Court Opinion

ID: 9845446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:06.328444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.001295
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
My agreement in the result reached by the majority opinion is founded on (1) the *1246Rules of Criminal Procedure for Justice of the Peace Courts and Municipal Courts as promulgated by this court, and (2) our holding in Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980), with reference to such rules.1 Appellant has a right to jury trial in this case by virtue of these rules.
I agree with Justice Raper that it is impractical from the standpoint of time and expense to mandate a jury trial in cases such as this wherein the probable penalty is a $12.00 fine and $5.00 costs. Accordingly, such rules should be changed to eliminate whatever procedural rights to a jury trial for petty offenses are contained therein.
I agree with Justice Raper that the legislature should act to reword the existing statutes so as to eliminate any question which might exist therein relative to procedural and substantive rights to a jury trial for petty offenses, making it definite that such rights do not exist. However, there are two aspects relative to such legislative action to be commented upon: (1) Whether or not the constitution mandates a right to a jury trial for petty offenses, and (2) whether or not a right to a jury trial for petty offenses is presently mandated by our statutes.
With reference to the second aspect, I believe the intent of the legislature as expressed in the overall statutory scheme of criminal prosecutions does not provide a right to a jury trial for petty offenses. Without detailing such, I note that the requirement for prosecution on indictment or information in serious crimes and that for prosecution only on a complaint in petty crimes correlates with the right to a jury trial in prosecution for serious crimes and the lack of such right in prosecution for petty offenses. Without referring to the several specific places in the statutes where distinctions are implied between serious crimes and petty offenses and for the purposes of this special concurrence, I will exemplify the overall statutory scheme by referring only to the particular statute concerning which the parties address their arguments in this case. Section 7-16-112, W.S.1977, provides:
“Before the justice has heard any testimony upon the trial, the defendant may demand a jury, which in all cases shall be allowed.”
As originally enacted, this section was part of “AN ACT Defining the Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace in Criminal Trials, and of the Proceedings therein.” The act was codified as Ch. 71, Part II, § 12, Compiled Laws of Wyoming 1876. It is now codified in Title 7, Ch. 16, W.S.1977 (§§ 7-16-101 through 7-16-211, W.S.1977). Of the nearly four dozen sections of the original enactment, only three sections have been amended in over one hundred years. One of the amendments in 1877 was to the section now codified as 7-16-101, W.S.1977. As originally enacted the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace were for certain crimes presented “on information.” The entire enactment was worded upon such presumption, even to the point of setting out the form of the information. By page 73, S.L. of Wyoming 1877, the section was changed to extend jurisdiction over the same crimes when presented “on information or complaint.” The rest of the enactment was not changed. A form of complaint was not set out.
Section 7-16-102, W.S.1977, still states that “Criminal actions for the commission of a public offense may be commenced before a justice of the peace by an information subscribed and sworn to, and filed with the justice.” And, indeed they may. A traffic ticket may be prosecuted by information. However, when initially enacted, the section obviously referred back to the next preceding section which gave the justice jurisdiction only when an information was filed for certain crimes. Section 7-16-102 was directive as to how the proceeding *1247was to be initiated. But it had no effect when the proceeding was started by means of a complaint.
Section 7-16-105, W.S.1977, authorizes the justice of the peace to issue a warrant for arrest “upon the filing of such information.” No provision was made for issuance of an arrest warrant when the proceedings were initiated on complaint. When arraigned, the justice of the peace is directed to inquire as to whether or not the defendant is properly named “in the information.” Section 7-16-107, W.S.1977. No such requirement is set forth if the proceedings were initiated by means of a complaint.
The entire enactment was intended to have effect only upon proceedings initiated on an information, not on a complaint. It was so intended when it was enacted, and the intention was not changed when authorization was given to initiate proceedings by means of a complaint. Section 7-16-112, W.S.1977, relative to a jury trial was a part of the enactment meant to apply to proceedings initiated by an information — not a complaint. It was not intended to apply when the proceedings were initiated by a complaint. The authority of a justice of the peace to issue a warrant for arrest on the basis of a complaint is set forth in other statutes, e.g., §§ 7-3-501, 7-8-105, W.S. 1977.
Again, I note that although it is probable that a legislative intent can be ascertained to not give a right to a jury trial in petty offenses, I join with Justice Raper in suggesting that the legislature make clear its intent in that respect.
The second aspect to be commented on is the expressed fear that it may not be possible, legislatively or otherwise, to deprive a defendant of a right to a jury trial for petty offenses because of constitutional restrictions.
Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part: “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases * * Such language solidifies the right to a jury trial in criminal cases as it existed in 1890 when the Constitution was adopted. It provides that such right “shall remain inviolate” (emphasis added). Thus, a right to a jury trial is constitutionally mandated by Art. 1, § 9, if such a right existed in 1890 at common law or if one then existed under the Constitution of the United States (recognized by the Wyoming Constitution to be the supreme law of the land. Art. 21, § 24, Wyoming Constitution). See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); Rankin v. Frebank Company, 47 Cal.App.3d 75, 121 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1975); Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966).
A right to a jury trial did not exist, or would not have existed, at common law for petty crimes. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970).
Art. Ill, § 2,2 and the Sixth Amendment3 of the Constitution of the United States are not in conflict with each other. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966). The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States makes the provisions of Art. Ill, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment thereto applicable to state criminal proceedings. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., supra. But they are not applicable for prosecutions for petty offenses. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The determination of whether or not a crime is petty can be made upon the basis of:
*1248“ * * * indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense. District of Columbia v. Clawans, * * * [300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937) ]. The most relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense is the severity of the penalty authorized for its commission. * * *” Frank v. United States, supra, 89 S.Ct. at 1505.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Raper has adequately indicated the propriety of generally considering a crime to be petty if the authorized penalty for it is a maximum imprisonment for six months and a fine of $500.00.
Finally, without reference to the fact that the Wyoming Constitution provides that the right to a jury trial “remains” as it existed in 1890, the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States which also requires the “trial of all crimes” to be by jury, and that the accused shall enjoy the right to a jury trial in “all criminal prosecutions” reflects the propriety of interpreting the Wyoming Constitution to except petty crimes from those for which a right to a jury trial is mandated. The force of the language in the United States Constitution is as strong in this respect, if not stronger, than that in the Wyoming Constitution.
The crime here involved is petty, and the right of appellant to a jury trial is not constitutionally required.
Because the Rules of Criminal Procedure for Justice of the Peace Courts requires a jury trial in this case, the case should be reversed and remanded with instruction to afford such trial to defendant. However, we should change such rules to preclude such right for petty offenses, and the legislature should act to express its position with reference to a right to a jury trial for petty offenses.

. Rule 5(c) and Rule 10, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. reflect a necessity for a justice of the peace to advise the defendant of a right to a jury trial and to afford one to him in all cases, and Rule 5(d) and Rule 10, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. reflect the same necessity for a municipal judge when a jail sentence “is to be imposed upon conviction.” In Lapp, we held that the fact that a jail sentence may be imposed was determinative of a right to a jury trial in municipal courts.

. Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part: “The Trial of all Crimes * * * shall be by Jury * *

. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury * *