Court Opinion

ID: 9668630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:19:51.602159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.167138
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).
¶ 66. The majority sets forth a blanket rule employing the exigent circumstances exception allowing forced *131blood draws in OWI cases. Such a blanket exception to the warrant requirement runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and renders meaningless the option of ever securing a search warrant for an OWI blood draw. In addition, I write separately to clarify any implication in the majority opinion that exigent circumstances might exist in cases where it is a controlled substance, not alcohol, that allegedly forms the basis for an arrest. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 67. In State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), this court determined in a 4-3 decision that exigent circumstances in OWI cases are based "solely on the fact that alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream." At the same time, and somewhat inconsistently, the Bohling court set forth four factors that must be satisfied for the police to forego a warrant:
(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation or crime, (2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication, (3) the method used to take the blood sample is a reasonable one and performed in a reasonable manner, and (4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw.
173 Wis. 2d at 533-34 (footnote omitted).
¶ 68. The dissent in Bohling observed that "the majority opinion holds that the exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol makes seizure of a blood sample without a warrant reasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment." 173 Wis. 2d at 548 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Although the dissent acknowledged that the exigent circumstances exception may be applied to the seizure of blood, it rejected the Bohling majority's blanket exception to the warrant requirement, concluding that law enforcement officers and courts must *132examine the facts on a case-by-case basis to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 549-550.
¶ 69. After Bohling, this court devised another blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment based on exigent circumstances. In State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 425-26, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), the court held that based on the destructibility of the evidence, a no-knock search is reasonable any time the police have a warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of drug dealing.
¶ 70. Subsequently, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the common law knock and announce principles form a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. In reaching its conclusion, the Court in Wilson peppered its decision with language warning that blanket exceptions to the knock and announce requirement were impermissible.
¶ 71. After Wilson, this court decided State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996). The court in Richards explained that it took the case to address the vitality of Stevens in light of the Supreme Court's warning in Wilson. Id. at 848. Nonetheless, this court did not heed the warning. It reaffirmed the Stevens rule, holding that exigent circumstances were always present in the execution of search warrants involving felonious drug delivery, based in part on the potential for the disposal of drugs prior to entry by the police. Id. at 847-48.
¶ 72. The U.S. Supreme Court promptly overturned us, abrogating the blanket rule. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). The Court concluded that a concurring opinion in Richards, not the majority, had correctly stated the law under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 391, 395. The concurring opinion repeated *133the concerns of the dissent in Bohling, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment requires an assessment of reasonableness based on the facts of each particular case. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d at 878 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
1 73. The Supreme Court's decision in Richards thus calls into question the basis for Bohling. Richards, along with this court's statement in Bohling that exigent circumstances in OWI cases are based "solely on the fact that alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream," Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539, suggests that Bohling embodies an impermissible blanket exception to the warrant requirement.
¶ 74. This blanket exception in Bohling may have been blurred by the court's articulation of the four factors that must be satisfied to justify a warrantless blood draw. At least some of these factors suggested that the determination of whether a given warrantless search was reasonable remained case-by-case based on individualized circumstances.
¶ 75. Today's majority opinion brings Bohling into focus. In practice, application of the four factors rarely, if ever, results in an individualized determination of reasonableness, and the exigent circumstances exception for blood draws in OWI cases embodies the type of blanket rule forbidden under Richards.
¶ 76. The first and second of the four Bohling factors amount to no more than probable cause to arrest for drunk driving. However, probable cause is already a requirement under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶ 17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621.
¶ 77. The third factor hás been held to be satisfied by any taking of blood in a "medical setting" or "medical *134environment." State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, ¶ 12, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867, review denied, 2001 WI 117, 247 Wis. 2d 1036, 635 N.W.2d 784 (unpublished table decision); State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, ¶ 15, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, review denied, 2000 WI 121, 239 Wis. 2d 310, 619 N.W.2d 93 (unpublished table decision). In reality then, the blood draw will satisfy this factor in virtually all cases.
¶ 78. Thus, the fourth factor is the only one that might seem to suggest that warrantless blood draws in OWI cases would remain subject to a case-by-case, particularized reasonableness determination as required by the Fourth Amendment. However, the majority has eviscerated that factor today.
¶ 79. The majority adopts the statutory standard for refusal under the implied consent statute as the constitutional standard for a reasonable objection. Majority op. at ¶[¶ 51-52. Under this standard, the only reasonable objection is a physical inability to submit to the test. This standard leaves no room for, among other things, a legitimate objection based on religious grounds. Thus, only in the most rare of cases will the fourth factor ever preclude a warrantless blood draw.
¶ 80. Any veil of uncertainty created by disparate language within Bohling is lifted by the majority opinion. Under the majority's opinion, if not also before it, the exigent circumstances exception for blood draws in OWI cases is a blanket rule that runs afoul of Richards.
¶ 81. Moreover, the majority's blanket rule runs afoul of its own framework. The majority opinion states that a law enforcement officer who arrests a person for operating under the influence has "three options for obtaining a blood sample," one of which is that the officer "may seek a search warrant to secure a blood draw." Majority op. at ¶ 42. However, because an officer *135may now obtain a forced blood draw without a warrant in virtually every case where the suspect refuses the test, the availability of this third "option" is rendered meaningless.
¶ 82. Finally, I note that the majority opinion discusses obtaining a blood draw to test for controlled substances. The majority states: "Securing a breath test rather than a blood test may not be satisfactory to law enforcement because an officer may want to determine whether the person is also under the influence of controlled substances." Majority op. at ¶ 40.
¶ 83. The majority's discussion referencing testing for controlled substances needs clarification to the extent it might be interpreted as an endorsement of any future application of the exigent circumstances exception to testing for controlled substances.
¶ 84. First, to the extent the majority's discussion of controlled substances makes such a suggestion, it is dicta. The case before us did not involve any alleged controlled substance use.
¶ 85. Second, and more importantly, any suggestion that the exigent circumstances exception should apply to testing for controlled substances is inapposite to the emergency nature of the exception. Citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966), the majority emphasizes that the "dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream constituted an emergency because it threatened the destruction of evidence." Majority op. at ¶ 27 (internal quotations omitted).
¶ 86. The same purported threat of rapid destruction of evidence may not be present when considering controlled substances. Indeed, evidence of controlled substance use generally dissipates much more slowly from the body than evidence of alcohol use. See State v. Jones, 895 P.2d 643, 644 (Nev. 1995); Emily J. Sovell, *136State v. Hanson: Has the Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement Swallowed the Rule?, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 163, 185 (2000).
¶ 87. In sum, the majority opinion sets forth a blanket rule under the exigent circumstances exception allowing warrantless blood draws in OWI cases. Because the Fourth Amendment does not countenance such a blanket rule, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 88. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissent.