Court Opinion

ID: 9608448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:12:59.871199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:05.851564
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects except the following.
First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by considering “plaintiff’s potential rental income” as a distributional factor. At issue is the trial court’s distributional factor O, which provides in its entirety:
Plaintiff currently does not live in the residence and could at least rent the property for several thousand dollars during the summer seasons. The Plaintiff failed to explain or justify to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt her failure to maximize the income from this property (which is especially puzzling in light of the Plaintiff’s asserted “need” for alimony from the Defendant).
*503The majority reasons that, because plaintiff accepted an out-of-state job three months before the trial, “it was premature for the trial court to expect plaintiff to supplement her income with the rental of her North Carolina residence.” I disagree.
The trial court is afforded wide discretion in entering equitable distribution orders, enabling the court to fashion its orders with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a given case. Wall v. Wall, 140 N.C. App. 303, 307, 536 S.E.2d 647, 650 (2000). Further, the trial judge is in a better position than this Court to evaluate witnesses’ credibility and the evidence. In the present case, the eviden-tiary facts underlying factor O are undisputed — that the plaintiff was in the probationary period of a new job, was living out of state, and had not rented her house for the summer.
Moreover, the trial court is charged with the exercise of discretion to determine whether 0, standing alone or in combination with other factors, supports an unequal division of the marital estate. The majority acknowledges the trial court’s obligation under G.S. § 50-20(c)(l) to consider “[t]he income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective[,]” and quotes Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 359, 352 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1987), for the proposition that “the legislature intended to grant the trial court the authority to consider the future prospects of the parties, as well as their status at the time of the hearing, in determining whether an equal division of marital assets would be equitable.” That being so, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion is puzzling. In conducting our review, this Court may disagree with a trial court’s determination of whether the evidence should support an unequal division of the marital estate. However, this does not necessarily manifest error on the part of the trial judge who sits in the best position to make such a decision. “[T]he trial court’s rulings in equitable distribution cases receive great deference and may be upset only if they are so arbitrary that they could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986). In the present case, I conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering plaintiff’s decision not to rent her property when she could have done so. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiff failed to demonstrate error with respect to factor O.
For similar reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider “plaintiff’s potential rental income of the Parmele Boulevard residence” in its *504determination that plaintiff was not a dependent spouse. The majority concludes that because of the “uncertainty as to plaintiff’s continued employment and residence, it was premature ... to expect plaintiff to supplement her income with the rental of her North Carolina residence.” However, our trial courts are necessarily vested with wide discretion in alimony determinations and frequently assign varying degrees of significance to evidence that does not necessarily lend itself to one interpretation over another. In the present case, the court’s evaluation of the potential rental income, like its evaluation of many other facts and circumstances, is clearly permissible. Again, the relevant facts regarding plaintiff’s failure to rent out her North Carolina home were not disputed. I would hold that the trial court properly considered plaintiff’s potential rental income in making its determination of whether plaintiff was a dependent spouse.
With respect to the potential rental income issue for the equitable distribution and alimony determinations, the majority has erroneously replaced its own judgment for that of the trial court.