Court Opinion

ID: 9808671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:46:36.37493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:06.716680
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting. I can not concur in tbe opinion of tbe Court for two reasons. While I am not prepared to say tbat it is reversible error for tbe Judge to tell tbe jury what is tbe punishment of tbe crime, I can not agree with tbe Court tbat tbe jury are entitled to be informed of tbe punishment. Tbe jury have nothing to do with tbe quantum of punishment. Their only province is to determine tbe guilt or innocence of'the accused, leaving tbe question of punishment to be determined by tbe Court, within tbe limitations of law. In fact, I think tbe better practice is not to inform the jury of tbe possible punishment, and this seems to have been tbe idea of tbe Judge below, who says tbat be did so “inadvertently. ”
But to come to tbe vital point: I do not think tbat there was sufficient evidence to go to tbe jury. There is a difference in tbe measure of evidence in civil and criminal cases, arising equally from reason and necessity. The Court cites tbe cases of State v. Neely, 14 N. C., 425, and State v. Massey, *54286 N. C., 658. Tbe former, decided by a divided Court, is distinctly overruled in tbe latter case by a unanimous Court.
I can not better express by own views than by citing from tbe opinion in Massey’s case, where this Court says on page ■660: “In order to convict a defendant on the charge of an assault with intent to commit rape, tbe evidence should show not only an assault, but that tbe defendant intended to gratify bis passion on tbe person of tbe woman, and that he intended to do so at all events, notwithstanding- any resistance on her part (citing authorities). When tbe act of a person may reasonably be attributed to two or more motives, tbe one criminal and 'the other not, tbe humanity of our law will ascribe it to that which is not criminal. ‘It is neither charity nor common sense nor law to infer the worst intent which the facts will admit of. The reverse is the rule of justice and law. If the facts will reasonably admit the inference of an intent, which though immoral is not criminal, we are bound to infer that intent’ (citing State v. Neely, dissenting opinion). Every man is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and it is a well-established rule in criminal ■ cases, that if there is any reasonable hypothesis upon which the circumstances are consistent with the innocence of the - party accused, the Court should instruct the jury to acquit, for the reason the proof fails to sustain the charge. * * * ' There is no evidence in this case, in our opinion, from which a jury might reasonably come to the conclusion that the defendant intended to have carnal knowledge of the person of the prosecutrix at all hazards and against her will. At most, • the circumstances only raised a suspicion of his purpose, and therefore should not have’been left to the consideration of the ."jury.”
I have cited thus fully from Massey’s case because it is the .leading case upon the subject, being a carefully considered *543opmiou by a unanimous of acknowledged learning and sagacity.
In tbe case before ns, there is no evidence whatever that the defendant ever touched the girl, that he ever spoke to her, or that he made any gesture that was in itself either lewd or. obscene. It appears that he might have caught her if he had wished to; and if he did not wish to, he was not guilty. In our abhorrence of the crime with which he is charged, we must no lose sight of the fact that to convict an innocent man of such a crime would be in itself a terrible wrong. Such crimes should be promptly and severely punished, but the accused should be fairly tried. I am in favor of punishing criminals, but not of malcing criminals by assumption of fact or construction of law.
That the defendant is guilty of a simple assault, I do not doubt; but he does not appear to have been guilty of the crime of which he was convicted. What was his motive I do not know. It may have been mere impertinence, or a malicious desire to frighten a child, which we see too often in older persons. Let it be what it may, I can not' distinguish the underlying principles in this case from those in Massey’s case,' and hence I must dissent from the opinion of the Court. I may be wrong, but I can never hope to. have greater learning than Smith, or a more chivalrous appreciation of the highest ideals of womanhood than Ashe and Buffin.
Eueches,, C. J. I concur in the dissenting opinion.