Court Opinion

ID: 9733761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:16:47.418223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:26.265542
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The issue posed in this case is whether sec. 943.20(l)(a) sets forth several offenses or one offense.1 The majority holds that the defendant was properly convicted of three counts *172of theft: (1) concealing weapons; (2) transferring two of the weapons to one buyer; and (3) transferring one of the weapons to another buyer. I dissent. I agree with the court of appeals that the defendant should be found guilty of only one count of theft.
In holding that the state may convict the defendant of three crimes, the majority apparently has determined that each verb set forth in the disjunctive in sec. 943.20(l)(a) establishes a separate crime instead of setting forth several ways of committing one crime.2
Under the majority opinion, a person who takes two radios from a shop without paying for them, without the owner's consent and with the intent to keep them, conceals the radios under his coat and then in the trunk of his car, retains possession of the radios using them in his home, and then sells each radio to a different buyer may be found guilty of at least six separate crimes: taking and carrying away; concealing; retaining; using; transferring one radio; and transferring the other radio. Because I can find no legislative basis for this result, and because it violates common sense, I dissent.
This case raises the question of multiplicity — the impermissible charging of one offense in several counts. The precise question here is whether the disjunctive verbs should be interpreted as setting forth several separate offenses or several ways of committing one offense. If the statute sets forth several offenses, then charging several counts under sec. 943.20(1)(a) is not multiplicitous; if, on the other hand, the statute sets forth one offense and lists ways that the offense can be committed, then charging *173multiple counts under sec. 943.20(1)(a) is prohibited as multiplicitous.
To determine whether a statute creates one offense or several offenses, we look to legislative intent.3 The majority correctly acknowledges that the following factors are relevant in determining legislative intent: "(1) the language of the statute; (2) the legislative history and context of the statute; (3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple punishment for the conduct." Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W. 2d 729 (1981). See also State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 338 N.W. 2d 466 (1983).
The majority's analysis of these factors is unpersuasive. Looking at the language of the statute, the majority concludes that the introductory clause of sec. 943.20(1)(a) stating that "whoever does any of the following may be penalized" indicates that the legislature intended each of the verbs set out in sec. 943.20(1)(a) to set forth separate offenses. The statement that "whoever does any of the following may be penalized" is equally consistent with the defendant's argument that the statute sets forth alternative means of committing a single offense as it is with the majority's conclusion. If the language can be read to mean either "multiple offenses" or "a single offense," the string *174of proscribed acts all within the same paragraph (a) supports the defendant's argument that the legislature intended one offense. In Manson v. State, supra 101 Wis. 2d at 422, we acknowledged that the legislature's use of separate paragraphs to proscribe two means of committing robbery seemed to indicate that two separate offenses were contemplated. Since the theft statute sets forth each alternative means in one sentence rather than in separate paragraphs, the inverse implication is applicable. It is reasonable to conclude from the statutory language that the legislature did not establish several crimes in sec. 943.20(l)(a) but merely several ways of committing one crime.
Recognizing that the statutory language is not plain but is ambiguous, the majority goes beyond the language to search for legislative intent in the legislative history. The majority asserts that the legislative history and context of the statute demonstrate that the legislature intended to provide multiple convictions for a larcenous transaction. It is not clear, however, how or why the history cited by the majority supports its conclusions.
The majority opinion explains that in 1955 the legislature consolidated more than 20 statutes relating to larceny in sec. 943.20(1)(a) to clarify and simplify the law of theft. It then refers to sec. 343.19, Stats. 1953, which proscribes concealment of stolen money and goods. Pp. 166-167. The majority does not explain why it refers to sec. 343.19. That section was not incorporated into sec. 943.20(1)(a), but became sec. 943.34, Stats. 1983-84, proscribing receipt of stolen property. See Wis. Legislative Council 1953 Report, vol. 5, sec. 343.29, p. 127. Theft and receipt of stolen property are separate crimes today, and the person who steals the property under sec. 943.20(1) (a) may not also be convicted of receiving it. See State v. Godsey, 272 Wis. 406, 75 N.W.2d 572 (1956); Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin —Part II, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 430, 452-53 (1961).
*175The majority refers next to sec. 343.175(1)(a), Stats. 1953, a statute punishing the unauthorized use of gas and electricity. P. 10. This statute was incorporated in sec. 943.20(1)(a), but the majority does not explain the significance of sec. 343.175(1)(a) to this case. Perhaps the majority is saying that before the 1955 revision a defendant could be convicted twice for the unauthorized use of gas and electricity, once under sec. 343.175(1)(a) and once under another larceny statute, and that after the 1955 statutory consolidation the state should be able to convict the defendant of several offenses. If this is the majority's point, it offers no evidence to support it. Indeed analysis of sec. 343.175(1)(a) indicates that this statute described conduct not necessarily falling within the other larceny statutes. See Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin—Part I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 253, 261 and n. 23 (1960-61).
The majority's last reference is to sec. 343.51(2), Stats. 1953, which proscribed the theft of logs. P. 166. Sec. 343.51(2) became part of sec. 943.20(1)(a). Again it is not clear why the majority discusses this statute. I infer that the majority is trying to say that sec. 343.51 contemplated two offenses — (1) taking, carrying away and otherwise converting logs, and (2) the sale or the disposition of logs— and that after the 1955 statutory consolidation the state should be able to convict the defendant of two offenses, taking and selling.
The majority's reasoning rests on the phrase "either of such offenses" in sec. 343.51(2), quoted at p. 167. The majority states its version of the two offenses without any support. After studying the legislative history of the log law, which dates back to 1855,1 conclude that the reference to two offenses was probably to theft of the logs and to altering log marks, an offense which at one time was a part of sec. 343.51(2) and was later made part of a different *176section. See sec. 353.54, Stats. 1953. Theft of logs and altering log marks are still separate crimes.4
The legislative history recited by the majority does not support the majority's contention that the legislature intended multiple crimes. The legislative history shows that the legislature consolidated many larceny statutes into one statute. The legislature expanded the definition of property subject to theft in sec. 943.20(1)(a) and listed a series of verbs to describe the various ways of misappropriating property, including but not limited to the common law element of trespassory taking.5 There is no evidence that prior to the 1955 revision multiple convictions were permissible under the several statutes that were combined into sec. 943.20(1)(a). I conclude that the legislative history supports the conclusion that the legislature intended sec. 943.20(1)(a) to define one crime, namely misappropriating another person's property, and described several ways of accomplishing that crime.
The final two factors to be considered in determining whether sec. 943.20(1)(a) sets forth separate offenses is the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishment. As we said in State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 34, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980): "A defendant ought not be charged, tried, or convicted for offenses that are substantially alike when they are a part of the same general transaction or episode."
Although the acts proscribed under the statute may be viewed as distinctive, they are also substantially alike in that they all constitute the exercise of unauthorized *177control over another person's property. All the acts are part of the defendant's plan to appropriate property belonging to another. Multiple punishment is inappropriate because the acts appear to be parts of one continuous transaction. Furthermore each act invades the same interest of the victim — namely depriving the victim of the property. These factors point to the conclusion that multiple punishment is not appropriate under sec. 943.20(l)(a).
A final aid to interpreting sec. 943.20(l)(a) is the canon of construction that if there is ambiguity, a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the defendant. State v. Bohacheff, supra 114 Wis. 2d at 417. In the absence of clear legislative intent to establish multiple punishment for each of the acts set forth in sec. 943.20(1)(a)— and the majority cannot point to any such clear legislative intent — the court should hold, as did the court of appeals, that only one conviction is appropriate in this case. This result is fair to the victim, society and the defendant. If the legislature wishes to impose a penalty on a thief for each exercise of unauthorized control over the property, the legislature should expressly state this objective.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Accordingly, I dissent.

 Sec. 943.20(1), Stats. 1983-84, provides as follows:
"943.20 Theft (1) ACTS. Whoever does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (3):
" (a) Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of movable property of another without his consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of such property.
" (b) By virtue of his office ... having possession or custody of money ... intentionally uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of such money....
" (c) Having a legal interest in movable property, intentionally and without consent, takes such property out of the possession of a pledgee....
" (d) Obtains title to property of another by intentionally deceiving him with a false representation....
" (e) Intentionally fails to return any personal property which is in his possession or under his control by virtue of a written lease...."

 In State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 252 N.W.2d 380 (1977), the issue was whether sec. 943.20(1)(a) should be read to require that a theft consists of first a taking from the owner and then an additional act of carrying away, using, transferring, concealing or retaining. The court held that the statute should be read as if "ors" appeared in the statute: takes and carries away, or uses, or transfers, or conceals, or retains. Genova did not raise or answer the question posed in this case.

 The majority discusses the issue of multiplicity in terms of the federal constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy and the Rabe analysis. See p. 161. This discussion is unnecessary. After Rabe the United States Supreme Court held that the dispositive issue in determining whether a court may impose multiple punishments on a defendant in a single trial for violating two statutory provisions (regardless of whether they constitute the same offense) is whether the legislature authorized multiple punishments. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983); State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983). This development of the law was anticipated by this court in State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61-62, n. 7, 291 N.W. 2d 809 (1980). Consequently the only issue that need be discussed is the question of legislative intent.

 See secs. 943.20(1)(a), 943.37, Stats. 1983-84; Wis. Legislative Council 1953 Report, vol. 5, sec. 343.31, pp. 129-130; ch. 263, Laws of 1864; ch. 257, Laws of 1878; ch. 295, Laws of 1880.

 See Wisconsin Legislative Council 1953 Report, vol. 5, pp. 113-115; 2 Model Penal Code, sec. 223.2, pp. 163-66 (1980); Model Penal Code, sec. 206.1, Comment 3, Tentative Draft 2, at 61-62 (1964); Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin — Part I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 252-61 (1960-61).