Court Opinion

ID: 9839305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 20:03:59.499296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:46.840686
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of C.D. and              2d Civil No. B323428
G.D.                                  (Super. Ct. No. D388847)
                                          (Ventura County)

C.D.,

     Appellant,

v.

G.D.,

     Respondent.

       A parent with “sole legal custody” of a child has “the right
and . . . responsibility to make . . . decisions relating to the
health, education, and welfare of [that] child.” (Fam. Code,1
§ 3006.) A noncustodial parent has none of these rights. To
acquire them, the noncustodial parent must obtain custody. To
do that, the noncustodial parent must demonstrate a significant
change in circumstances warranting a new custody arrangement
that is in the child’s best interest.

        1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Family Code.
       C.D. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment
order granting a request from G.D. (Father) that she enroll their
minor daughters in public school. Mother contends the order
must be vacated because, without a change in custody, Father
has no decision-making authority regarding their daughters’
education. We agree, and vacate the order.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Mother and Father married in 2013. Their twin daughters,
F.D. and S.D., were born four years later. Soon thereafter,
Mother petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The trial court
approved the dissolution petition and, after finding that Father
had sexually abused F.D. and S.D., granted Mother sole legal
custody. The court also barred Father from visiting his
daughters, but did not terminate his parental rights. We
affirmed the judgment on appeal. (See In re Marriage of C.D.
and G.D. (Sept. 11, 2023, B318718) __ Cal.App.5th __ [p. 12].)
       While that appeal was pending, Father requested that the
trial court order Mother to enroll F.D. and S.D. in public school
for the 2022-2023 school year. He argued Mother had not
provided their daughters with a formal education and that she
was not competent to teach them. He also alleged Mother was
isolating the girls and limiting their abilities to socialize with
their peers.
       Mother responded that, absent a change to the trial court’s
order awarding her sole legal custody, Father had no right to
dictate how she educated their daughters. She also informed the
court that her daughters were enrolled in an online
homeschooling program and had active social lives.
       The attempt to mediate the matter was unsuccessful. At a
subsequent hearing, Mother testified that her daughters were

                                2
enrolled in an online kindergarten program. She picked the
program because she would not have to teach F.D. and S.D.
herself; the program had instructors who videotaped lessons for
the girls. Her niece thrived when she participated in the
program during the 2021-2022 school year.
      F.D. and S.D. were in class from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., and
had homework afterward. Mother helped the girls with their
assigned projects, and monitored their activities to ensure they
complied with all school requirements. The girls were excited
about the program, and looked forward to their lessons each day.
      Regarding socialization, Mother said F.D. and S.D. enjoy
meeting people and playing with their friends. They have karate
classes two days a week, play at a local park at least twice a
week, and attend Sunday school weekly. They regularly see
cousins who live nearby, and have frequent weekend playdates.
They also attend social events with other homeschooled children.
      Father testified that he is a state-certified high school
teacher and would be better equipped than Mother to decide
matters regarding their daughters’ education. He was concerned
Mother was isolating F.D. and S.D. from the outside world. He
believed in-person school would be in the girls’ best interests
because it would enable them to interact with other children and
receive assistance from teachers. He also believed that
video-based instruction had negative impacts on children.
      The mediator testified as an expert on mediation and
family custody issues. She opined that in-person school was in
F.D.’s and S.D.’s best interests. Mother may not be qualified to
teach her daughters. The girls should spend less time with
Mother and more time with other adults. Professionals who
regularly saw the girls in an educational setting could help

                                3
evaluate whether their behaviors were concerning. Video-based
education without interaction with an instructor could not
replicate this evaluation.
       The trial court agreed with the mediator’s recommendation
and granted Father’s request for an order directing Mother to
enroll F.D. and S.D. in public school. Mother appealed and filed a
petition for writ of supersedeas. We issued the writ, and stayed
the trial court’s order pending resolution of the appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
       Mother contends the trial court abused its direction when it
granted Father’s request for an order directing her to enroll F.D.
and S.D. in public school because, absent a change in custody, he
has no decision-making authority regarding their daughters’
education. (Cf. In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32
[custody and visitation orders reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
We agree because, notwithstanding the evidence adduced at the
hearing on his request, Father has not shown a significant
change in circumstances warranting a change to the existing
custody order.
       A parent with “sole legal custody” has “the right and the
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health,
education, and welfare of a child.” (§ 3006.) “Joint legal custody,”
in contrast, means that both parents share those rights and
responsibilities. (§ 3003.) Here, Father requested a say in his
daughters’ education by asking the trial court to order Mother to
enroll them in public school. But because Mother has sole legal
custody of the girls, Father has no right or responsibility
concerning their education. To obtain those, Father had to secure
joint legal custody by showing a significant change in
circumstances. (See Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535

