Court Opinion

ID: 9528855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:49.154884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:24.633596
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the opinion of Justice-Gray for these reasons:
1. Such opinion overlooks the fact that even if Nichols promised property to-his niece, his subsequent marriage-revoked the offer by implication.
2. Such opinion confuses the situation-where a contract is completed at the time of remarriage and the situation where it is admitted no contract was completed at the time of remarriage..
3. In equity, a contract by a decedent to leave his property to another should not be enforced against an innocent third party (such as a wife).
4. One who seeks damages for breach of an alleged contract such as plaintiff claims in this case is required' to establish such contract by evidence which is clear, positive, certain and beyond all legitimate controversy; and plaintiff has not furnished such-evidence.
1. Revocation Implied From Mai'riage
The opinion of Justice Gray points out that the parties stipulated plaintiff came originally from Bulgaria to Casper in January, 1957, which was seven months after Nichols married the defendant, his second wife. Also, such opinion states correctly that ■ no ■ written evidence disclosing an ac*699'ceptance of any offer by plaintiff was produced. Hence, if any offer on the part ■of Nichols was ever outstanding, it could not have ripened into a contract until plaintiff came to the United States and performed her part of the supposed contract.
In the meantime, however, and prior to plaintiff’s departure for this country, Nichols wrote her June S, 1956, advising that "he was going to marry defendant. On July 10, 1956, he wrote again advising that he had married defendant and acknowledging receipt of a telegram from plaintiff which congratulated him on his marriage and wished him a happy life with defendant. These events are set out in the opinion of Justice Gray. They show clearly that prior to any action on the part of plaintiff, which could be construed as ■acceptance of an offer from Nichols, she had been notified of the change in Nichols’ position and circumstances, i. e., his mar-Tiage.
For Nichols to intend‘to give all his property to his niece when he was single and had no other close relatives would "be one thing. For him to intend to give all of it to her after he married defendant would be a different and unbelievable thing. In Annotation 69 A.L.R. 14, 68-69, at is said (with cases cited as authority for such statement) the fact that an alleged •contract is inequitable as to third persons may influence the court in determining its existence, since in such case its execution would be contrary to common observation and experience and against reasonable probabilities.
Our question is, should Nichols’ intent to revoke any former offer made to his niece be implied from his subsequent marriage? I think so.
In the law of contracts, the rule is that revocation of an offer may be made by a communication from the offeror received by the offeree, which states or “implies” that the offeror no longer" intends to enter into the proposed contract, if the communication is received before offeree has exercised his power of creating a contract by acceptance of the offer. Anderson v. Stewart, 149 Neb. 660, 32 N.W.2d 140, 3 A.L.R.2d 250. This rule is also- recognized in Restatement, Contracts, § 41, p. 49; in 1 Page, Contracts, § 133, p. 204; and in 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 40, p. 167.
The author in the section cited from Corbin says other facts besides a notice of revocation from the offeror may make it unreasonable for offeree to accept and rely; and the offeree should be held to the standard of a reasonable man. If plaintiff is held to that standard in the case at bar, it becomes apparent she cannot claim she thought an offer from Nichols to give her all his property was still open when she came to America.
For her to do so would be like one claiming the right to buy land offered to him, when prior to an acceptance or performance, the offeree obtains knowledge that offeror has contracted to sell the land to another. The cases generally hold in such a situation that knowledge obtained by offeree, prior to his performance or acceptance, terminates his power of acceptance. Antwine v. Reed, 145 Tex. 521, 199 S.W.2d 482, 485; Hoover Motor Exp. Co. v. Clements Paper Co., 193 Tenn. 6, 241 S.W.2d 851, 853-854. See also 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 39, pp. 164-165; and 17 C.J.S.Contracts § 50, p. 712.
From what I have said, it is obvious we must necessarily look to the July 10, 1956 letter, written by Nichols to his niece after his remarriage, and to none of the other letters, for evidence of the offer which plaintiff supposedly acted upon when she came to the United States. If this letter is thought of as offering to make plaintiff a daughter of Nichols and defendant, that would not mean property had to be given.
It is not at all an uncommon practice for a husband to leave all of his estate to his wife, regardless of children the couple may have. In the case before us, there was testimony indicating that before Nichols remarried he- had made a will in favor of his niece.
*700But, like the will of any other testator, the will of Nichols was subject to change. It was revoked by a subsequent will. The right and competency of Nichols to revoke the will in favor of his niece and to make in lieu of it one in favor of his wife has apparently been litigated already and resolved in favor of the wife.
No promise was made in the July 10, 1956 letter to give all of the Nichols estate, or any property at all, to plaintiff. In fact, at no time after Nichols remarried did he ever promise to give plaintiff any property. And, for the reasons I have heretofore set forth, a contract cannot be predicated upon an offer supposedly made prior to such remarriage. Therefore, plaintiff’s proof fails, and judgment for the defendant was proper.
2. Completed vs. Uncompleted Contract
The opinion of Justice Gray states, should the jury find .that the contract claimed was made and breached by decedent, his widow would not be deprived of her statutory right to receive one-half of decedents estate ■as provided in § 2-47, W.S.1957, and the property and rights vested in her by the provisions of §§ 2-213 to 2-217, W.S.1957.
This statement would be applicable if (and only if) a contract had been completed between Nichols and plaintiff at the time of Nichols’ remarriage, for the following reason:
If a contract is made by an uncle to leave all of his property to a niece, prior to a subsequent marriage of the uncle, the courts under principles of equity and under statutory requirements both might apply the formula suggested by Justice Gray. On the other hand, if such a contract has not been completed or made when the uncle marries, then and in that event the courts are compelled to hold that the uncle cannot, under the law, complete a contract to leave all his property to the niece.
As I have heretofore pointed out, if any ■offer on the part of Nichols was ever outstanding, it could not have ripened into-a contract until plaintiff came to the United States and performed her part of the supposed contract. Consequently, we are not dealing with the situation where an uncle has, prior to a subsequent marriage, made-a completed contract to give all of his property to a niece. Instead, we arc considering- whether in this instance the uncle could and did complete such a contract in January, 1957, seven months after his remarriage. In other words, was there a. meeting of minds at that time, and if so, will the law countenance it?
In order to say there was a meeting of minds in January, 1957, when plaintiff came to America, we would have to say Nichols, at that time, intended to give his niece one-half of his estate, less widow allowances provided for in §§ 2-213 to 2-217. The law would not permit more; and therefore more would be invalid. If Nichols ever-had such an intention, he certainly did not express or imply it in any of his letters.
There is no reason or justification in-, trying to apply the equitable principle which Justice Gray seeks to apply, except in instances where a contract has already been-completed and made at the time when prom-isor marries. There is obviously no evidence in this case, either direct or circumstantial, to show Nichols, at the critical time, intended to give his niece that portion-of his estate suggested by Justice Gray.. Hence, there could be no contract and plaintiff’s proof was not sufficient to support her claim for damages.
The creditor’s claim filed by plaintiff with the executrix as a prerequisite to suit; the complaint filed in this action; the settlement of issues in the pretrial conference report; and statements of plaintiff’s counsel in oral -argument to us, all make it very clear -it is the contention of plaintiff that she is entitled tó all of the Nick A. Nichols estate because he promised it to her “if she would come to the United States.”
*701If such a promise was made, however, it was before Nichols remarried, and no promise pertaining to property was made after his remarriage. The letters relied upon by plaintiff contain no reference to a portion of Nichols’ property. We cannot, of course, supply the omission and make them do so any more than we could recognize a contract for all of the Nichols estate.
Completion Was Impossible. Why do I say completion of the alleged contract was impossible at the critical time, January 1957? Because §§ 2-47 and 2-213 to 2-217, W.S.1957, mean, after Nichols married defendant, he could no longer, under the law, leave all his estate to plaintiff. And plaintiff (charged with the standard of a reasonable man) was bound to know that Nichols could not then leave all his property to her. Thus, it must necessarily be concluded that his marriage impliedly revoked an offer, if there was one, to leave plaintiff all his estate; and there zvas no offer or acceptance pertaining to a contract for part of it.
In Restatement, Contracts, § 50, p. 57, it is stated without qualification that where, after the making of an offer and before acceptance, the proposed contract becomes illegal, the offer is terminated.
It is uniformly held that death of an offeror prior to acceptance or performance by the offeree renders completion of a contract impossible, because no contract can be consummated after the death or disability of either party. New Headley Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Gentry’s Ex’r, 307 Ky. 857, 212 S.W.2d 325, 327. See also 12 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 38; and 1 Williston Contracts, § 62, pp.-206-207 (3rd Ed).
In the case at bar, the marriage of Nichols rendered completion of a contract to give all his property to plaintiff impossible, because the laws of Wyoming (§§ 2-47 and 2-213 to 2-217) would not allow such a contract to be recognized or enforced.
It is important to notice that the letter of July 10, 1956, does not contain language indicating a desire to contract upon the condition that Tsetsy would come to the United States. In the letter, Nichols assured his niece that Nicke, his second wife, was very good and would like and love the niece and was “wishing her a soon arrival.” This would contradict any idea plaintiff came on account of some supposed offer in the letter of July 10, 1956. She was already coming. Moreover, she was coming with full knowledge that supposed offers in previous letters were no longer operative.
