Court Opinion

ID: 9903979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:13:11.076811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.263000
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

STATE OF FLORIDA,

            Appellant,

v.                                    Case No. 5D21-3006
                                      LT Case No. 2019-CF-001451

OSCAR TRINIDAD,

            Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed October 28, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Osceola County,
Mikaela Nix-Walker, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellant.

William R. Ponall, of Ponall Law,
Maitland, for Appellee.

SASSO, J.
     The State appeals the trial court’s decision to grant Oscar Trinidad’s

(“Appellee”) motion to suppress an audio recording from evidence in his

pending criminal trial. On appeal the State argues that the trial court erred

by concluding that the probative value of the suppressed evidence would be

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. For the following reasons, we

agree and reverse.

     On April 21, 2019, Appellee was arrested following allegations of

sexual abuse. Earlier that day, the alleged victim, who was between the ages

of eleven and seventeen when the offenses allegedly occurred, had used

her iPhone to record audio of a conversation between herself and Appellee,

which she recorded without notifying or obtaining Appellee’s consent. The

recording was transcribed as follows:

     [Appellee]: You know, I could go, I could go to jail for the rest of
     my life.
     [Victim]: Ok, but…
     [Appellee]: Inaudible…Are you telling her?
     [Victim]: Well, she’s my friend, she’s like the only one who
     actually helps me.
     [Appellee]: Oh, so you gonna [sic] call the cops on me now?
     [Victim]: We’re not calling the cops on you, you need to calm
     down, we’re not calling the cops on you.
     [Appellee]: Yea you told me that. You know something, it’s not
     my fault too, it’s your fault too.
     [Victim]: How is it my fault?
     [Appellee]: Because you’re always get naked and… inaudible,,,
     too!
     [Victim]: That’s not my fault! I'm not, I’m not getting naked!
     Naked, getting naked where?

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     [Appellee]: And, And… Come on [Victim].
     [Victim]: I never, no, I don’t
     [Appellee]: Don’t say it was just just me. Because… Don’t say it
     was just me!
     [Victim]: What!? No!
     [Appellee]: Yes. Don’t, don’t, don’t play innocent.
     [Victim]: Really! I’m not doing anything wrong!
     [Appellee]: Ahh Ok. No? What, you don't come to my bed too
     sometimes?
     [Victim]: No, I don’t! No, I don’t!
     [Appellee]: No? Come on [Victim]. Get up. I'll leave, I'll leave
     and then don’t say your mother, your mother is going to have a
     fit! And…
     [Victim]: Ok well, she’s gonna [sic] have a fit because she needs
     to know!
     [Appellee]: Inaudible… To know what!?
     [Victim]: Whispering Ohh my god [sic]!
     [Appellee:] What you doing now?
     [Victim]: I’m on Instagram.
     [Appellee]: I’m gonna [sic] leave. I'm gonna [sic] leave. That…
     That… Get up! Put your phone down! Got to talk to you!
     Inaudible… That’s why you gonna [sic] record your mother too…
     inaudible… you wanna [sic] get your mother in trouble too?
     [Victim]: No I'm gonna [sic] record the conversation because she
     never does anything, every single time I call her.
     [Appellee]: Put the phone.
     [Victim]: Cause every single time I tell her she never, she never
     pays attention…
      [Appellee]: Turn it off. Turn it off.

     Appellee was ultimately charged with one count of lewd or lascivious

molestation on a victim less than twelve; six counts of lewd or lascivious

molestation; one count of lewd or lascivious conduct; six counts of sexual

activity with a child; one count of showing obscene material to a minor; and

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one count of battery upon a child by throwing, projecting, or expelling certain

fluids.

      On October 6, 2021, Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress the

audio recording. Appellee argued in the motion, inter alia, that: (1) the

recording was an illegal intercepted communication under chapter 934,

Florida Statutes (2020), and therefore inadmissible; (2) the contents of the

recording were legally irrelevant; and (3) its probative value would be

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Appellee.

      On November 1, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellee’s

amended motion to suppress. The State relied on section 934.03(2)(k),

Florida Statutes, arguing that the recording was legally obtained pursuant to

an exception to Florida’s general prohibition against interception of oral

communications, and that it was legally relevant. After hearing testimony and

argument of counsel, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. In its oral

ruling, the trial court explained that the recording may be found relevant “in

some ways,” but the evidence would confuse a jury, due in part to the

inaudibility of some of its content, and that the prejudice would outweigh the

value of the evidence.

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                                   ANALYSIS

      The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that

the April 21, 2019 recording was inadmissible under section 90.403 and in

granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. In considering rulings on a motion

to suppress, “an appellate court reviews legal conclusions using a de novo

standard, but generally defers to the factual findings of a trial court.”

Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

      As an initial matter, we agree with the State that the recorded audio

constitutes relevant evidence. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 171 So. 3d 210,

213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“Partially inaudible or unintelligible audio recordings

are not per se inadmissible. Instead, [their] admissibility . . . is ‘guided by the

principle that an audio [recording] should be admitted into evidence unless

the condition of the recording degrades its usefulness to such an extent that

it makes the evidence misleading or irrelevant.’” (second alteration in

original) (citations omitted)); State v. Elkin, 595 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 3d DCA

1992) (“For a statement to constitute an admission, it need not, in and of

itself, speak directly to guilt. It may be a statement from which guilt can be

inferred when the statement is analyzed in the context of other admissible

evidence.”). As a result, the issue becomes whether the trial court abused its

                                        5
discretion in determining that the probative value of the audio recording is

substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to Appellee.

      Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2021), states that evidence that is

relevant may nonetheless be inadmissible “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.” As this Court explained in State v. Gerry, 855 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2003), “[t]he unfair prejudice that section 90.403 attempts to eliminate

relates to evidence that ‘inflames the jury or appeals improperly to the jury’s

emotions.’” Id. at 159 (citation omitted). This type of “improper” evidence has

been characterized as evidence that “improperly implies that the defendant

is guilty simply because he or she has a propensity to commit crimes or is a

person of bad character.” Id. at 160. Separately, the “confusion” to which

90.403 refers is confusion of the issues. Evidence may fall into that category

if the evidence distracts jurors from the central issues of the trial in the case

in which the defendant is charged. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248,

1262 (Fla. 2006).

      Here, the trial court found that the probative value of the recording

would be outweighed by “some prejudice” and that it would “confuse a jury.”

Nowhere, though, did the trial court conclude or suggest that the audio

                                       6
recording is the type of evidence that would improperly inflame the jury or

improperly appeal to the jury’s emotions. Instead, the trial court appeared to

conclude that because the audio recording contained neither a definitive

confession nor an overt reference to molestation or intercourse it may

confuse the jury. But the lack of these explicit references would neither

improperly inflame the jury, nor would it distract the jury from the issues in

the case merely because the evidence requires inference. To the contrary,

the statements are evidence from which guilt as to the charged crimes may

be inferred. As a result, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in

concluding the audio recording was inadmissible pursuant to section 90.403.

See McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 326 (Fla. 2007) (holding that trial

court “abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the

law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence”).

      Finally, Appellee argues that even if this Court finds the trial court’s

reasoning in granting his motion to suppress to be erroneous, it should still

affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine because the recording was

inadmissible as an illegally intercepted oral communication. Appellee cites

McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014), to support his argument that

the recording should be excluded pursuant to section 934.03, Florida

                                      7
Statutes (2021), and section 934.06, Florida Statutes (2021). 1 However,

McDade analyzed the 2010 version of section 934.03. The statute was

amended in 2015 and now provides that it is lawful for a child under 18 years

of age to intercept and record an oral communication if:

      the child is a party to the communication and has reasonable
      grounds to believe that recording the communication will capture
      a statement by another party to the communication that the other
      party intends to commit, is committing, or has committed an
      unlawful sexual act or an unlawful act of physical force or
      violence against the child.

§ 934.03(2)(k), Fla. Stat. (2021). As the State argues, that exception applies

here. Therefore, because the recording may be properly admitted under

section 934.06 as an exception to the general prohibition of intercepting oral

communications of section 934.03(1), we reject Appellee’s tipsy coachman

argument.

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting

Appellee’s motion to suppress. We therefore reverse the order and remand

for additional proceedings.

      1
          Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (2021), provides in relevant part:

      “Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
      intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and
      no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in
      any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court . . .
      if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
      chapter.”

                                        8
     REVERSED and REMANDED.

NARDELLA and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.

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