Court Opinion

ID: 9896305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:28.241112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:41.389484
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 Freeman v. LMA & SAI 1433 Wilshire CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

ISRAEL FREEMAN,                                                  B325212

     Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and                              (Los Angeles County
Appellant,                                                       Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV00353)

         v.

LMA & SAI 1433 WILSHIRE LLC,

     Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
      Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, Stephen E. Foster, and
Andrew C. Spitser for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
      Cozen O’Connor, Matthew S. Steinberg, Christopher
Paolino, and Alexander E. Robinson for Defendant, Cross-
complainant and Respondent.
                     _______________________
       In March 2022 Israel (Izzy) Freeman, the owner of Izzy’s
Deli, filed a complaint for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial
determination of whether he was obligated to guarantee the lease
obligations of Izzy’s Deli under a lease with LMA & SAI 1433
Wilshire LLC (LMA). The following month LMA filed a cross-
complaint against Freeman and Izzy’s Deli, alleging causes of
action for breach of lease and breach of personal guaranty.
Freeman filed a special motion to strike the claim for anticipatory
breach (within the breach of guaranty cause of action) in the
cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16.1 The trial court denied the motion, and Freeman
appealed.
       Freeman argued in his special motion to strike that LMA’s
claim for anticipatory breach arose from Freeman’s filing of his
complaint for declaratory relief, which was protected activity.
The trial court denied the motion, finding the claim arose from
the dispute over the guaranties, not the filing of the complaint.
The court also found Freeman was not entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees and costs because he was not the prevailing party.
On the same day the court issued its order, LMA dismissed its
cross-complaint.
       On appeal, Freeman argues that notwithstanding LMA’s
dismissal of the cross-complaint, the trial court had jurisdiction
to decide the merits of his special motion to strike as a predicate
to determining whether he was entitled to prevailing party
attorneys’ fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).
LMA argues the cross-complaint was dismissed before the trial

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure. Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the
anti-SLAPP statute.

                                2
court ruled, depriving the court of jurisdiction to consider the
motion. As to the merits, Freeman contends the trial court erred
in denying the special motion to strike because Freeman’s filing
of the complaint constituted the anticipatory breach of the
guaranty alleged in the cross-claim. Because the filing of the
complaint is at most evidence of the anticipatory breach, not the
basis for the cross-claim, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Lease and Personal Guaranties2
      In 1973 Freeman, Ernest Auerbach, and Kenneth Horowitz
opened the predecessor to Izzy’s Deli. On March 29, 1973
Freeman and Horowitz, on behalf of the deli, signed a 15-year
lease with the landlord (Auerbach and his wife, Lisa Auerbach).
Under the lease, a default and breach of the lease by the deli
included “vacating or abandonment of the [p]remises” and failure
to pay rent when due. Freeman and his co-owners also signed a
guaranty, in which they guaranteed the deli’s performance of the
lease terms, including payment of rent. By February 1988,
Freeman became the sole owner of the deli.
      On February 15, 1988 Freeman, on behalf of Izzy’s Deli,
signed a second amendment to the lease, which extended the
lease term to May 31, 2003 and increased the rent. Concurrent
with the second amendment, Freeman signed a second personal
guaranty. The parties subsequently executed two amendments
to the lease that increased the rent, extended the lease term, and

2     The facts are taken from the complaint, cross-complaint,
and exhibits attached to both pleadings, which include the lease,
lease amendments, and two personal guaranties.

                                3
gave the deli an option to extend the lease. The fifth amendment
extended the lease term to May 31, 2028 and gave the deli an
option to extend the lease for another five years.

B.    Freeman’s Complaint
      On March 11, 2022 Freeman filed a complaint for
declaratory relief alleging two causes of action against LMA, the
successor landlord. In the first cause of action, Freeman
requested “a judicial determination that there is no operative
personal guaranty obligating him to guarant[ee] the current
operative Lease.” Freeman alleged his personal guaranty of the
second amendment to the lease “is a modification of the Original
Personal Guaranty and both extends and limits [his] personal
guaranty only to the end of the term of the Second Amendment,
which expired on May 31, 2003. The New Personal Guaranty did
not extend to and excluded any subsequent amendments.
Thus, . . . the New Personal Guaranty and Original Personal
Guaranty have expired and are unenforceable against him.” In
the second cause of action, Freeman sought a judicial
determination that if the original guaranty is interpreted to cover
the current lease, then it is unenforceable for lack of
consideration. Freeman asserted his original personal guaranty
was extinguished upon the deaths of Ernest and Lisa Auerbach,
explaining, “In the absence of currently operative personal
guaranties by the landlord/lessor, which were given to the lessees
as consideration under the Original Personal Guaranty, the
Original Personal Guaranty now lacks consideration and cannot
be enforced unilaterally against only [Freeman].”

                                 4
C.     LMA’s Cross-complaint and Dismissal of the Complaint
       On April 28, 2022 LMA filed a cross-complaint against
Izzy’s Deli and Freeman alleging causes of action for breach of
lease and breach of personal guaranty. In the first cause of
action for breach of lease against both cross-defendants, LMA
alleged Izzy’s Deli failed to make all required rent and other
payments under the lease beginning in July 2020, and it owed
$314,360 as of April 2022. LMA alleged it sent Izzy’s Deli a
notice of abandonment pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.35,
and Izzy’s Deli confirmed it had abandoned the property on
April 14, 2022. In the second cause of action for breach of
personal guaranty, LMA alleged in paragraph 30, “To date,
Freeman has not personally paid LMA/SAI any amount of money
associated with Izzy’s Deli’s indebtedness notwithstanding his
guaranties of these payments. Therefore, Freeman has not
performed under the personal guaranties that he executed
contemporaneously with the Lease and Second Amendment to
the Lease.” LMA added in paragraph 31, “On information and
belief, a formal demand made upon Mr. Freeman is futile because
he filed the initial Complaint in this action seeking declaratory
relief that the personal guaranties are not operative. Therefore,
Freeman by judicial admission has expressed his unequivocal
intention to refuse to honor his guaranties. LMA/SAI construes
Mr. Freeman’s conduct to be an anticipatory breach of contract
displaying his intent not to perform under the personal
guaranties.”
       On April 28, 2022 LMA filed a demurrer to Freeman’s
complaint. On June 2 Freeman filed a request for dismissal
without prejudice, which the court clerk entered the same day.

                                5
D.      Freeman’s Special Motion To Strike
        On June 27, 2022 Freeman filed a special motion to strike
the anticipatory breach claim within LMA’s second cause of
action for breach of guaranty pursuant to section 425.16.
Freeman argued the breach of guaranty cause of action pleaded
two separate claims: a claim for breach of guaranty as to amounts
already due, and a claim for anticipatory breach. Freeman
asserted, “This separate claim (the ‘Anticipatory Breach Claim’)
expressly alleges that ‘a formal demand made upon Mr. Freeman
is futile because he filed the initial Complaint in this action
seeking declaratory relief that the personal guaranties are not
operative.’ . . . In other words, LMA expressly rests its allegation
of anticipatory breach entirely on Freeman’s exercise of his right
to file the Complaint, and blatantly states that fact in its Cross-
Complaint. Indeed, Freeman’s protected filing of his Complaint
in this action is the only ‘conduct’ alleged, and thus must be the
‘conduct’ that LMA ‘construes’ as an anticipatory breach.”3
Freeman further argued LMA’s claim had no likelihood of success
because the filing of the Complaint was protected by the
litigation privilege and otherwise lacked merit. He added,
“Freeman will file a noticed motion for an award of all attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in connection with this motion, upon the
Court’s order granting this motion.”
        In its opposition, LMA argued Freeman’s special motion to
strike the cross-claim was moot in light of Freeman’s voluntary
dismissal of his complaint. LMA also submitted with its

3     LMA’s attorney confirmed at the hearing on the motion
that the cross-complaint alleged anticipatory breach of the
guaranty. But LMA’s attorney asserted the anticipatory breach
was alleged in paragraphs 1 through 28 and 30, not 31.

                                 6
opposition the declaration of its attorney, Frank Gooch, III.
Gooch averred that in early February 2022 he attended a meeting
with Freeman’s counsel (Stephen Foster and Andrew Spitser) in
which Gooch stated that even if Izzy’s Deli did not have the
financial means to pay the amounts owed on the lease, “Freeman
was personally obligated for all its lease debts based on his
personal guaranties.” According to Gooch, Spitzer and Foster
responded “explicitly and in no uncertain terms that in fact
Freeman had no current guaranty obligations . . . .” LMA also
maintained in its opposition that it met its burden under the
second step of section 425.16 to show minimal merit of its breach
of guaranty claim against Freeman because the litigation
privilege did not apply to contractual claims; Freeman’s
allegations in his complaint were judicial admissions that
supported the anticipatory breach of guaranty claim; and
Freeman’s lawyer unequivocally told LMA’s lawyer that Freeman
would not honor his guaranties. LMA also requested attorneys’
fees and costs, arguing Freeman’s motion was frivolous and filed
in bad faith.

E.     The Trial Court’s Ruling and LMA’s Dismissal of Its Cross-
       complaint
       On November 17, 2022, after issuing a tentative ruling to
deny Freeman’s special motion to strike and the parties’ requests
for attorneys’ fees and costs, the trial court held a hearing on
Freeman’s motion and took the matter under submission. On
November 21 the court issued a minute order (noting the order
was issued at 3:00 p.m.), which denied the motion. The court
found Freeman failed to make a threshold showing LMA’s
anticipatory breach claim arose from protected activity under

                                7
section 425.16, subdivision (e). The court explained, “[W]hile the
declaratory relief complaint may have triggered the anticipatory
breach claim and may be evidence in support of that claim, the
claim was not based on the filing of the complaint.” The court
reasoned LMA’s anticipatory breach claim was “based on an
underlying dispute between the parties on whether there has
been a breach” of the guaranty. Because the first step of section
425.16 was not satisfied, the court did not reach whether LMA
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of its
cross-claim for anticipatory breach of guaranty.
       The trial court noted both parties sought attorneys’ fees
and denied the requests. The court found Freeman was not the
prevailing party on his special motion to strike, and therefore
was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under section
425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Further, LMA was not entitled to
attorneys’ fees under sections 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), and
128.5 because Freeman’s motion was not frivolous or made in bad
faith.
       Also on November 21, 2022 LMA electronically submitted a
request for dismissal of its cross-complaint without prejudice.
The electronic notice of confirmation of filing reflects that the
court received LMA’s filing at 8:34 a.m. and “accepted” the filing.
The dismissal was entered on the same day.
       Freeman timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

A.   Freeman’s Appeal Is Not Moot
     LMA contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on
Freeman’s special motion to strike because LMA dismissed the

                                 8
cross-complaint before the trial court issued its ruling at
3:00 p.m. Freeman argues that although LMA’s request for
dismissal was electronically received at 8:34 a.m., there is no
evidence of the time when the court clerk entered the dismissal.
Further, Freeman notes the minute order discusses the motion on
the merits without mentioning that the cross-complaint had been
dismissed or addressing mootness. Thus, he contends that we
should presume the minute order was issued first and the trial
court acted properly.
       Regardless of when the court clerk entered the dismissal of
the cross-complaint, the dismissal was effective upon LMA’s
filing of its request for dismissal. (S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 380 [“A section 581 dismissal ‘is available
to [a] plaintiff as a matter of right and is accomplished by filing
with the clerk a written request therefor. If in proper form, the
dismissal is effective immediately.’ [Citation.] ‘The entry is a
ministerial, not a judicial, act, and no appeal lies therefrom.’”];
Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm, Inc. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 764, 771 (Catlin) [“dismissal was immediately
effective upon the tender of the request to the clerk”]; Law Offices
of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 869, 876 [“A
request for a dismissal is usually effective upon filing, and no
other action by the clerk or the court is required.”]; see § 581,
subd. (b)(1) [“An action may be dismissed in any of the following
instances: [¶] (1) [w]ith or without prejudice, upon written
request of the plaintiff to the clerk, filed with papers in the case,
or by oral or written request to the court at any time before the
actual commencement of trial, upon payment of the costs, if
any.”].)

                                 9
       Even where a complaint (or a cross-complaint) is dismissed,
a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a special
motion to strike as a predicate to an award of attorneys’ fees
under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), where a party files a
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Sandlin v. McLauglin
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 821 [“A trial court’s ‘resolution of the
underlying action does not moot a fee request under the SLAPP
statute.”]; Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457 [“‘[T]he trial court’s adjudication of
the merits of a defendant’s motion to strike is an essential
predicate to ruling on the defendant’s request for an award of fees
and costs.’”]; Law Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang, supra,
178 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 [“[W]hen plaintiff dismissed its case at
a time when defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was pending, the
trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the case only for
the limited purpose of ruling on defendants’ motion for attorney
fees and costs.”]; Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 211, 218 [“[B]ecause a defendant who has been
sued in violation of his or her free speech rights is entitled to an
award of attorney fees, the trial court must, upon defendant’s
motion for a fee award, rule on the merits of the SLAPP motion
even if the matter has been dismissed prior to the hearing on that
motion.”]; Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 751 [“[A]
defendant who is voluntarily dismissed, with or without
prejudice, after filing a section 425.16 motion to strike, is
nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as
a predicate to a determination of the defendant’s motion for
attorney’s fees and costs.”].)
       Although LMA is correct that in each of these cases the
prevailing party had filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, the fact

                                10
LMA did not file a motion is not controlling. Kyle v. Carmon
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901 (Kyle) is directly on point. In Kyle, the
trial court held a hearing on defendant’s special motion to strike
and took the matter under submission. (Id. at p. 906.) Two days
after the hearing, the plaintiff filed a request for voluntary
dismissal of the case with prejudice. (Ibid.) The trial court
subsequently filed an order striking the complaint under
section 425.16 and stating the defendant was entitled to recover
his attorneys’ fees and costs, with no mention of the voluntary
dismissal. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to strike the complaint because the voluntary
dismissal was entered before the ruling (id. at p. 917), but “the
trial court’s adjudication of the merits of the section 425.16
motion support[ed] affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees and
costs to defendant, without the need for remand.” (Id. at p. 919.)
       Catlin, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pages 783 to 784, relied on
by LMA, is distinguishable. There, an insurer sued a law firm
and its principal for the return of mistakenly paid funds. (Id. at
p. 769.) Both defendants filed special motions to strike the
complaint, stating in their motions “they would request attorney
fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), pursuant to a
‘subsequent, separate motion.’” (Id. at pp. 769-770.) Prior to the
hearing on the motions, the insurer voluntarily dismissed its
complaint. (Id. at p. 770.) At the scheduled hearing on the
special motions to strike, the defendants requested the court rule
on their motions “as a ‘predicate’ for going forward with their fee
motions,” but the trial court declined, finding the motions were
moot and suggesting the defendants instead file attorneys’ fees
motions. (Ibid.) Instead of following the court’s suggestion, the
defendants appealed the mootness order declining to address the

