Court Opinion

ID: 9690278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:02:19.738388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:07.217282
License: Public Domain

*337SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 82. (dissenting). The majority summarily and without analysis concludes that "the proceedings in this matter were neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."1 conclude that the minimum due process requirement of notice was violated in the present case.
¶ 83. Furthermore, the majority upholds the circuit court's decision to revoke supervised release on the ground that revocation of supervised release is necessary for the safety of others. I conclude that the State failed to prove this ground for revocation by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 84. Finally, I reach the question of whether a circuit court must consider alternatives to revocation. As to rules violations cases — I agree with Justice Crooks' concurrence that alternatives to revocation must be considered before a circuit court exercises its discretion to revoke supervised release in cases of rules violations. Alternatives to revocation must be considered after a circuit court finds that rules have been violated and a circuit court is exercising its discretion about revocation. Unfortunately, the majority opinion is fuzzy on this point.2
¶ 85. I also conclude that alternatives to revocation must be considered when the State and circuit *338court are resting on the second ground of revocation, that is, that the safety of others requires revocation. Inherent in a determination that the safety of others requires revocation is the determination that alternatives to revocation will not protect the safety of others.3 After a circuit court has considered the evidence and alternatives to revocation, the circuit court decides whether the safety of others requires revocation. If the *339circuit court decides that the safety of others requires revocation, revocation is mandated by the statute.
¶ 86. I agree with the majority opinion that procedural due process protections apply in supervised release revocation proceedings under chapter 980.4 As the majority opinion acknowledges, due process requires at a minimum written notice of the claimed violations and disclosure of the evidence against the person.5 "There is no principle of due process more important or firmly established than notice of the specific charge so that the accused can make a defense."6 These basic procedural due process protections were not afforded Burris.
¶ 87. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) (1997-98)7 is unequivocal in requiring that the State prove by clear and convincing evidence either that the rules or conditions of release had been violated or that the safety of others requires revocation.8
¶ 88. The majority opinion explicitly recognizes the distinction between the two "predicates" of revocation, going so far as to declare that a circuit court has discretion to revoke if the first ground is charged (the statutory word "may" means "may") but is required to *340revoke if the second ground is charged (the statutory word "may" means "shall").9
¶ 89. Due process requires the State to notify Burris under which ground (or grounds) it is proceeding so Burris may defend himself. Furthermore, Burris and the circuit court must know under which ground (or grounds) the State is proceeding because each must know whether revocation is discretionary or mandatory with the circuit court.
¶ 90. Burris had a list of 57 rules or conditions to follow. The State filed a petition (and two amendments thereto) alleging five violations10 of four rules or conditions.11 Two violations were charged only as violations *341of the catch-all provision of Rule 1 that states that Burris shall avoid all conduct "that is not in the best interest of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation." Each of the other alleged violations was charged as a violation of the catch-all provision of Rule 1, as well as another rule. Burris asserts Rule 1 is unconstitutionally vague. Constitutional or not, I believe a circuit court should treat an allegation of a breach of this catch-all Rule 1 with a healthy dose of skepticism. Any conduct of which the State does not approve falls within Rule 1, making it almost impossible for Burris to know how to conform his conduct to comply with the rules.
¶ 91. The State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a rule or condition has been violated. Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b). The parties disputed each alleged rule violation. The circuit court lumped the alleged violations together as demonstrating a "course of deceitful conduct," making Burris dangerous, but did not necessarily make findings regarding whether Burris had violated each rule. The majority opinion engages in serious overstatement when it characterizes the record as demonstrating that Burris engaged in "major transgressions."12 Hardly!13
*342¶ 92. After all the testimony was presented regarding the rules violations (testimony was not offered relating to Burris's jeopardizing the safety of others), the circuit court asked the assistant district attorney whether the court was limited to determining whether there was a rule violation or whether it could base its revocation decision on the second ground that public safety required revocation. The assistant district attorney advised the circuit court to rule on either ground as it saw fit. Defense counsel argued that the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rules violations occurred.
*343¶ 93. The circuit court did not make express findings regarding each allegation of rules violations, as required.14 The circuit court and the majority opinion improperly conflate the two grounds (referred to as "predicates" in the majority opinion) for revocation of supervised release: rules violations and public safety. The two are, however, related. For example, a circuit court may find rule violations and conclude that these violations demonstrate that the safety of others requires that it exercise its discretion to revoke supervised release.15 In the present case, however, the circuit court did not so proceed. The circuit court "relied upon Burris's conduct itself, not the halfway house rules" in deciding to revoke.16
¶ 94. When the State relies on allegations of rules violations, the second step the circuit court must take after determining whether any rule was violated is to determine whether the rules violations justify revocation of supervised release or whether some measures short of revocation satisfy rehabilitation and safety considerations.17
¶ 95. Violation of a rule may be a permissible basis for revocation, but revocation does not necessarily or automatically follow the establishment of a violation.18 The circuit court did not, in this rules violation case, "explore alternatives or fully explain why some step short of revocation would not be adequate."19 The circuit court did not "explain its decision and square *344that decision with the treatment-oriented purposes of the law," including the purpose of controlling sexually violent persons " 'in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person.' Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b)."20
¶ 96. Instead the circuit court ignored the alleged rules violations and ruled on the second ground, safety of others. It reached this conclusion upon finding that "Mr. Burris has engaged in a deceitful course of conduct with his agent," that the facility in which Burris was placed "is not a proper facility for any person who is committed under a 980 placement," and that "his history makes him an extreme risk for harm to the public if there is not significantly more control exercised over his activities than have [sic] been exercised in the past." Although Burris' history is an important consideration, the issue at this revocation hearing in which rules violations were alleged is whether the rules violations justified the conclusion that Burris should be returned to institutional care because he had become a higher risk to re-offend than when he was initially placed on supervised release.
¶ 97. Burris came to court to defend against allegations that he violated the rules of his supervised release with the expectation that the circuit court could exercise its discretion to revoke supervised release. The circuit court concluded that Burris's placement in the half-way house in which he was placed was not suitable for any chapter 980 person, but it made no attempt to explore whether any other supervised release placement was suitable for Burris, considering both public safety and rehabilitation. Burris left court with the circuit court having found that public safety requires *345revocation of his supervised release and that revocation was, according to the majority opinion, mandated by statute.
