Court Opinion

ID: 9430674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:19.607455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.630835
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.
Paragraph 105 of the Illinois Criminal Code authorizes a special procedure for the involuntary commitment of indi-*376victuals found to be “sexually dangerous persons.”1 In many respects, the proceeding is virtually identical to Illinois’ proceeding for prosecution of sex-related crimes. When the criminal law casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil proceeding, I think it clear that the procedure must be deemed a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.2
I
As the Court reaffirms today, the fact that a State attaches a “civil” label to a proceeding is not dispositive. Ante, at 369. Such a label cannot change the character of a criminal proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 49-50 (1967). Moreover, the words “criminal case” in the Fifth Amendment have been consistently construed to encompass certain proceedings that have both civil and criminal characteristics.3 And, of course, a State’s duty to respect the commands in the Fifth Amendment cannot be avoided by the names it applies to its procedures or to the persons whom it accuses of wrongful conduct. It is the substance of the Illinois procedure, rather than its title, that is relevant to our inquiry.4 Nei*377ther the word “civil” nor the unsettling term applied by the State — “sexually dangerous person” — should be permitted to obscure our analysis.
The impact of an adverse judgment against an individual deemed to be a “sexually dangerous person” is at least as serious as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal trial. In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972), we referred to the potentially indefinite commitment to the “sex deviate facility” located in the Wisconsin State Prison, id., at 506, as “a massive curtailment of liberty.” Id., at 509. In a case arising under the Illinois statute we review today, United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F. 2d 931 (1975), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding authorizes far longer imprisonment than a mere finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge.5 Moreover, the stigma associated with an adjudication as a “sexually dangerous person” is at least as great as that associated with most criminal convictions and “is certainly more damning than a finding of juvenile delinquency.” Id., at 936.
The distinctive element of Illinois’ “sexually dangerous person” proceeding, however, is its relationship to Illinois’ criminal law. Quite simply, criminal law occupies a central role in the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding. Like the prosecution for a criminal offense, the procedure may only begin “when any person is charged with a criminal offense.”6 *378Like the prosecution for a criminal offense, the decision whether to initiate the procedure is entrusted “to the Attorney General or to the State’s Attorney of the county wherein such person is so charged.”7 Like the prosecution for a criminal offense, “the burden of proof required to commit a defendant to confinement as a sexually dangerous person shall be the standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”8 Like the prosecution for a criminal offense, if the prosecutor sustains his burden of proof, “the court shall appoint the Director of Corrections guardian of the person found to be sexually dangerous and such person shall stand committed to the custody of such guardian.”9
Indeed, the Act even defines a “sexually dangerous person” with respect to criminal law, or rather, with respect to “criminal propensities”:
“All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared sexually dangerous persons.”10
According to the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of this definition, moreover, the prosecutor must prove that the individual charged with being a sexually dangerous person committed a criminal offense: “It is clear . . . that the statute requires more than the proof of mere 'propensity’; it also requires that the State prove that the defendant has ‘demonstrated’ this propensity. This language can only mean that the State must prove at least one act of or attempt at sexual *379assault or sexual molestation.” 107 Ill. 2d 91, 105, 481 N. E. 2d 690, 697 (1985).
Thus, the Illinois “sexually dangerous person” proceeding may only be triggered by a criminal incident; may only be initiated by the sovereign State’s prosecuting authorities; may only be established with the burden of proof applicable to the criminal law; may only proceed if a criminal offense is established; and has the consequence of incarceration in the State’s prison system — in this case, Illinois’ maximum-security prison at Menard. It seems quite clear to me, in view of the consequences of conviction and the heavy reliance on the criminal justice system — for its definition of the prohibited conduct, for the discretion of the prosecutor, for the standard of proof, and for the Director of Corrections as custodian — that the proceeding must be considered “criminal” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.11
II
The principal argument advanced by the State — and accepted by the Court, ante, at 369-370 — is that the statute has a benign purpose. The State points out that the statute, in appointing the Director of Corrections as guardian, requires that the Director provide “care and treatment for the person committed to him designed to effect recovery”;12 requires *380that the Director place his ward “in any facility in the Department of Corrections or portion thereof set aside for the care and treatment of sexually dangerous persons”;13 and requires that the individual be released if “found to be no longer dangerous.”14
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated unambiguously that “treatment, not punishment, is the aim of the statute.” 107 Ill. 2d, at 100-101, 481 N. E. 2d, at 695. The Illinois court, of course, is the final authority on the meaning and the purpose of Illinois legislation. Nevertheless, the ultimate characterization of the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding for Fifth Amendment purposes remains a federal constitutional question.
A goal of treatment is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render inapplicable the Fifth Amendment, or to prevent a characterization of proceedings as “criminal.” With respect to a conventional criminal statute, if a State declared that its goal was “treatment” and “rehabilitation,” it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment would still apply. The sexually-dangerous-person proceeding similarly may not escape a characterization as “criminal” simply because a goal is “treatment.” If this were not the case, moreover, nothing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of “dangerous person” statutes to shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven violations of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and “criminal propensities,” and constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply inapplicable. The goal would be “treatment”; the result would be evisceration of criminal law and its accompanying protections.
The Illinois Attorney General nevertheless argues that the importance of treatment in the Act has a special significance. *381The State contends that recognizing a right to silence would make it impossible to reach a correct diagnosis concerning the existence of a mental disorder and the need for treatment. However, the Illinois General Assembly has squarely rejected this argument in other civil commitment proceedings. Illinois’ civil commitment procedure expressly protects the individual’s right to silence.15 Quoting the Governor’s Commission for the Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois, the Illinois Appellate Court explained this unequivocal State policy:
“Experience in the public and private sectors has shown that application of the privilege against self-incrimination does not seriously impair the State’s ability to achieve the valid obj ectives of civil commitment. ” In re Rizer, 87 Ill. App. 3d 795, 799, 409 N. E. 2d 383, 386 (1980).
The Attorney General’s emphasis on the interference with treatment that the right of silence would create thus indeed has a significance, but not the one he suggests. For, not only would a characterization of the proceeding as “criminal” lead to a right to silence under the Fifth Amendment, but a characterization of the proceeding as “civil” would also lead to a right to silence under state law. It is only in the “sexually dangerous person” proceeding that the individual may be compelled to give evidence that will be used to deprive him of his liberty. The fact that this proceeding is unique — neither *382wholly criminal nor civil — surely cannot justify the unique deprivation of a constitutional protection.
Ill
It is, of course, true that “the State has a substantial interest in . . . protecting the public from sexually dangerous persons.” 107 Ill. 2d, at 102, 481 N. E. 2d, at 696. But the fact that an individual accused of being a “sexually dangerous person” is also considered a danger to the community cannot justify the denial of the Fifth Amendment privilege; if so, the privilege would never be available for any person accused of a violent crime. The fact that it may be more difficult for the State to obtain evidence that will lead to incarceration similarly cannot prevent the applicability of the Fifth Amendment; if so, the right would never be justified, for it could always be said to have that effect. Nor can the fact that proof of sexual dangerousness requires evidence of noncriminal elements — the continuing requirement that a future criminal “propensity” be proved, for instance — prevent the applicability of the Fifth Amendment; if anything, that requirement should be the subject of greater, rather than lesser, concern.16
In the end, this case requires a consideration of the role and value of the Fifth Amendment. The privilege sometimes does serve the interest in making the truth-seeking function of a trial more reliable.17 Indeed, a review of the *383psychiatrists’ reports in this very case suggests the propriety of that concern.18 The basic justification for the constitutional protection, however, also rests on the nature of our free society. As a distinguished leader of the Bar stated more than 30 years ago:
“[T]he Fifth Amendment can serve as a constant reminder of the high standards set by the Founding Fathers, based on their experience with tyranny. It is an ever-present reminder of our belief in the importance of the individual, a symbol of our highest aspirations. As such, it is a clear and eloquent expression of our basic opposition to collectivism, to the unlimited power of the state. It would never be allowed by communists, and thus it may well be regarded as one of the signs which sets us off from communism.” E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 81 (1955).19
*384For the Court, these concerns are not implicated today because the prosecution-initiated and prison-destined, sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is not “criminal” in nature. In my opinion, permitting a State to create a shadow criminal law without the fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment conflicts with the respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long characterized, and that continues to characterize, our free society.
I respectfully dissent.

 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 105-1.01 et seq. (1985).

 The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-634 (1886) (“We are . . . clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal”); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 718 (1971) (“From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man who ‘forfeits’ $8,674 [to the Government in a nominally “civil” proceeding] because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a ‘criminal fine’ of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct”).

 “It is well settled that realities rather than benign motives or noncriminal labels determine the relevance of constitutional policies. In re Winship, . . . 397 U. S. [358, 365-366 (1970)]. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 21, 27, 50 . . . (1967); Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. [519, 528 (1975)].” United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F. 2d 931, 936 (CA7 1975).

 “The instant ease illustrates the potential disparity in the magnitude of the loss. Stachulak was originally charged with Indecent Solicitation of a Child in violation of Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, § 11-6 (Smith-Hurd 1969). That offense carried a maximum penalty of a $600 fine and less than one year imprisonment in a penal institution other than a penitentiary. Instead of prosecuting him on that charge, the state brought a proceeding, which culminated in an indeterminate commitment, under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. For the last five years, Stachulak has been confined at the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard, a maximum-security penal institution.” Id., at 936, n. 4.

 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 105-3 (1985).

 Ibid.

 ¶ 105-3.01.

 ¶ 105-8.

 ¶ 105-1.01.

 The “sexually dangerous person” proceeding shares other characteristics with criminal law as well. The statute requires that the individual “have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel.” ¶ 105-5. Under the Illinois Supreme Court’s construction, moreover, an individual has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill. 2d 524, 529-530, 168 N. E. 2d 728, 731 (1960). Significantly, as with the latter set of requirements, many of the criminal law procedures that have been found applicable to the “sexually dangerous person” proceeding have been imposed by courts because of the nature of the proceeding. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F. 2d 931 (CA7 1975) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N. E. 2d 28 (1976) (same); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 105-3.01 (1985) (codifying requirement).

 ¶ 105-8.

 Ibid.

 ¶ 105-9. See also ¶ 105-8 (“The Director of Corrections as guardian shall keep safely the person so committed until the person has recovered and is released as hereinafter provided”)-

 See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 9172, ¶ 3-208 (1985) (“Whenever a petition has been executed pursuant to Section 3-507, 3-601, or 3-701, and prior to this examination for the purpose of certification of a person 12 or over, the person conducting this examination shall inform the person being examined in a simple comprehensible manner of the purpose of the examination; that he does not have to talk to the examiner; and that any statements he makes may be disclosed at a court hearing on the issue of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. If the person being examined has not been so informed, the examiner shall not be permitted to testify at any subsequent court hearing concerning the respondent’s admission”).

 See O. Holmes, The Common Law 65 (1923 ed.) (“Intent to commit a crime is not itself criminal. There is no law against a man’s intending to commit a murder the day after tomorrow. The law only deals with conduct”); Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wall. 463, 471 (1866) (“When trying a prisoner on an indictment, for a particular crime, proof that he has a general disposition to commit the crime is never permitted”).

 “It has long been recognized that the eliciting and use of confessions or admissions require careful scrutiny. Dean Wigmore states:
“ ‘The ground of distrust of confessions made in certain situations is, in a rough and indefinite way, judicial experience. There has been no careful collection of statistics of untrue confessions, nor has any great number of instances been even loosely reported . . . but enough have been verified to *383fortify the conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct, that under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives between which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk that may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some worse alternative associated with silence.’” In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 44-45 (1967) (quoting 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (3d ed. 1940)).

 One of the psychiatrist’s reports stated, in part:
“The defendant wanted to be found sexually dangerous and did so because he felt that it was a better alternative than a trial trying to be found not guilty. ... I have the definite impression that he is unreliable and that sometimes he is not telling the truth.” App. 36-37.
That doctor reported that the defendant admitted that he had “sexual intercourse” with the victim — a fact that she denied. None of the other incidents described in the doctor’s report (the first of which occurred when the defendant was 10 years old) had any corroboration or involved an identified partner or victim.

 Cf. Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, reprinted in Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 72-73 (1983) *384(In the Soviet Union, “[t]wo formal procedures are most commonly used to commit individuals to mental hospitals against their will: the civil and the criminal. . . . The criminal procedure for compulsory confinement is applicable to those who have been accused of a criminal offense, and whose mental health is called into question. . . . Under this procedure the accused loses virtually all of his or her procedural rights and is left only with the passive right to an honest psychiatric examination and a fair court hearing”).