                                11
merits of their motions. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal observed
that Kyle did not hold the trial court “has a duty to determine
entitlement to fees” in the absence of a fee request. (Id. at
p. 776.) The Catlin court affirmed the decision of the trial court
not to address the defendants’ right to attorneys’ fees in the
absence of a fees motion, explaining the defendants waived their
claims for fees because they “failed to seek recovery of attorney
fees by motion or cost memorandum in [a] timely fashion.” (Id. at
p. 784.)
       Similar to Kyle (and unlike Catlin), the trial court,
apparently without knowledge of the request for dismissal of the
cross-complaint, ruled on Freeman’s special motion to strike,
denying the motion and finding he was not entitled to attorneys’
fees. Given the court’s denial of Freeman’s motion, it would have
been futile for Freeman to have filed a motion for attorneys’ fees
after the trial court found he had not prevailed on his special
motion to strike. And the dismissal did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to consider whether Freeman was the prevailing
party for purposes of a motion for attorneys’ fees. Although
Freeman did not file an attorneys’ fees motion, the court treated
his statement of his intent to seek attorneys’ fees as a request for
fees and addressed it. On these unusual facts, the appeal from
the court’s order is properly before us.

B.    Special Motions To Strike Under Section 425.16
      A cause of action arising from an act in furtherance of a
defendant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue is subject to a special motion to
strike unless the plaintiff demonstrates a probability of
prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Serova v.

                                12
Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 871; Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni);
Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) An
“‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue’” includes, among other things, “any written
or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)
       “Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.”’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009;
Monster Energy v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788.)
       We review de novo whether a challenged claim arises from
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009; Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) “We
exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on
our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from
protected activity. [Citations.] In addition to the pleadings, we
may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability
is based. [Citations.] We do not, however, weigh the evidence,
but accept the plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only
whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its
entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park, at p. 1067.)

                                13
C.     Freeman Failed To Carry His Burden To Show LMA’s
       Cross-claim for Anticipatory Breach Arose from Protected
       Activity
       Freeman contends the filing of his complaint formed the
basis for LMA’s claim for anticipatory breach of Freeman’s
guaranty of the lease. LMA does not dispute that the filing of a
complaint is protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1).4 And certainly Freeman’s filing of the
complaint was the triggering event that led to LMA’s filing of the
cross-complaint. But the filing of the complaint does not supply
any of the elements of a claim for breach—or anticipatory
breach—of a guaranty.
       “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity
underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1062; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
78.) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected
activity took place does not mean the action arose from that
activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at
p. 1063; accord, Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on
determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to
his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity

4      There is no dispute “‘“‘the basic act of filing litigation’”’”
constitutes protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (e)(1). (Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
29 Cal.4th 82, 90; accord, Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113 [“‘“Any
act”’ under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) ‘includes
communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and
prosecution of a civil action.’”].)

                                 14
constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] . . . . [I]n
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the
defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis
for liability.” (Park, at p. 1063, italics omitted; accord, Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009 [“The defendant’s burden is to
identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show
how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category
of protected activity.”].) In analyzing whether a claim arises from
protected activity, reviewing courts are “attuned to and have
taken care to respect the distinction between activities that form
the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-
creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.”
(Park, at p. 1064.) Likewise, “[a]llegations of protected activity
that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for
recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394.)
       A party’s obligation under a guaranty is contractual. (Coles
v. Glaser (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 384, 391; see United Grand Corp.
v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 159 [“‘“A
contract of guaranty gives rise to a separate and independent
obligation from that which binds the principal debtor.”’”].) “[T]he
elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the
existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting
damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821; accord, Piedmont Capital
Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 968;
Gray1 CPB, LLC v. Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486
[breach of guaranty cause of action requires showing of (1) a valid

