Court Opinion

ID: 9363809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 18:07:14.312236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.350723
License: Public Domain

J-S32040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SHEILA ANN CARTER                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 680 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2020
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-54-CR-0000932-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED: JANUARY 17, 2023

         Sheila Ann Carter appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, following her convictions of

firearm and drug offenses. Carter’s counsel, Michael J. Fiorillo, Esquire, has

filed an application to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying Anders1

brief.    Upon review, we affirm Carter’s judgment of sentence and grant

Attorney Fiorillo’s application to withdraw.

         On May 1, 2019, police executed a search warrant at Carter’s primary

residence located at 1216 West Norwegian Street, Pottsville. Carter lives at

that location, an apartment, with Steven Davis. N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at

38-39, 42. The building is a three-story structure, with Carter’s apartment on
____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J-S32040-22

the first floor.   Id.   The interior of the residence contained a dining/living

room, a bathroom, a kitchen, and two bedrooms. Id. at 39. As police entered

the home, they encountered Carter, William Walters, and Davis at the dining

table. Id. at 42; see also id. at 111-14, 121 (Walters testifying that he was

purchasing heroin from Carter as police entered).        Walters had contacted

Carter to purchase heroin, and, upon his arrival, he saw Carter pull heroin out

of her black purse. Id. at 118-21. Walters testified that he was holding his

money as police entered the home, and that he saw Carter throw the heroin.

Id. at 114. Police ordered everybody onto the floor and, as Walters complied,

the cash he was carrying scattered onto the floor of the room. Id. at 114,

118. Walters testified that, while Davis was present, he was not involved in

the transaction.2 Id. at 114. Walters also testified that he had been using

heroin earlier that morning. Id. at 119-20.

       The police searched the residence and found the following items3 in the

dining room: cash; a white substance later identified as fentanyl; needles;

and a series of tote bags.        Id. at 47-48, 52-56. The tote bags contained

multiple jars of marijuana, an Arizona Iced Tea can with a false bottom

containing more marijuana, various pills later identified as oxycodone, bags
____________________________________________

2 Walters was not charged in relation to the raid. Id. at 115. However, he
testified that he had a pending parole violation at the time of his testimony.
Id. Walters testified that he had not received a deal in exchange for his
testimony. Id. at 115-16 (Walters testifying he hoped for future leniency).

3 We note that most of these items were stipulated to by the parties. Id. at
124-136, 138-169. Due to the number of the items and the length of their
respective description, we do not recount it all.

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utilized in the packaging and sale of heroin and fentanyl, several digital scales,

a knotted bag containing methamphetamine, a resealable bag containing

methamphetamine, an orange pill later identified as amphetamine, and a

taser. Id. at 53-63, 127, 132. They also recovered a Polarms shotgun, a

Wolf .50 caliber inline muzzle-loader with scope, and shotgun shells. Id. at

63-66, 128.      Trooper Matthew Hoke also recovered a black purse, which

contained cash and a pink wallet with Carter’s ID card. Id. at 85-90. In one

of the bedrooms4 the police recovered an “owe sheet,”5 a Browning .270 rifle

with scope, and a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun. Id. at 51-52, 75-78, 128. In

the other bedroom, police did not recover any weapons, drugs, or

paraphernalia. Id. at 78-79.

       Cassandra O’Doherty, Carter’s daughter, testified that on April 30, 2019,

Carter had purchased half a pound of methamphetamine from her for

$3,000.00. Id. at 94-95. In the same transaction, O’Doherty fronted Carter

twenty-five grams of heroin, and Carter indicated that she planned to sell

some of the twenty-five grams and use the rest. Id. at 95-97. O’Doherty

also testified that, at the time of her testimony, she had 60 pending drug

charges and she had not received a deal from the Commonwealth in exchange
____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth contended that this room was Carter’s due to the
feminine clothing found in the room such as dresses, and the lack of male
clothing. Id. at 81-82.

