Court Opinion

ID: 9394653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 00:00:45.152586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.481499
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30625      Document: 00516751526         Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/15/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                 ____________                                     Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                   No. 21-30625                             May 15, 2023
                                 ____________                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk
   Percy Taylor,

                                                              Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   James LeBlanc, Secretary,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 3:21-CV-72
                   ______________________________

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
          We withdraw our prior opinion in this case, Taylor v. LeBlanc, 60 F.4th
   246 (5th Cir. 2023), and substitute the following in its place.
                                        ***
          The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive
   any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
   Const. amend. XIV. § 1.          So it should go without saying that the
   government cannot hold a prisoner without the legal authority to do so, for
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   that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due process of
   law.” Id.
          Consistent with these principles, “[o]ur precedent establishes that a
   jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”
   Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “Detention of a prisoner
   thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially
   valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”
   Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).
          The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections recently
   conducted a study that uncovered a substantial number of inmates who were
   detained long past the expiration of their sentences. See Crittindon v.
   LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2022). Many inmates are detained in jail
   during trial or sentencing, and then transferred to the Department to serve
   the rest of their sentence in prison. But the study discovered that some local
   jails in Louisiana were often slow to communicate with the Department. As
   a result, some inmates would not get credit for their jailtime in a timely
   manner, and would therefore remain in prison past the length of their
   sentences.
          Percy Taylor was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence, but
   for a different reason: Department officials gave him credit for time served
   in pre-trial detention, but only for one (rather than both) of his two
   consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law then in
   effect. But Taylor was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at
   the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer
   than he should have.
          After his release, Taylor brought suit against various Louisiana
   officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns
   only one of those claims: Taylor’s claim against the head of the Department,

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   Secretary James LeBlanc. LeBlanc appeals the denial of qualified immunity
   arguing, inter alia, that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light
   of clearly established law.
          The right to timely release is clearly established. But Taylor does not
   show how LeBlanc’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
   established law. Taylor contends that LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable
   because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney.
   But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by
   a member of the bar. Accordingly, we reverse.
                                           I.
          For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in
   Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
   (2009).
          Taylor was imprisoned for a Louisiana felony conviction. He was later
   released on parole for good behavior.
          While on parole, Taylor was arrested, detained pending trial, and
   eventually convicted on another felony offense. His parole for his first
   offense was revoked, and he was additionally sentenced to a second,
   consecutive term of imprisonment.
          Eventually Taylor calculated his release date and believed it should
   have been at least two years earlier than the release date specified in his file.
   So he filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure grievance. He argued he
   should’ve received overlapping credit on both of his sentences for the time
   he spent in pre-trial detention for his second sentence. And he argued his
   parole should have been deemed revoked as of his arrest on the second
   offense rather than his conviction. A non-attorney Department employee

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   denied the grievance, seemingly misunderstanding Taylor’s request as one
   for certain good time credit he wasn’t entitled to.
          Taylor appealed unsuccessfully. The denial explained that, under a
   law enacted after Taylor’s second conviction and sentencing, the time Taylor
   spent in pre-trial detention for the second offense could not also be credited
   toward his sentence on the first offense. See La. Code Crim. Proc. art.
   880(E). It noted that overlapping credits are prohibited when the sentences
   are consecutively, rather than concurrently, imposed. See id. at 880(B).
          Taylor sought review from the state district court. A commissioner of
   the state district court issued a report recommending that the court grant the
   petition for review, but not that Taylor be immediately released. According
   to the report, Taylor should have received credit for jail time starting from
   the arrest on the second offense on both sentences. That’s because the
   version of the relevant state law in effect when Taylor’s parole was revoked
   and he was convicted of the second offense didn’t expressly prohibit
   overlapping jail credits for consecutive sentences. The state district court
   adopted the recommendation and ordered Taylor’s master prison record be
   recalculated to give credit for jail time as to both sentences.
          Taylor was released significantly later than the date he alleges he
   should have been released.
          Taylor sued, bringing various claims seeking damages for false
   imprisonment—including a § 1983 claim against LeBlanc. The operative
   complaint alleged, inter alia, that LeBlanc—a final policymaker—failed to
   initiate policies ensuring inmates’ timely releases, that he failed to train or
   supervise employees carrying out the Administrative Remedy Procedure
   process, and that he was aware that inmates were held for longer than their
   sentences due to reports, public statements, and various cases documenting

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   instances of inmates being detained beyond their sentences. The district
   court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
           Relevant here, the district court denied the motion as to the claim
   against LeBlanc, finding that he wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity. The
   district court found that Taylor sufficiently alleged a pattern of overdetention
   stemming from inadequate training, noting that the allegations included
   citations to various cases, reports, and statements suggesting LeBlanc “was
   aware of similar constitutional violations but failed to correct them.”
           LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity. 1
                                                II.
           “Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review
   orders denying qualified immunity.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310
   (5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
   dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, accepting as true all well-pleaded
   facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
   Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
           “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
   from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
           _____________________
           1
              Taylor argues that the district court shouldn’t have dismissed the other claims.
   We lack jurisdiction to review those dismissals on interlocutory appeal. This court has
   jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court. Tracy v. Lumpkin, 43 F.4th 473, 475
   (5th Cir. 2022). But the collateral-order doctrine presents a “narrow” exception to that
   principle. Id. Under the collateral-order doctrine, “non-final orders are immediately
   appealable if they: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an
   important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) are effectively
   unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). Taylor’s remaining
   claims don’t fall within this exception. Nor does pendant jurisdiction exist, because those
   other claims are not “inextricably intertwined” with the denial of qualified immunity for
   Secretary LeBlanc. Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir.
   2014).

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   established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
   would have known.”        Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
   (quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
   unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
   plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
   objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
   violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We are free to decide which prong of the
   qualified immunity analysis to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242
   (“[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best
   position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
   fair and efficient disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
          It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
   from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
   F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. But Taylor must also show how
   Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
   established law at the time of the violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445.
          The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that “[w]hether an
   official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an
   allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal
   reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
   clearly established at the time it was taken.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565
   U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (cleaned up, emphasis added).
          So a plaintiff must show that “the conduct of the defendants was
   objectively unreasonable in the light of . . . clearly established law.” Hare v.
   City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
   See also, e.g., Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2021) (defendant
   “is entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions were objectively
   unreasonable in light of clearly established law”) (quotations omitted); Blake

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   v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (qualified immunity turns on
   whether defendant’s conduct is “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
   established law”); Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (same).
          But the objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official
   action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
   has previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing
   law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
   (2002) (citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id.
   at 739–41.
                                           III.
          Department officials declined to apply Taylor’s pre-trial detention
   credits on both of his consecutive sentences. That was correct under current
   law. See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 880(B). But it was wrong here,
   because Taylor’s release date should have been governed by the law
   applicable at the time of his sentence, which allowed Taylor to apply his
   credits to both of his sentences.
          This appeal, however, does not concern the conduct of lower-level
   officials at the Department. Rather, the question before us is whether
   LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable in how he supervised the entire
   Department.
          Taylor contends that LeBlanc should have delegated the calculation
   of release dates to lawyers rather than non-lawyers—and that his failure to
   do so was objectively unreasonable. But nothing in the Constitution requires
   that these determinations be made by attorneys. At the federal level, pre-
   sentencing reports are routinely conducted by federal probation officers who
   are not lawyers. If that’s objectively reasonable, then it’s hard to say that it

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   was objectively unreasonable for LeBlanc to delegate sentencing calculations
   to non-lawyers as well. We reverse.

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