Court Opinion

ID: 9553488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:18.177175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:13.873688
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
There is no honor in lying about one’s military record. Indeed, Elven Joe Swisher joins a long line of luminaries accused of puffing and distorting their military service.1 But a witness discredited on a collateral issue — his military service — is not grounds to reverse a murder-for-hire conviction that was corroborated by independent evidence, particularly when defense counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine the witness on that subject. The question in this case is whether David Hinkson solicited Swisher to murder a federal judge and other public officers, not whether Swisher lied about his military sendee. The district court determined that information about Swisher’s military service was not “new” evidence, the prosecutor had no advance knowledge of this information, the defense was not diligent in pursuing this line of attack, and the defense was afforded ample opportunity to impeach Swisher.
In granting a new trial, the majority has assumed the role of a super trial court rather than a reviewing court. The bottom line is that nowhere does the majority give any deference to the district court’s detailed findings. Instead, in an effort to reconstruct the trial from the bottom up and in hindsight, the majority goes to great lengths to marshal the evidence, vigorously arguing the facts and the inferences from those facts, and forgetting that “[u]nder the abuse of discretion standard, *1299we cannot simply substitute our judgment for that of the district court[.]” United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir.1988). I respectfully dissent because the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order a new trial.
Reading the majority’s opinion leaves one with the impression that Swisher’s lies were a focal point of Hinkson’s trial, and that evidence of his misdeeds would play a pivotal role in a new trial. Nothing could be further from the truth. Placing the alleged “new” evidence in context underscores why impeachment evidence on such an attenuated and collateral issue does not merit a new trial and why the rules are geared to avoid a mini-trial on collateral issues. See United States v. Waggoner, 339 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.2003) (rejecting evidence cited in support of new trial as “cumulative, impeachment-related, or both.”).
The Evidence at Trial
After a two-week trial, a jury convicted Hinkson on three counts charging that Hinkson sought to persuade Swisher to murder United States District Judge Edward Lodge, Assistant United States Attorney Nancy Cook, and IRS Special Agent Steven Hines. More than fifteen witnesses testified at Hinkson’s trial, including Hinkson himself. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was left with no doubt that Hinkson was enraged at the government for prosecuting him on tax and currency structuring charges, and that he believed that the government was colluding with others to destroy his business, WaterOz, a “miracle water” company. Proud of his company’s success and deeply hostile towards anyone who challenged him, Hinkson was convinced that there was a “fairly long, lengthy list of people that were in the conspiracy to get him and take the company away from him.”
The evidence at trial unequivocally demonstrated that Hinkson hated Lodge, Cook, and Hines, and his feelings for them were a matter of public knowledge. After the government began its tax investigation, Hinkson filed a civil rights suit against Cook, Hines, the IRS, and others, seeking $50 million in damages, the return of papers, and an injunction halting the investigation. When Hinkson was a guest on a radio show called the “Agitator Hour,” he accused Cook of forging the grand jury foreperson’s name on the indictment against him and the judge’s name on a warrant authorizing the search of WaterOz. He admitted at trial that he drafted an article entitled “David Hinkson’s Day of Terror, at the Hands of Satan’s Foot Soldiers” in which he claimed that Cook and Hines “orchestrated” a dramatic raid on his house “for the sole purpose of murdering me and ending the lawsuit that was filed against them by me in the amount of $50 million dollars.” The evidence made crystal-clear that Hinkson, always “ranting and raving,” was out to get those who, in his mind, were out to get him.
Hinkson knew Swisher well because Swisher, through an independent testing company, had performed chemical analysis of WaterOz products on an ongoing basis. Swisher testified that at one point in their relationship, Hinkson called him his best friend, and promised him twenty acres of land so that Swisher and his wife could live close to him. According to Swisher, after telling Hinkson that he had been in the Marine Corps, Hinkson asked him whether he had served in any combat missions. Swisher responded that he had. Hinkson allegedly then asked Swisher whether he had “ever killed anyone.” Swisher answered that yes, he had. When Hinkson followed up with the question “how many?” Swisher responded, “Too many.” Swisher also stated that he had discussed weapons and guns with Hinkson, and that Hinkson *1300knew that he was an “expert rifleman [and] pistolman.”
