Court Opinion

ID: 9555606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:07:34.058779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:07.309330
License: Public Domain

J-S07038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee               :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
 THOMAS SIDERIO                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :        No. 2233 EDA 2021

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2021
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002900-2013,
                         MC-51-CR-0005791-2013

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 14, 2023

      Appellant, Thomas Siderio, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following

revocation of his probation. We affirm.

      The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

         On December 19, 2013, [Appellant] appeared before [the
         trial court, with the Honorable Genece Brinkley presiding,]
         and pled guilty to theft [by] unlawful taking, receiving stolen
         property, and conspiracy (CP-51-CR-0002900-2013).

         On March 31, 2014, [the trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant]
         on CP-51-CR-0002900-2013 to 6 to 23 months [of] county
         incarceration plus three years [of] reporting probation on
         the theft [by] unlawful taking charge, three years [of]
         concurrent reporting probation on the conspiracy charge,
         and no further penalty on the receiving stolen property
         charge. [Appellant] was ordered to undergo a Forensic
         Intensive Recovery (FIR) evaluation for dual diagnosis
         treatment, enroll in parenting classes, and continue with his
J-S07038-23

       mental health and drug treatment. On this same date,
       [Appellant] also was resentenced on two prior cases as he
       was in direct violation of his previous sentences. …

       On February 16, 2015, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition for
       relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act [(“PCRA”)],
       claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with
       his guilty plea on docket number CP-51-CR-0002900-2013.
       On July 16, 2015, Richard Blok, Esquire, of Montoya Shaffer,
       LLC, entered his appearance as retained counsel. Zachary
       Shaffer, Esquire, of the same law firm, entered his
       appearance on April 11, 2016 and filed an amended petition
       on April 25, 2016.

       [Appellant] was granted parole on July 29, 2015. He
       appeared before [the trial c]ourt for a status hearing on
       October 18, 2015, where he told the [c]ourt he was
       receiving weekly mental health treatment and was looking
       for a job. He appeared before [the trial c]ourt again on
       November 18, 2015 for another status hearing. He stated
       that he still did not have a job but was receiving mental
       health treatment and was reporting to probation as directed.
       [The trial c]ourt scheduled another status hearing for
       [Appellant] on March 18, 2016.

       On February 1, 2016, [Appellant] was arrested in New
       Haven, Connecticut for selling nitrous oxide balloons outside
       of a concert venue on Yale University’s campus and running
       from campus police when they instructed him to stop filling
       balloons. When he returned to Philadelphia on February 8,
       2016, [Appellant] was detained for incurring this new arrest
       and conviction, leaving Philadelphia County and the
       Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without permission, and
       failing to inform his Probation Officer of his new arrest within
       72 hours.

       On August 17, 2016, while [Judge Brinkley] was not sitting
       due to an extended medical leave, [Appellant] appeared
       before the Honorable Timika Lane for a violation of
       probation hearing. Judge Lane found [Appellant] in violation
       and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23
       months [of] county incarceration plus 4 years [of] reporting
       probation. [Appellant] was released on parole on December
       2, 2016.

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          [Judge Brinkley] returned from medical leave and resumed
          jurisdiction of this matter. On December 9, 2016, a notice
          of PCRA on the instant case docket number CP-51-CR-
          0002900-2013 was sent to [Appellant], directing him to
          appear before [the court] for a PCRA hearing on February 3,
          2017[; the notice specified that the proceeding would take
          place before Judge Brinkley. Thereafter, the c]ourt sent
          [Appellant] a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
          907 on March 16, 2017. On April 17, 2017, [the c]ourt
          dismissed [Appellant’s] petition based upon counsel’s
          Finley “no-merit” letter.[1]

          On April 21, 2017, [Appellant] was arrested and charged
          with murder and related charges. On April 25, 2017, a
          notice of violation of probation was sent to [Appellant],
          directing him to appear before [the trial c]ourt on May 11,
          2017 for a violation of probation hearing[.] The matter was
          continued several times pending the resolution of his open
          matter. On November 30, 2018, [Appellant] was found
          guilty of two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA):
          § 6106, carrying a firearm without a license; and § 6108,
          carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia. He was found not
          guilty on the remaining charges. On January 25, 2019, the
          Honorable Glenn Bronson sentenced [Appellant] to an
          aggregate term of 6 to 12 years [of] state incarceration.
          This conviction was a direct violation of [the trial c]ourt’s
          sentence[ in the instance case, CP-51-CR-0002900-2013.]

          On January 23, 2019, David Walker, Esquire entered his
          appearance as defense counsel. On January 30, 2019, Mr.
          Walker filed a motion to transfer this matter to Judge Lane
          for the violation of probation. On February 1, 2019, Mr.
          Walker made argument on the record regarding his request
          to have the case transferred. [The trial c]ourt denied that
          motion.

          On November 26, 2019, [Appellant] appeared before [the
          trial c]ourt for a violation hearing.   First, [the c]ourt
          summarized [Appellant’s] criminal history since his original
____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

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       guilty plea in 2013, including his resentencing before Judge
       Lane while [Judge Brinkley] was on medical leave, after
       which jurisdiction was returned to [Judge Brinkley].
       Subsequently, [Appellant] was convicted of gun charges and
       sentenced by Judge Bronson to 6 to 12 years [of] state
       incarceration. This conviction was a direct violation of [the
       c]ourt’s sentence.      [The trial c]ourt incorporated the
       probation officer’s October 3, 2019 summary into the record
       by reference. (N.T. 11/26/19, p. 11-13).

       Probation Officer Greg Baumbach stated that [Appellant]
       was in direct violation of his sentence and recommended
       revocation and a period of incarceration. Id. at 14.

       Defense counsel David Walker, Esquire then began to argue
       that this matter should be before Judge Lane…because
       Judge Lane had presided over a single probation violation
       hearing while [Judge Brinkley] was not sitting due to
       medical leave. He argued that [Judge Brinkley] conducting
       a violation hearing instead of Judge Lane “violate[ed]
       [Appellant’s] rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
       Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as
       Article 1 Section 8—or Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution, his due process rights, as well as his Sixth
       Amendment right to counsel [...].” Id. at 37. With respect
       to the actual violation of probation, Mr. Walker argued that
       [Appellant] had been through a terrible ordeal when his
       cousin was shot and that he already was serving a lengthy
       state sentence imposed by Judge Bronson. He further
       argued that [Appellant] had mental health issues, was only
       26 years old, and that he had recently become very
       religious. Mr. Walker recommended a sentence of time
       served. Id. at 43-46. Mr. Walker extensively argued that
       [Appellant] was owed time credit, and ultimately requested
       a continuance so that he could conduct further research into
       the time credit issue. His continuance request was granted
       and the case was given a date of February 20, 2020.

       The next part of [Appellant’s] violation of probation hearing
       was delayed by several months, first due to failure to be
       brought down from state prison, and second by the COVID-
       19 pandemic, resulting court closure, and prison quarantine
       protocols. On March 11, 2021, [Appellant] appeared before
       [the trial c]ourt via Zoom for his hearing. Once again, [the

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       trial c]ourt reviewed [Appellant’s] criminal history since his
       original appearance before [the trial c]ourt in 2013. [The
       c]ourt noted that this was a bifurcated violation of probation
       hearing and that the previous arguments from the prior
       hearings were incorporated into the record by reference.
       After    extensively   reviewing     [Appellant’s]    previous
       sentences, time served, and time credited, including the
       documentation provided to [the c]ourt by defense counsel,
       [the c]ourt determined that the theft unlawful taking charge
       was the only offense that was still active and that the
       maximum he could be sentenced on this charge was 51
       months. (N.T. 3/11/21, p. 28-33). The corrections officer
       at [Appellant’s] prison then informed [the c]ourt that it was
       out of time as there was another Zoom hearing scheduled
       at the prison, and [the c]ourt’s hearing had to end.
       Therefore, [the trial c]ourt continued the violation hearing
       to a future date.

       On October 14, 2021, [Appellant] appeared before [the
       court] again via Zoom for the conclusion of his violation
       hearing. Defense counsel recommended that [the c]ourt
       terminate [Appellant’s] sentence and probation because
       [Appellant] already would be under state supervision for the
       next seven years. (N.T. 10/14/21, p. 8-11).             The
       Commonwealth concurred with the probation officer’s
       recommendation of revocation and recommended a state
       sentence imposed at [the c]ourt’s discretion. Id. at 12.
       Next, [Appellant] spoke on his own behalf. He apologized
       for violating his probation and explained that he was going
       through “a hard time” in his life when his cousin was shot.
       He stated that he had learned a lot and that he wanted to
       help combat gun violence when he was released. Id. at 12-
       13. [The c]ourt found [Appellant] in direct violation and
       sentenced him to 25 to 50 months [of] state incarceration,
       to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. Id. at
       16.

