Court Opinion

ID: 9941301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:27.47999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:32.752589
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1283-MR

DAVID RAMLER                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE DANIEL J. ZALLA, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CI-01009

WILLIAM BIRKENHAUER AND
STEVEN FRANZEN                                                         APPELLEES

                        OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART
                         AND REVERSING IN PART

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND EASTON,
JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: William Birkenhauer (“Birkenhauer”) and Steven Franzen

(“Franzen”) (collectively “Appellees”) filed a complaint alleging defamation and

“false light” claims against Appellant David Ramler (“Ramler”). Birkenhauer is

the Chief of Police of the City of Highland Heights. Franzen is a “legal advisor,”

like a city attorney, for Highland Heights. Franzen also holds elective office as the

Campbell County Attorney. Highland Heights is a city within Campbell County.
The positions of Birkenhauer and Franzen with Highland Heights are appointed.

Ramler was previously an elected city councilmember for Highland Heights.

               The Appellees’ claims arise from pamphlets authored by Ramler and

distributed by him to the citizens of Highland Heights as part of his unsuccessful

campaign for mayor of Highland Heights. In these pamphlets, Ramler referred to

the Appellees as racist and sexist.1 Ramler filed a counterclaim, including a claim

for abuse of process, which was dismissed by the circuit court prior to trial.

               At the conclusion of all evidence at the jury trial, Ramler made a

renewed motion for a directed verdict, which was denied by the circuit court, and

the case was submitted to the jury. The jury awarded Birkenhauer $100,000 in

compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages and awarded Franzen $1

in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The punitive

damages awarded were one-fifth of what was demanded by the Appellees. Ramler

then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. This motion was

also denied. Ramler appealed, asking this Court to vacate the Judgment based on

the jury’s verdict and to reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing Ramler’s abuse

of process counterclaim.

1
  Originally, the Appellees complained of additional statements but decided to take to trial only
these two assertions.

                                               -2-
             Upon our review, we conclude the circuit court erred in denying

Ramler’s motion for directed verdict and should have granted summary judgment

dismissing the Complaint. Ramler’s opinion statements regarding the Appellees

were non-actionable in the undisputed circumstances presented. The Judgment

based upon the claims made because of those statements is reversed with direction

to dismiss the Complaint. We agree that the circuit court properly dismissed

Ramler’s abuse of process counterclaim and affirm that decision.

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Ramler was elected to serve on the Highland Heights City Council in

2014. Ramler had lived in the Harriet Avenue neighborhood of Highland Heights

and so he was familiar with it. This neighborhood is near the campus of Northern

Kentucky University (“NKU”). Because of this proximity, NKU students rent

apartments or houses in this area. During the school year, there could be issues

with how students maintained the properties. In a college community, there were

(not surprisingly) parties leading to public disturbance or noise complaints.

            Because of constituent complaints, Ramler went out to this area to

observe behavior of the residents and the police when they were called to the

scene. Ramler supposedly even went up to people to question them about what

they were doing and talked with the police officers. This made Ramler a thorn in

                                         -3-
the side of Birkenhauer. Birkenhauer wanted a meeting to “get Dave Ramler under

control.”

               The plan was to have a conversation about these issues before a city

council meeting on September 5, 2017. Before the city council meeting on that

date, another meeting took place. Mayor Greg Meyers (“Meyers”) sat at the head

of a table. To one side sat Franzen and Birkenhauer. On the other side sat Ramler

and Councilmember Debbie Ball (“Ball”). Franzen and Ramler were facing each

other across the table. Birkenhauer and Ball sat across from each other. Ramler

later explained that he and Ball were members of a safety committee of the city

council. Ramler refers to this interaction as a meeting of the safety committee,

while the Appellees refer to it as a “so-called” meeting.2

               Franzen warned Ramler that his presence at police scenes could

escalate situations and lead to someone being hurt. Franzen warned that the danger

of an escalated situation due to Ramler’s appearances at police scenes could cause

unwanted protestors “like Black Lives Matter” to come to Highland Heights.

Ramler noted the way Franzen said the phrase “Black Lives Matter.” Shortly after

2
  It is not clear if the safety committee keeps minutes of its meetings. If so, there are no minutes
in the record. The Appellees apparently did not consider this an “official” committee meeting.
The circuit court granted Appellees’ motion in limine to preclude Ramler from introducing
evidence that the safety committee meeting violated the Open Meetings Act. If it was a meeting
of that committee, it was subject to the legal requirements of notice to the public. See Kentucky
Revised Statute (“KRS”) 61.805(2). We can only wonder what might have been said or not said
if the public had been invited to observe the meeting.

                                                -4-
the meeting, Franzen apologized to Ramler for his tone. Franzen did not apologize

to Ball for his tone. Franzen would later explain that he was not directing his

comments during the meeting toward Ball. Franzen said he wished he would have

had the opportunity to speak with Ramler in private.

