Court Opinion

ID: 7817587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:41:29.712246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:38.632374
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result. When appellant elected to stand on his motion for summary judgment, his request for admissions had been quashed. Although he had filed a motion to vacate the order quashing his request, no action was taken thereon. By his election to stand on his motion for summary judgment, he waived the motion to vacate. Appellant could not have been entitled to a summary judgment unless the trial court was required to consider his request as admitted. Appellee had filed a pleading called “Motion to Quash” in response to the request. While this is not a proper pleading on a request for admissions under the statute, we are committed to the rule that a pleading is to be treated according to its substance rather than its title. Parker v. Bowlan, 242 Ark. 192, 412 S. W. 2d 597. Appellee’s motion stated that the request for these admissions in this case, after the same requests had been answered in a previous action on the same cause between the same parties, showed that it was made for the purpose of annoyance,-expense, embarrassment and oppression contrary to the spirit and purposes of the discovery procedures. Appellee further stated that the requests were irrelevant and argumentative and that the requests were otherwise improper. The trial court granted the motion. This motion actually constituted a written objection to the requests, which, in effect, was sustained by the trial court. Examination of the requests indicates that the motion may well have been granted upon the basis that some were irrelevant and some argumentative. Although the answer contains a general denial, it also contains certain specific statements ivhich might he deemed to have sufficiently answered some of appellant’s requests. Each request should have been phrased so that it could be admitted or denied without explanation. 2A Federal Practice & Procedure, Barron & Holtzhoff (Wright), Rules Edition, p. 503, Chapter 9, § 832. Some of the requests might well have been found to be argumentative because they would have been difficult, if not impossible, to answer without explanation. Appellant elected to stand on his motion for summary judgment. The premise of that motion is that the court was required to take the requests to be admitted, because no notice of hearing of appellee’s motion, to quash was given. Appellant does not question here the propriety of the granting of the motion to quash by the court, except because of appellee’s failure to give the. notice. Appellant cited only one case to support his contention, namely, United States v. Kellert, 101 F. Supp. 698. Since this case ivas decided before Arkansas adopted Rule 36 of FRCP, he urged that we adopted the construction of the rule in this case. While this rule of statutory interpretation is sound, it is doubtful that the decision of a district court would be as binding on us as that of an appellate court. Furthermore, there is a factor in the.case upon which appellant relies that prevents the decision from constituting authority for the rule he urges. In the Kellert case, the court relied upon the failure of the defendant to attempt to obtain a hearing on his motion to dismiss the request for admissions at any time within the year intervening between the filing thereof and the granting of the summary judgment. No such period of time elapsed here and this motion was heard by the court. If there was undue delay about the disposition of the motion, there was nothing to keep appellant from having asked for a hearing. We have previously held against appellant on this point and I think the holdings are proper. See Widmer v. Wood, 243 Ark. 457, 420 S. W. 2d 828; Widmer v. Wood, 243 Ark. 32, 421 S. W. 2d 872. I am not aware of any ease that follows the rules suggested by appellant here which was decided before our adoption of Rule No. 36. It is interesting to note that at least two district courts have held that failure to accompany objections to a request for admissions with a notice of hearing does not render the objections ineffective where local practice and procedure has eliminated oral hearings on motions. J. R. Prewitt & Sons, Inc. v. Willimon, 20 FRD 149 (D. C. Mo. 1957); Eastman Kodak Co. v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 34 FRD 490 (D. C. Md. 1964). The majority opinion suggests that requesting the same admissions as were sought in a prior non-suited action may be considered as vexatious. I do not agree that this is the case. The statute clearly states that an admission made pursuant to request is for the purpose of the pending action only and may not be used in any other proceeding. If this is the intended effect of the holding by the majority, I consider it an ill-advised limitation of a very salutary provision of our procedural statutes. The scope and purpose of this provision is broader than simply clarifying the issues. It is also for the purpose of eliminating issues as to which there can be no controversy in good faith. Like the motion for summary judgment, the request for admissions is designed to remove the shielding cloak of formal allegations in a pleading. Mid-South Ins. Company v. FirstNational Bank of Fort Smith, 241 Ark. 935, 410 S. W. 2d 873. Its use for that purpose should not be discouraged, particularly where that most evasive of all pleadings, the simple general denial, has been utilized. I am authorized to state that Browh, J., joins in this concurring opinion.