Court Opinion

ID: 9472559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:04:01.104746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:00.746708
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I differ with my brothers in three basic respects: one, I think the facts compel a finding that a warrantless entry and seizure of the Palumbo residence took place long before the warrant arrived; two, that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry and seizure; and, three, that the independent discovery rule does not apply.
*663I start my exposition of the facts with the arrival of the police at the Palumbo home after Ralph Palumbo was already in custody. Sometime between 6:80 and 7:00 p.m., at least five police officers went to the Palumbo home. Mrs. Palumbo was seated at her kitchen table drinking coffee with her father-in-law, Ralph Palumbo, Sr., who was visiting the family from out-of-state, when she observed two men approach the door. When Mrs. Palumbo opened the door, the two officers showed their badges, entered the house without consent, and informed her they had probable cause to search the house and were awaiting the arrival of a search warrant. Three or more officers, also in plain clothes, then entered the Palumbo residence. Mrs. Palumbo demanded to see a warrant. After the officers said one was coming, Mrs. Palumbo ordered them out of her home. To that demand the officers responded, “We’re not going anywhere.” The officers then informed Mrs. Palumbo that they were “securing the premises” in anticipation of the arrival of the warrant. Mrs. Palumbo asked if she and her two teenage children could leave and she was told that her children could leave but that she could not. I note, here, that if Mrs. Palumbo had been allowed to leave with her children the house could have been kept under surveillance from the outside with no danger of any evidence in the house being destroyed.
The police officers fanned out to various parts of the house, outside the field of vision of Mrs. Palumbo and Mr. Palumbo, Sr. Two preliminary, warrantless searches were then conducted. One officer searched the kitchen hutch and another officer searched Mr. Palumbo, Sr.’s suitcase which was upstairs.
Mrs. Palumbo again ordered the officers out of her house. They did not leave. It is not clear when the officers changed their minds about not allowing Mrs. Palumbo to leave the premises but she was told by the officers at some point that the occupants of the house could leave if they consented to a search of items taken with them.
Sometime after 7:00 p.m., Mrs. Palumbo telephoned a friend, Carol Melchionna, and asked her to drive over and take her children for the evening. As Mrs. Palumbo went down into the basement where the children were watching television, an officer followed her. She also went into the garage, accompanied by an officer, to get the dog. The officers had told her that if the dog attempted to bite one of them they would shoot it. Mrs. Palumbo then tied the dog to a tree away from the house.
By the time Mrs. Melchionna arrived, Mrs. Palumbo had been given permission by the police to leave. She started towards her car but was told that she could not use it. The police locked the car and took the keys. She was told that if she touched the officer giving directions she would be arrested for assault. She then got into Mrs. Melchionna’s car and asked that the doors be locked. Her children were already in the car. At that point the officers blocked Mrs. Melchionna’s exit with a police cruiser and banged on the windows directing Mrs. Palumbo to get out, warning her that she could not leave until her pocketbook was searched. By this time, the children were crying and nearly hysterical. Mrs. Palumbo therefore got out of the car. Mrs. Melchionna drove off with the children while Mrs. Palumbo’s pocketbook was searched. Nothing was seized from it, and Mrs. Palumbo was permitted to leave. She walked into town where she telephoned Mrs. Melchionna to take her to join her children. Mrs. Palumbo’s departure marked the last family member’s presence on the Palumbo premises until after 11:00 p.m.
When Mrs. Palumbo left her residence, no lights were on. Conflicting testimony was presented regarding the presence of law enforcement officers in the Palumbo residence at the time she departed. When Mrs. Palumbo returned at 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., the outside, garage, and kitchen lights were on. The dog was sitting inside the garage. The officers were outside the house, sitting in the breezeway, between the garage and main house.
*664One officer testified that the law enforcement personnel vacated the house when Mrs. Palumbo left, but that the phone in the garage was used in her absence. Another trooper testified that he used the kitchen telephone to talk to Assistant District Attorney Libby, although the time of this call was not given.
