Court Opinion

ID: 9472974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:16:09.800786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:15.442676
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the district court. I fully agree with Judge Gibson’s thorough analysis in Parts II-V and VIII and with the result reached in Parts VI and VIL I write separately only to explain the basis for my disagreement with the analysis in Parts VI and VII.
In Part VI appellant argues that the district court erred in allowing appellant’s former employee and codefendant Clark Stagner to testify on direct examination that he had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting appellant in the commission of the offenses charged in connection with the CUPAC scheme. Appellant argues that the testimony about the guilty plea prejudiced him because the jury learned that Stagner had in effect pleaded guilty to several of the very offenses with which appellant was charged. In my opinion appellant’s argument has merit. I would not allow the government to introduce evidence as part of its case-in-chief that a codefend-ant had pleaded guilty to the same or similar offense with which the defendant is charged. “This rule of exclusion is founded upon the notion that a codefendant’s guilty plea or conviction with respect to similar or identical charges has only slight probative value on the question of the defendant’s guilt, but is extremely prejudicial.” United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir.1979); cf. United States v. Medina-Arellano, 569 F.2d 349, 356 (5th Cir.1978) (coconspirator’s guilty plea to conspiracy other than the one involved in the case not prejudicial). Had the government *240introduced evidence of Stagner’s guilty plea on redirect following impeachment by the defense, accompanied by an appropriate cautionary instruction from the district court that the guilty plea could not be considered as substantive evidence of guilt, I would have no objection.
Guilty pleas of co-defendants should be brought to the attention of the jury in only certain narrow instances; i.e., when it is used to impeach trial testimony or to reflect on a witness’ credibility in accordance with the standard rules of evidence; where other co-defendants plead guilty during trial and are conspicuously absent; where opposing counsel has left the impression of unfairness which raises the issue or invites comment on the subject.
United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 425 (7th Cir.1975) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 426 U.S 912, 96 S.Ct. 2237, 48 L.Ed.2d 837 (1976). The premature admission of the evidence about Stagner’s guilty plea is not grounds for reversal, however, because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming in this case.
In Part VII appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of Gary Rickert. Ric-kert testified about appellant’s arranging contract liability insurance coverage for Rickert’s Osage House Hotel and charging an excessive consulting fee and about appellant’s breach of an agreement to purchase “flotéis” or hotel units built on barges from Rickert. Appellant argues that Rickert’s testimony was improperly admitted pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). In my opinion Rickert’s testimony about appellant’s breach of the Hotels agreement was irrelevant to the transactions at issue. Although Rickert’s testimony about the Osage House Hotel insurance transaction was similar to the schemes to defraud the University of Missouri Board of Curators, the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and CUPAC, I believe that its slight probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. However, the admission of Rickert’s testimony is not grounds for reversal in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.