Court Opinion

ID: 9918587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-15 15:08:27.034108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:30.923247
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 9, 2024

                                 In The

                           Court of Appeals
                                 For The

                       First District of Texas
                         ————————————
                           NO. 01-22-00086-CV
                         ———————————
                     ARMSTEAD SCALES, Appellant
                                   V.
   MICHAEL WHITING, KRISTOPHER J. WHITING, CHRISTOL P.
  DANIEL, SHEA WHITING, SR., SHIVERS WHITING, IV, KIRSTINA
SCALES, SANDRA TAPSCOTT, TAMMIE MINDO, JAKE DAVIS, DAISY
 SCALES, ZOLLIE SCALES, IV, JASON LAMONT SCALES, MELLANIE
 SCALES, ANNIE SCALES, VICTOR SCALES, SR., LOU ELLA SCALES,
BILLY SCALES, ROYLINDA F. SCALES, AND CASSANDRA Y. SCALES,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
                 OF ALTHEA SCALES, Appellees

                  On Appeal from the 21st District Court
                       Washington County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 34512
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This appeal arises from the partition of 276 acres in Washington County.

Armstead Scales appeals from the trial court’s order confirming the sale of certain

tracts to others that he maintains he was entitled to buy under the partition order.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                   BACKGROUND

      This partition action was filed in 2010. In February 2021, the trial court

entered a partition order finding that the surface estates of five designated tracts of

land are not susceptible to partition in kind between the parties, who all have an

ownership interest in these tracts. The trial court identified the tracts as follows:

                   Tract                                   Total Acreage
                     1                                         43.75
                     2                                         30.00
                     3                                         40.00
                     4                                         31.00
                     5                                         58.00

      As they are not susceptible to partition, the trial court appointed a receiver to

sell the surface estates of these five tracts, subject to any party’s right to buy out the

other parties’ interests in a portion of the tracts. To initiate a buyout, the order

required a party to give written notice to the court and receiver within 45 days of the

entry of the partition order. Any such notice was required to specify in detail which

portion the party intended to buy so that the receiver could definitively identify it.

                                            2
      Armstead Scales filed a notice designating four portions of the surface estates

he wished to buy from the other parties. He designated the following acreage:

           Tract                    Total Acreage          Armstead’s Designation
             1                          43.75                      43.75
             2                          30.00                      10.00
             3                          40.00                      18.00
             5                          58.00                      10.50

Each designation was accompanied by some description of the portions designated.

      After the 45-day deadline to designate had expired, Armstead amended his

Tract 1 designation from the entire tract to just 26 acres of the 43.75 total. But

Armstead remained willing to buy the entire 43.75 acres if he could not amend.

      The trial court held multiple hearings after Armstead filed his designations.

At the last of these hearings, in January 2022, the receiver testified. In general, the

receiver indicated that in the months following Armstead’s designations, she worked

via e-mail, telephone, and meeting to ascertain the exact portions of land that

Armstead wished to buy, thus indicating that at least some of his designations did

not allow her to definitively identify them based on the designation alone. In

particular, the receiver testified that three of Armstead’s designations were unclear.

      First, the receiver said that Armstead’s Tract 3 designation—which consisted

of 18 of the 40 acres comprising Tract 3—was initially unclear because the portion

of the tract he designated was split by Farm to Market Road 1155. But the receiver

testified that at some later point in time she came to understand this designation.

                                          3
      Second, the receiver said that Armstead’s Tract 1 designation—which

consisted of 43.75 of the 43.75 acres comprising Tract 1—was unclear. But she

conceded that her actual concern was not lack of clarity but rather how adjoining

properties could be accessed if Armstead was allowed to designate the entirety of

Tract 1. (Tract 1 is one of three u-shaped tracts totaling about 144 acres that are

jointly known as “the Hoot Owl property” because this property is accessible solely

via Hoot Owl Lane, which only interfaces with the 43.75 acres making up Tract 1.)

      Third, the receiver said that Armstead’s Tract 2 designation—which consisted

of 10 of the 30 acres comprising Tract 2—was initially unclear. But the hearing does

not include an explanation as to why she thought this designation was unclear.

