Court Opinion

ID: 9958192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 15:01:28.769491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.591681
License: Public Domain

22-6246
     Zhou Yi v. Garland
                                                                                     BIA
                                                                                Leeds, IJ
                                                                             A206 458 530

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 4   four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                        JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 8                        MICHAEL H. PARK,
 9                        MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   MEI ZHOU YI,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                        v.                                       22-6246
17                                                                 NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                      Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, NY.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 2                                      Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant
 3                                      Director; Michele Y. F. Sarko, Senior Trial
 4                                      Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 5                                      United States Department of Justice,
 6                                      Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Mei Zhou Yi, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

11   China, seeks review of a May 4, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming an August 2,

12   2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum,

13   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

14   (“CAT”). In re Mei Zhou Yi, No. A 206 458 530 (B.I.A. May 4, 2022), aff’g No. A 206

15   458 530 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 2, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity

16   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

18   completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.

19   2006). We review the agency’s “legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings,

20   including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence

21   standard.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
                                             2
1    marks omitted). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

2    reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

3    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

4          An asylum applicant bears the burden of proof.                 See 8 U.S.C. §

5    1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

 6         The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the
 7         applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant
 8         satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is
 9         persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that
10         the applicant is a refugee. In determining whether the applicant has
11         met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible
12         testimony along with other evidence of record. Where the trier of fact
13         determines that the applicant should provide evidence that
14         corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be
15         provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
16         reasonably obtain the evidence.
17
18   Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). In assessing credibility, a factfinder considers the “totality

19   of the circumstances” and may rely on “the consistency between the applicant’s or

20   witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under

21   oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made),

22   the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

23   with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such

24   statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

                                               3
 1   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”        Id.

 2   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

 3          “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

 4   credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant

 5   unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao

 6   Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007).       And in other cases, “an

 7   applicant may be generally credible but [her] testimony may not be sufficient to

 8   carry the burden of persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of [her] claim of

 9   crucial facts if [s]he fails to put forth corroboration that should be readily

10   available.” Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Pinel-Gomez

11   v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529–30 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that the agency may find

12   testimony credible but “still decide that the testimony falls short of satisfying the

13   applicant’s burden, either because it is unpersuasive or because it does not include

14   specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee” (internal

15   quotation marks omitted)). Before denying a claim solely for failure to provide

16   corroboration, an IJ must “(1) point to specific pieces of missing evidence and show

17   that it was reasonably available, (2) give the applicant an opportunity to explain

18   the omission, and (3) assess any explanation given.” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31.

                                              4
 1   When the IJ has satisfied these requirements, we may reverse the agency’s decision

 2   only if “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating

 3   evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); see also Yan Juan Chen v. Holder,

 4   658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2011).

 5         The IJ’s decision here conflates these two manners of framing a lack of

 6   corroboration, stating that the absence of corroboration undermined credibility,

 7   but focusing on its availability, which is relevant where corroboration is required

 8   for credible testimony. By contrast, the BIA treated the corroboration finding as

 9   having been made in addition to the adverse credibility determination.

10   Regardless of how the issues are framed, the agency did not err in concluding that

11   Zhou Yi failed to meet her burden of proof because it identified weaknesses in her

12   testimony, and she failed to produce available corroboration of her claim that she

13   was detained and beaten for attending an underground church in China.

14         Some of Zhou Yi’s testimony on cross-examination was confused and

15   unresponsive regarding her husband’s church attendance after an alleged May

16   2011 raid. Her husband wrote in his letter that Zhou Yi secured his release from

17   detention a week after the raid and he fled to the United States a few months later,

18   but Zhou Yi continued attending services and was harmed as a result; he did not

                                              5
 1   mention returning to church with her or otherwise describe their activities

 2   between his detention and escape.       Zhou Yi’s initial testimony was that she

 3   stopped attending church for about two months, then resumed attending about

 4   once a week with her husband for about three weeks. But in response to follow-

 5   up questions, she testified that either she or both she and her husband attended

 6   church frequently after September 2011, before clarifying that she moved and

 7   began attending church more often after her husband left China. Her confused

 8   testimony was at least grounds for finding her testimony less persuasive, and we

 9   give “particular” deference to the agency’s assessment of demeanor because the IJ

10   is in the best position to assess whether a witness understood a question. 1 Majidi

     1 Still, we agree with Zhou Yi that the agency overstated the discrepancies by
     misstating that she testified that she attended church in the two months after the
     raid and that her husband’s letter omitting mention of church attendance was
     inconsistent with her testimony. “[T]he probative value of a witness’s prior
     silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness
     would reasonably have been expected to disclose” and, while “an omission by a
     third party may form a basis for an adverse credibility determination,” “an
     applicant’s failure to explain third-party omissions is less probative of credibility
     than an applicant’s failure to explain his or her own omissions” when the omission
     does not create an inconsistency with the applicant’s statements. Hong Fei Gao v.
     Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2018).

