Court Opinion

ID: 9550433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:35:11.298673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:32.110831
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that felony murder, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3401, includes the accidental death of a co-felon in its application.
The felony-murder statute, K.S.A. 21-3401, provides:
“Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed maliciously, willfully, deliberately and with premeditation or committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony.”
In the past, the felony-murder rule applied only to the deaths of innocents and not to the deaths of co-felons. The majority quotes State v. Dubish, 234 Kan. 708, 712, 675 P.2d 877 (1984), and then strictly construes the statute against the person at whom it is directed. Dubish is not authority for construing the statute in this manner, but authority for the opposite constitutional interpretation of the statute. Dubish requires that K.S.A. 21-3401 be strictly construed in favor of the person at whom it is directed, the defendant, Hoang.
Still following Dubish, the majority states that strict construction means simply that ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning. Further, it is stated that a statute should not be read to add that “which is not readily found therein or to read out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in it.”
The majority’s literal interpretation of the “ordinary English” of the felony-murder statute ignores prior decisions of this court *47which have construed the same felony-murder statute. We have held, for example, that the underlying felony in a felony-murder case must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human life, and that whether a felony is inherently dangerous to human life must be determined when considered in the abstract only. State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 632, 634, 664 P.2d 1358 (1983). Clearly, there is no such literal limitation contained within the legislature’s statement of the law. In Lashley, the majority obviously did not feel that philosophical amendment by the court was an improper judicial amendment of the statute.
The majority agrees that its literal interpretation of the statute can certainly produce some harsh results. For example, while studying in a college dorm, three students, A, B, and C, decide to steal beer from C’s father’s garage. C tells A and B, “The beer is in the garage, just open the door.” A and B drive to C’s house. A gets out of the car and lifts the garage door. C’s father hears burglar A and chases after him. While attempting to get to B’s car, A is hit and killed by a car that ran a red light. Under the majority’s literal interpretation of the statute, B and C could be charged with felony murder because A was killed during the commission of a felony.
This result is contrary to legislative intent. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, the statute should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding, as far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. Clark v. Murray, 141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042 (1935). If harsh results were not the intent of the legislature, this court should determine the legislative policy and purpose of the statute.
Prager, C.J., and Allegrucci, J., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.