Court Opinion

ID: 9534757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:38.538049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:14.564831
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LAMPKIN, specially concurring: I recognize that we are bound by our supreme court’s holding in Patrick that a defendant must testify to preserve for review the issue of the trial court’s refusal to rule on a motion in limine seeking to bar the use of prior convictions for impeachment. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. Nevertheless, I write to emphasize that trial courts, as a simple matter of fairness, need to make early rulings on motions in limine addressing the admissibility of prior convictions. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 73. I further emphasize that a trial court’s blanket policy not to rule on a motion in limine in advance of the defendant’s decision not to testify constitutes an abuse of discretion. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 74-75. In addition, I believe our supreme court should consider the availability of relief to defendant Strickland, even though he did not testify, because the record indicates the trial court had a blanket policy not to rule on motions in limine. A deferred ruling on a motion in limine to bar prior convictions adversely impacts the defense’s strategy and the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel cannot adequately advise a defendant on the important tactical decision of whether to testify if counsel does not know whether prior convictions will be admissible for impeachment purposes. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 69. Furthermore, a trial court’s refusal to rule handicaps counsel during voir dire when counsel presents defendant’s issues to prospective jurors and later during opening statements when counsel frames the issues to be decided by the jury. Specifically, counsel must decide whether to inform prospective and selected jurors about the defendant’s prior convictions or his election to testify. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 70. The admissibility of prior convictions affects counsel’s strategy in selecting prospective jurors and questioning them about their feelings on relevant matters involved in the case, like guns, street gangs or drug abuse. In addition, the uncertainty that results from deferred rulings on the admissibility of prior convictions may force a defendant to forgo testifying and, thus, hardly serves the trial’s purpose to search for the truth. Only rare cases warrant a deferred ruling on motions in limine to bar prior convictions, and the trial court must give reasons for any deferment based on the specific facts of the defendant’s case. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 73-74. During my 22 years of service as a criminal court judge, I considered motions in limine to bar prior convictions and conducted the Montgomery balancing test on many occasions. I never refused to rule on those motions in limine because a defendant needs to know which convictions may be used against him before he can make an informed and intelligent decision about whether to testify. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 69-70. In Averett and Tucker, our supreme court has allowed leave to appeal “to consider whether relief might be available to a defendant, even if he chose not to testify, if the trial court had a ‘blanket policy’ not to rule on the motion in limine in advance of the defendant deciding not testify.” People v. Patrick, Nos. 104077, 104445 cons, order at 1 (May 27, 2009) [per curiam) (explaining the consistent rationale for granting review to defendants Averett and Tucker while denying Phillips leave to file a motion to reconsider the denial of his petition for rehearing). Furthermore, our supreme court has allowed motions to reconsider in cases where additional investigation uncovered “an indication of a blanket policy” and the issue was properly preserved despite the defendants’ decisions not to testify. Patrick, order at 2 (referring to People v. Cowans, No. 105982, People v. Townsend, No. 106547, and People v. Earl, No. 107665). Similarly, the record here indicates that the trial court merely adhered to a blanket policy not to rule when the parties filed cross-motions in limine on the admissibility of defendant’s five prior convictions to impeach his credibility should he elect to testify. At issue were defendant’s convictions for the 2005 offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, the 2003 offense of possession of a controlled substance, the 2001 offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and the two 1999 offenses of delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant argued that the danger of prejudice outweighed any probative value, that some of his prior crimes were similar to the current charge, and that the jury would misuse the information as evidence of defendant’s propensity to possess and deliver narcotics. The trial court stated that it relied on Luce and would have to decide the matter if and when defendant testified “in order to make the proper ruling.” Furthermore, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to prohibit defendant from arguing that he pled guilty in prior cases because he was in fact guilty but proceeded to trial in his current case due to his innocence. The trial court’s reliance on Luce was misplaced. Luce, contrary to the trial court’s implication, does not stand for the broad proposition that a trial court may or should weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect after the defendant has testified. See People v. Holloway, 393 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321 n.2, 912 N.E.2d 799, 802 n.2 (2009). Rather, Luce held that a defendant who does not testify at trial may not challenge on appeal an in limine ruling respecting the admission of a prior conviction for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Luce, 469 U.S. at 42-43, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 447-48, 105 S. Ct. at 463-64. That narrower holding was based on the reviewing court’s inability to adequately evaluate the correctness of the trial court’s ruling outside the specific factual context of the trial as it unfolded and the handicap posed to the reviewing court’s harmless-error determination when a defendant does not testify. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 447-48, 105 S. Ct. at 463. The State argues that this case is controlled by our supreme court’s ruling in Patrick that defendant Ezekiel Phillips failed to preserve this same issue for review because he chose not to testify. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 77. Defendant’s situation, however, is distinguishable from Phillips’ case, where the trial court did not adhere to a blanket policy not to rule but, rather, partially granted the motion in limine to bar one of Phillips’ prior convictions while deferring on the other three. Here, in contrast, the trial court did not address any of defendant’s five convictions, despite the obvious danger of prejudice from his three drug convictions. As in Patrick, the trial court here failed to give a reason for its deferred ruling based on the specific facts of defendant’s case. Unlike the rare situation where a trial court may not have sufficient information to weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect before a defendant testifies, the record here does not indicate a sound basis for deferment. The trial court certainly had enough information to conduct the Montgomery balancing test where the prejudicial effect of the use of defendant’s three drug convictions for impeachment purposes was obvious. Consequently, the record indicates the trial court adhered to a blanket policy to defer ruling on motions in limine to preclude evidence of prior convictions until after hearing the defendant’s testimony.