Court Opinion

ID: 9371611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 17:08:32.596609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.881782
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cleveland v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-459.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                             No. 111660
                v.                                  :

JOHN A. BOYD,                                       :

                Defendant-Appellant.                :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2023

                     Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
                                Case No. 2021-CRB-009279

                                              Appearances:

                Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Gina Villa,
                Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.

                Judith M. Kowalski, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                John Boyd appeals his sentence for criminal mischief as imposed by the

Cleveland Municipal Court. After a careful review of the facts and law, we affirm in

part and vacate in part.
                         I. Factual and Procedural History

             Boyd was charged with one count of criminal damaging or endangering

and three counts of criminal mischief.         The charges stemmed from conduct

occurring in July 2021 where Boyd was caught on surveillance cameras tearing down

political signs at a gas station on multiple occasions, utilizing a knife to do so. A plea

agreement was reached, and Boyd entered a guilty plea to a single count of criminal

mischief, a third-degree misdemeanor.

             Boyd was referred for a presentence investigation with the probation

department, but the interview was never completed due to apparent confusion

regarding Boyd’s phone number. The presentence-investigation report, therefore,

contained only information regarding Boyd’s criminal history and the instant

offense. It appears that from Boyd’s criminal history and his alleged failure to

contact the probation department, the probation officer recommended that, as part

of his sentence, Boyd complete a community orientation program (“COP”), a

community awareness program (“CAP”), a substance abuse assessment and

counseling (“SAA/C”), substance abuse testing (“SAT”), a mental health assessment

(“MHA”), anger management, and community work service (“CWS”).

             At sentencing, Boyd’s counsel conceded that the COP and CAP

sanctions were both appropriate, but that the remaining recommendations were

unrelated to this offense that was nonviolent and did not cause financial loss. Boyd

noted that the two violent offenses on his record, first-degree murder and murder

while perpetrating a robbery, occurred over 50 years ago. Boyd argued that since
that time, he has become a productive member of society, citing the fact that he ran

for city council three times and county council another time, and served as a precinct

committee member. Boyd also received a degree in clinical counseling and was

employed as a mental health counselor for 15 years.

            The court sentenced Boyd to 60 days in prison, all of which were

suspended, and $500 in costs, $450 of which were suspended. The court did not

impose every program recommended by the probation department and ordered

Boyd to complete two years of active probation, including completing the COP, CAP,

anger management, and SAA/C programs. He was also required to submit to the

MHA to determine his eligibility for the mental health docket and submit to SAT.

             At this point, Boyd began arguing with the trial court.

      THE DEFENDANT: Are you really going to give me two years active
      probation for this —

      THE COURT: I really am. I really am.

      THE DEFENDANT: — for tearing down a sign?

      THE COURT: I really am. Yes, I am —

      THE DEFENDANT: What’s the jail time —

      THE COURT: — Defendant to contact Probation, today. Failure to call,
      warrant to issue.

      THE DEFENDANT: This is — this is harsh. This is crazy.

      THE COURT: Um-hum. It is crazy.

      THE DEFENDANT: This is political. It’s been political from the
      beginning. It seems to me, continues to be political.
       THE COURT: Got it. See you tomorrow, 8:30, courtroom 15-C.

       THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, right.

       THE COURT: Um-hum.

       THE DEFENDANT: You wrong, Judge. Wrong —

       THE COURT: Okay. And so are you.

       THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. You’re about —

       THE COURT: It was probably something that was needed. Thanks,
       Eric.

(Tr. 10-11.)

               The hearing concluded immediately thereafter. Boyd timely appealed

his sentence, assigning a single error for our review:

       The sentencing court erred and abused its discretion by requiring that
       the appellant submit to the substance abuse assessment and
       counseling, mental health court screening and evaluation, drug testing,
       and anger management, as those services bear no relation to the
       offense to which he pleaded guilty.

                              II. Law and Analysis

               In his sole assignment of error, Boyd argues that the trial court abused

its discretion in sentencing Boyd to SAA/C, anger management, SAT, and the MHA

for a nonviolent offense against property. Boyd argues that these sanctions do not

relate to the offense to which he plead guilty.

               Trial courts have broad discretion when sentencing a defendant in a

misdemeanor case. Euclid v. Gage-Vaughn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86498, 2006-

Ohio-1941, ¶ 28, citing State v. Yontz, 33 Ohio App.3d 342, 343, 515 N.E.2d 1012
(12th Dist.1986). A trial court’s sentence will not be disturbed absent an affirmative

showing of an abuse of discretion. Gage-Vaughn at id., citing State v. Nite Clubs of

Ohio, Inc., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03 MA 20, 2004-Ohio-4989, ¶ 7; Rocky River v.

Burke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78578, 2002-Ohio-1651. An abuse of discretion

occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a

matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio

St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “‘“implies that the

court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’”            State v.

Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135, quoting Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams,

62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

              A trial court is authorized to impose a sentence of community-control

sanctions in misdemeanor offenses pursuant to R.C. 2929.27(A). R.C. 2929.27(C)

instructs that in addition to the listed sanctions within R.C. 2929.27(A), a court “may

impose any other sanction that is intended to discourage the offender * * * from

committing a similar offense if the sanction is reasonably related to the overriding

purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.”

             When imposing a misdemeanor sentence, trial courts “must consider

the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing which are ‘to protect the public

from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.”’

