Court Opinion

ID: 9714201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:32:52.462548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.314680
License: Public Domain

MAY, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe Campos undoubtedly has standing to challenge the subsequent stop of the vehicle after the traffic stop for speeding had been concluded.7 The second stop was unsupported by any suspicion independent of the original stop and was therefore illegal.8 Therefore, the search that arose out of the illegal stop violated Campos’ Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure.
I would not, in the case before us, rely on the doctrine of standing to immunize police from the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule when the police behavior was this egregious; the officer obtained consent to a search by stating it was “necessary” after an improper second stop, which stop was unsupported by independent suspicion.
Furthermore, after the illegal second stop the police failed to advise Campos he had the right to consult a lawyer before consenting to a search. This serves as an independent ground for exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal second stop. I must therefore respectfully dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, a passenger may challenge the stop of a vehicle in situations when he could not challenge a search. See Osborne, 805 N.E.2d at 439 (a person has no standing to object to a *684search of a car based merely on the fact he or she was a passenger at the time of the search, but every person in a motor vehicle has a right to contest the stop of the vehicle in which he is traveling as either a driver or passenger).
Campos has such standing because he was subjected to an illegal “second stop” after the initial traffic stop was concluded. The officer told Santiago-Armendariz a search of the car was “necessary” even though neither Santiago-Armendariz nor Campos had done anything after the completion of the stop to give the officer reasonable suspicion that further investigation was necessary. Campos was “unlawfully detained beyond the parameters of a routine traffic stop,” Tumblin, 736 N.E.2d at 323, and “[t]he ensuing search and seizure were constitutionally infirm.” Id. As the evidence against Campos was obtained through an unlawful search, it cannot be used against him. See id.
An automobile passenger’s standing was explained in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979):
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation.... Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.
(Emphasis supplied.) An investigatory stop may be made only if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific facts that further investigation is necessary. McKnight v. State, 612 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63, 99 S.Ct. 1391), reh’g denied, trans. denied. In evaluating the validity of a stop, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. Id.
In McKnight, an officer was dispatched to a fight. About two blocks from the fight scene, he saw a car in which McKnight was a passenger traveling at a high rate of speed. When it did not come to a complete stop at a stop sign, the officer stopped the vehicle and asked the driver why he was driving so fast. The driver responded he was in a hurry to go home because he knew he was in violation of curfew. At that time, the officer received a radio call that the fight was going on and he had to go there. The officer told the driver and McKnight to go home. He then went to the fight scene.
Upon arriving, the officer learned several of the fight participants had fled the scene in a large vehicle. Recalling his earlier stop of the vehicle in which McKnight was riding he decided to stop it again. When he did so, he knew the occupants were violating curfew. He suspected the occupants had participated in the fight.
As the officer approached the automobile to question the occupants, he saw McKnight stuff something under his seat. The officer ordered the driver and McKnight to get out of the vehicle. He arrested them for violating curfew. In an inventory search of the vehicle he found cocaine. Some was under McKnight’s seat and some was on the floorboard in front of his seat.
McKnight contended the stop was illegal under the reasoning of People v. Fox, 203 Ill.App.3d 742,148 Ill.Dec. 826, 561 N.E.2d 132 (1990). Police stopped Fox because he was speeding. Later, a second stop was made because the same trooper noted the way Fox tugged on his jacket during the first stop and suspected Fox might have a weapon hidden under his jacket. The Fox court found the evidence from the second *685stop should have been suppressed, noting there must be separate justification for a second stop. Id. 148 IlLDec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 184.
The police officer told Fox “he hadn’t done anything wrong the second time, but from the actions that he did in my car [during the first stop], it made me nervous." Id. 148 IlLDec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 133. The court determined there was no independent reason for the second stop.
In McKnight we distinguished the Fox facts:
Due to the confluence of a number of factors, including the lateness of the hour, the emptiness of the streets, the proximity of [the car] to the fight scene, the speed with which [the driver] was driving in the vicinity of the fight scene, and the information that some of the combatants had fled in a large vehicle, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver and McKnight were participants in the fight.... Furthermore, this suspicion was independent of the initial stop. Therefore, any objection to the admission of the evidence garnered from the second stop would have been fruitless.
612 N.E.2d at 588.
In Fox, by contrast, Fox was stopped for speeding. He accompanied the officer to his squad car, where the officer wrote a speeding ticket. Before Fox entered the squad car, the officer took a hunting knife Fox was carrying. After writing the speeding ticket, the officer returned Fox’s knife and Fox left. The officer continued to follow Fox, and after Fox traveled two or three miles, the officer flashed his headlights and motioned for Fox to pull over. Fox testified the officer “grabbed my arm and up under my vest and started ... reaching, grabbing.” 148 Ill.Dec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 133. The officer removed a pistol from the waistband of Fox’s pants and placed him under arrest.
While writing the speeding citation, the officer had noticed Fox tugged at his vest three times as he sat in the patrol car. The officer stated, “I was somewhat curious but I didn’t feel at that time I had reason enough to go ahead and search his person.” Id. The officer said he stopped Fox the second time because:
After [Fox] got out of my vehicle, I was curious so I watched his movements. After he got out of the car, he buttoned his vest up and it made it snug around his waistband. I noticed a small bulge on his waistband on the rear left side and that made me even more curious, but it wasn’t large enough to be what I perceived to be a gun. At that time, he got back on his motorcycle and I followed him between a quarter and an eighth of a mile. It wasn’t a long distance. After he got on the motorcycle, he reached back to the spot where the bulge was and did what I do when I carry my weapon off duty to adjust it so it is less visible for a period of probably three to four seconds, and that’s when I decided to stop him again and check the area.

Id.

The officer testified that before stopping Fox the second time he “felt reasonably sure” Fox had a weapon. Id. The officer stated that when he searched Fox, he believed Fox to be dangerous because Fox had earlier stated he was carrying a knife because he was going to pick up a truck for a friend, and he “expected some trouble.” Id.
The Fox court determined the second stop was an incident separate and apart from the original and legitimate stop for a traffic violation, and noted the officer would have been justified in conducting a pat-down search for weapons in connection *686with the traffic arrest. Id. 148 Ill.Dec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 134. However, once that transaction was completed and Fox was allowed to leave, these safety considerations were no longer relevant and any farther intrusion on Fox’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy had to be “separately justified.” Id. That is, to justify the second stop the officer had to “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
By the officer’s own admission, Fox’s act during the first stop of tugging at his vest made the officer “somewhat curious,” but did not give him reason enough to search Fox while Fox was in the patrol car. Similarly, the officer discounted the small bulge he saw during the first stop at Fox’s waistband because it “wasn’t large enough to be what I perceived to be a gun.” Id. 148 Ill.Dec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 135. It was only after following Fox for some distance on the highway and seeing him reach behind to the area of the bulge in his vest and make an adjustment that the officer decided to “stop him again and cheek the area.” Id. The officer testified Fox’s gesture was similar to what he himself did when adjusting his weapon to make it less visible. However, as the trial court stated, the gesture was “equally consistent with innocent behavior,” e.g., adjusting one’s clothing for better wind resistance while riding. Id. The officer’s conclusion that Fox was carrying a weapon was therefore more a mere suspicion or hunch than a rational inference from the facts. Mere suspicions of the police are not sufficient to establish the reasonableness of a stop. As the officer’s stop of Fox was unreasonable, his subsequent search for weapons was impermissible. Id.
In the case before us, there was even less of a “separate justification” for the “second stop” of Campos and Santiago-Armendariz after the traffic stop was concluded and they were told they were “all set.” The officer apparently did not have “reason enough to search,” id. 148 Ill.Dec. 826, 561 N.E.2d at 133, Santiago-Armendariz, Campos, or the car during the initial traffic stop. And unlike Fox, neither Santiago-Armendariz nor Campos did anything suspicious after the officer concluded the traffic stop. Because the officer had no “suspicion ... independent of the initial stop,” McKnight, 612 N.E.2d at 588, the “second stop” of Santiago-Armendariz and Campos was illegal, and Campos has standing to challenge it.
Campos’ challenge to the stop would have been successful. The officer unlawfully detained Campos and Santiago-Ar-mendariz when he told Santiago-Armendariz a search of the car was “necessary” after he completed the traffic stop. We addressed detention “beyond the parameters of’ a traffic stop in Tumblin, 736 N.E.2d at 322. A police officer stopped a car in which Tumblin was a passenger for speeding. Neither the driver nor Tumblin was wearing a seat belt. The officer issued a verbal warning to the driver about the traffic infractions, then asked if there were drugs or weapons in the car. The driver said no and assented to the officer’s request to search the vehicle. The officer directed the driver and Tumblin to submit to a patdown search, which revealed Tum-blin had a gun. He failed to produce a license to carry it and was convicted of Carrying a Handgun Without a License.
We concluded Tumblin was “unlawfully detained beyond the parameters of a routine traffic stop. The ensuing search and seizure were constitutionally infirm. Tum-blin’s conviction, based on evidence obtained through an unlawful search, cannot *687stand.” Id. at 323. We found the officer had fully concluded a routine traffic stop without any indication of illegal activity beyond traffic infractions. There, as in the case before us, the purpose of his initial stop had been completed and the vehicle occupants were led to believe they were free to go before the officer inquired as to drugs or weapons. The officer’s testimony did not indicate either the driver or Tumblin evinced hostility, threatened him in any way, or made movements toward any area where a weapon could have been secreted.
In Tumblin we reviewed a number of decisions that addressed whether a police officer may routinely question a person lawfully detained for a traffic violation about the presence of weapons. We found courts have permitted such questioning in two situations: if the questioning was necessary for officer safety and if the officer’s question was reasonably related to the reason for the stop. Id. at 321. Accordingly, the officer was justified in asking Tumblin about weapons, which inquiry led to the vehicle search and patdown, only if he reasonably believed his safety was threatened or his inquiry was reasonably related to the basis of the initial stop. Because the initial stop was premised on minor traffic infractions, we focused exclusively on the safety justification. Id.
We concluded “the record herein does not disclose specific facts that caused [the officer] to entertain a reasonable fear for his safety in issuing a citation or making an arrest.” Id. at 322. We noted a vague and general characterization of demeanor, such as “nervousness,” does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. Id. The officer’s testimony at most indicated his general suspicion that a patdown search of Tumblin would yield incriminating evidence. Such a “general exploratory search” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Campos’ situation is similar to Tum-blin’s, and the officer’s search after telling Santiago-Armendariz such was “necessary” was improper under either Tumblin rationale. As in Tumblin, the purpose of the initial traffic stop had been completed. Campos and Santiago-Armendariz were told they were “all set” before the officer told Santiago-Armendariz it was “necessary” that he search the car in which Campos was a passenger. The record does not reflect either Santiago-Armen-dariz or Campos evinced hostility or threatened the officer in any way, or that their fidgeting included furtive hand movements toward any area where a weapon could have been secreted.
Having determined the second stop was illegal and Campos had standing to challenge it, I would also find Campos was in custody when the officer asked for his consent 9 to search the car. The officer was therefore obliged to advise Campos he had the right to consult a lawyer. This serves as an independent ground for exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal “second stop.”
Our Supreme Court held in Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975), that a person who is asked to consent to a search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel before deciding whether to consent. Because Pirtle was not afforded counsel after he requested it, he “could have no conception of the extent of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 28, 323 N.E.2d at 640.
The officer did not advise Campos of his Pirtle rights. The State argues no such *688advisement was required because Campos was not in custody. He was. A person is “in custody” if a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe he was under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the police. Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind.2006).10
There, the officer asked Sellmer between three and five times for permission to search her car before securing her consent. “We think that a reasonable person, asked the same question over and over and over again, might well conclude that she was not free to give the police a negative answer.” Id. at 364. The officer told Sellmer he “was needing to speak with her and it was in reference to a phone conversation which was received by our dispatcher and that there was a large amount of illegal drugs in it. And then [he] asked her directly at that point in time if she knew anything about that.” Id. The Court noted “a reasonable person, asked repeatedly if he or she knew why the police had received a report of a large quantity of contraband in his or her car, might well conclude either that he or she was under arrest or, at least, that she was not free to deny police permission to search her car.” Id.
In trying to convince Sellmer to give him permission to search her car, the officer told her “It’s in your best interest to cooperate with us and not make us jump through a bunch of hoops.” Id.
We think that a reasonable person, told by a police officer that it would be in the person’s “best interest” not to require the police to “jump through a bunch of hoops,” might well conclude that the consequence of denying the police permission to search her car might be arrest or, at least, detention during whatever time it would take for the police to jump through the hoops.

