Court Opinion

ID: 9767738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:24:40.999304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.420414
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
Since I am convinced that the judgment should not be reversed upon the grounds-stated in the majority opinion, the reasons-therefor are briefly stated.
The majority opinion holds that the trial: court erred: (1) In failing to require the Commonwealth to “produce the written) statement of the accused”; and (2) in failing to exclude “the oral testimony of the witness, Bladyes, (sic) insofar as its substance was embraced in the writing”. Neither of these grounds should be held to constitute prejudicial error under the record in this case.
The question of whether or not counsel for appellant was entitled to have the written statement of the accused produced as evidence was not raised in the circuit court. The mere fact that counsel for appellant asked the attorney for the Commonwealth to produce the written statement does not constitute a motion which would require a ruling of the trial court. Criminal Code of Practice, Section 152. Another reason why this question is not before this Court is that Sections 280 and 282 of the Criminal Code *187of Practice have uniformly been construed as requiring a timely obj ection to the ruling of the trial court and an exception to the ruling in the bill of exceptions to save an alleged error for appellate review. See Roberson, New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure, Second Edition, Sections 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954, pages 2090-2094. Caswell v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 394, 147 S.W.2d 1045. Yet, in the absence of a motion or a ruling of the trial court, or an exception taken to the procedure of the court, this Court has considered appellant’s contention concerning this matter and has held that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in failing to compel the Commonwealth to produce the written statement. I would prefer to adhere to our former well-established rule and hold that the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.
I also disagree that the trial court erred in admitting the “oral testimony of the witness, Bladyes, (sic) insofar as its substance was embraced in the writing”. Ordinarily, when the primary evidence of a fact is a writing, the best evidence rule requires the writing to be produced in evidence, unless its nonproduction is explained or excused. However, when the ultimate fact sought to be established was observed by a witness, his testimony regarding what he had seen or heard is primary evidence, regardless of whether such fact is reduced to writing. See Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Volume 2, Section 607, page 501. Commonwealth v. Bement, 213 Ky. 501, 281 S.W. 507.
The record discloses that Blaydes did not testify from either the writing or information he obtained from it. Instead, he testified about what he heard appellant say concerning his involvement in the alleged crime. These oral admissions were properly received in evidence because they constituted a declaration against interest.
Consequently, I believe the reasons given for the reversal of the judgment are unsound.
CAMMACK, J., joins in this dissent.