Court Opinion

ID: 9907668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 20:02:40.336368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:59.896444
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 P. v. Taghilou CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

  THE PEOPLE,                                                B324856

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. A708409)
           v.

  FARAMARZ TAGHILOU,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
      Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

      Faramarz Taghilou filed a motion under Penal Code
section 1473.7 to vacate his 1988 conviction for oral copulation of
a person under the age of 14, arguing he was not adequately
advised of the immigration consequences of his no contest plea.1
The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Because
Taghilou has not shown it was reasonably probable he would
have rejected the plea had he understood the immigration
consequences of the conviction, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Conviction and Prior Postconviction Proceedings
      In 1987 the People charged Taghilou with one count of
participating in an act of oral copulation with a person under
14 years of age and more than 10 years younger (former § 288a,
subd. (c))2 and three counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act
upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). In 1988
Taghilou pleaded no contest to the oral copulation charge in
exchange for (1) a “three-year lid” (meaning the trial court would
not sentence him to prison for more than three years),3

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2     Former section 288a was renumbered as section 287. (See
Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49.)
3    A lid “constrains the maximum sentence a trial court may
impose but is less than the maximum exposure the defendant
would otherwise face absent the agreed-upon lid.” (People v.
Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 376.)

                                 2
(2) submitting to a diagnostic study under section 1203.03,4 and
(3) dismissal of the remaining counts. (See People v. Taghilou
(June 25, 2014, B248510) [nonpub. opn.] (Taghilou I).) During
the plea hearing, the prosecutor (at the trial court’s direction)
advised Taghilou, “If you are not a citizen, a conviction of this
criminal offense could result in your deportation, exclusion from
the United States, or denial of naturalization. Do you
understand that?” After conferring with his counsel, Taghilou
responded: “Okay. Yes.” At the sentencing hearing a few
months later, the trial court sentenced Taghilou to 116 days in
jail with credit for time served and three years of formal
probation. Pursuant to section 290, the trial court also required
Taghilou to register as a sex offender. (People v. Taghilou (May
13, 2021, B303561) [nonpub. opn.] (Taghilou II).) After the
probationary period expired, the trial court allowed Taghilou to
withdraw his no contest plea, entered a plea of not guilty, and
dismissed the case under section 1203.4.
       Twenty years later, Taghilou filed a motion to vacate his
conviction or, in the alternative, for an order relieving him of his
obligation to register as a sex offender. Taghilou argued that he
had not been adequately advised he would have to register as a
sex offender for life and that lifetime registration was not part of
the plea agreement. The trial court initially denied the motion,
ruling it did not have discretion under section 290 to relieve

4     “Penal Code section 1203.03 empowers a sentencing court
to temporarily commit a convicted felon to a diagnostic facility of
the Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation] for a report
containing a ‘diagnosis and recommendation concerning the
disposition of the defendant’s case.’” (People v. Tang (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 669, 672.)

                                  3
Taghilou of his obligation to register as a sex offender. We
reversed that order and directed the court, notwithstanding
section 290, “to conduct an evidentiary hearing and determine
whether there was an affirmative agreement or implicit
understanding between the parties regarding the consequences of
[Taghilou’s] plea.” (Taghilou I, supra, B248510.) On remand the
trial court relieved Taghilou of his obligation to register as a sex
offender.

      B.      Taghilou Files a New Motion To Vacate His
              Conviction on the Ground He Was Not Adequately
              Advised of the Immigration Consequences of His Plea
       In 2019, 30 years after he pleaded no contest, Taghilou filed
another motion to vacate his conviction—the motion that gives
rise to this appeal. Taghilou brought this motion under
section 1473.7, arguing he did not understand the immigration
consequences of his plea and conviction. The trial court initially
denied the motion without a hearing and without appointing
counsel to represent Taghilou. We reversed that order and
directed the trial court “to determine whether the court should
appoint counsel for Taghilou, to appoint counsel if appropriate,
and to hold a hearing on Taghilou’s motion to vacate his
conviction.” (Taghilou II, supra, B303561; see § 1473.7, subd. (d)
[“All motions” to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7 “shall
be entitled to a hearing.”]; People v. Fryhaat (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 969, 981 [“section 1473.7 . . . provide[s] the right
to appointed counsel where an indigent moving party has set
forth factual allegations stating a prima facie case for entitlement
to relief under the statute”].)

