Court Opinion

ID: 9663039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:34.218882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.080127
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
concurring.
Regarding points of error two and three, I fully concur in the opinion of Justice Boyd. As to point one, however, I conclude that Officer Hugg satisfied the prerequisites of article 38.22, § 2 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. By directing appellant’s attention to the article 38.22, § 2(a)(l)-(5) admonishments appearing in the written confession and by informing appellant that “those are the rights that had previously been gone over with him” before appellant read and signed the confession, Hugg did that demanded by the statute. See Campbell v. State, 358 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex.Crim.App.1962) (holding that warnings uttered before the accused affixed his signature to the written confession sufficed). That the confession named an officer other than Hugg as the one who informed appellant of his Miranda rights matters not. At most, the mistake did nothing other than remove the police conduct from the realm of literal compliance into the realm of substantial compliance, and substantial compliance is all that was needed. See Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130, 135 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (rejecting an article 38.22, § 2 attack because the warnings “substantially complied” with the statutory requirements).