Court Opinion

ID: 9855486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:26:00.839852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:55.572673
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I believe the harmless error doctrine can be applied in this case. Admittedly, this view is a change from a previously held position. I believe, however, that changes in the law now allow the harmless error doctrine to be applied to coerced but reliable confessions.
At the time of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 87 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), two leading United States Supreme Court cases on the exclusionary rule, it was generally assumed that confessions given in violation of Miranda were subject to the harmless error doctrine. The same could not be said for coerced confessions.
The introduction of involuntary or coerced confessions clearly calls for automatic reversal regardless of the amount of other evidence indicating guilt____
... The Supreme Court has settled it as the law that involuntary confessions call for automatic reversal because the right not to be forced to testify against one’s self is “basic to a fair trial.” The Court may have been concerned about the likelihood that an accused may make an untrue confession in order to escape mental or physical abuse at the hands of his interrogators. It is likely that the Court felt that coerced confessions, although extremely unreliable, could have a determinative effect on the minds of the jurors, and thus felt it the safer rule to require reversal in all cases, rather than draw fine lines concerning the quantum of additional evidence necessary to render the error “harmless.”
Cameron & Osborne, When Harmless Error Isn’t Harmless, 1971 LAW & SOC. ORD. 24, 29-30. At this time, however, I question the blanket assumption that the admission of any coerced confession is per se harmful and therefore reversible.
In the instant case, the majority has stated that the erroneous admission of defendant’s first confession to Sarivola, which was held to be involuntary, cannot be considered harmless error. The majority states, “there is an unbroken line of authority supporting the rule that ... the harmless error doctrine does not apply to coerced confessions.” To support this proposition, the majority cites United States Supreme Court and other federal cases.
The federal cases cited by the majority are not sound authority for its ruling. Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1535-37 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 2832, 100 L.Ed.2d 933 (1988), involved a confession obtained in violation of Miranda, not a coerced confession. The court in Miller held that the defendant’s confession was voluntary. Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 218 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928, 107 S.Ct. 3212, 96 L.Ed.2d 699 (1987), held that it was improper to apply a harmless error analysis to a denial of the right of self-representation. In dicta, the court merely cited Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958), for the proposition that harmless error does not apply to coerced confessions. United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1456 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, Ramirez v. United States, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987), was not a coerced confession case either. The court found the confession to be voluntary, but in dicta cited Mincey v. Arizona as authority that harmless error does not apply to coerced confessions. Williams v. Maggio, 727 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (5th Cir.1984), involved only a claim that the confession was involuntary, which the court found to be unsupported by any evidence. Here too, the court in dicta cited Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), as authority that harmless error does not apply to coerced confessions. Finally, in United States v. Davis, *264617 F.2d 677, 695-96 (D.C.Cir.1979), the court in dicta referred to Mincey and Jackson as holding that a coerced confession would require reversal. The court found, however, that the confession in question was voluntarily given.
Thus, of the citations given as support, only three have actually held that the admission of coerced confessions cannot be considered harmless error. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 98 S.Ct. at 2416; Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77, 84 S.Ct. at 1780-81; Payne, 356 U.S. at 568, 78 S.Ct. at 850. Of these three cases, only Mincey is a post-Chapman, post-Miranda case. All of these cases involved confessions obtained under circumstances that resulted in the defendant being in a weakened, vulnerable physical condition and the police using coercive pressure through intensive interrogation to elicit a confession.
In Payne, a pre-Chapman case, a “mentally dull” youth was arrested for murder without a warrant, denied a hearing and not informed of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. 356 U.S. at 567, 78 S.Ct. at 849-50. The defendant was held incommunicado for three days during which family members who requested to see him were turned away and he was refused permission to make a phone call. Id. at 563, 78 S.Ct. at 848. The defendant was denied food for over twenty-five hours and then only given two sandwiches and not fed again for another fifteen hours. Id. at 564, 78 S.Ct. at 848. The police told the defendant that thirty to forty people were waiting outside to get him. Id. A police officer told the defendant that if he would make a confession he i would try to keep the mob away from him. Id. The Court found that because of the totality of this course of police conduct and particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, the confession had been coerced and did not constitute an “expression of free choice.” Id. at 567, 78 S.Ct. at 850.
