Court Opinion

ID: 9394882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 16:03:11.062565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:03.916862
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                               In re the Matter of:

                KRISTEN LEIGH HENRY, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                         v.

                  DAVID SPETZLER, Respondent/Appellant.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 22-0172 FC
                                 FILED 5-16-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FC2020-001738
               The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge

                                   VACATED

                                    COUNSEL

Mark J. DePasquale, P.C., Phoenix
By Mark J. DePasquale
Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Schmidt McElwee & Gordon, PLLC, Phoenix
By Paul G. Schmidt
Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
                          HENRY v. SPETZLER
                          Decision of the Court

Hallier Stearns, PLC, Phoenix
By Angela K. Hallier, Jason D. Brierley
Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix
By Eileen Dennis GilBride
Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the
Court, in which Judge David D. Weinzweig and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani
joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1            David Spetzler (Father) appeals the family court’s
clarification order construing the extraordinary-care provisions of the
consent decree dissolving his marriage to Kristen Henry (Mother). For the
following reasons, we vacate the family court’s order.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2            On April 1, 2021, the parties dissolved their marriage by a
consent decree incorporating their joint decision-making agreement and
parenting plan (the parenting plan). Specific to this appeal, the consent
decree provides that support for the parties’ eldest child, who “has severe
mental and physical disabilities,” will continue “past the age of majority.”
In relevant part, the consent decree states:

      Child Support. Pursuant to the Child Support Worksheet . . .,
      [Mother] would pay [Father] $75 per month. [Father] will be
      paying the cost of [the eldest child’s] child care expenses (as
      set forth below) and all private school tuition for [the younger
      children] through high school. The parties have agreed and
      acknowledge that neither requires child support from the other
      given their respective economic circumstances with the exception
      of the expenses Father shall pay, which are in the nature of
      child support. Therefore, the Court finds and orders that a
      deviation from the Child Support Guidelines is in the best

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       interest of the parties’ children and neither party shall pay
       child support to the other for the children except as to the
       expenses set forth in the child support worksheet. (Emphasis
       added.)

¶3             The child support worksheet, attached as an exhibit to the
consent decree, reflects that as of March 2021, Father paid $4,667 per month
for the younger children’s extra-educational expenses and $11,500 per
month for the eldest child’s extraordinary-care expenses. Consistent with
the child support worksheet, the consent decree charges Father with the
“sole[] responsib[ility] for paying private school tuition, uniforms and
books” for the younger children. But in contrast to the simple and clear
assignment of the younger children’s extra-educational expenses wholly to
Father, the consent decree details an elaborate framework for apportioning
the costs of the eldest child’s extraordinary care as follows:

       The parties shall jointly maximize the use of state funded care
       programs for [the eldest child]. If the parties agree upon a
       program or schooling with costs attendant to the
       program/schooling, [Father] shall pay all costs of the
       program or schooling. [Father] shall pay all care in [Mother’s]
       home from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. on days [the eldest child] is at
       [Mother’s] home and not eligible to be in school or a program.
       If [the eldest child] is attending school or a program on one of
       [Mother’s] parenting days, [Father] shall pay for care before
       and after the school/program but only during hours
       commencing at 7 a.m. and ending at 8:30 p.m. If [Mother]
       removes [the eldest child] from school or a program for reasons
       due to illness or a medical/dental appointment requiring a
       caregiver, [Father] will pay for that time. If [Mother] travels
       away from home with [the eldest child], [Father] will pay for
       [the eldest child’s] care for the number of hours he would
       have paid if [the eldest child] had been in the state-funded or
       other mutually agreed-upon program or schooling and on
       weekends for [Mother’s] travel from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. if the
       program does not cover the weekend. The remainder of care
       costs for [the eldest child] shall be [Mother’s] responsibility.
       (Emphasis added).

Using much of the same language, the parenting plan likewise spells out
the parties’ respective obligations for the eldest child’s extraordinary care:

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      The parties shall jointly maximize the use of state-funded care
      programs for [the eldest child]. If the parties agree upon a
      program or schooling for [the eldest child] with costs
      attendant to the program/schooling, Father shall cover all
      costs of the program or schooling. Father shall pay all costs
      for [the eldest child’s] care while in Mother’s home from 7
      a.m. to 8:30 p.m. when [the eldest child] is not eligible to be in
      a school or a program. If [the eldest child] is attending school
      or a program on one of Mother’s parenting days, Father shall
      pay for care before and after the school/program, but only
      during hours commencing at 7 a.m. and ending at 8:30 p.m. If
      Mother removes [the eldest child] from school or a program for
      reasons due to illness or a medical/dental appointment
      requiring a caregiver, Father will pay for that time. If Mother
      travels away from home with [the eldest child], Father will
      pay for [the eldest child’s] care for the number of hours he
      would have paid if [the eldest child] had been in the program
      and on weekends for Mother’s travel from 7 a.m. to 8:30 p.m.
      if the program does not cover the weekend. The remainder of
      any care costs for [the eldest child] shall be Mother’s
      responsibility. Neither parent requires the approval of the other
      parent as to the employed care providers working in their own home.

      Subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the scheduling of
      [the eldest child’s] child care providers shall be done by each
      parent for their own parenting time. . . . Father shall only be
      obligated to reimburse Mother for [the eldest child’s] child care
      expenses for time the providers are actually providing care
      for [the eldest child] between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 8:30
      p.m. and subject to the other provisions of the parties’ Decree of
      Dissolution of Marriage and this Plan (i.e., Father is not
      required to reimburse Mother for [the eldest child’s] child care costs
      if a state-funded care program is available). (Emphasis added.)

¶4             About two months after entry of the consent decree, Mother
petitioned for contempt, alleging Father violated the decree by failing to
reimburse her for the extraordinary-care expenses she incurred in April and
May 2021. Denying any violation, Father argued that the consent decree
and parenting plan require him to pay for the eldest child’s extraordinary-
care costs only when no state-funded care is available—meaning Mother
must first exhaust available state-funded care for which the eldest child is
eligible before Father is obligated to pay for in-home care. Asserting Mother
did not exhaust available state-funded care programs in April and May

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2021, Father contended he was not obligated to reimburse her for any
extraordinary-care expenses (in-home care) she paid during that time.

¶5           Given the parties’ conflicting interpretations of their
respective obligations under the consent decree, Mother moved to clarify
the extraordinary-care provisions or, alternatively, set aside those
provisions and establish child support. Because the parties construed the
consent decree and parenting plan requirements differently, Mother
claimed “there was no meeting of the minds” when the parties entered the
agreements.

¶6            The family court accepted Mother’s framing―that the parties
had no mutual understanding of the consent decree and parenting plan
requirements concerning the eldest child’s extraordinary care―but found
that Father did not willfully fail to comply with a court order, denying
Mother’s petition for contempt. After oral argument on the motion to
clarify, the family court entered a final order adopting Mother’s
interpretation of the extraordinary-care provisions:

       In reviewing the relevant provisions as a whole, the Court
       agrees that the decree and parenting plan make a distinction
       between a program and day care. When [the eldest child] is
       enrolled in and attending a program (a structured event
       typically with a start and stop time for every day that a child
       is in the program), Father does not have to pay for day care.
       If the parties have not agreed on a program and [the eldest
       child] is receiving day care instead, Father pays for the care-
       givers.

¶7           Father moved for reconsideration, which the family court
denied. Father timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶8            Father challenges the family court’s interpretation of the
extraordinary-care provisions. First, he argues the term “program,” as used
within the consent decree and parenting plan, includes in-home care.
Second, he contends that absent an agreement between the parties, he has
no obligation to pay for the eldest child’s extraordinary care during
Mother’s parenting time if the eldest child is eligible to receive care from an
available state-funded program―even if Mother refuses to utilize that
resource.

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                            Decision of the Court

¶9             We review a family court’s interpretation of a consent decree
de novo. Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 66, ¶ 10 (App. 2007). To construe a
consent decree’s provisions, “we apply the general rules of construction for
any written instrument,” considering the plain meaning of the words in the
context of the entire decree and applying unambiguous language as
written. Id. at ¶ 11.

¶10             Parties’ disagreement about the meaning of language does
not, by itself, constitute an ambiguity. United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 258 (App. 1983). Because a consent decree is “an
independent resolution by the court of the issues before it and rightfully is
regarded in that context and not according to the negotiated intent of the
parties,” we do not consider parol evidence to inform our interpretation of
the decree. In re Marriage of Zale, 193 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 11 (1999).

¶11            When a plain reading of a provision, viewed in isolation, is
susceptible to more than one construction, “we look to related provisions”
of a decree to resolve the ambiguity. In re Marriage of Johnson, 231 Ariz. 228,
234, ¶ 20 (App. 2012). In general, we presume a word or phrase appearing
repeatedly in a decree “is used in the same sense in both places.” Id. But this
“same meaning” rule does not override our obligation to interpret a consent
decree in a manner that is consistent with its purpose and harmonizes its
provisions. See State ex rel. Goddard v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 206 Ariz. 117,
122, ¶¶ 23-24 (App. 2003) (explaining that “[w]hen the context of the words
at issue differs[,] . . . a reasonable interpretation in one context does not
compel that identical meaning in another context”); Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 67,
¶¶ 14-15. To that end, we will not assign meaning “to part of the language
which would render another part meaningless, nor remake the language to
alter the existing rights or obligations.” Stine v. Stine, 179 Ariz. 385, 388
(App. 1994).