5 At trial, Trooper Kurt E. Montz testified that drug dealers track their sales,
purchases, and debts through “owe sheets.” Id. at 51-52. Trooper Montz
also testified, on cross-examination, that he did not know who authored the
owe sheet. Id. at 68-70.

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for her cooperation in this case. Id. at 97-101 (O’Doherty stating she was

testifying so she would receive future leniency and confirming that she had

been released on bail).

       Troy Greenawald, qualified as an expert in narcotics packaging and

distribution, see id. at 184, testified that, in his expert opinion, Carter

possessed the various narcotics with the intent to distribute. See id. at 185-

94.   In particular, Greenawald explained that the presence of numerous

firearms, and the high quantity of drugs, packaging materials, scales, and

other paraphernalia, were all indicative of drug dealing.      Id.   Greenawald

estimated that the total wholesale value6 of the drugs was $8,000.00, and the

total retail value7 of the drugs was $22,000.00.      Id. at 189.    Greenawald

testified that the police recovered approximately 670 to 1,300 individual doses

of heroin and fentanyl with an estimated wholesale value of $1,300.00 and a

retail value of $3,900.00.        With respect to the methamphetamine, police

recovered approximately 2,700 to 3,600 individual doses, with an estimated

wholesale value of $5,000.008 and a retail value of $21,000.00. Id. With
____________________________________________

6 Greenawald testified that “wholesale value” refers to the value of the drugs
sold in large quantities, typically from a larger dealer to a smaller dealer down
the chain, but not to specific end-users. Id. Greenawald explained that
“wholesale value” is often discounted. Id.

7Greenawald testified that “retail value” refers to the “street” value, typically
when a drug is sold from a small-time dealer to a user. Id.

8 Greenawald did not specifically testify to this number. Rather he testified
that police recovered approximately 217 grams, each costing approximately
$23.

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respect to the marijuana, police recovered approximately 200 individual doses

of marijuana. Id. at 190-91. Greenawald did not estimate the marijuana’s

value, due to the value of marijuana being based upon its potency. Id.

     Carter testified in her own defense. Id. at 202-36. Carter admitted to

being a drug addict and user. Id. She also admitted to owning the tote bags,

the marijuana contained in the mason jar, and at least some of the heroin,

fentanyl, and methamphetamine; however, she stated it was all for her own

personal use. See id. at 47-48, 127, 132 (description of items contained in

tote bags); see also id. at 206-09, 211-17, 227-30 (Carter testifying she

owned tote bags and various items). Carter testified that Walters was selling

drugs to her. Id. at 211-13, 233-35. Carter stated that it was common for

people to come visit her residence and do drugs with her. Id. Additionally,

Carter testified that she no longer lived at the apartment regularly because

the landlord had shut off the water and, at some time in 2018, Carter had left

the apartment and began living in several different places including with a

friend, in Carter’s car, or with Carter’s daughter, Megan Truscott. Id. Carter

admitted owning the clothing found in the rear bedroom of the West

Norwegian Street apartment. Id. at 223. Carter also testified that she did

not know any of the guns were in the residence, but she admitted to owning

the taser. Id. at 216-17, 230-33.

                                    -5-
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        On February 12, 2020, Carter proceeded to a jury trial, after which she

was convicted of two counts of person not to possess a firearm,9 four counts

of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID), 10 seven

counts of possession of a controlled substance,11 one count of possession of

drug paraphernalia,12 and one count of possession of a prohibited offensive

weapon.13       The trial court ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence

investigation report (PSI) and deferred sentencing. On March 30, 2020, the

trial court sentenced Carter to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years in prison.

        On May 28, 2020, Carter sent a letter to the trial court in which she

stated that she desired to file a direct appeal.    Ultimately, the trial court

considered this letter to be a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, and appointed PCRA counsel. After

PCRA proceedings, the court denied relief and Carter appealed to this Court.

This Court determined that Carter had been deprived of her direct appeal

rights and remanded the matter to the trial court to reinstate Carter’s direct

appeal rights nunc pro tunc. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 273 A.3d 1076

(Pa. Super. 2022) (Table).

____________________________________________

9   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

10   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

11   Id. at § (a)(16).

12   Id. at § (a)(32).

13   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a).

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       Upon remand, the trial court appointed Attorney Fiorillo to represent

Carter on direct appeal. Carter subsequently filed a nunc pro tunc notice of

appeal.    The trial court ordered Carter to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and, in response, Attorney

Fiorillo filed an Anders brief.14              See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).   Counsel

subsequently filed, with this Court, an application to withdraw as counsel, and

a brief pursuant to Anders. Carter filed a pro se application for substitute

counsel, in which she requested that this Court appoint alternative counsel to

represent her on appeal. This Court denied Carter’s application as, pursuant

to Anders and its progeny, she is required to either file a pro se response or

hire alternative counsel. See Order, 11/3/22, at 1. Subsequent to our order,

Carter filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief.

       When counsel files an Anders brief, and the appellant files a pro se or

counseled response, this Court will first determine whether counsel has

complied with the dictates of Anders and Santiago. See Commonwealth

v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 2015) (outlining proper procedure

where counsel files Anders brief and appellant files pro se response).          If

counsel has complied with the dictates of Anders and Santiago, we will

address the issues raised in the Anders brief and conduct our independent
____________________________________________

14 We observe that the Anders brief filed in the trial court is identical to the
one Attorney Fiorillo filed with this Court. Additionally, we note that counsel
is not required to file an Anders brief with the trial court, rather counsel
should file a statement of intent to file Anders. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
Nevertheless, Attorney Fiorillo’s Anders brief conveys that intent, and we
proceed to the Santiago technical requirements and issues contained within.

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examination of the record as to those issues. See id. Finally, if we determine

those issues to be without merit, we next examine the appellant’s pro se

allegations. See id. In doing so, “[this] Court is limited to examining only

those issues raised and developed in the brief[; w]e do not act as, and are

forbidden from acting as, appellant’s counsel.” Id.

      Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous

and wishes to withdraw from representation, counsel must:

      (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
      making a conscientious examination of the record and
      interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal
      would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the
      record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to
      defendant and advise [her] of [her] right to retain new counsel or
      to raise any additional points that [s]he deems worthy of the
      court’s attention. The determination of whether the appeal is
      wholly frivolous remains with the court.

Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

      Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a

proper Anders brief must:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

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      After determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements

of Anders and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of

the record to ascertain if there appears on its face to be arguably meritorious

issues   that   counsel,   intentionally   or   not,   missed   or   misstated.”

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Instantly, our review of counsel’s Anders brief and application to

withdraw reveals that counsel has substantially complied with the technical

requirements of Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287,

1290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (counsel must substantially comply with requirements

of Anders). We note that counsel frames the issues in terms of whether they

have arguable merit, and, in the factual summary, does not provide citations

to the record. However, in the argument section, counsel identifies potential

issues that could be raised, cites to the record where appropriate, and

concludes that the appeal is frivolous. Additionally, counsel indicates that he

has made a conscientious review of the record. The record further reveals

that counsel has furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Carter, advised Carter

of her right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se, or raise any additional

points that she deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Attorney Fiorillo has

substantially   complied   with   the   requirements    for   withdrawing   from

representation and, therefore, we will examine the record and make an

independent determination of whether Carter’s appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.

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      In the Anders brief, counsel first challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence. Anders Brief, at 11-15. In particular, counsel contends that the

Commonwealth failed to demonstrate Carter was in constructive or actual

possession of any of the illicit items. Id.

      When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

adhere to the following standard of review:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not [re-
      ]weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
      finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
      guilty may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
      weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability
      of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
      Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
      of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while
      passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
      evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

      § 6105. Persons not to possess, use manufacture, control,
      sell or transfer firearms

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         (a) Offense defined.--

            (1) A person who has been convicted of an offense
            enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
            Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence
            or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c)
            shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer[,] or
            manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use,
            control, sell, transfer[,] or manufacture a firearm in
            this Commonwealth.

                                     ***

         (c) Other persons.--In addition to any person who has
         been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b),
         the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of
         subsection (a):

                                     ***

            (2) A person who has been convicted of an offense
            under . . . The Controlled Substance Drug, Device, and
            Cosmetic Act [(the Act)], or any equivalent Federal
            statute or equivalent statute of any other state, that
            may be punishable by a term of imprisonment
            exceeding two years.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), (c)(2).

      A person commits the crime of prohibited offensive weapons “if, except

as authorized by law, [she] makes repairs, sells, or otherwise deals in, uses,

or possesses any offensive weapon.” Id. at 908(a). Section 908 includes

“tasers or other electronic or electric weapons” in its definition of “offensive

weapons.” Id.

      Possession of a controlled substance is defined as:

      Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit
      substance by a person not registered under [The Controlled
      Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (the Act)], or a
      practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State

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      board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or
      pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner,
      or except as otherwise authorized by [the Act].

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).       The Act further defines possession of drug

paraphernalia, in relevant part, as “[t]he use of, or possession with intent to

use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of . . . packing, repacking, storing,

[or] containing . . . a controlled substance in violation of this [A]ct.” Id. at §

(a)(32). Drug paraphernalia includes, but is not limited to,

      [s]cales and balances used, intended for use or designed for use
      in weighing or measuring controlled substances[;] . . . [c]apsules,
      balloons, envelopes and other containers used, intended for use
      or designed for use in packing small quantities of controlled
      substances[; and c]ontainers and other objects used, intended for
      use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled
      substances.

Id. at § 780-102(b)(5), (9), (10).

      Possession with the intent to deliver is defined under the Act as “the

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a

controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a

practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or

knowingly creating delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit

controlled substance.” Id. at § 780-113(a)(30).

      An individual can possess firearms and drugs either physically or

constructively.   Regarding constructive possession, we are guided by the

following:

      Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
      deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
      possession is an inference[,] arising from a set of facts[,] that

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     possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
     defined constructive possession as conscious dominion.     We
     subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control
     the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid
     application, we have held that constructive possession may be
     established by the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012).

     “To find constructive possession, the power and intent to control the

contraband does not need to be exclusive to the appellant.” Commonwealth

v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 438 (Pa. Super. 2021).         “[C]onstructive

possession may be found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in

an area of joint control and equal access.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26

A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

     Regarding the firearms, the Commonwealth and Carter stipulated that

she had a prior disqualifying conviction of delivery under 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30).   See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at 136 (parties stipulating to

Carter’s disqualifying conviction); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2).

Additionally, as noted in our factual summary above, Carter was present in

the room with two visible firearms. Carter’s purse, identification, and other

personal items were located around the room as well.       Moreover, Carter

testified that she had slept in the dining/living room the night before. See

N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at 207-08, 233 (Carter testifying she stayed

overnight at residence, and woke up to purchase drugs from Walters).

Therefore, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain

Carter’s convictions of person not to possess. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a);

see also Johnson, supra; Smith, supra. Furthermore, regarding Carter’s

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conviction of prohibited weapons, she testified that she owned the taser, which

is a prohibited weapon. N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at 220-21; see also 18

Pa.C.S.A. 908(a).

      Regarding Carter’s possession of the drugs and paraphernalia, we

likewise conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

sustain these convictions. In particular, as noted above, Carter was in the

dining/living room all night, including when the police entered on the morning

of May 1, 2019.     Almost all of the narcotics and paraphernalia Carter was

charged with possessing were located in various tote bags that Carter

admitted were hers. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at 206-09, 211-17, 227-

30. Additionally, Carter testified that the methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl,

and at least some of the marijuana were hers. Id. at 206-09, 211-17, 227-

30.   In light of the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Carter either physically or

constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia. See Brown, supra;

Johnson, supra.

