Court Opinion

ID: 9741744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:01:15.620289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.537722
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
concurring in result with separate opinion.
I concur in result.
While I agree that generally, time is not of the essence in proving a criminal offense, it “becomes of the essence after the invocation of the alibi statute.” Quillen v. State, 271 Ind. 251, 391 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1979); see also Baggett v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1244 (Ind.1987); Evans v. State, 224 Ind. 428, 68 N.E.2d 546 (1946).
As the majority indicates, the State’s answer alleged that the offenses occurred between February 9 and 11. “[T]he filing of an alibi defense does make the time of the alleged offense of the essence, ... [and] the effect of the State’s answer to the notice of alibi is to restrict the State to proof of the date in the answer.” Jennings v. State, 514 N.E.2d 836, 837 (Ind.1987) (citations omitted). Thus, the State had the burden to prove that the offenses occurred on or between the dates specified. “Where the State at trial restricts its proof to the time frame within the information or within its answer to the notice of alibi, it has met its obligation under Ind.Code Sec. 35-36^4-2.” Stewart v. State, 521 N.E.2d 675, 676-77 (Ind.1988).
Here, the State did not restrict its proof to the time frame within its answer, February 9 to February 11. However, in order for the State to meet its burden, it is not a requirement that all the evidence presented indicates the offenses occurred within these dates. The question here is simply the sufficiency of the evidence: Was there sufficient evidence presented to prove that Sangsland committed the offenses between February 9 and 11? On this question, I agree with the majority that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, while I believe that time was of the essence of the offenses, the State met its burden of proof in convicting Sangsland.