Court Opinion

ID: 9581604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:40.655501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:07.199250
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion prepared by Judge GRIMSON, but I desire hereby to present some additional reasons for the affirmance of the judgment.
My discussion may well begin by asking, what was the primary purpose of the attempt by the defendant union representatives in negotiating with representatives of Signal Oil and Gas Company, J. F. Prit-chard Company, Oil Field Service and Die-' derich and Bye?
Mr. Miller of Signal Oil and Gas Company testified at length. Several informal meetings had taken place between the parties. But the meeting of August 19, 1953, brought the issue to a head. At that meeting the plaintiffs were not present.
In an attempt to get at the primary objectives of the defendants, statements of Mr. Miller are pertinent. He was asked:
“All right, sir, at the first meeting, what subject of business did the union representatives bring up for discussion? A. Well, they protested, the use of non-union labor and non-union contractors on our construction work at the plant at Tioga.” * * *
“Q. All right, sir, now which ones— did they all concur in the statements? Did they all make similar statements? A. Well, yes it was all agreed on that they protested the use of non-union contractors and non-union laborers on our Tioga gasoline plant.
*156“Q. Well, with regard to the negotiations that were held at each of these, the discussions that were held at.each of these meetings, was it a matter of first taking up the matter of one craft and then taking up the matter of another craft and then taking up the matter of a third craft, or were they all discussed together at one time? A. No, sir, those gentlemen wanted this to be a union job complete, total in all its phases.
“Q. And then— A. (Continuing) They objected to the use of Oil Field Service and Diederich and Bye who were non-union contractors.
“Q. All right, sir, did they tell you that they wanted this to be an exclusively union job? A. Yes, sir.”
“The Witness: I believe in that part of the discussion Mr. Johnson was active. He seemed concerned that my company should sign a contract for any work on this job that wasn’t already agreed upon to be a union arrangement. He also expressed some concern that the contract itself did not have a clause in it which would permit me to stop it because it was not a closed shop deal where all the people belonged to the union. I kept insisting with those men all "along that that was out of my sphere, for authority and that was — well, they thought that was quite an argument. They thought I had the authority to do that. I insisted that I didn’t. So there was a lot of confusion because many people were talking. Well,.at that meeting Mr. Taylor was there and I said to Taylor, I said,' ‘Don’t you believe that this is out of my scope?’ ‘Yes.’ But if we could get something concise, pin-pointed from what these people were demanding, we would at least present it to the management. That’s where the samples of these contracts were submitted * *
Mr. Miller explained that one Mr. Rush, a representative of the International- Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, had explained that the Minot Labor Council had already authorized them to banner the job if they did not accomplish a satisfactory contract with the Oil Field Service and Die-derich and Bye that day (August 19). He also stated that Mr. Johnson of the Carpenters Union said that he would, in Wil-liston that night, move at the meeting that the job be bannered, if something was not done about the foundation being done by non-union men.
“Q. When they told you that they wanted you either to get rid of the -Plaintiffs or to induce them to sign a contract. Did they give you a specimen of the kind of contract they wanted you to get the Plaintiffs to sign ? A. Those are part of the contracts that are submitted.
“Q. Mr. Miller, at the meetings that we have been discussing, did the union representatives demand of you that Signal Oil and Gas Company require that all of the contractors on the project to employ entirely union labor?
Obj ection.
“A. Yes, sir.”
There is no substantial testimony in the record that the defendants were attempting to compel the plaintiffs to recognize them as bargaining agents. If such a conclusion is to be reached, it must be based on inference. The defendant union representatives were asking for a closed or union shop and seeking contracts that would make it so. They were interested in an all union job.
It is true that at the time of the trial of this action testimony was elicited indicating a willingness on the part of the defendants to méet with the employers, and also negativing any intent- to violate the state law and the public policy thereby established. This testimony is mostly of á self-serving nature. It amounts to saying: “We did not' intend to do what was done.”
When the entire testimony is considered it is clearly apparent that the purpose of the negotiations was to obtain an all union job at the Signal Oil and Gas Company *157plant. The specimen contracts that were given to Mr. Miller either at his request or as an indication of what the unions wanted, provided for a closed shop or a union shop, or at most provided an escape clause if these were illegal under state law. The specimen contract attached to the complaint was one involving a closed shop.
