Court Opinion

ID: 9419532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:49:58.069588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:09.349101
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Black,
concurring:
The National Labor Relations Act does not vest courts with power to review the evidence presented to the Labor Board and make independent findings of fact. 29 U. S. C. 160 (e). Therefore the propriety of the Board’s order in this case must be considered on the basis of the facts the Board found.
The Board did not exercise jurisdiction and enter its order on a fact finding that petitioner’s insurance activities merely affected commerce in types of interstate business other than its own. On this fact issue it made no finding at all. Its finding was that the petitioner, being “engaged in the insurance business,” was “engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.” This ultimate finding of fact rested on detailed subordinate findings which revealed the widespread interstate activities of the petitioner in carrying on its insurance business. As the Court’s opinion points out, these insurance activities involved a “steady stream, into and out of Illinois, of bills, notices, and policies, the payments of commissions, the making of loans on policies, the insertion and circulation of advertising material in newspapers, and its dissemination over the radio.” Only on the basis of the ultimate finding that petitioner was itself “engaged in commerce” did the Board make the essential further finding that petitioner’s refusal to bargain collectively with its employees had a “close, intimate, and substantial relation to com-*652mere© among the several States” and tended “to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce.”
As a conclusion of law the Board stated that petitioner’s unfair labor practices constituted “unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.” Section 2 (6) defines the term “commerce” to mean “trade, traffic . . and § 2 (7) defines the term “affecting commerce” to mean either “in commerce” or “burdening or obstructing commerce.” 49 Stat. 449, 450; 29 TJ. S. C. 152 (6) and (7). From the language of these definitions, and the Board’s findings above described, it is apparent that the Board’s conclusion of law that “commerce” was “affected” by petitioner’s unfair labor practices rested upon its previous conclusion of fact that petitioner’s insurance business was engaged in commerce. The Board concluded that, since the insurance business itself was engaged in commerce, petitioner’s refusal to bargain, and the strike thereby provoked, would affect commerce. Compare Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, 128-130 with Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 219-224.
The doctrine that Congress1 may provide for regulation of activities not themselves interstate commerce, but merely “affecting” such commerce, rests on the premise that in certain fact situations the federal government may find that regulation of purely local and intrastate commerce is “necessary and proper” to prevent injury to interstate commerce. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342; Second Employers; Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 46-47; and see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 121. In applying this doctrine to particular situations this Court properly has been cautious, and has required clear findings before subjecting local business to paramount federal regulation. City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685, and cases therein cited. It has insisted upon “suitable regard to the principle that *653whenever the federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear.” Id.; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 211-212; cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 196-197; Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 92-95.
The Board not having found as a fact that petitioner’s life insurance business affected interstate activities of other businesses, the first issue is whether the Board’s findings that petitioner’s insurance activities were conducted across state lines are supported by evidence. I think they are. This leads to the question, chiefly argued by both parties, “Is the business of insurance commerce, and, when conducted across state lines, subject to federal regulation as such under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?” For the reasons given in the Court’s opinions in this case and in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533, I agree that the business of insurance is commerce, subject to federal regulation as such when conducted across state lines, and! that the Board’s order was proper.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy join in this opinion.