Court Opinion

ID: 9702806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:24:51.311305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.447505
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the assets presently in the estate of Ruth G. Braman, which came from the estate of Mary 0. Goddard and were not owned by Ruth G. Braman at the time of her death, are to be distributed in accordance with the provisions of her last will and testament or are to be distributed to Ruth G. Braman’s heirs because she is deemed to have died intestate with respect to these assets received after death. The majority concludes that because it has not been demonstrated that the testatrix (Ruth G. Braman) at the time of death actually had an interest in this property, it was not possible for her to distribute her expectancy through a residuary clause in her will. It is my view that such a construction is incorrect. I agree with the trial court that “If a will properly controls the disposition of a decedent’s assets, even though they are unknown to a testator, what logical reason can be assigned to hold that after-acquired assets should go to beneficiaries that the decedent did not choose to benefit with any other part of her estate? We believe it to be illogical to so hold.”
The residuary clause in Ruth Braman’s will virtually compels the result reached by the orphans’ court because it is so broad and all-inclusive: “All the rest, *585residue and remainer or my estate of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situate, I give, devise and bequeath. . . .” Further, by disposing of the assets from the Goddard estate through the residuary clause, the legal goal of preventing an intestacy is preserved. “In order to avoid partial intestacy, the general rule is that a general residuary clause should be construed liberally so as to pass all of testator’s estate which is not otherwise disposed of. . . . Its effect is not limited to property in which testator has a legal estate; but it also includes property in which he has an equitable interest. Unless a contrary intention appears from the will, its effect is not limited to property in which testator has an interest in possession, but includes property in which lie has interests in expectancy.” 3 Page on Wills, §990. Since all parties agree that Ruth Braman’s interest in the Goddard assets was an expectancy and since there clearly is no contrary intent contained in the Braman will, it necessarily follows that these assets should be distributed according to the residuary clause.
It seems to me well within the purposes of the residuary clause to include a situation such as the one presented by the instant ease. Many legal formulations of the breadth of a residuary clause indicate its all inclusive nature, unless in some way restricted by the testator. Thus our Court has said: “A catchall residuary clause carries out testator’s dominant intent to dispose of everything which he still owns or has a dispositive interest in or general power over—■ everything not otherwise specifically or effectually disposed of by will.” Jull Estate, 370 Pa. 434, 438, 88 A. 2d 753, 755 (1952). But the majority seeks to undermine this general applicability by establishing an exception to the effectiveness of the residuary clause: that it cannot dispose of after-acquired property. In my judgment such an exception is artificial and, in *586the absence of a contrary intent expressed by the testator, such after-acquired items should be distributed through the residuary clause.
Therefore, I dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Eagen join in this dissent.