The negotiations never proceeded to the point where the defendants requested either Signal Oil and Gas Company, the Oil Field Service, or Diederich and Bye to sign a closed shop or union contract. But the threat to banner and picket the job was made in negotiations that clearly indicate that the unions were concerned primarily about obtaining that kind of an arrangement.
When the plaintiffs failed to appear at the August 19, 1953, meeting at the field house of the Signal Oil and Gas Company plant, apparently the unions felt that to force the issue they must banner and picket the plant. If the bannering and picketing did not have for its purpose to force Signal Oil and Gas Company to induce the plaintiffs to enter into contracts that would make the job an all union one, it had no purpose at all. The testimony shows that not only did the representatives of the unions request that this be an all union job, but time after time attempted to get the Signal Oil and Gas Company, through Mr. Miller, to use its influence with the contractors doing the work to make it an all union job, or if they would not, then to cancel their contracts with the plaintiffs because they were employing non-union men.
The trial court found, and its findings are supported by ample evidence:
“34. The primary objectives of the Defendant labor unions and representatives were:
“a. To negotiate union security contracts with Plaintiff Oil Field Service Co. for the employment of union labor exclusively with respect to crafts employed by the Plaintiffs.
“b. To persuade Signal to require the Plaintiffs to negotiate union security contracts with the Defendants for the employment of union labor exclusively.
“c. To force or require' Signal to cease doing business with Plaintiff Oil Field Service Co.
“35. The Defendants attempted by negotiation, without success, to accomplish the foregoing objectives.”
None of the unions attempting to negotiate represented the employees of the plaintiffs nor were they certified representatives of anyone, as required by the Taft-Hartley Act. It is obvious that before there can be a bargaining representative of a union there must, of course, be an established union in existence. No union had been established among the employees of the plaintiffs. Any attempt to force the formation of a union is illegal under North Dakota law.
It is argued that since the defendant sought by means of picketing, bannering and other methods to force and induce the employees of carriers transporting commodities and other materials to the site of the Signal Oil and Gas Company and to. engage in a refusal in the course of their employment, because of the picketing and ■bannering, to transport and otherwise handle materials and commodities consigned to the plaintiffs, the objective of which was to coerce or force the Signal Oil and Gas Company to cease doing business with the plaintiffs, such activities constituted unfair labor’ practices as defined, by Section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management Relations-Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (4). The trial court found this to be the case. Other acts of the defendants are pointed out as unfair labor practices. It is further argued that these unfair labor practices constitute the entire demand upon the Signal Oil and Gas Company and the plaintiffs; that no actual bargaining took place, and no specific contracts were demanded of either the plaintiffs or the Signal Oil and Gas Company; and that the bannering and picketing of the plant constituted secondary pressure on Signal Oil and Gas Company. The company did not employ any men directly, but of course they were *158interested in the expeditious completion of the plant. But the facts show the primary objectives to be the attainment of an all-union job. The defendants wanted contracts that would make it so. That was the first requirement. Other considerations were left to abide that objective.
The main point at issue is whether or not the unfair labor practices involved in this controversy, which involved interstate commerce, deprive the state court of jurisdiction to enjoin the defendants.
Our public policy is clearly established by Section 23 of the North Dakota Constitution and Sections 34 — 0106, NDRC 1943, 34— 0114, NDRC 1953 Supp., 34-0802, NDRC 1943, and 34-0901, NDRC 1953 Supp. Under our Constitution and our statutes both the closed shop and the union shop arc illegal. Section 34-0114, NDRC 1953 Supp.
Under circumstances such as exist here, where some of the acts that took place constitute unfair labor practices under the Taft-Hartley Law and where the same acts are illegal under the declared public policy of the State of North Dakota under the “right to work” act and other statutes, is the controversy involved one subject solely to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board under the Taft-Hartley Act, or does the illegality or attempt to procure contracts violating the “right to work” law and contrary to our public policy, give the employers a choice of remedies under the state law or the Taft-Hartley Act, depending upon which ground of illegality they may want to assert ? That is the crucial issue in this controversy.
The violations of the Taft-Hartley Act involved in this controversy are clearly distinct from the attempted violations to procure contracts that are illegal, void, and contrary to the public policy of the State of North Dakota.
While the injunction in this case was justified by the trial court primarily on the basis of the state’s police power, the question arises as to whether or not the court was within its jurisdiction to issue the injunction to protect, maintain, and enforce the declared public policy of this state. It is my opinion that the trial court had such jurisdiction. If the violations under the Taft-Hartley Law and the violations under the declared public policy of this state, particularly the “right to work” law, Section 34-0114, NDRC 1953 Supp., had covered the same area, then under the cases there is no doubt that this being a controversy involving interstate commerce, the state court would have no jurisdiction.
If as the trial court found, the primary objectives of the bannering and picketing were to procure union security contracts with the plaintiffs, Oil Field Service Company and Diederich and Bye, for the employment of union labor exclusively with respect to the crafts employed by them, and to persuade the Signal Oil and Gas Company to require the plaintiffs to negotiate union security contracts, and to force or require them to cease doing business with the plaintiffs, did the trial court have jurisdiction, or was the jurisdiction of the controversy pre-empted under the Taft-Hartley Act?
Under Chapter 120, Section 14(b), page 151, 61 U.S.Statutes, 29 U.S.C.A. § 164 (b), it is provided:
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”
The execution or application of closed or union shop contracts is prohibited in North Dakota. This is commonly referred to as the “right to work” law, Section 34— 0114, NDRC 1953 Supp.
Does Section 14(b) Cede to the states complete jurisdiction in a controversy in which the primary objective is to obtain contracts in violation thereof ? Or put another way, does the Tak-Hartley Act, because it only in a limitdd sense covers the *159same area as our “right to work” law, although the legal effect is entirely different, bar the state from taking jurisdiction?
If the Congress intended to give the states a free hand in the area covered by Section 14(b) it must have intended that the states have the right to enforce, maintain and protect any policy adopted pursuant to that section. In other words, is this an area under the Taft-Hartley Act which has been ceded to the states, free from any federal interference under that act? It is an area in labor relations which is not recognized by the Taft-Hartley Act. It is an area referred to in a specific exclusion. If the area is exclusive to a state, then it must follow that the state must have the rig-ht to protect, maintain, and enforce it. The Taft-Hartley Act does not provide for any maintenance, protection or enforcement of the “right to work” laws as promulgated by the states.
If that be true, even though the violations which are here involved also cover some areas under the Taft-Hartley Act, that becomes immaterial since the area left to the states must be assumed to be complete. The protection of this area, its maintenance and enforcement by a state is in no sense a duplication upon any power or authority set out or covered by the federal law. It is not a field that is protected, prohibited, or in conflict with its provisions. It is an area left to the states.
In the case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 484, 99 L.Ed. 546, the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed some of the leading cases. It said:
“1. The Court has ruled that a State may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect. Thus, in Hill v. State of Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 89 L.Ed. 1782, the State enjoined a labor union from functioning until it had complied with certain statutory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on the ground that the Wagner Act included a ‘federally established right to collective bargaining’ with which the injunction conflicted.”
No right exists in this state to bargain for the purpose here expressed.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not protect the “right to work” as determined 'by our public policy. It is true that it prohibits the closed shop and protects the union shop if certain conditions are complied with as required by the act, but it does not completely protect in the sense that our statutes do, the “right to work”. It would, therefore, seem that a state may by injunction protect, maintain, and enforce its public policy, and that this is not in any sense a conflict with the Taft-Hartley Act.
While it may be conceded that the picketing in the case at bar constituted unfair labor practice under the federal statutes, it, at the same time was not such picketing, under our state law, because it had for its objective the attainment of illegal contracts prohibited by law. The objectives sought are not only unfair labor practices but are completely prohibited. . In any event the unions were attempting to obtain a result in a manner prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act and by the state law. But the prohibition under our law is of much greater scope than any violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In Garner v. Teamsters Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 171, 98 L.Ed. 228, it was said:
“For a state to impinge on the area ■of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.”
Here the picketing is prohibited when conducted for the purpose of obtaining something that is illegal under our statute. It, therefore, does not impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free under the Taft-Hartley Act.
Reduced to its simplest terms the question may be propounded thus: Must the *160state court refrain from protecting', maintaining and enforcing its declared public policy where there are also involved violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, such violations being entirely different than those involved under the state law? Did the Congress intend that the states under those circumstances be dependent upon enforcement of their policy by the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act by federal action? The right to work in the sense of our statute cannot be protected by that act. Nor was it meant to be.
