Court Opinion

ID: 9556029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 21:03:43.049862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:13.481737
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 P. v. Cabrera CA2/8
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B314954

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA115599)
                   v.

JOSE LUIS CABRERA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of James Koester and James Koester for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael C. Keller,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       In June 2022, we affirmed the denial of defendant and
appellant Jose Luis Cabrera’s motion to vacate a 1995 conviction
pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).
Defendant sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court.
On January 26, 2023, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza) and
transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our decision
and reconsider the matter in light of Espinoza. The parties
submitted supplemental briefing.
       Having vacated our prior decision and reconsidered the
issues presented in light of Espinoza, we again affirm the denial
of defendant’s motion.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       We grant defendant’s request for judicial notice of portions
of the file pertaining to his 1995 conviction.
       In 1995, defendant was charged with one count of
committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 in
violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). According to
the probation report, defendant’s nine-year-old stepdaughter told
her mother defendant had touched her inappropriately on
numerous occasions, the first time when she was just seven. Her
mother, who had two younger sons with defendant, called the
police.
       At a hearing on July 12, 1995, defendant was represented
by deputy public defender Bruce Schweiger and assisted by a
Spanish language interpreter. The prosecutor advised the court
the parties had reached a negotiated disposition in the case in
which defendant would plead guilty to the lewd conduct charge,
serve one year in county jail, five years of formal probation,

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register as a sex offender, receive counseling upon release and
observe a stay away order in favor of the victim during the period
of probation.
       Before accepting defendant’s plea, the court advised
defendant of the legal consequences attendant to entering a plea
of guilty to a serious felony, including the following: “If you are
not a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea can result in
your deportation, denial of citizenship, naturalization, amnesty,
or reentry into this country.” When the court asked defendant if
he understood everything so far, he answered yes. Having heard
the court’s advisement regarding the immigration consequences,
defendant did not ask any questions or seek clarification from the
court or his counsel. The fact defendant was advised by the court
of the immigration consequences of his plea was also confirmed in
the minute order for that date.
       The court continued with the plea colloquy, advising
defendant of the specific trial rights he was giving up by pleading
guilty and accepting defendant’s oral waivers of each right on the
record. The court then asked defense counsel, “Mr. Schweiger,
have you discussed with your client his constitutional rights, the
nature of the charge, and the consequences of the plea as well as
any legal or factual defenses, and do you further believe he
understands all of those matters?” Mr. Schweiger said yes.
       The court asked defendant whether he understood
everything his attorney and the court had explained to him, and
defendant again answered yes. When the court asked defendant
if he had any questions, defendant and his counsel conferred off
the record. After conferring with counsel, defendant asked the
court if it could make a recommendation to the sheriff’s

                                 3
department that he be placed on a work assignment in county
jail. He had no further requests or questions.
       The court found defendant’s waivers to have been made
voluntarily and knowingly, found a factual basis for the plea and
accepted defendant’s plea of guilty. Counsel concurred in the
plea and stipulated to the factual basis for the plea.
       In September 2001, defendant, who had completed his
sentence and was out of custody, moved pursuant to Penal Code
section 1203.4 for his conviction to be vacated and the charges
dismissed. The court granted the motion. The expungement
pursuant to section 1203.4 has no effect on federal immigration
consequences. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th
555, 560.)
       In 2016, Assembly Bill 813 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) was
passed, enacting Penal Code section 1473.7 which provides a
procedural mechanism for individuals who are no longer in
custody to move to vacate their prior convictions on certain
enumerated grounds. (Stats. 2016, ch. 739, § 1.) The statute
became effective January 1, 2017.
       In September 2020, defendant filed his motion to vacate
pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). In a
supporting declaration, defendant said he was not advised about
the immigration consequences of his plea. He said if he had
known he would be subject to mandatory deportation, he would
have asked his attorney to attempt to negotiate an immigration-
neutral disposition. Defendant said his lawyer told him he could
seek expungement after serving any punishment, and therefore
he did not believe the conviction would “carry any long-lasting
consequences.” He said he came to the United States from
Guatemala at the age of 24, no longer had any ties with

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Guatemala, lived in the United States with his wife (whom he
married in 2013) and five children and was their sole source of
support. Defendant said he was currently facing removal
proceedings as a result of the conviction and did not want to
abandon his family. Other than attaching copies of his marriage
certificate and his children’s birth certificates, defendant did not
present any other evidence in support of his motion.
       The People filed opposition arguing that defendant was
advised of the immigration consequences of his plea and had not
satisfied the burden of proof to prevail on the statutory motion.
The opposition included a copy of the reporter’s transcript for the
1995 plea hearing at which the court advised defendant of the
immigration consequences of his plea.
       On July 19, 2021, the court held an evidentiary hearing on
defendant’s motion. Defendant testified, as did his public
defender on the 1995 case, Mr. Schweiger. We provide a more
detailed discussion of their testimony below.
       After entertaining argument, the court took the matter
under submission and later issued a written order denying
defendant’s motion. The court found defendant had failed to
meet his burden on the motion and specifically stated it did not
find defendant’s “testimony regarding his lack of understanding
of the court’s advisements to be credible.”
       This appeal followed.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Penal Code Section 1473.7
       Defendant moved to vacate his conviction based solely on
subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 1473.7. Subdivision (a)(1)
allows a defendant, who is no longer in custody, to move to vacate
a conviction or sentence where “[t]he conviction or sentence is

                                 5
legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving
party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence. A finding of legal
invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
       Penal Code section 1473.7 specifies the court “shall grant” a
motion to vacate if the moving party establishes “by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any of the
grounds for relief specified in subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (e)(1).)
A defendant moving for relief under subdivision (a)(1) “shall also
establish that the conviction or sentence being challenged is
currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the
denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status,
or naturalization.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).)
       Further, the statute provides “[t]here is a presumption of
legal invalidity for the purposes of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) if the moving party pleaded guilty or nolo
contendere pursuant to a statute that provided that, upon
completion of specific requirements, the arrest and conviction
shall be deemed never to have occurred, where the moving party
complied with these requirements, and where the disposition
under the statute has been, or potentially could be, used as a
basis for adverse immigration consequences.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(2).)
2.     The Presumption of Invalidity Does Not Apply
       Defendant contends subdivision (e)(2) of Penal Code
section 1473.7 should be read broadly to include all plea
convictions eligible for relief pursuant to section 1203.4. Since he
obtained expungement of his conviction pursuant to

                                  6
section 1203.4 after he completed his probationary term, he says
the presumption of invalidity should therefore apply here.
Defendant admits there is no case authority interpreting the
presumption in this manner.
       We are not persuaded by defendant’s novel statutory
interpretation argument. The language of Penal Code
section 1473.7, subdivision (e)(2) is unambiguous. The
presumption of invalidity pertains only to convictions for
violating a statute that expressly contains language providing for
expungement of the conviction after the completion of certain
conditions. Defendant pled guilty to a violation of section 288,
subdivision (a). There is no language in section 288 that states or
suggests that a defendant may apply to expunge the conviction
upon the successful completion of the sentence imposed.
       We adhere to the well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that where statutory language is not ambiguous,
the plain meaning of the language governs. (People v. Walker
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581.)
2.     Defendant Did Not Satisfy His Burden of Proof as
       Moving Party
       a.    Standard of review
       We independently review trial court rulings on motions
brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319–320; People v. Vivar (2021) 11
Cal.5th 510, 527–528 (Vivar).) While engaging in independent
review, an appellate court nonetheless should give particular
deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal
observations of witnesses but need not do so for trial court
findings arising only from a cold record. (Espinoza, at p. 320;
Vivar, at pp. 527–528, 534.)

                                 7
       b.    The evidentiary hearing
       Defendant was represented by counsel at the hearing on
his motion and testified under oath with the assistance of a
Spanish language interpreter. Defense counsel did not ask
questions of defendant on direct. The parties agreed that
defendant would submit on the declaration attached to his
motion and that the prosecutor could proceed with cross-
examination.
       Defendant was born in Guatemala. There was no
testimony about how or when he arrived in the United States,
but the declaration supporting his motion said he was 24 years
old at the time. Defendant said after he arrived in the United
States as an undocumented person, he was assisted by a
nonlawyer in obtaining a work permit and he renewed it
annually. He did not have permanent residency status.
       Defendant admitted he pled guilty to a violation of Penal
Code section 288 in 1995 and that the lewd conduct involved his
minor stepdaughter. He also acknowledged a copy of his signed,
written statement he gave to police in which he admitted to
inappropriately touching his stepdaughter between three and
five times. She was nine years old at the time. However,
defendant claimed to not recall talking to the police about it and
that he did not recall doing what he had admitted back then.
Defendant said he did recall talking to a psychologist “inside jail”
and admitting to the psychologist that he touched his
stepdaughter inappropriately.
       Defendant denied being told about the adverse immigration
consequences of his plea. “I was not told that if I pled guilty I
would have immigration problems. I was not told any of that.”
He said the court may have told him, but he was “very nervous”

