Court Opinion

ID: 9765665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:12:26.409081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:12.690364
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order, but write separately as I reach this result by a different route.
While it is certainly accurate to say that parties may contract for a different interest rate than that provided by the prejudgment interest statute,2 S.C.Code Ann. § 34-31-20 (Supp.2009), I do not find that rule applicable here. The parties’ contract provides, in subparagraph 9.7.2, that Clemson “shall pay interest on delayed certified payments to [appellant] in accordance with Section 29-6-50 of the SC Code of Laws.” While this provision expressly incorporates the Prompt Payment Act into the contract, it does not alter a statutorily-set interest rate. Moreover, neither the Act nor subparagraph 9.7.2 are applicable to this contract dispute, which does not involve certified periodic or final payments, but rather arises from appellant’s successful claim that Clemson wrongfully withheld monies due under the contract.
I find, however, that appellant is barred from recovering prejudgment interest by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is well-settled that the doctrine bars recovery of interest against the State “unless [the State has been] bound by an act of the Legislature or by a lawful contract of its executive officers....” Monarch Mills v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 149 S.C. 219, 146 S.E. 870 (1929); see also e.g. Div. of Gen. Serv. v. Ulmer, 256 S.C. 523, 183 S.E.2d 315 (1971).
In 1985, this Court prospectively abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity insofar as that doctrine had insulated *557state and local governments from tort liability. McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). McCall included Appendix A, a list of 122 cases, and provided that these cases were “overruled to the extent that they hold that an action may not be maintained against the State without its consent.” Although Monarch Mills and Ulmer are on that list, their holdings that the State is not liable for prejudgment interest except when bound by statute or by contract remain unaffected as the right to this interest is not a matter of tort liability.3 Since § 34-31-20 does not allow for recovery of interest against the State, and because the parties’ contract is süent as to this type of interest, I find that • appellant’s request for prejudgment interest is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Ulmer, supra; Monarch Mills, supra. For this reason, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

. Turner Coleman, Inc. v. Ohio Const. & Eng’g Inc., 272 S.C. 289, 251 S.E.2d 738 (1979).

. This is an appeal from an administrative proceeding involving a contract dispute. Whether a party to a tort action against the State could recover prejudgment interest under § 34-31-20 is a question best left for another day. Compare Varn v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 311 S.C. 349, 428 S.E.2d 895 (Ct.App.1993) (costs available against State in tort action even though Tort Claims Act does not specifically.provide for award since Act provides State agencies are liable in tort in same manner and to same extent as private individual).