Court Opinion

ID: 9929820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 14:09:58.325464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:51.836202
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 30, 2024

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00255-CV
                           ———————————
                       CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant
                                        V.
                    JOHN ANTHONY BRANCH, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 333rd District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2020-31674

       DISSENTING OPINION ON EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

      In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Houston challenges the trial court’s

order denying its motion for summary judgment in John Anthony Branch’s

negligence suit against the City.    Branch alleged he was injured when City

Councilmember Michael Kubosh, a passenger on a stopped golf cart, hit the gas
pedal of the cart with his foot as he leaned over to speak with someone, causing the

golf cart to strike Branch.

      A majority of this Court affirms the ruling of the trial court holding Branch

presented evidence raising a fact issue over whether his injury arose from

Councilmember Kubosh’s “operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle” and thus

whether his claim falls within the waiver of immunity in Section 101.021(1) of the

Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”). I respectfully dissent.

      Because there is no evidence Branch’s injuries arose from the operation or use

of a motor vehicle or that the tangible personal property immunity waiver applies, I

would reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion for summary

judgment and render judgment dismissing Branch’s suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

                                     Discussion

      Branch asserted a negligence claim against the City of Houston, alleging

Councilmember Kubosh “operated a golf cart” that struck him resulting in personal

injury. In his Original Petition, Branch alleged that Councilmember Kubosh failed

to (1) maintain a proper lookout, (2) control the operation of the golf cart, (3) avoid

the incident in question, (4) pay attention to his surroundings, and (5) operate the

golf cart as a person of ordinary prudence would have in the same or similar

circumstances. Branch alleged his claims involved “personal injury caused by the

                                          2
negligent operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle by [the City’s] employee” and

thus he could sue the City under the TTCA’s motor vehicle waiver of immunity.

      The City moved for traditional summary judgment on Branch’s claim. It

argued the TTCA’s motor vehicle waiver did not apply because the waiver applies

to public, not private, vehicles and further because Branch’s injuries did not arise

from an employee’s negligent operation or use of the golf cart as a motor vehicle.

One day prior to the hearing on the City’s motion, Branch filed his First Amended

Petition alleging waiver of the City’s immunity under the motor vehicle waiver or,

alternatively, the personal property waiver.          Branch did not allege that

Councilmember Kubosh “operated a golf cart,” as he did in his Original Petition.

Instead, he alleged that “City employee Michael Kubosh was in the passenger seat

of a golf cart when he ran over Plaintiff” causing him injury. Branch did not assert

negligence claims against John Gibbs or allege that Gibbs, the driver of the golf cart,

was negligent in his operation or use of the golf cart.

      Following the hearing on the City’s motion for summary judgment, the trial

court denied the motion.

               Section 101.021(1): Motor-Driven Vehicle Waiver

      A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity in

suits against the government. Tex Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638

(Tex. 1999). The City of Houston is a governmental unit generally immune from

                                           3
tort liability except where the legislature specifically waives that immunity. City of

Hous. v. Nicolai, 539 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet.

denied). Branch therefore had the burden to establish jurisdiction by pleading—and

ultimately proving—not only a valid immunity waiver but also a claim that falls

within that waiver. San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 135–36

(Tex. 2015); Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 586–87 (Tex.

2001).

         Relevant to this appeal, Section 101.021(1) of the TTCA provides that a

governmental unit is liable for personal injury “proximately caused by the wrongful

act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of

employment” if the personal injury “arises from the operation or use of a motor-

driven vehicle” and “the employee would be personally liable to the claimant

according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1). This requires

evidence of both (1) “operation or use” of a motor-driven vehicle, and (2) a causal

connection between the “operation or use” and the plaintiff’s injuries. See Williams

v. City of Baytown, 467 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no

pet.).

         Courts strictly construe the terms “operation or use” of a motor vehicle under

Section 101.021(1)(A). Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cnty., 453

S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (“Given the Legislature’s preference for a limited

                                            4
immunity waiver, we strictly construe section 101.021’s vehicle-use requirement.”);

see Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008)

(explaining courts interpret waivers of immunity narrowly noting intent to waive

must be expressed by clear and unambiguous language).                  While Section

101.021(1)(A) “does not explicitly require that the operation or use [of a motor

vehicle] be ‘active’ or that it be ongoing ‘at the time of the incident,’” a plaintiff’s

alleged damage or injury must “arise from” the motor vehicle’s “operation or use.”

PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2019). That is, the

statute “requires a nexus between the injury negligently caused by a governmental

employee and the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.” Id. at 302 (quoting

LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992)).

The claim must be based on “more than mere involvement of property. Id. “[T]he

use or operation [of a motor vehicle] ‘must have actually caused the injury.’” Id.

(quoting Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex.

2001)); see Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2003)

(“[T]he operation or use of a motor vehicle ‘does not cause injury if it does no more

than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible.’”).

      The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed the “arises from” and “operation

or use” requirements in PHI, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 593 S.W.3d

296 (Tex. 2019). There, a governmental employee drove and parked a Juvenile

                                           5
Justice Department van on an incline near a PHI-owned helicopter, turned off the

ignition, and exited the van without setting the emergency brake. See id. at 300. As

the employee walked away, the van began rolling backwards and crashed into PHI’s

helicopter. See id. PHI sued the Department alleging it breached its duty to act with

ordinary care in maintaining and operating the van based on its employee’s

negligence. See id. at 300–01. The Department filed a combined plea to the

jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. See id.

at 301. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-

nothing judgment for the Department. See id.

      On petition for review, the Department argued PHI’s negligence claims were

barred because its employee was not even in the van, much less actively operating

it, when the collision occurred. See id. at 305. The Department relied on the Texas

Supreme Court’s prior statement in Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette

County, 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015) that “a government employee must have been

actively operating the vehicle at the time of the incident.” Id. at 304–05 (quoting

Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 927). The Court clarified that while that statement remains an

important inquiry, the court of appeals erred in treating it as statutory text. See id.

at 305 (“Ryder correctly suggests that whether a government vehicle was in ‘active’

operation ‘at the time of the incident’ is an important consideration in determining

whether an alleged injury arises from the operation or use of a vehicle. But a single

                                          6
sentence from that opinion is not itself the rule of decision.”). The Court held that

although the employee was not in the van at the time of impact, the evidence raised

a fact issue as to whether the accident “arose from” the employee’s failure to set the

emergency brake after he exited the van. See id. at 304.

      In considering whether the Department employee’s failure to engage the

emergency brake qualified as “operation or use” of the van, the Court noted it had

previously defined “use” as “to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or

apply to a given purpose,” and “operation” as “a doing or performing of a practical

work.” Id. at 303 (citing Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Est. of Lindburg, 766

S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989)). After noting that these definitions, although correct,

are not all that enlightening, the Court concluded that “ensuring your car will not

roll away after you leave it, including engagement of the emergency brake when

necessary, is an integral part of the ‘operation or use’ of a vehicle.” Id. at 303–04.

Notably, no one refuted that the Department employee had been operating or using

(driving) the van moments before the incident. Rather, the sole question before the

Court was whether applying the emergency brake was an “‘essential’ and ‘final’

aspect of driving the van . . . .” Id. at 304 (“PHI’s allegation that Webb negligently

performed this ‘essential’ and ‘final’ aspect of driving the van fits squarely within

the textual parameters of section 101.021(1)(A).”).

                                          7
      As part of its analysis, the PHI Court discussed its interpretation of the

“operation and use” requirement in LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent

School District, 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992). In LeLeaux, a school bus took students

from the defendant school district to a marching band contest where the students

watched other bands perform. See id. at 50. While the school bus was “parked [and]

empty, with the motor off,” a student jumped onto the rear of the bus and hit her

head. Id. at 51–52. The Court held the injury did not arise out of the operation or

use of the bus because the bus “was nothing more than the place where [the student]

happened to injure herself” and was “only the setting for the injury.” Id. The PHI

Court distinguished LeLeaux, stating,

      Here, by contrast, the Department’s van was not simply the venue of
      the injury. The van itself rolled away and collided with the helicopter,
      and PHI alleges this happened because of the driver’s negligent failure
      to make sure the van did not immediately roll away after he exited it.
      The bus driver in LeLeaux had nothing to do with the accident, whereas
      PHI’s allegation is that the van driver caused the accident by
      negligently performing the final act of driving, which is making sure
      the vehicle he just finished driving wouldn’t roll away.

PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 302.

