Court Opinion

ID: 9404235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 16:09:49.616653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:12.593768
License: Public Domain

J-S09010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 KEITH LAMAR FOSTER                       :   No. 519 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0006450-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: JUNE 22, 2023

      The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s April 18, 2022 order

granting Appellee’s, Keith Lamar Foster (hereinafter “Foster”), pretrial motion

to suppress statements he made during a police interview.         After careful

review, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

      The trial court summarized the pertinent background of this case, as

follows:

      This is a Commonwealth appeal of this [c]ourt’s grant of a motion
      to suppress [Foster’s] statements. During the course of an
      investigation into a sexual assault, Detective Brian Sellers of the
      City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police obtained a search warrant for
      a buccal swab of [Foster’s] DNA. In the affidavit of probable cause
      submitted in support of that search warrant, Detective Sellers
      represented to a judicial officer that probable cause existed to
      obtain [Foster’s] DNA based on the fact that male DNA was
      recovered from the alleged victim and [Foster] was alone with the
      alleged victim on the evening of the alleged sexual assault.
      Shortly after obtaining the search warrant, Detective Sellers
      summoned [Foster] to police headquarters and interviewed
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        [Foster]. [Foster] was not placed in handcuffs or other restraints
        and he was not provided with Miranda[1] warnings. Detective
        Sellers specifically informed [Foster] that he was not under arrest
        and [stated that Foster] … was not a suspect in the sexual assault
        of the victim. He then interviewed [Foster].

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/22/22, at 1.

        During Foster’s interview, he stated that he did not know the victim and

did not have sexual intercourse with her.        See N.T. Suppression Hearing,

4/18/22, at 15-16; Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, 3/29/22, at

4. At the close of the interview, Foster consented to his DNA being taken, and

it was subsequently found to be a match to male DNA found during the victim’s

sexual assault examination, thus demonstrating that Foster did have some

sort of sexual contact with the victim. See Reply Brief in Support of Motion

to Suppress at 5. Consequently, the Commonwealth intends to use Foster’s

statements to Detective Sellers, in which he denied knowing the victim or

having any contact with her, against Foster at trial by showing that he lied to

the detective. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/18/22, at 5-6.

        Foster filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statements to Detective

Sellers, arguing that his statements were not voluntary, given the totality of

the circumstances. See Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress at 9.

Specifically, Foster claimed that his “choice to give a statement to Detective

Sellers was not free and unconstrained since Detective Sellers misrepresented

the fundamental nature of the interaction” by telling Foster he was not a

____________________________________________

1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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suspect. Id. According to Foster, “[w]ithout knowing he was a suspect, [his]

capacity for self-determination was critically impaired.” Id.

        The trial court conducted a bifurcated suppression hearing, with

testimony being offered on February 15, 2022, and argument by the parties

occurring on April 18, 2022. At the close of the hearing on April 18th, the court

found     that   Foster’s   statements    were    involuntary    based    on    the

misrepresentation by Detective Sellers that Foster was not a suspect, despite

Detective Foster obtaining a warrant for Foster’s DNA prior to the interview.

Specifically, the court reasoned:

        [The Court]: We don’t issue warrants to take evidence for criminal
        cases on the basis that we want to eliminate somebody from
        criminal conduct. Well, let’s see, I know that Mr. Jones over here
        didn’t do it; I want to get his DNA to prove it. We don’t do that.
        We say, I think Mr. Jones is a viable suspect in this case, and I
        want his DNA because I think it’s going to turn out to be the DNA
        that was on the victim. That’s the whole point of it.

        And by the way, I don’t think Detective Sellers was trying to be a
        wise guy, but he misunderstood what he was doing. He tells a
        [j]udge in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, I think this guy is a
        viable suspect for this terrible crime. Here’s why. The [j]udge
        agrees with him. He tells [Foster], no, you’re not a suspect; if
        you say something that changes that I’ll let you know.

        And it’s the nature of the misrepresentation that troubles me. It’s
        not, hey, one of the boys that came out after you, they saw you
        get in the car; they saw you put your hands on her; they saw her
        resisting you. Let’s say that’s all a lie; they can do that. They can
        tell him that they have facts they don’t have.

        But to tell him, you’re not a suspect, and I want you to make a
        valid decision on asserting your rights or not, that’s a different
        kind of misrepresentation that goes to the voluntariness of the
        statement. Is it something that’s prejudicial against him? Yes,
        you want to use it. It’s not neutral.

