Court Opinion

ID: 9771500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:45:24.127477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:54.262203
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
After petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the indictment charging him with burglary, evidence was introduced and he was found guilty. He waived the ten-day period for filing a motion for new trial.
On February 17,1975, after sentence was pronounced, he waived his right to appeal. On February 26, petitioner filed a written notice of appeal. On March 28, petitioner filed what he terms a “Writ of Habeas Corpus For Notice of Appeal.”
The Honorable Don Metcalfe, the hearing judge, found that petitioner made a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal after he was sentenced. In Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court wrote:
“. . .A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal would only prevent him from appealing without consent of the trial court. . . .”
In Abron v. State, 531 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), this Court wrote that the waiver of the right to appeal at the time of sentencing “is effective unless and until a timely notice of appeal is filed.” It appears that the better rule is found in the Reed case.
Often a defendant wants to waive time for filing a notice of appeal so that he may start serving the punishment assessed in order to get extra credit for time while serving at the Department of Corrections. In many cases, people who are convicted and who waive time for giving notice of appeal are transported immediately to Huntsville. If they are not satisfied with the accommodations there, they could give notice of appeal after they have been through the diagnostic unit. The appeal process would then start. In most cases, a lawyer would have to be appointed. If the lawyer finds that the appeal is frivolous, as most of them are after a plea of guilty has been entered, he must serve the person convicted with a copy of the brief and afford him a chance to file a brief in his own behalf. Then a copy of the record can be demanded by the appellant for filing his own brief. Other expensive delays and complications could arise.
The rule of this Court regarding the filing of a motion for new trial after a defendant has waived his time for filing should be followed. See Robinson v. State, 505 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), where it is written:
“. . . And ‘good cause’ should be shown for the late filing of such a motion for new trial. . . .”
See also, Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Bedell v. State, 443 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), and Adams v. State, 440 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).
Where there has been a waiver of the right to appeal after sentencing, this should not be set aside unless good cause has been shown to the trial judge. The finding of good cause would be subject to review by this Court. Since petitioner waived his right to file a notice of appeal after that right accrued, and since there is no good cause shown or even alleged to allow him to withdraw the waiver, no further hearing on the matter should be required.
The majority holds that another hearing should be held to see if there was a knowing waiver of his right to appeal. This will probably amount to an exercise in futility. The petitioner will probably testify that he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal even though he did so before the court after he had been sentenced. There was also a premature written waiver before the trial. The hearing court conducted the trial, heard the evidence, saw the petitioner and heard him state that he waived his right to appeal. What other evidence is necessary? If this matter comes back to this Court, it may be in the same position as it is now. *104Will the majority require more if there is nothing to add?
The procedure adopted by the majority will in effect cause the jails to be further crowded by keeping admitted and judicially found felons until there is no possibility that they might say, “I was denied my right to appeal.” Does this new rule apply to all waivers where a petitioner merely alleges he was denied a right?
The matter should be closed with the finding of the court in this case until something is at least alleged entitling petitioner to relief.
OPINION FOLLOWING REMAND
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Following remand on original submission of this habeas corpus proceeding, seeking an out-of-time appeal of petitioner’s conviction for burglary of a building, wherein the punishment was assessed at six (6) years, the cause was remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the waiver of appeal was knowingly and intelligently made.
After such evidentiary hearing, the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The record shows that at the time of trial the petitioner was 24 years old and had gone to the ninth grade in school. A psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Grigson prior to trial revealed that petitioner’s behavior was normal, and he was oriented as to time, place and person though of a lower average intelligence. Dr. Grigson’s report revealed his opinion that petitioner was competent to stand trial and able to assist his attorneys.
After listening to the petitioner testify at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the petitioner had enough intelligence, education and awareness to understand the nature of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of those waivers. The court further found that petitioner had previously been convicted of two felonies and that in the latter conviction he had given notice of appeal and had withdrawn it some five months previously and thus had some awareness of court procedures. The court further found that the petitioner had waived his right of appeal in open court following sentencing.
The court concluded as a matter of law that the waiver of appeal was intelligently and knowingly made. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.
The relief prayed for is denied.