Court Opinion

ID: 9465575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:50:07.608577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:15.147848
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
It certainly may seem curious that broadcasters, whose mission is to display their creations to the widest possible audiences, are striving so hard to keep certain of their programs from becoming viewable more than once. This extensive litigative effort bespeaks, then, deep concern that the superficially innocuous recording requirement at issue will jeopardize cherished journalistic independence. Petitioners seek to overturn that requirement under the First Amendment, and Judge Wright’s opinion presents a persuasive analysis of the chill that Section 399(b)1 and the implementing regulations could forebode for First Amendment expression. Nonetheless, I think our decision is more firmly grounded on the Fifth Amendment’s pledge of equal protection of *1125the laws.2 Accordingly, I join in Parts I and IV of Judge Wright’s opinion and in the judgment of the court, and elaborate herein my reasons for doing so.
I
Section 399(b) draws classifications among broadcasters in two ways. First, it applies only to those licensees who receive financial assistance from certain specific federal sources; more importantly, it applies only to those broadcasters who air public affairs programs.3 Petitioners, who are among the class burdened, do not argue that they are politically powerless 4 or have historically been subjected to unequal treatment,5 and obviously they do not comprise a “discrete and insular” minority.6 Thus no suspicions are raised simply by the nature of the group around whose collective neck the legislated millstone has fallen.
But while the affected class itself raises no eyebrows, the recording obligation Section 399(b) imposes on a differential basis calls for closer investigation.7 We have here a mandate that is specifically related to speech. In a sense, the recording directive facially impacts on First Amendment interests no greater than do many other more commonplace regulatory commands that are similarly expensive and time-consuming to obey.8 This one, however, varies expressly and proportionally with the level of communicative activity of a particular kind, which is not the case with such general edicts as those summoning broadcasters to submit reports and pay taxes.9 Noncommercial licensees who emphasize public affairs in their programming bear the brunt of the recording rule, and resultantly the statute and the supplementing regulations on their face could operate as a disincentive to programming of that type. Beyond that, even, petitioners con*1126tend that we should look to what they allege is the requirement’s improper purpose — facilitation of governmental pressure on noncommercial broadcasters. In support of their argument, they cite remarks of Senator Griffin, quoted in Judge Wright’s opinion,10 as indicative of a congressional willingness to exact recording as the quid pro quo for avoiding more direct governmental censorship.
It cannot be gainsaid that the existing regulatory framework provides dangerous opportunities for abuse.11 But the call for recording adds little more to that peril; it simply makes marginally easier what could happen in any event.12 Whether the heightened menace posed by Section 399(b) imposes a chill on First Amendment freedom sufficient to require its invalidation on that ground is a question I see need to not address. Though Judge Wright’s opinion states a persuasive case that the section “was intended ... to impose the threat of congressional or government control over the content of noncommercial public affairs broadcasting,” 13 I think it jurisprudentially sounder to avoid whenever possible — as it is here — a direct search for improper motives of the legislature in passing a law, or of the executive in implementing it. In any event, I would rely upon a probe of that kind to overturn governmental action only when the exploration has uncovered clear and convincing proof.14
Moreover, petitioners’ contention runs afoul of the sensible proposition that it benefits no one to invalidate automatically and totally every law that might do some good merely on the ground that it might also be used to do some bad. It must be remembered that this litigation is not an effort to enjoin an instance of the misuse of Section 899(b) feared by petitioners. Rather, we are asked to invalidate on its face the entire *1127provision on the basis of apprehensions that it might sometimes — though of course it might never — be abused. Judicial review to assure the constitutionality of governmental action is not so blunt an instrument that ordinarily we must upset a legislative or administrative scheme in advance of a “reasonable probability” of perversion of power.15 Normally we can await a real threat of the disease and then intercept it, or at least carefully excise it from the body politic without necessarily maiming the patient.
Hence, I must reject petitioners’ plea to subject Section 399(b) to the strictures of the First Amendment. That I would reserve for statutes facially impinging on First Amendment interests and those being or likely to be perverted to do so. Yet, because the burden of this legislation is assigned on the basis of the nature of the expression, and because suspicions about its real objective and potential use have been voiced- — either of which might serve to deter broadcasters’ willingness to air controversial programs — one cannot shed entirely his First Amendment cares.16 So, any exploration into whether Section 399(b) satisfies the demands of Fifth Amendment equal protection must be conducted in light of these somber First Amendment concerns. Indeed, petitioners argue that equal protection summons careful scrutiny to assure that the requirement is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “substantial governmental interest.” 17 The invitation is tempting,18 but I believe Section 399(b) cannot withstand even more restrained equal protection review, and hence I feel no need to measure it against any more stringent standard.
II
Having ascertained the class and the interests affected, the next step is to determine whether “the classifications drawn in [the] statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.” 19 This is a quest first entailing identification of Section 399(b)’s ostensible legitimate objectives. That will be no mean feat here, since Congress has indicated only vaguely what ends or mixture of ends the recording requirement was intended to serve.20
*1128The legislative history of Section 399(b) is sparse indeed. As Judge Wright observes, some statements during the legislative debates point to an undifferentiated intent to censor,21 but that is not all that surfaces at times. There are also hints that program recording was meant to serve the objectivity and balance directive of Section 396(g)(1)(A)22 or the ban on editorializing in Section 399(a).23 The Commission as respondent and Senator Griffin as amicus curiae suggest that Section 399(b) was directed additionally toward preservation of significant programming or oversight of federal expenditures. No reference to these latter two are seen in the legislative history, and courts cannot rely upon aims that apparently never crossed the minds of the legislators,24 particularly when confronted by the possibility of danger to a fundamental interest. Even when Section 399(b) is analyzed in relationship to all these supposed goals,25 however, it emerges as an odd mechanism for producing any of the results for which some would give it credit.
A. Preservation of Significant Programming
If this be its purpose,26 then Section 399(b) is grossly and indisputably underinclusive. Noncommercial licensees who have not accepted federal funds or who broadcast little or no public affairs programming — as well as all commercial licensees— undeniably air many “significant” presentations.27 Absent any legislative or adminis*1129trative findings on this score, I am left to common sense, and it simply strains credulity to think that the burdened class is responsible for a decisionally conclusive portion of “significant” programming.28 Thus I must turn elsewhere to find a legislative goal explaining the distinction.
B. Oversight of Federal Funding
At first blush, this end seems related to a means, such as Section 399(b), that draws a distinction on the basis of receipt of federal funds, but careful analysis is needed before the law can be approved as furthering fiscal oversight. Surely more can be expected of those who drink deepest at the public trough, but that which is expected must be related to governmental provision of assistance; the existence of a fulcrum such as public aid is not the equivalent of a constitutionally-valid reason for applying leverage.29 The rubric of funding oversight can be invoked only when the vehicle chosen seems designed to give assurance that the funds are being properly spent, and that is not the case here.
The recording requirement has no sensible correlation with this supposed target. The burdens of Section 399(b) fall most oppressively on those who most often broadcast public affairs programs, not on those who most extensively receive federal money. Consequently, the requirement is both over- and underinclusive: it applies to all public affairs presentations by federally subsidized noncommercial broadcasters, even though most of such programming is unaided by federal funding; 30 it does not apply to any other type of programs, though millions of federal dollars are expended for their presentation.31 In short, while oversight of federal expenditures is a laudable end, the Section 399(b) means has, in Judge Wright’s words, at most but an occasionally coincidental relationship to it.32
C. Assuring Objectivity and Balance
This purported mission comes from Section 396(g)(1)(A), which instructs the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) to adhere to a policy of “objectivity and balance in all programs . . . of a controversial nature.”33 The fairness doctrine, which requires all broadcasters to cover public issues and to present conflicting points of view, is somewhat similar.34 Enforcement of this latter duty, however, is hardly the objective of Section 399(b), for the Commission has determined that a recording requirement is not needed therefor.35 Section 399(b), moreover, would be *1130irrationally underinclusive if directed toward that end since it does not apply to commercial licensees. Assuring compliance with Section 396(g)(1)(A) is more pertinent to Section 399(b), but that certainly does not explain the differential treatment it accords.
The policy of objectivity and balance is, to begin with, a prescription only for CPB in its efforts to develop and upgrade public broadcasting.36 When Section 399(b) was first considered, CPB was already retaining copies of every program it funded, so Congress knew there was no problem in checking on CPB’s performance.37 The objectivity and balance requirement of Section 396(g)(1)(A) does not in terms apply to individual noncommercial licensees in airing their public affairs programs — even though federally funded. Section 399(b), on the other hand, is not self-limited even to licensees assisted by CPB grants, but encompasses anyone who at any time has received public broadcasting funds under the Act from any federal source 38 It is surely curious that the objectivity and balance directive applies only to CPB and not individual licensees while the recording requirement, which is said to be rationally related, applies only to the individual licensees and not CPB. Thus the taping requirement does not seem linked in any way to an effort to promote objectivity and balance, and much less could it be rationally related to that end.
Some of my dissenting brethren nonetheless accept that objective as Section 399(b)’s goal, and are able to avoid prohibitive over-inclusiveness therein by the simple expedient of narrowing the statutory language to match that goal — by defining the means to fit the end. Judge Leventhal reads that critical Section 399(b)(1) phrase, “each licensee which receives assistance ... after the date of [its] enactment”, as referring to “any program” and not to “each licensee.”39 I agree, however, with Judge Wright that we cannot adopt such a constrictive construction if it would do violence to evident legislative intentions respecting scope of the recording requirement.40 “Of course, if it can be lawfully done, our duty is to construe the statute so as to render it constitutional. But this does not imply, if the text of an act is unambiguous, that it may be rewritten to accomplish that purpose.”41 As Justice Holmes once put it, in construing a statute the judicial “function is merely academic to begin with — to read English intelligently — and a consideration of consequences comes into play, if at all, only when the meaning of the words used is open to reasonable doubt.” 42 Hardly more plainly could Congress have made its wish known when in Section 399(b)(1) it said that “each licensee which receives assistance” *1131shall abide the taping requirement for its public affairs programs.43
Even if the statutory phrase in question were somewhat ambiguous, I could not accept the reading suggested as a reasonable version of its intended meaning. That interpretation apparently has not occurred to any of the numerous lawyers in this litigation, or to the Commission or any of those who made , presentations to it regarding the taping rule, or to Senator Griffin in his amicus brief. More importantly, strong indications of congressional design are all to the contrary. As Judge Wright notes, Judge Leventhal’s construction is irreconcilable in three particulars with Section 396(g)(1)(A).44 And a contemporaneous administrative construction — the Commission’s, in the rulemaking proceeding we are now reviewing — is diametrically opposed to Judge Leventhal’s interpretation and yet was not objected to by a single legislator.45
Referring to admittedly ambiguous statements by two Members of Congress — which at most “revealf ] one purpose” 46 but do not exclude others,47 and do not speak directly *1132to the scope of Section 399(b) — Judge Leventhal’s dissent concedes that the main reason for the judicial draftsmanship it proposes is an effort to avoid constitutional susceptibility.48 But surely “a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.” 49 And if statutes must always be narrowed to the scope tolerated by permissible goals, every judicial decision overturning a law on grounds of overinclusiveness of persons not similarly situated was wrongly decided.50 Just months ago, the Supreme Court rejected a proffered objective for a statute, concluding that the argument was “belied ... by the provisions of the statute, which are both under- and over-inclusive.” 51 Moreover, if a statute can be constricted in the face of plain language and clear congressional intent, why should courts refuse to expand a statute to eliminate undercoverage? 52 Though indubitably we must strive to avoid declaring a statute infirm, it is no less an invasion of the legislature’s province to undertake to rewrite a law in accordance with one’s view of a proper objective in the field. And though we may feel that what Congress did is *1133unwise or even absurd, we may not “ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language.”53
Judge Leventhal’s chosen approach, furthermore, bypasses the equal protection problem only through a direct confrontation with the issue of congressional power to control the content of communications that it has had a part in financing, an issue this court has steered clear of on at least two occasions.54 And while I do not reach it under my view of this case,55 I think it much more difficult than the dissenters apparently do.56 The objectivity and balance requirement is justified, according to the dissents, by the exigency of assuring against governmental pressure on CPB to fund programs espousing partisan views.57 Though legitimate fears of governmental propagandizing might justify restrictions on the Government or on CPB to safeguard against exertions of that sort — and there are quite a few such restrictions in the Public Broadcasting Act58 — it might not so *1134easily validate rules affecting the broadcaster’s editorial decisions. Provisions calculated to stop governmental or CPB officials themselves from trying to influence private broadcasters would not only combat the real problem more squarely, but also less intrusively on First Amendment rights,59 than would those that order broadcasters to air only approvable programs.
Even if experience should prove that such restraints could not stop all governmental attempts to dominate CPB funding decisions or CPB efforts to influence editorial decisions, the fairness doctrine — which applies to public broadcasters 60 — and perhaps also the First Amendment itself61 might assure the presentation of points of view conflicting with those officially coerced. This manner of dealing with the spectre of official influence — advancing an argument for the other side instead of banning all viewpoints save those hewing to the middle of the road — might not only avoid unnecessary censorship of the noncommercial broadcaster when his onesided program truly reflects his own ideas, but simultaneously might promote the First Amendment policy of encouraging “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” debate on public issues.62 Preoccupation with the mischief feared should not be permitted to obscure the historical fact that “ ‘the remedy of silence is generally not the way of the first amendment.’ ” 63
III
Neither a particular proper purpose nor any amalgam of legitimate aims provides a *1135sound explanation for the classification and means chosen in Section 399(b). Consequently, the statutory recording requirement and the rules implementing it must give way to the demands of equal protection. That conclusion is strengthened when we recall that Section 399(b) tends to discourage broadcast expression on issues of public importance and thus to that extent at least disserves “the First Amendment goal of achieving ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’ ”64 While the absence of an acceptable connection between Section 399(b) and any valid governmental function certainly suggests that Judge Wright may be correct in the thesis that the taping mandate was actually intended to facilitate an unlawful end,65 it is enough for me that there is no basis for a finding that the requirement reasonably relates to any objective to which the Government permissibly can aspire,66 and no rational justification has been shown for the disparate treatment it metes out to noncommercial broadcasters who have been aided by federal funding. Accordingly, I concur in so much of Judge Wright’s opinion as espouses this view, and in the judgment today pronounced by the court.

. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (Supp. V 1975) states in relevant part:
(a) No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may engage in editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate for political office.
(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each licensee which receives assistance under sections 390 to 399 of this title after August 6, 1973 shall retain an audio recording of each of its broadcasts of any program in which any issue of public importance is discussed. Each such recording shall be retained for the sixty-day period beginning on the date on which the licensee broadcasts such program.
(2) The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a licensee’s broadcast of a program if an entity designated by the licensee retains an audio recording of each of the licensee’s broadcasts of such a program for the period prescribed by paragraph (1).
(3) Each licensee and entity designated by a licensee under paragraph (2) which retains a recording under paragraph (1) or (2) shall, in the period during which such recording is required under such paragraph to be retained, make a copy of such recording available—
(A) to the Commission upon its request, and
(B) to any other person upon payment to the licensee or designated entity (as the case may be) of its reasonable cost of making such copy.
(4) The Commission shall by rule prescribe—
(A) the manner in which recordings required by this subsection shall be kept, and
(B) the conditions under which they shall be available to persons other than the Commission,
giving due regard to the goals of eliminating unnecessary expense and effort and minimizing administrative burdens.

. “The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 1903-1904, 48 L.Ed.2d 495, 506-507 (1976); see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1228 n.2, 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 519 n.2 (1975) (approaches under the two amendments are “precisely the same”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 695, 98 L.Ed. 884, 887 (1954) (it is “unthinkable” that the Federal Government would have a lesser responsibility than the states in assuring equal protection).

. See note 1 supra.

. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 1070, 55 L.Ed.2d 287, 291 (1978), citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-784 n.4, 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241-1242 n.4 (1938); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 & n.13, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762-2763 & n.13, 49 L.Ed.2d 651, 661 & n.13 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169-1170 n.14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389, 402-403 n.14 (1974). A central purpose of the equal protection guarantee is to shield the politically impotent from capricious action by the majority. E. g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1969); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 507-508 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d as mod. sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 408 F.2d 175 (1969). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-653, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1724-1725, 16 L.Ed.2d 828, 836-837 (1966).

. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1973); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 40 (1973).

. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., supra note 4, 304 U.S. at 152-153 n.4, 58 S.Ct. at 783-784 n.4, 82 L.Ed. at 1241-1242 n.4; see, e. g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L.Ed.2d 65, 85 (1976); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 1891, 29 L.Ed.2d 273, 276 (1971).

. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081-1082, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 172 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 596-591, 100 L.Ed. 891, 898-899 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942).

. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566-567, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1981-1982, 56 L.Ed.2d 525, 540-542 (1978).

. Compare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. -, -, 593 F.2d 1112, 1113 (Wright, C. J. (Wright Op.)).

. See generally Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 Duke L.J. 213.

. As video tape recorders become more ubiquitous, it is hard to imagine why this recording requirement would be at all necessary to a plot to deter exercise of First Amendment rights. In fact, since the rules require only an audio tape, anyone with an inexpensive tape recorder —or, indeed, anyone who watched the program in question or heard about it — would have no need for the aid of § 399(b).

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1114 (Wright Op.). That opinion presents a rather convincing case through use of the sources for discovering improper purpose that the Supreme Court has suggested: historical background, sequence of events leading up to the challenged action, whether the challenged action represents a substantive departure from prior policy, and legislative and administrative history. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 268, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564 -565, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, 465-466 (1977).
Ironically, Judge Wright’s analysis is strengthened by Judge MacKinnon’s dissent, which admits — indeed, hopes — that § 399(b) will deter “the broadcast of irresponsible, inaccurate and slanted utterances. . . . ” 192 U.S.App.D.C. at —593 F.2d at 1153 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting opinion (MacKinnon Op.)) Even were it not menacing to the very heart of the First Amendment to assume that some governmental body should assure the caliber and accuracy of speech, the problem is that broadcasters can only guess what might be labeled “slanted,” and thus “will trim [their] sails to abide the prevailing winds.” 192 U.S.App. D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1123 (Wright Op.); see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.21, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420 n.21, 55 L.Ed.2d 707, 723 n.21 (1978). The natural desire to tack to the safest course will inevitably result in indoctrination for the governmental status quo, something even the dissents believe Congress wanted to avoid.

. Reliance upon individual expressions of legislative purpose is often unsafe because “[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it . . .” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1683, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 684 (1968). For that reason, I would prefer to rely upon other types of evidence — such as the absence of a reasonable fit between the means chosen and any legitimate end — that at least indicate what the governmental body as a whole had or did not have in mind when making its decision. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2054, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, 615 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor[, f]or normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds”).

. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 192 U.S. App.D.C at —,---- n.36, 593 F.2d at 1075, 1076-1077 n.36 (1978) (concurring opinion).

. In this regard, it makes no difference whether the governmental action absolutely prohibits a certain category of speech or simply restricts it by imposing additional burdens on those who wish to engage in it. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 1497, 14 L.Ed.2d 398, 403-404 (1965); see, e. g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 134-140, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 2031-2034, 32 L.Ed.2d 600, 607-610 (1972) (recoupment statute might deter use of appointed counsel by indigents accused of crime); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 100 (1972) (election fees “closely scrutinized” because of “impact” on right to vote).

. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-102, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293-2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, 220 (1972); see id. at 99 n.6, 92 S.Ct. at 2292 n.6, 33 L.Ed.2d at 219-220 n.6, quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556 n.14, 85 S.Ct. 453, 465 n.14, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 485 n.14 (1965) (content-based distinction “points up the fact that the statute reaches beyond mere traffic regulation to restrictions on expression”); accord First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, supra note 13, 435 U.S. at 784-785, 98 S.Ct. at 1420, 55 L.Ed.2d at 723 (“the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak”); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001, 1009 (1976) (“[t]he main evil against which vigorous First Amendment scrutiny is designed to guard is content discrimination — discrimination based on the message itself”).

. Whether the First Amendment itself imposes a requirement of equal treatment of similarly-situated speakers would be an academic inquiry, for the test applied to governmental action would be the same. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.Chi.L.Rev. 20 (1975).

. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 (1964); see, e. g., Mathews v. Lucas, supra note 4, 427 U.S. at 508 n.14, 96 S.Ct. at 2763-2764 n.14, 49 L.Ed.2d at 662-663 n.14 (“appellees, in order to make their case, must ultimately rely upon the asserted failure of the legislative product adequately to fit the purported legitimate aim”).

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. at---, 593 F.2d at 1118-1119 (Wright Op.).

. Id. at---, 593 F.2d at 1111-1113.

. See notes 46-47 infra.

. See note 1 supra.

. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-217, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 1030-1032, 51 L.Ed.2d 270, 280-283 (1977) (plurality opinion).

. No one argues that we should uphold the taping requirement as a means to enforce § 399(a)’s prohibition of editorial statements. Section 399(b)’s physical location in the Act might suggest that it was intended as that, and the original proposal in 1970 expressly stated that relationship. S. 3558, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Curiously, however, no one argues that the recording requirement was designed to facilitate oversight of § 399(a). See Dissenting Opinion of Leventhal, J. (Leventhal Op.) at note 47. This reticence is due no doubt to uncertainty over whether § 399(a) could itself withstand constitutional scrutiny, for it is not a chill but a hard freeze and its legislative history is replete with troubling statements. E. g., Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 6746 & S. 1160 Before the House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 641 (1967) (Representative Springer) (“[t]here are some of us who have very strong feelings because they have been editorialized against”); 113 Cong.Rec. 26399 (1967) (Representative McClure) (public television “might well . . . crusade for my opponent in next year’s election”); id. at 26391 (Representative Keith, speaking of a program televised in his district) (“[i]t is conceivable that . . . [the program] could . . . have adversely affected my candidacy for re-election”; “[t]his kind of film is the kind of program that we must guard against”); id. (Representative Jeolson) (incumbents would be “sitting duck[s]” and “the right of editorializing should be very, very carefully scrutinized”); id. at 26389 (Representative Devine) (“I understand that there is one educational TV station out on the west coast that a bunch of ‘hippies’ are running”; “[s]omeone has suggested that it would indeed be amazing to hear the type of analysis they are making”).
The Senate, which did not have a similar provision in the bill it had passed, acceded to the House in conference “when it was explained that the prohibition against editorializing was limited to providing that no noncommercial educational broadcast station may broadcast editorials representing the opinion of the management of such station.” H.R.Rep. No.794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967) (statement of House managers), reprinted in [1967] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1772, 1835 (emphasis supplied). The debate on the House bill thus must be given “special significance . as an expression of the purpose the new statute was intended to serve.” United States v. Bailey, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 210 n.30, 581 F.2d 984, 988 n.30 (1978), citing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254, 76 S.Ct. 330, 334-335, 100 L.Ed. 267, 273 (1956). And the limitation emerging from the conference hardly serves to dispel qualms about how the proscription on such editorializing might fare constitutionally.

. Preservation itself might well be only a means, not an end, and thus one might still inquire, “why preserve any of these programs?”

. The statute is also overinclusive since quite a few public affairs programs presented by noncommercial broadcasters who have pocketed federal funding are likely to be less than memorable.

. Since there is no indication that the affected class, in proportion to its size, is responsible for any greater quantity of significant programming than unaffected commercial broadcasters, the under- and overinclusiveness of the statute cannot be justified on the ground that it would be administratively difficult to harness the means more closely to the purpose.

. See, e. g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2682-2683, 49 L.Ed.2d 547, 557 (1976); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612-613 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 970-971 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-519, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1468 (1958).

. Only about one-fourth of the funds spent in fiscal year 1976 by noncommercial broadcasters were supplied by the Federal Government. See 192 U.S.App.D.C. at---& n.15, 593 F.2d at 1108-1109 & n.15 (Wright Op.).

