Court Opinion

ID: 9634033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:16:41.148673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:03.650708
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Where the equities lie in this case is not in dispute. What is controlling, however, is a federal statute specifying that “benefits provided under the pension plan may not be assigned or alienated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Commenting in dicta on this provision and speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun stated:
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in our view, would be especially problematic in the context of an antigar-nishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment therefore can be defended only on the view that the effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes precedence over the desire to do equity between particular parties. It makes little sense to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever enforcement appears inequitable. A court attempting to carve out an exception that would not swallow the rule would be forced to determine whether application of the rule in particular circumstances would be “especially” inequitable. The impracticability of defining such a standard reinforces our conclusion that the identification of any exception should be left to Congress.
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376, 110 S.Ct. 680, 107 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990). The statutory command accompanied by this gloss frustrates Norma’s claim.
True, exceptions exist, specified by statute. We are told, however, that they are to be read narrowly and are not subject to judicial expansion. Id. As of 1984, Congress provided the QDRO exception. It is Norma’s only possible path to part of Phillip’s pension.
A QDRO must relate “to the provision of child support, alimony payments or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, *1148child or other dependent of a participant.” Norma, however, is neither the spouse nor former spouse of Phillip. Neither is she his child. She is not currently his dependent. When Congress wanted to refer to a previous relationship, it specified “former.” Norma is a former dependent not referenced by the statute.
The arbitration award she has won and the state domestic relations order she has secured do create property interests in Norma that may well be secured by action taken directly against Phillip. The award and the state order have not created a right to direct payment by the trustee of the plan.