Court Opinion

ID: 9931331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:05:05.072601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:43.251687
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                              MCFADDEN, P.J.
                           BROWN AND MARKLE, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                    February 8, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1312. BARNWELL v. TRIVEDI.

      MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

      C. Napoleon Barnwell sued Ankur Pankaj Trivedi for defamation. The trial

court granted Trivedi’s motion to dismiss the complaint under OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b),

a provision of the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirmed the dismissal in Barnwell v.

Trivedi, 366 Ga. App. 168 (881 SE2d 16) (2022). When the case was returned to the

trial court, the court granted Trivedi’s motion for attorney fees under OCGA §§ 9-11-

11.1 (b.1) and 9-15-14 (a) and (b) in the amount of $21,450. Barnwell filed this appeal.

      Contrary to Barnwell’s argument, we hold that evidence supports the award

under OCGA § 9-15-14. Barnwell argues that the trial court erred in awarding fees for

the earlier appeal. But under the anti-SLAPP statute, a court may award fees for
appellate work. OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b.1). Finally, Barnwell argues that the amount of

fees awarded was unreasonable. But he has not shown that the trial court abused his

discretion in awarding that amount. So we affirm.

      1. Background

      As set forth in the earlier opinion,

      Barnwell and Trivedi are licensed Georgia attorneys who at one point
      represented opposing parties in a case in the State Court of DeKalb
      County. Barnwell employed law student Renee E. Taylor, who
      conducted depositions in the case. After suspecting and confirming that
      Taylor was not a licensed member of the Bar when she took the
      deposition, Trivedi secured transcripts of depositions from matters
      handled by other law firms in which Taylor also conducted depositions
      prior to becoming licensed to practice law. As a result of his
      investigation, Trivedi filed in the State Bar of Georgia a grievance against
      Taylor for holding herself out as an attorney and conducting depositions
      prior to obtaining her provisional license to practice law and a grievance
      against Barnwell for facilitating and promoting the unauthorized practice
      of law (“UPL”) by Taylor.

            Trivedi also moved for sanctions in the DeKalb County case. At
      the hearing on the motion, Barnwell took the position that Taylor, his
      intern and a law student at John Marshall Law School, was authorized to
      practice law under the Supreme Court of Georgia’s Student Practice
      Rule. At the hearing, the judge concluded that Taylor’s actions were not

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      permitted under the Student Practice Rule and that Barnwell violated the
      rule by permitting her to take the depositions.

             Barnwell filed [a complaint] against Trivedi in the Superior Court
      of Gwinnett County, alleging claims for defamation/slander by: (1) filing
      the motion for sanctions in the DeKalb County case; (2) filing the Bar
      complaint; and (3) expressing to other lawyers that Barnwell engaged in
      UPL. Trivedi moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim and
      for violation of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute. At the hearing on the
      motion to dismiss, Barnwell abandoned his claims based on Trivedi’s
      statements in the Bar complaint and in the sanctions motion in the
      DeKalb County case, conceding that the statements constituted
      protected speech under Georgia law, but he argued that his claim that
      Trivedi slandered him to other attorneys remained actionable.

             The trial court dismissed Barnwell’s case, finding that he failed to
      establish a possibility that he would prevail on his remaining claim
      because there was no evidence that Trivedi made statements regarding
      Barnwell assisting in Taylor’s UPL to any lawyers other than those in
      Trivedi’s law firm, nor was there evidence that Trivedi said anything
      that was not already a matter of public record.

Barnwell, 366 Ga. App. at 168-169 (footnotes omitted). We affirmed the dismissal of

Barnwell’s lawsuit against Trivedi. Id. at 173-174.

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      After the remittitur was filed in the trial court, the court granted Trivedi’s

motion for attorney fees under OCGA §§ 9-11-11.1 (b.1) and 9-15-14 (a) and (b).

Barnwell filed this appeal.

      2. Basis for fees

      Barnwell challenges the award to the extent that it was based on OCGA § 9-15-

14, arguing that no evidence showed that he brought his defamation action against

Trivedi in bad faith, with the intent to harass, or without substantial justification. We

hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Trivedi made the required showings

for the award.

      (a) OCGA § 9-15-14 (a)

      OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) provides:

      In any civil action . . . reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and
      expenses of litigation shall be awarded to any party against whom another
      party has asserted a claim, defense, or other position with respect to
      which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of
      law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would
      accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.

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“OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) provides for a mandatory award. The standard of review for this

section is the ‘any evidence’ rule.” Haggard v. Bd. of Regents, 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4) (c)

(360 SE2d 566) (1987) (footnote omitted).

      Barnwell argues that the trial court erred because he alleged a prima facie case

for defamation. But as detailed above, the appropriate standard, which the trial court

applied, is whether “there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of

law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the

asserted claim,” OCGA § 9-15-14 (a), not whether Barnwell alleged a prima facie case.

And here, evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Barnwell’s defamation

action lacked any justiciable issue of law or fact.

      Relying on the factual findings made in the order granting Trivedi’s anti-SLAPP

motion to dismiss as well as the facts recited in the prior appeal, the trial court found

that during oral argument on the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, Barnwell conceded

that two of his alleged grounds for defamation — libel for statements Trivedi made in

complaints to the State Bar of Georgia and libel for statements Trivedi made in a

motion for sanctions in DeKalb County State Court — were not sustainable because

the statements were protected speech under Georgia law. See OCGA § 51-5-8 (“All

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charges, allegations, and averments contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of

competent jurisdiction, which are pertinent and material to the relief sought, whether

legally sufficient to obtain it or not, are privileged.”); Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga.

App. 197, 200 (1) (728 SE2d 826) (2012) (“issues before the State Bar involving

conduct of attorneys are official proceedings authorized by law and, therefore, covered

by the Anti-SLAPP statute”) (citations and punctuation omitted). These findings

support the trial court’s conclusion that there was a complete absence of any

justiciable issue of law as to these two grounds of the defamation complaint.

      As for the third ground — slander as a result of Trivedi informing other lawyers

that Barnwell had participated in the commission of the unauthorized practice of law

— the trial court found that no evidence supported Barnwell’s claim. And as noted

in the prior opinion in this case, Trivedi denied discussing the matter with outside

lawyers, and Barnwell failed to come forward with any evidence showing that he had,

relying instead on inferences. Barnwell, 366 Ga. App. at 173. So some evidence

supports the trial court’s conclusion that there existed a complete absence of any

justiciable issue of fact for this ground of the defamation complaint.

      (b) OCGA § 9-15-14 (b)

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      OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) provides:

      The court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and
      expenses of litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon
      the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or
      party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked
      substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was
      interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party
      unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct,
      including, but not limited to, abuses of discovery procedures available
      under Chapter 11 of this title, the “Georgia Civil Practice Act.” As used
      in this Code section, “lacked substantial justification” means
      substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially
      vexatious.

“OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) is discretionary and the standard of review is abuse of

discretion.” Haggard, 257 Ga. at 527 (4) (c).

      As a basis for the award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), the trial court concluded

that Barnwell’s “claims lacked substantial justification and that parts thereof were

interposed for delay or harassment, and [that Barnwell] unnecessarily expanded the

proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of

discovery procedures . . . .” The court found that Barnwell’s action was filed

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       in retaliation for the Bar complaint filed against him and for the motions
       for sanctions filed against him . . . based upon fact that service was
       attempted in an improper and harassing manner, that unsustainable
       claims were made in this suit that were abandoned only when challenged,
       and that no evidence of any type was submitted to this [c]ourt to support
       the generalized claim that [Barnwell] was disparaged to “other lawyers.”

Given these findings, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in awarding fees under

OCGA § 9-15-14 (b).

       (c) OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b.1)

       Moreover, under OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b.1), “a prevailing moving party on a

motion to strike shall be granted the recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses of

litigation related to the action in an amount to be determined by the court based on the

facts and circumstances of the case.” Trivedi was the prevailing party on his motion

to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute and so was entitled to the award of fees under

this statute.

       3. Fees for appellate proceedings

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       Barnwell argues that the trial court erred in awarding fees for the prior appellate

proceedings. He acknowledges that we held in Rosser v. Clyatt, 364 Ga. App. 101 (874

SE2d 140) (2022), that OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b.1), “the anti-SLAPP’s attorney fees

provision[,] allows parties to recoup appellate fees.” Rosser at 104 (2). But he argues

that Rosser was wrongly decided. We are not persuaded. Because Rosser remains valid

precedent, the trial court did not err in awarding fees for the appellate proceedings.

       4. Fee amount

       Barnwell argues that the trial court awarded an unreasonable amount of fees.

He has not shown that the trial court abused his discretion.

       Barnwell argues that at the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the

defamation action, Trivedi’s attorney represented that he charged Trivedi $400 per

hour but at the hearing on attorney fees, he stated that $500 per hour is reasonable.

In fact, the attorney, who works in the same firm as Trivedi, did not testify that he

charged Trivedi any particular amount. Rather, he testified at the anti-SLAPP hearing

on the motion to dismiss that $400 per hour is a reasonable fee for this kind of matter,

given his experience. At the hearing on the issue of attorney fees, he testified that a fee

between $400 and $500 per hour would be reasonable, given the complexity of the

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case and the level of his experience. He submitted his time records, documenting the

41.4 hours of work he performed on the case.

      Barnwell’s attorney cross-examined Trivedi’s attorney, but put up no evidence

as to a reasonable fee. The trial court concluded that, after weighing all of the evidence

before it, the preponderance of the evidence supported an award calculated at $500

per hour.

      As the court observed, under OCGA § 9-15-14, a trial court is authorized to

assess an award representing the reasonable value of the attorney’s services rendered

and is not limited strictly to the amount that the attorney actually billed to his client.

Hindu Temple & Community Center of High Desert v. Raghunathan, 311 Ga. App. 109,

117-119 (3) (714 SE2d 628) (2011). Barnwell has not shown that the trial court abused

his discretion.

      Judgment affirmed. Brown and Markle, JJ., concur.

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