Court Opinion

ID: 9392088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 07:00:19.071049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:19.189637
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CINDY M. DABNER,                                DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         CH-1221-17-0112-W-1
                                                     CH-1221-18-0483-W-1
                  v.

     ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
       AGENCY,                                       DATE: May 3, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Chungsoo Lee, Feasterville, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Debra K. Smith, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed petitions for review of the initial decisions that
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
     We JOIN the appeals for processing under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36. For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petitions for review, VACATE the

     1
      A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     initial decisions, and REMAND these now joined appeals to the regional office
     for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is a GS-13 Environmental Scientist for the agency. Dabner v.
     Environmental Protection Agency, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-17-0112-W-1,
     Initial Appeal File (0112 IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 16 at 4.         In July 2016, the
     appellant filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC), alleging that the agency took multiple personnel actions against her
     between 2013 and 2016, in retaliation for various disclosures that she had made
     between 2012 and 2016. 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 8-29. After 120 days had elapsed
     without a decision from OSC, on December 6, 2016, the appellant filed the instant
     IRA appeal. Id. at 4.
¶3        The administrative judge issued an order, notifying the appellant of her
     jurisdictional burden and ordering her to file evidence and argument on the issue.
     0112 IAF, Tab 3. After the record on jurisdiction closed, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.    0112
     IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (0112 ID). She found that the appellant failed to
     exhaust some of her claimed disclosures before OSC, and that the appellant failed
     to make a nonfrivolous allegation that any of her remaining disclosures were
     protected. 0112 ID at 3-10.
¶4        The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative
     judge’s jurisdictional analysis.    Dabner v. Environmental Protection Agency,
     MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-17-0112-W-1, Petition for Review (0112 PFR) File,
     Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.
¶5        Around the time that she filed her petition for review in the first appeal, on
     March 15, 2018, the appellant filed a second whistleblower complaint with OSC,
     again alleging that the agency retaliated against her for various protected
     disclosures.   Dabner v. Environmental Protection Agency, MSPB Docket
                                                                                        3

     No. CH-1221-17-0483-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0483 IAF), Tab 1 at 22-25.
     After 120 days had elapsed without a decision from OSC, on December 6, 2016,
     the appellant filed another IRA appeal. 0483 IAF, Tab 1.
¶6         The administrative judge notified the appellant of her jurisdictional burden
     in that appeal as well, and after the record on jurisdiction closed, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction. 0483 IAF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (0483 ID). She found that the
     appellant was attempting to raise several claims that had already been litigated in
     her previous appeal, and that she was collaterally estopped from doing so . 0483
     ID at 2-4.   Regarding the appellant’s remaining claims, she found that the
     appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before OSC and failed to
     make a nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosures were protected.         0483 ID
     at 5-8.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review of that initial decision as well,
     disputing the administrative judge’s jurisdictional analysis.            Dabner v.
     Environmental Protection Agency, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-17-0112-W-1,
     Petition for Review (0483 PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.

                                         ANALYSIS
¶8         To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must show
     by preponderant evidence that she exhausted her remedies before OSC, and make
     nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in a protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).        Linder v. Department of
     Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(1). The U.S. Court
     of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the Board may not deny
     jurisdiction by crediting the agency’s interpretation of the evidence as to whether
                                                                                         4

      the alleged disclosures fell within the protected categori es or whether the
      disclosures were a contributing factor in an adverse personnel action. Hessami v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

      The appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that she made two disclosures
      protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), and engaged in one activity protected
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) and another activity protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(D).
¶9          Because we have joined these appeals for processing, we find it unnecessary
      to decide whether the administrative judge correctly applied the doctrine of
      collateral estoppel in the second appeal. Nevertheless, we agree with her that the
      ten different disclosures and activities that the appellant raised in these two
      appeals overlap to a certain extent. 0483 ID at 2-3. We will address each of
      these matters in turn.
¶10         Under Disclosure 1, the appellant alleged that, between 2009 and 2010, she
      disclosed gross mismanagement and gross waste of funds, violations of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302, Federal Acquisition Regulations, and Environmental Protection Agency
      Acquisition Regulations. 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 4. The administrative judge found
      that the appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to
      this claim because she did not raise it with sufficient specificity in her OSC
      complaint. 0112 ID at 5; 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 20.
¶11         On petition for review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s
      exhaustion analysis. 0112 PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15. However, regardless of
      whether the appellant exhausted her administrative remedies, we find that she has
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure. 2

      2
        The appellant alleged in her Board appeal that she disclosed these matters to the
      agency’s Office of Inspector General, an activity which could be protected under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) regardless of whether it would otherwise be protected under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 4. However, the appellant made no such
      allegation before OSC, and we therefore find that she failed to exhaust her
      administrative remedies as to any such claim. See Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 7 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1993). While this case was pending on review,
      the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued Delgado v. Merit Systems
                                                                                               5