¶ 98. Thus Burris received notice that the State was proceeding on the basis of one ground for revocation of supervised release but was tried on the second ground for revocation of supervised release. Yet Burris had no notice of the change of charges and had no opportunity to defend. This failure to give Burris notice cannot be characterized as "a minor indiscretion" on the part of the State, as the majority opinion characterizes other problems in the record.21
¶ 99. Due process requires, at a minimum, written notice of the claimed violation and disclosure of the evidence against the person. Burris received neither in regard to the claim that he was jeopardizing the safety of others. The circuit court never made clear whether its ruling was a discretionary one or not, yet the majority opinion concludes that the circuit could not have exercised discretion. Nor can this court exercise the circuit court's discretion on review; the record is not sufficient.
¶ 100. The core of the process due Burris, the opportunity for a meaningful hearing on the alleged violation and the appropriate disposition, was not available to him. The proceedings were arbitrary and fundamentally unfair.
*346HH HH
¶ 101. The majority opinion concludes that supervised release must be revoked upon a circuit court's finding that the safety of others requires revocation of supervised release.22 That makes sense!
¶ 102. The majority opinion fails, however, to explain how the State by clear and convincing evidence proved that the safety of others required revocation of Burris's supervised release. The State offered no proof of how or why Burris's conduct justified the conclusion that he had become a higher risk to re-offend than he was when initially placed on supervised release.
¶ 103. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) does not explicitly articulate what a circuit court must consider in determining whether public safety requires a chapter 980 person to be institutionalized23 I think it self-evident that to succeed in its petition for revocation of supervised release on the ground that public safety requires revocation, the State must make substantially the same proof as the statutes require the State to make when the State opposes a petition for supervised release. In opposing such a petition, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person and that it is substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not committed to institutional care 24
¶ 104. Inherent in a determination that the safety of others requires revocation is the determination that alternatives to revocation will not protect the safety of *347others. The majority opinion states this principle clearly: "We think it is self-evident, however, that when the court determines, on the evidence after a hearing, that 'the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked,' the court has found that there is clear and convincing evidence that it has no alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of others. Put another way, the court has found that the safety of others requires the person's commitment to a secure facility because supervised release will not be adequate."25
¶ 105. It is only after a circuit court has considered the evidence relating to the chapter 980 individual's conduct and alternatives to revocation that the circuit court can decide that the safety of others requires revocation. If the circuit court decides that the safety of others requires revocation, then revocation is, of course, mandated by the statute.
¶ 106. The State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Burris was still a sexually violent person and that it was substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual violence unless he was committed to institutional care. The circuit court's proclamation that Burris's conduct demonstrated that Burris suffered from "compulsive personality" and therefore public safety required revocation is unsupported in the record. A "course of deceitful conduct," as found by the circuit court, may not be desirable behavior from a chapter 980 individual, but it is certainly not clear and convincing proof that Burris is still a sexually violent person and that it is substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence if he is not *348committed to institutional care. The State failed to offer any proof that no alternative to revocation would be sufficient to protect the public safety. Indeed the circuit court did not consider any alternative placements, even though the circuit court determined that the placement in this half-way house was unsuitable for all chapter 980 individuals.
Ill
¶ 107. Wisconsin Stat. § 908.06(2)(b) mandates that a circuit court must consider alternatives to revocation of supervised release in both grounds for revocation of supervised release.
¶ 108. As to rules violations cases — I agree with Justice Crooks' concurrence that alternatives to revocation must be considered before a circuit court exercises its discretion to revoke supervised release in cases of rules violations. Revocation of a particular supervised release may be appropriate but another type of supervised release may also be appropriate considering the changing circumstances of the person and the needs of public safety.26
¶ 109. As to the safety-of-others cases— alternatives to revocation must be considered before a court can make the predicate determination that the safety of others requires revocation. A finding that public safety requires revocation by definition requires a finding that supervised release is inappropriate. If a circuit court fails to consider whether the safety of others can he protected by some form of supervised *349release, a circuit court's ruling that revocation is required to protect the safety of others is not supported by the record.27
¶ 110. The record in the present case demonstrates that the real basis for the circuit court's decision to revoke supervised release was that placement in this half-way house was not suitable for any chapter 980 committee. The clear inference from the record is that a different placement might have been satisfactory for Burris and for public safety. But, as the circuit court was well aware, the State has had great difficulty in finding or establishing placements for chapter 980 individuals.28
¶ 111. Furthermore, the legislative policy underlying chapter 980 requires a circuit court to consider alternatives to revocation.
¶ 112. "[T]he constitutionality of a Chapter 980 commitment hinges on treatment,"29 and the state must focus on appropriate treatment for chapter 980 individuals as well as protecting the public. Without such a focus, our repeated exhortations that chapter 980 is constitutional as a "treatment-oriented statute"30 are meaningless.
¶ 113. Chapter 980 individuals are committed to the Department of Health and Family Services "for *350control, care and treatment"31 in the "least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's commitment order."32 As Justice Crooks correctly points out, "to determine the least restrictive manner, it follows that alternatives to revocation must be considered and such consideration must be on the record for purposes of review."33
¶ 114. Chapter 980 individuals are not prisoners, but patients of the state.34 As such, they are entitled to the same rights as patients under chapter 51, the Mental Health Act, including the right to "receive prompt and adequate treatment, rehabilitation and educational services appropriate for [their] condition."35
¶ 115. The crux of chapter 980 is that commitment is not punishment but a measure for the protection of community and the treatment of chapter 980 individuals.36 Unless both of these objectives are given weight in dealing with chapter 980 individuals, the state is doing nothing more than indefinitely warehousing chapter 980 individuals.
*351¶ 116. In considering the needs of public safety and the treatment needs of the chapter 980 individual, a circuit court must, under chapter 980, consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a particular supervised release under either grounds for revocation.
¶ 117. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 2. See also id., ¶ 75.

