Court Opinion

ID: 9928847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 01:00:46.21717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:39.445914
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30685         Document: 00517051791             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/31/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-30685
                                                                                        FILED
                                     Summary Calendar
                                                                                 January 31, 2024
                                     ____________
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
   Crystal Strunk,                                                                         Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Methanex USA, L.L.C.,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:22-CV-793
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Crystal Strunk appeals the district court’s dismissal of her various
   claims of gender-based discrimination against her employer Methanex USA,
   L.L.C. The district court concluded that Strunk failed to timely file her civil
   suit within ninety days after receiving her Right to Sue letter from the Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In so doing, it rejected

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30685     Document: 00517051791          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                   No. 23-30685

   the argument that equity required tolling the period during which Strunk’s
   physically debilitating medical condition rendered her incapable of properly
   pursing her legal rights under Title VII. While sympathetic to Strunk’s
   circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
   discretion by declining to apply equitable tolling. We AFFIRM.
                                         I.
          For two years, Crystal Strunk, a chemical engineer by trade, worked
   for Methanex USA, L.L.C. Strunk alleges that during that time, she was
   subjected to gender-based harassment, discrimination, and retaliation at the
   hands of her male coworkers. Based on this conduct, Strunk timely filed
   charges with the EEOC and, upon her own request, both she and her attorney
   received a Right to Sue letter on July 14, 2022. At the time she received her
   Right to Sue letter, Strunk was seven months pregnant and was “on bedrest
   due to preeclampsia,” a disease that causes “shortness of breath, dizzy
   spells, headaches, fatigue, and elevated blood pressure near stroke level.”
          Approximately two weeks after receiving her Right to Sue letter,
   Strunk scheduled an appointment with her attorney. Strunk details that, at
   that time, her attorney required more information (e.g., dates, facts,
   documents) to assess the merits of her case. However, symptoms related to
   Strunk’s preeclampsia curtailed her ability to speak about her case for long
   periods of time. As a result, Strunk’s consultation was cut short, and she
   decided to reschedule for approximately two weeks later.
          Unfortunately, Strunk’s condition deteriorated. On August 30, 2022,
   her preeclampsia caused her to go into labor and have a preterm caesarean
   birth. After returning home, Strunk applied for “Pregnancy/Maternity”
   leave with her employer. On the leave benefits form, her physician specified
   that she would be “incapacitated for a single continuous period of time,” but
   noted that the reason for her leave was that Strunk “need[ed] time off to

                                              2
Case: 23-30685      Document: 00517051791          Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                    No. 23-30685

   recover from delivery” and to “care and bond with [the] new baby.”
   Although Strunk continued to experience symptoms of preeclampsia, her
   leave benefit form did not mention the disease or any symptoms resulting
   from it. Her leave began on August 31, 2022, and ended on October 26, 2022.
          On October 12, 2022, Strunk set up a third consultation with her
   attorney. However, the call was cut short due to an episode of dizziness,
   shortness of breath, and high blood pressure. Finally, on October 13, 2022,
   Strunk’s condition stabilized. That same day, ninety-one days after Strunk’s
   receipt of her Right to Sue letter, Strunk called her attorney, who prepared
   and filed her complaint. On October 21, 2022, Methanex filed a motion to
   dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
   seeking dismissal of Strunk’s untimely complaint. On September 15, 2023,
   the district court dismissed Strunk’s claims as untimely, declining to apply
   the equitable tolling doctrine. Strunk timely appealed.
                                         II.
          We review a district court’s denial of equitable tolling for an abuse of
   discretion. Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2011). A
   district court abuses its discretion if “it bases its decision on an erroneous
   view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Perez
   v. Stephens, 745 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
   “This standard of review extends to both the district court’s factfinding, and
   its determination of the applicability of equitable tolling to those facts.”
   Bernstein v. Maximus Fed. Servs., Inc., 63 F.4th 967, 969 (5th Cir. 2023).
   When a plaintiff raises equitable tolling as a defense to a motion to dismiss,
   we take her “pleaded facts as true, and . . . will remand if the plaintiff has
   pleaded facts that justify equitable tolling.” Id. (quoting Teemac v. Henderson,
   298 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2002)).

