Court Opinion

ID: 9419203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:47:38.54741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:02.948058
License: Public Domain

*287Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting:
The jury found from the evidence before it that the railroad had, contrary to the Federal Safety Appliance Act, used cars “not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.” 45 U. S. C. § 2. The trial judge, who alone of the judges in the several proceedings below had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses as well as to observe a coupling apparatus brought into the court room as an exhibit, made it clear that he regarded the evidence as sufficient to support the jury’s verdict both by submitting the issues to it and by denying a new trial. The Circuit Court of Appeals took the same position in its first opinion. 115 F. 2d 317. Solicitude for the right to trial by jury on issues of fact prompted the adoption of the Seventh Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights.1 Respect for the institution of trial by jury should, in my judgment, prompt us to leave undisturbed the jury’s finding in this case that the coupler was defective.
Because it must rely on the written page rather than living words, an appellate court can never fully appreciate the effect of testimony heard by a jury of local citizens. Even in the written record, however, I can find support for the jury’s finding which convinces me that it should stand. The transcript shows the following:
If a pin lifter functions properly, there will be automatic coupling of the cars, making it unnecessary for a workman to go between them. Stewart was an experi*288enced workman. Besides being his duty, it was conducive to his safety for him to' use the pin lifter to bring about coupling. On the day he was found with his arm crushed between the couplers, he had successfully handled the coupling of other cars.
The crew foreman who shortly after the accident undertook the coupling of the particular cars between which Stewart was crushed testified as follows:
“Q. Now, after this accident, when you coupled the cars, which I presume you did, did you couple the cars after the accident?
“A. I did.
“Q. How did you open the knuckle?
“A. I opened it with my hand.
“Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Stogner, if the coupler is working automatically, or the pin lifter, is it necessary to go in between the cars to open with your hands then?
“A. No, sir.”
And in the course of cross examination by the company’s attorney, whose questions indicated he accepted the fact that Stogner had tried without success to use the pin lifter, Stogner was asked: “Now, which knuckle did you try to open, or which pin lifter did you try to use?” His reply — “The one on the north side” — designated the one connected with the coupler which had caused Stewart’s death.
Had Stogner’s attempts with the pin lifter been successful, he would not have had to go between the cars to couple them. But that was what he testified he did after trying to raise the pin lifter. True, Stogner did not say how many attempts he made, nor how much force he applied in the effort. But the jury could reasonably have inferred that the company’s foreman, a worker of many years of experience, applied such force as would have raised a pin lifter which was not defective. Moreover, since there was a statutory duty not to continue using *289this particular pin lifter if it was defective, we can reasonably assume that the railroad’s inspectors made some examination of it. Yet no inspector nor anyone else was called by the railroad to give testimony on the condition of the pin lifter immediately after the accident.2 Under these circumstances, reasonable jurors are not to be denied the right to make inferences which other reasonable people would make: that Stogner tried in the usual way to couple the cars; that his efforts were unsuccessful; and that he was therefore compelled to go between the cars to effect a coupling. And they could therefore have concluded that the pin lifter was defective. The jury’s finding of this fact should not have been disturbed.
Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murpht join in this dissent.

 Amendment VII: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

 Cf. Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 167 N. C. 510, 521, 83 S. E. 762; Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U. S. 379, 383; Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 225-226.