Court Opinion

ID: 9552345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:09:11.94422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:09.133218
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the adoption of the “totality of the circumstances” rule, but must dissent from the result because the totality of circumstances here leads to the inescapable conclusion that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s actions influenced the jury.
In reaching this conclusion, the first circumstance to be considered is the making of the inquiry itself. As the majority opinion notes, the trial court’s question regarding numerical division of the jury is condemned because “there is more danger of possible prejudice than any possible good which may result in employing the practice.” The importance which should be placed on this becomes clear when one notes that in federal criminal cases the inquiry alone results in automatic reversal. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345, 346 (1962).
The second circumstance which should be noted is the fact that the answer to the inquiry showed only one holdout remaining among the members of the jury. If the division had been 7-5 or 8-4, it might be safe to conclude that the question had not been damaging. But when it was revealed that the division was 11 to 1, the one juror was effectively singled out and put under considerably more pressure than if the division had been greater. The vice of this is well described in Brasfield, supra:
*517[T]he effect [of the inquiry] upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded.
272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 135-36, 71 L.Ed. at 346. From a pragmatic standpoint, when such a division is announced and eleven pairs of eyes turn to look at the single holdout, it is impossible to conclude that the juror was not subjected to pressure after the jury had returned to the jury room. As the court of appeals noted, the situation no doubt had a “... double coercive effect by softening the resistance of the minority and solidifying the determination of the majority.” Chief Justice Udall made a telling remark in his dissent in a similar case involving the Voeckell, or “dynamite”, instruction:
With the scales thus delicately balanced the court upon its own motion gave the instruction in question which certainly accomplished the purpose intended, for within fifteen minutes thereafter they announced agreement. To my mind that constituted coercion and was an abuse of discretion which can not be explained away by any high sounding words as to the fairness or innocuousness of the instruction. The old adage that “proof of the pudding is in the eating” applies.
State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 156-57, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949). The proof of the pudding here is that although the juror in question had held out through the evening before and three ballots, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict barely an hour after the inquiry by the judge revealed an eleven to one split.
Another factor to be considered here is that after learning of the eleven to one division, the trial court commented that there was “a lot of evidence, so give it awhile longer and see if you can’t reach a verdict.” The defendant was tried in ab-sentia,1 so the jury had heard no evidence from him. In that context, the court’s statement was almost a comment on the evidence. Such comments are proscribed by the Arizona Constitution, art. 6, § 12. Attempting to put the best possible face on the matter, the State contends that the judge was not commenting on the nature of the evidence but merely on its “quantity.” One could argue that the Constitution precludes both types of comment. Leaving this aside, however, it is reasonably possible that the trial judge’s comment on the quantity of evidence may have had a persuasive effect on the juror and is part of the totality of the circumstances to be considered.2
We should note, also, that before the initial inquiry, the foreman had informed the judge that the jury had deliberated “very conscientiously”, had discussed the case thoroughly and had no hope of reaching a unanimous verdict. Apparently, therefore, the holdout had not displayed an arbitrary or unreasonable attitude toward the law or the evidence, but had acted out of reasoned conviction. No doubt that juror found it difficult enough to remain as the lone dissenter after three ballots, and it is reasonable to infer that singling him out and then commenting on the quantity of the evidence may have tended to persuade him to surrender his conviction and conform to the other eleven members of the jury on the next ballot. This is the very evil to be prevented. No matter how strong the evidence of guilt, under our system the judge is not *518allowed to help persuade a juror to surrender his conviction and conform. “ ‘Every attempt [by the court] to drive men into an agreement which they would not have reached freely, is a perversion of justice.’ ” State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. at 159, 210 P.2d at 981 (Udall, J., dissenting, quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412, 417 (1898)).
This brings us to yet another factor. Having made the inquiry regarding division and the comment on the quantity of evidence, the court sent the jurors back for further deliberations without cautioning them not to surrender their honest convictions. Whether such a cautionary instruction was given is also part of the totality of the circumstances to be considered. See State v. Rickerson, supra. While the majority correctly points out the judge did tell the jury to “[l]et us know again” if they reached the point where there was “no reasonable probability” of a verdict, this falls far short of telling the jury that each of them is to vote their honest convictions, an instruction which I think was mandatory under the circumstances of this case.
When all of the foregoing is considered, it is certainly reasonably possible that the court’s question regarding division, the answer to it and the comment from the judge which followed had some persuasive effect on the lone juror still holding out for an acquittal. The majority concludes that the trial court’s remarks were “not prejudicial or coercive3.” However, neither it nor I, nor anyone except that juror (and perhaps not even he) can ever know whether the trial court’s conduct was in fact coercive. Because of this, the test used to determine prejudice should not be one which requires this or any court to know the unknowable. To use such a test “will result in an endless chain of decisions, each link thereof tempered and forged with varying facts and circumstances and welded with ever changing personalities of the appellate court. This is not in keeping with sound justice and the preservation of human liberties and security.” State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161 at 166, 342 P.2d 197 at 200 (1959) (adopting Justice Udall’s dissent in State v. Voeckell, supra, and holding that the giving of the “dynamite” instruction would no longer be approved in this State). I would hold that if the circumstances make it reasonably possible that the trial judge’s conduct had a coercive or persuasive effect on the jury, then there is prejudice and reversal is required. United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979).
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, I must conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the inquiry which revealed a division of eleven to one and singled out a lone juror, followed by a comment regarding the quantity of the evidence, helped persuade the recalcitrant juror to conform to the will of the majority. Accordingly, I agree with the court of appeals and would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

. Not only was defendant absent from the trial, but he called no witnesses. While the majority points out that there had been much cross-examination, I think that in the eyes of most lay persons if there had been “a lot of evidence” it had come from the State.

. State v. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183, 1184-85 (1981), the New Mexico case relied on by the majority, acknowledges that additional instructions — and the court’s comment here could be so interpreted — are part of the totality to be considered.

. The use of “coercive” is unfortunate. I use it because it is the word used in the majority opinion and in all the cases on the subject. However, the Constitution not only forbids “coercion” of the jury, but also prevents the judge from persuading or influencing the jury in any way.