Court Opinion

ID: 9660594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:16:34.96563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.126074
License: Public Domain

*117Yeager, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the latest opinion adopted in this case in its entirety. I do not dissent from that portion which concludes that on its merits the motion for new trial should be sustained on the ground that this conclusion is incorrect but on the ground that the merits of the motion are not, under the law as it is rather than as the opinion declares it to be,- at this time before this court.
I insist that the opinion in 152 Neb. 39, 40 N. W. 2d 252, is a proper and correct present disposition of the case. The insistence here is based on all of the reasons set forth in that opinion together with other pertinent statutes, legal principles, and section 25-1315.03, R. R. S. 1943, which the latest opinion erroneously says was not given consideration. It is true that section 25-1315.03 is not referred to in the opinion but it does not follow that it was not duly and carefully considered. It was not mentioned but it is obvious that it was carefully considered since the determination is in strict conformity with the mandate of that section.
This latest opinion in 36 paragraphs dealing with the statement of the case and that subject comes to the conclusion that after reversing the judgment notwithstanding the verdict we were in error in remanding the cause for a ruling on the motion for new trial. The basis of the conclusion is, as stated in the ■ opinion, that we failed to give consideration to section 25-1315.03.
In this connection I submit that in all of this there is no analysis of the section on which to base such a conclusion. An examination of the statute furnishes the reason for this failure. A faithful analysis of the provision finds it devoid of any language or reasonable inference to support the conclusions of the majority.
One conclusion drawn in the opinion is directly .contrary to the specific language of the statute. In the opinion it is said: “Clearly section 25-1315.03, R. R. S. 1943, vests the power here on appeal to review the action taken *118by the trial court * * * and to enter here the judgment in favor -of the party who was entitled to the judgment in the trial court.”
The statute provides: “The Supreme Court on appeal * * * may order and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to such judgment.”
While this may not be of grave importance in the light of other considerations it thus early herein demonstrates that the majority opinion fails to comprehend the true nature and quality of the statutory provision.
Before passing on to any analysis of the statutory provisions in the light of their context it is deemed apropos and not impertinent to call attention to- a strange and revolutionary and withal dangerous approach to and arriving at an ascertainment of legislative intent. In the opinion it is said: “However, the. Judicial Council, apparently as the result of their study, caused a significant change to be made therein when the bill was proposed for introduction in our Legislature.” And again: “While our statute was copied in part from the South Dakota act, it is obvious that the Judicial Council and the Legislature intentionally omitted the limiting language quoted, and instead used the much broader language, * * *.”
Viewed from any point this is to say that in statutory interpretation for the purpose of arriving at intent resort at least in part is to be had to the intention of a proponent of legislation, though the proponent is not a part of the legislative machinery. I submit that the voice of the lobbyist has no proper place in the deliberations of this court when it engages in the solemn function of the ascertainment of legislative intent.
One of the conclusions of the majority opinion is that in instances such as is confronting here the Legislature intended to and did abrogate rules reannounced as late as Underwriters Acceptance Corporation v. Dunkin, 152 Neb. 550, 41 N. W. 2d 855, as follows: “A question not presented and ruled on by the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Neither does a motion, which was *119never presented and ruled on below, present anything for review.”
Also a conclusion is that the Legislature intended and did abrogate, again in such instances as this, that body of statutory law and the decisions of this court which make indispensable as a basis for review in this court the filing of a motion for new trial and a ruling thereon by the trial court in cases where the errors complained of depend upon errors of law occurring at the trial and rulings made during the trial. Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N. W. 2d'533.
Neither of these conclusions finds even the remotest basis in these statutory provisions. Clearly inferentially if not indeed specifically the provisions preserve and protect all of the preexisting rights of parties litigant under preexisting statutes and decisions with regard to motions for new trial and motions generally, the foremost of which was to file them and to have them ruled upon first by the trial court.'
It is freely conceded that the Legislature could with perfect propriety dispense with the necessity for a motion for new trial and a ruling thereon as a condition precedent to consideration here on review. It however did not do so. This legislation is not and does not purport to be, if its text is to be given reasonable regard, any restriction, limitation, or extension of the manner, in which motions for new trial as such were to be regarded and treated under preexisting statutes and decisions.
Just what are the contents of these statutory provisions anyway? What functions do they perform? What evils were they designed to correct? The answers to these questions must flow fundamentally from what the Legislature said in coordination with related law on the subject, and not from extraneous discovery of the intent of the Judicial Council.
As is well known and as is pointéd out in the majority opinion in Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N. W. 2d 533, prior to this legislation a district *120court was not authorized to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict except where, upon the statements in the pleadings, one party was entitled by law to a judgment in his favor. If a district court submitted a case to a jury and a verdict was returned sustaining a cause of action, even though there was no evidence to sustain a cause of action and even though a motion for a directed verdict had been made at the close of the trial it could do no more than to sustain a motion for new trial. It could not go back and review the motion for directed verdict and render such judgment as would have been proper before the verdict was returned. Winterson v. Pantel Realty Co., 135 Neb. 472, 282 N. W. 393.
Also prior to this legislation the action of the district court in granting a motion for new trial was not reviewable on appeal unless and until there was a new trial and a verdict adverse to the party against whom the motion for new trial had been sustained. Greenberg v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 695, 35 N. W. 2d 722.
The purpose of the legislation as is disclosed by its context was to permit the trial court, after verdict or if none was returned to review its prior action and to render such judgment as would have been proper on the motion for directed verdict at the time made, and to permit this court to review the ruling or rulings of the district court in this connection, and further to permit this court to review without a retrial the action of the district court in sustaining a motion for new trial. The provision also makes an order overruling a motion for a new trial an appealable' order but this is not new at least when it is coupled with a judgment in conformity therewith.
In other words all that the legislation does in these connections is to extend the powers of the district court and, within the measure outlined, to extend the power of review on appeal. It does not directly or by any quality of inference confer upon this court any power of original action not found in previous legislation.
*121I submit that analysis confirms without peradventure the contentions set forth herein. By section 25-1315.02, if a motion is made for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence in a case and denied, the following, and nothing else, is provided for and from it nothing else may flow: (1) It is to be deemed that the court submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions involved in the motion; (2) within ten days after the verdict the moving party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (3) if there is no verdict such party may move for a judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict; (4) a motion for new trial may be filed with this motion; (5) a motion for new trial may be prayed for in the alternative; (6) if a verdict was returned the court is empowered (a) to allow the judgment to stand, (b) to reopen the judgment and order a new trial, or (c) to direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict- had been directed; and (7) if no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
Section 25-1315.03 contains just two sentences. The first provides only and in simple language that the entry of judgment pursuant to section 25-1315.02 is an appeal-able order; that the granting of a new trial is an appealable order; and that the denial of a new trial is an appealable order.
The second sentence defines and prescribes the limitation upon the power and function of this court when subjects come here on appeal. The terms of this second sentence are likewise simple. Without any confusion or opportunity or occasion for misunderstanding or misinterpretation it says that on review on appeal of a judgment entered, or in an action where no verdict was returned, or -from an order granting a new trial, or from an order denying a new trial, this court may direct judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to such judgment.
*122In re-emphasis of this point already made it is to be observed that at no point in any part of this legislation is the Supreme Court empowered either directly or by reasonable implication to exercise any original jurisdiction with regard to the subjects therein considered. It grants only power to consider specific matters .under appellate jurisdiction and to make direction solely in the light of appellate consideration.
Applied to this case when it came here on appeal this court was empowered only to consider the attack upon the judgment notwithstanding the verdict since that was all that ever was or is before this court. Having found that the judgment was erroneous and could not be sustained this court had power only to reverse the judgment, remand the cause, and give directions to the district court to adjudicate (direct judgment to be entered) upon the record as it stood in the district court after the judgment was reversed, that is to proceed and determine judicially the matters which £tood, in the light of the determination of this court, without decision. The thing which stood without adjudication was the motion for new trial.
That motion stood without decision and moreover under no cited or known rule of law or reason could it have been ruled upon with finality in the absence of an ultimate determination upon'the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict favorably to the plaintiff. The most that could ever have been done was for the district court to have anticipated a possibility that the judgment would be reversed and in that light to have academically and tentatively ruled upon the merits of the motion for new trial. There is nothing in the statute which points to any such procedure.
Attention has been directed to what these statutory provisions do contain. Attention is now directed to fallacious assumptions of their content contained in the majority opinion and some of the reasons why those assumptions ought not to be indulged.
*123The majority opinion assumes that the effect of the sustaining of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and rendition of judgment accordingly was a judgment of dismissal. Not desiring to be technical I shall not voice any disagreement in that respect. However the related assumption that this became in effect a judicial determination upon the motion for new trial adversely to the appellee I cannot so mildly dismiss. The implications of such an assumption are much too startling.
In this case the defendant won completely its lawsuit and by the judgment on its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Upon it no burden remained. The judgment had finality subject only to reversal on review in this court on appeal by the plaintiff. Contrary however to this necessary implication the assumptions of the majority opinion impose the burden upon this defendant of becoming an appellant with the duty to seek a reversal of an adjudication which was never made, an adjudication which was expressly and properly reserved, and moreover one which could not have been made properly and with valid and binding force and effect except in the event of reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict by this court.
An inevitable inference from the assumptions of the majority opinion and the manner in which the subject is treated is that if the trial court had ruled upon the merits of the motion -for new trial the adjudication would have been adverse to the defendant. If this inference is not correct then why did this court require the defendant to appear before this court as appellant on the motion rather than to require the plaintiff to come as appellant to overcome the assignments contained in the motion? .
I submit no such inference may properly flow from the record and the statutory provisions under consideration, and no other statutes and no decision of this court supply a basis for the indulgence of any such inference. *124The motion for new trial contained 36 assignments of error and only one was the same as any assignment contained in the motion for directed verdict. The two motions as this discloses were basically different. Who in this light' can validly infer what the adjudication would have been had one been made?
And yet by the majority opinion in this case the decision is not only inferred but also that it would have been necessarily wrong.
This is the confusion which the majority opinion says that the Legislature sought to impose upon litigants and the legal profession of the state of Nebraska. I am not convinced that any intention to so confuse flows from this legislative expression.
I submit that the original opinion in this case correctly determines the issues involved and that its disposition of the case should not be disturbed.
Boslaugh, J., concurs in this dissent.