Court Opinion

ID: 9929484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 19:02:25.65331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:26:28.672109
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/24 P. v. Meneses CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081553

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. RIF2100963)

 JESSE DANILO MENESES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
         Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters and Charles C. Ragland,
Assistant Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina, Christine Bergman and
Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Following a bench trial, Jesse Danilo Meneses was convicted of assault

against peace officers (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (c); counts 2, 3, 5, and 6),

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 8, 9), and attempting to
deter, prevent, and resist officers from performing their duties (§ 69, subd.

(a); counts 11-16).2 The court sentenced Meneses to a suspended six-year
eight-month prison term, consisting of a four-year midterm on count 2, and
one-third the midterms on the other counts: a consecutive 16-month term on
count 3, concurrent 16-month terms on counts 5 and 6, a consecutive eight-
month term on count 8, a concurrent eight-month term on count 9, a
consecutive eight-month term on count 11, and concurrent eight-month terms
on counts 12 through 16. The court placed Meneses on probation for 24
months.
      Meneses contends insufficient evidence supports his convictions for
criminal threats and assault against peace officers, in part because the
deputies were assertedly not lawfully performing their duties, his arrest was
unlawful, and one officer was not present during his pursuit and
apprehension. He further contends the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence from his assertedly illegal detention and arrest.
We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Events of March 6, 2021
      In March 2021, Meneses became angry and aggressive after one of his
stepsisters, M.R., removed a copy of a news article about another family
member’s death that Meneses had posted on a wall of the house in which
they all lived. The incident resulted in his other stepsister, K.R., making a

2     The court found Meneses not guilty of an attempted murder charge
(§§ 664, subd (e), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and a charged criminal threat in
count 10 against his mother. The People had earlier dismissed another
assault charge in count 4 against one officer, Deputy Jardinas, and a criminal
threat charge in count 7.
                                       2
911 call to police. Multiple sheriff’s deputies and a sergeant responded to the
call. As captured by responding officers’ body-worn cameras, M.R., K.R. and
Meneses’s mother all related that Meneses said he was going to burn the
house down. M.R. told officers Meneses also said he would “kill everybody”
and “kill the cops [¶] . . . [¶] . . . if they came.” She said Meneses “was
threatening to burn the house down. He was threatening to kill the cops if
they came. He was threatening our family.” M.R. told one deputy that K.R.
called police and they locked themselves in a room with their dog “because we
knew that if he got in, he would probably, I don’t know, try to do something.”
M.R. and K.R.’s brother, S.R., described to officers how he intervened
between M.R. and Meneses during the incident. He told a deputy that M.R.
was “shaking, crying, and trembling,” then “started throwing up” once
Meneses had returned to his room after the altercation.
      K.R. told an officer “we’ve all been feeling unsafe” because they had
seen Meneses multiple times in the past starting fires outside and letting
them burn while he walked away. M.R. also agreed that Meneses had “habits
or behaviors of lighting fires” and another family member agreed he engaged
in that behavior “[j]ust recently.” K.R. said they did not feel safe at the house
with him living there. She told officers that “we see him, like, making a
spear, and he’ll bring it up and he’ll look very angry like and so we feel like
he’s just going to hurt us, um, like in the middle of the night, um, so we’re
scared.” In the past, Meneses had threatened to kill K.R. with a large pocket
knife, leading family members to lock K.R. in a bathroom.
      After deputies arrived at the scene, some of them attempted to speak
with Meneses from the bottom of a stairwell at the entryway. Meneses was
at the top of the stairwell on a landing. He was agitated and yelling
profanities, holding a tall, sharpened stick. Meneses at one point threatened

