Court Opinion

ID: 9703979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:16:03.492828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:53.895870
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
FITZGERALD, J.:
¶ 1 I must respectfully depart from the majority’s thoughtful analysis. Primarily, I depart in the analysis of whether jury deliberations constitute a “critical stage,” and counsel’s right to be present during playback of testimony. I believe our courts have generally accepted that jury deliberations constitute a critical stage. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 884 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa.Super.2005) (‘We do not disagree with Appellant that jury deliberations have been viewed as critical stages to which the right to counsel attaches”) (citing Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 517, 856 A.2d 806, 822 (2004)). As such, I would find that Appellant did have the right to counsel during the deliberations, although, I note, Appellant was actually represented by counsel.
¶ 2 Nonetheless, I emphasize that the right to counsel when the jury makes a request should not be taken lightly, particularly when the jury wishes to review testimony again. Counsel must be present in order to ensure that “the resulting review[ ] ‘does not place undue emphasis on one witness’ testimony.’ ” Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 438, 741 A.2d 666, 674 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Peterman, 430 Pa. 627, 631, 244 A.2d 723, 726 (1968)). Normally, this purpose is achieved when, upon the trial court’s granting a request for the court reporter to read back a portion of the transcript, such request is fulfilled in open court with both parties present. As the Peterman Court stated:
But where a jury, in order to refresh their recollection, requests a reading of a portion of the testimony actually given at the trial, it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant such request. If the trial court does grant the request, the review of *1288testimony must be conducted in open court in the presence of parties and their counsel.... [I]f, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, a review of testimony is allowed, such review must be conducted before the court, the parties and counsel.
Peterman, 430 Pa. at 631-32, 244 A.2d at 726 (emphasis added). Counsel’s presence is required in order to ensure, inter alia, that the reading is accurate, and that the court reporter does not emphasize any particular portion of the transcript. See id. at 633-34, 244 A.2d at 727 (noting concern that trial court, upon summarizing its notes of requested testimony, placed undue, even if unintentional, emphasis on certain aspects of testimony).
¶ 3 Once the trial court sent the audiotape into the jury deliberation room, without the presence of the judge, Appellant, and counsel, the audiotape became an exhibit for the jury to deliberate over. There is no doubt that the trial court intended this result, since the trial court stated, “We have now determined that the original tape and a technician will be provided to them in the jury deliberation room so that they can deliberate while listening to the tape privately.” N.T., 10/11/03, at 122 (emphasis added). However, this result is exactly what the Peter-man Court sought to avoid when stating that “the review of testimony must be conducted in open court in the presence of parties and their counsel.” Peterman, 430 Pa. at 632, 244 A.2d at 726. Accordingly, by sending the audiotape to the jury as an exhibit, the trial court improperly denied Appellant his right, pursuant to Peterman, to be present during playback of testimony.
¶ 4 As the learned majority notes, audiotape playback of testimony lessens the concern over potential inaccuracies or unnecessary emphasis. Nonetheless, they do not eliminate those concerns completely. Recording of certain portions of testimony may be garbled or difficult to hear, or temporary failure in the recording may cause the loss of some of the testimony on playback. Moreover, just as counsel should be present to ensure that “undue emphasis” is not placed on a witness’s testimony by the court or court reporter, I conclude that counsel must also be present to ensure that the audio operator, whether intentional or unintentional, does not emphasize any particular portion of the testimony.11 Thus, while I agree with the majority that Appellant does not necessarily have a right to have counsel present in the jury room during jury deliberations, he does have a right to be present, and to have counsel present, during a recitation of testimony to the jury, whether in written or audio form. See Peterman, supra. Accordingly, I would conclude that if trial counsel had objected properly to the playback of the audiotape in the deliberation room, the trial court would have erred if it denied that objection.
¶ 5 Therefore, the final step is to determine whether this error was prejudicial. I agree with the majority that we should interpret Commonwealth v. Karaffa, 551 Pa. 173, 709 A.2d 887 (1998), to necessitate a finding of prejudice per se if there is a violation of any part of Rule 646. See id. at 178-79, 709 A.2d at 890 (holding that sending written jury instructions to jury during deliberations is “intrinsically prejudicial”); see also Pa.RA.P. 646(B)(4). I also agree with the majority that the language of Rule 646 does not expressly forbid sending back an audiotape to the jury. Nonetheless, I believe Karaffa and Commonwealth v. Oleynik, 524 Pa. 41, 568 *1289A.2d 1238 (1990), necessitate a finding of prejudice per se in the instant matter. Our Supreme Court in Oleynik stated:
The cautionary statement made by the trial judge regarding the weight to be afforded the written instructions was wholly inadequate to cure any possible prejudice. The likelihood that a jury would assess undue weight to the points of law in written instructions and possibly misinterpret or misapply that law offered in a written statement was the basis for insisting on oral instructions .... Where a jury is permitted to take with them written instructions during their deliberations, a question may arise as to the appropriate application of the written instruction when resolving an issue in the cause.
Oleynik, 524 Pa. at 46, 568 A.2d at 1241. Similarly, the Peterman Court was concerned about the likelihood that the jury would assess undue weight to particular portions of testimony if recitation of the testimony is not conducted in open court in the presence of the trial judge and the parties. Accordingly, I would conclude that by virtue of sending the audiotape to the jury deliberation room for the jury to listen to alone, Appellant was “intrinsically prejudiced.” See Karaffa, supra; see also Oleynik, supra; Peterman, supra.
¶ 6 Finally, the learned majority cites to Commonwealth v. Bango, 560 Pa. 84, 454 Pa.Super. 339, 742 A.2d 1070 (1999), in support of their analysis. I agree fully that the trial court enjoys great discretion in determining whether it will allow the jury to review recordings or transcripts introduced as exhibits at trial. I emphasize, however, that the tapes and transcripts at issue in Bango involved conversations that occurred outside of the trial. See id. at 86-87, 742 A.2d at 1071-72 (noting that the tapes and transcripts involved wiretaps recording conversations between the appellant and seventeen other people during the course of drug transactions). Thus, this aspect of the Bango decision holds no legal weight over instances where the jury wishes to review recordings or transcripts of actual testimony or statements made during the trial. See Peterman, supra (expressing concern about jury’s review of witness testimony); Ka-raffa, supra (expressing concern about jury’s review of trial court’s jury instructions in written form); Oleynik, supra (same as Karajfa). Moreover, the Bango Court emphasized that the trial court’s cautionary instructions to the jury showed its decision to allow the jury to review the transcripts was not only reasonable, but perhaps even necessary, given the confusion regarding which of the seventeen or eighteen voices it heard at a given time. Bango, supra at 89-90, 742 A.2d at 1073. No such potential for confusion existed instantly; therefore, I believe Bango is inapposite.
¶ 7 In conclusion, I find that prejudicial error occurs when the jury is in possession of any recorded testimony in the deliberation room. I would find that there is no reasonable basis for trial counsel to have failed to object to the trial court’s action. Accordingly, I would find trial counsel ineffective and reverse the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant relief on his petition.

. For example, the audio operator should not repeatedly play back a specific portion of the testimony, even upon request by the jury.