Court Opinion

ID: 9810041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:42.19397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:20.641312
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COATS,
concurring in the judgment only.
128 While I too would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, I do not disagree with that court's construction of seetion 18-8-203(1)(f), C.R.S. (2014). I would order reinstatement of the defendant's consecutive sentence solely for the reason that I believe, contrary to the understanding of the court of appeals, that the sentencing court never considered itself bound to order a consecutive sentence and instead understood the scope of, and properly exercised, its sentencing discretion. Because I therefore believe the defendant's sentence would not change in any event and because the legislature can amend the statute if it intends a different result, writing separately would hardly be worth .the time and effort were it not for what I consider to be the majority's serious mishandling of fundamental principles of statutory construction. As it is, however, I feel obliged to make known my differences with the majority, in the hope that despite controlling the outcome of this case, its opinion will not be regarded as persuasive and its methodology will not be followed in the construction of other statutes. I therefore concur in the judgment, but only the judgment, of the court.
129 Initially, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals for erroneously ascribing to the district court's sentencing decision any application whatsoever of the consecutive sentencing mandate of section 18-38-203(1)(f). As the majority notes, maj. op. 18 n.4, the sentencing court made clear its assumption that the statute required only that the defendant's sentence for assault run consecutively to a sentence being served "at the time of the offense," and both the prosecutor and defense counsel expressed agree*628ment that the statute could be construed that way. In imposing the sentence, after entertaining argument on the merits of both concurrent and consecutive sentencing for this defendant, the court further indicated its belief that the legislature's consecutive sentencing mandate was intended to ensure that a sentence for committing an assault while in custody would "pack some punch," and the court avoided having to construe the fine points of the statute by simply exercising its discretion to further that intent.
[ 30 It is well established that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, sentencing courts in this jurisdiction have the inherent power to order, at their discretion, sentences to be served either consecutively to or concurrently with other sentences already being served. Marquez v. People, 2013 CO 58, ¶ 6, 311 P.3d 265, 267. Not only did the sentencing court here fail to suggest that it would impose a concurrent sentence were it not statutorily limited from doing so; rather than imposing the four year, mid-point-of-the-presumptive-range sentence that was otherwise available if it considered a mandatory consecutive sentence too harsh, the court instead made findings concerning this particular defendant and this particular offense sufficient to justify the consecutive sentence, in the aggravated range, which it ultimately imposed. As we have previously held, in the absence of any suggestion by the sentencing court that it considered itself bound by statute, and therefore erroneously failed to exercise its discretion as required, construction of the statute in question is not at issue. See Tumentsereg v. People, 247 P.3d 1015, 1020-21 (Colo.2011).
81 With regard to the question of statutory construction, I disagree with the majority's methodology and conclusion on a number of critical points, beginning with its failure to adequately distinguish the interpretation of statutory language relative to the question of ambiguity from the construction of an ambiguous statute. The precise point at which the one leaves off and the other begins in any particular case will, of course, often be subject to debate, but as a matter of general principle, it is clear that a statute takes its meaning, first and foremost, from the text of the statute itself. When that language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, it is considered to be ambiguous, and the particular reasonable interpretation that embodies the legislative intent, and therefore the ultimate meaning of the statute, is to be determined by reference to a body of both internal and external aids to statutory construction. While the reasonable interpretation of statutory text is clearly dependent upon the definitions of the words of the text themselves, the context in which they are used, and the relationships among them, as governed by accepted rules of grammar and syntax, when those considerations nevertheless produce more than one reasonable understanding of the text, additional presumptions, drafting conventions, and external sources pointing to the intent of the body enacting the statute must resolve the "legislative intent."
1 32 It at least appears to be the case that the majority believes the question of ambiguity to turn on more than the text of the statute itself, relying as it does on a number of dubious propositions, or rules of statutory construction, to find that statute unambiguous. As its first of a number of rationales, the majority asserts that the key phrase of the statute "means just what it says-'with any sentences being served.'" Maj. op. 1 15. But giving emphasis to the word "any," as the dissenting opinion in the intermediate appellate court had done, actually suggests confusion about precisely what is at issue. There is no dispute here about the kinds of sentences to which a section 208(1)(f) sentence must be consecutive. Rather the matter at issue concerns the meaning of the phrase "being served." Because "being" clearly describes something in existence, rather than something that has existed in the past or will exist in the future, the meaning of the text necessarily turns on the point in time to which "being served" refers.
€33 Rather than concluding from the text's failure to specify any particular point in time that it is therefore ambiguous, the majority mechanically relies on another dubious proposition to conclude that construing the term "being served" as a reference to *629"the time of the assault" would require im-permissibly adding or "imply[ing]" words to the text. Maj. op. 115. I consider the majority's reasoning faulty for two separate reasons. First, it in no way advances the argument in the majority's favor. If inferring a reference to "the time of the assault" amounts to impermissibly adding words, it is far from clear why inferring a reference to "the time of sentencing" does not amount to adding words in precisely the same manner. Second, and more importantly, this abbreviated proposition itself represents an accurate principle of construction only to the extent that it forbids adding words to avoid an ambiguity, not to resolve one. Furthermore, words that are necessarily implied by the text are not added within the meaning of this principle at all, but are simply made explicit. It is, of course, not only permissible but in fact imperative to interpret the text of a statute in terms of its necessary implications. It is, however, the possibility of competing or contradictory reasonable implications, or interpretations, that creates (or perhaps defines) an ambiguity, and it would therefore be nonsensical to dismiss the acknowledgment of any reasonable implication of the text as requiring the addition of words. When statutory text admits of contradictory reasonable interpretations, clarifying which interpretation embodies the legislative intent is the purpose of the rules of construction-not forbidden by them.
34 Notwithstanding the statute's failure to modify the phrase "being served" with the words "at the time the sentence is imposed," as well as the majority's overstatement that adding words is impermissible, the majority finds that an earlier reference to the imposition of sentence must indicate that the intended time is the time the sentence is imposed, rather than the time of the assault. While this inference might be considered reasonable, it is certainly neither necessary nor the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the complete text of section 203(1)(f). Because a sentence is "imposed pursuant to this paragraph (£)" for an assault by an adult on a prison employee only if the assault is committed "while lawfully confined or in custody as a result of being charged with or convicted of a crime," it is equally reasonable, if not more so, to infer that the class of sentences to which a sentence imposed pursuant to paragraph (£) must run consecutively was intended to be limited to those sentences for which the defendant's lawful confinement constitutes an element of the offense.
1 35 Apparently unconvinced by its earlier explanations why the statute should be considered unambiguous, the majority adds that requiring sentences imposed pursuant to paragraph (f) to run consecutively only to sentences for which the defendant was lawfully confined when he committed one of the specified assaults would be "illogical." However, the fact that paragraph (f) elevates what might otherwise be assaults in the third degree to assaults in the second degree in certain cases not involving the service of another sentence in no way renders it illogical or contradictory to mandate consecutive sentences for those assaults committed while serving another sentence. To the extent the majority suggests a legislative intent that sentences for violation of paragraph () not be served concurrently with any other sentence, its own construction would no more accomplish this result than would the construction of the court of appeals. Only by forbidding subsequent sentencing courts from running later-imposed sentences concurrently with a sentence imposed pursuant to paragraph (f) could this broad goal be accomplished, and the legislature has clearly shown no inclination to do so.
36 As a final reason for finding the statute unambiguous, the majority observes that if the legislature intended the phrase "being served" as a limitation to sentences being served when the assault was actually committed, it could simply have said so. Once again this observation advances the inquiry not one iota. While it may be an accurate observation, it is applicable with equal force to the majority's construction. If the legislature intended the phrase "being served" to refer to sentences being served at the time of sentencing, it could simply have said so. Rather than demonstrating a lack of ambiguity in the text, the legislature's failure to specify with which sentences a paragraph (f) sentence could not be ordered to run concur*630rently is the very omission creating the ambiguity.
T37 I agree with the majority that existing records of legislative hearings are not helpful in resolving the question in this case. Even without the benefit of such external evidence of legislative motivation, however, the majority divines a "legislative purpose" or "clear legislative intent" to deter assaults in custody, and it asserts that its owns construction better "facilitates this objective." Although the majority's construction might result in restricting sentencing court discretion in a larger class of cases, it could hardly enhance the deterrent value of the penalty, even if such broad deterrence actually were the motivating factor behind the statute. Deterrence, in the sense of behavior modification, necessarily requires an awareness of an undesirable consequence in order to avoid it. The majority's construction would mandate consecutive sentences based on the fortuitous, or even manipulated, timing of sentencing hearings rather than enhancing the predictability of the consequences of assaulting a prison employee. In any event, the legislature has separately both elevated and aggravated sentences for assault on law enforcement and prison personnel, and little deterrent effect could be expected from mandating consecutive sentencing, which is already within the discretion of sentencing courts. Perhaps more importantly, however, nothing suggests a legislative purpose to deter any more than to ensure adequate retribution or punishment for such crimes by eliminating the possibility that the offender would serve no greater sentence than that for which he was already confined.
38 Along these lines, a serious objection to the majority's construction, and one leading me to believe the obvious ambiguity in the text should be resolved in favor of limiting a sentencing court's discretion only for sentences the service of which elevates the assault to the felony 4 level in the first place, is the fact that doing otherwise effectively increases a defendant's confinement on the basis of factors not only beyond his control, but even occurring after the commission of his crime. Unlike the court of appeals, I do not suggest the majority's construction lacks any rational basis; but whether constitutional limitations are implicated or not, we in this jurisdiction have long acknowledged traditional principles of criminal responsibility prohibiting the state from converting a less serious charge into a more serious one on the basis of something occurring after the charge. Largely in reliance on this very principle, we long ago resolved ambiguous language in our habitual eriminal statute to disallow enhanced sentences on the basis of convictions incurred after commission of the offense for which the defendant was being sentenced. See People v. Nees, 200 Colo. 392, 615 P.2d 690, 698 (1980) (construing "within ten years" to mean only within ten years before, rather than including ten years after, commission of the current offense). Unlike so-called "real offense" sentencing, see generally Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 98 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); People v. Newman, 91 P.3d 369 (Colo.2004), which permits consideration of even unrelated conduct in imposing a sentence within a statutorily dictated range, the majority's construction extends confinement on the basis of convictions not even yet in existence, and in fact crimes not even yet committed, when the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced was committed.
39 Finally, I am completely baffled both by the majority's reliance on the prior court of appeals rationale in People v. Bendvides, 222 P.3d 391 (Colo.App.2009), and its attempt to minimize the distinction between that rationale and its own reasoning, characterizing it as nothing more than "a distinetion without a difference." Maj. op. 122. Rather than involving a mere difference in procedural history, as the majority asserts, the construction of Benavides stands in diametric opposition to the majority's construction today. More particularly, the Benavides court relied on the definition of the crime itself, which elevates the classification of assaults on prison employees committed by defendants "while lawfully confined or in custody as a result of being charged with or convicted of a crime," to conclude that the legislature's consecutive sentence mandate must have been intended to extend to any sentence, whether yet imposed or not, for a crime with which the defendant had already been charged and *631as a result of which charge he was lawfully confined at the time of committing his subsequent assault. 222 P.3d at 394. Ironically, the Benavides rationale grew out of an attempt to avoid the fortuitous impact of scheduling which the majority now celebrates as enhancing deterrence. Whatever its merits, Benavidez did not, and could not consistently with its own rationale, accept any construction mandating consecutive sentencing for crimes other than those for which the defendant was already lawfully confined at the time of the prison assault.
140 Because the legislature's failure to specify the point in time to which the phrase "being served" was intended to apply creates an ambiguity which I believe, for both policy and textual reasons, should be resolved as was done by the court of appeals below, I agree with the court of appeals' construction of the statute. Because, however, I believe the court of appeals failed to appreciate that the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion to sentence consecutively rather than concurrently, I would nevertheless reverse the court of appeals' judgment,. I therefore concur only in the judgment of this court and not its reasoning.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE EID joins in this concurrence in the judgment only.