Court Opinion

ID: 9723850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:36:11.18792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:52.759454
License: Public Domain

JEFFERSON (Bernard), J.
I concur in the judgment.
I agree with the majority in its reversal of the trial court’s order of dismissal, but I do not reach the two grounds relied upon by the majority for its holding. In part II of the majority opinion, the majority holds that the plaintiff effected substituted service — a good nonpersonal delivery service of the summons and complaint upon the natural defendants, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20. In part III of the majority opinion, the majority holds that plaintiff effected a good service of the summons and complaint on the corporate defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 416.10.
*832I do not reach the question of whether plaintiff effected a good service of summons and complaint on all defendants under Code of Civil Procedure sections 415.20 and 416.10 as set forth in parts II and III of the majority opinion. I place my concurrence with the majority’s decision reversing the trial court’s order of dismissal on the ground discussed and rejected in part I of the majority opinion.
In part I of the majority opinion, the majority rejects the plaintiff’s contention that a stipulation entered into by the parties granting defendants an open extension to “answer or otherwise plead” constituted a general appearance sufficient to bring her within the statutory exception to section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure. The majority relies upon Owen v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 566 [137 Cal.Rptr. 378], in which the court held that while a stipulation giving defendant an extension of time to answer avoided the effect of Code of Civil Procedure section 581a, a stipulation to extend time to defendant to plead had no such effect.
I dissented in the Owen case and am still of the opinion that the majority’s decision in Owen is subject to criticism. However, I do not simply rely upon my dissenting opinion in Owen for the purposes of the case at bench. It is my view that the stipulation entered into between the parties in the case at bench, together with the defendants’ subsequent attempts to avoid service, create an estoppel to preclude defendants from obtaining a dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 581 a. In my view the stipulation which the parties entered into in the case at bench is substantially different from the stipulation found in Owen so that Owen does not govern the case at bench.
I view the stipulation and surrounding circumstances in the case at bench as falling within the decisional law principles which have created a nonstatutory exception to the mandatory provision for dismissal set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 581a.
The nonstatutory exception created by the decisional law to the section 581a requirements, is phrased in terms of an estoppel to preclude a defendant from obtaining a dismissal under section 581a. In Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431, 437-438 [96 Cal.Rptr. 571, 487 P.2d 1211], the court defined the estoppel doctrine in this language; “This doctrine affirms that ‘a person may not lull another into a false sense of security by conduct causing the latter to forebear to do something which he otherwise would have done and then take advantage *833of the inaction caused by his own conduct.’ [Citations.]” The Tresway court set forth the justification for the creation of the nonstatutory defense of estoppel by observing: “[RJecognition of the doctrine of estoppel is essential if section 581a is to be applied ‘ “with a view of subserving, rather than defeating, the ends of substantial justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 438.)
In the case at bench, at the request of a representative of the defendants’ insurance carrier, plaintiff’s counsel granted by letter an open extension to defendants to “answer or otherwise plead.”
This stipulation is not simply a grant to defendants of additional time “to plead.” The addition of the language to “answer” to the language —“otherwise plead” — should mandate a different result in considering the estoppel doctrine.
I fully recognize that in Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44 [115 Cal.Rptr. 241, 524 P.2d 369], the court made clear that a plaintiff’s consent to a defendant’s request for an extension of time “in which to answer or otherwise plead” could not be considered a general appearance to avoid application of the mandatory dismissal provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 581a. But the Busching court was explicit in stating that this holding had reference solely to the statutory exception set forth in section 581a and not to the exceptions which the decisional law had created.
In Carruth v. Fritch (1950) 36 Cal.2d 426 [224 P.2d 702, 24 A.L.R.2d 1403], which dealt with the estoppel principle as applied to the statute of limitations, the court stated that “ ‘[ojne cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause his adversary to subject his claim to the bar of the statute of limitations, and then be permitted to plead the very delay caused by his course of conduct as a defense to the action when brought.’ ” (Carruth, supra, 36 Cal.2d 426, 433.)
I consider that the estoppel doctrine that was found applicable in Tresway is clearly established in the case at bench. By requesting an extension of time “to answer or otherwise plead,” defendants’ conduct lulled plaintiff into a false sense of security which prevented plaintiff from effecting personal service upon the individual defendants and ultimately caused plaintiff to seek substituted service pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, even though it may be reasoned that a *834stipulation for extension of time “to plead” should not lull a plaintiff into a false sense of security because “pleading” may well take the form of an attack upon the jurisdiction of the court. But in obtaining an extension of time to “answer” as well as to “plead,” a plaintiff is entitled to believe that defendant intends to make a general appearance in the absence of some glaring situation which poses an issue such as lack of jurisdiction. No such glaring situation is presented here.
I deem it an irrelevant consideration as to whether plaintiff properly served defendants pursuant to the statutory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 415.20 and 416.10. I would hold that the defendants’ request and receipt of an extension of time “to answer” is not rendered defective under the decisional law estoppel exception to Code' of Civil Procedure section 581a by the additional consent from plaintiff for the defendants to “otherwise plead.”
I would thus reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal on the sole ground that defendants became estopped from relying upon the mandatory dismissal provisions of section 581a by obtaining from plaintiff the open-ended extension of time “to answer or otherwise plead.”