Court Opinion

ID: 9880711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 15:07:04.044119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:22.230084
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                             TO BE PUBLISHED

          Supreme Court of Kentucky
                      2022-SC-0423-WC

FRANCISCO RODARTE                                   APPELLANT

              ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                    NO. 2022-CA-0239
               WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                      NO. WC-18-64352

BLUELINX CORPORATION;                               APPELLEES
HONORABLE JOHNATHAN R.
WEATHERBY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD

                           AND

                      2022-SC-0428-WC

FRANCISCO RODARTE                                   APPELLANT

              ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                    NO. 2021-CA-1473
               WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                      NO. WC-16-98428

BLUELINX CORPORATION;                               APPELLEES
HONORABLE DOUGLAS WAYNE GOTT,
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD

          OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT

                        AFFIRMING
      Francisco Rodarte (Rodarte) appeals a ruling of the Court of Appeals that

addressed two separate appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Board (the

Board). Rodarte sustained two work-related injuries while working for

BlueLinx Corporation (BlueLinx): a knee and ankle injury in 2016 and a

shoulder injury in 2018. In 2019, Rodarte filed an application for resolution of

a claim (Form 101) for his knee and ankle injuries. At that time, Rodarte was

receiving total temporary disability (TTD) and medical benefits for his shoulder

and had not yet filed a Form 101 for that injury. Rodarte and BlueLinx

ultimately entered into a Form 110 agreement as to compensation (settlement

agreement) for Rodarte’s knee and ankle injuries. The settlement agreement

did not include language regarding Rodarte’s 2018 shoulder injury.

      Eleven months after the settlement agreement was entered, Rodarte

reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) for his shoulder injury and

stopped receiving benefits. He filed a Form 101 for his shoulder injury three

months later. BlueLinx denied his shoulder claim, arguing that it was barred

pursuant to KRS1 342.270 due to his failure to join it to the 2016 claim.

Rodarte then filed a motion to reopen the 2016 claim based on a mutual

mistake of fact, asserting that both parties had intended to join the shoulder

injury to the settlement agreement. Chief Administrative Law Judge Douglas

Gott (CALJ Gott) denied the motion to reopen. Thereafter, ALJ Johnathan

Weatherby (ALJ Weatherby) dismissed Rodarte’s shoulder claim, finding that

      1 Kentucky Revised Statute.

                                           2
his failure to join his shoulder claim to the 2016 claim rendered his shoulder

claim waived under KRS 342.270. Rodarte appealed the respective rulings.

      In separate opinions, the Board affirmed CALJ Gott’s denial of Rodarte’s

motion to reopen and reversed ALJ Weatherby’s ruling that his shoulder claim

was barred due to failure to join. Rodarte and BlueLinx each filed appeals.

The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and a split panel affirmed the

Board in part and reversed it in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

Board’s ruling on the motion to reopen but reversed its determination that

Rodarte’s shoulder claim was not barred for failure to join and reinstated ALJ

Weatherby’s order denying the 2018 claim. After review, we affirm the Court of

Appeals in full.

               I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Rodarte is a fifty-five-year-old male with an eleventh-grade education.

He began working for BlueLinx as a truck driver in 2015. On January 5, 2016,

Rodarte fell from a flatbed truck while trying to tighten a ratchet strap, tearing

the meniscus in his right knee and spraining his left ankle. His meniscus was

surgically repaired on July 19, 2016. After he recovered from knee surgery, he

returned to work at BlueLinx on March 25, 2017. Over a year later, on August

13, 2018, Rodarte sustained a superior labrum anterior-posterior (SLAP) tear

in his right shoulder while tightening a ratchet strap. He began receiving TTD

and medical benefits for his shoulder injury the next day. Three months later

in November 2018, Rodarte underwent his first shoulder surgery to repair the

SLAP tear.

                                            3
      On March 11, 2019, Rodarte filed a Form 101 for his knee and ankle

injuries under claim number 2016-98428 (2016 claim). On October 7, 2019,

Rodarte and BlueLinx entered into a settlement agreement for his 2016 claim.

The settlement agreement was approved by ALJ Roland Case on the same date.

Rodarte did not file a motion to join his shoulder injury to his 2016 claim, and

the settlement agreement accordingly did not include language excluding his

2018 shoulder injury. A month after the settlement agreement was entered,

Rodarte underwent a second shoulder surgery; he was still reporting pain and

decreased strength following the first surgery and a physician had opined that

revision surgery was needed.2 When the settlement agreement for the 2016

claim was entered Rodarte was still receiving TTD benefits and medical benefits

for his shoulder injury, which BlueLinx continued to pay until September 14,

2020, when he reached MMI.

      Thereafter, on December 4, 2020, Rodarte filed a Form 101 for his

shoulder injury under claim number 2018-64352 (2018 claim). In January

2021, BlueLinx filed a Form 111 notice of claim denial. BlueLinx denied the

claim based, in part, on its contention that the 2018 claim was waived in

accordance with KRS 342.270(1) due to Rodarte’s failure to join it to the 2016

claim. That statute provides in relevant part:

      If the parties fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation
      under this chapter, either party may make written application for

      resolution of claim. . . . When the application is filed by the
      employee or during the pendency of that claim, he or she shall join

      2 BlueLinx paid for both of Rodarte’s shoulder surgeries.

                                              4
      all causes of action against the named employer which have
      accrued and which are known, or should reasonably be known, to
      him or her. Failure to join all accrued causes of action will result
      in such claims being barred under this chapter as waived by the
      employee.3

Rodarte then attempted to alter the settlement agreement by filing a motion to

reopen the 2016 claim under KRS 342.125, which states that

         (1) Upon motion by any party or upon an administrative law
             judge's own motion, an administrative law judge may reopen
             and review any award or order on any of the following
             grounds:

            (a) Fraud;

            (b) Newly-discovered evidence which could not have
                been discovered with the exercise of due diligence;

            (c) Mistake; and

            (d) Change of disability as shown by objective medical
                evidence of worsening or improvement of
                impairment due to a condition caused by the injury
                since the date of the award or order.

