Court Opinion

ID: 9655137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:01:11.84697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:16.317969
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Chief Justice LAMBERT.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on the following three grounds: First, the decision to grant or deny an extraordinary writ is a matter of discretion, and the Court of Appeals did not abuse that discretion1; second, the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure (KBML) has failed to make the necessary showing of “irreparable injury” and “inadequate remedy by appeal” entitling it to extraordinary relief; and third, the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the CR 60.02 motion, applying KRS 13B.150, and ordering KBML to conduct a due process hearing in light of new evidence. One important basis for KBML’s order revoking Dr. Shafer’s Kentucky medical license was a West Virginia criminal conviction that was overturned on appeal. As that basis no longer exists, and it is impossible to determine the extent to which it influ-
*781eneed the decision to revoke, I would reinstate the trial court’s order requiring a new due process hearing.
I discern no irreparable injury to KBML by requiring it to conduct a new due process hearing. While acknowledging the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal of the trial court’s CR 60.02 order, KBML argues that it will suffer irreparable injury if it is forced to conduct the due process hearing ordered by the trial court. The grounds for these contentions are that an executive branch agency will not be able to contest the authority of a trial court to order such a hearing. This is unfounded and inconsistent with enabling statutes,2 CR 60.02, KRS 13B.150, KRS 311.598, and due process of law. KBML would not be foreclosed from contesting the circuit court’s authority to order a CR 60.02 hearing on appeal, and therefore the primary claim of irreparable injury is unfounded. Moreover, KBML characterizes such a due process hearing as “illegal conduct,” a characterization I regard as an intemperate overstatement.
Fairness requires courts to afford a party affected by an administrative order procedural due process.3 Any administrative proceeding that affects a party’s rights, and that does not afford an opportunity to be heard is arbitrary. We have repeatedly held that an arbitrary hearing is not supported by substantial evidence.4 It was well within the authority of the trial court to review its own orders. Upon learning of the new evidence of a vacated criminal conviction in West Virginia and evidence of false statements to the KBML during the license revocation hearing, the trial court properly ordered the KBML to conduct a new administrative hearing.
As KBML failed to show that it would suffer irreparable injury and that there was no adequate remedy by appeal, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the extraordinary writ. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the Court of Appeals.
GRAVES and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. Bender v. Eaton, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (1961).

. KRS 311.530-311.620.

. American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1964), citing Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Jacobs, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 189 (1954).

.Id., citing Thurman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., Ky., 345 S.W.2d 635 (1961).