Court Opinion

ID: 9895436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 14:04:45.65347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:49.708042
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: November 7, 2023

 S23Y0437. IN THE MATTER OF WALTER DOUGLAS ADAMS.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter arises from a fee dispute between

Walter Douglas Adams (State Bar No. 004650) and his former, long-

time client. In December 2022, this Court received a report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (the

“Review Board”), which reviewed the report and recommendation of

the Special Master, Jack J. Helms, Jr., at the request of Adams

pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214 and 4-216. In its report, the Review

Board adopted the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions

of law and agreed that Adams, who has been a member of the State

Bar since 1980, was in default1 and should be suspended from the

        1 On September 10, 2020, the State Bar filed its formal complaint. While

Adams acknowledged service of the formal complaint, he failed to file a timely
answer or obtain an extension of time to file an answer, and the Special Master
practice of law for six months and provide restitution totaling

$2,732.81 to his former client based on his violations of Rules 1.4,

1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 1.16, and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules

of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or the “Rules”) found in Bar Rule

4-102 (d).2 On April 18, 2023, we issued an order remanding the

matter back to the Special Master. While we did not agree with

Adams that the Special Master erred in granting default judgment

given Adams’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Bar Rules 4-212

(b) and 4-221 (b) and OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), we ordered the Special

Master to clarify his findings of fact and conclusions of law, to

include citations to case law that supported his recommended level

of discipline, and to revise his report and recommendation consistent

with this Court’s order.

ultimately granted the State Bar’s Motion for Default and ruled against
Adams’s Motion for Relief from Default. Nevertheless, the Special Master
offered Adams an in-person meeting as he requested to allow him to provide
input on the appropriate level of discipline, see Bar Rule 4-213.
      2 The maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, and 9.3 is

a public reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.15
(I) and (II) (a) and (b) is disbarment.
                                      2
      The Special Master held a second evidentiary hearing with

Adams and filed this amended report and recommendation in which

the Special Master now asks the Court to disbar Adams and order

that he make restitution based on his violations of the Rules. Adams

has filed exceptions to the revised report and requests review by the

Review Board,3 and the State Bar has filed a response. Having

reviewed the record, we agree with the Special Master that Adams

has violated Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 1.16, and

9.3. However, we disagree that disbarment is warranted under these

particular facts and instead impose a one-year suspension, which is

more consistent with our disciplinary precedent.

      1. The Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

      3 While Adams requests review by the Review Board, we already
addressed the appropriate filing procedure to follow by directing in our remand
order that the Special Master filed his revised report directly with this Court’s
Clerk’s Office, and that Adams and the State Bar could file any such exceptions
in this Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-218. Thus, we deny Adams’s request.
Importantly, we note that in our remand order, we did not vacate the previous
report and recommendations of the Special Master and Review Board, compare
In the Matter of Farnham, 312 Ga. 65, 70-71 (860 SE2d 547) (2018), which,
consequently, might have permitted Adams to file exceptions before the Review
Board before the disciplinary matter was again brought before this Court. See
Bar Rule 4-214 (c) and (d).
                                       3
        a) Findings of Fact

     By virtue of Adams’s default, and thus his admission of the

statement of facts in the formal complaint, and after two evidentiary

hearings, the Special Master made the following findings. Since

November 2013, Adams has agreed to represent a client in several

matters. On November 15, 2013, Adams and the client signed a

written contingency fee contract for him to represent her in a claim

for “improper items on credit reports.” He also represented the client

in a personal injury matter, and while he did not have a written

contingency fee agreement to handle that matter, the settlement

statement, signed August 19, 2016, showed that Adams took a one-

third contingency fee from the proceeds of that matter, plus

expenses. In both matters, Adams successfully represented the

client, and she was satisfied with the results. Beginning in 2015,

Adams also agreed to represent her in a second credit report matter

against credit reporting agency Trans Union LLC. Adams did not

have a written contingency fee agreement with the client to handle

the Trans Union matter or any other written communication with

                                  4
her as to how he would be paid. The client believed that Adams was

handling the Trans Union matter on a contingency fee basis, and

Adams did not require her to pay him a retainer or provide her with

any bills for time expended or expenses incurred in the Trans Union

matter.

