Court Opinion

ID: 9906955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 17:03:24.445931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:53.005163
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                               In re the Matter of:

    JILLVONIE LA’SHANETTE TRAYLOR also known as JILLVONIE
            LA’SHANETTE REEVES, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                         v.

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY,
                       Petitioner/Appellee,

                                        and

            CALBERT CLARK REEVES JR., Respondent/Appellee.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 23-0166 FC
                                 FILED 12-5-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FC2018-006597
                 The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Jillvonie La’shanette Reeves, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Emily M. Stokes
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
                   TRAYLOR/REEVES v. REEVES, et al.
                        Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1           Jillvonie La’shanette Reeves (“Mother”) appeals various
aspects of the family court’s dissolution decree ending her marriage to
Calbert Clark Reeves Jr. (“Father”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
family court’s decree. Bowser v. Nguyen, 249 Ariz. 454, 456 ¶ 8 (App. 2020).
Mother and Father were married in 2013 and separated in 2018. Mother
filed for divorce in March 2022. They share a child (“Child”) born in 2015,
who has lived with Mother since the parents’ separation. The court held a
trial on the petition for dissolution of the marriage in November 2022.

¶3           At trial, Mother requested that Father’s parenting time be
supervised, that she be awarded sole legal decision-making authority for
Child, and that the court allow her to relocate to Atlanta, Georgia. As
evidence that Father should not be allowed unsupervised contact with
Child, Mother offered text messages that Father allegedly exchanged with
a then-14-year-old girl. The court sustained Father’s objection to the
messages’ admission because their content did not indicate that the person
with whom Father was communicating was “underage.”

¶4            Mother argued that she should be awarded sole legal
decision-making authority because Father had gone months without seeing
Child and had “abandoned” them. As for relocation, Mother acknowledged
that Child had lived in Arizona her whole life, but argued that maternal
aunts, an uncle, and cousins in Atlanta would serve as a “support team” if
they relocated. She contended Father could afford to travel to Atlanta for
his parenting time because he had previously traveled to Las Vegas,
Nevada, in 2019. Mother offered a letter from her aunt explaining her
support system, proposed living situation, and family ties in Atlanta. Father
objected to admission of the letter as hearsay, which the court sustained.

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                   TRAYLOR/REEVES v. REEVES, et al.
                        Decision of the Court

¶5            The court awarded Mother and Father joint legal
decision-making authority. The court also set forth a parenting time
schedule in which Mother is Child’s primary residential parent, but Father
has unsupervised parenting time three weekends per month. The court
denied Mother’s motion for relocation. It reasoned that relocation would
strain Father’s ability to maintain his relationship with Child, and that
deprivation of that relationship would be detrimental to Child’s emotional
and developmental needs. Mother timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶6            Mother’s opening brief lacks citations to relevant authorities,
statutes, and portions of the record. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a). Her
failure to comply with these rules makes our ability to evaluate her
arguments and address her claims difficult. See, e.g., In re U.S. Currency in
Amount of $26,980.00, 199 Ariz. 291, 299 ¶ 28 (App. 2000) (refusing to
consider unsupported and undeveloped arguments). Although she is
representing herself, she is held to the same standards as a qualified
attorney. Higgins v. Higgins, 194 Ariz. 266, 270 ¶ 12 (App. 1999). Father has
not filed an answering brief, which may be considered a confession of
reversible error. See United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Thomas J. Grosso Inv., Inc., 4
Ariz. App. 285, 285 (1966). But in the exercise of our discretion, we will
address the substance of Mother’s appeal. See Nydam v. Crawford, 181 Ariz.
101, 101 (App. 1994).

¶7            This court reviews child custody and relocation decisions for
an abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the decision. Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420 ¶ 7 (App.
2003); Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 17 (App. 2015).

I.     Parenting Time and Legal Decision-Making Authority

¶8            Mother argues that the trial court erred in awarding Father
unsupervised parenting time. She contends that the court erred in not
admitting evidence that showed a relationship between Father and a minor;
she argues that the relationship makes Father unfit for unsupervised
parenting time. But the trial court did not err because Mother’s evidence
was not relevant to any material fact. Evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ariz.
R. Evid. 401. And if evidence is irrelevant, it is inadmissible. Ariz. R. Evid.
402. Here, Mother’s only evidence was text communications between
Father and an unidentified third party whom Mother alleged was a minor

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                    TRAYLOR/REEVES v. REEVES, et al.
                         Decision of the Court

child. The messages did not indicate the other party’s age or an
inappropriate relationship. The messages were thus irrelevant. The court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father unsupervised parenting
time.

¶9             Mother also argues that Father’s “abandonment” of Child
justifies termination of his legal decision-making authority. In determining
legal decision-making, the court must consider all factors relevant to the
child’s physical and emotional well-being, including those set forth in
A.R.S. § 25–403(A). And in making the decision between sole and joint
decision-making, the court considers “(1) [t]he agreement or lack of an
agreement by the parents regarding joint legal decision-making[;] (2)
[w]hether a parent’s lack of an agreement is unreasonable or is influenced
by an issue not related to the child’s best interests[;] (3) [t]he past, present
and future abilities of the parents to cooperate in decision-making about the
child to the extent required by the order of joint legal decision-making[;]
and (4) [w]hether the joint legal decision-making arrangement is logistically
possible.” A.R.S. § 25–403.01(B).

¶10          Here, Mother and Father have no agreement, and the court
found that Mother desired to “punish” Father by making it difficult for him
to see Child, a motivation unrelated to Child’s best interests. See A.R.S.
§ 25–403.01(B)(2). The court found that both parents were fit and capable of
making decisions for Child, and that a joint arrangement was logistically
possible. The court thus considered the necessary factors for Child’s
well-being and did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint legal
decision-making authority.

II.    Relocation

¶11            Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by not
allowing her to relocate with Child to Atlanta, Georgia. When parents
cannot agree about the relocation of a child, the trial court must “determine
whether to allow the parent to relocate the child in accordance with the
child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 25–408(G). In determining this, the trial court
must apply the factors set forth in A.R.S. § 25–408(I). The parent seeking to
relocate has the burden to prove that the move is in the child’s best interests.
A.R.S. § 25–408(G); Pollock v. Pollock, 181 Ariz. 275, 277 (App. 1995).

¶12          The record supports the trial court’s denial of relocation. The
court found that Child is bonded to Father, and that depriving her of the
relationship would be detrimental to her emotional and developmental
needs. The court noted that relocating to Atlanta could promote Child’s

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                   TRAYLOR/REEVES v. REEVES, et al.
                        Decision of the Court

stability “to the extent” it provided Mother with stability, but noted that
“[t]hat stability is not, however, a foregone conclusion.” The court also
found that Mother’s relocation request was “driven, at least in part, by her
anger at Father for having ‘abandoned’ her and [Child],” and that his
absence from Child’s life after the move “would be detrimental to her
emotional and developmental needs.” The court further found that Arizona
and Georgia are not reasonably close to each other, and that regular travel
to Georgia would be time-consuming and potentially expensive. The court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that relocation was not in the child’s
best interests.

¶13            Mother also argues that the court erred by not admitting her
aunt’s letter into evidence because it was hearsay. Hearsay is “a statement,”
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
“offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c). The author of the letter, Mother’s aunt,
was not present to testify, and Mother identified no hearsay exception that
would authorize the admission of the letter. The court did not abuse its
discretion in not admitting the letter.

                              CONCLUSION

¶14           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: AA

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