Court Opinion

ID: 9692016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:36:39.932805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.801178
License: Public Domain

MEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that Bahr’s complaint satisfies the plain language of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) because it alleges that Bahr opposed an employment practice forbidden under the MHRA. I would further conclude that Bahr’s complaint is sufficiently pled because it alleges that Bahr objected to an employment practice that she reasonably and in good faith believed was forbidden under the MHRA. Because Bahr’s complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, I would affirm.
In her complaint, Bahr alleged the following. Bahr managed L.A., an African-American woman who was transferred to Bahr’s department after L.A.’s position in *86another department was eliminated. Within a few months, Bahr noticed that L.A.’s performance was below standard. Bahr attempted to provide informal coaching efforts, but L.A. “demonstrated little to no improvement.”
On several occasions Bahr conveyed concerns regarding L.A.’s below standard performance to Capella’s Human Resources Department and to her supervisor. In January 2007, Bahr asked Nichole Scott, a Human Resources representative, for guidance in improving L.A.’s performance. On March 7, 2007, Bahr told her supervisor, Scott, and Seth Lockner (another Human Resources representative), that L.A.’s performance warranted placement on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Lockner told Bahr to “move slowly with [L.A.] ” and not to move forward with the PIP. Such resistance to a PIP was highly unusual.
On March 27, 2007, after other employees “expressed their frustrations” with L.A.’s work performance, Bahr again voiced her concerns to Human Resources. Scott told Bahr “to move more slowly ... [with L.A.] than she had ever moved on a performance issue” because L.A. had a racially-based employment history with the university, and Capella wanted to avoid action that could result in the filing of a discrimination lawsuit by L.A. Scott also told Bahr that L.A.’s situation was “known and monitored by the highest levels in the organization, including [the president and CEO].” Scott further directed that Bahr delay L.A.’s annual performance review to permit the legal department to examine the review before it was given to L.A.
Bahr completed the performance review and did not give it to L.A. but rather gave the review to Scott. Because L.A.’s review fell below the minimum standards, Scott instructed Bahr to “minimize the performance issues raised,” “do the right thing,” and provide “balance” to L.A.’s review. Scott told Bahr to continue delaying L.A.’s review, so that the Human Resources Department could “take a fine tooth comb through it” and “vet it through legal.” It is alleged that Human Resources did not examine the performance reviews of any other employee.
Bahr told her supervisor and Human Resources on several occasions that Capella’s handling of L.A.’s situation was discriminatory to both L.A. and L.A.’s coworkers. When Bahr suggested on April 11, 2007, that L.A. be placed on a formal plan for improvement, she noted that Capella’s treatment of L.A. was “unfair and discriminatory to [L.A.] and to other employees.” Five days later, when Bahr was planning to meet with L.A. to discuss performance issues, Bahr stated to Human Resources and her supervisor that “the treatment of [L.A.] was discriminatory and unfair to [L.A.] AND to other people in the department.” On April 19, 2007, Bahr told her supervisor that “she could no longer actively participate in the discriminatory treatment.” On June 12, 2007, Bahr’s supervisor asked her how L.A. was performing. Bahr responded that L.A. was not doing her job, that Bahr’s hands were tied by Human Resources directives, and that she “was unwilling to engage in discriminatory treatment.”
Bahr alleged that Capella retaliated against her by firing her because she opposed its discriminatory conduct. Bahr had previously been promoted. In April 2007, when Bahr met with her supervisor regarding the complaints relating to managing L.A., he praised Bahr’s performance but stated that there was a “general belief’ that Bahr was “intimidating.” While Bahr’s earlier request for a 360-review of her department had been denied, Capella ordered a 360-review after Bahr com*87plained about “unfair discriminatory treatment.” Through the review, Bahr received high marks from her director and peers but lower marks from her staff, allegedly due to staff perception that Bahr was not properly addressing L.A.’s poor performance. On June 14, 2007, she met with a consultant to discuss how to improve her team’s dynamic. Five days later, she told her supervisor and Human Resources representatives that she had taken steps to improve her team’s work. Bahr’s supervisor stated that he “did not think [Bahr] could turn the situation around to suit him and started to list various options for her termination.” Bahr did not resign and she was then terminated and told to leave.
Bahr’s complaint specifically alleges Capella engaged in unlawful employment practices that violated the MHRA and that Capella engaged in retaliatory conduct against Bahr due to her “good faith reports of discriminatory treatment and refusal[] to participate in discriminatory employment practices.” To establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) statutorily protected conduct; (2) adverse action (against plaintiff); and (3) a causal connection between the two. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn.2001). The parties do not dispute whether the second and third elements were satisfied. The only disputed issue is whether Bahr engaged in “statutorily protected conduct.”
Two possible standards govern whether a plaintiff has alleged statutorily protected conduct under the MHRA: the actual-violation standard or the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard.1 See Barbara Linde-mann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 416-17 (Supp.2000). To plead a viable complaint under the actual-violation standard, a plaintiff must allege that she suffered retaliation for opposing conduct that actually violates the MHRA. See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.Supp. 300 (M.D.Ga.1975); Winsey v. Pace Coll., 394 F.Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y.1975). To plead a viable complaint under the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard, a plaintiff must allege that she reasonably and in good faith believed that the conduct she opposed was discriminatory. See, e.g., Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir.1981); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
In construing the MHRA, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2008). When possible, we construe the MHRA to give effect to all its provisions. See id.; see also City of W. St. Paul v. Krengel, 768 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn.2009). If the words of the MHRA are unambiguous, we apply their plain meaning. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16. If the words are ambiguous, we examine factors beyond the MHRA’s text to determine legislative intent. See id.
The MHRA reprisal provision states:
*88It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any individual who participated in the alleged discrimination as a[n] ... employer ... to intentionally engage in any reprisal against any person because that person:
(1) [ojpposed a practice forbidden under this chapter....
A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment. It is a reprisal for an employer to do any of the following with respect to an individual because that individual has engaged in the activities listed in clause (1) or (2): refuse to hire the individual; depart from any customary employment practice; transfer or assign the individual to a lesser position in terms of wages, hours, job classification, job security, or other employment status; or inform another employer that the individual has engaged in the activities listed in clause (1) or (2).
