Court Opinion

ID: 9629881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:51:42.950838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:26.061916
License: Public Domain

Hale, J.
(dissenting) — The attorney for the appellant, on cross-examination, attempted to impeach the credibility of the state’s principal witness, Michael McClarron, an accomplice to the robbery by asking the following question:
By Mr. Cronk: . . . Q. You also admitted a couple of other robberies, is that correct? A. Yes, this is true.
On redirect examination Mr. Atkinson, attorney for the *25state, asked the following question and the following occurred:
By Mr. Atkinson: . . . Q. All right. With regard to the couple of other robberies, then, that Mr. Cronk asked you about, who was with you on those robberies? Mr. Cronk: Objection, your Honor. Mr. Atkinson: This was raised in cross examination. The Court: It is within the scope of his examination. Mr. Atkinson: He opened this up. Mr. Cronk: It wasn’t brought in regarding this defendant, your Honor. Mr. Atkinson: It would be proper examination on direct. Mr. Cronk: They asked him if he had admitted being at some other robbery. The Court: I am going to overrule the objection now. Q. (By Mr. Atkinson) First of all, when were the other robberies? A. I don’t know. Sometime afterwards. Q. Both on the same night? A. No. Q. Different nights? A. Yes. Q. Who was with you? A. The same two gentlemen. Q. The same gentlemen? A. Yes. Q. Mack both times? A. (Whereupon, the witness nodded his head in the affirmative.) Mr. Atkinson: That is all I have.
Recross Examination
By Mr. Cronk: Q. Do you recall when these other robberies were? A. Huh? Q. Were you charged with these other robberies? A. Yes. Q. Not in Superior Court? A. No. Mr. Cronk: No further questions.
The majority hold that the eminent trial judge erred when, in the proper exercise of his discretion, he permitted the questioned evidence to be considered by the jury. I do not agree with the majority for the following reasons:
(1) The questioned evidence was invited by the appellant, when his counsel asked the question, “You also admitted a couple of other robberies, is that correct?”
In State v. Gefeller, 76 Wn.2d 449, 455, 458 P.2d 17 (1969), this court said:
It would be a curious rule of evidence which allowed one party to bring up a subject, drop it at a point where it might appear advantageous to him, and then bar the other party from all further inquiries about it. Rules of evidence are designed to aid in establishing the truth. To close the door after receiving only a part of the evidence not only leaves the matter suspended in air at a point *26markedly advantageous to the party who opened the door, but might well limit the proof to half-truths. Thus, it is a sound general rule that, when a party opens up a subject of inquiry on direct or cross-examination, he contemplates1 that the rules will permit cross-examination or redirect examination, as the case may be, within the scope of the examination in which the subject matter was first introduced. State v. Stevens, 69 Wn.2d 906, 421 P.2d 360 (1966); [Citing cases.].
The trial court properly applied the rule announced by this court in the Gefeller case and held that the state’s redirect examination was within the scope of the subject matter of the appellant’s invited inquiry. The majority opinion totally ignores this salient issue. In my opinion the door was opened by the appellant, and to deny further inquiry by the state limits the proof to only a half-truth.
(2) The statement was not prejudicial to the appellant, tie testified in his own behalf and denied any participation with Michael McClarron in any robberies. The evidence did not affect the credibility of the appellant for the reason stated in the majority opinion, “A witness’s credibility can be attacked by evidence of prior convictions, but not by evidence of alleged criminal acts” When the appellant’s attorney Cronk attempted to impeach the testimony of the state’s witness Mr. McClarron he did not inquire about prior convictions, but only of Michael McClarron’s participation in other robberies. The evidence, therefore, was not prejudicial to either the state or appellant.
(3) The rule is that evidence of unrelated crimes may not be admitted, except where such evidence shows motive, intent, absence of accident or mistake, a common scheme or plan, identity, or is somehow relevant and necessary to prove an essential ingredient of the crime charged. State v. Mott, 74 Wn.2d 804, 447 P.2d 85 (1968). The majority opinion admits the rule and categorically holds “The testimony elicited [by the state] herein was not admissible under any of the above exceptions.” I do not agree. The evidence in question falls squarely within the exception announced in the cases cited. The record established that within a 3-*27month period the trio had engaged in a “common scheme or plan” to commit three robberies, the first of which was the one at the Alibi Tavern. Whether the evidence of the three robberies did in fact establish a “common scheme or plan” was a jury determination. The jury resolved the factual determination in favor of the state by the unanimous verdict of guilty.
(4) Finally, it has often been said by this court that an appellant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. State v. Ingle, 64 Wn.2d 491, 392 P.2d 442 (1964). The rule applied by the majority leaves little doubt that the perfect trial rule is now the Washington rule. In my opinion the Court of Appeals properly held that considering the “backdrop” of the evidence the appellant did receive a fair trial. I add to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals a further reason that “when a party opens up a subject of inquiry on . . . cross-examination, he contemplates that the rules will permit . . . redirect examination . . . within the scope of the examination in which the subject matter was first introduced.” State v. Gefeller, supra, and cited cases. In my opinion there can be no question that the redirect examination was “within the scope” of the subject matter so introduced.
The judgment, in my opinion, should be affirmed.
Ott, J. Pro Tem., concurs with Hale, J.