Court Opinion

ID: 9752578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:15:59.695262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:17.545391
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result.
This case seeks to define the term needs and welfare of the child and to clarify the procedure under which the trial court considers the needs and welfare of the child where the court has before it a petition to terminate involuntarily parental rights. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 23, § 2511 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
The majority correctly concludes that there is no bright line definition of needs and welfare, and properly notes that the definition of needs and welfare does not and should not encompass the traditional balancing equation associated with the term best interest of the child as used in the context of a custody dispute.
Section 2511 is entitled “Grounds for involuntary termination.” The section is divided into two subsections: (a), the General rule, is subdivided into five paragraphs, each covering different grounds for involuntarily termination; and (b), “Other considerations,” which provides as follows:
(b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent, (emphasis added).
Subsection (a) does not refer to needs and welfare except in paragraph (5). We, therefore, have an interesting configuration of the needs and welfare language. Subsection (b) including needs and welfare language is applicable to sub*478section (a) and subsection (a) needs and welfare language is found only in paragraph (5). In other words, paragraph (5) requires a consideration of needs and welfare twice; once in (a) (5) to determine the initial statutory requisite and if those statutory requisites are satisfied, again under subsection (b) .
Paragraph (5) of subsection (a) in setting forth grounds for involuntary termination provides:
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. (emphasis added).
Initially, we note that the petitioner relied on grounds found in paragraphs (a)(2)1 and (a)(5) of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Paragraph (2) does not provide for a consideration of needs and welfare while paragraph (5) does. I agree with the majority’s analysis of paragraph (a)(2); that the needs and welfare standard of subsection (b) becomes relevant only after the statutory mandate of paragraph (a)(2) have been met. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of paragraph (5) because the majority ignores the needs and welfare language of paragraph (5) which makes consideration of needs and welfare part of the initial statutory requirements.
I would interpret paragraph (5) as requiring the trial court to:
*4791. Determine whether the conditions which led to the removal continue to exist;
2. Determine whether the parent cannot or will not remedy the conditions within a reasonable time;
3. Determine whether the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the condition which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable time; and
4. Determine whether termination of the parental rights will serve the needs and welfare of the child.
I conclude that the reason the legislature included the needs and welfare language in paragraph (5) is because a paragraph (5) petition requires more intense scrutiny by the court than a petition brought under paragraphs (1) through (4). Paragraph (5) parents are ones whose children have already been removed by the state or who have voluntarily ceded their children to the state. Under these circumstances one can assume that prior to the state’s filing the petition for termination the state has had significant contact with the family and its intrusion into the family’s life has been substantial. A situation exists where the power of the state has been already pitted against the family. Given the significant involvement of the state upon paragraph (5) parents the legislature directs that before the statutory requirements of subsection (a) are satisfied the needs and welfare of the child must be considered. This directive places the trial court in the position of putting the brakes on termination of parental rights at an earlier stage of its analysis.
Needs and welfare is not a concept that fosters parental termination. It is a concept that inhibits it. The general scheme of the statute provides that even if all of the statutory requirements are satisfied, the parents’ rights cannot be terminated without the court’s concluding that termination will serve the needs and welfare of the child. Suppose for example that the state has removed a 12-year old child from his home. The state agency brings a timely petition for termination of parental rights. The court finds *480that the situation which caused the removal will never be cured, and therefore the requirements of paragraph (5) are met with the exception of a consideration of the needs and welfare of the child. If the child has siblings in different foster homes, termination will cut him off from contact with them. Under these circumstances, the court might determine that the needs and welfare of the 12-year old child will not be served by termination because continued contact with his siblings and with his family, however fragmented, is desirable. Therefore, considering the needs and welfare of the child, the judge will deny the petition to terminate parental rights.
The question naturally arises of what the legislature meant by directing that needs and welfare of the child be first considered under paragraph (5) and then reconsidered under subsection (b). Subsection (b) is applicable to all five paragraphs of subsection (a). As to paragraph (5), because of the significant state intrusion, I conclude that the legislature directed the trial court first to consider needs and welfare as an initial statutory requirement and then, if the statutory requirement under paragraph (5) is satisfied, to reconsider the child’s needs and welfare under subsection (b). As the state involvement under subsections (a)(1) through (4) is not as intrusive as under paragraph (5), then consideration of needs and welfare are undertaken only after the statutory requirements under subsection (a) are satisfied.
I agree with the majority that in considering needs and welfare, balancing of interests as used in the custody context is totally inappropriate. I emphasize that the rationale behind needs and welfare is to inhibit termination of parental rights, so that parental rights will not be terminated merely because the statutory requirements of subsection (a) are satisfied.
It is difficult to state with precision the meaning of needs and welfare, and clearly to distinguish that phrase from best interests. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has used the phrase best interests in connec*481tion with termination of parental rights. See In re: Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 607, 515 A.2d 883, 892 (1986) (“Judicial inquiry is to be centered on the best interest of the child, rather than the fault of the parent.”); In re: Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287, 298-299, 361 A.2d 294, 300 (1976) (Best interests of child cannot be considered until the statutory requirements for termination have been met.) Where the phrase best interest has been used in prior cases, no case has contemplated a balancing of the pre-adoptive and post-adoptive circumstances.

. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control of subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.