Court Opinion

ID: 9491067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:02:54.593645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:29.503486
License: Public Domain

*1077MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Because I believe the majority extended inappropriately the Younger abstention doctrine to § 1983 damages actions, I respectfully dissent. However, I concur in the majority’s view that the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Carroll’s § 1983 action.
A. Abstention
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether Younger abstention applies' to § 1983 damages actions. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202, 108 S.Ct. 523, 529, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) (“We need not decide the extent to which the Younger doctrine applies to a federal action seeking only monetary relief_”). Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, many of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Several circuits have applied Younger abstention to § 1983 damages actions. See Amerson v. Iowa, 94 F.3d 510, 513 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 696, 136 L.Ed.2d 618 (1997); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n. 1 (1st Cir.1992); Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1989); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 135, 102 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir.1986); Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir.1985); Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.1981). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit unequivocally holds that Younger has no applicability to a claim for damages. See Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 & n. 22 (5th Cir.1995). Similarly, the Second Circuit takes the position that a federal court should not dismiss damage claims on Younger principles alone. Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 192-94 (2d Cir.1981). Today, the majority opinion aligns our circuit with those circuits applying Younger abstention to § 1983 damages actions. I dissent from that opinion.
“[Fjederal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2513, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). “Underlying [this] assertion[ ] is the undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds.” Id. at 359, 109 S.Ct. at 2513 (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922)). “However, because federal courts do have discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief, abstention is appropriate in a few carefully defined situations.” Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir.1992). “Thus, there are some classes of cases in which the withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with state proceedings is ‘the normal thing to do.’” New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359, 109 S.Ct. at 2513 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45, 91 S.Ct. at 751 (1971)). Abstention, nevertheless, is the exception and not the rule. “[T]he federal courts’ obligation to adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction [is] ‘virtually unflagging.’ ” Id. (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203, 108 S.Ct. 523, 530, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988)).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from enjoining state criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court has since expanded the reach of Younger to noncriminal judicial proceedings in which important state interests are involved. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger abstention reflects “a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.” Id. at 431, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. Thus, a federal court will only consider Younger abstention when the requested relief would constitute undue federal interference in state judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601-05, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1206-09, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). Accordingly, “where federal proceedings parallel but do not interfere with the state proceedings, the principles of comity underlying Younger ab*1078stention are not implicated.” Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1201.
In this case, the principles of comity underlying Younger are not implicated. This is a parallel proceeding in the federal court that does not interfere with the state proceeding because Carroll is seeking only monetary damages in the federal court. As this court has previously observed, “[s]uits which seek only monetary relief are much less intrusive into legitimate state functions than actions for injunctive or declaratory relief.... Moreover, while federal- adjudication of a damage claim may affect state judicial proceedings in some circumstances, the mere possibility of an impact on state proceedings is insufficient to warrant abstention.” Carras v. Williams, 807 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir.1986). Cf. Jeremy D. Sosna, comment, Quaekenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.: The Continuing Saga of the Younger Doctrine, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 275, 284 (1996) (“An examination of the Younger doctrine reveals that the context in which it arose, and the justifications for its sustenance by the Supreme Court, are rooted in traditional principles of equity. Thus, federal courts-, should regard Quaekenbush as a constraint on their power to invoke the principles of Younger in cases at law.”).
Not only is it inappropriate to apply Younger abstention to actions at law simply seeking damages as relief, but do so also would deprive the state court defendant/federal court plaintiff of a federal forum in which to litigate her federal constitutional claim. This result impairs the purpose of § 1983 and subverts the proper role of the federal courts in enforcing federal rights. According to the Supreme Court, “[sjection 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2160, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). Consequently, § 1983 along with other post-Civil War civil rights legislation established the “role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power....” Id. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987. Although the Court has admonished that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, federal courts must presume the state courts are able to protect the interests of the federal plaintiff, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 19, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1530, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987), it has also acknowledged that “[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.” Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at 2162 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, Carroll filed a § 1983 action for damages against the City of Mount Clemens alleging the City’s legislative action violated her federal constitutional rights. The majority holds the district court properly applied Younger abstention to Carroll’s damages action because she could raise her constitutional claims in state court. In so holding, the majority ignores the following observation made by Justice Stewart in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975): “The duty of the federal courts to adjudicate and vindicate federal constitutional rights is, of course, shared with state courts, but there can be no doubt that the federal courts are ‘the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.’ ” Id. at 355, 95 S.Ct. at 2295 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 65 (1927)).
Given the central role of the federal courts in protecting federal constitutional rights, the majority errs in extending Younger abstention to § 1983 damages actions. The majority fails to provide any reasoned justification for such an extension of Younger, simply relying on the general principles of “comity” and “Our Federalism” discussed in Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750-51. That very paragraph of Younger, however, reflects the key distinction between Younger itself and *1079the extension of Younger espoused by the majority today: Younger was premised on the “fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction,” specifically to prevent federal courts from enjoining pending (criminal) proceedings in state courts. Where, as here, the federal action is for damages only, the normal constraints of equity practice are absent, and the interference with comity and federalism is substantially reduced. In these circumstances, the extension of Younger to a damages action is unwise; it is not required by Supreme Court precedent; and it unduly restricts the protections afforded by § 1983.
B. Stay
I concur in the majority’s view that when applying Younger abstention to § 1983 damages actions, district courts must stay rather than dismiss the federal action. Nevertheless, I write separately to amplify why a stay is required. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996), the Supreme Court addressed the application of Burford abstention to common law damages claims. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 708-10, 116 S.Ct. at 1717. In so doing, however, the Court explained that all abstention doctrines are equitable in nature, and the granting of equitable relief (including declaratory relief) lies within the sound discretion of the federal courts. Id. at 716-20, 116 S.Ct. at 1721-22.
When abstention applies, a federal court, in its discretion, can decline to exercise its equitable powers. Id. at 716-18, 116 S.Ct. at 1721. Conversely, an action for damages does not lie within a federal court’s discretion; thus, damages actions require a federal court to retain its jurisdiction by entering a stay when abstention is appropriate rather than altogether dismissing the case. Id. at 716-22, 116 S.Ct. at 1721-23. The Court emphasized that “[i]n those eases in which we have applied traditional abstention principles to damages actions, we have only permitted a federal court to withhold action until the state proceedings have concluded; that is, we have permitted federal courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted them to dismiss the action altogether.” Id. at 728-32, 116 S.Ct. at 1727-28 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
To further highlight this point, Justice Sea-lia wrote separately to respond to Justice Kennedy who would “not rule out ... the possibility that a federal court might dismiss a suit for damages in a ease where a serious affront to the interests of federalism could be averted in no other way.” Id. at 731, 116 S.Ct. at 1729. In response, Justice Scalia commented that:
I would not have joined today’s opinion if I believed it left such discretionary dismissal available. Such action is foreclosed, I think, by the Court’s holding, clearly summarized in the concluding sentences of the opinion: “Under our precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because this was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.”
Id. at 731-32, 116 S.Ct. at 1728 (quoting opinion of the Court at 1728).
While Quackenbush involved Burford abstention, its reasoning applies with equal force to Younger abstention. Younger abstention concerns itself with federal court interference with state court proceedings, and a stay simply does not implicate that concern. Rather, a stay merely preserves the availability of a federal forum in the event the state court fails to address the plaintiffs federal claims. Preservation of a federal forum strikes the appropriate balance between countervailing interests: the state’s •interests in operating its own courts free from federal interference and the federal interest in protecting federal rights. See, e.g., Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 726-31, 116 S.Ct. at 1726-27 (Court applied Burford abstention to strike balance between “the strong federal interest in having certain classes of eases, and certain federal rights, adjudicated in federal court,” and “the State’s interests in maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem.”) (internal quotations omitted); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 523, 530 n. 7, 98 *1080L.Ed.2d 529 (recognizing that unless federal court retained jurisdiction during the pen-dency of the state proceeding, a plaintiff could be barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing her claims in federal court). See also DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Quackenbush for proposition that “in a damages action, the district court may only order a stay pending resolution of state proceedings; it cannot invoke abstention to dismiss the suit altogether.”); Hart and Wechdler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 86-87 (Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro eds., 4th ed. Supp.1997) (The Court in Quackenbush “drew a sharp distinction between a federal court’s staying an action and its dismissing or remanding the action. Dismissal or remand ... is justified only in cases (like those seeking an equitable remedy or a declaratory judgment) in which a federal court has discretion whether to grant relief_” Id. at 86. Although Quackenbush involved Burford abstention, the authors observed that “[t]he Court’s opinion appears, however, to have more, general applicability, as it discussed a broad range of related doctrines.... ” Id. at 87). From the foregoing analysis, I conclude Quackenbush provides that federal courts do not have the authority to dismiss damages actions when abstaining.

CONCLUSION

Principles of fairness dictate that when a party alleges a violation of her constitutional rights, a speedy resolution is required. As a result, the facts of this case mandate that the federal action should proceed. The City brought its enforcement action in state court in July 1993. Yet, as of oral argument in this court in October 1997 the state court action was still pending. It is now 1998, and the parties have not informed us of any resolution in the state court proceeding. Given the glacial pace at which the state court is moving, Carroll asserts that she had to file the federal action to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitations. Appellant’s Br. at 32 n.3. The dearth of activity in the state court belies any argument that there is federal interference with the state proceeding. In fact-, it appears that the federal court may be the only court capable of timely resolving Carroll’s allegations that the City has violated her constitutional rights. Nevertheless, to the extent that Younger abstention applies, Quackenbush counsels that where a plaintiff has properly invoked a federal court’s jurisdiction by filing a § 1983 damages action, federal courts should preserve the availability of the federal forum by staying rather than dismissing the action.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s extension of Younger to § 1983 damages actions. Given the majority’s decision to extend Younger, I concur in the majority’s determination that a stay rather than a dismissal is warranted in this case.