Court Opinion

ID: 9908983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 14:10:17.087744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:39.204582
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Causey, Raphael and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Loudoun, Virginia

              DANY EDGARDO HERNANDEZ
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1221-22-4                               JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
                                                                                DECEMBER 12, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
                                               Tracy C. Hudson, Judge

                                Shalev Ben-Avraham, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Office of
                                the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant.

                                Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                                Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      Dany Edgardo Hernandez appeals his convictions, in a jury trial, for conspiracy to commit

              murder, first-degree murder, stabbing in the commission of a felony, and three counts of gang

              participation under Code §§ 18.2-22, -32, -53, and -46.2. He argues that the trial court erred by not

              striking a juror for cause, that the Commonwealth violated Brady1 and Napue,2 and that some of his

              sentences must be set aside under double jeopardy principles. Finding no error, we affirm the

              judgment of the trial court.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                      1
                          Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
                      2
                          Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
                                        BACKGROUND3

       “On appeal, we view the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

because it was the prevailing party below.” Delp v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 227, 230

(2020). “Viewing the record through this evidentiary prism requires us to ‘discard the evidence

of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible

evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’”

Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va.

323, 323-24 (2018)).

       Hernandez was indicted in Prince William County for conspiracy to commit murder,

first-degree murder, use of a firearm in commission of a murder, and stabbing in the commission

of a felony, all related to the death of Wilfredo Guardado-Huezo, in violation of Code

§§ 18.2-32, -22, -53, and -53.1. Hernandez was also indicted on three counts of gang

participation under Code § 18.2-46.2, with the conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree

murder, and the shooting or stabbing offenses serving as the three predicate criminal acts.

       A potential juror, G.B., disclosed during the trial’s voir dire that he was the victim of a

violent assault by a group in which he was struck with a wine bottle while on a bus, causing an

injury to his head requiring stitches. When asked if he could be fair and objective in reviewing

the evidence, G.B. stated, “It was a minority that attacked me. I’m going to try but I’m just

saying I had the top of my head taken off, I had a reverse mohawk, I had it sewn back on.” G.B.

stated he would do his best to be impartial and denied believing Hernandez more likely to be

       3
         The record in this appeal is partially sealed. “To the extent that this opinion mentions
facts found in the sealed record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the
decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v.
MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).
                                                 -2-
guilty as a minority. Hernandez made no motion to strike G.B. for cause, instead eliminating

G.B. from the pool with a peremptory strike.

       Wilfredo Guardado-Huezo, a member of the 18th Street gang as defined under Code

§ 18.2-46.1, was killed in the early morning hours of April 17, 2017, in an alley next to the

restaurant Tom’s Diner in Manassas. On the other side of Tom’s Diner was another restaurant, Don

Julio’s. Don Julio’s had indoor surveillance cameras and outdoor surveillance of the back parking

lot between the two restaurants. When law enforcement arrived on scene immediately after the

killing and reviewed the footage, they developed Denis Sanchez as a suspect and detained him in

Don Julio’s.

       Sanchez was a member of MS-13, a criminal gang as defined under Code § 18.2-46.1.

Sanchez knew Hernandez as a higher-ranking MS-13 member. Don Julio’s internal surveillance

showed Guardado-Huezo make hand signs associated with the 18th Street gang at Sanchez. The

18th Street gang was the primary rival of MS-13.

       After seeing Guardado-Huezo display the hand signs, Sanchez left the restaurant and drove

to Hernandez’s trailer. There, Sanchez told Hernandez, “Cruz,” and “Christian” that an 18th Street

member was at Don Julio’s. Hernandez told Sanchez, Cruz, and Christian that they could move up

in rank in the gang by killing Guardado-Huezo. Hernandez armed himself with a knife and

machete. Cruz had a .45 caliber firearm, and Sanchez had a .38 caliber firearm. All three left the lot

and drove to a 7-Eleven store, where surveillance showed Sanchez buying Newport cigarettes.

