Court Opinion

ID: 9653292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:43:15.775963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.604136
License: Public Domain

EAGER, J.
(dissenting). — A majority opinion and a dissenting opinion were filed in this case on June 13, 1955. Thereafter the court of its own motion granted a rehearing; supplemental briefs were filed and the case has been reargued.
By stipulation of all parties this case was consolidated on appeal with the case of State of Missouri ex inf. J. Patrick Wheeler, Pros. Atty., ex rel. John Berhorst et al., Appellants vs. Reorganized School District R-VI in Lewis County, Missouri et ah, Respondents, No. 44,689, 365 Mo. 545, 284 S.W. 2d 535, which is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Lewis County. The cases involve the same question *535and only one opinion on the merits will be written. ¥e consider here, however, the contentions made by counsel in both cases, upon the original submission and upon the rehearing as well. Both suits are actions seeking, by injunction, to declare certain school district levy increases to be void. The parties will be referred to in this [528] opinion as plaintiffs (respondents here) and defendants (appellants here). This court has jurisdiction primarily because the case necessitates a construction of the Constitution of the State of Missouri.
There is no controversy concerning the facts. As shown both by the pleadings and by an agreed statement they are as follows: On July 20, 1954, pursuant to notice, a special school election was held in the defendant school district, at which election a proposition was submitted to authorize an increase in the school levy of one dollar and forty-five cents ($1.45) per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation, for a period of one year, to be used as a building fund for an elementary school and gymnasium; the $1.45 so referred to was in excess of the constitutional limit of one dollar, which may be levied without a vote, and also in excess of a previous levy increase of fifty cents which had been approved on April 6, 1954. At the election the proposal received 214 affirmative votes and 160 negative votes; in other words, it received a favorable majority, but not two-thirds of the ballots cast. Following this election the defendant members of the Board of Education certified that the proposed levy increase had been approved, caused a levy to be made accordingly, and the defendant County Collector extended the levy of the tax upon the tax books against all assessed real and personal property in the school district. This suit was instituted at the relation of various residents and taxpayers of the school district to enjoin the collection of the tax and to declare the levy and its certification void. The trial court heard the cause and granted the injunction, holding that a two-thirds vote on the proposition was necessary, and that the proposed levy and tax were void.
The legal question in the ease may be more simply stated than determined. It is asserted by plaintiffs (and, of course, denied by defendants) that no school levy increase for the purpose of erecting new buüd/ings may be adopted except by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors voting thereon. The question primarily involves a construction of § 11(c) of Article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri, as adopted in 1945 and amended November 7, 1950, by vote of the people upon Resolution submitted by the General Assembly, which Resolution has now become §§ 11(a) to 11(f), inclusive, of Article 10. Section 11(b) prescribes the limits of taxation which may be imposed without a vote. We set out at this point § 11(c) as originally adoped by the 1943 Constitutional Convention, as follows:
“In all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of taxation as herein limited may be increased for their respective purposes for not to exceed four years, when the rate and purpose of the *536increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided, that the rates herein fixed, and the amounts by which they may be increased, may be further limited by law; and provided further, that any county or other political subdivision, when authorized by law and within the limits fixed by law, may levy a rate of taxation on all property subject to its taxing powers in excess of the rates herein limited, for library, hospital, public health, recreation grounds and museum purposes."
The material part of the amendment adopted in 1950 (and now appearing immediately after the first semicolon in original § 11(c), supra), is as follows:
"provided in school districts the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed one year, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided in school districts in cities of 75,000 inhabitants or over the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed two years, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon [529] shall vote therefor”; (The emphases shown here and elsewhere on the words "for school purposes" and "for building purposes" have been supplied.)
The basic question involved here is whether this amendment of 1950 authorized school districts to increase taxes above the constitutional limits of § 11(b) of Article 10, for the purpose of erecting new buildings, by a bare majority vote, subject to the other limitations of the amendment; or, expressed in another way and perhaps'more simply, whether “for school purposes,” in § 11(c), Article 10, as amended, includes the erection of new buildings. The trial court found that under Article 10, § 11(c), as amended, and the provisions of the applicable statutes, the levy increase for building purposes was not properly and legally adopted by a simple majority, that a two-thirds vote was required, and that the levy and the extension of the tax were void; and the various defendants were enjoined from enforcing the levy and from collecting the tax.
