Court Opinion

ID: 9473105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:19:12.379088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:19.093407
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s adoption of the district court order denying Burger’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. A review of the record reveals that Burger was denied the effective assistance of counsel by both his appointed counsel’s active representation of his co-indictee’s conflicting interest and his counsel’s failure to present any evidence on his behalf at either of his two sentencing proceedings.
The general principles applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims were articulated in Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See also King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir.1984). To demonstrate that the assistance provided by counsel was so deficient as to require reversal, a defendant must make a two-pronged showing. First, he must demonstrate that his counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 2064. Such errors must be outside the generous range given to “reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 2066. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. To meet this portion of his burden, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 2068. A court reviewing an ineffective assistance claim, however, must bear in mind that
the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system relies on to produce just results.
Id. at 2069.
The Court in Strickland v. Washington also considered the showing that is required when a defendant argues that counsel was ineffective by reason of conflict of interest.1 Where counsel breaches the duty of loyalty to his client, a limited presumption of prejudice applies. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716-1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Prejudice is presumed if the defendant can demonstrate that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and “that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland v. Washington, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at 350, 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 1718.
Turning first to Burger’s conflict of interest claim, the record is clear that Burger’s counsel actively represented both Burger and Stevens. Both Burger and Stevens were charged with and indicted for the murder of Roger Honeycutt. Both were appointed counsel by the trial court at approximately the same time. Burger’s appointed counsel, Leaphart, and Stevens’ appointed counsel, Smith, were partners in a two-partner law firm. At the federal habe-as hearing, Leaphart testified that he inter*943viewed both Burger and Stevens. Leap-hart also testified that he assisted Smith in the preparation of Stevens’ case and that Smith assisted him in the preparation of Burger’s case. Both lawyers discussed the issues involved in each case and researched the law together.2 Smith and Leaphart collaborated in preparing the briefs for both Burger and Stevens on each defendant’s first appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia; Leaphart testified that he “primarily” prepared the briefs for Burger and Stevens on the second appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.3 The fee received by each attorney for representing each client was deposited in the law firm’s corporate account. At no time in his representation of Burger did Leaphart or the trial court ever inform Burger of a possible conflict of interest.
Whether analyzed as a situation where one attorney, Leaphart, represented both Burger and Stevens,4 or where one law firm represented both Burger and Stevens,5 the end result was that Leaphart was actively involved in the defense of both to the extent that a conflict of interest was clearly established.
Although multiple representation is the paradigm context in which conflict of interest claims arise,6 a finding of multiple representation alone does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The conflict must be shown to be actual, not merely speculative, before representation will violate Sixth Amendment standards. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). “An actual conflict of interest occurs when a defense attorney places himself in a situation ‘inherently conducive to divided loyalties.’ ” Zuck v. Alabama, 588 *944F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir.1974)); see also Baty v. Balkcom, supra, 661 F.2d at 397 (“[a]n actual conflict of interest exists if counsel’s introduction of probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another whom the same counsel is representing.”).
In this case the fundamental issue framed by counsel was not Burger’s guilt but the extent of his culpability. At the habeas corpus hearing, Leaphart exhaustively reviewed the evidence that the extent of Burger’s culpability was less than that of Stevens.7 In sum, this evidence was as follows. At the time the crime was committed, Burger was seventeen; Stevens was twenty. Burger has án I.Q. of 82 and possible brain damage. Stevens appeared to be the leader in their relationship; Burger was the follower. Stevens planned and initiated the robbery of the victim; Burger followed his instructions. Stevens actually committed the robbery; Stevens made the victim undress; Stevens forced the victim to perform oral sodomy on Stevens; Stevens anally sodomized the victim; Stevens tied the victim up and forced him to get in the trunk of the cab. Stevens told Burger they would have to kill him; Burger said he didn’t want to kill him. Stevens told Burger they would have to get rid of the cab by driving it into the pond; Stevens ordered Burger to drive the cab with the victim locked in the trunk into the pond. Burger drove the cab and the victim into the pond. In short, the essence of Burger’s defense was that he was less culpable than Stevens.
In this situation, any evidence or arguments made by counsel in Burger’s behalf would, by the very nature of Burger’s defense, damage Stevens. Such adversity in the interests of Leaphart’s clients demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest existed. See Zuck v. Alabama, supra, 588 F.2d at 439 (adversity sufficient to demonstrate actual conflict of interest exists if “the attorney owes a duty to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to his other client”).