¶12            Guided by these principles, we examine the extraordinary-
care provisions of the consent decree and the parenting plan. In both
documents, the provisions first state: “The parties shall jointly maximize
the use of state funded care programs for [the eldest child].” As the parties
note, “program,” viewed in isolation, has alternate meanings. Because
neither the consent decree nor the parenting plan defines the word
“program,” Father contends that we should ascribe the term its ordinary
meaning. See State ex rel. Winkleman v. Ariz. Navigable Stream Adjudication
Comm’n, 224 Ariz. 230, 240, ¶ 24 (App. 2010) (explaining courts may consult
dictionaries “to glean the plain meaning of” a word and should apply that
plain meaning “unless the context suggests otherwise”). As commonly
defined, a “program” is “a plan of activities to be done or things to be

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achieved.”            Program,            Cambridge              Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/program (last
visited May 10, 2023). Consistent with Father’s contention, the ordinary
meaning of “program” is sufficiently broad to include in-home care. But, as
first used within the extraordinary-care provisions of both documents,
“program” is not a stand-alone term; rather, it is modified by the phrase
“state funded care.” A “state funded care program” is a particular type of
“program.” Section 36-558, which requires the State to establish, operate,
and maintain state-funded programs and services for persons with
developmental disabilities, specifically enumerates “[i]n-home” care
services as a resource provided by the State. A.R.S. § 36-558(C)(4)(g). Thus,
under A.R.S. § 36-558’s rubric, the phrase “state-funded care program”
expressly includes in-home care services. See Baumgartner v. Timmins, 245
Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (explaining words may have technical
meanings unique to a field).

¶13            While acknowledging that the common definition of
“program” encompasses in-home care services, Mother argues that within
the broader context of the extraordinary-care provisions, applying the plain
and ordinary meaning of “program” is nonsensical. As Mother correctly
points out, most of the provisions’ other references to “program” omit the
“state funded care” modifier and instead pair “program” with “school.”
Given the repeated coupling of “school” and “program,” Mother asserts
under the noscitur a sociis doctrine the terms should be given
“commensurate” meanings: an out-of-home service providing care. See City
of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206, 211, ¶ 13 (2019) (explaining
“a word’s meaning cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn
from the context in which it is used,” such that associating several terms
suggests, in context, that “the terms have some quality in common”).

¶14            With Mother’s assertion in mind, we turn to the second
sentence of the extraordinary-care provisions in each document, which are
substantially the same: “If the parties agree upon a program or schooling”
with attendant costs, Father must pay “all costs of the program or
schooling.” By referencing attendant costs, “program,” as used in this
sentence, clearly pertains to a third-party care service that is not funded by
the State. But the context of the sentence does not preclude application of
the plain meaning of “program,” which, as stated, encompasses in-home
care services.

¶15         Proceeding to the third sentence of each extraordinary-care
provision―again substantively the same―Father must pay for “all costs” in
Mother’s home from 7:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. if the eldest child is “not eligible

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to be in a school or a program.” Contrary to Mother’s contention, the
context of this sentence does not suggest a deviation from the ordinary and
plain meaning of “program,” which encompasses both in-home and out-of-
home care services. Nor does the context support Mother’s argument that
the word “eligible,” as used here, means “actually enrolled in or attending,”
such that Father is required to pay for all third-party care in her home
unless the eldest child is “actually enrolled in or attending” a school or
program. Indeed, Mother’s proposed construction strips the eligibility
qualifier of any meaning because she does not incur in-home care expenses
when the eldest child is “actually enrolled in and attending“ a school or
program, see infra ¶ 16. (Emphasis added.) See Stine, 179 Ariz. at 388 (“A
meaning should not be assigned to part of the language which would
render another part meaningless.”). Ascribing the plain and ordinary
meaning of eligible―“having the necessary qualities or satisfying the
necessary conditions”―the sentence requires Father to pay all in-home
extraordinary-care expenses incurred during Mother’s parenting time only
if the eldest child fails to qualify for a school or program. Eligible,
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/eligible (last visited May 10, 2023). This interpretation is consistent
with the overarching principle underlying the introductory language of
both extraordinary-care provisions, namely, that the parties must “jointly
maximize the use of state-funded care programs.” Read in that context,
ineligibility means that the eldest child does not qualify for a state-funded
school or program, not that she has failed to register for or enroll in one.

¶16           In sum, Father is financially responsible for extraordinary-
care expenses incurred during Mother’s parenting time only if: (1) the
parties have agreed to a school or program with attendant costs, (2) Mother
has exhausted available state-funded care services, or (3) the eldest child is
otherwise ineligible for state-funded care. While the parties are free to
arrange for caregivers in their respective homes without the approval of the
other, they must agree to any program with attendant costs to trigger
Father’s financial obligation. In the absence of such an agreement, Mother
must avail herself of her allotment of available state-funded care programs
or bear the expense for other extraordinary-care services.1

1      We find no merit to Mother’s contention that adopting Father’s
interpretation of the extraordinary-care provisions “undermin[es] the basis
for the [family] court’s child support decision.” Although Mother correctly
points to the substantial extraordinary-care expenses credited to Father in
the child support worksheet, the consent decree expressly states that the

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                              CONCLUSION

¶17            For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the family court’s
clarification order.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

parties’ respective economic circumstances―not Father’s payment of extra-
educational and extraordinary-care expenses―warrant a deviation from the
child support guidelines and further provides that Father’s financial
obligation for the eldest child’s extraordinary care shall be determined by
the framework outlined in the extraordinary-care provisions, not as
detailed in the child support worksheet.

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