Court Opinion

ID: 9897398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:04.49667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.453383
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       May 15 2023, 8:25 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR JOHN C.
Randall L. Parr                                           COULSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
Riley L. Parr                                             AS TRUSTEE OF THE ZOE E.
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     COULSON TRUST
                                                          Samuel C. Drummy
                                                          The Rowe Law Firm, LLC
                                                          Linton, Indiana
                                                          ATTORNEY FOR THE FIRST
                                                          PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF
                                                          SULLIVAN, INDIANA, AND THE
                                                          BOARD OF TRUSTEEES OF THE
                                                          FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
                                                          OF SULLIVAN, INDIANA
                                                          Judy L. Woods
                                                          Krieg DeVault, LLP
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAM
                                                          TODD COULSON,
                                                          INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
                                                          TRUSTEE OF THE BRADLEY
                                                          KERR COULSON TRUST,
                                                          BRADLEY KERR COULSON AND
                                                          THE BRADLEY KERR COULSON
                                                          TRUST
                                                          Joleen V. Klotz
                                                          James O. McDonald
                                                          Everett, Everett & McDonald
                                                          Terre Haute, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                  Page 1 of 16
                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Nancy Coulson-Smith,                                      May 15, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-PL-980
        v.                                                Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit
                                                          Court
John C. Coulson, as Successor                             The Honorable Robert E. Hunley,
Trustee of the Zoe E. Coulson                             II, Judge
Trust; the Zoe E. Coulson Trust;                          Trial Court Cause No.
John C. Coulson; William Todd                             77C01-2107-PL-410
Coulson; Bradley Kerr Coulson;
William Todd Coulson, as
Trustee of the Bradley Kerr
Coulson Trust; the Bradley Kerr
Coulson Trust; the First
Presbyterian Church of Sullivan,
Indiana; the Board Trustees of
the First Presbyterian Church of
Sullivan, Indiana; the Board of
Trustees of the Old Pine Church;
and the Old Pine Church of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Appellees-Defendants.

                                  Opinion by Judge Robb
                              Judges Mathias and Foley concur.

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issue

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                        Page 2 of 16
[1]   Nancy Coulson-Smith filed a complaint contesting the validity of an

      amendment to a trust naming her as a beneficiary. The trial court dismissed the

      complaint as untimely. Nancy appeals, raising the issue of whether an

      agreement she entered into with the trustee tolling the statute of limitations was

      valid to extend the time in which she could file her complaint. Concluding the

      Tolling Agreement was valid, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Zoe E. Coulson established the Zoe E. Coulson Agreement of Trust (“Trust”)

      in December 1993. Over the years, Zoe amended the Trust several times,

      including in February 2009. The next and final amendment was made in

      November 2016 (“2016 Amendment”). The 2016 Amendment named Zoe and

      John C. Coulson 1 as Co-Trustees of the Trust. Nancy Coulson-Smith was a

      beneficiary of the Trust and remained a beneficiary under the 2016

      Amendment. Other beneficiaries under the 2016 Amendment included John,

      William Todd Coulson, Bradley Kerr Coulson, 2 the Bradley Kerr Coulson

      Trust, and William as Trustee of the Bradley Kerr Coulson Trust. Zoe died on

      May 11, 2018, leaving John as the sole Trustee.

      1
          John is Zoe’s brother.
      2
          Nancy, along with William and Bradley, are children of Zoe’s deceased brother Lee A. Coulson.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                  Page 3 of 16
[3]   On May 11, 2021—the third anniversary of Zoe’s death—John, as Trustee, and

      Nancy entered into a Tolling Agreement, reciting that Nancy has certain claims

      relating to the Trust, “including whether [Zoe] had the capacity to execute the

      [2016 Amendment.]” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 32.

                   The Parties wish to enter into this Agreement in order to toll any
                   statutes of limitations or statutes of repose that may apply to any
                   claims, counterclaims, damages or causes of action in any way
                   arising out of the [capacity and fiduciary duty claims] . . . and
                   also to suspend the effect of any defenses such as laches,
                   estoppel[,] waiver or similar equitable defenses based upon the
                   running of any statute of limitations, statute of repose, or the
                   passage of time while they attempt to mediate the Claims.

      Id. Accordingly, the parties agreed that “[a]ny . . . statutes of limitations

      relating to any legal action or proceeding that may be available to [Nancy] . . .

      and all other time-related limitations or defenses” “shall be tolled as of the

      Effective Date with such tolling continuing through the Termination Date” as

      defined in the Tolling Agreement. 3 Id.

