Court Opinion

ID: 9518044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:41:27.487909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:05.278909
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
Respectfully, I dissent from the decision of the majority that reverses the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Casandra Oliver (Oliver) in her declaratory judgment action and denying reimbursement to the City of Pittsburgh (City) for benefits paid to Oliver under the statute commonly known as the Heart and Lung Act, Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 637-638. In reversing, the majority reaffirms the erroneous decision in Brown v. Rosenberger, 723 A.2d 745 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999), where this Court affirmed the trial court’s order on the basis of its opinion determining that a Heart and Lung Act benefits provider had subrogation rights in the employee’s tort recovery in a third-party tortfeasor lawsuit arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
As the majority notes, the facts are undisputed. Oliver was injured in a motor vehicle accident on December 23,1996 during her course of employment as a police officer. She received $848.48 in Heart and Lung Act benefits during the time that she could not work and also filed a personal injury action against the third-party tort-feasor. She eventually settled for $2,300, and thereafter the City indicated that it would seek subrogation for benefits that it paid. Oliver’s attorney placed the disputed amount in escrow and filed an action for declaratory judgment and then a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The City filed its cross-motion.
The City contends that Section 25(b) of the Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 190, No. 44 (Act 44), which partially repealed Sections 1720 and 1722 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1720 and 1722,1 as they pertain to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708, also applies to Heart and Lung Act benefits. Section 25(b) provides: “The provisions of 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1720 and 1722 are repealed insofar as they relate to workers’ compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” (Emphasis added.) The City contends that principles of equity and the holding in Brown require subrogation rights reinstated by Act 44 to be extended to Heart and Lung Act benefit providers. It asserts that payment of an officer’s full salary under the Heart and Lung Act is “compensation” and therefore no different from workers’ compensation and that the Heart and Lung Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act are in pari materia as they relate to “the same class of persons or things” and accordingly should be construed together pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932.
*1244Oliver argues that Section 25(b) of Act 44 applies only to workers’ compensation or other benefits paid under the Workers’ Compensation Act and that Heart and Lung Act benefits are neither. The Heart and Lung Act was enacted to provide full salary to all police officers, firefighters and other law enforcement officers injured in the line of their duty who are temporarily incapacitated from performing their duties. Moreover, the Heart and Lung Act is not administered through the workers’ compensation system, and in City of Scranton v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Walsh), 127 Pa.Cmwlth.89, 560 A.2d 937 (1989), the Court held that sums paid under that Act were not workers’ compensation benefits and hence could not be modified for failure to follow up on job referrals.
Noting first that the title and preamble of a statute may be considered under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924 in interpreting its meaning, Oliver refers to Section 1 of Act 44 stating that it amends Section 101 of the Act of June 2,1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338), to provide that the act shall be called and cited as the Workers’ Compensation Act and shall apply to all injuries occurring within the Commonwealth. Oliver adopts the statutory construction rule at 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) that if the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, as they are in Section 25(b) of Act 44, the letter of it may not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Oliver cites as well to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1971(c), which states that a statute should not be construed to repeal an earlier statute unless the two are irreconcilable, and she agrees with the trial court that there is no conflict in construing Heart and Lung benefits as being exempt and workers’ compensation benefits as being subject to subrogation.
In granting Oliver’s motion, the trial court reasoned in part as follows:
Even though the Heart and Lung and Workers’ Compensation statutes have been similarly construed, the partial repeal of § 1720 speaks only to “workers’ compensation payment [sic] or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Emphasis added. There is no ambiguity in this provision. The Legislature has not repealed § 1720 with respect to Heart and Lung benefits. It is not for this Court to do so.
Trial Court opinion at 11-12. The trial court analyzed prior decisions concerning subrogation of Heart and Lung Act benefits. In Fulmer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 60, 647 A.2d 616 (1994), a state trooper was injured while riding as a passenger in a state police vehicle. He filed a third-party lawsuit when the 1984 version of Section 1720 was in effect and when the phrase that currently reads “benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or excess” originally read “benefits in lieu thereof paid or *1245payable.” The trooper received Heart and Lung Act benefits, and the State Police sought subrogation against his tort claim settlement. The trooper argued that clear legislative intent precluded subrogation in a motor vehicle tort claim recovery. On the other hand, while acknowledging that the Heart and Lung Act contained no specific provisions regarding an employer’s right to subrogation, the State Police argued that broad considerations of equity, good conscience and unjust enrichment required that it be afforded subrogation rights in the tort recovery, citing Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962).2
The Court pointed out in Fulmer that the MVFRL became effective October 1, 1984 and that if applicable it would supersede the prior case law where a claimant’s injury arose out of a motor vehicle accident. Moreover, tort recoveries by a claimant who received workers’ compensation benefits likewise would be shielded from subrogation rights based upon the assumption that the accident arose out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and that the MVFRL applied as it existed before Act 44. The Court concluded that Section 1720 applied to benefits paid under the Heart and Lung Act because they qualified within the “benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable” language of that section. The Court explained:
Benefits received under the Heart and Lung Act effectively replace workmen’s compensation benefits for those employees covered by its provisions. These benefits provided petitioner with a full rate of salary during his temporary incapacity and required him to turn over all workmen’s compensation benefits he received to the PSP.... On its face, the contested language of Section 1720 attempts to include all those potential benefits which may have been too numerous to mention. Furthermore, it is a “well-recognized rule that the Financial Responsibility Law is to be liberally construed.”
Fulmer, 647 A.2d at 619 (quoting Rimpa v. Erie Ins. Exch., 404 Pa.Super. 287, 590 A.2d 784, 789 (1991)). The Court rejected the State Police’s attempt in Fulmer to defeat the plain language of Section 1720 by raising arguments based upon principles of equity, and it concluded that the statute did not permit subrogation against the tort recovery for Heart and Lung Act benefits that the trooper received. The Court’s result would be the same under the 1990 amendment as well, which substituted the current language for the former “benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable.”
In Oliver’s case the trial court indicated that the issue of subrogation for Heart and Lung Act benefits was not addressed again until Brown. Quoting one statement from Fulmer, 647 A.2d at 619, that “[bjenefits received under the Heart and Lung Act effectively replace workmen’s compensation benefits for those employees covered by its provisions,” the Brown trial court made an unsupportable leap that Heart and Lung Act benefits were to be treated the same as workers’ compensation benefits and therefore that “the pre-1984 principle of equity and unjust enrichment must again operate to allow recovery against a third-party tort-feasor for all losses sustained, and must also allow a benefit provider to be subrogated to any recovery of benefits. The distinction between an employer under the Heart and Lung Act and an employer under other benefit provider schemes is irrelevant for these purposes.” Brown v. Rosenberger, 40 Pa. D. & C. 4th 432, 439 (1998). The trial court cited no *1246authority for its conclusion that equity principles must again operate to allow a Heart and Lung Act benefits provider to subrogate against a third-party motor vehicle tort claim recovery.
The trial court in Oliver’s case criticized the rationale in Brown, noting that it undercut the intent of Section 1720 by expanding the right to subrogation to any benefits that a claimant might receive, except those separately enumerated in the MVFRL, and noting also that no ambiguity exists in the 1993 repeal of Section 1720. It relates solely to “workers’ compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Trial court Opinion at 7. Also, the Heart and Lung Act has existed since 1935, and the legislature could have repealed Section 1720 with respect to that Act had it intended to do so, but it did not.
The right of subrogation for Heart and Lung Act benefits was mentioned again in City of Pittsburgh v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Williams), 810 A.2d 760 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), where a police officer was injured in a motor vehicle accident in February 1994 (after Act 44’s effective date), and he received Heart and Lung Act benefits. The officer was terminated for unrelated conduct, and his benefits were converted to workers’ compensation resulting in a lower payout. When the officer settled his third-party tort action, the City sought subrogation. The WCJ and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board found that payments made by the City under the Heart and Lung Act prior to the termination were not subject to subrogation under Fulmer. The Court in Williams reversed the finding that the City improperly converted Heart and Lung Act benefits to workers’ compensation, but it clearly stated in a footnote that Heart and Lung Act benefits were not subject to subrogation. No party addressed Brown in Williams.
The trial court noted the federal court determination in City of Wilkes-Barre v. Sheils, 382 B.R. 871 (M.D.Pa.2008), that Section 1720 of the MVFRL precluded subrogation of Heart and Lung Act benefits under the language “benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement” without ever referencing Brown. This decision however was vacated, and the case was remanded by the Third Circuit in an unpublished opinion that the majority heavily relies upon in its analysis. See In re Cole, No. 08-1412, 2009 WL 1090329 (3d Cir. April 23, 2009). The Third Circuit’s unpublished decision is not binding on this Court, and even if the decision were binding it nevertheless could not be followed because it utterly fails to support reversal of the trial court here.
