Court Opinion

ID: 9528477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:30.121637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:54.170733
License: Public Domain

Dore, C.J.
(dissenting) — The City of Tacoma claims that RCW 43.135 entitles it to reimbursement for costs it incurred complying with the Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1984. The majority concludes that the City is entitled to reimbursement under RCW 43.135 for measurable, quantifiable costs that are the result of the 1984 act. I dissent because I do not believe that the Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1984 imposed "new programs or increased levels of service" on the City of Tacoma.
In Seattle v. State, 100 Wn.2d 16, 24, 666 P.2d 359 (1983) and State v. Howard, 106 Wn.2d 39, 43, 722 P.2d 783 (1985) we conclude that the terms "programs" and "service", as used in RCW 43.135, are synonymous and that they "denote measures designed to accomplish specific public goals and to benefit the public." We warn that the public benefit from a legislatively imposed program or increased level of service must be "measurable or quantifiable" or RCW 43.135 would not apply. Howard. Similarly, if the Legislature only modifies the internal procedures of an existing program, to render more efficient the same level of service, then the taxing district is *366not entitled to reimbursement. Seattle v. State, 100 Wn.2d at 25. And, even if the taxing authority changes the type of service it offers the public, the authority is not entitled to reimbursement unless the change increases the level of services overall. Seattle v. State, supra.
The City proposes that the "new" definition of "domestic violence" contained in the 1984 Domestic Violence Prevention Act increased the level of service offered to the public. The definition of "domestic violence" contained in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1984, however, includes no more than the conduct described in the domestic violence act of 1979. The 1979 act lists illustrative crimes that fall within the scope of "domestic violence", but it also states that this list is not exclusive: " 'Domestic violence' includes but is not limited to any of the following crimes." (Italics mine.) RCW 10.99-.020(2). Thus, the definition in the 1984 Domestic Violence Prevention Act only repeats in more general language what the 1979 act already encompassed. Compare RCW 10.99.020(2) with RCW 26.50.010(1).
The City argues that the 1984 act expands the rights of victims of domestic violence. Under either the 1979 act or the 1984 act, the right of the victim is the same. The victim is entitled to maximum protection from abuse and impartial enforcement of the law against an aggressor, regardless of whether the aggressor is a member of the victim's family or household. RCW 10.99.010.
Similarly, the "expansion of advice given to victims" does not constitute a new program or increased level of service. The 1979 act required peace officers to cooperate with community service organizations with expertise in domestic violence, protect victims of violence, and "offer, arrange, or facilitate" victims' access to medical treatment or to safe shelter. RCW 10.99.030(1), (2), (5). The 1984 act directs the officer to "advise the victims of all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including advising each person of the availability of a shelter or other services in the community." RCW 10.99.030(4). Protecting victims of *367violence encompasses advising them of means to prevent further violence or other services and both provisions require that the officer advise victims of shelter. The 1984 act only clarifies a duty imposed by the 1979 act; it does not quantifiably increase the level of service overall.
The City claims that the issuance and enforcement of no-contact orders constitute a new program or increased level of service. Under the 1979 act, however, the court could prohibit the defendant from contacting his victim to protect the victim and prevent further aggression. Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 105, § 4(2). Moreover, the 1979 act made the violation of such orders a misdemeanor. The more explicit language of the 1984 act only modified the procedures to be followed when implementing a duty created in 1979. RCW 10.99.040(2), (3), (4).
The City argues that entering no-contact orders into a computer based criminal intelligence information system, as required by the 1984 act, is a new program or level of service. RCW 10.99.040(5). Under the 1979 act, the victim received a copy of the no-contact order, and peace officers and enforcement agencies made complete reports and maintained records of any reported violations of the order. Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 105, § 3(3)(b), (5), (6); § 4(2). Effectively, the computer recordkeeping that the 1984 act requires modifies internal procedure and makes more efficient an existing program or level of service.
Amendment of the domestic violence act, making arrest mandatory when an officer believes a crime of domestic violence has been committed, does not impose a new program or service on a taxing authority. The 1979 act authorized peace officers to arrest whenever they had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 105, § 3(3)(a). The mandatory language of the 1984 act only makes more explicit what the 1979 act permitted.
The City alleges that the new civil remedy that the 1984 act created, the petition for an order for protection, is a new program or level of service. RCW 26.50.030. The *368plan in this case involves coordination of enforcement agencies and the judicial system to protect victims of domestic violence. The creation of civil procedures or a remedy is a modification of the means available to achieve that goal. The remedy and procedures merely "streamline and render more efficient", 100 Wn.2d at 25, the means by which a victim may gain the "maximum protection from abuse" that the 1979 act contemplates. RCW 10-.99.010. Because I do not believe that the requirements of the 1984 act constituted a "new program" or imposed an "increased level of services" on the City, I would reverse the trial court and deny the request for reimbursement.
Finally, courts may take judicial notice of any public statute of this state. Gross v. Lynnwood, 90 Wn.2d 395, 397, 583 P.2d 1197, 96 A.L.R.3d 187 (1978). Appellate courts may also take judicial notice of "facts capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy and verifiable certainty." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Department of Rev., 96 Wn.2d 785, 796, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982) (quoting State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wn.2d 772, 779, 380 P.2d 735 (1963)). I take judicial notice of RCW 82.14, which governs the allocation of sales and use tax revenues to cities and counties. The Legislature amended the act in 1984, to more equitably distribute revenues from the sales and use tax equalization account. Laws of 1984, ch. 225, § 1. Under the act, as amended, cities and towns receive their share of the state sales tax from the Department of Revenue and pay none of the collection expenses. Such collection expenses are absorbed by the State. When the cities and towns sought a share of the state sales tax it was represented to the Legislature that such funds would be used to pay for obligations and duties imposed by the Legislature by the passage of various laws. Since 1984, the cities and towns' share of the sales tax has increased because of the increase in retail sales. Records of the Department of Revenue show that the City of Tacoma *369received the following sales and use tax revenues from 1984 through 1988:
1984 $7,930,226.92
1985 $8,218,626.75
1986 $8,414,835.13
1987 $9,189,212.53
1988 $10,015,494.01
It is readily apparent that the City's revenues increased more than $2 million after 1984 and it received total revenues of $45,768,395.34 during 1984 through 1988. This money was available to the City of Tacoma to meet any cost it incurred complying with the Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1984. The revenue the City accepted would more than cover either the $2 million that the City alleged it spent complying with the 1984 act, or the $580,811 the court awarded it.
I would reverse the trial court and dismiss.