     After the federal district court denied Trans Union’s motion to

dismiss, Trans Union offered $7,000 to settle the case. Adams then

communicated to the client that he had obtained a settlement offer

that would yield her $1,500, and she informed Adams that she would

accept such a settlement if that was all that Trans Union offered.

Adams did not inform the client that the total settlement amount

was $7,000 before she agreed to the lesser amount. And when she

appeared at his office in December 2018 to sign the release to

effectuate the settlement, she learned for the first time that the total

amount was $7,000. Adams was not present at the time the client

signed the release, and she believed he was mistaken that her share

was only $1,500; however, Adams later spoke to her and informed

her that he “had done considerably more work than the settlement

                                   5
would produce in attorney[] fees than if [he] were paid on an hourly

basis.” Adams told her that she was only entitled to $1,500 and that

he was going to keep the remainder, but she did not believe that it

was fair for Adams to keep over 70% of the proceeds of the

settlement.

     The client decided that she no longer trusted Adams and asked

him to give her the files for all of her cases, but Adams did not

comply. In the meantime, Trans Union informed Adams that

because the settlement check had not been issued in 2018, the client

would have to sign “new W-9 forms” that reflected a settlement in

2019. When the client met with Adams to find out why it was taking

him so long to give her the files, he asked her to sign the new W-9

forms. She refused to do so until she had reviewed all of her

settlements with him, so she could understand how his attorney fees

and expenses had been calculated, and he replied: “Those are old

closed files, they are in storage, and I’m through with it.” As Adams

said this to the client, he put his right hand up in the air toward her

and turned and walked away. Adams has never provided the client

                                  6
with the files as requested, and she maintained her refusal to sign

the W-9 forms. In his sworn response to the Notice of Investigation

in this matter, Adams informed the State Bar that the client had not

contacted him since.

     In January 2019, the client filed her grievance with the State

Bar, Adams filed a written response to the grievance, and the client

filed a rebuttal. In May 2019, the State Bar sent a letter to Adams

requesting a copy of his trust account record/ledger for all

settlements involving the client, and regarding all transactions

involving the client, his attorney-client agreements, settlement

statements, and copies of cancelled checks disbursing the

settlements. In response, Adams sent the State Bar a ledger card

accounting for the settlement proceeds in the first credit report and

personal injury matters, but Adams sent no documents accounting

for the proceeds of the Trans Union matter. In addition, he sent the

State Bar a copy of his contingency fee agreement in the first credit

report matter, a copy of his settlement statement in the first credit

report and personal injury matters, and a copy of his cancelled

                                 7
checks disbursing proceeds in the first credit report and personal

injury matters. However, Adams failed to send the State Bar a copy

of any attorney-client agreement in the personal injury or Trans

Union matters, a copy of any settlement statement regarding the

proceeds in the Trans Union matter, or a copy of any cancelled check

in the Trans Union matter.

     In February 2020, the client received a Form 1099-Misc. tax

form from Trans Union LLC memorializing that in 2019 the client

received a settlement of $7,000 from Trans Union. When the State

Bar asked Adams to account for the fact that the client received the

1099 Form (but received no such money), he replied in a letter:

     The total amount of the settlement was $7,000.00. Trans
     Union never paid anything to [the client] through my
     office. Trans Union never paid anything to me. [The
     client] has not received any of the $7,000.00. The check
     in the amount of $7,000.00 is payable to her and to me
     jointly. She did not return to my office, and therefore, I
     could not negotiate the check. I still have the check.

     Counsel for the State Bar asked Adams to send him a copy of

the check, and while Adams responded, he did not send a copy of the

check. Counsel again asked via email for a copy of the check, and he

                                 8
responded in a letter:

     I do need to correct a misstatement in my letter to you of
     August 12, 2020. I do have the check, which is made
     payable to me and it has never been cashed. . . . The check
     is from the law firm which represented Trans Union. . . .
     If you have any questions concerning this letter, please
     contact me.