Rodarte argued that the 2016 claim should be reopened due to a “mistake”: he

asserted that both parties intended to include language in the settlement

agreement that excluded his shoulder injury, and that their failure to do so was

a “clerical error.” Rodarte also filed a motion to amend the settlement

agreement and correct the omission nunc pro tunc as well as a motion to void

the settlement agreement for mutual mistake of fact. Rodarte’s motion to

reopen was assigned to CALJ Gott under the original 2016 claim number,

      3 KRS 342.270(1).

                                           5
2016-98428, while his 2018 claim and BlueLinx’s corresponding joinder

defense was addressed by ALJ Weatherby under claim number 2018-64352.

     On July 1, 2021, CALJ Gott entered an order denying Rodarte’s motion

to re-open the 2016 claim. He reasoned:

     Rodarte wants the CALJ to issue an order to retroactively say that
     the settlement of the 2016 claim in 2019 had no effect on the
     separate 2018 injury claim pending between the same parties.

     The CALJ finds no basis for this argument. Rodarte says, “It is
     clear there was no intent by either party to settle the 2018 claim”
     in the settlement of the 2016 injury. But that’s not the point.
     BlueLinx’s defense in the 2018 claim is that Rodarte failed to join
     that claim to the 2016 claim before the Form 110 was approved,
     and therefore the 2018 claim is barred. It is up to the ALJ in the
     2018 claim to decide whether the joinder defense applies. Rodarte
     cites no authority to allow this CALJ to reopen a claim to add
     language to a settlement agreement in order to protect the viability
     of a separate claim.

     Rodarte’s alternative motion to amend the prior Form 110 is
     denied for these same reasons. [. . .]

     Rodarte’s subsequent pleading grounding his motion to reopen in
     mutual mistake is also without merit. . . . Interestingly, Rodarte
     does not claim any mistake on his part, but says “[BlueLinx] was
     clearly mistaken” in not preserving his 2018 shoulder claim in the
     2019 settlement agreement. [BlueLinx] concedes no such thing, so
     there cannot be a mutual mistake. The fact that [BlueLinx]
     continued to pay benefits under the 2018 shoulder claim is
     immaterial. Further, [BlueLinx] had to weigh the consequences of
     terminating benefits if the joinder defense is unsuccessful.

     [. . .]

     Finally, as BlueLinx notes, Rodarte does not seek reopening of the
     2016 claim to modify the benefits he received from that settlement;
     he only seeks to change the effect of the closed 2016 claim on the
     pending 2018 claim. That is not a basis for reopening under KRS
     342.125.

                                          6
Rodarte thereafter filed a petition for reconsideration (PFR), which was denied.

In denying the PFR, CALJ Gott again emphasized a lack of mutual mistake as

well as a lack of an obligation on BlueLinx’s part to ensure Rodarte’s shoulder

claim was preserved. The CALJ also noted that it was Rodarte’s decision to

settle his knee and ankle claims before his shoulder claim was ready for

negotiations, and that in the absence of an express agreement by both parties

to preserve the 2018 claim, the CALJ lacked the ability to re-open the 2016

claim.

         The following month, ALJ Weatherby dismissed Rodarte’s 2018 claim.

The ALJ made the following conclusions in support of his ruling:

         11. The undisputed facts in this matter indicate [Rodarte] suffered
         an onset of pain while working for [BlueLinx] on August 13, 2018,
         reported an injury, and received [TTD] benefits as a result thereof.

         12. It is also undisputed that [Rodarte] settled a prior claim against
         the same employer on October 7, 2019, for an injury that occurred
         in 2016.

         13. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Ridge v. VWV Enterprises,
         Inc., 114 S.W.3d 845 (Ky. 2003), said the language of KRS
         342.270(1) is clear and unequivocal, and mandatory. Ridge
         involved almost identical facts including two sequential but
         different injuries suffered in the employ of the same defendant.
         The court reasoned that once a claim was made for the first injury,
         KRS 342.270(1) required him to join the claim for the second
         injury prior to settling the first.

         14. [Rodarte] has argued that the failure to join the instant claim
         was due to a mistake or in the alternative that the language barrier
         prevented his understanding of the joinder requirement.

         15. [Rodarte] however testified he understood the origin of the
         [TTD] and medical benefits he received due to the 2018 injury. [. .
         .]

                                              7
      16. The ALJ therefore finds [Rodarte] failed to join this cause of
      action as required by KRS 342.270(1), that the claim had accrued,
      and that he knew or should have reasonably known of the
      requirement due to his representation by competent, English-
      speaking, legal counsel.4

      Rodarte filed separate appeals with the Board regarding each adverse

ruling. On November 19, 2021, the Board addressed Rodarte’s appeal from

CALJ Gott’s denial of his motion to reopen. Rodarte again argued that the

2016 claim should have been reopened based on mutual mistake of fact: he

asserted that he was mistaken in not including language joining the 2018

claim to the settlement agreement, and that BlueLinx was mistaken because it

continued to pay TTD and medical benefits for his shoulder injury for eleven

months after the settlement agreement was approved.

