Court Opinion

ID: 2963977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:22.709098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:53.652303
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1559

                                  ONE NATIONAL BANK,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                                JOSEPH M. ANTONELLIS,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                         and Skinner,* Senior District Judge.
                                       _____________________

                                _____________________

               Dale R. Harger,  with whom Mountain, Dearborn  & Whiting and
               ______________             _____________________________
          Howard J. Potash were on brief for appellant.
          ________________
               George  A. Berman,  with  whom Cynthia  C.  Smith, Susan  S.
               _________________              __________________  _________
          Riedel and  Posternak,  Blankstein  &  Lund  were  on  brief  for
          ______      _______________________________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 3, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.    In  this legal  malpractice
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.
                                ___________

          action,  appellant-plaintiff One  National  Bank  ("ONB" or  "One

          National") appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment

          for appellee-defendant Joseph M. Antonellis ("Antonellis").   Two

          principal  issues  are  raised  on  appeal:    first,  whether  a

          nonclient can  maintain an action  against an attorney  when that
          _________

          attorney negligently certifies to  a mortgagee that the  title is

          good,  and  the mortgagee  then  assigns  the title  certificate,

          mortgage, and all  associated documents to the  nonclient in good

          faith; and second, whether  the mortgagee's assignee can maintain

          an  action  for negligent  title  certification  pursuant to  the

          Massachusetts title certification statute,  Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93,

            70.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    In  late 1987,  Milford Savings  Bank ("Milford")  lent

          $100,000 to Thomas J.  Milani and Thomas Chamberlin, individually

          and as trustees of T & T Realty Trust, and to Jaqueline Wojnowski

          and Cathy A.  Milani, individually.   A mortgage  on property  in

          Bellingham, Massachusetts  served as security  (the "first Milani

          mortgage").   A few months later, in April of 1988, Thomas J. and

          Cathy  A.  Milani  (together,  the  "Milanis")  executed  another

          mortgage  on  the same  property, also  to  Milford, to  secure a

          $150,000  loan  (the  "second  Milani mortgage").    Milford  was

          represented in  the 1988  transaction by appellee  Antonellis, an

                                         -2-

          attorney.

                    Some  months later,  on  August  10, 1988,1  Antonellis

          issued  a  certification  of  title,  which  certified  that  the

          mortgagors   held  title   to   the  property   "free  from   all

          encumbrances,  and the  mortgagee  [held] a  good and  sufficient

          record first mortgage to the property."2  No mention  was made of

          the first Milani  mortgage.   The certification  also included  a

          disclaimer,  which stated:  "THIS  CERTIFICATE IS NOT  TO BE USED

          FOR  TITLE   INSURANCE  PURPOSES  WITHOUT  THE   EXPRESS  WRITTEN

          PERMISSION OF  JOSEPH M. ANTONELLIS, ESQUIRE."   While Antonellis

          was preparing the title certificate, according to his deposition,

          a Milford bank  official called  him around the  time the  second

          Milani mortgage  was executed.  The  official informed Antonellis

          of  the  first  Milani mortgage,  and  stated  that  it would  be

          subordinated to  the April 1988 second Milani mortgage.  However,

          it appears that Milford never subordinated the mortgage.

                    In the meantime, ONB purchased a package of eighty-five

          adjustable rate  one-year first mortgages from  Milford on August

          2, 1988, including the second Milani  mortgage.  ONB did not hire

          an attorney  to check  these mortgages' certifications  of title.

                              
          ____________________

          1  The district court noted that  Antonellis claimed that it took
          several months to  prepare the formal certificate  because he was
          too busy.

          2  Antonellis' certification is made up of two documents:  a form
          entitled  "Certification of  Title,"  dated May  3,  1988, and  a
          second  form  entitled  "Attorney's  Certification  of  Title  to
          Mortgagee  and Mortgagor[s]," dated August 10,  1988.  The former
          document  was   attached  to  the  latter   and  incorporated  by
          reference.

                                         -3-

          Subsequently,  Milford was  declared insolvent  in early  July of

          1990, and the  Milanis defaulted  on both their  mortgages.   The

          Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")  took over Milford

          and  was  appointed  its  receiver.    The  FDIC  repudiated  the

          agreement between Milford and ONB.

                    Faced   with   this   situation,  One   National   sued

          Antonellis,  the  FDIC,  and the  Milanis.    The district  court

          granted  summary judgment to defendants Antonellis and FDIC.  One

          National  dismissed  its action  against  the  Milanis, and  here

          appeals the summary judgment only as to appellee Antonellis.  

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    After reciting the standard  of review, we address each

          issue in turn.

                                A.  Standard of Review
                                A.  Standard of Review
                                    __________________

                    This court reviews a  district court's grant of summary

          judgment de novo.   See, e.g.,  Rhode Island Depositors  Economic
                   __ ____    ___  ____   _________________________________

          Protection Corp. v. Hayes, 64 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1995).  "When
          ________________    _____

          presented  with  a motion  for  summary  judgment, courts  should

          'pierce the  boilerplate of the pleadings and  assay the parties'

          proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.'"

          Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 613 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting
          ____________    ______

          Wynne v. Tufts  Univ. Sch. of  Medicine, 976  F.2d 791, 794  (1st
          _____    ______________________________

          Cir.  1992),  cert.  denied,  507  U.S.  1030 (1993)).    Summary
                        _____  ______

          judgment is therefore appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,

          answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

          the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

                                         -4-

          any material  fact and  that the moving  party is  entitled to  a

          judgment as a matter  of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A fact is

          material  if  it "carries  with it  the  potential to  affect the

          outcome of the  suit under the applicable law."  Nereida-Gonz lez
                                                           ________________

          v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703  (1st Cir. 1993).  We review
             ______________

          the  record  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  nonmovant,

          indulging all reasonable inferences in that  party's favor.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Flanders &  Medeiros, Inc.  v. Bogosian, 65  F.3d 198,  201
          ____  __________________________     ________

          (1st  Cir. 1995);  Rhode  Island  Depositors Economic  Protection
                             ______________________________________________

          Corp.,  64 F.3d at 25.  Here,  because the parties do not dispute
          _____

          any  facts that  could affect  the suit's  outcome, our  analysis

          confines itself to whether Antonellis is entitled to  judgment as

          a matter of law.

                                  B.  Applicable Law
                                  B.  Applicable Law
                                      ______________

                    Both  parties share  the  view  that Massachusetts  law

          applies.    Accordingly, we  will apply  that state's  law, since

          "[w]here the  parties agree  what substantive law  controls in  a

          diversity case,  we can -- and ordinarily should -- accept such a

          concession."  Moores v.  Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1107  n.2 (1st
                        ______     _________

          Cir. 1987); see Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1264 (1st Cir.
                      ___ _________    _____

          1991) (accepting the parties'  contention that Massachusetts  law

          applied to allegation of implied attorney-client relationship).

                               C.  The Negligence Claim
                               C.  The Negligence Claim
                                   ____________________

                    One National  claims Antonellis is liable to it for his

          failure  to  record  the  first  Milani  mortgage  on  the  title

          certificate.   See  Republic Oil  Corp.  v. Danziger,  400 N.E.2d
                         ___  ___________________     ________

                                         -5-

          1315, 1317 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (finding attorney negligent  for

          failure  to  disclose  the  existence  of  a  perfected  security

          interest  in a  certification of  title).   Because there  was no

          attorney-client   relationship  between  the  parties,  any  duty

          Antonellis  owed ONB must  be based  on Massachusetts'  theory of

          foreseeable reliance, which states that a lawyer may be liable to

          a non-client.3  As  discussed below, we find that  Antonellis did

          not  owe  One  National a  duty  of  care  under the  foreseeable

          reliance exception.  Therefore, we  will not address the parties'

          dispute as to  whether Antonellis  was in fact  negligent.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Lamare  v. Brisbanes, 636  N.E.2d 218, 219-20  (Mass. 1994)
          ____  ______     _________

          (affirming summary  judgment in favor of  attorney where attorney

          had no duty to  third party nonclient); Logotheti v.  Gordon, 607
                                                  _________     ______

          N.E.2d  1015, 1018  (Mass. 1993)  (finding that  negligence claim

          failed  where attorney  had  no  duty  of  care  to  third  party

          nonclient).

                    1.   The Foreseeable Reliance Exception
                    1.   The Foreseeable Reliance Exception
                         __________________________________

                    In order to  sustain a claim of  legal malpractice, ONB

          must show that Antonellis owed One National a duty of  care.  See
                                                                        ___

          Spinner  v. Nutt,  631 N.E.2d  542, 544  (Mass. 1994);  DaRoza v.
          _______     ____                                        ______

          Arter, 622 N.E.2d  604, 608 (Mass. 1993).   The issue  of whether
          _____

          such  a duty  exists is  a question  of law.   Id.  at 381.   The
                                                         ___
                              
          ____________________

          3  The parties  do not argue on  appeal that there was  either an
          express or implied attorney-client relationship.   See Sheinkopf,
                                                             ___ _________
          927 F.2d at 1265-66;  Falherty v. Baybank Merrimack Valley, N.A.,
                                ________    ______________________________
          808 F. Supp. 55, 60 (D. Mass. 1992); DeVaux v. American Home Ins.
                                               ______    __________________
          Co., 444 N.E.2d  355, 357  (Mass. 1983).   Accordingly, we  focus
          ___
          solely  on whether  Antonellis'  liability extends  to ONB  under
          Massachusetts' theory of liabilitybased on foreseeable reliance. 

                                         -6-

          general  rule is  that  "an attorney's  liability for  negligence

          arises out of a duty owed to  a client."  Norman v. Brown, Todd &
                                                    ______    _____________

          Heyburn,  693 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (D. Mass. 1988).  Massachusetts
          _______

          case law  has crafted  an exception  to this general  proposition

          based on foreseeable reliance, however,  so that "an attorney  is

          not  'absolutely   insulated  from  liability   to  nonclients.'"

          Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at  544 (quoting Page v. Frazier,  445 N.E.2d
          _______                              ____    _______

          148, 154 (Mass. 1983)).

                    As defined  in the  case law, the  foreseeable reliance

          exception demands that two requirements be met.  First, a duty is

          only owed to nonclients "who the attorney  knows will rely on the

          services rendered."  Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 536
                               _________    __________________________

          N.E.2d 334, 350 (Mass.),  cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894  (1989); see
                                    _____ ______                        ___

          Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 544; DaRoza, 622 N.E.2d at 608.  It is not
          _______                     ______

          enough  that a plaintiff claims  actual reliance:   "[i]t must be

          shown  that  the  attorney  should reasonably  foresee  that  the

          nonclient will  rely upon him  for legal services."   Id.  at 608
                                                                ___

          n.7.   Second,  "the court will  not impose a  duty of reasonable

          care on an attorney if such an independent duty would potentially

          conflict with  the duty the attorney owes  to his or her client."

          Lamare,  636 N.E.2d  at 219;  see Robertson,  536 N.E.2d  at 350;
          ______                        ___ _________

          Kirkland  Constr. Co. v. James,  658 N.E.2d 699,  701 (Mass. App.
          _____________________    _____

          Ct.  1995).   Here,  the district  court  found there  was  "some

          question" as  to the  first, foreseeable  reliance  prong of  the

          test,  but  that  there   was  "no  question"  that   there  were

          potentially conflicting  duties.  (District  Court Memorandum and

                                         -7-

          Decision, p. 15).  Reviewing the issue de novo, we agree with the
                                                 __ ____

          court  below   that  there  was  a   potential  conflict  between

          Antonellis' duty to Milford and his alleged duty to One National,

          so  that   ONB  cannot   meet  the  test's   second  requirement.

          Accordingly,  we need  not  determine whether  Antonellis  should

          reasonably have foreseen ONB's reliance on the title certificate.

                    2.   Potential Conflict
                    2.   Potential Conflict
                         __________________

                    The conflict requirement of the  reasonably foreseeable

          test  does not  demand that  an actual  conflict arise.   Rather,

          Massachusetts and federal case law has consistently found that  a

          potential  conflict between  an  attorney's duty  to  his or  her

          client and the  alleged duty  to the nonclient  is sufficient  to

          defeat the nonclient's malpractice claim.  "[I]t is the potential

          for conflict  that prevents the  imposition of  a duty .  . .  ."

          Spinner,  631 N.E.2d at 545; see Schlecht v. Smith, No. 92-30099-
          _______                      ___ ________    _____

          MAP,  1994 WL 621594 at * 5 (D.  Mass. 1994); Page, 445 N.E.2d at
                                                        ____

          153; see, e.g., DaRoza, 622 N.E.2d at 608 (employee's interest in
               ___  ____  ______

          worker's  compensation  suit  could  have  differed  from  client

          insurer's).   Thus, any potential  conflicts between  Antonellis'

          duty to  Milford and  his  alleged duty  to ONB  will defeat  One

          National's claim.

                    Before addressing the potential conflicts, we note that

          the facts in  the present  case differ in  several material  ways

          from  the Massachusetts  cases  we have  found  that address  the

          foreseeable  reliance  exception.    In  those  cases,  only  one

          transaction  is generally  at  issue, the  potential third  party

                                         -8-

          nonclient's identity is known from the start of the  transaction,

          and often, the nonclient and client are in an adversary position.

          See,  e.g., Page, 445 N.E.2d  at 149-50; Kirkland,  658 N.E.2d at
          ___   ____  ____                         ________

          699-700.   Here, there  were two  independent transactions:   the

          certificate  of title prepared  for the first  transaction -- the

          second Milani  mortgage --   was relied on  in the second  -- the

          sale  of  that  mortgage.    Also, the  third  party  nonclient's

          identity  was  not  known  until  after  the  legal  service  was

          rendered, and the nonclient  is attempting to stand in  the shoes

          of the client as mortgagor in  the first transaction, not in  its

          adverse  position  as buyer  in the  second.   In short,  we find

          ourselves  facing  the  dilemma  of  having  to  apply the  fact-

          dependant Massachusetts foreseeable reliance test to factors that

          have not yet come before the state courts.

                    One National argues that  in this context there was  no

          conflict  between  Antonellis' duty  to Milford  and the  duty he

          allegedly owed ONB.  It  asserts that the duty on which  it rests

          its claim is the same duty  Antonellis owed Milford:  the duty to

          search properly and to  report accurately the state of  the title

          with respect to  the 1988 mortgage.   It argues  that two  duties

          cannot  be in  conflict with  each other  if they  are identical.

          Unlike  in Page, ONB argues, where the attorney faced a potential
                     ____

          conflict  between duties  to the  mortgagee client  and mortgagor

          nonclient because  they may have had different concerns about the

          state of the title, Page, 445 N.E.2d at 153, both ONB and Milford
                              ____

          simply wanted an accurate certificate of title.  That is true, as

                                         -9-

          far as it goes.

                    However,  One National  misconstrues the  scope of  the

          duty to  the client that  Massachusetts courts  have focused  on.

          "[A]n isolated  instance identity  of interests" between  ONB and

          Milford  does not suffice to impose duty on Antonellis.  Spinner,
                                                                   _______

          631 N.E.2d at 545.  "Although the particular activity in question

          may  not  be  adverse,  and  may   actually  be  beneficial,  the

          appropriate  inquiry concerns  the  purpose of  the entire  legal

          representation."   1 Ronald E.  Mallen & Jeffrey  M. Smith, Legal

          Malpractice    7.11,  at  387 (3d  ed.  1989).   Antonellis  owed

          Milford not only an obligation to report on the title, but also a

          concurrent  duty  of  confidentiality.    The  Massachusetts  and

          federal   courts  that  have  applied  the  foreseeable  reliance

          exception  have repeatedly drawn on the importance of the duty of

          confidentiality in  finding the potential for a conflict, so that

          "an attorney's duty to third parties is circumscribed and limited

          by  the  law  and   the  disciplinary  rules  governing  attorney

          conduct."  Schlecht, 1994 WL 621594  at * 5; see, e.g., Austin v.
                     ________                          ___  ____  ______

          Bradley, Barry  & Tarlow,  P.C., 836  F. Supp.  36, 38  (D. Mass.
          _______________________________

          1993); Logotheti, 607 N.E.2d at 1018; Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 545;
                 _________                      _______

          see also  Mallen & Smith,  supra, at    7.11 at 388  ("The policy
          ________                   _____

          considerations against implying a  duty are strongest where doing

          so would detract from the  attorney's ethical obligations to  the

          client.").

                    In Logotheti  and  Spinner the  Supreme Judicial  Court
                       _________       _______

          framed the  attorney's duty  of confidentiality in  terms of  the

                                         -10-

          Massachusetts disciplinary rules'  requirement "that an  attorney

          preserve  the secrets  and confidences  gained in  the course  of

          representing a client."   Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 545;  see S.J.C.
                                    _______                      ___

          Rule 3:07, Canon  4, DR 4-101  ("Preservation of Confidences  and

          Secrets  of a  Client");  S.J.C. Rule  3:07,  Canon 7,  DR  7-101

          ("Representing a  Client Zealously"); see also  Schlecht, 1994 WL
                                                ________  ________

          621594  at * 5 ("To  impose on a  borrower/mortgagor's attorney a

          duty to  the lender/mortgagee can create  situations antithetical

          to  the  disciplinary  rules which  govern  attorney  conduct.");

          Logotheti, 607 N.E.2d at  1018; Harris v. Magri, 656  N.E.2d 585,
          _________                       ______    _____

          586 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).   Other cases posit the obligation

          of confidentiality in  more general  terms.  See  Austin, 836  F.
                                                       ___  ______

          Supp.  at  38 (citing  to  attorney's  "concurrent obligation  of

          confidentiality" to his client).

                    Here,  contrary  to  ONB's  claim,  there  is  a  clear

          potential conflict rooted in Antonellis' duty of confidentiality.

          Milford knew  that there was  a first mortgage that  had not been

          reported.  Given  this, if we place a duty  to ONB on Antonellis'

          shoulders,  we put  on him  the obligation  to inform  it of  his

          error.    That  mistake was  made  in  the  first transaction,  a

          transaction to which One  National was not a party.   Antonellis'

          purported  duty  to  ONB  therefore  arose  only  in  the  second

          transaction,  where that  bank  actually  was  a  party.      Cf.
                                                                        ___

          Hendrickson  v.  Sears,  310  N.E.2d  131,  135-36  (Mass.  1974)
          ___________      _____

          (holding  that cause  of  action for  negligent certification  of

          title  accrues  upon  discovery).    Ostensibly,  having  already

                                         -11-

          produced the  certificate, his  duty  would be  to check  whether

          Milford subordinated the  debt, remind  it of his  error, and  if

          Milford  did not rectify  it, to do so  himself by informing ONB.

          Clearly,  at that point a conflict in the duty of confidentiality

          would  arise:    if  his  client  decided  not  to  pass  on  the

          information and Antonellis did  so in its stead, he  would breach

          his duty of confidentiality.   See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon  4, DR
                                         ___

          4-101(B)  (stating that  "a  lawyer shall  not  knowingly .  .  .

          [r]eveal a confidence or secret of  his client.").  If he did not

          pass on the  information, he would  breach his duty  to ONB.   We

          refuse to place  him in that position.   Therefore, we find  that

          the potential for conflicts in Antonellis' duty to Milford and to

          ONB bars  liability in this case.4   Cf. Austin, 836  F. Supp. at
                                               ___ ______

                              
          ____________________

          4   The court below relied  on a different basis  in finding that
          there was  a clear potential for conflict in this case.  It found
          that ONB and  Milford were in the adverse positions  of buyer and
          seller in August 1988.  Since the courts have found that reliance
          on  an adverse party's legal counsel in a business transaction is
          unreasonable as a matter of law, see Schlecht, 1994 WL 621594  at
                                           ___ ________
          * 7; Robertson,  536 N.E.2d at 350 n.6; Page,  445 N.E.2d at 154-
               _________                          ____
          55, the  court found that there was a potential for conflict.  It
          found that Antonellis  would be under  different pressures if  he
          were representing both Milford and ONB than if he represented ONB
          alone.  The court also commented on One National's failure to use
          its own counsel in the sales transaction.

             One National  contests that Antonellis was  not representing a
          party adverse to it, because he did  not represent Milford in the
          ONB-Milford  sales transaction,  but  only in  the second  Milani
          mortgage.   When  he rendered  the  title certificate  at  issue,
          Milford and ONB were not yet adverse parties.

             Because  we  find  that   One  National  fails  the  potential
          conflicts prong  of the  foreseeable reliance exception  on other
          grounds,  we do not address  here whether the  district court was
          correct in finding that  ONB sought to rely on  the legal counsel
          of an adverse party.

                                         -12-

          38 (refusing to infer a duty to disclose a client's insolvency to

          nonclient  investors  where  duty would  directly  conflict  with

          concurrent obligation of confidentiality to client).

                    ONB contests that potential conflicts would  only arise

          if  Antonellis  had  represented  Milford as  the  seller  of the

          mortgages  in   the  second  transaction,  and   if  Milford  and

          Antonellis had intended to deceive ONB.  We disagree.  Neither of

          these additional  facts are necessary for  potential conflicts to

          arise.  First, ONB is relying  on the work Antonellis did for the

          first  transaction  --  whether  we  consider  ONB  as  Milford's

          replacement in the  first transaction  or as a  party adverse  to

          Milford in the second is irrelevant to this analysis.  Second, as

          the district court noted, there is no allegation that Milford and

          Antonellis colluded to deceive  ONB.  There are many  reasons why

          Milford  could fail to inform  ONB of the  faulty title.  Indeed,

          even if it did tell ONB about the problem, Antonellis could still

          face  a conflict in his  duty of confidentiality  if Milford made

          any  misrepresentations about the  circumstances under  which the

          error  was made,  i.e. that it  too knew  of the  omission of the
                            ____

          first  Milani mortgage.  Thus  we do not  accept ONB's contention

          that there was no potential conflict.

