Court Opinion

ID: 9661745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:47:59.680165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:33.151055
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I concur in the r ^reversal and write only to underscore why the interrogation violated Miranda even though Wedgeworth was advised of his rights three times. He was advised prior to the taped interrogation and signed a waiver-of-rights form. He was advised again at the beginning of the taped interrogation and then a third time at the end of the interrogation. Nevertheless, because of his stated confusion over his right to counsel, I agree to reverse. As the majority correctly asserts, the police may properly interrogate a suspect in custody after he invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel only if the suspect initiates communication with the police and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives that right. See, e.g., Brussard v. State, 295 Ark. 296, 239 S.W.2d 71 (1988). The parties framed the issue in the instant case, in part, as whether the detective’s question, “So what do you want to do?” was an interrogation. However, the taped conversation admitted at trial was clearly an interrogation, so the real issue is whether, prior to making those statements, Wedgeworth initiated contact with the police and validly waived his right to counsel. The statements of both the detective and Wedgeworth in the instant case indicate that the appellant was confused about the nature of his right to counsel. First, the detective’s actions in response to Wedgeworth’s request for counsel cast doubt on whether he understood his rights. If the detective implied that the appellant could have an attorney present only if he could recall one’s name, it is difficult to conclude that Wedgeworth agreed to talk out of free and deliberate choice. Furthermore, the appellant’s own statements during the interrogation indicate a lack of understanding about the nature of his right to counsel. At the beginning of the taped interrogation, Detective Morrow said to the defendant, “O.K., James when . . . Ah . . . When I read you your rights. . . Ah ... You said you wanted your attorney present ... I give [sic] you an opportunity to . . . to . . . to tell me who your attorney was so we could get him up here ... is that correct?” Wedgeworth responded affirmatively. Then the detective said, “At that time you told me you didn’t have one but you wanted to go ahead and speak to me, is that correct?” Again, the appellant answered, “Yes sir.” Then, following the interrogation, the detective said to Wedgeworth, “O.K., As I said earlier . . . when I started talking to you . . . you said you wanted your attorney . . . but you didn’t have . . . you . . . you didn’t you didn’t have an attorney and you . . . you choose [sic] to go ahead and speak to me of your own free will ... is that correct?” The appellant then responded: “Yes... I did not know of a name of an attorney right offhand.” These exchanges support Wedgeworth’s assertion that he believed he was entitled to have counsel present only if he could think of the name of a lawyer. While the detective testified that he advised the appellant that he had the right to an attorney even if he could not afford one, he did not testify that he explained to Wedgeworth that he was entitled to an attorney even if he did not know one by name. In fact, the detective’s actions could reasonably be interpreted to imply the opposite. In short, I believe Wedgeworth could have made a statement after the detective reentered the room, had he fully understood his rights. But, again, the record indicates that he did not. Because the record leads me to believe that the defendant may well have thought that, if he could not think of his own attorney’s name, he had no right to counsel, I agree to reverse.