Court Opinion

ID: 9786556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:57:54.774534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.398569
License: Public Domain

*507DEITS, C. J.
SAIF Corporation (SAIF) and P & A Metal Fab, Inc., seek judicial review of a Workers’ Compensation Board (board) order that awarded claimant attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) for prevailing over a noncooperation denial— that is, a denial pursuant to former ORS 656.262(15) (2001), renumbered as ORS 656.262(14) (2003).1 On review, SAIF asserts that claimant was not entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) and that, even if claimant is entitled to fees, the board’s explanation for its $1,200 award is inadequate for judicial review. We review claimant’s entitlement to attorney fees for errors of law and the board’s award of fees for abuse of discretion, ORS 656.298(7); ORS 183.482(8), and affirm.
In November 2000, claimant apparently injured his back at work and filed a workers’ compensation claim. Thereafter, SAIF, claimant’s employer’s insurer, requested that the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services suspend claimant’s compensation because he had not scheduled an interview with SAIF. On January 2, 2001, the director issued a notice of suspension, and, on January 12, the director issued the order suspending claimant’s compensation pursuant to ORS 656.262(15). Thereafter, in January, claimant requested a hearing. On February 1, before the expiration of the 30-day time period provided for in ORS 656.262(15), SAIF denied claimant’s claim. Its letter to claimant stated, in part:
‘You failed to cooperate with our investigation of your claim. Pursuant to ORS 656.262(15), OAR 436-060-0135 *508and the January 12, 2001 Order suspending compensation, we deny your claim. This is not a denial on the merits.”2
(Emphasis added.)
The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the order suspending claimant’s compensation but set aside the denial because it was premature under ORS 656.262(15). As noted above, that statute provides that, “[i]f the worker does not cooperate for an additional 30 days after the notice, the insurer or self-insured employer may deny the claim because of the worker’s failure to cooperate.” Here, the insurer issued its denial too soon. The ALJ also reasoned that claimant was entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1), but set the amount of the award at zero. On appeal to the board, the only issues concerned attorney fees. In its October 5, 2001, order, the board concluded that claimant was entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) and set the amount of the award at $500.
Claimant requested reconsideration, arguing that the amount of the award should be increased to “at least $1,500.”3 In his letter to the board, claimant’s attorney asserted that (1) generally, the minimum fee for prevailing over a denial is $2,500; (2) “[t]he amount of work trying this denial was essentially the amount of work that goes into any *509denial”; (3) this case was unique and fairly complex and “required a strong grasp of workers [’] compensation law”; (4) he and claimant’s trial counsel were experienced; (5) he and trial counsel had prehearing discussions concerning the case; and (6) “[i]t is now impossible to do the amount of work that we did on this case with the level of expertise provided, accept such a fee, and hope to keep the doors open.” The record does not contain a statement of services from claimant’s attorney that indicates the number of hours spent working on the case and the hourly rate of the attorneys involved.
In its response to the board, SAIF asserted that, even though it was not conceding that claimant was entitled to attorney fees, the $500 award was reasonable. SAIF argued that the $500 award was reasonable, because claimant’s attorney “present [ed] no evidence regarding the time spent only on the denial issue.” Citing to various portions of the administrative record, SAIF contends that it is unlikely that claimant’s attorney spent any time on the denial issue and that, because the ALJ applied the law on his own to determine that the denial was premature and claimant’s attorney did not raise the premature denial issue, the fee should be minimal. Finally, in its response, SAIF indicated that the issue on which claimant prevailed was not complex and that, based on the other factors that the board must consider, there should be no increase in the $500 award.
