Court Opinion

ID: 9573344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:52:57.420772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:39.140571
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
This tort case presents the important issue of whether a law enforcement officer owed a duty to that segment of the general public, which is within the path of travel of an intoxicated driver within his immediate zone of control, to protect a member of that segment who was killed less than two hours later. The alleged breach is the failure to exercise that control by taking custody of the driver or by taking other reasonable steps to prevent her driving. The facts of the case are set out in our original decision, Landis v. Rockdale County, 206 Ga. App. 876 (427 SE2d 286) (1992). Defendants’ petition to the Supreme Court of Georgia for writ of certiorari was granted. Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in the light of its decision in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861) (1993).
The circumstances of the present case are outside the scope of City of Rome v. Jordan. Jordan involves the “special relationship” exception described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 (b), between the defendant and the plaintiff.2 In footnote 4 of the opinion, the Supreme Court stated: “Since the situation is not presented by the facts of this case, we do not determine whether a special duty may exist even in the absence of a special relationship where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime, has the knowledge and the resources to act to the benefit of the injured party, yet does not.” Recalling from our earlier decision that the posture of this case fo*706cuses our concern on the showing made by plaintiff’s evidence on motion for summary judgment, the facts conform to the situation explicitly distinguished in the Supreme Court footnote.
There is evidence that Deputy Drummond was present at the scene where Taggart was driving under the influence, talked with her, was aware of her impaired state, and could have terminated her driving and the palpable risk of injury created by it that evening. This response to her demonstrated condition would have saved the life of plaintiff’s decedent.
Having determined that City of Rome v. Jordan is not directly controlling, the question remains whether or not the rule announced therein should extend to the circumstances of the present case. I conclude that it should not, to the extent of requiring a special relationship in the sense of direct contact between the injured party and the governmental unit because, as we discussed in our earlier consideration of the case, of the “ ‘risks involved and the General Assembly’s efforts to control drunk driving for the protection not only of those drivers but others on the highways. . . .’ [Cit.]” Landis, supra, citing Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 (327 SE2d 716) (1985); OCGA § 40-6-391. See Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 615 NE2d 588 (Mass. App. 1993), which noted that its legislature had determined that intoxicated drivers should be removed from the highway, so that a police officer’s decision to place in protective custody a person whom he knows to be intoxicated and who he has probable cause to believe will imminently drive on the highway is a decision which should not be sheltered by immunity.
Tort liability in drunk driving cases is extended to social hosts and to commercial purveyors of alcoholic beverages, for the benefit of unidentified members of the traveling public, because of the high risk of injury and high rate of occurrence. Sutter, supra; Studebaker’s of Savannah v. Tibbs, 195 Ga. App. 142 (392 SE2d 908) (1990) (physical precedent); Tibbs v. Studebaker’s of Savannah, 184 Ga. App. 642 (a) (362 SE2d 377) (1987) (physical precedent); OCGA § 3-3-22. These are adoptions of the special relation between the defendant actor (whose duty is at issue) and the third person (intoxicated driver). This gives rise to a duty toward foreseeable victims. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (a) recognizes this exception to the general principle that a person has no duty to control a third person’s conduct. See Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 NE2d 305, 315 (2) (Mass. 1993).
A policeman’s duty, which is undergirded by an officially imposed authority to act, implements that public policy. The duty arises from the officer’s presence at the scene of a crime (drunk driving), the nature of which crime gives rise to the occurrence of a foreseeable act (injury-producing car crash), coupled with the total power to prevent *707the latter. That is, it arises from the unique position, power, knowledge of the officer, and foreseeability, to prevent the tort. See Jean W. v. Commonwealth, supra; Irwin v. Ware, 467 NE2d 1292 (Mass. 1984). The foreseeability of the harm is a crucial factor in finding the duty and in justifying liability. Irwin, supra. In this case a breach of this duty, if found, would permit recovery to the plaintiff if coupled with proximate cause. See Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A2d 1379, 1384 (Conn. 1982), Peters, A. J., dissenting, and cases cited in the dissent.
Decided March 18, 1994
Reconsideration denied April 1, 1994
Thomas W. Malone, Peterson, Dillard, Young, Self & Asselin, James M. LaChance, Lawrence J. Pond, for appellant.
Jenkins & Eells, Frank E. Jenkins III, Maddox, Starnes & Nix, John A. Nix, Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, V. Jane Reed, Dawkins & Serio, Harrill L. Dawkins, for appellees.
Abdul S. Valiani, pro se.
I conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the three defendants on the claim of Drummond’s negligence.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.

 City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 314 (2) (439 SE2d 95) (1993), applies this.