Court Opinion

ID: 9586135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:35.710789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:21.236941
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
with whom BRYNER, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I. Introduction
In the face of CSED’s strong body of scientific, testimonial, and documentary evidence supporting a finding of paternity, Howard Meyer contested summary judgment with only his general denial of paternity. Pleading an inability to recall specific dates or details as to when he last had sexual contact with M.T., Meyer offered only his “belief’ that it was prior to the probable dates of conception. Because the Alaska legislature has expressed a policy goal of parental responsibility in creating a presumption of parentage when genetic tests establish a 95% probability of paternity, and because Meyer’s probability of paternity is 99.98%, his equivocal denial of paternity does not raise a genuine issue of fact. Where the putative father has the burden to rebut the presumption of paternity, a mere denial of paternity should not prevent the granting of summary judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
II. The Evidence Offered by Meyer to Oppose Summary Judgment
Meyer argues that the following responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for admission raise a genuine issue of fact in this case. First, in response to an interrogatory requesting the specific facts upon which Meyer intended to base his denial of paternity, Meyer replied that M.T. had “assured” him that she was taking birth control pills during the periods that they engaged in sexual relations. Second, Meyer stated that he “believed” that he had last had sexual intercourse with M.T. in 1991, more than nine months before N.G.T.’s December 26, 1992 birth.
Even this broad denial was not unequivocal. Indeed, Meyer prefaced his interrogatory responses by stating that “[d]ue to the passage of time, I am unable to recall each specific occasion when I have had contact with [M.T.]. For the same reasons, I am unable to recall the precise dates, times of day, locations and circumstances surrounding each such contact that I have had with her.” It was only under “these limitations” that Meyer stated his inconclusive denial. This is the full extent of Meyer’s proffered evidence opposing summary judgment.
Yet Meyer has not challenged CSED’s strong evidence supporting a paternity finding. He has not disputed M.T.’s hotel and telephone receipts that indicate that he had contact with M.T. at the time of conception. Nor has he challenged the specific date of conception that M.T. offered. Meyer has offered no evidence that M.T. had other sexual partners to controvert M.T.’s statement that Meyer was her sole sexual partner during the time of conception. The evidence offered by Meyer is thus insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact.

III.Alaska Civil Rule 56(e)

Alaska Civil Rule 56 highlights the concerns raised by such insubstantial responses to a summary judgment motion. Rule 56(e) states in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ad*370verse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
This rule clearly disapproves of Meyer’s reliance on equivocal denials of CSED’s factual allegations and his failure to offer any evidence affirmatively setting forth specific facts. While Meyer does present evidence outside of his pleadings, these responses amount to little more than a reiteration of his blanket denial of paternity in his answer.1
This court has affirmed summary judgment in other contexts where the nonmovant has provided only his own meager statements unsupported by other evidence. In Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co.,2 the issue on summary judgment was the date of an accident. The victim presented only his own deposition testimony as evidence that the accident occurred on a certain date, but the defendant presented authenticated hospital records indicating a different date. We held that the victim’s evidence did not “reasonably tend[ ] to dispute or contradict” the authenticated hospital records, and we therefore affirmed summary judgment.3 Similarly, in Martech Construction Co. v. Ogden Environmental Services, Inc.,4 we indicated that an affidavit from Martech’s president stating that Ogden agreed to purchase certain equipment, where no other evidence supported this “naked assertion,” would not suffice to raise a genuine issue of fact.5
In a case factually similar to the present one, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a general denial in the putative father’s opposition brief was not sufficient under Colorado’s analogous Rule 56(e) to defeat summary judgment.6 In People ex rel. J.M.A., the plaintiff moved for summary judgment where genetic tests indicated a 99.79% probability of paternity.7 In response, the putative father filed an opposition brief containing a general denial of paternity without affidavits or other supporting evidence.8 The court determined that this submission was equivalent to resting upon the mere denial in the answer and therefore failed under Rule 56(e) to “demonstrate by relevant and specific facts that a real controversy existed with regard to his paternity.”9
IV. The Public Policy Underpinning the Presumption of Paternity
Even if indefinite denials made outside of the pleadings may in some contexts suffice to withstand a summary judgment motion, such denials should not be adequate in the present context given the surrounding policy and statutory framework. Through AS 25.20.050(d), the legislature created a presumption of parentage that arises when certain scientific test results establish a probability of parentage of at least 95 percent.10 This presumption may be rebutted, but only by clear and convincing evidence.11 The legislature added this provision in 1984 with the explicit goal of “enhanc[ing] the efforts of those persons who seek to enforce the payment of child support obligations by noncustodial parents having the duty to support.”12 *371The legislature found that the failure to pay child support not only creates severe hardships for the children and families — often “lower-income, single-parent families [ ] headed by women” — but also has deleterious effects upon society at large, contributing to increased levels of public assistance payments, child abuse, and delinquency.13 By shifting and heightening the burden of proof, the legislature sent a clarion call that parents must be responsible for them obligations to them children.
In line with this policy, other jurisdictions have required the putative father to present more than mere denials of paternity to defeat a summary judgment motion. The Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. J.M.A. affirmed summary judgment where the putative father submitted an opposition brief which contained a general denial of paternity and failed to demonstrate by “relevant and specific facts” that paternity was genuinely at issue.14 And Illinois courts have enforced this public policy by consistently holding that a general denial of paternity without eviden-tiary support is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion where scientific testing has established the presumption of paternity.15
In the context of paternity cases, in which a blood test result raises the presumption of paternity, we too should properly effectuate the public policy of parental responsibility for children by requiring the putative father to present more than an equivocal general denial of paternity in order to defeat summary judgment.
V. Conclusion
In light of the disfavored use of general denials in opposing summary judgment as expressed in Rule 56(e) and the paramount importance of establishing paternity, thereby ensuring the financial support of children, I would hold that Meyer’s indefinite denial of paternity was inadequate to withstand CSED’s summary judgment motion.
Here, Meyer admitted having a sexual relationship with the mother and could not remember the precise details of this relationship. He presented nothing more than an equivocal denial of paternity, basing his belief that he did not have sexual intercourse with M.T. during the presumed period of conception on mere supposition rather than on actual recollection of any specific facts. In light of M.T.’s uncontroverted statement that Meyer was her sole sexual partner during the presumed period of conception, her documentary evidence of contact with Meyer in Anchorage during this period, and blood tests indicating a 99.98% probability of paternity, Meyer has failed to present any evidence that sets forth specific facts or challenges M.T.’s assertions. Meyer’s denial of paternity is simply not enough to raise a genuine issue of fact for purposes of Rule 56(e), and I would therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

