Court Opinion

ID: 9533088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:15.026823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.648438
License: Public Domain

PERRY, J.,
dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent, because, in my opinion, the facts of the case do not bring the case within the definition of the tort false imprisonment.
The majority state, “False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint upon another’s freedom of movement.” While this statement is often used to describe the tort of false imprisonment, this definition is far too all-inclusive, unless there is kept in mind the basic element of false imprisonment, an intent to confine.
A person out of anger may assault another and knock him down, thus restricting the other person’s freedom of movement, but I do not believe the law *364would say the assailant was guilty of false imprisonment, even though the act that caused the restraint from any movement was unlawful. The Restatement of the Law defines false imprisonment as follows:
“(1) An act which, directly or indirectly, is a legal cause of a confinement of another within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no matter how short in duration, makes the actor liable to the other irrespective of whether harm is caused to any legally protected interest of the other, if
(a) the act is intended so to confine the other or a third person, and
(b) the other is conscious of the confinement and
(c) the confinement is not consented to by the other, and
(d) the confinement is not otherwise privileged.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an unreasonable risk of imposing it and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.” 1 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 35, page 66.
From this statement, it is quite certain that the evidence must disclose an intent to confine, otherwise, while an unlawful act, such as assault and battery, may have been committed, the tort is not that of false imprisonment. As we stated in Roberts v. Coleman et al, 228 Or 286 at 293, 365 P2d 79:
“The act must be done with intent to confine and must be the legal cause of confinement. Section 37. The Restatement outlines four possible methods by which confinement may be accomplished, (1) by actual or apparent physical barriers. Section 38; (2) by compulsive physical force *365or submission thereto. Section 39; (3) by submission to a threat to apply physical force. Section 40; and (4) by assertion of legal authority. Section 41.”
Therefore, it becomes important to determine from the facts of this case whether a reasonable conclusion can be reached that the agent of the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff to a particular area and the plaintiff could, from the actions or words, conclude that such was the agent’s intention.
The fact of whether or not there was an intent to confine is to be determined from all of the circumstances which occurred after the defendant’s agent learned of the purported theft and after the plaintiff and her granddaughter left the store.
An examination of the statements of the plaintiff and her granddaughter discloses these facts concerning the actions of defendant’s agent: (1) He said we had a white dress in that shopping bag; (2) the granddaughter had possession of the shopping bag; (3) he took hold of the granddaughter; (4) the granddaughter told him he would have to show his credentials to see in the bag; (5) he said he didn’t have to show “anything”; (6) he took hold of the shopping bag; (7) he got loud and boisterous and plaintiff got afraid he might hit her or the granddaughter; (8) plaintiff then took hold of the shopping bag to keep him from jerking the bag away from the granddaughter; (9) he was so loud and boisterous and plaintiff was embarrassed and getting scared, so she let him look in it.
As stated by the majority, the intention of the defendant’s agent was to look into the shopping bag. They state, “What he wished to do was to look inside the bag.” The only conclusion that reasonable minds could draw is, therefore, that to accomplish this object, *366it might he necessary to detain the possessor of the hag. This was the granddaughter and not the plaintiff. Therefore, if there was any intent to confine anyone for the purposes disclosed by the evidence, it was the possessor of the hag, and, as stated, this was not the plaintiff.
Now, the majority cite the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows:
“Under the rule stated in § 35, the confinement may he by submission to a threat to apply physical force to the other’s person or to the person of a member of the other’s immediate family immediately upon the other’s going or attempting to go beyond the area in which the actor intends to confine him.” 1 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 40, page 76.
1 am unable to discover any application of this rule of law to the facts in this case. The illustrations 1 and
2 of Section 40, and comments thereon, show the purpose and extent of the rule. I quote:
“1. B, standing at the door some feet away, says to A, ‘if you attempt to leave this room, I will knock you down. ’ B makes no threatening gesture. A, in submission to the threat remains in the room. B has confined A.
“2. A and his child are seated in a room. B, with a revolver in his hand, is standing in close vicinity to A’s child. B threatens to shoot A’s child if A leaves the room. A in submission to the threat, remains in the room. B has confined A.
“b. The submission must be made to a threat to apply the physical force immediately upon the other’s going or attempting to go beyond the area within which the threat is intended to confine him. Submission to the threat to apply physical force at a time appreciably later than that at which the other attempts to go beyond the given area is not *367confinement.” 1 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 40, page 76.
There was not one single threat directed against the plaintiff that if she walked away from the scene she would be injured because she left, nor was there the slightest threat that the granddaughter would be injured if the plaintiff left without the agent’s permission. In fact, the defendant’s agent uttered no threat of violence to anyone if plaintiff wished to leave. The only evidence is that plaintiff drew a conclusion from his “getting so loud and boysterious-like [sic] # * * he might get so mad he might hit one of us because we wouldn’t let him, have the shopping bag; * * (Emphasis mine).
As pointed out by the Restatement, and clearly held in Roberts v. Coleman, supra, the force, apart from physical barriers, physical or by threats must refer to the intention to presently confine. There is simply no evidence of this fact in this case.
The facts disclose the plaintiff herself was a voluntary participant in the entire affair. “A mere voluntary remaining in custody * * * ” does not constitute false imprisonment. 35 CJS 634, False Imprisonment, §9.
The majority, to sustain the judgment, must then somehow rely upon the fact that since the plaintiff testified it was her shopping bag she did not remain voluntarily but to protect her shopping bag.
There is not a single iota of evidence that defendant’s agent wished to purloin the shopping bag. According to plaintiff’s own testimony, he wanted to look in the shopping bag. This does not imply he wished to take, steal, and carry away the bag. The *368fact that he grabbed the bag can hardly indicate to the plaintiff, or anyone, an intention to possess permanently the bag, when she herself states she did not think so.
For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment, with instructions to enter a directed verdict for the defendant.
Mr. Justice Goodwin joins in this dissent.