Court Opinion

ID: 9378540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 19:02:46.711983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.004334
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/10/23 In re Ronald M. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 In re RONALD M. et al., Persons                                   B316541
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _____________________________________
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND                                        Super. Ct. No.
 FAMILY SERVICES,                                                  18CCJP02454B–C)

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.

 ANDRE M.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
      William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, and Kim
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       Andre M. (father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court
denying his requests to: (1) place the minors at issue with a
paternal relative; and (2) return the minors to his custody, or
alternatively, receive further reunification services.
       The sole contention raised by father on appeal is that the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) failed to make an adequate inquiry under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1900 et seq.) and related
state laws (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).1 According to
father, this asserted ICWA error requires remand to the juvenile
court for further proceedings.
       Assuming, without deciding, that there was ICWA inquiry
error below, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders because any
error was harmless.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I.   The dependency proceedings
     Father and Joann R. (mother) are the parents of Ronald M.
and Michelle M. (minors).

1All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

                                2
      In November 2019, DCFS filed a dependency petition
pursuant to section 300 alleging that six-year-old Michelle and
ten-year-old Ronald were at substantial risk of serious physical
harm due to (1) father’s possession and sales of narcotics while
minors were under his supervision and care; (2) father’s history of
substance abuse and current abuse of illicit substances; and
(3) mother’s history of substance abuse, which resulted in her loss
of custody over minors’ half-sibling in an earlier dependency
matter.
      At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in
December 2019, the juvenile court sustained the allegations
against parents, declared minors dependents of the court,
removed minors from parents’ custody, and ordered DCFS to
provide reunification services to parents. Approximately three
months later, DCFS placed minors in the home of their
godmother and NREFM (non-related extended family member).
      At the six-month and twelve-month status review hearings,
the juvenile court ordered continued reunification services for
parents and granted DCFS the ongoing discretion to liberalize
parents’ visits from monitored to unmonitored. Minors remained
placed with their godmother.
      In July 2021, after a contested 18-month review hearing,
the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that
return of minors to the custody of either parent would create a
substantial risk of detriment to minors. The court terminated
reunification services for parents and set the matter for hearing
on the selection and implementation of a permanent plan
pursuant to section 366.26.

                                3
       In September 2021, father filed a “Request to Change Court
Order” pursuant to section 388.2 In his request, father indicated
that his relationship with godmother had deteriorated, which
affected the quality of his visits with minors. Father requested
that minors be placed with a paternal relative who was living in
Sacramento at the time. The juvenile court denied the request
without a hearing in October 2021. Father timely appealed from
that order.
       In January 2022, father filed another request pursuant to
section 388. This time, father represented that he had finished
his court-ordered case plan and requested that the juvenile court
return minors to his custody, or alternatively, order further
reunification services. Again, the juvenile court denied the
request without a hearing. Father timely appealed from that
order.3
       In August 2022, while father’s consolidated appeal was
pending, the juvenile court selected the permanent plan of legal
guardianship, appointed godmother the legal guardian of minors,
and terminated jurisdiction. No parties appealed from that
order.

2 Section 388 provides that any parent or other person having an
interest in a dependent child may petition the juvenile court to
modify or set aside a prior order upon grounds of change of
circumstance or new evidence.
3 Father’s appeals from the October 2021 and January 2022
juvenile court orders were originally assigned appellate case
numbers B316541 and B319098 respectively. On August 3, 2022,
this court ordered the two appeals consolidated for purposes of
briefing, oral argument, and decision under lead case number
B316541.

                               4
II.    ICWA related facts
      On November 11, 2019, the family came to the attention of
DCFS when law enforcement executed a search warrant on
father’s home due to suspected trafficking of narcotics. The
children were in the home at the time. DCFS interviewed father
on that date and asked if there was any Indian ancestry in his
family. Father denied any such ancestry. The next day, DCFS
interviewed mother, who also denied having Indian ancestry in
her family.
      At the initial detention hearing, which took place on
November 14, 2019, parents were present with their respective
court appointed attorneys.4 Each parent signed and submitted a
Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form in which
they denied Indian ancestry under penalty of perjury. Upon
reviewing these documents, the juvenile court stated: “the court
has no reason to know that the Indian Child Welfare Act applies
or that these are Indian children.” No party objected to the
juvenile court’s ICWA finding. In its minute order, the juvenile
court ordered parents “to keep the Department, their Attorney,
and the Court aware of any new information relating to possible
ICWA status.”
      At various points throughout the dependency case, father
provided DCFS with contact information for the paternal
grandmother, a paternal aunt, and two additional paternal
relatives. Mother reported being in touch with maternal
relatives, including maternal grandmother and maternal aunts
and uncles, and provided DCFS with contact information for one

4There were no paternal or maternal relatives present at the
detention hearing.

                               5
maternal aunt. It is undisputed that DCFS did not ask any
paternal or maternal relatives whether they were aware of
Indian ancestry in their respective family heritages.
      Each report filed by DCFS after the detention hearing
referenced the juvenile court’s November 2019 finding that there
was no reason to know the minors are Indian children as defined
by ICWA.
                          DISCUSSION

I.     Father’s appeal is not moot
       As a threshold matter, we address DCFS’s contention that
this court should dismiss father’s appeal as moot. DCFS argues
that because father did not appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating jurisdiction, and because that order is now final,
father’s consolidated appeal from the orders denying his section
388 requests is moot.
       “[I]t is a court’s duty to decide ‘ “ ‘actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter
in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ ” (In re N.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 53, 58–59.) A case becomes moot, and subject to
dismissal, when it is “ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it should
decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive]
relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In
re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) This rule applies with
respect to dependency proceedings on a case-by-case basis, based
upon whether the parent has demonstrated a specific and non-

                                   6
speculative legal or practical consequence to be avoided upon
reversal of the jurisdictional findings. (Ibid.)
       In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156 is instructive on
the issue of mootness as presented in this case. In that case, the
mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order
declaring the minor a dependent, but did not appeal from the
subsequent order terminating jurisdiction with a custody order
granting her sole physical custody of the minor, and both parents
joint legal custody. (Prior to the initiation of dependency
proceedings, the mother had sole physical and legal custody of
the minor.) The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother’s appeal
as moot, reasoning that when a party challenges a jurisdictional
finding that results in an adverse custody order and the party
seeks to have that custody order set aside, “an appeal from the
orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is
necessary for this court to be able to provide effective relief.” (Id.
at p. 164.) In other words, because the mother sought a
modification of the custody order, and that custody order was not
before the appellate court, the appellate court could provide no
“effective relief” for the mother, and “a remand for further
proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless.” (Id. at
p. 165.)
       Here, in contrast, if this court were to find reversible error,
it could provide effective relief to father in the form of a
remittitur remanding the matter to the juvenile court with
directions to conduct further inquiry regarding possible Indian
heritage. Although jurisdiction has indeed terminated in the
underlying dependency matter, an appeal from the juvenile
court’s order terminating jurisdiction is not necessary for this
court to provide father with effective relief. That is because this

                                  7
court’s remittitur “creates the limited jurisdiction needed for a
juvenile court to correct reversible errors found by an appellate
court.” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 664.) “Thus, even
after a juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction, a reviewing
court can still effectively require the juvenile court to correct
reversible error.” (Ibid.)
       Having rejected DCFS’s contention that father’s appeal is
moot, we now address the merits of his appeal.
II.    Any asserted ICWA error was not prejudicial
       A.     Statutory framework
       “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid–1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers
of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’
(Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989) 490
U.S. 30, 32).” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.)
       Under California law, the juvenile court and the county
welfare department have “an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire” whether a child subject to a dependency petition “is or
may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to
inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited
to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the
party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.”
(Ibid.) If a child is placed in the temporary custody of a county
welfare department, the department “has a duty to inquire
whether that child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)
“Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,

                                 8
others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting
child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is
domiciled.” (Ibid.)
       Additionally, at “the first appearance in court of each party,
the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing
whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the
child is an Indian child” and “shall instruct the parties to inform
the court if they subsequently receive information that provides
reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
       After the initial inquiry, if the juvenile court or the county
welfare department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding,” then the court or department “shall
make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the
child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§
224.2, subd. (e).) If the court or the county welfare department
“knows or has reason to know” that an Indian child is involved in
a dependency proceeding, the county welfare department shall
provide notice to relevant tribes and agencies for hearings that
may culminate in an order for foster care placement, termination
of parental rights, or adoptive placement. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)
       B.     Standard of review and prejudicial error
       Generally, “ ‘we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings
under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to
determine if reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports
the court’s order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders
and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in
favor of affirmance.’ [Citation.]” (In re Dominic F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 565.)

