Court Opinion

ID: 9663538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:42:00.543428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:51.506890
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.

(dissenting).

The majority correctly notes that plaintiffs claims regarding defendants’ decisions are barred by governmental employee immunity because those decisions were discretionary-decisional. The majority goes on to hold, in effect, that a governmental employee’s decision is not discretionary-decisional unless it is "informed.”
In our earlier opinion in this case, we stated that defendant Temple based his recommendation on about thirteen weekly visits to the Baskin home, interviews with Mr. and Mrs. Baskin, observations of interaction between the parents and children, and defendant Jones’ report. Jones ap*732parently based his conclusion on an office interview with Mr. and Mrs. Baskin and references to Temple’s reports. Bolton v Jones, 156 Mich App 642, 645; 401 NW2d 894 (1986), vacated 431 Mich 856 (1988).
I dissent because any plaintiff could use the majority’s opinion as a basis for an argument that his or her claims regarding a governmental employee’s decision are not barred because that employee should have conducted one more test or interview before deciding.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to adequately interview and investigate the Baskins. The majority interprets these claims in an overly-broad manner in finding that plaintiff, in effect, claimed that defendants failed to make informed decisions. Our Supreme Court referred to "informed” decisions as decisions based on statutory criteria. See Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326, 351, n 15; 422 NW2d 688 (1988); Teasel v Dep’t of Mental Health, 419 Mich 390, 409; 355 NW2d 75 (1984). I find no reason to believe that defendants failed to make "informed” decisions.
The majority suggests that, although defendants’ decisions were discretionary, some type of standards governed the amount of information that they should have obtained before making the decisions and the manner in which the information should have been obtained. The majority further suggests that defendants’ alleged deviation from these standards was ministerial. Our Supreme Court rejected the theory advanced in Davis v Lhim (On Remand), 147 Mich App 8, 12-15; 382 NW2d 195 (1985), lv gtd 425 Mich 851 (1986), that any act of a professional which deviates from professional standards is, ipso facto, ministerial in nature. Canon, supra, p 334. Our Supreme Court stated:
*733To adopt such a definition for "ministerial” would come close to eliminating all immunity for professionals by confusing the issues of immunity and negligence. The distinction is significant. If every act which deviates from a professional norm were to be categorized as "ministerial,” immunity would seldom shield professional discretion. Nothing in Ross, supra, [Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984)] hints at such a drastic limitation on the scope of individual immunity. To the contrary, in Ross, we cited with approval Justice Edwards’ observation in Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 261-262; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), that " '[discretion implies the right to be wrong.’ ” Ross, supra, p 628. The very concept of immunity presupposes that the activities complained of may have been negligently performed — i.e., in violation of the requisite standard of care. In protecting significant decision making on the part of public employees from tort liability, Ross intended "to ensure that a decision-maker is free to devise the best overall solution to a particular problem, undeterred by the fear that those few people who are injured by the decision will bring suit.” Ross, supra, p 631. Courts should take care not to confuse their separate inquiries into immunity and negligence. [Canon, supra, p 335.]
The majority’s opinion appears to reestablish the definition of "ministerial” which our Supreme Court rejected in Canon. Decision makers will not be free to devise the best overall solutions to problems if they are forced to delay their decisions and conduct superfluous tests, interviews and investigations because of fear that they will be sued for an alleged failure to acquire sufficient information before deciding. Decision makers should not be forced to prove at trial or in an "appropriate” motion, as the majority suggests, that their professional expertise combined with their knowledge of *734a particular case enabled them to make a discretionary decision.
I would affirm the lower court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants based on governmental employee immunity.