Court Opinion

ID: 9409364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 21:03:42.030872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.089438
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/17/23 Valencia v. Valencia CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 MARTHA DIAZ VALENCIA,                                          B320164

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                             Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BD632673
           v.

 MANUEL VALENCIA, JR.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rolf M. Treu, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

     The Law Offices of Kurt Bier and Kurt Bier for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

         No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
                     _________________________
       Martha Diaz Valencia (Diaz) filed a petition to dissolve
her marriage to Manuel Valencia, Jr. (Valencia), but she did
not identify any community property for the court to divide.
Five years after the court entered judgment of dissolution,
Diaz petitioned the court to divide three properties in which she
claimed a community property interest. The court refused to
do so on the basis that Diaz had failed to identify the properties
in her petition for dissolution. On appeal, Diaz argues the court
is required under Family Code section 2556 to adjudicate the
properties. We agree and reverse the order.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In January 2016, Diaz filed a petition for dissolution of
her marriage to Valencia. In a section of the petition related to
community and quasi-community property, Diaz checked a box
stating: “There are no such assets or debts that I know of to be
divided by the court.”
       Valencia did not respond to the petition, and the court
entered default judgment of dissolution in May 2016. The
judgment states there are no property “assets or debts subject
to disposition by the court in this proceeding.”
       Just over five years later, in July 2021, Diaz filed a petition
asking the court to divide three properties: 1242 E. 35th Street,
1917 E. 114th Street, and 1525 Starz Street. In a declaration
attached to the petition, Diaz said that, although the dissolution
judgment states there are no community assets or debts, “[t]his
is not true. The Respondent, Mr. Valencia, and I purchased
three properties while married, none of which were divided by
the judgment.”
       According to Diaz, she did not include the three properties
in the dissolution petition because “Valencia demanded that I not

                                  2
include them. During the marriage, Mr. Valencia would threaten
me and my family and force me to sign various documents related
to the properties and made me believe that I had no interest
in them. After discussing the issue with legal professionals,
I realize that I do have an interest.” Diaz said she tried to
resolve the issues informally, but Valencia told her he would
“rather burn down the properties than give me anything.”
       In a declaration opposing the petition, Valencia claimed
Diaz had completed and filed the dissolution petition without his
input or participation. According to Valencia, Diaz has a degree
in criminal justice, has been employed at law firms for decades,
and is “highly educated and skilled in litigation tactics.”
       Valencia claimed he purchased the Starz Street property
after the dissolution, but he acknowledged that he and Diaz
purchased the other two properties during their marriage.
According to Valencia, Diaz waived her interest in the properties
because they were not worth much at the time. In return, Diaz
took control of three other properties they had purchased during
their marriage, which were worth significantly more than the
properties she left for Valencia.
       At the hearing on the petition, Diaz’s counsel argued
the court should conduct a trial to determine how to divide
the omitted assets. The court, instead, denied the petition,
apparently on the basis that Diaz had not identified the
properties in the dissolution petition. The court explained it
was “very concerned that a person so admittedly experienced
in litigation would sign under penalty of perjury matters that
she now considers to be untrue. . . . [T]he court warns petitioner
that stating things under penalty of perjury which she later

                                3
admits are not true may very well have consequences for her
in a professional and/or legal sense.”
       Diaz timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       “Under California law, a spouse’s entitlement to a share
of the community property arises at the time that the property
is acquired. [Citations.] That interest is not altered except by
judicial decree or an agreement between the parties. Hence
‘under settled principles of California community property law,
“property which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community
property is left unadjudicated by decree of divorce, and is
subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in common
meanwhile.” ’ [Citations.] This rule applies to partial divisions
of community property as well as divorces unaccompanied by
any property adjudication whatsoever.” (Henn v. Henn (1980)
26 Cal.3d 323, 330 (Henn).)
       Originally, a former spouse was required to file a separate
action in equity to adjudicate community property that was not
divided in a dissolution judgment. (See In re Marriage of Huntley
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1059 (Huntley).) In 1992, the
Legislature enacted Family Code section 2556, which grants
courts in dissolution of marriage proceedings continuing
jurisdiction to award community assets that have not been
previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceedings.
(Fam. Code, § 2556.) Under the statute, a party may “file a
postjudgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding
in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset
or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. In these
cases, the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated
community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon

                                4
good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal
division of the asset or liability.” (Ibid.)
       The fact that a party was aware of an asset when the court
entered judgment does not preclude the party from requesting
the court divide it at a later time. (See Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d
at p. 330; Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060 [Family Code
“[s]ection 2556 applies even when former spouses were aware
of the community property at the time the dissolution judgment
was entered”]; Huddleson v. Huddleson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d
1564, 1569 [a “missed asset” is subject to a post dissolution claim,
regardless of whether the parties knew of it or discussed it before
the court entered judgment].)
       Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d 323 is instructive. In that case,
the family court entered judgment of dissolution incorporating
the parties’ property settlement, which awarded each party
specific items of community property as their separate property.
(Id. at p. 326.) Several years later, the wife filed an action
seeking adjudication of the husband’s pension, which the
judgment did not address. (Id. at p. 327.) The California
Supreme Court held the wife was not precluded from asserting
her community property interest in the pension, despite her
failure to identify it during the dissolution action. The high court
explained the wife’s interest in the husband’s pension “arose
independent of and predates the original decree of dissolution
and property settlement. This interest was separate and distinct
from her interest in the items of community property which were
divided at the time of the dissolution. Since it is conceded that
the issue of [the husband’s] military pension was not before
the court which issued the final decree, the judgment of that

                                 5
court cannot be said to have extinguished [the wife’s] putative
interest in that asset.” (Id. at p. 330.)
       Here, it is undisputed the dissolution judgment did not
adjudicate the three properties that Diaz identified in her July
2021 petition. Accordingly, the properties remain “ ‘ “subject
to future litigation.” ’ ” (Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 330.) If
the court determines the assets are community property, under
Family Code section 2556, it must divide them equally unless
it finds the interests of justice require an unequal division. (Fam.
Code, § 2556.) Although Diaz’s significant delay in identifying
the properties might be relevant to the court’s equitable division,
it does not provide grounds for the court to refuse to consider
the issue altogether, as it seems to have done here. (See Huntley,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061 [“Although it is undisputed [the
former wife] handled the finances during the marriage and was
aware of the very community property she sought to have divided
under section 2556, her knowledge did not provide a basis for
denying her motion.”].)

                                 6
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed. On remand, the court shall conduct
further proceedings to determine whether Diaz has a community
interest in the properties and, if so, how to divide the properties
between the parties. Martha Diaz Valencia is awarded her costs
on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

                                 7