In its order on reconsideration, the board said, “[A]s modified herein, we adhere to and republish the Board’s October 5, 2001 [,] order.” In the order on reconsideration, the board also awarded claimant $1,200 in attorney fees. The board explained its reasons for the award:
“On reconsideration, based on the following reasoning, we find that $1,200 is a reasonable attorney fee under the facts of this case. The ‘non-cooperation’ denial issue was of average complexity. Although claimant did not prevail over the Department’s suspension order, he did prevail over the ‘non-cooperation’ denial; therefore, he is entitled to a reasonable fee for prevailing over the denial. Furthermore, although the ALJ set aside SAIF’s ‘non-cooperation’ denial based on a theory not raised by claimant, claimant advocated that the ‘non-cooperation’ denial was void. By appealing the denial and advocating that it was void, claimant’s *510attorney’s efforts ultimately resulted in the denial being set aside.
“The nature of the proceeding, a hearing before an ALJ, is common under workers’ compensation law. The hearing record consisted of ten exhibits, two of which were submitted by claimant. The hearing transcript was 57 pages long, with three witnesses testifying — claimant and his mother testified on claimant’s behalf and SAIF’s claims adjuster testified on SAIF’s behalf. The value of the interest involved and the benefit secured is average.
“The attorneys on both sides are skilled. Based on SAIF’s challenge to the claim, there was a risk that the attorney’s efforts may go uncompensated. Finally, no frivolous issues or defenses were asserted.
“After considering these factors, we conclude that a reasonable fee for claimant’s attorney’s services at hearing regarding the ‘non-cooperation’ denial is $1,200, payable by SAIF. In reaching this conclusion, we have particularly considered the complexity of the issue, the value of the interest involved, and the risk that claimant’s counsel might go uncompensated.”
(Citations omitted.) SAIF did not file objections with the board concerning the amount of the fee awarded on reconsideration.
In its first assignment of error on review to this court, SAIF asserts that the board erred in concluding that claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) because a noncooperation denial is not a “denied claim” as that term is defined in ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). SAIF argues:
“A non-cooperation denial is not a ‘denial’ for purposes of ORS 656.386(1). A ‘denied claim’ within the meaning of ORS 656.386(1) is a claim for compensation that an insurer or self-insured employer ‘refuses to pay on the express ground that the injury or condition for which compensation is claimed is not compensable or otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation.’ A non-cooperation denial does not deny compensability or otherwise assert that the claimant is not entitled to compensation on his or her claim. Rather, it is a denial that the claimant has cooperated with the employer’s investigation of the claim. Under ORS 656.262(15), if a non-cooperation denial is set *511aside, then the claim is remanded to the insurer or self-insured employer ‘to accept or deny the claim.’ Accordingly, a non-cooperation denial is not the kind of denial contemplated by ORS 656.386(1).”
The pertinent statute here, ORS 656.386(1), provides, in relevant part:
“(a) In all cases involving denied claims where a claimant finally prevails against the denial in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney. In such cases involving denied claims where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge or in a review by the Workers’ Compensation Board, then the Administrative Law Judge or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. In such cases involving denied claims where an attorney is instrumental in obtaining a rescission of the denial prior to a decision by the Administrative Law Judge, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed.
“(b) For purposes of this section, a ‘denied claim’ is:
“(A) A claim for compensation which an insurer or self-insured employer refuses to pay on the express ground that the injury or condition for which compensation is claimed is not compensable or otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation [.]”
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, SAIF unquestionably denied claimant’s claim. As discussed above, SAIF issued its denial pursuant to ORS 656.262(15). ORS 656.262(15) provides that, when a claimant fails to cooperate for an additional 30 days after the notice of suspension, the insurer has two alternatives: it may deny the claim or it may allow the suspension of compensation to remain in effect. In this case, SAIF chose to deny the claim. As noted above, it expressly stated, “[W]e deny your claim.”
The critical question here is whether SAIF’s denial, which was based on claimant’s failure to cooperate, is a “denied claim” as that term has been defined in ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). The board concluded that it was and articulately explained:
*512“[AJlthough the ‘non-cooperation’ denial also stated that it was not a denial on the merits, that statement does not take it out of the realm of a ‘denied claim’ under ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). As quoted above, ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A) defines a ‘denied claim’ in terms of a carrier’s refusal to pay compensation on a claim either on the grounds that it is not compensable on the merits or on the grounds that it ‘otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation.’ SAIF’s ‘non-cooperation’ denial falls within the latter category. In other words, by issuing the ‘non-cooperation’ denial, SAIF was refusing to pay compensation on claimant’s back injury claim on the grounds that he failed to cooperate with its investigation of his claim.
“In addition, as quoted above, SAIF stated that it was denying claimant’s claim pursuant to ORS 656.262(15), which provides that if a worker does not cooperate for an additional 30 days after the Director’s notice, the carrier ‘may deny the claim because of the worker’s failure to cooperate.’ The statute also provides that, after issuance of a ‘non-cooperation’ denial, certain requirements must be met by the worker or the worker will not be granted a hearing on the merits of the claim and ‘the worker’s claim for injury shall remain denied.’ ORS 656.262(15). Thus, if the ‘noncooperation’ denial is not set aside', it becomes a final denial of claimant’s claim for injury.
“Given all of these factors, we find that SAIF’s ‘noncooperation’ denial represented a ‘denied claim’ under ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). Furthermore, because the ALJ found that the ‘non-cooperation’ denial was void (a decision that has not been contested on review) claimant finally prevailed against the denial at hearing. Therefore, claimant is entitled to a reasonable assessed attorney fee under ORS 656.386(1).”
(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
We agree with the board’s understanding of the statute. For the reasons that the board explained, SAIF’s action comes within the plain language of the definition of a denied claim in ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A).4 Further, because claimant succeeded in overturning this denial in a hearing before the *513ALJ, as the statute requires, claimant finally prevailed on a denied claim. Accordingly, under the statute, claimant is entitled to attorney fees.
The dissent understands the statute differently. It reasons that a noncooperation denial is not a denied claim within the definition in ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). We do not find the dissent’s reasoning persuasive. The principal reason that we find it unpersuasive is that it is inconsistent with the text of the definition of a “denied claim,” which includes “a claim for compensation which an insurer * * * refuses to pay on the express ground that the injury or condition for which compensation is claimed * * * otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation[.]” ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). According to the dissent, the definition of a “denied claim” includes “denials that are based on a lack of compensability and those denials that are based on a lack of entitlement to compensation.” 192 Or App at 528 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). The dissent reasons that denials based on lack of entitlement “include situations where the injury arguably occurs within the course and scope of employment but the claim is not compensable for other reasons.” Id. at 525 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). The dissent explains that “[a]n example of when a work-related injury or condition is not compensable for another reason is when it is not the major contributing cause of a consequential condition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), or when it is not the major contributing cause of a combined condition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).” Id. (Edmonds, J., dissenting). As another example, the dissent refers to denials based on a lack of responsibility under ORS 656.307 and ORS 656.308 for which “a worker may not be entitled to compensation from a particular employer even though the injury or condition is determined to be compensable.” Id. (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
As support for its position, the dissent points to the 1995 amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) and concludes that
“[t]he use of the word ‘otherwise’ in the amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) is illustrative of how the legislature used the word ‘otherwise’ in chapter 332 to create the structure of when an employer is responsible and when an *514employer is not responsible for a work-related injury or condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) is an example of that kind of structure. An employer is responsible for a combined work-related and preexisting condition only when the work-related injury or condition is the major contributing cause of the combined condition. Otherwise, an employer has no liability under such circumstances for what was initially a work-related injury or condition.”
