Court Opinion

ID: 9745515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:05:58.691813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.215108
License: Public Domain

*420HAERLE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, and do so for four principal reasons: (1) I do not believe the majority’s opinion accurately sets forth the quantity of “independent evidence” adduced at a preliminary hearing which is sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti rule; (2) nor, I submit, does the majority adequately deal with the principle that circumstantial evidence and inferences are both permissible types of “independent evidence” of a charge of conspiracy; (3) nor does the majority adequately deal with the very liberal standard of proof applicable at preliminary hearings; and (4) I believe that, considered under the combination of those three standards, there was ample “independent evidence” of a conspiracy adduced by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing. For those reasons, I would reverse the trial court and remand the case to it with instructions to reinstate the dismissed conspiracy charge against defendant and respondent, Frank Evan Powers-Monachello.
I.
Regarding the first point, the quantity of independent evidence necessary for the prosecution to present at a preliminary hearing, the majority cites and quotes from our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372] (Alvarez). But, regrettably, it omits several highly pertinent statements from that opinion, statements I believe are clearly applicable here regarding precisely that issue.
In the course of reversing the holding of a panel of the Fourth District (which had held the corpus delicti principle not satisfied), the Alvarez court made clear the minimal quantity of independent evidence (i.e., here, evidence above and beyond statements by others) required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. It stated: “Of course, as we have seen, the modicum of necessary independent evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus the jury’s duty to find such independent proof, is not great. The independent evidence may be circumstantial, and need only be ‘a slight or prima facie showing’ permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a criminal agency, after which the defendant’s statements may be considered to strengthen the case on all issues. [Citations.]” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)
The court cited, among its several prior holdings on the subject, People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890], There, it had emphasized that:. “[W]e have never interpreted the corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary. Instead, there need only be independent evidence establishing a slight or prima facie showing of some injury, loss or harm, and that a criminal agency was involved.” (Id. at p. 303, italics added.)
Quite importantly, the Alvarez court also stressed that the required “independent evidence” does not have to stand alone, i.e., it may be considered in *421conjunction with the extrajudicial admissions. (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) This is made clear by its phrase that such evidence may be considered “in addition to such statements” (id. at p. 1165) and by its later emphasis that: “In every case, once the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues.” (Id. at p. 1171; see also, to the same effect, Rayyis v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 138, 144-145 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 12] (Rayyis), a decision relied on extensively by the majority; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 408 & 413.)
As applied here, this means that the trial court could well have considered both the admissions of the former codefendants and the other evidence presented, if the latter met the “slight or prima facie showing” standard articulated in Alvarez. As I will outline in part IV. below, I believe that standard was easily met here.
H.
Many cases—most of them not discussed or cited by the majority—make clear that circumstantial evidence and/or inferences are clearly permissible types of such “independent evidence,” especially regarding a charge (as here) of criminal conspiracy.
One of the earliest of these cases is People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75, 94-96 [323 P.2d 397]. There, the court affirmed the conviction of multiple defendants whom a San Diego Superior Court jury had convicted of conspiracy to commit assault. On appeal, those defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish conspiracy, but were rebuffed in that argument by this response from our Supreme Court: “It is true that there is no direct evidence of a conspiracy; all the direct evidence bearing on the question is to the effect that the defendants who actually participated in the assault and battery had been instructed to avoid the use of violence. But ‘A conspiracy can generally be established only by circumstantial evidence. It is not often that the direct fact of a common unlawful design can be proved other than by the establishment of independent facts bearing on such design.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 94.)
This court made this principle even clearer in our decision in People v. Lipinski (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 575-576 [135 Cal.Rptr. 451] (Lipinski), where we stated: “It is likewise well recognized that the very crux of the conspiracy, the evil or corrupt agreement [citations], may be shown also by circumstantial evidence. Thus, it is not necessary to prove that the parties met and actually agreed to perform the unlawful act or that they had previously arranged a detailed plan for its execution. Rather significantly, the agreement *422may be inferred from the conduct of the defendants mutually carrying out a common purpose in violation of a penal statute [citations]. As the court put it in People v. Morales [(1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 368,] 376 [69 Cal.Rptr. 402], the sufficiency of evidence relative to the establishment of a conspiracy must be viewed against the background of the type involved, and ‘ “If there be knowledge by the individual defendant that he is a participant in a general plan designed to place narcotics in the hands of ultimate users, the courts have held that such persons may be deemed to be regarded as accredited members of the conspiracy.” ’ [Citation.]” (Lipinski, supra, at pp. 575-576; see also, citing Lipinski and to the same effect: People v. Longines (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 621, 626 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 356]; People v. Consuegra (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1726, 1734 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288]; People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1232 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382]; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 891 [273 Cal.Rptr. 757]; People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1402-1403 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; People v. Towery (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1132 [220 Cal.Rptr. 475]; People v. Martin (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 148, 163 [197 Cal.Rptr. 655].)
I respectfully submit that the evidence summarized in part IV. of this opinion clearly meets this standard. But before detailing that evidence, it is also appropriate to discuss the related issues of the standard of proof required at a preliminary hearing and at a Penal Code section 995 (section 995) hearing.
III.
The governing statute on the standard of proof required at preliminary hearings is Penal Code section 872, subdivision (a), which provides that the magistrate shall order a defendant to answer to a criminal complaint as and when “it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe that the defendant is guilty . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 872, subd. (a).)
The cases applying and interpreting this statute have made clear that this, too, is a rather liberal standard. Thus, in People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 738 [145 Cal.Rptr. 806], certiorari denied Orduno v. California (1979) 439 U.S. 1074 [59 L.Ed.2d 41, 99 S.Ct. 849], the court wrote: “At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate must decide only whether there is ‘sufficient cause’ to believe the defendant guilty of a probable offense. That phrase is generally equivalent to ‘reasonable and probable cause’ which has been defined as such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. [Citations.]” (People v. Orduno, supra, at p. 750; see also People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 *423P.2d 609]; People v. Batista (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1292 [248 Cal.Rptr. 46]; People v. Ortiviz (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 537, 541 [141 Cal.Rptr. 483]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial Proceedings, § 147, pp. 349-350, and cases cited therein.)
Post-Alvarez, this principle is even stronger. Because of the ruling in that case regarding the admissibility of the statements of a defendant or coconspirator, at a preliminary hearing “the amount of additional evidence that is required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule (aside from the defendant’s extrajudicial statements) is ‘slight’ or ‘minimal.’ ” (Rayyis, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.)
My colleagues seem to feel that the corpus delicti rule is applied differently in a preliminary hearing. They argue that the cases I rely upon hereafter regarding the application of that rule are distinguishable because they “involved trials, where the operation of the corpus delicti rule is different from its application at a preliminary hearing . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 418.) But this statement runs directly contrary to Rayyis, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 138, a case my colleagues repeatedly cite approvingly. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 408 & 413.) In that case, the court held: ‘Alvarez changes nothing when it comes to application of the corpus delicti rule to preliminary hearings (except that there is no longer any basis to exclude a defendant’s extrajudicial statements from evidence). Moreover, there is nothing in the language of section 28 [, subdivision] (d) [of article I of the California Constitution]—the constitutional provision at issue in Alvarez—that could be construed as affecting only preliminary hearings. To the extent section 28[, subdivision] (d) affected application of the corpus delicti rule at trial, it affected its application at preliminary hearings, no more and no less.” (Rayyis, supra, at p. 148.)
A similar principle applies when, as here, the hearing is conducted under section 995 after the filing of an information.1 In People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242], the court defined the relevant rule thusly: “In determining if charges in an information can withstand a motion under section 995, neither the superior court nor the appellate court may reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. [Citations.] Ordinarily, if there is some evidence in support of the information, the reviewing court will not inquire into its sufficiency. [Citations.] Thus, an indictment or information should be set aside only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a necessary element of the offense charged. [Citations.] H] ‘Although there must be some showing as to *424the existence of each element of the charged crime [citation] such a showing may be made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of reasonable inferences on the part of the magistrate.’ [Citation.] ‘Every legitimate inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the information.’ [Citations.] Thus, the ultimate test is that ‘ “ ‘[a]n information will not be set aside or prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Italics omitted; see also People v. Jimenez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 795, 801-803 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 466].)
When this standard is combined with the two other principles noted above, i.e., that (1) only “some slight or prima facie showing” is necessary in combination with the now admissible extrajudicial statements of a codefendant (see Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1171 & 1181) and (2) “circumstantial evidence” and/or an “inferred” agreement are sufficient to establish a conspiracy (see Lipinski, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at pp. 575-576), I believe there was more than adequate evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing to require respondent to be held to answer the conspiracy charge in the information.
I will now outline what that evidence was.
IV.
I believe neither the arguments made to us by defendant and respondent nor their acceptance by the majority fully state the relevant evidence adduced by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing. For example, respondent’s brief to us argues: “Herein, other than the statements by Gearardo-Scheiner and Floyd, the only evidence in the record that appellant can claim possibly demonstrates a conspiratorial agreement is: (1) respondent, or someone else driving the green BMW, performed counter-surveillance activities as he or she drove from community to community; (2) respondent regularly frequented the residence at 1109 Copeland Creek Drive, Rohnert Park; (3) respondent was found in possession of a key, common to many safes, that fit the safe found at 1109 Copeland Creek Drive, Rohnert Park, although he was not found in possession of the electronic combination to the safe; (4) respondent was seen in the presence of Schemer and Floyd; and (5) respondent was observed giving two shoe-box size packages to Floyd on one occasion.”
