Court Opinion

ID: 9764289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:18:12.325334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.496263
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The appellate history of this case, which case has received a certain amount of local news coverage, reveals that a panel of the Austin Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion by Chief Justice Phillips, unanimously affirmed the conviction of Paul Woodward, appellant.
The panel opinion unanimously rejected appellant’s claim that the law prohibited the admission into evidence at his trial crucial evidence, namely, a pistol, that had been seized without probable cause and without warrant from appellant’s automobile by Keith Riehs, a deputy sheriff of Colorado County.
I believe it is important to point out that in rejecting appellant’s claim and affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals did not cite or discuss a single case that was on all fours, factually and legally, with appellant’s case.
I also point out that the record reflects that a member of the Austin Police Department issued a statewide “BOLO”1 bulletin for a vehicle suspected of being driven by appellant. A dispatcher with the Colorado County Sheriff’s Department received the message and relayed it to Riehs, a patrol officer who was then on duty. When Riehs saw a vehicle traveling through Columbus which matched the description of the vehicle that was contained in the “BOLO” message, he stopped the driver, who was later *350identified as appellant. Although the “BOLO” message did not authorize any law enforcement official to arrest appellant, nevertheless, soon after Riehs came into contact with appellant, he arrested him and subsequently booked him into the Colorado County jail. Thereafter, Riehs reported to a member of the Austin Police Department what he had done, and that person asked Riehs if he had found a gun inside of appellant’s vehicle. Riehs responded he had not. On his own volition, Riehs returned to appellant’s stationery automobile, which appears to have been left in a safe place when Riehs took appellant to jail, and, with assistance from a wrecker driver, Riehs entered appellant’s automobile. After conducting a search and seize mission, Riehs found and seized a pistol, which finding was reported to an Austin police officer. Thereafter, police officers from Austin came to the Colorado County jail where they obtained custody of appellant and the pistol. The record of appeal does not clearly reflect what happened to appellant’s automobile.
After the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, pursuant to the appellate law of this State, appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, which petition was subsequently granted by this Court. In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Clinton, this Court held that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the pistol that had been previously seized by Riehs. The unanimous opinion stated, inter alia, the following:
Therefore, arrest of appellant by Deputy Riehs, on the strength of the BOLO and his own confirmation of the license number [of appellant’s vehicle] violated [appellant’s] constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and under Article I, Section 9; the evidence secured as an incident thereto—the details of which we need not examine— should have been excluded from his trial. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-569, 91 S.Ct. 1031 [1037], 28 L.Ed.2d 306; Barber v. State, 611 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
Thereafter, this Court granted the State’s motion for rehearing, and today affirms appellant’s conviction, holding, among other things, that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence at trial the pistol that had been seized by Riehs from the interior of appellant’s automobile. It also holds that at the time Riehs seized the pistol without warrant he had probable cause to so act.
After carefully studying the majority opinion and reviewing the authorities it cites and discusses, it is obvious to me that a majority of this Court erroneously sustains the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, by holding that when Riehs seized the pistol he had probable cause to seize the pistol without warrant.
Until today’s majority opinion, the law in this State has always been unquestioned as to when an arrest or search made by a law enforcement official pursuant to a “BOLO” message is valid or invalid. The answer to the question, whether the arrest or search is valid, has always depended upon whether the information that was known to the dispatching officer at the time he initiated, transmitted, or sent the “BOLO” message was sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless arrest or search.
The test as to probable cause in such cases where the officers act solely upon a request for arrest is the information known to the officer who requests another officer to effect the arrest. Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Thus, until today’s majority opinion, if a warrantless arrest or search was made pursuant to a “BOLO” message, and was thereafter challenged, it was incumbent upon the State to establish that the officer who initiated or sent the “BOLO” message had probable cause at that time to make a warrantless arrest of the defendant or a warrantless search of a vehicle the defendant was driving when stopped or arrested. If the State failed to establish at a hearing held on the challenge, that probable cause existed at the time the “BOLO” message was sent, then the arrest or search would *351be held unlawful. Of course, because of the illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest or the search became inadmissible at the defendant’s trial. Colston v. State, supra; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The reason that police are permitted to use sophisticated technology such as police radio bulletins, in order for one law enforcement agency to communicate with others, is because we have a large and mobile population. To require communication in this day and time to be solely on a human basis would not be practical.
Notwithstanding the feasibility of using police radio bulletins, there is a strong public policy in this State, as in most other States of the Union, against a rule which would permit police officers to initiate an arrest or search and then justify the arrest or search by information in police hands at the time of the arrest, rather than at the time the directive to arrest or detain issued. “To hold [otherwise] would encourage police officers to issue [“BOLO messages” or] “be on the lookout for” memorandums or other directives to arrest on the hope that additional knowledge will be gained which, together with the information at hand, will constitute probable cause. [Citation Omitted]. An argument may be made that it would be overtechnical to require [a police officer] to withdraw his [“BOLO”] memorandum and issue a new one when he secured facts giving him probable cause to arrest. The answer [to that argument] is that no societal or legitimate police purpose exists for encouraging the issuance of a [“BOLO”] memorandum in the first place without probable cause.” People v. Ford, 150 Cal.App.3d 687, 198 Cal.Rptr. 80, 88 (5th Dist.1984).
In Whiteley v. Warden, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States was confronted with a case where an arrest warrant had issued without probable cause. The warrant information was transmitted over a statewide radio network and was received by a sheriff in another county who, pursuant to the broadcast, arrested the defendant. Several items of evidence were seized and introduced into evidence at the defendant’s trial. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the arresting officer did not have probable cause. In accord with what this and other Courts of this Nation had previously stated, the Supreme Court held that the arrest that was made in reliance upon the radio broadcast, which was based on an invalid warrant, was illegal and would not support the search incident to the arrest of the defendant in that cause. The evidence that had been seized was ruled to be inadmissible evidence.
In Peterson v. State, 292 A.2d 714, 720, 15 Md.App. 478 (Md.Sp.Ct.App.1972), Whiteley was given the following commonsense intérpretation:
The immediate holding of Whiteley was that, just as justification for police action is not diminished in transmission, neither is it enhanced. If the justification is adequate at the point where the message is transmitted, it is no less so at the point where the message is received. Conversely, if the justification is inadequate at the point where the message is transmitted, the inadequacy endures and will not somehow be dissipated on the wires or on the airwaves. In transmission nothing is lost and nothing is gained. [Emphasis Added].
The majority opinion expressly holds that the initiator of the “BOLO” message, a member of the Austin Police Department, “was without probable cause when the statewide BOLO was issued.” (Page 343). In light of this holding, before today, the issue that is before the Court would be simple and easy to resolve. In fact, before the majority erroneously changed the law today, this case could be disposed of by a one sentence opinion, namely: Because the person who initiated the “BOLO” message did not then have probable cause, both appellant’s arrest and the subsequent search of his automobile by Riehs were illegal.
However, and notwithstanding its express holding that at the time Riehs arrested appellant he did not have probable *352cause, and even in the face of a strong public policy of this State that is against a rule of law which would permit the police to initiate an arrest or search and then justify the arrest or search by information in police hands at the time of the arrest, rather than at the time the directive to arrest or search issued, the majority opinion holds that in assessing the probable cause with which Riehs had to arrest appellant, this Court is not restricted to the state of the information that existed at the time the “BOLO” memorandum issued.
Furthermore, by its holding, the majority implicitly overrules Colston v. State, supra, Colston’s progeny, and all cases which have subscribed to the principle stated in Colston, supra.2 It is amazing to me that the majority is able to accomplish what it does when it does not have the appropriate facts or appropriate law applicable to the facts of the case which would support its holding.
The new rule of law now mandated by the majority opinion is that in “BOLO” cases of the future a court may impute to the arresting officer the collective knowledge or information of all law enforcement personnel who may have participated in the case, provided that the knowledge or information consists of any fact that might tend to go to the crime that was committed. Furthermore, it will not be necessary for the arresting officer to be privy to the knowledge or information that others might have, and the fact that the information or knowledge might have resulted from uncoordinated efforts will be immaterial and irrelevant.
Not only does the new rule of law deprecate the Constitutional rights of all our citizens, it is not in accord with what this Court and the Supreme Court have held in the past.
Furthermore, as far as my research reveals, the doctrine of collective knowledge or information of law enforcement officers, working as an uncoordinated team, has never been invoked and applied to establish probable cause to arrest or search the accused. And the majority does not refer me to a single case, Federal, State, or Timbuktu, which holds this.
In formulating its new rule of law, it is obvious that the majority relies on a footnote that appears in Whiteley v. Warden, supra. However, and as Associate Justice Andreen of the California Court of Appeals, Fifth District, further pointed out in People v. Ford, see supra, that although the Supreme Court of the United States in Whiteley v. Warden, supra, in footnote 12 of the opinion, 401 U.S. 568, 91 S.Ct. 1037, did touch upon the possibility of the originating officer securing additional corroborative data after he had issued the directive to stop a defendant, nevertheless, “Thorough research of California and other state and federal cases has failed to reveal any decision which has discussed this footnote in a pertinent manner.” (198 Cal.Rptr. at 85-86).
I must add the following at this point. The majority opinion does not cite or refer the reader to anything contrary to what Justice Andreen has stated. Not even anything from Timbuktu!!!
It would be a needless exercise in pedantry to restate the reasons why, except in the most limited of circumstances, a law enforcement official must never arrest or search without warrant. Nevertheless, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 408 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 175 S.W.2d 214 (1943); Giacona v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 325, 298 S.W.2d 587 (1957); Burton v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 444, 215 S.W.2d 180 (1948).
*353The majority, however, in formulating its new rule of law, relies upon several Federal decisions as support for its holding that both the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless search of his automobile were permissible under the law. However, a careful reading of those decisions should quickly reveal to anyone that the majority’s reliance is misplaced.
Two of its cases are not even factually or legally in point. The facts and holding in Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833 (D.C.Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1008, 87 S.Ct. 1350, 18 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966), and Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.1969), are only mirror images of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959).
The majority also relies upon Wood v. Crouse, 436 F.2d 1077 (10th Cir.1971), cert. denied sub. nom. Wood v. Gaffney, 402 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 2193, 29 L.Ed.2d 432 (1971), a case which Shephard’s Citator reflects has never been cited in either a majority or dissenting opinion by any member of this Court, past or present.
However, Wood v. Crouse, supra, is factually a little closer to this case than is Smith or Moreno-Vallejo, supra, in that at least in that case there is a reference to a “BOLO” type message. However, there, contrary to here, no issue concerning probable cause for either the “BOLO.” message, .the defendant’s arrest, or the search of his vehicle was raised. The issue in that cause concerned whether the police had the right to conduct a belated search of the defendant’s vehicle. The facts reflect that the arresting officer had received a “BOLO” message for a particularly described vehicle. The “BOLO” message also stated that an occupant of the vehicle had tried to pass a check obtained from a recent burglary of a business establishment. The vehicle that the arresting officer stopped matched in all things the vehicle described in the “BOLO” message. A search of the defendant driver revealed a check that had been taken from the recently burglarized business establishment. The driver and his passenger were taken to the county jail. The vehicle was left on the highway. Subsequently, two highway patrol officers saw the abandoned vehicle, made contact with the arresting officer, who asked the patrolmen to bring the vehicle to the county jail, which was done. By the opinion, the two highway patrolmen also had received the same “BOLO” message that the arresting officer had received. The arresting officer asked the highway patrolmen to search the defendant’s vehicle, which they did at the county jail. Additional checks were found inside the defendant’s vehicle by the highway patrolmen. The sole question that was before the panel of the Tenth Circuit was whether the belated search of the vehicle was lawful. Applying Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the panel sustained the search of the vehicle.
In sustaining the search, the panel was careful to point out why it had done so, namely: “The sequence of all the events and the conduct of the officers bring the case within Chambers and the justification for the search still obtained when it was made.” Thus, because there was probable cause to search the vehicle at the scene where the stop and arrest of the defendant had occurred, it was permissible for the arresting officer to advise other law enforcement officials, the highway patrolmen, to conduct a belated search of the vehicle at the county jail.
As previously noted, the panel opinion in Wood v. Crouse, supra, does not reflect that a challenge was made to stopping the defendant’s vehicle or to the “BOLO” message as lacking probable cause. Thus, neither the pertinent facts nor the pertinent law stated in Wood v. Crouse, supra, which relies upon Chambers v. Maroney, supra, are applicable to this cause.
In Chambers v. Maroney, supra, the Supreme Court held that if a police officer has probable cause to search a vehicle at the time and place of the arrest, a search of the vehicle at another time and place, even though done several hours after the arrest, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In sustaining the belated search, the Supreme *354Court expressly stated the following: “For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between ... seizing and holding a car before presenting probable cause issues to a magistrate and ... carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.”
Thus, in Wood v. Crouse, supra, because probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle existed when the initial arrest of the defendant occurred, it was not thereafter necessary to go and obtain a search warrant from a magistrate in order to belatedly search the vehicle. Unquestionably, because the highway patrolmen who searched the defendant’s vehicle had received the same “BOLO” message that caused the arresting officer to take the action he did, which message apparently contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause, was an underlying factor which caused the panel of the Tenth Circuit to hold as it did in Wood v. Crouse, supra.
Thus, both factually and legally, neither Wood v. Crouse, supra, nor Chambers v. Maroney, supra, nor its progeny, are applicable to this cause.
The majority asserts that in Whiteley v. Warden, supra, the Supreme Court left the clear implication that if the arresting officer, although not himself possessed of any factual data tending to corroborate an informer’s tip, see Draper v. United States, supra, nevertheless, had such corroboration existed, then such could be considered in determining whether probable cause existed. The Supreme Court, however, made no such holding.
However, after reading that portion of Whiteley v. Warden, supra, to which the majority opinion refers, it is obvious that what the majority is actually referring to is footnote 12 of the opinion, which states: “The arrest warrant issued at about noon on November 24, 1964 ... State bulletin 881 was broadcast at 3:03 p.m. that same day ... It is apparent that Sheriff Og-burn, [the officer who made the complaint which led to the “BOLO” message being sent], did not himself acquire additional corroborative data possibly supporting a probable-cause arrest after securing the warrant.”
Regardless of what clear implication the Supreme Court may have intended when it put footnote 12 in its opinion, the fact remains that no decision of any court, either Federal or State, or even Timbuktu, has ever discussed, much less applied, what the Supreme Court stated in footnote 12. Furthermore, my research has yet to reveal, and the majority does not cite the reader to a single case, where an arrest or search was sustained when all that was shown was an arrest by a law enforcement official who was acting solely pursuant to an insufficient to sustain probable cause “BOLO” message.
The majority also either misreads or misinterprets Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 46 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). In Carroll, supra, although the Supreme Court said much in its opinion regarding the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, nevertheless, it only held that if there is known to an officer facts constituting probable cause to believe that a vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal merchandise, then an arrest and a search of the vehicle will be sustained. Or to state the primary holding in another way: If the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that criminally related objects are concealed in an automobile he then has the right to search that automobile. Hence, the warrantless search of the vehicle in Carroll, supra, was not unreasonable under the circumstances, because the officers had a probable cause belief, not simply a subjective good faith expectation, which would have been sufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant had their information been laid before a magistrate, even though, in fact, it had not been. Accordingly, the lawful scope for searches under Carroll, supra, is determined precisely the same way as the scope of execution of search warrants.
In Brinegar v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court sustained a search of an *355automobile where it was shown that Federal officers charged with enforcing federal statutes regulating alcoholic beverages were on routine patrol and recognized the driver of an automobile as having been recently involved in illicit liquor transactions, who was then headed toward a well known illegal liquor market. The driver of the vehicle had recently been arrested by one of the officers under the same circumstances. Upon challenge to the existence of probable cause, the Court upheld the validity of the arrest.
From the above, it should be obvious that neither Carroll nor Brinnegar, supra, are applicable to this cause.
Interestingly, in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927), which was an almost identical situation as found in Brinegar, supra, the Supreme Court held that probable cause was not established because the police officers who had searched the automobile of the defendant without warrant had no knowledge at the time of the arrest and search and seizure that the defendant driver of the vehicle had any background or history of illicit activity, nor were the arresting officers cognizant of the commission of any criminal offense.
Notwithstanding it does not have either the facts or the law to support its holding, the majority nevertheless holds the following:
... a minimal showing has been made that the facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the officers involved and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that appellant had committed an offense and that an instrumentality of the offense might be found in the automobile he drove.