Critically, witness Richard Bellon corroborated in full Hinkson’s belief in Swisher’s military achievements. Bellon was a legal researcher who worked for Hinkson in connection with the government’s tax investigation. Bellon testified that Hinkson informed him that Swisher had “an extensive military background,” had “been in combat,” and had “killed people during the war.” Hinkson also told him that Swisher was “licensed to carry a gun,” and that Hinkson was interested in hiring Swisher as a bodyguard “because he was trained.”
Hinkson also had first-hand knowledge of Swisher’s familiarity with guns and his shooting prowess. In December 2002, Hinkson invited Swisher to go on a trapshooting trip with a visitor from the Ukraine. In testimony that was not refuted at trial, Swisher stated that he brought his own cache of guns with him on the trip: a .22 Henry lever-action rifle, a .32 semiautomatic Browning pistol, and a .45 automatic. Swisher’s shooting performance was very impressive: he apparently hit all six of the targets, while Hinkson hit none.
All of this evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Swisher’s purported military achievements and gun expertise made him, in Hinkson’s eyes, the perfect candidate to carry out a murder-for-hire plan. That Swisher in fact lied about his military record does not, in any way, alter the conclusion that Hinkson believed in his lies, and thought of him as capable of executing a hit. The issue at trial was not whether Swisher was a decorated veteran (he did in fact serve overseas in the Marines), but that Hinkson believed that Swisher had the military and combat experience necessary to carry out a contract hit. To be sure, Swisher’s puffed-up misrepresentations and misdeeds are shocking and offensive. But this collateral issue fails to undermine other evidence in the-record demonstrating Hinkson’s firm belief in Swisher’s qualifications for the job.
The record supports a very plausible explanation for Swisher’s lies: his desire to continue receiving benefits from the Veterans Administration under a fraudulent cover story that he also told his friend Hinkson. The great lengths that Swisher went to at trial to defend his military record — the bold lies, the convenient backstory, the forged document — make it more probable, not less, that Swisher convincingly puffed to his friend Hinkson, that Hinkson bought the story, and that Hinkson then solicited Swisher to kill the federal officials.
Other portions of Swisher’s testimony, corroborated by Hinkson himself, supported these inferences. According to Swisher, Hinkson first asked him in April 2002 to torture and kill Dennis Albers, an attorney who had once won a large judgment against Hinkson on behalf of a former WaterOz employee. That Hinkson and Swisher both loathed Albers was no state secret. When Albers was running for public office in the fall of 2000, he started an “Unelect Dennis Albers Campaign.” Hinkson also admitted that he had once said about Albers, “God needs to smite him” because “he was putting innocent people in jail.” Swisher also had “bad feelings” towards Albers because he had prosecuted Swisher (unsuccessfully) twenty years before. Swisher acknowledged at trial that he may have spoken with Hinkson about his hostile feelings for Albers, and possibly participated in Hinkson’s campaign to “unelect” Albers.
According to Swisher, the first object of Hinkson’s murder-for-hire scheme was their mutual enemy, Albers. But Swisher thought Hinkson was kidding, and he told Hinkson unequivocally to knock off talk like that. Only a few months later, Swish*1301er again solicited Swisher, this time to kill Cook, Hines, and their families, but Swisher warned Hinkson that he would report him to the authorities if he brought it up again. By the third solicitation, Swisher knew that Hinkson was dead serious. At that point, Swisher reported the solicitation to an Idaho prosecutor and then the FBI was called in.
At trial, the defense hit Swisher hard on cross-examination and repeatedly attacked his credibility. In over eighty pages of cross-examination, Hinkson’s attorneys explored Swisher’s credibility with endless efforts to impeach him on different subjects: his bias (“[Hinkson] needs to discredit me in the worst way”); his deteriorating relationship with Hinkson (testifying about an attempt on his life and concluding that it must have been Hinkson because “no one else [ ] hates me bad enough”); his credibility (Swisher testified that he would consider killing someone for a half million dollars); and his previous legal involvement with Hinkson (Swisher admitted that Hinkson had sued him as a third party in an earlier Idaho state court civil action, and Swisher filed a cross-claim against him).
Swisher’s testimony aside, other evidence presented at trial cemented the government’s case against Hinkson. Witness after witness testified to Hinkson’s express, intense desire that Hines, Cook, and Lodge be tortured and killed. Lonnie Birmingham, a WaterOz employee and close friend of Hinkson, testified that Hinkson had told him that he “wanted [Cook, Hines, and Lodge] killed” because “he felt like they were conspiring to come after him to destroy him.” Bellon talked with Hinkson for hours on end about Hinkson’s belief of a government conspiracy against him. Bellon described Hinkson’s anger towards the officials prosecuting him as the “central focus of his life.” After he violated the terms of his bond in the tax case, Hinkson told FBI Agent William Long during an interview that he hoped Cook, Hines, and Lodge would die, and that he had “vented about Judge Lodge, Nancy Cook, Steve Hines, and Dennis Albers.” Long also disclosed that Hinkson admitted telling Harding that “if someone were to kill them [Cook, Hines, and Lodge], it would be worth $10,000 to me.”
Harding’s account of Hinkson’s solicitations was almost identical to Swisher’s account of his solicitations. Harding met Hinkson through a mutual friend in late 2002. Harding testified that in January 2003, Hinkson handed him a large wad of cash purported to be $10,000, and promised another $10,000, if Harding killed Lodge, Cook, and Hines. Anne Bates, a friend of Harding who was in the same room at the time of the alleged offer, corroborated this account. Over a three-month period, Hinkson allegedly repeated his offer to Harding and raved that the officials’ families, and then the officials themselves, should be tortured before they were murdered. According to Harding, Hinkson once stated that the officials should be murdered with “multiple shots and then a kill shot.” Bates also stated that she overheard Hinkson say to a third party in 2003 that Hines and Cook “should watch their children be killed,” and that Hinkson “wanted them dead.”
The jury concluded that Hinkson solicited Swisher because the evidence compelled that verdict. The credible detail in Swisher’s testimony, plus other evidence backed up by Hinkson’s admissions and corroboration from third parties, including law enforcement, dispel any notion that Swisher’s military service was a centerpiece or the linchpin of the trial.
Appellate Review of Denial of the Motion For New Trial
Our review of the denial of a motion for new trial is governed by the long-standing *1302abuse of discretion standard. The defendant bears a “significant burden” to overcome this standard. United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1989). According to our precedent, reversal under this standard is permissible only when we are firmly convinced that the district court committed a clear error in judgment. Put another way, reversal is justified only “when the appellate court is convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.2000). To give texture to this standard, it is critical that we not only give deference to the district court but engage in some degree of self-reflection that we are true to our role as a reviewing court rather than as a trial court.
In assessing the exercise of discretion, the district court’s denial of a new trial is benchmarked against the standards in United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir.2005). Harrington sets out five criteria that the moving party must satisfy to warrant a new trial on the basis of new or newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence is newly discovered; (2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner is not attributable to lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is material to the issues at trial; (4) the evidence is neither cumulative nor merely impeaching; and (5) the evidence indicates that a new trial will probably result in an acquittal. Id. (citing United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 548 (9th Cir.1991)). The majority’s de novo conclusions that the district court was wrong in evaluating every Harrington factor is more than a stretch.
As a general matter, evidence that is “merely cumulative or impeaching” is not ordinarily “an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial.” Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 5, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956). It is no leap to conclude that the prospect of impeachment on a collateral issue also does not warrant a new trial. Hinkson does not satisfy even the first two factors — newly discovered evidence and diligence — nor does he meet the remaining criteria. Finally, it bears noting that the majority hints at government impropriety with respect to the production of evidence regarding Swisher’s military record. Op. at 1271-72. Speculation on this point ignores the district court’s explicit findings:2
[T]he Government did not fail in its disclosure obligations. Furthermore, there is no factual link whatsoever between the government’s conduct here and any alleged wrongful conduct on the part of witness Swisher. There is no indication that the Government had any awareness that any of Swisher’s testimony regarding his military background could be false prior to defense counsel’s mid-trial receipt of the surprise letter from the National Personnel Records Center.
I object to the majority’s effort to override the district court record. If the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous, then reversal on that point would be in order. Alternatively, if there remains a substantial question as to the timing and receipt of evidence regarding Swisher’s military record, then the case should be remanded to the district court for further hearing and findings on that issue. But the worst of all worlds is to sprinkle the opinion with innuendo and then simply let it hang there as a backdrop to the remainder of the opinion.
*13031. Newly Discovered Evidence
The majority summarily discounts the newly discovered evidence factor in concluding that neither the Miller nor the Woodring affidavit were in the possession of the defense (or the government) until after the trial.3 It goes without saying that neither affidavit was or could have been in the trial record, as they were not offered or procured until after the trial. But that superficial analysis begs the question. As the district court noted, “the substance of both proffered documents is not new[.]”
The Miller and Woodring affidavits added nothing of substance to the mix of information available to both sides before trial ended. The Miller affidavit essentially repeated information that had already been uncovered, e.g., that Swisher had not been awarded any military service awards, including a Purple Heart; that the replacement DD-214 did not exist in Swisher’s official military file and was likely not authentic; and that his injuries stemmed from a vehicle accident, not from combat. The only matter of substance mentioned in the Woodring affidavit that the defense had not previously known is Woodring’s declaration that his signature on the replacement DD-214 was forged. But this revelation barely makes a ripple in contrast to the information that was uncovered before trial ended. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that nothing of significance offered by the defense in support of its new trial motion qualified as newly discovered evidence. Although the court had acknowledged at trial that the file was “very difficult to decipher,” with the benefit of briefing and the entire record, it concluded that the “new” evidence offered by the defense was not newly discovered. That conclusion alone should end the new trial inquiry.
The sequence of events leading to Swisher’s testimony about his military record is instructive on the first and second Harrington factors. On direct examination, Swisher testified that he told Hinkson that he served in the Marine Corps; that he discussed his military service with Hinkson; and that he told Hinkson that he had killed “too many” people. After an extensive and withering cross-examination, defense counsel admitted in a side-bar colloquy that it had been digging into Swisher’s military history and decided to cross-examine Swisher on that point. As the district court noted, defense counsel “opened the door on this,” i.e., the subject of Swisher’s military service.
At the close of its cross-examination of Swisher, defense counsel had in its possession the Tolbert letter, which stated that Swisher’s record failed to show that he was ever awarded any personal decorations. With the court’s permission, counsel reopened cross-examination to explore the military service issue. When that examination backfired and Swisher produced the replacement DD-214, there was extensive discussion between the court and counsel over how to proceed.
The district court was open-minded as to how to address the military commendation issue. Recognizing that defense counsel *1304opened the door and that “ordinarily, under the rules, you are stuck with the witness’ answer and the court has the discretion to restrict further collateral proof of that impeachment,” the court nonetheless suggested that counsel could continue cross-examination. The court also stated that another option would be to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony relating to the Purple Heart.' With the consent of defense counsel, the court ultimately finessed the situation by telling the jury that the court had erred in permitting the inquiry and gave the following remedial instruction:
[I]t’s been a long day; and I now realize that I made a mistake in allowing the question with regard to the Purple Heart Medal. So I am going to instruct you to disregard completely all of Mr. Swisher’s testimony with regard to that military commendation.
Although defense counsel marked the available documents as exhibits, they were neither offered, nor refused, as evidence. Nor did counsel attempt to procure an actual witness on the subject of Swisher’s military history, although it could have done so before close of the trial. The defense did not request a short continuance or offer another remedial alternative to the court. In the end, defense counsel accepted the proposed instruction and made a deliberate choice not to reexamine Swisher a third time.
