Court Opinion

ID: 9671672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:41:41.687347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.427197
License: Public Domain

BARRON, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the provision of the above applicable statute regarding the holding of a hearing and the rendering of a decision in writing within thirty days after the commission receives such notice of appeal is of a jurisdictional nature. I can readily think of a number of valid and necessary reasons for some delay under many circumstances if justice is to be done.
I believe the rule should be interpreted as requiring action within thirty days after receipt of notice of appeal, or if good and valid cause exists on the part of any party, the earliest time possible after the expiration of thirty days. To interpret the meaning of the above period of time as jurisdictional, in my opinion, would place the city in a relative straight-jacket and sometimes require the retention of undesirable or even corrupt officers on technical grounds. Also, injustice toward the involved officer might result.
The word “shall”, particularly under these circumstances, is not consistently given a mandatory construction. Walker v. Hirsch Cooperage Co., 236 S.W. 710, 712 (Tex.Comm’n App.1922, holding approved). I do not believe it should be given such a construction here.
An act of the legislature should be given a fair and reasonable construction in order to carry out its legitimate purpose and not be construed in such a manner as to nullify or defeat its purposes and intent. Walker v. City of Houston, 466 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston (14th Dist.) 1971, no writ). I can see absolutely no necessity in construing this portion of the statute as jurisdictional, and I believe the matters above discussed should be under the reasonable control of the Commission or the court on review when necessity arises.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.