. Cf. Western Pioneer v. Harbor Enters., 818 P.2d 654, 657 (Alaska 1991) (discounting nonmovant's testimony in support of opposition to a summary judgment motion where it "reflect[ed] only a restatement of his position in [the] litigation”).

. 803 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1990).

. Id. (quoting State, Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 606 n. 32 (Alaska 1978)).

. 852 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1993).

. Id. at 1149-50 n. 7. The dissent agreed that "sometimes testimony may be so internally inconsistent and in conflict with the apparently reliable evidence offered by the proponent of a summary judgment motion that it may not serve to create a genuine issue of material fact and thus defeat summary judgment.” Id. at 1156 n. 1 (Matthews, J., dissenting).

. See People ex rel. J.M.A., 803 P.2d 187, 193 (Colo.1990).

. Id. at 192 (applying 6A Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-25-126(1)(e)(IV) (West 1987)).

. See id. at 193.

. Id.

. AS 25.20.050(d).

. See id.

. See ch. 144, §§ 1(b), 4, SLA 1984.

. Ch. 144, § 1, SLA 1984.

. 803 P.2d at 193.

. In Illinois, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 45/11 (West 1993) permits genetic testing results to create a rebuttable presumption of paternity. See People ex rel. Hughes v. Walker, 278 Ill.App.3d 116, 214 Ill.Dec. 823, 662 N.E.2d 177 (1996) (affirming summary judgment where putative father did not deny having sexual intercourse during probable time of conception, but stated, without corroborating evidence, that the mother had sexual relations with unidentified man); People ex rel. Black v. Neby, 265 Ill.App.3d 203, 202 Ill.Dec. 630, 638 N.E.2d 276 (1994) (affirming summary judgment where putative father opposed motion by stating that he was not in Illinois during month of conception despite plaintiff's production of traffic ticket issued to him in Illinois city of mother’s residence); Breese v. Dewey, 223 Ill.App.3d 356, 165 Ill.Dec. 490, 584 N.E.2d 924 (1991) (affirming summary judgment where putative father flatly denied paternity, but pled insufficient memory or knowledge with respect to all other relevant questions); Cf. In re Paternity of Smith, 179 IIl.App.3d 473, 128 Ill.Dec. 487, 534 N.E.2d 669 (1989) (reversing summary judgment grant where putative father not only denied paternity but also produced supporting documentary and testimonial evidence).