Court Opinion

ID: 9558651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:14:48.115189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:29.631835
License: Public Domain

Schultheis, C.J.
(dissenting) — Given the unusual facts of this case I would not find it necessary to reach the merits of Glen Fulps’s arguments regarding alleged misconduct by the confidential informant or the alleged law enforcement violation of the knock and announce rule. I would reverse and dismiss the case on the speedy trial violation pursuant to CrR 3.3.1
The plain language of CrR 3.3 does not directly address the issue presented by Mr. Fulps, i.e., when a defendant is released from jail on cash bail with no release order entered with the court. “When CrR 3.3 is silent, however, Washington courts have often looked to the ABA [American Bar Association] Standards Relating to Speedy Trial as an interpretive supplement.” State v. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388, 392, 779 P.2d 707 (1989).
“The time for trial should commence running, without demand by the defendant, as follows:
“(a) from the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been continuously held ... on bail . . . then the time for trial should commence running from the date the defendant was held to answer;”
Id. (quoting 2 American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal *945Justice, Standard 12-2, at 12-17 (2d ed. 1980)). More recently, the court in State v. Harris, 130 Wn.2d 35, 40, 921 P.2d 1052 (1996), stated:
The ABA standard cited in [State v. Peterson, 90 Wn.2d 423, 585 P.2d 66 (1978)] currently exists as 2 American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice Std. 12-2.2 (2d ed. 1980).
The ABA standard adopted by Peterson has been cited as controlling law in many subsequent cases. See, e.g., State v. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388, 392, 779 P.2d 707 (1989); State v. Anderson, 94 Wn.2d 176, 183, 616 P.2d 612 (1980); State v. Austin, 59 Wn. App. 186, 201, 796 P.2d 746 (1990); State v. Bradley, 38 Wn. App. 597, 599, 687 P.2d 856, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984). Even though the ABA standard adopted in Peterson cannot be found in CrR 3.3, standard 12-2.2 has been incorporated into the rules through Peterson’s adoption of the standard and Fladebo’s continued adherence to it. CrR 1.1 (“These rules . . . shall be interpreted and supplemented in light of the common law and the decisional law of this state.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 595, 845 P.2d 971 (1993).
Relying on Fladebo, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Fulps was not “held to answer” for purposes of speedy trial calculations from January 17, 1997, when he was released from jail on cash bail. However, I do agree with the majority’s conclusion that the procedure and form used to secure Mr. Fulps’s release were “conspicuously deficient under CrR 3.2.” Majority at 940. That rule states:
Order for Release. A court authorizing the release of the accused under this rule shall issue an appropriate order containing a statement of the conditions imposed, if any, shall inform the accused of the penalties applicable to violations of the conditions imposed, if any shall inform the accused of the penalties applicable to violations of the conditions of the accused’s release and shall advise the accused that a warrant for the accused’s arrest may be issued upon any such violation.
CrR 3.2(g) (emphasis added).
*946Mr. Fulps was not given an order of release, which would have set forth his mandatory due process right to notice of the conditions of his release and more importantly, the penalties associated with violation of those conditions. Mr. Fulps apparently did not even receive a preliminary hearing. Nowhere in the record does it state that Mr. Fulps was informed that his failure to personally appear at future court hearings could result in the loss of his bail money and/or the issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest. Nor was he informed of the obligatory language found in CrR 3.2B(c)(2), which states, in part: “If no complaint, information or indictment has been filed by the time set for release or reappearance, the defendant shall be immediately released from jail or deemed exonerated from all conditions of release.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority reasons that when no information was filed at the expiration of the 72-hour period, by operation of law Mr. Fulps was deemed exonerated from all conditions of release pursuant to CrR 3.2B(c)(2). The majority infers that, after 72 hours, Mr. Fulps had an affirmative duty to contact the superior court to request the return of his bail money. For this reason the majority concluded Mr. Fulps was not “held to answer” during the nearly six months it took the State to file charges against him.
The majority cites State v. Poirier, 34 Wn. App. 839, 840, 664 P.2d 7 (1983), as support for its conclusion. I respectfully disagree. The Poirier court stated:
We do not agree, however, with Poirier’s initial contention that the charges should have been dismissed with prejudice because of a violation of CrR 3.3. Poirier argues that, because he was arrested September 13, 1980, and released on posting a bail bond, he was being held to answer; thus the speedy trial clock of CrR 3.3 commenced running at that time. This argument might have merit had not the State on September 15 filed a “No Charges Filed” document pursuant to CrR 3.2A(c)(2). That rule states in part: “If no complaint, information or indictment has been filed by the time set for release or reappearance, the defendant shall be . . . deemed exonerated from all conditions of release.” Defendant was thus not held to *947answer, i.e., subjected to conditions of release, until he appeared February 23, 1981, to plead to an information filed February 9, 1981.
Id. (emphasis added). Poirier is distinguishable in that Mr. Fulps was required to pay $3,000 cash to be released on bail while Mr. Poirier posted a bond. Next, unlike Mr. Poirier, Mr. Fulps did not receive any form of notice that the State would not be filing charges against him at that time. Finally, Mr. Fulps did not receive notice that he was exonerated from any conditions imposed and was therefore entitled to have his bail money returned. State v. Paul, 95 Wn. App. 775, 778, 976 P.2d 1272 (1999).
