Court Opinion

ID: 9588475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:46.537023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:59.082092
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment only.
I cannot join in giving the judicial definition to the term “collapse” in this and an unknown number of insurance contracts which is declared in this case. As I understand it, the word “collapse” (when otherwise not defined in the policy) would mean “a reasonably detectable serious impairment of structural integrity.” I do not believe this is the same thing, as such a condition may exist without collapse.
The word is both a noun and a verb. The policy states: “PART II OF THIS POLICY INSURES AGAINST ALL DIRECT LOSS FROM THE FOLLOWING NAMED PERILS: ... 11. Collapse1 of a building or any part thereof.”
As I see it, “collapse,” in use here as a noun, is a process. It may occur suddenly, as when hit by a great external force; or it may occur less traumatically, as when caused by internal weakening. Here it is evident the building, or wall, was in the process of collapsing and that it would have totally collapsed with the mere passage of time, but for the intervention of a human agency. There was evidence that total collapse, or breakdown, was otherwise inevitable, predictable, and irreversible. Instead of the process of collapse continuing to totality, the alert homeowner intervened and prevented the total collapse by ferreting out the source of the problem and stopping the process of collapsing. He had also conscientiously purchased an all-risk insurance policy to shield him from financial loss should his home be dam*419aged in whole or in part due to the peril denominated “collapse.” The law ordinarily favors one who mitigates his damages. OCGA § 13-6-5; Kingston Pencil Corp. v. Jordan, 115 Ga. App, 333, 334 (1) (154 SE2d 650) (1967).
Except when words of art are being used, we are to construe the words in contracts as having their plain and ordinary, usual meaning. OCGA § 13-2-2 (2). I would attach to it in this context that meaning rather than the one chosen by the majority from among the many possibilities discussed as coming from other cases. I am afraid that the meaning attributed to the word adds a connotation which may very well not have been intended. If it was, it is rather obtuse, and the court is writing these other words into this and untold numbers of existing contracts.
But it is the intention of the parties which we are charged with ascertaining. OCGA § 13-2-3. We ought whenever possible to give the denotative meaning, as that is the common denominator. In the marketplace of insurance contracts made with lay people, the ordinary use of words, the meaning generally ascribed to by the public, should be given because the insureds have no choice of words since they do not participate in drafting. The law construes the words of contracts against the drafter for that reason. See Kytle v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 109, 112 (1) (195 SE2d 787) (1973). We are governed by the principle that “[i]n construing an insurance policy» ‘[t]he test is not what the insurer intended its words to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand them to mean. The policy should be read as a layman would read it and not as it might be analyzed by an insurance expert or an attorney.’ [Cit.]” Greer v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 61, 63 (253 SE2d 408) (1979).
In the contract the word is not restricted by the use of words such as “final” or “total” or some other such language which would denote an intention of the parties that it was not meant to cover damage resulting from any stage of a collapse in progress. It is not an ambiguous term, involving a choice between two or more constructions (see Burden v. Thomas, 104 Ga. App. 300, 302 (121 SE2d 684) (1961)), but simply an unqualified one. In construing the scope of coverage, as opposed to the scope of exclusions, a broad view is taken. James v. Penn. Gen. Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 427, 431 (306 SE2d 422) (1983); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Bishop, 132 Ga. App. 816, 817 (1) (209 SE2d 223) (1974). “Had the insurance company desired coverage to be more restrictive, it could have drafted the policy accordingly.” Greer, supra at 63.
Of course, there would have to be proof persuasive to the factfinder that this is indeed what was happening when the collapse was arrested in progress.
*420Decided December 5, 1986
Rehearing denied December 19, 1986
William A. Dinges, William D. Strickland, for appellant.
H. Martin Huddleston, Nancy K. Wasserman, for appellees.

 This word in the phrase is in bold print.