Court Opinion

ID: 9760824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:18:23.086041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:17.758281
License: Public Domain

Rodowsky, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge and Davidson, JJ., dissent. Eldridge, J., filed a dissenting opinion at page 519 infra, in which Davidson, J., concurs in Part III.
Md. Code (1957,1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 264 deals with the forfeiture of cash seized in connection with an arrest for gambling. In this case we shall hold that the instances in which forfeitures pursuant to § 264 may arise are not limited to situations where the claimant of the cash is ultimately convicted of the gambling offense for which the claimant was arrested.
On April 18, 1980, officers from the vice section of the Baltimore County Police Department, acting under search warrants, conducted a raid at a cocktail lounge on Pulaski *514Highway. The raid culminated an undercover investigation of suspected gambling activities at the premises. Gerald Previti (Previti), the appellee, was arrested in the raid and charged with violating Art. 27, § 240 by accepting wagers on sporting events. Among the articles seized from Previti were $3,336 in currency, $5.50 in nickles, a major league baseball schedule and two "sport sheets.” A stet was entered to the criminal charge against Previti on August 28, 1980.1 After notice had been given by Baltimore County to Previti of the requirements of § 264 "for making claim for the return of seized moneys” (§ 264 (d) (4)), Previti, on June 27, 1981, wrote to an Assistant County Solicitor requesting its return.2 This letter was forwarded to the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County where it was treated as an original pleading, and a civil case was opened on the docket. In a show cause order dated July 23,1981 the District Court named the Baltimore County Office of Finance (the County) as defendant.3 After hearing conflicting evidence, the District Court held that it was "going to order the forfeiture of $3,341.50.” Judgment was entered in favor of the County, as defendant.
*515Previti appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County which reversed. We then granted the County’s petition for certiorari which raised this single question:
Does the absence of a conviction of a defendant charged with violations of the gambling laws preclude the Court from ordering money seized from the Defendant forfeit to the County, after the Court conducts a hearing and finds that the money is contraband pursuant to [§ 264 (d)]?
There was no conditional cross-petition.
The circuit court’s decision was made on June 30, 1982. It relied almost entirely on certain language appearing in an opinion of the Court of Special Appeals which had been filed on June 3,1982 in Bozman v. Office of Finance of Baltimore County, 52 Md. App. 1, 445 A.2d 1073 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983). That case arose under Art. 27, § 297, dealing with forfeitures in controlled dangerous substances cases. Bozman had argued that some kind of final disposition of related criminal charges was a condition precedent to a forfeiture proceeding instituted under § 297 by the seizing authority. We affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s rejection of that contention. However, in its Bozman opinion, the Court of Special Appeals commented on § 264, the *516gambling forfeiture statute, in the following manner (52 Md. App. at 9, 445 A.2d at 1077):
[Section 264] allows forfeiture of monies seized as a result of a gambling arrest. The statute mandates that forfeiture shall be commenced within 90 days of "conviction.” The appellant adroitly likens section 264 to section 297, and, while not specifically suggesting that we read the statutes to be in pari materia, very gently prods us in that direction.
We think that the Legislature meant to draw, and did draw a sharp distinction between forfeitures in gambling cases and forfeitures in controlled dangerous substances matters. The requirement of a "conviction” in a gambling case is a recognization by the General Assembly that, while gambling is unlawful, it is not such a heinous offense as to dictate forfeiture absent conviction.
On Previti’s appeal, the circuit court concluded that "in view of the holding in the Bozman case, supra, this Court must find that the District Court erred in ordering the forfeiture of the $3,341.50.” We do not agree. Forfeitures under § 264 are not exclusively limited to situations in which a criminal conviction against the claimant has been obtained on the gambling charges. The plain language of § 264 produces the forfeiture result in this case.
Under § 264 (a),4 the money seized from Previti is "deemed prima facie to be contraband of law.... All rights, *517title, and interest in and to” the money "immediately vest[ed] in and to” the County. Subsection (a) further provides that "no such money ... shall be returned to any person claiming the same . .. except as provided in this section.”
The statute then addresses factual variations which can occur following the initial seizure. "If the trial or other ultimate disposition” of the charges results in "a record of conviction,” the financial officer of the seizing governmental body "shall within 90 days from the date of the record of the entry of such conviction” apply to a court for an order declaring the money forfeited. § 264 (c).5 Subsection (d) treats situations where the criminal charge results in "acquittal, dismissal, a stet, a nolle prosequi, or probation [before judgment].” 6 Within one year from that type of dis*518position, a person who claims that the seized money is not contraband may apply to a court for a determination that the money "is the property of the claimant and for an order that it be returned.” § 264 (d) (1). That is what Previti did in this case. If the petition filed by the claimant "is finally decided against the claimant, the seized moneys ... shall be forfeited to the custodian without further judicial action.” § 264 (d) (3). That is what the District Court did in this case. It was authorized by the statute. Subsection (c), dealing with proceedings for forfeiture initiated by the seizing government after a conviction, does not limit the operation of subsection (d). The circuit court erred in requiring that there first be a criminal conviction for a forfeiture to result in this case.
*517(c) Forfeiture upon conviction. — If the trial or other ultimate disposition of such charge or charges, indictment or indictments, results in a record of conviction being entered against the person or persons so arrested, in connection with which the money, currency, or cash may have been so seized or captured, the State Treasurer, the county treasurer of the county or the director of finance in Baltimore City, shall within 90 days from the date of the record of the entry of such conviction, unless the case is appealed to an appellate court, make application to the District Court or circuit court of the county or to the District Court of Baltimore City or a law court of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, for an order declaring and ordering that such money, currency or cash in the custody of the State Treasurer, director of finance or county treasurer shall be forfeited to the sole use and gain of the State, county or city. The court to which any such application has been directed shall establish to its satisfaction that there is no pending and undetermined suit or proceeding which has been filed in any court of competent jurisdiction, against the director of finance or treasurer, seeking a return or recovery of the money, currency or cash so held in custody, before the court shall proceed so to order a forfeiture of such money, currency or cash to the State, County or Baltimore City.
*518Previti also argues that the 90 day time limit under § 264 (c) for institution of a forfeiture action applies to this case, so that the County has lost any right to retain the seized money. This argument is simply a corollary of the position which we have rejected above. It incorrectly assumes that a criminal conviction is always a condition precedent to any forfeiture under § 264.
*519Taking a different taek, Previti contends that, because a stet is not a disposition of guilty, a stet should be equated with a disposition of not guilty, especially where, as here, the County has failed to seek forfeiture. Under § 264 (d) (2), an acquittal is prima facie evidence that the seized money is not contraband in a hearing on a claimant’s application for return of the money. It follows, says Previti, that the County failed to meet the "severe” burden of proof needed to overcome the presumption. But there was no presumption one way or the other in this case. Section 264 (d) (2) states that "[n]o presumption in the proceeding shall attach to an entry of stet.”

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed.

Case remanded to that Court for the entry of a judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County.

Costs to be paid by Gerald Previti.

. At the trial of the instant action Previti explained that, at the time of his April 18, 1980 arrest, he was awaiting trial on unrelated federal charges, on which he was subsequently convicted. The stet was entered because the State did not wish to incur the expense of transporting Previti to Baltimore County, Maryland for trial from the federal correctional facility where Previti was serving the federal sentence.

. The letter reads:
Mr. Michael Moran Assistant County Solicitor:
In regards to your letter advising me of my rights for a hearing for my money which was seized and I do contend that the judgment was entered in my favor and contend that the money is not contraband of law and therefore should be returned to me and do request a hearing as soon as possible.
Thank you for advising me of my rights.
Yours truly,
GERALD PREVITI [Signature]
6 Fernsell Court
Apt. 1-C
Balto. Md 21237

. "[Jjurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is not ousted by irreg*515ularities in the proceedings ... or by insufficiencies in the pleading.” Steinpreis v. Leet, 240 Md. 212, 216, 213 A.2d 555, 557 (1965). See also Travelers v. Nationwide, 244 Md. 401, 410, 224 A.2d 285, 290 (1966); Fooks’ Executors v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 624, 192 A. 782, 787, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726, 58 S. Ct. 47, 82 L. Ed. 561 (1937). This is particularly true in the District Court of Maryland where the pleadings and proceedings are informal in nature. See Travelers, 244 Md. at 406, 224 A.2d at 288; MDR 300(a). Any irregularity involved in the filing of the petition was cured or waived when Previti, represented by counsel, appeared in court and where Previti’s claim as stated in the letter was presented and argued without objection by the defendant on grounds of irregularity.
Nield v. Nield, 126 W. Va. 430, 433, 28 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1944), cited in the dissent, states that the lack of an adequate petition, to which the petitioner’s adversary objected in that case, "[did] not relate to the jurisdiction of the court, but to the manner in which jurisdiction was attempted to be exercised.”

. Section 264 (a) reads as follows:
(a) Deemed contraband. — Whenever any money, currency, or cash is seized or captured by any police officer in this State in connection with any arrest for the playing or operation of any bookmaking, betting and wagering on horses or athletic events, or any lottery, game, table, or gaming device unlawful under the provisions of this article, all such money, currency, or cash shall be deemed prima facie to be contraband of law as a gambling device or as a part of a gambling operation. All rights, title, and interest in and to such money, currency, or cash seized by the police of the local government shall immediately vest in and to the local governments of the county, municipality, or Baltimore City, or if seized *517by State authorities, to the State, and no such money, currency, or cash shall be returned to any person claiming the same, or to any other person, except as provided in this section. The Baltimore City police department is not a State authority for the purposes of this section.

. The text of the relevant portion of § 264 (c) reads:

. The full text of § 264 (d) reads:
(d) Application for return of seized money. — (1) Upon the ultimate disposition of such charge or charges, indictment or indictments, resulting in acquittal, dismissal, a stet, a nolle prosequi, or probation under the provisions of § 641, any person *518claiming that all or any of the seized money, currency, or cash is not contraband of law under (a) and should be returned to the claimant, within one year after the date the judgment or order was entered or the action was taken which constituted the ultimate disposition, may make application on giving ten days’ prior written notice to the State Treasurer, custodian, county treasurer, or director of finance, to the appropriate court for a determination that the money, currency, or cash is the property of the claimant and for an order that it be returned.
(2) In a proceeding upon that application an acquittal, a dismissal, or a nolle prosequi with respect to the gambling charges or indictments involved in the seizure of the money, cash, or currency is prima facie evidence that it is not contraband. A conviction, plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, and probation under the provisions of § 641 is prima facie evidence that it is contraband. No presumption in the proceeding shall attach to an entry of stet.
(3) If a petition is not timely and properly filed, or if it is finally decided against the claimant, the seized moneys not disposed of shall be forfeited to the custodian without further judicial action.
(4) Timely notice must be given by certified mail or other appropriate means to any known claimants, at their last known address, of the requirements of this section for making claim for the return of seized moneys, or the seized moneys shall not be forfeited as provided by paragraph (3) of this section.