Court Opinion

ID: 9699566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:34:06.436219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:53.327500
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
The probative value of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth of the fire in the adjoining building on January 9 was so far outweighed by its potential for prejudice to appellant that it ought to have been excluded. Therefore, I dissent.
In my view, “ ‘ “[ejvidence of other offenses may be received if relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.” ’ ” Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 594, 342 A.2d 84, 92 (1975) (concurring opinion), quoting Commonwealth v. Boykin, 450 Pa. 25, 33, 298 A.2d 258, 262 (1972) (concurring opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Jones, C. J.). Furthermore, “evidence of other offenses is subject, as is all relevant evidence, to exclusion if its probative value is outweighed by ‘the danger that the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury’s emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy.’ ” Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, at 462 Pa. 594, 342 A.2d at 92 (concurring opinion). See also Fed.R.Evid. 403, 404(b); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 185, at 438-39 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
In this case I need not speculate, as does the majority, to what issues the evidence of the other fire was relevant, for I conclude that, when one strikes the balance of probative value and risk of prejudice, the result must be exclusion. The balance swings to the side of exclusion *604because the probative value of the evidence of the other fire, when properly considered and regardless of its relevance, is exceedingly slight.
For the “other fire” evidence to be probative of anything at all relevant to the January 11 fire, it would have to be concluded that appellant started the January 9 fire intentionally. But there was no evidence from which this could have been inferred. The Commonwealth concedes that the “other fire” evidence proves no more than that appellant “lit several matches to see where he was. going. As a result of lighting these matches, he started a fire which consumed the premises.” Brief for Appellee at 3-4. Only pure speculation on the part of the jury could have supplied the element of intent, for the evidence surely did not. I must conclude that the “other fire” evidence, properly considered and without speculation, proves little or nothing relevant to the January 11 fire.
When this exceedingly insubstantial probative value is balanced against the great risk that the jury would conclude that appellant was by nature a “firebug” and for that reason find him guilty of the January 11 fire, the balance swings toward the side of exclusion.
I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissent.