Court Opinion

ID: 9593733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:24:31.982878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:22.002876
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as the orders which are the subject of these appeals are not final and are therefore not matters which can be pursued by direct appeal on behalf of the State. OCGA § 5-7-1. Contrary *652to the majority opinion, I see no reason to make an exception to the finality requirement for direct appeals in these criminal cases as the disqualification orders have no bearing upon the rights of the defendants. (See 5 ALR4 1252 for discussion on the appealability of a state court’s order granting or denying motion to disqualify attorney. Compare my dissent in Hargrove v. Phillips, 186 Ga. App. 525 (368 SE2d 123). In that case, an attorney was disqualified in a civil matter where the rights of the client were directly affected.) Further, there is no indication that the State’s interests have been impaired as a result of the disqualification orders. In this regard, I see no evidence that the solicitor pro tempore (who was appointed to prosecute the cases) was not qualified to proceed on behalf of the State. Moreover, the record indicates that these collateral matters may be moot and the opinion of the majority merely advisory because of final dispositions in the underlying prosecutions.
Decided June 23, 1988
Dewey Hayes, Jr., pro se.
Robert B. Sumner, for appellees.
In any event, the proper procedure for review was by application for immediate review pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-2. See State v. Davis, 159 Ga. App. 537 (284 SE2d 51). Accordingly, I would dismiss these appeals since the applications for immediate review were denied by this court on August 18, 1987, for failure to obtain certificates of immediate review from the trial court.