Court Opinion

ID: 9420727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:48.60473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.804632
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are cargo owners1 who shipped goods on the steamship Nathaniel Bacon owned by petitioner, the United States, and operated as a common carrier of goods for hire. It collided with the Esso Belgium and respondents’ cargo was damaged. The ships were also damaged. This litigation was brought in the District Court to determine liability for the damages suffered by the cargo owners and for the physical damage caused the ships. It was agreed in the District Court that:
(a) The collision was due to negligent navigation by employees of both ships. The cargo owners were in no way at fault.
(b) The Belgium, as one of two joint tortfeasors, must pay “100%” of damages suffered by the Bacon’s cargo owners.
*238(c) Because of § 3 of the Harter Act2 and § 4 (2) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,3 the cargo owners are barred from directly suing the Bacon for cargo damages.
(d) Since the two ships were mutually at fault, the aggregate of all damages to both should be shared by both.4
(e) In computing the aggregate damages caused both ships, account should be taken of the cargo damages recovered from the Belgium by the cargo owners.
(f) The bill of lading issued by the Bacon to the cargo owners contained a “Both-to-Blame” clause.5 This clause, if valid, requires the cargo owners to indemnify the carrier Bacon for any amounts the *239Bacon loses because damages recovered by the cargo owners from the Belgium are included in the aggregate damages divided between the two ships.
The only question presented to us is whether the “Both-to-Blame” clause is valid. Respondent cargo owners contend that it is void and unenforceable as a violation of the long-standing rule of law which forbids common carriers from stipulating against the consequences of their own or their employees’ negligence. Petitioner, the United States, contends that § 3 of the Harter Act, as substantially reenacted in § 4 (2) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, provides special statutory authorization permitting ocean carriers to deviate from the general rule and to stipulate against their negligence as they did here. The District Court held the clause valid. 90 F. Supp. 836. The Court of Appeals reversed. 191 F. 2d 370. Deeming the question decided of sufficient importance to justify our review, this Court granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 913.
There is a general rule of law that common carriers cannot stipulate for immunity from their own or their agents’ negligence. While this general rule was fashioned by the courts, it has been continuously accepted as a guide to common-carrier relationships for more than a century6 and has acquired the force and precision of a legislative enactment. Considering the relationship of the rule to the Harter Act, this Court said in 1901 that “in view *240of the well-settled nature of the general rule at the time the statute was adopted, it must result that legislative approval was by clear implication given to the general rule as then existing in all cases where it was not changed.” The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 268-269. Our question therefore is whether the language of the Harter Act, substantially reenacted in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, has carved out a special statutory exception to the general rule so as to permit a carrier to deprive its cargo owners of a part of the fruits of any judgment they obtain in a direct action against a noncarrying vessel that contributes to a collision.
Prior to the passage of the Harter Act in 1893, cargo damages incurred in a both-to-blame collision could be recovered in full from either ship. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302. The Harter Act, under some circumstances, took away the right of the cargo owner to sue his own carrier for cargo damages caused by the negligent navigation of the carrier’s servants or agents. It did not deprive the cargo owner of his tort action against the noncarrying ship. The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, 549-550. Nor did the Harter Act go so far as to insulate the carrier from responsibility to another vessel for physical damages caused to the ship by negligent navigation of the carrier’s servants or agents. In The Delaware, 161 U. S. 459, 471, 474, this Court declined to give the Harter Act such a broad interpretation even though the language itself, if “broadly construed” and considered alone, would have justified such an interpretation. In addition, the Harter Act does not exonerate the carrier from its obligation to share with the noncarrier one-half the damages paid by the noncarrier to the cargo owners. The Chattahoochee, supra, at pp. 551-552; see also Aktslsk. Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U. S. 394, 401-402.
Apparently it was not until about forty years after the passage of the Harter Act that shipowners first attempted *241by stipulation to deprive cargo owners of a part of their recovery against noncarrying ships. See The W. W. Bruce, 14 F. Supp. 894, rev’d on other grounds, 94 F. 2d 834. The present effort of shipowners appears to date from 1937 when the North Atlantic Freight Conference adopted the “Both-to-Blame” clause.7 So far as appears, this is the first test of the legality of the clause that has appeared in the courts. When Congress passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1936, it indicated no purpose to bring about a change in the long-existing relationships and obligations between carriers and shippers which would be relevant to the validity of the “Both-to-Blame” clause. At that time all interested groups such as cargo owners, shipowners, and the representatives of interested insurance companies were before the congressional committees.8 Although petitioner and respondents both appear to find comfort in the language and the hearings of the 1936 Act, nothing in either persuades us that Congress intended to alter the Harter Act in any respect material to this controversy.
Petitioner argues that the clause does nothing more than remove an “anomaly” which arises from this Court’s construction of the Harter Act. It is said to be “anomalous” to hold a carrier not liable at all if it alone is guilty of negligent navigation but at the same time to hold it indirectly liable for one-half the cargo damages if another ship is jointly negligent with it. Assuming for the moment that all rules of law must be symmetrical, we think it would be “anomalous” to hold that a cargo owner, who has an unquestioned right under the law to recover full damages from a noncarrying vessel, can be compelled to *242give up a portion of that recovery to his carrier because of a stipulation exacted in a bill of lading. Moreover, there is no indication that either the Harter Act or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was designed to alter the long-established rule that the full burden of the losses sustained by both ships in a both-to-blame collision is to be shared equally. Yet the very purpose of exacting this bill of lading stipulation is to enable one ship to escape its equal share of such losses by shifting a part of its burden to its cargo owners.
Here, once more, “we think that legislative consideration and action can best bring about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related interests” 9 of the varied groups who would be affected by permitting carriers to deviate from the controlling rule that without congressional authority they cannot stipulate against their own negligence or that of their agents or servants. If that rule is to be changed, the Congress, not the shipowners, should change it.10

