Court Opinion

ID: 9580101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:49.055372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:01.692990
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully in Presiding Judge Ruffin’s dissent but write separately to note that (1) there is a split in the federal circuits regarding the main question presented; (2) federal circuit court opinions on this matter are not controlling on this Court; (3) the United States Supreme Court has limited the scope of permissible investigation in the related area of roadblock cases, to not include ordinary criminal wrongdoing such as illegal drug activities; (4) the result suggested by the dissents is not anomalous; and (5) the posture of this case on appeal and the record before us raises questions.
1. The primary question debated in this case is whether an officer may, during the course of a traffic stop, question the driver and request consent to search, on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop, without articulable suspicion of other illegal activity, such as drugs. The majority relies in part on the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v. Purcell, 236 F3d 1274, 1279-1280 (11th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that the only constitutional concern raised by such questioning is “not the content of the questions, but their impact on the duration of the stop.” What the majority fails to note is that the Eleventh Circuit’s comments that it recites were only meant to describe the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning on the matter. In fact, in Purcell the Eleventh Circuit did not establish or adopt any particular guideline or test to determine when the scope of the stop has been exceeded. Id. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit Court simply “recognized that there are two possible tests for when a police investigation exceeds the scope of a routine traffic stop.” United States v. Boyce, 351 F3d 1102, 1111 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, the federal circuits are split on this very question.
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts have held that an officer may not ask questions during a traffic stop that are unrelated *109to the purpose of the original stop, even if the questioning does not extend the stop, unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.86 The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts generally agree that such questioning is allowed so long as the unrelated questioning does not unreasonably lengthen the traffic stop.87 So, the issue is far from settled in the federal courts.
2. Moreover, a federal circuit court’s opinion on this issue is not binding on this Court, but merely persuasive authority.88
3. The majority also appears to reason that questions about drug trafficking on our nation’s roads are properly within the legitimate scope of all traffic stops. But as shown above, the federal circuit courts are split on this issue and the United States Supreme Court has not spoken.89 Furthermore, in an instructive and possibly analogous case, the United States Supreme Court has held thatroadblock/checkpoints contravene the Fourth Amendment if they are established for the primary purpose of detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, such as illegal drug activities. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, *110531 U. S. 32, 41-42 (III) (121SC 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000).90 In other words, roadblocks, which may be established “to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety,” may not be established with the primary purpose of drug interdiction (although illegal drug activities may be investigated if articulable suspicion develops). Id. The United States Supreme Court has therefore recognized that, at least in the roadblock setting, drug interdiction is beyond the scope of roadway-safety - traffic-law enforcement, which, as noted by the majority, is already broadly defined to include computerized checks of license, insurance, registration, VTN, and identification.
4. The majority contends that a restriction during a traffic stop on an officer’s ability to request consent to search for drugs produces an anomalous result. The majority relies heavily on the idea that police questioning, in and of itself, does not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (111 SC 2382, 115 LE2d 389) (1991), and on the argument that what is allowed at a first-tier stop cannot be improper at a second-tier stop.
But, as our own Court has noted, at a first-tier stop officers may “ask for identification, and freely question the citizen without any basis or belief that the citizen is involved in criminal activity, as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Afires v. State, 266 Ga. App. 214,215 (596 SE2d 719) (2004). This distinguishes a first-tier stop from a second-tier stop, which, as is well established, is a temporary detention that constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 809-810 (116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996). Similarly, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. at 434. In other words, although questioning alone is not a seizure, at a second-tier stop, the person is already seized. The tier system is based on the idea that more and more justification is required for police actions as the level of detention increases. Accordingly, it is not anomalous that during a traffic stop, police are required to have articulable suspicion to question a person about a nontraffic topic.
*1115. Finally, the posture of this case requires comment. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the arresting officer was present in the courtroom but he did not testify, no other evidence was introduced, and the parties did not stipulate to any facts. Rather, the parties and the court simply discussed the legal issue. The trial court indicated that it was concerned about this area of law because it had recently learned how law enforcement officers were being trained in this area. The two counsel and the court then discussed what they perceived as conflicting lines of authority from the Court of Appeals regarding consent to search. Finally, the court made a suggestion:
I can tell you what I can do. I can just make the decision and give y’all discretionary appeal and let you take it up there and straighten it out. . . .
Defense counsel suggested that the court rule in such a way so as to avoid having an interlocutory appeal. The court apparently agreed, and it decided to grant the motion to suppress so as to allow a direct appeal. Defense counsel commented, “. . . it’s an adversarial system but we’re together wanting to know what the answers are type thing [sic].”
On appeal, the only “stipulation” of facts before this Court is an attachment to both the State’s and the defense’s brief in which both counsel agree that the “Statement of Facts” section of their briefs shall constitute the “facts that would be adduced at trial.” This Court may not consider documents attached to appellate briefs. High Voltage Vending v. Odom, 266 Ga. App. 537, 538 (597 SE2d 428) (2004). “Nevertheless, where ‘facts . . . necessary for disposition are stated in a brief, and the State concedes such statement is substantially correct, we are permitted to reach a decision upon the agreed upon facts.’ ” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 253 Ga. App. 10 (557 SE2d 473) (2001). Oddly, however, the one thing that is not stipulated is what the defendant said in response to the question of whether he would agree to a search. The parties agree that Bibbins’s answer to the request for consent to search is inaudible on the video tape. Ultimately, Bibbins’s answer proved irrelevant based on the law in Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840 (2) (a) (597 SE2d 116) (2004).
We caution the bench and bar that appeals may not be manufactured by the parties. The trial court should give full consideration of the merits of issues raised below based on the law and the facts as presented to it. It makes this Court’s job much more tedious and difficult if it is required to sort out questions of whether proper procedure has been followed.
*112Decided December 1, 2004
Reconsideration denied December 16, 2004
William T. McBroom, District Attorney, Thomas J. Ison, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Virgil L. Brown, Eric D. Hearn, Ronald J. Ellington, for appellee.

