Court Opinion

ID: 9896027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:13.53454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:51.188019
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1349-MR

OLIVIA BOGGS MOLINAR AND
ALDDO MOLINAR                                                        APPELLANTS

                   APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE ALISON C. WELLS, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 20-CI-00300

TERRY A. GIESE                                                          APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Olivia Boggs Molinar and Alddo Molinar appeal

from an order confirming a Master Commissioner’s sale of property. We believe

that there was a fundamental error in the description of the property being sold;

therefore, the sale must be vacated. We reverse and remand with instructions for

the circuit court to vacate the Master Commissioner’s sale.
                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                 On September 11, 2020, Terry Giese filed a petition to partition

certain real estate and have the real estate sold at a Master Commissioner’s sale.

Numerous people had partial interests in the property as those interests had been

passed down via inheritances. The petition indicated that only the surface property

was for sale and that the mineral rights had been reserved earlier in the chain of

title. On February 15, 2022, an order and judgment was entered directing the

Master Commissioner to sell the property. The order indicated that only the

surface property was being sold and then described the property. The Master

Commissioner properly filed and posted a notice of sale with the same property

description as that used by the trial court. The commissioner then sold the property

on March 25, 2022, for $52,500. Appellants were the successful bidders.

                 On April 4, 2022, Appellants filed exceptions to the sale. They

argued that there were multiple issues with the property which precluded the

execution of a deed in their favor. Such issues included liens against the property

and some of the named heirs, the inability to verify ownership interests in some of

the heirs, and a lack of notice to some of the heirs.1 Appellants requested that the

court order Appellee to resolve these issues before executing the deed.

1
    Other issues were raised, but these were the most material.

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             On April 15, 2022, Appellee filed a response to the exceptions. This

response and attached exhibits cleared up many of the issues raised by Appellants.

The response also raised, for the first time, the issue of timber rights on the

property. Appellee indicated that he owned the mineral rights and timber rights to

the property. Appellants later filed a motion to vacate the commissioner’s sale and

have returned to them the funds paid. This motion was based on the lack of notice

of the reservation of timber rights in the order and judgment of sale and the

commissioner’s notice of sale.

             A hearing on the exceptions and the motion to vacate the sale was

held on September 23, 2022. On October 14, 2022, the court entered an order

denying the motion to vacate and confirming the commissioner’s sale. This appeal

followed.

                                     ANALYSIS

                    The circuit court’s decision to confirm or vacate a
             judicial sale is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The
             test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s
             decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
             unsupported by sound legal principles. A sale ought not
             to be lightly disapproved where it was conducted in a fair
             and regular manner, and confirmation ought not to be
             refused except for substantial reasons.

U.S. Bank National Association as Tr. for Registered Holders of Banc of America

Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through

Certificates 2007-1 v. Courtyards University of Kentucky, LLC, 594 S.W.3d 205,

                                          -3-
209 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition,

we review matters of law de novo. Auslander Properties, LLC v. Nalley, 558

S.W.3d 457, 464 (Ky. 2018).

             In the case at hand, Appellants raise multiple issues as to why the

commissioner’s sale should be vacated. We believe the issue regarding the belated

notice of timber rights requires a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court.

             There should be a sufficient description of the real estate
             ordered to be sold as will enable the purchaser or bidders
             to know with reasonable certainty what property was
             being offered for sale; and the report of the commissioner
             should in like manner be sufficient to the end that there
             should be no controversy after the sale as to what
             property was sold or purchased. . . . The judgment
             should be explicit in regard to the property ordered to be
             sold, as well as to the time, terms, and place of sale, so
             that the commissioner should not be required to look to
             any other paper or order for directions. If the
             commissioner should be allowed to look to anything
             other than the judgment as his guide he might very
             innocently sell property not adjudged to be sold, or sell it
             upon terms not authorized by law. In other words, the
             judgment should specifically direct the commissioner
             what to do, and not leave him to draw his conclusions
             from any other paper, or from any other source of
             information.

Meyer v. City of Covington, 103 Ky. 546, 550-51, 45 S.W. 769, 770 (1898).

             When Appellee petitioned to partition the real estate at issue, he put

the court on notice that only the surface property was to be sold. The trial court, in

its order and judgment of sale, indicated that only the surface property was to be

                                          -4-
sold. The Master Commissioner’s notice of sale indicated that only the surface

property was to be sold. This put Appellants and other potential purchasers on

notice that the mineral, gas, and oil rights had been reserved and were not part of

the commissioner’s sale. The question we must ask is, did this also give notice that

the timber rights had been previously reserved? We believe that it did not.

             Appellee is the owner of the mineral and timber rights. He notified

the trial court that the mineral rights had been reserved and he could have done the

same for the timber rights. To reiterate, “[t]here should be a sufficient description

of the real estate ordered to be sold as will enable the purchaser or bidders to know

with reasonable certainty what property was being offered for sale[.]” Id. While

the Meyer case focuses primarily on issues regarding the commissioner, issues

surrounding purchasers and bidders are also a factor to be considered when

determining if judicially ordered sales should be confirmed. Here, there was no

notice that the timber rights had been previously reserved even though such a

notice was possible.

             In addition, timber is included in “surface rights” if the timber has not

been specifically reserved. See Olinger v. Combs, 306 Ky. 374, 377, 208 S.W.2d

50, 51-52 (1948). While the timber rights had been specifically reserved, the

public was not notified of the reservation. Furthermore, it is entirely reasonable for

                                         -5-
anyone seeking to purchase this real estate to believe the timber would be included

in the surface property description.

                                         CONCLUSION

                 Appellants, as well as the other potential purchasers, were not given

notice that the timber rights had been reserved and were not included in the

property being sold. Appellee, the owner of the timber rights, should have

informed the trial court that those rights were not for sale as he did with the

mineral rights. Without a notice regarding the lack of timber rights, the

commissioner’s sale was fatally flawed and cannot stand. Based on the foregoing

reasons, we conclude that it was unfair and unsupported by sound legal principles

to confirm the sale. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is

remanded with instructions to vacate the commissioner’s sale.2

                 ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                         BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

    Sara A. Johnston                               Phillip Lewis
    Mary L. Bryson                                 Hyden, Kentucky
    Lexington, Kentucky

2
    Other issues were raised on appeal, but they are moot based on our holding.

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