Court Opinion

ID: 9778991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:31:29.996962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:18.643542
License: Public Domain

CAVE, Special Judge
(dissenting). — I cannot concur in the majority opinion.' The right of a party litigant in a civil action to a change of venue because of the disqualification of the judge or the prejudice of the inhabitants has existed in this state since territorial days, and such right does not spring from any constitutional grant or authority. What are now Sections 508.090 and 508.140, R. S. 1949, have, since territorial days, contained, in substance, the same provisions that now exist. See 1 Territorial Laws, page 117, See. 32; Vol. 1, Laws of .1822, page 848, Sec. 33.
Our courts have uniformly held that “The right .to a change of venue is not a constitutional right, but is a mere statutory privilege which the parties may waive either before or after, the change has been granted”; State ex rel. Dilliner v. Cummins, 338 Mo. 609, 92 S. W. (2) 605; Graves v. Davidson, 334 Mo. 882, 68 S. W. (2) 711; that ‘ ‘ The right to a change of venue is purely statutory, and has no existence outside of the special grant of power to award it.” State ex rel. Cottrell v. Wofford, 119 Mo. 408, 410; Heather v. City of Palmyra, 311 Mo. 32; Clark v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 6 S. W. (2) 954, 319 Mo. 865; Graves v. Davidson, supra.
Thus it would appear that Section 29 of Article VI, Mo. Const. 1875, and Sections 6 and 15, Article V, Const, of 1945, have nothing to do with the power of the Legislature to provide for the right of a litigant to a change of venue from the judge or from the citizens. In other words, the Legislature has the inherent power to provide by statute for the right to a change of venue, which is merely a procedural matter.
The perplexing question is whether Sections 6 and 15, Article V, supra, have divested the Legislature of the power to provide by statute for disposition of a civil action when the judge alone is disqualified. The majority opinion holds that Sections 508.090, 508.100, and 508.140 have “been nullified, insofar as.they provide for the granting of a change of venue upon the ground .of the disqualification of the judge.” This conclusion is supported by the opinion in Pogue v.. Swink,. 364 Mo. 306, 261 S. W. (2) 40.
*936I do not believe those sections are, or were intended to be, all inclusive of the disposition of a civil suit when a judge is disqualified. I do not believe they do, or were intended to, divest the Legislature of all power to legislate on the subject. As was so well said by this court in Hickey et al. v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis et al., 363 Mo. 1039, 256 S. W. (2) 775, 778, “‘It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a State Constitution is not a grant of power as is the Constitution of the United States but, as to legislative power, it is only a limitation; and, therefore, except for the limitations imposed thereby, the power of the State Legislature is unlimited and practically absolute.’ * * * Those limitations must be ‘expressed in the Constitution or clearly implied by its provisions.’ ” It seems to me that Sections 6 and 15 do not place a “limitation” upon the Legislature, or a disqualified judge, as did Section 29 of Article VI of the 1875 Constitution; but on the contrary, said sections remove certain prior “limitations”; particularly with respect to a disqualified judge calling another judge.
In State ex rel. Dunlap et al. v. Higbee, 328 Mo. 1066, 43 S. W. (2) 825, and in many subsequent cases, this court has held that Section 29, Article VI, supra, and the statutes enacted thereunder, did not authorize a judge, who had been disqualified in a particular ease, to call in another judge to try that particular case. That section did place a limitation upon a disqualified judge from calling in another judge to try a particular case, but it did not place any limitation upon the Legislature to provide for such a contingency. On the contrary, it authorized the Legislature to do that very thing. Note this language of said Section 29: ‘ ‘ * * * and in all such cases, or in any ease where the judge cannot preside, the General Assembly shall make such additional provisions for holding court as may be found necessary. ’ ’ The difficulty arises from the fact that the Legislature has never authorized a disqualified judge to call in another judge in a civil suit. I know of no case holding that the Legislature could not so provide. Sections 6 and 15 supply that authority and to that extent, and only to that extent, are inconsistent with and supersede the provisions of the statutes which make it mandatory for a disqualified judge to transfer the cause to another circuit, unless the parties agree upon a special judge, or both parties request the election of a special judge.
The opinion in Pogue v. Swink and the majority opinion in the instant case seem to me to eliminate the right of the parties to agree upon a special judge or to elect a special judge. In other words, Sections 6 and 15 have completely appropriated the field of a change of venue because of the disqualification of a judge; and he can now do only one of two things: (a) call in another judge; or (b) request the Supreme Court to transfer a judge to that county. I do not agree with that view.
*937I think the views I have expressed are supported by the cases construing Sections 545.660 and 545.690, which provide that when a judge is disqualified in a criminal case he may call in another circuit judge to try the cause. In construing these statutes, this court, in State v. Gillham, 174 Mo. 671, 675, said, of the authority of a disqualified judge to call in another judge: “This authority must depend for its support absolutely upon the provisions of our statute.” There are many other cases to the same effect. The pertinent and important difference between the statutes regulating the disposition of a case after the disqualification of a judge in a civil suit and that in a criminal case is, that in the civil suit the disqualified judge is not authorized by statute to call in another judge, while in the criminal case the statute does authorize the calling in of another judge.
In support of the conclusions reached, the majority opinion cites, in addition to Pogue v. Swink, supra, the following cases: State v. Scott, 359 Mo. 631, 223 S. W. (2) 453; Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S. W. (2) 323; and Adair County v. Urban, 364 Mo. 746, 268 S. W. (2) 801. In those cases, the disqualified judge had called in another judge to try the cause, or the Supreme Court had transferred a judge for that purpose, and the question was, whether the new judge had jurisdiction. In each case the court properly held that he did have jurisdiction under Sections 6 and 15 and Rule 11. Each of those cases expressed doubt about the validity of the change of venue statutes when a judge had been disqualified, but I do not understand that the court met that issue squarely until the opinion was rendered in Pogue v. Swink.
The opinion in Pogue v. Swink stresses the fact that Sections 6 and 15 “tend to expedite the work of the courts of the state and, of greater importance, save the litigants the annoyance, delay and expenses attending a trial in another circuit when their sole complaint is against the judge of the court.” Those are excellent reasons why a disqualified judge should call in another judge to try the case, as he is now permitted to do by Sections 6 and 15, but I do not believe they are sufficient to justify the holding that the Legislature has been divested of all power to legislate in that field. ■
The primary purpose of Sections 6 and 15 and Rule 11 is to fully utilize the judicial personnel of the state to expedite litigation and dispose of it as economically as possible. This is a wholesome and beneficial purpose, and should be utilized to the fullest. But it seems to me, those sections and rule have little relation to the procedural matter of a change of venue; this is primarily a field for legislation.
It is my opinion that Sections 6 and 15 and Rule 11 merely supplement our change of venue statutes.