Court Opinion

ID: 8849746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 17:09:04.551119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:27.387950
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
(.lime 11, 1S!>4.)
Before HABLAN, Circuit Justice, WOODS, Circuit Judge, and BUNN, District Judge.
WOODS, Circuit Judge.
"A rehearing is asked for the purpose,” says the petition, “of ascertaining definitely whether the following material questions are involved in the appeal, and, if so, whether they ha,ve been in whole or in part determined by the opinion filed or the decision rendered upon the hearing: First:. Does the so-called 'mortgage of the franchise’ cover the plant and other tangible property of the Oconto Water Company now in the hands of the receiver, and, if so, to what extent? Second. Should the order granting the injunction he wholly set aside, or only modified so far as it affects the rights or interest of Andrews and Whitcomb in the franchise? Third. Should the one hundred thousand dollars of bonds ordered delivered over to the clerk of the court as void be returned to Andrews and Whitcomb? Fourth. Was the so-called 'mortgage of the franchise’ a valid instrument? Fifth. If such instrument was valid, was the same so foreclosed, and the franchise covered thereby so sold, as to give to Andrews and Whitcomb the title to, and right of possession of, any property held by the receiver?”
We do not deem it necessary, or perhaps proper, to speak more definitely in respect to any of these questions. The granting or refusal of an injunction or restraining order pendente lite has always been a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court *790or judge'whose order was sought. If refused in the first instance, it might be granted at a later stage of the case or at the final hearing, and, if granted when asked, it might afterwards be revoked’ or modified, and at the final hearing be denied or made perpetual; and we are of opinion that it was not intended by the recent statute, which for the first time gave a right of appeal from interlocutory orders of injunction, that a decision upon the appeal from such an order should be conclusive upon the court in the further progress or in the final determination of the case. All that should be conclusively determined by such an appeal, we think, is that the order appealed from was a proper one when made, and therefore should be affirmed, subject to the discretion of the court thereafter to modify or annul it; or that, when made, the order was an improper one, and should be reversed or modified, subject likewise to the discretion of the court, upon a new or further showing, invoking the application of different rules or principles, to reinstate the order in the original or modified form, and at the final hearing to consider or reconsider all questions involved, whether of law or of fact, and give such judgment or decree as should seem right. From that judgment the aggrieved party would of course have the right to appeal and to obtain thereon a decision in all respects final. Notwithstanding the rule in respect to final judgments that, on a mándate from the supreme court affirming a decree, the circuit court must execute its decree as affirmed (Durant v. Essex Co., 101 U. S. 555), it has been decided that the affirmance of an interlocutory order of injunction does not operate to deprive the circuit court, of its inherent power to suspend the injunction, whenever the ends of justice call for the exercise of such power (Edison Electric Light Co. v. U. S. Electric Lighting Co., 59 Fed. 501, 8 C. C. A. 200); and by the same principle, we think, a decision on appeal reversing or modifying such an order should be deemed conclusive only in respect to the particular order reviewed, and that in the further progress and upon final hearing of the case in the circuit court the opinion and ruling on the appeal should be regarded as. advisory only,—more or less controlling, according to the circumstances. In this case the circuit court looked upon the mortgage of the appellants as a nullity. For the reasons given in the opinion, this court reached the opposite conclusion. But if, instead of the positive conviction declared, we had entertained grave doubt upon the point on which the question turned, it would have been our duty to rule just as we did, because an injunction before final hearing should be allowed only when the right to it is clear. Standard Elevator Co. v. Crane Elevator Co., 6 C. C. A. 100, 56 Fed. 718. It is plain, therefore, that our decision did not involve, and should not be regarded as, a technical and final adjudication, for the purposes of the case, of the points which we considered in reaching our conclusion that the order of the circuit court was wrong, or of the questions propounded in the petition for rehearing.
The question remains, what should be the scope of the mandate? It is not necessary to consider whether or not under the statute an appeal may be had from an order appointing a receiver. On that *791question, see Construction Co. v. Young, 59 Fed. 721, 8 C. C. A. 231; Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Munger, etc.. Co., 2 U. S. App. 188, 1 C. C. A. 668, 50 Fed. 785; Richmond v. Atwood, 2 C. C. A. 596, 52 Fed. 10; Pennsylvania Co. v. Jacksonville, etc., Ry. Co., 55 Fed. 131, 5 C. C. A. 53; American Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 148 U. S. 372, 13 Sup. Ct. 758. The appointment in this case was of a receiver of the property of the Oconto Waterworks Company, and of that the appellants cannot complain. The wrong done them was in ordering them to surrender to the receiver the possession of the waterworks plant of which they were in possession, claiming title under the foreclosure sale, in directing the receiver to take possession thereof, and in enjoining them against asserting title or claim to the property. These features of the order are prohibitory or mandatory in character, and subject to review upon appeal. The order whereby certain bonds were required to be delivered to the clerk involves no present harm to either party, and need not be disturbed. The mandate therefore will he that those portions of the order of the circuit court whereby the receiver was directed to take and the appellants to surrender possession of property, excepting the bonds aforesaid, and the appellants enjoined from asserting’ title, be set aside, and that the possession be restored to the appellants, unless for some cause, not apparent in the record before us, the possession of the receiver should be continued. The petition for a rehearing is overruled.
BAKER, District Judge, who participated in the original decision, concurs.