Court Opinion

ID: 9943133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:49.470591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:10.798181
License: Public Domain

J-S40015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MARLON GLENN                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3166 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 28, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0004532-2017

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2024

       Appellant Marlon Glenn appeals from the order dismissing his first Post-

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition.            Appellant argues that David

Rudenstein, Esq. (trial counsel)2 was ineffective. We affirm.

       A prior panel summarized the relevant facts and procedural history in

this case as follows:

       At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
       Philadelphia police officers Andrew Miller, Terrance Lewis, Terry
       Tull, Earl Tilghman, and Kelly Walker, Philadelphia police
       detectives Joseph Centeno and James Burke, Philadelphia
       associate medical examiner Dr. Lindsay Simon, and Lerin Gilliard,
       David Westin, Von Williams, Margie Lazenbury, Carole Moore,
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46.

2 David Rudenstein, Esq. (trial counsel) represented Appellant at trial and
through Appellant’s direct appeal to this Court. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 2/9/23,
at 2.
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     Dennis Moore Jr., and Cameron Davis. [Appellant] presented no
     evidence.      Viewed in the light most favorable to the
     Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence established
     the following.

     After work on Friday, March 3, 2017, Ramone Anthony Smith, the
     victim, drove his co-worker, Lerin Gilliard, to her home, but first
     stopped to pick up Appellant. After dropping off Gilliard, Smith
     and Appellant arrived at Smith’s house on the 4800 block of
     Bouvier Street in Philadelphia. Smith and Appellant had been
     friends for several months and were also engaged in a sexual
     relationship, which had been limited to Smith performing oral sex
     on Appellant. Appellant, however, did not identify as homosexual,
     and he lived and shared a bedroom with a woman.

     Sometime after 9:00 p.m., Appellant was in Smith’s basement
     working out. Smith walked over to Appellant and began to
     straddle him, which made Appellant upset. The two men got into
     a struggle during which Appellant grabbed Smith’s gun from a
     holster on Smith. The men proceeded upstairs into the kitchen,
     where Appellant, using Smith’s gun, shot Smith one time in the
     back of the head.

     Because Smith did not answer his phone after 9 p.m. on Friday,
     all day Saturday, and Sunday morning, Smith’s friends, Cameron
     Davis and David Westin, grew concerned because they typically
     spoke with him every day. On Sunday, March 5, 2017, Davis and
     Westin went to Smith’s house and noticed that Smith’s Toyota
     Camry was missing. The friends entered Smith’s house using a
     spare key that Smith had given them, and they discovered the
     house was in “complete disarray” and looked “ransacked.” In the
     living room, couch pillows were on the floor, and Smith’s television
     was missing. In the dining room, papers were scattered across
     the table. In the middle upstairs bedroom, which Smith had
     converted to a walk-in closet because he loved to shop and had a
     large collection of wallets, watches and shoes, many of Smith’s
     things were gone. Westin found Smith’s dead body in the kitchen
     with a pool of dry blood surrounding his head. The medical
     examiner determined that the cause of death was a gunshot
     wound to the back of the head.

     Philadelphia police detectives then conducted an investigation of
     the shooting. When police arrived at Smith’s house, Davis and
     Westin gave detectives a photo of Appellant, whom they believed
     was at Smith’s house on that Friday night. Police were able to

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     identify Appellant and discovered his last known address was the
     200 block of North 61st Street. Officers also recovered Smith’s
     FitBit and cell phone, and an analysis of the FitBit showed that
     Smith stopped moving at 9:42 p.m. on March 3, 2017.

     Officers also learned of Smith’s car’s vehicle identification number
     and placed it in stolen status. The next day, March 6, 2017, police
     located Smith’s car on the 100 block of North Robinson Street,
     which is located approximately a block and a half away from
     Appellant’s residence. Shortly after initiating surveillance on the
     vehicle, Appellant arrived. Wearing blue rubber surgical gloves,
     Appellant connected jumper cables to Smith’s car. He also went
     inside the front of Smith’s vehicle. Officers then approached
     Appellant, handcuffed him, and transported him to the Homicide
     Unit on 8th and Race Streets.

     At Homicide, Appellant was placed in an interview room and
     waived his Miranda[fn1] rights. However, he later requested a
     lawyer, so detectives immediately ended their questioning. The
     next day, March 7, 2017, Appellant asked to resume speaking with
     Detective James Burns and again waived his Miranda rights.
     During questioning Appellant wrote “private” on a piece of paper,
     crossed it out after Detective Burns saw it, and then asked to use
     the bathroom. While Detective Burns and Appellant were out of
     the interview room, [Appellant] confessed to killing Smith and told
     him the events that led to Smith’s death. Although Appellant
     indicated that he would repeat his confession on camera,
     Appellant refused to do so once he and Detective Burns re-entered
     the interview room. Instead, he claimed that what he told
     Detective Burns was merely a hypothetical.
        [fn1] Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (U.S. 1966).

     While Appellant was at the Homicide Unit, detectives executed a
     search warrant on Appellant’s residence, and recovered items,
     including wallets, watches and shoes, which were later identified
     by Davis and Williams as items belonging to Smith. In addition,
     after police cleared the crime scene, Von Williams, Smith’s close
     family friend, went to Smith’s house to clean the residence. On a
     shelf in the kitchen near where Smith’s body was found, Williams
     found a 9 millimeter Ruger fired cartridge casing. Police recovered
     Smith’s gun sometime in May 2017, when it was confiscated from
     Kyvon Jenkins in Abington Township. Jenkins lived in the West
     Philadelphia area, approximately one mile away from where

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       Appellant resided.    Ballistics testing showed that the fired
       cartridge casing found near Smith’s body matched Smith’s gun.

Commonwealth v. Glenn, 2438 EDA 2018, 2020 WL 602331, at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. filed Feb. 7, 2020) (unpublished mem.) (citations omitted and

formatting altered).

       On December 27, 2017, a jury found Appellant guilty of one count each

of voluntary manslaughter, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying

firearms on public streets or on public property in Philadelphia, possession of

an instrument of crime (PIC), and two counts of theft by unlawful taking.3 On

March 16, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant an aggregate term of

twenty-one to forty-two years of incarceration.4       See Sentencing Order,

3/16/18, at 1.

       After the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions, Appellant

filed a timely appeal. On February 7, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for

allowance of appeal. See Glenn, 2020 WL 602331, appeal denied, 237 A.3d

411 (Pa. 2020).       Appellant filed a timely counseled PCRA petition, and on
____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503(a)(1), 6106(a)(1)), 6108, 907(a)), and 3921(a),
respectively.

4 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of
incarceration as follows: ten to twenty years for voluntary manslaughter,
three and a half to seven years for carrying a firearm without a license, two
and a half to five years for carrying firearms on a public street or public
property in Philadelphia, two and a half to five years for PIC, and two and a
half to five years for theft by unlawful taking.      See Sentencing Order,
3/16/18, at 1.

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November 28, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.5             This

timely appeal followed.       Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

       1. Where the evidence at trial plainly supported a self-defense
          case, which was clearly more likely to succeed than a frivolous
          challenge to the identity of the perpetrator, did the PCRA court
          err by deciding that trial counsel was not ineffective and for not
          granting an evidentiary hearing on this issue?

       2. Was trial counsel ineffective for not presenting a preserved
          discretionary aspects of sentence claim on direct appeal where
          that claim was plainly stronger than those that were put before
          this Court, and did the PCRA court err by determining
          otherwise?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

       Appellant first argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting his claim

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a claim of self-defense

at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant contends that the evidence

supported a self-defense jury instruction and trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request this instruction. See id. at 14.
____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court also entered similar orders dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition on November 29, 2022, and December 1, 2022. It is unclear from
the record why these subsequent orders were filed. However, Appellant’s
notice of appeal was filed within thirty days from the earliest order. Therefore,
we conclude that there is no impediment to our jurisdiction and appellate
review. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that notice of appeal shall be filed
within thirty days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken);
see also Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(noting that the timeliness of an appeal implicates this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction).

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      The Commonwealth responds that the PCRA court properly rejected

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim because the evidence at trial did not support

self-defense and instead reflected that “the uncontested medical evidence

established that [Appellant] shot Smith in the back of the head.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9.

      This Court has explained that when reviewing the denial of a PCRA

petition, our standard of review

      is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
      supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
      error.     The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
      supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
      apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions.

      Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
      counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
      evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
      to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
      is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
      basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
      and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
      the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

                                   *    *    *

      [A] failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires
      rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered). Moreover, a PCRA petitioner is not

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automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing.      Our Supreme Court has

explained:

      the PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without a
      hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2). In order to obtain relief, the appellant must show that
      he or she raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his
      favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 249 A.3d 1046, 1054 (Pa. 2021).

      The defense of self-defense necessarily requires that the appellant
      admit that the shooting was intentional in order to protect one’s
      self. Likewise, an imperfect self-defense claim is imperfect in only
      one respect—an unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that
      deadly force was required to save the actor’s life. All other
      principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 must be satisfied
      to prove unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter. Thus, to
      maintain a self-defense or imperfect self-defense claim, [the]
      appellant must admit he intentionally shot the [victim] to protect
      himself.

Com. v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. 2012) (formatting altered and some

citations omitted).

      Pursuant to Section 505 of the Crimes Code, self-defense is
      established and the use of force is justifiable “when the actor
      believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
      of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such
      other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a).
      Significantly, the use of deadly force, however, is not justifiable if
      the actor provoked the use of force against him or could have
      avoided the necessity of using force by retreating. Id. § 505(b).

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Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 51 (Pa. 2012). Our Supreme Court

has explained:

        To prevail on a justification defense, there must be evidence that
        the defendant (a) . . . reasonably believed that he was in imminent
        danger of death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary
        to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm; (b)
        that the defendant was free from fault in provoking the difficulty
        which culminated in the slaying; and (c) that the [defendant] did
        not violate any duty to retreat. The Commonwealth sustains its
        burden [of disproving self-defense] if it proves any of the
        following: that the slayer was not free from fault in provoking or
        continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying; that the
        slayer did not reasonably believe that [he] was in imminent
        danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary
        to kill in order to save [him]self therefrom; or that the slayer
        violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2012) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). Moreover, it is well settled that “[c]ounsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Id. at

1118.

        Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s first claim of error as

follows:

        [T]here was no evidence in the record that would justify a self-
        defense instruction. While [Appellant] did not testify, his two
        versions of the events that led up to the killing came into evidence
        through his admissions to the police. In his videotaped statement
        to police, [Appellant] denied shooting Smith. Accordingly, if
        [Appellant’s] statement on video were believed, [Appellant] was
        not the shooter and self-defense was irrelevant.

        According to Detective Burns, [Appellant] gave an altogether
        different account of the shooting during a break outside of the
        interview room in which [Appellant] admitted shooting Smith. By
        this account, a struggle ensued between [Appellant] and Smith
        after [Appellant] became upset when Smith straddled him.

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      However, [Appellant] never claimed that he believed that he was
      in any danger from Smith. [Appellant] stated that during the
      struggle, he took ahold of Smith’s gun, which was holstered at the
      time. [Appellant] said that while Smith and [Appellant] were in
      the kitchen, [Appellant] panicked and he shot Smith one time.
      While [Appellant] did not say where he had shot Smith, the
      uncontested medical evidence established that [Appellant] shot
      Smith in the back of the head. [Appellant] never claimed that
      Smith was at any time in possession of the unholstered gun or any
      other weapon. He also never maintained that he was fearful of
      being injured in any way by Smith.

      Accordingly, [Appellant’s] alternate version of the events was also
      completely inconsistent with self-defense. Because self-defense
      was refuted by [Appellant’s] own versions of the facts, he was not
      entitled to a self-defense instruction.

      [Appellant] further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not
      presenting a self-defense case. However, [Appellant] proffered
      no evidence that counsel could have presented in support of such
      a claim, and if such evidence existed, it would have been
      contradicted by [Appellant’s] own versions of the facts.

      Because the record establishes that [Appellant] was not entitled
      to a self-defense instruction and that he lacked any evidence to
      present a self-defense case, trial counsel could not have been
      ineffective for failing to pursue a self-defense theory. No relief is
      due.

PCRA Ct. Op., 2/9/23, at 5-6 (formatting altered).

      After review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s findings are supported

by the record and free of legal error, and the court did not abuse its discretion

in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. See Sandusky,

203 A.3d at 1043; Hairston, 249 A.3d at 1054. As the PCRA court noted,

Appellant initially denied shooting Smith but later admitted that he “panicked

and [] shot Smith one time.” See PCRA Ct. Op., 2/9/23, at 5-6 (citing N.T.,

12/22/17, at 36-46; 38-39). However, there was no evidence that Appellant

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feared for his life and shot Smith because Appellant believed he was in danger.

See id. at 5. Accordingly, a self-defense claim was not available to Appellant.

See Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1995) (explaining

that self-defense necessarily requires the defendant to admit that the shooting

was intentional and done in order to protect his own life and where the

defendant claims the shooting was caused by mistake or accident, self-

defense is not available because self-defense is mutually exclusive of the

defense of accident or mistake).

      On this record, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel

was ineffective for not pursuing a defense of self-defense. See Sepulveda,

55 A.3d at 1118 (stating that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a

meritless claim). Further, because there is no merit to Appellant’s argument

concerning self-defense, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to

request a jury instruction on self-defense. See Philistin, 53 A.3d at 12-13

(concluding that because the defendant was not entitled to a defense of self-

defense, trial counsel cannot be ineffective for not requesting a self-defense

jury instruction); Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1118. For these reasons, Appellant

is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Next, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence on direct

appeal.    Appellant’s Brief at 16.        Appellant notes that he preserved a

discretionary sentencing claim in his post-sentence motion and that the issue

was “plainly stronger” than the issues trial counsel argued on direct appeal.

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See id. Appellant asserts that if trial counsel pursued this issue, there is a

reasonable probability that this Court would have remanded the case for

resentencing. See id. at 17.

       The Commonwealth responds that because there is no merit to

Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence, trial counsel

was not ineffective for failing to pursue that claim on direct appeal.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12. Further, the Commonwealth contends that

Appellant failed to show that the outcome of his direct appeal would have been

different had trial counsel raised a sentencing claim, and as such, Appellant

failed to establish prejudice. Id. at 13-14.

       “[C]laims implicating the discretionary aspects of sentencing raised in

the context of an ineffectiveness claim are cognizable under the PCRA.”

Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 455 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted).6 In order to obtain relief on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to pursue a preserved challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence on direct appeal,

       a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that the underlying
       sentencing issue has merit. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 942
       A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]f the PCRA court can
____________________________________________

6 Here, there is no dispute that Appellant preserved his sentencing claim
before the trial court, but that trial counsel abandoned the issue on Appellant’s
direct appeal. See Glenn, 2020 WL 602331, at *6, n.3 (noting that although
Appellant preserved a claim involving the discretionary aspects of his sentence
in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant “abandoned this claim in his brief,”
and therefore, this Court concluded the issue was waived on direct appeal).

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       determine from the record that the sentence was not excessive .
       . . then there is no underlying merit to the ineffectiveness claim
       and the claim must fail.”). The actual prejudice a petitioner must
       prove with this type of sentencing claim is a showing of reasonable
       probability that a reviewing court on direct appeal would have
       awarded a reduction in his sentence if prior counsel challenged the
       discretionary aspects of his sentence.         Commonwealth v.
       Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011).

       In this regard, we bear in mind that “[s]entencing is a matter
       vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a
       sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse
       of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 122
       n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). We will only vacate a sentence
       falling within the guidelines when the application of the guidelines
       would be clearly unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). An
       “unreasonable” decision is “one that is irrational or not guided by
       sound judgment.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456 (internal quotation
       marks and citation omitted).

       Moreover, a court need not undertake a lengthy discourse to
       satisfy the requirement that it state its reasons for imposing
       sentence. Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 544 (Pa.
       Super. 2017). Rather, “the record as a whole must reflect the
       sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and
       character of the offender.” Id. (citation omitted). We presume a
       court that has the benefit of a PSI thus is apprised of all relevant
       sentencing criteria. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903,
       908 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 1727 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 3837159, at *4 (Pa.

