Court Opinion

ID: 9479861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:30:42.033961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:19.200128
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority acknowledges that the note at the end of the verdict form was confusing; so confusing, in fact, that the district judge read it one way at trial, only to reach a radically different interpretation a few months later. The majority even goes so far as to recommend that the form as it is now written not be used in future eases. Nevertheless, the court is unable to conclude that use of the form was improper here.
If the district court had given an appropriate instruction that the plaintiffs fault would not reduce his recovery under the strict liability claim, I might be less concerned about the verdict form. The majority points out that the trial judge instructed the jury to find the total amount of damages “disregarding any fault on the part of the plaintiff” and that the jury was told the plaintiffs recovery for negligence would be reduced by the percentage of his fault. These directives, however, provided no guidance on whether the plaintiffs fault would affect his recovery under the strict liability claim. The jury could have understood and followed all of its instructions and still have logically interpreted the note on the verdict form to mean that the plaintiffs recovery under strict liability would be reduced by the percentage of his fault. In these circumstances, I do not believe that the “charge as a whole ... state[d] the governing law fairly.” Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.1986).
There is another troublesome aspect to this case. The majority summarily dismisses without discussing the defendant’s argument that the district court should have defined the term “defective condition” in instructing the jury regarding the strict liability theory. The trial judge described in explicit detail what would constitute negligence on the part of the defendant and the plaintiff. See, e.g., Instruction No. 14 (instructing jury to assess a percentage of fault to the defendant if at the time the coal conveyor was sold, the conveyor “had an in-running nip point and shear edge at the transfer chute and was therefore dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated”); Instruction No. 16 (“The term ‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ as used in these instructions with respect to Todd Gander means the failure to use that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent coal conveyor operator would use under the same or similar circumstances.”). In contrast, the district court gave no description of what facts would warrant a finding that the conveyor was sold in a “defective condition,” as required by the strict liability theory. Given that the district court’s ultimate decision regarding the plaintiff’s recovery was based on the outcome of the strict liability claim without any regard to the jury’s findings on the negligence cause of action, it is ironic that the jury had such explicit instructions regarding what particular facts would constitute negligence while being left with no guidance at all regarding the definition of a “defective condition.” 1
*1385Concededly it might be permissible for a trial judge not to give an instruction regarding the definition of a “defective condition” in a single issue products liability action involving a simple consumer good. Yet I cannot agree that a jury may be left with no guidance at all on the definition in a case involving factory equipment with which few typical jurors can be expected to be familiar, and in a case where negligence is defined and the jury can infer from the verdict form that recovery on either negligence, strict liability, or both will be reduced by the percentage of plaintiff's fault.
I recognize that the plaintiff suffered a grievous injury that might warrant a two-million dollar damage award. I am concerned, however, that the award be the result of a verdict which is free of the taints that affect the one here. Thus, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the Missouri approved jury instructions (MAI) require that the jury not be given a definition of "defective condition.” See Nessel*1385rode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 378 & n. 11 (Mo.1986) (en banc); see also Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo.Ct.App.1984). We have held, however, the MAI provide only guidance, not binding authority, for the giving of instructions in a federal diversity case. See, e.g., Bersett v. K-Mart Corp., 869 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir.1989); cf. Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir.1988) (rejecting argument that Nesselrode reasoning prohibited the district court in a diversity case from defining the term "unreasonably dangerous” as used in a strict liability instruction).