Court Opinion

ID: 9636950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:50:39.871044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:51.623620
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Armando Gonzalez, was seriously injured when he was struck by a forklift operated by a co-worker. He sued the *418forklift’s first-stage manufacturer (defendant Komatsu), contending that it should have installed additional warning devices on the machine in order to make its operation safe.1 Komatsu moved for summary judgment on the ground that state tort claims for workplace injuries are preempted when the allegedly defective product was manufactured in compliance with federal standards. The motion was granted.
Plaintiff appealed, contending that the relevant federal standard, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), only applies to employers and not to manufacturers, thus rendering preemption inapplicable. In a reported opinion, a divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing, Inc., 371 N.J.Super. 349, 853 A.2d 298 (App.Div.2004). In ruling, the court concluded that it did not need to determine OSHA’s reach because both parties proceeded on the assumption that Komatsu was bound by OSHA’s forklift standards. Id. at 360, 853 A.2d 298. Therefore, the majority assumed, without deciding, that OSHA’s forklift regulations were binding on Komatsu and not just informative or evidential of the standard of care applicable to the manufacturer or seller. Ibid.
The majority next addressed whether plaintiffs state tort claim was preempted by federal law and concluded that the state regulation urged by plaintiff would stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of’ the federal regulation regarding additional warning devices, and thus determined that plaintiffs product liability theory was preempted as in conflict with the federal standard. Id. at 362, 853 A.2d 298.
One judge dissented. He disagreed with “the majority’s understanding that plaintiffs accepted the premise that OSHA’s standards govern product manufacturers because they failed to argue that OSHA applies only to employers.” Id. at 371, 853 A.2d 298. Instead, he opined that plaintiffs’ position on that issue was “clearly inferable” from their argument that OSHA does not *419preempt third-party tort claims. Ibid. The dissenter went on to conclude that Komatsu’s preemption argument was without merit because OSHA only applies to employers and not to manufacturers. Ibid. The ease came to us as of right because of the dissent. We have carefully reviewed this record in light of the claims advanced by the parties regarding preemption and now affirm.
A few comments are in order, however. First, we agree with the dissenting judge that plaintiffs’ position that OSHA regulations only apply to employers was clearly in the case from the beginning as an integral implication of the argument that OSHA does not preempt third-party tort claims. We also agree with his opinion to the extent that it can be read to hold that some third-party claims arising in the workplace may not be preempted by OSHA. We part company from him in connection with his blanket conclusion that OSHA can never preempt a third-party tort claim.
Preemption may be express or implied and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent explicit preemptive language, [the United States Supreme Court] has recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
[Gads v. Nat’l Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d 73, 84 (1992)(internal citations and quotations omitted).]
Express preemption is determined from an examination of the explicit language used by Congress. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604, 613 (1977). In this case, the OSHA statute governs on the question of express preemption. OSHA contains a saving clause that provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
*420[29 U.S.C.A § 653(b)(4).]
OSHA also contains a preemption clause that states that “[n]othing in this [Act] shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 667(a).
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the interplay between analogous saving and preemption clauses, concluding that the preemption clause should be read narrowly:
Without the saving clause, a broad reading of the express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt those actions, for, as we have just mentioned, it is possible to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as applying to standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as well as standards contained in state legislation or regulations. And if so, it would pre-empt all nonidentical state standards established in tort actions covering the same aspect of performance as an applicable federal standard, even if the federal standard merely established a minimum standard. On that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any, potential “liability at common law” would remain. And few, if any, state tort actions would remain for the saving clause to save. We have found no convincing indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions, in such circumstances. Hence the broad reading cannot be correct. The language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes common-law actions. Given the presence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-emption clause must be so read.
[Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1918, 146 L.Ed.2d 914, 923 (2000).]
By that reasoning, as the Appellate Division properly held, under OSHA, state tort actions are not expressly preempted.
We turn next to field preemption, which, as the United States Supreme Court has said, occurs “where the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S.Ct. at 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d at 84 (citation omitted). OSHA provides:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated ... shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement.
*421[29 U.S.C.A § 667(b).]
It further states:
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.
[29 U.S.C.A § 667(a).]
Those provisions of OSHA clearly demonstrate the intent of Congress to allow states to have some role in maintaining safe and healthful working conditions. Thus, field preemption is inapplicable.
The remaining issue is whether conflict preemption applies and that is where we think the Appellate Division majority was directly on the mark. Conflict preemption occurs where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S.Ct. at 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d at 84 (citation omitted).
As the Appellate Division noted, ascertaining the interplay of conflict preemption and OSHA is made difficult by the fact that the Supreme Court was unable to reach a consensus on the issue in Gade. Gonzalez, supra, 371 N.J.Super. at 366, 853 A.2d 298. There, the Court addressed whether OSHA preempted an Illinois statute that required the licensing of hazardous waste equipment operators and laborers. Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 91, 112 S.Ct. at 2379, 120 L.Ed.2d at 80. The majority of justices held that there was preemption, but did not agree on whether the preemption was express or implied. Id. at 102, 112 S.Ct. at 2385, 120 L.Ed.2d at 84. In the plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of herself and three other justices, held that a finding of federal preemption was required due to conflict preemption principles. Id. at 98, 112 S.Ct. at 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d at 84. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but held that that preemption was express. Thus, while Gade established that Congress intended OSHA regulations to have a preemptive effect, it did not resolve *422whether a state regulation that is only supplemental to federal regulations is preempted.
In Geier, supra, the Court answered the question in a different context. There, the Court addressed whether the federal regulation regarding automobile airbags preempted a state common law tort action in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant auto manufacturer, who was in compliance with the federal standard, should nonetheless have equipped an automobile with airbags. Geier, supra 529 U.S. at 864-65, 120 S.Ct. at 1916-17, 146 L.Ed.2d at 921. At issue was the question of conflict preemption. The Court detailed the history of the federal regulation of restraint systems in automobiles, noting that after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of various restraint systems, the Department of Transportation had adopted a regulation that set a performance requirement for passive restraint devices and allowed manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms such as airbags and automatic seatbelts in order to satisfy that requirement. Id. at 877-78, 120 S.Ct. at 1923, 146 L.Ed.2d at 928-29.
The Court determined that the federal regulation “deliberately sought to gradually phase-in passive restraints,” requiring the manufacturers to equip only 10% of their car fleet manufactured after a certain date with passive restraints, increasing the percentage in three annual stages until 100% of the new car fleet was so equipped. Id. at 879,120 S.Ct. at 1924, 146 L.Ed.2d at 930. Thus, the Court concluded that:
In effect, petitioners’ tort action depends upon its claim that manufacturers had a duty to install an airbag when they manufactured the [automobile in question]. Such a state law — i.e., a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty — by its terms would have required manufacturers of all similar cars to install air bags rather than other passive restraint systems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors. It thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought ... Because the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of’ the important means-related federal objectives that we have just discussed, it is preempted.
[Id at 881, 120 S.Ct. at 1923, 146 L.Ed.2d at 931-32 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.CL 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)).]
*423Geier provides a framework for analyzing whether there is conflict preemption in this ease. We think the Appellate Division majority applied Geier correctly when it stated:
Upon examining the content of the ANSI standards, and their intended meaning, we conclude that plaintiff’s product liability theory suggests a standard that is in direct conflict, and not merely supplemental, to the ANSI standards. Two ANSI standards demonstrate this conflict. The first requires that forklifts be equipped with an operator controlled horn, while the second declares that “other devices (visible and audible) suitable for the intended area of use may be installed when requested by the user.” As can be seen, ANSI does not leave open an area where the States may regulate with regard to “other” warning devices. Instead, like the phased-in airbag regulation considered in Geier, ANSI specifically creates a standard for “other” warning devices, requiring the user to determine their need, dependent upon the “intended area of use.”
ANSI’s interpretation of these standards[2] demonstrates that OSHA requires that such additional warning devices should not be installed absent a contrary determination by the user:
[T]he user [should] consider certain factors to enhance a safe operation. He may use his own judgment or that of one with more experience. The myriad combinations related to lighting, ambient noise levels, traffic routes for both materials and personnel, floor conditions, proximity of machinery, equipment and work stations, etc., suggest that this would be a difficult subject to cover in a standard with finite verbiage. The support for using additional audio and/or visual alarms is that it may promote safety. The argument against indiscriminate use of additional alarms is that it might encourage the driver to ignore his responsibility of looking in the direction of travel and being alert to impending danger. Also, automatic continuous alarms can become so commonplace that they will soon be ignored by persons in the area. [ANSI/ASME B56.1-1983, Interpretation 1-6.]
As can be seen, the ANSI standards, do not merely set a mandatory minimum for forklift safety devices, but regulate the universe of warning devices, concluding that the inclusion of warning devises other than an operator-controlled horn, may tend to create more dangers than they prevent and, thus, should depend upon the conditions in which the forklift is used, as determined by the owner/user. Plaintiff urges application of a product liability standard regarding “other” warning devices that, by being more rigorous, attempts not to supplement, but to supplant, OSHA’s more discretionary regulation. In short, the result of ANSI’s expertise in this area — which OSHA co-opted — was its conclusion that the “other” warning devices, which plaintiff alleges were required to render the forklift safe, actually may tend *424to create additional dangers in the workplace. That is a standard not the absence of a standard, and the state regulation urged by plaintiff, through the imposition of tort liability, would stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of’ the federal regulation regarding additional warning devices. Geier, supra, 529 U.S. at 881, 120 S.Ct. at 1925, 146 L.Ed2d at 932 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581, 587 (1941)). Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs claim for damages based upon Komatsu’s alleged failure to comply with a standard which conflicts with OSHA’s standards was properly dismissed.
[Gonzalez, supra, 371 N.J.Super. at 369-70, 853 A.2d 298 (alteration in original).]
Those conclusions fully accord with relevant conflict preemption principles in all respects. Although a state tort action involving a third party and a work place injury could survive an OSHA conflict analysis, this one simply does not. The judgment of the Appellate Division is therefore affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Fisher’s thorough and thoughtful opinion.

 Gonzalez's wife also sued per quod.

 "ANSI’s interpretation of its own standards is entitled to considerable deference. Geier, supra, 529 U.S. at 883, 120 S.Ct. at 1926, 146 L.Ed.2d at 933. By adopting ANSI’s standards, we assume it was also the intent of the Secretary of Labor to have those standards mean the same thing which ANSI intended.” Gonzalez, supra, 371 NJ.Super. at 369 n. 9, 853 A.2d 298.