Court Opinion

ID: 9542898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:39:59.429282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:10.957562
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting,
I regret that I must dissent. Our statutes provide that significant impairment of the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the *601wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law is a mitigating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). We have previously held that drug or alcohol intoxication by itself is not a mitigating circumstance. State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 290, 614 P.2d 825, 832, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980). Intoxication is a mitigating circumstance only if the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. Id., see State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 70, 659 P.2d 22, 29, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 3097, 77 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1983); State v. Britson, 130 Ariz. 380, 388, 636 P.2d 628, 636 (1981); State v. Smith, 125 Ariz. 412, 417, 610 P.2d 46, 51 (1980).
We have also held that mental impairment, caused by voluntary intoxication or otherwise, is not an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 48, 659 P.2d 1, 7, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). Neither is the death penalty precluded because the trial court found one mitigating factor and one aggravating factor. We are not required to consider each aggravating and mitigating factor to be of equal significance. State v. Knapp, 125 Ariz. 503, 504, 611 P.2d 90, 91 (1979). More is required than the existence of simply any mitigating factor to preclude the death penalty. Id. Instead, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances must be weighed against each other to determine whether the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-703(E).
I do not agree with the majority that the mitigating circumstance of mental impairment caused by voluntary drug and alcohol intoxication outweighs the aggravating circumstance. I find the cases cited by the majority to be distinguishable from the present case. In State v. Graham, 135 Ariz. 209, 660 P.2d 460 (1983), the defendant not only had a history of drug use and abuse, but he had neurological problems and brain damage as well. Moreover, defendant’s drug abuse problem was not totally self-inflicted. When defendant was seven years old, mental health specialists prescribed drugs to him. Id. at 213, 660 P.2d at 464. As the defendant’s presentence report stated:
Unlike many other defendants who appear before the Court guilty of crimes related to drug abuse, the etiology of the defendant’s drug abuse does not appear to be entirely of his own making. By legal and professional sanction the use of drugs has been an intimate part of the defendant’s life from an early age.
Graham, 135 Ariz. at 213, 660 P.2d at 464.
Unlike the defendant in Graham, Mr. Stevens did not have neurological problems or brain damage nor was his drug abuse created by anything but his own choice.
Similarly, in State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979), the defendant had a pre-existing neurological lesion. A psychiatrist testified that such a lesion would make it difficult for someone with it to undergo normal character development. The psychiatrist also testified that people with such lesions tend to have anti-social or asocial behavior. Id., at 41, 601 P.2d at 1325. Although the murder was committed during a drug deal, the court did not find that drugs impaired Brookover’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Rather, the defendant’s mental impairment was caused by his brain lesion. Accordingly, I find Brookover does not support the majority’s ruling.
I am not convinced that the evidence presented is sufficient to support a finding that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. However, even if I accept the psychiatrist’s testimony that the drugs influenced defendant’s behavior, I do not believe that this mitigating circumstance sufficiently outweighs the aggravating circumstance, and thus I believe the death penalty should be imposed in this case. I do this based not only upon the *602reasoning of the trial court, but also upon review of the record anew in this court. State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 603, 691 P.2d 689, 694 (1984) (in death penalty cases, the Supreme Court independently reviews the record to determine the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the weight to be given to each); State v. Graham, 135 Ariz. 209, 212, 660 P.2d 460, 463 (1983).
I would affirm the trial court.