Court Opinion

ID: 9406145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 00:00:25.135557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.307433
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40241     Document: 00516805153         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/29/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                          FILED
                                                                  June 29, 2023
                                 No. 22-40241
                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                          Clerk

   Van Damme V. Jeanty,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds, a corporate entity,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-366
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:

          Van Damme V. Jeanty, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
   dismissal of his claims of breach of contract and false imprisonment against
   Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM in part,
   REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.
Case: 22-40241         Document: 00516805153               Page: 2       Date Filed: 06/29/2023

                                         No. 22-40241

                                                 I.
           In November 2015, Jeanty was arrested and released on a surety bond1
   provided by Big Bubba’s. Jeanty was formally charged with the same offense
   in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before re-
   ceiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several
   months, but according to Jeanty, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s
   on his behalf. In July 2016, Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court,
   requesting an arrest warrant for Jeanty on the grounds that he had failed to
   fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide con-
   tact information. The trial court subsequently granted the request, and Jeanty
   was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.
           On May 13, 2019, Jeanty sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated
   their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting mis-
   leading information to the court in order to obtain the arrest warrant. Big
   Bubba’s moved to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
   Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that under the Texas Code of Criminal
   Procedure, a surety such as itself is permitted to present a petition to the trial
   court requesting an arrest warrant, and that such submission does not give
   rise to a cause of action.
           The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Jeanty’s false impris-
   onment claim because his arrest was concededly based on a warrant whose
   validity was undisputed. In addition, the magistrate judge recommended

           _____________________
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              “A surety bond creates a three-party relationship, in which the surety becomes
   liable for the principal’s debt or duty to the third party obligee.” In re Falcon V, L.L.C., 44
   F.4th 348, 350 n.1 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

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   dismissal of his contract claim because under Tex. Occ. Code
   § 1704.207(b)–(c), an individual has the right to challenge their surrender by
   a bail bond agent in the same court where they are being prosecuted. Since
   Jeanty did not avail himself of this remedy, the magistrate judge determined
   that Jeanty could not pursue a claim for breach of contract. The magistrate
   judge then concluded that to challenge surrender, “the principal must do so
   in the court that authorized the surrender.”
          Jeanty objected to the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recom-
   mendation. On March 17, 2022, the district court adopted the magistrate
   judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation in its entirety and granted Big
   Bubba’s motion to dismiss. Jeanty timely filed this appeal.
                                            II.
          We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
   failure to state a claim. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d
   833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) evaluates the ade-
   quacy of the allegations in a complaint rather than the merits of the case.
   George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, we
   “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light
   most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,
   948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted). “To survive a
   motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
   cepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
   v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
   U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
   pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
   that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation
   omitted).
          Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may also “‘be appropriate based on a success-
   ful affirmative defense,’ provided that the affirmative defense ‘appear[s] on

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   the face of the complaint.’” Basic Cap. Mgmt. v. Dynex Cap., Inc., 976 F.3d
   585, 588 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP
   Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006)). In such a sce-
   nario, the pleadings must “reveal beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove
   no set of facts” that would overcome the defense or otherwise entitle them
   to relief. Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
   1991). Pro se pleadings, such as Jeanty’s, must be liberally construed. Alderson
   v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017).

                                         III.
          On appeal, Jeanty contends that his false imprisonment and contract
   claims were wrongly dismissed by the district court. We begin with his false
   imprisonment claim.
          Under Texas law, the elements of a false imprisonment claim are: (1)
   willful detention; (2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law. Wal–
   Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002). Legal author-
   ization or justification is established either through the issuance of an arrest
   warrant or by demonstrating the presence of probable cause. Wal-Mart
   Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513, 519 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996,
   writ denied).
          If an arrest or detention is executed under a process that is legally suf-
   ficient in form and duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction—where
   an arrest is made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, for example—there is no
   cause of action for false imprisonment. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918
   (Tex. 1982). To determine whether an arrest warrant is valid, we look only to
   the form of the process by which the arrest warrant was made. Id. If the war-
   rant is valid on its face, our inquiry ends there. Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d
   25, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

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          Here, Jeanty challenges the grounds on which the warrant was issued,
   not the warrant’s facial validity. As Jeanty concedes, he was arrested
   pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Therefore, there can be no cause of action
   for false imprisonment. See James, 637 S.W.2d at 918. Consequently, we
   affirm the district court on this issue.
          While Jeanty’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his
   contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Jeanty,
   who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex.
   Occ. Code § 1704.207(b)–(c). We conclude that Jeanty is not limited to
   this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim.
          Texas courts have recognized that bail bonds are contracts between
   the surety and the State, whereby the former ensures that the defendant will
   appear before the court in exchange for a promise by the State that it will
   release the defendant from custody. See Reyes v. State, 31 S.W.3d 343, 345–
   46 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.). Under the Texas
   Code of Criminal Procedure, the surety can end its financial liability on the
   bond by physically surrendering the principal back into the custody of the
   authorities, appropriately notifying the authorities where the principal is oth-
   erwise incarcerated, or filing an affidavit stating the cause of surrender with
   information sufficient to allow for an arrest warrant to be issued. See Tex.
   Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.16(a)(1), (2) & art. 17.19(a).
          Traditionally, if the surety has wrongfully withdrawn from the bail
   bond, Texas law permitted the principal to contest the surrender in a civil
   action against the bonding company. See, e.g., Karakey v. Mollohan, 15 S.W.2d
   692, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1929, no writ); Ex parte Vogler, 495 S.W.2d
   893, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). However, in 1973, the Texas Legislature
   passed Article 2372p-3, § 13 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which is
   currently recognized as Article 1704.207 of the Texas Occupations Code. See
   Cooper v. Hunt, No. 05-14-00928-CV, 2016 WL 1213299, at *2 n.6 (Tex.