       Don Julio’s outdoor surveillance showed the three drive into the parking lot of the

restaurant. Sanchez got out of the driver’s seat and went back inside the restaurant. When Sanchez

re-entered Don Julio’s, Guardado-Huezo was still there. In the meantime, Hernandez and Cruz

waited outside, and leaned against the car; Hernandez smoked one of the cigarettes bought at the

7-Eleven. Hernandez wore a hat given to him by Sanchez.

                                                 -3-
        Surveillance footage showed Guardado-Huezo leaving the restaurant, walking by

Hernandez and Cruz in the parking lot, and entering the alley outside the view of the camera.

Hernandez dropped his cigarette next to the car; while pulling objects out of their clothing,

Hernandez and Cruz both followed Guardado-Huezo.4 Almost immediately after Hernandez and

Cruz entered the alley there were flashes on the surveillance footage consistent with gunfire, and

two people then fled the alley back through the parking lot.

        Although Guardado-Huezo was alive when law enforcement arrived on scene, he was

unable to communicate and ultimately died from two stabbing wounds and five gunshot wounds in

his torso. Guardado-Huezo had three bullets in his body; two more bullets and shell casings were

found in the alley and a third bullet in a nearby restaurant. The bullets and casings were all fired

with a .45 caliber semi-automatic firearm.

        Behind the restaurants, in the direction Hernandez and Cruz fled, were trailer park units

where Hernandez’s girlfriend at the time lived. The day after the murder, Hernandez told her that

he needed to leave and could not stay at his normal trailer because “other people” were there.

Hernandez said they were at Don Julio’s the night of the murder because “a friend had told him that

there was another person there” and “that something went wrong,” but Hernandez would not

explain further. He indicated that the other person was a rival of MS-13.5 When police searched a

trailer lot Hernandez’s girlfriend confirmed he stayed at, they found a knife and a .45 caliber

magazine with corresponding bullets and case cartridges, along with MS-13 paraphernalia.

        4
         Law enforcement collected that cigarette butt; analysis showed that Hernandez could not
be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA on that cigarette.
        5
         After Hernandez had been arrested, he called the former girlfriend and asked her to lie and
provide him an alibi for that night. She testified that at the time of the murder, Hernandez
sometimes stayed at a nearby trailer.
                                                  -4-
       Eric Contreras testified for the Commonwealth as a former member of MS-13 and an expert

on its gang culture. Two days after the murder, Hernandez went to Contreras’s apartment and said

that he had planned the killing, waited for Guardado-Huezo to leave the restaurant, and stabbed him

with Cruz. Hernandez told Cruz to shoot him, and after Cruz fired, Hernandez took the gun and

also shot Guardado-Huezo. Hernandez and Cruz then ran to the trailer. Contreras admitted to

having pending unrelated charges but denied that he was promised anything in exchange for his

testimony. When asked why he was testifying, Contreras stated that he wanted out of the gang and

that Hernandez wanted to blame him for the murder. On cross-examination, when asked what

benefit he was getting for his testimony, Contreras stated:

               None for right now. I’m not getting anything. I’m not receiving any
               kind of benefit. I don’t know about anything. I had gone, seen a lot
               of cases. I know about a lot of cases, but I don’t want to be in the
               gang anymore. . . . And when I was on the gang side of things,
               there’s a saying that the police are the enemy. So now I kind of view
               that as, well, now I’m kind of with them, and you could maybe take
               it like that, that maybe now I’m with them, because I’m collaborating
               with them.

A law enforcement gang expert later testified that he commonly works with gang members

testifying against their fellow gang, and he agreed that “[m]ost likely, when someone does

something, they’re going to want something in return for it.”

       After the jury convicted Hernandez of all counts except using a firearm in the commission

of a felony, Hernandez’s counsel discovered an audio recording of a meeting between Contreras and

the prosecutors who represented the Commonwealth at Hernandez’s trial. In that recording, the

prosecutors continually told Contreras that they could not make specific promises to him about what

impact his cooperation would have in his own case, and Contreras admitted that he was cooperating

to avoid jail time. The recording also indicated that the prosecutors met with Contreras on more

than one occasion.

                                                 -5-
        Hernandez then filed several post-trial motions. He argued that multiple sentences for gang

participation under Code § 18.2-46.2 would violate double jeopardy, that the trial court erred in not

striking G.B. for cause sua sponte, and that the Commonwealth violated Brady and Napue for

failing to disclose the recording before trial and correct Contreras’s testimony during trial. The trial

court considered the motions on their merits and denied them. The trial court then entered a

sentencing order imposing 85 years of incarceration with 50 years suspended. This appeal follows.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                    I. Brady and Napue Violations

        Hernandez first argues that the Commonwealth’s failure to turn over Contreras’s audio

recording before trial was a violation of its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), and that the Commonwealth’s failure to correct Contreras’s testimony about why he was

testifying and the number of times he met with the Commonwealth violated Napue v. Illinois, 360

U.S. 264 (1959), both of which require a new trial.

        When reviewing alleged constitutional violations, “[w]e review the trial court’s findings

of historical fact only for ‘clear error,’ but we review de novo the trial court’s application of

defined legal standards to the particular facts of a case.” Castillo v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App.

394, 466 (2019) (quoting Doss v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 435, 455 (2012)).

        “Under Brady, ‘the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” Mercer v. Commonwealth, 66

Va. App. 139, 146 (2016) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “There are three components of a

violation of the rule of disclosure first enunciated in Brady . . . .” Workman v. Commonwealth,

272 Va. 633, 644 (2006). First, “[t]he evidence not disclosed to the accused ‘must be favorable

to the accused, either because it is exculpatory[]’ or because it may be used for impeachment.”

                                                  -6-
Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). Second, the Commonwealth

must have withheld the evidence, without regard to whether it did so “willfully or inadvertently.”

Id. Third, the evidence must be “material” under Brady, meaning “there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Commonwealth v. Tuma, 285 Va. 629, 634-35 (2013) (quoting Smith v. Cain, 565

U.S. 73, 75 (2012)); see also Workman, 272 Va. at 644-45 (describing the third prong as whether

the accused was prejudiced). “A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant ‘would

more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the likelihood

of a different result is great enough to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”

Cain, 565 U.S. at 75 (alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).

However, “[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the

defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the

constitutional sense.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 79, 106 (2008) (quoting United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976)). “The accused has the burden of establishing each

of these three components to prevail on a Brady claim.” Mercer, 66 Va. App. at 146 (quoting

Tuma, 285 Va. at 635).

       Just as under Brady, if the Commonwealth knowingly fails to correct false testimony, then

the conviction “must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 492

(2007) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103). This is true even if “the false testimony goes only to

the credibility of the witness.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. This Court “must determine first that the

testimony [at issue] was false, second that the prosecution knew of the falsity, and finally that the

falsity affected the jury’s judgment.” Teleguz, 273 Va. at 492.

                                                -7-
        Throughout the recorded interview, the prosecutors gave Contreras examples of the types of

influence the Commonwealth wielded and how that influence possibly could impact Contreras’s

own case. However, they made no specific quid pro quo deal with Contreras. The record clearly

supports the trial court’s factual finding that the Commonwealth made Contreras no promises of any

kind in return for his testimony. Thus, the Commonwealth was not obligated to correct Contreras’s

testimony that no promises were made in exchange for his testimony, especially given Contreras’s

admission at trial that he was given no promises “for right now.”

        Nonetheless, the trial court found that the prosecutor under Napue “probably should have

corrected” Contreras’s statement at trial that he was testifying only because he wanted to get out of

the gang, and Contreras’s recorded admission of hope for limiting his incarceration was

impeachment evidence that the Commonwealth should have disclosed under Brady. However, the

trial court ultimately found that due to the overwhelming evidence establishing Hernandez’s guilt,

these failures did not likely impact the jury’s judgment. Assuming without deciding that this

evidence should have been disclosed pre-trial and corrected at trial, we find that the record supports

the trial court’s finding that there was no impact upon the verdict.

