Court Opinion

ID: 9819423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:01.929149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:21.426240
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority’s holding that the search of defendant’s vehicle cannot be justified as an inventory search incident to the car being towed. I disagree, however, with the determination that the search of the car was not proper under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). I believe Belton is applicable, and, therefore, there is no need to consider whether the search was proper under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). Further, in my opinion the determination of whether this was a proper search incident to arrest is controlled by People v. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1994). In Bosnak, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The police discovered cannabis in the glove compartment of Bosnak’s car. The trial court granted Bosnak’s motion to suppress the cannabis. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 124-25. Evidence at the suppression hearing indicated that Bosnak, while driving to his apartment, passed two police cars parked on the side of the street without lights. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 123. After driving about 200 yards past the police cars, Bosnak drove to the side of the street and parked 100 feet from his apartment. He did not observe any police cars behind him with flashing emergency lights and the police did not make initial contact with him until he had parked his car and walked about ten yards from it. At this point, Bosnak heard somebody say, “Excuse me. Do you have a driver’s license?” Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 124. Upon turning, Bosnak observed a police officer and noticed a squad car without its emergency lights or headlights activated parked 15 to 20 yards from his car. A police officer directed Bosnak into the squad car and informed him that he was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Prior to making contact with Bosnak, the police had information that his license was suspended. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 124. After the officers placed Bosnak in one of the squad cars, one of the officers searched the interior of the car, purportedly to protect Bosnak’s personal belongings, “for the legal reasons for the police department,” and to search for evidence of alcohol consumption consistent with the officers’ suspicion that Bosnak was under the influence of alcohol. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 125. In Bosnak’s glove compartment, an officer found a bag containing a leafy green substance. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 125. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the search was neither a proper inventory search nor a proper search incident to arrest. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 125. In analyzing whether the search of Bosnak’s car was a proper search incident to arrest, we noted that the United States Supreme Court in Belton addressed the applicability of Chimel to searches of automobiles as follows: “ ‘While the Chimel case established that a search incident to arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of “the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” when that area arguably includes the interior of the automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 126, quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 774, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. The Supreme Court further held that “ ‘when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 126, quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. We noted that Belton represents a departure from Chimel because Belton adopted a bright-line rule instead of a rule requiring a case-by-case determination of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 126. We recognized that some federal courts have declined to apply Belton where the police officer does not make initial contact with the arrestee until after the arrestee has exited his automobile, citing various cases. See Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 127. We decided not to follow these cases and instead adopted the law and rationale set forth in United States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1992), and State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986). Franco expressed a preference for the application of Belton’s bright-line rule in cases where the search of the vehicle is not too remote in time and place from the arrest and where the arrestee is a very recent occupant of the vehicle. Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 127-28, citing Franco, 981 F.2d at 472. We also agreed with the following reasoning set forth in Fry: “ ‘The Belton rule is a simple and reasonable rule ***. A police officer may assume under Belton that the interior of an automobile is within the reach of a defendant when the defendant is still at the scene of the arrest, but *** not physically in the vehicle. We cannot say as a matter of fact that a defendant never could regain access to the interior of an automobile after initially leaving the vehicle. Thus, we would seriously undermine police security if we adopted *** the rule that the interior of an automobile never is within the reach of a suspect who is outside the vehicle at the arrest scene; such a rule would prohibit all automobile searches as an incident to an arrest, unless the defendant was allowed to remain in the automobile during the search, which increases the risk of danger to the officer.’ ” Bosnak, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 128, quoting Fry, 131 Wis. 2d at 174-75, 388 N.W2d at 574. Like the defendant in the case before us, the defendant in Bosnak was not stopped by a police officer until after he had exited his car, and the officer did not search the car until after the defendant had been placed in a squad car. Due to the similarity between Bosnak and the case at bar, I believe Bosnak is controlling. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s reliance upon the absence of evidence that the officer’s safety was in jeopardy or that a need to preserve evidence existed. The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498 (1994), rejected the majority’s position by recognizing that, under Belton, “ ‘[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 504, quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 461, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775-76, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. The court in Bailey further held that, although a search incident to an arrest is based on the need to disarm and discover evidence, the authority to search does not depend upon the probability that weapons would be found or evidence would be destroyed. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d at 504. Accordingly, under Bailey and Bosnak, lack of danger to the arresting officer and the absence of a need to preserve evidence do not render the search improper. The only questions for the court to determine are whether the officer made a lawful custodial arrest of the defendant and whether the defendant was a recent occupant of an automobile. Because both requirements were met in this case, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.