Court Opinion

ID: 9537064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:57.860775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:51.879973
License: Public Domain

ROYIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The trial court granted summary judgment based upon its conclusion that the County had no duty, as a matter of law, “to construct a pedestrian walkway.” The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “a county’s failure to provide a pedestrian walkway along a rural road cannot constitute actionable negligence.” Wheeler v. Baker, 636 P.2d 1326 (Colo.App.1981). The dissent in the court of appeals stated that the rule should be that a governmental entity has a duty “to exercise reasonable care to protect foreseeable plaintiffs from injury and foreseeable damages.” Id. at 1327 (Pierce, J., dissenting). At every stage of the proceedings, the question has been whether the County owed a duty to the plaintiff, and, if so, what was the scope of that duty. The majority assumes the answer to that question, stating: “The issue in this case is not whether the County is required to construct a sidewalk along County Road 13, but whether it breached its duty to maintain the roadway in a reason*562ably safe manner for members of the public who use it.”
It may be that the County should have a duty when it constructs a road to provide accommodation for pedestrians as well as automobiles. On the other hand, it might be concluded that the decision of how to allocate tax dollars should be within the discretion of elected officials. In any event, there are weighty policy considerations that can be brought to bear on each side of the question, and I believe that it is a substantial issue that deserves to be addressed.
One court has described the considerations involved in determining whether a duty exists as follows:
“An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a statement that two parties stand in such relationship that the law will impose on one a responsibility for the exercise of care toward the other. Inherent in this simple description are various and sometimes delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises, compared with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms of the parties’ relative ability to adopt practical means, of preventing injury; the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury and the availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties’ relationship; the prophylactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget; and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share with their fellow citizens — such are the factors which play a role in the determination of duty.”
Raymond v. Paradise Unified School District, 218 Cal.App.2d 1, 31 Cal.Rptr. 847, 851-52 (1963).
I believe that the court should address these factors and arrive at a considered decision, rather than merely assuming its conclusion. The question of the existence and scope of a duty is a question of law. Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo.1980). It is our duty to answer the question. Therefore, I would address the question that has been the focus of this case from the outset: What is the nature and scope of a County’s obligation to provide a method of safe transit for pedestrians along a county road?
I am authorized to say that Justice QUINN joins me in the dissent.