Court Opinion

ID: 9898004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:44.176048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:42.348772
License: Public Domain

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                                                                                                      Filed
                                                                                                Washington State
                                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                                 Division Two

                                                                                                  April 11, 2023

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56856-0-II

                                       Respondent,

               v.

        TROY C. RESTVEDT,                                              PUBLISHED OPINION

                                       Appellant.

              LEE, P.J. — Troy C. Restvedt appeals his convictions for second degree theft and six counts

       of unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction. Restvedt argues there is

       insufficient evidence to support his convictions for unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment

       card transaction because RCW 9A.56.290, the statute under which he was charged, does not apply

       to his conduct. Restvedt further asserts that if there is sufficient evidence to support his unlawful

       factoring convictions, then those convictions violate double jeopardy. Restvedt also argues that

       the trial court abused its discretion when it prevented him from impeaching a witness, which

       violated his right to present a defense; the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting the burden

       of proof; and the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of all his convictions.

              We hold that there is insufficient evidence to support Restvedt’s convictions for unlawful

       factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction under RCW 9A.56.290. We also hold that

       the trial court did not commit evidentiary error or violate Restvedt’s right to present a defense

       when it precluded him from impeaching a witness because Restvedt could not articulate how his

       impeachment inquiry was relevant. Additionally, the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof,
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       No. 56856-0-II

       and therefore, there is no prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, because there were no errors, the

       cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse Restvedt’s convictions on six

       counts of unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction, affirm the second degree

       theft conviction, and remand for the trial court to dismiss with prejudice the six counts of unlawful

       factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction and for resentencing.1

                                                     FACTS

       A.     BACKGROUND

              Restvedt and Jessica Stirling met and began dating in 2016; they began living together

       shortly after. In late 2016, Restvedt and Stirling moved to Onalaska. In Onalaska, Restvedt

       worked under-the-table contracting jobs while Stirling made income from an Etsy2 shop.

       Otherwise, the couple primarily lived on Stirling’s savings. Restvedt and Stirling later moved to

       Centralia, into a home Stirling bought.

              Throughout Restvedt and Stirling’s relationship, Stirling owned a bank account at OnPoint

       Credit Union. She had a debit card associated with the account. Restvedt did not have access to

       Stirling’s bank account nor did he possess his own bank account. Restvedt did, however, have his

       own credit card.

       1
          Because we reverse Restvedt’s multiple unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card
       transaction convictions and remand for dismissal of those charges with prejudice, we do not
       address Restvedt’s double jeopardy argument relating to the multiple convictions for unlawful
       factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction.
       2
         Etsy is an online marketplace for small business owners and artists to sell their products to
       consumers. ETSY, www.etsy.com/about (last visited Mar. 31, 2023).

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       No. 56856-0-II

              When Stirling needed to access funds from her OnPoint account, Restvedt and Stirling

       would drive to an automated teller machine (ATM) together. Stirling would give Restvedt her

       debit card because he was in the driver’s seat and then give him the personal identification number

       (PIN) to remove the cash. Generally, Stirling used her debit card only at ATMs or store cash

       registers. According to Stirling, she never gave her debit card to Restvedt nor did she give Restvedt

       permission to use it any time he wanted.

              Early in Restvedt and Stirling’s relationship, Stirling would find her OnPoint debit card

       missing. Stirling would then see charges to her account that she had not made. Each time this

       happened, Stirling would replace her debit card and choose a new PIN. Stirling suspected Restvedt

       of using her card without permission. She replaced her card several times over the course of her

       relationship with Restvedt. Stirling would move funds between her OnPoint account and other

       accounts she owned in an effort to “hide money” from Restvedt. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP)

       (Mar. 24, 2022) at 169. Additionally, Stirling would keep her debit card hidden in different places

       around their home, including in her safe, her dresser, and in her wallet. Though Stirling never saw

       Restvedt take her card, Stirling believed Restvedt was the only person who would have been able

       to access her card.

              In April 2020, Stirling noticed her debit card missing. She then checked her bank account

       online and noticed withdrawals. Stirling asked Restvedt where her debit card was. According to

       Stirling, Restvedt “looked at [her], and he patted all of his pockets, and then he patted his breast

       pocket and he pulled [her] card out of it and handed it back to [her].” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at

       135. When Stirling asked Restvedt why he had withdrawn money from her account, he replied,

       “‘[T]hat was your asshole tax.’” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 135.

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       No. 56856-0-II

              Stirling asked Restvedt to leave and they separated. According to Restvedt, his relationship

       with Stirling ended because he found out Stirling “was married.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 270.

       Stirling had been previously married from 1995 to 2004. However, she was not married at any

       point she and Restvedt were in a relationship.

              A few weeks after Restvedt left, Stirling found video footage on a camera she owned of

       Restvedt allegedly making a withdrawal at an ATM at State Security Bank in Morton. The camera

       was a “GoPro knockoff” that Stirling primarily kept in her car on the dashboard. 1 VRP (Mar. 24,

       2022) at 96. The video depicted Restvedt driving Stirling’s truck to the ATM. After apparently

       exiting the vehicle and then returning to it, Restvedt turned the camera around and spoke into it.

       Restvedt then replaced the camera in its original position. The camera did not have any audio.

              After seeing the video, Stirling accessed several months’ worth of bank account statements.

       She noticed over 60 unauthorized transactions between January 7, 2020 and April 6, 2020. One

       of the transactions Stirling noticed was a $4003 ATM cash withdrawal from Security State Bank.

       Other alleged unauthorized transactions included purchases at the “Buck Stop,” “the Chevron in

       Centralia,” and the hardware store. 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 113, 115. According to Stirling,

       these locations were places that Restvedt frequented.

              Stirling contacted law enforcement in early May to report Restvedt for theft. Sergeant Jeff

       Humphrey responded to Stirling’s theft complaint. Stirling provided Sergeant Humphrey her bank

       account statements with X’s placed next to unauthorized charges that Restvedt allegedly made.

       Stirling also provided the video of Restvedt to Sergeant Humphrey, along with a receipt from one

       3
        The total withdrawal amount is listed as $403. However, $3 of the $403 appear to be an ATM
       withdrawal fee.

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       No. 56856-0-II

       of the alleged unauthorized ATM withdrawals. The receipt was from the Morton Country Market.

       Stirling did not share with Sergeant Humphrey the fact that she had replaced her debit card and

       PIN several times over the course of her relationship with Restvedt.

              Sergeant Humphrey contacted the Morton Country Market and requested surveillance

       footage of its ATM. The Morton Country Market surveillance video showed Restvedt allegedly

       using Stirling’s debit card at the ATM—apparently checking the account balance—and then

       making purchases at the cash register.

              The following day, Sergeant Humphrey contacted Restvedt. When Sergeant Humphrey

       explained the purpose of his call, Restvedt appeared “familiar with what [Sergeant Humphrey]

       was talking about.” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 236. Restvedt initially denied making any

       unauthorized transactions with Stirling’s debit card. However, when Sergeant Humphrey asked

       Restvedt about the video from Stirling’s camera, Restvedt admitted to withdrawing $400 and

       making the video; he told Sergeant Humphrey that “this was a tax for [Stirling] being a bitch for

       the last four years.” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 237. Restvedt then told Sergeant Humphrey that

       he did make withdrawals and purchases using Stirling’s debit card, but that he had provided

       Stirling cash to deposit and his withdrawals were a means of accessing that cash. When Sergeant

       Humphrey asked Restvedt whether the cash Restvedt gave Stirling to deposit would be reflected

       on her bank statements, Restvedt “changed his story again and said she may have put the cash in

       her safe at her residence.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 12.

              In June, the State charged Restvedt with theft in the second degree (Count I) and nine

       counts of unlawful factoring of credit card or payment card transaction (Counts II-X). Restvedt

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       No. 56856-0-II

       allegedly made $1,859.60 worth of unauthorized purchases or withdrawals. Restvedt pleaded not

       guilty to all charges and elected to be tried by a jury.

       B.       JURY TRIAL

                The superior court held a two-day jury trial in March 2022.4

                1.     Restvedt’s Testimony

                Restvedt testified that he used Stirling’s debit card, but always with her permission and

       knowledge. Restvedt acknowledged that he visited and made purchases at the locations reflected

       on Stirling’s bank statements. Restvedt further testified that if he ever did have Stirling’s debit

       card, he “would give it right back to her.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 275. As to his admission to

       Sergeant Humphrey and Stirling that he withdrew $400 from Stirling’s bank account, Restvedt

       stated, “[Y]eah, I told both of them that I withdrew the money. . . . I mean [Sergeant Humphrey’s]

       line of questioning, if I can remember, I—I was a little flustered. . . . [Y]ou know, the breakup was

       still fresh, so it was still pretty painful.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 282.

                2.     Evidence of Stirling’s Name

                Stirling also testified during trial. During Stirling’s cross-examination, Restvedt’s counsel

       attempted to inquire about Stirling’s last name. The State objected based on relevance. The trial

       court excused the jury and Restvedt’s counsel argued:

                        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So Ms. Stirling has used a number of names over
                the years. And contrary to what she has testified to, one of the—probably main
                reason that the relationship broke up was because she was continually dishonest
                with [Restvedt]. [Restvedt] did some investigation and confronted her on that, and
                that’s ultimately what caused the relationship to end.
                        But he had confronted her about some of her past that he had discovered.
                She, of course, denied it, and there was an argument, and he ended up leaving the

       4
           The trial date was reset several times. The trial was originally set for November 2020.

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       No. 56856-0-II

             relationship. And that’s where it’s going, based on her deception during the
             relationship, which includes her names and who she was or is currently married to.

