Court Opinion

ID: 9914051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:04:40.133095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:58.831457
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-1389-MR

TIMOTHY ROLLIN                                                     APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CR-00950

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Timothy Rollin, pro se, appeals from the Hardin Circuit

Court’s denial of his motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(f). Rollin entered a plea of guilty to second-

degree burglary in 2019 and now claims he could not have been convicted because

he was the tenant of the apartment he was charged with burglarizing. Upon careful
review, we agree with the trial court that the motion is procedurally barred and

substantively without merit; consequently, we affirm.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             According to Rollin, he and Brooke Shoemaker began dating in May

2018 and lived together sporadically in his apartment in Elizabethtown. Rollin’s

mother leased the apartment and Rollin is listed as a resident on the lease

document in the record. Rollin claims Shoemaker would stay at the apartment for

a week at a time and at one point stayed there for three weeks. She had a key to

the apartment and kept clothes and toiletries there.

             On July 9, 2018, Shoemaker obtained an emergency protective order

(EPO) against Rollin that prohibited him from coming within 500 feet of the

apartment or entering it. The EPO was subsequently vacated in an order entered

on July 19, 2018, upon the trial court finding no domestic violence.

             Rollin was arrested on August 27, 2018, for violating the EPO and

committing burglary by knowingly entering and remaining unlawfully in the

apartment on July 13, 2018. The warrant alleged that he kicked in the door and

damaged several items in the apartment, including some items belonging to

Shoemaker.

             Rollin was indicted for burglary in the second degree and for violating

the provisions of the EPO. On January 29, 2019, he entered a plea of guilty to the

                                         -2-
charges. He received a sentence of five years for the burglary charge and twelve

months for the violation of EPO charge, to be run concurrently for a total sentence

of five years, probated for five years.

             On November 25, 2019, Rollin filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, alleging his attorneys were ineffective

for failing to present evidence that would have resulted in the dismissal of his case:

specifically, the testimony of eyewitnesses that he was not in the area when the

alleged burglary took place and a copy of the apartment lease showing he was a

resident.

             On January 13, 2020, Rollin filed a motion to vacate judgment

pursuant to CR 60.02(f), claiming his arrest was invalid because the arrest warrant

was unsigned.

             On February 4, 2020, following a hearing, Rollin’s probation was

revoked for committing a new felony offense and for his admission to continuing

methamphetamine use and manipulation of court-ordered treatment.

             On October 6, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying Rollin’s

RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02(f) motions. Rollin appealed from the order but did not

file an appellant’s brief. This Court provided him with additional time to file a

motion for extension of time and tender the brief, but he failed to do so, and his

appeal was dismissed.

                                          -3-
             On April 28, 2022, Rollin filed his second CR 60.02(f) motion, which

is the subject of the present appeal. He repeated the claim made in his RCr 11.42

motion that he was entitled to extraordinary relief because he could not have been

convicted of burglarizing his own home. The trial court denied the motion on the

grounds that Rollin was not legally allowed to enter the home under the terms of

his EPO, and he intended to commit a crime upon entering the apartment. The trial

court further held that the motion was procedurally barred because Rollin could

have raised the present arguments in his previous CR 60.02 motion and in his RCr

11.42 motion. This appeal by Rollin followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion.

Diaz v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Ky. App. 2015). The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky.1999) (citations omitted). Absent a “flagrant miscarriage of

justice[,]” we will affirm the trial court. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d

853, 858 (Ky. 1983).

                                    ANALYSIS

             “The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment

of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized

                                         -4-
and complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr

11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.” Id. at 856. CR 60.02 motions are limited to

afford special and extraordinary relief not available in other proceedings.

McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.1997).

             CR 60.02 was enacted as a statutory codification of the common law

writ of coram nobis. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. The purpose of coram nobis was

to bring pronounced judgment errors before the court which (1) had not been heard

or litigated, (2) were not known or could not have been known by the party

through the exercise of due diligence, or (3) the party was prevented from

presenting due to duress, fear, or some other sufficient cause. Id.

             The Kentucky Supreme Court “has attempted to make abundantly

clear . . . that CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42 motions are not to be used to relitigate

previously determined issues.” Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Ky.

2008). CR 60.02 “is for relief that is not available by direct appeal and not

available under RCr 11.42.” Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. It is not intended to afford

a defendant a “second bite at the apple.” Id. at 857.

             The trial court determined that Rollin’s motion was procedurally

barred because (1) Rollin previously litigated the claim that he could not have

burglarized his own apartment in his unsuccessful RCr 11.42 motion; and (2) he

could have raised the claim in his previous CR 60.02 motion. Rollin nonetheless

                                         -5-
argues that it is not barred because his previous CR 60.02 motion was brought

under CR 60.02(e) rather than CR 60.02(f). This argument is without merit. Our

review of the record indicates his prior motion was brought under section (f), not

section (e). In any event, the proper inquiry is whether he could have raised his

current claim in the earlier CR 60.02 motion under any subsection. Without a

doubt, it could have been raised in that earlier motion and therefore does not merit

extraordinary relief. “[A] defendant is precluded from raising claims which were,

or reasonably could have been, raised in prior proceedings.” Berry v.

Commonwealth, 624 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Ky. App. 2021) (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d

at 857).

             Rollin’s motion is also without substantive merit. “A person is guilty

of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he or she

knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling.” Kentucky Revised

Statutes (KRS) 511.030(1). Rollin claims he did not go back to the apartment that

day; he could lawfully be inside the apartment because he was on the lease; and it

could not be shown he intended to commit a crime in the apartment because he

could not illegally destroy his own property. Essentially, he is arguing that there

was insufficient evidence to support the burglary charge. But because Rollin

entered a valid plea of guilty to the charge, he cannot challenge its evidentiary

basis.

                                         -6-
             Entry of a voluntary, intelligent plea of guilty has long
             been held by Kentucky Courts to preclude a post-
             judgment challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
             The reasoning behind such a conclusion is obvious. A
             defendant who elects to unconditionally plead guilty
             admits the factual accuracy of the various elements of the
             offenses with which he is charged. By such an
             admission, a convicted appellant forfeits the right to
             protest at some later date that the state could not have
             proven that he committed the crimes to which he pled
             guilty.

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. App. 1986) (citations

omitted).

             Furthermore, there is no dispute that at the time he committed the

burglary, Rollin was subject to an EPO that prohibited him from being within 500

feet of the apartment. Rollin’s reliance on Hedges v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d

703 (Ky. 1996), is misplaced. In Hedges, the appellant was charged with burglary

after his wife let him into her apartment and he grabbed her by the neck after

discovering another man was there. At the time, the appellant was subject to a

domestic violence order (DVO) forbidding him from committing acts of violence

against his estranged wife or disposing of or damaging the couple’s property. The

DVO did not contain a “no contact” provision and the appellant frequently had

contact with his wife regarding their child and with her permission spent the night

at her apartment on several occasions. Hedges, 937 S.W.2d at 704-05. Hedges

held that it would have been unreasonable for a jury to find the appellant guilty of

                                         -7-
burglary under this set of facts because “misconduct or criminal conduct does not

become burglary solely by reason of commission of the act on the property of

another.” Id. at 707. In other words, “misconduct by one rightfully on the

premises should not convert that conduct into burglary[.]” Robey v.

Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Ky. 1997) (citing Hedges, 937 S.W.2d

703). By contrast, the EPO in Rollin’s case expressly prohibited him from entering

the apartment. The EPO was in effect on the date the burglary was committed.

Consequently, Rollin was not rightfully on the premises, regardless of whether he

was named on the lease.

             This conclusion is fully in accordance with two unpublished opinions

cited by Rollin: Farmer v. Commonwealth, No. 2011-CA-001412-MR, 2012 WL

5042119 (Ky. App. Oct. 19, 2012), not to be published, rev’d, No. 2012-SC-

000756-DG, 2014 WL 5410235 (Ky. Oct. 23, 2014), and Taylor v.

Commonwealth, No. 2021-CA-0346-MR, 2023 WL 2618124 (Ky. App. Mar. 24,

2023). In Farmer, the Court of Appeals held that Farmer’s counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise the defense that he was a tenant-at-will of a cabin he was

charged with burglarizing; the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed on the grounds

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a novel defense that had never

been raised before in Kentucky, explaining: “It is difficult to comprehend how the

failure to assert a tenant-at-will defense – the viability of which is still an open

                                           -8-
question – can ever constitute deficient performance.” Commonwealth v. Farmer,

No. 2012-SC-000756-DG, 2014 WL 5410235, at *4 (Ky. Oct. 23, 2014). In

Taylor, the appellant lived in an apartment he shared with his daughter and his

name was on the rental agreement of a television he was charged with unlawfully

removing from the residence. This Court held that “[i]f Taylor did, in fact, reside

with his daughter and had permission to be in her apartment, Taylor could not have

committed second-degree burglary[.]” Taylor, 2023 WL 2618124, at *3. Each of

these cases is clearly distinguishable from Rollin’s because neither Farmer nor

Taylor was subject to an EPO or DVO forbidding them from entering the premises

they were charged with burglarizing.

             For the foregoing reasons, the order denying Rollin’s CR 60.02

motion is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Timothy Rollin, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky                         Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Matthew F. Kuhn
                                         Solicitor General

                                         Bryan D. Morrow
                                         Deputy Solicitor General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -9-