Court Opinion

ID: 9597575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:00:31.882392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:37.860355
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree that there was ample properly admitted evidence to support the finding that defendant murdered Mrs. Roberts wilfully, deliberately, and with premeditated intent to kill, and I find no miscarriage of justice. However, I'disagree with the holding that in the circumstances of this case Dr. Paxton was properly allowed to testify, in answer to the question, ‘ ‘ assuming that the bullet you took from the body . . . had come from a .32 c-aliber Colt automatic pistol, do you have an opinion as to whether or not that pistol could have been held by the deceased at the time the trigger was pulled and the gun was discharged?” that "I have an opinion . . . This would be a very unusual pattern for a self-inflicted wound.” It seems obvious to me that the pertinent question here is not whether it was usual or unusual for persons who kill themselves to do so by shooting themselves in the manner in which deceased was shot, but whether this particular woman inflicted this particular wound upon herself. It appears to me that the doctor’s testimony as to the frequencies of occurrences of this kind of wound and of other binds of wounds among other persons committing suicide is irrelevant to any issue here.
The doctor (whose qualifications as a pathologist are not disputed) described the course taken by the bullet, indicated it on a photograph of deceased and sketched it on a blackboard. The bullet entered the body "anteriorally and laterally in the left chest” between the third and fourth ribs, traveled up through the heart and upper lobe of the right lung, and struck and shattered the humerus of the right arm about three inches below the shoulder joint.
Before the jury the prosecuting attorney asked, in various forms, if the doctor had an opinion as to whether the wound could have been self-inflicted. This might have been a proper *109approach if a sufficient factual foundation had been laid; but such foundation had not been established, and, .as subsequently appeared, did not exist. Béfense counsel objected, and said, “I feel this is going into a matter that is for the jury to decide, and not called upon for any expert witness’ testimony. I don’t believe there has been any foundation or ground showing this doctor is an expert, whether a wound can be self-inflicted or whether inflicted by some other agency.” (Italics added.) This objection raised, although not in a particularly apt manner, the question whether a sufficient factual foundation had been laid upon which this doctor or any doctor could be qualified to give an opinion that this woman could or could not have shot herself in the fashion in which she was shot. The prosecuting attorney said, “We feel the doctor is qualified, having seen this body; he has noticed the length of the arms of the deceased person and . . . has already testified to her obesity and so forth and so on; we feel he is in a position to tell us whether he thinks that person could have discharged a pistol into her own person as to cause this wound.” But as hereinafter shown the.doctor himself established the facts showing want of foundation for formation of an opinion entitled to be received as “expert opinion” on the pertinent issue.
There was further argument on the question outside the presence of the jury, during which defense counsel correctly pointed out that “as far as the testimony as to the length of the arm, or anything like that, those facts are not yet in evidence.” The trial court commented, “if the question "of death of this woman depends solely . . . [on] the expert or opinion testimony of Dr. Paxton, they would be on very weak ground. However, I am making no ruling on that at this time. I am now overruling the objection, however.... The value will go . to the jury, its weight. You of course will have full opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Paxton in that respect.” This ruling, in my opinion, was error because the prosecution had not adduced evidence upon which the doctor could be qualified to either form or express an opinion that the wound in this case could or could not have been self-inflicted.
Before the jury the doctor then testified on direct examination that “This would be a very unusual pattern for a self-inflicted wound”; that he did not know whether deceased was right-handed or left-handed, but that (indicating upon himself with the pistol which inflicted the wound) it would be *110difficult to inflict such a wound upon himself with either hand. It appears to me that in the absence of showing some similarity or defined dissimilarity between the doctor’s and the decedent’s pertinent capabilities, the doctor’s testimony concerning himself would be immaterial. On cross-examination the doctor testified that he had not measured the deceased’s arms. The basis of the doctor’s opinion that the wound was not self-inflicted was then brought out: he had examined by autopsy “perhaps twenty people” who died from gunshot wounds and seen “numerable cases in the emergency hospitals which I have worked in”; “I can form an opinion from my past experiences in examining the suicidal victims . . . and I would say that ninety percent of the suicidal victims I have examined have shot themselves in the head . . . And a majority of those are in the right temple . . . The next most common site is through the mouth . . . The next most common site is an attempt at the heart . . . and I have never seen one in this position. . . . The location in my opinion indicates that this is not self-inflicted.”
The basis of the doctor’s opinion as expressed in his testimony shows that there was not adequate factual foundation for, and that he was not qualified to express, the opinion above quoted. It was of no concern to the jury, and not helpful to them, to know that “ninety percent of the suicidal victims” examined by Dr. Paxton had “shot themselves in the head” rather than shot themselves in certain other places or, it may be interpolated, had jumped off bridges or hit themselves over the head with axes. The case here concerned the woman who did die from the wound in the chest described above. The question for the jury was whether that particular wound was inflicted by decedent or by another person. Since the prosecution had not, before the doctor gave his opinion, shown a factual base upon which the doctor as a pathologist could intelligently and reasonably form and support the opinion that the wound here involved was not self-inflicted,1 that opinion should not have been received in evidence. The error of receiving it became more apparent when on his cross-examination it developed that he had no basis for an opinion that this particular woman could not have shot herself as she was shot. However, as stated above, it does not appear to me, *111from an examination of the entire record, that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly I concur in the judgment and, generally, in the other propositions of law discussed in the opinion of the Chief Justice.

The evidence contains no suggestion that the doctor was acquainted with the decedent in her lifetime and knew her character as evidencing a propensity to commit an act such as suicide in a conventional rather than unusual manner.