Court Opinion

ID: 9524755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:56:52.305715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:43.252467
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his no-contest plea and scheduling the case for trial. Because I cannot conclude that there was no justification for the trial court’s ruling, I would affirm.1
MCR 6.310(B) states the standard of review that governs motions to withdraw guilty pleas before sentence:
*598On the defendant’s motion or with the defendant’s consent, the court in the interest of justice may permit an accepted plea to be withdrawn before sentence is imposed unless withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice the prosecutor because of reliance on the plea. If the defendant’s motion is based on an error in the plea proceeding, the court must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea if it would be required by MCR 6.311(B).
Use of the term “may” denotes that the trial court has discretion to allow the withdrawal of the plea before sentencing if withdrawal is in the interest of justice and the withdrawal does not substantially prejudice the prosecutor because of reliance on the plea. People v Spencer, 192 Mich App 146, 150; 480 NW2d 308 (1991). An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
Where, as here, a defendant moves to withdraw the plea before sentencing, the burden is on the defendant to establish a “fair and just” reason for withdrawal of the plea; the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to establish that substantial prejudice would result from allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea. People v Jackson, 203 Mich App 607, 612; 513 NW2d 206 (1994).
I agree that there is no evidence on the record to suggest that a dismissal of the charges against defendant upon successful completion of the delayed sentence was a part of the plea agreement. However, defendant’s proffered reason for withdrawing his plea was not that dismissal of the charges was part of the plea agreement, but rather that he pleaded no contest as a result of defense counsel's erroneous advice that *599the charges would be dismissed upon successful completion of the delayed sentence. Defense counsel represented to the court that he indeed advised defendant that the charge would be dismissed upon successful completion of the delayed sentence, despite the fact that there is absolutely nothing on the record to support a belief that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss or reduce the charge if defendant complied with the conditions of the delay. In light of defense counsel’s representation, the trial court determined that defendant’s plea was the result of a “mistaken belief,” and that this mistaken belief was a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea.
Given the trial court’s statement that it was unnecessary to consult the record to determine the exact terms of the plea agreement, as well as the trial court’s statements with regard to withdrawal of the plea, I find it clear that the trial court essentially concluded that defendant did not receive the effective assistance of counsel with regard to the plea and that it was therefore in the interest of justice to allow defendant to withdraw his plea. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that an unprejudiced person would find that there was no justification for the court’s ruling that defendant established a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his plea. Ullah, supra at 673.
Because the trial court found that defendant established a “fair and just” reason for withdrawal of his plea, Jackson, supra at 611, the prosecution was required to establish that substantial prejudice would result from the withdrawal. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 605; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). From my review of the record, it appears that the prosecution *600offered no evidence to support a finding that substantial prejudice would result from the withdrawal. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.

 I note that defendant could be tried on the original charge of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, if the plea is withdrawn.