Court Opinion

ID: 9588412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:17.123543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.744667
License: Public Domain

Cureton, Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the opinion written by Judge Goolsby because it reflects both accurate facts and the applicable law in this case.
First, a distinction must be made between actual agency (whether expressed or implied) and ostensible agency. The following statement reflects the general rule:
An implied agency is distinguishable from an agency by estoppel, or ostensible agency,... although the two are often confused and the courts as a rule do not distinguish them but use the terms synonymously. An implied agency is an actual agency as much as if it were created by express words, and is a fact to be shown or ascertained by inferences and deductions from other facts for which the principal is responsible, while agency by estoppel should strictly be limited to those cases where the authority is not real but apparent.
2A C. J. S. Agency Section 52 (1972). Accord, Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Ledford, 194 S. C. 347, 9 S. E. (2d) 804 (1940).
In this case, even a cursory reading of the record shows *70that there is no evidence that McCampbell was the actual (implied) agent of Mobil Oil. The only evidence presented by Watkins in his case in chief on the question of agency was his own testimony that the manager of the station “was dressed in a Mobil Oil uniform, a light blue jacket with the Mobil emblem.” On the other hand, Branham, Mobil’s witness, and a manager for Station Operators, testified that Station Operators operated the store and had hired and supervised McCampbell. He further testified that Mobil had nothing to do with the store’s operation.1 Clearly, such evidence does not show actual agency.
On the issue of ostensible agency, Branham stated on cross-examination that the store displayed Mobil’s signs and sold Mobil gasoline. He responded to a question by Watkins’ (counsel as follows:
Q. My question to you, very, very, simply, down to earth, did anybody that came up to that station had no (sic) reason to believe that they were dealing with anybody but Mobil Oil Company and the people that worked for Mobil Oil Company?
A. That’s right, that right.
When a third party relies, as Watkins evidently does, on an ostensible or apparent agency,2 all of the elements of an estoppel must be present. There must be conduct or a representation calculated to mislead, an actual reliance upon such representation and a change of position or injury in reliance upon such representation. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Ledford, supra; 2A C. J. S. Agency Section 61. The record is devoid of any evidence that Watkins relied upon the actions or inactions of Mobil to his injury.
Regarding the injustice that the dissent says is implicit in Judge Goolsby’s opinion, it has not been demonstrated to me why Watkins did not or cannot sue Station Operators, the admitted principal of McCampbell. I would think that jus*71tice could best be served by Watkins suing Station Operators.

 The record does not show who owned the store.

 Regardless of the dissent’s assertion that ostensible agency is irrelevant to this case, Watkins requested and received a jury charge on apparent agency. We have no way of knowing that the jury’s verdict is not based on apparent or ostensible agency.