Court Opinion

ID: 9529002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:46:13.550482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:34.761501
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: Like the appellate court, I believe that the premature admission of evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore respectfully dissent. Plain error is a limited and narrow exception to the general waiver rule, to be invoked only where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so substantial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128 (2001). The second prong of the plain error exception is to be invoked only where the alleged error is so serious that its consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 128. Here, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was not closely balanced. Thus, the plain error doctrine applies only if the premature admission of evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination threatens the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. As the majority’s own analysis demonstrates, however, the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is not the least bit at risk in this case. First, the majority concedes that, under Jefferson, the State could have solicited evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination to rebut Williford’s subsequent claim of police coercion. 202 Ill. 2d at 372. According to the majority, then, the “integrity of the entire judicial process” (202 Ill. 2d at 372) is at risk because, in an isolated case, the trial court entertained perfectly admissible evidence a little bit too soon. Stated differently, the majority is convinced that the evidentiary error that occurred in this case is of such magnitude as to threaten “the integrity of the entire judicial process.” 202 Ill. 2d at 372. Yet the majority’s remedy is to remand this cause for a new trial at which the exact same evidence will come in, only in a slightly different order. Surely, if the judicial system’s integrity is as fragile as the majority suggests, something more than mere formalism is called for. Second, and more importantly, the majority’s concern for the judicial system’s integrity is based not upon what happened in this case but upon what would happen if the facts of this case were exactly the opposite of what they are. As the majority explains: “While in this case the State had the good fortune to obtain subsequent testimony from Williford that may have justified the introduction of the polygraph evidence to refute his claim of coercion under our rationale in Jefferson, in many other cases, the State will not be so fortunate. It would be unwise to allow the State to procure otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging polygraph evidence in the speculative hope that a witness will later justify its admission. If the justification does not materialize, then the admission of the unreliable evidence has done irreparable damage to both the individual defendant’s case and the integrity of the entire judicial process.” 202 Ill. 2d at 372. Thus, according to the majority, “irreparable damage to both the individual defendant’s case and the integrity of the entire judicial process” occurs only when a justification for the “otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging polygraph evidence” does not materialize. This may or may not be true. But what is undeniable is the fact that, in this case, the necessary justification did materialize. Consequently, under the majority’s own analysis, no harm was done to either this defendant’s case or the integrity of the entire judicial process, and no plain error occurred. The bottom line is that the error that occurred in this case was harmless. It is well established that, in a bench trial, the judge is presumed to consider evidence only for its proper purpose. People v. Lewis, 30 Ill. 2d 617, 622 (1964). Under Jefferson, the State may properly introduce evidence relating to a polygraph examination to rebut a witness’ claim that his or her statement was the product of coercion. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 496. Here, the State introduced evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination before any claim of coercion was made. While the trial court should have sustained defense counsel’s objection at that point, the fact remains that Williford shortly thereafter asserted that his statement was coerced. At this point, the evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination became perfectly admissible. Thus, any error that the trial court committed in admitting the evidence in the first instance was at worst harmless and at best cured entirely. As for the majority’s concern that “the State’s premature introduction of the polygraph evidence may have actually compelled Williford to justify his prior actions by claiming coercion in his subsequent testimony” (202 Ill. 2d at 371), I have two responses. First, absolutely nothing in the record supports the majority’s conjecture. Second, and more importantly, the majority’s conjecture is logically untenable. The majority apparently believes that, had the State not asked Williford about his polygraph results, Williford might never have mentioned the coercion that led to his signed and sworn confession. What the majority’s theory overlooks, however, is that Williford had just testified that the signed and sworn confession that landed him 25 years in prison was a complete fabrication. Surely, the majority cannot believe that, had the State not asked Williford about his polygraph results, Williford’s testimony would have concluded without either side inquiring as to why Williford not only gave a false confession but also pleaded guilty and accepted 25 years in prison on the basis of that confession. Of course those questions would have been asked, and of course Williford’s claim of coercion would have come out at that time. As a final matter, I wish to note that, while the majority talks a great deal about “the inherent unreliability of polygraph testing” (202 Ill. 2d at 367), “sufficient indicia of reliability” (202 Ill. 2d at 368), and “scientifically unreliable tests” (202 Ill. 2d at 368), none of these concerns are implicated in this case. This is because the State never introduced the results of Williford’s polygraph examination. Indeed, after reading the majority opinion, one would think that the State not only introduced those results but also argued that they constitute scientific proof that Williford lied during his polygraph examination. In fact, the only thing that the State introduced was Williford’s understanding of his polygraph results, and it did so only as evidence of Williford’s state of mind at the time he gave his inculpatory statement. As with all state of mind evidence, the purpose of this testimony was to show what the witness believed at a certain relevant time, not whether that belief was in fact true. That the State was interested in eliciting evidence only of Williford’s state of mind is demonstrated by the fact that, from the record, we have no idea (1) what Williford was asked during his polygraph examination, (2) whether Williford in fact failed his polygraph examination, or (3) whether Williford even took a polygraph examination. All we know is that, at the time he confessed, Williford believed he had just failed a polygraph examination. Whether or not this evidence is admissible, its reliability has nothing to do with a polygraph’s scientific integrity. For these reasons, I dissent. JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.