Court Opinion

ID: 9558498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:10:51.406888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:20.266463
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I fully support the lucid dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Lee and respectfully add the following:
I join the majority in upholding the aggravated robbery convictions of Hopper and Valentine and in granting Moreland a new trial. However, both law and logic require that Hopper and Valentine also be granted a new trial on the felony murder counts.
The felony murder doctrine evolved as a means of imputing felonious intent to characterize as murder a killing accidentally caused by one in the course of committing an intended felony such as robbery.1 Instead of convicting the perpetrator only of the underlying robbery, and treating the homicide as non-criminal, accidental conduct because unintended, the felonious intent to commit the underlying robbery was imputed to the act of killing, thus rendering the killing a murder rather than an accidental homicide.
*248The next step in the process occurred when, during a felony committed by two criminals, one accidentally killed the victim. In such a case the act of killing could also be imputed to the co-felon, as a principal, accessory or co-conspirator. This was accomplished under the familiar doctrine that each such participant in a crime may be held responsible for the criminal act of his co-participant. Since each participant had the felonious intent to commit the underlying felony, thus justifying application to him of the imputed intent aspect of the felony murder doctrine, and each was legally' responsible for the acts of the other committed in furtherance of the intended felony, it was not unjust to hold both for felony murder.
In the instant case, however, the majority carries the doctrine beyond its logical limits. Here the majority imputes to the robbers the act of an innocent third party — not within the circle of principal, accessory or co-conspirator. Our law traditionally holds one accountable for the deeds of those with whom one acts in concert, but not for the actions of all who happen to be present at the scene or for “acts of God.” The mere coincidence that one is killed during the time span when a felony is being committed is not enough to justify invoking the felony murder doctrine.
Here, if the jury found that the victim shot himself accidentally, there should be no legal basis for imputing the victim’s act to the defendants. Under the rule adopted by the majority, if during a robbery the victim were killed by lightning, the robber would be guilty of murder. The felony murder doctrine should be limited to cases where death is caused by the act of one of the co-felons.
Here there was ample evidence from which the jury may have inferred that the homicide victim accidentally shot himself, perhaps after the robbery was completed. He bled to death from a gunshot wound in his leg inflicted by a pistol his family kept hidden in the house. The gun was found next to him. He knew how to use guns, but not this particular pistol. The gun had no safety device, and easily could have fired accidentally. There was no evidence that any of the robbers knew where this pistol had been hidden in the house. There was no disarray of furniture or other sign of a struggle at the scene. The victim had no wounds except the one shot in his leg. No blood type other than that of the victim was found. No fingerprints of any of the defendants were on the weapon.
The issue is whether under the rule of Alvarez v. District Court, 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131 (1972), which indisputably was the law applicable, it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury that the defendants could be convicted of felony murder “even if one or more of the defendants did not actually commit the act that caused said death.”2 Contrary to the law laid down in Alvarez, that instruction told the jury that the defendants could be guilty of murder even if the victim accidentally shot himself.
*249Surely in this factual setting a jury properly instructed under the then-existing law might have had reasonable doubt whether one of the defendants fired the gun or the victim accidentally shot himself. Might not the jurors have wondered why a robber would shoot his victim in the legl Why he would not “finish him off’ so as to leave no witnesses? At least there was a legitimate fact issue who caused the death. Fair trial standards at least required submitting this issue to the jury under proper instructions.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Lee, the prejudicial effect of this erroneous jury instruction was compounded by the prosecutor’s overzealous argument that this instruction required the jury to “convict the three scum,” regardless of who caused the death. While it is understandable that prosecutors, in the heat of argument, may injudiciously imply that some defendants are “beyond the pale” of the law’s protection, we have a duty to apply the same law to all. No defendant is entitled to a perfect trial, but all are entitled to a fair trial. We cannot except from the guarantee of fair trial even the most loathsome, lest we erode this ultimate bulwark of all our liberties.
In a scene from the play A Man for All Seasons, Sir Thomas More, then Lord Chancellor of England, is berated by his zealously religious son-in-law, Roper, for not causing the arrest of one Rich who is obviously a “bad” man. More responds that he would let Rich go, “if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law!”
“ROPER: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!
“MORE: Yes, what would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
“ROPER: I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
“MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned around on you — where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast — man’s laws, not God’s — and if you cut them down — and you’re just the man to do it — d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.”3
The rule of law that all are entitled to a fair trial requires a new trial on the felony murder charges for all three defendants. Valentine and Hopper received a fair trial on the aggravated robbery charges and I join in affirming those convictions.

Instruction 16.

 R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 66 (Random House, 1962).