Court Opinion

ID: 9896917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:03:54.98676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:53.032094
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 P. v. Olivares CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097068

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE018267)

           v.

 MANUEL OLIVARES,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Manuel Olivares guilty of committing five sexual offenses
against a victim under the age of 14 years. Defendant appeals, arguing we should reverse
his convictions because: (1) his trial counsel performed ineffectively, violating
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, by not objecting to hearsay evidence about DNA analysis;
(2) the trial court abused its discretion by preventing defendant from introducing
evidence of a motive for the victim’s family to fabricate her allegations; and (3) his trial
counsel also performed ineffectively by failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks in

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closing argument about the victim’s lack of motive. We conclude defendant has failed to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel and has failed to establish a prejudicial abuse
of discretion. Accordingly, we will affirm defendant’s convictions.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
       Defendant lived in a house with nine other family members, including the victim.
At trial, the victim testified that defendant put his penis into her anus on more than five
occasions, made her lick his penis on three occasions, put his fingers in her anus on three
occasions, licked her anus on one occasion, and touched her buttocks with his hands on
approximately 10 occasions. The victim specifically recalled the final incident before she
reported the abuse to her mother: Defendant grabbed her by the wrist and brought her
into the defendant’s parents’ bedroom, took off her pants and underwear, threw her on the
bed, took off his own clothes, positioned her with her buttocks lifted off the bed, and then
moved his penis in and out of her anus while holding her hips so that she could not move.
She told him to stop, but he did not stop until he was breathing heavily and announced he
was tired. After defendant stopped, the victim could see “[w]ater was coming out” of his
penis. After each incident, defendant would threaten to kill the victim if she told anyone
about the abuse.
       The day of the final incident, the victim told her mother that defendant had
grabbed her buttocks. Her mother took her to the doctor the next day. Police officers
were called to the doctor’s office and interviewed the victim in a mix of Spanish and
English. The victim told the officers that her uncle hurt her by grabbing her buttocks,
inserting his fingers and then penis into her anus, and inserting his penis into her vagina.
The victim then stated another incident occurred a month earlier, but did not tell the
officers any details of that incident. The officer who questioned the victim was not a
trained forensic interviewer and expected such an interviewer to talk with the victim
more extensively later. After the interview, the officers brought the victim to a forensic
sexual examination.

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       Dr. Angela Vickers performed a forensic sexual examination of the victim and
found no injuries or sexually transmitted diseases. Dr. Vickers also collected samples
from the victim’s mouth, neck, nipples, genitals, and anus to be tested for bodily fluids.
Police collected the victim’s underwear and bedsheets from defendant’s bed and his
parents’ bed for testing.
       Analysts from the Sacramento County Crime Lab tested the samples taken from
the victim’s body, underwear, and from the bedsheets for bodily fluids and attempted to
create DNA profiles from the fluids found. Of all the samples, only the one taken from
the bedsheet from defendant’s parents’ room contained bodily fluid from which the
analysts were able to develop a DNA profile. As explained in greater detail below, the
analysis determined the sperm found on the sample from the bedsheet very likely came
from defendant.
       The prosecution charged defendant with committing five separate lewd or
lascivious acts against the victim, a child under the age of 14 years, by force or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant
testified at trial that he got up on the day of the final incident described by the victim,
went to breakfast with his wife, then took a nap for three or four hours. When he woke
up, he danced with the victim in his parents’ bedroom. They were initially separated
while dancing, but when the victim started getting closer to defendant, he pushed her
away because he felt uncomfortable. He thought it was easier to push her away than to
tell her to back up. At first, defendant testified that he had only pushed the victim. But,
after being reminded of statements he made to the police the day after the incident,
defendant admitted that, after he pushed the victim to the ground, he then held her on the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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ground to get her to stop getting close to him. Defendant denied any sexual contact with
the victim.
       The jury found defendant guilty of committing all five lewd or lascivious acts
against the victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years in state prison.
Defendant timely appealed.
                                    II. DISCUSSION
A.     Ineffective Assistance for Failing to Object to Testimonial Hearsay Evidence
       Defendant first contends his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to
object when Joy Viray, a DNA analyst from the Sacramento County Crime Lab, testified
about the contents of reports prepared by Michelle Chao, another DNA analyst from the
Sacramento County Crime Lab. Specifically, defendant contends his counsel should
have objected because Viray’s testimony about the contents of Chao’s reports was
inadmissible hearsay and violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
We conclude defendant’s counsel could have reasonably decided not to object to Viray’s
testimony on either ground. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
       1.     Factual Background
       The specific testimony defendant contends his counsel should have objected to is
Viray’s agreement with the conclusion of one of Chao’s reports—that the sperm found on
the bedsheet from the defendant’s parents’ bed, where some of the abuse occurred, was
very likely to be defendant’s. That sample had been identified as possible semen by
Desiree Dudley, another DNA analyst at the Sacramento County Crime Lab. Dudley
selected areas of the bedsheet that appeared to contain semen, performed a test for a
chemical found in large quantities in semen, and looked at the samples that tested
positive under a microscope to confirm the presence of sperm cells. She then packaged
the samples containing sperm cells for DNA testing.

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       Chao performed the DNA testing, adding chemicals and heat to extract DNA
molecules, isolating part of the DNA to develop a profile, and using software to help
interpret the profile. The software determined the DNA profile developed from the
sperm on the bedsheet was 7 octillion times more likely to come from defendant than
from a random unrelated individual. There was no female contributor in the sample.
Chao completed a lab report documenting the testing she performed.
       The prosecution moved Chao’s report on the bedsheet sample into evidence, and
defense counsel did not object.
       2.     Legal Background
       “[A] defendant cannot automatically transform a forfeited claim into a cognizable
one merely by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010)
49 Cal.4th 79, 121, fn. 14; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202-1203.)
Rather, “[t]o establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a defendant must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the
defendant.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.)
       “[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(People v. Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122.) “ ‘When a defendant on appeal makes
a claim that his counsel was ineffective, the appellate court must consider whether the
record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation provided by
counsel. “If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ [citation], the contention must
be rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 845.)

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       3.     Analysis
       Defendant argues his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object to
Viray’s testimony identifying defendant’s DNA in the semen from the bedsheet because:
(1) the testimony would have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay and (2) admitting
the conclusion of Chao’s report without permitting cross-examination of Chao violated
defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. The People respond that (1) the
report was properly admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
(2) the evidence was not testimonial hearsay protected by the right to confrontation, and
(3) in any event, defense counsel could have “made a reasonable tactical decision not to
object.” We agree with the People’s final contention, so we need not decide whether the
report would have been admissible or was testimonial.
       The parties have not identified any evidence in the record explaining defense
counsel’s decision not to object on either hearsay or confrontation grounds, so we must
determine whether defense counsel could have no satisfactory explanation for the
decision. Here, objecting to Viray’s testimony about the conclusion of one of Chao’s
reports would likely not have benefited defendant. Chao was included on the
prosecution’s witness list, and nothing in the record indicates she would have been unable
to testify if called. If Chao had testified about the findings of her analysis, the results
would not have been hearsay. (See Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a) [hearsay is “evidence
of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing”].)
Accordingly, defense counsel could have decided not to waste time further substantiating
DNA testing he planned to downplay. Defense counsel may even have preferred to have
Dudley testify, though Dudley was not on the prosecution’s witness list, because Dudley
was the DNA analyst who located and selected the bedsheet sample, whereas Chao just
performed a standard test on the sample and recorded the output of the software. Despite
the opportunity to question Dudley about the subjective decisions she made, defense

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counsel declined to cross-examine her, suggesting he likewise would have had nothing to
gain by cross-examining Chao about her more routine work.
         Defense counsel may also have determined objecting to Viray’s testimony about
the results of the test performed by Chao would have been futile. “ ‘Generally speaking,
a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made “with a primary purpose of creating
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” ’ ” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1196-1197.) Applying this test, several California courts have concluded reports
containing DNA analysis like Chao’s are not primarily testimonial because: “(1) they
were generated by a lab technician pursuant to standardized procedures; (2) even though
[defendant] had been charged with the crime, lab technicians such as [Chao] have no idea
what their results might show, and DNA testing is routinely used to inculpate or
exonerate those charged with crimes; and (3) the accusatory opinions came from expert
witness [Viray], who was subject to vigorous cross-examination.” (People v.
Barba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 712, 742; accord People v. Holmes (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 431, 438-439; People v. Steppe (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1126-
1127.)
         Our Supreme Court has also indicated that machine-generated data in the report of
a nontestifying analyst does not implicate the right to confrontation “[b]ecause, unlike a
person, a machine cannot be cross-examined.” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569,
583.) Though the record is not well developed in this respect, it seems the numerical
likelihood of the bedsheet sample matching defendant’s DNA profile was the output of
the lab’s computer software, which would not implicate the right to confrontation. Given
all this precedent, defense counsel could have reasonably assumed that an objection on
confrontation grounds would have been futile.
         Because defendant has failed to show that his counsel could have had no
satisfactory explanation for declining to object to Viray’s testimony as inadmissible

