Court Opinion

ID: 9539773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:09:59.270423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:19.491564
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
ROSSMAN, J.
A reading of the petition for a rehearing induces the belief that the plaintiff-respondent has misconstrued our previous opinion. It made no intimation that a rule prevails which renders the general con*310tractor liable to the 'subcontractor for delays and time consuming efforts that may unexpectedly beset the subcontractor in the performance of his subcontract. Moreover, this is not a case in which the plaintiff, as a subcontractor, seeks to hold the prime contractor (the defendant) responsible for not having the premises ready so that the subcontractor could proceed expeditiously with the performance of his work. The plaintiff, when he was ready to perform his work, entered upon the premises at his will and without interference from anyone began the performance of his work.
In this case the subcontractor seeks to hold the prime contractor responsible for work, material and efforts which he says he expended in meeting unwarranted demands of the engineer. He claims that the supervision of the engineer and Ms demands upon the plaintiff went beyond the contemplation of the defendant and the plaintiff when they entered into the subcontract. To the extent that the plaintiff, as subcontractor, was required to work upon the job longer than he had anticipated, the situation was due, so he says, to (1) the dilatory methods of the engineer and (2) the fact (if such it was) that the latter demanded of the plaintiff work beyond the requirements of the plans and specifications. In other words, the delay, to such an extent as any occurred, was due to the fact that the engineer required the work to be performed in a manner that required more time and effort than the plaintiff had foreseen. We believe that our previous opinion states the foregoing as the basis for the claimed liability; but if it does not do so, this opinion —and not the former — must be accepted as the statement of the facts.
Before stating specifically the contentions of the *311petition for a rehearing we will mention additional facts. The petition does not criticize the part of onr decision which ruled that the subcontract to which the defendant and the plaintiff were the parties subjected the latter to the jurisdiction and supervision of the engineer, Ebasco Services, Inc. The plaintiff, in support of his petition for a rehearing, argues that even though he entered into that relationship nevertheless the defendant was responsible if the engineer’s directions went beyond those “contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into.” The quoted words were taken from the plaintiff’s (respondent’s) brief. The plaintiff’s reply (the subject is not mentioned in the complaint) alleges that the plaintiff was required to perform his subcontract in a manner
“* * * more costly than reasonably would be incurred by plaintiff under customary methods and means, * * # all of which were not within the terms of plaintiff’s agreement, nor contemplated between plaintiff and defendant * * *. Plaintiff protested to defendant * * * and informed defendant that the work was of a different nature, character and kind from that contemplated by the parties in its alleged contract * * #. By preventing plaintiff from prosecuting his work, pursuant to the usual and customary methods and means * * * the cost of prosecuting said work was increased considerably * * * and constituted a material modification, departure and abandonment of the alleged contract.”
The bid which the plaintiff submitted to the defendant and which the latter accepted stated:
“All of the foregoing per specifications for project, drawings Gr-143482 * * * and letters of Aug. 15 and Aug. 16, to Electrical Construction.”
It will be recalled from our previous opinion that the letters of August 15 and 16 (1958) directed attention *312to parts of the specifications that were known as the General Conditions. The letters just mentioned and the General Conditions were prepared by the engineer. Their purpose was to extend the engineer’s control over all contractors and subcontractors who worked upon this project, in the event they, like the plaintiff, acquiesced in the general conditions, so that through the engineer’s supervision of their efforts they would comply fully with the plans, 'specifications, and contract. The General Conditions were, as we said, applicable in part to all subcontractors and when their provisions were applied to the plaintiff they required him to subject himself to the supervision of the engineer. They provided “The Owner contemplates and the Contractor hereby agrees to a thorough, minute inspection by the Owner, or by any of its agents, of all the work and material furnished under this contract.” The engineer, as our previous opinion held, was the agent of the owner. The owner, Portland General Electric Co., was engaged in the construction of a large costly dam and hydroelectric plant. The work and buildings involved in this action were a part of that project. One can readily perceive that “thorough, minute inspection” very likely is essential in the construction of a large dam and in the building of appurtenant structures that will house electrical equipment. Ebasco Services, Inc., is an engineering concern of national status. On behalf of the Portland General Electric Co. it prepared the plans, specifications, contracts, etc. for the undertaking. As agent for the owner it also awarded the needed contracts and then supervised the work which each contractor and subcontractor performed. The record indicates that it had on the job several engineers, each skilled in a particular phase of the work that was under way, *313and who inspected and supervised the different types of work such as concrete work, iron work and so on. The general conditions provided that supervision by the engineer should extend over the work performed by the subcontractors “as if they were employees of the contractor.” There can be no doubt but what the plaintiff, as a subcontractor, was subject, pursuant to his own agreement, to the supervision and direction of the engineer. It is likewise clear that the General Conditions subjected the work which the plaintiff had undertaken to perform to inspection that would be more diligent and searching than “customary” and “ordinary” inspection — those being the words that the plaintiff’s pleading employs. The General Conditions called for “thorough, minute inspection.”
Although all the papers pertaining to this job, including the General Conditions, were placed before the plaintiff some days before he submitted his bid, he did not read the General Conditions. Likewise, he made no inquiries concerning them or their import. He attributes no blame to the defendant for his failure to have read the General Conditions. He simply did not read them. Likewise, he made no inquiries as to the name or identity of the inspecting engineer until after he had entered upon the performance of his subcontract.
The foregoing indicates that although the plaintiff speaks of supervision by the engineer that went beyond that “contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into,” he did not discover until after he had begun the performance of his subcontract the identity of the engineer, and did not know even then that the General Conditions, which he now concedes are a part of his subcontract, subjected him to the supervision of the engineer and required his *314work to undergo “a thorough, minute inspection.” Therefore, when the plaintiff refers to supervision which the parties contemplated “at the time the contract was entered into” he could not have had any well-informed expectations upon that 'subject because he did not know then that he would be under the supervision of the engineer and that he would have to do his work so well that it could withstand minute inspection. Unless we misjudge the plaintiff’s testimony, he did not anticipate, when he undertook this subcontract, that any engineer would supervise his work. He evidently thought that the only person with whom he would have any relationship would be the defendant, and inferred that if his work satisfied the defendant he did not need to bother about any one else. That, probably is the reason why he did not inquire for the name of the supervising engineer.
When the defendant accepted the general contract including the part that is the work mentioned in the plaintiff’s subcontract, it also was required to submit itself to the jurisdiction and supervision of the engineer. It, too, agreed to “a thorough, minute inspection” of its work.
Although the evidence indicates that the inspection by Ebasco Services was thorough, the engineer made no alterations whatever in the buildings, materials or any other feature of the work which the plaintiff was required to perform. Ebasco Services was insistent upon good work and may have been painstaking in its supervision, but the ultimate result of its efforts was faithful compliance with the specifications. The plaintiff claims that in several instances Ebasco Services misinterpreted the specifications, and in that manner required him to perform details which the contract *315did not call for, 'but the specifications authorized the engineer to interpret them.
As our previous opinion points out, the plaintiff makes no charge that the defendant in any manner interfered with his efforts to perform his contract. To the contrary, he concedes that the defendant at all times was helpful to him. It was the engineer, and only the engineer that inspected his work and insisted upon high standards.
This, therefore, is a case in which the plaintiff voluntarily agreed that his performance of his subcontract should be subject “to a thorough, minute inspection by” Ebasco Services, Inc. The defendant, which he now seeks to hold responsible for his ill fortune, made no trouble for him. To the contrary, as he freely concedes, the defendant, as contractor, was at all times helpful.
In Norcross v. Wills, 198 NY 336, 91 NE 803, the plaintiff, as the subcontractor for granite work upon a costly home, subjected himself to the supervision of Babb, Cook and Willard, the architects for the home. His subcontract provided that he should furnish the granite and set it in place “under the direction and to the satisfaction of Messrs. Babb, Cook and Willard, architects, acting for the purposes of this contract as agents of the owners.” The prime contractor (defendant in the action) was subject to a similar provision which likewise subjected him, in the performance of his contract, to the supervision of the architects. Precisely the same situation is true in the case at bar. In the Norcross casé, as our previous opinion points out, the court held that the prime contractor was not liable to the subcontractor. It reasoned in the following manner:
“The plaintiff knew of the defendant being un*316der a contract with the owner of the property which gave the absolute control of the work to Babb, Cook and Willard, the owner’s architects, and with such knowledge he was also willing to agree in his contract to perforin his work under their jurisdiction and to their satisfaction ‘acting for the purpose of this contract as agents of the owner.’ ”
The same situation exists in the case at bar. The plaintiff, in accepting the subcontract, agreed to abide by the directions of the engineer. His quarrel is with the engineer or the owner. The engineer was the agent of the owner, not of the defendant. If the engineer did the plaintiff a wrong, the defendant was not responsible for it.
Decisions which are in harmony with the excerpt which we just quoted from the Norcross case are Wright-Rosa Engineering Co., Inc. v. I. M. Ludington Sons, Inc., 174 NYS 273, and Benjamin Foster Company v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 318 Mass 190, 61 NE2d 147, 166 ALR 925.
The plaintiff’s petition for a rehearing also contends :
“The court erred in holding that plaintiff-subcontractor was bound by the contract to perform pursuant to the supervision and direction of the engineer, even though that supervision and direction was found to be arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond that contemplated by the parties to the subcontract.”
In presenting his ease the plaintiff ignored throughout the provisions that demanded that his materials and work should withstand “thorough, minute inspection.” Normally, when an engineer is given by contract the power of supervision his demands cannot be set *317aside unless lie was arbitrary or guilty of fraud. The Massachusetts court, in the decision which we cited, in speaking of a situation similar to the one before us, held:
“* # * Por a court to substitute its own lay opinions on such matters, however well it may think itself informed through evidence, for the opinions of the engineers in the field to whom the parties have entrusted such decisions would be directly contrary to the terms of the contract and in the long run likely to produce unsound results.”
There is no contention in this case that the engineer was guilty of fraud, bad faith, or was prompted by an improper motive or purpose.
The foregoing takes care of the contentions of the petition for a rehearing which are applicable to this case, that is, to a situation in which the subcontractor claims that the supervising engineer demanded too much or acted tardily. Our previous opinion, in deciding the issues, mentioned rules which govern liability in cases where the subcontractor seeks to hold the prime contractor liable for delays that beset the subcontractor and which generally arise out of the failure of the contractor to have the premises ready at the appointed time for the performance of the subcontractor’s work. Sometimes those delays occur from the fact that other subcontractors are busy upon the premises and delay the subcontractor who later becomes plaintiff in a case. Sometimes they arise out of the fact that one subcontractor has not completed, let us say, the footings of a building so that another subcontractor, who erects the steel work, may proceed with his work. The case at bar is not that kind of case. And, accordingly, those parts of our opinion were concerned with principles of law that are not *318applicable to the case in hand. They are now nothing more than dictum and must be deemed withdrawn.
The petition for a rehearing is without merit and is denied.