      A unanimous Board panel rejected Rodarte’s arguments and affirmed the

CALJ. The Board reasoned that Rodarte did not identify any “mistake

regarding the settlement agreement as it applies to the 2016 injury claim[,]”

and that the only mistake alleged concerned solely the 2018 claim. Moreover,

Rodarte had presented no evidence whatsoever indicating that the parties

intended the settlement agreement to contain language preserving his shoulder

injury. The Board further discussed that the “payment of benefits in the 2018

claim after the settlement [had] no bearing on the 2016 claim.” Finally, it

noted that “the facts in the case sub judice are indistinguishable from Ridge,”

and that the CALJ properly determined that Rodarte’s motion to reopen was an

      4 BlueLinx filed a PFR from this ruling that is not material to this appeal that

was granted. Rodarte did not file a PFR.

                                               8
improper attempt to use the 2016 injury claim to cure a perceived failure

regarding the 2018 claim.

      However, a few months later in February 2022, the Board unanimously

reversed ALJ Weatherby’s dismissal of Rodarte’s 2018 claim. The Board held

that KRS 342.270(1)’s compulsory joinder requirement was not applicable

because Rodarte’s shoulder claim had not yet accrued when the settlement

agreement was entered. It reasoned:

      In the case sub judice, there is no dispute that after the 2018
      injury, Rodarte immediately began drawing TTD benefits and
      shortly thereafter underwent surgery on November 27, 2018. The
      undated Form 110 in the 2016 claim was approved by ALJ Case by
      order dated October 7, 2019. At that time, Rodarte had not filed a
      claim for the 2018 injury presumably because he was receiving
      TTD benefits and was still recovering from the November 2018
      surgery. The parties’ stipulation establishes that at the time the
      Form 110 was approved in [the 2016 claim], Rodarte was still
      drawing TTD benefits. Further, he underwent another surgery one
      month after the settlement agreement in the 2016 claim was
      approved. Thus, at the time the settlement agreement was
      approved, Rodarte could not possibly ascertain the extent to which
      the first surgery remedied his shoulder problem, whether he would
      be impaired as a result of the injury, i.e., the nature and extent of
      his injury, and whether the injury merited an impairment rating.
      Significantly, he underwent a second surgery which BlueLinx’s
      evaluating physician, Dr. Walkiewicz, agreed was reasonable and
      necessary. . . . Dr. Walkiewicz opined that Rodarte would be at
      MMI one year after [that] surgery. Assuming his opinion also
      applied to the [first shoulder surgery], Rodarte at the time ALJ
      Case approved the settlement of the 2016 claim would not have
      been at MMI following the first shoulder surgery. Rather, he would
      have attained MMI on November 27, 2019.

      Rodarte’s TTD benefits were terminated by BlueLinx on September
      4, 2020, over eleven months after the parties settled [the 2016
      claim]. Based on a November 2, 2020, examination, Dr. Kay was
      the first doctor to offer an opinion concerning the existence of an
      impairment rating assessing a 24% impairment rating as a result
      of the 2018 injury. . . . In light of the above, we hold that at the

                                           9
time [the 2016 claim] settled, Rodarte’s claim had not accrued for
purposes of KRS 342.270(1). At the time of the settlement,

assuming Dr. Walkiewicz would have assessed MMI one year after
the first [shoulder] surgery, Rodarte would have attained MMI at
least one month beyond the date ALJ Case approved the
settlement on October 7, 2019. Significantly, when ALJ Case
approved the [the settlement agreement in the 2016 claim] Rodarte
was drawing TTD benefits. The BRC5 Order reflects Bluelinx did
not dispute Rodarte’s entitlement to TTD benefits between August
14, 2018, and September 14, 2020. Thus, Rodarte had met the
statutory definition of temporary total disability and was entitled to
TTD benefits during this period. Just as important, as of October
7, 2019, none of the physicians could offer an opinion regarding
the nature and extent of the injury and whether the 2018 injury
generated an impairment rating pursuant to the AMA Guides, as
the AMA Guides are clear an impairment rating cannot be assessed
prior to attainment of MMI.

The first impairment rating offered in the case sub judice was
generated by Dr. Kay, who based on a November 2, 2020,
examination assessed a 24% impairment rating. Consequently, at
the earliest, Rodarte was aware he sustained a permanent injury at
the time of Dr. Kay’s report. [Most] importantly, at the time the
2016 claim settled, the statute of limitations had not begun to run
on Rodarte’s claim as the limitation period began to run after
September 14, 2020, when payment of TTD benefits ceased. Thus,
his claim had not accrued at the time the settlement agreement in
the 2016 claim was approved and KRS 342.270(1) is inapplicable.

BlueLinx would have us hold that in order for Rodarte’s August
2018 claim to be viable, he was required to file a claim for the 2018
injury even though he was recovering from surgery, probably not at
MMI, and could not be appraised of the nature and extent of his
right shoulder injury. Further, in all likelihood, upon filing the
claim for the 2018 injury, Rodarte’s TTD benefits would have been
terminated. According to BlueLinx, even though there was
uncertainty as to the extent the first surgery was beneficial and
whether Rodarte’s 2018 right shoulder injury merited an
impairment rating, he was required to file a claim for the 2018
injury. As claimed by BlueLinx, Rodarte was required to file a
claim for the 2018 eleven months before the statute of limitations
began to run on the claim. We reject that premise.

5 Benefit review conference.

                                    10
      The Board held that Ridge was distinguishable because this Court

specifically noted that there was no indication that TTD benefits were paid for

Ridge’s second injury at the time Ridge filed a claim for his first injury. In

Ridge this Court noted that

      [a]lthough TTD benefits continued to be paid for the [second] injury
      at that point, the parties stipulated that they ceased shortly
      thereafter on December 26, 1999. The [first] injury claim was not
      filed until April 19, 2000. Contrary to the claimant's assertion,
      there is no indication in the record that any TTD benefits for the
      [second] injury were paid after the [first] injury claim was filed.6

Based on the foregoing language, the Board concluded that this Court’s holding

in Ridge would have been different “had Ridge been receiving TTD benefits for

the [second] injury at the time the parties settled the [first] injury claim.” For

reasons discussed below, the Board also found Saint Joseph Hospital v. Frye,7 a

published case, as well as Pepsi Cola General Bottlers, Inc. v. Butler,8 and

Martin County Fiscal Court v. Simpkins,9 two unpublished cases, to be

persuasive.

      BlueLinx appealed the Board’s ruling on the compulsory joinder issue,

while Rodarte appealed its ruling on his motion to reopen. The Court of

Appeals consolidated the cases and addressed both issues in Rodarte v.

      6 114 S.W.3d at 847.

      7 415 S.W.3d 631 (Ky. 2013).

       8 2006-CA-002401-WC, 2007 WL 1964526 (Ky. App. July 6, 2007), aff'd sub

nom. Pepsi Cola v. Butler, 2007-SC-000514-WC, 2008 WL 1850581 (Ky. Apr. 24,
2008).
      9 2014-CA-001863-WC, 2015 WL 4880356 (Ky. App. July 24, 2015).

                                            11
BlueLinx Corporation.10 The court affirmed the Board and the CALJ in their

rulings on the motion to reopen and agreed that Rodarte had presented no

evidence of mutual mistake of fact, and that he could not use the 2016 claim to

cure his failure to join the 2018 claim.11

      However, the court reversed the Board as to the joinder issue, thereby

reinstating the ALJ’s motion to dismiss the 2018 claim.12 The court held that

under its unpublished opinion of Wireman v. Bizzack, Inc.,13 Rodarte’s 2018

claim had accrued “on the day he was injured and first saw a doctor for his

injury.”14 The court further concluded that “[t]he Board’s determination that

MMI must be reached for a claim to accrue is not based on any precedent[,]”

and that the Board conflated the issues of claim accrual and the statute of

limitations.15 It explained that, because Rodarte’s claim for his shoulder injury

accrued on the day that he was injured, the statute of limitations on his claim

began running on that date.16 And, the fact that BlueLinx paid TTD benefits

on the 2018 claim tolled the statute of limitations but did not change the date

of accrual.17

      10 2021-CA-1473-WC, 2022 WL 3721729 (Ky. App. Aug. 26, 2022).

      11 Id. at *6.

      12 Id. at *8.

      13 2011-CA-001948-WC, 2012 WL 2483451 (Ky. App. June 29, 2012).

      14 Rodarte, 2022 WL 3721729 at *7.

      15 Id.

      16 Id. at *8.

      17 Id.

                                             12
      Judge Maze dissented and agreed with the Board that Rodarte’s 2018

claim had not yet accrued when he settled the 2016 claim.18 He asserted that

three decisions relied upon by the Board that were rendered subsequent to

Ridge —Frye, Butler, and Simpkins—called the result in Ridge into question

and “made it clear that joinder is not required simply because a subsequent

injury occurs while a prior injury claim is pending[.]”19

      Rodarte now appeals the Court of Appeals’ rulings on his motion to

reopen and the dismissal of his 2018 claim to this Court. Additional facts are

discussed below as necessary.

                                 II.   ANALYSIS

      Our well-established standard of review in workers’ compensation cases

is to “correct the Board only where [this] Court perceives the Board has

overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an

error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause a gross injustice.”20

However, when an issue solely concerns statutory interpretation, i.e., a

question of law, our review is de novo and we provide no deference to the

rulings made below.21

      18 Id.

      19 Id.

      20 W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992).

       21 Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye, 415 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Ky. 2013) (citing Ky. Emps.

Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2007)).

                                             13
A. Rodarte’s motion to reopen was properly denied.

       As noted, KRS 342.125 provides that “an administrative law judge may

reopen and review any award or order” on the grounds of fraud, newly

discovered evidence, mistake, or change of disability.22 “Upon reopening, the

administrative law judge may end, diminish, or increase compensation

previously awarded, within the maximum and minimum provided in [KRS

Chapter 342], or change or revoke a previous order.”23 In order to prevail on a

motion to reopen, a claimant is “required to make a reasonable prima facie

preliminary showing of the existence of a substantial possibility of the presence

of one or more of the prescribed conditions that warrant a change in [the ALJ’s

decision] before his adversary is put to the additional expense of relitigation.”24

      Rodarte has never argued that his 2016 claim should be reopened to

affect a material change to his 2016 settlement agreement. Rather, he sought

only to add language to the settlement agreement stating that his 2018

shoulder claim would not be waived by its entry. We agree with the reasoning

of both the CALJ and the Board that KRS 342.125 provides no authority for an

ALJ to reopen a closed claim to add language in order to protect the viability of

a separate claim.

      Moreover, Rodarte continues to argue that his motion to reopen should

have been granted on the basis of mutual mistake of fact. He contends that he

      22 KRS 342.125(1).

      23 KRS 342.125(4).

      24 Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972).

                                           14
and BlueLinx were mutually mistaken on a material fact regarding the 2016

settlement agreement. Rodarte asserts that he was mistaken in not including

language joining his 2018 claim to the settlement agreement, while BlueLinx

was mistaken after the settlement agreement was entered because it continued

to pay TTD and medical benefits for the 2018 claim. This does not constitute

mutual mistake of fact.

