Court Opinion

ID: 9494877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:49:01.453368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:19.032119
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, the evidence does not support the act of God affirmative defense instruction given by the district court. Thus, I would remand this case for a new trial. Upon remand, I would strike the answer of Sandals Resorts as a sanction for the contumacious conduct of its lawyer noted by the district court. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
This is an issue we review de novo. On questions of fact, we defer to the fact-finder, but the sufficiency of the evidence to create an issue of fact is a question of *956law. Cox v. Miller County R-I Sch. Dist., 951 F.2d 927, 931 (8th Cir.1991). Accordingly, the court is wrong when it makes the matter a “weight of the evidence” question.
Reports that it was “very windy” the night before the incident, and that it was “very windy” the day before the tree fell, and “much windier than it had been on previous days” are simply insufficient as a matter of law to justify the act of God defense. Coastal resorts can “reasonably expect” very windy conditions on occasion, given the irregularity of coastal winds and weather, thus even the definition of “act of God” provided in the instant case was not satisfied by the evidence. Under South Dakota case law, an act of God is defined as “any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented.” Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Henry Carlson Co., 83 S.D. 664, 165 N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D.1969). Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884, 886 (S.D.1971), in passing, deals with the sufficiency of un-usualness required for an act of God defense by stating that even though rainfalls in excess of four inches in a twenty-four-hour period had occurred only twice before in South Dakota, the third occurrence at issue in that case was not so unprecedented as to constitute a so-called act of God. Id.
Other jurisdictions note that “[t]he ordinary force of nature such as winds which are usual at the time and place are conditions which reasonably could have been anticipated and will not relieve from liability the person guilty of the original negligent act.” Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475 F.2d 301, 304 (Wyo.1970). Courts consider whether the natural “occurrence and magnitude should or might have been anticipated, in view of the ... history of the locality and the existing conditions affecting the likelihood of [the natural occurrence], by a person of reasonable prudence.” Keystone Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 351 (Ia.1998) (quotation omitted); see also McCutcheon v. Tri-County Group XV, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 627, 632 n. 2 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that act of God defense “is only available where it is ‘an event in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations in the locality affords no reasonable warning of their coming’ ” (citation omitted)). The Sandals Resorts, in this case, ought to have been held to a standard of proving that even though the winds were from natural causes, they were of such unusual and extraordinary manifestation of nature that they could not have been anticipated or expected. 1 AmJur 2d, Act of God §§ 2, 5 (1994); Sky Aviation, 475 P.2d at 304.
It is the defendants’ burden in raising the act of God as a defense, to prove that the plaintiffs’ damage was caused solely by an act of God. Northwestern Bell, 165 N.W.2d at 350. “[W]here an act of God and the negligence of a defendant concur and proximately cause damage, the defendant is liable as though his negligence alone had caused the damage .... ” Id.
In their opening brief and in a motion to supplement the record, the appellants presented information supporting a finding that Sandals Resorts and its lawyer deliberately obstructed discovery in this case. It also appears, from affidavits and other filings in other cases, that this is standard operating procedure for Sandals’ counsel in litigation involving the resorts. Based upon this additional information, it is clear to me that the sanctions imposed in this case were insufficient. The district court, as noted by the court’s opinion today, found that Sandals’ attorney had “engaged *957in a pattern of discovery abuse, such as failures to meet deadlines regarding discovery, evasive or nonresponsive answers to interrogatories, failure to answer interrogatories, and refusal to produce documents.” These transgressions are all the more serious when the site of the incident and the location of evidence is several thousand miles away from the forum.
At a time when the ethics, civility and professionalism of the bar are under intense scrutiny, the courts cannot permit a “slap on the wrist” to suffice. A more appropriate remedy for this type of conduct would have been to direct liability against the defendants or, at least, to strike the defendants’ answer and require trial on a general denial of negligence, causation, liability and damages.
I dissent.