Although I am not yet ready to accept the new rule of law the majority opinion gives birth to, nevertheless, I have diligently searched the opinion for facts, other than appellant’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless entry into appellant’s automobile by Riehs, that added to the collective order of things. The best that I can determine is that the facts the majority states that Riehs had, which the majority asserts were of a corroborative nature, are those facts which the majority implicitly states that the author of the unanimous original opinion obviously overlooked in holding that Riehs did not have probable cause to arrest appellant or search his automobile.
Those facts are the following: “He [appellant] was found on a road leading from Austin, driving in a direction away from Austin; he had earlier been seen on the same road, traveling in the same direction. Appellant was found, some two hours after the killing, slightly more than ninety miles from the scene of the crime.”
I exclaim to the other members of this Court: If what was in the “BOLO” message is added to the above and this is sufficient to constitute probable cause factual data that appellant committed the murder of the decedent in Austin, we might as well rip out of our law the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Art. I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution, as well as cease using in our legal vocabulary the phrase “probable cause.”
However, before the members of this Court do that, I pray that each will ask himself the following question: If the majority opinion’s holding is on such solid legal ground, why is it that it cannot cite a single case, even one from Timbuktu, that would support it both factually and legally?
It is obvious that in its haste to see justice done in this case, what the majority refuses and will not accept is that although Riehs might have had reasonable suspicion, based on the “BOLO” message, to stop and temporarily detain appellant for purposes of investigation, such as to find out what he was doing at that hour of the morning driving his vehicle on a road in a direction away from Austin, approximately ninety miles from the scene of the killing, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, he did not take that action. Instead, without *356probable cause he arrested appellant and later searched appellant’s vehicle. Also see Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Fatemi v. State, 558 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); and Leighton v. State, 544 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Baldwin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, I dissent to the majority holding that at the time Riehs arrested appellant and searched his vehicle he had probable cause to do both.
There is yet a more fundamental reason why appellant’s conviction should be set aside, and that is because he was not legally charged with committing a criminal offense. The majority, however, does not choose to write on this subject, content I suppose in having already done sufficient damage to a part of the law of this State.
Even though the majority does not write on the subject, I shall.
Appellant was indicted for violating the provisions of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 22.03(a)(2)(B).
At the time appellant was indicted, Sec. 22.03(a)(2)(B) of the Penal Code provided as follows:
(a) A person commits [the offense of deadly assault on a court participant] if, with a firearm or a prohibited weapon, he intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury:
(2) to a participant in a court proceeding when he knows or has been informed that the person assaulted is a participant in a court proceeding:
(B) in retaliation for or on account of the injured person’s having exercised an official power or performed an official duty as a participant in a court proceeding. [Emphasis Added].
The precursor to the above statute, Art. 488, was originally enacted by the Legislature of this State in 1858. From 1858 until 1979, the applicable statute applied only to peace officers. Payne v. State, 596 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). However, the Legislature amended the statute in 1979 to include a person who had “performed an official duty as a court participant in a court proceeding.” [Emphasis Added] The term, “participant in a court proceeding,” is defined to mean “a judge, a prosecuting attorney who represents the state, a grand juror, a party in a court proceeding, an attorney representing a party, a witness, or a juror.” V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 1.07(a)(37).
By the formal terms of the statute, when the complaining witness or the victim is other than a peace officer, in order to properly charge a person with committing an offense under the statute, it is necessary that the indictment or information state the following elements:
(1) A person, (2) with a firearm or a prohibited weapon (2) intentionally or knowingly, (3) causes serious bodily injury, (4) to another person, (5) who is a court participant, (6) and the assaulting party knew or had been informed that the person assaulted was a participant in a court proceeding, (7) and the assault occurred in retaliation for or on account of (8) the injured person’s having performed an official duty as a participant in a court proceeding. [Emphasis Added].
