Court Opinion

ID: 9893385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 19:13:11.80869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:00.557666
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                                FILED
                                  September 2023 Term
                                                                         October 26, 2023
                                _____________________                        released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                         EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                         SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                     No. 22-0036                              OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                _____________________

                         SANDY M. AND SANTANA M.,
                 Co-Guardians and Co-Conservators of DONALD M.,
                           Defendants Below, Petitioners,

                                            v.

                                       DONALD M.,
                               Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

       ___________________________________________________________

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wayne County
                     The Honorable James H. Young, Jr., Judge
                             Civil Action No. 19-C-66

                               AFFIRMED
        _________________________________________________________

                           Submitted: September 26, 2023
                              Filed: October 26, 2023

Michael S. Bailey, Esq.                            Cayman M. Jarrell, Esq.
Bailey Legal Services, PLLC                        Jarrell Law Office
Barboursville, West Virginia                       Wayne, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioners                            Counsel for Respondent

JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit

court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. The

final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,

and the circuit court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous

standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc.

v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).

              2.     “To establish title to land under an alleged lost deed, on parol

testimony, proof that it existed, and of its contents, must be clear and conclusive.” Syl. Pt.

1, Lucas v. Hensley, 81 W. Va. 239, 94 S.E. 138 (1917).

              3.     “The proponent of a lost or missing instrument must prove its

existence and contents with clear and conclusive evidence.” Syl. Pt. 2, Estate of Bossio v.

Bossio, 237 W. Va. 130, 785 S.E.2d 836 (2016).

                                              i
WOOTON, Justice:

              Sandy M. and Santana M. (collectively “the petitioners”) 1 are the guardians

and conservators of the father. 2 They appeal the December 14, 2021, order entered by the

Circuit Court of Wayne County, West Virginia, declaring the respondent Donald Gene

M. as the owner in fee of all of the property and all the appurtenances of the property in

dispute (“the disputed property”) after conducting a bench trial. 3 The court determined

that the respondent by “clear and strong” evidence had established all the required

elements necessary to prove that the disputed property had been conveyed by the father

to the respondent in a deed that had been signed by the father but thereafter was lost or

stolen, and that the petitioners “did not present any witnesses or evidence to contradict”

the respondent’s evidence. The court also found that the respondent had established that

he was entitled to title to the disputed property under a theory of adverse possession. The

       Sandy M. and Santana M. are also Donald M.’s (“the father”) daughters and will
       1

be referred to throughout this opinion by their respective names. The case originally
included another daughter of the father, Cherry S., who was identified as a conservator and
guardian; however, Cherry S. had a “change of heart” after the filing of the answer in this
case and testified on behalf of her brother, the respondent Donald Gene M. She does not
appear as a petitioner in the instant appeal.

      The father has been declared a protected person lacking capacity by order entered
       2

on May 22, 2018, and has remained a protected person throughout these proceedings.
       3
         The respondent, Cherry S., and the respondent’s nephew, Mason S., all testified
during the trial. The petitioners did not call any witnesses or present any evidence.
                                             1
petitioners argue 4 that the circuit court erred in its findings of fact and conclusions of law

relative to lost documents, the statute of frauds, and adverse possession, claiming that the

findings of fact were contrary to the weight of the evidence and the legal conclusions

were based on a misapplication of law. After considering the parties’ briefs and oral

arguments, the appendix record, the applicable law, and all other matters before the Court,

we find that the circuit court did not err in granting title of the disputed property to the

respondent, as the evidence established that the deed conveying the disputed property

       4
         The petitioners set forth five assigned errors including: 1) the court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law are against the weight of the evidence and are based on
misapplication of the law in regard to lost documents, the statute of frauds, and adverse
possession; 2) the court’s application of the law to the facts erroneously awarded ownership
of the real property under a theory of a lost or stolen document when the only evidence of
this was the respondent’s own self-serving testimony that a subsequent (but allegedly
identical) deed was prepared and executed despite the lack of written or documented
evidence of such a deed; 3) the court erred in its application of the law to the facts to award
ownership of real property under a theory of adverse possession as to the entirety of the
ninety-two acres despite the fact that the respondent’s use of the property was with the
father’s knowledge and permission; 4) the court erred in is application of the law to the
facts to award ownership of real property under a theory of adverse possession as to the
entirety of the ninety-two acres despite the respondent’s own testimony that he did not use,
improve, or control any position of the bottom half of said property; and 5) the court erred
in its decision to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence to recognize a claim for
“lost or stolen document” when such possible amendment was not raised for the first time
until the court’s final order as such claim was not asserted by the respondent. The
petitioners set forth these assigned errors in a haphazard and redundant manner. For ease
of review, we consolidate the assigned errors as did the petitioners in the argument portion
their brief. See Evans v. Holt, 193 W. Va. 578, 581 n.2, 457 S.E.2d 515, 518 n.2 (1995)
(“For ease of discussion, those assignments of error that are redundant are consolidated
conceptually herein.”).

                                               2
from the father to the respondent was lost or stolen. 5 Accordingly, we affirm the circuit

court’s decision.

       5
         The petitioners also argue that the circuit court erred in finding that the respondent
established the elements needed to prove adverse possession. We agree. Under West
Virginia law, “[t]he burden is upon the party who claims title by adverse possession to
prove by clear and convincing evidence all elements essential to such title.” Syl. Pt. 2,
Brown v. Gobble, 196 W. Va. 559, 474 S.E.2d 489 (1996). In this regard,

              [][o]ne who seeks to assert title to a tract of land under the
              doctrine of adverse possession must prove each of the
              following elements for the requisite statutory period [which is
              ten years]: (1) That he has held the tract adversely or hostilely;
              (2) That the possession has been actual; (3) That it has been
              open and notorious (sometimes stated as visible and
              notorious); (4) That possession has been exclusive; (5) That
              possession has been continuous; (6) That possession has been
              under claim of title or color of title.[]

Id. at 566, 474 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and
Erection Co., 160 W. Va. 84, 232 S.E.2d 524 (1977)); see W. Va. Code § 55-2-1 (2016)
(establishing ten-year statutory period).

       Here, the respondent testified that he acted with the father’s permission in his use
of the property and, in fact, believed the property had been gifted to him by the father. The
respondent’s permissive use of the property defeats any claim of adverse possession. As
this Court recognized in Fantasia v. Schmuck, 183 W. Va. 361, 395 S.E.2d 784 (1990),

              [i]f the use of the land in dispute is permissive, the element of
              hostility or adversity is negated. “It is elementary that adverse
              possession cannot be permissive. . . . Permissive possession is
              not considered to be the possession of the occupant but is
              considered to remain the possession of the party on whose
              pleasure the permissive possession depends.” 3 Am.Jur.2d
              Adverse Possession § 52 (1986) (footnotes omitted).

Fantasia, 183 W. Va. at 363, 395 S.E.2d at 786. Thus, the circuit court erred in its
determination that the respondent proved all the requisite elements of adverse possession
of the disputed property. Nevertheless, the circuit court’s decision is still properly affirmed
by this Court as discussed infra in greater detail. “This Court may, on appeal, affirm the
judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal
                                              3
                          I. Facts and Procedural Background

              On February 9, 1989, the respondent acquired land adjoining the father’s

property; however, the respondent’s property did not provide access to any improved

roadway. The respondent testified that the father told him that he (the father) would give

the respondent the land adjacent to the respondent’s property (“the disputed property”).

Based on the father’s assurances, the respondent testified that he made (and paid for)

improvements to the disputed property, including building a road, which involved

clearing trees, setting off dynamite, and filling in with extensive amounts of gravel. The

respondent testified that in or about 1990 he fenced in the disputed property and installed

three gates, which restricted access to the road he had constructed. The respondent also

testified that he installed relay stations so that city water could be pumped onto the

property and cleared trees along each side of the road so that electricity could be run to

the property. The respondent further testified that in or about 2008 he paid approximately

$110,000 to have a home built on the disputed property for his daughter. 6

ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the
lower court as the basis for its judgment.” Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246,
140 S.E.2d 466 (1965).
       6
         This portion of the disputed property was conveyed by the father to the
respondent’s daughter, Tiffany B., and her husband by deed dated January 24, 2013,
reserving a life estate in the property for the respondent and his wife. No issue is raised in
regard to this conveyance. The father also conveyed a parcel of the disputed property to
the respondent’s son, Jeremy M., by deed dated February 5, 2013. There also is no issue
pertaining to this conveyance.

                                              4
              In 2012, the father and the respondent decided to formalize the father’s gift

of the disputed property to the respondent by executing a deed conveying the property.

The father walked the disputed property with the respondent, driving stakes into the

ground delineating the property boundaries. The respondent testified that the father then

hired True Line Surveying, Inc., to survey the disputed property using the stakes that the

father and the respondent had placed in the ground. In March 2012, Wayne County

Surveyor Randy Thompson prepared a survey and plat of the boundaries of the disputed

property. Mr. Thompson revised the survey on October 22, 2012, to reflect the parcels

contained within the disputed property boundaries that were to be conveyed to the

respondent’s daughter and son. 7

              The respondent testified that after the father looked over the survey and

accompanying plat, the father told him to go have a deed prepared memorializing a

conveyance of the disputed property to the respondent, but reserving a life estate in the

       7
         Although not relevant to the resolution of this matter, it is apparent from the record
that in preparation of conveying the disputed property from the father to the respondent,
the disputed property was first surveyed in 2012 based on the stakes that the father had
placed in the ground. Thereafter, this original survey was revised due to the anticipated
conveyances of certain parcels contained therein by the father to the respondent’s son and
daughter, as the respondent’s daughter already had a home on the parcel that was conveyed
to her. See supra note 6. The record reflects that the deed in regard to the disputed property
was prepared in 2012 and included the property description based on the October 22, 2012,
revised survey, so logically the deed was prepared after the revised survey. As indicated
in footnote six, the deeds to respondent’s daughter and son were executed and recorded in
early 2013.
                                              5
property for the father. 8 The respondent had attorney Don Jarrell prepare a deed

conveying the disputed property from the father to the respondent, and the respondent

paid attorney Jarrell for the preparation of this deed. The respondent picked the deed up

when it was ready and took it to the father, who was not at home. The respondent stated

that his sister, Sandy M., was at the father’s home and he showed the deed to her. When

she saw that the deed had been prepared by attorney Jarrell, she told the respondent: “we

want one from Mr. [Lycan],” who also was an attorney. Thus, this first deed was never

executed.

              The respondent testified that he went to attorney David Lycan and asked

him to prepare a deed identical to the one that had been prepared by attorney Jarrell. The

respondent also paid for the preparation of this deed. When the second deed was ready,

the respondent testified that he accompanied his father to attorney Lycan’s office. The

respondent stated that he and his father picked up the deed and took it to the car so that

the father could read it “and go over the plat and everything step-by-step, which we did.”

The father told him, “It’s perfect.” The two went back into attorney Lycan’s office, where

the respondent watched the father sign the deed. The father’s signature was notarized by

attorney Lycan’s secretary, Pilar Harrison, who put her seal on the document. Ms.

Harrison then told the respondent that she could have the deed recorded, and that it would

       8
        There was no objection by the petitioners to the admission of the unexecuted deed
as “being offered for purposes of identification by [the respondent] being the one he asked
Don Jarrell’s office to produce.”
                                             6
cost seventy-eight dollars for that service. The respondent testified that he paid attorney

Lycan in cash for preparing the deed, and for the costs and fees associated with recording

the deed; he was given a receipt for the services rendered, but did not retain the receipt.

Neither the respondent nor the father was given a copy of the executed deed.

              The deed was not recorded. The respondent testified that shortly thereafter

he called attorney Lycan’s office to confirm that the deed had been recorded, and was

informed by Ms. Harrison that it had not been. The respondent testified that he was told

his sisters had picked up the deed and took it with them. He asked: “How could you give

my deed away to somebody else?” and was told, “Well, they said that they would take

care of it, and I thought it would be all right.” The respondent then went to the father’s

home and asked his sister, Sandy M., “Where’s my deed at?” and was told that she had

put the deed with their father’s will. When the respondent asked the father if this is was

what he wanted, the father responded, “they got it with my will,” adding “You know it’s

yours. It’s every bit yours.” Finally, the father told him, “At my death, they will give it

to you.”

              Cherry S. testified that her sister Sandy M. was friends with Ms. Harrison.

According to Cherry S., Ms. Harrison called Sandy M. and told her that their brother and

father had been to attorney Lycan’s office to get a deed signed, and asked if she wanted

to come to the office to see the deed. Cherry S. went to the Lycan office with Sandy M.,

and they collected the deed from Ms. Harrison. Cherry S. testified that she saw the deed,

                                             7
and that the deed had been signed by the father and notarized. She stated that she knew

the father wanted the respondent to have the disputed property and that she and her sister

“should’ve never went down there and got the deed, and brought it up there, because that

has nothing to do with us. My dad wanted my brother to have that [referring to the

disputed property.]”

              The respondent also called as a witness his nephew (and the father’s

grandson) Mason S. Mason S. testified that his aunt Sandy M. was informed about the

executed deed by Ms. Harrison and that Sandy M. schemed that “[o]ne day, we can get

money [out] of all this because we’ve got his [the respondent’s] driveway.”

              The respondent testified that the father suffered a stroke in 2015, 9 which,

as the undisputed evidence of record shows, was after the father had executed both the

deed to the disputed property and his will. 10 A guardianship/conservator proceeding was

       9
          The petitioners indicate in their brief that the stroke occurred in 2015. We note
that the circuit court found that the father also suffered from dementia, which finding is not
disputed.

       10
         The father executed a will on October 23, 2014. He discussed his will with the
respondent, and asked the respondent what property he would like to receive. The
respondent testified that because he had already received the disputed property through
the deed the father had executed, he asked the father for the Mathis Ridge property. The
father’s will contains a provision bequeathing the Mathis Ridge property to the
respondent.

                                              8
instituted and, according to the petitioners’ brief, the father was recognized as a protected

person in 2018. During that proceeding, the father’s will was read, at which time the

respondent realized that there was no mention of the deed conveying the disputed property

to him despite the fact that the deed was supposed to have been kept with the father’s will.

As a result, the respondent testified, he became concerned about the whereabouts of the

deed.

              On April 18, 2019, the respondent filed a complaint against his sisters, who

were the guardians and conservators for their father. He alleged in the complaint that in

2012 the father had conveyed title to the disputed property to him by a deed executed by

the father and notarized by attorney Lycan’s secretary, but that “deed was never recorded

by The Law Office of David Lycan;” that the respondent had title to the land under a

claim of adverse possession because he “held [the disputed property] under a code of title

for more than ten years, as well as upkeep and maintenance[;]” and that the petitioners

were “unjustly enriched by the improvements that [the respondent] built upon the land

that was promised to have been his land.” 11 The petitioners then filed a motion for

         The circuit court found the unjust enrichment count to be without merit, because
        11

the respondent had “not offered any reliable or admissible evidence in the record that can
establish either the cost or value of any such improvements including for creation and
maintenance of the road, utilities, or fencing.” The respondent does not appeal this ruling
and therefore he has waived any claim of error with regard to the unjust enrichment count.
See Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W. Va. 135, 140 n.10, 506 S.E.2d 578,
583 n.10 (1998); Syl. Pt. 6, Addair v. Bryant, 168 W. Va. 306, 284 S.E.2d 374
(1981)(“Assignments of error that are not argued in the brief on appeal may be deemed by
this Court to be waived.”).
                                              9
summary judgment, and it was in the summary judgment proceedings that the issue of the

deed being lost or stolen arose. The circuit court denied the petitioners’ motion for

summary judgment, finding that there “remain disputed issues of material fact, the most

notable of which at this time are questions as to whether the deed Plaintiff claims to have

had was taken by one of the Defendants and refused to be returned.” Thereafter, the

matter proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the circuit court declared

that the respondent was the owner in fee of all the disputed property as described in the

court’s order. The petitioners appeal.

                                 II. Standard of Review

              The petitioners’ alleged errors challenge the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in the final order entered by the circuit court following a bench trial.

Our standard of review provides:

                     In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions
              of the circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged
              deferential standard of review is applied. The final order and
              the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of
              discretion standard, and the circuit court’s underlying factual
              findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
              Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d

538 (1996). With these standards in mind, we address the issues before us.

                                            10
                                       III. Discussion

              The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in finding that the respondent

proved the necessary elements to establish his claim to title in the disputed property by

clear and convincing evidence. 12 Conversely, the respondent contends that the court

properly relied upon “the Lost Document Theory . . . to declare the Plaintiff/Respondent

the owner in fee to the property in question[,]” because he proved the elements of “a lost

document by clear, strong, and conclusive evidence at trial.” We agree with the respondent.

              It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence governing property transactions that West

Virginia Code section 36-1-1 (2011), commonly known as the statute of frauds, requires a

deed or will to create an interest in real estate as follows:

                     No estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of
              more than five years, in lands, or any other interest or term
              therein of any duration under which the whole or any part of

       12
          The petitioners also challenge the circuit court’s credibility determinations made
in regard to the witnesses who testified on the respondent’s behalf, and the court’s
determination, over the petitioners’ hearsay objection, that the respondent could testify
about any actions he took based on conversations that he had with the father but he could
not testify as to “the words that were spoken [by the father]” because the father had been
adjudicated a protected person and thus would not have been competent to testify.

          We find the petitioners’ challenges to be unavailing; evidentiary rulings and
credibility determinations are left to the sound discretion of the circuit court. See Syl. Pt.
1, in part, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995) (“The West
Virginia Rules of Evidence . . . allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making
evidentiary . . . rulings. Thus, rulings on the admissibility of evidence . . . are committed to
the discretion of the trial court. Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary
. . . rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard.”). Nothing in the
record of this case would support a finding that the circuit court abused its discretion either
in its evidentiary rulings or its credibility determinations.
                                              11
              the corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed,
              except for domestic use, shall be created or conveyed unless by
              deed or will.

Id.

              In regard to a deed, West Virginia Code section 36-3-4 (2011) requires that

“[a]ny instrument which shows on its face a present intent to pass the title to, or any

interest, present or future, in real property, shall, if properly executed and delivered, be

given effect according to its manifest intent.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Syl. Pt. 1,

Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962) (“A valid

written instrument which expresses the intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous

language is not subject to judicial construction or interpretation but will be applied and

enforced according to such intent.”). Succinctly stated, a deed must sufficiently describe

the property that the parties intend to be conveyed, it must be executed by the grantor, and

it must be delivered. See W. Va. Code § 36-3-4.

              With regard to description, this Court stated in Sally-Mike Properties v.

Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 332 S.E.2d 597 (1985), that

              [a] deed of conveyance, in order to pass title, must contain a
              description of the property being conveyed which sufficiently
              identifies the land, either by the language of the granting clause
              itself or by reference to extrinsic facts which render the
              description certain. See, e.g. Consolidated Coal Company v.
              Mineral Coal Company, 147 W. Va. 130, 126 S.E.2d 194
              (1962); Meadow River Lumber Company v. Smith, 126 W. Va.
              847, 30 S.E.2d 392 (1944); Jones v. Gibson, 118 W. Va. 66,
              188 S.E. 773 (1936).

                                             12
175 W. Va. at 301-02, 332 S.E.2d at 602. Further, “[d]elivery of a deed by the grantor with

intent that it take effect as his deed and its acceptance, express or implied, by the grantee

are essential to its validity.” Syl. Pt. 3, Bennett v. Neff, 130 W. Va. 121, 42 S.E.2d 793

(1947); accord Syl. Pt. 5, Walls v. Click, 209 W. Va. 627, 550 S.E.2d 605 (2001).

“Recording of the deed is not critical . . . to its validity.” Jones v. Wolfe, 203 W. Va. 613,

615, 509 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998).

              With the foregoing in mind, this case turns on whether the circuit court erred

in determining that the respondent’s parol evidence clearly and convincingly established

that a legally valid deed conveying the disputed property to him existed, but had been lost

or stolen. Generally,

                      [t]he effect of a delivered deed to pass title is not
              affected as between the parties by the fact that the deed is
              thereafter lost or destroyed. The fact that a deed was lost or
              misplaced does not destroy the title of those claiming under it,
              nor revert it in a grantor, provided the instrument once existed
              and fulfilled the formalities required by law. The failure to
              record a deed does not deprive a person of the opportunity to
              assert a claim of legal title to property, and a lost deed may be
              established in order to prove title.

52 Am. Jur. 2d Lost and Destroyed Instruments § 6 (2023) (footnotes omitted).

              Our precedents in regard to establishing a conveyance of property by a deed

that was thereafter lost or stolen uniformly provide that

              [t]he spirit of our law is that title to land shall pass only by deed
              or will, and where it is sought to set up title under a lost deed,

                                               13
              the evidence of the execution of such deed, of the contents
              thereof, and of its delivery, must be clear and convincing,
              approaching in dignity the conclusiveness of a written
              instrument. This rule has been laid down and adhered to by this
              court and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia without
              exception, and we think it is a rule based upon sound
              considerations of public policy.

Lucas v. Hensley, 81 W. Va. 239, 240, 94 S.E. 138, 139 (1917). This holding has remained

unchanged and unchallenged since it was first articulated more than a century ago. See

Syl. Pt. 6, Shaffer v. Shaffer, 69 W. Va. 163, 71 S.E. 111 (1911) (“If an ancient deed be

lost, but its existence and contents be proven by oral evidence, and it be also proven to have

been recently in the possession of and produced by the grantee, and such account thereof

is given, as might be reasonably expected, under all the circumstances, such oral evidence

is admissible to establish such deed or grant, without otherwise proving the due execution

and delivery thereof; and such deed will be treated as presumptively genuine, until such

presumption is overcome by evidence to the contrary.”); Syl. Pt. 1, Telluric Co. v. Bramer,

76 W. Va. 185, 85 S.E. 177 (1915) (“To establish or set up a lost instrument rising to the

dignity and importance of a muniment of title, the evidence of its former existence, loss,

and contents must be clear, strong, and conclusive.”). In Lucas, the Court reiterated its

prior holdings in a new syllabus point: “To establish title to land under an alleged lost deed,

on parol testimony, proof that it existed, and of its contents, must be clear and conclusive.”

Id. at 239, 94 S.E. at 138, Syl. Pt. 1. We see no reason to alter or amend this holding. See

Marshall v. Elmo Greer & Sons, Inc., 193 W. Va. 427, 429-30, 456 S.E.2d 554, 556-57

(1995) (“Generally, a high degree of proof from one seeking to establish a lost instrument

is required. In Syl. pt. 1, Lucas v. Hensley, 81 W.Va. 239, 94 S.E. 138 (1917) we said, ‘[t]o

                                              14
establish title to land under an alleged lost deed, on parol testimony, proof that it existed,

and of its contents, must be clear and conclusive.’ See Syl., Drake v. Parker, 122 W.Va.