Id. at 531-32 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). It follows, according to the dissent, that “[t]he version of ORS 656.386(1) applicable to this case tracks the above language added in 1995.” Id. at 533 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). In conclusion, the dissent states that “ [a] denial based on lack of cooperation cannot logically fall into either classification of a ‘denied claim’ for purposes of ORS 656.386(1) because a claimant does not finally prevail on the issue of compensability or on an issue giving rise to an entitlement to compensation when he or she overcomes a denial based on lack of cooperation.” Id. at 534 n 5 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
There are two problems with the dissent’s reasoning. First, as we understand the dissent’s position, it views ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the statute governing the compensability of a combined condition, as somehow limiting the entitlement to compensation for an “otherwise compensable injury.” However, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) governs the compensability of a combined condition. It does not function as a limit on the ability to obtain compensation for an “otherwise compensable injury.” Pursuant to ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), if an “otherwise compensable injury” is not the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the need for treatment of the combined condition, the combined condition is not compensable. In other words, the claim for a combined condition would be denied on the ground that the condition is not compensable and not on the ground that it otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation. That has been the longstanding understanding of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).5 The dissent’s reading of ORS *515656.005(7)(a)(B) and ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A) is a reading that is inconsistent with the long-standing interpretation of the statute governing the compensability of a combined condition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). For those reasons, we disagree that the 1995 amendments to other provisions in ORS chapter 656 require the dissent’s interpretation of ORS 656.386(1).
Second, and more fundamentally, even though the dissent has attempted to identify types of denials based on the ground that the injury or condition “otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation,” those examples may not necessarily be the only types of denials that are encompassed within the definition. As discussed above, the noncooperation denial at issue in this case clearly was not issued on the ground that the injury was not compensable but on the ground that the injury or condition “otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation.”
The dissent also argues that claimant is not entitled to attorney fees because he has not finally prevailed on the issue of compensability. Although SAIF does not cite Greenslitt v. City of Lake Oswego, 305 Or 530, 754 P2d 570 (1988), in its brief on review, the dissent relies on that decision in concluding that claimant is not entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1). In Greenslitt, the court held that, in order to be entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1), *516a claimant must finally prevail on the issue of compensation. In its analysis, the dissent treats Greenslitt as context — i.e., a prior judicial construction of the same or similar statutory language. The dissent reasons that, even though claimant was successful in having SAIF’s denial of claimant’s claim for compensation set aside, SAIF will now be required to process the claim, which does not necessarily mean that claimant will be awarded compensation. Accordingly, the dissent holds that claimant has not finally prevailed on the issue of compensability and, thus, is not entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1).
The dissent’s reliance on Greenslitt is misplaced. First, the issue presented in Greenslitt was different from the issue here. That case involved a question of jurisdiction to determine attorney fees between the circuit court and the board. Second, because the definition of a denied claim that is at issue in this case had not been enacted by the legislature, the court in Greenslitt did not interpret that definition.6 7The legislature significantly amended the language of ORS 656.386 after Greenslitt was decided. ORS 656.386(1) (1987), which was cited in Greenslitt, provided:
“In all cases involving accidental injuries where a claimant finally prevails in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney. In such rejected cases where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before the referee or in a review by the board itself, then the referee or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. In the event a dispute arises as to the amount allowed by the referee or board or appellate court, that amount shall be settled as provided for in ORS 656.388(2). Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.”
In 1995, the legislature substantially amended ORS 656.386. Or Laws 1995, ch 332, § 43. Significantly, the legislature deleted the language of the statute that was interpreted in Greenslitt.7 In particular, the legislature deleted *517the language that a claimant must finally prevail “from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Further, the legislature replaced the deleted language with new language, including the term “denied claim” and including a specific definition of a “denied claim.” As discussed above, that definition of a denied claim includes not only a denial on the ground that a condition or injury is not compensable but also a denial on the ground that the injury or condition “otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation.” ORS 656.386(1)(b)(A). SAIF’s noncooperation *518denial in this case was a denied claim under the new definition. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Greenslitt is no longer persuasive authority because the statutory language that the Supreme Court interpreted in that case did not include the new definition of a denied claim.8 The addition of the definition is significant because, under the plain language of the current statute, a claimant is entitled to attorney fees if he or she finally prevails at a hearing before an ALJ or review to the board against a denied claim as that term is specifically defined in the statute.