                                 9
      In the context of asserted ICWA inquiry errors, a majority
panel of this division articulated a hybrid substantial
evidence/abuse of discretion standard of review. (See In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984 (Ezequiel G.).) Under this
standard, the appellate court reviews the juvenile court’s
determination as to whether there is reason to know a child is an
Indian child for substantial evidence, and the ruling that DCFS
exercised due diligence and conducted a proper and adequate
ICWA inquiry for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 1003–1004.)
      On the issue of prejudice, the Courts of Appeal have crafted
varying standards for assessing when a defective ICWA inquiry
is harmless. These standards range from mandated reversal
whenever an agency’s inquiry is deficient (see, e.g., In re Antonio
R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 432–437) to presumptive
affirmance unless the appealing party can demonstrate with a
proffer on appeal that further inquiry would lead to a different
ICWA finding (see In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1065).
(See In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 779, review granted
September 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.) [setting forth the different
rules that courts have staked out regarding prejudice].)
      In Ezequiel G., a majority panel of this division adopted the
standard for assessing prejudice set forth in the Dezi C. decision:
whether “ ‘the record contains information suggesting a reason to
believe that the child may be an “Indian child” within the
meaning of ICWA, such that the absence of further inquiry was
prejudicial to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding.’ ” (Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014.) Stated another way, in
assessing whether ICWA inquiry error is harmless, the question
is whether “it is reasonably probable that an agency’s error in not
conducting a proper initial inquiry affected the correctness (that

                                10
is, the outcome) of the juvenile court’s ICWA finding.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.)
       Assuming, without deciding, that there was ICWA inquiry
error below, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders because any
error was harmless. Based on the record before us, it is not
reasonably probable that DCFS’s failure to inquire of the
paternal and maternal relatives whether they knew of possible
Indian ancestry affected the correctness of the juvenile court’s
ICWA finding.
       Here, father and mother unequivocally denied having any
Indian ancestry during initial interviews with DCFS, and both
attested under penalty of perjury through their signed ICWA-020
forms that they had no known Indian ancestry. They were
present at the hearing when the juvenile court found that there
was no reason to know ICWA applied and that minors are not
Indian children, and yet neither parent (nor their counsel)
objected to the court’s findings. Parents’ denial of Indian
ancestry in their respective family heritages strongly suggests
that there was no Indian ancestry to report. (See Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010 [a “child’s parents will, in many
cases, be a reliable source for determining whether the child or
parent may be a tribal member”].)
       Notably, father does not argue in either his opening brief or
reply brief that he and the mother are unreliable reporters of
their own family heritage. Nor does he proffer evidence on
appeal that would call into question parents’ initial denials of
Indian ancestry. While the record does contain references to
mother having a diagnosis of a mild intellectual disability and
some memory loss due to seizures, the record also contains
detailed and thorough statements by mother regarding her social

                                11
history and background, including where she was born and
raised, the people with whom she grew up, and her current
relationships with relatives. On whole, the record does not
demonstrate a good reason to question the reliability of parents’
own statements denying Indian ancestry.
       Furthermore, both parents were raised in households with
biological family members. Father reported having a “wonderful”
childhood in which he grew up with his biological mother, sister,
and step-father. Likewise, mother grew up with her biological
parents and siblings (until her father passed away when she was
10 years old). While it appears that mother left the maternal
grandmother’s home as a teenager, she lived with a biological
brother who was out of state, and returned home approximately
six months later to finish high school. The record amply
demonstrates that both parents spent extended periods of time
with biological relatives who presumably would have shared
information regarding Indian family heritage if there was any
such information to share. This stands in stark contrast to the
situation in In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, where the
mother was adopted at the age of two, lacked any information
regarding her biological relatives, and was estranged from her
adoptive parents. Under those facts, it was reversible error for
the agency not to follow up on the one lead it had regarding
mom’s biological family. (Id. at pp. 548, 556.) No such severance
or estrangement from all biological relatives exists in this case.
       Additionally, the juvenile court ordered mother and father
to notify the court, DCFS, and their counsel of any new
information relating to possible ICWA status. Yet, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that during the 33 months when
the dependency case was open, either father or mother notified

                               12
the juvenile court or DCFS of any information regarding possible
Indian ancestry beyond their initial unambiguous statements
denying such ancestry. This likely indicates there was no
additional information that DCFS could have gleaned from
further inquiry. (See In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502,
510 [parents’ failure to come forward with any additional
information regarding Indian ancestry when ordered by the
juvenile court to do so indicates that there may be no Indian
ancestry to report].)
       Finally, we are not persuaded by father’s argument that he
need not demonstrate any prejudice stemming from ICWA error
because he is requesting a “conditional affirmance” and not a
reversal of the legal guardianship. Ultimately, what father seeks
is a remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings on
ICWA. Whether couched as a conditional affirmance or reversal,
father’s requested remand requires a showing of prejudice, which
he has failed to demonstrate. (See Ezequiel G., supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 995, fn. 2.)
       In conclusion, we decline to remand the matter for further
proceedings because it is not reasonably probable that any
asserted inquiry error affected the correctness of the juvenile
court’s ICWA finding.

                               13
                         DISPOSITION
      For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court’s orders are
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

I concur:

                  EDMON, P. J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                14
LAVIN, J., Dissenting:

      For the reasons set forth in my dissent in In re Ezequiel G.
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1015–1025, I would vacate the court’s
ICWA finding and remand for further proceedings.

                                          LAVIN, J.

                                1