Court Opinion

ID: 9692839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:07:51.841414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:37.274465
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wolff. I write separately only to emphasize how important this case is because it presents a lethal threat to the constitutional fundamental right to liberty in the procedural context of leap-frogging from civil to criminal prosecutions.
The Court’s hyper-technical analysis of what constitutes adjudication of parentage for purposes of prosecuting someone for criminal non-support results, in essence, to the application of collateral estoppel to legal elements of a criminal offense from a determination made in civil dispute where the burden of proof shifts to beyond a reasonable doubt from preponderance of the evidence. I shudder at the logical extension of such a paradigm because it guts the traditional burden placed upon the State to prove the elements of any offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Shall we also eliminate the presumption of innocence?
“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”1 “Our society’s belief, reinforced over the centuries, that all are innocent until the state has proved them to be guilty, like the companion principle that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and is established beyond legislative contravention in the Due Process Clause.”2 “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the cíame with which he is charged.”3 As *244Justice Scalia has so appropriately emphasized, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.”4
While I staunchly support the public policy of protecting the children of this state, this Court should not forsake the Constitution in a rush to inflict a form of retribution that does absolutely nothing to provide any support for this child. The simplistic and practical solution is oft times obscured by attempts to expediently close the prison cell door. So I ask, with the fundamental rights of due process and liberty at stake, what is the harm of conducting a DNA test to confirm Mr. Perkin’s parentage beyond a reasonable doubt? Where is the harm in holding the State to its burden of proof? I see no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The fact that reasonable minds on this Court have differed proves the legal standard was not breached. I would quash the preliminary writ.

. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895).

. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (Justices Marshall and Brennan dissenting), citing to, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979) (Stewart, L, dissenting).

. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990).

. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989).