Court Opinion

ID: 9688305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:43:06.97751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.322474
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
What the majority characterizes as a procedural bar, that is, “our procedural rule barring” inquiry into a defendant’s prior plea-based conviction, is actually a very real denial of a substantive right of constitutional stature. The majority maintains that since inquiry into constitutional validity of a defendant’s prior plea-based conviction is a procedural matter, a defendant’s inquiry into a prior conviction may be barred by procedural default, that is, failure to invoke and adhere to a procedure available to examine the constitutional validity of a prior conviction. Can there be a procedural default, namely, noncompliance with a prescribed and valid procedure, when in fact no procedure exists? Is it possible to have procedural noncompliance or default concerning a nonexistent procedure? *37Procedural default is not the same as procedural deficiency, because a defendant cannot fail to employ and comply with a procedure unless the procedure first exists. Presently, beyond limited inquiry into representation by counsel at a prior plea-based conviction, Nebraska law provides no procedure whereby a defendant may assert and establish constitutional invalidity of a prior conviction. See State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 434 N.W.2d 293 (1989) (Shanahan, J., dissenting). Consequently, failure to provide a procedure for assertion of a constitutional right is essentially and effectively an absolute and complete denial of the constitutional right and, hence, a denial of due process.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant’s guilty plea is constitutionally invalid unless the record affirmatively shows that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived the rights to trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront accusers. From Boykin, one must conclude that a conviction based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is equally invalid and, therefore, lacks constitutional effect.
Also, in State v. White, 238 Neb. 840, 848-49, 472 N.W.2d 720, 726 (1991), we stated, “As a matter of due process in the Nebraska criminal justice system, a defendant’s guilty or nolo contendere plea must satisfy the requirements expressed in State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).” In Irish, this court recognized that “to support a finding that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been entered freely, intelligently, voluntarily, and under standingly,” the court in which the defendant enters the plea must inform the defendant concerning “(1) the nature of the charge; (2) the right to assistance of counsel; (3) the right to confront witnesses against the defendant; (4) the right to a jury trial; and (5) the privilege against self-incrimination____” 223 Neb. at 820, 394 N.W.2d at 883.
Thus, in accordance with due process and pursuant to Boykin and Irish, a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere is constitutionally valid only if the defendant, prior to entry of the plea, has been informed concerning the constitutional rights to confront witnesses against the *38defendant, have a trial by jury, and exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. True, Irish goes beyond Boykin regarding additional information which a defendant must have for a constitutionally valid conviction based on the defendant’s plea; for example, Irish requires that a defendant must be informed concerning the constitutional right to assistance of counsel, whereas that information concerning counsel is not required for a valid plea under Boykin.
Nevertheless, this court indulges in a semantical smokescreen from which there emerges an illusory distinction: inquiry into the question of counsel in a prior plea-based conviction is characterized as a direct attack, while, simultaneously, inquiry into a prior plea-based conviction in light of Boykin and Irish is characterized as a “collateral attack.” That approach ignores that, under Boykin and Irish, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers, which the majority maintains cannot be the bases for an inquiry into a prior plea-based conviction, are the constitutional coequals of a defendant’s right to representation by counsel in a criminal case and, consequently, have the same stature and identity of import in constitutional law. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Boykin, specifically equated a defendant’s right to counsel with his rights to trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront accusers, requiring that the same standard must be applied concerning a waiver of each of those constitutional rights. See Boykin, supra. Moreover, both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution express a criminal defendant’s rights to counsel, to confront accusers or witnesses against the defendant, and to have a jury trial. Yet, in the majority’s view, a defendant can inquire whether the defendant was represented by counsel or waived that representation in a prior plea-based conviction, but cannot inquire whether the defendant was informed concerning the rights to confront accusers or adverse witnesses and have a jury trial, rights which are specifically expressed within the same constitutional provision for assistance of counsel. There is no constitutional hierarchy or other order of preference or priority for the rights to counsel, to confront accusers, and to have a *39jury trial. Why exploration of the counsel question is permissible, but inquiry concerning the other rights in the same constitutional provision is impermissible, remains unexplained and indefensible. Thus, the majority’s approach to the problem is a classic illustration of a “[distinction without a difference.” Because there is no rational basis for this court’s disparate treatment of a defendant’s constitutional rights as subjects for inquiry into a prior plea-based conviction, this court has used its power of definition and classification without a constitutional basis and, therefore, in an arbitrary and impermissible manner. As this court expressed regarding the Legislature, classification of “ ‘persons, places, objects or subjects . . . must rest upon some difference in situation or circumstance which, in reason, calls for distinctive legislation for the class.’ ” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 357, 370, 466 N.W.2d 461, 470 (1991) (quoting from State, ex rel. Cone, v. Bauman, 120 Neb. 77, 231 N.W. 693 (1930)). Moreover, a