                     ....

                    . . . [I will ask] when she started using the name Stirling, why, and if she
             has gone by any other names. And I’m going to be asking her if she’s currently
             married.

                     ....

                    [THE COURT]: How is changing a person’s name—how does that relate to
             dishonesty?

                     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . [T]he central focus of this case, Your Honor,
             is credibility.

                     ....

                     . . . [B]ecause this case comes down to her word against [Restvedt]’s word,
             and that’s what it’s going to be. And what I’m trying to show is her veracity or
             lack thereof.

                     [THE COURT]: By changing one’s name? I’m not seeing the connection
             between changing one’s name and—or having different names and being a
             dishonest person or how that affects your credibility. I’m not seeing the connection,
             if you can explain that to me.

                    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And if she answers truthfully to what [Restvedt]
             may testify to, no harm, no foul. But I don’t anticipate that she’s going to give me
             the answers that I anticipate are truthful and [Restvedt] is going to testify, and it
             comes down to the jurors being able to weigh credibility between [Stirling] and
             [Restvedt].

                     ....

                     . . . [Q]uite honestly, Your Honor, I’m just trying to make her look like a
             liar.

                     [THE COURT]: I understand. And that’s a valid strategy, of course, for
             any witness, to try to point out dishonesty. I’m just not seeing—I’m just trying to
             follow, linearly, how you get there by asking her—let’s play out the scenario.

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       No. 56856-0-II

                      ....

                      . . . She says she hasn’t used different names. And what proof do you have
              that she has?

                     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I don’t have documents in my possession
              today to approach her and say, hey, isn’t this a marriage license where you were
              married to so and so and you took his name?

                      ....

                      . . . I can tell you what I’ve learned from [Restvedt].

                      ....

                      [THE COURT]: . . . I’m just not seeing that asking that question without an
              offer of proof that she has or hasn’t used different names—and if she says she
              hasn’t, not having anything—anything to prove otherwise, I just don’t see that
              that’s something you can go into.

       1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 138-143.

              Later during the trial, Stirling testified that she had been previously married from 1995 to

       2004. She stated she was not currently married. Stirling also testified that she chose her current

       last name around 20 years ago and had it formally changed through the court. Stirling had chosen

       her name because “[i]t ha[d] family heritage.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 291.

              3.      Closing Arguments

              During closing arguments, the State argued:

              [STATE:] [T]here’s this nonsense about [Stirling] being married. He’s the one that
              broke up because he found out she had been married. Really?
                      Two things. One, it can’t be true, because it would have been easy to find
              out; right? I mean, he could have gotten a marriage certificate somewhere and—

                      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. Burden shifting.

                      [THE COURT]: Sustained.

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       No. 56856-0-II

                      [STATE]: Picture that argument they had. All right? Ms. Stirling says that
              the argument was over him taking money from her without her permission. He says
              the argument was over the fact that, wow, she had been married and he didn’t know
              about it.
                      Which one of those is more reasonable? Which one of those, balanced
              against your experience, is the more reasonable one? Which one would be easier
              for the other party . . . at the time, to look into regarding their version of the
              argument?
                      She said she changed her name at one point. A lot of people who get
              divorced change their name afterwards. That’s not uncommon at all.

       1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 320-21.

              4.      Jury Instructions

              The State proposed jury instructions. Restvedt did not propose any instructions and did

       not object to the State’s proposed instructions. The trial court stated:

              And I think that the Court will set a rule that says both sides shall present jury
              instructions and if you don’t, then I think that can be construed as a waiver of or
              joining in what was proposed.

                      ....

                       . . . It basically prevents you from being able to say, well, I object to those .
              . . or they were improper on appeal. . . . [Y]ou know, you can’t decide on them and
              then later challenge those instructions as being improper.

                     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I am absolutely not making any objections or
              exceptions, objections to those given or exceptions to any not given.

       1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 285.

              There were 24 jury instructions total. Jury Instruction No. 6 stated in pertinent part:

                      To convict the defendant of the crime of unlawful factoring of a credit card
              or payment card transaction as charged in Count II, each of the following elements
              of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
                      (1) That on or about or between the 7th day of January, 2020 through the
                          14th day of January, 2020, both days inclusive, the defendant did use a
                          scanning device to access, read, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily
                          or permanently, information encoded on a payment card without the

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       No. 56856-0-II

                          permission of the authorized user of the payment card, or with the intent
                          to defraud the authorized user, another person, or a financial institution;
                          and
                      (2) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

       CP at 21.

              Jury Instructions No. 7-14, pertaining to Counts III-X, stated in pertinent part:

                     To convict the defendant of the crime of unlawful factoring of a credit card
              or payment card transaction as charged . . . each of the following elements of the
              crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
                     (1) That on or about or between the 15th day of January, 2020 through the
                         6th day of April, 2020, both days inclusive, the defendant did use a
                         scanning device to access, read, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily
                         or permanently, information encoded on a payment card without the
                         permission of the authorized user of the payment card, or with the intent
                         to defraud the authorized user, another person, or a financial institution;
                         and
                     (2) That this was a second or subsequent unlawful factoring of a credit card
                         or payment card transaction; and
                     (3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

       CP at 22-29.

              Jury Instruction No. 15 provided, “A separate crime is charged in each count. You must

       decide each count separately. Your verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any

       other count.” CP at 30. Jury Instruction No. 16 stated:

                      The State alleges that the defendant committed acts of Unlawful Factoring
              of a Credit Card or Payment Card Transaction on multiple occasions. To convict
              the defendant on any count of Unlawful Factoring of a Credit Card or Payment
              Card Transaction, one particular act of Unlawful Factoring of a Credit Card or
              Payment Card Transaction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and you
              must unanimously agree as to which act has been proved. You need not
              unanimously agree that the defendant committed all the acts of Unlawful Factoring
              of a Credit Card or Payment Card Transaction.

       CP at 31.

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       No. 56856-0-II

              5.      Jury Verdict

              The jury found Restvedt guilty of second degree theft (Count I). The jury also found

       Restvedt guilty of unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction as charged in

       Counts III-VIII. However, the jury found Restvedt not guilty of unlawful factoring of a credit card

       or payment card transaction as charged in Count II, Count IX, and Count X. The trial court polled

       the jury, and each juror confirmed that the verdict was his or her verdict. The trial court entered a

       judgment and sentence, sentencing Restvedt to six months total confinement.5

              Restvedt appeals.

                                                   ANALYSIS

       A.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence “to determine whether, after viewing

       the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found

       guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sells, 166 Wn. App. 918, 923, 271 P.3d 952 (2012),

       review denied, 176 Wn.2d 1001 (2013). A sufficiency challenge admits the truth of the State’s

       evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d

       243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). “Circumstantial and direct evidence are to be considered equally

       reliable.” Id. at 266. However, conflicting testimony and witness credibility are for the trier of

       fact to determine and not subject to appellate review. State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330

       5
         After Restvedt’s appeal to this court, he filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence to allow
       electric home monitoring. The trial court granted the motion and entered an electric home
       detention order.

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       No. 56856-0-II

       P.3d 182 (2014). Appellate courts will reverse convictions only when “‘no rational trier of fact

       could find that all elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

       Christian, 200 Wn. App. 861, 864, 403 P.3d 925 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)

       (quoting State v. Fedorov, 181 Wn. App. 187, 194, 324 P.3d 784, review denied, 181 Wn.2d 1009

       (2014)).

       B.      UNLAWFUL FACTORING OF A CREDIT CARD OR PAYMENT CARD TRANSACTION

               1.      Legal Principles

               The State charged Restvedt under RCW 9A.56.290, which defines the crime of unlawful

       factoring of transactions. Under RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a), a person commits unlawful factoring of a

       credit card or payment card transaction if that person “[u]ses a scanning device to access, read,

       obtain, memorize, or store . . . information encoded on a payment card without the permission of

       the authorized user of the payment card or with the intent to defraud the authorized user, another

       person, or a financial institution.”

               A “credit card or payment card transaction” means “a sale or other transaction in which a

       credit card or payment card is used to pay for, or to obtain on credit, goods or services.” RCW

       9A.56.280(4).     “Person” is defined as an “individual, partnership, corporation, trust, or

       unincorporated association, but does not include a financial institution or its authorized employees,

       representatives, or agents.” RCW 9A.56.280(12). A “scanning device” is any “scanner, reader,

       or any other electronic device that is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store,

       temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a payment card.” RCW 9A.56.280(15). A

       “payment card” includes credit cards and debit cards. RCW 9A.56.280(11).

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       No. 56856-0-II

              We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Thomason, 199 Wn.2d 780,

       787, 512 P.3d 882 (2022). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the

       legislature’s intent. State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 172, 421 P.3d 944 (2018). We derive

       legislative intent from the plain language of the statute, “considering the text of the provision in

       question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the

       statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. at 172-73.

              We may use dictionary definitions to discern the plain meaning of terms undefined by

       statute. State v. Valdiglesias LaValle, 23 Wn. App. 2d 934, 944, 518 P.3d 658 (2022). “When

       construing a statute, we must give effect to every word.” State v. Cathers, 13 Wn. App. 2d 29, 33,

       461 P.3d 375 (2020); see also State v. Yusuf, 21 Wn. App. 2d 960, 968, 512 P.3d 915, review

       denied, 200 Wn.2d 1011 (2022) (“[I]ndividual words should not be interpreted in isolation.”). “[A]

       court should be ‘reluctant to accept literal readings with . . . strained consequences, especially

       when they do not align with the statute’s purpose and plain meaning of its text.’” Yusuf, 21 Wn.

       App. 2d at 968 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

       Bergstrom, 199 Wn.2d 23, 37, 502 P.3d 837 (2022)). If the text and context of a statute is clear,

       the analysis stops. State v. Van Wolvelaere, 195 Wn.2d 597, 600, 461 P.3d 1173 (2020). However,

       if “there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the plain language, then a statute is

       ambiguous.” Dennis, 191 Wn.2d at 173. Courts may then “turn to statutory construction, relevant

       case law, and legislative history to discern legislative intent.” State v. Pratt, 196 Wn.2d 849, 853,

       479 P.3d 680 (2021).

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       No. 56856-0-II

              2.      Insufficient Evidence of Unlawful Factoring

              Restvedt argues that RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a) does not apply to his alleged conduct because

       he is not a “‘merchant’” or “‘commercial agent.’” Br. of Appellant at 16, 17. He asserts that the

       purpose of the statute under which he was charged is to “criminalize[] unlawful transactions by

       merchants” and “money laundering.” Br. of Appellant at 16. Restvedt also asserts there is

       insufficient evidence in the record that he used a scanning device to access information encoded

       on Stirling’s debit card without her authorization. The State argues that RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a)

       applies to Restvedt’s alleged conduct because Restvedt’s interpretation that the statute applies only

       to “merchants and others within the financial realm is not supported by the plain language of the

       statute.” Br. of Resp’t at 17. Specifically, the State asserts that any individual’s fraudulent

       conduct, not just those of merchants, is captured by the statutory language. We agree with Restvedt

       that RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a) does not apply to his alleged conduct.

              As a threshold matter, RCW 9A.56.290 criminalizes “unlawful factoring.” “Factoring” is

       not defined in the statute. See RCW 9A.56.010, .280, .290. This court may look to dictionary

       definitions to discern the plain meaning of undefined terms. Valdiglesias LaValle, 23 Wn. App.

       2d at 944. “Factoring” is the “purchase of accounts receivable from a business by a factor who

       thereby assumes the risk of loss in return for some agreed discount.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

       INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 813 (2002). A “factor” is “a person that acts or transacts business

       for another.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 813. Based on these

       definitions, only a “factor” can engage in “factoring.” Therefore, the plain meaning of “unlawful

       factoring” is when a factor purchases or utilizes some sort of business account in an unlawful

       manner as delineated in the statute.

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       No. 56856-0-II

              RCW 9A.56.290 does not use the term “factor” in defining who can commit the crime of

       unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction. Instead, the statute states that “[a]

       person commits the crime of unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction” under

       delineated circumstances. RCW 9A.56.290(1). However, a “person” is statutorily defined as not

       only an individual, but also a “partnership, corporation, trust, or unincorporated association.”

       RCW 9A.56.280(12). The statutory definition of “person” is in keeping with the notion that RCW

       9A.56.290 pertains to businesses, business conduct, and business accounts—in other words, the

       individual or entity conducting the business for another is the factor.

              Here, the record shows that Restvedt was not regularly employed during the months at

       issue. During the trial, Restvedt testified, “I was doing small contracting jobs for neighbors and

       friends and those types of things.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 264. Even if Restvedt put himself

       forward as self-employed or as an independent contractor conducting business, there is no

       evidence that he, at any point, acted or transacted business for another. Therefore, there is

       insufficient evidence that Restvedt was a “factor.” Because there is insufficient evidence that

       Restvedt was a factor, his alleged conduct, by definition, cannot fall within the definition of

       “unlawful factoring.”

              The State argues that to apply the statute so narrowly is “myopic.” Br. of Resp’t at 20.

       Specifically, the State contends that “[t]he conduct codified as unlawful by the legislature in RCW

       9A.56.290 exceeds the narrow confines of the dictionary definition of factoring” and that we

       should give such definitions “minimal consideration.” Br. of Resp’t at 20, 21. The State then

       asserts that the record shows that Restvedt used Stirling’s debit card to make unauthorized

       purchases at various merchant establishments and withdrawals using a cash register or ATM.

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       No. 56856-0-II

       Therefore, according to the State, because cash registers and ATMs are electronic devices that can

       be used to “access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store” information encoded on a debit card,

       they are scanning devices, and Restvedt’s conduct fits into the plain language of RCW 9A.56.290.

              Even if we adopt the State’s argument that Restvedt’s use of Stirling’s debit card fits within

       a literal reading of RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a) because Restvedt, a person, used a scanning device to

       access information encoded on Stirling’s debit card to make unauthorized purchases or

       withdrawals, this literal reading ignores the term “factoring” in the statute.           See RCW

       9A.56.290(1). Courts should read and construe statutory provisions in their entirety. Cathers, 13

       Wn. App. 2d at 33. Additionally, courts should avoid accepting literal readings with strained

       consequences, especially when those consequences do not align with the statute’s purpose and

       plain meaning of its text. Yusuf, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 968. The State essentially asks for a literal

       reading of the statute while ignoring the key term, “factoring.” Furthermore, had Restvedt taken

       Stirling’s debit card and instead made unauthorized online purchases, no scanning device would

       have been involved, so he could not be charged or convicted under RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a) for what

       amounts to the same conduct—making unauthorized purchases. This is a strained, if not absurd,

       consequence of the State’s literal reading of RCW 9A.56.290(1)(a).

              And even if we accept the State’s argument that the legislature intended a more expansive

       definition of factoring, the term “person” then becomes ambiguous. “Person” could mean a

       “factor,” as discussed above, or it could mean any individual or non-financial institution entity

       engaged in any kind of unauthorized conduct, not just business conduct on behalf of another. A

       statute is ambiguous if there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the plain language.

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       No. 56856-0-II

       Dennis, 191 Wn.2d at 173. When statutes are ambiguous, courts may turn to legislative history to

       discern legislative intent. Pratt, 196 Wn.2d at 853.

              The legislature defined “unlawful factoring” in 1993 when it first introduced the bill

       containing the unlawful factoring statute:

              A business that wishes to accept credit cards from its customers must first enter into
              a merchant agreement with a financial institution. Credit card factoring occurs
              when a business that has a merchant agreement (the factor) processes the credit card
              transactions of a second business that has been unable or unwilling to obtain its
              own merchant agreement. In return, the second business pays a fee to the factor,
              which often is based on a percentage of the credit sales processed.

              It has been reported that certain “disreputable” operators use factoring in
              connection with schemes to defraud or deceive consumers. These deceptive
              transactions can produce significant losses to consumers who do not receive
              bargained-for products or services, and to financial institutions who must reimburse
              injured consumers.

              It has been suggested that criminalizing factoring used to facilitate unfair or
              deceptive trade practices would help to reduce the operations of “disreputable”
              businesses in this state.

       S.B. REP. ON S.B. 5704, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1993). The legislative history makes clear

       that the factoring statutes are intended to address unlawful merchant and business transactions,

       attempts to defraud financial institutions, and, as Restvedt argues, money laundering.

              This interpretation is consistent with other jurisdictions’ understanding of RCW 9A.56.290

       and that of legal reference materials. See, e.g., Minute Order re Motions in Limine, DCR Mktg.

       Inc v. U.S. All. Grp., Inc., No. SACV 19-1897JVS, Ex. A at 23 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 18, 2022)

       (holding acts of laundering violate federal and state statutes, including RCW 9A.56.290); 81 AM.

       JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Identity Theft and Other Misuses of Credit and Debit Cards § 7, 155

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       No. 56856-0-II

       (2005) (“Another practice that some states make it a crime is factoring, the practice of a merchant

       sending in credit card drafts for a sale made by someone else.”).

              Indeed, Washington typically prosecutes unauthorized debit and credit card use under

       statutes prohibiting possessing stolen property, theft, and identity theft. See, e.g., Christian, 200

       Wn. App. at 862-63 (defendant prosecuted for theft and identity theft for using a stolen debit card

       to make purchases); Sells, 166 Wn. App. at 922 (defendant prosecuted for possession of stolen

       property and identity theft after stealing and using credit cards). Given both the plain language of

       the statute and the legislative history, and because there is no evidence in the record indicating that

       Restvedt was a factor, we hold there is insufficient evidence to convict Restvedt of any of his

       unlawful factoring charges. Accordingly, we reverse Restvedt’s convictions of unlawful factoring

       under Counts III-VIII and remand to the trial court to dismiss those charges with prejudice. State

       v. Majeed, 14 Wn. App. 2d 868, 883, 474 P.3d 1085 (2020).

       C.     EVIDENTIARY ERROR AND RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

              1.      Legal Principles

              Trial courts determine the admissibility of evidence. State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 59,

       502 P.3d 1255 (2022). Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. ER 402. Evidence is relevant

       if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

       of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” ER 401.

       “There is no constitutional right to admission of irrelevant evidence.” State v. O’Connor, 155

       Wn.2d 335, 349, 119 P.3d 806 (2005).

              Witnesses may have their credibility impeached during cross-examination with specific

       instances of conduct, so long as the conduct is probative of the witness’s truthfulness. ER 608(b).

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       In allowing such evidence, “the trial court may consider whether the instance of [conduct] is

       relevant to the witness’s veracity on the stand and whether it is germane or relevant to the issues

       presented at trial.” O’Connor, 155 Wn.2d at 349.

              Appellate courts review trial court evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Jennings,

       199 Wn.2d at 59. “‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable

       or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.’” State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 799,

       453 P.3d 696 (2019) (quoting State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)), cert.

       denied, 142 S. Ct. 726 (2021).

              Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amend.

       VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63. However, the right is not absolute.

       Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 812. “Whether a Sixth Amendment right has been abridged presents a legal

       question that is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 797. When a criminal defendant claims an evidentiary

       ruling violated his or her right to present a defense, appellate courts engage in a two-part analysis.

       Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 58. Appellate courts “review the trial court’s individual evidentiary

       rulings for an abuse of discretion and . . . consider de novo the constitutional question of whether

       these rulings deprived [the defendant] of [his] Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.” Arndt,

       194 Wn.2d at 797-98. Even if the trial court made a proper evidentiary ruling, that ruling could

       still violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 58.

              To determine if a defendant’s constitutional right has been violated, courts focus on

       whether the particular evidence at issue is a defendant’s entire defense. Id. at 63. Specifically,

       “the State’s interest in excluding evidence must be balanced against the defendant’s need for the

       information sought to be admitted.” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 812.

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               2.     No Evidentiary Error

               Restvedt argues that his counsel “was improperly barred from impeaching Ms. Stirling’s

       credibility by inquiring as to whether, and how many times, Ms. Stirling had used different names.”

       Br. of Appellant at 22. Specifically, Restvedt asserts Stirling’s use of “different names” was

       probative of her truthfulness and he had a “good faith basis for the inquiry.” Br. of Appellant at

       22-23. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the information

       Restvedt sought was collateral. The State also argues that the evidence Restvedt sought was

       ultimately admitted during the State’s rebuttal, and therefore there was no error. We agree with

       the State.

               Restvedt contends that he and Stirling ended their relationship because Stirling was

       “continually dishonest” and that dishonesty extended to Stirling’s “names and who she was or is

       currently married to.” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 139. When Restvedt’s counsel attempted to ask

       Stirling about her name, the State objected. After excusing the jury, the trial court repeatedly asked

       Restvedt’s counsel how Stirling’s name change was relevant to her credibility. Restvedt’s counsel

       ultimately answered, “Well, you know, quite honestly, Your Honor, I’m just trying to make her

       look like a liar. That’s the bottom line.” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022) at 141. The trial court

       acknowledged Restvedt’s trial strategy, but noted that Restvedt’s counsel did not have any offer

       of proof of when Stirling changed her name or how many times she had changed her name.

               Here, the issue was whether or not Restvedt used Stirling’s debit card to make unauthorized

       purchases or withdrawals. Because of much of the evidence against Restvedt is based on Stirling’s

       testimony, her credibility as a witness is relevant. Furthermore, Restvedt and Stirling dispute the

       cause of their breakup. Restvedt claims the breakup was precipitated by confrontation over

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       No. 56856-0-II

       Stirling’s past marriage. Stirling testified that the relationship ended due to ongoing issues and

       “financial abuse.” 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 289. However, as the trial court pointed out, evidence

       of Stirling’s name is “classic collateral evidence—a trial within a trial.” 1 VRP (Mar. 24, 2022)

       at 141. Moreover, the trial court has discretion in its admission of evidence. ER 608(b).

              The record shows that the trial court gave Restvedt’s counsel multiple opportunities to

       explain how Stirling’s name change and past marriage were germane or relevant to the issues at

       trial. Because Restvedt’s counsel could not provide an answer to the trial court other than argue

       that Stirling’s name change and past marriage related to her credibility, and because there was no

       offer of proof to support Restvedt’s claims relating to Stirling’s name change and marriage dates,

       the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Restvedt’s counsel from impeaching

       Stirling about her name change and marriage dates.6 Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion.

              3.      No Violation of Right to Present a Defense

              Restvedt argues that his right to present a defense was violated when the trial court blocked

       the inquiry about Stirling’s name change and marriage because it “was necessary to and would

       have sought to show that Ms. Stirling was a liar.” Br. of Appellant at 27. Restvedt asserts his

       defense was “predicated on the argument that Ms. Stirling . . . knowingly and purposefully [made]

       6
         Even if the trial court had abused its discretion, Stirling later testified about her past marriage
       and name change. Stirling was married from 1995 to 2004, and she has been using the surname
       “Stirling” for approximately 20 years. 1 VRP (Mar. 25, 2022) at 290. Because the information
       Restvedt sought was ultimately admitted, any error was harmless. See State v. Aguilar, 153 Wn.
       App. 265, 275, 223 P.3d 1158 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1022 (2010).

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       No. 56856-0-II

       false accusations against Mr. Restvedt” and his inability to attack her credibility was constitutional

       error. Br. of Appellant at 27. We disagree.

              Again, the issue at trial was whether Restvedt made unauthorized purchases or withdrawals

       with Stirling’s debit card. And during trial, Restvedt’s counsel appropriately attempted to create

       questions of fact as to whether and if it was possible for Restvedt to have taken and used Stirling’s

       debit card without permission—especially because Stirling never witnessed Restvedt doing so.

       Therefore, Restvedt had opportunity to attack, and did attack, Stirling’s credibility. In light of this,

       the record is clear that Restvedt’s defense did not hinge on evidence of Stirling’s name change or

       marriage.

              Furthermore, the evidence Restvedt sought was ultimately admitted, so the jury could make

       the credibility determination that Restvedt desired. Because Restvedt’s inquiry into Stirling’s

       name change or marriage was not his entire defense, he was able to attack Stirling’s credibility in

       other ways, and because the evidence was ultimately admitted, there is no constitutional violation.

       D.     PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

              1.       Legal Principles

              In claims of prosecutorial misconduct, “the defendant bears the burden of proving that the

       prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial.” State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756,

       278 P.3d 653 (2012). A defendant must first show that the prosecutor’s statements are improper.

       Id. at 759. Improper statements include those that shift the burden of proof to the defendant in a

       criminal proceeding. Id. at 759-60; accord State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 453, 258 P.3d 43

       (2011) (“[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to argue that the burden of proof rests with the

       defendant.”).

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              “Once a defendant establishes that a prosecutor’s statements are improper, [the court]

       determine[s] whether the defendant was prejudiced under one of two standards of review.” Emery,

       174 Wn.2d at 760. If the defendant objected at trial, he or she must show that the prosecutor’s

       misconduct “resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.”

       Id. Alternatively, if the defendant did not object at trial, “the defendant is deemed to have waived

       any error, unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction

       could not have cured the resulting prejudice.” Id. at 760-61. If the latter standard applies, the

       defendant must show that no curative instruction would have prevented any prejudicial effect and

       that the prejudice had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict. Id. at 761.

              2.      No Prosecutorial Misconduct

              Restvedt argues that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof to him because the

       State argued that Restvedt should have produced evidence of Stirling’s dishonesty. We disagree.

              The State bears the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Christian, 200 Wn. App. at 864. Here, Restvedt objects to the prosecutor’s statement during

       closing arguments that Restvedt could have found out on his own that Stirling had been married.

       Restvedt claims the State “faulted [him] for not securing evidence to prove his account of the

       fractious end to the relationship resulting in the vindictive repercussions of criminal accusation he

       suffered.” Br. of Appellant at 31. However, how exactly Restvedt and Stirling’s relationship

       ended was not at issue during trial. And the prosecutor was speaking to Restvedt’s and Stirling’s

       credibility in light of their conflicting stories. The prosecutor did not convey to the jury that

       Restvedt needed to prove his version of events to be found not guilty.

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              “[A] prosecutor has wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence.”

       Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d at 453. Given the context of the testimony the jury had just heard—that

       Stirling had been married over a decade before she even met Restvedt—it is reasonable to infer

       that that fact alone would not have precipitated the breakup of a four-year relationship.

              The prosecutor did not shift the burden to Restvedt to present evidence. Therefore, the

       prosecutor’s challenged statements during closing arguments were not improper.

       E.     CUMULATIVE ERROR

              The cumulative error doctrine applies when a combination of trial errors denies the

       defendant a fair trial, even if any one of those errors individually may not justify reversal. In re

       Det. of Coe, 175 Wn.2d 482, 515, 286 P.3d 29 (2012). “‘The test to determine whether cumulative

       errors require reversal of a defendant’s conviction is whether the totality of circumstances

       substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied him a fair trial.’” Rookstool v. Eaton, 12 Wn.

       App. 2d 301, 311, 457 P.3d 1144 (2020) (quoting In. Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664,

       690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014)). A defendant may not claim cumulative error as a way to address

       unpreserved issues on appeal. Id. at 311.

              Here, because the trial court did not commit any evidentiary or constitutional error, and

       because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative error does not apply. Restvedt’s

       cumulative error claim fails.

                                                CONCLUSION

              Because there is insufficient evidence that Restvedt committed unlawful factoring under

       RCW 9A.56.290, we reverse Restvedt’s convictions of unlawful factoring of a credit card or

       payment card transaction (Counts III-VIII).      Restvedt’s other challenges on appeal are not

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       No. 56856-0-II

       persuasive. Therefore, we reverse Restvedt’s convictions of unlawful factoring of a credit card or

       payment card transaction, affirm Restvedt’s conviction of theft in the second degree, and remand

       for the trial court to dismiss the unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction

       charges with prejudice and for resentencing.

                                                           Lee, P.J.
        We concur:

        Price, J.

        Che, J.

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