Court Opinion

ID: 9391144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 09:08:46.217775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.679749
License: Public Domain

In the
               Court of Appeals
       Second Appellate District of Texas
                at Fort Worth
             ___________________________
                  No. 02-22-00340-CV
             ___________________________

            SYLVIA KING-BOLING, Appellant

                             V.

CORNERSTONE BAPTIST CHURCH OF ARLINGTON, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
                  Tarrant County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 342-333058-22

        Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Sylvia King-Boling filed her lawsuit on the last day of the limitations

period, and she waited approximately three months to serve Appellee Cornerstone

Baptist Church of Arlington. When Cornerstone moved for summary judgment on

its statute of limitations defense, King-Boling did not respond, and the trial court

entered judgment for Cornerstone. Just as the judgment was about to become final,

King-Boling moved for a new trial and for leave to file a late summary judgment

response, both of which the trial court denied. King-Boling now argues that the trial

court erred by (1) denying her motion to file a late response, (2) granting summary

judgment, and (3) denying her motion for a new trial. We will affirm.

                                   I. Background

      King-Boling’s employment was terminated on September 26, 2019, and she

filed a wrongful-termination suit against Cornerstone on the last day of the limitations

period: September 27, 2021.1 Citation issued on October 5, but King-Boling’s

counsel waited more than 85 days—until December 30—to deliver that citation to the

process server. Within hours of the process server receiving the citation, Cornerstone

was served.

      1
       King-Boling asserted her claim under Sabine Pilot; she pleaded that she had
been discharged from her employment for the sole reason that she had refused to
perform criminal acts. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.
1985) (creating exception for “the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that
the employee refused to perform an illegal act”).

                                           2
      Cornerstone filed a motion for summary judgment on the limitations issue. It

relied upon the undisputed dates listed in King-Boling’s petition and reflected in the

record—the date of her termination, the date she filed suit, the date citation issued,

and the date of service. King-Boling did not respond to the motion, nor did she

appear at the June 2022 summary judgment hearing. The trial court entered judgment

for Cornerstone.

      More than 30 days later,2 in July 2022, King-Boling filed an unsworn motion

seeking both a new trial and leave to file a late summary judgment response. In the

declaration attached to this motion, King-Boling’s counsel (Counsel) claimed that he

had “somehow missed” the email containing the citation on October 5, 2021, and that

he did not realize this oversight until December. As for the failure to respond to the

summary judgment motion, Counsel stated that the motion and hearing notice had

been “viewed at [his] home” rather than his office and that he had “failed to place

[them] on [his] office calendar due to all the changes and disruptions that have been

hampering [his] life [for more than two years] since March 2020.”3 Counsel listed an

impressive number of “disruptions” to contextualize his lapses:

      2
       The trial court’s summary judgment was signed on June 2, 2022. The thirtieth
day after that judgment was Saturday, July 2, and because July 4 was a holiday, the
next business day was Tuesday, July 5, 2022. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4, 329b(a). King-
Boling filed her motion that day after 6:00 p.m.
      3
       Counsel’s declaration stated that “[h]ad [the motion for summary judgment]
been viewed at [his] office [rather than his home in April 2022], it would have been
calendared on the docket management system at that time, which [wa]s [his] standard

                                          3
      •      he had been trying to avoid contracting COVID-19 since 2020;

      •      he had not accepted any new clients since February 2020 due to
             COVID-19;

      •      he had lost several employees between March 2020 and September 2021;

      •      he had not been able to interview new staff due to the risk of COVID-
             19 exposure;

      •      he had suffered from “food shortages, toilet paper hoarding, mail
             delays,” and other COVID-19 complications;

      •      he had migrated to Microsoft 365 in February 2021 “to facilitate
             telecommuting”;

      •      he and his wife had moved to a new home in March 2021;

      •      he had shifted to working from home in June 2021 to avoid COVID-19
             exposure;

      •      he had been “inundated with other legal responsibilities”4 of unspecified
             dates and durations;

      •      he and his wife had moved again in February 2022;

      •      his wife’s travel had left him with “all domestic responsibilities” in
             March 2022;

practice.” But the same declaration stated that Counsel had “beg[u]n to work from
home more and less often at the office after June 2021” and that he had shifted “to
Microsoft 365 to facilitate telecommuting.” Counsel did not explain why his
“standard [calendaring] practice[s]” had not evolved to reflect that he had “beg[u]n to
work from home more.”
      4
        Although Counsel’s declaration stated that he had been “inundated with other
legal responsibilities,” the declaration also stated that Counsel had not accepted any
new clients since February 2020. And during the July 2022 hearing on King-Boling’s
motion for new trial, Counsel reiterated that he “ha[d not] signed up a new person
since February of 2020” and that he was “down to about six cases.”

                                          4
      •      he had been “reviewing [his] tax return” at an unspecified point in time
             and for an unspecified duration; and

      •      he had switched internet service providers at his residence in early April
             2022.
      The trial court denied King-Boling’s motion.5

                                    II. Discussion

      King-Boling challenges three alleged trial court errors:6 (1) denying her motion

for leave to file a late summary judgment response, (2) granting Cornerstone’s motion

for summary judgment, and (3) denying King-Boling’s motion for new trial.

A.    Motion for Leave: The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
      King-Boling claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her

motion for leave to file a late summary judgment response.

      1.     Standard of review

      Generally, a nonmovant must file and serve its summary judgment evidence at

least seven days before the hearing. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (d). Evidence may be

filed later—even after the summary judgment hearing—if the trial court grants

permission. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Hand v. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co., No. 02-

10-00347-CV, 2011 WL 1103725, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2011, no

      5
        Cornerstone contends that the trial court did not rule on the motion for leave
to file a late response, but the trial court’s order denied “the [joint] motion for new
trial and motion for leave to late file a response . . . in its entirety.”
      6
       King-Boling lists four issues in her brief, but we restructure those issues and
construe them as three.

                                            5
pet.) (mem. op.). But “no evidence can be filed after the court rules on the [summary

judgment] motion.” Hand, 2011 WL 1103725, at *3; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)

(providing for summary judgment based on evidence “on file at the time of the

hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court” (emphasis

added)); Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane Co., 945 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied).7

       We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling

on a motion for leave to file a late summary judgment response. Carpenter v. Cimarron

Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686–87 (Tex. 2002). Such a motion should be

granted when the movant establishes good cause for failing to timely respond by

showing that “(1) the failure to respond was not intentional or the result of conscious

indifference, but the result of accident or mistake, and (2) allowing the late response

will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seeking summary

judgment.” Id. at 688.

       But see Mathis v. RKL Design/Build, 189 S.W.3d 839, 842–43 (Tex. App.—
       7

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Stephens v. Dolcefino for the rule that “[a] trial
court may accept summary judgment evidence filed late, even after summary
judgment, as long as the court affirmatively indicates in the record that it accepted or
considered the evidence”); Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120, 133–34 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (stating rule, citing distinguishable
cases that address evidence filed after hearing or filed to support motions for
reconsideration or new trial).

                                             6
      2.     Filed too late

      King-Boling’s motion for leave to file a late response came 30 days after the

trial court entered summary judgment, and “no evidence can be filed after the court

rules on the motion.” Hand, 2011 WL 1103725, at *3; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). For

this reason alone, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying King-Boling’s

motion.

      3.     Undue delay or injury

      We need not rely on that reason alone, though, because King-Boling also failed

to establish the Carpenter elements. Although her unsworn motion for leave8 and

Counsel’s attached declaration both attempted to explain the “accident[s] or

mistake[s]” that caused King-Boling’s “failure to respond”9—the first Carpenter

element—neither document addressed the possibility of delay if the court granted the

motion for leave10—the second Carpenter element. See Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 688.

