Court Opinion

ID: 9466113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:05:59.462217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:33.298101
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion relating to the entry and search of the premises.
United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 1679, 52 L.Ed.2d 377 (1977), permitted, without a search warrant, the entry of premises of a third party for execution of an arrest warrant, based upon the officer’s reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant was within the building. The court reasoned that despite a lack of exigent circumstances, an officer who has already been to the magistrate once to secure the arrest warrant need not make an additional trip if he has determined that the suspect is within certain premises. 545 F.2d at 421.
In Cravero the officers personally had observed the subject enter the dwelling and, after maintaining surveillance for several hours, reasonably concluded that the subject was still within the house. Here, however, we are confronted with a different factual situation. The arresting officer had not observed Ricky Lyons, the subject of the arrest warrant. His belief that Lyons was within the premises was based solely upon an informant’s tip. The informant had not seen Lyons on the premises,1 but had merely heard his voice in the background during a telephone call from Jimmy, Lyons’ companion, who stated that he and Lyons were at the location of a given telephone number. After matching the telephone number with a residence,2 the officers, without first applying to a detached magistrate for a search warrant, proceeded to the premises where they detained the defendants and, after entering and looking through the rooms, discovered not the subject of the arrest warrant, but a cache of cocaine. As in Cravero there was an arrest warrant but no exigent circumstances; unlike Cravero the evidence linking the subject to the premises was extremely fragile and insufficient to justify an entry without a search warrant.3
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the Supreme Court extended the Terry doctrine 4 to include a stop based not only on the policeman’s observations but also on an informant’s tip which did not satisfy the *549Aguilar-Spinelli criteria.5 Adams and Terry involved a minimal invasion of privacy, however, as compared with the greater intrusion occasioned by the search of a third party’s private home. When an intrusion of such magnitude occurs, if not based upon the policeman’s personal observation, nothing short of a full-fledged Aguilar-Spinelli tip should be acceptable.
Therefore, I would reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.
I concur with the remainder of the opinion relating to the other grounds of appeal.

. Compare with Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953, 93 S.Ct. 3023, 37 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1973) where informant had observed the subject enter the building.

. No address or name of resident was furnished by informant, but these were ascertained from the telephone company.

. The circuits are not in accord on this issue. The Third Circuit, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119, 47 L.Ed.2d 323 (1976), held: “Although police have warrants for the arrest of suspects, they may enter premises, at least of third persons, to search for those suspects only in exigent circumstances where the police officers also have probable cause to believe that the suspects may be within.” However, the Tenth Circuit, citing Cravero as authority, affirmed denial of a motion to suppress in a case factually similar to the case before us. United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837, 98 S.Ct. 128, 54 L.Ed.2d 99 (1977).

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).