Court Opinion

ID: 9391825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 14:10:55.449938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.892633
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00145-CR

         CODY ALLEN HAMPTON, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 12th District Court
                Walker County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. 26848

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Cody Allen Hampton pled guilty to burglary of a habitation, and pursuant to a plea-

bargain agreement with the State, the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community

supervision for a period of eight years. After the trial court found that Hampton violated the

terms and conditions of his community supervision, it adjudicated Hampton’s guilt and

sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment.

        On appeal,1 Hampton argues (1) that the trial court erred by adjudicating guilt based on

alleged violations used to obtain prior modifications to his community supervision, (2) that the

trial court’s finding that Hampton violated the terms and conditions of his community

supervision was not supported by the evidence, (3) that the trial court erred in permitting opinion

testimony about his suitability for community supervision, and (4) that the trial court abused its

discretion by rejecting an agreed modification in lieu of proceeding to an adjudication hearing.

        We overrule Hampton’s first and second points of error because, while old grounds that

resulted in modifications of community supervision were included in the State’s adjudication

motion, sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings of “true” on new allegations. We

also find that Hampton failed to preserve his third point of error and inadequately briefed his last

point of error. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1
 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We find no difference
between the precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and this Court on any issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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I.     Sufficient Evidence Supported the Finding of “True” on New Allegations

       The appellate record in this case shows that the State filed several motions to adjudicate

Hampton’s guilt, which were ultimately resolved by amending the terms and conditions of

Hampton’s community supervision instead of proceeding to an adjudication hearing. Because

the State included old allegations that had resulted in modifications of community supervision,

Hampton argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating guilt on those old allegations. Even so,

“[a]n appeal from an order revoking [community supervision] is limited to the propriety of the

revocation.” Corley v. State, 782 S.W.2d 859, 860 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). As a result, the

question of whether new allegations were supported by sufficient evidence is dispositive of

Hampton’s first two points of error. Because we find that sufficient evidence supported the

findings of “true” to new allegations not raised in a prior motion by the State, we overrule

Hampton’s first two points.

       A.      Factual and Procedural Background

       Hampton was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision in 2015. In 2016,

the State filed its original motion to adjudicate guilt on grounds that Hampton (1) tested positive

for both marihuana and opiates on May 22, 2015, (2) possessed marihuana on December 5, 2015,

and (3) failed to pay fines and fees as ordered.       The original motion was dismissed after

Hampton and the State agreed to modify the terms of community supervision to include

provisions that required Hampton to complete a drug-offender-education course, a drug and

alcohol evaluation, and an intensive community supervision program.

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        In 2020, the State filed a second motion to adjudicate guilt. In addition to listing old

violations from the original motion, the State alleged in its second motion that Hampton had

been indicted after committing the offense of publishing or threatening to publish intimate visual

material in July 2019. The State’s second motion also alleged that Hampton had failed to

complete community service hours or report to the community supervision department in July

and October 2019. Because Hampton and the State again agreed to modify the terms of his

community supervision, the trial court dismissed the State’s second motion to adjudicate guilt

after extending Hampton’s community supervision by another two years and requiring him to

serve twenty-four days in the Walker County Jail.

        In November 2021, the State filed a third motion to adjudicate guilt, which, in addition to

old complaints, alleged that Hampton committed theft of property, drove without a valid license,

and failed to report to the community supervision department in May 2021. The State amended

its third motion by adding allegations that Hampton committed another theft of property and

failed to report in January and April 2022.

        At the adjudication hearing, the State abandoned the theft allegations and the allegation

that he drove with an invalid license, leaving the old allegations and the new failure-to-report

allegations. Hampton pled “not true” to all the State’s allegations.2

        Misty Jones, Hampton’s former community supervision officer (CSO), testified that

Hampton failed to report in May 2021 and January 2022. Kody White, Hampton’s then-current

CSO, testified that Hampton failed to report in April 2022. Although Hampton testified that he

2
 Even though the trial court took evidence on the old allegations and found them to be true, those facts and findings
are inconsequential to this opinion and need to not be recited.
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was in court on the date he was supposed to report in January 2022, he admitted that his mother

had driven him to court but could not say why he failed to report to his CSO after court.

Hampton said he sometimes had trouble arranging transportation but provided no definitive

excuse for failing to report in May 2021 or April 2022. During closing, Hampton acknowledged

that there was evidence of the new failure-to-report allegations but still argued that he should be

continued on community supervision.

       After hearing the evidence, the trial court found the State’s failure-to-report allegations in

the third motion to adjudicate guilt true and sentenced Hampton to eleven years’ imprisonment.

       B.      Standard of Review

       We review a decision to adjudicate guilt in the same manner as we review a decision to

revoke community supervision—for abuse of discretion. Little v. State, 376 S.W.3d 217, 219

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006)); see In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.);

see Dickson v. State, No. 10-17-00257-CR, 2018 WL 1415543, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco

Mar. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In a revocation hearing, the

trial court is the sole trier of the facts and “determines the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given their testimony.” In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 321. A trial court’s decision to

revoke community supervision and to proceed to adjudication is examined in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id.

