Court Opinion

ID: 9668181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:04:55.364288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:43.394554
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Judge,
dissenting.
The issue presented in this cause is whether Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution provides greater protection against double jeopardy than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In my opinion, it does not.
Appellant was charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. His first trial ended in a mistrial. His second trial also ended in a mistrial, granted at his request, after the State introduced evidence before the jury of a criminal act committed by appellant other than that charged in the information. Before the State could try appellant for the third time, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging the third trial was jeopardy barred under both the United States and the Texas Constitutions.
The habeas judge found that while the State did adduce testimony of the extraneous criminal act improperly in order to prejudice the jury against appellant, it did not do so with the intent to goad appellant into moving for a mistrial. Furthermore, appellant moved for the mistrial. The habeas judge refused to dismiss the prosecution against appellant. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed. Bander v. State, 880 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” (Emphasis added.)
Texas Constitution Article I, Section 14 provides: “Double Jeopardy. No person for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction.”
In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment generally does not bar the retrial of the defendant following the granting of a mistrial upon the defendant’s own motion. “Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant’s motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause ... Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant *710raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. at 2089. Therefore, appellant, to prevail under the federal constitutional standard established by Kennedy, is required to show that the prosecutorial conduct giving rise to his successful motion for mistrial was intended to provoke or “goad” him into moving for a mistrial. Appellant concedes, on page fifteen of his brief in support of his petition for discretionary review, that he cannot prevail under the federal standard.
Appellant avers nonetheless that Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
This Court, in Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), held it was not bound to construe state constitutional provisions in the same way that the United States Supreme Court construes comparable provisions in the federal constitution. We held that in interpreting Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, we will not be bound by Supreme Court decisions addressing the comparable Fourth Amendment issue. Heitman, at 690. Thus, we are free to find that provisions of the Texas Constitution provide more rights to the citizens of Texas than under comparable provisions of the federal constitution.
An examination of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 shows the two are very similar. We have previously stated that “conceptually the State and Federal double jeopardy provisions are identical.” Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). See also Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391, 393, n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Appellant’s contention that the Texas Constitution provides more double jeopardy protection than its federal counterpart is not supported by its language.
Appellant concedes in his brief that he can find no indication the framers of the Texas Constitution intended to provide greater protection from double jeopardy than that provided by the Fifth Amendment.
Both the State’s and the Appellant’s briefs recognize that the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution has its origins in various sources, such as the British common law, Spanish law, the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of several states.
Several state supreme courts have explicitly adopted the Oregon v. Kennedy standard under their state constitutions, including Virginia (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 814, 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994)); Kentucky (Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983); North Carolina (State v. White, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988)). We have also held that we will use a standard substantially identical to the Oregon v. Kennedy standard in cases where appellant claims jeopardy after having asked for and been granted a mistrial. Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
The only two states that have adopted appellant’s position — that mere prosecutorial indifference to appellant’s rights resulting in a mistrial should prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds — are Oregon (State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983)); and Arizona (Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984)). In my opinion, appellant has not, based on jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, provided adequate cause for us to reverse our prior decision in Anderson to adopt the Oregon v. Kennedy standard.
The Oregon v. Kennedy standard, which provides that a retrial is not barred by the federal double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment following granting of a mistrial on appellant’s motion absent a showing the State intended to goad him into requesting a mistrial, has worked effectively since it was set forth thirteen years ago. Appellant’s suggested indifference standard — if adopted — may well lead to unfortunate consequences. In my opinion, it is based on a sort of negligence theory and could lead to a bar to retrials following granting of mistrials due to aggressive prosecutorial tactics made in good faith in the heat of trial, but found by trial judges to have prejudiced defendants’ rights. In effect, the majority opinion could very well lead to a bar to a retrial, on double jeopardy grounds, in any case where, due to *711prosecutorial error that the trial court determines cannot be cured by a jury instruction, a mistrial is granted on the defendant’s motion. Requiring, in order to avoid a retrial and thus have the charges against him dismissed, a criminal defendant to show the State intentionally goaded him into moving for a mistrial is not an unreasonable standard and it has worked to protect both the rights of a criminal defendant not to be subjected to unjustified multiple trials as well as the right of the State to a full and fair opportunity to present its case against that defendant.
For the reasons above, it is my opinion that Article I, Section 14 of the Texas Constitution provides the same protection against double jeopardy as the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, this Court should continue to apply the standard established in Oregon v. Kennedy in cases where appellants allege retrials are jeopardy-barred following granting of mistrials on appellants’ own motions.
I respectfully dissent.