Court Opinion

ID: 9491950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:28:31.51348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:01.939709
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. The defendant here plainly failed to demonstrate unconstitutional motive or bad faith on the part of the government in declining to seek a downward departure. I write separately, however, to explain briefly why the rule of a majority of the circuits — which permits judicial review of an alleged bad-faith refusal by the government to file a § 5K1.1 motion pursuant to a cooperation agreement — makes good sense to me.
Plea agreements, because they are contracts, impose on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that government’s refusal to file § 5K1.1 motion violates plea agreement if attributable to bad faith); United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C.Cir.1995) (stating that substantial-assistance provision in plea agreement “provides additional protection” because “[l]ike all contracts, it includes an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing”).
*227-231Under the typical plea agreement, a defendant promises to provide substantial assistance to the satisfaction of the government; in turn, a defendant has the right to expect that the government will make that evaluation in good faith. The government promises that, if it is satisfied with the defendant’s cooperation, it shall make the defendant’s efforts known to the sentencing judge by filing a § 5K1.1 letter. This motion is essential; without it, the sentencing judge ordinarily is without jurisdiction to depart downward and the cooperating defendant’s efforts go unrewarded. Review of the government’s decision ensures that the agreement is faithfully carried out by both sides. See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1988) (“A contractual approach to plea agreements ensures not only that constitutional rights are respected, but also that the integrity of the criminal process is upheld”).
Recognizing that a remedy is available when the government breaks its conditional promise is wholly consistent with Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a plea agreement, a defendant is entitled to relief only if a prosecutor’s decision not to file a substantial-assistance motion was motivated by an unconstitutional consideration or if the government’s refusal “was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end.” Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840. It would be strange indeed if a defendant had less protection where he actually obtained an binding cooperation agreement than where, as in Wade, no conditional promise to file a § 5K1.1 motion had been made by the government.
I do not share my fellow panel members’ fear that inquiring whether the government has complied with the terms of a plea agreement in good faith would necessitate disclosure of confidential information in all cases or involve questions that are difficult for a court to assess. Wade itself provides a standard that is both rigorous and sufficiently protective of the government: a defendant must make a “substantial threshold showing” of unconstitutional motive or bad faith before he is entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840. This approach would prevent the dangerous prospect of a prosecutor who, after having elicited useful information by way of a plea agreement, deliberately chooses not to fulfill his end of the bargain knowing that his decision to renege is almost completely insulated from judicial scrutiny.
The contours of both sides of the debate now having been sketched out, I agree that resolution of the issue is best left for another day.