 The majority opinion states that a circuit court "should explore alternatives or fully explain why some step short of revocation would not be adequate." Majority op., ¶ 44. At another point the majority opinion states, "When supervised release is revoked on the basis of the violation of a rule or condition of release, the court should explain its decision and square that decision with the treatment-oriented purposes of the law." Majority op., ¶ 45. In ordinary usage and dictionary definition the word "should" means "is obliged to" or "has a duty *338to." Justice Crooks, however, does not read the word "should" as used in the majority opinion to mean "miist." See Justice Crooks's concurrence, ¶ 1.
Rather than force litigants and courts to guess at the meaning of the majority opinion's dicta regarding consideration of alternatives to revocation in rules violations cases, the majority opinion should state clearly that alternatives must be considered in rules violations cases or that alternatives need not be considered in rules violations cases but that such consideration of alternatives is good practice, or that it is not addressing the issue of alternatives in rules violations case because this case involves the second ground, public safety.
The majority opinion's concluding paragraph appears to decide the due process issue for both grounds for revocation, stating broadly as follows: "As a general rule, sexually violent persons on supervised release under Chapter 980 are not entitled to a due process right to have the circuit court consider and reject alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release." Majority op., ¶ 75. The majority opinion does not explain why this proposition is stated with the weasel words "as a general rule" and does not provide any hints about the exceptions to this general rule.

