Court Opinion

ID: 8124826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 15:04:52.575665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:10.756668
License: Public Domain

Caldwell, J.
This case arose under tbe constitution and by-laws of the order in force in'3880. Tested by these laws the alleged suspension of Harrisburg lodge by the supreme reporter was a nullity. It was not merely irregular, but it was a void act. The constitution and by-laws then in force conferred no jurisdiction upon the supreme reporter to suspend subordinate lodges in any case, or for any offense; and his mandate suspending Harrisburg lodge had no more effect, inside or outside of the order, than if it had been made by one who did *454not belong to the order. Article 9, § 1, article 15, § 1, Const. 1879. Moreover, it was made without giving the lodge an Opportunity to be heard, and for an alleged ground that had no existence in fact. If 'the supreme reporter had been invested with jurisdiction to try and suspend lodges, and he had given Harrisburg lodge due notice of the proceedings, the fact that he erred in judgment in the application of the law to the case, or in his finding of facts, would have been a mere irregularity, which might have been corrected on appeal, or in such mode as the constitution provided; but until his judgment was reversed by the appropriate supervisory power it would be conclusive on the parties, and not subject to collateral attack- in any tribunal. This is nothing more than the application to the decrees of these organizations affecting their members of the familiar principles that obtain in relation to the validity and effect of judicial determinations of controversies between citizens in the courts. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, its judgment, however erroneous on the law and the facts, concludes the parties unless appealed from. But, if jurisdiction over the subject-matter and person is wanting, its judgment is a nullity. The case of Karcher v. Supreme Lodge, 137 Mass. 368, S. C. 19 Cent. Law J. 152, is grounded on this rule. The court in that case say:
“Karcher was suspended by the tribunal which he had chosen to determine the question according to rules to which he assented in becoming a member, and he received notice of the proceeding. The action of this tribunal according to its rules, on a question which it had authority to decide, honestly taken, after the requisite notice to him, cannot be collaterally reviewed in this court on the ground that facts existed which, if brought to the notice of the tribunal, would have warranted or required a different decision.”
None of the prerequisites here laid down as necessary to the validity and conclusiveness of a decree of one of these tribunals exists in the case at bar. By the laws of the order in force at the date of this transaction, neither Harrisburg lodge nor Hill consented that the supreme reporter should have jurisdiction to try and suspend lodges, with or without notice. The action of the supreme reporter in suspending Harrisburg lodge was not taken according to the laws of the organization; it was not a question which that officer had authority to decide, and it was, moreover, taken without notice. It was not merely an erroneous proceeding on the part of that officer, but a usurpation which cannot affect the legal rights or change the legal status of any one. Agnew v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. Missouri Court of Appeals, 1885. Harrisburg lodge was not required to appeal from such an order of suspension. The obligation to appeal is not imposed where the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. It may be likened to a judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter or the person. No appeal or writ of error is necessary to get rid of such a judgment; it is void in all courts and places. The lodge, therefore, did right in ignoring the so-called sus*455pension, and forwarding assessment No. 66, as was done. This assessment was forwarded twice, and returned each time. The grounds assigned for this action were two: First, that assessment No. 65 had not been paid; and, second, that the lodge was suspended. Both the grounds were without foundation in fact. Assessment No. 65 had been paid, and the lodge had not been suspended. The tender of assessment No. 66 was'just as effectual to.preserve the rights of the lodge and its members as if it had been accepted. For the purpose of avoiding penalties and forfeitures, or the loss of any right or privilege, a tender is the exact equivalent of payment. It does not have to be repeated. After tender made, the burden is on the creditor to act; he mast demand the debt, and it is only required of the debtor to be ready to meet the demand. No demand of assessment No. 66 was ever made after it was returned to Harrisburg lodge. For the purposes of this case, therefore, that assessment must be treated as paid. Other calls were made, as stated in the fifth finding of fact, before Hall’s death, but notices of these assessments were not sent to Harrisburg lodge, as required by the constitution and by-laws of the order. The officers of the Supreme lodge, supposing Harrisburg lodge was suspended, sent that lodge no notice of assessments after No. 66.
In the case of ordinary life policies, the company is under no obligation to give the assured notice of the amount and maturity of the premiums accruing on the policy, because the policy fixes definitely the amount of the premiums and the time of tlieir payment, and the assured is bound to know these facts. Thompson v. Insurance Co. 104 U. S. 252. But under the constitution of the Kniglits of Honor the amounts which the subordinate lodges and their members are liable to pay cannot be known in advance of the assessments made by the supreme lodge. The amount and frequency of the assessments depend on the mortality of the members of the order. The subordinate lodges forward proof of death of their members to the proper officers of the supreme lodge, who ascertain from these returns the amount necessary to be assessed upon the subordinate lodges, and through tliem upon their members, to pay the amounts due to the holders of benefit certificates. When this amount is ascertained, it is distributed and assessed on the several subordinate lodges. The constitution of the order requires notice of these assessments to be sent to each lodge. This is the only mode by which the subordinate lodges can be informed of the amount they are required to pay, and the time within which the payment is to be made. Until this is done, no liability is imposed upon a subordinate lodge or its members. Castner v. Farmers' Ins. Co. 15 N. W. Rep. 452, (Mich. 1883;) Bates v. Mutual Ben. Ass'n, 47 Mich. 646; Gellatly v. Mutual Ben. Ass’n, 27 Minn. 215; S. C. 6 N. W. Rep. 627.
The subordinate lodges and their members discharge their constitutional obligation to the W. & O. B. fund when they pay, upon due notice, the assessments made by the Supreme lodge to maintain that *456fund. An assessment notice of which is withheld from any lodge and its members is not an assessment on that lodge or its members, and their good standing is not lost by not paying an assessment of which they had no notice, through the fault or misconduct of the Supreme lodge or its officers. The Supreme lodge is bound to discharge its constitutional obligations to the subordinate lodges and their members. When, by its own wrongful act, it puts it out of the power of a subordinate lodge and its members to pay an assessment or assessments, it will not be heard to claim that the unoffending lodge and its members shall be visited with penalties and forfeitures the same as though the failure to pay the assessments had arisen from their fault. The subordinate lodge and its members, who have conformed to the laws of the order, are not to be deprived of their rights by a breach of its constitutional duty by the Supreme lodge. The Supreme lodge is under legal obligation to pay the benefit certificates of all members of the order who have conformed to its laws and died in good standing; and, if it refuses to perform its contract contained in the constitution and by-laws, the lawful holder of the benefit certificate may have recourse to the proper courts to enforce the contract. Dolan v. Court Good Samaritan, 128 Mass. 437.
Let judgment be entered for the plaintiffs for $2,000, with 6 per cent, interest from the first day of January, 1881.