Court Opinion

ID: 9472216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:53:05.685914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:48.612741
License: Public Domain

NIES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion and write only because I see a need for treatment of the issue of harmful error to a greater extent than it has been given in note 3 of the majority opinion.
The Baracco appeal is the lead case on interpretation of the harmless error provision found in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) vis-a-vis the statutorily mandated time period for reply to the notice of proposed removal. Baracco asserts that he was given only 6 days to reply, but for reasons not discussed in the majority opinion or pertinent to other controllers.
Baracco was sent the same notice as other controllers. Thus, under the majority decision here, he was initially given a 7-day notice period. The notice was mailed August 7 by regular mail with a duplicate sent the same day by certified mail. Since Baracco did not testify, we do not know when he received the notice by regular mail which, if before receipt of the certified mail, would have started the running of the reply period. In any event, he signed for the certified mail on August 11. In an undated letter from Baracco to the agency received August 14, he requested an extension of time to file written reply on the ground that “seven days” was not a reasonable time for filing a response. At that time he knew he had 7 days, as the MSPB found. In reply, the agency denied “an extension of time to submit a written reply beyond the seven day period.” Had the agency letter stopped there, Baracco would have no basis for argument that he is in a different situation from others. However, in the same letter, the agency stated that the written response was to be submitted “prior to August 18, 1981, the expiration of the seven day notice period.”
Treating this as arguably creating an ambiguity as to the final date for reply, the presiding official ruled that Baracco would have had to show, in any event, that a 6-day reply period was harmful error, that is, that the error might have affected the outcome of the case. Since Baracco had made a written reply within 7 days and offered no evidence at any time of individual circumstances which might have changed the outcome, the presiding official ruled that Baracco failed to show harmful error. The board agreed that Baracco was required to show that the asserted procedural error was harmful.
Baracco’s position is that harmful error should not have entered into resolution of the issue of the shortened notice period. Baracco maintains that his right to a minimum 7-day reply period, unquestionably required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2), rendered the action “not in accordance with law” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C), set out below, and that, therefore, reversal is required. In essence, Baracco argues that a statutory procedural requirement is not subject to the harmful error provision of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A). Stated another way, violation of a statutory procedural requirement is harmful per se.
The statutory provisions under consideration here read in pertinent part:
7701(c)(2) [T]he agency’s decision may not be sustained ... if the employee
(A) shows harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such decision.
Hs sfc * * # sfc
(C) shows that the decision was not in accordance with law.
*496The MSPB carefully reviewed the statutory history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (Reform Act) to discern the relationship of these two provisions and found no clear guide to their interpretation. However, it found direction, in favor of the presiding official’s ruling, in the numerous expressions of concern during hearings on the Reform Act about unnecessary procedural reversals of agency actions.1
In rejecting Baracco’s argument, the board also found guidance in the need to give effect to all parts of the statute. The board reasoned that procedural regulations have the force of law and that, if the harmful error provision could not be applied in connection with procedures established by statute, by the same token, it could not be applied to procedures established by regulations which have the force of law. Therefore, the statutory provision on harmful error would be meaningless.
The board then reviewed and reconciled its own decisions with its holding here, and, finally, found support for its interpretation in precedent of this court, particularly, Doyle v. Veterans Administration, 667 F.2d 70, 72, 229 Ct.Cl. 261 (1981); Brewer v. U.S. Postal Service, 647 F.2d 1093, 1097, 227 Ct.Cl. 276 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, 102 S.Ct. 1005, 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982) and Shaw v. U.S. Postal Service, 697 F.2d 1078 (Fed.Cir.1983). For example, as stated by Senior Judge Cowen in Brewer, the first ease reviewed by the Court of Claims under the Reform Act:
In enacting the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Congress declared that this court should reverse agency actions for procedural error “only if the procedures followed substantially impaired the rights of the employees.” S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in [1978] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2723, 2786.
647 F.2d at 1097.
In support of the contrary position, petitioner cites cases, for example Ryder v. United States, 585 F.2d 482, 218 Ct.Cl. 289 (1978) and Washington v. United States, 147 F.Supp. 284, 137 Ct.Cl. 344 cert. denied, 355 U.S. 801, 78 S.Ct. 6, 2 L.Ed.2d 19 (1957), which are clearly no longer controlling in view of the addition to the statute of the harmful error provision.
Turning again to the precise language of the statute, I conclude that paragraphs (A) and (C) are directed at different evils. Harmful error in procedures (paragraph A) raises the question: Did the wrongful procedure harm the employee in the presentation of his defense so that a different result might have been reached? Petitioner here has not asserted such harm. He asks simply for a per se rule. That is not a “showing” of harm as the statute requires. Paragraph (C), on the other hand, is directed to the decision itself. Was the decision in its entirety in accordance with law? Since the harmful error rule is part of the law, the question becomes: Is the decision in accordance with the law including the harmful error provision? Tested against this standard, the Baracco decision cannot be reversed since no harmful error has been shown.

. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on S. 2640, S. 2707 and S. 2830, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 22, 43, 101, 146 (1978); Hearings Before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on H.R. 11280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 122-23 (1978).