Court Opinion

ID: 9941065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 20:01:25.173807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:11.589078
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1178     Document: 010111000954      Date Filed: 02/15/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 15, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1178
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:17-CR-00483-RBJ-2)
  THIERRY SHAQUR ROBERSON,                                    (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Thierry Shaqur Roberson appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se

 motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We exercise

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court was required to treat

 Mr. Roberson’s motion as filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we reverse and remand for

 further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1178    Document: 010111000954        Date Filed: 02/15/2024     Page: 2

 I.    Background

       Mr. Roberson pleaded guilty in 2019 to three counts of possession of a

 firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

 § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court sentenced him to three consecutive seven-year

 terms for a total of twenty-one years’ imprisonment. Mr. Roberson did not appeal.

 He also did not move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under § 2255.

       In 2023, Mr. Roberson asked the district court for a sentence reduction under

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), commonly referred to as compassionate release. He argued the

 offenses underlying two of his § 924(c) convictions did not qualify as crimes of

 violence. The relevant predicate offenses were robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C.

 § 1951(a), otherwise known as the Hobbs Act. Mr. Roberson contended there were

 extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence because these § 924(c)

 convictions were void.

       The district court denied Mr. Roberson’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion. It

 rejected his contention that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of

 violence, and Mr. Roberson therefore failed to provide extraordinary or compelling

 reasons why the court should consider compassionate release.

 II.   Discussion

       A.     Standard of Review and Legal Background

       We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate-release motion for an

 abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1147-48, 1154-55

 (10th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect

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 conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact,” United States v. Piper,

 839 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “when it

 renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly

 unreasonable,” United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). We liberally construe Mr. Roberson’s pro se filings but

 we do not act as his advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir.

 2013).

          A district court may grant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) only

 when it (1) “finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

 reduction”; (2) “finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

 statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) “considers the factors set

 forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” United States

 v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2021); see also § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

 A district court has discretion to independently determine what constitutes

 “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” but its discretion is circumscribed by the

 applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Maumau,

 993 F.3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).1

          1
          When Mr. Roberson filed his motion, the Sentencing Commission’s existing
 policy statement applied only to motions filed by the Bureau of Prisons. See
 Maumau, 993 F.3d at 836-37. That policy statement therefore did not constrain the
 district court’s “discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and
 compelling.” Id. at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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        B.     Analysis of Mr. Roberson’s Motion

        The district court denied Mr. Roberson’s motion for compassionate release

 because he failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a

 sentence reduction. It based this conclusion on its holding that Hobbs Act robbery

 qualifies as a crime of violence, contrary to Mr. Roberson’s contention.

        We hold that the district court erred in ruling on Mr. Roberson’s motion

 pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because the court was required to treat the motion as

 filed under § 2255. “When a federal prisoner asserts a claim that, if true, would

 mean ‘that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

 United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,’ § 2255(a), the prisoner

 is bringing a claim governed by § 2255.” United States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277,

 1288 (10th Cir.), cert. docketed, No. 23-6384 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2023). In such a case,

 “the district court must apply § 2255,” id. at 1288 n.6, including “the statutory

 restraints imposed by § 2255, such as timing, the content of the motion, and the

 grounds on which one can bring additional motions,” id. at 1283. Thus, a prisoner

 challenging his conviction or sentence cannot avoid § 2255 and its limitations by

 seeking relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) instead. See id. at 1288.

        In Wesley, for example, we rejected a prisoner’s contention that a district

 court’s discretion to determine what constitutes “‘extraordinary and compelling

 reasons’” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) “is limitless” and “could include the sorts of

 attacks on a conviction or sentence that prisoners normally bring through § 2255

 motions.” Id. at 1283. Rather, construing both statutes, we held that § 2255 is “the

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 vehicle by which federal prisoners must raise challenges to their convictions or

 sentences.” Id. at 1284; see id. at 1284-86.

       Mr. Roberson’s motion raised a claim governed by § 2255 because he

 challenged the validity of two of his § 924(c) convictions. The district court

 therefore erred by treating the motion as filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and by

 denying relief under that statute. See id. at 1288-89.2 We vacate the district court’s

 order denying compassionate release and remand for further proceedings on

 Mr. Roberson’s motion.

       C.     Procedure on Remand

       When Mr. Roberson filed his motion purportedly seeking compassionate

 release, he had not previously filed a § 2255 motion.3 Therefore, on remand, the

 district court shall follow the procedure set forth in Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830

 (10th Cir. 2005), before recharacterizing Mr. Roberson’s motion as filed under

 § 2255:

       The district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to
       recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization
       means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions
       on second or successive motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to

       2
         Although we issued our decision in Wesley before the district court ruled on
 Mr. Roberson’s motion, the court did not apply that decision, nor do the parties apply
 it on appeal.
       3
            According to the district court’s docket in Mr. Roberson’s criminal case, he
 has not subsequently filed a first § 2255 motion. See, e.g., In re Syngenta AG MIR
 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1169 n.25 (10th Cir. 2023) (“In an exercise of our
 discretion, we take judicial notice of the . . . district court’s subsequent proceedings
 . . . related to the appeals at hand.”).
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        withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims
        he believes he has.

 Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Roberson may then choose how he

 wishes to proceed.

 III.   Conclusion

        We vacate the district court’s order denying Mr. Roberson relief under

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings

 consistent with this order and judgment.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Bobby R. Baldock
                                              Circuit Judge

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