Court Opinion

ID: 9444625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:06:43.8764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:56.323717
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In indicating my reasons for dissenting, I find it necessary to make a somewhat fuller statement of facts than does the majority opinion.
July 17, 1953, the appellant, Samuel Wrightson, and three others, all armed and prepared to kill, robbed a super market in the District of Columbia. Pursuant to a pre-arranged plan they waited in the vicinity until the manager, William H. Soper, came out of the store some 45 minutes after the closing hour of 9:00 p. m. Then, with two of the bandits acting as lookouts, Wrightson and another forced Soper at gunpoint to re-enter the store, open the safe, and turn over to them about $7,000 in money and several thousand dollars more in government and personal checks. They also took a white metal box containing about $40.00 in pennies. The four robbers then repaired to Wrightson’s apartment where they divided the spoils.
Wrightson was arrested in his apartment early in the morning of July 29. A white metal box, similar to that taken from the super market, and a box of cartridges were in plain view on a dresser. Asked where the gun was that went with the bullets, Wrightson said it was under the pillow. The articles mentioned were seized by the arresting officers. Wrightson and his three accomplices, who were arrested at different times and places, made full and complete confessions to several policemen and other persons. Wrightson asked that an assistant United States attorney be present to hear his confession, apparently with the idea he would be treated more leniently if the prosecutors knew he had “co-operated” with the officers. E. Riley Casey, an assistant United States attorney, was called, whereupon Wrightson told him and the others the whole story of the robbery.
The four defendants were tried together. Their separate confessions were detailed by the Government witnesses who received them and of course the victim, Soper, testified concerning the robbery and, as the majority say, identified Wrightson as one of the two principal actors. In addition, the white metal box, the cartridges and the pistol were received as Government exhibits over Wrightson’s objection.
The other three defendants took the stand and repudiated their confessions, but Wrightson did not testify.1 ’ All four were found guilty by the jury, but only Wrightson appeals. His sole ground for reversal is alleged error in admitting the exhibits.
Wrightson’s objection to the introduction of the articles seized in his apartment following his arrest was based upon the theory that the arrest without a warrant was unlawful and that, consequently, the property was illegally seized *563without warrant. This objection was tantamount to a motion to suppress for use as evidence the exhibits offered by the Government.
A defendant’s right to move to suppress evidence is governed by Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:
“(e) Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress Evidence. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized * * to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant * * *. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall * * * not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.”
Wrightson did not make a pretrial motion to suppress, although he had ample opportunity to do so and was well aware before the trial began of such ground as he had for making the motion —the alleged illegality of his arrest without a warrant. In these circumstances, Rule 41(e) leaves it to the discretion of the District Court either to entertain the motion and decide it on the merits, or to deny it without hearing or consideration on the ground that it came too late.
This provision of Rule 41(e) gives rise to the basic fundamental question in this case, which should be first considered and determined. I cannot state it more succinctly than the majority opinion does when it says, “Our question is whether in disposing of Wrightson’s objection at the trial the court declined to entertain it or entertained and denied it.” The correct answer to this threshold question,—which I shall show later is that the trial judge declined to entertain the objection—is dispositive of this case. For, if Wrightson’s objection to the exhibits (which was in effect a motion to suppress) was denied because it was not made before the trial, no reason for reviewing the ruling appears and the judgment should be affirmed without further discussion. This proposition is not denied by the majority opinion.
On the other hand, if the trial judge considered the merits of the motion to suppress the exhibits and denied it for the sole reason that he thought the arrest was legal, it is of course necessary for this court to go on from the threshold question and consider the subsidiary problem which then arises: was there probable cause for the arrest without warrant ?
The majority seem to regard the subsidiary question as the more important, since they take it up first and devote the bulk of their opinion to it. They conclude the arrest was illegal and then turn to the initial fundamental question, to which they give short shrift; they answer it merely by quoting some remarks of the trial judge and by concluding therefrom—incorrectly, I think—that he “entertained the objection and overruled it.” This is, in my view, the basic error in the court’s opinion.
In sum, my brothers say the judge decided to consider the motion on its merits and erred in denying it because they hold the record does not show the officers had probable cause to believe Wrightson had committed a felony and so does not show that the arrest without a warrant was legal. Thus they award a new trial to a self-confessed armed robber because of what seems to me to be an erroneous notion that the trial court invaded a constitutional right of the bandit by denying his tardy motion to suppress, thereby permitting the introduction of certain exhibits which had practically no probative value and *564could have had very little, if any, part in leading to the jury’s verdict.
In the interest of clarity, I follow the majority’s example and take up the questions in inverse order. I first discuss the question concerning the illegality of the arrest, although I am clear it does not properly arise because the trial judge did not entertain the motion to suppress on its merits, as I shall show; but I am also convinced that the subsidiary question is being incorrectly answered by the majority of the court.
My view is that, although there was no separate hearing before the judge as to probable cause for arresting Wrightson, as there would have been had the motion to suppress actually been considered on its merits, the record made before the jury incidentally but sufficiently shows the officers had probable cause for their undoubted belief that Wrightson had committed this particular felony. One of the arresting officers testified he arrested Wrightson as the result of his investigation of the robbery, and added that he “had information that the Government cheeks were in that apartment.” (My italics.) The word “the” is significant in view of the fact that a number of government checks were stolen from the super market by Wrightson and the other bandits. ■
And yet the majority say, “* * * [W]e do hot know why the officers were at Wrightson’s apartment, especially at such an hour and so many dáys after the robbery * * To me the' reason for their presence there is clear: their investigation hád led theiii to' believe Wrightson had cominittéd the crime a’rid they had been informed that some of the fruits of the robbery'were in his apártment. That is why they went to Wright-son’s apartment and that is why, when he gave his name, they instantly arrested him. Certainly the officers believed Wrightson • had committed the robbery and: had reasons for their belief.
But, as I .have said, the legality of the arrest is not properly in issue. No question concerning it arises because the trial court’s ruling was not based upon it. Consequently, regardless of the existence of probable cause for arrest without warrant, the judgment should be affirmed because the trial judge exercised his discretion not to consider the merits of the motion to suppress. This is so because the record as a whole shows, I think, that Wrightson’s objection was overruled on the ground that it came too late; and the appellant agrees, saying in his brief: “In the instant case, the court would not suppress the evidence because a motion to suppress had not been made before the trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) Despite this concession by the appellant, the majority of the court disagree with him and grant him a new trial because they disagree. They choose to construe the remarks of the trial judge as showing he considered the motion to suppress on its merits and then denied it.
There were numerous colloquies between bench and bar, as Wrightson’s objection to the exhibits was repeatedly overruled. Some of the trial judge’s remarks concerning the basis of his ruling are seemingly equivocal and at times apparently contradictory, as the majority opinion , shows by quoting therefrom. Even so, his remarks taken as a whole permit the inference that the motion to suppress was denied as being too late, equally as well as they permit the inference drawn by the majority. For example, the judge made this statement, which is quoted (but with different emphasis) in the majority opinion:
“The Court: I am going to exclude this line of examination because the rules provide that any such objection as that must be made before, the trial by a motion to suppress. No such.motion was made.
“In addition to that I have already ruled, irrespective of that, that a search of premises where an arrest is made may be made incidental to the arrest, in connection therewith.”
None of the judge’s statement should be isolated. Everything he said should be considered in. tfie light of the factual *565and procedural situation disclosed by the whole record, and in the light also of an important provision of Rule 41(e), to which I shall allude. So considered, the basis for overruling the motion to suppress becomes clear as being that it was made too late. The trial judge said at the outset and throughout his discussion that the rule requires the motion be made before trial. His position may be fairly summarized as being that he denied the motion because it came too late, but that he would not do so if he thought from what had been said in evidence that it might have merit; for, if he thought that, he would exercise his discretion to consider the motion and receive evidence out of the jury’s presence on any issue of fact necessary to decision thereon.
I can attribute no other significance to the trial judge’s ruling, not only because of what he said, but also because of the significant fact that he did not conduct a hearing, apart from the jury, on the issue of the legality of the arrest without a warrant. Nobody is more conversant with the rules of civil and criminal procedure than is the learned trial judge.2 Had he considered the motion to suppress on its merits, he would have been quick to follow the peremptory provision of Rule 41(e) that in hearing such a motion, made either before or during trial, “The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.” Like my brothers of the majority and like me, indeed like all human judges, the district judge who tried this case is capable of error; but in view of his experience, I think it fair to , say it is highly improbable that he overlooked or deliberately disobeyed this simple but imperative sentence in the very rule under which he was acting.
That he conducted no hearing on the motion is, to me, convincing proof that, as he said, he denied it “because the rules provide that any such objection as that must be made before the trial by a motion to suppress. No such motion was made.” The Government was afforded no opportunity to show the reasons why the officers believed Wrightson had committed the robbery, as it would have been if the motion had been considered on its merits in a separate hearing. Had the inquiry been entered into, undoubtedly the prosecutor would have attempted a more extensive showing of reasonable cause than was contained in the more or less incidental statements on that subject made by the arresting officer, to which I have referred.
The majority express concern over the tendency of police officers to arrest people without warrants and without probable cause. If there is such a tendency, 1 too am disturbed by it and agree that it should be judicially condemned and curbed. But I do not agree that the arrest of Wrightson indicates such a tendency. Officers occasionally make mistakes in that regard, but I am not aware of any definite tendency on their part — locally, at least — to abuse the power of arrest without warrant.
I am much more disturbed over what seems to me to be a judicial tendency in recent years toward a rather mawkish exaggeration of the rights of criminals, particularly in search and seizure and confession cases, with too little concern for the protection of the public. We should, of course, recognize and safeguard the legal and constitutional rights of even a confessed and confirmed criminal like Wrightson. (This is his fifth robbery conviction.) But the duty to do so does not require us to choose between two alternatives that which leads to reversal of his conviction because of the admission of inconsequential evidence, when the choice of the other alternative is equally, if not more, reasonable and logical. We should not lightly attribute wrongdoing to the police who, after all, are not enemies but rather protectors of society.
*566I think Wrightson, armed bandit and potential murderer, should serve the term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced.

. That is, he did not testify in his own defense before the jury. He did give testimony in a hearing before the judge on the admissibility of his confession, in the course of which he said:
“ * * * Mr. Casey told me who he was and showed me his credentials, and I asked him if there was any possible chance you know of getting my case in the right court and before the right judge, and he said that he couldn’t guarantee that I would go before any certain judge or what amount of time that I would get, but he said I would get every consideration due to me.”

. Judge Alexander Holtzoff, co-author of an extensive and useful work on federal practice and procedure, covering both civil and criminal rules.