Court Opinion

ID: 9491996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:29:40.05207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:03.368599
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In reversing, the court concludes that Nazarova was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that her absence should be excused due to exceptional circumstances. We lack jurisdiction over these arguments because they were not made to the BIA. Nazarova renews the argument that she made before the BIA— *486that she did not receive adequate notice because the consequences of her absence were not explained to her. As the court notes, Nazarova did receive adequate notice. And even if we had jurisdiction to address the other issues, neither merits a reversal, so I respectfully dissent.
Under the prior (and now amended) statutory scheme, which applies to this case, our review of deportation orders entered in absentia was more limited than our review of other deportation orders. An alien deported in absentia could move to reopen her case only on two grounds: that she did not receive the statutorily mandated notice, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(B); or that her absence was caused by “exceptional circumstances,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A). “Exceptional circumstances” are circumstances beyond the control of the alien “such as serious illness of the alien or death of an immediate relative, but not including less compelling-circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2). Where the BIA denies such a motion to reopen, this court’s review of that decision is limited to: (1) whether the alien received valid notice; (2) the reasons why the alien was absent from her hearing; and (3) whether clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence of deportability was established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(4).
In her petition to this court, Nazarova argues, as she did to the BIA, that she did not receive adequate notice because the consequences of her absence were not explained to her. She relates several deficiencies to support her claim: she was misled as to the availability of interpreters at the master calendar hearing; no one spoke to her in her language of the availability of an interpreter; and no one explained to her in her language the consequences of her being late. Thus, she claims she did not receive valid notice and therefore could not be deported in absen-tia.1 The court characterizes Nazarova’s argument as her being entitled to a notice written in her native language, and correctly concludes that such an argument must fail. Opn. at 483. But Nazarova’s argument goes beyond the language barrier. Before the BIA, Nazarova argued that she was provided inadequate notice of the consequences of her failure to appear on time and so she was denied due process. She makes the same argument here, asserting that under the “unique circumstances” of her case, the BIA’s refusal to reopen her hearing was a denial of due process. The “factual” basis of her argument is that the INS’s failure to provide her an interpreter at the master calendar hearing made her afraid to appear at subsequent hearings without her own interpreter lest she fail to understand, and that she did not understand that she would be deported if she did not appear on time because the IJ failed to explain this to her.2
*487The BIA correctly concluded that Naza-rova had actual notice that she could be deported in absentia if she failed to appear for her deportation hearing. Written notice was provided to Nazarova in English, and, as the court correctly concludes, notice in English to a non-English speaker is adequate because a reasonable person would obtain the services of translator to inform her of what the notice contained. If Nazarova ignored this obligation, she would be in no better position to complain about the adequacy of the notice than one who, although he could read English, threw the notice away without looking at it. In either case, actual notice has been given. And in Nazarova’s case, she did procure the services of an interpreter. Thus, the entire factual basis of Nazaro-va’s argument is false. She in fact knew the consequences of her absence; the alleged misinformation regarding the presence of an interpreter at the master calendar hearing did nothing to change this. Nazarova’s problem was not that she had no notice of the consequences of her tardiness, but that in the face of that notice she chose to wait for her interpreter. Thus, I agree with the BIA that Nazarova’s argument must fail.
The court interprets Nazarova’s argument to be that although she received notice, she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Opn. at 484. The court seems to recognize that this argument was not made to the BIA. Opn. at 482. While the court is correct that in some contexts we have the power to hear arguments forfeited below, opn. at 481-82, we cannot address arguments that were not presented to the BIA. An alien must exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), and we have no jurisdiction to review unexhausted arguments, Perez-Rodriguez v. INS, 3 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.1993). Generally, an alien need not exhaust due process claims before the BIA, but must do so where the alleged errors are — like Nazaro-va’s — procedural and can be corrected by the BIA. Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir.1993). Moreover, even if we had jurisdiction to hear this argument, I conclude that it too would fail.
The court concludes that “the course of events here conspired to deprive [Nazaro-va] of the meaningful opportunity to be heard that the due process clause guarantees.” Opn. at 485. Discussing whether the “course of events” deprived Nazarova of her opportunity to be heard misses the point. The statutory scheme that governed Nazarova’s hearing provided her with due process. The statute required that Nazarova be given notice of the time of the hearing and the consequences of her absence; that was done here. This notice satisfied due process even though it was not in Russian. And the statute provided Nazarova with a meaningful opportunity to be heard because it required a hearing at which the INS had the burden to present evidence of her deportability and at which she would be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses and present her own evidence. Nazarova was not heard' — meaningfully or otherwise — because she did not attend that hearing. Her absence was caused by her decision to sit and wait when her interpreter was late, even though she had notice that doing so might result in her deportation in absentia. Nothing the INS did forced her to make that choice.
The court concludes that the interpreter’s tardiness put Nazarova on the “horns of a dilemma.” The court supposes that Nazarova had only two choices: either proceed to the hearing without the interpreter and participate in a hearing she could not comprehend, or wait for him and risk being deported in absentia. But this presumes a false dichotomy. Nothing precluded Nazarova from attempting to contact the IJ to explain her delay, and while she certainly would have had to do this with the assistance of someone else, she had already used the help of Ms. Aizen-berg to contact the court. And had Naza-*488rova gone to the hearing, there is no reason to conclude she would have been forced to stand mute and uncomprehending while the proceeding took place around her. First, we do not know whether the INS would have provided a Russian interpreter at the hearing. Second, we do not know what the IJ would have done had Nazarova presented herself on time but conveyed that her interpreter was late or, if conveying that was beyond her abilities, simply conveyed that she could not understand. (Nazarova apparently understood enough English so that at her first hearing she was able to provide her name, birth date, and place of birth.) Even if Nazaro-va had been completely unable to understand English, her being at the hearing and speaking only Russian would have more than adequately conveyed to the IJ what her problem was. We have held that it is within the IJ’s discretion to determine whether an alien requires an interpreter. Drobny v. INS, 947 F.2d 241, 244 (7th Cir.1991). There is no reason to suppose that the IJ would not have properly exercised his discretion when presented with an alien who could speak only Russian. And a review of what he did or did not do in that circumstance would be for abuse of discretion.
The court should not blame Nazarova’s absence on the INS’s misinformation regarding the interpreter at the master calendar hearing. Although it was clear to Nazarova that she had gotten incorrect information about the first hearing, she did not attempt — through Ms. Aizenberg or the interpreter that she hired — to clarify the misunderstanding, that is, to inquire whether an interpreter would be at the deportation hearing, or what could be done to arrange for one to be provided by the INS. A single instance of misinformation does not instill in a reasonable person the notion that the INS will never provide accurate information. The inevitable fact is that Nazarova was late to her hearing because she employed an unreliable interpreter and when she discovered he was late made the bad choice of waiting for him. There is nothing “unique” about those circumstances. In fact equally sympathetic cases are often addressed by the courts of appeal.
In Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.1992), the alien was deported in absen-tia when he arrived 10 minutes after the hearing was ended because he and his attorney had “crossed signals” regarding their meeting place. The First Circuit concluded there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to reopen the proceedings. 976 F.2d at 790. In Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.1996), the aliens were 45 minutes to an hour late for their hearing due to traffic congestion and parking problems. The Ninth Circuit held that the refusal to reopen their proceedings was not an abuse of discretion nor did that refusal violate due process. 89 F.3d at 548. In de Morales v. INS, 116 F.3d 145 (5th Cir.1997), the aliens never appeared at their hearing because their car broke down on the way. The Fifth Circuit held the refusal to reopen their case was not an abuse of discretion. 116 F.3d at 148-49. And cases as sympathetic as Nazarova’s are routinely affirmed as unpublished orders. See, e.g., Cetino v. INS, 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir.1998) (no abuse of discretion to not reopen where alien missed hearing to care for her son); Gil-Garibay v. INS, 165 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.1998) (no abuse of discretion to not reopen when alien was ill on morning of hearing); Soniregun v. INS, 165 F.3d 19 (4th Cir.1998) (no abuse of discretion to not reopen where counsel sent notice of hearing to wrong apartment); Simon v. INS, 139 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.1998) (no abuse of discretion to not reopen where absence caused by counsel’s mix-up about date of hearing); Zeron v. INS, 129 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.1998) (no abuse of discretion to not reopen where alien missed hearing due to drowsiness caused by prescription medicine).
In addition to resolving the due process argument, the court raises a second issue sua sponte. It addresses the issue of *489whether Nazarova had shown “exceptional circumstances” that would excuse her absence. Nazarova raised this issue in her initial motion to reopen her case, but the IJ concluded that the facts she alleged did not meet the statutory definition. Nazaro-va never appealed this conclusion to the BIA, nor did she raise this issue in her second motion to reopen. We could conclude that Nazarova failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding this issue and that, as noted above, we are without jurisdiction to address it. But the BIA did address this issue sua sponte, so it was exhausted to the extent it could be. But Nazarova has not raised the issue in this court. Therefore this court need not address this issue, but even if properly raised the argument should fail.
The judiciary certainly can determine whether Congress intended statutory language to have a particular meaning. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-46, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (deciding whether Congress intended two different statutory phrases to have same meaning). But where Congress has delegated to the BIA the application of ambiguous statutory language on a case-by-case basis, we owe the BIA’s interpretations deference. Id. at 448, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). The open-ended definition of “exceptional circumstances” is a paradigm example of such ambiguous language. Thus, it is only logical that we review the BIA’s conclusion for an abuse of discretion. Groza v. INS, 30 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir.1994). The court today does not explain why the BIA abused its discretion when it concluded Nazarova’s situation did not meet the definition of “exceptional circumstances.” Opn. at 484. Nazarova’s circumstances are no more exceptional than the great number of petitioners who present a sympathetic explanation, and whose motions to reopen are routinely denied and equally routinely affirmed in the courts of appeal. Not only is there no abuse of discretion on these facts, but Nazarova herself does not assert that she satisfied the statutory requirements.
I would affirm.

. The INS argues that Nazarova has failed to raise any of the grounds permitted in a petition for review to this court, but her argument falls squarely within the first ground: she is challenging the validity of the notice she received.

. Nazarova frames her due process argument as:
[tfjnder the unique facts of her case — where she appeared two hours late to her hearing with the explanation that [she] was misled about the availability of interpreters and felt that she could not risk appearing without one — her due process rights were violated by the Board's failure to reopen her case to provide her an opportunity to be heard. The Board should have taken into consider-aLion the fact that she was late only because she believed it was crucial to her ability to be present and heard that she bring her own interpreter — and that she reached that belief because no notice regarding interpreters had been given to her other than the mis-information that an interpreter would be provided at the initial Master Calendar hearing.
Pet. Brief p. 24. She also states her argument as:
The additional procedural protection [Nazaro-va] requests — that the Board forgive her two hours' tardiness caused by the failure of the Immigration Judge to provide an interpreter — is so minimal and at no cost to the government that the failure to provide that relief should be held a violation of due process. Pet. Brief p. 25.