Court Opinion

ID: 9842014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:12:22.889169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:03.492382
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
If the partial strike activity in this case were protected, or even arguably protected, by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, the Court’s conclusion would be supported by San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236. But in Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Board, 336 U. S. 245 (Briggs-Strait on), the Court rejected the argument that comparable activity was protected by § 7. And as I understand the Court’s holding today, it as*157sumes that this activity remains unprotected.1 Moreover, if such activity were prohibited, or arguably prohibited, by § 8 of the Act, the Court's conclusion would also be supported by Garmon. But ever since NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, it has been clear that this activity is not even arguably prohibited.
If Congress had focused on the problems presented by partial strike activity, and had enacted special legislation dealing with this subject matter, but left the form of the activity disclosed by this record unregulated, the Court's conclusion would be supported by Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252. But this is not such a case. Despite the numerous statements in the Court’s opinion about Congress’ intent to leave partial strike activity wholly unregulated, I have found no legislative expression of any such intent nor any evidence that Congress has scrutinized such activity.2
*158If this Court had previously held that the no-man’s land in which conduct is neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited by federal law is nevertheless preempted by an unexpressed legislative intent, I would follow such a holding. But none of the cases reviewed in the Court’s opinion so holds.3 Ever since 1949, when Briggs-Stratton was decided, the rule has been that partial strike activity within that area may be regulated by the States.
If adherence to the rule of Briggs-Stratton would per*159mit the States substantially to disrupt the balance Congress has struck between union and employer, I would readily join in overruling it. But I am not persuaded that partial strike activity is so essential to the bargaining process that the States should not be free to make it illegal.4
Stability and predictability in the law are enhanced when the Court resists the temptation to overrule its prior decisions.5 It is particularly inappropriate to do so when the Court is purporting to implement the intent of Congress with respect to an issue that Congress has yet to address. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 n. 14. Finally, I am not nearly as sanguine as the Court about the likelihood that this decision will clarify or harmonize a fairly confused area of the law. In sum, I would adhere to prior precedent which is directly in point.

 I recognize that there is some ambiguity in the Court’s discussion, ante, at 152-153, which first implies that the employer may take any appropriate disciplinary action, including discharge, since the union activity is unprotected by § 7, and then immediately casts doubt on this assurance to the employer by indicating that some economic weapons may be used in reprisal even if the activity is protected. The ambiguity of the Court’s rationale is inconsistent with its assumption that the employer is wholly free to use economic self-help without fear of committing an unfair labor practice. In all events, while I recognize that I may be misreading the Court’s opinion, I assume that its holding rests on the predicate that the concerted refusal to work overtime in this case, like the partial strike activity in Briggs-Stratton, is unprotected by § 7.

 A scholar who has criticized Briggs-Stratton has observed: “The omission of a federal prohibition against 'quickie’ strikes certainly could not have implied a desire that unions be free to embrace the tactic without restraint; congressional silence almost surely is attributable to the happy circumstance that no prohibition is urgently required because American labor unions have almost unanimously *158fected such tactics.” Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L, Rev. 1337, 1347 (1972).
The Union argues that Congress focused upon partial strike activity during passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, relying upon a provision passed by the House, but rejected in the Conference Committee, that declared unlawful “any sit-down strike or other concerted interference with an employer’s operations conducted by remaining on the employer’s premises.” H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 12 (a)(3)(A) (1947). See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28, 43-44 (1947); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 38-39, 42-43, 58-59 (1947). The concerted refusal to work overtime in this ease does not involve “concerted interference with an employer’s operations conducted by remaining on the employer’s premises.”

 In NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, the Court held that the partial strike activity in that case did not violate the union’s duty to bargain in good faith; in other words, even though the activity was not protected by § 7, it was not prohibited by § 8. Contrary to the Court’s implication, ante, at 141, the case did not hold that the States could not prohibit such activity, but only that the NLRB had not been authorized to do so. Congress’ failure to grant power over such activity to the NLRB hardly amounts to withdrawal of the same power from the States.
The Court’s quotation, Ibid., from Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U. S. 181, 187, when read in context, is nothing more than a reference to a statement in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, which poses, but does not answer, the question whether pre-emption extends to activity that is neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited.

 See n. 2, supra.

 I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that the holding in Briggs-Stratton, overruled today, numbers among those that have been eroded rather than preserved. See ante, at 151-154, and n. 12. The decision in Insurance Agents, supra, is readily distinguishable. See n. 3, supra. It is true that Briggs-Stratton has been limited to its facts insofar as it sanctions judicial determination whether conduct arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 is actually protected or prohibited. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 291; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, at 245 n. 4; see Insurance Agents, supra, at 492-494, and nn. 22, 23. But the rule established in Garmon, and reaffirmed in Lockridge, is fully consistent with the conclusion that the States may regulate conduct that is neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited.