Court Opinion

ID: 9376102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 20:02:29.676171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.323219
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/23 In re Rogelio O. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re ROGELIO O. et al.,                                       B320698 consolidated with
                                                                B320696
 Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05309)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 ROGELIO O.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
      Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ______________________

      Rogelio O. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s finding that
the facts before it did not support application of the sibling
exception1 to termination of his parental rights over the youngest
of his three children, and its order of a permanent plan of
adoption for that child. Father contends that termination of his
parental rights will substantially interfere with the relationship
between that of his youngest child, Rogelio O. (Roger)2 (born in
2013), and sister Itzel O. (born in 2005), who is seven-and-one-
half years older than Roger. Father further argues the juvenile
court erred in finding the benefits adoption would provide Roger
outweighed the benefits from continuing this sibling relationship.
      As explained below, we disagree and affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Father and Lorena E. (Mother) have three children:
Marilyn O. (born in 2004), Itzel, and Roger. Mother is not a party
to this appeal. As the issue in this appeal centers on the

      1 See Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). Further unspecified statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
      2The child’s given name is Rogelio, but he refers to himself
as Roger as do others, including his family. We accordingly use
the name Roger when discussing him.

                                 2
relationship between Roger and Itzel, we focus our description of
the facts and procedural history accordingly.
A.     Prior Dependency History and Referral Leading to
       Detention
       Before 2020, the family had multiple prior dependency
cases involving domestic violence and alcohol abuse by both
Father and Mother. In connection with the last of these matters,
Father was awarded sole legal and physical custody of all three
children in January 2020.
       On October 5, 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral reciting
aspects of the family’s past history with DCFS, stating that
Father had been deported to Mexico, that Mother was living
separately from the children and unable to care for them, and
that one of the relatives who had been caring for the children in
the United States had just been arrested.
       During investigation of the referral, Marilyn told a DCFS
social worker that the children moved from California to Mexico
in December 2019. All three children stated that while in
Mexico, Father physically abused them, failed to provide them
with life necessities such as food, and continued to abuse alcohol.
The children stated that Father would not work and would
panhandle for money; the money he did receive was used to
purchase alcohol instead of food for the children. Father also sold
the children’s cell phones, clothing and other items to buy alcohol.
Sometime in late June or early July 2020, the children went to
live with their maternal grandmother in Chihuahua, Mexico.
Marilyn estimated they were there for about three weeks when
Father accused the maternal grandmother of kidnapping the
children and called Mexican law enforcement. In August 2020,

                                 3
the children returned to the Los Angeles area with two adult
maternal half-siblings and began living in the half-siblings’
home. However, the half-siblings could not regularly care for the
children based on one working far from home and the other being
arrested and ultimately incarcerated. Marilyn stated she and her
siblings had not attended school since they left to live with
Father in Mexico.
B.    Detention Hearing and Subsequent Investigation
      On October 7, 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious
physical harm based on Father’s physical abuse of them when
they lived with him in Mexico as well as the parents’ respective
alcohol abuse issues. On October 9, 2020, the juvenile court held
a detention hearing. The court ordered the children detained and
placed in foster care, with monitored visitation to the parents.
The court noted Father was in Mexico and therefore his visits
would have to be telephonic. Following the detention hearing,
the children were placed with three different foster families.
Roger was placed with two caregivers who had cared for him
during prior dependency court cases.
      Father contacted DCFS the day after the detention
hearing. Father accused maternal grandmother of kidnapping
the children and denied any allegations of physical abuse or
failure to feed the children, but did state sometimes there was
not enough money to buy food. Father claimed an investigation
conducted in Mexico concluded the children were making false
allegations against him. Father also denied he ever consumed
alcohol excessively. Father said that maternal grandmother
eventually released the children to an adult sibling who brought
the children to the United States without Father’s consent.

                                 4
Father stated he was aware the children were not happy in
Mexico and did not want them returned to him in Mexico.
       In a November 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS
reported that the children were interviewed that month. The
children confirmed that Father drank excessively and had abused
them, and that the children were scared of Father. Itzel reported
she did not want to return to Mexico with Father and wanted her
caregiver to adopt her. Roger also stated he wanted to stay with
his caregivers and did not want to go back to Mexico. The report
also stated Father remained in Mexico and had not had any
contact with the children.
       In a December 2020 supplemental jurisdiction/disposition
report, DCFS reported that Father remained in Mexico. Father
continued to deny any mistreatment of the children, insisted
Mother and the maternal grandmother coached the children to
make false allegations, and again claimed an investigation by
Mexican authorities showed the allegations were untrue. Father
admitted to occasional alcohol use, but said he was not an
alcoholic.
       Father reported that he was willing to comply with DCFS
and court orders to get the children back. Father stated his
intent to cross the border. Father said that, once he was in the
United States, he planned to pick up Roger and take Roger back
to Mexico because Roger wanted to be with Father. Father stated
he was willing to leave Marilyn and Itzel behind if they were not
willing to go back to Mexico with him, but that his desire was to
take all three children with him. Father said he did not want to
stay in California because he feared being deported and leaving
his children behind, and that was why it was best for his children
to be with him in Mexico.

