Court Opinion

ID: 9627640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:49:22.653382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:03.044970
License: Public Domain

Opinion By
Justice JIM MOSELEY,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s dispositions of Edward G. Robinson’s breach of contract, negligent badment, and negligence claims, and of Robinson’s issue concerning the dismissal of Jerry Skaggs and John Schaefer from this lawsuit. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of Robinson’s conversion claim against National Autotech because I disagree with the majority as to what “intent” is necessary to accomplish the intentional tort of conversion.
Conversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another which is to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner’s rights. Williams v. City of Dallas, 63 S.W.3d 780, 787 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). In his First Amended Petition, Robinson alleged that, acting through its agents Skaggs and Schaefer, National Autotech converted his *44personal property, described as nine tool boxes that had been stacked and bolted together to make one tool box about six feet tall and eight feet long, as well as the tools located inside. Specifically, he alleged Skaggs and Schaefer “wrongfully exercised unauthorized control of [his] property” by two acts: (1) “releasing and authorizing the release of the property to someone other than [Robinson] ...and by (2) “loading and moving [his] property off [National Autotech’s] premises and onto the truck of an unknown person.”
National Autotech’s sole ground for summary judgment on Robinson’s conversion claim was that he had no evidence National Autotech “illegally assumed or exercised ownership or control of [Robinson’s] property, a necessary element of a claim for conversion.” Thus, if Robinson produced more than a scintilla of evidence that National Autotech unlawfully assumed and exercised dominion and control over his personal property, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his conversion claim. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Crocker v. Paulyne’s Nursing Home, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to Robinson, the non-movant, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. See Crocker, 95 S.W.3d at 419. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex.1994).
Robinson presented evidence that Schaefer and Skaggs were National Auto-tech’s employees; Schaefer helped the imposter remove Robinson’s tool box from National Autotech’s garage and load it onto Schaefer’s truck; and after the imposter returned later in the day with a second truck, Skaggs and Schaefer helped him move Robinson’s tool box from Schae-fer’s truck onto the second truck. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Robinson and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, I would conclude the evidence rises to a level that would at least enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ on whether National Auto-tech’s employees intentionally exercised dominion or control over the tool box that in fact seriously interfered with Robinson’s right to control or possess it. See Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 224 cmt. c (1965). Thus, I would conclude the trial court erred in granting National Auto-tech’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Robinson’s conversion claim. See Crocker, 95 S.W.3d at 419; see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
The majority concludes to the contrary. Citing Dolenz v. National Bank of Texas at Fort Worth, 649 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the majority defines the requisite intent for conversion as an intent to assert some right, including the right of possession, in the property being converted. Accord Parker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); White-Sellie’s Jewelry Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 477 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ); Powell v. Forest Oil Corp., 392 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1965, no writ). On that basis, the majority concludes Robinson failed to produce a scintilla of evidence that National Autotech intended to assert a right in Robinson’s tools and tool box.
I do not agree the intent necessary for conversion is limited to the intent to assert some right in the property converted. Other Texas courts have held defendants liable for conversion even though the defendants never asserted some right in the property converted. See e.g., Schwartz v. *45Pinnacle Communications, 944 S.W.2d 427, 432-33 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (defendant liable for conversion when he incorrectly delivered the plaintiffs property to an unrelated company even though he thought he was delivering the property to the plaintiffs subsidiary with the plaintiffs permission); Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Hill, 879 S.W.2d 116, 121-22 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (defendant hable for conversion when its employee placed plaintiffs property in store room on defendant’s property and some of the property ended up missing).
Although Schwartz and Lone Star Ford do not expressly state what intent was required for a defendant to be hable for conversion, the purpose behind the tort of conversion is a guide to the type of intent required. Conversion is designed to protect against interference with a person’s possessory interest in personal property. Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.1981); see also Killian v. Trans Union Leasing Corp., 657 S.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (conversion “is concerned with possession, not title”). Accordingly, the requisite intent is not the intent to assert some right (i.e., some title or right of possession) in the converted property, but rather, the intent “to exercise a dominion or control over [personal property,] which in fact seriously interferes with the right of another to control [or possess] it.” Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 224 cmt. c. Stated another way, “[t]he intention required is simply an intent to use or dispose of the goods.... ” Rensch v. Riddle’s Diamonds, 393 N.W.2d 269, 271 (S.D.1986).
When read in its entirety, even Dolenz, cited by the majority, supports this conclusion. There, Dolenz sued a bank for converting personal property that was contained in three truck trailers the bank repossessed. 649 S.W.2d at 369. The bank was unaware the property was in the trailers; when it was discovered, the bank contacted Dolenz to come get his property.
In affirming the judgment in favor of the bank, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals recognized that “[conversion is an offense against possession and not title, and has been defined as the unlawful and wrongftd exercise of dominion, ownership, or control by one person over the property of another, to the exclusion of the exercise of the same rights by the owner ... which may be effected by taking actual corporal possession and control over the property of another so as to prevent the owner from exercise of such rights.” Id. at 370. Do-lenz also stated, as noted by the majority, that before there can be a conversion, the “conversion defendant must intend to assert some right in the property....” Id. However, in ruling for the bank the court emphasized that the critical factor was the absence of any evidence the bank knew it had possession of Dolenz’s property.
This conclusion is also consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states the following with respect to conversion:
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.
(2) In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors are important:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control;
(b) the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control;
(c) the actor’s good faith;
*46(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interferences with the other’s right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel; [and]
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 222A. Thus, the absence of any evidence that National Autotech intended to exert ownership over Robinson’s tools may be a factor with respect to whether a conversion occurred, but it is not the only factor and cannot support the entry of a no-evidence summary judgment against Robinson’s conversion claim.
National Autotech’s argument is, in essence, that it cannot be liable for conversion because there is no evidence its employees did not believe the imposter was actually Robinson. This is contrary to pri- or holdings of this Court. In Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ), we held that “[i]n an action for conversion, it is no defense that the defendant acted in complete innocence and perfect good faith.” Morey goes on to state that “[a] mistake as to ownership is not a defense to a claim of conversion.” Id.; see also Rensch, 393 N.W.2d at 271 (“[T]he knowledge or ignorance of the actor as to the ownership has no influence in deciding the question of conversion.”). This argument is also contrary to section 222A of the Restatement, as explained in comment d, illustrations 9 and 10: “A ships goods over B carrier, consigned to himself. By mistake B delivers the goods to C. B discovers the mistake immediately and within twenty-four hours recovers the goods from C, and delivers them to A. This is not a conversion.” Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 222A cmt. d, illus. 9. “The same facts as in Illustration 9, except that the goods are not recovered, and remain in the possession of C. This is a conversion.” Id. illus. 10.
Although illustrations 9 and 10 set forth a bailment hypothetical, a non-bailor defendant can still be hable for conversion if he incorrectly delivers the plaintiffs personal property to another who is not entitled to immediate possession of it. Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 235(1) cmt. c; see Schwartz, 944 S.W.2d at 432-33. And all the parties concede that the imposter was not entitled to immediate possession of Robinson’s tool box.
The majority states “the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence” that: (1) Skaggs and Schaefer were acting within the course and scope of their employment when they helped the imposter remove Robinson’s tool box from National Auto-tech’s garage to Schaefer’s truck and then to a second truck; (2) National Autotech, either expressly or impliedly, authorized Skaggs and Schaefer to assist the imposter; or (3) National Autotech ratified Skaggs’s and Schaefer’s actions. Nevertheless, National Autotech did not raise these grounds in its motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court cannot consider or affirm the trial court’s judgment based on these grounds because they were not raised in National Autotech’s motion. See Alder v. Laurel, 82 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.1993)); see also Hinkle v. Adams, 74 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 339-42 (Tex.1993)).
In summary, although I agree with the majority with respect to affirming the rest of the judgment, I would sustain Robinson’s first issue with respect to his conversion claim, reverse the trial court’s judgment as to that claim, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. *47Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.