Court Opinion

ID: 9740785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:45.430378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.275664
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting; In People v. Novak, the Illinois Supreme Court was presented with the precise issue raised in this case: whether aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The court concluded it was not. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 115, 643 N.E.2d 762, 773 (1994). The State attempts to distinguish Novak based on the fact that the defendant in Novak had been charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and not predatory criminal sexual assault. This difference, however, does not affect our analysis, as the version of the aggravated criminal assault statute used to charge the defendant in Novak contains the same elements of the predatory criminal sexual assault of a child statute with which defendant here was charged. See 720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(b)(1) (West 1994); 720 ILCS 5/12 — 14.1(a)(1) (West 2000). Because we are bound by the principle of stare decisis, this court is without authority to overrule or modify the decisions of the supreme court, and therefore, I would reverse. King v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 337 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55, 785 N.E.2d 35, 38 (2003). In Novak, the defendant, who had been charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault, appealed the trial court’s refusal to tender jury instructions on aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 105, 643 N.E.2d at 768-69. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court’s refusal to do so had not been error because the language of the charging instrument in question did not set out the outline for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 115, 643 N.E.2d at 773. The court reasoned that the offense with which the defendant had been charged, aggravated criminal sexual assault, was based on sexual penetration, which carried an implied mental state of intent, as opposed to the intent of sexual gratification that is necessary for the sexual conduct element of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 115, 643 N.E.2d at 773. In finding that the charging instrument before it, which charged the defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault and described an act of “sexual penetration,” did not describe aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the Novak court reasoned that “sexual penetration,” which refers to aggravated criminal sexual assault, and acts of “sexual conduct,” which refers to aggravated sexual abuse, are different types of conduct. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 114-15, 643 N.E.2d at 773. The majority rejects this analysis, finding that “common sense dictates” that sexual penetration sufficiently implies the intent of sexual gratification. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 148. While the terms “sexual penetration” and “sexual conduct” may convey a common understanding, we must focus our inquiry on the statutory definitions of these terms and are not at liberty to apply the “common understanding” of a particular term where the legislature has defined it in a limited and specific manner. Here, in the statutory definition of “sexual conduct,” the legislature has included the element of “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.” We are required to apply this definition as written even where it does not reflect our common understanding of the term. To support their holding, my colleagues cite from Justice Nickles’ dissent in Novak. However, the majority opinion in Novak rejected his view, and we are bound to follow the majority. Additionally, the majority here relies upon People v. Allensworth and People v. Balle, both of which are cases that the court in Novak distinguished. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 114-15, 643 N.E.2d at 773, citing People v. Allensworth, 235 Ill. App. 3d 185, 600 N.E.2d 1197 (1992), and People v. Balle, 234 Ill. App. 3d 804, 601 N.E.2d 788 (1992). In those cases the use of the phrase “sexual conduct” was held to be sufficient to inform a defendant who had been charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse of the charge against him. Allensworth, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 188-89, 600 N.E.2d at 1199; Balle, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 811-13, 601 N.E.2d at 793-94. Thereafter, in People v. DiLorenzo, the defendant, who had been charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, argued that his indictment was fatally deficient for failing to state that the alleged sexual conduct was for the purpose of sexual gratification. People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321, 662 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1996). The supreme court, again citing Allensworth and Baile, held that the indictment in question, which alleged that defendant had committed an act of “sexual conduct” and provided citation to the relevant statutory provision, apprised the defendant of the charge against him with enough specificity to prepare his defense.5 DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d at 323-24, 662 N.E.2d at 414. Unlike Allensworth, Balle, and DiLorenzo, the defendants in Novak and in this ease were charged with aggravated or predatory criminal sexual assault and their indictments made no allegation of “sexual conduct” so as to trigger any notice of the charge of criminal sexual abuse. I believe the recent case, People v. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d 4, 9-10, 698 N.E.2d 554, 558 (1998), sheds light on this matter. In DeWeese, this court discussed Novak and DiLorenzo and held that aggravated criminal sexual abuse can be found as a lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault* ****6 even where the indictment omits language describing defendant’s touching or fondling of the victim for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 9-10, 698 N.E.2d at 558. The court noted that the focus of its inquiry was whether the language of the indictment in question implicitly contained the element of touching for the purpose of sexual gratification so as to set forth the main outline of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 10, 698 N.E.2d at 558. The court found that because the indictment at issue alleged contact between the defendant’s finger and the victim’s vagina, and that the defendant had used the threat of force to initiate this contact, this combined language implicitly connoted that the defendant touched the victim for the purpose of his sexual gratification and arousal and not by mistake or inadvertence. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11, 698 N.E.2d at 558. Therefore, the court found that the indictment contained the main outline of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. DeWeese, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 11-12, 698 N.E.2d at 559. Unlike the indictment in DeWeese, the indictment in this case does not contain the additional allegation of the threat of use of force, or any language from which the implication of the element of a purpose of sexual gratification or arousal could arise, and therefore DeWeese is inapposite. The language used in the charging instrument against the defendant here reads as follows: “[0]n or about April 30, 2000, at and within the County of Cook, Marian Kolton committed the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in that he was seventeen years of age or over and committed an act of sexual penetration upon [C.S.], to wit: an intrusion of Marian Kolton’s finger into [C.S.’s] vagina, and [C.S.] was under thirteen years of age when the act of sexual penetration was committed in violation of Chapter 720, Act 5, Section 12— 14.1(a)(1), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes 1992, as amended, and contrary to the Statute, and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois.” The language in this indictment is nearly identical to the indictment in Novak: “ ‘Chester M. Novak committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault in that he was seventeen years of age or over and committed an act of sexual penetration upon [the victim], to wit: contact between Chester M. Novak’s penis and [the victim’s] mouth and the victim was under thirteen years when the act of sexual penetration was committed, in violation of [111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 14(b)(1)].’ ” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 114. It is the duty of this court to follow the decisions of our supreme court. Schusse v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 334 Ill. App. 3d 960, 970, 779 N.E.2d 259, 267 (2002). As such, because the Illinois Supreme Court held that the indictment in Novak, a functional equivalent of the indictment in the case at bar, did not describe the foundation or main outline of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, we are bound to conclude that the indictment here does not describe the foundation or main outline of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. I would reverse. ■For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.  The majority also refers to Lemons v. O’Sullivan, a case in which the defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated sexual abuse because the indictment charged “sexual conduct,” but not the intent of sexual gratification. Lemons v. O’Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1995). DiLorenzo had not yet been decided, and the habeas corpus petition alleged the indictment did not provided fair notice of the charge. The Seventh Circuit analyzed Novak and correctly predicted the result in DiLorenzo. Lemons, 54 F.3d at 363 n.5. This, however, does not support the conclusion that where a defendant is charged with predatory criminal sexual assault and where the indictment does not charge the defendant with “sexual conduct,” a conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse is proper.   I note that the version of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute relied on to charge the defendant in DeWeese contains the same elements of the predatory criminal sexual assault of a child statute with which defendant here was charged. See 720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(b)(1) (West 1994); 720 ILCS 5/12— 14.1(a)(1) (West 2000).