Court Opinion

ID: 9558876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:18:14.135039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:38.916729
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the owner of real property is constitutionally entitled both to a proper notice and an effective opportunity to be heard before either the people or its government may change substantially the uses of the property. The majority holds otherwise. It concludes that while the grant of a zoning variance or use permit on real property is an “adjudicative” act, the amendment of an entire zoning ordinance is “legislative” in character even though that amendment affects only a very few parcels of land owned by only a very few persons. (Ante, pp. 518-519.) In so holding, the majority emphasizes the form of the administrative action, without considering either its substance or effect.
The result is to deny appellant property owners important due process protections to which they clearly should be entitled when their property is subjected to an adjudicative disposition. Approximately 12 percent of the registered voters of Costa Mesa, by approval of an initiative, are permitted to abort the construction of a carefully considered moderate income housing project without giving appellant owners any prior opportunity to express their opposition at a full public hearing. When measured against this sacrifice of fundamental constitutional rights and interests the majority’s expressed concern for the saving of “administrative costs” {id., at p. 523) is of substantially less importance.
*526I find merit in appellants’ primary contention that the rezoning of a very small number of specific parcels of property privately owned by a few landowners is essentially an adjudicative action which constitutionally requires that the affected owners be afforded both notice and a reasonable opportunity for hearing which are not presently afforded by the initiative process.
In 1974, we rejected a broad constitutional attack upon the use of the initiative process to enact zoning ordinances. (San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205 [118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570, 72 A.L.R.2d 973].) It was argued in San Diego that because zoning ordinances frequently have a direct and substantial effect upon property values, zoning by initiative would be an improper device unless accompanied by the requisite due process protections of notice and hearing. (Id., at pp. 220-224 (dis. opn. by Burke, J.).) We held, however, that such due process protections were required only in connection with “quasi-judicial” or “adjudicative” proceedings and need not accompany the adoption of “general legislation.” As we emphasized, “Since the enactment of the instant general zoning ordinance [adopting a 30-foot height limit for all building along San Diego’s coastline] through the initiative process was unquestionably a legislative, as distinguished from adjudicative, act, the constitutional requirements of ‘notice’ and ‘hearing’ do not apply.” (Id., at p. 211.)
San Diego, however, relied primarily upon the principle that, “From the inception of this nation’s legal system, statutes of general application have regularly been enacted without affording each potentially affected individual notice and hearing.” (Ibid., italics added.) We were definitionally precise. We quoted Justice Holmes’ familiar observation in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915) 239 U.S. 441, 445 [60 L.Ed. 372, 375, 36 S.Ct. 141], that “Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.... General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.” (Italics added.)
In San Diego we emphasized the further distinction that “the decisions applying the due process requirements of notice and hearing have all involved governmental decisionmaking in an adjudicative setting, in which the government’s action affecting an individual was determined by facts peculiar to the individual case;. .. [Italics in original.] [H] The *527San Diego ordinance challenged in the instant action is unquestionably a general legislative act. We are thus not faced . . . with any of the great number of more limited ‘administrative’ zoning decisions, such as the grant of a variance or the award of a conditional use permit, which are adjudicatory in nature and which thus involve entirely different constitutional considerations. Instead we review the enactment of legislation of the classic mold, establishing a broad, generally applicable rule of conduct on the basis of a general public policy. Under the established constitutional principle noted above, notice and hearing have never been constitutional prerequisites for the adoption of such a legislative enactment. [Citations.]” (Italics added, fns. omitted, id., at pp. 212-213.)
As the majority properly notes, the enactment of general zoning (and rezoning) measures ordinarily is deemed to be a legislative act. (See Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 834-835 [323 P.2d 71]; Toso v. City of Santa Barbara (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 934, 942 [162 Cal.Rptr. 210]; Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 467, 473 [137 Cal.Rptr. 304].) Appellants forcefully and correctly contend, however, that where, as here, a restrictive rezoning ordinance applies to only a small number of specific parcels of land owned by a few property owners adoption of the ordinance cannot fairly be characterized as “general legislation” which, in any reasonable sense, “establish[es] a broad, generally applicable rule of conduct” within the meaning of our San Diego rationale. Rather, the governmental action is “determined by facts peculiar to the individual case.” Such an ordinance much more closely resembles the grant of a variance or the award of a conditional use permit, matters which uniformly have been held to constitute adjudicative action. (San Diego, at p. 212 and cases cited in fn. 5; see also Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612-614 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134] [approval of tentative subdivision map]; Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 548-549 [99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137] [grant of conditional use permit]; Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments (1978) 51 So.Cal.L.Rev. 265, 273 [noting the functional equivalence of zoning amendments and special use permits]; Oren, The Initiative and Referendum’s Use in Zoning (1976) 64 Cal.L.Rev. 74, 89-90 [same].)
