Court Opinion

ID: 9918634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 13:05:41.085007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:13.920077
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                    No. COA22-1043

                               Filed 16 January 2024

McDowell County, Nos. 17 CRS 51009-10

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

ROBERT TODD GUFFEY, Defendant.

      Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 18 February 2022 by Judge

Forrest D. Bridges in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 19 September 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Asher
      P. Spiller, for the State.

      Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron
      Thomas Johnson, for defendant-appellant.

      MURPHY, Judge.

      When a defendant is charged with a continuing criminal enterprise, each act

alleged to have constituted the enterprise is an essential element of the offense. As

an indictment must allege all the essential elements of an offense, an indictment

charging a defendant with a continuing criminal enterprise is invalid unless it

specifies the acts alleged to have constituted the enterprise itself. Here, where the

indictment charging Defendant with aiding and abetting a continuing criminal

enterprise did not specify the acts alleged to have constituted the enterprise, the

indictment was fatally defective.
                                  STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

      However, the jury’s verdict with respect to Defendant’s separate charge of

conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine was not fatally ambiguous under our

longstanding precedent pertaining to disjunctive conspiracy instructions, and no

error occurred with respect to that charge.

                                 BACKGROUND

      Defendant is an admitted participant in a drug trafficking enterprise

appealing his 17 February        2022    convictions of conspiracy    to traffic in

methamphetamine and aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”).

The enterprise in question distributed meth, crack cocaine, opiate pills, and

marijuana and moved quantities whose total dollar value was in the hundreds of

thousands. However, by the State’s own characterization, Defendant was neither an

organizer nor employee of the principal operation, instead being a routine purchaser

of drugs for resale with whom some more immediate members of the operation were

familiar.

      Defendant was indicted on 21 August 2017, and the indictments with which

Defendant was charged provided as follows:

             The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or
             about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named
             above [] [D]efendant named above unlawfully, willfully and
             feloniously did conspire with Jamie Leonard Tate to
             commit the felony of trafficking by possession and
             transportation of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams
             of methamphetamine.

             ....

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                                   STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

             The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or
             about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named
             above [] [D]efendant named above unlawfully, willfully,
             and feloniously did aid and abet Jamie Leonard Tate and
             Dwayne Bullock in unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously
             engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise by violating
             [N.C.G.S.      §]    90-95(h)(3b)      by    trafficking    in
             methamphetamine. The violation was part of a continuing
             series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General
             Statutes, which Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock
             undertook in concert with more than five other persons,
             including Jackie Pearson, Marqueseo Pearson, Gregory
             Rutherford, Randy Scott, Aretha Fullwood, Aretha Giles,
             and Karita Bullock, with respect to whom Jamie Leonard
             Tate and Dwayne Bullock occupied a position of organizer,
             a supervisory position, and a management position, and
             from which Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock
             obtained substantial income and resources.

      Defendant was tried beginning on 14 February 2022. During trial, Defendant

made “[a] general motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence[,]” arguing, in

particular, that the evidence did not establish sufficient involvement in the criminal

enterprise for purposes of the CCE charge and that the evidence also did not establish

Defendant trafficked the amount of methamphetamine specified in the charge. The

trial court denied the motion. When the jury returned its verdict, the verdict sheets

indicated Defendant was “guilty of conspiracy to traffic[] in methamphetamine by

possession or transportation of 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams[,]” as well

as “guilty of aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise[.]”

                                     ANALYSIS

      On appeal, Defendant argues both that the trial court lacked subject matter

                                           3
                                   STATE V. GUFFEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction over the charge of aiding and abetting a CCE because the indictment was

fatally defective and that it erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of aiding

and abetting a CCE because a defendant may not be guilty of that offense under a

theory of aiding and abetting. He also argues both verdicts were fatally ambiguous

because the jury was instructed disjunctively on two separate theories of trafficking

to support both charges.

      As we agree that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

charge of aiding and abetting a CCE, we vacate that charge; therefore, we need not

address whether, as a general matter, a defendant may be guilty of aiding and

abetting a CCE or whether that verdict was fatally ambiguous. However, we hold

that the jury’s verdict with respect to conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine was

not fatally ambiguous and find no error with respect to that charge.

                           A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

      We first address Defendant’s argument that the charge of aiding and abetting

a CCE in the indictment was fatally defective. Specifically, Defendant argues the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense because the indictment

did not specify each of the offenses comprising the CCE. “Whether a trial court has

subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v.

Herman, 221 N.C. App. 204, 209 (2012) (citation omitted).

      North Carolina defines the offense of continuing criminal enterprise in

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1:

                                            4
                                  STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

             (a) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal
             enterprise shall be punished as a Class C felon and in
             addition shall be subject to the forfeiture prescribed in
             subsection (b) of this section.
             (b) Any person who is convicted under subsection (a) of
             engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit
             to the State of North Carolina:
                (1) The profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
                (2) Any of his interest in, claim against, or property or
                contractual rights of any kind affording a source of
                influence over, such enterprise.
             (c) For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in a
             continuing criminal enterprise if:
                (1) He violates any provision of this Article, the
                punishment of which is a felony; and
                (2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series of
                violations of this Article;
                   a. Which are undertaken by such person in concert
                   with five or more other persons with respect to whom
                   such person occupies a position of organizer, a
                   supervisory position, or any other position of
                   management; and
                   b. From which such person obtains substantial
                   income or resources.

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 (2022).

      In interpreting a federal statute with nearly identical wording, see 21 U.S.C. §

848, the United States Supreme Court held in Richardson v. United States that each

individual offense comprising a CCE constitutes an essential element of the offense:

             When interpreting a statute, we look first to the language.
             United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490 (1997). In this
             case, that language may seem to permit either
             interpretation, that of the Government or of the petitioner,
             for the statute does not explicitly tell us whether the
             individual violation is an element or a means. But the
             language is not totally neutral. The words “violates” and
             “violations” are words that have a legal ring. A “violation”

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                      STATE V. GUFFEY

                     Opinion of the Court

is not simply an act or conduct; it is an act or conduct that
is contrary to law. Black’s Law Dictionary 1570 (6th
ed.1990). That circumstance is significant because the
criminal law ordinarily entrusts a jury with determining
whether alleged conduct “violates” the law, see infra, at
822, and, as noted above, a federal criminal jury must act
unanimously when doing so. Indeed, even though the
words “violates” and “violations” appear more than 1,000
times in the United States Code, the Government has not
pointed us to, nor have we found, any legal source reading
any instance of either word as the Government would have
us read them in this case. To hold that each “violation”
here amounts to a separate element is consistent with a
tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is
whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates
the law. To hold the contrary is not.

The CCE statute’s breadth also argues against treating
each individual violation as a means, for that breadth
aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would
risk. Cf. Schad v. Arizona, [501 U.S. 624, 645 (1991)]
(plurality opinion). The statute’s word “violations” covers
many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees of
seriousness. The two chapters of the Federal Criminal
Code setting forth drug crimes contain approximately 90
numbered sections, many of which proscribe various acts
that may be alleged as “violations” for purposes of the
series requirement in the statute. Compare, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§§ 842(a)(4) and (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (providing civil
penalties for removing drug labels) and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(Supp.III) (simple possession of a controlled substance)
with 21 U.S.C. § 858 (endangering human life while
manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the
drug laws) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (possession with intent to
distribute large quantities of drugs). At the same time, the
Government in a CCE case may well seek to prove that a
defendant, charged as a drug kingpin, has been involved in
numerous underlying violations.         The first of these
considerations increases the likelihood that treating
violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a
jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of

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                                   STATE V. GUFFEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

             each violation, will cover up wide disagreement among the
             jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do.
             The second consideration significantly aggravates the risk
             (present at least to a small degree whenever multiple
             means are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus
             upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply
             concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that
             where there is smoke there must be fire.

