Court Opinion

ID: 9840193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:58.710322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:46.482726
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

Lisa Marie Kerr,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0253 (Kanawha County 21-AA-37)

West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Lisa Marie Kerr appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, entered on
March 4, 2022, affirming the June 3, 2021, order of the West Virginia Public Employees
Grievance Board (“Grievance Board” or “Board”) denying her consolidated grievance challenging
(1) a directive that she leave the Lincoln County office of Respondent West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”) on March 26, 2019, and take annual leave for the day;
and (2) a ten-day suspension from the DHHR without pay. 1 Upon our review, we determine that
oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order
is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

         Petitioner is employed by the DHHR. She works as a Social Worker II, a classified
position, in Adult Protective Services (“APS”) in Lincoln County. On March 26, 2019, petitioner
received the directive that she take annual leave for the day due to her failure to de-escalate after
her argument with two coworkers over who had signed out a DHHR vehicle. During the argument
and a subsequent meeting at which supervisors attempted to reduce petitioner’s agitation, she was
shaking and clenching her fists. Petitioner also had a red face. Petitioner was directed to go home
because the supervisors believed petitioner’s body language signaled that she could escalate to a
physical confrontation with either themselves or other coworkers.

       In the first grievance petitioner filed, she challenged the directive that she go home on
March 26, 2019, and asked for the one day of annual leave to be restored to her. At level one, 2 a
grievance evaluator denied petitioner’s initial grievance, finding that, because petitioner was

       1
        Petitioner is self-represented. The DHHR appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick
Morrisey and Deputy Attorney General Steven R. Compton.
       2
           The grievance process consists of three levels. See W. Va. Code § 6C-2-4.

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allowed to use annual leave when she was sent home, the DHHR did not subject petitioner to
disciplinary action and did not engage in discrimination or any other inappropriate action with
regard to her. Thereafter, the initial grievance was consolidated with petitioner’s grievance about
the ten-day suspension without pay. 3

        By letter dated August 29, 2019, the DHHR suspended petitioner without pay for ten days
due to (1) complaints about petitioner’s behavior the DHHR received from her coworkers and
various outside agencies that work with the DHHR; (2) the March 26, 2019, argument petitioner
had with two of her coworkers resulting in the DHHR’s directive for her to take annual leave for
the day; and (3) a May 29, 2019, incident during an active shooter training provided by a West
Virginia State Police trooper at the Lincoln County office. Petitioner challenged the trooper on
certain information he gave attendees and told him he was wrong. Although she calmed
momentarily, she stood back up and informed the trooper that he was giving the attendees
inaccurate information and that she was not going to stay for the training. When petitioner left the
training, she exhibited a red face and had her fists balled up. Petitioner was also shaking. At the
same time, the trooper was upset that petitioner disrupted the training. In suspending petitioner for
ten days, the DHHR found that she violated DHHR policy 2106 by disrupting normal agency
operations for the three reasons it gave in its letter to petitioner. 4

        In 2020 and 2021, the Grievance Board held a four-day level three hearing regarding the
consolidated grievance. The Grievance Board found that the DHHR met its burden of showing that
petitioner disrupted normal agency operations. The Grievance Board rejected petitioner’s claims
that the DHHR’s reasons for suspending her were pretexts for retaliation against her due to her
sexual orientation. Finally, the Grievance Board found that petitioner did not prove that the
ten-day suspension was disproportionate to her misconduct. Petitioner filed an appeal of the
Grievance Board’s June 3, 2021, order denying her grievance in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County. 5 The circuit court, by order entered on March 4, 2022, affirmed the denial of the August
30, 2019, grievance. In affirming the Grievance Board, the circuit court adopted the Board’s
findings “as if set forth fully herein,” and also made its own findings.

       Petitioner appeals the circuit court’s March 4, 2022, order affirming the Grievance Board’s

       3
          Petitioner filed her grievance challenging the ten-day suspension without pay directly at
level three pursuant to West Virginia Code § 6C-2-4(a)(4), which provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a]n employee may proceed directly to level three . . . when the grievant has been . . . suspended
without pay[.]”
       4
         The DHHR also suspended petitioner for violating DHHR policy 2123 by creating a
hostile work environment. However, in its June 3, 2021, order, the Grievance Board found that the
DHHR failed to establish that petitioner created a hostile work environment.
       5
        West Virginia Code § 6C-2-5(c) provides that any appeals from orders of the Grievance
Board shall be filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.

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denial of her grievance. “When reviewing the appeal of a public employee[’s] grievance, this
Court reviews decisions of the circuit court under the same standard as that by which the circuit
court reviews the decision of the [Grievance Board].” Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v. Barbour Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 228 W. Va. 238, 719 S.E.2d 406 (2011). West Virginia Code § 6C-2-5(b) provides that the
Grievance Board’s decision is reviewed on grounds that it is (1) contrary to law or a lawfully
adopted rule or written policy; (2) beyond statutory authority; (3) contaminated by fraud or deceit;
(4) clearly wrong based upon a review of the record; or (5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. We have held:

               “Grievance rulings involve a combination of both deferential and plenary
       review. Since a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings
       rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to
       substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual
       determinations. Credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge are
       similarly entitled to deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions of
       law and application of law to the facts, which are reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1,
       Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Education, 208 W.Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437
       (2000).

Syl. Pt. 2, W. Va. Dept. of Transp., Div. of Highways v. Litten, 231 W. Va. 217, 744 S.E.2d 327
(2013).

        On appeal, 6 petitioner initially argues that the circuit court erred in finding that her
testimony before the Grievance Board lacked credibility. Although the Grievance Board denied
petitioner’s grievance, it made no finding that her testimony was not credible. In fact, the
Grievance Board relied on petitioner’s testimony to find that she suffers a red face, visible shaking,
and clenched fists as symptoms of a secondary trauma condition that may be triggered in stressful
situations. However, in addition to adopting the Grievance Board’s findings, the circuit court made
its own findings in affirming the denial of petitioner’s grievance, including that she was not
credible. Assuming, arguendo, that the circuit court erred in finding that petitioner’s testimony
lacked credibility, “[t]his Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it
appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the
ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment.” Syl. Pt. 3,
Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965). Therefore, we find that the circuit
court’s finding that petitioner was not credible, even if erroneous, did not constitute reversible

       6
          To the extent that petitioner raises issues that are not (1) included within her assignments
of error and/or (2) supported by specific citations to the record showing that the issues were raised
before the lower tribunals, we decline to review any such issues pursuant to Rule 10(c)(7) of the
West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, that the petitioner’s
argument must clearly set forth “the points of fact and law presented, the standard of review
applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, under headings that correspond with the
assignments of error” and that “the Supreme Court may disregard errors that are not adequately
supported by specific references to the record on appeal.”

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error given that the circuit court’s adoption of the Grievance Board’s findings provides an alternate
ground for affirmation.

        Next, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in placing the burden of proof on her to
show that the suspension without pay was not justified. In its findings, the Grievance Board
properly placed the burden of proof to justify the suspension on the DHHR. See Litten, 231 W. Va.
at 222, 744 S.E.2d at 332 (“[I]n disciplinary matters, . . . the burden is on the employer to prove
that the action taken was justified.”) (quoting W. Va. Code R. § 156-1-3.1). With regard to
petitioner’s secondary trauma condition, the Grievance Board found that she previously neglected
to share “this diagnosis with any agent of [the DHHR]” or “explain this difficulty when confronted
with her behavior so that it could have been taken into consideration.” However, this was not
inappropriate burden-shifting as the Grievance Board determined that the DHHR proved that
petitioner disrupted normal agency operations, violating DHHR policy 2106, by a preponderance
of the evidence. See Litten, 231 W. Va. at 222, 744 S.E.2d at 332 (“The applicable standard of
proof in a grievance proceeding is preponderance of the evidence.”) (quoting Watkins v. McDowell
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 W. Va. 500, 511, 729 S.E.2d 822, 833 (2012)). Specifically, the Grievance
Board found that the DHHR “proved that several complaints had been lodged by hospital social
workers and courthouse staff regarding [petitioner]’s rude and threatening behavior” and that
petitioner’s direct supervisor achieved the goals petitioner attempted to achieve “with the same
hospital staff by taking a more calm and reasoned approach.” Therefore, based upon our review of
the record, we find no cause to disturb the Grievance Board’s finding that the DHHR satisfied its
burden of proving petitioner’s suspension was justified.

        Petitioner further argues that the circuit court failed to conduct a complete analysis under
the burden-shifting framework for retaliation claims. However, the full analysis is set forth in the
Grievance Board’s findings. The burden-shifting framework consists of three phases: First, the
grievant has the burden to establish a prima facie case that the employer retaliated against her.
Freeman v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 215 W. Va. 272, 277, 599 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004). If the
grievant makes that showing, the employer may rebut the grievant’s prima facie case by offering
credible evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disciplinary action. Id. If the
employer makes this showing, the third phase returns the burden to the grievant, who may prove
that the reason offered by the employer was merely a pretext. Id. The Grievance Board took
petitioner’s prima facie case as a given, finding that West Virginia Code § 6C-2-2(o) defines
“reprisal” as “the retaliation of an employer toward a grievant . . . in the grievance procedure either
for an alleged injury itself or any lawful attempt to redress it.” Nevertheless, the Grievance Board
found that the DHHR “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there existed valid reasons
for the disciplinary action” and further determined that petitioner “did not prove that those reasons
are mere pretext for discrimination or retaliation.” Accordingly, based upon our review of the
Grievance Board’s order, we find that it properly shifted the burden of proof between the parties as
it progressed through the required legal analysis in determining that petitioner’s claim—that the
DHHR’s reasons for suspending her were pretextual—was without merit. Therefore, we find no
cause to disturb the Grievance Board’s rejection of this claim.

       Finally, petitioner argues that the ten-day suspension without pay was disproportionate to
her misconduct. In making this argument, we find that petitioner does not challenge the Grievance
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Board’s determination that such a claim constituted an affirmative defense that petitioner had the
burden of establishing. See W. Va. Code R. § 156-1-3.1. However, petitioner makes the legal
argument that her ten-day suspension without pay violated DHHR policy 2104, which provides for
progressive discipline comprised of verbal warnings, written warnings, suspensions, demotions,
and dismissals from employment. The DHHR counters that, notwithstanding the stated preference
for progressive discipline, policy 2104 makes clear that the severity and circumstances of the
violation determine the level of discipline employed. We agree with the DHHR. DHHR policy
2104 provides, in pertinent part, that the DHHR may issue a suspension “where minor
infractions/deficiencies continue beyond the written warning or when a more serious singular
incident occurs.” (Emphasis added.) As explained in policy 2104’s general policy statement, “due
to the sensitive and essential nature of services the [DHHR] must provide the public, and the
standards of service required in many program areas, there may be instances where more severe
levels of discipline are initially imposed for some infractions.” Thus, we reject petitioner’s
argument that DHHR policy 2104 was misinterpreted. Rather, we concur with the Grievance
Board’s finding that petitioner failed to establish that her ten-day suspension without pay was
disproportionate. The March 26, 2019, incident, and the May 29, 2019, incident, were each
sufficiently serious to allow the DHHR to forego progressive discipline in petitioner’s case.
Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court properly affirmed the Grievance Board’s denial of
petitioner’s grievance.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s March 4, 2022, order upholding the
Grievance Board’s June 3, 2021, order denying petitioner’s consolidated grievance.

                                                                                        Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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