                                 4
       On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for Taghilou.
In a supplemental filing in support of his motion to vacate the
conviction, Taghilou did not discuss the prosecutor’s advisement
about potential immigration consequences during the plea
hearing or argue the advisement was insufficient. Instead,
Taghilou asserted he “was in need of a Farsi interpreter and did
not fully understand the English language that was used in
obtaining his plea.” Taghilou explained in his declaration he left
Iran and arrived in the United States in 1983 because his
“brother-in-law was a marine who was one of the hostages in the
U.S. Embassy” and Taghilou “feared for [his] life.” Taghilou
hired Melvin Sacks as his attorney after the preliminary hearing.
Taghilou said that he “wanted . . . to go to trial,” but that Sacks
“kept telling” him “they will put 12 white bitches up there and
you will be convicted and go to prison and this is not a good time
because you are Iranian and the hostage situation just
happened.”
       Taghilou stated that he was “convicted by the judge,” but
that he “did not understand everything [the judge] was saying.”
He asked Sacks for a Farsi interpreter, but Sacks said: “[Y]our
English is fine and just answer what the judge asks you.”
According to Taghilou, he was “never explained about
immigration” and “never fully understood what [he] was doing by
pleading no contest” or “what would happen to [him] in the
future,” and Sacks “did nothing to help [Taghilou] prove his
innocence . . . .” Taghilou stated that he had “been a responsible
citizen of the United States . . . with no other arrests or
convictions but for the one in 1987” and that the conviction had
“kept [him] from traveling to Iran to see [his] family and to
conduct family business as well as other travels.”

                                 5
       C.    Taghilou and Sacks Testify at the Hearing
       Taghilou testified at the hearing on the motion to vacate
his conviction under section 1473.7, again stating that he did not
understand English well enough to understand the nature of the
court proceedings and that he asked Sacks for an interpreter but
did not get one. When asked by the prosecutor whether he
committed the crime of oral copulation of a person under the age
of 14, Taghilou said: “No I did not. . . . That’s why there is no
proof, no witness, no evidence. No, that is false.” Taghilou stated
that he did not understand the terms of the plea or his sentence
and that he thought he was “going to prison for three years for
something that [he] didn’t do.”
       As stated, at the 1988 plea hearing Taghilou answered
“yes” when he was asked whether he understood that his
conviction may have immigration consequences. He also
answered “yes” when asked whether he understood the terms of
his plea. At the hearing on the motion to vacate his conviction,
the prosecutor asked Taghilou why he had answered “yes” to
those questions in 1988. Taghilou answered that he did not
understand the questions and that he said “yes” because he
looked at Sacks and Sacks “got angry” and said, “Don’t f’ing look
at me, say yes.”
       Taghilou testified that he was seeking to vacate his
conviction because he wanted “to get [his] citizenship” and that
he was currently in deportation proceedings but had not been
deported to Iran because of the Convention Against Torture.5

5     “Under federal immigration law, noncitizens who commit
certain crimes are removable from the United States. During

                                 6
Taghilou stated that since 2000 he has had “to register every year
with immigration” and inform immigration officials any time he
leaves California and that he “was just tired of it . . . .” On cross-
examination, Taghilou admitted that (notwithstanding the
statement in his declaration he had not committed any other
crimes since 1987) in 1999 he was convicted in federal court on
two counts of bankruptcy fraud and that he was sentenced to
10 months in federal prison.
      Sacks testified he first represented Taghilou in 1987 after
Taghilou was charged with willfully injuring, destroying,
secreting, abandoning, or disposing of insured property with
intent to defraud. (See § 548.) Sacks also stated he represented
Taghilou in 1992 after Taghilou was charged with committing
battery on his two sisters.6 According to Sacks, he and Taghilou
had no difficulty communicating in English, and Taghilou never
requested an interpreter; rather, Taghilou told Sacks he learned
English in school in Iran and “prided himself” on how well he
spoke it. Sacks also denied telling Taghilou how to respond to

