Court Opinion

ID: 9468108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:04:53.367711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:41.381292
License: Public Domain

MIKVA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
Although I agree that appellant has raised no issues meriting relief, I cannot agree that the trial judge was carrying out an affirmative duty in his active examination of appellant and his alibi witnesses.
This court has repeatedly admonished district courts that their power to participate in the examination of witnesses should be exercised with caution and that any error should be on the side of abstention. See, e. g., United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C.Cir.1970); United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321-22 (D.C.Cir.1969).1 We have been more receptive to a trial judge’s intervention when it is aimed at providing needed clarification, rather than at challenging testimony or initiating new lines of questioning. See United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858, 860-61 (D.C.Cir.1971); Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1322; cf. Green, 429 F.2d at 760. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, this was not a case in which the judge’s participation was necessary to alleviate confusion. Moreover, the government had able *1050counsel and hardly needed help from the bench.
Appellant’s three alibi witnesses — his mother and two sisters — testified during direct and cross-examination regarding appellant’s activities during the day of the robbery. But the judge’s questions focused on appellant’s previous and subsequent visits to his family and the events on those days. See Trial Transcript (Tr.) at 170-74, 202-03, 223-25. This was not an attempt to elucidate, but an effort to impeach credibility.2 If the judge thought that this area of inquiry was a promising one, he should have called both attorneys to the bench or to chambers and made the suggestion. See Green, 429 F.2d at 760 (“the proper procedure” when more than one or two questions are involved); Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1322 & n.25. Similarly, the judge’s examination of appellant regarding his failure to file a tax return for his gambling winnings opened a new line of questioning rather than clarified previous ones. See Tr. at 271-72. Although the judge may not have anticipated appellant’s response to all his questions, he should have been aware of the possibility that appellant would answer that he had neglected to file a tax return. The judge should have been sensitive to the potential prejudice of such a response; he should have considered the possibility that a judge’s eliciting such an answer from appellant might well give “undue eminence to matters otherwise irrelevant to the offenses with which the appellant was charged.” Wyatt, 442 F.2d at 860.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that any error in the district court’s examination of defense witnesses is insufficient to justify reversal. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the judge’s conduct was so egregious as to constitute a constitutional violation, and the government had substantial evidence pointing to guilt. But I think that the record clearly evidences over-zealousness on the part of the court below. The judge’s questioning was relatively extensive and opened new areas of inquiry, questions were asked only of defense witnesses, cf. Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1322, and defense counsel did object to the judge’s intervention. The proper exercise of discretion would have been to suggest appropriate questions to counsel and to limit substantially the examination actually conducted by the court. We ought not encourage trial judges to be nonchalant about the line between impartial elucidation and prosecution.

. The court explained the relevant considerations quite clearly in Green:
[Although a federal judge in a criminal case has the power to participate in the examination of witnesses when it is necessary to “[make] the case clear to the jurors,” this power should be sparingly exercised. Particularly when the questioning is designed to elicit answers favorable to the prosecution, “it is far better for the trial judge to err on the side of [a]bstention from intervention in the case.” If more than one or two questions are involved, the proper procedure is “to call both counsel to the bench, or in chambers and suggest what [the judge] wants done. That the judge may be able to examine witnesses more skillfully or develop a point in less time than counsel requires does not ordinarily justify such participation. That is not his function.” As Judge Learned Hand once said, “Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions in the administration of justice: they must not merge.”
429 F.2d at 760 (footnotes omitted).

. The jury could quite reasonably have inferred from the nature of the judge’s questions that he found the defense witnesses incredible. In response to one witness’ uncertainty about appellant’s activities during a prior visit, for example, the judge asked, “You mean your brother visited you and you are not sure whether you told your mother he was there?" and “You don’t know who he stayed with?” Tr. at 203, 202. Moreover, in questioning appellant’s mother, the judge queried, “What time would he get in, what time would he go, where did he go? You know this on the other date, how about this date?” Tr. at 172-73. These inquiries do not have the qualities of neutral questions aimed at clarification, even when viewed prospectively rather than “in the brilliant glare of hindsight.” Green, 429 F.2d at 760.