Court Opinion

ID: 2965648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:43:05.274478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:07.435789
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-1198

                       CAROLINE G. DOUGLAS,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

             NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT PROFESSIONAL
                    CONDUCT COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

                      Defendants, Appellees.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

         [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
                   Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                

     Caroline G. Douglas on brief pro se.
     Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General and Daniel J. Mullen,
Senior Assistant Attorney General on brief for appellees.

December 29, 1998

                                
                                
            Per Curiam.  Plaintiff Caroline Douglas appeals a
    district court judgment that dismissed her amended complaint
    for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the New
    Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (NHPCC) 
    from instituting disciplinary proceedings against her.  The
    district court's dismissal order was based on the abstention
    principle enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
    and extended to attorney disciplinary proceedings in Middlesex
    County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457
    U.S. 423 (1982).  
              Applying de novo review, see Brooks v. New Hampshire
    Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996), we affirm. 
    The allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint establish that
    the disciplinary investigations commenced by the NHPCC are the
    sort of judicial proceedings that warrant abstention, as
    evidenced by the cases cited in the district court's opinion. 
    Plaintiff's argument to the contrary is meritless.  See, e.g.,
    Wightman v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir.
    1996)(applying Younger to disciplinary proceeding in its early
    stages), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 744 (1997); Fieger v. Thomas,
    74 F.3d 740, 746-49 (6th Cir. 1996)(applying Younger where
    attorney could raise constitutional claims before state bar
    disciplinary board and, via petition for mandamus or petition
    for discretionary review, before state supreme court); Brooks,
    80 F.3d at 638 (applying Younger where, inter alia, state
    disciplinary proceeding was only in the "embryonic" stage).    The allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint are
    also insufficient to state a claim within the "bad faith"
    exception to the Younger principle.  See Wightman, 84 F.3d at
    190 ("[t]he bad faith exception is narrow and is to be granted
    parsimoniously"); Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in
    Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 779 (1st Cir. 1990)(similar). 
    Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that she was acting as a
    private citizen is insufficient to suggest that the NHPCC acted
    in bad faith in opening its investigations.  See Judge v. City
    of Lowell, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1998), 1998 WESTLAW
    789187 at *4("the element of illegal motive must be pleaded by
    alleging specific non-conclusory facts from which such a motive
    may reasonably be inferred, not merely by generalized
    asseveration alone[]"); Collins v. County of Kendall, Illinois,
    807 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1986)(plaintiff asserting bad faith
    prosecution must allege specific facts to support an inference
    of bad faith).  Plaintiff's allegation that the NHPCC followed
    improper procedures in initiating the September 15, 1997
    complaint also fails to raise the specter of bad faith, for
    plaintiff has failed to identify any rule that prohibited the
    opening of the complaint in the fashion alleged.  We further
    cannot say that the "Hewson complaint" described a scenario
    that was patently beyond the NHPCC's jurisdiction, nor that its
  docketing was a "manifest" example of bad faith.    Finally,
    that the NHPCC failed to pursue a number of complaints against
    plaintiff's ex-husband is irrelevant to whether the complaints
    against plaintiff were opened in bad faith.  See Mason v.
    Departmental Disciplinary Committee, 894 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir.
    1990)(allegation that professional conduct board was at fault
    because it failed to adjudicate misconduct charges against
    others was irrelevant to determining propriety of board's
  inquiry into plaintiff).    Finally, plaintiff's allegations
    concerning the NHPCC's alleged  bias in favor of politically
    influential attorneys are too general to overcome the
    presumption of integrity that we must ascribe to the
    defendants.  See, e.g., Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court
    of California, 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995); Bettencourt,
    904 F.2d at 780.   
       Affirmed.