Court Opinion

ID: 9807368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:01:50.07575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:34:49.318959
License: Public Domain

Dick, J.
{dissenting.) Under our former system of gov-mment, if the Justices of a county made a contract with a irson, in pursuance of powers vested in them by law, they raid be compelled by a writ of mandamus, to perform such mtract, upon their legal liability being clearly established. McKoy v. Jus. of Harnett 6 Jon. 488. This writ was wanted to a person having a just claim under such contract, icause he had no remedy by an ordinary action, to compel Lese officers to perform a public duty.'
Under our present system of government, many of the rblic duties which were performed by the Justices of a ranty, are now entrusted to five Commissioners. A person *224having a specific legal claim against a county, may still enforce his right by a writ of mandamus against the commissioners, unless the Code of Civil Procedure affords him an adequate remedy by civil action : C. C. P. sec. 392.
It is therefore necessary for me to consider in this case, whether the plaintiff can obtain adequate relief by a civil action against the county as a body corporate.
The act of 1868, ch. 20, provides that ‘‘every county is a body politic and corporate and has the powers specified by statute, or necessarily implied in such a body and no others.” It has power to sue and be sued in the name of the commissioners.
A county is only a quasi corporation, established exclusively for public and political purposes, and constitutes, a part of the government of the State. It is entrusted with many high and important functions, which are to be exercised by its officers for the public benefit. The Legislature may, at will, enlarge or modify these functions, but public policy requires that they shall not be impaired by the private action of a citizen, except by the authority of a statute expressly defining the force and extent of such action. The common law does not give any such right of action, and it cannot arise by implication from a general statute providing merely that such a corporation may “sue and be sued.”
(1.) The law does not contemplate the satisfaction of a claim against a county, in any other manner than by an assessment upon the taxable property of its citizens; Act of 1868, ch. 20, ch. 2, sec. 8, par. 1, s. 3, 9, to 13. If the present action can be maintained, then the plaintiff, upon obtaining a judgment, is entitled to an execution, under which he may sell the court house and jail, and thus obstruct entirely, or produce great inconvenience in, the public administration of justice, and render insecure the pub lie records and papers in which every citizen is interested. The bare statement of such a proposition seems to me to be sufficient to show its fallacy. It cannot be possible that the law by mere *225implication gives an action when a judgment cannot be enforced by final process without great detriment to the-public interests.
I therefore entertain the opinion that a private action cannot be brought against a county for neglect or omission to perform a public duty, without some express statute directing the manner in which a judgment in such action can be satisfied; Eastman v. Meredith 36 New Hamp. 296, where the authorities are fully cited and ably commented upon.
• “The reasons which exempt these public bodies from liability to private actions based upon neglect to perform public duty, do not apply to villages, boroughs and cities which accept special charters from the State. The grant of this-corporate franchise in these cases, is usually made only at the= request of the citizens to be incorporated, and it is justly assumed that it confers a valuable privilege. This privilege is a consideration for the duties which the charter imposes. In this respect these corporations are regarded as occupying the same position as private corporations,” &c. Cooley on Con. Lim. 247; Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ire. 73. Counties'and townships do not usually possess corporate powers under special charters, but they exist under general laws, and have to perform certain public duties as a part of the machinery of the State. “Whether they will assume these public duties and exercise these powers they are not allowed the privilege of choice” Cooley, 240. The plaintiff’s counsel insists that this action may be prosecuted to judgment, and then the plaintiff can apply for a writ of mandamus to enforce the payment of his claim. The law certainly cannot contemplate such circuity of action when the same result can be obtained by a direct remedy, enforceable by attachment.
. The proceedings in this case cannot be regarded as an application for a mandamus, as that high prerogative writ can be granted only by the Judge of a Court of superior juxis-dietion.
*226In my opinion Ms Honor was right in sustaining the demurrer.'
Pee Cueiam. Error.