Court Opinion

ID: 9659166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:33:38.51177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:04.605227
License: Public Domain

*336SUNDBY, J.
(concurring). I differ with the court only with respect to the termination of parental rights warnings. First, I conclude that both the oral and written warnings given by the trial court satisfied sec. 48.356, Stats.1 I would not, therefore, reach the issue as to whether a written warning is sufficient to provide a jurisdictional basis for a CHIPS termination under sec. 48.415(2), Stats. Second, if we decide that issue, I conclude that both the oral and written warnings required by sec. 48.356 must be given in order to satisfy sec. 48.415(2).
The record of the dispositional hearing shows that the mother's counsel advised the court as follows:
I think that [the mother] understands the implications of the [dispositional] Order herself at this time. So, I'm satisfied that she's received a full explanation of the content of this document and that she also understands the nature of the warnings that you are going to give her and be providing her today .. ..
In response to questions from the trial court, the mother indicated that she understood the terms of the order, that she had gone over it with her attorney and with the guardian ad litem, and that they had explained the order to her. The court then learned that the mother *337had not read the order and took a brief recess while she read it. After recess, the court told the mother that she had been provided a form advising her that her parental rights could be terminated if the conditions necessary to return her child to her home were not met or if she abandoned the child. The court instructed the mother to go over the form with her counsel and with the guardian ad litem. The court then instructed the mother to listen carefully while the court explained the applicable grounds for possible termination of the mother's parental rights. The court advised the mother as follows:
If the conditions and directions as outlined in the Court Order are not complied with, the action on your part may result in grounds for termination of your parental rights.
Also, if you fail to visit [the child] for a period of six months, your parental rights could be terminated; or if you refiise, neglect or are unable to change the conditions and comply with the conditions of this Order.
You have the entire law in front of you. You should study it carefully. Basically, if the conditions which led to the removal which are necessary to return the child home to you are not met; or if you abandon a child by failing to visit or communicate with the child for six months, your rights could be terminated. Do you have any questions about that?
The mother responded, "No."
Short of reading the order itself, I do not see how the court could have been more complete in its explanation. There is no requirement in the law that the trial court read the order to a parent in order to satisfy the notice requirement of sec. 48.356(1), Stats.
The written order contained the following:
*338That [the mother] was warned by the court orally pursuant to sec. [48.356(2)], Wis. Stats., that grounds exist for termination of her parental rights under sec. 48.415 Wis. Stats. Specific grounds that may apply include abandonment under sec. 48.415(1) and continuing need of protection or services under sec. 48.415(2) of the statutes. A copy of the statute is annexed to the order. [The mother] was further warned by provision in court of a copy of the termination statutes to her and incorporation of the statutes by attachment to this order. [Emphasis added.]
A copy of sec. 48.415, Stats., was attached to the written order. In In re D.F., 147 Wis. 2d 486, 433 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988), we held that the notice requirements of sec. 48.356, Stats., were not satisfied by simply attaching the statute to the dispositional order. However, in this case the trial court did not attempt to substitute the attachment for the requirements of sec. 48.356. The trial court properly gave the mother the oral warnings required by subsection (1) and the written warning required by subsection (2).
I would let the matter rest simply by finding that the warnings given by the trial court satisfy sec. 48.356, Stats. The court concludes that sec. 48.415(2), Stats., does not require proof that oral notice was given to the mother of the applicable grounds for termination of her parental rights, as required by sec. 48.415(1), Stats. The court thus unnecessarily invites reversed of our decision. The supreme court may be loath to allow our decision to stand based as it is upon what I conclude is an erroneous view of the law.
Section 48.415, Stats., provides that grounds for termination of parental rights may include the child's continuing need of protection or services. Subsection (2) provides:
*339Continuing need of protection or services may be established by a showing of all of the following: (a) That the child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or services and placed, or continued in placement, outside his or her home pursuant to one or more court orders under s. 48.345 [disposition], 48.357 [change in placement], 48.363 [revision] or 48.365 [extension] containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2). [Emphasis added.]
Section 48.356(1), Stats., requires oral notice by the trial judge to the parent or parents of any applicable grounds for termination of parental rights under sec. 48.415, Stats. Section 48.356(2), Stats., provides: "In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), any written order which places a child outside the home under sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents of the information specified under sub. (1)." (Emphasis added.)
The court concludes that because sec. 48.356(2), Stats., imposes the written-order notice requirement, the italicized language is surplusage. I disagree. I conclude that the duty to warn under sec. 48.356(2) includes by incorporation the oral warning required under subsection (1).2 The legislative history of secs. 48.356 and 48.415, Stats., supports my conclusion. The statutes were created by ch. 330, Laws of 1979 and are, therefore, in pari materia.
The statutes were effective September 1, 1980. Section 14, ch. 330, Laws of 1979. In general, the act applied to proceedings for the termination of parental rights commenced on or after the effective date of the act. Section 12(1), ch. 330, Laws of 1979. Thus, the parents *340of a child subject to a dispositional order placing the child outside the parents' home before September 1, 1980, received no notice of the applicable grounds for termination of their parental rights. To respond to this deficiency, the legislature created ch. 7, Laws of 1981. Section 2(1) of the session law required the circuit court to send notice of grounds for termination of parental rights to the parents of any CHIPS child removed from the home before September 1, 1980. Section 2(2) required that the notice set forth the grounds for termination of parental rights and inform the parents that the court had set aside a time for the parents to appear before the court for the purpose of having the contents of the notice explained. Chapter 7, Laws of 1981 demonstrates the legislature's concern that the court orally explain to the parents the grounds for termination of their parental rights. The legislature was not satisfied with only a written notice. I consider that ch. 7, Laws of 1981 is contemporaneous legislative construction of the requirements of notice of termination of parental rights.
Our decision today effectively repeals sec. 48.365(1), Stats. Failure of the trial court to give the oral warning required by the statute has no effect upon the dispositional order and, now, no effect upon an order terminating parental rights.
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982), the United States Supreme Court stated:
[PJersons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family matters. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
*341The nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on the balancing of three distinct factors: the private interests affected by the proceedings; the risk of error created by the state's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. at 754. In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding. Id. at 758. The risk of error from abandoning oral notice of the grounds for termination of parental rights is substantial. The countervailing government interest favoring a written-notice only procedure is nonexistent.
Perhaps giving only written notice to a parent of the grounds for terminating his or her parental rights will survive a due process challenge. However, I submit that the Wisconsin legislature has concluded that oral warning by a judge is required before the state exercises its last-resort power over the family. I am certain that a parent pays attention when the judge says, "listen carefully." However, legal documents daunt all but those who prepare them. Such documents are not a fair or adequate substitute for the judge's spoken word.

 Section 48.356, Stats., provides:
(1) Whenever the judge orders a child to be placed outside his or her home because the child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or services under s. 48.345, 48.357, 48.363 or 48.365, the judge shall orally inform the parent or parents who appear in court of any grounds for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable and of the conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home.
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), any written order which places a child outside the home under sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents of the information specified under sub. (1).

 The majority unfairly suggests that I would rewrite the statute. When a statute is ambiguous, it is our duty to construe the statute according to the legislature's intent. State v. Vonesh, 135 Wis. 2d 477, 482-83, 401 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1986).