Court Opinion

ID: 9849062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:34:11.368072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:59.634324
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
The Court granted leave in these two cases in order to consider the legal standard to be applied in workers’ compensation cases involving psychiatric disabilities related to employment. The Legislature has amended the relevant statute effective January 1, 1982. Because this Court today *598in Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), has construed this statute as applicable to "personal injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982,” we decline to reexamine our interpretation of the earlier statute in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978).
Facts
A. Peters v Michigan Bell Telephone Co
The plaintiff worked as a telephone operator for the defendant from November, 1967, until September, 1977. In September 1978, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging a nervous and emotional disorder, aggravation of hypertension, and an aggravation of an injury to the heart, circulatory system, and central nervous system.
Plaintiff was awarded benefits by the hearing referee in 1980, and, on October 29, 1982, the wcab, citing Deziel, affirmed the award with a minor modification. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal from the decision of the board. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted leave to appeal.
B. Morrish v General Motors Corp
Plaintiff Morrish worked for General Motors from February, 1969, until January, 1978. Subsequently, Morrish filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging a psychiatric disability caused by incidents at work. The hearing referee, on February 4, 1980, determined that there was no causal nexus between plaintiff’s disability and her employment. On November 19, 1982, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision *599of the hearing referee and awarded benefits. The. Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal on May 25, 1983. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
Discussion
In Deziel, this Court considered the compensability of mental disorders under the existing statute, MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1). In interpreting the statutory requirement that compensable injuries must arise "out of and in the course of’ employment, we developed a three-step analysis. This analysis required findings that
1) the claimant was disabled;
2) an injury in the form of a precipitating work-related event had occurred;
3) using a subjective causal nexus standard, the employment had combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the disability.
Deziel, p 37.
The relevant statute was subsequently changed by the Legislature, 1980 PA 357, MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2), effective January 1, 1982.1
Conclusion
In light of the legislative action, we decline to reexamine our interpretation in Deziel as we are persuaded that it would be unwise to create potentially a third standard for the determination of the complex question of liability for alleged work-re*600lated mental disability. These cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Williams, C.J.

 "Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof.”