Court Opinion

ID: 9367514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 23:05:17.126319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.913223
License: Public Domain

01/31/2023

                                          DA 21-0082
                                                                                           Case Number: DA 21-0082

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 19N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

DANIEL HUNTER FLANSBURG,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-17-390
                       Honorable Michael G. Moses, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Jeavon C. Lang, Assistant Appellate
                       Defender, Helena, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant
                       Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: January 11, 2023

                                                              Decided: January 31, 2023

Filed:

                                 Vir-6A.-if
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Daniel Flansburg (Flansburg) appeals from the January 22, 2019 Order Re Motion

to Suppress of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denying

Flansburg’s Motion to Suppress. We affirm.

¶3     On April 12, 2017, Flansburg was charged with one count of Sexual Intercourse

Without Consent, a felony, or, in the alternative, Sexual Assault, a felony. Thereafter, the

State amended its charges two additional times, ultimately charging Flansburg with two

felony counts of Sexual Assault. On September 26, 2018, Flansburg filed a Motion to

Suppress asserting his confession was involuntary as law enforcement “failed to obtain a

valid Miranda rights waiver and used coercive interrogation techniques.” Following

hearing on January 6, 2019, the District Court issued its order on January 22, 2019 denying

Flansburg’s Motion to Suppress finding that, under a totality of the circumstances,

Flansburg understood his rights; made a voluntary, uncoerced choice to waive his rights;

and the interrogation techniques were not psychologically coercive such that Flansburg’s

confession was voluntarily given. Thereafter, Flansburg entered into an Acknowledgment

of Waiver of Rights and Plea Agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count I—

Sexual Assault, the State agreed to dismiss Count II—Sexual Assault, and Flansburg
reserved his right to appeal the court’s suppression ruling. Pursuant to the plea agreement,

on August 22, 2019, Flansburg plead guilty to one count of felony sexual assault, the State

dismissed the other count of felony sexual assault, and the District Court sentenced

Flansburg to 20 years at the Montana State Prison, with 12 of those years suspended.

Additional facts will be discussed below as necessary.

¶4       We review a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress to determine whether

the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court’s application of the

law is correct. State v. Eskew, 2017 MT 36, ¶ 12, 386 Mont. 324, 390 P.3d 129.

     The question of whether a defendant has given a confession voluntarily is a
     factual determination within the province of the district court. The district court
     has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best
     position to determine their credibility. We will not, on appeal, reweigh the
     evidence or substitute our evaluation of the evidence for that of the district court.

State v. Old-Horn, 2014 MT 161, ¶ 14, 375 Mont. 310, 328 P.3d 638 (citations omitted).

¶5       “Whether or not a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination is triggered is a

conclusion of law. Our standard of review of a district court’s conclusions of law is

plenary. We determine whether the district court’s conclusions are correct.” State v. Hill,

2009 MT 134, ¶ 21, 350 Mont. 296, 207 P.3d 307; State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155, 915 P.2d

809.

¶6       Flansburg asserts Detective Wichman “downplayed” the Miranda1 warning he read

to Flansburg before proceeding with the custodial interrogation interview and, although

Flansburg signed the Miranda warning, he did not read it or understand its importance.

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
Flansburg asserts the Miranda warning was inadequate such that the State cannot meet its

burden to show Flansburg voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Conversely, the State

asserts Detective Wichman advised Flansburg of the four Miranda tenets and confirmed

orally and in writing that Flansburg understood his Miranda rights and, having these rights

in mind, still desired to talk with Detectives Wachman and Baum. Further, Flansburg

willingly signed the Miranda waiver of rights document and initialed the document twice

confirming he understood his rights and that he still agreed to talk with the detectives. The

State asserts the advisement of his Miranda rights together with Flansburg’s immediate

actions thereafter support the District Court’s finding that Flansburg’s waiver was

voluntary.

       The law regarding confessions in criminal proceedings is well established in
       Montana. Voluntary confessions are generally admissible in criminal
       prosecutions, and they are recognized as an important tool for law
       enforcement. State v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 109, 606 P.2d 1043, 1048 (1979).
       A voluntary confession is the result of a free choice by the suspect, and “if
       he has willed to confess, it may be used against him.” State v. Davison, 188
       Mont. 432, 438, 614 P.2d 489, 493 (1980) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut,
       367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961)). However,
       a person charged with a crime has a right under the due process clause of the
       Fourteenth Amendment coupled with the Fifth Amendment right against
       self-incrimination to not be convicted based upon an involuntary confession.
       Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 434-35, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330, 147 L. Ed.
       2d 405 (2000); State v. Morrisey, 2009 MT 201, ¶ 29, 351 Mont. 144, 214
       P.3d 708. An involuntary confession is not admissible against the defendant,
       and if the defendant moves to suppress a confession, the burden shifts to the
       State to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or
       admission was voluntary.” Section 46-13-301(2), MCA; Davison, 188
       Mont. at 438, 614 P.2d at 493.

