Court Opinion

ID: 9444912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:15:46.078855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:03.802320
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge.
I respectfully dissent because it seems to me that the phrase, “fleeing from justice”, as used in the statute1 has acquired a well defined historical meaning contrary to the opinion of the majority. For the history of that phrase, we have but to read the opinion of the Supreme Court in Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 134, 135, 16 S.Ct. 244, 247, 40 L.Ed. 365:
“Section 1045 of the Revised Statutes is a re-enactment of the corresponding proviso in the first crimes act of the United States, ‘Provided, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice.’ Act April 30, 1790, c. 9, § 32 (1 Stat. 119).
“At the time of the passage of that act, the only use, in the constitution or statutes of the United States, of the words ‘flee from justice,’ was in article 4, § 2, of the Constitution, concerning persons charged with crime in one state and found in another state of the Union.”
My brothers think that the Supreme Court in Streep v. United States, supra, and in Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, recognized a difference in construction between the present statute and the extradition statute. To me it is inconceivable how the Supreme Court could have expressed its opinion more clearly that the two statutes should receive the same construction. In Streep v. United States, supra, 160 U.S. at page 134, 16 S.Ct. at page 246, the Court said:
*566.‘“And'there dan be no that, in this respect, section 1045 of the Revised Statutes .must receive the same construction that has been given to section 5278 by this court, saying: ‘To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party Charged should have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that having, within a state, committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process, to answer for his offenses, he has left its jurisdiction, and is found within the territory of another." Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97, 6 S.Ct. 291 [29 L.Ed. 544].”
In Appleyard v. Massachusetts, supra, 203 U.S. at pages 229, 230, 27 S.Ct. at page 124, the Court said:
“It is suggested that Roberts v. Reilly was substantially modified in Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 134, 16 S.Ct. 244, 40 L.Ed. 365, 369, in which the court had occasion to construe § 1045 of the Revised Statutes. But this is an error. Interpreting the words ‘fleeing from justice’ as found in that section, the court expressly held that these words must receive the same construction as was given in Roberts v. Reilly to like words in § 5278 of the Revised Statutes, the inquiry in that case being whether the accused was a fugitive from justice.” 2
True, the, factual situation in Streep v. United States, supra, did not require the definite holding with which we are confronted in the instant case, and the Court itself commented that, “It is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present case, to undertake to give an exhaustive definition of these words, *' * * ” 160 U.S. at page 133, 16 S.Ct. at page 246. Nor was this Court required to meet the issue here presented in Porter v. United States, 5 Cir., 91 F. 494, nor in Greene v. United States, 5 Cir., 154 F. 401.
True, also, there are factual situations sometimes presented under the present statute which differ from the simple facts hypothesized in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544, that is having been within the jurisdiction at the time of the commission of the crime and thereafter having left the jurisdiction. The analogy of the extradition statute would not apply unless the person was physically present in the judicial district at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed, and where he was not so present intention may become material under the present statute. Brouse v. United States, 1 Cir., 68 F.2d 294, was such a case. Nor would the analogy of the extradition statute apply when the person never went out of the district, but simply hid himself within it, and, again in that situation, intention may become material under the present statute. Ferebee v. United States, 4 Cir., 295 F. 850, was such a case. While there is conflicting language in the opinions in the Brouse and Ferebee cases, neither of those decisions is in conflict with the holding in McGowen v. United States, 70 D.C. 268, 105 F.2d 791, 792, 124 A.L.R. 1047, that, “Accordingly appellant, when he left the District after committing forgery, was a ‘person fleeing from justice,’ regardless of his motive in leaving.”
The Constitution was not finally ratified and declared effective until September 13,1788. Within less than two years thereafter, the first Congress used in the predecessor to the present statute the same expression employed in Article 4, § 2, Clause 2, of the Constitution, “flee from Justice.” It seems to me that, in *567its wisdom, that first Congress thought that in cases where a defendant relies on the statute of limitations, there was a need for as definite a statute as possiHe, not unnecessarily requiring a full dress trial on limitations before getting down to the real issue on the merits of guilt or innocence, at least similar to the necessity for such a Constitutional provision in extradition cases.
The appellant argues that some statute of limitations should apply to a person who was present in the district when the crime was allegedly committed, and later with bona fide and honorable intentions permanently left that district. At common law there is no limitation as to the time within which offenses may be prosecuted. 15 Am.Jur., Criminal Laws, § 342, p. 31; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 223, note 85, p. 350; United States v. Fraidin, D.C.Md., 63 F.Supp. 271, 279; United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489, 25 L.Ed. 194. It would seem that the constitutional (Sixth Amendment) right to a speedy trial does not arise until after a formal complaint has been brought against a defendant. Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 9 Cir., 192 F.2d 338, 350; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 134; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 466, 467. I do not think that the courts should assume the duty of protecting persons who have left the district in good faith, but should leave that matter to the action of Congress, if .and when it may be impressed, by experience under the present statutes or otherwise, with the desirability for such protection.
The precise question here presented has been decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in McGowen v. United States, supra; see also, Green v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 188 F.2d 48; by the Eighth Circuit in King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729, and in principle by the Fourth Circuit in Bruce v. Bryan, 136 F. 1022, approving the opinion of District Judge Morris in In re Bruce, C.C.Md., 132 F. 390, in each instance contrary to the opinion of the majority in this case. Those decisions seem to me to be sound, both by precedent and by reason. They accord with the history of the phrase, with the language of the Supreme Court in Streep v. United States, supra, and Appleyard v. Massachusetts, supra, and they announce a simple, practical, and workable principle of procedural law in the administration of justice in criminal cases.
Further, the facts of the instant case remove it entirely from the rationale, or certainly from one of the main reasons, for the decision in Brouse v. United States, supra, as there expressed;
“The doubtful point is whether the same principle is applicable between federal districts. The states are independent jurisdictions whose powers do not extend beyond their own borders. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, they have the right to demand from each other the surrender of fugitives from justice. The situation is very different as to the United States. Its powers extend throughout its territory.” 68 F.2d at page 295.
The indictment in the present case was returned on October 1, 1951; if it had been returned on or before July 20, 1951, it would have been within the statutory three year period as to all crimes charged; so that it is necessary to toll the statute of limitations for a total of only seventy-two days. The defendant himself testified to various absences entirely beyond the boundaries of the United States, for example:
“Q. Now, getting back down to —what’s the name of that town in Honduras ? A. Tegucigalpa.
“Q. That was the capital of Honduras. How long did you remain there? A. As I said, until November 24th. I left Honduras — 1950.
“Q. You got your passport there; does your passport indicate when you arrived? A. Yes, sir. I arrived on July 21st, 1950.
“Q. And then in November you left Honduras; where did you go? *568A. I came back to the United States.
“Q. How long were you here ? A. I was here a week and I returned on November 29th.
“Q. To Honduras? A. To Honduras, yes.”
During that period alone, defendant was in Honduras for more than one hundred fifty-six days. Clearly, under-such facts, the district court was correct in holding: “ * * * as a matter of law the statute of limitations was tolled as to the defendant herein by virtue of his being without the jurisdiction of this court and that the intent of the defendant in so leaving and remaining without the jurisdiction is immaterial, * *
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. “Fugitives from justice
“No statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3290.

. It may be noted that Justice Harlan who wrote tbe opinion in the Appleyard ease, and three of tbe justices who concurred in that opinion bad concurred in tbe opinion in tbe Streep case,