Court Opinion

ID: 9953704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:00:46.550858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:44.202492
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11740    Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2024   Page: 1 of 19

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11740
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JOHN IFEOLUWA ONIMOLE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00492-WMR-CCB-8
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11740

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               John Onimole appeals his 36-month sentence for money
        laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. He argues that
        the district court erred in (1) calculating his guideline range by
        considering other relevant conduct for which he was not convicted
        and which was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) ordering
        restitution for losses caused by the overall conspiracy instead of
        those caused solely by his conduct; and (3) denying a reduction for
        acceptance of responsibility. After review, we affirm.
                                 I.     Background
              In 2020, a federal grand jury issued a 21-count superseding
        indictment charging Onimole, among other codefendants, with
        one count of conspiracy and one count of money laundering
        (Counts 1 and 19). According to the indictment, Onimole,
        Ahamefule Aso Odus (“Aso”), Chukwukadibia Ikechukwu
        Nnadozie (“Chuka”), and Uchechi Chidimma Odus (“Uche”),
        conspired to knowingly engage in a business e-mail compromise
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        23-11740                  Opinion of the Court                               3

        (“BEC”) scheme1 and a “romance scam” scheme2 between
        approximately February 2017 and September 2018. According to
        the indictment, the co-conspirators set up numerous personal and
        business bank accounts for sham companies for the purposes of
        receiving the ill-gotten gains from the schemes. Once the stolen
        funds were received, the conspirators then quickly dispersed the
        money through wire transfers to other accounts or by making
        check or cash withdrawals in an attempt to conceal the source of
        the funds. Count 19 charged Onimole, Aso, and Uche with money
        laundering based on one of the BEC schemes.
               Onimole entered an open plea of guilty to the money
        laundering charge (Count 19). At the change-of-plea hearing, the
        government set forth the factual basis for the charge. The
        government explained that Count 19 incorporated by reference the
        factual allegations of Count 1 (the conspiracy count). Specifically,

        1 In a BEC, an e-mail message which appears legitimate—but in fact is not—is

        sent to a business and fools an unwitting employee to interact with the
        message, which then deploys malware into the employee’s computer system.
        From there, the malware collects secured information and monitors
        correspondence to determine when a financial transaction is scheduled to take
        place. When one is scheduled between legitimate parties, the illegitimate
        third party that has been monitoring the company through the malware then
        sends a “spoofed” e-mail that again appears legitimate and changes the wiring
        instructions thereby sending the money into a bank account controlled by the
        conspirators.
        2 In a romance scam, the conspirators have fake profiles on dating websites

        and engage with users of the site and cultivate a romantic relationship only to
        then trick the victim into sending the conspirator money under false pretenses.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                23-11740

        “[t]he defendants named in the first superseding indictment,”
        including Onimole, “were all residents of the metro Atlanta area
        and they served as money launderers for other conspirators
        throughout the country and throughout the world who conducted
        [BEC] schemes, romance fraud schemes, and targeted companies
        and individuals across the United States.” The defendants set up
        numerous bank accounts, including ones for sham companies that
        they registered with the State of Georgia for the purpose of
        receiving the stolen funds. Once the funds were received, they
        quickly disbursed the funds into other accounts through wire
        transfers or by making check or cash withdrawals.
               On July 26, 2018, as a result of a BEC, company BCL wired
        $46,450.85 to a bank account controlled by defendants. At the
        direction of defendant Aso, another co-conspirator used the stolen
        funds to purchase cashier’s checks payable to others, including
        Onimole. Onimole then cashed the $22,230 check.
               Onimole agreed with the government’s summary of the
        facts. However, he clarified, upon further questioning, that he did
        not know that the source of the money was fraudulent, and he only
        learned about that after the fact. His counsel then explained that
        Onimole’s plea was not based on actual knowledge but on
        deliberate ignorance—meaning that he understood the
        circumstances were highly suspicious and logically indicated the
        funds were “from an inappropriate source,” but he actively
        disregarded the circumstances because his co-conspirators gave
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        23-11740                  Opinion of the Court                           5

        him money for cashing the check.3 The government asserted that
        it believed it could prove actual knowledge at trial, but agreed that
        Onimole could alternatively be convicted on a deliberate ignorance
        theory. The court then asked Onimole whether he “suspect[ed]
        that the money was not legitimate, that it was from some illegal or
        criminal purpose,” and he stated “Yes, your honor. I had a feeling.
        I did have a feeling. I mean, I was told it wasn’t. But I just had a
        strong feeling and I still do.” The court further clarified, asking
        whether Onimole knew “when [he] got involved in it and started
        preparations to receive the money and to withdraw the money and
        convert it to cashier’s checks and to otherwise disburse it, did [he]
        know then that that money came from criminal activity?”
        Onimole stated “[a]t that point, yes, sir.”
                The district court then found that there was a factual basis
        for the plea, noting that based on the government’s proffer it
        believed the government could prove actual knowledge, but
        alternatively, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Onimole
        deliberately ignorant. Accordingly, it accepted his plea.
                Following Onimole’s plea, the United States Probation
        Office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI
        indicated that Onimole’s involvement in the underlying conspiracy
        consisted of opening bank accounts used to receive funds obtained
        from BEC schemes and withdrawing those funds. Onimole was
        linked to a SunTrust bank account, two Bank of America accounts,
        and a sham company called “Branagh, Inc.” The PSI also indicated

        3 Onimole received $1,000 for his services.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11740

        that Onimole was held accountable for an intended loss of
        approximately $1,267,996.06 based on his participation in several
        BEC schemes in addition to the one involving BCL that served as
        the basis for Count 19, and it detailed his connection with those
        schemes. Onimole objected to this information, arguing that he
        did not plead guilty to Count 1 and he was not liable for any losses
        stemming from Count 1. The probation officer maintained that
        even though Onimole did not plead guilty to Count 1, the other
        schemes were properly included and considered as relevant
        conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
               The probation officer determined that Onimole’s base
        offense level was 22 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2) and 2B1.1
        because Onimole was responsible for an intended loss amount that
        was more than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000. After accounting
        for specific offense enhancements and a three-point reduction for
        acceptance of responsibility, Onimole’s resulting total offense level
        was 20. An offense level of 20 and a criminal history score of I
        resulted in a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment.
               Onimole objected, arguing that he should be responsible for
        only the value of the laundered funds he pleaded guilty to in Count
        19, which would result in a total offense level of 11 and a lower
        guidelines range. In light of Onimole’s objections to the inclusion
        of relevant conduct, the government objected to the three-point
        reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
            Prior to sentencing, Onimole filed a sentencing
        memorandum, asserting that he should receive a three-point
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        23-11740               Opinion of the Court                        7

        reduction for his acceptance of responsibility because he pleaded
        guilty to Count 19. He then reiterated his argument that he should
        only be held responsible for the specific conduct underlying Count
        19, which would result in a significantly lower offense level and
        guidelines range of zero to six months’ imprisonment. He also filed
        a motion in limine to exclude “irrelevant, inadmissible evidence and
        issues at his sentencing,” seeking exclusion of any evidence at
        sentencing that did not specifically relate to Count 19.
               At sentencing, the district court stated that it was not going
        to “grant . . . or consider” the motion in limine because such a
        motion is designed to prevent evidence from being introduced—
        typically when juries are involved. But, in this instance, the court
        needed to know about what Onimole did not want the court to
        consider in order to resolve the objections to the PSI and determine
        whether the objected-to conduct was relevant or not. Onimole
        argued that there was “an enormous difference between a
        conspiracy and a substantive count.” He argued that he would
        have denied the conspiracy allegations at trial because he was not
        involved in managing or controlling the bank accounts, his
        codefendants had access to his personal information, and his
        codefendants exploited him to engage in activities without his
        knowledge. Thus, he maintained that the conduct underlying the
        money laundering count to which he pleaded guilty was “totally
        disassociated from all the other allegations . . . about him being
        involved in other [BEC schemes,” and that only the conduct related
        to the substantive money laundering count should be considered.
        The court noted that the sentencing guidelines direct the district
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    23-11740

        court to consider all relevant conduct, and asked Onimole whether
        he had any authority to support his position. Onimole admitted
        that he did not have any additional authority other than what he
        presented in his motion in limine.
              The government argued that, under the guidelines and this
        Court’s precedent, the district court should consider all relevant
        conduct, which includes uncharged conduct. The court overruled
        Onimole’s objection and allowed the government to present
        evidence on relevant conduct related to other BEC schemes and
        money laundering activities that involved Onimole.
               The government then called Special Agent Joshua Barnes
        who testified at length to Onimole’s involvement in the BEC
        schemes. Generally, his testimony established that Onimole
        registered the fictious company Branagh, Inc. in his name, with the
        State of Georgia in June 2018. 4 Onimole also opened several
        business bank accounts for the company, but none of the accounts
        had any transactions consistent with business activities. In addition
        to the conduct to which Onimole pleaded guilty in Count 19
        involving company BCL, the investigation connected him with
        other BEC schemes involving companies AMM, HZOH, STC,
        GWL, Orahealth, and ZTB.
             For instance, the agent testified that, as a result of a BEC
        scheme, company A.M.M. wired $54,918.67 to a SunTrust Bank

