Court Opinion

ID: 9730035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:58:05.26525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.406843
License: Public Domain

*102GARRARD, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by Judge Staton, but for the reasons hereafter stated I am more concerned with a different problem presented by the statute now before us.
Appellant Johnson was charged with and convicted of battery as a class C felony, i. e., battery committed by means of a deadly weapon or one inflicting serious bodily injury. See IC 35-42 — 2-1. The critical issue in the appeal is whether the trial court properly refused Johnson’s tendered instruction which would have advised the jury that they might find him guilty of criminal recklessness, a class D felony.
In examining that question the parties and Judge Staton have dwelled upon the meaning and purpose of an offense based upon a culpability standard of recklessness. While that analysis presents a legitimate issue concerning included offenses, it misses the invidious duplicity which the legislature has unwittingly provided in IC 35-42-2-2.
That statute provides,
“(a) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness, a class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is a class A misdemean- or if the conduct includes the use of a deadly weapon.
(b) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury on another commits criminal recklessness, a class D felony.”
Because of the use of the disjunctive “or” and the inclusion within the definition of “knowingly” and “intentionally” the legislature has created a duplicate offense to the various battery crimes, as well as murder (IC 35-42-1-1) and voluntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-3).1
The statute contains no basis for differentiating between the offenses and thus leaves it to the unbridled discretion of the charging authority which offense will be prosecuted.
I have grave misgivings about the appropriateness of such schemes in a society which has as its goals equal justice and fair play. I am mindful, however, of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s frequent admonitions that we are not, and should not be, free in questions of constitutional due process to draw on our merely personal and private notions. See, e. g., Rochin v. California (1952), 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183.
From the point of view of the federal constitution, such overlapping statutes continue to pass muster as to due process so long as the particular statute gives fair notice of the elements of the offense and penalty for violation, and as to equal protection, so long as the statutes are not employed to treat different recognizable classes differently. U. S. v. Batchelder (1979), 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755; Berra v. U. S. (1956), 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013.
We, however, are confronted under the Indiana Constitution with an obligation significantly different than that which permitted the Berra court to conclude that the trial court might properly refuse to charge the jury as an overlapping offense which carried a lesser penalty.2 In Berra the court pointed out that the role of the jury in federal court was to decide only issues of fact, taking the law as given by the court. 76 S.Ct. at 688. Thus, said the Court, the question of law was strictly one for the court.
Article 1, § 19 of the Constitution of Indiana requires that,
“In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.”
In construing this provision our Supreme Court has held that it does not require a trial court to misapply the law by instruct*103ing juries on offenses that are not properly includable lesser offenses to the principal offense charged.
However, those cases are not relevant to the issue where the legislature has created overlapping offenses as it did in the criminal recklessness statute.
Under such circumstances, upon proper request, I believe the accused is absolutely entitled to have the jury instructed on an overlapping offense carrying a lesser penalty, and Johnson must be given a new trial because of the court’s refusal in this case. If the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction of the battery charged (and it is) it proves him guilty of criminal recklessness as well. If we are going to permit such overlapping statutes to co-exist, then the jury must be permitted to make its constitutionally mandated determination of the law that shall apply.
Finally, I believe Judge Hoffman’s reliance upon Smith v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1179 is misplaced.
Certainly, where an instruction contains words of art it is proper for the court to additionally instruct on the meaning of such terms when properly requested to do so. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co. v. Parks (1979), Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 1073; Love v. Harris (1957), 127 Ind.App. 505, 143 N.E.2d 450. On the other hand, no such definitional instruction need be given for words of common usage readily understood by laymen. Martin v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60, reh. den. 317 N.E.2d 430, cert. den. 420 U.S. 911.
Ordinarily, for one to be entitled' to complain about the failure of the court’s instructions to define certain terms, that party must have tendered an instruction supplying the definition. Edmonds v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 332, 215 N.E.2d 547; Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185; Wilson v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 365, 111 N.E.2d 709.
We recognize that, generally speaking, the instructions to be given lie largely within the trial court’s discretion. Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 382 N.E.2d 157, cert. den. 440 U.S. 984, 99 S.Ct. 1798, 60 L.Ed.2d 246; Hackett v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E.2d 1000. Yet the purpose is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts in such a manner that the jury will not be misled and will arrive at a fair, just and correct verdict.' Foster v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 567, 320 N.E.2d 745; Cockrum v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 366, 234 N.E.2d 479. Thus, it is error to refuse an applicable instruction correctly stating the law where its substance has not been covered by other instructions. Brannin v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 123, 46 N.E.2d 599; see also Wilson v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 112, 374 N.E.2d 45.
We must then balance the need for the jury to be fairly and fully instructed with that discretion which the trial court must\ necessarily have to refuse instructions which are likely to confuse or mislead the jury albeit their technically correct, though possibly incomplete, statement of the law.
It seems to me that the better rule would be this: Where such an instruction correctly stating the law and applicable to the issues is tendered, it may be properly refused if its incompleteness is properly objected to by an opposing party. The offeror may then have an opportunity to modify it appropriately or the court may do so on its own. If, however, no objection is made and the court does not elect on its own to modify the instruction, then it should be given and the burden shifts to the opposing party to tender an instruction properly supplying the definition or additional statement. Of course, this presupposes no other instruction covering the point in question. Where the issue is adequately covered by other instructions there is no error in refusing a tendered instruction. Coker v. State (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 857.
While Smith v. State, supra, suggests that error in refusing such an instruction might be unavailable unless the offeror also tendered whatever definitional instructions were ultimately deemed necessary, the case did not necessarily so hold. It appears that the bare contents of the instruction and the context in which it was tendered persuaded *104the court that it might be misleading on the facts present. I do not feel it should be extended to other situations.
Finally, the overlapping feature of the statutes now before us and the requirement of “knowingly or intentionally” in both of them seems to require the giving of the instruction. Surely, these are terms not beyond the ken of ordinary laymen.
I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

. “Serious bodily injury” as used in IC 35-42-2-2(b) is defined by IC 35-^12-1-2 to include injury that causes death.

. The overlapping statutes in Berra made it both a felony and a misdemeanor to file a fraudulent tax return with intent to evade payment of taxes.