Court Opinion

ID: 9583062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:33.110066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:50.656233
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
As much as the majority may wish, Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997), is applicable to this case. Robinson specifically singled out Blake v. Kroger Co., 224 Ga. App. 140 (480 SE2d 199) (1996), which dealt with constructive knowledge and the failure to prove compliance with the owner/occupier’s inspection policy. Quoting from Blake, the Supreme Court held, “ ‘[u]nder Lau’s Corp. [ v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991)], the defendant proprietor has no burden whatsoever on summary judgment to pro*687duce evidence to negate the plaintiff’s theory of recovery’; [cits.] Because the Lau’s Corp. decision modified the practical application of the [standard under] Alterman Foods[ v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980)], we must modify Alterman Foods somewhat in order to regain balance in the allocation of the burden of proof.” Robinson, supra at 747. “As a group, these rulings are suspect for several reasons. First, by routinely adjudicating as a matter of law questions of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s negligence, proximate cause, and the exercise of ordinary care, these decisions have made commonplace what is, in reality, an unusual circumstance in tort law, since ‘(a)s a general proposition, issues of negligence, contributory negligence and lack of ordinary care for one’s own safety are not susceptible of summary adjudication . . . but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner. The trial court can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff only where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 739. “Where reasonable minds can differ as to the conclusion to be reached with regard to questions of whether an owner/occupier breached the duty of care to invitees and whether an invitee exercised reasonable care for personal safety, summary adjudication is not appropriate. Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166 (279 SE2d 342) (1981).” Id. at 740. “As a result, a defendant who moved for summary judgment achieved success by establishing either that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance, or that the plaintiff had been negligent by either confronting the hazard with actual knowledge of its presence or by failing to exercise ordinary care to ascertain the hazard’s presence. See Hilsman v. Kroger Co., 187 Ga. App. 570, 572 (370 SE2d 755) (1988) (Sognier, J., concurring specially): ‘The rule has been, and continues to be, that on motion for summary judgment, regardless of which party would have the burden of proof at trial, if a material fact has been alleged in the complaint, can be reasonably drawn from the pleadings, or has been raised by the evidence placed in the record by any party, the defendant-movant has the burden of proving the non-existence of that fact and it is not until the movant carries its own burden that the burden then shifts to the plaintiff-respondent. (Cits.)’ After this Court’s decision in Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, supra, 261 Ga. 491, the weighty burden placed on slip- and-fall plaintiffs by Alterman Foods was made manifest.. Under Lau’s Corp., a defendant movant who did not bear the burden of proof at trial need no longer ‘affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the . . . record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’ Id. at 491. Since the defendant had only to point to the deficiency in the plaintiff’s *688case and no longer had to affirmatively negate by the presentation of evidence an essential element of the plaintiff’s case, in order for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff was required to establish both the defendant’s knowledge of the foreign substance and the plaintiff’s lack of negligence either before the defendant moved for summary judgment or in response to that motion. [Cits.]” Id. at 746-747. Plaintiff’s burden of coming forward with evidence is to raise a material issue of fact, not conclusively prove the fact which is for the jury to decide. Thus, Robinson directly impacts when summary judgment is appropriate, even under the first prong of Alterman Foods.
The record and plaintiff’s evidence show that plaintiff suddenly slipped and fell after stepping in some drops of water on the floor within one foot of the end of the aisle nearest the pharmacy. She was not distracted either visually or auditorially at the time of her fall.
Plaintiff fell to the floor on her buttocks and back. Her feet went out in front of her. The fall was very sudden. Plaintiff had stepped on something that caused her to slip. After her fall, she saw on the floor a few small, separate drops of water near where her foot slipped and toward the center of the aisle. When she examined the drops of water, some had been smeared by her foot. She found the drops of water were located over an area of two to three inches. The water drops did not form a puddle. They were sprinkled over the three-inch area like drips. In appellant’s opinion, the water drops were as if someone had been cleaning and left the drops; it was not a splash or spatter because the water drops were separate and dispersed. In her opinion, there were approximately two tablespoonfuls of water making up the drops. After the fall, her clothes were not damp.
No warning signs were posted indicating that the floor was wet. Plaintiff did not see any employees with a mop, cleaning utensils, or bucket at any time either before or after the fall. The affidavits of the defendant’s employees state precisely that there were no cleaning materials in the vicinity of plaintiff’s fall but said nothing about when they had last mopped. However, the affidavits did not say that no routine cleaning had taken place that evening at the time of the fall and stated only that there were no cleaning materials in the area of the fall. Doug Horn, the store manager, testified in his first affidavit that the store was mopped and swept routinely twice daily, “once in the morning and again in the evening. This policy was followed on December 14, 1994.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff did not see the water drops prior to her fall. In the general area just before the location of her fall, plaintiff saw black scuff marks, some of which were straight and others diagonal to the aisle. The scuff marks appeared to have been caused from dragging something across the floor. The black scuff marks did not have water drops *689across them. Plaintiff testified that the small number and pattern of water drops appeared to her to have resulted from someone dripping water while cleaning, instead of from a splash or splatter. This lay opinion based upon a factual predicate in conjunction with Horn’s testimony that routine cleaning had occurred that evening creates a factual issue as to the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of its own acts.
The majority seeks to exclude such lay opinion evidence, because it creates a jury question. This will be the post -Robinson methodology to dispose of premises liability cases — use either Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986) or some other evidentiary pretext to exclude plaintiff’s evidence which creates a jury question and which the Court cannot do on summary judgment on the record in this case. Is it any wonder then that cases in the area of slip and fall from this Court the Supreme Court finds “[a]s a group, these rulings are suspect. . . .” Robinson, supra at 739.
However, OCGA § 24-9-65 reads: “Where the question under examination, and to be decided by the jury, shall be one of opinion, any witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor. If the issue shall be as to the existence of a fact, the opinions of witnesses shall be generally inadmissible.” The Supreme Court has held that non-expert opinion evidence as to maintenance of floors was admissible as a matter in the common experience of laypersons when the factual basis and reasons were given, and such non-expert opinion evidence was sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 253 Ga. 337, 338 (320 SE2d 174) (1984). “The evidence given involves the kind of information which is within the common knowledge and experience of men. OCGA § 24-9-65.” Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 490 (4) (371 SE2d 384) (1988). “The conclusion of a non-expert witness, or his opinion, is admissible when predicated upon facts stated by the witness.” Dean v. Littleton, 161 Ga. 651, hn. 1 (131 SE 507) (1926); see also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373 (86 SE2d 311) (1955). When a nonexpert witness observed the matter in issue and cannot adequately state or describe the data so fully or accurately to place the jury in the place of the witness when the observation was made to enable them to equally draw the inference from such data, the witness may state an opinion after providing the factual basis and reasons for such opinion. McGahee v. Phillips, 211 Ga. 118 (84 SE2d 19) (1954); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Blount, 116 Ga. App. 86 (156 SE2d 409) (1967). To the extent that a lay witness qualifies testimony as to facts as a belief, opinion, or conclusion, this is admissible as fact not opinion. Faucette v. State, 71 Ga. App. 331 (30 SE2d 808) (1944). Clearly, anyone who has used a mop or observed someone else use a mop would be able to formulate an opinion that drops of water looked as if *690dripped from a mop. The majority has gone to great lengths, chanting the exclusion mantra: “vague and equivocal,” “unfounded assumptions,” “unauthorized,” and “self-contradictory,” to exclude the plaintiff’s factual description of what she saw and how she explained the particular droplet pattern of small drops of water that fits the description like no other of a dripping mop, so that the majority then can say that another customer may have made such unusual pattern. Has Robinson taught us nothing?
After her discovery of the water drops, plaintiff smeared the drops more with her foot to make it dry for others’ safety. She informed the pharmacist that she had fallen. The manager came and talked to her. She took him to where she fell and pointed out the location of the water drops. The manager and other employees inspected the area, but found no water drops and denied that any had been present, which creates a material conflict in evidence.
“The plaintiff may make out a cause of action by showing an act or omission on the part of the defendant which was the proximate cause of [her] injury and which could not have been avoided by the plaintiff through the exercise of ordinary care. See, Hogg v. First National Bank, 82 Ga. App. 861 (62 SE2d 634) (1950).” Alterman Foods v. Ligon, supra at 623-624. When the slippery condition was thus created by the Active negligence of the owner/occupier’s employees or by their maintenance of the premises, such active negligence imputes actual or constructive knowledge to the owner/occupier. Lipham v. Federated Dept. Stores, 263 Ga. 865 (440 SE2d 193) (1994); Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra at 338; Alterman Foods v. Ligon, supra at 623-624; American Nat. Bank &c. v. Howard, 117 Ga. App. 834 (161 SE2d 838) (1968); Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507 (148 SE2d 451) (1966). Thus, under the allegations of the complaint as framed, defendant would have constructive knowledge of the residue drops of water from its routine evening cleaning and superior knowledge. Plaintiff lacked equal knowledge, and by the testimony of the defense’s own witnesses, the water drops could not be seen or even found to exist; the dispute as to the existence of the water creates a jury question.
In this case, plaintiff testified that, in her opinion, the small water droplets looked like they had dripped “like just somebody has cleaned it or left, you know, like cleaning stuff, but not like a splash. It was not like a splash.” Such testimony gives rise to the reasonable inference that the water pattern of small drops came from a dripping mop while cleaning the floor and not like something that had made a splash or a spill as if caused by another customer. When the plaintiff gives an opinion based upon the facts that she observed regarding defendant’s negligent maintenance, such opinion testimony satisfies Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. at 622, and creates a fact question *691for the jury. See Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra at 338. Further, the small area of water droplets was in close proximity to a number of straight and diagonal scuff marks on the middle of the aisle, which looked like something heavy had been dragged across the floor by an employee, marring the floor surface. This evidence gives rise to the reasonable and favorable inference that an employee, as part of routine afternoon cleaning and maintenance, attempted to remove the black marks and caused the small water droplets. The weather was dry, and there had been no ice, rain, sleet, or snow, so that it is not a reasonable inference that the water had been tracked into the store as a foreign substance. The appellant testified that the water appeared to have been dripped on the floor and not spilled or splashed. If, in cleaning the floor, an employee left water drops on the floor and failed to clean them up, then this is active negligence, and knowledge is presumed. Alterman Foods v. Ligon, supra at 623-624; American Nat. Bank &c. v. Howard, supra. This satisfies the first prong of the Alterman Foods test, and the issues raised should be decided by a jury.
Decided February 20, 1998
McCurdy & Stone, John D. Stone, for appellant.
“The purpose of the Summary Judgment Act is to eliminate the necessity for a trial by jury where, giving the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . On a motion for summary judgment the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact is upon the movants and the evidence must be construed most strongly against them” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Alterman Foods v. Ligon, supra at' 625. “To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiff’s claim, that claim tumbles like a house of cards.” Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, supra at 491; OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
I am authorized to state that Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.
*692Hicks, Casey & Barber, Mark A. Barber, Richard C. Foster, Sharon C. Barnes, for appellee.