Court Opinion

ID: 9422895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:05:04.055863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.806832
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins,
concurring.
This case marks the first interpretation by this Court of the significant changes wrought by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 increasing federal supervision of internal union affairs. At issue are subtle questions concerning the interplay between Title I and Title IV of that Act. In part, both, seem to deal with the same subject matter: Title I guarantees “equal rights and privileges ... to nominate candidates”; Title IV provides that “a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates.” Where the two Titles of the legislation differ most substantially is in the remedies they provide. If a Title I right is at issue, the allegedly aggrieved union member has direct, virtually immediate recourse to a federal court to obtain an adjudication of his claim and an injunction if his complaint has merit. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U. S. C. § 412 (1958 ed., Supp. V).. Vindication of claims under Title IV may be much more onerous. Federhl-court suits can be *142brought only by the Secretary of Labor, and then, only after the election has been held. An additional barrier is thus placed between the union member and the federal court. Remedies shape the significance of rights, and I think the Court too casually forecloses the direct access to a federal court which the Court of Appeals held was given these respondents by Congress.
At the time this case was brought, District 1 of the National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (NMEBA) had two rules of direct relevance here governing selection of candidates for election to union office. One rule,- of long standing in the union, prescribed that self-nomination was the only manner by which a name could be placed before the membership for election to union office. The second rule, adopted seven months before this election was scheduled to occur, severely limited eligibility for office by requiring that prospective officérs must have belonged to the national union for five years and served 180 or more days of sea duty in each of two years during the three-year period before the election.1 According to the three union members who brought this action, the combination of these rules unreasonably limited their right to nominate. They alleged that, except for those members of the union who fulfilled the strict eligibility requirements, the self-nomination rule emptied of all meaning the equal right to nominate. To be sure, the “right tó nominate” continued, but, they, say, for the countless union members rendered ineligible for office by the new sea-duty rule, the privilege of turning in one’s name for prospective candidacy was meaningless.
The Court precludes the District Court from asserting jurisdiction over this complaint by focusing on the fact *143that one of the imposed restrictions speaks in terms of eligibility. And since these are “possible violations of Title IV of the Act regarding eligibility” they “are not relevant in determining whether or not a district court has jurisdiction under § 102 of Title I of the Act.” By this reasoning, the Court, forecloses early adjudication of claims concerning participation in the election process. But there are occasions when eligibility provisions can infringe upon the right to nominate. Had the NMEBA issued a regulation that only Jesse Calhoon was eligible for office, no one could place great store on the right to self-nomination left to the rest of the membership. This Court long ago recognized the subtle ways by which election, rights can bevremoved through discrimination at a less visible stage of the political process. The decisions in the Texas Primary Cases were founded on the belief that the equal right to vote was impaired where discrimination existed in the method of nomination. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. No less is the equal right to nominate infringed where onerous burdens drastically limit the candidates available for nomination. In scrutinizing devices designed to erode the franchise, the Court has shown impatience with arguments founded in the form of the device. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 345. If Congress has told the courts to protect a union member from infringement of, his equal right to nominate, the courts should do so whether such discrimination is sophisticated or simpleminded. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275.
After today, simply by framing its discriminatory rules in terms of eligibility, a union can immunize itself from pre-election attack in a federal court even though it makes deep incursions on the equal right of its members to nominate, to vote, and to participate in the union’s internal affairs;
*144The Court justifies this conclusion by looking to the “structure and language” of the Act. The language is certainly not free from doubt. And the legislative history indicates that the ■ structure can be misleading. What now constitutes Titles II through VI of the Act was substantially contained in the original bill presented to the Senate by Senator Kennedy. Title I, first introduced by Senator McClellan, was the product of doubt that the bill went far enough in guaranteeing internal democracy in union affairs. The concept of Title I — its stress on equal rights and judicial protection — was the subject of great controversy both in the Senate and in the House. Repeated attempts were made by representatives of organized labor, among other groups, to have the strict mandate of this so-called Bill of Rights modified, or eliminated altogether. Despite these efforts to remove Title I, it endured, and indeed was amended to provide stronger remedial provisions than those contained in the original version.' As originally introduced, § 102 would have required an aggrieved union member to make his complaint to the Secretary of Labor, exactly the remedy provided by Title IV. The Kuchel amendment, however, substituted the present provision permitting suit by an aggrieved member in a federal district court. When Senator Kuchel introduced this change, he commented:
