Court Opinion

ID: 9720318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:26:12.324544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:15.984403
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting in the reversal and concurring in the affirmance.
I respectfully dissent in that the majority announces that the failure to advise a defendant of the dangers of self-representation at a guilty plea hearing does not require a showing of prejudice to establish a basis for post-conviction relief and that White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1986) does not apply. I disagree.
Our supreme court in White reassessed the method for reviewing guilty pleas in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 895-905. The White court analyzed the purpose for allowing collateral attacks and re-tooled the standard of review in light of federal and state constitutional concerns. Id. In casting aside the previous standard, which employed the “right to be told” rather than the “right to know” requirement, the White court said:
The [former] rule has led to reversal in instances where the trial judge’s omission cannot genuinely be said to have worked an injustice or, indeed, have made any difference at all. We have concluded that a new method of inquiry for assessing collateral attacks on criminal convictions is required.
To decide a claim that a plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently, we will review all the evidence before the court which heard his post-conviction petition, including testimony given at the post-conviction trial, the transcript of the petitioner’s original sentencing, and any plea agreements or other exhibits which are a part of the record.
A petitioner who claims that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent but can only establish that the trial judge failed to give an advisement in accordance with § 35-35-1-2 has not met his burden of proof. He needs to plead specific facts from which a finder of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial judge’s failure to make a full inquiry in accordance with § 35-35-l-2(a) rendered his decision involuntary or unintelligent. Of course, unless the record reveals that the defendant knew or was advised at the time of his plea that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right of confrontation and his right against self-incrimination, Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)] will require that his conviction be vacated.
Id. at 905.
The majority analysis unnecessarily restricts application of the White decision. A search of the record and a requirement of prejudice is mandated by White because the right asserted by Redington is not a Boykin right.
Turning to the record of Redington’s guilty plea, taken at his arraignment, Redington and his co-defendant were told that if they did not have the money, means or property to hire an attorney that the court would appoint one. Redington refused counsel. Then, the following colloquy occurred:
Judge Tombaugh: Well, if you change your mind as we proceed here, stop me and we’ll get a lawyer then.
We’ll take up Mr. Redington first. Before reading the charge to you and asking you how you wish to plead, the Court instructs you that the charge against you is a felony. The penalty is fixed by the legislature.
If you were to plead guilty to the crime charged, then it would be the duty of the court to assess the penalty within the limits fixed by the legislature for the crime charged. Do you understand that?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: How far did you go in school?
*121Mr. Redington: Tenth grade.
Judge Tombaugh: Now you’ll stop me, won’t you, if you don’t understand something?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: O.K. The Constitution of the State of Indiana provides in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed, to be heard by him and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a copy thereof, to meet the witnesses face to face and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
No person in any criminal prosecutions shall be compelled to testify against himself. Do you understand those rights?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Any question about what they are?
Mr. Redington: No.
Judge Tombaugh: Were you furnished with a copy of the information?
Mr. Redington: Yes.
Judge Tombaugh: And you say you went to the 10th grade. Can you read?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor?
Judge Tombaugh: Did you read your copy?
Mr. Redington: Yes.
Judge Tombaugh: Do you understand what the charges are?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Is there any question about what you are charged with?
Mr. Redington: No.
Judge Tombaugh: If you enter a plea of not guilty and have a trial and are convicted by this court or jury, you have a right to appeal your case to a higher court — that is, to the Indiana Court of Appeals or the Indiana Supreme Court. Do you understand that?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: And you understand that you don’t have to prove that you are innocent of the crime charged? You don’t have to prove anything. The burden is on the State of Indiana to prove that you are guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Have you taken any intoxicating liquor or any narcotic drugs into your system in the last forty-eight hours?
Mr. Redington: No, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Then I’ll ask you again. Is your mind free and clear at this time?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Is the plea that you are about to enter being made of your own free will?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Is the plea being made with a full understanding?
Mr. Redington: Yes.
Judge Tombaugh: And is the plea being made voluntarily?
Mr. Redington: Yes.
Judge Tombaugh: Has there been a plea bargain agreement entered into with the State of Indiana?
Mr. Wells: No, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Has anyone made any promises to you or threatened you in any way to get you to plead either guilty or not guilty?
Mr. Redington: None, your Honor.
[The court then advised of the potential penalties for a Class D felony and the possibility of alternative sentencing as a misdemeanor.]
Judge Tombaugh: Do you fully understand the charge contained in the Information?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Do you fully understand the penalty for the crime charged?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Now the Information and the statute having been read, are you now ready to plead?
*122Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: Before the Court asks you how do you plead, do you have any questions that you want to ask the prosecuting attorney or the judge?
Mr. Redington: No, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: And you know that you have a right to be represented by a competent lawyer, don’t you?
Mr. Redington: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Tombaugh: I’ll ask you again — do you want a lawyer?
Mr. Redington: No, your Honor.
After Redington stated his intention to plead guilty, the trial court further advised Redington that he would be giving up his rights I) to a public and speedy trial, 2) to a jury trial, 3) to face witnesses against him, 4) to have witnesses subpoenaed on his behalf, 5) to have the State prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 6) to have the allegations proven without compulsion to testify against himself. Further, the court reminded Redington that a guilty plea would be admission of the truth of the charge. To determine whether waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary, the record must demonstrate that the defendant was made aware of the “nature, extent, and importance” of the right to counsel and the necessary consequences of waiving such a right. Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), quoting Kirkham v. State, 509 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). Inquiries should be made into the educational background of the defendant, the defendant’s familiarity with legal proceedings and the defendant’s mental state if warranted. Martin, 588 N.E.2d at 1293. But a valid waiver does not require adherence to specific guidelines. Id.
Here the trial court painstakingly advised Redington of his rights, including his right to counsel. While not specified as “dangers of self-representation,” Redington was informed of such. The trial court was. not under a duty to ask particular questions, but only those questions which allowed a finding that Redington understood the process and the right being waived. See White, 497 N.E.2d at 904-906; Martin, 588 N.E.2d at 1293. The portion of the record noted above amply supports a finding that Redington knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Sedberry v. State, 610 N.E.2d 284, 286-287 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (no rigid requirements for inquiries before determination that defendant voluntarily waived right to counsel).
The majority is correct in its analysis pursuant to Sedberry. Slip op. at 8. The typical consequences of waiving counsel and proceeding to trial are not present when a defendant chooses to plead guilty. Sedberry, 610 N.E.2d at 287. A guilty plea obviates the usual hazards of proceeding pro se in a trial setting. Id. Redington did not avail himself of the opportunity for a trial, where presumably he would have been further advised of the dangers of proceeding pro se.
The record as a whole reveals adequate advisements by the trial court to warrant a finding that Redington knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty. I concur in the affirmance and dissent from the reversal.