Court Opinion

ID: 9953479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:51.232433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:59.968468
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

KANDICE HOLDER,                                                       FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                      March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,                                   9:05 a.m.

v                                                                     No. 364401
                                                                      St. Clair Circuit Court
ANCHOR BAY INVESTMENTS, INC,                                          LC No. 2021-000013-NI

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAMERON and PATEL, JJ.

CAMERON, J.

         In this slip-and-fall case, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s orders granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and
MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine question of fact). We vacate the trial court’s order granting
summary dismissal of plaintiff’s common-law premises liability claim and remand this issue to
the trial court for further factual development under Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, ___ Mich
___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 162907 and 163430). We affirm the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition of plaintiff’s statutory claims.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Plaintiff leased a first-floor apartment from defendant. There were two newly-constructed
sets of exterior stairs leading into two different doors of plaintiff’s apartment. The stairs at issue
were made of wood and led to a landing outside the main entrance of plaintiff’s apartment.
According to plaintiff, she noticed that these wooden steps eventually became “algaefied” and
were slippery. Plaintiff was injured after she slipped and fell on one of the wooden steps.

        She later filed a two-count complaint. Count one alleged breach of statutory duties under
MCL 554.139 and MCL 125.536. Count two alleged common-law premises liability. Defendant
moved for summary disposition. The trial court granted summary dismissal of the common-law
premises liability claim, concluding the defect at issue was open and obvious. In a separate order,
it dismissed plaintiff’s statutory claims. This appeal followed.

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                                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews de novo motions for summary disposition. Innovation Ventures v
Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 506; 885 NW2d 861 (2016). Defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). The purpose of a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

       All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light
       most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be
       granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of
       law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. When deciding a
       motion brought under this section, a court considers only the pleadings. [Id. at 119-
       120 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

         The purpose of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), meanwhile,
is to test the “factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Id. at 120.

       In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a
       trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
       evidence submitted by the parties . . . in the light most favorable to the party
       opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine
       issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
       matter of law. [Id. (citations omitted).]

        Under the burden-shifting framework of MCR 2.116(C)(10), “the moving party has the
initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of disputed fact exists.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996) (citations omitted). The nonmoving party “must go beyond the pleadings to set forth
specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id.

      This case also involves questions of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de
novo. GC Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 419; 662 NW2d 710 (2003).

                The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative
       intent that may be reasonably inferred from the words expressed in the statute . . . .
       If the language of the statute is clear, we presume that the Legislature intended the
       meaning expressed. If the statute does not define a word, we may consult dictionary
       definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word . . . . However,
       legal terms of art are to be construed according to their peculiar and appropriate
       meaning. [Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 427; 751 NW2d 8
       (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

                         III. COMMON-LAW PREMISES LIABILITY

       Plaintiff first argues the trial court erred in dismissing her premises liability claim because
the danger posed by the condition of the stairs was open and obvious. Our Supreme Court in

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Kandil-Elsayed, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2, recently revised the open and obvious danger
doctrine. Because these changes were made after the trial court granted summary disposition, we
vacate the trial court’s order granting summary dismissal of plaintiff’s common-law premises
liability claim and remand to the trial court for further factual development under Kandil-Elsayed.

        A preliminary issue in this case is whether the trial court wrongly dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint—which included allegations defendant violated its statutory duties under MCL
554.139—on the basis of the open and obvious danger doctrine. Indeed, “[t]he open and obvious
danger doctrine is not available to deny liability for a statutory violation under MCL 554.139(1).”
Bowman v Walker, 340 Mich App 420, 431; 986 NW2d 419 (2022) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court wrongly dismissed her complaint on the
basis of the open and obvious danger doctrine even though her complaint also included allegations
defendant violated its statutory obligations. In other words, plaintiff believes a trial court cannot
partially dismiss a premises liability complaint because a defect is open and obvious if the
complaint also includes statutory liability claims.