     Adams did not send a copy of the $7,000 check. However, he

did send a $1,500 check to the Bar in September 2020 to forward to

the client as payment of her portion of the settlement. As to his total

expenses in the Trans Union matter, Adams stated in his August 12,

2020 letter that his “out-of-pocket expenses were Court costs of

$101.50, and the bill for the Court reporter in the amount of

$332.35.” Adams initially claimed that he did not deposit the $7,000

check into his trust account or any other account, but after the

supplemental hearing, Adams provided bank documents that reflect

a deposit in October 2022 of the $7,000 check into his trust account

and stated that this was done at the urging of the Review Board. A

formal complaint was filed by the State Bar on September 10, 2020,

and on June 15, 2021, the Special Master granted the State Bar’s

                                  9
Motion for Default due to Adams’s failure to timely answer or obtain

an extension of time to file an answer.

       b) Rule Violations

     By virtue of his default, the Special Master concluded that

Adams violated the following Rules.

     Adams violated Rule 1.4 (a) (1), by failing to communicate

“information and explanation” regarding the $7,000 settlement in

the Trans Union matter that was “adequate” for the client to give

her informed consent to the settlement. He violated Rule 1.4 (a) (2)

by failing to “reasonably consult with” the client about how the

Trans Union matter would be resolved or inform her of the total

amount of the Trans Union settlement and Rule 1.4 (a) (3) by failing

to tell the client that her case settled for $7,000 when he asked her

to accept $1,500.

     Adams violated Rule 1.5 (a), insofar as he charged and

intended to keep an unreasonable fee now that he has deposited the

$7,000 check. He also violated Rule 1.5 (c) (1) by failing to put the

contingency fee agreement in writing in regard to the personal

                                 10
injury and the Trans Union matters, and in regard to the Trans

Union matter, failing to state the method by which the fee was to be

determined or state whether expenses were to be deducted before or

after the contingency fee was calculated. He also violated Rule 1.5

(c) (2) by failing to provide the client with a written settlement

statement.

     For well over three years, Adams violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by

failing to keep the Trans Union settlement proceedings intact in an

IOLTA account. In addition, because Adams failed to pay any

amount of the proceeds to his client (before he sent a $1,500 check

to the State Bar in September 2020), he violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c). He

further violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to account to the client for

the Trans Union settlement proceeds. Adams also violated Rule 1.15

(I) (d) by failing to keep the Trans Union settlement proceeds

separate until there could be an accounting and severance of his

interest versus the client’s. In sum, Adams was required to promptly

disburse to the client the portions of the Trans Union settlement

proceeds not in dispute, but he did not do so or take any affirmative

                                   11
steps to reconcile with the client, until 20 months later when he sent

the State Bar a check for $1,500 – after two requests from the State

Bar’s Counsel and after a formal complaint had been filed against

him.

       Adams violated Rule 1.15 (II) (a) by failing to administer the

Trans Union settlement proceeds from a trust account and Rule 1.15

(II) (b) by failing to keep and maintain trust account records on the

settlement proceeds as required.

       Adams violated Rule 1.16 (d), insofar as he failed to surrender

to the client the portion of the Trans Union settlement funds to

which she was entitled in a reasonable and timely manner and then

only after a complaint was filed against him by the client. In

addition, he violated this Rule by failing to surrender to the client

her papers and her file from the first credit report matter, the

personal injury matter, and the Trans Union matter. (f) Adams

violated Rule 9.3 by failing to account to the State Bar for the

proceeds in the Trans Union matter (until about three years later),

provide the State Bar with the attorney-client agreement in the

                                   12
personal injury or Trans Union matters, provide the State Bar with

the settlement statement in the Trans Union matter, and provide

the State Bar with any cancelled checks disbursing funds in the

Trans Union Matter or documentation that the $7,000 check had

been deposited until about three years later.

