Court Opinion

ID: 9578385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:46.117563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:55.122297
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting)—I would affirm the trial court.
The only issue here is whether this court on appeal should order the trial court to hold an in camera hearing pursuant to CrR 4.6(h)(6) to determine whether the identity of the confidential informant should have been disclosed.
I believe that a restatement of the facts would be helpful in order to put this matter in perspective.
This case was tried nonjury in Superior Court, on stipulated statements and affidavits and with a total absence of oral testimony. A motion for disclosure of the informant's name was made and denied. There was no request for an in camera hearing at the trial level and that issue is raised for the first time on appeal. It is defendant's contention on appeal that there can be no waiver of her request for an in camera hearing for the reason that it is mandatory in all *50cases of this nature, based upon the constitutional requirement, amendment 6, guaranteeing the right to a defendant in a criminal case to be confronted by witnesses.
The arrest of the defendant, Phyllis Allen, took place in her apartment on February 14, 1978, at 9:10 a.m. The arrest was made by the Seattle Police upon a probable cause search warrant, based on information given by an informant. When the police broke into the apartment by use of force they found three individuals, the defendant, Phyllis Allen, who was in bed, a Sheila Lomax, who was sleeping on the couch in the living room, and a man named Rountree.
The findings of fact signed by the trial court describes the following drugs that were recovered from the apartment: (1) in the bedroom was found a plastic bag containing one yellow rolled-up balloon (0.3 grams of heroin); (2) nine rolled-up balloons were found on the ground outside a broken window of the apartment and directly beneath it; they were later analyzed and found to contain a total of 2.4 grams of powder containing heroin; (3) in a jewelry case on top of the bedroom dresser was found one blue pill and one red balloon; the pill and the contents of the balloon were later analyzed and found to contain diazepam and 0.3 grams of powder containing heroin; (4) inside the top drawer of said dresser was found a foil package containing 39 blue pills; these were later analyzed and found to contain diazepam; (5) inside a closet adjoining the bedroom was found a blue overnight case containing balloons, packaging equipment, a prescription bottle of brown powder, and a plastic vial of tan powder; and (6) in the closet was found a paper sack containing packaging materials and a red can of white powder.
The court also found that heroin and diazepam are controlled substances.
The affidavit for the search warrant on which the probable cause was based, in part, reads as follows:
That on this date, 2-13-78, this informant was inside apartment #215 at 415 Boren Ave. and observed the sale of heroin by the occupant, known to the informant as *51"Tree", to another visitor of the premise; that upon the informant's departure from the apartment an additional quantity of heroin remained packaged for sale therein.
In State v. Potter, 25 Wn. App. 624, 611 P.2d 1282 (1980), we stated that a trial court should apply a relevancy standard in exercising its discretion as to whether to hold an in camera hearing. In Potter, the court stated:
The court should conduct an in camera hearing if the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence. An in camera hearing should not be conducted if the defendant's contention that the informant may have relevant information is based upon speculation, but the trial judge should be aware of the difficulty of explaining "in the abstract why the informant's testimony is crucial." Bewers, Defendant's Right to a Confidential Informant's Identity, 40 La. L. Rev. 147, 168 (1979). A relevancy standard for making the determination of whether to conduct an in camera hearing has two bases: (1) the determination of whether evidence is privileged is a judicial function, Cook v. King County, 9 Wn. App. 50, 510 P.2d 659 (1973), and (2) conducting an in camera hearing enables the trial court to make an informed determination as to whether the State's interest in refusing disclosure outweighs the interests of the defendant. See State v. Harris, [91 Wn.2d 145, 588 P.2d 720 (1978)]; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957).
If the trial court determines that an in camera hearing should be held, the State may be present at the hearing and is required to produce the confidential informant. The State has a right to protect the identity of confidential informants. The burden of showing that circumstances exist that would justify setting aside the anonymity of the informant is on the defendant. State v. Massey, 68 Wn.2d 88, 411 P.2d 422 (1966) ...
The trial court should consider carefully at the in camera hearing the State's interest against disclosure, including (1) the interest in preserving the free flow of information to law enforcement agencies, (2) whether the informant is currently acting as an informant in other cases, and (3) whether there has been or may be any personal danger to the informant if his or her identity is *52disclosed. We see no reason for requiring the disclosure of an informant when the evidence that the informant possesses would be cumulative or only tend to prove the defendant's guilt. The trial court should balance these interests against the relative degree of relevance and materiality to the defendant when considering such factors as the nature of the charge, possible defenses and the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., State v. Wandix, 590 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1979); see generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961).
State v. Potter, supra at 628-30.
After reading the record, including the affidavits, it is clear that the informant is not possessed of any evidence that would be relevant to the defendant Allen's innocence, other than pure speculation.
It is true that the informant was in the apartment the day before and witnessed the transaction wherein a man called "Tree" (there is no indication that this is the defendant Rountree) sold drugs to a third party. However, there was no testimony or inference from any of the information that he was in the defendant Allen's apartment the following day, February 14, or that he had any knowledge of the whereabouts of drugs in six different locations on the premises, all located in such areas and in such places indicating that they were in the possession of the resident of the apartment, the defendant herein. The charge against the defendant Allen is the possession of drugs, not the sale of drugs, and there is no showing how informant could possibly have any information concerning such possession. In order to exonerate the defendant Allen, the informant would have to testify that the man "Tree" was in fact the defendant Rountree, and that Rountree, not defendant Allen, had exclusive and sole possession of the drugs. There is not a shred of evidence that the informant could so testify. I must conclude that the trial judge had substantial evidence of irrelevancy and pure speculation upon which he based his decision, denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
*53However, even if there was evidence that would make a prima facie showing that the informant might testify to matters favorable to the defendant, nonetheless this appellate court should deny the defendant's request for an in camera hearing. No request was ever made of the trial court for an in camera hearing but was raised for the first time on appeal. The defendant clearly waived his right to such a hearing and there is no justification for this court to even consider the matter at this stage of the proceedings. The majority endeavors to skirt the issue of waiver by saying that a defendant has a constitutional right to an in camera hearing on the basis of fairness as a constitutional requirement of the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). I can find no case law to substantiate such a holding. The cases that defendant cites merely say that an in camera proceeding is a proper method for the trial judge to use in determining whether the informant's testimony would be relevant and helpful to the defendant. However, even if the trial judge finds that such testimony would be relevant and helpful to the defendant, nonetheless upon balancing the interests of the help to the defendant against the interests of the public in not disclosing the informant's name and his testimony, the trial judge can refuse to divulge the informant's name and not make the informant available for testimony. Thus, it is clear that even in the case of relevance and helpfulness to the defendant, the informant's name and testimony can be suppressed. Such rulings have been upheld by the appellate courts, so obviously a defendant has no constitutional right to secure an informant's name and testimony, let alone the right of a defendant to secure an in camera hearing, which is merely a technique to secure information.
I would affirm.
Reconsideration denied September 26, 1980.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 19, 1980.