Court Opinion

ID: 9604124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:15:16.848082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:18.475748
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting on denial of petition for rehearing.
This office was initially assigned the responsibility for preparing the opinion for *197the Court in this matter, and after much research and careful consideration, a proposed majority opinion was circulated to the Court as it was then comprised.1 That opinion as originally drafted was revised considerably at the request of the other members of the Court, and in attempting to expedite the matter, this justice was brought to joining the majority, which in retrospect, involves the element of collegiality. However, upon having this opportunity to write on the denial of the petition for rehearing, it is refreshing to dust off that original proposed opinion and present it anew. The conclusion of that opinion would have reversed and remanded the cause for further consideration, which would have been a much better and more just result.
That initial draft opinion read:
John Zamora, as a seventeen year old youth attending high school, on the verge of reaching the age of eighteen, was charged by the State of Idaho of violating I.C. § 18-8006 (aggravated DUI) and I.C. § 18-8007 (leaving the scene of an injury causing accident) under a petition pursuant to the Youth Rehabilitation Act. The State charged he was the driver of a GMC Jimmy which was involved in a one vehicle accident. Zamora and two passengers in the vehicle were injured.
The State also petitioned the court for a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Magistrate Roy Holloway granted the motion. After the order waiving jurisdiction was entered, the State refiled the charges against Zamora charging him as an adult.
Zamora appealed the magistrate’s order to the district court. The district court, in affirming the waiver of jurisdiction, held that the juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction in this case because traffic violations are exempted from the Youth Rehabilitation Act (“YRA”). Even though the district court found the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction by operation of statute, it went on to affirm the order on the merits.
Zamora argues on appeal: (1) that the juvenile court did have original jurisdiction over the cause; (2) that the court’s findings of fact do not support the decision to waive jurisdiction; and (3) that the court did not conduct the “full investigation” required by I.C. § 16-1806(1).
1. THE JUVENILE COURT HAD ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE BECAUSE NEITHER OF THE CHARGES HERE IS A “TRAFFIC VIOLATION” AS THAT TERM IS USED IN I.C. § 16-1803.
Idaho Code § 16-1803 provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any child and over any adult who was a child at the time of any act, omission or status ... in the following cases:
2. Where the act or omission is a violation of any federal, state, local or municipal law or ordinance which would be a crime if committed by an adult, regardless of where the same occurred, except traffic, watercraft ... [and] fish and game violations.
The district court found, and the State contends, that there is no juvenile jurisdiction over the charges alleged here because they are “traffic violations” for purposes of I.C. § 16-1803(2). After examining the relevant statutes, we conclude that the juvenile court did have original jurisdiction over the criminal charges alleged to have been committed by Zamora.
The phrase “traffic violation” is not defined in the YRA. See I.C. tit. 16, ch. 18 (Youth Rehabilitation Act of 1989). However, the Motor Vehicle Code, I.C. § 49-123(5), defines “violation” as “a conviction of a misdemeanor charge involving a moving traffic violation, or an admission or judicial determination of the commission of an infraction involving a *198moving traffic infraction____” Somewhat perplexingly however, the Penal Code states that “[w]henever the word[ ] ... violation [is] used in the entire Idaho Code ... [it] shall be construed to mean a misdemeanor____” I.C. § 18-111B. The offenses which the State has levelled against Zamora are felonies.
Thus, even though it is not clear whether the legislature intends the term “violation” to mean either a misdemean- or (per I.C. § 18-111B) or a misdemeanor or traffic infraction (per I.C. § 49-123(5)), what is clear is that a felony is not included within either definition. Accordingly, I.C. § 16-1804 should be interpreted as divesting the court of juvenile jurisdiction over traffic offenses which are misdemeanors (e.g., reckless driving), but not as divesting the court of jurisdiction over traffic offenses which are felonies. (Otherwise stated, felony traffic offenses are not excluded from juvenile jurisdiction as traffic violations because felonies are not “violations.”2)
We hold that the district court erred when it held that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the charges here, and the order waiving jurisdiction cannot be upheld on that basis.
2. THE MAGISTRATE’S FINDINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER.
Idaho Code § 16-1806(8) sets forth the criteria the court must consider when determining whether juvenile jurisdiction over a child should be retained or declined. That statute provides:
(8) In considering whether or not to waive juvenile jurisdiction over the child, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors:
(a) The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires isolation of the child beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;
(b) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons;
(d) The maturity of the child as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(e) The child’s record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile justice system;
(f) The likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of facilities available to the court;
(g) The amount of weight to be given to each of factors listed in subsection (8) of this section is discretionary with the court, and a determination that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile law may be based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth above, which shall be recited in the order of waiver.
The magistrate’s findings track the factors listed in I.C. § 16-1806(8). He found: (a) that the offenses were of a substantially serious nature but that the protection of society did not necessarily require incarceration of Zamora; (b) that the offenses were not committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilful manner but were the result of alcohol abuse and showed a gross disregard for the rights and safety of others; (c) that the offense was against persons but that Zamora did not intend to inflict injury upon the passengers in the truck; (d) that Zamora is a mature, responsible individual who is married and living on his own; (e) that Zamora has a “very good record” and his previous contacts with the juvenile system are of “no particular concern”; (f) that “the court is without specific information regarding the need for ‘rehabilitation’ in this particular case” but that it appeared that the juvenile facilities available are not designed for an individual the age and maturity level of Zamora.
*199The magistrate noted that Zamora’s high level of maturity was a particularly compelling factor in his decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction. The magistrate wrote that ‘[t]his factor, coupled with the serious nature of the offenses, convinces this court that it is a compelling case for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.’
Although an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction has been held reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, see State v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 631, 633, 603 P.2d 586, 588 (1979), this Court has held that the lower court’s failure to act ‘consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it’ is an abuse of discretion. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). We agree with Zamora’s assertion that the magistrate misunderstood the meaning of factor (d) and improperly based the decision to waive jurisdiction on the fact that he is mature. This Court has written that “[¡Jurisdiction ordinarily is waived when ... the defendant has acquired such a level of emotional or mental maturity that he is not receptive to rehabilitative programs designed for children.” State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 916, 500 P.2d 209, 217 (1972) (footnotes omitted), see also Wolf v. State, 99 Idaho 476, 481, 583 P.2d 1011, 1016 (1978) (quoting Gibbs). An underlying assumption of our statement in Gibbs is that the defendant is in need of rehabilitative treatment. Here, the magistrate found he was ‘without specific information regarding the need for “rehabilitation” in this particular case.’ Accordingly, Zamora’s level of maturity is irrelevant absent that specific information. The court abused its discretion in waiving jurisdiction based on the maturity factor because its decision was based upon an erroneous view of the iegal standards applicable to the decision.
Finally, the Court should conclude that the error is not harmless. Even though there were other findings that arguably could support the waiver of jurisdiction, the lower court did not rely on those findings in its order. The only other factor relied upon by the court was the seriousness of the offenses. However, while the gravity of the misconduct is a proper factor to consider, Wolf v. State, 99 Idaho at 480, 583 P.2d at 1015, it cannot be the controlling factor. In re Ferris, 222 Kan. 104, 110, 563 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Kan.1977) (relied upon in Wolf). Further, the magistrate also found several mitigating circumstances in this case, i.e., that incarceration was not necessary to protect society; that the offenses were not committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilful manner; that Zamora did not intend to inflict injury upon the passengers in the vehicle; and that Zamora’s record relative to his previous contacts with the juvenile system were not such to be of particular concern. Had the magistrate realized that Zamora's maturity was irrelevant in the absence of additional information, it is readily doubted that he would have waived jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court should hold that the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over charges of I.C. § 18-8006 (aggravated DUI) and I.C. § 18-8007 (leaving the scene of an injury causing accident). Hence, the order waiving jurisdiction must be reversed because, absent a finding that Zamora needs to be rehabilitated, his maturity does not serve as a sufficient basis for waiving jurisdiction. Zamora also argued that he was deprived of his right to a “full investigation” as required by I.C. § 16-1806(1) because it was not determined whether he needed rehabilitation, but if this cause were to be reversed and remanded, we would not need to address that contention.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order waiving jurisdiction and remand the cause for further proceedings. If Zamora should turn twenty-one years old before the case could be reheard and no basis for a valid waiver is established upon remand, the cause should be dismissed. I.C. § 16-1805 provides that juvenile jurisdiction may not be extended past a youth’s twenty-first birthday. See State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho at 917, 500 P.2d at 218.
*200The foregoing would have been a better, more just, and more even-handed result. Unfortunately, this justice was the sole proponent of this result and is once again a lone voice in the wilderness.

. Bakes, C.J., Bistline, Johnson, and McDevitt, JJ. Boyle, J., sat, but did not participate due to his resignation on March 30, 1992.

. All traffic infractions are excluded from juvenile jurisdiction because infractions are civil in nature. I.C. § 49-1502. I.C. § 16-1803 limits juvenile jurisdiction to acts which are crimes.