Court Opinion

ID: 9895590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 20:13:28.903664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:36.312133
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                               September 2023 Term                        FILED
                                _______________
                                                                      November 7, 2023
                                                                          released at 3:00 p.m.
                                     No. 22-0197                      EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

                                   _______________                    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                           OF WEST VIRGINIA

                           STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
                            Plaintiff Below, Respondent,

                                         V.

                             RUSTY ALLEN WHITE,
                            Defendant Below, Petitioner.

      ____________________________________________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
                     The Honorable Debra McLaughlin, Judge
                            Case No. CC-19-2018-F-31

                               AFFIRMED
      ____________________________________________________________

                            Submitted: October 10, 2023
                             Filed: November 7, 2023

     Christian J. Riddell, Esq.                  Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
     The Riddell Law Group                       Attorney General
     Martinsburg, West Virginia                  William E. Longwell, Esq.
     Attorney for the Petitioner                 Assistant Attorney General
                                                 Charleston, West Virginia
                                                 Attorneys for the Respondent

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     When reviewing an order modifying or revoking a defendant’s

supervised release under West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(h), we apply a three-pronged

standard of review. We review the circuit court’s final order and decision to modify or

revoke a defendant’s supervised release under an abuse of discretion standard; we review

challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; and we review questions

of law and interpretations of statutes de novo.

              2.     United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 204

L. Ed. 2d 897 (2019), does not apply to a supervised release revocation pursuant to West

Virginia Code § 62-12-26 because § 62-12-26 does not require a mandatory minimum

sentence upon revocation.

              3.     “In order for the State to prove a conspiracy under W. Va. Code,

61-10-31(1), it must show that the defendant agreed with others to commit an offense

against the State and that some overt act was taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect

the object of that conspiracy.” Syllabus point 4, State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 294 S.E.2d

62 (1981).

                                             i
BUNN, Justice:

              Petitioner Rusty Allen White appeals the Circuit Court of Jefferson County’s

February 16, 2022 order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to a two-year

term of imprisonment. In this appeal, Mr. White claims that the circuit court erred in

denying his motion to dismiss the petition seeking to revoke his supervised release pursuant

to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26. He argues that any additional term of imprisonment,

outside the underlying statutory maximum term of the crime of conviction, required factual

findings by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He also claims that the court erred by finding

by clear and convincing evidence that he conspired to deliver a controlled substance. We

disagree, as a revocation of supervised release pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26

does not require factual findings by a jury, and the evidence supported the court’s factual

finding and the following revocation of Mr. White’s supervised release.

                                             I.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              In June 2018, Mr. White entered a no contest plea to sexual assault in the

third degree, a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-5. On October 1, 2018, the circuit

court sentenced Mr. White to one to five years imprisonment. His sentence included ten

years of supervised release pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26. On the same day,

Mr. White signed a six-page document notifying him of his supervised release terms and

conditions. He acknowledged that he understood those terms and conditions and agreed to

                                             1
comply with them. The terms and conditions included that he “shall not violate any law of

this state, any other state, any municipality, or of the United States” and that he “shall not

use, consume, purchase, possess, or distribute any narcotics, marijuana, or other controlled

substance, unless prescribed to him . . . by a physician.” The acknowledgement included

that if he violated “any of the terms and conditions,” Mr. White would “be subject to

immediate arrest, with or without a warrant,” by his supervising probation officer. He did

not appeal the sentence for his underlying conviction.

              Mr. White completed the sentence of imprisonment 1 and began his ten-year

term of supervised release on January 14, 2021. On November 19, 2021, a probation officer

filed a petition in the circuit court alleging that Mr. White violated the conditions of his

supervised release, including the conditions regarding violating a law of this State or of the

United States, and prohibiting the use, consumption, purchase, possession, or distribution

of controlled substances. The petition alleged that Mr. White tested positive for cocaine

and was charged and arrested for conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine. 2 Mr. White filed a

motion to dismiss the petition, claiming that he had served his sentence and could not be

              1
                In the supervised release revocation hearing, Mr. White reported that he
served fifteen months imprisonment and a year on parole.
              2
                The probation officer amended the petition in January 2022 to add an
allegation involving obtaining money by false pretenses, which is of no consequence to his
appeal because the circuit court found that the State failed to prove that allegation by clear
and convincing evidence.

                                              2
sentenced to further incarceration “based on any factual finding made without the aid of a

jury trial.” The State opposed the motion.

              The court denied Mr. White’s motion to dismiss and held a contested hearing

regarding the allegations in the petition. Sergeant Justin Harper with the Martinsburg City

Police Department testified about the allegation of conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine. He

told the circuit court that he conducted a traffic stop of Mr. White’s truck after he noticed

a defective brake light. Mr. White was driving the truck and had a passenger, Mr. Joseph

Garner. When Sgt. Harper asked Mr. White to step out of the vehicle, the officer noticed

signs of crack use around the floorboard of Mr. White’s seat: small pieces of copper scrub

pad that Sgt. Harper explained users often stuff into a pipe to prevent crack from falling

into their mouths. While Sgt. Harper found no controlled substances on Mr. White, he

found 16.4 grams of crack cocaine in Mr. Garner’s pants, as well as $1,900 cash. Sgt.

Harper testified that amount was “a lot” of crack cocaine, confirming that it was “more

crack than for normal personal use.”

              Significantly, Sgt. Harper also found a sandwich bag behind the seat in Mr.

White’s vehicle with the corner torn off. He testified that “typically” means “they’re

packaging crack cocaine for sale.” Sgt. Harper explained that sellers “will put a small

amount of crack in the corner of a sandwich bag, tie it off and rip the other part of the bag

                                             3
off so you’re left with a sandwich bag that’s either missing one or both corners.” 3 He also

found used bags that looked like corners from plastic bags, as described above, in Mr.

White’s vehicle.

              Mr. White informed Sgt. Harper that he was dropping Mr. Garner off at Mr.

Garner’s residence around the corner. Law enforcement did a knock and talk at the

residence, where they encountered Mr. White’s wife along with Cynthia Allen, Mr.

Garner’s significant other. Ms. Allen admitted drugs were inside the house, and law

enforcement subsequently obtained a search warrant for that residence. Law enforcement

found $2,700 cash, 13.6 grams of powdered cocaine, 90 grams of marijuana, 6.7 grams of

crack cocaine, 1.4 grams of suspected heroin, five Suboxone strips, eight oxycodone pills,

two pistols, and two digital scales. Many of these items were in plain view when law

enforcement stepped into the apartment. Some of the crack cocaine was “actively being

cooked” when law enforcement arrived. Sgt. Harper testified that the amounts of

substances found by law enforcement were dealer amounts, or more than personal use

amounts.

              3
                Defense counsel asked Sgt. Harper on cross-examination, “if drug dealers
are cutting bags like this for the purposes of holding drugs and distributing them[,] then by
natural logic any buyer would then come in possession of those same baggies; right?” Sgt.
Harper disagreed, responding “No. Not a sandwich bag with the corner removed because
if you’re buying the drugs and they’re packaged, why would you need to package them
again unless you’re distributing them?”

                                             4
              On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Sgt. Harper if he charged Mr.

White for conspiracy to deliver. When Sgt. Harper confirmed the charge, defense counsel

then asked, “What is your evidence of an agreement or tacit understanding between Mr.

White and Mr. Garner to jointly engage in the distribution of crack?” Sgt. Harper

catalogued the evidence before the circuit court at the time:

                      There’s signs of crack use in his vehicle. There’s
               evidence that crack or some type of [controlled dangerous
               substance] is being packaged inside his vehicle. One subject
               has all of the money [and] crack. The other subject has the car
               with signs of drug use and packaging material inside the car.

                     ....

                     . . . They state that they’re driving from 7-Eleven back
               to Garner’s house. So if his wife is at his house, wouldn’t logic
               say that they left the house and went to 7-Eleven and came
               back? If he was buying crack from Mr. Garner inside the
               vehicle, there was a whole lot of crack already packaged at
               Mr. Garner’s house so why would he need to drive anywhere
               to do a deal when his wife is sitting in plain view of a bunch
               of crack?

              Mr. White’s counsel inquired whether there was any other evidence of

conspiracy, and Sgt. Harper answered that dealers typically “don’t ride around with crack

in their underwear[,]” but they place it there when the police pull them over. Sgt. Harper

explained that fact also contributed to Mr. White’s knowledge that drugs were in his

vehicle.

                                              5
              Defense counsel noted that he did not intend to dispute the allegation in the

petition regarding Mr. White’s use of a controlled substance. Still, the State presented

evidence, and Mr. White’s probation officer testified that in October 2021, he asked Mr.

White whether he had used controlled substances after Mr. White took a drug analysis test

that showed positive results for controlled substances. Mr. White informed the probation

officer that he had not, so the probation officer sent the specimen to the lab for

confirmation. The probation officer explained that the lab results showed that the specimen

was positive for “benzo . . . the metabolite of cocaine.”

              After hearing the evidence and argument from counsel, the circuit court

determined that Mr. White violated conditions of his supervised release, finding by clear

and convincing evidence that Mr. White possessed and used cocaine and conspired to

deliver crack cocaine. The court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Mr. White

to two years imprisonment and explained that upon release he would continue to serve

supervised release until the expiration of his ten-year term. 4 Mr. White now appeals.

              4
               The supervised release statute, West Virginia Code § 62-12-26, entitled
“Extended supervision for certain sex offenders; sentencing; conditions; supervision
provisions; supervision fee,” provides the following regarding the revocation of supervised
release:

                    (h) Modification of conditions or revocation. – The
              court may:
                    ....

                                              6
                                              II.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

              Section 62-12-26 of the West Virginia Code governs the imposition of a

period of supervised release and any subsequent modification or revocation of supervised

release. When considering appeals regarding supervised release revocations or

modifications, this Court has applied assorted standards of review that relate to other

determinations by a circuit court, although the standards applied by this Court have

generally provided for a de novo review for questions of law and challenges to findings of

fact under a clearly erroneous standard. In State v. Hargus, a 2013 consolidated appeal

challenging the constitutionality of revoking a defendant’s supervised release, this Court

recited the standard of review as de novo. Hargus, 232 W. Va. 735, 739, 753 S.E.2d 893,

897 (2013) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, State v. Rutherford, 223 W. Va. 1, 672 S.E.2d 137 (2008)

for the proposition that “‘[t]he constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which this

Court reviews de novo.’”). Two years later, when reviewing consolidated appeals regarding

certain conditions of supervised release in State v. Hedrick, this Court applied the standard

                    (3) Revoke a term of supervised release and require the
              defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised
              release without credit for time previously served on supervised
              release if the court, pursuant to the West Virginia Rules of
              Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation,
              finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
              violated a condition of supervised release, except that a
              defendant whose term is revoked under this subdivision may
              not be required to serve more than the period of supervised
              release[.]

                                              7
of review set forth in Syllabus point 4 of Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W. Va. 178, 469

S.E.2d 114 (1996). 5 Hedrick, 236 W. Va. 217, 223, 778 S.E.2d 666, 672 (2015). The

Burgess standard of review reads as follows: “This Court reviews the circuit court’s final

order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges

to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo.’” Syl. pt. 4, Burgess, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114. 6

             More recently, in State v. Johnny Ray D., No. 20-0009, 2021 WL 3833254

(W. Va. Aug. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision), and State v. Stephens, No. 19-1103, 2021

             5
                The defendant in State v. Hedrick also challenged certain conditions of
supervised release imposed by probation officers. 236 W. Va. 217, 220-21, 778 S.E.2d 666,
669-670 (2015).
             6
               Accord Hedrick, 236 W. Va. at 223, 778 S.E.2d at 672 (citing two criminal
cases that used the standard of review from Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W. Va. 178, 469
S.E.2d 114 (1996): Syl. pt. 1, State v. Messer, 223 W. Va. 197, 672 S.E.2d 333 (2008) (per
curiam) and Syl. pt. 1, State v. Davis, 199 W. Va. 84, 483 S.E.2d 84 (1996) (per curiam)).
In Hedrick, the Court also noted that the appeals derived from the defendant’s original
sentence, so additionally recited the following standard of review:

             [I]n syllabus point 1 of State v. Watkins, 214 W. Va. 477, 590
             S.E.2d 670 (2003), this Court confirmed the following standard
             of review with regard to sentencing orders in criminal cases:
             “‘The Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing
             orders . . . under a deferential abuse of discretion standard,
             unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.’
             Syllabus Point 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496
             S.E.2d 221 (1997).”

