Court Opinion

ID: 9566502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:40:08.90295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:51.446876
License: Public Domain

Hill, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons that follow, I find it necessary to dissent to both Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion.
In Division 1, the majority holds that Inventex is “transacting business” in Georgia within the meaning of Code Ann. § 22-1401. But as the majority recognizes, the “facts indicate Inventex is proposing to conduct a continuous business” (emphasis supplied), the twelve exclusions in § 22-1401 (b) (1) through (12) are not exclusive, and more substantial activity within the state is required under the registration statute than under a jurisdictional statute. Inventex has yet to conduct its business in Georgia; indeed, Inventex has not yet decided to conduct business in Georgia but is merely investigating the possibility. In effect, Inventex has an option to purchase certain property in Georgia if it decides to conduct business here; i.e., if a building permit for the project is secured.
Although no Georgia case has decided this precise issue, the Ninth Circuit has pointed out that: “A distinction can be drawn between an act preparatory to entering business and an act of carrying on or pursuing business.” Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Auth., 233 F2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1956). That court then held that the act of executing a lease was merely incidental and preliminary to the business in which the corporation ordinarily engaged and did not constitute “entering upon, doing, or transacting any business, enterprise or occupation” (emphasis supplied) within the meaning of a state statute declaring void any such acts taken by a foreign corporation prior to obtaining a license to do business. Likewise, I would hold that obtaining an option and conducting a feasibility study for a project in Georgia do not constitute “transacting business” in Georgia within the meaning of Code Ann. § 22-1401. Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Auth., supra; FCA Properties v. Hudson Oil Co., 192 NW 2d 390 (Mich. App. 1971).
In Division 2, the majority cites Cos Corp. v. City of Evanston, 190 NE2d 364, (Ill. 1963), for the proposition that a landowner may acquire a vested right to use his land in a permitted manner — notwithstanding a later change in the zoning ordinance that predates the issuance of a building permit — by virtue of “substantial expenditures” based upon an existing zoning ordinance and “assurances” from zoning administrators that the contemplated use is permitted by the existing ordinance. But two salient facts distinguish Cos Corp. v. City of Evanston, supra, from the case at *78hand: There the use (a professional office building for doctors and dentists) was permitted by the zoning both before and after the amendment at issue; the amendment merely increased the number of off-street parking spaces required per square foot of floor area. Additionally, the building permit was applied for before the amendment was enacted and action on it was apparently delayed in what proved to be a vain attempt to render the amendment applicable to the project at issue.
Neither of those facts appear here: the proposed use itself is prohibited by the amended zoning ordinance, and no application for a building permit was filed until after the amendment had taken effect. Thus we have considerably expanded on a case which represents an extension of a minority rule. The majority of jurisdictions hold that the issuance of a building permit alone confers no vested rights as against a change in the zoning ordinance, 3 Rathkopf Ch. 57 § 1, p. 57-2; while the minority hold that the issuance of a valid building permit under which the landowner in good faith makes substantial expenditures or incurs substantial obligations, does protect the applicant from a subsequent change that would otherwise render the permit invalid. 3 Rathkopf Ch. 57 § 3, p. 57-6. A smaller minority hold that the issuance of a valid building permit alone is binding notwithstanding a subsequent change in zoning. 3 Rathkopf Ch. 57 § 2, p. 57-4. Georgia formerly took the minority within the minority view. See Keenan v. Acker, Clark v. International Horizons, Inc., supra, cited by the court. But the court today adopts the Illinois rule which goes beyond the two minority rules, 3 Rathkopf Ch. 57 § 4, p. 57-8, and abandons the sound requirement that no vested rights accrue until and unless a building permit issues.
I can only conclude that the majority has substituted “assurances” of zoning administrators for the requirement of a building permit. What were these “assurances”? That the project would be permissible under the existing zoning (if certain modifications were made)? If so, then the administrator did no more than correctly interpret the existing ordinance, which the landowner could have done for himself, so that the “assurance” was surplusage. Only if the administrator also assured the landowner that the existing ordinance would not be changed would the landowner be entitled to rely on the “assurances” of the administrator, and such an assurance from the administrator would be ultra vires. Code Ann. § 89-903 provides: “Powers of all public officers are defined by law, and all persons must take notice thereof. The public may not be estopped by the acts of any officer done in the exercise of a power not conferred.” A zoning administrator cannot bind the county commissioners not to amend the zoning ordinance. Nor can the zoning administrator in *79Forsyth County issue a building permit. Code Ann. § 69-1212. In light of the court’s decision today, in order to preserve their power to amend zoning ordinances county commissioners should instruct zoning personnel not to give advice to citizens as to whether a particular use is permissible under the existing zoning ordinance. This is an intolerable result and I therefore must dissent.