Court Opinion

ID: 2964958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:27.778025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:55.691509
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2370

                     LUIS CARRERAS-ROSA AND FRANCISCO SOLER-ROSA,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                              MELVIN ALVES-CRUZ, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Antonio Bauza-Torres on brief for appellants.
            ____________________
            Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor  General, Edda Serrano-Blasini, Deputy
            ________________                      ____________________
        Solicitor   General,  and   Edgardo  Rodriguez-Quilichini,   Assistant
                                    _____________________________
        Solicitor General, Department of Justice, on brief for appellee Melvin
        Alves-Cruz.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 9, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.    This   appeal   concerns   the   judgment
                 __________

            dismissing a 42 U.S.C.   1983 complaint as untimely under the

            applicable Puerto  Rico statute of limitations.   We write to

            clarify that, applying  Puerto Rico law, the  day plaintiffs'

            action accrued should not be counted  as the first day of the

            limitations  period and that the limitations period begins to

            run on  the following day.  The prior decisions of this court

            and the district court for Puerto Rico may have been somewhat

            inconsistent  on  that   point.    Therefore  we   take  this

            opportunity to resolve any uncertainty.

                                    I.  Background
                                    I.  Background

                 Plaintiffs'   brother  was   shot  and  killed   by  the

            defendants,  policemen  in  Puerto  Rico  on  May  19,  1994.

            Plaintiffs learned of the death on May 20,  1994.  They filed

            their   1983 complaint on May 22, 1995. 

                 Defendants moved to dismiss based on the applicable one-

            year statute  of limitations,  Article 1868(2)  of the  Civil

            Code,  P.R.  Laws  Ann.  tit.  31,     5298(2).    Plaintiffs

            responded that  they did  not know of  their cause  of action

            until they received an autopsy report in early May 1995.  The

            district court rejected  plaintiffs' analysis and  determined

            that the action accrued on May 20,  1994.  The district court

            further  concluded that the complaint filed  on May 22, 1995,

            was two days too late  and so entered judgment dismissing the

            complaint.

                                         -2-

                 Plaintiffs moved  to vacate  the judgment  of dismissal,

            arguing that the day  of accrual, May 20, 1994, should not be

            counted, so that the 365-day limitations period ran from  May

            21, 1994, until Saturday, May  20, 1995.  They further argued

            that  their complaint  was  timely filed  on Monday,  May 22,

            1995,  the  next court  day.   The  district  court summarily

            denied that motion.

                 This  appeal  followed.   The  parties'  briefs  did not

            adequately  address the question  whether the day  of accrual

            should be counted as the first day of the limitations period,

            and so supplemental briefs were  ordered.  Now that the issue

            has been fully  briefed, and as the facts  are fully laid out

            upon the record, we are prepared to decide the appeal without

            further argument.  See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 34.1(a)(2)(iii).
                               ___

                                   II.  Discussion
                                   II.  Discussion

                 The  limitation period for  filing this    1983 claim is

            governed by the  applicable state statute of  limitations for

            personal injury actions.  See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
                                      ___ ______    ______

            278-80  (1985).   In Puerto  Rico  the applicable  limitation

            period for tort actions is one year.  Article 1868(2)  of the

            Civil  Code, P.R.  Laws Ann.  tit. 31,    5298(2);  Torres v.
                                                                ______

            Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d  404, 406 (1st Cir. 1990).
            ________________________

            One year  means 365 days,  or 366 days  in leap year.   Olivo
                                                                    _____

            Ayala v. Lopez  Feliciano, 729 F. Supp.  9, 10 (D.P.R.  1990);
            _____    ________________

                                         -3-

            Yeinsip  v. Lufthansa German  Airlines, 725 F. Supp.  113, 115
            _______     __________________________

            (D.P.R. 1989).

                 Although  the limitations period  is determined by state

            law,  the date  of accrual  is a federal  law question.   The

            accrual period  for a    1983 action "ordinarily  starts when

            the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of  the injury on

            which  the  action  is based."    Rivera-Muriente  v. Agosto-
                                              _______________     _______

            Alicea,  959  F.2d  349,  353  (1st  Cir.  1992).    In  this
            ______

            particular case, it is clear that the date of accrual  is May

            20, 1994,  the  date on  which  plaintiffs learned  of  their

            brother's death.

                 The  question that  concerns  us  here  is  whether  the

            limitations  period begins  on  the date  of  accrual or  the

            following day.  In this    1983 case brought in Puerto  Rico,

            Puerto Rico law governs the limitations period, including the

            "closely  related  questions  of  . .  .  application."   See
                                                                      ___

            Wilson,  471 U.S.  at  269.   Thus,  when  the federal  court
            ______

            borrows the state statute of  limitations, so too the date on

            which   the  limitations  period  starts  to  run  should  be

            determined by the state law defining the "application" of the

            limitations period.   Accordingly, we determine  the question

            under Puerto Rico law.1
                                  1

                                
            ____________________

               1To the extent that Puerto  Rico law provides that the day
               1
            that an action accrues is not counted as the first day of the
            limitations period,  it is  consistent with  Fed. R.  Civ. R.
            6(a), which provides:

                                         -4-

                 The prior opinions of the Puerto Rico district court and

            this court may have been somewhat inconsistent in determining

            the first day of the limitations period.  The inconsistencies

            appear  to stem from differing applications of two provisions

            of Puerto Rico law and a Puerto Rico court rule.  Article 388

            of the Political Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1,   72, provides:

                      The time in which any act provided by law
                      is to  be done is  computed by  excluding
                      the first  day, and  including the  last,
                      unless the  last day  is  a holiday,  and
                      then it is also excluded.