In Jackson, a pre-Miranda, pre-Chapman case, the defendant was involved in a gun battle with police after he robbed a hotel clerk. 378 U.S. at 370-71, 84 S.Ct. at 1777. He was shot twice, but managed to get to a hospital. Id. Jackson made incriminating statements to a detective and then hospital personnel gave him demerol, an analgesic sedative, and scopolamine, a drug used to dry up mouth secretion in preparation for surgery. Id. at 371, 84 S.Ct. at 1778. Police continued to interrogate him even though by this time Jackson had lost 500 cc. of blood. Id. At one point Jackson said, “Look, I can’t go on;” however, police continued to question him. Id. An hour after the questioning, doctors operated on him. Id. at 371-72, 84 S.Ct. at 1778. The Court reversed the denial of defendant’s habeas corpus petition and remanded the case to the district court to allow the state a reasonable time to afford him a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession or a new trial. Id. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788. The Court recognized that the facts could be interpreted to find that the confession was coerced as a result of the police tactics. Id. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788.
In Mincey, the defendant had unbearable pain in his leg, was in intensive care in the hospital and was depressed to the point of coma. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 98 S.Ct. at 2416-17. The defendant was lying on his back, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus. Id. at 399, 98 S.Ct. at 2417. He clearly expressed his wish not to be interrogated. Id. When the detective began the interrogation, the defendant wrote: “This is all I can say without a lawyer.” Id. The detective continued the interrogation despite Mincey’s pleas to stop.
Moreover, he complained several times that he was confused or unable to think clearly, or that he could answer more accurately the next day. But despite Mincey’s entreaties to be let alone, [Detective] Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals when Mincey lost consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness.
*265Mincey, 437 U.S. at 400-01, 98 S.Ct. at 2418.
The Court said it was apparent that the defendant’s statements were not the product of his free and rational choice. “Due process of law requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 402, 98 S.Ct. at 2418.
In each of these three “coerced confession” cases, the defendant was in a physically distraught condition, which the police took advantage of by interrogating the defendant despite the defendant’s indications that he did not want to make a statement or confess. In each case, the Supreme Court recognized that coercion is more than police brutality, it can also result from relentless interrogation inflicted on a defendant in a physically-weakened condition. Thus Payne, Jackson, and Mincey stand for the proposition that in these types of situations, confessions obtained by these means amount to coerced confessions that are not admissible and are not subject to the harmless error doctrine.
There have been, however, several cases involving involuntary confessions, sometimes characterized as “coerced,” in which courts have applied a harmless error analysis. These confessions were considered coerced only in a technical sense and did not involve the egregious police methods or brutality characteristic of the true “coercion” cases. See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (assuming, arguendo, that confession obtained by police officer posing as an accused person confined in defendant’s cell should have been excluded, record clearly revealed that any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Federal circuit courts have also considered this issue in several cases. See United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.1986) (assuming defendant’s statements were involuntary because police detective misled defendant into thinking that he was being questioned for an assault, not a murder, court concluded that their admission into evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt); Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.1982) (admission of involuntary confession induced by alleged police representation that “consideration” would be given to defendant held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323, 325 (4th Cir.1971) (despite a dispute in the record about the voluntariness of the statement, court finds its admission to be harmless error); United States ex rel. Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966, 90 S.Ct. 2180, 26 L.Ed.2d 550 (1970) (“While the case where admission of an improperly obtained confession can be considered harmless error is exceedingly rare, this is one.”).
State courts, including this court, have held the erroneous admission of involuntary confessions to be harmless error. State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 387, 724 P.2d 1, 6 (1986) (admission of defendant’s statement regarding whereabouts of victim’s body induced by police telling defendant they would bring his sister to the site if he refused to tell them where the body was, may have amounted to coercion, but any error in failing to suppress the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Gibson, 109 Ill.App.3d 316, 64 Ill.Dec. 787, 440 N.E.2d 339 (1982) (defendant’s incriminating statements given to his cellmate, a government informant who was also a convicted felon, were improperly admitted, but in view of other testimony, it was only cumulative and the error was harmless); Kelley v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind.1984) (even if the defendant’s statements were involuntary, reversal not réquired because any error in the admission of the challenged statements would be harmless); People v. Ferkins, 116 A.D.2d 760, 497 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1986) (court finds state did not prove admissions to be voluntary, however any error in their admission was harmless given the cumulative nature of the statements); State v. Johnson, 35 Wash.App. 380, 666 P.2d 950 (1983) (admission of defendant’s written statement, which he alleged had been coerced, was harmless in any event); State v. Dean, 363 S.E.2d 467 (W.Va.1987) (confession induced by promise of receiving psychiatric *266treatment considered involuntary, but its admission into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
I recognize the authority of Payne, Jackson and Mincey; however, I do not find the rule regarding involuntary confessions to be as clear cut as the majority makes it appear. See United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 208 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, Stauffer v. United States, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 812, 88 L.Ed.2d 786 (1986) (“The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of whether admission of an involuntary confession may be harmless since its landmark holding in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), that a federal constitutional error can be held harmless.”).
Two courts have addressed the issue of an involuntary confession induced by some type of promise and found the erroneous admission of the statements to be harmless error. In State v. Dean, an arson investigator investigated a fire in defendant’s room at the YMCA. 363 S.E.2d 467, 468 (W.Va.1987). By interviewing the defendant, the investigator learned that defendant was depressed and contemplating suicide. Id. He agreed to help defendant get psychiatric treatment and made inquiries on defendant’s behalf. The investigator accompanied defendant to the Mental Health Center and upon arrival, defendant admitted to him that he had been involved in several other fires. Id. The trial court ruled that the statements were inadmissible because they had been induced by the investigator’s promises to assist defendant in getting psychiatric treatment. Id. at 469. Nonetheless, the West Virginia Supreme Court said:
We are aware that error in the admission of a coerced confession is not ordinarily subject to harmless error analysis. See Rose v. Clark, [478] U.S. [570], 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). A rare exception to this rule has been recognized, however, where the involuntary confession is merely duplicative of other testimony or admissible statements of the accused. Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.1982); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed.2d 182 (1971); United States ex rel. Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966, 90 S.Ct. 2180, 26 L.Ed.2d 550 (1970); State v. Johnson, 35 Wash.App. 380, 666 P.2d 950 (1983). See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 812, 88 L.Ed.2d 786 (1986); State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 724 P.2d 1 (1986). The standard for review in such cases is the same as in other cases of error of constitutional magnitude: “ ‘Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975).” Syllabus point 1, Maxey v. Bordenkircher, — W.Va. -, 330 S.E.2d 859 (1985).
State v. Dean, 363 S.E.2d at 471 (footnote omitted).
In Harrison v. Owen, the defendant called his friend, told him he was involved in a killing and asked for advice. 682 F.2d 138, 139 (7th Cir.1982). His friend negotiated with police and told defendant that the police promised “considerations and leniencies” if defendant would come forward and surrender. Id. Upon signing his confession, the police told him they couldn’t come right out with a deal, but consideration would be given to him later. Id. The court found that the admission of defendant’s incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the evidence as a whole and testimony by defendant’s friend and the police corroborating the incriminating statements. Id. at 142.
I find the analysis employed by the Eighth Circuit to be persuasive. The court recognized that a harmless error analysis should not apply only to certain types of coerced confessions. United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.1986). In Carter, an FBI agent misled the defendant *267about the subject of the interrogation. He told the defendant that he was investigating an assault, although he was actually investigating a murder. 804 F.2d at 489. The defendant gave a false alibi that was later used to impeach his credibility. Id. When he found out the victim had died, he invoked his right to remain silent. Id. The court held that even assuming the statement was involuntary, the error in admitting it was harmless. Id. The court noted:
Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 944 & n. 18 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, [475] U.S. [1025], 106 S.Ct. 1223, 89 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986), is not to the contrary. In Flittie we said: “If the statements were coerced, their admission could not have been harmless error.” Ibid. Only if the word “coerced” is read to include deception, as opposed to physical or mental compulsion, would the harmless-error analysis be inappropriate in the present case. Such an extended reading of Flit-tie is not tenable, and would be contrary to Milton v. Wainwright, supra.
Carter, 804 F.2d at 489 n. 3.
This meaning of “coerced” is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation in footnote one of Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), which discusses various confession cases where police conduct was coercive. The Court found that all the cases it had considered in the last fifty years involved defendants who were in weakened physical conditions and/or subjected to intensive and relentless police interrogation or coercive tactics. The Court also noted in footnote two that “[e]ven where there is causal connection between police misconduct and a defendant’s confession, it does not automatically follow that there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 n. 2, 107 S.Ct. at 520 n. 2; see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (fifth amendment not concerned “with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.”); see also United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 210 (6th Cir.1985) (court applies harmless error analysis to confession where there was an element of coercion, but no police misconduct).
A case similar to the present case is People v. Gibson, 109 Ill.App.3d 316, 64 Ill.Dec. 787, 440 N.E.2d 339 (1982). A government informant, also a convicted felon, was deliberately placed in defendant’s jail and was asked by police if he would “pay attention” to anything the defendant might say regarding the murder. Id. at 322-23, 64 Ill.Dec. at 791-92, 440 N.E.2d at 343-44. With his identity unknown to the defendant, the informant gained defendant’s confidence and elicited incriminating statements from him. Id. at 323, 64 111. Dec. at 792, 440 N.E.2d at 343. The court found the admission of the informant’s testimony regarding defendant’s statements to be clear error, but in view of the other testimony in the case, it was only cumulative, and the evidence, taken together, overwhelmingly established the defendant’s guilt without the informant’s testimony. Accordingly, the court held that the erroneous admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324, 64 Ill.Dec. 793, 440 N.E.2d at 344.