[4]   On July 16, 2021, Nancy filed a Complaint contesting the validity of the 2016

      Amendment. She named the Trust, John in his capacity as Trustee of the

      3
          The Tolling Agreement was to remain in effect until:

                   a. John answers Nancy’s first set of interrogatories served January 20, 2021;
                   b. John responds to Nancy’s first request for production served January 20, 2021,
                   including specifically the production of documents in Nos. 3-7;
                   c. John files the statutory accounting for the 1993 Trust;
                   d. 30 days following John’s compliance with a-c above; and
                   [e]. 10 days following a mediation conference (the “Termination Date”).
      Id. at 33.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                   Page 4 of 16
      Trust, John in his individual capacity, William, Bradley, the Bradley Kerr

      Coulson Trust, William as Trustee of the Bradley Kerr Coulson Trust, and

      other beneficiaries of the Trust as defendants. 4 The complaint alleged that on

      November 5, 2016, Zoe “did not possess the soundness of mind required in

      order to validly amend” the Trust “and as such, the 2016 Amendment is

      invalid.” Id. at 15. Nancy asked the trial court to declare the 2016 Amendment

      “to be invalid and to declare its terms a nullity” in favor of the terms of the

      February 2009 amendment governing the disposition of the trust property. Id.

      at 16.

[5]   John, in his capacity as Trustee and in his individual capacity, filed an answer

      and asserted as defenses that Nancy’s complaint was barred by the applicable

      statute of limitations and by the doctrine of laches.

[6]   William, Bradley, the Bradley Kerr Coulson Trust, and William as Trustee of

      the Bradley Kerr Coulson Trust (collectively, the “Trust Beneficiaries”) filed a

      motion to dismiss Nancy’s complaint. In their motion, the Trust Beneficiaries

      alleged Indiana Code section 30-4-6-14 requires a person to commence a

      proceeding contesting the validity of a revocable trust within three years of the

      settlor’s death. As Zoe died on May 11, 2018, they alleged Nancy was required

      4
        Additional beneficiaries are the First Presbyterian Church of Sullivan, Indiana and its Board of Trustees
      (collectively “First Presbyterian Church”) and the Old Pine Church of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and its
      Board of Trustees. Neither church participated in the trial court proceedings described herein. The First
      Presbyterian Church has filed a brief in this appeal but takes no position as to the validity or effect of the
      Tolling Agreement. See Brief of [First Presbyterian Church] at 4.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                       Page 5 of 16
to file her complaint no later than May 11, 2021, and because her complaint

was filed on July 16, 2021, she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. 5 Nancy responded to the motion to dismiss by invoking the Tolling

Agreement:

         7. [Nancy] denies that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the
         subject matter due to the expiration of the time period specified
         in Indiana Code 30-4-6-14.

         8. [Nancy] denies that Trial Rule 12(B)(6) applies to [her]
         Complaint by virtue of I.C. 30-4-6-14, and [Nancy] asserts that
         through her Complaint [she] has indeed stated a claim upon
         which relief can be granted.

         9. A certain Tolling Agreement entered into by and between the
         Trustee of the . . . 2016 Amendment and [Nancy], conferred
         upon [Nancy] the authority to file her Complaint on July 16,
         2021 by virtue of the power and authority of the Trustee to toll
         and extend the I.C. 30-4-6-14 time period, which apparent
         Trustee power and authority [Nancy] relied upon with respect to
         the prosecution, defense, and management of the particular legal
         controversy regarding the 2016 Amendment.

5
  A Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion is an appropriate means to raise the statute of limitations when the complaint
shows on its face that the limitations period has run. See William F. Braun Milk Hauling, Inc. v. Malanoski, 192
N.E.3d 213, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The Trust Beneficiaries’ motion also alleged that because Nancy
failed to file her complaint on or before May 11, 2021, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter of her complaint. However, Trial Rule 12(B)(1) “is not a proper procedural vehicle for a motion to
dismiss” based on a statute of limitations. Kennedy Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Emmert Indus.Corp., 67 N.E.3d
1025, 1028 n.1 (Ind. 2017). Legal errors are not the same as jurisdictional defects. See R.L. Turner Corp. v.
Town of Brownsburg, 963 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2012) (noting “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction exists when the
Indiana Constitution or a statute grants the court the power to hear and decide cases of the general class to
which any particular proceeding belongs”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                      Page 6 of 16
      Id. at 49. The Tolling Agreement was one of several exhibits attached to

      Nancy’s response.

[7]   The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the

      parties stipulated to the following facts:

          • The Trust Beneficiaries were not aware of the Tolling Agreement prior to

              the expiration of the statute of limitations;

          • The Tolling Agreement is authentic;

          • The matter is purely a legal question and no testimony would be given.

      See Transcript, Volume 1 at 6. After hearing argument from attorneys for the

      Trust Beneficiaries, Nancy, and John, the trial court took the motion under

      advisement. The Trust Beneficiaries and Nancy each filed a post-hearing brief.

      John, in both his individual capacity and his capacity as Trustee, filed a brief in

      support of the Trust Beneficiaries’ motion.

[8]   Having considered the motion and response, the arguments at the hearing, and

      the parties’ post-hearing briefs, the trial court issued an order granting the Trust

      Beneficiaries’ motion to dismiss for the following reasons:

              (1) the three (3) year statute of limitations set forth in I.C. 30-4-6-
              14 applies;

              (2) the Tolling Agreement is invalid because [the Trust
              Beneficiaries] and other beneficiaries with interests in the trust,
              were not parties to, and did not sign, the Tolling Agreement; and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                Page 7 of 16
               (3) the procedures set forth in I.C. §30-4-7 et seq., were not
               followed such that the Tolling Agreement is invalid.

       Appealed Order at 1-2. The trial court dismissed Nancy’s complaint with

       prejudice as to all defendants. Nancy now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       I.      Standard of Review
[9]    The Trust Beneficiaries made, and the trial court granted, a motion to dismiss

       Nancy’s complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim

       upon which relief can be granted. The trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

       is proper if it is apparent that the facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of

       supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Chenore v. Plantz, 56 N.E.3d

       123, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to

       state a claim, the trial court may look only to the complaint and may not resort

       to any other evidence in the record. Id. However, “[i]f . . . matters outside the

       pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be

       treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”

       Ind. Trial Rule 12(B).

[10]   Here, Nancy attached several documents to her response to the Trust

       Beneficiaries’ motion to dismiss, including the Tolling Agreement. The Trust

       Beneficiaries stipulated to the authenticity of the Tolling Agreement and that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023             Page 8 of 16
       the issue was a question of law upon which no testimony was needed. 6 The

       trial court did not exclude the Tolling Agreement and, according to the plain

       language of its order, considered the Tolling Agreement in deciding whether

       Nancy’s complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

       Therefore, although the Trust Beneficiaries denominated their motion a motion

       to dismiss and the trial court referred to the motion as such in its order, we

       review the trial court’s order as a ruling on a motion for summary judgment

       because the trial court considered the Tolling Agreement. See State v. Costas,

       552 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 1990) (stating that because the trial court held an

       evidentiary hearing on the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the court would

       review its grant of the motion as a ruling upon a motion for summary

       judgment).

[11]   As with any motion for summary judgment, we review de novo whether there

       is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the Trust Beneficiaries as the

       moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. T.R. 56(C). In

       doing so, we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most

       favorable to Nancy as the nonmoving party. Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend

       Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ind. 2003).

       6
         Indiana Trial Rule 12(B) also provides that if a motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary
       judgment, “all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
       motion by Rule 56.” Because the Trust Beneficiaries stipulated to the authenticity of the Tolling Agreement
       and declined to offer any testimony at the hearing on the motion, they seem to have been given this
       opportunity.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                    Page 9 of 16
       II. Validity of the Tolling Agreement
[12]   “Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law; as such, these

       questions are reviewed de novo.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind.

       2019). Moreover, because statutory interpretation is a question of law,

       summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Speedy Wrecker Serv., LLC v.

       Frohman, 148 N.E.3d 1005, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Here, the parties

       dispute whether the Tolling Agreement was subject to Indiana Code chapter 30-

       4-7 (the “Compromise Chapter”) such that the agreement was required to be

       executed by all interested persons, including the Trust Beneficiaries. 7 The trial

       court determined that it was.

