Court Opinion

ID: 9629246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:33.623095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.156511
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority that the trial judge should have afforded the handwriting expert, C. G. Kelson, an opportunity to testify as to a possible forgery of the promissory note in question. However, in view of the fact that the trial court did not permit such testimony, I would now reverse both judgments granted on both promissory notes.
This action was filed originally by the plaintiffs as a specific performance action to require defendant Wonders to comply with an alleged purchase of Pettet's Floor Covering business and. the building in which it was conducted.
At the opening of trial, plaintiffs' counsel advised the court as follows:
I have given a notice of application for trial amendment, which I don't think is opposed. The complaint initially called for judgment on the promissory note, plus specific performance of the contract. We're not seeking any performance on the contract, but simply a judgment on the promissory note.
The trial court granted the motion to amend.
The two notes sued on were plaintiffs' exhibit 10 for $1,000, which was the earnest money on the business purchase agreement, and plaintiffs' exhibit 3 in the amount of $24,700, which allegedly represented the down payment on the building purchase. Both notes are identical, except for their dates of execution, amounts due and a provision for attorney fees.
Plaintiffs' exhibits 10 and 3 are illustrated on the following page.

*804

*805It is to be noted that both notes have the same time payment requirement, "On demand at closing only after date." However, both parties and the realtor McCorkle agreed that the transaction never closed. The realtor McCorkle specifically testified as follows:
Q Now, so we all understand, the deal never did close?
A [McCorkle] This deal did not close.
Q No cash was ever paid, no money has ever changed hands?
A That is correct.
As the sale never closed, admittedly there never was any demand on defendant for payment of the promissory notes.
Originally, in exhibit 1, the sellers Pettets, gave the purchaser Wonders an option to purchase the real estate for the sum of $82,000. Subsequently the option agreement was negated and replaced by an earnest money agreement to purchase the building outright to which was attached a real estate contract specimen form, which real estate contract was never signed by either party and contained no legal description of the property being purchased or any terms of purchase. Plaintiffs' exhibit 2 has been mistakenly identified in the testimony and in the findings of fact and conclusions of law as a real estate contract. At best it is an earnest money agreement for the purchase of real estate and is not a real estate contract. Plaintiffs did not have an executed real estate contract to enforce, and this was the obvious reason why they abandoned their action for specific performance of the real estate contract at the commencement of the trial and sued only on the promissory notes.
In order for the judgments awarded to plaintiffs to be upheld, the findings must be supported by substantial evidence. They are not in this case. Both promissory notes (plaintiffs' exhibits 3 and 10) provide that they shall be due and owing if and when the sales agreement for the purchase of the store and building are closed, then and only then will the principal amount of such notes be due. As admittedly the sales were never closed, the promissory notes *806never became due and owing. It was error to enter judgments on the nondue promissory notes.
The majority, in refusing to recognize the undisputed evidence that the promissory notes even at this late date are still not due and therefore are not enforceable, skirt the issue by alleging:
First, "[w]e will not consider alleged errors that have not been pointed out in the assignments of error," . . . Second, " [contentions that are not supported by argument or authority will not be considered by us."
(Citations omitted.) We agree with the majority's presentation of the law but this is not the factual situation here.
Defendant in his brief assigned errors, among others, to findings of fact Nos. Ill, IV, XI and XIV, which read as follows:
III
That thereafter on October 29, 1975 the defendant above named, executed a promissory note in the amount of $24,700.00, Exhibit "3," which constituted the down payment on the purchase of Pettet's Floor Covering business in the amount of $18,000.00 and the down payment on the purchase of the real estate as provided for in Exhibit "2".
IV
That on September 25, 1975 as part of the earnest money agreement for the purchase of the real estate, the defendant executed a promissory note in the amount of $1,000.00 as earnest money for the purchase of the real estate.
XI
That the promissory note, Exhibit "3" was valid and enforceable . . .
XIV
That the promissory note, Exhibit "3", provided for the payment of interest from the date of default therein at the rate of 12% per annum, and the Court finds that the date of default on said note was November 19, 1975, and that interest on said note at 12% per annum should commence from said date.
Defendant argued assignments of error based on findings of fact Nos. Ill and IV in his brief. However, in addition to *807the specific assignments of error, defendant has consistently argued throughout these proceedings that he had no recollection of signing exhibit 3 ($24,700 promissory note) and has continuously challenged the judgment entered on such note. Plaintiffs waived their action for specific performance of the purchase agreements and elected to seek judgment only on the promissory notes. The court's finding of fact No. XI recites that the promissory note, exhibit 3, "was valid and enforceable ..." Plaintiff's exhibits 3 and 10, duly admitted into evidence, say on their face that they are due and owing on demand at closing only. As it is undisputed among all parties that the sales agreements between the parties never closed, I must conclude the promissory notes are still not due and "findings of fact" finding such notes are enforceable must fail, for such notes are unenforceable until they are due, and demand for payment is made.
The enforceability of the promissory notes which are the subject of this lawsuit are properly before this appeals court for resolvement.
I would reverse and set aside both judgments.
Reconsideration denied August 16,1979.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 7, 1979.