Court Opinion

ID: 9749989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:10:51.161761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:01.130411
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Chief Justice,
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the principal opinion, except the punitive damages award. In Chappell v. City of Spriitgfield, this Court set forth the general rule that “in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such recovery, punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable against a municipal corporation.” 423 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Mo.1968) (emphasis added). The Court explained that “[p]unitive damages, in this state as in others, are awarded for the purpose of inflicting punishment for wrongdoing, and as an example and deterrent to similar conduct,” but “the underlying justification and purpose of punitive damages ... is not applicable when applied to a municipal corporation.” Id. at 814.
One of the principal reasons advanced by the courts why punitive damages should not be recoverable against a municipality, in the absence of specific legislative authority, is that to permit such recovery would contravene public policy. The reasoning is that since punishment is the objective, the people who would bear the burden of the punishment — the tax paying citizens — are the same group who are supposed to benefit from the public example which the punishment makes of the wrongdoer.
*793Id. This analysis has also been set out by the United States Supreme Court. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (“[Pjunitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill”).
The majority has ruled that section 213.111.2 of the MHRA, which provides “actual and punitive damages” are available against an employer, should be read along with section 213.010(7) that defines an “employer” to include a municipality. By combining the language of these two sections, the majority finds that the MHRA authorizes punitive damages against municipalities.
I disagree. The presumption is that punitive damages are not available against municipalities unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. The combination of the statutory definition of an employer and the separate statutory section allowing a court to award damages, including punitive damages, to a prevailing party, does not equate to the specificity necessary to overcome this longstanding and well-reasoned presumption.
This is precisely the rationale set out by the Eighth Circuit in Kline v. City of Kansas City, holding that the MHRA did not overcome the presumption against awarding punitive damages against municipal defendants. 175 F.3d 660, 670 (8th Cir.1999).
[T]he MHRA is a voluminous statute with many provisions and definitions. We believe that a result cobbled together from different sections of the statute is insufficiently explicit under the Missouri cases to overcome the presumption against punitive damages when a municipality is a defendant that has been found liable.
Id. For a statute to specifically provide for the imposition of punitive damages against a municipality or other governmental entity it must do so clearly and expressly in a single section, uninterrupted by other statutory provisions.
I would reverse the judgment with respect to punitive damages.