Court Opinion

ID: 9553473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:09.752094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:12.790752
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The majority reaches the right result for the wrong reason. It correctly concludes that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition or mandate directing the superior court to grant her motion to set aside the indictment against her. But the majority errs in concluding that the superior court correctly instructed the grand jury on the standard of proof for an indictment, and that the prosecutor did not mislead the grand jurors by telling them they could consider only the evidence the prosecution had presented. As I shall explain, the superior court erred when it told the grand jury it could return an indictment if the evidence established a “strong suspicion or probability” of petitioner’s guilt, and the prosecutor improperly discouraged the grand jury from exercising its independent investigatory powers when it limited their consideration to evidence already presented. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal properly denied the writ petition because the irregularities petitioner has identified are not permissible grounds for attacking an indictment.
I
Petitioner brought a motion in superior court under Penal Code section 995 (hereafter section 995) to set aside the indictment against her. In that motion, petitioner raised these claims of error: (1) the court incorrectly instructed the grand jury on the standard of proof for returning an indictment; (2) the prosecutor erroneously instructed the grand jury to consider only evidence supplied by the prosecution; and (3) the prosecutor erroneously failed to instruct the grand jury on lesser included offenses shown by the evidence. The superior court denied the motion. Petitioner then sought review of the superior court’s ruling by petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition or mandate. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.) The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and this court granted review of the action taken by the Court of Appeal.
Section 995 permits an accused to attack an indictment on the ground that it was not properly “found, endorsed, and presented” and on the ground that the accused was “indicted without reasonable or probable cause.” With one exception, a court may not set aside an indictment “on any grounds other than the two named in the statute.” (People v. Van Randall (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 771, 774 [296 P.2d 68]; accord, Cereghino v. Superior Court (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 328, 330-332 [2 Cal.Rptr. 159]; see also, People v. *1039Boehm (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 13, 23 [75 Cal.Rptr. 590] [bias of grand juror is not a ground for setting aside an indictment].) The single recognized exception is this: a court may set aside an indictment on the ground that the proceedings have failed to comport with the demands of the due process clause of the federal or state Constitution. (See People v. Backus (1979) 23 Cal.3d 360, 392-393 [152 Cal.Rptr. 710, 590 P.2d 837].)
Here, petitioner makes no claim that she was indicted “without reasonable or probable cause.” In the words of petitioner’s counsel, in a brief submitted to this court, “petitioner is not asking the Court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment under Section 995, and certainly is not contending that such an evidentiary challenge would be governed by any other standard of review than the probable cause standard set forth in Section 995.” (Italics in original.)
Nor does petitioner contend that the indictment procedures denied her due process. Her claims are grounded in California statutes governing grand jury proceedings, not in the state or federal Constitution.
This leaves only one permissible ground for attacking the indictment under section 995: that it was not “found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in this code.” (§ 995, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Thus, the cognizability of petitioner’s claims turns on the meaning of this statutory language.
A claim that an indictment was not “found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in this code” may be based only on the provisions of “part 2, title 5, chapter 1, of the Penal Code beginning with section 940.” (People v. Jefferson (1956) 47 Cal.2d 438, 442 [303 P.2d 1024], citing People v. Kempley (1928) 205 Cal. 441, 447 [271 P. 478], and People v. Colby (1879) 54 Cal. 37.) The referenced sections of the Penal Code contain these requirements: (1) In counties having a population exceeding 4 million persons, at least 14 of the 23 grand jurors must concur in the indictment; in all other counties, at least 12 of the 19 grand jurors must concur in the indictment (Pen. Code, § 940); (2) the indictment must be endorsed as “[a] true bill,” and the endorsement must be signed by the grand jury “foreman” (ibid.); (3) the names of witnesses who have given evidence to the grand jury, either in person or by deposition, must be “inserted at the foot of the indictment, or indorsed thereon, before it is presented to the Court” (id., § 943); and (4) an indictment must be presented to the court by the grand jury “foreman” in the presence of the other grand jurors, and must be filed by the clerk (id., § 944). Petitioner’s claims do not relate to any of these requirements.
