Court Opinion

ID: 9792879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:38:37.013104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:22.260584
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the result of the majority opinion. However, the majority’s reasons for imposing a mens rea requirement as a part of 5 AAC 81.140(b) seem to me to be somewhat unfocused.
The majority’s first reason is that without a mens rea requirement the regulation is overbroad and is therefore void for vagueness. The concept of overbreadth as it is used in vagueness cases refers to a lack of fair notice as to what conduct is punishable. Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1974). Here there is fair notice in the sense that the regulation is linguistically precise in delineating the type of conduct proscribed. The problem with it is that it includes within its ambit the conduct of people who have no reason to believe that what they are doing is criminal. I suggest, therefore, that the vagueness rationale does not support the conclusion reached.
The alternative reason set out by the majority strikes down the regulation because it has no reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Once again, this is at best a tangential expression of what is wrong with the regulation. There certainly is a legitimate government interest in preventing the unlawful killing of game, and imposing strict forfeiture or criminal fines on persons who transport unlawfully killed game bears a relationship to the accomplishment of that purpose.
I would require mens rea as an element of this regulation because the penalty for its violation includes a possible six-month term of imprisonment. See AS 16.05.900(a). In my view due process requires that there be a culpable mental state in every case where a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. Although we have never unconditionally adopted such a rule, our cases suggest that it is appropriate.
In Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969) we held that a culpable mental state must exist for there to be a conviction of a crime. We recognized a “public welfare offense” exception to this rule, and noted that such offenses are characterized by relatively small penalties, and conviction of them does not significantly damage one’s reputation. Id. at 79.
In Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971), we reaffirmed the principles of Speidel and noted “the necessity of basing serious crimes upon a general criminal intent as opposed to strict criminal liability which applies regardless of intention,” the goal being to “avoid criminal liability for innocent or inadvertent conduct.” Accord Kimoktoak v. State, 578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978); State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
Likewise, in the recent case of Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980), we noted that the “ ‘general conditions of penal liability’ require ‘not only the doing of some act by the person to be held liable, but also the existence of a guilty mind during the commission of the act.’ ”
These cases establish that mens rea is an essential element for criminal liability, except as to crimes for which the penalties are relatively small, and do minimal damage to *116the offender’s reputation. In my view, any prison sentence is an important, even traumatic, event in the life of a human being, especially one who conducts his affairs with an intent to conform to the norms required by law. Further, any prison sentence is likely to have a considerable detrimental effect on one’s reputation. The laws of our society should not be structured so that an individual may be jailed for conduct which he reasonably believes to be lawful. Therefore, I believe that a mens rea requirement should be imposed in all cases in which the penalty may be incarceration.1
Many commentators agree with this position. For example, in F. Sayre’s article, Public Welfare Offenses,2 he notes that the severity of the penalty represents a cardinal principle upon which to determine whether mens rea should be required. He concludes that if the possible penalty is serious, particularly if it involves imprisonment, the defendant’s individual interest weighs too heavily to allow conviction without proof of mens rea:
To subject defendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense of justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can long endure. Crimes punishable by prison sentences, therefore, ordinarily require proof of a guilty intent.3
Accord W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 31 at 218 (1972); Model Penal Code § 2.05, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
For these reasons I agree that a mens rea element should be read into 5 AAC 81.-140(b).

. The possibility of incarceration is a dividing line between serious and non-serious crimes for other purposes in the criminal law such as the right to trial by jury and to court appointed counsel. Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970).

. F. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L.Rev. 55 (1933).

. Id. at 72.