Court Opinion

ID: 9905783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:05:57.156131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.918062
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1477-21

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL,

          Plaintiff-Respondent/
          Cross-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

     Defendant-Appellant/
     Cross-Respondent.
___________________________

                   Argued November 1, 2023 – Decided November 30, 2023

                   Before Judges Firko, Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0696-20.

                   Eric Corngold (Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman
                   LLP) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice,
                   argued the cause for        appellant/cross-respondent
                   (Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, attorneys for
                   appellant/cross-respondent; Blair R. Albom and Eric
                   Corngold, on the briefs).
            Lance Jon Kalik argued the cause for respondent/cross-
            appellant (Riker Danzig, LLP, attorneys: Lance Jon
            Kalik, Michael P. O'Mullan, and Charles B. McKenna,
            of counsel and on the briefs; Corey L. LaBrutto and
            Austin W.B. Hilton, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      This appeal arises from defendant New Jersey Economic Development

Authority's (NJEDA or Authority) decision to rescind tax incentive credits it

awarded to plaintiff Holtec International (Holtec) under the New Jersey Grow

Program. In 2014, NJEDA agreed to award $260 million in tax credits over a

ten-year period to induce Holtec to build a new technology campus in Camden.

Holtec built the facility and continues to operate it. NJEDA initially certified

the tax credits. In June 2019, the Office of the State Comptroller issued a report

alleging Holtec had misrepresented facts in its application. The public report

criticized NJEDA for its lack of diligence in enforcing the tax incentive

program. Thereafter, NJEDA refused to certify tax credits for the 2018 tax year,

prompting Holtec to file the present lawsuit.

      NJEDA appeals from an order issued by Judge Robert T. Lougy granting

summary judgment to Holtec. Judge Lougy concluded in a well-reasoned forty-

one-page written opinion that NJEDA could not void the tax incentive

agreement, finding that certain provisions in the application were ambiguous

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and should be construed against NJEDA, which drafted the application. The

judge concluded that Holtec did not make any material misrepresentations in its

application for tax credits. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the

governing legal principles and arguments of the parties, we affirm.

                                      I.

      We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record.

The Grow New Jersey Assistance Act, N.J.S.A. 34:1B-242 to -249, enacted in

2011, authorizes NJEDA to award tax credits to eligible businesses "to

encourage economic development and job creation and to preserve jobs that

currently exist in New Jersey but which are in danger of being relocated outside

of the State." N.J.S.A. 34:1B-244(a). The Economic Opportunity Act of 2013

(the 2013 Act) modified the tax incentive program to encourage "capital

investment" where "the resultant retention and creation of full-time jobs will

yield a net positive benefit to the State. . . ." L. 2013, c. 161. The 2013 Act also

contained provisions to encourage businesses to remain in or relocate to a

Garden State Growth Zone under the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic

Recovery Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27BBB-1 to -65. Ibid.

      Throughout 2013 and 2014, NJDEA and Holtec discussed a possible

application under the Grow Program. Those preliminary discussions focused on

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Holtec's interest in building a new technology campus. NJDEA's then-president

agreed during his deposition that the parties had a mutual interest in relocating

to Camden because it was the only city that was a designated Garden State

Growth Zone and qualified under the Municipal Rehabilitation and Recovery

Act. He also confirmed Holtec's initial application featured a $350 million

project and the relocation of jobs from Holtec's facility in Marlton. After the

preliminary discussions, Holtec formally applied for tax incentives under the

Grow Program.

      The application form had an "Additional Background Information"

section that began by explaining,

            [b]usinesses applying for eligibility for NJEDA
            programs      are  subject     to    the     Authority's
            Disqualification/Debarment        Regulations       (the
            "Regulations"), which are set forth in N.J.A.C. 19:30-
            [2.1 to -8.3]. Applicants are required to answer the
            following background questions pertaining to the
            commission of certain actions that can lead to
            debarment or disqualification from eligibility under the
            Regulations.

"Item 8" of the background questions reads "[d]ebarment by any department,

agency, or instrumentality of the State or Federal government."

      On January 20, 2014, defendant submitted its application and responded

"[n]o" to Item 8. The application did not disclose that the Tennessee Valley

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Authority (TVA) had disbarred Holtec for ten days in December 2010. The brief

debarment occurred pursuant to an administrative agreement with the TVA. The

disbarment was based "upon alleged actions and conduct taken by or on behalf

of Holtec in connection with the facts underlying the plea agreement of [a]

former TVA employee. . . ." No civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding

took place. Moreover, the debarment was publicly reported.

