Court Opinion

ID: 9643993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:46:07.82823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:07.246019
License: Public Domain

ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit capital murder1 with the punishment, assessed by the jury, at seven years.
The indictment reads that appellant
“did then and there with intent that a felony, to wit: capital murder for remuneration and the promise of remuneration, be committed, the said Judith Lindsay did then and there agree with Kenneth G. Davis, Jewelle Beard and Larry Whittaker that the said Judith Lindsay, Kenneth G. Davis, Jewelle Beard and Larry Whittaker engage in conduct that would constitute said offense and the said Kenneth G. Davis, performed an overt act in pursuance of said agreement, to wit: by shooting Larry Lindsay with a firearm. . . ” (Emphasis supplied)
On original submission, the majority reversed the conviction because the indictment failed to put the appellant on notice of the specific acts or conduct which formed the basis of the agreement.
In Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this Court reversed the conviction because sufficient notice was not set forth in the information. The defendant was convicted of driving while his license was suspended under Article 6687b, Section 24, V.A.C.S., and Article 6687b, Section 34, V.A.C.S. The indictment was held to be insufficient because it did not specify the facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of which of the five subsections of Article 6687b, Section 24, supra, formed the basis of the suspension.
*574Similarly, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.03, lists five means by which capital murder can be committed. This indictment, however, specified which of the five subsections of Section 19.03 formed the basis of the charge. She was put on sufficient notice that she would have to defend herself against the charge of capital murder for remuneration.
It should not be necessary to specify the details of the intended offense with greater particularity than was done in the instant case. See also the indictment in Brown v. State, 576 S.W.2d 36, fn. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In Garza v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 413, 55 S.W.2d 1042 (Tex.Cr.App.1932), in construing Article 1622, V.A.P.C. (1925), we held that the means by which the conspiracy would be accomplished need not be alleged. In Nisbet v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 336 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1959), we held that the intended offense or object of the conspiracy need not be alleged with the same particularity as an indictment charging the commission of the intended offense.
In Nisbet, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to steal money and property from the City of Houston, with conspiracy to steal money and property from unknown persons, with conspiracy to accept a bribe. The indictment was sufficient because the crime of conspiracy is a single and separate offense, the gravamen of which is the agreement to commit a felony. It is a separate offense regardless of the number of intended offenses.
Here, as in Nisbet, sufficient facts have been alleged to constitute an agreement to commit a felony. A conviction for conspiracy will be sustained once proof of that agreement and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement have been introduced into evidence. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 15.02. At that point, the offense of conspiracy is complete. Smith v. State, 363 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1963); Witt v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 627, 177 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1944). The holding of Carter v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 457, 116 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App.1937), is applicable. This indictment is sufficient to put Lindsay on proper notice of the offense with which she is charged.
In the present case a conspiracy to commit murder plus the overt act pursuant to the agreement was alleged. The conspiracy to commit murder allegation was sufficient under the former statute, and the addition of the overt act made the indictment sufficient under the present statutes.
Further, a reasonable interpretation of the indictment is that for remuneration Kenneth G. Davis was hired to kill Larry Lindsay and attempted to do so by shooting him with a firearm.
The motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
DALLY, J., joins in this dissent.

. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 15.02, provides:
“(a) A person commits criminal conspiracy if, with intent that a felony be committed:
“(1) he agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and
“(2) he or one or more of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement.”
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.03, provides:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.-02(a)(1) of this code and:
“ * * *
“(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.”