Court Opinion

ID: 9535375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:33.619882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.659149
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
While I fully agree with the majority opinion, I write separately to make one additional observation.
Samuel argues that recognizing Lora’s payments made from her separate property to preserve the house after separation but before the divorce would result in an unequal division of property. This, he argues, would run counter to the rule that an equal division of property is presumptively fair. I believe this argument to be fundamentally flawed.
The rule that an equal division of assets of the marriage is presumptively fair is more complicated than it sounds. Often adjustments to value, must be made before the rule can be applied. Obvious examples are that the gross value of property must be reduced for secured debt, and assets involving periodic payments must be reduced to present value.
When marital property is wasted by one party after separation but before divorce, the property can be “recaptured” by giving it a pre-waste value and crediting that value to the award to the wasting party. Once this adjustment is made, the whole of the marital property can be divided in accordance with the usual principles. See Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 643 (Alaska 1989):
The trial court sought to compensate Patricia for the dissipated assets by giving her a larger percentage of the remaining marital estate because it did not believe it had the authority to recapture previously dissipated assets. Because of this incorrect conclusion, we reverse the court’s property division and remand the issue to allow the trial court the opportunity to recapture any dissipated assets and then determine the appropriate division of property using the Merrill factors.[1] In doing so, the court should take care that it does not double count, that is, recapture dissipated assets and make a preferential award to Patricia because assets have been dissipated.
Expenditures made from separate property to preserve marital property are the other side of the “waste” coin. They can be recognized by making deductions from the award to the party who made the expenditures. The adjustment can be regarded as representing what the property on which the money was spent would be worth if the expenditures had not been made. Once this adjustment is made, all the marital property can be divided. And if the division is equal after the adjustment is made, the rule of presumptive fairness will be satisfied.
For this reason, giving recognition to Lora’s expenditures need not violate the equal division rule.

. Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 (Alaska 1962).