Court Opinion

ID: 9901359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:01:35.755797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.546157
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COTTONWOOD                                No. 22-36015
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER,
                                        D.C. No. 2:20-cv-
              Plaintiff-Appellant,        00028-BMM
and

MONTANA RIVERS; GALLATIN                    OPINION
WILDLIFE ASSOCIATION,

              Plaintiffs,
 v.

RON EDWARDS, in his official
capacity as Manager of the Big Sky
Water and Sewer District; BIG SKY
WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT;
BOYNE USA, INC.,

              Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Montana
        Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted October 4, 2023
                 Seattle, Washington

                Filed November 21, 2023
2           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

     Before: KIM MCLANE WARDLAW and MILAN D.
          SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and KIYO A.
               MATSUMOTO, * District Judge.

             Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

                          SUMMARY **

                      Environmental Law

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s judgment after a jury trial in favor of
defendants in an action under the Clean Water Act.
    Cottonwood Environmental Law Center filed suit
against Big Sky County Water & Sewer District No. 363 and
Boyne USA, Inc., for their alleged discharge of treated
wastewater into the West Fork of the Gallatin River without
a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permit. The District provides water and wastewater services
for a resort community at Big Sky, Montana, and it treats and
stores wastewater so that the resulting effluent can be reused
for irrigation on nearby properties in Big Sky, including the
golf course owned by Boyne.
   Affirming in part, the panel held that the district court
properly ruled, in orders denying summary judgment, that

*
  The Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS             3

Cottonwood could not advance a direct-discharge theory of
liability against the District at trial. The panel held that it
had jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders denying
summary judgment to Cottonwood because, in those orders,
the district court rejected Cottonwood’s direct-discharge
theory as a matter of law. The panel affirmed the district
court’s holding that the District could not be liable on a
direct-discharge theory because an underdrain pipe below
but not connected to the District’s holding ponds did not
transfer pollutants between meaningfully distinct water
bodies, and thus was not a “point source” of pollution. The
panel held that, under the “meaningfully distinct water
bodies” test, there is no requirement that the source water be
navigable.
   Reversing the district court’s dismissal of Cottonwood’s
Clean Water Act claim against Boyne for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and remanding, the panel held that
Cottonwood’s letter to Boyne provided sufficient notice of
Cottonwood’s indirect-discharge theory of liability.

                         COUNSEL

John P. Meyer (argued), Cottonwood Environmental Law
Center, Bozeman, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jonathan W. Rauchway (argued), Andrea M. Bronson, Mave
A. Gasaway, and Michael M. Golz, Davis Graham & Stubbs
LLP, Denver, Colorado; William M. Morris (argued), Ian
McIntosh, Neil G. Westesen, and Joseph M. Noreña,
Crowley Fleck PLLP, Bozeman, Montana; for Defendants-
Appellees.
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                          OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    This case involves alleged violations of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Plaintiff-Appellant
Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (Cottonwood) filed
suit against Defendants-Appellees Big Sky County Water &
Sewer District No. 363 (the District) and Boyne USA, Inc.
(Boyne) for their alleged discharge of treated wastewater
into the West Fork of the Gallatin River (the West Fork)
without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit.
    Before trial, the district court ruled that Cottonwood
could not advance a direct-discharge theory of CWA liability
against the District at trial. The district court also dismissed
Cottonwood’s claim against Boyne for lack of proper notice
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). On appeal, we
affirm the district court’s rejection of Cottonwood’s direct-
discharge theory, but reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Cottonwood’s claim against Boyne.
               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The District is a special purpose unit of government
encompassing approximately 6,285 acres across two
Montana counties. It provides water and wastewater
services for a resort community at Big Sky, Montana. To
manage Big Sky’s wastewater, the District operates a Water
Resource Recovery Facility (WRRF). The WRRF treats and
stores wastewater so that the resulting effluent can be reused
for irrigation on nearby properties in Big Sky, including the
Meadow Village Golf Course owned by Boyne. Despite
          COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS             5

undergoing significant treatment, the resulting effluent still
retains pollutants, including nitrogen.
    Because the irrigation season in Big Sky runs only from
May through October, the WRRF has constructed three lined
storage ponds to store treated effluent throughout the winter.
The ponds hold approximately 82 million gallons of treated
effluent and are lined with a high-density polyethylene liner.
Despite the high-density liner, water still leaks from the
WRRF storage ponds into the groundwater directly below
them.
    When the District added the liners to its three holding
ponds, it also installed an “underdrain”—i.e., a system of
perforated piping that collects groundwater—beneath two of
the ponds. The underdrain pipe is not connected to the
WRRF storage ponds. Instead, it creates a preferential
pathway for groundwater that naturally sits beneath the
ponds, lowering the groundwater table and preventing
groundwater from pushing up on—or “floating”—the pond
liners. Collected groundwater travels through the underdrain
and discharges through a pipe into a small wetland near the
WRRF. The wetland is approximately 130 feet away from
the West Fork. The parties agree that the water from the
aquifer below the WRRF holding ponds would reach the
West Fork regardless of the existence of the underdrain pipe.
The parties also agree that water from the holding ponds, via
leakage from the wastewater holding ponds and irrigation on
the Meadow Village golf course, ultimately enters the West
Fork.
               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 2020, Cottonwood sued the District in federal court
for violating the CWA, which “forbids ‘any addition’ of any
pollutant from ‘any point source’ to ‘navigable waters’
6          COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

without” an NPDES permit. Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A)). It is undisputed that the District
does not hold an NPDES permit to discharge any pollutants,
including from the holding ponds or the underdrain pipe, into
the West Fork.
    Cottonwood first moved for summary judgment on the
District’s liability in October 2021. Cottonwood asserted
that the District violated the CWA under a direct-discharge
theory—namely, that the District directly discharged
nitrogen into the West Fork via the underdrain without a
permit. The District opposed the motion, arguing that the
underdrain is not connected to the storage ponds and that
“the underdrain pipe is not adding any pollutants, but [is]
merely providing a preferential path for groundwater flow.”
The District also cross-moved for summary judgment on the
same grounds.
    The district court denied both parties’ motions due to the
existence of genuine disputes as to material facts. The
district court also cast doubt on the validity of Cottonwood’s
direct-discharge theory, observing that any leakage from the
storage ponds would have to “move through an aquifer
before reaching the . . . underdrain pipe or the West Fork.”
Therefore, in order to succeed in its claim, Cottonwood
would need to advance an indirect-discharge theory pursuant
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Maui, which held that
discharges of pollutants into groundwater eventually
reaching navigable waters still require a CWA permit if such
indirect discharges are the “functional equivalent of a direct
discharge from the point source into navigable waters.” 140
S. Ct. at 1478. Because the parties’ experts disagreed about
how the factors comprising Maui’s “functional equivalence”
test applied to the discharge in question, the court ruled that
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS             7

there were additional factual disputes that “must be resolved
at trial.”
    In the same order, the district court also sua sponte
granted Cottonwood “leave to amend [its] [c]omplaint . . . to
include the Meadow Village Golf Course’s owner, Boyne,
as a party in th[e] lawsuit.” The district court opined that
Boyne, and not the District, was “the proper party for
allegations of CWA violations that arise from discharges
through the Meadow Village Golf Course’s [irrigation and
drainage] system.”
    Three days after the court issued its ruling granting leave
to amend, Cottonwood sent Boyne a letter pursuant to the
CWA’s 60-day notice provision.                See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A). In the letter, Cottonwood alleged:

       Boyne is violating the Clean Water Act by
       over irrigating the Meadow Village golf
       course. 33 U.S.C. [§] 1311(a). Boyne’s
       irrigation practices exceed the agronomic
       uptake rate of the grass, which leads to
       nitrogen pollution reaching groundwater and
       then being discharged to the West Fork . . .
       through several French drains as well as the
       underdrain pipe below the . . . District’s
       holding ponds.

The letter further stated that “[t]he Supreme Court recently
identified seven factors [in Maui] that help answer the
question of whether Boyne’s irrigation practices amount to
a ‘functional equivalent’ of a direct discharge to the West
Fork,” and proceeded to explain why it believed that
Boyne’s conduct amounted to such a discharge pursuant to
those factors. In addition to identifying “six ‘drains’ on the
8         COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

golf course directly discharging into the West Fork,”
Cottonwood alleged that “[n]itrogen [was] reaching
groundwater as a result of irrigating” and making its way to
an “underdrain pipe,” that discharged into the West Fork.
Cottonwood also alleged more broadly that excessive
irrigation caused “nitrogen to reach the groundwater and
ultimately the West Fork.” After sixty days had passed,
Cottonwood filed its third amended complaint, in which it
abandoned its specific allegations from the letter regarding
the six drains on the golf course and focused instead on its
broader allegation that Boyne’s excessive irrigation—which
allegedly results in nitrogen leaching into the groundwater—
amounts to the functional equivalent of a direct discharge
into the West Fork.
    Two weeks after Cottonwood filed its third amended
complaint, it again moved for summary judgment against the
District on a direct-discharge theory, contending that
pollution from the storage ponds discharges directly into the
West Fork from the underdrain pipe. Cottonwood primarily
relied on its expert’s opinion that “pollutants leak from the
[District’s] holding ponds, enter the groundwater system
below the holding ponds, and flow either to the West
Fork . . . through the aquifer, or via the WRRF underdrain
pipe.”
    The district court again denied Cottonwood’s motion,
which the court found to have rested “on the same facts and
legal arguments . . . presented in [its] first motion for
summary judgment.” The district court then clarified its
previous summary judgment order, explicitly stating that
Cottonwood’s direct-discharge theory failed as a matter of
law as applied to the undisputed facts. The court reiterated,
however, that Cottonwood had a triable theory of indirect
discharge that is the “functional equivalent of a direct
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS               9

discharge” pursuant to the Maui test. It determined that “the
WRRF holding ponds, if they leak a pollutant, qualify as a
point source under the CWA.” Accordingly, Cottonwood
could prevail on its CWA claim against the District if it
could prove at trial that nitrogen leaked from the ponds and
reached the West Fork, and that the leakage constituted the
“functional equivalent of a direct discharge” from the ponds.
    The district court bifurcated the trials against the District
and Boyne. At trial against the District, Cottonwood
advanced its indirect-discharge theory. It did not advance a
direct-discharge theory or propose jury instructions to that
effect. After resolving objections from the parties, the
district court ultimately instructed the jury that “[t]his case
is about indirect discharges,” that “the [D]istrict’s storage
ponds are a point source if they leak a pollutant,” and that,
although “the underdrain pipe is not a point source,” the jury
“may determine that the underdrain pipe contributes to an
indirect discharge.” The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the District, finding that the District did not violate the
CWA.
    Shortly after trial against the District, Boyne filed a
motion to dismiss. On November 3, 2022, the district court
granted the motion for Cottonwood’s lack of proper notice
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), and therefore, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against
Boyne. Specifically, the court found that Cottonwood’s
notice letter “failed to identify any alleged indirect
discharges of pollution” into the West Fork and instead only
alleged that “several specific drains and an underdrain pipe
directly discharged nitrogen pollution into the West
Fork . . . .” On December 1, 2022, the court denied a
subsequent motion for leave to amend the complaint and
then entered a final judgment. Cottonwood timely appealed.
10         COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s ruling on a summary
judgment motion. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th
Cir. 2008). We also determine de novo whether a district
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action. Singh
v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir.
2019).
                        ANALYSIS
I. We Have Jurisdiction to Review the District Court’s
   Pretrial Ruling Foreclosing Cottonwood’s Direct-
   Discharge Theory of the Case.
    On appeal, Cottonwood asks us to review the district
court’s orders denying summary judgment to Cottonwood,
in which the district court rejected Cottonwood’s direct-
discharge theory of the case as a matter of law. The District
contends that we lack jurisdiction to do so because orders
denying summary judgment are generally not reviewable
after trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
     As we recently observed in Matter of York:

        In Ortiz v. Jordan, the Supreme Court held
        that, on appeal from a final judgment after a
        trial on the merits, an appellate court may not
        review a pretrial order denying summary
        judgment if that denial was based on the
        presence of a disputed issue of material fact.

78 F.4th 1074, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Ortiz v.
Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 183–84, 186–87 (2011)). However,
when an earlier ruling denying summary judgment resolved
“purely legal issues—that is, issues that can be resolved
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS              11

