Court Opinion

ID: 9831950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:29:58.789674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:39.826305
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In his most able motion for rehearing, appellant vigorously insists that we were in error in affirming the judgment of the trial court. Appellant contends that the trial court should have specifically instructed the jury, in effect, that the burden was upon ap-pellee (defendant) to prove that the insured committed suicide with such a preponderance of evidence as to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of a natural or accidental death, and further that, since suicide was sought to be established by circumstantial evidence, the court should have charged the jury that the evidence and circumstances introduced to be sufficient to establish said fact must exclude any ' reasonable hypothesis that she met her death by natural or accidental or any other cause than that of suicide. We think the courts of this state have many times, and correctly, held against this contention of appellant. Wylie v. Posey, 71 Tex. 34, 9 S. W. 87, 90; Denham v. Trinity County Lumber Co., 73 Tex. 78, 11 S. W. 151, 152; Jennings v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 296 S. W. 961, 962; Woodmen of the World v. Alexander (Tex. Civ. App.) 239 S. W. 343; Travelers’ Protective Ass’n v. Roth (Tex. Civ. App.) 108 S. W. 1039, 1043; Moore v. Scott (Tex. Civ. App.) 16 S.W.(2d) 1100, 1109, pars. 6, 7; Masterson v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Nav. Dist. (Tex. Com. App.) 15 S.W.(2d) 1011.
In Wylie v. Posey, supra, the Supreme Court quoted, with approval, this language: “The law does not attempt to tell the juror what amount or kind of evidence ought to produce belief in his mind. ⅞ ⅜ ⅜ To do so — to try to give a specific meaning to the word ‘reasonable’ — is, in the words of Sir *905Fitz James Stephens, trying to count what is not number, and measure what is not space.”
In Denham v. Trinity County Lumber Co., supra, the Supreme Court used this language: ‘‘The charge itself is incorrect, inasmuch as it informs the jury that certain facts, .if proved, constitute contributory negligence, instead of leaving that question for them to determine according to the very facts of this case.”
In Jennings v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., supra, the court stated: “The legal presumption against suicide merely places the burden of proof upon the party pleading the same, and the rule relating to the evidence necessary to prove suicide is no different from the rule relating to the establishment of any other fact. In order to establish suicide, it is not necessary that the evidence should preclude every other reasonable hypothesis of death than that of suicide. Whether or not a man committed suicide is a fact question, and must be proved by preponderance of the testimony just as any other fact.” In Travelers’ Protective Association v. Roth, supra, the court used this language: “Appellant insists that the evidence relied upon to prove that Roth died as a result of an injury to his head caused by his fall on the ice is circumstantial, and that in such a case the eviden-tiary facts to show that his death was so caused must be of such a nature and so related to each other as to not fairly and reasonably permit any other conclusion than that his death was so caused to be drawn from them. It therefore contends that the court erred in instructing the jury that they should find for appellee if they believed from a preponderance of the evidence that the fall on the ice alone caused Roth’s death. * * * The weight of authority is that in all civil cases a mere preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.”
 Where a cause is submitted on special issues, the court is not authorized to give a general charge. The rule seems to be well established in this state that, where a party relies upon circumstantial evidence to establish his cause of action, or his defense, it is only necessary that said fact be established to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, whether same be circumstantial or otherwise.
Appellant contends that the trial court should have specifically charged the jury that there is a presumption of law against a person committing suicide. We do not agree with this contention. Our courts uniformly hold that the trial judge should not charge on the weight of the evidence, neither should he charge upon legal presumptions unless the same are expressly defined by statute. There are many issues of fact that are presumed, such as a witness is presumed to tell the truth, or that a letter mail-¡ed, properly stamped and addressed, is presumed to reach its destination, or that a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is valid, or that a person who dies suddenly did not commit suicide. Presumptions, however, always vanish when facts are given which destroy the presumption. Stooksbury v. Swan, 85 Tex. 565, 22 S. W. 963, 966; Jennings v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 296 S. W. 961; Black v. Continental Casualty Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 19 S.W.(2d) 69, 71; Moore v. Scott (Tex. Civ. App.) 16 S.W.(2d) 1109, par. 7; Reynolds v. Weinman (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 302; Sharpleigh & Co. v. Cooper, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 55; Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31, 19 S. W. 294, 296; Langford v. El Paso Baking Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1 S.W.(2d) 479, par. 4; American Central Ins. Co. v. Heath, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 445, 69 S. W. 235, 236; Largen v. State, 76 Tex. 323, 13 S. W. 161.
In Stooksbury v. Swan, supra, Judge Stay-ton used this language: “When a judge instructs a jury that a given fact will be presumed he must be understood to mean that the fact is to be taken as established — a result which cannot be reached except in those cases in which the presumption is said to be one of law, and therefore conclusive, otherwise than by weighing the evidence,, and therefore determining the existence or nonexistence of the fact. Such a weighing of evidence by a judge, and declaration of the result to the jury, are clearly a violation of the letter and spirit of the statute. * * * It has been frequently held in this state that a charge which, in effect, informed the jury that the law presumes the existence of some fact from the existence of others, is a charge upon the weight of evidence, and therefore improper, unless it be in those cases in which the presumption is said to be one of law, and therefore conclusive, or one of fact, required by positive law, but rebuttable” — citing a large number of authorities.
In Black v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, a case in which the insurance company was seeking to defeat a recovery by reason of the insured having committed suicide, the plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: “You are further instructed, if you find from the evidence, that the insured Elzie Burleson, came to his death by external and violent means, then the presumption of law is that he met his death by accidental means.”
The appellate court held that said charge should not have been given, and stated: “A similar requested charge, in almost identical language, was expressly condemned in Jennings v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 296 S. W. 961.”
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Tillman, supra, the Supreme Court used this language: *906“The death of Goslin, indisputably due to an overdose of morphine or opium self-administered, must he explained on the theory of accident or of intentional suicide. It is true that the presumption of law attaches to the former theory, hut this presumption cannot prevail against evidence to the contrary.”
In American Central Ins. Co. v. Heath, supra, the court used this language: “Presumptions [of suicide] disappear when confronted with facts.”
We have carefully examined the entire record in the light of appellant’s motion for rehearing, and we find no reason for reversing the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.