Court Opinion

ID: 9373485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:21.799395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.758405
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DAVID G. BARBER,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        PH-0752-13-5792-I-5

                  v.

     SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DATE: August 16, 2022
       ADMINISTRATION,
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           John Walton, Jr., Bear Creek, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Ronald V. Santora, Esquire, Forty Fort, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Andrew Lynch, Esquire and James McTigue, Esquire, Philadelphia,
             Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     following circumstances:     the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency removed the appellant from his Customer Services Technician
     position on the charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee.            Barber v.
     Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-13-5792-I-5, Appeal
     File (I-5 AF), Tab 11 at 100-08.         The charge contained two specifications
     regarding the appellant’s collection of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
     benefits as the designated payee on behalf of his minor son.            Id. at 92-93.
     Specification 1 claimed that the appellant failed to report to the SSI program that
     he had earnings from his employment with the agency from September 2008 , until
     December 2010. Id. at 92. Specification 2 claimed that, during the same time
     period, the appellant continued to collect SSI benefits for his minor child while
     earning income from his employment with the agency, resulting in an
     overpayment in benefits. Id.
¶3         In April 2011, the agency’s SSI office issued a notice of overpayment to the
     appellant. I-5 AF, Tab 21 at 39-44. The appellant requested reconsideration of
                                                                                        3

     the determination, id. at 51-53, which was denied, id. at 54-56. He then requested
     a hearing. Id. at 64. Around the same time, the agency launched an investigation
     into the overpayment claim. I-5 AF, Tab 11 at 76-91. After the investigation
     concluded, the agency issued a notice of proposed removal to which the appellant
     responded. Id. at 92-99, 101. On August 1, 2013, the agency issued the final
     decision, sustaining both specifications of the charge and removing the appellant
     from his position. Id at 100-08. The appellant filed an appeal with the Board,
     arguing that, pursuant to his employment letter he received when he began
     employment with the agency, he reported his new income to the SSI program on
     September 17, 2008, by calling an 800 number, and therefore, he did not fail to
     report, as charged in specification 1, and had no reason to believe he was
     receiving an overpayment of benefits, as charged in specification 2. Barber v.
     Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-13-5792-I-1, Initial
     Appeal File, Tab 1 at 3.
¶4        After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     sustaining both specifications of the charge and upholding the removal. I-5 AF,
     Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 11, 14. After providing a lengthy analysis of the
     appellant’s credibility, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s account
     of the alleged September 17, 2008 telephone call was not credible. ID at 7. He
     also found that the appellant had not done enough to meet the reporting
     requirements and likely knew or should have known he was receiving an improper
     windfall from the SSI benefits.       ID at 8-11.      After a full analysis, the
     administrative judge concluded that the agency met its burden regarding the
     charge, nexus, and penalty of removal. ID at 12-14. He also found that potential
     due process issues that arose during the deciding official’s testimony were
     remedied by later testimony. ID at 14.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the administrative
     judge’s credibility findings and claiming that the agency violated his due process
     rights. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7-17. The agency has filed an
                                                                                          4

     opposition to the appellant’s petition, to which the appellant has replied. PFR
     File, Tabs 5-6. The Board also has accepted into the record an April 4, 2017
     Notice of Decision from the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
     (ODAR) regarding the appellant’s challenges to the original SSI overpayment
     determination, and the agency has filed a response to the submission. PFR File,
     Tabs 7-9.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         Generally, an agency is required to prove its charges in an adverse action
     appeal by preponderant evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B). A charge of conduct
     unbecoming has no specific elements of proof; the agency establishes the charge
     by proving the appellant committed the acts alleged under this broad label.
     Canada v. Department of Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 9 (2010). On
     review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s credibility findings
     regarding his testimony about the alleged September 17, 2008 telephone call. 2
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-10.
¶7         When an administrative judge has held a hearing and has made credibility
     determinations that were explicitly or implicitly based on the witness’s demeanor
     while testifying, the Board must defer to those credibility determinations and may
     overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
     doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
     Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 15 (2016). Here,
     the   administrative    judge’s    credibility    findings    were    comprehensive,
     well-analyzed, and appropriately based on the factors set forth in Hillen v.
     Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). ID at 5 n.3, 7-11. He

     2
       The appellant’s argument relates solely to specification 1 of the charge. He does not
     appear to dispute that he received SSI payments for his minor child while earning
     income from his employment with the agency, resulting in an overpayment in benefits;
     rather, he claims that he properly reported his income as required by the agency and by
     the SSI program. ID at 5-6; PFR File, Tab 6 at 1.
                                                                                           5

     discussed, in detail, internal inconsistencies in the appellant’s own testimony and
     external inconsistencies between his testimony and other record evidence.            ID
     at 7-8. The administrative judge also discussed the inherent improbability of the
     appellant’s testimony by highlighting certain implausible facts that would have to
     be presumed if he were to credit the appellant’s version of ev ents. Id. Moreover,
     on at least two occasions, the administrative judge discussed the appellant’s
     demeanor, noting that, upon certain lines of questioning, the appellant would
     become angry and evasive.         ID at 8, 10.   Because the administrative judge’s
     credibility determinations were, in part, based explicitly on the appellant’s
     demeanor at the hearing, we must defer to these findings absent “sufficiently
     sound” reasons. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301; see also Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R.
     647, ¶ 15.
¶8         Here, the appellant’s assertions on review do not persuade us to encroach on
     the deference owed to the administrative judge’s credibility determ inations. The
     appellant asserts that his Verizon telephone record, which was submitted at the
     hearing, should be sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim that he properly
     reported his income during the September 17, 2008 telephone call. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 7; I-5 AF, Tab 11 at 73-74. The appellant also asserts that it was this
     document alone that formed the basis of the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s decision to
     decline Federal prosecution on the matter. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. However, the
     administrative judge gave this evidence due consideration and weighed it against
     other factors determinative of credibility before reaching an ultimate conclusion
     on the appellant’s credibility.     ID at 7-8.   We find that the appellant has not
     provided a sufficiently sound reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
     credibility determinations, and without any such reason, those determinations will
     not be disturbed. 3

     3
       Although the ODAR administrative law judge found that the September 17, 2008
     phone call occurred and that the appellant reported his earnings during the call, we are
     not bound by those findings and conclusions. PFR File, Tab 7 at 9; see Nash v. Office
                                                                                            6

¶9          The appellant also argues on review that the agency violated his due process
      rights. First, he argues that the agency removed him from his position prior to the
      completion of his overpayment case with the SSI program. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10.
      While this assertion is true, the agency’s removal case was not dependent upon
      the outcome of the overpayment case. Neither specification of the charge against
      the appellant claimed any specific amount of overpayment. Rather, the agency
      charged him with failing to report his income and, thus, receiving an overpayment
      of SSI benefits. I-5 AF, Tab 11 at 92. 4 Along with providing the appellant with
      the opportunity to respond, of which he availed himself, id. at 98, 101, the notice
      of proposed removal was clear in providing detailed notice of the charge’s
      specifications and did not rely on the status of the overpayment proceedings, see
      id. at 92-95. As such, we find that the agency’s removal process did not violate
      the appellant’s due process rights.        See Cleveland Board of Education v.
      Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (providing that a tenured, public employee
      is entitled to prior notice and an opportunity to respond before being deprived of
      a property right in continued employment).
¶10         The appellant also argues that the agency violated his due process rights
      because it did not conduct any further investigation after it received the report
      from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) but before the time it issued the
      notice of proposed removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. Based on our review of the

      of Personnel Management, 92 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶¶ 9-10 (2002). Regardless of whether the
      September 17, 2008 telephone call occurred and whether the appellant adequately
      reported his income during that telephone call, he nonetheless concedes that he made no
      attempt to report the salary increases he received on January 4, 2009, August 30, 2009,
      January 3, 2010, and August 29, 2010. PFR File, Tab 6 at 1. This further supports the
      administrative judge’s finding regarding specification 1 that the appellant had not done
      enough to meet the reporting requirements. ID at 8 -11.
      4
        The ODAR Notice of Decision ultimately found the appellant to be responsible for a
      lesser amount of overpayment than what was detailed in the agency’s notice of
      proposed removal. PFR File, Tab 7 at 9-11. Nonetheless, the Notice of Decision
      similarly concluded that the appellant failed to report his income on several occasions,
      resulting in an overpayment of SSI benefits. Id. at 10-12.
                                                                                         7

      record, it appears the appellant raises this issue for the first time on review, and
      as such, the Board will not consider it absent any new or material i nformation.
      Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.115(d). Nonetheless, we note that the appellant’s allegation is contrary to
      the record evidence. The OIG issued its report in October 2012, and the agency
      formally interviewed the appellant on January 31, 2013, prior to issuing the
      notice of proposed removal.      I-5 AF, Tab 11 at 76-81, 88-91.       Because the
      appellant’s argument conflicts with record evidence, and he has not provided any
      new or material information, we find this claim provides no basis for disturbing
      the initial decision.
¶11         The appellant further asserts that the deciding official failed to act
      independently in the final decision to remove him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. This
      claim appears to be based on the deciding official’s testimony that the decision to
      remove the appellant “wasn’t just her decision” and that “she did her own
      investigation.” Id.; ID at 14. The administrative judge considered this testimony
      but found no due process violation. ID at 14. He explained that the deciding
      official further testified that her “investigation” was merely reviewing the paper
      file, which consisted of the documentation reflecting the overpayments , and that
      any input she received was from the appellant’s supervisor via the proposal letter
      (which the supervisor drafted) and human resources personnel confirming that
      removal was the standard penalty for this type of conduct. ID at 14.
¶12         Although an appellant’s right to due process can extend to ex parte
      information provided to a deciding official, only ex parte communications that
      introduce new and material information to the deciding official constitute due
      process violations. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed.
      Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation , 179 F.3d 1368,
      1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, we find no evidence that the paper file reviewed
      by the deciding official contained any information other than the overpayment
      documentation with which the appellant was already familiar. Further, it would
                                                                                            8

      be illogical to conclude that a review of the proposal notice provided any new and
      material information to which the appellant did not have an opportunity to
      respond, particularly considering that he did, in fact, respond to the notice.
      I-5 AF, Tab 11 at 99, 101. Finally, our reviewing court has held that a deciding
      official’s contact with other agency employees to confirm or clarify information
      already in the record does not violate the appellant’s due process rights. Blank v.
      Department of the Army, 247 F.3d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2001).                Here, the
      proposal notice stated that the appellant’s penalty of removal was consistent with
      the penalty imposed upon other employees for similar offenses. I-5 AF, Tab 11
      at 97. The deciding official testified that her contact with the human resources
      representative was to confirm the penalty of removal. I-5 AF, Tab 30, Hearing
      Compact Disc (testimony of the deciding official); ID at 14. Thus, pursuant to
      Blank, we find no due process violation.
¶13         We have considered the appellant’s arguments on review but have
      concluded that a different outcome is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the
      initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
             You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described b elow do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        9

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  10

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and tha t such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     11

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judi cial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for j udicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017 . Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                12

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our websi te at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.