Court Opinion

ID: 9892732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 18:05:42.26749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:33:46.999418
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/24/23 P. v. Isla CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097067

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                         (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                   MANCRFE20190009993)
           v.

 REGIE ISLA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After defendant Regie Isla pled guilty to multiple offenses, including committing
lewd or lascivious acts with a child, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $3,018,499 in
victim restitution. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s restitution order
violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. We will affirm.

                                                             1
                                     I. BACKGROUND1
       In July 2019, the victim reported to police that defendant had repeatedly sexually
abused her. The abuse began when she was 13 years old. The victim told police that
defendant would place his mouth on her vagina, penetrate her vagina digitally, and then
have sexual intercourse with her several times a week for over six years. The People
charged defendant with multiple crimes, including continuous sexual abuse of a child
(Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a))2 and three counts of unlawful sexual abuse (§ 261.5, subd.
(d)). Defendant ultimately pled guilty to multiple offenses including committing lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)). At the
sentencing hearing, the victim told the court that every day she “still continue[s] to
discover all the ways that the abuse [she] suffered ha[d] affected [her] life
psychologically, shaped [her] whole being, [and] destroyed [her] teenage and early
adulthood that every kid deserves.” She reiterated that the sexual abuse occurred “almost
every week of every month” and admitted that she “even attempted to take [her] own
life.” The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to a total of 6 years in prison,
including the middle term of six years for committing lewd or lascivious acts and a
concurrent term of two years for another count.
       Pursuant to the California Constitution and section 1202.4, the People requested
victim restitution, including noneconomic losses for psychological harm. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13); § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) At the restitution hearing, a
psychologist and a vocational rehabilitation counselor opined as to the effect of the
sexual abuse on the victim personally, as well as on her future life care plan and lost
earning capacity. Based on their expert opinions, the trial court ordered defendant to pay

1 We are limiting recitation of the facts to those directly pertinent to defendant’s claim to
protect the privacy of the victim.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               2
$3,018,499 in victim restitution, comprised of $626,840 in lost earning capacity,
$641,659 for her life care plan, and $1,750,000 for pain and suffering.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that the trial court’s restitution order violated his
constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466
(Apprendi). More specifically, defendant argues that “[b]ecause restitution for
noneconomic losses constitutes punishment . . . the trial court may not impose such
restitution above the statutory maximum except upon a jury verdict based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
       As defendant acknowledges, he did not raise this specific argument below. But
even assuming defendant may raise this claim for the first time on appeal, we find it
without merit. In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the United States Supreme Court held
that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the high court applied Apprendi’s principle to sentences of
criminal fines. (Southern Union Co. v. U.S. (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346.)
       The California Courts of Appeal have uniformly held that Apprendi and its
progeny do not apply to restitution for two reasons. First, victim restitution is not
criminal punishment. (See People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585
[“[N]either Southern Union [nor] Apprendi . . . have any application to direct victim
restitution, because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty”]; People v. Foalima
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398; People v. Wasbotten (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 306,
308-309; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184; People v. Millard
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35.) Rather, “direct victim restitution is a substitute for a civil
remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits.” (Pangan, supra,
at p. 585; see also § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B) [victim restitution “shall be enforceable as if

                                              3
the order were a civil judgment”].) Second, direct restitution is not subject to any
statutory maximum. (Pangan, supra, at pp. 585-586; Foalima, supra, at p. 1398
[“Section 1202.4 imposes no statutory limits on the amount of direct restitution a court
may order”]; Wasbotten, supra, at p. 309.) Federal courts have rejected Apprendi
challenges to restitution for the same reasons. (See, e.g., U.S. v. LaGrou Distribution
Systems, Inc. (7th Cir. 2006) 466 F.3d 585, 593 [“[R]estitution is not a penalty for a
crime for Apprendi purposes since ‘restitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy’ ”];
U.S. v. Sosebee (6th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 451, 461 [“[R]estitution orders are not affected
by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi . . . because the restitution statutes do not
specify a statutory maximum”].)
       Urging a contrary conclusion, defendant argues that the trial court’s restitution
award here runs afoul of Apprendi because it includes noneconomic restitution. But this
court held in People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415 (Smith) that “a restitution order
for noneconomic damages does not give rise to a jury trial right” under the California
Constitution and that “ ‘the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due
process.’ ” (Id. at p. 433.) We reasoned that “there is no basis for distinguishing jury
trial rights, or lack thereof, for restitution orders for economic damages and restitution
orders for noneconomic damages. In both cases, the trial court is performing a task that,
in a civil case, a jury would perform.” (Ibid.) This same reasoning applies with equal
force to the present claim.
       Defendant insists Smith was wrongly decided because noneconomic restitution
“carries a primarily punitive purpose.” In support, he points out that section 1202.4 only
provides for noneconomic restitution when defendants are convicted of violating sections
288, 288.5, or 288.7—all of which criminalize child sexual abuse. By limiting
noneconomic restitution to such offenses, defendant submits, the legislature is intending
to selectively punish defendants. We are not convinced. The purpose of restitution in
such cases is not to punish a defendant but to provide compensation to child victims who

                                              4
have endured sexual abuse, which generally has serious and long-term psychological
effects. The Senate Committee of Public Safety’s analysis of Senate Bill No. 756 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1202.4 to provide noneconomic restitution for
violations of sections 288.5 and 288.7, explains: “SB 756 will help address the mental
health needs of children who are victims of serious sex crimes . . . [by] requir[ing]
restitution for the pain and suffering incurred by these victims. The trauma that young
children experience from egregious sex crimes takes an enormous psychological toll,
leaving them anxious, depressed, withdrawn and even suicidal. To cope, many need the
help of a mental health counselor to help understand that they can recover from the abuse,
trust adults and lead a normal life.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 756 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 17, 2017, p. 2.)
       In sum, we conclude defendant did not have the right to a jury trial as to victim
restitution. Having rejected defendant’s claim on the merits, we also reject defendant’s
alternative claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the
above arguments in the trial court. (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732
[“ ‘Counsel may not be deemed incompetent for failure to make meritless objections’ ”].)

                                               5
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                           /S/

                                                  RENNER, J.

       We concur:

       /S/

       DUARTE, Acting P. J.

       /S/

       WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                              6