       “The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the

terms and conditions of” community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 1993). Proof by a preponderance of evidence as to any one of the alleged violations

of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to

revoke community supervision. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(“We have long held that ‘one sufficient ground for revocation would support the trial court’s

order revoking’ community supervision.” (quoting Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193–94 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978))); Fenner v. State, 571 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019,

pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing

Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)).

       C.      The Evidence Supported the Failure-to-Report Allegations

       The State argues that it proved the new failure-to-report allegations by a preponderance

of the evidence. We agree.

       Jones and White testified that Hampton failed to report in May 2021 and January and

April 2022. Hampton testified that he was required to rely on others for transportation. Even so,

the trial court was free to disbelieve him, especially after Hampton admitted that he had

transportation to court on the January 2022 reporting date, that he knew he had to report in

person, but that he failed to do so. Because we find that testimony from Jones and White

established Hampton’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his community

supervision by a preponderance of the evidence, we find that sufficient evidence supported the

trial court’s findings of “true” on the new allegations. As a result, we overrule Hampton’s first

and second points of error.

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II.       Hampton Failed to Preserve His Third Point of Error

          In his third point, Hampton argues that the trial court erred by allowing a lay witness to

provide opinion testimony. We find that Hampton failed to preserve this complaint for our

review.

          “To preserve error for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely objection or

request and state the grounds on which he thinks he is entitled to a favorable ruling.” Gonzalez

v. State, 616 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 436 (2021). “An

objection or request is sufficiently specific if the trial court is aware of the complaint or if the

grounds are apparent from the context.” Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)). “Magic words are

not required, but the litigant must ‘let the trial court know what he wants and why he feels

himself entitled to it clearly enough for the judge to understand him.’” Id. (quoting Vasquez v.

State, 483 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). “A general objection will not preserve

error unless the legal basis is obvious to the trial court and opposing counsel.” Id. (citing

Vasquez, 483 S.W.3d at 554).3

          Hampton complains of the following portion of the transcript, which occurred during

White’s questioning,

                Q      [(BY WHITE)] Based on the experience that you have had with
          Mr. Hampton thus far, do you feel he’s a good candidate to continue on
          [community supervision]?

                                   [HAMPTON’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

3
 Also, a “point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.” Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346,
349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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                                   THE COURT: Overruled.

                 A        No. I don’t.

We find that Hampton’s general objection at trial did not alert the trial court to his complaint on

appeal regarding opinion testimony. As a result, we conclude that Hampton failed to preserve

his third appellate point for our review.4 It is overruled.

III.    Hampton Inadequately Briefed His Last Point of Error

        At a preliminary hearing, Hampton announced that he had reached an agreement with the

State to modify the terms of his community supervision: Hampton agreed to pay restitution to

the victims of his theft offenses in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop prosecution of

those offenses. After the State confirmed that it had not spoken to the theft victims, the trial

court said, “[I] would rather just hear testimony and determine whether or not the allegations in

the [third] motion to adjudicate are true, and then make my decision on my own. . . . Not saying I

won’t do that, but I want to hear evidence before I do it.” At the adjudication hearing, there was

no mention of an agreement between Hampton and the State.

        In his last point of error, Hampton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

rejecting an agreed modification in lieu of proceeding to an adjudication hearing. As an initial

matter, the appellate record does not contain any written alleged agreement to modify

community supervision, and it does not appear that the trial court rejected any such agreement

4
 Moreover, “a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection. An
error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection.”
Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Valle v. State, 109
S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The record shows that the same question posed to White was posed to
Jones, who also said that Hampton would not be a good candidate to continue on community supervision. Jones’s
testimony came in without objection.
                                                        8
outright. Even so, we suspect that Hampton was required to have pled “true” to the State’s third

motion to adjudicate guilt to receive the benefit of the bargain. Yet, Hampton pled “not true” to

the State’s allegations during the adjudication hearing, which did not mention any agreement

between Hampton and the State. That suggests that Hampton’s point is unmeritorious.

       Even assuming Hampton’s point had merit, we find it inadequately briefed. “To avoid

forfeiting a legal argument for inadequate briefing, an appellant’s brief must contain ‘a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the

record.’” Taylor v. State, 558 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)); see Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);

Johnson v. State, 263 S.W.3d 405, 416 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d). “[E]ncompassed

within Rule 38.1 is the party’s task of explaining or discussing why an argument has substance.”

Taylor, 558 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).

“[A]n appellate court has no ‘obligation to construct and compose [an] appellant’s issues, facts,

and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” Wolfe v. State, 509

S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008)).

       Hampton failed to cite to any authority supporting his one-paragraph, conclusory

argument that the trial court erred by proceeding to an adjudication hearing. He also failed to

address the impact of his plea on any alleged agreement with the State. We are “not required to

make an appellant’s arguments for him.” Neville v. State, 622 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. App.—

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Waco 2020, no pet.) (citing Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896). As a result, we find that Hampton has

inadequately briefed his last point of error and overrule it.

IV.    Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Scott E. Stevens
                                               Chief Justice

Date Submitted:        April 19, 2023
Date Decided:          May 3, 2023

Do Not Publish

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