Court Opinion

ID: 9494933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:50:35.040635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:43.096912
License: Public Domain

ROSEN, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all but Part III, section D of the Court’s decision. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this case be remanded for resentencing under the authority of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This ruling, in my view, joins the wrong side in an intra-circuit debate as to the proper construction of Apprendi. To be sure, there is Sixth Circuit authority for the position taken by the majority — but this is precisely the problem, because there also is authority for the narrower view I advocate, a prior series of cases which continue to be followed and have never been overruled. Subsequent panels, including this one, are bound to follow these initial post-Apprendi decisions, by the doctrine of stare decisis, by our Circuit rule embodying this principle, see Sixth Circuit Rule 206(c), and by our express recognition that “when a later decision of this court conflicts with one of our prior published decisions, we are still bound by the holding of the earlier case.” Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2001). If any additional “tiebreakers” were needed, I would suggest two: first, that the cases followed by the majority espouse a sweeping construction of Apprendi which is at odds with any tenable reading of that case, and second, that this broad reading has been rejected by all ten other Circuits that have considered the question, leaving our Circuit as an acknowledged “minority of one” on this point. See United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir.2001).
The majority, in my view, then exacerbates the problem by following another set of Sixth Circuit decisions which confer special status on Apprendi claims, exempting them from the usual rule of waiver that is a bedrock principle of appellate law: namely, that an objection is forfeited, and hence subject only to plain error review, if not timely asserted before the trial court. Instead, the majority holds that we should review such claims de novo, even where, as here, a defendant has not remotely raised an Apprendi challenge before the District Court, but, to the contrary, has explicitly acknowledged at sentencing that the pre-Apprendi state of affairs still governed. Again, there is Sixth Circuit authority for the majority’s position — but again, there is prior, competing authority, never overruled and still followed, which dictates that we apply plain error review under the *455circumstances presented here. As “tiebreakers,” I again would point to unanimity among the other Circuits that the plain error standard should govern, plus, more importantly, direct Supreme Court precedent applying plain error review under legally indistinguishable circumstances — a ruling which plainly trumps any intra-cir-cuit conflict.
Admittedly, this panel cannot single-handedly unravel the conundrum of this Circuit’s post -Apprendi law. The majority, to its credit, certainly tries to do so; indeed, I must confess a grudging admiration for its herculean effort to harmonize a body of law that it characterizes — charitably, in my view — as “inordinately complicated,” (Majority Op. at 450), and as defying “formal logic,” (id. at 451 n. 8). The majority’s effort, however, fails to assuage my fundamental concern that like cases are being decided differently — and that this case, in particular, is apparently governed by two distinct lines of published precedent that dictate two different outcomes. Under these circumstances, I believe that we are bound to follow this Circuit’s first, clear, and unmistakable statement of the rule of Apprendi in its initial efforts to construe that decision. Instead, the majority elects to follow a later (and contrary) line of cases, thereby breathing new life into decisions of questionable pedigree. As a District Judge who must apply Apprendi in the first instance, I am especially troubled by this Circuit’s failure to endorse a single “rule” of Apprendi in its decisions, by the hopeless jumble that instead presents itself as the “precedent” of this Court on this question, and by the havoc this state of affairs plays with any principled attempt to adhere to the cardinal rule of stare decisis.
By these decisions, our Circuit has realized the fears of the dissenters in Appren-di. Justice O’Connor, in particular, warned that the Court’s opinion would have an “unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state determinate-sentencing schemes,” and that “the Court’s decision threatens to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part.” 530 U.S. at 550-51, 120 S.Ct. at 2394-95 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).1 This concern did not rest solely upon disagreement with the rule announced by the majority, but was based in part upon the “several formulations” through which the majority announced its ruling, leaving the lower courts “in a state of limbo” regarding the true scope of Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 533, 551, 120 S.Ct. at 2385, 2395 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Other Circuits, to their credit, have recognized but downplayed the “alarms sounded by the dissenters” in Apprendi, finding certain guideposts in the majority opinion and in related Supreme Court precedents that point unmistakably toward a narrow reading of that decision. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 576 & n. 17 (5th Cir.2000). We, too, quickly adopted this narrow construction in our initial post-Apprendi cases. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542-45 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 524-25 (6th Cir.2000). A handful of subsequent panels, however, seized upon Apprendi’s “several formulations” of its rule — and, in one especially unfortunate instance, relied upon a concurrence that decidedly lacked the support of a majority *456of the Apprendi Court — as an invitation to embrace a much broader reading. These same panels either failed to address the proper standard of review for Apprendi challenges, or cut out of whole cloth a de novo standard that applies uniquely to such claims, regardless of whether they were raised before the District Court.
In resolving the Apprendi challenge in this case, the majority follows these latter panels, both in their strained reading of Apprendi and in their application of an improper standard of review. Accordingly, while I concur in the remainder of the majority’s decision, I dissent from its ruling that this case be remanded for resen-tencing.
I.
As indicated above, I have two principal concerns with elements of this Circuit’s post-Apprendi jurisprudence. First, while, as Justice O’Connor aptly observed, the Apprendi majority stated several formulations of its ruling which are somewhat in tension with each other, it is incumbent upon us, nevertheless, to adopt and adhere to one of these formulations as the law of this Circuit. Instead, we, like the majority in Apprendi have endorsed several different, and inconsistent, statements of “the rule” of Apprendi. To be sure, if Appren-di itself is ambiguous, there is little we can do to overcome this problem. Yet, I believe, and our sister Circuits concur, that any potential ambiguity is cured by reading Apprendi alongside the whole of Supreme Court precedent in the area of sentencing. I submit that the construction of Apprendi adopted in some of our cases, including by the majority here, cannot be squared with this body of law.
Second, given the questions that inevitably have arisen about the retroactive application of Apprendi to sentences imposed prior to that decision, we must be clear in establishing the standard of review that will govern Apprendi challenges at the various stages of criminal proceedings. Some of our decisions, however, do not even address the proper standard of review, and others, like the majority ruling here, are at odds with the governing Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Supreme Court precedent, and our many pri- or decisions in which we have applied newly-announced rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions. I will discuss each of these points in turn.
First, it unfortunately is true that Ap-prendi’s central “holding” is stated in different ways. Indeed, the very paragraph in which the majority announces its conclusion includes two variants of “the rule” of Apprendi:
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)]. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: “[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 526 U.S., at 252-253, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also id., at 253, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 (footnote omitted).
*457As observed in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, these two formulations seem to embrace a variety of different “rules.” First, by endorsing the statements in the concurring opinions in Jones, “the Court appears to hold that any fact that increases or alters the range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed — which, by definition, must include increases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum penalties — must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 533, 120 S.Ct. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor then suggests two further “plausible interpretations” of the majority’s holding: (i) “the Constitution requires that a fact be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt only if that fact, as a formal matter, extends the range of punishment beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” or (ii) “the Constitution requires that a fact be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt if it, as a formal matter, increases the range of punishment beyond that which could legally be imposed absent that fact” 530 U.S. at 540-41, 120 S.Ct. at 2389-90 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Finally, the Court’s initial statement of its holding could be construed as a constitutional command that a defendant’s actual sentence not exceed the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict.
While all of these readings (and perhaps more) enjoy some degree of support in the brute text of the Apprendi decision, there is ample reason to reject the broadest of these interpretations — i.e., that facts which alter the range of penalties must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Most significantly, we know that the Supreme Court did not intend this result in Apprendi, because it expressly declined to overturn a prior decision, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), which is diametrically at odds with this expansive reading. In McMillan, the Court rejected due process and Sixth Amendment challenges to Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, under which “anyone convicted of certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment if the sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person ‘visibly possessed a firearm’ during the commission of the offense.” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81, 106 S.Ct. at 2413. In so ruling, the Court observed that each of the enumerated felony offenses carried a maximum sentence of at least 10 years, and that the mandatory minimum statute did not alter these maximum penalties. 477 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417. Instead, the Pennsylvania law “operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm,” and “ ‘upfped] the ante’ for the defendant only by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be imposed within the statutory plan.” 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417 (footnote omitted).
Justice O’Connor insisted in her Ap-prendi dissent that “it is incumbent on the Court ... to admit that it is overruling McMillan.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533, 120 S.Ct. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In response, the Apprendi majority emphasized that “[w]e do not overrule McMillan.” 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. at 2361 n. 13. Rather, the Court stated that “[w]e limit [McMillan’ s] holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict — a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.” 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. at 2361 n. 13. Thus, Apprendi and McMillan, read *458in tandem, plainly would permit a sentencing judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts which increase the minimum penalty faced by a defendant, so long as the judge’s findings do not lead to the imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict alone. This completely belies the broad, “alter the range” interpretation of the rule of Ap-prendi
There are other indications within Ap-prendi itself that the majority did not adopt such a sweeping rule. For example, Justice Thomas’s concurrence does endorse something akin to the “alter the range” standard, in light of his “view that the Constitution requires a broader rule than the Court adopts.” 530 U.S. at 499, 120 S.Ct. at 2367 (Thomas, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Thomas opined that “a ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment, (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment).” 530 U.S. at 501, 120 S.Ct. at 2368 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas observed that the effect of his proposed rule upon the continuing vitality of McMillan “should be plain enough,” but he then went on to explain that this rule would reach, and invalidate, “the McMillan situation of a mandatory minimum sentence” based upon a judge’s findings by a preponderance of the evidence:
No doubt a defendant could, under such a scheme, find himself sentenced to the same term to which he could have been sentenced absent the mandatory minimum. The range for his underlying crime could be 0 to 10 years, with the mandatory minimum of 5 years, and he could be sentenced to 7. (Of course, a similar scenario is possible with an increased maximum.) But it is equally true that his expected punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range and that the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish. The mandatory minimum entitles the government to more than it would otherwise be entitled (5 to 10 years, rather than 0 to 10 and the risk of a sentence below 5). Thus, the fact triggering the mandatory minimum is part of the punishment sought to be inflicted; it undoubtedly enters into the punishment so as to aggravate it, and is an act to which the law affixes punishment. Further, ... it is likely that the change in the range available to the judge affects his choice of sentence. Finally, in numerous cases ..., the aggravating fact raised the whole range — both the top and bottom. Those courts, in holding that such a fact was an element, did not bother with any distinction between changes in the maximum and the minimum. What mattered was simply the overall increase in the punishment provided by law.
530 U.S. at 518, 521-22, 120 S.Ct. at 2378, 2379-80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations with alterations and citations omitted). Plainly, Justice Thomas would not have deemed it necessary to advocate a “broader rule,” encompassing whole sentencing ranges and not just máximums, if the majority had already adopted such a standard.
Apprendi’s limitation to statutory máx-imums is further confirmed by the majority’s response to Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that its holding “rests on a meaningless formalism,” since a legislature seemingly could satisfy the majority’s standard by establishing an elevated statutory maximum for a collection of previously separate (and separately punishable) offenses, and then defining a variety of sentencing factors, found by the judge by a preponderance of the evi*459dence, that would more specifically determine a defendant’s sentence within this expanded statutory range. See 530 U.S. at 539-40, 120 S.Ct. at 2389 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Tellingly, the Court did not deny that such a scheme would pass constitutional muster, but instead conceded that “a State could, hypothetically, undertake to revise its entire criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests — extending all statutory maximum sentences to, for example, 50 years and giving judges guided discretion as to a few specially selected factors within that range.” 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. at 2363 n. 16. Nevertheless, the Court dismissed this possibility as “remote” because, “[ajmong other reasons, structural democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that expose every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the crime.” 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. at 2363 n. 16.
All of this is compelling evidence that the rule of Apprendi implicates only sentencing máximums, and not sentencing ranges generally. Further, as noted, each and every one of our sister Circuits that has addressed the question — in all, ten of the eleven other Circuits — has arrived at this conclusion. See United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir.2001) (“While the Supreme Court may certainly overrule McMillan in the future and apply Apprendi to any factor that increases the minimum sentence or ‘range’ of punishment, rather than only the maximum punishment, that is not our role.” (citations omitted)); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir.2001) (“[W]e read [Apprendi] to apply only when a sentencing court’s findings increase the penalty faced by the defendant above the statutory maximum for a given count, and not when they merely affect the length of a sentence within the statutory range.”); United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 238 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.2001) (finding that “Apprendi has no application here,” as it “dealt with the consideration of facts in sentencing enhancement beyond the statutory maximum,” while, “[i]n the instant case, the sentence imposed was ... below the statutory maximum”); United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir.2001) (“[W]hen a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment within the statutory maximum for the crime of which he was convicted, Apprendi is beside the point.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 41 (1st Cir.2001) (“The rule in Apprendi only applies in situations where the judge-made factual determination increases the maximum sentence beyond the statutory maximum, and not in situations where the Defendant’s potential exposure is increased within the statutory range.”); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir.2000) (“[T]hough the District Court’s finding regarding the amount of drugs substantially increased the possible statutory maximum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), we hold that Apprendi is not applicable to [the defendant’s] sentence, because the sentence actually imposed ... was well under the original statutory maximum of 20 years.”); United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 577 (10th Cir.2000) (“[A]s long as the defendant’s sentence falls within the maximum established by statute, Apprendi does not foreclose consideration of drug quantities beyond the offense of conviction.”); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that because the defendant’s “sentence did not exceed the maximum sentence of thirty years under [21 U.S.C.] § 841(b)(1)(C), the offense established by the jury’s verdict, it does not run afoul of *460Apprendi’s constitutional limitations”); United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir.2000) (“Applying Apprendi’s constitutional principle to section 841 cases, it is clear that the principle is violated if a defendant is sentenced to a greater sentence than the statutory maximum based upon the quantity of drugs, if such quantity is determined by the sentencing judge rather than the trial jury.”); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.2000) (“The rule of Apprendi only applies where the non-jury factual determination increases the maximum sentence beyond the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict.”).2
More importantly, our own Circuit immediately adopted the “statutory maximum” interpretation of Apprendi. In our very first post-Apprendi decision, United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 541-42 (6th Cir.2000), we confronted a case in which the defendants’ sentences for a RICO conspiracy were based in part upon the District Court’s finding that a murder plot was one of the objects of this conspiracy, but the jury’s general verdict did not indicate whether it had reached this same factual conclusion. Despite the sentencing implications of the District Court’s fact-finding, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, we found no violation of Apprendi:
In this case, [the defendants] faced a maximum sentence of twenty years on the RICO conspiracy counts, disregarding the murder conspiracy. Because the district court did not sentence either defendant to a term of more than twenty years on the RICO counts, Apprendi is not triggered and the existence of a murder conspiracy did not have to be decided by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard.
227 F.3d at 542 (citation omitted).
Soon thereafter, we considered Appren-di at length, and again found that it addressed maximum penalties. In United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 522 (6th Cir.2000), the defendant pled guilty to heroin distribution, an offense with a maximum sentence of 20 years, but the District Court found at sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a death had resulted from this distribution, leading to a statutory sentencing range of 20 years to life and an actual sentence of 24 years and 4 months. Upon reviewing Apprendi, we stated that “[o]ur duty, in light of this clear dictate from the Court, is to examine whether the sentencing factor in this case was a factual determination, and whether that determination increased the maximum penalty for the crime charged in the indictment.” 226 F.3d at 524. Because the District Court’s factual finding at sentencing had “increase[d] the maximum penalty to which [the defendant] was exposed,” we held that this was an “element[ ] of the offense which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we remanded for a redetermination of this question under the proper standard of proof. 226 F.3d at 525.
More to the point of the present appeal, we reached the same conclusion in United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542-45 (6th Cir.2000), a case which, like this one, involved a challenge to the sentencing court’s determination of drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence following a jury conviction on a drug conspiracy *461charge. After examining Apprendi and Rebmann, we stated:
The Court finds the principles set forth in Apprendi applicable to defendants’ eases. In count one of the indictment, defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. There is no mention of quantity in the indictment and the jury made no findings regarding quantity. Pursuant to the provisions of [21 U.S.C.] § 841, the quantity of drugs is a factual determination that significantly impacts the sentence imposed. Section 841(b)(1)(C) provides for a maximum penalty of 20 years unless the crime involves a quantity of drugs as set forth in subsections (A) or (B). These subsections provide for a maximum penalty of 40 years if the crime involved 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, see § 841(b)(1)(B), and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment if the crime involved 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, see § 841(b)(1)(A). The district judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the quantity of drugs for which each defendant was accountable. Based on this drug quantity determination, each defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding the 20-year maximum set forth in § 841(b)(1)(C). However, as instructed in Apprendi, a defendant may not be exposed to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict. The jury merely found that defendants conspired to distribute and possess to distribute some undetermined amount of crack cocaine. As such, defendants cannot be subjected to the higher penalties under § 841(a)(1)(A) or (B). Rather, the maximum sentence that may be imposed on this count is 20 years pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C).
