Court Opinion

ID: 9521756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:11:11.698699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:35.699149
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, specially concurring: The prosecution witnesses, the circumstantial evidence and the effective rebuttal of the one defense witness support the majority conclusion that the evidence was not closely balanced. I concur. But I feel we should examine the alleged mistake in determining whether error occurred, before asking whether it rose to the level of plain error. The majority notes that “[t]he People contend that the circumstances here do not fall within the ambit of the prohibition against comment on the silence of an accused under Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240, and related decisions.” (88 Ill. 2d at 251.) I believe it is clear that the Staté’s Attorney’s remarks do fall within the ambit of Doyle and its progeny, and such remarks are prohibited. In closing arguments the State’s Attorney said: “You didn’t hear any story about at that time about, well, this other guy started it or anything like that. He [the defendant] never told him [the police officer] anything about that. ### He didn’t say 000 anything like that.000.” Those words are unmistakable remarks about the defendant’s silence; as such they unquestionably constitute error. In Doyle v. Ohio the supreme court recognized that “##l> it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” (426 U.S. 610, 618, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245.) This court expressed agreement with the rationale of the Doyle majority in People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514. We hold that the Doyle rule applied, even absent any evidence that the defendant had been given Miranda warnings. We said: “Since every arrested person has the right to remain silent and may be aware of his right even in the absence of Miranda warnings, post-arrest silence remains ‘insolubly ambiguous.’” (74 Ill. 2d 514, 521.) The Miranda warnings provide a means by which an accused is aware of certain rights he possesses. They “do not confer rights on a defendant.” (74 Ill. 2d 514, 521.) The critical juncture is the arrest when the defendant is taken into custody and not the police officer’s reading of the Miranda warning. Recently the United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson (1981), 447 U.S. 231, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86, 100 S. Ct. 2124, held that pre-arrest silence was a proper subject for cross-examination of a suspect at trial. The State contends that the Anderson decision should control the outcome of this case. In Jenkins v. Anderson the prosecutor did not comment upon the silence of the defendant following the arrest, but upon the fact that the defendant had waited two weeks to surrender and had not come forward with the self defense claim posited at trial. The supreme court then held that “impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Emphasis added.) (447 U.S. 231, 240, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86, 96, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2130.) Anderson does not apply to this case. Prior to an arrest there is no need to assert one’s right to remain silent. The occasion for its assertion does not arise until one is taken into custody by officers of the State. The defendant here did not testify at trial. The prosecutor’s remarks on the defendant’s failure to tell the police of his self-defense claim cannot be construed as impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. The defendant’s silence was used as substantive evidence from which the prosecution implied that the defendant cut his hand in the altercation at the bar and not on his motorcycle. It is agreed upon that the defendant’s nonassertion of his self-defense claim came after his arrest. The defendant was in custody. I feel it is important to reemphasize our adherence to the holding of People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, that prosecutorial remarks about an accused post-arrest silence are impermissible. (74 Ill. 2d 514, 521.) The defendant may well be aware of his right to remain silent. It is unfair to deprive him of asserting that right because he knew of it without being informed. To limit Doyle v. Ohio to instances where the Miranda warnings are given “could eviscerate Doyle through the simple expedient of not reading Miranda warnings at the time of arrest.” Weir v. Fletcher (6th Cir. 1981), 658 F.2d 1126, 1132 (the prosecutor’s comments to the jury concerning the defendant’s silence following his arrest but prior to the reading of Miranda warnings violated the defendant’s fifth amendment rights). I believe the complained-of comments constitute error. I agree, however, that the error does not rise to the level of plain error. We consider plain error in two circumstances: where the error is so fundamental that it impugns the integrity of the judicial process, and where substantial injustice would be done to the defendant in the case. People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31; People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 444, 453 (Ryan, J., specially concurring). In the former instance it is not necessary to weigh the evidence. Those errors are so basic that they require reversal regardless of the evidence aligned against the defendant. In the latter instance it becomes necessary to weigh the evidence only after an initial inquiry has been answered as to whether an error has been made. I think it is appropriate that the first question be asked and answered. Was there obvious error here? Yes. Was it plain error? No. The evidence was not close. Therefore, while the court does not consider the error here to be “plain error,” in my opinion error did occur. It is only in weighing the evidence that we can determine if this type of error denied the accused a fair trial (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280). However, the balancing should follow a preliminary examination of the prosecutor’s closing remarks. I believe they constituted error but because the evidence was not close, the error did not subject this defendant to a miscarriage of justice. I hope that this decision will not be construed as a redefining of the lines drawn in Better. Every arrested person has the right to remain silent, whether Miranda warnings are given or not. To assure a defendant that protection and then allow impeachment of, or comments about, the assertion of that privilege is wrong. We found such actions by the State’s Attorney to be error in Better; I do not think that this decision should be viewed as a retreat from that position.