Court Opinion

ID: 9894370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 16:10:33.461814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:25.518361
License: Public Domain

J-S25038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    EMILY ELIZABETH SWIKA POST                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 69 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-45-CR-0002497-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2023

       Emily Elizabeth Swika Post (Appellant) appeals1 from the judgment of

sentenced entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas after her

non-jury convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) — controlled
____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered a verdict on this matter on September 12, 2022.
Appellant filed a post-verdict motion, which the court denied on November
30th. That same day, she was sentenced. Appellant then filed a notice of
appeal “from the Order of her Guilty Verdict entered in this matter on
September 12, 2022, the Order Imposing Sentence on November 30, 2022,
and the Denial of [Appellant]’s Motion for Post-Verdict Relief entered in this
matter on November 30, 2022.” See Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, 12/28/22.

      We remind Appellant that an appeal properly lies only from the
judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 578 A.2d 1334,
1335 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“[I]n criminal cases[,] appeals lie from judgment of
sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt[.]”); Commonwealth v.
Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (Pa. 2002)
(“In a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence
made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.”) (citation omitted).
J-S25038-23

substances/impaired ability, and the summary offenses of exceeding speed

limits and careless driving.2 On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency

and weight of the evidence supporting her verdict for DUI — controlled

substances/impaired ability, as well as the admission of evidence that she

possessed a controlled substance.              For the reasons below, we affirm the

judgment of sentence, but remand the matter to the trial court for the limited

basis of correcting a clerical error regarding a fine for Appellant’s summary

conviction of careless driving.

       The underlying facts of this case are as follows.         On June 13, 2021,

Pennsylvania State Police Troopers Adam Thieling and Jared Beilman received

a call via radio about an “erratic driver” on Interstate 80. See N.T., 9/8/22,

at 4-5.    The trooper located the vehicle and with his speedometer, which

permitted him to determine the accurate speed of other cars, “clock[ed]” the

vehicle in question as traveling at a speed of 72 miles per hour in a posted 55

miles per hour zone. See id. at 5-6, 19-20. After locating the vehicle, the

troopers initiated a traffic stop and identified Appellant as the driver. Id. at

7-8. After asking for Appellant’s identification, Trooper Thieling returned to

his vehicle. Id. at 8. He then noticed Appellant “with her head down on the

driver window” and noted “it almost looked like she was sleeping[.]” Id. at

9. Based on his experience, the trooper believed “that’s not a normal thing

[to do during] a traffic stop . . . no matter how tired you are[.]” Id. at 22. At
____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(2), 3362(a)(2), 3714(a), respectively.

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this time, he suspected Appellant was “possibly under the influence of drugs

or alcohol” and returned to Appellant’s car to speak with her. Id. at 9, 23.

      Trooper Thieling recounted his conversation with Appellant as follows:

      I learned that [Appellant] did use drugs in the past and she was
      recovering[. S]he said from time to time she has a relapse. I
      asked [Appellant] a couple more questions about when her clean
      date was, as most people who are recovering do know their clean
      date, and she was unable to provide that to me[. Appellant also
      “didn’t know the last time she relapsed or the last time she used.”
      This] led me to believe that she was possibly under the influence
      of drugs. I then asked her to step out of the car, which she
      complied, and I was going to do a pat down for any weapons. She
      emptied her pockets for me and . . . pulled out a blue glassine
      heroin baggie.

N.T., 9/8/22, at 9, 25. Appellant also informed him the sweatshirt she was

wearing did not belong to her, she just “picked up [or] dropped off a

passenger[,]” and she was “tired[.]”     Id. at 25-27.    He noted Appellant

“seemed to be coherent” while speaking with him. Id. at 25.

      After observing the blue glassine baggie, Trooper Thieling suspected it

contained heroin or drug residue.    N.T., 9/8/22, at 10.   He then asked to

search her car, to which Appellant consented. Id. at 12, 27. Trooper Thieling

found 12 more blue glassine baggies on the passenger side of the car, which

he suspected were heroin packets, during his search. Id.

      Based on Trooper Thieling’s observations at that point, he conducted

field sobriety tests. See N.T., 9/8/22, at 10. The trooper stated that when

Appellant exited her car, before he administered the tests, he did not see her

“swaying” or “stagger[.]” Id. at 28. During the horizontal gaze nystagmus

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(HGN) test, the trooper did not observe any indicia of impairment, and told

Appellant “she      was doing       well”      because   “[s]he   was following [his]

instructions.” Id. at 10, 29. However, he noted “with drugs a lot of times[,]

you’re not going to see [indicia of impairment] on [an] HGN test[.]” Id. at

10. He then administered a “walk and turn” test, where he observed six clues

of impairment, and a “one leg stand” test, where he observed one indicia of

impairment. Id.

