Court Opinion

ID: 9648609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:30:18.374996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:04.143373
License: Public Domain

Boyd Tackett, Special J. (dissenting). Act 12 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-First General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, as Amended by Act 225 of the 1959 Legislature, Ark. Stat. 80-1910-14, provides in substance that a County Judge of any county of this state, who believes that any organization operating-in the county is engaged in activities designed to hinder, harass and interfere with the powers and duties of the State of Arkansas to control and operate its public schools shall afford a public hearing, after notice is given to the involved organization, to make a determination as to whether such organization operating- within the involved county is engaged in such aforementioned activities; and that, upon a determination by the County Judge, after such notice and hearing that the organization is engaged in activities detrimental to the powers and duties of the State of Arkansas to control and operate its public schools, he shall order the organization to file with the office of the County Clerk, within a period of seven days after such order is made, the following: (1) official name of the organization and its list of members, (2) the office, place of business, headquarters or usual meeting-place of the organization, (3) the officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives of the organization, (4) the purpose of the organization, and (5) a statement disclosing whether the organization is subordinate to a parent organization, and, if so, the name of the parent organization. The legislation further provides that the organization shall furnish the required information; and the information thus filed becomes public information. A penalty is provided for violation of the legislative provisions. Act Í3 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-first General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, Arl>. Stat. 84-4012-15, provides, in substance, that if the Attorney General of the State of Arkansas should have reason to believe that any organization within the State has evaded, attempted to evade, or has defrauded the State of Arkansas of taxes due it under the laws of the State of Arkansas, he may, upon procurement of an order of authorization ex parte from any Chancery Court, scrutinize and obtain copies of the records of the organization and obtain any evidence from the organization revealing evasion of the state taxes or violation of any of the laws of the State of Arkansas. The legislation requires the involved organization to make available to the Attorney General the involved records; a penalty is provided for violation; and the procured evidence becomes admissible in all courts. Concerning Act 12, as amended, and Act 13, our United States Supreme Court, during the month of October, 1928, State of New York, ex rel v. Zimmerman, et al. 278 U. S. 63, held similar New York legislation to be Constitutional. The New York Statute—supposedly directed at the Ku Klux Klan—-provided that organizations which required an oath prerequisite of membership, other than Labor Unions and Benevolent Orders, file with the Secretary of State of New York a sworn copy of its Constitution, rules, roster of members, officers, etc. Our 1928 United States Supreme Court, in this New York v. Zimmerman case, held that the contention of being deprived of liberty of membership in the organization was without merit; that liberty, and other personal rights, must yield to the rightful exertion of police power; that the state might prescribe and apply to organizations any reasonable regulation calculated to define the purposes and activities within limits consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare; that the state was entitled to be informed of the nature and purpose of the organization, the membership, and by whom its activities were conducted; that the required information would operate as an effective or substantial deterrent from violations of public and private right to which the organization might be tempted if such disclosure were not required; that the requirement was not arbitrary or oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be of real effect; and that the power to require the disclosures included authority to prevent individual members of an association who had failed to comply from attending meetings or retaining membership with knowledge of its default. Our United States Supreme Court, in that instance, concluded that the “due process clause” of our Constitution was not violated. However, on the 30th day of June, 1958, our United States Supreme Court did a complete about-face, turned a flip-flop, and, in the case of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 499, ruled that a requirement for disclosure of NAACP membership was Unconstitutional. Our 1958 United States Supreme Court purported to distinguish the Alabama case from the New York case by taking judicial knowledge that the Ku Klux Klan was engaged in unlawful intimidation and violence, but that, in effect, the NAACP could do no wrong. Our United States Supreme Court has often stated that where individual freedom ends and state power begins is a delicate decision, and that a restraint upon individual liberties must be justified by clear public interest, U. S. v. Carolene Production Company, 304 U. S. 144, and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516. There is certainly clear public interest in our schools and in our taxation. Our United States Supreme Court permits every individual freedom, guaranteed by our Constitution, except those afforded the NAACP, to be regulated and subjected to discipline and control. Yes, our United States Supreme Court permits chambers of commerce, labor unions, benevolent orders, charity organizations, and all other such organizations, even our churches, to be subjected to regulations, control and discipline—all except the NAACP. We know that the Ku Klux Klan was originally formulated to provide unity strength with which to combat carpet bag rule and return our government to the local people. Even so, the Ku Klux Klan was misused and the true purpose of the organization was abused to the detriment of the people, resulting in disorder, breach of peace, violence and other unlawful activities. Business people provide unity strength with such organizations as chambers of commerce; laboring people achieve unity strength through labor union; and the Negro people have achieved unity strength through the NAACP organization formulated to better the Negro race. Even so, often the true purposes of the chambers of commerce, labor unions, benevolent orders, charity organizations, churches, and even the NAACP are abused. We know that the NAACP has in some instances engaged in stirring up strife, creating resentment and hatred, and has violated laws for the purpose of supplying the United States Supreme Court with fodder for litigation. I am not a Ku Klux Klan sympathizer, and I do not disapprove of the original time purposes of the NAACP, but I do not believe in allowing the rights of the NAACP to exceed the rights of other such organizations. I am of the considered opinion that the individual freedom of NAACP members should be subjected to the same rules and regulations as members of other worthy organizations, including church members. The majority of this court recites statements of the trial judge that Act 12 is too broad in its scope to meet Constitutional requirements; that the Act precludes organizations from questioning the state’s power or duty in the operation of its public schools; and that the Act requires the identity of members of the organization who care to question the power or duty of the state in the aforementioned respect. I shall admit that our present United States Supreme Court will, no doubt, declare any legislation Unconstitutional which purports to regulate or restrict the NAACP and its members as other organizations and their members are regulated and restricted. Prior to the United States Supreme Court assuming the role of guardian for the NAACP—right or wrong—Act 12 was Constitutional; and I don’t believe that our State Supreme Court should throw in the towel merely because we know that the United States Supreme Court will declare the legislation Unconstitutional. I can find no verbiage in Act 12 precluding any organization from questioning the state’s power or duty in the operation of the public schools. For the identity of members of the organizations questioning the state’s power or duty to be made known was consistently approved by the courts until the United States Supreme Court recently assumed the obligation of favoring the NAACP and its members with greater privileges than any other organization in this county. I can find no verbiage in Act 12, as amended, denying the right of any citizen to free and untrammeled access to the courts, or discouraging the exercise of that right, as concluded by the trial judge. I can not reconcile the conclusion of the trial judge that Act 12, as amended, constitutes legislative delegation of authority to the county judges, contrary to Article 4, Section 1, of the Arkansas Constitution. Our legislature has many times delegated investigative and judicial authority to county judges, and our Supreme Court has ruled such legislation Constitutional. It will be noted that the trial judge in this instance ruled Act 13 to be Constitutional while ruling Act 12, as amended, to be Unconstitutional, even though Act 13 delegates similar investigative, enforcement and judicial authority to the Attorney General as Act 12, as amended, delegates to the County Judge. The County Judge, by virtue of the provisions of Act 12, as amended, is authorized to make a judicial determination, after notice and hearing, as to whether an organization is engaged in activities detrimental to the powers and duties of the state of Arkansas to control and operate its public schools. The Attorney General, by virtue of the provisions of Act 13, is authorized to investigate any organization, and, upon procurement of an ex parte order from any Chancery Court, scrutinize the records and activities of the organization, determine whether the organization is evading state taxes or violating laws of the state, and make the evidence obtained available to the courts. Most legislation delegates enforcement authority, and I respectfully state that there is no way to justify holding Act 13 Constitutional while, at the same time, holding Act 12, as amended, Unconstitutional. Either would be declared Constitutional except for the recent role of the United States Supreme Court in championing the NAACP. The provisions of Act 12, as amended, do not afford discrimination as indicated by the trial judge—the legislation applies to all organizations and all persons without favor or exception. All of us know that were the NAACP excluded from the provisions of Act 12, as amended, and Act 13, the United States Supreme Court would find no difficulty in finding the legislation Constitutional. There just must not be any legislation which will in any wise regulate the NAACP if the present United States Supreme Court can be expected to find same Constitutional. Act 14 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-first General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, Ark. Stat. 41-703-6, prohibits any person who has no direct interest from engaging in, exciting and stirring-up suits and quarrels between individuals, between an individual and the state, or between an individual and any legal entity; prohibits any person committing a breach of the peace for the purpose of creating- litigation; prohibits proposing- that another person institute and prosecute a suit against another person, the state, the nation, or any other legal entity; prohibits encouraging, aiding and abetting commission of breach of the peace for litigation purposes; prohibits financing litigation in which the financier has no interest; and prohibits the institution, prosecution, or maintenance of litigation by a person who has no direct or substantial interest in the relief sought. Act 16 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-first General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, Ark. Stat. 41-707-13, prohibits solicitation or donation of finances, and prohibits receiving or accepting financial assistance for the purpose of encouraging or maintaining litigation. The Act does not prohibit regular employment of an attorney upon a fixed fee or contingent basis. The Act provides that a party-litigant, the court or agency in which the proceeding is pending, may require a party-litigant to execute and file with the court an affidavit that he has not received or conspired to receive assistance as an inducement to prosecute or maintain the action. The Act also provides that a party-litigant, the court, or agency in which the proceeding is pending, may require an involved attorney to execute and file with the court an affidavit to the effect that he is not receiving and will not receive a fee for his services in an action from a source other than his client. The act provides penalties for violation of the Act. Act 16 provides that no person shall be exempt from attending, testifying, or producing evidence before a Grand Jury, before any court, or in any cause based upon or growing out of an alleged violation of the Act; but that such person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty concerning any matter about which he is required to testify, produce evidence, or the like. The Act exempts attorneys who are parties to contingent fee contracts with their clients, and wherein the involved litigation concerns title to property, tax matters, common carrier rates, public utilities, criminal prosecutions, and wherein the involved attorney is participating through finances of legal aid societies. The Act prohibits and punishes champerty, maintenance, and barratry, and precludes the solicitation of or