Court Opinion

ID: 9387897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 13:06:44.744552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.060896
License: Public Domain

[J-62-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                WESTERN DISTRICT

 LINDSAY FRANCZYK,                                :   No. 11 WAP 2022
                                                  :
                      Appellee                    :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                  :   Superior Court entered September
                                                  :   24, 2021 at No. 1090 WDA 2020,
               v.                                 :   affirming the Order of the Court of
                                                  :   Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                                                  :   entered May 15, 2020 at No. GD-18-
 THE HOME DEPOT, INC. D/B/A HOME                  :   010285.
 DEPOT, PHILIP ROGERS, AND THOMAS                 :
 MASON,                                           :   ARGUED: November 29, 2022
                                                  :
                      Appellants                  :

                                 CONCURRING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                                             DECIDED: APRIL 19, 2023
       The majority holds that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act

(“WCA”), 77 P.S. § 481, precludes Lindsay Franczyk’s civil tort action, in which she

alleged that her employer negligently investigated her work injury by failing to obtain

identification information from the third-party tortfeasor, thereby undermining her ability to

seek relief against that tortfeasor. Interpreting the statutory language of the exclusivity

provision, along with the WCA’s definition of “injury,” the majority concludes that

Franczyk’s claims are barred because the alleged negligent acts arose in the course of

her employment.

       For the reasons set forth infra, I agree with the majority’s holdings in this regard,

as an employer’s negligence in investigating an employee’s work injury generally arises

in the course of employment, as it did here, and the liability of the employer under such

circumstances rests exclusively under the WCA. I write separately, however, as I fear
the majority’s opinion may be interpreted as precluding common law actions, not at issue

here, where the employee alleges that the employer intentionally interfered with the

employee’s statutory right to sue a third-party tortfeasor.

       Like the majority, my analysis begins with the relevant statutory language of the

WCA’s exclusivity provision, which states that the “liability of an employer under this act

shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees . . . in any

action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section

301(c)(1).” Id. § 481(a). Relevant here, Section 301(c)(1) of the WCA, in turn, defines

“injury” and “personal injury” to mean “an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous

physical condition . . . arising in the course of his employment and related thereto.” Id.

§ 411(1). Additionally, the WCA expressly authorizes an employee to commence an

action against a third party who causes the employee injury, while shielding the employer

from liability to the third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity. Id. § 481(b).

       As observed by the majority, this statutory language reflects a legislative

compromise whereby the employer assumes liability for a work injury without fault, but is

granted a certain measure of immunity from liability in tort. The employee benefits from

the prompt payment of compensation, but sacrifices a common law tort action against the

employer for damages for his work-related injuries.

       Keeping in mind this legislative compromise, and acknowledging the broad

statutory language addressing the exclusivity of the WCA, this Court, in Martin v.

Lancaster Battery Co., Inc., 606 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1992), concluded such exclusivity was not

without exception. In Martin, the employee filed a civil tort claim against his employer,

alleging that the employer’s fraudulent misrepresentation of the employee’s blood test

results caused a delay in the employee’s ameliorative treatment and aggravated the

original work injury. In holding that the lawsuit was actionable at common law and not

                              [J-62-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
barred by the exclusivity provision of the WCA, this Court emphasized two components

of the claim that distinguished it from claims recoverable solely under the WCA.

       First, the claim did not seek compensation for the work-related injury itself. Id. at

447. The claim was indisputably related to a work injury to the extent that the relief sought

damages for the aggravation of the original work injury.            Notably, however, the

compensation sought was severable from any workers’ compensation benefits

recoverable as a result of the original work injury.

       Second, the claim alleged intentional employer misconduct that fell outside the

compromise struck by the WCA’s exclusivity clause. This Court reasoned that “when the

Legislature enacted the [WCA] in this Commonwealth, it could not have intended to

insulate employers from liability for the type of flagrant misconduct at issue herein by

limiting liability to the coverage provided by the [WCA].” Id. at 448. We recognized the

“difference between employers who tolerate workplace conditions that will result in a

certain number of injuries or illnesses and those who actively mislead employees already

suffering as the victims of workplace hazards, thereby precluding such employees from

limiting their contact with the hazard and from receiving prompt medical attention and

care.”1 Id. (emphasis original). Because the aggravation of the injury arose from the

employer’s fraudulent misrepresentation of the employee’s blood test results, this Court

concluded that the employee was not limited to the remedies under the WCA, and could

pursue a common law action. Id.

1 This Court in Martin distinguished our prior decision in Poyser v. Newman & Co., 522
A.2d 548 (Pa. 1987), which held that the exclusivity provision precluded an employee’s
action against the employer for a work-related injury caused by the employer’s willful and
wanton disregard for employee safety by fraudulently misrepresenting factory safety
conditions to federal safety inspectors. The Martin Court held that, unlike in Poyser, the
fraudulent misrepresentations before it were made directly to an employee and related to
an aggravation of a work injury. Martin, 606 A.2d at 447.

                              [J-62-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3
       In my view, the instant appeal boils down to whether the exception to the WCA’s

exclusivity rule we recognized in Martin applies where, as here, the common law action

alleged that the employer’s negligent investigation of the work injury impaired the

employee’s right to sue the third-party tortfeasor. The majority essentially finds the Martin

exception inapplicable on two grounds: (1) the nature of the claim alleged (i.e., the

negligence of the employer in investigating the work injury); and (2) the lack of severability

between the work injury and the alleged loss of the third-party claim against the tortfeasor.

       I would resolve this appeal based solely on the first ground, as I agree with the

majority that Martin should not be extended to the circumstances before us where the

common law claims sound in negligence.           The majority, however, also holds that

Franczyk’s common law action does not fall under Martin’s exclusivity exception because

she failed to demonstrate that the alleged loss of a third-party action is “truly separable”

from her work injury, concluding instead that any loss of the claim against the third-party

tortfeasor is inextricably intertwined with the work injury. Majority Opinion at 16. The

majority further highlights difficulties that may arise in proving losses resulting from an

employer’s impairment of an employee’s statutory right to sue a third-party tortfeasor. Id.

at 17-18.

       I distance myself from that portion of the majority opinion, as I find the commentary

unnecessary because the nature of the claims alleged by Franczyk clearly removes this

case from the ambit of Martin’s exclusivity exception. As noted, this case involves mere

allegations of negligence, and does not involve intentional misconduct by the employer

akin to the fraudulent misrepresentation that caused injury to the employee in Martin. In

my view, no further analysis is required.

       My hesitancy to definitively resolve the separability issue also derives from the

realization that, although the legislative compromise leading to the WCA’s exclusivity

                              [J-62-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4
provision causes employees to sacrifice certain common law claims against their

employer, employees do not sacrifice any causes of action against third-party tortfeasors

who either caused or contributed to the work injury. Accordingly, similar to the recognition

in Martin that there is a difference between employers who tolerate workplace conditions

that result in injuries and those who cause injury by fraudulent misrepresentation, in the

appropriate case there may likewise be a distinction between an employer’s negligent

investigation of a work injury, which results in the mere impairment of the employee’s right

to sue a third-party tortfeasor, and an employer’s intentional interference with that right.2

The majority’s finding of non-severability here could be interpretated as foreclosing the

latter common law cause of action as a matter of law.

       Accordingly, I would leave the severability issue for another day in an appeal where

that determination is necessary to the disposition of the case — that is, one in which an

employer’s intentional interference with an employee’s right to sue a third-party tortfeasor

is at issue — and would resolve the instant matter based on the nature of the claim raised.

2  Such scenario might occur where, for example, the employer either intentionally
destroyed or withheld evidence to preclude the employee from filing a third-party
tortfeasor action adverse to the employer’s business interests, or where the employer
intimidated co-employees, causing them not to cooperate or appear as witnesses in the
employee’s third-party tort action.

                              [J-62-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5