Court Opinion

ID: 3197557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-04-25 20:18:31.287896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:12.161250
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            NO. 73500-4-1                                    o
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TANIS COLEMAN,                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION                    ZK
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(1999). A party's lack of preparation or oversight does not establish good cause. ]d. For
instance, there is no good cause when the State does not diligently compile

documentation or seek a hearing within the 180-day period. State v. Tetreault, 99 Wn.

App 435, 437-38, 998 P.2d 330 (2000). On the other hand, courts have held in
analogous settings that a prosecutor's scheduling conflicts, including a scheduled
vacation or a court's need to attend a judicial conference may constitute good cause to

extend proceedings beyond time limits. C_L State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 200, 110
P.3d 748 (2005) (scheduling conflicts may justify a continuance beyond speedy trial
expiration date); State v. Flinn, 119 Wn.App. 232, 246-47, 80 P.3d 171 (2003) (annual
judicial conferences may justify trial extension under speedy trial rules); State v.
Williams, 104 Wn. App. 516, 522, 17 P.3d 648 (2001) (prosecutor's scheduling conflicts

may constitute unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances warranting trial extension
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No. 71155-5-1/5

under speedy trial rules). We review a court's decision to extend sentencing beyond a

statutory time limit for abuse of discretion. State v. Roberts, 77 Wn. App. 678, 685, 894

P.2d 1340 (1995)("trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there is good

cause to postpone sentencing" beyond 40-day time limit).

        Here, Coleman contends the "good cause" found by the court at the initial restitution

hearing on April 10, 2015 was insufficient. He maintains, and we concur, that mere

commencement of the restitution hearing did not toll or extend the 180-day period.1

He also contends that the court's continuance of the April 10 hearing to a date within the

180-day period did not alter the expiration date for the 180-day period or justify the court's

April 17 continuance for entry of findings beyond the 180-day period. The State responds

that the court's April 10 continuance and finding of good cause, which were based in part

on witness unavailability and the defense's "late argument," "tolled" the 180-day period for

the length of the continuance. VRP (04/10/15) at 11

        Neither party provides authority or statutory analysis addressing whether the

180-day period can be "tolled" by a continuance ordered and completed within the 180-

day period. And even assuming the continuance from April 10 to April 17 somehow

tolled the 180-day period for one week, the 180-day expiration date would have reset to

April 29—still several days shy of the court's May 1 order determining restitution. In any

event, we need not resolve these issues because we conclude the court had good

cause at the April 17 hearing to continue the proceeding beyond the 180-day limit.

         1We note that contrary to the trial court's impression, nothing in RCW 9.94A.753(1) indicates that
starting a restitution hearing within the 180-day period tolls or satisfies the 180-day requirement. The
statute plainly requires courts to "determine" the amount of restitution within 180 days, not merely
commence a hearing within that time.
No. 71155-5-1/6

      As the State points out, it is clear from the transcript of the April 17 hearing that

the court extended the proceedings beyond the 180-day time limit due to the

unavailability of counsel and the court. The prosecutor was leaving town the following

day and returning after expiration of the 180-day period. Defense counsel was leaving

for four days on the day the prosecutor returned, and the court had a conflict with a

judicial conference. In order to accommodate these obligations, the court ruled that

counsel could file proposed findings when they returned after expiration of the 180-day

period. Nothing in the record indicates that this continuance was due to a party's lack of

preparation, diligence, or other self-created hardship. Given the obligations of the

parties and the court, and considering that the hearing was essentially finished except

for the parties proposed findings and the court's written ruling, there was good cause to

continue the matter beyond the 180-day time limit. The court did not abuse its discretion

or exceed its authority.

       Citing Tetreault, Coleman contends the court "failed to exercise its discretion in

extending the 180-day deadline because itfailed to consider any of the factors

discussed in Tetreault. . ." Appellant's Reply Br. at 2. But nothing in Tetreault or any

authority cited by Coleman requires a court to consider, on the record, the continuance

factors mentioned in Tetreault before delaying a determination of restitution beyond the

180-day limit.

       Coleman also states in conclusory fashion that "the court did not mention the

words 'good cause'" when, after learning of counsel's unavailability, it told them they

could file their findings when they returned. App. Reply Br. at 2. But he provides no

authority or analysis requiring a court to make an express finding of good cause. We do

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No. 71155-5-1/7

not consider conclusory arguments unsupported by relevant authority. Cowiche Canyon

Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (arguments not

supported by authority or analysis need not be considered); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d

6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (appellate court need not consider claims that are

insufficiently argued); State v. Rafav. 168 Wn.App. 734, 843, 285 P.3d 83 (2012)

(rejecting claim due to absence of meaningful argument or authority to support

conclusory claim).

       Given our conclusion that the court had good cause to exceed the 180-day time

limit, we need not decide whether the challenged restitution order also fell within the

modification exception to that limit.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR

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