Court Opinion

ID: 9671936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:45:48.281717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.171611
License: Public Domain

BROCK, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the decision of the majority that the service of process upon third party defendant Robert M. Allen, an attorney who resides and practices law in Texas, is properly sustained under the Tennessee long arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I prefer, however, to rest my concurrence in the Court’s decision upon the recent decisions and opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, _ U.S. _, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) rather than upon the rationale set out in the majority opinion and its reliance upon Shelby *336Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, Tenn.App., 645 S.W.2d 242 (1981). In the Calder case the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction in a libel action of the California court over the Florida defendants, based upon the service of process under the California long arm statute, applying the following rationale:
“Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the state in which she lives and works (California) and in which the National Inquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 297, 100 S.Ct., at 567; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1699-1700, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). An individual in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly caused the injury in California.” 104 S.Ct. at 1487.
Upholding the service of process under Florida’s long arm statute on defendants residing in Michigan, the Supreme Court in Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, supra, said, in pertinent part:
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations,’ International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 319. [, 66 S.Ct. at 159] By requiring that individuals have ‘fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,’ Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 [, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2587, 53 L.Ed.2d 683] (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), the Due Process Clause ‘gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit,’ World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297[, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490] (1980).
“Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this ‘fair warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. [770, _, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1479] (1984), and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. [408, _, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872] (1984) ....
“We have noted several reasons why a forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who ‘purposefully directs’ his activities toward forum residents. A state generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. Id., [McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220] at 223; [78 S.Ct. 199 at 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957)]; see also Calder v. Jones, supra, [465 U.S.] at _ [104 S.Ct. at _] .... “Notwithstanding these considerations, the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State. International Shoe Company v. Washington, supra, [326 U.S.] at 316. [66 S.Ct. at 158.] Although it has been argued that foreseeability of causing injury in another State should be sufficient to establish such contacts there when policy considerations so require, the Court has consistently held that this kind of foreseeability is not a single ‘sufficient benchmark’ for exercising personal jurisdiction. World-Wide *337Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 295. [100 S.Ct. at 566.] Instead, ‘the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ Id., at 297. [100 S.Ct. at 567.] In defining when it is that a potential defendant should ‘reasonably anticipate’ out-of-state litigation, the Court frequently has drawn from the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 [78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283] (1958):
‘The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’
“This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra [465 U.S.] at _ [104 S.Ct. at _]; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S., at 299, [100 S.Ct. at 568,] or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person,’ Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, supra [466 U.S.] at _ [104 S.Ct. at _]. Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State....
“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra [465 U.S.] at _ [104 S.Ct. at _]; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. at _ [104 S.Ct. at _]; McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S., at 222-223. [78 S.Ct. at 200-201.] Cf. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S., at 313, 317 [63 S.Ct. 602 at 605, 87 L.Ed. 777] (1943).” Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. at 2181-2184.
Assuming that my understanding of the Supreme Court’s recent opinions, above discussed, is correct, I hold that service under the Tennessee long arm statute on the Texas lawyer in this case is properly sustainable because his act of incorporating an inaccurate description of the land in a warranty deed used to transfer property located in Tennessee is action purposefully directed toward Tennessee property owners and is “such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Upon this basis I concur in the decision of the majority of the Court upholding long arm jurisdiction in this case.