Court Opinion

ID: 9476894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:08:22.564414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:34.202197
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which affirms the district court’s judgment and award of compensatory damages against Hendricks based on the fourteenth amendment.
The award against Hendricks is based on the fact that Hendricks held some position in the chain of command which led to Ivey’s pre-hearing detention with respect to the cigarette incident and subsequently participated as a member of the adjustment committee. Ivey also contends that the insufficiency of the evidence violates due process.
“[T]he requirement of impartiality mandates the disqualification of an official who is directly involved in the incident or is otherwise substantially involved in the incident but does not require the disqualification of someone tangentially involved.” Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir.1983); see Jensen v. Satran, 688 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1007, 103 S.Ct. 1244, 75 L.Ed.2d 475 (1983). Nothing in the record indicates that Hendricks was directly or substantially involved in the cigarette incident. Hendricks filed no reports nor gave any testimony against Ivey. Accordingly, due process was not violated by Hendrick’s service on the Adjustment Committee.
In Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (citation omitted), the Court held
that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.... This standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced....’ Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the *959credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.
“Meager” evidence is sufficient, and direct evidence is not required. Id. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775. Further, “[t]he Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. In this case, the evidence indicated that Ivey came out of the protective custody unit with more cigarettes than he went in with, and that Ivey was admitted to the unit to fulfill his duties as a legal aide and not to transact personal business. The evidence is sufficient to meet the “some evidence” standard, and accordingly, the finding of guilty did not violate due process.
For these reasons, the judgment against Hendricks based on the fourteenth amendment should be reversed.