An associate of the law firm retained by the Palumbos testified that when he arrived at the Palumbo residence shortly after 11:00 p.m., a partner of the firm was in the house with several law enforcement officers. The officers were requested to vacate the house, and they did so. When Mrs. Palumbo returned she was forbidden to reenter her home until the search had begun. At approximately 11:45 p.m., Corporal Holmes arrived with the warrant. At least fifteen law enforcement officers and seven police vehicles were present at that time. No copy of the warrant had been made, and the attorneys were allowed to read it only while the police held it. The attorneys were unable to scan the affidavit, however, because it had been sealed at the request of Corporal Holmes. The lawyers stated Mrs. Palumbo did not consent to the search and Holmes noted the objection. After the search began, the attorneys and Mrs. Palumbo were permitted to enter the house but were confined to the kitchen.
These facts, in my opinion, establish that starting at approximately 7:00 p.m. the police took complete control and possession of the Palumbo premises. The officers refused to leave the home when asked to do so by Mrs. Palumbo. The police decided who could leave the premises and when.- They refused to allow Mrs. Palumbo to leave in her car, locking it and taking the keys. After Mrs. Palumbo left, the officers used the telephone freely and some of them remained inside the home. The dominion exercised over the Palumbo home from 7:00 p.m. until the warrant arrived at 11:45 p.m. constituted a seizure of the house, its contents, and Mrs. Palumbo’s automobile. United States v. Berkowitz, 429 F.2d 921, 924 (1st Cir.1970).
It is a fundamental, repeatedly enunciated “principle of Fourth Amendment law,” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586,100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes omitted), unless they fall within one of the “few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), to the warrant requirement. In the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to authorize a police entry into a home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1647-48, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. at 1380; United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 225 (1st Cir.1978).
That officers have probable cause alone, without indicia of exigent circumstances, does not authorize a warrantless entry of a residence, Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 52 S.Ct. 466, 467, 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 6, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925), nor after an illegal entry may valid searches or seizures occur absent a warrant. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1256-57, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958). Searches or seizures “conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 [46 S.Ct. 4, 6, 70 L.Ed. 145], for the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police____’ Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482 [83 S.Ct. 407, 413-414, 9 L.Ed.2d 441].” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514. “Over and ‘again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,” United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951), and that searches and sei*665zures “conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate,” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514 (emphasis added), must fall within one of the recognized exceptions. “[T]he general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for it.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759, 762, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2037, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (citations omitted).
On the authority of Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), I conclude that the police entry and occupancy of the Palumbo home constituted a search and seizure encompassed by the fourth amendment. In Johnson, the officers suspected the presence of illicit drugs in a hotel room but were unaware of the occupant’s identity. They knocked, the door was opened, and they entered the room. The Court held that the entry marked the beginning of an illegal search. “An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion.” Id. at 17, 68 S.Ct. at 370 (emphasis added). This principle was reconfirmed recently in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382, and in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. at 1647, when the Court observed, “[I]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to a house. Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold may not be crossed without a warrant.” Accordingly, the police entry and seizure of the Palumbo home must find its justification in either consent or exigent circumstances.
Since there was no consent, the question is whether exigent circumstances, specifically the portent of destruction of evidence, justified the warrantless entry of the Palumbo home. The Supreme Court has recognized that “imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the evidence to be seized” is one type of exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless police entry and search. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 52, 72 S.Ct. at 95; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 15, 68 S.Ct. at 369.
In Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970), the Court rejected a ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court that a warrantless search was independently supportable because it involved narcotics which are easily removed, hidden or destroyed. The Court then went on to specify the situations justifying a warrant-less entry into a home: consent; an emergency; hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; goods either in the process of destruction or about to be removed from the jurisdiction. Id. at 35, 90 S.Ct. at 1972. This is a stringent test and, if applied literally, no entry could be made unless the police possessed actual knowledge that evidence was being destroyed. As far as I know, no circuit court has followed this test literally.1 While the police need not wait until the process of destruction is in progress or perfectly gauge the moment the destruction will begin, the belief that evidence is likely to be destroyed must be based on more than a mere supposition or one of a range of hypothetical possibilities. This circuit has never had occasion to decide what factors are necessary to underpin a finding that this type of exigency existed.
