Court Opinion

ID: 9919476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:26.14974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.346777
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                                                  RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                   2022-SC-0301-MR

DURRELL DAVIS                                                             APPELLANT

                    ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
V.                    HONORABLE KATHLEEN LAPE, JUDGE
                               NO. 21-CR-01403

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                   APPELLEE

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                     AFFIRMING

      Durrell Davis was indicted on charges of sodomy in the first degree,

victim under 12, and sexual abuse in the first degree, victim under 12, relative

to conduct allegedly perpetrated against his girlfriend’s minor daughter. Both

charges were alleged to have occurred in a continuing course of conduct 1 over

a four-and-a-half-year period. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and

received a life sentence. He now appeals as a matter of right. 2 We affirm.

      1  Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 501.100(2) (“A person may be charged with
committing an offense against a vulnerable victim in a continuing course of conduct if
the unlawful act was committed against the same person two (2) or more times over a
specified period of time.”). It is undisputed that each of the crimes charged qualified
as an “offense against a vulnerable victim” as that term is defined in KRS 501.100(1).

      2   KY. CONST. §110(2)(b).
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In late 2018, after a presentation on body safety and inappropriate

touching at her elementary school, Nicole 3 reported to her second-grade

teacher that Davis had touched her in her “bathing suit area.” 4 The teacher

alerted the appropriate authorities and an investigation into potential sexual

abuse was initiated. The investigation revealed Davis had previously been

involved in a sexual relationship with Nicole’s mother, DeeDee, and would often

stay overnight at DeeDee’s apartment in Covington, Kentucky. Nicole disclosed

that Davis abused her when she was between three and five years of age. She

stated Davis would remove her clothes and touch her private parts with his

hands, mouth, and penis. The abuse occurred on two or three occasions and

Davis warned her not to tell anyone what had happened.

      During a voluntary interview with police on March 15, 2019, Davis stated

he was a father-figure to Nicole and considered her his “starter-daughter”

although they were not biologically related. In response to the allegations

against him, he told investigators Nicole was a hypersexualized child who was

“thirsty” for knowledge about sex. She would often enter the room while he

and DeeDee were engaging in sexual relations, and she repeatedly tried to

touch and kiss his genitals. Davis said Nicole would often awaken him by

“grinding” on him or sitting on his face. He indicated that on one occasion,

      3   In accordance with Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 7(B), we
refer to the juvenile victim by a pseudonym to protect her privacy.

      4   The presentation apparently used this term to refer to a child’s private parts.

                                            2
Nicole masturbated him almost to the point of ejaculation before he awoke

sufficiently to stop the contact. Davis admitted to having dreams of having sex

with Nicole. He claimed to have told DeeDee about Nicole’s inappropriate

conduct, but she seemed unconcerned. Davis stated he left his relationship

with DeeDee when Nicole was three or four and had no contact with them after

about 2015 when he moved to Cincinnati, Ohio.

      Sometime after the interview, Davis contacted several of his family

members and made incriminating statements. After the phone calls, Davis, his

mother, brother, and sister had a family meeting where Davis made more

horrific and damning admissions. He told his relatives Nicole was like “crack

cocaine” to him, he “had to have her,” and that he “loved the way [she] tasted.”

He said he “had never been so hard in his life” and that Nicole “brought out the

monster” in him. Davis indicated Nicole was coming on to him and he was just

giving her what she wanted. When pressed on how often things happened

between the two, he stated “10, 50, 80, 100, I don’t know how many times.”

      A jury convicted Davis of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in

the first degree. He received a life sentence for the sodomy conviction and a

concurrent five-year sentence for the sexual abuse conviction. This appeal

followed.

                                   ANALYSIS

      Davis now raises six allegations of error in seeking reversal. First, he

contends the continuing course of conduct language in the instructions

violated the rule laid down in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1390

                                        3
(2020). Second, and closely related to his first argument, he asserts the jury

instructions contained double jeopardy and unanimity violations. Next, Davis

argues the trial court failed to find a compelling need before permitting Nicole

to testify out of his line of sight. Fourth, Davis contends the trial court

erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce improper KRE 5 404(b)

evidence against him. Davis next alleges the trial court prevented him from

putting forward a defense when it limited his cross-examination of a police

detective. Finally, he contends two police detectives were improperly permitted

to give irrelevant testimony during the penalty phase of the trial.

      Several of the arguments raised on appeal were admittedly not preserved

for appellate review. To the extent his arguments are unpreserved, Davis

requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr 6 10.26. Although not properly

preserved, a palpable error “affects the substantial rights of a party” and “relief

may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted”

from the error. RCr 10.26. To obtain a reversal based on an alleged palpable

error, a defendant must show such error was “shocking or jurisprudentially

intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006). “When an

appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its focus is on what

happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and

unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 5.

      5   Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

      6   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                          4
                         I.   No Ramos violation occurred

      Davis first argues the continuous course of conduct language in the

instructions violated Ramos and his right to a unanimous verdict. This issue

was admittedly not raised before the trial court and is unpreserved. We will

therefore review only for palpable error.

      In Ramos, the United States Supreme Court simply held the Sixth

Amendment right to a unanimous verdict in criminal matters applies to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 140 S.Ct. at 1397. Louisiana and

Oregon were the only two states directly affected by the ruling as those states

allowed for a conviction on a finding of guilt by ten jurors. Id. at 1394. Ramos

had no practical impact in the Commonwealth because “Kentucky has long

required criminal convictions by a unanimous jury verdict.” Capstraw v.

Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148, 158 (Ky. 2022). See also Wells v.

Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978) (“Section 7 of the Kentucky

Constitution requires a unanimous verdict reached by a jury of twelve persons

in all criminal cases[]”); KRS 29A.280(3) (“A unanimous verdict is required in

all criminal trials by jury”); RCr 9.82(1) (“The verdict shall be unanimous. It

shall be returned by the jury in open court[]”).

      Nevertheless, Davis asserts inclusion in the jury instructions of the

continuing course of conduct language of KRS 501.100 violated Ramos and

created a unanimity issue. Although his argument is underdeveloped and

                                        5
based primarily on speculation, supposition, and belief, 7 it is clear that Davis

seeks an expansive reading of the Ramos holding to cover a situation neither

contemplated nor ruled upon by the Supreme Court. While unanimity was

generally addressed, that opinion plainly does not reach the type of issue

raised herein. Davis raises no challenge to the validity of KRS 501.100 and

there is nothing in the record to indicate less than all twelve jurors voted for a

finding of guilt. Under the facts presented, Ramos is inapplicable in this

matter, and we decline Davis’s invitation to expand it beyond its clear and

narrow holding. There was no error, and certainly no palpable error.

       II. The instructions did not violate unanimity or double jeopardy

      Second, and closely related to his first argument, Davis contends the

instructions presented unanimity and double jeopardy violations as they did

not sufficiently differentiate between the acts identified as sodomy from the

acts identified as sexual abuse. He asserts the language in the instructions

made it possible for the jury to rely on the same conduct to convict him of the

two separate charged offenses. Davis acknowledges his challenges are

unpreserved and requests palpable error review. As an unpreserved alleged

error, absent a finding that manifest injustice resulted, no palpable error will

be deemed to have occurred. See Sexton v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 227,

      7  Davis contends the verdict in his case did not reflect the “conscience of the
community” but rather “the passions of a subset of the jury” which occurred “in the
already pressurized environment” surrounding child sex cases. He baldly asserts that
because the jury deliberated his guilt for just over an hour, there can be no certainty
of unanimity in their decision.

                                           6
232 (Ky. 2022) (holding that “reversal is not the universal, essential result of a

unanimous verdict error. Where manifest injustice will not result, this Court

can find no palpable error”). “In all cases presenting an unpreserved error

regarding a unanimous jury, the courts must ‘plumb the depths of the

proceeding’ and scrutinize the factual idiosyncrasies of the individual case.

That includes a consideration of the weight of the evidence.” Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Martin, 207 S.W.3d

at 4).

         Davis presents a challenge based on what he characterizes as a

“multiple-acts” unanimous-verdict violation as described in Martin v.

Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2015). Further, he asserts the evidence

permitted the jury to convict him of two crimes based on the same act, thereby

resulting in a double jeopardy violation. He contends the sexual abuse

instruction merely required the jury to find he engaged in sexual contact with

Nicole without specifying what body parts were used to perpetrate the crime or

what act or acts would qualify as sexual contact. In his estimation, if the jury

were to conclude his act of touching Nicole’s vagina with his mouth constituted

deviate sexual intercourse sufficient to convict him of sodomy, it would

automatically also have to conclude he subjected Nicole to sexual contact. In

short, he contends one cannot engage in deviate sexual intercourse without

also engaging in sexual contact and thus the instructions were infirm as it

cannot be said with certainty that the jurors did not use the same conduct to

convict him of two separate crimes. His arguments are without merit.

