Court Opinion

ID: 9719813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:05:21.144434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:14.626607
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: Defendant agrees that its liability is primary but argues that its liability is restricted to the limits imposed by the financial responsibility statute. The trial court considered this issue as an affirmative defense and determined that: “The affirmative defense in defendant’s answer is substantially insufficient in law to state a defense to the cause of action alleged in the first amended complaint, because the endorsement relied upon is ineffective to reduce the amount of defendant’s primary insurance under the rule of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 34 Ill. 2d 424 (1966), and Automobile Undertvriters, Inc. v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company, 48 Ill. 2d 108 (1971).” As the opinion notes the cited cases do not pass upon the issue here considered. The opinion sets forth the endorsement which provides that “customers” shall not be considered “insured” except as provided in the three parts quoted, i.e., (1) where there is other available insurance to the limits of the statute there is no coverage, (2) where there is other available insurance but in an amount lower than the limits of financial responsibility defendant will pay additional amounts up to such limit, and (3) where there is no other insurance available defendant will pay the amount required by statute. The language of the endorsement discloses a scheme of coverage that, in effect, provides that defendant shall pay no more than the amounts provided in the financial responsibility statute. By its answer at trial and its argument here, defendant waives its claim to escape all liability if sufficient other insurance is available, or to pay only the difference between insufficient other available insurance and the amounts required under the financial responsibility law. The effect of such waiver is to make operative the third part of the endorsement, i.e., if no other insurance is available the defendant will pay amounts as provided by the financial responsibility statute. Section 3 — 317(f)(4) of the Illinois Vehicle Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 95M, par. 7 — 317(f)(4)), in effect at the date of the policy as well as presently, provided: “The policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider or endorsement which shall not conflict with the provisions of this Act shall constitute the entire contract between the parties.” Our courts have established that an endorsement of an insurance policy controls any provision of such policy which may conflict with the endorsement. (Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1956), 11 Ill. App. 2d 503, 137 N.E.2d 855; Metro Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Anthony (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 612,275 N.E.2d 296.) In Konrad, the policy stated a coverage up to *25,000 per person but an endorsement restricted coverage upon vehicles subject to the Illinois Truck Act to *5000. The court held that the endorsed limit controlled and reversed the judgment for a greater amount. In Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 408,287 N.E.2d 529, this court reviewed a number of Illinois cases restricting the definition of an insured and held that unless the case or a statute determined such restriction to be void or against public policy, it was the duty of the court to construe the contract as written and not to rewrite it. We find nothing which suggests that the endorsement is contrary to public policy or violates any statute. It is held that “omnibus” coverage is not required in the policy unless such policy is one that must be filed under the statute to show proof of financial responsibility. McCann v. Continental Casualty Co. (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 476,134 N.E.2d 302; Porterfield v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1960), 28 Ill. App. 2d 195,171 N.E.2d 108; Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 847, 285 N.E.2d 185; Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 408, 287 N.E.2d 529. Upon consideration of the law cited and the endorsement in all its terms, it seems clear that customers are not covered by the limit stated in the policy and any “omnibus” provision it may contain. The endorsement limits the coverage of customers to the amounts provided in the financial responsibility statute for the third paragraph provides that if there is no other insurance available the policy shall pay the statutory amount. By the terms of the endorsement as to customers, the “primary insurance” is the *10,000 to *20,000 coverage provided by the financial responsibility statute. In such view the endorsement as pleaded and argued does not have an effect to reduce the amount of primary insurance as the trial court found or to “activate” a reduction clause as the opinion states. I would reverse to the trial court with directions to enter judgment to the plaintiff in the sum of *20,000.