Court Opinion

ID: 9589954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:29.299442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:54.721753
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
concurring in the result.
I disagree with the majority’s position that a silent complaint may afford plaintiff the benefit of a discovery rule such as N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16). In my view, a complaint which indicates two specific acts occurring outside the statute of limitations, such as the complaint at hand which alleges that the acts causing severe emotional distress took place in June 1989 and on 8 September 1992, must further set forth in the pleadings facts sufficient to show when the “bodily harm to the claimant . . . [became] or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant.” N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16). Since the discovery rule of N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) provides that the cause of action will not accrue until this time, the complaint should indicate the time the injury occurred or reasonably manifested itself to plaintiff.
Nevertheless, I concur with the result reached by the majority because the complaint in the subject case, taken as a whole, makes sufficient allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge that the statute of limitations has run. The complaint outlines the specific acts causing injury and then further alleges that plaintiff was unaware of these acts prior to 2 November 1994. It is inconceivable that plaintiffs emotional distress would arise before plaintiff became aware of Dr. Adams’ alleged injurious acts. Thus, the face of the complaint shows that plaintiff’s injury must have occurred after 2 November 1994 and within the applicable three year statute of limitations. Accordingly, I believe the trial court’s dismissal of the action was inappropriate not because the necessary facts are missing from defendant’s statute of limitations plea, but rather because the plaintiff’s complaint, on its face, is sufficient to show that the statute of limitations is not a bar.