      To reform a written contract upon the equitable grounds of mutual
      mistake, the proponent of the reformation must satisfy these three
      elements: “First, it must show that the mistake was mutual, not
      unilateral. Second, [t]he mutual mistake must be proven beyond a
      reasonable controversy by clear and convincing evidence. Third, it
      must be shown that the parties had actually agreed upon terms
      different from those expressed in the written instrument.”25

Rodarte’s argument fails each of these requirements. BlueLinx has never

conceded that both it and Rodarte intended to include his 2018 shoulder injury

in the 2016 settlement agreement, and Rodarte has never presented any

evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, of that alleged mutual intent.

We therefore agree that Rodarte failed to make a prima facie case for reopening

his 2016 claim and affirm.

B. Rodarte’s 2018 claim accrued prior to the entry of the settlement
   agreement for the 2016 claim. His 2018 claim is therefore barred by
   KRS 342.270.

      Rodarte next argues that ALJ Weatherby and the Court of Appeals erred

by ruling that his 2018 claim was waived under KRS 342.270 due to his failure

to join that claim to his 2016 claim prior to the entry of the settlement

      25 Nichols v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 423 S.W.3d 698, 702–03 (Ky. 2014) (quoting

Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Ky. 2006)).

                                             15
agreement. He argues in line with the reasoning of both the Board and the

dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals decision below. In particular, he

asserts that although Ridge appears to be controlling, its facts are sufficiently

distinguishable. And, he argues, the subsequent opinions of Frye, Butler, and

Simpkins have called the holding in Ridge into question. For the reasons that

follow, we disagree.

      We begin with the joinder statute at issue, KRS 342.270(1). The statute

became effective in 1996 and was enacted by the General Assembly to address

concerns raised by this Court in Jeep Trucking, Inc. v. Howard26 regarding

problems that often arose due to the piecemeal litigation of workers’

compensation claims. KRS 342.270(1) directs in its entirety:

      If the parties fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation
      under this chapter, either party may make written application for
      resolution of claim. The application must be filed within two (2)
      years after the accident, or, in case of death, within two (2) years
      after the death, or within two (2) years after the cessation of
      voluntary payments, if any have been made. When the application
      is filed by the employee or during the pendency of that claim, he or
      she shall join all causes of action against the named employer
      which have accrued and which are known, or should reasonably
      be known, to him or her. Failure to join all accrued causes of
      action will result in such claims being barred under this
      chapter as waived by the employee.27

Accordingly, a workers’ compensation claimant is required to join all causes of

action against an employer “which have accrued and which are known, or

      26 891 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1995).

      27 (Emphasis added).

                                           16
should reasonably be known[.]”28 And, if a claimant fails to join an accrued

cause of action, that cause of action will be considered waived and therefore

barred. The sole issue before this Court, then, is whether Rodarte’s shoulder

injury claim accrued before the settlement agreement on his 2016 claim was

entered. We begin with discussion of the case law cited by the parties.

      Ridge is considered the seminal case to interpret and apply KRS

342.270(1). But, although the facts of Ridge are similar to the ones at bar, the

issues addressed are quite different. The claimant in Ridge sustained two

distinct work-related injuries while working for the same employer: a knee

injury in July 1998 and a back injury in April 1999.29 In November 1999, the

employer’s insurance carrier sent a letter to the claimant’s attorney proposing

that the parties settle the 1998 knee injury “and concentrate on the [1999]

back claim.”30 The employer paid TTD benefits for the back injury, but those

payments ceased in December 1999, a month after the carrier’s letter was

sent.31 Four months later in April 2000, the claimant filed a Form 101 for his

knee injury.32 The parties reached a settlement agreement for the knee injury

in August 2000, but the agreement contained no mention of his back claim.33

      28 Id.

      29 114 S.W.3d at 846.

      30 Id.

      31 Id.

      32 Id.

      33 Id.

                                          17
The claimant did not file a Form 101 for his back injury until February 2001,

which the employer denied citing a lack of joinder under KRS 342.270(1).34

      Following a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the back claim, noting that

“although the claimant was clearly aware of his back injury when settling the

knee injury claim, he did not seek to join the claims,” and that the burden was

on the claimant to comply with KRS 342.270(1) “between the date of the back

injury and the date upon which the knee injury claim was settled[.]”35 In his

PFR, the claimant asserted that KRS 342.270 only required joinder of claims

arising out of the same incident.36 In addition, he argued that the ALJ erred by

not addressing his argument that the employer was estopped from invoking

KRS 342.270 because it agreed to bifurcation via its carrier’s letter.37 The PFR

was denied, the claimant appealed, and the Board and Court of Appeals

affirmed.38

      Before this Court, the claimant argued: (1) that he sustained different

injuries on different dates, and KRS 342.270 applied separately to each

incident; and (2) that the employer was estopped from invoking the joinder

statute because it had agreed to bifurcating the claims via its carrier’s letter,

and that the ALJ erred by failing to consider his estoppel argument.39 The

      34 Id.

      35 Id.

      36 Id.

      37 Id.

      38 Id.

      39 Id.

                                            18
Ridge Court dismissed the claimant’s first argument in short order by holding

that

       [t]he language of KRS 342.270(1) is clear, unequivocal, and
       mandatory, both with respect to a worker's obligation to join “all
       causes of action” against the employer during the pendency of a
       claim and with respect to the penalty for failing to do so. Under
       KRS 342.270(1), it is immaterial that the claimant's knee and back
       injuries arose at different times, involved separate claims, and were
       treated by the parties as separate matters. Once he filed a claim
       for the knee injury, KRS 342.270(1) required him to file and join
       the claim for the back injury before the knee injury claim was
       settled.40

The Court likewise rejected the claimant’s estoppel argument. It held:

       We are not persuaded that by sending a letter to encourage
       settlement of the knee injury claim so that the parties could
       concentrate on the back injury or that by paying separate TTD
       benefits for the two injuries, the employer or its carrier engaged in
       conduct that warranted an estoppel. The injuries occurred at
       different times and affected different parts of the claimant's body.
       At the time that the letter was sent, no claim had been filed for
       either injury. Although TTD benefits continued to be paid for the
       back injury at that point, the parties stipulated that they ceased
       shortly thereafter on December 26, 1999. The knee injury claim
       was not filed until April 19, 2000. Contrary to the claimant's
       assertion, there is no indication in the record that any TTD
       benefits for the back injury were paid after the knee injury claim
       was filed.41

       So, the primary issue the Ridge Court addressed was whether KRS

342.270(1) applies separately to each work-related injury a claimant might

sustain. Because of that, although the Ridge claimant’s back injury had

impliedly accrued prior to the settlement agreement because joinder was

mandated, nowhere in the opinion does the Court directly address when, how,

       40 Id. at 847.

       41 Id.

                                            19
or why his back claim accrued. And, although the Ridge Court specifically

noted that TTD payments for the back injury ceased prior to the settlement

agreement, it did so in response to an estoppel argument, not an accrual

argument. We therefore must respectfully disagree with the Board’s conclusion

that the outcome in Ridge would have been different had the claimant been

receiving TTD benefits for the second injury at the time the parties settled the

first injury claim.

      Frye, Butler, and Simpkins are similarly not dispositive of the issue now

before us nor do they call any aspect of Ridge into question.

      Frye presented an atypical set of procedural circumstances wherein the

claimant’s second work-related injury did not occur until after the final hearing

before the ALJ for her first work-related injury.42 When this Court addressed

whether joinder of the claims was required, it explicitly declined to address the

claimant’s argument that her cause of action for the second injury had not yet

accrued.43 Instead, the Court held that joinder was not mandated under KRS

342.270(1) because her “first injury claim was not pending between the date of

the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim.”44

Frye is therefore of little use here, as it did not address accrual and is factually

      42 415 S.W.3d at 631-32.

      43 Id. at 632.

      44 Id. at 635. See KRS 342.270(1) (“When the application is filed by the
employee or during the pendency of that claim, he or she shall join all causes of
action against the named employer . . . .”) (emphasis added).

                                            20
distinct: Rodarte’s second injury occurred several months before he filed a

Form 101 for his first injuries.

      The next two opinions, Butler and Simpkins, are both un-published.

“‘Not To Be Published’ opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals

are not binding precedent[.]’”45 Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that

those opinions have precedential value, they would not be dispositive.

      Butler addressed when a claimant’s cause of action for a psychological

injury accrued.46 In February 2000, the claimant sustained a work injury to

his coccyx.47 He thereafter filed a Form 101 for that injury and settled the

claim with his employer in October 2001.48 Neither the Form 101 nor the

settlement agreement contained any language concerning a psychological

injury.49 During his deposition prior to the settlement, the claimant testified

that he took “nerve pills” for depression and that he was experiencing anxiety

and depression as a result of no longer being able to provide for his family.50

The claimant returned to work from his injury in January 2001 and continued

      45 Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 41(A).

      46 Butler, 2007 WL 1964526 at *6.     We note here that this Court subsequently
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Butler in an unpublished opinion, Pepsi Cola v.
Butler, 2007-SC-000514-WC, 2008 WL 1850581 (Ky. Apr. 24, 2008), and agreed with
the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. The Board and Rodarte have only cited to the Court
of Appeals opinion; it is therefore the one we address.
      47 Butler, 2007 WL 1964526 at *1.

      48 Id.

      49 Id.

      50 Id. at *2.

                                              21
to work until July 2004 when he had to stop due to increased back pain and

fatigue.51

      In March 2005 the claimant filed a motion to reopen alleging that his

physical condition had worsened and that he had developed depression due to

his severe, chronic pain.52 In support of his psychological injury claim, he

submitted physician reports diagnosing him with depression caused, at least in

part, by loss of function from his work-related injury.53 The ALJ granted the

motion to reopen, rejected the employer’s argument that the psychological

injury claim was barred by KRS 342.270(1), and awarded the claimant benefits

for his psychological injury.54

      On appeal, the employer argued that the cause of action for the

psychological injury claim had accrued when the claimant first experienced

depression and anxiety and sought treatment for those symptoms, which

occurred prior to the settlement agreement.55 The claimant responded, and the

Court of Appeals agreed, that his “cause of action . . . did not accrue until that

claim had all the elements present to be a compensable claim,” which did not

occur until after the settlement agreement was entered.56

      51 Id.

      52 Id. at *1.

      53 Id. at *3.

      54 Id. at *5.

      55 Id. at *6.

      56 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                              22
      The Court of Appeals began by noting that KRS 342.270(1) mandates a

claimant to bring all claims “which are known, or should reasonably be known

to him.”57 Based on this, it held that “a cause of action for a psychological

injury accrues when a claimant becomes aware that he has suffered a

psychological injury.”58 Next, it determined “when a psychological injury

occurs” based on the definition of injury provided in KRS 342.0011:

      any work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic events,
      including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of
      employment which is the proximate cause producing a harmful
      change in the human organism evidenced by objective medical

      findings. . . . but shall not include a psychological, psychiatric, or
      stress-related change in the human organism, unless it is a direct
      result of a physical injury.59

Reading this definition in conjunction with the joinder statute, the court held

that a “cause of action for a psychological injury accrues when a claimant has

suffered a ‘harmful change in [his] human organism evidenced by objective

medical findings’ and he knows or should know that such harmful change is a

‘direct result of a physical injury.’”60 The court noted that there was no

evidence of record that the claimant treated with a psychologist or psychiatrist

or underwent any psychological testing prior to the settlement agreement, nor

was there evidence that a physician had assigned him an impairment rating for

      57 Id.

      58 Id.

      59 Id. at *7.

      60 Id.

                                           23
his complaints of anxiety or depression until after the reopening.61 Citing

Gibbs v. Premier Scale Company/Indiana Scale Co.,62 the court held that the

claimant’s psychological injury claim did not accrue until “his symptoms were

diagnosed by a physician and there were objective medical findings to support

that diagnosis.”63 It accordingly affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the claim was

timely filed.64

       In Simpkins, the claimant sustained skin damage caused by an exposure

to chemicals in July 2010.65 He later filed a Form 101 for the injury and

entered into a settlement agreement regarding the claim.66 On October 10,

2011, the ALJ entered a hearing order noting that the parties had settled the

claim, and the settlement was formally approved on October 27.67 Earlier that

month, on October 4, Simpkins injured his back and reported the injury to his

employer.68 However, “the record [demonstrated] that it was unclear on

October 5, 2011, whether Simpkins’ complaints stemmed from a new work-

related injury or from aggravation of preexisting and possibly non-work-related

       61 Id. at *7.

       62 50 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2001) (holding that a diagnosis must be supported by

“objective medical findings,” i.e., direct observation and testing applying objective or
standardized methods, in order to establish the presence of a compensable injury).
       63 Butler, 2007 WL 1964526 at *7.

       64 Id. at *8.

       65 2015 WL 4880356 at *1.

       66 Id.

       67 Id.

       68 Id.

                                               24
back pain.”69 The claimant filed a Form 101 for his back injury in January

2013, which his employer moved to dismiss based on his failure to join his

back injury to his 2010 skin damage claim.70 The ALJ concluded that KRS

342.270 did not bar his claim because the claimant’s back injury did not

accrue until after the skin damage claim was settled, and the Board affirmed.71

      The sole issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the joinder

statute required the claimant to join his back injury claim to his skin injury

claim prior to the entry of the settlement agreement.72 The court noted that

both the ALJ and the claimant had relied heavily on Butler, which in turn relied

on the definition of “injury” under KRS 342.0011(1) “in holding that the

claimant’s cause of action for psychological injury did not accrue until the

claimant [had] suffered a harmful change in his human organism evidence by

objective medical findings and he knows or should know that such harmful

change is a direct result of a physical injury.”73

      The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Butler and saw no reason

it was inapplicable to the claimant in Simpkins.74 Citing Butler and KRS

342.0011, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the existence of an injury is only

      69 Id. at *1-2.

      70 Id. at *1.

      71 Id.

      72 Id.

      73 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      74 Id.

                                              25
one element of determining when a workers’ compensation claim “accrues.”75

In addition, the claimant must also be aware that the injury is work-related.76

It held that the claimant was not aware that his back injury was work related

until January 3, 2013, when a physician concluded that his back injury “was a

job injury resulting in a low back injury[.]”77 The court went on to reason that

      in the five days between the [back] injury and settlement of the
      2010 claim, “[i]t was extremely difficult to determine whether
      Simpkins had a meritorious claim for a work-related injury[.]”
      Indeed, on October 10, 2011, when the 2010 claim was settled, the
      appropriate process for making such a determination had only just
      begun. To read KRS 342.207(1) as requiring Simpkins to
      immediately continue the settlement of the 2010 claim and seek
      joinder of an unconfirmed work-related claim is unreasonable,
      unduly burdensome, and beyond the intended function of KRS
      342.270(1).78

Accordingly, the court held that the claimant’s back injury claim was not

barred by KRS 342.270(1).79

      In comparison to Butler and Simpkins, in the case now before us there

has never been any dispute that on August 13, 2018, Rodarte sustained a

“work-related traumatic event” that was “the proximate cause producing a

harmful change in the human organism evidenced by objective medical

findings.” The parties stipulated that Rodarte’s shoulder injury was work-

related, and there can be no doubt that objective medical findings supported

      75 Id.

      76 Id.

      77 Id.

      78 Id. at *3.

      79 Id.

                                          26
the diagnosis of that injury: an MRI revealed a SLAP tear in Rodarte’s shoulder

which led to his first shoulder surgery on November 27, 2018. And, again,

both the MRI and the shoulder surgery occurred before the Form 101 for his

knee and ankle injuries was filed in March 2019. Consequently, even if Butler

and Simpkins held sway, they are simply inapplicable here.

      Rather, to determine the date on which Rodarte’s shoulder injury claim

accrued, we now turn to KRS 342.185, the workers’ compensation statute of

limitations. The statute directs:

      [N]o proceeding under this chapter for compensation for an injury .
      . . shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident shall have
      been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the
      happening thereof and unless an application for adjustment of
      claim for compensation with respect to the injury shall have been
      made with the department within two (2) years after the date of
      the accident[.] . . . If payments of income benefits have been
      made, the filing of an application for adjustment of claim with
      the department within the period shall not be required, but
      shall become requisite within two (2) years following the
      suspension of payments or within two (2) years of the date of
      the accident, whichever is later.80

KRS 342.185 acts “as both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose.”81

When the alleged injury is cumulative, “the running of both periods begins on

the date the injured employee is advised that he has suffered a work-related

cumulative trauma injury.”82 But, for single-event injuries such as Rodarte’s

this Court has refused to adopt a discovery rule,83 and has consistently held

      80 KRS 342.185(1) (emphasis added).

      81 Consol of Ky., Inc. v. Goodgame, 479 S.W.3d 78, 84 (Ky. 2015).

      82 Id.

      83 See Coslow v. General Elec. Co., 877 S.W.2d 611 (Ky. 1994).

                                            27
that “the running of both periods begins on the date of accident,”84 i.e., the

date the work-related injury occurs. “A statute of limitations limits the time in

which one may bring suit after the cause of action accrues[.]”85 If the statute

of limitations is triggered on the date the cause of action accrues, and the

statute of limitations begins running on the date of the accident, then the date

of the accident is the date the cause of action accrues. Therefore, Rodarte’s

claim accrued on the date he injured his shoulder: August 13, 2018.