removal proceedings, a noncitizen may raise claims under the
international Convention Against Torture, known as CAT. If the
noncitizen demonstrates that he likely would be tortured if
removed to the designated country of removal, then he is entitled
to CAT relief and may not be removed to that country (although
he still may be removed to other countries).” (Nasrallah v. Barr
(2020) 590 U.S. ___, ___ [140 S.Ct. 1683, 1687].)
6      Sacks testified that the insurance fraud case was “resolved
in [the] courthouse” prior to the preliminary hearing and that
Taghilou received “probation . . . with community service.” Sacks
testified he withdrew from the battery case. The record does not
reflect how the battery case resolved.

                                  7
the prosecutor’s questions and advisements at the 1988 plea
hearing.

      D.       The Superior Court Denies Taghilou’s Motion Under
               Section 1473.7
        The superior court denied Taghilou’s motion to vacate his
conviction under section 1473.7. The court explained that
granting the motion “would require [the court] to indulge in this
fiction that [Taghilou] didn’t understand what was going on in
1988 at the time the plea was taken.” The court found that,
before Taghilou filed the motion, there was “nothing in the record
. . . indicating there was any kind of problem at all.” The court
also found Taghilou was not a credible witness. Taghilou timely
appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

       A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a person who
is no longer in custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction on
the ground it is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging
the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (See
People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza); People
v. Coca (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.) To prevail, the
“defendant must first show” by a preponderance of the evidence
“that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that his
misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, at

                                8
p. 319; see § 1473.7, subd. (e)(1) [“[t]he court shall grant the
motion to vacate . . . if the moving party establishes, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any of the
grounds for relief specified”]; People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th
510, 517 (Vivar).) “‘[P]rejudical error . . . means demonstrating a
reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected
the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences.’” (Espinoza, at p. 319;
see Vivar, at p. 529.)
      “We apply independent review to evaluate whether a
defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he
would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its
immigration consequences. [Citation.] ‘“[U]nder independent
review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law,”’” but “must
give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if they
are based on ‘“‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court]
heard and observed.’”’” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319-
320; see Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527; People v. Coca, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court
to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts
establish prejudice under section 1473.7.” (Vivar, at p. 528; see
People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)

      B.      Taghilou Has Not Shown Prejudicial Error
      On appeal Taghilou has abandoned the arguments he made
in the trial court; namely, that he did not understand English
well enough to understand the immigration consequences of his
plea and that he needed a Farsi interpreter. Instead, Taghilou
now argues the advisement he received from the prosecutor

                                 9
during the plea hearing—that his conviction “could result in [his]
deportation, exclusion from the United States, or denial of
naturalization”—was insufficient. Citing People v. Ruiz (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1061 (Ruiz), Taghilou contends “the words ‘may
have’ [or here, “could have”] in a section 1016.5 immigration
advisement”7 are not sufficient where the defendant is charged
with a deportable offense. Instead, “[d]efendants must be advised
that they will be deported, excluded, and denied naturalization as
a mandatory consequence of the conviction.” (Ruiz, at p. 1065.)
Therefore, Taghilou argues, “he is now entitled to vacate his
plea.”
       Taghilou takes the court’s statement in Ruiz out of context.
When the court in Ruiz stated a defendant must be advised he or
she will be deported, the court was applying the Supreme Court’s
holding in People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885 (Patterson) to
the facts in Ruiz. In Patterson the Supreme Court held a person
is not “barred from seeking section 1018 relief on grounds of
mistake or ignorance”8 solely because he or she received the

7     Section 1016.5, subdivision (a), provides: “Prior to
acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any offense
punishable as a crime under state law, except offenses designated
as infractions under state law, the court shall administer the
following advisement on the record to the defendant: [¶] If you
are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the
offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of
the United States.”
8    Section 1018 authorizes a trial court, “at any time before
judgment, or within six months after an order granting probation