Petitioner’s three claims challenge the propriety of legal advice and instructions that the grand jury received. As such, none of these claims is *1040cognizable under section 995: “An indictment cannot be attacked either under Penal Code section 995 or following a denial of such motion on appeal from a judgment of conviction on the grounds that the grand jury was given insufficient or even inaccurate legal advice before returning an indictment.” (People v. Gordon (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 476 [120 Cal.Rptr. 840].)
Because section 995 does not authorize a court to set aside an indictment on the grounds urged by petitioner, the superior court properly denied petitioner’s section 995 motion, and the Court of Appeal properly denied the writ petition. This conclusion should end this court’s consideration of the case. It does not, but only because the majority has chosen to cast aside the procedural barrier and to reach the substantive merits of petitioner’s claims. Although the merits of petitioner’s claims are not properly before us, the majority’s resolution of those claims will influence the conduct of future grand jury proceedings. Rather than permit the majority’s conclusions to pass unchallenged, I will explain why I disagree with the majority’s analysis of two issues.
II
Penal Code section 939.8 sets forth the standard of proof for an indictment in these words: “The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence before it, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in its judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury.” (Italics added.) To determine the meaning of this statute, it is proper to begin by examining its words, as these are usually the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615].) If the language is clear, courts should construe a statute according to the usual and ordinary meaning of its words, unless this construction would produce absurd consequences or a compelling basis exists for concluding that the Legislature intended a different meaning. (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140]; Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672].)
The key phrase in the statute is “warrant a conviction by a trial jury.” (Pen. Code, § 939.8.) The word “warrant” has this meaning: “To give sufficient grounds or good reasons for or to; to justify; to require as a consequence; as, his need warrants the expenditure; the evidence does not warrant us to change our opinion.” (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1942) p. 2877; see also State v. Rish (1916) 104 S.C. 250 [88 S.E. 531, 534] [stating that terms “warrant” and “justify” are “practically synonymous”].) Thus, the grand jury is to find an indictment when the evidence before it would justify or be sufficient for a conviction by a trial jury.
*1041Evidence is sufficient to justify or sustain a conviction by a trial jury if it will withstand a motion for acquittal during trial (Pen. Code, § 1118.1) or a review on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. Indeed, the phrase “warrant a conviction” has been used in both of these senses. Former section 1118 of the Penal Code, the predecessor of current section 1118.1, authorized the trial court to advise the jury to acquit the defendant if the court found the evidence insufficient to “warrant a conviction.” (See People v. Daniels (1894) 105 Cal. 262, 266 [38 P. 720].) And, when reviewing the evidence on an appeal from a judgment of conviction, this court has often, particularly in older cases, phrased the issue in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence to “warrant a conviction.” (See, e.g., People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449]; People v. Ferlin (1928) 203 Cal. 587, 595 [265 P. 230]; People v. Richardson (1911) 161 Cal. 552, 555 [120 P. 20]; People v. Maroney (1895) 109 Cal. 277, 279 [41 P. 1097]; People v. Royce (1895) 106 Cal. 173, 176 [39 P. 524]; People v. Gallagher (1893) 100 Cal. 466, 472 [35 P. 80].)
When a trial court rules on a motion for acquittal, it applies the same test as an appellate court reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence. (People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 666 [159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738].) For either purpose, the court must determine whether the evidence could persuade a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 346 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].)
This standard of proof differs significantly from the standard used by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing. A magistrate will make an order holding a defendant to answer a felony charge if there is “sufficient cause” to believe the defendant is guilty. (Pen. Code, § 872.) “Sufficient cause” or “probable cause” means a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 [200 Cal.Rptr. 448, 677 P.2d 854].) The burden that this standard places on the prosecution at the preliminary hearing is “quite distinct from that necessary to obtain a conviction before a judge or jury.” {Id. at p. 637.) To satisfy the standard of sufficient or probable cause, the evidence “need not be sufficient to support a conviction.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1144, 1147 [80 Cal.Rptr. 747, 458 P.2d 987], italics added; accord, People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 [108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609].)
By equating the grand jury’s standard of proof in indictment proceedings with that of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, the majority holds that a standard of proof that requires evidence sufficient to “warrant a conviction *1042by a trial jury” may be satisfied by evidence that would not be sufficient to support a conviction. The majority concludes, in other words, that the Legislature did not mean what it said. Courts should reach such a conclusion only when presented with compelling grounds to support it. (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.4th 593, 601; Burden v. Snowden, supra, 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) The majority provides no compelling grounds for its conclusion.
The majority argues that sufficient or probable cause is the appropriate test because the indictment is part of the charging rather the adjudicative phase of the criminal proceeding. This court disposed of essentially the same argument more than 100 years ago: “Formerly an indictment was regarded as a mere accusation, which the grand jury ought to find if probable evidence were adduced in its support. ‘But great authorities,’ says Chitty, ‘have taken a more merciful view of the subject, and considering the ignominy, the dangers of perjury, the anxiety of delay, and the misery of a prison, have argued that the grand inquest ought, as far as the evidence before them goes, to be convinced of the guilt of the defendant. What was, therefore, anciently said respecting petit treason, may be applied to all other offenses, that since it is preferred in the absence of the prisoner, it ought to be supported by substantial testimonies.’ (1 Crim. Law, 318.) The more merciful view of the subject thus referred to is secured by statute in this State. Our Criminal Practice Act declares that the grand jury . . . ‘ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury’ (Sec. 212), and of course ought not to find an indictment when the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would not warrant such conviction. The indictment is then something more than a mere accusation based upon probable cause; it is an accusation based upon legal testimony, of a direct and positive character, and is the concurring judgment of at least twelve of the grand jurors, selected to inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within their county, that upon the evidence presented to them the defendant is guilty.” (People v. Tinder (1862) 19 Cal. 539, 542-543, fn. omitted, italics added.)
Returning to this point later in the opinion, this court added: “. . . the grand jury have no right to present, and we are not to presume that they have presented, an indictment of that character, unless the evidence before them, unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant in their judgment a conviction of the offense in that degree. The indictment is their finding that of the offense designated, in its character and degree, the defendant is guilty.” (People v. Tinder, supra, 19 Cal. 539, 547.)
Thus, as this court explained, there were two schools of thought on the standard of proof for an indictment. The first, echoed by the majority in this *1043case, was that probable cause should be sufficient to indict because an indictment is a mere accusation. The second, described as the “more merciful view,” was that the standard ought to be stricter than probable cause because grand jury indictment proceedings are ex parte, providing no opportunity for the accused to test the prosecution’s evidence by cross-examination or to present affirmative evidence of innocence, and because the consequences of an indictment, in terms of loss of liberty and damage to reputation, are so severe. The Legislature’s choice of language indicates its rejection of the “mere accusation” view of an indictment and its adoption of a more demanding standard of proof.
The statutory language construed in People v. Tinder, supra, 19 Cal. 539, was section 2121 of The Criminal Practice Act of 1851 (Stats. 1851, ch. 29, p. 212 et seq.). In 1872, when the Legislature enacted the Penal Code, it preserved this language as Penal Code section 921, the source of current Penal Code section 939.8.2 Because courts must assume that the Legislature acts with awareness of existing judicial decisions (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 65 [81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137]), this court must assume that the Legislature was aware of People v. Tinder, supra, 19 Cal. 539, when it enacted the Penal Code, and that it intended the language of Penal Code section 921 to carry the meaning ascribed to it in that decision. (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076].) Additional support for this conclusion is found in the code commissioners’ note to section 921, because the note cites People v. Tinder, supra, in explanation of the provision’s meaning. (Code comrs. note, Ann. Pen. Code § 921 (1st ed. 1872) p. 306.) The code commissioners’ note “is entitled to great weight in construing the statue and in determining the intent of the Legislature.” (People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 171 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].)
The 1872 Penal Code is significant for another reason. As an alternative to an indictment, the code authorized grand juries to use a presentment, which it defined as “an informal statement in writing, by the Grand Jury, representing to the Court that a public offense has been committed which is triable in the county, and that there is reasonable ground for believing that a particular individual named or described therein has committed it." (Ann. Pen. Code *1044§916 (1st ed. 1872) p. 305, italics added.)3 Thus, the Legislature that adopted the 1872 Penal Code was well aware of the distinction between the reasonable or probable cause standard, which it chose to adopt for presentments, and the more exacting standard described in People v. Tinder, supra, 19 Cal. 539, which it chose to adopt for indictments.