                                5
       In a February 1, 2021 last minute information (LMI) for the
court, DCFS reported that throughout their various interviews
the children had consistently stated they were victims of physical
abuse, emotional abuse and general neglect by Father while in
Mexico. DCFS indicated it had contacted the relevant Mexican
authorities to follow up on Father’s claims about the
investigation there. DCFS obtained documents that included
orders for the children to reside with maternal grandmother
during the investigation of the children’s allegations, signed
interview statements demonstrating Father’s substance abuse
and physical abuse toward the children made by the maternal
grandmother and her male companion, psychological interviews
of the children showing consistent statements regarding Father’s
physical and emotional abuse, Father’s withdrawal of his petition
alleging the children had been kidnapped, and a final assessment
recommending Father complete an anger management/parenting
class before the children were returned to his care. DCFS
reported the children expressed being fearful of Father and
wished to remain in foster care rather than going back to live
with Father. Marilyn and Itzel stated they no longer wished to
reunify with either parent and did not feel their parents could
provide them with a safe home.
       In two March 2021 LMIs, Roger’s caregivers reported that
he was doing well in their home overall. Roger was very active
physically and enjoyed outdoor activities, but was struggling with
online learning (due to school closures based on the COVID-19
pandemic). Roger had demonstrated some aggressive behavior
towards other children in the home, and was working with the
wraparound team to reduce these outbursts. Itzel’s caregiver
reported Itzel was doing well in her home overall. However, Itzel

                                6
experienced some school-related anxiety and engaged in defiant
behavior that included refusing to participate in online learning,
leaving the home for a few hours without telling anyone, and
saying she did not want to participate in wraparound services.
To help Itzel, the caregiver said she was looking to provide Itzel
with Intensive Services Foster Care (ISFC) mental health
services.
C.     Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
       On March 22, 2021, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction
hearing. Father, who at this point was in the United States but
in federal immigration custody, appeared telephonically. The
court sustained the section 300 petition in its entirety and
assumed jurisdiction over the children pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j).
       On April 20, 2021, the juvenile court held a disposition
hearing. The court ordered the children removed from the
physical custody of both parents, denied both parents family
reunification services, and set a selection and implementation
hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
       In August 2021, DCFS reported on the living situations of
Roger and Itzel. Roger continued to live with his caregivers. The
caregivers were providing the child with a loving and supportive
living environment, and were meeting the child’s educational,
development, and emotional needs, which included being trained
to become an ISFC home if Roger was eligible for ISFC mental
health services. DCFS observed Roger to be comfortable in the
caregivers’ presence, as evidenced by him smiling with them,
responding positively to their directions, and calling them “mom”
and “dad.” Roger wanted to be adopted by the caregivers, and the
caregivers in turn were dedicated to providing Roger with

                                 7
stability and permanency through adoption. Although the
caregivers were unable also to adopt Marilyn and Itzel, they were
willing to facilitate continued visits between Roger and his
siblings if parental rights terminated and they became Roger’s
adoptive parents. During the review period, the children had
visits together as arranged by their caregivers. One such visit
occurred in July 2021, when Roger celebrated his eighth birthday
by having a party at a local park. Marilyn and Itzel attended the
party, and Roger said he enjoyed seeing them there.
       Itzel continued to live with her own caregiver. Itzel
reported to DCFS that she was happy and comfortable in the
home, but did not want to be adopted or placed under a legal
guardianship. Instead, she wanted “to stay in her placement
home just as things currently are.” Marilyn, who was nearly 17,
also wished to remain in foster care until she turned 18 instead of
a legal guardianship or adoption.
D.    Father’s Section 388 Petition
      On January 20, 2022, Father filed a section 388 petition
requesting the juvenile court return the children to his physical
custody, grant him family reunification services, and/or grant
him unmonitored visitation with the children. The court
subsequently ordered an evidentiary hearing on Father’s section
388 petition.
E.    Developments Before the Section 388 and Section
      366.26 Hearings
      In February 2022, DCFS provided an interim report on the
family’s current circumstances. Roger continued to live with the
same caregivers, to whom he had grown very close over the past
15 months. The caregivers continued to commit to adopting
Roger if parental rights terminated. Roger identified his

                                8
caregivers as his “parents” and said he wanted to be adopted by
them; he identified Father as his “dad” and as a “friend” who was
“fun to see.” Roger agreed to continued visits with Father so long
as Itzel or someone else was also present. The caregivers
reported that Roger began exhibiting increased anxiety and
sleeping difficulties after learning Father was released from
federal detention in December 2021. When asked why he did not
feel comfortable being alone with Father, Roger replied,
“ ‘Because I want to be safe and as long as my sister is there I
will be safe. I am scared that he will take me if I am alone.’ ”
       Itzel likewise continued to live with her caregiver. When
asked with whom she ideally would want to live, Itzel replied she
could not think of anyone and that “I am not really close to
anyone.” Itzel said she was having hourly visits with Roger once
every two weeks but wished she “could see him a lot more.” Itzel
also said she did not want Roger to be adopted because she
believed that would make it more difficult for her to see him.
       In May 2022, DCFS again reported on the family’s current
circumstances. Roger was having monitored visits with Father
every other week; Itzel also attended these monitored visits. Itzel
sometimes took on a “motherly role” during visits, such as
making sure Roger ate his meal before dessert and was respectful
toward Father. Roger told Itzel that she had “a friend in him”
after Itzel said she did not have any friends at her school. In an
interview with a DCFS social worker, Roger said that he only felt
comfortable visiting Father if Itzel was also there. Roger
identified his caregivers as the people with whom he would want
to talk if he had a “good day” or a “bad day.” When asked with
whom ideally he would want to live, Roger said his caregivers,
who he referred to as his “mom” and “dad.”

                                9
      In mid-May 2022, DCFS reported that Father tested
positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in March 2022
and was thereafter terminated from his substance abuse
treatment program. After a monitored visit with Itzel and Roger
in May 2022, Father told the DCFS social worker who had
monitored the visit that he was planning to move out of state.
Father said this was necessary because he had been “receiving
threats for things he did in the past” and that he believed the
children were in danger if he continued to have contact with the
children.
F.     Section 388 and Section 366.26 Hearings
       On May 17, 2022, the juvenile court held evidentiary
hearings on Father’s section 388 petition followed by a section
366.26 hearing to select Roger’s permanent plan. Father testified
in support of his section 388 petition as well as his position
concerning Roger’s permanent plan under section 366.26.
Counsel for DCFS and the children asked the court to deny the
section 388 petition. Based on the evidence presented, the court
denied the section 388 petition, finding that Father failed to show
a change of circumstances or that the relief requested by Father
was in the children’s best interests.
       The juvenile court then turned to the section 366.26
hearing. Counsel for DCFS and Roger both asked the court to
find that Roger was adoptable and no statutory exception to the
legislative preference of adoption applied, and to terminate
parental rights. Counsel for DCFS argued that the court should
not apply the sibling relationship exception. Counsel for DCFS
contended that despite Roger and Itzel having a positive
relationship with one another, there was evidence that visits
between the siblings were likely to continue (and thus there

                                10
would be no substantial detriment to their relationship if
Father’s parental rights were terminated) and the permanent
plan of adoption was in Roger’s best interests. Roger’s counsel
joined in these arguments, and additionally proffered that she
had spoken with Roger’s caregiver, who “confirmed she will
support [Roger] and will continue to allow him to . . . have
visitation with his siblings.”3
       Itzel’s counsel stated Itzel was opposed to Roger being
adopted and that the evidence showed Itzel and Roger would
continue to benefit from having a sibling relationship. Father’s
counsel likewise asked the court to find the sibling relationship
exception applied and to order a permanent plan for Roger that
did not involve adoption.
       In ruling, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental
rights as to Roger based on its findings that the child was
adoptable and no statutory exception to adoption applied. The
court found “There’s clearly a bond between [Roger] and his
siblings, and we would not want to do anything that’s going to
cause substantial interference with that relationship.” The court
declined to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption,
finding that “there would not be substantial interference with the
relationship between [Roger] and his siblings given the
statements that [the court had] heard,” and that “any risk of loss
of ongoing contact between [Roger] and [Itzel] [is] outweighed by
the long-term benefit that he would receive through the
permanency and stability of adoption.” The court designated
Roger’s caregivers as the prospective adoptive parents, stating

      3Father’s counsel did not object to this proffer at the time
it was made but did object later after the court had already ruled.