      The fact that Rodarte received TTD benefits beginning the day after his

shoulder injury and ending almost a year after the settlement agreement is a

red herring. If income benefits are paid, KRS 342.185 tolls the running of the

statute of limitations until two years after the last voluntary payment or two

years after the date of the accident, whichever is later.86 But a tolling provision

is just that, it postpones the date on which a claimant must file a claim for a

cause of action that has already accrued, it does not change the date on which

it accrued. It is on this point that the Board “overlooked or misconstrued

controlling statutes or precedent” when it held that

      at the time the 2016 claim settled, the statute of limitations had
      not begun to run on Rodarte’s claim as the limitation period began
      to run after September 14, 2020, when payment of TTD benefits
      ceased. Thus, his claim had not accrued at the time the
      settlement agreement in the 2016 claim was approved and KRS
      342.270(1) is inapplicable.

      84 Consol, 479 S.W.3d at 84.

      85 Id. at 82 (quoting Coslow, 877 S.W.2d at 612) (emphasis added).

      86 KRS 342.185(1).

                                            28
In other words, the Board held that Rodarte’s claim accrued on the date that

BlueLinx stopped paying TTD benefits. But, as noted, Rodarte’s claim accrued

on the date his shoulder injury occurred, meaning that his statute of

limitations began running on August 13, 2018. BlueLinx’s act of beginning

TTD payments on August 14 tolled the statute of limitations, but it did not and

could not cause the date of accrual to change. If the Board’s logic is followed,

then the act of making voluntary payments would have stopped the running of

a statute of limitations that never started: it held that the claim did not accrue,

and therefore the statute of limitations did not begin running, until Rodarte

stopped receiving voluntary benefits.

      In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that the

Board’s holding that Rodarte had to reach MMI before his claim could accrue is

not based on any precedent. In that vein, we would further note that 803 KAR

25:010 §7, which lists the documents that must be filed in support of a Form

101, does not require documents stating that the claimant has reached MMI.

Rather, the regulation states, in relevant part:

   (1) The applicant shall file an application for resolution of an injury,
       occupational disease, hearing loss, or interlocutory relief claim
       through the LMS. At the time of, or within fifteen (15) days after
       the filing of the application, the following shall be filed:

            (d) One (1) medical report, which may consist of
            legible, handwritten notes of the treating physician,
            and which shall include the following:

                   1. A description of the injury that is the
                      basis of the claim; [and]

                   2. A medical opinion establishing a causal
                      relationship between the work-related
                                            29
                      events or the medical condition that is
                      the subject of the claim[.]

Moreover, the plain language of KRS 342.270 requires joinder of all claims that

have accrued and are known or reasonably should be known. Nowhere does

the statute state that the joinder is only required if the claimant has reached

MMI.

       Based on the foregoing, we hold that Rodarte’s shoulder injury claim

accrued prior to the entry of the settlement agreement for the 2016 claim. KRS

342.270(1) directs that a claimant “shall join all causes of action against the

named employer which have accrued and which are known, or should

reasonably be known, to him[.]” And, “[f]ailure to join all accrued causes of

action will result in such claims being barred under this chapter as waived by

the employee.” Rodarte’s cause of action for his shoulder injury accrued on the

date he injured his shoulder: August 13, 2018. There is no dispute as to the

injury’s work-relatedness or that the SLAP tear diagnosis was supported by

objective medical evidence. It is also not alleged that the injury was not

“known” to Rodarte. When Rodarte filed his Form 101 for his knee and ankle

injury in November 2018, he had already injured his shoulder, been diagnosed

with a SLAP tear, and underwent surgery to repair the SLAP tear. He was

therefore obligated by KRS 342.270(1) to join his 2018 shoulder claim to his

2016 knee and ankle claim prior to the finality of the settlement agreement.

His failure to do so renders his 2018 claim barred.

       Although we feel constrained by KRS 342.270(1) to reach this outcome,

we are further compelled to note our displeasure in doing so. It is well-
                                           30
established that the primary purpose of the Workers’ Compensation statutes

“is to aid injured or deceased workers” and that they must “be interpreted in a

manner that is consistent with their beneficent purpose.”87 Under these facts

and circumstances we are left with no choice but to apply KRS 342.270(1),

though doing so does not serve the overarching purpose of the Workers’

Compensation statutes.

                              III.   CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Court of Appeals in full. CALJ

Gott’s order denying Rodarte’s motion to reopen is affirmed, and ALJ

Weatherby’s order dismissing Rodarte’s 2018 shoulder claim is hereby

reinstated.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Michael Louis Weber
Weber, Dickey & Bellman

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, BLUELINX CORP.:

Douglas P. Dawson
Sewell & Neal, PLLC

       87 See, e.g., Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Ky. 2022)

(quoting Ky. Unisured Emp.’s Fund v. Hoskins, 449 S.W.3d 753, 762 (Ky. 2014)).

                                             31
APPELLEE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD:

Michael Wayne Alvey, Chair
Department of Workers’ Claims

APPELLEE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Johnathan R. Weatherby

APPELLEE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Douglas Wayne Gott

                                  32