Court Opinion

ID: 9726689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:03:56.77202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.737078
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
The issues are whether the trial court had jurisdiction to accept defendant’s1 plea of guilty to second-degree murder and, if so, whether defendant’s plea forecloses his post-conviction attack based on what he alleges was an illegally obtained confession. We conclude that Recorder’s Court did have jurisdiction of this matter and that defendant may not successfully attack his plea of *363guilty on the basis that it was involuntarily induced by his confession.
Facts
Janice Ott was stabbed to death in the hallway of her Detroit apartment building on December 22, 1971. Underneath her body, the police found a hat. In the hatband was a slip of paper. A purse containing the victim’s identification but no money was found in the parking lot behind her apartment. Names and telephone numbers on the slip of paper found in the hat led the police to the O’Neil home on December 28, 1971. Defendant, born February 14, 1955, had been residing with the O’Neils, his cousins. Defendant’s mother was deceased and the whereabouts of his father unknown. The O’Neils are an adult and married couple.
When the police came to the O’Neil home, they were admitted into the house by defendant. He was placed under arrest for the murder of Janice Ott. While in the home, the police seized two coats which appeared to have blood on them. Defendant was taken to the Youth Home. On December 29, the police asked permission of the probate court to take the defendant to police headquarters for the purpose of taking a blood sample and hair sample, and the giving of a polygraph test. The probate court advised that the police would have to first obtain the consent of the O’Neils. This was done. The O’Neils then accompanied the defendant before a referee of the juvenile court. Defendant was advised by the referee that he had the right to have an attorney and that one would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. He was told that he had the right not to make a statement, and that statements made by him or the results of *364tests performed could be used against him. Defendant indicated that he understood these rights and agreed to submit to the blood, hair and polygraph tests.
At police headquarters a hematologist-serologist took hair samples and blood from the defendant in the presence of Mrs. O’Neil. This technician testified at defendant’s waiver hearing and later at the preliminary examination in recorder’s court that, because of chemical damage to the hair of defendant, it was possible to match with certainty these hair samples with hair found on the victim’s coat. Further, blood found on the defendant’s jacket did not match his blood type, but did match the victim’s relatively rare AB blood type.
Defendant was then taken to the polygraph room where, in the presence of Mrs. O’Neil, he was read a standard constitutional rights form. He then read the form. The police then had defendant write on the rights form the reason why he wanted to take the test. He wrote "To prove that I didn’t do it”, and then signed the form. Upon completion of the polygraph, the operator told defendant that he had failed the test. Defendant then said "I did it. I stabbed her.” Defendant then gave a more detailed statement to the police completely implicating himself in the robbery-murder of Janice Ott.
Defendant was returned to the Youth Home. The prosecutor petitioned the probate court to waive jurisdiction so that defendant might be prosecuted as an adult on the charge of first-degree murder. Counsel and a guardian ad litem were appointed for the defendant. Following a hearing on February 15, 1972, the probate court’s decision on the question of waiver was announced on March 6, 1972. The probate court set forth the *365standards upon which it based its decision to waive jurisdiction as follows:
"1. Glynn Peters is a fairly large individual for his age. He is now past his 17th birthday. He appears mature. His prior record is extremely bad. It dates back to October 24, 1968 and he has been in Court a considerable number of times since then.
"He is an orphan and has been raised in boarding homes, by relatives, etc. He has had attorneys represent him at a considerable number of hearings. He has had previous convictions, using knives in assaults and robberies.
"In February 1970 he was committed by this Court to the State Department of Social Services, was placed at the Boys Training School, and became a State ward.
"2. The crime with which he is charged is extremely serious. This was not only a robbery with a large knife, but it was committed under circumstances that indicate clearly that he is dangerous.
"3. He has a long pattern of repetitive conduct in committing assaults and other offenses.
"4. There is no suitable program at the juvenile level. He could only be confined until he is 19 years of age and he is now past his 17th birthday.
"Attached hereto is a letter signed by Hartford Smith, Jr., Chairman, Parole and Review Board, Office of Youth Services. He indicates very clearly that there is no program at the juvenile level. It should be pointed out that if he is found guilty of this charge, he needs long term confinement. He was a truant from the Training School at the time of this assault.
"5. It is certainly in the best interests of the public and Glynn Peters that he stand trial as an adult. The public certainly needs protection from Glynn Peters.
"Sometimes the question of waiver presents a very close case. In this case, there is no doubt whatsoever. If found guilty of this charge, Glynn Peters needs long term confinement in a security institution extending years beyond his 19th birthday.
"If he were kept at the juvenile level, he could only be confined until he is 19 years of age. He has been in *366juvenile programs for years and none of these programs have done anything to rehabilitate him.
"At the conclusion of the hearing on February 15, 1972, the matter was referred to the Clinic for Child Study and case was continued to March 6, 1972 with the consent of counsel.
’’The matter again comes before the Court on March 6, 1972. A report had been submitted by Dr. Schornstein of the Clinic for Child Study in which he agreed with the Parole and Review .Board of the Office of Youth Services. He recommended waiver to Adult Court.
"On March 6, Mr. Goodman, the attorney for Glynn Peters was given an opportunity to submit additional testimony and argument. He is an experienced attorney who had carefully protected the record on a number of matters where he challenged the admissibility of evidence.
"The Court stated the reasons for waiver as set forth in this memorandum. Mr. Goodman had a chance to examine and study all the files and records in the case including the Clinic report.
"This is a very clear-cut case for waiver. It is not a close decision. Obviously, if found guilty, Glynn Peters needs long term confinement.”
After preliminary examination in recorder’s court, defendant was bound over for trial on the charge of first-degree felony murder. Thereafter, a motion to suppress defendant’s confession was heard and denied as were motions to suppress a lineup identification and an anticipated in-court identification. A motion was also filed to quash the information on the basis of the alleged unconstitutionality of the waiver statute. This motion was likewise denied without prejudice to refiling after the rehearing of People v Fields, 388 Mich 66; 199 NW2d 217 (1972).
On October 26, 1972, defendant appeared in open court and pled guilty to the included offense *367of murder in the second degree. The transcript of the plea proceedings before the late Judge John R. Murphy is set forth at length in the appendix following this opinion.
Defendant was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed at 56 Mich App 305; 224 NW2d 65 (1974), holding that recorder’s court lacked jurisdiction in the matter by reason of our decisions in People v Fields, supra, adhered to on rehearing, 391 Mich 206; 216 NW2d 51 (1974). We reverse and reinstate defendant’s conviction.
I
We note first that in People v Fields, supra, the contested waiver of jurisdiction occurred in 1968, before the adoption of JCR 1969, 11. Therefore, the effect of the standards for waiver set forth in JCR 11 upon the question of lack of standards in the waiver statute was not before the Fields Court. Second, the argument advanced by defendant that this Court could not by court rule constitutionally insure procedural due process in the handling of juvenile waiver proceedings was rejected, at least by implication, even by the majority in Fields on rehearing:
"While this Court cannot enact substantive laws, it does have the authority to decide upon the procedures to be followed in the courts of this state. Such authority has been exercised by adopting the General Court Rules for courts of general jurisdiction, the District Court Rules for the district courts, and the Juvenile Court Rules. Being fully cognizant of the problems created by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Kent, supra [383 US 541; 86 S Ct 1045; 16 L Ed 2d 84 (1966)], and In re Gault, 387 US 1; 87 S Ct 1428; 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967), the Probate Court Committee of this *368Court, * * * undertook with the help of the probate judges, to insure procedural due process in the handling of juvenile court cases. Any question pertaining to JCR 1969, 11, is not before the Court in this case since it was not in effect at the time the action of the probate judge herein reviewed took place.” 391 Mich at 215-216.
Finally, we must express our disagreement with the holding of the majority opinion in Fields on rehearing, and our agreement with the reasoning of dissenting Justice Levin when he stated:
"There was and is no need to declare the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction provision unconstitutional. This Court has ample power, which it has exercised both decisionally and through rule making on countless occasions, to provide adequate standards to guide judges in reaching their decisions, and to make both the hearing process and appellate review meaningful.
"The judiciary of this state in establishing waiver criteria both before and after the decision in Kent v United States, 383 US 541; 86 S Ct 1045; 16 L Ed 2d 84 (1966), did precisely what judges have been doing for centuries — filling in gaps in a statute. Especially where power has been delegated to a court, it can frequently find the 'intelligible principle’ in its own jurisprudence and in the decisions of other courts dealing with like problems.” 391 Mich at 239-240. (Footnotes omitted.)
"While the courts have refused to allow Legislatures to impose nonjudicial functions on them, there is little support for the proposition that a legislative act which confers power on a court is constitutionally deficient because it lacks standards to guide the court in discharging its judicial duty. The standards test is a judicial safeguard against the action of administrative officials and agencies, not against judicial action.” 391 Mich at 244. (Footnote omitted.)
*369"The means of protecting juveniles who are improvidently waived to a court, of general criminal jurisdiction is appellate intervention. We can protect against unjustified discrimination in the exercise of the waiver power by encouraging the circuit courts and the Court of Appeals to exercise, and by ourselves exercising, thoughtful review on appeals from orders waiving jurisdiction. This means reading transcripts, weighing the testimony, scrutinizing the reasons advanced for ordering and sustaining the waiver, and, where unconvinced, unhesitating intervention.” 391 Mich at 251-252.
Our reading of the transcripts and the reasons advanced by the probate court in ordering waiver convinces us that jurisdiction was not improvidently waived and, in fact and as stated by the probate court, "[t]his is a very clear-cut case for waiver”. To the extent that People v Fields, supra, is not supportive of our decision today, it is overruled.
II
Defendant argues that (1) the probate court acted in violation of its role of parens patriae when it allowed him to go to police headquarters for evidentiary purposes, (2) that his confession at the conclusion of the polygraph examination would therefore have been inadmissible in a trial of him in adult court, and that (3) his plea of guilty on the advice of counsel to a reduced charge some 10 months later2 was the product of the allegedly inadmissible confession. He asks us to set aside the plea as involuntary. We need not reach the merits of defendant’s first two contentions in order to reject the third:
*370"[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258, 267; 93 S Ct 1602, 1608; 36 L Ed 2d 235 (1973).
Tollett reaffirmed the principle recognized in the 1970 Brady trilogy: Brady v United States, 397 US 742; 90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 747, McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763, Parker v North Carolina, 397 US 790; 90 S Ct 1458; 25 L Ed 2d 785. In Parker the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the guilty plea of a 15-year-old youth accused of burglary and rape was the involuntary product of a coerced confession:
"[B]ut we need not evaluate the voluntariness of petitioner’s confession since even if the confession should have been found involuntary, we cannot believe that the alleged conduct of the police during the interrogation period was of such a nature or had such enduring effect as to make involuntary a plea of guilty entered over a month later.” 397 US at 796.
See also People v Morris, 57 Mich App 573; 226 NW2d 565 (1975), leave denied 394 Mich 751 (1975).
The same arguments advanced by defendant in this Court in support of his assertion of an involuntary plea were made in the trial court on the motion to suppress. That motion was denied and defendant’s confession as well as other evidence was ruled admissible. On the advice of able counsel, defendant chose not to risk a trial on the *371greater charge and the possibility that an appellate court would uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling in the event of a conviction. A review of this record convinces us that "the advice he received was well within the range of competence required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases”. Parker, supra, 397 US at 797-798. A reading of the plea transcript manifests beyond peradventure that the trial court showed great sensitivity to the seriousness of defendant’s plea and questioned him at length concerning his guilt and the voluntariness of the plea before it was accepted. Parker, supra, 397 US at 816 (Brennan, J., concurring in Brady).
The Court of Appeals is reversed. Defendant’s conviction on his plea of guilty to murder in the second degree is reinstated.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, Coleman, Ltndemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.

 Defendant signs his name Glynn Peters, and the probate records so read. The Recorder’s Court and Court of Appeals refer to him as Glenn Peters.

 We note that defendant was 17 years of age at the time of his plea, and that he was 17 when jurisdiction was waived to Recorder’s Court.