Id.

11

The officer also stated: “If you have nothing to hide here, and the information we have been given is not true, I’m going to thank you for your time and allow you to go on your way.” Id. A reasonable person, told by a police officer she could go on her way if she permitted the police to search her car and no contraband was discovered, might well conclude she was not free to go until a search was conducted. Id. at 364-65.
Sellmer asked the officer, “Do I have to let you [search my car]?” Id. The officer did not tell Sellmer she did not have to let him search and had the right to refuse. Instead, he again said, “It would be in your best interest to cooperate if you have nothing to hide.” Id. at 365. A reasonable person who asks that question and, rather than being told she did not have to consent to the search was instead told it would be in her best interest to consent, would conclude she had no practical alternative but to consent. Id.
The Court noted it was applying a “totality of the circumstances” test, and none of the factors taken alone “or, in all likelihood, several of them taken together,” would cause it to conclude a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe she was under arrest and not free to resist the entreaties of the police. However,
given the extensive efforts [the officer] went to ... to persuade Sellmer to consent and to avoid advising her that she *689was not required to consent even in the face of her direct questions, we conclude that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as those in which Sellmer found herself would believe either that she was under arrest or, at least, that she was not free to resist the entreaties of the police.
Id. As such, Sellmer was entitled to a Pirtle advisement and the trial court should have granted her motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of her car.
A different situation presented itself in Jones, 655 N.E.2d at 49. There, Jones was not in custody when he consented to the search of his vehicle. The number of officers present for Jones’ traffic stop was unusually high, but none of the officers touched or physically restrained Jones before he consented to a search of his car. Jones was not asked incriminating questions. He was never in the “care and control” of the police or interrogated in a manner impheating the Fifth Amendment and necessitating the giving of Miranda warnings. Id. at 56. Had Jones refused to give the police permission to search, he would have been given two citations and been free to leave. The officer told Jones he did not have to let the officer search and he had the right to refuse, but Jones reaffirmed, saying, “Go ahead.” Id. at 53.
The case before us is more like Sellmer than Jones. When the officer sought consent to the search, neither Campos nor Santiago-Armendariz was told he could decline to consent. Instead, the officer told Santiago-Armendariz the search was “necessary,” (Tr. at 31), and he obtained Campos’ consent based on Santiago-Ar-mendariz’s consent to the “necessary” search.12 Like in Sellmer, the officer asked Campos and Santiago-Armendariz the same questions multiple times — here, about where they had been and who owned the car. After telling Santiago-Armendar-iz the search was “necessary” he told Santiago-Armendariz and Campos to remain in the police car as he searched the car in which Campos had been riding. He asked Campos for his identification even though the stop was ostensibly because the driver committed a traffic violation.
Campos was in custody after the officer told Santiago-Armendariz, even though the traffic stop had been completed, the search was “necessary.” Campos was accordingly entitled to a Pirtle advisement.
Our Supreme Court and this court have consistently condemned “fishing expeditions” such as that to which Santiago-Armendariz and Campos were subjected. See, e.g., Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 364 (Ind.2005) (“Allowing random searches, or searches of those individuals whom the officers hope to find in possession of incriminating evidence gives excessive discretion to engage in fishing expeditions.”).
In State v. Tucker, 588 N.E.2d 579 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), we held a seizure of evidence from Tucker’s automobile could not be justified as a result of a purported “inventory search” where the search was conducted as part of an investigation by officers who were told to look for evidence and to impound the automobile and do an inventory search if they found anything. “We will not countenance such fishing expeditions. An illegal search, though it be called an *690inventory search, is still an illegal search.” Id. at 581.
We reached a similar result in Sanders v. State, 576 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991). Police officers were watching Sanders because an informant had reported Sanders would be driving a gold Cadillac and was “possibly in possession of some narcotics at that time.” Id. at 1329. Police made no attempt to establish the trustworthiness of that information. The officers pulled Sanders over because he did not to use his turn signal, not because they had probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. Sanders and his passenger were asked to leave the car and police searched it.
The State argued the search was necessary to ensure the officers’ safety. There, as in the case before us, there was “absolutely no indication that the officers reasonably believed they were in danger.” Id. Instead,
[t]his was a case in which the officers went on a fishing expedition and discovered marijuana. As our supreme court has stated: “It will be a sad day indeed when this court sanctions the detention and search of persons and their property on the mere allegation that they are of suspicious character.” The State has not demonstrated that it had probable cause to believe Sanders had committed a crime, or that a search of the vehicle was necessary for the safety of the officers. The evidence admitted at trial was obtained through an illegal search, and was thus inadmissible.
Id. at 1330 (citation omitted).
The evidence against Campos was obtained through such a “fishing expedition” in the form of the illegal “second stop.” The officer improperly stated consent to a search of the car was “necessary,” even though no reasonable suspicion arose after the completion of the traffic stop. I would therefore reverse the denial of Campos’ motion to suppress.

