Court Opinion

ID: 9399536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 16:01:12.52447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.324455
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             JUN 5 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MUDASAR ASGHAR,                                 No. 21-1290
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A203-681-527
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted April 21, 2023
                            Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and McMAHON, District
Judge.**

      Mudasar Asghar, a native and citizen of Pakistan, appeals from a Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s)

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (CAT). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

restate them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The Honorable Colleen McMahon, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
petition.

      1. “Taking the totality of the circumstances into account,” substantial

evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Kumar v.

Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). The agency’s determination

turns on implausible statements made at Asghar’s merits hearing and critical

inconsistencies pertaining to his protection claim. For example, Asghar claimed

he was unaware that he could obtain a visa to travel to the United States or enter

the country at a land-based port of entry. However, the petitioner has an

extended history of travel to multiple countries, including a months-long stay in

Russia, and has obtained visas to travel to such countries. The agency properly

deemed this statement, and others regarding Asghar’s ability to report his

assault to police, implausible.

      The agency also identified multiple inconsistencies between statements

made at Asghar’s credible fear interview and at his merits hearing. These

inconsistencies, regarding Asghar’s reasons for leaving Pakistan, his prolonged

stay in Russia, and his possible conversion to Shia Islam, are relevant to his

protection claim and were not explained in his testimony, and though Asghar

offered explanations for these inconsistencies at the hearing, the agency

“reasonably reject[ed]” them or properly deemed them implausible.

Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022). For example, at

his credible fear interview, Asghar claimed that he never considered leaving

Pakistan before he was assaulted in June 2019. Yet at his merits hearing,

                                        2                                    21-1290
Asghar admitted to meeting in May with his travel agent, who “explain[ed] the

possibility” of Asghar departing Pakistan for the United States.” This

inconsistency relates directly to Asghar’s motivation for fleeing Pakistan and

Asghar failed to adequately explain it in the hearing.

      Similarly, Asghar provided contradictory testimony about whether he

converted to Shia Islam before leaving Pakistan. At his credible fear interview,

Asghar stated that both he and his wife, Fatima Nadeem, were persecuted for

“changing our sect from Sunni and Shia to Ahle-Tashi,” the latter of which is

synonymous with Shia Islam. Yet, at his merits hearing, Asghar confirmed that

he “did not become Shiite,” though neighbors may have suspected that he

converted. The agency properly relied on these and other inconsistencies in

making its adverse credibility determination.

      Finally, the agency’s demeanor finding “specifically and cogently”

referenced hearing testimony in which the petitioner appeared to grow agitated

and combative. Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2003).

The agency noted Asghar’s “audibly agitated demeanor” when responding to

questioning by government counsel. The trial transcript reflects multiple

confrontations between Asghar and government counsel during cross

examination that support the agency’s conclusion. For example, responding to

the government attorney’s presentation of social media posts suggesting that

Asghar may have made misleading statements about his visits to Russia, Asghar

appears to grow increasingly frustrated.

                                           3                                21-1290
      Under the “extremely deferential” substantial evidence standard, Farah v.

Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003), we are not “compelled to

conclude” that the agency erred in its adverse credibility determination.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      2. Asghar was not prejudiced by incompetent translation at his merits

hearing in violation of his due process rights. While “[i]t is long-settled that a

competent translation is fundamental to a full and fair hearing,” Perez-Lastor v.

INS., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000), to establish a due process violation

based on incompetent translation, a petitioner must (1) provide evidence of

mistranslation and (2) establish prejudice by demonstrating “that a better

translation would have made a difference in the outcome of the hearing.”

Acewicz v. INS., 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Tejeda-Mata v.

INS, 626 F.2d 721, 727 (9th Cir. 1980)).

      3. Here, the trial transcript contains some evidence of mistranslation,

including “direct evidence of incorrectly translated words, unresponsive

answers by the witness, and the witness’ [sic] expression of difficulty

understanding what is said to him.” Siong v. INS., 376 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2004). However, most of these errors were corrected through further

questioning or requests for clarification. See Kotasz v. INS., 31 F.3d 847, 850

n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that translation errors may be “rectified” through

“[c]larification or repetition” at a petitioner’s hearing).

      Ultimately, Asghar was not prejudiced by instances of incompetent

                                          4                                   21-1290
translation that remained unclarified. “When the BIA bases its denial of an

asylum claim on an adverse credibility finding, as it did here, evidence that the

translation caused the BIA to disbelieve the petitioner’s testimony is sufficient

to show prejudice.” Perez-Lastor, 208 F.3d at 780 n.8. Here, the unclarified

translation errors were relatively minor and did not outweigh the substantial

evidence supporting the agency’s adverse credibility finding. As such, Asghar

has not provided sufficient evidence that translation errors caused the agency to

disbelieve his testimony, in light of voluminous, properly translated testimony

supporting the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

      4. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Asghar

failed to carry his burden of proof, independent of his testimony, on his asylum,

withholding, and CAT claims. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th

824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[F]actual findings underlying the BIA’s

determination that a petitioner is not eligible for asylum, withholding of

removal, or CAT relief” are reviewed for “substantial evidence.”). The agency

properly observed that the country conditions evidence in this case is mixed,

and Asghar offers no further evidence in support of his protection claims.

Asghar instead argues that the agency’s cursory treatment of such evidence

warrants remand, analogizing his case to Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136 (9th

Cir. 2020), in which we remanded to the BIA based on its “selective[]” citation

to country conditions evidence. Id. at 1143.

                                        5                                    21-1290
      But here, the agency properly reviewed equivocal country conditions

evidence in the record. While the country conditions reports suggest that Shia

Muslims are targeted by the government and certain sectarian groups, the same

reports note that the Pakistani government has attempted to tamp down such

violence. Thus, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that “the

same evidence demonstrates that the Pakistani government protects Shias and

inter-sectarian couples from harm, and actively combats sectarian violence and

discrimination towards such groups.”

      Asghar offers no other arguments to contest the agency’s denial of

asylum, withholding, and CAT protection. Accordingly, the agency’s denial of

relief was proper.

PETITION DENIED.

                                       6                                   21-1290