Court Opinion

ID: 9595287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:38:10.437894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:27.082831
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I agree that we must treat plaintiffs claim as a claim for breach of contract. I also agree that the parties are restricted on appeal to the promissory estoppel theory on which the case was tried. However, I would reverse and remand on the basis of a promissory estoppel.
I agree with the majority’s basic premise that promissory estoppel applies only when there is a lack of actual consideration. See Schafer et al v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or 446, 468-72, 290 P2d 190, 294 P2d 609 (1956). However, the majority confuses subsequent action in reliance on the promise with *633“actual consideration.” 104 Or App at 632. In her pleadings, at trial and on appeal, plaintiff argued that Robert Mayers promised to do the conversion through Adroit for between $7,000 and $7,500. A jury could have reasonably found from the evidence that, in making that promise, Mayers bargained for the consideration of plaintiffs promise to pay between $7,000 and $7,500. Plaintiff never actually made such a promise; therefore, there arguably was a lack of consideration for Mayers’ promise. However, a jury could reasonably have found from the evidence that plaintiffs subsequent purchase of the house was a reasonably foreseeable change of position in reliance on Mayers’ promise; thus, the promise was enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Schafer et al v. Fraser et ux, supra, 206 Or at 472; Bixler v. First National Bank, 49 Or App 195, 199-200, 619 P2d 895 (1980).
It is true that there was some evidence that Mayers actually bargained for plaintiffs promise to purchase the house when he promised to do the conversion. However, there was also contrary evidence. A jury could have reasonably found that there was no consideration for Mayers’ promise to do the conversion but that there was a promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. See City of Rogue River v. DeBoer, 288 Or 485, 488, 605 P2d 697 (1980).
Therefore, I dissent.