Court Opinion

ID: 9726862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:10:54.900489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.569875
License: Public Domain

*1048RATLIFF, Presiding Judge.
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the majority opinion of Judge Neal as to the duties of the trial judge in granting a motion to correct errors and in the result reached in this case. I also agree that the original trial judge1 could have considered the property transferred to Richard’s mother as a marital asset on the ground the transfer was fraudulent. However, I do not agree with the majority’s statement that the trial judge in this case could have set aside the fraudulent conveyance.
The trial court in a dissolution proceeding may not enter a decree which disposes of or affects property rights or interests of a third person not a party to the action. Shula v. Shula, (1956) 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612; Copeland v. Copeland, (1969) 145 Ind.App. 73, 248 N.E.2d 571; Edwards v. Edwards, (1961) 132 Ind.App. 567, 177 N.E.2d 919; Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d (1975). Neither may the court award property not owned by the parties. Geberin v. Geberin, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 255, 360 N.E.2d 41. If the property rights of non-litigants are to be affected by the dissolution decree such persons are necessary parties to the action. Shula; Copeland; Edwards; 63 A.L.R.3d 403.
Here, Richard’s mother was never a party to this action. The real estate in question and upon which the court sought to impose a lien for the payment of the judgment in favor of Sharon, was in the mother’s name as the record owner. The deed from Richard to her had not been set aside and could not be set aside in this action because the transferee was not a party. Thus, while the court could find the transfer fraudulent arid consider the real estate as marital property as between Richard and Sharon, the court could not have set aside the fraudulent conveyance in this case unless all necessary parties to such a determination were before the court. To the extent the majority opinion might imply that the court could have set aside the conveyance in this case, I disagree. Even if, as the majority indicates, Richard had no standing to litigate his mother’s interest, if any, in the property, the court could not affect the interest of the non-party. Therefore, the court could not impose any lien on the real estate so long as it remained in the name of Richard’s mother. The court could impose a lien upon any interest of Richard in the real estate which lien might then become enforceable if the conveyance to the mother were set aside and title once again became vested in Richard.

. The original trial judge, if available, although no longer serving as the regular judge of the court was the proper judge to rule on the motion to correct errors. Bailey v. Sullivan, (1982) Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 75. However, neither party has raised any issue concerning the propriety of the successor judge ruling on the motion to correct errors. Therefore, any such issue has been waived.