Court Opinion

ID: 2963840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:01.109086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:45.815058
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2000

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    HENRY LOMBARD,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            F. Mark Terison, Assistant United States  Attorney, with whom  Jay
            _______________                                                ___
        P. McCloskey, United  States Attorney,  was on brief,  for the  United
        ____________
        States.

            Jane E. Lee, by appointment of the court, for appellant.
            ___________

                                 ____________________

                                  December 15, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge.    Henry Lombard,  Jr.  and
                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge.
                              ______________

            Hubert Hartley  were tried  separately in the  Maine Superior

            Court in  1992 on  charges of  murdering two  men.   Each was

            acquitted.   Afterward, Lombard and Hartley  were indicted as

            co-defendants  in  the federal  district  court  in Maine  on

            federal  firearms  and  other  charges  arising  out  of  the

            murders.  Hartley pleaded  guilty at mid-trial, but appellant

            Lombard entrusted his fate to the jury.  He was convicted.

                      At sentencing,  under the Guidelines,  the district

            court found by a  preponderance of the evidence  that Lombard

            had used  his illegally possessed firearm  to commit "another

            offense":  the same murders of which he had been acquitted in

            the  state court.   The resulting  Guidelines sentence  was a

            mandatory term of life  in prison, which Maine law  would not
            _________

            have  required  even  had  defendant been  convicted  of  the

            murders.   Lombard thus received a life sentence based on the

            federal court's finding that it was more likely than not that

            Lombard  had  committed  the murders  of  which  he  had been

            acquitted.   The  sentencing judge  was greatly  troubled but

            felt  as  a matter  of law  that he  had  no authority  to do

            otherwise under the Guidelines.

                      Lombard appeals the mandatory life sentence and his

            convictions.    We affirm  the  convictions  for the  reasons

            stated later.  We address first the very troubling sentencing

            issue.   Finding  that  this  is a  case  in  which the  life

                                         -2-
                                          2

            sentence  enhancement  is the  "tail which  wags the  dog" of

            defendant's trial and conviction, thus raising constitutional

            due process concerns, we hold that under section 5K2.0 of the

            Guidelines  the district  court had  the authority,  which it

            thought it had  not, to  consider a downward  departure.   We

            vacate the  life sentence and  remand for a  determination of

            whether a downward departure might be warranted in the unique

            circumstances here.

                                          I

                                      Background
                                      __________

                      On Thanksgiving morning of 1990,  Morris Martin and

            Paul Lindsey, Jr. were murdered, each shot in the head as  he

            lay  sleeping in  the living  room of  a small  cabin  in the

            backwoods of Fairfield, Maine.  The cabin was owned by Hubert

            Hartley,  the half-brother  of the  defendant  Henry Lombard.

            All four men had been living in the cabin  for a week to hunt

            deer in  the surrounding  woods.  Tammy  Theriault, Hartley's

            girlfriend, had also been living in the cabin, along with her

            eighteen  month old  daughter.   She  was also  pregnant with

            Hartley's child at the time.  Theriault was a near-eyewitness

            to the murders,  able to hear and observe much through a hole

            in the floor of her upstairs bedroom.

                      Lombard and Hartley were  tried separately on state

            charges of  murder before  two juries in  the Maine  Superior

            Court.   Each  defendant  testified in  his  own defense  and

                                         -3-
                                          3

            claimed that the  other had committed  the murders.   Hartley

            and  Theriault testified against  Lombard at Lombard's trial.

            Both state trials resulted in acquittals.

                      One year  later, a  federal grand jury  returned an

            indictment in  the U.S. District Court,  charging Hartley and

            Lombard  with unlawful  possession of  a firearm,  aiding and

            abetting the  same, and  with conspiracy charges  relating to

            the aftermath  of  the murders.1   Lombard  and Hartley  were

            tried   jointly  in   the  federal   district  court.     The

            prosecution's key witness was Tammy Theriault.  Her testimony

            departed in  some respects from the  testimony and statements

            she gave earlier.   She testified, as  follows, that although

            she did not  see the  murders being committed,  she did  hear

            conversations  between Hartley  and Lombard  just before  and

            after  the  gunshots  were  fired.    At  about  10  a.m.  on

            Thanksgiving morning,  Lombard  and Hartley  returned to  the

            cabin from a morning hunt.  Martin and Lindsey were asleep on

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Count  1 of  the indictment  charged Hartley  and Lombard
            with a multi-part  conspiracy with the following  objectives:
            unlawfully  to   possess  and  aid  and   abet  the  unlawful
            possession of  a firearm  and ammunition in  violation of  18
            U.S.C.   922(g)(1); to cross state lines with intent to avoid
            prosecution  or   avoid  giving  testimony   in  a   criminal
            proceeding  in violation of  18 U.S.C.   1073;  and to remove
            and  transport  from  Hartley's  cabin  certain  evidence  of
            Lombard's unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in
            violation of  18 U.S.C.   2232(a).   Count 2  charged Lombard
            with  unlawful  possession of  a firearm  in violation  of 18
            U.S.C.     922(g),  924(e).   Count  3  charged Hartley  with
            aiding and abetting  Lombard in the unlawful possession  of a
            firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1)-(2).

                                         -4-
                                          4

            couches in the living room.   Hartley, seeing Theriault, told

            her to go back upstairs because he and Lombard "had something

            to do."   On returning to her room, she  heard Lombard say to

            Hartley,  "[I]f you don't shoot  him, I'm going  to shoot 'em

            both."    Next,  Theriault,  still  upstairs  with  her  baby

            daughter, heard  five or six gunshots,  followed by Lombard's

            exclamation,  "I didn't  think you  had the  guts to  do it."

            Hartley boasted,  "I  showed you,  didn't I?"  and added,  "I

            don't think he's dead yet.  Shoot him again."

                      Lombard and Hartley stuffed the victims' bodies  in

            garbage  bags, as Theriault  watched through the  hole in her

            bedroom floor.   Theriault  was with  Lombard and  Hartley as

            they cleaned the cabin  of blood and other evidence,  and hid

            the bodies temporarily  in the cellar.  The next  day, as the

            two men were  attempting to move  the bodies to the  trunk of

            Hartley's   car,  Theriault's   family   arrived   to   bring

            Thanksgiving  leftovers.   They  sat visiting  in the  living

            room, with one victim's body hidden in the trunk of Hartley's

            car  outside,  the  other still  in  the  cellar.   Theriault

            accompanied  Lombard and Hartley when they later went to dump

            both bodies  in a roadside  bog.  She  was also present  when

            Lombard  sold his  Marlin .22  caliber rifle  as well  as the

            victims' two hunting guns  to a broker.  Lombard  and Hartley

            were planning to flee from Maine to Massachusetts just before

            they were arrested.

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      Excerpts of testimony that Hartley  and Lombard had

            given in their  state court murder trials were  also admitted

            into evidence.  These excerpts (including Lombard's own prior

            testimony)  corroborated  much  of  Theriault's  account  and

            established  that Lombard  owned a  Marlin .22  caliber rifle

            which he had brought to Hartley's cabin, that he loaded it on

            the morning of Thanksgiving  Day, 1990, that he took  the gun

            with him to  go hunting  that morning, and  that Lombard  and

            Hartley   together  attempted  to   clean  the  bloody  cabin

            following  the  murders,  removed  evidence  of  the murders,

            disposed of  the  bodies, and  planned  to flee  from  Maine.

            Other  witnesses'  testimony  established  that  Lombard  had

            reason  to  be aware  that he  could  not lawfully  possess a

            firearm, that he nonetheless  purchased the .22 caliber rifle

            from  Tammy Theriault's  brother, and  that the  bullets that

            were recovered from the  victims' bodies were consistent with

            having been fired from a .22 caliber rifle. 

                      Hartley  pleaded  guilty   at  the  close   of  the

            government's case.   Lombard, however,  put his  case to  the

            jury  (without  presenting  an   affirmative  case)  and  was

            convicted on both Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment.

                      At Lombard's sentencing, the court applied a cross-

            reference  in  the  relevant  provision  of   the  Guidelines

            governing   the   firearms   conviction  (Count   2),   which

            essentially provided that  if Lombard's unlawfully  possessed

                                         -6-
                                          6

            firearm had been used in the commission of a murder, his base

            offense level (BOL)  on that conviction was to  be determined

            by the same guideline applicable  to a conviction for murder.

            The court determined that the firearm had so been used.   The

            resulting  BOL  required a  term  of  life imprisonment,  and

            Lombard was sentenced accordingly.

                                          II

                                     The Sentence
                                     ____________

                      Lombard  raises  two  challenges  to  the  sentence

            imposed by the  district court.   He contends  that the  life

            sentence was imposed in violation of his rights under the Due

            Process Clause.2  He  also argues, to  no avail, that he  was

                                
            ____________________

            2.  As  a  preliminary  matter, we  reject  the  government's
            assertion that  the defendant did not  properly preserve this
            issue  for appeal.  The issue of  whether and in what way the
            murders of which Lombard had been acquitted could properly be
            considered  at  sentencing was  adequately  presented  to and
            squarely  addressed  by the  district  court.   As  the court
            itself stated:

                       The  key issue in this  sentencing, of course,
                is whether or  not premeditated murder is the  object
                offense in  connection with  which the  firearms were
                unlawfully possessed. . . .
                       Resolution  of  this   issue  is  particularly
                difficult because  of the fact  that both defendants,
                Mr. Lombard and Mr. Hartley, were acquitted of  first
                degree murder  charges  in  the state  court  . . . .
                The suggestion made by counsel for Mr. Lombard  quite
                appropriately  is how  could  the  object offense  in
                deriving   the   calculation   of   the   appropriate
                guideline in determining  the sentence  in this  case
                be  calculated on  the basis of crimes  for which the
                defendant has been acquitted albeit in state court?
                       And  that's  the central  core issue  that has
                been troubling me  throughout this process since  the

                                         -7-
                                          7

            erroneously  denied  credit  under  the  Guidelines  for  his

            acceptance ofresponsibility forthe firearms andflight crimes.

            A.  Calculation of the Guidelines Sentence
                ______________________________________

                      Lombard received a life sentence  as a thrice-prior

            convicted felon  ostensibly for his unlawful  possession of a

            firearm  in violation of 18 U.S.C.    922(g) and 924(e).3  He

            was sentenced to the  statutory maximum of 60 months  for the

            conviction on the conspiracy  count, concurrent with the life

            sentence.4  Lombard  does not contend here  that the district
                                      ___

            court incorrectly  applied the Guidelines in  determining his

            life sentence, but rather argues that the manner in which the

                                
            ____________________

                trial and  during  the  presentence  conferences  and
                reviewing    the    presentence   report    and   the
                transcripts.

            3.  Section 922(g)(1) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
            person . . . who has been convicted in any court  of, a crime
            punishable  by imprisonment  for  a term  exceeding one  year
            . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,
            or  possess   in  or  affecting  commerce,   any  firearm  or
            ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
            been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce
            [paragraph structure omitted]."
                Section 924(e)(1) provides: "In the case of  a person who
            violates section 922(g) of this title and has  three previous
            convictions  by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of
            this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
            both, committed on occasions different from one another, such
            person  shall be fined  not more than  $25,000 and imprisoned
            not less  than fifteen years, and,  notwithstanding any other
            provision of  law, the court  shall not suspend  the sentence
            of, or  grant a  probationary sentence  to, such  person with
            respect to the conviction under section 922(g)."