             Finally, this Court has indicated that the Constitution
             itself limits a State’s power to define crimes in ways that
             would permit juries to convict while disagreeing about
             means, at least where that definition risks serious
             unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition. Schad
             v. Arizona, 501 U.S., at 632-633 (plurality opinion); id.[] at
             651 (SCALIA, J., concurring) (“We would not permit . . . an
             indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either X
             on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday . . .”). We have no reason to
             believe that Congress intended to come close to, or to test,
             those constitutional limits when it wrote this statute. See
             Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 783-784[] . . . (1985)
             (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, pt. 1, pp. 83-84, (1970)) (in
             making CCE a separate crime, rather than a sentencing
             provision, Congress sought increased procedural
             protections for defendants); cf. Gomez v. United States, 490
             U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an
             interpretation of a federal statute that engenders
             constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
             interpretation poses no constitutional question”);
             Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 (1936)
             (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818-20 (1999).

      The United States Supreme Court’s expression of constitutional concern with

respect to CCE in Richardson, while avoided for prudential reasons in the opinion

proper, was well-founded. Id. at 820; cf. Matter of Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642 (1977)

(“If a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which will raise a

                                            7
                                  STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

serious question as to its constitutionality and the other will avoid such question, it

is well settled that the courts should construe the statute so as to avoid the

constitutional question.”). While the State has some latitude to “define different

courses of conduct, or states of mind, as [] alternative means of committing a single

offense,” its ability to do so is not boundless under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. at 632. “The axiomatic requirement of

due process that a statute may not forbid conduct in terms so vague that people of

common intelligence would be relegated to differing guesses about its meaning carries

the practical consequence that a defendant charged under a valid statute will be in a

position to understand with some specificity the legal basis of the charge against

him.” Id. at 632-33 (citations omitted) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,

453 (1939)). For this reason, “no person may be punished criminally save upon proof

of some specific illegal conduct.” Id. at 633 (emphasis added).

      Here, the specificity concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court in

Richardson are fully present in the indictment. The indictment does not allege that

the enterprise engaged in any specific conduct, only defining the CCE as “a continuing

series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes” and generally

naming the participants and their positions in the trafficking scheme’s hierarchy. A

juror would have no way of knowing how many criminal acts were committed within

the organization or how Defendant’s acts advanced them; while the indictment

specifies that Defendant aided and abetted the CCE “by trafficking in

                                           8
                                  STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

methamphetamine[,]” it says nothing of why the enterprise with which Defendant

dealt constituted a CCE. Moreover, if such an indictment were sufficient as to the

establishment of a CCE, a future indictment could permissibly invite little to no

agreement from individual jurors as to in which acts a defendant actually

participated.

      While Richardson is not a directly binding authority as to the interpretation of

North Carolina’s statute, the command of the Due Process Clause is; and we, like the

United States Supreme Court, will not construe a statute so as to jeopardize that

statute’s constitutionality. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 820; Matter of Arthur, 291 N.C.

at 642. We therefore hold that each underlying act alleged under N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1

constitutes an essential element of the offense. Moreover, as “an indictment . . . must

allege all the essential elements of the offense[,]” State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 887

(2018) (marks and citations omitted), we further hold that a valid indictment under

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 requires the state to specifically enumerate the acts alleged.

      Defendant’s charge of aiding and abetting a CCE was therefore fatally

defective, and we vacate the judgment on that charge. Having so held, Defendant’s

other arguments with respect to that charge are moot. Roberts v. Madison Cty.

Realtors Ass’n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 398-99 (1996) (marks and citations omitted) (“A

case is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered,

cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”)

                               B. Motion to Dismiss

                                           9
                                     STATE V. GUFFEY

                                     Opinion of the Court

       We turn next to whether Defendant’s conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine

verdict was fatally ambiguous.        Specifically, Defendant argues the verdict was

“fatally ambiguous because it is not possible to determine from the indictments,

evidence, jury instructions, and verdict sheets whether the jury unanimously found

trafficking by possession versus trafficking by transportation . . . .”

       “A verdict should be certain and import a definite meaning free from

ambiguity, with an uncertain or ambiguous verdict being insufficient to support the

entry of a judgment.” Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 710 (marks and citations

omitted), reh’g denied, 377 N.C. 217 (2021). Jury verdicts are “fatally ambiguous in

the event that the verdict sheet or the underlying instructions were vague, making it

unclear precisely what the jury intended by its verdict.” Id. As ambiguity in a jury

verdict creates an issue of jury unanimity, we review this argument de novo. See

State v. Surrett, 217 N.C. App. 89, 93 (2011) (“We review the existence of a unanimous

jury verdict de novo on appeal . . . .”).

       Here, as Defendant’s argument depends on the failure to distinguish between

trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation, a determinative question

is whether these offenses, if presented to the jury in the disjunctive, would actually

render the jury’s verdict fatally ambiguous. Under our binding conspiracy precedent,

the answer is no.       “[O]ur case law has long embraced a distinction between

unconstitutionally vague instructions that render unclear the offense for which the

defendant is being convicted and instructions which instead permissibly state that

                                             10
                                    STATE V. GUFFEY

                                    Opinion of the Court

more than one specific act can establish an element of a criminal offense.” State v.

Walters, 368 N.C. 749, 753 (2016). On the one hand, “a disjunctive instruction[] [that]

allows the jury to find a defendant guilty if he commits either of two underlying

acts, either of which is in itself a separate offense, is fatally ambiguous because it is

impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found that the defendant

committed one particular offense. In such cases, the focus is on the conduct of the

defendant.” Id. (marks omitted) (emphasis in original). On the other hand, “if the

trial court merely instructs the jury disjunctively as to various alternative acts which

will establish an element of the offense, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied. In

this type of case, the focus is on the intent or purpose of the defendant instead of his

conduct.” Id. (marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

       Where a conspiracy charge disjunctively lists multiple offenses, we have held

that each underlying offense does not create a separate conspiracy, but is instead an

alternative act by which a Defendant may be found guilty of the singular conspiracy

alleged. In State v. Overton, the defendant’s verdict sheet charged a conspiracy to

“manufacture, possess with intent to sell and deliver or sell and deliver[] . . . heroin[,]”

and the jury’s verdict mirrored that use of the disjunctive. State v. Overton, 60 N.C.

App. 1, 34 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 581 (1983).                  Although we

“acknowledge[d] that the verdict sheet was not artfully drawn,” we nonetheless held

that “[t]he parameters of the conspiracy could include either a conspiracy to

manufacture or to possess with intent to sell or deliver or to sell and deliver heroin.”

                                            11
                                  STATE V. GUFFEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

Id. We reasoned that the defendant “could not have been prejudiced by the inexact

nature of this verdict form because the punishments for conspiracy to do any one of

these three offenses are the same, and the trial court’s judgment contained a sentence

well within the statutory limits. Id. Moreover, in State v. Davis, we applied a similar

principle to hold that a defendant “charged only with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine”

was not subject to the risk of a non-unanimous verdict because “fact that the different

methods of trafficking constitute separate offenses is immaterial.” State v. Davis, 188

N.C. App. 735, 741 (2008) (citing State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 578-79 (1985)).

      We are bound by this precedent and therefore hold the jury’s verdict was not

fatally ambiguous.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Defendant’s verdict with respect to conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine

was not fatally ambiguous.      However, as Defendant’s judgment for aiding and

abetting a CCE did not enumerate the acts alleged to have constituted the CCE as

necessary elements of the offense, we vacate that judgment.

      VACATED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.

      Judge FLOOD concurs.

      Judge STROUD concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.

                                          12
No. COA22-1043 – State v. Guffey

      STROUD, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

      While I concur with the majority’s decision regarding the issue of a fatal

ambiguity in the verdict, I write separately to dissent as to the indictment issue.

