Court Opinion

ID: 9907157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 20:01:04.235716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:29.719105
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14244    Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 12/05/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14244
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MATTHEW G. MUNKSGARD,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00017-AW-GRJ-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-14244

        Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Matthew Munksgard appeals his conviction and sentence of
        18 months’ imprisonment for making materially false statements,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On appeal, he argues, for the first
        time, that his conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause be-
        cause the conduct establishing his § 1001 conviction was also used
        to revoke his supervised release that resulted from a prior convic-
        tion. He also argues that his 18-month sentence is substantively
        unreasonable because the court based its upward variance on in-
        formation outside of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and infor-
        mation already accounted for in the calculation of his guideline
        range. After review, we affirm.
            I.    FACTUAL        BACKGROUND           &    PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
                In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Munksgard on four
        counts of making a false statement on a loan application and one
        count of aggravated identity theft. In 2016, a jury convicted
        Munksgard on all counts. He was sentenced to a total of 30
        months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised re-
        lease, and he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
        $197,995.34. Munksgard’s conditions of supervised release in-
        cluded the requirements that he truthfully answer his probation of-
        ficer’s inquiries and “provide the probation officer any requested
        financial information, both business and personal.” Munksgard
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        22-14244               Opinion of the Court                        3

        appealed, and a panel of this Court affirmed his conviction. United
        States v. Munksgard, 913 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019).
                 On November 23, 2021, Munksgard’s probation officer filed
        a petition for warrant or summons against Munksgard, alleging
        that he had violated his conditions of supervised release. The peti-
        tion alleged that Munksgard had committed nine different viola-
        tions of his supervised release conditions, including: (1) failing to
        make required restitution payments; (2) leaving the judicial district
        without permission on four different occasions; (3) submitting
        monthly financial reports with inaccurate or missing information;
        (4) failing to provide the probation officer with requested financial
        information; and (5) failing to refrain from violating the law by
        making false statements to the probation officer on two occasions,
        both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The probation officer recom-
        mended that the district court issue a summons for Munksgard to
        appear and show cause as to why his supervised release should not
        be revoked. As a result, the district court executed a summons
        against Munksgard.
               On August 1, 2022, an information charged Munksgard with
        one count of making materially false statements, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 1001. The information alleged that Munksgard submitted
        a monthly financial report for June 2020, as required by the condi-
        tions of his supervised release, that knowingly and willfully omit-
        ted his receipt of a check for $24,000.
               The next day, the district court held a hearing to address the
        petition for revocation of Munksgard’s supervised release and to
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-14244

        address his change of plea for the § 1001 charge. The court recited
        the allegations contained in the probation officer’s petition, which
        Munksgard admitted to committing. Based on his admissions, the
        court found Munksgard violated his terms of supervised release.
               The district court then moved to the new charge against
        Munksgard. Munksgard indicated he was ready to enter a guilty
        plea for the § 1001 charge, prompting the court to begin a plea col-
        loquy. However, after discussions with Munksgard, the probation
        officer and counsel for both parties, the court rejected Munksgard’s
        guilty plea, finding that he did not adequately admit that his false
        statement was made “knowingly and willfully” as required by
        § 1001.
               Shortly thereafter, the court held a second change of plea
        hearing. The court questioned Munksgard on his failure to include
        his $24,000 income on his monthly report to the probation officer.
        After this discussion, the court was satisfied with Munksgard’s ad-
        mission to each of the elements of his § 1001 charge, and it accepted
        his guilty plea pursuant to a written plea agreement and statement
        of facts.
               The probation officer then prepared Munksgard’s presen-
        tence investigation report (“PSI”), which set Munkgard’s base level
        offense at six pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2). The PSI applied a
        two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to
        § 3E1.1(b), yielding a total offense level of four. The PSI also re-
        ported Munksgard’s criminal history, which included a 2000 arrest
        for providing a false odometer reading and his 2015 convictions for
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        22-14244               Opinion of the Court                          5

        making false statements on loan applications and aggravated iden-
        tity theft. Because Munksgard committed the instant offense while
        on supervised release from his 2015 conviction, the PSI added two
        criminal history points. This resulted in a total of five criminal his-
        tory points, yielding a criminal history category of III. Based on
        these findings, the PSI calculated Munksgard’s guideline range as
        zero to six months’ imprisonment. The PSI further noted that the
        § 1001 offense carried a maximum term of five years’ imprison-
        ment. Neither party objected to the PSI.
               At sentencing, Munksgard presented testimony from Tony
        Boyette, who employed Munksgard through his commercial sur-
        vey company called Landguard. Boyette described Munksgard as
        an integral part of his team at the company. Boyette stated that, in
        addition to paying Munksgard a regular salary, he provided
        Munksgard with advance income to assist him with repairing the
        roof of his house and paying off the restitution amount Munksgard
        owed in his prior criminal case. Boyette described these payments
        as advancements on work Munksgard was going to do for
        Landguard in the future.
               The district court then informed Munksgard of his right of
        allocution, and Munksgard responded by apologizing “for all of us
        being here.” The court then heard arguments as to each party’s
        recommended sentence. The government stated that its argument
        was intended to address both the revocation sentence and the
        § 1001 offense, and that Munkgard’s behaviors demonstrate a pat-
        tern of conduct of dishonesty, fraud, and a willful disregard to his
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                22-14244

        probation officer’s instructions. The government also argued that
        a harsher sentence would advance both specific and general deter-
        rence and requested that the court impose an upward variance.
                The court responded to the government’s argument by not-
        ing that Munksgard’s violation of his supervised release and his
        prior offense both contained an aspect of fraud. The court ex-
        pressed serious concern about his prior offense and the violation of
        his supervised release as both being rooted in dishonesty. The
        court further stated that Munksgard received a “very lenient . . .
        below guideline sentence” for his prior offense, yet he continued
        to engage in the same conduct upon release. The court later noted
        that its reference to Munksgard’s lenient sentence in his prior case
        was not meant to suggest its belief that the sentence was inappro-
        priate or incorrect, but to explain that most people who received a
        more lenient sentence would want to put their criminal histories
        behind them.
               Munksgard then presented his mitigation argument, con-
        tending that other figures in his life had led him down the road re-
        sulting in his prior conviction. He argued that his prior time in
        prison impacted his life, and that he did not want to go back and
        instead believed counseling would be better. He further argued
        that a prison sentence in this case would not advance general de-
        terrence and that he did not pose a danger to the community.
        Munksgard requested that his supervised release be continued with
        no prison time.
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        22-14244                Opinion of the Court                          7

                Ultimately, the court sentenced Munksgard to 18 months
        for the § 1001 violation and 10 months for the supervised release
        revocation, set to run consecutively for a total of 28 months’ im-
        prisonment. The court acknowledged that the sentence was un
        upward variance for the § 1001 violation, but it noted the super-
        vised release sentence was within guidelines. As to the § 1001 con-
        viction, the court characterized the sequence of Munksgard’s con-
        duct as “egregious,” and stated that it was not sure that Munksgard
        fully accepted responsibility or appreciated the gravity of his of-
        fense. The court emphasized that Munksgard was given an oppor-
        tunity to put his fraudulent behaviors behind him upon his release
        from prison, but then failed to take advantage of that opportunity.
        The court recognized that Munksgard had paid his restitution, but
        that it was only paid after he made many efforts to avoid paying it.
        The court also expressed its belief that, because Munksgard had not
        expressed sincere regret or remorse for his actions, a severe sen-
        tence was necessary to deter Munksgard and others from similar
        behavior. The court explained its concern that the § 1001 offense
        followed a conviction and sentence for fraud. The court stated that
        the guideline range simply did not account for Munksgard’s dis-
        honest history and nature. Lastly, the courted explained that an
        upward variance was justified by a need to protect the public from
        further frauds by Munksgard.
                The district court then explained its sentence for the revoca-
        tion of Munksgard’s supervised release, which it had considered
        separately from its sentencing decision for the § 1001 violation. Fi-
        nally, the court stated that it had considered all the § 3553(a) factors
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-14244

        before reiterating its sentence of 28 months’ total imprisonment, a
        $7,500 fine, and three years of supervised release.
               After sentencing, the district court filed a Statement of Rea-
        sons outlining the basis for Munksgard’s § 1001 sentence. The
        court marked the nature and circumstances of the offense as sup-
        porting an upward variance, noting that a downward variance in a
        conviction for a related fraud offense did not adequately deter
        Munksgard. The court also wrote that an upward variance was
        supported by Munksgard’s expression of little remorse and his his-
        tory of dishonesty. The court also marked multiple other § 3553(a)
        factors as relevant to its decision to impose an upward variance,
        including deterrence and protection of the public. Munksgard’s ap-
        peal followed.
            II.   ANALYSIS
                  A. Munksgard’s § 1001 Conviction Does Not Violate the
                     Double Jeopardy Clause.
                Although we usually review de novo double jeopardy claims,
        we review double jeopardy claims that are not properly raised in
        the district court for plain error. United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366,
        1371 (11th Cir. 2009). Under plain-error review, the defendant has
        the burden to show that the district court committed (1) an error
        (2) that is plain which (3) that aﬀected his substantial rights. Id. If
        all three elements are met, we may exercise our discretion and re-
        verse “if the error seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public
        reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. When “the explicit lan-
        guage of a statute or rule does not speciﬁcally resolve an issue,
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        22-14244               Opinion of the Court                         9

        there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the
        Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v.
        Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
        marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288,
        1291 (11th Cir. 2003)).
                The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be “sub-
        ject for the same oﬀence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
        U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy clause protects defend-
        ants “against a second prosecution for the same oﬀense after ac-
        quittal, a second prosecution for the same oﬀense after conviction,
        and multiple punishments for the same oﬀense.” Bobb, 577 F.3d at
        1371. Importantly, when a defendant’s supervised release is re-
        voked due to him having subsequently committed another crimi-
        nal oﬀense, that subsequent oﬀense “does not constitute punish-
        ment for that criminal oﬀense for purposes of double jeopardy.”
        United States v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 992 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) (ex-
        amining a double jeopardy challenge in the context of a revocation
        of probation while citing cases about revoking supervised release
        because the two procedures are essentially the same). Instead, rev-
        ocation of probation constitutes a modiﬁcation of the terms of the
        original sentence and implicates solely the punishment initially im-
        posed for the oﬀense conduct underlying that sentence.” Id.; see
        also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“Treating
        postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial of-
        fense . . . avoids [Double Jeopardy] diﬃculties.).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-14244

                On appeal, Munksgard argues, for the ﬁrst time, that his
        § 1001 conviction violates double jeopardy principles. Because he
        only now raises this argument and did not preserve the argument
        before the district court, we review the issue for plain error. Bobb,
        577 F.3d at 1371. Under such review, Munskgard’s argument fails
        because this Court’s precedent clearly holds that a revocation sen-
        tence does not implicate double jeopardy because such a sentence
        is derivative of his original sentence. Woods, 127 F.3d at 992.
                Munksgard attempts to distinguish his case from others by
        noting that his revocation was based upon speciﬁc conditions of his
        supervised release rather than on a standard “commit no crime”
        condition. However, Munksgard did not identify any binding prec-
        edent recognizing this distinction as relevant for double jeopardy
        purposes. Because no clear case law or statute supports
        Munksgard’s argument, his claim fails on plain error review. Cur-
        tin, 78 F.4th at 1310.
                  B. Munksgard’s Sentence is Not Substantively Unreason-
                     able.
               We review for an abuse of discretion the substantive reason-
        ableness of a sentence. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th
        Cir. 2020). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of
        showing “that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record
        and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312,
        1322 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion and im-
        poses a substantively unreasonable sentence when it (1) fails to con-
        sider “relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives
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        22-14244               Opinion of the Court                         11

        signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com-
        mits a clear error of judgment” by balancing the proper factors un-
        reasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
        v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
                Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “shall im-
        pose a sentence suﬃcient, but not greater than necessary,” to “re-
        ﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, to promote respect for the law,
        and to provide just punishment for the oﬀense;” “aﬀord adequate
        deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further
        crimes of the defendant;” and “provide the defendant with needed
        educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
        tional treatment in the most eﬀective manner.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). In addition, the court must consider “the na-
        ture and circumstances of the oﬀense and the history and charac-
        teristics of the defendant;” “the kinds of sentences available;” the
        guideline sentencing range; any applicable policy statements; “the
        need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
        ants with similar records who have been convicted of similar con-
        duct;” and the need to provide restitution to oﬀense victims. Id.
        § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
               Our review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
        involves “examining the totality of the circumstances” and whether
        the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence. United States v. Gonzalez,
        550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We will only vacate a sentence
        as unreasonable if “we are left with a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   22-14244

        that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
        weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
        outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
        the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted)
        (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
                District courts have “discretion to decide how much weight
        to give each § 3553(a) factor.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1323. While
        the district court is required to consider all § 3553(a) factors, it “is
        permitted to attach ‘great weight’ to one factor over others.”
        United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 57 (2007)). Moreover, district courts
        are permitted to consider a wide array of information related to a
        defendant’s background and character in imposing an upward var-
        iance. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
        “[T]he district court, in imposing a variance, may consider conduct
        that a probation oﬃcer already had considered in calculating the
        defendant’s advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Moran, 778
        F.3d 942, 983 (11th Cir. 2015). Further, “variances from the advi-
        sory guidelines range can sometimes be based on the sentencing
        judge’s disagreement with whether a guideline properly reﬂects the
        § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
        (11th Cir. 2015).
              A sentence outside of the guideline range is not presumably
        unreasonable, but we may consider the extent of a variance in our
        review of the reasonableness of a sentence. Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1237.
        A court selecting a sentence outside the guideline range must have
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        22-14244               Opinion of the Court                        13

        a justiﬁcation “suﬃciently compelling to support the degree of the
        variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We give weight to a district court’s
        decision to vary because the district court has substantial discretion
        “in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the
        extent of one that is appropriate.” Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238. “A sen-
        tence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an in-
        dicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d
        633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014).
                On appeal, Munksgard argues that his 18-month sentence
        for his § 1001 conviction is substantively unreasonable because the
        district court relied on improper factors, such as his history of dis-
        honesty and fraud and his prior below-guidelines sentence, when
        crafting the sentence.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion and imposed a
        substantively reasonable sentence for Munksgard’s § 1001 convic-
        tion. The district court stated that it considered the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors and found that an upward variance was reasonable in light of
        Munksgard’s history of untruthfulness, the need for both speciﬁc
        and general deterrence, and in the interest of protecting the public.
        The court based its decision on the fact that the instant oﬀense of
        dishonesty followed a prior conviction for fraud and identity theft.
        Moreover, the court appropriately considered of facts already ac-
        counted for in the calculation of his guideline range. Moran, 778
        F.3d at 983. Finally, the court appropriately crafted the sentence
        based on its ﬁnding that the Guidelines did not adequately reﬂect
        the seriousness of Munksgard’s conduct and his history of
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        14                        Opinion of the Court              22-14244

        dishonesty. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Thus, the district court
        clearly considered proper factors in crafting Munksgard’s sentence
        and provided suﬃciently compelling support for imposing the up-
        ward variance. Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238. Further, the sentence is well
        below the ﬁve-year statutory maximum, which supports the rea-
        sonableness of his sentence. Stanley, 739 F.3d at 656. Thus, the
        district court did not clearly err in reaching and imposing its sen-
        tence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
             III.      CONCLUSION
                    For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM.