Court Opinion

ID: 9453356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:10:55.569518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:37.434082
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I believe that no hearing was required relating to the request of the defendant’s counsel to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty after he had been denied probation and had received a prison sentence.1
Whatever the defendant’s attorney may have represented to the defendant following a conference in the judge’s chambers regarding his chances of probation, the defendant was put on notice immediately thereafter by the judge in the courtroom that whether the defendant would be granted probation depended “on a lot of things which I [the judge] do not yet know; but I am not making you [the defendant] any promises, nor have I made any promises.” Thus any reliance that the defendant placed on what his lawyer may have told him pertaining to promises of leniency was dispelled by the subsequent discussion in the courtroom.
When the record is analyzed, even considering the gratuitous copies of the alleged affidavits of the defendant and his counsel (made a part of the brief filed by the defendant, but not filed either in the district court or in this court), there is no claim that either the district judge or the United States Attorney made an unqualified promise to grant probation. Moreover, the defendant at all times indicated both that no promises of any kind had been made to him directly and that he was never informed of any such promises by his attorney. The most that can be gleaned is that the judge indicated that he would consider probation if the background facts concerning the defendant were proved on investigation to be as represented by defense counsel at the conference in chambers, and that the United States Attorney stated he would have no objection to probation for the defendant. These representations are a far cry from a promise that probation will be granted which is made as an inducement for a plea of guilty.
Although the defendant’s state of mind at the time he entered his guilty plea is of utmost importance, speculation and conjecture is necessary to conclude that the defendant changed his plea to guilty because of some mistake or'misapprehension. There is no basis for viewing the in-court colloquy between the judge and the defendant as a mere ceremonial exercise designed to mask a “negotiated plea.” Rather, I believe the record demonstrates that the defendant and his lawyer were aware that he was taking a chance by changing his plea in the hope that he might receive probation. But changing a plea under such circumstances cannot later be converted into an action premised on mistake when the hope of leniency is frustrated by the imposition of a stiff penalty.
I agree with Judge KILEY’s views about the desirability of full disclosure on the record of any understanding between Government counsel and a defendant or his attorney in respect to a plea of guilty, save for two caveats. First, I think the term “plea bargaining” is unfortunate conveying, I fear, invidious overtones to both the legal profession and the public generally. Second, I believe that a trial judge should stand aloof as much as possible from any “negotiating” between Government counsel and a defendant or his attorney.

. It is not without significance that this request did not follow the recommendation of a “severe penalty” by the assistant United States Attorney, but came only after the sentence was pronounced.