Court Opinion

ID: 9952551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 00:00:45.107371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:30.699045
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10962           Document: 31-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/19/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 23-10962
                                  Summary Opinion                                  FILED
                                   __________                                March 19, 2024
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
Dedrick Henry,                                                                     Clerk

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

T-Force Freight,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:23-CV-453
                  ______________________________

Before Dennis, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiff–Appellant Dedrick Henry brought this lawsuit against De-
fendant–Appellee T-Force Freight (“TForce”), asserting causes of action
for “Slander, Harassment, Libel” after Henry was terminated from his em-
ployment with TForce. After TForce removed this case to federal court, the
district court ordered Henry to file an amended complaint complying with

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10962        Document: 31-1       Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/19/2024

                                  No. 23-10962

the federal and local rules. TForce later filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, to which Henry failed to respond. The district court granted
TForce’s motion and dismissed Henry’s complaint with prejudice. Henry
timely appealed.
       We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and
viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[].” Dorsey v.
Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While we construe pro se complaints
liberally, pro se plaintiffs must “still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).
       Here, the district court properly dismissed Henry’s complaint for
failure to state a claim. In support of his claims, Henry alleges that TForce
“knowing and willingly used false documents, statements and alter[ed]
documents to harass and intimidate, slander libel [and] cause emotional
damage.” Specifically, Henry alleges that, in 2022, TForce made him take a
random drug test and accused him of causing a “serious incident” that led to
his termination. Without more, Henry failed to state a claim for slander or
libel under Texas law since he did not plead that the allegedly defamatory
statements were “published to a third person” given that, according to
Henry’s amended complaint, the statements were contained to TForce’s
own internal systems. Randall’s Food Markts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d
640, 646 (Tex. 1995); see also Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150,
1161 (5th Cir. 2006). Henry’s harassment claim—whether arising under
Title VII or the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act—similarly fails

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Case: 23-10962        Document: 31-1           Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/19/2024

                                      No. 23-10962

because he did not allege that TForce’s behavior was motivated by Henry’s
protected status or activity. Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C., 915 F.3d
320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that “Title VII does not prohibit all
harassment [rather] [i]t makes harassing conduct unlawful when it results in
the employer ‘discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”) (internal
citation removed); Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170
(5th Cir. 2014) (“The substantive law governing Title VII and TCHRA
retaliation claims is identical.”).
       The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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