Court Opinion

ID: 9774923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:18.583779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.723104
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion that the trial court retained jurisdiction under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. arts. 42.031 and 42.033 to chango the terms of the sentence insofar as it involves a work release program.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s determination that due process rights do not attach to a change of the sentence and that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy to determine due process violations in the sentencing process. In Ex parte Walker, 599 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980), the movant sought habeas corpus relief from a misdemeanor charge of theft which resulted in her being sentenced to 60 days’ confinement which she was to serve at her residence. When she left home a week later to pick up her daughter at school, she was confined in jail and sought relief by habeas corpus. On appeal, relief was granted. The Court initially found the sentence was invalid because her confinement could only be served in jail, not at home. That could have been the end of the opinion, but it was not.
The Court went further to state that “a sentencing privilege ‘cannot subsequently be arbitrarily withdrawn at the whim of the trial court or upon mere fact of [a report of violation]. To hold otherwise would violate due process, due course of the law of the land, and fundamental fairness. The record here clearly supports the fact that the trial judge automatically revoked upon learning of a new [report of violation] and erred in so doing.’ ” [Emphasis added]. 599 S.W.2d 332 at 334. There are identical facts in this case. The trial court received a report from the office of the sheriff of a sentence violation (failure to return after release for work) and without notice, hearing or any other due process procedures amended the Order for Confinement to terminate the work release provision.
Because the Walker opinion cites only cases involving revocation of probation, the majority of the Court concludes that it has no application to a sentence involving the work release program. I do not read the constitutional right of due process so narrowly. I believe due process applies to all judicial proceedings. Clearly the Court in Walker did not choose to limit due process rights only to a change of sentence where there is a revocation of probation. There was no probation involved in Walker.
While the Appellant may have a right to file a Motion to Reinstate, I would not limit the Great Writ where due process has been denied. The Court did not limit its use in Walker and took the opportunity to discuss the due process issue even after holding the original sentence was invalid.