legislative definition must be reasonable, and cannot be arbitrary and unfounded. . . . “[T]here is a limit to the legislature’s power to nullify and circumvent constitutional provisions by putting an arbitrary, but improper and unfounded, definition upon a certain word.” . . . “Classifications for the purpose of legislation must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference. ”
(Emphasis in original.) MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 571, 573, 575, 471 N.W.2d 734, 739-41 (1991) (quoting from Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255 N.W. 551 (1934), and State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980)). What this court has previously chided as arbitrariness and a distinction without a substantial difference in perceived infirmity of legislative action is now all too obviously and painfully present in the judicial action taken today by the majority in Crane’s case, for this court has unfortunately applied its definitional powers to achieve an arbitrary classification which lacks a rational and legitimate basis in the Constitutions of the United States and Nebraska and *40circumvents due process required by the Constitutions. “Physician, heal thyself.”
One notably peculiar feature of the majority’s opinion is the expression “challenging a prior plea-based conviction based on the lack of a Boykin-type colloquy constitutes a collateral attack,” which is soon followed by an afterthought without much thought: “One could also challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction through a separate proceeding, such as an action for declaratoryjudgment.” Let’s run through that again. A Boykin claim and, correspondingly, an Irish claim raised in an enhancement proceeding constitute a collateral attack on a prior plea-based conviction used in the enhancement proceeding, but a declaratory judgment outside the enhancement proceeding, that is, a separate proceeding to determine the constitutional validity of the prior conviction used in an enhancement proceeding, is not a collateral attack. In Moore v. Black, 220 Neb. 122, 127, 368 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1985), this court stated:
[A]n original action which does not state a valid, independent cause of action apart from the appeal of a lower tribunal’s decision constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on that decision and is not maintainable as an action for a declaratoryjudgment unless the decision was procured by fraud or the lower tribunal lacked jurisdiction, thus rendering its decision void.
See, also, Reed v. Parratt, 207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981); Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980).
A declaratory judgment action is not a substitute for a new trial or appeal; a method of destroying proper exercise of power in a former action; authority for a second trial by the same parties on identical issues in different forums; or a justification for an unnecessary decision; and does not approve collateral attacks on former adjudications or operate to supersede former adjudications or proper proceedings already pending in court. See, Moore v. Black, 220 Neb. 122, 368 N.W.2d 488 (1985); Zarybnicky v. County of Gage, 196 Neb. 210, 241 N.W.2d 834 (1976); Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 274 *41N.W. 483 (1937).
State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 878, 434 N.W.2d 293, 302 (1989) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
Thus, while the majority emphatically denounces a Boykin or Irish claim as a collateral attack in an enhancement proceeding, in the same breath the majority suggests recourse to a declaratory judgment action, which is itself an action collateral to the enhancement proceeding and, therefore, a collateral attack on the prior conviction used for enhancement. Consequently, in the majority’s view, a collateral attack is impermissible to test the constitutionality of a prior plea-based conviction, but a collateral attack in the form of a declaratory judgment action is available to contest the constitutional validity of the prior conviction. What a colossal contradiction! For that reason, a declaratory judgment action under the circumstances is feckless, a forensic phantom for rectification of a wrong.
Also, were a declaratory judgment available to test constitutionality of a prior plea-based conviction, why would it be necessary to engender such inquiry in an action entirely and procedurally separated from an enhancement proceeding? Judicial economy and efficiency, as well as an avoidance of burgeoning litigation, require an uncomplicated and direct approach in an enhancement proceeding, namely, allowing a defendant to contest the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in the proceeding wherein the prior conviction is sought to be used against the defendant. That procedure would comport with the Constitutions and common sense. Otherwise, the more twists and turns one puts in a pipeline, the more one slows the flow. Nevertheless, under the approach adopted by the majority, the situation is hopeless but, in the majority’s view, not serious.
Even if a Boykin or Irish inquiry into Crane’s prior conviction is a collateral attack, such inquiry is available in accordance with due process, for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), “ ‘Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore *42void.’ ” Although this court declares that a collateral attack on a prior plea-based conviction is procedurally barred, the longstanding rule in Nebraska is that “ ‘a void judgment is subject to collateral attack.’ ” State ex rel. Ritthaler v. Knox, 217 Neb. 766, 768, 351 N.W.2d 77, 79 (1984). Accord, Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, supra; State ex rel. Southeast Rural Fire P. Dist. v. Grossman, 188 Neb. 424, 197 N.W.2d 398 (1972). Moreover, “a void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding.” Lammers Land & Cattle Co. v. Hans, 213 Neb. 243, 249, 328 N.W.2d 759, 763-64 (1983). Accord Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988). “ ‘A void judgment is in reality no judgment at all. It does not bind the person against whom it is rendered. It may be impeached in any action, direct or collateral.’ ” Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 75, 18 N.W.2d 654, 656 (1945). “ ‘It is a general rule of law that a judgment which is null and void is subject to collateral attack.’ 31 Am. Jur. 181, sec. 583. ‘A void judgment may be impeached in a collateral proceeding.’ 34 C. J. 510.” Drainage District No. 1 v. Village of Hershey, 139 Neb. 205, 211, 296 N.W. 879, 882 (1941). See, also, Davis Management, Inc. v. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 276, 204 Neb. 316, 282 N.W.2d 576 (1979); County of Douglas v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W.2d 740 (1945). Consequently, rather than barring an inquiry into the constitutional validity of Crane’s prior conviction, the real rule recognized in Nebraska permits and demands just such inquiry into the constitutional validity of a prior plea-based conviction used for enhancement purposes.
In what is a constitutionally indefensible position, and, for that reason, what will undoubtedly and eventually become an exercise in futility, this court tries to avoid the effect of Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989):
[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case “ ‘clearly and expressly’ ” states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Caldwell [v. Mississippi, 472 U. S., at 327, quoting [Michigan v.] Long, 463 U. S., at 1041.
*43Today, this court had the opportunity to identify the Nebraska procedure in which a defendant can raise and litigate a Boykin or Irish claim, an epiphanic enunciation that, much to the disappointment and frustration of many, continues to elude expression in this court’s decisions. Rather, in its action today this court stubbornly ignores all previous federal decisions which have rejected the majority’s renewed approach to a constitutional inquiry into a plea-based conviction for enhanced penalty purposes in Nebraska. See, State v. Gonzales, 218 Neb. 43, 352 N.W.2d 571 (1984), writ of habeas corpus granted, Gonzales v. Grammer, 655 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Neb. 1987), aff’d 848 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1988); State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 434 N.W.2d 293 (1989), writ of habeas corpus granted, Oliver v. Spire, No. CV89-L-149 (D. Neb. Sept. 10, 1990). To persist on a course now thoroughly discredited by the federal courts comports with neither judicial economy nor reality.
Under the approach expressed by the majority today, Nebraska procedure lacks a method to judicially process a Boykin or Irish claim as an inquiry into the constitutional validity of a prior plea-based conviction used for enhancement of penalty and, hence, fails due process. Thus, notwithstanding today’s decision in Crane, there is still “no new twist to Oliver.. . .” State v. Johns, 233 Neb. 477, 482, 445 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1989) (Shanahan, J., dissenting; renewal of dissent in State v. Oliver, supra). As matters now stand under Nebraska procedure with its continued cryptic means to litigate a Boykin or Irish claim, if Crane files an application for habeas corpus relief through federal court, that relief will be granted before the ink from the filing stamp dries on Crane’s application.
Accordingly, the sentence imposed on Crane should be set aside, and these proceedings should be remanded for a sentence hearing at which Crane may challenge the constitutional validity of his prior plea-based conviction. In such a procedure, the State may demonstrate the constitutional validity of Crane’s prior conviction and thereby constitutionally justify an enhanced sentence.