stirring up of litigation by those who are not real parties in interest to the subject matter of the litigation. Barratry, maintenance, and champerty have been prohibited by common law and state statutes for many years; and the evils of barratry, maintenance, and champerty have been condemned by our courts over the years, and also condemned by Canons Rules of Professional Ethics governing attorneys, litigants, and litigation. There is no justification for excluding the NAACP, its attorneys and litigants from barratry, maintenance, and champerty. Permission to practice law, for instance, is a wonderful privilege, affording a great range of power. A person privileged to practice law holds within his palm the destiny of lives, liberties, and an untold amount of property of others. Attorney activities should be closely regulated. The United States Supreme Court does not question such statements concerning any other than the NAACP. In the recent case of NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, seven of the plaintiffs in the Virginia Public School suits testified that they were unaware of their status as plaintiffs, and ignorant of the nature and purpose of the suits to which they were parties. They did not even know their attorneys; and, of course, the NAACP attorneys did not know them. Even though the NAACP was openly practicing barratry, maintenance, and champerty with ignorant people, the United States Supreme Court condoned such actions. All attorneys have been taught, and most are firm belieyers, that his services should not be controlled or exploited by any agency, personal or corporate, which interferes or intervenes between client and lawyer; that a lawyer’s qualifications and responsibilities are individual ; that a lawyer should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary; that his relationship to his client should be personal and that his responsibility should be directly to his client—not through a litigation peddler or canvasser. Solicitation of legal business by the NAACP violates Chapter 33 of Canons Rules of Professional Ethics. In order to permit the NAACP to indulge in barratry, maintenance, and champerty—a privilege not afforded any other organization-—-the United States Supreme Court in the Button case ruled Virginia legislation prohibiting such practice as Unconstitutional. No this legislation does not curtail access to our courts. It affords justifiable restrictions to the evil practice of barratry, maintenance, and champerty-—-nothing more. The NAACP just does not desire such restrictions. Precluding a person without true interest from engaging in stirring up litigation, precluding commission of breach of the peace for the purpose of creating litigation, and precluding a financier from engaging-in litigation in which he has no interest, does not impair freedom of thought and action relating to access of the judiciary. I can see no wrong in the court having benefit of tbe true litigants. In fact, the court is entitled to know the true parties to the litigation. There is no reason why our legislation should preclude unincorporated organizations, such as labor unions, NAACP, and others, from participating in litigation in the names of the involved organizations, and thereby afford the courts knowledge of the true party litigants. All attorneys should be strenuously regulated for the reasons aforementioned, and for attorneys to be required to abide by professional ethics, court rules and regulations, should not constitute a hazardous operation. Surely, members of the medical profession should not be allowed to run rampant without regulation while they are engaged in activities that control the destiny of people’s lives; and, for them to be so regulated as they are, does not place them in a hazardous profession. The legislation does not preclude assistance to indigent people in need of representation in litigation. In fact, the legislation permits legal aid societies to assist such litigants. The legislation does not impair the power or right to employ an attorney. The legislation merely prohibits people without an interest from financing litigation. While the legislation requires the organization’s officers and members to testify concerning the records and activities of the organization, such testimony can not incriminate the witnesses for the simple reason that the legislation provides that no such person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty concerning any matter about which he is required to testify. Actually, the evidence introduced in the trial court in support of contentions of the NAACP that this legislation will violate the Constitutional guaranties of the NAACP and its members is based purely upon speculation and conjecture. The involved legislation has not been enforced; and, therefore, no one knows whether there would be violations of the Constitutional guaranties of the NAACP. Even so, we might as well face the issue head-on and ignore the possibility that there is no justiciable issue, because we realize that the United States Supreme Court will take judicial knowledge, regardless of the evidence, that the legislation is Unconstitutional. The majority of this Court states, in effect, that because the Supreme Court of Virginia has acceded to the wishes of the United States Supreme Court and declared some of the involved legislation Unconstitutional, and that, because the majority of this court is of the considered opinion that the involved legislation will be declared Unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the Arkansas Supreme Court may as well concede. This line of reasoning is as logical as advising the freedom loving people of Cuba that they may as well join the Communist Party because Castro is going to rule anyway. There is a possibility that our United States Supreme Court will in time return to sound judicial activities, render decisions based upon law and evidence, desist from legislation by judicial ediction, and treat the NAACP as all other such organizations are treated. That will not be possible if we voluntarily join the United States Supreme Court during its present recklessness. I do not believe that we should surrender and, thereby, accelerate the reckless disregard of our present United States Supreme Court for our fundamental democratic principles. This being my first participation as Justice of an appellate court, I sincerely regret that I can not join in the majority opinion of this court. While I fully appreciate the position of the majority of this court, I must respectfully dissent to the majority opinion. No doubt the majority is influenced by the fact that they have been slapped in the face by recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court to such an extent as to cause them to yield to the United States Supreme Court without further ado. I just cannot condone that philosophy. I realize that the United States Supreme Court will declare the involved legislation Unconstitutional, but I do not believe that we should assist. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.