The Second Circuit, however, in at least two recent cases has faced this precise question. It has formulated and applied a *666test which strikes an appropriate balance between the competing public interests at stake, namely, the right of individuals to be secure in their homes and the interest of the public in preventing the disappearance of evidence necessary to convict criminal offenders. In Segura v. United States, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), the court reapplied the test it first formulated in United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980). In order for officers to enter a residence to prevent the destruction of evidence “the arresting officers must have (1) a reasonable belief that third persons are inside, and (2) a reasonable belief that the third persons are aware of the arrest outside the premises so that they might destroy evidence, escape or jeopardize the safety of the officers or the public.” Segura v. United States, 663 F.2d at 414 (quoting Agapito).
A review of the facts leading to the decision to “secure” the Palumbo home pri- or to obtaining a warrant shows that the officers lacked the basis for a reasonable belief that Mrs. Palumbo was at the home and that she was aware of her husband’s arrest so that the destruction of evidence was imminent. The testimony of Trooper Holmes was unequivocal: at the time it was decided to secure the home, the police did not know that Mrs. Palumbo was there, nor was there any reason to believe that she knew her husband had been arrested. The record discloses no attempt whatsoever to ascertain the presence of Mrs. Palumbo or others by surveillance or the use of other legitimate police investigatory methods prior to deciding to enter the home. There certainly was no shortage of available police personnel. At the least, a telephone call could have been made to determine if anyone was home. The officers simply assumed, without more, that Mrs. Palumbo was at home.
Nor does Agent Graffam’s scenario that Mrs. Palumbo would learn either intuitively or from some third party that her husband had been arrested withstand scrutiny. The arrests of Palumbo and Walker occurred five miles from the Palumbo residence in the rear parking lot of a Ramada Inn in a city of over 20,000. Although there were several witnesses to the arrest, there was no reason for the officers to believe that any of the witnesses knew either Palumbo or his wife and would inform Mrs. Palumbo that her husband had been arrested.2
In summary, the officers had no objective independent facts on which to base their belief that Mrs. Palumbo was at home and. would destroy any evidence in the house. The “reasonable belief” test had not been met, nor, of course, did the facts meet the more stringent requirements of Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. at 34, 90 S.Ct. at 1971.
Additionally, it must be noted that, although DEA Agent Graffam testified he knew that telephonic warrants could be obtained under the Federal Rules, see Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2), no consideration was given to obtaining such a warrant. This was precisely the type of situation for which a warrant obtained by telephone was designed:
Federal law enforcement officers are not infrequently confronted with situations in which the circumstances are not sufficiently “exigent” to justify the serious step of conducting a warrantless search of private premises, but yet there exists a significant possibility that critical evidence would be lost in the time it would take to obtain a search warrant by traditional means.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2) advisory committee note (1977).
I realize that despite the findings by the Second Circuit that the entries into and control over the Agapito and Segura residences were unlawful, it did not suppress the evidence seized from the homes. In *667United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 338, it reasoned that “[although the agents seized the suitcase in Room 1701 which contained the cocaine, they did not open it until after the warrant had been obtained. The one kilogram of cocaine, therefore, was admissible if the warrant was valid.” With due respect, I do not think an illegal seizure can be cured by a warrant subsequently obtained. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356, 88 S.Ct. at 514. There is no basis in fourth amendment jurisprudence for this back door approach.
I believe the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of this question comports more closely with the spirit and purpose of the fourth amendment. The Ninth Circuit has consistently ruled “[w]e draw no Fourth Amendment distinction between ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ of residences. Seizures of residences, like searches, require a warrant unless exigent circumstances are present.” United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 893 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 189 n. 1 (9th Cir.1982).3
The Supreme Court has never recognized a “securing the premises in anticipation of a search warrant,” exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Obviously, such an exception cannot coexist with the precedents established in the almost six decades of fourth amendment jurisprudence which have followed Agnello. Such an exception would necessarily swallow the rule. The warrant requirement protects the privacy of the home by “interpospng] a magistrate between the citizen and the police ... so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). Undoubtedly, it would be easier and more efficacious for police to enter and “secure” homes pending a magistrate’s determination of whether a warrant should issue,
[b]ut the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that privacy of a person’s home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2414 (1978). Failure to suppress the evidence obtained from the Palumbo home results in exploitation of illegal conduct and eviscerates the fourth amendment.
My brothers seek to buttress their decision by falling back on the independent source rule. With due respect, I think they misconstrue and misapply this rule. The rule has its roots in Silverthorne Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). That case involved an illegal examination and copying of the books, papers, and documents of defendant. Based on the information thus obtained, a new indictment was drawn and subpoenas issued for the original documents. Justice Holmes stated:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
Id. at 392, 40 S.Ct. at 183. This obviously means that if a third party had told the government about the material, a subpoena could lawfully have been issued for them.
In the context of this ease, an independent source might have been a neighbor of the Palumbos who had visited the house, seen the implicating material, and informed the police. I have found no cases, how*668ever, suggesting that an independent source could be the officers’ probable cause belief that implicating evidence was on the premises.
Nor do I think that United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir.1980) applies. There, we found that the police, as a matter of investigative routine, would inevitably have discovered the evidence regardless of the initial illegal search. Here, the evidence was seized illegally as part of the initial seizure of the house. There was no possibility of obtaining the same evidence elsewhere from another source, as in Bienvenue.
Moreover, in Bienvenue the Government specifically advanced the independent source rule and the inevitable discovery theory below and before us. Here, the Government depended solely on exigent circumstances as justification for its seizure of the house. The majority’s determination that the exigent circumstances were “rather thin” has forced them to invoke a rule not briefed or argued by the parties. I would point out also that if the independent source rule is to be applied, the critical issue of whether it was shown that the evidence would have been found independently is one in the first instance for the district court. United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cir.1983).
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), presents a much stronger case for the application of the majority’s independent source cum inevitable discovery rule were such application within the realm of fourth amendment jurisprudence. There the police were validly inside the defendant’s apartment during an authorized drug bust. Gunfire came from the direction of the defendant who was in another room, fatally wounding one police officer. This homicide was only one of several serious crimes committed in the actual presence of the police. The information forming the probable cause to search Mincey’s apartment for evidence of these crimes was, therefore, far beyond the probable cause belief the police officers possessed here that relevant evidence existed within the Palumbo residence. After a homocide squad’s arrival, the police began its investigation of Mincey’s residence and gathered evidence over four days. No warrant was ever obtained. Under the majority construction of the independent source/inevitable discovery rules, none of the evidence found as a result of the warrantless search and seizure of Mincey’s apartment should have been suppressed because the officers’ knowledge that crimes had been committed, made them their own independent sources. Further, given the police dominion over the residence after the crimes had been committed, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. The Supreme Court, however, unanimously suppressed, the evidence and declined to find a species of a probable cause exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 390, 98 S.Ct. at 2412. In examining the proferred arguments justifying a murder-scene exception to the warrant requirement, the Court said: “It is one thing to say that one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened right of privacy in his person. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened right of privacy in his entire house.” Id. at 391, 98 S.Ct. at 2413 (citations omitted). Other arguments were similarly rejected. I do not believe that it makes any difference that in Mincey a warrant was never obtained. The rule is that searches and seizures “conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few ... well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 390, 98 S.Ct. at 2412 (quoting Katz v. United States) (first emphasis added).
The question is not as my brothers put it of whether bad conduct should be allowed to spill over and affect consequences of truly independent good conduct. Majority Opinion at 32. Rather, the question is whether a warrantless entry, search and seizure of a home is to be forgiven because the police had probable cause, but with no exigent circumstances acted without having the warrant in hand. My brothers have carved out another exception to the war*669rant requirement of the fourth amendment: if probable cause exists and the application process for a warrant has begun, a warrantless entry, search and seizure become valid retroactively when the warrant arrives. I cannot agree. This may help convict criminals, but it violates the fourth amendment. I respectfully dissent.

. See e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 469 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 335-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973); United States v. Kelly, 683 F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 103 S.Ct. 305, 74 L.Ed.2d 285 (1982); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050, 95 S.Ct. 626, 42 L.Ed.2d 645 (1974); United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1144-45 (D.C.Cir.1981). See also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5 at 436-39 (1978).

. Compare United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973) (arrestee apprehended in neighborhood of his home and in presence of people he knew, yelled "Call my brother"; this, with other circumstances, raised great likelihood arrestee’s confederates at his home would be alerted to arrest and destroy evidence).

. The Sixth Circuit appears to have preceded the Ninth Circuit in so ruling on this issue but its initial holding is left in some doubt after a more recent case. Compare United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050, 95 S.Ct. 626, 42 L.Ed.2d 645 (1974) with United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.) (divided panel), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 808 (1980).