Court Opinion

ID: 9454911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:03:32.858553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:22.468856
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
To a very substantial degree testimony considered by the jury in convicting appellant was given by an accomplice. This witness at the time of testifying was actually serving a prison sentence for bank robbery. Moreover, on cross-' examination he admitted that he made his living through robberies. In arguing the case to the jury the defense accordingly attacked the credibility of this witness. In responding to this attack the prosecuting attorney pointed to the difficulties in general of obtaining evidence of crime, and went on to say:
You get it from within.
Perhaps some of you read Truman Capote’s book, In Cold Blood. He probably made a million dollars writing that story.
If you read the story you know that that vicious, horrendous crime would not have been solved but for an accomplice coming forward, someone who heard something, one from the criminal ranks coming up. The crime is solved.
If you go back a little bit farther in history, back into the early 30’s, with John Dillinger- — there is not one of you who doesn’t remember the fact about Dillinger.
After he plagued the country for a long time, was a fugitive, the Bureau of Investigation trying to find him, he robbed another bank, he is locked up again, he escapes again, he kills a policeman in the city of Chicago.
But Dillinger can’t be found. How do you find Dillinger? Only from someone from within the criminal ranks coming forward, the notorious lady in red.
She came forward, and you will recall she told the partner of the policeman who had been killed where Dillinger would be on a given night and as he came out of the theater and moved for his gun, he was killed.
Had he not been killed surely other policemen would have been killed and other banks would have been robbed.
But crimes, not just today, not the crime of December 1, 1965, but crimes throughout history are solved in large measure by the cooperation of some criminals who come forward.
At the conclusion of the arguments objection was made by counsel for ap*820pellant’s eodefendant in the form set forth in the margin, pointing to the prejudice to all defendants.1
This argument by the representative of the government undoubtedly prejudiced appellant. If proper of course he must stand the prejudice. If improper, reversal is required in my opinion. I think the argument was highly improper. It was a deliberate attempt to persuade the jury to accept this witness’ testimony because certain notorious criminals had been brought to justice, or their criminal careers ended, through the aid of informers. These references did not have the slightest relevance to the credibility of the accomplice who testified in this case.
The court advised the jury that the argument referred to was solely to illustrate that on occasion informers came from former associates of persons charged with crime. I respectfully disagree that this was its sole purpose.2 There was no need for the prosecutor to refer to the notorious Dillinger and other cases to furnish such an illustration, for this accomplice himself was illustrative. The main purpose was to press upon the jury extraneous instances wholly unrelated to the case on trial so as to persuade the jury to accept the credibility of this accomplice because of the service rendered the government by informers in the other instances mentioned. Moreover, the problem was not whether on occasion informers come from former associates of persons accused of crime; it was whether this accomplice, on the basis of his criminal record, should be believed. Of course the jury had a right to believe him, but not because of the Dillinger episode or the crimes described by Mr. Capote.
It seems to me the prosecutor, in his dilemma over the weakness of the testimony he was relying upon, due to the witness having a very grave criminal record, did not adhere to “the highest practical standard of fairness” the court approves, quoting from the opinion in McFarland v. United States, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 197, 150 F.2d 593, 594; and see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314; Cross v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 353 F.2d 454.
The test of prejudice3 has been firmly established by the Supreme Court:
But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is *821left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1240, 90 L.Ed. 1557.
Dillinger’s career of crime, and the crimes described in In Cold Blood, had “no inferable connection with the case” against this appellant. See Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295, 298-299 (5th Cir.). And I am “left in grave doubt” — Kotteakos v. United States, supra, — that reliance by the prosecution upon those unconnected instances had no substantial influence upon the verdict. The case against appellant, depending upon a questioned identification, was close. Compare McFarland and Cross, both supra. Indeed, at a previous trial the jury had been unable to agree upon a conviction. The testimony of the accomplice was crucial and should not have gained credence because of the prosecution’s reliance upon the Dillinger and In Cold Blood cases.
I respectfully dissent.

. [Counsel]: - * * may I respectfully move Your Honor to withdraw a juror at this stage and declare a mistrial upon the rebuttal argument of the Government, which included two references to a theory designed to inflame this jury against the defendants and did in fact prejudice this defendant.
One was his reference to Truman Capote’s book, which had no place in this trial at all, but even more important was his reference to John Dillinger and the role that Dillinger played in criminal activities and likened that role to these three defendants.
I submit that this was highly inflammatory. It was designed to be such and did in fact prejudice these defendants.
The court: As I recall, [the prosecutor’s] words, those two references had to do solely with the spectacle of one who is involved with criminals coming forward and giving state’s evidence.
I will deny your motion.

. Even were I to agree that this was its sole purpose I would still consider the references improper, and prejudicial in their effect.

. The opinion of the court in the present case states:
The appellant here would have us say that such references inevitably led to his being prejudiced. We are not persuaded that the incident so transcended the bounds of legitimate argument as to require reversal.