                    3.   Kirkland Construction Co. v. James
                    3.   Kirkland Construction Co. v. James
                         _________________________    _____

                    One  National points  to Kirkland  Construction Co.  v.
                                             __________________________

          James, 658 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), the Appeals Court of
          _____

          Massachusetts'  most recent  decision addressing  the foreseeable

          reliance  exception to  the  no duty  rule,  as support  for  its

                                         -13-

          position.  There, the court faced a challenge to a lower  court's

          grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil

          Procedure.   Kirkland,  a  contractor, was  asked  to renovate  a

          retail space for an office supply firm.  He sought and received a

          letter from  the firm's attorney, defendant  James, assuring that

          his  client could pay for the  work.  However, after Kirkland had

          performed under the  contract, the office  supply firm failed  to

          pay.   Kirkland sued James and  the partners of his  law firm for

          negligence, and the lower  court granted the defendants' 12(b)(6)

          motion.   Id.  at  699-700.   The  court reversed,  finding  that
                    ___

          Kirkland was entitled to  seek relief from the attorneys  under a

          theory of foreseeable reliance.  Id. at 701.
                                           ___

                    An  examination of  the  factors the  court weighed  in

          Kirkland in comparison with the facts of the instant case reveals
          ________

          that the circumstances here are sufficiently different from those

          in  Kirkland that  we  should affirm  the court  below.   In  its
              ________

          analysis, the  Kirkland  Court focused  on  who was  intended  to
                         ________

          benefit  from  the letter:   "an  independent  duty will  be more

          readily  found where, as here, the service is intended to benefit

          the  client as  well  as  the  third party."    Id.  (citing  the
                                                          ___

          Restatement (Second) of Torts   552(2)(a) (1977)).  Examining the

          letter,  which was addressed to Kirkland, the court noted that it

          contained  unqualified  representations  and  that   the  typical

          hedging phrases were absent.  Id. at 702; cf. Jurgens v. Abraham,
                                        ___         ___ _______    _______

          616 F. Supp. 1381,  1386 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding  that nonclient

          stated a claim where attorney told him he attached a sum of money

                                         -14-

          for   nonclient's  benefit).    That  is  not  true  here:    the

          certificate   of   title   was   not  addressed   to   ONB,   the

          representations were made  in boilerplate language with  standard

          exceptions  listed,  and  there  was an  express  disclaimer,  in

          capital letters, on one of the two pages.

                    The Kirkland court also  listed a series of allegations
                        ________

          in the plaintiff's complaint that, if proven, would be "the stuff

          of liability."   658 N.E.2d at 701.  First, both Kirkland and ONB

          allege that the representations  were false.  The fact  that both

          plaintiffs make the  same allegation, however,  is somewhat of  a

          red  herring, because  if  there were  no false  representations,

          there would be no basis for suit.  Second, Kirkland alleged  that

          the   letter  stated  that  the   office  supply  firm  had  made

          arrangements  to   ensure  payment,   and  that  the   attorneys'

          "objective was to induce Kirkland to enter into a contract."  Id.
                                                                        ___

          We cannot say that Antonellis' objective was to induce ONB into a

          contract, since ONB was not a party to the  transaction for which

          the certificate  of title  was performed.5   Third,  the Kirkland
                                                                   ________

          complaint maintained  that the attorneys "knew  and intended that

          Kirkland  would  rely  on  the  representations,"  and  that  the

          reliance was reasonable.  Id.  Again, ONB was  not a party.  Even
                                    ___

          if we  infer  that  Antonellis should  have  suspected  that  the

                              
          ____________________

          5  Nor can ONB argue that the purpose of Antonellis' work was  to
          induce  the Milanis  into  the mortgage,  because  by law  it  is
          unreasonable for a mortgagee  to rely on mortgagor's  counsel, as
          mortgagee and mortgagor are adverse parties.  See  Schlecht, 1994
                                                        ___  ________
          WL   621594  at  *  5;  Lamare,  636  N.E.2d  at  218;  Beecy  v.
                                  ______                          _____
          Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Mass. 1982).
          ___________

                                         -15-

          mortgage would be  sold, however, the  ties between the  attorney

          and  nonclient here  are  nowhere  near  as  close  as  those  in

          Kirkland,  where  the  letter  at  issue  was  addressed  to  the
          ________

          plaintiff  nonclient  and   expressly  addressed  its   concerns.

          Finally, Kirkland  alleged that  it was seeking  information, not

          legal advice, from the lawyers about their client.   Id.  Whether
                                                               ___

          Antonellis'  certificate  of  title  is a  legal  opinion  proves

          irrelevant, however,  since the  Kirkland court also  stated that
                                           ________

          "the  likelihood of liability would not be greater" if the letter

          were an opinion letter.  Id. at 702 n.7.
                                   ___

                    In   the  light  of   the  potential  conflict  between

          Antonellis'  duty to  his  client and  his  alleged duty  to  One

          National, and the differences between the factors that led to the

          court's reversal in Kirkland  and the facts of the  instant case,
                              ________

          we  find  upon  de novo  review  that  as  a  matter of  law  One
                          __ ____

          National's legal malpractice claim fails the foreseeable reliance

          test.   As a consequence,  we need not determine  whether ONB can

          meet the foreseeability  requirement.  See DaRoza,  622 N.E.2d at
                                                 ___ ______

          609.