       c) The American Bar Association Standards of Imposing
          Lawyers Sanctions

     The Special Master determined that pursuant to the American

Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,

the factors to consider in imposing a sanction for lawyer misconduct

include the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the actual or

potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The Special Master

then determined that all of Adams’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and

(II) implicated ABA Standard 4.1 (failure to preserve client’s

property). As to Adams’s mental state, the Special Master found the

following. Adams acted with an intent to obtain a benefit by keeping

an unreasonably large share of the $7,000 settlement through his

                                 13
superior position of power and control by maintaining control over

the money as the client’s attorney and fiduciary. Adams refused to

pay her anything until she agreed to his terms, and then paid her a

portion of her funds only after a formal complaint was filed against

him. His actions and refusal to cooperate fully demonstrated

selfishness by attempting to advance his own interests over those of

his client. Adams was given every opportunity to work with his

client to resolve this dispute, but at every turn he doubled down on

his refusal to take any responsibility or recognize that he violated

his professional duties and responsibilities. In addition, his actions

amounted to a gross abuse of his relationship with his client and a

knowing and intentional abuse of his fiduciary position. Adams

“again and again” failed to handle the disputed funds appropriately.

See generally GRPC 1.15 (I) Comment [3A] (“In those cases where it

is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other

property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed

funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties

attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it

                                  14
would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds

or property.”).

     Regarding injury, the Special Master determined that at a

minimum, the client suffered the injury of having to wait almost two

years for Adams to deliver to her the $1,500 that he did not dispute.

Adams repeatedly refused to recognize his duties to his client as a

professional with an intent to use his superior position to deprive

his client of a fair division of fees. According to the Special Master,

Adams still refuses to admit that the proposed division of the

settlement funds and his handling of the affairs ran afoul of his

duties under the GRPC, and indeed, he continued to assert that the

client suffered no loss in this case.

     Next, the Special Master concluded that Adams’s violations of

Rule 1.4 violated his duty of diligence to the client. The Special

Master concluded that Adams deliberately omitted mention of the

amount of recovery to the client until after he told her how much she

would receive from the settlement; that, while he was not present,

he had his secretary oversee the client signing the release that for

                                   15
the first time informed the client of the total settlement amount; and

that after she disputed the amount she was to receive, he abruptly

cut off communication with her and took no further action toward

the client until he sent the State Bar the $1,500 check in September

2020 in response to the Formal Complaint. The Special Master also

found that it was not until June 2023 that Adams represented to the

Bar that he had placed the check in his trust account in October

2022 at the urging of the Review Board and was holding it until this

matter could be resolved. As to his mental state, the Special Master

concluded that Adams acted with intent when he abused his duties

to communicate with the client in violation of Rule 1.4 because he

had not been completely candid or forthcoming with his client about

the settlement negotiations, the division of fees or her property

based on the final amount of the settlement, and he admitted at the

supplemental hearing that he had not sent the client any portion of

her settlement or made any effort to do so, until after a formal

complaint was lodged against him. The Special Master opined that

a simple phone call or letter or other effort may have easily headed

                                 16
off this whole dispute; instead, the Special Master opined, Adams

“dug in his heels” and to this day maintains that he has not caused

any harm to his client, the public at large, or the profession. The

Special Master concluded that Adams knowingly engaged in conduct

that caused injury to his client due to the delay in her obtaining

some portion of the settlement and that he had done next to nothing

to remedy the injury in the interim.

     Finally, the Special Master concluded that Adams’s violations

of Rules 1.5, 1.16, and 9.3 implicated ABA Standard 7.0 (violations

of duties owed as a professional) because he engaged in misconduct

with the “intent to obtain a benefit” for himself – that is, to keep an

unreasonably large share of the $7,000 and to frustrate or avoid an

investigation by the client or the State Bar as to what happened with

the $7,000, and the client was injured by this conduct as already

described above. As to his mental state, the Special Master found

that Adams’s failure to provide the client with a settlement

statement and her files in violation of Rules 1.5 (c) and 1.16 (d) was

done intentionally. The Special Master determined that Adams still

                                  17
had not provided any documents or records that justified how he

decided to divide the ultimate settlement of $7,000.