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   App.—Dallas Mar. 29, 2016, no pet.) (unpublished). It provides that a
   defendant in a criminal case “may contest the surrender” and mandates that
   the surety may be obligated to refund fees to the defendant if the “surrender
   was without reasonable cause.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1704.207(b)–(c).
          Based on the State’s adoption of this provision, the magistrate judge
   determined that principals who wish to contest a surrender are now restricted
   to the remedy provided by the statute. The magistrate judge further noted
   that Jeanty’s argument to the contrary was based on a single footnote in
   McConathy v. State, 545 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) and that subse-
   quent case law and a recent advisory opinion from the Texas Attorney Gen-
   eral have made it clear that the contest provision in § 1704.207 governs a
   principal’s right to challenge their surrender. We disagree.
          It is well-settled that federal courts sitting in diversity should be slow
   to expand state law in the absence of any indication of intent by the state
   courts or legislature. See Nicolaci v. Anapol, 387 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2004)
   (“Federal courts sitting in diversity should be cautious about pushing state
   law to new frontiers.”) (cleaned up). In the absence of authority supporting
   the proposition that § 1704.207 limits a principal’s right to pursue a civil ac-
   tion, we find no support for the district court’s conclusion.
          Prior to 1973, the only route for a principal to seek relief from a
   surety’s wrongful withdrawal from a bail bond agreement was to pursue a
   civil cause of action. Vogler, 495 S.W.2d at 894 (“If the surety has wrongfully
   withdrawn from the bail bond, appellant’s remedy lies not in a habeas corpus
   proceeding but rather in a civil action against the bonding company.”) (empha-
   sis added)). However, the enactment of article 2372p-3, § 13 (now
   § 1704.207) allows the principal to recover all or part of the bond fee paid to
   the surety in the trial court if the surrender was without probable cause. See
   § 1704.207(b)–(c).

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          The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cited this provision in McCona-
   thy, only a few years after its passage, ruling that it provided a remedy for the
   principal to recover the bond fee paid if the surrender was without reasonable
   cause. 545 S.W.2d at 168. However, the court also emphasized that “another
   remedy of the principal is a civil action against the surety.” Id. at 169 n.3 (cit-
   ing generally Vogler, 495 S.W.2d at 893). Subsequent case law in Texas has
   affirmed the availability of a civil cause of action for the principal. See, e.g.,
   Dunn v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 535, 537–38 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1979, no writ)
   (discussing a surrender action in a civil action); Spears v. State, No. 10-08-
   00396-CR, 2009 WL 5155573, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 30, 2009, no
   pet.) (observing that a principal “can pursue a civil action against the bond
   company” in order to “challenge the validity or content” of an Article 17.19
   affidavit); Adi v. Rapid Bail Bonding Co., No. 01-08-00290-CV, 2010 WL
   547474, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2010, no pet.) (un-
   published) (reversing summary judgment for the surety on a breach-of-con-
   tract claim).
          The two post-McConathy cases cited by the magistrate judge, Robbins
   v. Roberts, 833 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ) and Cooper
   v. Hunt, No. 05-14-00928-CV, 2016 WL 1213299 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.
   29, 2016, no pet.) (unpublished), only affirm that the statutory provision is a
   valid remedy and do not suggest that this remedy is exclusive to all other po-
   tential remedies available to a principal.
          In Roberts, which the magistrate judge cites as proof that “when the
   contest provision of Chapter 1704 applies . . . its remedy governs,” the surety
   argued that the lower court erred in finding that the principal’s claim was
   properly brought in the trial court and that he should have initiated a civil
   action. 833 S.W.2d at 620–21. However, the court rejected this argument
   finding that § 1704.207 “governs when invoked,” but pointed out that this

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   remedy is “in addition to the remedy of a separate civil action,” not exclusive
   of it. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
          Likewise, the magistrate judge’s invocation of Hunt misses the mark.
   There, a criminal defendant challenged his surrender using the statutory
   mechanism; the trial court ruled in his favor, and the surety appealed, arguing
   that the challenge “constitutes a separate civil action.” Hunt, 2016 WL
   1213299, at *1–3. The court found that the surety had waived her procedural
   argument and failed to demonstrate substantive error. Id. at *4–5. But just
   like Roberts, this case does not stand for the proposition that suing a bail bond
   agent can only be done through § 1704.207.
          Similarly, the reliance on the advisory opinion is also misplaced as it
   does not address the availability of civil remedies, and as Jeanty correctly
   notes, opinions provided by the Texas Attorney General do not constitute
   authoritative interpretations of Texas law. See Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d
   920, 924 (Tex. 1996).
          Thus, the district court’s ruling that Jeanty had to turn to § 1704.207
   for a remedy against Big Bubba’s cannot be squared with existing Texas law.
   Because the pleadings must “reveal beyond doubt that [Jeanty] can prove no
   set of facts” that would overcome Big Bubba’s defense or otherwise entitle
   him to relief, the district court erred in dismissing his contract claim. See
   Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 938 F.2d at 594.
                                         IV.
          For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
   district court as to Jeanty’s false imprisonment claim, and we REVERSE
   and REMAND for further proceedings on his contract claim.

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