Court Opinion

ID: 9833206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:31:24.74119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.466015
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees in their original brief filed in this case asked this court to affirm the judgment of the trial court without considering the issues raised by appellants in the several propositions of law submitted by them, on the following ground:
“Because all errors are predicated upon an alleged peremptory instruction given by the court, and such instruction and verdict of the jury are wholly omitted from the transcript filed herein.”
This request, together with the grounds on which the same was based, was fully considered before the preparation of our original opinion in this case. We did not at that time consider the ground so urged sufficient to deprive appellants of a review of the case on appeal, but we did not state in the opinion that such request was made nor state our reasons for denying the same.
Appellees make our action in denying said request the major issue in their motion for rehearing. ■
There is nowhere in the record a formal written instruction, signed' by the judge and filed by the clerk, directing the jury to return a verdict for defendants. Neither is there a .separate paper containing the verdict of the jury, signed by the foreman and filed by the clerk, found in the record. The record does, however, contain the judgment of the court, and said judgment is, in part, as follows:
“Came a jury in said cause of six good and lawful men, to wit, W. C. Harris and five others, who were duly sworn and impaneled by the court to try said cause, and after having heard the pleadings, the evidence and argument of counsel, the court on the 25th day of November, A. D. 1922, said cause having been adjourned to that date, sustained the motion of the defendants for an instructed verdict, and said jury thereafter in open court did make and return their verdict as follows, to wit:
“ ‘We, the jury, find for the defendants.
“ ‘W. C. Harris, Foreman.’
“Which said verdict was received by the court and ordered filed. It is now, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court in accordance with and upon the verdict and findings of the jury aforesaid, that the plaintiffs take nothing by their suit against the defendants, and that said defendants go hence without day and recover their costs, for the collection of which let execution issue.”
The record also contains bill of exceptions, signed by counsel for appellants, agreed to and signed by counsel for appellees, and approved and ordered filed as a part of the record in the ease by the judge. Omitting formal parts, said bill of exceptions begins as follows:
“Before the charge of the court was read or submitted to the jury, and within a reasonable time after same was submitted to counsel for examination, counsel for plaintiffs presented to the court the following objections and exceptions to the court’s charge, and objected to the court’s peremptorily instructing the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendants for each of the following reasons, to wit:”
Following the paragraph so quoted, said bill of exceptions contains eight other paragraphs, each objecting to a peremptory charge and urging reasons why the issues of fact involved in the case should be submitted to the jury. These several objections are followed by the affirmative statement: “And the court overruled said objections and exceptions.”
£7] Wg think it appears affirmatively from these recitals in said judgment and bill of exceptions that the court did not submit the issues of fact in this case to the jury, but, on the contrary, that he held that there was no issue to submit to the jury and decided-the case himself on the evidence and directed the verdict returned for the defendants by the jury.
We cannot conceive that a court would declare by solemn recital in his judgment that he sustained the defendants’ motion for an instructed verdiet when such declaration was untrue and when he had in fact submitted the issues to the jury either by special questions or by general charge. Neither can we conceive that the court would allow a bill of exceptions 'and make the same a part of the record in the ease, when such bill was based exclusively upon the giving of a peremptory charge, if such charge had not in fact been given.
Appellants insist that the recitals in the judgment in this case cannot be considered as showing the facts so recited, and cite in support of such insistence the case of Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Good (Tex. Civ. App.) 184 S. W. 805. That case involved an appeal from a judgment by default. The jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is essential to the rendition of a valid personal judgment against him. Such jurisdiction can be acquired under our practice only by service of citation in some of the ways prescribed by the statutes. Jurisdiction over the ’ property of a defendant by seizure of *521the same under attachment or other like process of the court is essential to a valid judgment subjecting that identical property to the satisfaction of a purely personal demand against the defendant. So in cases of judgments by default, the jurisdiction of the court over the person must be shown affirmatively by the process issued and by the return, showing not only the fact of service, but the manner thereof, and the jurisdiction of the court over property based on a seizure of such property by its process must be shown affirmatively by the proceedings which authorized the issuance of such process, as well as such process itself and the return thereon. Recitals in the judgment of such service of seizure are not sufficient to sustain a judgment by default when it is submitted for review by appeal or writ of error, but the jurisdictional facts must affirmatively appear in the record. Revised Statutes, art. 2109 23 Cyc. 767; Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Good, supra; Pipkin v. Kaufman & Runge, 62 Tex. 545; Burditt v. Howth, 45 Tex. 466, 471; Insurance Co. v. Friedman Bros., 74 Tex. 56, 11 S. W. 1046; Carlton v. Miller, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 619, 21 S. W. 697. Such recitals, however, are not improper nor entirely without force and effect, but are sufficient to support the validity of such judgment in cases of collateral attack thereon, and in such cases import absolute verity. Burditt v. Howth, supra; Treadway v. Eastburn, 57 Tex. 209; Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336, 344; Wheeler v. Ahrenbeak, 54 Tex. 535, 536.
The recitals in the judgment in this case are not about jurisdictional matters. They are about proceedings in course of the trial upon which the court based its judgment. They are solemn declarations of the court concerning the verdict rendered by the jury and the reasons why said verdict was so rendered. We quote, concerning the effect to be give to recitals of this character when contained in judgments, from 23 Cyc. p. 1292, as follows:
“The recitals of a judgment are conclusive evidence in regard to the form of action, the time of bringing the suit, the various proceedings taken in it and the disposition finally made of it.”
A similar issue was before our Supreme Court in the ease of Railway v. Dickey, 108 Tex. 126, 137,187 S. W. 184. The issue there under consideration was whether that court could consider objections by a party to a suit to the charge of the court as required by Revised Statutes, art. 1971, in the absence of a bill of exceptions. The state of the record in that case and the holding of the Supreme Court are sufficiently disclosed by the following excerpt from the opinion in that case, the italics being ours:
“We think a filed paper in the cause setting forth the objections, with some .due authentication of the fact that they were presented to the court, and before the reading of the charge to the jury, .substantially complies with the requirement of amended article 1971. In this case the record distinctly shows what the objections to the general charge were as presented by the attorneys for the defendant, as recited and set forth in a filed paper in the cause; and, as above shown, there is in the record the order or judgment of the court, taken from -the minutes of the court and, there-fqre, necessarily approved by the judge, plainly reciting that the objections to tire charge were presented to the court before the reading of the charge to the jury, were duly considered, and were overruled. We do not think there could be a more reliable authentication of record presented that the objection urged on tibe appeal to the erroneous paragraph of the general charge above noted was in fact made as required by amended article 1971; and the assignment of error in relation tlbereto was accordingly entitled to be considered.”
We also cite, in this connection, Graves v. Cameron et al., 77 Tex. 273, 275, 14 S. W. 59, and Haynie v. McAnally (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 431, 433, 434, 436.
Article 1971 of the Revised Statutes requires the charge of the court to be in writing, and requires it to be submitted to the parties for objection before it is read to the jury, and provides that all objections not then made and presented to the court shall be considered waived. Article 1972 provides that the charge shall be filed by the clerk and constitute a part of the record in the case. It is true that article 2109 of the Revised Statutes in general terms provides that, except in special cases, the transcript shall contain a full and correct copy of the proceedings had in the case; but article 2113, which enumerates the particular proceedings required to be contained in every transcript, does not include the charge of the court, whether peremptory or general, in such enumeration. There is no statute which declares that a party shall be denied a hearing on appeal because some particular proceeding not enumerated in article 2113 has been, perhaps by inadvertence, omitted from the transcript, notwithstanding that the fact- that such proceedings was had may be conclusively shown by the record considered as a whole. It has been several times held by our Supreme Court that a peremptory instruction to the jury to find a particular verdict is not a charge within the meaning of article 1971. Walker v. Haley, 110 Tex. 50, 214 S. W. 295; Shumaker v. Byrd, 110 Tex. 146, 216 S. W. 862; Harlan v. Flooring Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 348.
We quote from Walker v. Haley, supra, as follows:
“When a court determines upon a peremptory instruction, the ruling decides the cause. It is a determinative decision upon the effect of the evidence. * * *
“The ‘charge of the court’ with which the act deals, is a charge applying the law to the *522facts of the case for the jury’s guidance, a charge for that end, and which for supposed errors, may be open to correction. It has no reference to a direction of the verdict, which ■leaves the jury with no province, and subject, therefore, to no influence from a charge; which is not a ‘charge’ at all in any true sense, but only the means of giving effect to the sustaining of a demurrer to the evidence; and which, if erroneous at ail, is so, not because of any defect in the direction, but because of the court’s mistaken view as to the effect of the proof.”
