Court Opinion

ID: 9756833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:03:04.782674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.047412
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge McCLOSKEY.
I respectfully dissent as I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that William Ole-ski’s (Appellant’s) original claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)1 remains viable. I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellant only needed to file a copy of the federal court judgment with the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (county court) in order to revive his original claim filed with that court. To the contrary, I believe that Appellant’s failure to promptly file a certified transcript of the pleadings from the federal action in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b)(2), bars further action at the county court.
Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b)(2), when Appellant sought to transfer the case back to the county court, he needed to certify the complaint that was at the federal level. The county court cannot presume that the original complaint, which had been transferred to federal court, was now being reinstated. Once the complaint was transferred to federal court, any number of changes could have taken place at the federal level. That is why, to effect a proper transfer back to county court, the pleadings át the federal level need to be certified.
There is nothing in the statutory law, or the case law, that would provide for “reactivation” of a complaint first filed in county court that had been transferred to federal court. Additionally, the original complaint had already been amended once by the Appellant. This amended complaint did not contain a cause of action under the PHRA. It is inconceivable that Appellant could now be allowed a second amendment to his complaint to include a PHRA cause of action after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The majority, however, concludes that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations had not expired at the time Appellant attempted to re-file his PHRA claim in county court, in September, 2000. Interestingly, neither party ever raised an issue as to the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) at any stage of these proceedings. More importantly, this issue is complicated by the fact that the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) has been successfully challenged in other states and its constitutionality as applied to Pennsylvania law is at the very least an arguable issue. See Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 122 S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002); Jinks v. Richland County, 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002), certiorari granted, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 435, 154 L.Ed.2d 328 (2002).
Based on the fact that Appellant failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 5103(b)(2) in effecting a proper transfer to county court and the statute of limitations had expired by the time Appellant sought to file his second amended complaint adding the PHRA claim, I would affirm the grant of Appellee’s preliminary objections by the trial court.

. Act of Oct. 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 951-963.