       7
           Nancy’s brief also addresses whether John, as Trustee, had the authority to enter into the Tolling
       Agreement and whether the Trust Beneficiaries had standing to make the motion to dismiss.
       As for the Trustee’s authority, the Trust Beneficiaries do not specifically challenge that authority and in fact,
       call it “irrelevant” to the question presented by their motion to dismiss. [Trust Beneficiaries’] Response Brief
       at 13. The only party to claim the Trustee did not have authority to enter the Tolling Agreement was the
       Trustee himself. Here, Nancy and John entered into the Tolling Agreement and Nancy relied on that
       agreement when filing her complaint more than three years after Zoe died. Then John, as Trustee and
       individually, took an inconsistent position by filing an answer asserting the statute of limitations as an
       affirmative defense to Nancy’s complaint and aligning with the Trust Beneficiaries on their motion to
       dismiss and in this appeal, but he is estopped from now disclaiming the Tolling Agreement. See Town of New
       Chicago v. City of Lake Station ex rel. Lake Station Sanitary Dist., 939 N.E.2d 638, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
       (stating estoppel is a judicial doctrine sounding in equity based on the principle that “one who by deed or
       conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent
       position, attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other”) (citing Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d
       48, 51-52 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied. We will therefore not consider his argument that he lacked authority to
       toll the statute of limitations on behalf of the Trust Beneficiaries. See Response Brief of [John C. Coulson] at
       7.
       As for the Trust Beneficiaries’ standing, we need not address it given our resolution of the statutory issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                                      Page 10 of 16
[13]   We begin with the premise that parties may enter into agreements to toll the

       statute of limitations. See, e.g., City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169

       N.E.3d 382, 394 (Ind. 2021) (acknowledging parties entered into a “valid tolling

       agreement that tolled the statute of limitations” for plaintiff’s claims); cf. In re

       Julie R. Waterfield Irrevocable Tr. Agreement Dated October 21, 1997, 960 N.E.2d

       800, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (acknowledging the parties entered into a tolling

       agreement but noting a tolling agreement executed after the statute of

       limitations has already expired has no effect).

[14]   The question in this case is the nature and effect of the Tolling Agreement the

       Trustee and Nancy executed. In pertinent part, Indiana Code section 30-4-7-1

       states:

                 This chapter applies to the compromise of a contest or
                 controversy with respect to the following:

                 (1) The construction, validity, or effect of a trust instrument.

                 (2) The identity, rights, or interests of a beneficiary of a trust.

                 (3) The administration of a trust.

       Ind. Code § 30-4-7-1(1), (2). When the Compromise Chapter applies:

                 The terms of [the] compromise . . . must be set forth in an
                 agreement that is:

                        (1) in writing; and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                  Page 11 of 16
                        (2) executed by all persons or the guardians or guardians
                        ad litem appointed under section 4 of this chapter of all
                        persons who:

                                 (A) have an interest in the trust; or

                                 (B) have a claim against the trust.

       Ind. Code § 30-4-7-6.

[15]   Nancy contends the Tolling Agreement is not a compromise subject to the

       requirements of the Compromise Chapter, asserting the Tolling Agreement is

       only “tangentially” related to Zoe’s trust. Brief of Appellant at 16. The Trust

       Beneficiaries counter that the “Tolling Agreement itself is the compromise of a

       contest or controversy with respect to the construction, validity or effect of a

       trust instrument and the rights or interests of trust beneficiaries.” [Trust

       Beneficiaries’] Response Brief at 11.

[16]   In Bergal v. Bergal, 153 N.E.3d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, the wife of

       the settlor had diverted several trust assets to herself after the settlor became

       incapacitated. The reduction in trust assets effectively disinherited the settlor’s

       son. When this became known shortly after the settlor’s death, the wife and son

       had a meeting at which the wife admitted to re-titling the assets and admitted

       the settlor did not intend to disinherit his son. Among other things, the wife

       agreed to replace the assets into the trust in exchange for the son’s agreement

       “to refrain from filing a lawsuit and to try to restore family harmony.” Id. at

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023               Page 12 of 16
       248. The wife did disclaim her status as primary beneficiary of one asset but

       took no further action on the remaining assets.

[17]   When it became apparent the wife did not intend to return the rest of the assets

       to the trust, the son filed a complaint making several claims, including breach of

       contract. The wife filed a motion to dismiss the son’s breach of contract claim

       arguing the contract stemming from the family meeting pursuant to which she

       had agreed to return assets to the trust must have been in writing to be enforced,

       citing the Compromise Chapter. The trial court denied the motion. A jury

       found in favor of the son and against the wife on all the son’s claims and the

       wife appealed.

[18]   One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying the

       wife’s motion to dismiss. The wife argued the general rule that oral agreements

       are enforceable did not apply because the agreement related to the

       administration of the trust and the Compromise Chapter therefore required the

       agreement to be in writing. See Ind. Code § 30-4-7-1(3). “[E]ssentially, [the

       wife argued] that because the agreement relates to a trust, it necessarily falls

       under” the Compromise Chapter. Bergal, 153 N.E.3d at 252. We disagreed,

       noting the “General Assembly did not draft that chapter so broadly[; i]nstead, it

       limited the statute’s reach” to certain aspects of trusts. Id. Because the

       agreement “did not concern the management or supervision of the Trust, [or]

       relate to how, when, or to whom assets were to be directed or disbursed, [or]

       concern the manner in which assets were to be invested or safeguarded[,]” it did

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023             Page 13 of 16
       not relate to the administration of the Trust. Id. Therefore, the agreement did

       not have to be in writing.