without reference to any disputed facts,” then that “ruling[]
. . . merge[s] into the final judgment, at which point [it is]
reviewable on appeal.” Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729,
735 (2023) (“While factual issues addressed in summary-
judgment denials are unreviewable on appeal, the same is not
true of purely legal issues . . . .”).
    In this case, when the district court clarified its rejection
of Cottonwood’s direct-discharge theory, the district court
did so “without reference to any disputed facts” from the
record. Dupree, 598 U.S. at 735. The parties agreed that
“the groundwater beneath the WRRF [holding ponds] and
the West Fork . . . represent a hydrologically connected
water body,” and that “the water from the aquifer below the
WRRF [holding ponds] would reach the West Fork . . .
regardless of the existence of the underdrain pipe.” It was
precisely because of these undisputed facts that the district
court concluded that Cottonwood could not “argue a tenable
direct discharge theory from the underdrain pipe.”
Therefore, the district court’s foreclosure of Cottonwood’s
direct-discharge theory is a “pretrial legal ruling[]” and not
a “factual” one. Dupree, 598 U.S. at 735. Because this
“purely legal conclusion[] at summary judgment [was] not
‘supersede[d]’ by later developments in the litigation, th[e]
ruling[] . . . merge[d] into the final judgment,” and is
therefore “reviewable on appeal.” Id. (citations omitted).
     The District’s primary argument against our exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s pretrial legal
ruling relies upon the fact that the ruling—had it gone the
other way—could not have completely obviated the need for
a trial. In support, the District selectively quotes dicta from
our decision in Banuelos v. Construction Laborers’ Trust
Funds for Southern California, 382 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir.
2004), to imply a bright-line rule that we cannot exercise
12         COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

appellate jurisdiction over any ruling contained within a
summary judgment denial unless the ruled-upon issue
“[c]ould have negated the need for a trial.”
     However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dupree—
which was published shortly after Cottonwood filed its
opening brief—squarely forecloses the District’s all-or-
nothing approach to appellate review of summary judgment
denials. Dupree makes clear that a reviewing court may
review some issues contained in a summary judgment
denial, and not others. See 598 U.S. at 735 (“While factual
issues addressed in summary-judgment denials are
unreviewable on appeal, the same is not true of purely legal
issues—that is, issues that can be resolved without reference
to any disputed facts.”). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction
to review the district court’s pretrial legal ruling that
Cottonwood could not pursue its direct-discharge theory at
trial, despite lacking jurisdiction to review other rulings
contained within the same summary judgment denials.
II. The District Court Did Not Err When It Rejected
    Cottonwood’s Direct-Discharge Theory as a Matter
    of Law.
    Cottonwood argues that the district court erred when it
ruled that “the underdrain pipe discharging pollution was not
a ‘point source’” and therefore precluded Cottonwood from
advancing a direct-discharge theory at trial, thereby leaving
Cottonwood to pursue an indirect-discharge theory of
liability, which “added extra elements to [Cottonwood’s]
burden of proof.” In the District’s view, “[t]he district court
correctly rejected Cottonwood’s direct-discharge theory . . .
because the underdrain does not directly discharge pollutants
to the West Fork as a matter of law and the undisputed facts.”
             COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS                     13

    We agree with the District. Early in the litigation,
Cottonwood alleged that there were two point sources of
pollution under the District’s control—the ponds and the
underdrain.       With respect to the underdrain pipe,
Cottonwood conceded that the pipe was not connected to the
District’s WRRF holding ponds. Cottonwood also did not
contest that “the groundwater beneath the WRRF [holding
ponds] and the West Fork . . . represent a hydrologically
connected water body,” and that “the water from the aquifer
below the WRRF [holding ponds] would reach the West
Fork . . . regardless of the existence of the underdrain pipe.”
These undisputed facts necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the underdrain pipe does not transport pollutants
between “meaningfully distinct water bodies,” and thus
cannot constitute the discharge of a pollutant within the
meaning of the CWA. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 111–12 (2004).
    Cottonwood argues against the application of
Miccosukee’s “meaningfully distinct water bodies” test
because this case, unlike Miccosukee, “does not involve a
transfer between navigable waters.” 1 However, the plain
language of the test does not require that the source water be
navigable. As the District correctly observes, “the test
examines the relationship between the source water and
receiving water to determine whether the waters are
‘meaningfully distinct.’” If the source water and receiving
water are not “meaningfully distinct,” then the transfer
between the two cannot “count[] as a discharge of pollutants

