Court Opinion

ID: 9679168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:43:11.442986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:10.967678
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which PRICE, J., joined.
“Argot: 1. an idiomatic vocabulary peculiar to a particular class or group of people *466... devised for private communication and identification .... 2. the special vocabulary and idiom of a particular profession or social group.” WebsteR’s ENCYclopedic UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH Language, Gramercy Books, 1989.
Like many groups, the Board of Pardons and Paroles (BPP) appears to have developed an argot that is useful within the confines of intra-panel communication but is counter-productive when used outside of that environment. The plain language used in its communications with applicant is, at best, ambiguous and uninformative, at worst, incorrect and misleading.
There is a legitimate differentiation between mandatory supervision and discretionary mandatory supervision (a legislative oxymoron). The inexact use of the words “eligible” and “ineligible” seem to be producing much of the confusion. If BPP means that an inmate is ineligible for mandatory supervision, but eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision, then its communications with inmates should say so. “[OJffense identified as not eligible for mandatory supervision release by statute” does not convey such a message. An inmate (and many a lawyer) will read such a notation to indicate that BPP is ignorant of the law or the facts. If an inmate’s offense is not listed in Texas Government Code § 508.149, BPP will be thought to be ignorant of the facts. If an inmate’s criminal history does not include an offense listed in Texas Government Code § 508.149, BPP will be thought to be ignorant of the law. Or both.
Coupling “offense identified as not eligible for mandatory supervision by statute” with “offender was denied mandatory supervision by Board of Pardons and Paroles vote and converted to non-mandatory supervision status pursuant to HB 1433” exacerbates the already ineffective communication. If an inmate is not eligible for mandatory supervision, denial of it is superfluous, and the inmate’s status cannot be “converted” to non-mandatory supervision status because he already has that status.
I suspect that such inexact use of language generates a plethora of legal filings, not only in this Court, but also in BPP. The flood of paper might conceivably be stanched by the use of plain, accurate descriptions of actions taken by BPP and removal of notations, such as “HB 1433,” that are vague (HB 1433 from which session?), uninformative, and cryptic for persons such as inmates. For example, the notification to an inmate after a release hearing might be one of the following: “Inmate is ineligible for release on mandatory supervision because of a prior conviction for an offense listed in Texas Government Code § 508.149”; “Inmate is eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision, but has been denied release because the inmate’s accrued good-conduct time does not accurately reflect the inmate’s potential for rehabilitation and the inmate’s release would endanger the public. Texas Government Code § 508.149(b)”; “Inmate has been denied release on discretionary mandatory supervision for the third time and is therefore ineligible for further consideration for such release.”
Given the opacity of the BPP’s communication to applicant, I am unwilling to presume anything about BPP’s intent. I would remand to establish what applicant’s actual status is and, upon return from remand, reconsider the merits of applicant’s complaint.
I respectfully dissent.