Court Opinion

ID: 9950126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:12:28.862868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:45.008322
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-919.]

                                         COURT OF APPEALS
                                       LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                   JUDGES:
                                                 Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                      Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                 Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
 -vs-
                                                 Case No. 2023 CA 00049
 JACK E. SCOTT, JR.

          Defendant-Appellant                    OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                       Appeal from the Licking County Court of
                                                 Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 00747

 JUDGMENT:                                       Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         March 12, 2024

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant

 JENNY WELLS                                     BRIAN A. SMITH
 Licking County Prosecuting Attorney             123 S. Miller Road, Suite 250
                                                 Akron, Ohio 44333
 KENNETH W. OSWALT
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
 20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor
 Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                  2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Jack E. Scott, Jr. appeals the judgment entered by the

Licking County Common Pleas Court convicting him following jury trial of nine counts of

rape (R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)), four counts of gross sexual imposition

(R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)), and two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor (R.C.

2907.04(A)), and sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of life without

parole. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   On November 7, 2022, the thirteen-year-old victim was living in Licking

County, Ohio with her step-grandmother, her aunt, four of her cousins, and Appellant.

Newark police received a report Appellant had touched the victim inappropriately in the

morning when she was getting ready for school. The victim spoke with Newark Police

Detective Steve Vanoy at school. The victim told police in the morning while getting ready

for school, she had let the dogs outside, and when she came back inside, Appellant asked

her to come in the bathroom. Appellant touched the victim’s vagina with his hands under

her clothing, then took her hand and made her touch his penis. Appellant’s DNA was

found in the victim’s underwear and pubic hair combings.

       {¶3}   The pattern of sexual abuse started when the victim was six years old. She

woke up in her bedroom to discover Appellant touching her vagina. He told the victim to

be quiet, and what he was doing was very bad. The sexual abuse continued over the

next seven years, and including touching, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, and

vaginal intercourse. During the periods of time when Appellant was not living in the same

home with the victim, the family would visit on weekends, and Appellant would engage in

sexual activity with the victim. When the victim was eight years old, she told her step-
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                   3

grandmother, who was the victim’s legal custodian, what Appellant was doing to her. Her

step-grandmother did not believe the victim. Appellant threatened to kill the victim if she

told anyone.

       {¶4}    After speaking with the victim at school, Detective Vanoy interviewed

Appellant at his home. The next day, Appellant came to the police station to retrieve his

cell phone, and spoke with Detective Vanoy again. Although Appellant initially denied

anything sexual occurred between himself and the victim, Appellant eventually told the

detective on the morning of November 7, 2022, the victim came into the bathroom and

asked him about oral sex. He has difficulty explaining things, and so he licked her vaginal

area to demonstrate. He turned to masturbate into a trash can, and the victim put her

mouth on his penis. He claimed this was the only time anything sexual happened

between himself and the victim.

       {¶5}    Appellant was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury with nine counts

of rape, four counts of gross sexual imposition, and two counts of unlawful sexual conduct

with a minor. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police at his

home and at the police station on the basis he was not Mirandized or advised of his right

to counsel. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion.

       {¶6}    The case proceeded to jury trial in the Licking County Common Pleas Court.

Appellant testified he had never touched the victim in a sexual manner. He testified he

did not live with the victim from 2016-2019, and had no access to the victim alone. He

testified he falsely admitted to Detective Vanoy he had assaulted the victim in hopes of

talking to someone other than the detective. He testified he smokes cigarettes, and spits

the saliva from where the tobacco from the tubes comes through either between his legs
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                      4

while sitting on the toilet, or into the bathtub. He believed the victim sat on his saliva and

scooted across it, explaining why his DNA was found in her underwear and pubic hair.

       {¶7}   The jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court convicted him

in accordance with the jury’s verdict, sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration

of life without parole. It is from the May 26, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

              I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST

       WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

              II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO

       SUPPRESS, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-

       INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO

       THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE

       OHIO CONSTITUTION.

              III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING JUDITH

       TEEGARDIN’S TESTIMONY, BASED ON JUDITH TEEGARDIN ASSERTING

       HER FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, IN

       VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL

       UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

       UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO

       CONSTITUTION.

              IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING

       APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                       5

          RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND

          FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

          AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

                                                   I.