             Ramler stopped showing up at police scenes on Harriet Avenue. A

year later, Ramler decided to run for mayor of Highland Heights in the 2018

election. He ran primarily to address the alleged lack of enforcement of ordinance

violations on Harriet Avenue. In October 2018, Ramler published a six-page

pamphlet to outline his platform. Ramler distributed around 1,200 pamphlets

around town. The content of the pamphlet no doubt also made its way to the ever

present internet.

             Ramler’s pamphlet states there is “racism, sexism, discrimination

toward our residents by city attorney [Franzen], police chief [Birkenhauer], and

mayor [Meyers].” The pamphlet describes Ramler’s recollection of the events that

took place at the meeting on September 5, 2017. Ramler states the meeting was

started by Birkenhauer and immediately turned over to Franzen. The pamphlet

describes Franzen’s behavior at the meeting as “very unprofessional, yelling with

anger and hatred at council members Ball and [Ramler].” It then goes on to say

Franzen told Ramler and Ball they “interfered with police business and that an

officer could be shot.”

                                         -5-
            The pamphlet states the “real reason” Birkenhauer and Franzen would

not resolve the problems on Harriet Avenue was because “[t]here are black as well

[as] white students and athletes living on Harriet Ave.” According to Ramler,

Birkenhauer and Franzen “singled out and grouped all black students at NKU and

judged them as a group not as individuals[.]” Ramler accuses Franzen and

Birkenhauer of saying the reason they have chosen not to enforce issues on Harriet

Avenue is “because they did not want any marches or protest[s] from . . . groups

‘like BLACK LIVES MATTER.’” In Ramler’s view, since Birkenhauer and

Meyers did not correct this comment, they supported it. Ramler writes that

Franzen’s statement about Black Lives Matter “is a very hateful and racist

statement and not acceptable coming from police chief and city attorney and

county attorney.”

            Ramler’s pamphlet then discusses the aftermath of the meeting.

Ramler acknowledges that Franzen apologized to Ramler privately for the way

Franzen talked to him (but did not apologize for the agenda of the meeting).

Ramler states Franzen did not apologize to Ball, “demonstrating sexism toward

her.”

                                        -6-
              Ramler lost the 2018 mayoral election to incumbent Meyers by a

more than two-to-one margin.3 Right after that election day in 2018, Franzen and

Birkenhauer (but not Meyers) filed the Complaint against Ramler for defamation

and false light based upon the contents of Ramler’s pamphlet.

              Before his Answer was due, Ramler solicited a settlement offer from

Franzen and Birkenhauer. In response, Franzen and Birkenhauer tendered an

“Abeyance and Settlement Agreement” to Ramler. This proposed settlement

agreement called for Ramler to issue an apology letter to the Appellees, retracting

his statements in the pamphlet. Another provision of the settlement agreement

called for Ramler to sell his home in Highland Heights and remain outside

Campbell County for at least forty years. Ramler rejected the Appellees’

settlement offer.

              After settlement negotiations failed, Ramler filed his original Answer,

Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims. Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss,

For More Definitive Statement and Sanctions. The circuit court granted leave for

Ramler to file an amended pleading, paring down his counterclaims. Ramler pled

that the Appellees’ settlement offer calling for Ramler to move out of the county

for forty years was evidence of the Appellees’ attempt to punish him and to

3
  Taking judicial notice pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 201, official results of
the Kentucky State Board of Elections show Meyers with 1,091 votes (69.14%) to Ramler with
487 votes (30.86%).

                                              -7-
prevent future political challenges from him. This was the basis for the abuse of

process claim. The Appellees renewed their request for dismissal.

               By Order entered on October 4, 2019, the circuit court dismissed

Ramler’s abuse of process counterclaim. The circuit court held that the Appellees’

settlement offer “was not an improper use of the legal process and was not a

method of extortion, a threat, or a club.” Although Ramler had made claims other

than for abuse of process, that is the only claim for which he seeks review on this

appeal.

               Ramler filed a Motion to Change Venue. Ramler’s argument was that

he would not receive a fair trial in Campbell County because Birkenhauer was

Chief of Police of the City of Highland Heights and Franzen was both the legal

advisor for Highland Heights and the elected Campbell County Attorney. Ramler

also noted Franzen publicly supported the presiding circuit judge, who had been

elected to fill an unexpired term during the same 2018 election.4 The circuit court

denied Ramler’s Motion to Change Venue.5

4
  Kentucky Board of Elections data also confirms the presiding judge’s election in a contested
race in 2018.
5
  We find no error in this decision by the circuit court. Judges in Kentucky are elected. The fact
that an attorney or party supported a successful candidate for judge does not automatically
require disqualification. See Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Ky. 2006). Also,
changes of venue are usually not appropriate until an effort has been made to seat a jury in the
proper venue. See Hubers v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 750, 777 (Ky. 2020). There was no
substantial difficulty seating a jury composed of jurors with proper indifference to who the
parties were in this case.

                                               -8-
              In late 2020, the Appellees filed a Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment on liability asserting they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

all their claims, and the only element left to be determined was that of damages.

Ramler filed an opposing Motion for Summary Judgment. Ramler’s main

argument was that the statements contained in his pamphlet were statements of

opinion which cannot be proven as true or false and thus are not actionable.

              The circuit court denied both motions for summary judgment. The

circuit court ruled Ramler’s opinions that the Appellees are “racist” and “sexist”

implied facts that are provable as false. The circuit court stated Ramler’s opinions

about the Appellees implied they “have engaged in conduct that would lead one to

believe that they are racist or sexist.” The circuit court added Ramler’s opinions

“could be construed as defamatory if the facts implied are not true.”

              Before trial, Ramler was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the

case pursuant to the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“UPEPA”).6 KRS

454.460 et seq. This law provides protection from liability for statements made

about a matter of public concern and allows expedited relief in cases alleging

6
 In 2022, Kentucky became only the third state (joining Washington and Hawaii) to adopt
UPEPA.

                                             -9-
liability for such statements. The circuit court correctly denied Ramler’s UPEPA

motion. That law was not expressly made retroactive.7

               On July 13, 2022, the three-day jury trial commenced. Franzen,

Ramler, Birkenhauer, and Ball were the only witnesses called. For completeness,

we will summarize the testimony in some detail.

               Franzen was the first witness. He testified that he has been the legal

advisor to the City of Highland Heights for 35 years and Campbell County

Attorney since 2010. Franzen has known Birkenhauer on a professional basis for

decades. Franzen first became familiar with Ramler when Ramler attended several

city council meetings before his election to the council. Ramler’s complaints at

these meetings were about the noise on Harriet Avenue, as well as disturbances

relating to the adjacent soccer field on NKU’s campus.

               Franzen testified Birkenhauer asked him to intervene because Ramler

was repeatedly “interfering with police work” after being elected to the city

council. Birkenhauer complained to Franzen about Ramler’s allegedly showing up

at police scenes on Harriet Avenue and antagonizing the student residents on the

street. Franzen testified Ramler would try to tell officers at the scenes who to

arrest. Franzen stated that Ramler’s “inject[ing] himself into an active scene” was

inappropriate as a councilmember.

7
    KRS 446.080(3).

                                          -10-
               Franzen set up the meeting with Ramler and Birkenhauer to be held

prior to a regularly scheduled city council meeting. Franzen planned to address

Birkenhauer’s concerns with Ramler. Franzen stated he anticipated only Ramler to

show up; instead, Meyers and Ball were also present. Franzen warned Ramler that

his presence at police scenes could lead to a lawsuit or someone being hurt.

               Franzen testified he advised Ramler he did not want “protestors

coming into our city because somebody’s been hurt.” Franzen gave Black Lives

Matter as an example. He wanted Ramler to take the situation seriously. He did

not intend to indicate any racial animosity with the example given. Franzen stated

he would not want any protestor group coming to Highland Heights. Franzen

testified his concern was due to protests such as the ones in Ferguson, Missouri.8

Franzen had heard a presentation at a prosecutors’ conference and remembered

how “agitators” and others “causing trouble” were involved in that situation.

               Franzen testified he did virtually all the talking at the meeting and

addressed all his comments directly to Ramler. According to Franzen, he never

addressed Ball at any point during the meeting. Franzen testified Ramler became

defensive during the meeting. Sometime after the meeting, Franzen apologized to

Ramler for his tone and stated he wished he could have spoken to Ramler one-on-

8
 A series of events occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, after a white police officer, Darren Wilson,
shot and killed an 18-year-old black man, Michael Brown, in August 2014.

                                              -11-
one rather than in front of others. Franzen testified he did not apologize to Ball as

he did not address her during the meeting. Franzen remembered that he and

Ramler were cordial with each other following the meeting, and that Ramler

stopped showing up at police scenes on Harriet Avenue.

             Franzen believes he was defamed because of Ramler’s ambitions to

become mayor. Franzen stated he sought to “punish” Ramler. Franzen also filed

the defamation lawsuit to remove the “stain” from his reputation. Franzen

characterized the contents of Ramler’s pamphlet as “insulting.” Franzen was

worried about the hypothetical scenario of a terminated employee potentially

claiming racism or sexism on his part due to the contents of Ramler’s pamphlet.

When asked how he arrived at claiming $1.00 in compensatory damages and

$500,000.00 in punitive damages, Franzen replied he did not know, but that his

intent behind pleading a big number was to make an impression on Ramler and

“others who wanted to speak lies about people.”

             When cross-examining Franzen, Ramler’s counsel attempted to

introduce into evidence the proposed settlement agreement from the Appellees in

which they offered to drop the lawsuit if Ramler sold his Highland Heights home

and moved outside Campbell County for a period of forty years. Ramler’s counsel

offered this to show the level of Franzen’s negative feelings against Ramler as an

element of his credibility, despite the evidence being subject to the general

                                         -12-
prohibition of introducing evidence about settlement negotiations.9 The circuit

court excluded this evidence.

               The Appellees then called Ramler as a witness. Ramler testified

regarding what transpired during the meeting, as well as the contents of his

election pamphlet. Ramler stated the Appellees’ actions toward him and Ball

during and after the meeting were the sole basis for his claims of racism and

sexism on the part of the Appellees. Ramler believed Birkenhauer to have the

same beliefs as Franzen as Birkenhauer did not admonish Franzen for the

comments but instead showed silent agreement with Franzen’s comments and

behavior. Ramler believed Franzen to be sexist as he did not apologize to Ball.

Ramler testified he believed at the time of publishing, and continued to believe at

trial, that the Appellees acted in a racist and sexist manner.

               Birkenhauer also wanted to “punish” Ramler. He wanted

“consequences” for Ramler’s statements. Birkenhauer stated he would have been

fired if Ramler won the mayoral election, and that the allegations of racism and

sexism would hinder Birkenhauer from finding a new job. Birkenhauer

occasionally serves as an expert witness in other cases, and he complained the

allegations could prevent him from serving as an expert witness in the future.

9
    KRE 408.

                                         -13-
Birkenhauer has remained the Chief of Police since the publishing of Ramler’s

pamphlet.

             Ball testified that she was “talked down to,” “demeaned,” and “put in

her place” by Franzen at the meeting. Ball remembered a prior occasion when she

first joined the city council. Ball believed Franzen talked down to her then too,

and she instructed him then never to do that again. Unlike Ramler, Ball did not

receive an apology from Franzen. Ramler informed Ball of his apology from

Franzen. Ball testified she then sent an email to Franzen, Birkenhauer, and Meyers

asking for an apology such as the one Ramler received. She specifically asked if

she was unworthy of an apology because she was a woman. She received no

response, much less any apology. Ball also believed that the Appellees’ conduct at

the meeting was racist as well.

             At the end of the Appellees’ case and once again after the close of all

evidence, Ramler moved for a directed verdict. Both motions were denied.

Ramler’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was also

denied. This appeal followed.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A circuit court considering a motion for directed verdict “must draw

all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the party opposing

the motion.” Belt v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d 524, 530 (Ky. 2022) (citation

                                        -14-
omitted). The circuit court should grant a directed verdict only when “there is a

complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist

upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Id. (citation omitted). Upon review,

this Court will reverse the circuit court’s ruling only if we find that the jury could

not have “reasonably reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence before it.” Id.

(citation omitted). “In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we apply the same standard of review that

we use when reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a motion for a directed

verdict.” Louisville and Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist. v. T+C Contracting

Inc., 570 S.W.3d 551, 576 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

             But application of this standard for directed verdict of course assumes

there is a matter for the jury to properly determine as a question of fact. As we will

explain, there was no viable claim to submit to the jury. The Complaint should

have been dismissed by summary judgment, despite the stringent standard for such

motions. The same may be said for the counterclaim for abuse of process.

                                     ANALYSIS

             The seminal case of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), prohibits a public official

from recovering damages for defamatory statements relating to his or her official

                                         -15-
conduct, unless he or she can prove that “the statement was made with ‘actual

malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of

whether it was false or not.” Actual malice must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence. Welch v. Am. Publ’g Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724, 728

(Ky. 1999). As for the tort of false light, the actual malice standard must also be

met for a plaintiff to prevail at trial when the subject matter of the speech is of

public interest. Cromity v. Meiners, 494 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Ky. App. 2015). As we

shall see, opinions are not false statements of fact which may be a basis for

defamation under these standards.

              The traditional elements of a defamation claim are: (a) a false and

defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third

party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d)

either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of

special harm caused by the publication. Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d

276, 281-82 (Ky. 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558). This

last element ties into the proof of damages necessary to demonstrate an injury to

reputation:

              Generally, defamatory words written or spoken of
              another are divided into two classes in determining the
              extent to which they are actionable. Words may be
              actionable per se, or per quod. In the former class,
              damages are presumed and the person defamed may
              recover without allegation or proof of special damages.

                                          -16-
              In the latter class, recovery may be sustained only upon
              an allegation and proof of special damages.

Hill v. Evans, 258 S.W.2d 917, 918 (Ky. 1953).

              In other words, defamatory statements are actionable per se “when

there is a conclusive presumption of both malice and damage.” Stringer v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 794 (Ky. 2004), overruled on other grounds by

Toler, 458 S.W.3d 276 (citation omitted). Thus, when the language at issue is

determined to be defamatory per se, recovery is permitted without proof of special

damages, because injury to plaintiff’s reputation is presumed and the words are

“actionable on their face – without proof of extrinsic facts or explicatory

circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

              “Special damages are those beyond mere embarrassment which

support actual economic loss[.]” Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d

270, 274 (Ky. App. 1981). In contrast to defamation per se, defamation per quod

is actionable only when the defamed person alleges and proves special damages.

Hill, supra, at 918. In the present case, the claim as pled was for defamation per

quod.10 The Appellees claimed specific elements of damages in their Complaint.

10
  At oral argument, counsel for the Appellees conceded that the pleadings alleged defamation
per quod, but counsel argued that the final judgment essentially amended the pleadings to the
evidence (or rather lack of evidence) regarding damages pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (“CR”) 15.02. Because damages are a secondary issue in this case, we choose not to
comment further on this questionable excuse for the failure to plead defamation per se. Based on
the pleadings, Ramler would have prepared for evidence of actual damages, which was not

                                             -17-
              In New York Times, supra, at 256, 84 S. Ct. at 710, the United States

Supreme Court decided for the first time the extent to which the First Amendment

limits the government, specifically the courts, from awarding damages in

defamation cases to public officials against their critics. As previously mentioned,

New York Times requires a public official plaintiff to prove actual malice on the

part of the speaker of the defamatory statement. And ever since this ruling,

American courts have striven to strike the balance between the constitutional right

to free speech toward a public official in matters of public concern and the

common law right to seek recovery for damage to reputation due to a false factual

statement.

              Ramler argues his pamphlet is “pure opinion,” which is absolutely

protected speech. In Yancey v. Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989), the

Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS’

approach to opinion-based defamation claims. Pure opinion “occurs when the

maker of the comment states the facts on which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff

and then expresses a comment as to the plaintiff’s conduct, qualifications or

character.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b. A statement

consisting of pure opinion is absolutely protected. Yancey, supra, at 857. See also

forthcoming, and then, using CR 15.02, the whole nature of the defamation alleged would have
been changed after the failure to produce required evidence for defamation per quod.

                                            -18-
Doe 1 v. Flores, 661 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Ky. App. 2022) (comments made about the

behavior of Covington Catholic students observed at a protest in Washington DC

were not actionable because they were opinions).

             The other type of opinion, the mixed type, “is one which, while an

opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or

his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the

parties to the communication.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b.

A mixed opinion may open a defendant to liability if a listener draws a reasonable

inference that the defendant’s opinion must have been based on undisclosed

defamatory facts. Yancey, supra, at 857.

             Soon after Yancey, the United States Supreme Court examined the

relationship between opinion and fact in defamation claims in Milkovich v. Lorain

Journal Company, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S .Ct. 2695, 11 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990). The Court

concluded a statement on matters of public concern must be sufficiently factual so

that it may be proven false, or the statement must imply underlying facts which are

provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law. Id. at 21,

110 S. Ct. at 2707. When reaching its decision, the Court provided the following

analogy:

             If a speaker says, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” he
             implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the
             conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker
             states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those

                                        -19-
             facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his
             assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
             imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such
             statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these
             implications; and the statement, “In my opinion Jones is
             a liar,” can cause as much damage to reputation as the
             statement, “Jones is a liar.”

Id. at 18-19, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.

             In Cromity, supra, at 501, a police officer brought a defamation claim

against a radio program host arising out of statements made by the host after the

officer cited him for speeding, including calling the officer an “out and out liar,” a

“troubled public servant,” and “delusional.” The Kentucky Supreme Court found

the radio host’s statements addressed an issue of public concern – the integrity of a

local police officer. Id. at 504. The court ruled that, since the radio host fully

disclosed the facts supporting his opinion, and those facts were not provable as

false, his opinions were constitutionally protected. Id. Conversely, the court

reasoned that the radio host’s statements alleging the police officer was a liar could

have been actionable if the host failed to state the facts in support of his opinion,

failed to give a complete rendering of the facts, or gave facts that were provable as

false. Id. at 503.

             Ramler’s pamphlet fully disclosed the facts supporting his opinion

regarding the Appellees, and those facts were not provable as false. The pamphlet

outlined the events that took place during, and immediately after, the meeting. The

                                         -20-
pamphlet explicitly disclosed the factual reasons behind Ramler’s assertions of

racism and sexism on part of the Appellees. Ramler opined the Appellees were

racist due to the Black Lives Matter statement, and he believed the Appellees were

sexist due to a lack of an apology to a female member of the city council.

            The parties agree that the events surrounding the meeting is the sole

basis for Ramler’s claims of racism and sexism. There are no allegations that

Ramler omitted any material facts about the meeting from the pamphlet. There

were no substantial arguments about the events and who said what. We conclude

the contents of Ramler’s pamphlet were pure opinion pursuant to Cromity, and thus

the Appellees’ case should have been dismissed before presenting it to a jury.

            Ramler also argues his pamphlet is nonactionable rhetorical

hyperbole. Separate from opinions, statements considered “rhetorical hyperbole,”

“vigorous epithet,” and “loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language” are provided

constitutional protection. Nat’l College of Kentucky, Inc. v. WAVE Holdings, LLC,

536 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Ky. App. 2017). The Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed

this issue in Welch v. American Publishing Company of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724

(Ky. 1999). In Welch, an incumbent mayor sought re-election. Id. at 726.

Supporters of the incumbent’s challenger ran an advertisement in the local paper.

Id. This advertisement included the following statements about the incumbent:

“The City is Broke Because of His Management,” “Employees Have Been Paid

                                        -21-
Almost $100,000 because of Political Firings,” and “Frog Has Squandered Over

1½ Million Dollars of Surplus [City] Money.” Id. The incumbent sued the

supporters of his challenger, as well as the newspaper that ran the advertisement,

for defamation and false light. Id. The circuit court granted summary judgment to

the defendants. Id.

             The court in Welch characterized many of the contested phrases in the

advertisement as being figurative, and that they employed rhetorical exaggeration

to accomplish their intended purpose of casting a political candidate in a negative

light. Id. at 730. The court found such language unactionable. “This type of

generalized rhetoric bandied about in a political campaign is not the language upon

which a defamation lawsuit should be based, but instead is political opinion solidly

protected by the First Amendment.” Id. The court cautioned their ruling “should

not be interpreted as condoning political advertising which appears to have no

purpose other than to sully the reputation of a candidate.” Id. However, the court

determined the evidence on record was insufficient to create an issue of fact for a

jury to consider. Id.

             Ramler’s statements also constitute “rhetoric bandied about in a

political campaign.” Ramler’s statements were used in an election pamphlet as

part of his campaign for mayor. The pamphlet’s intended purpose was to cast

                                        -22-
incumbent Meyers and the city’s appointed employees in a negative light (which

was ultimately unsuccessful as Meyers easily won re-election).

             Courts outside Kentucky have generally recognized that statements

labeling another person as “racist” are rhetorical hyperbole. In Stevens v. Tillman,

855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988), an elementary school principal filed suit against the

president of the school’s parent teacher association for calling the principal

“racist.” The principal had contended that the epithet “racist” was itself actionable

because it marked her as unfit for her job. Id. at 401. The Seventh Circuit held the

statement of the president of the parent teacher association calling the principal

“racist” was not defamatory. Id. The court added: “In daily life ‘racist’ is hurled

about so indiscriminately that it is no more than a verbal slap in the face[.]” Id. at

402. The court found the statement calling the principal a “racist” “fit comfortably

within the immunity for name-calling.” Id.

             Other jurisdictions have further determined that characterizing

someone as “racist” is not actionable. See Garrard v. Charleston Cnty. School

District, 838 S.E.2d 698 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019), aff’d in part & vacated in part by

890 S.E.2d 567 (S.C. 2023) (ruling statements in a newspaper editorial

characterizing a local high school football coach and several of his players as

“racist douchebags” were not actionable because they were expressions of opinion

and rhetorical hyperbole); Silverman v. Daily News, L.P., 129 A.D.3d 1054 (N.Y.

                                         -23-
App. Div. 2015) (ruling newspaper’s report that plaintiff authored “racist writings”

was a statement of opinion, with full disclosure of the facts supporting the

opinion); Meissner v. Bradford, 156 So.3d 129, 131 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (ruling

statement made by a commissioner in a youth football league that the league’s

former president “has a problem with people of color” was a statement of opinion

in the nature of hyperbole); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972 (N.J. 1994) (ruling

defendant’s statement that plaintiffs “hate Jews” constituted nonactionable name-

calling).

             Whether an offensive statement is couched as opinion or rhetorical

hyperbole, we recognize opinions are like . . . feet. Almost everybody has a

couple, and some of them stink. We will take a moment to show how easy it can

be to say something which can lead to a perhaps unfair but nonetheless

unactionable opinion.

            In his testimony, Franzen referred to the events in Ferguson, Missouri,

and used words to describe people as “making trouble” and “agitating.” This same

wording was used to describe those “outsiders” who fought against segregation in

the infamous Southern Manifesto of 1956. The document was entitled a

Declaration of Constitutional Principles. It decried “agitators and troublemakers

                                        -24-
invading our States.”11 To their credit, no senator or representative from Kentucky

signed the document.

                One could argue that use of this wording implies that the speaker is a

racist. This is the use of a single statement to label a person. Many in our society

today are weary of others permanently labeling others with reference to isolated

statements or events. Yet such labeling is an opinion based upon the fact of the

statement being made. It is not actionable as defamation.

                 The testimonies of the Appellees lend support to the notion that

racism is hard to define as an opinion much less as a matter of fact. Franzen

testified, “I don’t think that there’s anybody in the country that’s not a racist on

Mr. Ramler’s definition.” Birkenhauer similarly testified “by Mr. Ramler’s

definition [racism] could be anything.” When asked if he had ever told a racist

joke, Birkenhauer said that it “depends on your definition of racist.”

                At the oral argument for this case, the Court asked the Appellees’

counsel to define the word “racism.” Counsel replied essentially that racism was

judgment of a person based on the color of their skin. The Merriam-Webster

dictionary lists three different definitions of “racism.” The first such definition

states racism is “a belief that race is a fundamental determinant of human traits

and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a

11
     Congressional Record, Senate – March 12, 1956, at page 4460.

                                              -25-
particular race.” Merriam-Webster also lists multiple definitions of the word

“race,” and none of the definitions narrowly define “race” as simply based on skin

color. If the successors of Noah Webster and the Appellees cannot define a

“racist,” then how can the Appellees prove they are not or Ramler prove they are?

             We may engage in a similar discussion about sexism. During the trial,

an attorney for one of the Appellees couched questions in terms of how something

made the witness feel “as a man.” But defamation does not discriminate based on

gender. At one point, Franzen explained one of the reasons he wanted to punish

Ramler was because Ramler was “not man enough” to make the statements to

Franzen’s face. Surely, there was no intent to suggest that women are subject to a

different standard when it comes to the courtesy of initiating difficult but

appropriate confrontations, rather than speaking about someone behind his or her

back.

             Again, someone could use the fact that such statements were made to

form an opinion about sexism of the speaker. It would not necessarily be an

accurate or even fair opinion. Still, it is an opinion and is not actionable as a

factual mistruth under defamation law.

             One of the prospective jurors understood the problem with this case.

He said he did not like politicians. He thought this was a case of two politicians

“duking it out.” He wondered that if politicians could sue each other for the things

                                         -26-
they say about each other these days, why were there not a lot more suits, and he

gave an example of numerous comments by a well-known national politician. This

juror was struck for cause. As it turns out, he got it. The First Amendment simply

does not allow lawsuits over every hostile thing a politician says.

             Moving past the insufficient status of Ramler’s opinions as

defamation, Ramler also argues Appellees failed to introduce any evidence that

they suffered special damages from Ramler’s speech. The Appellees argue that

Ramler’s statements constitute defamation per se because they exposed the

Appellees to public hatred, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace. Thus, recovery is

permitted without proof of special damages because injury to plaintiffs’ reputation

is conclusively presumed.

             We disagree. A jury cannot be “permitted to presume damages

without proof of injury[.]” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.

Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974). “As with any defamation claim against a

public official, [a plaintiff] must establish that statements have been made that hold

him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that caused him to be shunned or

avoided, or that injured him in his business or occupation; that the statements are

false; and that the statements were made with actual malice.” Doe v. Coleman, 497

S.W.3d 740, 749 (Ky. 2016).

                                        -27-
             In this case, neither Appellee showed that Ramler’s statements

subjected them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. No witness was called to

establish this in the local community. Nor could the parties testify the statements

caused measurable harm to them. Franzen testified he was worried people in the

community would think he is racist or sexist, but he did not detail a specific

instance in which a person ridiculed him. Franzen’s occupation was also

apparently unharmed as he was elected without opposition as county attorney in

both 2018 and 2022. He still serves as the legal adviser to the City of Highland

Heights.

             Birkenhauer also could not testify to specific acts of diminished

reputation. Birkenhauer testified he would have been fired if Ramler won the

mayoral election, and that the allegations of racism and sexism would hinder him

from finding a new job – not that he is looking for one. Birkenhauer also

complained the allegations could prevent him from serving as an expert witness in

the future. No witness was called to establish Birkenhauer was or would be denied

any job he sought. No witness was called to say Birkenhauer’s use as a paid expert

witness was in fact damaged. The evidence consisted only of Birkenhauer’s self-

serving statements of concern about this.

             The damages claimed are speculative at best, and speculative damages

may not be recovered. Curry v. Bennett, 301 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Ky. App. 2009). A

                                        -28-
plaintiff must prove special damages to establish the element of injury to

reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, supra, at 274. The Appellees did

not prove special damages, and thus failed to establish their reputation was injured.

This discussion about damages is academic anyway because the statements were

not actionable as we have explained.

             The circuit court should not have let this case go to a jury as there was

a complete absence of proof on several elements necessary to sustain a public

concern defamation case. “An indispensable principle of free speech guaranteed

by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is ‘that debate on public

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include

vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and

public officials.’” Welch, supra, at 725-26 (quoting New York Times, supra, at

271, 84 S. Ct. at 721). Political figures often need thick skins when obtaining and

holding public office. Sharp criticisms can hurt feelings, but public officials know

what they are getting into when elected or appointed to serve the public.

              Appellees’ false light claims also fail as a matter of law. False light

is part of the right to privacy. It can be difficult, although not impossible to apply

the claim when the person is a public figure. The Kentucky Supreme Court

recognized the cause of action of false light within the tort of invasion of privacy in

McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, 623 S.W.2d 882, 887-

                                         -29-
88 (Ky. 1981). False light and defamation are closely allied, and an injured party

may seek relief through both causes of action, arising out of the same publication,

but he is limited to only one recovery. Id. False light requires that (1) the false

light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable

person; and (2) the publisher had knowledge of, or acted in reckless disregard as to

the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other was

placed. Id. at 888.

             The court in McCall recognized its past ruling in Sellers v. Henry, 329

S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959), that if a publication deals with a matter of public interest

or public concern, even if it invades a person’s privacy, it is not subject to the tort

of invasion of privacy. The court in McCall did not go so far regarding the specific

action of false light. Instead, the court held the defense of public interest should be

applicable to false light claims where the published statements are true, but it is not

available as a defense in cases of the publication of false statements. 623 S.W.2d

at 888.

             As previously mentioned, the parties do not dispute the basic

underlying facts about what was said or done at the meeting – the disagreement is

whether Ramler’s opinion based on those facts was defamatory. The Appellees

have stated the Black Lives Matter statement was made and that Franzen did not

                                          -30-
apologize to Ball. Since the essential facts behind Ramler’s contested opinion

statements are true, the Appellees’ claim for false light also fails.

             As we believe Ramler’s statements of opinion were on matters of

public concern and Ramler disclosed the underlying facts behind the statements,

the Appellees cannot sustain a defamation action. The circuit court should have

granted summary judgment to Ramler as his statements could not be proven to be

false at trial. At the very least, the circuit court should not have let the issue go to a

jury. The jury verdict against Ramler cannot stand and is therefore reversed.

             RAMLER’S ABUSE OF PROCESS COUNTERCLAIM
                      STANDARD OF REVIEW

             When proceedings on a motion to dismiss include consideration of

evidentiary material outside the parameters of the pleadings themselves, the motion

often becomes one for summary judgment. CR 12.02. In this case, the circuit

court did not limit its review just to the pleadings themselves. Evidentiary

materials were in the record and part of the motion to dismiss process.

             “The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether

the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact

and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson

ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).

Summary judgment is only proper when “it would be impossible for the

respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”

                                          -31-
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to construe the

record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . and all

doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Id.

                                      ANALYSIS

             Ramler believes his abuse of process counterclaim was the only claim

in this case that should have been tried. Ramler asserts the Appellees’ settlement

offer calling for Ramler to move out of Campbell County for forty years was a

textbook example of abuse of process. The counterclaim had more merit than the

Complaint, but it still fails as a matter of law.

             An abuse of process claim is defined as “the irregular or wrongful

employment of a judicial proceeding.” Simpson v. Laytart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394

(Ky. 1998) (citation omitted). The essential elements of this claim are: (1) an

ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the

regular conduct of the proceeding. Id. “Some definite act or threat not authorized

by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process is

required and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than

carry out the process to its authorized conclusion even though with bad intentions.”

Id. at 394-95. An ulterior purpose “usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a

collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the

                                          -32-
surrender of property on the payment of money, by the use of the process as a

threat or a club.” Id. at 395 (citation omitted).

             We do not believe the Appellees’ settlement offer to Ramler was an

abuse of process. They sued to punish Ramler. This was not an improper motive;

they wanted and obtained an award of punitive damages. Still, Ramler may have

been able to show the first element of an ulterior motive. The Appellees may have

wanted not to just punish Ramler with an award of damages but also get rid of him

by making him leave the community.

             Historically, the tort of abuse of process must relate to some aspect of

the process of a suit (seeking an injunction, garnishment, or some other act by the

court) to achieve the improper purpose. We hesitate to approve the use of this tort

solely on the basis of a settlement offer. Such communications do not involve

process which may be issued by the court itself. Other states have similarly

cautioned against using settlement discussions as the sole basis for an abuse of

process claim. See Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 718 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1986). In this

case, the Appellees responded to a request from Ramler. The fact that they did so

in a preposterous manner does not sustain an abuse of process claim when all the

circumstances of this case are considered.

            Many may see the banishment demand as outrageous. In an almost

Biblical fashion, the Appellees emulate God to cast Ramler, like Moses, into the

                                          -33-
wilderness for the required forty years to achieve redemption. Kentucky does not

allow such a punishment of banishment, even for criminals. Weigand v.

Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. 1965).

             Still, the Appellees filed a lawsuit which, if meritorious, could

properly seek to “punish” Ramler. They tendered a settlement offer only when

requested by Ramler. The filing of the lawsuit and the settlement offer were in the

natural course of litigation. The settlement negotiations did not actually involve

“process” to be issued by the court. Summary judgment dismissing the abuse of

process claim was proper.

                                  CONCLUSION

             The Appellees’ counsel challenged us to have the “courage” to create

a right for public officials to sue those who express opinions about them even

though based on factual observations. We instead find courage to uphold the

freedom enshrined in our Constitution. It is no accident that freedom of political

speech is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. That freedom was

particularly important to the founders who, if they had lost their battle for freedom,

could have been executed by a king for criticizing him.

             In numbered paragraph 17 of his unsuccessful motion for a change of

venue, Ramler said: “This is a political case, involving political rivals, which

should have properly ended at the ballot boxes in November.” Indeed. Statements

                                         -34-
made during a campaign for elective office are at the pinnacle of the protection of

the First Amendment. Ramler’s opinions about racism and sexism are just that –

opinions. He stated the basis for them. He cannot be found liable for defamation

for these opinions.

            The Judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court in favor of the Appellees

is REVERSED with direction to dismiss the Complaint. The Campbell Circuit

Court’s dismissal of the abuse of process counterclaim is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT                  BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:                            FOR APPELLEES:

Michael Abate                             Nick Alig
William R. Adams                          John Alig
Louisville, Kentucky                      Wilder, Kentucky

                                        -35-