Court Opinion

ID: 9520015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:29:20.771953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:25.909113
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. While there have been varying • definitions of the term alimony, the cases generally agree it primarily is “an allowance the wife from the husband for her support in a divorce action in lieu of the legal obligation of her husband to support her . . . .” Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, 352, 144 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1966), quoting 2 Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, section 14.02 (2d ed. rev.' 1961). The right to receive alimony is based upon the husband’s common law obligation to support his wife. Division of property is based on the wife’s right to a just and equitable share of the property which the parties have accumulated through their joint efforts during the existence of the marriage. Knipfer, 259 Iowa at 353, 144 N.W.2d at 143. See also In re Marriage of Woodward, 229 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Iowa 1975). Although they have a different purpose, alimony and property divisions are closely related in determining proper allocations following the Schantz criteria.1 In re Marriage of Cook, 205 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1973).
In the present case, we must presume trial court’s original award of property and alimony was equitable. There is no present allegation the $100 per month alimony imposed in 1963 was inequitable due to respondent’s inability to pay a greater amount.
With this background as a basis, I believe respondent has met his burden of showing a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant elimination of his alimony obligations. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that trial court reasonably would have contemplated petitioner’s increased income. However, the award of alimony is based upon relative need and resources, not merely earning capacity. See In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Tucker, 213 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Iowa 1973); In re Marriage of Cook, 205 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1973); In re Marriage of Campbell, 204 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1973).
In determining resources, I also believe petitioner’s inheritance should be considered. The value of inherited property “is a proper factor to be considered by the court in arriving at the net worth of each party, relative needs of the other, and the value of the resources of the parties.” Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246, 253 (Iowa 1976). If such property is considered in determining an equitable award in the original proceedings, there is no rational reason for holding it to be outside the scope of the court’s consideration in modification proceedings. See In re Marriage of Fisher, 237 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Iowa 1976). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the re*225ceiving of an inheritance in this instance is not of such a magnitude to warrant a finding of a change in circumstances.” Likewise, if inflation can serve as a basis for increasing a support obligation, see Page v. Page, 219 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Iowa 1974), the impact of inflation on the value of a party’s resources should be considered. Finally, I believe the record establishes petitioner has no real need for continued alimony.
In conclusion, I do not believe an original award of alimony should serve as an annuity to its recipient. When circumstances no longer justify its continuation, a court is under an obligation to order its termination. Such are the circumstances of this case. Trial court’s order should be reversed.
OXBERGER, C. J., joins in this dissent.

. Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968).