236 W. Va. at 223, 778 S.E.2d at 672 (omission in Watkins). See Syl. pt. 1, id. (quoting
Syl. pt. 1, Watkins, 214 W. Va. 477, 590 S.E.2d 670 (per curiam)).

                                            8
WL 1550260 (W. Va. Apr. 20, 2021) (memorandum decision), the defendants challenged

the revocation of their supervised release on multiple grounds. In both cases, this Court

applied the traditional standard of review relating to sentencing, without applying the three-

factor test that the Court used in Hedrick. Both Johnny Ray D. and Stephens noted as the

standard of review that this Court “‘reviews sentencing orders . . . under a deferential abuse

of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.’”

Johnny Ray D., 2021 WL 3833254, at *2 (omission in original) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, in part,

State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)); Stephens, 2021 WL 1550260, at

*3 (same). Both Johnny Ray D. and Stephens also recited Syllabus point 4 of State v.

Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982), stating “‘[s]entences imposed by the

trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are

not subject to appellate review.’” Johnny Ray D., 2021 WL 3833254, at *2 (alterations in

Johnny Ray D.); Stephens, 2021 WL 1550260, at *3 (alterations in Stephens).

              Meanwhile, in a memorandum decision issued between the Johnny Ray D.

and Stevens decisions, the Court applied the same standard to a supervised release

revocation order that this Court applies to the revocation of probation. See State v.

Raymond B., No. 20-0605, 2021 WL 2580715, at *2 (W. Va. June 23, 2021) (memorandum

decision). Raymond B. recited Syllabus point 1 of State v. Duke, 200 W. Va. 356, 489

S.E.2d 738 (1997):

              When reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
              a circuit court sentencing a defendant following a revocation

                                              9
              of probation, we apply a three-pronged standard of review. We
              review the decision on the probation revocation motion under
              an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying facts are
              reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of
              law and interpretations of statutes and rules are subject to a de
              novo review.

Raymond B., 2021 WL 2580715, at *2. Raymond B. also employed the standard of review

found in Syllabus point 1, in part, of Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221. Raymond B.,

2021 WL 2580715, at *2 (noting that sentencing orders are reviewed under a deferential

abuse of discretion standard and quoting Syl. pt. 1, State v. James, 227 W. Va. 407, 710

S.E.2d 98 (2011), a consolidated appeal involving the initial imposition of supervised

release, which also quoted Lucas).

              While the parties in this case cite different precedent, they agree that this

Court (1) should review de novo Mr. White’s assertion of a violation of his constitutional

rights and (2) should review the findings of fact by the circuit court under a clearly

erroneous standard. 7 We agree.

              7
               The State suggested that this Court apply the three-prong standard of review
found in Syllabus point 1 of State v. Duke, 200 W. Va. 356, 489 S.E.2d 738 (1997), relating
to revoking a defendant’s probation. The State also cited the Lucas standard of review,
found in Syllabus point 1 of State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997), which
provides an abuse of discretion standard of review for sentencing orders, and noted that the
Court relied on that standard in Raymond B., No. 20-0605, 2021 WL 2580715, at *2
(W. Va. June 23, 2021) (memorandum decision).

              Similarly, Mr. White suggested that the question of law be reviewed de novo,
citing Syllabus point 1 of State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507 (1996), which
concerned the denial of a Rule 35 motion made pursuant to the West Virginia Rules of

                                             10
              However, given the assorted standards referenced by our earlier opinions and

memorandum decisions, albeit usually similar, we find that we must clarify the standard of

review applicable to our review of a circuit court’s order modifying or revoking a

defendant’s supervised release pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(h). We have set

forth individualized three-prong standards of review for at least two post-conviction

considerations: (1) a circuit court’s revocation of probation, found in Syllabus point 1,

Duke, 200 W. Va. 356, 489 S.E.2d 738, quoted above, and (2) an order concerning a Rule

35 motion made under the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 found in Syllabus

point 1, State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507 (1996). 9 These standards of review

follow the standards listed in Syllabus point 4 of Burgess, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114,

yet are tailored to the post-conviction considerations. Therefore, we now hold that when

Criminal Procedure. Mr. White further suggested that this Court apply the clearly
erroneous standard for the factual findings from Hedrick, 236 W. Va. at 223, 778 S.E.2d
at 672, which partially concerned a revocation of supervised release and borrowed its
standard from Syllabus point 4 of Burgess, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114.
              8
               A Rule 35 motion requests the correction of a sentence or the reduction of
a sentence. See W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35.

