Court Opinion

ID: 9728271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:03:35.724885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.273345
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
In State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971), we said that the procedure in a guilty plea must, at a minimum, conform to the procedures contained in the ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (1968 Approved Draft). We imposed the new standards for taking guilty pleas in order to conform our plea-taking procedures to those required by Boy-kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
The majority cites State v. Lewis, 192 Neb. 518, 222 N.W.2d 815 (1974), for the proposition that the plea must be voluntary and intelligent. Lewis goes further. Even when there is an implication in the record that the defendant, in fact, knew the consequences of her plea, the judge is still required to advise the defendant of possible penalties.
The standards recommend that a defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere upon timely motion if he proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, § 2.1. The standards provide that one of the items which may constitute manifest injustice is a failure to be advised of penal consequences of a plea.
Lewis at 522, 222 N.W.2d at 818. In Lewis, we found that there was not substantial compliance with ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.4(c) because of the failure of the court to advise the defend*383ant of the penalties before accepting her plea.
The constitutional requirement for the procedure in a guilty plea is that the plea be voluntary and intelligent and the determination of the fact be readily determined. Boykin v. Alabama, supra; State v. Turner, supra. In State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. 135, 274 N.W.2d 157 (1979), we considered whether the conviction and sentence of the defendant must be vacated and set aside because of the failure of the court, during arraignment, to inform the defendant of the range of penalties for the offense of burglary. Quoting Lewis, we stated:
The practice of advising a defendant who is about to enter a plea to a felony of the possible penalties on conviction, although not made mandatory by any statute in 'this state, is one of long standing in this jurisdiction and antedates the adoption of the standards in State v. Turner, supra.
Curnyn at 139, 274 N.W.2d at 160.
[Where] the extent of the defendant’s knowledge of the applicable penalties is a matter in dispute and cannot be clearly determined from the record of this case without indulging in inferences, we deem it advisable, without vacating and setting aside defendant’s conviction and sentence, to remand this matter to the trial court with leave to the defendant to apply to the trial court to withdraw his plea.
Curnyn at 140, 274 N.W.2d at 161.
In State v. Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 455, 259 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1977), we considered whether the defendant’s guilty pleas were involuntary because of the trial court’s participation in plea bargaining discussions. Remanding the case for further proceedings, we said: “The Post Conviction Act provides that unless the motions and files and records of the case show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the *384court shall grant a prompt hearing.” We held that since the files and records of the case did not affirmatively establish that the defendant was entitled to no relief, the District Court should have granted an evidentiary hearing.
The instant case should be governed by the principles set out in Lewis, supra, Curnyn, supra, and Svoboda, supra. The majority opinion does not comply with these standards. Because of the failure to affirmatively show the knowledge of minimum and maximum penalty, the record fails to establish that the defendant entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily and it also fails to affirmatively establish that the defendant’s allegations do not entitle him to relief. See, also, State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 266 N.W.2d 237 (1978); State v. Ford, 198 Neb. 376, 252 N.W. 2d 643 (1977).
The majority opinion attempts to diminish the requirement that the judge advise the defendant of the maximum possible penalty. This approach is not supported by the ABA Standards nor the advisory rules for trial judges. In the comment to § 1.4(c)(i) and (ii) of the ABA Standards, the drafters state: ‘‘The emphasis in the case law has been upon the requirement that the judge inform the defendant of the maximum possible punishment. This is understandable, as it is ignorance of the maximum which is most likely to serve as a basis for withdrawal of the plea.” The Nebraska Bench Book XVIII-9 (1976) provides that the judge should ask the defendant to state on the record the penalty for the offense. ‘‘[This is the] bare minimum to meet the American Bar Association’s and Nebraska Supreme Court’s requirements.”
There is nearly universal agreement that the defendant must know the minimum and maximum sentence a judge may impose. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, § 3.39 (1978). State v. Jackson, 17 Ariz. App. 533, 499 P.2d 111 (1972) (case remanded *385for hearing to see if defendant in fact knew penalty where record does not show advice); Dunlap v. United States, 462 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant may withdraw plea and plead anew where record does not show advice on penalties); United States v. Perwo, 433 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant must know the precise limits of the maximum possible penalty instead of substantially where the outer limits were).
The case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether, in fact, the defendant knew the penalty limits. State v. Curnyn, supra.
McCown and Brodkey, JJ., join in this dissent.