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 486, 99 L.Ed. 546, the court said:
“In Allen-Bradley Local, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154, the State was allowed to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property damage to employees, obstruction of streets and public roads, the blocking of entrance to and egress from a factory, and the picketing of employees’ homes. The Court held that such conduct was not subject to regulation by the federal Board, either 'by prohibition or by protection.” ' (Emphasis supplied.)
In other words, there was no conflict between the state law and the Taft-Hartley Act either prohibiting or protecting the conduct involved. The court also said in the same case:
“International Union, etc., v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651, involved recurrent, unannounced work stoppages. The Court upheld the state injunction on the ground that such conduct was neither prohibited nor protected by the Taft-Hartley Act and thus was open to state control.”
In the cáse of Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691, the state court forbid enforcement of a maintenance of • membership clause in a contract between employer and union. .Since there was nothing in the Wagner or Taft-Hartley Acts sanctioning or forbidding these clauses, they were left to the regulation of the state.
Since the state, under Section 14(b) is permitted to prohibit entirely closed and union shops, which has been done in this state, and since such prohibition does not conflict with any specific provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, and since this area is in the nature of an exclusion from the provisions of the Act, complete regulation, protection, maintenance and enforcement of this area must be left free to the state to make it effective.
Certainly it must be conceded that nowhere in the Taft-Hartley Act is there complete protection of the “right to work” such as is afforded under the declared public policy of the State of North Dakota, and therefore, there is no controlling and superseding federal power, or curtailment thereof by the state. This is so because the intervention is of a different nature than that which would be afforded under the Taft-Hartley Act.
Where, as here, such negotiations as were, and as found by the trial court, had for their main objectives the violation of the declared public policy of the State of North Dakota, the same could be enjoined because illegal under our law, and the state action does not conflict with the Taft-Hart-ley Act as no equivalent protection is afforded to the employers or laborers under the federal act as exists under the state law.
Furthermore, since under Section 14(b) the Taft-Hartley Act is not to be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in labor organizations as a condition of employment in any state or territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by the state or territorial law, it must be implied as a necessary incident of the right to thus prohibit the execution and application of agreements providing for closed or union shop, that the state might take whatever steps are necessary to secure maintenance, enforcement and protection of the law, *161which would include a resort to the state court when the primary purpose of banner-ing and picketing is to secure an illegal contract contrary to provisions of the state law. There was certainly no object for enactment of Section 14(b) as a part of the Taft-Hartley Act if it merely means that the state may prohibit the execution and application of these agreements but may do nothing more.
The maintenance of our dual sovereign-ties under the federal and state constitutions demands that neither unduly encroach upon the other insofar as that can be avoided. Each is independent in its own sphere except as limited by state and federal constitutional provisions. The separation of powers under our dual system of government, state and federal, demands complete independence of actions of each within its proper sphere of governmental regulations, and a state should not be dependent for maintenance or enforcement of its public policy in labor relations, as determined by the North Dakota constitution and statutes, upon procedures or court action of the government of the United States. Undoubtedly that was the basis for the insertion of Section 14(b) in the federal act. The Virginia case, Local Union No. 10, United Ass’n of Journeymen, Plumbers, etc. v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946, recognizes that a state by its judicial process has a right to protect its declared public policy under the so-called right to work statutes. While interstate commerce may not have been involved in that case, where the area or field of action is exclusive to the state as indicated by Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the state courts must have the right to protect that policy whether interstate commerce is involved or not.
In the case of Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525, 52 S.Ct. 217, 219, 76 L.Ed. 447, it was said:
“The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.”
This may be applied to the field of labor relations. It could never have been intended that a state might entirely prohibit agreements involving closed or union shop and make such agreements entirely null and void, and then be left powerless to take such steps as would make its policy effective; that its courts were without jurisdiction to maintain, enforce, or protect that policy where such enforcement would also preserve federal rights that might be involved.
I conclude that apart from any consideration of the police power, the state for compelling reasons, has the right to protect, maintain and enforce laws protecting the “right to work” regardless of membership or non-membership in a labor union, and that this was the primary purpose for which provision was made in the Taft-Hartley Act under Section 14(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b).
For reasons herein expressed as well as those set out in Judge GRIMSON’S opinion, the judgment should be affirmed.