Court Opinion

ID: 9787847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:26:12.411711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:01.420587
License: Public Domain

Wachtler, J. (dissenting).
Although I agree that we cannot finally resolve either case on its merits, it is my view that outright dismissal will only further delay the adjudication of "preferred” rights under the First Amendment (Matter of Brown v McGinnis, 10 NY2d 531, 536). Both cases have already been unnecessarily protracted and should be remanded to the trial court for prompt hearing and resolution.
As to the claim that the respondent unlawfully refused to hand over an unsolicited publication sent to petitioner in the mail from the "Anarchist Black Cross”, we know only that the prison authorities refused to deliver mail to the petitioner and subjected him to disciplinary sanctions, in plain contravention of their own rules (Administrative Bulletin, No. 60).* We know nothing of the mail’s nature for the simple reason that the petitioner did not possess the publication when his petition for relief was drafted and consequently it is not a part of the record.
Relief was denied in Supreme Court solely on the basis of the definition of anarchist. In my view the censorship of mail addressed to a prisoner may only be effected to achieve a substantial governmental interest, e.g., to prevent a clear and present danger to the institution (Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396). Here, the respondent has presented no justification for censoring this particular material. Vague characterizations as to the publication will not authorize suppression absent some indication that the material will by its nature foment *724riot or that the petitioner is disseminating inflammatory documents.
In the second case, this same petitioner asserts that his religion requires him to wear a beard, and that in violation of the First Amendment, prison authorities have compelled him to remain clean shaven. The pro se pleading was styled in the nature of an article 78 petition and the courts below, taking the characterization at face value, dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Completely overlooked was the fact that section 610 of the Correction Law assured all prisoners in this State the free exercise of their religious beliefs and subdivision 3 of section 610 authorizes the institution of a proceeding by any prisoner who believes his rights have been violated. There is no requirement in this statute that a prisoner first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of his First Amendment claim.
On the appeal to this court the majority has sustained the dismissal solely on the ground that the petition is legally insufficient particularly because the prisoner’s religion was inadequately described or identified.
It is true, of course, that the petitioner’s religion, the nature of its tenets, indeed the extent of the petitioner’s fidelity to the religion are all facts which he must prove as "preconditions to the relief requested”. But although they must be proven at the hearing, they need not be alleged in the pleading, at least not under the modern, liberal pleading rules. There is no longer any requirement in this State, as there once was, that the pleading must allege the "material facts * * * on which the party pleading relies” (Civ Prac Act, § 241). That requirement, which proved completely unworkable in practice, was abandoned in the hope "that the considerable judicial effort formerly expended in distinguishing 'evidence’ or 'conclusions’ from 'facts’ be directed to more useful purposes” (3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3013.01).
CPLR 3013 now provides that "[statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense.” It has been noted that under this statute "meticulous particularity” is not required and that the pleading should not be dismissed "unless *725the allegations therein are not sufficiently particular to apprise the court and the parties of the subject matter of the controversy” (3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3013.03).
Here the pleading alleges that the petitioner is a prisoner, that he is in the custody of the correction authorities, that they have required him to cut his beard and that this violates his religious beliefs. Thus it clearly puts the respondent and the court on notice that the petitioner claims that the prison authorities are violating his First Amendment rights, which as indicated are guaranteed by section 610 of the Correction Law. Perhaps it could be said that this pleading, drawn by a layman is inexpertly drafted. But it could hardly be said that it fails to apprise the court and the parties of the subject matter of the controversy. To deny this prisoner access to the courts because of the alleged deficiencies of his pro se application is the height of formalism. He should at least be heard on his complaint.
Apparently the majority feels that is not warranted here because there is some indication in the record that the petitioner professes pantheism, "an undefined and unheard of religion”. In effect they have taken judicial notice of the "fact” that there is no such religion, or that it does not, as petitioner alleges, prohibit the cutting of his beard. The courts of course cannot take judicial notice of the tenets of a particular religion (Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of Christ’s Church v Collett, 240 NY 563) and are even less equipped to judicially notice the existence or nonexistence of an "unheard of religion”. These are factual matters which can only be resolved at a hearing.
It may well be that, if granted a hearing, the petitioner will be unable to prove his allegations regarding his religious beliefs. If that occurs it would seem unlikely that this case would, as the majority fears "establish a precedent which would be productive of even more useless and expensive litigation.” In any event it is hard to see how a dismissal without prejudice to the making of new applications will serve judicial economy. Experience has shown the contrary to be true. In fact it is quite clear that by enacting the CPLR’s liberal pleading rules the Legislature "sought to discourage time-consuming pleading attacks which were unlikely to result in a final disposition of the action on the merits (see 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 3026.02) and *726which would have a tendency to defeat the over-all objective of the Civil Practice Law and Rules 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding.’ (See CPLR 104.)” (Foley v D’Agostino, 21 AD2d 60, 65-66.)
The order appealed from should be reversed and the case remitted to the Supreme Court for a hearing on the merits.

 To send this matter back to the prison committee at this stage of the proceedings would be counterproductive in that it would only prolong the controversy.