Court Opinion

ID: 9782820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:20:52.745395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:13.722060
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part with opinion.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly issued a gen*436eral injunction prohibiting the District from establishing or enforcing rules that do not further the purposes that are set forth in the statute. I also agree that the trial court correctly denied the Klosinskis’ request for an injunction regarding the septic inspection program. However, for reasons discussed below, I must part ways with my colleagues’ conclusion that the Klosinskis lacked standing to challenge the septic inspection program because they were not “aggrieved” parties in accordance with Indiana Code section 14-33-5-24.
This statute provides that “[a]n interested person adversely affected by an action committed or omitted by the board in violation of this chapter may petition the court having jurisdiction over the district to enjoin or mandate the board.” I.C. § 14-33-5-24. Because no case has specifically addressed the meaning of the terms “[a]n interested person adversely affected,” the majority cites the “aggrieved or adversely affected” language contained in the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) and concludes that the Klosinskis lack standing to bring their action. In short, the majority observes that the Klosinskis are not aggrieved parties because they have nothing more than a “generalized concern” and cannot point to a “specific harm to a pecuniary property, or personal interest.” Op. at 433. However, the record establishes that the Klo-sinskis own property in the District, they are subject to — and are affected by — the District’s rules and regulations, and they pay assessments or fees for the services that are provided by the District. Appellants’ App. p. 12.
In Schrenker v. Clifford, 270 Ind. 525, 529, 387 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ind.1979), our Supreme Court observed that “[Where] a valid Indiana statute was being violated, equity may enjoin such continued wrongful activity and the nonexistence of provable damages does not prevent the granting of an injunction”; see also Meyer v. Town of Boonville, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N.E. 146 (1904) (observing that a resident taxpayer has standing to enjoin illegal or wrongful acts).
The statute at issue here is the Conservancy Act, Indiana Code section 14-33-1-1 et seq., and the Klosinskis asserted that the District was violating the statute by exceeding its authority in several areas. As noted above, the Klosinskis were directly affected by the District’s rules and regulations, and they pay the fees for the District’s services. The aim of the Klo-sinskis was to seek an order compelling the District to follow the law and refrain from acting beyond its authority. Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I believe that the trial court properly determined that the Klosinskis were aggrieved parties and had standing to file their petition.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.