Court Opinion

ID: 9897368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:42.68027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.405993
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   Jun 16 2023, 9:31 am

                                                                       CLERK
                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                        and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,
Kevin E. Steele                                            TOWN OF OGDEN DUNES
Burke Costanza & Carberry LLP                              BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
Valparaiso, Indiana                                        Charles F.G. Parkinson
                                                           Julie A. Paulson
                                                           Harris Welsh & Lukmann
                                                           Chesterton, Indiana
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES,
                                                           DAVID AND CHERYL TARPO
                                                           John E. Hughes
                                                           Lauren K. Kroeger
                                                           Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP
                                                           Merrillville, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Greg and Robin Shinall,                                    June 16, 2023
Appellants-Petitioners                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-PL-3098
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Porter Superior
                                                           Court
Board of Zoning Appeals for                                The Honorable Michael A. Fish,
Town of Ogden Dunes, Indiana;                              Judge
David and Cheryl Tarpo,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Respondents.                                     64D01-2206-PL-5496

                                      Opinion by Judge Pyle

                    Chief Judge Altice concurs. Judge Riley dissents.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023                           Page 1 of 16
      Pyle, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Greg Shinall and Robin Shinall (“the Shinalls”), appeal the trial court’s grant of

      the motion to dismiss their petition for judicial review in favor of David Tarpo

      and Cheryl Tarpo (“the Tarpos”), and the Board of Zoning Appeals for the

      Town of Ogden Dunes (“BZA”) (collectively, “the Defendants”).

[2]   We reverse and remand.

      Issue
      Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
      Shinalls’ petition for judicial review based on a lack of standing.

      Facts
[3]   Consistent with our standard of review, we take the allegations made in the

      petition as true. The Shinalls own a home, which they purchased in 2005,

      located at 3 Cedar Trail, Ogden Dunes, Indiana. The Shinalls’ home is located

      on a hill. The Tarpos own property, which they purchased in 2015, located at

      58 Shore Drive in Ogden Dunes. The Tarpos’ property is on the south shore of

      Lake Michigan. The Shinalls’ home is almost directly south of the Tarpos’

      property, such that the Shinalls have a view of Lake Michigan from their home

      over the roof line of the Tarpos’ existing home.

[4]   The Ogden Dunes Zoning Code (“Zoning Code”) limits the height of

      residential buildings to thirty feet. Desiring to build a new 6,500 foot home on

      their property, in 2022, the Tarpos petitioned the BZA for a number of
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023         Page 2 of 16
      variances, only one of which is the subject of the instant appeal, namely, a

      variance of the residential building height restriction from thirty feet to thirty-

      nine feet. In May 2022, the Shinalls received notice that the Tarpos had applied

      for the height variance. On June 9, 2022, a public hearing was held on the

      Tarpos’ application, at which the Shinalls argued against the variance. At the

      conclusion of the public hearing, the BZA approved the height variance.

[5]   On June 28, 2022, the Shinalls filed their Verified Petition for Review of Zoning

      Decision in which they made the following relevant allegations:

              9. The [Shinalls] reside and own the property located at 3 Cedar
              Trail, Ogden Dunes, Indiana 46368 . . . Pursuant to Indiana
              Code 36-7-4-1603(2), they have standing to bring this Petition
              because they are persons aggrieved by the zoning decision and
              they participated in the board hearing that led to the decision by
              (A) appearing at the BZA hearing on June 9, 2022, in person and
              presenting relevant evidence . . . and (B) filing with the BZA a
              written opposition statement setting forth facts and opinions
              relating to the request for variance.

                                                       ***

              28. The Tarpos' property is on the south shore of Lake Michigan.
              Petitioners reside at 3 Cedar Trail, Ogden Dunes, which is
              almost directly south of the Tarpos' property. Petitioners enjoy
              excellent, elevated lake views, including views over the roof line
              of the Tarpos' current house. If the Tarpos are permitted to
              construct a house higher than the 30-foot height limitation in the
              Zoning Code, Petitioners' lake views will be substantially
              reduced, which will interfere with their use and enjoyment of
              their property.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023            Page 3 of 16
        29. The variance not only will substantially and adversely affect
        Petitioners[’] use and enjoyment of their property, but it also will
        also affect the value of their property. The negative impact on the
        value is both obvious and readily confirmable by comparing the
        valuations of the properties with lake views to those without lake
        views. One real estate expert, Andy Krause (principal data
        scientist at Greenfield Advisors, a real-estate research company)
        estimates that a house like Petitioners', on a hill with a largely
        unobstructed water view, is worth significantly more than a
        comparable house without a water view: "A home partway up a
        hill with a partially obstructed water view over neighbors'
        rooftops could increase the overall price by 10 to 30%" and "the
        same home, in the same location, with an unobstructed view"
        could increase the price by "30-50%." Based on this research—
        and common knowledge—Petitioners' current lake view
        significantly enhances the value of our property, and anything
        that reduces that lake view would reduce the value accordingly.

        30. Several other neighboring properties on Cedar Trail and the
        south side of Shore Drive also have lake views that will be
        obstructed or reduced if the Tarpos are allowed to construct a 39-
        foot house despite the 30-foot height limit in the Zoning Code
        (e.g., 1 Cedar Trail, 5 Cedar Trail, 57 Shore Drive, and 61 Shore
        Drive).

                                                 ***

        32. All five of the neighboring property owners whose lake views,
        enjoyment, use and values will be most affected by the variance
        either joined Petitioners' Opposition (1 Cedar Trail, 3 Cedar
        Trail, 61 Shore Drive, and 5 Cedar Trail) or submitted their own
        written objection to the requested variance (57 Shore Drive). In
        addition, several other neighboring property owners and Ogden
        Dunes residents also submitted written objections to the request
        variance.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023           Page 4 of 16
               33. Thus, all of the neighboring property owners, whose "use and
               value" would be "adversely affected" and whose interests the
               BZA is required to consider, respect and protect under the
               governing variance standards (Zoning Code § 152.204(E)(2)(c)),
               submitted objections to the proposed variance.

      (Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 15-16, 23-24) (footnotes omitted). The Shinalls

      argued, among other things, that the BZA’s decision should be set aside

      because it was inconsistent with the Zoning Code’s standards, it was

      unsupported by the evidence, and because it was arbitrary, capricious, and an

      abuse of the BZA’s limited discretion. As required by statute, the Shinalls filed

      a certified copy of the BZA record of proceedings with their Petition for Judicial

      Review.

[6]   On September 23, 2022, the Defendants filed their Joint Motion to Dismiss for

      lack of standing pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), along with a

      memorandum of law in support. The Defendants contended that the Shinalls

      had no legally protected right to an unobstructed lake view under Indiana

      common law and that “[a]ny right of [the Shinalls] to an unobstructed view of

      the lake flows from the Ogden Dunes zoning ordinance and height restrictions

      in the ordinance.” (Appellants’ App. Vol. III, pp. 156-57). In their response to

      the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Shinalls contended that the Defendants

      had conceded that the Zoning Code furnished them with a legally protected

      interest in the view of the lake from their home. On November 3, 2022, the

      trial court held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion at which no evidence was

      heard.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023         Page 5 of 16
[7]    On December 15, 2022, the trial court issued its Order, dismissing the Shinalls’

       Petition for Judicial Review due to lack of standing. The trial court did not

       enter findings of fact in support of its ruling. However, citing Bagnall v. Town of

       Beverly Shores, 726 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. 2000) and EP MSS LLC v. Merrillville Bd. of

       Zoning Appeals, 192 N.E.3d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, the trial court

       concluded that the “Shinalls are not aggrieved by any perceived hindrance to

       their prospective lake views. Thus, they cannot maintain standing to pursue

       judicial review of the BZA’s granted height variance.” (Appellants’ App. Vol.

       II, p. 10).

[8]    The Shinalls now appeal.

       Decision
[9]    The Shinalls argue that the trial court erred by finding that they did not have

       standing to petition for judicial review of the zoning decision. Specifically, they

       argue that the facts alleged in their petition satisfy the standing requirements

       outlined in INDIANA CODE § 36-7-4-1603(a)(2). We agree.

[10]   “Motions to dismiss for lack of standing may be brought under Trial Rule

       12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Thomas v.

       Blackford County Area Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 907 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ind. 2009).

       The allegations made by the petitioner are taken as true. Id. Because the

       question of standing is purely a legal question, we owe no deference to the trial

       court’s decision, and we review it de novo. Common Council of Michigan City v.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023          Page 6 of 16
       Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Michigan City, 881 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2008).