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hearsay or on confrontation grounds, defendant has failed to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
B.     Evidence of Motive
       Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him
from introducing evidence that defendant’s father had decided to give him a share of a
house previously promised solely to the victim’s father, creating a motive for the victim’s
family to fabricate her allegations. The People respond that the trial court properly
excluded the evidence and, in any event, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.
       1.     Factual Background
       Defendant sought to introduce evidence that his father had originally announced
his intention to give a house to the victim’s father but then, sometime in the four years
between making the plan and the victim making her allegations, defendant’s father
changed his mind and planned to give the house to both the victim’s father and defendant.
This could have created a motive for the victim’s parents to fabricate allegations against
defendant in order to discredit defendant in his father’s eyes, which could cause
defendant’s father to revert to the plan to give the house only to the victim’s father. But
defense counsel acknowledged that he could only substantiate that defendant’s father and
the victim’s father knew about the original planned transfer. As for who knew about
defendant’s father changing his plan, defense counsel told the trial court that he would
ask the father before putting him on the stand. But defense counsel never provided any
assertion that anyone knew about the father changing his mind. The victim’s mother,
who first spoke with police about the victim’s allegations, had already testified that she
knew nothing about any transfer of the house to her husband.
       The trial court considered this theory “extremely attenuated,” especially because
defendant’s offer of proof did not establish when defendant’s father had changed his
mind or whether the victim’s parents knew about the planned transfer or the change.

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Accordingly, the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it had very little probative
value that was substantially outweighed by the probability it “would create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, as well as
necessitating undue consumption of time.” Defendant did not call his father as a witness.
       2.     Legal Background
       Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “ ‘[T]he latitude
[Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual
cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating
into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.’ ” (People v. Ayala
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301.) “Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude
impeachment evidence ‘is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of factual
situations in which the issue arises’ [citation], a reviewing court ordinarily will uphold
the trial court’s exercise of discretion.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932.) A
trial court does not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 unless it rules in
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner. (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th
475, 521.) Defendant has not met this high bar here.
       3.     Analysis
       Evidence of a motive for the victim’s parents to pressure her into fabricating
allegations could have been relevant. Likewise, evidence that the victim’s mother lied
when she said she knew nothing about any potential transfer of a house would have been
relevant impeachment. But defense counsel’s offer of proof did not include such facts.
As the trial court noted, defense counsel had not offered any testimony about when the
father had changed his mind or who the father had told about changing his mind.

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       We agree with the People that testimony on this subject could have turned into a
trial within a trial about defendant’s father’s plan for the house, who knew about the plan,
and the credibility of those individuals. This could confuse the issues, mislead the jury,
and consume undue time by turning the trial away from the testimony and credibility of
the victim and defendant to this side issue. (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th
263, 291 [affirming exclusion of evidence whose introduction would have entailed “a
lengthy evidentiary detour into a matter that was only marginally relevant and might well
have confused the jury”].) And, given that the side issue would be relevant only if the
defendant’s father happened to testify to facts unknown to defense counsel at the time he
made his offer of proof, we agree with the trial court that any relevance was extremely
attenuated. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
this line of questioning.
C.     Ineffective Assistance for Not Objecting to Prosecutorial Misconduct
       Lastly, defendant contends his trial counsel also performed ineffectively by failing
to object to the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument about the victim’s lack of
motive. The People respond that the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper and, in any
event, they did not prejudice defendant. While we agree with defendant that the
prosecutor’s remarks were improper, we conclude defense counsel could have made a
reasonable tactical decision not to object. Accordingly, defendant has not established
ineffective assistance of counsel.
       1.     Factual Background
       In closing argument, amid arguing that the victim’s and her mother’s testimony
was more credible than defendant’s, the prosecutor argued that the victim and her mother
had no motive to lie and that the process of reporting the abuse was instead unpleasant for
the victim. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
       “And when you think about those things and you compare [the victim], her mom,
and the way that they talked about these things, there’s no motive for them to lie. There’s

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no motive for [the victim] to say these things about [defendant], because when people lie,
whether it’s an adult or a child, they do so for a reason. You lie to get out of trouble.
You lie for a benefit. There is no benefit to [the victim] to tell her mom that [defendant]
put his penis inside of her anus.
       “It’s the opposite of a benefit, because we saw what happened. She told her mom.
She had to go see her first doctor, who called the police. Then she had to go to the BEAR
[Clinic]. She had to have an invasive exam where her genitalia is looked at, her anus is
looked at. She had to talk to police officers. She had to go through an interview. She
had to come in to testify. There’s no benefit. It’s not cool at eight years old to say,
[defendant]’s penis was in my butt. That doesn’t give you street cred. on the playground,
doesn’t give you clout. There’s no motive.
       “And when I sit down once I’m done with my comments here, I’m going to listen
to defense counsel and see, because if they’re asking you to find the defendant not guilty,
they are asking you to find that [the victim] lied, and if they are doing that, there should
be a reason. There should be a motive. And from what I’ve seen in the evidence, there is
no motive, no motive for [the victim] to make it up.
       “And I would suggest that you listen to defense and see, see what motive there is
that’s not speculation, that’s not a guess, but actually within the evidence, within the four
walls of this courtroom, and I don’t think there’s going to be one. And if they come up
with one, I’ll address on it my rebuttal.”
       Defense counsel did not object, and the prosecutor moved on to discuss the
credibility of other witnesses.
       2.     Legal Background
       A number of cases have criticized prosecutors who successfully argue for the
exclusion of evidence based on a lack of relevance but then argue in closing that the lack
of the excluded evidence is relevant to the jury’s consideration. For example, in People
v. Varona (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 566, the defense sought to introduce evidence the

                                             11
victim had previously pled guilty to prostitution, but the prosecutor successfully argued
for the exclusion of the evidence. (Id. at p. 568.) In closing argument, the prosecutor
then argued that there was no evidence the woman was a prostitute. (Id. at p. 569.) The
appellate court concluded the prosecutor had committed misconduct, reasoning: “We
agree that, in a proper case, a prosecutor may argue to a jury that a defendant has not
brought forth evidence to corroborate an essential part of his defensive story. But we
know of no case where such argument is permissible except where a defendant might
reasonably be expected to produce such corroboration. Here the prosecutor not only
argued the ‘lack’ of evidence where the defense was ready and willing to produce it, but
he compounded that tactic by actually arguing that the woman was not a prostitute
although he had seen the official records and knew that he was arguing a falsehood. The
whole argument went beyond the bounds of any acceptable conduct.” (Id. at p. 570.)
       In People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, the appellate court reversed a
conviction for battery upon a police officer and resisting arrest after the prosecutor
successfully argued for the exclusion of a second incident where the officer had allegedly
used excessive force and then argued to the jury that the evidence showed only one such
incident. (Id. at pp. 140, 146.) The court referred to this as “the prosecutor’s obvious
misconduct.” In People v. Daggett (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, the court reversed
convictions for four sexual offenses against a child, in part because the prosecutor
“unfairly took advantage of the judge’s ruling” excluding evidence by “ask[ing] the
jurors to draw an inference that they might not have drawn if they had heard the evidence
the judge had excluded.” (Id. at pp. 754, 758.) In People v. Roberts (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 469, the appellate court considered it clear misconduct to say there was no
evidence as to whether the victim had gone to the hospital after an incident of domestic
violence after successfully arguing for the exclusion of evidence the victim had been
arrested after the incident and could not have gone to the hospital. (Id. at p. 481.)
Specifically, the court reasoned that “[a]fter convincing the trial court to exclude

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evidence of the victim’s arrest on the basis that its minimal relevance was outweighed by
its prejudicial effect, the prosecutor then took unfair advantage of that very ruling by
implying that what the victim may have done after the incident was relevant.” (Ibid.)
       Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are, however, subject to forfeiture. “In order
to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request
an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of
misconduct preserved for review.” (People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1328.)
       3.     Analysis
       As an initial matter, we agree with defendant that the prosecution took unfair
advantage of the trial court’s ruling excluding evidence of a potential motive by
subsequently arguing to the jury that defendant had failed to offer any evidence of
motive. Though the offer of proof in this case was less definitive than the evidence
excluded in the cases cited above, we conclude the same principle applies: The
prosecution cannot stop the defense from seeking to introduce evidence based in part on
that evidence’s lack of relevance and then emphasize the lack of that evidence to the jury
as relevant to their decision.
       But here we must decide whether defense counsel performed ineffectively by
failing to object to this misconduct and request the trial court to admonish the jury.
“ ‘Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ ”
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.)
       Here, defense counsel made a tactical decision to address the victim’s motive to lie
in his own argument. Beginning early in his argument, defense counsel argued that the
lack of motive fit his theme, that the victim was a child whose story changed and grew
each time she interacted with a new group of adults trying to prove defendant had
committed a crime. Defense counsel emphasized only one of the questioners was a

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forensic interviewer trained to avoid leading questions, which can “put a story in a child’s
head.” Depicting the victim’s story as spiraling out of control from its beginning as a
small lie or misunderstanding about an interaction with defendant was a reasonable
approach. Defense counsel would have expected the jury to wonder why the victim
would lie, whether the prosecutor mentioned it or not. He had prepared to answer this
question, and stopping the prosecutor from discussing motive would not have assisted his
strategy and could have looked suspicious to the jury, especially given the prosecutor’s
discussion of motive took up only one page, two-thirds of the way through the 30-page
transcript of her argument.
       We conclude defendant has not established that defense counsel acted
unreasonably by deciding not to object to the prosecutor’s argument about the victim’s
lack of motive.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Mauro, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Mesiwala, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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