[19]   Like the wife in Bergal, the Trust Beneficiaries essentially argue that because the

       Tolling Agreement relates to the trust, it must be subject to the Compromise

       Chapter and be executed by all interested persons and approved by the court.

       They baldly assert the Tolling Agreement “is a compromise of a contest or

       controversy with respect to the construction, validity or effect of a trust

       instrument and the rights or interests of trust beneficiaries” without showing

       how it is so. [Trust Beneficiaries’] Response Br. at 11. The Trust Beneficiaries’

       own definition of “compromise” as “[a]n agreement between two or more

       persons to settle matters in dispute between them” belies their argument. Id.

       (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed.). The Tolling Agreement did not settle

       a dispute about the applicable statute of limitations – that was a matter of

       statute. It simply tolled that accepted statute of limitations and allowed Nancy

       more time to file her complaint. Moreover, reading the Compromise Chapter

       as a whole, section 10 states that if the court approves a compromise agreement,

       “all further disposition of the trust that is within the scope of the agreement

       shall be made under the terms of the agreement.” But the Tolling Agreement

       did not address disposition of the trust or any other matter concerning the trust

       itself.

[20]   As the court in Bergal said, it is not enough that the agreement relate to a trust; it

       must be “[a] compromise of a contest or controversy” related to one or more of

       the limited aspects of a trust defined in section 30-4-7-1. Here, although the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023             Page 14 of 16
       Tolling Agreement provided Nancy additional time to contest the validity of the

       trust, it did not address any substantive issue surrounding the trust. It did not

       settle a controversy about the validity of the trust; nor did it impact the

       construction or effect of the trust; the identity, rights, or interests of a

       beneficiary; or change the terms of the trust. The adjudication of Nancy’s

       complaint—by the trial court or by a later agreement about the substance of the

       complaint—may affect any or all of those things, but when the Tolling

       Agreement was signed, Nancy had of course not yet filed her complaint. 8

[21]   The Probate Code has a similar compromise provision requiring a compromise

       agreement about the construction, validity, or effect of a testamentary

       instrument or the rights or interests of a beneficiary of such instrument to be in

       writing and approved by the court. See generally Ind. Code ch. 29-1-9. The

       probate chapter’s purpose is “to set up legal machinery whereby parties having

       an interest in a decedent’s estate may compromise any difference they may have

       with reference to a division of the corpus of the estate, and obtain a court order

       approving the compromise.” Ind. Code § 29-1-9-1, 1953 cmt.

               As such, the settlement agreement is a contractual agreement to
               transfer and distribute property among the parties so as to avoid
               litigation. There is no statutory requirement that the agreed-to
               distributions mirror one or more of the instruments in dispute.
               The compromise statute is not merely a mechanism for

       8
         We do note the parties stated they were entering into the Tolling Agreement to toll any statutes of
       limitations “while they attempt to mediate” Nancy’s claims. Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 32. Had mediation
       been successful, it is possible the ensuing agreement may have required the provisions of the Compromise
       Chapter to be followed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023                               Page 15 of 16
               enforcement of existing will provisions; it permits living persons
               to agree to accept alternative provisions.

       In re Estate of Yeley, 959 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[22]   Although the probate compromise chapter is not directly applicable to this case,

       the similarity in the provisions make cases interpreting it instructive here. The

       Tolling Agreement is not, as described in Yeley, an agreement by which the

       beneficiaries of the Trust have agreed to accept alternative provisions in order to

       settle a dispute over distributions and avoid or settle litigation. The Tolling

       Agreement is not a “compromise of a contest or controversy” requiring the

       provisions of the Compromise Chapter to be followed. Accordingly, the

       Tolling Agreement validly extended the time for Nancy to file a complaint. As

       no party has contended Nancy did not file her complaint within the time

       allowed by the Tolling Agreement, Nancy is entitled to judgment as a matter of

       law that her complaint is not untimely.

       Conclusion
[23]   We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to vacate

       its order dismissing Nancy’s complaint and reinstate Nancy’s cause of action.

[24]   Reversed and remanded.

       Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-980| May 15, 2023            Page 16 of 16