In so far as we have found, the term “for school purposes” has not previously been construed or considered by the courts in connection with § 11(c), Article 10 of the present Constitution. It was considered several times as it appeared in Art. X, § 11 of the Constitution of 1875. Since we shall refer to some of those opinions, we set out here excerpts of the material parts of that section, as follows:
"* * Provided, the aforesaid annual rates for school purposes may be increased, in districts formed of cities and towns, to an amount not *537to exceed one dollar on the hundred dollars valuation, and in other districts to an amount not to exceed sixty-five cents on the hundred dollars valuation, on the condition that a majority of the voters who are taxpayers, voting at an election held to decide the question, vote for said increase. For the purpose of erecting public buildings in counties, cities or school districts, the rate of taxation herein limited may be increased when the rate of such increase and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been submitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or school district, voting at such election, shall vote therefor * *
In considering that section of the 1875 Constitution, the Missouri courts held several times that there were inherent distinctions between levy increases for “school purposes” and levy increases for the erection of new buildings (or, we may say, “bidlding purposes”), that the two types of increases required different votes, and that the constitutional limitations on the amount of increases “for school purposes” did not apply to levy increases for building purposes. Probably these decisions were based upon the distinction expressly made in the Constitution, but whatever the source, the courts emphatically recognized the distinction. To this effect see: Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo. 915, 38 S. W. 2d 1062; Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 S.W. 769; Harrington v. Hopkins, 288 Mo. 1, 231 S.W. 263, 265; Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154, 238 S.W. 443; Russell et al. v. Frank et al., — Banc, 348 Mo. 533, 154 S.W. 2d 63; State ex rel. Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 395, and State ex rel. Setzer v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Mo. 166. In the case of Peter v. Kaufmann, (38 S.W. 2d at l.c. 1066, 1067), this court said:
“Section 11, Art. 10, of the Constitution places limitations on the annual rates of taxation which can be levied for school purposes, which term is construed to cover all the usual and ordinary expenses of maintaining and operating schools. Hudgins v. Consolidated School District, 312 Mo. 1, 12, 278 S.W. 769. But, as we have seen, the only limitation on the rate of taxation for buildings is that such rate and the purpose thereof shall be submitted to a vote of the people of the district and receive the sanction of a two-thirds majority of those voting. Therefore, no building tax, whatever the rate, which has received a two-thirds majority vote of the voters of the district at a legally called election, [530] can be held violative of the Constitution. A limitation of 100 cents per $100 valuation is fixed by statute. Section 11183, Rev. St. 1919. A levy for building purposes and erection of buildings is a separate and distinct tax not included in the term ‘school purposes’ and not subject to the limitation as to amount imposed by the Constitution. Hudgins v. Consolidated School District, 312 Mo. 1, 12, 278 S.W. 769.”
In fact there does not seem to be any real controversy between the parties here as to the distinction so recognized under the 1875 Constitu*538tion. Counsel for defendants say, however; among other things: That the above cases are not applicable here because the express distinction between school purposes and building purposes was not preserved in § 11(c) of the present Constitution; that the present § 11(c) in itself discloses an intent (presumably of the legislature and the people) not to be bound by the prior construction; that the purpose of the 1950 amendment was to permit levy increases in limited amounts and for a limited time, without regard to purpose; that various statutes show a legislative construction favorable to defendants; that if “school purposes” is not construed to include “building purposes” then no levy increase for building purposes could ever be properly authorized' by § 11 (e), supra; and, finally, that any other construction would introduce chaos and confusion into the administration of the school districts of Missouri. Other incidental contentions will be referred to in the opinion.
