Court Opinion

ID: 9671940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:45:53.574669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.210658
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, appellant complains that the pre-1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act do not apply and therefore it was error to treble the damages in this case. Appellee did not discover the defects in the house until after the effective date of the 1979 amendments.
Although appellant correctly states the rule derived from Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo, 616 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ), it must be viewed in the proper context. It is true that before a plaintiff discovers the house was not built in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner he has no cause of action. 616 S.W.2d at 633. However, Cocke involved whether the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The time period for limitation begins to run when the damages actually began to show on the completed house. 616 S.W.2d at 634.
The case at hand does not involve the statute of limitations, but rather which version of the DTPA controls. Therefore, it is necessary to take notice of the savings clause included in the 1979 amendment which provides:
“This act shall be applied prospectively only. Nothing in this Act affects either procedurally or substantively a cause of action that arose either in whole or in part prior to the effective date of this Act.” (emphasis added).
Act of June 13, 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1327, ch. 603, Sec. 9, Tex.Gen.Laws 1332, eff. August 27, 1979. McAllen State Bank v. Linbeck Construction Corp., 695 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The implied warranty arises from the sale, which occurred on August 22, 1979. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.1968). Therefore, although the cause of action did not accrue until after the effective date of the 1979 amendment, a part of the cause of action did arise prior to the effective date.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.