Court Opinion

ID: 9795961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:43:35.794427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:43:18.757950
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.,
Concurring.—I write separately to express my frustration with the apparent inability of the government officials involved here to answer a simple question: How do the federal clean water standards (which, as near as I can determine, are the state standards) prevent the state from considering economic factors? The majority concludes that because “the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution requires state law to yield to federal law, a regional board, when issuing a wastewater discharge permit, may not consider economic factors to justify imposing pollutant restrictions that are less stringent than the applicable federal standards require.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 618.) That seems a pretty self-evident proposition, but not a useful one. The real question, in my view, is whether the Clean Water Act prevents or prohibits the regional water board from considering economic factors to justify pollutant restrictions that meet the clean water standards in more cost-effective and economically efficient ways. I can see no reason why a federal law—which purports to be an example of cooperative federalism— would decree such a result. I do not think the majority’s reasoning is at fault here. Rather, the agencies involved seemed to have worked hard to make this simple question impenetrably obscure.
A brief review of the statutory framework at issue is necessary to understand my concerns.
I. Federal Law
“In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.), commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA) [Citation.] ...[][] Generally, the CWA ‘prohibits the discharge of any pollutant except in compliance with one of several statutory exceptions. [Citation.]’. . . The most important of those exceptions is pollution discharge under a valid NPDES [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] permit, which can be issued either by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or by an EPA-approved state permit program such as California’s. [Citations.] NPDES permits are valid for five years. [Citation.] [f] Under the CWA’s NPDES permit system, the states are required to develop water quality standards. [Citations.] A water quality standard ‘establishes] the desired condition of a waterway.’ [Citation.] A water quality standard for any *630given waterway, or ‘water body,’ has two components: (1) the designated beneficial uses of the water body and (2) the water quality criteria sufficient to protect those uses. [Citations.] [][] Water quality criteria can be either narrative or numeric. [Citation.]” (Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1092-1093 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 76].)
With respect to satisfying water quality standards, “a polluter must comply with effluent limitations. The CWA defines an effluent limitation as ‘any restriction established by a State or the [ERA] Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.’ [Citation.] ‘Effluent limitations are a means of achieving water quality standards.’ [Citation.] [f] NPDES permits establish effluent limitations for the polluter. [Citations.] CWA’s NPDES permit system provides for a two-step process for the establishing of effluent limitations. First, the polluter must comply with technology-based effluent limitations, which are limitations based on the best available or practical technology for the reduction of water pollution. [Citations.] [f] Second, the polluter must also comply with more stringent water quality-based effluent limitations (WQBEL’s) where applicable. In the CWA, Congress ‘supplemented the “technology-based” effluent limitations with “water quality-based” limitations “so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.” ’ [Citation.] [1] The CWA makes WQBEL’s applicable to a given polluter whenever WQBEL’s are ‘necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law or regulations . . . .’ [Citations.] Generally, NPDES permits must conform to state water quality laws insofar as the state laws impose more stringent pollution controls than the CWA. [Citations.] Simply put, WQBEL’s implement water quality standards.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1093-1094, fns. omitted.)
This case involves water quality-based effluent limitations. As set forth above, “[u]nder the CWA, states have the primary role in promulgating water quality standards.” (Piney Run Preservation Ass’n v. Commrs. of Carroll Co. (4th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 255, 265, fn. 9.) “Under the CWA, the water quality standards referred to in section 301 [see 33 U.S.C. § 1311] are primarily the states’ handiwork.” (American Paper Institute, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (D.C. Cir. 1993) 302 U.S. App. D.C. 80 [996 F.2d 346, 349] (American Paper).) In fact, upon the 1972 passage of the CWA, “[s]tate water quality standards in effect at the time . . . were deemed to be the initial water quality benchmarks for CWA purposes .... The states were to revisit and, if *631necessary, revise those initial standards at least once every three years.” (American Paper, at p. 349.) Therefore, “once a water quality standard has been promulgated, section 301 of the CWA requires all NPDES permits for point sources to incorporate discharge limitations necessary to satisfy that standard.” (American Paper, at p. 350.) Accordingly, it appears that in most instances, state water quality standards are identical to the federal requirements for NPDES permits.
II. State Law
In California, pursuant to the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Wat. Code, § 13000 et seq.; Stats. 1969, ch. 482, § 18, p. 1051; hereafter Porter-Cologne Act), the regional water quality control boards establish water quality standards—and therefore federal requirements for NPDES permits— through the adoption of water quality control plans (basin plans). The basin plans establish water quality objectives using enumerated factors—including economic factors—set forth in Water Code section 13241.
In addition, as one court observed: “The Porter-Cologne Act . . . established nine regional boards to prepare water quality plans (known as basin plans) and issue permits governing the discharge of waste. (Wat. Code, §§ 13100, 13140, 13200, 13201, 13240, 13241, 13243.) The Porter-Cologne Act identified these permits as ‘waste discharge requirements,’ and provided that the waste discharge requirements must mandate compliance with the applicable regional water quality control plan. (Wat. Code, §§ 13263, subd. (a), 13377, 13374.) [f] Shortly after Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972, the California Legislature added Chapter 5.5 to the Porter-Cologne Act, for the purpose of adopting the necessary federal requirements to ensure it would obtain EPA approval to issue NPDES permits. (Wat. Code, § 13370, subd. (c).) As part of these amendments, the Legislature provided that the state and regional water boards ‘shall, as required or authorized by the [Clean Water Act], issue waste discharge requirements . . . which apply and ensure compliance with all applicable provisions [of the Clean Water Act], together with any more stringent effluent standards or limitations necessary to implement water quality control plans, or for the protection of beneficial uses, or to prevent nuisance.’ (Wat. Code, § 13377.) Water Code section 13374 provides that ‘[t]he term “waste discharge requirements” as referred to in this division is the equivalent of the term “permits” as used in the [Clean Water Act].’ [][] California subsequently obtained the required approval to issue NPDES permits. [Citation.] Thus, the waste discharge requirements issued by the regional water boards ordinarily also serve as NPDES permits under federal law. (Wat. Code, § 13374.)” (Building Industry Assn. of San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 866, 875 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 128].)
*632Applying this federal-state statutory scheme, it appears that throughout this entire process, the Cities of Burbank and Los Angeles (Cities) were unable to have economic factors considered because the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (Board)—the body responsible to enforce the statutory framework—failed to comply with its statutory mandate.
For example, as the trial court found, the Board did not consider costs of compliance when it initially established its basin plan, and hence the water quality standards. The Board thus failed to abide by the statutory requirement set forth in Water Code section 13241 in establishing its basin plan. Moreover, the Cities claim that the initial narrative standards were so vague as to make a serious economic analysis impracticable. Because the Board does not allow the Cities to raise their economic factors in the permit approval stage, they are effectively precluded from doing so. As a result, the Board appears to be playing a game of “gotcha” by allowing the Cities to raise economic considerations when it is not practical, but precluding them when they have the ability to do so.
Moreover, the Board acknowledges that it has neglected other statutory provisions that might have provided an additional opportunity to air these concerns. As set forth above, pursuant to the CWA, “[t]he states were to revisit and, if necessary, revise those initial standards at least once every three years-—a process commonly known as triennial review. [Citation.] Triennial reviews consist of public hearings in which current water quality standards are examined to assure that they ‘protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes’ of the Act. [Citation.] Additionally, the CWA directs states to consider a variety of competing policy concerns during these reviews, including a waterway’s ‘use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes.’ ” (American Paper, supra, 996 F.2d at p. 349.)
According to the Cities, “[t]he last time that the narrative water quality objective for toxicity contained in the Basin Plan was reviewed and modified was 1994.” The Board does not deny this claim. Accordingly, the Board has failed its duty to allow public discussion—including economic considerations—at the required intervals when making its determination of proper water quality standards.
What is unclear is why this process should be viewed as a contest. State and local agencies are presumably on the same side. The costs will be paid by taxpayers and the Board should have as much interest as any other agency in fiscally responsible environmental solutions.
*633Our decision today arguably allows the Board to continue to shirk its statutory duties. The majority holds that when read together, Water Code sections 13241, 13263, and 13377 do not allow the Board to consider economic factors when issuing NPDES permits to satisfy federal CWA requirements. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 625-627.) The majority then bifurcates the issue when it orders the Court of Appeal “to remand this matter to the trial court to decide whether any numeric limitations, as described in the permits, are ‘more stringent’ than required under federal law and thus should have been subject to ‘economic considerations’ by the Los Angeles Regional Board before inclusion in the permits.” (Id. at pp. 628-629.)
The majority overlooks the feedback loop established by the CWA, under which federal standards are linked to state-established water quality standards, including narrative water quality criteria. (See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1) (2004).) Under the CWA, NPDES permit requirements include the state narrative criteria, which are incorporated into the Board’s basin plan under the description “no toxins in toxic amounts.” As far as I can determine, NPDES permits designed to achieve this narrative criteria (as well as designated beneficial uses) will usually implement the state’s basin plan, while satisfying federal requirements as well.
If federal water quality standards are typically identical to state standards, it will be a rare instance that a state exceeds its own requirements and economic factors are taken into consideration.1 In light of the Board’s initial failure to consider costs of compliance and its repeated failure to conduct required triennial reviews, the result here is an unseemly bureaucratic bait- and-switch that we should not endorse. The likely outcome of the majority’s decision is that the Cities will be economically burdened to meet standards imposed on them in a highly questionable manner.2 In these times of tight fiscal budgets, it is difficult to imagine imposing additional financial burdens on municipalities without at least allowing them to present alternative views.
Based on the facts of this case, our opinion today appears to largely retain the status quo for the Board. If the Board can actually demonstrate that only the precise limitations at issue here, implemented in only one way, will achieve the desired water standards, perhaps its obduracy is justified. That case has yet to be made.
*634Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the majority’s decision is wrong. The analysis may provide a reasonable accommodation of conflicting provisions. However, since the Board’s actions “make me wanna holler and throw up both my hands,”3 I write separately to set forth my concerns and concur in the judgment—dubitante 4
The petitions of all appellants and respondent for a rehearing were denied June 29, 2005. Brown, J., did not participate therein.

 (But see In the Matter of the Petition of City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco Baykeeper et al. (Order No. WQ 95-4, Sept. 21, 1995) 1995 WL 576920.)

 Indeed, given the fact that “water quality standards” in this case are composed of broadly worded components (i.e., a narrative criteria and “designated beneficial uses of the water body”), the Board possessed a high degree of discretion in setting NPDES permit requirements. Based on the Board’s past performance, a proper exercise of this discretion is uncertain.

 Marvin Gaye (1971) “Inner City Blues.”

 I am indebted to Judge Berzon for this useful term. (See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald (9th Cir. 2005) 400 F.3d 1119 [2005 WL 466202] (conc. opn. of Berzon, J.).)