Court Opinion

ID: 9701135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:06:51.534268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:19.700857
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
dissenting:
Because I am unable to agree with the majority’s determination that the instant appeal is not properly before us, I must dissent.
On March 9, 1982, appellee petitioned the court below for the enforcement of certain agreements, which were allegedly entered into as a “settlement” of the original action. On April 12 and April 14, 1983, hearings were held, as announced by the court below, “on the issue of whether there has been a settlement.” N.T., April 12, 1983, at 3. At the conclusion of the April 14, 1983 proceedings, appellee’s counsel initiated the following exchange:
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, may I ask that the Court enter an Order that ISI not make any transfers of assets not in the ordinary course of business?
THE COURT: I won’t do that, because that’s the final Order in an equity action, and I’m not at that stage yet. If they do it — well, all right, I understand what you’re saying, but you have to give me some evidence that that’s what they’re doing.
MR. GREEN: If I submit an affidavit—
THE COURT: All you’re doing is, you’re asking me to order them to do that which they’re not supposed to do. That’s a ludicrous order.
MR. GREEN: Can I put Mr. Beckman on the stand to put evidence on that the company already, in anticipation of this, is taking—
THE COURT: No. You file the appropriate affidavits and motions that you would ordinarily file in an equity action.
This is a petition to enforce a settlement agreement. I’m not going to wander all over the lot.
*154N.T., April 14, 1983, at 182-83. Accordingly, on April 27, 1983, appellee filed his petition to freeze corporate assets, the granting of which is the subject of this appeal.
“Preliminary” and/or “special” injunctions have been defined as “methods whereby the plaintiff may prevent the dissipation of the subject matter of his cause, of action while he litigates his rights.” GOODRICH-AMRAM 2d § 1531(a):l. Clearly, the objective of both appellee, in filing the April 27, 1983 petition, and the court below, in granting that petition, was the preservation of the corporate status quo pending a final disposition regarding appellee’s rights pursuant to the alleged “settlement.”
Having carefully reviewed and considered the record and the briefs before us, I would find that the “method” utilized to preserve the status quo herein is, in both nature and effect, appropriately characterized as an injunction, appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Cf Rosenzweig v. Factor, 457 Pa. 492, 327 A.2d 36 (1974). Therefore, I would reach the merits of those issues properly raised in this appeal.