Court Opinion

ID: 9570353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:36.393043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:49.401076
License: Public Domain

ROYIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that a discovery rule is applicable to wrongful death claims, and therefore a wrongful death claim must be filed within two years from the date the alleged negligence resulting in death is discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered, or within one year from such death, whichever is later. Maj. op. at 643. The plain language of the statute admits no such discovery rule. Moreover, the legislative history of the statute and the judicial precedent relied upon by the majority do not support the majority’s construction of the statute and the conclusion arrived at.
I.
The statute of limitation applicable to the present case provides that:
All actions [seeking damages for death by negligence] shall be brought within two years from the commission of the alleged negligence resulting in the death for which suit is brought or within one year after the death for which suit is brought, whichever is later.
§ 13-21-204, 6 C.R.S. (Supp.1985).
We must give effect to the statute as written, and “[fjorced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretation should never be resorted to where the language is plain, its meaning is clear, and no absurdity is involved.” Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973).
Our earlier opinions interpreting predecessor wrongful death statutes consistently held that the statute of limitations begins running, at the latest, when the decedent suffers the injury that ultimately causes his death. In those cases, we made no reference to any discovery rule. See Ferrari v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136, 522 P.2d 105 (1974) (dictum); DeCaire v. Public Service Co., 173 Colo. 402, 479 P.2d 964 (1971); Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.2d 897 (1953); Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).
The first application of the discovery rule to the wrongful death statute of limitations in Colorado came in the court of appeals’ opinion in Crownover v. Gleichman, 38 *645Colo.App. 96, 554 P.2d 313 (1976), aff'd, 194 Colo. 48, 574 P.2d 497 (1977):
[W]e hold that the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action begins to run on the date the damage or injury arising from the commission of the alleged negligence from which death later results becomes known or by reasonable care could have been discovered.
38 Colo.App. at 98, 554 P.2d at 315.
A close reading of that opinion reveals, however, that the discovery rule the court announced was an unjustified expansion of the holdings in the cases cited above. The issue before the court of appeals was whether the decedent’s initial injury or his death started the running of the statute of limitations: on the facts before it, it was irrelevant whether the limitations period began running at the time of the decedent’s initial injury or only at his discovery thereof. The court’s invocation of a discovery rule was therefore unnecessary, and it plainly was at odds with our decision in DeCaire.
We granted certiorari in Crownover on the limited issue of:
[Wjhether the statute of limitations, section 13-21-204, runs from the date of death or from the wrongful act, neglect, or default which resulted in the death.
In answering that question we relied on our prior decisions and noted that if an action is not filed within two years after the commission of the alleged negligence which resulted in death, then the action is barred, Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.2d 897 (1953). We also pointed out that in DeCaire v. Public Service Co., 173 Colo. 402, 479 P.2d 964 (1971), we held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant has been injured or damaged by the alleged negligence.
After noting that the physician’s negligent failure to diagnose the victim’s cancer in Crownover became known when the deceased later underwent surgery but the complaint was not filed until more than two years after the “discovery” of the negligence, we concluded that:
[Wjithout torturing the language of the statute, it is difficult to see how one could interpret the language of the statute to mean anything other than what it says — “all actions ... shall be brought within two years from the commission of the alleged negligence resulting in the death for which suit is brought.” ...
194 Colo, at 51, 574 P.2d at 499, quoting § 13-21-204, 6 C.R.S. (1973). The majority tortures the language of the statute and misconstrues our opinion in Crownover when it states that in Crownover we concluded that the period of limitations began to run not at the time of death but at the time of discovery of the alleged negligence. Maj. op. at 642.
The “language” to which Crownover referred is identical to the language we are asked to interpret today. The present statute states, quite simply, that the limitations period begins running on the date of the “commission of the alleged negligence”; it makes no reference whatsoever to the plaintiff’s discovery of that negligence.
The legislature has demonstrated its ability to include a discovery rule in a statute of limitations, as is evident from the statute that requires that certain malpractice suits be:
[Instituted within two years after the [plaintiff] discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discovered, the injury.
§ 13-21-204, 6 C.R.S. (Supp.1985). See also § 13-80-109, 6 C.R.S. (1973) (“Bills for relief on the ground of fraud shall be filed within three years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such fraud, and not afterward.”). Had the legislature intended that a similar rule apply to wrongful death claims, it surely would have expressed that intent by adopting exact and appropriate language. I thus have trouble understanding how the statute can be read except as commencing the limitation period on the date of the defendant’s commission of the negligence.
