Court Opinion

ID: 9607273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:56:58.047776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:20.388593
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissents:
I disagree with the opinion of the majority that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. I would reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it operated to void the proceedings before the Commission.
The judgment of the district court operated to “vacate” the order of the commission. In the course of his ruling, the judge gave reasons for vacating:
“ * * * the commission entertained documentary evidence, held conversations out of the presence of the Complainant, or Plaintiff in this case, who under the law was entitled to a fair hearing before the Commission and that while the matter was under advisement, based upon a record, one of the commissioners discussed this matter with Frank Hays, entertained letters from him pro and con, and thereafter made a finding which is so vague that the Court could not determine from that what charge, if any, he is guilty of; and that the Complainant in this case, Norton C. Conklin, has not had due process of law as provided in the Constitution and under the Civil Service Act, now therefore:
“IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the Order of the State Civil Service Commission be, and hereby is, vacated.”
It is to be noted that the case was not remanded for a new trial or for the entry of appropriate findings. The findings were ordered vacated. The mandate of this Court is a simple affirmance of the action of the district court and the net effect is approval of reinstatement of defendant in error — plaintiff — which was ordered by the district court.
What is the basis for the action of the majority? The opinion discloses that the findings and conclusions are not responsive to the charges and the evidence. The *535Court does not hold that the charges are insufficient in law or that the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to support the charges. It holds that the findings are inadequate. Thus the deficiency is a mere procedural one. Having condemned the findings of the Commission, the case should have been remanded to the district court with instructions to that court to remand the cause to the Civil Service Commission with orders to determine specifically whether the evidence supported the charges, and to enter definite, particular and concrete findings relative to each charge. Or in the alternative the mandate could have directed a new trial or other proceedings consistent with the views expressed.
The applicable Constitutional and statutory provision does not contemplate the procedure followed herein. Art. XII, Sec. 13, provides for dismissals, and requires only that there shall be written charges and a hearing. It declares:
“Persons in the classified service shall hold their respective positions during efficient service and shall be graded and compensated according to standards of efficient service which shall be the same for all persons having like duties. They shall be removed or disciplined only upon written charges, which may be filed by the head of a department or by any citizen of the state, for' failure to comply with such standards, or for the good of the service, to be finally and promptly determined by the commission upon inquiry and after an opportunity to be heard. No person shall be discharged for a political or a religious reason. In cases of emergency or for employment of an essentially temporary character, the commission may authorize temporary employment without a competitive test.”
The statutory provision, C.S.A. 1953, 26-1-4, is in the same language. The grounds for dismissal are declared to be inefficiency or “for the good of the service.” Unquestionably good practice requires written findings, responsive to the charges and the evidence, unequivo*536cally determining whether inefficiency or discharge for the good of the service have been made out. 146 A.L.R. 209. The instant findings fail to do this, and the trial court was justified in ordering that the findings be set aside. But in the absence of a legislative mandate that the charges be voided the appropriate procedure was to send the case back with instructions to correct the administrative mistake, and to supply the omission.
The general rule set forth in 42 Am. Jur. 689, Public Administrative Law, Sec. 248, calls for remand in circumstances like those at bar.
“ * * * the general rule is that the courts, even in the absence of statute, have such power where it is necessary to effectuate the demands of justice, and statutes frequently grant such authority to the courts. The court does not encroach upon the administrative function by such procedure. There is nothing in the principles governing judicial review of administrative acts which precludes the courts from giving an administrative body an opportunity to meet objections to its order by correcting irregularities in procedure, or supplying deficiencies in its record, or making additional findings where these are necessary, or supplying findings validly made in the place of those attacked as invalid. * * * ”
In a recent decision, Board of Commissioners v. Salardino, 136 Colo. 421, 318 P. (2d) 596, we held that the record was inadequate and ordered that the case be remanded:
“There is nothing before us in the present case from which we can determine whether the action of the Board in denying the. license was arbitrary. Such being the case, our decision in Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo. 536, 313 P. (2d) 980, controls, and the trial court should have remanded the matter back to the Board for further proceedings. The following language from Geer v. Presto, supra, is pertinent:
“ ‘Where the findings and determination of the administrative authority [the Board] are so imperfect and *537contradictory as to preclude the trial court from basing a considered judgment thereon, we, being in no better position than the trial judge, have but one course to pursue — we must reverse. * * * Imperfection of the determination of an administrative board which leaves no avenue for the court to take in reviewing the matter, and which furnishes no basis upon which to resolve whether the board may or may not be sustained, requires reversal. * * *
“ ‘ * * * Administrative hearings should be decided according to the evidence and the law. Findings of fact should be sufficient in content to apprise the parties and the reviewing court of the factual basis of the action of the administrative agency, so that the parties and the reviewing tribunal may determine whether the decision has support in the evidence and in the law. * * * ’
“The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to remand the matter to the Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County for hearing on the plaintiff’s application and the taking and recording of all testimony, exhibits, and other evidence in support of the application, together with all testimony, exhibits, and evidence in opposition to the application; for the making of specific findings of fact as the basis of an order granting or denying the license applied for.”
If the majority had ruled the evidence to be insufficient to support the charges, or had agreed with the district court that the defendant in error was deprived of due process, the present mandate would be justified. In Civil Service Commission v. Hoag, 88 Colo. 169, 293 P. 338, this Court upheld a judgment of the district court which judgment voided the order of the Civil Service Commission because the evidence was wholly insufficient to support the charges. Our language in that case shows the contrast between an “insufficiency” case which was there presented and an “administrative nicety” case such as the instant one. We there said:
*538“Undoubtedly, the Civil. Service Commission has the power to adopt standards of efficient service and to remove its employees upon charges of inefficiency being filed and after a hearing, if the evidence supports the charge. Also they may remove ‘for the good of the service’ if written charges are filed, a hearing is had thereon and evidence to support the same is introduced. An order of removal based upon a finding of inefficient service or ‘for the good of the service’ must be supported by evidence sufficient to justify such a determination. If evidence at any such hearing is sufficient to justify the Civil Service Commission in the exercise of its discretionary power of removal, the courts are powerless to interfere with such exercise of discretion. However, where a complaint has been made that no sufficient evidence was introduced to support the charges made, the court undoubtedly has the jurisdiction and power to review such proceedings. Civil Service Com. v. Cummings, 83 Colo. 379, 265 Pac. 687; Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 37 Sup. Ct. 227; McLaughlin v. Mayor of Cambridge, 253 Mass. 193, 148 N.E. 458; Bash v. Allen, 24 Del. 444, 76 Atl. 370; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595.”
Our more recent decision in Commission v. Hazlett, 119 Colo. 173, 201 P. (2d) 616, also recognized that this Court has a limited power to review the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission. We there said:
“It should be observed at the outset that the constitutional provision applicable herein confers upon the Civil Service Commission, and not upon the courts, the exclusive jurisdiction to ascertain the qualifications, fitness and merit of applicants for positions under classified service, and the final determination as to when, under what circumstances, and for what causes those in such service may be removed therefrom.
“The scope of review in certiorari proceedings, and the authority of courts to interfere with the findings of tribunals vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine *539particular issues, have, by a long line of decisions, been judicially defined. We cannot consider herein whether the commission’s findings are right or wrong, substitute our judgment for that of the commission, or interfere in any manner with the commission’s findings if there is any competent evidence to support the same.”
It follows then that judicial review is here limited to a determination of the sufficiency of the charges, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges. If it is concluded that the charges are insufficient in law or that the evidence is legally insufficient, the defect is fatal, and a judgment voiding the proceeding is justified. If, however, it is concluded that the charges and evidence are sufficient but that the findings do not spell out “inefficiency” or “discharge for the good of the service,” the obvious remedy is repair of the findings so as to conform to the charges and the evidence, or in the alternative, a new trial. To my mind, the “repair” order would have been appropriate.
Mr. Justice Sutton has authorized me to say that he joins in the views which are expressed herein.