Court Opinion

ID: 9947552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 13:05:49.086119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.081524
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-645

                                 Filed 5 March 2024

Robeson County, No. 19CRS051648

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

DWIGHT DOUGLAS SMITH

      Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 27 October 2022 by Judge Henry

L. Stevens in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23

January 2024.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Liliana R.
      Lopez, for the State-Appellee.

      John W. Moss for Defendant-Appellant.

      COLLINS, Judge.

      Defendant Dwight Smith appeals from judgment entered upon a guilty verdict

of driving while impaired. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to dismiss, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

defense counsel did not renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence.

Because defense counsel did not renew Defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of

all of the evidence, Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to dismiss is not properly before us, and we therefore dismiss in part.
                                        STATE V. SMITH

                                       Opinion of the Court

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and we therefore find no

error in part.

                                  I.      Background

      The evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 1 April 2019 at

approximately 9:00 p.m., Trooper Justin Waldrop with the North Carolina Highway

Patrol was advised of a collision on Boone Road. Waldrop arrived on the scene and

observed Defendant standing outside a pickup truck that was pulling a trailer.

Defendant’s two sons were also at the scene. Defendant told Waldrop that there was

a “small collision” between his truck and another vehicle, and that he was driving the

truck at the time of the collision.

      Waldrop observed that Defendant had red, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and a

strong odor of alcohol. Defendant was walking in a “zig-zag pattern” and stumbling,

and Waldrop had to keep him from falling at one point. Thereafter, Waldrop asked

Defendant to perform field sobriety tests. Waldrop administered the horizontal gaze

nystagmus test to Defendant to measure the “involuntary jerking of [his] eyes.” The

test revealed that Defendant exhibited six out of the six clues indicating impairment.

Waldrop then administered a portable breath test, known as the Alco-Sensor, at

9:10 p.m. and again at 9:22 p.m., which confirmed the presence of alcohol in

Defendant’s system. At that point, Waldrop formed the opinion that Defendant had

consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to appreciably impair his mental and

physical faculties.

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                                  STATE V. SMITH

                                 Opinion of the Court

      Waldrop arrested Defendant for driving while impaired and transported him

to the Robeson County Detention Center to read him his Miranda rights and

administer an Intoximeter breath test, which uses a “deep lung sample” to determine

the “percent of alcohol in the defendant’s body.” Upon arriving at the detention

center, Waldrop asked Defendant a series of questions. Waldrop asked Defendant

whether he had been operating a vehicle, and Defendant responded “yes.” When

asked what time he began drinking and how many drinks he had, Defendant stated

that he had one drink at 4:00 p.m. Waldrop asked Defendant what size the drink was

and Defendant responded, “Not sure.” Waldrop then asked, “On a scale of zero to ten,

zero being completely sober and ten being completely drunk, where do you see

yourself?” Defendant responded, “One.” Waldrop asked, “In your opinion, should you

have been operating a vehicle[,]” to which Defendant responded, “Yes.” Waldrop read

Defendant his rights concerning the Intoximeter at 9:58 p.m. Thereafter, Defendant

refused to provide a breath sample for the Intoximeter.

      Defendant was found guilty in district court of driving while impaired and

subsequently appealed to superior court. The matter came on for trial on 26 October

2022. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence at the close of

the State’s evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. Defendant then put on

evidence but did not renew his motion to dismiss. The jury returned a guilty verdict

of driving while impaired.    The trial court sentenced Defendant to 60 days of

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                                        STATE V. SMITH

                                    Opinion of the Court

imprisonment, suspended for 12 months of supervised probation.                 Defendant

appealed.

                                  II.     Discussion

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

      As a threshold issue, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear

this appeal.

      N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1448(b) states, “Notice of appeal shall be given within

the time, in the manner and with the effect provided in the rules of appellate

procedure.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1448(b) (2023). Rule 4(a) of the North Carolina

Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an appeal in a criminal case may be taken

by either “giving oral notice of appeal at trial” or by filing a written notice of appeal

within 14 days after entry of judgment. N.C. R. App. P. 4(a). When a defendant has

not properly given notice of appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the

appeal. State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320 (2005).

      Prior to sentencing, defense counsel stated, “Judge, I’ve never done this, but I

don’t know at what point in this process I do, but Mr. Smith wants to give notice of

appeal.” The trial court responded, “Okay. We can do that once we get the judgment

in.” After entry of the final judgment, defense counsel did not enter oral notice of

appeal, but the trial court “note[d] the [prior] appeal and . . . [ap]pointed the appellate

defender to represent [Defendant].” As Defendant prematurely entered oral notice of

appeal before entry of the final judgment in violation of Rule 4, this Court does not

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                                    STATE V. SMITH

                                   Opinion of the Court

have jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s direct appeal. See State v. Lopez, 264 N.C. App.

496, 503, 826 S.E.2d 498, 503 (2019).

      Acknowledging that his notice of appeal was defective, Defendant filed a

petition for writ of certiorari. This Court may issue a writ of certiorari “in appropriate

circumstances . . . to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals

when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]”

N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). In our discretion, we grant Defendant’s petition for writ of

certiorari and reach the merits of his appeal.

B. Motion to Dismiss

      Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.

Defendant concedes that defense counsel failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the

close of all of the evidence, but nonetheless argues that the denial of his motion to

dismiss was error.

      A defendant in a criminal case may not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence on appeal unless a motion to dismiss is made at trial. N.C. R. App. P.

