Court Opinion

ID: 9788527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:55:46.984052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:58.939889
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
¶ 28 I concur in part and dissent in part.
I. TRUSTEE’S BREACH OF TRUST
¶ 29 The main opinion concludes that Malu “could not transfer the property in the trusts, as a trustee, other than as directed in the trusts.” This evades the well-established principle that a trustee can breach the trust, thereby triggering the statute of limitations. See 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 125 (2002) (“The trust relationship may continue until it is terminated by a repudiation by the trustee.... ”); 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 654 (2005) (stating that the statute of limitations is tolled only “until the trustee openly repudiates the trust”). The United States Supreme Court and Utah’s courts have both long recognized this rule. See Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 252, 12 S.Ct. 418, 36 L.Ed. 134 (1892) (“[W]here a trustee [breaches the trust], the eestuis que trust are entitled to [take action] subject to the qualification that the application for such relief must be made within reasonable time....”); Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U.S. 151, 157, 5 S.Ct. 1181, 29 L.Ed. 336 (1885) (“[W]hen the trust is repudiated by ... the trustee who claims to hold the trust property as his own, ... the statute of limitation will begin to run.”); Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1981) (per curiam) (‘Where the trustee denies the obligation of his trust and the beneficiary has notice of his repudiation, the statute begins to run.”); Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 56, 44 P. 652, 654 (1896) (“[W]hen the trustee denies the trust and assumes ownership of the trust property, ... then the statute of limitations attaches.”); Wood v. Fox, 8 Utah 380, 32 P. 48, 52 (1893) (“The law is that the statute of limitations begins to run against a claim growing out of a trust from the time the trustee repudiates the trust and the ces-tui que trust has notice.”).
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
¶ 30 The main opinion also concludes that the quiet title action is not subject to a statute of limitations. In Branting v. Salt Lake City, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
[W]e are very clearly of the opinion that ... actions by which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to quiet *868title to real property as against apparent or stale claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, yet we are also clear that all actions in which the principle purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief ... come within the [statute of limitations] ....
47 Utah 296,153 P. 995, 1001 (1915) (emphasis added). This court has ruled that “[a] statute [of limitations] ‘applied to all actions, both legal and equitable, in which affirmative relief is sought.’ ” Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992)). To determine whether a claim seeks affirmative relief, the key distinction is not whether the claim is styled as a quiet title action but whether it is “against apparent or stale claims” as opposed to an active battle between adverse parties. In Branting itself and all of the cases that Branting cites on this point, the courts concluded that the parties sought affirmative relief where there were active, adverse claimants.1 Thus, Nolan and Gatlin’s action is not exempt from a statute of limitations merely because it is a quiet title action.
¶ 31 While I take issue with the main opinion for failing to recognize that a trustee’s actions may trigger a limitations period, without more evidence, I would not adopt the Defendants’ argument that Malu’s actions in fact triggered the limitations period. Instead, I would instruct the trial court to permit the Defendants to provide such evidence on remand.2
III. TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD
¶ 32 I also take issue with both the trial court and the main opinion because Nolan was not Gatlin’s agent, and her actions and knowledge should not be imputed to Gatlin.
¶ 33 Further, the main opinion remands to the trial court to weigh the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ conduct in light of the Defendants’ steps to conceal the cause of action. Because the trial court stated that it had considered the discovery rule, I would more specifically outline what factors the trial court did not but should consider. Specifically, the trial court should “apply a balancing test” to determine when “a rigid application of the statute ... [will] be irrational and unjust.” Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,¶ 11, 998 P.2d 262 (quotations and citation omitted). This test “weights] the hardship imposed on the claimants] ... against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). In this balance, the trial court should consider that (1) the Defendants never had any legal or equitable claim to the trust properties whereas Nolan and Gatlin had both,3 (2) *869Nolan did take some action, (3) Cuma’s agent Fadel misled Nolan and Gatlin, and (4) “the close familial relationship^] involved” may have affected the parties actions. Id. at ¶ 11; see also Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (1965); Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (1959).
III. LENGTH OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD
¶ 34 I also take issue with the main opinion’s failure to examine and specify which statute of limitations applies to which cause of action. The trial court ruled that one of several statutes of limitations applied, and the main opinion adds little clarity.4
¶ 35 First, the claim for the return of the rents and lease payments seeks return of mesne profits. Section 78-12-23(1) sets a six-year period of limitations “for the mesne profits of real property.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(1) (1995). This specific statute controls over any more general one. See Cathco, Inc. v. Valentiner Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah, 1997) (“[T]he more specific provision will govern over the more general provision.” (quotations and citation omitted)). It is un-eontested that Nolan and Gatlin brought a claim within six years. Since I would hold that Nolan and Gatlin have held equitable title to the trust property since the formation of the trusts, they are entitled to the mesne profits regardless of the application of the statutes of limitations to the other claims.
¶ 36 Second, the gravamen of the wrongful deprivation claim lies in tort and does not straightforwardly stem from the trust instrument. Tort claims for the taking of personal property are governed by a three-year limitations period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2) (1995). The other tort claims, in-eluding the wrongful deprivation of real property, are subject to a four-year limitations period. See id. § 78-12-25(3) (1995). The punitive damage claim arises out of the tort claims and should be treated as ancillary to them with an identical period of limitation.
¶ 37 Third, in essence, the remaining claims all ask for the return of the trust property. The trial court’s analysis was flawed to the extent that it considered section 75-3-1006 because neither “the claim of any claimant,” as defined by Utah Code Title 75,5 nor “the right of any heir or devisee” is at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 (1995). Moreover, the Defendants’ argument for section 78-12-19 should fail because Nolan and Gatlin are not “claiming under the decedent” — their claim does not stem from Malu’s ownership but from their own — and, this is not an action to set aside a sale. Id. § 75-12-19 (1995).
¶ 38 Without explanation, the supreme court determined that section 78-12-25 limited recovery in a dispute between a beneficiary and a constructive trustee. See Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,¶ 9, 998 P.2d 262. Section 78-12-25 addresses in one subsection actions “upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing” and provides “for relief not otherwise provided by law” in another subsection. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1), (3). It limits recovery for these actions to four years. See id. Although the court’s rationale for applying this statute was never made clear, the reason may be that although the obligation stemmed from a written instrument, the relief lay in equity, which is “not ... provided by law.” Id. While there is implicit authority that would point us to Utah Code section 78-12-23(2) (1995), which grants a six-year period to bring claims “founded upon an instrument *870in writing,” namely Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 44 P. 652 (1896), I feel that it is our duty to follow the supreme court’s lead, even if its steps are shrouded.
¶39 Thus, on remand after determining how long the limitations period should be tolled, I would have the trial court apply a four-year limitations period, except as otherwise noted.
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
¶ 40 “[W]here an appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty of ‘passing] on matters [that] may then become material.’ ” Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 22, 20 P.3d 388 (first and second alterations in original) (citation omitted). I take issue with the main opinion’s failure to address these points.
A. Ending of the Limitations Period
¶41 On remand, it may be necessary to determine when to stop counting to determine whether the limitations period expired. Two dates are possible: (i) August 26, 2002, when Nolan instituted a probate proceeding to have herself appointed as successor trustee and to convey Inez Gatlin’s interest to herself and Gatlin, or (ii) October 10, 2002, when Nolan brought a civil claim directly against the Defendants. This appeal flows most directly from the civil claim, as the heading implies, but the probate proceeding was consolidated into that case. For the most part, Nolan effectively sought the same result from both actions — i.e., control over the trust property. And to that extent, the commencement of this action should be the first day on which Nolan took legal action to protect her interest in the trusts, August 26, 2002. On the other hand, to the extent that the civil case asks for punitive damages and tort claims, which were not raised in the probate proceeding, those actions were commenced on October 10, 2002.
B. Dowry
¶42 Cuma has raised the argument that because she had dowry rights to the trust property when Malu created the trusts, Malu could never have devised all of the property into the trusts. Utah Code section 74-4-3 was in effect and Malu and Cuma were married at the time that Malu transferred the property into the trusts. See Utah Code Ann. § 74-4-3 (1953) (repealed 1977) (providing that “[o]ne-third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, to which the wife has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives him ...”). This interest, however, did “not vest until the death of her husband.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. Meyer, 568 P.2d 755, 756 (1977). Because the provision was repealed before Malu died, Cuma’s dower interests never vested; instead, she was protected by the elective share statutes, Utah Code sections 75-2-201 to -207. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-201 to -207 (1995). There is no information in the record to determine whether Malu adequately provided for Cuma, given that the trust property was not properly part of the estate. I would instruct the trial court that Cuma is not entitled to dower rights under Utah Code section 74-4-3.
CONCLUSION
¶ 43 In conclusion, I concur in the result to reverse this case to the trial court. On remand, though, I would have the trial court permit the Defendants to introduce evidence that Malu breached the trust and triggered the limitations period. I dissent from the main opinion’s conclusion that the quiet title action is exempt from a statute of limitations because the action requests affirmative relief. I would also specifically point out the factors in the discovery rule test that the trial court ignored to determine whether the Plaintiffs should both be charged with knowledge of Malu’s breach. I would also make it clear that if the trial court determines that the statute of limitations was triggered, the trial court should apply a four-year statute of limitations to the quiet title claims, a three-year statute of limitations to the tort claims for personal property, and a six-year statute of limitations for the mesne profits.
*871¶ 44 I respectfully dissent in part and concur in the result.

