Court Opinion

ID: 9410458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:05:52.48458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.025810
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0452-MR

BRENDA COMPTON                                                      APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-00066

BODDIE NOELL ENTERPRISES,
INC., D/B/A HARDEE’S
RESTAURANT                                                            APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Brenda Compton appeals from the order granting summary

judgment in favor of Boddie Noell Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Hardee’s Restaurant

(Hardee’s), entered by the Johnson Circuit Court on March 25, 2022. Following a

careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On March 15, 2020, Compton was injured at Hardee’s and thereafter

filed suit on March 12, 2021. Her complaint against Hardee’s was vague and

merely alleged she “encountered an unsafe condition on the premises” which

injured her. Hardee’s mailed a copy of its answer and first set of interrogatories to

Compton’s counsel at the address listed on the complaint – 124 West Court Street,

Prestonsburg, Kentucky. Compton timely filed an answer to the first two

interrogatories, but her answers were neither signed nor verified.

             The trial court scheduled a status conference for June 11, 2021, but

sent a copy of its order to Compton at 214 South Central Avenue, Prestonsburg,

Kentucky. At the status hearing, the trial court entered an order setting trial for

April 25, 2022. A copy of that order was also sent to Compton at 214 South

Central Avenue and returned as undeliverable and unable to forward.

             Hardee’s sent a second set of interrogatories and requests for

production of documents, as well as requests for admission, to Compton at the

address listed in the complaint. After Compton failed to answer, Hardee’s moved

the trial court to compel her answers to interrogatories and requests for production

of documents, as well as to provide a current address because its mail was returned

as undeliverable and unable to forward. The trial court granted the motion and

gave Compton ten days to answer. Although the distribution list included the

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address in the complaint, the envelope containing the order was addressed to 214

South Central Avenue and, again, was returned as undeliverable and unable to

forward.

             Over one month later, Hardee’s moved the trial court for summary

judgment because Compton failed to support – or even fully identify – her claims.

Its motion was mailed to the address listed in the complaint.

             Less than one month later, Compton responded to the motion. The

only additional light she shed on the incident was that she “slipped and fell . . . in

the bathroom” at Hardee’s. Compton claimed she was unaware of the requests for

admission prior to the motion for summary judgment, but she was certainly aware

thereafter as a copy of the requests was attached to that motion. Compton updated

the address in her response to 112 West Court Street, Suite 202, Prestonsburg,

Kentucky.

             A hearing was held the following day, during which the trial court

entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment and giving Compton

ten days to answer all pending discovery. A copy of the order was again

inexplicably sent to the 214 South Central Avenue address and again returned as

undeliverable and unable to forward.

             Nearly two months later, Hardee’s renewed its motion to compel

answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, as well as its

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motion for summary judgment, and mailed these to the updated address. A hearing

was held on March 25, 2022 – one month prior to the date trial was scheduled to

begin – at which the trial court found there was no genuine issue of material fact

and Hardee’s was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The court’s

order was entered the same day, and this appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03.

“[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a

matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce

evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

                An appellate court’s role in reviewing an award of summary judgment

is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material

fact exists, and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary

judgment is reviewed de novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Audubon Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing

Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

             Here, because the trial court granted summary judgment to Hardee’s,

we review the facts in a light most favorable to Compton and resolve all doubts in

her favor. Applying the Steelvest standard, and based on the record, we agree with

the trial court that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we

conclude that summary judgment was proper.

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Compton argues the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment because there was “clear evidence showing that there were issues of

material fact[.]” However, Compton points us to no such evidence. Instead, she

“alleges that there is a genuine issue of material fact that [Hardee’s was] well

aware of” without identifying what that fact was. She further claims despite there

being essentially no discovery undertaken – whether her fault or not – “that does

not preclude that there are material facts at issue[.]”

             In Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2003), the

Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted a burden-shifting approach to premises

liability cases involving injuries to business invitees, such as Compton. Under that

approach, to create a rebuttable presumption sufficient to defeat Hardee’s motion

for summary judgment, Compton was required to show:

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             (1) . . . she had an encounter with a foreign substance or
             other dangerous condition on the business premises; (2)
             the encounter was a substantial factor in causing the
             accident and the customer’s injuries; and (3) by reason of
             the presence of the substance or condition, the business
             premises were not in a reasonably safe condition for the
             use of business invitees. [Lanier, 99 S.W.3d at 435-36.]
             Such proof creates a rebuttable presumption sufficient to
             avoid a summary judgment or directed verdict, id. at 435,
             and “shifts the burden of proving the absence of
             negligence, i.e., the exercise of reasonable care, to the
             party who invited the injured customer to its business
             premises.” Id. at 437.

Martin v. Mekanhart Corp., 113 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Ky. 2003).

             The Supreme Court further observed in Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospital

Management, LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 628-29 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Weidekamp’s

Adm’x v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 159 Ky. 674, 167 S.W. 882, 884 (1914)), when

confronted with a premises liability claim:

             [n]either courts nor juries are authorized to indulge in
             speculation or guesswork as to the cause of accidents;
             there must be some tangible evidence from which it
             may be fairly said what brought about the accident. It
             has long been the rule in this state that no recovery can
             be had in such cases where the evidence is so
             unsatisfactory as to require surmise or speculation as to
             how the injury occurred, and that there will be no
             presumption of negligence.

(Emphasis added.) Moreover, “‘[b]elief’ is not evidence and does not create an

issue of material fact.” Sparks v. Trustguard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Ky.

App. 2012) (citations omitted).

                                        -6-
             In the case herein, there is no evidence or explanation in the record

establishing what Compton believes caused her to slip and fall in the Hardee’s

bathroom. Just as in Phelps, Compton’s “inability to identify the mechanism

which caused her fall is fatal to her premises liability claim.” Phelps, 630 S.W.3d

at 629. “Without some proof or testimony indicating [Hardee’s] failed to discover

an unreasonably dangerous condition and either correct or warn of it, any attempt

to lay blame for [Compton’s] fall is an exercise in surmise and speculation.” Id.

             Furthermore, it is well-established that a “party opposing summary

judgment cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without [offering]

significant evidence.” Wymer v. JH Props., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. 2001).

Compton had over one year to produce evidence and was only one month away

from trial when summary judgment was granted. Due to Compton’s failure to

produce sufficient evidence of negligence, we find no error in the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Johnson

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Wolodymyr Cybriwsky       Christopher L. Rhoads
Prestonsburg, Kentucky    Nathan Lee Bishop
                          Owensboro, Kentucky

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