Court Opinion

ID: 9367325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 16:02:21.500107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.207500
License: Public Domain

20-1457(L)
    Adhikari v. Garland
                                                                                  BIA
                                                                             Sponzo, IJ
                                                                          A209 870 432

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
             REENA RAGGI,
             RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
             WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                  Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    PRAJMAL ADHIKARI,
             Petitioner,
                                                                 20-1457(L),
                      v.                                         21-6165(Con)
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq.,
                                      New York, NY.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                      Attorney General, Civil Division;
                              Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant
                              Director; Jeffrey M. Hartman,
                              Trial Attorney, Office of
                              Immigration Litigation, United
                              States Department of Justice,
                              Washington, DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for review

are DENIED.

    Petitioner Prajmal Adhikari, a native and citizen of

Nepal, seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance of an Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see

In re Prajmal Adhikari, No. A 209 870 432 (B.I.A. Apr. 2,

2020), aff’g No. A209 870 432 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July 16,

2018), and of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, see

In re Prajmal Adhikari, No. A209 870 432 (B.I.A. Mar. 3,

2021).    We   assume   the    parties’   familiarity   with   the

underlying facts and procedural history.

  A. Denial of Asylum and Related Relief

    We have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions.

See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528

                                 2
(2d Cir. 2006).     We review the agency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence, and we review questions of law de novo.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d

510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

    To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of

removal, an applicant must establish past persecution or a

well-founded fear or likelihood of persecution “on account of

race,   religion,   nationality,       membership     in    a   particular

social group, or political opinion.”         8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42);

see also id. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b).         “[P]ersecution is an extreme

concept that does not include every sort of treatment our

society regards as offensive.”          Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633

F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).                    “To

qualify   as   persecution   the       conduct   at    issue      must   be

attributable to the government, whether directly because

engaged in by government officials, or indirectly because

engaged in by private persons whom the government is unable

or unwilling to control.”      Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106,

114 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).                   “Under the

unwilling-or-unable     standard,      ‘a   finding    of       persecution
                                   3
ordinarily     requires   a   determination       that   government

authorities, if they did not actually perpetrate or incite

the persecution, condoned it or at least demonstrated a

complete helplessness to protect the victims.’”          Id. at 114-

15 (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).

      Before this court, Adhikari does not challenge the IJ’s

and BIA’s determinations that he failed to establish the

Nepali government’s inability or unwillingness to control the

private actors who attacked him and whom he claims to fear,

and so he has abandoned any challenge to those findings.         See

Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir.

2005).     Even if Adhikari had not abandoned that argument, we

would deny review because Adhikari did not present evidence

sufficient to attribute Maoist activity to the government.

His   unilateral   decision   not   to   report   attacks   to   the

authorities, based on his belief that the police and the

Maoists were “working with each other” demonstrates only his

subjective belief that the government condoned the Maoists’

conduct.     On such a record, neither the IJ nor the BIA was

required to attribute Adhikari’s attacks to the national

                                4
government.    See Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th at 116.

     Because    this    issue   is    dispositive      of   asylum   and

withholding of removal, see id. at 114, we need not reach the

agency’s alternative dispositive bases for denying those

forms of relief.

    To the extent Adhikari challenges the denial of CAT

relief, denial was warranted because the record supports the

IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions that Adhikari could reasonably

relocate within Nepal to avoid any likelihood of torture.

See Singh, 11 F.4th at 118 (holding that petitioner’s “ability

to relocate internally means that he cannot establish [the]

likelihood of torture” necessary to state a claim for CAT

relief).   Adhikari had lived and worked in Kathmandu unharmed

for more than two years after the Maoists’ attack and for an

additional    three    months   after    the    Maoists     purportedly

discovered his location.        See Gautam v. Barr, 832 F. App’x

740, 743 (2d Cir. 2020) (denying review where “there is no

evidence that [petitioner] encountered Maoists in the four

months that he lived in Kathmandu before departing for the

United   States,   notwithstanding      his    claim   that   they   had

discovered his location”); Kandel v. Barr, 832 F. App’x 67,
                                  5
71 (2d Cir. 2020) (denying review where petitioner had “lived

unharmed   in    Kathmandu   for   approximately     a   year”   before

entering United States). 1

    B. Motion to Reopen

      We review the denial of motions to reopen for abuse of

discretion and any country conditions determinations for

substantial evidence.        Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d

138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).            As the BIA found, Adhikari’s

October 2020 motion to reopen was untimely because he filed

it more than six months after the BIA’s April 2020 order of

removal.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day

deadline   for    motions    to   reopen).     The   time   limit   for

reopening may be excused to apply for asylum “based on changed

country conditions arising in the country of nationality or

the country to which removal has been ordered, if such

evidence is material and was not available and would not have

1Adhikari argues the IJ erred by failing to discuss evidence of ongoing
civil strife in Nepal that might undermine the relocation conclusion.
“[W]e presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence
before him, unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise,” Xiao Ji
Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir.2006), and
Adhikari points to no such record evidence here. In any event, Adhikari
points to no evidence of civil strife that would undermine the IJ’s
finding.
                                   6
been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.”

8    U.S.C.     § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);        see     also     8    C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

     Adhikari    does    not   challenge     the     BIA’s    reasonable

determinations that his country conditions evidence showed a

continuation rather than a change in conditions in Nepal since

his hearing before the IJ, and that his family’s interaction

with Maoists while he was in the United States constituted a

new personal circumstance that did not excuse the time limit.

See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 541 n.1, 545 n.7; see also

Weinong Lin v. Holder, 763 F.3d 244, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2014)

(recognizing that “changed circumstances” standard permitting

late-filed    asylum    applications   “is    more    expansive”    than

“change in ‘country conditions’” standard to excuse deadline

for reopening); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A.

2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion

to   reopen   demonstrates     a   material        change    in   country

conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s]

the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion

to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing

below.”).
                                   7
    Adhikari’s only argument on appeal is that the Himalayan

Times published an article “a few weeks before [his] merits

hearing before the [IJ]” explaining that, after the events

experienced by Adhikari, “the Maoists joined the government

of Nepal as a ruling party, and obtained the control of some

government ministries, including the Home Ministry, which

oversees the country’s police departments,” Pet.’s Supp. Br.

15-16, and that the Maoists’ new status qualifies as a changed

country   condition.    Adhikari      fails   to     explain   why   this

information was not available to him during the proceedings

below, in the absence of which there is no reason for us to

depart from the rule that this court will decide a petition

“only on the administrative record on which the order of

removal is based.”     8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A); Xiao Xing Ni

v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that

court will not remand for consideration of evidence outside

the record).    Nor does Adhikari explain why the Himalayan

Times article is material given that he had already presented

the IJ with three other articles discussing the Maoists merger

with Nepal’s ruling party.

    Accordingly,     Adhikari’s    motion     does    not   fall     under
                                  8
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)’s   exception   to   § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)’s

timeliness bar.

    For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

                              9