     Moreover, the Special Master determined that Adams’s

violation of Rules 1.5 (a) and (c), 1.16 (d), and 9.3 injured the public

and the legal profession insofar as any callous disregard of those

rules undermined the efforts, and indeed the reputation, of every

Georgia lawyer who abided by the rules while Adams did not.

Accordingly, the Special Master concluded that Adams’s violations

implicated ABA Standard 7.1 (“Disbarment is generally appropriate

when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a

duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for

the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious

injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).

     Factors in Aggravation. The Special Master found that the

following aggravating factors applied here. Adams had a dishonest

or selfish motive. See ABA Standard 9.22 (b). He acted with intent

to deceive the client as to the settlement and how to divide the

money sent to him, and intentionally failed to comply with the

                                   18
disciplinary process. See, e.g., In the Matter of Davis, 311 Ga. 797

(860 SE2d 467) (2021) (disbarring lawyer who did not respond to

client’s letter requesting a refund and otherwise abandoned client,

who did not respond to the grievance the client filed with the State

Bar, and who had a dishonest and selfish motive); In the Matter of

Arrington, 308 Ga. 486, 487 (841 SE2d 663) (2020) (disbarring

lawyer who hid misconduct and “intentionally failed to comply with

the disciplinary process” and acted “willfully, dishonestly, and with

a selfish motive”). Adams also committed multiple offenses, as he

violated six Rules and multiple paragraphs within each Rule. See

ABA Standard 9.22 (d); In the Matter of Coulter, 304 Ga. 81, 85 (816

SE2d 1) (2018) (lawyer’s many rule violations in a trust accounting

case with a single client constituted multiple offenses under ABA

Standard 9.22 (d)). Adams has at times obstructed the disciplinary

proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of

the disciplinary agency, see ABA Standard 9.22 (e), and this is a

significant aggravating factor as it shows that Adams has

consistently refused to take the client’s grievance and disciplinary

                                 19
process seriously and to act with the utmost urgency given the

gravity of the proceedings. See, e.g., In the Matter of Harris, 301 Ga.

378, 379 (801 SE2d 39) (2017) (disbarring attorney and noting that

he ignored the gravity of the proceedings by his failure to respond).

While Adams did make some efforts to respond early on to the

complaint, he did not timely respond to the complaint, and he made

no effort to follow up as he should have to rectify his failure to timely

answer. To compound these offenses, Adams belatedly, and only

after prodding from the State Bar and Review Board, provided some

money to the client and finally produced banking records regarding

the $7,000 check. Finally, Adams has persistently failed to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard

9.22 (g); has substantial experience in the practice of law, see ABA

Standard 9.22 (i); and has shown indifference to making restitution,

see ABA Standard 9.22 (j), as his payment to the client was both

untimely and inadequate.

     Factors in Mitigation. The Special Master found only one factor

in mitigation, which was that Adams had no prior disciplinary

                                   20
record. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a).

        d) The Special Master’s Recommendation

     While initially recommending a six-month suspension plus

restitution, “after careful consideration of [this] Court’s remand and

instructions,” persuasive arguments of the State Bar, and Adams’s

position in this matter, the Special Master determined that the

correct recommendation was disbarment. The Special Master stated

that this conclusion came with “some reluctancy and hesitancy,” but

found that when applying the considerations and criteria as outlined

in prior case law with somewhat “similar facts” and given Adams’s

conduct, there was no other conclusion. As an additional sanction,

see ABA Standards, III (B) (2.8) (a), the Special Master determined

that the great weight of the evidence, including the two prior

matters Adams handled for the client, showed that Adams and the

client had a contingency fee agreement for 33.33% with expenses to

be reimbursed to Adams. Thus, the Special Master concluded that

restitution in the amount of $2,732.81 was due to the client; out of

the $7,000 settlement, this was the net figure due to the client after

                                 21
deduction of expenses of litigation, the $1,500 Adams already paid

to her, and Adams’s 33.33% fee.

     2. Adams’s Exceptions to the Special Master’s Report

     Adams has filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report in

this Court. In his exceptions, he requests review by the Review

Board of the Amended Report pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (d). He

also claims that the Special Master failed to address pertinent

evidence in the record and made factual findings that are not

supported by the record.

     In addition, regarding the Rule 1.5 (c) (1) violation, Adams

claims that while the Special Master found a violation because the

personal injury case contract was not in writing, the Special Master

also acknowledged that the client was satisfied with his

representation   in   that   case,     and   information   regarding

disbursements had been furnished to the State Bar. And while the

Special Master faults Adams for not having a written contingency

fee agreement in the Trans Union matter, Adams claims that he has

testified that he never would have taken this case on a contingency

                                  22
fee basis because there was no evidence of actual damage. He also

claims that the Special Master has exceeded his authority by

ordering that Adams pay the client restitution and that the “tenor”

of the amended report also raises questions of “bias.”

      Moreover, Adams contends that there were three errors of law,

including: (1) the finding that he was in default; (2) the Special

Master’s consideration of conduct that occurred after the June 12,

2020 formal complaint, which constituted a due process violation;

and (3) the Special Master’s finding that Adams had converted

funds, even though the formal complaint made no such allegation

and there was no evidence of conversion.

      Finally, Adams claims that a number of cases show that the

Special Master committed an error in his recommendation of

discipline.4 See e.g., In the Matter of Hamilton, 315 Ga. 821, 824-825,

830-831 (884 SE2d 887) (2023) (six-month suspension imposed

      4 In his report, the Special Master alluded to the cases cited by Adams

and stated that they did not support leniency as they all involved some element
of remorse, acknowledgement of wrong, complete cooperation with the
investigative process, or full restitution to the client.
                                      23
where attorney with several prior disciplines and who filed petition

for voluntary discipline failed to return an unearned fee and made

false statements in a sworn answer to the complaint); In the Matter

of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 215-216, 218-219 (857 SE2d 212) (2021)

(review panel reprimand, rather than two-year suspension

recommended by Review Board, where there were multiple

disbursements of trust account funds before fees received, but in

mitigation there was no allegation that attorney failed to adequately

or competently represent a client); In the Matter of Johnson, 302 Ga.

865, 866-867 (809 SE2d 797) (2018) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline and imposing a six-month suspension where client funds

were put into operating account and trust account funds were used

to pay personal bills).

     In sum, Adams requests a reprimand, pointing to the fact that

he has not previously been subject to any disciplinary action; the

State Bar took a considerable amount of time to file a formal

complaint; the member of the State Disciplinary Board appointed to

investigate this matter never contacted him; the formal complaint

                                 24
was not filed within 30 days of the time that the Review Board found

probable cause of violations of the Rules; and the complaint includes

numerous assertions of conduct which had not occurred before the

Review Board made its decision.

     3. The State Bar’s Response to Adams’s Exceptions

     The State Bar has responded to Adams’s exceptions and

contends that the cases he cites are all fundamentally different

either on a procedural or substantive basis or both. Moreover, the

Bar has determined that in many of the cases, the respondents had

shown some level of timely remorse, acknowledged wrongdoing,

acted unintentionally, cooperated with the disciplinary process,

presented    significant   mitigating    circumstances,     or   provided

restitution. And, here, it contends that the Special Master correctly

recommended disbarment as the appropriate discipline based on

relevant case law. See Davis, 311 Ga. at 798-799 (disbarment

warranted where attorney who failed to respond to disciplinary

authorities violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3

by intentionally making misrepresentations to and abandoning his

                                    25
client facing criminal charges); In the Matter of Redwine, 311 Ga.

287, 288 (857 SE2d193) (2021) (surrender of license, which is

tantamount to disbarment, was appropriate sanction for attorney

who violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a), 3.2, 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 by

abandoning a client’s legal matter and failing to respond to the

grievance or ensuing notice of investigation); Arrington, 308 Ga. at

487 (disbarring attorney who did not respond to disciplinary

proceedings and by default admitted to violating Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15

(I), and 1.15 (II) (a) by abandoning his client, failing to keep $972.50

in a trust account separate from his own funds, and failing to deliver

or account for them upon the client’s request); In the Matter of

Butler, 283 Ga. 250, 251 (657 SE2d 245) (2008) (disbarring attorney

who was found in default, although he still engaged in disciplinary

process, for violating Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (II) (b), 8.1, and 8.4 (a)

(4), where attorney failed to return $3,500 retainer and $50,000 that

client entrusted to attorney to hold in a trust account; aggravating

circumstances included attorney refusing to acknowledge the

wrongful nature of his conduct, having a dishonest or selfish motive,

                                   26
being indifferent to making restitution, and obstructing the

disciplinary process); In the Matter of Noriega-Allen, 308 Ga. 398,

398-399 (841 SE2d 1) (2020) (disbarring attorney, who was in

default, based on her violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I),

1.15 (II), 1.16 (d), and 3.2 in receiving retainer to represent client in

divorce matter but then abandoning client).

     In addition, the State Bar states that while Adams claims that

the Special Master showed “bias” and exceeded his authority, Adams

did not cite any evidence of this in the record other than the Special

Master’s revised recommendation of discipline to support that claim.

Moreover, the State Bar notes that Adams is attempting to relitigate

his default, despite the Court having ruled against him on that issue

in its remand order, and while he complains of due process issues,

his arguments are not supported by the record. In conclusion, the

Bar asserts that the Special Master’s amended report reflects “th[is]

Court’s unqualified interest” in “the importance of protecting the

public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to

incompetence, and the need for public confidence in the profession.”

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In the Matter of Brown, 289 Ga. 912, 914 (717 SE2d 217) (2011).

Moreover, the Bar concludes that the Special Master was correct to

consider Adams’s “fierce refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing or

further obligation to [the client] and how that fit into the larger

picture of [Adams] trying to take advantage of his client for his own

gain.” Accordingly, the State Bar requests that the Court accept the

recommendation of disbarment.

     4. Adams’s Reply to the State Bar

     Adams replies that the Special Master’s amended report

erroneously alleges matters that had not yet occurred at the time of

the notice of the finding of probable cause; that this matter simply

involves a misunderstanding on the part of the client who filed the

grievance; and that the imposition of a contingency fee in this matter

makes no sense.

     5. This Court’s Analysis and Recommendation

     While Adams again challenges the findings of fact in his

exceptions   and   seeks    to   challenge   the   Special   Master’s

determination that Adams was in default, this Court already

                                  28
rejected this argument in the remand order, stating that “we do not

agree with Adams that the Special Master erred in granting default

judgment given Adams’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Bar

Rules 4-212 (b) and 4-221 (b) and his failure to satisfy the

requirements of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) for opening default.” His due

process argument also lacks merit. Bar Rule 4-213 (a) provides that

“[w]ithin 90 days after . . . the expiration of the time for filing of the

answer [i.e., following default] . . . the Special Master shall proceed

to hear the case. . . . When the hearing is complete, the Special

Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and

a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Clerk of

the State Disciplinary Boards as hereinafter provided” (emphasis

supplied). Thus, despite Adams’s default, the Special Master was

permitted to hold an evidentiary hearing and make additional

findings of fact after the formal complaint was filed, and, indeed, did

so not once, but twice, with this Court stating in the remand order

that such a hearing was authorized pursuant to Bar Rule 4-213 (a).