Minn.Stat. § 363A.15 (2008) (emphasis added). The MHRA public policy provision states that it is, in part, the public policy of Minnesota to secure for all persons freedom from employment discrimination due to race. See Minn.Stat. § 363A.02, subd. 1(a)(1) (2008). It further provides that it is state policy to “protect all persons from wholly unfounded charges of discrimination.” Minn.Stat. § 363A.02, subd. 1(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
Bahr alleges facts that are sufficient to establish an actual violation of Minn.Stat. § 363A.15, the reprisal provision. First, the conduct she alleges is discriminatory. The MHRA defines “discriminate” to include segregate or separate. Minn.Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 13 (2008). In other words, discriminatory conduct is conduct that segregates or separates on the basis of race. Capella separated L.A. from other employees by refusing to offer L.A. assistance in improving her job performance that it offered to other employees. Bahr was not instructed to “move slowly” or depart from standard performance improvement methods with any other employee. Capella also separated L.A. in the performance review process because L.A. was the only employee whose performance review was evaluated by Human Resources and the legal department. Thus, under the definition of discrimination in the MHRA, Capella’s conduct was discriminatory.
Furthermore, Capella retaliated against Bahr for her opposition to its handling of L.A.’s situation. Capella did not order review of Bahr or criticize her performance until after she expressed her objection to Capella’s discriminatory treatment of L.A. and L.A.’s coworkers. According to Bahr’s complaint, Capella abandoned procedures afforded other managers to improve their performance before termination when it terminated Bahr. Finally, Bahr’s supervisor directly told Bahr that she was fired because she could not “turn the situation [regarding L.A.] around” to satisfy him. Drawing favorable inferences for Bahr and accepting the allegations in her complaint as true, Capella’s conduct constitutes reprisal under the MHRA.
The plain language of section 363A.15 does not require individuals opposing discrimination to establish that discrimination actually occurred. The MHRA requires only an allegation of discrimination to protect a person from reprisal. The alleged discrimination must be based on opposition to a practice forbidden by the MHRA, but alleged discrimination is distinct from actual discrimination.
While a person opposing a practice believed to be discriminatory need not establish actual discrimination, the MHRA also reflects that the Act’s reprisal provision does not protect frivolous or meritless alie-*89gations of discrimination. “It is also the public policy of this state to protect all persons from wholly unfounded charges of discrimination.” Section 363A.02, subd. 1(b). I suggest that a “wholly unfounded” claim means conduct that could not reasonably be believed to be discriminatory or that the person asserting the claim does not actually believe to be discriminatory. Because the MHRA does not protect frivolous allegations of discrimination, it follows that an allegation of discrimination must be reasonable and made in good faith. Frivolous opposition to an employment practice is not protected under the Act from reprisal.
Courts interpreting Title VII’s substantially similar retaliation provision have not required proof of actual discrimination. Title VII’s retaliation provision is in substance similar to the MHRA reprisal provision:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this sub-chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Every federal circuit court that handles Title VII claims has adopted the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard.2 We typically look to federal cases interpreting Title VII when construing the MHRA’s legislative intent. See, e.g., Fletcher v. St Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.1999) (“In construing the MHRA, we apply law developed in federal cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”).
The good-faith, reasonable-belief standard comports with the public policy objectives codified in the MHRA. See Minn.Stat. § 363A.02 (2008). As noted, the MHRA is intended to free persons from employment discrimination. Id., subd. 1(a)(1). Requiring a plaintiff to satisfy an actual-violation standard would likely chill reprisal claims and undermine the MHRA’s effectiveness in combating discrimination. See, e.g., Hearth v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 436 F.Supp. 685, 688 (D.Minn.1977) (“[TJhis Court believes that appropriate informal opposition to perceived discrimination must not be chilled by the fear of retaliatory action in the event the alleged wrongdoing does not exist.”); see also Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1172 (recognizing that requiring actual discrimination would discourage complaints of discrimination); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir.1981) (describing the “chilling effect” on reporting alleged discrimination that would arise without permitting reasonable belief to support employee opposition to discrimination). The good-faith, reasonable-belief *90standard encourages employees to voice their concerns about discrimination while also protecting employers from frivolous claims of discrimination. Sias, 588 F.2d at 695 (adopting the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard in part to prevent “chill[ing]” employees from filing claims). The standard also encourages employees to call their employers’ attention to discriminatory practices of which the employer might be unaware. Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980). In these ways, the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard facilitates the MHRA’s public policy goal of eliminating employment discrimination. See Minn. Stat. § 368A.02, subd. 1(a)(1). Because it furthers the MHRA’s stated public policy goals, I would adopt the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard to govern retaliation claims under the MHRA.
Bahr’s complaint satisfies the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard. To allege discrimination in good faith, an employee must have an “honestly held” belief that the employer was engaged in discriminatory practices. Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir.1980). In her complaint, Bahr alleges that she informed her supervisor and Capella’s Human Resources Department on several occasions that she believed that Capella’s actions were discriminatory to both L.A. and L.A.’s coworkers. Construing the allegations as true, Bahr’s opposition to Capella’s conduct was “honestly held” and therefore in good faith. See Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 791 n. 1 (Minn.2005).
To hold a reasonable belief, an employee must allege behavior that a reasonable person could have believed constituted unlawful discrimination. Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1997). Bahr alleged that Capella officials told her that they were handling L.A.’s situation differently because L.A. had a “racially based” history with the organization, and they wanted to avoid a discrimination lawsuit. Bahr further alleged that it was “highly unusual” to delay placement of an employee on a PIP and that L.A.’s performance review was handled differently from that of any other employee. A reasonable person may believe that treating one employee in this different manner due to her race is unlawful discrimination. Moreover, drawing favorable inferences for Bahr, we may assume that L.A.’s coworkers were not African-American. A reasonable person may also believe that treating L.A.’s coworkers differently because they are not African-American is also unlawful discrimination.3 Accordingly, construing her allegations as true and drawing inferences in her favor, Bahr’s complaint satisfies the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard. Bahr alleged an honestly held belief that discrimination occurred, and a reasonable person could believe that Capella’s alleged conduct was unlawfully discriminatory.
Because Bahr’s complaint satisfies both the good-faith, reasonable-belief standard and the actual-violation standard, I would affirm the court of appeals.

