Court Opinion

ID: 9557436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:06.502816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:49.799356
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
In this case, and long before 'the commencement of the trial, the defendants made application to the trial court for an order directing that plaintiff be examined by a physician to be selected by the defendants, or by the trial court. The trial court, relying upon former decisions of this court, found and held that it was without authority of law to direct an examination by physicians selected by the court, or by physicians selected by the defendants. I agree that the trial court should be affirmed in so holding. A reversal of the case based upon that ground would result in an entrapment of the plaintiff which could hardly be justified in view of the long line of decisions from this court which were relied upon by the plaintiff. However, I do not believe we should perpetuate that rule, believing as I do that it is more unjust to require a defending party to go blindly into court than it is to require the party seeking damages for personal injuries to submit to a physical examination.
The minority rule, which has been followed by this court, seems to be based upon strong feelings as to the inviolability of the person and lack of power. This feeling of inviolability of the person has been disappearing during the past thirty or forty years. The reason for the minority rule has almost completely disappeared.
In 17 Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 47, it'is said:
*582‘‘While there is some difference of opinion on the question whether the court, in a personal injury action, has inherent power to require the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by physicians and surgeons', according .to the great weight of authority in this country, and the distinct modern trend of the courts, trial courts, in actions to recover damages for personal injuries, have an inherent, discretionary power to order a reasonable physical examination of the plaintiff to be made before trial by competent physicians and surgeons whenever -such examination is necessary to ascertain the nature, extent, or permanency of the alleged injuries. * * *.
'“Many other forcible reasons may be advanced in support of the rule above stated. Foremost among the supporting reasons is the fact that such an 'examination prevents a defendant from being subjected to fraudulent claims for feigned personal injuries. Moreover, it may rightly be argued that when a person appeals to a court of justice for relief, he impliedly agrees in advance to make any disclosure which is necessary in order that justice nfay be done. Another reason given in support of the rule is that the production of the best evidence is a necessary means of attaining full and exact 'justice. Obviously, an examination of the actual physical condition of the plaintiff will reveal the true extent of the injuries caused by the defendant’s wrongful act more clearly than any other evidence which could be introduced.”
In 51 A.L.R. at page 183 there appears an annotation entitled “Power to require plaintiff to submit to physical examination.” At page 184 therein, it is said:
“As stated in the former annotations, the rule in the majority of jurisdictions is that the trial court has the power to require the plaintiff, in an action to recover for injuries, to submit to a physi- ■ cal examination in order that the extent of the injuries may be ascertained.”
The foregoing annotation is supplemented in 108 A.L.R. at page 142, wherein it is said:
“As shown by the earlier annotations on this subject, the prevailing rule, even in the absence of express statute on the subject, seems to be that the trial court has the power to require the plaintiff in a personal injury action to undergo a physical examination at the behest of the defendant, although the latter’s right is not considered absolute, and the matter is wholly within the discretion of the trial court, so long, of course, as the exercise of such discretion is free from palpable abuse.”
In People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783, it is said:
“Two possible explanations of this treatment of the problem occur to us. Strong feelings as to the ‘inviolability of the person’, see the majority opinion in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 1891, 141 U.S. 250, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 may have been tacitly responsible. But when one seeks to recover damages on the basis of his physical injuries he put his physical condition in issue. It becomes a fact to be proved, as much as the physical conduct that gave rise to his injury, or the documents on which a right to recover is asserted in a contract action. The basic principle that animates our law of evidence is that what is relevant is admissible. Exceptions to that principle must justify themselves. If there is to be exception here, it must be because a privilege exists. And a privilege in the law of evidence, to be soundly based, must rest on considerations that make it more desirable to risk concealment of the truth than to disrupt the values that the privilege supports. No such considerations are involved in the ordinary physical examination in a personal injury case.
*583“The other explanation is that the doctrine of ‘lack of power’ may have been a shorthand way of saying that the court felt that it was appropriate for the legislature, and not the courts, to determine that such examinations should be permitted. Cf. People ex rel. Wayman v. Steward, 249 Ill. 311, 316, 94 N.E. 511, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 259. This view, however, ignores the common-law precedents that permitted physical examination where necessary, and it overlooks the power of our courts to regulate judicial procedure. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634; Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713. Moreover, it involves the dubious assumption that the legislature could today constitutionally cut off a reasonable and appropriate method of getting at the truth in a judicial controversy. Since Parker v. Enslow was decided there has been a substantial change in judicial attitude. Excessive emphasis upon the adversary aspects of our system, and hence upon the sporting chances of a trial, has yielded to universal recognition of the role of a trial as a search for truth. Limited discovery, available only in equity, has been replaced by comprehensive discovery available in all actions. In the light of the comprehensive discovery allowed today, it would be difficult to justify an exception that would single out for disparate treatment the case of the plaintiff who seeks damages because of his physical condition.
“By decision, by rule of court, and by statute, physical examination is almost everywhere permitted in appropriate cases. Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed., sec. 2220; see cases collected, Brown v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 A. 30; 51 A.L.R. 183; Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686, 108 A.L.R. 142, 135 A.L.R. 883. That this result is supported by strong policy considerations is apparent from the fact that in workmen’s compensation cases, and in many other instances, our statutes require physical or mental. examinations. Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 48, pars. 138.12, 172.47; chap. 91½, pars. 4-4, 6-1; chap. 38, par. 823.”
While I concur in the majority opinion affirming the trial court I am of the further opinion that we should repudiate our former decisions which follow the minority rule. It is my further view that we should apply the majority rule in all those cases tried subsequent to the publication of our opinion herein (See People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. 364, 92 P. 853, and 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 186a and 187) where timely request has been made, and where it further appears that a physical examination would be just and appropriate.
I am authorized to state that WELCH and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur in the views herein expressed.