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       So[,] on the basis of everything that we discussed, the motion to
       suppress [Foster’s] statements that he didn’t know the victim and
       didn’t have any interaction with her prior to him being Mirandized
       are suppressed, because it goes to voluntariness, not to the
       custodial interrogation. It goes to voluntariness. Motion granted.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/18/22, at 14-16.2

       That same day, the court issued an order granting Foster’s motion to

suppress. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, and certified

that the court’s order substantially handicaps its prosecution of this case. See

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). It then timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The

court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 2, 2022.             Herein, the

Commonwealth states the following issue for our review: “Whether the trial

court erred in granting the motion to suppress?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

       To begin, we recognize that,

       [i]n appeals from orders granting suppression, our scope of review
       is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
       In the Interest of L.J., … 79 A.3d 1073, 1088–89 ([Pa.] 2013).
       Thus, we may consider only the evidence from the appellee’s
       witnesses together with the Commonwealth’s evidence that, when
       read in context of the record at the suppression hearing, remains
       uncontradicted. Id.; Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635,
       637 (Pa. Super. 2013). As for the standard of review, we apply
       no deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions.
       Whitlock, 69 A.3d at 637.          In contrast, we defer to the
       suppression court’s findings of fact, “because it is the fact-finder’s
____________________________________________

2 We note that Foster also argued, in his motion to suppress, that he was
subject to a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings. See
Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion at 3. The court’s statements at the close of the
suppression hearing indicate that it did not find that Foster was subject to a
custodial interrogation. For the reasons set forth infra, we discern no error in
the court’s determination. See footnote 3, infra.

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      sole prerogative to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the
      weight to be given to their testimony.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 999 (Pa. Super. 2014) (footnote

omitted).

      Instantly, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s determination

that Foster’s statements to Detective Sellers were involuntary based on the

detective’s telling Foster that he was not a suspect in the case, although the

detective had obtained a warrant for Foster’s DNA. Specifically, in its Rule

1925(a) opinion, the court explained its decision to grant Foster’s motion to

suppress, as follows:

      This [c]ourt granted suppression because it believed [Foster’s]
      statement was not voluntary.           “[T]he ultimate test for
      voluntariness is whether the confession is the product of an
      essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
      Commonwealth v. Fleck, 471 A.2d 547, 549 (Pa. Super. 1984).
      “[T]he voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality
      of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d
      959, 963-[]64 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). In Templin, the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court … explained as follows:

         In determining voluntariness, the question is not whether
         the defendant would have confessed without interrogation,
         but whether the interrogation was so manipulative or
         coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability to make
         a free and unconstrained decision to confess. “By the same
         token, the law does not require the coddling of those
         accused of crime. One such need not be protected against
         his    own      innate   desire    to   unburden      himself.”
         Commonwealth v. Graham, … 182 A.2d 727, 730-31
         ([Pa.] 1962). Factors to be considered in assessing the
         totality of the circumstances include the duration and means
         of the interrogation; the physical and psychological state of
         the accused; the conditions attendant to the detention; the
         attitude of the interrogator; and any and all other factors
         that could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion
         and coercion.

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      Id. at 966 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

      It is this court’s view that the circumstances of [Foster’s]
      interrogation deprived [him] of making a free and unconstrained
      choice to undergo an interview relative to the sexual assault of
      the alleged victim. [Foster] was not restrained or informed that
      he was not permitted to leave[,] and the interview did not appear
      coercive. However, Detective Sellers misrepresented to [Foster]
      that he was not a suspect in the sexual assault of the victim prior
      to interviewing him. It is this [c]ourt’s belief that Detective
      Sellers’ misrepresentations were designed to[,] and did[,] induce
      [Foster] to speak with Detective Sellers. This [c]ourt firmly
      believes that had Detective Sellers been truthful with [Foster],
      Detective Sellers would have informed [Foster] of his Miranda
      rights and [Foster] would have been in a position to knowingly
      and intelligently make a decision as to his constitutional rights.
      This [c]ourt does not believe that [Foster’s] decision to speak with
      Detective Sellers was a product of an informed and conscious
      choice. On the contrary, his decision to speak with Detective
      Sellers was borne solely from Detective Sellers’ affirmative
      misrepresentation that [Foster] was not a suspect in a sexual
      assault. This assurance manipulated [Foster] to believe that he
      was exposed to no jeopardy by agreeing to the interview.

      For the foregoing reasons, the suppression motion was properly
      granted.

TCO at 2-3.

      On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that, “[d]espite referencing the

proper ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, the trial court actually used the

disavowed ‘but for’ test, focusing only on the incorrect statement that [Foster]

was not a suspect” in concluding that his statements were involuntary.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. The Commonwealth stresses that Foster

      traveled to the police station on his own. He was not locked into
      the interview room. He was not handcuffed or restrained in any
      way. He was not badgered or demeaned. He was informed that
      he wasn’t a suspect and that if he did start to give incriminating
      information, he would be given his Miranda rights ([TCO] at []1;
      Appendix B at B-1). [The trial court] watched the interview and

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       found that there was “nothing coercive in the detective’s manner,
       demeanor, or anything like that[.]” [N.T. Suppression Hearing]
       at [] 28. What caused the court to suppress the statement was
       the sole factor that [Foster] had been misled about being a
       “suspect”:

            THE COURT: I agree. So far what I’ve seen there is nothing
            coercive in the detective’s manner, demeanor, or anything
            like that, I agree. It is one thing to say your buddy is over
            there ratting you out, that is total misrepresentation, that is
            acceptable and legal. It’s another thing on the issue of
            voluntariness to mislead unintentionally somebody by
            saying you’re not a subject. The officer, the detective, could
            have believed that he was not a subject because he didn’t
            have enough to go on but the fact is that he represented to
            a judge that [Foster’s] DNA is important to this criminal
            investigation so on that[, the] particular representation “you
            are not a suspect of this investigation yet,” that is
            misleading. That goes to the voluntariness, not as to some
            fact, some collateral fact. That is the part I am having
            trouble with.

Id. at 17-18 (quoting N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/15/22, at 28-29).

       The Commonwealth contends that the court erred in concluding that

Detective Sellers’ misrepresentation to Foster that he was not a suspect was

sufficient, in and of itself, to render his statements involuntary. It points out

that   “a    statement    can   be   obtained   when    police   make    intentional

misrepresentations, so long as the totality of the circumstances goes to show

that the statement was voluntary.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-20 (citing

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 969 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 2009)). In Roberts,

a Philadelphia detective obtained a statement from Roberts after a woman

accused Roberts of sexually abusing her 20 years earlier. Id. at 595-96. At

the conclusion of the interview, the detective told Roberts that “he believed

that prosecution was not possible, because the statute of limitations period

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had passed, but stated he would give the information to the Philadelphia

District Attorney’s Office and would speak with police in Florida, where the

[victim] resided.” Id. at 596. Thereafter, officers from Florida interviewed

Roberts in the living room of his home.      Id.   Although the officers were

carrying their service weapons, they wore plain clothes and were driving an

unmarked car.     Id.   “At some point during the interview, [the officers]

informed [Roberts] that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not going to

prosecute him because of the statute of limitations issue.”       Id.    Roberts

subsequently admitted that the allegations made against him were true. Id.

      Ultimately, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office concluded that the

statute of limitations had been tolled for various reasons, and they filed

charges against Roberts. He moved to suppress his statement to the Florida

officers, and the trial court granted that request, concluding that although the

Florida officers’ “statement that [Roberts] would not be prosecuted … had

been made in good faith, … the statement rendered [Roberts’] confession

involuntary.” Id. The Commonwealth appealed, and we reversed the trial

court’s order. Initially, we noted:

      Pennsylvania looks at the totality of the circumstances when
      assessing the voluntariness of a confession. When reviewing
      voluntariness pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, we
      should look to[,]

         the duration and means of the interrogation; the physical
         and psychological state of the accused; the conditions
         attendant to the detention; the attitude of the interrogator;
         and any and all other factors that could drain a person’s
         ability to withstand coercion.

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     Commonwealth v. Nester, … 709 A.2d 879, 882 ([Pa.] 1998).
     Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically
     disavowed the use of a narrow “but-for” test when determining
     voluntariness. Commonwealth v. Templin, … 795 A.2d 959,
     964 ([Pa.] 2002).

Id. at 599. We then explained:

     In the instant matter, it appears that the trial court employed the
     disavowed approach, focusing solely on the ultimately incorrect
     statement that [Roberts] would not be prosecuted in Pennsylvania
     and concluding that he would not have confessed but-for that
     statement. The trial court did not make an examination of the
     totality of the circumstances or look at the factors highlighted
     above in rendering its decision. This was error.

     In examining the totality of the circumstances in this matter, we
     first note that this is not a case where either the Philadelphia or
     Florida police attempted to deliberately mislead … [Roberts],
     employ subterfuge, or otherwise engage in fabrication to induce a
     defendant to confess. The record clearly demonstrates that the
     police believed the statement to be accurate at the time it was
     made. The detectives thought that Pennsylvania authorities could
     not prosecute because the statute of limitations period had run.
     It was not until later that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
     decided that three circumstances unique to [Roberts’] situation,
     the age of his alleged victims, his employment as a fireman while
     residing in Philadelphia, and his moving out of the jurisdiction,
     when combined could serve to toll the statute of limitations.
     Further, we are not dealing with a quid pro quo situation where
     detectives told [Roberts] that he would not be prosecuted if he
     confessed.