                                 8
and just wanted to get out of the courtroom and get the whole
thing over with, and so he just answered yes to everything. He
said he was never told pleading to the lewd conduct charge would
result in mandatory deportation or make him ineligible to return
to the United States or seek permanent residency at a later date.
         Defendant also denied that his attorney, Mr. Schweiger,
told him about any adverse immigration consequences. He said
Mr. Schweiger only explained that he faced a lot of years in
prison if he went to trial, and that the plea offer would allow him
a short time in jail with five years of probation and the
opportunity afterward to “have my record clean.” He said he was
happy about the offer because he “wanted to get out of that
jail. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I didn’t want to be there. I wanted to be
with my family, my children.”
         The prosecutor asked what defendant understood
Mr. Schweiger to mean by saying he could have a “clean record.”
Defendant said he knew the conviction “was a problem. And
that’s why I asked him afterwards [sic] I would be able to clean
my record. The thing is, I don’t—I don’t know the law.” When he
was asked to clarify, defendant repeated he knew it was “[a]
problem, yes. But not with immigration. I didn’t know that.”
Defendant was asked again how the conviction was a problem.
He answered only that, “[i]n the United States to violate, to do
something which is not correct.” Defendant was not asked to
provide further clarification.
         Shortly thereafter, defendant was asked whether, if he had
been told his plea would result in deportation, he would have
talked with his lawyer about it. Defendant said, “[i]f I had been
paying attention, possibly. Yes.” The prosecutor asked him if it
was his testimony that he was not paying attention to what the

                                    9
court was saying to him during the plea hearing. Defendant
responded by saying he did not understand anything that was
going on. “I was not in my right mind . . . . I was very nervous. I
was crying. [¶] I wanted to get out of there.” Defendant said he
was told he would lose at trial and faced as much as 20 years in
prison if he did not plead guilty, so he pled guilty because he
wanted to get out of there.
       Mr. Schweiger, defendant’s public defender in 1995,
testified that in 1995 he had over 10 years of experience, having
joined the public defender’s office in 1984. Mr. Schweiger said
the office had an in-house immigration specialist who trained
him and the other lawyers on immigration issues and kept them
current on immigration law. He did not have a specific
recollection of defendant or his case given the lapse of time but he
said his custom and practice was to discuss citizenship with every
client and to explain possible immigration consequences to the
charges they faced.
       Mr. Schweiger testified that “in a case such as this”
involving a sexual offense, he would “go a step further” and
explain to the client “they have to expect to be deported.” He said
he would discuss the possibility of expunging the record, the
possibility of additional charges being added, the potential
sentences and trial risks, and he reiterated he would tell
noncitizen clients “they had to expect to be deported.”
       c.    Analysis
       Espinoza tells us that, in moving to vacate a conviction, a
defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence
that “he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea [and that] misunderstanding constituted
prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319, italics

                                10
added; see also Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1) [movant must
demonstrate “prejudicial error damaging [his] ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence”].)
       Defendant contends the court’s advisement about
immigration consequences was inadequate because it only told
him he may be deported, not that it was mandatory due to the
nature of the charge to which he was pleading. He argues the
error was compounded by Mr. Schweiger’s failure to properly
advise him about the immigration consequences at all and, more
particularly, his failure to explain that any later expungement
would not be effective to prevent his deportation. The trial court
did not find defendant’s testimony on this point credible. The
trial court was in the best position to assess defendant’s
credibility and its finding is entitled to deference. (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–
528.)
       Moreover, even assuming error in the advisements that
resulted in defendant misunderstanding the full scope of
immigration consequences, it is not enough to warrant relief.
Defendant was required to demonstrate prejudicial error.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 528.)
       On establishing prejudicial error, Espinoza said, “To
determine whether there is a reasonable probability a defendant
would have rejected a plea offer if he had understood its
immigration consequences, courts must ‘consider the totality of
the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘Factors particularly relevant to
this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the

                                11
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible.’ [Citations.] Also relevant
are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable
outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference
between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were
convicted at trial. [Citation.] These factors are not exhaustive,
and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320–321.)
        Espinoza also instructs that “[a] defendant must provide
‘ “ ‘ “objective evidence” ’ ” ’ to corroborate factual assertions.
[Citation.] Objective evidence includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence
of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 321.)
        Defendant presented evidence he came to the United States
in 1988 as a 24-year-old adult and worked here under a work
visa. Defendant has lived in the United States since that time
and defendant said he maintained no “significant connections” to
Guatemala. He also stated he is the financial provider for his
wife and five children but did not provide any information about
his work history other than that he had been working fulltime at
the time of his plea in 1995.
        Other than these ties to the United States, defendant did
not offer other evidence supporting a finding it was reasonably
probable he would have rejected the prosecution’s plea offer had
he fully understood the adverse immigration consequences he

                                12
was facing or that he had any reason to believe there was a more
favorable, immigration-neutral disposition to be negotiated.
       Espinoza made clear that in establishing prejudice, the
probability of a more favorable outcome was an important factor
and that the “inquiry is informed by whether the defendant
would have had reason ‘to expect or hope’ that a plea deal
without immigration consequences ‘would or could have been
negotiated.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.) “Factors
relevant to this inquiry include the defendant's criminal record,
the strength of the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the
charges or whether the crimes involved sophistication, the
district attorney’s charging policies with respect to immigration
consequences, and the existence of comparable offenses without
immigration consequences.” (Id. at p. 323.)
       Defendant signed a statement admitting he inappropriately
touched his nine-year-old stepdaughter on three to five separate
occasions. He acknowledged that statement in his testimony at
the hearing. There is no evidence suggesting the prosecution, in
light of that evidence, was willing to offer defendant a more
favorable plea that might have been immigration neutral. His
counsel offers speculation that had he been fully apprised of the
immigration consequences, he may have urged Mr. Schweiger to
seek an alternative disposition, but counsel does not suggest the
prosecution indicated any willingness to negotiate an
immigration neutral plea. Speculation is not sufficient to satisfy
his burden. (See, e.g., People v. Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 942,
954 [a defendant’s speculation another disposition could have
been negotiated is not evidence].)
       Further, defendant did not provide any testimony or other
evidence he was willing to risk trial despite the evidence against

                               13
him. When asked at the hearing whether he would have asked
Mr. Schweiger additional questions if he had understood he faced
deportation by pleading guilty, defendant said he “possibly”
would have “[i]f [he] had been paying attention.” When asked to
clarify this statement, defendant said he did not understand
anything that was going on during the plea colloquy because he
was nervous and just wanted to get out of there.
       Defendant’s statements during the plea colloquy and
during his testimony at the motion hearing show that his
primary focus in 1995 was getting out of jail and avoiding any
time being incarcerated. The transcript of the plea hearing
shows defendant conferred off the record several times with
Mr. Schweiger, but there is nothing indicating defendant had any
questions about the immigration consequences of his plea.
Defendant only asked the court to recommend a work assignment
for him at the jail. He affirmed several times that he understood
what he was being told and did not have any questions.
Defendant did not offer any evidence contemporaneous with the
taking of his plea that would support his contention many years
later that avoiding adverse immigration consequences was a
paramount consideration in 1995. (Lee v. United States (2017)
582 U.S. 357, 369 [in resolving a motion to withdraw a plea,
judges should “look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate
a defendant’s expressed preferences”].)
       Considering the totality of circumstances, defendant failed
to demonstrate that if he had been further advised about the
immigration consequences of his plea, it was reasonably probable
he would have rejected the prosecution’s offer, or that he had
reason to hope for or expect, given the evidence against him
(including his admissions of guilt), a plea offer of an immigration

                                14
neutral disposition. The motion to vacate was properly denied.
We are not persuaded that remanding the case for further
development of the record is warranted.
                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s motion to vacate pursuant
to Penal Code section 1473.7 is affirmed.

                             GRIMES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

                       STRATTON, P. J.

                       WILEY, J.

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