Because the indictment was not fatally defective, the trial court had subject matter

jurisdiction, and I would find no error as to the indictment of continuing criminal

enterprise (“CCE”).

                                    I.   Indictment

      It is well-established that

                    [t]o be sufficient, an indictment must include, inter
             alia, a plain and concise factual statement asserting facts
             supporting every element of a criminal offense and the
             defendant’s commission thereof. If the indictment fails to
             state an essential element of the offense, any resulting
             conviction must be vacated. The law disfavors application
             of rigid and technical rules to indictments; so long as an
             indictment adequately expresses the charge against the
             defendant, it will not be quashed.

State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 886-87, 821 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (2018) (citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Our Supreme Court has clearly stated “the

purpose of an indictment is to put the defendant on notice of the crime being charged

and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy.” State v. Newborn, 384 N.C. 656,

659, 887 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2023) (citation omitted). “[T]he traditional test is whether

the indictment alleges facts supporting the essential elements of the offense to be

charged.” Id.
                                    STATE V. GUFFEY

                   STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

      North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1 establishes the criminal

charge of CCE, stating:

             (a)    Any person who engages in a . . . [CCE] shall be
          punished as a Class C felon and in addition shall be subject
          to the forfeiture prescribed in subsection (b) of this section.

            (b)   Any person who is convicted under subsection (a) of
          engaging in a . . . [CCE] shall forfeit to the State of North
          Carolina:

                       (1) The profits obtained         by   him     in    such
                           enterprise; and

                       (2) Any of his interest in, claim against, or
                           property or contractual rights of any kind
                           affording a source of influence over, such
                           enterprise.

             (c)     For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in
          a .. . . [CCE] if:

                       (1) He violates any provision of this Article, the
                           punishment of which is a felony; and

                       (2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series
                           of violations of this Article;

                              a. Which are undertaken by such person
                                 in concert with five or more other
                                 persons with respect to whom such
                                 person occupies a position of organizer,
                                 a supervisory position, or any other
                                 position of management; and

                              b. From which such person obtains
                                 substantial income or resources.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1 (2021).

      The indictment charging Defendant with CCE stated:

                                           -2-
                                   STATE V. GUFFEY

                   STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

             The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or
             about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named
             above [Defendant] named above unlawfully, willfully, and
             feloniously did aid and abet Jamie Leonard Tate and
             Dwayne Bullock in unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously
             engaging in a . . . [CCE] by violating G.S. 90-95(h)(3b) by
             trafficking in methamphetamine. The violation was part of
             a continuing series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90
             of the General Statutes, which Jamie Leonard Tate and
             Dwayne Bullock undertook in concert with more than five
             other persons, including Jackie Pearson, Marqueseo
             Pearson, Gregory Rutherford, Randy Scott, Aretha
             Fullwood, Aretha Giles, and Karita Bullock, with respect
             to whom Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock
             occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory position, and
             a management position, and from which Jamie Leonard
             Tate and Dwayne Bullock obtained substantial income and
             resources.

      The majority relies on a United States Supreme Court case, Richardson v.

United States, 526 U.S. 813, 143 L.E.2d 985 (1999), to determine “each underlying

act alleged under N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 constitutes an essential element of the offense.”

However, as the majority noted, this decision is not binding on this Court as to North

Carolina’s CCE statute since Richardson was interpreting a federal statute, not

North Carolina’s statute. See generally id. I believe, under current North Carolina

case law, North Carolina’s law is more in line with the dissenting opinion in

Richardson than the majority opinion. The dissenting justices would have held that

an indictment alleging CCE need not allege each underlying act that is the basis for

this type of charge. As the dissent in Richardson notes, requiring the government to

specifically allege the underlying acts that constitute a CCE charge “is a substantial

                                           -3-
                                    STATE V. GUFFEY

                    STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

departure from what Congress intended.” Richardson, 526 U.S. at 826, 143 L.E.2d

at 998 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

      Here, the indictment specifically alleged Defendant aided and abetted Jamie

Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock by “engaging in a . . . [CCE] by violating G.S. 90-

95(h)(3b) by trafficking in methamphetamine[,]” which is a felony offense under

North Carolina law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3b) (2021). The indictment

specifically alleged this felony offense was part of a “continuing series of violations of

Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes” and states Defendant undertook the

violations “in concert with more than five other persons[,]” naming each person, and

alleging Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock “occupied a position of organizer,

a supervisory position, and a management position, and from which Jamie Leonard

Tate and Dwayne Bullock obtained substantial income and resources.”

      The indictment tracks the statutory language of North Carolina General

Statute Section 90-95.1 by naming the underlying felony offense as required by

subsection 90-95.1(c)(1); expressly stating the person was part of a “continuing series

of violations” as required by subsection 90-95.1(c)(2); the violations were in concert

with five other people and the person occupied a “position of organizer, a supervisory

position, and a management position” as required by subsection 90-95.1(c)(2)(a); and

the person “obtained substantial income and resources” as required by subsection 90-

95.1(c)(2)(b). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1.

                                            -4-
                                     STATE V. GUFFEY

                    STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

      Since, as the dissent in Richardson also notes, the underlying violations that

constitute the CCE charge could involve “hundreds or thousands of sales[,]” and the

indictment is sufficient under North Carolina law to put Defendant on notice and

tracks the statutory language, I would hold there was no error with respect to the

indictment of the CCE charge. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 826, 143 L.E.2d at 998

(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Newborn, 384 N.C. at 659, 887 S.E.2d at 871 (“[T]he

purpose of an indictment is to put the defendant on notice of the crime being charged

and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy.” (citation omitted)); see also State

v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953) (“The general rule in this state

and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense

is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent

words.” (citation omitted)).

                               II.   Motion to Dismiss

      Defendant also argues “[t]he trial court erred by denying [Defendant’s] motion

to dismiss the CCE charge where a defendant cannot be guilty of that offense based

on a theory of aiding and abetting[.]”        While the majority did not discuss this

argument since it concludes the indictment was fatally defective, I will briefly discuss

the issue since I would conclude there was no error as to the indictment.

      The State’s evidence tended to show that Jamie Tate and Dwayne Bullock were

leaders of a criminal enterprise specifically related to drug trafficking.         As the

majority notes, the criminal enterprise trafficked various drugs and collected

                                            -5-
                                     STATE V. GUFFEY

                     STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

hundreds of thousands of dollars from the trafficking enterprise. Defendant’s role in

this enterprise was limited to purchasing drugs from Jamie Tate and Dwayne

Bullock, or their associates, and re-selling the drugs. There is no indication that

Defendant was under the direction or control of Jamie Tate or Dwayne Bullock, or

was otherwise involved in the enterprise aside from purchasing drugs to re-sell.

      At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss for

insufficiency of the evidence, which the court did not rule on. Defendant did not

testify on his own behalf or present any evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss

at the close of all evidence. The trial court ultimately denied the motions to dismiss.

      Defendant’s argument is essentially that he could not be convicted of aiding

and abetting a criminal enterprise since he was not involved in any leadership role,

and his purchase of drugs from the enterprise was a small part of the enterprise’s

overall operation.     Defendant discusses federal caselaw regarding the federal

equivalent to North Carolina’s CCE statute, stating:

             The Second Circuit has held that a defendant cannot be
             guilty of the offense based on this theory of vicarious
             liability, while the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
             concluded that a defendant can be liable as an aider and
             abettor under some circumstances. Both circuits
             concluded, however, that such aiding-and-abetting liability
             should not exist where, as here, the defendant is an
             employee or agent of the CCE.

Defendant cites to United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)

and United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2nd Cir. 1987).

                                             -6-
                                     STATE V. GUFFEY

                     STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

      While I would not conclude a defendant can never be charged as an aider and

abettor to a CCE, I would conclude, under these facts, the trial court erred by not

dismissing the CCE charge. The State correctly notes that “aider and abettor liability

in North Carolina is a principle of common law.” See State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247,

260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999) (laying out the common law elements of aider and

abettor liability). The plain language of North Carolina General Statute Section 90-

95.1 abrogates aider and abettor liability for those who are not in a management or

leadership position in a criminal enterprise. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1; see also

State v. James, 371 N.C. 77, 87, 813 S.E.2d 195, 203 (2018) (“The intent of the General

Assembly may be found first from the plain language of the statute[.] If the language

of a statute is clear, the court must implement the statute according to the plain

meaning of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.” (emphasis added) (citation

omitted)).

      North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1(c) states:

               (c)     For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in
             a . . . [CCE] if:

                        (1) He violates any provision of this Article, the
                            punishment of which is a felony; and

                        (2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series
                            of violations of this Article;

                                a. Which are undertaken by such person
                                   in concert with five or more other
                                   persons with respect to whom such
                                   person occupies a position of organizer,

                                             -7-
                                    STATE V. GUFFEY

                    STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

                                   a supervisory position, or any other
                                   position of management; and

                               b. From which such person obtains
                                  substantial income or resources.

Id. (emphasis added).

      Subsection (c)(2)(a) states a person who “occupies a position of organizer, a

supervisory position, or any other position of management” can be liable for a CCE

charge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1(c)(2)(a). Thus, the plain meaning of the words

“organizer,” “supervisor,” and “management” will control the meaning of the statute.

See James, 371 N.C. at 87, 813 S.E.2d at 203. “Organizer” means “one that

organizes[,]” which means “to cause to develop an organic structure[,] to form into a

coherent unity or functioning whole[,] to set up an administrative structure for[,] to

persuade to associate in an organization[,] to arrange by systematic planning and

united effort[.]”   Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 874 (11th ed. 2003).

“Supervisor” means “one that supervises; an administrative officer in charge of

business, government, or school unit or operation[.]” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 1255 (11th ed. 2003). “Management” means “the act or art of managing:

the conducting or supervising of something[,] judicious use of means to accomplish an

end[,] the collective body of those who manage or direct an enterprise[.]” Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 754 (11th ed. 2003).

      Taken together, the clear legislative intent of North Carolina General Statute

Section 90-95.1 is that it should apply to those who are drug kingpins, not those who

                                            -8-
                                   STATE V. GUFFEY

                   STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

are not involved in the overall enterprise leadership structure. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §

90-95.1. Holding to the contrary would impose criminal liability under a theory of

CCE for any person who purchases drugs from a criminal enterprise, which the

General Assembly did not intend. See id. Here, it is undisputed Defendant was

involved in the purchase and distribution of large quantities of illegal drugs, and he

was charged and convicted of those crimes. Those convictions are not affected by this

appeal. But the evidence was clear that Defendant’s role in this enterprise was

limited to purchasing drugs from Jamie Tate and Dwayne Bullock, or their associates,

and re-selling the drugs. The State even conceded at trial that Defendant “wasn’t a

kingpin. So you can treat him differently than you would the kingpin.” In the State’s

brief to this Court, it again conceded that “Tate and Bullock soon formed [a] close-

knit organization of ‘seven or eight’ associates and family members who ran the drug-

trafficking enterprise[,]” listing “[t]he individuals under Tate and Bullock’s

supervision[,]” without listing Defendant. The State does not characterize Defendant

as an employee of the organization, while it specifically referred to the seven listed

individuals as employees of the organization.

      While it is clear and undisputed that Defendant sold drugs obtained by the

criminal enterprise, it is also clear Defendant was not one of the organizers,

supervisors, or managers listed in North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1(c)(2)(a). Since North Carolina General Statute Section

90-95.1 demonstrates a clear legislative intent to punish those acting as drug

                                           -9-
                                    STATE V. GUFFEY

                    STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

kingpins, I would conclude the trial court erred in not dismissing the CCE charge at

the close of all evidence.

       For the reasons outlined above, I concur in part and dissent in part.

                                           - 10 -