      The appellant’s invocation of a series of statutes and regulations, without any
      explanation of why she believed that they had been violated or even a general
      description of the facts and circumstances supporting her belief, is the sort of
      vague and conclusory assertion that the Board has found does not constitute a
      nonfrivolous allegation.     0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 20, Tab 9 at 4; see Francis v.
      Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 11 (2013); Boechler v.
      Department of the Interior, 109 M.S.P.R. 542, 548-49 (2008), aff’d, 328 F.
      App’x. 660 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The appellant asserts that there is no requirement
      for her “to cite the correct and specific rules and regulations [she] is alleging to
      have been violated.” 0112 PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. In some situations this may be
      true, see DiGiorgio v. Department of the Navy, 84 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 14 (1999), but
      the appellant in this case has also failed to identify the Government actions that
      were the subject of her alleged disclosures.
¶12         Under Disclosure 2, the appellant alleged that, between 2012 and 2015, she
      reported to various individuals in the agency that the agency was granting unfair
      preference and advantages to Caucasian employees.             0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5.
      Although the appellant identified these disclosures in her OSC complaint,
      0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 20, the administrative judge found that she failed to articulate
      the matter to OSC with sufficient clarity and precision so as to satisfy the
      exhaustion requirement, 0112 ID at 4-5.
¶13         On petition for review, the appellant argues that if she could have pursued
      discovery “she would have uncovered sufficient information and records to

      Protection Board, 880 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2018), rejecting what it viewed as the
      “unusually stringent approach” of determining exhaustion “separately for each fact that
      an employee alleges rather than for each claim of protected disclosure or retaliation.”
      Id. at 923 (emphasis in original). Rather, the court concluded, the exhaustion
      requirement is satisfied if the appellant has provided OSC “sufficient information to
      permit a legally sophisticated reader to understand [the] charge of retaliation and to
      investigate further.” Id. at 927. We find that, to enable a legally sophisticated reader to
      understand a charge of retaliation for disclosing information to an Inspector General, an
      employee must at least inform the reader that she made such a disclosure.
                                                                                       6

      establish a sufficient basis for OSC to pursue investigation.”    0112 PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 14. However, because jurisdiction in an IRA appeal is established by
      making nonfrivolous allegations and the appellant here retained documentation
      concerning her communications with OSC, we find that the administrative judge
      did not abuse her discretion in deciding these appeals prior to the completion of
      discovery, and that the appellant cannot demonstrate that her substantive rights
      were thereby prejudiced. E.g., 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 8-45; see Davis v. Department
      of Defense, 103 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 13 (2006); Sobczak v. Environmental Protection
      Agency, 64 M.S.P.R. 118, 122 (1994).
¶14        Furthermore, even if the appellant had satisfied the exhaustion requirement,
      we find that the Board would still lack IRA jurisdiction over these disclosures
      because disclosures alleging race discrimination are covered under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(1)(A), rather than 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Redschlag v. Department of
      the Army, 89 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 84 (2001); Nogales v. Department of the Treasury,
      63 M.S.P.R. 460, 464 (1994).         The Board has recently found that the
      Whistleblower   Protection   Enhancement    Act   of   2012   (WPEA),    Pub.   L.
      No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, does not alter the longstanding principle that
      Title VII claims are excluded from coverage under the whistleblower protection
      statutes. Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 21-23.
¶15        Disclosures 3, 4, and 5 are similar in nature, and we will address them
      together. Disclosure 3 occurred during a November 2014 meeting, in which the
      appellant allegedly informed her first- and second-level supervisors that the Ohio
      Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was failing to enforce environmental
      protection laws. 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 3; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5. Disclosure 4
      concerns a September 25, 2015 report that the appellant created, again informing
      her first- and second-level supervisors of the Ohio EPA’s failure to enforce
      environmental laws.    0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 5; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 5.         Under
      Disclosure 5, the appellant alleged that, on November 3, 2015, she disclosed to
      her first- and second-level supervisors that the agency and the Ohio EPA were
                                                                                             7

      duplicating inspections of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, leading to a waste of
      time and money by the Ohio EPA. 3 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 5; 0483, Tab 4 at 6. The
      administrative judge did not separately address Disclosure 3 in her initial
      decision, but the appellant reasserts the matter on petition for review. 0112 PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 7.    In her initial decision, the administrative judge considered
      Disclosures 4 and 5, but she found that the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that they were protected. 0112 ID at 7 -9.
¶16         The appellant disputes the administrative judge’s findings on these
      disclosures, and we have considered her arguments. 0112 PFR File, Tab 1 at 18,
      20-21. To the extent that the administrative judge’s analysis took into account
      the agency’s interpretation of the appellant’s disclosures , we find that, under
      Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1368-69, this was error. 4 Nevertheless, we find that the
      appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that any of these three
      disclosures were protected because she has not explained how the alleged
      shortcomings of the Ohio EPA might implicate the “interests and good name” of
      the Federal Government. Ivey v. Department of the Treasury, 94 M.S.P.R. 224,
      ¶ 11 (2003) (citing Arauz v. Department of Justice, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7 (2001)).
      Reports by Government employees concerning the possible breach of law or
      regulation by a private party generally do not constitute protected disclosures.
      Willis v. Department of Agriculture, 141 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
      superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Salazar v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 42. The same principle applies to allegations of

      3
        To the extent that the Disclosure 5 could be construed as pertaining to an alleged
      waste of Federal funds, we find that the appellant could not have had a reasonable
      belief in this regard. Under 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c), the Federal inspection of hazardous
      waste facilities is mandatory regardless of whether a state with overlapping jurisdiction
      might also choose to conduct an inspection. We find that the appellant’s opinion that
      the agency wasted funds because it performed duties required by statute is not protected
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      4
       The administrative judge did not have the benefit of Hessami at the time she issued
      her initial decision.
                                                                                          8

      wrongdoing by state and local governments. Such disclosures are protected only
      if they implicate the interests and good name of the Federal Government. See
      Miller v. Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 175, ¶¶ 11-13 (2005)
      (finding that alleged misconduct by state law enforcement officers implicated the
      interests and good name of the Federal Government because the misconduct was
      alleged to have occurred in the presence of Federal agents during their joint
      execution of a warrant); see also Covington v. Department of the Interior,
      2023 MSPB 5, ¶¶ 15-19 (finding that the WPEA did not change the longstanding
      principle that a disclosure of wrongdoing committed by a non -Federal
      Government entity may be protected only when the Federal Government’s
      interests and good name are implicated in the alleged wrongdo ing).         We find
      nothing in the record to suggest that such a connection might exist in this case.
¶17        Under Disclosure 6, the appellant alleged that, in November 2015, she
      disclosed to two agency managers that her personal health information had been
      sent unencrypted to her supervisor, in violation of the Health Insurance
      Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Privacy Act.           0112 IAF
      Tab 9 at 5; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 6. In her initial decision, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect
      to this disclosure. 0112 ID at 6. She found that HIPAA and the Privacy Act
      cover certain transmissions of specific information by designated entities, and
      that the appellant, in her OSC complaint, failed to specify who sent what to whom
      and under what conditions, thus making it impossible for OSC to conduct any
      type of investigation.   0112 ID at 5-6. She further found that the appellant’s
      attempt to elaborate on her disclosure during the jurisdictional re sponse was
      insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 0112 ID at 6.
¶18        On petition for review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s
      exhaustion analysis. 0112 PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-16. However, regardless of
      whether the appellant might have exhausted this claim, we find that she failed to
      make a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed that the agency
                                                                                        9

      violated HIPAA, the Privacy Act, or any other law, rule, or regulation.        The
      appellant does not identify the party who sent the personally identifiable
      information to her supervisor, so it is impossible for us to determine whether the
      Federal Government might have initiated the transmission or whether the alleged
      wrongdoing was committed by a non-Federal entity, as with Disclosures 3, 4,
      and 5 discussed above. Moreover, even assuming that the Federal Government or
      an associated private entity transmitted this information, there is no indication
      that it was kept in a “system of records” so that its disclosure would be covered
      under the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5), (b), or that the entity that
      transmitted the information was a “covered entity” or “business associate” such
      that the transmission would be covered under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, see
      42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500(a), .502(a). The appellant’s failure
      to describe the facts and circumstances of this alleged transmission of information
      prevents us from making a finding that she reasonably believed that it constituted
      any violation of any law, rule, or regulation.
¶19         Under Disclosure 7, the appellant alleged that, on November 17, 2015, she
      disclosed to her first- and second-level supervisors two violations of Federal
      environmental law at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 5;
      0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 6. The administrative judge found that the appellant cited
      Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for violating contingency plan emergency
      procedures and allowing hazardous waste to accumulate for too long, but that her
      supervisor disagreed with the citation and ordered the appellant to draft a report
      returning the base to compliance. 0112 ID at 9. Considering the supervisor’s
      rationale, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed that her disclosure evidenced
      a violation of law. 0112 ID at 9-10.
¶20         On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
      erred in accepting her supervisor’s assessment of the underlying violations. 0112
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-21. We agree, and we find that the administrative judge
                                                                                          10

      improperly considered the agency’s interpretation of the evidence in assessing the
      appellant’s prima facie case. See Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1368-69. Restricting our
      analysis to the appellant’s pleadings and her OSC complaint s, we find that she
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that her November 17, 2015 disclosure evidenced
      a violation of law. Although the appellant did not identify the particular law s that
      she alleges Wright-Patterson Air Force Base violated, she has at least identified
      the general nature of the alleged violations. 5 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 20. Considering
      the low standard for a nonfrivolous allegation and the appellant’s professional
      expertise in this area, we find that she made a nonfrivolous allegation that she
      reasonably believed that such violations occurred. See Embree v. Department of
      the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996) (considering the appellant’s asserted
      subject matter expertise in finding that she made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      gross mismanagement in connection with agency collection efforts). We further
      find that the appellant raised this matter before OSC with sufficient clarity so as
      to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 20; 0483 IAF, Tab 1
      at 23; see Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir.
      1992) (stating that, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)
      in an IRA appeal, an appellant must inform OSC of the precise ground of her
      charge of whistleblowing, giving OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an
      investigation which might lead to corrective action).
¶21           Under Disclosure 8, the appellant claims that, on April 7, 2016, she filed a
      Form 12 disclosure with OSC, alleging that the agency was failing to protect
      confidential business information. 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 32-45, 0483 IAF, Tab 4
      at 6.   The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to exhaust her

      5
        The appellant states that her disclosure concerned violations of 42 U.S.C. § 6926 and
      40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3). 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 8; 0483 IAF, Tab 1 at 23, Tab 4 at 6.
      This does not seem correct because those provisions set forth the requirements that
      states must meet in order to administer certain hazardous waste programs. They set
      forth no substantive rules to govern contingency plan eme rgencies or the accumulation
      of hazardous waste.
                                                                                         11

      administrative remedies with respect to this disclosure             because making
      disclosures to OSC’s Disclosure Unit does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement
      under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); 0112 ID at 3; see Mason v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 16 (2011). She further found that the appellant’s
      whistleblower complaint did not list the filing of the Form 12 as a protected
      activity. 0112 ID at 3-4.
¶22           On petition for review, the appellant argues that she did, in fact, raise this
      matter in her whistleblower complaint.       0112 PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11.       The
      appellant is correct. 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 24; 0483 IAF, Tab 1 at 23. Further, we
      find that she raised the matter with sufficient specificity so as to satisfy the
      exhaustion requirement. 0112 IAF, Tab 1 at 24; 0483 IAF, Tab 1 at 23. We also
      find that, regardless of whether the content of the Form 12 disclosure would
      otherwise be protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the disclosure itself
      constitutes protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).        See Salerno v.
      Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 12 (2016).
¶23           Under Disclosure 9, the appellant alleges that, in June or July 2016, she
      disclosed to her first- and second-level supervisors that they were committing a
      gross waste of funds by ordering the re-inspection of a hazardous waste facility
      that had already been issued an informal notice of violation. 0483 IAF, Tab 4
      at 6.   In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
      failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to this disclosure because, after
      the appellant filed her complaint, the OSC examiner emailed the appellant and
      asked her to provide a copy of the disclosure and any response she received, but
      the appellant merely responded, “I was removed from the case after emailing the
      EPA management of my whistleblower activity.” 0483 ID at 5; 0483 IAF, Tab 4
      at 12, 14.
¶24           On petition for review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s
      exhaustion analysis. 0483 PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. We agree with the appellant
      that she exhausted her remedies with respect to this disclosure. Specifically, we
                                                                                           12

      find that the appellant’s failure to respond fully to OSC’s follow -up inquiry is not
      dispositive of the issue, and in fact, it could be viewed as evidence that OSC
      actually followed up by investigating the matter. In any event, considering the
      contents of the whistleblower complaint itself, we find that the appellant pro vided
      OSC with the essential information about this disclosure, including approximately
      when she made it, the individuals who received it, and its subject matter. 0483
      IAF, Tab 1 at 23.
¶25         We further find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegati on that
      she reasonably believed that her disclosure evidenced a gross waste of funds or an
      abuse of authority. For purposes of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), a
      “gross waste of funds” is a more than debatable expenditure that is significantly
      out of proportion to the benefit reasonably expected to accrue to the Government.
      Embree, 70 M.S.P.R. at 85. We find that the appellant has alleged sufficient facts
      that, if proven, could show that the agency spent time and resources conducting a
      completely unnecessary inspection of a hazardous waste facility that was of no
      benefit to the Government. 6 0483 IAF, Tab 1 at 23, Tab 4 at 6. Under the WPA,
      an “abuse of authority” includes an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a
      Federal employee that results in personal gain or advantage to preferred other
      persons. Sirgo v. Department of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 261, 267 (1995). We find
      that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure evidenced a
      reasonable belief that her supervisors abused their authority by ordering a second
      inspection in order to drag out proceedings and help the business being inspected

      6
        The appellant does not specify how much she believes that this inspection cost to
      conduct, but she states that it was conducted by “a team of inspectors that included two
      attorneys.” 0843 IAF, Tab 4 at 6. It would therefore appear that the cost of conducting
      this inspection was more than de minimis. See S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 8 (2012) (“[T]he
      Committee notes that, with respect to a disclosure of ‘gross mismanagement,’ a ‘gross
      waste’ of funds, or a ‘substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,’ the
      statute requires more than disclosure of de minimis wrongdoing.”), as reprinted in
      2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 596.
                                                                                     13

      to avoid the enforcement action that should have been commenced against it.
      0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 6.
¶26        Under Disclosure 10, the appellant alleges that, on October 7, 2016, she
      acquiesced to her supervisor’s order to change her responses on a Technical
      Contact Review Checklist for an Ohio EPA grant work plan but signed the form
      “under duress” and wrote “[w]ill review the current budget upon receipt” in
      response to whether the budgeted costs were reasonable. 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 7,
      151-54, Tab 8 at 243-44.     She provided a series of emails showing that her
      supervisor directed her to change her responses to reflect that the Ohio EPA had
      an approved quality assurance project plan and quality management plan and to
      “mark the grant as approved” to comport with the appellant’s August 19, 2016
      signed hard copy. 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 151-52. The emails also reflect that the
      appellant informed her supervisor that she did not agree with the directive
      because she had not been provided the Ohio EPA’s plans for review and did not
      believe that the budgeted cost associated with the project was reasonable.     Id.
      at 151. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to exhaust her
      administrative remedies on this matter, and she further found that the appellant
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosure was protected because
      it represented a mere disagreement with her supervisor about the use of agency
      authority. 0483 ID at 7-8.
¶27        On petition for review, the appellant has filed a closeout letter from OSC,
      reflecting that after the initial decision in her second appeal was issued, OSC
      became aware of her October 7, 2016 disclosure and considered whether it might
      form the basis for a claim of whistleblower retaliation. 0483 PFR File, Tab 1
      at 25-30. Under these circumstances, we find that the exhaustion requirement is
      satisfied. See Atkinson v. Department of State, 107 M.S.P.R. 136, ¶ 12 (2007)
      (accepting evidence that the appellant submitted for the first time on review
      showing that he exhausted his OSC remedy); Hawkins v. Department of
      Commerce, 98 M.S.P.R. 107, ¶¶ 7-8 (2004) (remanding an IRA appeal that
                                                                                       14

      became ripe while pending on petition for review because OSC terminat ed its
      inquiry and informed the appellant of his Board appeal rights).
¶28        We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that this disclosure was protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). The appellant’s own submissions show that this claimed disclosure
      did not contain any allegations of danger or Government wrongdoing. Rather, it
      amounted to a disagreement with her supervisor’s instructions to amend her
      Technical Contact Review Checklist to show approval of the Ohio EPA’s project
      and management plans, and that the budgeted cost was reasonable. 0483 IAF,
      Tab 4 at 7, 151-52.      The Board has held that the statutory protection for
      whistleblowers is not a weapon in arguments over policy or a shield for
      insubordinate conduct. Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248,
      ¶ 8 (2015). A disclosure that an agency decision or ruling is legally incorrect is
      not a disclosure protected under the WPA.           O’Donnell v. Department of
      Agriculture, 120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶¶ 14-15 (2013), aff’d, 561 Fed. App’x 926 (Fed.
      Cir. 2014).   Even under the expanded protections afforded to whistleblowers
      under the WPEA, general philosophical or policy disagreements with agency
      decisions or actions are not protected unless they separately constitute a protected
      disclosure of one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A).
      Webb, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 8; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D). Here, the appellant’s
      disagreements about whether to approve the Ohio EPA’s plans and the
      reasonableness of the budgeted cost do not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of
      any of the covered categories of wrongdoing.
¶29        Nevertheless, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that her resistance to her supervisor’s instructions constituted pro tected activity
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D), which protects an employee from retaliation for
      “refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law, rule,
      or regulation.” Specifically, the appellant alleged that her supervisor instructed
      her to indicate on the Technical Contact Review Checklist that she had reviewed
                                                                                      15

      the Ohio EPA’s Quality Assurance Plan, when in fact, she had not. Based on
      these allegations, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that she refused, at least initially, to follow an order that would require he r to
      falsify a Federal document in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
¶30        It appears that the appellant may have made Disclosure 7 during the normal
      course of her duties to investigate and disclose noncompliance with Federal
      environmental laws.     The WPEA added a provision providing that “[i]f a
      disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the
      disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection [ 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)] if [the
      agency takes a personnel action] with respect to that employee in reprisal for the
      disclosure.” WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 101(b)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 1465, 1466
      (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2012)). In December 2017, Congress amended
      section 2302(f)(2), adding language that the provision applies to disclosing
      employees “the principal job function of whom is to regularly investigate and
      disclose wrongdoing.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
      (2018 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(ii), 131 Stat. 1283, 1618
      (2017). The Board has held that the 2018 NDAA clarified the intent of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) and therefore the language of that subsection as amended by the
      2018 NDAA applies to all pending cases even if the events at issue occurred
      before the 2018 NDAA was enacted. Salazar, 2022 MSPB 42, ¶¶ 15-21.
¶31        The determination of whether a disclosure made in the normal course of
      duties is protected will often require factual findings best made after a more
      complete development of the record. Accordingly, that determination should be
      made as part of an appellant’s prima facie case and not at the jurisdictional stage
      of an IRA appeal. Therefore, the administrative judge should provide the parties
      with an opportunity to provide evidence and argument on remand as to whether
      Disclosure 7 is covered by section 2302(f)(2). To the extent section 2302(f)(2)
      applies, the appellant will also have the burden of proving, as part of her prima
                                                                                          16

      facie case, that the agency took the alleged personnel actions in reprisal for
      Disclosure 7.
¶32         In sum, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that
      Disclosures 7 and 9 were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), Disclosure 8
      was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), and Disclosure 10 was protected
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D). We also find that the appellant has exhausted
      her administrative remedies with respect to these matters.

      The appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency took personnel
      actions against her.
¶33         In these appeals, the appellant alleged that the agency took numerous
      retaliatory personnel actions against her between June 2013 and February 2018.
      0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 6-8; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 7-9. However, because the earliest
      disclosure still at issue, Disclosure 7, did not occur until November 17, 2015, we
      decline to consider any alleged personnel actions that occurred prior to that date.
      See Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 27 (finding that disclosures made after the
      personnel actions at issue could not have been contributing factors in those
      actions). The alleged personnel actions that occurred during the relevant time
      period include the following:     (1) a 13-day suspension effective February 11,
      2016 7; (2) a June 1, 2016 order to undergo a psychiatric examination ;
      (3) 13 nonselections for appointment, detail, transfer, and reassignment between
      June 20, 2016, and October 12, 2018; (4) denial of opportunity to participate in
      developmental programs on July 28, 2016, and January 11, 2017; (5) an
      October 17, 2017 performance evaluation; (6) a November 6, 2017 denial of
      monetary award; and (7) a significant change in working conditions. 0122 IAF,
      Tab 9 at 6-8; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 7-9.

      7
        The appellant listed the 13-day suspension and the corresponding proposal as separate
      personnel actions. 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 8. Although the proposal could be viewed
      separately as a threatened personnel action, see Bacas v. Department of the Army,
      99 M.S.P.R. 464, ¶ 5 (2005), we find it more appropriate under the circumstances of
      this case to consider it as part and parcel of the suspension itself.
                                                                                              17

¶34         Addressing each of these seven matters in turn, we find that the 13-day
      suspension     would     constituted    a    “personnel     action”    under     5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii). Likewise, an order to undergo psychiatric examination is
      specifically listed as a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(x). 8
      Nonselections and decisions on details, transfers, and reassignments also
      constitute personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iv). 9               It
      appears that the two developmental programs that the appellant identified may
      have constituted training or education that could reasonably be expected to lead
      to a promotion or other favorable personnel action, and thus she has
      nonfrivolously alleged that the agency’s denial of her participation in these
      programs would be covered under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).                         The
      performance evaluation would constitute a personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii), and the denial of a monetary award would likely constitute
      a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix) as a “decision concerning
      pay and benefits.” See Hagen v. Department of Transportation, 103 M.S.P.R.
      595, ¶ 13 (2006).
¶35         Finally, a significant change in working conditions is a personnel action
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). The appellant did not explicitly claim that
      she was subjected to a significant change in working condit ions, but she did
      allege that that she was denied the opportunity for telework and for flexibility in
      her work schedule. 0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 6, 8. Decisions about such matters are

