Court Opinion

ID: 9686264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:36:36.192449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:16.867921
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh and McCown, JJ.,
dissenting.
The plaintiff attempted to raise the issue of the ap*173plicability and constitutionality of section 16-679, R. R. S'. 1943, in both the district court and in this court. The opinion of the majority holds that section 16-679, R. R. S. 1943, is applicable and that the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of the statute in this action.
The plaintiff is an integrated public utility providing natural gas service to wholesale and retail customers in four states. In Nebraska the plaintiff serves 52,926 retail customers within the boundaries of 141 separate municipalities, and 11,513 rural retail customers.
Section 16-679, R. R. S. 1943, enacted in 1901, authorizes the mayor and council in cities of the first class to regulate and fix the rates for gas supplied by an individual or private-corporation “operating such works or plants.” The reference is to manufactured gas produced from oil or coal or both in a gas works located in the city.
Natural gas is produced from underground sources and transmitted by pipeline to distribution centers. Manufactured gas is produced by local plants or works at the distribution center and is not transmitted through long-distance pipelines. Natural gas was not used in Nebraska before 1930.
In considering a similar statute, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in Citizens Utilities Co. v. City of Rocky Ford, 132 Colo. 427, 289 P. 2d 165, said: “The meaning of this statute when construed in the light of subsequent events, must be discovered by giving consideration to the language of the statute as it was understood at the time of its enactment. No new meaning can be given thereto because of changed conditions. This statute cannot be construed as broad enough to include a natural gas distribution system. The very wording of the statute when applied to conditions existing at the time of its passage, if defendants’ contention be considered at all, certainly provokes a doubt, to say the least, as to the meaning of ‘gasworks,’ and invoking the well-settled rule, if a doubt exists as to the power of a *174municipality to create or acquire a natural gas distribution system under this statute, then such doubt is resolved against the municipality. Since municipal corporations are creatures of statute, they are confined to the powers specifically granted thereby. Notice is to be given to the fact that in 1899 distribution of natural gas was unknown. Such gas as was available for use at that time was artificial gas, manufactured in what may be termed a ‘gasworks,’ and distributed by its particular system, and it follows that a word used in the statute of that date does not include everything to which that word may be applied at the present time. At that time the legislature" could not have contemplated that municipalities in the state of' Colorado would, at the present time, be using natural gas, and therefore the word it employed at that time could have'referred only to artificial or manufactured gas.” See, also, Application of Village of Walthill, 125 F. Supp. 859, holding that a gas plant or gas works is an establishment where gas is manufactured.
' We think that the proper interpretation of section 16-679, R. R. S. 1943, is that it has no application to an integrated natural gas distribution system such as that operated by the plaintiff, and that the Legislature has not delegáted the power to regulate this type of utility.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to enjoin the defendant city from preventing the plaintiff from putting its proposed rates into effect. It was not a continuation of the. proceeding before the-city council of the defendant city'or a form of direct review' of the action of the city council. The rule upon which the majority relies refers to an attempt to challenge the validity of a statute in the same action in which the. benefit of the statute' is claimed.
In Shields v. City of Kearney, 179 Neb. 49, 136 N. W. 2d 174, the plaintiffs “appealed” to the district court “from the enactment of • the' ordinance” *and' then' attempted to challenge the validity of the ■ statute which *175purported to authorize the “appeal.” They had invoked the benefit of the statute to obtain a determination that the action of the city was not authorized. We think the better rule is that the plaintiff is not estopped in this action from questioning the applicability or constitutionality of section 16-679, R. R. S. 1943.
In Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 119 Neb. 153, 227 N. W. 922, this court held that since the plaintiff had accepted benefits arising from the Bank Depositors’ Guaranty Law, it was estopped to question the validity of an assessment made under the law. In holding that the plaintiff was not estopped, the United States Supreme Court, in Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 51 S. Ct. 252, 75 L. Ed. 690, said: “The banks were not bound for all time, regardless of consequences.”
We think it is clear that the regulation of the rates of an integrated utility, such as the plaintiff, is not a matter of local concern, but is a matter of statewide concern. It is a power which was not delegated by the Legislature under the statute passed in 1901.