Court Opinion

ID: 9728172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:00:47.520626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.493310
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellee BCM was awarded summary judgment in the trial court and was the sole surviving defendant in lawsuit brought by the appellant plaintiffs who were all employed in the Radnor School District Transportation Building which was a new one-story structure having been built in 1984. About the same time, the District began converting its bus fleet to diesel fuel rather than gasoline. Buses were parked next to the building where appellants worked. I respectfully dissent from the majority disposition, as I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. I would do so on two bases.
First, I find that the reasoning adopted by the majority in its reversal is not supported by the pleadings or briefs in this case. The majority finds that application of the statute of limitations in this case is controlled by a determination that the applicable two year commencement period is fixed by ascertaining when BCM’s tortious conduct occurred and further finds that there is a jury issue to be decided under discovery rule principles. BCM, an engineering firm, was retained to investigate the IAQ (indoor air quality) at the subject premises. Using the majority’s apt hypothetical, the theory of BCM’s responsibility may be described as a failure to diagnose (the presence of harmful substances in the environment). The majority then applies the discovery rule to suggest that the issue is when the employees may be charged with knowledge that their injuries were “continuing” as a result of BCM’s failure to discover (or diagnose) the presence of harmful substances. It is then decided that this presents an issue for jury determination.
The concept that this lawsuit involves dual statute of limitations initiation dates—one for those who allegedly caused the disease, another for BCM who allegedly, by reason of its faulty IAQ, caused the injuries to persist, is not supported by the asserted claims of the appellants. I do not find the dual statute distinction set forth in the pleadings nor is it articulated in appellants’ briefs on appeal, even though new briefs were prepared for reargument en banc. While the theory is clearly expressed by the majority, my examination of the pleadings and briefs do not disclose reasoned assertion or argumentation of the dual statute theory by the parties. It is fundamental to our appellate review that issues not raised or argued, are deemed waived. In re Appeal of Municipality of Penn Hills, 519 Pa. 164, 546 A.2d 50 (1988); Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa.Super. 36, 532 A.2d 441 (1987); Bunt v. Pension Mtg. Associates, Inc., 446 Pa.Super. 359, 666 A.2d 1091 (1995); Santillo v. Reedel, 430 Pa.Super. 290, 634 A.2d 264 (1993); Arthur v. Ruchar, 546 Pa. 12, 682 A.2d 1250 (1996); Smith v. King’s Grant Condominium, 418 Pa.Super. 260, 614 A.2d 261 (1992), aff'd. 537 Pa. 51, 640 A.2d 1276 (1994). Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 544 Pa. 387, 676 A.2d 652 (1996); Murray v. Hamot Medical Center, 429 Pa.Super. 625, 633 A.2d 196 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 632, 658 A.2d 796; Kalenevitch v. Finger, 407 Pa.Super. 431, 595 A.2d 1224 (1991).
It is true that an appellate court may affirm the decision of a trial court for reasons other than those proffered by the trial court. McAdoo Borough v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 506 Pa. 422, 485 A.2d 761 (1984); Williams v. Otis Elevator Co., 409 Pa.Super. 486, 598 A.2d 302 (1991). However, the majority reverses the trial court on a theory not raised in the trial court or argued on appeal. I would conclude that it is error to reverse a judgment of the trial court on a theory not presented to, or adjudicated in, the trial court, indeed, one which has not been articulated on appeal before this court.
*491Assuming, however, the propriety of the majority rationale, I would, nevertheless dissent since I believe that the trial court properly granted summary judgment under either statute of limitations theory.
We are instructed as to our standard of review that:
A trial court’s order granting summary judgment will not be reversed unless it is established that the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion (citing cases)
Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 666 A.2d 245, 249 (1995).
Cochran further cautions us that:
—the discovery rule is an exception to the rule that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises.
—one who claims benefit of the discovery rule, has the burden of establishing its applicability.
—the statute is not tolled by mistake or misunderstanding.
—diligent investigation may include obtaining further medical or legal assistance.
—a party must use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the cause of his injury.
Cochran, 666 A.2d at 248, 249.
Accepting the majority view that appellants claims against BCM must be for such losses as were incurred as a result of the prolongation of their maladies which can be traced to the deficient IAQ study done by BCM, we first observe that BCM reported its definitive study on May 10, 19881 and that the three appellants filed suit on January 21, 1992, over three years and eight months after the alleged faulty IAQ study.
As the trial court noted, it is abundantly clear that appellants had notice of an injury as early as the late 1980’s. In fact, it was because of their symptomology that BCM was brought in to do the May, 1988, test.2 (The BCM IAQ survey report initially states that the survey was done “to evaluate potential stressors that may have a potential to contribute to the expression of symptoms experienced by some employees”). The majority suggests that the cause was not discovered until an investigation by another firm in 1991 pinpointed diesel fumes as the offending substance. Since every history of this case discloses that the onset of appellants’ symptoms were contemporaneous with the changeover to diesel fuel in buses which were approximate to the appellants’ workplace, it is difficult to comprehend why due diligence would not have disclosed the apparent nexus, as well as the ineptitude of the BCM study well within the two years which the law allots.
Given, then, the presence of sufficient work-related symptomology by appellants to cause their employer to contract for IAQ studies and, further, given the easy discover-ability of BCM’s tortiously inaccurate IAQ study, it is abundantly clear that appellants, from May 10, 1988 forward, had a statutory two years to employ due diligence and whatever medical and legal advice and investigations were necessary to pursue their claims. Thus, appellants were alerted to determine A) a diagnosis of their illness; B) the likely cause of their illness3 and, C) the role of BCM in prolonging their illness by reason of its faulty study.
*492Based upon the principles set forth by our supreme court in Pocono International Raceway v. Pocono Produce, 503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468 (1983) and Cochran v. G.A.F. (supra), I would affirm the trial court conclusion that summary judgment is appropriately entered in favor of BCM.
Finally, I am in agreement with the majority in rejecting appellants’ contention that BCM is estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense.

. BCM did later follow-up studies which are of no present consequence.

. There is record evidence that all three appellants suffered relevant physical complaints in and about 1988.

. All three appellants, in their complaints, rely upon a later study of the HVAC systems and, in all but verbatim identical averments, complain that:
This environmental survey found contaminated areas trapped in the humidifiers with high concentrations of fungal antigents that include Cladosporium, Candida and Aureoba-sidium.
The survey also found very poor ventilation as evidenced by trapped diesel fuel fumes, combustion contaminants in the building and poor air movement in the offices, as well as problems with airborne fiberglass.
As a result of the above. Plaintiff has been caused to expend substantial sums of money for medical care, treatment and therapy, and has incurred various miscellaneous expenses, which expenses will continue indefinitely into the future.