Court Opinion

ID: 9405373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 07:16:28.575721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:21.630629
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00170-CR

          RICKEY CUNNINGHAM, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 71st District Court
                Harrison County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 20-0112X

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
               Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                          OPINION

         On June 10, 2022, Rickey Cunningham pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault of a

child and, pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement with the State, was placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for ten years. The State moved to adjudicate Cunningham’s

guilt for both offenses on the grounds that he violated the terms and conditions of his community

supervision by testing positive for methamphetamine on June 14. After the trial court found the

State’s allegation true, it revoked Cunningham’s community supervision, found him guilty of

two counts of sexual assault of a child, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment on each

count.

         On appeal, Cunningham argues (1) that the trial court erred by failing to quash the State’s

motion to adjudicate guilt, (2) that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he violated the

terms and conditions of his deferred adjudication community supervision, and (3) that the trial

court erred by admitting testimony about the contents of Cunningham’s community supervision

file—which was authored by a non-testifying witness—over his objection that the testimony

violated his right to confrontation. We find that Cunningham received fair notice of a violation

of community supervision and that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s decision to

adjudicate guilt. However, because we find that Cunningham was harmed by a denial of his

right to confront the key witness against him, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand

the matter for a new adjudication hearing.

                                                  2
I.     Cunningham Received Fair Notice of a Violation of Community Supervision

       “[W]ritten notice of the claimed violations of [community supervision]” is one of “the

minimum requirements of due process which must be observed in community supervision

revocation hearings.” Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Gagnon

v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)). In his first point of error, Cunningham argues that the

State’s notice failed “to comport with due process requirements.” We disagree.

       The State filed separate, but identical, motions to adjudicate guilt for each count. Each

motion stated,

       Defendant violated the following terms and conditions, thereof, in the following
       respect, to-wit:

       Condition 10: DO NOT POSSESS OR CONSUME ANY ALCOHOLIC
       BEVERAGE; nor possess or consume any controlled substance, including
       marijuana, as defined by the Texas Health and Safety Code; to wit: the defendant,
       Rickey Lloyd Cunningham[,] Jr[.] tested positive for Methamphetamines on or
       about the 14th day of June 2022.

Cunningham moved to quash the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt because “there [was] no

allegation that [Cunningham] possessed or consumed [methamphetamine] while on probation.”

At a hearing, Cunningham argued that simply testing positive for methamphetamine four days

after being placed on community supervision was insufficient and that the State would be

required to show that Cunningham consumed the drug after being placed on community

supervision. After hearing that argument, the trial court denied the motion to quash.

       “Before revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision and proceeding to

adjudication, due process required, at a minimum, that [Cunningham] receive written notice that

fully informed him which terms of his community supervision the State was alleging he breached
                                                3
and the conduct allegedly constituting the breach.” Hammack v. State, 466 S.W.3d 302, 306

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d)). “Nevertheless, the notice requirements in the revocation context

are not nearly as stringent as those required for an indictment.” Id. at 307 (citing Chacon v.

State, 558 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). “All that is required is that the motion to

revoke fully and clearly set forth the bases on which the State seeks revocation so that the

accused and his counsel have notice.” Id. (citing Leyva v. State, 552 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1977)).

       Here, we find that the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt was sufficient to inform

Cunningham of the allegation that he violated Condition 10 of the terms and conditions of his

community supervision, which stated:          “DO NOT CONSUME OR POSSESS THE

FOLLOWING: alcoholic beverages, unlawful controlled substances, narcotics, dangerous drugs,

marijuana, mood/mind altering drugs.” Cunningham’s brief admits that “[t]he conditions made

clear that Cunningham was obligated to refrain from using illegal drugs during the period of

community supervision.”     The State’s motion also alleged that Cunningham violated this

condition by testing positive for methamphetamine. While not the picture of clarity, it is obvious

that the State alleged that Cunningham violated Condition 10 by using methamphetamine after

he was placed on community supervision. Cunningham’s arguments at the hearing on the

motion to quash showed that Cunningham was not surprised by the allegation, “was given fair

notice by the motion to [adjudicate guilt,] and was therefore afforded the real opportunity to

                                                4
prepare a defense without surprise.”     Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 442 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d). As a result, we overrule Cunningham’s first point of error.

II.    Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Decision to Adjudicate Guilt

       Next, Cunningham questions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s

decision to adjudicate guilt.

       A.      Standard of Review

       At an adjudication hearing, “[t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that a defendant violated the terms [and conditions of community supervision].” Cobb v. State,

851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof by a preponderance of evidence as to any

one of the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a

trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and adjudicate guilt. Smith v. State, 286

S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1980)).

       “The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge is

reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

42A.108(b). “We review the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for an abuse

of discretion.” Davidson v. State, 422 S.W.3d 750, 756 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d)

(citing Meyer v. State, 366 S.W.3d 728, 729 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)). In our

determination, we are “permitted to consider all evidence in the trial-court record, whether

admissible or inadmissible.” Velez v. State, No. 01-13-00337-CR, 2014 WL 4783268, at *2

                                                5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 25, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (quoting Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). At the

hearing, “the trial court is the sole trier of the fact[s]” and “determines the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). A trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and

to proceed with adjudication is examined “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

[judgment].” Id.; Davidson, 422 S.W.3d at 756.

       B.      The Evidence

       At the adjudication hearing, Elena Allen, the lead director of the community supervision

department, testified that she supervised Alyssa Marcum, who was Cunningham’s community

supervision officer (CSO). Allen said that Cunningham’s intake was completed by Marcum,

who explained the terms and conditions of community supervision to Cunningham on June 10,

2022. Allen testified that individuals on community supervision are given an opportunity to tell

their CSO if they have taken any controlled substance before being placed on community

supervision.   Over a confrontation objection, Allen testified about Marcum’s notes, which

indicated that Cunningham claimed he “would be clean” on a subsequent drug test.

       Reading from Marcum’s report, Allen testified that Cunningham’s preliminary urinalysis

testing on June 14 was positive for methamphetamine, and the specimen “[wa]s sent to the

lab[oratory] for confirmation” after Cunningham initially denied using the drug. According to

Allen, Marcum’s notes showed that Cunningham first said that he was just in the company of

people smoking methamphetamine before he was placed on community supervision, but

                                                6
Cunningham later told Marcum that he used the drug on June 9. Allen said that that statement

prompted further questioning from Marcum because Cunningham told her that he would be able

to pass a drug test on June 10.        Reading from a laboratory report, Allen testified that

Cunningham “was positive . . . with a quantitative value of 343 nanograms for the

amphetamine[], and methamphetamine[], 422 nanograms.” During cross-examination, Allen

admitted that she could not tell on what date Cunningham used the methamphetamine.

        Amanda Culbertson, Cunningham’s expert witness, testified that a person could test

positive for methamphetamine in a urinalysis “for as long as nine days after consuming” and, as

a result, there was “no way to determine” when Cunningham last used methamphetamine based

on the results of the laboratory tests.      Culbertson also testified that she considered the

quantitative value of methamphetamine in Cunningham’s urine to be a low level, “slightly above

the -- the cutoffs.”

        In his own defense, Cunningham testified that he had a methamphetamine addiction, last

used the drug on June 9, and lied to his CSO on June 10 when he said he would be able to test

negative for drugs.

                C.     Analysis

        Proof of the State’s allegation, by a preponderance of the evidence, was sufficient to

support the trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Here, the trial court heard evidence that Cunningham told

Marcum that he would be able to pass a drug test on June 10. Although Cunningham said he had

lied to Marcum, the trial court was free to disbelieve his self-serving testimony. Instead, as fact-

                                                 7
finder, the trial court could conclude that Cunningham told the truth on June 10, succumbed to

his addiction, and used methamphetamine while on community supervision.1 As a result, we

find the evidence sufficient to support the decision to adjudicate guilt and overrule

Cunningham’s second point of error.

III.    Cunningham Was Harmed by a Denial of His Right to Confrontation

        When Allen was asked what Marcum did during the June 10 intake, Cunningham’s

counsel lodged an objection, stating “[N]ot having Ms. Marcum here denies us our right to

confront and cross-examine witnesses against us in this case under the federal and state

constitution.” The State responded that Allen, “as supervisor[], ha[d] knowledge of all of the

events that [were] documented in Ms. Marcum’s file.” The trial court overruled Cunningham’s

objection but granted him a running objection to Allen’s testimony. Marcum’s file was not

introduced into evidence. Instead, over the confrontation objection, Allen continued to testify

about the contents of Marcum’s file. On appeal, Cunningham argues that the trial court erred by

allowing Allen’s testimony.

        A.       Standard of Review

        “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d)

(citing Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Abuse of discretion

occurs only if the decision is ‘so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable

people might disagree.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App.

1
 Because Culbertson testified that she could not determine when Cunningham last used methamphetamine, the trial
court was free to disregard her testimony.
                                                      8
2008)). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing Moses v.

State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it

was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. (citing De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

       B.      There is a Split of Authority on Whether the Sixth Amendment’s
               Confrontation Clause Applies to Adjudication and Revocation Hearings

       In his appellate brief, Cunningham argues that the trial court’s ruling to admit Allen’s

testimony “violated [his] Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.” As both

parties note, there is currently a split of authority on whether the Confrontation Clause applies to

adjudication and revocation hearings.         Because this Court has not decided the issue,

Cunningham’s appeal presents a matter of first impression. To inform our decision, we discuss

the history leading to the split decisions among our sister courts.

       “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that ‘[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him . . . .’” Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting U.S.

CONST. amend. VI). “Consistent with the Confrontation Clause guarantee, a testimonial hearsay

statement may be admitted in evidence against a defendant ‘only where the declarant is

unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.’”

De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Crawford v.

                                                  9
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)).2 Despite the notion that an accused’s liberty interest is at

issue in adjudication and revocation hearings, the phrase “criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth

Amendment has caused much debate about whether the protections of the Confrontation Clause

and Crawford3 apply during those hearings.

           In 1971, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that “[a] probation revocation

hearing is not an adversarial proceeding, a civil action, or a criminal prosecution[;] instead, it is

administrative in nature, a means of protecting society and rehabilitating lawbreakers.” Hill v.

State, 480 S.W.2d 200, 202–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (op. on reh’g) (citations omitted). In

1973, the United States Supreme Court wrote that “[p]robation revocation, like parole

revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782

(1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). Citing to (1) the Confrontation

Clause’s language that it applies to “criminal prosecutions,” (2) the legal principle that

adjudication and revocation hearings are administrative in nature, which was overturned in

Ex parte Doan as discussed below, and (3) the language from Scarpelli and Morrisey, our sister

courts routinely found that the Confrontation Clause and, consequently, Crawford did not apply

in those hearings. See Wisser v. State, 350 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no

pet.); Norman v. State, No. 13-10-00017-CR, 2011 WL 2732673, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Jul. 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Mauro v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. ref’d); Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 234

2
 “[T]he Crawford rule reflects the Framers’ preferred mechanism (cross-examination) for ensuring that inaccurate
out-of-court testimonial statements are not used to convict an accused.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418
(2007).
3
    Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
                                                      10
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Smart v. State, 153 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. ref’d).

       The split among our sister courts was created after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

(CCA) examined Scarpelli and Morrissey in its 2012 decision in Ex parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In Ex parte Doan, the CCA explained that prior decisions labeling

revocation proceedings as administrative in nature were the “result of confusion about federal

law.” Id. at 208. The CCA noted that Scarpelli’s description of federal revocation hearings bore

little resemblance to the corresponding Texas procedure.         In Scarpelli, the United States

Supreme Court noted

       that a probation-revocation hearing in an administrative agency is unlike

              [a] criminal trial, [in which] the State is represented by a
              prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant
              enjoys a number of procedural rights . . . . In short, a criminal trial
              under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique
              characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the
              State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer
              with the orientation [toward rehabilitation]; formal procedures and
              rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the
              hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of
              probation or parole.

Ex parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d at 210 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Scarpelli,

411 U.S. at 789). In noting the differences in Texas procedure, the CCA wrote,

       In Texas, the State is represented by a prosecutor, the defendant does have a right
       to counsel, the hearing is before the judge, formal rules of evidence do apply, and
       there may be appeal directly to a court of appeals. They are conducted entirely
       within the judicial branch. The Rules of Evidence and the exclusionary rule to
       bar illegally seized evidence apply fully in a Texas probation revocation hearing.
       Indeed, aside from the burden of proof required to prove a community-
       supervision violation (preponderance of the evidence, which is lower than the
                                                11
       burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that is required to prove a new
       criminal offense), there are few procedural differences between a Texas criminal
       trial and a Texas community-supervision revocation proceeding.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). As a result, Ex parte Doan held that “[c]ommunity

supervision revocation proceedings . . . are judicial proceedings, to be governed by the rules

established to govern judicial proceedings.” Id. at 212.

       After Ex parte Doan, several appellate courts have reexamined the issue with mixed

results. The Houston 14th District and the Corpus Christi courts reversed course and found that

the Confrontation Clause applied to adjudication and revocation proceedings. Hughes v. State,

651 S.W.3d 461, 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. granted) (holding that the

Confrontation Clause does apply to revocation proceedings); Perez v. State, No. 13-14-00300-

CR, 2015 WL 4234236, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[I]f the Rules of Evidence and exclusionary rule

apply to community supervision proceedings, so should the United States Constitution.”).

However, the majority of appellate courts deciding the issue after Ex parte Doan have found that

the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to adjudication and revocation hearings because

Ex parte Doan “did not hold that they constitute a phase of ‘criminal prosecution’ under the

Sixth Amendment.” Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet.

filed); see Dupas v. State, No. 07-22-00117-CR, 2022 WL 5052714, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Oct. 4, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying the law of

the transferor court); Flores v. State, No. 02-21-00028-CR, 2022 WL 3097287, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Aug. 4, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); White v.

                                                12
State, No. 02-21-00059-CR, 2022 WL 623450, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 3, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Olabode v. State, 575 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2019, pet. ref’d) (“By its own terms, the Confrontation Clause applies only to

criminal prosecutions, and a probation revocation, whether it follows ‘regular’ probation or

deferred adjudication probation, is not a stage of criminal prosecutions.”).

       To date, the CCA has not resolved the split among our sister courts on this issue. See

Inman v. State, No. PD-0251-22, 2023 WL 3495573, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 17, 2023)

(per curiam) (noting that the CCA “granted review of the Confrontation Clause issue” but

concluded the “decision to grant review was improvident”).

       C.      Cunningham Had the Right to Confront the Key Witness Against Him

       After reviewing the rationale of our sister courts on this issue, we conclude that the

Confrontation Clause applied to Cunningham’s adjudication proceeding. In doing so, we decline

to follow the majority of our sister courts, which base their reasoning on Morrissey and

Scarpelli’s language that community supervision and parole revocation proceedings are not a

stage of a criminal prosecution.

       We begin by noting that neither Morrissey nor Scarpelli considered whether the right of

confrontation was available in revocation and parole proceedings under the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477; Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782. Instead, both

cases found that, under the federal system, the “minimum requirements of due process” under the

Fourteenth Amendment included the right to confrontation in both revocation and parole

hearings because they could result in a loss of liberty. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting

                                                13
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). To use these cases to deny the right to confrontation in Texas

adjudication and revocation proceedings under the Sixth Amendment simply because Scarpelli

and Morrissey employed the language that federal revocations are not criminal prosecutions

seems incongruous with the CCA’s explanation in Ex parte Doan that “there are few procedural

differences between a Texas criminal trial and a Texas community-supervision revocation

proceeding.” Ex parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d at 210.

         Here, the State was represented by a prosecutor in a hearing before a judge where the

rules of evidence applied. Notwithstanding the fact that Cunningham had pled guilty and signed

the typical plea paperwork applicable to the underlying offense, the end result of the proceeding

was a conviction and sentence for the underlying offense that resulted in a loss of Cunningham’s

liberty. As far back as 1968, Judge Jack Onion noted, “[I]t would be difficult for any student of

the law to conclude that [Texas] revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings ‘where

substantial rights of an accused may be affected.’” Crawford v. State, 435 S.W.2d 148, 151

(Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (Onion, J., dissenting).

         Morrissey noted that “[t]he [defendant] is not the only one who has a stake in his

conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to

normal and useful life within the law.”4 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484. Our consideration of

societal interests leads us to be unpersuaded by our sister court’s arguments that Doan

conclusively established that adjudication and revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions

4
 Notwithstanding the conditional nature of “[t]he liberty of a parolee,” Morrissey noted that the interest at stake
“includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee
and often on others.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
                                                         14
because they used the term “judicial proceedings” to describe them. Doan, 369 S.W.3d at 212.

This is especially so where the CCA has already decided that there is a Sixth Amendment right

to counsel in adjudication hearings even though the express terms of the Sixth Amendment say

that right applies only to criminal prosecutions. Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1977). In doing so, the CCA noted that it had previously determined that “revocation

proceedings cannot be isolated from the context of the criminal process” and referred to them as

criminal prosecutions. Id. (quoting Crawford, 435 S.W.2d at 151). After examining the facts of

this case, in light of Ex parte Doan, we find that Cunningham’s adjudication hearing was a part

of the criminal prosecution.5

        Moreover, “[t]he central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of

discretion in a community supervision revocation case is whether the defendant was afforded due

process of law.” Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 41 (citing Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012)). We find that Cunningham’s trial objection and briefing fairly subsumes a

due process issue. “[A] party need not spout ‘magic words’ or recite a specific statute to make a

valid objection.” Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Instead, “[a]ll a

party has to do . . . is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to

it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in

a proper position to do something about it.” Id. (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Cunningham’s objection clearly informed the trial court that he sought

5
 Marzek v. State, No. 06-10-00087-CR, 2011 WL 238347, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 25, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying the Confrontation Clause to a revocation proceeding); see
Galloway v. State, No. 06-13-00157-CR, 2014 WL 2129525, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 22, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (suggesting that, after Ex parte Doan, the Confrontation Clause
applies to revocation proceedings).
                                                      15
to exclude Allen’s testimony about his CSO’s notes on confrontation grounds.                         His brief

mentions Scarpelli, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Pointer v. Texas, in which the United States

Supreme Court said, “[W]e have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the right to

cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of

due process of law.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). As a result, we find that

Cunningham has preserved a due process issue and, based on Scarpelli and Morrissey, conclude

that Cunningham was entitled to confront the witnesses against him.6

        D.       Cunningham’s Right to Confrontation Was Violated

        The admission of a testimonial, out-of-court statement from a declarant who does not

appear at trial violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant was unavailable to testify at

trial and the defendant had “a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Davis v. Washington,

547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). We first determine

whether the complained-of statements were testimonial.

        “The primary focus in determining whether a hearsay statement is ‘testimonial’ is upon

the objective purpose of the interview or interrogation, not upon the declarant’s expectations.”

De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at

822–23).     “Generally speaking, a hearsay statement is ‘testimonial’ when the surrounding

circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interview or interrogation is to

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. (quoting

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822–23). “In such a situation, the person offering information is literally

6
 “In Texas, the procedure for revoking probation affords a probationer greater safeguards than those required by
[Scarpelli] and Morrissey.” Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 42.
                                                      16
bearing testimony.” Id. “[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

trial” are also considered testimonial. Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010) (quoting Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

       Here, even though the State represented that Allen, as Marcum’s supervisor, had

knowledge of the events in Marcum’s file, nothing showed that she had personal knowledge of

the contents of the file, and counsel obtained a running Confrontation Clause objection to all of

Allen’s testimony. From Marcum’s file, Allen testified that, after Marcum explained that drug

use would be a ground for revocation, Cunningham said he would be able to pass a drug test.

Allen testified that Marcum’s notes said Cunningham told her he “would be clean” on a

subsequent drug test. From Marcum’s notes, Allen also testified about Cunningham’s statements

to Marcum attempting to explain the reasons for the positive drug test, which showed that he had

“changed his story.”

       Allen testified about those out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Cunningham’s statements to his CSO were made as a result of

questioning from an arm of law enforcement to establish past events potentially relevant to a

revocation hearing that would result in his criminal conviction. The statements were made under

circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe they would be used at a revocation

hearing. We find that Allen’s testimony about Marcum’s account of the statements Cunningham

gave her included testimonial hearsay. See Pickins v. State, No. 02-17-00050-CR, 2018 WL

3468359, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

                                               17
publication) (finding that community supervision officer’s testimony based on statements in

community supervision records constituted testimonial hearsay).

        Allen also testified about Marcum’s notes, which said that a preliminary drug test

administered by an unidentified male employee of the community supervision department was

positive.7 Allen also testified about the laboratory result of Cunningham’s urinalysis, which was

admitted through Allen over objection. “The admission of a lab report created solely by a non-

testifying analyst, without calling that analyst to sponsor it, violates the Confrontation Clause.”

Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d

634, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011)).

        Consequently, we find that Cunningham’s right to confrontation was violated. To avoid

violating Cunningham’s right to confrontation, there must have been some evidence showing

that Marcum and the laboratory analyst were unavailable to testify and that Cunningham had a

prior opportunity for cross-examination. Here, the State showed neither.

        E.       Cunningham Suffered Constitutional Harm

        Our harm analysis is governed by Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which requires us to reverse unless convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not contribute” to the revocation of Cunningham’s community supervision and the

adjudication of his guilt. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Crayton v. State, 485 S.W.3d 488, 505 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.). In making our determination, we view the entire record and

consider the following factors:

7
 Allen testified that this preliminary test must have been administered by an unidentified male employee of the
community supervision department.
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       “(1) the importance of the [complained-of] evidence to the State’s case; (2)
       whether the . . . evidence was cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or
       absence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the [complained-of]
       evidence, . . . ; (4) the overall strength of the State’s case”; and (5) any other
       factor in the record that affects the probable impact of the error.

Crayton, 485 S.W.3d at 505 (alterations in original) (quoting Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

       Here, we find that Cunningham was harmed by the admission of Allen’s testimony. The

State had the burden of establishing that Cunningham used methamphetamine after June 10. Its

evidence on that issue was not strong. The statements in Marcum’s file that were the substance

of counsel’s Confrontation Clause objection and the objected-to laboratory report were the sole

pieces of evidence comprising the State’s case-in-chief against Cunningham.                 While

Cunningham did agree that he told Marcum he could pass a drug test on June 10, the results from

the preliminary drug test in Marcum’s file and the laboratory report were not cumulative of any

other evidence.

       The record shows that Marcum was the key witness in the State’s case, but Cunningham

had no opportunity to confront her. In short, the evidence should have been excluded under the

Confrontation Clause and, as a matter of due process, was absolutely critical to the State’s case.

Without it, the evidence would have been insufficient to establish that Cunningham violated a

term and condition of community supervision by ingesting methamphetamine after he was

placed on community supervision, and Cunningham would have had no obligation to make any

defense at the hearing. Given these facts, we are not convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that

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the error did not contribute” to revocation of Cunningham’s community supervision and the

adjudication of his guilt. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).

        Because Cunningham suffered constitutional harm, we sustain Cunningham’s last point

of error.

IV.     Conclusion

        We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for a new

adjudication hearing.

                                              Charles van Cleef
                                              Justice

Date Submitted:         May 25, 2023
Date Decided:           June 22, 2023

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