Court Opinion

ID: 9626170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:04:30.299003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:22.505197
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is valid, I dissent.
*49Decided November 21, 2005.
Warner, Mayoue, Bates, Nolen & Collar, Edward E. Bates, Jr., Andrea M. Dyer, for appellant.
Davis, Matthews & Quigley, Richard W. Schiffman, Jr., Kurt A. Kegel, for appellee.
In Scherer v. Scherer,2 this Court held that a prenuptial agreement is unenforceable if there was a “nondisclosure of material facts” when the agreement was entered. Thus, under Scherer, parties entering a prenuptial agreement have a duty to disclose material facts even absent the presence óf a'confidential relationship. By necessity, whether a fact is material to a prenuptial agreement will depend on the property and alimony issues that are addressed in the agreement. In the present case, Mr. Mallen’s attorney prepared a prenuptial agreement that significantly limited Ms. Mallen’s right to alimony. The agreement provides that, in the event of a divorce, Ms. Mallen would be entitled to $1,000 per month in alimony, to be increased $100 a month for each year of the parties’ marriage, with Ms. Mallen’s right to alimony to terminate four years after the date of the parties’ divorce decree. Because a party’s income is a critical factor in determining the appropriate amount of alimony,3 Mr. Mallen’s income was material to the prenuptial agreement. In this regard, it is undisputed that, at the time the parties entered the prenuptial agreement, Mr. Mallen did not disclose his income to Ms. Mallen and that his income was approximately $560,000 per year.
Because this material fact was not disclosed to Ms. Mallen, I conclude that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is unenforceable. I therefore dissent to the majority opinión.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this dissent.

 249 Ga. 635, 640-641 (292 SE2d 662) (1982).

 See McGinn v. McGinn, 273 Ga. 292, 292-293 (540 SE2d 604) (2001).