Court Opinion

ID: 9615311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:34:03.512801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:45.097592
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Although concurring in the result obtained in the disposition of this appeal, I cannot join in the legal analysis contained in Division 1 of the majority opinion, including the theory of admissibility of entries in medical records asserted therein. Moreover, I reject any legal analysis in the majority opinion which might be construed as implying that genuine issues of material fact could exist solely based on inferences to be drawn from the deteriorated physical and mental condition of Lane as observed upon his return from x-ray. Proof of nothing more than an unexplained physical and mental deterioration, standing alone, will not establish liability on the part of the hospital. See Innes v. Dixie Svc. Center, 224 Ga. App. 584, 585 (481 SE2d 572) (mere fact of injury or damage does not give rise to a presumption or inference of negligence).
The trial court held that the hearsay declaration made by Lane to his wife immediately upon his return from additional x-rays met the threshold requirement for trustworthiness and were sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. Although I cannot join in either the majority’s or the trial court’s independent analysis regarding these statements, I do find that the record provides adequate support for the trial court’s ultimate ruling as to declaration reliability and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion (see Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 339 (1) (486 SE2d 601); compare Star Gas of Hawkinsville v. Robinson, 225 Ga. App. 594, 597 (4) (484 SE2d 266); Gilbert Corp. &c. v. Yetman, 219 Ga. App. 320, 322 (2) (464 SE2d 822); Brown v. City of Fitzgerald, 177 Ga. App. 859, 861 (3) (341 SE2d 476)) when it in essence admitted this declaration by holding it was sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. Lee v. Peacock, 199 Ga. App. 192 (404 SE2d 473) is distinguishable. In Lee, supra, we were testing for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ruling the declarations inadmissible, while in this case we are testing for an abuse of discretion as to a ruling which finds the declaration sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. After the trial court found the declaration to be reliable, it proceeded erroneously to shift the burden of going forward to nonmovant appellant; in doing so the trial court committed reversible error.
For the above reasons, I am compelled to join in the reversal of the judgment granting summary judgment to appellee Tift County Hospital Authority.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ruffin joins in this special concurrence.
*564Decided September 17, 1997.
O. Wayne Ellerbee, Laurie L. Paterson, Howard E. McClain, for appellant.
Reinhardt, Whitley & Wilmot, Robert C. Wilmot, for appellee.