1
  The parties agree that the “water transfer rule,” which excepts from the
NPDES permitting requirement “activity that conveys or connects
waters of the United States without subjecting the transferred water to
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use,” does not apply in
this case. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i).
14         COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

under the CWA . . . .” ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 798 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 133
S. Ct. 710, 713 (2013)).
    Our decision in Northern Plains Resource Council is
instructive on this point. In that case, we analyzed whether
water pumped from an aquifer—which is not navigable—
into a navigable body of water could be considered a
“pollutant” within the meaning of the CWA. See N. Plains
Res. Council v. Fid. Expl. & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1157–
60 (9th Cir. 2003). We found that it could because without
the defendant’s extraction pump, water from the aquifer
would never reach the navigable body of water. Id. at 1158.
In the words of Miccosukee, the water in the aquifer and the
water in the navigable body of water were “meaningfully
distinct,” and, therefore, transfer of water from the former to
the latter could constitute the discharge of a pollutant within
the meaning of the CWA. That is not the case here, where
Cottonwood conceded that “the water from the aquifer
below the WRRF [holding ponds] would reach the West
Fork . . . regardless of the existence of the underdrain pipe.”
Accordingly, the district court was correct to conclude that
the transfer caused by the underdrain pipe alone cannot
constitute the discharge of a pollutant pursuant to the CWA.
     As for the ponds themselves, the District conceded that
at least some water from the WRRF holding ponds is leaking
through the pond liners into the groundwater immediately
below them. The District also did not dispute that the
groundwater below the ponds eventually makes its way to
the West Fork, including through the underdrain pipe it
installed to prevent groundwater from pushing up against the
WRRF holding ponds. In light of those facts, the district
court permitted Cottonwood to proceed to trial on the claim
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS            15

that the leakage of wastewater from the holding ponds into
the groundwater below “cause[d] an indirect discharge of a
pollutant to the West Fork” under Maui. To bolster that
theory, Cottonwood was also free to argue that the
underdrain pipe, installed by the District, contributed to that
indirect discharge by affecting the transit time, distance
traveled, and the other factors relevant to whether an indirect
discharge is the “functional equivalent” of a direct discharge
under Maui.
    Contrary to Cottonwood’s arguments, “[t]his
framework” endorsed by the district court “d[oes] not allow
the District to ‘exploit a loophole’ in the CWA.” It is
precisely because of Maui that the District could not argue
that the leakage from its wastewater ponds was beyond the
CWA’s reach because the leaked water had to travel through
groundwater first before reaching the West Fork. That was
the loophole Maui sought to close. See Maui, 140 S. Ct. at
1473. The district court therefore correctly foreclosed
Maui’s much-feared “loophole” that would have benefited
the District when it ruled that Cottonwood could still pursue
an indirect-discharge theory at trial.
    Cottonwood offers several other arguments, but none
overcomes its concession that the wastewater leaking from
the WRRF holding ponds must travel through natural
groundwater first before reaching the West Fork. These
factual circumstances squarely call for the application of
Maui, which provides a pathway to CWA liability so long as
“the addition of . . . pollutants through groundwater is the
functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point
source into navigable waters.” 140 S. Ct. at 1468, 1477.
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that
Cottonwood could argue an indirect-discharge theory
16         COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

pursuant to Maui, but not a direct-discharge theory in light
of Miccosukee’s “meaningfully distinct water bodies” test.
III. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed
     Cottonwood’s Claim Against Boyne for Lack of
     Proper Notice.
    Cottonwood also appeals the district court’s dismissal of
its CWA claim against Boyne for lack of proper notice and
therefore subject matter jurisdiction. Boyne contends
dismissal was correct because, according to Boyne, the
indirect-discharge theory of excess nitrogen leaching into
the groundwater due to overirrigation and eventually making
its way to the West Fork did not appear at all in
Cottonwood’s notice of its intent to sue.
    For a federal court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over a private CWA claim, the individual or entity bringing
the claim “must give a 60-day notice of intent to sue. In fact,
absent that notice, the action is prohibited,” as “it is a
jurisdictional necessity.” Ctr. For Biological Diversity v.
Marina Point Dev. Co., 566 F.3d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2009)
(as amended) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)). Such
notice must include:

       sufficient information to permit the recipient
       to identify the specific standard, limitation, or
       order alleged to have been violated, the
       activity alleged to constitute a violation, the
       person or persons responsible for the alleged
       violation, the location of the alleged
       violation, the date or dates of such violation,
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS             17