       Trooper Thieling also asked Appellant to complete an “ARIDE” test,

which consisted of “timing [Appellant’s] internal clock to see if [she was] able

to count [to] 30 seconds . . . , and also observing if there[ was] any swaying

in the body, body tremors, [or] eyelid tremors[.]”3 See N.T., 9/8/22, at 10.

A person who is not under the influence of drugs would “typically” count to 30

within a five second interval during the test — meaning they would complete

the test within 25 to 35 seconds. Id. at 11. However, Appellant’s “internal

clock was 19 seconds during a 30 second duration[,]” meaning she “thought

she counted [to] 30 seconds, [but] it was only 19 seconds.”                Id. at 11.

Additionally, the trooper observed Appellant’s pupils dilating and constricting

at the same time. Id. at 11-12. He concluded, based on the glassine baggies,

standard field sobriety tests, and ARIDE test, that “further indicators of drug

____________________________________________

3 Trooper Thieling also administered a “lack of convergence test[,]” which
consisted of placing a stimulus in front of Appellant’s face to see if her eyes
would “converge together” or “cross[.]” See N.T., 9/8/22, at 10-11. He did
not testify as to the results of this test, specifically.

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use” and impairment were present and Appellant was “likely under the

influence[.]” See id.

       Trooper Thieling testified that he arrested Appellant for a suspected DUI

and transported her to Monroe County Correctional Facility for DUI processing.

See N.T., 9/8/22, at 12. While there, the trooper read Appellant a DL-26 form

to request a blood draw, which she refused. Id. at 12-13.

       In addition to DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability, Appellant

was charged with exceeding speed limits and careless driving.4 Relevant to

this appeal, Appellant did not file any pre-trial motions.

       This matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on September 8, 2022. At

trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Thieling, who

described his interaction with Appellant as summarized above.           On cross-

examination, Trooper Thieling testified that when he initially observed

Appellant driving at a high rate of speed, he did not observe “any indicators

of impaired driving” or any other infractions. See id. at 19.

       At trial, Appellant’s counsel played the mobile video recorder (MVR)

footage from the incident as evidence.           The video, provided by Trooper

Thieling, depicted his view of Appellant’s vehicle before he initiated traffic stop

through the conclusion of the encounter. See N.T., 9/8/22, at 13-14. While
____________________________________________

4  Appellant was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, 35
Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(32), but the Commonwealth withdrew the charge before
trial.  See Commonwealth’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Criminal
Information and For Non-Jury Trial, 4/29/22, at 1 (unpaginated); Order,
4/29/22 (granting Commonwealth’s motion).

                                           -5-
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playing the video, Appellant’s counsel made an oral motion to suppress the

statements made in the MVR video after Trooper Thieling decided to return to

Appellant’s vehicle.   Id. at 23.   Counsel argued that the trooper’s return

marked a “second encounter” and investigative detention, which required

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to continue. Id. The Commonwealth

responded that Appellant’s counsel failed to file a motion to suppress prior to

trial, and in any event, the initial traffic stop had not yet concluded. Id. at

23-24. The Commonwealth maintained that when Trooper Thieling witnessed

Appellant’s unusual behavior on his way back to her car, this gave him

reasonable suspicion to further speak with her. Id. at 24. The trial court

overruled the objection. Id.

      On September 12, 2022, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one

count each of DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability, exceeding speed

limits, and careless driving. On September 22nd, Appellant filed a post-verdict

motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the verdict was against

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.       See Appellant’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal and Request for Extension of Time to Obtain CRN

Evaluation, 9/22/22, at 2-5 (unpaginated).     Counsel also argued the court

erred when it admitted “evidence of possession of a controlled substance[.]”

Id. at 5-6.

      On November 30, 2022, the trial court denied the motion and, that same

day, sentenced Appellant to a term of 72 hours to six months’ incarceration

for her DUI conviction. Relevant to our disposition, at her remaining summary

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convictions, Appellant was ordered to pay a $76.50 fine for exceeding speed

limits, and a $25.00 fine for careless driving. Appellant did not file a post-

sentence motion but did submit this timely appeal. Appellant then timely filed

a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must first

determine whether she has properly preserved these claims for our review.

In her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant alleged the following:

      1. [Appellant] appeals from the Guilty Verdict entered on
      September 12, 2022, in which [Appellant] was found guilty of
      Count 1 of the Criminal Information, [DUI — controlled
      substances/impaired ability];

      2. [Appellant] appeals from the Sentence that was imposed by
      order dated November 30,2022; and

      3. Appellant appeals from the Denial of her Post-Verdict Motions,
      decided on November 30, 2022[.]

            Any one or all of the foregoing reasons raise a substantial
      question as to the rationality of the sentence imposed, thus
      warranting appellate review.