. In fiscal year 1976, almost one-fifth of all federal funding for noncommercial broadcasting came from sources — such as the National Endowment for the Arts — that do not trigger the recording requirement. See Id. at - & n.42, 593 F.2d at 1119-1120 & n.42 (Wright Op.). Consequently, § 399(b) is significantly underinclusive for those funds alone.

. Id. at--, 593 F.2d at 1122 (Wright Op.).

. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).

. See generally National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 567 F.2d 1095 (1977). But see 192 U.S.App. D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1136 (Leventhal dissenting opinion (Leventhal Op.)).

. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Maintain Certain Program Records, 64 F.C.C.2d 1100, 1114 (1977); 192 U.S.App.D.C. at--& n.47, 593 F.2d at 1121 & n.47 (Wright Op.).

. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).

. See S.Rep.No.869, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 3954, 3960.

. See note 1 supra; -U.S.App.D.C. at---, 593 F.2d at 1120 (Wright Op.).

. Note 1 supra; 192 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1148 (Leventhal Op.).

. Id. at -, 593 F.2d at 1125 (Wright Op.); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101, 23 S.Ct. 611, 614-615, 47 L.Ed. 721, 726 (1903).

. Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. R. (The Employers’ Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 463, 501, 28 S.Ct. 141, 146,. 52 L.Ed. 297, 310 (1908); accord, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 642, 1 S.Ct. 601, 611-612, 27 L.Ed. 290, 295 (1883); see Commissioner v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. 310, 313, 44 S.Ct. 528, 529, 68 L.Ed. 1031, 1033 (1924) (“if the plain words of the statute are against such a conclusion, leaving no room for construction, the courts have no choice but to follow it, without regard to the consequences”); United States v. Ewing, 184 U.S. 140, 149, 22 S.Ct. 480, 483, 46 L.Ed. 471, 474 (1902) (courts may not adopt a construction that “violates the clear directions of the law” even to avoid “great injustice”; “we cannot for that reason alter its terms . . and thus ourselves enact instead of construing the law”); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357, 76 S.Ct. 919, 927, 100 L.Ed. 1242, 1254 (1956) (“we must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences”).

. Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679, 726 (1904) (dissenting opinion).

. See George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379, 53 S.Ct. 620, 622, 77 L.Ed. 1265, 1270 (1933); 192 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1150 (MacKinnon Op.) (“Judge Leventhal’s limiting construction . . improperly narrows the plain meaning of [the] statute”).

. Wright Op. at note 4; see Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373, 379, 77 S.Ct. 995, 998, 1 L.Ed.2d 918, 922 (1957) (coherence must be given to all portions of the statute); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 496, 13 L.Ed. 504, 512 (1850) (same).

. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 334, 339-340, 38 L.Ed.2d 287, 294-295 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854-855, 28 L.Ed.2d 158, 165-166 (1971); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124, 129 (1944).

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1143 (Leventhal Op.). These two statements are there seen as the only relevant legislative history, id., at---, 593 F.2d at 1141-1143, but more can be gleaned. When the statute was first considered in 1970, the Senate Report noted that CPB already had copies of all programs it funded and then, indicating that the proposed recording requirement went well beyond codifying that practice, stated in the very next sentence that the proposal would “require noncommercial educational broadcast stations which received assistance under Title II of the Public Broadcasting Act to keep . . . audio recordings ... of programs they broadcast involving issues of public importance . .” S.Rep.No.869, supra note 37, at 8, [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3960. The use of the past tense “received,” and the fact that the report modifies “programs” only with “involving issues of public importance,” show to my satisfaction that the broad language used in the Act was not in any wise the result of congressional misdraftsmanship. Further probative information is found in the Conference Report, which states that the 1970 bill was rejected partly because of a feeling that the recording requirement should be even broader: “Questions were also raised as to why [the requirement] should be limited in [its] application to public broadcast stations receiving Federal grants under title III of the Communications Act of 1934.” H.R.Rep.No.1466, (Conf. Rep.) 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (statement of House managers), reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 3963, 3964; see id. at 4, [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 3964 (“the managers on the part of the House agree that legislation similar to the recordkeeping provisions in the Senate bill, but applicable to all broadcast stations, should be the subject of the hearings in the next session of Congress”).
Perhaps even more telling legislative history emanates from a statement by Senator Griffin, sponsor of § 399(b), in 1972 hearings identifying two of the section’s objectives as making noncommercial broadcasters “more responsive to local needs” and as monitoring compliance with § 399(a)’s prohibition of editorializing. See Financing for Public Broadcasting — 1972: Hearings on H.R.11807, 7443 & 12808 before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 242-243 (1972). Although the Senator also mentioned the requirement of objectivity and balance, id., his statément lessens the possibility that enforcement of § 396(g)(1)(A) was the one and only purpose of § 399(b).