It is true, of course, that § 11(c) of Article 10 of the present Constitution makes no express distinction between levy increases for “school purposes” and “building purposes”; in fact, it does not mention “building purposes” as such, or the erection or acquisition of buildings. The 1943 Constitutional Convention and the people of Missouri originally adopted § 11(c) in a form which specifically required a two-thirds vote (and not to exceed a four-year term) for any and all levy mareases. We regard this as highly material, for the form in which the section was thus adopted eliminated automatically all necessity for any distinction between “school purposes” and “building .purposes.” The Convention, therefore, certainly evidenced no intent to cut down the two-thirds majority theretofore uniformly required on levy increases for building purposes; and we need look no more to any intention of the convention, for it had thus performed its work and departed. The people of Missouri, by their vote, adopted the 1945 Constitution containing the all-inclusive two-thirds requirement of (original) § 11(c). If any uncertainty exists, it has arisen by reason of the amendment adopted on November 7, 1950, following the Legislative Resolution. And we pause here to say, parenthetically, that in construing the Constitution (or any amendment) the primary consideration is the understanding of the people at the time of its adoption, since it derives all its force as a fundamental law from the people. Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner — Banc, 356 Mo. 808, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 737.
There is, of course, nothing in this record tending to demonstrate specifically the intent of the people in adopting the amendment. The statement is made in plaintiffs’ briefs that in the campaign for the adoption of this amendment the people were never advised that funds so voted might be used for building purposes. That fact, if true, is outside the record, and we prefer not to risk stretching the doctrine of judicial notice that far.
*539We cannot agree that § 11(c) as it now exists shows, in and of itself, an intent “not to be bound by” the previous construction of the phrase “school purposes.” This contention seems to be based upon the absence of any express distinction between “school purposes” and “building- purposes.” As previously stated, all necessity for such was eliminated when the all-inclusive requirement of a iwo-fhirds vote was first adopted. But the phrase “for school purposes” was revived by the amendment of 1950; so, as of that date, we must look to its past meaning in order to determine what it was understood to mean upon its re-adoption. The phrase “for school purposes” had [531] been adopted by the people in 1875 as one having a fixed meaning entirely distinct from huilding purposes; and over a period of approximately seventy years this phrase, “for school purposes,” had consistently been considered by the people and construed by the courts as meaning “all the usual and ordinary expenses of maintaining and operating schools” (Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo. 915, 38 S.W. 2d 1062, 1066).1 So far as we can see it makes little difference how the meaning arose; the chief point is that the words had a distinct meaning. Unless there is some express wording in.the new § 11(c) to indicate the contrary, we think that we must consider that the words were used and adopted in the amendment in accordance with their traditional, historic and previous meaning, as acquired over this long period of years. Such is a recognized rule of constitutional construction. (Moore v. Brown—Banc, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W. 2d 657; Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck—Banc, 275 Mo, 339, 205 S.W. 196.) We find no express wording in the present section to indicate the contrary. And we note further that if the 1943 Constitutional Convenion “abolished” the phrase (as counsel argue) and distinction, which it apparently did solely because the distinction was no longer necessary, the people of Missouri revived the phrase by adopting the 1950 amendment when, for the first time, any distinction was made under the 1945 Constitution between a simple majority vote and a two-thirds vote; the people are presumed under these circumstances to have attached to the words their previously fixed meaning.2 And actually the convention did not abolish the phrase “for school purposes” at all, but merely eliminated, temporarily, the necessity for it. Counsel argue, very ably, that *540the real purpose of the 1950 amendment was to permit a levy increase for any purpose by a majority vote, so long as the increase was limited to three times the usual constitutional limitation (one dollar per hundred here) and the effective period was limited to one year. But if we adopt this argument we would thereby make the phrase "for school purposes" entirely superfluous; and certainly some purpose and meaning must be given to every part of the section if such may reasonably be done. This rule seems to apply with particular emphasis to constitutional construction and to require consideration of every word and every phrase (State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman—Banc, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W. 2d 701; State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Com.—Banc, 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W. 2d 196, 203; State on inf. McKittrick v. Williams—Banc, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S.W. 2d 98, 103). And, accordingly, a construction which renders any words or any phrase meaningless should be avoided, if possible, (id). Certainly school districts may only tax for some objective connected with schools, and the first clause of the section gives them ample authority to increase the rate of taxation for any and all purposes within their powers, upon a two-thirds vote (i.e., "In all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates * * may be increased for their respective purposes * *"). If this were not true then we would attribute to the Constitutional Convention of 1943 the adoption of a perfectly useless provision, for this sub-section was the only provision for increase adopted by it. We, therefore, construe the "respective purposes" of a school district as including all purposes and objectives for [532] which a school district may properly levy an increased tax, and we believe that the Constitutional Convention so intended it and the people so adopted it. The amendment was adopted to permit some form of increase upon a simple majority. If the phrase (of the amendment) "for school purposes" is not construed to have a limiting effect, then we think that it has no meaning whatever and is rank surplusage; and if it was inserted for no reason, certainly a serious mistake was made. If the phrase was not thus intended to limit the all-inclusive "respective purposes," then this part of the amendment might just as well have read: "provided in school districts the rate of taxation as herein limited may be increased3 so that the total levy shall not exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed oné year, when * * * a majority of the qualified voters * # shall vote therefor.” If defendants are correct in their contentions, such wording would have been just as effective and much more simple. It seems to us rather ridiculous to imply that "for school purposes” had to be inserted to distinguish the functions of a school district from those of a county or a city; certainly a school district cannot levy county or city taxes. We conclude that this phrase was used and adopted with a restrictive *541effect and in the light of the previous understanding and interpretation so long accorded to it. Consequently, we believe and those who concur in this opinion hold that the purposes for which a levy increase may be or is authorized under this section upon a majority vote (of less than two-thirds) do not include an increase for erecting or purchasing new buildings.
What we have already said probably answers the contention that, upon our present -construction, there could be no means of increasing a levy for building purposes. We hold that there is, by means of the two-thirds vote (and other requirements) contained in the first clause of the section. It seems clear that the Convention of 1943 and the people originally intended and considered that the “respective purposes” (so used) should include both the “school purposes” and the building purposes referred to separately and specifically in the 1875 Constitution, and thus combined them, requiring a two-thirds majority for all.
Counsel for the school districts have -called our attention to many statutes as supposedly evidencing a legislative intent favorable to their contentions and which, they say, should be persuasive here. It w'ould be impossible to discuss all these statutes in detail; they cover many subjects, including annexations, the discontinuance of school districts, accounting, length of school terms, tax levies and other subjects. Many of these could in no event be specifically applicable to the districts here involved, because of population requirements. Counsel argue: (a) That in many of these sections the term “school purposes” (as in the annexation statutes) very apparently has a broader meaning than we have given the term in this opinion; ancl (b) that, in others (such as certain taxing statutes) there is a reference to “school purposes,” but no specific reference to building purposes. The vast majority of the statutes so cited are re-enactments, either verbatim or substantially so, of statutes existing prior to the adoption of the 1945 Constitution. As to those, and on contention (a) above, we say that if the term “school purposes,” as there used, be given a broader meaning, then the statutes were each and all in conflict with the 1875 Constitution where the term concededly was given an expressly limited meaning; we can hardly attribute such a meaning or construction to a whole group of statutes. Contention (b), supra, is that certain of the school taxing sections (ancl perhaps others) refer to “school purposes” with no reference to building purposes, and, as we understand the contention, that our construction would leave a gap, so to speak, in the authority of the districts. That does not follow, for these are not the laws upon which tax levies for building purposes depend. Under the 1939 Revised Statutes increased levies for school purposes and for building purposes were separately authorized [533] (§ § 10,358 and 10,359, RSMo 1939); with these provisions and the basic constitutional grants it would seem that there was no need for *542any reference to building purposes in any of tbe sections referred to, prior to the adoption of the 1945 Constitution. The later statutes are discussed in the next paragraph. At most, the cited statutes may only be considered as indicative of a possible legislative intent.
