Court Opinion

ID: 9544004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:16.786844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:44.665902
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT
specially concurring in the result:
I agree with the majority’s definition of “emergency as an exigency or an unforeseen combination of circumstances that call for immediate action.” Maj. op. at 275. I also agree that it would be unfair not to give the parties the opportunity to “present relevant evidence and argue how the newly delineated definition applies to [the] evidence.” Maj. op. at 276. Moreover, I agree that because “the trial court ... did not conduct an evi-dentiary hearing before deciding the case,” maj. op. at 276, we must remand this matter to the trial court. I write separately, however, because I do not join in part II B of the majority’s opinion.
In part II B, the majority concludes that pretrial motions under section 24-10-108, 10A C.R.S. (1988), should be treated in the same fashion as motions to dismiss for failure to meet the notice requirements under section 24-10-109, 10A C.R.S. (1988). The majority does so despite noting “some dififer*278ence in language,” maj. op. at 276 (emphasis added), including specific language in section 24-10-109, i.e. “jurisdictional prerequisite,” not present in section 24-10-108. Because I believe it is a difference worthy of distinction and that section 24-10-108 only mandates the use of pretrial motions, I do not join in part II B of the majority opinion. I nonetheless concur in the judgment because in my view this matter must be remanded for further proceedings and application of the correct standard.
I
In 1971 we abrogated the doctrine of sovereign and governmental immunity as unjust and inequitable. § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988) (“The General Assembly also recognizes that the supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity....”); Bertrand v. Board of County Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223, 226 (Colo.1994) (citing Evans v. Board of County Comm’rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Flournoy v. School Dist., 174 Colo. 110, 482 P.2d 966 (1971); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971)). As a consequence, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is now recognized “only to such extent as may be provided by statute.” § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988).
The General Assembly created immunity for public entities through section 24-10-106. In Bertrand, we held that “the immunity created by the GIA is in derogation of the common law.” Bertrand, 872 P.2d at 227. As a consequence, we held the provisions creating immunity under our GIA “must be strictly construed.” Id. (citing Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992) (statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed)). Such construction of the GIA is consistent with our precedent.
Our decisions have “fundamentally altered the common law of Colorado regarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Bertrand, 872 P.2d at 226. In Colorado, unlike other jurisdictions, the GIA creates immunity from suit. In other jurisdictions and under federal law, the sovereign “consent[s] to be sued.” 4 Thus, it is accurate in those jurisdictions to conclude that “the terms of [the sovereign’s] consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain that suit.” Maj. op. at 276 (citing United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) and cases referred to therein). However, our GIA does not grant the “consent to be sued,” rather it creates “a bar” to suit. Importantly here, I believe the bar to suit is not created by section 24-10-108 but exists by the force of section 24-10-106.
Such structural differences, I conclude, are not insignificant. Moreover, it is these very differences that caution against an automatic transfer of legal doctrines or practices applicable to other jurisdictions. For example, I do not believe United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) is appropriate authority for the proposition cited by the majority under our GIA. In Dalm, the Supreme Court upheld a Tax Court ruling dismissing the claims of a tax*279payer because her claims were filed after “the statute of limitations [had] long since ... run.” Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. at 1363. The Court concluded that “[f]or the District Court to have jurisdiction over her suit for refund, Dalm was required to file a claim for refund of the tax within” the applicable limitations period. Id. at 609, 110 S.Ct. at 1368-69. Because Dalm “failed to comply with the statutory requirements,” id. at 609-10, 110 S.Ct. at 1369, the Court concluded she had failed to meet the terms of the United States’ “consent to be sued.” Thus, Dalm’s claims were outside the tax court’s “jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. at 608, 110 S.Ct. at 1368. However, the Court continued, stating that Dalm’s substantive claims for a tax refund under the doctrine of equitable recoupment may still be meritorious:
Our holding today does not leave taxpayers in Dalm’s position powerless to invoke the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Both the Secretary, at the administrative level, ... and a court which has jurisdiction over a timely suit for refund may consider an equitable recoupment claim for an earlier tax paid under an inconsistent theory on the same transaction.
Id. at 610, 110 S.Ct. at 1369. Hence, even under federal immunity law, the Court in Dalm did not determine that because the tax court was without jurisdiction the substantive merits of Dalm’s case was lacking. I do not question the accuracy of the language cited, but I do not agree that it is applicable here.
Our district courts, courts of general jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to hear claims brought as common law claims against the state, except those expressly barred by the GIA. In contrast, the limited jurisdiction of federal trial courts exists only as a consequence of federal statute or constitution. See E.J.R. v. District Court, 892 P.2d 222, - (Colo.1995) (noting the distinction between our state district courts, courts of general jurisdiction, and lower federal courts which are all of limited jurisdiction). This distinction, coupled with our unique common law regarding sovereign immunity, makes me less ready than the majority to adopt federal precedent as the appropriate guide to resolution of our unique sovereign immunity law.
II
Section 24-10-108, 10A C.R.S. (1988) of the GIA provides:
Except as provided in sections 24-10-104 to 24-10-106, sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant. If a public entity raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or immediately after the commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery, except any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity, and shall decide such issue on motion.
By its language, that section acknowledges in its first sentence that the legislative bar to suit is found in section 24-10-106.5 The second sentence, which is at issue before us, directs trial courts to acknowledge the immunity existing as a consequence of section 24-10-106 by deciding “the issue of sovereign immunity” on pretrial motion, if raised prior to or immediately after the commencement of discovery.6
Assuming, as does the majority, that under our rules of statutory construction we look “first at the language of the statute,” maj. op. at 274, and “must give statutory terminology its commonly accepted meaning,” id., I come *280to a different result. I find in the language of sections 24-10-108 and 24-10-109 more than a distinction without a difference. While I agree with the majority’s interpretation that section 24-10-108 requires a “trial court to hear and decide a claim of sovereign immunity ... if [ ] raised before trial,” maj. op. at 276, I conclude it merely directs trial courts to address, “on motion,” the issue of whether sovereign immunity is a bar to plaintiffs claims, leaving the method of doing so to the trial courts under our rules of procedure.
Ill
In Trinity Broadcasting of Denver v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo.1993), we held that Rule 12(b)(1) applies to motions to dismiss for failure to meet the jurisdictional notice requirement of the GIA. Relying on Trinity, the court of appeals held that “the proper procedure for determining a public entity’s sovereign immunity is C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), not C.R.C.P. 56.” Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525, 527 (Colo.App.1993). The majority affirms the court of appeals’ holding that “[wjhether a claim falls within an exception to the GIA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and, if raised before trial, it appropriately is addressed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).” Maj. op. at 277. Unlike the majority, however, I would not limit consideration of pretrial motions to Rule 12(b)(1).
In Trinity, a private corporation, Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, complained that the City of Westminster had allowed water to leak from its water tanks or water mains and that as a result Trinity experienced some damage to its building’s foundation. At issue was whether Trinity had met the notice requirement set forth in section 24^10-109(1), 10A C.R.S. (1988), of the GIA, which provides in relevant part:
Any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity or by an employee thereof while in the course of such employment ... shall file a written notice as provided in this section within one hundred eighty days after the date of the discovery of the injury, regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a claim or of a cause of action for such injury. Compliance with the provisions of this section shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action brought under the provisions of this article, and failure of compliance shall forever bar any such action.
(Emphasis added.) We stated in Trinity that “the legislature characterized the notice requirement in section 24-10-109 of the Governmental Immunity Act as a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924 (emphasis added). That is, if proper notice was not given, the court would have no jurisdiction over the matter. We then noted that a sovereign cannot be forced to trial without that jurisdictional prerequisite having been met. Id. No such “jurisdictional prerequisite” characterization appears in section 24-10-108.
Ultimately in Trinity, we held that because notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite, the trial court should treat notice matters as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).7 From that holding, the court of appeals in this case concluded that all motions to dismiss under the GIA should be treated as Rule 12(b)(1) motions; and the majority affirms. I disagree. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is appropriate to determine whether a court lacks “jurisdiction over the subject matter.” I do not believe Trinity should be read to stand for the proposition that Rule 12(b)(1) must be applied to substantive elements of a governmental immunity claim.8
*281Such a holding under section 24-10-108 would be contrary, in my view, to both the plain language of that section and our sovereign immunity jurisprudence, including our unique common law and the GIA. Because the “bar to suit” under our GIA necessarily requires a determination of immunity that is intertwined with the merits of the case, I believe a plaintiff is entitled to a full and fair hearing on the merits of his claim, a hearing that is not always guaranteed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). I agree that prior to dismissal, plaintiffs should be provided with a full and fair hearing, however, contrary to the majority, I would leave the type of pretrial motion utilized to the parties and the discretion of the trial court.9
IV
Because the determination as to whether a bar to Fogg’s claim may exist under the GIA is so “intertwined with the merits” of his claim, I agree that the trial court’s reliance upon C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss was in error. Accordingly, because I too would reverse and remand, I concur only in the result.

. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988); Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994) (state may lay its sovereign immunity aside and consent to be sued); Smith v. Phillips, 451 S.E.2d 309 (N.C.Ct.App.1994) (absent waiver of consent, sovereign immunity provides state, counties and public officials absolute and unqualified immunity from suits against them in their official capacities); Erickson Oil Products v. Wisconsin, 184 Wis.2d 36, 516 N.W.2d 755 (App.1994) (state’s consent to be sued, waiving sovereign immunity, must be clearly and expressly stated); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 437 S.E.2d 290 (1993) (state may not be sued without its consent under doctrine of sovereign immunity); Norgeot v. South Dakota, 334 N.W.2d 501, 502 (S.D.1993) (“[L]egislative action is the only means by which the doctrine of sovereign immunity can be waived.”); Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Vermont, 159 Vt. 481, 622 A.2d 495 (1993) (lawsuits against state for acts essentially governmental in nature are barred unless state waives its sovereign immunity and consents to be sued); Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Director of Revenue, 796 S.W.2d 883 (Mo.1990) (state is entitled to invoke sovereign immunity unless it expressly consents not to do so); Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 68 Haw. 192, 708 P.2d 129 (1985) (sovereign immunity precludes any suit against the state without the state's express consent); Patterson v. Wilson, 34 Pa.Cmwlth. 58, 382 A.2d 1000, 1001 (1978) (“Commonwealth enjoys absolute sovereign immunity absent legislative consent....”).

. Also, although not before us today, I believe § 24-10-108 is unclear as to when a motion to dismiss on the "issue of sovereign immunity” can no longer be asserted to "suspend discovery” and to require the trial court to "decide such issue on motion.” I am unclear whether the term "immediately after” means the day after, within a week of, or some other undesignated period after “the commencement of discovery." When compared to § 24-10-109 and its more definite and clear language denying jurisdiction for insufficient notice under § 24-10-109, i.e., that notice must be given "within one hundred eighty days after the date of the discovery of the injury,” I conclude the General Assembly intended to create a jurisdictional prerequisite in § 24-10-109 but did not so clearly act under § 24-10-108.

. Rule 12(b)(1) of our rules of civil procedure provides:
“(b) ... [T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter....”

. Since our Rule 12(b)(1) is identical to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and our Rule 12(b)(5) is identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we may turn, as we did in Trinity, to federal authorities for guidance in construing the Colorado rules. Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924. In Trinity, we cited to a line of federal authority which states that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be denied if the jurisdictional issue is "intertwined with the merits of the case.” See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 685 (10th Cir.1993); Cizek v. United States, 953 F.2d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir.1992); See gener*281ally 2A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07[2.-2] at 12-60 (2d ed. 1992).

. My reading of §§ 24-10-108 and 24-10-109 does not limit pretrial motions to Rule 12(b)(1); our rules of procedure also contemplate other pretrial motions, including 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim motion for summary judgment and dismissal under C.R.C.P. 56.