Court Opinion

ID: 9581401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:33.151092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:55.249297
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the affirmance of appellant’s convictions for theft by taking (Counts 2 and 3) for two reasons.
1. In addressing appellant’s enumeration of error questioning the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, the majority opines that the evidence presented against appellant was substantially the same as that recently found by this court to have been sufficient in *523the separate trial of appellant’s co-indictee. See Gordon v. State, 181 Ga. App. 391 (352 SE2d 582) (1986), cert. granted Feb. 18, 1987. In Gordon, supra, I filed a dissenting opinion in which I presented my view that in order to convict Gordon of theft by taking, the State had chosen to attempt to prove he had committed theft by deception and had failed to do so, causing Gordon’s convictions for theft by taking to fall due to a lack of sufficient evidence to support them. I have the same difficulty in the case at bar: I fail to find evidence that the State’s property was taken from it against its will (Stull v. State, 230 Ga. 99 (1) (196 SE2d 7) (1973); that a false impression as to an existing fact or past event was created by appellant or his co-conspirators and not corrected by them (OCGA § 16-8-3 (b) (1) and (b) (2); Sassoon v. State, 138 Ga. App. 172, 176 (225 SE2d 732) (1976); Croy v. State, 133 Ga. App. 244 (1) (211 SE2d 183) (1974)); or that the State entered into a definite contract with appellant or his co-conspirators. OCGA § 16-8-3 (b) (5). In light of the lack of evidence on all of these points, I must dissent on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by taking. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Decided March 19, 1987
Rehearing denied April 3, 1987
Billy L. Spruell, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Harrison Kohler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, *524George P. Shingler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*5232. I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant waived his objection to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the elements of theft by deception. It is my belief that the failure to give a charge on theft by deception constituted “a substantial error in the charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whether objection was made hereunder or not.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c). “To constitute harmful error within the meaning of this subsection, an erroneous charge or failure to charge must result in a gross injustice, such as to raise a question as to whether the appellant has been deprived of a fair trial.” Hamrick v. Wood, 175 Ga. App. 67 (2) (332 SE2d 367) (1985). I believe the failure to give a charge on theft by deception in this case meets the criteria set forth in OCGA § 5-5-24 (c) and Hamrick v. Wood, supra. For this reason also, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.