        In his testimony, Sanchez described the entire course of events on the night of the murder,

from his first interaction with Guardado-Huezo until after Guardado-Huezo died, and was fully

corroborated by surveillance footage at Don Julio’s and 7-Eleven. Sanchez’s testimony established

that Hernandez plotted, directed, and enacted Guardado-Huezo’s murder while armed with a knife

and machete. DNA evidence further corroborated Hernandez as one of the assailants captured on

that surveillance footage. Hernandez admitted his involvement to his girlfriend at the time and

asked her to lie to create a false alibi. The Commonwealth’s gang expert’s testimony that gang

members cooperate to help themselves impeached Contreras’s testimony. The only charge that

would have rested entirely on Contreras’s testimony was the felonious use of a firearm, as Sanchez

                                                 -8-
testified that Hernandez was not armed with a gun. The jury acquitted Hernandez of that offense.

Hernandez’s crimes of conviction were supported by overwhelming evidence independent of

Contreras’s testimony, and we will not disturb the trial court’s finding that a new trial was

unwarranted under Napue or Brady.6

                                              II. Juror Bias

        Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by failing to strike, sua sponte, G.B. for cause as

a juror for bias. He asserts that he is entitled to a new trial as a result. We disagree.

        Hernandez did not make a motion to strike G.B. for cause, and instead used a peremptory

strike to remove G.B from the jury panel. His post-trial motion to set aside the verdict asserted for

the first time that the trial court erred in not striking G.B. for cause sua sponte. Generally,

objections related to the selection of the jury must be raised either during voir dire or before the

jury is empaneled. See Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 100 (2003) (“Because [defendant]

failed to raise any objection either during the voir dire of prospective juror Young or before she

was empanelled and sworn as a juror to hear the case, he has waived the argument that he now

presents on appeal.”); see also Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 278 (1993); Spencer v.

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 306-07 (1989). Although Rule 3A:14(b) permits a trial court to

strike a juror on its own motion, a defendant is still required to timely object to preserve the

argument. Green, 266 Va. at 101; Rule 5A:18.

        Nonetheless, Code § 8.01-352 permits a litigant to make a post-trial juror motion “with

leave of court.” See Hill v. Berry, 247 Va. 271, 273-74 (1994) (Code § 8.01-352 preserved a

post-trial juror challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Robert M. Seh Co.,

        6
         Hernandez asks this Court to fashion a new rule that all willful violations of Brady
should result in a new trial, irrespective of whether the defendant establishes that the violation
created a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. We decline to do so as this Court is
bound by precedent requiring such a finding. See Tuma, 285 Va. at 634-35 (following Smith,
565 U.S. at 75).
                                                 -9-
Inc. v. O’Donnell, 277 Va. 599, 603 n.3 (2009) (Code § 8.01-352 preserved a post-trial motion to

strike a juror for bias). Because the trial court addressed Hernandez’s post-trial motion on its

merits, it “implicitly granted” Hernandez leave to make this motion. See Mason v.

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 505, 509 (1998) (“Here, the trial court implicitly granted [defendant]

leave to challenge the juror because the court decided his motion.”). Thus, we review on appeal

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hernandez’s post-trial motion. Lawlor v.

Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212 (2013). However, for Hernandez to succeed on appeal by way

of his post-trial motion, he must show that the juror’s “disability be such as to probably cause

injustice” in his case. Code § 8.01-352(B); see also Mason, 255 Va. at 510.

        Hernandez removed G.B. from the jury with a peremptory strike. Normally, “[i]t is

prejudicial error for the trial court to force a defendant to use the peremptory strikes . . . to

exclude a venireman who is not free from exception.” Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,

300 (1976). However, because Hernandez did not raise an objection until after trial, he must

now establish that his use of a peremptory strike against G.B. “probably cause[d] injustice.”

