Court Opinion

ID: 9895244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 16:01:45.38736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.105052
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-2125
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                   Anton Moore

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Missouri
                                 ____________

                          Submitted: September 19, 2023
                            Filed: November 6, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Anton Moore appeals a district court 1 order sentencing him to nine months of
imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. Moore contends the
district court impermissibly imposed the sentence to rehabilitate Moore in violation

      1
        The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.
of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Tapia v. United States, 564
U.S. 319, 321 (2011). We affirm.

       In January 2021, after Moore pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm
as a felon, the district court sentenced Moore to thirty-eight months of imprisonment,
followed by three years of supervised release. Moore was released under
supervision in October 2022. During his release, Moore was required to refrain from
illegal drug use and participate in substance abuse treatment. Less than three months
later, in January 2023, Moore missed the intake for his first substance abuse
treatment. He failed to report to any intake appointments for four consecutive weeks,
and on January 21, 2023, he tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines. Moore
admitted to these violations.

       During the revocation hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of nine
months, followed by two years of supervised release, which was within the advisory
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) range. After this
pronouncement, defense counsel asked for clarification of the district court’s reason
for not imposing a lesser sentence. As part of its response, the district court
explained that a custodial setting would provide Moore with “structure” that would
enable him “to participate in the treatment programs.” Defense counsel objected “to
the extent [the district court] based [the] sentence on rehabilitation programs within
the [Bureau of Prisons.]” The district court responded, saying the objection
“misstate[d]” its reasoning. The district court then clarified that Moore
“demonstrated he needs structure, and I think that a custodial sentence is appropriate
for his failures to participate in the programs that have been made available to him.”

       On appeal, Moore argues the district court’s reason for imposing the sentence
violated 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and Tapia. We review these alleged violations de novo.
See United States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2008).

      District courts consider a variety of factors when revoking supervised release,
as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) prohibits imprisonment
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for the purpose of “promoting correction and rehabilitation.” See Tapia, 564 U.S. at
327 (holding § 3582(a) prohibits sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a
prison term to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation). Moore argues the district court
imposed a lengthened prison sentence so Moore could receive rehabilitative
treatment.

       We disagree. While the district court made several references to treatment
and rehabilitation in relation to Moore’s sentence, 2 it did so in the context of
addressing Moore’s letter, in which Moore requested rehabilitative care outside a
custodial setting in lieu of prison time. The district court acknowledged Moore’s
“very thoughtful” letter requesting treatment, but denied his request for no prison
time, emphasizing that Moore had been offered noncustodial rehabilitative
opportunities and had not taken advantage of them. After these opening remarks,
the district court found imprisonment proper because Moore “violate[d] his terms”
of supervised release. The district court also considered the relevant sentencing
factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the pertinent policy statements in the Guidelines.
This reasoning aligns with considering “the nature and circumstances of the
violations and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(1); see
also United States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 376–77 (8th Cir. 2014). Although the
district court did not specifically outline the § 3553 factors, it was not required to do
so. See United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen a
judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not
necessarily require lengthy explanation.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Indeed, we presume district courts “know

      2
        During the sentencing, the district court discussed and recommended
treatment options for Moore. That discussion, by itself, does not violate § 3582(a).
See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (“A court commits no error by discussing the
opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or
training programs.”). “[D]istrict courts are permitted to ‘make recommendations to
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regarding treatment programs and can discuss the
benefits of such programs with defendants at sentencing.’” United States v.
Holdsworth, 830 F.3d 779, 784–85 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2011)).
                                          -3-
the law in regard to sentencing and need not recite each factor to be upheld.” United
States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009).

       If there was any doubt as to the propriety of the district court’s reason for
imposing its sentence, the district court clarified itself later in the hearing after
Moore’s counsel objected. The district court expressly disavowed basing the
sentence on rehabilitation programs within the Bureau of Prisons and clarified it
simply meant “a custodial sentence is appropriate for [Moore’s] failures to
participate in the programs that have been made available to him.” In other words,
the district court found Moore’s supervised-release violations warranted
imprisonment.

      In conclusion, although some of the district court’s statements could be
viewed in isolation to violate 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and Tapia, the record as a whole
reveals no such error.

      We affirm the district court’s within-Guidelines revocation sentence.
                       _____________________________

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