            Similarly, as relevant here, Rule 68.1 provides:

                      In   computing   any   period   of   time
                      prescribed or allowed  by these rules, by
                      order  of the court, or by any applicable
                      statute,  the  day of  the act,  event or
                      default from which  the designated period
                      of  time  begins  to  run  shall  not  be
                      included. . . .

            In contrast, Article  1869 of the Civil Code,  P.R. Laws Ann.

            tit. 31,   5299, provides: 

                      The time  for  the  prescription  of  all
                      kinds  of  actions,   when  there  is  no
                      special provision to  the contrary, shall
                      be  counted from  the day  on which  they
                      could have been instituted.

                                
            ____________________

                      In   computing   any   period   of   time
                      prescribed  or  allowed  by  .  .  .  any
                      applicable statute, the  day of the  act,
                      event   or   default   from   which   the
                      designated period  of time begins  to run
                      shall not be included.
            Therefore, the result here would  be the same whether federal
            law or Puerto Rico law were applied.

                                         -5-

                 In  some  federal  cases, with  which  we  now disagree,

            Article 1869 was thought to  prevail, so that the limitations

            period  was held  to include  the first  day that  the action

            could  have been  instituted.   See Ramirez  Morales v.  Rosa
                                            ___ ________________     ____

            Viera, 632 F. Supp. 491, 492 (D.P.R. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 2,
            _____                                      _____

            4-5 (1st Cir.  1987); Olivo Ayala, 729 F. Supp.  at 10; Dennis
                                  ___________                      ______

            v. Figueroa, 642  F. Supp. 959, 961 (D.P.R. 1986);  de la Cruz
               ________                                        __________

            LaChapel v.  Chevere Ortiz, 637 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.P.R. 1986);
            ________     _____________

            see also Altair  Corp. v. Pesquera de Busquets,  769 F.2d 30,
            ________ _____________    ____________________

            33 (1st Cir. 1985).  And in dicta this court has  equated the

            date of accrual with the first day of the limitations period:

            "[The]  date   of  accrual,  i.e.,  the  day   on  which  the
                                         ____

            limitations  clock begins to tick, is determined by reference

            to federal  law."   Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz,  23 F.3d  607, 610
                                _____________    ____

            (1st  Cir. 1994) (precise dates  were not dispositive in that

            case). 

                 However,  in other  cases,  with  which  we  now  agree,

            Article 388 prevailed,  so that the limitations  period began

            on the day  following the date of accrual.   See Salamanca v.
                                                         ___ _________

            American  Airlines, Inc., 920  F. Supp. 24, 26  (D.P.R. 1996);
            ________________________

            Conde v.  Beltran Pena, 793 F. Supp. 33,  35-36 (D.P.R. 1992);
            _____     ____________

            Yeinsip,  725 F. Supp.  at 115;  see  also Silva-Wiscovich  v.
            _______                         _________ _______________

            Weber  Dental Manufacturing Co., 835 F.2d  409, 409 (1st Cir.
            _______________________________

            1987).

                                         -6-

                 We  now  conclude  that  the  method  of  computing  the

            limitations period followed in Salamanca,  Conde, and Yeinsip
                                           _________   _____      _______

            applies in this   1983 action filed in the district court for

            Puerto Rico:

                      the day in  which a tort cause  of action
                      arises  counts  in   the  sense  that  it
                      provides  the  starting   point  for  the
                      computation of the  prescriptive term; it
                      is  not,  however,  counted  within  that
                      term.

            Salamanca, 920 F. Supp. at 26.  
            _________

                 We  reach this conclusion because, as the district court

            in Salamanca noted,  the Puerto Rico  Supreme Court has  held
               _________

            that Article 388 (not counting  the first day) applies to the

            statute of limitations  for tort actions, which  statute also

            prescribes  this    1983 action.    E.g., Comunidad  Agricola
                                                ____  ___________________

            Bianchi v. Superior Court, 99 P.R.Dec. 366, 368 (1970); Ortiz
            _______    ______________                               _____

            v. American  Railroad Co.,  62 P.R.Dec.  171, 176-77  (1943);
               ______________________

            Cintron  v.  Insular  Industrial  &  Agricultural  Exposition
            _______      ________________________________________________

            Ass'n,  58 P.R.Dec.  821, 828  (1941); see  also Escalera  v.
            _____                                  _________ ________

            Andino, 76 P.R.Dec.  251, 254 (1954).  As  the district court
            ______

            in  Yeinsip  explained,   Article  1869   "is  a   suppletory
                _______

            [provision], to  be applied only  if no special law  over the

            matter has  been adopted,"  and Article  388  "is a  specific

            statute which regulates  the computation of legal  periods of

            time," so that Article 388 controls.  725 F. Supp. at 115.  

                 Here,  applying   the  correct   rule  to   compute  the

            prescriptive period,  plaintiffs' action  accrued on  May 20,

                                         -7-

            1994, but  the statute  of limitations did  not begin  to run

            until the  next day,  May 21, 1994.   The  applicable 365-day

            period  would have  expired on Saturday,  May 20,  1995, but,

            excluding the  weekend days, the  limitations period extended

            to  the  following  Monday.    It  follows  that  plaintiffs'

            complaint was timely filed on Monday, May 22, 1995.  

                 Accordingly,  we vacate  the  judgment  of the  district
                                  ______

            court  dismissing  the  complaint   and  remand  for  further
                                                     ______

            proceedings.

                                         -8-