Court Opinion

ID: 9859638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:14:43.401261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:37.674755
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK, dissenting: Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s opinion to the extent that it holds that the intent to deliver was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither human experience nor logic permits an inference of intent to deliver under the facts and circumstances of this case. The evidence showing how and why the police were present at the scene is offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is not substantive evidence against defendant. Casting away this preliminary evidence involving the conduct of Patton, defendant’s culpability commences when he is confronted by the police inside the apartment. As stated by the majority, a reasonable inference of intent to deliver narcotics arises from possession of a quantity of contraband in excess of the amount designed for personal use. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 4.36 grams of cocaine is in excess of an amount designed for personal use. Quantitatively, this amount is far below the 51 pounds and the 578.8 grams of cannabis that triggered an inference of intent to deliver in the Birge and Shaefer cases. Unlike cases finding an inference of intent to deliver, in the case at bar, there was no drug paraphernalia, large sums of cash or a weapon associated with defendant. The majority bolsters its theory of an inference of intent to deliver by focusing on the fact that defendant possessed more cocaine than Patton possessed or sold to Hutch. This theory is troubled by the fact that the marked money given to Patton was never found. Perhaps we could speculate that the unfound marked money was stashed with an unfound cache of drugs. Perhaps we could speculate that the drug dealer Patton had nearly sold all of his inventory. We cannot speculate as to how defendant assisted Patton. The isolated transaction between Hutch and Patton causes the majority to make a pronouncement that drug-purchasing customers were not permitted inside Patton’s apartment. The majority’s logic reasons that since defendant was inside Patton’s apartment, he was not a customer. Nothing in the record supports this pronouncement. Our focus is limited to the inquiry: How did defendant assist Patton in the specific drug transaction with Hutch? The majority states that Patton obtained the drugs from somewhere or someone as he left Hutch standing at the door. No one could disagree. But how did defendant assist Patton? Did Patton obtain the drugs from his own person, defendant or a hidden cache? There is no evidence that defendant assisted Patton. There is no evidence that defendant was in the apartment when Hutch purchased the drugs from Patton. There is no evidence of defendant having an interest in the apartment. There is no explanation as to the failure of the police to find the prerecorded funds. There is no evidence to negate the probability of additional drugs stashed in the same place as the prerecorded funds. I conclude that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite intent to deliver an illegal substance. (See People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 257 (test is whether reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).) However, defendant was clearly found to be in unlawful possession of 4.36 grams of cocaine. I would reduce the conviction of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver to conviction of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56V2, par. 1402(b).) The trial court should conduct a sentencing hearing and impose a sentence consistent with this decision.