Court Opinion

ID: 9550318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:57.824918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:23.489495
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Hoblit. However, I disagree with the court’s holding that the statute of limitations in actions to determine rights in real property begins to run only when the victim actually discovers the fraud, regardless of whether the victim acted reasonably in discovering the fraud.
The statute at issue in this case, AS 09.10.230, along with the remainder of the Territory of Alaska’s first code of civil procedure, was adopted, almost verbatim from Oregon’s code on June 6, 1900. The text of AS 09.10.230 (then Part IV, § 361 of Carter’s Annotated Alaska Codes), and in particular its provision for the discovery of fraud or mistake as the starting point for the limitations period, has not been materially altered since it was adopted from Oregon.
In Alaska, a statute adopted from another state which has been construed by that state’s highest court is presumed to be adopted with that construction. Carver v. Gilbert, 387 P.2d 928 (Alaska 1962). “Discovery” of fraud or mistake within the meaning of Hill’s Annotated Laws of Oregon § 382, the section from which AS 09.-10.230 was originally derived, was interpreted by the Oregon Supreme Court to mean the time at which the mistake or fraud was actually discovered or should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Loomis v. Rosenthal, 340 Or. 585, 57 P. 55, 60 (Or.1899); Sedlack v. Sedlack, 14 Or. 540, 13 P. 452 (Or.1887). There is no indication in the legislative history of AS 09.10.230 that Alaska lawmakers intended to disavow the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of Hill’s Annotated Laws of Oregon § 382. Therefore, I am of the view that “discovery” within AS 09.10.230 should be construed to mean the time at which fraud or mistake was actually discovered or should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The court’s opinion advances no compelling reason to depart from this presumptive interpretation of AS 09.10.230. The passage from Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980), cited by the majority to support its position, has little relevance to cases involving statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations do not excuse unlawful conduct; such statutes merely preclude stale claims. Furthermore, Cousi-neau involved a contractual dispute rather than the application of a statute of limitations. While there may indeed be a “growing trend” in contract law toward the doctrine that negligence in trusting in a misrepresentation will not deprive the defrauded person of his or her remedy, the over*1090whelming majority of other jurisdictions hold fraud victims to a standard of due diligence in discovering the fraud for purposes of complying with statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Sun ‘N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal.3d 671, 148 Cal.Rptr. 329, 350, 582 P.2d 920, 941 (Cal.1978); Mathies v. Hoeck, 588 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Or.1978); Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, 524 P.2d 726, 733 (1974); Greco v. Pullara, 166 Colo. 465, 444 P.2d 383, 384 (1968).
I would hold that the limitations period set forth in AS 09.10.230 begins to run when a fraud victim discovers the fraud or should have discovered the fraud through exercise of reasonable diligence.