All of my discussion having to do with whether Nichols, after marrying, could have completed a contract for all of his estate; and whether there was any evidence of an offer and acceptance pertaining to a contract for part of it, serves to point up the fact that the supposed contract has not been sufficiently established for us to know what portion of the Nichols estate is supposedly involved and what the terms of the contract are supposed to be. It is no wonder the trial court said the letters upon which plaintiff relies did not fix the terms of the agreement with sufficient definiteness.
In any event, there being no completed contract in existence at the time of the second marriage of Nichols; it having been unlawful for him to contract, after his marriage, for all of his estate; there having been no offer- for plaintiff to act upon pertaining to a portion of such estate, at the time of her-supposed performance; and the idea having been contradicted that plaintiff’s consideration was the act of coming to the United States, there could be no contract for plaintiff to base a cause of action for damages upon.
The proposition that, in the absence of a previously completed contract, an uncle cannot, after he has married, complete a valid contract to give all of his estate to a niece has a connection with the next subject in my opinion. , Additional reasons and the citation of authority for such proposition will therefore be set out in the *702succeeding discussion pertaining to the rights of a wife.
3. Rights of Wife
One of the leading cases in establishing the principle that specific performance will not be decreed where it is claimed a decedent contracted to leave plaintiff his property, if the result would be harsh and oppressive or unjust to innocent third parties, is Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710, 712-713, 33 L.R.A. 369. As near as I can tell, this case has been universally recognized as good authority and followed with very little exception. Before discussing some of the more recent authority for the same principle, I think it will be worthwhile to review some of the language used in the Owens opinion, because it is exceedingly apropos to our own case.
It was reasoned in the Owens case that , relief under the alleged contract could not be granted without sweeping aside the rights of the wife and widow, vested under a contract most strongly favored by the law. The court said while the alleged .contract was not void as against public ■ policy at the time it was entered into, it must be held the parties to it contracted in view of the fact that a subsequent marriage by decedent might be consummated; and the effect of this marriage would be to compel á court of equity, in justice to the widow or children to deny relief. Or viewed in another way, the court said, it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that decedent might marry; for the contract could not have been designed as a restraint upon his marriage, or it would be void.
There was no equivocation on the part of the Supreme Court of California, in the Owens case, in announcing that if the contract embraced the taking of deceased’s estate to the exclusion of any future wife or child, the court would have no hesitation in saying the contract was void as against public policy.
The rule adopted in the Owens case was recognized in Fowler v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 518, 120 P.2d 161, 164, the court saying a person may make a valid agreement binding himself to dispose of his property in a particular way, but such a contract must show adequate consideration, must be definite and certain, and the remedy asked for must not be harsh and oppressive or unjust to innocent third parties or against public policy.
Also, in Fowler v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 146 Cal.App.2d 37, 303 P.2d 565, 572, the court specifically followed the Owens case and refused to enforce a contract which would prevent a testator from fully providing for his wife, a natural and legitimate object of his bounty. For additional recognition of the principle in the Owens v. McNally case see Annotation 69 A.L.R. 14, 67-73 and 161, n. 45; Annotation 11 A.L.R.2d 309, 442, n. 13.
In the annotation in 69 A.L.R. 14, at pp. 70-71, it is made clear that a contract such as the one ■ alleged in the case before us cannot be enforced if the result is inequitable. As, for example, where after an agreement of this character was made the promisor married again and had issue. The ■ reason given is that the result would be both inequitable and against public policy.
It surely follows that if a completed agreement, as dealt with in the text and . in the Owens case and other cited cases, ■ cannot be enforced, then where no agreement has been completed at the time of marriage but only an offer to contract is claimed, the offer should be treated as having been impliedly withdrawn by the marriage.
In the case before us, it must have been within the contemplation of plaintiff that Nichols might marry. Indeed, there was considerable reference to it in his letters. At one time he spoke, of considering marriage with a woman from New York. At another time he spoke of wanting to marry a woman from South Dakota. In another, letter . he discussed suggestions which had been made by the niece to ⅛⅞ *703effect that he marry a certain Polish woman.
This evidence clearly establishes, in my view, that it was within the contemplation of the parties that Nichols would or might marry. Therefore, since plaintiff is claiming the existence of a contract which would have embraced the taking of the deceased’s entire estate to the exclusion of any future wife or child, we should have no hesitation, on the authority of Owens v. McNally, in saying we cannot presume the parties intended to consummate such a contract because it would have been contrary to public policy and hence void.
Generally, of course, a contract against public policy or against the mandate of a statute may not be made the foundation of any action, either in law or in equity. Stockton Morris Plan Co. v. California Tractor and Equipment Corp., 112 Cal.App.2d 684, 247 P.2d 90, 92; Martinez v. Johnson, 61 Nev. 125, 119 P.2d 880, 882.
If Nichols, because of his marriage, could not complete a valid contract to leave all of his property to his niece at the time she came to America, then it must be concluded that his marriage impliedly revoked any possible offer to do so, where plaintiff had not accepted or acted upon any offer at the time of the marriage.
4. Was Proof Clear and Definitef
I cannot conclude my dissent without saying the trial court, in my opinion, was quite right in ruling a contract such as the one alleged here (that Nichols would give all his estate to plaintiff for coming to the United States) has to be shown by direct and definite evidence. Justice Gray’s opinion states, while there is "some” authority to that effect, we have not gone that far.
I think we have gone that far. For example, Justice Blume for this court, in Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927, 928, 43 A.L.R. 1010, said such contracts are not favored, and the courts generally hold, upon good reason, that they must be 'clearly shown in order to be enforceable. Also, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Slover v. Harris, 77 Wyo. 295, 314 P.2d 953, 962, where recovery was sought for breach of a contract to will property, said the trial court, having in mind, no doubt, the quality of proof necessary to prove such contracts, found against plaintiffs. It then sustained the finding.
To the same effect is Jennings v. D’Hooghe, 25 Wash.2d 702, 172 P.2d 189, 190, where the Supreme Court of Washington said such contracts are not favored and are even regarded with suspicion and will not be enforced except upon the strongest evidence of valuable consideration and deliberate agreement by deceased.
The rule was applied in a case much like the one at bar, in Wood v. Wrigley, 119 Cal.App.2d 90, 258 P.2d 1049, 1053, where a nephew brought an action for damages, claiming his aunt had agreed to convey realty to him. Evidence, including letters of the aunt to the nephew in which the aunt twice said she had willed the land to the nephew and several times expressed an intention to leave it to him after her death, was held insufficient to support a finding that such a contract existed.
The rule that one seeking damages, for breach of an alleged agreement to give property, must establish the contract by evidence which is clear, positive, convincing, satisfactory, certain and beyond all legitimate controversy is so consistently accepted and followed in this country that it must be accepted as a universal rule. Some of the more recent cases from states in the Pacific area, which have applied this rule, are the following:
Wood v. Wrigley, 119 Cal.App.2d 90, 258 P.2d 1049; Lynch v. Lichtenthaler, 85 Cal.App.2d 437, 193 P.2d 77; Hoff v. Armbruster, 125 Colo. 198, 242 P.2d 604; Wehrle v. Pickering, 106 Colo. 134, 102 P.2d 737; Thomas v. Thomas, 83 Idaho 86, 357 P.2d 935; Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351; Johnson v. Flatness, 70 Idaho 37, 211 P.2d 769; In re Mueseler’s Estate, 188 Kan. 407, 362 P.2d 653; In re Duncan’s Estate, 186 Kan. 427, 350 P.2d 1112; *704In re Wert’s Estate, 165 Kan. 49, 193 P.2d 253, opinion adhered to 166 Kan. 159, 199 P.2d 793; Shook v. Woodard, 129 Mont. 519, 290 P.2d 750; Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614; Lindley v. Lindley, 67 N.M. 439, 356 P.2d 455; McDonald v. Polanslty, 48 N.M. 518, 153 P.2d 670; Barchus v. Pioneer Trust Co., 229 Or. 268, 366 P.2d 890; Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, modified as to other matter 174 Or. 261, 148 P.2d 936; Silhavy v. Doane, 50 Wash.2d 110, 309 P.2d 1047; Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48 Wash.2d 395, 293 P.2d 935; Boettcher v. Busse, 45 Wash.2d 579, 277 P.2d 368, 49 A.L.R.2d 191; In re Hickman’s Estate, 41 Wash.2d 519, 250 P.2d 524; Jansen v. Campbell, 37 Wash.2d 879, 227 P.2d 175; Jennings v. D’Hooghe, 25 Wash.2d 702, 172 P.2d 189; McGregor v. McGregor, 25 Wash.2d 511, 171 P.2d 694; Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wash.2d 505, 161 P.2d 200; Whiting v. Armstrong, 23 Wash.2d 290, 160 P.2d 1014; Payn v. Hoge, 21 Wash.2d 32, 149 P.2d 939; Dau v. Pence, 16 Wash.2d 368, 133 P.2d 523; and Aho v. Ahola, 4 Wash.2d 598, 104 P.2d 487.
As I see it, the trial judge in the case at bar was correct in finding that the letters relied upon by plaintiff did not fix the terms of the agreement with sufficient definiteness, and that proof of a contract of this nature must be direct and definite. It is regrettable that he is being reversed on such a finding.
For the four reasons discussed herein the judgment of the district court ought to be affirmed and not reversed. The conclusion is inescapable, as I have pointed out, that Nichols did not at any time after his remarriage promise to give his niece any property at all. Consequently, there is no basis for the recovery of damages, even if plaintiff is given the status of an adult daughter. The law has not seen fit to prohibit a husband from willing all of his estate to his wife regardless of minor or adult sons and daughters, adopted or natural.