Court Opinion

ID: 9639842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:49:52.612591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:22.316889
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Reargument
Adams, J.
The defendants claim in their motion that this Court was in error in considering their exception to finding 9 and construing the deed, plaintiff’s exhibit 1, as conveying to the plaintiff the title in fee to the land in question, instead of conveying only an easement therein. They say the opinion states that the parties "agreed 'that the plaintiff acquired title in fee to the area in dispute by the deed’.” The opinion does not so state. The whole opinion shows that the rights acquired by the deed were the very essence of the dispute. The opinion at the place questioned by the defendants simply states that the chancellor meant by the finding that *245the plaintiff acquired title in fee and that the parties so treat the finding.
The defendants now claim that the deed in question was a release although in the form of a deed because of the wording of the third paragraph following the particular description of the land in question. They now call attention to three pages in their brief pertaining to their exception to part of finding 9. They did not therein specifically call attention to the paragraph now relied upon. They did in one sentence only mention that the plaintiff obtained a full release and discharge. In considering finding 9 which set forth the deed in full and the defendants’ exception to a part thereof, we did not fail to consider the entire deed. It is plain that the paragraph now relied upon did not limit the grant of the land specifically described in the first paragraph of the deed as subsequent paragraphs granted additional rights for fills, culverts and' other works and structures adjacent to the land particularly described.
The defendants now rely upon Robinson v. Missisquoi R. R. Co., 59 Vt 426, 10 A 522. They did not cite or rely upon it in their original brief. We cited the case in the opinion. We stated that this Court there held that the deed in question in that case conveyed only an easement and distinguished that deed from the one in the instant case because the deed in that case contained in the description of the land certain qualifying words. We see no reason to change our opinion in that regard.
The defendants also claim in their motion that the opinion deprives them of ingress and'egress and other valuable property rights. They say that a piece of land is much more valuable when it adjoins a throughway than when it is 49 H and 24 feet from the travelled highway and behind a general parking lot. The land in question between their land and the now travelled highway is not to be used for a general parking lot. It is to be used only for parking in connection with off-highway usage. The opinion does not leave it as they claim. The defendants’ right of ingress and egress is protected by the order in the opinion for a modification of the injunction so that they have the right of reasonable ingress and egress to *246the travelled part of the highway. See Nelson v. State Highway Board, 110 Vt 44, 53-54, 1 A2d 689, 118 ALR 915.
The trouble with the defendants’ position is that their whole case is based upon the false premise that the plaintiff had only an easement for public travel over the land in question rather than title in fee.
The present motion calls to our attention no material question that has not received careful consideration in arriving at the conclusion which we have announced, and which we see no reason to alter.

Motion for reargument denied. Let full entry go down.