      8
       As in Carpenter, we “assum[e without deciding] that the trial court could
consider counsel’s unsworn argument under these circumstances in deciding whether
[the movant] established good cause to allow a late response.” Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at
688.
      9
        We need not address whether King-Boling’s motion and affidavit were
sufficient to establish “accident or mistake.” See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; cf. Carpenter, 98
S.W.3d at 688 (concluding that trial court did not “abuse[] its discretion in denying
leave based upon counsel’s bare assertion that he had ‘miscalendared’ the
summary[ ]judgment hearing” with “no explanation of the [calendaring] error from
which the trial court might determine that an accident or mistake had occurred”).
      10
          In the portion of King-Boling’s motion that addressed her request for a new
trial, she stated that “[t]he granting of a new trial will not occasion any undue delay or

                                            7
      In Swett v. At Sign, Inc., we held that a trial court did not err by denying a party’s

motion for leave to file a late summary judgment response because the motion did not

address the possibility of delay or injury. No. 2-08-315-CV, 2009 WL 1425161, at *2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The motion

was filed one day before summary judgment was rendered, and although it discussed

the circumstances and scheduling issues that led to the late response, it “wholly failed

to establish that allowing the late response would not unduly delay or otherwise

injure” the opposing party. Id. at *1–2; see Brown v. Melissa 121/5 Partners, Ltd., No. 05-

13-01189-CV, 2014 WL 3811120, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 4, 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding similarly when trial court denied unsworn motion to file late

response and motion “wholly failed to establish the second Carpenter element” and

“d[id] not even mention the possibility of delay”).

      Here, too, King-Boling’s motion and affidavit “wholly failed to [address or]

establish that allowing the late response would not unduly delay or otherwise injure

[Cornerstone].” Swett, 2009 WL 1425161, at *2. This omission was all the more

glaring because, rather than filing her motion a day before judgment was rendered as

in Swett, King-Boling filed her motion more than 30 days after judgment was

prejudice” and she offered to “pay any reasonable fee occasioned by the failure to
respond and failing to appear for the hearing.” Even assuming the trial court could
consider this unsworn statement, and even putting aside its conclusory nature, the
statement said nothing about the trial court’s consideration of a late response as
distinct from a new trial.

                                            8
rendered, when the judgment was on the brink of finality. The mere date of the

motion’s filing indicated that allowing the late response would have caused some

delay, and King-Boling failed to address the issue at all. See Galindo v. Imperial Grp.,

L.P., No. 2-04-040-CV, 2005 WL 1244691, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26,

2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing motion for leave to file late response and

clarifying that “[u]ndue prejudice depends on whether filing the late response will

delay trial or significantly hamper the opposing party’s ability to prepare for trial”).

       Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying King-Boling’s

motion for leave, and we overrule King-Boling’s challenge to that ruling.

B.     Summary Judgment: The evidence supported judgment on limitations.
       Next, King-Boling argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support

Cornerstone’s motion for summary judgment.

       1.     Standard of review

       We review a summary judgment de novo. Marcus & Millichap Real Est. Inv.

Servs. of Nev., Inc. v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. 2023);

Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. 2021). We view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if

reasonable factfinders could, disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless

reasonable factfinders could not, and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009);

20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008).

                                             9
       The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 94, and a

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on such an affirmative defense if the

defendant conclusively proves (1) when the cause of action accrued and (2) that the

statute of limitations has run. Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 89; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b),

(c). “If service is diligently effected after limitations has expired, the date of service

will relate back to the date of filing,” but if the plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence

in the issuance and service of citation, the “timely filed suit will not interrupt the

running of limitations.” Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007); see Murray v.

San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. 1990). Accordingly, “‘[w]hen failure

to timely serve the defendant has been shown,’ the defendant moving for summary

judgment has carried its burden to prove conclusively that limitations expired, and

‘the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to explain the delay’” by “rais[ing] a material fact

issue concerning the diligence of service efforts.” Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 94 (first

quoting Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 830; and then quoting Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216).

       2.     Conclusive evidence of limitations

       Cornerstone’s motion for summary judgment conclusively established the

elements of its limitations defense.

       It is undisputed that King-Boling’s claim began to accrue when her

employment was terminated on September 26, 2019, that the lawsuit was filed on

September 27, 2021, that citation was issued on October 5, 2021, and that

Cornerstone was served on December 30, 2021. Cornerstone’s summary judgment

                                             10
motion identified these dates and attached the documents establishing them—King-

Boling’s original petition, the citation on file with the trial court, and the return of

service on file with the trial court.       Based on these undisputed dates and the

undisputed two-year limitations period,11 Cornerstone conclusively established that

King-Boling’s lawsuit had been filed on the last day of the limitations period and that

King-Boling had failed to serve Cornerstone for approximately three months

thereafter.   Because Cornerstone was not timely served before the statute of

limitations expired, the burden shifted to King-Boling to raise a fact issue regarding

her due diligence. See Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 88–89, 94.

       King-Boling claims that she raised such a fact issue, but because she did not file

a timely response to the summary judgment, she raised no fact issues at all. Based on

Cornerstone’s conclusive evidence of its statute of limitations defense and on King-

Boling’s failure to produce any evidence raising a fact issue on due diligence, the trial

court properly granted summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (requiring

summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). We overrule King-Boling’s

challenge to this ruling.

       11
         The parties agree that King-Boling’s claim is governed by a two-year statute
of limitations, see Riddle v. Dyncorp Intern. Inc., 666 F.3d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 2012); Stroud
v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ
denied), disapproved of on other grounds by Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580
S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019), so we do not address this issue on appeal.

                                             11
C.       Motion for New Trial: The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
         Finally, King-Boling argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

her motion for new trial.

         1.      Standard of review

         We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion. B. Gregg Price, P.C. v. Series 1 - Virage Master LP, 661 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex.

2023).        Under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines—which both parties agree applies

here12—a defaulting party is entitled to a new trial when: “(1) the failure to appear was

not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but was the result of an

accident or mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense, and

(3) granting the motion will occasion no delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.” Id. at

         Both parties agree that Craddock applies. Cf. Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686
         12

(holding Craddock does not apply when nonmovant discovers mistake before summary
judgment but leaving open question of “whether Craddock should apply when a
nonmovant discovers its mistake after the summary[ ]judgment hearing or rendition
of judgment”). The issue is not dispositive in this case because, generally, “[m]istake
by a party or the attorney for the party, not induced by the opposing party, is not a
reason for granting a new trial.” Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.
1970); see Rivera v. Henderson, No. 01-21-00418-CV, 2022 WL 3722320, at *13 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same, quoting Malooly);
Ruiz v. Ruiz, No. 02-14-00047-CV, 2014 WL 4458952, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 4, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (similar, citing Malooly). Therefore, we assume
without deciding that Craddock applies. Cf. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d
922, 927 (Tex. 2009) (noting that Carpenter “stressed that . . . the defaulting party
realized its mistake before judgment” and applying Craddock when counsel failed to
appear for trial due to belief that trial court was aware of scheduling conflicts).

                                            12
423–24; see Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n

Op.] 1939).

      2.      No evidence of meritorious defense

      The second Craddock element—that the defaulting party “set[] up a meritorious

defense”—is dispositive here. See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. King-Boling argues

that she satisfied this element by setting up a due-diligence defense to the statute of

limitations. The setting up of a meritorious defense required King-Boling to have

alleged facts that would constitute a defense to limitations. Dolgencorp of Tex., 288

S.W.3d at 928. King-Boling wholly failed to do so.

      “The duty to exercise diligence is a continuous one, extending from the date

suit is filed until service is obtained.” Perez v. Thomas, No. 02-18-00253-CV, 2019 WL

2432155, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Erven v.

Springer, No. 02-16-00350-CV, 2017 WL 2471096, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June

8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). When assessing due diligence, the question is “whether

the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the same or

similar circumstances and was diligent up until the time the defendant was served.”

Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216; see Perez, 2019 WL 2432155, at *2 (similar). Although this is

generally a fact question, it can be decided as a matter of law when no explanation is

offered for the delay or when the lapse of time and the plaintiff’s actions conclusively

negate diligence. Perez, 2019 WL 2432155, at *2; see Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216 (noting

                                          13
that diligence may be determined as a matter of law when, for example, “one or more

lapses between service efforts are unexplained or patently unreasonable”).

      King-Boling argues that the meaning of “due diligence” was redefined in the

COVID-19 pandemic era13 and that the delayed service of Cornerstone was justified

by the “disruptions” in her Counsel’s life—his loss of staff, his shift to

telecommuting, his residential moves, and his wife’s travel plans, to name a few.

Nowhere in Counsel’s declaration did he claim that he made any efforts to serve

Cornerstone between October 5, 2021,14 and December 30, 2021.                  As to the

“disruptions” listed in Counsel’s declaration, they did not evidence due diligence but

simply provided excuses for failing to exercise due diligence.15

      13
         King-Boling offers no authority to support such a proposition and we do not
so hold. While she quotes from and emphasizes the Texas Supreme Court’s First
Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19, that Order was issued in March 2020, and it
was amended and superseded numerous times before King-Boling filed her lawsuit on
September 27, 2021. See First Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 596
S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2020). The Fortieth Emergency Order in effect on September 27,
2021, did not relieve King-Boling of her duty to diligently serve Cornerstone, nor did
the Forty-Third Emergency Order, which was in effect during the due-diligence
period below. See Forty-Third Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster,
629 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. 2021) (amending and renewing Fortieth Emergency Order,
effective Oct. 1, 2021); Fortieth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster,
629 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2021) (effective Aug. 1).
      14
        King-Boling obtained citation eight days after filing suit, and for purposes of
our analysis, we assume without deciding that she raised a fact issue regarding her
exercise of due diligence during this period.
      15
        At the hearing on King-Boling’s motion for new trial, Counsel admitted that
the delayed service of Cornerstone was because he “was distracted by other matters.”

                                            14
      Even if a good excuse could substitute for due diligence, none of the excuses

offered occurred within the relevant time period.         Counsel’s declaration recited

numerous life events from March 2020 through September 2021 and from February

2022 through April 2022,16 but the primary period of delayed service was from

October 5, 2021 to December 30, 2021. Counsel admitted that he had “somehow

missed” the citation that issued on October 5, but he did not explain how or why he

had missed it, nor did he explain why a reasonably prudent, diligent person—who

knew that the case had been filed on the last day of the limitations period—would

have failed to follow up on the case until December 30. Cf. Erven, 2017 WL 2471096,

at *4 (holding nonmovant failed to raise fact issue on due diligence when affidavits

“wholly failed to explain [several] significant periods of inaction” including a “nearly

six-week gap between when the suit was filed . . . and when [the plaintiff’s] law firm

sent the citation to [the process server’s] company for service”).

      Because King-Boling alleged no facts that would support her claim of due

diligence between October 5, 2021 and December 30, 2021, King-Boling failed to set

up a meritorious defense. Absent this second Craddock element, the trial court did not

      16
         Counsel’s declaration also referenced several undated tasks that took his
attention—such as working on Coffey v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, No. 12-21-00015-
CV, 2021 WL 4613972 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.), and
reviewing his tax returns—but he did not identify the deadlines associated with these
tasks, so it is unclear if such tasks occurred between October 5, 2021 and December
30, 2021.

                                           15
abuse its discretion by denying her motion for new trial. See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at

126. We overrule King-Boling’s challenge to this ruling.

                                  III. Conclusion

      Having overruled all of King-Boling’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

                                                    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                     Bonnie Sudderth
                                                     Chief Justice

Delivered: April 27, 2023

                                         16