Court Opinion

ID: 9372529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 20:02:24.000028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.002114
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/23 P. v. Alcantar Vazque CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B302686
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. CR44630)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Ventura County)

v.                                                         OPINION ON TRANSFER
                                                            FROM THE SUPREME
JOSE ALBERTO ALCANTAR                                             COURT
VAZQUEZ,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      In June 2022 we filed our opinion affirming an order
denying appellant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to former
Penal Code section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.1 (People v.
Vazquez (June 1, 2022, B302686) [nonpub. opn.] (Vazquez II).) In
September 2022 the California Supreme Court granted review
and transferred the matter back to us “with directions to vacate

        All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
         1

Code. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
as section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §
10.) We will refer to the statute as section 1172.6.

                                                    1
[our] decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 [Strong].” We will do so and again deny
relief.
        In 1999 appellant was convicted of first-degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189). He was not the actual killer, did not
intend to kill, and was not at the scene of the homicide. The jury
found true special circumstance allegations that the murder had
occurred during the commission of a burglary and an attempted
kidnapping (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(B) & (G)). The jury was
instructed that it could not find the special circumstance
allegations true “unless [it is] satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt” that appellant acted “with reckless indifference to human
life and as a major participant” in the commission of the
underlying crimes.
        In 2019 appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The court issued an order to show cause. (Id.,
subd. (c).) After an evidentiary hearing (id., subd. (d)), the trial
court concluded that appellant was ineligible for relief. It viewed
the evidence in light of the factors set forth in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522 (Clark). The trial court found “beyond a reasonable
doubt that [appellant] was both a major participant and [had]
acted with reckless indifference to human life.”2
        Appellant contends the trial court failed to properly apply
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. The trial court
said its task was to “examine[] the evidence to determine if, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, each essential
element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

      2As appendix A to this opinion, we attach the trial court’s
written ruling dated October 3, 2019.

                                 2
(Italics added.) The trial court misstated its task. At a section
1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the court should not view the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Instead, it
should act as an independent factfinder. Nevertheless, we are
satisfied that the trial court fulfilled its role as an independent
factfinder in determining that the evidence proved appellant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if it had applied a
substantial evidence standard, the error would have been
harmless. We therefore vacate our decision in Vazquez II and
affirm.
                                 Facts3
       Appellant married Monica Donahoo in June of 1997. They
had dated each other when they were teenagers, but had broken
up because their parents disapproved of the relationship. In the
intervening years, Donahoo had been married to a professional
gambler. He died in 1996. She inherited his house, a large sum
of money, and his interest in the Players Club card room, a poker
parlor.
       After the professional gambler’s death and before her
marriage to appellant, Donahoo became enamored with Felipe
Arambula, the murder victim. Arambula was married and had
three children. He was a part owner of a Mexican restaurant.
Donahoo often visited the restaurant and brought Arambula
gifts. Arambula instructed his employees not to tell Donahoo
that he was married.

      3 The relevant facts are taken from our prior unpublished
opinion affirming the judgment on direct appeal. (People v.
Vazquez (Apr. 24, 2001, B135076) slip opn. at pp. 2-4 (Vazquez I).)
In his opening brief’s factual summary in the present appeal,
appellant states, “The facts of the case are taken verbatim from
the unpublished opinion.”

                                 3
      In March 1997 Donahoo gave Arambula two cashier’s
checks, each in the amount of $25,000. Arambula used the funds
to purchase a home for his family. Donahoo also gave him a
power of attorney to sell an automobile, which he drove for
several months and eventually sold for $10,000.
      Manuel Vasquez (no relation to appellant) worked at Jiffy
Lube and serviced appellant’s car in May 1997. During the
summer of 1997, Vasquez asked his friend, Erick Gonzalez, to
help him kidnap someone. Vasquez told Gonzalez that he had
been hired by a person who worked at or owned a card club, and
that the intended victim owed that person a lot of money.
Vasquez showed Gonzalez a box containing rope, tape, and
handcuffs, and said they were going to take the victim to “Jose’s”
house. Appellant’s first name is Jose. Vasquez showed Gonzalez
a gun and said “Jose” had given it to him. Gonzalez decided not
to participate in the kidnapping.
      Vasquez asked another friend, Angel Gutierrez, if he would
be interested in helping kidnap somebody. Vasquez said the man
who had hired him owned a card room. He took Gutierrez to the
house where appellant and Donahoo lived, but appellant was not
home. Vasquez also took Gutierrez to the restaurant owned by
Arambula and told him the owner was the man he planned to
kidnap. Gutierrez declined to participate in the kidnapping.
      Vasquez discussed his plan with a third friend, Richard
Garcia. Vasquez told Garcia that the owner of the Players Club
was going to pay him to do a kidnapping. Vasquez said the
owner had given him a gun.
      On June 13, 1998, Vasquez spent the afternoon and early
evening with Gonzalez, Gutierrez and Garcia. David Hampton
was also with the group. Vasquez showed his friends two guns,

                                4
one of which was a stun gun. At about 9:00 p.m., Vasquez and
Hampton left the group saying they were going to “handle this
thing.”
       Vasquez and Hampton entered Arambula’s home at about
9:45 p.m. They were armed with a nine-millimeter Beretta pistol
and a stun gun. Arambula had not yet returned home. His wife
was putting their children to bed.
       Vasquez ordered Arambula’s wife to remain in one of the
bedrooms and said they would not hurt her. Vasquez said that
Arambula owed $100,000 and that they were there for the money.
Arambula’s wife did not see Hampton, but heard someone talking
on the phone in another room of the house.
       Arambula came home shortly after 10:00 p.m. He was
carrying over $2,000 in cash receipts from his restaurant. His
wife heard a struggle and the buzzing sound of a stun gun,
followed by several gunshots. Arambula was shot six times by a
nine-millimeter firearm. He died from these wounds.
       After the shooting, Vasquez and Hampton spoke to
Gonzalez, Gutierrez, and Garcia. They said they had used the
stun gun and had tried to grab Arambula, but he had put up a
struggle. Vasquez dropped the nine-millimeter firearm.
Hampton picked it up and shot Arambula. Vasquez said he had
dropped his cellular phone inside Arambula’s house.
       The police found Vasquez’s cellular phone. It was
registered in the name of his mother. Telephone company
records showed that a few minutes before the shooting, several
calls had been made from the cellular phone to appellant’s
residence. During the previous year, there had also been several
calls between the two telephone numbers.

                               5
       After the shooting Vasquez went into hiding. Before he
disappeared, he had met briefly with appellant. At the time of
appellant’s trial, Vasquez had not been apprehended.
       A few days after the shooting, Hampton met with his
parents and told them what had happened. He showed them a
“wad” of cash and said he had been paid $1,000.
       Appellant purchased a one-way airline ticket for Hampton
to Austin, Texas. He arranged for Hampton to stay there with
appellant’s friend. While Hampton was in Texas, he and
appellant spoke on the telephone several times. Hampton was
eventually apprehended.
       After the shooting appellant and Donahoo flew to Mexico.
Appellant was arrested upon their return in August 1998 and
was interviewed by the police. He denied knowing any details
about Donahoo’s relationship with Arambula, but said he had
noticed that she had behaved strangely one day when they went
to Arambula’s restaurant. Later, a man appellant did not know
approached him at a gas station, told him to watch his back, and
mentioned the name “Felipe.” Appellant wanted to find out what
was going on, so he asked Vasquez to contact Arambula and set
up a meeting. Appellant claimed he wanted Vasquez to tell
Arambula that he wanted to talk to him; he did not want
Arambula to be kidnapped or harmed in any way. When
appellant learned about what had happened to Arambula, he was
frightened. He gave $300 to Hampton and arranged for him to go
to a friend’s house in Texas.
                         Procedural History
       A jury convicted appellant of murder, attempted
kidnapping (§§ 664, 207, subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), assault with
a stun gun (§ 244.5, subd. (b)), and false imprisonment by

                                 6
violence (§ 236). The jury found true special circumstance
allegations that the murder had occurred during the commission
of a burglary and an attempted kidnapping (§ 190.2, subds.
(a)(17)(B) & (G)). In addition, the jury found true allegations that
appellant had been armed with a firearm and had furnished a
firearm to another during the commission of each offense except
the assault with a stun gun (§§ 12202, subd. (a)(1)), 12022.4).
       The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the
possibility of parole plus four years, eight months. We affirmed
the judgment on appeal. (Vazquez I, supra (see ante, p. 3, fn. 3.)
       Our Supreme Court’s decision in Banks was issued in 2015.
Its decision in Clark was issued in 2016. In April 2017 appellant
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. He
alleged that, based on Banks and Clark, the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s special circumstance findings
that he was a major participant in the underlying felonies and
had acted with reckless indifference to human life. In May 2017
the trial court denied the petition on the merits. Appellant
subsequently filed a habeas petition in this court. We summarily
denied the petition.4
       In 2019 appellant filed a petition for resentencing. (§
1172.6.) Because the trial judge who sentenced appellant had
retired, the matter was assigned to Judge Anthony Sabo.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).) In the petition appellant reiterated his
rejected habeas claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s findings that he was a major participant in the
underlying felonies and had acted with reckless indifference to

      4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of these court
records. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

                                 7
human life. In opposing the petition, the People argued that the
jury’s true findings on the special circumstance allegations
categorically precluded appellant from obtaining relief.
         The trial court ruled that appellant had made a prima facie
case for relief. It issued an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c).) The trial court subsequently conducted an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether appellant was entitled to relief.
(Id., subd. (d).) Neither side presented new evidence at the
hearing.
         After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a 7-
page ruling. (Appendix A.) The trial court stated that it had
reviewed the trial transcripts, our opinion affirming the
judgment on direct appeal, the probation report, and appellant’s
habeas corpus petition. It said its task was to “examine[] the
evidence to determine if, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, each essential element of the crime was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
         The trial court made an in-depth analysis of the evidence.
In its conclusion the court wrote: “After examining the evidence
submitted by [appellant] and applying the Banks factors, the
court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] was both a
major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human
life. . . . [The] Petition for Resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section [1172.6] is denied.”
         Appellant appealed. In a majority opinion authored by now
retired Justice Perren (Yegan, J., concurring), we affirmed the
order denying the petition because “[t]he totality of the
considerations supports the jury’s finding that appellant was a
major participant in the attempted kidnapping and burglary who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Vazquez II,

                                 8
supra, slip opn. at p. 15.) Now retired Justice Tangeman
dissented. He concluded that the matter must be remanded for a
new evidentiary hearing because the trial court had not acted as
an independent factfinder and the jury’s special circumstance
finding had predated Banks and Clark.
                       Appellant’s Contentions
       Appellant contends: “[T]he trial court applied the
substantial evidence standard of proof to deny relief after an
evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the court concluded that
substantial evidence supported the jury’s felony murder special
circumstances finding made well before . . . Banks . . . and . . .
Clark . . . . Under Strong, that was error and requires reversal.”
“[T]he trial court viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, thereby lessening the prosecution’s burden.”
       In his reply brief appellant cites Enmund v. Florida (1982)
458 U.S. 782, for the proposition that he could not be convicted of
first degree murder as a matter of law because it is undisputed
that he neither committed the homicide, nor was present when
the killing took place, nor schemed nor participated in a plot to
commit murder. Enmund is distinguishable. The issue there
was whether the imposition of the death penalty was
constitutionally disproportionate under the circumstances, which
were completely different from the circumstances here. “[T]he
[Supreme] Court found that Enmund’s degree of participation
in the murders was so tangential that it could not be said to
justify a sentence of death. It found that neither the deterrent
nor the retributive purposes of the death penalty were advanced
by imposing the death penalty upon Enmund.” (Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137, 148.)

                                 9
       Finally, appellant claims “that the trial court erred by
relying in part on the probation report following the evidentiary
hearing.” The claim is forfeited because he did not raise it below.
(See People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 538.) Moreover,
appellant fails to show how the court’s consideration of the
probation report prejudiced him. “[T]rial [court] error . . .
is reversible only if the defendant proves prejudice.” (People v.
Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 312.) In a supplemental letter brief
filed on April 11, 2022, appellant stated, “While the use of the
probation report in and of itself would not require reversal, the
combination of relying on the probation report with the
application of the incorrect standard of proof does warrant
reversal.”
                           People v. Strong
       “In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . , the
Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder
rule. [Pursuant to new section 1172.6,] [i]t also created a path to
relief for defendants who had previously been convicted of
murder on a felony-murder theory but who could not have been
convicted under the new law.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
703.)
       Appellant was convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory. In Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, our Supreme
Court noted: “Penal Code section 189, as amended [by Senate Bill
No. 1437], now limits liability under a felony-murder theory
principally to ‘actual killer[s]’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(1)) and
those who, ‘with the intent to kill,’ aid or abet ‘the actual killer in
the commission of murder in the first degree’ (id., subd. (e)(2)).
Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were

                                  10
‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of [Penal Code] Section 190.2’ — that is, the statute defining the
felony-murder special circumstance. (Id., § 189, subd. (e)(3).)”
       The Supreme Court continued, “Banks and Clark both
substantially clarified the law governing findings under Penal
Code section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks elucidated what it
means to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent, what it
means to act with reckless indifference to human life, while Clark
further refined the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 706-707.) Thus, “[f]or petitioners [such as
appellant] with pre-Banks/Clark findings, no judge or jury has
ever found the currently required degree of culpability for a first
time.” (Id. at p. 718.)
       The Supreme Court held: “[Un]less a defendant was tried
after Banks was decided [in 2015], a major participant finding
will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case [under section
1172.6, subdivision (c)]. And unless a defendant was tried after
Clark was decided [in 2016], a reckless indifference to human life
finding will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case.
[¶] Because Strong’s case was tried before both Banks and Clark,
the special circumstance findings do not preclude him from
making out a prima facie case for resentencing under section
1172.6.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p 721.) “This is true even
if the trial evidence would have been sufficient to support the
findings under Banks and Clark.” (Id. at p. 710.)
          Impact of People v. Strong on Section 1172.6(d)(3)
       If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section
1172.6, subdivision (c), the court conducts an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which provides: “At

                                11
the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to
relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder
. . . .” “A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (Ibid.)
         Appellant was convicted of felony murder before Banks and
Clark were decided. Therefore, “no judge or jury has ever found
the currently required degree of culpability for a first time.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 718.) It follows that at the
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing, the People
were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
was a major participant in the underlying felony and had acted
with reckless indifference to human life. The jury’s pre-
Banks/Clark special circumstance findings did not relieve the
People of this burden.
          The Trial Court Acted as an Independent Factfinder
         The language of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires
the trial court to act as an independent factfinder. “This plain
language shows the People are required to establish the
defendant is guilty under current law as a matter of fact and
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 296.) “[T]he plain text of the statute requires
the trial judge to sit as a fact finder, not as a quasi-appellate
court.” (Id. at p. 295.) The People concede that “[a]t a section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing, the court must act
as an independent factfinder . . . .”
         Instead of acting as an independent factfinder, the trial
court here arguably applied the substantial evidence rule.

                                12
Pursuant to this rule, in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence “both trial and appellate courts must review ‘the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment’ and decide
‘whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272,
italics added.) The trial court said its task was to “examine[] the
evidence to determine if, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, each essential element of the crime was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Italics added.) The court noted,
“This same standard also applies to challenges to the evidence
where a special circumstance is found to be true. People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.” At page 715 Edwards sets
forth the substantial evidence standard of review. In accordance
with that standard of review, the trial court observed: “It was
reasonable for the jury to conclude that [appellant] was aware of
what was taking place and the possible consequences of the crime
with the supplied weapons.” “The jury could have logically
concluded that [appellant] was being informed of exactly what
was taking place in the home as the attempted kidnapping was
taking place and when the murder occurred.”
       “The trial court’s use of an unsound course of reasoning is
immaterial if the action ultimately taken . . . was proper.
[Citation.]” (People v. Patton (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 211, 219.)
Here, the action ultimately taken by the trial court was proper.
When it ruled on appellant’s petition, the court fulfilled its
responsibility to act as an independent factfinder and determine
whether the evidence established appellant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court said, “After examining the evidence
submitted by [appellant] and applying the Banks factors, the

                                13
court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] was both a
major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Italics added; see Appendix A, p. 6, “Conclusion.”)
       But in an abundance of caution, we show below that even if
the trial court had applied an incorrect standard of proof, the
error would have been harmless. In our discussion below, we
assume for purposes of analysis only that the trial court did not
act as an independent factfinder.
               Any Assumed Error Is Subject to Review
                Under the Watson Harmless Error Test
       “[S]ection [1172.6] is an act of legislative lenity in that a
defendant who qualifies for [post-sentencing] relief [under the
statute] may receive a decreased punishment.” (People v. Myles
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 703.) It “is purely a creature of state
statutory law.” (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29.)
“Typically, when an ‘error is purely one of state law, the Watson
harmless error test applies.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 973; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) “Under
the Watson test, we deem an error harmless unless it is
‘reasonably probable’ the outcome would have been different in
the absence of the [assumed] error.” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13
Cal.5th 933, 942.)
               Harmless Error: Major Participant Issue
       In Banks the Supreme Court identified factors that “may
play a role in determining whether” a defendant was a major
participant in criminal activity. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
803.) “Among those factors . . . are these: What role did the
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to
one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the

                                14
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in
the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used? No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one
of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major’ [citations].” (Ibid.)
       Assuming the trial court had not acted as an independent
factfinder, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would have
been different as to the “major participant” issue had the court
acted as an independent factfinder. Appellant was the
“mastermind” of the attempted kidnapping. He hired Vasquez
and Hampton to kidnap the victim. The trial court noted that
appellant had supplied the murder “weapon and a stun gun to
Vasquez in preparation for the kidnapping.” Appellant had “also
supplied his accomplices with ammunition, . . . rope, tape, and
gloves.”
       Although appellant was not physically present at the scene
of the killing, cell phone records show that he was in contact with
Vasquez during the commission of the crimes. The trial court
stated: “[T]he evidence shows that [appellant] was in direct
contact with Vasquez virtually from the moment Vasquez and
Hampton entered the home until just before the two men fled
after the murder. . . . With near continuous communication
taking place between the armed hired kidnappers and

                                15
[appellant], [appellant], from his remote location, could have
either facilitated or prevented the murder by giving directions to
his confederates.”
       The trial court continued: “[B]ut for [appellant’s]
involvement there is no reason to believe any crime would have
been committed.” Appellant’s “actions make him both the
catalyst for the crime as well as the leader of it and therefore a
major participant. . . . Following the killing, the record indicates
that Vasquez and Hampton were paid at least $1,000 each . . . .”
Appellant “facilitated Hampton in fleeing to the state of Texas
with a plane ticket, money, and a place to stay.”
             Harmless Error: Reckless Indifference Issue
       “Reckless indifference to human life ‘requires the defendant
be “subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony
involved a grave risk of death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
807.) “The mere fact of a defendant's awareness that a gun will
be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish reckless
indifference to human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.)
       “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.”’” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.)

                                16
       In Clark our Supreme Court set forth several factors that
may be relevant in determining whether the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life. The first factor is the
defendant’s awareness that a firearm would be used, whether the
defendant used a firearm, and the number of firearms involved.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Appellant knew that a
firearm would be used. He provided the firearm and ammunition
to Vasquez and Hampton.
       The second factor is the defendant’s “physical presence at
the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the
victim.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619, italics and
capitalization omitted.) Although appellant was not physically
present at the scene of the crime, he was in continuous contact
with the perpetrators and could have restrained them. They
were acting on his behalf and under his direction. After the
victim was shot, appellant made no attempt to aid him.
       The third factor is the “duration of the felony.” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620, italics and capitalization omitted.)
“Where a victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise
restrained in the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods,
‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’ [citation],
possibly culminating in murder. The duration of the interaction
between victims and perpetrators is therefore one consideration
in assessing whether a defendant was recklessly indifferent to
human life.” (Ibid.) Here, the intended crime – kidnapping –
involved movement of the victim at gunpoint and a prolonged
period of restraint.
       The fourth factor is the “defendant’s knowledge of factors
bearing on a cohort’s likelihood of killing . . . .” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 621.) The trial court stated: “There is no evidence

                                 17
that either Vasquez or Hampton had any experience in crimes of
violence. . . . [Appellant] appears to have hired the first two
people who were willing to commit the crime for him . . . . [T]hey
were unsophisticated criminals sent to a larger person’s home to
commit a crime of violence with a weapon provided by
[appellant]. It should have been reasonable for [appellant] to
expect that under those circumstances his criminal employees
would be in a position to use those weapons more recklessly and
more quickly than someone with more criminal experience.” The
trial court noted that appellant had told the police that “the
victim was a big man who might want to fight.”
       The fifth factor is the “defendant’s efforts to minimize the
risks of the violence during the felony.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 621, italics and capitalization omitted.) Appellant took no
measures to minimize the risks of violence. He planned and
supervised the commission of a crime with a high risk of lethal
violence: an armed home-invasion kidnapping while the victim’s
wife and children were inside the home. “[Appellant] had to be
aware of the risk of resistance to such an armed invasion of the
home and the extreme likelihood death could result.” (People v.
Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 617.) The trial court observed:
“[Appellant] was aware that the victim was married and should
have reasonably assumed that his wife would be home at the
time of the break in.”
       Thus, assuming the trial court had not acted as an
independent factfinder, it is not reasonably probable the outcome
would have been different as to the “reckless indifference” issue
had the court acted as an independent factfinder. The trial court
would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
“‘“subjectively aware that his . . . participation in the felony

                                18
involved a grave risk of death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
807.)
                            Disposition
      Our decision in Vazquez II is vacated. The order denying
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     YEGAN, J.

I concur:

            GILBERT, P. J.

                                19
GILBERT, P. J., Concurring.
      I concur because it appears the trial court applied the
Banks-Clark factors in arriving at its decision beyond a
reasonable doubt.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                              GILBERT, P. J.

                                 1
BALTODANO, J., Dissenting.
       I respectfully dissent. The order denying the Penal Code 1
section 1172.6 petition should be reversed and remanded for a
new evidentiary hearing.
       In examining the evidence “in the light most favorable to
the verdict,” the trial court improperly applied a sufficiency of the
evidence standard at the evidentiary hearing and did not
independently weigh the facts. “[A] fact finder tasked with
holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
‘must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received throughout the entire trial’ and determine whether that
‘proof . . . leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is
true.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
294-295.) Only after “the trial court sits as a trier of fact” (People
v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442) and makes an
independent finding of facts beyond a reasonable doubt, can we
meaningfully review whether there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s factual findings. (Clements, supra, at pp.
295, 298.)
       The trial court applied a substantial evidence standard
when it based its ruling on what “was reasonable for the jury to
conclude” and what the jury “could have logically concluded.” It
did not mention the defense’s evidence or theory of the case,
much less independently weigh the evidence. Because the trial
court did not engage in this comparative analysis, its finding
regarding reckless indifference to human life falls short of the
evidentiary support required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
       In its minute order denying the resentencing petition, the
trial court cited People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, but did

      1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  1
not cite People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, or its factors.
Banks, at page 803, lists factors for the “major participant”
element. (See Clark, at p. 611.) Clark lists factors for “reckless
indifference to human life.” (Id., at pp. 618-622.) “ ‘[W]hether a
category of crimes is sufficiently dangerous to warrant felony-
murder treatment, and whether an individual participant has
acted with reckless indifference to human life, are different
inquiries.’ ” (Id., at p. 616.) The trial court here confused the two
elements, erroneously stating, “[t]he Banks decision . . . listed
factors it considered in determining if a defendant acted with
reckless indifference.” The court then listed and analyzed the
Banks factors and concluded they established reckless
indifference, without ever referring to the Clark factors. Because
the trial court did not analyze the Clark factors, it could not have
made the independent factual finding that appellant acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
       These errors are not harmless under People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 because there is “ ‘more than an abstract
possibility’ ” the trier of fact might find a reasonable doubt as to
this element if it independently weighed the evidence. (People v.
Hardy (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 312, 329–330.) A “ ‘reasonable
probability’ ” “ ‘does not mean “more likely than not,” but merely
a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Given the trial court’s incorrect application
of the standard of proof at the evidentiary hearing and its failure
to apply the Clark factors, there has not been a finding beyond a

                                  2
reasonable doubt by either the jury or the trial court that
appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life as
defined by Clark.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                        BALTODANO, J.

                                3
APPENDIX A

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                   Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

              Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Todd W. Howeth, Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defenders,
William Quest, Snr. Deputy Public Defender.
       Rob Bonta, Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee,
Colleen M. Tiedemann, Daniel Chang, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.