Court Opinion

ID: 9637863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:24:15.523281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:01.273297
License: Public Domain

.KENYON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority. It seems to me there are questions of fact involved which should be settled by a jury. One of these is whether or not defendant in error is bound by plaintiff in error’s understanding and construction of the agreement, and is estopped to deny liability for underweights. From August 25, 1920, the date of the receipt of a certain letter written by plaintiff in error to Mr. Thomas, purchasing agent of defendant in error, defendant knew that it was plaintiff’s understanding 'of the contract that the guaranteed weight and underweight features were part thereof, and that plaintiff in error expected defendant in error to pay underweights and itself to pay overweights on the shipments of ties. Approximately 27 per cent, of the ties sold had been received by defendant in error at the time of the receipt of this letter. The situation, it seems to me, is therefore presented of defendant in error, when it had received approximately 27 per cent, of the ties it had purchased, being informed of plaintiff in error’s understanding of the contract, and with such information it uttered no word of protest — it made no suggestion' to plaintiff in error to correct the misconstruction-of the contract from its viewpoint, but permitted plaintiff in error to go ahead and carry out the contract according to its understanding, and defendant in error received approximately 73 per cent, of the ties, knowing that plaintiff in error expected to be paid according to its idea of the contract, viz. that defendant in error had agreed to pay the underweights.
I cannot escape the conclusion that, when the letter referred to of August 24, 1920, was received by defendant 'in error, it was its duty to speak out, or in some way indicate its nonconcurrence therewith. If it was not willing to accept the ties, knowing plaintiff in error’s expectation that defendant in error would pay the underweights, it was its duty to say so. Silence when one should speak, and acquiescence when one should object, may be sufficient to establish estoppel. I think there are questions of fact, also, with reference to the alleged contract, which were for the jury, but I forego discussion thereof. I rest my dissent principally upon the proposition that there was evidence from which a jury would have been justified in *443finding an estoppel as to defendant in error, and that this question should have been submitted to the jury.