Court Opinion

ID: 9572346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:02.322636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:33.304869
License: Public Domain

Justice CARLTON
dissenting.
The most honest statement I can make at the outset is that I am not absolutely certain what group or groups of persons our legislature intended to benefit in enacting G.S. 97-29.1 (1979). However, the majority has not convinced me that the group to which Mrs. Taylor belongs should be omitted from the statute’s reach and, for that reason, I respectfully dissent.
I think it particularly interesting that the majority nowhere attempts to define the groups the statute was designed to benefit. The majority’s time and space is devoted only to an attempt to justify and explain which people the statute was not designed to help. The Court of Appeals attempted to explain its same result by noting which group of people it felt the statute was designed to benefit. The majority nowhere indicates whether it agrees or disagrees with the Court of Appeals’ determination on this point.
If I understand the majority, it reasons that the statute does not benefit Mrs. Taylor, a woman who received a lump sum payment of $12,000, because she runs afoul of two restrictions: (1) the statute was only intended to benefit those who receive weekly *400compensation payments, and (2) the statute did not specifically provide for an increase in the total compensation of $12,000.
I think this reasoning will lead to great confusion. For example, according to the majority’s view, one receiving the maximum of $37.50 per week for 320 weeks (which would equal the maximum of $12,000) would be entitled to an increase in weekly payments under G.S. 97-29.1 (1979) but would receive the weekly payments for a lesser number of weeks because that person would reach the $12,000 maximum sooner. Specifically, one receiving $37.50 before enactment of G.S. 97-29.1 (1979), but who later became entitled to a 20% increase, for example, under the statute, apparently would see his weekly payments rise from $37.50 per week to $45.00 per week but he would only receive the payments for 266.67 weeks because at the end of that time he would have reached the $12,000 maximum. In other words, this employee gets $7.50 more per week, but loses more than an entire year’s compensation! The legislature may have intended that in enacting G.S. 97-29.1 (1979); I doubt it.
Another possibility under the majority view is this: if Mrs. Taylor had been awarded a lump bum of $8,000 instead of $12,000, she would appear to be entitled to the statute’s benefits because she would not be in violation of the majority’s second restriction — the $12,000 maximum. However, because of the majority’s first restriction she still would not be entitled to the increase in payments because she would hot have been receiving her payments on a weekly basis. I cannot imagine, and the majority does not explain, why the legislature would want to help someone receiving weekly payments and not help one like Mrs. Taylor who otherwise qualifies under the statute except for the lump sum manner of payment.
Again, I concede that I do not know for certain which groups of people the legislature intended to benefit with this statute. The majority must not know either because the opinion does not say. At any rate, I must dissent for the reasons stated above and for two other very important reasons: (1) the statute refers to all cases of total and permanent disability occurring prior to 1 July 1973 where the disabled is entitled to benefits as of 1 July 1977; Mrs. Taylor meets all these requirements, and (2) this Court has held for years that the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.