. Federal courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) developed both standards in relation to retaliation claims under Title VII, the federal analog to the MHRA. See Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 416-17, 428-29 (Supp.2000). Federal courts generally applied the actual-violation standard in the first decade after Title VII’s enactment (1965-1975). See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.Supp. 300 (M.D.Ga.1975); Winsey v. Pace Coll., 394 F.Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y.1975). During the same period, the EEOC held that the actual-violation standard was incorrect and took the position that an employee need only show a good-faith, reasonable belief that the practice opposed was discriminatory. Lindemann & Grossman, supra, at 428-29.

. See, e.g., Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir.2008); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir.2008); EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th Cir.2005); Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 525 n. 3 (8th Cir.2005); Crumpacker v. Kan., Dep’t of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir.2003); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996); Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir.1994); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir.1994); Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 909 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir.1990); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1989); Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll, of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir.1988); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C.Cir.1981). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the prevailing interpretation of Title VII, but the Court has not directly addressed the issue. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam).

. This is not to say that positive action programs aimed at reducing discrimination against protected classes are restricted under the MHRA. Minn.Stat. § 363A.02, subd. 1(b) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted as restricting the implementation of positive action programs to combat discrimination.”). Nothing in the record indicates that Capella’s treatment of L.A. was part of a positive action program.