Court Opinion

ID: 9825995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:10:11.644209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:45.853706
License: Public Domain

March 15, 1907. Order refusing petition for rehearing was made by
Mr. Justice Gary.
This is a petition for a rehearing in which the first ground submitted is, that “the effect of the order of the Circuit Judge, appealed from herein and affirmed by this Court, is to hold that the Court of Equity has power to partition and to stay waste upon land, in and to which the plaintiff has absolutely no interest or title.”
2 The record shows that the cause was docketed by the plaintiff on Calendar 2, and that the motion made by the defendants was for an order transferring the cause to Calendar 1, for the trial of the issue of title raised by the pleadings, which motion was .refused. By reference to the opinion of this Court it will be seen, that this order was affirmed solely on the ground that there was no abuse of discretion in according to the plaintiff the mode of trial, which she had elected to pursue, for the determination of the question of fraud. The right to partition the land and to stay waste is dependent upon the result of the trial by jury of the legal issues, and there should not, of *318course, be a decree for partition or to stay waste until the legal issues are disposed of. The question of fraud, however, stands upon a different footing, for the reasons stated in the opinion.
3 The next ground relied upon by the petitioners’ attorneys is, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable aid of the Court, in cancelling the deed for fraud, for the reason that she was not in possession of the land when the action was commenced.
In the case of Sires v. Sires, 43 S. C., 266, it was decided that a tenant in comnfon, not in possession, may maintain an action against a co-tenant to set aside, as fraudulent, a deed under which the defendant claims that he is the sole owner of the property, and in the same action may demand partition — the question of title asserted by the defendant being triable by jury. The Court in that case used this language, at page 273: “The appellant contends that the presiding Judge was in error in not holding that possession on the part of the plaintiff was necessary to sustain the action herein;” and then quotes, with approval, the following language from' the case of Miller v. Hughes, 33 S. C., 541, 12 S. E., 419: “The foundation of a cause of action in such a case is fraud, and if the plaintiff, after alleging the fraud, makes further allegations showing that his rights are impaired or destroyed by the perpetration of the fraud, then he states a cause of action. 'Of course, the mere fact that his debtor has perpetuated a fraud, even of the grossest character, gives him no cause of action; but when he alleges other facts tending to show that his rights are injuriously affected by such fraud, then he states a complete cause of action, which, if established, will entitle him to relief. But fraud is peculiarly a matter of equitable cognizance, and when fraud is alleged, and the further allegation is made that such fraud is injurious to the creditor’s rights, it seems to us that a Court of Equity has jurisdiction of such a case. In such a case the creditor does not ask the aid of the Court of Equity, upon the ground that he can obtain no relief at *319law, but his claim to the aid of equity is based upon the fraud which has been practiced upon him, and from which the Court of Equity has jurisdiction to relieve him. It is not universally true that a plaintiff must show that he has no plain adequate remedy at law before he can invoke the aid of a Court of Equity, for there are some cases in which the jurisdictions are concurrent, and fraud is one of those matters. * * * It is further urged, that the claim of the plaintiffs being a plain legal demand, should first be established by a judgment at law, before the aid of equity can be invoked. Whatever embarrassments this might have offered under our former system of judicature, when law and equity were administered by different tribunals, cannot be felt now under our present system, especially after the Code has provided that both legal and equitable causes of action may be united in the same complaint. We do not see, therefore, why the plaintiffs may not demand judgment for the amount alleged to be due them on the law side of the Court, and in the same action ask relief on the equity side from the fraud which they allege will render their action fruitless.”
This ground must, therefore, be overruled.
The appellant lastly contends that an insuperable obstacle to cancellation of the deed for fraud is, that it appears upon the face of the pleadings, that the alleged fraudulent deed is not a cloud upon title, because, even if set aside, plaintiff would not have a valid title to the land, as other sources of title besides said deed, are set out in the answer.
There would be 'much force in this argument, if the pleadings showed that the plaintiff admitted that the defendants could rely successfully, upon the other sources of title, in case the deed was cancelled. The language heretofore quoted from the case of Miller v. Hughes, 33 S. C., 541, shows that a complaint states a complete cause of action, when it alleges fraud, and that the rights of the plaintiff are thereby injuriously affected. In the case under consideration the plaintiff not only alleges that the deed was fraudulent, but that her rights were thereby injuriously affected. *320She, therefore, had the right to invoke the aid of the Court in the exercise of its chancery powers. In an action for partition wherein it is alleged, that the plaintiff and the defendants are co-tenants of the land, the Court is not divested of its equitable jurisdiction, by reason of the fact that the defendants plead paramount title. Albergotti v. Chaplin, 10 Rich. Eq., 428.
Therefore, the Court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, had the power to determine any matters of equitable cognizance, not dependent upon the result of the trial of the legal issues. It cannot be successfully contended that the question of fraud was dependent'upon such result, as the object of its adjudication before the issue of title was tried by a jury was merely to clothe the plaintiff with the legal title, in order that she might be prepared to contend with the defendants in the Court of law, with an additional legal weapon.
After careful considteration, this Court is satisfied that no material question of law or of fact has either been overlooked or disregarded.
4 It i.s, therefore, ordered that the petition be dismissed, and that the order heretofore granted staying the remittitur be revoked.

The Chief Justice and other Justices concur.