Court Opinion

ID: 9943130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:47.62011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:10.336995
License: Public Domain

J-S47013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LEWIS RICKEY TUCKER, JR.                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1393 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 2, 2023
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
                Criminal Division at No: CP-64-CR-0000083-2018

BEFORE:       STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2024

         Appellant, Lewis Rickey Tucker, Jr., appeals from the May 2, 2023 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, which denied his second

amended petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

         The factual and procedural background of the instant appeal is not at

issue.      On November 15, 2019, Appellant entered a negotiated nolo

contendere plea to third-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of fifteen

to thirty years.1 On December 26, 2019, he was sentenced in accordance with

the negotiated agreement. No direct appeal was filed.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1The remaining sixteen charges against Appellant were withdrawn by the
Commonwealth pursuant to the negotiated agreement.
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       On September 14, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a suppression

motion, as well as other claims of general dissatisfaction with representation.

On December 2, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA petition

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a post-sentence

motion and/or direct appeal. Thereafter, PCRA counsel was appointed.2 A

second amended PCRA petition and request for evidentiary hearing was filed

on March 30, 2023. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and

the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue:

       Did the PCRA court err in denying the Appellant’s Post-Conviction
       Relief claim where the Appellant testified that he requested trial
       counsel to pursue a direct appeal within the requisite time period
       and that the request was ignored or rejected by trial counsel?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and

free of legal error. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091

(Pa. 2010). “The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by

the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard

____________________________________________

2 There is no explanation for why PCRA counsel was not appointed upon the

initial filing.

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of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Roney,

79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244

(Pa. 2011)).

     With respect to ineffectiveness claims, our Supreme Court has

explained:

     It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to have been effective
     and that the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s
     alleged ineffectiveness.       To overcome this presumption, a
     petitioner must establish that: (1) the underlying substantive
     claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable
     basis for his or her act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered
     prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, that is a
     reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the
     outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A PCRA
     petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal. A
     petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the
     claim.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

     Further, an appellant is entitled to reinstatement of direct appellate

rights where an attorney fails to file a requested appeal. Commonwealth v.

Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 714 (Pa. Super. 2011).          When an appeal is not

requested, counsel may be ineffective if he does not consult with his client

about their appellate rights. Id. Our Supreme Court explained:

     [C]ounsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with the
     defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either
     (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example,
     because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that
     this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that
     he was interested in appealing. In making this determination,

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      courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or
      should have known.

Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000)).

      “A deficient failure on the part of counsel to consult with the defendant

does not automatically entitle the defendant to reinstatement of his or her

appellate rights.” Touw, 781 A.2d at 1254.          Rather, a defendant must

establish prejudice.   Id.   “[T]o show prejudice in these circumstances, a

defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would

have timely appealed.” Id. (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484).

      Here, the PCRA Court conducted an evidentiary hearing wherein both

Appellant and trial counsel testified. Appellant testified that he requested trial

counsel to file a direct appeal during a phone call after sentencing. N.T. PCRA

Hearing, 5/1/23, at 8-9. He wanted to appeal because he received a longer

sentence than his co-defendants. Id. at 10. Appellant stated that trial counsel

told him there was no reason to appeal.        Id. at 9-10.    During the PCRA

hearing, trial counsel explained that the Commonwealth initially offered twelve

to twenty-four years if Appellant would testify against his co-defendants. Id.

at 16-17. Appellant refused. Id. at 17. The Commonwealth and trial counsel

ultimately agreed upon fifteen to thirty years, which was accepted by

Appellant. Id. at 17-18. There was no written communication regarding an

appeal. Id. at 21, 23. Trial counsel testified that he did not recall a specific

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conversation with Appellant about filing an appeal. Id. at 19, 21. However,

he stated that it was his practice to file an appeal if requested by a client. Id.

at 19-20.

      Following the hearing, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order

denying Appellant’s petition. The PCRA court found trial counsel’s testimony

to be credible, and that Appellant failed to present evidence, other than his

own testimony, that he requested trial counsel to file an appeal. Although the

record indicates that Appellant was not completely satisfied with trial counsel’s

representation, Appellant fully understood that he was entering into a

negotiated agreement. In addition to executing an extensive ten-page written

colloquy, both the Commonwealth and defense counsel conducted an oral

colloquy on the record. N.T. Plea Hearing, 11/15/19, at 7-17. Pertinent to

the issue here:

      Q:    Do you understand that part of the deal is the
            recommendation that this Court would impose a period of
            incarceration of not less than fifteen no[r] more than thirty
            years, do you understand that?

      A:    Yes, I understand that.

      Q:    And that’s a recommended sentence higher than what we
            talked about when we were here yesterday, correct?

      A:    Yes.

                                      ****

      Q:    The numbers yesterday were not less than twelve no[r]
            more than twenty-four, correct?

      A:    Yes.

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     Q:   But that required your cooperation and potentially your
          appearance at a trail [sic] to testify, correct?

     A:   Yes.

     Q:   And you relayed to me that you prefer not to do that,
          correct?

     A:   Yes.

                                   ****

     Q:   Okay. Now, on paragraph thirty-six we went over this when
          I was down to see you at the Wayne County Prison on
          Wednesday, the question was are you satisfied with my
          representation, actually are you satisfied with the
          representation of your attorney and you said no, correct?

     A:   Yes.

                                   ****

     Q:   Can you indicate to the Court the         basis   for   your
          dissatisfaction with my representation?

     A:   Just wasn’t satisfied.

     Q:   Okay, can you be more specific other than the fact that you
          weren’t satisfied?

     A:   The lack of communication and the representation I just
          wasn’t satisfied with it so that’s my opinion.

     Q:   Okay. You’re still prepared to enter the Nolo Contendere
          Plea that we just went over with the Court, correct?

     A:   Yes.

                                   ****

     Q:   Mr. Tucker, despite your dissatisfaction with your counsel
          because you’re objectively dissatisfied, is it your choice
          today freely, voluntarily, and knowingly to enter a plea to

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            fifteen to thirty years and third degree murder, is that your
            choice?

      A:    Yes.

Id. at 12-15. Appellant chose not to speak at sentencing and did not raise

any issues regarding the negotiated agreement or the term of his sentence.

The trial court accepted the agreement, sentenced Appellant pursuant to said

agreement, and advised Appellant of his post-sentence rights.               N.T.

Sentencing, 12/26/19, at 6-8.

      Based on a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err

when it denied Appellant’s second amended PCRA petition. Since Appellant

received the negotiated sentence, there was no rational reason for trial

counsel to believe that Appellant wished to file a direct appeal.     Further,

Appellant failed to show that counsel’s omission violated the constitutionally-

imposed duty to consult with him about an appeal; therefore, we conclude

that Appellant failed to prove trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Touw, supra.

Additionally, we are bound by the credibility determinations of the trial court

and agree with the trial court’s finding that Appellant failed to reasonably

demonstrate that he requested trial counsel to file a direct appeal. Roney,

supra.

      Order affirmed.

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Date: 2/22/2024

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