Court Opinion

ID: 9626732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:22:30.730532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:32.588964
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The officer in this case brought defendant to jail, inventoried the objects in his pockets, seized one object that announced its contents and subjected those contents to confirmatory chemical testing. Because I believe that each step in that process was lawful and that lawfully obtained evidence may be used in a subsequent prosecution, I respectfully dissent.
It is undisputed that Pfaff was authorized to transport defendant to jail for detoxification. ORS 426.460(3). It is also undisputed that, when an intoxicated individual is brought to jail for that purpose, the booking officer may conduct an inventory of the individual’s property. State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984).
Although there is disagreement about what action Pfaff was allowed to take after the paperfold came into his possession, the other authors of today’s tripartite opinion appear to agree that the inventory itself was properly conducted. Defendant does not challenge the legality of the procedure that was used, and I, too, am satisfied that the act *438of emptying defendant’s pockets was well within the permissible scope of an inventory. Unlike the other cases we have addressed, no wallet, purse, box, suitcase or other closed container was opened in order to find the contraband.
The only question, then, is what Pfaff was allowed to do with the paperfold. The lead opinion would have him inventory “one paperfold” and would disallow any subsequent prosecution for possession of a controlled substance. The special concurrence would have Pfaff secure a search warrant and would then allow defendant to be prosecuted. I would have Pfaff be entitled to open the paperfold and test its contents.
We have held that the lawful discovery of a paperfold gives an officer probable cause to believe that a person is in possession of a controlled substance. State v. Shelton, 105 Or App 570, 573, 805 P2d 698, rev den 311 Or 427 (1991). Simply put, an officer’s belief that a paperfold contains an illegal drug is reasonable because of the unique nature of the object. At this point in history, due to its use as a method for carrying illegal drugs, “a paperfold, like a transparent container, announces its contents.” State v. McCrory, 84 Or App 390, 397, 734 P2d 359 (1987)(Buttler, J., specially concurring). The Supreme Court has held that, when a container announces its contents, no warrant is required before an officer may open it and seize its contents. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524 (1986).
Owens also held that chemically testing the contents of such a container to determine whether it is a controlled substance “is neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ under Article I, section 9.” 302 Or at 206. Accordingly, “[a] test for such a limited purpose does not infringe any privacy interest protected by the Oregon Constitution.” 302 Or at 206. Whether the scenario in this case is characterized as plain view of contraband from a lawful vantage point or probable cause justifying arrest and search incident to that arrest or lawful discovery of a container that announced its contents, the result is the same: The seizure and testing of the paperfold was constitutional.
The only remaining issue, then, is whether the results of the chemical test were admissible in defendant’s *439prosecution. In other cases involving civil detoxification custody, seized evidence has been held inadmissible because the underlying searches were unreasonably intrusive and, therefore, violated Article I, section 9. Here, no such violation occurred. When the Supreme Court concluded that, in the context of civil detoxification detentions, the “test of each step in the police procedure is reasonableness,” State v. Newman, 292 Or 216, 224, 637 P2d 143 (1981), cert den 457 US 1111 (1982) (emphasis supplied), that presumably meant that, when each step of the police procedure is reasonable, the evidence will be admissible. If the Court did not intend that result, it would have fashioned a per se rule requiring warrants in every case or automatically excluding evidence, regardless of the reasonableness of the procedure.
Furthermore, in State v. Westlund, 302 Or 225, 230, 729 P2d 541 (1986), the Supreme Court found “no indication that the legislature intended [the civil detoxification statute] to immunize intoxicated persons from criminal prosecution for otherwise criminal conduct.”1 (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant’s intoxication was not a crime, but his possession of cocaine was. Prosecuting him for that possession would not be contrary to either the legislature’s intent or the constitution.
It bears repeating that the touchstone in civil detoxification cases is “reasonableness.” Every detoxification inventory case on which we have previously written has involved a closed container and some unreasonable action on the part of the officer.2 This case is different. The officer was in a place where he had a right to be, conducting an inventory that he had a right to conduct and, concededly, performing that inventory in a lawful manner. During the process, he *440saw, in plain view, evidence of a crime. I believe that he had a responsibility to seize that evidence and to make whatever arrest was mandated by the circumstances. The same would be true for an officer who came across contraband while on his way home from work or while sitting in church. Those basic rules do not change simply because this officer happened to be in a detoxification center.
I remain committed to the view that when an officer follows the book, he should be entitled to act on what he sees.

 Reliance on State v. Westlund is far from “whimsical.” 112 Or App at 434 n 2. In Westlund, the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted the statute that is at issue in this case. That interpretation was neither limited to nor dependent on the facts of that case.

 The lead opinion takes the approach that, because no case has heretofore admitted evidence that was seized in a civil detoxification setting, we cannot allow it to happen in this case. That ignores the fact that, in each case that addresses the detention of intoxicated persons under ORS 426.460, the evidence was held inadmissible only because the underlying search was unreasonably intrusive and, therefore, violated Article I, section 9. The lead opinion’s approach would avoid our first responsibility to apply the law to the facts of the case. Instead, it would have us reach the same result every time, regardless of different facts.