As the board explained, because the noncooperation denial was set aside by the ALJ and that decision was not challenged on appeal to the board, claimant finally prevailed against the noncooperation denial at hearing. The board concluded:
“As explained above, the ‘non-cooperation’ denial is a ‘denied claim’ under ORS 656.386(1); i.e., it is a ‘claim for compensation’ that SAIF refused to pay on the ground that it ‘otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation.’ In order to be entitled to an attorney fee under ORS 656.386(1), the statute requires that the claimant prevail against a ‘denied claim,’ as that term is defined in the statute. Here, claimant has done that.”
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the board did not err in awarding claimant attorney fees.
In its second assignment of error, SAIF asserts that, even if claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1), the board’s attorney fee award must be vacated because “[t]he Board’s explanation for its fee award of $1,200 is inadequate for judicial review under the standard set by the Supreme Courtf.]”9 Specifically, SAIF asserts:
*519“The Board cited the ‘time devoted to the case’ on the noncooperation denial issue as a factor in its award, and that factor was disputed. Claimant submitted no statement of services. Under these circumstances, it behooved the Board to make a finding regarding how many hours it thought claimant’s attorney expended on the non-cooperation denial issue. Absent such a finding, it is impossible to know what kind of hourly rate the Board considered reasonable or how the other factors it recited affected its fee award.”
In determining whether the board’s explanation is adequate for judicial review, it is helpful to compare Schoch v. Leupold & Stevens, 325 Or 112, 934 P2d 410 (1997), and SAIF v. Bacon, 160 Or App 596, 982 P2d 40 (1999). In Schoch, the board awarded the claimant attorney fees of $3,000. The claimant requested reconsideration and submitted an affidavit and a statement for services totaling $19,897.50. In its order on reconsideration, the board adhered to its original decision. We affirmed without opinion, and the Supreme Court reversed. In holding that the board’s explanation was inadequate for judicial review, the Supreme Court noted the specific documentation submitted by the claimant on reconsideration and the great discrepancy between the requested award and the board’s actual award.
On remand, claimant reduced the amount of the requested fee. The board offered a more detailed explanation, including a statement that it was not questioning claimant’s attorney’s representations about the amount of time expended in the case. Schoch v. Leupold & Stevens, 162 Or App 242, 247-48, 987 P2d 13 (1999). Ultimately, the board adhered to its $3,000 award. Claimant sought review in this court. In describing the reason that the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the board, we said that “[i] t was unclear to the court whether the Board had thought that the hourly rate was too high, whether it thought that the time spent on *520the case was excessive, or whether the Board had discounted claimant’s fee request because of the fees awarded in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 246-47. We concluded that the board’s more detailed explanation on remand was also inadequate for judicial review. Specifically, we noted the following inadequacy in the board’s explanation:
“The Board’s opinion on remand discusses, for example, the nature of the work claimant’s counsel performed before the Board and the complexity of the issues counsel addressed. The opinion does not go on to say, however, whether the hours claimant’s counsel worked were reasonable or unreasonable in light of the nature and complexity of the work he did. The intermediate step that is missing from the Board’s opinion is the reasoning that led it from the factors it considered to the amount of the attorney fee it awarded.”
Id. at 249. In other words, in Schoch, the inadequacy of the board’s explanation arose from the great discrepancy between the claimant’s specific documentation of her attorney’s services and the board’s actual award. To be sufficient for judicial review, the board had to explain the discrepancy.
In Bacon, the ALJ awarded claimant attorney fees of $2,000. Although the claimant had not submitted a statement of services, the ALJ relied on the record and the nature of the issues to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. Neither party requested reconsideration. The claimant did not submit “evidence to show that the ALJ’s award did not reflect the hours his attorney had in fact worked or the value of his attorney’s services.” Bacon, 160 Or App at 598. SAIF “did not submit any affidavits or other evidence on reconsideration to show that the fee the ALJ had awarded was too high.” Id. SAIF then appealed to the board and challenged the AU’s fee award. SAIF argued that the claimant’s attorney had submitted no evidence concerning the amount of time spent that would justify the award, the fee was excessive because there was no explanation of how the ALJ determined the amount of the award, and the claimant should be required to submit a statement of services. Ultimately, the board affirmed the ALJ’s $2,000 award.
*521In Bacon, in affirming the board, we explained:
“Before turning to the issue SAIF raises on review, we note what is not at issue in this case. SAIF does not argue on review that the Board had no basis for awarding claim - ant attorney fees because claimant had not submitted a statement of services to either the ALJ or the Board. Rather, SAIF’s argument assumes that the ALJ or the Board legitimately may infer the amount of time that the attorney reasonably expended on the case and the reasonable value of his or her services from the extent of the proceedings and the nature of the issues litigated before the agency. SAIF also has not argued on review that the fees the ALJ and the Board awarded in this case are unreasonable. Finally, SAIF did not submit any documentation to either the ALJ or the Board to show that those fees were too high. Accordingly, the issue on review is not whether the Board’s order was sufficient to resolve a specific objection to the agency’s fee award. Compare Schoch, 325 Or at 118-20 (addressing that issue). Rather, the issue, as SAIF frames it in its brief, is whether the Board’s explanation is sufficient in the absence of any specific objection to the fee award.
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“The reasoning in Schoch makes clear that its holding is driven in large part by the need for meaningful appellate review. When, however, neither the claimant nor the employer objects to the reasonableness of the fee award, the need to ensure meaningful appellate review is absent. See McCarthy [v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc.], 327 Or [185, 189, 957 P2d 1200 (1998)]. Although general administrative law principles still require the Board to explain the basis for its fee award, the need for specificity diminishes in the absence of any substantive objection to the fee award itself. Moreover, when, as in this case, neither the claimant nor the employer submits any evidence of either the hours that were reasonably expended or the value of an attorney’s services, we cannot say that the agency erred in not going into greater detail than it did here. We emphasize that if SAIF or claimant had submitted specific evidence challenging either the ALJ’s or the Board’s fee award, as the claimant did in Schoch, the Board’s explanation would have to comply with the standard in Schoch.”
Bacon, 160 Or App at 600-04; (footnote omitted).
*522In this case, the board’s explanation for its award is similar to the board’s explanation in Schoch after remand by the Supreme Court; however, this case is distinguishable from Schoch and similar to Bacon, because there was no specific objection to the attorney fee award. The record does not indicate that claimant submitted a statement of services.10 SAIF did not argue to the board and does not argue on review in this court that there is no basis for awarding attorney fees without a statement of services. On reconsideration to the board, neither party submitted documentation to demonstrate that the $500 award was or was not reasonable. Additionally, SAIF presented no documentation that an award greater than $500 would be unreasonable. Instead, the parties submitted argument concerning whether the $500 award should be increased. Both claimant’s and SAIF’s arguments assumed that the board could legitimately infer the reasonable value of claimant’s attorney’s services from the record of proceedings and the nature of the litigation. SAIF did not file objections to the board’s $1,200 award in its order on reconsideration. Thus, as in Bacon, there was no specific objection concerning the attorney fee award.
The gravamen of SAIF’s argument on review is that, because the board cited time devoted to the case “as a factor in its award,” the board should have made “a finding regarding how many hours it thought claimant’s attorney expended on the non-cooperation denial issue” and that, without that finding, “it is impossible to know what kind of hourly rate the Board considered reasonable or how the other factors it recited affected its fee award.” However, although SAIF *523asserts that the board cited time devoted to the case “as a factor in its award,” the board, in its order on reconsideration, did not purport to rely on that factor. Additionally, we are not persuaded by SAIFs argument that the board should have made findings concerning the amount of time that it thought claimant’s attorneys worked on the case. Here, not only was no documentation submitted concerning the number of hours that claimant’s attorneys expended or the value of those attorneys’ services, but the board’s rule concerning attorney fees, OAR 438-015-0010, does not expressly require that the board make a finding about the time an attorney devoted to a case.11 As we said in Bacon, under those circumstances, “we cannot say that the agency erred in not going into greater detail than it did here.” 160 Or App at 604. For all of those reasons, under the particular circumstances in this case, the board’s explanation was adequate for judicial review, and the attorney fee award is affirmed.
