Court Opinion

ID: 9881131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 19:00:47.755537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.097287
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13442    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 09/29/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13442
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JASON VASHON JONES,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 7:19-cr-00009-HL-TQL-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13442      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 09/29/2023     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13442

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Jason Jones appeals his sentence of 151 months’ imprison-
       ment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled
       substance. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in ap-
       plying a career offender enhancement when calculating his guide-
       line range, because a conspiracy conviction does not constitute a
       “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The gov-
       ernment concedes error on this issue in light of our decision in
       United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
       Jones also argues that his prior Georgia marijuana convictions do
       not constitute “controlled substance offenses” because the Georgia
       definition of “marijuana” is overbroad compared to the federal def-
       inition. Jones further argues that his prior Georgia marijuana con-
       victions are not “controlled substance offenses” under § 4B1.2 be-
       cause the Georgia definition of marijuana included hemp at the
       time of his convictions, while the federal definition at the time of
       his sentencing for the instant offense excludes hemp.
                                         I.
             We review de novo a district court’s decision to classify a de-
       fendant as a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.2. United States v.
       Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). We are not bound by
       a concession of law. United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th
       Cir. 2021). Likewise, we need not accept the government’s
USCA11 Case: 22-13442     Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 09/29/2023     Page: 3 of 4

       22-13442              Opinion of the Court                        3

       concession of error “when the law and record do not justify it.”
       United States v. Linville, 228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000).
             The Sentencing Guidelines provide that
             [a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant
             was at least [18] years old at the time the defendant
             committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the
             instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either
             a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
             and (3) the defendant has at least [2] prior felony con-
             victions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
             substance offense.
       U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). “Career offender” status warrants a set offense
       level based on the statutory maximum of the underlying offense.
       Id. § 4B1.1(b). In Dupree, we ruled that the text of § 4B1.2(b)—
       which defines “controlled substance offense”—unambiguously ex-
       cludes inchoate crimes, including conspiracy. Dupree, 57 F.4th at
       1277-79 (vacating and remanding for resentencing without a career
       offender enhancement, holding that conspiracy to possess with in-
       tent to distribute heroin and cocaine was not a “controlled sub-
       stance offense”). Moreover, Dupree overruled prior precedent of
       this Court that relied on Application Note 1 of § 4B1.2 in holding
       that a conspiracy offense can trigger a career offender enhance-
       ment. Id. at 1279-80.
              A defendant with a pending appeal is entitled to receive the
       benefit of a change in the law by having any intervening law-chang-
       ing decision applied retroactively to his case. See Griffith v. Ken-
       tucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
USCA11 Case: 22-13442     Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 09/29/2023    Page: 4 of 4

       4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13442

              Here, the district court erred in applying a career oﬀender
       enhancement. We have stated explicitly that inchoate crimes, such
       as Jones’s conspiracy conviction, are not “controlled substance of-
       fenses” under § 4B1.2. Thus, because Jones’s instant conviction is
       neither a “controlled substance oﬀense” nor a “crime of violence,”
       he is ineligible for career oﬀender status under § 4B1.1(a). Lastly,
       because Dupree provides a suﬃcient basis to vacate and remand in
       this case, we do not address Jones’s arguments related his prior
       Georgia state convictions. Accordingly, this we vacate Jones’s sen-
       tence and remand for resentencing consistent with Dupree.
             VACATED AND REMANDED.