Court Opinion

ID: 9850153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:46.029961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.467553
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, P. J.,
dissenting.
Defendant used a gun in the commission of two robberies and a rape. The court imposed consecutive five-year mandatory minimum terms of confinement on each charge pursuant to ORS 161.610(5). The majority holds that the trial court could lawfully impose only one minimum term for the series of crimes. I disagree and therefore dissent.
Although lurking in the background of the majority’s reasoning there may be considerations of constitutional fairness and proportionality, there is no constitutional issue raised in this case. Resolution of the issue involves only a question of statutory construction. In approaching that task it is important to place the sentencing authority of the trial court in proper perspective.
As the majority observes, all three crimes were committed as part of a single criminal transaction. Also, as the majority correctly observes, the offenses are lawfully treated separately for sentencing, i.e., they are not “mergeable” under the theory of State v. Linthwaite, 295 Or 162, 665 P2d 863 (1983), and State v. Cloutier, 286 Or 579, 596 P2d 1278 (1979). Additionally, the court could lawfully order the underlying sentences to be served consecutively. The majority does not dispute these general sentencing propositions.
It is also important to understand the particular aspect of a sentence under ORS 161.610(5). In State v. Wedge, 293 Or 598, 652 P2d 773 (1982), the court held that whether a defendant used a gun in the commission of a felony is an element of the crime for purposes of sentencing under ORS 161.610(5) and that the defendant was entitled to a jury determination of that element. The court said that, although ORS 161.610(5) is usually denominated an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new crime for which a minimum *596term is required. If the elements are properly established for the purposes of ORS 161.610(5), the court is required to impose the minimum term for the crime, unless it finds mitigating circumstances under ORS 161.610(6). State v. Warner, 52 Or App 987, 630 P2d 385, rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).
Applying those general and specific principles to the facts of this case, the court was required to sentence defendant separately on each charge and to impose a minimum sentence on each charge.
The majority, after finding no specific guideline in the statute, concludes that separate minimum terms are not consonant with legislative policy. The legislative policy the majority finds is expressed in the term “use a gun, serve a minimum term.” A more accurate rendition would be “commit a felony with a gun, serve a minimum part of the sentence imposed for that crime.” The majority appears to conclude that if the legislature did not express a policy or think of a problem and offer a solution, the court is free to adopt a particular policy from an array of choices and mold the statute to fit that policy. Perhaps the majority’s choice is supportable as a legislative act but not as a judicial act.
I do not agree with the majority that the legislature may not have contemplated the situation where separate sentences are lawfully imposed for a series of felonies involving the use of a gun. ORS 161.610(4) provides in part:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.605 or 137.010(2), if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime, it shall impose at least the minimum term of imprisonment as provided in subsection (5) of this section. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
The minimum term becomes a required part of a sentence for a crime if the elements invoking ORS 161.610(4) are established. The statute expresses a legislative intent that, if a defendant commits a crime using a firearm, he will have to serve a minimum term for that crime. The words of the statute control the situation here at issue. There is no need for a judicial foray into the thicket of legislative policy.
*597The trial court may order that the separate sentences including the required minimums be served concurrently. That is a matter of discretion. The majority makes it a matter of law.
ORS 161.610(5) (b) and (c) are not involved in this issue. Those subsections provide for an increased minimum term for felonies committed with a firearm subsequent to conviction and punishment for a felony or felonies using a firearm. I agree with the majority that the appropriate minimum term for each felony in this series is five years. ORS 161.610(5)(a).
I would affirm the sentences imposed and therefore dissent.