Court Opinion

ID: 9852219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:42.817729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.323583
License: Public Domain

*330T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
In order to convict defendant of statutory manslaughter, the prosecutor was required to prove the following elements:
(1) a death; (2) that the death was caused by an action of the defendant; (3) that the defendant caused the death without lawful justification or excuse; (4) that the death resulted from the discharge of a firearm; (5) that at the time of such discharge the defendant was pointing or aiming the firearm at the decedent; and (6) that at the time of such discharge, the defendant intended to point or aim the firearm at the decedent. [People v Duggan, 115 Mich App 269, 271; 320 NW2d 241 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 857 (1983).]
When viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant did not act in self-defense. See People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621, 626; 212 NW2d 918 (1973); People v Bell, 155 Mich App 408, 414; 399 NW2d 542 (1986). Thus, a rational trier of fact could not have found that Hester’s death resulted without justification or lawful excuse. See People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 268-270; 380 NW2d 11 (1985).
A defendant has the right of self-defense where circumstances cause him to reasonably believe that there was a present and impending necessity to act in order to prevent the infliction of great bodily harm. People v Lenkevich, 394 Mich 117, 124; 229 NW2d 298 (1975). Our Supreme Court has said that a police officer, like a private citizen, who claims self-defense must have reasonably and honestly believed himself to be in great danger and that his response was necessary to save himself. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 102-103; 276 NW2d 9 *331(1979). See also People v Garfield, 166 Mich App 66, 78-79; 420 NW2d 124 (1988). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable factfinder could have concluded that defendant did not honestly and reasonably believe that he or Boyd was in great danger from Hester. Defendant was attempting to intervene in what appeared to be an intensely volatile confrontation between two men, one of them armed with a knife, amid a sea of onlookers. I do not necessarily condone the method by which defendant undertook his law enforcement duties on this occasion. Nevertheless, having set upon his course as a police officer to defuse the tension and attendant danger, I do not intend to convey to such a defendant that, in hindsight, fear for his own safety and that of others was either dishonest or unreasonable.
Further, given the circumstances surrounding this homicide, I cannot say that the prosecution proved that defendant was criminally negligent. The evidence showed only that defendant’s approach to these combatants demonstrated poor judgment. As noted by defendant, criminal negligence is more than ordinary negligence or a mere error in judgment. People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 310; 187 NW2d 434 (1971); 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure, §§ 290, 291, pp 610, 612.
I would find that the prosecution did not carry its burden of proof with regard to the third element of statutory manslaughter and would reverse this conviction. Because no underlying felony took place, the felony-firearm conviction cannot stand and it, too, should be reversed. People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 311-312; 353 NW2d 444 (1984). Reversal on this issue would not require review of the other issues raised.