Court Opinion

ID: 9928106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 20:05:32.152287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:10.335966
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/30/24 Nevinny v. Devor CA2/4
         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

VICTORIA NEVINNY et al.,                                          B323746

         Plaintiffs and Respondents,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 21STCV32177)
         v.

ROBINSON DEVOR,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Barbara Marie Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.
      Robinson Devor, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
      Nolan Heimann, Jordan Susman, Margo Arnold for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                           INTRODUCTION
       Plaintiffs Victoria Nevinny and VINS, LLC filed a
complaint alleging breach of contract and other claims involving
a film. Defendant Robinson Devor did not appear, and the court
entered default. The court then entered a default judgment in
favor of plaintiffs, ordering specific performance, an injunction,
and declaratory relief. The court also appointed an elisor to sign
an agreement and assignment of rights regarding the film.
       Devor appealed the judgment, contending that the
summons and complaint were not properly served on him.
However, he has not provided a sufficient record to support that
contention, and as such, he has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court erred in finding that service was proper. Devor also
challenges some of plaintiffs’ substantive allegations, but he may
not assert these arguments for the first time on appeal after
defaulting below, and the limited record does not support his
contentions. We therefore affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The record on appeal consists of the judgment and
documents from the same date or post-dating the judgment.
Thus, the record does not include the summons, complaint, proof
of service for the summons and complaint,1 or the default prove-
up documents. The following facts are taken mostly from the
judgment, which includes a short description of the case
substance and history.
       Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Devor on August 31,
2021, alleging seven causes of action: breach of contract; breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; specific

1        The register of actions indicates that a proof of service was
filed.

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performance; temporary restraining order, preliminary
restraining order and permanent injunction; declaratory relief;
intentional interference with contractual relations; and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
The parties’ disagreement involved distribution of a film called
“Pow Wow.” The judgment states, “The Summons and Complaint
were duly served upon Defendant, and Defendant has neither
answered nor otherwise responded to the Complaint.” The clerk
entered default on January 20, 2022.
       At the hearing on the order to show cause (OSC) re: entry
of default judgment on August 1, 2022, Devor appeared in court.
The minute order from the OSC stated, “Defendant is advised
that he cannot defendant [sic] himself while in default status.”
       The court signed and filed the judgment the same day. The
judgment stated that the court found the causes of action in the
complaint to be adequately alleged, and that plaintiffs proved
they were entitled to the relief requested. The court entered
judgment in favor of plaintiffs on three of the seven causes of
action. On the cause of action for specific performance, the court
ordered Devor to “perform his obligations under the 2011
Memorandum of Understanding between Plaintiffs and [Devor],
and . . . to execute the assignment and indemnification
agreement(s) that will allow Plaintiffs to distribute and exploit”
the film. On the cause of action for temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction, the court
enjoined Devor from claiming ownership in, preventing
distribution of, or interfering with the distribution of the film.
On the cause of action for declaratory relief, the court ordered
that plaintiffs were entitled to the copyright and all other rights
and interests regarding the film. In a separate order, the court

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appointed an elisor for Devor, and ordered the elisor to sign a
directing services agreement and a related assignment of rights.
       Devor timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Devor argues he was not properly served with the
summons and complaint. His entire factual and legal argument
on this issue is as follows: “Defendant was not properly served
with a Summons and Complaint and did not receive the legal
documents personally or through an alternative form of service.
The papers were served to a person (an unknown intern who was
not in charge of the business) who volunteered in a partially
closed office complex (because of Covid) which the Defendant had
vacated five years prior. If papers are not served in the correct
way at the correct time, the court cannot go forward with the case
(CA Codes – ccp:415.10-415.95).”
       When the question on appeal is whether the entry of
default and the default judgment were void for lack of proper
service of process, we review the trial court’s determination de
novo. (Giorgio v. Synergy Management Group, LLC (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 241, 247; Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
1193, 1200.) However, “it is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to
be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the
trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
“‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that
the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’” (Id. at p. 609.)
       The trial court found that Devor had been properly served;
it expressly stated this finding in the judgment. The record on

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appeal cannot support a finding to the contrary. The proof of
service for the summons and complaint is not in the record, and
there is no evidence about the address to which they were served.
There is also no support for Devor’s claim that the summons and
complaint were served to an address that was not current.2
Devor therefore has failed to demonstrate that the trial court
erred in concluding that service of the summons and complaint
was proper.
      Devor also challenges some of plaintiffs’ substantive claims.
He argues, for example, that “[t]he court erred in finding that
Defendant was in breach of a contract,” and “[t]he court erred in
finding that Defendant had no good faith and fair dealing with
the Plaintiffs.” There are several problems with these
contentions.
      First, while a defaulting defendant may raise certain
procedural errors such as lack of personal jurisdiction (see, e.g.,
Brue v. Shabaab (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 578, 586), such a
defendant may not challenge the substance of the default
judgment. A “‘judgment by default is said to “confess” the
material facts alleged by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant’s failure

2      Devor caused certain documents to be included in the
clerk’s transcript on appeal that had not been admitted in the
trial court. This court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike these
documents from the record. Plaintiffs also moved to strike
portions of Devor’s opening brief that relied on facts not in the
record. Devor did not oppose the motion. We deny plaintiffs’
motion to strike regarding the top paragraph of page 8, which is
Devor’s argument about service quoted above, but we
acknowledge that his factual contentions are unsupported by any
record evidence. We grant the remainder of plaintiffs’ motion to
strike.

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to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the
matters well pleaded in the complaint.’” (Steven M. Garber &
Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 823,
quoting 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings
Without Trial, § 153, p. 570.) Devor, having failed to contest the
action in the trial court, may not challenge the substance of
plaintiffs’ claims for the first time on appeal.
      Second, the judgment makes no findings as to the causes of
action Devor challenges. The court entered judgment only on the
causes of action for specific performance, restraining
order/injunction, and declaratory relief. Thus, there is no support
for Devor’s contention that the court erred in making findings on
other causes of action, such as breach of contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
      Third, the record is insufficient to support Devor’s
arguments. Even if, for example, it could be inferred that the
court’s judgment included a finding that Devor breached the
parties’ contract, the record does not contain enough information
to conclude that such a finding was erroneous. The record does
not include the contract itself or any information about the
parties’ performances under the contract. Thus, the record
cannot support a contention that the court erred.
                            DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
recover their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.                                          ZUKIN, J.

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