        Plaintiff’s complaint contained two theories of liability—premises liability and statutory
duty. Each of these theories was set forth in two separate counts in the complaint. It is common
practice for courts to partially dismiss a complaint on the basis of a viable defense and the open
and obvious danger doctrine is a viable defense against premises liability claims. See, e.g., Kandil-
Elsayed, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 44 (“As part of the breach inquiry, the fact-finder may
consider, among other things, whether the condition was open and obvious . . . .”). Thus, there is
nothing inherently inconsistent with the trial court’s dismissal of the premises liability count under
the open and obvious danger doctrine.

        Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in dismissing the premises liability portion of the
complaint because the danger at issue was unavoidable. The question whether a condition is
unavoidable is a product of the common-law “special aspects” doctrine. See Lugo v Ameritech
Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 517; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), overruled Kandil-Elsayed, ___ Mich at
___; slip op at 2. Until recently, special aspects were an exception to the open and obvious danger
doctrine, and they allowed a defendant to be held liable for damages where they created an
unavoidable or unreasonably dangerous condition on the land. Lugo, 464 Mich at 517. Plaintiff
asserts the danger posed by the stairs was unavoidable because both sets of stairs leading to the
apartment were “algaefied,” suggesting plaintiff could not enter or exit her apartment without
encountering this danger.

         In Kandil-Elsayed, our Supreme Court also overruled the special-aspects doctrine, holding
instead that “when a land possessor should anticipate the harm that results from an open and
obvious condition, despite its obviousness, the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable
care.” ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2. Plaintiff’s appeal was filed before our Supreme Court issued
Kandil-Elsayed, therefore her argument on appeal relies on the special-aspects doctrine. She
makes no argument whether defendant should have anticipated the harm caused by the slippery
steps. Because the record before us is devoid of any consideration of Kandil-Elsayed, we vacate
the trial court’s order granting summary disposition of plaintiff’s common-law premises liability
claim and remand the case to the trial court to allow the parties to develop the factual record in
light of Kandil-Elsayed.

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                                   IV. STATUTORY CLAIMS

        Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her statutory claims.
According to plaintiff there remained factual questions regarding: (1) whether the stairs were
reasonably fit for their intended use under MCL 554.139; and (2) defendant’s duty to repair the
stairs. She also believes the trial court inappropriately considered her evidence showing violations
of the applicable building codes and Michigan’s Housing Law, MCL 125.401, et seq. We disagree.

                                  A. FIT FOR INTENDED USE

        The first question is whether the trial court erred when it concluded there was no genuine
question of fact whether the stairway was fit for its intended use under MCL 554.139(1). This
statute states:

             (1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor
       covenants:

               (a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by
       the parties.

               (b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or
       license, and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and
       of the local unit of government where the premises are located, except when the
       disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the
       tenants wilful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct. [MCL 554.139(1).]

        A defendant’s duty depends on whether the area is considered part of the “premises” or
whether it is a “common area.” Thus, the first question in this case is whether the stairway was
part of the “premises” or a “common area.” “[I]n the context of leased residential property,
‘common areas’ describes those areas of the property over which the lessor retains control that are
shared by two or more, or all, of the tenants.” Allison, 481 Mich at 427. Further, in Hadden v
McDermitt Apartments, LLC, 287 Mich App 124, 130; 782 NW2d 800 (2010), this Court
considered an exterior stairway to be a common area. Like the stairs in Hadden, the stairs at issue
were outside, and leading to, plaintiff’s apartment. There was testimony that defendant was
primarily responsible for maintenance of the stairway. Although there was no evidence the
stairway was used by two or more tenants, given the other facts, a reasonable conclusion is that
this exterior stairway was a “common area” under MCL 554.139(1).