A review of the case law mandates that a court should look to the circumstances surrounding the involuntary confession. If the confession was a result of the type of coercion found in Payne, Jackson and Mincey, then admission of the incriminating statement will constitute reversible error. If, however, the involuntary confession is only “coerced” in a technical sense, and is merely duplicative of other testimony or admissible statements of the defendant, then a harmless error analysis is appropriate.3 Additionally, if the record reveals *268overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, any error in admitting such statements may be considered harmless.4
The confession in the present case, although considered involuntary, is not the type of “coerced” confession found in Payne, Jackson and Mincey. The record does not reflect that defendant was in any type of weakened condition when he confessed to Sarivola. Although Sarivola was a paid FBI informant, he was not a police officer. Police did not intentionally place Sarivola in defendant’s cell. Rather, Sarivola had heard rumors that defendant was suspected of killing a child and told his FBI contact about it. Only then did the FBI agent tell Sarivola to find out about the rumor. The evidence does not indicate that the FBI agent ever told Sarivola to offer protection to defendant or threaten him in any way if defendant refused to divulge any information. The Arizona authorities were not involved at this time.
Sarivola did not subject defendant to any coercive, intensive interrogation. While defendant might not have confided in Sarivola had he known the information would be passed on, he did voluntarily tell Sarivola, in conversational tones, the circumstances surrounding the murder of his stepdaughter. This “involuntary” confession to Sarivola is not the type of coerced confession found in the cases of egregious police conduct the Supreme Court has addressed when it refused to apply the harmless error doctrine. It was at most, a confession obtained surreptitiously through an informant.
I believe defendant’s “coerced” confession is merely cumulative to other admissible statements made by the defendant. Defendant’s second confession to Donna Sarivola contained much of the same information as his confession to Anthony Sarivola. He told both of them that he killed his stepdaughter, choked her, and made her beg for her life. He also expressed his hatred for his stepdaughter to each of them by telling Anthony Sarivola he “hated” her and referred to the victim as a “little fucking bitch” and by telling Donna Sarivola he wanted to “piss on her [the victim’s] grave.”
This is also a case where the record reflects overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant made inconsistent statements concerning the victim’s disappearance. He said that he had a good relationship with the victim and that she had been instructed in the use of firearms. Defendant’s wife contradicted these statements by testifying that he had a poor relationship with the victim and that the defendant had never instructed the victim in the use of firearms. The evidence indicated that the day before defendant reported the victim’s disappearance, he went to a Mesa gun shop to trade his rifle for an extra barrel for his .357 revolver. The evidence showed that the victim had been shot twice with a .357 revolver. Other physical evidence such as the wounds, ligature around the victim’s neck, motorcycle tracks and the location of the crime scene all linked defendant to the murder.
The evidence, taken together, established defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the use of defendant’s confession to Sarivola. Thus, in light of all these facts and the absence of coercive police tactics in this case, I believe that the erroneous admission of defendant’s involuntary confession to Sarivola was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require nor do the circumstances justify reversing his conviction on this ground.
*269Apart from the facts in this case, I find no reason in logic or law to hold that a “coerced” confession can never be harmless. It cannot be said that there will never be a case in which facts are so overwhelming against a defendant that the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, I do not believe we can ignore the cost of applying the exclusionary rule in this case. The “coercion” in this case was not great. Comparing the costs and benefits, the costs are too great and the benefits negligible. Were I deciding this case on independent state grounds, I believe the cost of excluding the “coerced” confession is too great a price to pay for the meager benefit obtained. See Cameron & Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109 (1984).

. For cases holding that harmless error analysis is appropriate in involuntary confession cases if the statement is cumulative of other testimony or evidence against the defendant see Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138, 141 (7th Cir.1982); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323, 325 (4th Cir.1971); People v. Gibson, 109 Ill.App.3d 316, 324, 64 Ill.Dec. 787, 792, 440 N.E.2d 339, 344 (1982); Kelley v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Ind. 1984); People v. Perkins, 116 A.D.2d 760, 763, 497 N.Y.S.2d 159, 162 (1986); State v. Johnson, *26835 Wash.App. 380, 386, 666 P.2d 950, 953 (1983); State v. Dean, 363 S.E.2d 467, 471 (W.Va.1987).

. For cases holding that harmless error analysis is appropriate in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 2175-76, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (three other confessions); United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir.1986) (six witnesses against defendant); United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 203, 210 (6th Cir.1985) (massive circumstantial and corroborating evidence); United States ex rel. Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir.1970) (other confession, corroborating testimony from other witnesses covering every element of the crime, finding of stolen property in defendant’s possession); State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 387, 724 P.2d 1, 6 (1986) (positive identification by witness and physical evidence connecting defendant to crime).