Court Opinion

ID: 9825638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:49:58.151078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:58.489731
License: Public Domain

Opinion on Rehearing Holt, J. In their brief on rehearing, counsel for appellants call to our attention, and urge as error, the giving by the trial court of appellees’ requested instruction No. 3 and that this assignment was overlooked in the original opinion. Instruction No. 3 is as follows: “I instruct you that where an automobile is struck upon a public crossing in this state by trains operated over the crossing by a railroad that the law presumes negligence upon the part of the railroad and its employees, and in this case, should you find that the deceased, Vincent E. Hovley, while driving his car on Highway 67 across Frisco Railroad crossing in the town of Hoxie, Arkansas, was struck by a train moved over such crossing by the defendant and its employees, the law presumes that the resulting damage from such collision was due to the negligence upon the part of the defendant. The defendants to avoid liability may show by preponderance of the evidence that the striking of such automobile was not the result of negligence upon the part of the railroad or its employees or that the plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence equal to or a greater degree than that of the defendants or their employees.” Upon reconsideration we have reached the conclusion that appellants’ contention must be sustained and, therefore, the giving of this instruction constituted reversible error. Since the decision of the Supreme 'Court of the United States in the case of Western & Atlantic Rd. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 S. Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884, this court has condemned instructions similar to this one, and has held the giving of instructions such as the above to be reversible error. In the recent case of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Mangum, ante, p. 767, 136 S. W. 2d 158, this court said: “The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Western & Atlantic Rd. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, said, in discussing an instruction similar to the one here involved: ‘The only legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the railroad company the duty of producing some evidence to the contrary. "When that is done, the inference is .at an end, and the question of negligence is one for the jury upon all of the evidence.’ The court further said, in discussing the Georgia .and Mississippi statutes: ‘The Mississippi statute created merely a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the introduction of opposing evidence. . . . That of Georgia as construed in this case creates an inference that is given effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony and is to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate.’ “The vice of instruction No. 3 is that it gives effect to the presumption and it is to be weighed against opposing testimony and is to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate. In other words, the instruction tells the jury that the appellee is entitled to recover when it is shown by the evidence that the injury was caused by the operation of a train, unless the railroad company introduces evidence that preponderates, or shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not guilty of negligence. “In the case of St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Cole, 181 Ark. 780, 27 S. W. 2d 992, we followed the decision of the United States Supreme Court, supra, and quoted as follows from that opinion: “ ‘The only legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the railway company the duty of producing some evidence to the contrary. When this is done, the inference is at an end, and the question of negligence is one for the jury upon all the evidence.’ “Under § 11138 of Pope’s Digest, railroad companies are made responsible for all damages to persons or property done or caused by the running of trains in this state. Under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and our own decisions, when one is shown to have been injured by the operation of a train in this state, it creates a presumption of negligence .and the burden is then upon the railroad company to produce some evidence to the contrary. When it does that, however, the presumption is at an end and the question of negligence is one for the jury upon all the evidence; the presumption or inference cannot he considered by the jury as evidence, but it is at an end and the jury must then pass upon the question of negligence from ,all the evidence introduced. “To permit the presumption to be considered as evidence after other evidence has been introduced, would, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, be unreasonable and arbitrary, and would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The principle considered in the case of Western & Atlantic Rd. Co. v. Henderson, supra, has been considered and discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States in several cases since that time.The same principle was announced in the following 'cases: Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. Los Angeles County, Calif., 284 U. S. 8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76 L. Ed. 136, 78 A. L. R. 826; Seaboard Airline Rd. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86, 53 S. Ct. 32, 77 L. Ed. 180, 86 A. L. R. 174; Georgia Ry & Electric Co. v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165, 55 S. Ct. 701, 79 L. Ed. 1365; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, Extrx., 303 U. S. 161, 58 S. Ct. 500, 82 L. Ed. 726, 114 A. L. R. 1218. “A recent case decided by this court, Mo. Pac. Rd. Co. v. Beard, Admr., 198 Ark. 346, 128 S. W. 2d 697, held that an instruction similar to the. one given in this case was erroneous, and held that the only legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the railway company the duty of producing some evidence to the contrary. When this is done the inference is at an end, and the question of negligence is one for the jury upon all the evidence. To the same effect is the case of Mo. Pac. Rd. Co. v. Ross, ante, p. 182, 133 S. W. 2d 29. In other words, after evidence is introduced, the presumption of negligence passes out, and whether the railroad company is negligent is determined from all the evidence introduced. This question was not only thoroughly discussed by the Supreme Court of the United .States in the cases cited,but also in the cases by this court above cited.” We conclude, therefore, that on account of the error of the trial court in giving appellees’ instruction No. 3, the petition for rehearing’ must he granted, and accordingly the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.