      In this case, the City argued in its motion for summary judgment that

Councilmember Kubosh was not using or operating the golf cart as a motor vehicle

but rather as a waiting area or holding cell. It argued that the unrefuted evidence

established that, moments before the alleged incident, Councilmember Kubosh was

sitting in the passenger seat of the stopped golf cart and leaned over toward the
                                         8
driver’s side—not to put the cart into motion—but to speak to someone. Relying on

his affidavit and the affidavit of Gibbs, the driver of the golf cart, Branch responded

he had presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the “operation or use” and “arise

from” requirements of Section 101.021(1)(A) or, at a minimum, raised a fact issue

precluding summary judgment.

       In considering the City’s motion, the trial court had before it the affidavits of

Gibbs and Branch. Gibbs, the City’s Community Outreach Liaison for

Councilmember Kubosh, was responsible for driving Councilmember Kubosh in the

parade in the Councilmember’s privately owned golf cart. In his affidavit, Gibbs

attested that:

       The day of the event, my role as Co-Chair was to drive Councilmember
       Kubosh in the parade, in his privately-owned golf cart.

                                          ...

       I drove Councilmember Kubosh in the golf cart to find his correct
       position for the parade. I stopped the golf cart near where Chief Sam
       Pena was standing and applied the golf cart’s brake and emergency
       brake. Mr. Branch approached the golf cart and leaned with his elbows
       on the windshield of the golf cart. His feet were underneath the front
       of the golf cart.

       With the emergency brake still on, I started to exit the golf cart from
       the driver’s side. Councilmember Kubosh started to slide toward the
       driver’s side of the vehicle. I observed with my peripheral vision his
       left foot pass over the gas pedal without touching it. With his shift in
       body weight the golf cart shifted forward. I did not see an impact
       between the golf cart and Mr. Branch.

                                           9
In the affidavit attached to his summary judgment response, Branch stated:

      At the parade, City of Houston Councilmember Kubosh was sitting in
      the passenger seat of a stopped golfcart. Councilmember Kubosh
      leaned over to the driver’s side of the golf cart to speak to someone.
      When Councilmember Kubosh did this, he reached out his hand and
      leaned his body to the driver’s side of the golfcart.            Then
      Councilmember Kubosh’s foot hit the gas pedal and I heard the
      golfcart’s engine rev. I then felt the golfcart hit me.

      John Gibbs was about 10 feet away, talking to someone else, when the
      golfcart hit me.

      Based on these affidavits, the majority opines that “the case for immunity

[here] is at least as strong as it was in PHI.” It states that “[w]hereas applying the

brake is the ‘final’ act of driving, applying the gas pedal initiates the act of driving.

Indeed, the gas pedal is designed for the purpose of enabling the car to move.

Consequently, stepping on the gas pedal—even when done unintentionally—

squarely fits within the definition of ‘use’ as meaning ‘to put or bring’ the motor

vehicle ‘into action or service.’”

      I disagree with the majority that this case is like or “as strong as” PHI. Unlike

PHI, where the Department employee was the driver of the van, it is undisputed that

Councilmember Kubosh was a passenger in a stopped golf cart. There is no

evidence, like there was in PHI, that Branch’s injury was caused by the

Councilmember’s negligent failure in making sure the golf cart was properly parked.

To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that Gibbs, the driver of the golf cart,

                                           10
parked the golf cart and applied the brake and emergency brake before exiting the

golf cart.

       Contrary to the en banc majority’s characterization, there is also no evidence

Councilmember Kubosh “applied” or “stepped” on the gas pedal. Branch testified

that Councilmember’s Kubosh’s foot hit the gas pedal as he leaned over to the

driver’s side to speak to someone, and not that the Councilmember stepped on or

applied the gas pedal.1 That the Councilmember may have “hit the gas pedal” with

his foot while leaning over from the passenger seat to speak to someone does not

transform this act into the “operation or use” of the golf cart as a motor vehicle for

purposes of Section 101.021(1)(A). Nor do I agree with the majority that such act

can be construed as “initiating the act of driving.”

