Court Opinion

ID: 9658223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:51:58.135571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:51.926395
License: Public Domain

R. M. Shuster, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In Leveque v Leveque, 41 Mich App 127, 131; 199 NW2d 675 (1972), relied on by the trial court, this Court held that whether a person is an invitee or a licensee is normally a question of fact. Accordingly, the trial court correctly refused to charge that Bertha Doran (plaintiff) was an invitee as a matter of law unless reasonable individuals could not differ as to the conclusion to be derived from the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom. Jackovich v General Adjustment Bureau, Inc, 119 Mich App 221, 238; 326 NW2d 458 (1982).
A person is an invitee if he has been expressly or impliedly invited to visit an owner’s premises, *498the dominant purpose of that visit being to perform some service beneficial to the owner. Moreover, if the primary purpose of the visit is social intercourse, that person is a social visitor or licensee. Leveque, supra. A visitor is also a licensee if the purpose of the visit is to obtain a personal benefit which is unshared by the owner of the premises. Socha v Passino, 105 Mich App 445, 448; 306 NW2d 316 (1981).
In this case, plaintiff was returning her son’s children to his ex-wife’s (defendant’s) home. The children were being returned after plaintiffs’ son exercised his visitation rights at plaintiffs’ home as required by the couple’s judgment of divorce. Plaintiff, her son, and defendant had no formal arrangement concerning who would take the children home after a visit. On the date of the accident, there was no express invitation by defendant to plaintiff to come to her home. Defendant stated that, had she been asked, she would have picked up her children from plaintiffs’ home. Testimony also showed that plaintiff occasionally visited defendant socially.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, defendant, as any court must when considering whether a directed verdict on an issue should be granted, I cannot agree that reasonable persons would be compelled to conclude that plaintiff was an invitee.
I believe that the jury could conclude that plaintiff’s primary purpose in going to defendant’s home was to benefit her son. The children were, after all, visiting plaintiff’s home so that her son could exercise his visitation rights. In any case, here, where defendant testified that she would willingly have picked up her children from plaintiff’s home if asked, I do not believe that a reasonable jury *499would have to conclude that defendant impliedly solicited any visit from plaintiff, let alone a visit whose dominant purpose was to benefit defendant.
Assuming, however, that when the agent (here, plaintiff) of a non-custodial parent returns the children to the custodial parent’s home, this necessarily constitutes, as a matter of law, a visit whose dominant purpose is the benefit of the custodial parent, I still disagree with the majority’s conclusion. To the extent that taking the children to defendant’s home was primarily a benefit to her, this benefit was fulfilled upon the transportation of the children to defendant’s home. Plaintiff was not obligated to leave her car and step onto the premises to complete the service of transporting the children. Indeed, when plaintiff was asked why she simply did not drop the children off in the driveway, she responded: "Well, because I — I thought that we — I felt free to go in and talk with her [defendant].” Plaintiff also indicated that it was her normal practice to stop and talk with defendant when she brought the children home. Therefore, the jury could easily conclude that, when plaintiff left her car and was injured, she was then engaged in some personal business of her own (i.e., a social visit with defendant). This conclusion is amply supported by plaintiff’s own testimony.
I would affirm.