        Under MCL 554.139(1)(a), a landlord must ensure that common areas are fit for their
intended use. See also Allison, 481 Mich at 430. Our Supreme Court’s opinion in Allison, 481
Mich 419 and this Court’s opinion in Hadden, 287 Mich App 124, continue to guide our
understanding of whether a common area is fit for its intended use. The Allison plaintiff broke his
ankle as he was walking to his vehicle in an apartment parking lot when he slipped on some snow
and ice. Allison, 481 Mich at 423. At issue was whether the accumulation of snow and ice violated
the landlord’s duty to keep the parking lot fit for its intended use. Id. at 429-430. The Court
explained that the intended purpose of a parking lot was to allow residents “to park their vehicles
in the lot and have reasonable access to their vehicles.” Id. at 429. A landlord fulfills their duty if

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they “ensure that the entrance to, and the exit from, the lot is clear, that vehicles can access parking
spaces, and that tenants have reasonable access to their parked vehicles.” Id.

           The Court determined that the defendant did not violate their duty under MCL 554.139(1),
stating:

                   While a lessor may have some duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard
           to the accumulation of snow and ice in a parking lot, it would be triggered only
           under much more exigent circumstances than those obtaining in this case. The
           statute does not require a lessor to maintain a lot in an ideal condition or in the most
           accessible condition possible, but merely requires the lessor to maintain it in a
           condition that renders it fit for use as a parking lot. Mere inconvenience of access,
           or the need to remove snow and ice from parked cars, will not defeat the
           characterization of a lot as being fit for its intended purposes. [Id. at 430.]

         This Court in Hadden, 287 Mich App at 130 utilized the same analytical framework, but
we reached a different conclusion. The Hadden plaintiff was injured when she fell on an exterior
12-riser stairway. Id. The plaintiff said the day before her fall, she “noted the presence of snow
on all the stairs of the stairway.” Id. She notified the defendant of the condition and the defendant
assured the plaintiff they “would take care of it.” Id. at 131. The plaintiff testified about the
circumstances of her fall, stating: “[S]he did not see the ice before her fall because it was black ice
and the stairway was too dark.” Id. “As she fell . . . [the] plaintiff noticed that the gutters overhead
were overflowing with water and icicles had formed.” Id.

       We concluded there were remaining questions of fact whether the stairway was fit for its
intended use, explaining:

           [T]he primary purpose of a stairway is to provide pedestrians reasonable access to
           different levels of a building or structure. Reasonable minds could conclude that
           the presence of black ice on a darkly lit, unsalted stairway—possibly caused or
           aggravated by overflowing ice water from overhead gutters in the presence of
           freezing rain—posed a hidden danger that denied tenants reasonable access to
           different levels of the apartment building and rendered the stairway unfit for its
           intended use. [Id. at 132.]

        Like Allison, this Court determined: “MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require perfect
maintenance of a stairway. The stairway need not be in an ideal condition, nor in the most
accessible condition possible, but, rather, must provide tenants ‘reasonable access’ to different
building levels.” Id. at 130. Nevertheless, this Court concluded that Hadden was “factually
distinguishable from Allison because black ice on a stairway presents more than the mere
inconvenience posed by one to two inches of snow in a parking lot.” Id. at 132 (quotation marks
and alterations omitted).

        In contrast to Hadden, this case involved three wooden steps, there was no evidence
plaintiff had difficulty seeing the algae. Plaintiff was familiar with the danger posed by the algae—
indeed, she testified she “took extra time” when she used the steps. Furthermore, plaintiff said she
used the stairway at least twice a day; thus, she was not impeded from accessing her apartment.

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In this context, the trial court did not err when it concluded there was no genuine question of fact
whether these stairs were fit for their intended use under MCL 554.139(1).

                                        B. DUTY TO REPAIR

         Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in concluding there was no question of fact
whether defendant violated its duty to repair under MCL 554.139(1). Again, MCL 554.139(1)(b)
states, in part, that a landlord has a duty “[t]o keep the premises in reasonable repair during the
term of the lease . . . .” (Emphasis added.) As discussed above, there is a difference between
“premises” and “common areas.” Indeed, our Supreme Court in Allison held that “the lessor’s
duty to repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b) does not apply to common areas.” Allison, 481 Mich at
435. Here, the stairway at issue was a common area, and not part of the “premises.” Therefore,
defendant had no duty to repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b).

                                C. BUILDING CODE VIOLATIONS

        Plaintiff further argues the trial court incorrectly analyzed plaintiff’s evidence showing
violations of the Michigan building code. She contends that her complaint should not have been
dismissed because her evidence showing violations of the Michigan building code sufficiently
demonstrated at least a question of fact whether defendant “compl[ied] with the applicable health
and safety laws of the state and of the local unit of government” under MCL 554.139(1)(b).1
Again, plaintiff’s arguments as to this issue are misplaced.

        The trial court in this case considered plaintiff’s evidence as to the violations of the
applicable building code under the framework of MCL 125.536, not MCL 554.139(1)(b).
Plaintiff’s arguments as to this issue on appeal do not explain this discrepancy, or how the trial
court incorrectly analyzed the issues under MCL 125.536. Thus, plaintiff’s challenge to the trial
court’s analysis of the building codes in connection with her claims under MCL 554.139 is
meritless.

                                  D. MICHIGAN HOUSING LAW

       Plaintiff next focuses on MCL 125.536. She claims that the trial court erred in concluding
defendant did not violate the duty to repair and whether defendant had notice of the condition.
MCL 125.536(1) states:

                   When the owner of a dwelling regulated by this act permits unsafe,
          unsanitary or unhealthful conditions to exist unabated in any portion of the
          dwelling, whether a portion designated for the exclusive use and occupation of
          residents or a part of the common areas, where such condition exists in violation of
          this act, any occupant, after notice to the owner and a failure thereafter to make the
          necessary corrections, shall have an action against the owner for such damages he
          has actually suffered as a consequence of the condition. When the condition is a
          continuing interference with the use and occupation of the premises, the occupant

1
    Plaintiff incorrectly cites this subsection as “MCL 554.139(2)(b).”

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       shall also have injunctive and other relief appropriate to the abatement of the
       condition.

        A threshold question is whether MCL 125.536 applies to exterior stairways, which has not
been decided in any published case. We conclude that MCL 125.536 does not pertain to exterior
stairways, such as this one. The statute states that it applies to areas that are “in any portion of the
dwelling.” MCL 125.536(1) (emphasis added). It is a basic premise of statutory interpretation
that courts should follow the meaning plainly expressed in the statute. Allison, 481 Mich at 427.
MCL 125.536(1) plainly applies to areas “in” the dwelling. Here, it is undisputed that this stairway
was not “in” the dwelling.2 Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument under MCL 125.536(1) is meritless
and we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s statutory claim under MCL 125.536.

                                           V. DAMAGES

        Finally, plaintiff disputes the trial court’s statement that her damages were limited to
contractual damages and she argues that tort damages are a recognized form of recovery for the
allegations in her complaint. We disagree.

        This argument is completely illogical. Plaintiff argues ad nauseam why she is entitled to
tort damages for her claims. While the trial court found “[a]ny remedy under [MCL 554.139(1)(a)]
consists exclusively of a contract remedy,” the basis of the trial court’s dismissal was not that
plaintiff’s complaint sought improper tort damages. Rather, the trial court’s dismissal was
predicated on whether defendant satisfied the criteria for a motion for summary disposition. It
simply is not at issue whether plaintiff is entitled to damages under the law cited in her complaint
and this argument purportedly explaining plaintiff’s entitlement to damages is meritless.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray

2
  Our conclusion is consistent with the unpublished, and not binding decision, MCR 7.215(C)(1),
Jamel v WBR Kings Arms, LLC, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 26, 2023 (Docket No. 359763). Jamel held: “One prerequisite to establishing a violation
of this statute is that the condition exists in a portion of the dwelling. Here, the stairs were not
inside the dwelling but were instead at the outside end of the dwelling. MCL 125.536(1) does not
apply to these stairs.” Id. at 6.

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