Court Opinion

ID: 9444282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:55:04.823912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:47.739803
License: Public Domain

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
No time need be spent in endeavoring to prove or disprove that the Welborn decision is to be accepted as the law of Illinois. Assuming that it is the case has no application here. The policy in Welborn was for garage liability. It specifically included in its coverage the use of the designated premises “for the purpose of an automobile dealer or repair shop, and all operations either on the premises or elsewhere which are necessary and incidental *611thereto, including repairs of automobiles or their parts * * [347 Ill.App. 65, 106 N.E.2d 143.] A later exclusion clause stated that the coverage did not extend “to property owned by, rented to, in charge of, or transported by the insured.” In that matter while a gas tank was being removed from a customer’s car by a garage employee the gas ignited causing damage to the automobile. The garage was held responsible for the damage and claimed that the occurrence was within its above policy. The court upheld that contention on the theory that, as it stated, “The precise wording of the general exclusion provision appears to be in direct conflict with the specifically defined operations which are declared covered.”
That is not the situation before us. The policy at issue is one for a contractor’s liability. It generally covered “all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.” It went on to state its particular exceptions to that general coverage and specifically excluded “property in the care, custody or control of the Insured.”
The Welborn principle that explicit coverage cannot be avoided by later general exclusion does not solve our problem. What we have is a policy that starts off with a general statement of coverage and then follows with certain carefully stated exceptions. There is no ambiguity about the document in whole or in part. The Illinois law on that sort of policy language is in accord with the firmly settled doctrine that it must be construed as it plainly reads.1 Nor can the Welborn court’s interpretation of the phrase “in charge of” be taken from the restrictive pattern presented by the facts there to control the utterly different circumstances of the issue before us where instead of a risk being specially assumed it is specially excluded.
There is nothing mysterious about the policy in suit. The insured received what it paid for. It it had desired further protection it could have readily obtained that for a further commensurate premium. The policy is the insured’s contract, clear on its face. The coverage now sought was distinctly eliminated from the agreement the insured purchased because that kind of insurance was not included for the premium paid. That is the plain intent of the policy as gathered from its four corners. This action is based solely on that complete unambiguous contract. It offers no excuse for going off the agreement; certainly not for speculation as to what kind of insurance Foster would want. The only other reason for the decision of the district court, now affirmed, was its reliance upon the Wel-born opinion giving an ownership status to the phrase “in charge of”. As already indicated, I think it sound law that Welborn does not control this litigation and it is not only sound but salutary that the above connotation Wel-born attempts to attribute to the “in charge of” phrase be confined to the Welborn type of insurance contract. The language of the suit policy “in the care, custody or control of the insured” instead of being so misinterpreted “requires only that the insured be in ‘control’ of the property actually injured * * *.” Judge Augustus Hand, Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Mason-Moore-Tracy, Inc., 2 Cir., 1952, 194 F. 2d 173, 174.
It was a forty-five ton grinder which was being moved not by its owner but by Foster, the expert called in for the purpose. The district judge concedes that Foster had physical possession of the grinder at the time of the accident. He had been hired to install it for the *612reason that he was skilled in that kind of task. But because he did not own the grinder the district court, upheld by the majority opinion, says that he did not control it. That is contrary to the fact, contrary to the ordinary definition of control quoted by appellee2 and contrary to settled decisional law. The Hardware Mutual case above mentioned on its facts is very similar to the present issue; it should be persuasive. And see Speirs & Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 1948, 84 Cal.App.2d 603, 191 P.2d 124; Guidici v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 1947, 79 Cal.App.2d 128, 179 P.2d 337; State Automobile Mutual Ins. Co. v. Connable-Joest, Inc., 1939,174 Tenn. 377, 125 S.W.2d 490; Root Motor Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 1932, 187 Minn. 559, 246 N.W. 118; Vaughan v. Home Indemnity Co., 1952, 86 Ga.App. 196, 71 S.E.2d 111.
I think the judgment in favor of Foster and against Hartford should be reversed.

. Zitnik v. Burick, 1946, 395 Ill. 182, 69 N.E.2d 888; Dempsey v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1949, 404 Ill. 423, 88 N.E.2d 874; Lentin v. Continental Assurance Co., 1952, 412 Ill. 158, 105 N.E.2d 735.

. “Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, direct, govern, administer or oversee”. Black’s Law Dictionary, page 428.