145, 7 S.E.2d 651 (1940) (‘[f]or parol testimony to establish title to land through an alleged

lost instrument, proof of its execution, contents and loss must be conclusive’); Gill v.

Colton, 12 F.2d 531, 534 (4th Cir.1926) (‘[i]t is incumbent upon one seeking to establish

a lost instrument to prove it by evidence of the clearest and most satisfactory character’);

Smith v. Lurty, 108 Va. 799, 800-01, 62 S.E. 789, 790 (1908) (because of the motive of the

party alleging a lost instrument, a high degree of proof is required).”).

              Most recently, in Estate of Bossio v. Bossio, 237 W. Va. 130, 785 S.E.2d 836

(2016), we examined the foregoing precepts in the context of a lost instrument, specifically,

a lost stock purchase agreement. Id. at 133-35, 785 S.E.2d at 839-41. We reiterated that

our consideration of whether a document or instrument was lost or stolen was well

established and grounded in evidentiary principles: 13

       13
           The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in amending the pleadings to
conform to the evidence and to recognize a claim for “lost or stolen document” when the
amendment was not made until the circuit court’s final order. In response, the respondent
concedes that the lost document theory was not explicitly in the pleadings but argues that
he met the elements of a lost document by clear and convincing evidence that was unrefuted
by the petitioners. Critically, the circuit court’s amendment of the pleading was based on
the respondent’s failure to plead any cause of action (contractual or otherwise) based on
his factual allegations as to the existence of a deed and then its mysterious disappearance.
It is this failing that the circuit court sought to correct by amending the respondent’s
pleading.

       Rule 15(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a court to
amend the pleadings to conform with the evidence. See id. (“When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
                                             15
                       As a threshold matter, we observe that Rule 1004(a) of
               the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that an original
               writing is not required to prove its contents where “[a]ll the
               originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting
               in bad faith[.]” In that event, “secondary evidence” is permitted
               to prove the existence and content of a writing. All parties
               appear to agree that, although West Virginia has no blanket
               syllabus point governing all writings, this Court has
               traditionally followed the general rule that “a high degree of
               proof from one seeking to establish a lost instrument is
               required.” Marshall v. Elmo Greer & Sons, Inc., 193 W. Va.
               427, 429, 456 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1995). The Marshall Court
               further cited with approval caselaw regarding lost deeds which
               consistently holds that “proof that [the deed] existed, and of its
               contents, must be clear and conclusive.” Id. (citing Syl. Pt. 1,
               Lucas v. Hensley, 81 W. Va. 239, 94 S.E. 138 (1917)); see also
               Syl., Drake v. Parker, 122 W. Va. 145, 7 S.E.2d 651 (1940)

all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; . . . the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby. . . .”) (emphasis added)); Syl. Pt. 4, Floyd v.
Floyd, 133 S.E.2d 726, 148 W. Va. 183 (1963) (“Under both the old trial procedure in
effect in West Virginia prior to July 1, 1960, and the new procedure in effect on and after
that date as Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings could be amended under control of the
court during the trial of a case to encompass an issue raised by the evidence although not
in the pleadings; but if an issue is so raised in trial and trial by consent of the parties without
such amendment, it is treated as if it had been raised in the pleadings and the failure to
amend will not affect the verdict.”).

        Our review of the appendix record shows that the petitioners neither objected to any
of the evidence introduced by the respondent in regard to the lost or stolen deed, nor offered
any evidence of their own to refute that offered by the respondent. Further, the respondent
did, at least implicitly, raise the “lost or stolen deed” in the complaint as he alleged that he
had an executed and notarized deed from the father that had not been recorded by the
attorney. Further, the circuit court found in its denial of the petitioners’ summary judgment
motion that there remained a disputed factual issue in regard to whether the deed the
respondent allegedly had was taken by one of the petitioners and “refused to be returned.”
Finally, the factual issue of the lost or stolen deed permeated the entire bench trial, as
discussed in greater detail infra. Accordingly, the court did not err in amending the
pleadings.

                                                16
              (“For parol testimony to establish title to land through an
              alleged lost instrument, proof of its execution, content and loss
              must be conclusive.”); Syl., Telluric Co. v. Bramer, 76 W. Va.
              185, 85 S.E. 177 (1915) (“To establish or set up a lost
              instrument rising to the dignity and importance of a muniment
              of title, the evidence of its former existence, loss and contents
              must be clear, strong, and conclusive.”). . . .

                     This precedent is in accord with the majority of
              jurisdictions: “The courts have used a variety of terms to
              describe the standard or degree of proof required to establish
              the existence and contents of a lost instrument, generally
              resting most heavily on the clear and convincing standard.” 52
              Am. Jur. 2d Lost and Destroyed Instruments § 35 (2015).

Estate of Bossio, 237 W. Va. at 134, 785 S.E.2d at 840 (footnotes omitted). Based on the

foregoing, the Court extended the lost or stolen deed principles to other documents or

instruments by holding that “[t]he proponent of a lost or missing instrument must prove its

existence and contents with clear and conclusive evidence.” Id. at 130, 785 S.E.2d at 837,

Syl. Pt. 2.

              In the instant matter, the uncontested evidence introduced during the bench

trial showed that there were two deeds prepared – the first by attorney Jarrell, and the

second, at petitioner’s Sandy M.’s request, by attorney Lycan. The first deed, which was

not executed, was admitted into evidence without objection and contained a full description

of the disputed property that the father intended to convey to the respondent. The

uncontroverted evidence also showed that the second deed, which was prepared by attorney

Lycan, “conveyed, from [the father] to [the respondent], the same property description as

the deed prepared by Attorney Donald Jarrell.” The respondent also introduced evidence

                                             17
of a property description of the disputed property and survey map of the property drafted

by the Wayne County Surveyor Randy Thompson that matched the property descriptions

in both deeds. The respondent also testified that he and the father walked the disputed

property together and placed stakes into the ground delineating the property boundaries.

              The undisputed evidence further showed that the respondent and the father

went to the office of attorney Lycan together when the second deed was ready; that the

father executed the deed after reviewing it; that the deed was notarized; and that the

respondent had possession of the deed after the father executed it, but left it with Ms.

Harrison in response to her suggestion that she take the deed to have it recorded. The

respondent testified that he paid attorney Lycan for his services, including the cost and fees

associated with recording of the deed.

              Thereafter Ms. Harrison called Sandy M. and told her that the executed deed

was at attorney Lycan’s office. Cherry S. testified that she and Sandy M. retrieved the deed

from the attorney’s office before it was recorded. She stated that she saw the executed

deed, which then disappeared despite assurances made to the respondent that it was being

held in safekeeping with the father’s will.

              Based on this evidence, the circuit court determined that the respondent

              established the execution, contents, and loss of the deed
              conclusively. The evidence was clear and strong on all of the
              required elements. Additionally, the Defendants did not

                                              18
              present any witnesses or evidence to contradict Plaintiff’s
              evidence. Defendants did not object to the presentment of this
              evidence by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court FINDS that
              Plaintiff is GRANTED title to the subject property under the
              theory of lost document.

We find no error in the circuit court’s factual findings or conclusions of law in regard to

the respondent’s right to title in the disputed property based on an executed and notarized

deed between the father and the respondent that was later lost or stolen. The circuit court

also did not err in the legal description of the disputed property as set out in detail in the

circuit court’s order entered December 14, 2021. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                   Affirmed.

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