Court Opinion

ID: 9770683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:07.685908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:47.170430
License: Public Domain

DANIEL, Justice,
concurring.
I am compelled to concur in the opinion of the Court because the Legislature has enacted a law which, under the circumstances of this case, compels the trial court to grant the writ of habeas corpus without regard to the best interests of the child.1
It is obvious from the number of cases which have reached us on this same point that numerous members of the bar and trial judges have either overlooked Section 14.10 of the Family Code, effective January 4,-1974, or have chosen to ignore it.2 The same is true to some extent with reference to Section 11.05(a) of the Family Code, which, subject to stated exceptions, provides that the original court acquiring jurisdiction of a parent-child relationship shall retain continuing jurisdiction and that “no other court has jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship” except upon transfer as provided in Section 11.06 of the Code.
Even a court of continuing jurisdiction, however, is bound by the mandatory language of Section 14.10. It must grant a writ of habeas corpus for the delivery of possession of a child in accordance with an existing court order without any delay for separate or simultaneous consideration of a pending motion for modification of the existing custody order and without consideration of the best interests of the child. McElreath v. Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1977); Standley v. Stewart, 539 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.1976). There are certain exceptions which are set forth in Section 14.10 and in the Court’s opinion this day handed down in Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978).3
*238It is understandable that some trial judges are slow to disregard the best interest of the child in any child custody proceeding, especially if they have not studied the important mandatory change made by the Legislature when it enacted Section 14.-10 of the Family Code. For many years prior to that time the best interest of the child was the paramount consideration in both original child custody cases and habeas corpus proceedings relating thereto. Herrera v. Herrera, 409 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.1966); Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex.1966); Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.1963); Knollhoff v. Norris, 152 Tex. 231, 256 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (1953); Duckworth v. Thompson, 37 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Com.App.1931); Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281 (1894).
Many changes in child custody proceedings were made in the Family Code. Perhaps Section 14.10 is one of the most harsh, far-reaching and difficult for some trial judges to apply. A study of some of the cases which have reached this Court will show that some decisions have been compelled by the statute which were not in the best interests of the children. However, the statute is clear and definite. It should be studied and followed by the courts until and unless it is changed by the Legislature. In this connection, it has been suggested that the Legislature might well consider an amendment which would permit the court of continuing jurisdiction to give paramount consideration to the welfare and best interest of the child by consolidating hearings on writs of habeas corpus and any pending cross actions or motions for change of custody.

. Section 14.10 of the Texas Family Code, which is quoted in the Court’s opinion.

. See, in addition to this case, Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978); Robertson v. Hazlett, 21 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 23 (Oct. 22, 1977); Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.1977); Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1977);. McElreath v. Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.1977); Standley v. Stewart, 539 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.1976). See also Ex Parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); Fountain v. Nelson, 546 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, no writ); Lugo v. Wade, 534 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Civ.App.1976, no writ); Clayton v. Newton, 524 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ).

.The principal exception which would seem to apply to the facts of some of the cases which have reached us, but which has seldom been *238used in such cases, is in Subsection 14.10(c), which provides: “The court may issue any appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child.”