Court Opinion

ID: 9593426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:25.487269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:21.298750
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority’s finding there is no probable cause to believe the child committed second-degree murder. However, I do not agree the finding of no probable cause constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the case sufficient to implicate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. I would hold it does not.
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to state court proceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, has been held specifically applicable to state juvenile court proceedings. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). The Court in Breed applied the double jeopardy clause to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings which determine a juvenile’s delinquency, but the Court, nevertheless, recognized that non-adjudicatory juvenile transfer hearings can be held without jeopardy attaching. 421 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d at 360. The Court stated:
We note that nothing decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he committed the offense charged, so long as the showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429 [43 S.Ct. 618, 619, 67 L.Ed. 1062,] (1923); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-392, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1064, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). The instant case is not one in which the judicial determination was simply a finding of, e.g., probable cause. Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent had violated a criminal statute.
Breed, 421 U.S. at 538, n. 18, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, n. 18, 44 L.Ed.2d at 360, n. 18 (the juvenile court in Breed had been directed by statute to make an adjudication of whether the child was a delinquent by a preponderance of the evidence.)
In the instant ease, the juvenile court made its finding on the issue of probable cause in the context of deciding the larger question of whether to waive juvenile court jurisdiction of the matter. The waiver hearing was held pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.45, which provides, in relevant part:
1. After the filing of a petition which alleges that a child has committed a delinquent act on the basis of an alleged commission of a public offense and before an adjudicatory hearing on the merits of the petition is held, the county *47attorney of the child may file a motion requesting the court waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense.
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6. At the conclusion of the waiver hearing the court may waive its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense if all of the following apply:
b. The court determines ... there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would constitute the public offense.
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Iowa Code § 232.45 (1991) (emphasis added).
Clearly this statute contemplates a non-adjudicatory hearing wherein only a finding of probable cause need be made. The juvenile court is not instructed by section 232.45 to adjudicate whether the child is a delinquent by any standard of proof. Rather, it is section 232.47 which contemplates and prescribes the procedure for an adjudicatory hearing on the merits of the petition. See Iowa Code § 232.47 (1991).
As such, I do not believe the juvenile court hearing on waiver of jurisdiction was adjudicatory in nature or purpose, and the juvenile court’s finding of no probable cause cannot be found to implicate the double jeopardy clause. See Breed, 421 U.S. at 538, n. 18, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, n. 18, 44 L.Ed.2d at 360, n. 18; United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir.1976); Keener v. Taylor, 640 F.2d 839, 842-43 (6th Cir.1981); Hall v. McKenzie, 575 F.2d 481, 484 (4th Cir.1978); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691, 694-95 (3d Cir.1977).