Court Opinion

ID: 9642538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:01:47.767785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:49.430314
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I would not dispute the demonstration in the principal opinion that letters of credit and supersedeas bonds are different legal animals. In this case, however, the parties and the court agreed that a letter of credit could be used in lieu of a conventional supersedeas bond. A transaction of this kind seems to me to be expressly authorized by Rule 81.09, which contemplates alternate forms of security. The pertinent portions of the governing rule reads as follows: (Emphasis supplied).
Rule 81.09
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(b) Form of Bond — Amount. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award. When the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay, unless the court after notice and hearing and for good cause shown fixes a different amount or orders security other than the bond.
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Rule 81.11
By entering into a supersedeas bond, the surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and his liability may be enforced on motion for judgment thereon, without the necessity of an independent action. A copy of the motion, and such additional notice of the motion as the court requires, shall be served like a summons upon a surety who resides and can be found in the county where the judgment was entered, or who maintains an office and agent in said county where *901and upon whom such service may be made....
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The appellant bank agreed to issue a letter of credit so that its customers could stay execution on a judgment against them. There is no reason why the bank should not be held to make good on its undertaking, once the judgment has become final. Nor should the judgment creditor be relegated to a separate lawsuit. Relief should be available at the foot of the judgment. There is no procedural or substantive disadvantage to the issuer if its liability is determined in the same lawsuit. We can confidently predict that, so long as the principal opinion stands, judgment creditors will hesitate to accept alternate forms of security.
There is another reason why the full reversal is in error. The record brought to us shows no unequivocal objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the defendant. Commerce Bank was before the court. We must assume that it was properly summoned in accordance with the terms of Rule 81.11. If Commerce challenges the service, it has the burden of adducing a record to support its claim of error. It filed no motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction or to quash service and made it clear at the outset that it disputed only the amount of its liability.1 Its hesitant arguments about jurisdictional questions were interspersed with arguments touching the merits. Counsel requested findings and conclusions. Counsel placed itself in court.
To the extent that the principal opinion relegates the Highway Commission to a separate action, I dissent. With the case in the posture in which the principal opinion leaves it, I express no opinion as to whether the judgment against the bank should be for the full amount of the judgment against the property owners, or for the face amount of the latest issue of the letter of credit. This issue will be for resolution when and if a separate lawsuit is filed.

. I cannot understand why it has not paid the amount it admits it owes.