Court Opinion

ID: 9884872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:20:19.434987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:41.604195
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by JAMES R. EYLER, Judge,
which DAVIS, KENNEY, and DEBORAH S. EYLER, JJ., join.
I respectfully dissent. To help create a mental picture of the scene, to understand the negligent acts of the parties, I shall begin with some general background information.
The following description is derived from appellant’s testimony. The incident occurred on the construction site for a building which, when finished, would house a Safeway store. As is typical in that situation, the work of subcontractors was coordinated, and more than one subcontractor worked on the site at the same time.
During the time period leading up to the day of the incident, appellant’s employer, a plumbing subcontractor, was on the site, and appellee, a masonry subcontractor, was on the site. It is unknown whether other subcontractors were also working on the site. At that time, the building was in its early stages of construction. Concrete footers had been poured, defining the footprint of the building. Cinder blocks had been laid on *177the footers to grade height at some or all of the wall locations. Appellee had erected a three level scaffold from one corner of the building to another corner of the building for the purpose of laying cinder blocks to build a wall to its desired height. Appellant’s employer, including appellant, had finished approximately 50 per cent of the initial, pre-building shell, plumbing work which consisted of trenching, laying pipes, and backfilling to cover the pipes. The pipes were to serve as water supply and drain lines. The ends of the lines at various locations were “stubbed,” meaning that they extended above ground level, to eventually be connected to the internal plumbing of the building, after the pouring of a concrete slab and the erection of the building shell and installation of internal plumbing.
According to appellant, on the day of the incident, he was working in a trench laying pipe approximately 30 to 40 feet from where appellee’s employees were constructing a block wall. The scaffolding was three levels high, but the wall was in its early stages and the masons were working off, or slightly below,3 the first level of the scaffolding, which was 5 to 7 feet in height. Appellant walked to an area near the scaffolding to look for pipe fittings in bins left in that area.
Appellant testified that he saw the forklift in question as it entered the building footprint. He explained that he knew the forklift would deliver materials to the scaffolding for the masons and he knew the path the forklift would take. He knew this because the forklift had to take the same path each time in order to maneuver between the stubbed pipes and other obstructions within the footprint. Appellant testified that he went to the bins and kneeled, approximately 5 to 6 feet from the scaffolding. While there, he knew that the forklift had moved to its destination, approximately 8 to 10 feet behind him, and was unloading its materials. Appellant also *178knew that blocks were on the scaffolding and that masons were working from the scaffolding. According to appellant, there were no obstructions between him and the forklift operator and, therefore, nothing to prevent either one from seeing the other.
Appellant had worked as a plumber for 24 years, mostly commercial plumbing, similar to the job that he was working on at the time of the incident. He stated that it was typical for plumbers and masons to work on a construction site at the same time. Appellant testified that, on construction jobs, a worker typically does not ask another subcontractor’s employee to stop work in order for the worker to get something because each worker is responsible for not putting himself or herself in a dangerous position. He did not think he had put himself in a position of danger, however, because he had been around scaffolds on many occasions and had never seen whole blocks fall. He acknowledged the potential for danger and that pieces of block frequently would fall while masons were working. Appellant did not see what struck him prior to impact. He did not know what caused the blocks to fall.
Hervin Montiel, the forklift operator, testified to the following. He approached the scaffolding with a mortar pan full of mortar to be placed on the first level of the scaffolding. He stopped, approximately 12 feet from the scaffolding, at the location from which he planned to move the boom to which the forks were attached to place the pan. While stopped, he noticed a man walk by, underneath the boom. He waited until the man was 8 to 10 feet away. At that point, he ceased watching the man, concentrated on placing the mortar pan, and did so. After he set the mortar pan on the scaffolding, he heard someone yell. Montiel did not see appellant being struck. When he saw appellant lying on the ground after being hit, appellant was 10 inches from the edge of a hanger which extended approximately two feet from the scaffolding. Montiel did not testify as to how far appellant was from the forklift.
*179Some of the questions Montiel was asked concerned the situation as it existed on the day of the incident; others were general questions, about the usual performance of his work. With respect to the specifics of the day of the incident, Montiel testified that he did not see any broken blocks on the scaffolding. Also, he did not see any blocks fall. Speaking generally, he acknowledged that, when blocks are placed on scaffolding by a forklift, particularly without a pallet, blocks sometimes break. The blocks on the scaffolding in question on the day of the incident were placed there without a pallet, by inserting the forks through the holes in the bottom layer of blocks to be moved. Montiel acknowledged it was possible that broken blocks were on the scaffold. Again speaking generally, he stated that, when a mortar pan is placed on scaffolding, the scaffolding may vibrate, sometimes causing blocks to fall. He also acknowledged that the possibility of blocks falling would be greater if there were broken blocks on the bottom of the stack of blocks. Montiel testified that, after the man walked by, he continued with his work. He did not think the man, appellant, was in a place of danger.
Stephen Fournier, a professional engineer, testified as an expert witness on behalf of appellee.4 On direct examination, Fournier described the situation as it existed leading up to the incident as “normal.” He acknowledged that placing a mortar pan on scaffolding could cause material to fall, including blocks. Speaking generally in terms of what constituted good practice, and not the specifics as they existed at the time, he opined that appellant violated good construction practice by placing himself in an area where there was a potential hazard of falling material.
On cross-examination, Fournier was asked several hypothetical questions. In essence, Fournier testified that, assuming: (1) there were broken blocks on the scaffolding; (2) that they were on the bottom of the stack of blocks; and (3) that placing *180the mortar pan caused vibration, it would create an unstable condition. This possibility would be foreseeable by an experienced worker, including Montiel. Further assuming that Montiel knew appellant’s location and knew that it was a position of danger, then Montiel had a duty to warn appellant and to not proceed with his work.
On redirect examination, Fournier testified that, if Montiel did not know there were broken blocks on the scaffolding and he believed appellant was at least 5 feet from the scaffolding, he could continue with his work. If Montiel subjectively believed that appellant was in a position of danger, Montiel should have stopped until appellant left the position of danger.
The above constitutes the testimony relevant to the issue before us. The jury found that appellee was negligent, appellant was negligent, and that the act of negligence of each was a proximate cause of the incident. The only question before this Court is whether the last clear chance doctrine was applicable on these facts.
In order for last clear chance to apply under Maryland law, there must first have been acts of negligence by both the plaintiff and the defendant, each proximately causing the incident in question. If a defendant is primarily negligent, and a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, the plaintiffs action is barred. That bar does not exist if the defendant committed an act of negligence different from that which resulted in a finding of primary negligence at a point in time after the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent, and the new act of negligence can be said to supersede the plaintiffs act of contributory negligence. Thus, for last clear chance to apply, we have the well settled requirement, acknowledged by the majority, that a defendant must have committed sequential acts of negligence. Burdette v. Rockville Crane Rental, Inc., 130 Md.App. 193, 216, 745 A.2d 457 (2000). The first act gives rise to primary negligence. The second act must occur at a time when the plaintiff can not avoid the accident. See Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 133, 792 A.2d 1102 (2002) (quoting MPJI section 19:12 (2d ed. 1984)). This is sometimes *181referred to as the plaintiff being in a position of helpless peril while the defendant has a fresh opportunity to avoid the accident. Id.
In this case, appellant’s negligence theory rested on a single negligent act: that Montiel placed the mortar pan on the scaffolding, without warning appellee, when he knew or should have known that there were broken blocks on the scaffolding, thus creating an unstable condition, which resulted in a block or blocks falling on appellant. Appellee’s contributory negligence against appellant also rested on a single act of negligence: that he placed himself in a position that he knew or should have known was dangerous and remained there with knowledge of the forklift’s operation. Obviously, the jury found that appellant should have known that he placed himself in a dangerous position and that Montiel should have known the same.
The relevant point is that, while both parties were negligent, the negligent acts were concurrent. The only act of Montiel’s negligence was placing the mortar pan on the scaffolding, when he knew or should have known that it might cause blocks to fall, and that appellant was in a zone of danger.