                      D.  Assignability of Certificate of Title
                      D.  Assignability of Certificate of Title
                          _____________________________________

                    One  National contends  that it  acquired the  right to

          proceed    against   Antonellis   through   assignment   of   the

          certificate.6    Specifically,  it states  that  because  Milford
                              
          ____________________

          6  In  fact, it proves difficult to determine  the intended scope
          of  ONB's  assignment  argument.    Before the  court  below,  it
          contended that as assignee of the mortgage it "had all the rights
          of Milford Savings Bank  once the mortgage was assigned  and duly
          recorded  .  . . which  would  include  all  rights  against  the

                                         -16-

          entered into a contract  with Antonellis for the issuance  of the

          title certificate and then assigned the fruits of the contract to

          ONB, ONB has the right  to proceed against Antonellis.  The  crux

          of  the  issue,   it  claims,  is  whether  the  certificate  was

          transferrable by Milford to  ONB.  Essentially, ONB asks  that we

          allow it to step into Milford's shoes as a  client merely because

          it  was  assigned the  certificate that  was  the product  of the

          attorney-client relationship.  Noting  that the disclaimer barred

          reliance  by a  title  insurer, not  assignment,  it argues  that

          although  the  transferability  of  a certificate  of  title  has

          apparently not  been addressed by the  Massachusetts courts, they

          would  hold  the assignment  valid.   ONB  makes its  argument by

          analogy  to  the law's  general  favor  towards assignability  of

          contracts and  contract rights,  and the fact  that Massachusetts

          allows assignments  of many  types of claims,  including contract

          damages.  See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 106   2-210(2).  It also makes an
                    ___

          analogy  to  other jurisdictions'  acceptance  of  assignments of
                              
          ____________________

          certifying attorney Antonellis."   (Appdx.  at 50).   It did  not
          specify which rights it referred to.  In its brief to this court,
          ONB  argued that the  "gist" of the tort  of legal malpractice is
          the  lawyer's breach of contract,  and that ONB  acquired a legal
          malpractice  claim  with   the  certificate,  stating  that   "if
          Milford's  assignment to  ONB is  treated as  an assignment  of a
          malpractice  claim, the  Supreme  Judicial Court  would hold  the
          assignment valid."  (Brief of Appellant at 27).  Of course, since
          ONB did  not raise below  a claim that a  legal malpractice claim
          was assigned, they cannot do so here.  See Ondine Shipping  Corp.
                                                 ___ ______________________
          v. United  States, 24 F.3d 353,  355 (1st Cir.  1994); Clauson v.
             ______________                                      _______
          Smith, 823  F.2d 660,  666 (1st  Cir.  1987) (collecting  cases).
          _____
          However, in  its reply brief ONB  states that it was  not arguing
          that the action  involved an assignment  of a malpractice  claim,
          but  rather the  "real  issue" was  whether  the certificate  was
          transferable.   Since we deem that this "real issue" was included
          within the scope of its argument below, we address their claim.

                                         -17-

          legal malpractice claims.  See, e.g., Oppel v. Empire Mutual Ins.
                                     ___  ____  _____    __________________

          Co.,  517 F.  Supp. 1305,  1306-07 (S.D.N.Y.  1981); Thurston  v.
          ___                                                  ________

          Continential Casualty Co., 567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989).
          _________________________

                    One National  recognizes  that others  might object  to

          selling  the product of  legal services as  inconsistent with the

          personal   and  fiduciary   character   of  the   attorney-client

          relationship.   See Dunne v. Cunningham, 125 N.E. 560, 561 (Mass.
                          ___ _____    __________

          1920) (commenting on the  "highly fiduciary" relationship between

          attorney and client).  Without citing any direct authority in its

          support,  ONB  contends  that  the   assignment  illustrates  the

          "inherently weak  nature" of the relationship  where the attorney

          merely  plays a standardized role  of reporting the  state of the

          public records.   See Fall  River Savings Bank  v. Callahan,  463
                            ___ ________________________     ________

          N.E.2d  555, 561 (Mass.  App. Ct. 1984)  (noting the standardized

          nature of passing on a title); 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, at   25.8
                                                           _____

          (setting out  the process and describing  potential liabilities).

          Thus, since the purpose of the relationship is not to give advice

          or  counselling   but  to  produce  a   formal  certificate,  ONB

          maintains, the  transfer would  not jeopardize any  public policy

          favoring the attorney-client relationship.

                    The   district   court   addressed   ONB's   assignment

          contention  within the context of its discussion of Mass. Gen. L.

          ch.  93,   70.    It rejected  One  National's position  that  an

          assignee  should have  the same  fiduciary relationship  with the

          assignor's attorney  as  the assignor,  the  original  mortgagee,

          enjoyed, on  two bases.  We address the first, which draws on the

                                         -18-

          language of section 70, in our discussion of that section, infra.
                                                                     _____

          The district  court's second  basis for rejecting  ONB's position

          was  that ONB's argument  does not  arise out  of the  common law

          governing  the unique attorney-client  relationship -- a personal

          relationship,  voluntarily   assumed,   which  is   governed   by

          disciplinary rules.  Under de novo review, we  also find that the
                                     __ ____

          attorney-client relationship between Antonellis and Milford plays

          a  crucial  role  in  determining  whether  the  certificate  was

          transferable.

                    Massachusetts  case law offers little specific guidance

          on this issue, but we find that an analysis of their treatment of

          the  attorney-client relationship  in the  context of  claims for

          negligent certification of title  proves illustrative.  First, as

          was noted above, the  nature of the attorney-client relationship,

          including the  obligation of  confidentiality and  application of

          the  disciplinary  rules,  has  consistently been  cited  by  the

          Massachusetts courts  within this  context.  See,  e.g., Spinner,
                                                       ___   ____  _______

          631 N.E.2d at 545.  This indicates that the courts do not see the

          attorney-client relationship in this context as inherently  weak,

          as ONB suggests.   Significantly, in Hendrickson  v. Sears, which
                                               ___________     _____

          involved  a suit  by the  purchasers of  real estate  against the

          attorney they hired  for the  title search, the  Court noted  the

          differences between legal and  medical malpractice actions in its

          analysis, 310 N.E.2d at 134, and commented that

                      [t]he client is not an expert;  he cannot
                      be  expected  to  recognize  professional
                      negligence if  he sees it,  and he should
                      not  be  expected   to  watch  over   the

                                         -19-

                      professional  or  to   retain  a   second
                      professional to  do so.   The relation of
                      attorney and client  is highly  fiduciary
                      in its nature.

