Court Opinion

ID: 9573897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:17.975242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:38.467921
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.
I dissent.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1, 67 S Ct 504, 91 L Ed 711, 168 ALR 1392, spent unusual effort upon a case which was governed by the same principle of law that governs the case at bar. It stated the principle with clarity and sustained 'the constitutionality of the challenged statute. We should apply the same principle of law in this case and recognize as valid the statute under attack. Certainty of law governing the relationship between the state and religious organizations, although difficult of expression, is peculiarly desirable. Confusion and controversy are certain to arise when the United States Supreme Court and this court interpret differently a constitutional principle that should have a single meaning. The Everson decision affords a good opportunity to achieve a high degree of certainty. It should not be cast aside; it should be embraced.
I will now state an additional reason for my dissent. It is commonly recognized that if more than one reasonable interpretation can be placed upon a statute *262which, is challenged as invalid, one of which will sustain its constitutionality and the other of which will render it unconstitutional, the courts must accept the former. The most recent of our decisions which so held is Federal Cartridge Corporation v. Helstrom, 202 Or 559, 276 P2d 720. I believe that a simple reasonable interpretation can be placed upon ORS 337.150 (the act under attack) which will assure its validity.
A free textbook statute, applicable only to public elementary schools, was enacted in 1931. Oregon Laws 1931, Chapter 61, § 1, p. 74. Oregon Laws 1941, Chapter 485, § 1, page 878, amended the act just cited by expanding its scope. The amended act read:
“The board of directors of each and every school .district in the state of Oregon hereby is authorized, empowered and directed, in the manner hereinafter provided, to provide textbooks, prescribed or authorized by law for the free use of all pupils residing in its respective districts and enrolled in and actually attending standard elementary schools. For the purpose of this act a school shall b.e standard when it meets the standards of the state board of education and all teachers engaged in classroom instruction in said school shall hold a valid Oregon teaching certificate of the proper teacher level. * * .
It is clearly evident that the legislature, in making the amendment to the 1931 enactment, wished to improve the quality of the denominational schools. It, therefore, rendered textbooks available also to pupils who were enrolled in denominational schools that met qualifications for “standard elementary schools.” But prior to the 1941 act a denominational school could select any textbook it preferred and use it in the classroom. Let us at this point assume that the members of the 1941 Legislative Assembly, in voting to extend *263the free use of textbooks to the pupils in denominational schools, thought that 'the pupils in those schools would receive superior instruction if the schools adopted the books chosen by the State Board of Textbook Commissioners (ORS 337.010 and 337.050); under those circumstances we surely would be forced to hold that the legislature had in mind the pupils and superior instruction for them—not financial gain for the schools. ORS 337.260 is a clear indication that the legislature is vitally concerned with the contents of the textbooks that are used in teaching the youth of Oregon. We see from the facts just mentioned that when a denominational school requests the local school board to render available to its pupils the use of free textbooks it must accept books chosen by the 'officials of the public school district and not by itself.
The majority concede that although churches and denominational schools pay no taxes they nevertheless receive many benefits from public moneys. For example, if a fire breaks out in a church the local fire department undertakes to extinguish it. That obviously is done because the church is a local asset and also because the fire, if left unextinguished, might spread to other structures. If a thief invades a church or denominational school he is prosecuted by the public authorities because if he were left to go his way the property of others might be taken. However, in all instances of that kind the benefits to the religious organization is secondary or incidental. For example, the street adjacent to a church or denominational institution may be improved at public expense, not for the purpose of conferring a benefit upon the church, but in order to enable traffic to move expeditiously. A church or a denominational school likewise may be *264enabled to hook up to the public sewer lines, not in order to confer a benefit upon 'the church, but because to do otherwise might cause an epidemic of disease to arise. The majority quote from a text writer as follows :
“* * * Furthermore, a church may receive police protection when classed as property, tax exemption when classed as a non-profit institution, sewage connections when classed as, a building, and yet be denied financial aid when classed as a religious institution * *
Classifications of that kind solve nothing. They represent wishful thinking whereby cases are solved according to preconceived ideas. To me, it seems we must in all instances endeavor to determine why the statute under attack was enacted. A good instance is OBS 421.035 which reads as follows:
“There shall be appointed by the board two chaplains of the Oregon State Penitentiary, two chaplains of the Oregon State Correctional Institution and two chaplains of the MacLaren School for Boys. One shall be a non-Catholie clergyman, the other a Catholic clergyman of the archdiocese of Oregon, in each instance. They shall:
“■(I) Look after and 'attend to the spiritual wants of the inmates of the penitentiary, the correctional institution and the MacLaren School for Boys and of all other public institutions in Marion County, when called upon so to do by the inmates, respectively.
“(2) Visit their respective charges for the purpose of giving them religious and moral instructions * * *”
That enactment represents a clear appropriation of public funds for religious purposes. Yet, when the legislature enacted the statute it was not prompted by a desire to improve the finances of any church, *265religious denomination or clergyman. It was thinking of the unfortunate individuals who are confined in our penal institutions and was prompted by a hope that if a clergyman, Bible in his hand, called upon them a new light 'might enter their lives and turn them from law breaking to worthy aspirations. A Salvation Army band, clothed in tattered uniforms but playing some of the church’s favorite hymns as it marches through skid row is a greater force for law compliance than a battalion of police officers.
As I have indicated, the act in question clearly can be deemed an educational act. Its purpose was to bring to the avail of the pupils in denominational institutions textbooks which the legislature favored. The legislature was not concerned with any church, but with the youth of Oregon and believed that textbooks chosen by the State Board of Textbook Commissioners would afford superior education to those selected by the denominational schools.
I add that a parochial school is in no sense enriched through the operation of the statute under attack. If, prior to the enactment of ORS 337.150 the parochial school did not provide for its pupils free textbooks then obviously ORS 337.150 did not relieve it of any burden. But, if prior to the enactment of ORS 337.150 the parochial school provided free textbooks, then the act under question does not give to the parochial school any books whatever. ORS 337.200(2) renders it clear that the books are entrusted to the pupil and are not the property of the school. In fact, ORS 337.190 states:
“All textbooks purchased under ORS 337.150 are, and shall remain, the property of the school district. Upon receipt thereof, each of said books shall be immediately and properly labeled as the property of the school district.”
*266ORS 337.200 renders it the duty of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to see to it that all of the books thus rendered available to the pupils are returned to the school board. Without further analysis I express my conclusion that the act under review is constitutional and that this court should adhere to Everson v. Board of Education, supra.