          {¶8}   In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues his convictions are against

the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues the victim’s testimony was not credible.

He argues the evidence demonstrated the victim wanted to go live with her parents, and

was therefore motivated to lie in order to leave her step-grandmother’s custody. He

argues his explanation for how his DNA ended up in the victim’s vaginal area was

credible, as was his testimony he did not have access to the victim alone during much of

the time frame she testified the acts occurred.

          {¶9}   In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678

N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).

          {¶10} Appellant was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and

(A)(2):
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                    6

               (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is

      not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is

      living separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following

      applies:

               (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or

      not the offender knows the age of the other person.

               (2) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the

      offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of

      force.

      {¶11} Appellant was convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.

2907.05(A)(4):

               No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of

      the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual

      contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have

      sexual contact when any of the following applies:

               (4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen

      years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.

      {¶12} Appellant was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation

of R.C. 2907.04(A):
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                     7

                No person who is eighteen years of age or older shall engage in

       sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, when

       the offender knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older but

       less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless in that regard.

       {¶13} Appellant does not argue the victim’s testimony, if believed, was insufficient

to convict him of the charges, but rather argues his testimony was credible, while the

victim’s testimony was not credible. Appellant argues the victim was motivated to lie

because she wanted to live with her parents instead of in the home where Appellant

resided.      However, her desire to live with her parents could easily be explained as a

desire to escape Appellant’s sexual abuse.

       {¶14} Further, while Appellant claimed at trial he falsely confessed to Detective

Vanoy in order to speak to someone else, the DNA evidence found on the victim

corroborates his confession he had engaged in oral sex with the victim before school on

the morning the DNA testing occurred. We find the jury did not lose its way in believing

the DNA evidence was the result of the sexual conduct he confessed to, rather than his

trial explanation of spitting on the toilet seat or in the bathtub and the victim scooting in

his saliva.

       {¶15} The victim was able to recount multiple places where Appellant engaged in

different types of sexual conduct with her over an extended number of years, including

weekend family visits at times when Appellant did not reside in the home. We find the

jury did not lose its way in believing the victim’s testimony rather than Appellant’s
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                 8

testimony. The judgments of conviction are not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

      {¶16} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                               II.

      {¶17} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

overruling his motion to suppress statements made to Detective Vanoy.

      {¶18} At the outset, we note Appellant has filed a motion to supplement the record

with audio recordings of the statements he made to Detective Vanoy at his home, and of

his statement made at the police station. Appellant’s motion to supplement was filed

pursuant to App. R. 9(E), which provides:

             (E) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any difference

      arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial

      court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court and

      the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party

      is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties

      by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is

      transmitted to the court of appeals, or the court of appeals, on proper

      suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that omission or misstatement

      be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified, filed,

      and transmitted. All other questions as to the form and content of the record

      shall be presented to the court of appeals.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                    9

       {¶19} The rule allows the record to be supplemented by material omitted from the

record by mistake or accident. However, a reviewing court cannot add matter to the

record before it, which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the

appeal on the basis of the new material. State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d

500 (1978). In the instant case, while portions of the audio recordings were played for

the trial court during the suppression hearing, the recordings were not offered into

evidence and were not admitted into evidence. Therefore, the full recordings were not a

part of the record before the trial court. This Court therefore cannot add the recordings

to the record and decide the issues raised concerning suppression of Appellant’s

statements on the basis of material not presented to the trial court. Appellant’s motion to

supplement the record is overruled.

       {¶20} Appellant first argues the trial court erred in finding he was not in custody

for purposes of Miranda at the time he was questioned at the police station.

       {¶21} A duty to administer Miranda warnings arises only when an accused is

taken into custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966). For purposes of Miranda warnings, “custody” is defined as a formal arrest or

restraint on the freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. State

v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 154, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1998). In order to determine whether

a person was in custody, the court should apply a totality-of-circumstances test, including

where the interrogation occurred, whether the investigation had focused on the subject,

whether the objective indicia of arrest were present, and the length of the questioning

involved. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                                  10

        {¶22} Appellant argues a reasonable person in his circumstances would not have

felt free to go because he did not have his cell phone, which he had come to the police

station to retrieve, and he was interviewed by two separate individuals, Detective Vanoy

and an employee of Children’s Services, with the door closed.                     The trial court found

Appellant was not in custody because he voluntarily drove himself to the police station,

was advised he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time, and the door was

only closed for privacy.

        {¶23} As discussed above, the portions of the interview recording which were

played for the trial court are not a part of the record before this Court on appeal. However,

Detective Vanoy testified he informed Appellant he was free to go, noted Appellant was

there voluntarily, and told Appellant he was not under arrest. Supp. Tr. 14. The detective

testified Appellant indicated he understood. Id. The detective also testified Appellant

stated he had come down to get his cell phone, and out of respect, Appellant agreed to

stay and talk to Detective Vanoy. Supp. Tr. 15. On cross-examination, Detective Vanoy

testified he gave Appellant the option on whether or not he wanted the door closed, and

his choice was to leave it open. Supp. Tr. 20.1

        {¶24} We find based on Detective Vanoy’s testimony the trial court did not err in

finding Appellant was not in custody at the time he was interviewed at the police station.

While two persons were present for the interview, only one was a police officer, and

nothing in the record indicates the employee of Children’s Services participated in

questioning Appellant. Appellant indicated he understood he was free to go and was not

1 If at some point during the interview the door was closed for privacy reasons as found by the trial court,

this is not a part of the record before this Court on appeal.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                       11

under arrest. Appellant affirmatively indicated he came to the police station to retrieve

his cell phone, and agreed to stay and speak with Det. Vanoy out of respect.

       {¶25} Appellant also argues he asserted his right to counsel during the interview,

and the trial court therefore erred in finding his post-arrest statements to police were

admissible. Appellant did not raise this argument in the trial court, and the trial court did

not expressly rule on Appellant’s claim he asserted a right to counsel. However, the trial

court noted in its judgment after approximately 39 minutes of interviewing, when the

defendant indicated he wished to talk to someone, he was placed under arrest and his

Miranda warnings were provided to him.

       {¶26} “It is well-settled law that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised

for the first time on appeal because such issues are deemed waived.” Columbus v. Ridley,

2015-Ohio-4968, 50 N.E.3d 934, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Barrett, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 11AP-375, 2011-Ohio-4986, 2011 WL 4489169, ¶ 13; see State v. Comen,

50 Ohio St.3d 206, 211, 553 N.E.2d 640 (1990). This principle also applies to arguments

not asserted either in a written motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing. Id.

       {¶27} Again, the recording of the interview played for the trial court is not a part of

the record before this Court on appeal. During the questioning of Detective Vanoy, the

prosecutor stated on the record, “I think I have around about 39 minute point where he

indicates that perhaps he’d like to speak to somebody about things.” Supp. Tr. 15.

       {¶28} Police investigators must honor an invocation of the right to cut off

questioning only if such invocation is unambiguous. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516,

520, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001), citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350,

129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).        “If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                   12

unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.”

Davis, supra; State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 18.

The officers also have no obligation to ask clarifying questions to ascertain if the suspect

is attempting to invoke his right to counsel. Davis at 461-462. Relying on Davis, the

Supreme Court of Ohio held, “If the suspect says something that may or may not be an

invocation of the right, police may continue to question him; they need not treat the

ambiguous statement as an invocation or try to clear up the ambiguity.” State v. Murphy,

supra at 521.

       {¶29} The transcript of the suppression hearing suggests Appellant indicated

“perhaps he’d like to speak to somebody about things.”            We find this is not an

unambiguous, unequivocal request for counsel, and the detective therefore did not have

an obligation to terminate questioning, nor did he have an obligation to ask clarifying

questions to ascertain if Appellant was attempting to invoke his right to counsel. The

detective testified there was no additional time in the remaining minutes of the recording,

which it appears were not played for the trial court, where Appellant asserted a right to an

attorney. Supp. Tr. 16.

       {¶30} We find the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to

suppress. The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  III.

       {¶31} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

striking the testimony of Judith Teegardin after she pled the Fifth Amendment, without

inquiring further into her desire to plead the Fifth.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                     13

       {¶32} Teegardin was called as a witness for the defense. Because she was facing

charges as the custodian of the child victim, Teegardin was represented by counsel

during her testimony. Teegardin testified on direct examination concerning the times and

places where Appellant resided with the family. She testified Appellant was not alone

with the victim, and testified the victim expressed a desire to live with her natural parents.

       {¶33} On cross-examination, after confirming her place of residence, the following

colloquy occurred:

              Q. Okay. And it would be fair to say that since you obtained custody

       of [the victim] when she was approximately three years old that you have

       moved quite a few times throughout that - - her life; correct?

              Well, there was a period there where we was –

              Q. It’s yes or no. Have you moved quite a few times?

              A: Can I plead the Fifth?

              THE COURT: No. Well, yes, you can.

              A: I plead the Fifth.

              THE COURT: Are you done then?

              THE WITNESS: Yes, please.

              THE COURT: Okay.

              MS. WELLS [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I would just state that

       pleading the Fifth is not I am going to plead the Fifth when it’s convenient

       and not when it’s not convenient.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                      14

              THE COURT: Well, I don’t think I can make her testify to things that

       are going to incriminate her.

              MS. WELLS: The State would ask that the entirety of her previous

       testimony be stricken as well since we’ve not had the opportunity to cross-

       examine this witness.

              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You’re done.

              THE WITNESS: I just don’t like being made out to be a monster.

              THE COURT: That’s really not the reason to do that, ma’am. Thank

       you.

       {¶34} Tr. (II) 339-40.

       {¶35} The court then recessed for lunch. After lunch, the attorneys discussed an

issue regarding Appellant’s next witness, Jacinda Brooks. Appellant then raised an issue

about Teegardin’s testimony, noting at a status conference a week prior to trial, there was

the potential for Teegardin to take the Fifth. Appellant’s counsel stated it was unusual to

have a witness only plead the Fifth during cross-examination, having completed her

testimony on direct examination, and this was “an issue for us to delve into.” Tr. (II) 346.

       {¶36} The State asked for the opportunity to put Teegardin back on the stand and

have her take the Fifth Amendment as to each question the State asked. The trial court

stated there was no point in having the witness plead the Fifth ten times. The trial court

found it was a “sleazy trick” for the witness to testify on direct then choose to take the

Fifth only on cross-examination. Tr. (II) 348. The trial court stated it was inclined to strike

her entire testimony. Appellant moved for a mistrial on the basis Teegardin’s actions were
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                   15

harmful to his case. The motion was overruled, and the trial court struck Teegardin’s

testimony.

       {¶37} When a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination, a court may

not rely upon the witness's claim alone, but has a duty to determine whether the witness's

refusal to answer is justified. State v. Arnold, 147 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-1595, 62

N.E.3d 153, ¶ 45 citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95

L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The trial judge must determine if a proposed witness's testimony would

be self-incriminating. Id.; State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 120–121, 559 N.E.2d 710

(1990); McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 400, 89 N.E. 10 (1909), paragraph two of the

syllabus. A valid assertion exists where a witness has reasonable cause to apprehend a

real danger of incrimination. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127, 100 S.Ct.

948, 63 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980); In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (C.A. 6 1983); State v.

Linkous, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3517, 2013-Ohio-5853, 2013 WL 6918875, ¶ 55. “To

sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the

setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer * * * might be dangerous because

injurious disclosure could result. * * *.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–487, 71 S.Ct. 814. The

privilege extends to answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence, exposing

the witness to criminal liability. Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.

159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed. 170 (1950); State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 120–121, 559

N.E.2d 710.

       {¶38} The Ohio Supreme Court held in Arnold, supra:
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                   16

              The trial court's inquiry into the basis of a witness's assertion of the

       privilege is critical, even when the purported basis seems implausible,

       frivolous, or suspect. The trial court must tread lightly, of course, because

       “if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard

       in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court,

       he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege

       is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed.

       1118. Thus, the trial court “must carefully balance the interests of the party

       claiming   protection   against   self-incrimination   and   the   adversary's

       entitlement to equitable treatment” in its analysis of the propriety of the

       claim. Sec. & Exchange Comm. v. Graystone Nash, Inc. 25 F.3d 187, 192

       (3d Cir. 1994). And the record of the trial court's proceedings should clearly

       reflect the court's inquiries into the bases of the claim of privilege and the

       proponent's responses.

