Court Opinion

ID: 9364220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:01:59.050752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.680846
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 USA English Language Center v. Sacco-Cooke Unlimited CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 USA ENGLISH LANGUAGE CENTER,                                                       D079608
 INC.,

            Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                                    (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
            v.                                                                      00065588-CU-BT-CTL)

 SACCO-COOKE UNLIMITED, LLC et al.,

            Defendants and Respondents.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed.
          Law Offices of David C. Beavans and David C. Beavans for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
          Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton; Quarles & Brady, Sandra L.
McDonough, and Ryan J. Evans for Defendants and Respondents.

                                                                    I
                                                     INTRODUCTION
          Plaintiff USA English Language Center, Inc. (the Language Center)
appeals an order granting a special motion to strike filed under the anti-
SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; further undesignated statutory
references are to the Code of Civil Procedure) by defendants Sacco-Cooke
Unlimited, LLC dba Connect English Language Institute (Connect English),

Nicholas Sacco, Adam Cooke, and Christopher Hill.1 We affirm.
                                       II
                               BACKGROUND
   A. The Complaint
      The Language Center is a private postsecondary education institute
that offers English language instruction programs in San Diego. Connect
English is a competitor offering similar programs in the same market. Sacco,
Cooke, and Hill are Connect English employees.
      The Language Center and an affiliated entity (together, the plaintiffs)
filed a lawsuit against Doe defendants 1–100, four of whom were
subsequently identified as Connect English, Sacco, Cooke, and Hill. The
operative first amended complaint pleaded causes of action against all of the
named defendants for violations of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200; the UCL), intentional interference with contractual relations,
and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and it
pleaded a fourth cause of action for trade libel against the individual
defendants.
      The operative complaint alleges the defendants violated the UCL by:
(1) making disparaging, in-person statements about the Language Center to
current and prospective students, including statements that the Language
Center charges illegal fees to students, offers poor educational instruction,
and operates a “visa mill,” (2) making similar disparaging statements on

1     SLAPP is an acronym that refers to a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1242.)
                                       2
publicly-accessible websites, (3) accessing the private information of
Language Center students without authorization; (4) enrolling at the
Language Center to misappropriate its trade secrets; and (5) lodging false
complaints with the Accrediting Council for Continuing Education and
Training (the Accrediting Council) and the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (the Exchange Program) about the Language Center’s alleged
failure to comply with those entities’ regulations. The Accrediting Council is
a federally-recognized accrediting agency that provided institutional
accreditation to the Language Center. The Exchange Program—a program
overseen by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—provides schools

with the certification necessary to enroll foreign nonimmigrant students.2
(8 C.F.R. § 214.3.)
      The causes of action for interference with contractual relations and
interference with prospective economic advantage incorporated these
allegations and further alleged the defendants committed their “wrongful
acts” to interfere with the Language Center’s relationships with its students
and the Accrediting Council. The trade libel cause of action incorporated
these same allegations. According to the operative complaint, the defendants’

2      The Language Center argues the operative complaint does not base any
claim for relief on the defendants’ alleged complaints to the Accrediting
Council or the Exchange Program. The complaint is certainly ambiguous at
times—seemingly intentionally so. But it explicitly alleges, as a claim for
relief, that the defendants made “misrepresentations to potential enrollees
and others,” and false complaints were lodged against the Learning Center
“with its accreditor” and the Exchange Program. The plaintiffs’ opposition to
the defendants’ special motion to strike, as well as their accompanying
declarations, make unmistakably clear the defendants lodged the alleged
complaints with the Accrediting Council and the Exchange Program. We
must consider these additional allegations in our analysis. (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health Sys. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1017, fn. 5 (Bonni).)
                                       3
misconduct caused the Accrediting Council to deny reaccreditation to the
Language Center and it caused students to end their relationships with the
Language Center.
   B. The Special Motion to Strike
      The defendants filed a special motion to strike the operative complaint
under the anti-SLAPP statute. They argued they satisfied their first-step
anti-SLAPP burden because the plaintiffs’ claims for relief were based on
constitutionally-protected activities. In particular, they asserted the alleged
complaints to the Accrediting Council and the Exchange Program were
protected acts because they were statements made before official proceedings
authorized by law (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) or, alternatively, statements made
in connection with official proceedings authorized by law (id., subd. (e)(2)).
Further, they claimed all of their alleged statements—including their
statements to students—constituted protected conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional rights of petition and free speech in connection

with a public issue or an issue of public interest (id., subd. (e)(4)).3
      The defendants argued the plaintiffs could not satisfy their second-step
burden under the anti-SLAPP statute because they could not establish a
probability of success for any of their pleaded causes of action. They argued
all four pleaded causes of action were precluded to the extent they were based
on complaints to the Accrediting Council and the Exchange Program because
such communications were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b)(3). They claimed the causes of action were also precluded
insofar as they were based on statements to students, since the statements

3     The defendants did not specifically argue their alleged access of private
student information and enrollment at the Language Center were protected
acts.
                                         4
were subject to the common interest privilege codified in Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (c). Finally, they argued the plaintiffs were unable to
prove the elements of causation or damages for any of their causes of action.
      The plaintiffs opposed the special motion to strike. Without
differentiating between their claims for relief, the plaintiffs generally
asserted the complaint was exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute because it
alleged conduct that fell within the statutory exemption for commercial
speech. They also argued—again, without differentiating between their
claims for relief—the complaint was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute
because it alleged illegal conduct. Next, they claimed—in a one-sentence
heading of their opposition brief—that the defendants’ alleged misstatements
were not protected acts under the anti-SLAPP statute. Finally, they argued
their pleaded causes of action had at least minimal merit. Together with
their opposition brief, they filed declarations from the Language Center’s
owner, students, and administrators, who averred they personally heard the
defendants’ allegedly disparaging remarks or learned about the remarks from
others. The plaintiffs did not respond to the defendants’ arguments
concerning the Civil Code section 47 privileges.
      The defendants filed a reply brief and evidentiary objections to the
plaintiffs’ declarations.
      The trial court granted the special motion to strike in its entirety,
largely for the reasons set forth in the defendants’ moving papers. The
Language Center (but not its co-plaintiff) appeals.
                                       III
                                 DISCUSSION
   A. Anti-SLAPP Framework

                                        5
      “Enacted by the Legislature in 1992, the anti-SLAPP statute is
designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the
exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a
claim ‘arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable
News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).)
      “A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. ‘Initially, the
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected [speech or petitioning] activity
in which the defendant has engaged.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
“A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the
wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to
some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine
whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.]
Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these
actions fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.)
      The defendants in this case invoke three categories of protected acts.
The first category applies to “any written or oral statement or writing made
before … [an] official proceeding authorized by law[.]” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)
The second category encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by … [an]
official proceeding authorized by law[.]” (Id., subd. (e)(2).) The third category

                                         6
covers “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).)
      Sometimes, a plaintiff pleads what is colloquially known as a mixed
cause of action—that is, “a cause of action that rests on allegations of
multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which
do not.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) In such cases, courts are “not
confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the
plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead, courts should
analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for
relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to
determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they
give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.” (Ibid.)
“When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected
activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at [the first] stage.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)
      If the defendant makes the required showing, the “ ‘plaintiff must then
demonstrate its claims have at least “minimal merit” ’ ” at the second step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) This second
step has been described as a summary judgment-like procedure. (Sweetwater
Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940
(Sweetwater Union).) At this stage, the court must determine “ ‘whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual
showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s
evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if
it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] “[C]laims with
the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

