Court Opinion

ID: 9900540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-19 15:08:26.818514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:09.243703
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                            ══════════
                             No. 22-0321
                            ══════════

      In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Company and
                     Marianne Michele Cagle,
                                Relators

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
           On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                            PER CURIAM

      Following a car wreck in April 2017, Thalia Harris settled with
the other driver for his policy limits. Harris then sued her insurer for
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits.        The insurer disputed the
amount of Harris’s alleged damages and sought production from her
primary care physician of Harris’s medical records. The request covered
a time period of fifteen years—later narrowed to ten years—during
which Harris was involved in five other car accidents, some of which
caused injuries similar to those she sustained in the April 2017 accident.
Harris moved to quash the discovery and for sanctions. The trial court
granted the motion and ordered the insurer’s counsel to pay $2,000 as a
sanction. The insurer seeks a writ of mandamus, asserting the trial
court abused its discretion by quashing the requested discovery. We
agree and conditionally grant the writ.
      Thalia Harris was driving in April 2017 when a car driven by
Darien Haynes veered from an adjacent lane and struck her car. Harris
alleges that she incurred $17,632.60 in past medical expenses because
of the accident and will incur over $265,000 in future medical expenses,
plus additional damages. Harris sued Haynes, who ultimately offered
his liability policy limits of $100,000 to settle. Harris accepted with the
permission of her insurer, Liberty County Mutual Insurance Company.
Harris then asked Liberty to pay her alleged damages in excess of
$100,000 under the UIM provision in her policy. Liberty refused, so
Harris sued Liberty and the adjuster assigned to her claim, alleging
violations of the Insurance Code1 and seeking a declaration of her
entitlement to UIM benefits.
      During a deposition taken in her lawsuit against Haynes, Harris
testified that her “head hit the steering wheel” and that she “injured my
right shoulder and then my back.” In support of her damages claims,
Harris filed billing affidavits and records from several medical
providers. She also produced a “Plan of Anticipated Future Medical
Expenses” in support of some of her future medical expenses that she
attributes to the April 2017 accident. According to the future-care plan,
the April 2017 accident caused injuries to Harris’s “cervical spine (neck,
including headaches and radiation of pain into her extremities—
including her arm and shoulder), her thoracic spine (middle back), her
lumbar spine (lower back, including radiation of pain into her
extremities—including her right foot) and her right shoulder.”

      1 Harris’s extra-contractual claims were abated by agreement until her

declaratory-judgment claim is decided.

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      The record shows that Harris was involved in multiple other car
accidents both before and after the April 2017 accident, some of which
caused injuries like the ones she alleges were caused by the April 2017
accident:
           Harris was in a car accident in March 2015. She testified by
            deposition that she recalled only that she had been in a car
            accident before April 2017 but did not recall when or any
            specifics.
           Two months after the April 2017 accident, Harris was in
            another car accident. She did not identify this accident when
            asked at her deposition about motor vehicle accidents since
            April 2017.
           Harris was in another accident in April 2018. She testified
            that she injured her neck and her back in this accident.
           Harris was rear-ended on the highway in June 2019.
            Following that accident, she “sought treatment for my neck
            and my back” and experienced a “tingling” in her right leg that
            she continues to live with.
           Harris was in another car accident in January 2020, but she
            did not identify this accident when asked about motor vehicle
            accidents since April 2017.
      Liberty served two Notices of Intention to Take Deposition by
Written Question, each with a subpoena duces tecum, to Harris’s
primary care physician, Dr. F.J. Simmons. One of the subpoenas sought
all documents pertaining to Dr. Simmons’s care, treatment, and
examination of Harris covering the fifteen-year period from April 2007
(ten years before her accident with Haynes) to the date of the subpoena,
approximately five years after the accident. Specifically, the subpoena
sought the following:

