Court Opinion

ID: 9679339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:49:35.881032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:12.678575
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(concurring). I fully agree with the majority’s reasoning and holding that the burglary *327charge against O’Neill was improper. I write separately, however, for two reasons.
First, I believe that the district attorney’s office improperly refused to request the search warrant asked for by O’Neill. The probable cause standard used by Enright, the assistant district attorney, in deciding whether to request a judge to issue a search warrant should not be misconstrued as being the law in Wisconsin. O’Neill requested a search warrant on two different occasions. The district attorney refused to request a search warrant the first time because Sanders would not allow his name to be disclosed. An informant’s name is not necessarily required to be disclosed before a search warrant is issued. The mere fact that an informant wishes to remain anonymous does not mean per se that his information is unreliable.
“In assessing the value and reliability of information provided by an anonymous informant for purposes of establishing traditional probable cause to issue a search warrant, the United States Supreme Court recently held that an anonymous informant’s tip should be analyzed under a ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach, which includes a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all indicia of reliability attending the information. [Illinois v.] Gates,-U.S. at-, 103 S. Ct. at 2330, 2332 [1983]. Prior to issuing a warrant, a magistrate must make a common-sense decision whether, given all circumstances before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. -U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. In determining the overall reliability of an anonymous informer’s tip, the ‘totality of circumstances’ approach permits a deficiency in indicia demonstrating an informer’s veracity to be compensated for by a strong showing concerning the informer’s basis of knowledge, or by some other indicia of a reliability.” See Id. at 2329. State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 453-54, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
*328The request to the assistant district attorney for a search warrant was denied a second time because Sieg could not identify any distinguishing marks or serial numbers on the stereo, even though Sieg saw what he believed to be his stereo through the window of the house. This demand by Enright was unreasonable. Sieg would have had to have been inside the house to provide that specific information. The quantum of evidence necessary to support a determination of probable cause for a search warrant is:
“. . . sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime and that they will be found in the place to be searched.” Ritacca v. Kenosha County Court, 91 Wis. 2d 72, 77-78, 280 N.W.2d 751 (1979).
Enright had been supplied with more than sufficient facts that Sieg’s stolen stereo was probably being stored at 720 Chippewa Street. He knew that Sanders lived at the Chippewa Street residence and that Sanders believed that his roommate, Ward, was keeping a stolen stereo there. He was also informed of the fact that Sanders’ description of the stereo matched the description of the stolen stereo provided O’Neill by Sieg. Additionally, after Sieg looked through the window into the house, he believed that the stereo which he saw was his stereo. Based on all of this information, the district attorney should have requested a search warrant from a judge.
My second reason for writing this concurrence is that I believe that the district attorney abused his prosecutorial discretion in charging O’Neill with burglary. The charging decision of a district attorney is not unlimited; it has bounds. State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 608, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). We have said,
“[I]t is an abuse of discretion for the prosecutor to bring charges when the evidence is clearly insufficient *329to support a conviction or to bring charges on counts of doubtful merit to coerce the defendant to plead guilty to a less serious offense. Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 328-330, 212 N.W.2d 109 (1973).” Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 609.
The evidence against O’Neill was clearly insufficient to support a conviction of burglary. The district attorney had various contacts with O’Neill prior to his charging O’Neill with burglary. O’Neill’s persistence in trying to secure a search warrant evidences an attempt to recover the stolen stereo within the limits of the law. There was substantial evidence that O’Neill reasonably believed that his entering and searching the premises was legal. I strongly believe that law enforcement officers should not be prosecuted for making honest mistakes. In cases such as this, fear of prosecution for burglary may inhibit officers from carrying out the duties which are within the scope of their authority. Whether entry to premises may lawfully be made because adequate consent has been given or exigent circumstances exist is always a judgment call on the part of the law enforcement officer. To find that officers who exercised faulty judgment should be subjected to criminal prosecution for burglary would be an unreasonably harsh penalty which I do not think the legislature intended.
The district attorney had no evidence of an intent on the part of O’Neill to commit a felony or that O’Neill knew he was acting in excess of his lawful authority, and, therefore, I believe the district attorney abused his prosecutorial discretion in charging O’Neill with burglary.