                                 4
[once initial custody order is in place, court must “preserve the
established mode of custody unless some significant change in
circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in
the child’s best interest”].)
       The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Brown &
Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947 (Brown), supports our conclusion. In
that case, a mother had sole legal custody of her son. (Id. at p.
953.) When she sought to move her son to Nevada, the son’s
father opposed the move. (Ibid.) The mother argued the father’s
opposition was irrelevant; as the parent with sole legal custody,
she had the right to “make all decisions regarding [her son’s]
residence and schooling . . . without interference from [his
father].” (Id. at p. 956.) Our Supreme Court disagreed. It
concluded that the father could potentially block the move if he
were to “seek and obtain a custody modification based on a proper
showing pursuant to the changed circumstance[s] rule.” (Id. at p.
959.)
       Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th 947, stands in contrast to In re
Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816 (Furie) and Enrique
M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371 (Enrique M.),
cases on which Father relies. In Furie, the parents stipulated
that they would share joint legal custody of their children.
(Furie, at p. 820.) The trial court later granted the mother’s
request to have sole decision-making authority over the children’s
orthodontic care. (Id. at pp. 820, 823-824.) Our colleagues in
Division 1 upheld the orthodontic order under the “best interest
of the child” standard, explaining that the mother did not need to
show a significant change of circumstances to obtain it since the
order did not “rise to the level of a change in legal custody” (id. at

                                  5
p. 827); the father “continue[d] to share joint legal custody with
[her]” (id. at p. 826).
       The parents in Enrique M. similarly shared joint legal
custody of their son. (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p.
1375.) After the father moved, he sought to have his son either
change school schedules or enroll in a new school. (Id. at p.
1376.) The trial court denied the father’s request, applying the
changed circumstances rule. (Ibid.) The Fourth District
reversed, concluding that the request was not to change the joint
custody agreement between the parents but was rather more
akin to a change in visitation. (Id. at p. 1382.) The changed
circumstances rule did not apply. (Ibid.)
       Unlike the mother in Furie, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 816, and
the father in Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, Father
does not share joint legal custody of F.D. and S.D. Thus, unlike
those parents, Father has no direct say in the decisions regarding
the health, education, and welfare of his children. To have such a
say, Father must acquire joint legal custody. That, in turn,
requires him to demonstrate a significant change of
circumstances showing that a new custody arrangement would be
in his daughters’ best interests.
       Father did not do so. At the hearing on his request for an
order directing Mother to send F.D. and S.D. to public school,
Father testified that he believed in-person school would be in his
daughters’ best interests. The mediator echoed that belief. But
the best interest test does not apply here; the changed
circumstances test does. And Father concedes he has not
satisfied it. Nor can we read the trial court’s order granting
Father’s request as impliedly finding that he did; the court did
not issue an order awarding joint custody, an order for which

                                6
satisfaction of the changed circumstances test was a prerequisite.
(See § 3083 [detailing requirements of joint custody order].)
       We thus conclude that the trial court erred when it granted
Father’s request for an order directing Mother to send their
daughters to public school. Prior to issuing such an order, the
court was required to find that Father demonstrated a change in
circumstances warranting modification of its initial custody
order. Not making that finding was an abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of McKean (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1089
[misapplying the law is an abuse of discretion].) Reversal is
required. (Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1382
[reversal required where court applies wrong test].)
                          DISPOSITION
       The postjudgment order granting G.D.’s request for an
order directing C.D. to enroll F.D. and S.D. in public school,
entered September 7, 2022, is vacated. The trial court is directed
to enter a new and different order denying G.D.’s request. The
stay issued by this court on October 26, 2022, shall dissolve
automatically upon issuance of the remittitur. C.D. shall recover
her costs on appeal.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                    BALTODANO, J.

I concur:

            GILBERT, P. J.

                                7
YEGAN, J., Concurring:
       I concur in the result only. Family Code section 3006 could
not be written in any plainer language. A parent who has no
legal custody has no standing to request an order regarding the
education of children. A choice of where a child is to be educated
rests in the sole discretion of the custodial parent. It matters not
what a mediator, or a superior court judge, or an appellate court
justice, thinks is a better choice.2 Rather than conduct a hearing
on what was best for the children’s education, the trial court
should have summarily denied the instant request. That should
have been the beginning and end of this dispute.
       The majority opinion’s discussion of the tendered issues on
the merits may send an erroneous message to the litigants, the
trial court, and the family law bar. We should exercise restraint.
This case has nothing to do with the abuse of discretion rules or
“move-away” jurisprudence. The majority opinion may be
interpreted as encouraging a noncustodial parent to litigate
issues that are foreclosed by statute. At no time in the briefing or
at oral argument has appellant sought a change of custodial
status. When asked at oral argument if he was seeking a change
of legal custody, appellant said, “no.” This is fatal to his defense
of the trial court’s order.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                     YEGAN, J.

      2 Parenthetically, I agree with father, the mediator, and the
trial court. But, as indicated, my views are not relevant.
                      Rocky J. Baio, Judge

                Superior Court County of Ventura

                 ______________________________

      Law Offices of Jeffrey A. Slott, Jeffrey A. Slott; The Law
Office of Greg May and Greg May for Appellant.
      Taylor, McCord, Praver & Cherry, Patrick G. Cherry;
Ventura Coast Law and Douglas K. Goldwater for Respondent.