Court Opinion

ID: 9719028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:41:03.46971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.289085
License: Public Domain

REGAN, Acting P. J.
I dissent. I believe the 1978 legislative amendments give defendants Robert, Lillian and Bruce Boal absolute immunity from any liability to plaintiffs premised on the Boals’ “furnishing” of alcoholic beverages as social hosts. I believe this is so because the amendments apply retroactively to immunize social hosts from the kind of liability asserted in this case. In this regard, it is particularly the “social host” liability which is without effect at the time of the incident here, as I believe the doctrine defining this liability in Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669], was in fact stillborn. My explanation follows.
First, it is fundamental that a statute be interpreted to effectuate the legislative intent. (Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686 [91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17].) Courts must look then for expressions of legislative intent. In order to determine what the legislative intent is, “all pertinent factors” must be considered. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, *1179746 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].) Some of these factors are; (1) purposes of the legislation; (2) public policy; (3) history and background; (4) evils to be remedied; and (5) the express language of the statute. (Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 587.)
“In determining the legislative intent, the court turns first to the words used in the statute. [Citations.] The words, however, must be read in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear [citations], and the statutory language applied must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the objective of the law [citations].” (Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 273 [158 Cal.Rptr. 683].)
While the instant legislation obviously does not use the word “retroactive,” I note that both Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 contain express language which could be construed as giving the legislation retroactive effect. Specifically, Civil Code section 1714 states: “It is the intent of the legislature to abrogate the holdings [of Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164 (95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151) and its progeny] and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section . . . .” (Italics added.) Similarly, Business and Professions Code section 25602, subdivision (c), states “The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in [Vesely and its progeny] be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation . . . .” (Italics added.) I interpret this language to mean two things. First, the Legislature never intended Business and Professions Code section 25602 to be used to create a duty to a class of persons, nor should the breach of such duty have been used as the basis for a presumption of negligence. Second, the Legislature never intended the court to modify the common law notion of proximate cause under which the consumption rather than the serving of alcohol was the proximate cause of injuries caused by intoxicated patrons.
If the Legislature never intended such liability in the 'first place, it is logically absurd to deny a retroactive application of the amendments. Courts must avoid an interpretation which attributes a logical absurdity to the legislation being construed. (Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co. (1943) 23 Cal.2d 110, 113 [142 P.2d 929].)
This interpretation means the Legislature is in effect telling us what its intent was when it first passed Business and Professions Code section 25602 and what its intent is now. Although the authority to interpret preexisting legislation is a power belonging exclusively to the judiciary (Matter of Coburn (1913) 165 Cal. 202, 209 [131 P. 352]), an express declaration by the *1180Legislature of what its intent was in an earlier enactment (through prior judicial interpretation) may be considered together with other factors in arriving at what the true intent of the Legislature is. (People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 374, 389 [169 Cal.Rptr. 183].)
It is true that a plausible interpretation of the 1978 amendments might be that the Legislature initially intended Business and Professions Code section 25602 to be interpreted to establish civil liability and only later changed its collective mind in 1978 following the public outcry over Vesely. However, both the history surrounding that section and its express language lead me to conclude the Legislature never intended it to be used as a basis for civil liability, particularly for social hosts. I assume the mandate in Business and Professions Code section 25602 “that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in \Vesely and its progeny] be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation . . . .” directs us to look at the common law as it existed under Tammers v. Pacific Electric Ry. (1921) 186 Cal. 379 [199 P. 523], Hitson v. Dwyer (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 803 [143 P.2d 952]; Fleckner v. Dionne (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 246 [210 P.2d 530], and Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345 [289 P.2d 450].1
In Cole, the California Supreme Court stated: “A number of jurisdictions have adopted statutes creating a right of action, . . . California, however, has enacted no such statute notwithstanding the fact that, as hereinafter shown, its Legislature has repeatedly dealt with problems concerning alcoholic beverages and concerning tort liability.” (45 Cal.2d at pp. 348-349.) “[T]he Legislature . . . has at no time seen fit to adopt a statute inconsistent with the common law so far as concerns a remedy for injury or death following the furnishing of liquor . . . .” (Id., at p. 355.)2
