Court Opinion

ID: 9720168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:18:49.285286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:13.891264
License: Public Domain

*449KLINE, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority gives lip service but does not genuinely adhere to the applicable standard of review. Indulging all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s findings, they must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Applying the standard properly, it seems to me inescapable that the trial court’s finding of reckless disregard for the truth as to all three misrepresentations in the affidavit is supported by substantial evidence and that, when redacted to reflect the true facts, the affidavit does not establish probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.1
The trial court found that Olivares acted recklessly in stating that three men, rather than one, were loading the truck, that “unk. type equipment” was being loaded into the truck, and that the garage light was out but the subjects were using a flashlight. As the majority concedes, the recklessness finding as to the statement regarding “three males” is supported by substantial evidence, as Detective Smith had expressly reported to Olivares that one man was loading the truck. The majority then goes on to conclude that although “the existence of one deliberate misstatement in an affidavit lends some weight to the idea that other misstatements might have been made with the same state of mind” (maj. opn., p. 443) that inference does not render the overall evidence substantial in this case.
The trial court viewed it otherwise: “[T]he court finds there is so much— well, that there were not three males, that the garage light was not out; the subjects weren’t using a flashlight; that unknown-type equipment into the car, that that’s not what was stated by the officer that was surveilling. He said that it looked like a typewriter, so it was not unknown. And it was singular and not plural. And when put together with the three males loading it, the court gets the impression that it’s numerous items, and not just a singular object . . . .” (Italics added.) The court also observed: “[Let’s take the whole paragraph. What about the garage light was out and the subjects were using a flashlight? Now, to me, when I look at that sentence, I would say, “ ‘Aha. Garage light out. Using flashlight. Obviously done in a surreptitious manner; obviously three men carrying all of this equipment [out] of the garage don’t want to be seen. What is going on? Aha.’ ” (Italics added.)
The trial court found that the misrepresentations in the affidavit created the scenario of a group of thieves surreptitiously hauling away a truckload of office equipment, just as the informant had predicted, instead of revealing *450the more pedestrian truth: an individual openly loading a truck with branches and other debris, into which he also tossed a single blanketed object consistent with the shape of a typewriter. The trial court implicitly found that the sinister picture painted by Olivares’s handwritten paragraph so inexcusably distorted the truth that if he did not misstate the facts intentionally he at least did so recklessly. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondents and presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, as an appellate court must, I conclude that the trial court’s determination as to all three misrepresentations in the affidavit is clearly supported by substantial evidence. My colleagues’ contrary conclusion is based on a mischaracterization of the record and a misreading of the law.
The majority states that the mention of “unk. type equipment” “was absolutely correct as far as it went,” and asserts that “[t]he further problem that the word ‘equipment’ might connote more than one piece of equipment shows negligence at most.” (Maj. opn., p. 442.) Given the evidence of the actual report made to Olivares by Smith and the other misstatements in the affidavit, the majority is simply improperly substituting its judgment and usurping the fact-finding function of the trial court. As to the statement regarding use of a flashlight, the majority concludes: “On this record we are left to speculate, first, who conveyed the faulty information, and second, whether miscommunications by either or both of the officers might have been innocent or negligent, rather than reckless.” (Maj. opn., p. 442.) Smith testified that the porch light, garage light and a back light were on during the loading of the truck, and that the man loading the truck did not use a flashlight or appear to be “trying to keep something from view of anybody that might be passing in the street.” Smith also testified generally that he advised Olivares of his observations at the stakeout. A fair inference can be drawn from this evidence that either Smith correctly reported his observations to Olivares and Olivares recklessly disregarded the truth, or Smith recklessly disregarded the truth in his report to Olivares. Either inference is sufficient. Police cannot “insulate one officer’s deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity.” (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 163, fn. 6 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 677, 98 S.Ct. 2674]; see also Rugendorf v. United States (1964) 376 U.S. 528, 532-533 [11 L.Ed.2d 887, 891, 84 S.Ct. 825].)
The question before us is simply whether, when corrected to reflect the true information known to the police, the affidavit establishes probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The majority ostensibly does not decide whether this court should undertake a true independent review of the affidavit or defer to the issuing magistrate in determining whether the affidavit supports probable cause. My colleagues strongly suggest, however, *451that this court should in fact defer to the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant. I cannot agree.
Settled principles render it clear that in the circumstances presented by this case the appellate court must make a de novo determination whether probable cause exists without deference to either the conclusion of the superior court or of the magistrate. The Franks court stated that in the event reckless disregard is established and “with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. ” (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 156 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 672], italics added; see United States v. Rubio (9th Cir. 1983) 727 F.2d 786, 795 [“facts upon which the magistrate bases his probable cause determination must appear within the four corners of the warrant affidavit”]; accord, United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1234; United States v. Anderson (9th Cir. 1971) 453 F.2d 174, 175.) The sufficiency of the remaining contents of the affidavit must be independently assessed by this court.
In U.S. v. Grandstaff (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 1353, the Ninth Circuit held that the appellate court was required to make an independent determination of probable cause based upon a search warrant affidavit which had been purged of information obtained through illegal entry of the defendant’s hotel room. The court there stated: “We are in as good a position as was the district court to assess the legal sufficiency of the redacted affidavit. [Citations.] . . . Hence de novo review of the district court’s decision is appropriate.” (Id., at p. 1355.) In this case, we are actually in a better position to assess the sufficiency of the affidavit than was the superior court (which ignored the last paragraph in its entirety) or the magistrate (who considered the last paragraph with the false statements included).