As we explained in DeCaire, negligence is not actionable until it causes some harm to the victim; as a consequence, “negligence” as used in the statute includes not only the wrongful conduct by the defendant, but also some injury arising therefrom. 173 Colo, at 407, 479 P.2d at 966. *646The statute of limitations begins running, therefore, when the defendant’s alleged wrongful act or omission causes some injury to the victim which later results in death.
That reading is consistent with the operation of the wrongful death statute, which permits recovery:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof....
§ 13-21-202, 6 C.R.S. (1973). The statute requires that the cause of the death be some conduct for which the decedent could have brought suit had he lived. Similarly, the statute of limitations commences running at the time at which the decedent could have brought suit had he lived.
II.
The majority does not explain its interpretation of the statute directly, but instead relies on the purported affirmation of the discovery rule in Crownover. As explained above, I do not agree that Crown-over recognized that a discovery rule is applicable to the wrongful death statute,1 and we should attribute no more meaning to the Crownover decision than was necessary to its result.
Moreover, the majority relies in part on its perception that the legislature understood Crownover as applying a discovery rule. When the legislature amended the limitations period to permit the filing of suit up to one year following the victim’s death, it did not change that part of the statute we interpreted in Crownover, and thus was apparently satisfied with our reading. I agree, in principle, that the legislature’s approval of settled case law may be inferred from its choice not to amend the relevant portion of the statute of limitations. See Crownover, 194 Colo, at 51, 574 P.2d at 499; Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 117, 371 P.2d 422, 426 (1962). In this case, however, we do not need to resort to such rules to discern the legislature’s intent: its intent is expressed plainly in the statute itself.
Moreover, the legislature’s understanding of Crownover was apparently different from the majority's. The sponsor of the amendment, Representative Speltz, explained:
There are several cases that there have been different decisions on, in both the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals. And the problem being that there is now a case in Colorado Springs where the lady had to sue for the wrongful death of her husband before he died because the original statute says that you cannot sue after two years after the commission of the alleged negligence.
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... the choice we have is to go on one side and say: Okay, you have a certain amount of time, period, and leave it to the plaintiffs to bring it up; or you can go somewhere in the middle, which I *647hope we’ve done, and say two years after the commission or one year after the death.
Hearing on H.B. 1⅛39 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (Feb. 27,1979). The majority mentions that the legislature referred to the Crownover case by name, but even then former Representative Safran, explaining the House amendment, was unclear about Crownover’s holding:
What happened in the Crownover case that you were talking about is that a person did bring an action during the time that he had available for personal injury, but died more than two years after the date of the injury, and they didn’t allow his family to recover in a wrongful death action.
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... [the] Speltz [bill] says two years from the date of the negligent act or one year from the date of death, whichever occurs later.
Hearing on H.B. 1⅛39 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (April 27, 1979). In any event, nothing in the legislative history indicates that the legislature had a discovery rule in mind, or that it believed Crownover applied such a rule.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. In DeCaire v. Public Service Co., 173 Colo. 402, 479 P.2d 964 (1971), we held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the decedent suffered the injury from which death resulted. Justice Carrigan dissented from the majority opinion of the supreme court in Crownover, and Judge Smith dissented from the majority opinion in the court of appeals. Both understood the respective majorities to follow DeCaire, which clearly invoked no discovery rule.
On the other hand, the majority in Crownover discussed the facts and concluded:
In the instant case the injury or damage from Dr. Kennedy’s alleged negligence was known or should have been known on April 26, 1972, when the deceased underwent surgery and the doctors discovered large areas of cancerous tissue in her chest. It was not until Novem-her 13, 1974, that Dr. Kennedy was served with a summons, more than two years from the "discovery" of the alleged negligence. See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
Even if the Crownover majority meant to invoke the discovery rule its reliance on Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), was misplaced. Owens applied a discovery rule to medical malpractice claims. Its holding was based on the legislature’s use of the undefined term “such cause of action accrued” to commence the running of the statute of limitations, and our interpretation of that language as adopting a discovery rule relied heavily on our conclusion that “the word ‘accrued’ should be equated with the ‘discovery rule’ ”. 172 Colo, at 530, 474 P.2d at 606.