Court Opinion

ID: 9752891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:42:25.265335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:24.827597
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which vacates the divorce decree and remands for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and for determination of whether Mr. Syno is capable of making sound personal *231decisions. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, not the least of which is that the marriage was irretrievably broken at the time the divorce decree was initially granted, and the parties had lived separate and apart for at least five years, I must reject the majority’s finding that as an adjudicated incompetent, Mr. Syno may not proceed with a divorce decree without the appointment of a guardian ad litem. I do so for several reasons.
First, the incompetency determination relied upon by Mrs. Syno is clearly limited, establishing Mr. Syno’s competency only with respect to the management of his estate. Mrs. Syno’s attempt to rely on a court order declaring Mr. Syno to be incompetent to manage his personal affairs fails where the court order upon which she relies unambiguously states that this particular issue has neither been raised nor addressed. Order of Court, dated 6/29/84.
The Annotation, Divorce—Insanity as Precluding, 19 A.L.R.2d 144 (1951) § 20, at 182, states:
Since the right to sue for a divorce is regarded as as strictly personal to the aggrieved spouse, and no marital offenses automatically effect a dissolution of the marriage, the general rule is that, in the absence of a statute so authorizing, an insane person cannot institute an action for divorce.
The same Annotation also notes, however, that:
In the absence of a legal adjudication of insanity it will be presumed generally that a person has the capacity to bring a divorce action, even though not of strong mind, it being essential only that the plaintiff have sufficient mentality to understand the nature of the action taken.
Id. § 21, at 184. This position is echoed by other authorities:
[I]f the plaintiff has not been adjudicated, although admittedly insane, he himself may bring the action, and he may also bring the action if he is capable of consenting to the dissolution of the marriage whether or not he has been [so] adjudicated (citations omitted).
*232Homer H. Clark, Jr., Law of Domestic Relations in the United States (2d) § 14.2 at 535. Other authorities advance the same position:
In the absence of the adjudication of insanity or mental illness, there is a presumption that the capacity to maintain the action exits. If the party has a reasonable understanding of the nature and the purpose of the action for divorce, and has the will to decide whether or not an action should be brought, that person has the mental capacity to bring an action in his or her name (citations omitted).
I Family Law and Practice, Arnold H. Rutkin (ed.), § 2.06[1] at 2-33—2.34. These authorities support allowing the trial court to make a determination regarding capacity on a case by case basis, echoing the provision of Pa.R.C.P. 2051(b)(2) which allows a trial court to make this determination “in the pending litigation,” also in a case by case fashion.1
Careful scrutiny of this record reveals that Mr. Syno testified as follows:
Q: Now, Mr. Syno, is there any question in your mind that at least for the last 15 years, you have lived separate and apart from your wife, Mrs. Syno?
A: I have lived separate and apart.
Q: Do you understand why we are here today
A: So I can get a divorce.
Q: Do you want a divorce.
A: That’s why I’m here.
*233Q: Is there any chance that you and your wife could ever possibly get together again as husband and wife?
A: No chance whatsoever.
Q: Are you sure about that?
A: Positive.
Q: Do you understand the proceedings here; that this is to get a divorce.
A: Right.
Q: And you’re telling us that you don’t want to live with your wife?
A: Right.
Q: And that you can’t possibly live together as man and wife?
A: Right.
Q: Do you understand all of this?
A: I understand very well.
Q: Is there any question in your mind about that?
A: No question whatsoever.
Q: Do you feel that your marriage is irretrievably broken?
A: It’s broken.
Q: Irretrievably; that means that you could never again—
A: It could never be picked up.
N.T., 12/2/86 at 20-21.
Based on this testimony, I would conclude, as did the Master and the trial court, that Mr. Syno had a reasonable understanding of the nature and the purpose of the action for divorce, and also had the will to decide whether or not a divorce action should be brought. Consequently, there is support for the conclusion that Mr. Syno had the mental capacity to bring a divorce action in his own name.
Next, citing to Fink’s Estate, 343 Pa. 65, 21 A.2d 883 (1941), Mrs. Syno argues that because Frank Syno had a *234guardian appointed for his estate he was not competent to testify and that his testimony is inadmissible. In Commonwealth v. Trudell, 371 Pa.Super. 353, 538 A.2d 53 (1988), we stated:
The competency of a witness to testify is is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. The breadth of that discretion is wide since the trial judge has the opportunity to personally observe and evaluate the demeanor and sincerity of the witness. Indeed, we have recognized that the better practice where questions of witness competency arise is to permit the witness to testify and to leave the matter of credibility to the fact finder.
371 Pa.Super. at 359, 538 A.2d at 56.
In general, it is presumed that a witness is competent. 42 Pa.C.S. 5911. Even though a witness may be mentally disabled or insane, the burden of proving incompetency falls to the party asserting that the witness is incompetent. Packel and Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence (1987) § 601.7. The trial court may in the exercise of its discretion order a psychiatric examination if it has reason to believe that a witness is incompetent. Id. While there appears to be some support for the conclusion “that the usual presumption of competency is reversed where the witness has been committed to a mental hospital,” Id. at n. 6, in essence the question of a witness’ competency is a finding of fact. Hence while the cases often state that a finding of witness competence determined in the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, more rigorous analysis is advanced by observing that findings of fact will not be reversed if supported by evidence of record.
The trial court found Mr. Syno competent to testify, determining that Mr. Syno’s testimony appeared to be lucid and in direct response to questions asked of him. Trial court opinion, 5/18/90, at 10. Significantly, the trial court noted that even though the question of Mr. Syno’s competency had been raised by opposing counsel, the Master *235continued with the testimony and failed to indicate “that the hearings should be terminated or suspended” because Mr. Syno had difficulty understanding the nature of the proceedings. Id. As the trial court properly states, in applying an abuse of discretion standard, we will not attempt to usurp the Master’s duty as a finder of fact; substantial weight will be given to the findings of the Master where the Master had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor. Id. at 7. Hence, I would find no error, and no abuse of discretion, and would affirm the order of the trial court.

. The trial court, relying on Carver Estate, 5 D. & C.3d 743 (1977), determines that incompetents may not be denied the right to seek divorce simply and only because of the adjudication of incompetency. Carver relies on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), to conclude "that presumptions which deny basis civil rights violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth amendment." Carver, at 755. In view of our disposition pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2051(b)(2), we find it unnecessary to address this argument.