Court Opinion

ID: 9550592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:37:48.763966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:55.035134
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice.
Certiorari to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, to review its decision denying unemployment compensation benefits to plaintiffs.
The facts are as follows: Prior to June 25, 1950, switching and spotting of railroad cars upon the premises of the Garfield, Utah, plant of the American Smelting & Refining Co. (A. S. & R. Co.) - was performed pursuant to contract by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (D. & R. G. W.). The railroad employees were members of the Switchmen’s Union of North America. On June 25th, the Switchmen’s Union “struck” the D. & R, G. W. Approximately nine switchmen affected by the strike, walked off their jobs at Garfield. The A. S. & R. Co. had anticipated such a possibility and had arranged by contract with Local Union No. 4347 United Steel Workers of America, C. I. 0., which had jurisdiction over the A. S. & R. Co. employees, that the Steelworkers Union would take over the jobs vacated by the striking switchmen and perform such work, using equipment recently acquired by the A. S. & R. Co. The contract with the D. & R. G. W., being terminable at will, had been cancelled and there were no positions in the *553plant operations which were being filled by railroad employees.
On June 28, 1950, the Switchmen’s Union established picket lines at the gates of the plant. The Executive Board of the Steelworkers Union, Local 4347, had determined to honor such a picket line and the morning shift of A. S. & R. Co. employees stayed outside the plant upon encountering the pickets. Representatives of the Steelworkers Union conferred with the A. S. & R. Co. management suggesting that the afternoon and night shifts be advised of the situation and told not to report for work. Such information was broadcasted on various radios that afternoon and consequently most of the workers on the afternoon and evening shift did not report for work. The only reason for the closing down of the plant was the refusal of the employees to pass the picket lines established by the Switchmen’s Union. No dispute of any kind existed between the smelting company and its employees, either as to wages or any condition of employment. Both the Switchmen’s and Steelworkers Union were notified of the termination of the contract calling for switching and spotting services by railroad employees within the plant. Nevertheless the picket line remained until July 6th. The employees of the smelting company returned to work July 8, 1950.
Plaintiffs represent the A. S. & R. Co. employees who contend that they are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits for the period from June 25th through July 8, 1950. The salient portions of the Utah Employment Security Act provides as follows:
42-2a-4, U. C. A. 1943:
“An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if it has been found by the commission that: * * * (c) He is able to work and is available for work.”
42-2a-5,
“An individual shall be ineligible for benefits * * * (a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause, is so found by the commission * * (Italics added.)
*554Plaintiffs contend that they did not leave work voluntarily without good cause, nor was there work available for them within the meaning of the statute. The reason given for refusing to cross the picket line was stated by one of the witnesses to be:
“Well, every union man on joining a union pledges that he will work for the betterment of organized labor and that he will not under any circumstances take another man’s job and that he will cease work on the orders of his union and it is also a common belief among organized labor that what hurts one union man hurts another and to undermine the — for the C. I. O. for example to undermine the A. F. of L. Union by crossing their picket lines and aid in breaking their strike, would undermine all our rights.”
Other testimony is to the effect that any man who crosses a picket line is considered a scab, a person devoid of honor, who cannot be trusted, hardly fit for the society of other working men; that Garfield is a union community where a scab would be socially ostracized. There was no evidence of violence when the morning shift encountered the pickets, but the plaintiffs testified that they feared a fight would start if someone attempted to cross it. Thus plaintiffs argue that these socio-economic reasons compelled them to honor the picket line and furnished “good cause” for their decision to remain away from work; that if work could only be obtained at the risk of violence or social ostracism then the work was not as a practical matter “available.”
The claims supervisor of the Industrial Commission in denying the plaintiffs’ application for unemployment compensation, stated as follows:
“You were unemployed because in accordance with your union principles you did not choose to cross the picket line which had been established by the Switchmen’s Union. This choice is one which members of organized labor are frequently called upon to make and in the eyes of the Utah act, this kind of choice has never been deemed involuntary. You are therefore ineligible to receive benefits from June 25 through July 8, 1950.”
*555In Members Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208, and in Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm., . . . Utah . . , 243 P. 2d 951, we have cited Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935, 939. There a machinist’s union refused to cross the picket line of the welder’s union established at the Bodinson plant. The court held that the machinists were ineligible for unemployment compensation. The question was whether the claimant “left his work because of a trade dispute” as provided by the California statute. The court reasoned that the phrase implied that the employee is disqualified for benefits “only if he leaves his work voluntarily”. Thus the issue was whether the employees who refused to pass the picket line acted of their own volition. Our statute provides that the individual shall be ineligible for benefits when he leaves work “voluntarily without good cause,” and therefore the Bodinson decision is squarely in point. The decision of the court is expressed by the following quotations found at page 940 of 109 P. 2d:
“If the picket line was maintained within the limits permitted bylaw, as this one presumably was, no physical compulsion was exerted to prevent corespondents from working. They were unemployed solely because, in accordance with their union principles, they did not choose to work in a plant where certain of their fellow employees were on strike. Their own consciences and faith in their union principles dictated their action. This choice is one which members of organized labor are frequently called upon to make, and in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never been deemed involuntary.” '
The “Utah Unemployment Reserve Law” as it was first known was enacted in 1935, Chapter 38, Laws of Utah 1935. Section 1 declared that the policy of the act was to lessen the burden of involuntary employment “which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.” The act was designed to establish “financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” At that time this nation was in the throes of a great economic depres*556sion. The purpose of providing unemployment benefits was twofold: first, to alleviate the need of the worker and his family who found no market for their services and were deprived of wages by the general business collapse; second, it was a “pump-priming” measure to provide increased buying power and thereby stimulate our economic system. In present times of prosperity, neither of these objectives would be served by granting benefits to the present claimants. Future times may present occasions when the cushioning effect of unemployment compensation may arrest the course of a narrowing downward economic spiral so as to make pump-priming in its raw form unnecessary. Labor’s right to seek higher wages by concerted lawful economic pressure is recognized but the labor force which chooses to strike in order to enforce its demands cannot be classified as involuntarily unemployed. It is specifically disqualified from receiving compensation by statute. Those who are in sympathy with the striking body and stay away from their available jobs in order to uphold the reciprocal pact amongst laboring forces to honor each other’s picket lines cannot logically be placed in any other category. We believe that consideration of the background and general purpose of unemployment legislation is what has prompted the courts to hold that the decision of an employee not to cross a picket line which surrounds his place of work cannot be deemed an involuntary act.
In the instant case, the claimants voluntarily remained away from work which was available to them because of their adherence to the union principle of honoring picket lines. There is no merit to the argument that because the switchmen’s picket line was an illegal secondary boycott, it was the duty of the A. S. & R. Co. management to have it enjoined; that the failure to do so prevented the employees from gaining access to their place of employment. The Executive Board of the Steelworkers Union knew that there was no dispute existing between the A. S. & R. Co. and members of the Switchmens Union of North America. *557They knew that there were no jobs on the premises being filled by railroad employees. Nevertheless, they voted to recognize the picket line and thereby add their own economic strength to the demands of the Switchmen’s Union. In doing so, they not only participated in the work stoppage, but their action was the cause of it.
Insofar as claimant’s eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits is concerned, it is immaterial whether claimant refuses to cross the picket line because of his own personal conviction that the Switchmen’s Union picket line must be honored, or if his refusal to cross the picket line stems from his belief that his own union officials’ (Executive Board Steelworkers Union, Local No. 4347) decision to honor the switchmen’s picket line should be obeyed. In the final analysis, the Switchmen’s strike only involves the claimant’s grade, class, or group, so as to cause Ms unemployment when the claimant himself obeys his union officials’ decision to honor the picket line. In either case it is a decision which calls for an exercise of claimant’s volition and upon which choice depends his eligibility for benefits. He may need to balance, in the exercise of that volition, a loss of benefits as against the obloquy which it is claimed a refusal to honor the picket line of an outside union would draw down upon him.
There is no evidence of any violence occurring at the plant gates on the morning that the steelworkers met the pickets. The Union Executive Board’s decision to honor the picket line was made five days prior to its establishment. The absence of violence or use of force by  the pickets is shown by an incident which occurred on the morning of June 28th. While the morning shift of steelworkers was standing outside the gates of the plant, some A. F. of L. construction workers crossed the picket line without any trouble. Members of the Steelworkers Union went inside the plant and told the construction workers that they should not violate the picket line while the steelworkers were honoring it. The A. F. of L. workers *558peacefully left the plant. The evidence in the record sustains the appeals referee’s comment
“that it was not primarily fear of physical violence but strict adherence to union policy that kept the workers from crossing the picket line.”
In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 P. 2d 404, we held that peaceful picketing is an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free speech and is thus permitted under Section 49-1-16 (2), U. C. A. 1943, as amended, Laws of Utah 1947, ch. 66. The statute provides:
“(2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others: * * *
“(d) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force, or coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of employment * *
We assume that picketing will be conducted within the limits prescribed by this statute.
Insofar as the unions are concerned, in unity there is strength and the overall aims of union negotiations are assumed to be advanced by a full and complete recognition of pickets. Regardless of how laudable these union principles may be, they cannot be construed as controlling the matter of eligibility of claimants for unemployment benefits. The view here adopted by this court has been expressed in other jurisdictions. In the case of American Brake Shoe Company v. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, 90 N. E. 2d 83, 85, the court stated:
“Since the fear of such classification [scabs] appeared to be the motivation for their failure to enter their place of employment, it logically follows that they were either participating in the labor dispute by failing to cross the picket line or voluntarily remained away from their employment, either of which would disqualify them from compensation benefits.”
*559The Oregon Appeals Referee in case No. 46-RA-144, March 9, 1946 quoted at paragraph 8059 of CCH Unemployment Insurance Service, held that even though claimant is not a member of the striking union, he expresses interest and participation in the dispute which creates his unemployment by his refusal to cross the picket line at the factory where he was last employed.
The Supreme• Court of Washington has stated: 
“The mere fact that the passage through the picket lines was contrary to their union convictions was not enough to make their refusal involuntary, since they had a legal right to pass the lines if they so desired.” In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 2d 580, 110 P. 2d 877, 884.
This position was reiterated in Appeals of Employees of Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Wash. 2d 659, 198 P. 2d 675. Although the specific statutory phrase governing disqualification differs in the states of Pennsylvania, Missouri and Indiana, the courts of those states also have held that the claimants’ acts in honoring a picket line amounted to voluntarily leaving work without good cause. Franke v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 166 Pa. Super. 251, 70 A. 2d 461; Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 240 Mo. App. 1022, 223 S. W. 2d 835, paragraph 8151 of CCH Unemployment Insurance Service; Indiana Board of Review, Decision No. 48-LDR-6, 4-18-49 quoted at paragraph 8163 of CCH Unemployment Insurance Service.
The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission denying the plaintiffs’ application for unemployment compensation is affirmed. Costs awarded to defendants.
McDonough, j., concurs.