The majority states that it “makes no sense” to defer to the superior court’s conclusion here because it assessed probable cause “based on the erroneous premise that the entire last paragraph of the affidavit had to be ignored.” (Maj. opn., p. 444.) I agree. It would be equally nonsensical, however, to defer to the magistrate’s determination since the magistrate’s conclusion was based upon the erroneous assumption that the affidavit contained no statements made in reckless disregard of the truth. The majority’s view that deference should be given to the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant is predicated upon the assertion in Grandstaff that the question is whether the affidavit “still affords the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing” (813 F.2d 1353, 1355, italics added) and the statement in Franks that the purpose of *452retesting is to determine whether the affidavit contains “support for a finding” of probable cause. (438 U.S. 154, 172 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 682].) Common sense dictates that these passages cannot have the meaning the majority ascribes to them. Otherwise, a presumption is created that the magistrate would issue a warrant regardless of corrections in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant. There is no support in logic or in the law for such a presumption. A de novo appellate assessment of probable cause without deference to any previous determination is clearly appropriate.
When the corrected affidavit is tested under the “totality of the circumstances” analysis mandated by Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317], it is manifestly insufficient to establish probable cause.
The police relied upon the tip of an anonymous informant. As the majority concedes, information from an untested informant will not establish probable cause unless “corroborated in essential respects by other facts, sources or circumstances.” (People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 752 [94 Cal.Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583].) The majority states that “there was abundant detail in the December 12 caller’s tip, and Olivares was able to corroborate most of it.” (Maj. opn., p. 447.) An analysis of the affidavit, however, demonstrates that the corroboration was almost entirely of the type of “pedestrian facts” to which the courts deservedly attach little if any significance. (See Higgason v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 929, 940 [216 Cal.Rptr. 817].)
Olivares was able to verify Costello’s name, his place of residence and the fact that there was an outbuilding at the rear of the property. The majority apparently views as corroboration the fact that the informant stated Costello could bypass an alarm system because he was an experienced former employee of an alarm company. The informant, however, only mentioned that fact after Olivares brought up the matter of the alarms being bypassed. Furthermore, Olivares was unable to verify that Costello had worked for an alarm company, a fact that would have provided some meaningful corroboration. The police were able to verify only that Costello had a sister enrolled in a computer class at a high school from which computers had recently been stolen, which is not particularly incriminating information in view of the fact that high school computer classes are commonplace.
The majority also views as corroboration the facts that Olivares had received an earlier anonymous tip stating that the informant had seen a large amount of computer equipment at Costello’s house and that Olivares knew that similar anonymous information had been received by the narcot*453ics unit. The affidavit discloses that the only information Olivares mentioned as being received by narcotics officers was that Costello worked at Santa Rosa Luggage Company, an extremely innocent fact in the context of this case which, as it turns out, Olivares could not verify. More significantly, however, “it is impossible to show different pieces of anonymous information emanated from independent sources and are truly corroborative of one another.” (Higgason v. Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 929, 938, italics in original.) “ ‘ “[T]he quantification of the information does not necessarily improve its quality; the information does not rise above its doubtful source because there is more of it.” ’ ” (Ibid., citing People v. Fein, supra, 4 Cal.3d 747, 753.)
It is true that the informant knew the approximate dates of the thefts, that computer equipment had been taken and that an implement which might have been a pipe wrench had been used in connection with entry. These, however, are historical facts which could have been learned by anyone in the community and do not themselves in any way implicate respondents in the criminal activity.
Finally, the majority asserts that Smith’s surveillance on December 12 added much corroboration and that his “report of seeing a man (presumably Costello) loading what appeared to be a concealed typewriter onto the truck for apparent transportation elsewhere frosted the cake.” (Maj. opn., p. 448.) Smith gave Olivares the license number and description of the truck and Olivares confirmed through DMV records that it was registered to Costello, harcjly a startling piece of information considering that the vehicle was parked oh Costello’s property. The majority observes that it was “twilight” during the loading, somewhat ironically attaching significance to this after stating previously in the opinion: “Even if we could sustain a recklessness finding, it would have had no significant impact on the magistrate to know that a garage light rather than a flashlight was used.” (Maj. opn., pp. 442-443.) I cannot agree with the majority that “[s]uch otherwise innocent-looking activity [observed by Smith] became suspicious in the context of the caller’s tip.” (Maj. opn., p. 448.) An individual openly loading a truck full of branches and debris plus one covered item consistent with the shape of a typewriter is scant corroboration for the anonymous tip that Costello was storing and about to move computer equipment worth $35,000. Thus, when properly analyzed, the informer’s tip is corroborated only by innocent rather than incriminating facts or by easily obtained historical information. Certainly Costello’s name and the location of his residence are insignificant. That his sister attended a computer class, obviously not an uncommon occurrence, is no indication of his involvement in criminal activity, even considering the robbery of computers from the school. The knowledge of details of the thefts provided no connection to Costello. When corrected in *454light of the Franks hearing, the affidavit does not through Smith’s observations or otherwise provide corroboration for the anonymous tip. In short, the affidavit merely reported the anonymous tip uncorroborated in any meaningful way. “There are few principles of human affairs more self-evident than this: The unverified story of an untested informer is of no more moment than a fairy tale on the lips of a child, and the same tale from an anonymous tattler is worth much, much less.” (Higgason v. Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 929, 946, 952 (conc. opn. of Crosby, J.), original italics omitted.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied December 22, 1988. Broussard, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

I agree with the majority that the trial court should have corrected the affidavit to reflect the true facts known to the affiant rather than striking the paragraph in question in its entirety.