Court Opinion

ID: 9553820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:42.41992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:18.727983
License: Public Domain

HENDLEY, Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in part). I disagree with and dissent from the opinions of both Judge Sutin and Judge Lopez regarding the search and seizure question. I agree that defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. First, as to Judge Sutin’s opinion: Conspicuously absent from that opinion is the purpose for the inventory and return requirements. Those requirements are first to provide defense counsel access to the warrant, Fitez v. State, 9 Md.App. 137, 262 A.2d 765 (1970); and second, to protect the searched party from having his seized property stolen or misplaced by the police. State v. Cortman, 251 Or. 566, 446 P.2d 681 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 951, 89 S.Ct. 1294, 22 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). There is no question in this case that defendant had access to the warrant. He was served with a copy. While protection of the property seized is a desirable object, the use of the exclusionary rule to help prevent the possibility of theft or misplacing is overkill of the highest order. This is particularly true when the searched party can use his civil remedies for any loss that may occur as a result of a seizure. It is precisely because the inventory and return requirements are wholly irrelevant to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, and indeed become important only after invasion of privacy has occurred, that most courts have termed those requirements ministerial. See State v. Perea, 85 N.M. 505, 513 P.2d 1287 (Ct.App.1973); United States v. Kennedy, 457 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, in 409 U.S. 864, 93 S. Ct. 157, 34 L.Ed.2d 112 (1972); United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 2435, 32 L.Ed.2d 684 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 899, 93 S.Ct. 101, 34 L.Ed.2d 158 (1972); United States v. Haskins, 345 F. 2d 111 (6th Cir. 1965); Gilbert v. United States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961), reversed on other grounds in Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962); Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957),' cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976, 77 S.Ct. 1059, 1 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1957); Giacolone v. United States, 13 F. 2d 108 (9th Cir. 1926); Rose v. United States, 274 F. 245 (6th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 655, 42 S.Ct. 97, 66 L.Ed. 419 (1921); United States v. Sims, 202 F.Supp. 65 (E.D.Tenn.1962); United States v. Callahan, 17 F.2d 937 (M.D.Pa.1927); State v. Cortman, supra; State v. Ronniger, 7 Or.App. 447, 492 P.2d 298 (1971); People v. Schmidt, 172 Colo. 285, 473 P.2d 698 (1970); Williams v. State, 125 Ga.App. 170, 186 S.E.2d 756 (1971); Fitez v. State, supra; State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (Me.1967); People v. Di Polito, 61 Mise. 2d 65, 304 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1969); People v. Fusaro, 53 Misc.2d 510, 279 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1967); People v. Montanaro, 34 Misc.2d 624, 229 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1962); People v. Phillips, 163 Cal.App.2d 541, 329 P.2d 621 (1958), overruled on other grounds in People v. Butler, 64 Cal.2d 842, 52 Cal.Rptr. 4, 415 P.2d 819 (1966); State v. Blackwell, 49 N.J.Super. 451, 140 A.2d 226 (1958); State v. Struce, 1 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.1927); Joyner v. City of Lakeland, 90 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1956). Judge Sutin attempts to distinguish the contrary cases by asserting that only facially inadequate warrants, as opposed to inadequately administered warrants, are invalid. The cases do not support such a distinction. Moreover, assuming that the acts of inventory and return are merely “ministerial”, as Judge Sutin must to assert this distinction, it seems illogical to conclude that the mere inadequate directions to perform those acts are fatal, particularly since the consequences of fatality are so drastic. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) and United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3 Cir. 1972) are no help here. They are eavesdropping cases, where the defendant may not even know he is being searched. Both courts discussed the inventory and return requirements only as a means of giving the defendant notice of the search, and rightly found that the requirements were necessary in that situation. In this case, as in all personal, physical search cases, defendant well knew he was being searched. He was also served with a copy of the warrant. It is unfortunate that the exclusionary rule, which was designed to curb the abuse of police power, has spawned an abuse of its own — the strange judicial idea that anj use of the exclusionary rule must be a good use. It is little wonder that the rule is under attack. It is ironic indeed that those who think they were breathing the most life into 'it are in fact killing it. I also cannot agree with Judge Lopez. I will not detail the information contained in the warrant. Prong one of Aguilar can be met if the information received is detailed enough to imply that it was other than vague hearsay. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The information in the instant affidavit suffices in that regard. As Judge Lopez himself points out: “[t]he tip in the case at bar was independently corroborated in three ways. . . . ” In Spinelli there was only one major corroborated detail. To say that, despite this imbalance, the present tip was “ . . . less incriminating and corroborative . . . ” is to place on the magistrate an intolerable burden of fine sifting and weighing of relative incrimination and corroboration. Common sense must be used by the magistrate in evaluating the affidavit, for it has not been drafted by lawyers but by laymen in the haste of a criminal investigation. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). Accordingly, I dissent on the search and seizure issue and would affirm the conviction.