Court Opinion

ID: 9368316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 18:02:23.068349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.921669
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/3/23 P. v. King CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A165028
 v.
 WARREN JOSEPH KING,                                                    (Contra Costa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 5-100326-8)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Warren King appeals from the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6,
based on changes to the law of murder made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437).1 King’s appellate counsel filed a Wende2
brief asking this court for an independent review of the record to determine
whether any arguable issues exist.
         Recently, our state Supreme Court held that there is no right to Wende
review in section 1172.6 appeals, but it established a procedural framework
to follow when counsel finds no arguable issues. (People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222 (Delgadillo).) Under that framework, we gave notice
to King that he had the right to file a supplemental letter or brief or his

         1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
         2   People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

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appeal could be dismissed. (See id. at pp. 231–232.) He filed a letter raising
several issues, requiring us to issue an opinion evaluating them. (See id. at
p. 232.) We conclude that none of King’s claims have merit and affirm.
                                      I.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                 BACKGROUND
      Based on the 2009 killing of John Lyles, a jury convicted King of one
count of second degree murder and found true that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. The jury also convicted
King of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the trial court found that
he had three prior serious-felony convictions.3 On appeal, this division struck
one of the serious-felony enhancements but otherwise affirmed, resulting in a
sentence of 50 years to life in prison.4 (People v. King (Feb. 28, 2012,
A130713) [nonpub. opn.].)
      In July 2019, King filed his resentencing petition, in which he declared
that he was convicted of murder on a theory of felony murder or under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and could no longer be convicted
of murder because of changes to the law made by Senate Bill 1437. The
petition was inadvertently overlooked, and it remained pending for over two
years before the trial court appointed counsel for King and set a briefing
schedule.

      3 King was convicted under section 187 (murder) and former
section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), now section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (felon
in possession of firearm). The sentencing enhancements were found true
under sections 12022.53, subdivision (d) (firearm discharge), and 667,
subdivision (a)(1) (prior serious-felony conviction).
      4In its order, the trial court stated that it did not consider our prior
opinion, the trial transcript, or other materials evincing the underlying facts.
Likewise, we need not discuss those facts to decide this appeal.

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      The People opposed the petition, contending that King could still be
convicted of murder because he acted with malice aforethought and, even if
he had been convicted of felony murder, he was the actual killer and
therefore ineligible for relief. King responded that he had made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, based on his declaration that he met all the
requirements for resentencing, and he argued that the trial court should
issue an order to show cause.
      In February 2022, the trial court issued an order denying King’s
resentencing petition for failure to make a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief. The court took judicial notice of the jury instructions from King’s
trial, which “show[ed] that the jury was not instructed on felony murder or
liability for aiding and abetting under the natural and probable
consequence[s] doctrine.” Since “[t]he instructions permitted the jury to
convict [King] of second degree murder only if it found express or implied
malice,” he could still be convicted of murder under the current law, and “the
record conclusively refute[d] the petition’s contrary allegations.”
      King appealed, and his appellate counsel filed a Wende brief. Shortly
after, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Delgadillo. We then sent King a
letter informing him that he had the right to file a supplemental brief within
30 days raising any issues he thought should be reviewed, and if he did not
do so his appeal could be dismissed. In response, he timely sent us a letter
raising several claims.
                                       II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 ‘to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to

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kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively
amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill 1437 added [former]
section 1170.95, [now section 1172.6], which provides a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
        Under Delgadillo, if a no-issues brief is filed in a section 1172.6 appeal
and the defendant then “files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief
and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We
are not required to conduct “an independent review of the entire record to
identify unraised issues.” (Ibid.)
        King’s letter mainly discusses issues related to his trial that are not
cognizable in section 1172.6 proceedings. King claims that his murder
conviction should be overturned because the prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence and committed other misconduct and some witnesses gave perjured
testimony. But section 1172.6 is not a vehicle for establishing prosecutorial
misconduct or attacking the evidence admitted at trial. Resentencing
proceedings under the statute involve “prospective relief from a murder
conviction that was presumptively valid at the time,” not the correction of
“errors in past factfinding.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 713–
714.)
        In particular, we are not persuaded by King’s claim that “according to
the amendments made to sections 188 and 189,” he has “a due process right
to have the history, the witness testimonies, and any and all exhibits that
[were] used in [his] case . . . thoroughly examined.” True, if an order to show
cause issues and an evidentiary hearing is held, determining whether a

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defendant is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 may require an
examination of the trial evidence. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) That review
would not, however, extend to determining whether prosecutorial misconduct
or perjury occurred. King provides no authority to the contrary.
      King also claims that his appointed attorneys below and on appeal
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. He states that although he
explained the broad scope of review he believes is available in this
proceeding, “the attorn[eys] in question told [him] that [sections] 1170.95 and
1172.6 [were] only made for felony murder [and] . . . the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and nothing else!” As noted, section 1172.6 does not
authorize a review of any objection a defendant might have about the
proceedings leading to the conviction. Instead, it focuses on whether the
defendant could have been convicted of murder had the later amendments to
sections 188 and 189 been in effect. Thus, the attorneys’ view of the law was
correct, meaning their representation did not “[fall] below an objective
standard of reasonableness” as required to establish ineffective assistance.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688.)
      Finally, although we are not required to address this point, we conclude
that the trial court properly denied King’s resentencing petition for failure to
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. In
relevant part, the statute requires that the defendant was “convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) King
checked a box on his petition stating that he was convicted at trial of “1st or
2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine,” but the jury instructions show that the jury

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was not instructed on either theory of murder liability. Thus, the court
properly rejected King’s characterization of his conviction. (See People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
                                       III.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The February 28, 2022 order denying King’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Swope, J. *

     *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

People v. King A165028

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