Court Opinion

ID: 9724597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:03:55.899885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.906498
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
concurring in the result.
The petition filed in this case is in the form of a condemnation action under the power of eminent domain for the taking of an easement by the State on specifically described property adjacent to the interstate highway for the control of outdoor advertising thereon. The original petition of taking alleges that such taking is in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 39, article 13, R. S. Supp., 1959, and sections 76-704 to 76-724, inclusive, R. R. S. 1943. Chapter 39, article 13, R. S. Supp., 1963, provides in substance that the Department Of Roads' is authorized to acquire property, or an interest in property, by gift, agreement, purchase, exchange, condemnation, or otherwise, for highway purposes, including the control of outside advertising within the area adjacent to and within 660 feet of the edge of the interstate highway. The authority is to be exercised in the manner set forth in sections 76-704 to 76-724, R. R. S. 1943, the general law providing for the condemnation of private property for public use under the power of eminent domain.
The record shows that the interstate highway crosses the lands of the plaintiff, the right-of-way having been obtained from plaintiff’s predecessors in title. The present action is a separate and distinct proceeding completely disassociated from the original taking for highway purposes.
The question arises as to whether or not the claim of the plaintiff is based on the taking of an easement by condemnation under the power of eminent domain or whether or not it is a claim for damages resulting from an exercise of the police power for which the Legist lature has authorized a recovery.
*28In the instant case there is no property taken for public use nor any damage resulting from the taking of any property for such use. What we have here is a restriction on the private use of property under the police power. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 6, p. 13; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1.42(2), p. 95, and § 1.42, p. 87; 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, § 7, p. 789. It is not a taking of property under Article 1, section 21, of the Constitution of Nebraska. If it is an eminent domain proceeding, as the majority opinion indicates, the enactment of sections 39-1320 to 39-1320.03, R. S. Supp., 1963, would have been wholly unnecessary to afford a basis of recovery. It is the difference in eminent domain and police power that should be made clear and strictly followed in the instant case.
“A proper exercise of the police power by the sovereign does not require the payment of compensation. Compliance with an enactment of the legislature in the exercise of the police power for purposes of health, morals, safety or welfare without compensation does not constitute a damaging or taking of property without just compensation within the meaning of the law of eminent domain. It follows, therefore, that the constitutional provisions which limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain, so that just compensation must be provided for, have no application to and impose no- limitation upon the proper exercise of the police power.” 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1.42(3), p. 100.
In Beisner v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 445, 293 N. W. 289, this court said: “A legislative enactment under the police power of the state which is regulatory in character is not violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because it reduces or destroys the value of property acquired under a former law.
“Neither does such an act amount to the taking or damaging of private property for public use without just compensation within the meaning of constitutional provisions on the subject.”
*29The regulation of billboards and signs, is generally conceded to be an exercise of the police power. In Gibbons v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 142 Okl. 146, 285 P. 1040, the court said: “It is well settled that the regulation of the subject of signboards, as in the instant case, is an exercise of the police power and not an exercise of the power of eminent domain. (Citing cases.) * * * It is. a well-settled principle of constitutional law that all property in the jurisdiction of a state, however unqualified may be the title of the owner, is held on the implied condition or obligation that it shall not be injurious, to the equal rights, of others to- the use and benefit of their property, and is held subject to the general police power of the state to control and regulate its use in proper cases so- as to secure the general safety, the public welfare, and the peace and good order and morals of the community (6 R. C. L. 194); and, having held the regulation of the subject of signboards to be an exercise of the police power and not an exercise of the power of eminent domain, the fact that the statute does not provide compensation to the owner does not render the same unconstitutional. * * * ‘Hence, it is held that acts done in the proper exercise of the police power, which merely impair the use of property, do not constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional requirements as to the making of compensation for the taking of property for public use, and accordingly do not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from the state or its agents, or give him any right of action for the injuries sustained.’ ” See, also, City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628, 73 N. E. 1035, 70 L. R. A. 230; St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929; City of St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8, 77 S. W. 876; Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916C 488; General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N. E. 309, 72 A. L. R. 453.
Nothing was taken for a public use in this case. The *30majority opinion is written on the theory that an easement was taken. I assert that there was m easement taken. If the majority opinion be correct that the limitation of the use of billboards, on plaintiff’s property is an easement put to a public use, then such easements exist where limitations are imposed by zoning restrictions, health and safety ordinances, and other limitations imposed upon private property under the police power. Such has never been the law of this state.
The power exercised in this case is the police power and not that of eminent domain. The basis for a recovery is solely the statutory authorization contained in Chapter 39, article 13, R. S. Supp., 1963.
The statute is in derogation of the common law. The procedure provided for the statutory recovery of damages is a part of the right and must be followed. But the fact that the procedure provided was that provided in condemnation under the power of eminent domain does not change the nature of the statutory wrong sought to be remedied. The right to recover is based solely on the statute and is in no way influenced by Article 1, section 21, of the Constitution.
The power of eminent domain is. a sovereign power which the Legislature may delegate but not expand. The constitutional provision providing for • compensation for taking or damaging property taken for a public use is a limitation on the exercise of the power. Likewise the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the power is a limitation upon the power. The power of eminent domain is the power of the state to take property for public use as limited by constitutional and statutory provisions. But here there was no. taking for a public use or damaging because of such a taking; it is nothing more than a limitation of an owner’s use. Any attempt to expand the power beyond the fundamental basis of the sovereign power would be in violation of this sovereign right of necessity, and consequently void. See May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N. W. 2d 448.
*31I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion. I submit, however, that the rationale of the opinion should be that the reasonable regulation of billboards and signs is an exercise of the police power for which a statutory remedy has been provided for the payment of damages to the owner that otherwise would be noncompensable. For the reasons stated, I concur in the result.
Brower, J., and Robert L. Smith, District Judge, join in this concurrence.