In sum, we hold that claimant finally prevailed on a denied claim under ORS 656.386(1) and was entitled to attorney fees. Additionally, consistently with Bacon, the board adequately explained its $1,200 attorney fee award.
Affirmed.

 Former ORS 656.262(15) provides, in part:
“If the director finds that a worker fails to reasonably cooperate with an investigation involving an initial claim to establish a compensable injury * * *, the director shall suspend all or part of the payment of compensation after notice to the worker. If the worker does not cooperate for an additional 30 days after the notice, the insurer or self-insured employer may deny the claim because of the worker’s failure to cooperate.”
We note that, even though the language of former ORS 656.262(15) (2001) was not amended in 2003, all references in this opinion to ORS 656.262(15) are to the former 2001 version in order to be consistent with the record and the parties’ briefing.

 At the April 26 hearing, claimant’s attorney identified the issues as the “denial orders” of January 12 and February 1. After SAIF’s attorney noted that claimant had not appealed the February 1 denial, claimant’s attorney stated that, “if it hasn’t been appealed, it’s appealed now.” SAIF’s attorney argued to the administrative law judge (ALJ) that claimant had not timely appealed the denial and that, because claimant had not requested an expedited hearing, the hearings division lacked jurisdiction under SAIF v. Dubose, 166 Or App 642, 999 P2d 529 (2000), rev’d, 335 Or 579, 74 P3d 1072 (2003). In Dubose, we had held that an ALJ had no authority to set aside a noncooperation denial because the claimant failed to request an expedited hearing as required by ORS 656.262(15). 166 Or App at 650. Before the board, SAIF again argued that claimant had not timely appealed the denial.
After oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in SAIF v. Dubose, 335 Or 579, 74 P3d 1072 (2003). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ORS 656.262(15) does not require that a claimant request an expedited hearing. Id. at 588. On review to this court, SAIF does not argue that claimant did not request a hearing nor does it argue that claimant did not timely appeal the denial. Accordingly, we do not consider those issues.

 Because claimant requested reconsideration, the board withdrew its October 5 order.

 On review, SAIF also argues that, because the noncooperation denial was void, it cannot give rise to a fee under ORS 656.386(1). Because SAIF did not preserve that issue, we do not consider it.

 Contrary to the dissent’s understanding, we are not asserting that the dissent is changing the standard for the compensability of a combined condition. Rather, as explained above, our point is that, as the case law demonstrates, when a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition but is not the major contributing cause of the combined condition, the combined condition is not *515compensable and would be denied on that basis. See Schuler v. Beaverton School District No. 48 J, 334 Or 290, 296, 48 P3d 820 (2002) (reasoning that, with regard to the application of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), “[t]he burden is on claimant to show that her injury is compensable. ORS 656.266. To show that an ‘otherwise compensable injury is * * * the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition,’ a claimant must show that the otherwise compensable injury contributed more to the need for treatment than all other causes combined” (omission in original)); Birrer v. Principal Financial Group, 172 Or App 654, 658 n 2, 19 P3d 972 (2001) (“In order for a combined condition to be compensable, the work-related injury must be the major contributing cause of the current condition.” (Emphasis added.)); Bailey v. Reynolds Metals, 153 Or App 498, 503, 959 P2d 84, rev den, 327 Or 432 (1998) (“[T]he combined condition is work related if the work-related injury is its major contributing cause.”); see also Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 320 Or 509, 518-19, 888 P2d 544 (1995) (in discussing the concept of compensable injury under a prior version of ORS 656.005(7), the court reasoned that, “unless the major contributing cause standard is satisfied, consequential conditions (subparagraph (A)) and resultant conditions (subparagraph (B)) are not ‘compensable injuries’ ” and that in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), the legislature “is defining a compensable injury not merely announcing further conditions under which a compensable injury will be paid” (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original)).