Code § 8.01-352(B). Hernandez has failed to establish what, if anything, would have differed in

the empaneled jury as a result of his using a peremptory strike against G.B. Thus, he did not

prove that his use of a peremptory strike “probably cause[d] injustice.” Code § 8.01-352(B).

We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion.

                                                 - 10 -
                                       III. Double Jeopardy

        Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in refusing to find that his three sentences for

gang participation under Code § 18.2-46.2 violated double jeopardy.7 We disagree and affirm

the trial court.8

        We review questions pertaining to double jeopardy or statutory interpretation de novo.

Davis v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 446, 455 (2011). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the

United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Virginia’s constitutional

guarantee against double jeopardy affords a defendant the same guarantees as the federal Double

Jeopardy Clause.” Stephens v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 58, 62 (2002). “This constitutional

provision guarantees protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after

acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple

punishments for the same offense.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 741 (2016)

(quoting Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 227 (1999)).

        When an accused is tried for multiple offenses in the same trial, only the third prohibition

is at issue. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 529-30 (1980). “[T]he Double Jeopardy

Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than

the legislature intended.” Stephens, 263 Va. at 63 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,

        7
         Hernandez also argues, briefly and with no independent authority, that these same
principles preclude his sentences for both conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder;
this argument contradicts well-established precedent clearly stating otherwise. See Schwartz v.
Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 407, 438-39 (2005); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 351
(1988).
        8
          The Commonwealth asserts that Hernandez’s argument is waived for failure to comply
with Rule 3A:9, as he raised the double jeopardy claim in a motion post-trial. However, Rule
3A:9(d) permits the trial court to entertain the motion “[f]or good cause,” and the trial court’s
implicit finding of such by ruling on the merits means we will entertain these arguments on
appeal.
                                                 - 11 -
366 (1983)). “When considering multiple punishments for a single transaction, the controlling

factor is legislative intent.” Johnson, 292 Va. at 741 (quoting Kelsoe v. Commonwealth, 226 Va.

197, 199 (1983)). “[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not

different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”

Stephens, 263 Va. at 63 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980)). It is

within the legislature’s discretion to determine the “‘unit of prosecution’ and set the penalty for

separate violations.” Johnson, 292 Va. at 741 (quoting Jordan v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.

590, 594 (1986)).

       Code § 18.2-46.2 criminalizes knowing and willful participation “in any predicate

criminal act committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal

street gang[.]” Code § 18.2-46.1 defines a “predicate criminal act” specifically as stabbing in the

commission of a felony under Code § 18.2-53, among other enumerated statutory violations, as

well as any “act of violence.” Under Code § 19.2-297.1, both first-degree murder and

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder are “acts of violence.” Thus, each of Hernandez’s

three underlying convictions are criminal acts that may serve as the “predicate” for a conviction

under Code § 18.2-46.2.

       “Virginia courts ‘presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it

enacted the relevant statute.’” Prease v. Clarke, __ Va. __, __ (July 6, 2023) (quoting Tvardek v.

Powhatan Vill. Homeowners Ass’n Inc., 291 Va. 269, 277 (2016)). “The one canon of

construction that precedes all others is that ‘[w]e presume that the legislature says what it means

and means what it says.’” Id. at __ (quoting Tvardek, 291 Va. at 277). We therefore presume

that the legislature’s choice to use “any predicate criminal act” means any single enumerated

offense may serve as the predicate criminal act and does not encompass several predicate

criminal acts. Code § 18.2-46.2. If the legislature had intended for only one punishment of gang

                                               - 12 -
activity for multiple predicate criminal acts, it would have used “one or more predicate criminal

acts” in lieu of “any predicate criminal act.” See Johnson, 292 Va. at 741-42 (holding that the

unit of prosecution for failing to appear in court under Code § 19.2-128 was the number of

charged felonies because the statute used “a” felony rather than language such as “one or more

felonies”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting Hernandez’s claim that sentencing

him upon more than one conviction for criminal gang participation violated double jeopardy

principles.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                                                         Affirmed.

                                               - 13 -