Court Opinion

ID: 9617333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:54:14.044661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:08.163359
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Judge
(concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. Unfortunately, I agree that the current state of the law prohibits recovery by Ms. Parker. However, I find this troubling, and believe it is also the policy of the law to hold both parents fully accountable *1111for the support of their children. In my opinion, this policy should especially apply with undiminished force to a casual biological father whose fatherhood resulted from actions in which no contemplation was given to the formation of a family.
Estoppel is “an equitable doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their [own] rights where their [own] actions render it inequitable to allow them to ■ assert those rights.” Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah App.1989) (emphasis added). I believe application of this doctrine in a child support context should be significantly limited than the law now allows. .
It has long been recognized that the child’s right to receive current or future support is his or her own and “is not subject to being bartered away, or estopped, or in any way defeated by the conduct of the parents or others.” Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); see also Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 227, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956); Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153, 154, 289 P.2d 1044, 1044 (1955) (“Future child support effectively cannot be the subject of bargain and sale. Among other things, the State is an interested party in such matters since a child’s welfare is at stake.”).
In the case of a child support obligation arising in a paternity context, the interested parties are the child, parents, and the State. The child has a right to support from his or her parents. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 (1992) (duty of father to support his child), 78^45-4 (1992) (duty of mother to support her child), 78^45a-l (1992) (duty of father of child born outside marriage same as father of child born within marriage).
In a paternity action, the claim for past child support is already limited to four years by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992) (“The father’s liability for past education and necessary support are limited to a period of four years next preceding the commencement of a [paternity] action.”). In fact, the State argues that this statute provides adequate financial protection for the biological father, and thus should be read to preempt the availability of equitable estoppel as an additional protection.
Unfortunately, current case law prevents us from accepting the State’s argument. In Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), the mother of a child brought a paternity action against the father over four years after the child’s birth. The mother was awarded past child support, limited only by section 78-45a-3, which, as noted above, limits the father’s liability to a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. The father sought to invoke the equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches in addition to the limitation already imposed by section 78-45a-3. The per curiam decision of the supreme court held summarily that these equitable doctrines do not apply in a statutory action. Zito, 584 P.2d at 869.
However, this reasoning was expressly overruled in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). In Borland, the father attempted to raise a defense of laches to a paternity action brought seven years after the birth of the child. The court held that while laches did not apply to the facts of that case, it was nevertheless available as a defense in a paternity action. The court stated:
At common law, an equitable defense could not be raised to a legal action, and because a statutory action was legal in nature, equitable defenses would not apply. This seems to be the theory behind Zito, a per curiam opinion. However, Utah long ago abolished any formal distinction between law and equity. It is well established that equitable defenses may be applied in actions at law and that principles of equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice. Therefore, it is clear that under appropriate circumstances, laches may bar an action for paternity.... Therefore, we conclude that to the extent that Zito stands for the proposition that an equitable defense is not available, it is an incorrect statement of the law and is overruled.
Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
The supreme court in Borland was not faced with the specific question of whether equitable estoppel can defeat a mother’s claim for reimbursement of past child support, given the four-year limitation already imposed by section 78^45a-3. The court did not specifically address whether the four-year limitation was intended to preclude the application of equitable estoppel as to those four years. However, since the four-year limitation on past child support was part of the Zito case, and the supreme court overruled Zito in broad terms without reserving the question of the specific preemptive power of this legislative limitation, we must infer *1112from Borland that the court views the defense of equitable estoppel as available in an action to recover past child support accruing within the four-year period prior to the filing of the paternity .action. This court so relied on Borland in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d. 1046 (Utah App.1990), when it sanctioned the use of equitable estoppel as a defense to a mother’s claim for back child support in a paternity action.
Based on Zito, Borland, and Burrow, we are now forced to conclude that the defense of equitable estoppel to a claim for reimbursement of past child support has not been preempted by the four year limitation of section 78-45a-3. There is no clear indication that section 78-45a-3 is intended to be the only possible limitation to any obligation arising from a child support obligation.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent the sometimes harsh rule of law from working an unfairness between two parties. In a child support context, and as the law now stands, equitable estoppel is applicable between the parents after the child’s rights are discharged. The courts are at liberty to use equitable estoppel as a tool to strike what is believed to be a fair balancé between the mother and the father. However, the balance struck between the mother and father has a residual effect on the interests of the child and the State. Those interests suggest that the balance should be tilted in favor of the parent who actually furnishes support to the child. So, while equitable estoppel presently has an application in this area, its application should be severely limited and should not be invoked lightly.
In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Parker made statements prior to the birth of the children to the effect that she did not want Mr. Irizarry’s money, or to have anything to do with him, but that at the same time she kept money proffered by him.3 At the time she made those statements, Ms. Parker had not expended funds in support of the twins. However, the current case law reveals that reviewing courts have failed to require strict application of the facts to the correct legal standard of equitable estoppel. Utah courts require reasonable reliance, in the form of action , or inaction, as one of the elements of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Trolley Square Assoc. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App.1994); Burrow, 788 P.2d at 1048. Recognizing that such a determination is “a highly fact-dependent question,” Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65, to nevertheless find reasonable reliance by a father in an action such as this should require more supporting evidence than mere communications or conduct by the mother occurring prior to her actually providing the child support.
In the present case, Mr. Irizarry seeks to estop Ms. Parker from asserting her right to reimbursement. At the time of the conduct and communications relied on by Mr. Irizar-ry, Ms. Parker had no right to reimbursement simply because she had not yet furnished the support. Indeed, “[t]he right of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support.” Baggs, 528 P.2d at 143 (emphasis added). It stretches the limits of reasonability to suggest that Mr. Irizarry can reasonably rely on conduct or communications of Ms. Parker that she will, in the future, relieve him of a legal obligation and will thereafter not assert a personal right 'acquired as a result of such future conduct. It would seem only logical that to act reasonably in not reimbursing Ms: Parker for the support she provided, Mr. Irizarry would have to have some knowledge that Ms. Parker actually provided that support.
• Furthermore, although the application of equitable estoppel to the statements and actions of Ms. Parker prior to the birth of the twins is in keeping with the present state of the law, it leaves in jeopardy the interests of .not only the children, but also those of the State. Perhaps the question of when equitable estoppel should apply in a paternity ac*1113tion for past child support will be addressed by the legislature in order to give full effect to the underlying duty of a father to support his children. It is clear that the legislature intends that this responsibility be taken seriously, lest the children suffer or become a public charge. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-101, -104 (1992).
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of WILKINS, J.

. The trial court found that Ms. Parker made three statements to Mr. Irizarry: (1) In September. 1984, Ms. Parker told Mr. Irizarry over the telephone that “she didn't want any money and would take care of herself." (2) After he sent a letter, Mr. Irizarry made a follow-up call to Ms. Parker in November 1984 and "once again she said she wanted nothing to do with [Mr. Irizar-iy]."' (3) In January 1985, Mr. Irizarry called Ms.,Parker and “once again the plaintiff said she wanted nothing to do with him.” In April 1985, the twins were bom. The findings are supported by the evidence and, thus, are not clearly erroneous.