                                         3
to slash his own neck and kill himself rather than submit to police. Some of
the other family members were in upstairs bedrooms next to the stairway,
and the supervising sergeant became concerned for their safety. Another
deputy considered the stick a deadly weapon.
      When officers finally got upstairs to Meneses, he threw a 40-ounce
glass beer bottle at them, missing them, and swung at two officers with his
knife. Meneses was ultimately detained and handcuffed. After he was taken
away, one of the deputies discovered a cut in his shirt near his abdomen; the
knife had cut through to the Kevlar in his body armor vest.
Trial Testimony
      At trial, K.R. testified that when she told police what Meneses had said
about burning the house down, she was in fear for her safety. But she also
testified that she did not personally hear Meneses’s threat, she only heard
about it through M.R.
      M.R. likewise testified at trial that based on Meneses’s anger that
night, she was worried about her family and her own safety. She admitted
that Meneses never specifically threatened her that night. She could not
recall exactly what she told police Meneses said, but said she was “probably
not” exaggerating. She acknowledged telling police Meneses said he was
going to kill family members, but could not remember it at trial.
      S.R. testified that he made an audio recording of Meneses’s statement
about burning the house down. Apparently speaking of M.R., he agreed she
was in fear that night. He testified he heard Meneses make his statement
that he was going to burn the house down from a baby monitor; he did not
actually see Meneses make the statement. S.R. was alone in the room when
he heard it, and Meneses was alone at the time he said it. According to S.R.,

                                      4
M.R. did not hear Meneses’s statement; he was the only one. But he told the
other family members about it.
      One of the sheriff’s deputies who responded that night, Deputy Eric
Garcia, testified that when he first walked in the house, he was told Meneses
was aggressive, fighting with one family member, and said he was going to
light the house on fire. Upon immediately encountering Meneses, he saw him
as hostile and carrying a weapon. Deputy Garcia testified that when he was
informed that Meneses had threatened to burn the house down and kill
family members, he believed Meneses had committed a criminal threat. He
interpreted Meneses’s statements to officers as telling them if they went
upstairs, he would hurt them. Deputy Garcia observed the family members
in apparent fear. That circumstance, combined with Meneses’s possession of
a weapon and his statements to officers, led the deputy to conclude it was not

safe to proceed without detaining Meneses.3 Because he and other deputies
determined the potential for imminent danger, they formulated a plan to

3     Deputy Garcia specifically testified that the officers had established a
crime before making their plan to arrest Meneses: “Now that we established
a crime in that there was some imminent danger that he had a potential to do,
we had to figure out a safe tactical plan to try to apprehend him to remove
him from the house. And I when say safe, safe for myself, my partners, the
family, him so he didn’t potentially burn this house down hurting or killing
anybody.” (Italics added.) He explained he knew there might be a struggle
and wanted to peacefully detain Meneses, so “[t]hat is why we took so long
talking to him trying to figure out, you know, what we can do to peacefully
get him down stairs.” It was after this point that the deputy said he called
his corporal and sergeant.

                                      5
enter an upstairs room from the outside so as to detain Meneses quickly and

safely.4
                                  DISCUSSION
                  I. Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
      “In the context of a criminal case, the substantial evidence standard
stems from the requirement that a criminal conviction necessitates
‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime . . . .’ ” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 198.) Under this
standard, “an appellate court retrospectively inquires whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
based on all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. ‘Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether “the
government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even been
submitted to the jury.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 199.) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony
which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge [in a court trial] or
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends.’ [Citation.] Ultimately, it is
within the [fact-finder’s] exclusive province to determine whether an
inference that may be drawn from the evidence is, in fact, the only reasonable

4      A transcript of a body worn camera recording indicated that at some
point, Deputy Garcia told Meneses’s siblings that Meneses’s behavior—him
“being loud, for him scaring you guys”—did not indicate a crime: “Right now,
just because he’s talking like this, he hasn’t committed a crime. So
technically, there’s no reason for us to go up there and get him and kick him
out of the house. So, that’s what I’m trying to figure out, if there’s a crime
here. Because if this goes sideways and we get into a physical altercation
with him, for what?” After these comments, M.R. told Deputy Garcia that
Meneses said, “I’ll burn your house down,” and that he had habits or
behaviors of starting fires.
                                         6
one, a determination that depends on its resolution of conflicting evidence
and weighing the credibility of witnesses. . . .‘[F]ounded upon the evidence,
the [fact-finder] not only is authorized to make any logical and reasonable
deduction, but [it] is the exclusive judge of the weight and value of the
inference that may be drawn by it . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 202.)
      We view the evidence in light of the whole record, and do not limit our
appraisal “to isolated bits of evidence selected by the respondent.” (People v.
Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153.) We also “ ‘ “must judge whether
the evidence of each of the essential elements . . . is substantial; it is not
enough for the respondent simply to point to ‘some’ evidence supporting the
finding, for ‘[n]ot every surface conflict of evidence remains substantial in the
light of other facts.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) At the same time, we keep in mind that a
trier of fact “ ‘may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony and reject other
parts.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 287, 290, quoting People v.
Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 345.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.
[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118; People v.
Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1004.) But the “ ‘mere fact that there
are contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, or that
the truth of his evidence is open to suspicion, does not render it inherently
improbable.’ ” (People v. Tereno (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 246, 251; see also
People v. Moreno (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 334, 336.)
      “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears
‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)

                                         7
    II. Sufficiency of Evidence of Criminal Threats Against K.R. and M.R.
      Meneses contends the evidence is insufficient to support his criminal
threat convictions as to K.R. and M.R. because there is no evidence (1) he
specifically threatened them; (2) he intended to communicate his statement
to anyone as he was alone in his room; (3) his statements caused K.R. or M.R.
sustained fear for their own or immediate family’s safety (4) a reasonable
person would have feared he would burn down the house and (5) the threat
was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it communicated to
M.R. or K.R. a serious intention and the immediate prospect that it would be
carried out.
      To prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution must prove “ ‘(1) the
defendant willfully threatened death or great bodily injury to another person;
(2) the threat was made with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat,
regardless of the defendant’s intent to carry it out; (3) the threat was “on its
face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened,
a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution”; (4) the threat
caused the person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety
or for his or her immediate family’s safety”; and (5) this fear was reasonable
under the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 809; see also In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630;
People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228; People v. Gaines (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 91, 136.) The offense “does not require an immediate ability or
even an actual intention, to carry out the threat.” (People v. Holmes, McClain
and Newborn, at p. 810.)

                                        8
A. Specific Threats to M.R. and K.R.
      As recounted above, the record contains evidence that both K.R. and
M.R. told deputies that Meneses said he was going to burn the house down.
This was an unconditional and specific threat made while Meneses was in an
angry and aggressive state. The trial court as the finder of fact in this bench
trial was entitled to infer from the transcript of the body camera footage that
both K.R. and M.R. were present and physically heard Meneses make this
threat, and that this threat, as well as his threat to kill “everybody” and
“[the] . . . whole family,” were directed at them both. And because both M.R.
and K.R. acknowledged Meneses had set fires in the past, the court was
entitled to infer Meneses had the means to make good on that threat and
intended his words to be taken as a threat. (See People v. Brugman (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 608, 633 [all surrounding circumstances, including prior history,
is relevant to determine gravity and specific intent to make a threat; citing
cases].) Meneses’s words were not merely an “angry outburst, made in the
heat of an argument” (ibid.); they conveyed a “gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat” (ibid.) that resulted in K.R.
hiding and calling police, and M.R. shaking, crying, and vomiting, then
locking herself and others in a room. K.R. specifically testified that when she
decided to call 911 she feared for her safety, suggesting her fear continued to
a point even after Meneses’s threat. M.R. testified based on Meneses’s anger
that night she was worried for her and her family’s safety. “[A] victim can
experience sustained fear even if the fear exists only during the incident
itself, as long as the fear during the incident is more than ‘momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) The record—viewed in the light most
favorable to the People—evidences sustained fear on M.R. and K.R.’s part,

                                       9
which was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, meeting the
standards of section 422.
      We reject Meneses’s arguments to the contrary, which seek to isolate
bits of seemingly contradictory evidence or draw inferences contrary to the
court’s findings. The court was permitted to believe portions of the witnesses’
statements or testimony and disregard contrary portions or other
inconsistent evidence. For example, Meneses argues the evidence is
insufficient as to M.R. because M.R. told deputies that he “wasn’t getting
mad at me” or he did not “exactly” threaten her. When one deputy asked
M.R. if Meneses threatened to “kill you guys,” she said, “Well, not me exactly
but them,” then clarified, “My whole family. Everybody.” The court was
entitled to disregard M.R.’s other statements to law enforcement
downplaying Meneses’s conduct and her later trial testimony that Meneses
never specifically threatened her that night.
      We also reject Meneses argument that K.R. told deputies that he did
not “say anything” to her or say he was going to hurt her on the night of the
incident. At the referenced part of K.R.’s statement, a deputy asks K.R., “So,
tonight he didn’t specifically say anything to you? He was going to hurt you?”
She responded, “No because I was hiding in my room.” The court was
entitled to infer that K.R. was talking about events after Meneses had made
his initial threat, leading her to hide in fear.
      Meneses says no reasonable person would have been in fear given he
had “regularly” said he would burn down the house and kill the family or
himself, but “never hit or kicked any family member or made any attempt to
burn down the house in the past.” He argues S.R. did not fear Meneses
would commit arson because S.R. did not leave the house, supporting his
position about the state of the evidence. But the trial court was entitled to

                                        10
conclude under all of the circumstances that the fear experienced by M.R. and
K.R. was objectively reasonable, given Meneses’s prior acts of setting fires
and the unequivocal words he used on the night of the incident. We note
further that M.R. told a deputy that Meneses “hates all my family” and did
not think of them as family. She related there was a history of Meneses’s
aggressive behavior, saying they “know how he gets,” describing it as “very
aggressive” and saying, “He’s very violent.” All of these circumstances
support the court’s finding that their fear was objectively reasonable.
      Nor do we agree with Meneses’s assertion that the evidence did not
show any serious intention on Meneses’s part so as to communicate the
immediate prospect the threat would be carried out. He again argues his
statement did not cause any of the siblings to take precautions “such as
leaving the house or warning family members to leave . . . .” He argues his
threat was not the siblings’ “main concern” when speaking with Deputy
Garcia, who had to use “leading questions” to draw out M.R.’s feelings about
it. These arguments disregard M.R. and K.R.’s testimony about hiding or
locking themselves in their rooms, evidencing their fear. They also seek to
draw inferences from the evidence contrary to the court’s findings, which this
court will not do on our review for substantial evidence.
               III. Meneses’s Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress
A. Background
      Before trial, Meneses unsuccessfully moved under section 1538.5 to
suppress evidence of his actions after his arrest, contending that his initial
arrest and seizure lacked probable cause. The trial court considered
arguments on the motion after the People rested their case. In part, the
prosecutor pointed out that he had relied on case law pertaining to exigent
circumstances, “i.e., threats of violence, a situation that could turn sour in a

                                       11
moment’s notice, . . . and . . . situations where [there is] an immediate need to
detain or arrest someone to prevent violence . . . .” The prosecutor asserted
the People had met their burden to prove reasonable suspicion to detain
Meneses, and probable cause that a crime had been committed given M.R.
and K.R.’s sustained fear. He argued, “I think that [Deputy Garcia] had all
the information that he had at that time to discuss with his partners and the
sergeant to make the determination that an immediate detention needed to
occur for the safety of everyone in the house. Again, they don’t know if there
was fire-starting abilities behind that wall. They had no idea because they
weren’t up there.”
      In his argument, Meneses’s counsel pointed to Deputy Garcia’s
assertions that there was no crime and suggested the officer had goaded the
witnesses into making their statements about Meneses’s threat from them by
asking leading questions and improperly interviewing them at the same time.
He also argued there were no specific articulable facts in Meneses’s threat to
generate probable cause: “Perhaps if [ ] Meneses said I’m going to burn the
house down where is my lighter, where is my lighter, that may have been
enough. If he had a lighter in his hand, I’m going to burn the house down,
that might have been a fire. Where is the firewood? Where is the firewood?
Where is gas? I got gas in my house. I’m going to burn this place down.”
According to counsel, just saying, “I’m going to burn the house down” by itself
was not enough evidence for the police to enter the house, detain and arrest
Meneses. Defense counsel argued the law enforcement officers’ presence
created the exigency, with Meneses becoming upset after seeing their
presence and their guns, and seeing they were refusing to allow him to leave
without handcuffing him.

