Court Opinion

ID: 9738137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:43:24.106081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.921980
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
{concurring). The writer joins in the majority opinion but concurs for the purpose of expressing disagreement with the separate concurring opinion of Justice Day, which states dissatisfaction with the harmless error rule recently adopted in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).
Quite aside from the broader policy reasons for not now switching to a new harmless error rule, I am troubled by the analysis which would discard the Dyess rule because of the dictionary’s definitional difference between "possible” and "probable.” Dyess *56was formulated for the express purpose of escaping the enslaving yoke of semantics. It would indeed be absurd to say that the words, "possible” and "probable,” are always synonymous. But what we said in Dyess was that henceforth, for the purpose of the application of the test, meanings of those words should make little difference, that we should look to the substance of the test. We pointed out therein that "there are few meaningful distinctions among the various formulations of the test for prejudice.” P. 545. Dyess attempted to stress a common-sense approach to whether or not an error seriously undermined confidence in a verdict. We drew on the experience of this court which taught us "that the determination of whether the trial error was harmless is unaffected by the particular formulation of the harmless error test used.” P. 543.
I fear that what the concurring opinion urges is that we resort to a "counting-the-angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin” logic or to an undue reliance on Webster’s Dictionary. I also point out that anyone who thinks that "possible” and "probable” are discrete words with no congruent meanings will be promptly disabused of this idea after even a cursory examination of some of the meanings ascribed to these words in Burton’s Legal Thesaurus (MacMillan 1980).
While I sympathize with, and agree with, Justice Day’s quest for an ever better harmless error rule, that quest should put aside the assumption that the solution to this vexing problem is to be found in dictionary definitions. Any rule adopted, or to be adopted, by this court or others will only confirm the appropriateness of the nomenclature used by Chief Justice Traynor: "The Riddle of Harmless Error.” No test is likely to be completely satisfactory. What is *57harmless or prejudicial eventually comes down to a subjective judgment, no matter how carefully we attempt to hedge that subjective decision with recognizable guidelines. What this court needs is a consistent and predictable policy in handling questions of harmless error.
The effect of the concurring opinion is to place in doubt our present admittedly less than perfect harmless error rule. Perhaps we will now replace it with another formulation that will be equally subject to criticism and whose jurisprudential life will soon be terminated. Nothing in the briefs or oral arguments in the present case has suggested any dissatisfaction or argued for a change in Dyess. On the other hand, when Dyess was adopted, there was widespread and publicly acknowledged dissatisfaction with whatever harmless error rule we theretofore had. To my knowledge, there has been no widespread disagreement with the Dyess procedure.
Recognizing, as any reasonable person should, that there is indeed a "Riddle of Harmless Error,” I believe the court should, in the effort to give some predictability and reckonability to this aspect of the law, stick with the present test of harmless error. Until or unless we can reach the conclusion, based on experience, that the Dyess rule, properly read, understood, and applied, fails to serve the purpose of seeing to it that criminal convictions are not set aside for trivial reasons but are set aside only where the right to a fair trial has been impaired, the Dyess rule should be preserved. The duty of this court to provide and assure some continuity and predictability mandates that there be no change in the rule unless we can, with some assurance, come up with a better rule that in likelihood can be applied with greater understand*58ing and consistency by the lawyers and the judges of this state. What the concurrence appears to propose is a rule that compounds whatever confusion may arise out of the present rule. I would suggest that whatever rule we have, or which we may adopt in the future, assuming it substantially meets the dual test of foregoing reversals for trivial errors but yet assuring fair trial, we stick with the rule and work with it if necessary to see to it that it is made workable and understandable.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE BA-BLITCH joins in this concurrence.