. Judge Leventhal’s dissenting opinion ignores the fact that other purposes, such as those for which respondents and Senator Griffin as amicus contend — or even less legitimate objectives, such as that feared by Judge Wright, see test supra at note 10 — might also have been in contemplation and might have caused the means chosen to be broader than any single aim approved by that dissent. Cf. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 224-225 (1962). If that is the case, then Congress did intend the broad construction demanded by the plain language.
*1132Judge Leventhal admits that, at least in the analytical framework seen as required in this case, the court’s task does not extend to a search for objectives that have “not surfaced in congressional deliberations,” 192 U.S.App.D.C. at---, 593 F.2d at 1146 (Leventhal Op.) and we are on even weaker ground in reading the statute to reflect a purpose that its express terms indicate was not the only one that actually spurred the legislature to action. As I noted earlier, see note 14 supra, I think it generally safer to base a conclusion in regard to the legislature’s real ends on the means it selected — which indirectly but more reliably would indicate what moved a majority of the decision-makers — as opposed to speculations on whether two legislators accurately portrayed a consensus of the whole body in their oral comments on the bill. See Mathews v. Lucas, supra note 4, 427 U.S. at 508 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. at 2763-2764 n. 14, 49 L.Ed.2d at 662-663 n. 14 (“[w]e are not bound to agree with the [Government’s] description of the legislative design if the legislative history and structure of the provisions themselves belie it ”) (emphasis supplied); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra note 2, 420 U.S. at 648, 95 S.Ct. at 1233, 43 L.Ed.2d at 524-525. If the purpose suggested by Judge Leventhal really did lead to this legislation and we invalidate it on equal protection grounds for overinclusiveness, Congress will still be free to reenact it in a narrower version. That outcome would have the advantage of enabling Congress to face directly the First Amendment implications of its action. Congress might then decide, on either constitutional or policy considerations, against oversight of the editorial decisions involved in particular broadcasts. See 192 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 593 F.2d at 1146 (Leventhal Op.) (“[s]ound constitutional principles demand that Congress carefully consider the justification for a statute touching on First Amendment interests”).
That course would also avoid another problem raised by Judge Leventhal’s necessarily heavy reliance on congressional use of the appropriations process to oversee the objectivity of CPB-funded programs. Id. at , 593 F.2d at 1138-1139 (Leventhal Op.); see Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 82, 561 F.2d 963, 975 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068, 98 S.Ct. 1247, 55 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978). It is that very mechanism of funding that allows official pressure to be brought to bear on broadcasters to propagandize or to reflect particular political viewpoints. To avoid that pressure, Congress is once again examining other means of funding that would guarantee more independence. See Broadcasting, July 3, 1978, at 32.

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 593 F.2d at 1146 (Leventhal Op.); see id. at — , 593 F.2d at 1145 (“the literal terms of § 399(b) do not limit the taping requirement to programs which are subject to the standards of § 396(g)(1)(A)”).

. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518, 46 S.Ct. 619, 623, 70 L.Ed. 1059, 1067 (1926).

. E. g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra note 2; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965).

. National Bank v. Bellotti, supra note 13, 435 U.S. at 793, 98 S.Ct. at 1424, 55 L.Ed.2d at 728.

. To do that would undercut decisions invalidating statutes on the ground that they do not include all those similarly situated with respect to the statutory objective. E. g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1975); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 19; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).

. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2291, 57 L.Ed.2d 117, 133 (1978).

. See Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, supra note 47, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 82, 561 F.2d at 975; Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 196-197, 521 F.2d 288, 296-297, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1664, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1975).

. In light of Judge Leventhal’s characterization of my position, see - U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1149 (Leventhal Op.), I reemphasize that I do not suggest that the Government may not seek to prevent use of its funds on onesided programs. Nor do J reach the constitutionality of an attempt, in effect, to purchase specific programs as opposed to an effort to open up a forum but only to certain voices, and I perceive no occasion to decide which is the case here. My major point is that the recording requirement is not reasonably related to the goal of assuring that CPB properly doles out the monies that have been entrusted to it. I raise questions about the propriety of that goal simply to support my view that Judge Leventhal’s approach does not achieve the intended objective of avoiding difficult constitutional questions. See id. at , 593 F.2d at 1147.

. Compare Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'g per curiam, 429 F.Supp. 731 (E.D.Va.1977) (school newspaper, though established and funded by school board, is a public forum, thus school board may not ban publication of controversial article); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, aff’d, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. en banc 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774 (1974) (because state university had recognized student magazine as generally available forum, it may not censor particular articles unless otherwise in accordance with First Amendment requirements). See also Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260-261 (5th Cir. 1975); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266, 1270 (D.Colo.1971); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F.Supp. 138, 143 (D.Md.1970) (three-judge district court); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.Supp. 1329, 1336 (D.Mass.1970). The Federal Government’s provision of some financial assistance to noncommercial broadcasters surely does not convert them into governmental instrumentalities — such as the Voice of America — created by the Government as the means for its communication, and of which it is of course the editor.
I am not persuaded by Judge MacKinnon’s argument that restrictions on expression are sustainable here on the ground that noncommercial licensees “hold[] [themselves] out to the public as acting in the public interest and not for commercial purposes (that is, functioning for impartial public motives).” 192 U.S. App.D.C. at--, 593 F.2d at 1153 (MacKinnon Op.). That theory apparently is based solely on the circumstance that these licensees do not seek to make a profit, and thus stands the now discredited commercial speech doctrine, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), on its head and leaves only profit-making enterprises within the protective sphere of the First Amendment. A countless number of the organizations in this country regularly voicing their views — on the airwaves and otherwise — are noncommercial and hold themselves out as actors in the public interest as they see it. Under Judge MacKinnon’s rationale, the Government would be able to censor any expression by these groups that it did not itself perceive to be in the public interest.

. 192 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 593 F.2d at 1140 (Leventhal Op.); see id. at -, 593 F.2d at 1151 (MacKinnon Op.). Judge Leventhal bolsters his perception of the focus of congressional concern by highlighting the possibility that CPB will use public funds to further its own political philosophy. See id. at -, 593 F.2d at 1149 (Leventhal Op.). But even that purpose does not explain the imposition of the recording requirement on broadcasters instead of on CPB, especially since CPB already retains copies of the programs it funds. See note 46 supra.

. “Congress [has] erected numerous statutory safeguards against partisan abuses.” Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, *1134supra note 47, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 81, 561 F.2d at 974. The Act expressly prohibits any federal agency or official from interfering with CPB or any noncommercial licensee, 47 U.S.C. § 398(2) (1970); see also---U.S.App.D.C. at , 593 F.2d at 1137-1138 (Leventhal Op.), and “[t]he plain purpose of Section 398 is to prevent any governmental body from influencing CPB in a manner calculated to turn it into a governmental spokesman.” Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, supra note 47, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 82, 561 F.2d at 974. The Commission itself is specifically enjoined from censoring any broadcaster, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970), and various other provisions seek to guarantee to public broadcasting the “maximum possible freedom from government or political interference or control.” 113 Cong.Rec. 12986 (1967) (Senator Pasto're); see 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6), (f)(3) (1970). “For one conspicuous example, [CPB] board membership is limited to no more than eight out of the authorized fifteen from the same political party,” Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, supra note 47, 183 U.S.App.D.C., at 82, 561 F.2d at 974; see 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (1970), and as a further protection against governmental influence CPB and the Public Broadcasting Service, which are not authorized to broadcast programs themselves, may not own or control noncommercial stations. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3) (1970).

. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237 (1960).

. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, supra note 54, 172 U.S.App.D.C. at 195, 521 F.2d at 295.

. See Note, Constitutional Ramifications of A Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 64 Geo.L.J. 1293, 1306-1314 (1976) (public’s First Amendment right to receive information might require presentation of “issues or points of view that have not received adequate coverage” when governmental action is involved in broadcasting).

. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 701 (1964). The public is entitled to “receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences,” and that right “may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or the FCC.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806-1807, 23 L.Ed.2d 371, 389 (1969). Thus the Court indicated strongly that the proper response to the dilemma of scarce frequencies is to push the doors open to all viewpoints, not to close them to all but one “neutral” voice: “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.” Id.

. Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: 1127 (1974), quoting Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 Texas L.Rev. 1123, the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 Law & Contemp.Prob. 530, 535 (1966); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095, 1106 (1927) (concurring opinion) (“the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones”; “[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, [the framers of the First Amendment] eschewed silence coerced by law”).

. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2114, 56 L.Ed.2d 697, 716 (1978), quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424-1425, 89 L.Ed. 2013, 2030 (1945); see note 63 supra. Paradoxically, public affairs programming is at the very core of the role envisioned for noncommercial broadcasting. See S.Rep.No.222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1773, 1778 (“[particularly in the area of public affairs your committee feels that noncommercial broadcasting is uniquely fitted to offer in-depth coverage and analysis which will lead to a better informed and enlightened public”); H.R.Rep.No.572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1799, 1800-1801 (“[w]ho can estimate the value to a democracy of a citizenry that is kept fully and fairly informed as to the important issues of our times”).

. The legislature is seldom if ever so inept that it cannot fit the chosen means to its real end, particularly where a court can readily see ways to do so. Consequently, a poor fit may well indicate that the legislature had some other goal at least partly in mind. See Perry, Constitutional “Fairness”: Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 Va.L.Rev. 383, 386 (1977). Since the Government undoubtedly will endeavor to present to the court every legitimate purpose the statute might possibly serve, substantial over- or underinclusiveness may betray a legislative ability intelligently to relate the means to ends, which included some unstated, illegitimate purpose. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123, 128 (1972). In this case, for instance, if one works backward, the only purpose the means can realistically suit includes that of facilitating manipulation of federal funding to discourage presentation of unacceptable points of view on controversial issues.

. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, supra note 2, 426 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 1905, 48 L.Ed.2d at 508-509.