Court Opinion

ID: 9375743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:06:50.810136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.329974
License: Public Domain

J-S45024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 FREDERICK BROOKS                           :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 2212 EDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 27, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0003383-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2023

      Appellant, Frederick Brooks, appeals from the September 27, 2021

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying

his petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends the PCRA court

erred by denying relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

interview and investigate a witness. Upon review, we affirm.

      On direct appeal, this Court repeated the trial court’s summary of

relevant facts as follows:

      On August 24, 2014, [Appellant] was a hotel guest at the Crowne
      Plaza Hotel in Philadelphia. Capri Grice, a housekeeper at the
      hotel, knocked on [Appellant’s] door to clean the room,
      announcing “housekeeping” before entering.       When no one
      responded, Ms. Grice opened the door only to find Brooks and a
      woman asleep on the bed. Grice closed the door without entering
      and continued down the hallway to clean the next room.
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       A short time afterwards, Brooks and his female companion exited
       their room and followed Grice down the hallway, angrily
       demanding that she return the money. [Appellant] then grabbed
       the maid by the throat pinned her against the wall lifting her off
       the ground choking her and rendering her unable to breathe while
       she and her cart were searched by the woman who was with
       [Appellant].    Ms. Grice testified that the choking lasted for
       approximately fifteen minutes. The housekeeper told [Appellant]
       that she did not have his money and she never entered his room.
       When another hotel guest came out of their room and into the
       hallway to intervene, Ms. Grice escaped to call security.
       [Appellant] followed her into the room to which she had fled and
       continued to angrily demand she return his money. [Appellant]
       left to go search his room for the money which he found behind
       the dresser. [Appellant] thought this was funny, laughing as he
       told the housekeeper “Just let it go[]” and trying to give her some
       money. Ms. Grice refused the money, and hotel management
       called the police.     When the police arrived on the scene,
       [Appellant] had fled and Ms. Grice was still crying and visibly
       shaking. The housekeeper was suffering from severe head pain
       as a result of the choking, spent the night in the hospital and
       missed a full week of work.

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 1190 EDA 2016, unpublished memorandum at

1-2 (Pa. Super. filed July 20, 2017) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/16, at

2-3) (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

       Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of

aggravated assault, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another

person, imposing an aggregate sentence of three to six years in prison,

followed by two years’ probation.1 On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his

____________________________________________

1At trial, the Commonwealth called as witnesses Ms. Grice and Officer Roland
Butler, the officer who arrived at the hotel in response to a radio call
concerning the assault. Appellant did not testify and did not present any
witnesses in his defense. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Trial, 12/16/15.

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judgment of sentence. Id. Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of

appeal to our Supreme Court, which denied the petition on December 5, 2017.

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 176 A.3d 231 (Table) (Pa. 2017).

      Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on February 16, 2018.

Counsel was appointed and, following many continuances, the substitution of

counsel, and the filing of an amended petition, the Commonwealth filed a

motion to dismiss on February 23, 2021. On August 16, 2021, the PCRA court

issued a Notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss the

amended petition without a hearing.       By order entered on September 27,

2021, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed.

Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents one issue for our consideration:

      Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition
      where Appellant’s conviction was the result of the ineffective
      assistance of trial counsel, because trial counsel failed to interview
      and investigate eyewitness David House, who witnessed the
      events that transpired in this case, where David House’s first-hand
      account of the events would have been relevant and probative on
      the issue of whether Appellant’s alleged acts constituted any crime
      of either simple assault or aggravated assault?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (some capitalization omitted).

      “It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut

that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012) (citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

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(1984)). As this Court reiterated in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d

701 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014):

      “To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner
      must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit;
      (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and
      (3) actual prejudice resulted from counsel’s act or failure to
      act.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111,
      1127 (2011). Where the petitioner “fails to plead or meet any
      elements    of   the    above-cited    test,  his   claim    must
      fail.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1272 (Pa.
      Super. 2010).

Id. at 706-07. See also Koehler, 36 A.3d at 132 (same). Our Supreme

Court has recognized that “an appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s

findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by the record, and

reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014).

      In his Amended PCRA Petition, the sole bases for relief were set forth in

Paragraphs 10(1) and 11(1). Appellant asserted he was entitled to PCRA relief

due to the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of

the particular case, so undermined the truth determining process that no

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Amended

PCRA Petition, 10/28/20, at ¶ 10. He continued:

      11. More specifically, Petitioner is entitled to relief because trial
      counsel was ineffective for,

         (1) Inadequately preparing his case by failing to review
         discovery and identify a witness David House. Conduct a
         formal interview of such witness and present him at trial.
         Counsel also failed to investigate this case and preserve and
         collect video recordings from the crime scene.

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Id. at ¶ 11 (verbatim).2

       In Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en

banc), this Court explained:

       “Neglecting to call a witness differs from failing to investigate a
       witness in a subtle but important way.” Stewart, 84 A.3d at 712.
       The failure to investigate “presents an issue of arguable merit
       where the record demonstrates that counsel did not perform an
       investigation.” Id. “It can be unreasonable per se to conduct no
       investigation into known witnesses.”          Id.      Importantly, a
       petitioner still must demonstrate prejudice. Id. To demonstrate
       prejudice where the allegation is the failure to interview a witness,
       the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability
       that the testimony the witness would have provided would have
       led to a different outcome at trial. Commonwealth v.
       Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950 A.2d 945, 961 (2008).

       In this respect, a failure to investigate and a failure to interview a
       witness overlaps with declining to call a witness since the
       petitioner must prove: (i) the witness existed; (ii) the witness was
       available to testify; (iii) counsel knew of, or should have known
       of, the existence of the witness; (iv) the witness was willing to
       testify; and (v) the absence of the testimony was so prejudicial as
       to have denied the defendant a fair trial. See Commonwealth
       v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297, 302 (discussing failure to
       interview and call and alibi witness).

Id. at 638-39.

       Appellant notes that Mr. House was identified as an eyewitness to the

incident on Officer Butler’s report, which included Mr. House’s Virginia

address. Appellant suggests that “[t]o the extent that Mr. House witnessed

the events of this incident firsthand, Mr. House was a crucial fact witness in

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant is not pursuing his claim relating to video recordings
in this appeal.

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Appellant’s case.”      Appellant’s Brief at 17.   He contends that Mr. House

witnessed the interaction between Ms. Grice and Appellant and that he

“observed events regarding the nature of the assault and seriousness of any

injuries.” Id. at 18.

      As noted above, this Court in Pander recognized that failure to

investigate a known witness can be unreasonable per se.                However,

“[i]mportantly, a petitioner must still demonstrate prejudice [by showing] that

there is a reasonable probability that the testimony the witness would have

provided would have led to a different outcome at trial.” Pander, 100 A.3d

at 638-39.

      The timeline of events included in the Factual History set forth in

Appellant’s brief underscores the lack of prejudice resulting from the failure to

investigate and interview Mr. House.       Appellant cites the testimony of Ms.

Grice, in which she recounts that Appellant and his female companion

approached her in the hall outside their room. There, an angry Appellant held

Ms. Grice against the wall with a hand on her throat and repeatedly asked

where his money was. When she responded that she did not know where his

money was, Appellant choked her against the wall while his companion

searched Ms. Grice and her housekeeping cart.          Appellant continued his

accusatory tirade as Ms. Grice continued her denials. Appellant let her go but

then grabbed her arm and said, “B-I-T-C-H, where’s my money?             I’m not

playing with you.    Where’s my effing money?”       Appellant’s Brief at 13-14

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(quoting N.T., Trial, 12/16/15, at 10).            “He then paced up and down the

hallway.     Another hotel guest walked into the hallway and told

[Appellant] to calm down. In response, [Appellant] told the man to mind

his own business. While [Appellant] and the man were arguing, Ms. Grice

entered another room to call security.” Id. at 14 (citing N.T., Trial, 12/16/15,

at 10, 11) (emphasis added).3

        By Appellant’s own timeline, the incidents of holding Ms. Grice against

the wall and choking her occurred before the guest, Mr. House, even stepped

into the hallway from his room.                Nothing in Appellant’s Factual History

suggests Mr. House observed any part of the assault, unlike Appellant’s

companion—whom Appellant’s counsel identified as Appellant’s fiancée4—who

did not testify. Therefore, Appellant is unable to demonstrate prejudice by

showing any reasonable probability that testimony from Mr. House would have

led to a different outcome at trial. The failure to demonstrate actual prejudice

defeats Appellant’s claim with respect to the failure to investigate or interview

Mr. House. See Pander, 100 A.3d at 639.

        Consistent with Pander, in which this Court also addressed the failure

to call a witness at trial, our Supreme Court has stated:

        To prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
        to present a witness, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1)
____________________________________________

3We note that portions of Appellant’s Factual History erroneously cite Page 16
of the trial transcript for testimony that appears on Page 10 of the transcript.

4   See N.T., Sentencing, 4/8/16, at 8-9.

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      the witness existed; (2) counsel was either aware of or should
      have been aware of the witness’s existence; (3) the witness was
      willing and able to cooperate on behalf of the defendant; and (4)
      the proposed testimony was necessary to avoid prejudice to the
      defendant.

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 757 (Pa. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 746 (Pa. 2004) (additional citation

omitted)).

      While Officer Butler’s report might confirm Mr. House’s existence and an

inference that trial counsel was aware of his existence, there is no suggestion

that Mr. House was willing or able to cooperate on Appellant’s behalf, or that

his proposed testimony would have been favorable to Appellant. In fact, Ms.

Grice’s testimony suggests to the contrary. As she testified, Mr. House came

out of his room, “and was, like, What’s going on. Calm down. Why you hitting

on her?” N.T. Trial, 12/16/15, at 9. She explained that Appellant told Mr.

House “to mind his business,” and then described Appellant and Mr. House as

“going at it” while she went into a nearby room to call security. Id. at 9-10.

      As the PCRA court recognized,

      [Appellant] has failed to provide even a scintilla of evidence
      required. There is no affidavit from Mr. House, nor any other
      evidence provided from which it could be determined that this
      individual was willing to testify, or that his testimony would have
      benefitted [Appellant] in any way whatsoever. . . . Having failed
      to provide even a pittance of proof as to this witness, the claim is
      meritless.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 7.

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      We agree. By failing to demonstrate that Mr. House was available and

prepared to cooperate and to testify on his behalf, Appellant has failed to meet

his burden to raise even a prima facie claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness on

this basis. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 306 (Pa. 1990).

      We conclude that the PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by the

record and that its legal conclusions are free of error. Therefore, we shall not

disturb its ruling.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023

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