Court Opinion

ID: 9965717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:02:21.14155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:35.021127
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 3, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                   Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2023-0611
                                   _________________________

                                    Colton Trent Ketchum

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                          Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
                                    (CC-21-2979)

KELLUM, Judge.

        The        appellant,        Colton        Trent       Ketchum,           was       convicted         of

manslaughter, see § 13A-6-3, Ala. Code 1975, for hitting Edward Louis

Rivers, Jr., with a vehicle and causing his death. He was sentenced to 20
CR-2023-0611

years in prison. 1   Ketchum gave oral notice of appeal at his sentence

hearing.

     The State's evidence tended to show that in the early morning hours

of March 2, 2021, a hunter discovered Rivers's body lying face down on a

rural road. The hunter testified that Rivers was moving one leg and was

"making a moaning sound." (R. 101.) The hunter telephoned emergency

911. Rivers died later that day from his injuries. The medical examiner

testified that Rivers had numerous injuries to his body and that the

injuries to his head were so extensive that his skull surface was visible

and "brain material was herniating" from the wound. (R. 236.)

     Lauren Finney testified that in 2021 she was in a relationship with

Ketchum and that on March 2 Ketchum telephoned her to come and pick

him up because his vehicle had broken down. (R. 137.)    Finney went to

pick Ketchum up, and she got out of the driver's seat of her vehicle and

went to the passenger's seat. Finney said that she had taken "four Xanax

     1Ketchum was indicted for murder, see § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975,

but was convicted of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.

                                   2
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bars and two footballs and [she] couldn't sit up at that point." 2 (R. 137.)

She testified:

     "[Prosecutor]: At that point, when did [Ketchum] get in the
     car?

     "[Finney]: When I pulled up beside his aunt, Amanda Taylor's
     car, I pulled into the middle of the road and stopped there
     beside her and I got out and I said, 'I don't know where
     [Ketchum] is. Like, where is [Ketchum]? Wake him up.'
     Because she told me he was asleep. And I said, 'Well, you're
     going to have to make him drive,' and I got in my passenger
     seat and he got in the driver's seat after he was woken up. He
     was asleep in the backseat of his aunt's car."

(R. 138.) Ketchum drove to his aunt's house and Rivers asked them for a

ride home. During the drive, she said, Ketchum and Rivers argued over

a gun that Rivers had that belonged to Ketchum. When they arrived at

Rivers's mother's house Ketchum told Rivers to go inside the house and

get his gun. Finney testified: "They just went to arguing again and

[Rivers] just jumped out of the car and said, 'All right. Today I'm fixing

to raise you little boy. I'm fixing to show you today.' " (R. 141.) She said

that when Rivers made this statement, he was holding a metal bar.

Finney testified:

     2Finney explained on cross-examination that a bar of Xanax was

two milligrams and that a "football" was "normally one milligram of
Xanax." (R. 153.)
                                     3
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     "[Prosecutor]: Where did [Rivers] go when he got out of the
     car?

     "[Finney]: He came around the front of the headlight on the
     passenger's side coming to the driver's side to drag
     [Ketchum] out.

     "[Prosecutor]: What -- How far did he get around the car?

     "[Finney]: He got to my headlight, my passenger headlight.

     "[Prosecutor]: And then what happened?

     "[Finney]: [Ketchum] hit the gas.

     "[Prosecutor]: Did [Ketchum] say anything?

     "[Finney]: No, not at that point. No, he had pulled off.

     "[Prosecutor]: Did [Rivers] disappear?

     "[Finney]: Honestly, I don't remember [Rivers] falling. I
     don't remember seeing [Rivers] being hit. I don't remember
     anything at that point but coming back to at the stop sign."

(R. 142.) She realized that Rivers was dead after she saw the news later

that night. (R. 145.) Finney testified that she tried to get Ketchum to

agree to go to the police but, she said, Ketchum was terrified. They left

her vehicle, a Honda Pilot, on a friend's property.

