Court Opinion

ID: 9529397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:25.238233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:45.900232
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
Section 19 of article VI of the Constitution of California provides: “The court may instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses.” (Emphasis added.) And section 371 of the Probate Code provides “Any issue of fact involving . . . the due execution and attestation of the will, or any other question substantially affecting the validity of the will, must be tried by a jury unless a jury is waived. ...”
The foregoing provisions make it abundantly clear that fact finding in cases involving wills is as essentially the province of a jury as in any other field of the law. I expressed my views in this respect in my dissent in Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 at page 588 [241 P.2d 990], and I cannot refrain from reiterating here that the majority of this court has, in this field of the law probably more than in any other, violated express constitutional and statutory mandates by assuming the role of the fact finder and reversing judgments based upon jury verdicts which have not only been approved by the trial judge but have been affirmed by a unanimous decision of a District Court of Appeal and where this court has been divided on the very issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. In this case, we have 10 jurors rendering a verdict on the issue of undue influence; we have an able and outstanding trial judge denying motions for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial; and three able and eminent jurists of the District Court of Appeal rendering a unanimous decision affirming the judgment (Estate of Welch *(Cal.App.) 261 P.2d 18)—holding the evidence sufficient to establish the issue of undue influence. In addition to the above *182we have Mr. Justice Schauer and myself on this court—a total of six judges in addition to the 10 members of the jury —all of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of undue influence.
It is impossible for me to rationalize or reconcile the position of the majority here with any concept of the well recognized and traditional rule that an issue of fact becomes an issue of law only where the evidence is such that only one conclusion can be reached by reasonable minds. In other words if the evidence is such that reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusion to be reached, the issue is one of fact and not law, and an appellate court is bound by the determination of the trier of fact. I say that I cannot rationalize or reconcile the position of the majority in this case with such a rule when we have 10 jurors and six judges taking the position that there is sufficient evidence that the will and codicil were procured, by undue influence, and only five justices of this court taking the position that there is no substantial evidence to this effect.
I think it is time that this court should speak more frankly in cases of this character and honestly state the basis for its refusal to recognize the well settled and traditional rule with respect to the question of when there is an issue of fact to be determined. In the case at bar it is obvious that the majority of this court has weighed the evidence and come to the conclusion that it is insufficient to support a finding of undue influence. In so doing the majority has violated the Constitution of this state in depriving the litigants in this case of their right to a trial .by jury.' The majority has done this by substituting its view as to the weight of the evidence for that-of the jury, the trial judge, the three members of the District Court of Appeal and' two members of this court. There is no question in my mind but that the majority decision in this case is based solely upon the view that it and not the jury or the trial judge should determine factual issues in cases of this character. This view is in direct conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state, and in my opinion a judge of this court who concurs in such a decision is violating his oath of office.’
' To say that there is no evidence of undue influence exercised by the proponent of the will and codicil over the testatrix in this case is shocking to my sensibilities. The evidence shows that when Arthur returned after the death of Myrtle’s husband she had made up her mind to sell her home and live *183with her sister Geraldine. Arthur told her she should not do so. At that time he said to her, “Myrtle, now that Fred is gone, you will have to make out a new will, and if you will everything you have to me, I will will everything I have to you.” He then told Geraldine to “Take your things and get out of here. I am going to stay with Myrtle. ’ ’ He then lived with Myrtle and kept her under his surveillance and refused to permit any of her relatives to visit her. She made a will in accordance with his demands within three weeks thereafter. He continued to live with her and keep her under his surveillance for approximately two years and then she executed a codicil naming him as executor without bonds. He permitted her to lie in a filthy bed without medical or nursing care when she was sick and dying and would not permit her relatives to visit her. To say that an inference of undue influence could not be drawn from such conduct is to disregard that which any fair and reasonable minded person would be justified in concluding if he believed the evidence on behalf of contestants.
To my mind the evidence of undue influence in this case is overwhelming, and the reversal of the judgment denying probate to the will and codicil here involved will result in a rank miscarriage of justice. I would therefore affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

A bearing was granted by the Supreme Court on November 19, 1953.