     Instead, the record reflects that the interview was conducted by
     two plainclothes detectives in [Roberts’] living room. It lasted
     approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. The detectives spoke to
     [Roberts] in calm voice and the questioning never got “heated or
     accusatory.”     [Roberts’] freedom of movement was never
     restricted. The detectives stated that [Roberts] was calm and
     quiet throughout the interview. Lastly, [the officer’s] recollection
     of [Roberts’] demeanor during the interview belies the assertion
     that [Roberts] was coerced. [The officer] testified that when he
     read a portion of one of the alleged victim’s statements and asked
     [Roberts] if it was true, [Roberts] was:

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           … quiet. I mean, he brought his hands up to his face, I’ve
           got in my report, like a praying position. His head was
           bowed. He seemed like a lot was going through his mind.
           He was quiet. He didn’t seem angry. He didn’t seem
           nervous. He just seemed very somber, if you will.

Id. at 599-600 (emphasis in original; internal citations to the record omitted).

        The Roberts panel also found that the facts before it were “far less

coercive than those allowed in [Commonwealth v.] Hughes[, 555 A.2d 1264

(Pa. 1989)].” Id. at 600. In that case,

        the police took [Hughes,] a juvenile[,] into custody and
        questioned him for over five hours on one day and over five and
        one-half hours on the second day concerning the sexual assault
        of one child and the murder and sexual assault of a second child.
        [Hughes] had been arrested, taken into custody from his
        bedroom, and driven to police headquarters. [Hughes] was
        questioned in the presence of two uncles and given a lie detector
        test. After [Hughes] and his uncles were told that he failed the lie
        detector test, the police and his uncles “prodded” him to confess.
        On the first day, [Hughes] gave both oral and written statements
        confessing to the sexual assault of the first child and the murder
        and sexual assault of the second child. The next day, after further
        interrogation, [Hughes] made additional admissions regarding the
        murder. On appeal, [Hughes] challenged the voluntariness of the
        confession arguing that his free will was overborne by the
        prodding of the police and his uncles and by the later-discovered
        to be mistaken statement that he had failed the polygraph. The
        record disclosed that the detective questioning the defendant had
        been given inaccurate information by the polygraphist that the
        defendant had failed the test, when, in fact, the results were
        inconclusive.    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, after
        examining the totality of the circumstances, that [Hughes’]
        confession was voluntary.

Roberts, 969 A.2d at 600 (internal citations to Hughes omitted).

        Comparing the facts in Hughes to those in Roberts, the Roberts panel

found that the circumstances were “far less coercive….” Id. We explained

that,

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      as in Hughes, there was no subterfuge by police; rather there
      was good faith reliance on information that later proved to be
      incorrect. There is simply nothing in the record to support a
      finding that, when the voluntariness issue is properly examined in
      light of the totality of the circumstance, the circumstances were
      so inherently coercive as to deprive [Roberts] of his free will. We
      thus hold that the trial court erred in excluding the confession.

      Our conclusion that [Roberts’] confession was voluntary is
      buttressed by the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
      found confessions to be voluntary even in cases where the police
      made intentional misrepresentations, so long as the remaining
      circumstances suggest that the confession was voluntary. In
      Commonwealth v. Jones, … 322 A.2d 119 ([Pa.] 1974), the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a confession to be voluntary
      even though, after the defendant gave an initial exculpatory
      statement, the detective falsely claimed that a co-conspirator had
      implicated him. Jones, 322 A.2d at 126. The Pennsylvania
      Supreme Court explained that it did not believe that the alleged
      fabrication was either likely to cause an untrustworthy confession,
      nor was it so reprehensible as invalidate the confession by
      offending basic notions of fairness.            Id.    See also,
      Commonwealth v. Williams, … 640 A.2d 1251, 1259 ([Pa.]
      1194) ([finding that the a]ppellant’s claim that police falsely
      stated that they had located a gun sold by [the a]ppellant which
      was of the same caliber used in the crime, was not sufficient to
      render a confession involuntary absent other coercive
      circumstances). Here, [the officer’s] mistaken statement was
      more likely to cause a trustworthy confession rather than an
      untrustworthy confession, and we do not find the mistake to be
      reprehensible so as to offend basic notions of fairness.

Roberts, 969 A.2d at 600-01 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

      Based on our discussion in Roberts, and our Supreme Court’s decisions

in Jones and Williams, we conclude that the misrepresentation made by

Detective Sellers in the present case did not render Foster’s statements

involuntary. Initially, however, we disagree with the Commonwealth that the

trial court failed to consider any of the pertinent factors under the totality-of-

the-circumstances test. The court recognized that Foster “was not restrained

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or informed that he was not permitted to leave[,] and the interview did not

appear coercive.” TCO at 2. However, the court made no mention of the

duration of the interview, Foster’s psychological state, or the conditions

attendant to his detention.       See Roberts, 969 A.2d at 599.              The

Commonwealth elaborated on these factors in its brief in opposition to Foster’s

suppression motion, stating:

      Once he arrived at police headquarters, [Foster] was escorted to
      an interview room without the use of handcuffs or leg shackles.
      He was permitted to retain and use his phone. He waited alone in
      the room, with the door unlocked, for approximately five minutes.
      During that time, he used his phone to make phone and video
      calls. After five minutes, Detective Sellers entered the interview
      room and shut the door but did not lock it. He was dressed in
      plainclothes with his service weapon on his hip. Detective Sellers
      began by telling [Foster] he was not a suspect and that the
      questions he would be asking were to determine the events of the
      night of January 25[], 2019. Detective Sellers did not read
      [Foster] his Miranda warnings as he was not under arrest at the
      time, but told him that it was possible that information could come
      out during the course of the interview that would require the
      reading of [Foster’s] Miranda rights. Detective Sellers told
      [Foster] that if that happened, he would pause the interview and
      read [Foster’s] Miranda rights. [Foster] stated he understood,
      and during questioning, [Foster] stated that he did not know the
      [v]ictim before that evening, but that he did pick her up after she
      wrecked her car. He also stated that he had never had sex with
      the [v]ictim. The interview lasted approximately twenty minutes,
      at which point [Foster] was allowed to leave the station. Prior to
      leaving, [Foster] provided a DNA sample.

Commonwealth’s Brief in Opposition of Motion to Suppress, 3/16/22, at 3-4.

      In sum, it is apparent that Foster willingly came to the police station for

the interview. He was not handcuffed or locked in the room, he was permitted

to use his cell phone during the five minutes he waited for the interview to

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commence, and the duration of the interview was brief.           The trial court

expressly found that Detective Sellers’ manner and demeanor during the

interview was not coercive.         See N.T. Suppression, 2/15/22, at 28.3   The

totality of these circumstances establish that Foster’s statements were

voluntary.

       Moreover, given the decisions in Roberts and Hughes, we do not agree

with the trial court that Foster’s statements were rendered involuntarily simply

because of Detective Sellers’ misrepresentation to Foster that he was not a

suspect in this case. While in Roberts the defendant was mistakenly told, by

two different interviewing officers, that he could never be prosecuted for the

crimes about which he was being questioned, here, Foster was simply told

____________________________________________

3 We note that, in his appellate brief, Foster does not develop an argument
that he was subject to a custodial detention but, based on the totality of these
circumstances, we would find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that he
was not. Based on the factors just discussed, it is clear that Foster was not
“physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way” and he was not
“placed in a situation” where he would have “reasonably believe[d] that his
freedom of action or movement [was] restricted by such interrogation.”
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations
omitted). In other words, “the totality of the circumstances,” or “the
conditions and/or duration of the detention” were not “so coercive as to
constitute the functional equivalent of arrest.” Id. (citations omitted). While
Foster was interviewed at the police station, he came there voluntarily, he was
not restrained, Detective Sellers did not use or threaten force, and the
duration of the interview was brief. See id. (setting forth factors to utilize in
determining whether a detention has become so coercive as to be the
functional equivalent of an arrest) (citation omitted). Thus, we would agree
with the court that Foster was not subject to a custodial interrogation requiring
Miranda warnings.

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that he was not a suspect at that time. Notably, Detective Sellers informed

Foster that if he said anything inculpatory, he would be provided with Miranda

warnings, thereby indicating that Foster could become a suspect depending

on what he said during the interview. Further, as in Roberts, the trial court

in this case found that the misrepresentation to Foster was unintentional and

simply a misunderstanding on the part of Detective Sellers.         See N.T.

Suppression Hearing, 4/18/22, at 14-15 (“I don’t think Detective Sellers was

trying to be a wise guy, but he misunderstood what he was doing.”). Unlike

in Hughes, Foster was not pushed to confess, or subject to multiple, hours-

long interviews. Therefore, the circumstances of this case are less coercive

than those in Roberts and Hughes.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances

demonstrates that Foster’s statements to Detective Sellers were voluntary,

despite the misrepresentation to Foster that he was not a suspect.

Consequently, the trial court erred by granting Foster’s motion to suppress.

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2023

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