                                11
Roger had lived with them for over six months, the caregivers
had expressed a commitment to adoption, and they had taken at
least one step to facilitate the adoption process.
       Father timely filed separate notices of appeal from the
section 388 and section 366.26 hearings, one as to Marilyn’s and
Itzel’s dependency cases, and one as to Roger’s dependency case.
We consolidated the appeals for purposes of briefing and decision.
                          DISCUSSION
      Father’s appellate briefing addresses only the juvenile
court’s rejection of the sibling relationship exception as to Roger
at the section 366.26 hearing. Accordingly, we treat the appeal
from the denial of the section 388 petition as forfeited. (See In re
A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived’ ”].)
A.    The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      “[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘. . . to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.) At that hearing, “the court may
order one of three alternatives—adoption, guardianship, or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If a child is adoptable, there is a
strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency
plans.” (In re Collin E. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 647, 663.) There
are statutory exceptions to this “strong preference” if a parent
can demonstrate that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child for any one of several statutorily
enumerated reasons. As relevant here, the sibling relationship
exception applies when a court concludes “There would be

                                12
substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking
into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship,
including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a
sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant
common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with
a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best
interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as
compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
       When addressing this exception, the “juvenile court ‘is
directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights
would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.’ ” (In
re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.) “The sibling bond
exception is evaluated from the perspective of the child who is
being considered for adoption, not the perspective of that child’s
siblings.” (Id. at p. 174.) “Many siblings have a relationship with
each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship
ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause
detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference
with that relationship.” (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 952.)
       “ ‘If the court determines terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is
then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that
sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by
the permanency of adoption.’ ” (In re D.O., supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174.) “[E]ven if a sibling relationship
exists that is so strong that its severance would cause the child
detriment,” that is not the end of the analysis; the court must
then “weigh[ ] the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling

                                13
relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would
provide.” (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 952-953.)
       Because of “the Legislature’s preference for adoption when
possible, the ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong
language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing
adoption.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) The parent
advocating for the sibling exception bears the burden of proof to
show it applies. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.)
A juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception
applies “will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern
young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable
parent are paramount.” (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
987, 1014.)
       “[W]e apply the substantial evidence standard to the
juvenile court’s underlying factual determinations.” (In re D.O.,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) But, “When the juvenile court
finds the parent has not established the existence of the requisite
beneficial relationship, [this court’s] review is limited to
determining whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of
the parent on this issue as a matter of law. [Citations.] When
the juvenile court concludes the benefit to the child derived from
preserving the sibling relationship is not sufficiently compelling
to outweigh the benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption,
[this court] review[s] that determination for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 782.)
Finally, “we review the lower court’s ruling, not its reasoning”
and “may affirm that ruling if it was correct on any ground.
[Citations.]” (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.)

                                14
B.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
       Finding that Termination of Father’s Parental
       Rights Would Not Substantially Interfere with the
       Relationship Between Roger and Itzel
       The juvenile court found that while there was “clearly a
bond between [Roger] and his siblings,” “there would not be
substantial interference with the relationship between [Roger]
and his siblings” from termination of Father’s parental rights.
Father argues for a substantial evidence standard of review, and
argues substantial evidence does not support this finding. In
particular, he focuses on a representation made by Roger’s
counsel that Roger’s caregiver would continue to allow visits with
Roger’s siblings. Father argues this unsworn statement was not
evidence, and that there was no other substantial evidence—that
is, evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value—supporting the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Jerry M.
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 [defining substantial evidence].)
       DCFS argues the juvenile court’s finding that there would
not be substantial interference in Roger’s sibling relationship
with Itzel if Father’s parental rights were terminated constituted
a determination that Father had failed to establish the existence
of a beneficial sibling relationship between Roger and Itzel.
Therefore, in the view of DCFS, the juvenile court found Father
did not meet his burden of proof and Father must establish on
appeal that “the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent
on this issue as a matter of law.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 782.)4

      4Father asserts that DCFS should be judicially estopped
from arguing Father failed to prove a beneficial sibling

