Court Opinion

ID: 9736774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:06:12.45341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:08.815334
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The problem I have is that if the $50,000 personal injury settlement were distributed to Ms. Ramsdell as part of the property division, then the division would be equal and the trial court’s finding that the $300.00 monthly “alimony” was not property division would not be clearly erroneous. Redlin v. Redlin, 436 N.W.2d 5 (N.D.1989). However, the trial court appears to have found that the personal injury settlement was not part of the property division because it found that the settlement was an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying the termination of “alimony.” That being the case, there was obviously a huge disparity in the property division which, under Redlin, would be a strong factor in favor of a determination that the $300.00 per month “alimony” is property division, not spousal support.
In my view, it follows that the trial court’s finding that the $300.00 a month “alimony” was not property division was clearly erroneous. The “alimony” was to be paid every month with no limitations expressed concerning remarriage, death or duration and it compensated for a marked disparity in Ms. Ramsdell’s award of property. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
If I did not disagree with the majority’s holding on the interpretation of the term “alimony,” I would concur with its holding on the issue of extraordinary circumstances, subject to the following proviso.
In her article, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D.L.Rev. 225 (1985), Professor Marcia O’Kelly analyzes the respective purpose and characteristics *526of rehabilitative spousal support (used to mitigate economic disadvantage) and compensatory spousal support (used to compensate when rehabilitation is wholly or partially impossible). O’Kelly suggests that spousal support of either type should be viewed as an entitlement based on the recipient’s shared contributions to the marital enterprise. Id. at 260. However, she also recognizes our precedents that there is no indefinite entitlement to compensatory support to maintain an established standard of living. Bauer v. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.1984); Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323 (N.D.1967).
In Bauer, we affirmed the continuation of rehabilitative support to pay college expenses of the remarried recipient but held that there were no extraordinary circumstances justifying the continuation of the compensatory support of $50.00 a month for life. Referring to this latter holding, O’Kelly states:
“That conclusion, however, would not preclude arguing in an appropriate case that compensatory support should not terminate at remarriage because the underdeveloped earning capacity of the recipient could not be or was not yet rehabilitated and she had not been proportionately compensated for her contributions to the enhanced earning capacity of her former spouse.” Id. at 260-61, n. 151.
No such arguments were made in this case and no facts were presented in support of them. I agree that Ms. Ramsdell did not fulfill her burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances.
However, I would reverse on the ground that the trial court's finding that the award of “alimony” is spousal support is clearly erroneous.