Court Opinion

ID: 9559483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:30:05.568349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:12.133354
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — The majority, in a well-written opinion, has set forth the historical background of the action for breach of promise to marry. It states the policy reasons for abolishing the action, but chooses to retain its major underpinnings. The sole change is to modify the doctrine to the extent that a plaintiff can no longer recover for loss of expected financial and social position, but may still recover foreseeable special and general damages caused by breach of a defendant's promise to marry.
I believe the change advocated does not go far enough. Motive of the defendant may still, apparently, be considered in assessing damages. Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash. 393, 218 P. 260, 34 A.L.R. 1358 (1923). Where the breach of promise to marry is wanton or deliberate, the effect is to *623allow exemplary damages, contrary to the public policy of our state. Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wn. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976). In Wyman, at page 398, the Court of Appeals abolished the action for alienation of affections of a spouse by an unrelated third person on the ground, among others, that "the element of punishment is so inextricably interwoven into any award of damages for alienation of the affections of a spouse that the true nature of the award is punitive." This is no less true in this case than it was in Wyman. In addition, in 1973 our state adopted a new dissolution of marriage act. RCW 26.09. The establishment of the fact that a marriage is "irretrievably broken" is now a sufficient ground for dissolution, with no finding of fault necessary. The trial judge observed in his memorandum decision on motion to dismiss:
The current public policy expressed in the 1973 Dissolution Act is to disregard fault in the judicial determination of property rights at the dissolution of a marriage. Fault is not to be considered in determining which party shall have the decree. There are no damages as such in a dissolution. Is it not obvious, however, that one of the parties to a dissolution suffers at least as much humiliation, embarrassment, mental suffering and loss of financial expectation and security as does a party to the breakup of an engagement?
It is significant that there was no divorce by judicial decree at common law when the breach of promise action came into being. Tupper v. Tupper, 63 Wn.2d 585. Should not the public policy declared in the divorce statutes be applicable to engagements? I believe it is.
The majority lists the almost uniform criticisms of the action by commentators: "(1) the action is used as an instrument of oppression and blackmail; (2) engaged persons should be allowed to correct their mistakes without fear of publicity and legal compulsion; (3) the action is subject to great abuse at the hands of gullible and sympathetic juries; (4) it is wrong to allow under the guise of contract an action that is essentially tortious and penal in nature ..."
*624I believe these criticisms are sufficient grounds, given the recently enunciated policy of the state in the dissolution of marriage act, to justify our abolition of this now obsolete, judicially created, cause of action.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Utter, J.