Court Opinion

ID: 9901842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:03:34.54547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.731175
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Nov 22 2023, 8:56 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Rachelle N. Ponist                                        Betsy Sommers
      Morgan B. Brading                                         Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C.
      Nicholas Andre                                            Carmel, Indiana
      Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl LLC
      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                 IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Jamie Marie Russell,                                      November 22, 2023
      Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                23A-DC-578
              v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                                Court
      Leonard Alan Russell,                                     The Honorable Marie L. Kern,
      Appellee-Respondent.                                      Magistrate
                                                                Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                49D14-2110-DC-9275

                                      Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                 Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   In this dissolution-of-marriage case, Jamie Marie Russell (“Mother”) and

      Leonard Alan Russell (“Father”) entered into a partial mediated settlement
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                            Page 1 of 15
      agreement (“Partial Mediated Agreement”) in which they agreed to share “joint

      physical custody” of the parties’ daughter, K.R. (“Daughter”). The trial court

      accepted and approved this agreement. The trial court, however, in both its

      subsequent provisional order and final dissolution decree, sua sponte addressed

      the issue of physical custody and awarded Mother less parenting time than that

      awarded to Father. Mother appeals and argues that, by granting unequal

      parenting time, the trial court violated the terms of the Partial Mediated

      Agreement. We agree with Mother that the Partial Mediated Agreement called

      for the parties to have equal parenting time and that the trial court’s custody

      order awarded Mother less than equal parenting time. Accordingly, we reverse

      and remand.

      Issue
[2]   Mother presents one issue for our review, which we expand and restate as the

      following two:

              I.       Whether the parties’ agreement to share “joint physical
                       custody” means that the parties agreed to have equal
                       parenting time with Daughter.

              II.      Whether trial court had authority to award Mother less
                       parenting time than Father after the court accepted and
                       approved of the Partial Mediated Agreement.

      Facts
[3]   Mother and Father married in July 2016. The marriage produced one child,

      Daughter, who was born in December 2017. Mother has an older daughter
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023       Page 2 of 15
      from a prior relationship. Mother and Father separated, and, on October 29,

      2021, Mother filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. On January 27 and 31,

      2022, the trial court held provisional hearings. 1 At this time, Mother indicated

      her intention to move from the Indianapolis area to somewhere closer to

      Lafayette, where Mother was employed.

[4]   On March 15, 2022, the parties participated in mediation and signed the Partial

      Mediated Agreement. The Partial Mediated Agreement resolved all issues

      regarding the marital estate and some of the issues regarding child custody.

      Regarding other child custody issues, however, the Partial Mediated Agreement

      provided:

               12.      Parties agree to joint legal and physical custody of Minor
                        Child. Parties are not in agreement with regards to the
                        primary residence of Minor Child or the long[-]term
                        parenting time schedule, such matters are reserved for a
                        final hearing on this matter.

               13.      In the interim, parents agree that they will engage in a
                        “nesting” parenting time arrangement with each parent
                        occupying the residence for three days/overnights in an
                        alternating pattern. Each parent agrees to be absent from

      1
        Both the parties and the trial court referred to the provisional hearings and provisional order as
      “preliminary hearings” and a “preliminary order.” The Indiana Code generally uses the term “provisional
      hearing” and “provisional order,” to refer to hearings and orders entered before the final dissolution decree.
      See Ind. Code § 31-15-4-13 (“The issuance of a provisional order is without prejudice to the rights of the
      parties or the child as adjudicated at the final hearing in the proceeding.”); Ind. Code § 31-15-4-14 (“A
      provisional order terminates when: (1) the final decree is entered subject to right of appeal; or (2) the petition
      for dissolution or legal separation is dismissed.”); Ind. Code § 31-15-4-15 (“The terms of a provisional order
      may be revoked or modified before the final decree on a showing of the facts appropriate to revocation or
      modification.”). But see Ind. Code § 31-15-4-12 (listing the options of the parties “[i]f the court grants a
      change of venue or change from the judge after the preliminary order of support, custody, or parenting time
      is issued”) (emphases added).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                                 Page 3 of 15
                       the Marital Residence[] during the other parent’s parenting
                       time.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 22-23 (emphasis added). On March 17, 2022, the

      trial court accepted and approved the Partial Mediated Agreement via an entry

      that stated the Agreement was “APPROVED AND SO ORDERED[.]”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 25. Nothing in the Partial Mediated Agreement

      suggests that it was intended to be a temporary agreement that was modifiable

      by the trial court.

[5]   On March 21, 2022, the trial court entered an order after the provisional

      hearing (“Provisional Order”), which provides in pertinent part:

              5.       The Court finds it is in the child’s best interests to order
                       Father to have primary physical custody of the minor
                       child, subject to Mother’s parenting time. The Court
                       believes Father is more likely to facilitate parenting time
                       with the minor child. The Court is also concerned by
                       some of Mother’s decisions as they reflect upon her
                       judgment, such as discussing adult matters in front of the
                       child, leaving the child in the care of a third party without
                       communicating this information to Father and filming
                       Father in front of the child.

              6.       Mother may exercise her parenting time in Clarks Hill,
                       Indiana, or Lafayette, Indiana, should she so desire. If
                       Mother exercises her Wednesday parenting time in Clarks
                       Hill or Lafayette, the parties shall meet at an agreed upon
                       halfway point at 8:00 p.m.

              7.       The parties shall divide holidays and special days per the
                       Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines as amended January
                       1, 2022.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023          Page 4 of 15
      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 26-27 (emphasis added). The Provisional Order

      did not mention the Partial Mediated Agreement the court had approved only

      five days before the entry of the Provisional Order. A final hearing date was set

      for May 10, 2022.

[6]   On April 18, 2022, Mother moved to continue the final hearing. The trial court

      granted this motion over Father’s objection and set the final hearing for July 25,

      2022. Before the final hearing, Mother moved to set aside the Provisional

      Order. Three days before the final hearing, Father moved to modify legal

      custody, and on the day of the final hearing, Mother also moved to modify legal

      custody.

[7]   The trial court began the final hearing on July 25, 2022. At the hearing, Mother

      argued that the trial court should set aside the Provisional Order because the

      order was inconsistent with the provisions of the Partial Mediated Agreement

      regarding physical custody. The trial court was unable to complete the final

      hearing on that day and scheduled a second day of the hearing for September

      26, 2022. On August 24, 2022, between the first and second day of the hearing,

      the trial court entered an Order on Interim Parenting Time. In this order, the

      trial court noted that Mother had not moved to Lafayette as previously

      indicated and, therefore, awarded Mother more parenting time than called for

      by the Guidelines. Specifically, the trial court ordered:

              The Court now orders Mother to have parenting time pursuant to
              the [Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines], plus an additional
              overnight on Sundays of the weekends she exercises parenting

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023     Page 5 of 15
              time and a mid-week overnight every week. Mother shall be
              permitted to pick the child up from the childcare/daycare
              provider to begin her parenting time. The child shall be returned
              to a childcare provider at the conclusion of her parenting time.

      Id. at 41. Following the September 26, 2022 continuation of the final hearing,

      the trial court took the matter under advisement.

[8]   On February 13, 2023, the trial court issued the final dissolution decree. In its

      decree, the trial court denied Mother’s motion to set aside the Provisional Order

      and awarded Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody of

      Daughter. The dissolution decree provided in relevant part:

              9.     The Partial Mediated Settlement Agreement resolved some
                     child custody and parenting time issues.

              10. Per the Partial Mediated Settlement Agreement, the
                  parties were to share joint legal and joint physical custody
                  of the minor child. The parties were not in agreement
                  regarding the child’s primary residence or the long-term
                  parenting time schedule. The parties agreed that in the
                  interim they would maintain a “nesting” parenting time
                  arrangement in the home.

                                                    *****

              18. The remaining issues before the Court are legal custody and
                  parenting time. Case law and the Indiana Parenting Time
                  Guidelines make it clear an equal division of parenting time

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023     Page 6 of 15
                is not required for shared parenting time to be ordered by
                the Court.[ 2]

         19. The minor child is a [five-year-old] little girl. Both parents
             want to have sole legal custody and greater parenting time
             than the other parent.

                                                 *****

         31. The Court finds it is in the child’s best interests to order
             [Father] sole legal custody of the minor child. [Father] is
             ordered to discuss major decisions about the child’s
             education, health care, and religious training with [Mother]
             and consider her position, but [Father] shall have final
             decision-making authority.

                                                 *****

         36. Pursuant to the parties Partial Mediated Settlement
             Agreement, the parties are ordered to have joint physical
             custody of the child.

         37. [Mother] shall exercise parenting time with the minor child
             pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, with an
             additional overnight on Sunday nights when she exercises
             weekend parenting time, as well as an overnight every week
             on her mid-week parenting time visit. . . .

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 45-53 (emphases added). 3 Mother now appeals.

2
  The trial court cited no authority for this rather bold statement. As explained below, our review of the case
law suggests the opposite.
3
 The trial court noted in the decree that it ordered both parties to submit proposed orders and that Mother
had submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon. The trial court further noted, however, that
neither party requested such findings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52 and declined to enter such findings
sua sponte.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                               Page 7 of 15
       Discussion and Decision
       I. Standard of Review

[9]    “‘Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially

       in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct

       interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of

       time.’” Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)

       (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). Trial courts are

       “‘enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and

       intuitive discernment’, and, therefore, are ‘in a superior position to ascertain

       information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the

       best interests of the involved children.’” Id. (quoting Best, 941 N.E.2d at 502).

