Court Opinion

ID: 9389985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 17:01:08.302198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.921527
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM J. MYERS, Jr.,                          No. 22-16379

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00631-SMM-MTM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
NEIL V. WAKE, Senior United States
District Judge,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                  Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted April 17, 2023**

Before:      CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      William J. Myers, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order

dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action alleging various claims

arising out of two prior actions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Myers’s action because Myers failed to

establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that an action may be dismissed for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction where the alleged federal claim is “wholly

insubstantial and frivolous” or “otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to

involve a federal controversy” (citations omitted)); Franklin v. State of Or., State

Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that a district court

may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction, even before issuing a

summons); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (explaining that

judges are immune for their judicial acts, even if “alleged to have been done

maliciously or corruptly,” unless taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”).

      Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, we do not consider Myers’s contentions regarding the merits of his

claims.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Myers’s amended

complaint, which was filed after the action was dismissed, or by allegedly rejecting

Myers’s motion for reconsideration after having previously instructed the clerk to

reject any further filings in the case, except in furtherance of an appeal. See Ready

Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth

                                           2                                    22-16379
standard of review and explaining that federal district courts have the “inherent

power to control their docket” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      We reject as unsupported by the record Myers’s contentions that the district

court was biased against him, acted improperly, or denied him due process.

      All pending motions are denied.

      AFFIRMED.

                                          3                                   22-16379