The majority argues at some length that because the superior court employs the probable cause standard to review an indictment on a motion under section 995, the grand jury necessarily must employ the same standard to return the indictment in the first instance. But nothing in law or in logic requires that the same standard be used for these distinct purposes. The Legislature could reasonably have decided that the superior court should use a less exacting standard to avoid second-guessing the grand jury’s factual determinations.
Indeed, this court has recognized that the superior court employs a deferential standard when it reviews the sufficiency of an indictment under section 995. In Lorenson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 49 [216 P.2d 859], a case cited by the majority, we put it this way: “The duty of determining whether or not an indictment should be found is lodged exclusively in the grand jury and not in the courts. The Legislature has stated that duty as follows: ‘The grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury.’ (Pen. Code, § 921; italics added.) A court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the grand jury. ‘If there is some evidence to support the indictment, the courts will not inquire into its sufficiency (see cases collected in 59 A.L.R. 573).’ (Greenberg v. Superior Court [(1942) 19 Cal.2d 319, 322 (121 P.2d 713)].)” (At p. 55, original italics.) Returning to this theme later in the opinion, the Lorenson court quoted this language from an earlier opinion: “ ‘. . . [T]he [grand] jurors had the discretion to determine, “in their judgment” whether the evidence would “warrant a conviction by a trial jury.” In that event... the jury “ought to find an indictment,” as it did. We may not interfere with that discretion of the grand jury, or weigh the evidence adduced to determine its sufficiency.’ ” (Id. at p. 58, quoting McFarland v. Superior Court (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 153, 158 [198 P.2d 318].)
I see only one way to read this language. When it reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment under the “reasonable or probable cause” standard of section 995, the superior court gives deference to the *1045grand jury’s finding by applying a less exacting standard than that used by the grand jury. The majority’s holding in this case is directly to the contrary: it permits the superior court, when ruling on a section 995 challenge to an indictment, to apply the very same standard used by the grand jury to the very same evidence considered by the grand jury. When it applies the same standard to the same evidence, the superior court necessarily substitutes its judgment for that of the grand jury. Thus, the majority allows the superior court to do precisely what this court said it could not do—interfere with the discretion vested exclusively in the grand jury.
Finally, the majority asserts that “[ojther states with statutes substantially identical to section 939.8 have determined that the standard of proof for returning an indictment is ‘probable cause.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1028.) The assertion does not withstand scrutiny.
The majority cites Michael v. State (Alaska 1991) 805 P.2d 371, 374, in which the court remarked, in dictum, that “an accused is entitled, under Alaska law, to a decision by a grand jury that there is probable cause to hold him for trial.” (Italics in original.) The majority ignores an earlier case containing a clearer and more authoritative statement. In Maze v. State (Alaska 1967) 425 P.2d 235, the defendant claimed a right to a postindictment preliminary hearing. Rejecting the claim, the court said: “Appellant here was not illegally prejudiced by not receiving the opportunity to ‘test the complaint’ by questioning witnesses and marshalling his evidence as is argued in his brief. The fact is that in presenting appellant’s case to the grand jury, the factual basis for his continued detention was subjected to a more strict standard than would have been the case if a preliminary hearing had been held. Under Criminal Rule 5(d) (5) the district judge is required to hold the accused to answer to the grand jury if it appears that a crime has been committed and ‘that there is sufficient cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of that crime.’ . . . Criminal Rule 6(k) provides that the grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction.” (Maze, supra, at p. 237, italics added, original italics and fn. omitted; see also Lupro v. State (Alaska 1979) 603 P.2d 468, 473.)