. This process is known as a "Badger” — a police interdiction technique by which an officer attempts to obtain consent to a search even though the officer has no legal basis to further detain the person he has stopped. See State v. Jones, 278 Wis.2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104, 107 (App.2005), review denied 282 Wis.2d 720, 700 N.W.2d 272 (2005). There, an officer stopped the vehicle in which Jones was a passenger for speeding. The officer asked defendants for their identification, then ran checks on the identifications and the vehicle license plate. The checks did not reveal anything irregular or suspicious. The officer wrote a warning citation for the driver. The officer asked the driver to accompany him to the rear of the vehicle, where the officer explained the warning citation to him. The officer returned both identification cards.
Seconds later, the officer asked the driver if there was anything illegal in the car. The driver said no and the officer then asked to search the vehicle. The officer found cocaine and a weapon, and arrested Jones and the driver. The trial court granted Jones' motion to suppress the evidence the officer obtained from the "Badger” interdiction. The Jones court affirmed, on the ground the driver was "seized” when he consented to the search.

.As the State acknowledges in its own Statement of the Facts, ”[a]ll business concerning the traffic stop was concluded,” (Br. of Appellee at 4), before the officer told Santiago-Armendariz a search of his car was "necessary.” The officer handed the driver the warning ticket, returned his identification, told him he was "all set,” and to be careful pulling out into traffic. As explained below, under these undisputed facts I cannot join the majority's statement "[t]his was a single ongoing stop continuously supported by reasonable suspicion.” (Op. at 682.) Rather, Campos was subjected to an illegal "second stop.”

. The State does not explain why the officer was seeking ''consent” from the passenger Campos, who the State now asserts had no standing to object to a search anyway.

. The State does not acknowledge the Sellmer facts, analysis, or result.

. The Court also noted such a reasonable person might well conclude that even if she refused, her car would be searched anyway "as soon as the police finished jumping through the hoops.” Id.

. The State asserts Santiago-Armendariz's conversation with the officer about consent is "irrelevant to Campos' consent.” (Br. of Ap-pellee at 17) (emphasis in original). The State does not acknowledge in that argument the undisputed evidence that when Campos consented he was deferring to Santiago-Ar-mendariz, who had already consented because it was "necessary” he do so.