I find it wholly anomalous that, had appellants voluntarily sought a zoning variance or use permit for their own property, a due process hearing would have been required to permit an airing of the pros and *528cons of such an “adjudicative” matter. Yet, under the majority’s analysis when third parties, by an initiative, effect for the owner an involuntary change of use against the owner’s will such notice and hearing is denied the owners, the very parties most directly affected. This result is sanctioned by the majority notwithstanding our admonition that “the most fundamental ingredient of the ‘due process’ guaranteed by our state Constitution is ‘a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’” (Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 550 [96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13].)
In Horn, supra, we recently explored further the distinctions between legislative and adjudicative action within the context of the due process requirements in land use cases. Our analysis in Horn is instructive and fully applicable here. We first restated as follows the general rules which govern these controversies: “Due process principles require reasonable noticé and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest. [Citations.] [H] It is equally well settled, however, that only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. Legislative action is not burdened by such requirements. [Citations, italics in original.]...[II] We expressly cautioned in San Diego that land use planning decisions less extensive than general rezoning could not be insulated from notice and hearing requirements by application of the ‘legislative act’ doctrine... . ” (24 Cal.3d at pp. 612-613, italics added.) Does the present case involve “general rezoning”? Manifestly not.
In Horn, the county had approved a tentative subdivision map without giving prior notice to adjoining property owners. Employing the principles described in San Diego, we observed that “Subdivision approvals, like variances and conditional use permits, involve the application of general standards to specific parcels of real property. Such governmental conduct, affecting the relatively few, is ‘determined by facts peculiar to the individual case’ and is ‘adjudicatory’ in nature. ... [If] Resolution of these issues [regarding subdivision approval] involves the exercise of judgment, and the careful balancing of conflicting interests, the hallmark of the adjudicative process. The expressed opinions of the affected landowners might very well be persuasive to those public officials who make the decisions, and affect the outcome of the subdivision process.” (Id., at pp. 614-615, italics added.)
*529Similarly, in the present case the restrictive rezoning of appellants’ properties and no others involves precisely the same adjudicative considerations that were present in Horn. The initiative, rezoning the Arnel property to R-l, effectively rescinded and thwarted a prior city approval of a subdivision plan and tentative map which would have permitted extensive low-to-medium density residential development of that property. As for the South Coast and Roberts properties, the rezoning measure likewise nullified a prior city approval for medium-density residential development. The decision to rezone and thereby severely restrict future development of these three specific properties, affecting only three landowners in the entire city, clearly was a decision “affecting the relatively few, ... ‘determined by facts peculiar to the individual case’ and.. . involves the exercise of judgment, and the careful balancing of conflicting interests .... ” (Ibid.)
The Costa Mesa initiative herein presented contains no general statement of land development policy. It prescribes no criteria of broad, general application to all city property, or even to all property within a particular zone or district. Rather, the ordinance is pointed at only three owners. It relates to the specific uses of three very specific parcels constituting only a small fraction of the zoned property within city limits. As such, the ordinance is “adjudicative” within any rational meaning of the term as defined in our prior cases.
The foregoing analysis finds support in three very recent and relevant legal commentaries. Commenting upon the doubtful social value of the initiative process in the context of rezonings, one writer has observed that “Where questions on the [initiative] ballot affect and interest many voters, public participation in decisions would indeed further accuracy and acceptability values. On the other hand, where only a few owners of a single parcel are affected . .. and the decision to be made requires the evaluation of specific facts, voters would have much less to contribute, while a formal hearing would be valuable. Additionally, voters will have less to complain about if they are not consulted on decisions which affect only a few citizens.” (Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning Decisions (1979) 6 Hastings Const.L.Q. 1011, 1047-1048, italics added.)
Equally recently another author has focused precisely upon the due process aspects of zoning by initiative, in noting that “There is a significant risk that zoning by initiative may erroneously and permanently deprive affected landowners of their property rights. The electorate is *530not required to ensure that its proposals are consistent with local planning, nor is it required to consider the environmental consequences of its action. The property owner becomes simply a voice in the wilderness left to compete with the sometimes selfish desires of society in general. He may be left saddled with the burdens of ownership while the initiative action takes away the benefits of ownership .. . . ” (Hile, Zoning by Initiative in California: A Critical Analysis (1979) 12 Loyola L.A.L.Rev. 903, 922-923.) The writer thereupon concludes that “Compliance with the State Zoning Law scheme of hearings, study, recommendations, etc., would provide at least some safeguards to the property owner and put him on a more equal footing.” (P. 923.)
Still another current commentator stresses the inappropriateness of the initiative process as a device to accomplish “small-scale rezoning decisions.” Professor Peter G. Glenn reasons that “The essential characteristic of a tract or small-area rezoning is that the decision directly imposes, removes, or modifies regulations in the context of a particular development proposal.... [¶] In such cases an intelligent decision would seem to require a factfinding and assessment process by persons who have developed some expertise and who are conversant with less obvious implications of the decision for the community’s overall planning effort. To the extent that particularized facts are relevant, a somewhat formal hearing process would seem to be essential to provide the basis for both intelligent decisionmaking and concomitant fairness to those affected by the decision. Fairness also suggests the desirability of a final decision by the representative governing body . . .. [H] These characteristics of a small-area rezoning suggest that plebiscite decisionmaking may not yield intelligent decisions and may result in decisions that are unfair to the affected landowners. .. .[¶] Finally, small-scale rezoning decisions are hardly the type of governmental decision for which the direct legislation devices were designed. These rezonings rarely involve statements of general public policy; such decisions implement rather than declare policy, and often do so in a context where the citizens most directly affected are accorded special rights of participation in the representative decision making process. On balance, the small-scale rezoning decision appears to be one in which a choice should be made against the use of the direct legislation devices; a contrary result threatens important societal values without a significant countervailing benefit.” (Glenn, supra, 51 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 304-305, fns. omitted.)
TLe distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” matters does not lend itself to easy or precise definition. The courts and commenta*531tors have suggested a variety of different approaches. (See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. City Council (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 869, 883-885 [129 Cal.Rptr. 173] [“dominant concern” test]; Oren, supra, 64 Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 85-93 [“balancing approach”]; Kahn, supra, 6 Hastings Const.L.Q. at pp. 1047-1048 [number of landowners affected]; see also Andover Develop. Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach (Fla.App. 1976). 328 So.2d 231, 237-238; Fasano v. Board of County Comm’rs. of Washington Cty. (1973) 264 Ore. 574 [507 P.2d 23, 26]; Fleming v. City of Tacoma (1972) 81 Wn.2d 292 [502 P.2d 327, 331]; Neuberger v. City of Portland (1978) 37 Ore.App. 13 [586 P.2d 351, 354]; South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt (5th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 389, 393; West v. City of Portage (1974) 392 Mich. 458 [221 N.W.2d 303, 308, 72 A.L.R.3d 1016].) As a general proposition, however, governmental action may be deemed adjudicative for due process purposes if it requires consideration of facts peculiar to the individual case, and, affecting the relatively few, involves the exercise of discretionary judgment and the careful balancing of conflicting interests. (Horn, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 614-615.)
I emphasize that in the present case we are concerned with the legislative or adjudicative character of the ordinance for the purpose of determining whether due process requirements were satisfied. We are not presented with the question whether the adjudicative nature of rezoning ordinances of this kind requires either a more probing form of judicial review or the preparation of judicial-type findings. (See, e.g., Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 517 [113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12]; Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d 934, 942; Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 467, 473.) The disposition of such further issues may well be governed by considerations not fully developed here.
