Court Opinion

ID: 9788347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:44:02.753266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:08.507514
License: Public Domain

LANKFORD, Judge,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
¶ 17 There is much in the majority’s opinion with which I agree. I concur that Martinez does not apply because no aggravating factor was found by a jury and no fact exempt from a jury finding is present. I also agree that the holding of Henderson does not apply. In Henderson, the sentence was vacated, while in this case the majority affirms the sentence. Moreover, as the majority points out, in paragraphs 5 and 6, supra, Henderson involved a super-aggravated sentence requiring a finding of at least two aggravating facts, while in this case an ordinary aggravated sentence could be imposed based on a single fact.
¶ 18 The difficulty lies in deciding what remedy, if any, to apply given the indisputable constitutional error. In deciding that no remedy is available, the majority errs in two respects.
¶ 19 The first error lies in treating the inquiries into whether Blakely error occurred and whether the error is prejudicial as the same. Indeed, our prior opinion recognized the difference. See 209 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d at 210. The majority nevertheless argues that because the sentence imposed was “within the aggravated range,” supra ¶ 12, defendant was not affected by the error. This implicitly borrows from Martinez, which the majority concedes is inapplicable.5 In Martinez, our supreme court held that one Blakely-compliant or Blakely-ex-empt fact was enough to comport with the constitutional requirement of jury findings of aggravating sentencing facts. Martinez addressed whether error occurred, not whether the error was reversible.
¶20 Our decisions, and those of our supreme court, have long held that the inquiry into prejudicial sentencing error involves a comparison between the sentence imposed and the sentence that might or would have been imposed absent the error. See Mun-ninger, 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 41, 104 P.3d at 216 (citing cases). Thus, the question is not whether the sentence without the error would also have been a sentence aggravated to some degree, as the majority suggests, but whether the sentence would have been of the same duration.
¶ 21 This longstanding analysis reflects the realities of Arizona’s sentencing system. An aggravated sentence is one that, as the majority recognizes, falls within a range. The degree of punishment depends upon the weighing of aggravating and mitigating facts. Any number of aggravating facts, from one to many, could bear on the judge’s determination of the degree of punishment. It seems obvious that the more numerous the aggravating factors, and the more serious those facts, the greater become the justification and likelihood of lengthier punishment.
¶ 22 It is therefore not enough to say that one factor is enough and “an aggravated sentence would have been imposed.” Supra ¶ 12. The question is instead whether the same length of sentence would have been imposed if the trial court had jury findings of three aggravating factors instead of just one.
¶ 23 My second difficulty with the majority’s decision is that it means that Blakely error is almost never remediable. Unless the error falls within the extraordinary eir-*399cumstanees of Henderson’s missing super-aggravating fact, the defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced. The majority’s holding is essentially that, if one harmless sentencing error occurred, ipso facto all other errors are harmless.
¶24 The majority would apparently so hold even if the sentencing judge had said that the sentence would be shorter with only two aggravating factors, and shorter still with only one. That is because the majority is satisfied with a single aggravating factor authorizing the judge to impose some sentence within the aggravated range. It would not matter that the actual sentence would have been aggravated, but aggravated to a lesser degree.
¶ 25 But it surely is not harmless for a defendant to be sentenced to a greater sentence than the facts justify. If with only the single proper aggravating fact this defendant would have received an eleven-year sentence instead of the twelve and one-half years imposed, who would regard the eighteen months of additional, unlawful imprisonment as harmless? The Arizona Supreme Court opined in Henderson that the error should be analyzed for prejudice to defendant. Moreover, it said that defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice. But it did not describe that burden, and merely said that defendant had met it on the facts. It did not say that the defendant must prove that his sentence would not have been aggravated without the erroneous sentencing factors, as the majority requires here. Nor did it say that defendant must show that his sentence would have been shorter without those factors.
¶ 26 If a defendant were obligated to prove that the sentence would have been shorter or not aggravated at all, there would be no remedy for Blakely error in eases such as this. No defendant can meet such a high burden. The majority condemns defendant’s argument that his sentence would have been shorter as “speculation.” Supra ¶ 14. But a defendant cannot do more than appeal to the logic that a shorter sentence could well have resulted if two of three significantly aggravating factors were subtracted from the sentencing equation.
¶ 27 No defendant is able to point to a trial record in which the sentencing judge discussed the hypothetical sentences with fewer aggravating facts than the judge used in imposing sentence. In reviewing more than 3,000 criminal appeals over the years, I have yet to see a single case in which the sentencing judge did so. Busy trial judges lack the time to engage in such hypothetical exercises.6 It is enough, in my opinion, that it appears likely that a different length of imprisonment would have been imposed with only one significant aggravating factor instead of three.
¶ 28 I also do not believe that State v. Glassel supports the majority, as it contends. Supra ¶ 13. The majority overlooks that Glassel challenged only one of many aggravating facts; he did not challenge any of the others as constituting Blakely error. 211 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 104, 116 P.3d at 1218. The only alleged Blakely error was a factor the court found implicit in the jury’s verdict and therefore exempt from the requirement of a jury finding. Id. Accordingly, there was no Blakely error, as there is in the present case. Nor, apparently, was there any room for an argument that a jury would not have found the same aggravating facts. See id. at 57 n. 17, ¶ 101, 116 P.3d at 1217 n. 17.
¶ 29 The standard to be applied for prejudicial error is the one that Arizona courts have used for many years: Are we certain that the same sentence would have been imposed absent the erroneous factors? See Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 41, 104 P.3d at 216 (citing eases). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (court must be convinced that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). That question requires analysis of both the number and quality of aggravating factors. See State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 443, ¶ 60, 967 P.2d 106, 118 (1998) (supreme court weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in death penalty case). We have *400already determined that we cannot be certain that the penalty would have been the same without reliance on the erroneous factors. 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 41, 104 P.3d at 216. Neither Martinez nor Henderson addressed this analysis, and the State’s petition for review from our prior decision did not raise the issue. I see no reason to depart from our prior reasoning.
¶ 30 On the contrary, departing from the historical method of assessing sentencing error presents a new and significant problem. The reversal of any sentencing factor can mean that “the sentencing calculus ... has changed.” State v. Lehr, 205 Ariz. 107, 109, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 703, 705 (2003). By statute, sentencing is a matter of discretion for the trial courts to exercise. “[T]he sentence to be imposed is completely within the discretion of the trial judge.” A.H. by Weiss, 184 Ariz. at 630, 911 P.2d at 636. When we uphold a sentence as “within the range” that the trial judge could have imposed, but that the trial judge would not have imposed, we usurp that discretion. We should instead remand to allow the trial court to impose the sentence that it determines to be justified by the properly considered sentencing facts. If that sentence differs, we have done justice to the defendant and upheld the trial court’s discretion. If the sentence remains the same, we have done no more mischief than require that the sentencing judge think twice about the severity of punishment.
¶ 31 Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the Court’s opinion that affirms a sentence that is conceded to be erroneously based on improper sentencing factors. I would instead remand for resentencing, as we directed in our prior opinion.

. The "one factor" analysis does not necessarily transfer from the question whether there was a violation to whether the violation was prejudicial. It is one thing to say that a single fact found by a jury, or a single fact exempt from the required jury finding, complies with Blakely’s demand that aggravating facts be submitted to a jury. It is quite another to say that, although every fact found violated the Blakely mandate, if a jury would have found just one of several aggravating facts upon which the sentence rested, the defendant is not prejudiced because the sentence is unaffected.

. The judge would have had to pronounce six alternative sentences in this case to indicate what the sentences would have been if any factor were found invalid on appeal: the sentences with any one of the three factors taken alone, and any pair of the three factors.