     Officer Roland Frye of the Mobile County Sheriff's Department

identified several photographs that showed blood splatter on various

                                    4
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sections of the undercarriage of the Honda. Forensic tests conducted on

that blood showed that it matched Rivers's DNA. (R. 260.)

     Officer Jonathan Rivers of the Mobile County Sheriff's Office

testified that he transported Ketchum from the Washington County jail

to Mobile. He said that Ketchum was very talkative and that during the

drive Ketchum made a "spontaneous statement." At one point when they

were driving though Citronelle, he said, Ketchum thought that he saw

his mother and he asked if Off. Rivers would " 'tell his mother that he did

not mean to kill that man.' " (R. 214.)

     On appeal, Ketchum raises the following issues.

                                    I.

     Ketchum first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his

requested jury instruction regarding "how the jury could consider the

evidence of Finney's bad character in determining whether to credit any

of her testimony." (Ketchum's brief at p. 13.) 3

     3Finney testified on cross-examination that she had a severe drug

problem and that she had previously hit a United States Marshall and a
former boyfriend with a vehicle she was driving. In his defense, Ketchum
presented several witnesses who testified to the extent of Finney's drug
use.

                                    5
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     The record shows that Ketchum's requested jury instruction

number 10 read: " 'I charge you ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if the

evidence convinces you that Lauren Kinney[ 4] is a woman of bad

character and unworthy of belief, then you may disregard her evidence

altogether.' Ashlock v. State, 367 So. 2d 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)." (C.

215.) On this instruction is the handwritten note: "Given as modified."

At the charge conference, a lengthy discussion was held on this requested

instruction. (R. 302-310.) The circuit court noted that it would not give

an instruction that named a specific witness and that the instruction

unnecessarily called attention to the witness's gender. The circuit court

indicated: "I will say you may consider any testimony regarding a

witness's bad character, along with all of these other things that I talk

about in the credibility charge. And to that extent, I will give it as

modified." (R. 310.) The circuit court gave the following instruction:

           "There are certain principles of law which may help you
     in arriving at a verdict. It is your duty to try to reconcile all
     the testimony so that each witness will have spoken the truth.
     In the event that it is not possible to reconcile the testimony,
     then you may determine for yourselves wherein the truth lies
     And in so doing, you may accept or reject any part of the

     4The  requested instruction spells this witness's last name as
"Kinney." However, the record states that her name is "Finney." (C. 215;
R. 134.)
                                    6
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     testimony of any witness in this case and consider only the
     testimony that you consider to be worthy of belief.

           "In determining what the true facts are, you may take
     into consideration any natural interest or bias that a witness
     has as a result of any connection with the case. You may take
     into consideration the demeanor of the witness on the witness
     stand, such as whether the witness testified frankly or
     evasively. You may also consider any evidence offered of the
     bad character of any witness. You may in short use your good
     common sense in trying to arrive at the truth and find out
     what the true facts are.

            "There is another principle of law that is applicable. In
     the event that you determine that any witness after being
     sworn has intentionally testified falsely to any material fact,
     then you in your discretion may disregard that witness's
     entire testimony. The principle of law is based on a theory
     that if a witness has intentionally testified falsely as to one
     material fact while under oath, he or she may well testify
     falsely to other material facts This does not apply in cases
     where a witness is confused or his or her memory might be a
     little vague because of a lapse of time, but only where you feel
     that under oath he or she has intentionally testified falsely to
     a fact that was material."

(R. 358-59.)

     At the conclusion of the charges, Ketchum made no objection to the

circuit court's failure to give his requested charge on bad-character

evidence.5 Also, at the charge conference when the circuit court indicated

     5The only objection was to the circuit court's failure to give a charge

on voluntary intoxication. (R. 367.) The circuit court noted that the
defense had never submitted a request for an intoxication instruction and
                                    7
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that it would give a modified charge on Ketchum's requested charge,

Ketchum made no objection. Rule 21.3, Ala. R. Crim. P. provides:

           "No party may assign as error the court's giving or
     failing to give a written instruction, or the giving of an
     erroneous, misleading, incomplete, or otherwise improper oral
     charge, unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires
     to consider its verdict, stating the matter to which he or she
     objects and the grounds of the objection. Opportunity shall be
     given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury."

     In Buford v. State, 891 So. d 423 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), this Court

stated:

     " 'The defendant is required to state with particularity the
     grounds of his objection to the court's refusal to give a
     requested charge.' Miller v. State, 673 So. 2d 819, 820 (Ala.
     Crim. App. 1995). Finally, '[i]n order to preserve for review
     an objection to the giving or the denial of a jury instruction, it
     is necessary for the appellant to state for the record upon what
     specific grounds the objection is made.' Cauley v. State, 681
     So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)."

891 So. 2d at 431. Thus, this issue is not properly preserved for review

on appeal.

     Moreover, Ketchum argues that according to this Court's holding in

Ashlock v. State, 367 So. 2d 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), the circuit court

erred in declining to give his requested instruction. The State argues

defense counsel stated: "Then I won't except that if I didn't give you one."
(R. 367.)
                                     8
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that the requested charge was, in substance, given. It further argues

that it was reasonable for the court to give a general instruction on bad

character because both the State and the defense had presented

witnesses "with notable character deficiencies." (State's brief at p. 23.)

Lastly, the State argues that the circuit court's failure to give the

requested instruction was harmless error.

     In Ashlock the requested charge read: "I charge you, gentlemen of

the jury, if the evidence convinces you that Wanda Cassidy is a woman

of bad character, and unworthy of belief, then you may disregard her

evidence altogether." Ashlock, 367 So. 2d at 560. We held that the circuit

court erred in failing to give the instruction because evidence had been

presented of Cassidy's bad character. "Under the evidence presented the

charge is not abstract as there was evidence of her 'bad character.' " 367

So. 2d at 561.

     Subsequent to Ashlock, this Court has relied on Ashlock to reverse

only one case for a circuit court's failure to give a similar instruction.

See Cook v. State, 437 So. 2d 1378 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). The Alabama

Supreme Court and this Court have affirmed the judgments in numerous

other cases that raised the Ashlock argument. See Ex parte Wright, 494

                                    9
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So. 2d 745, 748 (Ala. 1986) ("Because the requested charges were covered

by the trial court's oral charge and by other written charges to the same

effect, we find no error in the trial court's refusal of [the bad character

charge.]"); Dill v. State, 600 So. 2d 343, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("[A]ny

error in refusing to give the charge would have been harmless because

there were far more significant reasons for the jury to reject certain of

the witnesses's testimony other than for the reason that they were

persons of 'bad character'. … The jury was also thoroughly and properly

instructed on those other reasons. Thus, even had a correct charge been

presented, any error would have been harmless."); Adams v. State, 587

So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("In [Ashlock] there was clear

evidence of the witness's bad character. No such evidence is revealed,

after careful review of the record, in the case now before us. In fact, the

defense in this case did not call any witnesses to testify at trial. Defense

counsel did, however, during cross-examination elicit certain testimony

concerning the lifestyle of the victim; however, nothing even remotely

rising to the showing of bad character in [Ashlock] was testified to during

this trial."); Connolly v. State, 539 So. 2d 436, 438 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)

(issue not preserved for review on appeal because no specific objection

                                     10
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was made at trial); Singletary v. State, 473 So. 2d 556, 576 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1984) ("Ashlock is clearly distinguishable from the instant case in

that in Ashlock the error of the trial court that required a reversal of the

case was in the refusal by the trial court of a charge requested in writing

by defendant setting forth the principle urged by appellant as to the

significance or value of character evidence, which defendant did not

present to the trial court by a requested written charge or otherwise.").

     Here, Ketchum admitted to Off. Rivers that he was driving the

vehicle that hit the victim when he asked Off. Rivers to tell his mother

that "he did not mean to kill that man." (R. 214.) The circuit court gave

an instruction similar to the instruction that the Court relied on in Ex

parte Wright to find no reversible error in a court's failure to give a

similar charge. 6   Also, as we noted in Dill, there were "far more

significant reasons for the jury to reject certain of [Finney's] testimony

other than for the reason that [she was a] person of 'bad character.' " 600

     6In Wright v. State, 494 So. 2d 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), this

Court discussed the instruction at length and held, in part, that the
failure to give the requested instruction was harmless. On certiorari
review, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it did not need to reach
the issue whether the instruction was harmless because the substance of
the requested instruction had been given. See Ex parte Wright, 494 So.
2d at 748.
                                    11
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So. 2d at 353. Indeed, Finney testified that she had remembered little

about what happened that night because of her extensive drug use that

evening. "The jury was … thoroughly and properly instructed on those

other reasons. Thus, even had a correct charge been presented, any error

[in refusing to give it] would have been harmless." Dill, 600 So. 2d at

353. Based on the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Wright

and this Court's holding in Dill, we find no reversible error because the

substance of the requested charge was given and any possible error in

failing to give the full requested instruction was harmless.       For the

foregoing reasons, Ketchum is due no relief on this claim.

                                    II.

     Ketchum next argues that the circuit court erred in failing to hold

a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of his

statement to a police officer. On appeal, the State argues that Ketchum

did not request a hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the circuit

court's procedure was proper, and that Ketchum's statement was a

spontaneous statement not governed by the Miranda7 predicate.

     7Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                    12
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     Off. Jonathan Rivers testified that he transported Ketchum from

the Washington County jail to Mobile. The prosecutor questioned Off.

Rivers about the drive and Off. Rivers testified that Ketchum was very

talkative and that he made a "spontaneous statement" to him. (R. 207.)

Ketchum's first objection to the admission of the statement was that

there was no proper predicate. The circuit court told the prosecutor to

lay a predicate. (R. 207.) A few questions later, defense counsel again

objected and said that there had been nothing to suggest that the

statement had been made voluntarily. (R. 208.) The circuit court again

stated that the prosecutor should lay a proper predicate. Several minutes

later defense counsel objected a third time and stated that the prosecutor

had not questioned Off. Rivers about the voluntariness of the statement.

At this point, the circuit court held a hearing outside the presence of the

jury and the following occurred:

     "[Defense counsel]: Judge, before a statement of [Ketchum]
     can be admissible, there is two-fold, one, of course, is the
     reading of the Miranda rights; secondly, they have to show --
     the State has to show that it was voluntarily made. So we
     don't know anything about the condition of [Ketchum] when
     he's put in the back of the car. We know it's a custodial
     environment. The deputy has testified that he had been
     making conversation with [Ketchum], but we don't know what
     he said. And they have to show there has been no promises
     made, no inducements, and you don't -- doesn't have to be

                                    13
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     anything in great manner, it can be something innocuous. It
     can be also -- we don't know if any threats are made, if he's
     under drugs or alcohol, you know, the condition of [Ketchum]
     at all. He just got pulled out of jail, if he's discombobulated
     mentally. Probably this should be taken up outside the
     presence of the jury to get the full predicate in to see if he can
     do it, but I think he has to do it as a matter of law for the
     Court, and then, again, as a matter of fact for the jury.

     "THE COURT: I think it does have to be done as a matter of
     fact for the jury. I mean, I think I can do it at the same time.
     I don't think that's required that it be bifurcated under these
     types of circumstances. But I do think there needs to be a
     little bit more of a predicate with regards to threats or
     promises, voluntariness, coherency, that type of think, okay.

            "So to that -- [defense counsel], so to that limited extent,
     I'll sustain the objection at this time."

(R. 210-11.)

     The current law in Alabama is that if a defendant files a motion to

suppress a statement, he does not have to request that a hearing be held

outside the presence of the jury because such a hearing is mandatory.

     "Before the adoption of Rule 104, Ala. R. Evid., we held that
     '[A]n accused is not entitled to a hearing outside the presence
     of the jury unless he specifically requests one.' Cliff v. State,
     518 So. 2d 786, 791 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). Rule 104, Ala. R.
     Evid., which became effective January 1, 1996, makes
     mandatory a hearing on a motion to suppress outside the
     presence of the jury. See also Charles Gamble, McElroy's
     Alabama Evidence § 200.02(5) (5th ed. 1996)." 8

     8Rule 104(c), Ala. R. Evid., provides:

                                     14
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Lewis v. State, 27 So. 3d 600, 602 n. 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). However,

Rule 104 (c), Ala. R. Evid., imposes no duty on a judge to hold a hearing

outside the presence of the jury when no motion to suppress or challenge

to the evidence has been made.

     First, the cases cited by Ketchum in his brief to this Court involve

situations where the defendant filed a motion to suppress a confession or

statement. Here, the record shows that Ketchum made no written or oral

motion to suppress his statement. In fact, it was not until midway

through the questioning of Off. Rivers that Ketchum mentioned the

possibility of any type of hearing outside the jury's presence. Nor did

Ketchum present any argument or evidence to contradict the evidence

presented by Off. Rivers. "There is no reversible error in failing to hear

evidence on the voluntariness of a confession outside the presence of the

jury where there is no request for a hearing and there is no conflict in

           "In criminal cases, hearings on the admissibility of
     confessions or evidence alleged to have been obtained
     unlawfully shall be conducted out of the hearing and presence
     of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be
     conducted out of the hearing and presence of the jury when
     the interests of justice require."

(Emphasis added.)
                                   15
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evidence as to the voluntariness on the main trial." Reynolds v. State,

346 So. 2d 979, 983 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).

     Also, unlike Ketchum's argument at trial as quoted above, this

Court has noted that spontaneous statements are not governed by the

Miranda predicate. In Borden v. State, 401 So. 2d 802 (Ala. Crim. App.

1981), the defendant was "being escorted to the jail cell 'he was mumbling

under his voice in a bragging manner that he shot [the victim].' " 401 So.

2d at 802. This Court noted that "[t]he holding of Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not apply to

unsolicited volunteered statements. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630."

Borden, 401 So. 2d at 802.

     More recently in Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734 (Ala. Crim. App.

2014), we stated:

           "Because the undisputed evidence at the suppression
     hearing demonstrated that Shanklin made unsolicited
     statements to Chief Bobo, which were not in response to
     interrogation, Shanklin's statements to Chief Bobo do not fall
     within the purview of Miranda. Consequently, the circuit
     court did not err when it denied Shanklin's motion to suppress
     his statement to Chief Bobo as having been made in violation
     of Miranda."

187 So. 3d at 758. In reaching the conclusion that Shanklin's statement

was admissible, we noted that the State presented evidence indicating

                                   16
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that Shanklin made the unsolicited statement at the police station, that

Shanklin was asked no questions about the case, and that Shanklin was

not promised, threatened, or coerced in any way to make the statement.

See also Smith v. State, 489 So. 2d 638, 640 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("A

voluntary spontaneous statement made by an accused to police officers

before any questions have been asked is admissible against the accused

even though he has not been advised of his Miranda rights.").

     Here, Off. Rivers testified that Ketchum was very talkative on the

drive to Mobile. He testified that Ketchum was not given his Miranda

rights, that Ketchum was asked no questions involving the case, that

Ketchum was alert, that Ketchum did not appear to be intoxicated or be

suffering from any mental incapacity, that Ketchum made the statement

of his own free will, that Off. Rivers made no threats nor did he offer

Ketchum any deals, that he did not speak about the investigation with

Ketchum, that when he was passing through Citronelle Ketchum

thought that he saw his mother at a gas station, and that Ketchum said

to him " 'That's not my mom.' Then he asked me, 'To tell his mother that

he did not mean to kill that man.' " (R. 214.)

                                    17
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     Given the facts surrounding the statement and the fact that

Ketchum did not move to suppress his statement, we cannot say that the

circuit court abused its discretion in its handling of this evidence.

Moreover, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the circuit

court's ruling admitting the statement.

     Based on the foregoing, we affirm Ketchum's conviction for

manslaughter.

     AFFIRMED.

     Windom, P.J., and McCool and Minor, JJ., concur. Cole, J., concurs

in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

                                   18
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COLE, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

     Although I agree with the main opinion that the trial court did not

commit reversible error in instructing the jury on "bad-character

evidence," I would remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing on

the admissibility of Colton Trent Ketchum's statement that "he did not

mean to kill that man." (R. 214.) As to that portion of the opinion, I

respectfully dissent.

     The main opinion correctly outlines what transpired at trial in

relation to the admission of testimony of Ketchum's inculpatory

statement. Ketchum initially objected to Off. Rivers's testimony based

upon there being "no proper predicate laid." (R. 207.) This objection was

sustained, but after two additional questions related to Ketchum's

statement, Ketchum reasserted the "[s]ame objection," then expressly

argued that the prosecution had not "shown the statement [was]

voluntary" and that the State did not "talk about reading him any rights."

(R. 208.) After further testimony, Ketchum again asserted that there was

a "voluntariness question." (R. 209.) When allowed to state the grounds

for this "objection" outside the presence of the jury, Ketchum explained

in detail, as outlined in the main opinion, that this involved a "two-fold"

                                    19
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inquiry of voluntariness and the Miranda requirements, and stated that

"[p]robably this should be taken up outside the presence of the jury to get

the full predicate in to see if he can do it, but I think he has to do it as a

matter of law for the Court, and then, again, as a matter of fact for the

jury." (R. 211 (emphasis added).) The trial court instructed the State

that there needed "to be a little bit more of a predicate with regards to

threats or promises, voluntariness, coherency, that type of thing," but

held that the proceedings did not need to be "bifurcated under these type

of circumstances." (R. 211.) After further testimony explaining what had

transpired before Ketchum made the statement in question, Ketchum

stated: "Judge, I would renew my objection." (R. 214.) The trial court

overruled the objection, and Off. Rivers testified that Ketchum told him

"[t]o tell [Ketchum's] mother that he did not mean to kill that man." (R.

214.)

        When the admissibility of a statement made by a defendant in a

criminal case is in question, it is clearly a better practice for an attorney

to file a written pretrial motion to suppress the evidence. It is, however,

well settled that " 'a pretrial motion to suppress is not necessary, and that

objection to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence may be made

                                     20
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for the first time when illegally obtained evidence is offered at trial."

Lewis v. State, 27 So. 3d 600, 602 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Biggs

v. State, 346 So. 2d 467, 469 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)). I agree with the

main opinion that "Rule 104(c), Ala. R. Evid., imposes no duty on the

judge to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury when no motion

to suppress is filed or challenge to the evidence has been made." ___ So.

3d at ___. My primary disagreement with the main opinion is that I

believe Ketchum sufficiently challenged the evidence to trigger the

requirement that a hearing be conducted outside the presence of the jury.

"The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for

appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error,

giving an opportunity to correct it.' " Ex parte Parks, 923 So. 2d 330, 333

(Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Works, 640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994),

citing Jennings v. State, 588 So. 2d 540, 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)).

Ketchum sufficiently notified the trial court of the issue raised in this

case.

        Rule 104(c), Ala. R. Evid., is very clear:

              "In criminal cases, hearings on the admissibility of
        confessions or evidence alleged to have been obtained
        unlawfully shall be conducted out of the hearing and presence
        of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be

                                       21
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     conducted out the hearing and presence of the jury when the
     interests of justice require."

(Emphasis added.) In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394, 84 S. Ct.

1774, 1790, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964), the United States Supreme Court

considered whether a procedure in the State of New York that permitted

a jury to determine the voluntariness of a confession passed

constitutional muster and determined that it did not.          The Court

explained:

     "Jackson's position before the District Court, and here, is that
     the issue of his confession should not have been decided by the
     convicting jury but should have been determined in a
     proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or
     innocence. So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to
     such a hearing in the state court."

The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently recognized that

     "there is much in the lengthy [Jackson] opinion which leads
     us to the inevitable conclusion that the Supreme Court of the
     United States will not uphold a conviction where the question
     as to the voluntariness of the confession is presented in the
     presence of the jury if a request for a hearing outside the
     presence of the jury is made."

Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 164, 176 So. 2d 840, 858 (Ala. 1965). It is

now well settled that a defendant who challenges the admissibility of a

statement and requests a hearing is entitled to one outside the presence

of the jury. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 27 So. 3d 600, 602 (Ala. Crim. App.
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2008). Ketchum made four objections to the admission of his statement;

he stated grounds for those objections; and he argued that the testimony

should be taken outside the presence of the jury. I interpret his request

to the trial court to be a request for a hearing before the trial judge only,

which should be followed ("then, again") by a separate presentation of the

evidence to the jury. I believe that Ketchum sufficiently challenged the

evidence and made clear to the trial court his belief that a hearing outside

the presence of the jury was required.

     Although I generally agree with the main opinion that evidence

presented to the trial judge, in the presence of the jury, would have been

"sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's ruling admitting the

statement" ___ So. 3d at ___, I do not believe that this conclusion is

relevant to the issue before this Court. The law states that a defendant

is entitled to a hearing outside the presence of the jury when the

admissibility of a confession or an incriminating statement is in question.

It would be inappropriate to speculate how Ketchum's cross-examination

of Off. Rivers would have changed had the jury not been present.

Furthermore, this Court cannot speculate whether the defense would

have presented additional evidence from witnesses, other than Off.

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Rivers, had it been granted a hearing outside the jury's presence. It is

clear, however, that Ketchum would have been allowed to testify

regarding the admissibility of his statement in a hearing outside the

presence of the jury without being subject to cross-examination regarding

the facts of the crime. Rule 104(d), Ala. R. Evid., states that "[t]he

accused does not, by testifying at a preliminary hearing on the

admissibility of a confession, become subject to cross-examination as to

other issues in the case." This limitation on cross-examination would not

apply if Ketchum had testified in the presence of the jury. Thus, although

Ketchum may have chosen not to testify regarding the admissibility of

his statement, Ketchum "was deprived of his chance to testify about the

circumstances relating to the voluntariness of his statement," Ex parte

Jackson, 836 So. 2d 973, 975 (Ala. 2001), when he was not granted an

evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence.      Clearly, a hearing

outside the presence of the jury offers the defense additional avenues to

challenge the admissibility of a confession that are not available in a

hearing held in the jury's presence. Thus, the apparent admissibility of

Ketchum's statement based upon testimony taken in the presence of the

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jury should not be a determining factor in deciding whether Ketchum was

entitled to an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury.

     Although I would find that the trial court erred in refusing to

conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury, this finding does not

require a reversal of Ketchum's conviction. In Ex parte Jackson, 836 So.

2d at 976 (Ala. 2001), the Court addressed the same issue and explained

the appropriate remedy:

           "In accordance with Smith [v. State, 554 So. 2d 451 (Ala.
     1989)], we remand this case for a hearing to determine the
     admissibility of Jackson's statement. If, after the hearing, the
     trial court determines that Jackson's statement was
     voluntarily made and was properly admitted into evidence for
     the jury's consideration, a new trial is not required. See
     Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 393-94, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (stating
     that if the statement was properly admitted into evidence, 'we
     see no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding
     with a new trial, for [the defendant] has already been tried by
     a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found
     guilty'). However, if the trial court determines that Jackson's
     statement was not voluntary and therefore was not
     admissible into evidence, then there must be a new trial, at
     which the statement is not admitted into evidence."

Therefore, I would remand this matter to the trial court with instructions

for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility

of Ketchum's statement.

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