Court Opinion

ID: 9568724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:06:59.124288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:27.000351
License: Public Domain

Clarke, Chief Justice.
Wright sued Richmond County and Logue, a Richmond County deputy. Wright alleged that Logue caused a collision with Wright through negligent operation of his patrol car. It is undisputed that the county carried no liability insurance covering the incident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Richmond County but denied Logue’s motion for summary judgment. Logue sought to appeal the denial of his motion for summary judgment. This appeal did not involve the grant of summary judgment to the county. The Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory review and then dismissed the appeal. Logue v. Wright, 193 Ga. App. XXX (1989). We accepted certiorari to decide the following questions:
A) In light of this court’s decisions in Martin v. Ga. Dept. of Public Safety, 257 Ga. 300 (357 SE2d 569) (1987), cert. denied 484 U. S. 998 (1988), and Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 (361 SE2d 146) (1987), does the applicability of sovereign immunity still turn on the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts of public officials?
B) Is a county required by OCGA § 45-9-40 and Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (330 SE2d 95) (1985), to secure liability insurance to cover damages arising out of the operation of county-owned motor vehicles? If so, what is the effect of a failure to secure such insurance?
C) Is the Department of Risk Management of Richmond County, which is budgeted to compensate “claims against the county and its employees for which the county or its employees are legally responsible,” a self-insurance fund within the meaning of OCGA § 45-9-1 et seq.?
1. Under this court’s decisions in Martin and Price, supra, where there is a formal self-insurance plan or a policy covering official acts of a public official, sovereign immunity is waived. However, where there is no self-insurance fund, the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts is still viable in ruling on immunity for public officials for liability for their negligent acts. It is important to keep in mind that the immunity is for negligent acts, not for malicious acts, acts of corruption, wilful acts, or acts involving reckless disregard for *207the safety of others.
Under Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 (264 SE2d 878) (1980), if Logue was acting in his official capacity he is immune from liability for negligent acts which were discretionary rather than ministerial. Logue argues that he was acting in his official capacity in responding to an emergency and that his actions were discretionary in nature. Logue insists that since he is being sued in his official capacity and since the complaint alleges mere negligence, he is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity.
Appellee Wright relies upon the case of Crews v. McQueen, 192 Ga. App. 560 (385 SE2d 712) (1989), in which the Court of Appeals considered the question of sovereign immunity in the case of a child whose arm was broken during a paddling by a school principal. The majority held that summary judgment in favor of the principal was not appropriate in that case because a question of fact remained as to whether the punishment was within the sound discretion of the principal. The case is distinguishable from the present case because Crews was decided according to the provisions of OCGA § 20-2-732, which provides immunity for school officials administering corporal punishment which is neither excessive or unduly severe in good faith. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while OCGA § 20-2-732 is generally compatible with general principles of sovereign immunity, a finding that a school official was acting within the “scope of authority” is not sufficient to determine whether the punishment was within the “exercise of ... sound discretion” as required by OCGA § 20-2-731. In other words, an act could be within the scope of authority as required by Hennessy v. Webb, supra, and still be beyond the exercise of sound discretion.
In the present case there was no dispute that Logue was answering a call regarding a fight when the accident occurred. He was not using his blue light or siren when he failed to yield the right-of-way to Mrs. Wright and caused the collision in question. Under OCGA § 40-6-6 a car driven by a local law enforcement officer when responding to an emergency call or when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law may disregard certain rules of the road. However, the officer must use a flashing or revolving blue light when the rules of the road are not adhered to. Failure to use the light or siren in this case was an act of negligence, not an act of malice, corruption, wilfulness, or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Therefore, if the county has not waived immunity by obtaining insurance, the trial court was incorrect in denying summary judgment to Logue under the principles discussed in Hennessy v. Webb, supra.
We agree that under the facts of this case the defendant had no discretion to violate the law by failing to activate his blue light and siren. In fact, we would subscribe to the proposition that the law does *208not generally grant discretion to a public employee to act negligently. The discretionary act rule deals not with the act of negligence. The rule grants immunity to public employees who perform discretionary acts in a negligent manner. That happened here. The decision to rush to the scene of the disorder lay within his discretion. He exercised this discretion. The fact that he did so negligently does not place him outside the rule. To say that it did would render the rule meaningless.
2. Construing together OCGA §§ 45-9-40 and 33-24-51, one concludes that the legislature intended to require that the state procure liability insurance for the operation of state owned motor vehicles, but the procurement of similar insurance by counties and municipalities is discretionary.
OCGA § 45-9-1 authorizes the purchase of liability insurance or formulation of plans of self-insurance to insure public officers or employees of any agency, board, bureau, commission, department, or authority of the state to the extent that they are not immune from liability. This purchase is discretionary. OCGA § 45-9-1 (c) specifically excludes counties and municipalities from the term “agency” of the state.
OCGA § 45-9-20 provides for the purchase of liability insurance by counties and municipalities to insure officers and employees against liability for damages arising out of the performance of their duties whether based upon negligence, violation of contract rights, or violation of civil, constitutional, or statutory law. There is no provision in this section for formulation of plans of self-insurance.
From the statutes construed, it is apparent that the legislature intended to require the state to purchase liability insurance to insure against liability for damages arising out of the operation of state vehicles. The state and its agencies are authorized to purchase insurance or formulate self insurance plans to insure officers and employees against liability for damages arising out of the performance of their duties. Counties and municipalities are authorized to procure insurance to insure officers and employees against liability for damages arising out of the performance of their duties. It is apparent that the statute authorizing this purchase does not require it. Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga., supra, holds that under Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia, counties as well as the state waive sovereign immunity to the extent that they have liability insurance. Nothing in Toombs County u. O’Neal requires that counties procure insurance.
The foregoing discussion leads us to the following analysis:
(1) OCGA § 45-9-40 requires the state to secure a blanket or group liability insurance policy covering its employees during the operation of any state owned motor vehicle. There *209is no corresponding requirement for counties.
(2) OCGA § 45-9-1 authorizes the state or any of its
agencies, boards, bureaus, commissions, departments or authorities to purchase policies of liability insurance or contracts of indemnity or to formulate sound programs of self-insurance as additional compensation for its employees. Sub-paragraph (c) of that section specifically excludes counties and municipalities from the section.
(3) OCGA § 45-9-20 allows counties to purchase liability insurance covering their employees as additional compensation but grants no authority to provide a self-insurance plan.
(4) OCGA § 45-9-21 allows counties to provide a legal
defense to employees for certain legal actions but again makes no mention of a self-insurance program or any waiver of sovereign immunity.
From this, we can only conclude that the legislature has not empowered the counties to establish a self-insurance program.
3. Since the defense of sovereign immunity is available to Logue in the absence of liability insurance, and since the purchase of such insurance was discretionary, Logue is entitled to summary judgment unless Richmond County had liability insurance protecting him against liability. It is undisputed that Richmond County did not purchase a policy which would protect him. However, Wright contends that the Department of Risk Management of Richmond County, budgeted to compensate claims against the county and its employees, constitutes a self-insurance program which waives sovereign immunity. Logue insists that this fund cannot constitute a self-insurance fund which would waive immunity because OCGA § 45-9-1, the section containing the self-insurance option, does not apply to counties.
We hold that under the statutes dealing with liability insurance for government employees and officials, only state self-insurance plans will waive sovereign immunity. There is no provision for a county to set up a self-insurance plan. Therefore the fund established by Richmond County is not a self-insurance plan which will waive sovereign immunity.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, P. J., who dissents.