                                         7
      The evidence adduced at trial revealed multiple instances of sexual abuse

comprised of two distinct categories of acts: oral sex and rubbing/touching of

genitals with hands. The instructions made clear that deviate sexual

intercourse required for a finding of guilt on the charge of sodomy related to

the sex organs of one person and the mouth of the other and the sexual

contact required for sexual abuse involved the touching of the sexual or

intimate parts of another for the purpose of sexual gratification. There were

two separate and discrete criminal acts which were each supported by

substantial testimony.

      First-degree sexual abuse is properly classified as a lesser included
      offense of first-degree sodomy. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864
      S.W.2d 266, 277 (Ky. 1993). The distinction between the two
      offenses is the body part touched for purposes of sexual
      gratification. Sexual abuse requires “sexual contact,” KRS
      510.110, which means “touching of the sexual or other intimate
      parts of a person,” KRS 510.010(7). Sodomy, on the other hand,
      requires “deviate sexual intercourse,” KRS 510.070, which means
      “any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1)
      person and the mouth or anus of another,” KRS 510.010(1). The
      additional element in a sodomy offense is the specific sexual or
      intimate parts involved, namely, the mouth or anus.

Mash v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 548, 559 (Ky. 2012). Thus, whether

Davis’s convictions for sodomy and sexual abuse violate double jeopardy

depends on whether the sexual abuse was incidental to and thus subsumed by

the sodomy or was instead a separate criminal act. See Commonwealth v.

Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996) (adopting the test set forth in

Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).

                                        8
      The acts of Davis touching Nicole’s vagina with his hands and Nicole

grabbing Davis’s genitals and masturbating him were wholly unrelated to and

independent of the oral sodomy Davis inflicted on Nicole. The separate charge

of sexual abuse here was not based on contact related to the oral sodomies,

but on separate acts of sexual gratification. See Benet v. Commonwealth, 253

S.W.3d 528, 536 (Ky. 2008); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737, 739-

40 (Ky. 1984). There was no double jeopardy violation.

      Further, the instructions sufficiently differentiated the criminal acts

necessary for a finding of guilt under each. This is simply not the type of

unanimity violation described in Martin. There was no error, and certainly no

palpable error as there can be no reasonable possibility a manifest injustice

occurred.

   III.     Davis waived any challenge to the trial court’s decision to shield
                              Nicole from his line of sight

      Davis next contends the trial court erred in failing to make a finding of a

“compelling need” for Nicole to be shielded from his sight line during her

testimony. He asserts the placing of a television set and other equipment

between himself and Nicole while she was on the witness stand violated his

constitutional right to confront his accuser. Our review of the record reveals

Davis waived any challenge to the trial court’s ruling.

      Almost all issues are subject to waiver, whether from inaction or
      consent, even in a criminal case, and “[a] new theory of error
      cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Springer v.
      Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999)[.] . . . The lone
      exception to this rule, of course, is when the question is whether
      the trial court had general subject-matter jurisdiction.

                                        9
Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2013) (citations

omitted).

      Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion pursuant to KRS

26A.140 and 421.350 seeking to permit Nicole to testify via closed circuit

television from outside the courtroom or, alternatively, to allow her to testify

out of Davis’s line of sight, citing the emotional trauma which would ensue

from Nicole having to see Davis, a substantial probability she would then be

unable to testify, and the emotional and physical consequences which would

befall her following her testimony. A hearing was held on the motion

approximately a week before trial, during which defense counsel acknowledged

that “by statute they are entitled to” the requested accommodation. After Davis

indicated his preference for using a whiteboard to shield Nicole from his view

rather than having her testify via closed circuit television, the trial court noted

its desire to protect Davis’s confrontation rights and agreed to allowing

placement of a whiteboard. Defense counsel further stated it was “fine” for

Nicole to enter the courtroom in a way that would prevent her from having to

see Davis.

      At the beginning of the second day of trial and just before Nicole was to

testify, defense counsel objected to the use of any screening and informed the

trial court that although Davis had previously consented to using the

whiteboard accommodation, he now believed based on an unnamed Court of

Appeals opinion that the Commonwealth was required to show a compelling

need prior to being granted an accommodation for a witness such as Nicole. In
                                        10
response, the Commonwealth indicated the objection was untimely, especially

considering Davis had consented to the accommodation at the pretrial hearing.

The trial court overruled Davis’s objection, noting there had been two pretrial

conferences to handle all pending motions and plenty of time to argue the

matter before trial commenced.

      Davis now challenges the trial court’s ruling on the Commonwealth’s

motion for an accommodation, asserting KRS 421.350 mandates a finding of a

compelling need prior to allowing a child victim to testify outside the presence

of the defendant. His argument fails for two reasons. First, by its plain

language, KRS 421.350 is inapplicable as that statute concerns only child

victim testimony taken outside the courtroom, and here, Nicole admittedly

testified inside the courtroom. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Davis

has waived the right to raise this argument. He never raised KRS 421.350

before the trial court as a basis for seeking relief so he cannot now present this

new theory for the first time on appeal. Further, he explicitly consented to the

use of a screening mechanism, objecting only at an untimely and inappropriate

time to such screening. Davis is not now entitled to any relief.

            IV. There was no error in allowing KRE 404(b) evidence

      Davis next posits the trial court erroneously permitted the

Commonwealth to elicit testimony from Nicole about uncharged illicit sexual

acts which occurred in Ohio. He contends the evidence served only to show he

was predisposed to sexually assault a child and should have therefore been

excluded. We disagree.

                                        11
      Although Davis argues to the contrary, we discern this issue was not

properly preserved for appellate review. No objection to the introduction of this

portion of Nicole’s testimony appears on the record, nor have we been directed

to a ruling by the trial court. The Commonwealth filed the required notice

pursuant to KRE 404(c) indicating an intention to elicit other crimes evidence

from Nicole during trial. The trial court convened a hearing on the notice the

day before trial, but Davis challenged Nicole’s proposed testimony only on

competency grounds and noted alleged inconsistencies between statements she

made during her investigatory interview and those he made to police during his

own interview. No contemporaneous objection was lodged during Nicole’s trial

testimony. Thus, the issue is not preserved for appeal. However, in his reply

brief, Davis has requested we undertake a palpable error review of this issue.

As previously stated, an error is palpable only if it resulted in a manifest

injustice. Upon review, we discern no error, much less palpable error.

      Nicole was on the witness stand for approximately twelve minutes. When

asked if Davis had ever touched her in a way she did not like, she testified

Davis “raped” her. Upon subsequent questioning by the Commonwealth, she

explained “rape” to her meant Davis touched her private parts with his penis,

hands, and mouth. She stated these acts occurred on more than one occasion

at her apartment and she also remembered things happening at “JuJu’s

house.” On cross-examination, Nicole said she thought JuJu lived in Ohio. No

other mention of any uncharged acts arose during Nicole’s testimony.

                                        12
      KRE 404(b) regulates the admissibility of evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts. Such evidence “is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Id. The Rule provides

for two exceptions allowing such evidence to be admitted:

      (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
          opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
          absence of mistake or accident; or

      (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
          the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
          accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
          party.

Id. Furthermore, “evidence of similar acts perpetrated against the same victim

are [sic] almost always admissible” to prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake

or accident. Lopez v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Ky. 2015) (quoting

Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002)).

      The question of whether uncharged misconduct should be admissible

“confront[s] . . . courts with a difficult choice between protecting defendants

against unfair prejudice and impeding the proof of charges by the prosecution.”

Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30[1][a] (2022

ed.). KRE 404(b) is “exclusionary in nature” and, as such, “any exceptions to

the general rule that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible should be

‘closely watched and strictly enforced because of the dangerous quality and

prejudicial consequences of this kind of evidence.’” Clark v. Commonwealth,

223 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Ky. 2007) (quoting O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d

153, 156 (Ky. 1982)). We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence

                                        13
under KRE 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231

S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). Such an abuse occurs only when the trial court’s

ruling was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      Here, there was little more than a fleeting mention of Nicole recalling

“things happening” while she and Davis were visiting JuJu’s house. The

Commonwealth quickly moved on from the topic and did not seek to obtain

details of any uncharged occurrences. The testimony did not draw an objection

for the defense and the trial court was never asked to rule on the

appropriateness and admissibility of the evidence. We can perceive no

prejudice suffered by Davis by this testimony, and certainly not sufficient harm

to overcome the general rule permitting admission of similar acts perpetrated

against the same victim. Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by Davis’s

suggestion that Nicole’s brief mention of unspecified acts occurring in Ohio

served only to show he was predisposed to sexually assaulting a child. There

being no prejudice, no manifest injustice, and no showing the trial court

abused its discretion, we conclude there was no error in Nicole’s testimony,

and undoubtedly no palpable error.

            V. Davis was not prevented from presenting a defense

      For his fifth allegation of error, Davis contends the trial court erred when

it prevented questioning of one of the investigating detectives about the use of

                                       14
the “Reid Technique” of interrogation. 8 On cross-examination, the detective

was asked whether he had been trained in the technique and whether he was

aware of the controversy surrounding its use. The Commonwealth objected to

further questioning on relevancy grounds and the trial court agreed. Davis

asserts the ruling was flawed and prevented him from presenting an entire

defense. We disagree.

