Court Opinion

ID: 9762532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:54.830651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:53.840881
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Justice,
concurring.
I concur only in the result that the majority opinion reaches, namely, that the judgment of the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court’s judgment and ordered the cause remanded to the trial court for new trial, should be affirmed.
The record reflects that on direct appeal to the First Court of Appeals, Carl Wesley Deason, henceforth appellant, presented only two points of error for review, namely: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial judge’s decision to find appellant guilty of indecency with a child, and (2) the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence over objection a videotaped interview session that occurred between the child complaining witness and a Houston Police Officer. The court of appeals overruled the first contention but sustained the second contention, and then reversed and remanded the cause for new trial. See Deason v. State, No. 01-86-00716-CR, August 20, 1987.
On direct appeal, the District Attorney responded to appellant’s first point of error by asserting that the sufficiency of the evidence challenge could not be reviewed because an exhibit, the videotape recording, was not in the record of appeal. The court of appeals subsequently ordered the exhibit transmitted to that court, after which it reviewed and rejected appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial judge’s decision to find appellant guilty of committing the offense of indecency with a child. I do not find in the record where the District Attorney filed any supplemental brief after the court of appeals obtained possession of the exhibit.
In response to appellant’s second point of error, the local District Attorney made the following arguments: that any error in admitting into evidence the videotaped interview session was cured when appellant introduced into evidence a transcription of same; that because this was a trial to the court, the trial judge was presumed to have ignored any inadmissible evidence; that failure to have the videotape recording in the record precluded the appellate court from considering the point of error; and, lastly, it was unnecessary for the court of appeals to consider the constitutionality of the statutory provision that provided for the admissibility of the videotape recording because that court had already held the statutory provision was constitutional.
In an unpublished opinion, the First Court of Appeals, after correctly reviewing all of the evidence that the jury heard, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child “by touching the genitals,” as alleged in the indictment. However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment *718of conviction and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial on the basis of this Court’s decision of Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), which held that the statutory provision which permitted the State to introduce into evidence a videotaped interview session with a child victim unconstitutionally deprived the accused of his right of confrontation under both Federal and State Constitutions, and thus it was error of both state and federal constitutional magnitude to admit such evidence at the accused’s trial over objection. Also see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). The court of appeals did not address the District Attorney’s contention that because this was a bench trial it should be presumed that the trial judge ignored the inadmissible evidence, namely, the videotaped interview session that occurred with the child complaining witness.
The court of appeals summarily reversed the trial court’s judgment of conviction after it found “Long” error. The District Attorney did not, however, even though he was the beneficiary of the “Long” error at trial, either on original submission or through a motion for rehearing, request the court of appeals do any kind of harmless error analysis. See, however, Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, which had been in effect for almost one year when the court of appeals ruled favorably on appellant’s contention. Thus, because the District Attorney did not raise in the court of appeals the issue that the error in admitting the videotaped interview session with the child complainant into evidence was harmless, such issue is not now before this Court for review, and this Court should not now, sua sponte, make that determination. See Tallant v. State, 742 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
This Court granted the petitions for discretionary review that were filed in this cause by (1) appellant and (2) the District Attorney. It refused the petition for discretionary review that was filed by the State Prosecuting Attorney’s office. See post.
Appellant claims in his sole ground for review that the court of appeals should have entered a judgment of acquittal on his behalf because he claims that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for indecency with a child.
I find that appellant’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to be totally and wholly without merit, if one considers all the evidence that the trial judge heard in this cause, both that which is admissible and that which is inadmissible, and if one will treat the trial court’s error as “trial error.” Because of its importance to the issue, I will later discuss the distinction between “trial error” and “sufficiency of the evidence error.”
It is now axiomatic in our law that if an appellate court can conclude from all the evidence, that is, evidence which was properly admitted combined with evidence that was improperly admitted, and a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient, then the appellate court will hold the evidence to be sufficient. Thus, even if an appellate court sustains a defendant’s contention that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence, there is no bar under the above rule of law that would prevent an appellate court from considering that evidence in judging a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The above rule of law was recently reaffirmed by this Court in Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), in which this Court pointed out the following: “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all evidence which the jury was permitted, whether rightly or wrongly, to consider. Beltran v. State, 728 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Poner v. State, 662 S.W.2d 602, 605-606 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) ...” (Emphasis in original.) Also see Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
“Trial error” or “judicial error” is to be distinguished from “sufficiency of the evidence error.” Generally, double jeopardy does not attach when a case is reversed by an appellate court because of trial error, *719but double jeopardy does attach when a judgment of acquittal is ordered entered after the appellate court finds that the evidence is insufficient. See Franklin v. State, 693 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), Ex parte Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Ex parte Sorola, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1989).
The term “trial error” is actually self-explanatory. “Trial error” occurs when the trial judge is called upon to act, usually to determine the admissibility of some piece of evidence, and he erroneously overrules the defendant’s objection to the admissibility of that evidence, and an appellate court later determines that the trial judge erred in admitting such into evidence. This kind of error, however, is only “trial error,” which is not synonymous with “sufficiency of the evidence error.” This is because under our law at this time an appellate court, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, is entitled to review all the evidence, both that which has been held admissible and that which has been held inadmissible. For further discussion on this subject, see Gardner v. State, 699 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Teague, J., concurring and dissenting opinion.) Also see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978); and Gregg v. State, 667 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
Thus, appellant’s contention that the evidence in this cause is insufficient to sustain the trial judge’s decision to find appellant guilty of indecency with a child is totally without merit if one considers all of the evidence, both that which was properly admitted and that which was improperly admitted. In this instance, I find, as did the court of appeals, that the properly admitted evidence, when combined with the improperly admitted evidence, causes the evidence to be more than sufficient to sustain the trial judge’s decision to find appellant guilty of committing the offense of indecency with a child. Appellant’s petition for discretionary review should be dismissed as having been improperly granted. Also see Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Duncan, J., concurring opinion, in which the author of the majority opinion opined that where a court of appeals has resolved against a defendant a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should never grant an appellant’s petition for discretionary review that challenges that decision of a court of appeals. E.g., Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).
Therefore, it would be proper for this Court to end its discussion regarding appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this note. However, for reasons not exactly clear from the majority opinion, it injects into this cause a rule of law that comes to us from the civil side of the street, see post. The majority opinion appears to have transformed the civil rule of law into another “harmless error” rule.
After reading many of the civil cases which have interpreted the civil rule of law, I am afraid that those members of this Court who join the majority opinion do not understand the rule, as it existed and was applied on the civil side of the street. The rule provides that in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, where trial was to the court, even if the trial judge erroneously overruled an objection to the admissibility of certain evidence, if there was sufficient evidence without the inadmissible evidence to sustain the trial judge’s decision, the trial court’s judgment will nevertheless be affirmed. Is this not a form of some type of “harmless error” rule? Isn’t Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, which does not distinguish between a trial to the court and a jury trial, and which is only applicable to erroneous rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and which has nothing whatsoever to do with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s harmless error rule when it comes to making the determination whether, notwithstanding that it was error to admit certain evidence, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Rule 81(b)(2) provides:
If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appel*720late court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.
This Court, of course, should always leave rules of law that have been created on the civil side of the street to that side of the street, because it has a tendency to misunderstand them, which causes this Court to misapply them in a criminal case. See, for example, Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). But also see Gold v. State, 736 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting opinion).
I must ask: How many harmless error rules can the bench and bar of this State cope with? With the adoption of the one created by our sister Supreme Court of Texas in this cause, and those that are extant at this time, I dare say that no other supreme appellate court in this Nation has more harmless error rules than this Court now has. Also see Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Teague, J., dissenting opinion.)