      At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court ruled from the bench. Based on its

interpretation of the February 2021 partition order, the trial court ruled as follows:

      [T]he property is defined as five tracts of land. Then a party is entitled
      to make a designation on an election to buy a specific portion of
      property. The Court is of the opinion you’re entitled to a specific
      portion, not a hodgepodge or multiple portions. Therefore, the Court
      will state that the only proper designation of property was the 18-acre
      tract in the JP Cole Survey A34. All other designations are improper.
      That same day, in January 2022, the trial court signed an order in which it

again ruled that only Armstead’s 18-acre designation from Tract 3 was valid. But

the trial court’s order stated a different rationale for its ruling than the one the trial

court stated from the bench; specifically, the order stated that, unlike the 18-acre

designation from Tract 3, Armstead’s other three designations were “not properly

                                            4
made on or before 45 days after the [February 2021 partition order] was entered.”

The trial court also approved the sale of two properties by the receiver to a third

party. These two properties include portions of land that Armstead tried to

designate—specifically the 43.75 acres from Tract 1 and 10 acres from Tract 2.

      Later, in July 2022, the trial court entered a final judgment, in which it restated

that, unlike Armstead’s 18-acre designation from Tract 3, his other three

designations were “not properly made on or before 45 days after the [February 2021

partition order] was entered” and thus disallowed them. In this final judgment, the

trial court also directed the receiver to take possession of the property subject to suit

and remove all occupants from it, apart from livestock allowed by agreement.

      Armstead appealed. After filing his brief, however, Armstead passed away.

                                    DISCUSSION

                             Effect of Armstead’s Death

      When, as here, a party “dies after the trial court renders judgment but before

the case has been finally disposed of on appeal, the appeal may be perfected, and the

appellate court will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive.”

TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(1); see also Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 678–79 (Tex.

2018) (issuing judgment as if plaintiff who died on appeal remained living). Any

substitution of parties that may be necessary is an issue to be addressed by the trial

                                           5
court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 151–52 (providing for heirs or estate representative to

appear in suit after plaintiff’s death or estate representative on defendant’s death).

                            Appellate Issues Presented

I. Issue 1: Armstead contends the trial court erred in ruling that he could only
   make one designation, not several, from the five tracts subject to sale.

      Armstead argues that the trial court erred in disallowing three of his four

designations based on an erroneous interpretation of the partition order. As a matter

of law, he maintains, the partition order did not limit him to a single designation.

      Armstead’s argument is premised on the trial court’s ruling from the bench at

the conclusion of the January 2022 hearing. However, the trial court stated a different

rationale in its written order entered the same day and in its later final judgment.

When, as here, there is a conflict between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and

its written order or judgment, the written order or judgment prevails. E.g., Fort Bend

Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Am. Furniture Warehouse Co., 630 S.W.3d 530, 537 n.1

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Cap. Fin. & Commerce v. Sinopec

Overseas Oil & Gas, 260 S.W.3d 67, 84 n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,

no pet.). Consequently, Armstead does not address the actual basis for the ruling.

      Nor does Armstead challenge in the alternative the ruling the trial court

actually did make, which was that he failed to properly designate the portions of

property that he desired to buy by the deadline stated in the court’s prior partition

order. As Armstead did not raise this issue, it is not before us on appeal. See TEX. R.

                                           6
APP. P. 38.1(f) (requiring appellant to identify issues presented for decision in brief);

see, e.g., Pelco Constr. Co. v. Chambers Cty., 495 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (confining review to issues raised by party on

appeal because appellate court cannot reverse judgment based on unraised issues).

And when a party does not challenge an independent ground that fully supports the

trial court’s order or judgment, the party cannot prevail on appeal. D & M Mar. v.

Turner, 409 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).

II. Issue 2: Armstead contends the trial court erred in ordering the receiver to
    remove all occupants from the property that is subject to this lawsuit.

      The record establishes without contradiction that the sole persons who occupy

portions of the property at issue are Carlos Green and Gloria Lofton, neither of whom

are parties. Neither Armstead nor his lawyer purport to represent these nonparties,

and Armstead does not contend that the trial court’s removal order affects him.

Because a judgment modifying or reversing this aspect of the trial court’s judgment

would not affect Armstead or vindicate any right he possesses, he lacks standing to

raise this issue on appeal. See Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs.,

573 S.W.3d 912, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (stating

appellant must have standing to appeal trial court’s judgment and cannot complain

of errors that do not injuriously affect him or merely affect another’s rights).

                                           7
                                CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              Gordon Goodman
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

                                        8