Court Opinion

ID: 9928084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 19:14:14.268822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:10.435669
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                          Washington State
                                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Division Two

                                                                                          January 30, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                 No. 57707-1-II

                                Respondent,

         v.

 ELIAS FREDY CAMACHO NÚÑEZ,                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                Appellant.

       GLASGOW, C.J.— A jury convicted Elias Fredy Camacho Núñez of two counts of first

degree rape of a child and one count of first degree child molestation. At sentencing, the trial court

found Camacho Núñez indigent but imposed some legal financial obligations and other expenses.

       Camacho Núñez appeals. He argues that the crime victim penalty assessment and DNA

collection fee should be stricken from his judgment and sentence. He also contends that the trial

court erred by not expressly “waiving” community custody supervision fees on the judgment and

sentence. Finally, Camacho Núñez asserts that the trial court erred by imposing a community

custody provision requiring him to pay for future polygraph testing used to monitor compliance

with community custody conditions and treatment.

       We remand for the trial court to strike the crime victim penalty assessment and DNA

collection fee and to check the box expressly “waiving” community custody supervision fees. On

remand, the trial court must reevaluate the provision requiring Camacho Núñez to pay for future

polygraph testing in light of this opinion.
No. 57707-1-II

                                             FACTS

       After a friend’s daughter reported that Camacho Núñez touched her inappropriately, the

State charged Camacho Núñez with two counts of first degree rape of a child and one count of first

degree child molestation. In 2022, a jury convicted him of all charges.

       The trial court imposed a mid-range sentence of 189 months. And the trial court found

Camacho Núñez indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3) based on his “financial status.” Verbatim

Rep. of Proc. at 718.1 The judgment and sentence included two lines with check boxes next to

them, one reading, “The defendant shall pay supervision fees as determined by the [Department of

Corrections],” and the other reading, “The defendant is indigent and the payment of supervision

fees is waived.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 64. The trial court did not check either box.

       The trial court imposed the then-mandatory crime victim penalty assessment and DNA

collection fee and waived other fees that were not mandatory, but the trial court did not explicitly

say that it intended to impose only nonmandatory legal financial obligations. And as part of his

community custody conditions, Camacho Núñez stipulated to, and the trial court imposed, a

condition about polygraph examinations. The provision read, “You shall, at your own expense,

submit to polygraph examinations at the request of [the Department] and/or your sexual deviancy

treatment provider. Such exams will be used to ensure compliance with the conditions of

community custody and of your treatment program(s).” CP at 74. On a separate list of crime-

related community custody conditions, a requirement that Camacho Núñez undergo polygraph

1
  The judgment and sentence allowed the trial court to indicate via checking a box whether the
defendant received public assistance, was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility, or
received an annual income below 125 percent of the federal poverty level. The trial court checked
the box indicating that Camacho Núñez was indigent but did not check any other boxes indicating
how it had reached that conclusion. The State does not contest his indigence.

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No. 57707-1-II

examinations as required by his community corrections officer did not include the clause requiring

Camacho Núñez to pay for the cost of the exams.

        Camacho Núñez appeals the imposition of legal financial obligations and the requirement

that he pay the cost of polygraph examinations.

                                               ANALYSIS

                                 I. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

        Camacho Núñez argues that we should remand for the trial court to strike the crime victim

penalty assessment and DNA collection fee from his judgment and sentence. Trial courts may no

longer impose the crime victim penalty assessment on indigent defendants or the DNA collection

fee on any defendant. Former RCW 7.68.035 (2018), amended by LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §§ 1(4),

4. A new statute applies to all cases that were pending on direct appeal when the statute took effect.

State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 225, 246, 429 P.3d 467 (2018). The trial court found Camacho Núñez

to be indigent and the State does not contest that finding. Therefore, we remand for the trial court

to strike those legal financial obligations.

                 II. SUPERVISION FEES AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION EXPENSES

        Camacho Núñez next argues that the trial court improperly failed to “waive” community

custody supervision fees on the judgment and sentence form and erred by imposing the community

custody condition requiring him to submit to polygraph examination at his own expense. In part,

he contends that the polygraph expenses constitute community custody supervision fees, which

can no longer be imposed on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 8(2)(d). Thus, Camacho

Núñez reasons that we should remand for the trial court to strike the polygraph fee provision and

“amend the judgment and sentence to specify that no community custody supervision fees are

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No. 57707-1-II

authorized.” Br. of Appellant at 6. The State’s brief is neither clear nor precise, but it appears to

respond that this issue is not ripe until the trial court affirmatively imposes fees related to

community custody.2

         We remand for the trail court to expressly “waive” the community custody supervision fees

and to reevaluate the imposition of future polygraph expenses.

A.       Supervision Fees

         To begin, trial courts may no longer impose community custody supervision fees on

indigent defendants, and the new statute took effect before Camacho Núñez was convicted. LAWS

OF 2022, ch. 29, § 8(2)(d). See RCW 9.94A.703; Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 246. On remand the trial

court should expressly “waive” community custody supervision fees as provided on the judgment

and sentence form.

B.       Polygraph Expense Provision

         We next turn to the provision requiring Camacho Núñez to pay for any future polygraph

examinations required to monitor compliance with conditions or treatment.

         We note that Camacho Núñez apparently stipulated to the provision. “Nevertheless,

appellate courts ‘regularly exercise their discretion to reach the merits of unpreserved [legal

financial obligation] arguments’” because the fines “can create a significant hardship for indigent

defendants and severely hinder their reintegration into society.” State v. Ortega, 21 Wn. App. 2d

488, 498, 506 P.3d 1287 (2022) (quoting State v. Glover, 4 Wn. App. 2d 690, 693, 423 P.3d 290

(2018)). Therefore, we exercise our discretion under RAP 2.5(a) to reach this issue.

2
    The word “polygraph” appears nowhere in the State’s response brief.

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No. 57707-1-II

          Next, although the State’s arguments are not clear, the State apparently contends that this

question is not ripe until such fees are affirmatively imposed. But the Washington Supreme Court

has held that a challenge to a trial court’s imposition of a discretionary legal financial obligation

satisfies the prerequisites for ripeness. State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 832 n.1, 344 P.3d 680

(2015).

          Two different community custody conditions require Camacho Núñez to undergo

polygraph examinations, but the conditions are inconsistent about whether they require Camacho

Núñez to bear the cost of those examinations. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the trial court

intended to impose the expense of future polygraph testing on Camacho Núñez at all. In addition,

one provision states that it would require Camacho Núñez to pay the expenses of polygraphs

ordered both by his community corrections officer and his treatment provider. But if a future

polygraph is ordered by a community corrections officer, the fee for the polygraph would be a

community custody supervision fee that is now prohibited because Camacho Núñez is indigent.

LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 8(2)(d); see RCW 9.94A.703.

          Thus, on remand, the trial court must also reevaluate the imposition of the polygraph

expenses.

                                           CONCLUSION

          We remand for the trial court to expressly “waive” community custody supervision fees

and to strike the crime victim penalty assessment and DNA collection fee. On remand, the trial

court must also reevaluate the condition imposing expenses for future polygraph testing.

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No. 57707-1-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                  Glasgow, C.J.
 We concur:

 Lee, J.

 Price, J.

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