Court Opinion

ID: 9957762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 13:06:48.506677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:37.408750
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-1290.]
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
              FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                       :   APPEAL NO. C-230447
                                                          TRIAL NO. B-2203434A
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                          :

   vs.                                                :     O P I N I O N.

 DARRIUS WILSON,                                      :

     Defendant-Appellant.                             :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed, Pleas Vacated, and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal:April 5, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plainitff-Appellee,

Roger W. Kirk, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, Judge.
       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant    Darrius       Wilson   appeals   convictions   for

involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault. He argues that the trial court erred

in accepting his guilty pleas because they were not made knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily, and in not allowing him to withdraw his pleas. We agree that the trial

court erred in accepting Wilson’s pleas, although not for the reasons he states, and we

reverse his convictions and vacate his pleas.

       {¶2}    Wilson was originally indicted for two counts of murder, two counts of

felonious assault, and one count of attempted murder, all with accompanying firearm

specifications. The state alleged that Wilson handed a gun to his brother, which his

brother immediately used to shoot two individuals. One victim was killed and the

other wounded.

       {¶3}    Under the terms of a plea agreement, Wilson pleaded guilty to a reduced

charge of involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A), with one specification,

and one count of felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). The remaining charges

and specifications were dismissed. The parties agreed to an aggregate sentence of ten

to 12 years in prison.

       {¶4}    The record shows that at the plea hearing, after the trial court had

informed Wilson of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty,

the following exchange occurred:

       THE COURT: This is an agreed-upon sentence; is that correct?

       THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

       THE COURT: Do you understand that agreement is between your

       attorneys and the State, not with me?

       THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       THE COURT: So that means I can sentence you according to their

       recommendations or I could come up with my own sentence. Do you

       understand?

       THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

       THE COURT: I’m not bound by the agreement that they came up with.

       Do you understand?

       THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

       {¶5}    After accepting the plea, Wilson’s counsel spoke in mitigation. He

stated that Wilson was not the shooter and that Wilson did not know that his brother

intended to shoot anyone. He also said that Wilson was remorseful and wished to

apologize “to everyone.”

       {¶6}    The court then permitted one victim’s mother to make a statement.

After she described her son and the effect of this death on his family, the court asked

her, “Are you in agreement with the recommended sentence?” She replied, “Can I be

honest? * * * If it were up to me I wish they could get longer sentences, anywhere from

25 years to life for the shooter because when you take a life you should do life. As an

accomplice, 15 years.”

       {¶7}    The court then asked the defendant if he had anything to say, and

Wilson replied, “Nothing at all.” Counsel then reiterated that Wilson was remorseful.

The court then stated, “I don’t see any remorse, but if you see it that’s okay, but I don’t

see it, the victim’s mother doesn’t see it. Why should I go along with the agreement?”

Defense counsel stated, “We’ve put together a lot of time in this talking to the State. I

know they previously talked to the mother. All sympathies to her of course. It’s my

understanding they previously agreed to these times and we’ve come to that

agreement, all with the parties involved. I would hope the Court would impose that.”

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶8}   The state added, “Judge, I know this has been negotiated. I sympathize

greatly with [the victim’s mother] but these agreed pleas are negotiated based on our

evidence and what we believe we can prove. And I understand 100% where she’s

coming from emotionally, but I know this was a well-negotiated agreement.” Defense

counsel then reiterated that Wilson had not been the shooter, and the victim’s mother

had approved the agreed plea and sentence.

       {¶9}   The court stated, “I don’t believe that the Defendant is remorseful. I

don’t believe he cares that the victims were killed or injured in this offense. I’m not

going to go along with the recommended plea.” It then imposed a sentence of 15 to 19

years in prison. Wilson then moved to withdraw his pleas, and the trial court denied

his motion.

       {¶10} Wilson presents two assignments of error for review. In his first

assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty pleas

when it did not clearly indicate prior to accepting the pleas that it might not impose

the agreed sentence. He argues that the court should have given him the opportunity

to withdraw his pleas before accepting them if the court did not agree with the

proposed sentences. He also argues that the court erred in denying his motion to

withdraw his pleas after accepting them. This argument is without merit.

       {¶11} Plea agreements are made between the state and the defendant, and

they are not binding on the trial court. State v. Greene, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos.

29836 and 29837, 2024-Ohio-363, ¶ 36-37; State v. Elliott, 2021-Ohio-424, 168

N.E.3d 33, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). “Thus, any plea agreement between the state and a

defendant is implicitly conditioned on the trial court’s acceptance of that agreement.”

Elliott at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Darnell, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 02CA15, 2003-Ohio-2775,

¶ 7.

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

          {¶12} Nevertheless, due process requires the trial court to put the defendant

on notice of the possibility that it could impose a longer prison term than the prison

term negotiated under a plea agreement before accepting a guilty plea. Elliott at ¶ 18;

State v. Huffman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105805, 2018-Ohio-1192, ¶ 21. A trial court

does not err by imposing a sentence greater than the sentence agreed to by the parties

when “it forewarns the defendant of the applicable penalties, including the possibility

of imposing a greater sentence than that recommended by the prosecutor.” State ex

rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6, quoting

State v. Buchanan, 154 Ohio App.3d 250, 2003-Ohio-4772, 796 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 13 (5th

Dist.).

          {¶13} The record shows that the court notified Wilson that it could impose a

sentence longer than the term agreed to between the parties. Wilson acknowledged

several times that he understood, and he entered guilty pleas anyway. Therefore, his

due-process rights were not violated, and the trial court’s decision to impose a longer

aggregate sentence does not justify reversal.

          {¶14} What does justify reversal is the trial court’s failure to inform Wilson of

the maximum sentence that could be imposed prior to accepting his pleas. A guilty

plea is constitutionally valid only if it is entered knowingly, voluntarily and

intelligently. State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶

10; Ohio v. Jackson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200332, 2022-Ohio-3449, ¶ 6. Crim.R.

11(C) requires a trial court to address the defendant and verify that the defendant is

entering the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of the effect of the plea, the nature

of the charges, and the maximum potential penalty, as well as the constitutional rights

the defendant will waive. State v. Stumph, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190318, 2021-

Ohio-723, ¶ 6.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} When explaining the constitutional rights that the defendant is waiving

by entering a plea, the trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11. Jackson at ¶ 7;

Stumph at ¶ 7. But when explaining the nonconstitutional provisions of the rule to a

defendant the court need only substantially comply with Crim.R. 11. Stumph at ¶ 7.

Substantial compliance means “that under the totality of the circumstances, the

defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is

waiving.” Stumph at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d

474 (1990).

       {¶16} If a trial court fails to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 regarding a

nonconstitutional provision, a reviewing court must determine whether the trial court

partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. State v. Davis, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-230121, 2023-Ohio-4389, ¶ 10; Stumph at ¶ 8. Where a trial court has

completely failed to comply with the rule, the defendant’s plea must be vacated. State

v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 32; Stumph at ¶ 8.

But where a trial court has partially complied, the plea may only be vacated if the

defendant demonstrates prejudice. Davis at ¶ 16; Stumph at ¶ 8.

       {¶17} Here the trial court completely failed to comply with the rule in regard

to informing Wilson of the maximum sentence, including any mandatory time on the

specification, that he could receive. See State v. Bobbitt, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-12-051,

2013-Ohio- 5067, ¶ 7-9. Although the plea form he signed included the maximum

sentence, Crim.R. 11 requires the trial to court to personally address the defendant and

inform him of the maximum sentence during the plea colloquy. State v. Jones, 1st

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130825 and C130826, 2014-Ohio-4497, ¶ 18; State v. Fuller,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040318, 2007-Ohio-1020, ¶ 4. We have stated that “a trial

court’s failure to advise the defendant of the maximum sentence─a Crim.R. 11(C)(2)

nonconstitutional right─even though he signed a written plea of guilty that recited the

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

penalties, was not substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Yanez, 150

Ohio App.3d 510, 2002-Ohio-7076, 782 N.E.2d 146, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). Therefore, we

sustain Wilson’s first assignment of error.

       {¶18} In his second assignment of error, Wilson contends that the trial court

erred when it failed to inform him of the Regan Tokes sentence notifications required

under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Because we have already held that Wilson’s pleas must

be vacated, this assignment of error is moot, and we decline to address it. See App.R.

12(A)(1)(c).

       {¶19} In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in accepting Wilson’s pleas

because they were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We reverse the

trial court’s judgment, vacate Wilson’s pleas, and remand the cause to the trial court

for further proceedings.

                              Judgment reversed, pleas vacated, and cause remanded.

BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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