The following facts and evidence are either omitted or misstated in that argument of defendant and respondent—and many of them are also not mentioned or considered by the majority:
*4251. No one other than respondent was ever seen driving the green BMW; it was, during the periods of the surveillances, respondent’s regular vehicle for his many trips out of and then back into Sonoma County;
2. In driving that car, appellant’s several detectives performed extensive and thorough countersurveillance activities. The descriptions provided of those activities, whether seen visually in downtown San Francisco or in Rohnert Park, or seen via the GPS device at other locations (Oakland, San Rafael, San Mateo, Hayward, etc.) established that they were remarkably expert. And also successful, as witness his May 2007 trip to San Francisco.
3. Respondent had reported to his parole officer that his residence was the Branching Way house in Petaluma. However, unmentioned by the majority is the fact that he never went to that address during the period he was under surveillance. But he did, in fact, have a real residence; the Grandview Way house he occupied with his girlfriend, and to which he returned after each trip out of the county—albeit apparently always after having stopped first at the Copeland Creek house. Perhaps most importantly, as far as this record reveals (but again never mentioned by the majority), respondent never reported to his parole officer that he actually lived in Rohnert Park, not Petaluma.
4. Respondent had no visible occupation, much less one that could or would feasibly entitle a 24 year old to be the possessor and apparent owner of five different vehicles, not to mention over $15,000 in cash. And his girlfriend (never a codefendant) told the investigating officers that respondent had told her he was in the construction business, although she admittedly wondered about that because of his always “smooth” hands and the fact that he did not appear to own either work tools or clothing.
5. Respondent did far more than regularly frequent the residence at 1109 Copeland Creek. He regularly entered that residence without knocking or ringing any bell, either via the front door or the garage. He was clearly personally friendly with the male resident of that house, Schemer. More specifically, he was seen working with Scheiner on the green BMW, which had its hood up, regarding some sort of “wiring for stereo speakers or some kind of speakers.”
6. There is no evidence in the record that the safe key found in what was, almost certainly, respondent’s jeans on the floor of the master bedroom at Grandview Way, was common to many safes. Common sense suggests that any manufacturer of such safes does not provide a “one key fits all” system. And the fact that normal entry to such a safe requires both a key and a combination and no written record of the combination was found at either house does not detract from the discovery of a key which fit into the lock on this specific safe.
*426Regarding the safe at the Copeland Creek address, the majority concedes that the record “contains evidence to support an inference of an agreement between certain of the defendants to store a safe, but it does not contain evidence to connect all the defendants to the safe and its contents or to any sale of cocaine.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 411.) This contention frankly puzzles me: (a) the safe—and cocaine usage paraphernalia—were found at the Copeland Creek residence of two of the defendants, (b) what was (at the minimum “inferentially”) a key to it was found in respondent’s clothes at his de facto residence, and (c) the safe contained cocaine. Why cannot an inference of a conspiracy involving respondent and those other defendants be drawn from those facts?
7. Finally, there was the extensive opinion evidence adduced by Detective Tomlin which, to its credit, the majority references.2 Tomlin was asked for his “opinion as to what was taking place based on your observations.” He responded that, in his opinion, “this was a large scale, larger than what’s been seen in some time, cocaine distribution ... in Sonoma County.” He explained that, from his experience, he was aware that the “Bay Area is one of the central points where narcotics coming out of other countries will come in and then be distributed out to other areas” and that respondent was making his frequent “trips to the Bay Area and pick up quantities of cocaine.” He was then “bringing his narcotics back into Sonoma County” and selling them there and “using Mr. Floyd to assist him in distributing the narcotics at the street.”
Tomlin went on to opine that Schemer and Gearardo (a married couple) “were assisting” respondent “by allowing him to keep the cocaine at their residence so that he could avoid detection. In exchange for them allowing him to do this, he was paying them with cocaine to support their habit” and “storing narcotics there to avoid detection.” Respondent was, in Tomlin’s opinion, “the ringleader of this operation” and used Floyd to sell “cocaine at a smaller level on the street.”
Finally, Tomlin opined that the reason respondent listed his residence with his parole officer as the Branching Way house in Petaluma (a house owned by his father) was that the residence of a person on parole is subject to search at *427any time and that, in fact, respondent “was using Grandview Way in Rohnert Park as kind of his home base where he was living with his pregnant girlfriend.”
V.
All of the above convinces me that there was indeed “some slight or prima facie” level of evidence adduced “in addition to,'‘ the admissions of former codefendants Floyd and Scheiner (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1171, 1165, 1177) to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.3 It seems clear, therefore, that this was not a prosecution directed at “a crime that never happened.” {Id. at p. 1169.)
Reinforcing this conclusion are the arguments made by this respondent’s counsel at the section 995 hearing. There, he contended that the magistrate who conducted that preliminary hearing had been “correct” that there had been “no independent evidence of an agreement,” and then added that there were “[n]o inferences that could be drawn from the evidence that was presented of the agreement.”4 The trial court appeared to agree with this argument, as it stated a few pages later: “I need to focus on the evidence before we get to the statements. What I’m deciding is whether those statements should come in. So I’m really not considering those statements at all until I make a ruling on whether or not those statements should come in in regards to conspiracy.”
As noted above, in his brief to us, defendant and respondent concedes that the trial court erred in excluding those statements. However, he continues, any such error was and is harmless because, even considering those statements, there was insufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy. The majority essentially agrees with this argument.
I believe that such a conclusion is simply not consistent with the principles articulated by our Supreme Court in Alvarez. As noted previously, that court specifically stated that (1) “independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible,” (2) “once the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the . . . *428extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues,” and (3) the requisite independent evidence may be considered “in addition to such statements.” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1171 & 1165.) I believe there clearly was sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to permit “an inference of criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 1171.)
I believe the majority substantially ignores the appropriateness of considering both “inferences” and circumstantial evidence because, among other things, my colleagues never cite, much less discuss, this court’s discussion of that precise issue in Lipinski, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at pages 575-576. Rather, the majority asserts: “Although the facts adduced at the hearings certainly supported the prosecution of sales of cocaine by certain of the [individual] defendants, they are insufficient to infer that Powers and his associates conspired to sell cocaine together.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 410.)
I strongly disagree. The “slight” or “minimal” independent evidence sufficient to permit an inference of such a conspiracy is summarized in part IV. above. Regrettably, the majority neglects to mention, much less consider, much of that evidence (see, especially, pars. 3, 4 and 5 of pt. IV, ante) and, unjustifiably, in my view, essentially rejects the opinion testimony of Detective Tomlin who concluded, among many other things, that defendant Powers-Monachello was “the ringleader of this operation.”
To their credit, my colleagues sum up a good deal of the evidence I have outlined above in this highly pregnant sentence: “Certainly the inference can reasonably be drawn that Powers knew the other defendants, that he was deceptive in his behavior; that he had an arrangement to rent space for the safe, which he often visited; and that the safe was found to contain cocaine for sale.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 414-415.) But then, and frankly rather startlingly, the majority brushes aside these very correct conclusions with its next sentence: “However, any inferences to be drawn from these facts are limited to Powers.” {Id. at p. 415) How can this possibly be so when (1) the safe containing the cocaine was at the house occupied by two other codefendants, (2) that house was regularly entered by Powers without knocking after each and every trip he made out of Sonoma County, and (3) Powers was friendly enough with one of the residents of that house (Schemer) to be seen working with the latter on the green BMW at that location? Finally, and most importantly, how can the majority’s “limited to Powers” conclusion be deemed even slightly consistent with the law regarding inferences of conspiracy as articulated by this court in Lipinski? (See dis. opn., ante, at pp. 421-422.)
*429In conclusion, I note again the phraseology of the Rayyis opinion, an opinion relied on extensively by both the majority and defendant and respondent (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 408, 413) and one involving, as here, a preliminary hearing, that “the amount of additional evidence that is required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule (aside from the . . . extrajudicial statements) is ‘slight’ or ‘minimal.’ ” (Rayyis, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.) I believe there clearly was such evidence here.

 The ruling at issue here involves a combination of a preliminary hearing record and a section 995 hearing. Although the motion brought by respondent was under section 995 subsequent to the prosecution’s filing of the information against him, in granting that motion the trial court clearly relied almost entirely on the transcript of the earlier preliminary hearing.

 And correctly so, as opinion evidence is admissible as either some or all of the “slight” or “minimal” independent evidence required. (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 450-451 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442]; People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 734-735 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618]; Rayyis, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 151.) Further, all defense counsel at the preliminary hearing, including defendant and respondent’s counsel, stipulated to Detective Tomlin’s expertise for purposes of that hearing.

 Indeed, in his brief to this court, respondent concedes that there was adequate evidence in the record to support six of the 10 overt acts charged in the information.

 As the People point out in their briefs to us, this is consistent with the argument made by respondent’s counsel at the preliminary hearing. There, that counsel relied on several preAlvarez cases in contending that there was insufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy to permit the court to consider the two extrajudicial statements. Those same cases are cited in defendant and respondent’s brief to us.