Court Opinion

ID: 9776534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:41.429909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.521665
License: Public Domain

RAY, Justice,
concurring.
The concurring opinion.of July 5,1989, is withdrawn and the following is substituted.
The court has correctly held that an ap-pellee may complain by cross-point of any error by the trial court without perfecting an independent appeal, unless the appellant limits his appeal pursuant to rule 40(a)(4) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. I fully agree with the majority opinion and concur only to further explain this very confusing and difficult area of appellate practice.

Cross-Points in the Courts of Appeals

This court has consistently held that an appellee can seek affirmative relief by cross-points against unfavorable rulings of the trial court unless the appellant has clearly and distinctly indicated his intention to limit his appeal.1,2 Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 130 Tex. 476, 483, 109 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1937). In amending former rule 420 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, the court affirmed the right of an appellee to bring forward cross-points against the appellant without perfecting an independent appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 420 general commentary — 1966 (Vernon 1985). This right has been recognized since the early history of this court. Dallas Elec. Supply Co. v. Branum Co., 143 Tex. 366, 370-71, 185 S.W.2d 427, 430 (1945).
The requirement that an appellant must clearly and distinctly indicate his intention to limit his appeal produced gamesmanship by appellants who sought to delay and hide their intentions from appellees by varying when and how they indicated a limitation of appeals. To remedy this problem, the court amended rule 353 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to provide strict procedures for prosecuting a limited appeal. Now appearing as rule 40(a)(4) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the rule currently provides:
Notice of Limitation of Appeal. No attempt to limit the scope of an appeal shall be effective as to a party adverse to the appellant unless the severable portion of the judgment from which the appeal is taken is designated in a notice served on the adverse party within fifteen days after judgment is signed, or if a motion for new trial is filed by any party, within seventy-five days after the judgment is signed.
Compliance with rule 40(a)(4) is the only way that something filed by the appellant may operate to limit what an appellee may assert by cross-points. Absent the appellant’s compliance with rule 40(a)(4), the court of appeals must rule on any cross-*641points brought by the appellee, regardless of the relief sought. See Hernandez v. City of Fort Worth, 617 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.1981).
The court today reaffirms its approach in Hernandez and by implication disapproves the language of cases purporting to find limitations on an appellee’s right to assert cross-points other than those expressly sanctioned by this court. E.g., Dallas Indep. School Dist. v. Porter, 759 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Speed v. Eluma Int’l, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.App—Dallas 1988, no writ); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Striland Constr. Co., 753 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reynolds v. Charbeneau, 744 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, writ denied); Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 743 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); Miller v. Presswood, 743 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, writ denied); Miller v. Spencer, 732 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); Chapman Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Franks, 732 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yates Ford, Inc. v. Benavides, 684 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Marshbank v. Austin Bridge Co., 669 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Young v. Kilroy Oil Co., 673 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stendebach v. Campbell, 665 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).3 Because of the growing number of decisions by the courts of appeals contrary to Hernandez, I will address this issue in detail.
Most court of appeals opinions limiting the appellee’s right to assert cross-points beyond what has been expressly sanctioned by this court suggest that the matter raised by the cross-points must “affect the interest of the appellant” or “bear upon matters presented by the appeal.” The quoted phrases or their equivalents have indeed appeared in opinions of this court as limitations on the appellee’s right to assert cross-points. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Phil Dor Plaza Corp., 158 Tex. 262, 267, 310 S.W.2d 811, 313-14 (1958). Although rule 40(a)(4) has overruled the narrow holding of the Connell Construction case, the quoted phrases state a longstanding principle of appellate law that is unaffected by rule 40(a)(4).4 Properly construed in the limited context in which this court has applied the language, these phrases describe a valid limitation on the right to assert cross-points. But the proper construction bears little resemblance to the broad-sweeping interpretation the lower courts have sometimes given these phrases.
