Court Opinion

ID: 9735030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:58:06.411054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:54.537409
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
The court today holds that the officers of the new consolidated City of Indianapolis, commonly called “Uni-Gov,” may lawfully proceed to issue municipal bonds in the sum of $40,000,000.00, during the pendency of a suit attacking the constitutionality of the Act, Acts 1969, ch. 173, Burns §§ 48-9101 to 48-9507, which Act created the new city. The majority approves the separation and early disposition by the trial court of the claims of the plaintiffs for injunction against the issuance of the municipal bonds from their claims raising the constitutionality of the “Uni-Gov” Statute.
In so doing, I believe, they have erroneously approved a procedure and power which may now be exercised by our courts which is at odds with the public policy of this State *173governing this type of case, as expressed in the Public Lawsuit Statute, Acts 1967, ch. 357, §§ 1 through 8, Burns §§ 3-3301 through 3-3308. It does so in this case, which is described by the appellant in his brief as “friendly” in which many obvious assertions on both sides are not made at all, and in which no showing is made that delay in the sale of these bonds and the construction of these projects will result in any significant harm or damage to the citizens of the new city. This holding will permit litigants and our courts to totally by-pass the exclusive procedures set forth in Burns § 3-3305 of the Public Lawsuit Statute which are intended to bring about a fair and just accommodation of the conflicting interests of the challenging taxpayer in maintaining his suit to test the lawfulness of government action and the public in being free from unnecessary delay and consequent damage caused by the existence of the suit.
I hasten to point out that no party to this appeal discusses the applicability of the Public Lawsuit Statute to this case, although it is unquestionable that the parties and the trial court were aware that this suit must be governed by the provisions of the Public Lawsuit Statute. The trial court in its judgment, from which this appeal is taken, states that it is as follows:
“The Court now finds that this is a public lawsuit, under the provisions of Chapter 367 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the Stated [sic] of Indiana for the year 1967, which questions the validity of acts being taken to construct and finance public improvements and which seeks to enjoin the completion of the organization and formation of a municipal corporation pursuant to Chapter 173 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana for the year 1969.”
The complaint alleges that the suit is a “public lawsuit” in Paragraph I:
“The plaintiffs . . . and each of them, bring this action as a public lawsuit as Plaintiffs for themselves and for all *174other persons as a class similarly situated as citizens or taxpayers.”
Each legal paragraph of this complaint constitutes a public lawsuit within the definition created in § 3-3301 of the Public Lawsuit Statute:
“(b) ‘Public lawsuit’ shall mean any action whereby the validity, location, wisdom, feasibility, extent or character of construction, financing or leasing of any public improvement by any municipal corporation is questioned directly or indirectly, including but not limited to suits for declaratory judgments or injunctions to declare invalid or to enjoin such construction, financing or leasing, and shall mean any action to declare invalid or enjoin the creation, organization or formation of any municipal corporation. This definition, as used in this act, shall not be construed to broaden any right of action as is now validly limited by applicable law.” (Emphasis added.)
It is equally clear that the Public Lawsuit Statute solely governs the rights and procedures in this suit:
“3.3302. Bringing of public lawsuits.—All public lawsuits shall be brought solely in conformity with and governed by the provisions of this act.”
In the case on appeal the separation of the plaintiffs’ claim of unconstitutionality from their claim for injunction against the issuance of municipal bonds was made on motion of the defendants and was unobjected to by the plaintiffs. It was clearly intended to make possible an early determination in the trial court and in this Court of the validity of the bond issue, and thus, remove the legal cloud that was placed on that bond issue by the suit to declare ch. 173 unconstitutional and the suit to enjoin the bond issue. This was obviously a legitimate aim for the defendants to pursue. However, this should have been done under the provision of § 3-3305 of the Public Lawsuit Statute which reads as follows :
“3-3305. Interlocutory hearing.—At any time prior to the final hearing in a public lawsuit, the defendant may *175petition for an order of the court that the cause be dismissed unless the plaintiff shall post a bond with surety to be approved by the court payable to defendant for the payment of all damages and costs which may accrue by reason of the filing of the lawsuit in the event the defendant prevails. A hearing shall be had on such petition in the same manner as the hearing on temporary injunctions under Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.) c. 38. If at the hearing the court determines that the plaintiff can not establish facts which would entitle him to a temporary injunction, the court shall set the amount of bond to be filed by the plaintiff in an amount found by the judge to cover all damage and costs which may accrue to the defendants by reason of the pendency of the public lawsuit in the event the defendant prevails. In the event such bond is not filed by the plaintiff with sureties approved by the court within ten (10) days after such order is entered the suit shall be dismissed. Either plaintiff or defendant may appeal such order to the Indiana Supreme Court within such ten (10) day period by notice of appeal and a statement of error in the same manner as is provided in a petition for mandate or prohibition. The Supreme Court may stay the lower court order pending its own decision, may set a bond to be filed by the plaintiff in connection therewith, may modify the order of the lower court, or may enter its order as a final order in a case. In the event no bond is filed as provided in this section the public lawsuit shall be dismissed and no court shall have further jurisdiction of the public lawsuit or any other public lawsuit involving any issue which was or could have been raised therein.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendants obviously were seeking to avoid the delay in financing and constructing the projects which involved new parks, sewers, streets, parks and other public improvements. Section 3-3305 provides that defendants in the position of the defendants here desiring to avoid unnecessary and harmful delay in carrying out their proposed projects, should file a petition for dismissal of the suit or bond. The plaintiffs would then be permitted to maintain their suit in its full vigor if it met the burden of showing grounds which would suffice for the court to issue a temporary injunction. If plaintiff failed in this burden, the burden would then be upon the defendants to come forward with evidence that the delay caused by the *176pendency of the suit was causing monetary damage to them. The plaintiff would then be permitted to defend against these assertions. The court would thereupon set the amount of bond. If the plaintiff posts such a bond he may maintain his suit in all its aspects and with all of its consequent delay and inconveniences to the public. If not posted, dismissal of the entire suit would result.
The Public Lawsuit Statute has been enacted by our Legislature and labored over time and again by this Court. It provides a suitable and just procedure for the resolution of the issues presented by the motion of the defendants in this suit to sever the paragraphs for injunction against the issuance of these bonds, and for an early determination of the issues raised by those paragraphs.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Jackson, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 263 N. E. 2d 266.