Court Opinion

ID: 9711197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:26:14.444333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.771442
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: I would affirm the order of the trial court. The existence of a duty owed by defendant is a question of law to be determined by the court. Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538; Barnes v. Washington (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535. In Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co. (1938), 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879, it was held that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant for the reason that it was not negligence per se to have narrow fairways, or fairways in near proximity without separation by trees, or rough or otherwise guarded despite expert testimony purporting to show such duty. The test of liability in operating a golf course was determined to be whether the condition of such course operated by defendant unreasonably subjected the players to hazards over and above those commonly inherent in the game of golf. We have found no modification of this standard or test. See Annot. 82 A.L.R.2d 1183, 1187 (1962 and 1976 Supp. to A.L.R.2d Later Case Service). In the context of physical conditions comparable to that shown in Campion, the complaint charged in various ways that defendant negligently operated a “unique and hazardous golf course.” Such allegation is a characterization to which no witness would be permitted to testify. In the context of duty, or breach of duty, we find no allegation of fact demonstrating that the course was unique or hazardous. At best, the allegation is the imposition of the imaginative imagery of the pleader upon the trial court. In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the court, in Fanning v. LeMay (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182, stated that a complaint which fails to allege facts the existence of which is necessary to enable a party to recover does not state a cause of action, and the deficiency cannot be remedied by liberal construction or argument. See also Whitmer v. Schneble (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 659, 331 N.E.2d 115. In Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 374, 282 N.E.2d 723, the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint under the Structural Work Act which simply alleged that defendant “had charge of” certain work for the reason that the allegation was a conclusion. That opinion noted that an allegation that a defendant “negligently” performed an act was a conclusion, and that the complaint was subject to dismissal, citing Richardson v. Eichhorn (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 273, 151 N.E.2d 819. Comparable allegations of operating a golf coruse where there was “undue hazard,” and charging failure to warn of hidden dangers contained no allegation of fact which supports a determination that such hazards or dangers were, in fact, present. We have not undertaken to set forth each of some 13 charges of negligence, but conclude that each encompasses the same absence of factual allegation sufficient to show a duty, or a breach of duty. The trial court properly dismissed the counts at issue.