Eskew, ¶ 14.
¶7     Determining whether a confession is voluntary is a factual issue which requires

consideration of the totality of the circumstances—including, but not necessarily limited

to, whether defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; the interrogation techniques used;

the age and education of the defendant; the defendant’s demeanor, articulation, and

capacities; and the presence of any threat of violence, improper influence, or promise to

induce the confession. Eskew, ¶¶ 16-18.

¶8     In denying Flansburg’s Motion to Dismiss, the District Court found he was

twenty-four years old, had some minor experience with the criminal justice system, and

there were no obvious concerns about his level of education and understanding. Flansburg

does not contest these findings, but rather asserts Detective Wichman treated the recitation

of the Miranda warning as a “mere formality” which did not make clear to Flansburg the

seriousness of the situation, rendering the warning inadequate. Upon our review of the

record, we disagree with Flansburg’s characterization of the Miranda warning given him

by Detective Wichman as being inadequate. Here, prior to any substantive questioning of

Flansburg, Detective Wichman read verbatim to Flansburg a standard Miranda warning

advising him of Miranda’s four prescribed warnings—Flansburg had the right to remain

silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had a right to have

an attorney present, and if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed to him

prior to any questioning if he so desired. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Detective Wichman

then followed up with Flansburg to confirm he understood his rights and was still willing

to speak to him and Detective Baum. Flansburg did not indicate any misunderstanding as

to his rights, did not indicate he had any difficulty with reading or comprehending the
English language, presented in a manner indicating he comprehended the warning and the

interview situation, did not ask for clarification of anything, did not request an attorney,

and initialed the Miranda waiver in several locations and signed it. From our review of

the record, the factual findings of the District Court were supported by substantial evidence.

Although Detective Wichman advised Flansburg that reading his rights to him was for both

of their “safeties” and Flansburg did not himself read the Miranda warning document, such

does not negate the fact that Detective Wichman did read the Miranda warning in its

entirety to Flansburg and then confirmed with Flansburg he understood his rights and that

he was still willing to talk with the officers. Flansburg does not assert he has educational

or cognitive deficits that precluded him from understanding the Miranda warning read to

him and he does not assert he was forced to initial and sign the document. The manner in

which Detective Wichman advised Flansburg of his Miranda rights was reasonable, not

atypical, and certainly not a “hollow and meaningless exercise” as characterized by

Flansburg. Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the

District Court’s factual findings that Flansburg was adequately advised and understood his

Miranda rights and the District Court correctly applied the law in concluding Flansburg

voluntarily waived those rights.

¶9     Flansburg also asserts that because of the interrogation circumstances—the use of

subtle psychological coercion and the cold temperature of the interview room—his

confession was not voluntary. In considering the interrogation circumstances, the District

Court found the interview took place at the jail in the DUI interview room, the room was

cold, but not intentionally kept cold. Flansburg was nervous, but not excessively so. He
was not handcuffed.        The detectives addressed Flansburg in a conversational,

non-aggressive manner, did not express anything untrue to Flansburg, made no statements

to Flansburg as to the evidence they did or did not have, made no promises about what

might occur if he confessed, and made no statements to Flansburg that he was guilty. The

interview was not unduly prolonged, lasting only a little over an hour, with Flansburg

confessing forty-four minutes into the interview.

¶10    Flansburg contends the detectives used subtle psychological coercion including

assumption of guilt leading Flansburg to believe an admission of wrongdoing would lead

to counseling as opposed to felony conviction and punishment. From our review of the

record, considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the

District Court’s factual findings that the interrogation techniques were not psychologically

coercive and the District Court correctly applied the law in concluding Flansburg’s

confession was made voluntarily. Although it was cold in the interview room, Flansburg

was not subjected to prolonged cold exposure. The entire interview was relatively short,

lasting about an hour. Although empathetic to Flansburg’s history of abuse, the detectives

did not make any promises to Flansburg as to what would occur upon a confession and any

belief on Flansburg’s part of an implied promise of treatment is not supported by the record.

The detectives did question Flansburg regarding inconsistencies and matters they did not

believe added up between his account and what was reported from others. This Court has

not held that questioning a suspect, who has been fully advised of his Miranda rights and

has agreed to talk with law enforcement, with legitimate evidentiary issues constitutes
impermissible psychological coercion and we decline to do so under the circumstances of

this case.

¶11    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶12    Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR