Court Opinion

ID: 9950796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:02:59.434758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:46.402551
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Lebeau CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B321829

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. NA041629
        v.

 PATRIC DEMON LEBEAU,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of Winston K. McKesson and Winston Kevin
McKesson for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION

       In 2001, a jury found defendant and appellant Patric
Demon Lebeau guilty of second degree murder and two counts of
attempted murder and, in connection with each of these counts,
found true the allegation that Lebeau had personally discharged
a firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury and
death. The jury was instructed on both direct aiding and abetting
and felony murder but was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. In 2019, Lebeau filed a petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Lebeau’s
petition was filed before the change in the law that provided for
resentencing for attempted murder convictions made under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, but his reply brief
was filed after the change in the law and requested resentencing
of his attempted murder convictions. The trial court denied the
petition, concluding that, because the jury found true the
allegation that Lebeau personally discharged a firearm, which
proximately caused the death of the victim, he was the actual
killer and thus was not entitled to relief. It held that the same
reasoning applied to the attempted murder convictions. Although
the court’s reasoning was flawed, its conclusion that Lebeau
failed to make a prima facie case of entitlement to relief under
section 1172.6 was correct. We affirm.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Lebeau

filed his petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, which
the Legislature later renumbered to section 1172.6 without
substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We hereafter cite to
section 1172.6 for ease of reference.

                                   2
                 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      Murder victim Kenneth Wilson belonged to the Rolling 20’s
Crips. In the evening of March 6, 1999, Wilson drove through a
Long Beach neighborhood with passengers Leon Simon and
Skylar Morgan.
      Wilson thought he saw someone he knew and turned his
car around to talk to the person in front of an apartment on
Locust Street. There was a group of three men present, including
Jomo Bland, who was a member of the rival Insane Crips gang.
After a short exchange between Wilson, Bland, and Bland’s
cohort, Bland and another person in his cohort discharged
firearms into the car, killing Wilson and wounding Simon and
Morgan. Lebeau disputes that he was the second shooter.

              PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In an information dated November 28, 2000, Lebeau was
charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of
attempted murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and one count of
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). With respect to
counts 1 through 3, it was further alleged that Lebeau personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused
great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (d), personally discharged a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and personally
used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision
(a)(1) and 12022.53, subdivision (b).
       In relevant part, the jury was instructed on direct aiding
abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01), murder (CALJIC No. 8.10),
deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20),
unpremeditated murder of the second degree (CALJIC No. 8.30),

                                3
second degree felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.32), attempted
murder (CALJIC No. 8.66), willful, deliberate and premeditated
attempted murder (CALJIC No. 8.67), shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle (CALJIC No. 9.03), personal use of a firearm
(CALJIC No. 17.19), and intentional and personal discharge of a
firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death
(CALJIC No. 17.19.5).
       The jury found Lebeau guilty of second degree murder, two
counts of attempted murder, and shooting at an inhabited
vehicle. It also found true the allegation that Lebeau personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused
great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (d), with respect to counts 1 through 3. A
trial court sentenced Lebeau to 40 years to life for count 1; life
with possibility of parole plus 25 years for count 2, to run
consecutive to count 1; life with possibility of parole plus 25 years
for count 3, to run consecutive to count 2; and seven years for
count 4, which the court stayed pending the completion of counts
1, 2, and 3. This Division affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
(People v. Lebeau (Mar. 19, 2004, B155479) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In July 2019, Lebeau filed a form petition for resentencing.
He checked boxes stating: (1) a complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) at trial, he was
convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine;
and (3) he could not now be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189. The
petition did not mention attempted murder.

                                 4
       The court ordered the Los Angeles District Attorney to file
a response to the petition and appointed counsel for Lebeau.
       In January 2020, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office (District Attorney) filed an opposition arguing
that Lebeau was liable either as a direct aider and abettor or as a
major participant. The District Attorney argued that the
prosecution did not proceed under a theory of felony murder and
that the jury convicted Lebeau of second degree murder and
found the gun use allegation to be true. As support, the
prosecution cited the unpublished appellate opinion, which it
attached to its petition.
       In his reply, filed in May 2022,2 Lebeau explained that
“[t]his vacating and resentencing Reply is related to a legislative
change in the law concerning defendants serving
murder/attempted murder/manslaughter under any theory in
which malice is imputed solely based on participation in the
crime [in] accordance with Senate Bill 775, Penal Code §188, and
§ 1170.95.” Lebeau reiterated that he was incarcerated for both
murder and attempted murder and that, under section 1170.95,
“a defendant convicted of murder and/or attempted murder may
petition the Court to be resentenced . . . .” He argued that there
was no evidence that he was the actual shooter of Wilson or that
he “attempted to shoot” Morgan or Simon, nor was there evidence
that he was an aider and abettor. Lebeau further argued that he

2 Between the filing of the District Attorney’s opposition in January

2020 and the filing of Lebeau’s reply brief over two years later, Lebeau
filed three motions requesting that the District Attorney’s office turn
over its file on Lebeau, a petition for habeas corpus, and a petition for
resentencing under section 1385.

                                    5
was not a major participant in the crime and did not act with
reckless indifference.
       At the hearing on Lebeau’s petition, which took place on
May 18, 2022, the court heard arguments from the District
Attorney, Lebeau’s counsel, and Lebeau himself. The court
explained that a petition for resentencing can be denied at the
prima facie stage when the record reflects that the defendant was
convicted under a theory of murder that is still viable, citing
People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198. It further stated:
“When the court looks at the record, the transcript of the
sentencing, as well as the official minutes of the sentencing, the
jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder. More
importantly, they found him guilty — further found that the
allegation that the said defendant, Patric Demon Lebeau,
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun,
which proximately caused death to Kenneth Wilson within the
meaning of Penal Code 12022.53(d) to be true. [¶] It was a finding
of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
killer. This is not a theory pursued or relied upon by the jury in
convicting the defendant which is no longer viable. [¶] And the
same goes for the jury’s rulings on the attempted murder
allegation and the gun allegation attached to those.” The court
therefore concluded that Lebeau had failed to meet his prima
facie burden.
       In July 2022, Lebeau filed a notice of appeal.
       After the conclusion of briefing on appeal, the Supreme
Court issued its ruling in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433
(Curiel), in which it held that a special circumstance finding that
a petitioner had acted with the intent to kill was insufficient to
establish that he had been convicted under a now-valid theory of

                                6
murder as a matter of law. We asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefing addressing the impact, if any, of Curiel on
this appeal, and they have done so.3

                             DISCUSSION

      Lebeau contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support his attempted murder convictions and that we cannot
address whether he has established a prima facie case for
resentencing as to those convictions because the court did not
consider them in ruling on his petition. With respect to the
second degree murder conviction, Lebeau argues that he was not
the actual shooter and could not have been convicted as an aider
and abettor because the jury was not instructed on that theory
and the theory of aiding and abetting does not apply to second
degree murder. He further contends that there was insufficient

3 In November 2023, Lebeau filed a request to augment the record and

a supplemental brief, which we deem a request for leave to file a
supplemental brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(4).) Both the
request to augment and request for leave to file a supplemental brief
concern proceedings relating to the petition for resentencing that took
place in the trial court after this appeal was filed. “ ‘[W]here there is no
statutory exception, “ ‘[t]he filing of a valid notice of appeal vests
jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until determination of
the appeal and issuance of the remittitur’ [citation] and deprives the
trial court of jurisdiction to make any order affecting the judgment
[citation].” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cress (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 421, 424.) Lebeau cites no statutory exception to this
general rule, which he does not acknowledge. Thus, when he filed his
appeal, the court was deprived of jurisdiction to issue orders
concerning the petition for resentencing, such as granting a motion for
reconsideration, and we decline to consider the statements of the court
after it was divested of jurisdiction. We therefore deny his requests for
leave to file a supplemental brief and to augment the record.

                                     7
evidence to support his murder conviction and that he could not
be convicted today because he was not a major participant and
did not act with reckless indifference to human life. Lebeau also
asserts that the jury’s findings should have no preclusive effect.
       The Attorney General concedes that the court’s reasoning
was “incomplete,” but argues that the jury instructions and
findings do not permit the conclusion that Lebeau was convicted
of attempted murder under a now impermissible theory. The
Attorney General also contends that the jury’s finding that
Lebeau acted with intent to kill with respect to attempted
murder means that he was not convicted of second degree murder
under a felony murder theory.
1.    Legal Standards
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2), effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6, subdivision (a)
provides: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts[.]”
       An offender must file a petition in the sentencing court
averring that: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that

                                 8
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The
petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder
or attempted murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); see also id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)
Additionally, the petition shall state “[w]hether the petitioner
requests the appointment of counsel.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)(C).)
       “Upon receiving a petition in which the information
required by this subdivision is set forth or a petition where any
missing information can readily be ascertained by the court, if
the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
prosecutor shall file a response within 60 days of the service of
the petition, and the petitioner may file a reply within 30 days of
the response. (Id., subd. (c).) When briefing has been completed,
“the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) “If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(Ibid.)
       In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court’s inquiry will
necessarily be informed by the record of conviction, which will
facilitate the court in distinguishing “petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) This includes the jury

                                  9
instructions, which are part of the record of conviction, because
the instructions “given at a petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily
ascertainable facts from the record’ that refute the petitioner’s
showing, and reliance on them to make the eligibility or
entitlement determinations may not amount to ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which must wait to occur until after an order to show cause
issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055,
disapproved on another ground in Lewis.) The court is prohibited
from engaging in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.) Rather, the
court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s factual allegations as
true” ’ ” and make a “ ‘ “preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) Summary
denial of the petition is appropriate where the record of
conviction establishes the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law. (People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
945; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).)
       “The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of
section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for
allegedly erroneous prior factfinding . . . . The purpose of section
[1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188
and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
942, 947.)

                                10
       We independently review the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for relief.
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.) A denial at this stage is
appropriate if the record of conviction demonstrates that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)
2.    Analysis
       2.1.   Lebeau’s contention that the jury’s findings are
              not entitled to any preclusive effect is
              unsupported.
       As a preliminary matter, we address Lebeau’s contention
that, following People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong),
“[n]o finding in Appellant’s case should have preclusive effect or
be above relitigation of the issue.” Strong does not support this
broad proposition. In Strong, the court held that felony murder
special-circumstance findings under section 190.2, subdivision
(d), issued by a jury before the decisions in People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, which
clarified the terms “major participant” and “reckless indifference
to human life” in the special-circumstance statute, do not
preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for
resentencing of a felony-murder conviction, even if the trial
evidence would have been sufficient to support the findings under
Banks and Clark. (Strong, at pp. 706–710.) The Supreme Court
specifically rejected the contention of amicus curiae the Office of
the State Public Defender that the Legislature intended that
adverse special circumstances findings would have no effect on
resentencing. It explained: “[T]he structure of [section 1172.6] —
which permits trial courts to consult the record of conviction to

                                 11
determine whether the defendant has made out a prima facie
case of eligibility [citation], and which notably does not open
resentencing to every previously convicted murder defendant —
strongly suggests the Legislature contemplated that many, and
perhaps most, such findings would be given effect on
resentencing. Had the Legislature intended to permit wholesale
relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions in the
context of section 1172.6 resentencing, we expect it would have
said so more plainly.” (Id. at p. 715.)
       In Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, the Supreme Court
reiterated that, in Strong, it had “rejected the argument that
section 1172.6 categorically prohibited the consideration of
factual findings made by a jury in the defendant’s underlying
trial.” The Supreme Court further noted that “the resentencing
statute itself does not prohibit the consideration of jury findings
— and in fact affirmatively contemplates it[.]” (Id. at p. 451,
italics added.)
       There was no felony murder special-circumstance finding in
this case. However, Lebeau asserts that “there have been several
changes in the law regarding murder, attempted murder, [and]
intent . . . which were not present during [his] original trial,” but
simply lists “PC 745 and AB333” without discussion. We are
unwilling to hold that section 1172.6 permits the wholesale
relitigation of all jury findings relating to murder, attempted
murder, and intent in the absence of any analysis supporting that
contention. “ ‘ “ ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ” [Citation.]
“We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.
[Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to

                                 12
authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.” ’
[Citation.]” (Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Bennett (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 985, 1011.)
       Thus, “[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does
not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of
section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for
allegedly erroneous prior factfinding . . . . The purpose of section
[1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188
and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 947; accord, People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865
[“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal, and
[the petitioner] cannot use it to resurrect a claim that should
have been raised in his . . . direct appeal.”]; People v. DeHuff
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a
petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial
error”].) Lebeau raises no persuasive challenge to the preclusive
effect of the jury’s findings.4 Accordingly, we reject his contention

4 The Supreme Court has stated that the “contours [of issue preclusion]

are informative in this context” — i.e., in section 1172.6 proceedings.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) Lebeau does not assert that any
element of issue preclusion is not satisfied. Rather, in his
supplemental letter brief on Curiel, Lebeau contends that the jury’s
finding that he acted with intent to kill for attempted murder “must
not be given preclusive effect and or impact, if preclusion found, for
equitable considerations in this case.” As we understand it, these
“equitable considerations” are that the court purportedly erred in
failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense by failing to

                                   13
that we may not rely upon the jury’s findings in determining
whether he has made a prima facie case of entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6.
       2.2.   Although the court’s reasoning was flawed, it
              correctly concluded that Lebeau did not
              establish a prima facie case of entitlement to
              relief.
      The court concluded that the true findings with respect to
the gun allegations under section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
constituted “a finding of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was the killer” and that the same reasoning
applied to attempted murder. The court erred in its reasoning.
      In People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 336 (Bland), the
California Supreme Court explained: “Section 12022.53(d)
requires that the defendant ‘intentionally and personally
discharged a firearm’ . . . , but only that he ‘proximately caused’
the great bodily injury or death. . . . Proximately causing and
personally inflicting harm are two different things.” Thus, a true
finding under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), was possible
whether it was the defendant, the defendant’s accomplice, or an
event set in motion by the discharge of the firearm that directly
caused the victim’s death. (Bland, at pp. 335–336.) Further, in
People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598, Division One of
this District held that “the existence of an enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not show that a defendant
acted with malice aforethought. It therefore does not establish as
a matter of law that [the petitioner] could still be convicted of

instruct it on attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. As we discuss below, this argument is baseless.

                                  14
murder under the new law and is ineligible for relief under
section 1170.95.” (Ibid.)
      Accordingly, the true finding as to section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), standing alone, was not tantamount to a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lebeau was the actual shooter or
that he acted with express malice.5 Nevertheless, for the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that the record of conviction
conclusively precludes Lebeau from obtaining relief under section
1172.6.
      2.2.1. Attempted Murder
      In his opening brief, Lebeau acknowledges that, at oral
argument on his petition, the court stated that its analysis with
respect to second degree murder applied equally to his attempted
murder convictions. However, the only argument Lebeau makes
with respect to attempted murder in his opening brief is that
“there is no evidence [Lebeau] attempted to shoot Mr. Morgan
and/or Mr. Simon” or that he did so with intent to kill. For the
reasons discussed above, Lebeau’s arguments with respect to the

5 People v. Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 198 supports the proposition

for which the court cited it — that a petition for resentencing can be
denied at the prima facie stage when the record reflects that the
defendant was convicted under a theory of murder that is still viable
(see id. at pp. 204–206) — but does not support the proposition that
the true finding with respect to section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
means that the jury found Lebeau to be the actual killer. Although the
jury in Cortes found true allegations that a principal discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death with respect to the first
degree murder charge and found true as to count 2 that a principal
used and discharged a firearm with respect to the attempted murder
charge, the court of appeal did not conclude that either finding meant
that the jury had found the petitioner to be the actual shooter beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 202.)

                                  15
insufficiency of evidence are not cognizable in an appeal from the
denial of his petition for resentencing.
       On reply, Lebeau contends that “[t]he lower court never
addressed anything related to attempted murder in the original
appeal, which is one reason it granted the motion for
reconsideration. As it was not dealt with in the underlying appeal
or brought up by Appellant it must not be address by the Court.”
If Lebeau’s argument is that the court could not address
attempted murder in connection with his petition for
resentencing because the direct appeal from his convictions did
not discuss attempted murder, he cites no authority for this
proposition. In any event, the opinion in his direct appeal does
discuss his attempted murder convictions. If — as seems more
likely — Lebeau’s argument is that attempted murder was not
before the trial court in connection with his petition for
resentencing, this claim is belied by the court’s statements, which
Lebeau acknowledged in his opening brief, and by his reply brief
below. Indeed, in his reply brief below, Lebeau explained the
changes in the law that had occurred with respect to attempted
murder between when he filed his petition for resentencing and
his reply brief, and which were effective at the time the court
ruled on his petition, and advanced arguments pertaining to his
attempted murder convictions.
       We are satisfied that Lebeau sought resentencing with
respect to his attempted murder convictions and that the court
understood that his petition for resentencing addressed his
attempted murder convictions as well as his second degree
murder conviction because it expressly addressed attempted
murder in its ruling. Thus, we decline to remand for further
proceedings with respect to his attempted murder convictions.

                                16
       At trial, Lebeau’s jury was instructed on attempted murder
with CALJIC Nos. 8.66 and 8.67, which require a specific intent
to kill, and direct aiding and abetting with CALJIC No. 3.01,
which requires that the person aiding and abetting act with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, with intent
to commit or encourage the commission of the crime, and aids the
commission of the crime. The jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
       “Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.”
(Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) The Attorney General
argues that section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides that a
person convicted of attempted murder may be eligible for relief
only where he or she could be or was convicted “under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” and the absence of this
instruction means that Lebeau is ineligible as a matter of law.
(Coley, at p. 548 [petitioner not entitled to relief where jury was
instructed on direct aiding and abetting and was not instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine].) Lebeau does
not contest this point.
       Instead, in his supplemental briefing on Curiel, Lebeau
argues that he “was convicted of shooting at an occupied vehicle”
and “[t]hat charge alone should have included the jury
instructions for attempted murder under the natural and
probable causes when looking at the facts.” His claim appears to
be that attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine is a lesser included offense of shooting at
an occupied vehicle and that the court therefore had a duty to
instruct the jury on that doctrine. “An offense is a lesser included
offense to a charged offense if the former is necessarily included

                                17
in the latter. There are two tests to determine whether this is so:
(1) if all of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the
elements of the greater offense, or (2) if the allegations of the
pleading describe the charged offense so that it necessarily
includes all the elements of the lesser offense.” (People v. Taylor
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642.) We fail to see how attempted
murder could be a lesser included crime of shooting at an
occupied vehicle, considering that: (1) shooting at an occupied
vehicle is a general intent crime (People v. Overman (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356) whereas attempted murder requires the
specific intent to kill (People v. Mariscal (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
129, 137); and (2) attempted murder does not require the
discharge of a firearm.6 Moreover, Lebeau’s assertion of
instructional error relies on People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th
1570 and “has nothing to do with the legislative changes to
California’s murder law effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . and Senate Bill No. 775 [(2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.)]. . . . [¶] [T]he case law on which [he] relies was decided
well before the jury verdict in his trial. [Citations.] His remedy
for any alleged instructional error that affected the verdict was
his appeal from the judgment of conviction.” (People v. Burns
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867–868.)
        In any event, since the purported error was the court’s
failure to instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and Lebeau is only entitled to relief with
respect to attempted murder under section 1172.6 if he was

6 Courts have held that grossly negligent discharge of a firearm

(§ 246.3) is the lesser included offense of shooting at an occupied
vehicle (§ 246). (See, e.g., People v. Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1360–1361.)

                                   18
convicted under that doctrine, he essentially concedes that he
cannot establish a prima facie claim of entitlement to
resentencing with respect to his attempted murder convictions.
We decline his invitation to speculate as to whether the jury
might have relied on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine had it been given that instruction, because the jury
necessarily concluded that he acted with the specific intent to kill
under the instructions actually provided.
      We therefore conclude that Lebeau has failed to establish a
prima facie case of entitlement to relief with respect to his
attempted murder convictions.
      2.2.2. Second Degree Murder
      The jury was instructed with a now-impermissible second
degree felony murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.32. Specifically,
the jury was told: “The unlawful killing of a human being,
whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs
during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of
Shooting At An Occupied Motor Vehicle is murder of the second
degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit
that crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit the crime of Shooting
At An Occupied Motor Vehicle and the commission or attempted
commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
      The Attorney General argues that it is evident as a matter
of law that the jury did not rely on this instruction but instead
found that Lebeau acted with express malice, as demonstrated by
the attempted murder convictions. He relies again on Coley as
support for this proposition. The Coley court concluded that
“appellant’s conviction for attempted murder demonstrate[d] that
he was convicted of second degree murder with express rather

                                 19
than implied malice” where the record of conviction showed that
the “appellant was convicted of murder based on his aiding and
abetting of the same shooting that gave rise to the attempted
murder conviction.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) It
explained that “[a]n intent to kill is the equivalent of express
malice, at least when there is no question of justification or
excuse, and by finding appellant guilty of attempted murder, the
jury necessarily found he had personally harbored intent to kill
or express malice when he aided and abetted the second degree
murder.” (Ibid.)
       Lebeau asserts that he “was not charged as the actual
murderer but charged under an implied malice theory as he was
the alleged second shooter.” A jury may find that a defendant
acted with express malice regardless of whether he or she was
the direct perpetrator, as Coley demonstrates. The defendant in
that case was prosecuted under the theory that he was the driver,
not the shooter (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 542), but his
attempted murder conviction under a theory of direct aiding and
abetting necessarily meant that the jury found that he personally
acted with the intent to kill. (Id. at p. 547.)
       Lebeau contends that Coley is inapplicable because the
record established that there was a single shooter, whereas, in
this case, “the record demonstarates [sic] to separate shooting
events, while simalotues [sic], they are still separate.” The
distinction Lebeau attempts to draw is an artificial one, for which
he cites no support. It is undisputed that the three victims in this
case were in the same car and that the two shooters fired at them
at the same time, either killing or wounding them. The jury’s
findings demonstrate that it concluded that Lebeau was one of
the shooters. The fact that there was more than one person

                                20
shooting does not, in our view, support the claim that the murder
and attempted murders were separate incidents, such that
Lebeau could conceivably harbor a distinct mens rea as to each
crime. Even if the jury believed that Lebeau only harbored the
intent to kill Simon and Morgan and not Wilson, “[i]ntent to kill
transfers to an unintended homicide victim.” (Bland, supra, 28
Cal.4th at p. 326.)7 Thus, we agree with the Attorney General
that Coley is instructive and that the attempted murder
convictions demonstrate that Lebeau also acted with express
malice with respect to the second degree murder conviction.
       Lebeau correctly points out that, in Coley, “the jury did not
receive instructions that it could convict appellant based on
felony-murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine
at trial.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) He contends
that the presence of a felony murder jury instruction
automatically makes him eligible for resentencing. However, the
portion of Coley on which Lebeau relies merely states that “aiders
and abettors could be guilty of murder even if they did not
personally harbor malice under either the felony murder rule or
the doctrine of natural and probable consequences” at the time he
was tried and that the jury in Coley was not instructed on felony
murder. (Id. at p. 542.)
       In Curiel, our Supreme Court implicitly rejected Lebeau’s
contention. Although the jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the court stated that it could
“look to the jury’s verdicts, and the factual findings they
necessarily reflect, to determine whether the record of conviction

7 Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th 313, arose from the same shooting as this

appeal.

                                  21
refutes the factual allegations in Curiel’s petition.” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 465.) Thus, Curiel supports that the presence of a
jury instruction on a now-invalid theory of murder in the record
of conviction does not automatically establish that the petitioner
has made a prima facie case of entitlement to relief under section
1172.6.
       Accordingly, we consider whether the jury’s findings, taken
together, conclusively rebut that Lebeau was convicted under a
theory of felony murder. As we have stated, Lebeau’s convictions
for attempted murder demonstrate the jury found that he acted
with express malice. However, Curiel supports the proposition
that a jury’s finding that the defendant acted with express
malice, on its own, does not mean that he is not entitled to prima
facie relief as a matter of law.8 In Curiel, the Supreme Court
concluded that intent to kill “is only one element” and “does not
by itself establish any valid theory of liability. [Citation.] For
example, ‘under direct aiding and abetting principles, an
accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another [e.g.,
murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and
[with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.” ’
[Citation.] . . . A finding of intent to kill does not, standing alone,

8 We acknowledge that the Curiel court described the scenario

presented therein — “where a defendant is liable for murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, and acts with malice
aforethought, but is not liable as a direct aider and abettor — as ‘quite
narrow’ and relevant only to a ‘very small set of cases.’ [Citation.]”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.) For purposes of argument, we
assume that its conclusion that a finding of intent to kill, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish that a defendant was convicted under
a valid theory of murder is not limited to this narrow subset of cases.

                                   22
cover all of the required elements.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 463.)
       The Supreme Court then considered whether additional
jury findings in that case conclusively refuted the petitioner’s
claim that he could not be convicted under current law. (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) These findings established that: (1)
Curiel knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the
underlying crimes of disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed
firearm by a gang member, intended to aid the perpetrator in
committing either crime, and did aid him in committing those
crimes; (2) the perpetrator committed murder during the
commission of the underlying crimes; and (3) “ ‘under all the
circumstances a reasonable person in [Curiel’s] position would
have known that the commission of murder was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the crime of
disturbing the peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed
firearm by a gang member.’ ” (Id. at p. 466.)
       Our high court observed that, “[a]lthough in many factual
scenarios . . . the same act would satisfy the actus reus of aiding
and abetting the underlying target crime and aiding and abetting
the murder that results, we are unsure that the same act must
necessarily satisfy each as a matter of law.” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 467.) It declined to resolve whether the actus reus of
direct aiding and abetting had been satisfied, however. Instead,
the court concluded that the jury’s finding that Curiel aided and
abetted one of the underlying crimes did not necessarily mean
that it had found that he acted with the requisite mens rea for
aiding and abetting murder. (Ibid.) “An aider and abettor who
knows and intends to aid the direct perpetrator in certain
conduct, but does not subjectively appreciate that the conduct is

                                23
dangerous to human life, is not liable for the murder that results
because the aider and abettor has not sufficiently concerned
himself with that murder. This conclusion holds even if the aider
and abettor separately intends to kill. Intent to kill itself does not
establish a sufficient mens rea regarding a murder or life-
endangering conduct that the aider and abettor has no intent to
aid or encourage — and that the aider and abettor does not even
subjectively know will occur.” (Id. at p. 470.)
       We agree with the Attorney General that Curiel is
distinguishable. Unlike the special circumstance finding and
additional findings in Curiel, Lebeau’s convictions for attempted
murder establish both that Lebeau acted with an intent to kill
and that he was either the direct perpetrator or had knowledge of
Bland’s intent to kill and encouraged or instigated Bland to act in
furtherance of that intent. Although the true findings on section
12022.53, subdivision (d), do not necessarily mean that the jury
found Lebeau to be the direct perpetrator, the findings further
support that the jury found that Lebeau encouraged or instigated
the murder of Wilson because his discharge of a firearm —
whether it directly resulted in Wilson’s death or spurred Bland to
fire — proximately caused Wilson’s death and great bodily injury
to Simon and Morgan.
       In sum, the attempted murder convictions in this case
demonstrate that the jury found that Lebeau was sufficiently
“ ‘concerned’ with the crime [of murder] itself.” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 468.) These convictions also leave no room for
ambiguity as to whether the jury found that Lebeau’s acts were
in furtherance of murder or of some other offense. (See id. at
p. 467.) Thus, we reject Lebeau’s contention that the jury’s
verdicts shed no light on the theory under which he was convicted

                                 24
and conclude that the jury necessarily convicted Lebeau of second
degree murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory, rather
than a felony murder theory.9 We decline again to consider
Lebeau’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence,
which are not properly before us.

9 Lebeau attempts to argue that aiding and abetting is not a valid

theory for second degree murder. He relies on the amended language of
section 189, subdivision (e), which sets forth the current requirements
for first degree felony murder. While Senate Bill No. 1437 may have
eliminated second degree felony murder (see In re White (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 933, 937, fn. 2), we are not persuaded that second degree
murder with express malice under a direct aiding and abetting theory
has been eliminated. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848
[“Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting
liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must
possess malice aforethought”], abrogated by statute on other grounds.)

                                  25
                        DISPOSITION

      The order denying Lebeau’s petition under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

     EDMON, P. J.

     ADAMS, J.

                               26