Court Opinion

ID: 9726810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:09:33.578634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.026792
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting). We are concerned at the threshhold of this case, as we were in Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, with a question of jurisdiction.
One of the appellants set up lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as an affirmative defense in a suit brought by the appellee to obtain an injunction in a labor dispute:
“As and for an affirmative defense, defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 486, AFL-CIO, alleges that the plaintiff’s business and the employment relations of the plaintiff affect interstate commerce within the terms and definitions of the national labor relations act, 29 USCA, § 151 et seq., exclusive jurisdiction over which resides in the national labor relations board; and further alleges that any assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of the State of Michigan would violate article 1, § 8, and article 6 of the United States Constitution.”.
It should be obvious to any lawyer that reliance is being placed on the doctrine of Federal pre-emption, a doctrine vital to the effectuation of national policy in the field of labor relations. See Town & Country Motors, Inc., v. Local Union No. 328, 355 Mich 26. When such a jurisdictional question has been brought to the attention of a court, its first duty is to make an inquiry and determination even despite failure of the parties themselves to plead or argue the question. Thus, in New York, N. H. & H. *271R. Co. v. Jenkins, 331 Mass 720, 728 (122 NE2d 759), reversed on other grounds, 350 US 155 (76 S Ct 227, 100 L ed 166), the court held: “It is the duty of the court to decide its jurisdiction when the question appears on the record even though the point has not been raised by the parties.” This, however, was not done by the chancellor below.1
It answers nothing of substance to say that the appellant alleged no “facts” in support of its jurisdictional defense. "What it alleged in its sworn answer was that plaintiff’s business and employment relations affected interstate commerce. It asserted that exclusive jurisdiction over the case resided in the national labor relations board, and cited specifically the applicable sections of the Federal code. Are these “facts”?
Much ingenuity has been spent in the past distinguishing facts from conclusions, and questions of fact from questions of law. We cannot build the jurisprudence of a great State upon these slippery semanticisms. They represent, in all but the simplest cases, of which this assuredly is not one, terms not susceptible of either definition or accurate description. They are often ex post facto rationales for decisions reached, rather than reasons for arriving at the decision. Moore points out that the Federal courts under their present rules “are not hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence, or law.”2
No more should we be so hampered. The Federal courts have regarded their rules as freeing them from such mysticisms and we, as well, have adopted a liberal interpretation of our rules of pleading. Baker v. Gushwa, 354 Mich 241. If a pleading gives *272a fair notice to the other party of the basis of the claim or defense asserted, with such reasonable particularity as the circumstances of the case permit (call it fact, law, conclusion, mixed question, or whatnot), the pleading has fulfilled its function, and it is not necessary (Court Rule No 17, § 2 [1945]) to go further and plead one’s evidence. There could be no reasonable doubt in the mind of any party to this litigation that it was defendant’s position that the national labor relations board had exclusive jurisdiction over this case on the ground that interstate commerce was affected. It was not the pleader’s burden to prove this assertion in his pleading. If plaintiff were actually in doubt as to what this defense was all about, he could have demanded greater particularity in the pleading. There is no doubt that he knew how to make such demand, as will next appear.
A motion was made to strike the entire answer of the appellants, which contained the affirmative defense. It was not made within the 15 days specified by Court Rule No 27, § 6 (1945), but some 8 months later. It was granted and a default taken for want of an answer. The objections to the answer were directed to the paragraphs by which facts alleged in the bill of complaint were denied; no reply was made to the affirmative defense and no objection was raised to the manner in which it was made. As the cause thus proceeded nothing appeared to suggest that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was frivolous or otherwise did not deserve the attention of the chancellor. Counsel for the appellants did not contest the motion, indeed, took no further action until some time after the default decree had been entered. Yet the inaction or ineptitude of counsel does not relieve a court of the duty of determining its own jurisdiction. Jones v. Amsel, 388 Pa 47, 51 (130 A2d 119): “The chancellor himself is not [because of *273failure of the parties to raise the issue] thereby relieved of the obligation of determining his own jurisdiction.”
The employment of an analogy may serve to bring the issue before us in sharper focus. We will assume that through some misconception of the law, a bill for divorce is filed in the probate court, that general appearance is entered by the defendant, who challenges jurisdiction in the answer, that thereafter he writes letters to all parties that he will not participate in the trial, does not do so, and that decree pro confesso against him is taken. The decree of the probate court is a complete nullity. Challenge thereto will be heard by any court at any time from any party and will be raised by any court itself, sua sponte, should the circumstances become known to it. No rights can be built on such a decree, any officer attempting execution on the faith thereof is a mere trespasser, and the decree may be directly or collaterally assailed. In short, it is a mere brutum fulmen, wastepaper. See Fox v. Martin, 287 Mich 147.
Finally, it is argued that defendants did not move to vacate the default. What they did, more than 4 months after the entry of the default, was to file a pleading called “petition for rehearing” in which they requested that the decree be set aside, that they be allowed to file an amended answer, and that a rehearing be granted. The name attached to a pleading does not establish its character: it must be construed so as to accomplish its manifest purpose. The chancellor construed it as a prayer that the default be set aside and in so doing he was clearly correct.3
*274Generally a motion to set aside a default must be made before the expiration of tbe 4-month period of Court Rule No 28 (1945). But even assuming this default to have been “regularly” taken, despite the unanswered jurisdictional question, the policy underlying the rule limiting reconsideration must be weighed against the possible confusion that would result from permitting such a decree to remain outstanding, although beyond the power of the court, void, and subject to collateral attack. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power in the field of labor relations affecting interstate commerce, completely displaced State power to deal with matters entrusted to the national labor relations board, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 US 1 (77 S Ct 598, 609, 1 L ed 2d 601), and acts of a State court intruding-upon the jurisdiction of the board are nullities and vulnerable collaterally. Cf. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 US 433 (60 S Ct 343, 84 L ed 370). See, generally, Restatement, Judgments, § 10, comment b.
Reliance upon Austin v. Painters’ District Council No. 22, 339 Mich 462, is misplaced. In that case, defendants attempted to interject a jurisdictional point in a supplemental brief on appeal. This court examined the record and found nothing therein to form a basis for raising the point, concluding that “it is evident that defendants’ purpose in seeking to reopen the case was to explore the possibilities of establishing evidence upon which to base a Federal question.” Id. at 485. Where the point is not raised frivolously, proper respect for congressional purpose and the orderly administration of justice compels a court to consider the question of jurisdiction.
Whether there is jurisdiction of the subject matter in this cause cannot be determined without further *275inquiry. In Town & Country Motors, supra, there was a lack of jurisdiction. Here there may be or there may not be.
What appellee’s argument actually presents is a monument to Baron Parke, whose “almost superstitious reverence for the dark technicalities of ■special pleading”4 was so profound that he resigned from the bench when liberalizing reforms were introduced. The union, appellant before us, pleaded lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter from its first pleading in the trial court to its briefs before us. The point has never been ruled upon from that day to this, yet it is now proposed that we affirm a judgment against it of some $20,000. True, its counsel handled the case poorly,5 but poor handling does not invest a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The situation is reminiscent of Sergeant (later Mr. Justice) Haye’s dialogue, “Crogate’s Case; A. Dialogue in the Shades on Special Pleading Be-form.”6 Here Baron Surrebutter (obviously the Baron Parke, to whom we made reference herein-*276above) is discussing with Crogate7 the system of special pleading:
“Sur. B.: Done away with special pleading? Heaven forbid! * * * We framed a series of rules on the subject, which have given a truly magnificent development to this admirable system; so much so, indeed, that nearly half the cases coming recently before the court, have been decided upon points of pleading.
“Crogate: You astonish me. But pray how do the suitors like this sort of justice?
“Sur. B.: Mr. Crogate, that consideration has never occurred to me, nor do I conceive that laws ought to be adopted to suit the tests and capacities of' the ignorant.”
In ancient times, when trials were mere combats, between opposing counsel, he who best knew the intricacies of repleader and surrebuttal would prevail as a matter of course. Cases were disposed of in great numbers without taking the testimony of so much as a single witness. Justice was thus sacrificed on the altar of lifeless formalism. Today pleadings are construed, not as an impediment to justice-but to further its accomplishment. Save in the-clearest possible cases, of which this, assuredly, is-not one, modern courts do not dispose of substantial issues on pleading points alone, but on proofs. Since-it is enough that challenge to jurisdiction over the-subject matter need merely be suggested on the record to impose upon a court the duty of conducting-inquiry as to its jurisdiction to proceed, we need, hardly add that inartistic or unskillful pleading thereof'.(even should such exist) will not serve to-relieve the court of its duty.
The. order of the chancellor denying the relief' prayed by the appellants is reversed and the cause-*277remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this ■opinion, and upon such terms and conditions as may ■seem equitable to the chancellor under the circumstances. Although appellants have prevailed in this Court, the appellee may have his costs.
Decree should be reversed and remanded.
.Edwards and Souris, JJ., concurred with Smith, J.

