Court Opinion

ID: 9622889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:24:39.332724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:53.577743
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
dissenting:
I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s holding and rationale. In granting appellant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court stated:
To put it quite bluntly, in my view of the case, the Defendant should have either been convicted of First Degree Murder having caused the death of this decedent by a premeditated act, or he should have been acquitted. The only reason that the instruction on Manslaughter First Degree was [given is] the mandate of Morgan v. State, 536 P.2d 952, a 1975 case by the Court of Criminal Appeals. I believe that this was an error on my part for two reasons: one, Morgan requires that when voluntary — no. Requires a voluntary Manslaughter instruction when the Defendant’s defense is self defense. His defense was not self defense, but was excusable homicide. This may be a, well, I guess a splitting of hairs. I think that’s what Courts must often do. And two, and here I want to be very specific, the Morgan case itself in the opinion of this Court, and this is going to sound like the District Court reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, is founded on a faulty premise. ... For this specific reason, the Motion for New Trial is sustained, and the cause is referred to the Chief Judge for a trial setting. I don’t think I need to go further, (emphasis added)
Subsequent to the trial court’s reinstatement of appellant’s conviction, this Court overruled Morgan as being too inflexible a rule in Walton v. State, 744 P.2d 977, 978-79 (Okla.Crim.App.1987) (Parks, J., Specially concurring). Although Morgan was controlling at the time of appellant’s trial, contained within the trial court’s original order for a new trial is an independent ground for reversing this conviction, which is the seed of my dissent.
The gravamen of appellant’s complaint is he raised the theory of accidental homicide, not self-defense, and the merging, over his objection, of the two theories in the same jury instruction confused the jury, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. I am compelled to agree.
In Oklahoma, homicide is classified into four categories: (1) Murder; (2) Manslaughter; (3) Excusable homicide; or (4) Justifiable homicide. 21 O.S.1981, § 692. Both the common law and our statutes distinguish between excusable homicide and justifiable homicide. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1123-27 (3rd ed. 1982). Compare 21 O.S.1981, § 731 with 21 O.S.1981, § 733.
Excusable homicide is the taking of a human life by accident or misfortune; in contrast, justifiable homicide is the taking of a human life as a matter of right, as in self-defense. Lee v. State, 637 P.2d 879, 884 (Okla.Crim.App.1981); Elix v. State, 77 Okl.Cr. 45, 138 P.2d 139, 141 (1943). In either case, no criminal penalty attaches.
Title 21 O.S.1981, § 731(1) defines excusable homicide as “When committed by accident or misfortune ... in doing any other lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent.”
When the death of a human being is the result of accident or misadventure, in the true meaning of the term, no criminal responsibility attaches to the act of the slayer. When it appears that a killing was unintentional, that the perpetrator acted with no wrongful purpose in doing the homicidal act, that it was done while he was engaged in a lawful enterprise, and that it was not the result of negligence — the homicide will be excused on the score of accident.
Mead v. State, 65 Okl.Cr. 86, 83 P.2d 404, 410 (1938). Thus, when the element of *324intent to kill is absent, the accidental homicide is excusable, unless the element of intent is substituted by culpable negligence, such as 21 O.S.1981, § 716 (second degree manslaughter), or by the commission of an unlawful act, such as 21 O.S.1981, § 701.7(B) (felony murder) or 21 O.S.1981, § 711(1) (misdemeanor manslaughter).
When the accused defends on the basis of accidental homicide, and does not claim self-defense, and the facts support an instruction on excusable homicide, it is reversible error to instruct on justifiable homicide rather than on excusable homicide. Thompson v. State, 507 P.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Okla.Crim.App.1973).
Our Uniform Jury Instructions, adopted in 1981, differentiate between excusable homicide (OUJI-CR 725-727) and justifiable homicide (OUJI-CR 743-752). Here, the trial court combined OUJI-CR 725 (Defense of Excusable homicide, accident and misfortune — lawful act) with OUJI-CR 743 (Defense of self-defense — justifiable use of deadly force) in the same jury instruction over appellant’s objection. Nor did the trial court issue a complete set of jury instructions on excusable homicide. As such, the jury instructions, taken as a whole, did not correctly state the applicable law, and confused the jury as to appellant’s theory of defense. I would, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.