       The undisputed evidence before the trial court established (1) Councilmember

Kubosh was not the driver of the golf cart; (2) moments before the incident, the

driver of the golf cart, Gibbs, stopped the golf cart, applied the golf cart’s brake and

emergency brake, and exited the cart; (3) Councilmember Kubosh was waiting in

the passenger seat of the golf cart for the parade to begin; (4) no one directed

Councilmember Kubosh to move the golf cart; and (5) Councilmember Kubosh was

1
       “Step” is defined as “to press down with the foot.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
       DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/step (last visited
       January 16, 2024).

                                          11
“sitting in the passenger seat of a stopped golf cart” when he leaned over to speak to

someone. Even assuming, as Branch averred, that Councilmember Kubosh’s “foot

hit the gas pedal” as he leaned his body toward “the driver’s side of the golf cart,”

this evidence does not establish that the Councilmember was “doing or performing

a practical work” or that he put the golf cart “into action or service” or “employed it

for a given purpose.” PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 303 (defining “use” as “to put or bring

into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose” and “operation” as

“a doing or performing of a practical work”).

      In short, there is no evidence Councilmember Kubosh used or operated the

golf cart as a motor-driven vehicle. Unlike the government employee in PHI,

Councilmember Kubosh was not the driver of the golf cart, but merely a passenger.

And while it is true that nothing in the statute requires the use or operation of a motor

vehicle to be intentional, the conclusion that a person sitting in the passenger seat of

a “stopped golf cart,” while waiting for a parade to commence, has “used or

operated” the golf cart by inadvertently hitting the gas pedal while leaning over to

the driver’s side to speak to someone stretches the definition of “operation or use”

too far. As the Texas Supreme Court repeatedly has stated, “any purported statutory

waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed in favor of retention of

immunity.” Id. at 303 (quoting Prairie View A&M Univ. v Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500,

513 (Tex. 2012)).

                                           12
      In light of the evidence presented and applicable law, I would hold the City

retained its immunity under the TTCA’s motor vehicle waiver, because the evidence

does not satisfy the “operation or use” requirement under Section 101.021(1)(A) of

the TTCA and thus Branch did not establish his injuries arose from a government

employee’s negligent operation or use of a motor vehicle. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(A). Because I conclude that Branch failed to raise a fact

issue over whether his injuries arose from a government employee’s negligent

operation or use of a motor vehicle, we need not decide today whether, as Branch

contends, the motor vehicle exception extends to privately owned vehicles.2

      Because I would sustain the City’s first issue, I address the City’s second issue

below.

            Section 101.021(2): Tangible Personal Property Waiver

      In its second issue, the City contends that Branch’s untimely amendment to

his petition invoking the tangible personal property waiver under Section 101.021(2)

of the TTCA does not save his claims. The City argues that the personal property

waiver does not waive its immunity because (1) the motor vehicle and tangible

personal property waivers are mutually exclusive and cannot be pleaded in the

2
      See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion
      that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to
      final disposition of the appeal.”).

                                            13
alternative, and (2) the City itself did not use the golf cart, precluding application of

the waiver.

      On May 3, 2021, one day before the hearing on the City’s motion for summary

judgment, Branch filed his First Amended Petition asserting for the first time the

tangible personal property waiver under Section 101.021(2) of the TTCA as an

alternative basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction. Branch does not explain the basis

for jurisdiction in his First Amended Petition. Branch merely alleges, without more,

that the “Court has jurisdiction over this claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act

because the Texas Legislature waived Defendant’s sovereign immunity under Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. 101.021(1) or in the alternative Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

101.021(2).”

      Branch moved for leave to file his First Amended Petition on May 4, 2021,

the day of the summary judgment hearing. The trial court entered its order denying

the City’s motion for summary judgment that same day. In its summary judgment

order, the trial court stated: “After considering Defendant’s Traditional Motion for

Summary Judgment, the pleadings, the response, the reply (if any), the affidavits,

and other evidence on file, the Court DENIES Defendant’s traditional motion for

summary judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

      A party may not amend his pleadings within seven days of a summary

judgment hearing without leave of court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 63. When as here, a

                                           14
summary judgment states that all pleadings were considered, “leave of court is

presumed[.]” B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex.

2020) (“[L]eave of court is presumed when a summary judgment states that all

pleadings were considered, and when, as here, the record does not indicate that an

amended pleading was not considered, and the opposing party does not show

surprise.”) (quoting Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.

1996)). Although the City objected to the timeliness of Branch’s amended pleading

at the summary judgment hearing, it did not seek or obtain a ruling on that objection.

There is thus no reason to conclude the trial court did not consider Branch’s amended

pleading when it heard and ruled on the City’s motion. See id. at 262 (“And although

Steak N Shake objected to the timeliness of B.C.’s response, it neither sought nor

obtained a ruling on that objection before or after the trial court’s order; therefore,

we have no basis to conclude the trial court did not consider all summary-judgment

evidence on file at the time the motion was heard.”).

      Because the trial court’s summary judgment order expressly states it

considered “the pleadings,” I would presume leave of court was granted and that the

trial court considered Branch’s First Amended Petition during the hearing on the

City’s motion for summary judgment. See id. The City nonetheless argues that

dismissal of Branch’s suit is proper because the motor vehicle and tangible personal

                                          15
property waivers are mutually exclusive and further because the City “itself did not

‘use’ the golf cart.”

      In considering grounds for reversal on appeal, we are ordinarily limited to

those grounds expressly set forth in the summary judgment motions, answers, or

other responses. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch.

Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993) (citing City of Hous. v. Clear Creek Basin

Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979)). The City did not present these arguments

to the trial court either in its summary judgment motion or during the summary

judgment hearing. Instead, the City moved for summary judgment solely on the

motor vehicle waiver because that was the only immunity waiver Branch had

pleaded when the City filed its motion. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however,

cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Morello,

547 S.W.3d 881, 888–89 (Tex. 2018) (stating “challenges to lack of subject matter

jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal”); Oncor Elec. Delivery Co.

LLC v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018) (“Because a

challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, a party may

raise exclusive jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.”). As the Texas Supreme

Court has clarified, because immunity from suit implicates a court’s jurisdiction,

appellate courts must consider all of a defendant’s immunity arguments on appeal,

whether the governmental entity raised other jurisdictional arguments in the trial

                                         16
court or none at all. See Rusk v State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. 2012)

(holding court of appeals erred when it declined to consider state hospital’s new

immunity arguments on appeal).         Thus, this court must consider the City’s

jurisdictional argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the personal property

waiver does not waive its immunity.

      In his First Amended Petition, Branch alleged “[t]he Court has jurisdiction

over this claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act because the Texas Legislature

waived Defendant’s sovereign immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. [Code]

101.021(1) or in the alternative Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. [Code] 101.021(2).” Section

101.021(2) of the TTCA waives immunity for claims for “personal injury and death

so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2). The Texas Supreme Court has “consistently []

defined ‘use’ to be more than making tangible personal property available for use by

another. To use something, the governmental unit must ‘put [it] or bring [it] into

action or service [or] employ [it] for or apply [it] to a given purpose.’” Harris Cnty.

v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2018) (quoting San Antonio State Hosp. v.

Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Tex. 2004)). For the government to “use” tangible

personal property, the governmental unit must itself be the user and the injury must

be contemporaneous with the use of the tangible personal property. Sampson v.

Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. 2016). A governmental unit

                                          17
“does not ‘use’ tangible personal property . . . within the meaning of section

101.021(2) by merely providing, furnishing, or allowing . . . access to it.” Id.

(quoting Rusk State Hosp., 392 S.W.3d at 98).

      The City contends the personal property waiver does not waive its immunity

because the City itself did not use the golf cart. It argues the undisputed evidence

shows the City did not make the golf cart available to Councilmember Kubosh and

there is no indication that anyone from the City specifically authorized him to use it

during the parade. The City asserts no authorization would have been, in fact,

required because Councilmember Kubosh used his own personal golf cart and the

City neither organized nor sponsored the parade. In response, Branch argues

Councilmember Kubosh was a City employee acting within the scope of his

employment, the golf cart constitutes tangible personal property, Councilmember

Kubosh used the golf cart within the meaning of the statute, and the use of the golf

cart caused Branch’s personal injury.

      Branch’s allegations do not trigger the TTCA’s tangible personal property

waiver under Section 101.021(2) because the City itself did not use the golf cart.

Even if merely providing the golf cart to Councilmember Kubosh were sufficient to

waive the City’s immunity—which it is not—the undisputed evidence establishes

the City did not furnish the golf cart to the Councilmember because it was the

Councilmember’s privately owned golf cart. See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 389; see

                                         18
also Annab, 524 S.W.3d at 801–02 (concluding county did not waive immunity

under personal property waiver where record showed county did not make firearm

available to deputy constable and deputy admitted he owned firearm prior to

employment with county); Dall. Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41–42

(Tex. 2013) (concluding patient’s alleged injury resulting from being struck by

falling whiteboard did not arise from nonprofit organization’s “use” of personal

property, and therefore organization did not waive immunity, where organization

did not “use” whiteboard within meaning of TTCA Act merely by making it

available for use).

      Branch argues, alternatively, that his injuries resulted from a condition of the

golf cart and further that Gibbs’ testimony that he applied the golf cart’s brake and

emergency brake before exiting the cart created a fact issue over whether the golf

car was defective or inadequate. Within the context of the TTCA, the Texas

Supreme Court has defined “condition” as “either an intentional or an inadvertent

state of being.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 388. Branch’s negligence claims against

the City are based solely on Councilmember Kubosh’s alleged failure to (1) maintain

a proper lookout, (2) control the operation of the golf cart, (3) avoid the incident in

question, (4) pay attention to his surroundings, and (5) operate the golf cart as a

person of ordinary prudence would have in the same or similar circumstances.

Branch does not allege any facts in his First Amended Petition suggesting his claim

                                          19
is premised on the “intentional or inadvertent state of being” of the golf cart. Nor

does he premise his claim on the actions of Gibbs. Consequently, because Branch

raises his alternative theories concerning the “condition” of the golf car for the first

time on appeal, we may not consider them. See Foreman v. Lyndon B. Johnson

Hosp., No. 14-19-00733-CV, 2021 WL 3161440, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] July 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding plaintiff waived on appeal

argument that governmental units waived immunity under TTCA where petition did

not identify legal ground for alleged waiver).

       Branch argues that because the City’s summary judgment motion hinged on

the motor vehicle waiver, the case should be remanded to afford him a fair

opportunity to address the City’s arguments based on the tangible personal property

waiver. “When a defendant raises a jurisdictional argument for the first time on

appeal, remand may be appropriate to afford the plaintiff ‘a fair opportunity to

address’ the jurisdictional argument.” Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 616 (quoting Rusk, 392

S.W.3d at 96). If, however, the party asserting the jurisdictional defense, in this case

the City, establishes that (1) “the pleadings or record . . . conclusively negate the

existence of jurisdiction,” (2) the plaintiff did in fact have a “full and fair opportunity

in the trial court to develop the record and amend the pleadings,” or (3) even with a

remand “the plaintiff would be unable to show the existence of jurisdiction,” the case

should be dismissed without a remand. Rusk, 392 S.W.3d at 96.

                                            20
      There is no allegation in Branch’s First Amended Petition, and no evidence in

the record, from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the City itself

used the golf cart. The undisputed evidence establishes the City itself did not furnish

the golf cart or have any involvement in Councilmember Kubosh’s use of his

privately owned golf cart at a parade the City neither organized nor sponsored. The

filing of amended pleadings or future discovery will not change this key and

undisputed evidence. Because no amount of future discovery or rephrasing of the

allegations could properly invoke the TTCA’s tangible personal property waiver, I

would hold remand is inappropriate. See Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 616 (concluding

court of appeals erred in remanding case to trial court to allow plaintiff to replead

and conduct additional discovery where no amount of discovery or rephrasing of

allegations could result in plaintiff’s establishing county’s liability for deputy

constable’s off-duty criminal act).

      I would sustain the City’s second issue.3

                                      Conclusion

      I would reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion for summary

judgment and render judgment dismissing Branch’s suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction for the reasons set out in this opinion.

3
      Because I would hold the tangible personal property waiver does not waive the
      City’s immunity, we need not address the City’s argument that the motor vehicle
      and tangible personal property waivers are mutually exclusive.

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                                              Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                              Justice

On original submission, panel consisted of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and
Farris.

En banc reconsideration was requested. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.5. A majority of the
justices of the Court voted in favor of reconsidering the case en banc.

The en banc court consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly, Goodman,
Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris. Justice Landau, not
participating.

Justice Farris, writing for the majority of the en banc court, joined by Chief Justice
Adams and Justices Kelly, Hightower, Countiss, and Guerra.

Justice Rivas-Molloy, dissenting with separate opinion, joined by Justice Goodman.

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