                                       12
      The trial court denied the motion: “[I]t does appear as though the
police officers were lawfully on the premises. They were invited to the
premises and invited inside the home by family members. Officers were met
at the door with a statement from one of the family members indicating that
their brother threatened to kill them and burn the house down. [¶] We have
police officers conducting an investigation/operation trying to calm
everything down during the course of their investigation/operation. It
appears as though Mr. Meneses was obstructing their investigation by
refusing reasonable requests and making threats to kill the police officers
along the way. I do think that the People have met their burden of
establishing probable cause.”
B. Applicable Law
      When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, the Fourth
Amendment requires that “it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by
probable cause.” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) “Probable cause
is shown ‘when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade
someone of “reasonable caution” that the person to be arrested has committed
a crime.’ ” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 57.) “ ‘To determine
whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine
the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to” probable cause.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th
195, 237.) “An arrest remains lawful under the Fourth Amendment even
when the ‘criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest’ is
different from the ‘offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of
arrest.’ ” (Id. at pp. 237-238.)

                                       13
      Where the underlying facts are undisputed, this court independently
reviews whether the facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. (People v.
Zaragoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 57.) “ ‘[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.’
[Citation.] It is incapable of precise definition. [Citation.] ‘ “The substance
of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt,” ’ and that belief must be ‘particularized with respect to the person to
be . . . seized.’ ” (People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673; see also Kaley v.
United States (2014) 571 U.S. 320, 338 [“Probable cause, we have often told
litigants, is not a high bar: It requires only the ‘kind of “fair probability” on
which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act” ’ ”].)
      “A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or
intangible thing obtained as a result of a . . . seizure” if the seizure “without a
warrant was unreasonable.” (§ 1538.5.) When a defendant makes such a
motion, the People have “the burden of proving that the warrantless
. . . seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130; see also People v. Vannesse (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
440, 444-445.) But the defendant “ ‘must inform the prosecution and the
court of the specific basis for their motion.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 235; see also People v. Oldham (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1, 11-13, 15.)
      On appeal, “ ‘we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or
implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We
exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts
presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 232; see
also People v. Vannesse, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.) “ ‘ “[T]he power to

                                         14
judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony,
weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court.”
[Citation.] Consequently, if an inference is permissible under the evidence
and it upholds the trial court’s decision, we must presume that the trial court
drew it. Thus, we must “view the facts upon which the suppression motions
were submitted in the light most favorable to the People, drawing therefrom
all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order denying the
motions.” ’ ” (Vannesse, at p. 445.)
C. Analysis
      Meneses contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the statements he made during his assertedly illegal detention and
arrest. In making this argument, he incorporates by reference arguments he
makes as to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to his assault and
interference with an officer charges. He argues the court’s erroneous ruling
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus we must reverse his
convictions of assault and attempting to deter or prevent officers from
performing their duties.
      Meneses recounts the evidence of his conduct toward the officers and
eventual arrest in detail. But he acknowledges critical facts: that in response
to K.R.’s 911 call, deputies contacted K.R. and others upon arrival, and
Deputy Garcia was told Meneses had threatened to light the house on fire,
causing him to believe a crime had been committed. In her 911 call, K.R.
reported Meneses, who she thought had a pocketknife on him, was “getting

                                       15
really aggressive,” trying to fight her brother and threatening her mother.5
The trial court had heard the People’s evidence, including Deputy Garcia’s
testimony, before considering arguments on Meneses’s motion and found
deputies were lawfully present, obtained information that Meneses had
threatened to kill family members and burn the house down, and found the
existence of probable cause. The trial testimony and transcripts of the
recorded body camera footage recounted above support the court’s findings.
And the court, the sole judge of credibility, credited Deputy Garcia’s
testimony that he gathered this information and made his probable cause
determination early on while the deputies were still engaged in a verbal
confrontation with Meneses, before deputies formulated their plan to reach
him on the upstairs landing. (See footnote 3, ante.)
      On appeal, Meneses argues both that he was illegally detained at the
top of the stairs, and also unlawfully arrested. But Meneses did not base his
section 1538.5 motion on a theory of illegal detention, so the prosecutor had
no reason to adduce testimony on this point and the court had no reason to
focus its analysis on evidence supporting that theory. This entitles us to
disregard the illegal detention claim. (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 235; People v. Oldham, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) But
even assuming officers detained Meneses, it would be “reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment [if] the detaining officer can point to specific articulable
facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide
some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in

5     Though a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively
unreasonable, the presumption may be overcome by showing a need to
protect life or avoid serious injury to persons inside the home. (People v.
Rodgers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156; People v. Ormonde (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 282, 291.)
                                       16
criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Flores
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 627.) “The officer’s . . . suspicion must be
objectively reasonable, and ‘a[ ] . . . detention predicated on mere curiosity,
rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in
complete good faith. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] But where a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightfully expects a police
officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of the
officer’s duties.” ’ ” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) Under the
“ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” (ibid.), we conclude Meneses’s detention was
not unlawful given the specific information provided to the officers at the
door about his threat as well as Meneses’s agitated and hostile state, his
access to weapons, and the presence of other family members upstairs with
whom he had been reportedly fighting.
      Regarding his claim of unlawful arrest, Meneses’ arguments again seek
to draw conclusions or inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court in
denying his suppression motion. He makes an argument similar to one we
have in substance already rejected, namely, that the fact family members did
not leave the house demonstrated they were not in fear or consider his threat
serious. He argues deputies “knew or should have known that no one
believed [he] was going to burn down the house down or [they] would have
left.” He argues that upon the deputies’ arrival, they did not ask him about
any alleged threats, and he had assured them the incident was over. He also
points out he explained why he was scared of them (a prior incident with
police in which he was assertedly injured), explaining his actions, and that
deputies should have concluded there was no reasonable suspicion to detain
him or probable cause to arrest him. But the court was entitled to consider
evidence from the deputies of Meneses’s aggressive behavior, the fact he was

                                        17
wielding a long sharpened stick or pocketknife, and the evidence from M.R.,
K.R. and S.R. relating Meneses’s threats and actions before the incident. The
argument disregards Deputy Garcia’s specific testimony that he determined
through Meneses’s family members that before Meneses’s arrest, there
existed probable cause that Meneses had made a criminal threat, which the
court credited in denying the suppression motion. We hold the information
obtained from the siblings would “likely persuade an objectively reasonable
police officer that [Meneses had made a criminal threat].” (People v. Silveria
and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 238.)
      Meneses also points to Deputy Garcia’s statements to the siblings that
he did not see a crime (see footnote 4, ante). The transcript shows that the
deputy made these statements before K.R. related Meneses’s threat to burn
down the house. And again, the argument ignores Deputy Garcia’s trial
testimony that after hearing of Meneses’s arson threat he determined before
arresting Meneses that a crime had been committed. The court credited that
testimony, and we will not disturb its credibility determination.
      Meneses refers to trial testimony of the supervising sergeant on the
scene who agreed with defense counsel’s question that when deputies finally
accosted Meneses and removed him from the house there was no probable
cause for an arrest. He misconstrues and isolates her testimony. The
sergeant later clarified that when Meneses was detained “[a]t that point in
time” there was not probable cause “that I was aware of, no.” (Italics added.)
The court was entitled to either reject the sergeant’s testimony in favor of
Deputy Garcia’s, or interpret it as indicating the sergeant herself was then
not specifically aware of the same facts as Deputy Garcia had obtained from
other family members. The sergeant confirmed deputies talked to family
members before her arrival, then conducted more “in-depth” interviews later.

                                      18
Meneses misconstrues her statement when he says she testified that after he
was removed, “deputies decided to interview witnesses to determine if
probable cause existed to arrest [him].”
        IV. Sufficiency of Evidence of Section 69 and Assault Offenses
      Meneses contends there is insufficient evidence to support his assault
convictions against the deputies, as well as his convictions of attempting to
deter or prevent officers from performing their duties. He first maintains the
deputies acted unlawfully in detaining him “after they should have known
that he did not and would not commit a crime.” He further contends the
deputies had no probable cause to arrest him and thus were not acting
lawfully when he allegedly assaulted them. Meneses argues he never
attempted to deter the deputies’ lawful conduct, which is a separate reason to
reverse these convictions.
      Section 69, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who attempts, by
means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from
performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law, or who knowingly
resists, by the use of force or violence, the officer, in the performance of his or
her duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
($10,000), or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or
in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.”
      There are two ways of violating section 69. “ ‘The first way of violating
section 69 “encompasses attempts to deter either an officer’s immediate
performance of a duty imposed by law or the officer’s performance of such a
duty at some time in the future.” [Citation.] The actual use of force or
violence is not required. [Citation.] Further, “the statutory language [of the
first clause of section 69] does not require that the officer be engaged in the

                                        19
performance of his or her duties at the time the threat is made . . . .” ’ ”
(People v. Kruse (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1046, quoting People v. Smith
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 241.) The second is where a defendant resists an
officer “ ‘ “by the use of force or violence,” and it further requires that the
officer was acting lawfully at the time of the offense.’ ” (Kruse, at p. 1046; see
also In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815 [describing it as
“longstanding rule” that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense
against a peace officer unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time the
offense against the officer was committed].) “ ‘The rule flows from the
premise that because an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is
not engaged in ‘duties,’ for purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the
officer’s conduct is unlawful . . . . [¶] . . . [T]he lawfulness of the victim’s
conduct forms part of the corpus delicti of the offense.’ ” (In re Manuel G., at
p. 815.)
      Having concluded the officers did not unlawfully detain or arrest
Meneses, we are left with Meneses’s argument that there is no evidence he
attempted to deter their lawful conduct. He repeats and incorporates his
prior argument that “no rational trier of fact could have found that [his]
detention was legal after nine minutes 47 seconds because the deputies had
or should have had all the information necessary to determine that he had
not committed a crime and would not commit a crime.” He points out he had
not verbally or physically threatened any deputy, was “conversing with the
deputies and answering their questions,” and he was “only threatening to
resist a future unlawful seizure” which did not violate section 69.
      We cannot agree with Meneses’s characterization of the record, which
shows he made threats to deputies who were attempting to calm the situation
and convince him to come down the stairs to them. These threats included

                                         20
Meneses’s statements that there would be “problems” if deputies came
upstairs, or that if they did they were “gonna fucking fight or kill each other,”
or that he would “fucking end you . . . .” These are the sort of remarks plainly
intended to stop the officers from approaching him to either detain or arrest
him, or come upstairs to check on the safety of other occupants.
      Meneses finally contends there was no evidence to prove he violated
section 69 as to one of the officers—Deputy Jardinas—because there is no
evidence showing that officer was present and could hear him when he was at
the top of the stairs or when deputies apprehended him. He points out the
People dismissed the assault charge as to Deputy Jardinas (count 4) and
maintains the sole evidence related to Deputy Jardinas’s interview of M.R.
and their mother after his arrest. Meneses argues that nothing shows the
deputy was subject to any of his resistance. The People respond that as one
of the officers there to assess the situation, Deputy Jardinas was the subject
of Meneses’s threats.
      A section 69 conviction may be committed by a “ ‘threat,
unaccompanied by any physical force’ ” but “to ‘avoid the risk of punishing
protected First Amendment speech . . . the term “threat” has been limited to
mean a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer.’ ”
(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 195.) “[A] violation of section 69
through a threat ‘requires a specific intent to interfere with the executive
officer’s performance of his duties.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] present ability to carry
out threats is not required if . . . the target of the threat could reasonably fear
retaliatory action on some future occasion.’ ” (Ibid.) The “ ‘threats must be
placed and understood in their context.’ ” (Id. at p. 196.)
      Here, there is no dispute Deputy Jardinas was present that night, as he
interviewed M.R. and their mother. S.R. testified at trial that while police

                                        21
were at the bottom of the stairs, he heard Meneses say that if they came he
would “fuck them up.” And Deputy Garcia testified that he interpreted
Meneses’s comments to mean “[t]hat if myself or my partners went upstairs

that he would hurt us.” (Italics added.)6 Under the circumstances, the trial
court could reasonably infer that Meneses’s threats of future violence if the
deputies came up the stairs were specifically intended to deter or interfere
with officers coming up to arrest him or ensure the safety of the other
occupants. The court could also reasonably conclude that Meneses would
understand that such threats would be communicated to other officers at the
scene. It was enough that all of the officers present were the target of
Meneses’s threats, which were the type of statements intended to deter
performance of their duties.
      Meneses cites no authority that a threat must be made directly to the
face of the target, or that the target must somehow confirm he or she heard
it, if there is otherwise evidence that the threat was directed at and intended
to deter executive officers from performing duties. In reply, he cites People v.
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863 for the proposition that a “defendant must
intend that the threat be communicated to the target of the threat, which
may be done through a third party.” But in Hamilton, the court found a
threatening letter sufficient to support a finding that a defendant violated
section 69 where the defendant placed the letter directed to prosecutors with
a deputy sheriff, knowing it would eventually be delivered to the prosecutor’s
office. (Id. at p. 936.) The court emphasized that the statute did not require

6     Significantly, M.R. told Deputy Jardinas during her interview that
before police arrived, Meneses said he would “kill the cops [¶] . . . [¶] if they
came.” K.R. likewise heard Meneses say he was going to kill police. The
court could reasonably conclude that such a threat was communicated in
some manner to responding officers.
                                        22
the prosecutors feel threatened, or that the defendant have the present
ability to carry out the threats. (Ibid.) Rather “[e]vidence that the letter
contained the threats was sufficient to support a finding that defendant
violated section 69.” (Ibid.) So too here, evidence that Meneses directed
threats at officers who were collectively attempting to perform legal duties
was enough to support the section 69 convictions, including as to Deputy
Jardinas.
      Meneses also cites People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, but that
case does not assist him. There, the court held substantial evidence
supported a section 69 conviction where the defendant sent an e-mail to an
office of the Department of Defense in part complaining about California’s
Department of Fish and Game unlawfully shooting at mountain lions and
stating, “I am armed and will now fire on all Sheriff and Fish & Game after
this e[-]mail so either shut them down or put some boots on the ground to join
the battle . . . .” (Id. at p. 958.) Observing the offense required specific intent
to interfere with an executive officer’s performance of duties (id. at p. 967),
the court found the e-mail “convincingly demonstrates an intent to deter
officials from patrolling or otherwise performing duties in the Indian Valley
Open Space Preserve by threatening to ‘fire on’ them if they appeared there.
Attempts to deter either an officer’s immediate performance of a duty or the
performance of such a duty at some time in the future constitute a violation
of the statute.” (Ibid.) The court continued: “That the e-mail was not
separately or directly sent to the intended victims fails to negate proof of
either an attempt to deter or prevent an officer from performing a duty or the
requisite specific intent to interfere with the executive officer’s performance
of duties. The statute does not require that a threat be personally
communicated to the victim by the person who makes the threat.” (Id. at pp.

                                        23
967-968, italics added.) Nishi confirms that Meneses’s threats were not
required to be made directly to Deputy Jardinas, as long as it is reasonable to
infer they were intended to deter the performance of his and other deputies’
duties and that Meneses expected or should have known they would be
communicated to the officers at the scene.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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