       On October 27, 2021, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal to
       the Superior Court. On December 13, 2021, the Superior
       Court permitted Mr. Walker to withdraw as counsel and
       ordered [the trial c]ourt to determine within 60 days
       whether [Appellant] was eligible for court appointed
       counsel. [The c]ourt scheduled a hearing on January 13,
       2022, which was further twice continued to April 12, 2022.

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         On that date, after conducting a hearing via video, [the
         c]ourt determined that [Appellant] was eligible for court
         appointed counsel and ordered that counsel be appointed
         forthwith. Daniel Alvarez, Esquire entered his appearance
         on April 18, 2022. On June 1, 2022, [the c]ourt ordered
         that [Appellant] file a Concise Statement of Errors
         Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and
         [appellate] counsel did so on June 11, 2022.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/30/22, at 2-7) (footnotes omitted).

      Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal.

         Was the total incarceration sentence entered by the
         revocation [c]ourt excessive and an abuse of discretion for
         a theft offense, as it was much more than necessary to
         protect the public and rehabilitate Appellant who has drug
         abuse and mental health history. Moreover, the sentence
         was excessive as Appellant exhibited remorse and a
         willingness to seek complete rehabilitation, and the
         consecutive nature of the sentence (consecutive to any
         other sentence) was more than necessary to vindicate the
         authority of the [c]ourt?

         Appellant asserts the revocation [c]ourt erred by denying
         his motion to transfer this matter back to the previous
         sentencing Judge that had assumed jurisdiction from the
         revocation [c]ourt. Appellant proffers that supervision was
         improperly transferred back to this revocation [c]ourt
         without his knowledge or consent. Did the [trial] court err
         and was this a due process violation under the U.S. and PA
         Constitutions?

(Appellant’s Brief at 8).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion

in imposing an excessive sentence following revocation of his probation.

Appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider his history of mental

health and substance abuse, his remorse, and the actions that he has already

taken to turn his life around. Appellant contends that the sentence imposed

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and   its    consecutive   nature   to   other   sentences   he   is   serving   are

disproportionate to the nature of the offense and will not benefit the

rehabilitative needs of Appellant.       Appellant concludes the sentence was

excessive, and this Court must grant sentencing relief. We disagree.

      Initially, an appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence do not entitle him to an appeal as of right.        Commonwealth v.

Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 745,

964 A.2d 895 (2009), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspect of

sentencing issue:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
            appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
            902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
            at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
            sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E) regarding post-
            sentence motions after revocation of probation]; (3)
            whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
            2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that
            the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
            Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal

denied, 621 Pa. 682, 76 A.3d 538 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans,

901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d

303 (2006)). Generally, objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence

are waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to

modify the sentence imposed at that hearing.         Commonwealth v. Mann,

820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d

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599 (2003).    See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E) (governing motions to modify

sentence after revocation of probation).

      Instantly, Appellant did not challenge the discretionary aspects of his

sentence at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion to modify his

sentence. Therefore, Appellant’s first issue is waived. See Mann, supra.

      Moreover, even if Appellant had preserved a discretionary aspects

challenge, it would not merit relief. “Revocation of a probation sentence is a

matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s

decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or

an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041

(Pa.Super. 2014). A sentence should not be disturbed where it is evident the

court was aware of the appropriate sentencing considerations and weighed

them in a meaningful fashion. Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923

(Pa.Super. 2000).

      “[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is

limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally

at the time of the probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh,

770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2001). A court can sentence a defendant to

total confinement after revoking probation if the defendant was convicted of

another crime, the defendant’s conduct indicates it is likely that he will commit

another crime if he is not imprisoned, or such a sentence is essential to

vindicate the court’s authority. Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280

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(Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010).

      Instantly, upon revocation the court imposed a sentence that was within

the statutory limits.   The court explained that in imposing its sentence it

considered Appellant’s criminal history and new conviction on gun charges.

The court noted that:

         [a]long with a lengthy criminal record, [Appellant] had a
         history of mental health issues and drug abuse. In 2013,
         and at the subsequent violation and status hearings
         conducted thereafter, th[e c]ourt ordered him to attend
         drug treatment, receive mental health treatment, enroll in
         parenting classes, and get vocational training. Instead of
         using these programs to tum his life around, [Appellant]
         continued to get in trouble with the law, which included
         arrests in Illinois and Connecticut.     Although the jury
         acquitted [Appellant] of murder, he was found guilty of
         carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm
         on the streets of Philadelphia, two very serious crimes that
         directly impact the community. Based upon this direct
         violation and the fact that his repeated attempts at
         rehabilitation had failed, th[e c]ourt properly sentenced
         [Appellant] to 25 to 50 months [of] state incarceration.

(Trial Court Opinion at 9).

      Upon review, we agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The record makes clear the court adequately considered the relevant

sentencing factors, Appellant’s character, and mitigating circumstances.

While on probation, Appellant committed a new offense, and a jury found him

guilty of carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on the

streets of Philadelphia. Additionally, Appellant had a long history of probation

violations.   As such, the court was well within its discretion to impose a

sentence of total confinement. See Crump, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s

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challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is waived, and it would

not merit relief in any event. See Mann, supra; Colon, supra.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the court erred by not

granting his motion to transfer the case to Judge Lane. Appellant argues that

Judge Lane presided over one of Appellant’s prior revocation hearings, upon

which she assumed jurisdiction over his case.     Appellant claims that when

Judge Brinkley returned from medical leave, supervision of his case was

improperly transferred back to Judge Brinkley without his knowledge or

consent. Appellant insists that the case could only have been transferred back

to Judge Brinkley if extraordinary circumstances precluded Judge Lane from

supervising his case. We disagree.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 700 provides that “the judge

who presided at the trial or who received the plea of guilty or nolo contendere

shall impose sentence unless there are extraordinary circumstances which

preclude   the   judge’s   presence.”    Pa.R.Crim.P.   700(a).     See   also

Commonwealth v. McNeal, 120 A.3d 313, 323-24 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(holding that transfer which “did not occur based upon some extraordinary

circumstance, but rather by mere happenstance,” violated Rule 700). This

policy recognizes the value of a judge who “is in the best position to view a

defendant’s character, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and

nature of the crime. When formulating its order, the sentencing court must

consider the nature of the criminal and the crime.”      Id. at 323 (quoting

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Commonwealth v. Koren, 646 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Pa.Super. 1994)).

      Instantly, Judge Brinkley was the original judge who oversaw

Appellant’s December 19, 2013 guilty plea and March 31, 2014 sentencing.

When she was on medical leave, the case was assigned to Judge Lane, who

handled a violation of probation hearing, found Appellant in violation, and

sentenced him on August 17, 2016. Appellant did not challenge this transfer.

      Judge Brinkley then returned from medical leave. The record indicates

that on December 9, 2016, the court issued notice directing Appellant to

appear for a PCRA hearing before Judge Brinkley on February 3, 2017.

Appellant did not challenge the transfer of this matter back to Judge Brinkley.

Judge Brinkley conducted the PCRA hearing and denied relief on the PCRA

petition on April 17, 2017.

      Appellant once again violated his probation, and, on April 26, 2017, the

court issued notice and scheduled the violation of probation hearing. Nearly

a year and a half after this notice, and over two years after the matter was

transferred back to Judge Brinkley, Appellant filed his motion contesting the

second transfer and requesting transfer of the case to Judge Lane.

      Upon review, we conclude that Judge Brinkley remains “the judicial

officer best equipped to assess the nature of [Appellant] and the crime itself

before imposing sentence.” See McNeal, supra at 323. The fact that this

case was transferred to Judge Lane during Judge Brinkley’s medical leave does

not change the fact that Judge Brinkley, who has overseen all other aspects

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of this case, remained best equipped to conduct the instant violation of

probation hearing and to impose sentence. See id. Furthermore, we note

that Appellant consented to the proceedings before Judge Brinkley by failing

to raise any objection under Rule 700 when he appeared before Judge Brinkley

for the PCRA hearing without challenging the transfer. See Commonwealth

v. Banks, 198 A.3d 391, 400 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding challenge to judge’s

authority to preside over violation hearing was waived where defendant

consented to transfer).   Thus, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

Accordingly, we affirm.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2023

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