Court Opinion

ID: 9601388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:42:55.150278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:06.632522
License: Public Domain

KNUDSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
Under the opinion written by Justice Smith the judgment is reversed upon the ground that the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury on the last clear chance doctrine because “there is no substantial evidence to support the doctrine.” In order that the reasons for my dissent may be clearly understood I consider it necessary to mention more of the facts than are stated in said opinion.
The uncontradicted evidence discloses that the accident occurred within an intersection at approximately 1:30 a. m.; the street surface was dry and visibility was good. Plaintiff testified that he had spent the seven hours immediately preceding the accident in a beer parlor, during which time he had no food and admittedly drank four beers. Respondent also admitted that he had drunk some beer during the nighttime immediately preceding the accident. The officer who investigated the accident shortly after it happened stated that he was of the opinion that both parties had been drinking shortly prior to that time. The court instructed the jury that the question of intoxication of either party was a proper one for them to consider.
There was no testimony regarding the speed of the respective automobiles prior to the accident other than the statements of the parties themselves and neither party admitted driving in excess of 25 miles per hour. However, the record discloses that after the collision plaintiff’s car traveled 65 feet 4 inches, and defendant’s traveled 43 feet 1 inch. It is my view that the relative speed of the automobiles involved was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.
In said opinion it is in substance stated that the record is entirely lacking in proof of a time factor for applicability of the last clear chance doctrine. I disagree with such conclusion for the reason it is the uncontradicted fact that the point of impact occurred 6 feet 11 inches west of the center line of Fifth Street and approximately 2 feet south of the north boundary line of Warner Avenue as extended through Fifth Street.
*144The following is a copy of plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, which was prepared by the officer who investigated the accident and was admitted in evidence.

This evidence is unchallenged proof that defendant traveled a. distance of 28 feet S inches within the intersection before the accident occurred and that plaintiff traveled • only approximately 2 feet within the intersection .immediately prior to the collision.
' It' is alleged in defendant’s affirmative defense inter alia that any injuries or damage sustained or suffered by plaintiff at the time and place of the accident were caused in whole or in part, or were contributed to, by the negligence, fault or want of care of the plaintiff by driving said automobile-“without lighted headlights.” Defendant testified that he came to a complete stop at the intersection of Fifth and Warner Streets; that he there looked for traffic from north and south but did not see any. When asked if he saw any lights on the *145vehicle approaching he answered “no.” Under cross-examination defendant testified as follows:
“Q Did you ever tell the Police Officer, Mr. B. H. Miller, at the scene of the accident, there, that Mr. Schwandt was driving without lights?
“A That is a question that I don't know whether I did or not. I am hazy about that point.
“Q Well I will ask you if I served you with interrogatories in Chicago and I will read interrogatory number 17.
‘Do you claim that Mr. Schwandt was driving his pickup truck with the head lights off immediately prior to and at the time of the collision on May 27, 1961 ?’ To that interrogatory you answered, ‘Yes.’ * * *”
Notwithstanding the fact that visibility was good and their respective views were entirely unobstructed, there was no other explanation by either of them as to why they did not see each other before the accident. In this connection the court gave the following instruction:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 17
“The law will not permit a driver of a motor vehicle to say that he looked and did not see that which was plainly visible or that which an ordinarily prudent person should or could have seen; but he must be presumed to have seen a plainly visible object or that which an ordinarily prudent person could or should have seen.”
In Drury v. Palmer, 84 Idaho 558, 375 P.2d 125, this court had under consideration an accident which occurred at an intersection and stated:
“Appellant was under the duty to maintain a lookout for other vehicles approaching the intersection. The duty is not merely of looking, but is one of observation, imposing upon a motorist the necessity of being observant as to the traffic and general situation at or in the vicinity of the intersection. He must look in such prudent and careful manner as to enable him to see what a person in the exercise of ordinary care and caution for the safety of himself and others would have seen under like circumstances.”
I realize that plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove that the headlights on his car were lighted as he approached said intersection; however whether plaintiff did in fact have his headlights on, was a fact to be decided by the jury.
In support of my contention that the record discloses substantial evidence to support the doctrine I call attention to the following facts. The evidence is uncontradicted that defendant had traveled 26 feet through the intersection in plain view of plaintiff before plaintiff entered it. There is no evidence or contention that de*146fendant did not then have his headlights lighted. The evidence discloses that 25 miles per hour is the highest rate of speed which was being traveled by either of the parties immediately before the collision. Under such circumstances I contend that the jury would be justified in believing and concluding that if plaintiff had been keeping a proper lookout he could and should have avoided the collision and that he had, by the exercise of ordinary care and caution, a clear chance to do so.
I disagree with the statement contained in the concurring opinion wherein it is stated that “[i]n the instant action the plaintiff was proceeding in his vehicle on 5th Street and had the right of way over the defendant * * In order for such statement to be correct, it would require a conclusion that plaintiff was traveling with his headlights lighted and in all respects proceeding as an ordinarily prudent person would or should have been driving his vehicle while approaching the intersection. There is nothing in the record which shows that the jury found or believed that plaintiff was so driving. That the jury denied the plaintiff any damages strongly indicates to me the jury believed plaintiff to be in some degree at fault in causing the accident. If the jury believed that plaintiff was traveling without lights and/or that by reason of intoxication or-.other cause he was not maintaining a proper lookout in the exercise of ordinary care and caution for the safety of himself and others, he would not be entitled to the benefit of a statute or regulation giving him the right of way under lawful conditions. In the case of Coughran v. Hickox, 82 Idaho 18, 348 P.2d 724, this court stated:
“While there is no express provision in the present statute for forfeiture of right of way by a plaintiff who approaches an intersection at an unlawful rate of speed, such rule is implicit in the law of contributory negligence. So, if the jury found from defendant’s testimony that the plaintiff approached the intersection at an unlawful or dangerous rate of speed, or failed to drive at an appropriated reduced speed when approaching the intersection, and that such conduct was a contributing proximate cause of the collision, then the plaintiff could not recover.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The fact that one may be entitled to the right of way does not excuse him from the exercise of ordinary care to avoid causing an accident. Stallinger v. Johnson, 65 Idaho 101, 139 P.2d 460. The elements of intoxication, speed, lights, due care and observance by the parties were proper elements to be considered by the jury in their estimate of the conduct by the parties. In this connection I consider it proper to mention that defendant’s testimony that he stopped before entering the intersection is *147not contradicted by anyone and certainly the jury was at liberty to believe him in this respect.
This court has repeatedly held that the “last clear chance doctrine is authorized by the pleadings, where the complaint alleges negligence of the defendant and the answer denies it, and alleges that the accident was caused by the plaintiff’s negligence.” Graham v. Milsap, 77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744; McKinley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 796. In view of the denials contained in defendant’s answer and the allegations of his affirmative defense it must be conceded that the pleadings here involved put in issue the doctrine of last clear chance. This court has also stated that if the proof leaves the- issue of last clear chance in doubt, or if reasonable minds might from the evidence reach different conclusions thereon, then the issue of last clear chance must be submitted to the jury. Durrington v. Crooker, 78 Idaho 539, 307 P.2d 227.
In the concurring opinion it is in effect stated that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the last clear chance doctrine and that the doctrine should not be expanded into a rule that would excuse a defendant found to have been negligent from the responsibility of his own negligence; that such doctrine should be limited in its application to a plaintiff. Under this reasoning we would have a law or rule of the road applicable only to those who may ultimately be plaintiffs. I cannot agree with the annunciation of a doctrine which rules that where two successive negligences occur causing damage that only the party who is first to file complaint may invoke the rule, nor do I believe that such application of the doctrine was ever intended by this court.
In one of the earliest decisions of this court wherein such doctrine was considered, the court said that the doctrine is accurately stated as follows:
“The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for it.” Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., Ltd., 14 Idaho 327, 94 P. 432, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 254.
In said action the court also quoted with approval from Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 S.Ct. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485, wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
“Although defendant’s negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured, * *
In McKinley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 796, this court again stated that it adhered in the pronouncement in Pilmer v. *148Boise Traction Co., Ltd., supra, and restated the rule plainly in the following language:
“ ‘A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for such accident.’ ”
The opinion holds that if the defendant cross-claimed for damages he suffered in the accident, he would thereby be relegated to the relative position of a plaintiff and possibly be entitled to the benefit of such doctrine. This application of the doctrine would limit its aid to only the one who demands damages. If the defendant did not pray for some relief in the action, irrespective of how clearly it may be established that the plaintiff had every opportunity to avoid the collision, he, the defendant, would not be entitled to its aid. It is my view that it makes no difference whether it is applied in favor of a plaintiff to allow a recovery or in favor of a defendant to defeat recovery. I believe it to be a basic law of the road and the duty of every motorist to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle or other object when by the exercise of ordinary care he can do so. II.C. § 49-701.)
In the concurring opinion it is stated that the giving of the instruction on “last clear chance” could do nothing except authorize the members of the jury “to speculate on a defendant’s duties which are defined by statute.” I am unable to ascertain what “duties” are referred to. The record discloses that the court fully instructed and advised the jury regarding the duties of the defendant upon his approach and entrance to the intersection involved. If the jury believed that defendant stopped at the intersection and did not observe the plaintiff because plaintiff was traveling without lights, where did any speculation exist?
Said opinion also states that the giving of said instruction was prejudicial “as it distracts the attention of the members of the jury from their primary obligation of determining the issue of negligence of the parties and the issue of proximate cause.” It is not pointed out what language in the instruction would be expected to cause distraction. The fact is that under the instruction here considered the jury was told that “this doctrine [last clear chance] may or may not apply depending upon what you find the facts to be.” The determination as to whether the doctrine applied was left entirely with the jury where in my judgment it belonged.
It appears to me that each of the foregoing opinions is predicated upon an assumption that it is an established fact that defendant did not stop before entering the intersection and that the plaintiff had the right of way over the defendant. Since this *149court is not the trier of the facts, I do not feel that the court is entitled to entertain any such assumed facts. Although I have hereinbefore stated that defendant’s testimony to the effect that he did stop and observe, before entering the intersection, is not denied by any witness, I do think it is a fact to be decided by the jury. It has been stated by this court that where the minds of reasonable men might differ, or where different conclusions might be reached by different minds, the question as to the existence of negligence is a question for the jury. Stallinger v. Johnson, supra; Graham v. Milsap, supra.
It is also stated in Durrington v. Crooker, 78 Idaho 539, 307 P.2d 227 that:
“ * * * If the proof leaves the issue of last clear chance in doubt, or if reasonable minds might from the evidence reach different conclusions thereon, then the issue of last clear chance must be submitted to the jury. * $ *»
It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury upon every reasonable theory of either party finding support in the pleadings and evidence. Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Pay. L. Co., 64 Idaho 474, 133 P.2d 1017. From my examination of the record, I am convinced that there is sufficient substantial evidence to justify the court in giving the questioned instruction. The judgment should be affirmed.