Court Opinion

ID: 9705294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:01:31.628759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.680032
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND delivered the opinion of the court: Following a jury trial in Adams County, Gerald C. Schmidt, Jr., defendant, was convicted of burglary and theft. Defendant appeals contending the verdicts for burglary and for theft were inconsistent. We agree and reverse. The defendant was charged with burglary with intent to commit theft. The theft elements related to section 16 — 1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(a)), which provides as follows: “A person commits theft when he knowingly: (a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner.” The elements of burglary, with the elements of theft as so described, were instructed to the jury. A verdict of guilty of burglary was returned. A neighbor to the Schuering residence testified she saw a young man enter the residence through a window on the back porch and later exit from the same window. She further testified that the same man was then apprehended by police on the back porch. The defendant testified that he went to the Schuering home looking for work, and while at the front door, he saw a man run towards the back of the house. Defendant maintained that he then went around to the back of the house, picked up various items which the fleeing man had dropped, and was then apprehended by the police. A police officer testified to apprehending the defendant on the back porch. Defendant requested Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 13.07 (2d ed. 1981), which is the instruction as to theft as defined in section 16— 1(d)(1) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(d)(1)), which provides: “A person commits theft when he knowingly: * * * (d) obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen, and (1) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.” The issues instruction based on this provision was given together with verdict forms for theft under section 16 — 1(d)(1). A verdict of guilty was returned on the section 16 — 1(d)(1) theft. We are not dealing with an included-offense issue. Section 2 — 9 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 2 — 9), provides in part: “ ‘Included offense’ means an offense which (a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged * * * Burglary requires a determination that “without authority [one] knowingly enters *** with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 — 1.) The burglary, as charged, requires proof of the intent to commit theft, but not the theft. Theft under section 16 — 1(d) does not require an entry, nor does it require the intent to commit the initial theft, but a theft must have been committed by someone else. Thus, the burglary charge does not include the theft element necessary for a conviction under section 16 — 1(d). Neither the State’s charge in the present case nor the State’s proof included the section 16 — 1(d) elements.  The factual backgrounds of the defendants in People v. Dace (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 96, 470 N.E.2d 993, are similar to that of the present case. The Dace opinion results in some confusion. It recognizes the necessity, at times, of instructing as to a lesser-included offense, but it also states that theft is not a lesser-included offense of burglary. The opinion then discusses the “inherent relationship” doctrine which was enunciated in United States v. Whitaker (D.C. Cir. 1971), 447 F.2d 314, but specifically reaffirms the prior election not to follow the doctrine. At this point, one would expect a decision holding it was not error to deny the theft instruction in the burglary cases. Such was not the case. The court said: “While we do not agree with the appellate court that there is an inherent relationship between the crimes of residential burglary and theft, we agree that on these records the circuit court should have given the tendered instructions. The information in each case charged residential burglary with intent to commit a theft. The proof of the offense charged requires proof of the specific intent (People v. Toolate (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 301), and the evidence adduced in each case would support a conviction of theft (People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415). We hold that under these circumstances, where the information charged the specific intent to commit theft and the offense of theft was proved by the evidence, refusal to give defendant’s tendered instructions was error.” (People v. Dace (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 96, 102-03, 470 N.E.2d 993, 996.) No further reason for requiring the instruction based on theft is given. Because of the absence of an included offense and the rejection of the “inherent relationship” doctrine, we come to the conclusion the justification for requiring the theft instruction is based on the case law holding an accused is entitled to instructions on his theory of the case, and a refusal to give such instruction is error. (People v. Harris (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 805, 350 N.E.2d 850; People v. Dortch (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 911, 314 N.E.2d 324; People v. Kalpak (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 411, 140 N.E.2d 726.) In the instant case, defendant’s theory was that he did not enter the home, was not accountable (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 5 — 2) for the entry and theft therein, and if guilty of anything, was guilty of theft under section 16 — 1(d). The “theory of the case” citations generally apply to defenses, not to separate criminal offenses. Defendant’s theft by possession of stolen property theory is in the nature of a defense — a defense to burglary. So, arguably, it can be a theory of defense even if resulting in a conviction of a separate crime. While Dace lacks certain specificity, we believe that opinion required the trial court to give the defendant’s instruction in the present case.  In turning to the determination of the issue of inconsistent verdicts, we recognize a conviction under section 16 — 1(d) requires finding that Schmidt “knowingly obtained control over stolen property.” The property would have to have been stolen by another. Under the State’s theory of the case and the evidence presented by each side, it is impossible to sustain both a finding of an intent to commit a section 16 — 1(a) theft, which is alleged in the burglary charge, and also the section 16 — 1(d) conviction. The trier of the facts could not rationally find that there were multiple crimes. (See People v. Spears (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 396, 405, 493 N.E.2d 1030, 1034; People v. Gross (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 765, 367 N.E.2d 1028.) It would not be logical to find, under the evidence, that the defendant entered the house with the intent to commit a theft and also picked up stolen property dropped by another whom the defendant allegedly observed run through the house and crawl out the back window. These are inconsistent verdicts, and the cause must be remanded for a new trial on all counts. People v. Spears (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 396, 410, 493 N.E.2d 1030, 1035. This case, as well as others like it, indicate the difficulty of allowing defense instructions relating to a legally separate offense, or offenses, not charged in the information or indictment. It does not take much imagination to understand the confusion faced by the members of the juries. Even lawyers and judges practicing in the field of criminal law have difficulty with the various issues and conflicts between statutory provisions. We must live with the law as determined by Dace, but recognize the necessity of closing argument, and possibly written instructions, pointing out to jurors that, as in the present case, the proposed verdicts are inconsistent. For the above-stated reasons, the decision of the circuit court of Adams County is reversed and remanded. Reversed and remanded. SPITZ, P.J., concurs.