     The agency’s finding that Zhou Yi gave vague testimony about her alleged 15-day
     detention is also weak. When testimony lacks detail, but includes the essential
     elements of an asylum claim, the agency may reasonably suspect that the
                                            6
1    v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

2          The agency identified the following corroboration that should have been

3    provided: (1) testimony from Zhou Yi’s husband, (2) records from his asylum

4    proceedings, (3) medical records related to injuries Zhou Yi sustained in detention,

 5   and (4) a receipt for the fine she paid to secure her husband’s release from

 6   detention following the first alleged raid.

 7         As to the evidence from her husband, Zhou Yi alleged that her husband

 8   introduced her to Christianity, attended an underground church with her in

 9   China, and was present during the first alleged raid; that is, contrary to her

10   argument that his testimony would have been insignificant, he was a witness to

11   events central to her claim of past persecution. His fear of being detained after

12   losing his appeal in his own removal proceedings was not sufficient to show his

13   testimony was unavailable where, as here, he would have benefitted from a grant

     testimony is fabricated and choose to “probe for incidental details, seeking to draw
     out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack of credibility,” but it errs
     in relying on vagueness as a ground for an adverse credibility determination
     without making that additional inquiry. Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d
     104, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Zhou Yi gave
     details when asked, and although she said she could not provide more details, she
     provided a specific answer when asked to describe how many people she was
     locked up with.
                                              7
1    of asylum to Zhou Yi.         See Yan Juan Chen, 658 F.3d at 253; see 8 U.S.C.

2    § 1158(b)(3)(A) (providing that the spouse of a noncitizen granted asylum may be

3    granted the same status). Further, Zhou Yi did not give a reason when asked why

4    she had not obtained a waiver from her husband to allow review of records from

 5   his immigration proceedings—which would not have implicated the same risk of

 6   arrest.

 7             Zhou Yi did not demonstrate that the other evidence was unavailable. She

 8   testified that she had a fine receipt from her husband’s detention, she did not know

 9   that it had not been provided, and she did not give a reason why it was not

10   provided when its absence was raised. She alleged that the injuries she sustained

11   in detention required multiple doctor’s visits and surgery, but she did not produce

12   records of that care.     The IJ found her explanation that the hospital in China

13   would not release those records to her parents implausible because those types of

14   records are generally provided to the immigration court. The record does not

15   compel a contrary conclusion. 2 See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168–69 (2d Cir.

16   2007) (while the agency may not engage in “bald” speculation, “[t]he speculation

     2 Notably, a supporting letter from Zhou Yi’s parents does not mention an attempt
     to secure records on her behalf. Zhou Yi’s argument that the agency failed to
     assess her explanation is contrary to the record because the IJ explicitly rejected it.
                                               8
1    that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the

2    factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common

3    sense and ordinary experience”). Moreover, Zhou Yi testified that she received

4    follow-up care in the United States, and her testimony that she did not know that

5    those records were necessary does not establish that they were unavailable.

6          Zhou Yi argues that her testimony and documentary evidence were

7    sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof, and that the agency overlooked some

8    evidence. Of the evidence that she provided, only a fine receipt, letters from

9    China, and a letter from her husband related to her alleged past persecution. The

10   agency acknowledged this evidence and concluded that it did not satisfy her

11   burden, including because the fine receipt did not mention the alleged detention.

12   “We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

13   applicant’s documentary evidence,” Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332, and the agency is not

14   required to credit letters from interested parties or individuals unavailable for

15   cross-examination, see Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding

16   that an “IJ acted within her discretion in according [letters] little weight because

17   the declarants (particularly [the applicant’s spouse]) were interested parties and

18   neither was available for cross-examination”). And, as noted above, the agency

                                              9
 1   can deny a claim where reasonably available evidence has not been presented.

 2   See Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28.

 3         In sum, the agency reasonably concluded that Zhou Yi failed to satisfy her

 4   burden of proof because it pointed out weaknesses in her testimony and identified

 5   specific, relevant evidence that she should have provided, and her explanations

 6   do not compel the conclusion that this evidence was not reasonably available. See

 7   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31; Yan Juan Chen, 658 F.3d at 253.

 8   Because Zhou Yi’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims all rested on

 9   the same factual basis, the agency’s denial of asylum is dispositive of all

10   relief. 3 See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that an

11   applicant who fails to establish fear of harm required for asylum “necessarily” fails

12   to meet higher standard for withholding of removal and CAT relief).

13

     3 We therefore do not consider the Government’s argument that Zhou Yi’s CAT
     claim is unexhausted. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general
     rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision
     of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
                                              10
1        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

2   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

3                                      FOR THE COURT:
4                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
5                                      Clerk of Court

                                         11