Court Opinion

ID: 9790908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:01:13.150402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.573481
License: Public Domain

Winsor, J.
(dissenting)—I agree with the majority that the issue in this case is whether the term "disposition", as referred to in RCW 13.40.180, applies to all of the charges *262for which sentences are imposed at a disposition hearing, or only to the counts contained in each disposition order. This issue is identical to that decided by another panel of this court in State v. Brown, 47 Wn. App. 729, 737 P.2d 288, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1024 (1987), which the majority in this case relies upon to reach its holding. Because I believe that Brown was wrongly decided, I dissent.
As the Brown court discussed, if the language contained in a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires the court to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. Brown, 47 Wn. App. at 733 (citing State v. Martin, 102 Wn.2d 300, 304, 684 P.2d 1290 (1984)). The language of RCW 13.40.180 is ambiguous, because although the term "disposition" could be interpreted to mean each disposition order, as it was by the Brown court, it could just as easily be interpreted to refer to all counts at one disposition hearing, as argued by the appellants in this case. Under the rule of lenity, the court should construe "disposition" to refer to disposition hearings.
The Brown court determined that the term "disposition" is not ambiguous by construing the statute as a whole:
We come to this conclusion primarily because the statute does not require the State or the court to consolidate into a single disposition hearing different informations pending against the same youth. It is undisputed, therefore, that separate disposition hearings could have been held to sentence Brown on each information. Thus, if we accepted Brown's argument and held that the 300 percent rule applied to a disposition hearing, the State would nevertheless be entitled to avoid the effect of our decision merely by the scheduling of disposition hearings. Because the statute as a whole indicates that Brown's construction of the term "disposition" leads to absurd results, we conclude that the term refers to a disposition order.
(Italics mine.) Brown, 47 Wn. App. at 733-34. The fallacy of this interpretation of the statute is in the notion that the State (or any party) controls the "scheduling" of disposition hearings. The court controls the scheduling (and content) of disposition hearings. See JuCR 7.12(a), (b), and (d). Judges have the ultimate authority to decide how many accumulated dispositions against a juvenile will be handled *263at any given disposition hearing. While separate disposition hearings theoretically could have been held to sentence Brown on each information, the court has the responsibility to control proceedings to avoid "absurd results”. Further, judges presumably will want to have all of the pending dispositions involving the child presented at one hearing, not only to conserve time and expense, but more importantly in order to make the wisest and most fully informed decision regarding disposition. Unfortunately, the result of Brown is to instead afford the prosecutor the discretion to manipulate the 300 percent rule. The prosecutor can decide whether to accumulate a series of charges under one information or break them out into several informations. Although the Legislature has the right to delegate that choice to prosecutors, such an interpretation of the statute is by no means clear and seems unlikely. The Juvenile Disposition Standards Commission indicated as much when it apparently reacted to Brown on July 1, 1987, as set forth above by the majority. Majority, at 259.
Because I would not follow Brown, I would not reach the second issue discussed by the majority—whether the Commission's action effectively superseded Brown.
I would reverse and remand for disposition.
Review denied at 114 Wn.2d 1019 (1990).