Court Opinion

ID: 9885701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:11:27.406432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.961565
License: Public Domain

*134Hopkins, J. (dissenting).
I dissent and vote to affirm.
The question before us deals with the quantity and quality of power delegated to municipalities by the State. Originally and historically, a municipal corporation is a political subdivision of the State, created by the Legislature for the exercise of such governmental powers as may be entrusted to it (People ex rel. Wood v Draper, 15 NY 532, 562; Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182; cf. Bank of Chenango v Brown, 26 NY 467; see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1059, 1104, 1109-1112); the method of creating municipal corporations is controlled by the Legislature (Town of Hornellsville v City of Hornell, 38 AD2d 312, 315; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [1971 rev ed], §3.17, p 247, §,3.18, pp 248-250), and the legislative authority is plenary and exclusive (People v Snedeker, 160 NY 350, 356; People ex rel. Clancy v Board of Supervisors of Westchester County, 139 NY 524, 529; Matter of LaGuardia v Smith, 288 NY 1, 7), even to the extent of regulating the manner of increasing or diminishing the territory of the municipality (Adriaansen v Board of Educ., 222 App Div 320, 323-324, affd 248 NY 542; see, also, People ex rel. Village of Spring Valley v Schroeder, 189 Misc 324, affd 273 App Div 789). When the interests of municipalities collide, such as in the case of annexation, the Legislature has enacted statutory directions for the resolution of disputes (General Municipal Law, § 701 et seq.; cf. Matter of City Council of City of Mechanicville v Town Bd. of Town of Halfmoon, 27 NY2d 369). There is no inherent right to self-government; though powers may be shared by the State and the municipal unit, the Legislature finally is paramount (Massie v Brown, 84 Wn 2d 490).
Presently, our Constitution lodges the creative power of local governments in the Legislature “in such manner as shall secure to them the rights, powers, privileges and immunities granted to them” (NY Const, art IX, § 2, subd [a]). Towns and villages are both local governments (NY Const, art IX, § 3, subd [d], par [2]). There is no indication in this language that any priority or favor has been conferred on one form of local government over another; indeed, the implication is that, except as the Legislature may provide, their rights are to be treated equally. It is *135true that a village, unlike a town or county, is a voluntary corporation in the sense that it comes into being by vote of the electorate (Village of Kenmore v County of Erie, 252 NY 437, 442), but this distinction, so far as the Constitution divulges, leads to no discrimination for or against a village or in the creation of a village.
Hence, we must look to the provisions of the Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law to determine whether a town may adopt a local law changing the conditions enacted by the Legislature for the creation of a village. Again, there is nothing either in the Constitution or in the statute which expressly gives the power to a town to adopt a local law which adds to the conditions enacted by the Legislature for the creation of a village (Village Law, art 2; see, specifically, §§ 2-206, 2-208). Accordingly, the power of the town to adopt such a local law, if it exists at all, must lie in necessary implication, although we should expect that such an important and fundamental matter as the creation of a local government would not be removed from the Legislature except by express provision. In construing the constitutional and statutory words, we must read them in the light of the cases antedating the 1963 home rule amendment (Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 497).
The Constitution provides that “every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government” (NY Const, art IX, § 2, subd [c], par [i]). In addition, every local government is granted the power to adopt and amend local laws on certain enumerated subjects, none of which include the creation of local governments, except to the extent that the Legislature may restrict the adoption of such a local law (NY Const, art IX, § 2, subd [c], par [ii]). One of the subjects so described upon which the appellant town relies reads: “The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein” (NY Const, art IX, § 2, subd [c], par [ii], cl [10]). This statement, however, simply describes the general police power and cannot be considered to qualify the traditional authority of the Legislature to create municipal *136corporations. Moreover, the Constitution makes manifest that nothing in the Bill of Rights for Local Governments (NY Const, art IX, § 1) “shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to * * * [m]atters other than the property, affairs or government of a local government” (NY Const, art IX, §3, subd [a], par [3]).
The provisions of the Municipal Home Rule Law are no more declaratory of the power of the appellant town to adopt the local law in question. The statute tracks the language of the Constitution relative to the power to adopt local laws (Municipal Home Rule Law, § 10, subd 1, pars [i] , [ii]). It grants to a town, in addition, the power to adopt a local law concerning assessments and their review (Municipal Home Rule Law, § 10, subd 1, par [ii], cl d, subcls [1], [2]). Further, the Eckert amendment (L 1976, ch 365) to the statute (Municipal Home Rule Law, § 10, subd 1, par [ii] , cl d, subcl [3]), providing for the amendment or super-session of any provision of the Town Law by local law, unless expressly prohibited by the Legislature, does not empower the appellant town to adopt the challenged local law, since the local law applies not to the Town Law but to the Village Law, to which the Eckert amendment does not apply.
The power of the appellant town to adopt the local law does not arise by necessary implication, in any event, in the light of the express constitutional language. A local government may adopt local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of “any general law relating to its property, affairs or government” (NY Const, art IX, § 2, subd [c], par [i]). The Village Law is a general law (NY Const, art IX, § 3, subd [d], par [1]; Municipal Home Rule Law, § 2, subd 5). Thus, the necessary implication of the constitutional language is to the contrary of the meaning urged by the appellant town. “The drafters did not invent a new arrangement of words; they imported into the new article the old phrase 'property, affairs or government’ of a local government. It is unlikely that a term of art so heavily laden with the judicial gloss of the pre-1963 cases (supra) favoring the State’s power would have been used had State concerns been contemplated to be subordinate to local powers granted under the Statute of Local Governments” *137(Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 497, supra). When State-wide interests have been regulated by a general law, a local government may not interfere with its operative effect by a local law (see, e.g., Floyd v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 33 NY2d 1, 6-7; Bugeja v City of New York, 24 AD2d 151, 152, affd 17 NY2d 606; Town of Junius v Flacke, 71 AD2d 423, 427; Schnapp v Lefkowitz, 101 Misc 2d 1075).
In short, there exists no evidence of constitutional or statutory intent that the power was granted to one form of local government to constrict the initiation of another by the exercise of home rule, any more than the power was granted by the provisions of home rule in effect at the time of City of New York v Village of Lawrence (250 NY 429). Hence, Judge Lehman’s observation then is pertinent now (pp 438-440):
“The creation of the city as a subordinate governmental agency or political institution, and the determination of the territory in which that agency should function, are matters of general public interest, and when the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution was adopted it was the established policy of the State that the Legislature might by special act exercise its discretion in such matters.
“It is difficult to perceive in that amendment any attempt to limit the powers of the Legislature in the creation of new cities or to change, in this respect, the established policy of the State. The provisions of article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution, recognizing the power of the Legislature to form corporations for municipal purposes by special act, have not been expressly repealed or amended. Limitation upon that power must be found, if at all, in the provisions of section 2 of article XII, which prohibits the Legislature from passing a special or local law ‘relating to the property, affairs or government of cities,’ except on message from the Governor that an emergency exists.
“It may hardly be doubted that the creation of a new city and the determination of its boundaries do not relate ‘to the property, affairs or government of cities’ as used in the amended Constitution. These words were used in article XII, section 2, of the Constitution before the Home Rule *138Amendment. Then the Legislature might enact special laws relating to such matters, but after a bill was passed by both houses, it was in such case transmitted to the mayor of the city or cities affected, for acceptance or rejection. The intent of these provisions of the Constitution was to provide some measure of protection to a city from possible danger of ill-considered interference by the Legislature in its local affairs. Opportunity was afforded to a city to present objections before a special law relating to its property, affairs or government could become effective, but a non-existent city can have no property, affairs or government, and no officers could voice objections in its behalf. The Legislature was free to create, and did create, new cities by special law, and article XII, section 2, of 'the Constitution in its original form could have no application to laws passed for that purpose.
“The Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution, as we have pointed out, has enlarged the legislative powers of cities and restricted the legislative powers of the Legislature within the field of matters relating to the property, affairs and government of cities. It has no operation outside of that field, nor has it changed the description of that field contained in the Constitution before the amendment. Its limits remain as they were before, and the creation of cities and definition of the boundaries of the territory under their jurisdiction remain outside of that field. Here the power of the Legislature is plenary.”
It may well be, as the appellant town argues, that the symmetry and consequences of its zoning and planning ordinances, passed to control the orderly development of its land and population, will be frustrated by the incorporation of a new village within the town’s boundaries. It may well be that the problems engendered by the creation of the village should be addressed by the Legislature. These, however, are questions for the Legislature and not for the courts. We must enforce the Constitution and the statutes in their fair intendment and effect.
On the other side, the Legislature might well consider that to allow towns to adopt local laws raising a variety of conditions to the creation of villages in addition to those imposed by the Legislature, would unduly interfere with *139the desirable standard of uniformity of method for the creation of villages throughout the State, and would inaugurate a parochial resistance by towns to new villages through the formation of difficult or oppressive conditions. The Legislature, indeed, reflects the overriding concerns of the people of the State, and its judgment must ultimately resolve the conflicts between municipal segments of the State, rather than to permit a kind of internecine struggle between them. Here the Legislature has not found it appropriate to give to towns any power to regulate the creation of villages.
Since neither by express language nor by necessary implication of the Constitution or statute the appellant town has demonstrated its power to adopt the local law in suit, the judgment of Special Term should be affirmed.
Mollen, P. J., and Weinstein, J., concur with Titone, J.; Hopkins, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment, with an opinion.
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, entered July 28,1980, reversed, on the law, with costs, Local Law No. 3 of 1967 of the Town of Ramapo is declared valid and the proceedings are otherwise dismissed on the merits.