                                               3
Case: 23-30685      Document: 00517051791            Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                     No. 23-30685

                                          III.
          To assert Title VII claims in federal court, a plaintiff “must [first]
   exhaust administrative remedies” by filling a charge with the EEOC and
   receiving a statutory notice of the right to sue. See Taylor v. Books A Million,
   Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
   Plaintiffs have “ninety days to file a civil action after receipt of such a notice
   from the EEOC.” See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
   “This requirement to file a lawsuit within the ninety-day limitation period is
   strictly construed.” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. However, this requirement is
   also subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
   v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
          It is undisputed that Strunk filed her suit one day after the ninety-day
   limitations period, rendering her action untimely on its face. However,
   Strunk argues that the district court erred by failing to use its equitable
   powers to toll the ninety-day limitation period.
          We have before stated that equitable tolling applies only in “rare and
   exceptional circumstances.” Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628 F.3d 237, 239
   (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Teemac, 298 F.3d at 457). It is to be applied
   “sparingly,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, and the plaintiff has the burden to
   provide justification for the tolling, Granger, 636 F.3d at 712. Thus, a plaintiff
   is entitled to equitable tolling only if she establishes (1) that she continually
   and “diligently” pursued her rights, and (2) “that some extraordinary
   circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented timely filing.” Menominee
   Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting
   Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
          Here, we cannot conclude that the district court’s ruling was based on
   a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. The district court correctly
   noted that both Strunk and her attorney promptly received the EEOC’s Right

                                                 4
Case: 23-30685      Document: 00517051791          Page: 5    Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                    No. 23-30685

   to Sue letter. Moreover, the district court credited Strunk’s argument that
   “[f]or the sake of the unborn baby,” Strunk “was in no condition mentally
   or physically” to immediately file suit upon receiving her Right to Sue letter.
   However, the district court concluded that Strunk “failed to produce specific
   evidence showing that she lacked any ability whatsoever to communicate
   with counsel for the entirety of the six weeks between August 31 and October
   12, 2022.”
          In opposition, Strunk points to her application for short-term
   disability, which states that Strunk was “incapacitated for a single continuous
   period of time,” from August 31, 2022, to October 26, 2022. However, the
   district court did consider Strunk’s application for short-term disability, and
   concluded that it supports the opposite conclusion: “Plaintiff’s application
   for short-term disability benefits . . . indicates that she was not completely
   incapacitated, and states merely that Plaintiff ‘needs time off to recover from
   delivery + care + bond [sic] with new baby.’” We cannot say the district
   court erred by failing to equate evidence of being continuously incapacitated
   from performing work with evidence of being continuously incapacitated from
   calling an attorney to file a legal complaint. Furthermore, Strunk’s application
   for short-term disability does not mention her preeclampsia, or any
   symptoms related to the condition.
          Additionally, as correctly noted by the district court, “[w]e are
   reluctant to apply equitable tolling to situations of attorney error or neglect,
   because parties are bound by the acts of their lawyer.” See Granger, 636 F.3d
   at 712; see also Hood v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1999).
   Here, Strunk was, at all relevant points, represented by counsel. It is
   undisputed that Strunk had at least three, albeit short, phone conferences
   with her attorney during the relevant time-period. Neither Strunk nor
   Strunk’s counsel provide sufficient evidence explaining why her counsel—
   who also represented her in front of the EEOC—could not have collected,

                                              5
Case: 23-30685     Document: 00517051791           Page: 6   Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                    No. 23-30685

   over a six-week period, enough information to at least file a complaint,
   especially considering that the complaint could have been amended with new
   information afterward. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; cf. Granger, 636 F.3d at 712;
   Hood, 168 F.3d at 233. Thus, on this record, it appears the district court did
   consider the evidence presented by Strunk regarding her disability and her
   attorney’s ability to pursue Strunk’s claims, and we cannot say its assessment
   of that evidence was clearly erroneous.
          AFFIRMED.

                                             6