Court Opinion

ID: 9364792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:16.312058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.525552
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re BOLYARD-PRUETT/CRUMPTON/PRUETT,                                January 19, 2023
Minors.
                                                                     No. 361346
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2020-000182-NA

In re M. M. WARREN-PRUETT, Minor.                                    No. 361349
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2020-000182-NA

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In these consolidated appeals, respondent appeals as of right the termination of her parental
rights to six children. In Docket No. 361346, the trial court terminated respondent’s rights to EC,
GB, JP, NP, and SP under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). In Docket No. 361349, the
court terminated her parental rights to MW under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm for the
reasons stated in this opinion.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

       This case arises from respondent’s neglect, abuse, and improper supervision of her
children. On February 4, 2020, she was arrested for solicitation. She informed the police that her
children were home alone. Child Protective Services accompanied the police to respondent’s
home. When they arrived, they found NP, who was four years old, in a bedroom locked from the
outside. She was naked and covered in feces, and feces was smeared on the walls and the windows.
There was a bare crib mattress on the floor. JP, who was also four years old, and SP, who was
seven months old, were locked inside a second bedroom. JP was unusually drowsy because
respondent had given him a dose of Benadryl intended for an older child. The children were taken

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into protective custody. Following a medical examination, it was determined that JP and NP
suffered from severe autism.

        Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, filed a petition requesting the
court remove the children from respondent’s care and take jurisdiction over them. Respondent
entered a plea of admission to jurisdiction. In addition to admitting to leaving the children alone
and unsupervised in an unsuitable home, respondent admitted that JP, NP, and SP had tested
positive for cocaine when they were born, and she admitted that she had used cocaine as recently
as February 13, 2020. The court accepted her plea and entered an order taking jurisdiction over
the children.

       Thereafter, the court ordered respondent to participate in a treatment plan designed to
address her substance abuse, improve her parenting skills, and assist her in obtaining suitable
housing. Respondent, however, consistently failed to make progress with her treatment plan. She
continued to test positive for cocaine and did not participate fully in substance-abuse treatment or
other counseling. Moreover, she continued to lack suitable housing and was unable to maintain
employment. Although respondent attended in-person and virtual parenting time, the visits were
chaotic and respondent was unable to handle parenting-time visits where all five children were
present. She was offered a parent-partner to assist her, but she did not cooperate with that service.

       In the meantime, respondent became pregnant with MW. During her pregnancy, she
admitted that she used cocaine and she continued to test positive for cocaine. Subsequently, MW
tested positive for cocaine when she was born. She exhibited signs of cocaine withdrawal,
including seizures, difficulty breathing, and increased heartrate. Because of her symptoms, she
remained hospitalized for more than a month. When she was released, she still required a feeding
tube and oxygen.

       Petitioner filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to her five
older children, and filed an initial petition asking the court to take jurisdiction over MW and to
terminate respondent’s parental rights to her. Following a combined adjudication/termination
hearing, the trial court found grounds to take jurisdiction over MW, that there were statutory
grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), and that
termination of respondent’s parental rights to MW was in MW’s best interests. The court also
found that there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the older five
children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), and that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in their best interests. This appeal follows.

                                  II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to
terminate her parental rights to the children. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s
finding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

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committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id.
at 296-297.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

                                     1. OLDER CHILDREN

        The court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the five older children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). Termination is warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
and (c)(i) if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

               (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's
       jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
       the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
       notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
       conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
       within a reasonable time considering the child's age.

        The initial dispositional order was entered in March 2020, and the order terminating
respondent’s parental rights to the older children was entered in May 2022. The conditions that
led to the adjudication included respondent’s substance abuse, her lack of appropriate housing for
the children, and her neglect and improper supervision of the children. Despite more than two
years of services, respondent was unable to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication.

         In particular, respondent was unable to remedy her long-standing substance abuse problem.
As part of her plea of admission, she admitted that she started using cocaine when she was 18 years
old and that she had used continuously since then. She also admitted that two of her children had
tested positive for cocaine after she gave birth to them. To address this condition, petitioner
referred respondent for drug screens, a substance-abuse assessment, and substance-abuse
counseling. Respondent never participated in the court-ordered substance abuse assessment, and
she did not attend weekly therapy. In August 2020 and January 2021, respondent admitted herself
into two separate in-patient substance abuse facilities. However, she was expelled from both
facilities after five days because she engaged in physical altercations with other residents.
Respondent admitted that she continued to use cocaine during the pendency of the child protective
proceedings, and her drug screens corroborated her admissions. Respondent submitted to 18 of 54
offered drug screens.         She tested positive for cocaine 18 times, tested positive for
methamphetamine twice, and tested positive for THC once. Thus, 100% of the drug screens that
she submitted reflected that substance-abuse continued to be a problem. Indeed, respondent
admittedly used cocaine while pregnant with MW.

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         On appeal, respondent contends that her use of cocaine did not harm the children after they
were born and that she never arrived at parenting time under the influence. The evidence belies
these assertions. Witnesses testified that respondent appeared lethargic during visits and often fell
asleep. From this, a trier of fact could infer that respondent was under the influence of drugs when
she visited her children. Given this record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that more
than 182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional order and that one of the conditions leading
to adjudication—respondent’s substance abuse—had not been rectified. Moreover, given that
respondent had made no progress in the more than two-year period between the initial adjudication
and the termination hearing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that she would be unable
to rectify that condition within a reasonable time.

       Likewise, the other conditions leading to the adjudication had not been rectified.
Respondent continued to lack suitable housing. A caseworker testified that when she evaluated
the home, it was cluttered and that there were drug paraphernalia and baggies of a substance
suspected to be cocaine. Because of these conditions, the caseworker determined that the home
was not suitable for the children. Regarding a legal source of income, respondent claimed to be
employed, but she never provided verification of gainful employment.

        Respondent also failed to benefit from parenting classes. First, she only attended one of
two recommended parenting classes. Second, she insisted on virtual parenting time as opposed to
in-person parenting time. Initially, she expressed concern about COVID-19 exposure, but she later
admitted that her twins were too much for her to handle and that it was just easier for her to have
virtual visits. As a result, at the time of the termination hearing she had not seen her older children
in person in approximately 11 months. The parenting-time visits—regardless of whether they were
virtual or in-person—were chaotic. During the virtual visits, respondent’s young children
struggled to focus on the camera and respondent generally talked with either her caseworkers or
the foster parents. She appeared lethargic during the visits, would sometimes “doze off,” and
would occasionally abruptly leave the virtual visitation. At times she would just shut off her
camera. During the in-person visits, respondent struggled to manage all of the children. She often
requested that the caseworker not bring the twins—both of whom are autistic—to parenting time.
Frequently, she left SP in her stroller the entire visit. Respondent also made hurtful comments to
the children that negatively affected them after the visit. For example, she called GB fat. GB
would usually hyperventilate in the car ride home and would then cry herself to sleep. Respondent
referred to EC as a “pimp.” He expressed suicidal thoughts and required extra therapy sessions.

        In sum, respondent failed to rectify her substance-abuse issues. She continued to lack
appropriate housing for the children and did not have a verified source of income. Moreover,
despite completing a parenting-skills class, she was unable to show that she had benefited. Given
the substantial length of time provided for her to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication, and

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considering the young ages of the children, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii).1

                                      2. YOUNGEST CHILD

        The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights to MW
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). Termination is warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

               (g) The parent, although, in the court's discretion, financially able to do so,
       fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
       expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
       reasonable time considering the child's age.

        As noted above, MW tested positive for cocaine when she was born. She suffered severe
cocaine-withdrawal symptoms, including seizures, difficulty breathing, and increased heartrate.
Because of respondent’s admitted drug-use during her pregnancy, MW was hospitalized for over
one month and required a feeding tube and oxygen even after she was discharged. At that time,
respondent’s older children had been removed due to respondent’s substance abuse, lack of
suitable housing, and neglect and improper supervision of them. She had been offered services
for approximately one year to address each of those barriers to reunification. She had not shown
any benefit. Indeed, her continued drug use reflects that she was not complying with her case
services plan. Under such circumstances, respondent failed to provide MW with proper care and
custody. Moreover, given that respondent had not shown any benefit—not even a minimal
decrease—in her substance abuse or an improvement to her parenting skills, there is no reasonable
expectation that respondent would be able to provide MW with proper care and custody within a
reasonable time. See In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (stating that
“[h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                      III. BEST INTERESTS