Super. filed Jun. 6, 2023) (unpublished mem.) (some formatting altered).7

       Here, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim

against trial counsel was meritless and cited to its prior opinion which

addressed     Appellant’s     underlying       discretionary   sentencing   claim   on

____________________________________________

7 See generally Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (noting that unpublished memorandum
decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their
persuasive value).

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Appellant’s direct appeal. See PCRA Ct. Op., 2/9/23, at 6 (citing Trial Ct. Op.

11/16/18, at 13-16). In the prior opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s

sentencing issue as follows:

      Here, while [Appellant’s] sentences on most of the charges were
      upward departures from the guidelines, the sentence was
      reasonable for the reasons explained by the [trial court] in detail
      during the sentencing hearing.[fn2] In determining the appropriate
      sentence in this case, the [c]ourt explicitly considered the
      evidence adduced at trial and during the suppression hearing, the
      sentencing memoranda submitted by both sides, the sentencing
      guidelines, victim impact statements from Smith’s family and
      friends, [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs, the pre-sentence
      [investigation (PSI)] report, [Appellant’s] mental health
      evaluation, the need for the protection of the public, and the
      gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and
      on the community. N.T. 3/16/17 at 33-35. The [c]ourt stated
      that the killing [Appellant] committed was not within the heartland
      of the typical voluntary manslaughter case and determined that
      there were aggravating circumstances that warranted deviating
      upwards from the guidelines and for imposing consecutive
      sentences. N.T. 3/16/17 at 35.
         [fn2]The [c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to standard range
         sentences on the charges of carrying a firearm without a
         license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)) and carrying a firearm on
         public streets or public property in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S.
         § 6108). The sentences on the charges of voluntary
         manslaughter (18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a)(1)), PIC (18 Pa.C.S. §
         907(a)), and theft by unlawful taking (18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a))
         were upward departures.

      First, the Court observed that Smith had befriended [Appellant],
      helped him, and invited him as a guest in Smith’s home, and yet
      [Appellant] put a bullet in the back of Smith’s head. N.T. 3/16/17
      at 36. The [c]ourt also noted that in cases of heat of passion
      voluntary manslaughter, it is not typical to find a defendant who,
      after such a killing, takes the time to canvas the victim’s house
      and steal his personal belongings and car, all while the victim lay
      dead nearby. N.T. 3/16/17 at 36-37. In addition, the [c]ourt
      noted that such behavior showed a hardness of heart not often
      seen in voluntary manslaughter cases. N.T. 3/16/17 at 36. The

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       [c]ourt also stated that the consecutive sentences were necessary
       to achieve an aggregate sentence that was commensurate with
       the egregious misbehavior that led to the charges in this case.
       N.T. 3/16/17 at 37.

       Accordingly, the record establishes that there were compelling
       reasons for the departure above the Guidelines and the
       consecutive sentences in this case. As a result, the sentence was
       reasonable and should not be disturbed.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/16/18, at 15.

       Our review of the record confirms that the trial court carefully explained

its reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the Sentencing Guidelines and

explicitly considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the PSI report.

See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 3/16/18, at 33-37. Therefore, we agree with the

PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant’s underlying discretionary sentencing

claim is meritless. See Lawson, 2023 WL 3837159, at *4 (citing Jones, 942

A.2d at 908) (noting that where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report,

it is presumed that the trial court was apprised of all relevant sentencing

criteria). Likewise, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the

PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim was meritless,8

as trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim on

direct appeal. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043; Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at

1118; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 510, 525 (Pa. 2009)

(explaining that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to argue a

____________________________________________

8 See PCRA Ct. Op., 2/9/23, at 6; Trial Ct. Op. 11/16/18, at 13-16.

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meritless claim on appeal).9 Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on

that issue.

       For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled

to relief. Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/22/2024

____________________________________________

9 In any event, even if we found merit to Appellant’s assertion that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to argue a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
his sentence on direct appeal, there is no reasonable likelihood that the result
of the proceeding would have been different. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at
1044. As noted, the trial court aptly stated its considerations and its rationale
for the sentence imposed.         See N.T., Sentencing, 3/16/18, at 33-37.
Therefore, Appellant cannot establish the prejudice prong of the test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, and his claim fails on that basis as well. See
Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1044.

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