Court Opinion

ID: 9566428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:39:12.571704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:31.814545
License: Public Domain

HAYS, Justice
(dissenting) :
I concur with the majority opinion except for that portion which holds that the trial court’s distribution of the community property was arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional; nor would I characterize the distribution as whimsical. Obviously, in reading the same transcripts, we came to different conclusions. Our difference here is not as to the principles of law involved, but as to the application of the rather confusing facts to those princciples.
The enactment in 1973 by the legislature of ARS § 25-318 puts to rest for the future the question of whether fault is to be considered in the distribution of the community property. The ambivalence of the courts in this area is reflected in opinions which quote the rule in Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273, 195 P.2d 132 (1948), and then proceed to discuss the transgressions of the offending party. See Honig v. Honig, 77 Ariz. 247, 269 P.2d 737 (1954); Reed v. Reed, 82 Ariz. 168, 309 P.2d 790 (1957); Britz v. Britz, 95 Ariz. 247, 389 P.2d 123 (1964). The majority opinion does this in the following words:
“ • . • The record amply demonstrates that her husband was guilty of extreme cruelty in the use of physical violence upon her.”
Here again I am at a variance with the majority as to what position the record supports.
My sole purpose in this dissent is to make it clear that we do not wish to substitute our assessment of the evidence for that of the trial judge. We will interfere in that assessment only when the abuse of discretion by the trial judge is abundantly clear. I do not find that to be the case here on the issue of the distribution of the community property.