[10]   We also noted in Hahn-Weiz that:

               there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting
               latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.
               Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript
               of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the
               witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their
               testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly
               understand the significance of the evidence. . . .

       189 N.E.3d at 1141 (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016))

       (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, we review a trial

       court’s custody determination for an abuse of discretion. In re B.W., 17 N.E.3d

       299, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023        Page 8 of 15
       I. Joint Physical Custody

[11]   Mother notes that both parties agreed to share “joint physical custody” of

       Daughter in the Partial Mediated Agreement and argues that this term means

       equal parenting time. 4 We agree.

[12]   The term “joint physical custody” does not appear in any statute or court rule

       that we are aware of, nor does the term appear in the Parenting Time

       Guidelines. See Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)

       (noting that the appellant cited no authority defining the term “joint physical

       custody”). In Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

       we held that by increasing the father’s parenting time to seven overnights in any

       given two-week period, the trial court had ordered a de facto modification of

       custody to “joint physical custody.” In Miller, another panel of this Court noted

       that our opinion in Julie C. “does not suggest what, if anything other than a

       fifty-fifty split constitutes joint physical custody.” Miller, 965 N.E.2d at 111.

       See also 10A Ind. Law Encyc. Divorce § 190 (noting that “[w]here divorced

       parents have joint physical custody of their children[,] each parent has custody

       of the children approximately 50% of the time.”). Thus, the term “joint

       physical custody” means that the parties will share equal parenting time.

       4
         Prior to the final hearing, both parties filed motions seeking sole legal custody. In the final dissolution
       decree, the trial court found that joint legal custody was not in Daughter’s best interest and awarded sole
       legal custody of Daughter to Father. Mother does not challenge the trial court’s order regarding legal
       custody. Accordingly, we do not address this issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                                 Page 9 of 15
[13]   We find support for this proposition not only in the cases cited above, but also

       by analogy to the term “joint legal custody.” This term is defined by Indiana

       Code Section 31-9-2-67, which states: “‘Joint legal custody’ . . . means that the

       persons awarded joint custody will share authority and responsibility for the

       major decisions concerning the child’s upbringing, including the child’s

       education, health care, and religious training.” When the parties have joint

       legal custody, neither party has any more say than the other party with regard

       to how the child (or children) are raised. Similarly, when parties agree to “joint

       physical custody,” they mean that both parties will share equal parenting time.

[14]   In the present case, it is especially apparent that the parties understood the term

       “joint physical custody,” as used in the Partial Mediated Agreement, to mean

       equal parenting time. Indeed, after stating that the parties agreed to joint

       physical custody, the Partial Mediated Agreement then called for each parent to

       spend alternating periods of three days with Daughter.

       II. Mediated Agreement

[15]   Mother also claims that the trial court was without authority to award her less

       parenting time than that awarded to Father. Mother notes that the trial court

       accepted and approved the Partial Mediated Agreement, which called for “joint

       physical custody,” and that neither party petitioned the trial court to modify

       physical custody.

[16]   As this Court explained in Stone v. Stone:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023     Page 10 of 15
               “To promote the amicable settlements of disputes,” parties in a
               dissolution action may enter written agreements that include
               provisions for child support and custody. Ind. Code § 31-15-2-
               17(a). By statute, trial courts are not required to accept such
               agreements, and they may enter their own orders regarding
               dissolution matters, including child support and custody. I.C. §
               31-15-2-17(b). Additionally, parties to a written settlement
               agreement may jointly request that a trial court enter a summary
               dissolution decree based upon the settlement without holding a
               final hearing. I.C. § 31-15-2-13. However, the statute provides
               that a trial court “may” enter such a decree; it is not required to
               do so upon the parties’ request. Id.

       991 N.E.2d 992, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d on reh’g, 4 N.E.3d 666.

[17]   Mother argues that, once the trial court accepted the parties’ Partial Mediated

       Agreement, both the trial court and the parties were bound by the terms of that

       agreement. Indiana courts encourage parties to negotiate agreements regarding

       custody and parental visits. Tompa v. Tompa, 867 N.E.2d 158, 165-66 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2007) (citing Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

       The only requirement is that the agreement be in the child’s best interest. Id.

       (citing Keen, 629 N.E.2d at 941). We have noted before that the Guidelines

       themselves agree that “‘the best parenting plan is one created by parents which

       fulfills the unique needs of the child and the parents.’” Id. (quoting Parenting

       Time Guidelines, § II(A)).