“[H]ere is one of the major changes in the proposal. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas provided that the Secretary of Lábor might, on behalf of the injured or aggrieved member, have the right to litigate the alleged grievance and to seek an injunction or other relief. We believe that giving this type of right to the aggrieved employee member himself is in the interest of justice . . : .” II Leg. *145Hist., Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 1232.
Senator Clark of Pennsylvania noted that the Kuchel amendment “takes the Federal bureaucracy out of this bill of rights and leaves its enforcement to union members, aided by the courts.” II Leg. Hist. 1233.
Nonetheless, the Court finds a “general congressional policy” to avoid judicial resolution of internal union disputes. That policy, the Court says, was designed to limit the power of individuals to block and delay elections by seeking injunctive relief. Such an appraisal might have been accurate before the addition of Title I, but it does not explain the emphasis on prompt judicial remedies there provided. In addition to the injunctive relief authorized by § 1022 and the saving provisions of § 103,3 i 101 (a) (4) modifies the traditional requirement of exhausting internal remedies before resort to litigation.4 Even § 403 is not conclusive on the elimination of pre-election remedies.5 At the least, state-court actions *146may be brought in advance of an election to “enforce the constitution arfd bylaws.” And as to federal courts, it is certainly arguable that recourse through the Secretary of Labor is the exclusive remedy only after the election has been held.6 By reading Title I rights so narrowly, and by construing Title IV to foreclose absolutéjy pre-election litigation in the federal courts, the Court sharply reduces meaningful protection for many of the rights which Congress was so assiduous- to create.7 By so simplifying the tangled provisions of the Act, the Court renders it virtually impossible for the aggrieved union member to gain a hearing when it is most necessary— when there is still an opportunity to make the union’s rules comport with the requirements of the Act.
My difference with the Court does not reach to the disposition of this particular case. Whether stated in terms *147of restrictions on the right to nominate, or in terms of limitations on eligibility for union office, I think the rules of a labor organization would operate illegally, to curtail the members’ equal right to nominate within the meaning of Title I only if those rules.effectively distorted the basic democratic process. The line might be a shadowy one in some cases. . But I think that in this case the respondents did not allege in their complaint nor demonstrate in their affidavits that this.line was crossed. I would therefore remand the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.

 An additional restriction, applicable solely to the post of president, required that all candidates for that office must have served the union in some prior official capacity.

 “Sec. 102. Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) • as may he appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the'district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.”

 “Sec. 103. Nothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization.”

 See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F. 2d 75 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961).

 “Sec. 403. No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct elections of officers with greater frequency or in a different form or maimer than is required by its own constitution or bylaws, *146except as otherwise provided by this title. Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this title. The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive.”

 See Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act — Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 Ohio St. L. J. 119, 138-139 (1961). It would be strange indeed if only state courts were available to enforce the federal law created by the Act during the pre-election period.

 The Court’s reading of federal-court, remedies available under Title I and Title IV is particularly restrictive because of the limited powers of the district judge once the balloting has occurred. Under’ §402 (c), the court is confined to setting the election aside -only if “the violation of section 401 may have affected the outcome.” For-the aggrieved union member, this, protection may be totally inadequate. The function of nominating a candidate is not always to gain the office. A faction may be vitally interested in appearing on the ballot merely to show that it is part of the political structure of the union. Under the Gourt’s view,' until such a faction approaches majority status, judicial relief in the federal- courts will be absent. See Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 Yale L. J. 1221, 1257 (1961).