Counsel also call our attention to the wording of certain statutes enacted next following the adoption of the 1945 Constitution (§ 165.080, RSMo 1949, being A. L. 1945, p. 1630) and as amended following the adoption of the 1950 Constitutional amendment (§ 165.080, Y.A.M.S., 1951 Laws, pp. 469-470) ; these, it is argued, indicate that the legislature construed the present § 11 (c) of Article 10 as permitting a bare majority vote to be effective for any purpose. The 1945 Act, supra, necessarily required a two-thirds majority to make effective any increase above the specified constitutional limit, and also required that each purpose (and the rate and period proposed therefor) be stated separately. We note also that the legislature.there avoided the use of the phrase “school purposes” (and its previously fixed meaning) and used a new phrase, — “district purposes,” — as consonant with the all-inclusive § 11(c) as it then existed prior to the amendment. The 1951 Act, supra, also requires that each purpose (and the rate and period proposed therefor) should be stated separately, and provides: “and if the necessary majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, as required by article X, section 11 of the constitution, shall favor the proposed increase for any purpose, the result of such vote, * * * for each purpose * * * shall be certified ® The gist of the argument is that the use of the words “for any purpose” indicates a legislative construction to the effect that a bare majority vote is sufficient “for any purpose.” We do not so understand or construe the statute; counsel apparently overlook the word “necessary” appearing immediately before the word “majority.” We believe that the words “necessary majority” include a two-thirds majority, as well as a bare majority,4 and that the legislature has now merely provided that when a proposal of increase (for any purpose) receives the majority necessary or required for that increase by the Constitution, it shall thereupon be certified and take effect. In fact a consideration generally of the legislation since 1943 confirms our views as herein expressed. In school districts of 75,000 to 500,000 population, levy increases for “school purposes” (sic) and building purposes are still covered in separate sections of the Statutes (§ § 165.487 and 165.490', RSMo 1949, Y.A.M.S.). Section 161.040', RSMo 1949, Y.A.M.S., which was last re-enacted in 1947, deals with the apportionment of the state public school fund, and provides in part that: “When any district has legally levied for school purposes (teachers’ wages and incidental expenses) a tax rate not less than the constitutional limit * * it shall receive certain allotments. We do not say that this is an all-inclusive constitutional defini*543tion of school purposes, but it most certainly indicates a restrictive use of the term. In the 1955 legislative session Senate Bill No. 3, the so-called. “State Support of Schools” bill, was enacted subject to referendum. It was approved by the people on October 4,1955. In its first section, now § 161.021, V.A.M.S., 1955 Laws, it specifically defines “School purposes” as “teacher and incidental funds.” If, however, we should be controlled here by apparent legislative intent as supposedly indicated in literally scores of sections of the statutes, we might well find ourselves wandering in a labyrinth from which there is no return. Certainly the people, in adopting the 1950 constitutional amendment could not have known of, understood and interpreted the various and sundry statutes. But they did know that school districts had never been permitted, in fact, to increase levies for building purposes by less than a two-thirds vote.
[534] We do recognize the doctrine that constructions placed upon the Constitution and statutes by the legislature or public officers charged with their execution are persuasive and entitled to weight, where the meaning is doubtful (Folk v. City of St. Louis, 250 Mo. 116, 157 S.W. 71, l.c. 76; Gantt v. Brown, 244 Mo. 271, 149 S.W. 644, l.c. 646). But such constructions are not in any event binding on the courts; such is especially true if the supposed legislative construction is not clear. Here we think that the weight of legislative construction supports the views herein stated. And the principle is not applicable if the provision being' construed is not ambiguous.
It is insisted that the administrative interpretations of the Department of Education, as given to various school districts, should be highly persuasive. In the first place there is no evidence of any such interpretations in the transcript of either of the consolidated cases, and counsel have injected the matter into the cases extraneously, largely upon the rehearing. But even so, while it may be the duty of the Commissioner of Education to “advise * * school district officers * on all matters pertaining to the school law” (§ 160.100, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) this injunction certainly does not mean that he shall construe the Constitution of Missouri; this court will not, and should not, be controlled in its constitutional construction by the mere expediencies of a situation created in part by any such advice. We refer not to the Commissioner personally, but to the department as a whole, and the sources of any legal advice which may have been given.
