Court Opinion

ID: 9387928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:02:41.188909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.268061
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 230
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION II
                                        No. CV-22-788

                                                 Opinion Delivered April   19, 2023
JEANETTE MACIAS

                                APPELLANT        APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN
                                                 COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V.                                               NORTHERN DISTRICT
                                                 [NO. 42PJV-21-39]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD
                                                 HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN,
                                 APPELLEES       JUDGE

                                                 AFFIRMED

                                    RITA W. GRUBER

        Jeanette Macias appeals the order of the Logan County Circuit Court terminating her

 parental rights to her daughter (MC), born December 5, 2021. On appeal, Macias contends

 that the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to present sufficient proof

 that termination was in MC’s best interest. Because the specific issues raised by Macias on

 appeal are not preserved, we affirm.

                                I. Facts and Procedural History

        On December 6, 2021, a protective-services case was opened regarding MC pursuant

 to Garrett’s Law because Macias had tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine,

 THC, and benzodiazepine at MC’s birth. On December 8, DHS took custody of MC

 pursuant to a seventy-two-hour hold, when a hospital nurse reported that Macias had
attempted to suffocate MC while alone with her in her hospital room. DHS filed a petition

for emergency custody and dependency-neglect on December 13, alleging that MC was

dependent-neglected due to inadequate supervision, neglect, and parental unfitness. Michael

Parham was identified as MC’s putative father.1 An affidavit of family service worker Marla

Nelson (FSW Nelson) supported the petition. The affidavit identified a maternal

grandmother, Sarah Nehus, as a relative, and set out that DHS had the following history

with Macias. In September 2016, there was an unsubstantiated allegation of abuse for

striking a child six or under. A protective-services case was also opened in September 2016

due to the threat of harm involving two of Macias’s children, and a foster-care case was

opened regarding those same two children in October 2017, both of whom were

subsequently placed in the permanent custody of their paternal grandmother. In November

2020, a protective-services case was opened pursuant to Garrett’s Law with respect to a third

child of Macias, who was subsequently placed in the legal custody of that child’s paternal

grandmother.

       The circuit court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody December 13,

2021, finding that MC should continue in the custody of DHS. The court held a probable-

cause hearing on December 15 and 17, at which Macias and Parham were present. An order

was entered on January 7, 2022, finding that probable cause continued to exist for the

emergency order to remain in place and ordering supervised visitation as well as numerous

       1
           Parham is not a party to this appeal.

                                                   2
services, including a drug-and-alcohol assessment for Macias. Parham was ordered to submit

to genetic testing to determine if he is MC’s father.

       On February 2, the court held an adjudication hearing via Zoom. Macias appeared

from the Logan County jail due to her incarceration there. Parham was also present. On

February 7, the circuit court entered an order adjudicating MC dependent-neglected based

on parental unfitness due to Macias’s drug use, to which she stipulated. The circuit court set

a goal of reunification and found that DHS had made reasonable efforts. Macias was ordered

to complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment, parenting classes, and a psychological evaluation

upon her release from jail. She was also ordered to obtain and maintain appropriate housing,

income sufficient to support the family, and reliable transportation. Regarding Parham, the

order set out that the genetic test results were pending, but he would be permitted supervised

visitation with MC; if Parham was found to be MC’s father, he would be a nonoffending

parent; and his services would otherwise be identical to Macias’s.

       On May 18, a review hearing was held. Parham was present. Macias was not. On June

8, a review order was entered finding Macias to be “totally noncompliant with the case plan

and orders of the court,” because she had not completed any parenting classes or attended

any of her appointments for the outpatient classes. Although dates to visit MC were set up,

Macias did not attend them or respond to DHS’s efforts to contact her; she had tested

positive for multiple drugs during the pendency of the case and refused to take drug screens

on two separate occasions; and she had been arrested five times since the case was opened.

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       The circuit court found that Parham is MC’s parent and that he had complied with

the case plan. Parham was ordered to submit to a ninety-day hair-follicle test. The court also

found that DHS had made reasonable efforts. The court concluded that MC should remain

in the custody of DHS because Macias was unfit, and MC’s health, safety, and welfare could

not be protected if she were to be returned to her “parents.” The court further concluded

that continuation in DHS custody was in MC’s best interest, necessary to protect her health

and safety, and was the least restrictive alternative. The order continued the goal of

reunification with respect to Parham and gave DHS discretion for a trial home placement

with him. The court further ordered that DHS was permitted to pursue termination with

respect to Macias. A simultaneous review hearing and termination hearing was set for

September 7.

       DHS filed a petition to terminate Macias’s rights only on June 23 and sought

authority to consent to adoption and permanent alternate placement of MC. DHS alleged

two statutory grounds for termination: subsequent factors under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) (Supp. 2021) and aggravated circumstances under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-

27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a). In support of the subsequent-factors ground, DHS cited the incident

that led to DHS taking custody of MC; Macias’s previous history with DHS; the findings of

the court at the review hearing; Macias’s failure to make any progress in the instant case or

any prior case despite the provision of numerous services throughout the instant case as well

as the previous cases; and her two arrests since the May review hearing and her current

incarceration. In support of the aggravated-circumstances ground, DHS pled that, given

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Macias’s total noncompliance with services and court orders, as well as her current

incarceration, there was little likelihood that the continuation of services would result in

successful reunification. The petition alleged that termination was in MC’s best interest.

       On September 7, a termination hearing was held regarding Macias, and a review

hearing was held regarding Parham. Macias was present and represented by counsel, as was

Parham. Also present were DHS counsel, MC’s attorney ad litem MC’s paternal

grandmother, MC’s foster parents, DCFS supervisor Pamela Feemster, and the primary

caseworker, Brandy Ezell. A court report reflecting that Macias had not had stable housing,

income, or transportation, and the previous court orders were entered into evidence.

       Ezell testified as follows. She relayed the circumstances under which MC came to be

in DHS custody. DHS had offered services to Macias, and she had completed “The Clock is

Ticking” video and may have completed her drug-and-alcohol assessment, but she did not

complete the recommended outpatient treatment or any other services. Macias tested

positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, THC, and “benzos” on December 17 and

28, 2021, and April 7, 2022, and she refused or could not produce a sample on January 3,

April 20, and May 27, 2022. Macias would set up visits and then not show or respond to

DHS’s attempts to contact her, and she had not seen MC since she was taken into DHS

custody. Macias had been charged with multiple crimes since the case was filed, had been

incarcerated all but approximately two months since the case was opened, and was currently

incarcerated and unable to make bond.

                                              5
       Ezell testified further that she had worked with Macias in the past regarding her other

children, none of whom were in Macias’s custody, and DHS has never had a case with Macias

that resulted in a successful reunification. Macias had not complied, and it was in MC’s best

interest that Macias’s rights be terminated because she had shown no progress toward

reunification, and continuing services would be futile. Macias lacked housing, and at one

point she was staying with a friend, but that place would not be appropriate for MC because

Ezell saw drugs in the ashtrays when she visited there. Macias’s continued drug use would be

a safety risk to MC and indicated potential future harm.

       Regarding Parham, Ezell testified that DHS was not asking for his rights to be

terminated. He was offered services and was complying with the case plan and court orders.

Parham has had four unsupervised overnight visits; they just started weekend visits, all of

which have been going well. Parham’s last hair-follicle test was negative for all drugs. The

plan was to continue reunification services with Parham, have weekend visitation for the

next three weekends, and if those went well, transition to a trial home placement. Parham is

married to a woman named Sarah, and there were no issues with her.

       At this point, DHS was not trying to place MC for adoption, because DHS was still

working with Parham. However, if adoption became the goal, there would be no barriers to

MC being adopted. DHS recommended continuing current services with Parham and

terminating Macias’s rights.

       At the conclusion of Ezell’s testimony, Macias moved to dismiss the petition, arguing

that because DHS was not asking for MC to be adopted, it had not met its burden regarding

                                              6
best interest. DHS responded that the court could still find that it was in MC’s best interest

to terminate because the statute merely required that the court consider the adoptability

factor. Parham argued that his wife was willing, able, and intent on adopting MC later in the

process. The court recognized that it had heard testimony that there was no barrier to MC

being adopted and denied the motion. The court then received the ad litem’s

recommendation, which was termination of Macias’s rights. The court recognized that it was

somewhat unusual to terminate, given that the case was not yet a year old, but stated that

the case had been open almost nine months, and Macias had not made any attempts at

visitation with MC and had made “absolutely no progress.”

       On September 16, the order terminating Macias’s rights was entered. The circuit

court found by clear and convincing evidence that DHS had proved statutory grounds

pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a), subsequent factors; and Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a), aggravated circumstances. In support of the subsequent-

factors ground, the court cited Macias’s noncompliance with the case plan and court orders;

drug use; frequent and nearly continual incarceration; complete failure to attend visitation

with MC; failure to maintain housing, employment, and transportation; and her prior

history with DHS. The court concluded that, in light of that, as well as Macias’s incapacity

or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the circumstances

that prevented placement of MC in her custody, continuing to provide services to Macias

would not likely result in a successful reunification. In support of the aggravated-

circumstances ground, the court cited Macias’s failure to comply with the services or orders

                                              7
of the court and her failure to make any progress toward reunification, her previous and

current incarceration, and her history with DHS. The court concluded that her actions

clearly demonstrated little likelihood that services to the family would result in a successful

reunification. The court then found that the evidence proved that termination was in MC’s

best interest. In doing so, it found that although adoption was not the current plan in the

case due to the ongoing case with Parham, there were no barriers to adoption. The court

further found that returning MC to Macias’s custody would subject her to potential harm,

given that MC was nine months old, and Macias had not seen her since her birth; Macias’s

repeated criminal and drug issues in this case; her frequent and almost continual

incarceration; and her total noncompliance and failure to progress. Regarding Parham, the

court ordered that the permanency plan shall be reunification with him, given that he has

complied with the case plan and orders of the case, having done everything that has been

asked of him. The court also found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to finalize MC’s

permanency plan and had made reasonable and meaningful efforts to provide appropriate

family services. This timely appeal followed.

                           II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of a parent’s

natural rights. Bentley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 374, at 5, 554 S.W.3d 285,

289. However, the intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide

permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home

because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home

                                                8
cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3); Lyall v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 81, at 15,

661 S.W.3d 240, 250. As such, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or

destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Bentley, 2018 Ark. App. 374, at 5, 554

S.W.3d at 289.

       To terminate parental rights, DHS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that

a minimum of one statutory ground exists, and it is in the child’s best interest to do so. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341. Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will

produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction of the allegation sought to be established.

Bentley, 2018 Ark. App. 374, at 4–5, 554 S.W.3d at 289. In finding that termination is in

the best interest of the child, the circuit court is required to consider the likelihood that the

child will be adopted if the petition is granted and the potential harm to the health and

safety of the child that might result from returning the child to the parent’s custody. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). It is the overall evidence—not proof of each factor—that must

demonstrate that termination is in the child’s best interest. Cole v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2020 Ark. App. 481, at 9, 611 S.W.3d 218, 223. This court has held that other factors to be

considered in making a best-interest finding may include preserving a child’s relationship

with a grandparent; the cessation of child support from a parent; if less drastic measures,

such as a no-contact order or supervised visitation, may be used; if continued parental contact

would be beneficial to the children if or when they are living with a relative and not in an

                                               9
indeterminate state that is working against them; and whether the children are living in

continued uncertainty. Id. at 11, 611 S.W.3d at 224.

       The court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively

identify a potential harm. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, at 12, 314

S.W.3d 722, 728. The potential-harm evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking manner

and considered in broad terms. Samuels v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 527, at

5, 443 S.W.3d 599, 502. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior

and may be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm should the child be returned to

the parent’s care and custody. Shawkey v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 2, at 6,

510 S.W.3d 803, 807. Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue

is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Lyall,

2023 Ark. App. 81, at 15, 661 S.W.3d at 250. Moreover, a child’s need for permanency and

stability may override a parent’s request for additional time to improve the parent’s

circumstances. Id.

       Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(c)(2)(A) provides that “[t]ermination of

the relationship between a juvenile and one parent shall not affect the relationship between

the juvenile and the other parent if those rights are legally established.” Moreover, “[a] court

may terminate the rights of one parent and not the other parent if the court finds that it is

in the best interest of the child.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(c)(2)(B).

       We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit

                                              10
court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly

erroneous. Shawkey, 2017 Ark. App. 2, at 5, 510 S.W.3d at 806. In resolving the clearly

erroneous question, we give due regard to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the

credibility of witnesses. Bentley, 2018 Ark. App. 374, at 5, 554 S.W.3d at 289.

                                        III. Discussion

       Macias’s stated point on appeal is that “DHS failed to present sufficient proof that

termination was in [MC’s] best interest when there was a lesser restrictive option to

termination.”2 Yet within her argument, she contends that the “question presented to this

Court is whether termination was in the juvenile’s best interest where the evidence

demonstrated that (1) [Macias] did not harm her child, and (2) [Macias] posed no danger to

the child.” She further argues that MC’s need for stability and permanency was never at risk

insomuch as Parham’s rights were not being terminated, and DHS was continuing to work

with him.

       Macias’s best-interest arguments on appeal are focused on a least restrictive alternative

and whether she harmed or posed a danger to MC. However, Macias did not make those

arguments to the circuit court. The failure to raise a challenge or obtain a ruling below is

fatal to the appellate court’s consideration of an issue on appeal. Lamontagne v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. 190, 366 S.W.3d 351; Burkhalter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010

       2
       Macias does not challenge the circuit court’s finding of statutory grounds for
termination; therefore, any such challenge is waived. Scott v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021
Ark. App. 200, at 3, 624 S.W.3d 697, 699.

                                              11
Ark. App. 520, at 4. The parent, as appellant, has the burden of bringing a record before

this court sufficient to decide the issue presented. See Burkhalter, supra. Even in termination

cases, this court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Tuck v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 468, at 7, 442 S.W.3d 20, 24. Macias has never challenged

any of the circuit court’s prior reasonable-efforts findings, its prior finding that continuation

in DHS custody was the least restrictive alternative, or the change of goal to termination of

her rights coinciding with the continued goal of reunification with Parham. Moreover, at the

termination hearing, the only argument Macias made was that DHS had not carried its

burden of proof with respect to adoptability. Thus, the arguments advanced by Macias on

appeal are not preserved for this court’s review. As such, we affirm the circuit court’s

termination of her parental rights.3

       Affirmed.

       ABRAMSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

       K. Presley Turner, for appellant.

       3
         Assuming Macias had preserved her arguments, they would fail. There is ample
evidence that it was in MC’s best interest to terminate Macias’s parental rights, and the cases
she cites in support of her arguments are distinguishable, given that MC was still in the
custody of DHS at the time of termination and had been placed in a foster home; it remained
uncertain whether reunification with Parham would be achieved; there was no issue
regarding the preservation of some other familial relationship that flowed from her; and no
relatives had been approved for placement at the time of termination. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 457, at 7, 610 S.W.3d 688, 693 (citing Dominguez v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum, Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 2, 592 S.W.3d 723, for the proposition that where
relatives have not been approved for placement and the children remained in foster care, the
existence of potential relatives was not a basis to reverse a termination decision).

                                               12
       Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

       Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

                                           13