232 F.3d at 543. Because each of the defendants in Page was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 20 years, we held that Apprendi had been violated.3
We applied this same rule a fourth time in United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.2000), a case where, in contrast to Page, the defendant’s sentence did not exceed the default 20-year maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C). Defendant Zaferino Munoz pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, but “with the explicit reservation that he did not admit to conspiring to deliver methamphetamine but only admitted to the cocaine and amphetamine that was actually delivered.” Munoz, 233 F.3d at 411. The District Court then imposed a 121 month sentence, “based in part on his conclusion that defendant did conspire to distribute methamphetamine.” 233 F.3d at 411. We recognized that this determination by a preponderance of the evidence triggered an enhanced statutory sentencing range, both minimum and maximum, but nevertheless followed Corrado in concluding that the rule of Apprendi had not been violated:
[I]n the present case, defendant’s sentence is invalid under Apprendi only if the district court’s finding that defendant conspired to distribute methamphetamine resulted in defendant receiving a sentence in excess of the maximum statutory penalty for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the crime to which defendant pled guilty.
This case involves 126.7 grams of cocaine and 804.8 grams of either amphetamine o[r] methamphetamine. Title 21, *462U.S.C. § 846 provides that the penalty for conspiracy to distribute any drug will be identical to the penalties for distribution. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory penalty for distribution of 126.7 grams of cocaine ranges from zero to twenty years imprisonment. The statutory penalty for distribution of 804.8 grams of methamphetamine, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), is five to forty years imprisonment. The statutory penalty for distribution of 804.8 grams of amphetamine, a Schedule II drug, is zero to twenty years, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver the specified amount of cocaine. For the cocaine alone, the statute authorizes a maximum sentence of twenty years. Defendant was. actually sentenced to serve 121 months, approximately ten years. Defendant’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for the portion of the indictment to which he validly pled guilty. The sentencing judge’s determination by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant conspired to distribute methamphetamine, rather than amphetamine, did not increase his penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for conspiracy to distribute 126.7 grams of cocaine. Thus, the Apprendi ruling is not applicable here and does not impact defendant’s sentence.
233 F.3d at 413-14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The above-quoted passages from Page and Munoz could be repeated verbatim in this case. The superseding indictment charged Defendant/Appellant Montel Humphrey and several co-Defendants with three counts of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a “detectable amount” of cocaine and/or cocaine base (crack), (see J.A. at 589, 594, 597), as well as other offenses. The jury returned a guilty verdict on two of the three conspiracy counts,4 but did not determine the quantities of drugs chargeable to Defendant in connection with these drug offenses. Instead, the District Court determined at sentencing that Defendant was accountable for at least 50 but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 36 under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and triggering the enhanced sentencing range of 10 years to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) for drug offenses involving 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.5 In the end, however, Defendant was sentenced to a term of 20 years’ imprisonment, which, as noted in Page, does not exceed the 20-year maximum set forth in § 841(b)(1)(C) for drug offenses involving an indeterminate amount of cocaine.6 Under Page and Munoz, then, Defendant’s sentence does not violate the rule of Apprendi.
The majority recognizes as much, albeit without citing Page. Problematically, however, the majority goes on to hold that Defendant’s sentence violates a second “rule” of Apprendi, one which implicates sentencing ranges, even though our decisions in Page and Munoz — not to mention *463the prior rulings in Corvado and Reb-mann — had manifestly established as the law of this Circuit that Apprendi addresses only sentencing máximums. What is more, the majority is able to identify a line of Sixth Circuit cases in support of its conclusion. To fully appreciate the havoc these latter decisions have wreaked with the principle of stare decisis, and the chaotic state of our post-Apprendi law in the wake of these rulings, a brief history of the wayward journey is in order.
The trouble began in United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932 (6th Cir.2000), which was decided after Page and Munoz but mentions neither. In Flowal, the defendant was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and the District Court found at sentencing that this offense involved more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, triggering the elevated sentencing range found at § 841(a)(1)(A). Moreover, in light of the defendant’s two prior felony convictions for drug offenses, he was subject to mandatory life imprisonment under § 841(a)(1)(A), and the District Court imposed this sentence. The panel need not have looked any further than Page — or even Rebmann, which Flo-wal does cite — to find that this sentence violated Apprendi In particular, the defendant’s life sentence exceeded the maximum 30-year term of imprisonment he faced under § 841(b)(1)(C) as a prior drug felon whose latest offense, as determined solely by the jury’s verdict, involved an indeterminate amount of cocaine.7
Notwithstanding this readily discernible outcome under this Circuit’s own post-Ap-prendi precedents, the panel in Flowal deemed it necessary to interpret Apprendi anew. Its analysis, unfortunately, is anything but clear. First, upon reviewing Apprendi the panel concluded that it had adopted the principle set forth in the Supreme Court’s prior Jones decision: namely, that “any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Flowal, 234 F.3d at 936 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. at 1224 n. 6); see also Flowal, 234 F.3d at 936 (quoting Apprendi’s “increase! ] ... beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” variant of its ruling). The panel then addressed Reb-mann (albeit in a footnote), and recognized that the dispositive feature of that case was the sentencing court’s factual determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, which had “significantly impacted] the maximum penalty.” Flowal, 234 F.3d at 936-37 n. 2.8 Seemingly, then, the panel was headed toward a confirmation of Sixth Circuit precedent that Ap-prendi implicates only sentencing máxi-mums.
At this point, however, Flowal takes an unexpected (and unwarranted) turn. After all this discussion of sentencing máxi-mums, the Court stated that Apprendi was violated in the case before it because “a finding as to the weight of the drugs deter*464mined the range of penalties that would apply to [the defendant],” and because the sentencing judge’s “determination effectively limited the range of applicable penalties” by removing “any discretion in terms of imposing a shorter sentence” than life imprisonment. 234 F.3d at 936-37. Remarkably, the panel claimed that its holding “reaffirm[ed] the logic of Reb-mann: a fact that increases the applicable statutory penalty range for a particular crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.” 234 F.3d at 937 n. 2. As discussed earlier, however, neither Rebmann’s “logic” nor, more importantly, its express holding provides any authority for a broad “sentencing range” view of Apprendi. In fact, neither Flowal nor Rebmann provided the occasion for adopting such a construction of Apprendi, as the sentences in both cases violated the narrower “statutory maximum” variant of Ap-prendi’s “rule.”
There are a number of other flaws, as well, in the analysis through which the panel in Flowal sought to support its broad reading of Apprendi. First, throughout its discussion of mandatory minimum sentences and the resulting diminution of a sentencing court’s discretion, Flowal never once mentions the Supreme Court’s controlling statement on mandatory mínimums in McMillan, nor the language in Apprendi expressly confirming that McMillan continues to govern in “cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. at 2361 n. 13. Next, Flowal misreads the post -Apprendi decisions of other Circuits, claiming that the Eighth Circuit held in Aguayo-Delgado, supra, that “it is improper for a judge to determine any facts other than a prior conviction that would increase the penalty range beyond that applicable to the crime for which the jury has convicted the defendant.” Flowal, 234 F.3d at 937 n. 3. In fact, Aguayo-Delgado expressly rejects a proposed reading of Apprendi as encompassing mandatory minimum sentences, recognizing that McMillan provides the “governing constitutional standard” on this issue. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d at 933-34.9
Further, it is noteworthy that Flowal relies on, and quotes extensively from, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Appren-di. Without in any way denying the force of Justice Thomas’s reasoning, his opinion is, in the end, only a concurrence, and not a ruling of the Court — and even Justice Thomas recognized that his proposed rule would require that McMillan be overturned, while the Apprendi majority expressly declined to go so far. As stated by the Fourth Circuit, it is “not our role” to overturn McMillan, where the Supreme Court has elected not to do so. Harris, supra, 243 F.3d at 809. Finally, and most significantly, Flowal’s broad reading of Apprendi is flatly at odds with our earlier decision in Munoz, in which we squarely held that Apprendi did not apply to a sentencing judge’s findings by a preponderance of the evidence that triggered an elevated sentencing range, so long as the resulting sentence did not exceed the maximum achievable absent the judge’s *465additional determinations. The panel in Flowal had neither the authority nor the stated intention to overrule Munoz, but that was the clear import of its decision.
Despite its many flaws and questionable legitimacy, Flowal has taken on a life of its own in this Circuit, spawning a line of cases parallel to, but wholly inconsistent with, another distinct line of cases following the “statutory maximum” rule of Munoz, Page, and Rebmann. The most prominent members of the Flowal line, and the ones relied upon by the majority here, are the decisions in United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.2001), and United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir.2001). In Ramirez, as here, the defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and the District Court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A) upon finding that (i) the defendant had a prior felony drug conviction, and (ii) the amount of cocaine involved in the offense exceeded 5 kilograms. The panel did not cite Page or Munoz, but instead found Flowal controlling, stating that “[ajggravating factors, other than a prior conviction, that increase the penalty from a nonmandatory minimum sentence to a mandatory minimum sentence, or from a lesser to a greater minimum sentence, are now elements of the crime to be charged and proven.” Ramirez, 242 F.3d at 351-52.10 Judge Siler concurred, finding that the panel was bound by the decision in Flowal, but questioning whether Apprendi “is as far-reaching as we determine in this case, following Flowal,” and opining that McMillan should govern challenges to mandatory minimum sentences. Ramirez, 242 F.3d at 352 (Siler, J., concurring).
Most recently, in Strayhom, the panel addressed a 10-year mandatory minimum-sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B), for a marijuana distribution conspiracy involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, that precisely matched the 10-year statutory maximum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(D), for a prior drug felon convicted of an offense involving an indeterminate amount of marijuana. Again, the panel chose to follow Flowal and Ramirez, and did not discuss Page or Munoz. Interestingly, Strayhom states that “[i]n Flowal, we explained that each penalty provision of § 841(b) constitutes a different crime with different elements, including drug weight, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt when sentencing a defendant in excess of the default statutory maximum set out in § 841(b)(1)(C) for all drugs except marijuana, or in § 841(b)(1)(D) for marijuana,” and that “[o]ur sister circuits have uniformly agreed with” this rale. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 468 (emphasis added).
Of course, if this were the rale announced in Flowal, our sister circuits would be in agreement, and the sentence at issue in Strayhom would have been upheld as not in excess of the default statutory maximum found at § 841(b)(1)(D). The Strayhom panel quickly confirmed, however, that Flowal and Ramirez go a good deal farther, encompassing any case in which a sentencing court finds “aggravating factors” by a preponderance of the evidence that trigger a “higher penalty range,” even though the resulting sentence might still lie within the lower statutory bounds for the offense as *466determined by the jury’s verdict. See Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 469-70.11 Applying this much broader principle, the panel vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Read properly, and as applied in Ramirez and Strayhom, Flowal plainly cannot be said to be in accord with the view of Apprendi adopted by our sister Circuits. To the contrary, and as noted at the out*467set, Flowal places us in “a minority of one.” Hill, supra, 252 F.3d at 921. If I were convinced that Flowal had correctly construed Apprendi, I would have fewer qualms about our solitary position on this point. More importantly, if Flowal were this Circuit’s first word on Apprendi, or if it at least could be said that Flowal presented the first occasion for us to decide whether Apprendi implicates only statutory máximums or sentencing ranges generally, I would respect the prerogative of the panel in that case to reach a decision which, right or wrong, would bind all subsequent panels, including this one. As matters now stand, however, I not only harbor substantial doubt about the analysis in Flowal, but I fear that this decision and its progeny, rendered without sufficient regard for this Circuit’s pre-existing precedents, have reduced the rule of stare deci-sis from a settling principle into an empty bromide that may be recited as “requiring” either of two diametrically opposed outcomes of an Apprendi-based challenge.12
*468Given this state of affairs, perhaps it would behoove this Court to consider en banc review of a case that starkly presents the issue of the proper interpretation of Apprendi.13 As discussed below, this is not such a case — or, more accurately, it would not be, if Defendant’s Apprendi claim were evaluated under the proper standard of review. The majority’s decision to apply de novo review, however, lends new (and undue) significance to its expansive reading of Apprendi, and compounds error with further error.
II.
By now, my views regarding the correct construction of Apprendi should be evident. As conceded at the outset, however, the Court’s opinion in that case contains language that arguably supports a few competing interpretations. In any event, whether one subscribes to the “maximum penalty” or “sentencing range” view of Ap-prendi, the outcome of the present case should be no different, because Defendant/Appellant Humphrey cannot possibly satisfy the governing “plain error” standard. Yet, the majority concludes otherwise, upon first determining that Defendant’s Apprendi-based challenge should be reviewed de novo. According to the majority, Defendant sufficiently raised an Ap-prendi issue at sentencing to preserve the issue on appeal or, alternatively, his factual challenges to drug quantities at sentencing sufficed to preserve the issue. I take a different view, both as to the record and as to the governing law. I again must acknowledge, however, that our Circuit has provided mixed messages — and, all too often, no guidance at all — in determining the standard under which Apprendi challenges should be reviewed.
Although our initial post-Apprendi decisions in Corrado and Rebmann did not consider the proper standard of review for claims of Apprendi violations,14 Page squarely addresses — and, in my view, definitively resolves — this issue. Specifically, we held:
Defendants ... failed to object to the district judge making the determination of drug quantities. Where there has been no objection, review is for plain error. *469Page, 232 F.3d at 543 (citing Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b)).15
Once again, Page’s ruling on this point is in accord with the decisions of all of our sister Circuits. See United States v. Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (D.C.Cir.2001); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. White, 238 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Keeling, 235 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831, 833 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 306-07 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir.2000), amended on reh’g, 244 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.2001). Moreover, many of our own subsequent decisions have adhered to Page’s plain error standard in addressing Apprendi challenges. See, e.g., United States v. King, 272 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Neuhausser, 241 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir.2001).
In electing to apply plain error review, Page cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Johnson is instructive because it, like Page and the present case, involved a claim that a District Court had failed to submit an element of a criminal offense for the jury’s determination beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the jury in Johnson was instructed, in accordance with then-existing Eleventh Circuit precedent, that the element in question, materiality, would be decided by the District Judge. After the defendant was convicted, but before her appeal was heard, the Supreme Court held that materiality was a question for the jury, and not the Court, and the defendant then raised this issue in her pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals reviewed this matter for plain error, and the Supreme Court, upon granting certiorari, likewise concluded that the plain error standard governed its inquiry, because the defendant “did not object to the trial court’s treatment of materiality.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 465-66, 117 S.Ct. at 1548. To be sure, this lack of objection was to be expected: “at the time of trial it was settled that the issue of materiality was to be decided by the court, not the jury,” but “by the time of appellate consideration, the law had changed, and it is now settled that materiality is an issue for the jury.” 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. at 1549. Nevertheless, this lack of objection, however understandable, triggered plain error review.
Consequently, even if Page had not settled the issue, Johnson would dictate that we apply plain error review to an Appren-dNbased claim raised for the first time on appeal. As the majority recognizes, and as we have observed elsewhere, see, e.g., King, 272 F.3d at 374 & n. 3, Apprendi implicates the instructions to the jury, since it dictates, in cases involving drug offenses, that drug type and quantity determinations that result in a sentence beyond the default statutory maximum must be made by a jury under the “beyond a *470reasonable doubt” standard. Johnson, likewise, involved an issue that was decided by the trial judge but should have been submitted to a jury. Finally, in Johnson, as in Page and here, no objection was raised at trial to the District Judge making thé determination in question, presumably because this practice was in accordance with the settled law at the time. Cf. King, 272 F.3d at 374 n. 3 (noting that this Circuit has reviewed Apprendi-based challenges for plain error “even when Appren-di had not been decided at the time a defendant was tried and sentenced”).-
In the present case, during the proceedings in the court below, Defendant undeniably raised factual challenges to the drug quantity recommendations set forth in the presentence investigation report, and then reasserted these challenges at the sentencing hearing. These challenges rested on the contention that the Government’s proofs as to drug quantities relied heavily on the uncorroborated testimony of two cooperating witnesses whose credibility was open to question. (See J.A. at 463-68, 683-92.) For example, in his written objections to the presentence report, Defendant characterized these witnesses as “highly motivated informants,” with one being “an admitted drug addict” and the other “an admitted liar with a personal vendetta against” Defendant. (Id. at 684.) In light of the significant sentencing consequences if the testimony of these witnesses were credited, Defendant and his counsel urged the District Court to “exercise some caution” in assessing'this testimony. {Id. at 465.)16
But, Defendant and his counsel just as surely did not contest the District Court’s authority to make the determination of drug quantities, did not argue that this determination should be made beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, and did not object at trial that this was an issue for the jury and not the judge to decide. To the contrary, in his written objections to the pre-sentence report, Defendant expressly stated: (i) his request that “the Court ... make the ... finding[ ] at sentencing ... that Defendant be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of five years imprisonment for his sale of between 500 grams and five kilograms of powder cocaine,” {id. at 678 (emphasis added));17 and (ii) that “it is the government’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the quantity of narcotics for which a defendant should be held responsible,” {id. at 683 (emphasis added)). Likewise, at sentencing, defense counsel “ask[ed] the Court” to find that Defendant’s “total relevant conduct is less than five kilos,” resulting in a “ten-year mandatory sentence,” {id. at 466), and then stated, with regard to the informant testimony indicating greater drug quantities:
[T]his Court, as the Court knows, has its own independent discretion to decide, once again, lower. We agree with that preponderance of the evidence, but it’s still — preponderance of evidence means *471the Government’s got to show more likely than not. It’s not a close call, but show more likely than not these quantities are credible quantities to hold Mr. Humphrey accountable for.
And I would say given it affects his liberty, perhaps his life, that the Government hasn’t met that burden with respect to these witness’ testimony.
(Id. at 467 (emphasis added).) I do not see how the record could be more clear in demonstrating Defendant’s acknowledgment of the role of the District Court to determine drug quantities under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.18 This is hardly surprising, of course, where Ap-prendi had not yet been decided, and where, at the time of trial, the settled law dictated precisely the practice followed in this case.
Consequently, under Page and Johnson, Defendant’s Apprendi-based challenge, raised for the first time on appeal, should be reviewed only for plain error. Under this standard, Defendant is entitled to relief only if we identify (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantive rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67, 117 S.Ct. at 1549. For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe that Defendant cannot satisfy even the first element of this test, because the District Court’s findings as to drug quantity did not result in the imposition of punishment beyond the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict — namely, a drug conspiracy involving an indeterminate amount of cocaine, with a 20-year statutory maximum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C).19 In my view, then, there was no violation of Apprendi at all in this case.
Nevertheless, even accepting the majority’s view, following Flowal and its progeny, that Apprendi implicates sentencing ranges and not merely statutory máxi-mums, this finding of an Apprendi error would satisfy, at most, only the first two prongs of the four-part plain error test. In that event, we still could not conclude that this purported error affects Defendant’s substantial rights. Rather, it is well established, in this Circuit and others, that substantial rights are not affected, and the plain error standard is not satisfied, by a sentence that could have been achieved solely through the jury’s verdict (or a defendant’s guilty plea), and absent the additional findings of the sentencing court under the too-lenient preponderance standard. See United States v. Stafford, 258 F.3d 465, 477-79 (6th Cir.2001); Martinez, 253 F.3d at 255-56 & n. 5; Page, 232 F.3d at 544-45; see also United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943-44 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 960-61 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. White, 238 F.3d 537, 541-43 (4th Cir.2001).20 Again, this is the case here, *472where Defendant’s 20-year sentence lies within the permitted statutory range for the indeterminate-amount drug conspiracy offense established by the jury’s verdict.
The majority is able to conclude otherwise only by altogether avoiding a “substantial rights” inquiry, and instead reviewing Defendant’s Apprendi claim de novo. As the basis for this, the majority first endeavors to show that Defendant raised something akin to an Apprendi challenge before the District Court. In all of the many passages of the record quoted by the majority, however, Defendant never once questioned the District Judge’s authority to determine drug quantities for purposes of sentencing, and made only a single reference to a “higher standard,” (J.A. at 468), as part of his argument that the informant testimony offered by the Government was inherently unreliable. It seems to me unnecessary to decide whether the portions of the record cited by the majority contain something that could possibly be construed as an Apprendi-like argument, when the passages I quoted earlier — and which the majority does not— feature express statements of Defendant’s positions: namely, that it was the duty of the District Court to determine the drug quantities for which he was to be held responsible, and that it was the Government’s burden to establish these quantities by a preponderance of the evidence.21
Alternatively, the majority cites Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 467, for the proposition that an objection as to drug quantity at sentencing — which objection Defendant plainly did raise here — suffices to preserve de novo review of an Apprendi claim on appeal. Strayhom, in turn, rests its de novo review on the authority of United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1220 (6th Cir.1993).22 Lloyd, however, applied the de novo standard to facial attacks on the constitutionality of a federal statute — specifically, equal protection and substantive due process challenges to the statutory 100-to-l sentencing disparity under § 841(b) for drug offenses involving crack versus powder cocaine. Such questions of law, implicating the scope of congressional authority under the Constitution, clearly warrant de novo review.
In contrast, Defendant here has not mounted a constitutional attack upon a federal statute, but instead challenges the District Court’s decision as to which ele*473ments of a drug conspiracy offense must be submitted to the jury for determination beyond a reasonable doubt, and which may be determined by the Court at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. This, of course, was the very sort of challenge presented to us in Page, and to the Supreme Court in Johnson, and the courts in both cases determined that the plain error standard governed their inquiries, where the defendants had not raised their arguments in the lower court proceedings. Remarkably, Strayhom even cites Page, and expressly acknowledges that the plain error standard was applied in that case. See Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 467. Yet, rather than simply following Page, with its highly similar facts, Strayhom reaches out to Lloyd as authority for applying de novo review.
Arguably, Strayhom endeavors to distinguish Page and its application of plain error review by suggesting that the two cases involved different sorts of objections in the court below. In Strayhorn, the defendant “repeatedly objected] to the drug quantity determination at his plea hearing and at his sentencing hearing, as well as in a written objection to the calculation of his base offense level in his pre-sentence report,” and he “made it well known that he disputed the district court’s factual finding with respect to drug quantity.” Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 467. The panel contrasted this with the situation presented in Page, where the defendants purportedly “failed to object when [the] district court made its determination of drug quantities.” Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 467.
This attempted distinction, however, fails on at least two scores. First, as a factual matter, and as both the majority and I have pointed out in our respective opinions, Page says almost nothing at all about what objections, if any, were presented to the District Court in that case. The lone break from this silence, as I noted earlier, is the Court’s pointed observation that the defendants “did not object to the district court making the determination of drug quantities.” Page, 232 F.3d at 543. For all we know, then, the defendants in Page raised precisely the same sorts of factual challenges to the District Court’s drug quantity determinations as were made in Strayhorn,23
*474Next, even assuming the factual distinctions posited in Strayhom actually existed, I fail to see how a fact-based objection to a sentencing judge’s drug quantity computation could properly be construed as preserving the far different sort of challenge that arises from Apprendi — namely, a legal challenge implicating the division of labor between judge and jury, as well as the stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof attendant to a jury-sub-missible issue. The record in this case amply demonstrates the distinction between factual and Apprendi-based objections to a District Court’s determination of drug quantities — Defendant here quite plainly asserted the former type of objection at sentencing, but expressly disavowed any claim of the latter sort, and instead acknowledged the District Court’s authority to make such a determination by a preponderance of the evidence. It would be strange indeed if a defendant’s challenge to a District Court’s factual findings, which we review for clear error, see Neuhausser, 241 F.3d at 475, somehow triggered de novo review of a different sort of challenge that was not presented to the sentencing court. And, again, Strayhom stands alone in its failure to observe this distinction; several other Circuits, in contrast, have expressly held that the plain error standard applies even where there were factual objections to the sentencing court’s determination of drug quantities. See, e.g., Fields, 251 F.3d at 1044-45; Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d at 306 & n. 8; Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1056-57, 1060.
Indeed, I read Page as our Circuit’s definitive statement on the subject, leaving no room for the distinction that Strayhom seeks to draw. Page does not say much on the subject — we seldom do when setting forth the applicable standard of review — but what it says is plain enough: namely, that a defendant who does not “object to the district judge making the determination of drug quantities” faces plain error review on appeal. Page, 232 F.3d at 543 (emphasis added). The Court’s failure to expressly catalog each and every objection that was made at sentencing in that case, and to explain why each did not operate to preserve the defendants’ Apprendi challenges, does not in any way diminish the force of Page’s express holding. Nor does it afford any opportunity, in my view, for a later panel to seize upon Page’s silence as a basis for drawing a distinction which, as a matter of brute fact, might not even exist, and, as a matter of judicial interpretation, must have lacked legal significance to the Court in that case.24
*475In the end, I take Page to mean what it literally says, no more and no less. A defendant who “fail[s] to object to the district judge making the determination of drug quantities” faces plain error review of his Apprendi claim on appeal. Page, 232 F.3d at 543. To be sure, there can be cases falling at the margins of this rule and, as the majority points out, we require no particular “magic words” to preserve an Apprendi-based challenge. Yet, in my view, this case lies nowhere near any grey area in Page’s rule. Defendant not only failed to object to the District Judge making the determination of drug quantities by a preponderance of the evidence, he expressly agreed that this procedure governed his sentencing, and he framed his objections accordingly, inviting the District Court, in its role as factfinder, to discount the Government’s evidence of drug quantities as unreliable. On this record, I think it clear that Defendant’s present Apprendi claim should be reviewed only for plain error.
III.
The majority’s decision to remand this case for resentencing rests upon two underlying determinations: (i) that the rule of Apprendi is violated whenever a District Court’s factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence alters the range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed; and (ii) that Apprendi claims are reviewed de novo whenever a defendant raises any sort of challenge at sentencing to the District Court’s factual findings as to drug quantity. Both of these underlying propositions, I believe, are demonstrably in error, whether one proceeds by first principles from the relevant Supreme Court precedents, or whether one simply reviews the initial (and presumably still binding) Sixth Circuit precedents on each of these points. Accordingly, while I concur in all other respects, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of Defendant’s Ap-prendi claim, and from its decision to remand this case for resentencing.25

. The D.C. Circuit apparently has not squarely addressed the application of Apprendi to statutory sentencing ranges, but has held, with regard to sentencing enhancements under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, that "Ap-prendí does not apply to sentencing findings that elevate a defendant’s sentence within the applicable statutory limits.” United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C.Cir.2001).

. Nevertheless, as discussed below, we upheld the sentences of three of the four defendants under the "plain error” standard of review, "since, absent the [Apprendi ] error, their sentences would have been the same as those which were imposed.” 232 F.3d at 545.

. The third charge of conspiracy was dismissed before trial.

. This range becomes 20 years to life imprisonment if, as is the case here, a defendant previously has been convicted of a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The majority holds, and I agree, that Defendant’s challenge to his prior conviction is without merit.

.In fact, this statutory maximum increases to 30 years where, as here, the defendant has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, Defendant's 20-year sentence actually is well below the statutory maximum, even when drug quantities are omitted from the determination.

. Despite this Apprendi violation, the Government argued that the defendant's sentence could be upheld as within the range set forth in § 841(b)(1)(B), ten years to life, in light of the defendant’s admission to a quantity of cocaine just under 5 kilograms. The panel in Flowal rejected this argument, without ever stating the standard of review that governed its consideration. This additional defect in Flowal is discussed below.

. Flowal misstates the facts in Rebmann, however, claiming that the defendant in that case was sentenced to life imprisonment. In fact, as noted earlier, the challenged sentence in Rebmann was 24 years and 4 months, still beyond the default statutory maximum of 20 years.

. In Aguayo-Delgado, as in the case before us, the defendant was sentenced to a 20-year term of imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit found that this sentence was "permissible under Apprendi and McMillan," because it fell "within the statutory range authorized by § 841(b)(1)(C) without reference to drug quantity.” 220 F.3d at 934. It is ironic that Aguayo-Delgado, as transformed through its misreading by the panel in Flowal, now is an indirect part of the chain of authority in this Circuit for a result directly opposite that reached by the Eighth Circuit under identical facts.