It has also been suggested that the words “public school purposes” as ’used in § 5, Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution have a broader meaning than we have given to the words “school purposes” here, since that section provides for using the income of the fund there in question.for “establishing and maintaining” free public schools; and it is further argued that the construction of the words in the two articles should be harmonious. We must consider each of the respective phrases in the full context in which it is used. Section 5 of Article *5449 is dealing with and setting apart the “Public School Fund” consisting of “moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes.” It has no reference whatever to taxation. The Constitution distinguishes between the various funds held by the state, according to the purpose for which each fund was respectively created. One such fund is the “Public School Fund.” The words “belonging to or donated to any state fund .for public school purposes, ’ ’ merely serve to set apart Such money, property, etc., from all money or property belonging to or donated to any other state fund. The income from this fund, together with such moneys as are appropriated by the legislature, is applied to the support of the public schools ('§ 3(a), Art. 9, Constitution, 1945), and this combined fund is designated as the 11 State School Moneys Fund” (§ 161.225, RSMo 1949, Y.A.M.S.). A wholly different source of support for the schools is the method of local taxation provided by Article 10 of the Constitution. When thus considered, we see that the phrases are used in wholly different contexts in the two articles; the use in Article 9 of the words “public school purposes” (note the slight but perhaps immaterial difference) should not be controlling or even persuasive in construing Article 10 dealing solely with taxation, where a specific use and interpretation of the term “school purposes” has been recognized over a long period of years. In Article 9 there was no reason to differentiate between any different purposes concerning schools, whereas under Article 10, as we say, a distinction had long been recognized for purposes of local taxation. Section 161.040, RSMo 1949, Y.A.M.S., is a statute implementing § 5, Article 9, supra, and the legislature (if such interpretation be of any significance) therein used the words “levied for school purposes (teachers’ wages and incidental expenses).” We note also that the term “School Purposes” is used in the title of § 3(b) of Article 9, which section specifically refers merely to the support of the schools, — not to building or establishing [535] schools. Our construction is more harmonious with that use of the term than is the construction now contended for of § 5 of the same Article. Everything considered, we think little is to be gained by any comparison of the words actually involved with other words and terms appearing outside of the particular article now in question.
In view of the foregoing, we have determined that the levy increase in question was void and unenforceable. We believe that the taxpayers of Missouri have long recognized the distinction between the majorities required for tax increases for school operating purposes and for acquiring school sites and buildings. As a practical matter, an increase may always be voted for any purpose by a two-thirds majority.
Ño thinking person considers lightly the needs of our public schools, both in operations and- for buildings. But the framers of our *545fundamental law, and the people in adopting it, have seen fit to affix sundry restrictions on the taxing powers of local bodies which might perchance, become over-zealous. The tax-paying citizens of Missouri are entitled to the measure of protection afforded by those restrictions. This court has the final responsibility of construing and enforcing those provisions, and in this opinion we only seek to carry out that responsibility. We cannot compromise our interpretation of the fundamental law to meet some immediate need. The mere fact that a two-thirds majority was not obtained in either of these instances indicates, perhaps, considerable doubt on the specific propositions involved, and the wisdom of such permanent, over-all limitation.
The issues here have not involved any questions of maintenance, ordinary repairs, or the purchase of equipment or furnishings. In this respect, the majority opinion heretofore filed may have been misunderstood. Nor does the present case in any way involve or affect the power of a school district to incur indebtedness under § § 26(b) and 26(f) of Article 6 of the Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto.
The foregoing represents the views of the writer and of those who concur in this opinion. We, therefore, respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
Westlmes, J., and Ruarle, Special J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

We do not attribute a contrary intent to the case of St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo. 472, 29 S.W. 579, in which the court was considering then existing statutes and the mechanics of collection; moreover, that opinion seems to have recognized a distinction between the phrases “for schools” and “for school purposes.”
We have noted the cited ease of Decker v. Diemer, 229 Mo. 296, 129 S.W. 936, which involved the application of county funds, and no question of a levy increase for any purpose. It seems apparent that school districts have long been separately considered and the case is not persuasive.

On October 4, 1955, the people of Missouri also adopted, on referendum, the “State Support of Schools Bill,” now § 161.021, V.A.M.S., 1955 Laws, specifically defining “School purposes” as “teacher and incidental funds.”

And see the phrase “two-thirds majority” as used in Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo. 915, 38 S.W. 2d 1062, 1. c, 1066.