Court Opinion

ID: 9706686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:49:30.5619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.388288
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring).
i
As indicated by my colleague, Justice Mallett, the novel question presented to us is whether a person who is operating a snowmobile on a public *613highway1 while intoxicated can be charged and prosecuted under the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code’s ouil provisions. MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. The district court dismissed the ouil charge against the defendant, and the circuit court affirmed. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that an intoxicated person driving a snowmobile on a highway can properly be charged with ouil. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 20, 1989 (Docket No. 112578). While I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals, I write separately to further explain my reasoning.
ii
In addition to the facts stated by the lead opinion, the analysis by the Court of Appeals is also helpful to the resolution here. The Court of Appeals found that the applicable snowmobile statute was general in nature and that the ouil statute was specific because it applied only to vehicles operating on the highway. The Court of Appeals then stated that the snowmobile statute and the ouil statute shared a common application to snowmobiles on a highway, and therefore, should be read in pari materia. The Court of Appeals believed that, although read in pari materia, the two statutes had different purposes. The snowmobile statutes were concerned with the safe operation of snowmobiles, while the ouil statute and the Motor Vehicle Code were concerned with highway safety against intoxicated individuals. The Court of Ap*614peals felt that no sufficient reason existed to refuse to apply the ouil statute to intoxicated individuals operating snowmobiles on a highway and concluded by noting that the statutes could overlap in some circumstances and that the prosecutor, in her discretion, could charge a defendant under either statute.
Before reaching the more significant issue in this case, I undertake to determine, as did the lead opinion, whether a snowmobile is even a vehicle to which the Motor Vehicle Code provisions can possibly be applied. In Montgomery v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 172 Mich App 718, 722; 432 NW2d 414 (1988), the Court of Appeals, citing to the Motor Vehicle Code, found that a snowmobile is a vehicle because it is not "propelled by human power.” As indicated by the Court of Appeals in this case, a vehicle is defined as "every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway .. . .” MCL 257.79; MSA 9.1879.2 A snowmobile fits within this definition because, even under the provisions of the snowmobile act, situations exist when a snowmobile can transport persons on the highway. MCL 257.1512(a)-(h); MSA 9.3200(12)(a)-(h).
The snowmobile act’s own definition of a snowmobile further supports this conclusion. Under the snowmobile act, a snowmobile is defined as:
[A]ny motor driven vehicle designed for travel primarily on snow or ice of a type which utilizes sled type runners or skis, or an endless belt tread or any combination of these or other similar means of contact with the surface upon which it is *615operated .... [MCL 257.1501(e); MSA 9.3200(l)(e). Emphasis added.]
Thus, the snowmobile act itself defines a snowmobile not only as a vehicle, but also as a motor vehicle.
The subsequent language in the definition of a snowmobile,
but is not a vehicle which must be registered under Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,[3]
does not require a contrary result. In other words, this language indicates that a snowmobile does not have to be registered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, which are MCL 257.1; MSA 9.1801 to MCL 257.923; MSA 9.2623. The statement does not provide that a snowmobile is not subject to any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, but only that special registration requirements are applied to snowmobiles instead of the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Code. The very fact that the Legislature found it necessary to exempt snowmobiles from the motor vehicle registration requirements further indicates that a snowmobile is still a vehicle for other portions of the Motor Vehicle Code. Therefore, as noted by the lead opinion, I would also find that a snowmobile is a vehicle to which certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code can possibly be applied. I now turn to the more significant issue on appeal— whether an intoxicated person who drives a snow*616mobile on a highway can be charged under the ouil statute.
hi
A
When reviewing the defendant’s arguments, the Court is guided by a number of rules of statutory interpretation. In general, penal statutes must be strictly construed and the intent of the Legislature cannot be considered when the penal statute is clear and unambiguous. People v Goulding, 275 Mich 353; 266 NW 378 (1936); Gay v Webster, 277 Mich 255, 259; 269 NW 164 (1936). However, this rule only requires thát people are entitled to a fair warning of the conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Woll v Attorney General, 409 Mich 500, 516; 297 NW2d 578 (1980). When interpreting a penal statute, the Court shoúld also consider the evil that is sought to be penalized. People v Goolsby, 284 Mich 375, 379; 279 NW 867 (1938).
Under the rule of strict construction, the general rules of statutory interpretation also apply. See 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 59.06, p 36. Particularly important here is the rule that the Legislature generally does not cover the same ground in separate statutes. See Bd of Control of the Michigan State Prison v Auditor General, 197 Mich 377, 382; 163 NW 921 (1917); People v Smith, 423 Mich 427, 441; 378 NW2d 384 (1985) (Williams, C.J.) (the Legislature may be presumed to know of existing legislation on the same subject). If two statutes do relate to the same purpose and are deemed to be in conflict, the specific statute is considered an exception to the general statute. Mayor of Port Huron v City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich 99; 43 NW2d 77 (1950); In re Midland Publishing, Inc, 420 Mich *617148, 163-164; 362 NW2d 580 (1984). However, two statutes can be read in pari materia when they relate to the same class of persons or things or have a common purpose, County Rd Ass’n v Bd of State Canvassers, 407 Mich 101, 119; 282 NW2d 774 (1979), and they should be read in connection with one another as if they constituted one law even if they were enacted at different times and contain no reference to one another.
B
This case rests on the application of the ouil statute and the snowmobile statute to the present situation. The portion of the snowmobile act in question, MCL 257.1515; MSA 9.3200(15), states:
(1) A person shall not operate a snowmobile under any of the following circumstances:
(b) While under the inñuence of intoxicating liquor; a controlled substance as defined in section 7104 of Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, as amended, being section 333.7104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws; or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance. [Emphasis added.]
On the other hand, the ouil statute, MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1), states:
A person, whether licensed or not, who is under the inñuence of intoxicating liquor . . . shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway .... A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person was, at the time of an accident, the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident and was operating the vehicle upon a public highway ... in the state while in violation *618of this subsection or of subsection (2), or of a local ordinance substantially corresponding to this subsection or subsection (2). [Emphasis added.]
Under both the ouil statute and the snowmobile act, an individual can seemingly be charged with operating a snowmobile on a highway while intoxicated. The provisions of the snowmobile act, specifically MCL 257.1515(l)(b); MSA 9.3200(15)(l)(b), provide that a person shall not operate a snowmobile while intoxicated. The ouil statute, on the other hand, provides for regulations and penalties when any vehicle is driven specifically on the highway. MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1).
The defendant and Justice Riley, in dissent, argue that the ouil and snowmobile act statutes are conflicting and that the snowmobile act should control because it is more specific. The defendant and the dissent have focused strictly on the types of vehicles involved and have given no guidance with regard to why the statutes cannot, instead, be read in pari materia. However, when reviewing not only the specific provisions of both statutes, but also the timing and purposes of each statute, one can conclude that the two statutes can be read in pari materia and are not conflicting.
While both Justice Riley and the Court of Appeals argue that one statute or the other is more specific, I would find that each statute is both general and specific. The snowmobile act provision is specific about what vehicle is covered and general about the location of the vehicle when the statute applies. The ouil statute is specific about the location of the vehicle and general about which vehicle is covered. Any analysis regarding which statute is more specific is inconclusive and the task then returns to whether, under the rules of statutory interpretation, the statutes can be read in pari materia.
*619When interpreting these two statutes, the Court should assume that the Legislature knew of the existence of the ouil statute and that it generally would not cover the same ground in the snowmobile act that it had previously covered in the ouil statute. See Bd of Control, supra at 382. Therefore, by not specifically indicating otherwise, the Legislature must have known that the Motor Vehicle Code provisions, including the ouil statute, would be applied to a snowmobile, which is a vehicle, when it is operated on a highway.
By focusing more upon the location or area regulated by each statute rather than the vehicles to be regulated, the two acts can be interpreted in pari materia, consistently and harmoniously, People v Harrison, 194 Mich 363, 369; 160 NW 623 (1916), without finding that the snowmobile act impliedly repealed any portion of the ouil statute or other Motor Vehicle Code provisions. People v Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22; 4 NW2d 448 (1942). As indicated by the Court of Appeals, the snowmobile act, MCL 257.1515; MSA 9.3200(15), "regulates snowmobile operation[s] in general terms, without reference to whether the prohibited conduct occurs on or off a public highway.” The snowmobile act indicates that a snowmobile may legally be on a highway and indicates additional conduct that a snowmobile driver must follow while on a highway. However, it only generally states that a person shall not drive a snowmobile while intoxicated. In contrast, the ouil statute specifically prohibits certain conduct when driving any vehicle on a public highway. Therefore, these statutes can be read in pari materia by finding that while the snowmobile statute in question regulates the operation of a snowmobile while intoxicated when it is both on and off the highway, the ouil statute *620supplements those regulations when snowmobiles are driven on the highway.
This result is also supported by the purpose of each statute. See Woll, supra. While the snowmobile act is concerned with the regulation and registration of snowmobiles, the preamble to the Motor Vehicle Code indicates the Legislature’s specific concern with the "regulation of vehicles operated upon the public highways of this state or any other place open to the general public ... to provide for the regulation and use of streets and highways . . . [and] to provide penalties and sanctions for a violation of this act . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See also Jacobson v Carlson, 302 Mich 448, 452-454; 4 NW2d 721 (1942) (indicating that the purpose of the predecessor to the Motor Vehicle Code was to promote traffic safety by preventing the dangerous operation of vehicles on the highway and noting that the regulation of automobiles and other vehicles on public highways is the responsibility of the state).
This Court has interpreted the purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code broadly to cover all motor vehicles without limiting its application to automobiles or other vehicles generally using the roads and highways. Jacobson, supra. While the snowmobile act is only directed at the operation and safety of snowmobiles, the purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to protect citizens and vehicles while on the public highways. This purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code, which includes the ouil statute, further supports a conclusion that the ouil statute should supplement the provisions of the snowmobile act when a snowmobile is being operated on a highway.
In addition, when reviewing the evil attempted to be penalized by the statutes, Goolsby, supra, the ouil statute is intended to prevent accidents and *621hazards on the state’s highways caused by the improper conduct of intoxicated drivers. Jacobson, supra. However, the snowmobile act is an attempt to regulate snowmobiles in their general operations and registration. I agree with the Court of Appeals analysis of this point when it stated:
Furthermore, the two statutes are each directed toward discrete ends, i.e., safe snowmobile operation as differentiated from preservation of highway safety from hazards posed by drunk drivers. The different, and perhaps more exalted legislative concern attached to the dangers of drunk driving becomes apparent by a comparison of the penalty provisions of the two offenses in question. Violation of the snowmobile offense carries the usual penalties for a misdemeanor, MCL 257.1517; MSA 9.3200(17), but the ouil statutory scheme carries a more detailed, complex penalty provision specifically tailored to address the enormity of the danger posed by drunk driving, the need to deter offenders and to protect the public, and the unique problems of repeat offenders. These concerns are not implicated to any corresponding degree by the Legislature’s expressed concern to regulate snowmobile operation. We see no reason why the policy concerns underlying the ouil statute should be deemed inapplicable when an ouil offense is committed with a snowmobile!
IV
The purposes of both the ouil statute and the snowmobile act are further promoted by finding that an intoxicated person operating a snowmobile on a highway, either legally or illegally, can be charged with ouil. As does the lead opinion, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Griffin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.

 [A] "nurse rig” is "obviously” a motor vehicle . . . but under certain circumstances may be exempt from registration.

 Although the lead opinion states that it is unnecessary to determine whether the shoulder is part of the highway, I believe there is nothing to decide. Under either the Motor Vehicle Code’s general definitions, MCL 257.59a; MSA 9.1859(1), or the snowmobile act’s definitions, MCL 257.1501(k); MSA 9.3200(l)(k), the shoulder is part of the highway. Therefore, there can be no arguing whether the snowmobile in this case was being driven on the highway. It was.

 I refer to the definition of "vehicle” rather than “motor vehicle” because the ouil statute at issue here refers to the former, more expansive term.

 The same language is used in MCL 257.1512(c); MSA 9.3200(12)(c). The reference to the Motor Vehicle Code in this section clearly indicates that the Legislature was only delineating what sections were considered to be part of that code. The same interpretation applies here.