Court Opinion

ID: 9353794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:08.183607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:59.857590
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/23 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                              B317733

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                      (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. VA118660-03)
           v.

 COLT HAWKEYE SANCHEZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.
         Verna Wefald, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ___________________
      Colt Hawkeye Sanchez was convicted in 2013 of second
degree murder with a true finding he had personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the crime.
In January 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the superior
court denied Sanchez’s petition for resentencing pursuant to
                                                    1
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez was the actual killer of
Jose Ramos and, therefore, guilty of murder under California law
as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015)
(Senate Bill 1437).
      Foregoing any argument that substantial evidence does not
support the superior court’s order, Sanchez contends, because the
court’s finding was based on a cold record—that is, without
                             2
observation of live testimony —we should review the ruling
independently, as the Supreme Court did in People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar) when considering the superior
court’s decision whether to vacate a conviction under
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). Using that standard, Sanchez
argues, in light of the unreliability of the eyewitness testimony
identifying him as the individual who inflicted the fatal stab

1
      Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
      Judge John A. Torribio, who retired in 2021, presided at
Sanchez’s trial. Judge Joseph R. Porras heard Sanchez’s
section 1172.6 petition.

                                 2
wound, the evidence did not prove he was guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt.
      We agree with the reasoning in People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 302, which rejected the identical argument
for application of an independent standard of review on appeal
from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an
evidentiary hearing, and affirm the superior court’s order
denying Sanchez’s petition.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Sanchez’s Murder Conviction and Appeal
      Sanchez and three codefendants were charged with the
murder of Ramos, who was stabbed to death while attending a
birthday party for his girlfriend at her house in Pico Rivera. The
evidence at trial established that shortly after midnight the
four youths, all members of the Pico Nuevo criminal street gang,
along with several other individuals, attempted to force their way
into the invitation-only party. Ramos approached one of the
codefendants and told her she could not attend the party. A fight
broke out, and Ramos was stabbed three times. The fatal wound
                3
was to his chest. The fighting ended when someone among the
uninvited group waved a semiautomatic firearm and fired several
shots into the air. The intruders then fled in one or two vehicles,
including a dark sports utility vehicle. Sanchez was later
identified as the person who had stabbed Ramos. The murder
weapon was never found.

3
      Ramos was stabbed in the shoulder, abdomen and chest.
The fatal chest wound pierced his heart. Ramos had no defensive
injuries to his hands or forearms.

                                 3
       The eyewitness testimony identifying Sanchez as the
person who stabbed Ramos was inconsistent. Stephanie
Chagolla, Ramos’s girlfriend, testified Sanchez and one other
man were involved in the fight with Ramos; Sanchez, who had a
visible “PN” tattoo on his neck, was holding a knife. When first
interviewed by the police following the murder, however,
Chagolla, who was extremely upset, said Ramos had been shot.
Later that day she said she had seen an individual with a knife,
whom she described as a 20-year-old bald Hispanic male with a
medium complexion who weighed approximately 220 to 240
pounds. She did not mention any tattoos. Sanchez at the time of
the murder in January 2011 was 24 years old and weighed
150 pounds. Chagolla did not select Sanchez from a photographic
lineup one week after the party and a few months later identified
him during a live lineup only as one of two men who looked
familiar.
       Jesus Munoz, who was working as a DJ at the party,
identified Sanchez and his three codefendants as individuals who
were trying to get into the backyard party. When the fight
started, Munoz saw Sanchez “just go at” Ramos’s chest, but
Munoz could not see if Sanchez had anything in his hand. Munoz
said Sanchez made a thrusting motion toward Ramos’s chest and
Ramos’s shirt appeared to be sticking to Sanchez’s hand as the
men fought. Munoz thought Sanchez was “just punching him in
the chest.” When first interviewed by the police, he described the
man who stabbed Ramos as five feet 10 inches tall with a
medium complexion wearing a multi-colored shirt with a designer
logo. He did not mention tattoos. Munoz did not select Sanchez
from a photographic lineup. The following month Munoz

                                4
identified Sanchez at a live lineup, specifically recalling the “Pico
Nuevo” tattoo on the back of his head.
       Christian Cedano, a guest at the party, could not identify
any of the four defendants during his testimony. He previously
described the stabber as five feet six inches tall, weighing about
200 pounds.
       Jesus Barraza, another guest at the party, testified for the
defense. Barraza told the police the stabber had a tattoo of
red lips on his neck and repeated that description at trial.
Raymond Sanchez, an active Pico Nuevo gang member with a
tattoo of red lips on his neck, came to the party with another
guest, driving a black sports utility vehicle. Raymond Sanchez
was never placed in a live lineup.
       These and other witnesses testified to the presence of the
four defendants at the party and the extent to which they
observed Sanchez and his codefendants participating in the fight.
       In addition to instructions defining homicide (CALCRIM
No. 500) and explaining first and second degree murder and
manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521, 522, 570; CALJIC
Nos. 8.30, 8.50, 8.70, 8.71, 8.72), the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM Nos. 400 on general principles of aiding and abetting,
401 on aiding and abetting intended crimes, and 403 on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine where only a
nontarget offense is charged. The natural and probable
consequences instruction defined the target offenses as any one of
disturbing the peace, trespass, assault or battery, with murder as
the nontarget offense.
       The jury convicted all four defendants of second degree
murder (finding them not guilty of first degree murder), found
true the criminal street gang enhancement as to each of them

