Court Opinion

ID: 9659734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:53:46.854492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.208925
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a unilateral, nonbargained employee handbook may create contractual rights (thus serving as the basis of a breach of contract claim) and alter the unambiguous language of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) even though the handbook specifically and plainly says that it cannot do so. For this and other reasons, I respectfully dissent.
The CBA unambiguously required the immediate termination of Thomas’s employment if he was absent “from work for any reason other than military leave for a period of more than one (1) year.” [Emphasis added.] The undisputed evidence shows that Thomas did not work from July 2001 until August 2002 (a period of more than one year) and that he did not take military leave. Despite the evident justification for Thomas’s termination when connecting those facts, the majority holds that Thomas may succeed on his sole claim— which must focus on a breach of the CBA itself, the only agreement between the parties — because his twelve weeks’ leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) must expand the one-year absence limitation. See Majority op. at 859-60.1 The record and the law preclude the majority’s holding for several reasons.
First, although the majority correctly explains that in some circumstances documents related to the same transaction may be considered together, we should not rely on that manner of construction when the *861documents themselves prohibit such reliance. See Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.1981) (explaining that the principle of construing writings together is a “device for ascertaining and giving effect to the intention of the parties and cannot be applied arbitrarily and without regard to the realities of the situation”) (quoting Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 341, 321 S.W.2d 62, 65 (1959)).
Here, the handbook indicates that it does not enlarge collectively-bargained provisions; its first textual page states that it is
intended to provide employees with a general understanding of [appellants’] personnel policies. Employees are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the contents of the handbook, as it will answer many common questions concerning employment with [appellants].
However, this handbook cannot anticipate every situation or answer every question about employment. It is not an employment contract and it is not intended to create contractual obligations of any kind....
... These policies and/or benefits are not intended to disagree in word or intent with the current Labor Agreement. [Emphasis added.]
Other parts of the CBA and the handbook also weigh against the majority’s conflated construction of those two documents. For instance, while the CBA references work rules and rule books, it limits an employee’s duty to follow such provisions to “rules and regulations of [appellants] which are not in conflict with [the CBA],” which dictates the superiority of the CBA’s provisions. Also, the CBA’s reference to such rules does not provide that any definitions from the rules should be incorporated into the CBA’s provisions. The CBA further states that it is the “only agreement between the parties.” Finally, although the handbook indicates that it is to be construed in accordance with the CBA in use at the time of Thomas’s termination, it does not state the inverse — that the CBA is to be construed in accordance with the handbook.
Second, as the majority recognizes, our precedent establishes that as a general rule, employee handbooks and policy manuals constitute general guidelines in the employment relationship and do not create implied contracts between the employer and employee that alter the at-will employment relationship. Majority op. at 858-59; see Brown v. Sabre, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (describing that the rule particularly applies where, as here, “a specific disclaimer in the employee handbook warns the employee that the manual is intended to provide guidelines only, and does not create contractual rights”); see also Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex.1993); Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (explaining that “[u]nder Texas law ... a statement of company policy, unaccompanied by an express agreement, does not create contractual rights”). In the same way, although Thomas’s employment was not at-will, the handbook should not be construed to alter the provisions of the collectively-bargained contract on which Thomas bases his claim without an expressed intention to do so. The majority has failed to explain why the precept that guided our decision in Brown, that unilateral employment manuals cannot per se constitute written employment contracts, should not also apply to the ability of such manuals to alter preexisting contractual employment relationships. *862See Brown, 173 S.W.3d at 586 (citing Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1987)).
Third, Thomas’s argument that the handbook’s “absence” definition should be incorporated into the CBA to excuse FMLA leave does not make sense when considering the CBA’s specific and limited designation of military leave as an excused absence because military leave is also excluded as an absence in the handbook. In other words, if appellants and Thomas’s union had intended to add FMLA leave to an “absence” lasting greater than one year in the CBA by tacitly incorporating the handbook’s definitional provision, there would be no need to specifically mention military leave in the CBA, which is also excluded in that same definitional provision. If that had been their intent, the specific mention of military leave in the CBA’s termination provision would amount to unnecessary surplusage. And, of course, by the majority’s decision that indicates its opinion of the contracting parties’ intent to tacitly incorporate the handbook into the CBA, the “for any reason other than military leave” phrase in the CBA’s termination provision is rendered wholly inconsequential.
Thus, the majority’s decision to alter the CBA’s language by the handbook’s provisions defeats its stated goal of giving effect to “all provisions so that none are rendered meaningless.” Majority op. at 857; see NP Anderson Cotton Exch., L.P. v. Potter, 230 S.W.3d 457, 463 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). For the same reason, the decision also weighs against the entitlement of parties to a contract to select their own obligations — rather than having a court create obligations for them — by carefully choosing the words they select to include in the contract.2 See Doe v. Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., Inc., 283 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. filed) (citing Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 22 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.)).
Fourth, the majority’s decision that the handbook adds an employee’s FMLA leave to the one-year limitation in the CBA makes even less sense when considering the other types of leave that are mentioned in the handbook and are also necessarily added to the one-year period under the majority’s reasoning, such as holidays and vacations. The CBA provides appellants’ employees with eleven holidays. Because Thomas had been employed by appellants for more than nine years, he also received three weeks’ paid vacation. Thus, under the majority’s reasoning, when considering Thomas’s twelve weeks of FMLA leave, his more than two work weeks of combined holidays, and his three weeks of vacation, appellants could not have terminated Thomas’s employment until more than seventeen weeks (about four months), at a minimum, had passed after he had already been unable to work for a year. Appellants would then have to further add to that time any days off related to his jury duty, bereavement or administrative leave, or “approved union business.” As can be seen, the majority’s decision has turned a simple phrase — “absence from work for any reason other than mili*863tary leave for a period of more than one (1) year” — into a mathematical enigma that could justify Thomas’s absence from work for close to a year and a half.
Finally, the majority’s holding that the handbook adds to the CBA’s contractual language becomes further strained when considering that in the handbook, appellants “reserve[d] the right to change, revise, or eliminate any of the [handbook’s] policies.” Under the majority’s reasoning, although FMLA leave must be added to the CBA’s one-year limitation today, it may not be added to that limitation tomorrow if appellants choose to modify the handbook. Such fluidity is obviously at odds with our task of interpreting the parties’ contractual bargain. See Gamble v. Gregg County, 932 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (indicating that an employee handbook does not express an intent to vest contractual rights when it “expressly provides that the [employer] may unilaterally change the policies and practices”); Ryan v. Superior Oil Co., 813 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (holding that a vacation plan that stated that it could “be terminated or modified at any time” did not create a contractual obligation).
For all of these reasons, the handbook, as a matter of law, cannot enlarge or modify the CBA’s provisions, and it cannot serve as the basis for Thomas’s breach of contract claim. And even if the handbook’s provisions created doubt on interpreting the CBA’s termination language, the majority should have resolved those doubts in appellants’ favor. See IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004).
Because the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on Thomas’s claim for breach of the CBA, I would sustain appellants’ second issue and reverse this case. Because the majority affirms the trial court, I respectfully dissent.

. As the majority explains, Thomas relies on portions of the handbook that state that FMLA leave is "not counted as absenteeism” and exclude FMLA leave from the handbook's definition of "absence.” Majority op. at 859. Those portions of the handbook are relevant to the handbook's Attendance Control Program, which sets forth increasing disciplinary actions for employees accumulating several absences during a rolling twelve-month period. The program does not explicitly relate to absences lasting longer than one year, as does the CBA.

. In accordance with that entitlement, the CBA expresses that in crafting that document, Thomas’s union and appellants each "had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to all proper subjects of collective bargaining and that all such subjects [had] been discussed and negotiated upon and the agreements contained in this contract [had been arrived upon] after the free exercise of such rights and responsibilities.”