The Third Circuit suggested in In re Cole that a key rationale to Fulmer’s holding no longer existed because Section 1722 of the MVFRL no longer barred an employee from recovering amounts in a third-party tort action that corresponded to workers’ compensation benefits received (due to the 1993 repeal). It then went on to discuss Brown and agreed with its reasoning, despite the obvious fact that the trial court in Brown cited no authority for its decision, interpreted a statement from Fulmer out of context and, more fundamentally, failed to follow and/or apply the plain language of Section 1720. In addition, the Third Circuit did not discuss Williams except to note that its holding did not depend on the principle stated in footnote 5, i.e., that Heart and Lung Act benefits are not subject to subrogation under Fulmer. The holding in Williams obviously did not depend on that principle because this Court decided that the employee’s Heart and Lung Act benefits were properly converted to workers’ compensation, and under settled law the employer had a right of subrogation against the third-party tort recovery there. Also, the *1247Third Circuit failed to recognize that the 1993 repeal provision is plain and unequivocal.3
Again, Section 25(b) of Act 44 reads: “The provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1720 and 1722 are repealed insofar as they relate to workers’ compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” (Emphasis added.) This repeal provision says nothing about Heart and Lung Act benefits, and every relevant principle of statutory construction, if properly applied, would preclude any court from inserting benefits paid under the Heart and Lung Act into this repeal provision.
A careful analysis of relevant authority demonstrates that the Court in Brown misinterpreted the treatment of Heart and Lung Act benefits for subrogation purposes, and, as a result, Oliver and the trial court correctly perceived the need to overturn Brown. To reiterate, the Court in Fulmer stated that “Heart and Lung benefits fall within the ‘benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable’ language” of Section 1720. Id., 647 A.2d at 619. The Court recognized that Section 1720 should be liberally interpreted and indicated that on its face it sought to include “potential benefits which may have been too numerous to mention.” Id. Yet of all the benefits to be included in Section 1720, the legislature repealed that section and Section 1722 only “insofar as they relate to workers’ compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Section 25(b) of Act 44.
It is well settled in statutory construction jurisprudence that implied repeals of statutes are not favored in the law. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1971(c); In re Delinquent Tax Sale, 83 Pa.CmwIth. 411, 477 A.2d 603 (1984). Section 1 of Act 44 and the Section 25(b) language relate solely to the Workers’ Compensation Act, and accordingly the majority violates every applicable principle of statutory construction when it expands the repeal language to include by implication benefits under the Heart and Lung Act. Also relevant to this discussion is the observation made by the Court in connection with the legislative intent in enacting Section 1720, which serves an important purpose. The Court observed the following in Walters v. Kamppi, 118 Pa. Cmwlth. 487, 545 A.2d 975, 978 (1988) (emphasis in original):
The injured victim who is forced, through subrogation, to turn over his workmen’s compensation source funds he has recovered from a tortfeasor may end up realizing nothing for his non-economic losses. The elimination of subrogation, thus, furthers the goal of providing complete compensation to the innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident.
In this context, therefore, any expansion of the repeal of Section 1720 beyond the specific language in Act 44 erodes the intended protection of innocent victims.
To conclude, the Brown case was decided ten years ago but has never been relied upon by this Court in any subsequent decision. It only surfaced again in the Third Circuit opinion in In re Cole, which ignored the plain language of the repeal statute, although that decision nevertheless is not binding on this Court. It is *1248clear that Brown does not carry the weight or force of controlling case authority. For the reasons expressed, the Court first should overrule Bromi inasmuch as it was wrongly decided; second, it should conclude that Fulmer and Williams control the outcome; and lastly it should hold that the City has no subrogation rights in Oliver’s third-party tort recovery pursuant to Sections 1720 and 1722 of the MVFRL. The trial court was absolutely right in its analysis and conclusions, and its order therefore should be affirmed.

. Section 1720, relating to subrogation, provides:
In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to workers’ compensation benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits paid or *1244payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits). (Emphasis added.)
Section 1722, relating to preclusion of recovering required benefits, provides:
In any action for damages against a tort-feasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this sub-chapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this subchapter, or workers’ compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719.

. The Court mentioned a point made in Topel-ski that "Pennsylvania is the only jurisdiction that allows a government unit such rights [to subrogation] under equitable principles and in the absence of a statute conferring such right.” Fulmer, 647 A.2d at 619 n. 4.

. Contrary to the suggestion of the concurring opinion, the Court in Williams in footnote 5 was stating the existing principle of law. The context may have been to explain the basis for the claimant’s objection to subrogation, but the footnote 5 reference was not the claimant's interpretation of same disputed point. Rather, it was a statement by the Court of the settled principle that Heart and Lung Act benefits are not subject to subrogation, as was clearly held in Fulmer. Words mean what they say, and the statement in Williams cannot now be contradicted.