Court Opinion

ID: 9408992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 16:01:16.716797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.225365
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11697     Document: 30-1    Date Filed: 07/14/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                No. 22-11697
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       DEATRI J. LARRY,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01008-TFM-MU
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11697

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Deatri Larry appeals following the district court’s grant of
       summary judgment for the City of Mobile (“the City”) on his race
       discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil
       Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and discrimination and retaliation
       claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
       ment Rights Act (“USERRA”). He argues that the district court
       abused its discretion in excluding Myron King’s declaration pursu-
       ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) based on Larry’s failure to disclose him
       as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 as a person likely to have dis-
       coverable information. He also argues that the declaration would
       have created a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment
       if allowed.
               We review the decision to exclude a witness statement for
       abuse of discretion. Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir.
       2022). A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect
       legal standard, follows improper procedures, or makes ﬁndings of
       fact that are clearly erroneous. Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d
       1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019).
              We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
       de novo. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.
       2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if, construing the evi-
       dence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the movant
       shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the
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       22-11697                Opinion of the Court                          3

       movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1263-64.
       We may aﬃrm summary judgment on any ground supported by
       the record, even if the district court relied on an incorrect ground
       or gave an incorrect reason. Id. at 1264.
               We have held that we will review the district court’s eviden-
       tiary ruling for an abuse of discretion where an appellant argues
       that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law solely based on
       the failure to exclude testimony at trial under Rule 37. Taylor v.
       Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 940 F.3d 582, 591-92 (11th Cir. 2019). Thus
       we construe Larry’s appeal as a challenge to the district court’s or-
       der excluding King’s declaration rather than a challenge to its sum-
       mary judgment order because he does not challenge any facts or
       conclusions the district court made at summary judgment and
       merely argues that exclusion of King’s declaration was fatal to his
       case at summary judgment.
              Rule 26 requires parties to disclose individuals likely to have
       discoverable information in their initial disclosures. Fed. R. Civ. P.
       26(a)(1)(A)(i). Parties are required to supplement incomplete dis-
       closures in a timely manner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
               Rule 37 provides that “[i]f a party fails to provide infor-
       mation or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
       party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply
       evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure
       was substantially justiﬁed or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
       It further provides that “[i]n addition to or instead of this sanction,”
       the court may order payment of reasonable expenses and fees or
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11697

       impose other appropriate sanctions. Id. When reviewing the deci-
       sion to exclude a witness statement, we consider (1) the explanation
       for the failure to disclose the witness, (2) the importance of the tes-
       timony, and (3) the prejudice to the opposing party. Baxter, 54 F.4th
       at 1254.
               In Baxter, we upheld a district court’s decision to exclude a
       witness statement submitted in response to a motion for summary
       judgment by a witness who had not been disclosed under Rule 26.
       Id. at 1252, 1255. We reasoned that the explanation that the witness
       had been disclosed in a related case was insuﬃcient, that the testi-
       mony was unimportant at summary judgment, and that the testi-
       mony would prejudice the opposing party because they would not
       have the opportunity to depose the witness or develop other evi-
       dence. Id. at 1254-55.
               On appeal Larry basically makes two arguments: (1) that the
       district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal
       standard—i.e. an incorrect interpretation of Rule 37; and (2) that
       the district court abused its discretion in weighing the relevant fac-
       tors in evaluating the asserted violation of Rule 37. We address and
       reject each argument in turn.
                                         I.
              Larry argues for the first time on appeal that the district
       court employed an incorrect interpretation of Rule 37. Larry ar-
       gues that the district court erroneously perceived Rule 37 as a man-
       datory and automatic exclusion of the challenged evidence, unless
       Larry could show that his failure to disclose was either substantially
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       22-11697               Opinion of the Court                          5

       justified or harmless. In other words, Larry argues that the district
       court erroneously assumed—once it had found that the Rule 26 vi-
       olation was neither substantially justified nor harmless—that it had
       no discretion to order—instead of exclusion of the evidence—a
       lesser sanction like a continuance to allow the City to depose King.
       For separate and independent reasons, we reject Larry’s new argu-
       ment.
               First, we see no indication in the text of the district court’s
       order, or otherwise in the record, that the district court actually
       thought that it had no discretion to consider a lesser sanction in-
       stead of excluding the evidence. When Larry makes this argument
       for the first time on appeal, he cites only page 5 of the district
       court’s order, Doc. 74. See Larry’s Brief at 13. However, at that
       page 5 the district court merely quotes, verbatim, language from
       Rule 37. The district court does not say that exclusion of the evi-
       dence is mandatory and automatic once it found that the failure to
       disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. And the
       district court makes no mention of any lack of discretion or lesser
       sanctions. Quite inconsistent with any such perception, the district
       court expressly remarked that it would consider curing the viola-
       tion later—if Larry survived summary judgment—by reopening
       discovery. See Doc. 74 at 6. Especially in light of this remark, we
       cannot conclude that the district court actually entertained the in-
       terpretation of Rule 37 that Larry suggests.
            A second reason to reject this new argument is that Larry
       makes this argument for the first time on appeal; he never
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11697

       requested the district court grant a continuance to permit the dep-
       osition of King rather than excluding the evidence; he never re-
       quested the district court impose a lesser sanction even if it found
       Larry’s failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor
       harmless. Thus, Larry did not preserve for appeal a claim of error,
       as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a). And there is no
       plain error under Rule 103(e). It is not plain or obvious whether
       the Eleventh Circuit law provides for a mandatory and automatic
       exclusion if the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified
       nor harmless, or whether our law allows a district court discretion
       to apply a lesser sanction instead of exclusion even under those cir-
       cumstances. See Taylor, 940 F.3d at 603-06 (controlling concurring
       opinion by J. Carnes, J.) (pointing to the conflict in the circuits on
       the issue of whether the exclusion of evidence is mandatory and
       automatic in the absence of substantial justification or harmless-
       ness, and, at 606, “leav[ing] for another day a more dispositive rul-
       ing as to the circumstances under which a litigant’s violation of
       Rule 37(c)(1) should result in automatic exclusion of undisclosed
       evidence.”). Indeed, in Circuitronix, LLC v. Kinwong Elec. (Hong
       Kong) Co., 993 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021), we declined to en-
       tertain this very issue because the litigant had failed to raise the is-
       sue in the district court. We declined to address for the first time
       on appeal such “legal theories and arguments not raised squarely
       before the district court.” Id. at 1308.
                                         II.
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       22-11697               Opinion of the Court                         7

              Having rejected Larry’s first argument, we turn to his sec-
       ond. He argues that the district court abused its discretion in
       weighing the relevant factors—i.e. Larry’s explanation for failure
       to disclose the evidence initially or promptly supplement his initial
       disclosure; the importance of the evidence; and the prejudice to the
       City.
              First, the district court assumed King’s declaration was im-
       portant to Larry’s case because he relied on it in opposing the City’s
       motion for summary judgment. The declaration arguably was im-
       portant to Larry’s case because King stated that he sat in on meet-
       ings where Larry’s complaints were discussed (which may have
       given him personal knowledge); that Larry’s complaints were the
       reason he was not promoted; and that other white employees had
       been given administrative roles, so the City could have done so for
       Larry.
               Second, regardless of the declaration’s importance, the dis-
       trict court did not clearly err in finding that there was not substan-
       tial justification for Larry’s failure to disclose King as a witness.
       Larry argued that he found out about King from Shobe, suggesting
       that was toward the end of discovery. But Shobe was listed in
       Larry’s initial disclosures from July 7, 2020, so he would have
       known about Shobe almost a year before discovery closed on April
       30, 2021. The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-
       ing that Larry did not diligently pursue discovery with respect to
       Shobe, which would have led him to King much earlier. It is clear
       from Larry’s “Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11697

       Declaration of Myron King,” Doc. 60, that Larry had talked to
       Shobe well before discovery ended, but reached out to King only
       later, after Shobe elected not get involved. See Larry’s Response,
       Doc. 60 at 2 (“Counsel for Plaintiff reached out to Mr. Shobe be-
       cause he had reportedly been offered a civilian position with the
       department if he would resign his sworn position as a firefighter.
       Mr. Shobe rejected the offer and took a partial disability retirement.
       Mr. Shobe provided information relating to the offer but later
       elected not to get involved in plaintiff’s litigation, . . . Following up
       on information provided by Mr. Shobe, plaintiff reached out to
       Shobe’s supervisor and ultimately to his former commander, for-
       mer deputy chief Myron King.”). It is clear from Larry’s Response,
       and from the fact that Larry worked there in the same fire depart-
       ment, that Larry knew all along about Shobe, and who his supervi-
       sor and commander (former deputy chief King) were. Moreover,
       Larry had an ongoing obligation to supplement his disclosures. We
       cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in find-
       ing that Larry failed to meet his obligation to supplement in this
       regard. And we know he actually obtained the signed declaration
       from King two weeks before he filed it in support of his defense to
       the City’s motion for summary judgment, thus disclosing King as
       a witness for the first time. We cannot conclude that the district
       court abused its discretion in finding that Larry’s failure to disclose
       King as a witness was not substantially justified.
             Third, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
       King’s declaration did prejudice the City. Larry’s argument that
       King was an employee of the fire department, and therefore known
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       22-11697               Opinion of the Court                          9

       to the City, does carry some weight because the City arguably
       might have known whether King had relevant information. But
       there was no clear error by the district court in finding that the City
       was prejudiced because Larry had the burden of presenting evi-
       dence to show he was entitled relief, which means he was required
       to perform his own discovery to find adequate witnesses. Further,
       Larry responded to the City’s motion for summary judgment with
       King’s declaration a month and a half after discovery closed, which
       prevented the City from deposing King.
              Finally, Larry argues that Taylor indicates that the district
       court had other options rather than excluding King’s declaration.
       Even assuming that to be true, we note initially that Larry never
       suggested to the district court a lesser sanction: he never requested
       the district court reopen discovery rather than striking the evi-
       dence. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
       tion in choosing exclusion rather than a lesser sanction. At that
       point, the court had already extended discovery once, and both par-
       ties had filed briefs for summary judgment. The decision not to
       extend discovery again in the middle of summary judgment does
       not constitute an abuse of discretion.
              AFFIRMED.