      Recently, in Carson, this Court analyzed the use of testimony regarding

the Reid Technique. 621 S.W.3d at 447-51. There, under direct questioning

from the Commonwealth, a police officer described at length the methodology

underlying the technique and was allowed to state he was able to use its

behavioral analysis principles to determine from verbal and non-verbal cues

that the defendant was being deceptive during the interview. We held the

officer’s testimony went beyond the pale and infringed on the province of the

jury as he claimed to have specialized knowledge beyond that of a lay witness

which essentially gave him the ability to be a human lie detector.

      On the contrary, in this matter it was the defendant who broached the

subject matter, hoping to undermine the reliability of his own statement to

police. Further, a review of the recorded interview reveals no adversarialism or

      8  The Reid Technique is “a multi-phase interrogation technique in which an
investigating officer analyzes the suspect’s behavior, looking for signs of deception,
and then engages in a confrontational interrogation if they believe they spot such
indicators.” Carson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Ky. 2021). Use of this
method of interrogation has been subjected to great scrutiny and was one of the main
motivating factors for the United States Supreme Court creating the Miranda warnings
which are required to be given before any suspect can be interrogated. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).

                                         15
deceptive or dismissive practices for which the Reid Techniques is known. The

interview had previously been played for the jury and no concerns had been

raised. Contrary to his assertion, we cannot discern any relevance to

permitting further questioning regarding an interrogation method which was

not actually used during his interaction with police. The trial court did not err

in restricting this line of questioning.

            VI. Penalty phase testimony was improper but harmless

      For his final assertion of error, Davis argues two detectives were

permitted to give irrelevant testimony about the impacts of the investigation on

Nicole. During the penalty phase, two investigating detectives testified for a

total of approximately nine minutes. Pertinent to the issue raised by Davis, the

first detective stated his first interview with Nicole was ended early because she

“shut down” after her mother began crying and lost her composure and a

second interview was only marginally better than the first. The other detective

commented that upon speaking with staff at Nicole’s school, he was informed

Nicole would “be incontinent for a week or so” after any interaction with police.

      Davis argues neither detective qualified as a “victim” under the definition

of KRS 421.500 9 and therefore their testimony regarding the emotional impacts

of the investigation on Nicole was infirm. Davis further contends the detectives’

      9  After defining the term “victim” as one who is directly harmed as the result of
certain crimes, KRS 421.500(1)(a) states: “[i]f the victim is a minor, incapacitated, or
deceased, ‘victim’ also means one (1) or more of the victim’s spouse, parents, siblings,
children, or other lawful representatives which shall be designated by the court[.]”

                                           16
testimony was so improper and prejudicial that it incited the jury to give him

the maximum sentence. These allegations of error are concededly unpreserved.

      KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7) allows the Commonwealth to present evidence

regarding “[t]he impact of the crime upon the victim or victims, as defined in

KRS 421.500, including a description of the nature and extent of any physical,

psychological, or financial harm suffered by the victim or victims[.]” We agree

with Davis that based on the definition of “victim” in KRS 421.500, neither

detective fits into that category, and further agree their testimony crossed the

line to be considered victim impact testimony. However, we conclude the error

was harmless and did not impact the outcome of Davis’s trial.

      Each detective’s testimony was brief, gave a factual account of their

experiences investigating the crimes, did not tend to over-dramatize the

impacts of the crimes, and did not attempt to inflame the passions of the jury

or appeal for sympathy. The testimony was plainly not extreme, emotional, or

outrageous. Neither detective even alluded to the pending penalty decision nor

made a recommendation of the appropriate course of action for the jury to

take. Nevertheless, their testimony did constitute improper victim impact

evidence as it tended to show the victim’s mindset and the psychological

impact the crimes and ensuing investigation had on her.

      Although the detectives were not competent under the statutory language

to qualify as “victims,” we can discern no undue prejudice from the testimony.

In no way could these brief statements be seen as having “substantially

swayed” the verdict in the penalty phase. See Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283

                                       17
S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2010) (“A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be

deemed harmless [ ] if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”). While the detectives’

testimony regarding their difficulties in interviewing the child victim and her

school personnel’s dissatisfaction with her resulting behaviors was erroneous,

there was no manifest injustice and thus the error does not rise to the level of

palpable error warranting the reversal Davis seeks.

                                 CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is

affirmed.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kathleen Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Kentucky Attorney General

Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General

                                       18