Court Opinion

ID: 9724387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:55:10.666633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:59.918743
License: Public Domain

STATON, Sr. Judge,
dissenting
I dissent for two reasons.
First, the Majority has confused entitlement of judgment as a matter of law with entitlement of judgment as established by proven facts at trial. A party may be entitled to summary judgment where there has been a failure to establish a statutory duty, a statute of limitations has run, or procedural rules have not been followed.
But, proximate cause can never be more than a shimmering shadow until numerous facts are placed in evidence and expert testimony is presented. Often the offered facts and expert testimony are conflicting. The credibility of witnesses and the weighing of the evidence by a fact finder are necessary before proximate cause can take meaningful form. By its very nature, proximate cause is a factual issue that can only be determined by the admission of numerous pieces of evidence. This is why summary judgment is not appropriate and this is why a party is not required to make a full disclosure of all his evidence when responding to a motion for summary judgment. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.1994); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
As a result of the accident, Danny Wilson suffered bilateral forearm contusions, hematoma, a periumbilical contusion, a *1004chest wall contusion, and a forehead contusion. Prior to the accident he had a chronic liver disease. Later, he died.
By reversing the trial court, the Majority is holding that the movant of the summary judgment motion has proven a factual negative — no proximate cause. This is not a matter of law but a matter of fact. Although proximate cause may be an element of the cause of action, it does not change the factual character of the element. A single medical expert’s affidavit cannot have the finality and conclusiveness suggested by the Majority. This is especially true where a second medical expert’s affidavit is in conflict. Dr. Lawrence stated in his affidavit that it was possible that a lesion on the right side of Wilson’s liver was caused by the accident and that there was a possibility that the physical trauma sustained in the accident made Wilson’s liver disease worse and hastened his death.
Second, I dissent for the reason that the Majority has assumed a task that should be left to the Indiana Supreme Court.2 Negligent actions do not lend themselves to summary judgment because they are fact sensitive. Summary disposition should be left to matters of law and not to matters of fact as the Majority has at-te'mpted. A far different result may be reached once the fact finder has an opportunity to hear all the evidence. Anything less frustrates the ends of justice.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. See Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Cobb, 714 N.E.2d 295 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer on Jammy 19, 2000.