Court Opinion

ID: 9906028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:01:06.795564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.717294
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13993    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 11/30/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                           Nos. 22-13993, 23-10530
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ANDRE MAURICE LEWIS,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00019-PGB-DCI-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13993      Document: 36-1     Date Filed: 11/30/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13993

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Andre Lewis pled guilty to and was convicted of enticing a
       minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, in violation of 18
       U.S.C. § 2422(b), and was sentenced to life imprisonment. As part
       of his sentence, the court also ordered Lewis to pay restitution to
       the victim of the oﬀense to cover projected therapy costs. Lewis
       appeals the restitution order only, arguing that the government
       failed to prove the restitution ﬁgure by a preponderance of the ev-
       idence.
              The government has ﬁled a motion to dismiss Lewis’s appeal
       based on the sentence appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Lewis
       responds that the restitution order was imposed in violation of the
       restitution statute and so, in essence, exceeded the statutory maxi-
       mum restitution that could be imposed. We grant the govern-
       ment’s motion because Lewis’s appeal waiver is enforceable and
       bars his challenge.
              We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.
       United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sen-
       tence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and
       voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.
       1993). The touchstone for assessing whether an appeal waiver was
       made knowingly and voluntarily is whether the court clearly con-
       veyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal his
       sentence under most circumstances. United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d
       1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020). Appeal waivers apply “not only to
USCA11 Case: 22-13993      Document: 36-1     Date Filed: 11/30/2023     Page: 3 of 5

       22-13993               Opinion of the Court                         3

       frivolous claims, but also to difficult and debatable legal issues.”
       King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
       marks omitted).
              Here, the government has shown, and Lewis does not dis-
       pute, that the appeal waiver is enforceable and generally bars a
       challenge to the restitution order outside the exceptions listed in
       the waiver. See Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1068–69 (holding that an appeal
       waiver barred review of a restitution order, which is part of the
       sentence). The district court specifically questioned Lewis about
       the waiver during the plea colloquy and listed its exceptions. And
       Lewis confirmed his understanding of the plea agreement gener-
       ally and the appeal waiver in particular. Accordingly, the appeal
       waiver bars his challenge unless an exception applies.
              Lewis relies on the appeal waiver’s exception for an appeal
       raising “the ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory maxi-
       mum penalty.” In his view, his argument that the district court
       violated the restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2429, by imposing resti-
       tution in the absence of sufficient evidence as to the victim’s loss,
       is equivalent to a claim “that his sentence exceeds the maximum
       allowed by statute.”
              In enticement cases, the district court must order the defend-
       ant to pay restitution to any victim in the “full amount of the vic-
       tim’s losses,” as deﬁned in § 2259. See 18 U.S.C. § 2429(a), (b)(1),
       (3). This “full amount” includes “any costs incurred, or that are
       reasonably projected to be incurred in the future, by the victim, as
       a proximate result of the oﬀenses involving the victim,” such as
USCA11 Case: 22-13993      Document: 36-1     Date Filed: 11/30/2023     Page: 4 of 5

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13993

       “medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological
       care.” Id. § 2259(c)(2). Restitution for future therapy costs is ap-
       propriate “as long as the award reﬂects a reasonable estimate of
       those costs and is based on record evidence.” United States v. Osman,
       853 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2017). The government must prove
       the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence using
       evidence bearing suﬃcient indicia of reliability to support its prob-
       able accuracy. Id. at 1189.
              Here, we reject Lewis’s attempt to evade the appeal waiver
       by recasting his argument that the court relied on insuﬃcient evi-
       dence in calculating restitution as an argument that the amount of
       restitution exceeded the statutory maximum. The restitution stat-
       ute does not have a prescribed maximum that could be exceeded.
       See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2429, 2259; see also Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1069 (rea-
       soning that a restitution order did not exceed the statutory range
       because the restitution statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 3663, “has no
       prescribed statutory maximum”). So Lewis’s appeal does not fall
       within the exception for a sentence that “exceeds the maximum al-
       lowed by statute.” See Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1069.
              Nor did the district court act arbitrarily or for an improper
       purpose. See id. at 1068–69 (holding that an appeal waiver applied
       where the defendant was not “subjected to the unfettered whim of
       the district court, or punished on the basis of a constitutionally im-
       permissible factor such as race). Rather, the court applied the pre-
       ponderance standard and awarded a relatively modest amount of
       restitution—$3,665.36—to cover future therapy costs for one year
USCA11 Case: 22-13993         Document: 36-1        Date Filed: 11/30/2023         Page: 5 of 5

       22-13993                  Opinion of the Court                                5

       for the victim of Lewis’s oﬀense. 1 In other words, the award, on its
       face, appears to fall within the parameters of the restitution statute,
       which Lewis does not dispute. While Lewis argues the evidence
       on which the court relied to impose that award lacked suﬃcient
       indicia of reliability, such a challenge does not fall within any of the
       exceptions to his appeal waiver. Cf. United States v. Grinard-Henry,
       399 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that an appeal waiver
       barred a challenge to a sentence based on the district court’s drug-
       quantity ﬁndings).
              Because the appeal waiver is enforceable and no exception
       applies, we must enforce the waiver according to its terms and dis-
       miss the appeal. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294
       (11th Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently enforced knowing and vol-
       untary appeal waivers according to their terms.”). Therefore, we
       GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.
               APPEAL DISMISSED.

       1 The district court permitted the victim to reapply for restitution on a yearly

       basis under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).