Court Opinion

ID: 9587470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:22:29.208296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:20.056572
License: Public Domain

Judge McCULLOUGH
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the claim of constructive discharge based upon either a hostile work environment or in retaliation is authorized under the public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine set forth in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989), I respectfully dissent. I also dissent in the case sub judice on the grounds that even if constructive discharge claims are authorized, plaintiff’s case lacks sufficient evidence on the elements of the claim to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.
I. Claims for Wrongful Discharge
Plaintiff contends, and the majority agrees, that the North Carolina Supreme Court conclusively recognized the tort of con*44structive wrongful discharge in the case of Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447. I do not read Coman so broadly, but instead read its holding as more narrowly defined by the issue presented in that case: “Our present task is to determine whether we should adopt a public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine.” Id. The Court went on to adopt the public policy exception as a claim for wrongful discharge. I believe this is an altogether different claim than that of constructive discharge and therefore would distinguish this opinion from Graham v. Hardee’s Food Systems, 121 N.C. App. 382, 386-87, 465 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1996). In Graham, our Court seems to hold that a constructive discharge claim falls within the public policy exception of a wrongful discharge to an at-will-employee, and therefore requires proof that the discharge was in contravention of the public policy of North Carolina. Id.

A. The Public Policy Exception to an at-will-employee

Generally, an at-will-employee may be discharged without reason. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 260, 182 S.E.2d 403, 407 (1971). However, in Coman the Court held that, should an employee be discharged for failing to follow an employer’s demands, where such demands violate public policy, discharging that employee on the grounds of this failure is unlawful. The Court found authority for this exception in Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 13 (1985), where this Court stated:
[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent.
The issue in Sides was the employer’s demand that the employee perjure herself in a malpractice lawsuit; the issue in Coman was the employer’s demand that the employee violate federal trucking regulations and falsify logs. The Court found both of these demands violated public policy. Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447. In Coman, the employee who refused to violate the federal trucking regulations had his pay reduced by fifty percent, which the Court determined was tantamount to discharge. Id. at 173-74, 381 S.E.2d at 446. It is clear from Coman, that a claim under this wrongful discharge *45required some affirmative demand of an employee by the employer to viólate public policy.

B. Elements of Hostile Work Environment Constructive Discharge

A separate and distinct wrongful discharge claim, one other than the public policy exception to the at-will-employee doctrine as defined in Coman, is a claim in tort for a hostile work environment constructive wrongful discharge. North Carolina state courts have yet to adopt this type of claim. Graham, 121 N.C. App. at 385, 465 S.E.2d at 560.
In the interest of judicial economy, however, our Court in Graham assumed arguendo what the elements of this constructive discharge claim would be. Id. In so doing, we sought guidance from the Federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as to the elements of the claim. “A plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must therefore prove two elements: deliberateness of the employer’s action, and intolerability of the working conditions.” Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985). In Bristow, the Fourth Circuit required deliberateness be shown by the following:
Our decisions require proof of the employer’s specific intent to force an employee to leave[.] Intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, including a failure, to act in the face of known intolerable conditions].]
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Bristow Court required that intolerability be assessed by the following: “[A]s the circuits uniformly recognize, [intolerability] is assessed by the objective standard of whether a ‘reasonable person’ in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (emphasis added).
II. Plaintiffs Claim of Constructive Discharge
Assuming arguendo that North Carolina courts have adopted the claim of constructive discharge, a claimant would be required to bring forth the elements of the claim as set out in Bristow. See Graham, 121 N.C. App. at 385, 465 S.E.2d at 560. Because I do not believe plaintiff supported her case with more than a scintilla of evidence as to the element of defendant’s deliberateness or intent, I would hold the trial court was correct in granting the motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence.

*46
A. Standard, of Review

A motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure presents the same question for both trial and appellate courts: whether the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, was sufficient for submission to the jury. Helvy v. Sweat, 58 N.C. App. 197, 199, 292 S.E.2d 733, 734, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 741, 295 S.E.2d 477 (1982). The question of the evidence’s sufficiency is a matter of law, and the motion should be reversed if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support all the elements of plaintiffs prima facie case. Southern Railway Co. v. O’Boyle Tank Lines, 70 N.C. App. 1, 4, 318 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1984). Therefore, this Court reviews the record and transcript de novo, reversing upon a finding of more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of plaintiff’s prima facie case.

B. The Element of “Deliberateness” in Constructive Discharge

Plaintiff alleges the following evidence, put forth in their case in chief, is more than a scintilla of evidence to establish the element of defendant’s “deliberateness.” In making this claim, plaintiff argues that this element does not require specific intent, but can be met so long as an employer “tolerates discriminatory working conditions that would drive a reasonable person to resign.” Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1993). I would disagree, citing the stricter Bristow standard: “Our decisions require proof of the employer’s specific intent to force an employee to leave.” Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255 (emphasis added). Under either of these standards, the evidence was no more than a scintilla as to the element of deliberateness.
Plaintiff alleges the following evidence meets the “more than a scintilla” standard to survive a directed verdict on the question of defendant’s “deliberateness”: Plaintiff first began employment with defendant in the spring of 1999 at their Kemersville store. At that time, she signed a copy of defendant’s sexual harassment policy and was put on notice to take any concerns to management, or use the toll-free number in the back of the store for complaints.
Plaintiff began to be sexually harassed at her job in July of 1999 by co-employee Randy Schultz. Mr. Schultz worked in the meat department. The harassment consisted of daily sexual comments by Mr. Schultz when he would visit plaintiff at her register. This continued up until 26 October 1999, when plaintiff first reported the *47harassment to defendant’s management. She first told her immediate supervisor, who on the same day arranged to have her speak with Mike Turner, the store manager. Also on 26 October 1999, Mr. Turner contacted a special field specialist, Shirley Morgan, in Charlotte, North Carolina, to come and interview plaintiff. The field specialist told plaintiff she would get back with her in a week, but in fact got back in touch with her a “couple of weeks” later.
In the first week of November, four days after plaintiff’s concerns were brought to the attention of management, Mr. Schultz was transferred to another of defendant’s locations to start a management trainee program. In another meeting with Mr. Turner, plaintiff again discussed the continued sexual harassment and alleged threats by Mr. Schultz, despite his being transferred. Mr. Turner responded to these contentions, “Well, as far as I know he’s not been banned from the store.” He said he would again contact Ms. Morgan (the field specialist), but plaintiff did not hear from Ms. Morgan immediately.
Mr. Schultz occasionally came into the store throughout November to do paperwork, buy something, or just “hang out.” In mid to late November, plaintiff met with Ms. Morgan at McDonald’s where she was told the investigation had been completed, Mr. Schultz had denied everything, and they had found no evidence to corroborate her story. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was still making sexual statements to her after this meeting, and arranged a third meeting with Mr. Turner and a co-manager. Her father was also present. Plaintiff alleged defendant was stalking her, physically touching her, and making threatening phone calls. To this, Mr. Turner replied, “Wendy, what do you want me to do about it?”
Plaintiff alleged that incidents of both sexual comments and physical touching continued throughout November. Twice during November, Mr. Schultz followed plaintiff out of defendant’s parking lot in his car after plaintiff had finished work. Plaintiff contacted Ms. Morgan one last time at the end of November by phone. In December, plaintiff alleged defendant continued to make sexual statements to her, approximately two to three times a week.
Randy Schultz was known by plaintiff, fellow employees, and management to be having an affair with a fellow coworker before his November transfer to the management program. Defendant has a policy that its employees can be immediately discharged for “immoral conduct on or off the job.” Defendant never sought to discharge Mr. Schultz on these grounds.
*48From January 2000 to 22 February 2000, Mr. Schultz made no further attempts to contact plaintiff, by phone or otherwise. Plaintiff gave defendant notice of her resignation 22 February 2000.
Defendant’s undisputed evidence, offered to show the lack of deliberateness as to plaintiff’s resignation, was as follows: Defendant was not on notice of the alleged sexual harassment until 26 October 1999. That same day, the defendant took immediate action, having plaintiff interviewed by both Mr. Turner and Ms. Morgan (arriving from Charlotte). The following day Mr. Schultz was interviewed as to the alleged incidents. There was no evidence to corroborate plaintiff’s allegations and therefore no basis upon which to credit plaintiff or discredit defendant.
As Mr. Schultz was set to transfer four days after the complaint, defendant considered this a remedy to the problem because the two would no longer be working in the same store. Mr. Turner had recommended Mr. Schultz be placed in the management program before he was on notice of the alleged sexual harassment allegations. The allegations by plaintiff were the first of their kind against Mr. Schultz. Because Mr. Schultz had been selected for the management program, Mr. Turner told Ms. Morgan that he “wanted to get this investigation started as soon as possible and get to the bottom of it.”
The field specialist conducted the investigation, and recommended the following:
We knew that Randy was no longer at the store because he went into the MDP store and he moved out of that store I think two or three days after that. Our recommendation was, because we could not corroborate the allegations, that we go back to Wendy and Randy with follow-up memos and let them read the harassment policy indicating that they understood that harassment is not tolerated in the future. If anything happened in the future, it should be reported.
Both plaintiff and Mr. Schultz were given a copy of defendant’s harassment policy, and both were signed: plaintiff signed 22 November 1999, and Mr. Schultz signed 23 November 1999. In late November, Ms. Morgan was contacted one last time by plaintiff alleging that Mr. Schultz had come back into the store at one time, and that she had been receiving threatening phone calls from someone she believed to be him. At that time, Ms. Morgan offered that “if [plaintiff] felt, uncomfortable, she could work in Winston-Salem or *49Greensboro of her choice,” to which plaintiff responded, “she said she would think about that and let [Ms. Shirley] know.” After this offer of transfer and notification to plaintiff that the investigation was closed, plaintiff provided no clear evidence that she brought any further notice to defendant of harassment occurring in December, all alleged to have occurred by phone calls to plaintiff’s parents’ home. It should be noted that there are no allegations of any harassment by Mr. Schultz in either January or in the three weeks in February before plaintiff’s resignation.
When reading all evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, granting all reasonable inferences therefrom, I am not in a position to ignore defendant’s undisputed evidence. For this reason I believe the trial court was correct in denying a directed verdict motion at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, but was also correct in granting the motion at the close of all evidence.
I believe that the “deliberateness” element of constructive discharge as set out in Bristow, cannot as a matter of law be shown where defendant has undisputedly responded immediately to plaintiff’s complaint, in accord with the harassment policies that plaintiff signed, and where part of this response was an offer to transfer plaintiff in order that her employment may be retained. Furthermore, the record is clear that defendant considered the fact that Mr. Schultz was set to be moved to a new store in a matter of three or four days after the harassment claims were first brought to their attention. Defendant was reasonable in considering this a convenient and proper means to resolve an uncorroborated he-said, she-said scenario. Finally, plaintiff worked for nearly two months before her voluntary resignation, during which time she raises no allegations of harassment or any attempt by defendant to have her resign.
I find support in Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2000). In that case, the Second Circuit required something “beyond mere negligence or ineffectiveness” to show that an employer’s handling of plaintiff’s complaints amounted to a “deliberate” attempt to make her work place so intolerable that she would resign. Id. at 74.
The undercurrent of plaintiff’s argument is that, short of terminating Mr. Schultz, no response by defendant would be adequate.1 *50While this may be true had there been some corroborative evidence supporting claims for harassment, here no such corroborative evidence has been offered, even when read in the most favorable light to plaintiff.
In sum, I do not believe constructive discharge falls under the public policy exception of the at-will-employee doctrine as set out in Coman, but is a separate and distinct claim. I would therefore distinguish this case from Graham on that point, because Graham seemed to require a constructive discharge claim meet both the elements of deliberateness and intolerability, and also required a showing of a violation of North Carolina public policy under Coman.
Finally, applying the facts of this case to Graham and Bristow, even if the constructive discharge claim was cognizable in North-Carolina or should our Supreme Court hold it to be so, there was not sufficient evidence as to the element of deliberateness for the claim to survive a motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence. I would therefore affirm the trial court.

. It should be noted here that the jury found that no damages were proximately caused by defendant’s alleged negligent retention of Mr. Schultz or intentional infliction of emotion distress.