      8
        The agency disputes the appellant’s characterization of this alle ged personnel action,
      arguing that it was not a psychiatric examination but was instead “Communication
      Enhancement and Professional Development” training. 0112 IAF, Tab 15 at 15. This is
      a dispute of fact that cannot be appropriately resolved at the juri sdictional stage of the
      proceedings. See Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1369.
      9
         The appellant characterizes some of these alleged personnel actions as denials of
      “transfer” and others as denials of “reassignment.” 0843 IAF, Tab 4 at 7 -9. In context,
      it appears that the appellant may not be using these terms as they are defined in
      5 C.F.R. § 210.102(b). This distinction is not important at the jurisdictional stage, but
      it may become important during the merits phase to identify accurately the type of
      personnel action at issue.
                                                                                      18

      not separately enumerated as personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A),
      but they can be part of a significant change in working conditions . See Rumsey v.
      Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 23 (2013) (finding that cancellation
      of the appellant’s telework agreement constituted a significant change in working
      conditions).   In determining whether an appellant has suffered a significant
      change in her working conditions, the Board must consider the alleged agency
      actions both collectively and individually and consider whether they have
      practical and significant effects on the overall nature and quality of her working
      conditions. Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16. It
      is not clear whether the appellant will ultimately be able to prove by preponderant
      evidence that she was subjected to a significant change in working conditions,
      particularly because the record does not reveal what her telework and scheduling
      options were prior to November 17, 2015. However, we find that her pleadings
      are sufficient to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel action within the
      Board’s jurisdiction. In sum, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that all of these matters, either alone or in combination, fit the
      definition of “personnel action” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).

      The appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that Disclosures 7, 8, 9 , and 10
      contributed to these personnel actions.
¶36         We next determine whether the appellant has made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that Disclosures 7, 8, 9, and 10 were contributing factors in these
      claimed personnel actions. The most common way of proving contributing factor
      is through the knowledge/timing test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). Ayers v. Department
      of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 25 (2015). Under that test, an appellant can
      prove the contributing factor element through evidence that the official taking the
      personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and took the personnel
      action within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that
      the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action . Id.
                                                                                          19

¶37         In this case, the appellant alleges that her first- and second-level
      supervisors were both personally aware of Disclosures 7, 9, and 10, as of
      November 17, 2015, “June or July 2016, and October 7, 2016 respectively.” 10
      0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 5; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 6-7. The appellant further alleges that
      either one or both of these officials were involved in the 13 nonselections, the
      denial of opportunities to participate in developmental programs, the performance
      evaluation, and the denial of a monetary award. 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 7-9. The
      record also shows that the appellant’s second-level supervisor was the proposing
      official in the 13-day suspension. 0112 IAF, Tab 20 at 68. Although the alleged
      psychiatric examination appears to have been ordered by a different official, the
      Division Director, the record also shows that it was prompted by the first -level
      supervisor’s complaints to the Division Director about the appellant’s behavior
      after she returned from her 13-day suspension. Id. at 77-79. We find that the
      possibility that the appellant’s first-level supervisor influenced the Division
      Director’s decision is sufficient to raise a nonfriv olous allegation that the
      Division Director had constructive knowledge of the appellant’s disclosure. See
      Marchese v. Department of the Navy, 65 M.S.P.R. 104, 108-09 (1994).
¶38         Regarding scheduling and telework, the appellant does not identify the
      officials who were involved in making these decisions, and the documentary
      evidence fails to shed any light on the issue. However, we take notice that a first-
      or second-level supervisor would typically be involved in decisions about
      scheduling and telework. In light of the low evidentiary burden at this stage of
      the appeal, we find that the appellant’s allegations are sufficient for us inf er that

      10
         We acknowledge that the imprecision with which the appellant pled the date of
      Disclosure 9 leaves an open question as to whether it could possibly have been a
      contributing factor in the June 20 and 22, 2016 nonselections for reassignment or the
      July 28, 2016 “notice of non nomination to the Capital Hill Program.” 0483 IAF, Tab 4
      at 6-8. For jurisdictional purposes, however, we will give this pro se appellant the
      benefit of the doubt and assume that the disclosure predated all three of these claimed
      personnel actions.
                                                                                       20

      her first- and second-level supervisors, officials with actual knowledge of her
      disclosure, at least influenced the scheduling and telework decisions. Thus, with
      respect to Disclosures 7, 9, and 10, the appellant has made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the knowledge component of the knowledge/timing test is satisfied
      for every one of the alleged personnel actions.
¶39        Regarding the timing component, the record shows that the majority of
      these alleged personnel actions occurred within 1 or 2 years of th e disclosures.
      0112 IAF, Tab 9 at 8; 0483 IAF, Tab 4 at 7-9; see Peterson v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 16 (2011) (holding that personnel actions
      taken within 1 to 2 years of the protected disclosure satisfy the timing prong of
      the knowledge/timing test).    Although a few of the claimed personnel actions
      occurred after this 2-year period, we nevertheless find that, for jurisdictional
      purposes, the timing component is satisfied for these as well be cause they could
      be fairly viewed as part of a continuum of related personnel actions that began
      shortly after the appellant’s disclosures. See Agoranos v. Department of Justice,
      119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 23 (2013). For these reasons, we find that the appellant has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that Disclosures 7, 9, and 10 were a contributing
      factor in all of the above-described personnel actions, with the exception of the
      alleged personnel actions that predated them.
¶40        Disclosure 8 is a different matter. The record shows that, on April 5, 2016,
      the appellant filed a Form 12 disclosure with OSC concerning the agency’s
      alleged failure to protect confidential business information.    0112 IAF, Tab 1
      at 3, 38-45. However, the appellant has not alleged, and there is otherwise no
      indication in the record, that any official involved in any of the claimed personnel
      actions had either actual or constructive knowledge of this activity during the
      relevant time period. In the absence of such evidence or allegation, the appellant
      has not made a nonfrivolous allegation of contributing factor under the
      knowledge/timing test. See Johnson v. Department of Defense, 95 M.S.P.R. 192,
      ¶¶ 9-10 (2003), aff’d, 97 F. App’x 325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
                                                                                          21

¶41         Nevertheless, the knowledge/timing test is but one way for an appellant to
      prove contributing factor.    If an appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation of contributing factor under the knowledge/timing test, the Board will
      consider whether she has met her burden by alternative means.                Dorney v.
      Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). Specifically, the Board
      will consider other evidence, such as the strength or weakness of the agency’s
      reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was
      personally directed at the proposing or deciding off icials, and whether these
      individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Id.
¶42         We find that the record is sufficient to support a nonfrivolous allegation of
      contributing factor under this standard. Specifically, in her Form 12 complaint,
      the appellant directly accused her first- and second-level supervisors of being
      complicit in the mishandling of confidential business information.           0112 IAF,
      Tab 1 at 38. We find that such an accusation would be sufficient to create some
      retaliatory motive. Furthermore, as explained above, the record is sufficient to
      support a nonfrivolous allegation that one or both of these officials were involved
      in each of the claimed personnel actions, and that the personnel actions occurred
      more or less within the general timeframe that contributing factor might be
      inferred. The strength or weakness of the agency’s decisions to take or fail to
      take these various personnel actions is difficult to assess at this stage of the
      appeal, but on balance, we find that the appellant’s allegations are sufficient for
      jurisdictional purposes, and that she has raised a nonfrivolous allegation that
      (with the exception of the 13-day suspension, which predated it) Disclosure 8 was
      a contributing factor in all of the claimed personnel actions.       See Marano v.
      Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed.Cir.1993) (stating that “the
      legislative history of the WPA emphasizes that ‘any’ weight given to the
      protected disclosures, either alone or even in combination with other factors, can
      satisfy the ‘contributing factor’ test”); Jessup v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10 (2007) (finding that the appellant’s allegations of
                                                                                           22

      contributing factor were minimally sufficient to meet the low standard of a
      nonfrivolous allegation).
¶43         For the reasons explained above, we find that the appellant has established
      jurisdiction over her appeal, and that she is entitled to an adjudication of the
      merits, including her requested hearing and an opportunity to conduct discovery.
      See id.   On remand, the issues will be limited to the following.            First, the
      appellant will have the burden of proving her prima facie case by preponderant
      evidence by showing that Disclosures 7 and 9 were protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(A) or section 2302(f)(2), as discussed above; Disclosure 8 was a
      protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C); Disclosure 10 was a protected
      activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D); the claimed personnel actions satisfy the
      definition of “personnel action” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); and her
      disclosures were a contributing factor in those personnel actions. If the appellant
      meets this burden, the agency will have the opportunity to prove by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions
      notwithstanding the appellant’s protected disclosure or disclosures. See Runstrom
      v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 12 (2016). 11             In the
      remand initial decision, the administrative judge may reincorporate prior findings
      as appropriate, consistent with this Remand Order.

      11
         We note that the Board has recently issued final decisions in other ap peals in which
      the appellant may have raised some of the same alleged protected disclosures and
      activities that are at issue in this appeal. Dabner v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      MSPB Docket Nos. CH-4324-17-0458-I-1 and CH-0752-17-0398-I-1, Final Order
      (Apr. 28, 2023); Dabner v. Environmental Protection Agency, MSPB Docket
      Nos. CH-0752-18-0572-I-1 and CH-1221-19-0175-W-1, Final Order (May 1, 2023).
      The parties will have an opportunity on remand to address the preclusive effect, if any,
      of the Board’s findings in those appeals.
                                                                                   23

                                          ORDER
¶44        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.