Court Opinion

ID: 9734466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:35:44.686842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:48.924976
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting). This case is one of first impression. We are asked to determine whether a school administrator acquires tenure when that person begins serving under a written contract with a tenure exclusion clause and in later school years continues to serve without any written contract. The majority opinion holds that school administrators in such a setting do not acquire ten*335ure. While we agree with the discussion found in parts I to III of the opinion, we disagree with the majority’s conclusion in part IV that the Legislature intended MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2) to be interpreted "to give continuing effect to an original written contract that is neither renewed nor abrogated over the course of several years”.
To resolve this question, this Court, in effect, must reconcile and give consistent interpretation to a pair of statutory provisions which regulate the issue in the instant cases. MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2) provides that:
"The board may employ assistant superintendents, principals, assistant principals, guidance directors, and other administrators who do not assume tenure in position, for terms, not to exceed 3 years, fixed by the board and shall define their duties. The employment shall be under written contract. Notification of nonre-newal of contract shall be given in writing at least 60 days before the contract termination date or the contract is renewed for an additional 1-year period.” (Emphasis added.)
In addition, MCL 38.91; MSA 15.1991, a provision in the teacher tenure act, states in part that:
"After the satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a teacher shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the probationary period has been completed, and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act. If the controlling board shall provide in a contract of employment of any teacher employed other than as a classroom teacher, including but not limited to, a superintendent, assistant superintendent, principal, department head or director of curriculum, made with such teacher after the completion of the probationary period, that such teacher shall not be deemed to be granted continuing tenure in such capacity by virtue of such contract of *336employment, then such teacher shall not be granted tenure in such capacity, but shall be deemed to have been granted continuing tenure as an active classroom teacher in such school district. ” (Emphasis added.)
From these two provisions, it is easy to list the requirements that a school board must meet in setting the terms of an employment contract with a school administrator. First, MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2) places a burden on the school district, which employs the type of administrators listed in this provision, to provide for employment terms under a written contract. Second, the teacher tenure act in MCL 38.91; MSA 15.1991 requires a school district that wishes to deny administrative tenure to expressly deny that tenure in a written contract made with "any teacher employed other than a classroom teacher”. Third, to protect school administrators from "arbitrary and capricious” action by the school district, the district must notify an administrator of nonre-newal of a presumably written contract in writing "at least 60 days before the contract termination date or the contract is renewed for an additional 1-year period”. MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2). See, also, MCL 380.132(3); MSA 15.4132(3).
In effect, a simple reading of these two statutes leads us to believe that the Legislature has placed an affirmative duty upon a school district to provide a written contract to an administrator, since the intent of the Legislature is to allow school districts great flexibility in making decisions about which administrators are to be given tenured status. In short, if the school districts in the instant cases had provided the mandatory written contracts, the requirements of these two provisions would have been fulfilled and, hence, there would be no dispute. See Bode v Roseville School Dist, *337405 Mich 517, 527-528; 275 NW2d 472 (1979); Dodge v Saginaw Bd of Ed, 384 Mich 346, 347-348; 183 NW2d 197 (1971); Street v Ferndale Bd of Ed, 361 Mich 82, 86-87; 104 NW2d 748 (1960); Goodwin v Kalamazoo Bd of Ed, 82 Mich App 559, 568; 267 NW2d 142 (1978).
The key question in this issue is the proper interpretation to be given the following language found in MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2):
"Notification of nonrenewal of contract shall be given in writing at least 60 days before the contract termination date or the contract is renewed for an additional 1-year period.”
The majority opinion states that this language is "susceptible of either interpretation”. Notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature explicitly requires a written contract in the same provision, the majority chooses to legislate by reading the act affirmatively in that this language "can fairly be read to provide that continuous renewals can result from a failure to give notification of .nonre-newal”.
It is uncontested that this language was enacted to protect school administrators from "arbitrary and capricious conduct” by school districts. See MCL 380.132(3); MSA 15.4132(3). Thus, we cannot agree that, where a school district once fails in its mandatory duty to sign an administrator to a written contract, this extension clause serves "to protect the teacher from the vagaries that attend employment under an oral contract of uncertain terms”. Such an interpretation of this language is not fair to the administrator whom the Legislature decided to protect in enacting these provisions.
We agree with the majority opinion that the teacher tenure act is a remedial statute adopted *338"to protect indirectly the public interest by protecting directly the rights of teachers”. However, the majority’s interpretation of this extension clause accomplishes what the Legislature attempted to prevent in enacting these two provisions. In short, the extension clause, as interpreted by the majority opinion, does not "protect the teacher from the vagaries that attend employment under an oral contract of uncertain terms”. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals analysis in McKee v Woodhaven Public Schools, 100 Mich App 195, 201-202; 298 NW2d 881 (1980), where the Court stated that:
"An affirmative duty is placed by the statutes upon the school district to provide a written contract.
"Such a burden conforms with the language of MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2). The provision clearly requires a written contract between school districts and administrators. To allow a board to circumvent this clear language by construing the next sentence of the statute to allow continuing implied contracts is to render the requirement of a written contract meaningless. Every applicable version of the statute states, unambiguously, '[t]he employment shall be under written contract’. MCL 380.132(2); MSA 15.4132(2), superseding MCL 340.66; MSA 15.3066.
"The provision which follows in the statute providing for automatic renewal for a one-year period is a protection for employees from arbitrary action by the board. At the expiration date of a written contract it provides to the employee a right to a contract renewal for an additional one-year period if written notification of nonrenewal is not given as provided by statute. The statutory provision relating to renewal of the written contract 'for an additional 1-year period’ is phrased in the singular rather than plural. If the contract is renewed between the parties, whether by the automatic renewal provision of the statute or through an express new written contract, the employee has such status as *339an administrator as is provided for by the governing written contract.
"In the instant case it should be noted that construction of the statute to apply successive one-year renewals of the original contract is inconsistent with the facts as found by the Tenure Commission. The terms of McKee’s employment, including his position in the administrative structure, responsibilities and compensation, had been altered drastically over the years. Under such circumstances it is illogical to assert that the original contract remained in effect.”
For the reasons stated, we would reverse the judgment of the Macomb Circuit Court in Smiley and would affirm the judgment of the Ingham Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals in McKee. No costs, a public question being involved.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.