     Adams does not actually challenge any of Special Master’s

                                   29
conclusions of law, except the Special Master’s finding that he

violated Rule 1.5 (c) (1). However, the Special Master’s conclusion

that Adams was representing the client on a contingency fee basis

is not clearly erroneous, given that Adams previously represented

her in a credit report matter on a contingency fee basis, he had given

her no reason to believe that the Trans Union matter would be any

different, and he never billed her for the work or gave her any sort

of breakdown of the costs associated with the Trans Union

representation. Thus, it is likewise not clearly erroneous for the

Special Master to conclude that Adams should have explained the

rate and basis for a contingency fee in writing. Moreover, we note

that Adams does not challenge any of the Special Master’s findings

regarding the aggravating factors and his mental state, beyond

calling the Special Master “bias[ed].” And the cases Adams cites in

support of a Review Board reprimand appear distinguishable, in

that the attorneys had shown some sort of remorse and exhibited

greater participation with the State Bar in resolving those matters.

     Nevertheless, we also do not find the cases cited by the Special

                                 30
Master particularly relevant for determining the appropriate level

of discipline in this matter. In our remand order, we asked the

Special Master to show that his recommendation “is within the

range of discipline that this Court has previously imposed in cases

involving similar [Rule] violations and mitigating and aggravating

factors.” (Emphasis supplied). However, the Special Master only

cited a handful of cases in his discussion of the aggravating factors,

primarily focusing on cases in which this Court has disbarred

attorneys who have failed to comply with the disciplinary process.

He also cross-referenced cases cited in the State Bar’s “supplemental

brief.”5 However, those cases too appear distinguishable, not only

based on the conduct at issue, but in that they all include situations

where the attorney failed to engage and completely disregarded the

disciplinary proceedings. The only exception is In the Matter of

Butler, but the facts in that case are much more egregious in that

the attorney took over $50,000 entrusted to him and used the funds

     5 Although the State Bar’s supplemental brief does not appear in the

record, the cases on which the State Bar relied appear to be the same cases
cited in the State Bar’s response to the exceptions in this Court.
                                    31
for his own benefit, never paid the client any amount, and failed to

actually complete work on behalf of his client. See Butler, 283 Ga. at

250-251.

     Here, Adams failed to adequately communicate with his client

about the $7,000 settlement, charged an unreasonable fee for

obtaining the settlement, and failed to keep the settlement money

in a separate IOLTA account and maintain proper records of the

account. However, unlike Butler, Adams returned some of the

settlement money to his client, and he did engage in some of the

State Bar proceedings. Accordingly, we disagree with the Special

Master and the State Bar that disbarment is warranted in this case.

Instead, we conclude that under the particular facts of this case, and

given the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a one-year

suspension from the practice of law, with reinstatement conditioned

on Adams providing restitution totaling $2,732.81, to his former

client, is a sufficient sanction for his conduct in this matter. See In

the Matter of Wright, 294 Ga. 289 (751 SE2d 817) (2013) (accepting

review panel’s report and recommendation and imposing one-year

                                  32
suspension with conditions for attorney’s violations of Rule 1.4, 1.5

(c) (2), 1.15 (I) (b) and (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) related to her settlement

of client’s case, where attorney failed to send settlement statements

and retained settlement proceeds; attorney filed exceptions and

stated that review panel erred by overlooking facts in the record, by

crediting the clients’ testimony over hers, by finding a violation of

any Bar Rule, and by finding suspension appropriate); In the Matter

of Fitch, 289 Ga. 253 (710 SE2d 563) (2011) (accepting Special

Master’s report and recommendation and imposing one-year

suspension with conditions for attorney’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I)

(a), (b), and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 1.3, and 1.4 and noting that while

attorney never acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct or

that her actions were inappropriate, “her actions were not theft, but

poor practice management, particularly the failure to enter into a

clear representation agreement and fee schedule,” and that

suspensions have been imposed for Rule 1.15 (I) and (II) violations).

At the conclusion of the one-year suspension, Adams may seek

reinstatement by demonstrating to the State Bar’s Office of General

                                    33
Counsel that he has met the condition on reinstatement. If the State

Bar agrees that the condition has been met, it will submit a notice

of compliance to this Court, and this Court will issue an order

granting or denying reinstatement. Adams is reminded of his duties

under Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     One-year suspension with condition. All the Justices concur.

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