Court Opinion

ID: 9831328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:00:41.275932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.722314
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant maintains that the defense of bad faith was available under a general denial and submits a number of authorities. In our opinion they are not in point. So far as we have been able to ascertain, the rule of pleading in such case is correctly stated in Corpus Juris, in the title on Brokers, as follows:
“Thus the defense that plaintiff acted also for the other party, without defendant’s knowledge, cannot be proved under a general -denial, but must also be specifically pleaded; and this rule also generally applies to the defense of bad faith or fraud.” 9 C. J. 648, § 115.
The appellant also insists that the issue of the broker’s good faith was not one of fact for the trial court. When the broker told the customer that he might get the owner to take less than $6,250, he also stated that the owner “said he wanted to cheek over the bills when, he might be able to take less.” The case here is unlike the case of Harvey v. Lindsay, 117 Mich. 267, 75 N. W. 627, where the owner had an “asking price,” and the court submitted to the jury whether or not the broker disclosed this information or caused a customer to believe that the owner would not insist upon the “price asked,” and that he could press the owner into accepting a substantially less price. In such an instance the broker would assume the dual relation of undertaking to serve the adverse interests of the purchaser. Sears Land Co. v. Barton (Tex. Civ. App.) 227 S. W. 237. But in the case before us the list price depended on the cost price, which could not be furnished by the broker until the cost bills had been figured up by the owner, and, if the statement made by the broker to the customer was intended as a bona fide explanation that the price was not fixed because of lack of data on the cost of the house, we think we would not be justified in holding as a, matter of law that such evidence conclusively showed bad faith. Sheurer v. Eichelberger, 206 Mo. App. 635, 227 S. W. 622; Grollman v. Alexander (Tex. Civ. App.) 237 S. W. 592; Levy v. Jarrett (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 333.
Our refusal to reverse the judgment rendered against the appellant on his cross-action is also attacked. It is claimed by appellant that his refusal to rescind the proposed sale, after he learned of the customer’s fraud, would not have relieved him of liability for commission, and that our holding that it would have saved him from such liability conflicts with our holding that the owner is liable for the commission where the broker *206procures a purchaser, ready, able, and willing to buy, whether the deal is closed or not. We still think we were correct in the ruling. If the principal rejects a customer procured by the broker and refuses to enter tato a contract of sale because of the discovery of fraudulent representations made by the customer concerning the consideration, we think the broker cannot say that he has produced a purchaser, ready, able, and willing to buy on the principal’s terms. If the fraud has kept the minds of the parties from meeting, there ⅛ no sale unless the fraud be waived. Webb v. Durrett (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 1189. And if, for that reason, all negotiations are abandoned, the broker has earned no commission. McCarty v. Bristow (Tex. Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 1029. But in the case before us the principal waived the fraud, as already held.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.