                                         7
      We review a trial court order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.
(Sweetwater Union, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940.)
   B. First Prong Analysis
      As discussed above, the operative complaint asserts four separately-
pleaded causes of action based on five claims for relief. It asserts the
defendants: (1) made in-person, disparaging remarks about the Language
Center to students, (2) made similar negative statements online, (3) accessed
private information of Language Center students without permission;
(4) enrolled at the Language Center to misappropriate its trade secrets; and
(5) lodged false complaints about the Language Center with the Accrediting
Council and the Exchange Program.
      On appeal, the Language Center argues two of these claims for relief
fall outside the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. In particular, it claims:
(1) the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the defendants’ complaints to
the Accrediting Council and the Exchange Program because those complaints
were illegal; and (2) the commercial speech exemption applies to the

defendants’ in-person remarks to students.4 Further, it asserts (3) none of

4     In its discussions of the illegality exception and the commercial speech
exemption, the Language Center does not differentiate between its claims for
relief—a recurrent problem that plagues both parties’ briefing. However, the
Language Center’s illegality argument focuses in substance on the
defendants’ alleged complaints to the Accrediting Council and the Exchange
Program, and it limits its arguments concerning the commercial speech
exemption to the defendants’ alleged statements to students. We respond to
the Language Center’s arguments as it has framed them. To the extent the
Language Center intended its arguments to apply to other claims for relief,
those arguments are waived. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684 (Meridian) [“The reviewing court is not
required to develop the parties’ arguments or search the record for supporting
evidence and may instead treat arguments that are not developed or
supported by adequate citations to the record as waived.”].)
                                        8
the alleged conduct was constitutionally-protected. We address these
arguments in seriatim.
         1. Illegality Exception
      The Language Center claims the defendants’ alleged complaints to the
Accrediting Council and the Exchange Program were illegal because they
contained false statements of fact made in violation of federal law—
specifically title 18 of United States Code section 1001, which “prohibits lying
to the federal government.” (United States v. Oliver (9th Cir. 2022) 41 F.4th
1093, 1097.) According to the Language Center, the defendants’ conduct is
not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because it was illegal.
      In Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, the Supreme Court held that
the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to speech or petitioning activities that
are illegal as a matter of law. “The rationale is that the defendant cannot
make a threshold showing that the illegal conduct falls within the purview of
the [anti-SLAPP] statute and promotes section 425.16’s purpose to ‘prevent
and deter “lawsuits [referred to as SLAPP’s] brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for
the redress of grievances.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 316.) However, the illegality exception
applies only where “the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively
establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was
illegal as a matter of law[.]” (Id. at p. 320.) The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating illegality as a matter of law. (Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v.
L.A. Times Communications LLC (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 808, 818, fn. 10;
Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 385.)
      The defendants do not concede that they knowingly made false
complaints about the Language Center to the Accrediting Council or the
Exchange Program. On the contrary, they submitted evidence denying they

                                        9
engaged in any such behavior. Further, they argue the alleged complaints
were truthful—an argument that, if accepted, could provide them with a
meritorious defense to the Language Center’s contention that they violated
title 18 of United States Code section 1001. (See United States v. Castro (3d
Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 125, 139 [“to properly convict [the defendant] of violating
[18 U.S.C.] § 1001, the government must be able to show that he made a
statement to government agents that was untrue, and the government cannot
satisfy that burden … if in fact he told the literal truth”].)
      Because the defendants do not concede illegal conduct, and the
evidence does not conclusively establish illegal conduct, the Language Center
has not carried its burden of showing that the illegality exception applies.
(Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1158–
1159 [illegality exception inapplicable where defendants did not concede
illegal conduct and evidence did not conclusively establish it]; San Diegans
for Open Government v. San Diego State University Research Foundation
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 106 (SDOG) [same].)
         2. Commercial Speech Exemption
      Next, the Language Center argues the defendants’ statements to
students about the Language Center fall outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP

statute under the statutory exemption for commercial speech.5

5      Some courts refer to the commercial speech exemption as a threshold
determination that must be addressed before any analysis is conducted under
section 425.16. (See, e.g., Xu v. Huang (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 802, 806–807.)
Others refer to it as a first-prong determination conducted as part of the
section 425.16 analysis. (See, e.g., Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics,
Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769, 786 (Neurelis).) Neither party ascribes any
significance to whether the commercial speech exemption is a preliminary
determination or a first-prong determination. We assume without deciding
the commercial speech exemption presents a first-prong determination.
                                        10
      In 2003, the Legislature—concerned with litigants’ abuse of the anti-
SLAPP statute—enacted section 425.17, which exempts certain actions from
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49
Cal.4th 12, 21–22 (Simpson); § 425.17, subd. (a) [“The Legislature finds and
declares that there has been a disturbing abuse of Section 425.16, the
California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances, contrary to the purpose and intent of Section 425.16.”].) One
exemption set forth in section 425.17 is the commercial speech exemption.
      Section 425.17, subdivision (c), exempts from the anti-SLAPP statute a
cause of action arising from commercial speech when: “(1) the cause of action
is against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing
goods or services; (2) the cause of action arises from a statement or conduct
by that person consisting of representations of fact about that person’s or a
business competitor’s business operations, goods, or services; (3) the
statement or conduct was made either for the purpose of obtaining approval
for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in,
the person’s goods or services or in the course of delivering the person’s goods
or services; and (4) the intended audience for the statement or conduct” is an
actual or potential buyer or customer. (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 30.)
      The commercial speech exemption is construed narrowly and the
burden of establishing its applicability rests on the party seeking to invoke
it—here, the Language Center. (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 22–26;
Neurelis, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 786.) We review the applicability of the
commercial speech exemption independently. (Simpson, at p. 26.)
      The parties disagree on the first requirement necessary to invoke the
commercial speech exemption—that is, whether the defendants are primarily

                                       11
engaged in the business of selling education services. We need not resolve
the parties’ disagreement because the Language Center has not carried its
burden of demonstrating another essential requirement necessary to invoke
the exemption. In particular, it has not shown that the defendants’ alleged
statements to students were made to promote or secure sales, or commercial

transactions in, the defendants’ education services.6
      Indeed, the Language Center devotes just one fleeting sentence of its
appellate briefing to this requirement, stating—without citation to the
appellate record or legal authority—that the defendants made disparaging
statements “to prospective or current students of Connect English to promote
[the defendants’] own program over [the Language Center’s] program.” By
failing to present a cogent argument concerning the context or purpose of the
defendants’ alleged misstatements, supported by citations to the record and
relevant legal authority, the Language Center has waived its cursory claim
that the defendants made the statements at issue for the purpose of
promoting or securing sales, or commercial transactions in, their services.
(Meridian, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 684; see Munoz v. Patel (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 761, 773 [“ ‘ “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must
supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.” ’ ”].)
      Waiver aside, the evidence the Language Center submitted to the trial
court does not conclusively establish that the defendants’ alleged statements
to students were made to promote or secure sales of their purported
education services. Much of the evidence the Language Center submitted to

6     The Language Center does not argue that the defendants made the
allegedly disparaging statements to students in the course of delivering
services. (See § 425.17, subd. (c)(1).) Therefore, we do not consider the issue.
                                         12
the trial court consists of near-identical declarations from Language Center
administrators, all of whom made the same generic averment: “Over my time
working at [the Language Center] I have encountered many students whom
[sic] have informed me that they were told negative statements regarding
[the Language Center] by employees/faculty at Connect English.” These
barebones allegations are silent on whether the defendants or their agents
made disparaging statements about the Language Center for the purpose of
promoting or selling the defendants’ education services.
      The other evidence submitted to the trial court by the Language Center
was similarly deficient. In one declaration, a Connect English student avers:
“While I was at Connect English on or about August 4, 2017, Nick Sacco
asked me where I was going to school. [¶] I said at [the Language Center],
[sic] Nick Sacco told me that I should not go to school at [the Language
Center] because the school is closing and it’s a terrible school.” Similarly, in
another declaration (ostensibly filed on behalf of a student, although the
declaration is not clear on this point), the declarant generally states: “On or
[sic] August 25, 2016, I had a conversation with [a Connect English
instructor] at Connect English. ... [¶] [He] made … [disparaging] statements
regarding … [the] Language Center[.]” These declarations in no way show
the defendants made the disparaging statements at issue to promote or sell
their own education services.
      “The plain language of section 425.17 requires that a plaintiff establish
all of the elements of the section 425.17 exemption.” (Hawran v. Hixson
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273.) Because the Language Center did not
submit any evidence bearing on the purpose of the defendants’ alleged
statements to students, they did not satisfy their burden of proving that the
commercial speech exemption applies. (See Industrial Waste & Debris Box

                                       13
Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1152–1153 [commercial
speech exemption did not apply because plaintiffs did not “show that
defendants’ purpose [in preparing a report] was to promote [their client’s]
services, or their own”]; Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 357
[same, where “statements made by [defendant] were not statements of fact
about his services for the purpose of promoting his services”].)
         3. Protected Acts
      We turn now to whether the Language Center’s five claims for relief
fall within one or more of the categories of protected acts under
section 425.16, subdivision (e). First, we address whether the claims for
relief based on defendants’ alleged statements to the Accrediting Council and
the Exchange Program arise from protected acts. Then, we consider whether
the four remaining claims for relief are predicated on protected acts.
      The trial court broadly found the defendants satisfied their first-step
burden. In so doing, it expressly found the defendants’ alleged statements to
government agencies, like the Exchange Program, were protected statements
made before official proceedings authorized by law (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)),
and they were also protected statements made in connection with official
proceedings authorized by law (id., subd. (e)(2)). The court did not
specifically address whether the defendants’ alleged statements to the
Accrediting Council were protected acts.
      “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
[order] is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant
to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court,
that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the [order].”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; see also Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower

                                       14
court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’ ”].) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
prejudicial error even where, as here, the standard of appellate review is de
novo. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
      The Language Center does not assert that the defendants’ alleged
statements to the Accrediting Council or the Exchange Program were
unprotected. In fact, it argues its other four claims for relief were based on
unprotected acts because they were not based on the defendants’ statements
to the Accrediting Council or the Exchange Program—an implied concession
that such statements are protected. Because the Language Center presents
no argument concerning the defendants’ statements to the Accrediting
Council or the Exchange Program, it has forfeited any claim that such
statements were unprotected acts under section 425.16, subdivision (e).
(SDOG, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 106, fn. 17 [appellant forfeited claim that
respondents’ conduct satisfied public interest prong of section 425.16,
subdivision (e) by failing to discuss the issue in opening brief].)
      We turn now to the conduct giving rise to the remaining four claims for
relief. As noted, the Language Center based these claims for relief on
allegations that the defendants: (1) made insulting, in-person statements
about the Language Center to current and prospective students, (2) posted
similar derogatory statements about the Language Center online,
(3) accessed private student information without permission; and (4) enrolled
at the Language Center in order to misappropriate its trade secrets.
      The Language Center argues these are not protected activities. But it
did not make this argument in the proceedings below. Indeed, it made a
single cursory statement—buried in a heading of its opposition brief—that

                                        15
the defendants’ conduct was “not in furtherance of defendant’s [sic] right of
petition and/or free speech in connection with a public issue ….”
      “Issues presented on appeal must actually be litigated in the trial
court—not simply mentioned in passing. ‘ “[W]e ignore arguments, authority,
and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court.” ’ ” (Natkin v. Cal.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 (Natkin);
Truck Ins. Exchange v. AMCO Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 619, 635
(Exchange) [“ ‘ “[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not
consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but
were not presented to the trial court.” ’ ”].) By failing to present the trial
court with any substantive argument that the defendants’ alleged conduct fell
outside one or more of the categories of conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP

statute, the Language Center has forfeited this argument on appeal.7

7      We asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether
the Language Center forfeited its argument that its claims for relief do not
arise from protected acts under section 425.16, subdivision (e).
       The Language Center contends it presented this argument to the trial
court at the hearing on the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The record
proves otherwise. At the anti-SLAPP hearing, the Language Center asserted
only that the alleged conduct at issue fell within the statutory exemption for
commercial speech (§ 425.17). That argument is entirely different than the
one the Language Center is now trying to raise for the first time on appeal.
       In the alternative, the Language Center asks us to exercise our
discretionary authority and consider its argument, even though it failed to
make the argument to the trial court. The argument does not present a pure
question of law or an important legal issue. Further, the Language Center
offers no explanation for its failure to raise the argument below. Therefore,
we decline the Language Center’s request to consider its forfeited argument.
(See In re Marriage of Elali & Marchoud (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 668, 682
[“ ‘[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised
rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.’ ”].)
                                        16
   C. Second Prong Analysis
      “In the second step, we must determine whether plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits. To do so, plaintiff
must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim [citation], thereby
demonstrating his case has at least minimal merit [citation]. [¶] ‘Put another
way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to
sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.” ’ ” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 200, 211.) “[A]t the second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the
court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their equivalents if it is
reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be
admissible at trial.” (Sweetwater Union, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 949.)
      The Language Center makes just one argument that it satisfied its
step-two burden. It claims it made a prima facie showing sufficient to
overcome a substantive defense applicable to all four causes of action—that
is, the defendants’ defense that their alleged complaints to the Accrediting
Council were absolutely privileged or subject to the common interest privilege
codified in Civil Code section 47. The Language Center argues it made the
necessary showing because its administrators submitted declarations
averring that the defendants complained to the Accrediting Council about the
Language Center. It also notes that its students filed declarations alleging
that complaints were lodged in their names, but without their knowledge or
consent. According to the Language Center, this evidence, accepted as true,
proves the defendants made false representations in violation of title 18 of
United States Code section 1001. The Language Center further argues—
without citation to legal authority—that the illegality of the defendants’

                                       17
alleged misconduct precludes them from relying on the Civil Code section 47
privileges.
      In their special motion to strike, the defendants argued that the Civil
Code section 47 privileges precluded the Language Center from satisfying its
step-two burden. However, the Language Center did not mention—let alone
try to rebut—the defendants’ privilege defense in its brief in opposition to the
special motion to strike. Because the Language Center did not address the
defendants’ privilege defense in its trial court briefing, it has waived its
privilege defense arguments on appeal.
      Further, the Language Center did not merely fail to address the
privilege defense; the Language Center agreed with the defense at the
hearing on the special motion to strike. In advance of the hearing, the court
issued a tentative ruling finding that complaints filed with government
agencies were protected by the absolute privilege and complaints submitted
to the Accrediting Council were protected by the common interest privilege.
Then, at the subsequent hearing, the court asked the Language Center’s legal
counsel whether he “agree[d] with the court … in [its] analysis that the
information provided to the government agencies would be privileged.” The
Language Center’s counsel unambiguously replied, “Your Honor, yes.” Later
in the hearing, the court summarized the issues in dispute and again asked
the Language Center’s counsel whether he “agree[d] with [the court] on the
governmental entities.” Counsel responded, “Yes.”
      By failing to address the defendants’ Civil Code section 47 privilege
arguments in its trial court briefing—and, in fact, agreeing with those
arguments at the hearing on the special motion to strike—the Language
Center has waived its argument that it made a prima facie showing

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necessary to rebut the defendants’ privilege defense.8 (Natkin, supra, 219
Cal.App.4th at p. 1011; Exchange, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 635.)
      The Language Center does not address each essential element of its
four pleaded causes of action, let alone the evidentiary showing it made in the
trial court that, if accepted as true, would establish each necessary element.
Nor does it make any other cogent argument that it satisfied its step-two
burden. Thus, the Language Center has not met its appellate burden of
establishing that the trial court committed reversible error when it found
that the Language Center failed to satisfy its step-two burden.
                                      IV
                                DISPOSITION
      The order granting the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to their appellate costs.

8      Because the Language Center waived its privilege defense arguments,
we do not assess the admissibility of the Language Center’s declarations or
the effect of the trial court’s failure to rule on the defendants’ evidentiary
objections. Further, we do not decide whether the Civil Code section 47
privileges could apply to the Accrediting Council and Exchange Program
complaints notwithstanding the alleged illegality of the defendants’ conduct.
(But see Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 119, fn. 8 [“ ‘[C]ommunications made in connection
with litigation do not necessarily fall outside the [Civil Code section 47]
privilege simply because they are, or are alleged to be, fraudulent, perjurious,
unethical, or even illegal.’ ”]; Kemps v. Beshwate (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
1012, 1017 [“a defendant’s illegal conduct ultimately may be protected by the
litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)”].)
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                    McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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