Court Opinion

ID: 9865298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:56.070234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:23.555228
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Butler,
concurring.
For the following reasons, I concur in the reversal of the judgment:
The court instructed the jury as follows:
“An agent of a corporation is presumed to have that knowledge of its affairs particularly under his control and management which, by the exercise of due diligence, he would have ascertained.”
There was no evidence that Blackett personally had the money in his possession or that it was under his control and management, or that he personally converted the same to his own use or to the use of the corporation. *20It therefore was necessary .to show that in some manner he aided, abetted, assisted, advised or encouraged some other person in the commission of the crime; and, of course, it was necessary to show that he had knowledge of the acts or plans of such person. Whether or not he had such knowledge and whether or not he had a criminal intent were questions of fact to be determined by the jury-
Doubtless the instruction in question was given because of similar language in the opinion in Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 269, 75 Pac. 924. But that language must be taken in connection with the nature of the case and the facts then before the court. In that case a corporation and one Sutliffe were prosecuted jointly for violating an act forbidding the employment of children under fourteen years of age in any mill or factory. The act charged was malum prohibitum, not malum per se. The defendants were convicted and the conviction was affirmed. Sutliffe was assistant superintendent of the company’s mill, and had the authority to hire and discharge employees. We said: “It thus appears from the testimony that, by reason of his relationship to the company, and the performance of his duties, that he either knew, or, by the exercise of due diligence upon his part, should have known, that a minor under the prohibited age was in the employ of the company. For this reason, he must be held as having violated the statute, for it was within his power, by virtue of the relationship he bore to the company, to have prevented the employment. ’ ’
As applicable to that situation, we used the following language: “An agent of a corporation is presumed to have that knowledge of its affairs particularly under his control and management which, by the exercise of due diligence, he would have ascertained. ’ ’
There were cited to sustain that statement 21 A. & E. Ency. of Law, p. 896, and People v. McClure, 27 Colo. 358, 61 Pac. 612. In the former it is said that “as a *21general rule” that is the law. Civil cases only are cited in support of the text. The McClure case was a prosecution for receiving and assenting to deposits in an insolvent bank. The statute provides that the failure of a bank at any time within thirty days after a deposit is prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the person charged that such bank was insolvent at the time of its reception. McClure was president of the bank, and his ignorance, if any, was due to criminal negligence. We said:
“Of course, mere negligence does not, but criminal negligence does, supply the place of intention, or guilty knowledge, under this act. * * *
“After the bank was insolvent, and after defendant knew it, or would have known it, had he not kept himself in ignorance of its financial condition by criminal negligence, he neither revoked the authority of the teller, nor did anything to discourage or put a stop' to the taking of deposits by closing the doors, or giving notice that deposits would not be received. By such conduct he clearly assented to the reception of the deposits.” (Italics in last paragraph are mine.)
A distinction exists between acts that are malum prohibitum, e. g., the violation of statutes prohibiting employment of children in mills and the violation of statutes forbidding the sale of intoxicating ■ liquors without a license or at certain times, and acts that are malnm per se, e. g., murder, larceny and embezzlement. A less exacting rule concerning guilty knowledge and intent is sometimes applied in cases involving acts malum prohibitum than in cases involving acts malum per se. In the latter class of cases negligence, to take the place of criminal knowledge or intent, must be, not mere negligence but criminal negligence. Section 6633 of Compiled Laws is as follows: “A crime or misdemeanor consists in a violation of a public law in the commission of which there shall be an union or joint operation of act, and intention or criminal negligence.” (Italics are *22mine.) The court properly gave an instruction in that language.
Instruction 15, while it states the law applicable in certain civil cases, and perhaps in certain criminal cases involving acts malum prohibitum, should not be given in criminal cases involving acts malum per se. It was prejudicial error to give it in the present case, where a criminal intent is an essential element of the crime charged. In the circumstances of this case criminal intent could be established only by evidence showing actual knowledge, on the part of the defendant of the wrongful acts of some other officer or officers of the company, or by evidence showing that the defendant’s ignorance thereof was due to criminal negligence on his part. The instruction informed the jury, in effect, that even though the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the wrongful acts of the other officer or officers, nevertheless he was charged with knowledge thereof as a matter of law if his ignorance was the result of mere negligence on his part. That, I respectfully submit, is not the law applicable to this case.
In my opinion, the giving of instruction 15 was seriously prejudicial to the defendant and was reversible error.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck concur herein.