10(a)(3). “If a defendant makes such a motion after the State has presented all its

evidence . . . and that motion is denied and the defendant then introduces evidence,

defendant’s motion for dismissal . . . made at the close of State’s evidence is waived.”

Id. If a defendant subsequently fails to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all

of the evidence, the defendant “may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove the crime charged.” Id.

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                                    STATE V. SMITH

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Here, Defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, and the

trial court denied the motion. Defendant then presented his own evidence but did

not renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence. Consequently,

Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss is

not properly before us, and that portion of his appeal is dismissed.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because defense counsel failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the

evidence.

      We review whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel de

novo. State v. Wilson, 236 N.C. App. 472, 475, 762 S.E.2d 894, 896 (2014). Under de

novo review, this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment for that of the lower court. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669

S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008).

      “A defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of

counsel.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561, 324 S.E.2d 241, 247 (1985) (citation

omitted). To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his

counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.          State v.

Anthony, 271 N.C. App. 749, 754, 845 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2020). A defendant must

satisfy a two-part test to meet this burden:

             First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance

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                                    STATE V. SMITH

                                   Opinion of the Court

             was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
             errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
             “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
             Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
             deficient performance prejudiced the defense.            This
             requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
             deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
             reliable.

Braswell, 312 N.C. at 562, 324 S.E.2d at 248 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice, the defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of

the proceedings would have been different. State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626

S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006). Thus, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in which the defendant argues that his counsel failed to renew his motion to dismiss,

the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court

would have allowed the renewed motion. See State v. Blackmon, 208 N.C. App. 397,

401, 702 S.E.2d 833, 836 (2010).

      “In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether

there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the

defendant is the perpetrator.” State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 720, 782 S.E.2d 878,

881 (2016). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Lopez, 274 N.C. App. 439,

446, 852 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2020). “In making its determination, the trial court must

consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most

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                                    STATE V. SMITH

                                   Opinion of the Court

favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and

resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377, 382,

865 S.E.2d 350, 354 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contradictions

and discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to decide.” State v. Wynn, 276 N.C.

App. 411, 416, 856 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2021).

      Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1), a person commits the offense of driving

while impaired if “he drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public

vehicular area within this State . . . [w]hile under the influence of an impairing

substance[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1) (2023). A person is under the influence

if “his physical or mental faculties, or both, [are] appreciably impaired by an

impairing substance.”     Id. § 20-4.01(48b) (2023).       “An officer’s opinion that a

defendant is appreciably impaired is competent testimony and admissible evidence

when it is based on the officer’s personal observation of an odor of alcohol and of faulty

driving or other evidence of impairment.” State v. Gregory, 154 N.C. App. 718, 721,

572 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2002) (citations omitted).           “The refusal to submit to an

intoxilyzer test also is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt on a DWI charge.”

Id. (citation omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(f) (2023) (“If any person

charged with an implied-consent offense refuses to submit to a chemical analysis or

to perform field sobriety tests at the request of an officer, evidence of that refusal is

admissible in any criminal, civil, or administrative action against the person.”).

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                                  STATE V. SMITH

                                 Opinion of the Court

      Defendant argues that “there [was] no direct evidence that [he] was impaired

at the same time that he was driving” because “the State presented no evidence

regarding the lapse of time between the accident and [Defendant’s] call to law

enforcement or between [Defendant’s] call and Trooper Waldrop’s arrival on scene.”

However, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there

was substantial evidence that Defendant was driving while impaired.

      Waldrop testified that he was advised of a collision on Boone Road at

approximately 9:00 p.m. When Waldrop arrived on the scene, he observed Defendant

standing outside a pickup truck that was pulling a trailer. Defendant told Waldrop

that there had been a “small collision” between his truck and another vehicle, and

that he was driving the truck at the time of the collision. Defendant had red, glassy

eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol. Defendant was walking in a

“zig-zag” pattern and stumbling, and Waldrop had to keep him from falling at one

point. Waldrop administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and Defendant

exhibited six out of the six clues indicating impairment. An Alco-Sensor breath test

was administered at 9:10 p.m. and again at 9:22 p.m., which confirmed the presence

of alcohol in Defendant’s system. At that point, Waldrop formed the opinion that

Defendant had consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to appreciably impair his

mental and physical faculties.

      Waldrop arrested Defendant for driving while impaired and transported him

to the Robeson County Detention Center to read him his Miranda rights and

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                                      STATE V. SMITH

                                  Opinion of the Court

administer an Intoximeter breath test. At the detention center, Defendant admitted

that he was driving the truck and that he had consumed alcohol prior to driving.

Waldrop read Defendant his rights concerning the Intoximeter at 9:58 p.m., and

Defendant subsequently refused to provide a breath sample. As this was relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion

that Defendant was driving while impaired, Defendant has failed to show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel’s failure to renew his motion

to dismiss, the trial court would have allowed the motion. See Blackmon, 208 N.C.

App. at 403, 702 S.E.2d at 837 (holding that defendant did not receive ineffective

assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to renew his motion to dismiss

because “a second motion to dismiss would not have altered the result in [the] case”).

      Accordingly, Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

                               III.     Conclusion

      Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss is not properly before us, and we therefore dismiss in part. Furthermore,

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and we therefore find no

error in part.

      DISMISSED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.

      Judges ZACHARY and MURPHY concur.

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