Court Opinion

ID: 9819685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:31:01.432654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:03.164321
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. A defendant’s right to testify at trial is a fundamental constitutional right, as is his or her right to choose not to testify. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 145-46 (1997); see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. It is now generally recognized that the decision whether to testify ultimately rests with the defendant. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d at 146. Although it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the question of whether to grant a defendant’s motion to reopen the proofs, a trial court should not exclude defense testimony except in the most extreme circumstances. People v. Johnson, 151 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053 (1987), citing People v. Franceschini, 20 Ill. 2d 126 (1960). It is important to differentiate between motions to reopen the proofs in general and those motions to reopen the proofs so that the defendant might testify in his or her own defense. There is a world of difference, in terms of the constitutional factors involved, between these two types of situations. Society’s interest in the efficient administration of justice has to be balanced with a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair opportunity to defend. Johnson, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. “Of course, the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right ‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ [Citation.] But restrictions of a defendant’s right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 107 S. Ct. at 2711, quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973). Where a case presents no extreme circumstances justifying the exclusion of exculpatory testimony, a trial court risks abusing its discretion by denying a motion to reopen the proofs. People v. Figueroa, 308 Ill. App. 3d 93, 102 (1999), citing People v. Goff, 299 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1998). The Figueroa court, in discussing motions to reopen the proofs in general, identified the factors involved: “ ‘ “In considering a motion to reopen proofs, a trial court should take into account various factors, including the existence of an excuse for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial, e.g., whether it was inadvertence or calculated risk; whether the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence; whether the evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant’s case; and whether there are the most cogent reasons to deny the request.” ’ ” Figueroa, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 103, quoting People v. Watkins, 238 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258 (1992), quoting Hollembaek v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778 (1985). While I sympathize that Collier must have caused the trial court tremendous consternation by waffling between testifying and not testifying, his right to testify is of such a constitutional magnitude that it must be considered ahead of the Watkins factors. Collier’s constitutional rights must take precedence over those general factors that a trial court would weigh in a case where a defendant wanted to reopen the proofs for the admission of general evidence or testimony other than his own. The decision faced by the trial court was a serious one, especially considering the fact that Collier had twice before clearly indicated he would not testify. That being said, the question becomes one of weighing the impact of allowing the defendant to testify under these particular facts and circumstances. I understand that reopening the proofs would have caused some increased work, some inconvenience and, doubtless, more than a little aggravation. However, Collier’s final request to testify came before closing arguments were to be made before the jury. I presume the State’s Attorney was properly prepared at the onset of trial for the possibility that Collier would take the witness stand in his own constitutionally protected defense. As such, claims by the State of potential prejudice and harm to the prosecution’s case from having to delay closing arguments for the testimony and cross-examination of one more witness ring hollow. When weighed against Collier’s constitutional right to testify, notions of trial court or prosecutorial convenience simply must give way. Under a different set of facts, or were this a case with more obvious evidence of duplicity or gamesmanship at the heart of a defendant’s decision, I certainly recognize that a different result could be warranted. This is not such a case. I believe Collier should have been allowed to testify because his constitutional rights outweighed the trial court’s other concerns.