Court Opinion

ID: 9770054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:36:05.707001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:12.418409
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN,
concurring and dissenting.
We granted allocatur to clarify the holding in Commonwealth v. Young, 873 A.2d 720 (Pa.Super.2005), and address whether a voluntary confession precludes a prima facie finding that exculpatory results from DNA testing would establish actual innocence, as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 597 Pa. 233, 951 A.2d 263 (2008). I join the majority’s holding insofar as it disapproves Young, which held “an appellant cannot assert a claim of actual innocence where ... the validity of the confession has been finally litigated, found not to be coerced, and was knowingly and voluntarily given.” Young, at 727 (citation omitted). I also join the majority’s holding:
a confession, in and of itself, is not a per se bar under [§ ] 9543.1(c)(3) to a convicted individual establishing a prima facie case that the DNA testing being requested would establish actual innocence of the crime for which he or she was convicted, even if the voluntariness of that confession has been fully and finally litigated.
Majority Op., at 53,14 A.3d at 817. I dissent because I would affirm the Superior Court on an alternative basis.
*57A confession is just one aspect of the measure of evidence which may preclude a finding of innocence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. While it is not a per se bar to establishing innocence, a confession which has been deemed voluntary may lend itself to such a conclusion. The circumstances surrounding the confession may also contribute to the measure of evidence sufficient to overcome § 9543.1’s innocence requirement. A confession is, after all, just a piece of the evidentiary record. See Commonwealth v. Young, 767 A.2d 1072, 1077 (Pa.Super.2001) (Eakin, J., dissenting). The measure of evidence precluding an actual finding of innocence should be determined by an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the test which guides most criminal procedure determinations.1
Appellant confessed to raping, robbing, and murdering the victim, as well as burglarizing her home. In this statement, Appellant noted he was wearing a black Chicago Bulls sweatshirt, a pair of blue jeans, and Fila sneakers. Police recovered these items from Appellant’s home. Tests revealed the sweatshirt and jeans were splattered with the victim’s blood. The jeans also had a stain on the crotch, which appeared consistent with a combination of Appellant’s seminal fluid and the victim’s bodily fluids; however, the source of the fluid *58could not be conclusively identified because of the limitations of DNA testing in 1991.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress his statement, but the suppression court concluded it was knowing and voluntary. At trial, the Commonwealth presented Appellant’s confession, DNA evidence establishing the victim’s blood was found on the jeans in Appellant’s possession, eyewitness testimony from two people who saw Appellant enter the victim’s home the night of the murder, and testimony from two witnesses to whom Appellant made inculpatory statements. Notwithstanding its misplaced reliance on Young, the Superior Court suggested the evidence was overwhelming. I agree.
This is not a case where the evidence Appellant seeks to have tested will point to the actual killer. The stain on Appellant’s jeans, regardless of origin, cannot show Appellant did not rape and murder the victim; DNA evidence establishing the stain was not Appellant’s would not demonstrate his actual innocence. As Chief Justice Roberts indicated in District Attorney’s Office for The Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2316, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009), “DNA testing alone does not always resolve a case. Where there is enough other incriminating evidence and an explanation for the DNA result, science alone cannot prove a prisoner innocent.” Id. (citation omitted). Appellant has been found guilty. “[OJnce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears.” Id., at 2320 (citation omitted). Appellant’s access to DNA testing is not without its limits, and here, the evidence precludes the finding of innocence required by the statute.
Accordingly, I would not remand for further proceedings, but would affirm the denial of relief.

. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Housman, 604 Pa. 596, 986 A.2d 822, 840-41 (2009) (applying totality of circumstances in determining confession's voluntariness); Commonwealth v. Patton, 604 Pa. 307, 985 A.2d 1283, 1288 n. 3 (2009) ("we do not favor per se rules in error review”); Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 604 Pa. 61, 985 A.2d 847, 871 (2009) (Baer, J., concurring) (applying totality of circumstances in determining whether statement elicited at custodial interrogation); Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 603 Pa. 92, 982 A.2d 483, 501 n. 29 (2009) (determining probable cause); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 896 A.2d 1191, 1211-14 (2006) (determining whether prosecution used peremptory challenges to exclude women); Commonwealth v. Davido, 582 Pa. 52, 868 A.2d 431, 438-39 (2005) (determining whether defendant invoked right to self-representation); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 854 A.2d 489, 500-04 (2004) (determining plea’s validity); Commonwealth v. Reid, 571 Pa. 1, 811 A.2d 530, 545-46 (2002) (determining voluntariness of consent to search); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2001) (determining reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 564 Pa. 505, 769 A.2d 1116, 1127-28 (2001) (determining independent basis for identification).