Affirmed.

 Certain insurance companies are parties to this suit as subrogees of their insured cargo owners. Some cargo owners were not insured.

 27 Stat. 445, 46 U. S. C. § 192. This section provides that if due diligence is exercised by the shipowner in making the ship seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, then “neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel

 49 Stat. 1210, 46 U. S. C. § 1304 (2). This section provides that “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from — (a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship; . . . .”

 The shipowners have stipulated that in this case the Esso Belgium, is to bear two-thirds and the Nathaniel Bacon one-third of the total damages, although the normal admiralty rule requires an equal division of damages. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U. S. 282, 284.

 The clause reads as follows:
“If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the negligence of the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the Master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the Carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the owners of the goods carried hereunder will indemnify the Carrier against all loss or liability to the other or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as such loss or liability represents loss of, or damage to, or any claim what*239soever of the owners of said goods, paid or payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners to the owners of said goods and set-off, recouped or recovered by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners as part'of their claim against the carrying ship or Carrier.”

 See, e. g., Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 438-444 (1889); Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 71 (1900); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (1873); Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 445 (1918); San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Co., 294 U. S. 494, 496 (1935). And see cases collected in 9 Am. Jur. 874-877.

 Robinson, Admiralty, 872, 873; Knauth, Ocean Bills of Lading (3d ed. 1947), 95, 136, 175.

 Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1152, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.

 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U. S. 282, 286.

 We have not overlooked the argument that this bill of lading stipulation should be upheld because of this Court’s holding and opinion in The Jason, 225 U. S. 32. The Jason case upheld a stipulation that both shipowner and cargo owner should contribute in general average on account of sacrifices and expenses necessarily incurred by the master of the ship in order to preserve the cargo as a whole. Moreover, this general average clause “was sustained because it admitted the shipowner to share in general average only in circum*243stances where by the Harter Act he was relieved from responsibility.” Aktslsk. Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U. S. 394, 403. Here the shipowner attempted to relieve itself from responsibility for negligence of its employees in connection with damages inflicted on another ship — “circumstances where by the Harter Act he was [not] relieved from responsibility.”