. See Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995, 1001 (1915); see also Hecht v. Slaney, 72 Cal. 363, 14 P. 88 (1887) (cited in Branting and finding that a statute of limitations applied in a dispute between active, adverse litigants); Irey v. Markey, 132 Ind. 546, 32 N.E. 309 (1892) (same); Stonehill v. Swartz, 129 Ind. 310, 28 N.E. 620 (1891) (same); Royse v. Tumbaugh, 117 Ind. 539, 20 N.E. 485, 487 (1889) (same); Caress v. Foster, 62 Ind. 145 (1878) (same); see, e.g., Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374, 377 (1938) (holding that "if [a plaintiff's] relief ... depend[ed] ... upon the cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake, he must bring his action within the period provided by law for an action based upon that ground”).

. The Defendants assert that a statutory period of limitations began to run when Nolan and Gatlin received notice that Malu’s will devised the property to Cuma and her son. I do not think that it is yet clear whether Malu breached the trust. Because "[tjrustees must act with good faith, loyalty, fairness, candor and honesty toward the trust beneficiaries," 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 349 (2005), to breach a trust, a trustee must act in bad faith. “Bad faith is ... when a thing is done dishonestly and not merely negligently." Research-Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984) (quotations and citation omitted). At present, the record lacks any evidence that Malu acted with intent, bad faith, or dishonesty. The breach that, on the present record, has been alleged is far from clear. Neither the sentence in Malu's holographic will nor his failure to mention the trusts expresses anything like the requisite clarity to deny the trust.

.By operation of the Statute of Uses, when the terms of the trusts were fulfilled so that the trustees’ (or trustee's) only duties were to deliver the trust property to the beneficiaries, the Plaintiffs were vested with legal title to the properties. See 27 Henry 8, c. 10 (1535 Eng.); see also Garth v. Cotton, Eng. Rep. 392 (Ch. 1753) (recognizing "jus in rem” and jus "ad rem”); Henderson v. Adams, 15 Utah 30, 48 P. 398, 401 (1897) (stating that the rule of the Statute of Uses "is part of the common law of this state.”). Once Nolan *869turned twenty-one and the Hartmans died, the trust became passive, the Statute of Uses took effect, and the Plaintiffs became seised with the legal title to the trust property. Thus, Nolan and Gatlin were holders of both the legal and equitable title in the property in the LaRayne Hartman Trust after Nolan turned twenty-one and La-Rayne Hartman died, and they held legal and equitable title in the property in the Donald Hartman Trust after Nolan turned twenty-one and Donald Hartman died.

. The trial court ruled that Nolan and Gatlin’s claims were barred by Utah Code section 75-3-1006, 78-12-25(3), or 78-12-25(1). The Defendants argue that section 78-12-19 applies in this case.

. Utah Code section 75-1-201(4) specifically excludes actions of this type from the definition of a "claim.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(4) (1995).