          Id. at  135.  Nowhere does the  Court's language suggest that the
          ___

          fiduciary relationship  of an  attorney and client  is diminished

          because   the  services   the  attorney   rendered  were   highly

          standardized.   Similarly,  in  Schlecht v.  Smith, the  district
                                          ________     _____

          court addressed the attorney's failure to record the mortgage, at

          his  client's request,  within  the context  of the  disciplinary

          rules.  Schlecht, 1994 WL 621594 at * 5.  Again, nothing suggests
                  ________

          that the rules' force is somehow diminished.

                    Second,  in Fall  River Savings  Bank v.  Callahan, the
                                _________________________     ________

          Appeals Court  of Massachusetts noted the  standardized nature of

          title searches.   463 N.E.2d  at 561  ("There may be  no definite

          rules  which  prescribe  a  right  or  wrong  way  to  conduct  a

          deposition  but  certain rules  have  evolved  for passing  on  a

          title.").  The court found that fact significant in deciding that

          a court may use commentaries to establish the standard of care in

          the  land  conveyance  context, since  that  is  an  area of  law

          practice "which lends itself  particularly to formulation through

          decisional  law  and  commentary   as  to  what  are  appropriate

          procedures."   Id.  But even as it recognized the standardization
                         ___

          of this area, the  Court treated the attorney-client relationship

          as it would  in any other  context, as carrying  with it all  the

          attendant duties and responsibilities.  Id.
                                                  ___

                    This approach  makes intuitive sense.   Even though the

          practices for searching title  are standardized, the disciplinary

                                         -20-

          rules apply  as they  would in any  attorney-client relationship,

          and  the attorney is subject  to liability for  malpractice.  The

          duties  attendant  to  the  fiduciary  relationship  between  the

          attorney and  client are in full  force.  See Dunne,  125 N.E. at
                                                    ___ _____

          561  (noting  that  the  principles  relating  to  an  attorney's

          fiduciary  duties  "are  recognized   as  binding  in  all  their

          amplitude.").   Thus the unspecified public  policy concerns that

          ONB tells us  would not be jeopardized --  presumably, protecting

          the   attorney's   ability   to  function   effectively,   client

          confidentiality, the  integrity of  the  bench and  bar, and  the

          ethical  administration of  justice, see  Berman v.  Coakley, 137
                                               ___  ______     _______

          N.E. 667,  670-71 (Mass. 1923)  ("Public policy hardly  can touch

          matters of  more  general  concern than  the  maintenance  of  an

          untarnished standard of conduct by the attorney at law toward his

          client."); 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, at    11.5, 11.12, 12.4, 13.2
                                       _____

          -- are still implicated.

                    In sum, since  the case law clearly indicates  that the

          Massachusetts courts do not consider  the fiduciary nature of the

          attorney-client relationship to be attenuated in this certificate

          of title context, and in the absence of further guidance from the

          Massachusetts courts, we refuse  to allow a third party,  of whom

          the attorney does  not know,  to assume  the rights  of a  client

          through  assignment.  We therefore find that One National did not

          acquire  the  right   to  proceed   against  Antonellis   through

          assignment of the certificate of title.

                       E.   General Law Chapter 93, Section 70
                       E.   General Law Chapter 93, Section 70
                            __________________________________

                                         -21-

                    One  National's final  argument is  that Antonellis  is

          liable  under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93,   70.  Under that section, an

          attorney  rendering a certificate of title for a mortgagee may be

          subject to liability to the mortgagor as well:

                         The   liability    of   any   attorney
                      rendering  such  certification  shall  be
                      limited    to    the   amount    of   the
                      consideration  shown  on  the  deed  with
                      respect  to the  mortgagor, and  shall be
                      limited to the original  principal amount
                      secured  by the mortgage  with respect to
                      the mortgagee.  Said  certification shall
                      be  effective  for  the  benefit  of  the
                      mortgagor  so long as  said mortgagor has
                      title  to  the  mortgaged  premises,  and
                      shall be effective for the benefit of the
                      mortgagee  so long  as the  original debt
                      secured by the mortgage remains unpaid.

          Mass. Gen. L.  ch. 93,   70.   The loan or credit  secured by the

          purchase money first mortgage must be on real estate with between

          one and four dwellings, to be occupied by the mortgagor.  Id.
                                                                    ___

                    ONB argues that because it  holds the mortgage it falls

          within the scope of  "mortgagee" as used in section 70,  and that

          Antonellis is thus liable to it.  Noting that section 70 operates

          in a  manner analogous  to a  statute of  limitations in that  it

          provides that  the title certification  will remain in  effect so

          long as  the original  debt is  unpaid,  ONB argues  it would  be

          unreasonable  to argue that  the attorney's  liability disappears

          when a  mortgage is sold,  no matter whether or  not the original

          debt  is unpaid.  Further, ONB notes  that the sale of a mortgage

          neither enlarges  the attorney's liability,  as it is  limited by

          the statute, nor  changes the nature  of the liability.   As  ONB

          states, one bank  is simply  substituted for another:   all  else

                                         -22-

          remains  constant.   Thus  the  attorney  remains liable  on  the

          certificate until the mortgage debt is paid.