                                  5
and found true the allegation Sanchez had personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the crime.
      On appeal all four defendants challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence to support their convictions for second degree
murder: Sanchez specifically contended there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding he was the direct perpetrator of the
stabbing death of Ramos. The three codefendants argued the
evidence was insufficient to convict them under an aiding and
abetting theory of liability. We rejected those claims and
                         4
affirmed the convictions. (People v. Gonzalez (May 11, 2015,
B252881) [nonpub. opn.].) After summarizing Sanchez’s
argument concerning inconsistencies in, and the purported
unreliability of, the identifications of him as Ramos’s killer, we
held, “[T]he witnesses’ identifications of Sanchez were neither
physically impossible nor inherently improbable, and any
weaknesses in those identifications went to the weight of the
evidence, not the admissibility. Moreover, evidence casting doubt
on the credibility of the eyewitness identification evidence was
presented to the jury and argued at length by counsel. . . . The
jury accordingly was able to judge the credibility of the
eyewitness identification evidence, and reasonably could have
concluded from such evidence that Sanchez was the direct
perpetrator in the stabbing death.”

4
       We also held the gang enhancements were supported by
substantial evidence, upheld several evidentiary rulings made by
the trial court and rejected appellants’ arguments asserting
instructional error.

                                6
      2. Sanchez’s Petition for Resentencing
       Sanchez, representing himself, filed a petition for
resentencing on January 29, 2021 under former section 1170.95,
checking boxes on the form establishing a facially sufficient case
for resentencing relief, including the boxes stating he had been
charged with murder by complaint, information or indictment
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and he could not now be convicted of first or second
degree murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189
by Senate Bill 1437. As Sanchez requested, the court appointed
counsel to represent him during the resentencing proceedings.
       The prosecutor filed a response, asserting Sanchez had
been convicted as the actual killer, rendering him ineligible for
resentencing relief. In support the prosecutor argued the court
could rely on the record of conviction to determine whether
Sanchez was eligible for resentencing, including the appellate
record and our opinion affirming the judgment. Sanchez’s
appointed counsel filed a reply, contending Sanchez had shown a
prima facie case for relief and the court should issue an order to
show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the
People have the burden of proof.
       The court found Sanchez had established a prima facie case
and issued an order to show cause. The court subsequently
explained, although it seemed apparent from our opinion on
direct appeal that Sanchez had been found guilty as the actual
perpetrator, because a natural and probable consequences
instruction had been given with respect to all four defendants, it
was possible, for purposes of evaluating a prima facie case,

                                7
Sanchez had been convicted on that now-invalid theory of
liability.
       At the evidentiary hearing on January 19, 2022 the court
stated it had reviewed—and admitted into evidence—the
complete trial transcript and the appellate opinion affirming the
convictions of Sanchez and his three codefendants. Neither the
People nor Sanchez called any witnesses or introduced additional
evidence. After argument from counsel, the court, reviewing the
evidence as an independent fact finder, denied the petition,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez “is guilty of
murder under California law as amended by the changes to
section 188 or 189 made effective January 1st, 2019.”
       Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Section 1172.6 (Former Section 1170.95)
      Senate Bill 1437 substantially modified the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder exception to
the malice requirement for murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708;
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) It also authorized,
through former section 1170.95, an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he
or she could not now be convicted of murder because of Senate
Bill 1437’s changes to the definitions of the crime. (See Strong, at
p. 708; Lewis, at p. 957; Gentile, at p. 843.) As amended by

                                 8
Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) (Senate Bill 775),
these ameliorative changes to the law now expressly apply to
attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
       If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible
for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the court must appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3)), and direct the prosecutor to file a response to the
petition, permit the petitioner to file a reply and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.)
       When, as here, a petitioner has carried the burden of
making the requisite prima facie showing he or she falls within
the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may
also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.)
      2. Substantial Evidence Is the Proper Standard of Review
      This court held in People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 985, and People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 113,
as has every other court of appeal that has addressed the issue,
that appellate review of superior court findings following a full
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), is for substantial evidence. (E.g., People v.

                                  9
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; People v. Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 302; People v. Garrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.) The substantial evidence standard of
review, of course, is applied by appellate courts when reviewing a
judgment of conviction (see, e.g., People v. Navarro (2021)
12 Cal.5th 285, 302), and is generally the standard by which
appellate courts review a trial court’s findings of fact. (See, e.g.,
People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 298-299 [substantial
evidence standard applies to trial court’s resolution of factual
inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence].) Of particular
significance here, the Supreme Court held in People v. Perez
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1066, in the context of a postjudgment
hearing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012, the same deferential standard should be applied to the
superior court’s findings of fact even if the court relied solely on
the record of conviction to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for
resentencing. (Accord, People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
1089, 1096 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to
postjudgment orders denying resentencing under Proposition 47,
the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.)
       Notwithstanding the unanimity of appellate decisions
applying the substantial evidence standard to review the superior
court’s factfinding in section 1172.6 and former section 1170.95
cases, Sanchez urges us instead to independently review the
evidence of his guilt. In making this argument, Sanchez relies on
Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th 510, in which the Supreme Court
evaluated the superior court’s decision whether to vacate a
conviction under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), which
requires the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a prejudicial error that affected the petitioner’s ability

                                 10
to meaningfully understand the actual or potential immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence. Emphasizing the issues
raised by a section 1473.7 motion, “while mixed questions, are
predominantly questions of law” (Vivar, at p. 524), the Court held
an independent standard of review was appropriate.
       The Vivar Court explained, “[O]ur embrace of independent
review in this context is a product of multiple factors with special
relevance here: the history of section 1473.7, the interests at
stake in a section 1473.7 motion, the type of evidence on which a
section 1473.7 ruling is likely to be based, and the relative
competence of trial courts and appellate courts to assess that
evidence.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Further
underscoring the limited nature of its departure from the
traditional standard of deference to trial court findings, the Court
expressly noted, “Our decision addresses only the independent
standard of review under section 1473.7.” (Id. at p. 528, fn. 7.)
       As our colleagues in Division Two of the Fourth District
held in People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 276 when
rejecting the identical argument for independent review based on
Vivar as now made by Sanchez, unlike the issues involved in a
section 1473.7 hearing, whether a petitioner for resentencing
under section 1172.6 remains guilty of murder under a still-valid
theory of liability (was he or she the actual killer or did he or she
act with reckless indifference to human life) is predominantly a
factual determination. Accordingly, the factors that supported
independent review in Vivar “don’t support applying independent
review in the context of reviewing a trial judge’s ruling after a
full hearing under [former] section 1170.95 subdivision (d)(3).”
(Clements, at p. 302.) Perez, not Vivar, governs. (Clements, at
p. 302; accord, People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 232-

                                 11
233 [“we join our colleagues in the Fourth District in recognizing
that Perez, rather than Vivar, is the more persuasive authority in
answering the question of what standard of review applies in this
case”].)
       The Legislature’s recent amendment of former
section 1170.95 further supports the reasoning in Clements.
Although the courts of appeal have applied the substantial
evidence standard of review from the time the Legislature first
passed Senate Bill 1437 (see, e.g., People v. Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663; People v. Bascomb (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087), when amending former
section 1170.95 in 2021 to clarify the evidentiary standard to be
applied by the superior court following issuance of an order to
show cause and to correct what it characterized as other judicial
misinterpretations of Senate Bill 1437, the Legislature in Senate
Bill 775 did nothing to modify or correct the prevailing appellate
standard of review. In construing a statute, we presume the
Legislature has knowledge of existing judicial decisions and
enacts or amends a statute in light of those decisions. (See, e.g.,
People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 659; Brown v. Kelly
Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 727-728.)
       We agree with the analysis in Clements and adhere to our
prior holdings that the superior court’s findings following an
order to show cause and evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), are properly reviewed for
substantial evidence.
      3. The Superior Court’s Order Denying the Petition Is
         Supported by Substantial Evidence
      Sanchez does not contend the evidence considered by the
superior court at the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), hearing—

                                12
that is, the record from his 2013 trial—was insufficient to
support the finding he was Ramos’s actual killer under the
deferential substantial evidence standard. Nor could he do so
successfully.
       As we discussed when rejecting that argument in Sanchez’s
direct appeal, Chagolla testified she saw Sanchez holding a knife
and fighting with Ramos; and Munoz testified he saw Sanchez
fighting with Ramos and saw Sanchez make a thrusting motion
toward Ramos’s chest. Although Chagolla’s identification of the
direct perpetrator of the stabbing was inconsistent over time and
Munoz did not see Sanchez holding a knife during the fight (but
did notice Ramos’s shirt sticking to Sanchez’s hand), questions
about any discrepancies or weaknesses in the eyewitness
identifications were for the jury or, as here, superior court acting
as independent factfinder to resolve. Similarly, Sanchez’s
contention the identifications were inherently unreliable because
the fight was described by at least one witness as a “melee” and
many of the party attendees had been drinking alcohol was an
issue for the jury. There was nothing inherently improbable
about the identifications. (See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th
412, 480 [“[i]dentification of the defendant by a single eyewitness
may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator of a crime”]; People v. Hester (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
630, 635 [“Witness credibility is a question solely for the trier of
fact. [Citations.] ‘[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible
or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction’”]; People v. Watts (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 [“‘[t]o warrant the rejection by a
reviewing court of statements given by a witness who has been
believed by the trial court or the jury, there must exist either a

                                 13
physical impossibility that they are true, or it must be such as to
shock the moral sense of the court; it must be inherently
improbable and such inherent improbability must plainly
appear’”]; see also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 400
[“[e]ven if the evidence could be reconciled with a different
finding, that does not justify a conclusion that the jury’s verdict
was not supported by the evidence, nor does it warrant a
reversal”].)
                         DISPOSITION
      The postjudgment order denying Sanchez’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

                                      PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

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