Court Opinion

ID: 9429266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:15.847426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:18.447868
License: Public Domain

Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Marshall joins,
concurring in the judgment.
For me, the Court’s analysis in Part III of its opinion is quite sufficient to support its judgment. I agree that on the facts of this case, the detention of Place’s luggage amounted to, and was functionally identical with, a seizure of his person. My concern with the Court’s opinion has to do (a) with its general discussion in Part II of seizures of luggage under the Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), exception to the war*721rant and probable-cause requirements, and (b) with the Court’s haste to resolve the dog-sniff issue.
I
In providing guidance to other courts, we often include in our opinions material that, technically, constitutes dictum. I cannot fault the Court’s desire to set guidelines for Terry seizures of luggage based on reasonable suspicion. I am concerned, however, with what appears to me to be an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable.1
I pointed out in dissent in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 513 (1983), that our prior cases suggest a two-step evaluation of seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment generally prohibits a seizure unless it is pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized. See ante, at 701; Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 514 (dissenting opinion). The Court correctly observes that a warrant may be dispensed with if the officer has probable cause and if some exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent cir*722cumstances, is applicable. Ante, at 701. While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable seizures, the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most seizures to the judgment of courts or government officers: the Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a seizure is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 744-745 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Terry v. Ohio, however, teaches that in some circumstances a limited seizure that is less restrictive than a formal arrest may constitutionally occur upon mere reasonable suspicion, if “supported by a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 514 (dissenting opinion). See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700 (1981). When this exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements is applicable, a reviewing court must balance the individual’s interest in privacy against the government’s law enforcement interest and determine whether the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. Id., at 699-701. Only in this limited context is a court entitled to engage in any balancing of interests in determining the validity of a seizure.
Because I agree with the Court that there is a significant law enforcement interest in interdicting illegal drug traffic in the Nation’s airports, ante, at 704; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 513, 519 (dissenting opinion), a limited intrusion caused by a temporary seizure of luggage for investigative purposes could fall within the Terry exception. The critical threshold issue is the intrusiveness of the seizure.2 In this *723case, the seizure went well beyond a minimal intrusion and therefore cannot fall within the Terry exception.
HH l — H
The Court s resolution of the status of dog sniffs under the Fourth Amendment is troubling for a different reason. The District Court expressly observed that Place “does not contest the validity of sniff searches per se.” 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (EDNY 1980).3 While Place may have possessed such a claim, he chose not to raise it in that court. The issue also was not presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, contrary to the Court’s apparent intimation, ante, at 706, an answer to the question is not necessary to the decision. For the purposes of this case, the precise nature of the legitimate investigative activity is irrelevant. Regardless of the validity of a dog sniff under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure was too intrusive. The Court has no need to decide the issue here.
As a matter of prudence, decision of the issue is also unwise. While the Court has adopted one plausible analysis of the issue, there are others. For example, a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion. Neither party has had an opportunity to brief the issue, and the Court grasps for the appropriate analysis of the problem. Although it is not essential that the Court ever adopt the views of one of the parties, it should not decide an issue on which neither party has expressed any opinion at all. The Court is certainly in no position to consider all the ramifica*724tions of this important issue. Certiorari is currently pending in two cases that present the issue directly. United States v. Beale, No. 82-674; Waltzer v. United States, No. 82-5491. There is no reason to avoid a full airing of the issue in a proper case.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

 The Court states that the applicability of the Terry exception “rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of ‘the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Ante, at 703, quoting Terry, 392 U. S., at 20. As the context of the quotation from Terry makes clear, however, this balancing to determine reasonableness occurs only under the exceptional circumstances that justify the Terry exception:
“But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct — necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat — which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ibid.

 I cannot agree with the Court’s assertion that the diligence of the police in acting on their suspicion is relevant to the extent of the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. See ante, at 709-710. It makes little difference to a traveler whose luggage is seized whether the police conscientiously followed a lead or bungled the investigation. The duration and intrusiveness of the seizure is not altered by the diligence the police ex*723ercise. Of course, diligence may be relevant to a court’s determination of the reasonableness of the seizure once it is determined that the seizure is sufficiently nonintrusive as to be eligible for the Terry exception.

 The District Court did hold that the dog sniff was not conducted in a fashion that under the circumstances was “reasonably calculated to achieve a tainted reaction from the dog.” 498 F. Supp., at 1228. This, however, is a due process claim, not one under the Fourth Amendment. Place apparently did not raise this issue before the Court of Appeals.