Court Opinion

ID: 9733580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:10:56.029771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.481504
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
I dissent to the holding of the majority which reversed the decision of the trial judge because I believe it ignores the importance of giving great weight to the trial judge’s findings unless there has been a substantial abuse of discretion. The central focus of this trial and holding is the best interest of the child as it relates to the wisdom or propriety of retaining a shared custody arrangement. Assuming, without accepting, the interpretation of the majority that the child benefits from the unilateral actions of the father, it still does not necessarily follow that shared custody is the appropriate award in this case. Best interest does not always relate to immediate improvements in the child’s condition and the courts have never been reluctant to subject best interest to a higher requirement that in the process, fundamental rights and fair play not be sacrificed to apparent best interest.
A few examples of the subjection of best interest to a prior mandate of superior rights is illustrated in the following cases. In In re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955), and In re Rose, 161 Pa.Super. 204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947), this Court declared that the best interest of the child did not permit the state to take children from the poor and place them with the rich despite the improvement in their condition that would result. The Juvenile Act has carved out this precept in determining a need to establish first, *299neglect or deprivation, and secondly, a clear necessity to remove the child before the court may consider best interest. See Rose, supra; In interest of LaRue, 244 Pa.Super. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976). In recent times, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that despite a trial court finding that a child would suffer by living in a black community with his white mother and black stepfather, racially based concerns cannot be considered in determining what is in the best interest of the child. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984). In Burke v. Pope, 366 Pa.Super. 488, 531 A.2d 782 (1987), we held the custodian, who was not the natural mother, despite bonding with the children and caring for them for several years, could not defeat the right of the mother to assume custody. Best interest does not always appertain to immediate better treatment and care when viewed with relation to the permanent welfare of the child. It likewise cannot be argued that a parent who becomes a self-appointed custodian through child snatching automatically acquires preferential rights by isolating and alienating the child from the other parent, no matter how well the child appears to do under the meretricious arrangement. The entire Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5341 et seq., is directed at preventing this insidious and usually vicious practice. In essence, the law and the courts should not reward parents who unilaterally and willfully conduct themselves in such a manner that the other parent is deprived of the opportunity to be involved in the parenting process, even when the result is sometimes apparently beneficial to the child. Even if all the benefits which the majority claims to have accrued to the child by virtue of the father’s unilateral actions are true, this does not mean this child’s future is going to be a happy and productive one. It is also not an acceptable, logical conclusion that because the father has forced some beneficial actions unilaterally that shared custody is appropriate.
Shared custody as it finally has evolved in Pennsylvania cannot be justified on this record because the fundamental *300requirements for awarding shared custody have been violated blatantly by the father. It is also not appropriate for this Court to second guess the trial judge in his determination that the father took unilateral action without the approval of the court and did so to improve his position vis-a-vis the mother. The requirements of In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa.Super. 504, 445 A.2d 1243 (1982), have not been met, and to tell the trial court that in following Wesley it has violated the requirements for an appropriate shared child custody award is to rewrite the law and impose a totally new standard. The majority informs the domestic relations legal community that to win a shared custody award one need only unilaterally and secretively engage in practices and programs which may appear to have some benefit to the child. Following the majority analysis, the best interest would then require shared custody be awarded to the dominating parent. This should not be the message we impart to the volatile field of custody jurisprudence.
This Court would serve family law better in this case by supporting judicial action which, while recognizing, accepting and perpetuating whatever benefits to the child resulted from the father’s actions, condemns improper means of achieving them and supervises the child’s custody and developmental progress to assure continued stability. The path chosen by the majority will result in more acrimonious legal entanglements which will create more serious problems in the child’s future.
The following excerpts from the trial court’s Opinion clearly establish the appropriateness of his decision.
—Dr. Carabello, child’s pediatrician and family friend, had advised parents not to enter the child in speech therapy until at least age permit her own speech patterns to develop. Right or wrong the mother was acting pursuant to medical advice. The father took child to another doctor, a rehabilitation institute, and entered her in speech therapy, without any of these outside resources contacting the mother or Dr. Carabello. (Slip Op., Ludgate, J., 10/24/90, p. 4.) Mother received no information concerning *301the child’s enrollment in speech therapy until her attorney requested it.
—Dr. Carabello testified ten hours per day at the day care center was excessive for a three year old child, considering kindergarten is only four hours, morning or afternoon, for children five to six years of age. Even after the mother was informed of enrollment in day care, she could obtain no information from the center. (Slip op. p. 4.)
—Mother is the primary caretaker, has a flexible work schedule, nursed the baby and her work permits her to spend hours at a time with Kelsey. (Slip op. p. 5.)
—Employee of the Treasury Child Development Center had been informed by father not to tell the mother Kelsey had been enrolled and she did not do so. The speech therapist of Reading Rehabilitative Hospital testified their efforts appeared to be directed toward better articulation and expression and she did not appear to have any under-developmental problems. She also testified she did not inquire of the mother even after receiving a letter from the attorney. (Slip op. pp. 10-11.) This creates serious concerns because speech problems in young children are frequently related to emotional disturbances in the child’s environment. To proceed with therapy without a family evaluation and discussion with both parents about the problems appears to be wholly improper.1 To proceed in such therapy at age three is also subject to serious question and should have been thoroughly explored within the court setting.
—A baby-sitter, Dorothy Maxwell, testified that on at least one occasion, in June 1990, she saw the father leave *302the child in the house unattended but because the father returned shortly thereafter, she took no further action. (Slip op. p. 11.)
—The father testified he took unilateral and secretive action because he anticipated resistance from the mother. (Slip op. p. 16.) Yet, when the mother learned of these things, she placed the child’s best interest above her personal feelings and did not disrupt therapy, ultimately stipulating to it as the basis of the interim Order of July 12, 1990. To conceal this activity, father never confided in any progress being made in toilet training and returned the child to the mother in diapers even when diapers were not necessary. (Slip op. p. 17.) Work books for therapy in the home were never shared with the mother until August 23, 1990.
—An expert in custody evaluation, Dr. Gordon, testified the child should have a sense of permanency, and if the father continues to have the right of first refusal (to implement his own plans), it would be harmful to Kelsey because she is now suffering from confusion. Dr. Gordon also testified the parties were extremely diverse in their personalities and in their parenting style. (Slip op. p. 19.)
The trial court’s Opinion states with unwavering certainty that joint custody is not appropriate in this case and that statement is clearly supported by the evidence and his findings.
The Superior Court has stated that “[hostilities between the parents are relevant only insofar as they constitute a threat to the child or affect the child’s welfare.” Nancy E.M. v. Kenneth D.M., [316 Pa.Super. 351] 462 A.2d 1386, 1388 (Pa.Super.1983). In the instant case, the hostility and anger displayed by Perry Andrews has indeed affected Kelsey Andrews’ welfare. These affects are evidenced by Father’s unilateral actions regarding speech therapy, daycare and toilet training, as well as the confrontation between Father and Mother in which Father called Mother vulgar and demeaning names in the presence of Kelsey.
*303A minimal degree of cooperation between parents is an important consideration in awarding shared custody. In Re: Wesley J.K., [445 A.2d] at 1249. A review of the testimony reflects that even a minimal degree of cooperation is lacking. Prime examples of this lack of cooperation are the Father’s actions in taking Kelsey to the doctor, to the therapist, to child care and in keeping the Mother in the dark about the child’s progress in toilet training.
One of the major considerations in a joint custody Order is that the parties will be able to cooperate in promoting the child’s best interest. “The rationale behind the minimal cooperation requirement is that if the parents have total inability to make cooperative decisions relating to the child, the child will ultimately be harmed.” DeNillo v. DeNillo, 535 A.2d 200, 204 (Pa.Super.1987) (Beck, J. dissenting).
The hearing Judge must award custody to the party who had proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be superior. Murphey v. Hatala, [350 Pa.Super. 433] 504 A.2d 917, 924 (Pa.Super.1986), citing In Re: Custody of Hernandez, [249 Pa.Super. 274] 376 A.2d 648 (1977). The underlying theme in this case is one of the manipulation of a child through a pattern of secrets. The unilateral actions of the Defendant that evidence his inability to act in a cooperating manner about Kelsey [sic]. It is not a question of who has cared for the child when it is advantageous for litigation, but rather it is a question of who has cared for this child with the child’s best interests in mind.
(Slip op. pp. 20-21.)
I would affirm the decision of the trial court supported by his exhaustive and well reasoned Opinion which stated:
There is also no doubt that by the Father’s own admissions, he participated in this ongoing pattern of behavior, by making unilateral decisions regarding Kelsey’s life, irrespective of Mother’s opinions or Kelsey’s best interest. He continually put Mother in a “no win” situation *304and actively undermined the Mother/Child relationship. Mother’s acquiescence to his unilateral actions are not viewed by this Court as examples of a weak personality, but as one who acted to minimize the emotional trauma on her child, and as one who refused to “escalate” the war.
(Slip op. pp. 25-26.)
The court concluded, and the record supports the conclusion, the mother was cooperative and supportive of actions that benefited the child while the father continually struck his own course without consulting the mother. We may not set aside this judgment. See In Re Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 478 A.2d 800 (1984).
I would affirm the Order of the trial judge.

. The majority castigates this writer for making the above statement without supporting authority (Montemuro, J., footnote 8). The authority is my extensive experience as a trial judge in Juvenile Court in many cases in which speech problems were manifested. To the knowledge of this writer» the etiology of emotional problems in such cases and the need to involve the parents in the treatment process was unequivocally a paramount consideration by the experts and treatment of persons in alleviating the conditions. It is very likely that the speech problems resulted from the anger and hostility surrounding the custody disputes in this case.