Court Opinion

ID: 9925313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:02:26.664028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.030732
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 19, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0201
                                _________________________

        Ex parte Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                    (In re: Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton

                                                  v.

               Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson)

                     (Greene Circuit Court: CV-16-900019)

STEWART, Justice.

       Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson ("the defendants")

have petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene
SC-2023-0201

Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment on the basis

that the claims asserted against them by Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton

("the plaintiffs") are barred by State-agent immunity. For the following

reasons, we grant the petition and issue a writ directing the trial court to

enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

                               Background

     The material facts are undisputed. The defendants assert that they

are entitled to State-agent immunity by virtue of their employment with

the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"). At the time of the

incident underlying the plaintiffs' claims, Louie served as the Board's

superintendent, Rice was employed as the Greene County High School

("GCHS") principal, and Goodson was employed as the GCHS vice

principal.

     Ester Eaton began working as a substitute teacher in October 2014,

when she received the Board's approval. On April 7, 2015, Ester was

called to substitute at GCHS. When she arrived, Goodson assigned Ester

to supervise a classroom with both students who had been referred to the

Alternative Program and students who had been assigned to in-school

suspension ("ISS"). ISS was instituted by GCHS officials as an

                                     2
SC-2023-0201

alternative to suspending a student from school. The Alternative

Program served as an alternative-learning placement for 6th- through

12th-grade students in Greene County schools exhibiting disruptive

behaviors or problems associated with certain code-of-conduct violations.

The Board relocated the Alternative Program to GCHS from a different

school in March 2015. Upon the relocation, GCHS officials placed the

Alternative Program students in the classroom previously established for

students assigned to ISS ("the ALT/ISS classroom"). GCHS officials also

routinely used the ALT/ISS classroom as a temporary placement for

students with possible disciplinary violations that GCHS officials had not

yet had the opportunity to address.

     The ALT/ISS classroom was ordinarily supervised by Officer

Stinson, and occasionally by Officer Garner, who were certified police

officers assigned to GCHS as school-resource officers. On April 7, 2015,

Officer Stinson and numerous teachers were absent from GCHS, and

Rice was at a work-related conference in another city. Goodson initially

assigned Officer Garner to supervise the students in the ALT/ISS

classroom; however, Goodson assigned Ester to take over the ALT/ISS-

classroom supervision because he needed Officer Garner's assistance in

                                      3
SC-2023-0201

supervising the hallways in response to threats of impending violence

among multiple male students. Goodson had also requested and received

additional local law-enforcement presence at GCHS to address the

threat.

     T.F. and C.F. are sisters who were in the ALT/ISS classroom on

April 7. Around lunchtime, Goodson placed T.Y. in the ALT/ISS

classroom, as a result of her being tardy to class, until he had the

opportunity to speak with her to obtain more information. Although T.Y.

told Goodson that it was not a good idea to put her in that classroom with

T.F. and C.F., Goodson did not believe that there was a serious potential

for physical violence between those students. 1 When T.Y. entered the

ALT/ISS classroom, she and C.F. had a brief argument. Ester had T.Y.

sit in a chair next to her desk to keep the students separated.

Approximately 20 minutes later, Goodson brought four or five additional

students with whom T.Y. apparently had issues into the ALT/ISS

     1When T.F. and C.F. arrived at GCHS, T.F. told Officer Garner that

she and T.Y. were having issues. Officer Garner advised Goodson, and
Goodson spoke with T.F. and C.F. regarding the issues with T.Y. Goodson
referred all three to the GCHS counselor. The counselor did not report
any concerns to Goodson, and Goodson believed that the situation had
been resolved.
                                   4
SC-2023-0201

classroom. Goodson and Officer Garner checked the ALT/ISS classroom

every three to five minutes while patrolling the hallways, and Ester

never reported any concerns to them.

     At some point, C.F., T.F., and another student, S.W., rushed toward

Ester and T.Y. Ester stood up, and they began striking her in the face

and head. Ester briefly lost consciousness, and she was transported to an

emergency room for treatment. Ester suffered, among other injuries,

severe bruising, swelling in her arm, a torn rotator cuff, and hearing loss

in her right ear.2

     The plaintiffs sued the defendants, asserting claims of negligence;

negligent and wanton hiring, supervision, and training; and loss of

consortium. The plaintiffs alleged, generally, that the defendants had

violated the Board's policies by placing unauthorized students in the

ALT/ISS classroom and by assigning Ester to supervise that classroom.

     The defendants eventually moved for a summary judgment,

asserting, among other grounds, that they were entitled to State-agent

     2Two other female students joined in the attack. It is not clear from

the materials presented with the mandamus petition whether Ester was
the target of the attack or whether she was caught in the middle. It is
also unclear whether T.Y. was attacked.
                                   5
SC-2023-0201

immunity. The defendants supported their motion with deposition

testimony of Louie, Rice, Goodson, and Ester; the plaintiffs' responses to

interrogatories; the incident report made by Ester; and copies of the

pleadings.

     The plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the defendants'

summary-judgment motion in which they argued that the defendants

had failed to follow specific policies and procedures contained in the 2014-

2015 GCHS Faculty Handbook ("the faculty handbook") and the 2014-

2015 Information Guide for Students and Parents ("the information

guide"). To their response, the plaintiffs attached the faculty handbook,

the information guide, and deposition testimony of Ester, Goodson, Rice,

Officer Garner, and Glenda Hodges, a substitute teacher who had

previously supervised students in the Alternative Program.

     Rice testified that the information guide and the faculty handbook

contained guidelines -- not mandatory rules or policies. Goodson's

testimony, likewise, indicated that the provisions in the information

guide allowed room for discretion. Louie testified that the information

guide contained "expectations" that administrators should use to inform

their decisions but that they were permitted to deviate from those

                                     6
SC-2023-0201

expectations if the circumstances warranted. Louie explained that the

administrators are the individuals actually present in the schools and

that they have to have the flexibility to consider the circumstances to

decide the best course of action and consequences.

     Rice, Goodson, and Louie all testified that no policy or rule required

the Alternative Program to be held at a certain location or prevented a

teacher or a substitute teacher from supervising the students in the

Alternative Program or ALT/ISS classroom. In addition, Rice's and

Goodson's testimony indicated that, although Officer Stinson ordinarily

supervised the ALT/ISS classroom and Officer Garner sometimes filled

in, there was no rule or policy requiring a school-resource officer to

supervise the students in the Alternative Program.

     Both Rice's and Goodson's testimony indicated that ISS was an

appropriate disciplinary measure and that it was not in violation of the

provisions in the information guide or the faculty handbook. Rice and

Louie testified that local school administrators are authorized to develop

rules to assist in enforcing the "Student Code of Conduct" section in the

information guide, which provides: "Each classification is followed by a

disciplinary procedure to be implemented by the principal or his or her

                                    7
SC-2023-0201

designees. In addition, [t]he Board … authorizes the administration at

the local school to develop specific, local school rules and regulations

which will assist in enforcing the student Code of Conduct."

     Hodges testified that Ester should not have been assigned to

supervise the ALT/ISS classroom because she was a substitute teacher

and was not "certified." Hodges also testified that the Alternative

Program should be held at a location separate from GCHS. Officer

Garner testified that he was surprised that Goodson had assigned Ester

to supervise the ALT/ISS classroom and that a school-resource officer

should be assigned to supervise that classroom.

     After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for

a summary judgment with regard to the plaintiffs' claims of negligent

and wanton hiring, supervision, and training but denied the defendants'

motion with regard to the plaintiffs' other claims of negligence and loss

of consortium. The defendants timely filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus in this Court.

                          Standard of Review

     A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate method by

which an appellate court may review the denial of a summary-judgment

                                   8
SC-2023-0201

motion based on the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex parte Nall, 879

So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala.

2000)). To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the

petitioner must demonstrate: " '(1) a clear legal right to the order sought;

(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by

a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the

properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823

So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)." Id. at 543.

                                  Discussion

      The test for State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman,

792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)(plurality opinion), which was adopted by the

Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000), provides that a State

agent is entitled to immunity from civil liability for negligence alleged to

have occurred while the State agent was engaged in certain conduct. As

relevant here, a State agent shall be immune if his or her conduct

involved " 'formulating plans, policies, or designs' "; " 'exercising his or her

judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government

[… while] hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising

personnel' "; or " 'exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed

                                       9
SC-2023-0201

by statute, rule, or regulation in … educating students.' " Ex parte Butts,

775 So. 2d at 177-78 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405); see

also § 36-1-12, Ala. Code 1975. "Educating students includes not only

classroom teaching, but also supervising and educating students in all

aspects of the educational process." Ex parte Trottman, 965 So. 2d 780,

783 (Ala. 2007). The State agent's entitlement to immunity can be

defeated in circumstances in which "the State agent acted willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority."

Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).

     A State agent bears the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement

to immunity, and, once entitlement to immunity is shown, the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, an exception to

immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 452. In this case,

there is no dispute that the defendants met their burden of

demonstrating that they were entitled to immunity. The plaintiffs assert,

however, that the defendants were stripped of immunity because they

acted beyond their authority by not following established policies and

procedures contained in the faculty handbook and the information guide.

This Court has acknowledged that a plaintiff may demonstrate that a

                                    10
SC-2023-0201

State agent acted beyond authority by showing that the agent failed " ' "to

discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those

stated on a checklist." ' " Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 452

(quoting Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003),

quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178). Accordingly, we must

determine whether the plaintiffs established, by substantial evidence,

that the defendants violated provisions in the faculty handbook or the

information guide and, if so, whether such provisions qualify as "the type

of 'detailed rules or regulations' that would remove [the defendants']

judgment in the performance of required acts." Ex parte Spivey, 846 So.

2d 322, 333 (Ala. 2002)(citing Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).

     The plaintiffs' claims against the defendants center primarily on

alleged violations of provisions in the information guide. "[T]he threshold

question is whether a rule or directive in" the information guide, or the

faculty handbook, sets "forth a sufficiently specific, mandatory duty

governing the conduct of the [defendants] at issue in this case." Ex parte

Herring, [Ms. SC-2022-0981, Oct. 27, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023).

     The defendants, relying on, among other authorities, Moore v.

Tyson, 333 So. 3d 668 (Ala. 2021), argue that the information guide and

                                    11
SC-2023-0201

the faculty handbook contain general guidelines and not specific rules

that would remove an administrator's discretion. In Moore, the Moores

sued a teacher and a school administrator after their child was injured

when the teacher left the classroom to use the restroom. The Moores

argued that the teacher had acted beyond her authority by violating

provisions related to student supervision contained in the local board of

education's policy manual and certain training videos. The trial court in

that case entered a summary judgment in favor of the teacher and school

administrator based on State-agent immunity. The Moores appealed, and

this Court held that they had not presented any "detailed rule or

regulation that prohibited [the teacher] from leaving the students in her

classroom unattended in order to use the restroom." 333 So. 3d at 676.

This Court further held that the statements in the policy manual and the

training videos indicating that teachers should provide "effective

supervision" were " 'general statements' and '[were] not the type of

"detailed rules or regulations" that would remove [the teacher's]

judgment in the performance of required acts.' " Id. (quoting Ex parte

Spivey, 846 So. 2d at 333, quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at

178).

                                   12
SC-2023-0201

     The plaintiffs assert that Moore is distinguishable because it did

not involve detailed policies or procedures. The plaintiffs assert that this

case involves specific, established rules and policies similar to those

considered in, among other cases, N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561 (Ala.

2011), and Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2008). 3 Caldwell and Ex

parte Yancey do not support the plaintiffs' position because the policies

at issue in those cases explicitly established restrictions on the State

agent's discretion while, in this case, as explained below, the information

guide and faculty handbook do not contain explicit, detailed rules that

the defendants are alleged to have violated.

     The plaintiffs argue that the defendants acted beyond their

authority by violating certain provisions in the information guide related

     3In Caldwell, 77 So. 3d at 569, this Court held that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether a teacher had engaged in conduct
that constituted an explicit violation of school-board policy, thus
precluding a summary judgment, and, in Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d at
307, this Court held that a teacher's conduct was a "clear violation of the
policy set forth in the student handbook, to which [the teacher was]
bound."

                                    13
SC-2023-0201

to the Alternative Program. 4 The "Alternative Program" section in the

information guide provides, in its entirety:

     "The Alternative Program is designed primarily as an
     alternative-learning placement for students who exhibit
     disruptive behavior and/or problems associated with Class III
     Violations. The major goal of the Alternative Program is to
     provide a curriculum designed to meet the individual needs,
     abilities, and interests of students referred for alternative
     placement.

     "The Alternative Program is staffed with certified personnel
     and support staff. Students may be referred to the Alternative
     Program in grades 6-12 or based on extenuating
     circumstances. Acceptance to the Alternative Program is
     based upon the recommendation of the Truancy Officer and
     Supervisor of the Truancy Officer.

     "Parents are responsible for providing daily transportation for
     students admitted to the Alternative Program. A waiver may
     be obtained for special students with documented hardships.

     "Upon successfully completing placement in the Alternative
     Program, the students are placed back into the regular school
     setting and monitored for progress.

     "All students placed in the Alternative Program must abide
     by the policies of the Greene County Board of Education
     including the rules listed in the Student Code of Conduct and

     4With the exception of a few arguments directed specifically against

Rice and Goodson, most of the plaintiffs' arguments are broadly directed
against all the defendants. The plaintiffs do not identify any purported
regulation or policy that Louie, specifically, violated, nor do they explain
how Louie, specifically, acted beyond her authority or otherwise lost her
entitlement to immunity.
                                    14
SC-2023-0201

      additional rules developed specifically to facilitate a speedy
      transition back to the parent school."

      The plaintiffs assert that the Alternative Program is required to be

held in a location separate from GCHS and that that " 'program is to be

staffed with certified personnel and support staff.' " Plaintiffs' brief at 17

(purportedly quoting the information guide). The plaintiffs contend that

the defendants acted beyond their authority by placing the Alternative

Program at GCHS, combining the students in that program with

students assigned to ISS, 5 and placing Ester in the ALT/ISS classroom to

supervise because, they assert, she is a substitute teacher and not

"certified."

      The "Alternative Program" section of the information guide neither

requires the Alternative Program class to be held at a location separate

from GCHS nor requires, or prohibits, a particular physical location for

the program. Likewise, the "Alternative Program" section does not

contain a directive requiring the Alternative Program "to be" staffed with

certified personnel, as the plaintiffs contend. Instead, that section states

      5The plaintiffs assert that Rice, specifically, acted beyond his
authority by combining students from the Alternative Program in the
same classroom with students assigned to ISS.
                                  15
SC-2023-0201

that the program "is staffed with certified personnel and support staff,"

and nothing in that section defines "certified personnel" or addresses

what qualifications "certified personnel" must possess. Certainly,

nothing in the information guide prohibited Goodson from assigning a

substitute teacher like Ester to temporarily supervise the students in the

ALT/ISS classroom to enable the school-resource officer to respond to a

pressing security/safety issue at the school. Indeed, "[t]his is precisely

the type of situation that requires an exercise of discretion, based on the

circumstances as they are known to the [State agent] at that time."

Edwards v. Pearson, 309 So. 3d 1216, 1224 (Ala. 2020)(plurality

opinion)(holding that school bus driver's actions when faced with an

exigent circumstance required the exercise of discretion and, therefore,

were not beyond her authority).

     The plaintiffs also assert that Goodson violated the guidelines

listed in the tardy policy in the information guide by placing T.Y. in ISS.

However, the plaintiffs' argument is based on the faulty premise that

Goodson was disciplining T.Y. by assigning her to ISS. To the contrary,

Goodson testified that, because of the escalating security situation on the

morning of April 7, 2015, he placed T.Y. temporarily in the ALT/ISS

                                    16
SC-2023-0201

classroom so that she could be supervised until he had an opportunity to

discuss the situation with her to determine what discipline, if any, should

be imposed. The plaintiffs have not provided any specific rule or

regulation that prohibited such action under the circumstances faced by

Goodson on April 7, 2015. See Edwards, 309 So. 3d at 1224.

     The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants acted beyond their

authority by implementing and using ISS as a disciplinary measure

because, they assert, there is no authority for the creation or use of ISS

"in the Greene County handbook." 6 Plaintiffs' brief at 21. However, the

"Student Code of Conduct" section in the information guide expressly

provides for the creation of "a disciplinary procedure to be implemented

by the principal or his or her designees. In addition, [t]he Board …

authorizes the administration at the local school to develop specific, local

school rules and regulations which will assist in enforcing the student

Code of Conduct." Moreover, the plaintiffs have not identified a specific,

detailed rule or regulation that they allege prohibited the defendants

from implementing or using ISS. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs have

     6It is not clear whether the plaintiffs' reference to the "Greene
County handbook" is actually a reference to the information guide, the
faculty handbook, or some other source.
                                  17
SC-2023-0201

not identified "a sufficiently specific, mandatory duty governing the

conduct" of any of the defendants, Ex parte Herring, ___ So. 3d at ___,

the plaintiffs have not established that the defendants acted beyond their

authority by implementing and using ISS at GCHS.

     Ultimately, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the information

guide or the faculty handbook -- the only sources of guidelines the

defendants   are   alleged   to     have   violated   --   contain   specific,

nondiscretionary rules or regulations that were required to be strictly

followed by the defendants or that any guidelines in the information

guide or the faculty handbook constituted detailed rules or regulations

removing the defendants' discretion in the performance of their job

functions. See Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d at 333, and Moore, 333 So. 3d

at 676. As a result, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the

defendants acted beyond their authority, and, accordingly, the

defendants' conduct is covered by State-agent immunity.

                                  Conclusion

     Because the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are barred by

State-agent immunity, the defendants have established a " 'clear legal

right' to summary judgments in their favor." Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d

                                     18
SC-2023-0201

at 334 (citing Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 2000)).

Accordingly, we grant the defendants' mandamus petition and issue a

writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor

on all of the plaintiffs' claims.

      PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

      Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Mitchell, and

Cook, JJ., concur.

      Bryan, J., dissents.

                                    19