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Respondent also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
was in the children’s best interests. We review for clear error the court’s finding that termination
is in a child’s best interests. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        The court may consider several factors when deciding if termination of parental rights is
in a child’s best interests, including the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability,

1
  If this Court finds that the trial court did not clearly err as to the existence of one ground for
termination, this Court need not address any additional termination grounds. See In re HRC, 286
Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

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the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over
the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The court
may also consider psychological evaluations, the child’s age, continued involvement in domestic
violence, and a parent’s history. In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 131. The focus is on the child, not
the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

        The record reflects that the children’s ages were between one year and 12 years old. The
court found that the 12-year-old child, EC, had mild autism. He also suffered from severe mental
health issues and was receiving therapy. While in foster care, EC disclosed significant abuse and
neglect while in respondent’s care. Contact with respondent was a trauma-trigger for EC. Indeed,
after visits with respondent, EC expressed thoughts of self-harm. He was vocal about not having
a continued relationship with respondent. At the time of termination, EC had been placed in the
same foster home for almost two years. These caregivers had not fully committed to planning long
term, but they indicated a continued willingness to consider adoption. Weighing all of these
factors, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental
rights to EC was in the child’s best interests. It is evident from the record that EC had a strong
need for finality in order to ensure his mental and emotional well-being. A child’s need for finality
is a proper factor for the court to consider when balancing a child’s best interests. In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42.

        Eleven-year-old GB was placed with her legal father. The stability created by this
placement allowed her to thrive academically, physically, and emotionally. Similar to EC, she
reported that she had been physically and sexually abused while in respondent’s care. Respondent
admitted knowing of the abuse, but did not think it mattered because the abuser was dead.
Moreover, based on respondent’s behavior during parenting time, GB reported that respondent
seemed uninterested in visiting because she frequently appeared eager to end virtual visits. And,
as indicated above, respondent would call GB “fat,” which would result in the child
hyperventilating on the ride home and crying herself to sleep. In light of this record, the trial court
did not clearly err by finding that GB’s best interests would be served by terminating respondent’s
parental rights so that GB could achieve finality, which would promote continued healing of the
trauma caused by respondent’s neglect.

        The twins, JP and NP, were six years old at the time of termination. They were both
nonverbal and diagnosed with autism. JP and NP both required speech and occupational therapy,
but NP’s behavioral issues were more difficult than JP’s. Throughout the case, they were moved
to multiple foster homes. Indeed, NP had stayed with six different foster families. However, at
the time of termination, they were placed together and the caregivers had expressed a willingness
to plan permanently for the children. By contrast, respondent was not equipped to provide proper
care for them. Instead, she would request that they not be brought to in-person visits because they
were too difficult to handle. The situation with three-year old SP was very similar. She was also
diagnosed with autism and developmental delays. Her foster parent was willing to plan
permanently for SP. Considering that respondent had not benefited from services, the trial court
did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best
interests of JP, NP, and SP. Respondent was unable—and, in the twins’ case, unwilling—to parent
her children, whereas the foster families had demonstrated that they could satisfy the special needs
of the children in their care.

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        Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in MW’s best interests. Following her discharge
from the hospital at approximately one month of age, MW was placed with her legal father.
Respondent had only seen MW one time during the year that preceded the termination hearing.
Clearly, no bond could have developed with this limited contact. Further, MW was recently
diagnosed with a syndrome that would require her to participate in physical therapy to strengthen
the muscles in her torso and legs. Because respondent was unable to lead a substance-free lifestyle,
and she lacked the parenting skills necessary to parent a child, special needs or otherwise, the trial
court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental rights to MW was
in the child’s best interests.

        Nevertheless, respondent suggests that because GB and MW are in the care of their fathers,
termination of her parental rights to these two children was not warranted. The trial court,
however, determined that despite the children’s placement with their fathers, termination of
respondent’s parental rights was necessary to ensure the safety of the children. That finding was
not clearly erroneous.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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