Court Opinion

ID: 9689842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:48:40.861959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.488432
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice
(dissenting) :
In Bernhard v. Bernhard, 278 Ala. 240, 177 So.2d 565, this court construed a deed which, as here material, is substantially identical in language with the deed construed in the instant case. Among other things, this court said:
“We must give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the language which they use in the deed. What estate was created? It is our opinion that the parties here involved intended to create and did create a tenancy in common during the joint lives of the tenants with right of survivorship in the survivor. They carefully said that if neither survived the other, then in that event their property was to descend as if it held by them as tenants in common. Such we think is consistent with the intentions of the legislature as expressed in the above quoted statute. Survivor-ship is allowed, if expressed, as an incident to the estate of tenancy in common. Each does not own the whole, while at the same time owning the half. Rather, each owns an undivided one-half interest in the property for life, plus the right to own the unencumbered whole if he survives his co-tenant.
“Under these circumstances then, can there be a sale for ■ division over the ■ objection of one tenant during the joint lives? We think not. Such a result seems to be dictated when giving full consideration to the intention of the parties as expressed. We think- the lan guage used and our cases indicate that a division may be had during the joint lives only with the consent of all grantees. We have held that an interest in remainder is not subject to division, and this is the estate which we think is created under the deed involved: a tenancy in common during the joint lives of the tenants with a remainder to the survivor in fee simple. Such a construction is in accord with that of other jurisdictions. Finch v. Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910, and is not inconsistent with our holdings in related cases. . . . (278 Ala. at 243, 177 So.2d at 567)
In the instant case, the court now concludes that Bernhard is in error and cannot be allowed to stand. The court says: “ . . . . The statute as amended refers to joint tenants, not tenants in common. There is nothing in the amended statute to suggest that the legislature had any intention but to revive common law joint tenancy with the single requirement that the parties must clearly express an intention to have the right of survivorship in the instrument.....”
It appears to be conceded that § 19, Title 47, abolished joint tenancy. If it was the purpose of the legislature merely to revive joint tenancy, that purpose could easily have been accomplished by repeal of the statute. Instead, the legislature amended the statute twice.
I do not agree that the legislature intended to forbid the conveyance or devise of land to two or more persons during their joint lives with the entire fee to pass to the last survivor on the death of the other grantees. Such a conveyance creates an estate different from a common law joint tenancy.
In Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W.2d 715, (1952), the court con*526strued a deed in which the grantees were: “ . . . . ‘Alfred Carothers and Delarma Hackett, or the survivor of them.’ . . . .” The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a decree which determined that plaintiff, the grantee of Hackett, who survived Carothers, was the owner of the property. Among other things the court said:
“Plaintiff claims that the deed to the two grantees ‘or the survivor of them’ created a tenancy for life in the named grantees and a remainder in fee to the survivor, and cites four Michigan cases in support of her theory.
“In Schulz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N.W. 1012, the grantees are ‘Peter Brohl and Christine Schulz * * * to them and the survivor of them.’ We construed the deed, page 605, 74 N.W. 1012, ‘to convey a moiety to each of these parties for life, with remainder to [the survivor] in fee.’
“In Finch v. Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 510, 115 Am.St.Rep. 447, we held (per syl.) :
’ “ ‘A deed which conveys land to two 'grantees, “and the survivor of them, and to their heirs and assigns forever,” conveys a moiety to each for life with remainder to the survivor in fee, and neither 'of them, by conveyance during his lifetime, can create a tenancy in common, so as to cut off the contingent remainder.’
“In Jones v. Snyder, 218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505, we held (per syl.) :
“ ‘Under a deed conveying land to four persons, “as joint tenants, and to their heirs and assigns, and to the survivors or survivor of them, and to the heirs and assigns of the survivor of them, forever,” a joint tenancy for life in the grantees was created, with a contingent remainder in fee simple to the survivor, and, therefore, one of the grantees could not alienate his joint interest so as to cut off the contingent remainder.’
“In Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215, at page 218, 287 N.W. 439, we held:
“ ‘Where property stands in the name of joint tenants with the right of survivorship, neither party may transfer the title to the premises and deprive the other of such right of survivorship’, citing Schulz v. Brohl, supra, and Finch v-Haynes, supra.
“Defendant accentuates the background of authorities cited in the Schulz Case and authorities cited in the Finch Case, and argues that the rule in those two cases inadvertently and erroneously crept into Michigan jurisprudence from jurisdictions having different statutes, and problems relative to estates and in effect requests us to overrule those two cases as an improvement in the rules of' conveyancing.
“There is no necessity for overruling the four cases cited, by which a law of real property as to the right of survivor-ship has been established. We expressly reaffirm the rule as laid down in the four cases cited, as to the right of survivorship.” (334 Mich, at 457, 458, 459, 54 N.W.2d at 717)
The decision in Bernhard was delivered July 15, 1965, some seven years ago.
In The Alabama Lawyer, Vol. 1, at pages 54 to 58, may be found a discussion of deeds conveying real estate to husband and wife, “during their joint lives, and upon the death of either of them, then to the survivor of them in fee simple, and to the heirs and assigns of such survivor forever.” The article by the late Edward W. Faith, of Mobile, a distinguished member of the Alabama Bar, published in 1940, contains the following statement:
“In other words, under our law, the modest homestead becomes a lawsuit. It takes a lawsuit to get it, and it takes a lawsuit to sell it. And when sold, it takes a lawsuit to keep the money, for the proceeds cannot be used for the liv*527ing expenses of the minor children, but can only be reinvested under the supervision of the Circuit Court. (Mathews v. Goodenough, 206 Ala. 229; 89 So. 708).
“When the lawyer has pointed out to the client the results which may be reached under our homestead exemption statute, the question then arises. ‘Is this the result the client desires should happen in the event of these contingencies?’ If not, let us see how, in many cases, these contingencies may be obviated. In my opinion, the problem so far as concerns husband and wife, is easily solved by writing the deed so as to create a joint life estate in husband and wife, with a vested cross remainder. This is permissible under the Alabama law (First National Bank v. Lawrence, 212 Ala. 45; 101 So. 663; 33 Corpus Juris, 901).
“In my office we have written numerous deeds whereby in the granting clause the property is conveyed to ‘A’ and ‘B’, ‘husband and wife’, with the habendum clause reading as follows:
“ ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the said ‘A and B’, during their joint lives, and upon the death of either of them, then to the survivor of them in fee simple, and to the heirs and assigns of such survivor forever’.
“In this way we create by contract a joint estate in both husband and wife, where they may sell or mortgage during their joint lives upon both signing, and if not sold, then when the death of one occurs, the survivor receives the estate in fee simple without any court costs, lawyers’ fees or other expenses. It is true such a deed cuts off the minor children to the benefit of the surviving parent of the children; but experience has taught me such is the desire of clients, rather than let the property go under the uncertain, cumbersome, and expensive system as provided by our homestead exemption laws.” (1 The Alabama Lawyer at 58)
Many so-called survivorship deeds have been executed pursuant to the 1940 article in 1 Alabama Lawyer. Undoubtedly many persons have purchased real estate in reliance on the decision in Bernhard seven years ago.
As in the case at bar, many deeds have been executed to and paid for by grantees in reliance on the language in Bernhard. The deed in the instant case is such a deed.
The purchasers in such deeds were entitled to rely on Bernhard as truly and correctly defining the rights which the grantees received by such deeds.
Bernhard has been cited by this court in the following cases: Owens v. Owens, 281 Ala. 239, 243, 201 So.2d 396; Brown v. Andrews, 281 Ala. 598, 601, 206 So.2d 607; Fretwell v. Fretwell, 283 Ala. 424, 425, 218 So.2d 138; Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 284 Ala. 524, 528, 226 So.2d 308; Summerlin v. Bowden, 286 Ala. 391, 392, 240 So.2d 356; Shrout v. Seale, 287 Ala. 215, 217, 221, 250 So.2d 592; and Willis v. James, 287 Ala. 653, 254 So.2d 717.
This court has not intimated in any of these cases that the rights acquired were not the rights acquired under the language and holding in Bernhard.
In 1970, this court said:
“Joint tenancies with the right of survivorship in cases involving husbands and wives can present problems when the parties are divorced. However, the tenure under deeds similar to the one here does not arise from the relationship of the tenants, or status, but from the deed creating the estate, and, therefore, divorce does not affect the rights of the parties. Hence, the rule was established in Bernhard, supra, that a sale for division could not be compelled if one of the tenants objects is controlling, even though the tenants in Bernhard were estranged and not divorced.
*528“We do feel that we can safely say that the present Alabama law is to the effect that in cases involving deeds similar to the one here, there can be no compulsory partition in the absence of consent of the tenants, except in those cases where the tenants have invoked the jurisdiction of the equity court in a divorce proceeding with regard to the property in question.
“In view of the construction which we have placed upon our partition statute, it is up to the Legislature in its wisdom to decide whether to make provision for the partition of property held by tenants in common, with right of survivorship, when the tenants are divorced even when one tenant objects.” Summerlin v. Bowden, supra, 286 Ala. at page 393, 240 So.2d at page 357.
In 1971, this court said:
“In Bernhard, we held that there can be no sale for division in the case of a so-called 'survivorship deed,’ over the objection of one tenant during the joint lives because the ‘interest in remainder’ ' is not subject to division. (278 Ala. at p. 243, 177 So.2d at p. 567.)” Willis v. James, supra, 287 Ala. at page 658, 254 So.2d at page 721.
As Judge Collier said in dissent in Bryant v. Simpson, 3 Stew. 339:
. . . I believe with Mr. Jenkins, that ‘variety of judgments and novelty of opinions, are the two great plagues of a commonwealth.’ The decisions of a tribunal of the last resort, should possess permanence and stability of character. They should not be disregarded by the Court that pronounced them, though they may not correctly ascertain the law, unless a greater inconvenience would result from an adherence to them. Next to correctness of decision, nothing is so well calculated to give character to the bench, as a regard for precedent and harmony in its judgments. . . . (3 Stew, at 343)
I submit that Bernhard established a rule-of property in this state which this court has twice affirmed within the last two-years, and that rule should not now be: overturned.