Court Opinion

ID: 9853177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:43:56.875524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:42.125439
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
This is an appeal from the refusal of the trial court to quash a writ of attachment. The facts are not in dispute.
*1008The plaintiff foreclosed a mortgage it held on real estate. On February 6, 1976, the date the judgment of foreclosure was signed, it caused an attachment to.be issued whereby certain personal property of the defendant was seized by the sheriff. The sheriff made the defendant the keeper of the property and allowed him the use thereof. On April 12, 1976, the sheriff’s .sale of the mortgaged property was held, and it resulted in a deficiency judgment against the defendant.
Our statute1 provides as follows:
If it appears from the return of the officer making the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a balance still remains due, judgment therefor must then be docketed by the clerk and execution may be issued for such balance as in other cases; but no general execution shall issue until after the sale of the mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized as aforesaid.
It is thus clear that there was no judgment against the defendants prior to the sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged realty. The defendant claims that the writ of attachment was issued in violation of Rule 64A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is, therefore, invalid because it was issued without prior notice, hearing, or court supervision as required by the rule.
The answer to that claim is that Rule 64A, pertaining to prejudgment writs, was not in existence on February 6, 1976, the date of the issuance of the writ. The rule applicable at that time was Rule 64C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provided:
The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of the complaint, in an action upon a judgment, upon any contract express or implied, or in an action against a nonresident of this state, may have the property of the defendant, not exempt from execution, attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in such action, unless the defendant gives security to pay such judgment as provided in subdivision (f) of this rule, by filing with the court in which the action is pending an affidavit setting forth the following: that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff; specifying the amount thereof as near as may be over and above all legal set-offs and the nature of the indebtedness; that the attachment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the defendant; that the payment of the same has not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or personal property, situate or being in this state, or, if originally so secured, that such security has, without any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom the security was given, become impaired; and alleging, but not in the alternative, any one or more of the following causes for attachment:
* * * * * *
(4) That the defendant has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about to assign, dispose of or conceal, any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors; . . . [Emphasis added.]
The bank’s affidavit that was given as a basis for obtaining the writ stated:
. 5. That the amount of defendant’s Judgment amounts to the sum of $59,996.96 and that only a portion of that amount is entitled to a first lien on the property.
6. That along with other debtors there are judgments totaling in excess of $85,957.54, plus accruing interest at a rate of 8% per annum or greater.
7. That the total judgments are greater than the sums which can reasonably be expected at Sheriff’s Sale and a deficiency Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff will result.
8. That the affiant is informed and does believe that the defendant, Halbert Davis, is about to remove the said property in an attempt to avoid creditors, and that unless a Writ of Attachment issues irreparable damage will result to the plaintiff.
*1009The bank claims that the rule in effect when the attachment was obtained was complied with and that the attachment was, therefore, properly issued. The bank further claims that the rights obtained under the writ would not be affected by a change in the rules.
The fair import of the language of the bank’s affidavit is that the mortgage security has become impaired and that it is not sufficient to cover the amount of the indebtedness to the bank; and that the defendant has disposed of, or is about to dispose of, or conceal his property with the intent to defraud his creditors. Such allegations comply with the requirements of the rule in force at the time of the issuance of the writ. The defendant had permitted over $2,700.00 in accrued taxes to become a prior lien on the mortgaged property, thus impairing its value.
The defendant contends that under the holdings of the United States Supreme Court it is immaterial as to what the law used to be; that a prejudgment taking of personal property is prohibited. That may ,be what the Supreme Court would hold in a case depriving the owner of property without a chance first to be heard; but that is not this case.
Here, the sheriff merely attached the property and left it in the custody of the defendant. The defendant continued to use the property after the attachment in the same way that he used it prior to the attachment. He had ample notice that the property would be sold at a later date and that the proceeds would be applied in satisfaction of his debt if there was a deficiency judgment resulting from the sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged property. In fact, he retained possession until June 29, 1977, when the court ordered him to deliver the property over to the sheriff.
In its rulings, the United States Supreme Court seems to have directed its animus to the state laws insofar as an owner was deprived of custody. Note the language in the case of Fuentes v. Shevin :2
We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor. [Emphasis added.]
The obvious cause for the desire to quash the writ is to allow for intervening rights claimed by relatives of the defendant. The rights of the plaintiff were established as of the date of the writ. If the writ is quashed, then subsequent liens will prevail over that of the plaintiff.
The defendant also attacks the validity of the writ because the sheriff did not file an inventory of the items attached with the court. Since the items were not taken from the possession of the defendant, the fault on the part of the sheriff ought not defeat the lien rights of the plaintiff. The defendant was present when the attachment was made and received a copy of the items which the sheriff attached. There can be no reason for quashing the writ.
The main opinion relies heavily on the Idaho case of Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 544 P.2d 314, 328 (1975) for its position and states that “The Idaho statute interpreted here carries the same proscription as our Rule 64C.” There appears to me to be a great difference between the Idaho statute and our Rule. The statute provides3 that the affidavit must state “that such security . . . has become valueless," before an attachment may be issued where there is security for the debt. Our rule merely provides “ . . . that such security has . . . become impaired; . ” (Emphasis added.)
Under the Idaho law the attachment in the instant matter would be improper; but where it is only necessary to state that the security has become impaired as is the case in Utah the attachment is good. In the instant matter the security had become impaired and the affidavit so stated.
*1010I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. U.C.A., 1953, 78-37-2.

. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).

. Idaho Code, Sec. 8-502.