                    Upon  de novo review, we agree  with the district court
                          __ ____

          that,  while One  National's argument  makes intuitive  sense, it

          eventually fails.  First, like the  court below, we find that the

          plain language  of the statute  does not support  ONB's position.

          It  is a basic tenet  of statutory interpretation  that where the

          plain language  of a statute  is clear,  it governs.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) ("If a legislative
          ______    __________

          purpose  is expressed in 'plain  and unambiguous language,  . . .

          the . . . duty  of the courts is  to give it effect according  to

          its  terms'" (quoting United States v.  Lexington Mill & Elevator
                                _____________     _________________________

          Co., 232 U.S. 399,  409 (1914)).  ONB  correctly points out  that
          ___

          here, the  statute's  text does  not  state that  the  attorney's

          liability  to  the  mortgagee  terminates when  the  mortgage  is

          transferred.  However, we refuse to read the opposite inference -

          - that the liability is not extinguished upon transferral -- into

          the statute when it is not warranted by the plain language of the

          text.  The language of section  70 focuses on mortgagees, not, as

          One National would  have us believe,  on their assignees.     See
                                                                        ___

          Falmouth Ob/Gyn Assoc. Inc. v. Abisla, 629 N.E.2d 291, 293 (Mass.
          ___________________________    ______

          1994),  ("A term  employed in  a statute  should be  afforded its

          customary meaning, taking into  account the legislation's purpose

          and  history."); Page,  445  N.E.2d at  152  (refusing to  extend
                           ____

            70's  application to mortgagors  purchasing unimproved  land in

          the  absence of suggestions or implications in the clear language

                                         -23-

          of the statute).

                    "Exceptions  to  clearly  delineated  statutes  will be

          implied  only  where essential  to  prevent  'absurd results'  or

          consequences  obviously  at  variance  with  the  policy  of  the

          enactment as a whole."  Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552.  Clearly, no
                                  __________

          such  exception arises  here.   Constraining  the application  of

          section  70  to mortgagees'  assignees  does  not create  "absurd

          results."   As  the  court below  noted, Chapter  93  as a  whole

          addresses "the  regulation of trade  and enterprises in  order to

          prevent  unfair  practices against  consumers."   (District Court

          Memorandum  and Decision, p. 8).   Our reading of  the statute is

          not "obviously  at  variance"  with  that policy,  even  if  this

          reading does not extend the policy to assignees of mortgagees.

                    Second,  like  the  court  in Page,  we  note  that the
                                                  ____

          legislature, in  its amendments to  section 70, has  not expanded

          the  class of mortgagors it protects to encompass assignees.  See
                                                                        ___

          Page, 445 N.E.2d at 152.   As the district court stated,  had the
          ____

          legislature desired  to extend the  provisions of section  70, it

          could  have  done  so.    Instead,  only  purchase  money   first

          mortgages, of dwellings of  up to four families, occupied  by the

          mortgagor, fall within the section.  Clearly, the legislature did

          not  intend for  section 70  to provide  that a  commercial bank,

          which  neither  paid  for  the attorney's  services  nor  had any

          contact with the attorney,  be entitled to the protection  of the

          section merely because it was assigned the mortgage.  In the face

          of the  plain language  of the  statute,  and in  the absence  of

                                         -24-

          legislative  action to  the  contrary, we  reject One  National's

          argument that Antonellis is liable to it under section 70.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    In  this case, as in  all cases involving an allegation

          that an  attorney failed in  a duty  to a nonclient,  there is  a

          tension between  two concerns.   On one hand,  we do not  want to

          extend liability so widely that an  attorney faces "'liability in

          an  indeterminate   amount  for  an  indeterminate   time  to  an

          indeterminate  class.'"   Craig  v. Everett  M.  Brooks Co.,  222
                                    _____     _______________________

          N.E.2d 752, 755 (Mass. 1967) (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
                                                ________________    _______

          Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931)).  On the other hand, we do
          ___________

          not  want to reward an attorney's carelessness.  See Spinner, 631
                                                           ___ _______

          N.E.2d  at 545  (noting policy considerations  against sheltering

          attorney's negligence  from suit  in will-drafting context).   In

          finding  that  Antonellis'  liability  does  not  extend  to  One

          National, we  are cognizant  that on  the surface  we seem  to be

          protecting  him from suit for  his negligence.   However, we note

          that ordinarily, ONB would have  recourse against Milford for the

          faulty  title, and Milford in turn could bring a negligence claim

          against  Antonellis, as its lawyer.   See id.  (noting that trust
                                                ___ ___

          beneficiaries could  sue the trustees,  and the trustees  in turn

          could bring an action  against their attorneys, but beneficiaries

          could  not directly  sue trustees'  attorneys).   Because Milford

          failed, ONB has lost  that option.  ONB, essentially, took a risk

          in   deciding  not  to  get  its  own  title  insurance  for  the

          transaction.    It  was a  calculated  risk,  and  it required  a

                                         -25-

          complicated  chain  of  events  --  Antonellis'  negligence,  the

          Milanis' default,  Milford's failure, and the  FDIC's repudiation

          of the claim -- to make that risk fail to pay off.  We  refuse to

          spot  ONB's choice  to take that  risk with  the safety  net of a

          negligence  claim against Antonellis.   Cf.  Page, 445  N.E.2d at
                                                  ___  ____

          154-55  ("Where, as here, a  nonclient takes the  chance that the

          client's interests  are in harmony with  his own, and  does so in

          the face of an express warning that the interests may differ, his

          claim of  foreseeable reliance cannot be  rescued simply because,

          in retrospect, the interests are shown not to have differed.").

                    For the  foregoing reasons,  the order of  the district

          court  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Antonellis  is

          affirmed.
          affirmed.
          ________

                                         -26-