Rather than keep the matter simple, and apply Rule 81(b)(2) to the “Long” error that occurred in this cause, the majority opinion, for reasons that are not all that clear, invokes and applies to this cause a rule of law that was created on the civil side of the street. That rule is as follows: “When a cause is tried before the court and there is nothing to show that the judgment was based upon the inadmissible evidence (such by findings of fact or conclusions of law) it will be presumed that the trial judge disregarded incompetent evidence admitted at the trial and the judgment will not be reversed on appeal on the ground of the admission of incompetent evidence if sufficient proper evidence was admitted to sustain the judgment.”
The majority opinion relies upon Tolbert v. State, 743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), a plurality opinion of this Court, as its authority. Interestingly, at no place in Tolbert, which involved another “Long” error situation, will one find mention of Rule 81(b)(2). Tolbert simply invoked and summarily applied the above rule that had been created on the civil side of the street. Amazingly, the majority opinion in this cause treats us with not only the rule that was created on the civil side of the street, but it also gives us a dose of Rule 81(b)(2), which was, although not created by this Court, approved by this Court.
In this instance, the majority opinion finds that “the trial judge did consider [the inadmissible videotaped interview evidence],” and also finds that “Without the videotape evidence there is absolutely nothing in the record that the appellant touched the complainant’s vagina,” (footnote deleted). Thus, if this Court applies the reverse of the “Tolbert” presumption rule, why doesn’t appellant get an outright acquittal from this Court? The only good reason I can come up with at this time is that such a decision would not only cause a perverted individual to be acquitted, it would shock the conscience of a majority of this Court.
Isn’t it rather strange that after invoking and applying the above “civil presumption rule” to this cause, the majority opinion in this cause ultimately falls back on the harmless error rule set out in Rule 81(b)(2), but nowhere in Tolbert, upon which the majority opinion relies as its authority, can one find any reference to Rule 81(b)(2)?
The confusing majority opinion is, however, understandable when one considers that its authority is Tolbert v. State, which opinion, given the issue that this Court had to resolve, is truly one of this Court’s most incomprehensible, illogical, and nonsensical opinions ever handed down. Also see Miffleton v. State, 777 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). See, however, the dissenting opinion that I filed in Tolbert. Perhaps the idea of Tolbert is that if this Court follows Tolbert a sufficient number of times, then by sheer number that opinion will become authoritative, rather than simply incomprehensible, illogical, and nonsensical.
The civil presumption rule, however, is not an absolute rule without exceptions. Justice Garrett of the Supreme Court, in that Court’s 1891 decision of Moore v. Kennedy, 81 Tex. 144, 16 S.W. 740 (1891), that he authored for the Court, after setting out the above general rule, and after having *721reviewed the record, rejected applying the presumption to that cause: “But we are of the opinion, from a careful examination of the statement of facts found in the record, that the learned judge who tried the case below was influenced in his judgment by the incompetent evidence that was admitted.” (16 S.W. at 741).
In any event, until the evolution of “trial error” versus “sufficiency of the evidence error” in our criminal jurisprudence occurred, when used in the proper context, the above civil rule of law could be applied to a criminal case. However, now that we have in our criminal jurisprudence the “trial error” versus “sufficiency of the evidence error” rule, as well as having Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, in deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, does such civil rule of law have any place in our criminal jurisprudence?; I think not, and I believe that today is a good day to exorcise it from our criminal jurisprudence. Again, appellant’s petition for discretionary review should be dismissed as having been improvidently granted.
In his petition for discretionary review, the District Attorney’s second ground for review reads: “Was the appellant denied his right to cross-examine and confront the witness against him where the complainant was called as a witness at trial and subjected to cross-examination prior to the introduction of the videotape?” The District Attorney urges this Court “to adopt the reasoning of Judge McCormick in his dissenting opinion in Long v. State, supra, and find that, under the facts of this case, the appellant’s confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction of the videotaped statement.” (Page 5 of the District Attorney’s petition for discretionary review.)
The State Prosecuting Attorney, in the petition for discretionary review that he filed, which was refused by this Court without written opinion or comment, simply urged this Court to grant the State’s motion for rehearing that had been filed in Long v. State, which was then pending on rehearing but had not yet been decided by this Court. However, by the time this Court ruled on whether or not to grant the State Prosecuting Attorney’s petition for discretionary review, the State’s motion for rehearing in Long v. State had been overruled. Thus, given what the State Prosecuting Attorney petitioned this Court to review, and this Court’s final decision of Long, supra, it is or should be understandable why this Court refused that petition without comment or opinion.
Thus, at this time, the merits or demerits of this Court’s decision of Long v. State are not open to debate. It is final and will remain the law of this State until at least five judges of this Court vote to overrule it. Therefore, the second ground for review that the District Attorney presents to this Court to review is now moot.
The District Attorney does not in his petition ask this Court to remand this cause to the court of appeals so that court can do a harmless error analysis, regarding the “Long” error that was committed in this cause. Therefore, there is no need for this Court to do a harmless error analysis. In short, the District Attorney has decided to gamble all of his money on a single roll of the dice, and he loses because of Long v. State. It should be axiomatic that if the State, through a District Attorney or the State Prosecuting Attorney, does not request either the court of appeals or this Court to do a harmless error analysis pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), then that issue should never be addressed by this Court sua sponte.
Also see Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), and Rodriquez v. State, 759 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
The State’s failure to raise the issue of harmless error pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2) in its petition is, however, perhaps understandable. The State’s petition for discretionary review was filed on September 1, 1987. This Court’s mandate in Long did not issue until January 29, 1988. In Long, this Court did not, when it came to “Long” error, consider the applicability of the harmless error rule, pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), to such error. In short, under Long, if there was “Long” error in a case, it was “slam dunk” time for the defendant. *722Also see Jolly v. State, 739 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). It was not until this Court decided Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), on June 15, 1988, that “slam dunk” time ended for defendants who had “Long” error in their cases. It was in Mallory that this Court first concluded that a harmless error analysis pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, should take place when “Long” error was found in a case. Thus, in the beginning, and only by fortuitous circumstances, some defendants were granted new trials while others merely got a remand to the court of appeals for that court to make a harmless error analysis.
Since Mallory, however, if the court of appeals affirmed a case in which this Court found “Long” error to exist, and the State argued before this Court that the error could be harmless, this Court would remand the cause to the court of appeals so that court could first make a harmless error analysis. For some inexplicable reason, this Court’s majority approved the plurality opinion of Tolbert, which caused it to deviate from the course it had previously chartered.
However, notwithstanding the above, one would think that if the District Attorney seriously wanted this Court in this cause to consider whether the “Long” error that was committed was harmless, he would have made that suggestion to this Court at some time after Mallory was decided, which was within the almost two years that his petition for discretionary review has been pending before this Court. Because the District Attorney has never requested this Court to invoke and apply to the “Long” error that occurred in this cause the doctrine of harmless error pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), this Court has no business making a harmless error analysis of the “Long” error that occurred in this cause.
In closing, I point out that a majority of this Court has long been in lock step with whatever the Supreme Court of the United States states and holds when it comes to federal constitutional law, and applies same in rote fashion to provisions of our Texas Constitution. Just recently, in Bennett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), a majority of this Court ruled that Rule 81(b)(2) represents nothing less than a codified progeny of the Supreme Court’s harmless error rule as enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Supreme Court held that in determining whether federal constitutional error was harmless, “The question, however, is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct., at 828.” (Emphasis supplied.) 108 S.Ct. at 1798. Thus, logically at least, it stands to reason that if the State does not urge and argue that the error was harmless, it has waived the complaint that the error was harmless.
For the above reasons, I only concur in the result that the majority opinion reaches, that the judgment of the court of appeals must be affirmed.