      Holtec's application also stated it had "robust proposals" from South

Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. New Jersey was competing with these states

in Holtec's "strategic decision making process on where to center its

technological operations for the next one hundred years." Holtec identified

South Carolina as the number one competitor with New Jersey, and certified

"April 1, 2014 would be the first date in which [it] would choose to hire at

another location."

      Aside from the information provided in the four corners of the application,

the record shows that Holtec represented to NJEDA staff in meetings and other

communications that it had an offer of free land in South Carolina, specifically

at a shipyard in Charleston. An undated letter on Holtec letterhead was produced

in discovery entitled, "Why Expand Holtec International in New Jersey?" The

letter states, "Holtec has discussed constructing a new 650,000 square foot

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[technology center] in Charleston, South Carolina. South Carolina will give

Holtec the land." This letter appears to be related to a February 7, 2014 email

from the Holtec employee serving as the NJEDA liaison, to Holtec's CEO and

president, Dr. Kris Singh, with the subject line "Re: Camden Update -- NJEDA

Call Today." On February 9, 2014, Holtec's CEO replied, stating, in part,

"[r]egarding why NJ, I will send you some written text to help you get the story

together. . . ."

       At his deposition, Singh was asked if Holtec "had a clear offer from South

Carolina for free land?" Singh responded, "I believe that we had an informal

offer of land and a lot of other things. Free land would not even enter our

consideration if that's all they offered."   Singh testified that he could not

remember whether his discussions with South Carolina specifically included an

offer of free land. However, he stated that Charleston was a desirable location

in part due to its port.

       Holtec also had business dealings in South Carolina, including a joint

proposal related to a small modular reactor at a site along the Savannah River.

Holtec had conversations with the former South Carolina Governor and

representatives of South Carolina's Department of Commerce about relocating

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to that state. However, as Judge Lougy noted in his findings, there is nothing in

the record showing South Carolina made a definitive offer of free land to Holtec.

      Another    NJEDA     employee    testified   that   the   Grow   Program's

administrators did not require "a written offer from another state" regarding

relocation.   This policy decision was deliberate; NJDEA did not want to

encourage applicants to engage in negotiations with other states.

      Prior to the Holtec application, NJEDA had been put on notice as to

problems with the application form. For example, in December 2012, another

Grow Program applicant, Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., informed

NJEDA via an addendum to its application that "some of the items 1-10 are not

worded as a question."     Other applicants had also expressed confusion or

frustration with the application form with respect to the background items.

NJEDA acknowledged such deficiencies to some of these applicants. Moreover,

Marcus Saldutti, an NJEDA employee, testified that NJEDA informed those

applicants it only considered information about civil matters that occurred

within five years preceding an application, and only considered criminal or

regulatory matters that occurred within the preceding ten years.

      Saldutti also acknowledged that in the course of reviewing applications

from companies that made insufficient disclosures, he wrote an internal email

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stating, "[u]ltimately, we're most concerned with admissions or findings of guilt

or liability in concluded matters and with serious yet unresolved matters, as

well." He further clarified that applicants only had to disclose such legal issues

for the applicant and its "control group," consisting of "officers or directors of

the applicant or any affiliates."

      The criticisms of the application form prompted changes to the application

process.   The Grow Program issued a new application form in 2016 that

modified the additional background information section to read:

             Has Applicant, any officers or directors of Applicant,
             or any Affiliates (collectively, the "Controlled Group")
             been found guilty, liable or responsible in any Legal
             Proceeding for any of the following violations or
             conduct? (Any civil or criminal decisions or verdicts
             that have been vacated or expunged need not be
             reported).

The 2016 application form also explicitly defined "legal proceeding" as "any

State, Federal or foreign civil, criminal or administrative proceeding in a court

or administrative tribunal in the United States, any territories thereof or foreign

jurisdiction."

      NJEDA acknowledged other applicants that engaged in corporate

misconduct are still receiving tax credits without penalty. At a public hearing

held by the New Jersey Task Force on the Economic Authority's Tax Incentives

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                                        8
on October 17, 2019, Saldutti testified he prepared disciplinary reports for the

NJEDA board that made recommendations on whether an applicant's misdeeds

or failures to disclose misconduct "r[o]se to the level of a disqualification." Past

misconduct, or non-disclosure of past misconduct, he acknowledged, did not

necessarily disqualify an applicant.

      For example, Saldutti recommended approving Siemens's application

despite its parent company's 2008 guilty plea to violations of the Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act, which it had not disclosed in its initial application.

Similarly, he recommended approving JP Morgan's Grow Program application

despite its 2015 guilty plea "to one felony count of conspiring to fix prices and

rig bids for US dollars in Euro exchanged in the foreign exchange spot market,"

which resulted in a $355 million fine levied by European regulators.

      Saldutti stated he only remembered one business that had its application

denied, referring to it as an "outlier." That business, a marina, was partially

owned by an individual who pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide in New

York in 2007 in connection with a trench collapse at a construction project.

During the public hearing, Saldutti acknowledged that based on the twenty-five

memoranda he drafted, nothing "short of death" would "constitute [] an outlier

for the purpose of [NJ]EDA disqualifications for tax incentives."

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                                         9
      As we have already noted, Holtec was awarded $260 million in tax credits

to be released over ten years. It invested more than that amount to build the

campus in Camden. As part of its agreement with NJEDA, Holtec agreed to

submit yearly compliance reports. On January 15, 2018, Holtec submitted i ts

first Annual Compliance Report for the 2017 tax year. On April 11, 2018,

NJEDA certified Holtec's compliance.

      On January 15, 2019, Holtec submitted its Annual Compliance Report for

the 2018 tax year. On May 20, 2019, Holtec sent a letter to NJEDA updating its

answer to the "Debarment/Disqualification" question. Holtec answered "yes" to

Item 8 and provided details about its ten-day debarment by TVA. Holtec did

not receive a letter of compliance from NJEDA for the 2018 tax year, nor did it

receive the associated tax credits. The Authority's stated reason for withholding

the tax credits was Holtec's failure to disclose its 2010 debarment by TVA and

Holtec's misleading statements about "alleged alternative sites in South

Carolina."

      On March 23, 2020, Holtec filed a complaint against NJEDA, asserting

claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, and equitable estoppel. NJEDA moved to dismiss the complaint.

On August 4, 2020, Judge Mary C. Jacobson granted the motion in part by

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                                      10
dismissing Holtec's equitable estoppel claim but denied the motion to dismiss

the other counts.

      After discovery was completed, both parties moved for summary

judgment. Judge Lougy denied NJEDA's motion for summary judgment and

granted Holtec's motion. He ordered NJEDA to issue a letter of compliance

approving the issuance of tax credits to Holtec for the 2018 tax year.

      This appeal follows. 1 NJEDA contends the trial court erred in concluding,

on summary judgment, that Holtec did not make material misrepresentations

about its debarment or about its supposed alternate site in South Carolina.

                                     II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. As a general proposition, summary judgment is only appropriate

where no "genuine issue of material fact exists." Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J.

449, 472 (2020). When evaluating a summary judgment motion, "the trial court

must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non -moving

party.'" Ibid. (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).

1
  Holtec filed a protective cross-appeal. In light of our decision to affirm the
grant of summary judgment in Holtec's favor, we need not address the arguments
raised in Holtec's cross-appeal.
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                                      11
      Appellate review of the trial court's summary judgment decision is de

novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 224 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). On appeal,

we consider "'whether the competent evidential materials presented, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to

permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the

non-moving party.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406

(2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995)).

      As Judge Lougy observed, "[t]he parties agree that no material facts are

in dispute." Rather, this case hinges on the interpretation of the contract between

NJEDA and Holtec and the completed application form that culminated in the

agreement. "The interpretation or construction of a contract is usually a legal

question for the court, 'suitable for a decision on a motion for summary

judgment.'" Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State, Dep't of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304,

313-14 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Spaulding Composites Co., Inc. v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super. 167, 173 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd on other grounds,

Spaulding Composites Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 176 N.J. 25, 46

(2003)).

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      In contract disputes, the State "must 'turn square corners' rather than

exploit litigational or bargaining advantages that might otherwise be available

to private citizens." W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 116

N.J. 543, 561 (1989) (quoting F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains,

100 N.J. 418, 426 (1985)). The government must act fairly and "adhere to strict

standards in its contractual dealings," while also acting consistently with its

"supervening obligation . . . to deal scrupulously with the public." Id. at 562.

      "'An ambiguity in a contract exists if the terms of the contract are

susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations. . . .'" Nester v.

O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Kaufman v.

Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 993

F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993)). Whether a provision is ambiguous is a matter of law.

Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002). Where

the government is a party to and the drafter of a contract, any ambiguity is

"strictly construed against . . . the government entity." M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J.

Dep't of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 398 (2002).

                                       III.

      Applying these legal principles, we first address NJEDA's interrelated

contentions with respect to Holtec's failure to reveal its ten-day debarment by

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TVA. The Authority contends the trial judge erred by determining at summary

judgment that the Grow Program application was ambiguous with respect to past

debarment; erred by not applying the doctrine of "patent ambiguity"; and erred

by not considering other evidence of Holtec's intentions. The gist of these

arguments is that Holtec made a material misrepresentation in its Grow Program

application, and that Judge Lougy erred in finding otherwise.

      Judge Lougy ruled that Item 8 of the "Additional Background

Information" section of the Grow Program application was ambiguous. He

"construe[d] the contested clause against the NJEDA" because "NJEDA d rafted

the application."   NJEDA "did not specify its intent and it provided no

instructions or guidance to the applicants." Judge Lougy noted the debarment

portion of the application could be interpreted in multiple ways. He explained,

            [o]ne potential interpretation is NJEDA intended for
            applicants to answer the question including all past and
            current debarments regardless of relevant legal
            proceedings. A second interpretation is NJEDA
            required an affirmative response only if the applicant
            was currently debarred. An additional interpretation is
            an affirmative response was only necessary if the
            applicant was previously found guilty, liable, or
            responsible in any legal proceeding.

      Judge Lougy also found that NJEDA knew this portion of the application

was ambiguous based on other applicants' feedback.        He noted deposition

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testimony by NJEDA employees showed the Authority had already determined

debarments were only relevant if they applied to the members of the applicant's

"control group." Judge Lougy concluded,

            [u]nder that interpretation, a 'no' answer from [Holtec]
            would be accurate and render this issue moot. It is not
            clear that, at the time [Item] No. 8 was drafted,
            [NJEDA] even understood the type of information it
            hoped to learn. Accordingly, the [c]ourt declines to
            hold that ambiguity against [Holtec].

      Judge Lougy added that Holtec was not trying to conceal its ten-day

debarment from the Authority. He reasoned it was implausible that Holtec

would attempt to conceal this public information, which is accessible on the

internet. Holtec also assented to a background check as part of its Grow Program

application.2

      Although we review these issues de novo, considering all relevant

circumstances, we agree with Judge Lougy that NJEDA was not entitled to void

the incentive agreement based on Holtec's answer in the negative to Item 8. The

determination of an ambiguity in a contract is a question of law, and thus

appropriate for resolution by summary judgment. See Schor, 357 N.J. Super. at

191. We apply that principle to the application form that led to the execution of

2
  There is no indication in the record that NJEDA ever conducted a background
check.
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the agreement. Furthermore, where, as in this instance, the government is a

party to and drafter of a contract, any ambiguity is "strictly construed

against . . . the government entity." M.J. Paquet, 171 N.J. at 398.

      We also agree with Judge Lougy that the patent ambiguity doctrine does

not apply to Holtec's application since there is no bidding process in the NJEDA

Grow Program. In brief, the patent ambiguity doctrine states "in construing a

public contract a contractor has an obligation to alert the public entity to possible

errors in a contract before bidding on it." Dugan Constr. Co., Inc. v. N.J. Tpk.

Auth., 398 N.J. Super. 229, 241 (App. Div. 2008). To ensure equality for all

bidders, "contractors are urged" to examine all documents and "raise questions

about the drawings, specifications and conditions of bidding and performing the

work." Ibid. Patent ambiguity in publicly bid contracts is an "exception to the

general rule that a contract, and any latent ambiguities in it, should be construed

against the party that wrote it." Ibid. The onus is shifted from the government

to the bidder "by requiring that ambiguities be raised before the contract is bid

on, thus avoiding costly litigation after the fact." Ibid.

      Moreover, at the risk of stating the obvious, the concept of materiality

presupposes that a positive answer to Item 8 would have mattered. But the

NJEDA employee who was responsible for preparing recommendations and

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reports candidly acknowledged that Grow Program applications were granted to

companies with histories of far more serious transgressions. It thus seems

unlikely that Holtec's application would have been denied had it revealed in its

initial application that it once had a ten-day debarment in another state.

      In sum, given the application form deficiencies and the manner in which

NJEDA oversaw the application process, Holtec's negative response to Item 8

in its initial application does not constitute a material misrepresentation that

might warrant rescinding the award of tax credits.

                                      IV.

      We turn next to NJEDA's contention the trial court erred by ruling that

plaintiff did not materially misrepresent an offer of free land in South Carolina.

Judge Lougy concluded there were no material misrepresentations because

Grow Program applicants were asked only to make estimates about costs of

acquiring alternate sites. Holtec "consistently and explicitly referred to land

costs as assumptions." Judge Lougy stressed that NJEDA "did not seek or

request any additional documentation regarding land costs."

      Furthermore, Judge Lougy found, based on the deposition testimony of

NJDEA employees or former employees, "that, given the magnitude of the

project and the higher costs associated with construction in New Jersey, land

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costs were not a material factor in NJEDA's approval of [Holtec's] application."

Finally, Judge Lougy emphasized "[t]he record shows [NJEDA] intentionally

chose not to request written agreements [regarding land costs] from Grow

Program applicants because it did not 'want to push the companies to another

state to start engaging in further dialogue with them. . . .'" Judge Lougy

concluded that because Holtec did not make misrepresentations as to land

acquisition, NJEDA was not entitled to void the incentive agreement.

       We are unpersuaded by NJEDA's argument that these issues need to be

decided at a trial rather than by summary judgment. The law is well-settled that

summary judgment is appropriate "when the evidence 'is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law,' . . . the trial court should not hesitate to

grant summary judgment." Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The record amply supports Judge

Lougy's findings.     We reiterate and emphasize NJEDA's own employees

testified they did not press applicants for written offers from other states as a

matter of policy. Judge Lougy's well-supported finding that NJEDA never asked

for anything more than assumptions about alternative site costs forecloses a

finding that Holtec made material representations.        As Judge Lougy aptly

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concluded, Holtec supplied NJEDA with exactly what it asked for in the

application.

                                      V.

       We turn finally to NJEDA's contentions with respect to the remedy of

recission. NJEDA challenges Judge Lougy's conclusion that recission would be

an inequitable remedy, arguing in its reply brief that it is contractually entitled

to this relief.

       "Rescission is an equitable remedy and only available in limited

circumstances." Intertech Assocs., Inc. v. City of Paterson, 255 N.J. Super. 52,

59 (App. Div. 1992). Rescission is one possible remedy available, for example,

when a contract is induced by fraud. Ajamian v. Schlanger, 20 N.J. Super. 246,

249 (App. Div. 1952). "Even where grounds for rescission exist, however, the

remedy is discretionary." Intertech, 255 N.J. Super. at 59 (citing Hilton Hotels

Corp. v. Piper Co., 214 N.J. Super. 328, 336 (Ch. Div. 1986)). When a party

discovers fraud within a contract, "he must thereupon act with diligence and

without delay if he desires to rescind. . . ." Ajamian, 20 N.J. Super. at 249.

Importantly for purposes of this appeal, for rescission to be available, "[t]he

court must be able to return the parties to the 'ground upon which they originally

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stood.''' Intertech, 255 N.J. Super. at 59 (quoting Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol

Bridge Co., 28 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 1953)).

      We agree with the trial judge that recission is not an appropriate remedy

in this case. For one thing, as Judge Lougy aptly noted, no fraud occurred here.

The ambiguity associated with the application form NJEDA drafted excuses any

omissions in Holtec's completed application.

      Furthermore, as Judge Lougy stressed, Holtec relied on the tax credits in

deciding to make a very significant investment in New Jersey by relocating to

Camden as the Authority requested. Considering Holtec's significant investment

in the new technology campus, there is no way to return the parties to their pre -

contract positions. We add that NJEDA continues to benefit from Holtec's

ongoing performance. We can appreciate why NJEDA is strongly motivated to

make amends for its past lack of diligence in overseeing the Grow Program, as

claimed in the State Comptroller's report.      We appreciate why NJEDA is

motivated to respond to the State Comptroller's criticism of its administration of

the Grow Program. However, rescinding tax credits to a company that dutifully

fulfilled its agreement to make substantial investments in Camden—an

economically disadvantaged city—would hardly be equitable considering all

relevant circumstances.

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      In sum, we conclude this matter was ripe for summary judgment. The

Judge Lougy's comprehensive decision is well supported by the undisputed facts

in the record.

      Affirmed.

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