Court Opinion

ID: 9368258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 16:01:36.690021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.968315
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11012    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 02/03/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11012
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       PAUL JACKSON,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       MIDNIGHT EXPRESS POWER BOATS, INC.,
       A Foreign Profit Corporation,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22160-MGC
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11012

                               ____________________

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Paul Andrew Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Mid-
       night Express Power Boats, Inc. (“Midnight Express”), as to Jack-
       son’s claims for: (i) unpaid sick leave; and (ii) retaliation under the
       Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”) of the Families First
       Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”).1 Jackson also argues that
       the district court erred in not addressing his claim for violations of
       Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regula-
       tions. After thorough review, we affirm.
                                              I.
               We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de
       novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-mo-
       vant. Hallums v. Infinity Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1144, 1148 (11th Cir.
       2019). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
       dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
       ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Documents filed
       by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed and must be held to
       less stringent standards than documents drafted by attorneys. Es-
       telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

       1 See Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 5102(a)(2), 5104(1), 134 Stat. 178, 195–97 (2020).
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       22-11012               Opinion of the Court                       3

                                       II.
               First, we are unpersuaded by Jackson’s argument that the
       district court erred in granting summary judgment to Midnight Ex-
       press on his claim for unpaid sick leave under the Emergency Paid
       Sick Leave Act. Congress passed the Families First Coronavirus
       Response Act to provide relief to American workers during the
       COVID-19 pandemic. See Families First Coronavirus Response
       Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (Mar. 18, 2020). The EPSLA,
       which is a part of the FFCRA, required employers to provide paid
       sick leave to employees with COVID-19 throughout the fiscal year
       ending September 30, 2020. See FFCRA § 5102.
              Under the EPSLA, an employer who failed to provide sick
       leave was considered to have failed to pay the minimum wage un-
       der the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).               29 C.F.R.
       § 826.150(b)(1). The EPSLA requires an employee to provide no-
       tice to the employer to qualify for sick leave by providing (1) the
       employee’s name, (2) the date(s) the employee is requesting leave,
       (3) a qualifying reason for leave, and (4) an oral or written state-
       ment that the employee is not able to work due to a qualified rea-
       son for leave. Id. § 826.100. The qualifying reason for leave perti-
       nent to this case is when “[t]he Employee is experiencing symp-
       toms of COVID-19 and seeking medical diagnosis from a health
       care provider.” Id. § 826.20(a)(iii).
              Here, the district court did not err in granting Midnight Ex-
       press’s motion for summary judgment as to Jackson’s claim for un-
       paid sick leave under the EPSLA. According to Jackson’s version
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11012

       of events, one Friday in May 2020, while he was working for Mid-
       night Express, he began experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and
       immediately clocked out of work, informing a co-worker that he
       needed to leave. He claims that later the same day, he mailed a
       letter to Midnight Express’s Human Resources (“HR”) Depart-
       ment, noting that he was unable to work because of COVID-19,
       and he requested leave. On the following Monday, HR officials
       told him that his job had already been terminated.
               The record reflects that there is a factual dispute as to
       whether Jackson left work because he had COVID-19, a “qualifying
       reason for leave” under the Act, or whether he left work because
       he had been reprimanded that day. Nevertheless, even when we
       view the facts in the light most favorable to Jackson, he is not enti-
       tled to relief under the EPSLA because he failed to satisfy its notice
       requirements. In both his letter and phone call to Midnight Ex-
       press, Jackson said only that he was “requesting time away to re-
       cover and seek medical aid,” but he never gave the date or dates
       for which leave was requested. Id. § 826.100. Because Jackson
       failed to satisfy the EPSLA’s notice requirements, he was not enti-
       tled to paid sick leave under the Act, regardless of whether he had
       COVID-19. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s grant of sum-
       mary judgment to Midnight Express on Jackson’s claim for unpaid
       sick leave.
                                        III.
              We also are unconvinced by Jackson’s argument that the dis-
       trict court erred in granting summary judgment to Midnight
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       22-11012               Opinion of the Court                        5

       Express on his claim of retaliation under the EPSLA. Under the
       EPSLA, an employer who discharges, disciplines, or discriminates
       against an employee for seeking to exercise his rights thereunder is
       considered to have violated § 15(a)(3) of the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R.
       § 826.150(b)(2). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
       the FLSA, the plaintiff may demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in a
       protected activity under the Act; (2) he subsequently suffered an
       adverse action by the employer; and (3) there was a causal connec-
       tion between the employee’s activity and the adverse action. Wolf
       v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2000). The
       plaintiff has the burden of proving causation by demonstrating that
       “the adverse action would not have been taken but for the assertion
       of FLSA rights,” where the adverse action must occur after the as-
       sertion of FLSA rights. Id. (quotations omitted).
              Here, there is no genuine dispute of fact concerning whether
       Jackson established a prima facie case of retaliation under the
       FLSA. For starters, as we’ve explained, Jackson did not qualify for
       paid leave under the EPSLA, since he did not comply with the no-
       tice requirements. Accordingly, it’s not clear that Jackson engaged
       in protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim. Id.
              But even if Jackson had engaged in protected activity, he has
       provided no evidence of causation that Midnight Express termi-
       nated his employment because of his exercise of rights under the
       EPSLA. Rather, the company informed him that he had been taken
       off the payroll because it believed he had quit his job, which oc-
       curred before it was even aware that Jackson allegedly had COVID-
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11012

       19. Indeed, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Jackson,
       it showed that he put a letter in the mail seeking sick leave under
       the EPSLA the evening after he left work and, notably, after his
       employment was terminated. Further, even if Jackson was sick, he
       said he notified a co-worker that he was feeling ill but did not men-
       tion COVID-19 or its symptoms. Thus, Jackson has not offered any
       evidence to suggest that Midnight Express fired him after it discov-
       ered he intended to exercise his rights under the EPSLA. Id. We,
       therefore, affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
       Midnight Express on Jackson’s retaliation claim.
                                         IV.
               Finally, we find no merit to Jackson’s argument that the dis-
       trict court erred by not addressing his OSHA violation allegations.
       “A plaintiff may not amend [his] complaint through argument in a
       brief opposing summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald
       & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). “At the summary judg-
       ment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim
       is to amend the complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).”
       Id. “[A]n issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first
       time in an appeal will not be considered by this [C]ourt.” Access
       Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004)
       (quotations omitted).
             Here, because Jackson did not raise an OSHA claim until he
       opposed Midnight Express’s motion for summary judgment, and
       because he did so without amending his complaint, it was not
       properly before the district court. Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315. As a
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       22-11012                Opinion of the Court                         7

       result, the district court did not err in declining to address it. Fur-
       ther, to the extent he is raising additional OSHA allegations now
       for the first time on appeal, we will not consider that claim either.
       Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1331.
              AFFIRMED.