Court Opinion

ID: 9585438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:27.304373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:08.753042
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
It was a close question in this case whether the defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff were slanderous per se. See Nelson v. Rosenberg, 135 Neb. 34, 280 N.W. 229 (1938). If the statements were not slanderous per se, the plaintiff failed to make a jury question because there was no allegation or proof of special damages. If it was necessary to use an innuendo, it was just as necessary to allege and prove that special damages resulted from the use of the words. Nelson v. Rosenberg, supra.
In this case witnesses for the plaintiff were allowed to testify not only as to the defamatory statements attributed to the defendants but also, over objection, as to their understanding and interpretation of the statements. This evidence was both irrelevant and prejudicial. It permitted the plaintiff to *122improperly enlarge and embellish his case without pleading or proving special damages.
“[WJhere an innuendo is necessary to make the meaning of alleged slanderous statements clear and understandable, such statements are not slanderous per seL Hudson v. Schmid, 132 Neb. 583, 585, 272 N.W. 406, 408 (1937). See, also, Nelson v. Rosenberg, supra; Davis v. Meyer, 115 Neb. 251, 253, 212 N.W. 435, 436 (1927) (“words, spoken and published of another, which are not obviously defamatory, will not support an action for damages, unless, by innuendo or otherwise, special damages are pleaded and proved”).
In a case involving slander per se, the plaintiff is not required to prove damages, because damages are presumed. Hutchens v. Kuker, 168 Neb. 451, 96 N.W.2d 228 (1959). The plaintiff was allowed to obtain the benefit of this rule and then reinforce his case with inadmissible testimony as to the understanding, impressions, and assumptions made by his witnesses concerning the statements. The evidence was prejudicial under the circumstances of this case.
Error in the admission of evidence is presumed to be prejudicial unless it clearly appears from the record that it did not affect unfavorably the party against whom it was admitted. First Baptist Church v. State, 178 Neb. 831, 135 N.W.2d 756 (1965). The admission of testimony wrongfully received in a case tried to a jury is prejudicial error where it may have influenced the verdict. Witte v. Lisle, 184 Neb. 742, 171 N.W.2d 781 (1969).
The testimony by the witnesses Stiles and DeGoler that they understood the statements to attack the plaintiff’s integrity and charge him with theft may well have influenced the jury in reaching its verdict.
The judgment should have been reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Hastings and Caporale, JJ., join in this dissent.