Court Opinion

ID: 9715817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:15:06.275407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:38.230862
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 52. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that if Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1993-94) is to have meaning in non-commercial motor vehicle cases, the phrase "probable cause to believe" used in that section *318must mean something different from the same phrase "probable cause to believe" used in § 968.04 to govern the issuance of an arrest warrant. I conclude, in contrast to the standard set forth in the majority opinion, that an officer may request a preliminary breath screening test (PBT) of a driver of a non-commercial motor vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 when the driver exhibits several indicators of being under the impairment of intoxicants.
¶ 53. I write for two reasons. First, I do not think the majority opinion sets forth a workable standard to determine what information a police officer must have to request a driver of a non-commercial motor vehicle to submit to a PBT. The standard set forth in the majority opinion is that "probable cause to believe" refers "to a quantum of proof that is greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop, and greater than the 'reason to believe' necessary to request a PBT from a driver of a commercial motor vehicle, but less than the level of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest." Majority op. at 316. See also maj. op. at 309, 317. This standard does not sufficiently help law enforcement officers or the courts to determine whether a law enforcement officer has sufficient facts to satisfy § 343.303. Indeed the majority opinion does not even attempt to apply this standard to the evidence in the present case. Rather, the majority opinion analyzes the record to determine whether the defendant exhibited several indicators of intoxication in resolving whether the officer had probable cause to request the defendant to submit to a PBT. Majority op. at 316-17.
¶ 54. Second, I write to express my concern about this court's evolving jurisprudence that "probable cause to believe" requires varying degrees of evidence *319depending on the stage of the proceedings. Majority op. at 304, 308, 309. The majority opinion declares that "there is a great degree of difference between the minimum of suspicion indicated by the language 'reason to believe' and 'any presence of alcohol' and the degree of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest." Majority op. at 309.
¶ 55. As I see it, the degrees of proof required for various "probable cause" standards may, in real life, be indistinguishable. Although people on the planet may be connected by no more than six degrees of separation, as the popular play and motion picture demonstrate, I am not sure what degrees of separation exist in the various manifestations of probable cause. I am sure, however, that the degrees of separation, if any, are crammed on a narrow spectrum.1
¶ 56. Our case law supports the conclusion that the most demanding quantum of proof, the probable cause necessary to bind a defendant over for trial, is not very demanding at all. The magistrate must determine only whether under any plausible facts the accused probably committed a felony. State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 357 N.W.2d 151 (1984).
¶ 57. Furthermore our case law demonstrates that the varying degrees of proof are in fact very similar. In State v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972), the court noted that "while a preliminary hearing may require more by the way of evidence than other preliminary determinations of probable cause [citations omitted], these pretrial proceedings are similar in that they are all concerned with the practical and *320nontechnical probabilities of everyday íife in determining the existence of probable cause."
¶ 58. I have appended a diagram to this concurrence to demonstrate the spectrum of probable cause determinations. The diagram is not, however, an exact representation of all the varying degrees of probable cause determinations. Some probable cause determinations may be missing. Furthermore, I am unsure of the placement on the spectrum of all the determinations that are shown. For example, the majority opinion does not tell us where the quantum of proof required in this case fits in comparison with the quantum of proof needed to issue a search warrant (see note #5 in the diagram) and the quantum of proof needed to revoke an individual's driver's license (see note #6 in the diagram).
¶ 59. Because the most stringent interpretation of probable cause (the bindover for trial) requires only a "plausible account of the defendant's commission of a felony," this case raises the question of the usefulness of our jurisprudence regarding degrees of proof of probable cause.
¶ 60. For the reasons stated, I concur in the mandate.
¶ 61. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this concurrence.
*321DIAGRAM
Degrees of Probable Cause
-Probable cause to bind over for trial (see Note #1 below)
-Probable cause to approve issuance of criminal complaint (see Note #2 below)
-Probable cause to issue arrest warrant (see Note #3 below)
-Probable cause for warrantless arrest (see Note #4 below)
-Probable cause to issue search warrant (see Note #5 below)
-Probable cause at driver's license revocation hearing (see Note #6 below)
- THIS CASE: Probable cause to request a PBT from a driver of a non-commercial motor vehicle (see Note #7 below)
- "Any reason to believe" required to request a PBT from a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (see Note #8 below)
-Reasonable suspicion for investigative stop (see Note #9 below)
*322NOTES TO THE PROBABLE CAUSE DIAGRAM
1. Bind Over. "A defendant may be bound over for trial when the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the defendant probably committed a felony." State v. Leist, 141 Wis. 2d 34, 40, 414 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1987).". . .[P]robable cause at a preliminary hearing is satisfied [and the defendant can thus be bound over for trial] when there exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant's commission of a felony." State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984); See also Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1)(1997-98).
"The distinction between plausibility and credibility may be fine; the distinction is one of degree." Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 397. A judge does not delve into credibility of a witness. Vigil v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 133, 144, 250 N.W.2d 378 (1977).
The same principles governing preliminary hearings in felony prosecutions also apply to probable cause hearings held pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2) (1995-96) to determine whether a defendant is a sexually violent person. State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 201-05, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999).
The preliminary hearing standard also applies to probable cause hearings regarding involuntary mental commitment under Chapter 51 of the statutes. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d at 201 (referring to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(1995-96)).
2. Criminal Complaint. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.03 (1997-98) if a judge does not find "probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or that the accused has committed it," the judge shall indorse such finding on the complaint.
*323"A complaint must state facts sufficient in themselves or admitting to reasonable inferences which are sufficient in themselves or admitting to reasonable inferences which are sufficient to establish probable cause. . . .The term, 'probable cause,' contemplates the existence of facts and circumstances which would incite an honest belief in a reasonable man, acting under all the circumstances, that the charges made are true. A complaint is sufficient if a fair-minded magistrate could reasonably conclude that the facts alleged justify further criminal proceedings and that the charges are not merely capricious." State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 662-63, 188 N.W.2d 449 (1971).
"The test under Wisconsin law of the sufficiency of the complaint is one of 'minimal adequacy, not in a hypertechnical but in a common sense evaluation, in setting forth the essential facts establishing probable cause.'" T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 179, 189, 325 N.W.2d 329 (1982) (quoting State v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 580, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977)).
In comparative terms, "the degree of probable cause required for a bindover is greater than that required to support a complaint." T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d at 188.
The standard applied to a complaint may be the same as the standard set forth in notes #3 and #4 below. State v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d at 583; State ex rel. Pflanz v. County Court for Dane County, 36 Wis. 2d 550, 554-57, 153 N.W.2d 559 (1967); State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 594-95, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965).
3. Arrest Warrant. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.04 (1997-98), if it appears from the complaint and accompanying affidavits that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that *324the accused committed it, the judge shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant.
"Probable cause to arrest refers to that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime. . . .It is only necessary that the information lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a mere possibility, and it is well established that the belief may be predicated in part upon hearsay information." State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624—25, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971).
In comparative terms, "the probable cause needed to be shown to issue a criminal warrant is less than the probable cause needed to be shown to bind over a defendant for trial after a preliminary hearing." State v. Knoblock, 44 Wis. 2d 130, 134, 170 N.W.2d 781 (1969). See also State v. Berby, 81 Wis. 2d 677, 683, 260 N.W.2d 798 (1977).
The standard applicable to an arrest warrant may be the same standard as set forth in note #2 above. State v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 583, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977); State ex rel. Pflanz v. County Court for Dane County, 36 Wis. 2d 550, 554-57, 153 N.W.2d 559 (1967); State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 594-95, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965).
The standard applicable to an arrest warrant is the same standard as applicable in note #4 below. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 627, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1997).
4. Warrantless Arrest. A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when "there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is committing or has committed a crime" or violated a traffic regulation. Wis. Stat. § 968.07 (1997-98) (crimes); § 345.22 (1997-98) (traffic violations).
*325Within 48 hours after being arrested, the person is brought before a magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to believe an offense was committed by the suspect. See State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 698, 499 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied 510 U.S. 880 (1993).
In comparative terms, when a suspect is arrested without a warrant, the same quantum of proof is applicable as is applicable to a suspect arrested with a warrant; see note #3 above. Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 523, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).
"The State's burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing [challenging a warrantless arrest] is significantly greater than its burden of persuasion at a refusal [license revocation] hearing" under note #6 below. State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 517 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994).
5. Search Warrant. Before issuing a search warrant a magistrate must be "apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the place to be searched." State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). A deferential standard of review is Accorded to the warrant-issuing judge's finding of probable cause. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989. An affidavit should be interpreted in a commonsense manner, not in a hypertechnical manner. The defendant must establish that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 990-92.
In comparative terms, the quantum of evidence to issue a search warrant is less than that required to *326support a bindover for trial at the preliminary examination. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989.
6. Driver's License Revocation. At a hearing held to revoke a driver's license under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9X1997-98), the State must show that the officer had probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence of an intoxicant. "The trial court. . .simply must ascertain the plausibility of a police officer's account". State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 36, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986). Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d at 35, distinguishes between probable cause and probable cause to a reasonable certainty.
7. Preliminary Breath Screening Test (PBT) Request: Driver of a Non-Commercial Motor Vehicle. Probable cause to believe under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1993-94)(requesting a PBT of a driver of a non-commercial motor vehicle) refers to "a quantum of proof greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop [note #9 below] and greater than the 'reason to believe' necessary to request a PBT from a driver of a commercial motor vehicle [note #8 below] but less than that required to establish probable cause for arrest [note #3 above]." Maj. op. at 317.
8. Preliminary Breath Screening Test (PBT) Request: Driver of a Commercial Motor Vehicle. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.303 (1993-94) an officer may request that a driver of a commercial motor vehicle take a PBT if the officer "detects any presence of intoxicants" or "has any reason to believe the person" has violated laws prohibiting driving while under the influence of intoxicants.
*3279. Reasonable Suspicion. In order to stop a person an officer must be able to articulate specific grounds for having a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. See Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (1997-98) and maj. op. at 310 n.11 for a description of the reasonable suspicion standard.
The reasonable suspicion standard was adopted in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), in another context. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that before police execute a search warrant without knocking and announcing their presence, the officers must have a "reasonable suspicion," under the circumstances, that knocking would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.

 A spectrum is defined as "a range of values of a quantity or set of related quantities." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1731 (3rd ed. 1992).