Court Opinion

ID: 9528898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:45:05.033774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:27.162939
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing and on Petition for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae.
Givan, J.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing in this case was filed on October 21, 1969. Thereafter, on the 20th day of November, 1969, Loran W. Robbins and James R. Nolan, who are members of and President and Secretary-Treasurer, respectively, of Teamster Local Union No. 135 in Indianapolis, filed their petition to file brief as amicus curiae. This was the first time that said petitioners or anyone similarly situated have sought to intervene as amicus curiae in this appeal. In their petition they seek to raise a new question that the judgment and order against the Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519, is a nullity for the reason that said Local is not a separate entity, citing the case of Local Union No. 135, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., et al. v. Merchandise Warehouse Company (1956), 127 Ind. App. 57, 63, 64, 132 N. E. 2nd 715, 718.
*582Appellees have filed objections to the petition for leave to file brief amicus curiae in which they point out that the established law in Indiana is that a question or issue may not be presented to the Court for the first time on a petition for rehearing, citing Browne v. Blood (1964), 245 Ind. 447, 196 N. E. 2d 745, rehearing denied 199 N. E. 2d 712; Hardin v. State (1964), 246 Ind. 23, 201 N. E. 2d 333, rehearing denied 202 N. E. 2d 164.
It is thus argued that parties seeking to intervene as amicus curiae should not be permitted to so raise a new question for the reason that they are required to accept the case as they find it at the time of their petition to intervene. City of Indianapolis v. Wynn (1959), 239 Ind. 567, 157 N. E. 2d 828, rehearing denied 239 Ind. 567, 159 N. E. 2d 572; Indiana State Board of Medical Registration v. Seulean (1942), 219 Ind. 321, 328, 37 N. E. 2d 935.
With this we agree, and for that reason we deny the petition to file brief amicus curiae at this time. However, because the question raised casts reflection upon eminent counsel handling the appeal for the Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519, in that it suggests they failed to raise a pertinent point in the case, we feel compelled to point out that the case of Local Union No. 135 v. Merchandise Warehouse Company, supra, cited by those seeking to intervene, after recognizing the general principal which is urged by the intervenors, states as follows:
“An examination of the whole record, however, indicates that this is a suit against a class of individuals too numerous to be brought into court and that the appellants James Burrello, William Schlott, Harry Belmore and Gene San Soucie were sued as the representatives of that class known as Teamsters Local No. 135. The judgment, by its express terms runs against all members of Teamsters Local No. 135, separately and severally, and against Gene San Soucie, President, James Burrello, William Schlott and Harry Belmore as their agents and representatives. To that extent the judgment is valid.”
*583In the case at bar the restraining order was issued against the “Anderson Federation of Teachers Local 519, and every member thereof, and all persons agreeing, combining, and conspiring with them, their representatives, officers, associates, confederates, employees, agents, representatives and servants, and all persons whomsoever known or unknown to whom notice thereof shall come, . . . .” The judgment of contempt was rendered against the Local and fine levied in the sum of $500.00 per day starting with May 3, 1968, and for each school day “... said Anderson Federation of Teachers Local 519 and all of its members continue to strike, picket or in any manner interfere with plaintiff’s conduct with the public schools of the City of Anderson.” It is thus apparent that even by the authority of the very case cited by those seeking to intervene that the judgment rendered in this case is valid for the reason that the restraining order and the judgment include the individual members of the Union.
The fact that counsel for appellant did not raise this question themselves is certainly no reflection on their ability. It is commendable they did not raise a question which was so obviously not involved in the case.
Question is raised by the petition for rehearing that the decision of the Court is erroneous in holding that government employees may not engaged in a strike for any purpose in that there is no statute enacted by the General Assembly declaring such to be the public policy of the State of Indiana. The State of Indiana by statute has adopted “the common law of England, and the statutes of the British Parliament made, in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First----” Burns’ Ind. Stat. § 1-101.
The text which we quoted in our opinion from U. S. v. United Mine Workers of America (1947), 330 U. S. 258, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677, is a statement of the common law and thus also expressly a part of the law in the State of Indiana.
*584As was stated in U. S. v. Herron (1873), 20 Wall. 251, 22 L. Ed. 275, it is a maxim of the common law that “. . . when a statute is general and any prerogative, right, title, or interest would be devested or taken from the King, in such a case he shall not be bound unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him,...”
And in speaking of the same proposition, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Dollar Savings Bank v. U. S. (1873), 19 Wall. 227, 239, 22 L. Ed. 80, 82, stated:
“The most general words that can be devised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect not him [the King] in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights and interests.”
As pointed out in our original opinion, there is no right of public employees to strike. At the time of the formation the common law state of Indiana the public strike is not in the service of the king was considered treason. Thus, in the common law state of Indiana the public strike is not lawful.
The anti-injunction statute, a “policy statute,” does not apply to the state government or any of its subdivisions and by its very terms and definitions is confined to “labor disputes” in the private sector of the body politic. Any change in this status of the law which might permit any type of public strike can only be accomplished by express “public policy” legislation so stating.
We feel that other matters contained in the petition for rehearing are adequately covered by the original opinion.
Petition to intervene amicus curiae is denied.
Petition for rehearing is denied.
Hunter, C. J., and Arterburn, J., concur; DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion in which Jackson, J., concurs.
*585On Petition foe Rehearing and for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae