Court Opinion

ID: 9896484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 10:10:50.519898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:03.740475
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00219-CV
     ___________________________

        IN THE MATTER OF P.C.

  On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 323-121134-23

   Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                               I. INTRODUCTION

      After a magistrate ordered Appellant P.C., a juvenile, detained at a detention

hearing, P.C. threatened the magistrate and court staff. The question before us is

whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of these threats

during P.C.’s disposition hearing. P.C. claims that admission of the threats violated

the prohibition in Section 54.01(g) of the Texas Family Code, which provides, “No

statement made by the child at the detention hearing shall be admissible against the

child at any other hearing.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.01(g). We hold that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion because P.C.’s threats were after, not at, the

detention hearing and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                    II. JUVENILE-COURT PROCEEDINGS

      The trial court found that P.C. had engaged in delinquent conduct by

committing the offenses of assault of a public servant1 and retaliation.2         See id.

§ 51.03(a)(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(b)(1) (assault of public servant), 36.06

(retaliation). After a disposition hearing, the trial court ordered P.C. committed to the

Texas Juvenile Justice Department with an indeterminate sentence. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 54.04(d)(2).

      1
       P.C. head-butted two police officers. He was adjudicated for head-butting
only one officer.
      2
         P.C. threatened to kill four police officers. He was adjudicated for threatening
to kill only one officer.

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                     III. P.C.’S APPELLATE COMPLAINT

      On appeal, in one issue, P.C. argues that during the disposition hearing, the trial

court abused its discretion by admitting statements that he had made after the

magistrate had ordered him detained at a detention hearing.             See id. § 54.01

(“Detention Hearing”).     Specifically, P.C. argues that Section 54.01(g) prohibits

statements made by a juvenile “at the detention hearing” from being used in later

hearings. See id. § 54.01(g). Although not entirely clear, he appears to maintain that

Section 54.01(g) applies to the statements that he made in the courtroom and to the

statements that he made in the hallway outside the courtroom.

                            IV. STATE’S RESPONSE

      The State contends that Section 54.01(g) does not block the admission of P.C.’s

statements after the disposition hearing. First, the State argues that Section 54.01(g)

does not apply to any statements made outside the courtroom. Second, as for those

statements made in the courtroom, the State argues that detention hearings end after

both parties close and before the magistrate rules or, in the alternative, when the

magistrate rules.3 See In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)

(stating that “[f]ollowing [the detention] hearing, the court must release the child

unless” it finds that the juvenile falls under the criteria provided by Texas Family

      3
       The State also argues that P.C. failed to preserve his complaint. To comply
with Section 54.01(g), the trial court indicated that it would not consider the evidence
even after it came in. Once the trial court ruled in the State’s favor, P.C. requested
and the trial court granted a running objection.

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Code Section 54.01(e)(1)–(5)). In P.C.’s case, the disputed statements occurred after

the magistrate made its ruling, so the State concludes that the Section 54.01(g)

prohibition does not apply.4

  V. P.C.’S CONSTRUCTION OF “AT THE DETENTION HEARING”

      At trial, P.C. argued that his statements were part and parcel of the detention

hearing and necessarily occurred “at the detention hearing,” so they fell within Section

54.01(g)’s prohibition.   From P.C.’s perspective, the statements occurred at the

detention hearing as opposed to some other hearing or as distinguished from some

other setting.   Just because the magistrate made its ruling, he argues, did not

necessarily mean the detention hearing was over.

                     VI. THE STATEMENTS IN DISPUTE

      What were those statements? In the courtroom, after the magistrate ordered

P.C. detained, P.C. threatened to shoot the magistrate and one of the bailiffs.

Immediately thereafter, in the hallway outside the courtroom, P.C. threatened to

shoot the court intake unit supervisor, a probation officer, and a detention officer.

      In addition to his threats, in the hallway, P.C. attempted to head-butt the

supervisor and spat in the face of the detention officer. We do not understand P.C.’s

argument to encompass these acts.

      4
       The trial court adopted the State’s construction and ruled that Section 54.01(g)
did not apply because everything disputed occurred after the magistrate had ordered
P.C. detained.

                                            4
                           VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         We review a juvenile court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); In re J.M., No. 02-19-00325-CV, 2020 WL 3987581, at *2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). So long as the juvenile

court’s ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, it does not abuse its

discretion. A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 552; J.M., 2020 WL 3987581, at *2. We uphold a

trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling. Beck v. Law

Offs. of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416, 442 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no

pet.).

                                  VIII. DISCUSSION

         The statute in question provides, “No statement made by the child at the

detention hearing shall be admissible against the child at any other hearing.” Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 54.01(g). We must determine whether this provision encompasses

statements made by the juvenile after the trial court ordered the juvenile detained.

For the reasons given below, we hold that it does not.

A. Rules of construction

         Construing a statute is a question of law reviewed under a de novo standard.

Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Arce, 672 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tex. 2023). We interpret statutes by

            • looking to their plain language and

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          • construing the text in light of the statute as a whole.

City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813, 821 (Tex. 2023). Thus, we give statutory

terms their common, ordinary meaning unless

          • the text provides a different definition or

          • the common meaning leads to an absurd result.

Id.; see In re K.C., 656 S.W.3d 146, 150 n.12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.).

We may not impose our own judicial meaning on a statute by adding words or

requirements. City of Austin, 669 S.W.3d at 821. Further, we do not interpret statutes

in strict isolation; rather, we interpret the statute’s words with reference to the

legislature’s broader statutory context. Id. We give effect to all the statute’s words

without, if possible, treating any language as surplusage. Id. If undefined terms have

multiple meanings, we recognize and apply only the meanings that are consistent with

the statutory scheme as a whole. Greater Hous. P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58

(Tex. 2015).

B. Juvenile justice code’s overall focus

      The juvenile justice code’s overall purpose is, broadly speaking, to protect the

public and to rehabilitate the juvenile. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01.5

      5
       Section 51.01 provides,

      This title shall be construed to effectuate the following public purposes:

               (1) to provide for the protection of the public and public safety;

                                             6
      And procedurally, the juvenile justice code protects juveniles in ways that adults

are not protected. For example, written statements by a juvenile must be made in the

presence of a magistrate with no prosecuting attorney present and generally no law

enforcement officer present. Id. § 51.095(a)(1)(B)(i). And statements made by the

            (2) consistent with the protection of the public and public safety:

                   (A) to promote the concept of punishment for criminal
                   acts;

                   (B) to remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality
                   from children committing certain unlawful acts; and

                   (C) to provide treatment, training, and rehabilitation that
                   emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both
                   the parent and the child for the child’s conduct;

            (3) to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome
            moral, mental, and physical development of children coming
            within its provisions;

            (4) to protect the welfare of the community and to control the
            commission of unlawful acts by children;

            (5) to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment
            whenever possible, separating the child from the child’s parents
            only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of
            public safety and when a child is removed from the child’s family,
            to give the child the care that should be provided by parents; and

            (6) to provide a simple judicial procedure through which the
            provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which the
            parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other
            legal rights [are] recognized and enforced.

Id.

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juvenile “at a detention hearing” are not admissible. Id. §§ 51.095(a)(4)(C), 54.01(g).

The structure of detention hearings reflects the added safeguards accorded a juvenile.

C. Detention hearings

       Before a detention hearing begins, the trial court must advise the juvenile both

of his right to counsel and of his right to remain silent:

       Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the court shall inform the
       parties of the child’s right to counsel and to appointed counsel if they are
       indigent and of the child’s right to remain silent with respect to any
       allegations of delinquent conduct, conduct indicating a need for
       supervision, or conduct that violates an order of probation imposed by a
       juvenile court.

Id. § 54.01(b). But a juvenile’s right to counsel at a detention hearing—although

strongly encouraged—is not absolute. See id. § 54.01(b-1) (“Unless the court finds

that the appointment of counsel is not feasible due to exigent circumstances, the court

shall appoint counsel within a reasonable time before the first detention hearing is

held to represent the child at that hearing.”); see also 29 Thomas S. Morgan & Harold

C. Gaither Jr., Texas Practice: Juvenile Law and Practice § 9:2 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database

updated Nov. 2022) (observing that there is “[n]o absolute right to an attorney at

detention hearings”).

       Accordingly, in the context of a detention hearing, there may be instances when

the juvenile is not represented by counsel. Consistent with the juvenile justice code’s

overall concern that juveniles are vulnerable, Section 54.01(g) provides an added layer

of protection for any self-incriminating statements that a juvenile might make at a

                                             8
detention hearing. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.01(b), (g); In re A.K., No. 02-20-

00410-CV, 2021 WL 1803774, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). This safeguard is the one that P.C. contends was violated.

D. Disposition hearings

      When it comes to the disposition hearing, however, from the juvenile’s

perspective, the rules may be perceived as less favorable.        During a disposition

hearing, the rules regarding what is admissible are relaxed: “At the disposition hearing,

the juvenile court, notwithstanding the Texas Rules of Evidence or Chapter 37, Code

of Criminal Procedure, may consider written reports from probation officers,

professional court employees, guardians ad litem appointed under Section 51.11(d), or

professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses.” Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 54.04(b). “Courts have construed Section 54.04(b) as broadening the pool of

information available for the trial court’s consideration at the disposition hearing.”

J.M., 2020 WL 3987581, at *3 n.4. “We have no quarrel with this interpretation of

Section 54.04(b) and fully agree that the juvenile court should have available to it as

much information as possible to inform its determination of what disposition is

appropriate in a given case.” In re J.S.S., 20 S.W.3d 837, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2000, pet. denied).

      The disputed statements here were not admitted during the adjudication

hearing to help prove that P.C. committed the offenses alleged in the State’s petition.

Rather, they were admitted during the disposition hearing to help the trial court

                                           9
determine its disposition. Threats to kill one of the trial judge’s magistrates and other

court personnel seem like the type of information that would aid the trial court when

making its disposition ruling. Still, the question remains whether Section 54.01(g)’s

prohibition against admitting statements “made by the child at the detention hearing”

prevented the trial court from admitting P.C.’s threats in this instance.

E. “At the detention hearing”

      “At the detention hearing” may lend itself to different constructions. The State

contends that the detention hearing was over once the parties closed or, at the latest,

when the trial court ordered P.C. detained, whereas P.C. argues that his outbursts

occurred “at the detention hearing” in the sense that they occurred at the detention

hearing and not at some other hearing or in some other setting or context.

      The State’s construction is a reasonable one. Once the trial court ordered P.C.

detained, the detention hearing was over. Any statements that P.C. made thereafter

were in the courtroom or just outside the courtroom but were not “at the detention

hearing.” Theoretically, a proceeding for direct contempt might have followed. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.07(c); see, e.g., In re J.D., No. 02-21-00356-CV, 2021 WL

5277134, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 12, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)

(involving juvenile held in direct contempt for conduct during a detention hearing).

But the detention hearing itself was over. Consistent with our assessment that the

juvenile justice code’s overall purpose is to protect the public and rehabilitate the

child, we construe “at the detention hearing” to mean during the detention hearing

                                           10
itself, not before and not after. 6 See City of Austin, 669 S.W.3d at 821 (stating that

statutes are interpreted with reference to the legislature’s broader statutory context).

As the Texas Supreme Court recently noted, “We should strive throughout the law

for easily administrable bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with

confidence and applied by judges with predictability.” United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v.

Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex. 2023). With that goal in mind, we hold that the

detention hearing ended when the magistrate ordered P.C. detained.

F. Ruling

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting P.C.’s threats to shoot the magistrate, the bailiff, the court intake unit

supervisor, the probation officer, and the detention officer.

      To the extent, if any, that P.C.’s argument encompasses the attempted head-

butt and the spitting incidents in the hallway, they occurred after the detention hearing

too, so they would not fall under Section 54.01(g)’s prohibition either.7

      6
       P.C. points to no other statutes that protect juveniles from statements made in
other contexts. And the only other statute that we have noted is Section
51.095(a)(1)(B)(i), which is inapplicable here.
      7
        One definition of “statement” would not require speech: “an opinion,
comment, or message conveyed indirectly usually by nonverbal means.” Statement,
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
statement (last visited Nov. 6, 2023). Assuming that the attempted head-butting and
the spitting incidents were “statements” under Section 54.01(g)—an issue we need not
resolve here—they were nevertheless after the detention hearing had ended. Cf. id.
(defining “statement” as “something stated: such as . . . a single declaration or remark

                                           11
      We overrule P.C.’s sole issue.

                                 IX. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled P.C.’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                       Dabney Bassel
                                                       Justice

Delivered: November 9, 2023

. . . [or] a report of facts or opinions” and “the act or process of stating or presenting
orally or on paper”).

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