 Moreover, even if that definition had been in effect, SAIF apparently denied the claim in Greenslitt on the express ground that it was not compensable.

 Or Laws 1995, ch 332, § 43 provides:
*517“ORS 656.386 is amended to read:
“656.386. (1) [In all cases involving accidental injuries where a claimant finally prevails in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney. In such rejected cases where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before the referee or in a review by the board itself, then the referee or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. If an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed. Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.)
“[(2) In all other cases attorney fees shall continue to be paid from the claimant’s award of compensation except as otherwise provided in ORS 656.382.] In all cases involving denied claims where a claimant finally prevails against the denial in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney. In such cases involving denied claims where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge or in a review by the Workers’ Compensation Board, then the Administrative Law Judge or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. In such cases involving denied claims where an attorney is instrumental in obtaining a rescission of the denial prior to a decision by the Administrative Law Judge, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed. For purposes of this section, a ‘denied claim’ is a claim for compensation which an insurer or self-insured employer refuses to pay on the express ground that the injury or condition for which compensation is claimed is not compensable or otherwise does not give rise to an entitlement to any compensation. A denied claim shall not be presumed or implied from an insurer’s or self-insured employer’s failure to pay compensation for a previously accepted injury or condition in timely fashion. Attorney fees provided for in this subsection shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer.
“(2) In all other cases, attorney fees shall be paid from the increase in the claimant’s compensation, if any, except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter.”
The legislature deleted the italicized language in brackets and replaced it with the language in boldface.

 The dissent states, “My research of the legislative history of the 1995 amendments does not reveal any discussion by the legislature that would suggest an intent to legislatively overrule the holding in Greenslitt.” 192 Or App at 533 n 4 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). However, the lack of legislative history on the issue of whether the legislature intended to overrule a Supreme Court decision cannot be viewed as evidence that the legislature did not intend to effect a change in the law, particularly where the legislature significantly amended the wording of the statute that the court had interpreted.

 SAIF refers to two Supreme Court cases that explain the standard. See Schoch v. Leupold & Stevens, 325 Or 112, 934 P2d 410 (1997) (holding that, where the claimant submitted an affidavit and a summary of services detailing the *519number of hours her attorney devoted to the case, there was a great discrepancy between the attorney fees that were requested and the workers’ compensation board’s award, and the factors cited could have supported an award for the full amount of the requested award, the board’s explanation was inadequate for review); McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or 185, 189, 957 P2d 1200(1998) (reasoning that “[flindings are necessary to assist the appellate court in carrying out a meaningful review of the competing arguments of the parties and the attorney fee decision below”).

 As we indicated in Bacon,
“[b]y not requiring the party seeking fees to submit a statement of services as a prerequisite for receiving them, the Board has effectively shifted the burden to the party opposing the fee request to file specific objectionsif it believes that the amount of the fee awarded is excessive. At least before this court, however, SAIF has not challenged that practice. SAIF has not explained why the Board’s practice is inconsistent with either its rule or its governing statute, see Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 30 (deleting statutory requirement that a party submit a written statement of services in support of its fee claim), and we do not have the benefit of the Board’s explanation of its practice before us. We accordingly leave that issue for another day when it has been squarely presented and briefed.”
160 Or App at 603 n 5.

 OAR 438-015-0010(4) provides:
“In any case where an Administrative Law Judge or the Board is required to determine a reasonable attorney fee, the following factors shall be considered:
“(a) The time devoted to the case;
“(b) The complexity of the issue(s) involved;
“(c) The value of the interest involved;
“(d) The skill of the attorneys;
“(e) The nature of the proceedings;
“(0 The benefit secured for the represented party;
“(g) The risk in a particular case that an attorney’s efforts may go uncompensated; and
“(h) The assertion of frivolous issues or defenses.”