Court Opinion

ID: 9411370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 17:07:29.333133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.429064
License: Public Domain

J-S23027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                V.                               :
                                                 :
  JUSTIN HUDSON                                  :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :   No. 2656 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2022,
            in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002494-2020.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                                 FILED JULY 26, 2023

       Justin Hudson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after he

was convicted of sexual offenses.1             He challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his convictions. He also requests reconsideration of this

Court’s denial of his motion to remand to raise a weight-of-the-evidence claim

before the trial court. We affirm Hudson’s judgment of sentence and deny his

motion for reconsideration.

       On February 20, 2020, Hudson was watching his six-year-old niece K.J.

at her grandmother’s house. Later that day, K.J. told her older sister, who in

turn told their mother, that Hudson touched her inappropriately.             Police

____________________________________________

1 Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, unlawful contact with a

minor, statutory sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a
child, corruption of minors, and indecent exposure. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b),
6318(a)(1), 3122.1(b), 3124.1, 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 3127(a).
J-S23027-23

charged Hudson in connection with the incident and arrested him the next

day. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial.

         At trial, K.J. testified that Hudson had walked her up to his bedroom,

pulled down her pants and underwear, and licked her vagina.           K.J. ran

downstairs and then Hudson ran downstairs with his pants off, exposing his

“bottom part.” K.J. testified that Hudson called her mother to come pick her

up. She later told her older sister, who told her mother.

         The trial court found Hudson guilty of the above crimes. On September

30, 2022, the court sentenced Hudson to an aggregate term of 8 to 16 years

of imprisonment followed by 7 years of probation. Hudson did not file a post-

sentence motion.

         Hudson timely appealed on October 19, 2022. Hudson’s present counsel

then entered an appearance. On November 8, 2022, the trial court ordered

Hudson to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within

21 days. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Meanwhile, on November 10, 2022, Hudson

moved this Court to remand his case to the trial court so that he could file a

post-sentence motion “to argue that the verdict entered in the [trial court] is

against the weight of the evidence” and preserve a corresponding appellate

argument.       This Court denied Hudson’s remand motion per curiam on

December 8, 2022, without prejudice for Hudson to raise his issue again in his

brief.

         In the trial court, Hudson filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on December

9, 2022, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at all counts. On January

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9, 2023, the trial court entered an opinion reasoning that Hudson may have

waived his claim by failing to specify which elements of each crime were not

proven and that Hudson’s credibility-based challenge implicates the weight,

not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/22, at 2–3. On

the merits, the trial court found that K.J.’s testimony that Hudson licked her

vagina while he watched her after school and then exposed his genitals was

sufficient to establish Hudson’s guilt of all relevant crimes. Id. at 4–8.

      Mindful of this procedural history, we turn to the merits of Hudson’s

appeal. Because the trial court was able to address the issues in Hudson’s

untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we may as well. See Commonwealth v.

Burton, 973 A.3d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009). Hudson presents two matters

for review:

      1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to support [Hudson’s]
         convictions for Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse,
         Statutory Sexual Assault, Corruption of Minors, and all
         remaining lesser included offenses, where there was no DNA
         evidence corroborating the alleged child victim’s allegations of
         sexual assault, and the testimony of the Complainant was
         replete with inconsistencies and falsehoods?

      2. [Hudson] respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
         reconsider its decision to deny [Hudson’s] Motion for Remand,
         where [Hudson’s] prior counsel did not file [a] post sentence
         motion, which precluded [Hudson] from filing [a] meritorious
         weight of the evidence claim.

Hudson’s Brief at 6.

      Hudson’s first issue concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support

all of his convictions. He notes that testing of swabs collected from K.J. did

not detect any male DNA. He also highlights several inconsistencies between

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K.J.’s statements before and during trial. K.J. had told her older sister that

Hudson licked her when they were downstairs watching a movie and that he

took her to the store afterward.      K.J. had recounted to her mother an

additional exchange with Hudson about having to pee when he licked her. And

K.J. had told the forensic interviewer that she was wearing a skirt. However,

at trial, K.J. testified that the abuse happened upstairs when she was wearing

a shirt, tights, and underwear; she denied watching a movie or going to the

store; and she did not mention telling Hudson that she had to pee. Hudson

submits that these inconsistencies render K.J.’s testimony insufficient to

sustain any of his convictions.

      The Commonwealth responds that K.J.’s testimony alone was sufficient

to establish Hudson’s guilt. It echoes the trial court’s reasoning that Hudson’s

attack on K.J.’s credibility conflates a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence with an argument about the weight of the evidence.

      On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard

of review is de novo and scope of review is plenary.      Commonwealth v.

Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189 (Pa. Super. 2018).             “When reviewing a

sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner giving [that party, here] the prosecution[,] the

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”        Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000)).

      Notably, a court reviewing evidentiary sufficiency does not substitute its

own judgment (or a party’s judgment) for the judgment of the fact-finder,

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including passing on the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Palo,

24 A.3d 1050, 1054–55 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Bruce,

916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007)). An argument directed only to witness

credibility is therefore a challenge to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the

evidence. Id. at 1055. In a sufficiency challenge, we recognize that the fact-

finder was free to believe all, part, or none of the trial testimony. Id.

      However, a line of cases (not cited by Hudson) recognizes that some

testimony may be “either so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict

based thereon obviously       the   result   of conjecture   and not    reason.”

Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545, 550 (Pa. 1976) (citing

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 303 A.2d 220 (Pa. Super. 1973)).                   In that

situation, the evidence is insufficient to allow the Commonwealth to meet its

burden of proof. See id. at 550–51. For example, when the complainant in

a rape case testified at various points in trial to contradict any possible time

that the alleged rapes occurred, the evidence was insufficient to support a

guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1171–72 (Pa.

1993).

      By precedent and statute, a complainant’s testimony does not need to

be corroborated to constitute sufficient evidence of a sexual offense.

Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1994)

(citing Commonwealth v. Gabrielson, 536 A.2d 401 (Pa. Super. 1988));

see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3106. Further, a lack of DNA evidence does not render

the remaining evidence insufficient. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875

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A.2d 1141, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“In DNA as in other areas, an absence of

evidence is not evidence of absence.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Heilman,

867 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa. Super. 2005))).

      Here, Hudson’s sufficiency challenge turns on inconsistencies in K.J.’s

statements and the lack of DNA evidence. While fundamental inconsistencies

in a witness’ trial testimony may render that evidence insufficient to sustain a

guilty verdict, as in Karkaria, such is not the case here. K.J. testified that

Hudson licked her vagina on a specific occasion when he was watching her

and later exposed his “bottom part” to her. The trial court, sitting as finder of

fact, was free to believe this testimony, regardless of the other details that

K.J.’s mother and sister and the forensic examiner reported hearing. Palo,

24 A.3d at 1055. This holds even despite the lack of corroborating testimony

or physical evidence. Poindexter, supra; Brooks, supra.

      Considering K.J.’s testimony, Hudson licking her vagina meets the

relevant definitions for sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse,

which include “intercourse per os” (by mouth).       18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101; see

Commonwealth v. Westcott, 532 A.2d 1140, 1145–47 (Pa. Super. 1987)

(holding “penetration of the vagina by the tongue” meets these definitions).

This is the action underlying Hudson’s first six convictions. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), 3122.1(b), 3124.1, 4304(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(ii).

And Hudson exposing his genitals as he ran down the stairs after K.J.

establishes his seventh, indecent exposure. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a). To the

extent Hudson wishes to challenge other elements of these offenses, he has

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waived his argument by failing to specify which elements he contests. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257–58 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(finding a sufficiency challenge waived for failure to articulate which elements

were not established at trial).

      In sum, the trial court was free to believe K.J.’s testimony, which was

sufficient to establish Hudson’s guilt for his seven convictions. Hudson’s first

issue fails.

      Hudson’s second issue is a request for reconsideration of this Court’s

denial of his motion to remand. He wishes to file a post-sentence motion in

the trial court claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Hudson accurately observes that his prior counsel’s failure to file a post-

sentence motion waived the weight-of-the-evidence claim for appeal. See

Palo, 24 A.3d at 1055 (citing Commonwealth v. Mack, 850 A.2d 690 (Pa.

Super. 2004)).

      The Commonwealth responds that this matter is really a claim that

Hudson’s prior counsel was ineffective. Therefore, it submits that it should

not be raised on direct appeal but rather in a petition for post-conviction relief.

      At this juncture, we will deny Hudson’s request. In doing so, we note

that the trial court sat as fact-finder. “[I]t would be highly incongruous for a

trial judge presiding over a non-jury trial to find her own decision shocks her

conscience. . . . [A] judge in a non-jury trial has the dual duties of determining

the weight and admissibility of evidence. A trial court sitting as fact-finder is

unlikely to find, in response to a post-sentence motion, that it reached a

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verdict contrary to the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Matthews, No. 125

MDA 2020, 2020 WL 7047114, at *5 (Pa. Super. Dec. 1, 2020) (non-

precedential memorandum) (Strassburger, J., concurring). “Although weight

of the evidence claims have been addressed in non-jury cases, there is a

logical inconsistency in asking a trial judge to conclude that [her] non-jury

decision shocked [her] own conscience.” Commonwealth v. Wise, 2022 WL

2442141, at *5 (Pa. Super. July 5, 2022) (non-precedential memorandum).

     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Motion for reconsideration of request

to remand denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2023

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