Court Opinion

ID: 9603332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:05:10.840654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:10.881334
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
with whom CONNOR, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent. While the area/use variance and disjunctive/conjunctive ordinance analyses developed by other jurisdictions and utilized by the majority are instructive, the Juneau ordinance in question presents us with a unique situation, and we must interpret it according to its own terms. It would be helpful to a careful analysis to set forth the relevant ordinance again. Section 49.25.802 of the Ordinances of the City & Borough of Juneau states in pertinent part:
(c) Variances. Where hardships and practical difficulties resulting from peculiarities of a specific property render it difficult to carry out the provisions of this chapter, the board may grant a variance in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this chapter. Such variance may vary any standard requirement or regulation of this chapter after the prescribed hearing and after it is shown that all of the foregoing conditions exist:
(1) Compliance with the strict letter of the restrictions would unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property for a permitted purpose or would render a conformity with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome;
(2) That a grant of the variance applied for would do substantial justice to the applicant as well as to other property owners in the district;
(3) Whether a lesser relaxation than that applied for would give substantial relief to the owner of the property involved and be more consistent with justice to other property owners;
(4) That relief can be granted in such a fashion that the spirit of the ordinance will be observed and public safety and welfare secured;
*637(5) That the authorization of such variance will not be materially detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to nearby property;
(6) The variance does not allow the property to be used for uses not otherwise allowed in the district involved.
This ordinance differs from those governing the decisions of other states in two key respects. First, although it is couched in the conjunctive “hardships and practical difficulties” language, the Juneau ordinance does not modify the word “hardships” with any of the usual adjectives, such as “undue” or “extreme.” Thus, it is more amenable to a single-test construction.1 The application of a unitary standard is supported by A. Rathkopf, who, in his treatise, The Law of Zoning and Planning, observes:
The overlapping of the concepts of practical difficulty and undue hardship in so many factual situations and the lack of real reason for treating the two situations differently, has caused the courts to treat the two terms as if they were synonymous and, in many instances, the enabling acts or ordinances so treat them.
2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 45-20 (2d ed. 1972). That the Juneau ordinance is such an ordinance is illustrated by its second major distinguishing characteristic. Unlike the ordinances governing the cited decisions from other jurisdictions, the ordinance before us codifies six criteria under which area variance applications must be judged, all of which must be present before the variance can be granted.
Section 49.25.802(c) of the ordinance is capable of two constructions. Either the first sentence represents a threshold test for an application which must be met before the six criteria may be applied, or the six criteria define “hardships and practical difficulties resulting from peculiarities of a specific property . . . .” Because there is no language in the ordinance hostile to the latter construction, there are several compelling reasons for adopting it.2 There is no ready definition which can be culled from the cases for the term “hardships and practical difficulties.” The sub-parts of section 49.25.802(c) provide a relatively simple, straightforward definition, which is already in the hands of those responsible for the execution of the ordinance. If the conditions set forth in subsections (1) and (2) are present, I fail to see how “hardships and practical difficulties” could be absent. Finally, the language of subsections (l)-(4) is almost identical to what Rathkopf has advanced as the proper test in area variance cases.3
*638Such a result, in my opinion, is more likely to conform to the intent of the Assembly in drafting the ordinance. The Juneau ordinance provides no mechanism for varying the “use” requirements. It is, of course, much more important that a neighborhood not be adversely affected by inappropriate use of property, than that area requirements for a permitted use be varied. I see no reason to engraft the “extreme” or “unusual” hardships requirements that have historically been required for use variances on the Juneau area variance requirements. The construction of the ordinance here suggested adequately protects the public interest, yet is not so rigid as to make it practically impossible to grant an area variance. There are countless cases involving the need for waivers, such as when a property owner wishes to build a garage and may have to go one foot over the sideline requirement under circumstances which do not adversely affect the public interest at all. ' Area variances of that type would be effectively prohibited under the majority’s strict reading of the variance provision.
I think that Thibodeau presented a threshold case of hardship and practical difficulties. Because the order entered by the superior court directed the Planning Commission to make specific findings regarding the factors set forth in section 49.25.802(c), I would affirm.

. Judge Stewart, in his scholarly opinion, likewise concluded that the terms should be given a single construction.

. A similar result was achieved in Beatrice Block Club Association v. Facen, 40 Mich.App. 372, 198 N.W.2d 828 (Mich.App. 1972), where the court applied the Detroit use variance ordinance. That ordinance, organized similarly to the area variance ordinance before us, contained an introductory statement that variances could be granted if there was “practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship,” followed by three criteria that had to be met. Id. 198 N.W.2d at 831. The court held, “In order for the variance to have been properly granted, unnecessary hardship must appear in the record demonstrating the existence of the three requirements set forth in the ordinance.” Id. at 832.

. Rathkopf concludes:
An analysis of the reported cases in which the emphasis was put upon the aspect of “practical difficulty” indicates that . [t]he questions properly before the board of appeals on an application for a variance from “area restrictions,” as such non-use restrictions have herein been collectively termed, are:
1) Whether compliance with the strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.
2) Whether a grant of the variance applied for would do substantial justice to the applicant as well as to other property owners in the district, or whether a lesser relaxation than that applied for would give substantial relief to the owner of the property involved and be more consistent with justice to other property owners.
3) Whether relief can be granted in such fashion that the spirit of the ordinance will be observed and public safety and welfare secured.
*638In considering these basic questions the Board should take into consideration the nature of the zone in which the property lies, the character of the immediate vicinity and the uses contained therein, whether, if the restriction upon the applicant’s property were removed, such removal would seriously affect such neighboring property and uses; whether, if the restriction is not removed, the restriction would have a tendency to create hardship (to any extent) to the owner in relation to his efforts to make normal improvements in the character of that use of the property which is a permitted use under the use provisions of the ordinance.
2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 45-28 to 29 (2d ed. 1972). It appears likely that the drafters of section 49.25.802(c) read Rathkopf and intended to incorporate his test into the ordinance. The ordinances in the cases cited from other jurisdictions predate even the first edition of Rathkopfs treatise.