[18]   Although not all agreements between parties regarding child custody are

       automatically binding on the trial court, child custody agreements should

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023      Page 11 of 15
       generally be given great weight. Stone, 991 N.E.2d at 999-1000 (quoting

       Keen, 629 N.E.2d at 940). As we explained in Keen:

                For that reason, when reasonable parents are capable of carrying
                out their agreement without court intervention, the judge should
                defer to the parents’ agreement and refrain from imposing his
                or her personal conception of a preferential arrangement. One
                obvious exception is when an agreement might endanger the
                child’s physical health or significantly impair his emotional
                development. We find another exception occurs when the
                agreement . . . is not in the best interests of the child because,
                among other things, it is ambiguous, unworkable, and almost
                certainly will demand further litigation.

       629 N.E.2d at 941 (emphasis added).

[19]   Here, the parties entered into the Partial Mediated Agreement on March 17,

       2022, which settled the issue of child custody between the parties, and the trial

       court accepted and approved of this agreement. In the Partial Mediated

       Agreement, the parties agreed to share “joint physical custody.” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 22. As explained above, this term means equal parenting time.

       Although both parties subsequently moved to modify legal custody, neither

       party sought to modify physical custody. The only issues regarding Daughter

       that were left for the trial court to resolve were the specifics of the parenting

       time schedule and where Daughter would attend school. 5 Yet, both in the

       5
         We reject Father’s argument that the parties intended the Partial Mediated Agreement to be only a
       provisional agreement subject to the final hearing. Father claims that, by “reserv[ing] numerous child-related
       issues for the trial court’s future determination, each of which substantively impacted custody, support, or
       parenting time between Mother and Father,” a future final hearing was contemplated. Appellee’s Br. pp. 14-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                            Page 12 of 15
       Provisional Order and the final hearing, the trial court sua sponte modified the

       parties’ Partial Mediated Agreement after the court had already accepted and

       approved of the agreement. This was improper. See Bailey v. Bailey, 7 N.E.3d

       340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the trial court erred by sua sponte

       modifying physical custody of children from mother having primary physical

       custody to joint physical custody following a hearing on father’s petition to hold

       mother in contempt because neither party filed a petition to change physical

       custody, neither party argued for a change in custody, and trial court did not

       find that modification was in the children’s best interests).

[20]   In the final dissolution decree, the trial court indicated that it was following the

       Partial Mediated Agreement and ordered that the parties have “joint physical

       custody” of Daughter. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50. The trial court,

       however, then proceeded to award Mother parenting time that was not equal to

       that awarded to Father, i.e., parenting time pursuant to the Parenting Time

       Guidelines with an additional overnight on Sundays when it was Mother’s

       weekend with Daughter and an additional overnight every week during the

       mid-week parenting time.

[21]   The trial court estimated that this arrangement would give Mother parenting

       time consisting of 176 overnights with Daughter in a given year. This is an

       15. Although the Partial Mediated Agreement indicated that the parties were not in agreement regarding the
       primary residence of Daughter or the long-term parenting time schedule, the agreement was clear and
       unambiguous that the parties agreed to share “joint physical custody,” which as explained above, means
       equal parenting time. Nothing in the Partial Mediated Agreement suggests that it was only a provisional
       agreement.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023                         Page 13 of 15
       approximate 52% – 48% split of parenting time. Mother, however, notes (and

       Father does not dispute) that the trial court’s decree actually gives her only

       162.5 overnights with Daughter per year, which constitutes only 44.5% of the

       parenting time.

[22]   The term “joint physical custody” might not require a perfectly equal 50% –

       50% split of parenting time, but we are unable to say that granting Father 55.5%

       of parenting time and Mother 44.5% of parenting time is consistent with the

       intention of the parties to share “joint physical custody” of Daughter. The trial

       court’s final dissolution decree purported to award the parties joint physical

       custody but did not award Mother and Father equal parenting time. We,

       therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to abide

       by the terms of the Partial Mediated Agreement it had already accepted.

       Conclusion
[23]   The parties entered into a Partial Mediated Agreement that settled the issue of

       child custody by agreeing to “joint physical custody.” The trial court accepted

       the Partial Mediated Agreement. In its final dissolution decree, the trial court

       stated that it was awarding the parties “joint physical custody” pursuant to the

       Partial Mediated Agreement. Yet the trial court awarded Mother over ten

       percent less parenting time than that awarded to Father. We find that this is

       not “joint physical custody” as agreed to by the parties and as accepted and

       approved by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of

       non-equal parenting time and remand with instructions that the trial court

       award equal parenting time pursuant to the Partial Mediated Agreement.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023      Page 14 of 15
[24]   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

       Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-578 | November 22, 2023   Page 15 of 15