Court Opinion

ID: 9810980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:05:49.564226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:23.060478
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
concurring in result: Plaintiff went to the station of defendant at Concord intending to take the south bound local train for Harrisburg. He applied to the agent for a ticket when he was told that he could not get one at that time, as tickets would not be sold for the local train (No. 11) until the fast train (No. 33),'which would arrive first, had passed. Plaintiff called the agent’s attention to” the time of arrival of the two trains as stated on the bulletin board, and was told that the time of arrival was not correctly stated there and that the fast train would come in first. The agent testified that when he saw No. 11 coming he .announced the fact in the waiting room, but the plaintiff was not there at the time, and there was testimony introduced by the defendant which tended to show that plaintiff left the *360station after be bad asked for a ticket and failed to get one and did not return until after both trains bad passed. Testimony was introduced by tbe plaintiff wbicb tended to show tbat be did not bear tbe announcement of tbe agent, if it was made; tbat be was on tbe platform when tbe local train arrived, but supposed it was tbe fast train as be bad been told it would be tbe first train to come, and tbat tbe agent was witbin three feet of bim and gave bim no information. Tbat be went back to tbe office when tbe train bad left tbe station and asked for a ticket, when be was told tbat tbe local passenger train bad passed and tbat be could only get a ticket for Harrisburg on tbe local freight train, but tbe agent could not tell bim when it would leave. It did not leave until 12:30 o’clock. Tbe agent put tbe plaintiff out of tbe building and locked tbe door. Plaintiff’s leg was sore from a bum and be bad to use a crutch and cane in walking. Tbe day was very cold and by reason of tbe exposure while waiting at tbe station for tbe freight train, tbe sore on plaintiff’s leg_ became inflamed and be suffered great pain and inconvenience for many weeks. Testimony introduced by tbe defendant tended to contradict plaintiff’s version of tbe facts. Verdict and judgment for defendant.
There was much testimony introduced by tbe respective parties, but I have stated only so much thereof as is deemed necessary to present tbe question upon wbicb in my opinion tbe case should turn, at least in this appeal. Tbe charge of tbe court, in- an important particular, was erroneous, for tbat it must have left tbe jury in doubt as to tbe burden of proof and, more than this, it was calculated to impress them with tbe belief tbat, in a certain phase of tbe case, the burden was upon tbe plaintiff whereas in law it rested upon tbe defendant. Tbat part of tbe charge to wbicb reference is made was substantially as follows:
1. Now upon the first issue, Vas tbe plaintiff injured by default and negligence of defendant as alleged in tbe com*361plaint,’ that involves tbe question as to whether the defendant through its agent was guilty of negligence in its dealings with the plaintiff. 2. If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff as to just when the train would arrive at Concord, and in consequence thereof it refused to sell him a ticket, and thereby, as a reasonable consequence, made it necessary for him to remain at or near the depot at Concord several hours, until the departure of another train, if that is found by the jury by the greater weight of the evidence, then they will answer the first issue ‘yes.’ 3. On the contrary if the jury find that the defendant’s agent gave the plaintiff the wrong information as to how the trains would arrive, that ■ is to say, if he first informed him that the trains would arrive at Concord according to the regular arrangement — the fast train first and the local train coming about ten minutes afterwards — and that that was the way in which they would arrive, and that afterwards he made the announcement at the depot where the passengers had the right to be at that time, that the trains would not come in that order on that day and that the plaintiff either did not hear him or was absent, and did not apply for a ticket accordingly after this announcement was made, then the defendant could not be guilty of negligence, so that it becomes important right in the beginning to ascertain how that was. The burden is upon the plaintiff Charles Coleman; the burden is upon him to show this by the greater weight of the evidence.
It is apparent from the third paragraph of the instructions that there are certain facts therein recited which the defendant was required to prove, and as to them therefore the burden of proof rested upon it. The burden was surely not upon the plaintiff to establish all the facts stated in the second branch of the charge as above set forth. It was incumbent on the plaintiff, it is true, to satisfy the jury by the greater weight of the evidence that he had been injured as a *362result of the defendant’s negligence, but when he had shown that the agent had made a mistake and given him wrong information as to the time of the arrival of the two trains, the defendant was then required to show any facts which would exonerate it from liability for this act of negligence on the part of its agent, and the error consists in the failure so to present the case to the jury that they could understand, with reasonable certainty at least, how to apply the rule of law as to the burden of proof in weighing the evidence.
The case was not settled by the judge who tried it, and it may be that through inadvertence, sometimes unavoidable, the remarks of the court upon the burden of proof are not properly placed, or perhaps not correctly stated, in the charge as set out in the case, but, as it now appears, the jury must at least have been left in doubt as to where the burden of proof rested. In a case like this one, a charge which requires the plaintiff to carry a greater burden than the law imposes upon him may have seriously prejudiced him in the trial of his cause, and indeed may have turned the scales against him.
When the court 'charged that the “burden is upon the plaintiff to show this by the greater weight of the evidence” it should in some way have indicated to the jury to which branch of the charge it referred, and should have stated how the plaintiff in respect to the issue was affected by the rule with regard to the burden of proof. It may be that the jury did misunderstand the charge; at least it does not appear to us that they did not. Eor this error I think there should be another trial.
If the plaintiff, after being told that he could not buy a ticket until the fast train had passed, left the premises of the defendant before No. 11 arrived and went to the Cannon Mill or elsewhere and did not return until after both No. 11 and the fast train had passed, it seems to me that he cannot recover, as by his conduct he lost the rights of a passenger *363(Quantz v. Railroad, 137 N. C., 136) ; and tbe agent was not bound to look for him beyond the company’s yard limits in order to correct any mistake he had made as to the order in which the trains would pass. But whether the plaintiff so acted as to deprive himself of the rights of a passenger was a question peculiarly within the province of the jury to decide upon all the evidence under proper instructions from the court. The testimony is apparently conflicting on this point, though it does not clearly appear that the witness, Kress, and the witness, Eitch, saw the plaintiff going towards the Gannon Mill before No. 11 had passed. As the plaintiff returned' to the office and asked for a ticket and was told that his train (No. 11) had gone it would appear that the defendant’s witness saw him leaving the yard after No. 11 had passed and before No. 33 arrived. This may be made plain at the next trial, when the duty of the defendant towards the plaintiff, after he had been misled by the agent, may be more clearly defined by the court.