       {¶39} Arnold at ¶ 47.

       {¶40} In the instant case, the trial court did not conduct an inquiry into the basis

of Teegardin’s decision to invoke her privilege against self-incrimination, but terminated

her testimony as soon as she asked to plead the Fifth Amendment. The State argues it

is apparent from the statements in the record the possibility of Teegardin pleading the

Fifth was discussed at a status conference, which is not a part of the record before this

Court, and we therefore must affirm because we do not have a complete record. We find

the fact a possibility of Teegardin pleading the Fifth was discussed prior to trial did not
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                        17

relieve the trial court of its duty to inquire as to the basis of her decision to plead the Fifth

in response to a specific question at trial. We note even after Teegardin volunteered her

reason for pleading the Fifth being she didn’t want to be made out to be a monster, the

trial court informed her that was not a reason to take the Fifth. However, the trial court

excused the witness immediately without additional inquiry. We find the trial court erred

in failing to inquire into the basis for Teegardin’s decision to plead the Fifth, instead

choosing to immediately dismiss her and strike her testimony.

       {¶41} However, in Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court found error in failing to

conduct a proper inquiry into assertion of the right against self-incrimination is subject to

a harmless error analysis. Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal

cases and provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect

substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Under the harmless-error standard of review, “the

government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial

rights of the defendant.” State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d

643, ¶ 15, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d

508 (1993).

       {¶42} In Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court held in the context of failure to inquire

as to the basis for invocation of the right against self-incrimination, error may be harmless

where the evidence which was excluded by the witness pleading the Fifth is merely

cumulative of other evidence in the case. Arnold, supra, at ¶54. In the instant case,

Teegardin’s testimony on direct examination which was stricken by the trial court was

cumulative of Appellant’s testimony, and to some extent, the testimony of the victim.

Appellant’s exhibits, letters written by the victim expressing a desire to live with her
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                       18

parents, were identified by Teegardin during her stricken testimony; however, these

exhibits were ultimately admitted through the testimony of the victim on cross-

examination. We find the error in the instant case had no impact on the verdict and was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

       {¶43} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  IV.

       {¶44} In the fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

overruling his motion for a mistrial based on the events surrounding the testimony of

Teegardin, and also based on the exclusion of the testimony of Jacinda Brooks based on

an alleged violation by Appellant of the court’s separation of witnesses order.

       {¶45} A mistrial should not be ordered in a criminal case merely because some

error or irregularity has intervened. State v. Reynolds, 49 Ohio App.3d 27, 33, 550 N.E.2d

490, 497 (1988). The granting of a mistrial is necessary only when a fair trial is no longer

possible. State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1, 9 (1991). When

reviewed by the appellate court, we should examine the climate and conduct of the entire

trial, and reverse the trial court's decision as to whether to grant a mistrial only for a gross

abuse of discretion. State v. Draughn, 76 Ohio App.3d 664, 671, 602 N.E.2d 790, 793–

794 (1992).

       {¶46} As to the irregularities surrounding Teegardin’s testimony, Appellant has not

demonstrated a fair trial was no longer possible because she was excused and the trial

court struck her testimony from the record.             As discussed earlier in this opinion,

Teegardin’s testimony was merely cumulative of other evidence in the case, and

Appellant’s exhibits identified by Teegardin were entered into evidence through the
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                                  19

testimony of the victim. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling

Appellant’s motion for mistrial regarding the testimony of Teegardin.

       {¶47} Before Appellant called Jacinda Brooks as a witness, the State represented

to the trial court the previous night after court, Appellant made five phone calls from the

jail to Brooks, and discussed with Brooks the testimony of the victim and the detective.

Based on Appellant’s violation of the separation of witnesses order, the trial court

precluded Brooks from testifying on Appellant’s behalf.

       {¶48} Appellant argues the State did not present evidence demonstrating the

content of the phone calls to Brooks, and merely relied on the representations of the

prosecutor concerning the conduct. However, Appellant did not proffer the testimony of

Brooks. In the absence of a proffer, we cannot find a fair trial was made impossible by

the trial court’s exclusion of Brooks’s testimony. We find Appellant has not demonstrated

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00049                                           20

      {¶49} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Licking

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Baldwin, J. and
King, J. concur