Court Opinion

ID: 9606348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:17.188011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.186249
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result, but for an entirely different reason than that expressed by the majority of the court. I believe § 33-5-105, W.S.1977, would be constitutional, and I believe it to have been repealed in 1939.
SECTION 33-5-105, W.S.1977 WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
I do not consider In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973) to be conclusive as to the constitutionality of a statute such as § 33-5-105 for two reasons.
First, In Re Griffiths came to the United States Supreme Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a denial by the Superior Court of New Haven County of Griffiths’ application for admission to the bar of New Haven. Based on a state court rule, the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar of New Haven recommended denial of Grif-fiths’ application, and the membership of that bar accepted the recommendation. The original appeal to the Superior Court was from the action of the bar of New Haven County. A Connecticut statute was not involved. In Wyoming, the state bar is an integrated bar, organized and governed by the Supreme Court “as an administrative agency of the supreme court.” Section *1775-2-118, W.S.1977. Application for admission to the state bar is made to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court makes the final decision as to admission and does the act of admission. Disciplinary proceedings are those of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Wyoming State Bar has the characteristic “of being organized by or under the direction of the state, and of being under its direct control; and in effect such bars are governmental bodies.” 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law § 7. Attorneys at law in Wyoming, therefore, come under the rationale of Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979) rather than that of In Re Griffiths, supra.
Second, of the seven supreme court justices on the majority side in the Griffiths case, four joined the two dissenting justices in that case to form the majority in the Foley case, and three joined the same two dissenting justices to form the majority in the Ambach case. As pointed out in the majority opinion in this case, the Griffiths case was not expressly overruled by the Foley and Ambach cases, but the latter two cases reflect a new recognition of the status of citizenship and its attribute of allegiance to this country; and it reflects the recognition of the factor of performance of “governmental functions” and of duties with a “rational relationship of state interests” as a basis for upholding the qualification of citizenship for employment. Implicit in this recognition is the potential to hold that failure to permit the qualification of citizenship for the practice of law not only “denigrates” the legal profession but also “denigrates” the status of allegiance to our nation.
REPEAL OF § 33-5-105, W.S.1977
Section 33-5-105, W.S.1977 provides in part: “No one shall be admitted to the bar of this state who shall not be an adult citizen of the United States * * * It was enacted with substantially this same language in 1899.
It has been said that:
“The practice of law is so intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate the practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of the state government. Indeed, it has been said that the courts have an inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court and to control and supervise the practice of law generally, whether in or out of court. While it is a prerogative of the judicial department to regulate the practice of law, the legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest, but in so doing, it acts in aid of the judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of the courts.” 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law § 2, p. 44.
The Wyoming legislature has always had the posture of “aid” to the judiciary, and it enacted the law previously referred to authorizing the integrated bar. As part of that enactment, the legislature provided that:
“When and as the rules of Court herein authorized shall be prescribed, adopted, and promulgated, all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect to the extent of such conflict.” S.L. of Wyo.1939, Ch. 97, § 2.
Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme Court, sets forth the provisions relative to admission of attorneys to the Wyoming State Bar.
In the language of In Re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wash.2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971), at pp. 260-261:
“The above statutes [requiring United States citizenship for admission to the practice of law] pose no bar to the amendment of Admission to Practice Rules, since they have been impliedly repealed by the State Bar Act of 1933 (Laws of 1933, ch. 94) establishing the integrated bar of this state.” (Footnote omitted and bracketed material supplied.)
# sfe 4c ★ ⅜ ♦
“ * * * The 1933 act contains a general repealer section providing: ‘All acts *178and parts of acts in conflict with this act, or with any rule adopted hereunder, are * * * hereby repealed.’ Although we have held that such language will not, of itself, constitute a repeal by implication [citations omitted], the use of this language by the legislature is clear evidence of its intent that prior legislation on the same subject be superseded and is added indicia of such effect. * * * ”
The enactment of Ch. 97, S.L. of Wyo. 1939 (predecessor to § 5-2-118, W.S.1977) authorizing the integrated bar, coupled with the inherent power of the court to control the admissions to practice of law, Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929); In Re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), impliedly repeal that portion of § 33-5-105, W.S.1977 relative to the requirement of citizenship.
Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court does not contain the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for examination and admission to the bar. It does require a statement in the application for admission of facts “showing that he is a citizen of the United States.” Relator was allowed to take the bar examination. She has stated that she was Canadian born; that she married an American citizen in August 1976; that she immediately began procedures to obtain permanent residence status, a prerequisite to obtaining such citizenship; that she intends to become a citizen and will be eligible for such in 1981; and that she has a child who is a citizen. She graduated from the University of Wyoming. She was allowed to take the bar examination and successfully passed.
For the aforesaid reasons she should be permitted to take the oath as an attorney of the bar of this state.