Court Opinion

ID: 9754464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:03.449777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.861209
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Doyle:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that Petitioner was demoted. In applying the definition of demotion found at Section 3(r) of the State Civil Service Act,1 to the present case, the majority writes:
[T]he fact that petitioners current rate of compensation remained the same is irrelevant to determining whether he was demoted. What is important is that the maximum salary for a Traffic Control Specialist Supervisor during the time *154when petitioner was reassigned was higher than the maximum salary for a Traffic Control Specialist. . . .
Thus, the majority opinion, in deciding whether a change to a position in a class carrying a lower maximum salary has occurred, compares only the maximum salaries of the two pay ranges in question. This cannot be the correct comparison because every time an employee is reclassified downward, the maximum salary in the reclassified position will always be less than the maximum salary in the pre-reclassified position. Yet, reclassification downward is specifically authorized in Commission Regulation 99.42, 4 Pa. Code §99.42.
The facts in the present case reveal that the Petitioner and another employee, who was also classified as a Traffic Control Specialist Supervisor, were reclassified downward as the result of an extensive classification and organizational survey conducted over a ten day period in October of 1983 by the Department of Transportations Bureau of Personnel. The survey report, dated November 17, 1983, recommended the reclassification of thirteen employees in Engineering District 4-0, which district had just undergone a reorganization.2 Pe*155titioner had been notified by letter in August of 1984 that his position had been “reallocated downward to the Traffic Control Specialist class,” effective August 8, 1984, although he was to retain his current salary and civil service status. The letter reassured Petitoner “that this reallocation is not reflective of your performance, but is based solely on the classification review.”
In Davis v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 199 (1959), the Court, in examining reclassification downward, was concerned with three different groupings of employees. The first group is not pertinent to our discussions here; the other two are. In the second group, an employee was reclassified from a higher level position in which she was being paid the maximum salary to a position carrying a lower maximum salary. But she was held not to have suffered a demotion because “there was no change in her status, for she continued to receive the same salary, and this amount was the highest . . . which she could have attained in her old classification.” Id. at 205. In the third group, the employees pre-reclassification salary was $120.00 below the maximum salary at the time of her reclassification. The Court noted that her reclassification operated to deny her the $120.00 anticipated increase or merit increment. Despite this, the Court held that “a careful reading of the act, . . . leads us unmistakably to the conclusion that where the change is the result of a general classification or reclassification by the [proper authority][3] there is no demotion, regardless of *156what effect such . . . reclassification might have on an individual employe.” Id. at 205. This is still good law.
In a more recent opinion we held that Commission regulation 99.42 is a valid exercise of the Commissions power, Wetzel v. State Civil Service Commission, 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 47, 465 A.2d 69 (1983).4 We have also recently sustained the implementation of the reclassification procedures. Johnson v. Department of General Services, 91 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 96, 496 A.2d 1268 (1985). Additionally, we held in Carr v. Department of Public Welfare, 72 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 78, 456 A.2d 240 (1983), that where, as here, there is no loss in salary there is no demotion.
If, in feet, a personnel action has occurred here it must be a reclassification downward. Jurisdiction over classification issues rests with the Executive Board. Carr (citing Gorton v. State Civil Service Commission, 35 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 319, 385 A.2d 1026 (1978)). See also Orage v. Office of Administration, 85 Pa. Com*157monwealth Ct. 497, 482 A.2d 1174 (1984) (holding that due process rights attach to an appeal from reclassification taken before the Executive Board). The Commission may hear a reclassification action only upon an allegation of discrimination. I agree with the majority that no such allegation has been properly set forth and because in addition no demotion has occurred, I would affirm the Commissions order.

 Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, 71 P.S. §741.3(r). We note that Purdons Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated has incorrectly reported the definition of demotion. The original definition appearing in Section 3(s) of the Civil Service Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752 read: “ ‘Demotion means a change in status to a position in a class carrying a lower maximum salary.” This definition was redesignated Section 3(r), and amended by Section 1 of the Act of August 27, 1963, P.L. 1257 to read as follows, “ ‘Demotion means a change to a position in a class carrying a lower maximum salary.” Purdons has incorrectly printed the brackets [], and the words “in status” within those brackets, which the amendatory act of 1963 deleted and excised from the law. This incorrect pronouncement of the law has since been incorrectly published in case law. See, e.g., Sterling v. Department of Environmental Resources, 504 Pa. 7, 470 A.2d 101, (1983); Wetzel v. State Civil Service Commission, 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 47, 365 A.2d 69 (1983).

 The ten page organization survey report recommended, inter alia:
This new organization structure for traffic appears to be a move in the right direction for better utilization of employes and alignment of functions. However, it does require the downward reclassification of two Traffic Control Specialist Supervisors, Messrs J McHale and J Culkin. Both employes no longer have supervisory responsibilities, and their new duties are properly allocable to the Traffic Control Specialist classifications.
Mr McHale will be assisting municipalities in obtaining federal funding for traffic-related items such as the Pavement Markings and the Highway Signing Update Programs. Mr Culkin will be coordinating traffic control *155studies pertaining to speed limits, accident investigations, warning signing, permit investigations, school student walking routes, and will review requests for route approvals for the new 48-foot/single, 28-foot twin trailer program.

 The exact wording of the opinion states, “If such change in her status had been brought about by the authority appointing her [instead of the State Civil Service Commission], it could be said that she had been demoted as defined by the act. . . ” Id. at 205. *156The law has since changed and it is no longer the Commission that adopts or implements a reclassification, but the appointing authority itself. See Commission Rule 99.42; Wetzel, 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 52, 465 A.2d at 71. (“The appointing authority had the right to reclassify. . . .”) (Emphasis added.)

 In Wetzel, a case involving a demotion in lieu of furlough, we held that the demotion was indeed “voluntary.” The precise issue of whether a reclassification downward without a reduction in pay constituted a demotion was not reached. We stated:
We do not hereby hold that a reclassification downward without a reduction in pay is a demotion. We are treating Petitioners acceptance of her reclassification as a demotion for purposes of this appeal because the parties and the Commission have analyzed it as such. Petitioner agreed to accept her reclassification through the option given her to elect a voluntary demotion. We see no need to determine whether in feet this was a demotion since it has been consistently treated as one.
Id. at 51 n.5, 465 A.2d at 71 n.5.