Court Opinion

ID: 9584538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:49:42.601654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:23.050053
License: Public Domain

Judge WYNN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. I instead conclude that the release signed by plaintiff, by its own terms, does not bar her from pursuing her Woodson claim and that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment against plaintiff.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that in the course of her employment with defendant she was injured by defendant’s hydraulic drill press and that defendant knew the machine was unsafe and dangerous but still ordered plaintiff to operate it. Defendant moved for summary judgment pleading the “Agreement for Final Compromise Settlement and Release,” which plaintiff signed, as a bar to plaintiff’s action.
In order to prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party must meet the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party meets this burden by (1) proving that an essential element of the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party (2) cannot produce evidence to support an essen*329tial element of his or her claim, or (3) cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982). If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the opposing party does not have to respond and summary judgment should be denied. Brown v. Fulford, 311 N.C. 205, 316 S.E.2d 220 (1984); Steel Creek Development Corp. v. James, 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
A release executed by an injured party based on valuable consideration is generally a complete defense to an action for damages for such injuries. Miller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 295, 435 S.E.2d 537 (1993). What a release means depends upon the executing parties’ intent which is determined from the language used, the parties’ situation and the objectives they sought to accomplish. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen v. Syntek Finance Corp., 92 N.C. App. 708, 375 S.E.2d 689, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 433, 379 S.E.2d 243 (1989). When the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release are not in dispute and its terms are free from ambiguity, its meaning is for the court to determine. Miller, 112 N.C. App. at 301, 435 S.E.2d at 542. “Where a written agreement is explicit, the court must so declare, irrespective of what either party thought the effect of the contract to be.” McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 8, 136 S.E.2d 218, 223 (1964).
In the instant case, the release states in pertinent part:
Now, THEREFORE, Loretta Owens, for and in consideration of the compensation payment herein recited and the medical benefits which shall be paid upon approval of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby remise, release and forever discharge the said W. K. Deal Printing, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company of and from any and all and every manner of action and actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, dues and sums of money, judgments, demands and claims whatsoever, which against W. K. Deal Printing, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company she ever had or may now have, or which her heirs, next of kin or personal representatives, or any other person whomsoever, hereafter can, shall or may have by reason of or growing out of the terms and provisions of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act on account of the alleged injury, which gives rise to this claim for compen*330sation, and for any other disability or medical expenses sustained by her.
(Emphasis added).
By its own terms, the release only bars plaintiff from pursuing any action under the terms of the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97. The release does not bar plaintiff from pursuing a tort action. Woodson v. Rowland held that when an employer intentionally engages in conduct which the employer knew was substantially certain to cause injury, the employee may pursue a civil action against the employer. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). This conduct must be so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort. Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993). The employee may also pursue any workers’ compensation claims which arise from the same accident but is only entitled to one recovery. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
The release signed by plaintiff only addresses her claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act and does not bar her from pursuing a Woodson tort action. Defendant thus failed to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and this case must be reversed.
The majority’s analysis is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Woodson. The majority reasons that because the release agreement states that plaintiff’s injury was accidental, defendant has met its burden of proof and is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces evidence her injury resulted from defendant’s tortious conduct. In Woodson, however, the Supreme Court held that “accident” under the Workers’ Compensation Act means “ ‘(1) an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured employee; (2) a result produced by a fortuitous cause.’ ” Woodson, 329 N.C. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962)). The Court in Woodson then reasoned:
From the standpoint of the injured party, an injury intentionally inflicted by another can nonetheless at the same time be an “unlooked for and untoward event . . . not expected or designed by the injured employee.” Harding, 256 N.C. at *331428, 124 S.E.2d at 110. It is, therefore, not inherently inconsistent to assert that an injury caused by the same conduct was both the result of an accident, giving rise to the remedies provided by the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, and an intentional tort, making the exclusivity provision of the Act unavailable to bar a civil action.
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
Woodson clearly holds that a plaintiffs injury can be both an accident for the purposes of workers’ compensation and the result of an intentional tort committed by the defendant employer. In the instant case, in order for defendant to prevail on its motion for summary judgment, it must negate plaintiff’s allegation that its conduct was substantially certain to cause injury. See Dunleavy v. Yates Construction Co., Inc., 106 N.C. App. 146, 416 S.E.2d 193, disc. rev. denied, 332 N.C. 343, 421 S.E.2d 146 (1992) (Summary judgment properly entered for the defendant when his forecast of evidence revealed his conduct did not manifest reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff nor did it amount to the intentional failure to carry out a duty of care owed to the plaintiff). Merely pleading the release signed by plaintiff is insufficient, since the release does not bar plaintiff from pursuing a tort action.
The majority concludes, however, that based upon the release and defendant’s answer which alleged that plaintiff did not operate the hydraulic press properly, defendant had shifted the burden to plaintiff to produce evidence that her injury was the result of an intentional tort. Defendant’s allegation stated:
[A]t the time the Plaintiff was operating the machine that she was not operating the machine pursuant to the instructions that were given to her, or that she was not operating the machine in a safe and prudent manner; that in addition thereto, it is alleged upon information and belief that the Plaintiff was operating the machine under the influence of prescription medication, and that these acts constitute a bar to any recovery.
The nonmoving party does not bear the burden of coming forward with evidence in support of his claim, however, until the moving party has offered evidence which negates that claim. Mace v. Bryant Constr. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 297, 269 S.E.2d 191 (1980); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975); Whitely v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974). Defendant’s *332unverified allegation, upon which the majority relies, is an allegation of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577 (1956). Therefore, I conclude that defendant did not shift the burden over to plaintiff to supply evidence in support of her claim and that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against plaintiff should be reversed. I respectfully dissent.