Court Opinion

ID: 9649687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:06:16.899802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:13.908087
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court), which sustained a demurrer to Appellants’ complaint filed by various officers and employees of the Department of Corrections (Department). In doing so, the majority holds that: (1) death row inmates whose death sentences have been vacated and whose execution warrants have expired do not have a clear legal right to be released from death row; and (2) such inmates cannot obtain damages for the injuries they have sustained during solitary confinement on death row because they do not have a protected liberty interest in not being confined on death row for an indefinite duration after their death sentences have been vacated. For the following reasons, I disagree.
I. Facts
As the majority properly indicates, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits the well-pled facts in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Moreover, in ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the complaint. (Majority op. at 158 n. 4) (citing Composition Roofers Local 30/30B v. Katz, 398 Pa.Super. 564, 581 A.2d 607 (1990)). In their complaint, Appellants allege the following facts.
Appellants are death row inmates whose death sentences have been vacated. The Department is aware that the death sentences have been vacated, but the Department is keeping Appellants on death row. Death row is solitary confinement.1 Inmates on death row have limited non-con*167tact visitation rights, ten hours of exercise per week in a small cage, no outdoor exercise,2 three fifteen-minute phone calls per week, no opportunity to work and no participation in group, educational or rehabilitation programs. The Department’s keeping of Appellants in solitary confinement on death row for an indefinite duration has caused them to suffer from poor physical health and psychological trauma.
In their prayer for relief, Appellants seek damages in an amount that the court finds sufficient to compensate them for the pain and mental anguish they have suffered as a result of the duration of their solitary confinement on death row. In addition, because the duration of their solitary confinement on death row has caused them physical and psychological harm, Appellants seek an order directing the Department to release them from death row and to revise the policy of keeping inmates on death row after their death sentences have been vacated. (R.R. at 13-14, 18.)
II. Mandamus
Appellants allege that, because their death sentences have been vacated by court orders, they have a clear right to be removed from solitary confinement on death row, and the Department has a corresponding duty to remove Appellants from solitary confinement on death row.3
A sentence of death is subject to automatic review by our supreme court. Section 9711(h)(1) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). If a sentence of death is upheld by our supreme court, the prothonotary transmits a full record of the proceedings to the Governor. Section 9711(i) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(i). Unless a pardon or commutation of sentence has been issued, the Governor issues a warrant of execution within ninety days that specifies a day for execution, which shall be no later than sixty days after the warrant is signed. Section 2(a) of the Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 622, 61 P.S. § 3002(a). The Governor must reissue a warrant specifying a new execution date if the following occur: (1) the date of execution passed without imposition of the death penalty because of a reprieve4 or a judicial stay; (2) a pardon or commutation was not issued; and (3) the Governor received notice that a reprieve or judicial stay has terminated. Id.
The warrant is directed to the Secretary of Corrections, commanding that the subject of the warrant be executed on the day named in the warrant. 61 P.S. § 3002(b). “Upon receipt of the warrant, the [Secretary of Corrections] shall, until infliction of the death penalty or until lawful discharge *168from custody, keep the inmate in solitary confinement.” 61 P.S. § 3003 (emphasis added). The majority interprets this quoted language from 61 P.S. § 3003 to mean that the “only way out of [death row], besides execution, is a ‘discharge from custody.’ ” (Majority op. at 160.) In other words, the majority recognizes only two possibilities once the Department receives an execution warrant; either the inmate will be executed or the inmate will be totally exonerated or pardoned.5 For the following reasons, I disagree.
Any warrant that the Secretary of Corrections receives under 61 P.S. § 3003 expires after the execution date has passed. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 38, 771 A.2d 721, 743 (2001) (J. Castille, concurring) (stating that a “stay that persists beyond the time fixed by the warrant invalidates that warrant — finally, totally, and permanently.”). Indeed, under 61 P.S. § 3002(a), if the date of execution passes without imposition of the death penalty, the Governor must issue a second warrant that establishes a new execution date. Thus, in my view, the Secretary of Corrections only has authority under 61 P.S. § 3003 to keep a death row inmate in solitary confinement upon receipt and continued possession of a valid warrant.6
Here, because court orders have vacated Appellants’ death sentences, the warrants that served as the authority for the holding of Appellants on death row have expired and have become fínally, totally and permanently invalid. Thus, the Secretary of Corrections is no longer in receipt of a valid warrant. Absent a valid warrant, the Secretary of Corrections no longer has authority under 61 P.S. § 3003 to keep Appellants on death row.
Nevertheless, the Secretary of Corrections can keep Appellants on death row if there is a penological reason for doing so. However, in considering the Department’s demurrer, we must accept as true the reasonable inference that the Department lacks any penological reason for keeping Appellants on death row.7 Because the Secretary of Corrections has no statutory authority or penological reason for keeping Appellants on death row, I would conclude that Appellants have a clear legal right to be removed from death row and that the Department has a corresponding duty to remove them.8
*169III. Constitutional Torts
A person may seek damages in a state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, and the individual need not specifically allege in the complaint that the action is brought under that provision. Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the violation of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Id.
A. Due Process
Appellants argue in their brief that their complaint sets forth an action for damages against the Department based on a violation of their constitutional right to procedural due process, i.e., keeping Appellants in solitary confinement on death row for an indefinite duration without a meaningful opportunity to be heard.9 With respect to one of the Appellants, an inmate who has been adjudged ineligible for the death penalty due to mental retardation, Appellants argue that there can be no valid reason for keeping him on death row.
Procedural due process rights are triggered by a deprivation of a cognizable liberty interest. Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). An inmate has a protected liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement where the conditions impose atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)).
The U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of identifying the appropriate baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison system, and the federal appeals courts have not been consistent in this regard. Wilkinson. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Wilkinson that inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement “under any plausible baseline” where: (1) the state has imposed solitary confinement; (2) the confinement *170is of indefínite duration;10 and (3) the confinement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (emphasis added).
In Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir.2000), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that an inmate kept in administrative confinement for eight years without any prospect of release in the near future had a protected liberty interest in avoiding continued administrative confinement because the duration and indeñniteness of such confinement was atypical and imposed a significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Thus, in determining whether an inmate has a protected liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement, courts consider whether the solitary confinement exceeds similar confinement “in either duration or degree of restriction.”11 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
Here, we must accept as true the reasonable inference that Appellants’ solitary confinement on death row is of indefinite duration. Thus, pursuant to Wilkinson, Sandin and Shoats, Appellants’ confinement is atypical and imposes a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life as a matter of law. As a result, Appellants are entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the lack of a penological basis for their continued solitary confinement and the harm they suffered due to their continued solitary confinement.12
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Appellants allege in their complaint that the Department’s deliberate indifference to their deteriorating physical and mental health constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.13
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the government has an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical care for those being punished by incarceration. The denial of medical care to a prisoner may result in pain and suffering that does not serve any penological purpose, and the infliction of unnecessary suf*171fering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Id.
Thus, deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to a prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Id. “Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1988.” Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285.
Here, we must accept as true the reasonable inference that Appellants suffer from serious illness or injury as a result of the Department’s deliberate indifference to them deteriorating physical and mental health. Thus, pursuant to Estelle, Appellants have stated a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.14
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.15

