Court Opinion

ID: 9596598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:35.435186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:25.313995
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(dissents).
I respectfully dissent to this decision. Defendant’s jeopardy claim is based on the *951argument that there was only one agreement entered into on September 17th for defendant to sell Kane a set quantity of LSD for a set price, and that the sale was completed with the delivery in two installments, one of 31 tablets on September 17th, and the final delivery of 10 tablets on the following day. Defendant contends a single sale to one customer cannot be divided to allow two separate prosecutions simply because the agreed amount of LSD was delivered in two installments. Since defendant was convicted and sentenced for sale of LSD on September 17th to Kane, defendant asserts that conviction is a jeopardy bar to a separate prosecution and conviction for the completion of the sale on September 18th. I believe defendant’s contention is correct.
The evidence establishes that on September 17, 1969, John Kane, an undercover police officer, went with an individual named O’Brien to “Threads, Inc.” in Oklahoma City. O’Brien went into Threads, Inc. and returned shortly with the defendant. The defendant got into O’Brien’s automobile with O’Brien standing by the door. Kane and the defendant then had a conversation concerning buying LSD, discussing quantity and prices. Kane told defendant he “wanted to buy one hundred dollars ($100) worth” and they agreed upon a price of $2.50 per tablet. Defendant only had 31 tablets with him at that time, but told Kane “he could get some more” to complete the purchase of 40 tablets for $100, as requested by Kane. Kane then gave defendant $50 for the 31 tablets, and it was their “agreement” that Kane would come back “to pick up the rest of the purchase.” Kane stated: “I’m not sure exactly how much more, sir, I was supposed to pick up.” The next day, on September 18th, 1969, Kane called the defendant at Threads, Inc., and told him to come over to 1304 N.W. 16th about 5:30 with the remainder of the purchase. According to Kane, defendant arrived and gave Kane seven tablets with the understanding that he would be back in a little while with the remaining tablets. At approximately 9:00 that evening defendant returned and gave Kane three tablets.
The law does not permit two prosecutions and double punishment for a single criminal offense. Oklahoma Constitution, Art. II, § 21. 22 O.S.1971, § 14. 21 O.S. 1971, § 11. “A series of criminal charges cannot, under our system of jurisprudence, be based upon the same criminal act or transaction; a single criminal act cannot be split up or subdivided into two or more distinct offenses and prosecuted as such.” Thus the “state will not be permitted to split or divide up an offense into divers parts and punish each moiety.” Estep v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 103, 108, 143 P. 64, 66 (1914); Hochderffer v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 215, 218, 245 P. 902 (1926); Heldenbrand v. Mills, Okl.Cr., 476 P.2d 375, 376 (1970). Where “a person has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188, 9 S.Ct. 672, 676, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889). If a person is convicted for an unlawful sale, “it must, in a certain sense, be considered as a merger of all the distinct acts of sale.” Hochderffer v. State, supra.
Thus the question before this Court is whether, there was one sale or two distinct sales.
The California Supreme Court case of In re Johnson, 65 Cal.2d 393, 54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393 (1966), is instructive on this issue. In that case defendant and an undercover officer met at 9:00 P.M. and discussed a sale of heroin for $30 a spoon (approximately 2 grams). The officer asked for five spoons. Defendant then offered to sell an additional five spoons for a total cost of $250 for the ten spoons. Defendant then delivered five spoons to the officer. The officer later phoned defendant and arranged a second meeting at 11:00 P.M. where defendant delivered five more spoons. The defendant was convict*952ed for two sales of heroin, one at 9:00 P. M. and one at 11:00 P.M. On appeal the court held there was but a single transaction, allowing only one conviction.
The California Supreme Court held:
“Although the number of deliveries may be relevant in determining the number of crimes committed, it is not conclusive. The entire transaction must be considered. To find that the two deliveries in this case constituted separate crimes, it would be necessary to attach independent criminal significance to the bifurcation of the delivery, a circumstance that had nothing to do with petitioner’s culpability. Since one price was agreed upon at the outset and since petitioner intended from the outset to sell Robertson either ten spoons for $250 or five spoons for $150, he intended to make but one sale. Moreover, that sale was not carried out over such an extended period of time that the bifurcation of delivery posed separate, independent dangers. Under these circumstances, no legitimate penal purpose would be served ... to permit the prosecutor to carve this transaction into two crimes.
“The basic principle that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act precludes infliction of more than one punishment for the present Series of acts directed toward one criminal objective, the single sale of heroin to one customer.”
From a review of the facts in this case, it is apparent to me that there was one agreement between Kane and the defendant to sell a quantity of USD tablets at the price of $2.50 a tablet for $100’s worth of LSD, or a total of approximately 40 tablets. This agreement was entered into on September 17th in front of Threads, Inc. Since at that time the defendant had with him only 31 tablets, it was agreed that the remaining tablets, to complete the purchase, would be exchanged the following day. On the next day, September 18th, defendant delivered the balance of the tablets in accordance with their agreement. This was but one transaction, a sale to one customer for a given amount at a set price, completed with three meetings within 32 hours. As I view this evidence, it will support but one conviction for an unlawful sale of LSD. Consequently, I believe the judgment and sentence in the instant case should be reversed and remanded. Therefore, I must dissent to this decision.