Court Opinion

ID: 9550080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:29:05.018138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:46.846742
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, C. J.,
dissenting: This case is another illustration of the need for this state to adopt a uniform administrative procedure act. As I read the statutes involved, the enabling section vests in the commission various powers, one of which is the power to subpoena, and it imposes upon the commission certain duties. (K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 44-1004 as amended K. S. A. 44-1004.) However, those powers and duties are to be exercised by a commissioner, the commission, or members of its staff in accordance with the procedural section. (K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 44-1005 now K.S.A. 44-1005.) This section prescribes in detail the procedure to be followed in the resolution of complaints of discrimination. A reading of the section clearly reveals the Legislature contemplated a step by step procedure.
After a complaint is received and investigated, a determination must be made as to whether probable cause exists for crediting allegations of the complaint. If probable oause shall be found to exist, the commission must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice by conciliatory efforts. When conciliatory efforts fail the “said commissioner or the commission shall cause to be issued and served in the name of the commission, a written notice, together with a copy of such complaint, as the same may have been amended, requiring the person, employer . . . named in such complaint . . . to answer the charges of such complaint at a hearing before at least four (4) commissioners . . . at a time not less than ten (10) days after the service of said notice.” As will be observed, there is nothing in the statute to support the statement in the majority opinion that, “If conciliation fails or is not attempted, the commission may or may not schedule a formal public hearing on *127the complaint.” In regard to the statutory hearing, the “complainant or respondent may apply to the commission for the issuance of a subpoena for the attendance of any person or the production or examination of any books . . . pertinent to the proceeding at the hearing.” (K. S. A. 44-1005.)
The majority opinion is nothing less than a grant of unfettered authority to issue subpoenas for any employment records in the state in violation of the legislatively mandated procedural section. Adherence to orderly procedure is something the instant commission has apparently forgotten. Clearly, the exercise of subpoena power must be within “the rudimentary principles of justice.” (Federal Communications Commission v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 908 [S. D. N. Y. 1957].)
I would affirm the district court’s injunction.
Kaul, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.