Court Opinion

ID: 9478444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:49:02.204197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:25.818302
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in all but section C of the majority opinion. I write separately because I believe that the record demonstrates that Doe suffered no prejudice. We need not, therefore, remand this case to the district *783court. Doe’s conviction should be affirmed.
The majority suggests that the record contains insufficient information to decide whether the government’s statutory violations prejudiced Doe. Maj. op. at 781. It is suggested that the government’s failure to notify Doe’s parents or consulate of his custody, and its delay in forwarding him to the prosecution unit, may have caused his post-arrest confessions and his prosecution itself. I believe that the record indicates otherwise.
After his arrest, Doe confessed details of the illegal immigration scheme, including his role as driver, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Before trial, however, the government agreed not to use these post-arrest statements during its case-in-chief. It was Doe’s counsel who, during cross-examination of an INS agent, elicited damaging testimony describing Doe’s post-arrest confession. Doe’s counsel failed to interrupt or limit this damaging testimony, although he did unsuccessfully move afterwards to strike the testimony. Doe cannot raise on appeal the possible prejudicial effect at trial of an alleged error which he himself invited or introduced. United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1234 (9th Cir.1985); Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 834 (9th Cir.1984); Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428, 431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970, 90 S.Ct. 454, 24 L.Ed.2d 436 (1969).
The majority suggests that prejudice may be shown if Doe’s prosecution resulted from these post-arrest statements, and if these statements themselves resulted from the government’s statutory violations. Maj. op. at 781. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988), suggests otherwise. Bank of Nova Scotia involved statutory, nonconstitutional error at the grand jury phase of criminal proceedings. Applying harmless error analysis, the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the charges against the defendants. Nonconstitutional error requires dismissing charges only “ ‘if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict,’ or if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” Id. at 2374, quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78, 106 S.Ct. 938, 945, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Here we are similarly faced with the effect of a nonconstitutional statutory violation on the decision to charge and prosecute. We must therefore consider whether Doe’s post-arrest statements substantially influenced the decision to charge and prosecute Doe, or whether we have grave doubts that this decision was free from the substantial influence of Doe’s statements. Neither of these tests is met in this case. The government expressly stipulated that it would not use these statements at trial. It would not have pursued Doe’s prosecution without believing that there was a good chance of obtaining a conviction without that evidence. Doe’s post-arrest statements, therefore, could not have substantially influenced the decision to charge and prosecute. For the same reasons, I have no grave doubts that the decision to charge and prosecute Doe was free from the substantial influence of the government’s statutory violations.
To the extent that Judge Tang’s concurrence, by labeling the statutory violations here “so egregious,” suggests that the government’s failures under section 5033 also violate Doe’s constitutional right to due process, I cannot agree. Concurrence at 782; maj. op. at 779. As the majority opinion properly states, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was enacted to protect the due process rights of juveniles, but it is not coextensive with constitutional guarantees. Maj. op. at 782; United States v. Doe, 701 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1983) (Doe); United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (White Bear). This and other circuits have rejected a per se reversal rule for technical violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act. Doe, 701 F.2d at 822-23; United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 7-8 (10th Cir.1975); see also White Bear, 668 F.2d at 412. A court must examine whether a technical violation *784did in fact infringe on the juvenile’s due process rights. Doe, 701 F.2d at 822-23. We have stated that there is no denial of due process where “the arresting officer’s failure to notify has no adverse effect on the fundamental fairness of the proceedings and where the purpose of the [Juvenile Delinquency] Act’s notification provision, to guard the juvenile’s due process rights, has been met.” Id. at 822. The government’s agreement not to use Doe’s post-arrest statements ensured the fundamental fairness of Doe’s trial and fulfilled the purpose of guarding his due process rights. Because there was no constitutional violation, I cannot agree with Judge Tang that dismissal of the charges would be appropriate in this case. Concurrence at 782.