Court Opinion

ID: 9750358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:53:54.322365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.091105
License: Public Domain

*704PELLEGRINI, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority finds that a third party’s payment of fine and costs which constitutes a conviction of an offense requires the suspension of the charged party’s operating privileges even where:
* the fines and costs were paid without the charged party’s consent or knowledge
* the charged party had “of record” entered a “not guilty” plea
* the magistrate later dismissed the charge upon which PennDOT rules.
I dissent because the initial order certifying conviction is no longer valid when a subsequent certified order is introduced dismissing the charge certified as a conviction in the initial order and, more importantly, that PennDOT, as a stranger to the criminal proceeding, has no standing to challenge that certified order dismissing the charge even if the magistrate was without jurisdiction to enter it.
The facts are undisputed. Licensee received citation for underage alcohol consumption (18 Pa.C.S. § 6808). Conviction of that offense causes a licensee’s driving operating privileges to be suspended by PennDOT. Despite the licensee written plea of not guilty to the charge, her father, unbeknownst to her, paid the fine and costs. The payment of fine and costs constitutes a conviction. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6501. The magistrate certified the conviction to Penn-DOT who then suspended Licensee’s license. Subsequently, but prior to the hearing by the trial court on the appeal from PennDOT’s suspension of licensee’s license, Licensee pled guilty to a disorderly conduct charge but the Magistrate dismissed the underage drinking charge on which PennDOT’s suspension was based.
In Schaeffer v. PennDOT, 120 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 461, 465, 548 A.2d 714 (1988), we set forth the established principles under which PennDOT could introduce records to meet its burden in license suspension cases. We stated that:
*705Under principles established by this Court in licensé suspension cases, however, DOT may prove its case by submission of certified records necessary to justify the suspension. See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Mull, 61 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 558, 434 A.2d 871 (1981); Section 6103 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6103. Moreover, Section 6104, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104, provides that records authenticated pursuant to Section 6103 shall be admissible as evidence of the existence or non-existence of facts recorded unless the circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. (Emphasis added).
Schaeffer, 120 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 464-65, 548 A.2d 714.
Because licensee introduced a certified order (Exhibit E) evidencing the dismissal of the charges against her upon which PennDOT was seeking a suspension, the original certified conviction is not admissible because no longer had any probative value because it lacked the trustworthiness for the document to stand for the proposition for which it was introduced. It cannot then be used by PennDOT to meet its burden of proof that licensee had been convicted. Because PennDOT did not prove Licensee was convicted of underage drinking, the suspension order must be vacated on this ground alone.
More fundamentally, I dissent as to the majority position that a stranger to a criminal action can somehow challenge a dismissal of a charge by a magistrate based upon the allegation that the magistrate’s order was invalid. Penn-DOT contends, and the majority adopted the position, that the magistrate was without authority to vacate the original conviction and dismiss the charges because the only method to change the certification of conviction was by filing within thirty days a notice of appeal of the conviction to common pleas court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 86.
Ignoring the “difficulty” a party has in appealing a conviction within thirty days that he or she is unaware of and, further that the initial conviction may be void ab initio *706because a third party cannot constitutionally change an accused plea from not guilty to guilty, PennDOT, a stranger to the action, cannot collaterally attack that order on any basis.
Orders of court, even those issued without jurisdiction are valid and must be followed unless appealed by a party to the transaction. School District of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers, Local 400, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO et al., 31 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 461, 469, 376 A.2d 1021, 1025 (1977); reversed on other grounds, 486 Pa. 365, 406 A.2d 324 (1979). A third party, one that has no direct interest in the action, cannot challenge the order because it is not a party aggrieved. Walker v. Walker, 362 Pa.Superior Ct. 75, 78, 523 A.2d 782, 783 (1987); Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, Division of Houdaille Industries, Inc., 364 Pa.Superior Ct. 178, 187, 527 A.2d 1012, 1017 (1987). Here, neither the police officer nor the District Attorney challenged the lack of jurisdiction to dismiss the charge; the requisite thirty days have passed and it is binding on all parties to that proceeding.
The majority holds that PennDOT in a civil administrative hearing can challenge a magistrate’s decision in a summary criminal proceeding on the basis that he did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the charge — something that even the parties to that action cannot now do. Whether the magistrate had jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked by PennDOT, a non party, but had to be challenged by the arresting officer and/or the District Attorney in a Pa.Crim. E.P. 86 appeal. PennDOT has no standing to challenge the dismissal of charges, let alone challenge it in the wrong proceeding.
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.