 The majority opinion makes this point clearly as follows: "We think it is self-evident, however, that when the court determines, on the evidence after a hearing, that 'the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked,' the court has found that there is clear and convincing evidence that it has no alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of others." Majority op., ¶ 40.

 Majority op., ¶ 22.

 Id., ¶ 24.

 In re Commitment of VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶ 15, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236 (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)).

 This statute has been renumbered Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) (2001-02).

 Majority op., ¶ 68.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 46, 49.

 The State alleged the following violations:
1. Burris obtained Viagra in violation of Rule 1.
2. Burris did not sign a confidentiality release form for an agent to contact Ms physician in violation of Rule 1.
3. Burris refused to provide Ms agent with a written statement in violation of Rules 1, 4 and 13.
4. Burris involved himself in an intimate relationship and failed to notify Ms agent in violation of Rules 1, 4, and 18.
5. Burris possessed and consumed alcoholic beverages and offered them to another in violation of Rules 1 and 15a.

 The four rules Burris is alleged to have violated are as follows:
Rule 1: You shall avoid all conduct that is a violation of federal or state statute, municipal or county ordinances or that is not in the best interest of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation.
Rule 4: You shall inform your agent of your whereabouts and activities as she/he directs.
Rule 13: You shall provide true and correct mformation orally and in writing in response to inquiries by the agent.
*341Rule 15: The specific rules imposed at this time are:
A. You shall not consume or possess alcohol, illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia.
Rule 18: You shall notify your agent of any involvement in an intimate relationship at its beginning and you shall introduce the person to your agent to disclose your past sexual offenses prior to engaging in any type of sexual activity with that person.

 Majority op., ¶ 74.

 For example, the circuit court never found that Burris's conduct relating to Viagra was a rule violation. Rather the circuit court found that Burris thought his conduct was a rule *342violation. By the way, Burris never obtained any Viagra, nor did he ever obtain the prescription. A prescription slip for the Viagra was delivered to the halfway house, and the director of the house authorized another staff member to deliver the slip to Burris, who refused it.
No rule required Burris to voluntarily release confidential medical information.
The violation repeatedly stated by the circuit court was Burris's failure to tell his agent. For example, the circuit court said that Burris did not advise his agent of an "intimate relation." The circuit court did not determine whether a consensual adult one-night sexual encounter was an intimate relationship. Indeed the circuit court declared that Burris would benefit from a normal sexual relationship with an adult woman. The circuit court stated that sex with a married woman violated the criminal adultery statute but then conceded that no one is prosecuted for adultery.
Although there was testimony that Burris was seen drinking, there was also evidence that Burris had been given several random urine and breathalyzer tests; none showed any sign of alcoholic beverage consumption.

 Majority op., ¶ 10.

 Id, ¶ 68 n.12.

 Id, ¶ 62.

 Id, ¶ 69.

 Id, ¶¶ 38, 69.

 Id, ¶ 44.

 Id., ¶ 45.

 Id., ¶ 62.

 Id., ¶¶ 71-74.

 See id., ¶ 40.

 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).

 Majority op., ¶ 40. See also part III of this dissenting opinion.

 See majority op., ¶ 38.

 See ¶¶ 104-106, supra.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 5 n.5; State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W2d 349; State v. Keding, 2002 WI 86, 254 Wis. 2d 334, 646 N.W.2d 375; State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W2d 762 (Bradley, J., concurring); State v. Schulpius, 2004 WI App 39, ¶ 9, 270 Wis. 2d 427, 678 N.W.2d 369.

 State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 38, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Bradley, J., concurring).

 Majority op., ¶ 35.

 See Wis. Stat. § 980.0(1).

 See Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).

 Concurring op., ¶ 3.

 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 313, 541 N.W.2d 115, 126 (1995).

 Wis. Stat. §51.61(1)0); Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313-14. Patients are entitled to facilities that are "designed to make a positive contribution to the effective attainment of the treatment goals of the hospital." Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(m); Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314.

 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313.