      Regarding Carter’s convictions of possession with intent to deliver, we

conclude that the Commonwealth also presented sufficient evidence to sustain

these convictions. Notably, the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence.   See Smith, supra.       Here, the Commonwealth presented the

testimony of O’Doherty and Walters, who both testified that Carter had

conducted drug deals with them.         In particular, O’Doherty and Carter

conducted a drug deal on April 30, 2019, the day before the police executed

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their search warrant. Walters testified that he arrived at the residence early

in the morning of May 1, 2019, in order to purchase drugs from Carter. He

further testified that he was actively purchasing the drugs from Carter, who

was holding the drugs, as the police entered the residence. Moreover, the

Commonwealth presented the expert testimony of Greenawald, who rendered

his expert opinion that Carter possessed quantities of narcotics so large that

they were intended to be distributed rather than purely used personally. As

stated above, Greenawald also concluded that the sheer amount and type of

paraphernalia indicated that drugs were being sold, rather than just

consumed.       N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/20, at 184-95 (Greenawald concluding

number of scales, needles, glassine baggies, and other paraphernalia

indicative of drug sales).

         In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence to sustain each of Carter’s convictions. Accordingly, these

challenges lack merit and we address the second claim in counsel’s Anders

brief.

         In the second claim, counsel argues that Carter’s sentence was

manifestly excessive. Anders Brief, at 15-17. Carter’s claim challenges the

discretionary aspects of her appeal, from which there is no automatic right to

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-08 (Pa. Super.

2013). Rather, when an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence, we must consider her brief on this issue as a petition for permission

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to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary issue,

       [this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
       whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
       Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
       preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
       sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
       has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
       substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
       appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

       Here, Carter filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal. However, Carter did

not raise an objection at the time of sentencing, nor did she file a post-

sentence motion raising this claim. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d

274, 282-83 (Pa. Super. 2009) (challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence

waived when appellant failed to preserve challenge at sentencing or post-

sentence motion). Accordingly, Carter has not properly invoked this Court’s

jurisdiction, and her discretionary sentencing claim is not preserved for our

review. See id.; see also Moury, supra.

       Nevertheless, we review the merits of Carter’s claim as part of our

independent review of the record.15 See Dempster, supra. Our review of

the record reveals that, at sentencing, the trial court considered testimony
____________________________________________

15 We note that Attorney Fiorillo has failed to include a Rule 2119(f) statement
in the Anders brief; however, this omission is not an impediment to our
review in this case. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (where counsel filed Anders brief, this Court reviewed
discretionary sentencing claim even absent Rule 2119(f) statement).

                                          - 16 -
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and letters from one of Carter’s daughters, Megan Truscott, Carter’s lifelong

best friend, Linda Olano, the pastor at Carter’s church, Jeremy Smallwood,

and Ashley Stumhofer, a fellow inmate. See N.T. Sentencing, 3/20/20, at 7-

19, 22-23. These letters each detailed Carter’s struggle with addiction, as

well as her positive impact on the community and her family. Id. The trial

court also heard Carter’s personal statement concerning her struggles with

addiction and remorse for her actions. Id. at 19-22. Additionally, the trial

court considered Carter’s prior record score, and the PSI. See id. at 19; see

also Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (where

sentencing court considered PSI, this Court presumes that it “[is] aware of

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”). Accordingly, Carter’s

claim lacks merit.

      We now turn to the issues raised in Carter’s pro se response:

      [1.] Was counsel ineffective for failing to raise meritorious issues
      and filing an Anders [b]rief?

      [2.] Was [the] search warrant illegally obtained [in] violat[ion of
      Carter]’s Constitutional rights?

      [3.] Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
      conviction[.]

      [4.] Did the court abuse its discretion in excessively sentencing
      [Carter]?

Pro Se Response to Anders Brief, at 4.

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       Carter’s first claim sounds in ineffective assistance of counsel,16 which

is only cognizable in a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-9546, petition.         Generally, allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel may not be considered on direct review. See Commonwealth v.

Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013).               Instead, a defendant must defer

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to PCRA review, unless: (1) the

claim of ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the

extent that immediate consideration serves the interest of justice, or (2) there

is good cause shown and the defendant has given a knowing and express

waiver of [her] right to seek subsequent PCRA review. Id. At 563-64.

       Instantly, Carter has not satisfied either of the Holmes exceptions and,

thus, we are constrained to dismiss her claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel without prejudice to her ability to raise them again on collateral

review.

       In her second claim, Carter argues that the Commonwealth’s search

warrant was illegally obtained. Pro Se Response to Anders Brief, at 13-15.

She contends that the search warrant was based upon purported sales made

to a confidential informant (CI). Id. In particular, Carter argues that the
____________________________________________

16In her first claim, Carter asserts that her trial counsel and appellate counsel
are both ineffective for failing to raise meritorious claims.

Similarly, we observe that Carter appears to challenge appellate counsel’s
ineffectiveness for failing to raise sufficiency and sentencing challenges.
However, as discussed above, appellate counsel did raise those claims in the
Anders brief, but concluded they lacked merit. Moreover, we addressed these
claims and, likewise, concluded that they were meritless.

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search warrant should have been suppressed because the CI never testified

and was unreliable. Id.

       Preliminarily, we conclude that this claim is waived. A brief review of

the record reveals that there was never any challenge made to the veracity or

legality of the search warrant. Nor were any challenges made regarding a CI

or lack thereof. As, this claim was not raised in the trial court, we may not

review it on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial

court are waived”). Accordingly, this claim is waived.

       In her third claim, Carter purports to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence for each of her convictions. See Pro Se Response to Anders Brief,

at 16-18.

       Throughout this section of her brief, Carter actually raises several issues

regarding admissibility of evidence, discovery, and ineffectiveness of trial

counsel in impeaching witnesses.               None of these challenges go to the

sufficiency of the evidence and are not fairly suggested thereby. Thus, these

claims are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Additionally, our review of the

record reveals that none of her evidentiary or discovery claims were preserved

at trial and, thus, they are waived on this basis as well.17,18 See Pa.R.A.P.
____________________________________________

17We further observe that Carter does not direct our attention to anywhere in
the record that these claims were preserved for our review. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(e) (requiring record citations to where issue is preserved).

18  With respect to Carter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, she has
failed to identify a Holmes exception and, thus, this claim is more properly
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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302(a).     Moreover, we addressed the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s

evidence above.

        In her fourth claim, Carter contends that her sentence was excessive.

See Pro Se Response to Anders Brief, at 18-20.           Carter argues that her

sentence was excessive because the trial court allowed illegally obtained

evidence to be presented to the jury and ran her sentences consecutively. Id.

Additionally, Carter raises a sub-claim challenging one of the trial court’s jury

instructions regarding constructive possession. Id.

        Preliminarily, we observe that Carter, like Attorney Fiorillo, fails to

satisfy the jurisdictional requirements to address a discretionary sentencing

claim.19 See Moury, supra; see Gibbs, supra. Additionally, Carter’s sub-

claim that the trial court issued an incorrect jury instruction was not raised in

the trial court and, thus, is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

        In light of the foregoing, we conclude that this appeal is meritless and

grant counsel’s application to withdraw. In addition, Carter failed to present

any meritorious claims in her pro se response.       Thus, we dismiss Carter’s

claims that sound in ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to her

ability to raise them on collateral review.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

____________________________________________

raised in a PCRA petition. See Holmes, supra. Thus, we dismiss this claim
without prejudice to Carter’s ability to challenge trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
on collateral review.

19   Additionally, we addressed this claim supra and concluded it lacked merit.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/17/2023

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