Court Opinion

ID: 9694442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:41:49.070242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:01.515013
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellants Grover Battle and Mary Ann Moore contend that the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County erred in both imposing and in threatening to impose a harsher sentence following a trial de novo than was imposed at trial before the Municipal Court.1
*69On February 10, 1972, appellant Battle was convicted in Philadelphia Municipal Court of assault and battery and resisting arrest. The Honorable Charles J. Mabgiotti ordered him to pay costs and a one hundred dollar fine and placed him on a year’s probation. Appellant Battle then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas where he was again convicted on all counts after waiving his right to a jury trial. The Honorable D. Donald Jamieson then sentenced him to two years probation.
On January 10, 1972, appellant Moore appeared in the Municipal Court where she was convicted of failing to stop and render assistance at the scene of the accident. Following her conviction the Honorable Joseph 11. Glancey ordered her to pa.y a fifty dollar fine plus costs. Appellant Moore then appealed to the Common Pleas Court and requested a jury trial. The Honorable Edward J. Blake instructed her that under a recent United States Supreme Court decision she could receive a more severe sentence than the Municipal Court had imposed. Upon learning that she could be sentenced to three years in prison if convicted, appellant Moore decided to enter a plea of guilty. Judge Blake then imposed the same sentence as Judge Glancey had. She contends that she was coerced into entering her guilty plea by the threat of harsher punishment, forfeiting her constitutional right to trial by jury.
*70The Pennsylvania Constitution places jurisdiction over minor criminal offenses in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.2 Since there are no jury trials in the Municipal Court, the constitution provides that a defendant has a right to trial de novo before a jury in the Common Pleas Court. These constitutional guarantees of the right to appeal and to receive a trial by jury become meaningless if the defendant must subject himself to the possibility of an increased sentence for exercising these rights. This provision of the state constitution was examined twice previously in Commonwealth v. Harper, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 100, 280 A. 2d 637 (1971) and Commonwealth v. Mirra, 220 Pa. Superior Ct. 393, 281 A. 2d 773 (1971) where this court concluded: “[Ajbsent reasons appearing on the record, an appellant exercising his right of appeal in the Court of Common Pleas could not receive a higher sentence.” Mirra, supra at 220 Pa. Superior Ct. at 394.3 “[T]he possibility of an increased sentence without reason does more than ‘chill’ the right to appeal and obtain a jury trial. Just as in Pearce [North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) ] the chance of greater punishment may discourage appeal regardless of the merits of the case. Such an impediment to the right of appeal is a violation of due process of law.” Harper, supra, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. at 103.
Prior to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), individuals charged with kidnapping could be *71sentenced to death only if they exercised their right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court held that such a procedure “needlessly” penalized the assertion of one’s constitutional right to trial by jury. The evil in the statutory procedure was not that it coerced guilty pleas, but that such pleas were “needlessly” encouraged. 390 U.S. at 583. Analogously, the possibility of receiving an increased sentence discourages defendants from exercising their Pennsylvania Constitutional rights to receive a trial de novo before the Common Pleas Court.
The Jackson holding that the exercise of constitutional rights may not be chilled by the threat of increased punishment has long been applied. “No matter how heinous the offense charged, how overwhelming the proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless the defense, a defendant’s right to continue with his trial may not be violated. His constitutional right to require the Government to proceed to a conclusion of the trial and to establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exercised under the shadow of a penalty — that if he persists in the assertion of his right and is found guilty, he faces, in view of the Trial Court’s announced intention, a maximum sentence, and if he pleads guilty, there is the prospect of a substantially reduced term. To impose upon a defendant such alternatives amounts to coercion as a matter of law.” United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 567 (S.D. N.Y. 1963) (Footnotes omitted); Accord, Euziere v. United States, 249 F. 2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Wiley, 278 F. 2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); Thomas v. United States, 368 F. 2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966); Gillespie v. State, 355 P. 2d 451 (Ct. Crim. Apps. 1960).
In the instant appeals, both appellants were penalized for exercising rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, appellant Battle’s sentence should be reduced to one year’s probation and *72payment of a fifty dollar fine plus costs; appellant Moore should receive a new trial because her guilty plea was compelled by the threat of an increased sentence.
Spaulding, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Schedule to the Pennsylvania Constitution Judiciary Article (Article 5), §16(r) (iii) provides: “All criminal offenses for which no prison term may be imposed or which are punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than two years, and indictable offenses under the motor vehicle laws for which no prison term may be imposed or punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than three years. In these cases, the defendant shall have no right *69of trial by jury in that court, but he shall have the right of appeal for trial do novo including the right to trial by jury to the trial division of the court of common picas.” The proviso that the Municipal Court can hear all criminal cases where the term of imprisonment may not exceed two years has been supplemented by the Act of October 17, 1969, P. L, 259, §18, as amended, July 14, 1971, P. L. 224, No. 45, §1 (17 P.S. §711.18) which gives the Municipal Court jurisdiction in criminal offenses where a prison sentence of five years or less may be imposed. I do not decide the constitutionality of this legislative attempt to amend the schedule to the Constitution.

 See Footnote 1.

 The viability of this holding has not been disturbed by the holding in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) that an increased sentence following a trial de novo in Kentucky’s two tier criminal system does not violate rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. While the states may not abridge federal constitutional rights, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may grant more extensive protections to its citizens. Pennsylvania has done so. Commonwealth v. Harper, and Commonwealth v. Mirra, supra.