Court Opinion

ID: 9616589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:47:58.91912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.938730
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion overlooks the doctrine of harmless error. There can be no reasonable contention that malice was not proven under the evidence in this case. The only issue involved here was whether this defendant was the person who committed the homicide. The evidence was overwhelming that this was an intentional killing involving malice and the probata established the allegata of the indictment. Under the cold, harsh facts of the case, I would treat the trial court’s isolated reference to felony murder as harmless to the defendant’s case.
I would have a wholly different opinion if the evidence showed some issue with respect to malice because, in that event, the Edwards case cited by the majority would be controlling. However, there is a substantial factual distinction between this case and Edwards which can be readily discerned from Division 2 of the Edwards opinion. The question of malice was very much in issue in that case.
Not every error requires reversal, and I dissent to the reversal of this murder conviction for a technical but nonprejudicial error. I dissented in Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123 (205 SE2d 210), where a majority of the court upheld a conviction for forcible rape under a definition of statutory rape. There, it seemed to me, the jury had to be confused by the charge and I could not agree the error was harmless under that transcript and all the issues argued on appeal. However, if a majority of the court could find the errors there were harmless, I am at a loss to understand why the error here was not harmless. See, *470Robinson at pp. 128, 129. I dissent.