We have not been cited to any statute prescribing just how a “determinative decision by the court upon the effect of the evidence” shall be made to appear of record, nor how the exception thereto of a party deeming himself aggrieved thereby shall be preserved. Neither have we been cited to any rule of court dealing specifically with those subjects. The proper procedure in such cases must be deduced from general provisions. We think the principles announced by the Supreme Court in the case of Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502, 509, 240 S. W. 896, are applicable in a proper solution of the issue under consideration. In that case the appellate court was called upon to review the action of the trial court in overruling a plea of privilege. There was no bill of exceptions in the record. The action of the trial court in overruling such plea was shown by an order entered on the minutes of the court, which order it appears contained a recital that defendant excepted thereto. The evidence adduced on the hearing of such plea was preserved in the statement of facts. This hearing was had nearly two years before the final trial of the case. It was contended that the action of the trial court could not be reviewed for lack of a bill of exceptions. Such contention was disposed of as follows:
“If the evidence submitted on a plea of privilege be brought before the appellate court in either a bill of exceptions or a statement of facts, we are sure it should be considered. The bill of exceptions is an appropriate means of disclosing proceedings preliminary to the trial of a cause on its merits. But the determination of an issue presented by a plea of privilege may well be regarded as a part of the ‘trial’ referred to in our statute directing the preparation of a statement of the facts given in evidence on the trial. Mi Palmo v. Slayden & Co., 100 Texas, 15, 92 S. W. 796; Gulf, C. & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Texas, 360, 4 A. L. R. 613, 207 S. W. 897. So far as concerns the court’s order on the plea of privilege and a party’s exception thereto, a bill of exceptions would be entirely useless, the proper entry on the minutes definitely disclosing such order and exception. For that reason, no bill would be required Where the question of venue was’determined on special exception only. Thomson v. Locke, 66 Tex. 386, 1 S. W. 112. Disregarding mere form, it is quite indisputable that . defendant in error did not acquiesce in the court’s action in overruling his plea. Instead of acquiescing, he was excepting, and he was preparing and preserving everything requisite to avail himself of his exception in the reviewing court.
“It can hardly be said that defendant in error failed to take a bill of exceptions. He preserved in the record all that transpired in the court below when his plea of privilege was heard and sustained, and when it was heard and overruled, in the order on the minutes and in what is termed a statement of facts, both authenticated by the trial judge. Not only does the statement of facts show all the evidence introduced in support of, and against, the plea, and the court’s action thereon, but it also shows, by express reference to the order overruling the plea, the exception to the court’s ruling as reserved in open court. Therefore, we have in the record all that would be required in a proper bill of exceptions, if we ignore mere form. We should ignore mere form not only in obedience to the dictate of reason but in obedience to the mandate of article 2059 of the Revised Statutes.”
There is an analogy between the issue decided by the Supreme Court in that case ánd the issue here under consideration. If the court’s instruction to the jury was in writing, as indicated by the bill of exceptions, and was afterwards filed by the clerk and thus made a part of the record in the case, it should have been copied in the transcript, and its omission therefrom is an irregularity. We think, however, that the record in this case shows conclusively that the court decided the effect of the evidence and directed the jury to return the verdict which was returned and upon which the judgment itself declares it is based. The only thing lacking is the particular language used by the court in telling the jury to return such verdict. The particular language so used is of no importance. The verdict expressed the decision of the court and not the decision of the jury. To hold that appellant shall be denied a hearing on appeal for such irregularity would be to subordinate substance to mere form, which, it is held by the court in Ooalson v. Holmes, supra, should not be done.
 In cases tried by a jury the judgment must be supported by a verdict and must conform thereto, and such judgment, unless so supported, will be reversed on appeal. Ablowicn v. National Bank, 95 Tex. 429, 67 S. W. 79, 881; Battles v. Barnett (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S. W. 817. While it is not necessary to copy the verdict of the jury in the judgment, such course is permissible. The fact that a verdict is so copied in the judgment is evidence that it was recognized and approved by the court. McKinnon v. Reliance Lumber Co., 63 Tex. 30, 31, 32.
Appellees’ motion for a rehearing is overruled.