Court Opinion

ID: 9408667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:07:25.880154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.755663
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0823
                               Filed July 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CASSIDY CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, Chris Foy, Judge.

      Cassidy Young appeals following his Alford pleas to two counts of lascivious

acts with a child. AFFIRMED.

      David James Hanson (until withdrawal), Fayette, and Karmen Anderson,

Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Scott, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                           2

SCOTT, Senior Judge.

          Cassidy Young appeals following his Alford pleas to two counts of lascivious

acts with a child.1 Young asserts the post-plea competency assessment and the

presentencing investigation, neither of which was conducted in-person, deprived

him of due process. He also contends the court erred in denying his motion for

new trial based on newly discovered evidence, i.e., an affidavit that another man

was living with victim’s mother at the relevant time period, and his motion in arrest

of judgment on grounds his pleas were not knowing and voluntarily entered. Even

assuming Young has good cause to appeal, his contentions lack merit. So, we

affirm.

I. Background Facts.

          Young was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse,

class “B” forcible felonies. Iowa Code § 709.3 (2020). The State alleged Young

sexually abused a child on February 24 and March 3, 2020. Each count being

subject to a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of

seventeen years, which, if run consecutively, would require a minimum thirty-four-

year term of imprisonment. Id. §§ 902.9, .12.

          On January 19, 2022—the morning jury trial was to begin—the State offered

to enter into a plea agreement whereby Young would plead guilty to two counts of

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); see State v. Chapman, 944
N.W.2d 864, 872 (Iowa 2020) (“‘An Alford plea is different from a guilty plea in that
when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he . . . does not admit participation in the
acts constituting the crime.’ . . . Rather, the defendant declares that he is choosing
to plead guilty to a lesser charge instead of facing trial on a greater charge because
the available evidence makes conviction likely, not because he admits he
committed the charged crime.” (internal citation omitted)).
                                            3

lascivious acts with a child, which are class “C” non-forcible felonies with no

mandatory minimum terms, with the two ten-year terms to be served consecutively.

See id. §§ 709.8, 902.9(d). Young entered Alford pleas pursuant to the plea

agreement; while not admitting he committed the acts he did acknowledge the

evidence was such that a jury could find him guilty and that the reduction in the

potential sentence was a “good enough reason . . . to agree to be treated like” he

was guilty.

       The district court determined:

       Mr. Young, based on the discussion we’ve had this morning, I am
       satisfied and I am finding specifically that you do understand and you
       are aware of the elements of the amended charges, the potential
       penalties that you face by pleading guilty to the amended charges,
       and the rights that you’re giving up by entering Alford pleas and not
       going forward with the trial.
               Based on what’s in the Minutes of Testimony and the
       summary of evidence provided by [the prosecutor] I am satisfied that
       there’s a factual basis to support treating you as guilty of the two
       amended charges.
               I am also—I also find that the—the charging and sentencing
       concession that the State is making—primarily the charging
       concession, provides a sufficient basis for the court to accept a
       guilty—or to treat you like you’re guilty despite your unwillingness to
       admit guilt.

The district court accepted Young’s Alford pleas and informed Young of his right

to file a motion in arrest of judgment. The court filed an order noting the change

of plea, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI), and again noted the necessity

of a timely motion in arrest of judgment.

       On March 2, the defense contemporaneously filed an “application for mental

evaluation and determination of competency, request for stay of proceedings, and

request for hearing” and a motion in arrest of judgment asserting “the plea was not

knowingly or voluntarily entered.”
                                          4

         On March 7, a PSI report was filed with the court. In that report, the

evaluator indicated:

                Mr. Young was set up to be interviewed for this report by
         phone. From the start of the interview he was disrespectful when
         asked to clarify even basic demographical information. When he was
         asked about what he was accused of doing and claimed he did not
         do anything and hung up, terminating the interview. Butler County
         Jail staff were able to get Mr. [Young] complete the presentence
         packet for this report. Mr. Young provided some information but it
         was generally vague and unable to be verified.

         On March 11, after a hearing,2 the district court found “probable cause to

believe that Defendant suffers from a mental disorder which prevents him from

understanding the proceedings in this case or assisting effectively in his own

defense” and ordered a competency evaluation of Young.

         A competency evaluation report prepared by Abraham Assad, MD, was filed

with the court on April 21. Dr. Assad noted these sources for information:

         -- Interview on April 14, 2022, approximately 125 minutes
         -- Court Order for the Examination of Competency
         -- Presentence Investigation Report, dated March 6, 2022
         -- Medical Records from Farid Manshadi, MD, dated August 11, 2015
         to June 1, 2016
         -- Social History Records
         -- Butler County Jail Records
         -- Law Enforcement Records

The evaluator opined:

                 At this time I believe Mr. Cassidy Christopher Young is
         competent to stand trial. He meets criteria for [two disorders]. He
         does not report, endorse, or manifest any symptoms currently
         influencing his understanding of the legal process or his ability to
         assist legal counsel. He understands the charges against him. He
         has a rational and factual understanding of the court process,
         including key personnel and their functions. He is able to work
         effectively with his defense counsel without interference of any
         psychological symptoms. He is aware of appropriate courtroom

2   We have no transcript from that hearing.
                                           5

        behavior and is able to manage his own behavior. His current
        medication regimen would not be expected to interfere with his ability
        to receive a fair trial.

        On April 29, Young filed a “motion for new trial” on grounds “the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence” and “Defendant has not received a fair and

impartial trial.”

        A reported hearing was held on May 9, at which the court considered

Young’s competency and pending motions. With respect to competency, the

defense did not present any evidence but asserted Dr. Assad’s evaluation was

“problematic” because it was not an in-person evaluation but telephonic.            In

addition, defense counsel stated Young reported he was “not on his medications

on the day he was evaluated.” The court noted that even so, Dr. Assad found him

competent.

        The court noted it had requested the evaluation “more as a precaution as

anything else.” Continuing, the court noted:

                It’s been the court’s opinion and its observation in its dealings
        with you that you are competent to understand the proceedings, that
        you are competent to understand the nature and the severity of the
        charges against you; and based on my observations in your
        interactions with [defense attorney] Mr. Metcalf, it appears to the
        court that you are capable of communicating with him in a manner
        which he can—so that he can assist you in defending you, that you
        can assist him in preparing your defense.
                . . . I was satisfied, based on our—our dealings on January
        19th of this year, that you were competent at the time that you
        entered your Alford pleas.
                My concern, when I ordered this most recent evaluation, was
        that I did not want to proceed to sentencing with a person that was
        not capable of understanding what was taking place. And the
        evaluation that Dr. Assad has conducted and has prepared a report
        on concludes that you are capable of understanding the
        proceedings.
                                          6

       The court found Young competent,3 lifted the suspension of the

proceedings, and moved to the motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment.

       The defense argued it had newly discovered evidence that could be helpful

if presented to a jury. Defense counsel acknowledged the information that another

man living with the victim’s mother was “[o]n its face” not “totally exculpatory, but

it puts another male in the picture.”4

       The court addressed Young directly:

       [I]t’s the court’s view that because you did enter Alford pleas, what
       other information or other exculpatory evidence there may have been
       at the time of trial, whether your attorney knew about it or not, I don’t
       believe that it’s—it’s relevant; and I don’t believe it’s something that
       the court can or should rely on as a basis for setting aside your Alford
       pleas.
                At the time of your plea change, we spent a fair amount of
       time talking. And when I say we, you and I, and obviously the
       attorneys were there and participated. But there was a fair amount
       of conversation about what evidence the State was relying on.
                You were not admitting guilt. You were indicating that the
       different reasons we discussed on the record at the time of the plea
       change, that it was to your benefit for the court to accept your Alford
       plea, treat you as though you were guilty, so that in exchange, you
       would no longer be facing two class “B” felonies, each carrying a
       prison sentence of up to 25 years, each of them carrying a mandatory
       minimum sentence of at least 17 years in prison, that it was to your
       benefit to avoid those more serious charges.

       The court rejected the assertion made in the motion in arrest of judgment

that the pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. It summarized:

             And based on what was covered during the plea change
       proceedings, which shown up or reported in the transcript of that

3  A written ruling concerning the considerations of the court and its findings was
filed that same date.
4 The evidence outlined at the plea hearing included images found of inappropriate

conduct with an identifiable child when analyzing Young’s phone. Some of the
images showed a man’s hand. Another was a “selfie.” The defense asserted the
new evidence was that the hand in the images could be those of the man living
with the mother at the relevant time.
                                        7

       proceeding, it’s the court’s opinion that your plea was knowingly and
       voluntarily entered, Mr. Young.
               There were times you—you wanted to be able to speak
       privately with your attorney as we were taking the—the plea change
       or engaging in that hearing. You were given those opportunities.
               After any time you took a break—I won’t say every time but
       most times after you took a break, I asked you whether you had an
       opportunity to get your questions answered by Mr. Metcalf, and I
       think most every time you indicated you had.
               And you know, to the extent there were any times in the plea
       change proceedings where it was unclear to me whether you truly
       understood or appreciated what was taking place, within, you know,
       a short time later after a particular response you gave that raised a
       question in my mind, I didn’t have to wait much more than a minute
       or two for you to make another response or ask a question that made
       it clear to me you were understanding what was happening.
               I mean there was a couple times you made what I would
       consider sort of a snappy comment, and the only way that those
       comments would have made any sense is that you understood what
       was happening. You may have disagreed with how everything was
       going to be playing out, but you certainly understood what was
       happening and appreciated the significance of your Alford pleas.
       And for that reason, I am satisfied that your plea was knowingly and
       voluntarily entered.

       Moving on to sentencing, the defense objected to the PSI being conducted

telephonically.   The court confirmed the plea agreement included a joint

recommendation of sentence.       The court acknowledged it had no personal

knowledge how PSI reports were prepared and asked “what different information

would there be in the PSI if the court were to require somebody meet with

Mr. Young in person.” It asked the defense to “specifically identify matters in his

PSI that are incorrect or incomplete.” Counsel asked that Young be allowed to do

so, which the court reluctantly allowed. Young noted his weight and height were

incorrect and then objected to the investigator’s rudeness and antagonism.

       Both parties recommended that the court impose the sentence agreed

upon. The court found the joint recommendation appropriate, noting:
                                          8

             There were two separate offenses here. One was committed
      in February of 2020. The other was committed in March of 2020.
      For that reason, I do believe consecutive sentences are appropriate.
      I’ve noted this before, but I’ll just repeat that there is no mandatory
      minimum time on either one of these. And with good conduct credit
      and other credits that are available, it’s entirely possible that you will
      not serve anywhere close to the maximum indeterminate sentence
      on either one of these offenses.
             Ultimately, that will depend on how you conduct yourself once
      you're in prison and how—how you proceed. I mean, sex offender
      treatment will certainly be required as part of your sentence on each
      of these convictions. And I appreciate you—you maintain that you’re
      not guilty.
             I will tell you, Mr. Young, you’re not the first person. I’ve had
      people found guilty by a jury who maintain they’re innocent. And at
      this point, the court is satisfied that the State’s got the right person
      here and it is appropriate for the court to impose sentence on each
      of these charges.
             Certainly, a factor the court considers in its decision is whether
      you take responsibility. And you deny responsibility for any
      inappropriate contact with the victim in this case.

      The court imposed consecutive indeterminate ten-year terms and entered

judgment consistent with the plea agreement. Young now appeals.

II. Authority to consider on appeal.

      Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022) limits the direct appeal of a guilty

plea to a class “A” felony unless the defendant establishes “good cause.” We must

determine whether Young has good cause to appeal from his Alford pleas. State

v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2021).

      Our supreme court has liberally interpreted good cause to mean the

defendant need only show a “legally sufficient reason.”         Id. (quoting State v.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020)). What constitutes a legally sufficient

reason is context specific. Id. This court has concluded “that good cause exists

to challenge competency at the time of the plea irrespective of whether the issue

was contested below.” State v. Cue, No. 19-2150, 2020 WL 6157813, at *3 (Iowa
                                         9

Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020), further review denied (Dec. 22, 2020); see also State v.

Chindlund, No. 20-1368, 2021 WL 2708944, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021).

Our supreme court has agreed the defense raised a legally sufficient reason to

appeal to address a claim the district court failed to sua sponte order a competency

examination. State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 870–71 (Iowa 2022). The State

assumes Young has good cause to appeal.

III. Discussion.

       Turning to the merits of his appeal, Young first argues that because Iowa

Code section 812.4(1)5 refers to a person “arriving at a psychiatric facility for the

performance of the evaluation,” an in-person competency evaluation is implied and

required to satisfy his due process rights. Yet, he cites no Iowa or federal court

case to support that assertion.

       “The trial of an incompetent defendant in a criminal matter violates the

defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.” State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Iowa

2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699,

707 (Iowa 2016); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). “In

Iowa, we define the test as whether ‘the defendant is suffering from a mental

disorder which prevents       the defendant from appreciating the            charge,

understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.’” Lyman,

N.W.2d at 874 (quoting Iowa Code § 812.3(1)). Our review is de novo. Id. at 873.

5 Section 812.4 governs hearings to determine competency, and subsection (1)
provides, “A hearing shall be held within fourteen days of the arrival of the person
at a psychiatric facility for the performance of the evaluation, . . . .”
                                         10

       The case Young does cite, which is a California unpublished opinion, offers

him no support. People v. Ward, No. C088158, 2021 WL 717597 (Cal. Ct. App.

Feb. 24, 2021).     Ward involved a defendant who refused to meet with the

competency evaluator, leaving the evaluator unable to offer an opinion as to

competency. 2021 WL 717597, at *3. Young cites to the testimony of the evaluator

that an interview with the defendant was a “critical step” when evaluating

competency, and that “[w]ithout a personal evaluation, it would be inappropriate to

offer opinions about a defendant.” Id. Using this testimony, Young contends an

in-person interview is constitutionally required.

       Yet, Young does not mention that the Ward appellate court found there was

nonetheless substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding the defendant was

competent to stand trial, noting the defendant’s interviews with detectives, his

expressed understanding of the basic criminal procedure, and statements in court,

and his ability to assist counsel in his defense. See id. at *5–6. Young does not

contend Dr. Assad was unable to offer an opinion as to his competency and does

not identify any deficiency with the competency evaluation itself—other than it was

not in-person. Dr. Assad’s report to the court provided his observations during the

teleconference interview about Young’s capacity to appreciate the charges and

understand the legal proceedings in which he was involved. So, too, the district

court made findings that Young understood what was happening and appreciated

the significance of his Alford pleas. Young has failed to meet his burden to

overcome the presumption of competence. See Lyman, 776 N.W.2d at 874.

       We also reject Young’s second assertion, that the lack of a face-to-face PSI

interview denied him his right “to confront accusers,” citing the Sixth Amendment
                                           11

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.

Again, Young does not cite authority for this proposition, which by itself is sufficient

to deem the issue waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority

in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Moreover, his right

to confront witnesses did not apply after accepting a plea of guilty. See Iowa R.

App. P. 2.8(b)(4) (stating that “before accepting a guilty plea, . . . the defendant

has a right to be tried by a jury, and at trial has . . . the right to confront and cross-

examine witnesses against the defendant” (emphasis added)).

       Young next contends the district court erred in denying his motion for new

trial/in arrest of judgment based on newly discovered evidence. “We review a

denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for abuse of discretion and will reverse

only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly unreasonable or

untenable.” State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002).

       Here, the court found the purported new evidence was not relevant because

Young had chosen to accept the plea agreement to avoid a possible conviction

and longer sentence. Young now seeks to frame his claim as one of actual

innocence, relying on Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795, 797 (Iowa 2018)

(recognizing a “freestanding claim of actual-innocence,” and holding “[for an

applicant to succeed . . . the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence

that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact

finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found

the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered

evidence”). But the defense acknowledged at the hearing, the evidence was not

“totally exculpatory, but it puts another male in the picture.” And Young himself
                                       12

stated, “A reasonable jury could have found me guilty. A reasonable jury could

have also found me innocent, Judge.”

      We have reviewed the court’s reasons for denying the motion in arrest of

judgment, we find no abuse of discretion. We affirm.

      AFFIRMED.