Court Opinion

ID: 9716298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:33:27.507745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.472339
License: Public Domain

Eld ridge, J.,

dissenting:

As the majority points out, this is the first time that the issue of the rights of private landowners and the public in the littoral or dry sand beach of the Atlantic Ocean has been presented to this Court. The majority, however, in upholding the landowner’s right to build on the beach at the expense of the public’s use of the beach, fails to give sufficient weight to the exceptional nature of the ocean beach, the various circumstances surrounding its use, and the historic and compelling public interest in the ocean beach.
Courts in other parts of the country, recognizing the unique resource of the ocean beaches, and the traditional public use of them, have recently been upholding the right of the public to continue to use the ocean beaches for swimming, fishing, strolling and sunbathing. In reaching this result, the cases have been based on several different grounds such as express dedication (Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 504-505 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff’d, 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974)); implied dedication (Seaway Company v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 935-937 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964)); customary rights *16(State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P. 2d 671, 676-678 (1969); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P. 2d 57, 61-62 (Haw. 1973); and see City of Daytona Beach v. Tonar-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974)); or prescriptive use (Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P. 2d 50, 55-56, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); Seaway Company v. Attorney General, supra, 375 S.W.2d at 937-938).
I agree with parts (ii) and (iv) of the majority opinion, that no public rights in the subject beach area exist because of prescriptive use or because the land became temporarily flooded in 1962. However, I disagree with the conclusion in part (i) of the majority opinion that the public has no rights in the dry sand ocean beach by implied dedication. Furthermore, customary use of the ocean beach, contemplated from the time of Maryland’s Charter, and discussed in part (iii) of the majority opinion is an important factor which, considered together with other circumstances, leads me to the conclusion that the public has by dedication the right to use the dry sand beach for swimming, fishing, sunbathing, and other normal beach activities..
The majority opinion, in not recognizing a public easement by implied dedication in the subject ocean beach above the mean high tide mark, fails to deal with the unique factors involved in this case. An examination of prior Maryland cases convinces me that the doctrine of implied dedication is fully applicable here.
Almost one hundred years ago, Judge Alvey (later Chief Judge) speaking for the Court in McCormick v. Baltimore, 45 Md. 512 (1877), made it clear that dedication of land to public use need not take any particular form and that the landowner’s intent to dedicate his land to public use may be presumed from acts or conduct which estop him from denying the public’s right. It was thus stated (45 Md. at 523):
“It is now settled that it is not essential to a complete dedication that the legal title should pass from the owner, nor that there should be any grantee of the easement in esse to take the fee; nor is it necessary that there should be a deed or *17writing in order to evidence the dedication; but if the owner of the land has done such acts in pais as amount to a dedication, he is thereby estopped from denying that the public have a right to enjoy what is thus dedicated to its use, or from revoking what he has declared by his acts.”
And later (id. at 524):
“The evidence of such intention [to dedicate] is furnished in various ways; but . . . dedication will be presumed where the facts and circumstances of the case clearly warrant it....”
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 83, 33 A. 435 (1895), the Court emphasized that there are no general rules applicable to all cases of implied dedication, and that each case depends on its own facts and circumstances, saying:
“Indeed it has been found that it is very difficult to lay down any general rule applicable to all cases [of implied dedication]. It has been said ‘that each individual case must be decided by itself, taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, the condition of the respective parties and the acts, declarations and intentions of the landowner as manifested by his conduct. For it is largely on the ground of estoppel in pais that the principle of dedication rests.’ ”
The Court in Lonaconing Ry. Co. v. Consol. Coal Co., 95 Md. 630, 634, 53 A. 420 (1902), reiterated that no particular act or formality is needed for dedication of land to public use, that the intent to do so need not be expressed in any particular manner, and that dedication may be implied from the landowner’s conduct:
“ ‘There is no particular form or ceremony necessary in the dedication of land to public use. All that is required is the assent of the owner of the land and the fact of its being used for the purposes *18intended by the appropriation.’ Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431, 440; Morgan v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 96 U. S. 723. This assent need not be expressed in any particular manner, but it may be implied from the conduct of the owner of the land. Elliott on Roads and Streets, sec. 133; Carr v. Kolb, 99 Ind. 53; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 520; Abcott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 527. No conveyance of the land is necessary nor need there be any grantee in esse to take the title, ‘but if the owner of the land has done such acts in pais as amount to a dedication he is thereby estopped from denying that the public have a right to enjoy what is thus dedicated to their use or from revoking what he has declared by his acts.’ McCormick v. Mayor, 45 Md. 523; Hiss v. B. & H. P. R. R. Co., 52 Md. 250. Dedication is purely a question of intention and any act or acts of the owner of the land clearly manifesting such intention is sufficient.”