        4 Branagh was administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State in August

        2019.
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        23-11740                 Opinion of the Court                            9

        account controlled by a co-conspirator. After the money was
        received, two cashier’s checks totaling $52,000 were issued—one
        of which was for $30,000 payable to Onimole. The same day the
        check issued, Onimole’s driver’s license was used to cash the check,
        and his personal identifying information was listed on the bank’s
        currency transaction report (“CTR”).5 Onimole listed his
        occupation on the report as “retail sales.”
               This pattern continued with the other BEC schemes. For
        example, the agent testified that, after the funds from HZOH, STC,
        and ZTB were wired from the respective companies into a
        co-conspirator’s account, a portion of those funds would then be
        directly issued to Onimole via a cashier’s check or directly
        transferred into his personal bank account.6 As for the Orahealth
        and GWL scheme, the funds were transferred to a bank account in
        the name of Onimole’s sham company Branagh, Inc., and Onimole
        was a signer on the account. 7

        5 Banks are required to complete a CTR for any transaction involving cash

        over $10,000.
        6 A wire transfer of close to $72,000 of the stolen ZTB funds was attempted

        from one co-conspirator’s account to Onimole’s personal Wells Fargo
        account, but the wire was returned as a “beneficiary name mismatch” because
        the recipient of the money was listed as “Branagh, Inc.,” and that name did
        not match the name on the designated account. Once the funds were returned
        to the original co-conspirator’s account, they were ultimately withdrawn by
        other co-conspirators.
        7 On the same day as GWL’s wire, some of the stolen GWL funds were then

        used to purchase three airline tickets to California, one of which was in
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                23-11740

               Following the agent’s testimony and additional argument
        from the parties, the district court concluded that the government
        had met its burden to establish the existence of the conspiracy by a
        preponderance of the evidence and that the other schemes were
        relevant conduct. Accordingly, the district court determined that
        the intended loss amount of $1,267.966.06 8 was the correct amount
        even though all of that money did not necessarily “flow[]” to
        Onimole.
               The district court then sustained the government’s
        objection to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, noting
        that the court “spent most of the day talking about whether the
        defendant did the things the Government says he did and which he
        says he did not,” which was not consistent with an acceptance of
        responsibility reduction. Nevertheless, the court noted that it
        would keep Onimole’s position in mind when considering whether
        to depart or vary downward. Thus, the revised total offense level
        of 23 and a criminal history category of one resulted in an advisory
        guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment.
                Following arguments from the parties as to the appropriate
        sentence and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the
        district court varied downward and sentenced Onimole to a below-
        guidelines sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment to be followed by

        Onimole’s name. Onimole was then listed on a CTR from a bank branch in
        California withdrawing $15,000 of the stolen funds.
        8 The actual loss amount was $1,117,966.06.
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        23-11740               Opinion of the Court                        11

        3 years’ supervised release. The district court also imposed
        restitution in the amount of $1,117,966.06, jointly and severally,
        with Onimole’s co-conspirators. Finally, the district court ordered
        forfeiture of $550,000—the minimum amount of funds laundered.
        This appeal followed.
                                   II.    Discussion
               Onimole argues that the district court erred in (1) calculating
        his base offense level by considering other relevant conduct for
        which he was not convicted and which was not proven beyond a
        reasonable doubt; (2) ordering restitution for losses caused by the
        overall conspiracy instead of those caused solely by his conduct;
        and (3) denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We
        address each argument in turn.
                           A. Calculation of the base offense level
               Onimole argues that the district court erred in increasing his
        base offense level based on the total intended loss value of the
        laundered funds from the BEC schemes ($1,267,966.06), and that
        the court should have limited the value to the actual loss involved
        in the substantive money laundering offense to which he pleaded
        guilty ($22,230).
                “We review a district court’s interpretation of the
        Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and the determination of the
        amount of loss involved in the offense for clear error.” United States
        v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1151 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).
        “We review only for clear error the application of the relevant
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11740

        conduct guideline in § 1B1.3 to the facts of the case.” United States
        v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008).
                Section 2S1.1 of the Guidelines establishes the base offense
        level for money laundering offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. It
        provides, as relevant here, that the base offense level is “8 plus the
        number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property
        Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of the
        laundered funds, otherwise.” Id. § 2S1.1(a)(2). Under the relevant
        table, if the value of the loss attributable to the defendant is more
        than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000, the base offense level is
        increased by 14 points. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
               We have held that “[w]hen calculating a defendant’s
        sentencing range under the Guidelines, the sentencing court must
        consider all ‘relevant conduct’ as defined in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3.”
        United States v. Siegelman, 786 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2015);
        United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In
        addition, proper calculation of the guidelines requires
        consideration of all relevant conduct, not merely charged
        conduct.” (quotations omitted)). Section 1B1.3 of the guidelines,
        defines relevant conduct as “all acts and omissions committed,
        aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
        willfully caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
        “When an offense involves ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity,’
        [whether or not charged as a conspiracy,] relevant conduct includes
        ‘all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
        furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’” United
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        23-11740               Opinion of the Court                       13

        States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). “[R]elevant conduct is broadly defined
        to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct that is proven at
        sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Siegelman, 786
        F.3d at 1332. “Accordingly, under § 1B1.3(a), when a defendant is
        acting in concert with others, the appropriate conduct to consider
        for sentencing purposes is far broader than the conduct that drove
        the original conviction.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1297.
                We have held that, even absent a conspiracy charge, the
        district court may hold all participants responsible for the losses
        caused by the jointly undertaken scheme when the defendant’s
        actions suggested that he was actively involved in the criminal
        scheme and that he agreed to jointly undertake in the scheme. See
        United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018).
        When the defendant challenges the loss amount calculation, “the
        government bears the burden of supporting it with reliable and
        specific evidence.” See United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1318
        (11th Cir. 2015).
               Here, as discussed above, the government presented
        extensive evidence at the sentencing hearing that directly linked
        Onimole to several other BEC money laundering schemes in
        addition to the one that served as the basis for Count 19. This
        evidence included that after the stolen funds were wired from the
        respective companies into a co-conspirator’s account, a portion of
        those funds would then be directly issued to Onimole via a
        cashier’s check, directly transferred into his personal bank account,
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                         23-11740

        or were otherwise connected with his company Branagh, Inc.
        Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to
        conclude that Onimole agreed to participate in a jointly undertaken
        criminal scheme.9 See Whitman, 887 F.3d at 1248–49. Based on this
        evidence, the district court did not clearly err in considering the
        other BEC schemes as relevant conduct and in concluding that
        Onimole was responsible for the losses caused by the jointly
        undertaken schemes. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. As a result, the
        district court properly determined Onimole’s base offense level.
        U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(2), 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).

        9 Onimole argues that relevant conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable

        doubt and cannot be based on judicial factfinding, citing Alleyne v. United States,
        570 U.S. 99 (2013). This argument is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See
        United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting an
        identical Alleyne-based challenge and holding that “a district court may
        continue to make guidelines calculations based upon judicial fact findings and
        may enhance a sentence—so long as its findings do not increase the statutory
        maximum or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury
        verdict”); United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1301 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (rejecting argument “that all sentencing enhancements are elements . . . that
        a jury must decide” and reaffirming holding in Charles). Although Onimole
        contends that our precedent is inconsistent with Alleyne and other related
        Supreme Court decisions, under the prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior
        panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is
        overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
        by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th
        Cir. 2008).
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        23-11740                   Opinion of the Court                                15

                              B. Calculation of the restitution amount
                Onimole argues that, even if he is accountable for the total
        intended loss for purposes of his base offense level, the district
        court erred in imposing the total actual loss—$1,117,966.06, jointly
        and severally—as the restitution amount because a defendant is
        responsible “only for the loss caused by the specific conduct” that
        is the basis of his conviction, citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S.
        411, 413 (1990). 10
               “We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution,
        but review for abuse of discretion the determination of the
        restitution value of lost or destroyed property. We review for clear
        error factual findings underlying a restitution order.” United States
        v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations
        omitted) (internal citations omitted).
                The district court, in imposing a sentence, must order
        restitution in accordance with the Mandatory Victim Restitution
        Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. “The method for calculating
        actual loss, as opposed to intended loss, under the Sentencing
        Guidelines is largely the same as the method for establishing actual
        loss to identifiable victims under the MVRA. Stein, 846 F.3d at 1153

        10 To the extent that Onimole asserts that his financial situation should have

        been accounted for when the court ordered restitution or forfeiture, that
        argument is without merit. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th
        Cir. 2000) (“The district court is not required, nor does it have the discretion,
        to consider the offender’s ability to pay when ordering restitution under the
        [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act].”).
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11740

        (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[i]n most cases, the amount
        of actual loss under the guidelines will be the same as the
        restitution figure.” Id.
                The Supreme Court in Hughey v. United States held that
        restitution could be authorized under the Victim and Witness
        Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) “only for the loss caused by the
        specific conduct that [was] the basis of the offense of conviction.”
        495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). However, Onimole’s reliance on Hughey
        is misplaced. As we have previously explained, post-Hughey,
        Congress’s enactment of “the MVRA all but eviscerated Hughey
        with respect to crimes involving schemes.” United States v.
        Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
        v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004)). Congress greatly
        expanded the definition of “victim” under the MVRA, and we have
        held “that by defining ‘victim’ expansively in scheme-based crimes,
        Congress partially overrul[ed] Hughey’s restrictive interpretation of
        the VWPA and expand[ed] district courts’ authority to grant
        restitution.” Id. at 1293 (quoting Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1338). Thus,
        while “[a]n award of restitution must be based on the amount of
        loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct,” United States v.
        Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018),“[c]ourts have agreed
        that, in light of the expanded statutory language, restitution orders
        for conduct closely related to the offense of conviction are
        appropriate under [the MVRA], in addition to the specific conduct
        for which the defendant was convicted.” United States v. Brown, 665
        F.3d 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Valladares,
        544 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a restitution award
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        23-11740                 Opinion of the Court                             17

        that included losses from uncharged conduct and holding that “the
        district court was permitted to consider the losses [to the victim]
        incurred from [the uncharged] scheme” because the uncharged
        scheme “could be considered relevant conduct”).
              Accordingly, as discussed above, because the other BEC
        schemes were properly considered relevant conduct, the district
        court did not err in including the actual losses from those related
        BEC schemes in the restitution award. 11 Brown, 665 F.3d at 1252;
        Valladares, 544 F.3d at 1269.
                          C. Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility
               Onimole argues that the district court erred in denying him
        a two-point reduction under the guidelines for acceptance of
        responsibility, which he maintains he should have received because
        he pleaded guilty to Count 19.
                A defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction of his
        offense level if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
        for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Importantly, “[a] defendant
        who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment [for
        acceptance of responsibility] as a matter of right.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt.
        (n.3). Rather, to determine whether the reduction applies, the
        district court must consider, among other factors, the timeliness of

        11 Onimole argues that the district court failed to connect him to the total

        actual loss of $1,117,966.06. We disagree. As discussed previously, there was
        a preponderance of the evidence linking Onimole to the BEC schemes that
        made up the actual loss amount involving victims BCL, STC, HZOH, GWL,
        Orahealth, ZTB, and AMM.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11740

        the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and whether he
        truthfully admitted that he engaged in the conduct comprising the
        offenses of conviction and “any additional relevant conduct for
        which he is accountable under § 1B1.3.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A),
        (H)). “[A] defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively
        admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction” in order
        to receive a reduction—in other words, the defendant can remain
        silent. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.1(A)). However, “[a] defendant who
        falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the
        court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with
        acceptance of responsibility . . . .” Id.; see also United States v.
        Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022–23 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although a
        guilty plea can constitute significant evidence of acceptance of
        responsibility, it may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant
        inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.”).
               “In reviewing a district court’s refusal to grant a reduction
        under § 3E1.1, [we] review[] its interpretation of the Guidelines de
        novo. We review the factual findings upon which the denial of the
        acceptance reduction is based for clear error.” United States v.
        Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations
        omitted) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he determination of
        whether a defendant has adequately manifested acceptance of
        responsibility is a flexible, fact sensitive inquiry” to which we give
        “great deference.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, we will not set
        aside a district court’s determination that a defendant is not entitled
        to a § 3E1.1 adjustment unless the facts in the record clearly
USCA11 Case: 23-11740     Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 03/22/2024    Page: 19 of 19

        23-11740              Opinion of the Court                       19

        establish that the defendant has accepted responsibility.” Moriarty,
        429 F.3d at 1022–23.
               Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining
        that Onimole had not clearly demonstrated acceptance of
        responsibility. Although he pleaded guilty to Count 19, he, at the
        very least, frivolously contested relevant conduct, which is
        inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
        cmt. (n.1(A)). And we have upheld the denial of acceptance of
        responsibility under similar circumstances. See United States v.
        Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (upholding denial of
        reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant “went
        beyond mere silence” and affirmatively denied relevant conduct);
        United States v. Sammour, 816 F.3d 1328, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016)
        (upholding denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility
        where defendant “downplay[ed] his culpability at the sentencing”
        and “frivolously contested relevant conduct” (alterations
        adopted)). In light of the record before us, we cannot say that “the
        record clearly establish[es] that [Onimole] has accepted
        responsibility.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1022–23. Accordingly, he is
        not entitled to relief. Id.; Tejas, 868 F.3d at 1248.
                                  III.   Conclusion
              For the above reasons, we affirm Onimole’s conviction and
        sentence.
              AFFIRMED.