Court Opinion

ID: 9950802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:03:03.763104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:46.951340
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 In re Perla C. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re PERLA C., a Person                                     B328768
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law.                                                   Ct. No. 22CCJP00949A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

MICHELLE P.,

         Defendant and Appellant.
     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.

     Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
      Michelle P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights over her eighth child, Perla C.
Mother argues that the court did not comply with its initial duty
of inquiring into Perla’s possible Indian heritage under the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).1 We conclude that there was no error
and, alternatively, that any error was harmless. Accordingly, we
affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts Pertinent to Dependency Jurisdiction
      Mother gave birth to Perla in May 2018. Perla’s father is
Hugo C. (father).
      In March 2022, mother tested positive for amphetamines
and methamphetamine. At that time, father was incarcerated on
an eight-year sentence for assaulting a peace officer with a
deadly weapon.

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
II.    Procedural History of Petition
       On March 14, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over
Perla because mother’s substance abuse placed Perla at
substantial risk of serious physical harm, thereby rendering
jurisdiction appropriate under subdivision (b) of section 300.
       The juvenile court had exerted dependency jurisdiction over
all seven of mother’s other children. All seven had been removed
from mother’s custody; six were eventually placed in legal
guardianships and the seventh put up for adoption after mother’s
parental rights were terminated as to him.
       On May 20, 2022, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional
hearing and sustained the petition.
       On October 20, 2022, the juvenile court held a dispositional
hearing. The court removed Perla from mother’s custody and
bypassed reunification services for mother in light of her inability
to reunify with all seven of Perla’s older siblings. The court
placed Perla with two maternal cousins, and issued a protective
order requiring mother to stay away from Perla and her
caregivers. The court then set the matter for a permanency
planning hearing.
       On December 20, 2022, the juvenile court granted a
permanent restraining order against mother, protecting Perla
and her caregivers.
       On April 20, 2023, the juvenile court terminated mother’s
parental rights over Perla, naming the maternal cousins as the
prospective adoptive parents.

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III.  Facts Pertinent to Perla’s Status as an Indian Child
      Mother was repeatedly asked whether she had any Indian
heritage, and she on three different occasions consistently denied
having any.
      Father was asked if he had Indian heritage; he also denied
having any.
      Both father and mother also filled out the written ICWA-
020 form attesting that they had no Indian ancestry.
      The Department asked several of mother’s relatives
whether Perla might be an Indian child—namely, (1) the
maternal cousins who took custody of Perla, and (2) the maternal
grandfather and his wife. All of them denied any possible Indian
heritage. The maternal grandmother could not be asked because
she had passed away.
      The Department also asked the paternal grandmother, and
she denied any Indian heritage from her side or from paternal
grandfather’s side.
      Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court repeatedly
ordered the Department to inquire of maternal and paternal
relatives about Perla’s potential Indian heritage. On the basis of
the information set forth above, the court ultimately ruled that it
had no reason to believe Perla was an “Indian child” within the
meaning of ICWA.
IV. Appeal
      Mother filed this timely appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that
it had no reason to believe Perla was an Indian child because the
Department’s initial inquiry into Perla’s Indian heritage was
defective. Specifically, mother faults the Department for not

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inquiring of (1) the maternal great-uncle, (2) the paternal
grandfather, and (3) the four maternal aunts.2
       ICWA and corresponding statutes that our Legislature
enacted to implement ICWA assign the juvenile court and the
Department “three distinct duties” aimed at assessing whether a
child in a dependency action is an “Indian child,” and hence a
child who should not be separated from their tribal family
through adoption or foster care placement. (§§ 224.2, 224.3; In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32.) Only the first duty
is at issue here—namely, the initial “duty” of the Department
and the juvenile court “to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges
this duty by “asking” family members “whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).) For these purposes, an
“Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a member of an Indian tribe,”
or (2) “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. §
1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).) The Department's
duty to inquire extends not only to the child's parents, but also to
others, “includ[ing] . . . extended family members.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b).) For its part, the juvenile court is required, “[a]t the
first appearance” in a dependency case, to “ask each participant
present . . . whether the participant knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).)

2      Mother also faults the Department for not asking a
“paternal cousin,” but there is no paternal cousin. (Italics added.)
The reference to paternal cousin was a typo; it should have read
“maternal cousins.” As noted above, the Department did inquire
of the maternal cousins, who indicated that Perla had no Indian
heritage.

                                 5
       Although ICWA obligates the Department to inquire of the
child’s “extended family members,” California courts have not
construed the Department’s duty of initial inquiry to always
require an inquiry of every extended family member. To the
contrary, the Department discharges its duty of initial inquiry as
long as its interviews “‘reliably answer[]’ the question of whether
the child[ is a] Native American child[].” (In re E.W. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 314, 323; In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
984, 1009); accord, In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 603-604
(K.H.) [duty is discharged if Department’s “inquiry . . . extend[s]
far enough to reasonably ensure that if there is information the
child is or may be an Indian child, that information is
gathered”].) Mother urges us to ignore this consistent line of
authority in favor of a rule requiring an exhaustive inquiry of
every possible relative—and, because the statute only “includes”
but is not limited to extended family members, anyone else who
might know the child—who can be tracked down; we decline to do
so.
I.     The Department Complied With Its Initial Duty of
       Inquiry
       The Department’s initial inquiry into Perla’s possible
Indian heritage was sufficiently thorough to allow the
Department to “reliably answer[]” the question of whether there
was reason to believe she might be an Indian child. Although it
is insufficient merely to inquire of a child’s parents (K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 605), the Department here went far beyond
that—asking the maternal grandfather and his wife, the paternal
grandmother, and the maternal cousins who took custody of
Perla. All of them said the same thing: There is no Indian
heritage. This inquiry was sufficient.

                                 6
      Mother asserts that the Department should have also
asked the maternal great-uncle, the paternal grandfather, and
the four maternal aunts, but provides no explanation why inquiry
of these individuals was necessary to an adequate inquiry given
that the people the Department did interview—the parents and
grandparents—were in as good, if not better, a position to know of
Perla’s possible heritage. Indeed, the paternal grandmother told
the Department she knew of no basis for believing the paternal
grandfather had any Indian heritage.
II.   Any Error Is Harmless
      In In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted
September 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.), our Division held that
“an agency’s failure to conduct a proper initial inquiry into a
dependent child’s American Indian heritage is harmless unless
the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe
that the child may be an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of
ICWA, such that the absence of further inquiry was prejudicial to
the juvenile court’s ICWA finding. For this purpose, the ‘record’
includes both the record of proceedings in the juvenile court and
any proffer the appealing parent makes on appeal.” (Id. at p.
779.)
      Here, the record contains no information suggesting a
reason to believe that Perla may be an Indian child. Mother and
father denied having any Indian heritage, as did several relatives
on both sides of the family. Further, Perla’s seven older half
siblings have all been, or currently are, juvenile dependents and
the court in each case determined that none of them was an
Indian child. (E.g., In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483,
490-492 [holding that a prior finding of no ICWA concerns as to
sibling means deficiencies in ICWA inquiry as to subsequent

                                7
sibling were harmless]; In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396,
400-402 [same as to half sibling]; In re J.M. (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 375, 383 [same].) Mother offers nothing in the trial
court record or on appeal to suggest that further inquiry would
turn up any different conclusion.
       Mother urges us to disregard Dezi C. We will not, as it is
still pending before the Supreme Court.
                          DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                    ______________________, J.
                                    HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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