Court Opinion

ID: 9775377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:56:19.463337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.716792
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. In the renewed discussion of the writ of error corant nobis, which has been stimulated by our divided vote in Larimore v. State, 327 Ark. 285, 938 S.W.2d 818 (1997), we are confronted with the classic dilemma presented by the need for finality of legal decisions. At some point, the proceedings must come to a halt despite the prospect of allegations without end that something went wrong. As I continue to subscribe to the dissenting opinion written by Justice Glaze in the Larimore case, I concur in the result reached here on the ground that the petition is untimely, but I cannot agree with the explanation given by the majority. The opinion suggests that there is a good reason for requiring an allegation that someone other than the prisoner has confessed to the crime of which he or she was convicted to be made between the conviction and affirmance on appeal. The reason suggested is that such a claim must be addressed while the facts are within the fresh memories of persons involved and that it is desirable to have it dealt with by the court that tried the case originally. It is thus implied that we allow the other allegations that might support a coram nobis petition to be raised after affirmance because there is no such need of immediate memory. The other permissible bases of a coram nobis petition, quoted from Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 109, 925 S.W.2d 768, 775 (1996), are, “. . .insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea or material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, that might have resulted in a different verdict. ...” Each is as dependent upon the memories of witnesses as is a subsequent confession by someone other than the prisoner. Nor is it any less desirable in each of those instances that the court that tried the case deal with the subsequent allegations. The distinction sought to be made in the majority opinion fails utterly. In response to this concurring opinion, the majority states, “We made clear in Penn [v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670, S.W.2d 426 (1984)] that the time limitation was integral to our recognition of this new ground for a writ of error coram nobis.” That statement does not deal with the illogic of the distinction the majority poses. Here is the language from the Venn case to which the majority refers: We emphasize that we do not open the door to other petitions beyond those that would qualify under the facts in this case, especially the fact that it is presently between trial and appeal and can easily provide for an early hearing before the court that just heard the case. That statement makes no effort to distinguish among bases for the writ in the context of timeliness and should be taken to apply to all “other petitions.” Absent reasons for distinguishing among the grounds giving rise to the writ, all should be limited to the time prior to decision on appeal or none of them should be so limited. Glaze, J., joins in this opinion.