Court Opinion

ID: 9628173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:10:11.351108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:58.840125
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LOHR
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to adult defendants in criminal proceedings in state courts by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). Although the issue has never been presented to this court, I have little doubt that due process of law also requires the right to a speedy trial to be applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (due process of law requires notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation and cross-examination in juvenile delinquency proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (due process of law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency adjudications); but cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (due process of law does not require a jury trial in juvenile delinquency adjudications).
In order to determine whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, it is necessary to make an ad hoc judgment based on the facts of each case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, *36233 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971); Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 (1974). Factors to be considered include length of delay, the reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and any prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, supra; Potter v. District Court, supra; People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P.2d 260 (1973). Necessarily, this ad hoc balancing process is difficult and lacking in mathematical precision. See Gelfand v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 586 P.2d 1331 (1978).
In service of the same values reflected in the constitutional right to speedy trial, the legislature has required that defendants in criminal proceedings be brought to trial within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty. Section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8). This same requirement is contained in Crim. P. 48(b)(1). The time within which a defendant must be brought to trial pursuant to the constitutional requirement is not necessarily the same as the time for trial mandated by the statute and the rule in a particular case. Each of the two sets of requirements is to be applied independently. Potter v. District Court, supra; Gelfand v. People, supra.
The legislature has not chosen to adopt a requirement similar to section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), for juvenile proceedings, nor has this court adopted a rule containing such requirement. The desirability of such a requirement is not the issue before us; we can consider only whether the constitution mandates that an adjudication proceeding in a juvenile delinquency case take place within six months of denial of the allegations in the petition in delinquency.
Only in situations involving rights so fundamental that to refuse to apply them to juvenile proceedings would contravene due process of law has it been required that a statute applicable to adult criminal proceedings be applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. People in the Interest of C.B., 196 Colo. 362, 585 P.2d 281 (1978) (right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish probation violation which constitutes a criminal offense); People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46 (1978) (right to challenge for cause a potential juror employed by a law enforcement agency).1 In the case before us fundamental fairness would be fully assured by applying the constitutional right to speedy trial. I cannot agree that due process of law requires that section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 1973 (now in 1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and Crim. P. 48(b)(1) be applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
JUSTICE ROVIRA joins in this dissent.

 The right to a jury trial in delinquency adjudication proceedings is granted in certain circumstances by Colorado statute. Section 19-1-106(4), C.R.S. 1973.