The majority excuses the defense’s decision not to reopen cross-examination of Swisher because “[cjounsel could hardly have anticipated that Swisher, after being shown the[Tolbert] letter, would pull from his pocket a forged document purporting to provide a superseding account of his military service.” Op. at 1280. While Swisher’s dramatic production of the letter was unexpected, counsel still had a number of options to impeach Swisher. Defense counsel’s failure to prepare a backup plan in the event that Swisher did anything but wilt and confess his sins on the stand was a choice that it made.
Given the time available for the defense to investigate Swisher’s record, and the juicy material that it could have culled from information available to it-ranging from the time of Swisher’s service, to his signature on the original DD-214, to the fact that the replacement DD-214 was apparently not authentic-the defense had plenty of grist for the mill. The district court was flexible, and offered the reopening of cross-examination to explore these issues. Yet, the defense simply made the strategic decision not to go down that path.
2. Due diligence
Without deference to the district court’s analysis, the majority concludes that “[i]n our view, defense counsel were diligent in looking for evidence that could be used to impeach Swisher.” Op. at 1280. The majority’s extensive discussion of this diligence nowhere cites to the district court’s conclusion that Hinkson “is unable to establish that the failure to discover this evidence was not due to his counsel’s lack of diligence” and that “the Court finds that defense counsel had ample time to investigate Swisher’s record prior to trial, but was not diligent in pursuing the issue.”
The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. For starters, Hinkson’s attorneys admitted at trial that they had been suspicious “[f]or quite sometime” about Swisher’s military credentials because “of his age and because of the time of the war.” Three months prior to Hinkson’s criminal trial on the solicitation charges, one of Hinkson’s attorneys deposed Swisher as part of the multi-party Idaho state court lawsuit against Hinkson. At that time, Hinkson’s lawyers were skeptical about Swisher’s record. Swisher *1305stated during this deposition that he was born January 13, 1937. As a matter of public record, the Korean conflict began in 1950 and fighting ended in 1953.4 If Swisher had served in the “Korean War,” as he had claimed, he would have been 13 to 16 years old at the time of his alleged service-certainly a red flag as to the possibility that he was not being truthful about his military record. At the same deposition, Swisher stated that he had constantly suffered from back pain because he had suffered two grenade injuries while he was in the military. He made these same claims in two grand jury appearances in 2002 and 2004, which led to Hinkson’s indictments. The defense received those transcripts a week before trial. Defense counsel admitted that he knew, based on Hinkson’s prior testimony before the grand juries, that “I should be very careful in my cross-examination of him.”
All of these facts were on the table and subject to investigation before the trial began and certainly before trial ended. Even during trial, once more facts came to light, counsel could have subpoenaed witnesses on this subject. But it chose not to, a strategic decision that cannot now be the basis of the grant of a new trial motion. The district court had first-hand experience with the discovery chronology and the diligence of defense counsel. Nothing supports the majority’s rejection of the district court’s explicit findings regarding lack of diligence.
3. Materiality
The next question for consideration under Hamngton is whether the evidence about Swisher’s military record was material to the issues at trial. The district court held that the “proffered ‘new’ evidence is not material to the issue at trialt.]”
I cannot think of a clearer example of a collateral issue than Swisher’s military service.5 “Ordinarily, evidence impeaching a witness will not be material ... because it will not refute an essential element of the government’s case.” United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Evidence that Swisher allegedly lied during the course of Hinkson’s past trial will not refute an essential element of the government’s solicitation case against Hinkson at a new trial nor would the evidence be central to a new trial. The ultimate issue at a new trial is whether Hinkson solicited Swisher in the murder-for-hire scheme. Whether Hinkson was prompted to do so by his belief that Swisher had the qualifications to be an assassin is a related issue, although not one that depends on Swisher’s actual military record. But Swisher’s actual military record, and whether he was truthful about it, are collateral points. Ironically, Swisher’s puffing of his military achievements makes it even more likely that Hinkson would have found him to be a suitable candidate. In any event, the veracity of Swisher’s military record will not be material to the issues at a new trial and can only be described as a classic sideshow.
To be sure, Swisher is a key witness for the government, and his credibility is on the line. But the military service portion of his testimony was, relative to the rest of his testimony, unimportant. A district court “may well find it probable that an *1306acquittal would result on retrial” when “the bulk of a key witness’ testimony is otherwise shown to be false.” Krasny, 607 F.2d at 845 (emphasis added). Swisher’s testimony spanned over one hundred pages. Only three pages related to his Purple Heart and military service, and that portion was ultimately stricken from the jury’s consideration. The “bulk” of his testimony has not been proven false. Thus, while Davis recognizes that impeachment evidence may be so powerful that “it could render the witness’ testimony totally incredible!,]” 960 F.2d at 825, such is not the case here. Hinkson’s perception of Swisher’s purported prowess and daring, not the truth of his military record, is the real issue.
The district court also held that while information about Swisher’s record could be used for impeachment purposes, the documents and testimony by collateral witnesses would be inadmissible extrinsic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).6 Rule 608(b) bars introduction of extrinsic evidence of a witness’s past conduct. On cross-examination, the witness may be impeached by referencing documents and probing his veracity or “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 55, 105 5.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). Nonetheless, Rule 608(b) “limits the inquiry to cross-examination of the witness ... and prohibits the cross-examiner from introducing extrinsic evidence of the witness’ past conduct.” Id. at 55, 105 S.Ct. 465 (emphasis added). The district court also held that, on balance, the evidence was barred under Rule 403 because it would have “wasted considerable trial time on a confusing, tangential issue unrelated to the factual issues to be resolved by the jury.” These evidentiary rulings also undermine the defense’s claim that impeachment of Swisher’s military record will blossom into substantive evidence at a new trial.
4. Neither Cumulative Nor Merely Impeaching
The fourth factor for consideration is whether the alleged new evidence is “neither cumulative nor merely impeaching.” The evidence here fails on both counts. As the district court concluded, the prof-erred “new” evidence was cumulative of other information that was already available to the defense prior to the conclusion of trial, such as the Tolbert letter and the Dowling letter. Those documents established, among other things, that the replacement DD-214 was a forgery and that Swisher had lied about receiving military awards. The “new” evidence, while more extensive, essentially confirms those facts.
The evidence is also plainly “merely impeaching,” by any definition of the term. Evidence that Swisher lied with respect to his military record may affect the jury’s estimation of his credibility on the stand. But its sole use at a new trial would be to impeach Swisher. Impeachment evidence that renders a witness’s testimony totally incredible may be “material,” within the meaning of the third Harrington factor, where the impeached witness’s testimony was “uncorroborated and provided the only evidence of an essential element of the government’s case.” Davis, 960 F.2d at 825. But that circumstance does not describe the evidence here. To adopt the majority’s view would require us to ignore all of the corroborating and circumstantial evidence pointing to Hinkson’s guilt.
*13075. Probable Acquittal at a New Trial
The final consideration is whether the new evidence would probably result in Hinkson’s acquittal at a new trial. The district court noted that the “Federal Rules of Evidence would not apply any differently in a new trial,” such that “the proferred extrinsic evidence would ... [not] probably result in an acquittal.”
The “newly discovered” evidence fails this fifth prong of the Harrington test because it simply does not make an acquittal probable. The majority states that to convict Hinkson of solicitation, a jury at a new trial must believe that Hinkson “had been serious” in asking Swisher to kill Cook, Hines, and Lodge. Op. at 1287. The government has ample ammunition against Hinkson to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinkson solicited Swisher. A new trial cannot erase the long, detailed history between Hinkson and Swisher. It will not change the undisputed testimony that Hinkson believed that Swisher, as a result of his military background and gun expertise, had the wherewithal to execute a hit. Nor will it erase the third party testimony that Hinkson wanted the three officials killed, that he hoped that they would die, and that to him, it would be worth at least $10,000 a head for that to happen. In short, nothing in the record suggests that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that a new trial would probably not result in Hinkson’s acquittal.
The majority suggests that the evidentiary deck was equally stacked against Hinkson on the Swisher-related counts as on the Harding-related counts, implying that Swisher’s tales of military awards and combat injuries might have swayed the jury to convict Hinkson only on the Swisher-related counts.7 But the effort to construct perfect parallels between Swisher and Harding is too simplistic. There were myriad reasons other than those listed by the majority that may have made Hinkson’s guilt seem more solid to the jury on the Swisher counts. Unlike Swisher, who had known Hinkson for over two years and been a close friend at the time of the alleged solicitations, Hinkson had known Harding for only a few weeks before the first time that he allegedly asked Harding to kill three federal officials. Hinkson knew Swisher to be a vindictive person who, like Hinkson, acted on his dislike for those who had “wronged” him, like Albers. Hinkson had known Swisher through his regular consulting work for WaterOz, whereas Harding was a sometime radio show host who had recently worked on shows dealing with the paranormal. The fact that Hinkson believed Swisher to have significant combat experience was yet another reason that a solicitation to Swisher was both believable and a pragmatic choice. Swisher’s lies simply enhanced his prowess from Hinkson’s perspective. These distinctions illustrate that the Harding and Swisher solicitations cannot be neatly squared off, with evidence of Swisher’s actual rather than represented military service tipping the scales at a new trial.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a new trial, we must be mindful of the factors articulated in Harrington and the deference accorded to the district court in making its discretionary ruling on a new trial. The district court provided a long and thoughtful recitation of his weighing of each of these factors. No legal error un*1308-1312dermines that conclusion, and nothing in the district court’s reasoning and conclusions was an abuse of discretion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant Hinkson a new trial. At most, I would remand for further fact-finding on the issue of when the government knew, or should have known, of the Dowling letter. In doing so, if warranted by evidence of the government’s knowledge, I would give the district court the first opportunity to evaluate a new trial motion under the Zuno-Arce test. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886 (9th Cir.2003). Barring a majority for remand, I would affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial.

. See Henry Mark Holzer and Erika Holzer, Fake Warriors. Identifying, exposing and punishing THOSE WHO FALSIFY THEIR MILITARY SERVICE 15-21 (Xlibris 2003) (citing examples of a member of Congress, a prominent businessman and others who falsified military records).

. It is not our role to speculate about fax lines and timing of receipt of documents. In any event, after argument in this appeal, the government was asked to submit further documentation of the timing of its knowledge of the Dowling letter about Swisher's records. Nothing in that letter undermines the district court’s findings.

. The majority also notes that Swisher has been convicted for the fraudulent wearing of a military decoration and the making of false statements to obtain veterans benefits. Op. at ---. This information was not, of course, before the district court as part of Hinkson's new trial motion, and it would be inappropriate to permit this recent event to influence our evaluation of the district court's decision three years ago on the new trial motion. See United States v. Boberg, 565 F.2d 1059, 1062 (8th Cir.1977) (declining to decide a new trial motion on the basis of new evidence where it had not been previously presented to the trial court). As the majority appears to acknowledge this point, one wonders the purpose of recitation of this after-the-fact information.

. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Korean War, http:// www.britannica.com/eb/article9046072/Korean-War (last visited May 16, 2008).

. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, materiality is not coextensive with the fifth Harrington factor of whether acquittal would be probable. See United States v. George, 420 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding that the newly discovered evidence was "not material^]” as "[i]t would have only established a collateral point”).

. The majority's discussion of the wearing of the Purple Heart by Swisher seems misplaced. See Op. at 1282-83. That testimony was stricken, and there is little likelihood that this circumstance will be repeated at a new trial, such that the documents would be admissible as evidence to contradict a witness’s statement.

. The majority writes that "Swisher presented himself as a United States Marine who had been wounded in service of his country” and was a "decorated war hero.” Op. at -. But the district court instructed the jury to disregard all of the Purple Heart testimony, an instruction that we assume the jury followed. See United States v. Jimenez Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1101 n. 6 (9th Cir.2004).