Court Opinion

ID: 9471144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:25:51.505296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:17.224797
License: Public Domain

WYZANSKI, District Judge,
dissenting:
Judge Johnson’s opinion comprehensively states the facts and analyzes the governing authorities. Repetition would be superfluous.
Moreover, I am not in disagreement with his conclusion that the appellant plaintiffs cannot prevail on the ground which his opinion first considers: to wit, the plaintiffs’ “claim that their opposition to preclearance of the 1981 plan contributed substantially to the Justice Department’s decision to request more information, and so indirectly spurred the County to abandon that plan in favor of fresh efforts.”
But I reluctantly dissent from the court’s holding that (on the basis of the command of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), that “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”) we should defer to the district court’s factual finding that on the credible evidence the plaintiffs have not proved their claim that had they not filed suit on January 13, 1982 the County would not have made good on its declared intentions to have a constitutionally adequate plan precleared and in place in time for the 1982 spring primary.
Judge Johnson’s opinion states that “The question is close.” Obviously, I cannot say that the question admits of only one plausible answer: my respect for the considered statements to the contrary made by both the district judge and my brethren on this panel precludes any such declaration. Yet, for the following reasons, I am strongly driven to the belief that the district court’s *1077finding on the facts with respect to the claim which Judge Johnson takes up second is within the meaning of Rule 52(a) a “clearly erroneous” finding.
1. From January 1, 1973 to March 22, 1976 the County operated under a plan which was admittedly plainly unconstitutional and which the County did not, as required by the Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, submit to the Attorney General for preclearance or make the subject of a section 5 declaratory judgment action.
2. When, at last on March 22, 1976, the County did submit a plan to the Attorney General it procrastinated in providing plainly requisite relevant information, despite repeated requests from the Department of Justice, in such communications as those of May 25, 1976, and September 3. 1976.
3. Ignoring the demands of the Department of Justice for required information, the County in November 1976 held an election under a plan that it has admitted was unconstitutional.
4. In November 1978 the County held another election under the admittedly unconstitutional plan.
5. In January 1979 the County established a committee to draw a new plan. In July 1981 the County Commissioners approved the plan. On September 9,1981 the County submitted this new plan to the Department of Justice. On November 6,1981 the Department requested the County to supply additional information as to the new 1981 plan. The County admits that it was not until then that it began to think seriously about, or to take steps with respect to, a constitutional plan. [See defendants’ brief, at 7].
6. On January 13, 1982 the plaintiffs filed the suit upon which their claim for compensation is bottomed. Responding to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court on January 13,1982 set for January 21, 1982 a hearing on the plaintiffs’ prayer for a temporary restraining order. Between January 13 and January 21 the County Commissioners tentatively approved a plan for submission to the district court. And it was only on January 25 and 26 — four or five days after the district court hearing in the course of which the district judge had issued a solemn warning to the County — that the Commissioners held public hearings on that plan. In the course of those hearings there were many references to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
The foregoing chronology reveals a dramatic change in the County’s rate of speed of compliance with federal law at the very moment when the plaintiffs filed in January 1982 the civil action which they say entitles them to compensation. Those who cause public officials to stop ambling and to march, if not dance, to the nation’s anthem of equality seem to me pipers entitled to be paid.
I am persuaded that the district judge’s finding that the plaintiffs did not cause the plan to be adopted is “clearly erroneous.”