The majority insists that the initiative process itself meets due process requirements affording appellants and those similarly affected both ample notice and opportunity to express their views prior to the adoption of the measure. I am unable to agree. The initiative process is ill-suited to effect the kind of adjudicative changes that are herein presented. Justice Tamura speaking for the court in Taschner v. City Council (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 64 [107 Cal.Rptr. 214] (disapproved on other grounds in Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 596, fn. 14 [135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038]) carefully and accurately describes the *532substantial deficiencies of the initiative process when compared with the multiple procedural safeguards contained in our state zoning laws (Gov. Code, § 65800 et seq.): “It is urged that interested persons can suffer no substantial injury because the election process itself provides the equivalent safeguards afforded by state zoning law procedures. We are unpersuaded. The kind of public debate on the merits of a proposed zoning measure afforded by the election process, including the limited opportunity for the submission of written arguments to the voters, cannot be equated with a dispassionate study, evalation and report upon the proposal by a staff of planning experts (§ 65804), notice and hearing before the planning commission (§ 65854), written recommendation by the planning commission with reasons for its recommendation (§ 65855), and notice and hearing before the legislative body (§ 65856). Furthermore, it is common knowledge that election campaigns cost money and that the extent to which one may be heard in an election too often depends on the size of one’s pocketbook whereas planning commissions and legislative bodies are required by law to afford all interested persons a full and fair hearing on the merits of their respective claims. Moreover, the election offers the voters but a single choice, to accept or reject the proposal in its entirety. The legislative body, however, is empowered to modify (as well as approve or reject) a recommendation of the planning commission thereby enabling it to consider and take into account in its actions the legitimate claims and suggestions of those who would be affected by the proposal even though they may represent but a small segment of the electorate.”
The Taschner court concluded that some provision for notice and hearing comparable to the provisions of the state zoning laws is required as a matter of constitutional due process, at least whenever the zoning measure substantially affects land use in an adjudicative manner. (For similar analyses, see Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 613-615 (dis. opn. by Clark; J.); San Diego, supra, 13 Cal.3d 205, 222-223 (dis. opn. by Burke, J.); People’s Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 869, 873 [106 Cal.Rptr. 666]; Comment (1973) 10 Cal. Western L.Rev. 105, 114-117; Kahn, supra, 6 Hastings Const.L.Q. at pp. 1047-1048; Glenn, supra, 51 So.Cal. L.Rev. at pp. 304-305; but see Oren, supra, 64 Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 92-93.)
I am unpersuaded by the majority’s professed concern over the inability of courts to draw lines of distinction between “relatively small” and “large” parcels of land held by a “few” as opposed to “many” landown*533ers. Courts for years have fully demonstrated their ability on a case-by-case basis to quantify fairly land usages for purposes of ascertaining their “adjudicative” or “legislative” function. This has been so from Justice Holmes’ use of the term “more than a few people” in Bi-Metallic Co., supra, to our description of the “relatively few” in Horn.
Regardless of semantic niceties, however, the decision in this case should turn on what is a fair, equitable and just resolution of this dispute between the affected parties. On the one hand the majority principally urges that its result effects an “economy” {ante, p. 523) or lessened “administrative cost” {id., at p. 523). But we have been traditionally hesitant as a court to place a price tag on a constitutional right, and what of the opposing interest, the property rights of appellants? It is fundamental that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution impose due process property protections against both federal and state action. If one turns to the California Constitution one need go no further than the very first section of the very first article before learning that the sovereign people of this state have identified “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property” as rights which they have described as “inalienable,” and which they have ranked following only “life and liberty” and before their “safety, happiness, and privacy.” I am thus led to the inevitable conclusion that in determining priorities, appellant’s constitutional protection comes first, and any administrative convenience, efficiency, or economy comes a distant second. On principle the question must be asked—why is not the property owner entitled to a notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before the use of the subject property is so significantly affected?
I do not suggest that it would be impossible to modify the initiative process in a manner that would accord with due process principles. Justice Burke wisely observed that “The Legislature or the governing boards of local public entities might well develop an approach which strikes a proper balance between the rights of the affected property owners and the interests of the public in reserving the power to initiate legislation.” (San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, supra, 13 Cal.3d 205, 224, fn. omitted; see also Kahn, supra, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 1048; Comment, supra, 10 Cal. Western L.Rev. 105, 128-130, advancing a proposal to permit zoning by initiative with provision for a modification hearing by the governing body after the initiative measure is adopted.) As carefully noted in Horn, “We deliberately refrain from describing a specific formula which details the nature, content, and timing of the requisite notice [and hearing]. Rath*534er, we leave to the affected local governments [and to the Legislature] these determinations.” (P. 618.)
Leaving the specifics in legislative hands we should reaffirm, however, the constitutional requirement that notice and opportunity to be heard must be afforded the landowner, large or small, when within an adjudicative setting governmental decisions are made which substantially affect his property.
I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to declare invalid the subject initiative ordinance.
Clark, J., concurred.