Court Opinion

ID: 9831275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:59:06.395225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.442617
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The statement in our original opinion, to the effect that the place of connection of appellant’s line of railway with that of the Ft. Worth Belt Railway was 5 miles distant from the stockyards, the place of destination of the cattle, was an error. The distance between those two places was only 1 mile, and this finding is made to correct that error, which, however, could have no material bearing upon the conclusions we reached that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous.
Appellee now insists that under article 731, V. S. Tex. Oiv. Stats., the Ft. Worth Belt Railway Company, the connecting carrier, became the agent of the appellant to carry the cattle from the place where it received them to their destination, and by reason of that fact appellant was responsible for the negligence of such agent as well as for its own. By that statute, it is declared that all common carriers, handling a through shipment. of freight “on a contract for through carriage, recognized, acquiesced in or acted upon, by such carriers,” shall “be deemed and held to be the agents of each other, the agent of the others and all the others the agent of each. * * * ” But, clearly, plaintiff could not invoke the benefits of that statute in the present suit, since he did not plead that he shipped his cattle on a contract for through shipment over the line of the appellant and its connecting line, the Ft. Worth Belt Railway Company. On the contrary, his allegations that appellant owned and operated a line from Boss to North Ft. Worth and entered into a contract with him to ship the cattle throughout the entire trip to North Ft. Worth negatived any contract for shipment over two connecting lines, and also negatived the fact that they were shipped over any railway except that of appellant.
It is insisted further that in order for appellant to urge as an excuse for unusual delay in the shipment the fact that there was an unprecedented rush of business which it could not reasonably have anticipated, it was incumbent upon it to plead that fact specially, and that since the only answer filed by'it was a general demurrer and a general denial, the testimony, to procure which a continuance was sought, would not have been admissible, and for that reason the trial court did not err in overruling that motion. The following are some of the authorities which are cited to support that contention: V. S. Civ. Stats, art. 6554; 10 Corpus Juris, p. 299; Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Hannay-Frerichs, 130 S. W. 250; Dobie on Bailments and Carriers, 438.
Appellee filed three exceptions to the motion for continuance which were as follows:
“(1) There is no pleading upon which to predicate such testimony continuance is sought for.
“(2) Said testimony of said witnesses is not shown to be material, but, on the contrary, shows affirmatively that such testimony is immaterial.
“(3) No diligence is shown to secure said testimony, and shows wholly a want of diligence.”
[8] The order overruling the motion is in general terms, and contains no recitals showing the basis of the ruling, but in tíre bill of exception to the ruling it is expressly stated that the reason the motion was overruled was that the testimony sought was immaterial. If the first exception to the motion was sufficient to present the contention now urged, and if that exception had been sustained, then it is reasonable to assume that appellant would have filed an amended answer containing such allegations as would have cured that objection. Under such circumstances, it would be unfair to appellant to deny it the right now to complain of the ruling, even though it could be said that thé testimony would not have been admissible under its plea of general denial.
[9] Appellee insists further that it is a matter of common knowledge, of which this court should take judicial cognizance, that in handling such shipments the Ft. Worth Belt Railway Company does not act as an independent connecting line, but only as the agent and employé of th’e railway company from which it receives the shipment, and to whom alone it looks for compensation for its services. This court has held the very reverse of that contention, and the same is overruled. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arnett, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 92 S. W. 57. And the decision last cited, together with that of our Supreme Court in Hunter v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Tex. 195, 13 S. W. 190, supports the conclusion, reached by us on original hearing, to which we adhere, that the evidence introduced was sufficient to show prima facie that appellant entered into a contract with appellee to transport the cattle to their destination at the stockyards in North Ft. Worth.
Accordingly the motion for rehearing is overruled.