 The authority of the chancellor to make such a determination is well established. Teeter v. Teeter, 332 Mich 1; Lehman v. Lehman, 312 Mich 102; In re Estate of Fraser, 288 Mich 392.

 2 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed 1948), § 8.13, at p 1647.

 The ehaneellor held, in part, as follows: “Rule No 28, § 4 (1945), provides proceedings to set aside a default must be made within 4 months after the default is regularly filed and entered. This was not done.” Also: “Defendants further allege the default should be set aside because of the neglect of the attorneys.” Also: “This writer is a visiting judge and many trips were made to hear this *274matter, and afford all parties their rights. It can find nothing in the record to justify setting aside the default because of neglect of the attorneys.”

 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 US 48, 62 (73 S Ct 125, 97 L ed 77).

 The principal fault here, according to counsel’s affidavits, was -that appellants’ Milwaukee counsel understood that appellants’ Detroit counsel would forward them all papers filed in the cause but, •due to misunderstanding, this was not done. We are told by affidavit:
“That the address of the attorneys for said Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 486, and Neil Dalton, Jr., upon the Notice of Appearance was 2550 Guardian Building, Detroit, Michigan, and that the affiant understood that the Detroit offiee would forward all papers having to do with this case to the office in Milwaukee as soon as they were received in the Detroit office; that a misunderstanding in this regard oeeurred which was inadvertent and unintentional and whieh resulted in .the fact that the papers above mentioned, to-wit: the motion to strike the answer, the order of the court that the ánswer be stricken unless an amended answer be filed, the notices of default for failure to file an amended answer and the notice of hearing were received in the Detroit offiee, but were not forwarded to the Milwaukee’ offiee, and that they did not come to the attention of affiant until after said decree was made and entered.”

 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p 427.

 See Crogate’s Case, 8 Co Rep 66b (77 Eng Rep 574).