Court Opinion

ID: 9373562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:52.492957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.012715
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SEAN M. DONAHUE,                                DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         PH-3330-16-0342-I-1
                                                     PH-3330-16-0435-I-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
       AFFAIRS,                                      DATE: July 21, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sean M. Donahue, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, pro se.

           Alison M. Debes, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

           Marcus S. Graham, Esquire, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed petitions for review of the initial decisions, which
     denied his request for corrective action concerning two nonselections under the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

     Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA).            For the reasons
     discussed below, we JOIN the appeals, GRANT the appellant’s petitions for
     review, VACATE the initial decisions, and REMAND the cases to the regional
     office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        This decision involves two appeals, each regarding the appellant’s
     nonselection for a vacancy announcement.        See Donahue v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-16-0342-I-1 (0342 Appeal), Initial
     Appeal File (0342 IAF), Tab 1; Donahue v. Department of Veteran Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. PH-3330-16-0435-I-1 (0435 Appeal), Initial Appeal File (0435 IAF),
     Tab 1. The first appeal concerned Announcement Number 693 -16-HB-1701907-
     BU, which corresponded to a GS-05/09 Budget Analyst Intern position at the
     agency’s facility in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. 0342 IAF, Tab 11 at 12. The
     second concerned Announcement Number 693-16-HB-1727761-BU, the same
     position at the GS-07 level. 0435 IAF, Tab 4 at 11.
¶3        The agency posted both vacancy announcements under the Pathways Recent
     Graduate Program (Pathways Program). 0342 IAF, Tab 11 at 12 -14; 0435 IAF,
     Tab 4 at 11-14. Therefore, as recognized in those announcements, the positions
     were only open to applicants that graduated from a qualifying educational
     program within the 2 preceding years or veterans who graduated within the
     6 preceding years if they were unable to participate in the Pathways Program
     during their 2-year post-graduate period because of military service. 0342 IAF,
     Tab 11 at 13-14; 0435 IAF, Tab 4 at 13; see Exec. Order No. 13,562, 75 Fed.
     Reg. 82,585 (Dec. 27, 2010).
¶4        The appellant applied for both vacancy announcements, acknowledging that
     he completed his most recent educational endeavor more than 10 years earlier.
     0342 IAF, Tab 11 at 23-24; 0435 IAF, Tab 4 at 19, 22. The agency found that he
     was not eligible. 0342 IAF, Tab 11 at 33; 0435 IAF, Tab 4 at 31. For the first
                                                                                      3

     vacancy announcement, the agency ultimately cancelled the posting without
     selecting anyone. 0342 IAF, Tab 4 at 4-6, Tab 11 at 34. For the second vacancy
     announcement, the agency determined that a number of applicants were eligible,
     the selecting official chose a primary and two alternates, each of which were
     veterans, and the agency filled the position with one of those veteran candidates.
     0435 IAF, Tab 4 at 33-46, 48.
¶5        After exhausting his administrative remedies with the Department of Labor
     (DOL), the appellant filed timely appeals of his nonselections. 0342 IAF, Tab 1;
     0435 IAF, Tab 1.     For each, the administrative judges denied the appellant’s
     request for corrective action under VEOA, without holding the requested hearing.
     0342 IAF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (0342 ID); 0435 IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision
     (0435 ID). The appellant has filed a petition for review in each appeal. Donahue
     v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-16-0342-I-1,
     Petition for Review (0342 PFR) File, Tabs 1-2; Donahue v. Department of
     Veteran Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-16-0435-I-1, Petition for Review
     (0435 PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed responses, 0342 PFR File, Tab 4;
     0435 PFR File, Tab 3, and the appellant has replied, 0342 PFR File, Tab 5;
     0435 PFR File, Tab 4.
¶6        Though adjudicated separately below, we join the two appeals on review
     because the facts are interrelated and joinder will expedite processing without
     adversely affecting the interests of the parties. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b).

     The administrative judge properly denied the appellant’s request for corrective
     action under VEOA in the 0342 Appeal.
¶7        To prevail on the merits of his claim that the agency violated his veterans’
     preference rights, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that: (1) he
     exhausted his remedy with DOL; (2) he is a preference eligible within the
     meaning of VEOA; (3) the action at issue took place on or after the October 30,
     1998 enactment date of VEOA; and (4) the agency violated his rights under a
     statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. See Lazaro v. Department
                                                                                            4

     of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (setting forth these
     elements in terms of the appellant’s lesser jurisdictional burden); Isabella v.
     Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 333, ¶¶ 21‑22 (2007) (finding that, to prevail
     on the merits, the appellant must prove these ele ments by preponderant evidence),
     aff’d on recons., 109 M.S.P.R. 453 (2008).
¶8            It is undisputed that the vacancy at issue in the 0342 Appeal included a
     recent graduate requirement, pursuant to the Pathways Program, and the appellant
     did not meet that requirement. 0342 IAF, Tab 11 at 12-14. It is also undisputed
     that the agency accepted the appellant’s application and acknowledged his 5 -point
     veterans’ preference eligibility, but found him ineligible for the vacancy.           Id.
     at 33.     Among other things, the administrative judge properly noted that an
     agency’s decision to utilize the Pathways Program, including its recent graduate
     requirement, does not violate any veterans’ preference law or regulation. 0342 ID
     at 4-5; see Dean v. Department of Labor, 808 F.3d 497, 504-08 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
     Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to meet his
     burden of proving a violation of any veterans’ preference rights. 0342 ID at 4-6.
¶9            On review, the appellant argues that the agency improperly canceled the
     initial vacancy announcement in retaliation for his complaints. 2 0342 PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 6. As our reviewing court has recognized, “[a]n agency may cancel a
     vacancy announcement for any reason that is not contrary to law.”                  Abell
     v. Department of the Navy, 343 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003).              Here, the
     record suggests that the agency canceled the initial GS -05/09 vacancy
     announcement and replaced it with the second GS -07 vacancy announcement just

     2
       The appellant also suggests that the administrative judge erred by finding that he
     failed to meet his jurisdictional burden. 0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, he is
     mistaken. The administrative judge did not dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction;
     she denied the appeal on the merits. 0342 ID. In addition, the appellant asserts that
     additional discovery is necessary. 0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 7. However, without any
     further explanation, that broad assertion does not warrant review of the administrative
     judge’s discovery rulings, which included her partial grant ing of the appellant’s motion
     to compel. 0342 IAF, Tabs 20, 22, 27.
                                                                                           5

      days later to correct the advertised grade level. 0342 IAF, Tab 4 at 4, Tab 11
      at 4-5, 36-46. We are not persuaded by the appellant’s bare assertion that the
      cancellation was, instead, an act of retaliation or otherwise contrary to law.
¶10         Next, the appellant reasserts that it was improper for the agency to use the
      Pathways Program, arguing that the program is altogether illegal and invalid.
      0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 7-8. However, as noted above, our reviewing court
      has held otherwise. Dean, 808 F.3d at 504-06. The court also has found that an
      agency does not act contrary to any veterans’ preference laws or rules, or violate
      veterans’ preference rights, by considering the Pathways Program’s education
      requirement as the basis for excluding a veteran from consideration.                Id.
      at 506-08.
¶11         The appellant also alleges that the agency engaged in discrimination,
      “favoring non-whites, especially immigrants,” and failed to properly compare his
      academic credentials to the individual ultimately selected for the second vacancy.
      0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7. The Board’s role under VEOA is not to determine
      whether a preference eligible is qualified for a particular position or whether he
      should have been selected for the position in question , but instead focuses on the
      narrower question of whether the agency violated veterans’ preference rights .
      Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 11 (2014),
      aff’d, 818 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, VEOA does not provide the
      Board with the authority to review allegations of discrimination.                Ruffin
      v. Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶¶ 11-12 (2001). Therefore, we
      cannot address the appellant’s allegations concerning his credentials or
      discrimination.
¶12         Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge and find that the
      appellant has failed to meet his burden under VEOA for the 0342 Appeal.
                                                                                         6

      The administrative judge prematurely denied the appellant’s request f or
      corrective action under VEOA in the 0435 Appeal.
¶13         Like the 0342 Appeal, the record in the 0435 Appeal includes evidence that
      the vacancy at issue included a recent graduate requirement, pursuant to the
      Pathways Program, and the appellant did not meet that requirement. 0435 IAF,
      Tab 4 at 11-13, 22. The record also includes evidence that the agency accepted
      the appellant’s application and acknowledged his 5-point veterans’ preference
      eligibility, but found him ineligible for the vacancy. Id. at 31.
¶14         The administrative judge denied the appellant’s VEOA claim, concluding
      that he failed to meet his burden. 0435 ID at 6-8. However, as the appellant
      noted in his petition for review, 0435 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, and, as further
      explained below, the administrative judge issued the initial decision prematurely.
      Therefore, remand is appropriate.
¶15         The appellant filed the 0435 Appeal on August 18, 2016. 0435 IAF, Tab 1.
      On August 22, 2016, the administrative judge issued an acknowledgment order
      with relevant information, including discovery procedures.          0435 IAF, Tab 2.
      The order provided 30 days for initial discovery requests and 20 days for
      responses.   Id. at 4.   On August 25, 2016, the administrative judge issued a
      separate jurisdictional order, instructing the appellant to submit a statement
      concerning jurisdiction within 12 days.     0435 IAF, Tab 6 at 6 -7.      That order
      indicated that, if the appellant met his jurisdictional burden, the administrative
      judge would allow additional development of the record and a hearing, if
      necessary. Id. at 7-8. On September 7, 2016, the administrative judge issued the
      initial decision, finding that the appellant met his jurisdictional burden and
      denying his claim on the merits. 0435 ID at 1-2.
¶16         Consistent with the instructions provided in his acknowledgment and
      jurisdictional orders, the administrative judge should have permitted the parties to
      complete discovery and further develop the record before denying the appellant’s
      VEOA claim on the merits. See Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 113 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                             7

      502, ¶¶ 11, 14 (2010) (remanding a VEOA appeal when the administrative judge
      found jurisdiction and then ruled on the merits of the appeal without issuing a
      close of the record order or affording the parties the opportunity to make
      submissions regarding the merits of the appeal); Ruffin, 89 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶¶ 8-9
      (same); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(b).       Although the reasons his 0342 Appeal failed
      under VEOA may similarly apply in the 0435 Appeal, the appellant must be
      allowed the opportunity to develop the record and present his arguments.
¶17         On remand, the administrative judge must provide the parties with an
      opportunity to complete discovery and make submissions regarding the merits of
      his VEOA appeal.       Ruffin, 89 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 9.       Because the appellant has
      requested a hearing, if the parties’ submissions show that there is a factual
      dispute material to the issue of whether he is entitled to relief under VEOA, the
      administrative judge shall hold one. Id.; 0435 IAF, Tab 1 at 2.

      The administrative judge must further develop any potential Uniformed Services
      Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) claim concerning
      the appellant’s nonselections.
¶18         In his petitions for review of both appeals, the appellant argues that the
      underlying facts should be considered under a number of other provisions of law
      or regulations. 0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; 0435 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. Most
      notably, he refers to USERRA and generally alleg es that he was punished for
      being a Gulf War veteran. 3 0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; 0435 PFR File, Tab 1

      3
         The appellant also referred to other provisions of law and regulation, including
      5 U.S.C. § 3319, The Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1998, 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.3(a)(7), (b)(2), 5 C.F.R. § 300.103-.104, 5 U.S.C. § 7701, and “any other
      jurisdictions that [he] failed to mention or is unaware of.” 0342 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6;
      0435 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. However, even if the appellant raised these matters below,
      it is not apparent how these provisions relate to his nonselections, and he has provided
      no substantive explanation on these matters. Therefore, we will not address them
      further. See generally Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶¶ 6-7 (2016)
      (discussing the difference between pro forma and nonfrivolous allegations) , aff’d per
      curiam, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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      at 5-6; see Henson v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 10 n.6 (2009)
      (recognizing that USERRA claims are broadly and liberally construed).
¶19        In the 0342 Appeal, it appears that the appellant failed previously to invoke
      or otherwise present a USERRA claim. Nevertheless, the Board will adjudicate a
      USERRA claim even if the appellant raises it for the first time on review.
      Henson, 110 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 10 n.6.       In the 0435 Appeal, the appellant did
      invoke USERRA, 0435 IAF, Tab 7 at 7, Tab 8 at 4, but the administrative judge
      failed to explain the Board’s jurisdiction in USERRA appeals or addres s
      USERRA in any other way, see Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (recognizing that an appellant must receive
      explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional
      issue); Rassenfoss v. Department of the Treasury, 121 M.S.P.R. 512, ¶¶ 18-19
      (2014)   (remanding   a   USERRA      claim   when,   among    other   things,   the
      administrative judge did not adequately apprise the appellant of the burdens of
      proof and the type of evidence necessary to satisfy those burdens).
¶20        On remand, the administrative judge must provide the appellant with the
      applicable standards in a USERRA appeal and address any responsive argument
      and evidence accordingly. Rassenfoss, 121 M.S.P.R. 512, ¶¶ 18-19. Because we
      have joined the 0342 Appeal and 0435 Appeal, the administrative judge should
      address USERRA in both, if necessary.
                                                                                    9

                                         ORDER
¶21        For the reasons discussed above, we remand the now-joined appeals to the
      regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      The administrative judge should permit the appellant an opportunity to develop
      his VEOA claim for the second vacancy announcement and any USERRA claim
      he may have for either vacancy announcement. The administrative judge should
      incorporate by reference our analysis and disposition of the appellant ’s VEOA
      claim for the first vacancy announcement into a new initial decision so that the
      appellant will have a single decision with appropriate notice of appeals rights
      addressing both nonselections, VEOA, and USERRA.              See Goldberg v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 660, ¶ 12 (2005).

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.