Court Opinion

ID: 9864978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:18:56.361964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:33.900328
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
The judgment, it seems to me, should be affirmed instead of reversed. According to the rule adopted by the overwhelming weight of authority, the disability was not “immediate.” The majority opinion assumes that in Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617, this court adopted a contrary rule and held that “immediately” relates, not to time, but to causation. That is a mistake. That case arose under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which is highly remedial, beneficent in purpose, and should be given a liberal construction, so as to accomplish the evident intent and purpose of the act. Karoly v. Industrial Commission, 65 Colo. 239, 243, 176 Pac. 284. In the opinion in Central Surety & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, we said: “Did the legislature intend to require the strain to precede the hernia instantaneously? Did it not rather intend that there may intervene between the cause and the effect an interval of time, short indeed, but still sufficient for the effect to follow the cause in the usual course of nature?” We gave a liberal, reasonable construction to the statute by holding that “immediately” did not mean instantaneously. We recognized the fact that for the effect to follow the cause time was required, but held that the time allowed must be, not of indefinite duration, but short, and that in that case the time between the strain and the resulting hernia — only a few days — was short and therefore met the requirement of the statute. We gave illustrations of the various meanings given by the courts to the word “immediately,” and among the cases mentioned was Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Barnes, 72 Kan. 293, 80 Pac. 1020, 82 Pac. 1099. The language used by that court and quoted in our opinion in Central Surety & Ins. *263Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra, must be understood in the light of the facts before the court. There the time intervening between the accident and the disability was only a few days. The court recognized the fact that “immediately” is an adverb of time, not of causation. And see the recent case of Thomas v. Mutual Benefit, H. & A. Ass’n, 136 Kan. 802, 18 P. (2d) 151, where the time intervening between the accident and the disability was six days.
In the present case about three months intervened between the accident and the disability, and that, in my opinion, was entirely too long to justify a holding that the injury immediately disabled the insured.
I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Bouck concur in this opinion.