            4.  Lombard has  not appealed the sentence  on the conspiracy
            conviction.

                                         -8-
                                          8

            Guidelines, as applied by  the court, required it  to conduct

            its factfinding  and mandated the life  sentence violated his

            constitutional rights.

                       The   specific   guideline   applicable   to   the

            defendant's   firearms   conviction  is   U.S.S.G.    2K2.1.5

            Subsection (a)(2) of the 1990 version of section 2K2.1 sets a

            BOL  of 12  "if the  defendant is  convicted under  18 U.S.C.

              922(g)  . . . ."6    The  "cross-reference"   provision  of

            subsection (c)(2)  of  section 2K2.1 directs  that "[i]f  the

            defendant used  or possessed  the firearm in  connection with

            commission  or attempted commission of another offense, apply

              2X1.1  . .  .  in respect  to  that other  offense, if  the

            resulting  offense  level  is greater  than  that  determined

            above."   U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c)(2)  (Nov. 1990).   Treating the

            murders as "another offense,"  and finding by a preponderance

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Although the November 1993  version of the Guidelines was
            in effect at the time  of Lombard's sentencing, the  district
            court applied the  1990 version, apparently  to avoid any  ex
                                                                       __
            post  facto concerns.  See United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d
            ____  _____            ___ _____________    _______
            64, 66 n.1  (1st Cir. 1991).   The outcome (a  mandatory life
            sentence) would not have been different had any later version
            of  the  Guidelines  been  applied.    All  citations to  the
            Guidelines are to the 1990 version, unless otherwise noted.

            6.  An  unadjusted  BOL  of  12  (given  defendant's criminal
            history category of VI) would have translated into a sentence
            of 30-37 months.  However, because defendant was sentenced as
            an  armed career  criminal  under 18  U.S.C.   924(e),  which
            provides for a 15-year minimum, his total offense level could
            not  have  been   any  lower   than  34,   even  apart   from
            consideration of the murders.  See U.S.S.G.   4B1.4(b)(3)(A).
                                           ___
            That offense  level would  have translated into  a Guidelines
            sentencing range of 262-327 months.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            of the evidence that  the defendant had committed  that other

            offense, the court applied section 2X1.1, which  directed the

            defendant's BOL to be  set at "[t]he base offense  level from

            the  guideline  for the  object  offense  . . . ."   U.S.S.G.

              2X1.1(a)  (Nov.  1990).   The  "object  offense" was  first

            degree murder, to which a BOL of  43 attaches.7  See U.S.S.G.
                                                             ___

              2A1.1.    Finding  no  basis  for  awarding  acceptance-of-

            responsibility credit, the  district court  assigned a  total

            offense  level of  43.   Because Lombard  was sentenced  as a

            career  criminal  under  18  U.S.C.    924(e),  there  was  a

            statutory  minimum  of  15  years, but  no  stated  statutory

            maximum  applicable; thus  no reduction  was  indicated under

            U.S.S.G.     5G1.1(a)   (which  requires   adjustment   of  a

            Guidelines sentence to comply  with the statutory maximum for

            the offense of conviction).  The defendant's final Guidelines

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The same result would obtain under the current version of
            the  Guidelines.   The  November  1991  amendment to  section
            2K2.1(c) created a specific provision for cases in which  the
            underlying  offense  conduct is  found  to  have resulted  in
            death.   See  U.S.S.G.  App.  C,  amend.  374.    The  cross-
                     ___
            reference, as amended, provides as follows:

                (1)  If the defendant  used or possessed  any firearm
                or ammunition  in connection with  the commission  or
                attempted commission of another offense, . . . apply
                . . .
                       (B)    if   death  resulted,  the   most
                       analogous offense guideline from Chapter
                       Two,  Part  A, Subpart 1  (Homicide), if
                       the resulting offense  level is  greater
                       than that determined above.

            U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c)(1)(B) (Nov. 1995).

                                         -10-
                                          10

            sentence  was  a mandatory  term of  life imprisonment.   See
                                                                      ___

            U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A  (assigning life sentence to BOL  of 43

            for all criminal history categories).

            B.  The Life Sentence
                _________________

                      The  mandatory imposition of  a life  sentence here

            raises  questions  of  whether  such a  result  was  strictly

            intended by the Sentencing  Guidelines and whether the method

            followed  to   produce  that  result  comports with  the  Due

            Process Clause.   Our focus is  on the process  by which  the

            result was reached.  Lombard makes no claim, nor could he, on

            the  facts here  that imposition  of a  life sentence  on him

            (accompanied by due process) would itself be unconstitutional

            under the Eighth Amendment.   Harmelin v. Michigan, 501  U.S.
                                          ________    ________

            957 (1991).  The life sentence  resulted from the convergence

            of  several doctrines  in sentencing  law,  each individually

            well accepted, and none of which individually is questionable

            here.   But just as folk  wisdom recognizes that the whole is

            often greater and different than simply the sum of its parts,

            these  individual doctrines,  each reflecting  compromises in

            our criminal jurisprudence, in  this extreme case threaten in

            combination to  erode rights  that the Constitution  does not

            permit to be compromised.

                      We take  as given that once  convicted, a defendant

            has  no  right  under the  Due  Process  Clause  to have  his

            sentencing determination be confined to facts proved beyond a

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                                          11

            reasonable  doubt.   McMillan  v. Pennsylvania,  477 U.S.  79
                                 ________     ____________

            (1986);  United States  v. Gonzalez-Vazquez,  34 F.3d  19, 25
                     _____________     ________________

            (1st Cir. 1994).   A sentencing court's operative factfinding

            is  generally  subject  only   to  a  "preponderance  of  the

            evidence" standard.   See United  States v. LaCroix,  28 F.3d
                                  ___ ______________    _______

            223, 231 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d
                                      _____________    ________

            13, 17 (1st  Cir. 1989);  United States v.  Wright, 873  F.2d
                                      _____________     ______

            437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989).  But cf. United States v. Kikumura,
                                       ___ ___ _____________    ________

            918 F.2d 1084, 1102  (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that  "clear and

            convincing"    standard    applies    in   certain    limited

            circumstances).    Nor  is  a  sentencing  court  limited  to

            considering  only  the conduct  of  which  the defendant  was

            formally charged or convicted.  Even before the advent of the

            Guidelines,  some sentencing  courts  took  into account  any

            information  known  to  them,  including  uncharged  relevant

            conduct.  See,  e.g., Nichols  v. United States,  114 S.  Ct.
                      __________  _______     _____________

            1921,  1928 (1994); Williams v.  New York, 337  U.S. 241, 246
                                ________     ________

            (1949); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387-88 (2d
                    _____________    __________

            Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (1993).
                        ____________

                      The Guidelines were not intended to discontinue the

            courts'  historical  practice  of  considering  the  relevant

            circumstances of the defendant's real  conduct, whether those

            circumstances were  specifically charged or not.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States v. Jackson, 3  F.3d 506, 509 (1st Cir.  1993); Wright,
            ______    _______                                     ______

            873 F.2d at  441; see generally  Stephen Breyer, The  Federal
                              _____________                  ____________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
            _____________________________________________________________

            Rest,  17 Hofstra  L. Rev.  1, 8-12  (1988).   As now-Justice
            ____

            Breyer noted,  the Guidelines  evince a compromise  between a

            pure   "charge  offense"   system  in  which   sentences  are

            determined based solely upon conduct  of which a defendant is

            convicted, and  a "real  offense" system, in  which sentences

            are  fashioned  in  view   of  all  relevant  mitigating  and

            aggravating factors surrounding the defendant's conduct.  See
                                                                      ___

            id.   A  sentencing court  may, therefore,  consider relevant
            ___

            conduct of  the defendant  for purposes of  making Guidelines

            determinations,  even if he has  not been charged  with   and

            indeed,  even if he has been  acquitted of   that conduct, so
                                          _________

            long as the conduct can  be proved by a preponderance  of the

            evidence.  See United States v.  Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 80 (1st
                       ___ _____________     ________

            Cir.  1993)  (reasoning  that   failure  of  proof  beyond  a

            reasonable doubt  does not preclude proof  by a preponderance

            of the  evidence),  cert. denied,  114  S. Ct.  1644  (1994);
                                ____________

            Jackson, 3 F.3d at 509; Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 17.  Resolution
            _______                 ________

            of this case does not require the questioning of any of these

            general  rules but does involve recognition that there may be

            limits to their application.

                      Both  the  Supreme   Court  and  this   court  have

            recognized that the Due  Process Clause itself imposes limits

            on  the application of these doctrines  in extreme cases, and

            we  must   interpret  the   Guidelines  in  light   of  those

                                         -13-
                                          13

            constraints.    This court  recognized  in  United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st  Cir. 1993), that there is  a range
            ______

            of discretion  left to  the district  courts even  within the

            Linnaean categorizations  of the Guidelines.   We hold, under

            Rivera,  that the  district court  did have  discretion here,
            ______

            which it thought it had not, to consider a downward departure

            from the life sentence.  Accordingly, we remand.

                      1.   The Tail That Wags the Dog
                           __________________________

                      The  Supreme Court  decisions on  sentencing, while

            generally endorsing  rules that permit  sentence enhancements

            to be based on conduct not proved to the same degree required

            to support a conviction, have  not embraced the concept  that

            those rules are free from constitutional constraints.  On the

            contrary,  the  Court  has  cautioned  against  permitting  a

            sentence  enhancement to be the  "tail which wags  the dog of

            the substantive offense."  McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
                                       ________

                      McMillan  involved  a challenge  to  a Pennsylvania
                      ________

            statute that  imposed a mandatory minimum  prison sentence of

            five  years  for  a  defendant  found  at  sentencing   by  a

            preponderance of  the evidence  to have "visibly  possessed a

            firearm" in connection with his  offense of conviction.   The

            Court held that the  statute did not violate the  Due Process

            Clause.    See  McMillan,   477  U.S.  at  92.   ("[W]e  have
                       ___  ________

            consistently   approved   sentencing  schemes   that  mandate

            consideration of  facts related  to the crime,  . . . without

                                         -14-
                                          14

            suggesting  that   those  facts  must  be   proved  beyond  a

            reasonable  doubt."  (citation  omitted)).    The Court  did,

            however, take pains to place limits upon its holding:

                      [The challenged  statute] operates solely
                      to    limit   the    sentencing   court's
                      discretion in selecting  a penalty within
                      the range already available to it without
                      the special finding of visible possession
                      of  a  firearm.   [The statute]  "ups the
                      ante" for  the defendant only by  raising
                      to five years  the minimum sentence which
                      may be imposed within the statutory plan.
                      The statute gives no impression of having
                      been  tailored  to   permit  the  visible
                      possession  finding to  be a  tail  which
                                                 ______________
                      wags the dog of the substantive offense.
                      _______________________________________

            Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
            ___

                      Here,  in contrast,  the tail  has wagged  the dog.

            The  consideration of  the  murders  at Lombard's  sentencing

            upstaged  his  conviction  for   firearms  possession.    The

            circumstances of this case that have combined to produce this

            effect  raise  grave constitutional  concerns,  although each

            doctrine  considered separately  might  not provoke  a second

            thought.  Cf. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-
                      ___ _____________    _________

            96 (1st Cir. 1993) (circumstances that individually might not

            warrant  appellate relief "may  in the aggregate  have a more

            debilitating effect"  and that a cumulation  of circumstances

            "may sometimes  have a logarithmic effect,  producing a total

            impact  greater than  the arithmetic  sum of  its constituent

            parts"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994).
                     ____________

                                         -15-
                                          15

                      The  effect here  has been  to permit  the harshest

            penalty outside of  capital punishment to be imposed  not for

            conduct charged  and convicted  but for  other conduct  as to

            which there was, at sentencing, at best a shadow of the usual

            procedural  protections such  as  the  requirement  of  proof

            beyond a reasonable doubt.  This other conduct   murder   was

            surely of the  most serious sort, but exactly  the sort as to

            which our jurisprudence  normally requires the government  to

            meet its  full burden of  proof.  When  put to that  proof in

            state court,  the government failed.   The punishment imposed

            in view of this  other conduct far outstripped in  degree and

            kind the punishment Lombard would otherwise have received for

            the offense  of conviction.  There was no safety valve, or so

            thought the trial judge, to adjust the Guidelines sentence of

            life  imprisonment  to assure  consideration  of  the penalty

            imposed in light of the process followed.  And that, in turn,

            raises  questions as to  whether Lombard received,  as to his

            sentence, the process that the Constitution says was due.

                      While  we  discuss individual  concerns,  we stress

            that it is the  interplay amongst these concerns which  is of

            import,  and none  of these  concerns should  be examined  in

            isolation.  We  start with the  paramount seriousness of  the

            ostensibly "enhancing" conduct at issue.   A charge of murder

            represents   the  very   archetype   of  conduct   that  "has

            historically  been  treated   in  the  Anglo-American   legal

                                         -16-
                                          16

            tradition  as  requiring proof  beyond  a  reasonable doubt."

            McMillan,  477  U.S.  at  90 (citation  and  quotation  marks
            ________

            omitted).  Thus, a  rule structure that bars conviction  of a

            firearms charge  except on  proof beyond a  reasonable doubt,

            but  then permits imposition of a life sentence upon proof of

            a  murder by  a  preponderance of  the evidence  attaches, in

            effect, the  lesser procedural protections to  the issue that

            would naturally be viewed as having the greater significance.

                      That anomaly is heightened  by the specific  manner

            in  which  the  Guidelines  operated here.    Unlike  certain

            "relevant  conduct"  guidelines   that  simply  call   for  a

            determinate increase in a  defendant's BOL based on specified

            factual  findings, see, e.g., U.S.S.G.   2D1.1(b)(1) (calling
                               _________

            for  two-level increase  in BOL  for drug  conviction upon  a

            finding that a  firearm was  possessed), the  cross-reference

            provision that was applied in this case, U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c),

            required the district court to calculate Lombard's  BOL as if
                                                                    _____

            his offense  of conviction  had been  murder.   See  U.S.S.G.
                                                            ___

               2K2.1(c), 2X1.1 (Nov. 1990).8

                      Particularly in light of  the absence of any stated
                                                    _____________________

            statutory  maximum for  the firearms  offense, see  18 U.S.C.
            __________________                             ___

              924(e),  the cross-reference  to  the  first-degree  murder

                                
            ____________________

            8.  The current  version of the cross-reference  is even more
            explicit, directing the court to apply,  in cases where death
            resulted  from the  defendant's  offense  conduct, "the  most
            analogous offense guideline from Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart
            1 (Homicide)."  U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c)(1)(B) (Nov. 1995).

                                         -17-
                                          17

            guideline  essentially displaced  the lower  Guidelines range
                                   _________

            that otherwise would have applied.  As a result, the sentence

            to be imposed for Lombard's  firearms conviction was the same

            as  the sentence that would  have been imposed  for a federal

            murder conviction:  a mandatory  term of  life.   Despite the

            nominal characterization  of the murders as  conduct that was

            considered in "enhancing"  or "adjusting" Lombard's  firearms

            conviction, the reality is that  the murders were treated  as

            the gravamen of the offense.

                      As the enhancing conduct  in this case was serious,

            so  too was the "enhancement."  Attribution of the murders to

            Lombard  operated not merely to ratchet up his prison term by

            some fractional  increment, but  rather wholly to  remove the

            defendant's sentence  from  the term-of-years  continuum  and

            transform it  into a life  sentence without  the prospect  of

            parole.   That punishment represents "the  second most severe

            penalty known to the law," Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991)
                                       ________

            (Scalia,  J.).   It  qualitatively  differs  from any  lesser

            sentence in  resting upon a determination  that the "criminal

            conduct is so atrocious that society's interest in deterrence

            and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform

            or rehabilitation of the perpetrator."  Id. at 2719 (Stevens,
                                                    ___

            J.,  dissenting) (citation and  quotation marks omitted); see
                                                                      ___

            also  Helm v.  Solem, 684 F.2d  582, 585 (8th  Cir. 1982) ("A
            ____  ____     _____

            life sentence  without parole  differs  qualitatively from  a

                                         -18-
                                          18

            sentence  for  a term  of  years" because  it  represents the

            "total[] reject[ion] of rehabilitation as a basic goal of our

            criminal justice system."),  aff'd, 463 U.S. 277  (1983).  In
                                         _____

            short,  the  enhancement  at  issue not  only  increased  the

            duration of Lombard's sentence,  but placed his punishment on

            an entirely different order of severity.

                      This  qualitative  difference   between  the   life

            sentence  imposed and the  term of  years that  Lombard might

            otherwise have received as  a prior offender (262-327 months)

            implicates basic concerns of proportionality both between the

            enhancement  and base  sentence and  between the  offense and

            punishment as  a whole.   Even if these  concerns, considered

            alone, might not  rise fully to  the level of  constitutional

            significance, they  further distinguish  this case  from less

            troubling ones.  The  comparative severity of the enhancement

            invites scrutiny  of the  weight given  to factfinding as  to

            ostensibly "enhancing" conduct (the murders) allocated to the

            sentencing  phase, with its looser procedural constraints and

            lesser  burden of  proof.    It  raises  the  danger  of  the

            defendant's trial and conviction being turned into a means of

            achieving an  end that  could not  be achieved  directly: the

            imposition  of  a  life  sentence "enhancement"  based  on  a

            federally unprosecutable murder.  In its interaction with the

            other concerns  we describe, there is also an issue as to the

            proportion  between  the  gravity  of  Lombard's  offense  of

                                         -19-
                                          19

            conviction and the  severity of  his punishment.   If a  life

            sentence without  parole is  appropriate for murder,  in most

            instances that  sentence might appear to  be harsh punishment

            for  the unlawful  possession of  a rifle,  even by  a career

            criminal.   While  one  may doubt  whether  there are  Eighth

            Amendment concerns9  lurking here, cf. Harmelin,  501 U.S. at
                                               ___ ________

            997-1001 (Opinion of  Kennedy, J.), the harshness of the life

            sentence in relation to  the offense of conviction highlights

            the need for rigorous inquiry.10

                      Without  impugning  the  principle  that  acquitted

            conduct  may  be  considered  in  determining  a  defendant's

            sentence, the  prior state  court acquittal presents  another

            concern  in  its interaction  here.   Lombard  put  the Maine

            government to its proof on the charges of murder against him,

            and a state court jury determined that reasonable doubt as to

            his guilt persisted.  The federal prosecution followed on the

            heels of the acquittal.   As the particular murders  at issue

                                
            ____________________

            9.  Interestingly, the  Constitution of  the  State of  Maine
            contains  an  explicit   proportionality  guarantee:   "[A]ll
            penalties  and  punishments  shall  be  proportional  to  the
            offence."    Me. Const.  art. I,    9.   Thus,  it is  a fair
            question whether the Maine  Constitution would have permitted
            the  resulting  sentence here  if  Maine  had done  what  the
            federal prosecution did.

            10.  It  bears  emphasis that  the  perceived  severity of  a
            sentence is not,  standing alone, a basis  for departing from
            the Guidelines  sentencing range.  United  States v. Jackson,
                                               ______________    _______
            30 F.3d 199, 203-04 (1st Cir. 1994).  Here, the  magnitude of
            the  sentence enhancement is  of concern only  when viewed in
            its interaction with the other aspects of this case.

                                         -20-
                                          20

            were outside the sphere  of the federal prosecutor's criminal

            charging power as  to murder,11 Lombard was not  charged with

            murder in the federal indictment; the murders themselves were

            not  alleged by  the  government  to  be  an  object  of  the

            defendants' conspiracy; and the  federal jury was required to

            make no factual determination regarding the commission of the

            murders.  Yet it  would ignore reality not to  recognize that

            the  federal prosecution arose out  of and was  driven by the

            murders,  and that  the prosecution  was well aware  that the

            Sentencing  Guidelines would  require  consideration  of  the

            murders at  sentencing.   This reality was  reflected in  the

            prosecution's statement at the pre-sentencing conference that

            "it  was  quite clear  from  the beginning;  Mr.  Lombard was

            looking  at a  life sentence."   The  government, by  its own

                                
            ____________________

            11.  The  government conceded  at oral argument  that Lombard
            and  Hartley could  not have  been charged  under any  of the
            federal  murder  statutes.   See,  e.g.,  18 U.S.C.     1111,
                                         __________
            2113(e), 2118(c)(2); 21 U.S.C.   848(e).  The murders did not
            take  place   on  any  federal  installation,   were  not  in
            connection  with the robbery of a federally insured bank or a
            robbery involving  federally controlled substances,  nor were
            committed in  the course of a  continuing criminal enterprise
            as defined  by federal law.   Whether or not it  could do so,
            the  fact is that Congress  has chosen not  to federalize the
            state crime of murder in cases like Lombard's, and so has not
            authorized reprosecution for murder  pursuant to the doctrine
            of separate sovereignties.  See  Abbate v. United States, 359
                                        ___  ______    _____________
            U.S. 187 (1959).  Thus, the issue raised is not one of Double
            Jeopardy, nor, strictly speaking, of the reach of the federal
            power, but one of  Due Process: whether the sentencing  court
            is precluded  from considering that the Sentencing Guidelines
            as applied,  through  the vehicle  of  sentence  enhancement,
            effectively punishes  the defendant  for conduct as  to which
            there exists  no statutory authorization  for the  government
            even to prosecute.

                                         -21-
                                          21

            words, had intended  "from the beginning" that  consideration

            of the murders would result in a life sentence.

                      Through the post-trial  adjudication of the murders

            under  a lesser  standard of  proof, the  federal prosecution

            obtained   precisely  the   result  that   the   Maine  state

            prosecutors attempted,  but failed,  to obtain.   The federal

            prosecution may well have done better.  The net effect of the

            Guidelines  attribution  of   the  murders   to  Lombard   as

            understood by the district court was to mandate imposition of
                                                    _______

            a life sentence.   This  was the maximum  that Lombard  could
                                             _______

            have  received had he been  convicted of murder  in the Maine

            state  court.   See  Me. Rev.  Stat.  Ann. tit.  17-A,   1251
                            ___

            (setting minimum  sentence of 25 years and  maximum of life).

            Indeed,  a   state  murder  conviction  might   have  yielded

            something less severe than a life sentence.  See State v. St.
                                                         ___ _____    ___

            Pierre,  584  A.2d  618,  621-22 (Me.  1990)  (vacating  life
            ______

            sentence  and reducing sentence  to term  of 45  years, where

            although  defendant "committed  a brutal murder,"  the record

            failed to "establish behavior at the outermost portion of the

            range  of  cruelty  that  would  constitute  the  aggravating

            circumstances of  extreme cruelty").12   In any event,  in no
                                                                       __

                                
            ____________________

            12.  If  Lombard had  been convicted of  murder in  the Maine
            state court and received  a sentence of a  term of years,  he
            would have been eligible to receive credit against time to be
            served under the "good  time" provisions of state  law, which
            are   considerably  more   generous   than  similar   federal
            provisions.  Compare Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,   1253(3)
                         _______
            (entitling  any person sentenced to  a term of  more than six

                                         -22-
                                          22

            circumstances under Maine law would Lombard have been subject
            _____________

            to a mandatory life sentence.  See State v. Shortsleeves, 580
                 _________                 ___ _____    ____________

            A.2d 145, 149-50 (Me. 1990); St. Pierre, 584 A.2d at 621.
                                         __________

                      Although Lombard's firearms offense was the vehicle

            by which  he was  brought into  the federal  criminal justice

            system, the life sentence  resulted from the district court's

            finding    that   the   defendant   had   committed   murder.

            Characterized in  other terms, through the  mechanisms of the

            Guidelines and  accompanying legal doctrines,  the sentencing

            phase of the defendant's trial produced the conclusion he had

            committed murder and mandated  imposition of a life sentence,

            but  without   the  protections  which  normally  attend  the

            criminal process,  such as the requirement of  proof beyond a

            reasonable  doubt.    Given  the magnitude  of  the  sentence

            "enhancement," the seriousness of the  "enhancing" conduct in

            relation  to the  offense  of conviction,  and the  seemingly

            mandatory  imposition  of  the  life  sentence,  this summary

            process  effectively  overshadowed  the  firearms  possession

            charge  and  raises  serious   questions  as  to  the  proper

            allocation of  the procedural protections attendant  to trial

            versus sentencing.  See United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42,
                                ___ _____________    _______

                                
            ____________________

            months  "to receive  a deduction  of 10  days each  month for
            observing all rules of  the department and institution") with
                                                                     ____
            18  U.S.C.   3624(b) (permitting up  to 54 days  of good time
            credit per year to  prisoners serving terms of more  than one
            year  but less  than  life but  allowing  no such  credit  to
            persons serving a sentence for a crime of violence).

                                         -23-
                                          23

            47 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e agree that there is a constitutional

            requirement of some rough proportionality between  the weight

            of  the evidence of the  uncharged conduct and  the degree of

            [the sentencing] adjustment . . . .").  We would be hard  put

            to think  of a better example  of a case in  which a sentence

            "enhancement" might  be described as  a "tail which  wags the

            dog" of the defendant's offense of conviction.  McMillan, 477
                                                            ________

            U.S. at 88.

                      The convergence of circumstances and processes that

            yielded Lombard's life sentence distinguishes this case  from

            United States v. Mocciola,  891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st  Cir. 1989),
            _____________    ________

            and its progeny.  Mocciola itself involved the attribution to
                              ________

            the defendant  of an  acquitted firearms offense  pursuant to

            U.S.S.G.   2D1.1(b)(1)13  and  rejected the  contention  that

            consideration of the acquitted conduct (under a preponderance

            of the evidence standard) was unconstitutional.  Id. (quoting
                                                             ___

            McMillan, 477  U.S. at 91, and Wright, 873 F.2d at 441).  The
            ________                       ______

            acquitted conduct considered in Mocciola, a firearms offense,
                                            ________

            was well  within the sphere of  ordinary federal prosecution.

            The  consideration of the acquitted conduct in Mocciola had a
                                                           ________

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The defendant had pleaded guilty on a cocaine conspiracy
            charge,  but went to trial  and was acquitted  by the federal
            jury  on a firearms possession charge arising out of the same
            course of conduct.  See Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 14.
                                ___ ________

                                         -24-
                                          24

            relatively limited effect, simply increasing  the sentence by

            two offense levels (15 months).  See id. at 15, 17.14
                                             ___ ___

                      In United States  v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d  70 (1st Cir.
                         _____________     ________

            1993),  cert.  denied,  114  S. Ct.  1644  (1994),  defendant
                    _____________

            Patriarca's  appeal  raised  the  question  whether "relevant

            conduct" under U.S.S.G.   1B1.3  could include two murders of

            which  Patriarca himself had not  been charged, but which had

            been committed in furtherance of  the conspiracy to which  he

            had pleaded  guilty.  This court answered in the affirmative,

            reversing the district judge's conclusion.  See id. at 80-81.
                                                        ___ ___

                      Carrozza  supports  the  analysis  here  in several
                      ________

            important respects.  Although defendant Patriarca himself had

            not been charged federally  with murder, at least one  of his

            confederates had pleaded guilty to such a charge in a related

                                
            ____________________

            14.  At least two post-Mocciola  cases from this circuit were
                                   ________
            likewise  decided  on facts  dissimilar to  the circumstances
            here.  See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 23-
                   ___ _____________    ________________
            26 (1st  Cir. 1994)  (upholding, after drug  conviction, two-
            level  sentence enhancement  under U.S.S.G.    2D1.1(b)(1) in
            view  of conduct  alleged  in a  dismissed firearms  charge);
            United  States v. Jackson, 3 F.3d 506, 509-10 (1st Cir. 1993)
            ______________    _______
            (same, in view of uncharged conduct of which co-defendant was
            acquitted).
                 Also, in   United States  v. LaCroix, 28  F.3d 223  (1st
                            _____________     _______
            Cir. 1994), the  holding of Mocciola was restated  in dictum,
                                        ________
            but the only issue was whether certain financial losses could
            be attributed  to the defendant under  the "relevant conduct"
            provision  of  U.S.S.G.    1B1.3(a)(1)   (June  1988).    The
            defendant  had  been  convicted   as  a  participant  in  the
            conspiracy  that  caused  those  losses,  but  the  jury  had
            deadlocked on  the substantive counts.   The jury's inability
            to  reach consensus on the substantive counts was held not to
            preclude a  finding that the  losses were foreseeable  to the
            defendant  as a convicted co-conspirator.  See id. at 230-31.
                                                       ___ ___
            LaCroix does not aid the resolution of this case.
            _______

                                         -25-
                                          25

            case.  See United States v. Patriarca, 807 F.  Supp. 165, 185
                   ___ _____________    _________

            (D.  Mass. 1992), vacated,  Carrozza, 4 F.3d  70.  Certainly,
                              _______   ________

            there  had  been  no   acquittal.    Even  more  importantly,

            Carrozza's holding was based  on the explicit assumption that
            ________

            consideration of the murders  would not necessarily result in
                                                ___

            a life sentence.  In fact, the  district court had refused to

            consider  the  uncharged  murders  in  sentencing  Patriarca,

            troubled  by the prospect of exposing the defendant to a life

            sentence  on the  basis  of uncharged  conduct.   This  court

            rejected  the  premise  of  the  district  court's   concern,
                           _______

            explaining that  Patriarca's offenses  of  conviction    RICO

            violations    carried statutory  maximum sentences of  twenty
                                             _______               ______

            years each.  See  Carrozza, 4 F.3d at 81.   But even so,  the
            _____        ___  ________

            panel was  careful to  reserve decision  as to  whether there

            might remain a basis  for concern if the district  court were

            to order Patriarca to serve consecutive twenty-year sentences
                                        ___________

            on  each  of  his   three  RICO  convictions,  the  practical

            equivalent of a life sentence.  The court openly acknowledged

            that it was troubled by this potentiality:

                      At least one member of the panel believes
                      that serious  constitutional concerns may
                      arise   if   the   defendant   ultimately
                      receives  the   equivalent  of   a   life
                      sentence  on the ground of his connection
                      with a  murder  for  which he  was  never
                      indicted, tried or convicted by a jury.

            See id. at 81 n.9.
            ___ ___

                                         -26-
                                          26

                      The situation hypothesized in Carrozza is closer to
                                                    ________

            the  one  we  face  here,  with  added  amplifying  elements.

            Lombard was acquitted of  the murders by a state  court jury.
                        _________

            Nonetheless he received  not just "the  equivalent of a  life

            sentence" based  on attribution  of the  murders, but  a true

            life sentence, and  a mandatory  one at that.   Further,  the

            sentence  imposed may have been even more severe than what he

            would have received had he been convicted in state court.  We

            believe,  as  did  "at least  one  member  of  the panel"  in

            Carrozza, that  the life sentence imposed  upon the defendant
            ________

            raises "serious constitutional concerns."  Id.
                                                       ___

                      These  concerns  are   reinforced  by  the  Supreme

            Court's recent  discussion in Witte v. United  States, 115 S.
                                          _____    ______________

            Ct. 2199 (1995).   The  Court framed its  analysis by  asking

            when  a  sentence  enhancement  can  properly  be  viewed  as

            punishment  for  the offense  of  conviction,  as opposed  to
                        ___

            punishment  for  the  enhancing  conduct.    While  the  case
                        ___

            involved a Double Jeopardy  and not a Due Process  challenge,

            its discussion is instructive here: if the life sentence that

            Lombard received  can realistically  be viewed  as punishment

            for the  murders, as opposed  to punishment for  the firearms
            ___

            offense,   the  constitutional  difficulties  alluded  to  in

            McMillan then come to the fore.
            ________

                      In  Witte, the  defendant had  been convicted  on a
                          _____

            marijuana charge,  then received  an enhanced prison  term in

                                         -27-
                                          27

            view of certain cocaine-related "relevant conduct" considered

            at  sentencing.  Later, the defendant was prosecuted for that

            same cocaine-related conduct.  He objected on double jeopardy

            grounds, arguing that  he had already  been punished for  the
                                                                 ___

            cocaine-related conduct by virtue of the sentence enhancement

            following  the  marijuana  conviction.    The  Supreme  Court

            disagreed and held  that the defendant  had been punished  in

            the first prosecution only for the offense of conviction (the
                                       ___

            marijuana  charge),  even  though  the  sentencing court  had

            considered  the  cocaine-related conduct  in  calculating his

            sentence.  See  id. at 2207.  In so  concluding, however, the
                       ___  ___

            Court  emphasized  that  the  sentence  for  the  defendant's

            offense of  conviction (the  marijuana charge) had  carried a

            statutory maximum,  and the "enhancement" to  the defendant's

            sentence had  merely fixed the  term of imprisonment  at some

            point closer to (but still below) that maximum:

                      The relevant  conduct provisions  of  the
                      Sentencing    Guidelines    . . .     are
                      sentencing  enhancement  regimes evincing
                      the judgment  that a  particular  offense
                      should receive  a more  serious  sentence
                      within  the authorized  range  if  it was
                      _____________________________
                      either  accompanied  by  or  preceded  by
                      additional criminal activity.  Petitioner
                                                     __________
                      does not  argue that  the range  fixed by
                      _________________________________________
                      Congress is so broad,  and the  enhancing
                      _________________________________________
                      role  played by  the relevant  conduct so
                      _________________________________________
                      significant,  that consideration  of that
                      _________________________________________
                      conduct in sentencing has become  "a tail
                      _________________________________________
                      which  wags  the  dog of  the substantive
                      _________________________________________
                      offense."    McMillan,  477  U.S.  at  88
                      ________     ________
                      . . . .   We   hold   that,   where   the
                      legislature   has   authorized   such   a
                      particular punishment range  for a  given
                      ___________________________

                                         -28-
                                          28

                      crime, the resulting sentence within that
                                                    ___________
                      range constitutes punishment only for the
                      _____
                      offense of conviction for purposes of the
                      double jeopardy inquiry.

