Court Opinion

ID: 9452248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:34:42.64109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:08.320072
License: Public Domain

BOREMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I must respectfully note my disagreement with the result reached by the majority. “Ownership” of the 1961 Chevrolet which my brothers think was covered by the “family” policy issued to Virgil on December 20, 1960, by State Farm, raises a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
Looking to the evidence I note that Cecil Foster was Virgil’s son; Cecil was working away from home in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and needed a car for travel to and from his place of employment; Virgil owned a Plymouth which was covered by a separate policy of insurance issued by State Farm; the Plymouth was traded in on the Chevrolet (purchased on June 24, 1961) as part or perhaps all of the down payment and the balance was being financed through G.M.A.C.; Cecil was a minor, eighteen years old, and needed a responsible cosigner to complete financing arrangements; Virgil signed the financing papers with his son; Cecil made all the monthly payments as they came due except the last one which fell due after he was injured in the accident and Virgil paid it; Virgil considered it an obligation of Cecil’s as shown by Virgil’s testimony — “Yes, sir, I took his obligation over”; the State Farm agent was merely instructed to transfer the separate policy on the Plymouth to the Chevrolet and this was done.
The “family policy” provided that an acquired passenger car, owned by the named insured although not specifically described in the policy could be covered upon notice by the named insured within thirty days following the date of such *944acquisition. The only notice which State Farm’s agent had was that Cecil and Virgil, not Virgil, had acquired a Chevrolet and that a separate policy on Virgil’s Plymouth, for which a separate premium had been paid, was to be transferred to the Chevrolet.
The Chevrolet involved in the accident was shown on the title certificate as in the joint names of Virgil and Cecil Foster. It is understandable how this may have occurred since both parties obviously signed the papers at the time the car was acquired and financed. Two questions naturally arise which are not satisfactorily answered. (1) Why would Cecil be included in such evidence of ownership as provided by the title certificate if Virgil, the named insured in the policy, was acquiring the car for himself ? (2) Why would Cecil pay for his father’s car ? The endorsement on the family policy provides that any automobile qualifying for automatic coverage must be owned, by the named insured:
“(c) A private passenger, farm or utility automobile ownership of any of which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period, provided * *
I am persuaded that true ownership of the Chevrolet was a most relevant issue in the case.
The certificate of title to the Chevrolet in the names of Virgil and Cecil Foster was introduced in evidence and this constituted the only direct evidence of ownership of the vehicle. The judge below, in referring to titling of the Chevrolet, observed during the trial that “I assume it was put in both names because one was an eighteen year old boy.” Counsel for State Farm wished to show, in cross-examining Virgil Foster, that his son, Cecil, was the sole owner of the car and that the title was partly in the father’s name because of necessity or convenience due to Cecil’s minority and the requirement that the unpaid purchase price be secured. Upon objection, the court excluded evidence tending to prove that the Chevrolet was actually owned by Cecil upon the apparent theory that this was an impermissible effort on the part of State Farm to “go beyond the mere term ‘ownership’ as it applies to title and * * * show that in fact that Cecil R. Foster was the true owner.” In other words, the District Court excluded all evidence which would conflict with such evidence of ownership as supplied by the title certificate.
In Scott v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 202 Va. 579, 118 S.E.2d 519 (1961), ownership of a motor vehicle was involved. One George E. Bower and his son, Robert, who was nineteen years of age and resided with his father, purchased an automobile from a used car dealer for $250.00 cash. Of this purchase price the father paid $50.00 and Robert paid the balance of $200.00. The automobile was titled in the father’s name because of the son’s minority. The court held:
“While it is true that the title certificate showed George E. Bower to be the owner of the automobile, it was not conclusive but only prima facie evidence of ownership. United States Cas. Co. v. Bain, 191 Va. 717, 720, 62 S.E.2d 814-815.”
In the Bain case cited in the foregoing quotation it was held that the title certificate is not conclusive of ownership in Virginia, the non-titleholder “was the sole owner” and consequently the titleholder had no ownership of the vehicle.
Since, in my opinion, it was error to exclude evidence to show that Virgil was not the true owner of the Chevrolet, I think a new trial should be ordered.