Court Opinion

ID: 9672166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:12.15174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:07.905455
License: Public Domain

Beilfuss, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the present action is transitory. The reasoning that this is an *418action on contract, rather than one “for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such estate or interest,” ignores the nature of the relief sought by plaintiff.
An action on an option contract such as the instant one could generate three types of prayers for relief. One could be for damages only — clearly transitory. Another could be for the recovery or possession of the land — clearly local. A third form of relief could be an alternative demand — land or damages, which is local.
We are not at liberty to disregard what plaintiff seeks to recover in this suit, irrespective of the label given to the action. Plaintiff is seeking only to acquire an interest in and possession of real estate. Its right to this land, of course, stems from a contract. In an action to gain title to real estate, if the plaintiff proves its case, refusal of the defendants to convey title will not defeat plaintiff’s right to possession. The court judgment will be sufficient when it is filed in the register of deeds office.
The Cornell University Case, supra, referred to in the majority opinion, does stand for the proposition that ejectment is a local action. However, it should not be overlooked that there is a substantial similarity in the object of relief sought in ejectment actions and the present action. The ultimate goal is the same.
And, while it is true that mortgage actions are governed by a specific statute, the nature of most mortgage actions is a suit upon a contract which gives an alternative right to money damages or a sale of land to satisfy the judgment.
Two early cases bear decisively on the venue issue. In Hackett v. Carter (1875), 38 Wis. 394, the relief sought was that certain deeds be canceled, or that defendant be compelled to reconvey the subject lands to plaintiff. The basis of the action was that there was fraudulent misrepresentation as to *419certain lands which were to be conveyed in exchange for plaintiffs real estate. It was held that the action related to land and was therefore local. Therefore, the venue was properly laid only in the county where the land was situated.
Burrall v. Eames (1856), 5 Wis. 260, 263, was an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale and conveyance of certain lands. The action was commenced in the county where the subject land was located. Defendant resided in a different county. The court said, “A suit for specific performance, like that of foreclosure, is of a twofold character, partly in personam and partly in rem.’’
There was no statute such as is here at issue. Respecting R. S. 1849, ch. 90, sec. 3, which provided for venue where the defendant resided, the court said:
“. . . but this refers exclusively to personal actions at law, and has no bearing upon the question before us. As, therefore, without any statute or rule of court, by the common usage of courts of chancery, the bill might be filed in cases of this kind, in the county where the land lay, and as there is no statute or rule of court restricting or forbidding this practice, we are of the opinion that the plea to the jurisdiction was insufficient, and should have been overruled. . . .” Burrall v. Eames, supra, at page 263.
Interestingly, following the case there is a note added some years later by Dixon, C. J., upon republication of Vol. 5 of the Wisconsin reports, which sets forth the forerunner of our present statute, enacted subsequent to the Burrall Case, supra. Ch. 91, sec. 2, Laws of 1859.
Our statute was taken from the New York Field Code,1 ch. 379, sec. 103, Laws of New York, 1848, not materially different than the Wisconsin statutes.
*420What the majority opinion overlooks is the distinction between an action where title to the real estate is involved and an action where the judgment necessarily involves and requires a change in the title. The latter action must be tried as a local action. See Rothenberg v. Fields (1953), 204 Misc. 86, 118 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 822; Greenberg v. Refined Gas Stations, Inc. (1948), 83 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 761; Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnett (1914), 164 App. Div. 203, 149 N. Y. Supp. 645. In Grace v. Deepdale, Inc. (1957), 3 App. Div. (2d) 397, 160 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 598, it is said: “While it is true that some cases have assumed, or even held, that an executory real property contract, the rescission of which was being sought, did not affect the title to real property, it is difficult to accept the distinction as a sound one.”
Capobianco v. Romaine (1959), 21 Misc. (2d) 54, 191 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 219, was an action by a purchaser to rescind an executed contract to purchase real property and to impress a purchaser’s lien thereon for the amount of consideration paid. It was held that the action must be tried in the county where the land is situated.
*421Birmingham v. Squires (1910), 139 App. Div. 129, 123 N. Y. Supp. 906, was an action to rescind an executed contract to the sale of land by defendants to plaintiff, and to recover the consideration paid. It was held that the action affected title and was therefore local. The court said at page 131:
“In the case at bar, however, there can be no recovery without a cancellation of the contract, and, although a cancellation of the deed is not demanded, without its cancellation in a reconveyance plaintiff will not be entitled to recover, and therefore the necessary effect of the judgment demanded is to effect a change of title by the cancellation of the contract and conveyance.”
Hall v. Gilman (1902), 77 App. Div. 464, 79 N. Y. Supp. 307, was an action to enforce specific performance of an agreement to devise lands. It was held that it was proper to bring the action where some of the land was situated, even though some of the other lands affected by the agreement were located without the state.
Kearr v. Bartlett (1888), 54 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (47 Hun) 245, 13 N. Y. St. Rptr. 580, was a suit for specific performance of a contract to exchange lands. The court granted defendant’s application to have the suit removed to the county where defendant’s land was situated.
It is therefore evident that the instant action contemplates a change in title to the real estate and that this is the sole purpose of the action. Venue should be laid in the county wherein the land is situated. The action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

 “Actions for the following causes, must be tried in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose, or in which the subject of the action or some part thereof is situated, subject to the power *420of the court to change the place of trial, in the cases provided by statute.
“1. For the recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination, in any form, of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property;
“2. For the partition of real property;
“3. For the foreclosure of a mortgage of real property; . . The present pertinent provisions of the law read; “The place of trial of an action in which the judgment demand would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property shall be in the county in which any part of the subject of the action is situated.” C. P. L. R., sec. 507. Formerly C. P. A., 1920, sec. 183; C. C. P., 1876, sec. 982; C. P. (Field Code), 1848, sec. 123. While the Wisconsin statute does not read in terms of the judgment demanded affecting title to property, nevertheless, it would seem clear that the necessary effect of the words in sec. 261.01 (1), Stats., “or for the determination in any form of such estate or interest” is the same.