Court Opinion

ID: 9468011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:01:46.121159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:37.984965
License: Public Domain

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING BEFORE PANEL
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
The usual, and we believe preferred, practice where the opinions of the panel have already been expressed in majority and dissenting opinions is to rule without opinion on a motion for panel rehearing. It is only because of Judge Garth’s action in issuing an opinion sur the denial of rehearing in this case in which he has already authored a dissenting opinion that I am prompted to issue this opinion in response, notwithstanding my extreme regret for this proliferation of opinions.
The Secretary has filed a petition for rehearing which argues that the opinion of the court imposes “an unwarranted administrative burden” on Administrative Law *482Judges.1 The petition also refers to facts and predictions of caseloads and procedures which are not in the record, all of which Judge Garth repeats verbatim in his opinion as if they were properly before us.
The opinion of the court does not, as Judge Garth suggests, place an onerous burden on the ALJ called upon to decide whether a claimant is entitled to social security disability benefits. The opinion simply requires that the ALJ indicate that s/he has considered all the evidence, both for and against the claim, and provide some explanation of why s/he has rejected probative evidence which would have suggested a contrary disposition. As the opinion for the court makes clear, the ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.
Nor should this “requirement” disrupt the processing of disability claims. Judge Garth relies on additional statistics which have not even been proffered by the Secretary in the Petition for Rehearing. Even if they are correct, then approximately 50% of the applications handled by ALJs receive opinions; in cases which are appealed to the courts, the percentage no doubt is much higher. Especially when the ALJ has decided to write an opinion, it is difficult to credit the assertion that insistence on a concise explanation for the rejection of probative evidence will further delay adjudication of disability claims. The court’s opinion does not require the ALJ to undertake any additional inquiry, but merely to explain the basis for the decision to reject evidence which s/he has already made.
If anything, this court, by specifying the information it needs to conduct meaningful judicial review, contributes to enhanced understanding between the ALJs and the court and thereby facilitates the final resolution of applications for disability benefits.2 When the court articulates the prerequisites for review, it can subsequently expect the ALJs to furnish explanations adequate for the court to exercise its review function. This should reduce the time required for the court to review the record and obviate the need for remands to develop a more adequate record. In this way, the court’s decision in this case promises to expedite, rather than to obstruct, ultimate disposition of social security cases.

. The Secretary never makes the claim, as does Judge Garth, that “the majority’s decision . . . will have a devastating impact on the workload of the agency.” Dissenting opinion, at 484-485 (emphasis added).

. Even Judge Garth, in his dissent to the opinion of the court in this case, stated, “I cannot deny that requiring an ALJ to explain why he has rejected certain testimony may be very helpful and indeed would give added assurance to a reviewing court in reaching its decision.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 at 709 (3d Cir. 1981).