In another case cited by the majority, an intermediate appellate court rejected a defendant’s claim of entitlement to a preliminary hearing, saying: “. . . [A]n accused is not entitled to a preliminary hearing before he is indicted. The grand jury hearing is itself one which determines the existence of probable cause.” (State v. Walley (1969) 1 Or.App. 189 [460 P.2d 370, 371].) The majority ignores the later decision in Bekins v. Cupp (1976) 274 Or. 115 [545 P.2d 861], in which the Oregon Supreme Court said: “A grand *1046jury can only indict a person ‘when all the evidence before it, taken together, is such as in its judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.’ ORS 132.390. This is [a] more demanding requirement than reasonable suspicion . . . .” (Id., 545 P.2d at p. 867, italics added; see also State v. Shaw (1984) 68 Or.App. 693 [684 P.2d 7, 9-10].)
The majority’s final citation is to State v. Nordquist (N.D. 1981) 309 N.W.2d 109, in which the court held that it is not fatal to an indictment that some of the evidence before the grand jury was legally inadmissible. The opinion’s references to the standard of proof are ambiguous, and consistent with the view that the required standard is more exacting than sufficient or probable cause. After quoting the statutory standard, which is similar to Penal Code section 939.8, the court remarked: “We believe that language reflects the Legislature’s intent to allow the grand jury to determine whether or not the evidence put before it ... is satisfactory for the purpose of directing, in good faith, an accusation toward the person who is the subject of the indictment and which, in the jurors’ minds, could withstand the test of trial." (Nordquist, supra, at p. 117, italics added.)
The majority notes that Wisconsin, having no statute equivalent to Penal Code section 939.8, has adopted probable cause as the standard to be used by the grand jury in indictment proceedings. What the majority fails to mention is that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, when presented with a contention that the grand jury should have been instructed in substantially the language of section 939.8 (that is, “ ‘you ought not to find an indictment unless in your judgment the evidence before you, unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction by a petit jury’ ”), rejected the argument with these words: “It is considered that, whatever the law may be in other states, under the law of this state an instruction such as the one contended for requires a degree of proof greater than that required at common law, which must govern here, there being no statute.” (State v. Lawler (1936) 221 Wis. 423 [267 N.W. 65, 69-70, 105 A.L.R. 568, 573], italics added.)
In an Oklahoma case, the defendant argued that a magistrate at a preliminary hearing ought to use the same standard of proof as a grand jury returning an indictment, and that the use of different standards denied those accused of crime the equal protection of the laws. (Jones v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1983) 660 P.2d 634, 637.) The court rejected the contention, but it accepted its premise that different standards were used: “Under 22 O.S. 1981, §§ 262 and 264, the State’s burden of proof at a preliminary examination is ‘that any public offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. . . .’ 22 O.S.1981, § 264. This is usually referred to as a showing of probable cause, and as *1047discussed earlier, the showing does not have to be enough evidence to support a conviction. On the other hand, under 22 O.S.1981, § 336, a grand jury may return an indictment ‘when all of the evidence before them . . . would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.’ In other words, a prima facie case.” (Id. at p. 637, italics added.)
The majority cites no case from New York. That state formerly had a statute similar to Penal Code section 939.8. (See People v. Nitzberg (1943) 289 N.Y. 523 [47 N.E.2d. 37, 145 A.L.R. 482].) New York courts interpreted this statute as requiring evidence sufficient to establish not merely probable cause, but a prima facie case. (People v. Peetz (1959) 7 N.Y.2d 147 [196 N.Y.S.2d. 83, 164 N.E.2d. 384]; People v. Caminito (1958) 3 N.Y.2d 596 [170 N.Y.S.2d. 799, 148 N.E.2d. 139].) Although the statutory language has changed, the New York courts interpret the new language as requiring the same exacting standard. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (1986) 69 N.Y.2d 103 [512 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079].)
Minnesota, like New York, formerly had a statute similar to Penal Code section 939.8. This statute was repealed and replaced by a statute expressly establishing a standard of probable cause. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a contention that the new statute was “merely a ‘rephrasing’ ” of the prior law, concluding instead that it effected a change in the applicable standard of proof. (State v. Lalli (Minn. 1983) 338 N.W.2d 419,420; see also State v. Gottwalt (1940) 209 Minn. 4 [295 N.W. 67, 69] [grand jury standard requiring evidence sufficient to “warrant a conviction” was a “stricter provision” than committing magistrate standard of “probable cause”].)
This review of decisions from other jurisdictions illustrates that the language used in Penal Code section 939.8 has been uniformly regarded as establishing a standard of proof different and more exacting than sufficient or probable cause. I conclude that the words of Penal Code section 939.8 “mean what they say and say what they mean” (People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1218 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 824 P.2d 694]): the standard of proof for a grand jury to return an indictment is not probable cause, but substantial evidence sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense. Of course, the wisdom of this choice is not a matter for review by this court: “Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the Legislature.” (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 77 [95 Cal.Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785].) Accordingly, the superior court in this case erred when it instructed the grand jury to return an indictment using a “sufficient cause” standard, which the court defined as enough evidence to *1048support “a strong suspicion or probability” that the accused committed the offense charged.4
Ill
During the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor examined the witnesses, but the grand jurors also submitted written questions, and the prosecutor put those questions to the witnesses. After the last witness had been excused, the grand jurors asked the prosecutor a series of questions about gaps in the evidence. For example, they asked if the murder weapon had been found and if fingerprints or hair samples had been taken at the victim’s residence. In the course of his reply, the prosecutor said: “You can only consider the evidence we presented to you.”
Petitioner contends that this response was erroneous because the grand jury is an investigatory body and is statutorily authorized to summon witnesses on its own initiative. Rejecting petitioner’s contention, the majority reasons that: (1) nothing in the record suggests the prosecutor was aware of exculpatory evidence; (2) nothing in the record suggests the grand jury had reason to believe that exculpatory evidence existed; and, therefore (3) the prosecutor did not mislead the jury into believing it could not obtain additional evidence. I agree with the first two points, but the third point does not logically follow from them and is contrary to the record.
The grand jury is required to call for additional evidence “when it has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge.” (Pen. Code, § 939.7.) But this provision does not exhaust the grand jury’s investigatory powers. The grand jury has authority to summon witnesses simply to gain a fuller understanding of the case. (Pen. Code, § 939.2 [upon request of grand jury, any superior court judge may issue subpoena for witness whose testimony is material in an investigation before the grand jury].)
In an indictment proceeding, the prosecutor’s influence over the grand jury is vast, as many courts (e.g., United States v. Seruba (3d Cir. 1979) 604 F.2d 807, 816) and commentators (see Alschuler, Preventive Detention (1986) 85 Mich. L.R. 510, 559; and articles collected in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 590-591 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]) *1049have recognized. This was, moreover, a novice grand jury, conducting its first indictment proceeding. When the prosecutor told the grand jurors that they could consider only the evidence that “we” (that is, the prosecution) had presented, the prosecutor denied the very existence of the grand jury’s investigatory power. The statement was plainly erroneous and served to squelch any effort by the grand jurors to exercise their statutory right to obtain additional evidence on crucial points in the case.
IV
Petitioner has demonstrated that the grand jury that indicted her was incorrectly advised as to the standard of proof it was to use and as to its own investigatory powers. But petitioner has not thereby established an entitlement to relief. Under this state’s laws, incorrect legal advice to the grand jury is not a permissible basis for setting aside an indictment. Because petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred, I concur in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied February 11, 1993, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

Section 212 read: “The Grand Jury ought to find an indictment, when all the evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial Jury.” (Stats. 1851, ch. 29, p. 235.)

Section 921 of the 1872 Penal Code provided: “The Grand Jury ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury.” In 1959, the Legislature repealed this section and reenacted its substance in Penal Code section 939.8. (Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 2, p. 2454.)

In 1905, the Legislature repealed all provisions dealing with the presentment (Stats. 1905, ch. 531, § 1, p. 693.), thereby rescinding authorization for its use in this state.

The superior court instructed the grand jury in these words: “The law specifically provides that an indictment should be found when all of the evidence before you, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in your judgment, provide ‘sufficient cause’ to believe that a public offense was committed and that the person accused is guilty of it. For ‘sufficient cause’ there must be enough evidence to support a strong suspicion or probability of (1) the commission of the crime or crimes in question, and (2) the accused’s guilt thereof.”