       and the full name, address, and telephone
       number of the person giving notice.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a). “Notice is sufficient if it is specific
enough to give the accused company the opportunity to
correct the problem.” S.F. BayKeeper, Inc. v. Tosco Corp.,
309 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “We have sometimes been slightly
forgiving to plaintiffs in this area, but even at our most
lenient we have never abandoned the requirement that there
be a true notice that tells a target precisely what it allegedly
did wrong, and when,” Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 566
F.3d at 801, with “reasonable specificity,” Baykeeper, 309
F.3d at 1158 (quotation omitted).
    Cottonwood’s letter to Boyne provided more than
sufficient notice of Cottonwood’s indirect-discharge theory
of liability. The very first sentence of the letter states that
“Boyne is violating the Clean Water Act by over irrigating
the Meadow Village golf course. 33 U.S.C. [§] 1311(a).”
The letter also discusses the “seven [Maui] factors that help
answer the question of whether Boyne’s irrigation practices
amount to a ‘functional equivalent’ of a direct discharge to
the West Fork”—i.e., an indirect discharge—and explains
why Boyne’s conduct amounted to such a discharge pursuant
to those factors. Despite the letter alleging the existence of
several drains directly discharging into the West Fork—
allegations Cottonwood would later abandon in the
complaint—the letter also alleged that excessive irrigation
caused “nitrogen to reach the groundwater and ultimately the
West Fork,” regardless of the drains. For instance, the letter
discussed the hydraulic conductivity of the West Fork’s
watershed and how that enables nitrogen pollution to make
18           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

its way to riparian zones and streams that directly flow into
the West Fork.
    Accordingly, Cottonwood did not “change[] course” and
offer “materially distinct allegations” when it alleged in its
third amended complaint that Boyne’s irrigation practices
amounted to an indirect discharge of nitrogen into the West
Fork, as Boyne suggests. Cottonwood simply abandoned
specific allegations regarding the drains but continued to
press other, specific allegations regarding nitrogen leaching
into the groundwater through over-irrigation. Therefore, the
district court erred when it dismissed Cottonwood’s claim
against Boyne for lack of proper notice. 2
    However, Boyne argues that other grounds exist to
affirm the dismissal of Cottonwood’s claim against Boyne,
regardless of whether notice was adequate. Chief among
them is Boyne’s argument that the district court violated the
party presentation principle, which requires that courts “rely
on the parties to frame the issues for decision” and play “the
role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). Boyne
argues that the district court violated this principle when it
sua sponte granted Cottonwood leave to amend the pleadings
after the deadline to amend the pleadings had passed, so that
Cottonwood could “include the Meadow Village Golf
Course’s owner, Boyne, as a party to this lawsuit.”

2
  Boyne also argues that Cottonwood’s letter was “conspicuously silent
as to the ‘date or dates of such violation,’ as the regulations require.”
The district court did not address this alleged deficiency, but the notice
letter appears to contain sufficient information to put Boyne on notice of
such dates. Cf. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma
Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 951–53 (9th Cir. 2002); Baykeeper, 309 F.3d at
1158–59.
           COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS               19

    The district court’s actions do not amount to an abuse of
discretion. As Cottonwood correctly observes, the district
court never required Cottonwood to add Boyne as a
defendant. While other district courts may have taken a
more passive approach upon concluding that Boyne, and not
the District, was “the proper party for allegations of CWA
violations that arise from discharges through the Meadow
Village Golf Course’s [irrigation] system,” the district
court’s “modest initiating role” in suggesting that
Cottonwood join Boyne to the litigation was likely
“appropriate.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct.
1575, 1579 (2020). None of the authorities provided by
Boyne suggest otherwise, as they are readily distinguishable
on their facts. Accordingly, the district court did not violate
the party presentation principle.
    Boyne also asks us to affirm the dismissal because “[t]he
CWA explicitly excepts ‘discharges composed entirely of
return flows from irrigated agriculture’ from the statute’s . . .
permitting requirements,” and because Cottonwood
otherwise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. We decline to reach these merits-issues in the first
instance. See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248–49 (9th
Cir. 2013) (noting that it is “standard practice . . . to remand
to the district court for a decision in the first instance without
requiring any special justification for so doing”).
Accordingly, the dismissal of Cottonwood’s claim against
Boyne for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reversed.
                       CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment in favor of the District but REVERSE the
dismissal of Boyne. We REMAND this case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
20        COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. EDWARDS

Cottonwood shall bear the District’s costs on appeal, and
Boyne shall bear Cottonwood’s costs in appealing the
district court’s dismissal of Boyne. See Fed. R. App. P.
39(a).