                                 15
guaranty, (2) default by principal debtor, and (3) guarantor’s
failure to perform under the guaranty].)
       “‘There can be no actual breach of a contract until the time
specified therein for performance has arrived.’ [Citation.]
Nonetheless, if a party to a contract expressly or by implication
repudiates the contract before the time for his or her performance
has arrived, an anticipatory breach is said to have occurred.”
(Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 488-
489; accord, Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130, 137
[“Anticipatory breach occurs when one of the parties to a bilateral
contract repudiates the contract. . . . An express repudiation is a
clear, positive, unequivocal refusal to perform [citations]; an
implied repudiation results from conduct where the promisor
puts it out of his power to perform so as to make substantial
performance of his promise impossible.”]; Mission Beverage Co. v.
Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 702 [“[A]
breach need not be effected to be actionable. A plaintiff may sue
for anticipatory breach when the other party ‘“positively
repudiates the contract by acts or statements indicating that [it]
will not or cannot substantially perform essential terms
thereof . . . .”’”].)
       In support of his special motion to strike, Freeman relies on
a single paragraph in LMA’s cross-complaint (paragraph 31),
which alleges: “On information and belief, a formal demand [for
payment of money owed under the lease] made upon
Mr. Freeman is futile because he filed the initial Complaint in
this action seeking declaratory relief that the personal guaranties
are not operative. Therefore, Freeman by judicial admission has
expressed his unequivocal intention to refuse to honor his
guaranties. LMA/SAI construes Mr. Freeman’s conduct to be an

                                16
anticipatory breach of contract displaying his intent not to
perform under the personal guaranties.” Freeman contends that
because this paragraph specifically references the filing of his
complaint, that is the conduct giving rise to the anticipatory
breach of guaranty claim.
      Contrary to Freeman’s contention, LMA’s allegations in
paragraph 31 only provide evidence of Freeman’s express
repudiation of any guaranty. According to the Gooch
declaration,5 Freeman repudiated his obligation to guarantee the
lease obligations by his attorneys’ statements at the February
2022 meeting. Freeman’s filing of the complaint was therefore
not the basis for the claimed wrong—rather, the filing of the
complaint is, at most, evidence that Freeman a month earlier had
repudiated any obligation to pay the future rent due under the
lease. (See Callanan v. Grizzly Designs, LLC (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 517, 526 [“[T]he injury-producing conduct is not
the Menkens’ filing of a cross-complaint against Callanan;
instead, it is the Menkens’ alleged failure to comply with various

5      Freeman contends LMA cannot rely on conduct not alleged
in the cross-complaint, including the statements made at the
February 2022 meeting as set forth in the Gooch declaration. But
as the Supreme Court explained in Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
29 Cal.4th 82, 89, “‘In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’
requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.’” (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [in
determining whether a cause of action arises from conduct in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech, “the
court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
based”].)

                                17
wage and hour laws and other actions they took that have
nothing to do with the Menkens’ filing of a cross-complaint.”];
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 759 [explaining in affirming denial of
special motion to strike, “plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the City’s
acts or omissions in breach of its agreements . . . , its refusal to
cooperate, its stonewalling, and its tortious conduct,” and
“whatever else may be in the complaint, it is the background and
context—the evidence—to support that complaint”]; Area 51
Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581,
596, fn. 10 [“Under Area 51’s theory of liability, the liability-
producing conduct here was the City’s decision to end the
licensing relationship (whether that decision is doctrinally
categorized as a breach of contract or as an anticipatory
repudiation of a contract), not the expressive act of declaring an
end to the relationship by e-mail.”]; Copenbarger v. Morris
Cerullo World Evangelism (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1240
[“[W]hile the three-day notice might have triggered the
complaint, the evidence in the record demonstrates the complaint
was based on an underlying dispute over . . . repair and
maintenance obligations under the sublease and other
unprotected activities.”].)
      Because the cross-claim for anticipatory breach of guaranty
does not arise from protected activity, the trial court properly
denied Freeman’s special motion to strike and his request for
attorneys’ fees and costs as a prevailing party.

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                        DISPOSITION

       The November 21, 2022 order denying Freeman’s request
for attorneys’ fees is affirmed. LMA is to recover its costs on
appeal.

                                         FEUER, J.
We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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