Court Opinion

ID: 9376552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:04:54.405397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.775818
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

YAZAN MUSLEH,                                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 361362
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE                                       LC No. 21-004726-CK
COMPANY,

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff, Yazan Musleh, appeals on leave granted1 the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition to defendant, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

         On August 25, 2020, Musleh purchased an automobile insurance policy from Progressive.
The policy covered six vehicles. On the application for insurance, Musleh stated that each of the
vehicles was garaged in Washington Township. On August 27, 2020, Musleh sent a notarized
letter to Progressive’s underwriters. In the letter, he noted that his insurance agent had asked him
to provide information as to where he garaged his vehicles. He then listed each vehicle and the
address or addresses where it was “mostly kept.” Notably, only three of the vehicles were listed
as garaged in Washington Township.

       On November 16, 2020, Musleh filed a claim for the theft of one of the vehicles. On
November 30, 2020, Progressive advised that there might not be coverage under the policy for the
vehicle’s theft. Progressive also stated that it was investigating where Musleh’s vehicles were

1
 Musleh v Progressive Mich Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 30,
2022 (Docket No. 361362).

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principally garaged. Following its investigation, Progressive informed Musleh that it would not
cover the theft claim and that it was cancelling Musleh’s policy and refunding his premium check.
Progressive cited the fraud or misrepresentation provision in Musleh’s policy, which provided:

              This policy was issued in reliance upon the information provided on your
       insurance application. We may void this policy at any time, including after the
       occurrence of an accident or loss, if you:

              1. made incorrect statements or representations to us with regard to any
       material fact or circumstance;

               2. concealed or mispresented any material fact or circumstance; or

               3. engaged in fraudulent conduct;

       at the time of application. This means that we will not be liable for claims or
       damages that would otherwise be covered.

Thereafter, Progressive sent Musleh a rescission notice and a premium refund check.

        Musleh’s lawyer sent a letter rejecting Progressive “decision to unilaterally rescind” the
policy. Subsequently, Musleh filed a complaint against Progressive, alleging that it had breached
its contract with him by failing to compensate him for the fair market value of his stolen vehicle.
Following discovery, Progressive moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Musleh had misrepresented
where the vehicles were garaged and where his daughter resided and (2) the misrepresentations
were material because it would have not issued the policy if it had known the truth. In response,
Musleh argued that if Progressive had defined its garaging requirements in the application or in
his policy, he would have complied with the requirements. He noted that he had sent a letter to
Progressive listing where his vehicles were garaged. Finally, Musleh asserted that he had not
deposited the refund check because he was objecting to the rescission.

        The trial court granted Progressive summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Musleh moved for reconsideration under MCR 2.119(F)(3). However, before the trial court heard
that motion, Musleh filed a claim of appeal in this Court. Initially, this Court dismissed his appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending motion for reconsideration.2 Musleh moved for
reconsideration in this Court, asserting his belief that the trial court was never going to hear his
motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, this Court granted his motion for reconsideration and
entered an order treating Musleh’s appeal as an application for leave to appeal that was granted.3

2
 Musleh v Progressive Mich Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 17,
2022 (Docket No. 361362).
3
 Musleh v Progressive Mich Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 30,
2022 (Docket No. 361362).

                                                -2-
                                   II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Musleh argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to Progressive.
Challenges to a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition are reviewed de novo. Barnard
Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618
(2009).

                                            B. ANALYSIS

      Musleh argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition because, when
viewed in the light most favorable to him, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether he misrepresented information on his applicable for insurance. We disagree.

         “An insurance policy is much the same as any other contract, and the application is
considered part of the contract.” Holman v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, ___ Mich App ___
; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357473); slip op 5 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“[I]t is well settled that an insurer is entitled to rescind a policy ab initio on the basis of a material
misrepresentation made in an application for no-fault insurance.” 21st Century Premier Ins Co v
Zufelt, 315 Mich App 437, 445; 889 NW2d 759 (2016) (citation omitted). “Rescission abrogates
a contract and restores the parties to the relative positions that they would have occupied if the
contract had never been made.” Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 409; 919 NW2d 20 (2018).
Here, the insurance policy provided that Progressive could rescind the policy if, in his application,
Musleh “made incorrect statements or representations” regarding “any material fact or
circumstance” or if he “misrepresented any material fact or circumstance.”

