Court Opinion

ID: 9628102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:07:44.48537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:48.171665
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I concur in the judgment of the court but I must dissent from two assertions in the majority opinion. It is suggested in dictum that counsel’s role at lineups should be a passive one. From this conclusion, the majority go on to suggest that counsel might be constitutionally replaced by proper regulations governing lineups. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 99-100.)
The presence of counsel at a lineup is vital to counsel’s preparation for the cross-examination of witnesses at trial. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 99; People v. Fowler (1969) 1 Cal.3d 328, 348-349 [82 Cal.Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643]; United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157, 87 S.Ct. 1926].) This court has recognized that regulations for lineups are not an adequate substitute for the presence of counsel. Regulations cannot protect the constitutional rights of an accused to meaningful cross-examination and the effective assistance of counsel.1 Studies have also indicated that the presence of an observer *105at an identification procedure can reduce unintentional bias. (Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby (1973) 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1079, 1114, 1125, and studies cited at fn. 183.)
The majority opinion contains the unfortunate implication that the need for counsel might be obviated if regulations for lineups are adopted. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 99.) In my view, the requirement that counsel be present and the need to set down regulations are not mutually exclusive.
Legal scholars have repeatedly recognized the crucial value of regulations governing lineups and the importance of the presence of counsel. “[E]ven a strictly applied [standard against suggestive procedures] would not be an adequate substitute for counsel in confrontations held before the initiation of ‘adversary judicial proceedings.’ Due process cannot accomplish the same goals that counsel can.” (Comment, The Right to Counsel: Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceedings'? (1979) 47 Fordham L.Rev. 810, 831; see also Levine & Tapp, op. cit. supra, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1079, 1125: “It is not that the right to counsel should be abandoned.... It would, however, be most unfortunate if the presence of counsel produced a false sense of security which inhibited additional procedural reform.”)
The right to the presence of counsel at a lineup is not an ill-considered measure which may be dispensed with if regulations are adopted. The requirement that counsel be present serves constitutional interests. The right to the effective assistance of counsel is involved. Videotapes and regulations cannot be substituted for such a basic constitutional right.
The suggestion that counsel may be replaced by rule and camera grows out of the majority’s ill-conceived notion that counsel is merely a passive observer at lineups. This court has never enunciated such a role. (People v. Fowler, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 349, fn. 19.) Counsel cannot unreasonably be denied access to his own client, and, therefore, should in most cases be permitted to see his client prior to a lineup. (Cf. People v. Chojnacky (1973) 8 Cal.3d 759, 769 [106 Cal.Rptr. 106, 505 P.2d 530] [dis. opn. of Sullivan, J.].) Further, counsel can give valuable *106advice to an anxious client on how to conduct himself during the lineup so as to ensure its fairness. (Katz & Carter, Cal. Criminal Law Practice Series, Eyewitnesses Identification (1978) at p. 9; Levine & Tapp, op. cit. supra, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. at p. 1125.)
Further, counsel should be free to suggest changes so that a lineup is fair. The presence of counsel at the lineup also provides an opportunity to meet and interview eyewitnesses before a great deal of time has elapsed between their pretrial identifications and their in-court identifications.
Printed rules and a videotape camera do not a counsel make. A passive counsel is not necessarily an effective counsel at a lineup. If this court wants to ensure that identifications by eyewitnesses are fair and just, it should not discourage the participation of counsel who may be able to ensure that proper procedures are used.
Staniforth, J.,* concurred.

In People v. Fowler, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pages 348-349, this court discussed the constitutional infirmity of a highly regulated lineup that included still photographs of the *105lineup: “[Counsel’s] opportunity for cross-examination on the basis of the cold regulations provided to him could amount to little more than shooting in the dark .... ” (Id., at p. 349.)

 Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.