Court Opinion

ID: 9771733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:52:16.232672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:35.920062
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the conviction of driving under the influence, second offense within five (5) years, and the sentence of 30 days in jail and a $500 fine was correct.
Dedic was arrested and charged with DUI on May 27, 1993. He had previously been arrested on January 15, 1991 and convicted on February 6 of DUI. Any conviction during 1991 would be sufficient to enhance the penalty and the jury had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the present charge occurred in 1991, and was his second conviction within five years. As stated in other recent dissenting opinions, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526 (1996) (rendered April 25, 1996) and O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 529 (1996) (rendered April 25, 1996), I must conclude that the proof as to the first conviction was necessary in determining guilt, and such evidence was admissible during the guilt phase of the trial despite the possible danger of prejudice resulting from its introduction.
The majority opinion states that the procedure established by the legislature is “fundamentally unfair”. Although there is no showing of constitutional violation, the Court has judicially created a new form of misdemeanor *880trial. We have previously held that such a bifurcated proceeding is not constitutionally mandated and, absent such a mandate, any change is required to come from the legislature and not this Court. Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 418 (1982).
The majority opinion substitutes its view for that of the legislature, usurps a legislative function and breaches the long honored principle of separation of powers.
KRS 189A was enacted by the legislature in recognition of the danger presented to the public by those who repeatedly drive while intoxicated. In balancing the protection of the public and the possibility of prejudice to the defendant, I must conclude that the General Assembly has determined the public would be better served by permitting the admission of a prior judicial fact.
I would affirm the conviction and the decision of the Court of Appeals.
GRAVES and KING, JJ., join in this dissent.