More recently, in Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419-420, 24 A. 2d 795 (1942), Judge Delaplaine for the Court pointed out that acquiescence in public use is a manifestation of an intent to dedicate a facility for public use, that such use need not be for the prescriptive period or any definite length of time, that the public use need not be hostile, and that each case depends upon all of the circumstances involved in that case:
“As dedication is purely a question of intention, any act of a landowner clearly manifesting such an intention is sufficient. . . . The intention to dedicate may be implied from the conduct of the landowner. If, for example, a person throws open a passage through his land, and makes no effort to prohibit persons from passing through it, and does not show by any visible sign that he wishes to preserve his right over it, his action is a manifestation of an intention to dedicate the highway to public use and he is presumed to have so dedicated it. Thus, the *19question of dedication rests largely upon the ground of estoppel. . . . The right of the public to a road does not depend upon its continuous use for a period of twenty years or for any other definite length of time, but upon its use with the assent of the owner for such a period that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially affected by an interruption of such enjoyment. . . . Each particular case must be decided by considering the declarations of the landowner, his intentions as manifested by his acts, and all the other circumstances of the case. In our opinion, the bill of complaint in this case, alleging that the road in question is a public road, is not defective merely because it does not expressly allege that the public use of the road has been notorious and hostile.”
Other cases setting forth these same principles are Conway v. Prince George’s County, 248 Md. 416, 418-419, 237 A. 2d 9 (1968); Toney Schloss v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 204-205, 220 A. 2d 910 (1966); Harlan v. Bel Air, 178 Md. 260, 265, 13 A. 2d 370 (1940); Canton Co. v. Baltimore City, 106 Md. 69, 83-84, 66 A. 679 (1907); Pitts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 73 Md. 326, 332, 21 A. 52 (1891).
As these cases hold, there are few hard and fast rules with respect to implied dedication under Maryland law, and each situation must be viewed in light of its own peculiar circumstances. The circumstances warranting the conclusion that the general public of this State has a right to use the beach at Ocean City above mean high tide are as follows:
The Charter of Maryland (1632), as set forth in the majority opinion, indicated that the ocean beach was to have a unique status. The Charter certainly contemplated public use of the ocean beach, for it reserved to the subjects of England and Ireland, and their “successors,” the “privilege of salting and drying fish on the shores of the same province; and for that cause, to cut down and take hedging-wood and *20twigs there growing, and to build huts and cabins, necessary in this behalf, in the same manner as heretofore they reasonably might, or have used to do.” As pointed out by petitioners and also in the majority opinion, these privileges reserved to the public required that the public be able to use the dry sand beach above the line of mean high tide.