. Notably, the rule stated in Ramirez is remarkably similar to the standard advocated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Ap-prendi: namely, that "a ‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)." 530 U.S. at 501, 120 S.Ct. at 2368 (Thomas, J., concurring).

. Strayhom at least attempts to account for the Supreme Court’s decision in McMillan, citing that case for the proposition that "the government may still rely upon a district court’s finding of relevant conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, but only insofar as it 'operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it’ and does not 'alter[ ] the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create[ ] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.’ ” Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 470 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417). The quoted passage from McMillan, however, merely describes the Pennsylvania law at issue in that case, and does not purport to set forth the essential requirements for any mandatory minimum sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster.
Moreover, if it once was possible to define McMillan’s holding by reference to such notions as "separate offenses” or "separate penalties,” the decision and analysis in Apprendi now preclude such an effort. As we recognized in Rebmann, Apprendi marks a "radical departure” in the Supreme Court's method of determining the "elements” of an offense. Rebmann, 226 F.3d at 524. Questions of statutory structure and legislative intent have given way to purely functional considerations, and "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect — does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty ver-, diet?” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365; see also Rebmann, 226 F.3d at 524. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, in rejecting the contention that 21 U.S.C. § 841 is unconstitutional:
If Congress had specified that only judges may make the findings required by § 841(b), or that these findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence, then § 841 would create a constitutional problem. But the statute does not say who malees the findings or which party bears what burden of persuasion. Instead the law attaches effects to facts, leaving it to the judiciary to sort out who determines the facts, under what burden. It makes no constitutional difference whether a single subsection covers both elements and penalties, whether these are divided across multiple subsections (as § 841 does), or even whether they are scattered across multiple statutes. Apprendi holds that the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments make the jury the right deci-sionmaker (unless the defendant elects a bench trial), and the reasonable-doubt standard the proper burden, when a fact raises the maximum lawful punishment. How statutes are drafted, or implemented, to ful-fil that requirement is a subject to which the Constitution does not speak.
United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1079 (7th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).
Thus, in the wake of Apprendi, there is no constitutional significance in the question whether a 20-year statutory maximum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C) is "really” a sentence within the 10-years-to-life range governing the different "offense” set forth in § 841(b)(1)(A). Instead, the offense is defined solely by reference to the jury’s verdict, and the sentencing court then is free to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, one or more factors that impact upon the sentence for this offense, so long as these factors do not take the sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the offense. This is the process used by federal judges for some time now to determine sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines, and it seems untenable to suggest that Congress has less authority to establish relevant sentencing considerations by statute, as in § 841(b), than the Sentencing Commission may accomplish through the Guidelines. Moreover, I cannot conceive that Apprendi s functional approach was meant to invite more mind-reading of sentencing judges to determine which of a set of overlapping statutory provisions defined the real "offense” for which a defendant was sentenced. Rather, a District Court "creates a separate offense,” in the parlance of McMillan, only by sentencing a defendant in excess of the statutory maximum for the offense established through the jury’s verdict.

. In criticizing Flowal, I mean no disrespect to the panel that decided it. I have already acknowledged that Apprendi itself is not a model of clarity. Moreover, regarding Flo-wal's failure to account for this Circuit’s existing post-Apprendi precedents, it must be noted that Page and Munoz were decided in November of 2000, with Flowal following soon thereafter, on December 11, 2000. This Circuit’s initial flurry of post-Apprendi decisions admittedly posed a challenge to panels seeking to ensure that their decisions were consistent with our existing law on the subject. Nevertheless, Flowal and its progeny do depart from the decisions that preceded them. Thus, I respectfully differ from the majority’s view that Flowal, Ramirez, and Strayhom merely reflect the further development of our post-Apprendi jurisprudence, resolving issues left open in our initial decisions on the subject. I find this explanation wanting, both factually and legally.
First, if our initial ‘‘statutory maximum” reading of Apprendi were now a dead letter, supplanted by the broader holdings of Flowal and its progeny, one would expect that panels would no longer cite our earlier statement of the rule of Apprendi, but instead would ask whether a District Judge's findings by a preponderance of the evidence affected the sentencing range faced by the defendant. Yet, in the time since Flowal was decided, several panels of this Court have continued to follow the narrower rule of Corrado, Page, and Munoz, holding that Apprendi does not apply where the defendant’s sentence lies within the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury verdict (or guilty plea) alone. See, e.g., United States v. McLemore, 2001 WL 1563652, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec.3, 2001); United States v. Argo, 2001 WL 1216966, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct.4, 2001); United States v. Delgado, 2001 WL 1176420, at *3 (6th. Cir. Sept.25, 2001); United States v. Arbelaez-Agudelo, 2001 WL 1042249, at *3 n. 2 (6th Cir. Aug.27, 2001); United States v. Cook, 2001 WL 777404, at *9 (6th Cir. July 2, 2001); United States v. Ridley, 2001 WL 549401, at *3 (6th Cir. May 16, 2001); United States v. Deaton, 2001 WL 493372, at *2 (6th Cir. May 4, 2001); United States v. Oldham, 2001 WL 406424, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr.2, 2001); United States v. Neuhausser, 241 F.3d 460, 466-72 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Caldwell, 238 F.3d 424, 2000 WL 1888682, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000). Not one of these cases addresses (or even mentions) a statutory minimum sentence, as would be necessaiy if Flo-wal were now this Circuit’s sole and definitive statement of the scope of Apprendi. Although the majority places significance on the fact that most of these cases are unpublished, it seems to me that the panel in each instance was bound to ascertain and follow the law of this Circuit, whether or not it planned to publish its decision. Indeed, there was no need for these panels to publish their rulings, as they were merely following our prior published precedents in Corrado, Page, and Munoz.
More importantly, as a legal matter, the majority’s "development of the law” theory cannot hope to account for cases with legally indistinguishable facts but different outcomes. Munoz and Ramirez, for example, both involved drug-related findings by a District Judge that triggered an enhanced statutory sentencing range, both minimum and maximum, but the defendant in each case was sentenced within the default 20-year maximum of § 841(b)(1)(C). Munoz held that "the Apprendi ruling is not applicable here," 233 *468F.3d at 414, while Ramirez found a violation of Ramirez, 242 F.3d at 350-52. If Ramirez is deemed correct — or, more to the point, binding on subsequent panels — the conclusion is inescapable that Munoz is not. Munoz, then, has been overruled, plain and simple — notwithstanding our Circuit rule that one panel may not overrule another.
The question becomes, what to do about this state of affairs? The majority suggests— albeit tacitly, given its assertion that our post-Apprendi decisions are not in conflict — that the later decisions should prevail over the earlier ones. I am uncomfortable with this, as it seems to sanction a “one free bite” exception to our rule of stare decisis. In contrast, adherence to the earlier cases reinforces the principle of stare decisis by demonstrating our resolve not to permit one panel to overturn the ruling of another. Under the present circumstances, moreover, there is the additional consideration that Flowal and its progeny have effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s McMillan decision, and not just existing Sixth Circuit precedent. This, in my view, is the ultimate "tiebreaker.”

. Or perhaps, as the majority suggests, the Supreme Court will resolve the matter for us, as it appears that the Court will revisit Ap-prendi in a forthcoming opinion.

. As it happens, the standard of review was not determinative in Corrado and Rebmann. In the former case, the Court found no Ap-prendi violation, and the defendant could not have prevailed even under de novo review. In the latter, the defendant’s sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense to which she had pled guilty, and her claim therefore could have satisfied the more stringent plain error standard.

. On appeal, at least one of the four defendants in Page questioned the District Court's method of computing drug quantities. We rejected this challenge, and stated that "[o]ther issues ... regarding drug quantity are addressed in the unpublished appendix to this opinion.” Page, 232 F.3d at 541-42 & n. 2. As observed by the majority, however, Page does not indicate what sorts of challenges, if any, were or were not raised before the District Court — that is, apart from our direct statement that the defendants did not raise an Apprendi issue in the court below, thereby triggering plain error review.

. In addition, because the sentencing judge had not presided at trial, defense counsel went to some lengths at sentencing to point out that the jury’s guilty verdicts did not necessarily mean that the jury found the two cooperating witnesses fully credible, particularly as to specific drug transactions and quantities. (See id. at 465-66.)

. Given this admission in his written objections, and in light of his prior felony drug conviction (which he argued, unsuccessfully, should not be used in computing his sentence), Defendant clearly was subject to a sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant acknowledged this in his written objections to the presentence report, and again at sentencing. (See id. at 466, 692.)

. The Government’s counsel plainly shared this view, observing at sentencing, following the above-quoted statement by defense counsel, that "Mr. Dudley has accurately related to the Court what our burden is, and that's the lesser burden, preponderance.” (Id. at 468.)

. As noted earlier, this 20-year statutory maximum is raised to 30 years where, as here, the defendant has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

.The concurrence in Stafford is instructive on this point. Judge Clay endorsed the broader, "sentencing range” reading of Ap-prendi, see Stafford, 258 F.3d at 479-80 (Clay, J., concurring) — not surprisingly, since he was a member of the panel in Strayhom. . Nevertheless, Judge Clay recognized that the plain error standard governed the defendant’s Apprendi challenge. He then concurred in the majority's ruling that this claim did not survive plain error review, agreeing that the defendant’s substantial rights were not affect*472ed by a sentence which was less than the statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C) for cocaine amounts under 500 grams. Stafford, 258 F.3d at 482-83 & n. 8 (Clay, J., concurring).

. To the majority’s suggestion that it would be unfair to penalize a defendant for failing to anticipate a change in the law through a not-yet-issued Supreme Court ruling, I can only say that the requirement of contemporaneous objection, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, and the limited exception in cases of plain error, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b), reflect "a careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (footnote omitted). Thus, the availability of plain error review is intended to mitigate the very unfairness of which the majority complains. In any event, the Supreme Court’s application of the plain error standard in Johnson, under legally indistinguishable facts and circumstances— and, of course, Page’s application of the same standard, under even more similar circumstances to those confronting us here — dictates our course of action in this case, no matter how much we might prefer a different calibration of the competing policy concerns.

. Though Strayhom looks to Flowal and Ramirez for guidance in construing Apprendi, it cannot rely upon these decisions as authority for de novo review of Apprendi claims, for the simple reason that Flowal and Ramirez are completely silent as to the standard of review for such claims.

. Strayhom commits the same error with respect to our decision in Neuhausser, viewing that case, like Page, as distinguishable on the ground that the defendant purportedly "failed to object when [the] district court made its determination of drug quantities.” Strayhom, 250 F.3d at 467 (citing Neuhausser, 241 F.3d at 466). In fact, Neuhausser states at the outset that the defendant was challenging his sentence as “unlawfully based in part on the trial court’s determinations of drug types and quantities at sentencing under the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard," and that, because the defendant "failed to raise this objection in the court below, we review his sentence only for plain error.” 241 F.3d at 464 (emphasis added). Then, in the passage cited in Strayhom, Neuhausser surveys the decision in Page, and states that "in Page, as here, the defendants failed to object when the District Court initially made its determination of drug quantities.” Neuhausser, 241 F.3d at 466. From the context, as well as the reference to Page, it is evident that Neuhausser is speaking of a particular "fail[ure] to object” — namely, the lack of any objection that drug type and quantity must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and not by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Neuhausser, like Page is utterly silent as to whether any other sorts of objections were raised at trial or sentencing.
Parenthetically, as a member of the panel (and the writing Judge) in Neuhausser, I am able to go back to the record and confirm that, in fact, the defendant did present factual challenges to the District Judge’s determination of drug quantities, both in written objections to the presentence report and at his sentencing hearing. As indicated below, if this portion of the record was not mentioned in the panel’s opinion, it was because we *474deemed it irrelevant to either the issues before the Court or the standard of review to be applied in resolving those issues.

. As noted earlier, the distinction Strayhom seeks to draw between the circumstances presented in that case and the circumstances in Neuhausser does not, in fact, exist. Thus, we are in the same predicament in our post-Apprendi standard of review jurisprudence as I discussed earlier with regard to our decisions addressing the substantive scope of Apprendi: namely, that like cases are being decided differently, with Strayhom having effectively overruled Neuhausser, at least (and arguably also Page), on the standard of review issue. And, again, any effort to identify a coherent statement of our Circuit’s present rule on this issue runs afoul of the case law, where many of our recent decisions continue to cite Page as authority for applying a plain error standard, without ever considering whether a factual challenge at sentencing might instead trigger de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 2001 WL 1667289, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec.21, 2001); United States v. Martin, 2001 WL 1631410, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec.18, 2001); McLemore, supra, 2001 WL 1563652, at *3; King, supra, 272 F.3d at 374; United States v. DePaz, 2001 WL 1450805, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct.29, 2001); Arbelaez-Agudelo, supra, 2001 WL 1042249, at *3 n. 2; Cook, supra, 2001 WL 777404, at *5; Martinez, supra, 253 F.3d at *475255; United States v. Taylor, 2001 WL 549417, at *5 (6th Cir. May 16, 2001). Indeed, a review of these decisions reveals that some of the defendants did raise factual objections to the sentencing judge’s determinations, and yet we still applied plain error review. See Graham, 2001 WL 1667289, at *2; McLemore, 2001 WL 1563652, at *2-*3; King, 272 F.3d at 375, 378; DePaz, 2001 WL 1450805, at *2-*3; Arbelaez-Agudelo, 2001 WL 1042249, at *3 & n. 2. These cases, like Neuhausser, are in direct conflict with Strayhom’s rule of de novo review. Again, I would suggest that the Supreme Court, through its decision in Johnson, should serve as the "tiebreaker” in resolving this conflict.

. I do not understand the majority’s confusion as to the outcome I am advocating in this case. Specifically, I believe that Defendant’s Apprendi challenge should be rejected, and his sentence affirmed in all respects. As authority for this, I would look to Page, Munoz, and our other initial post-Apprendi rulings that I have surveyed above. To the extent that this approach requires us to "ignore” certain of our published decisions, this is by no means unprecedented. Rather, as I observed at the outset, we have adopted a rule to govern this precise situation, requiring that we adhere to our first published ruling on a subject over a later but conflicting decision. See Darrah, supra, 255 F.3d at 310.
In contrast, it is interesting to consider what might occur upon the remand ordered by the majority. At his initial sentencing, Defendant faced a Sentencing Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months, and the majority finds no error in this determination. On remand, then, Defendant stands to achieve at most a 5-month reduction in his sentence. Yet, his sentence also could be enhanced, *476since, as the majority points out, our post-Apprendi jurisprudence permits the imposition of a sentence that exceeds but does not equal an enhanced statutory minimum, so long as it does not exceed the default statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C) — in this case, 30 years. See King, 272 F.3d at 377-78.