Court Opinion

ID: 9615169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:32:13.156789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:42.422521
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s analysis regarding probable cause to arrest appellant for public drunk is irrelevant because resisting arrest for public drunk was not the basis upon which the trial court found appellant guilty of obstruction. In fact, the trial court never arrived at the conclusion fashioned solely by the majority in upholding appellant’s conviction for misdemeanor obstruction.1
At trial the prosecutor conceded, “I think he’s entitled to a directed verdict as to the public drunk charge because the officer did testify that he didn’t see any of the behavior that would be the foundation for an arrest on a public drunk charge.” The police officer’s testimony and the failure to prove the municipal ordinance forced the State to concede that probable cause to arrest appellant for public drunk did not exist.2
*703Rather than lose on the obstruction charge, however, the prosecution changed its tactics and argued that the basis for the obstruction was not the public drunk arrest, but was appellant’s failure to cooperate with the police investigation of the 911 call: “I don’t think you can distinguish and say, well, because he didn’t have probable cause to arrest him for public drunk, he therefore didn’t have probable cause to arrest him for obstruction. This case is not four squares on point with the case that Mr. Patterson [defense] is citing and in fact Officer Bradshaw had every right, not just right, obligation to detain Mr. Williams and talk to him long enough to find out what was going on whether or not, in fact, there was a basis for looking into him as a suspect on the simple battery call that he was responding to.” The prosecutor argued to the court that the obstruction charge arose “not because he was resisting a public drunk arrest. . . as I’ve pointed out Officer Bradshaw had other good and valid and legal grounds to detain and question Mr. Williams ... he was attempting to detain this individual and discuss a 911 call that he’d been dispatched to, he broke away from him, he raised his fist in an aggressive manner, he had to be physically restrained by two police officers in order to effect an arrest and that’s clearly obstruction.”
The trial court agreed with this revised basis for the obstruction charge: “I’m going to find the defendant guilty of the obstruction of an officer along the lines of the argument that Mr. Kirby [prosecutor] just made in closing.”
Despite the State’s concession that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for public drunk, and despite the trial court’s finding that the obstruction arose not from appellant’s arrest on public drunk, but from his refusal to be detained for police questioning, the majority decides herein that, “There exists ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact (the trial judge in this bench trial) could conclude that the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant for being drunk in public and to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of misdemeanor obstruction.” Since the rational trier of fact never reached such a conclusion, the majority’s analysis is immaterial to the sufficiency of the evidence issue raised by appellant.
This is not a “throw away” case. A misdemeanor criminal conviction is entitled to the same sufficiency of the evidence analysis afforded to a more “serious” offense or to a civil dispute. In conducting such analysis, it must be. recognized at the outset that the evidentiary basis for a jury verdict is usually unknown to this Court; thus, if there is some evidence of record sufficient to support the verdict, we will affirm it. Myers v. State, 184 Ga. App. 618, 619 (362 SE2d 92) (1987). Herein, however, this Court is privy to the basis upon which the trier of fact found appellant guilty of obstruction and *704must search for some evidence of record to support the trial court’s ruling in order to affirm the verdict based thereon. We are not free to substitute our analysis of the evidence for the trier of fact’s conclusions.
Decided October 2, 1997.
Jackie G. Patterson, Yasma Patterson, for appellant.
Louis J. Kirby, Solicitor, for appellee.
In this case, the accusation charged appellant with obstruction of an officer in that appellant “shout[ed] at the officer and walked away.” At trial, the only witness to the obstruction offense, Officer Bradshaw, testified that the conduct which gave rise to the obstruction as alleged in the accusation occurred when appellant resisted arrest for public drunk.3 The majority has determined from this evidence that the conduct which comprised the obstruction offense occurred when appellant resisted a “lawful” arrest for public drunk. The evidence of record precludes the trial court’s conclusion that the conduct alleged in the accusation occurred as a result of appellant’s refusal to be “detained” for police questioning; detained? According to the officer, appellant was already under arrest for public drunk when the conduct giving rise to the obstruction charge occurred. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of obstruction beyond a reasonable doubt on the grounds expressed by the trier of fact.
Although appellant’s conviction may be for only a misdemeanor, and although the prosecutor’s failure to introduce the ordinance may benefit a possibly “undeserving” defendant, this Court’s responsibil-' ity to conduct a fair analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence in all-cases obligates me to dissent.

 The State'did not bother to file a brief in this case.

 The testimony of the police officer on direct examination was clear: “I was attempting to — at first he was a suspect for the simple battery and then I noticed he was drunk, so I placed him under arrest and told him he was under arrest for public drunk to hold him at the scene, that’s when he became loud and boisterous and combative.” The requisite element of “boisterous” conduct necessary to support an arrest for the offense of public drunk under OCGA § 16-11-41 did not occur until after the officer had already arrested appellant for public drunk, presumably under the municipal ordinance which did not require the additional manifestation of boisterous conduct. See, e.g., Goldstein v. City of Atlanta, 141 Ga. App. 701 (234 SE2d 344) (1977). Even the prosecutor recognized that all of the evidence of “boisterousness” cited by the majority occurred after the arrest and was in reaction thereto, and that the State’s failure to introduce the municipal ordinance at trial proved fatal to the establishment of probable cause to arrest for public drunk. Woodward v. State, 219 Ga. App. 329 (465 SE2d 511) (1995). That is why the prosecutor, and thus the trial court, abandoned the issue.

 “[Q:] The basis of the obstruction of an officer charge is what? [A:] When I physically-put my hands on him to stop him from leaving the crime scene and then placing him under arrest for public drunk, he pulled away, shook his fist[.] [Q:] Officer, you’ve stated that you had already arrested him for public drunk before you charged him with obstruction, is that correct? [A:] This is true. [Q:] And you testified that the basis of the obstruction charge was because you arrested him for public drunk and he refused to stop walking away from you, is that correct? [A:] That, and lifted his hand in a threatening manner, yes. [Q:] [Y]ou charged him with obstruction after you arrested him for public drunk? [A:] This is true.”