Court Opinion

ID: 9859590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:04:52.897246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:53:44.187774
License: Public Domain

Francis, J.
(concurring). I concur in the conclusion that the circumstances disclosed by the proof justify an inference that the explosion of the bottle resulted proximately from the negligence of the defendant.
However, the court’s opinion is based upon an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which, it is said, “symbolizes a permissible presumption of negligence from the plaintiff’s proof, that is to say, an allowable inference of the defendant’s want of due care where (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the defendant’s exclusive control; * * In this context, I take the reference to exclusive control to relate to the time of the indicated negligence and not to the time of the plaintiff’s injury, because obviously when the explosion occurred the bottle had long since passed out of the defendant’s control. Our cases applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur generally speak in terms of control at the moment of accident. Mumma v. Easton and Amboy Railroad *276Co., 73 N. J. L. 653, 658 (E. & A. 1906). I agree with Dean Prosser that:
“It would be far better, and much confusion would be avoided, if the idea of ‘control’ [as an essential element] were discarded altogether, and we were to say merely that the apparent cause of the accident must be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it.” Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955), 205, 206. (Insertion mine)
Such is the basic thesis of the Appellate Division opinion in this case. 45 N. J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1957). And see, Francois v. American Stores Co., 46 N. J. Super. 394, 397-398 (App. Div. 1957).
Erancis, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Heher, Waoheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Francis—6.
For reversal—Hone.