Court Opinion

ID: 9528197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:38:14.885894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:21.776776
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the opinion of the Court because of the Court’s lack of analysis on two points which I consider extremely important. First, I am troubled by the language of the policy exclusion itself. The exclusion states that the policy does not apply “to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) any member of the same household .... ” (Emphasis added.) Farmers Insurance argues that this exclusion is meant to apply to any liability resulting from bodily injury to a member of the household (or a named insured, which Mrs. Porter by definition was). While that may be the meaning Farmers now wishes to put on this exclusion, I am unconvinced that this provision actually so provides. Mr. Porter was adjudicated liable for contribution in this action; he was not found liable to Mrs. Porter for damages for *137bodily injury.1 As with most practitioners, I have come to have the utmost confidence in the ability of insurance companies to anticipate and provide exclusions for specific types of liability. The insurance industry generally is known to both promote legislation and keep cognizant of legislation which has been enacted. See I.C. § 41-1840; Tommerup v. Albertson’s Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980). Had Farmers wished to exclude coverage of liability through contribution, I think it safe to assume they would have done so. That the contribution resulted from the injury to Mrs. Porter is of no consequence; there has never been a monetary judgment establishing Mr. Porter’s liability to Mrs. Porter. On the contrary, she has never contended that Mr. Porter was liable to her for damages. Liability is established either by judgment or by agreement to be liable, and is not necessarily the same thing as responsibility. The judgment in this case establishes only that Mr. Porter is partially responsible for Mrs. Porter’s damages, not that he is liable to her for her injuries. Since there has been no determination of Mr. Porter’s liability to Mrs. Porter, I experience difficulty understanding the manner in which the exclusion for liability to a named insured and family members is even applicable. This case involves Hasbrouck seeking contribution from Mr. Porter; it does not involve liability of Mr. Porter to Mrs. Porter. The Court’s opinion apparently does not see this as an issue necessary of resolution, or even as entitled to discussion.
Secondly, I would feel more comfortable if the opinion dealt more adequately with the contention that this exclusion .should be declared void as a matter of public policy. After noting the recent Washington case of Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb, 25 Wash.App. 841, 611 P.2d 1304 (1980), the Court states that the right to sue one’s spouse for injuries is entirely separate from the contractual obligation of an insurance company to pay for those injuries. While this is undoubtedly true, it does not explain away the Wiscomb case. There, too, the insurance company had attempted to limit its contractual obligation by excluding family members. There, too, the doctrine of spousal immunity had earlier been discarded. The court in Wiscomb noted that it was the public policy of Washington which prohibited intrafamily immunity and that the question before it was whether “an insurance company may privately contract to exclude coverage of claims between family members.” Id. at 1306. The court concluded that such an exclusion was void as against public policy:
“[Sjtrong public policy ... and society’s interest in permitting injured victims of automobile accidents to recover against the tort-feasor, even if the tort-feasor is a member of the family or household, dictates that the exclusion clause in question be declared null and void as contrary to public policy. The rationale supporting the family exclusion clause has clearly been rejected in this state, and any attempt by an insurance carrier to privately restrict recovery must be prohibited.” Id. at 1307-08.
This Court, like Washington’s, rejected the rationale which prohibited spousal immunity in Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975). That case implicitly recognized what I had always considered to be obviously sound public policy; tort victims should be able to recover against tortfeasors. Further, as stated in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 716 (Fla.1969):
“Automobile insurance has taken an important position in the modern world. It is no longer a private contract merely between two parties. The greater part of litigation in our trial courts is con*138cerned with claims arising out of property damage, personal injury or death caused by operation of motor vehicles. The legislatures of all our States have recognized the hazards and perils daily encountered and as a result have enacted various pieces of legislation aimed at the protection of the injured party.... That the general welfare is promoted by such laws can be little doubted. Government and the general public have an understandable interest in the problem. Many persons injured and disabled from automobile accidents would become public charges were it not for financial assistance received from the insurance companies.” (quoting Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co., 3 Ill.2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1954)).
Given the importance of automobile insurance, given the potential impact on society if insurance companies are allowed to exclude this class of people from coverage, and given the policy against interspousal immunity, it is understandable that the Washington court has recognized that insurance exclusions such as the present one violate public policy.
The Court’s discussion of the MVSRA seems to be a bit of a red herring; the MVSRA did not, at the time of this accident, specifically prevent this type of exclusion, but neither did it permit it.2 The question of whether this Court will sanction such an exclusion is an entirely separate one. The Court reads the exclusion into the policy and sanctions it. I do neither. I would interpret the legislature’s action in requiring compulsory insurance covering liability to family members, see I.C. §§ 49-233, 49-1521, as even further support for declaring this exclusion void as against public policy. Since the majority fails to address these issues, and because I am of the opinion that, had they been addressed, such discussion might very well have led to a different result, I respectfully dissent.

. Notwithstanding that I.C. § 6-803 and I.R. C.P. 14(a) allowed Hasbrouck to bring Mr. Porter into Mrs. Porter’s lawsuit on a claim that Mr. Porter was causally negligent, Mrs. Porter did not at any time contend that Mr. Porter was negligent. Mr. Porter was not a party defendant in Mrs. Porter’s lawsuit. Had Mrs. Porter sued Mr. Porter, her claim for relief was a cause of action which is barred by the two year statute of limitations. Hasbrouck’s lawsuit was based on the statutory liability of I.C. § 6-803, and falls into the class upon which suit must be brought in three years. I.C. § 5-218.

. As the court in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc., 107 Ariz. 291, 486 P.2d 773, 776 (1971) stated, “the legislature [by passing a financial responsibility act] focused ... attention on the need for security against uncompensated damages arising from the operation of motor vehicles on our highways.” The action of the Idaho legislature in enacting a financial responsibility act militates in favor of a holding that an exclusion such as the present one should be declared void as against public policy. I submit that the need to protect unwary insurance customers, and the need to secure against uncompensated damages arising from auto accidents, is nowhere greater than where an insurance company deliberately excludes the largest class of persons to whom an insured is likely to become liable — members of the insured’s family.