In addition, the fact that the Legislature could have reacted to the statutory interpretation contained in Cole, but didn’t, indicates the Cole court correctly interpreted the legislative intent at that time. I view this legislative inaction as extrinsic evidence that the Legislature either never intended the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act to impose dram shop liability, or that it acquiesced in the Cole interpretation. “. . . [I]f the Legislature does not see *1181fit to change the language of the statute, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and by its failure to amend the section has approved the decision as a statement of legislative intent. [Citations omitted.]” (People v. Strohl (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 359-360 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].)
By reinstating prior judicial interpretation and expressly eliminating social host liability for the furnishing of alcoholic beverages, the Legislature is telling us that it never intended Business and Professions Code section 25602 to be used to establish civil liability and that it is satisfied with the old law under Cole. I read this as an implicit, if not explicit, statement that the Legislature intends Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 to be given retroactive effect.
Sagadin is not persuaded by this argument and queries if the Legislature went to such pains to express its intent, why did it fail to include an urgency clause in either Business and Professions Code section 25602 or Civil Code section 1714?
Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution authorizes the Legislature to pass urgency legislation or emergency legislation on a two-thirds vote, following a finding that the legislation is necessary for the “ ‘immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety ....’” (Davis v. County of Los Angeles (1938) 12 Cal.2d 412, 418 [84 P.2d 1034].) Any law passed by the Legislature which is deemed an urgency measure will go into immediate effect.
However, given that the authority for urgency legislation is dependent on finding the legislation is necessary for the “immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety” (ibid.), I find the absence of an urgency clause to be less than significant. Amending civil procedure to immunize social hosts from civil liability is not per se a question of public peace, health or safety, except perhaps inasmuch as it supports the welfare of trial attorneys.
In light of the fact the Legislature (1) may have been operating under the assumption the language of the legislation implicitly contained expressions of intent to apply retroactively, and (2) is aware that “urgency” clauses are only used in cases where the legislation is necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety, I am unable to conclude the absence of an urgency clause is controlling.
Since Marriage of Bouquet directs us to “impute weight to expressions of intent in accord with their probative value” (16 Cal.3d at p. 590), I give *1182greater weight to the express language “reinstate prior judicial interpretation” contained in Civil Code section 1714 as evidence the Legislature intended Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714 to apply retroactively.
Furthermore, as I noted at the outset, Bouquet requires us to look at “all pertinent factors” (italics added) which may aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. Therefore, I turn to the “public policy” behind the amendments. (Id., at p. 587.) “Public policy considerations include the purpose to be served by the new rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 153 [181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305], citing Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203, 87 S.Ct. 1967].)
As I noted earlier, the express intent of the Legislature is to “reinstate prior judicial interpretation.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.) If we reinstate prior judicial interpretation and apply it prospectively (i.e., only to causes of action arising after Jan. 1, 1979), we create an anomaly. A statutory cause of action which arose on December 31, 1978, would be decided under Vesely, supra, 5 Cal.3d 153 and Coulter, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, while an identical cause of action which arose on January 1, 1979, would be decided under the 1978 legislation. It would be logically absurd to establish an 8-month “window,” within which social hosts face liability for injuries to third persons, some of whom conceivably may wait until they have reached their majority to pursue a cause of action against such hosts, stemming from an 8-month “window” years before.3
As I see it, the purpose of the legislation is to provide a broad immunity to social hosts from suits arising as a result of injuries caused by intoxicated guests. A similarly sweeping immunity is granted to licensed servers under Business and Professions Code section 25602, with one narrow exception pertaining to “obviously intoxicated minorfs].” (See Cory v. Shierloh (1981) 29 Cal.3d 430, 436 [174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8].)
However, this case does not involve the effect of the entire Vesely line of decisions, but only the doctrine set forth in Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, namely “social host” liability. Coulter was, as I view it, stillborn. While Sagadin argues the Legislature may have silently “approved” of the Vesely line of decisions, and later changed its mind, certainly the Legislature could not have “approved” of Coulter so.
