Court Opinion

ID: 9950564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:02:27.122142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:25.018552
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12418    Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12418
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       SELMA OLIVER-SMITH,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00054-TES-CHW-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-12418      Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12418

       Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Selma Oliver-Smith appeals his 84-month sentence for one
       count of being a felon in possession of a firearm on the grounds
       that the district court procedurally erred and the sentence is sub-
       stantively unreasonable. After careful consideration, we AFFIRM
       the district court’s sentence.
                                         I
               We generally review the reasonableness of a sentence for an
       abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In
       reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider
       whether the district court committed a procedural error. Id. A dis-
       trict court procedurally errs if, among other things, its sentence is
       based on clearly erroneous facts. United States v. Barrington, 648
       F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). “For a finding to be clearly erro-
       neous, this Court must be left with a definite and firm conviction
       that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d
       980, 990 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
       The district court must also treat the Guidelines as advisory, con-
       sider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explain the
       chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
USCA11 Case: 23-12418        Document: 21-1       Date Filed: 03/14/2024        Page: 3 of 6

       23-12418                 Opinion of the Court                              3

              Here, the district court did not commit procedural error—
       plain or otherwise—because it committed no error at all. 1 Oliver-
       Smith argued that his sentence was based on a clearly erroneous
       finding of fact because the district court stated that “in all this time
       that you’ve been under sentence, you never served longer than
       three years.” This statement, Oliver-Smith argued, was inaccurate
       because his presentence investigation report showed that the terms
       of imprisonment he had received added up to more than three
       years.
              We disagree. Read in context, the district court correctly
       found that Oliver-Smith had never served a period of imprison-
       ment longer than three years. See United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d
       1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing nature of the overall colloquy
       for context). And Oliver-Smith’s undisputed criminal history
       shows as much. His argument to the contrary is based entirely on
       a misinterpretation of the district court’s reasoning. Therefore, we
       affirm as to this issue.
                                            II
               After reviewing for procedural error, we consider the sub-
       stantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
       discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court abuses
       its discretion if it: “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant [§

       1 The parties dispute whether Oliver-Smith properly preserved this issue, and

       therefore whether we review this argument for plain error or clear error. Be-
       cause this issue fails under either standard of review, we need not resolve
       whether Oliver-Smith preserved it.
USCA11 Case: 23-12418      Document: 21-1       Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 4 of 6

       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-12418

       3553(a)] factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives signifi-
       cant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) commits a
       clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United
       States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation
       and quotation marks omitted). We will vacate a district court’s
       sentence as substantively unreasonable “only if, we are left with
       the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
       clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv-
       ing at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences
       dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190 (citation and quotation
       marks omitted).
               We “commit[] to the sound discretion of the district court
       the weight to be afforded to each § 3553(a) factor.” United States v.
       Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015). The district court does
       not have to give all the factors equal weight and maintains discre-
       tion to attach great weight to one factor over another. United States
       v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The district
       court also has discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) factors
       justify a variance and the degree of the variance. See Gall, 552 U.S.
       at 49–50. A district court’s decision to place “substantial weight”
       on a defendant’s criminal history is consistent with the § 3553(a)
       factors because five of the factors relate to criminal history. Rosales-
       Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Even though
       properly calculated guideline ranges incorporate a defendant’s
       criminal history, a district court may properly find that the guide-
       line range does not account for the nature of the prior offenses or
USCA11 Case: 23-12418      Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 5 of 6

       23-12418               Opinion of the Court                         5

       the continuous pattern of criminal behavior. See Rosales-Bruno, 789
       F.3d at 1263.
              A sentence outside of the calculated guideline range is not
       presumed to be unreasonable, but the extent of the variance is one
       consideration. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1186–87. One sign of reasonable-
       ness is that the varied sentence is well below the statutory maxi-
       mum. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
               Here, Oliver-Smith’s 84-month sentence is not substantively
       unreasonable because the district court acted within its discretion
       in placing considerable weight on the § 3553(a) factors it specified
       at sentencing, mostly relating to his criminal history, in imposing
       its sentence. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254, 1263–64; Perkins, 787
       F.3d at 1342. Oliver-Smith’s argument that the district court over-
       relied on one factor is unavailing; the court stated that not one, but
       five of the § 3553(a) factors supported an upward variance based on
       his undisputed criminal history. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263; see
       also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
              And it was within the court’s discretion to find that Oliver-
       Smith’s guidelines range of 46–57 months was insufficient to
       achieve the goals of sentencing—namely, to deter future criminal
       conduct when Oliver-Smith’s presentence investigation report re-
       flected that he had a lengthy criminal history of theft crimes and a
       clear pattern of recidivism despite numerous state court convic-
       tions accompanied by relatively minor sentences. Perkins, 787 F.3d
       at 1342; Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263. Additionally, his sentence
       fell considerably below the statutory maximum noted in his
USCA11 Case: 23-12418      Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 6 of 6

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12418

       presentence investigation report, which is also indicative of its rea-
       sonableness. Riley, 995 F.3d at 1278. Accordingly, Oliver-Smith’s
       sentence should be affirmed.
             AFFIRMED.