              9
                  Syllabus point 1 of Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507, reads as follows:

              In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a
              circuit court concerning an order on a motion made under Rule
              35 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, we apply
              a three-pronged standard of review. We review the decision on
              the Rule 35 motion under an abuse of discretion standard; the
              underlying facts are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
              standard; and questions of law and interpretations of statutes
              and rules are subject to a de novo review.

                                              11
reviewing an order modifying or revoking a defendant’s supervised release under West

Virginia Code § 62-12-26(h), we apply a three-pronged standard of review. We review the

circuit court’s final order and decision to modify or revoke a defendant’s supervised release

under an abuse of discretion standard; we review challenges to findings of fact under a

clearly erroneous standard; and we review questions of law and interpretations of statutes

de novo. 10

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

              After finding that the revocation of Mr. White’s supervised release did not

violate his constitutional rights, we next determine that the circuit court did not clearly err

by finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he conspired to deliver crack cocaine,

in violation of conditions of his supervised release.

                     A. The Constitutionality of a Sentence Imposed
              for Violating the Terms and Conditions of Supervised Release

              Mr. White argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

the probation officer’s petition seeking revocation of his supervised release, and that it

further erred by revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to two years of

              10
                 See Syl. pt. 4, Burgess, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (employing a
similar standard of review in a civil case regarding issues including attorney’s fees and
costs). See also Hedrick, 236 W. Va. at 223, 778 S.E.2d at 672 (applying Burgess three-
part standard of review in an appeal concerning a supervised release revocation).

                                              12
imprisonment. He asserts that the two-year sentence was outside of “the maximum

contemplated by the statutory penalty” of his underlying conviction, and that the court

violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution,

because a judge found the facts determining that he had violated conditions of his

supervised release, rather than a jury applying a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.

              To properly address Mr. White’s arguments, we first briefly discuss

supervised release in West Virginia. The supervised release statute, West Virginia Code

§ 62-12-26, provides that a person convicted of certain sex offenses, including sexual

assault in the third degree, must serve a period of supervised release up to fifty years. 11 The

supervised release period, which is a “part of the sentence imposed at final disposition,”

begins at the latest date of the end of a defendant’s period of probation, incarceration, or

parole supervision. 12 W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(a), (d). The terms of supervised release that

a person must follow include “any or all of the conditions applicable to a person placed

              11
                While the circuit court imposed Mr. White’s original sentence, including
a period of supervised release, in 2018, the Legislature amended West Virginia Code
§ 62-12-26 in 2020 and again in 2021. No substantive changes affect the statute’s
application to Mr. White in this case, although some subsections have been renumbered
since 2018. As the language of the provisions at issue have not changed, we refer to the
2021 version of the statute throughout this opinion.
              12
                 The supervised release period is “‘in addition to any other penalty or
condition imposed by the court.’” Hedrick, 236 W. Va. at 224, 778 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting
W. Va. Code § 62-12-26). See also State v. James, 227 W. Va. 407, 418, 710 S.E.2d 98,
109 (2011) (finding that “§ 62-12-26(a) reflects the legislative intent to impose a new and
additional penalty to the sentence of a person convicted of certain enumerated offenses”).

                                              13
upon probation.” W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(f). If a person violates a condition of his

supervised release, and the circuit court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

violation occurred, the circuit court may revoke the person’s supervised release and require

that the person serve time “in prison.” W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(h)(3). The statute does not

require the court to impose any minimum term of imprisonment.

              Mr. White relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348,

147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186

L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), and United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 204

L. Ed. 2d 897 (2019), for the proposition that he has already served the maximum time

applicable to his underlying sexual assault conviction and, without a jury trial, he cannot

be sentenced to additional incarceration related to his supervised release revocation. He

argues that the additional sentence of two years imprisonment violates his rights under the

Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree.

              In Apprendi,     the   United    States   Supreme Court considered the

constitutionality of a defendant’s sentence where a charged crime had a ten-year statutory

maximum term of imprisonment, yet a judge-found enhancement increased the potential

term of imprisonment. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. The state court

sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment on that count, and the defendant

appealed the enhanced sentence. Id. at 471, 120 S. Ct. at 2352. See id. at 474, 120 S. Ct. at

                                              14
2354. The Supreme Court determined that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 470, 120 S. Ct. at

2362-63. The Supreme Court explained that, with the exception of a prior conviction, “‘[i]t

is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that

increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is

equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 119 S. Ct.

