Court Opinion

ID: 9644259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:51:30.934034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:58.313560
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
In their petition for rehearing the appellants assert that the decree appealed from was erroneous, (1) because it included in the total amount of damages interest at the rate of 7 per cent, upon an unliquidated claim to the date of the decree, and (2) because it provided for interest at the rate of 7 per cent, after the date of the decree, although the legal rate in Nebraska was then 6 per cent.
*250[H] These questions were not argued in the appellants’ brief. The general rule is that questions not so argued will not be considered on appeal. United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (C.C.A.8) 82 F.(2d) 131, 133, 106 A.L.R. 942; Schnitzer v. United States (C.C.A.8) 77 F.(2d) 233, 235; Payne v. Ostras (C.C.A.8) 50 F.(2d) 1039, 1045, 77 A.L.R. 531; Nash v. Rehmann Bros., Inc. (C.C.A.8) 53 F.(2d) 624, 627; Wynne v. Fries (C.C.A.6) 50 F.(2d) 761; Allen v. Hudson (C.C.A.8) 35 F.(2d) 330; Schevenell v. Blackwood (C.C.A.8) 35 F.(2d) 421, 422; Hard & Rand, Inc., v. Biston Coffee Co. (C.C.A.8) 41 F.(2d) 625; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359, 369, 47 S.Ct. 400, 402, 71 L.Ed. 684; I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 432, 47. S.Ct. 136, 137, 71 L.Ed. 335; Denver Live Stock Commission Co. v. Lee (C.C.A.8) 18 F.(2d) 11; Harris v. Newsom (C.C.A.8) 23 F.(2d) 652, 654; United States v. Hayes (C.C.A.8) 20 F.(2d) 873, 877; City and County of Denver v. Denver Tramway Corporation (C.C.A.8) 23 F.(2d) 287, 295; Brown Sheet Iron & Steel Co. v. Maple Leaf Oil & Refining Co., Limited (C.C.A.8) 68 F.(2d) 787; E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (C.C.A.8) 69 F.(2d) 685, 687; Franklin Sav. Bank of Franklin, N. H., v. Garot (C.C.A.8) 69 F.(2d) 487, 489; United Iron Works, Inc., v. Woolsey (C.C.A.8) 39 F.(2d) 385, 386. The failure of this court to consider such questions would not, of course, furnish a basis for a rehearing.
The question of the right of a court to include interest or its equivalent in computing damages where the claim is. unliquidated is, to say the least, a controversial question and one which ought not to be determined upon an ex parte petition.
The Supreme Court in Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, at page 258, 45 S. Ct. 73, 78, 69 L.Ed. 265, said: “Generally, interest is not allowed upon unliquidated damages. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 653, 20 L.Ed. 860. But when necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or its equivalent as an element of damages. See Bernhard v. Rochester German Insurance Co., 79 Conn. 388, 397, 65 A. 134, 8 Ann. Cas. 298; Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126, 4 N.E. 620; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 262, 118 N.E. 609; De La Rama v. De La Rama, 241 U.S. 154, 159, 160, 36 S.Ct. 518, 60 L.Ed. 932; The Paquets Habana, 189 U.S. 453, 467, 23 S.Ct. 593, 47 L.Ed. 900; Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U.S. 456, 467, 16 S.Ct. 1082, 41 L.Ed. 225; Demotte v. Whybrow (C.C.A.) 263 F. 366, 368.”
In Concordia Ins. Co. v. School District, 282 U.S. 545, at page 554, 51 S. Ct. 275, 278, 75 L.Ed. 528, the court said: “In the absence of an authoritative state decision to the contrary, there was nothing in either [of two state statutes] which required the trial court in rendering its judgment to depart from the rale in respect of the allowance of interest which this court had recognized, namely, that, even in a case of unliquidated damages, ‘when necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or its equivalent as an element of damages.’ Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257-259, 45 S.Ct. 73, 78, 69 L.Ed. 265, and cases cited.”
In Nebraska the rule appears to be that in computing unliquidated damages for breach of contract, interest may be included. Parkins v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Neb. 242, 107 N.W. 260.
The contention that there is error in the decree because the legal rate of interest in Nebraska after August. 9, 1933, was 6 per cent, and not 7 per cent, stands in a different situation. Comp. Stat.Neb. § 45-102, as amended by Neb. Laws 1933, c. 84, § 1, reduced the legal rate from 7 per cent, to 6 per cent. A similar reduction in the interest 'on decrees and judgments was made by Neb. Laws 1933, c. 85, § 1, amending Comp. Stat.Neb. § 45-103. Whether this was called to the attention of the court below may be doubted, but it is clear that there was1 error in including interest at the rate of 7 per cent, after August 9, 1933, the effective date of the amendments. Since the case was tried in equity and it was for this court to say whether the decree appealed from should be modified, we think that we may, in the interests of justice, even now order the correction of a plain error called to our attention and about which there can be no controversy.
*251In computing damages to September 5, 1935, the date of the decree, the court below should not have included more than 6 per cent, interest after August 9, 1933, and should have provided for only 6 per cent, interest after the date of the decree. The, mandate of this court will be that the decree be modified accordingly, and, as so modified, affirmed.
The petition for rehearing is denied.