It appears the trial court was also concerned about the lack of due process shown Mr. Fulps. During its decision on Mr. Fulps’s motion to dismiss the trial court said:
It’s clear from the record that Mr. Fulps, as the phrase is defined in State vs. [Parmele, 87 Wn.2d 139, 550 P.2d 536 (1976)], has been held to answer since the 17th of January, 1997. It would appear that he never did actually appear in District Court. Apparently he was arrested at some point and had posted bail, which I believe was around the 17th of January. Nothing occurred then until this matter was trialed [sic] in June of ’97, the 5th, by Information in Superior Court. There was a preliminary finding of probable cause and also setting of bail by Judge Dubois’ preliminary hearing, if you will, in District Court in Othello.
I think clearly we can all agree that someone dropped the ball, whether it be the District Court Judge or whether it be the Prosecutor’s Office, or a combination, but someone did. Because what’s supposed to happen on the preliminary appearance is . . . once the person is arrested and bail set, you have to bring them in. . . .
The Court Rules indicate that the Court is supposed to make provisions for the defendant to reappear or appear for the first time if that’s the case in District Court within the 72-hour period. . . . Now, in Parmaly [sic] the order itself setting the bail indicated that if the charges weren’t filed in 72 hours, the bond was exonerated .... It’s over until the Prosecutor
*948decides to refile. That would have been a process that could have been followed here, but wasn’t.
. . . But clearly, once the bail was set, the Prosecutor’s office if they weren’t there needed to be notified, you have 72 hours to do something here or Pm exonerating the bail. . . . That didn’t occur here. So unfortunately for Mr. Fulps he has been held to answer [as] that term suggests and is defined in Parmaly [sic] and some of the other cases.
. . . There’s no question there was not compliance with the Court Rules. However, this Court doesn’t have any authority, I don’t believe, under the present 3.3 rule to—there’s no basis for a sanction or dismissing the charge because the Court didn’t have control over the cause of action and the defendant until June [when the information was filed]. . . .
... I think under the status of the present rule and the [State v. Phillips, 66 Wn. App. 679, 833 P.2d 411 (1992), vacated, 121 Wn.2d 1001, 847 P.2d 919 (1993)] case tell me that I cannot dismiss the charges.
Report of Proceedings at 22-27 (Sept. 4, 1997) (emphasis added). Because there was no release order and no order exonerating the charges and returning the bail money the trial court determined that Mr. Fulps had been “held to answer” since January 17, 1997. I agree. Pursuant to ABA Standard 2.2, the 90-day speedy trial rule should have commenced that day and continued until an order exonerating the charge and/or conditions of release ($3,000 cash) was entered. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d at 392.
Several policy reasons also underlie my conclusion. Court rules should be construed to advance the purposes for which they were enacted. In re Discipline of McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). The purpose behind the speedy trial rule (CrR 3.3) is to provide “a prompt trial for the defendant once prosecution is initiated.” State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 216, 616 P.2d 620 (1980). This rule does not authorize a long delay in bringing a defendant before the court to answer a charge filed *949nearly six months after his release from jail on an arrest warrant, especially when the court continues to hold $3,000 cash that rightfully belongs to the defendant.
CrR 1.2 provides the criminal rules “shall be construed to secure . . . the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” The procedural errors in this case were very expensive to Mr. Fulps. Charges should have been filed within 72 hours or the case should have been dismissed with Mr. Fulps’s bail money returned to him. Since neither of these events occurred, Mr. Fulps was being held to answer for his crime since he was released from jail. “The superior court speedy trial rules were not designed to be a trap for the unwary.” Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d at 394. If the State (purposely or accidentally) chose not to dismiss the case, then CrR 3.3 applies, commencing January 17, 1997, the day the court took possession of Mr. Fulps’s bail money.
Finally, the majority cites the language contained in CrR 3.3(a)2 as authority for the trial court’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to grant Mr. Fulps’s motion to dismiss. I disagree and cite the same rule as authority that it was well within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss the charge on a speedy trial rule violation. By its own language, the court (not Mr. Fulps) had the responsibility of ensuring a trial in accordance with the speedy trial rule. The court retained possession of Mr. Fulps’s bail money for nearly six months. For these reasons I would find that Mr. Fulps was still being “held to answer” for his crime. Consequently, the speedy trial clock expired 90 days from January 17, 1997.
In a related issue, the trial court, relying on State v. Phillips, 66 Wn. App. 679, 833 P.2d 411 (1992), vacated, 121 Wn.2d 1001, 847 P.2d 919 (1993), determined it did not have jurisdiction to grant Mr. Fulps’s motion to dismiss until it had both the person and the charge (upon filing the information) before it. Because Phillips is not good case *950law the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of Mr. Fulps’s motion to dismiss on this ground as well.

The operative language of CrR 3.3, as relevant here, states in part:
“(c) Time for Arraignment and Trial.
“(1) Cases Filed Directly in Superior Court. ... A defendant released from jail whether or not subjected to conditions of release pending trial shall be brought to trial not later than 90 days after the date of arraignment.”

CrR 3.3(a) provides in part:
“(a) Responsibility of Court. It shall be the responsibility of the court to ensure a trial in accordance with this rule . . .