Court Opinion

ID: 9942640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:52.477547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:22.782224
License: Public Domain

J-A25015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRANDON KEESLER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 735 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 7, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0002310-2013

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: February 21, 2024

       Brandon Keesler appeals pro se from the order dismissing his petitions

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

       On February 5, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to rape of a child stemming

from incidents that occurred between 2012 and 2013. The court immediately

imposed fifteen to thirty-five years of incarceration. Appellant did not file a

direct appeal, and thus his judgment of sentence became final on March 7,

2014. Accordingly, he had until March 7, 2015, to timely file a PCRA petition.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

       Appellant filed his first PCRA petition in February 2017.      The court

appointed counsel, who filed a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550

A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Thereafter, the PCRA court granted

counsel’s motion to withdraw and found Appellant’s petition untimely.

Appellant did not appeal this determination.

       On January 11, 2023, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition (“Second

PCRA Petition”) challenging the legality of his registration requirements.

Almost four months later, on May 9, the PCRA court entered notice of its

intention to dismiss without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, finding

that Appellant’s petition was untimely.1 The court gave Appellant twenty days

to respond. Appellant then filed on May 24 what he titled a “Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus.” (“Habeas Corpus Petition”). On June 7, the PCRA court

entered an order stating that it had reviewed the Habeas Corpus Petition and

determined that Appellant raised the same claims as in the Second PCRA

Petition.2   Therefore, the court denied relief on Appellant’s Habeas Corpus

Petition based on the rationale articulated in its Rule 907 notice. The court

also dismissed the Second PCRA Petition since Appellant did not raise an

____________________________________________

1 Therein, the PCRA court also examined Appellant’s substantive claims and

concluded that none warranted relief. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 5/9/23,
at 7-8.

2 This Court has held that “PCRA courts have jurisdiction to consider multiple

PCRA petitions relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time
so long as a prior petition is not under appellate review and, therefore, not
yet final.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 367 (Pa.Super.
2018).

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objection to the notice. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court ordered

Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied, and the PCRA court then

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Appellant   articulates    the   following   question    for   this   Court’s

consideration: “Did the lower court err in dismissing the Habeas Corpus

Petition as untimely and err in its finding that [the Sex Offender Registration

and Notification Act, effective June 12, 2018 (Act 29 of 2018)] is not

unconstitutional?” Appellant’s brief at 3 (cleaned up).

      We begin by reviewing the pertinent legal principles. Preliminarily, we

note that “[o]n appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review

calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by

the record and free of legal error. We apply a de novo standard of review to

the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d

561, 567 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). “[T]his Court may affirm a PCRA court’s

order on any legal basis.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595

(Pa.Super. 2021). Moreover, “[i]t is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that

the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury,

219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      We have held that “[i]t is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be

the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief.”          Commonwealth v.

Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa.Super. 2013). Furthermore, “[u]nless the PCRA

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could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ

of habeas corpus.” Id. at 465–66.

      The PCRA provides as follows regarding the time for filing a petition:

      Any petition [filed pursuant to the PCRA], including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation
         of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). If a PCRA petition is untimely, “neither this Court

nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition.” Commonwealth v.

Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned up).

      Concerning the Second PCRA Petition, Appellant “readily admits that he

was barred under the PCRA statutes from seeking relief.” Appellant’s brief at

3. He further acknowledges that the PCRA court correctly denied him relief

on that petition. Id. at 3-4. Hence, because Appellant concedes on appeal

that he is not entitled to relief on this petition, we need not examine it further.

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      Appellant next argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the

Habeas Corpus Petition. He contends that while he cannot overcome the PCRA

time bar, our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234

A.2d 602 (Pa. 2020) enables him to file a habeas corpus petition to obtain

relief. See Appellant’s brief at 3-4. However, as detailed infra, because the

crux of Appellant’s contention challenges the legality of his sentence as a

violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, it is

therefore cognizable under the PCRA and subject to the PCRA time bar. See

id. at 6.

      Although Appellant couches his claim as a habeas corpus petition, we

have held that, “[r]egardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a

petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if

it requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Hagan,

___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 844296, at *5 (Pa.Super. 2023). It is well-settled

that legality-of-sentence issues are cognizable under the PCRA and must be

brought in a timely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214,

223 (Pa. 1999) (stating that, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject

to review within the PCRA, [such a claim] must still first satisfy the PCRA’s

time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.”). Indeed, “the PCRA statute is

intended as the sole means of collaterally challenging a sentence.”

Commonwealth v. Concordia, 97 A.3d 366, 372 (Pa.Super. 2014). Phrased

differently, if an issue is cognizable under the PCRA, that issue “must be raised

in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition.”

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Taylor, supra at 466. Since the issue implicating the legality of Appellant’s

sentence is plainly subject to review within the PCRA, he “cannot escape the

PCRA time-bar by titling his petition . . . as a writ of habeas corpus.” Id.

(footnote omitted).

      Accordingly, because the self-styled Habeas Corpus Petition is, in fact,

a serial PCRA petition, we must determine if it was filed timely. As we already

discussed, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2015 and this

petition was filed in 2023. Moreover, Appellant did not plead an exception to

the PCRA time bar. Hence, he is not entitled to relief. Commonwealth v.

Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that “there is no

generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar

pertaining to post-conviction petitions.”).

      Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance upon Lacombe is misplaced. Therein,

the High Court held that a petition filed pursuant to the PCRA was not the

exclusive means for challenging sexual offender registration statutes.

Lacombe, supra at 618. As this Court has opined, “[t]he decision announced

in Lacombe offered registrants an opportunity to challenge current or future

registration requirements through a procedural mechanism other than a PCRA

petition when the registrant has fulfilled his or her sentence, has been released

from incarceration, and the registration requirements have begun.” Hagan,

supra at *7. Instantly, Appellant is still serving his sentence of incarceration

and his registration requirements have not started. Thus, Lacombe provides

Appellant no purchase in this situation.

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     Since both of Appellant’s petitions were untimely filed, we affirm the

PCRA court’s order denying them without a hearing.

     Order affirmed.

 DATE: 02/21/2024

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