The evidence provided by petitioner also demonstrates that this conflict “adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland v. Washington, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. On several occasions, Leap-hart refrained from taking actions in support of Burger that would have been detrimental to Stevens. For example, at no time in his representation of Burger did Leaphart offer Burger’s testimony against Stevens in exchange for a sentence less than the death penalty for Burger.8 See Baty v. Balkcom, supra, 661 F.2d at 397 N. 12 (“[p]lea bargains are perhaps the most obvious example of the manifest effects of a conflict of interest at pretrial proceedings.”); see also Flaming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Bowles, J., concurring) (“[n]o two defendants share equal responsibility for a crime. Usually one is more culpable than the other or for any number of reasons has a greater degree of responsibility for what occurred. One may also be more entitled to leniency based on such factors as age, intelligence, motive, background, previous conduct or *945record, etc. Common counsel eliminates any practical possibility of plea bargaining.”). The district attorney’s disinclination to plea bargain did not stop Leaphart from “constantly attempting” to bargain for a life sentence; there is no reason why it should have deterred him from making the more attractive offer of Burger’s testimony against Stevens. Moreover, at Burger’s trial Stevens was not called as a witness by the defense. Finally, Leaphart prepared the briefs for both Burger and Stevens on each defendant’s second appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In Burger’s brief, Leaphart does not argue that he was the less culpable party, although the scope of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s appellate review in capital cases includes a consideration of whether the “sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” O.C.G.A. 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982), formerly Ga.Code Ann. 27-2537(e)(3) (1933).
Once a defendant has made the two showings required by Strickland v. Washington, supra, prejudice is presumed. 104 S.Ct. at 2067. See also Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir.1983); Baty v. Balkcom, supra, 661 F.2d at 395 (“when counsel is confronted with an actual conflict of interest, prejudice must be presumed, and except under the most extraordinary circumstances, the error cannot be considered harmless”) (quoting Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir.1981)). Even accepting the district court’s finding, adopted by the majority in this case, that Leaphart did not “tailor[] his [trial] strategy toward protecting Stevens,” there is sufficient evidence of an actual conflict and of tangible adverse effect on Leaphart’s performance to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.9
Burger also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because Leaphart failed adequately to investigate possible mitigating evidence or to present any evidence, in mitigation or otherwise, at either of his two sentencing proceedings. Counsel’s duty of effective representation continues into the sentencing phase of his client. See Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 963 (11th Cir.1983) (“The special importance of the capital sentencing proceeding gives rise to a duty on the part of defense counsel to be prepared for that crucial phase of the trial.”). At the core of the duty of effective representation is the “independent duty to investigate and prepare.” Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir.1982). To fulfill this obligation, counsel must make reasonable investigations or make a reasonable decision that makes further investigation unnecessary. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. An examination of the relevant facts suggests that Leaphart failed in both his duty of investigation and his duty of representation at the sentencing proceeding.
The district court found that Leaphart’s investigation into available mitigating evidence consisted solely of conversations with Burger’s mother and an attorney who had befriended her. Although the content of those conversations and the identity of possible character witnesses were not clear, the district court concluded that Leaphart made “adequate if hardly ideal inquiries” and that his “investigation appears to meet at least minimal professional standards.” Such an investigation should not be characterized as reasonable or substantial. Moreover, even the scant amount of information which was unearthed through Leaphart’s investigation was not presented in the proceeding itself. Nor can it be said that Leaphart’s choice to curtail investigation and to present no evidence at the sentencing proceedings was a reasonable strategic decision based on reasonable *946assumptions. Leaphart has attempted to justify his approach by reference to three strategies or assumptions: 1) that Leap-hart’s theory of defense, or strategy, was to make the state prove its case; 2) that, if mitigating evidence had been offered at Burger’s sentencing proceedings, Leaphart would have lost the right to opening and closing argument; and 3) that Leaphart chose to rely in closing on the argument that Burger had never been in trouble before, which would have been undercut by an investigation into and testimony concerning Burger’s background. Even conceding that broad range must be given to the operation of professional judgment, Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, none of these strategies or assumptions withstand scrutiny for reasonableness.
Leaphart testified concerning his strategy or theory of defense in Burger’s case:
Well, of course, my theory of defense was of course trying to make the District attorney prove his case. And my theory of defense was to — well, that in effect in essence what it was. And, use whatever rules of evidence and to prevent him from doing so.10
And, specifically concerning the second trial solely on the issue of penalty, Leaphart again testified that he “felt that case should have been tried on the facts and make the District Attorney — I say make him, use whatever rules of evidence to exclude those harmful facts.” 11 The law provides that the state must prove its case, whether defense counsel is present or not. Relying on the state’s case is not a “strategy” for the defense, but rather reflects an abandonment of counsel’s obligation to develop a case for his client. This proffered strategy is tantamount to no strategy at all; and reliance on such a strategy in a capital sentencing proceeding, as an alternative to investigating and presenting available mitigating evidence, is patently unreasonable.
Second, Leaphart testified that he made a decision not to offer any evidence in mitigation in order to preserve his right to opening and closing arguments. Again, the basic assumption on which this strategy was based is patently unreasonable. O.C.G.A. 17-10-2(a) & (c) (1982), formerly Ga.Code Ann. 27-2503(a) & (c) (1933), provide for the conduct of sentencing proceedings in capital cases: “The district attorney shall open and the defendant or his counsel shall conclude the argument.” The presentation of evidence by the defendant at a capital sentencing proceeding in no way affects this division of argument between the state and the defense. In fact, this procedure was followed at Burger’s sentencing proceedings: the district attorney opened and the defense closed final arguments to the jury. Leaphart simply failed to inform himself of basic Georgia criminal procedure in sentencing proceedings. Cf. Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir.1982). No strategy based on such a false assumption is reasonable. The district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.12
The district court also found that Leap-hart’s failure to substantially investigate mitigating evidence was based on a strategic choice to rely in closing argument on the “major argument” in Burger’s behalf that he had no prior record of violent crime and had never been in trouble before. As it relates to Burger’s second sentencing proceeding, this finding is contradicted by the record: at no point in his closing argument did Leaphart mention the lack of evidence that Burger had a record or had been in trouble before. Instead, Leaphart’s closing argument at the second sentencing proceeding stressed Burger’s comparative lack of culpability and asked for the jury’s mercy. This argument would not have been *947undercut by the presentation of humanizing evidence concerning Burger’s background.
In short, Leaphart’s decision neither to conduct substantial investigation nor to present any evidence at the sentencing pro-, ceedings was not a reasonable strategic choice. It was, moreover, readily distinguishable from the choices made by attorneys in those cases relied upon by the district court. In Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir.), the district court found that petitioner’s attorney presented some mitigating evidence during the sentencing proceeding; and in Strickland v. Washington, supra, petitioner’s attorney relied on character testimony that had come in at an earlier plea colloquoy. 104 S.Ct. at 2071. Leaphart’s presentation of no evidence in the instant case is different; it represented an error “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
But the Sixth Amendment inquiry does not end with a finding of unreasonable performance by counsel. Burger may prevail only if he shows both a denial of effective assistance and actual prejudice to the course of his defense. Id. In this case, however, prejudice is apparent.
At the federal habeas hearing, Burger offered the testimony of his mother and numerous affidavits concerning his troubled childhood and background. This evidence demonstrated that Burger’s parents had been married when his mother was fourteen and his father was sixteen. His parents divorced when he was a child. Neither parent wanted Burger and his childhood was spent being shuffled between the two. His father threw him out of the house; his mother sent him back to live with his father. Burger’s mother remarried. Burger’s stepfather beat Burger, and beat Burger’s mother in his presence; Burger’s stepfather involved him in drugs and alcohol when he was eleven years old. Burger’s mother and stepfather moved from Indiana to Florida. Burger was sent to live with his father. Burger’s father beat him and refused to have anything to do with him. Burger ran away and hitchhiked to Florida to live with his mother, selling his shoes to buy food along the way. When Burger arrived barefoot in Florida, his stepfather told him he could not stay with them. Burger’s mother told juvenile authorities that she didn’t want him, and to send him back to his father in Indiana. When Burger arrived in Indiana, his father locked him out of the house. Burger was taken in by a neighbor, as he had nowhere else to go. The clinical psychologist who examined Burger testified at a motion hearing that Burger had an I.Q. of 82 and possible brain damage.
I cannot accept the holding that the failure to present this evidence was not prejudicial to Burger. The district court found that, although the affidavits of the character witnesses supplied by Burger at the hearing do “contain references to a difficult childhood which might have created some sympathy for Mr. Burger,” they also contained references to drug abuse, juvenile probation and violence. However, the thrust of the character testimony offered by Burger was not that Burger was a model citizen, but that Burger’s personality and motivation could be explained by his unusually stormy childhood. Although this is precisely the kind of humanizing evidence that “may make a critical difference, especially in a capital case,” Stanley v. Zant, supra, 697 F.2d at 969, Leaphart elected neither to conduct further investigation nor to use the evidence at the sentencing proceeding. Having heard the state’s case, unmitigated by any evidence presented on behalf of petitioner, two sentencing juries recommended the death penalty.
Failure to present this substantial, available mitigating evidence meets the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, supra. In fact Leaphart’s failure to investigate or to present evidence on his client’s behalf is an apt example of the kind of “breakdown in the adversarial process,” id. *948at 2069, that requires a reviewing court to find the results of a proceeding unreliable.
For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s finding that Burger was afforded the effective assistance of counsel during his state court proceedings and remand this case with directions to grant the writ.

. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel necessarily includes the guarantee of conflict-free counsel. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.1978).

. Transcript of Federal Habeas Corpus Hearing ("THC") at 18.

. THC at 40-41.

. The warden-appellant argues that the conflict of interest cases relied upon by Burger are inapposite as involving the representation of multiple defendants by one attorney. Here, appellant contends, Burger and Stevens were represented by "separate” attorneys. This argument is contrary to the facts as reflected by the record. Leaving aside the fact that Leaphart and Smith were partners in the practice of law, the attorneys here were each active in the defense of the other’s client and "seem to have viewed themselves as a defense 'team' acting on behalf of [both] of the accused." United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 515 (3d Cir.1979), rev’d on other grounds, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Leaphart consulted confidentially with Stevens, aided in preparing his case for trial, and prepared the briefs for both of his appeals. "Whatever may have been the extent of each attorney's participation in the trial of the ... defendants, we are satisfied that it was sufficient to establish that both attorneys represented [both] defendants.” Id.

. “The same principles [governing Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claims] apply where the joint representation is by two members of the same firm.” Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 983 (7th Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Hel-ton, 471 F.Supp. 397, 399 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.1979)); see also United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1st Cir.1977) (“[t]he same rule applies with equal force to representation of two or more defendants by members of the same law firm.’’). Cf. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1979) (ineffective assistance found where ”[t]he law firm which served as counsel to Zuck in his murder trial also represented, in an unrelated civil matter, the state prosecutor who tried Zuck.”); Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 44(c) (”[w]henever two or more defendants have been jointly charged ... and are represented by ... retained or appointed counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation."), construed in Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d at 983 ("[t]he Supreme Court’s proposal of this rule indicates its recognition that the potential constitutional problems attendant to multiple representation are present when different attorneys from the same legal partnership represent co-defendants with conflicting interests.”); ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5 — 105(d). Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia, exercising its supervisory role over the Bar, has adopted a mandatory rule in death penalty cases that co-defendants must be provided with separate and independent counsel. Fleming v. State, 264 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185 (1980). This rule applies with equal force to representation by a single attorney or by members of the same law firm. Id. at 188 n. 7.

. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718 ("[a] possible conflict of interest inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation”); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.1978).

. THC at 20-23.

. At the federal habeas hearing, Leaphart testified that he had not, at any time during his representation of Burger, discussed with the district attorney the possibility of Burger's testifying against Stevens in return for a lighter sentence. THC at 38-39. When further questioned about plea negotiations in Burger’s case, Leap-hart testified that he had engaged in plea negotiations, but that “during the first trial [the district attorney] refused to discuss it in any terms.” THC at 65 (emphasis supplied). From this account, it appears that plea negotiations were entered into in this case; that Leaphart never offered Burger’s testimony against Stevens; and that, after Burger’s first trial had begun, the district attorney refused to discuss a plea on whatever terms Leaphart had offered, presumably not the terms of Burger’s testifying against Stevens since Leaphart testified he did not at any time make such an offer. Thus, appellant’s argument that no pretrial conflict of interest could have arisen due to the district attorney’s refusal to plea bargain is contradicted by the record.

. The district court appears to take the position that it would not be possible to make a full demonstration of prejudice of the type, for example, that is required for general ineffective assistance claims under Strickland v. Washington. Whether or not such a showing would be possible is not relevant, however, to the issue of conflict of interest. In conflict of interest cases, as noted above, a limited presumption applies on a showing of some "adverse effect” on the lawyer’s performance, which has been amply demonstrated in the instant case.

. THC at 18.

. THC at 52.

. The district court's explanation that Leap-hart’s rationale was appropriate in the context of the culpability trial provides no justification for its application in the context of a sentencing proceeding where, as noted above, the Georgia procedural rules are different.