Court Opinion

ID: 9546633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:16.607361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:42.284138
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(dissents) :
I must respectfully, dissent to this decision. As I view the record of this trial, absent the testimony of the accomplice, Zolper, there is absolutely no corroborating evidence whatsoever sufficient to implicate the defendant. The testimony of the other three prosecution witnesses merely showed that the Taylor home was broken into; that certain items of property were stolen; and that this defendant was in the apartment where the stolen property was found when the accomplices were arrested. The majority opinion recites that defendant’s presence in the apartment is sufficient to place him in “constructive possession” of the stolen ■ property, which serves as- corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony. My imagination does not stretch to those limits. I believe defendant’s demurrer to the evidence was good and should have been sustained.
The pertinent part of 21 O.S.Supp.1961, § 1435, provides in part, the following:
“Every person who breaks and enters * * * with intent to steal any property therein or to commit any felony, is guilty of burglary in the second degree.”
As I understand the element of intent in the statute, it is “specific intent” which must be proved. This record fails to show the necessary intent of the defendant to steal any property, or to commit any felony. Instead, the prosecution relied upon the two former convictions of this defendant to cause the jury to “imply” defendant’s intent to commit a crime; and, that reliance proved good enough.
The accomplice, Bradley Douglas Zolper, plead guilty to second degree burglary and was given a one-year deferred sentence, ás reflected by his testimony. Zolper related what transpired when the three went to the Taylor home; that Michael Sims, who turned out to be a friend of the Taylor boy, and had been in the Taylor home on several occasions, went to the front door and found it locked, and then went to the back of the house, broke the window and opened the door. Zolper related, referring to Michael Sims, “He got out of the car and went to the front door and tried it; it was locked, and he went around back, and I got out of the car and Mickey [Michael Sims] went to the back door, broke out the window and then Gary came walking up.” (Tr. 33) He then related that Sims took the stereo, and defendant took the television, but he took nothing out of the house. No one who testified as this trial knew anything about the “gold ring” which was found on Sims’ finger when he was arrested.
*412Cross-examination of the accomplice Zol-per appears on Pages 40 and 41, of the transcript of testimony as follows:
“Q. How did he [defendant] come to go along with you?
“A. He was asked to go along.
“Q. Who asked him ?
“A. Mickey [Michael Sims] and I.
“Q. Did Mickey make any comments as to whose place this was out there?
“A. From what I understood, it was relatives by marriage, (referring to relatives of Michael Sims)
Later, Zolper was asked:
“Q. And did he [Michael Sims] tell you who this television set and stereo belonged to?
“A. He stated it was his.
“Q. He told you it was his and told Caskey that it was his, is that right?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did either you or Caskey — did Cas-key know that he was going to break into a place?
“A. No, sir.”
In Sheehan v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 41, 172 P.2d 809 (1946), this Court stated:
“ * * * a person is guilty of burglary in the second degree who breaks and enters a building in which property is kept zvith intent * * * to steal therein or * * * to commit any felony.” (Emphasis Added)
By the testimony of the state’s own witness, the defendant understood that he was assisting Michael Sims get property which he said he had bought from his relatives, and which supposedly belonged to him. Consequently, I fail to see proof of the requisite element of intent.
Defendant, who was eighteen years old, was charged with this crime “after former conviction of a felony,” which resulted in the ten-year penitentiary sentence, the minimum under 21 O.S.Supp.1968, § 51. When defendant testified in his own behalf, he admitted that he and another boy had earlier taken a stereo pack out of two different cars. Defendant’s father appears to have voluntarily surrendered the boy to the police on those two counts; he entered a plea of guilty to the two counts and was given a two-year suspended sentence. It was those convictions upon which the prosecution relied for the jury to “imply” defendant’s intent to commit a crime in this case.
Referring now to the majority opinion’s criticism of Lindsey v. State, Okl.Cr., 488 P.2d 935 (1971), which criticism is premised upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Alderman v. United States, supra, I fail to see its applicability as a modification of Lindsey. In the first place, Alderman was concerned with a wire-tapping matter in which the petitioners asserted that the electronic eavesdropping might have violated their Fourth Amendment rights and tainted their convictions. Six members of the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice White’s opinion, held that co-conspirators and co-defendants whose rights were not violated by illegal eavesdropping have no standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained as a fruit of such eavesdropping. That decision, in which five members agreed, also held that the owner of the premises, whether present or not, does have standing to object to the admissibility of such illegal evidence, even though he did not participate in the conversations. Five members of the Court also considered that the government should either dismiss the case, or disclose the illegally obtained evidence.
In Alderman, at page 186 in 22 L.Ed.2d and page 173 in 394 U.S. and page 966 in 89 S.Ct., the Supreme Court sets forth immediately preceding the citation quoted in this Court’s majority opinion, the following:
“The rule is stated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 [702] [78 ALR2d 233] (1960):
‘In order to qualify as a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and *413seizure” one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.
Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.’
“This same principle was twice acknowledged last Term. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247] (1968).
“We adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted, [citations omitted] None of the special circumstances which prompted NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953), are present here. There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another. No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other party. The victim can and very probably will object for himself when and if it becomes important for him to do so.”
Following the restatement of the law of search and seizure in Jones v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court enters into the statement quoted in this Court’s majority opinion. That statement, which starts out, “What petitioners appear to assert * * merely sets forth the unique contentions of the petitioners in Alderman, as they pertain to the use of evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping. As I view that decision, it precludes the extension of the exclusionary rule to include evidence seized from another person, in violation of that other person’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The thrust of Lindsey v. State, supra, is set forth in the fifth paragraph of the editor’s syllabus:
“To qualify as ‘person aggrieved by unlawful search and seizure’ one must have been victim of search or seizure, that is, one against whom search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through use of evidence gathered as consequence of search or seizure directed at someone else.”
This appears to be essentially what the Alderman case held, when it provided that one person cannot assert violation of his constitutional right because evidence is obtained in violation of another’s rights, as was done in Alderman.
Ironically, the majority Opinion recites on the one hand, that the accomplice’s testimony is corroborated because defendant had “constructive possession” of the stolen property, because he was in the apartment when the officers arrived; but, on the other hand, notwithstanding that possession, they assert the defendant had no standing to object to the search. I believe this Court quite properly provided in Lindsey v. State, supra, in the first paragraph of the Syllabus of the Court, the following:
“The state cannot charge ⅜ person with a crime of possession and then deny that person his remedy at law to object to the search and seizure of that which the state says is his.”
The majority opinion cites Chanosky v. State, 52 Okl. 476, 153 P. 131 (1915), to support the statement, “It has long been the law of this state that the right to question the validity of a search is personal to the occupant of the premises searched.” I fail to see the relevancy in view of the more recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in *414Wattenburg & Owens v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 859 (Ninth Circuit, 1968):
“But, in any event, Owens did have standing to object to that search and seizure, not necessarily because of his status as a roomer at Hideaway Lodge, but because one of the essential facts the Government sought to prove against Owens was that he was a joint possessor of the Christmas trees. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-264, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59.”
It must be conceded that defendant’s objection to the evidence should have been entered prior to, or when the prosecution offered it into evidence, but notwithstanding the objection was entered before his demurrer to the evidence was entered. Nonetheless, I believe defendant’s demurrer was good and should have been sustained. Therefore, in due respect to my colleagues, for the reasons hereinstated, I feel compelled to dissent to, this decision. I dissent.