Court Opinion

ID: 9625838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:52:37.383911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:16.153520
License: Public Domain

Grady, J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to concur in the conclusion reached in the majority opinion in view of the finding made that a labor dispute existed between the appellant and the union: The theory of Gazzam v. Building Service Employees International Union, 29 Wn. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97; Hanke v. Teamsters’ Union, 33 Wn. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 206, and Cline v. Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Local Union, 33 Wn. (2d) 666, 207 P. (2d) 216, as I read those cases, is that a union may not picket a place of business where no labor dispute exists for the purpose of coercing the owner by the use of economic pressure to conduct his business during certain hours or days of the week, or to join such union or to require his employees to do so. The reasoning of those cases would indicate that if there had existed labor disputes between the owners of the business and the unions, then if the picketing was peaceful and without intimidation of any one it would not have been enjoined. In balancing conflicting constitutional rights the existence or nonexistence of a labor dispute is not only persuasive to a court of equity, but in many instances can well be regarded as controlling. When there *606is a labor dispute there may be a legal justification for picketing where none would exist if there was no such dispute. In this case, the primary dispute seems to be whether the employer should sign a contract with the union which, in effect, would result in his nonunion employees being either required to join the union or seek employment elsewhere. The presence of a picket in all probability induced the falling off of appellant’s patronage and caused union drivers of trucks to refrain from making deliveries through the picket line. However, I do not think it can be said that we have ever decided it to be the public policy of this state that if there exists a labor dispute and such results incidentally flow from peaceful picketing it goes beyond the right of free speech and must be enjoined. This I believe is the effect of the majority opinion, and if carried to its logical conclusion all picketing might be said to be unlawful if its effect was to bring to bear any economic pressure upon the employer to meet the demands of a union in upholding its side of a labor dispute between itself and an employer. I think the guaranty of free speech as defined by the United States supreme court in labor cases does not permit this court to go that far.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Hamxey, J.
(dissenting) — The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that, since a “labor dispute” was involved, the court was deprived of power to enjoin the picketing because of the provisions of the labor disputes act of 1933. The provision of that act which the court apparently had in mind is § 4 (e) (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-4 (e) [P.P.C. § 695-7]). It is there provided that no court of this state shall have jurisdiction to issue an injunction for the purpose of prohibiting picketing, except where fraud or violence is shown, in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute.
Since Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397, this statutory prohibition against the issuance of injunctions has not been considered as binding upon the courts. The Blanchard decision expressely invali*607dated only §§ 7, 8 and 9 of the labor disputes act (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 7612-7, 7612-8, 7612-9 [P.P.C. § 695-13, -15, -17]). But it has been generally recognized that the reasoning of the opinion applies with equal force and effect to § 4 (e). The essence of that reasoning is that legislation abolishing or abridging the power of courts to issue injunctions contravenes provisions of the state constitution investing all judicial power in the courts. Since the Blanchard decision, efforts to resist picketing injunctions have usually been grounded upon general considerations of equity or upon the free speech guarantee of the Federal constitution.
The trial court was therefore in error in considering that it was bound by statute to dismiss the complaint, and in failing to exercise its discretion as a court of equity. The case is before us de novo. It is now for us to decide whether, in the exercise of a sound discretion, the relief prayed for ought to be granted. The question before us is not how far we have a constitutional right to go, but how far, in equity and good conscience, we ought to go.
The majority has properly turned to the labor disputes act for guidance in reaching a just result. This act, though abortive for constitutional reasons in so far as it purports to limit judicial power, nevertheless represents the considered opinion of the people respecting the correlative rights of employers and employees in these situations. It was enacted in 1933, and has never been amended. It carries added weight, as an expression of policy, by reason of the fact that similar acts have been enacted in many states. All of these state statutes stem from the Federal Norris-LaGuardia act, enacted in 1932. 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. A., §§ 101-115.
I feel, however, that the majority should not have limited its consideration of that act to § 2 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2 [P.P.C. § 695-3]). The majority opinion is made to turn entirely upon the conclusion that the picketing was for the purpose of having the employer coerce his employees into joining the union, contrary to certain provisions of § 2.
In my view, the basic policy of the labor disputes act is *608not the disapproval of closed shop agreements. That declaration is incidental to, and in my opinion qualified by, the primary objective of permitting employees, while engaged in a labor dispute, to wage their economic contest free from judicial interference, so long as fraud and violence are avoided. This basic policy is expressed and developed throughout the act. See, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Ludwig Teller, vol. 1, § 199, pages 586-588; Senate Report No. 163, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, February 4, 1932; House of Representatives Report No. 669, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, March 2, 1932; 15 Wash. L. Rev., pages 47-53.
In past cases of this kind it has been our practice to first determine whether there was involved a “labor dispute” within the meaning of the act. Where no labor dispute was found to exist, we have given paramount consideration to the anti-coercion declarations of § 2, and have frequently granted an injunction. See, Fornili v. Auto Mechanics’ Union Local No. 297, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422; United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772; Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union No. 44, 6 Wn. (2d) 560, 108 P. (2d) 354; Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wn. (2d) 193, 177 P. (2d) 873; Gazzam v. Building Service Employees International Union, 29 Wn. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97; Hanke v. Teamsters’ Union, 33 Wn. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 206; Pacific Nav. & Trading v. National Organization of Masters, etc., 33 Wn. (2d) 675, 207 P. (2d) 221.
However, where a labor dispute was found to exist, we have uniformly denied injunctions unless there was a showing of fraud or violence. Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters’ Union Local No. 524, 5 Wn. (2d) 346, 105 P. (2d) 46; Weyer-haeuser Tbr. Co. v. Everett Dist. Council of Lbr. & Sawmill Workers, etc., 11 Wn. (2d) 503, 119 P. (2d) 643; Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 29 Wn. (2d) 810, 189 P. (2d) 473; Wright v. Teamsters’ Union Local No. 690, 33 Wn. (2d) 905, 207 P. (2d) 662.
*609A review of the cited cases indicates that our only purpose in making this determination as to the existence of a “labor dispute” has been to learn whether it would be necessary to consider the anti-injunction policy of the act. As we have seen, that policy applies only where a labor dispute is involved.
We did consider that policy, and refused to grant an injunction, in Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, supra, on facts very similar to those here developed. We there said, at page 813:
“The facts recited above establish the existence of a labor dispute, hence injunction will not lie to prohibit respondent labor union and its members from peacefully picketing appellants’ motorship Garland for the purpose of completely unionizing that vessel’s crew, of which four were members of the union. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §7612-1 [P.P.C. § 695-1] et seq.”
The majority distinguishes the Berger case by saying that the decision in that case does not indicate that any of the employees objected to unionization of the ship, and that “no coercion was involved.” I do not see how we can draw that conclusion, inasmuch as thirteen of those employees joined the employer as parties plaintiff in that injunction suit.
Once we disregard the “labor dispute” line of demarkation, specified in the statute and heretofore respected by this court, we are sailing on uncharted seas. In this case coercion was found where only one employee had union membership, though he represented one hundred per cent of the company’s truck drivers. What will be our attitude when there are two employees, or a majority, or all but one, who are members of the union? Here the one union member did not divfilge his membership to his employer prior to the strike. Will it make any difference if such membership is known to the employer for a long period of time? The proposed agreement was for a closed shop. Will we find that a union shop agreement is also coercive, as we did in the Gazzam case, where no labor dispute was involved? In the instant case the employees (except for Kreiger and one *610employee on vacation) unanimously indicated their objection to unionization by signing a statement to that effect shortly after picketing began. What if there is no written ■record of such objection, or if it is delayed until the strike ■has long been in progress, or if less than all of the employees object? How far will we inquire into charges that employee objections to unionization resulted from undue influence exerted by employers?
- It is not sufficient to say that we will meet these problems when they arise. The point is that we ought not, except for most urgent reasons, launch upon a course which opens up whole new fields of litigation — fields in which we will have to improvise guideposts and principles as we go along. It has taken us from 1933 until the present time to develop the relatively well-established and generally understood principles which today govern in these cases. How many years it will now take to resettle the law must be left to the imagination.
The proposed contract here in question is a “package” containing many features besides the closed shop. It calls for higher wages, decreased hours, and other changes in working conditions. The majority makes it clear that picketing to attain these objectives would not be enjoined. The opinion provides that if the closed shop features of the contract is abandoned, the injunction may be dissolved.
Is this not placing the burden in the wrong place, even assuming that picketing for the purpose of obtaining a closed shop agreement should be enjoined where a labor dispute is involved? If any purpose of the picketing is lawful and not enjoinable, I would think that we ought not to issue the injunction. Moreover, the mere proposal for a closed shop agreement, as distinguished from picketing to attain a closed shop, is not unlawful even under the majority opinion. Why, then, should the withdrawal of such proposal be made a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the right to picket peacefully for “noncoercive” objectives?
It seems to me that the burden should be placed upon the employer, who seeks the injunction, to show that there-is *611no labor dispute regarding wages, hours of labor, working conditions, or any other noncoercive subject, before he is entitled to stop the picketing. If the employer is willing to meet the union demands in these respects, then the picketing would relate only to the closed shop proposal and would be for a “coercive” purpose (as the majority uses that term); otherwise not.
This suggestion accords with the disposition we made of Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw Mill Workers Union, 189 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066. That case involved a “labor dispute” within the meaning of the act. The employer claimed that the purpose of the strike was to compel him to sign a contract recognizing the union, and to require him to coerce his employees into joining the union. In denying the injunction, we said, at page 419:
“It appears from the evidence, as stated by the trial court in its memorandum opinion, that at least one of the reasons that the union men who were working for appellant were called out was on account of the low wage scale paid by appellant.”
I dissent.
March 1, 1951. Petition for rehearing denied.