Court Opinion

ID: 9541568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:44.84378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:31.598544
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that plaintiff does not present a claim for “breach of confidentiality.” However, because the majority’s analysis ,of the basis for which emotional distress damages may be awarded is incomplete, I respectfully *292dissent. I would hold that defendant’s actions infringed on plaintiffs’ legally protected right to enjoy property without unreasonable interference and that plaintiffs have a claim for emotional damages. Accordingly, I would reverse.
Oregon has recognized common-law liability for purely emotional distress injuries in three situations:
“First, where the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress. Second, where the defendant intended to do the painful act with knowledge that it will cause grave distress, when the defendant’s position in relation to the plaintiff involves some responsibility aside from the tort itself. Third, where the defendant’s conduct infringed on some legally protected interest apart from causing the claimed distress, even when that conduct was only negligent.” Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or 17, 22-23, 816 P2d 593 (1991) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Claims that fit into the legally protected interest situation are distinguishable from claims that fall into the other two in that “the right to damages for mental distress [is] predicated on the kind of interest invaded, rather than on a particular level of culpability.” Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., Inc., 60 Or App 70, 75, 652 P2d 852 (1982).
Recovery of emotional distress damages for infringement of a legally protected interest constitutes an exception to the usual rule that liability under ordinary negligence does not extend to “solely psychic or emotional injury” in the absence of any actual or threatened harm to the plaintiff. Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or 543, 558-59, 652 P2d 318 (1982). Even though recovery under a legally protected interest theory is an exception to the usual rule, it is neither a recent exception nor inconsistent with prior Oregon cases. See Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or 482, 506, 113 P2d 438 (1941) (“But it is well settled that where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement of a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered * * *. Violation of the right of privacy is a wrong of that character.”); Macca v. Gen. Telephone Co. of N.W., 262 Or 414, 420 n 1, 495 P2d 1193 (1972) (“Allowing recovery for mental suffering and *293anguish unaccompanied by physical injuries under the circumstances of the present case is in accord with previous decisions of this court.”).
For plaintiffs to recover for an infringement of a legally protected interest, their claim must meet three conditions. First, the interest infringed must be a “legally protected interest.” Hilt v. Bernstein, 75 Or App 502, 514-15, 707 P2d 88 (1985), rev den 300 Or 545 (1986). Second, the interest must be “of sufficient importance as a matter of policy to merit protection from emotional impact.” Id. at 515. Third, the plaintiff must have been directly injured by the defendant’s actions. The defendant’s liability is limited to only those parties immediately injured by the defendant’s negligent actions and does not extend to individuals indirectly injured. Norwest, 293 Or at 569.
We have previously classified cases claiming purely emotional damages based on an infringement of a legally protected interest into four categories. Those are: (1) certain intentional torts such as trespass to land, conversion, racial discrimination and intentional interference with contractual relations; (2) private nuisance; (3) invasion of privacy; and (4) miscellaneous cases that include unlawful disinterment of spouse’s remains and infringement of the right to child custody. See Meyer, 60 Or App at 73-74 (listing categories and citing relevant cases). The legally protected interest must arise “independently of the ordinary tort elements of a negligence claim.” Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or 702, 707, 670 P2d 137 (1983). As a consequence, Oregon courts have recognized, as independent claims, interests arising from any of several different sources including interests recognized by common law such as property interests, Macca, 262 Or at 417; interests arising from statutes, Nearing, 295 Or at 707, or from court orders, McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or 781, 789, 562 P2d 540 (1977), and interests arising from special relationships, Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II, 148 Or App 607, 618, 941 P2d 602 (1997), aff'd on other grounds 327 Or 9, 956 P2d 960 (1998).
Here is where I differ with the majority’s analysis: the majority analyzes plaintiffs’ independent legal interest as one that must arise from the relationship between plaintiffs *294and defendant and then concludes that a special relationship does not exist. 167 Or App at 286-87. The majority’s analysis ends there. I do not agree with the majority that the relationship between a bank and its customers is not a special relationship. However, it is not necessary to resolve that issue here because the majority fails to examine whether defendant’s actions also infringed on a legally protected interest arising from common law and, therefore, the majority’s analysis is incomplete. Defendant’s actions did infringe on plaintiffs’ legally protected interest arising from a common-law right to peacefully use and enjoy their property.