                                15
       It is unclear whether the juvenile court found Father had
failed to establish a beneficial relationship between Roger and
Itzel. The juvenile court stated, “[t]here’s clearly a bond” between
Roger and Itzel, and that it “would not want to do anything that’s
going to cause substantial interference with that relationship.”
While the court did not specify the nature of the “bond,” its
statement that it did not want to substantially interfere with that
“bond” could suggest it believed the bond was significant and
beneficial enough that it should be preserved if possible. On the
other hand, the court found that termination of Father’s rights
would not substantially interfere with the relationship between
Roger and Itzel, which suggests the juvenile court did not think
the bond was so significant and beneficial that it necessitated
preservation.
       Given this ambiguity, we adopt Father’s proposed standard
of review and consider whether substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s findings. Setting aside the proffer from
Roger’s counsel about the caregivers’ willingness to continue to
facilitate visits with Itzel, admissible evidence in the record

relationship between Roger and Itzel because it took a contrary
position before the trial court. We disagree DCFS has taken
inconsistent positions. Before the juvenile court, DCFS
acknowledged “there is a positive relationship” between Roger
and Itzel, and argued termination of Father’s parental rights
would not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. A
“positive” sibling relationship is not the same as a relationship
that is “sufficiently significant to cause detriment on
termination.” (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
Where “the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause
detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference
with that relationship.” (Ibid.)

                                16
established that Roger’s prospective adoptive parents were open
to continuing the sibling relationship through visits after
Father’s parental rights were terminated. Such “assurances of
continued sibling visits” are relevant to whether “terminating
parental rights will substantially interfere” with a sibling
relationship. (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) As
reflected in the permanency planning adoption assessment, one
of the parents specifically stated the willingness to continue that
sibling relationship to DCFS.5 Moreover, these assurances were
not empty talk. Visits were in fact facilitated; for example, Itzel
was invited to and attended Roger’s birthday party in July 2021.
      As In re D.O. notes, “Given the potential tenuousness of
future sibling visits, it is the better practice for juvenile courts to
also consider the expressly enumerated factors” in section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at
p. 176.) Like In re D.O., this court “conclude[s] it was not error to
depart from that practice here, where the record contains
substantial evidence that would have allowed the juvenile court
to otherwise reach the same conclusion by considering the
expressly enumerated factors.” (Ibid.) With regard to those
enumerated factors, Roger and Itzel were not raised together in
the same home; they were separated from one another during
prior dependency matters as well as during this dependency case
and lived apart for a meaningful period of time. They shared
some common experiences but, given the time they were

      5 Father argues we should not rely on this statement
because in his view it lacks credibility. However, in applying the
substantial evidence test, “We do not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
(In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)

                                  17
separated, they also had significant experiences apart from one
another. As to the strength and closeness of their bond, Roger
did not tell anyone he wanted to live with Itzel, or that he wanted
more visitation time with her. Roger did not rely on Itzel for
meeting his emotional or other needs. Roger did want Itzel
present at visits with Father, but that was largely because of his
fear of being alone with Father. Finally, with regard to weighing
the benefit of ongoing contact versus the benefit of adoption,
Roger wanted adoption despite Itzel’s objection to it and the
possible impact it might have on their relationship.
       Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights would
not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship between
Roger and Itzel.
C.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
      When Terminating Father’s Parental Rights as to
      Roger
      The juvenile court found in the alternative that even if one
assumed termination of Father’s parental rights would
substantially interfere with a beneficial sibling relationship
between Roger and Itzel, the benefit Roger would derive from
preserving the sibling relationship was not sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the benefit achieved by the permanency
of adoption. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
making this determination.
      In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, “we will not lightly
substitute our decision for that rendered by the juvenile court;
rather, we indulge all reasonable inferences to support the
juvenile court’s decision.” (In re Leon E. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th

                                18
222, 233.) “The test for abuse is whether the trial court exceeded
the bounds of reason.” (Ibid.)
      For most of Roger’s eight years, he lacked stability based on
the family being involved in multiple dependency court cases.
Both in connection with this case and in connection with prior
dependency matters, Roger lived with the same caregivers (and
apart from Itzel). And for an extended period of time, those
caregivers provided Roger with a loving and supportive
environment, met his needs, and committed to adopting Roger if
parental rights ultimately terminated. Roger repeatedly told
DCFS social workers he wanted to be adopted by the caregivers,
whom he identified as his “parents.” Although Itzel opposed
adoption for Roger believing it would negatively impact her visits
with him, the juvenile court properly evaluated Roger’s best
interests (including his preference for adoption) and not the
desires of his sister when selecting adoption as Roger’s
permanent plan. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54
[juvenile court considering sibling exception must focus its
analysis on the child being considered for adoption, not the other
siblings].) The court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by
designating the caregivers as Roger’s prospective adoptive
parents after terminating parental rights at the section 366.26
hearing in accord with Roger’s wishes.

                                19
                          DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

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