identity of assets that existed on the date of
separation is not the same as agreeing that the only value those assets might contribute to
the community estate is their value as of the date of separation. Moreover, the citation to
the record Alan makes does not support his position that the parties identified a cutoff
date for the crop income at the end of the first quarter of 2016. That is, the citation does
not support an inference that the parties themselves had agreed the full community value
of the crop income would be realized early in 2016, within six months of separation.
       Second, he argues that the value of the three assets would not have changed much
between the date of separation and trial, that the April 17, 2018, order rested on an
acknowledgment that Jennifer should be credited with her share of the community
property assets in existence at separation, and that those values should not be ignored as
irrelevant to the equal division of the estate. But the April 17, 2018, order provided that
the credits, as well as charges and other items identified in the order, would remain
“subject to reallocation as between the parties when the court [held] an evidentiary
[hearing] on all remaining disputed credits/charges/offsets/claims between the parties” at
a later date. Nothing in the order suggests Jennifer or the trial court was absolving Alan
of his responsibility to keep records of community assets that would enable the court to
trace the actual value those assets contributed to the community estate as sales were
made, income was collected, and debts were paid. Nor does it suggest that the court
would ignore precedent on the characterization and valuation of commingled assets if
Alan failed to meet his tracing burden: once he failed to trace separate and community
property portions of a commingled mass, the whole mass would be treated as a
community asset and that value divided.
       Third, he argues the trial court had a legal duty to render ultimate findings as to
the value of the community assets at separation in order to divide assets equally,
including to award Alan proper credits for separate payments he made on debts. But to
the extent cattle values and debt payments needed to be calculated—be that at the date of

                                             26
separation or later—the court properly evaluated these assets under See and its progeny.
Alan commingled the cattle and funds used to pay debts then failed to provide sufficient
tracing analysis. These assets were, therefore, properly deemed community in nature.
(See In re Marriage of Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 822-823.) To the extent Alan
thinks he should get some credit for assets the court could not divide due to a lack of
sufficient evidence by both parties—e.g., 2015 crop income—the trial court did not
foreclose a future division of that income.
       Fourth, in a trial brief he filed in the trial court, Alan suggests that he notified
Jennifer that he believed “asset values at separation” were an uncontested issue. The trial
brief only states that, “For purposes of dividing property the date of separation of
September 15, 2015[,] be used.” This, quite simply, doesn’t say asset values at the date
of separation were uncontested, nor does the possibility that they were uncontested as of
that date alter the requirements of section 2552. Similarly, Alan’s eleventh-hour
augmentation of the record with Jennifer’s trial briefs does not convince us the court was
required to evaluate assets at the date of separation in contravention of its statutory
duties. In one of his motions to augment the record, Alan suggests the trial briefs
evidence the parties’ “common understanding that the date of separation was the
appropriate point in time when the value of such community assets should be
established.” To begin trial briefs are not evidence or stipulations by parties. Second, the
language in Jennifer’s trial briefs that Alan points to more accurately reflect that Jennifer
understood the valuation could be more accurately calculated closer to the date of trial.
For example, in making a proposed valuation of crop income, she looks at post-
separation earnings in 2015 and 2016.
       Finally, Alan suggests we cannot consider the import of section 2552’s dictates to
value assets and liabilities “as near as practicable to the time of trial,” because Jennifer
has raised the requirement for the first time on appeal, and “the consistent facts and
procedure employed by the parties and the Superior Court have shown the stipulation of

                                              27
the parties and concurrence of the Superior Court to identify separation date values of
community property assets existing at that time.” As we find with respect to the first,
second, and third points on this issue in Alan’s Reply that we address, we find Alan’s
suggestion that the court and parties somehow agreed to value the community assets as of
the date of separation to be inaccurate based on the record before us. Additionally, to the
extent Alan implies we cannot consider the requirements of section 2552 because
Jennifer did not raise them below, we note, “it is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden
is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609, italics added.) Even if Jennifer had
made no argument as to the import of section 2552, we would not be required to ignore
section 2552 here, and we would not absolve Alan of his burden to demonstrate why it
should not apply here.