1215, 1228-29, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

              Following the reasoning of Apprendi, the Supreme Court in Alleyne held that

an element increasing a mandatory minimum sentence must also be submitted to the jury.

Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114-15, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 (“When a finding of fact alters the legally

prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of

a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.”).

              Most recently, in Haymond, the Supreme Court considered a mandatory

sentencing provision in the federal supervised release statutory scheme, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(k), and determined that it violated the defendant’s rights under the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments. See Haymond, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2373 (plurality opinion).

Section 3583(k) required a judge considering the revocation of a defendant’s supervised

                                             15
release to “impose an additional prison term of at least five years and up to life without

regard to the length of the prison term authorized for the defendant’s initial crime of

conviction” if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant, while

on supervised release, committed one of several enumerated offenses. Haymond, 588 U.S.

at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2374 (plurality opinion). Upon revocation, the defendant in Haymond

“faced a minimum of five years in prison instead of as little as none.” Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct.

at 2378.

              When considering the constitutionality of § 3583(k), the Haymond plurality

“emphasized the ‘structural difference’ between traditional parole, which operated as a

form of conditional liberty, and supervised release, which was introduced ‘only to

encourage rehabilitation after the completion of [a defendant’s] prison term.’” United

States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 295 (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Haymond, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 (plurality opinion)). The Haymond plurality

determined that the difference between parole and supervised release “‘bears constitutional

consequences’—namely, the inability to circumvent the historically significant jury right.”

Id. (quoting Haymond, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 (plurality opinion)) (discussing

plurality opinion). In explaining the Haymond decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals concisely explained that “[t]o the [Haymond] plurality, this is also an obvious

outgrowth of the Apprendi line of cases, which has held that any element that necessarily

increases the minimum or maximum prison sentence must be proven to a jury beyond a

                                             16
reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, and Alleyne, 570

U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151). Still, as this Court has recognized, the plurality also noted that

its decision was “limited to § 3583(k)—an unusual provision enacted little more than a

decade ago—and the Alleyne problem raised by its 5-year mandatory minimum term of

imprisonment.” Haymond, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2383 (plurality opinion). Accord

State v. Edward B., No. 19-1026, 2020 WL 7231608, at *4 (W. Va. Dec. 7, 2020)

(memorandum decision) (quoting same).

              Despite the plurality’s consideration of Apprendi and Alleyne, the controlling

decision in the Haymond case is Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Justice Breyer’s

concurrence “presented the narrowest grounds for the Court’s holding and therefore

controls.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 295 (citing cases including Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.

188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977), to explain the relationship between

Justice Breyer’s concurrence and the plurality opinion). 13 Justice Breyer’s concurrence

“departed from the plurality in two key ways: it found that supervised release is not so

different from traditional parole, and that Apprendi and Alleyne do not apply in the

supervised release context.” Id. (citing Haymond, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2385

              13
                 “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . .’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990, 993,
51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977) (omission in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 n.15, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.)).

                                             17
(Breyer, J., concurring)). Instead, Justice Breyer explained that “[r]evocation of supervised

release is typically understood as ‘part of the penalty for the initial offense.’” Haymond,

588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 529 U.S. 694, 700, 120 S. Ct. 1795, 1800, 146 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2000)). Justice Breyer,

however, concurred in the judgment that § 3583(k) was unconstitutional and noted that that

§ 3583(k) appeared “more like punishment for a new offense, to which the jury right would

typically attach” rather than a sanction for a “breach of trust.” Haymond, 558 U.S. at ___,

139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring) (setting forth three reasons why § 3583(k)

seemed “more like a punishment for a new offense”).

              Mr. White argues on appeal that he had already served the maximum

sentence for the underlying conviction and, pursuant to Apprendi, Alleyne, and Haymond,

cannot be sentenced to additional imprisonment without a jury trial. However, none of the

cases cited by Mr. White stand for the proposition that the sentence of a term of

imprisonment, which resulted from the revocation of his supervised release pursuant to

West Virginia Code § 62-12-26, was unconstitutional. The mandatory minimum term of

imprisonment in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), based upon judge-found facts, resulted in the United

State Supreme Court’s finding of unconstitutionality in United States v. Haymond, 588

U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2369. Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), West Virginia’s supervised release

revocation statute has no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, based upon a factual

                                             18
finding made by a judge, that increases a defendant’s period of incarceration. See W. Va.