Appellant’s Concise Statement of [Errors] Complained of On Appeal

(Appellant’s Concise Statement), 1/25/23.

      The trial court noted the statement, filed by Appellant’s counsel,

“contain[ed] only vague references to prior [o]rders” and “state[d] no specific

claims upon which [the court] may base” an opinion. Trial Ct. Op., 2/27/23,

at 1. Thus, the court concluded any claims Appellant wished to claim were

waived. Id. at 4.

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       We note that a Rule 1925(b) statement that is not specific enough for

the trial court to identify or address any of the appellant’s claims may result

in waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (a statement “shall concisely identify

each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify

the issue to be raised for the judge.”); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d

1, 2-3 (Pa. Super. 2006) (waiving issues not raised before the trial court due

to lack of specificity).

       When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
       that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails
       adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be
       pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of
       a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. In other words,
       a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to
       identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of
       no Concise Statement at all.

Id. at 2 (citation omitted).

       Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s determination — that

the Rule 1925(b) statement filed by counsel merely references the guilty

verdict, sentencing order, and the order denying the post-verdict motion, and

identifies no actual issue.5       See Appellant’s Concise Statement.    Because

Appellant’s issues on appeal were not made clear and the trial court wrote its

____________________________________________

5 In addition, counsel makes a vague assertion that the claims “raise a
substantial question as to the rationality of the sentence imposed” and thus
review is warranted. See Appellant’s Concise Statement. To the extent
Appellant’s counsel intended to raise a challenge to the discretionary aspects
of her sentence, it appears counsel has since abandoned this claim on appeal.
See id.; see also Appellant’s Brief at 8.

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opinion based on an “assumption[,]” we agree that Appellant has waived her

claims for failure to adhere to Rule 1925(b).6 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii);

Reeves, 907 A.2d at 2-3; Trial Ct. Op. at 1. For this reason, no relief is due.

       Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved her claims, she would

still not be entitled to relief.     Appellant’s arguments in her appellate brief

correspond with the “assumption[s]” identified by the trial court — and

indicate that she intended to assert the same claims outlined in the post-

verdict motion. Appellant raises the following issues:

       1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of
          guilty as to [DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability?]

       2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
          presented at trial[?]

       3. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting, considering, and
          concluding that [Appellant] was in possession of a controlled
          substance[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.7

       Based on our disposition, we will address all of Appellant’s issues

together. In her first argument, Appellant avers the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence that she was driving under the influence of an

illegal substance. Appellant’s Brief at 12. She contends the Commonwealth’s

evidence “only showed [she] appeared tired after working a double shift.” Id.

at 14. She maintains the trooper did not observe anything that would lead

____________________________________________

6 Appellant does not address waiver under Rule 1925(b) in her brief.

7 The Commonwealth did not file a brief.

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him to believe she was driving while impaired or under the influence of any

illegal substances.    Id.   Appellant highlights the fact that Trooper Thieling

“remark[ed] that she appeared fine and was doing well” during field sobriety

tests.     Id.   Lastly, Appellant insists that “there was no qualified expert

testimony confirming that the [glassine baggies contained] a controlled

substance[.]” Id.

         Our standard of review regarding a challenge to the sufficiency is well-

settled:

         The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
         is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
         most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
         to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
         a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
         the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
         addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
         the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
         resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
         inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
         drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
         may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
         beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
         evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
         must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
         considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
         credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
         is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

         A person is guilty of DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability based

on the following, in relevant part:

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      (d) Controlled substances. — An individual may not drive,
      operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
      vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

                                  *      *      *

         (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
         combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
         individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).     Additionally, we note expert testimony that a

petitioner’s inability to drive was caused by a controlled substance is not

mandatory in all DUI prosecutions, but in some cases “expert testimony may

be helpful, or perhaps even necessary[.]” Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32

A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis added).

      In her next argument, Appellant maintains the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant again avers Trooper

Thieling did not provide testimony that would support she was driving while

impaired.   Appellant’s Brief at 15.    She insists that none of the tests the

trooper administered indicated that she was under the influence. Id. Based

on these factors, Appellant maintains “the inference that [she] was not

substantially impaired . . . would hold greater weight.” Id.

      When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we keep the

following in mind:

      A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is
      sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the
      ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor
      of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice. On
      review, an appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the
      finder of fact and consider the underlying question of whether the

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      verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but, rather,
      determines only whether the trial court abused its discretion in
      making its determination.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citations

omitted). Further, the fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none or the

evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa.

2003) (citation omitted).

      This Court will not find an abuse of discretion

      based on a mere error of judgment, but rather . . . where the
      [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides or
      misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
      Importantly, [this C]ourt should not find that a trial court abused
      its discretion merely because [we] disagree[ ] with the trial court’s
      conclusion. Indeed, “when reviewing the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, it is improper for [this C]ourt to ‘step[ ] into the shoes’
      of the trial judge and review the evidence de novo.” In other
      words, [this C]ourt “may not disturb a trial court’s discretionary
      ruling by substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.”

Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 467 (Pa. 2019) (citations & some

quotation marks omitted).

      Lastly, Appellant avers the trial court erred when it permitted the

Commonwealth to present evidence that she was in possession of a controlled

substance. Appellant’s Brief at 16. She maintains Trooper Thieling “did not

have a sufficient basis to detain [her] for additional tests or searches.” Id. at

17. Appellant avers the trooper extended the traffic stop without reasonable

suspicion when he walked back to his vehicle then returned and administered

sobriety tests.   See id. at 17-18.        Appellant insists Trooper Thieling’s

comments about “how well” she was performing “suggest [he] did not have

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reasonable suspicion of impairment [or] justification to administer further

tests or request consent to search” her person or vehicle. Id. at 18. Instead,

Appellant contends the trooper administered the tests “based on a hunch or

to satisfy [his] curiosity” regarding her sobriety. Id. It merits mention that

Appellant does not address the failure to file a pre-trial suppression motion

and the resulting waiver in her brief.

      “The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of

the trial court and will be reversed only where there is a clear abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 1094, 1101 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation omitted). A defendant “may make a motion to the court to

suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the [their]

rights.”   Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A).   However, “[u]nless the opportunity did not

previously exist, or the interests of justice otherwise require, [a motion to

suppress evidence] shall be contained in the omnibus pretrial motion[.]”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). Failure to file a timely suppression motion will result in

waiver of the issue. Id.

      Had Appellant preserved the above-mentioned claims in a proper Rule

1925(b) statement, we would affirm on the well-reasoned basis of the trial

court opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-17 (concluding: (1) based on the totality

of the circumstances, the Commonwealth presented evidence that established

each element of DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability; (2) Trooper

Thieling testified credibly; (3) Trooper Thieling’s “uncontradicted testimony”

and the MVR video demonstrated that Appellant operated a vehicle after she

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consumed a controlled substance, which impaired her ability to drive;8 (4) due

to the Commonwealth’s credible evidence, the verdict did not shock one’s

sense of justice, and thus was not against the weight of the evidence; (5)

Appellant waived any purported suppression claim when she failed to file a

motion to suppress; (6) even if Appellant preserved a suppression claim,

Trooper Thieling did not yet issue a traffic citation for the underlying stop when

he began to suspect a potential DUI, thus he had reasonable grounds to

further investigate; (7) Appellant waived any claim regarding expert witness

testimony as a basis for relief when she did not raise the issue before the trial

court; (8) even if Appellant preserved her claim that expert testimony was

necessary to establish that she possessed a controlled substance, this is not

an element of the charged offense, and as such, the Commonwealth did not

need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the contents of the blue glassine

baggies; and (9) Trooper Thieling testified that based on his training and

experience, he identified the baggies as drug paraphernalia.)

       As Appellant has failed to preserve any of the claims raised above, and

moreover, because she has failed to establish the trial court erred in its

rulings, Appellant is not entitled to relief on her claims regarding her conviction

of DUI — controlled substances/impaired ability.

____________________________________________

8 We also note that Appellant refused to submit to a blood test, which can be

admitted to suggest consciousness of guilty. See Commonwealth v. Bell,
211 A.3d 761, 763-64 (Pa. 2019); N.T., 9/8/22, at 12-13.

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      Lastly, we note in its Rule 1925(a)opinion, the trial court acknowledged

that “due to a clerical error,” the fine for Appellant’s exceeding speed limits

conviction was “incorrect.”   See Trial Ct. Op. at 17.      The court ordered

Appellant to pay a fine of $76.50, when it should have been $59.00. See 75

Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(2) and (c)(1)(ii).   “The power to modify a judgment of

sentence to amend records, to correct mistakes of court officers or counsel’s

inadvertencies is inherent in our court system, even after the thirty-day time

limit set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, has expired.”     Commonwealth v.

Young, 695 A.2d 414, 420 (Pa. Super. 1997). Accordingly, we remand for

the limited purpose of correcting the sentence to reflect the proper fine

amount for Appellant’s exceeding speed limits conviction.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Case remanded to the trial court for

the limited basis to correct the clerical error regarding Appellant’s exceeding

speed limits summary conviction. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 11/01/2023

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