*1183Indeed, the 1978 legislation was originally introduced as Senate Bill No. 1645 on March 2, 1978, expressly abrogating only Vesely and Bernhard. The California Supreme Court decided Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, definitively establishing social host liability, in an opinion filed April 26, 1978. By May 17, Senate Bill No. 1645 was amended in the Senate to add Coulter to the list of cases to be abrogated, with additional provisions to immunize “social hosts.” Senate Bill No. 1645 was passed by the Senate on May 24, as amended, passed by the Assembly on August 28, and approved by the Governor on September 19. (1978 Stats., ch. 929, § 2, p. 2904; Sen. Final Hist. (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) p. 895; Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1645 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) May 17, 1978.) In the eyes of the public, Coulter had a shelf life of 147 days from the time of the decision to the signing of the bill abrogating it by name, and only 22 days from the time of the decision to its inclusion in the bill expressly abrogating it. In my eyes, this constitutes clear and convincing evidence the Legislature did not intend ever to give effect to Coulter, and that it never intended to provide for such liability through the statutory scheme. Insofar as I cited People v. Strohl, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 347, for the proposition that the Legislature “approved” of the Cole interpretation (i.e., “by [the Legislature’s] failure to amend the section, [it] has approved the decision as a statement of its legislative intent”) clearly, here, the reverse corollary pertains; the Legislature wasted no time in abrogating Coulter.
The majority points to the decision in Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951 [166 Cal.Rptr. 233], to support its conclusion the 1978 legislation operated prospectively only. While I disagree with the holding in Fosgate in any case, I think it is distinguishable from the instant case. I read Fosgate as holding that the repeal of a statutory remedy without a savings clause will terminate all pending statutory causes of action (id., at p. 960), but will not terminate pending common law causes of action. (Id., at pp. 960-961.) Since Fosgate was an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, all the plaintiff had to prove was whether on the face of the pleading under attack she sufficiently states a cause of action. Fosgate pled a common law cause of action in addition to a claim relying on Business and Professions Code section 25602 and Evidence Code section 669. Thus, by relying on her common law cause of action, Fosgate could avoid a judgment on the pleadings regardless of whether the repeal rule in Southern Service Co. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 963] and Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 [135 Cal.Rptr. 526, 558 P.2d 1] applied.
Because Sagadin’s cause of action is based solely on Business and Professions Code section 25658 and Evidence Code section 669,4 the distinction *1184in Fosgate between statutory and common law causes of action is inapposite. Since I view Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (c), as a repeal of the civil remedies which were previously available under either Business and Professions Code sections 25602 or 25658 and Evidence Code section 669, the repeal rule in Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra, at page 11 has the effect of cutting off Sagadin’s pending cause of action based on Business and Professions Code section 25658.
Finally, I turn to Sagadin’s argument that the Legislature may not validly repeal statutory remedies when to do so would deprive a person of a vested right or impair the obligation of contract. “Where a statute operates immediately to cut off an existing remedy and by retroactive application deprives a person of a vested right, it is ordinarily invalid because it conflicts with the due process clause of the federal and state constitutions. [Citations omitted.]” (California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 215 [187 P.2d 702].)
However, it is equally well-settled that when a pending cause of action is founded on a statute, a repeal of the statute before final judgment destroys the right of action. (People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo (1910) 159 Cal. 65, 77-78 [112 P. 866].) This must apply equally when there is an annulment of the rights based on a statute. Rights of action which are derived from a statute are inchoate until perfected by a final judgment. (Id., pp. 77-78; Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 170 [74 P.2d 252]; People v. One 1953 Buick (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358, 365 [19 Cal.Rptr. 488, 369 P.2d 16].)
Sagadin’s right to a statutory cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 25628 was inchoate because it had not been reduced to a final judgment prior to the 1978 amendments. Therefore, he cannot claim the application of the 1978 amendments to his pending cause of action cut off any vested rights.
I would reverse the judgment against the Boals.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied January 9, 1986, and the petitions of appellant Sagadin, respondents Ripper and Chuck Swift Dodge-Chrysler for review by the Supreme Court were denied March 19, 1986.

For analyses of what constitutes the prior judicial interpretation, see generally Comment, Civil Liability for Furnishing Liquor in California (1974) 5 Pacific L.J. 186; Comment, Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol (1979) 10 Pacific L.J. 95; Liquor Law Liability in California (1973) 14 Santa Clara Law. 46; Dram Shop Liability (1969) 57 Cal.L.Rev. 995.

Although the court in Cole did not specifically consider the question of the defendant’s alleged violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and instead prevented the plaintiff’s recovery under common law notions of proximate cause, Cole contains broad language which indicates the Legislature did not intend the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act to be used as a basis for statutory dram shop liability.

It would be equally illogical to assert that liability based on Coulter could extend retroactively before the date of decision in Coulter, especially in light of the 1978 legislative amendments abrogating Coulter and reinstating prior judicial interpretation, i.e., such as existed before the date of decision in Coulter.

Evidence Code section 669 provides in part; “(a) The failure of a person to exercise due *1184care is presumed if: [¶] (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; [¶] (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; [¶] (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.”