Code § 62-12-26.

              While Mr. White’s argument ignores the narrowing effect of Justice Breyer’s

concurring opinion on the plurality’s opinion in Haymond, even the plurality opinion fails

to deliver the result that Mr. White seeks. We have recognized multiple times that the

Haymond plurality limited its finding of unconstitutionality to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) and its

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, rather than broadening its finding to the entire

federal supervised release scheme. See State v. Black, No. 20-0244, 2021 WL 3833716, at

*3-4 (W. Va. Aug. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision); State v. Raymond B., No. 20-0605,

2021 WL 2580715, at *2 (W. Va. Jun. 23, 2021) (memorandum decision); 14 Edward B.,

2020 WL 7231608, at *4. Consistent with our determination in Black, we find that Mr.

White’s “reliance on Haymond for the proposition that he is entitled to a jury trial on his

supervised release revocation” is “misplaced.” See Black, 2021 WL 3833716, at *4. We do

              14
                 To the extent that Mr. White argues that our memorandum decision in
Raymond B. is actually a probation revocation case and should be afforded no
consideration, he is incorrect. See generally State v. Raymond B., No. 20-0605, 2021 WL
2580715 (W. Va. June 23, 2021) (memorandum decision). However, this confusion is
understandable, as the memorandum decision inaccurately refers to revocation of probation
when it instead contemplates a revocation of supervised release under West Virginia Code
§ 62-12-26. Certainly, § 62-12-26(h)(3) provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
applicable to a court revoking probation also apply to a court finding a violation of a
condition of supervised release. See W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(h)(3). See also W. Va. R.
Crim. P. 32.1 (titled “Revocation or modification of probation”). However, probation and
supervised release are distinct. Compare W. Va. Code § 62-12-2 (regarding eligibility for
probation), and § 62-12-3 (regarding suspension of sentence and release on probation),
with W. Va. Code § 62-12-26 (regarding extended supervised release for sex offenders).

                                            19
not extend the Haymond Court’s finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) is unconstitutional to

West Virginia Code § 62-12-26, as § 62-12-26 does not provide that the court must

sentence the defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. For these reasons,

we hold that United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 204 L. Ed. 2d 897

(2019), does not apply to a supervised release revocation pursuant to West Virginia Code

§ 62-12-26 because § 62-12-26 does not require a mandatory minimum sentence upon

revocation.

              We also reject Mr. White’s contention that Apprendi and its progeny prohibit

aggregate sentences for his original and revocation sentences that exceed the maximum

sentence of his underlying conviction. See United States v. Oxenham, No. 22-4048, 2022

WL 7973429, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (per curiam) (“Indeed, [defendant’s] argument

that Apprendi prohibits aggregate original and revocation sentences that exceed the

statutory maximum for the underlying crime of conviction has been rejected by multiple

[federal] circuits that have considered the issue post-Haymond.”). 15 In West Virginia, a

revocation of supervised release is “simply . . . a continuation of the legal consequences of

              15
                The Oxenham court cited United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1265-69
(11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Childs, 17 F.4th 790, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2021); United
States v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 810, 211
L. Ed. 2d. 503 (2022); and United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2021),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 321, 211 L. Ed. 2d. 157 (2021), in support of its holding rejecting
the defendant’s aggregate sentences argument. See United States v. Oxenham, No. 22-
4048, 2022 WL 7973429, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (per curiam).

                                             20
a defendant’s original crime.” State v. Hargus, 232 W. Va. 735, 743, 753 S.E.2d 893, 901

(2013). The revocation sanction is “part of a single sentencing scheme arising from the

defendant’s original conviction.” 16 Id. See also Syl. pt. 11, in part, State v. James, 227

W. Va. 407, 710 S.E.2d 98 (2011) (describing supervised release as a “legislatively

mandated additional punishment” that is “an inherent part of the sentencing scheme for

certain offenses”).

              We therefore determine that the circuit court did not err by denying Mr.

