Court Opinion

ID: 9499799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:58:14.275075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:44.362479
License: Public Domain

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority errs by shoehorning this case into an adverse credibility analysis. The majority goes astray, in my view, by characterizing this case as one where the Immigration Judge (IJ) required Singh to provide corroborating evidence despite the presentation of credible testimony by Singh. There are two fallacies inherent in that characterization: 1) that Singh gave credible testimony and, 2) that the IJ required the production of corroborating evidence. Rather, the record reflects that the IJ was unable to assess Singh’s credibility due to Singh’s obstructionist conduct.
At his hearing on April 15, 2002, Singh testified that an agent from the All-India Sikh Student Federation gave him a passport in the name of Sohan Lalf when they left India. He further testified that before the flight arrived in England, the agent gave Singh a passport bearing Singh’s name, which Singh used to enter Canada.
At his prior hearing on June 4, 2001, Singh never mentioned being given his own passport to enter Canada. To the contrary, Singh left the IJ with the distinct impression that he used the name Sohan Lalf to enter Canada. This impression was consistent with the statement on Singh’s application that he “travelled [sic] on another’s passport to Canada.” The reason for Singh’s dissimulation and inconsistency became apparent when the government reported the result of its inquiry to the Canadian immigration agency. Indeed, the Canadian government had an immigration file under the same name as Singh’s and with the same date of birth. Despite the obvious importance of the Canadian immigration file to the proceedings in this country, Singh refused to sign a waiver that would allow access to the Canadian immigration file. The importance of this file cannot be overstated. The contents of the file would either have confirmed Singh’s tale of persecution or given the lie to his claims.
The reasons Singh gave for refusing to sign the confidentiality waiver were significant factors in the IJ’s decision to draw the negative inference resulting in denial of Singh’s application. Singh testified that the agent “who brought [him] here,” threatened to kill Singh’s family if Singh told anyone about the agent. Singh also stated that sometime in the year 2000, he received a call on his cellular telephone from a person identifying himself as a Canadian immigration official. This person reportedly asked Singh about the agent who brought Singh to Canada, advising Singh that he “should tell them that it was he who brought [Singh] there.” Singh testified that he told the person on the telephone that he knew the agent, but denied knowing the whereabouts of the agent.
Singh’s testimony revealed that he had no contact with the Canadian immigration system between 1994 and the alleged telephone call in 2000, raising the question of why Canadian officials would contact him so long after his involvement with that *1028system. Neither could Singh explain how the Canadian immigration official would have obtained Singh’s cellular telephone number. Singh’s flimsy explanation for his refusal to grant access to the Canadian immigration file reinforced the IJ’s decision to draw a negative inference resulting in denial of Singh’s asylum request.
The majority opinion acknowledges the appropriateness of drawing a negative inference from Singh’s refusal to permit access to the Canadian immigration file. However, the majority opinion, without citation to any guiding authority, limits the use of that negative inference to making a finding of adverse credibility. I respectfully disagree.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.13, “[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act ...” The IJ must determine whether the evidence satisfies the Petitioner’s burden to prove “the elements of the claim for relief.” Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted).
It is “a generally accepted principle of law” that “an adverse inference may arise from the fact of missing evidence.” Smith v. United States, 128 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1232 (E.D.Ark.2000). Moreover, “[t]he failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, ... serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party.” International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C.Cir.1972).
“The theory behind the rule is that, all other things being equal, a party will of his own volition introduce the strongest evidence available to prove his case. If evidence within the party’s control would in fact strengthen his case, he can be expected to introduce it[.]” Id. at 1338. “Conversely, if such evidence is not introduced, it may be inferred that the evidence is unfavorable to the party suppressing it[.]” Id. Allowing an adverse inference to be drawn for failure to produce relevant evidence “plays a vital role in protecting the integrity of the administrative process!.]” Id.
This evidentiary presumption has arisen in various civil contexts. For example, in Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Transportation Communications International Union, 17 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir.1994), the Fourth Circuit determined that it was permissible for the arbitration board to draw an adverse inference from a party’s refusal “to comply with a Board request for additional evidence.”
Additionally, in a products liability case, the Third Circuit found that “[t]he unexplained failure or refusal of a party to judicial proceedings to produce evidence that would tend to throw light on the issues authorizes, under certain circumstances, an inference or presumption unfavorable to such party.” Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir.1983) (citations omitted). In Zapex Corp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir.1980), the Board challenged the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) “failure] to draw an adverse inference from (the companies’) failure to produce subpoenaed rec-ordsf.J” Although we did not ultimately decide whether the ALJ failed to apply the negative inference rule, we did conclude that “in view of [the party’s] failure for reasons of inconvenience alone to produce relevant documents, [this] supports, if not an application of the ‘adverse inference’ rule, at least a finding that the appellants did not carry their burden of proof.” Id.
*1029The IJ’s similar conclusion in this case— that Singh’s refusal to provide access to the Canadian file resulted in a failure of proof — is consistent with the most analogous authority that exists on this issue. In contrast, the majority’s conclusion that the IJ was required to make an adverse credibility determination in this circumstance is not supported by citation to a single case. Rather, the cases, cited in the majority opinion address failure to produce corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that an adverse inference was permissible when the Petitioner failed to produce corroborating evidence). However, Sidhu and comparable cases are not dispositive for two reasons: 1) Sidhu and similar cases merely hold that an adverse credibility determination is permissible when easily available corroborating information is not produced. Those cases do not purport to hold that the IJ is limited to making an adverse credibility determination and has no other options and, 2) as the IJ noted, we do not know whether the evidence would be corroborating or disqualifying. The latter reason highlights the philosophical weakness in the majority disposition. The majority would allow asylum applicants to blatantly refuse to permit immigration authorities to perform a complete investigation into the applicant’s eligibility for asylum. I emphasize that the immigration officials were not seeking to compel Singh to produce anything. Rather, the government merely requested that Singh authorize the government to gather this vital information itself. We should not reward those who deliberately thwart the administrative processes we have established to assess eligibility for asylum. As our cases reflect, adverse credibility determinations meet with varying results on review. Compare Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing the IJ’s determination that the petitioner “did not establish his credibility due to his evasiveness in answering questions”); with Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1256-57 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination on “obvious evasiveness”). The option of concluding in an appropriate case that denying access to information that well might be dispositive justifies denial of the application promotes respect for the administrative tribunal, fosters finality and injects a measure of certainty. For these reasons, I would not require an adverse credibility determination under the facts of this case. I would uphold the IJ’s determination that Singh’s blatant refusal to allow access to the Canadian immigration file warranted a determination that he failed to carry his burden of proof.