Omitting the formal parts of the indictment in this cause, it alleges that appellant:
... did then and there intentionally and knowingly with a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, cause serious bodily injury to Patricia Dohnalik, a participant in a court proceeding, to-wit: a witness in Cause No. 1-80-28 in the 241st District Court of Smith County, Texas, styled The State of Texas v. Paul Lanier Woodward, Jr., when the said Paul Woodward knew and had been informed that the said Patricia Dohnalik was a participant in said Court proceding, in retaliation for and on account of the said Patricia Dohna-lik’s having performed an official duty as a participant in said court proceeding, to-wit: having appeared and testified as a witness before the Grand Jury of Smith County, Texas that returned *357the indictment in said Cause No. 1-80-28 in the 241st District Court of Smith County, Texas, and he, the said Paul Woodward, did then and there cause serious bodily injury to the said Patricia Dohnalik, by shooting her with said handgun, thereby causing the death of the said Patricia Dohnalik.
The question this Court should decide is whether the above indictment states a violation of Sec. 22.03(a)(2)(B), i.e., whether a person appearing and testifying before a grand jury is performing an official duty? The term “official duty” is not defined in the Penal Code. Therefore, such term must be given its ordinary, common, and familiar meaning. Art. 5429b-2, Sec. 2.01 Y.A.C.S.; Art. 3.01, V.A.C.C.P.
A review of the Penal Code reflects that in all instances where the term “official duty” is used, it is used only in the context of performance of a duty by a public servant. The term “public servant” is defined in the Penal Code, see Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 1.07(a)(30). However, the definition for the term “public servant” limits its meaning to persons performing some governmental function, i.e., a person who is fulfilling duties of office which are public in nature, involving in their performance the exercise of some portion of governmental power falling under either the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. Texas Courts in the past have referred to the term “official duties,” in reference to the following positions: see, for example, de la Garza v. State, 579 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), (a jailer); Ex parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), (a district attorney); Gonzalez v. State, 574 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), (a constable); Sutton v. State, 548 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), (a police officer); Mutscher v. State, 514 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), (a legislator); Dorsey v. State, 450 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), (a district court judge); Petro-Chemical Transport, Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1974), (a clerk of a court of record).
My examination of many of the decisions by courts of this Nation, which have defined, interpreted, or construed the term “public official,” see Vol. 35, Words and Phrases, under “Public Official,” reveals that in every instance where a person has been held to be a “public official,” and thus capable of performing official duties, such person was then acting in a governmental capacity, in either the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. My research has yet to reveal a single instance where a citizen performing a civic duty, or legal duty if subpoenaed, such as appearing and testifying before a grand jury, has ever been classified as a “public official.”
The indictment in this cause alleges that the decedent in this cause had been murdered by the appellant in retaliation because the decedent had performed an official duty, to-wit: she appeared and testified as a witness before a Grand Jury of Smith County, Texas. However, the responsibility of a citizen to testify before a grand jury is not the performance of an official duty, but, instead, is the performance of a civic duty, or a legal duty if subpoenaed.
Thus, because the retaliation that was alleged to have been committed by the appellant was not on account of the performance of an “official duty” by the decedent, the instant indictment does not state a Sec. 22.03(a)(2)(B) offense. See supra.
I must ask: In sum of money, what is the value of this incorporeal hereditament? Is its value the equivalent of an advowson, a tithe, a common, a way, a dignity, a franchise, a pension, an annuity, or a rent? See Vol. VII, A History of English Law, by Sir William Holdsworth, at page 317. Quis Custodiet ipsos custodes? I am aware of the office of the Lord Chancellor, Vol. I, A History of English Law, supra, at page 251; Vol. V, Id., at page 409; the office of Constable, Vol. XIII, Id., at page 447; the office of Justice of the Peace, Vol. XIII, Id., at page 446; the office of high bailiff, Vol. XII, Id., at page 337, and such other “official” offices, but my research has yet to reveal anywhere where English is the native tongue there is such a thing as “office of a witness.”
*358For all of the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Appellant’s conviction, as a matter of law, should be reversed and not affirmed.

. The word “BOLO" stands for “be on the lookout."

. After I had finally completed writing this dissenting opinion, and in doing a little "clean-up” in my research, I re-read what various members of this Court stated in their respective opinions filed in Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). I find it rather interesting, because the majority implicitly, if not by its language expressly overrules Colston v. State, supra, an opinion authored by Presiding Judge Onion, that it also rejects virtually all of what Judge Odom stated in his original majority opinion and the dissenting opinion on motion for rehearing he wrote in Fry v. State, supra.