Court Opinion

ID: 9789749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:40:46.769408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:22.284063
License: Public Domain

Judge DUBOFSKY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Defendant argues that the failure of the police officers to record electronically his confession violates his Due Process rights under the Colorado Constitution. I agree with this argument.
Here, a critical dispute arose over whether the defendant said he shot the victim or shot at him. The police officer testified that defendant confessed to shooting the victim, whereas defendant claims that he admitted only to shooting at the victim and that someone else actually shot and killed him. At the suppression hearing, the par*52ents testified that their son never told the officers that he shot the victim, but they did not so testify at trial.
In my view, the Due Process Clause of the Colorado Constitution requires that if, as here, a suspect is detained and questioned at a police station or similar detention place, then an electronic recording (or other comparably accurate recording process) of the conversation must be made or else the confession is inadmissible. In reaching this conclusion, I rely primarily on the reasoning of the Alaska Supreme Court in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
The failure of the State to record and preserve a confession frequently results in losing essential parts thereof. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Even a few hours after hearing a conversation, it is difficult for a person to present precise and accurate testimony about those recent statements. Therefore, testimony about confessions/interrogatories made in court weeks or months afterwards is inevitably incomplete and at least partially inaccurate. See Stephan v. State, supra. This inevitable fallibility of human memory can be rectified by a contemporaneous recording of the confession and related interrogation.
The evidence indicates that small, portable, and accurate recording devices are being increasingly used by law enforcement officers when statements are taken from witnesses and suspects. See Stephan v. State, supra. The present technology exists to record readily and accurately by both video and sound tapes the statements of witnesses and suspects. Indeed, when it is to the advantage of the police to record the actions or statements of suspects or witnesses, this is often done. See Stephan v. State, supra.
The courts are therefore presented with a situation in which the State, with only a minimal expenditure of effort and money, has the technical capability to preserve vital testimony and yet, as here, it chooses not to do so.
The major objective of our criminal justice system should be to arrive at the truth so that justice is done. As our supreme court so poignantly stated in Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979), a criminal case is not a game of foxes and hounds in which the state attempts to outwit and trap a quarry.
Furthermore, by confirming the content, legality, and voluntariness of a confession, a recording will, in many cases, actually aid law enforcement officers. In many situations, a recorded confession and advisement and' waiver of constitutional rights will deter a defendant from changing his testimony or making false claims that his constitutional rights were violated. Certainly, such a recording will help the trial and appellate courts determine the truth and thus make more just decisions.
The primary argument against requiring law enforcement officers to record advise-ments and interrogations/confessions of defendants is that use of such devices may deter the suspect from making a statement. Since, under both the state and federal constitutions, an accused has a constitutional right to remain silent, and he must be informed of that right prior to a custodial interrogation, this argument is not persuasive. If the suspect refused to make a statement because he learned it was to be electronically recorded, this would probably indicate he mistakenly did not understand that non-recorded oral statements could be used against him. Furthermore, the State’s interest in ascertaining the truth in order to do justice also answers this argument.
The absence of an electronic recording of a disputed confession gives an unfair advantage to the prosecution. The courts and juries are far more apt to accept a police officer’s account of an interrogation than a conflicting one provided by a defendant. See Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (Singleton, J., concurring and dissenting).
In addition to the Alaska Supreme Court in Stephan v. State, supra, others have also recognized the importance of recording custodial interrogations. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1972) (suggesting that videotapes of inter*53rogations protected defendant’s rights and are a step forward in the search for truth); Smith v. State, 548 So.2d 673 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the Due Process clause of the Florida Constitution requires a recording of custodial interviews); Ragan v. State, 642 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 1979) (requiring that oral statements of the accused must be recorded in order to be admissible); A Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure § 130.4 (Official Draft 1975) (requiring sound recordings of custodial interviews). See generally Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams — A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 Geo.L.J. 209 (1977).
In relevant part, 10 Uniform Laws An-not., Model Penal Code § 243 (1974), states:
The information of rights, any waiver thereof, and any questioning shall be recorded upon a sound recording device whenever feasible and in any case where questioning occurs at a place of detention.
The courts have recognized that Due Process requires the State to preserve essential evidence so that it can be examined, analyzed, and used by the defendant. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334 (Colo.1987). Furthermore, the court system is entitled to receive the best evidence available in order to resolve the serious criminal matters which come before it. A logical consequence of these principles is the need for the consistent systematic recording of all interviews conducted by police of a detained suspect.
Moreover, the concept of Due Process is not static. See Stephan v. State, supra. Due Process must change to accommodate ideas of what is necessary to provide fundamental fairness to a criminal defendant. In order to do this, the law must change to keep pace with new scientific and technological developments. See People v. Fishback, 829 P.2d 489 (Colo.App.1991).
In summary, I would hold that the Due Process clause of the Colorado Constitution mandates the electronic recording of any confession by, and the associated interrogation of, any suspect who is interviewed by police in a place of detention.