Lakewood v. Dobra, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106001, 2018-Ohio-960, ¶ 9, quoting

R.C. 2929.21. R.C. 2929.22(B) enumerates factors that the trial court must consider
in misdemeanor sentencing and failure to consider these factors constitutes an

abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 9-10, citing Maple Hts. v. Sweeney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 85415, 2005-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7. Nonetheless, “the trial court is not required to

make factual findings on the record related to these factors.” Dobra at ¶ 10, citing

Sweeney at ¶ 7. So long as the misdemeanor sentence is within the statutory limits,

the trial court is presumed to have considered the required factors enumerated in

R.C. 2929.22 absent a showing to the contrary by the contesting defendant. Dobra

at id., citing Sweeney at id.

              Further, community-control conditions must reasonably relate to the

goals of community control: “‘rehabilitation, administering justice, and ensuring

good behavior.’” State v. Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295,

¶ 7, quoting State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201,

¶ 16. In State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990), the Ohio

Supreme Court set forth a test for determining whether community-control

conditions reasonably relate to these goals. The trial court must consider whether

the condition is (1) reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to

conduct that is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the

statutory ends of probation. “All three prongs of the Jones test must be satisfied for

the reviewing court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Mahon

at ¶ 8, citing State v. White, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1027, 2015-Ohio-3844,
¶ 10. Further, the conditions “‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge

upon the [offender’s] liberty.’” Talty at ¶13, quoting Jones at 52.

              Boyd appears to argue the inapplicability of the second prong,

suggesting that this was a “crime against property” and therefore bears no

relationship to the trial court’s community-control sanctions requiring Boyd to

participate in SAA/C, anger management, SAT, and the MHA. Boyd also suggests

that he is older and suffers from several health conditions and that these programs

are too onerous and disproportionate to the actual offense.

              Boyd directs this court to State v. Marcum, 4th Dist. Hocking Nos.

11CA8 and 11CA10, 2012-Ohio-572. In Marcum, the Fourth District applied the

Jones test to a community-control condition that forbade the defendant from having

contact with her own husband. The defendant was convicted of misuse of 911 and

obstructing official business stemming from a domestic incident where 911 was

contacted three separate times in one evening. The court ultimately found that the

first and third prongs were not met because a no-contact order could not possibly

rehabilitate the offender nor was there any pattern of conduct that led to the criminal

activity. We do not find persuasive authority in this case. Marcum stems from a

domestic dispute that resulted in a no-contact order. We cannot say that court-

sponsored programs specifically designed to rehabilitate offenders and facilitate

good behavior can be likened to a court’s attempt to limit contact with an individual.

              Boyd also directs this court to State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111173, 2022-Ohio-3233. Brown pled guilty to a single count of criminal nonsupport
and was sentenced to five years of community control. Part of Brown’s community-

control conditions forbade Brown from going anywhere where drugs and/or alcohol

were sold, served, or used. This court reversed, noting that not a single prong of the

Jones test was satisfied by this prohibition. The record was completely devoid of

any mention of drugs or alcohol and there was no evidence that Brown’s criminal

nonsupport was related to a substance abuse problem.            We do find Brown

persuasive in the instant matter. The requirement that Boyd submit to a SAA/C and

SAT does not have any nexus to this offense. There is no allegation or even mention

in the record that substance abuse contributed to Boyd’s tearing down of political

signs. This is consistent with several other holdings in this court. See, e.g., N.

Olmsted v. Rock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105566, 2018-Ohio-1084, ¶ 36; State v.

Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295, ¶ 11; Strongsville v.

Feliciano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96294, 2011-Ohio-5394. We therefore sustain

Boyd’s assignment of error as it pertains to SAA/C and SAT.

              We are, however, unpersuaded that anger management and the MHA

do not pass the Jones test. Under the first Jones factor, anger management and the

MHA both contribute to the rehabilitation of defendants because they both fall

under the umbrella of mental health treatment and are designed to rehabilitate

individuals by their very nature. Turning to the second factor, we note that “[t]he

community control sanctions are to be related to the circumstances of the offense,

but the sanctions do not necessarily need to relate only to the conviction itself.” S.

Euclid v. Bickerstaff, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107526, 2019-Ohio-2223, ¶ 20, citing
State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 12-14 (2d

Dist.). We therefore find that the nature of Boyd’s crime, which was tearing down

political signs, could be motivated by existing and untreated mental health

problems, therefore supporting a nexus to the underlying crime. Indeed, the record

reflects that Boyd made several attempts to tear down the sign, returning to the gas

station multiple times to finish the job. Turning to the third Jones factor, we find

that anger management and the MHA are related to Boyd’s criminality. Boyd’s

criminal history is extensive and though we note that it has tapered down in recent

years, it is wholly possible that Boyd’s inability to remain completely out of the

criminal justice system is related to untreated mental health problems and it is not

readily apparent that Boyd has benefitted from past punishments. Indeed, as

recently as 2017, Boyd was convicted of O.V.I. and two separate drug paraphernalia

charges in different municipal courts. Finally, Boyd’s candor towards the trial court

is indicative of this point. See, e.g., Bickerstaff at ¶ 24. Finding that all prongs of

the Jones test are satisfied by anger management and the MHA, we affirm the trial

court’s requirement that Boyd submit to these programs as part of his community-

control sentence.

                                   III. Conclusion

              After careful consideration of the entire record, we find that the trial

court abused its discretion in imposing community-control conditions relating to

substance abuse, including SAA/C and SAT, where the record before us does not
suggest that drugs and/or alcohol contributed to Boyd’s criminal conduct. We

vacate these portions of Boyd’s sentence.

             We do find, however, that the trial court did not err in requiring Boyd

to report for anger management and complete the MHA. These conditions are

supported by all three Jones factors and reasonably relate to the goals of

community-control. Those sanctions are affirmed.

             Judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR