Court Opinion

ID: 9613685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:19:10.517193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:30.923221
License: Public Domain

*391Felton, J.,
concurring specially. Mrs. Frances Adams, for herself and minor children, filed a claim for compensation for the death of her husband, John Quincy Adams, Jr., allegedly resulting from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by R. S. Kerr & Company. The case was heard by Deputy Director R. 0. Jackson, who issued an order denying compensation. Within seven days from the decision of the deputy director, the claimant filed an appeal to the full board, in which she contended that the evidence was sufficient to sustain an award for her and her children, and alleged that she had discovered a witness who was riding in the automobile in which her husband was riding when he was killed who was in position to testify before the board as to the details of the accident. She also alleged that the evidence was newly discovered, giving her reasons for so alleging. The board set a hearing before it in the following order: “Subject of Review: Claimant is dissatisfied with the award of May 7, 1952, because: ‘That the said C. J. Hudson, who was with Mr. Adams on the night of November 17, 'being the same that the deceased was killed, was actually riding in the automobile and is in a position to testify before this honorable board, to give the board the details of the accident, the location thereof, and other vital and invaluable information, in consideration of an award for Mrs. Adams, etc.’ Review of the above case by the full board will be heard in Room 309 State Building, Atlanta, Georgia, at 9:30 o’clock a. m. on May 26th, 1952. Parties may be represented by attorneys or briefs may be filed. In case there is to be personal representation please notify the board. In case briefs are to be filed the opposing side should be furnished with a copy of brief not later than the day before the date set for review.” The following affidavit by Clyde J. Hudson, Jr. was filed with the board prior to its decision: “I, Clyde J. Hudson, Jr., hereby state and declare that on March 17, 1952, Saturday, at approximately eight-thirty (8:30) p. m., Mr. J. Q. Adams came to my residence in a Plymouth station wagon and asked me if I would go to Macon, Georgia, with him and help him on a job and that he would pay me $1.25 per hour and I told him I would go but I didn’t know anything about the machinery and Mr. Adams told me that I could wash the parts and tools and hand them *392to him as he needed them. I had been trying to get a job with Mr. Adams, foreman for R. S. Kerr & Company, for about two weeks previous to the above date on which he came by for me to help him on the job in Macon, Georgia. At approximately 8:30 p. m. on March 17, 1952, I got in the Plymouth station wagon with Mr. Adams and we proceeded to Macon, Georgia, and at the time of the accident I was in the front seat, asleep, and Mr. Adams was driving. I did not at any time after the accident make any statement to Mrs. Adams as to how the accident occurred.” The full board affirmed the deputy director’s findings. The record shows that no additional testimony was taken or caused to be taken by the full board. The Superior Court of Clayton County affirmed the full board’s award and the claimant excepted.
The vital question in this case is whether the board acted illegally, contrary to law, and in excess of its powers in refusing to receive evidence on appeal to the full board or to cause it to be taken, in addition to that heard by the deputy director, the evidence being that of a witness who the claimant contended would testify that he was in the automobile driven by the alleged deceased employee at the time he was killed and would testify as to facts which would show that the death of the employee arose out of and in the course of employment, as shown by an affidavit of the witness. A decision of this question necessitates a consideration of the provisions of law permitting an appeal to the full board and a review of the decisions on just what kind of review the law contemplated. Code § 114-708 provides: “If an application for review is made to the Department of Industrial Relations within seven days from the date of notice of the award, all of the directors shall review the evidence or, if deemed advisable, as soon as practicable hear the parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses, and shall make an award and file the same in like manner as specified in the foregoing section, together with their rulings of law in.the premises. A copy of the award so made on review shall immediately be sent to the parties at dispute. All of the directors may remand to a single director any case before them for review for the purpose of taking additional evidence; said evidence shall be delivered to all of the directors and it shall be taken *393into account before rendering any decision or award in such case.”
This court has several times held that a review by the full board is a de novo hearing, but it is somewhat inconsistent in its definition of what a de novo hearing is. I do not think there can be any doubt about what a hearing or trial de novo means in a court of law, such as an appeal to a jury in a justice’s court or an appeal from a decision by a court of ordinary to the superior court. The review in such cases is a new hearing and a completely new trial, unaffected in any way by the fact that another trial of the issues has been had. In such a de novo hearing as is above referred to, the parties are not limited or restricted in any way in the introduction of legal evidence. The parties may introduce evidence on the de novo hearing whether it was available on the first trial or not, and regardless of whether it was newly discovered. After careful consideration of the aim and purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, its humanitarian purposes, its intended liberal construction, its avoidance of technical niceties of requirements as to practice and procedure, and its intent to afford parties a full and complete hearing by all three members of the board (except in unusual cases of incapacity or disqualification), I have reached the conclusion that the review by the full board was intended to be a trial de novo in the true and legal sense of the words except that evidence already taken is not required to be taken again. It has already been held that such a review is a de novo hearing to the extent that the board is a fact-finding body and may reverse a deputy or single director on identical evidence if authorized. I would now go a step further and hold that in every particular the review by the full board is a hearing de novo, except that the board itself is not required to take the evidence but may cause it to be done by a director and except evidence already taken is not required to be taken again. The provision in Code (Ann.) § 114-708, to the effect that “all of the directors shall review the evidence or, if deemed advisable, as soon as practicable hear the parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses,” does not mean that the production and introduction of new evidence or different evidence from that before a deputy or single director lies within the discretion of the board. *394That provision refers only to a case where each party has fully presented her, his, or its case and the stenographic record contains all of the evidence in the possession of both parties and there is no intention made known to the board to offer additional evidence. Where such is the case and there is no additional evidence to be introduced at the instance of the parties, the board may pass on the case from the record or it may rehear the parties and witnesses in its discretion, in whole or in part. Where either party has additional evidence of a substantial nature, relevant to a question to be decided, I think it is the duty of the full board on review to admit, hear, and consider such evidence or cause it to be heard by a director. Only by so doing can it give litigants • the full new hearing I believe the law intended. The provision that all the directors may remand a case to a single director does not militate against my conclusion. The board on its own motion may elect to obtain additional evidence by this method or, when parties suggest that they desire to introduce additional evidence on review, the board may elect to obtain it by the alternative method rather than hear it directly from witnesses themselves, but in the latter case the board would be required to obtain the additional evidence. Both this court and the board have by rulings and rules indicated that, before any additional evidence could be considered by the full board on review, the party seeking to produce such evidence would have to virtually comply with the rules of law prescribing the requirements for the obtaining of a new trial at law or in equity on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. This rule is one of the most technical, complicated, arid difficult known to the law, and I do not think that any such strictness was intended to be prerequisite to the production of additional evidence on the trial of a case on review before the full board. This court stated in American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487 (137 S. E. 113), that the board’s rule 26, now rule 25, will be enforced or relaxed within the discretion of the board, without interference by the courts. This statement was obiter dictum, as in that case the commission heard the additional evidence. If there is anything in Southeastern Express Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697 (119 S. E. 39), to the contrary, it should be overruled and disapproved. Division four of the opinion in *395Moody v. Tillman, 45 Ga. App. 84 (163 S. E. 521), and any other cases from this court holding to the same effect on this point should also be overruled.
I concur in the judgment because I am bound by the authoritative rulings in the cases cited in the majority opinion.