. Pursuant to section 3 of the Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 622, 61 P.S. § 3003, upon receipt of a warrant of execution, the Department shall keep the inmate in solitary confinement.
During the confinement, no person except the staff of the [DJepartment, the inmate’s counsel of record or other attorney requested by the inmate and a spiritual advisor selected by the inmate or the members of the immediate family of the inmate shall be allowed access to the inmate without an order of the sentencing court.
61 P.S. § 3003.

. The complaint actually- avers that there is no "indoor” exercise; however, having alleged that death row inmates exercise ten hours per week in a small cage, which is indoor exercise, I reasonably infer that there is no "outdoor” exercise.

. I do not entirely agree with the majority’s statement of the law governing mandamus. (See Majority op. at 159.) I disagree that mandamus is not a proper vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of a statute. In Coady v. Vaughn, 564 Pa. 604, 770 A.2d 287 (2001), our supreme court held that mandamus is a viable means for ■ challenging the constitutionality of a statute on ex post facto grounds. I also disagree that mandamus can never lie to compel an official to exercise discretion in a particular way. In Duncan Meter Corporation v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949), our supreme court stated that mandamus will lie to compel proper action where an official has abused his or her discretion.

.The Governor has the power to grant reprieves under Article IV, Section 9(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Morganelli v. Casey, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 538, 641 A.2d 674 (1994). A reprieve stays a death warrant in a particular proceeding for a period of time. Id.

. The majority states that, according to the Department, a “discharge from custody” occurs when the Department removes an inmate from death row after the Department decides that a death sentence is no longer a possibility. (Majority op. at 160.) The majority expresses no agreement or disagreement in this regard. I point out that moving an inmate from death row to the general prison population is not a "discharge from custody.” There is no question that the inmate is still in custody.

. I submit that the majority's interpretation, which allows the Secretary of Corrections to keep an inmate in solitary confinement on death row based on an expired warrant, is absurd and unreasonable. Under section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1), we must presume that the General Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable.

. Indeed, Appellants are not in solitary confinement as a result of disciplinary action taken against them by the Department. I note that, according to the majority, whether a valid penological reason exists to keep an inmate on death row is a conclusion of law. (Majority op. at 161 n. 8.) However, I reasonably infer that there is no penological reason of any kind to keep Appellants on death row, which is a question of fact.

. The majority states, "it is entirely a matter of the Department’s discretion where to house an inmate.” (Majority op. at 160.) However, under 61 P.S. § 3003, upon receipt of an execution warrant, the Department "shall” keep an inmate in solitary confinement. Thus, I submit that the majority’s statement is incorrect.
*169To the extent that the Department has discretion with respect to the housing of death row inmates whose death sentences have been vacated and whose execution warrants have expired, I submit that the Department abuses its discretion by keeping such inmates in solitary confinement on death row without due process. In fact, the Department's own regulation at 37 Pa.Code § 97.11(b) states that the Department will “require due process in accordance with established principles of law’’ for inmates in restricted housing.

. An inmate may file an action for damages against prison officials under 42 U.S.C.1983 for tort where: (1) the officials, acting pursuant to an established state procedure, deprive the inmate of life, liberty or property without due process; and (2) state tort remedies do not provide an adequate means for redress. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Here, Appellants allege that the Department deprived them of a liberty interest pursuant to an established policy without due process. As the trial court notes, the Department would be immune from state tort action, (see trial ct. op. at 7 n. 4); thus, in this case, the state tort remedies would not provide Appellants an adequate means for redress.
Sovereign immunity is not available as a defense in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Owens. However, prison officials do have qualified immunity in actions for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Qualified immunity is available where the officials acted in good faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds of reason under all the circumstances. Id. Qualified immunity is not available if the officials knew or reasonably should have known that the action taken would violate the constitutional rights of the inmate. Id.

. I note that when restricted housing is imposed as a sanction for misconduct, the inmate receives confinement in the restricted housing unit for a definite period of time. See 37 Pa.Code § 93.10 (imposing no more than ninety days for a Class I misconduct). Here, no date has been established for Appellants' release from solitary confinement, and no hearing has been set to consider their release; therefore, their confinement is indefinite.

. The majority states that indefinite duration in solitary confinement, by itself, does not create a protected liberty interest. However, there can be no question that, at some point, the duration of an inmate’s solitary confinement would become atypical and impose a significant hardship on the inmate. In Shoats, the inmate’s duration in administrative custody was eight years, and the special assistant to the Department’s Commissioner conceded that that amount of time was atypical.

. The majority states that Appellants have not alleged how the grievance process did not afford them due process. However, Appellants allege that their continued solitary confinement is pursuant to a Department death row policy. Unless the Department alters its death row policy, a result sought by Appellants here, any grievance would be futile.

. This cause of action is different from the constitutional tort claims, which allege that the solitary confinement has caused Appellants to suffer physical and psychological harm. The cruel and unusual punishment cause of action alleges only that the Department is deliberately indifferent to Appellants’ injuries.

. The majority states that Appellants’ "assertions regarding the pain and anguish of being [on death row] after their death sentences were vacated is just another way of stating that they are being held in the wrong place.” (Majority op. at 165.) I disagree that allegations of poor physical and mental health are equivalent to allegations of being held in the wrong place. By equating the two, the majority suggests that parts of a prison are designed to cause human illness and suffering and that this would not be cruel punishment.

. I would direct that, on remand, the trial court provide Appellants with the opportunity to amend their complaint under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1033 to include separate counts for the various causes of action implicated by the well-pled facts.