Court Opinion

ID: 9781877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:35.443743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.844760
License: Public Domain

*1125MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to address the issue of procedure presented in this case.
As explained by Judge Coats in the lead opinion, Judge Collins initially ruled (before trial) that Waterman's statement to the authorities was voluntary and admissible. Then, at the end of trial, when the judge was asked to rule on Waterman's motion for a judgement of acquittal, she issued a written decision that essentially contained two parts: a short denial of Waterman's request for a judgement of acquittal, followed by a lengthy sua sponte reconsideration and reversal of her earlier decision concerning the admissibility of Waterman's statement.
I concede that no statute or court rule required Judge Collins to alert the parties that the voluntariness of Waterman's statement was again at issue. I do note, however, that when Judge Collins decided to revisit this issue, she was not merely re-evaluating the evidence and law presented to her during the pre-trial litigation of this issue. Rather, the basis of her ruling was her sua sponte conclusion that the evidence presented at Waterman's trial differed significantly from the evidence presented during the pre-trial litigation of this issue-and that this new evidence required her to reverse her earlier decision.
This kind of judicial action presents three problems.
First, the judge's decision to revisit this issue sua sponte at the end of the trial might be perceived as unfair because the parties were not aware, when they were presenting their evidence at trial, that this issue was being litigated again-that the voluntariness of Waterman's statement was being re-assessed in light of the trial testimony. The content or detail of the testimony, and the types of questions posed to the witnesses, might have been significantly different if the parties had been aware that Judge Collins was re-evaluating this issue.
Second, because Judge Collins did not notify the parties that she was re-evaluating her earlier decision, she did not have the benefit of adversarial briefing and argument when she (1) analyzed the testimony presented at Waterman's trial, (2) compared that testimony to the evidence presented during the pretrial litigation of this issue, and then (8) applied the law to the facts as she found them. As this Court noted in State v. Angawhen a court decides an issue sug sponte-that is, decides the issue without a request by a party, and without input from the parties-the court's action provides "fertile conditions for the creation of judicial error." 847 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Alaska App.1993).
It is true that Judge Collins allowed the State to seek reconsideration of her ruling. But the fact that the issue was litigated in this manner illustrates the third problematic aspect of the procedure employed in this case.
Once a judge has publicly announced a decision (especially in writing), it is often psychologically difficult for the judge to admit that he or she might have acted precipitously and might have reached the wrong conclusion. One would hope that a judge would always have the candor (at times, the courage) to concede that an earlier decision was wrong. But as a practical matter, a lawyer asking for reconsideration of a publicly announced decision faces an uphill battle. For this reason, a lawyer's right to seek rehearing or reconsideration of an announced decision is not a ready substitute for the right to litigate the issue before the court publicly announces its decision.
As I said before, Judge Collins broke no rule of procedure when she decided, sug sponte, to re-evaluate the voluntariness of Waterman's statement after hearing the testimony presented at Waterman's trial. But I urge judges who face similar situations in the future to (1) give the parties notice that the issue is being reconsidered, (2) give the parties a description of the particular reasons why the earlier ruling is now perceived as wrong, and (8) allow the parties to brief or argue the issue before announcing a final ruling.