            Witte,  115 S. Ct.  at 2208  (emphases added,  some citations
            _____

            omitted).

                      This   case   presents   precisely  the   troubling

            situation  that Witte  makes  an effort  to distinguish:  the
                            _____

            applicable statutory sentencing range (fifteen years minimum,

            no  stated maximum)  is quite broad,  and the  enhancing role

            played  by   the  relevant  conduct      the  murders      is

            inordinately  significant.   The  effect  of considering  the

            murders was not just to fix Lombard's sentence at some higher
                        ___

            point within a particular range delimited by Congress for the

            firearms offense.15   Instead, the  Guidelines, combined with

                                
            ____________________

            15.  This is  in striking contrast  to the case  of Lombard's
            co-defendant, Hartley.   After he pleaded guilty, Count  3 of
            the indictment was  dismissed as to  him on the  government's
            motion.  Hartley's  BOL of 12 as to Count  1, with a criminal
            history category of I, would have yielded a sentence of 10-16
            months. The district court  found that Hartley, like Lombard,
            was  subject to  the  cross-reference  provision of  U.S.S.G.
              2K2.1(c).   But,  as  the government  informed  us at  oral
            argument,  Hartley   who did not qualify as a career criminal
              had the  benefit of  a five-year statutory  maximum on  his
                                     _________
            conviction  under Count 1, see 18 U.S.C.   371, which is what
                                       ___
            he received after his plea.  (Had Count 3 not been dismissed,
            Hartley  likely  would  have  been subject  to  the  ten-year
                                                                 ________
            statutory  maximum contained  in  18  U.S.C.   924(a)(2)  for
            aiding  and  abetting  the  firearms  offense.)    Thus,  for
            Hartley,   consideration  of   the  murders   under  U.S.S.G.
              2K2.1(c)  only had  the effect  of increasing  his sentence
            from a base of 10-16 months to the  statutory maximum of five
            years, even though Tammy Theriault's testimony indicated that
            Hartley  shared at  least equal  blame  with Lombard  for the
                                _____
            murders.

                                         -29-
                                          29

            the  absence  of  a  stated  statutory  maximum,  essentially

            required  the  district  court  to  determine Lombard's  base

            offense level as if his offense of conviction had been first-
                          _____

            degree  murder.16    See  U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c).    This  comes
                                 ___

            perilously close,  we believe,  to punishing Lombard  for the
                                                                  ___

            ostensibly "enhancing" conduct, the murders.17

                                
            ____________________

            16.  Cases  from other circuits addressing the permissibility
            of considering acquitted (or uncharged) conduct at sentencing
            generally  have involved  only modest sentence  increases, or
            increases  that were  within a  stated statutory  maximum, or
            both, and so provide little guidance here.  See, e.g., United
                                                        _________  ______
            States  v.  Hunter,  19  F.3d 895,  896-97  (4th  Cir.  1994)
            ______      ______
            (affirming  2-level sentence  enhancement on  drug conviction
            based  on an  acquitted  firearms charge);  United States  v.
                                                        _____________
            Smith,  5  F.3d  259,   261-62  (7th  Cir.  1993)  (affirming
            _____
            imposition  of  statutory maximum  sentence  of  5 years  for
            firearms  conviction  based  on  finding at  sentencing  that
            defendant  had committed  second degree  murder,  even though
            defendant had been convicted only of involuntary manslaughter
            in  state court);  United States  v. Galloway, 976  F.2d 414,
                               _____________     ________
            424-26   (8th   Cir.   1992)   (en   banc,   7-5)  (approving
            consideration   of  uncharged   property  theft   to  enhance
            sentencing range on conviction  for interstate theft from 21-
            27 months  to 63-78  months, where statutory  maximum was  10
            years),  cert. denied, 113 S.  Ct. 1420 (1993); United States
                     ____________                           _____________
            v. Bronaugh, 895 F.2d 247,  250-52 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming
               ________
            increase of sentence for firearms conviction from range of 4-
            27  months to  statutory  maximum  of  five years,  based  on
            uncharged  drug  trafficking   offenses);  United  States  v.
                                                       ______________
            Juarez-Ortega,  866 F.2d  747,  748-49 (5th  Cir. 1989)  (per
            _____________
            curiam) (affirming increase of sentence  for drug conviction,
            within statutory maximum, based on consideration of acquitted
            firearms charge).

            17.  The application of section 2K2.1(c) here might be viewed
            as being  less  like the  sentencing statute  approved of  in
            McMillan  and  similar  cases,   and  more  like  the  scheme
            ________
            invalidated in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607 (1967).
                           ______    _________
            In Specht, the Court  held that where the defendant  had been
               ______
            convicted  under a  sex offender  statute carrying  a 10-year
            maximum  penalty,   the  state  could   not  constitutionally
            sentence him without a hearing (with appropriate  protections
            such as the  right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses)

                                         -30-
                                          30

                      In  the aftermath  of Witte,  this court  in United
                                            _____                  ______

            States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993 (1st Cir. 1995), recently
            ______    ____________

            noted  that the manner in  which a sentence  is enhanced over

            and  above  the sentence  that  a  defendant would  otherwise

            receive is subject to constitutional limits:

                      [T]he   burgeoning    use   of   sentence
                      enhancers by Congress  and the Sentencing
                      Commission  as part  of the  catechism of
                      punishment poses an  obvious danger that,
                      in  extreme circumstances,  the lagniappe
                      might begin to overwhelm the main course.
                      In    all    probability,    there    are
                      constitutional   limits    on   the   way
                      sentencing factors can be deployed in the
                      punishment of a substantive offense.

            Id. at 1001.
            ___

                      There  is substantial reason  for concern  that the

            "enhancement" that produced  Lombard's life sentence exceeded

            these limits.   The convergence that  produced Lombard's life

            sentence, we believe,  is exactly the reason for  the Supreme

            Court's reserve  in McMillan and  in Witte when  it carefully
                                ________         _____

            withheld   its   constitutional  blessing   for   a  sentence

            "enhancement" that  would be a "tail which wags the dog" of a

            defendant's   offense   of   conviction.     That   troubling

            hypothetical is the reality here.

                                
            ____________________

            under   a  separate   but  related  statute   that  permitted
            imposition of a sentence of 1 day to life based on proof that
            the  defendant posed a threat  of bodily harm  to the public.
            Cf.  Galloway,  976 F.2d  at  441-42 (en  banc)  (Bright, J.,
            ___  ________
            dissenting)  (comparing  operation  of the  relevant  conduct
            provision of U.S.S.G.   1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1991) to the scheme
            invalidated in Specht).
                           ______

                                         -31-
                                          31

                      2.   Considering  Departure: Outside
                           _______________________________
                           the "Heartland"
                           ______________

                      Against this  background, we look  first to whether

            the  Guidelines themselves  are indeed  so inflexible  as the

            government  urged at  sentencing,  or whether  they permit  a

            different result, and if so, whether  that result would avoid

            the constitutional issue.  See United States v. Monsanto, 491
                                       ___ _____________    ________

            U.S. 600,  611 (1989); Edward  J. DeBartolo Corp.  v. Florida
                                   __________________________     _______

            Gulf  Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
            __________________________________________

            (1988).  We hold that a sentence of life imprisonment was not

            an inexorable outcome under the Guidelines, that this case is

            within the scope of section 5K2.0 which provides flexibility,

            and  that, under our  decision in Rivera,  the district court
                                              ______

            had authority  to avoid any unfairness  in Lombard's sentence

            through the mechanism of downward departure.

                      The principles governing downward  departures under

            the  Sentencing Guidelines  were comprehensively  outlined by

            this court in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir.
                          _____________    ______

            1993),  and  we apply  its  teachings  here.   A  fundamental

            premise of the Sentencing  Guidelines is that "each guideline

            . . .  carv[es] out  a 'heartland,'  a set  of  typical cases

            embodying   the  conduct  that   each  guideline  describes."

            U.S.S.G. Ch.  1, Pt. A,  intro. comment. (4)(b);  see Rivera,
                                                              ___ ______

            994  F.2d  at  947.    As the  Sentencing  Commission  itself

            recognized,  however, some  cases will  involve circumstances

            that make them atypical and  remove them from the "heartland"

                                         -32-
                                          32

            of  a  guideline's literal  scope.   U.S.S.G.  Ch. 1,  Pt. A,

            intro.  comment.  (4)(b).   A case  that  falls outside  of a

            guideline's heartland "is, by definition, an 'unusual  case'"

            and therefore  a candidate for downward  or upward departure.

            Rivera,  994 F.2d  at  947.   The  basic question,  then,  is
            ______

            simply:  "Does this  case fall within the 'heartland,'  or is

            it an unusual case?"  Id. at 948.
                                  ___

                      The  Sentencing Commission has  been explicit that,

            with  several  notable  exceptions  not  applicable here,  it

            "d[id] not intend to  limit the kinds of factors,  whether or

            not  mentioned anywhere  else in  the guidelines,  that could

            constitute  grounds   for  departure  in  an  unusual  case."

            U.S.S.G.  Ch.  1,  Pt.  A,  intro.  comment.  (4)(b).     The

            Guidelines themselves recognize that  even if a case presents

            no  circumstances  specifically  identified   as  permissible

            grounds  for departure,  the case  may still  be sufficiently

            unusual to warrant it:

                      Circumstances that  may warrant departure
                      from  the  guidelines  pursuant  to  this
                      provision cannot, by  their very  nature,
                      be comprehensively listed and analyzed in
                      advance.  The controlling decision  as to
                      whether and  to what extent departure  is
                      warranted can only be made by the courts.
                      . . .  Any case  may involve  factors  in
                      addition to  those identified  that  have
                      not been given  adequate consideration by
                      the  Commission.   Presence of  any  such
                      factor  may  warrant  departure  from the
                      guidelines, under  some circumstances, in
                      the discretion of the sentencing court.

                                         -33-
                                          33

            U.S.S.G.   5K2.0.   The  commentary to section  5K2.0 further

            provides  that  even  where  various   single  circumstances,

            considered individually,  might be insufficient  to permit  a

            finding  that a case is outside the heartland of a particular

            guideline, the presence of those circumstances in combination

            might permit a different assessment:

                      The  Commission  does  not  foreclose the
                      possibility  of   an  extraordinary  case
                      that, because of a  combination of  . . .
                      characteristics  or  circumstances  [that
                      separately would  not warrant departure],
                      differs     significantly     from    the
                      "heartland"   cases    covered   by   the
                      guidelines in a  way that is important to
                      the  statutory  purposes  of  sentencing,
                      even though none  of the  characteristics
                      or       circumstances       individually
                      distinguishes the case.

            U.S.S.G.   5K2.0,  comment. (Nov. 1995).18   The  Guidelines,

            in  short, do  not always  mandate the  appropriate sentence.

            See  Rivera,   994  F.2d  at  949   ("Ultimately,  . . .  the
            ___  ______

            Guidelines cannot dictate how  courts should sentence in such

            special, unusual or other-than-ordinary circumstances.").

                      Although   the  district   court  is   entitled  to

            considerable "leeway" in its determination of whether a given

                                
            ____________________

            18.  Amendments  to  the  Guidelines  that  are  intended  to
            clarify rather than change the Guidelines' operation, such as
            _______
            the 1994  amendments to the commentary  to section 5K2.0, may
            be  applied retroactively.  See United States v. Doe, 18 F.3d
                                        ___ _____________    ___
            41, 47  (1st Cir. 1994); see  also LaCroix, 28 F.3d  at 227 &
                                     _________ _______
            n.4 (stating  that  clarifying amendments  to the  Guidelines
            "may  be taken into account retrospectively,  not only by the
            sentencing  court  . . .  but  also  on  appeal"   (citations
            omitted)).

                                         -34-
                                          34

            set of circumstances renders a particular case "unusual," id.
                                                                      ___

            at  951, this court  has plenary review  over legal questions

            involving  interpretation  of  the  Guidelines  and  over the

            district court's determination of whether it had authority to

            depart  based on  its assessment  of the  relevant sentencing

            facts.  See id. at 951.
                    ___ ___

                      Here, the  district court did  not consider whether

            departure would have been appropriate under U.S.S.G.   5K2.0.

            At Lombard's sentencing hearing, the district court expressed

            considerable  unease  at  the  sentence  of  mandatory   life

            imprisonment that  had resulted  from  its consideration,  as

            required   by   the   Guidelines,  of   Lombard's   acquitted

            conduct.19    The  government   asserted  at  the  sentencing

            hearing that the  Guidelines "leave this court  in essence no
                                                                       __

            discretion  whatsoever  to   sentence  [Lombard]  below  life
            __________  __________

            imprisonment  [emphasis added]."   The district court thought

            that  it lacked authority  to impose any  sentence other than

            life imprisonment.  The  court also did not consider  whether

            the  constitutional questions  raised by  the  mandatory life

            sentence might warrant a finding that this case falls outside

            the  heartland  of  the   applicable  guideline.    Thus,  we

            conclude, as did the court in Rivera, that the district court
                                          ______

                                
            ____________________

            19.  For example, the district court worried: "The problem is
            that  th[is] scenario is very difficult for me to accept when
            the  whole concept of our criminal justice system is based on
            innocent until proven guilty, and when there is an acquittal,
            there has been no proof of guilt."

                                         -35-
                                          35

            erroneously  believed  it had  no power  to deviate  from the

            sentence  indicated by a  straightforward application  of the

            Guidelines and "did not  realize that it had the  legal power

            to    consider   [downward]   departure"   in   the   special

            circumstances presented.  See Rivera, 994 F.2d at 953.
                                      ___ ______

                      The facts and circumstances  of this case present a

            whole greater than the  sum of its parts and  distinguish it,

            from a constitutional perspective, from other cases that have

            involved facially similar issues.  The specific question from

            the perspective of the  Guidelines and under U.S.S.G.   5K2.0

            is whether these features of the case   e.g., the state court
                                                    ____

            acquittal and the  fact that the federal  sentence may exceed

            any  state  sentence that  would  have attached  to  a murder

            conviction;  the  paramount  seriousness  of  the  "enhancing

            conduct";   the   magnitude   of   the   "enhancement";   the

            disproportionality  between the sentence  and the  offense of

            conviction  as well as  between the enhancement  and the base

            sentence; and  the absence  of a  statutory  maximum for  the

            offense of conviction   taken in  combination, make this case

            "unusual" and remove it from the "heartland" of the guideline

            (  2K2.1)  that yielded  the mandatory  life sentence.   This

            case is outside the "heartland."

                      The  Sentencing  Commission  in   writing  U.S.S.G.

              2K2.1(c)  was undoubtedly  aware  that the  cross-reference

            provision might  in some  cases call  for a defendant's  base

                                         -36-
                                          36

            offense level to be determined by  reference to the guideline

            governing murder.  See U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(c)(1)(B) (Nov. 1995).
                               ___

            But from  our "intermediate vantage point"  in the sentencing

            process, we  try to place particular cases  within "a broader

            perspective  of sentencing law," Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949.  It
                                             ______

            seems  to   us  unlikely  that  the   Commission  could  have

            envisioned the particular  combination of circumstances  that

            in  this case culminated  in the mandatory  life sentence and

            the corresponding institutional concerns.

                      Whether  or not constitutional concerns were raised

            by these  circumstances, as  we think they  are, we  conclude

            that their  combination here gave  the court power  to depart

            under  U.S.S.G.    5K2.0.     That  the  application  of  the

            Guidelines  that produced  the mandatory  life sentence  does

            raise constitutional concerns only reinforces our conclusion.

            This case  may be  viewed   virtually  by definition    as an

            "unusual"  one  falling  outside  the  heartland  of  section

            2K2.1(c).   To decide otherwise  would be to  assume that the

            Commission   intended   that  the   application   of  section

            2K2.1(c)'s  cross-reference  provisions  could,  even   in  a

            heartland   case,   produce    sentences   raising    serious
            _________

            constitutional  issues.   This we  cannot do.   Cf.  Burns v.
                                                            ___  _____

            United  States, 501  U.S.  129, 137-38  (1991) (declining  to
            ______________

            credit  an interpretation of Fed.  R. Crim. P.  32 that would

                                         -37-
                                          37

            effectively  impute  to  Congress  an  intent  to  produce  a

            potentially unconstitutional result).

                      One of  the major  goals of the  sentencing reforms

            enacted by Congress  was to "assure  that sentences are  fair

            both to  the offender and to society."  S. Rep. No. 225, 98th

            Cong.,  2d Sess.  39 (1984),  reprinted in  1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
                                          ____________

            3182, 3222, quoted in  United States v. LaBonte, __  F.3d __,
                        _________  _____________    _______

            __, No.  95-1538, slip  op. at  24 (1st  Cir. Dec. 6,  1995).

            That sense of fairness is better served here by giving effect

            to the discretion preserved  to the courts by  the Commission

            in  U.S.S.G.   5K2.0.   If  a goal  of the  Guidelines is  to

            "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities  among defendants

            with similar records  who have been  found guilty of  similar

            criminal conduct," 28 U.S.C.    991(b)(1)(B), it is difficult

            to see how  mandating imposition  of a life  sentence on  the

            facts here  serves that  goal.  It  is the conduct  for which

            there has been no conviction  which raises the sentence  here

            to a life term, and then only by means of a finding by a mere

            preponderance  of the evidence.  Yet a  life term is the same

            sentence that  would have  been imposed for  a conviction  of

            murder.  Giving unbridled effect here to the cross-referenced

            murder  guideline would,  instead of  furthering the  goal of

            treating like  cases alike, ignore the  very real differences

            inherent  in  our  system   of  criminal  justice  between  a

            conviction  for murder  based  on proof  beyond a  reasonable

                                         -38-
                                          38

            doubt and a  firearms conviction enhanced  by a finding  that

            guns  were  used  to  commit  the  same  murder  based  on  a

            preponderance of the evidence.  Cf. Gigante, 39 F.3d at 47-48
                                            ___ _______

            (characterizing   preponderance  standard  as  a  mere  "tie-

            breaker" for evenly balanced evidence).  Viewing this case as

            falling outside the heartland  of section 2K2.1(c) seems more

            consistent  with  the  sentencing goals  set  by  Congress.20

            See LaBonte, __ F.3d at __, slip. op. at 24.
            ___ _______

                      The  Guidelines were not  meant to  have foreclosed

            the district court from considering a section 5K2.0  downward

            departure here.   Cf. United States v. Cuevas-Gomez,  61 F.3d
                              ___ _____________    ____________

            749,  750 (9th  Cir.  1995) (noting  that automatic  16-level

            sentence  enhancement for  certain defendants  under U.S.S.G.

              2L1.2(b)(2) averts due process problems "precisely because"

            the district court has discretion to consider departure based

            on  the individual facts of the case).  Certainly, a downward

            departure here would not be forbidden.   See id.; Concepcion,
                                                     ___ ___  __________

            983  F.2d at  389.    Had  such  a  downward  departure  been

            considered,  the impact  of giving  sentencing weight  to the

            acquitted murders  could have  been tempered by  the district

                                
            ____________________

            20.  Of course, where the text of an  applicable guideline is
            clear, the sentencing court  may not rely upon its  own views
            about the purposes of sentencing nor upon a personal sense of
            inequity  to deviate  from the  Guidelines  sentencing range.
            See, e.g., United  States v.  Talladino, 38  F.3d 1255,  1265
            _________  ______________     _________
            (1st Cir. 1994).  Here the sentencing policies articulated by
            Congress strengthen the analysis  of why the unusual features
            of this case warrant consideration of a downward departure.

                                         -39-
                                          39

            court's  fact-based, discretionary  judgment.   That judgment

            would have been  informed by the background principle  that a

            sentence enhancement may  not function as a  "tail which wags

            the dog" of the defendant's offense of conviction.

                      The  approach  adopted  here  is  similar  to  that

            adopted  by the Second Circuit, which  has used the mechanism

            of downward departure  to resolve a situation similar to this

            one.    In  United  States   v.  Concepcion,  one  of   three
                        ______________       __________

            codefendants (Frias)  was convicted on a  firearms charge but

            acquitted  of  a drug  conspiracy  charge.   On  the firearms

            charges  alone, the  defendant's guidelines  sentencing range

            would have  been 12-18 months.   Applying the cross-reference

            in U.S.S.G.    2K2.1 (the same provision at  issue here), the

            district  court had  found  that the  defendant actually  had

            engaged  in the  acquitted conduct,  and thus  determined his

            base  offense  level with  reference  to that  conduct.   The

            result  was  a  24-level  upward  adjustment,  with  a  final

            Guidelines sentencing range of  210-262 months.  983 F.2d  at

            389.

                      The  Second  Circuit,  reviewing   settled  circuit

            precedent, held that the  district court had properly applied

            the  Guidelines,  and  that  the  defendants'  constitutional

            rights  had not  been violated  by the  consideration of  the

            acquitted conspiracy charge.  Yet the court expressed serious

            discomfort with  the magnitude  of  the sentence  enhancement

                                         -40-
                                          40

            that had resulted.  It observed: "we doubt that, with respect

            to  conduct  of  which   the  defendant  was  acquitted,  the

            [Sentencing]  Commission intended  so  extreme an  increase."

            Id.;21 see also  United States v.  Monk, 15 F.3d 25,  26, 28-
            ___    ________  _____________     ____

            29  (2d  Cir.  1994).    The  court  concluded  that  in  the

            circumstances  of  that  case,  a  downward  departure  under

            U.S.S.G.    5K2.0 might  well have  been warranted.   Because

            "the  [district]  court  apparently  [had]  not  consider[ed]

            whether such a departure was permissible," the Second Circuit

            vacated the  sentence and remanded  for further  proceedings.

            Id.22
            ___

                                
            ____________________

            21.  Concurring,  Judge  Newman expressed  his own  view more
            sharply:

                 Under  the  rigor of  the  current  Guidelines, the
                 sentencing judge is required to assess  evidence of
                 relevant misconduct,  notwithstanding an acquittal,
                 and,  if  persuaded  by  a  preponderance  of   the
                 evidence  that  such   misconduct  occurred,   must
                 enhance the sentence according to the same scale of
                 severity that would have applied  had the defendant
                 been  convicted  of the  misconduct.  . . .   Thus,
                 after  [defendant]  was tried  for  the  conspiracy
                 offense and acquitted,  he faces virtually the same
                 sentence that  he would  have received had  he been
                 convicted! . . . When  the Guidelines and  the case
                 law implementing  them permit such a  result, it is
                 high time for both the Commission and the courts to
                 give  serious reconsideration to the decisions that
                 underlie this outcome.

            983 F.2d at 395 (Newman, J., concurring) (paragraph structure
            omitted).

            22.  On remand, the district court determined that a downward
            departure   was  indeed   appropriate  and   resentenced  the
            defendant to  a term of  144 months.   This new sentence  was
            affirmed.  See United States v.  Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392  (2d
                       ___ _____________     _____

                                         -41-
                                          41

                      On  the facts here, we are not as confident, as was

            the   Second  Circuit  in   Concepcion,  that   the  sentence
                                        __________

            enhancement  at issue  passes constitutional  muster.   We do

            share the doubts  of the Second  Circuit that the  Sentencing

            Commission  could have  foreseen the  kinds  of circumstances

            which in this case have coalesced to produce a mandatory life

            sentence,  and  we  agree  that  in  these  circumstances,  a

            downward  departure  under U.S.S.G.    5K2.0  was  within the

            court's discretion.

                      This case presents  difficult and delicate  issues,

            not  now susceptible  of articulation through  general rules.

            Our  concerns have  arisen from  a situation  where acquitted

            conduct  calling  for  the challenged  sentence  increase  is

            itself very serious conduct,  substantively more serious than

            the  offense  with   which  defendant   was  charged,   where

            consideration  of  that  conduct  resulted  in   an  enormous

            increase23  in the  sentence  (including possibly  beyond the

            sentence  that would  have  been imposed  for a  conviction),

            where the ultimate sentence is itself enormous, and where the

                                
            ____________________

            Cir. 1994)  (per  curiam),  cert. denied,  115  S.  Ct.  1433
                                        ____________
            (1995).

            23.  Whether  an  increase in  a  sentence is  enormous  is a
            matter  of  degree,  not resolved  simply  by  the  labels of
            ratios,  percentages, or the like.  For example, no one would
            deny the real  difference between an  increase of a  sentence
            from one  year to three years  and an increase from  20 to 60
            years,  even  though  each  represents  an  increase  of  300
            percent.

                                         -42-
                                          42

            judge  is seemingly mandated to impose that sentence.  Such a

            situation  increases the risk that what the judge is required

            to and  in fact is  sentencing the  defendant for is  not the

            convicted  offense  as  enhanced  by  relevant  conduct,  but

            directly for conduct as  to which the defendant has  not been

            charged, tried by  a jury,  nor convicted on  proof beyond  a

            reasonable doubt.  See Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 1001.
                               ___ ____________

                      The concerns  which  the district  court  expressed

            here  are valid, and  we have tried to  state the reasons for

            those concerns, and forcefully  so.  But we also  stress that

            this is an extreme case.  Absent the special circumstances we

            have highlighted here, no comparable concerns would be raised

            by cases involving even  sizeable sentence increases based on

            an  uncharged  quantity  of   drugs,  see  United  States  v.
                                                  ___  ______________

            Castellone,  985 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1993), an uncharged or
            __________

            acquitted  firearms offense, see  United States  v. Gonzalez-
                                         ___  _____________     _________

            Vazquez, 34  F.3d  19, 25  (1st Cir.  1994), the  defendant's
            _______

            commission of  an  unchargeable  state  offense,  see  United
                                                              ___  ______

            States  v. Carroll, 3 F.3d 98 (4th  Cir. 1993), or any number
            ______     _______

            of  kindred sentence enhancements.  The outcome we adopt here

            should  not  be  understood  as  an  invitation  to  litigate

            constitutional or departure  issues in usual cases  involving

            sentence   enhancements  based  on   uncharged  or  acquitted

            conduct.   This is an unusual and perhaps a singular case, at

                                         -43-
                                          43

            the boundaries of constitutional sentencing law, and does not

            provide an open door.

                      Because the  district court did  not recognize  its

            authority to consider whether a downward departure would have

            been  appropriate, we  vacate  Lombard's  life  sentence  and

            remand for  further proceedings.24   See Rivera, 994  F.2d at
                                                 ___ ______

            953;  United States v. Castiello,  915 F.2d 1,  5-6 (1st Cir.
                  _____________    _________

            1990)  (remanding  for  resentencing  where   district  court

            erroneously  thought  it  had no  power  to  depart  from the

            guidelines  sentencing range),  cert.  denied, 498  U.S. 1068
                                            _____________

            (1991);  cf. United States v. Garafano, 61 F.3d 113, 116 (1st
                     ___ _____________    ________

            Cir.  1995)  (appellate courts  have  broad  power to  "adapt

            mandates to the particular problem discerned on appeal").

            C.  Acceptance of Responsibility
                ____________________________

                      Lombard's claim that the district court erroneously

            refused  to award  him  sentencing credit  for acceptance  of

            responsibility  under U.S.S.G.    3E1.1(a) is  without merit.

            Lombard  has  not met  his  burden  of clearly  demonstrating

            acceptance  of  responsibility  for  his  offense.   U.S.S.G.

              3E1.1(a).  Review  of the adequacy of the defendant's proof

            is only for clear error.  See United States v. Ocasio-Rivera,
                                      ___ _____________    _____________

            991 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).

                                
            ____________________

            24.  The government agreed at  oral argument that if  we were
            to find that the district court erroneously believed  that it
            lacked  authority to grant a downward departure, a remand for
            resentencing would be the proper remedy.

                                         -44-
                                          44

                      Lombard appears to contend that prior incriminating

            statements made  by him,  e.g., his admissions  at his  state
                                      ____

            trial that he owned the .22 caliber rifle and helped to clean

            up the  cabin after the murders,  demonstrate his "acceptance

            of responsibility."   Hardly so.  These  statements were made

            to defend against state charges and cannot plausibly be taken

            as warranting  a sentence  reduction under  section 3E1.1(a).

            The  making  of an  incriminating  statement  cannot, without

            more, establish  acceptance  of responsibility.   Cf.  United
                                                              ___  ______

            States  v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d  1, 2-3 (1st  Cir. 1995) (divulging
            ______     _____

            incriminating information  to  government informant  did  not

            establish eligibility for sentencing leniency under 18 U.S.C.

              3553(f)).

                      Application note  2 to  section 3E1.1  specifically

            cautions  that  in  most  circumstances,  the  acceptance-of-

            responsibility  credit  "is  not   intended  to  apply  to  a

            defendant who puts the  government to its burden of  proof at

            trial by  denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is

            convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse."

            U.S.S.G.    3E1.1, comment. (n.2).  Lombard has not even done

            that much:  the record  discloses not even  a post-conviction

            admission  of guilt  or remorse with  respect to  the federal

            charges.

                                         III

                                    The Conviction
                                    ______________

                                         -45-
                                          45

                      Lombard claims that the district  court committed a

            number  of trial  errors  that affected  the jury's  verdict.

            Considering each  claimed misstep  in turn, we  conclude that

            there was no reversible error.

            A.  Admissibility of Hartley's Former Testimony
                ___________________________________________

                      Excerpts of Hartley's prior testimony from his  own

            state  murder  trial  and  from Lombard's  state  trial  were

            admitted  into  evidence.   Lombard  contends  that Hartley's

            former  testimony  was  inadmissible hearsay,  and  that  its

            admission violated the Confrontation Clause.

                      The  trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed

            for an abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Abreu,  952
                                         ___ _____________    _____

            F.2d  1458,  1467  (1st Cir.),  cert.  denied,  503  U.S. 994
                                            _____________

            (1992).   Any  properly  preserved  error  of  constitutional

            magnitude  requires reversal  unless  shown  to  be  harmless

            beyond a  reasonable doubt.   See Chapman v.  California, 386
                                          ___ _______     __________

            U.S. 18 (1967).

                      1.   Hartley's Prior Testimony  from
                           _______________________________
                                     Lombard's       State
                                     _____________________
                           Trial
                           _____

                      Approximately 60 pages  of Hartley's testimony from

            Lombard's  state trial  were admitted,  containing statements

            about Lombard's ownership of  the .22 caliber rifle; cleaning

            the cabin of blood; disposal of the bodies; Lombard's sale of

            firearms to a  broker; and Hartley's  and Lombard's plans  to

                                         -46-
                                          46

            flee.   Hartley had also  testified that Lombard  told him on

            the  morning of the murders that Hartley "didn't have to take

            no  shit  from nobody";  that  Lombard  and Hartley  on  that

            Thanksgiving morning  saw Martin  and  Lindsey (the  victims)

            sleeping on  couches in the  living room of  Hartley's cabin;

            and  that Lombard had, after the  murders, threatened to kill

            Hartley and Theriault if  they did not "stick" to  their plan

            to  tell police, if questioned,  that they had  last seen the

            two victims on the Wednesday before Thanksgiving.

                      Hartley's  prior  testimony  from  Lombard's  state

            trial was  admitted under  the former testimony  exception to

            the  hearsay  rule,  see   Fed.  R.  Evid.  804(b)(1),  which
                                 ___

            provides:

                      The  following [is]  not excluded  by the
                      hearsay   rule   if   the   declarant  is
                      unavailable as a witness:

                           (1)  Testimony  given  as  a  witness  at
                           another  hearing   of  the   same  or   a
                           different proceeding, . . . if  the party
                           against   whom   the  testimony   is  now
                           offered  . . .  had  an  opportunity  and
                           similar motive to  develop the  testimony
                           by    direct,    cross,    or    redirect
                           examination.

                      The other  conditions clearly being  met, the  only

            question is whether Lombard had "similar motive" at his state

            trial  to   "develop"  Hartley's  testimony   through  cross-

            examination.

                      The  party  against  whom  the prior  testimony  is

            offered  must   have  had  a  similar,   not  necessarily  an
                                          _______

                                         -47-
                                          47

            identical,  motive to  develop the  adverse testimony  in the
            _________

            prior proceeding.   See  United States v.  Salerno, 505  U.S.
                                ___  _____________     _______

            317, 326  (1992) (1992) (Blackmun, J.,  concurring).  Because

            Lombard faced both liability as to murder and as to  being an

            accomplice  to murder under Maine law, he had a very forceful

            interest at his state trial in attacking Hartley's testimony,

            in order to discredit his account of the actual killings, the

            concealing of evidence and the attempt to escape prosecution.

            This interest  could hardly  have been  any  stronger at  the

            federal trial, see  United States  v. DiNapoli,  8 F.3d  909,
                           ___  _____________     ________

            914-15  (2d Cir. 1993) (en  banc), and the  testimony, to the

            extent it related  to the events preceding  and following the

            murders, was properly admitted.

                      Hartley's  prior  testimony  from  Lombard's  trial

            concerning the .22 caliber rifle presents a different  set of

            issues.  In contrast to the federal trial, Lombard had little

            real  incentive  at  his  state  trial  to  attack  Hartley's

            statements concerning possession  or ownership of  the rifle.

            But Lombard himself  admitted during  the course  of his  own
                                 ________

            direct  examination at his  state trial that  the .22 caliber
            ______

            rifle belonged to him.   Furthermore, other properly admitted

            evidence,  including Tammy Theriault's testimony that Lombard

            owned  the rifle, strongly  corroborated Lombard's admission.

            Thus, under the circumstances  presented here, we believe any

                                         -48-
                                          48

            error arising from the admission of this portion of Hartley's

            prior testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                      Admission  of  Hartley's   former  testimony   from

            Lombard's state  trial  did  not  violate  the  Confrontation

            Clause.    See  U.S.  Const.  amend.  VI  ("In  all  criminal
                       ___

            prosecutions,  the accused shall enjoy the  right . . . to be

            confronted  with the  witnesses against  him.").   The Clause

            restricts  but   does  not  proscribe  the   admission  of  a

            declarant's  prior testimony  against  a criminal  defendant,

            requiring only  that the declarant be  "unavailable" and that

            the prior  testimony sought  to be admitted  "bear[] adequate

            'indicia  of reliability,'"  e.g.,  by  "fall[ing]  within  a
                                         ____

            firmly rooted  hearsay exception."  See Ohio  v. Roberts, 448
                                                ___ ____     _______

            U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).

                      The prosecution established that Hartley was indeed

            "unavailable,"  and his former  testimony at  Lombard's state

            trial was  within the firmly-rooted exception  to the hearsay

            rule  carved out  for  prior trial  testimony  that has  been

            subjected to cross-examination.  See Mattox v. United States,
                                             ___ ______    _____________

            156  U.S. 237 (1895)  (holding that prior  trial testimony is

            admissible  upon retrial  if declarant  becomes unavailable);

            see  also Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 67-73.   That testimony bears
            _________ _______

            "sufficient  'indicia  of  reliability'"  that  there was  no

            Confrontation Clause violation.  See Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 73
                                             ___ _______

            (citation omitted); Barber  v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968)
                                ______     ____

                                         -49-
                                          49

            (dicta)  ("where  a  witness  is unavailable  and  has  given

            testimony  at previous judicial  proceedings against the same

            defendant  which was  subject  to cross-examination  by  that

            defendant," his confrontation rights are satisfied).

                      2.   Hartley's Prior Testimony  from
                           _______________________________
                                     His Own State Trial
                                     ___________________

                      Approximately two pages of Hartley's testimony from

            his  own  state   murder  trial  were  admitted,   containing
                 ___

            Hartley's  statement that  he knew  that Lombard had  been in

            prison for eight years, and a  statement by Hartley's counsel
                                                                  _______

            at a sidebar conference  indicating that Hartley was prepared

            to testify that he  believed that Lombard "was in  prison for

            burglaries, escapes, and  this sort of  thing . . . ."   This

            evidence,  admitted prior  to Hartley's  change of  plea, was

            relevant to  the government's  charge that Hartley  aided and

            abetted unlawful firearms possession by a convicted felon.

                      Although  this  former  testimony  was  admitted as

            statements  by  a co-conspirator  during  the  course and  in

            furtherance of the conspiracy,  a problematic ground, we find

            no grounds for reversal.25

                                
            ____________________

            25.  The co-conspirator  exception could not  have applied to
            the  former  testimony,  because   the  conspiracy  had  been
            terminated at least by the date that the co-conspirators were
            arrested.   See United States v. Palow,  777 F.2d 52, 57 (1st
                        ___ _____________    _____
            Cir. 1985) ("[I]t  is beyond doubt that  the challenged post-
            arrest  statements  were  not  made  in  furtherance  of  the
            conspiracy."), cert.  denied, 475 U.S. 1052  (1986); see also
                           _____________                         ________
            Krulewitch v. United States,  336 U.S. 440 (1949) (statements
            __________    _____________
            made  after  objectives of  conspiracy  have  failed are  not

                                         -50-
                                          50

                      Lombard failed properly  to preserve his  arguments

            for appeal.  He posed only a general objection by a motion in
                                                                       __

            limine, but  made no comparable  objection at trial.26   That
            ______

            was  not enough.  See United States  v. Reed, 977 F.2d 14, 17
                              ___ _____________     ____

            (1st  Cir. 1992)  ("A  motion in  limine without  subsequent,

            contemporaneous  objection  at   trial  . . .  is  ordinarily

            insufficient to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appeal.").

                      No prejudice resulted, in any event, from admission

            of  this evidence.   See United States  v. Olano,  113 S. Ct.
                                 ___ _____________     _____

                                
            ____________________

            admissible under the co-conspirator  exception).  Also, since
            Lombard  was neither  present  nor represented  at  Hartley's
            state  trial  and had  no  opportunity  to cross-examine  him
            there, the testimony was not admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).
                Admission of the  sidebar statement by Hartley's  counsel
            as to what he believed  his client was about to say  presents
            difficulties as  well, for other reasons.   Cf. United States
                                                        ___ _____________
            v.  Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1990).  Sometimes,
                ______
            an  attorney's  statements may  be  imputed  to and  admitted
            against  his  client  as  a  principal under  Fed.  R.  Evid.
            801(d)(2)(D).  See Harris,  914 F.2d at 931.  But  cf. United
                           ___ ______                     ________ ______
            States v.  Valencia,  826 F.2d  169,  172-73 (2d  Cir.  1987)
            ______     ________
            (acknowledging that an attorney's statements can sometimes be
            used   against  client-defendant,   but  urging   caution  in
            admitting  such  statements  in  criminal  context  to  avoid
            infringing defendant's right against  self-incrimination, the
            right to  counsel of the defendant's choice [i.e., insofar as
            admission of  such a  statement might  require counsel  to be
            disqualified],  and  the  right  to effective  assistance  of
            counsel).   It is doubtful,  though, whether this  rule would
            apply to  such an offer of  proof by counsel at  sidebar.  In
            any event, even if  the rule properly applied, it  would only
            make the statements admissible against Hartley, not  Lombard.
            See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (statement by  a party's agent
            ___
            is only admissible against that party).

            26.  The  defendant's only  contemporaneous objection  to the
            testimony at trial  was limited to  specific language in  the
            transcript  of the  earlier proceeding.   This  objection was
            obviated when the  district court ordered the language  to be
            redacted before the testimony was admitted.

                                         -51-
                                          51

            1770, 1778 (1993).  Theriault's testimony, as well as that of

            her mother, independently established Hartley's  knowledge of

            Lombard's status  as a  convicted felon, and  Lombard himself

            stipulated to having  committed prior felonies.27   Admission

            of  the challenged evidence was not plain error, and there is

            no basis for reversal.  See id. at 1777-78.
                                    ___ ___

            C.  Admission of Testimony About the Murders
                ________________________________________

                      The admission of  a substantial amount of  evidence

            concerning the murders, Lombard  argues, was error under Fed.

            R. Evid. 403, because the prejudicial impact of that evidence

            outweighed its probative value.

                      Lombard preserved his Rule 403 objection  only with

            respect  to  the Theriault  testimony.   He  has not  met his

            burden  of showing an abuse of discretion in the admission of

            that testimony.   See Abreu, 952 F.2d at 1467.  A decision by
                              ___ _____

            the district  court on  a Rule  403 determination  must stand

                                
            ____________________

            27.  Because Hartley's testimony from  his own previous trial
            was introduced for the purpose of proving Hartley's knowledge
            of  Lombard's status as a  felon, and not  for the purpose of
            providing the jury with  unnecessary details about  Lombard's
            stipulated prior  felonies, there  was no error  under United
                                                                   ______
            States v. Tavares,  21 F.3d 1,  6 (1st  Cir. 1994) (en  banc)
            ______    _______
            ("[W]e acknowledge that in some cases evidence concerning the
            nature  of  the  prior  conviction  will  be  admissible  for
            impeachment or  other reasons, despite its  lack of probative
                        _________________
            value  on  the  prior   conviction  element  of  the  crime."
            (emphasis  added)).    In  any event,  the  Tavares  en  banc
                                                        _______
            decision  had not been handed  down at the  time of Lombard's
            trial  (December   1993)  and   thus  does  not   affect  the
            determination  of plain error.  Cf. United States v. Collins,
                                            ___ _____________    _______
            60 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1995).

                                         -52-
                                          52

            absent   a   demonstration  of   "extraordinarily  compelling

            circumstances."  United  States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d  1325, 1339
                             ______________    _____

            (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada,
                             ________ _____________    _________________

            877  F.2d  153, 156  (1st  Cir. 1989).    There  are no  such

            circumstances here.

                      That  Lombard posed  no Rule  403 objection  to the

            admission  of Hartley's  and  even his  own former  testimony
                                                    ___

            about  the  murders undercuts  his  objection  to Theriault's

            testimony.    Her  testimony  about  Hartley's and  Lombard's

            conduct in connection with  the murders was at  least equally

            relevant.     One  of  the  objectives   of  the  defendants'

            conspiracy charged was to  "flee the State of Maine  in order

            to avoid prosecution or the giving of testimony in connection

            with the  homicides of Morris  Martin and Paul  Lindsey, Jr."

            The indictment also charged  that the defendants conspired to

            "dispose of  certain evidence of Henry  P. Lombard's unlawful

            possession"  of a firearm.   Proof of  these charges required

            proof of the events  surrounding the murders, the defendants'

            knowledge of  the murders, and the  defendants' joint conduct

            following the murders.

                      The district  court recognized that  it was neither

            possible  nor  appropriate  to  excise all  evidence  of  the

            murders  from  the  government's  proof  of  the  defendants'

            conspiracy.  It correctly observed that the evidence touching

            on the  murders had  some prejudicial effect,  but explicitly
                                 ____

                                         -53-
                                          53

            weighed that effect against  its probative value, and decided

            in favor of  admitting much,  but not all,  of the  testimony

            offered.      There   are  no   "extraordinarily   compelling

            circumstances"  that  would warrant  disturbing  the district

            court's balancing  of prejudice against probative value here.

            See Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 996-98.
            ___ ____________

                      The  convictions  are affirmed.    The  sentence on
                      ___________________________________________________

            Count  2  of  the indictment  is  vacated,  and  the case  is
            _____________________________________________________________

            remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
            _______________________________________________________

                                         -54-
                                          54