                                10
standard section 1016.5 advisement prior to the plea. (Patterson,
at pp. 895-896.) The Supreme Court explained that a “defendant
entering a guilty plea may be aware that some criminal
convictions may have immigration consequences as a general
matter, . . . yet be unaware that a conviction for a specific
charged offense will render the defendant subject to mandatory
removal” and that, “for many noncitizen defendants deciding
whether to plead guilty, the ‘actual risk’ that the conviction will
lead to deportation . . . will undoubtedly be a ‘material matter[ ]’
that may factor heavily in the decision whether to plead guilty.”
(Id. at pp. 895-896.) In Ruiz the defendant filed a motion under
section 1473.7 to vacate her conviction, arguing she “‘was not
advised by her attorney that, because of her plea in this case, she
would be rendered permanently ineligible to ever become a legal
resident of the United States.’” (Ruiz, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1064-1065, italics omitted.) The trial court initially denied
the motion because the court had given the defendant the
standard section 1016.5 advisement. The court in Ruiz reversed,
citing Patterson for the proposition that “the words ‘may have’ in
a section 1016.5 immigration advisement are not an adequate
immigration advisement” where the conviction will result in
mandatory immigration consequences. (Id. at p. 1065.)
       Neither Patterson nor Ruiz, however, stands for the
proposition the trial court or the prosecutor at the court’s

if entry of judgment is suspended,” to permit the defendant “for a
good cause shown” to withdraw a guilty plea and substitute a
plea of not guilty. (§ 1018; see Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 894.) “‘Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the
exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty
plea’ under section 1018.” (Patterson, at p. 894.)

                                 11
direction (as opposed to the defendant’s attorney) must advise the
defendant that his conviction will result in mandatory
immigration consequences or that a defendant who receives the
standard advisement under section 1016.5 is automatically
entitled to vacate his or her conviction, even where the defendant
has not shown he or she did not understand the adverse
immigration consequences of the conviction. As the Supreme
Court explained in Patterson, “[o]ne of the purposes of the section
1016.5 advisement is to enable the defendant to seek advice from
counsel about the actual risk of adverse immigration
consequences.” (Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 896, italics
added.) That is because, when “federal immigration law specifies
in ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ terms that a criminal conviction
will result in deportability, . . . a criminal defense attorney must
accurately advise his or her client of that consequence before the
client enters a guilty plea. [Citation.] The generic advisement
under section 1016.5 is not designed, nor does it operate, as a
substitute for such advice.” (Id. at p. 898; see In re Hernandez
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 530, 544-545.) “[T]o hold that ignorance of
specific immigration consequences may constitute good cause to
withdraw a plea is not to hold that the trial court is under a duty
to provide such case-specific immigration advice.” (Patterson, at
p. 897.)
       Taghilou did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence
he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea,
as he was required to do to obtain an order under section 1474.7
vacating his conviction. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 319.) While Taghilou generally stated in his declaration that
no one ever explained to him the immigration consequences of his
plea, the basis of his motion was that he was not sufficiently

                                12
proficient in English to understand what the court, the
prosecutor, and his attorney told him and that he needed a Farsi
interpreter. We defer to the trial court’s express finding that
Taghilou’s testimony was not credible and implied finding that
Sacks’s testimony was. In addition, there were no
contemporaneous records indicating Taghilou had difficulty
understanding English, and Taghilou had a history of fraud
charges and convictions—crimes Taghilou failed to disclose when
he stated in his declaration he had “no other arrests or
convictions.” (See People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 315
[“[o]bviously it is easier to infer that a witness is lying” if he or
she has been convicted of a felony that “involves dishonesty as a
necessary element”]; People v. Burns (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 734,
738 [“it is undeniable conviction of a crime involving dishonesty”
is “probative of veracity”]; see also Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 527 [“factual determinations that are based on ‘“the credibility
of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed”’ are entitled
to particular deference”].)
       In any event, even if Taghilou satisfied the first step of the
section 1437.7 analysis—that he did not understand the
immigration consequences of his plea—he did not satisfy the
second—that it was reasonably probable he would have rejected
the plea had he understood its immigration consequences. (See
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Taghilou barely addresses
the prejudice requirement. The only evidence he cites in his
opening brief is a single statement in his motion that, had he
known of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea and
had it been “explained to [him] in his familiar language,” he
“would not have accepted the plea” and would have gone to trial
“to explain [his] side.” This statement is not sufficient. Where

                                 13
the defendant contends he would have rejected a plea had he
correctly understood its immigration consequences, he or she
“must corroborate [such] assertions with ‘“‘objective evidence.’”’”
(Espinoza, at p. 316; see Vivar, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 530.)
“Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration
concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges
the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, at p. 321.) Taghilou does not
cite any such evidence in his opening brief.
       Moreover, the record contains insufficient evidence to
corroborate Taghilou’s statement. “To determine whether there
is a reasonable probability a defendant would have rejected a
plea offer if he had understood its immigration consequences,
courts must ‘consider the totality of the circumstances.’
[Citation.] ‘Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include
the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.’” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320;
see Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527-528.) “Also relevant are
the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome
if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at
trial.” (Espinoza, at p. 320; see People v. Martinez (2013)
57 Cal.4th 555, 564 [“a factor pertinent to the decision to accept
or reject a plea may be the ‘“disparity between the terms of the
proposed plea bargain and the probable consequences of
proceeding to trial, as viewed at the time of the offer”’”].) “These
factors are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a

                                14
prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, at p. 321; see People v. Curiel,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.)
      Ties to the United States are particularly important in
corroborating a defendant’s assertion he or she would have
rejected a plea “because they shed light on a defendant’s
immigration priorities.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321;
accord, People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 673.)
“[W]hen long-standing noncitizen residents of this country are
accused of committing a crime, the most devastating consequence
may not be a prison sentence, but their removal and exclusion
from the United States.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 516.)
“Community ties may be established by length of residence;
immigration status; lack of connection to the country of origin;
connections to family, friends, or the community; work history or
financial ties; or other forms of attachment.” (Espinoza, at
p. 321.)
      Taghilou had some ties to the United States at the time of
his conviction. He had lived in the United States for five years,
and his brother-in-law allegedly served in the United States
Marines. However, Taghilou’s ties were far less extensive than
those courts typically find sufficient to corroborate the
defendant’s contention he or she would have rejected a plea had
he or she understood the immigration consequences. (See
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322 [defendant came to
California when he was 13 years old, had lived in California for
23 years, and had a wife and five children who were United
States citizens]; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [defendant
came to the United States when he was six years old, lived in the
United States for 40 years, and “had two children,
two grandchildren, and a wife” who were United States citizens];

                                 15
People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 707, 715 [defendant
came to the United States with his mother and siblings when he
was 13 years old, had lived in the United States for nine years,
“became a father figure and assumed responsibility for his
younger siblings,” and provided financial support to his mother];
People v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 611 [defendant came to
the United States as a teenager, lived in the United States for
over 20 years, had children and family in the United States, “was
gainfully employed,” and before sentencing “specifically advised
the probation officer he did not want to be deported”]; cf. People v.
Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1076 (Bravo) [that the
defendant came to the United States when he was 18 years old
and lived in the United States for four and a half years was
insufficient to corroborate his contention he would have rejected
plea], review dism. May 31, 2023.) Indeed, according to his
declaration, Taghilou was “relatively new to the United States
and was not that familiar with its customs” when he was
convicted.9
       And beyond Taghilou’s somewhat limited ties to the United
States, the remaining factors do not support Taghilou’s assertion
he would not have pleaded no contest in 1988 had he known of
the immigration consequences of his plea. Taghilou did not
submit any contemporaneous evidence suggesting he placed any
weight on the immigration consequences of his conviction. By the
time Taghilou filed his motion to vacate his conviction 30 years
later, he may have been “tired” of having to register annually

9     Taghilou’s strongest ties to the United States developed
well after his plea. Taghilou married a United States citizen
16 years after his plea and later had two children who were born
in the United States.

                                 16
with immigration officials and may have wanted to obtain his
citizenship, but there was no evidence Taghilou was concerned
about maintaining his eligibility for naturalization in 1988 when
he pleaded no contest. (See Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S.
357, 369 [37 S.Ct. 1958, 1967] [“Courts should not upset a plea
solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how
he would have pleaded but for [asserted] deficiencies. Judges
should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate
a defendant’s expressed preferences.”]; Bravo, supra,
69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076 [no prejudice where there was “simply
no evidence, contemporaneous or otherwise, outside defendant’s
self-serving declaration that he gave any thought to his
immigration status whatsoever”].) In addition, prior to his plea
and conviction in this case, Taghilou had been charged with
insurance fraud, and later was charged with and convicted of
bankruptcy fraud. As the People point out, “noncitizens
convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ are removable from the United
States” (Pugin v. Garland (2023) 599 U.S. 600, 603 [143 S.Ct.
1833, 1839]; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), and an offense that
“involves fraud or deceit in which loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $10,000” qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). (See Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) 584 U.S.___,
___ [138 S.Ct. 1204, 1210-1211] [“removal is a virtual certainty
for an alien found to have an aggravated felony conviction, no
matter how long he has previously resided here”].) While the
record does not reflect whether Taghilou’s convictions for
bankruptcy fraud involved losses to victim(s) of more than
$10,000 and therefore qualified as aggravated felonies (see Singh
v. Attorney General of U.S. (3d Cir. 2012) 677 F.3d 503, 510

                                17
[“subparagraph (M)(i) requires actual loss”]), that Taghilou
committed crimes of deceit that, at a minimum, may have
subjected him to removal, both before and after his 1988
conviction, undermines his contention immigration consequences
were an important consideration when he entered his plea. (See
People v. Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th 555, 568 [“defendant’s
criminal record” is relevant to determining whether defendant
would have rejected plea offer had he known of immigration
consequences]; People v. Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 715
[same].)
        Taghilou also failed to submit any evidence the prosecutor
would have considered a plea that did not have adverse
immigration consequences, and Taghilou presented only minimal
evidence he could have obtained a more favorable outcome at
trial. While the prosecutor did state during the plea hearing that
“the basis” for the plea was “witness problems,” Taghilou did not
discuss the evidence the prosecutor presented at the preliminary
hearing or what evidence (if any) Taghilou intended to present in
his defense. (See Bravo, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077
[“Without evidence of the probability of an alternate disposition,
. . . a defendant cannot support a showing that it is reasonably
probable that, if properly advised, he would have rejected
the . . . plea offer ‘in the hope or expectation that he or she might
thereby negotiate a different bargain or, failing in that, go to
trial.’”].)
        Finally, the sentence Taghilou received following his no
contest plea was significantly less than the sentence he could
have received had he been convicted at trial. Taghilou was
accused of engaging in sexual acts with a 13-year-old girl when
he was 26 years old. He was charged with one count of oral

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copulation of a person under the age of 14 and three counts of
lewd or lascivious acts upon a child. Each count carried a prison
sentence of three, six, or eight years. (See former § 288a,
subd. (c), § 288, subd. (a).) If convicted on all counts, Taghilou
faced the prospect of a decades-long sentence. By pleading no
contest, he received dismissal of three of the four counts and a
maximum prison term of three years on the remaining count, and
he ultimately served only 116 days in custody with credit for time
served. (See People v. Diaz (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 102, 115
[defendant did not show prejudice where “[t]here was no other
plea offer available” and, if convicted after a trial, the defendant
faced twice as many years in prison as he served by entering the
plea].) Given Taghilou’s (at best) moderate ties to the United
States in 1988, the absence of any contemporaneous evidence
suggesting he was at all concerned with immigration
consequences, and the favorable sentence he received by pleading
no contest, Taghilou has not shown it was reasonably probable he
would have rejected the plea had he understood the immigration
consequences.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed.

                                           SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.                     MARTINEZ, J.

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