Court Opinion

ID: 9833790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:01:52.222695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.789350
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[16] Appellant insists that, inasmuch as its codefendant, Dold, did not appeal, and as he has filed in this court his written consent that the judgment of the lower court herein be affirmed as to him, such judgment should be affirmed as to him and reversed and remanded as to appellant. Against this ap-pellee enters her vigorous protest. Thus is presented the remarkable spectacle of a defendant, against whom a judgment for $20,-000 has been rendered, asking that the same be affirmed, and the plaintiff therein protesting against such affirmance. When it is remembered that the appellant is a foreign corporation, and, if prosecuted alone, might secure a removal of this cause to the federal court, the reason for the anomalous position of the parties hereto may be surmised; but with that, further than it affects their legal rights, this court is not concerned.
We have held in our original opinion herein that, as to two of the alleged slanders, the defendants were joint tort-feasors. Such being the case, the appellee had the legal light to sue them jointly, and we do not think that any one can deprive her of that privilege without her consent, at any stage of the proceeding. It is true that, as she might have brought her suit against either of them separately, she may dismiss as to either of them, or, having obtained a joint judgment against them, Dold not having appealed, with his consent, which might be inferred from his failure to appeal, and with the consent of the appellant company, she might have an affirmance against Dold and continue her case against the company, upon the ground that both Dold and the company would be estopped to subsequently object to such proceeding. Whether this would be true or not we are not called upon to decide, for' the reason that the appellee is not consenting to such action.
The statute provides that there shall be but one final judgment (article 1997, R. S.); and, inasmuch as the plaintiff has not abandoned her cause of action against the defendants jointly, but is insisting upon the same, we hold that a reversal as to one of such defendants operates as a reversal as to both of them. Danner v. Walker-Smith Co., 154 S. W. 301, 302; Railway Co. v. Smith, 99 S. W. 171; Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S. W. 548.
Motion overruled.