Court Opinion

ID: 9741651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:00:10.388543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.287467
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LYTTON, dissenting: Although the majority quotes the statutory definition of a “farm,” it fails to apply this definition to either case on appeal. Instead, it focuses on the sufficiency of the PTAB’s factual findings and the legal impact of the Department of Revenue’s guidelines. This cursory analysis ignores the primary issue: whether the PTAB properly applied the language of the statute. The statute defines a “farm” as “any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops.” 35 ILCS 200/1—60 (West 1998). The statute then clarifies this definition by stating: “For purposes of this Code, ‘farm’ does not include property which is primarily used for residential purposes even though some farm products may be grown or farm animals bred or fed on the property incidental to its primary use.” 35 ILCS 200/1—60 (West 1994). The majority completely fails to address this portion of the statute. Whenever possible, courts must construe statutes so that no part is rendered a nullity. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1994). In this case, the plain language of the statute states that the primary use of a property is not altered by its incidental use for growing farm products or raising farm animals. The necessary implication of the majority’s reasoning would render this provision a nullity by making any portion of a property used for crops or farm animals divisible from the remainder of the property, and, thus, classified and assessable separately as farmland.4 This eliminates the need for the remaining statutory language concerning incidental farm uses. It also leads the majority to oversimplify the necessary statutory analysis, condensing a two-step process into a single step. Using the majority’s analysis, all properties, regardless of their primary use, would be divided into the portions used for farm and nonfarm purposes and assessed accordingly. This construction is not consistent with the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, this construction requires the court to apply two different meanings to the word “property.” Under the majority’s reasoning, “property” must refer to both the entire parcel owned by a taxpayer and to the individual sections classified as residential and nonresidential. Such a potential duality of meaning is not supported by the language of the statute for all properties which have some farm use. A proper construction of the statute requires: (1) finding the primary use of the property to be assessed; (2) if this use is residential, then any incidental use of part of the land for farm purposes does not alter its overall classification as residential for purposes of tax assessment; and (3) if the primary use is not residential, the property may be divided into residential and nonresidential components. This interpretation effectuates the whole statute and is consistent with the advisory guidelines, which state: “The primary use of a parcel containing only conventional farm and residential uses is residential unless the conventionally farmed portion of the parcel *** is larger than the residential portion *** and [the conventionally farmed portion] is not less than 5 acres in area.” A court must first consider whether the primary use of the properties as a whole in the instant case is residential. The evidence shows that the Kolesars lived on their property, but Stuparitz did not. Thus, the Kolesars’ use of the property is primarily residential, but Stuparitz’s use is not. Because of these factual differences, the analysis differs for each party. The Kolesars’ entire property must be classified and assessed as residential because the incidental use of a portion of the land does not qualify it as a “farm.” Stuparitz’s property, however, is not primarily used for residential purposes. Under the statute, the portion of the property devoted to farm use should be classified and assessed as farmland, with the remaining portion treated as residential property. Because the PTAB failed to apply the proper analysis in either case, I would set aside its ruling in the Kolesar case and confirm the result in the Stuparitz case, although on different grounds.   The majority seeks to justify this result by citing Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board of the Department of Local Government Affairs, 113 Ill. App. 3d 872, 448 N.E.2d 3 (1983). Santa Fe is inapposite. That case dealt with combined industrial and farm uses. The statute and the facts of this case apply to residential and farm uses. 35 ILCS 200/1—60 (West 1994). The majority has not reconciled the facts of this case with the above-quoted statutory, language.