Court Opinion

ID: 9725678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:59:16.928848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:17.820387
License: Public Domain

Lanphier, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I agree with the principle of law that an injunction is proper when essential to protect a property interest or when slander is published in aid of another tort.
I would hold that in this matter, the injunction was essential to preserve a property right and that the slander was in aid of another tort. As the majority states, Sullivan’s expressed goal was to put Dillon out of business and to become his “worst nightmare,” unless Dillon gave Sullivan something to which Sullivan was not legally entitled. That fits the classic definition *736of blackmail or extortion. The resulting statements of Sullivan attacked the reputation of Dillon. Reputation is an element of the goodwill of a business to a community. The goodwill of a business is as much an asset as its inventory. When an individual intentionally destroys goodwill with statements as in this case, the business has a right to stop the waste of this asset.
An injunction was the proper measure in this case. See, M. Ward & Co. v. United Employees, 400 Ill. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948); Horne v. Radiological Health Services, P.C., 83 Misc. 2d 446, 371 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975), aff’d 51 A.D.2d 544, 379 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1976); Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
I would affirm the decision of the district court.