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      All documents and records stored in any format or method
      including, but not limited to, all medical records, intake
      forms, patient completed forms and/or documents,
      correspondence, all office records, emergency room records
      or reports, inpatient and outpatient charts and records,
      lien files, SOAP notes, pathology records and reports, lab
      reports, pharmacy and prescription records, physical
      therapy records, sign-in sheets, all descriptions of exercises
      prescribed, documentation which indicate date and time of
      patient’s appointments, insurance documents, all radiology
      reports and readings, and any other documents maintained
      pertaining to the care, treatment and examination of
      Thalia Harris AKA: Thalia N. Harris, from 04/01/2007 to
      present.
      The second subpoena requested films and images maintained by
Dr. Simmons over the same fifteen-year period:
      COPIES of all original x-rays [sic] films, CT scans, MRIs
      and any other scans or images maintained . . . and all
      radiological reports and records maintained, including a
      comprehensive list of all dates and body parts of all films,
      CT scans, MRIs and all other images or scans taken and/or
      maintained, pertaining to Thalia Harris AKA: Thalia N.
      Harris, from 04/01/2007 to present.
      Harris moved to quash both DWQs, arguing that each “on its face
is overly broad, not limited in scope, and is a mere fishing expedition”
and that Liberty “has no legitimate need for these records as requested.”
Harris also sought monetary sanctions under Rule of Civil Procedure 13
or the court’s inherent power for her counsel’s attorney’s fees,
contending that Liberty’s counsel “knowingly, intentionally and
purposefully sent frivolous DWQs.”2 In response, Liberty argued that

      2 Harris also moved to quash DWQs that Liberty sent to various
insurance companies for their records relating to some of her other car

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Harris’s allegations, in which she claims to have suffered personal
injuries caused by the April 2017 accident in an amount greater than
$100,000, warrant discovery of her medical condition before the accident
and any complaints to or treatment by Dr. Simmons, who is Harris’s
primary care physician.3 Liberty noted in its written response that it “is
willing to narrow the pre-accident time period” and that it “has offered
to reduce the time period of its request to Harris’s primary care
physician.”
       At a hearing on Harris’s motion, Liberty again represented that
it “lessened the scope of the request to Ms. Harris’ PCP.” When the trial
court asked why Liberty’s request is “going back 15 years,” Liberty’s
counsel responded, “I have no problem pulling that down” and that “we
offered in our response brief . . . to limit the scope of the PCP records.”
He also stated at the hearing that Harris’s counsel could review Dr.
Simmons’s records and “withhold the ones that are irrelevant . . . or
privileged” before producing the documents to Liberty. Liberty’s counsel
concluded by asking the court to allow it to obtain the discovery sought
“as modified, in our response; that is, . . . limiting the request to her
PCP, Dr. Simmons, to five years before and five years after the accident,
with the condition that those records are provided to [Harris’s counsel]
first with giving him . . . two weeks to review and produce the records,

accidents, making nearly identical arguments and seeking the same sanctions.
Although both motions were argued together, the trial court did not rule on the
motion regarding discovery of the insurance company records.
       3 The parties do not dispute that Dr. Simmons was Harris’s primary

care physician during the time period for which discovery was sought. Harris’s
counsel also describes Dr. Simmons as her “OB/GYN physician.”

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withholding any that are privileged.” In response, Harris’s counsel
noted that at least two other trial court judges had quashed similar
discovery requests and imposed sanctions “for the same thing” that
Liberty had done.
      The trial court granted Harris’s motion and quashed the notices
without specifying the reasons.     The court also found that “defense
counsel has acted in bad faith” and ordered “defense counsel” to pay
$2,000 as a sanction. Liberty filed a mandamus petition in the court of
appeals, which was denied. 2022 WL 1076175 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr.
11, 2022). Liberty then sought mandamus relief from this Court.
      A party establishes its right to mandamus relief by showing that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the party lacks an
adequate remedy by appeal. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex.
2018). A discovery order that denies a party’s requested discovery on
improper grounds and thus prevents that party from developing a
defense that goes to the heart of its case is an abuse of discretion for
which mandamus may be appropriate. See In re K & L Auto Crushers,
LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 256 (Tex. 2021).
      Our procedural rules generally permit discovery of “any matter
that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). We have said that the purpose of
discovery is to enable courts to decide disputes based on “what the facts
reveal, not by what facts are concealed.”         K & L Auto Crushers,
627 S.W.3d at 248 (quoting Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 384, 394 (Tex. 2014)).       While the permissible scope of
discovery is broad, trial courts must consider proportionality and weigh

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a party’s right to discovery against the needs of the case. See In re State
Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. 2017). This proportionality
inquiry requires case-by-case balancing in light of several factors,
including the likely benefit of the requested discovery, the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation, the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the litigation, and any other articulable factor
bearing on proportionality.    Id. at 607-12.    Ultimately, the “court’s
responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to
consider [the proportionality] factors in reaching a case-specific
determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.” Id. at 615 (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 committee’s note to 2015 amendment) (alteration in
original).
       Liberty contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
completely denying its requests for discovery from Harris’s primary care
physician. Liberty argues that the requested documents are relevant
and discoverable because Harris has placed the existence, causation,
and extent of her alleged injuries at issue by suing and, indeed,
testifying that she suffered back and neck injuries—for which she seeks
damages in this case—in other accidents that occurred within the time
period covered by the DWQs. According to Liberty, precluding it from
obtaining these records vitiates or severely compromises its ability to
present a viable defense at trial. We agree.
       Having settled with Haynes, Harris’s suit for UIM benefits
requires her to prove in this case Haynes’s liability for the accident and
the existence and amount of her damages. See In re USAA Gen. Indem.

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Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 788 (Tex. 2021) (describing the coverage trial as
resembling “a typical car wreck case” (internal quotation omitted)).
Specifically, Harris must prove that Haynes’s negligence caused the
April 2017 accident, which in turn caused her to suffer damages
exceeding the $100,000 she was paid by Haynes’s insurer. Information
that is relevant to these disputed issues is discoverable unless privileged
or disproportionate in light of the factors discussed above. See id. at
791-93. In personal injury cases, relevant evidence at trial includes both
evidence of the injured person’s pre-occurrence condition and the course
of her physical condition and progress after the occurrence. Guevara v.
Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 666-67 (Tex. 2007). And we have held that
information about the insured’s pre-existing medical condition at the
time of the accident is relevant to the insurer’s damages defenses. In re
Cent. Or. Truck Co., 644 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. 2022).
      Aside from Harris herself, Dr. Simmons is likely the only person
who can provide evidence of Harris’s pre-accident condition.           Dr.
Simmons’s records may also evidence the existence and extent of
Harris’s injuries following the April 2017 accident, based on Harris’s
complaints (or lack thereof) and any testing or observations by the
doctor immediately after the accident. In addition, there is evidence of
other car accidents that caused physical injuries similar to those Harris
attributes to the April 2017 accident. Dr. Simmons’s records may show
what, if anything, Harris reported about those other accidents, which
could affect a factfinder’s decision about the causal link between her
physical injuries and the April 2017 accident. Even if Dr. Simmons’s
records do not reflect any discussion of or treatment for the April 2017

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accident, the absence of that information may itself be relevant to the
jury’s deliberations.   For all these reasons, Liberty is entitled to
discovery from Harris’s primary care physician.
      In response, Harris does not dispute that some of the information
Liberty seeks is relevant. Instead, Harris contends the trial court did
not clearly abuse its discretion because the document request was
“excessive” and “plainly overbroad.” In the trial court, Harris primarily
argued that Liberty’s requests were not reasonably tailored and
constituted an improper fishing expedition because they asked Dr.
Simmons to produce “[a]ll documents and records.”           But Liberty’s
request was limited to documents “pertaining to the care, treatment and
examination of Thalia Harris,” which is a relevant subject for discovery
given the dispute over the existence, cause, and extent of Harris’s
alleged personal injuries. See Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 666-67. Nothing
in the record suggests that the trial court considered the proportionality
factors, as we have said courts must do. State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d
at 615. To the contrary, by quashing all discovery from Harris’s primary
physician, the court’s order runs afoul of our comment to Rule 192 that
a court “abuses its discretion in unreasonably restricting a party’s access
to information through discovery.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 cmt. 7.
      In arguing to this Court that the trial court was justified in
quashing the discovery as overbroad, Harris focuses exclusively on the
document requests as originally written.          But Liberty expressly
narrowed the timeframe of its original requests to five years before the
accident and five years after. The record shows that Harris was involved
in car accidents both before and after the April 2017 accident and that

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at least some of them involved similar injuries to those she claims arose
from the accident at issue here. Liberty’s request as modified therefore
does not seek production of records from “an unreasonably long time
period” so as to make it impermissibly overbroad. See In re CSX Corp.,
124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (“Discovery orders requiring document
production from an unreasonably long time period or from distant and
unrelated locales are impermissibly overbroad.”); cf. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 74.052(c) (requiring a plaintiff asserting a health care
liability claim to provide a medical authorization form identifying,
among other things, all physicians or health care providers who
examined, evaluated, or treated the plaintiff “during a period
commencing five years prior to the incident”). And Harris presents no
argument to the contrary. In light of Liberty’s agreed limitation, the
trial court clearly abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash.
See K & L Auto Crushers, 627 S.W.3d at 251 (concluding that the trial
court should have considered concessions made on the record at a
hearing in determining whether a party’s document requests were
sufficiently narrowed and targeted).
      Harris also argues that the discovery requests would impose
significant burdens on Harris and her counsel, and at “personal cost to
her privacy.” The question of whether a discovery request is unduly
burdensome is distinct from the question of whether it is overbroad. In
re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2014). Harris does
not assert any undue burden on Dr. Simmons to produce the requested
documents. And Harris presented no evidence to support her conclusory
allegations that having her counsel review the requested documents for

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relevance or privilege would be unduly burdensome. See K & L Auto
Crushers, 627 S.W.3d at 253 (“[A] party resisting discovery must do
more than ‘make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is
unduly burdensome.’” (quoting In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d
173, 181 (Tex. 1999))).
      Liberty’s discovery requests sought relevant information and
were not so broad or disproportionate as to justify an order precluding
all discovery from Dr. Simmons. Harris failed to demonstrate that
responding to these discovery requests would be unduly burdensome.
The trial court therefore clearly abused its discretion by quashing the
discovery.
      We further conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate in this
case. If a discovery order vitiates or severely compromises a party’s
ability to present a viable claim or defense at trial, an appeal is not an
adequate remedy. In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex.
2021) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992)). We
recently held that mandamus relief was appropriate when an order
quashed requested discovery because it effectively denied a party’s
reasonable opportunity to develop a defense that goes to the heart of its
case and the appellate court could not evaluate on appeal the effect of
the trial court’s denial of discovery from third parties. K & L Auto
Crushers, 627 S.W.3d at 256.
      The central issue in this UIM lawsuit is the extent of Harris’s
injuries that were caused by the April 2017 accident. The trial court’s
order prevents Liberty from obtaining records from Harris’s primary
doctor regarding her pre-accident condition and whether she complained

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of similar injuries from her multiple other car accidents. That discovery
may produce information that undercuts the evidence adduced by
Harris and her hand-selected providers regarding the cause of Harris’s
ailments.     The discovery order thus denies Liberty a reasonable
opportunity to develop a defense that goes to the heart of its case. And
because the absent discovery is from a third party, the information
sought cannot be part of the appellate record, making it difficult, if not
impossible, to determine on appeal whether its absence at trial affected
the outcome. We thus conclude that the trial court’s order vitiates or
severely compromises Liberty’s ability to present a viable defense at
trial and an appeal is not an adequate remedy. Moreover, by Harris’s
own admission, other trial courts have been issuing similarly erroneous
orders. While we are mindful that mandamus review should not be
overused, mandamus is appropriate in select cases to afford appropriate
guidance to the law. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (finding mandamus relief appropriate for an issue
that had arisen in other cases and was likely to recur but eluded answer
by appeal).
      We also set aside the trial court’s award of sanctions. Harris’s
only asserted basis for sanctions was Liberty’s allegedly “frivolous”
discovery requests. Because we conclude the trial court clearly abused
its discretion by quashing Liberty’s discovery requests, there is nothing
in the record to support the sanctions order. See Glob. Servs., Inc. v.
Bianchi, 901 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1995) (holding that a movant’s
failure to establish sanctionable conduct rendered a trial court’s
sanctions order a clear abuse of discretion).

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      Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c), we
conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to
vacate its April 4, 2022 order quashing the deposition notices directed
to Dr. Simmons and ordering sanctions. We are confident the trial court
will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.

OPINION DELIVERED: November 17, 2023

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