Court Opinion

ID: 9851897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:21:09.357262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:18.999862
License: Public Domain

LANGDON, J.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for the value of services performed by him to the decedent, H. G. Halkett, during his lifetime. The complaint alleged an implied contract for services which were to be continuously performed and were so performed from January 1, 1930, until the death of the decedent. (See Turell v. Anderson, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 445 [60 Pac. (2d) 906].) The answer denied the material allegations and pleaded the statute of limitations and statute of frauds as a defense. The court, sitting without a jury, found that the decedent had requested plaintiff to render such services as he might require continuously for the remainder of his life,- that decedent had agreed to pay for them by leaving him all of his estate, or else property or money equal to the reasonable value of the services; that plaintiff rendered the services; that decedent failed to leave property or pay for them; and that the value of the services was $2,820. Judgment in that sum, together with interest was accordingly entered in favor of plaintiff.
The only substantial issue presented by this appeal relates to the sufficiency of the creditor’s claim filed by plaintiff. The written claim was filed within the prescribed time, and was treated by plaintiff as rejected after the executor’s failure to approve the same within ten days. The claim states that it was “for services in caring for deceased during his period of illness” describing the services and listing the amounts due. It is contended by defendant that the claim fails to indicate any contract for continuous services which would call for payment at the end of the period, and constitutes merely a statement of ordinary services, for which payment was due at once. Under defendant’s theory, the two-year statute of limitations would apply and constitute a bar to recovery for most of the services, that is, those performed *350prior to August 15, 1933, decedent having, died on August-15, 1935.
The contention is then, that the claim was insufficient in form, and reliance is placed on such cases as Etchas v. Orena, 127 Cal. 588 [60 Pac. 45], and Estate of Stuer, 77 Cal. App. 584 [247 Pac. 211]. Without discussing these in detail, it may be said that there is no necessity that a creditor’s claim be drafted with precision and completeness of a pleading. The only requirement is that it state such facts as will apprise the executor or administrator of the amount of the demand. (See Standiford v. Cantrell, 87 Cal. App. 736 [262 Pac. 800]; United States Gypsum Co. v. Shaffer, 7 Cal. (2d) 454 [60 Pac. (2d) 998].)  The claim in the instant case clearly called to the attention of the executor the fact of the services, the period during which they were rendered (up to the time of death), and the amount demanded. If any uncertainty remained, it was incumbent upon the executor to call for clarification (Standiford v. Cantrell, supra);  and in the instant ease defendant did demand and receive a bill of particulars and a copy of plaintiff’s book account. No demurrer was filed to the complaint on the ground relied upon herein, and the case was tried on other issues. The present contention appeared for the first time on motion for new trial. Under such circumstances, any formal defects in the creditor’s claim must be deemed waived by the trial on the merits. (See Standiford v. Cantrell, supra; Merrill v. Kohlberg, 29 Cal. App. 382 [155 Pac. 824].)
No other points require discussion. The judgment is affirmed.
Curtis, J., Waste, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
Houser, J., concurred'in the judgment.