Court Opinion

ID: 9704416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:34:46.13227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.253459
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
In Mahaffey v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 380, this Court held that when the defendant in a criminal case files notice of the intent to interpose the defense of insanity, such defendant "initiates" his psychiatric examination by two court-appointed physicians, thereby waiving his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to them. We said, "Appellant himself in effect requested the mental examination, and therefore he may not complain that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated." Id. at 382. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the United States Supreme Court, referring to mental examinations, held that once "a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psy*545chiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested." Id. at 422-23, 107 S.Ct. at 2918-19. In light of these holdings, it cannot be said that an Indiana criminal defendant, by nothing more than simply interposing the defense of insanity, "initiates" a psychiatric examination by other than the required two court-appointed psychiatrists, and therefore waives the privilege against self-inerimination at any other such mental examination. The proof presented by court-appointed psychiatrists is not the defendant's proof-it is that of the Court. See Ind.Code Ann. 35-86-22 (Burns 1994). If the defendant proposes to introduce his own proof on the issue of insanity, a stronger case for waiver would be present; however, such is not the case here. I would hold that the testimony of Dr. Crane was inadmissible as his examination was not preceded by a valid waiver by appellant of the privilege against self-inerimination.
Furthermore, in reference to the hearsay claim, the State could have stopped after introducing the earlier charging informations in support of their theory that appellant killed in retaliation for the victim's complaint. It did not. Over a hearsay objection, Officer Endress was permitted to repeat what Tawa-na Smith, the victim, had said when asked why she had waited so long in seeking those charges:
She said she was seared to tell, thinking no one would believe her, and also Mr. Taylor had threatened to kill her if she talked to anyone.
This answer is devastating to appellant's insanity defense, and the error in permitting the jury to consider it was not harmless.
This conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.