Court Opinion

ID: 9853822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:55:39.081843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:09.019069
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice.
This appeal is brought by the City of Lilburn (“the City”) from the trial court’s order declaring unconstitutional the City’s municipal ordinance requiring land lots at least one acre in size for the keeping of a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig as a domestic pet. Upon review, we are satisfied that a rational relationship exists between the ordinance and the legitimate governmental goal of reducing the substantial negative impacts these animals might have upon residential communities. We also are convinced that in ruling otherwise, the trial court improperly usurped the authority of the City’s administrators, and erroneously substituted its own judgment for that of a legislative body. Therefore, we reverse.1
The Sanchez family home is situated on a .24-acre lot, and is located within one of the City’s subdivisions. The Sanchezes owned a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig, Eugenia, which they kept as a domestic pet. Eugenia spent much, but not all, of her time on the family’s .24-acre lot. After adjoining property owners complained, the City cited and fined the Sanchezes for violating its municipal crime ordinance regulating the ownership of pigs:
(A) It shall be unlawful to keep hogs or pigs within the city.
(B) A purebred Vietnamese pot bellied pig is considered a household pet, and is allowed, provided that the lot is at least one acre in size, no hobby breeding, and only one pig shall be allowed per lot. All adjoining property owners shall sign a statement that they have no objection to the pig.
Lilburn City Code, § 11-3-3.
The Sanchezes sought a declaratory judgment that the ordi*521nance was unconstitutional, claiming that it was not rationally related to an articulable legislative purpose. After a hearing, the trial court upheld those portions of the ordinance allowing the keeping of Vietnamese pot-bellied pigs, classifying them as household pets, prohibiting their hobby breeding, and allowing only one pig per lot. However, the trial court declared unconstitutional the ordinance’s requirements that pot-bellied pigs be kept (1) only on lots at least one acre in size, and (2) only with the consent of all adjoining property owners. In so doing, the trial court utilized the “as applied” standard for determining the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, as set forth in Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs.2 On appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred in applying the wrong legal standard, and that once the proper legal standard is applied, the constitutionality of the ordinance’s acreage requirement is clearly established. As explained below, we agree.3
1. The Sanchezes’ complaint alleged that Lilburn’s criminal ordinance regulating pigs within the City, on its face, exceeds the scope of the City’s police powers and therefore violates substantive due process as applied to all residents who own pot-bellied pigs. The Sanchezes did not claim that the City had violated its authority to zone property for specific purposes. Before filing their complaint, the Sanchezes did not seek an administrative adjudication as to the impact of the City’s ordinance on their property rights in particular, as would have been required if this were a zoning challenge.4 Furthermore, while the ordinance at issue is regulatory in nature, it does not regulate by classifying property into separate districts, as do zoning ordinances.5 However, the trial court resolved the matter by applying the standards set forth by this Court in Gradous, supra, for determining the constitutionality of a municipal zoning ordinance.6 However, it is undisputed that this matter concerns a criminal, and not a zoning, ordinance. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred by failing to apply the proper standard for resolving a substantive due process challenge to a municipality’s enactment of criminal legislation pursuant to its police power, and we will resolve the matter by *522relying on those proper standards.
2. Because ownership of a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig is not a fundamental right, and because pot-bellied pig owners are not a suspect class, the City’s ordinance must be examined under the rational basis test.7 Under that test, a municipal ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power if it is substantially related to the public health, safety, or general welfare.8 In this regard, any plausible or arguable reason that supports an ordinance will satisfy substantive due process.9 So long as an ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose, without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.10 The rational basis standard is the least rigorous test of constitutional scrutiny. It does not require that an ordinance adopt the best, or even the least intrusive, means available to achieve its objective. To the contrary, the means adopted by an ordinance need only be reasonable in relation to the goal they seek to achieve.* 11
Only, if the means adopted, or the resultant classifications, are irrelevant to the City’s reasonable objective, or altogether arbitrary, does the ordinance offend due process.12 Otherwise, it is established that “the courts have no right to interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion ”13 Furthermore, where “legislative action is within the scope of the police power [as exists here], fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the determination of the courts, but for that of the legislative body on which rests the duty and responsibility of [the] decision.”14
The Lilburn city ordinance obviously serves a legitimate public purpose, as it regulates and controls some of the more unpleasant aspects of living with or near swine. Specifically, it was established before the trial court by expert veterinary testimony that the smell emanating from pot-bellied pig waste is much stronger than that *523associated with dogs and cats. What’s more, evidence showed that pot-bellied pigs generate manure in quantities four times greater than dogs, and that, because they require greater .care than other domestic pets, pot-bellied pig owners are more likely to neglect their responsibilities than are other pet owners. The impact of these organic statistics on the .24-acre lot where the Sanchez family kept their porcine pet, Eugenia, and on the surrounding property owners was evidenced by the testimony of the Sanchezes’ neighbor, Hogan. Hogan testified that his house stands 15 to 20 feet from the Sanchez home, and that the smell associated with Eugenia, and her byproduct, was reminiscent of a pig sty, and unbearable to the point of nauseating him. Hogan also testified that the smell of pig manure sometimes permeated the interior of his home.
Expert testimony also established that pot-bellied pigs are capable of transmitting more diseases to humans than are dogs. Furthermore, there are several bloodlines of these shoats, and, depending upon its genetic lineage, a pot-bellied pig can grow to a size anywhere between 30 and 150 pounds. Quite obviously, the larger the pig, the more severe its impact will be on both its owner’s lot and on the surrounding properties. Based on the statistics discussed above, a medium-to-large size pig could easily transform a suburban lot such as the Sanchezes’ .24-acre parcel into a fetid barnyard within a matter of weeks.
Clearly, then, Lilburn has legitimate interests both in regulating the domestic keeping of pot-bellied pigs, and in minimizing their impact upon residential communities. Imposing a one-acre minimum requirement for the keeping of these animals is a reasonably necessary means of satisfying that interest. The one-acre requirement effectively regulates the domestic swine population in Lilburn by density, thereby satisfying at least two legitimate goals. First, because there are a finite number of one-acre lots within Lilburn’s residential communities, the overall size of the pig population in Lilburn will be controlled, thereby limiting the number of surrounding properties that can be impacted by these pigs. Second, because pot-bellied pigs must reside on lots that are at least one acre, their impact on those lots will be dissipated over a greater area, minimizing the impact felt by neighboring property owners. Thus, the rational relation between the ordinance and its goals is clear.15 That being so, and because no claim is made that the ordinance is arbi*524trary on its face or as applied, the constitutionality of the City’s criminal ordinance regulating the ownership of domesticated pigs is conclusively established.16
In ruling otherwise, the trial court emphasized isolated opinion evidence that in some instances, a large lot size, such as that required by the ordinance, may effectively cause a pig to grow larger than it otherwise might. However, there also was evidence that, depending upon its genetic make-up, a single pot-bellied pig may grow upwards of 150 pounds, presumably even if it lives on a smaller-sized lot. Thus, we believe that lot size is an incidental, rather than a primary, factor in determining how large a pot-bellied pig will grow. Furthermore, even if the one-acre requirement will in some instances produce larger pot-bellied pigs, that fact, standing alone, does not render the ordinance unconstitutional. As noted, the Due Process Clause does not require Lilburn to implement the best means of regulating pot-bellied pigs as pets; it need only adopt means that are reasonably necessary to decrease the overall impact of such domesticated pigs on Lilburn’s citizens.17
Finally, in cases such as this one, courts are required to give due accord to the authority of city officials. As a reviewing court, our duty is only to determine whether, in enacting the ordinance, the City of Lilburn exercised its police power within the parameters of our State and Federal Constitutions. Fairly debatable questions as to the ordinance’s reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety “are not for the determination of the courts,” but remain within the sound discretion of city leaders.18 As discussed above, there was ample evidence before the trial court that in enacting the ordinance, the City of Lilburn properly exercised its police powers in a non-arbitrary manner, with an adequate factual predicate, and in reasonable furtherance of a legitimate goal. Whether the trial court, or this Court, appreciates, agrees with, or condones the City’s action is altogether irrelevant — so long as the City acted constitutionally. We conclude that, by holding the ordinance was unconstitutional, the trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the City’s leaders.

Judgment reversed.

All of the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Carley, JJ, who dissent.

 This Court granted the City’s application for discretionary appeal in Case No. S97A0678, and the City also filed a notice of direct appeal in Case No. S97A0870. The cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Because the Sanchezes have not attacked a zoning ordinance, but rather have sought to have a criminal ordinance declared unconstitutional, the trial court’s order is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34, and does not fall under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (l)’s discretionary appeal requirements. Therefore, Case No. S97A0678 is dismissed, and the direct appeal is considered on its merits.

 256 Ga. 469, 470 (349 SE2d 707) (1986).

 The City does not appeal the trial court’s ruling that the ordinance’s requirement that pot-bellied pigs be kept only with the consent of all adjoining property owners is unconstitutional.

 See Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 (383 SE2d 123) (1989). See also n. 1, supra.

 Zoning is defined as “the division of a city . . . into districts and . .'. regulations prescribing uses to which buildings [and real property] within designated districts may be put.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1450 (West 1979).

 The Gradous test balances the benefit accrued to the public by the zoning ordinance against the detriment suffered by the individual claiming a constitutional deprivation. 256 Ga. at 471.

 See City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 187 (475 SE2d 896) (1996).

 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 367, 387 (47 SC 114, 71 LE 303) (1926). See Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580 (308 SE2d 170) (1983) (property is held subject to legislative regulation by the police power in order to (1) protect the public health, (2) implement environmental regulations, or (3) abate nuisances).

 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611-612 (80 SC 1367, 4 LE2d 1435) (1960).

 See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137 (14 SC 499, 38 LE 385) (1894); Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 58 (389 SE2d 329) (1990); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings & Due Process, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1057, 1058 (1980).

 Flemming, supra; Lawton, supra; Cannon, supra.

 See Foster v. Ga. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 257 Ga. 409, 419 (359 SE2d 877) (1987).

 (Emphasis supplied.) Dixon v. City of Perry, 262 Ga. 212, 213 (416 SE2d 279) (1992); see Foster, supra.

 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 584 (49 SC 430, 73 LE 856) (1929).

 We note that in other contexts, area and density restrictions routinely are implemented as valid exercises of a municipality’s regulatory authority, so long as they further a proper purpose and are implemented in a constitutional manner, and they routinely are accorded a presumption of validity. See 3 Zieglar, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 34.03 [2],

 Lawton, supra; Cannon, supra.

 See Flemming, 363 U. S. at 611-612. Likewise, the trial court’s statement that the ordinance was invalid because it did not require setbacks is irrelevant. While requiring that owners of pot-bellied pigs keep them a certain distance away from adjoining property lines might be one means of regulating their impact in residential communities, it certainly is not the only means of achieving that goal. Moreover, because setbacks have no effect on airborne stenches, they might be wholly ineffective in this instance.

 Standard Oil Co., 279 U. S. at 584.