Court Opinion

ID: 9353009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 19:00:44.663305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:31.646530
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          ___________

                               No. 22-1875
                               __________

                    PATRICK LUMUMBA OKEYO,
                                       Appellant

                                    v.

   USCIS, NEWARK OFFICE; CITY HALL JERSEY CITY; HUDSON COUNTY
  CLERKS OFFICE; PRYSLAK TRANSPORTATION; NORTH STAR SERVICES,
    SOUTH KEARNY; NEW JERSEY UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY LABOR
     DEPARTMENT, NEW JERSEY DEPART. OF LABOR WORKFORCE;
NEW MARANATHA KARIBU SDA CHURCH; NEW BRUNSWICK ENGLISH SDA
 CHURCH; FARMERS INSURANCE; ANGELIC BAPTIST CHURCH, BAYONNE;
   FRANK A. VITERITTO, LAWYER; JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
  HARRISON POLICE DEPARTMENT; LINDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; LYFT
                        RIDESHARE SERVICE
                ____________________________________

              On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of New Jersey
                          (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-17431)
               District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
               ____________________________________

              Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                           November 23, 2022
        Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges

                     (Opinion filed: January 10, 2023)
                                         ___________

                                          OPINION*
                                         ___________

PER CURIAM

       Patrick Lumumba Okeyo appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his

complaint. One appellee, Farmers Insurance Company, has filed a motion for summary

action. We grant that motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment as

to Farmers and affirm the judgment as to all other defendants.

       In his complaint filed in September 2021, Okeyo sought to challenge multiple,

unrelated events that occurred as early as 1996. He believed that Appellees were

harassing and investigating him as well as taking his property. Appellees filed motions to

dismiss. The District Court granted the motions to dismiss and sua sponte dismissed the

complaint for failure to state a claim as to any remaining defendants. Okeyo filed a

notice of appeal, arguing only that the District Court erred because he stated plausible

claims for relief and the statute of limitations did not bar them.

       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review

over the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motions to dismiss. See Dique v. N.J.

State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
                                              2
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal

quotation omitted). It is not enough for a plaintiff to offer only conclusory allegations or

a simple recital of the elements of a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007).

       We agree with the District Court’s analysis. Okeyo’s scattered and conclusory

allegations simply do not assert a claim that is “plausible on its face.” See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678; see generally Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (a

complaint’s factual allegations are “clearly baseless” if they are “fanciful, fantastic, [or]

delusional” (citations omitted)).

       On appeal, Okeyo sets forth reasons he believes the statute of limitations should

not apply to his claims. However, the District Court dismissed his claims for failure to

state a claim and only noted that “it appears many of Plaintiff’s claims would be barred

by applicable statutes of limitations.” ECF No. 70 at 4 (emphasis added). Because we

agree with the District Court that Okeyo did not set forth any intelligible cause of action

against any defendant in his complaint, we need not address whether Okeyo would be

entitled to any tolling of the statute of limitations for his claims.

       For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we grant

Farmers’ motion and will summarily affirm as to Farmers and affirm the District Court’s

judgment in all other respects. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.

                                               3