Moreover, the evidence clearly showed that the beach area involved in this case had in fact been used by the general public for many years prior to this litigation. One witness, George Schoepf, the assistant captain of the Ocean City. Beach Patrol, testified that an estimated 1,000 people per day used the beach between 70th and 71st Streets, of which the disputed area was a part, on some summer weekends. Although he could not give a count of the number of users of the portions of respondent’s lots 4 and 5 which were a part of the dry sand beach, he did testify to the use of lots 4 and 5 by a portion of the crowds which used the 70th-71st Street beach. Another witness, Dr. Kohlerman, the sole stockholder in petitioner E. T. Park, Inc., the owner of the land directly west of lots 4 and 5, testified as to the “swimming, bathing, sunbathing, ball-playing, picnicking” by the public on lots 4 and 5. There was no evidence presented that respondent landowner or its predecessor in title took any action to discourage or prevent use of the beach by the public. While I do not suggest that mere acquiescence in the use by the public of a landowner’s property, without more, constitutes an implied dedication, nevertheless it is an important circumstance indicating an intent to dedicate land such as this to public use. Smith v. Shiebeck, supra.
Another factor in this case is that the original plat, made in 1917, of the area involved in this litigation, designated a portion of that area bordering on the ocean as “beach.” The 1940 revised plat (the Oceanbay City plat) also contained an area running along the shore which was designated as “boardwalk.” The most recent plat of the area, submitted in 1963, also designated an area adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean as “beach.” Although the sand beach in dispute is not within the area designated “beach” on the plats, because the beach has moved westward as a result of erosion, these plats show *21a consistent recognition that the area immediately adjacent to the ocean was to be kept as beach.
The evidence also showed that prior to the 1938 completion of a paved road to the Delaware line, the beach in the area of dispute had been used as a public road. See Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, supra, 375 S.W.2d at 932, 935.
The expenditure of government funds for the provision of services on the beach area at issue in this case is a circumstance indicating that the public, as well as the property owners, understood that the beach was dedicated to public use. Testimony demonstrated that the entire beach, including the area at issue, has been kept clean by government authorities. Lifeguard services have been provided by the city at a point near the disputed area which protected swimmers using that part of the beach. Regulations governing the behavior of members of the public on the beach have been promulgated and enforced in the beach area here involved. The county and later the city provided patrolling of the beach. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 465 P. 2d at 53, 59.
Government expenditures were also made to preserve the beach in the disputed area. In 1938 the State and in 1953 the county erected sand fences along the length of the island to build up dunes to protect the beach. In 1954, an asphalt jetty was constructed at 70th Street to protect the beach near that point. Following the extensive damage to the 70th-71st Streets area caused by the storm of 1962, the Army Corps of Engineers rebuilt the dune line along the entire length of the beach, including the property in question. 1,050,000 cubic yards of sand were pumped from the bay to the beach for use in rebuilding the dunes. This operation cost over one and a half million dollars of public funds. Easements were obtained from all property owners to allow construction and maintenance of the dunes. See United States v. Harrison County, Mississippi, 399 F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968).
Lastly, the understanding of the citizens of this State that the entire beach at Ocean City is open to the public should be *22considered. Anyone who has visited Ocean City, and this would include most Marylanders, knows that no one has ever questioned his right to stroll the beach and swim at any point on the length of the island. This is an assumption on which the rapid and profitable development of Ocean City has been based. It is an assumption which must have been known to the respondents. When the respondent landowner allowed the public to use the dry sand beach, and accepted the government services and protections with respect to the beach, he was endorsing this widely held public belief.
The various factors listed above, taken together, lead me to the conclusion that the landowner and his predecessors in title have recognized the public’s right to use and the public’s use of the dry sand beach to such an extent, that an implied easement to the public for recreational purposes has been created. None of the above factors, taken alone, result in this conclusion, nor do any two of the factors compel this result. But all of the circumstances evaluated together create a total picture of an implied dedication by the landowner and an unmistakable acceptance by the general public. See Seaway Company v. Attorney General, supra, 375 S.W.2d at 935-937, where essentially similar circumstances led the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas to hold that the Texas public had an easement by implied dedication to use the beach along the Gulf of Mexico.
Because the Atlantic Ocean beach is a unique geographic phenomenon, because it is such a limited resource of the State of Maryland, and because the public involvement in it has been of a different character than that associated with other types of land, the result I would reach in this case is not at all inconsistent with prior Maryland law involving the issue of implied dedication of the shore. Thus in Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346 (1885), this Court held that the defendant in that case acquired no easement, by either prescription or implied dedication, to store wood on the plaintiff’s shore along the Patuxent River based upon the general public’s use of that shore, which use had been acquiesced in by the plaintiff. One of the chief reasons in that case for denying an easement to the defendant for the storage of wood was that *23such an easement would amount to an exclusive appropriation of the land, inconsistent with the general public’s use of the shore. 63 Md. at 353. However, the Court also held that, for reasons of policy, merely permitting the public to use the shore should not give rise to an easement. Chief Judge Alvey stated for the Court in Thomas (id. at 354-355):
“As appropriate to this case, we may repeat here what was said, with great force of reason by COWEN, J., in Pearsall vs. Post, that considering the great extent of shore lines within our State, and the long and uniform indulgence extended by the proprietors of those shores to those who have had occasion to use them for purposes connected with water transportation or fishing, a decision which should admit the possibility of turning such permissive enjoyment into prescriptive and absolute right on the part of the public, would open a field of litigation which no community could endure. And what is still worse in a moral point of view, it would be perverting neighborhood forbearance and kind indulgence to the destruction of important rights. Consequently, if it be once understood that this permissive indulgence of the proprietors of the shores may be construed into irrevocable privileges, restrictions and hinderances will inevitably follow, to avoid the possibility of such permissive use maturing into public adverse rights. The production of any such consequence surely ought not to be desired by anyone.”
I fully agree with the above-quoted passage, that merely permitting the public to use the shore for boating, swimming or fishing should not in itself give rise to an easement. The same could be said with respect to a farmer permitting the public to hunt on his land, or any landowner permitting picnicking, hiking, etc. However, as pointed out above, the ocean beach presents an entirely different matter. *24While Maryland’s inland tidal shoreline measures over three thousand miles, its ocean shoreline is only thirty-five miles long. To recapitulate, from the time of the Charter of Maryland on, the ocean beach has had a unique status. Not only have the landowners acquiesced in the public’s use of the beach, but they have accepted government services, protections and regulations with respect to the beach which are of a totally different character than the government services, protections and regulations provided for other types of privately owned land. Plats have consistently shown an area to be dedicated as “beach.” The public and property owners of the State well understand that use of other types of land for recreational activities does not effect a dedication to the public. This is in stark contrast to the common understanding that the beach at Ocean City is a public beach.
In light of the consistent holdings of this Court that dedication of land to public use need not take any particular form, that it does not depend on hard and fast rules, that a landowner’s intent to dedicate may be presumed from acts and conduct, and that each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances, I would reverse the decision below on the ground that the peculiar facts and circumstances associated with the ocean beach and its use, compel the conclusion that the dry sand beach at the front of respondent landowner’s lots has been dedicated to recreational use by the general public.
Petitioners in this case argue that the respondent landowner should be held to have dedicated the beach to the line of dunes built after the 1962 storm. Since I would decide that only that part of the property which constituted a part of the dry sand beach used by the public was dedicated, the line urged by petitioners may be too inclusive. Other courts when faced with the question of what constitutes the “beach” for public recreational pursuits have settled on the line marked by the beginning of growth of vegetation. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, supra, 517 P. 2d at 63; Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, supra, 375 S.W.2d at 927, 939; State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra, 462 P. 2d at *25672-673. This would be a logical method of delineating the “beach” sinee the vegetation line marks the level reached by the waters of the ocean often enough to prevent the growth of plants. On the other hand, if the evidence showed that in a particular area, the portion of the beach traditionally used by the public with the acquiescence of the adjoining landowners, and maintained by the public authorities, was east of the vegetation line, then that line of public use eastward of the vegetation line should be the limit of the public’s easement in «ueh area. I would reverse the decree below and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.