On appeal, appellant does not argue to the contrary. Indeed, he could not make a contrary argument because no evidence of any other act of negligence was presented. Specifically, the majority’s theory that Montiel may have committed a preliminary separate act of negligence in placing the blocks on the scaffolding, without using a pallet, has not been argued by appellant. The reason for that is clear: it has no support in the record. In fact, the only evidence on that point was that placing the blocks, without a pallet, was normal. A jury finding to the contrary, had it been made, would have been based on pure speculation. At trial, the sole point of the evidence that there was or might have been broken blocks on the bottom of the stack of blocks was to show instability in the stack and to show foreseeability of an accident when the mortar pan was placed on the scaffolding. The majority’s *182theory as to what might have been the evidence, findings, and argument is not this case.5
What appellant does argue on appeal is that the jury could have found that Montiel’s failure to warn was a negligent act separate from his conduct of placing the mortar pan on the scaffold. Certainly, a failure to warn could, depending on the facts, constitute a negligent act separate from another negligent act, but here the negligent act was the conduct in placing the mortar pan while not giving a warning. The warning was not separable from the conduct. A warning would not have sufficed had Montiel continued with his conduct. Montiel should not have proceeded with his work until appellant left the area. It was his conduct that was the negligent act proximately causing damages.
Moreover, even if the failure to warn and placement of the mortar pan could be viewed as two acts, they were contemporaneous acts that continued up to the time of injury and were concurrent with the negligent act of appellant, which also continued up to the time of injury. The evidence indicates that Montiel did not have actual knowledge that broken blocks were on the scaffolding. Montiel thought that he was proceeding safely. He did not subjectively believe that appellant was in danger or that appellant was in a position from which he could not have readily removed himself. Appellant did not subjectively believe that he had placed himself in a position of actual danger; if he had, he could have removed himself. He had actual knowledge of the forklift’s operation. Both parties admitted almost the same awareness of the objective facts, one difference being that Montiel did not acknowledge that he knew appellant’s location just prior to the incident while appellant acknowledged that he knew Montiel’s location.
*183In summary, both parties had the same objective knowledge and the same subjective beliefs. Appellant could have taken himself out of a position of danger at any time. Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, appellant acknowledged greater awareness of the objective facts than did Montiel. Specifically, as mentioned above, appellant acknowledged that he knew the location of the forklift and that it was unloading, while Montiel did not acknowledge that he knew the location of appellant. Each party committed a continuing act of negligence during the same period of time.
Montiel, like the defendants in Sears and Quinn, discussed in the majority’s opinion, assumed that appellant had moved on and was not in a position of danger. Unlike Ritter, relied on by the majority, a case in which the defendant knew the plaintiff was sitting on the hood of the defendant’s car when the defendant moved forward, Montiel did not know appellant was in a position of danger. Montiel should have known. See Benton v. Henry, 241 Md. 32, 215 A.2d 226(1965) (plaintiff negligently jumped on an ice cream truck’s running board; defendant operator of truck negligently failed to detect plaintiffs presence but did not commit a new act of negligence by operating the truck with the plaintiff on the running board). A continuing act of negligence is not a new sequential act. See Myers v. Estate of Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 128-29, 560 A.2d 59(1989) (continued failure to diagnose a disease is not a new act of negligence).
I would affirm the judgment.

. It is clear that cinder blocks and other materials used by the masons were located on the first level. There was testimony that there were "hangers” on the scaffold, lower than the level holding the materials, so that workers could stand on the hangers while laying the blocks. It is unclear where the workers were standing at the time of the incident.

. To understand why Fournier was asked various hypothetical questions, it is helpful to point out (hat no one saw a block fall and hit appellant, nor did anyone offer direct evidence why blocks fell.

. Even if there had been a scintilla of evidence that Montiel negligently placed the blocks on the scaffolding prior to appellant's arrival in the area, the result would be the same. Neither party believed appellant was in peril. Appellant was not helpless and could have removed himself at any time prior to the injury. Montiel had no fresh opportunity to avoid the accident.