        Musleh complains that the trial court did not view the evidence he submitted in response
to summary disposition in the light most favorable to him. The record reflects, however, that none
of the evidence he submitted created a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether he
made a material misrepresentation on his application for insurance. Indeed, it is undisputed that
Musleh represented on his insurance application that he had six vehicles garaged in Washington
Township. That was not true. In a letter sent two days later, Musleh clarified that only three of
the vehicles were actually garaged in Washington Township. He made similar admissions during
Progressive’s investigation into where the vehicles were primarily garaged. He still does not
contend that the vehicles were actually garaged in Washington Township. There is, therefore, no
dispute that he made a misrepresentation on his application when he stated that all six vehicles
were garaged in Washington Township.

        The misrepresentation was also material. “An insurer’s evaluation of the likelihood of a
factor increasing the risk of loss affects its decision to enter into a contract. A misrepresentation
on an insurance application is material if, given the correct information, the insurer would have
rejected the risk or charged an increased premium.” Montgomery v Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins
Co, 269 Mich App 126, 129; 713 NW2d 801 (2005) (citation omitted). Here, Progressive’s
underwriter stated in an affidavit that if Progressive had known where the vehicles were actually
garaged the policy would not have been issued “as written” because “multiple garaging addresses
poses an underwriting risk.”

                                                   -3-
        On appeal, Musleh does not dispute that he made a material misrepresentation on his
insurance application when he stated that each of his vehicles was garaged in Washington
Township.4 Instead, he stresses that he did not intentionally make a material misrepresentation.
He posits that would have readily complied with the garaging requirements if Progressive had
described its “garage-related” concerns in the insurance application, had asked more detailed
questions in the application, or had defined its garage-related concerns in the insurance policy.
The plain terms of the contract, however, do not require a finding of fraud or intentional
misstatement. Instead, the rescission clause applies to both intentional and inadvertent material
misrepresentations in the insurance application. Thus, it is irrelevant whether he would have
accurately conveyed the information if he had been better informed by Progressive as to what it
meant when it asked for his “garaging zip code” and “rating city.” Indeed, “[r]escission is justified
without regard to the intentional nature of the misrepresentation, as long as it is relied upon by the
insurer.” 21st Century Premier Ins Co, 315 Mich App at 446. And, as it is undisputed that
Progressive relied upon the misrepresentation, rescission is warranted under the language of the
contract.

         Musleh also suggests that the insurance policy was ambiguous so it should be construed
against Progressive. He does not identify which provisions were ambiguous. He suggests—
vaguely—that the policy is ambiguous because it does not define what he terms “garaging-related”
terminology. The failure to define a term, however, does not render a policy ambiguous. Liparoto
Constr, Inc v Gen Shale Brick, Inc, 284 Mich App 25, 35; 772 NW2d 801 (2009). Instead, “[a]
provision is considered ambiguous when its words can reasonably be understood in different
ways.” Vanguard Ins v Racine, 224 Mich App 229, 233; 568 NW2d 156 (1997). Here, it is
axiomatic that a request for information on where the vehicle is garaged refers to where the vehicle
is physically stored when not in use. Indeed, the policy refers to “principle garaging address”
separately from the insured’s “mailing address” and “residence address,” which suggests that the
vehicle does not have to be stored at the insured’s residence. Moreover, Musleh was not actually
confused by the language used given that he sent a notarized letter indicating where each vehicle
was actually garaged. Finally, given that Musleh has not identified any ambiguities in the policy,
his claim that the trial court erred by interpreting the policy is without merit. See Mitcham v
Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not enough for an appellant in his brief
simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search
for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”).

        Musleh also suggests that the trial court never intended to hear his motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, however, may not set aside or amend its order granting summary
disposition because Musleh’s claim of appeal was treated as an application for leave to appeal and

4
  We note that Progressive also asserted that Musleh misrepresented the address of his daughter
on the application. The application, however, asked Musleh to include “all children who live away
from home who drive these vehicles . . . .” Musleh listed his daughter, but did not state that she
resided with him. He did not, in fact, list her address, nor was he asked to list her address. As a
result, there is no material misrepresentation related to the address of Musleh’s daughter.

                                                 -4-
was granted. See MCR 7.208(A). Consequently, the trial court did not err by failing to rule on
Musleh’s motion for reconsideration.

       Affirmed. Progressive may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                         /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                         /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                         /s/ Michael J. Riordan

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