 See United States v. Ramos, 42 F3d 1160 (8th Cir. 1994) (officer may only ask questions that are not related to the traffic stop if he has additional suspicion that would allow him to expand the scope of inquiry); United States v. Murillo, 255 F3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that questions posedhy officers require either some relation to the basis for the custody or an independent source of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Holt, 264 F3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (both the length and scope of a traffic stop are relevant factors in deciding whether the stop comports with the Fourth Amendment). Compare Oliver v. United States, 363 F3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2004) (panel decision issued subsequent to Holt, supra); United States v. Edward J., 224 F3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (only an en banc panel may overrule a prior panel’s decision).

 See, e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 993 F2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving unrelated questions about travel plans where officer was waiting for results of computer check when he asked the questions); United States v. Palomino, 100 F3d 446, 449-450 (6th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that no constitutional violation occurred because drug questioning did not extend stop longer than was necessary for the original purpose of the stop); United States v. Childs, 277 F3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (officer’s drug-related question did not turn reasonable detention into unreasonable detention where the question was asked while the driver was being processed and passenger could have protected himself by declining to answer).

 Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 58 (117 SC 1055, 137 LE2d 170) (1997) (supremacy clause does not require state courts to yield to a federal appellate court’s interpretation on a question of federal law); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat. Treasury Employees Union, 265 Ga. 557, 558 (458 SE2d 95) (1995) (decisions of federal courts of appeal are not binding on this Court, but their reasoning is persuasive).

 In support of its position, the majority cites United States Supreme Court cases that involve fact patterns that include drug-related questions during traffic stops. But none of these cases addresses directly the question of the scope of permissible questioning. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33 (117 SC 417, 136 LE2d 347) (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973). As stated by the Tenth Circuit Court, “[a]lthough the [United States Supreme] Court has not directly addressed the issue we now face, it has, in applying the Terry analysis, routinely employed language indicating there are limitations on both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out (what I refer to here as the ‘scope’ or ‘breadth’ of the detention).” United States v. Holt, 264 F3d at 1229.

 Compare Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419 (124 SC 885, 157 LE2d 843) (2004) (upholding traffic stop established for the specific purpose of obtaining information about a recent fatal hit-and-run accident; roadblock was not established for drug interdiction).