Court Opinion

ID: 9730428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:12:03.758191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.411611
License: Public Domain

J. C. Ravitz, J.
(concurring). I agree with the *441decision to affirm but write separately because I disagree with both the genesis and the resolution of the "split of authority” between People v Davenport, 39 Mich App 252; 197 NW2d 521 (1972), and People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467; 255 NW2d 648 (1977).
The Davenport decision was not simply an aberrant doctrine from one panel of this Court. As the Edgar decision noted, in People v Fuller, 395 Mich 451; 236 NW2d 58 (1975), the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is for the trier of fact to determine if the prosecution has 'negate[d] every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence of the crime charged’ ”. 75 Mich App 474. Commenting on this language, the Court in Edgar said: "For the most part, we agree with that statement.” Id. The Court was, at least at that time, not seeking to overrule the Fuller decision.
Yet, a few years later, through a series of Court of Appeals decisions, cited by the majority herein, "recent panels of this Court have followed Edgar” and thereby rejected defendant’s argument that "the prosecution is required to negate every reasonable theory consistent with defendant’s innocence”. This is a rejection, obviously, of both People v Davenport and Supreme Court authority in People v Fuller, supra.
How this evolved is instructive. In the most recent case cited by the majority, People v Richardson, 139 Mich App 622; 362 NW2d 853 (1984), that panel said: "We disagree with defendant’s contention that the prosecution was bound to disprove all theories consistent with defendant’s innocence. See People v Davenport * * *. We agree with panels of this Court which have held it sufficient if the prosecution proves its own theory beyond a reasonable doubt.” 139 Mich App 626.
But agreement with panels holding that it is *442"sufficient if the prosecution proves its own theory (guilt) beyond a reasonable doubt” does not lead to a rejection of the Davenport-Fuller doctrine. The Richardson decision misrepresented that doctrine by omitting the essential word "reasonable”. By including that word, I conclude that when the prosecution proves its theory of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt it necessarily also "disprove^] all [reasonable] theories consistent with defendant’s innocence”.
What might have begun as an argument over semantics has become far more significant than simply one side asserting that "the glass is half full”, while the other counters, "no, the glass is half empty”. Seemingly minor differences in words and in tone have led to significant differences in rules and decisions of law. The factual situations in People v Davenport, supra, and People v Richardson, supra, are sufficiently similar so as to highlight the important substantive and decisional changes that have occurred. I write because I believe the law and its application is well set forth in Davenport and not in Richardson. None of this helps Mr. Johnson in the case sub judice simply because the jury, as stated by the majority, was free to reject his testimony and his theory altogether; in addition, while his theory of innocence, consistent with the circumstantial evidence, may be "possible”, it is so unlikely that it does not constitute a "reasonable” doubt.
With respect to the scheduling of the adjourned preliminary examination I concur only because the preliminary examination was originally within the 12-day rule, and the defense moved to adjourn the examination, waived the 12-day rule and did not object when it was rescheduled 13 days later.
I agree with the majority that the sentence imposed here is not shocking to the appellate *443conscience and does not violate the proportionality standards which must, I think, be addressed in the near future if the purposes of sentence guidelines are to be realized. One solution, recommended in the concurring opinion in People v Line, 145 Mich App 567; 378 NW2d 781 (1985) is to follow the Minnesota Supreme Court which presumes that a sentence more than double that authorized by sentence guidelines is invalid. See State v Evans, 311 NW2d 481 (Minn, 1981).