The phrases “affect the interest of appellant” or “bear upon matters presented by the appeal” mean only that the matters presented by the appellee’s cross-points must have actually been in controversy in the suit as contested matters between the appellant and the appellee. In particular, the phrase “bear upon matters presented by the appeal” does not mean that the court of appeals should look to the points presented by the appellant in his brief to determine what is presented in the appeal. In the ordinary case, when there is only one plaintiff and only one defendant, everything that was in controversy in the trial court between the two parties may be raised by the appellee’s cross-points on appeal, unless the appellant has properly limited his appeal by strict compliance with rule 40(a)(4).
The situation is not the same when there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants. It is in this situation that the phrases “affect the interest of appellant” or “bear upon matters presented by the appeal” retain some significant meaning. For example, when one plaintiff recovers judgment against a first defendant, but *642fails in the trial court to recover judgment against the second defendant, and the first defendant appeals the judgment, the plaintiff, as appellee, may not assert by cross-points that he should have recovered judgment against the second defendant. The first defendant is the appellant and the matters in controversy between the plaintiff and the second defendant do not “affect the interest of appellant.” In the usual case, the plaintiff must perfect his own separate appeal against the second defendant. The matters in controversy between the plaintiff and the second defendant do not “bear upon matters presented by the appeal” of the first defendant.
A similar situation arises if the plaintiff has sued two defendants, and the first defendant cross-claims in the trial court against the second defendant. When the plaintiff appeals a judgment that he take nothing against the first defendant, or both defendants, the first defendant may not normally assert by cross-points that the trial court failed to render judgment in his favor against his codefendant. The matters in controversy between the two defendants do not “affect the interest of appellant” — the plaintiff — and do not “bear upon matters presented by the appeal” because the matters in controversy between the appellant and the particular appellee do not necessarily include what is in controversy between the two defendants.
An exception exists, of course, in those instances in which the rights of a nonap-pealing party are so intertwined with the rights of a party entitled to relief on appeal that the whole judgment must be reversed. See Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookkollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex.1982) (certain indemnity rights of nonap-pealing parties were so dependent or interwoven with the erroneous damages issue that the entire judgment had to be reversed); Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 536, 539, 101 S.W. 1074, 1075-76 (1907) (judgment fixing the boundaries to real estate must protect the rights of nonappeal-ing parties). Such situations must be recognized on a case-by-case basis, and should be regarded as exceptions to the general rule.
The term “severability” has also caused much confusion when used in connection with cross-points. Rule 40(a)(4) permits an appellant to limit his appeal to a severable portion of the trial court’s judgment. The term “severable” means that the cause could have been brought as a separate suit. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass’n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 611-12, 350 S.W.2d 11, 19 (1961). Severability is not a restriction on what allegations of error can be brought by cross-points.
An attempt to limit an appeal under rule 40(a)(4) may fail for lack of severability. When an appellant attempts to limit his appeal to a portion of the judgment that is not severable, even though he follows the formal requirements of rule 40(a)(4), he does not successfully limit his appeal. See Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 742-43 (Tex.1964). In this sense, severability issues may broaden the permissible scope of cross-points.
Some court of appeals opinions discuss severability as if it were a component of what “bears upon matters presented by the appeal” or “affects the interest of appellant.” See, e.g., Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that when an appellant appeals a severable portion of a judgment the appellee cannot use cross-points to complain of any matters falling wholly within the portion of the judgment not brought up for review by the appellant). Such discussion is error. Rule 40(a)(4) is the sole means by which an appellant may limit the appellee’s right to assert cross-points in the courts of appeals.
Severability may be a factor in whether the rights of nonappealing parties are so intertwined with those of an appealing party that the whole judgment must be reversed. In this sense severability is always related to the interest of the appellant. But that is really a separate question. It is not an element of what “affects the interest of appellant” or “bears upon matters presented by the appeal” for purposes of what may be presented by cross-points. If the matter was in controversy between one *643appellant and the appellee seeking to assert the cross-point, then it satisfies the test for being a matter presented by the appeal. If reversible error is shown between the appellant and the appellee, whether the judgment must also be set aside as to nonap-pealing parties is resolved under the principles set forth in Turner, Collie & Braden and the line of cases it cites.

Cross-Points in the Supreme Court

One source of confusion in the lower courts may be our treatment of cross-points before this court. There has always been a crucial difference between cross-points in the courts of appeals and cross-points in this court. When a party seeks a different and more favorable judgment than the judgment rendered by the court of appeals, such point must be brought to this court by application for writ of error. Archuleta v. International Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex.1984). A cross-point is insufficient to preserve the point of error. In general, to obtain a different and more favorable judgment and to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, each party in the court of appeals must file both a timely motion for rehearing and an application for writ of error.5,6 Id.; Wich v. Fleming, 662 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.1983); Pruitt v. Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex.1973); Oil Field Haulers Ass’n v. Railroad Comm’n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex.1964); Schleicher v. Runge, 90 Tex. 456, 457-58, 39 S.W. 279, 280 (1897); Tex.R.App.P. 130(b). This is in direct contrast to the rule in the courts of appeals, which allows an appellee to seek additional, affirmative relief by complaining of the trial court’s error by cross-points so long as the appellant has not limited the scope of the appeal. Hernandez, 617 S.W.2d at 924.7

Conclusion

This court has labored long and hard to remove as many procedural traps from our rules as possible. Litigants are entitled to have their disputes resolved on the merits, not on unnecessary and arcane points that can sneak up on even the most diligent of attorneys. The court’s decision in this cause is another step in achieving this goal. However, the simplicity of our holding still belies the intricacies and troubling inconsistencies in our rules for perfecting appeals in other contexts.
I believe it is time to adopt a single, consistent procedure for perfection of appeals in Texas courts. I suggest two alter*644natives; there may be others. One is that the filing of a cost bond by any party to a case invokes the jurisdiction of the appellate court for the benefit of all parties. If the appellant complains as to only one ap-pellee in a multiple party case, that appel-lee may, without perfecting an independent appeal, complain of any other party. If the appellant abandons his appeal or loses his right to continue, any other party may take up the burden of furnishing a record and continuing the appeal. This is the usual procedure for appeals to the Texas courts of appeals although numerous exceptions have been made, mostly in multiple party cases. The other alternative is that any party who seeks more or different relief from that provided by the trial court’s judgment must perfect his own appeal. An appellee may urge any ground in support of the trial court’s judgment without perfecting an appeal, but he cannot complain of the judgment on the basis that some other party has appealed. This is generally the procedure for appeal to this court and to the United States courts of appeals. I do not attempt to present a comparison of the benefits and detriments of these two approaches. My point is simply that our justice system would be well served by a simple, consistent, comprehensive, easily applied set of rules applicable in all appeals.
We cannot, of course, attempt to formulate such rules in the context of the simple facts of this cause. We can, however, consider this problem in our continuing study and revision of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Accordingly, I concur.
MAUZY and HECHT, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.

. For definitions of the terms "cross-point,” "reply point,” and the disfavored "counterpoint," see Jackson v. Ewton, 411 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex.1967).

. Cross-points in the courts of appeals are necessary only when expressly required by the rules, or when the appellee seeks to complain of some ruling by the trial court. Jackson v. Ewton, 411 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex.1967); Tex.R.Civ.P. 324(c). In particular, a cross-point in the court of appeals is not necessary to preserve an appellee’s right to an equal or lesser judgment based on an independent ground of recovery supported by jury findings. Boyce Iron Works, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 747 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex.1988); Chesshir v. First State Bank, 620 S.W.2d 101, 101 (Tex.1981). The appellee need not file a cross-point because the trial court has not committed any error. Although Chesshir is based on McKelvy v. Barber, the rule operates differently in the supreme court. See infra note 7; McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1964).

. The court has not previously addressed this cross-point issue either because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their applications for writ of error or because consideration of the cross-points was moot for other reasons.

. See majority opinion supra note 4.

. It is important to note that all applications for writ of error, including so-called conditional applications, cross-applications, and other successive applications for writ of error, must be filed with the clerks of the courts of appeals, not the clerk of the supreme court. Tex.R.App.P. 130(b).

. The rule requiring a motion for rehearing in the court of appeals also applies to so-called conditional applications, cross-applications, and other successive applications for writ of error. Rule 130(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[i]f any party [timely] files an application ... any other party who was entitled to file such an application but failed to do so shall have ten additional days from the date of filing any preceding application in which to file it.” The filing of a motion for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of an application for writ of error. Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Comm’n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex.1964); Grayce Oil Co. v. Peterson, 128 Tex. 550, 559, 98 S.W.2d 781, 785 (1936). A party who fails to file a motion for rehearing is, thus, not entitled to file an application.

.There is at least one situation when it is not absolutely necessary to file cross-points in the supreme court. The appellate practitioner may be rescued by a corollary to the rule of McKelvy v. Barber if he fails to assert a cross-point (in this context now properly called a reply point) directed at preserving the appellee’s right to an equal or lesser judgment based on an independent ground of recovery. See McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1964); Tex.R.App.P. 136(d). This situation usually arises when the court of appeals affirms a tried court’s judgment supported by multiple independent grounds of recovery, but the court of appeals declines to rule on the appellant’s remaining points of error after overruling other points of error that attack a single ground of recovery. See McKelvy, 381 S.W.2d at 64-65. However, the careful and seasoned appellate practitioner will include such a reply point anyway to ensure that the existence of independent grounds for affirmance of the court of appeals’ judgment is brought to the attention of the supreme court.