White’s motion to dismiss the petition or by sentencing Mr. White to a term of

imprisonment without holding a jury trial when revoking his supervised release.

              B. Mr. White’s Substantive Violation of a Term of Supervised Release

              Mr. White also contends that the circuit court erred by finding, by clear and

convincing evidence, that he conspired to deliver crack cocaine, in violation of conditions

of his supervised release. 17 See W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(h)(3) (requiring that a court find

             16
                 We also recognize that Mr. White’s argument, if successful, would
effectively eviscerate the supervised release scheme in West Virginia, often resulting in a
circuit court having to hold a jury trial for a violation of a condition of supervised release.
We agree with Justice Breyer’s contention that, “in light of the potentially destabilizing
consequences, I would not transplant the Apprendi line of cases to the supervised-release
context.” United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2385, 204
L. Ed. 2d 897 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring).

              Mr. White admitted to violating at least one of his conditions of supervised
              17

release—using crack cocaine. However, because the circuit court based its sentence on

                                              21
“by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised

release” before revoking his supervised release). We reject Mr. White’s argument and find

that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. White violated this condition of

supervised release and by revoking his term of supervised release.

              “In order for the State to prove a conspiracy under W. Va. Code, 61-10-31(1),

it must show that the defendant agreed with others to commit an offense against the State

and that some overt act was taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect the object of

that conspiracy.” Syl. pt. 4, State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 294 S.E.2d 62 (1981). The same

requirement applies in the context of a supervised release revocation hearing when the

defendant is accused of violating his supervised release terms and conditions by

participating in a criminal conspiracy. See W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(h)(3). The agreement

need not be formal, and “may be inferred from the words and actions of the conspirators,

or other circumstantial evidence.” Less, 170 W. Va. at 265, 294 S.E.2d at 67. The overt act

may be committed by anyone in the conspiracy, and each coconspirator does not have to

commit an overt act. Id.

              Here, ample evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that clear and

convincing evidence showed that Mr. White conspired to deliver crack cocaine in violation

“violations of supervised release”—both the violation of use and the violation of
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance—we will review Mr. White’s substantive
argument.

                                              22
of a term of his supervised release. In addition to the evidence in Mr. White’s vehicle of

the personal use of crack cocaine (remnants of the copper scrub pads used to pack crack

pipes), his vehicle contained a bag with a removed corner, which Sgt. Harper testified was

evidence of “packaging crack cocaine to sell.” Sgt. Harper also testified that with Mr.

White, in his vehicle, was Mr. Garner, who possessed dealer amounts of crack cocaine and

cash on his person. While Mr. White and Mr. Garner drove around together with the large

amounts of crack cocaine, Mr. White’s wife remained at Mr. Garner’s residence with Ms.

Allen, where crack cocaine was being prepared in plain view, and where officers recovered

many other controlled substances and firearms. Mr. White admitted that he intended to

return to that residence, purportedly to drop off Mr. Garner.

              While Mr. White argues that nothing proves that Mr. White and his wife were

not just buying drugs from Mr. Garner, a conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine can be

inferred from the evidence. The circuit court, in making its findings, specifically observed

that Sgt. Harper testified regarding the quantity of drugs and cash on Mr. Garner, who was

with Mr. White, and that Mr. White’s wife was back at Mr. Garner’s residence where drugs

were being processed. We give deference to the factual findings of the circuit court when

the findings are based on the credibility of witnesses. See Syl. pt. 3, in part, State v. Stuart,

192 W. Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994) (noting that, in the context of suppression hearings,

“factual findings based, at least in part, on determinations of witness credibility are

accorded great deference”). We find that the court did not err as there was sufficient

                                               23
evidence on the record to support the court’s conclusion that Mr. White was engaged in a

conspiracy to deliver crack cocaine. See State v. Moore, No. 18-0786, 2020 WL 533113,

at *5 (W. Va. Feb. 3, 2020) (memorandum decision) (finding sufficient evidence of a

conspiracy at a trial when defendant had packaged marijuana in his vehicle, a large amount

of cash, and a firearm).

                                           IV.

                                      CONCLUSION

              For the reasons stated above, this Court affirms the February 16, 2022 order

finding that Mr. White violated the conditions of his supervised release and sentencing him

to a two-year term of imprisonment.

                                                                                Affirmed.

                                            24