Court Opinion

ID: 9479239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:12:12.950512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:54.085052
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I wrote separately when we initially decided this case because I considered Hester’s claim against Local 660 to be time-barred. See Hester v. International Union, 818 F.2d 1537, 1548-56 (11th Cir.1987) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). In my earlier opinion, I detailed my disagreement with the majority’s position that the statute of limitations began running on August 6, 1984 rather than on October 7, 1983 — the date Hester received notice that Local 660 was proceeding against him in violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act’s bill of rights. See id. The Supreme Court’s mandate in Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1988), that we apply the one-year statute of limitations provided in Alabama’s general personal injury statute, Ala.Code § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975) (repealed in 1985), instead of the six-month statute of limitations that we applied when the case was before us earlier, does not *1311affect my view because Hester did not bring suit against Local 660 in the district court until November 7, 1984, one month after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. I accordingly reaffirm my earlier view that Hester’s claim against Local 660 is time-barred.