                                             IV

                                  Conduct of Proceedings

       Alan raises concerns about how the trial court conducted the trial both in terms of
how it sought testimony and documentary evidence from him, and in terms of evidence it
did not require Jennifer to submit. He argues that these purported “abuses of discretion”
caused the court to be unable to “render ultimate findings about the value of community
assets at separation.” The argument has no merit.
       Alan’s burden in arguing that the trial court abused its discretion is high. “A
reviewing court should not disturb the exercise of a trial court’s discretion unless it
appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice. . . . ‘Discretion is abused whenever,
in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered. The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of

                                             28
discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a
miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest
the trial court of its discretionary power.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 566.)
       Alan argues the trial court’s procedure for obtaining evidence from him was an
abuse of discretion. This argument has two primary aspects. First, Alan argues the court
violated its legal duty to ensure that evidence of the value of community assets at the date
of separation was introduced when it asked Alan questions. Above, we concluded the
trial court was not required to make findings about the value of the community property
on the date of separation. Thus, this argument fails.
       Second, Alan argues the trial court did not properly manage the introduction of
exhibits at trial, arguing there is no explanation for why a series of exhibits were skipped,
and stating confusion “misled [Alan] to believe that he had evidence in the record on
important issues in the case.” But we do not have copies of most of the exhibits to which
he refers, admitted or otherwise. Without them, we lack the ability to truly assess if their
exclusion from evidence caused a miscarriage of justice that would justify us finding an
abuse of discretion and reversing the judgment. (See Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County
of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 291 [“Where exhibits are missing we will not
presume they would undermine the judgment”].)
       Alan’s arguments regarding Jennifer’s introduction—or nonintroduction of
evidence—are similar to his arguments regarding the court’s questioning of him and its
admission of documents he provided. They fail for similar reasons. First, Alan argues
Jennifer did not offer evidence of the value of cash or other assets of the community
estate at the date of separation, thereby “preventing proof that financial assets at
separation were minimal.” But the court was not required to make a valuation of the
community assets on the date of separation. Moreover, to the extent a value could be
attributed to these assets based on the amount they eventually brought to the community:

                                             29
(1) the court did value the noncash assets (cattle) and proceeds from their sale, treating
the herds as a commingled asset based on the fact Alan commingled them and failed to
meet his burden to trace his separate property interest; and (2) the trial court refrained
from making specific findings regarding assets for which it determined both parties had
failed to present sufficient evidence and noted its continuing jurisdiction regarding those
items under section 2556.

                                              V

                                      Release of Funds

       Alan argues the trial court committed legal error by including the order for the
release of what he believes was his share of the sale proceeds from the Road 85 Property
to Jennifer in the judgment, and that it committed further error in ordering a release of
those funds while this appeal was pending in response to Jennifer’s posttrial motion.
       Alan’s argument is that the trial court’s authority to act on matters pending appeal
was circumscribed by section 290 and Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision
(a), and that an order releasing funds to Jennifer was in excess of that authority. This
argument is based on an incomplete analysis of the applicable codes and the nature of
Alan’s interest in the funds, and we are not persuaded the trial court erred.
       Section 290 allows trial courts to enforce judgments made under the Family Code
and subjects the trial court’s discretion in the enforcement of judgments to the dictates of
general statutes governing the enforcement of judgments—i.e. to provisions contained in
the Code of Civil Procedure. Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a),
provides that proceedings in the trial court are stayed pending appeal, however, it carves
out some exceptions to the stay, “as provided in Sections 917.1 to 917.9, inclusive.”
       Under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.1, subdivision (a)(1), “[u]nless an
undertaking is given, the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the
judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for . . . [¶] [m]oney or the

                                             30
payment of money, whether consisting of a special fund or not, and whether payable by
the appellant or another party to the action.” (Italics added.) Here, Alan has made no
argument that the judgment involves anything other than the payment of money to
Jennifer. Nor does he make a legally supported argument that the trial court ought to
have allowed him to use the portion of proceeds he believed he should have been entitled
to, to fund a deposit under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710.
      We find no error in the trial court’s order to release funds.

                                      DISPOSITION
      We affirm the judgment and the trial court’s postjudgment orders.

                                                 HULL, J.

We concur:

EARL, P. J.

RENNER, J.

                                            31