Court Opinion

ID: 9759400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:15:08.407436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:04:07.058534
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DALLY, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the delivery of marihuana. The punishment is imprisonment for three years.
The appellant asserts that the judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence. To support a felony conviction for the delivery of marihuana there must be proof that either remuneration was received or that more than one-fourth ounce was delivered. Suarez v. State, 532 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gonzales v. State, 530 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Here it was stipulated that only .10 ounce of marihuana was delivered. So we must examine the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to establish delivery for remuneration as alleged.
The appellant says the evidence fails to prove remuneration because he was an accommodation agent and received no remuneration for the delivery of the marihuana.
Sec. 1.02(8) of the Controlled Substances Act reads:
“ ‘[Djeliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual or constructive transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship . . . ”
Byron Smith testified that on the night in question he was working as an undercover agent for the Department of Public Safety. While at a bar in Edna, he met the appellant, who suggested that they purchase some marihuana. Smith and appellant first drove to the apartment of an individual who appellant said had marihuana for sale, but no one was home. They then drove to appellant’s residence, where appellant had a private conversation with Michael Johnson, his co-defendant. After this conversation, appellant told Smith that Johnson had some marihuana and suggested that they go to his house. When the group arrived at the Johnson house, Johnson went inside and returned with a plastic bag containing the marihuana. Smith paid Johnson $5.00, and Johnson handed the bag to appellant. Appellant subsequently handed the bag to Smith.
Appellant, in his testimony, denied that he had first suggested a purchase of marihuana and stated that he had merely acted to accommodate Smith at no profit to himself. Whether accommodation agency may be urged as a defense to delivery of marihuana for remuneration is a question that has not been addressed by this Court. See and compare Posey v. State, 515 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). If such a defense is available, it would not be a defense as a matter of law, but would only entitle a defendant to a jury charge. See Kemp v. State, 502 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). We need not decide the question in this case, since it was for the trial court, as the trier of facts following appellant’s waiver *832of his right to a jury trial, to weigh the testimony and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Smith’s testimony was sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction as a principal to the offense of delivery of marihuana for remuneration. See former Penal Code, Secs. 65 and 66, effective at the time of this offense on November 15, 1973. The evidence shows that the appellant was a principal in that he acted together with Johnson and, knowing his unlawful intent, aided and encouraged Johnson in the actual transfer of marihuana from Johnson to Smith. The evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court.
The judgment and sentence in this case state only that appellant was convicted of delivery of marihuana. The judgment and sentence are ordered reformed to reflect that appellant was convicted of delivery of marihuana for remuneration as charged in the first count of the indictment. See Art. 44.24, V.A.C.C.P. As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.