Court Opinion

ID: 9659927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:58:48.992851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.102107
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. I concur with the majority but write to further expand on the majority’s analysis of Mr. Williams’s first argument that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for conduct that did not involve signing of a pleading or document that must be filed. At the time Ms. Martin filed her Petition for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees on October 23, 1996, three of the appeals filed by Mr. Williams had been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, a fourth appeal filed by Mr. Williams was still pending. It is clear that the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on Ms. Martin’s Petition for Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees while an appeal was pending, because motions requesting sanctions under Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure are collateral to the merits of the underlying action. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 150, 901 S.W.2d 826 (1995); Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 318 Ark. 173, 883 S.W.2d 820 (1994). With regard to Mr. Williams’s claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award Rule 11 sanctions based upon documents signed by an attorney that are filed in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, we have held that the Rules of Civil Procedure govern only the conduct of the parties and attorneys in trial courts. Wright v. Eddinger, 320 Ark. 151, 894 S.W.2d 937 (1995); Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993). Thus, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals will not consider motions for Rule 11 sanctions regarding papers filed in trial courts. Wright, supra. Such motions must be filed with and addressed by the trial court, which can impose sanctions under Rule 11. Jones v. Jones, 329 Ark. 320, 947 S.W.2d 6 (1997). With regard to papers filed in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, motions for sanctions are to be considered by the appropriate appellate court under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which went into effect on March 1, 1997. Although an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the court that entered the judgment, decree or order from which the appeal is taken, a trial court does not have authority to pass on the validity of a notice of appeal. See Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 3(b). Rather, such authority is vested in the Supreme Court. Id.; see also Stahl v. State, 328 Ark. 106, 940 S.W.2d 880 (1997); Barnes v. State, 322 Ark. 814, 912 S.W.2d 405 (1995). Specifically, Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 3(b) provides that: Failure of the appellant or cross-appellant to take any further steps to secure review of the judgment or decree appealed from shall not affect the validity of the appeal or cross-appeal, but shall be ground only for such action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or cross-appeal. In this case, Ms. Martin filed her Petition for Sanctions against Mr. Gill and Mr. Williams not only after several notices of appeal were filed by Mr. Williams, but also after he filed several postjudgment motions and pleadings in the circuit court. In fact, her Petition for Sanctions listed five postjudgment motions and pleadings filed by Mr. Williams and characterized those papers as follows: [A]U of the above pleadings are virtually identical and restate what has already been previously filed. These pleadings are unnecessary pleadings and have been filed to further delay these proceedings. Further, Plaintiff has repeatedly incurred unnecessary expense in responding to these pleadings .... The facts pertaining to Mr. Williams’s actions as set forth in Ms. Martin’s Petition for Sanctions were accepted as true by Judge Reynolds in the May 8, 1997 order. Judge Dawson also agreed with those findings in the June 18, 1997 order that is the subject of this appeal. In view of the trial court’s findings that postjudgment pleadings and motions were filed by Mr. Williams for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary delay and expense, it cannot be said that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions for pleadings, motions and other papers filed in the Faulkner Circuit Court by Mr. Williams. Furthermore, based upon these findings that Mr. Williams filed postjudgment pleadings and motions for an improper purpose, I must concur with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Rule 11 sanctions. 984 S.W.2d 449 January 28, 1999 Rose Law Firm, by: David L. Williams, for appellant. Brazil, Adlong, Murphy & Osment, PLC, by: Michael L. Murphy, for appellee Kelly Lasley Martin. Mitchell, Blackstock, Barnes, Wagoner & Ivers, by: Jack Wagoner III, for appellee James R. Gill III. Glaze, J., joins in this concurrence.