Court Opinion

ID: 9446392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:53:15.477605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:38.003788
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting).
The majority says that if appellant had “remained standing where he was first accosted * * * , the police would have lacked probable cause either to arrest or to search him.” That is certainly true.
His attempt to run away when he was accosted did not give the police probable cause to believe he was violating the narcotics laws. The majority does not say that it did. Indeed, the Government conceded at the argument that none of the circumstances observed by the officers gave them probable cause to arrest appellant for a narcotics violation. The officers themselves apparently knew this, for they made the arrest on an illegal entry charge, not a narcotics charge. The question before us, then, is whether there was probable cause to believe that appellant was attempting to enter the dwelling in question in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3102. Appellant’s being with a known addict, his flight, his possible attempt to get rid of the narcotics before he was caught, in short everything that happened before his alleged attempt to get into the house, are irrelevant to the question before us.
The usual question in the “probable cause” cases is whether what the officers observed justified them in believing that the defendant had done a certain criminal act. This case is different. There is no question as to what appellant did, for whatever he did was done in the presence of the officers. The question here is whether those acts amounted to a crime. If they did not, the officers had no right to make the arrest.1
D.C.Code § 22-3102 makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $100 or imprisonment for up to six months or both, to “attempt to enter [any] * * * dwelling * * * against the will of the lawful occupant * * *.” Emphasis supplied. It is a necessary element of the offense that the attempt be against the will of the lawful occupant. The statute cannot be read to make it a crime to enter or attempt to enter a house merely without the consent of the lawful occupant. An attempt to enter after the owner has forbidden it is a crime. But one who enters when the owner has neither consented to it nor forbidden it, though he may be guilty of a civil trespass, does not violate the criminal statute.2 Under another clause of the statute such a person becomes guilty of illegal entry only if, after being ordered to leave, he fails to do so. Salesmen, solicitors or other nuisances who may enter our homes uninvited when they find the door unlocked are not subject to arrest unless they refuse to leave when ordered out.
*184To justify this arrest, therefore, the Government must show that appellant attempted to enter the house against the will of the householder, not merely without her consent.
Taking as true the officers’ own account of what happened,3 I conclude that appellant committed no crime. They said that appellant ran into the front yard of the house, past Mrs. Briggs, the householder, who was sitting on a bench in the yard, ran up the steps, placed his hand on the door knob as if trying to open the door and then “bounced off the door” into the arms of one of the officers who was right behind him.4 The officers seized him and, with the aid of the second officer who then came up and flashed his badge, arrested him. The officer who was right behind appellant as he went up the stairs testified as follows:
“Q. What did she [Mrs. Briggs] say and when did she say it before the defendant bounced off the door? A. As he was going past, she asked him, she says, T live here, where are you going?’ And then he tried the door and she said, ‘Get away from the door.’ ”
Thus the only expression of Mrs. Briggs’ will that appellant not enter her house 5 occurred after he had attempted to enter. And after she ordered him away, the record shows he made no further attempt to enter, for the police seized him immediately after his one attempt. Therefore the statute was not violated.
Since the arrest was illegal, appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant thereto should have been granted. I would reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

. If appellant’s attempt to get into the house amounted to a crime we would reach some of the problems, pressed on us by appellant, as to whether the police may, in effect, manufacture the justification for searching a mere suspect by spurring him into committing some misdemeanor. E. g., is a person liable to arrest for illegal entry if he runs into the nearest house, against the owner’s will, in an attempt to flee from threatened violence by unidentified assailants? If, instead of forcing his way into a house in flight from the apparent threat, the person runs across a street against a traffic light, may the police arrest him and, if so, may they search Mm? Since appellant’s conduct did not amount to a crime, as I view the case, these problems do not arise.

. If the entry is made by opening a closed door and if it is accompanied by an intent to commit a criminal offense, the person is, of course, guilty of housebreaking under D.C.Code § 22-1801.

. In certain material respects, the householder’s account varied from that of the officers.

. The officer testified that he “took off” after appellant and, though he did not run, but only walked “at a fast gait,” was close enough to catch him as “he bounced off the door and bounced right back into my arms.” Mrs. Briggs said that appellant also only “walked” past her and up the stairs.

. From Mrs. Briggs’ testimony it does not appear that she ordered appellant away from her door. It appears rather that she ordered the police to make their arrest off her property. She testified that, when the officers told her they wanted appellant, she told them “You all take him in the street.”