The Oregon Supreme Court has twice held that the right to peacefully use and enjoy property is a protected interest. In Macca, the defendant erroneously listed the plaintiffs’ telephone number in the yellow pages directory as the after hours phone number for a florist shop. 262 Or at 415. As a consequence, plaintiffs received multiple phone calls over a period of months which, in turn, interfered with plaintiffs sleep and caused them increased anxiety. Id. at 417. The court held that the defendant’s actions constituted a private nuisance because the repeated telephone calls infringed on the plaintiffs’ right to enjoy property without unreasonable interference and that plaintiffs could recover emotional distress damages. Id. at 418. See also Mark v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 158 Or App 355, 360, 974 P2d 716, rev den 329 Or 479 (1999) (“A private nuisance is an unreasonable nontrespassory interference with another’s private use and enjoyment of land.”). In Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 280 Or 307, 309, 570 P2d 1169 (1977), the defendant’s negligent actions caused water from their irrigation ditch to flood the plaintiffs property. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for “mental anguish” as a result of the defendant’s interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property. Id. at 310. Although fact-matching can be a fool’s errand, in this instance the type of intrusion suffered by plaintiffs (repeated telephone calls over a period of months) and the interest infringed (the right to peacefully use and enjoy one’s property) are indistinguishable from the intrusion experienced in Macea and the interest protected in both Macea and Edwards. Defendant’s actions created a private nuisance and *295resulted in an infringement of plaintiffs’ legally protected interest.
Because plaintiffs’ infringed right falls into one of the four recognized categories of legally protected interests, this court must determine whether the interest invaded is of sufficient importance to warrant the award of damages for emotional distress. Collver v. Salem Insurance Agency, Inc., 132 Or App 52, 65-66, 887 P2d 836 (1994), rev den 320 Or 598 (1995). Again, Macea and Edwards hold that the right to peaceful use and enjoyment of one’s property merits protection from emotional impact. Macca, 262 Or at 419-20; Edwards, 280 Or at 310. That conclusion is supported by Meyer, which concluded that, although the right to recover for emotional distress does not extend to every harm to property interests, infringements that amount to a private nuisance are sufficiently significant to warrant recovery for emotional distress damages. 60 Or App at 79-80.
The significance of the interest at issue before us would diminish if that interest were solely economic. This court has consistently held that solely economic interests do not merit an award of emotional damages. See Collver, 132 Or App at 66 (even if the right to a driver’s license is a legally protected interest, it is primarily an economic interest and is not of sufficient importance to warrant award of emotional damages); Hilt, 75 Or App at 515 (the right to share equitably in marital assets is an economic interest); Flowers v. Bank of America, 67 Or App 791, 794, 679 P2d 1385, rev den 297 Or 601 (1984) (contractual right to have a credit card honored). Plaintiffs’ interest here is in the peaceful use of their home and is not merely economic. Plaintiffs’ interest merits protection.
Finally, plaintiffs were directly injured by defendant’s actions. The harm plaintiffs suffered was not the result of defendant’s negligent actions towards a third party, as was the case in Norwest. Rather, the direct consequence of defendant’s actions was that plaintiffs suffered harassing telephone calls from bill collectors over a period of several months. Plaintiffs therefore satisfy all three conditions *296required to recover emotional distress damages for an infringement of a legally protected interest.
As the majority notes, plaintiffs’ claim can withstand summary judgment if it can otherwise support the recovery of emotional distress damages. 167 Or App at 286. It does.1 Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s award of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.
I respectfully dissent.

 The majority takes the dissent to task for reaching an issue not raised. Yet, as the majority correctly notes, it is this court’s duty to determine if ‘Tpllaintiffs’ claim, even if misdenominated, could, nevertheless, withstand summaryjudgment if [the claim] could otherwise support the recovery of emotional distress damages only.” 167 Or App at 286.