[11]   In order to establish standing to obtain judicial review of a zoning decision, our

       General Assembly has outlined several preconditions that must be met, one of

       which is relevant in this case. A person has standing if:

                (2)     A person aggrieved by the zoning decision who participated in the
                        board hearing that led to the decision, either:

                        (A)      by appearing at the hearing in person, by agent, or by
                                 attorney and presenting relevant evidence; or

                        (B)      by filing with the board a written statement setting forth any
                                 facts or opinions relating to the decision.

       I.C. § 36-7-4-1603(a)(2) (emphasis added). The only issue here is whether the

       Shinalls have established that they are aggrieved by the zoning decision.

[12]   “To be aggrieved, the petitioner must experience a ‘substantial grievance, a

       denial of some personal or property right or the imposition . . . of a burden or

       obligation.’” Bagnall, 726 N.E.2d at 786 (quoting Union Tp. Residents Ass’n v.

       Whitley County Redevelopment Comm’n, 536 N.E.2d 1044, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1989)). Further, the zoning decision “must infringe upon a legal right of the

       petitioner that will be ‘enlarged or diminished by the result of the appeal’ and

       the petitioner’s resulting injury must be pecuniary in nature. [A] party seeking

       to petition for [judicial review] on behalf of a community must show some

       special injury other than that sustained by the community as a whole.” Bagnall,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023               Page 7 of 16
       726 N.E.2d at 786 (quoting Robertson v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Town of Chesterton,

       699 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).

[13]   In this case, the trial court based its decision to dismiss the Shinalls’ petition for

       judicial review on two cases: Bagnall and EP MSS LLC. A review of these two

       cases reveals that they are easily distinguishable.

[14]   In Bagnall, Michael and Deborah Pavel (“the Pavels”) owned property in the

       town of Beverly Shores. They filed three petitions with the Board of Zoning

       Appeals of the Town of Beverly Shores (“the Board”) requesting variances from

       ordinances so that they could build an addition onto their home and alter the

       placement of a well. After several hearings, the Board granted the Pavels’

       petitions. George and Ann Bagnall (“the Bagnalls”), who owned a property

       three lots away from the Pavels’ property, timely petitioned for judicial review

       of the Board’s decisions. In response, the Board filed motions to dismiss, one

       of which alleged that the Bagnalls lacked standing. After a hearing, the trial

       court granted the motions to dismiss because “the Bagnalls’ lot was not

       adjacent to or surrounding the Pavel lot in that there [were] three (3) lots of 50

       feet each between Lot 7 and Lot 11 for a total separation of 150 feet and that

       the Bagnalls [did] not have a substantial grievance, a legal right, legal interest or

       pecuniary injury.” Bagnall, 726 N.E.2d at 786 (cleaned up). On appeal, our

       supreme court agreed and held that nothing in the Bagnalls’ petition or the

       evidence presented had shown how the variance would result in infringement of

       a legal right resulting in pecuniary injury or a special injury beyond that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023             Page 8 of 16
       sustained by the entire community. Id. Here, however, the Shinalls’ petition

       contain many allegations as to how they had been aggrieved.

[15]   Turning to EP MSS LLC, DG Properties (“DG”) owned commercial property

       containing retail establishments and a 69,000 square foot vacant building in the

       City of Merrillville. At some point, it wanted to convert a portion of its

       property into a self-storage facility. To facilitate its desire, DG petitioned for a

       variance because a storage facility was not a permitted use on the property as it

       was currently zoned. EP MSS LLC (“EP”), which operated a self-storage

       facility approximately one mile away from DG’s property, objected to the

       proposed variance. After considering the arguments of the parties, the

       Merrillville Board of Zoning Appeals unanimously recommended approval of

       DG’s petition to the Merrillville Town Council, which subsequently approved

       the variance. EP filed a petition for judicial review challenging the approval of

       DG’s petition for a variance. EP asserted that it was aggrieved because the

       “market for self-storage units in Merrillville was already oversaturated and the

       variance would render existing self-storage businesses less profitable, possibly

       leading them all to fail.” EP MSS LLC, 192 N.E.3d at 983. In other words, EP

       claimed that increased competition would impair its ability to make a profit.

       DG filed a motion to dismiss claiming EP lacked standing. After a hearing, the

       trial court granted DG’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, another panel of this

       Court noted that zoning boards are not charged under any Indiana statute with

       protecting private businesses from competition. Id. at 986. We specifically

       explained that“[r]estricting competition among private businesses does not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023            Page 9 of 16
       serve any of the specifically enumerated purposes in” INDIANA CODE § 36-7-4-

       601, “and [EP] does not argue that it serves any other purpose this chapter of

       the Indiana Code is meant to protect.” Id. As a result, this Court affirmed the

       trial court’s decision. We held that EP had failed to show any pecuniary harm

       beyond being exposed to competition in our free-market system, which is a risk

       borne by the community as a whole. EP MSS LLC, 192 N.E.2d at 987. Unlike

       EP, the Shinalls have adequately established the pecuniary harm they would

       suffer.

[16]   Having distinguished these two cases, we turn to an argument made by the

       Defendants in their appellees’ brief. The Defendants argue that our decision in

       Center Township Corp. v. City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),

       trans. denied declined to establish a view of the water as a compensable property

       right. As a result, the Defendants argue that the Shinalls could not have

       standing to challenge the variance because they had no legal right to a

       waterfront view of Lake Michigan from their property. Again, we disagree.

[17]   In Center Township Corp., the City of Mishawaka (“the City”) initiated a plan to

       build a pedestrian footbridge from Lincoln Park across the St. Joseph River to

       Kamm Island, which was owned by the City. At some point, owners of

       condominiums along the riverfront filed a complaint “for inverse

       condemnation, nuisance, and anticipatory trespass for the construction of the

       pedestrian bridge between Lincoln Park and Kamm Island.” Id. at 766. The

       condominium owners argued that the construction of the pedestrian bridge

       interfered with their use and enjoyment of their property, including the view of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023          Page 10 of 16
the river, to such a degree that it amounted to a taking under the “Indiana and

United States Constitutions.” Id. After a hearing on whether a taking had

occurred, the trial court found that the condominium owners had suffered a loss

to the value of their property values “based upon the loss of view and the loss of

free use and enjoyment of the property, including the right to ingress and egress,

the right to construct a pier, wharf or boat dock and the right to boat and fish in

the river[.]” Id. at 766-767. Arguing that Indiana did not recognize “a right to

a view as part of the bundle of riparian rights,” the City filed a motion to

reconsider.1 Id. at 767. The trial court granted the motion, but only altered its

ruling by indicating that the existence of a right to a view for riparian rights “is

best left to an appellate court . . . .” Id. The trial court then appointed

appraisers to “assess the amount of just compensation owed to the

[condominium owners] as a result of the taking of” their rights. Id. After the

report had been issued, all parties objected and demanded a jury trial on

damages. A jury trial was held where the sole issue was damages. At the

conclusion of the trial, the trial court issued final instructions, one of which

stated that damages had to be confined to the loss of riparian rights. However,

1
  “The term ‘riparian rights’ indicates a bundle of rights that turn on the physical relationship of a body of
water to the land abutting it. Riparian rights are special rights pertaining to the use of water in a waterway
adjoining the owner’s property. Riparian rights of the owners of lands fronting navigable waters are derived
from common law as modified by statute. According to some authorities, riparian rights do not necessarily
constitute an independent estate and are not property rights per se; they are merely licenses or privileges.
Stated differently, they constitute property rights of a qualified or restricted nature.” Center Townhouse Corp. v.
City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023                                     Page 11 of 16
       the trial court specifically stated that loss of view should not be considered. The

       condominium owners objected, and an appeal was taken by all parties.

[18]   On appeal, another panel of this Court concluded that a taking had occurred.

       However, our Court noted that, while riparian rights are defined by INDIANA

       CODE § 14-29-1-4, it is not clear that this statute is a complete definition. We

       noted that “other states have recognized a riparian right to an unobstructed

       view as a legally protected use.” Id. at 771. The condominium owners urged

       “us to follow suit,” but we declined their invitation. Id. at 772. We held that the

       “scope of a landowner’s view, whether of the water or otherwise, is a policy

       decision best left to the legislative branch generally and the local zoning

       authorities specifically, who can determine appropriate and reasonable

       setbacks, maximum height requirements, and the like, suitable to the plan or

       design of that particular region, area, or neighborhood.” Id. at 772.

[19]   This is exactly what has happened in this case. The Town of Ogden Dunes

       exercised its policy prerogative and adopted a Zoning Code limiting the height

       of residential construction to thirty feet. Since 2005, the Shinalls have owned

       property that has afforded them a view of Lake Michigan over the rooftop of

       the Tarpos’ existing home. The Tarpos sought a variance from the Zoning

       Code allowing them to build a home exceeding the height restriction. The

       Shinalls assert that the proposed home would interfere with their use and

       enjoyment of their property by blocking their view of Lake Michigan.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023         Page 12 of 16
[20]   The Shinalls were required to establish that they had a substantial grievance

       against the variance. Bagnall, 726 N.E.2d at 786. In other words, the Shinalls

       “must have a legal interest which will be enlarged or diminished by the result of

       the appeal. In order for a party to be entitled to appeal from a final action, it

       must appear that it has substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation

       and that it is prejudiced or aggrieved from the action from which it seeks to

       appeal.” Union Tp. Residents Ass’n, Inc., 536 N.E.2d at 1045.

[21]   Taken as true, the allegations in Shinalls’ petition clearly establish that they are

       aggrieved for purposes of establishing standing to seek judicial review under

       INDIANA CODE § 36-7-4-1603(a)(2). The Zoning Code established a thirty-foot

       height restriction for residential construction. The record in this case reveals

       that for almost two decades the Shinalls have enjoyed a waterfront view of Lake

       Michigan over the roofline of the Tarpos’ existing home. The Shinalls’ petition

       asserted that they have a marketable interest in the property value associated

       with the waterfront view from with their property. Further, the petition asserts

       that the proposed variance allowing the Tarpos to build their home would

       obstruct the Shinalls’ view of Lake Michigan, diminishing the property value of

       the Shinalls’ home and the values of adjacent properties. In addition, the facts

       alleged not only demonstrate a pecuniary injury but establish an injury beyond

       that to be suffered by the community as a whole. In other words, only the

       Shinalls and the adjacent property owners would likely suffer from the loss of

       enjoyment and market value from an obstructed waterfront view of Lake

       Michigan. As a result, we hold the Shinalls had standing because they had a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023          Page 13 of 16
       substantial grievance with BZA’s decision granting a variance to the Tarpos.

       As a result, the trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

       and we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

[22]   Reversed and remanded.

       Altice, C.J., concurs.

       Riley, J., dissents with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023        Page 14 of 16
[23]   Riley, Judge dissenting.

[24]   [1] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Shinalls have

       standing to seek judicial review in this matter. Indiana Code section 36-7-4-

       1603(a)(2) requires that, in order to have standing to contest a zoning decision,

       a person must be “aggrieved” by that decision. Our supreme court has

       explained that in order to be “aggrieved” for purposes of establishing standing,

       the petitioner must allege the denial of some legally protected right, either a

       “personal or property right”, by the zoning authority’s decision. Bagnall v. Town

       of Beverly Shores, 726 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind. 2000). In EP MSS, cited by the

       majority, this court examined the nature of EP MSS’s claimed injury and found

       no standing, holding that EP MSS did not have “a legal right to be free from

       increased competition.” EP MSS LLC v. Merrillville Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 192

       N.E.3d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Thus, we have concluded

       that it is not adequate to confer standing when petitioners seeking judicial

       review are nearby property owners or even that they assert a pecuniary loss;

       rather, petitioners must also have a legal right to the interest they claim was

       injured. See id. The interest the Shinalls claim is injured in this case is their

       right to a view to Lake Michigan over the roofline of the Tarpos’ home.

       However, we have already concluded in Center Townhouse Corporation v. City of

       Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, that

       Indiana does not recognize any common law riparian right of an unobstructed

       view of water by a landowner.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023            Page 15 of 16
[25]   [2] The majority distinguishes EP MSS merely on the basis that, here, the

       Shinalls alleged a pecuniary loss, and, citing Center Townhouse Corporation, it

       holds that the Shinalls’ standing issues from the fact that “[t]he Town of Ogden

       Dunes exercised its policy prerogative and adopted a Zoning Code limiting the

       height of residential construction to thirty feet.” Slip op. at 12. However, if

       standing is conferred by the existence of a zoning statute itself, there is no limit

       to who may claim standing to contest a zoning decision. Because the majority’s

       decision today throws open the floodgates of standing and conflicts with

       Bagnall, EP MSS, and Center Townhouse Corporation, I dissent.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3098| June 16, 2023           Page 16 of 16