Court Opinion

ID: 9707343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:09:19.734691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:31.518447
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE MORAN delivered the opinion of the court. This appeal involves interpretation of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 85, § 1-101 et seq.) passed into law August 13, 1965, and referred to herein as the Tort Immunity Act. The plaintiff, Alvernest Mills, on September 5, 1965, shortly after the adoption of this Act, while entering her automobile which was parked on one of the streets of the City of Rockford, County of Winnebago, State of Illinois, sustained an injury as a result of a bullet passing through the thighs of both of her legs. It seems that one John Williams, Deputy Sheriff of the County of Winnebago, defendant, while in the performance of his duties, was in pursuit of a youth suspected of having committed a misdemeanor. Williams fired his revolver at the fleeing youth and one of the bullets struck the plaintiff as stated. On March 4, 1966, the plaintiff filed a notice with the County Clerk of the defendant which notice informed the defendant (along with other information not necessary to be considered in this appeal) that she was about to commence an action because of the injuries sustained. Thereafter, on August 30, 1966, plaintiff filed her complaint solely against the defendant setting forth, in addition to the above matters, that she was in the exercise of due care of herself at the time and place in question; that it was the duty of Williams not to cause her harm but that, despite this duty, Williams did so in a “wilful and wanton” manner which caused the claimed injury. The defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint. One of the grounds was based upon section 22.1 of the Corporate Name and Powers in General Act (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 34, § 301.1) and referred to herein as the Indemnification Act. The motion was allowed with leave to amend; however, the plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint and this appeal followed. The sections of statutes in force at the time of this occurrence are as follows: Chapter 85, § 2-109: “A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” Chapter 85, § 2-202: “A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton negligence.” Chapter 34, § 301.1: “No county shall be liable for any injuries to the person or to the property or for the death of any person heretofore or hereafter caused by or resulting from the negligence of its agents, servants, officers or employees in the operation or maintenance of any property, equipment or facility under the jurisdiction, control or custody of the county or otherwise occasioned by the acts or conduct of such agents, servants, officers or employees; however, in case any injury to the person or property of another is caused by a sheriff or any deputy sheriff, while the sheriff or deputy is engaged in the performance of his duties as such, and without the contributory negligence of the injured person or the owner of the injured property, or the agent or servant of the injured person or owner, the county shall indemnify the sheriff or deputy, as the case may (be) for any judgment recovered against him as the result of such injury, except where the injury results from the wilful misconduct of the sheriff or deputy, as the case may be, to the extent of not to exceed $50,000, including costs of suit. . . (Emphasis added.) It is plaintiff’s theory that section 2-202, which concerns itself with immunity of public employees as opposed to public entities, allows her to recover against Williams if he has been guilty of wilful and wanton negligence. Then, after first establishing her right under section 2-202, in the manner related above, the plaintiff urges that, even though Williams has not been found liable in another action or joined in this suit, he may, nevertheless, be found guilty in the present case. She then concludes that if he is found guilty of wilful and wanton negligence, then it would naturally follow that the defendant would be liable under section 2-109. A brief history reveals that in 1959, there was passed into law that portion of the statute which immunized all counties and its agents, servants, officers or employees from liabilities caused by their negligent acts in the operation or maintenance of any property, equipment or facility under the county’s jurisdiction, control or custody. In 1961, by amendment, there was added the present indemnification provision set forth as section 301.1 above, relating to injuries caused by the negligent acts of sheriffs or their deputies while engaged in the performance of his duties, “except where the injury results from wilful misconduct of the sheriff or deputy, . . . .” This statute remained intact until the case of Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill2d 379, 382, 215 NE2d 274 (1966) when the Supreme Court held void that portion of the Act adopted in 1959, which granted immunity to all counties and their agents, servants, officers or employees for injuries caused to others as a result of their negligent acts. The reason assigned in the decision was that the Legislature had attempted to classify governmental units as such, without regard to similarity of function. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court specifically referred to only the 1959 enactment and not to the added portion of 1961. It is to be further noted that while the 1961 addition refers only to sheriffs and their deputies, still the Legislature had, as far back as 1945, adopted a like provision in the Cities and Villages Act referring to members of the police department of a municipality. (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 24, §§ 1-4-5 and 1-4-6.) See Andrews v. Porter, 70 Ill App2d 202, 217 NE2d 305 (1966), affd in Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill2d 309, 226 NE2d 597 (1967).  We are of the opinion that the portion of the statute with which we are here concerned, namely, the indemnification by the county for the negligent acts of the sheriff or his deputies, survived the Hutchings case, first, because the decision was specifically directed at that portion of the statute enacted in 1959 and, second, because the 1961 enactment encompassed two separate subjects or objects. It is a rule that where a statute provides for two distinct subjects or classes, it may be sustained as to one of them although the portion relating to the other may be unconstitutional and void, provided the separation may be accomplished without jeopardizing the intent of the Legislature. Henrys v. Raboin, 395 Ill 118, 124, 69 NE2d 491 (1946); Noel v. People, 187 Ill 587, 597, 58 NE 616 (1900); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill 361, 389-391, 37 NE 247 (1894). Therefore, at the time the plaintiff’s cause of action arose, there was in force a specific statute relating to injuries caused by the negligent acts of Williams while in the performance of his duties but excepting therefrom any wilful misconduct on his part. The question then becomes whether or not the plaintiff can sue the county directly when she charges only wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the deputy who is an employee of the defendant county? We think not.  The Tort Immunity Act must be read in pari materia with the Indemnification Act. Both statutes relate to the one injury received by the plaintiff through the act of Williams. Where statutes relate to the same thing or the same subject or object they are in pari materia and should be construed together regardless of the time of their enactment. Spring Hill Cemetery of Danville v. Ryan, 20 Ill2d 608, 615, 170 NE2d 619 (1960). Statutes are to be construed according to their intent and meaning taking into consideration the reason for their enactment, the existing circumstances and the objective sought by the Legislature. Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chegin, 85 Ill2d 375, 378, 220 NE2d 226 (1966). It is noteworthy that after the Hutchings case was decided in 1966, the Legislature in 1967 readopted the Indemnification Act, without the 1959 provision, and this was done after the Tort Immunity Act of 1965 which, it seems, clearly evidences, not only their knowledge of the existing statute, but their intent with relation to acts of sheriffs and their deputies in the performance of their duties. People ex rel. Myers v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 19 Ill2d 122, 129, 166 NE2d 86 (1960). It is a further rule of statutory construction, that where there is a statute covering a specific subject it should control as against general provisions covering the same subject either in the same act or in the general laws relating thereto. People ex rel. Myers v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra; Jansen v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 58 Ill App2d 97, 105-106, 206 NE2d 249 (1965).  While the case of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill2d 11, 163 NE2d 89 (1959) eliminated the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity for municipal corporations, List v. O’Connor, 19 Ill2d 337, 340, 167 NE2d 188 (1960), still the General Assembly has the right to enact legislation establishing total immunity or partial immunity if it does so within the framework of our Constitution. With the Molitor case in view, the Legislature adopted the Tort Immunity Act. This Act limits the Molitor rule by specifying in what instances a person may not recover. Part 1 of Article II of the Act concerns itself only with public entities as defined by section 1-206 and sets forth specifically when a local public entity will not be liable. One such instance is where the injury complained of results “from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” Section 2-109, supra. It could not be more plainly and simply stated. Since a public entity acts only through its employee, as defined by section 1-202 of the Act, it cannot by itself be liable without its employee being liable, as a condition precedent to recovery. Part 2 of Article II of the Act concerns itself with public employees, as defined by section 1-202, and also specifically sets forth when a public employee will not be liable. One such instance is when his act or omission is in the execution or enforcement of any law, “unless such act or omission constitutes wilful and wanton negligence.” Section 2-202, supra. We interpret this to mean that while a public employee may be immune from suit for his action or inactions, if you will, in the execution or enforcement of any law, still he, personally or individually, not the entity, may be held to answer for his act or inaction if it amounts to wilful and wanton negligence. The plaintiff in the instant case is attempting to interchange separately covered subjects of the legislature, which are both directed at the one subject of immunity. Still, as can be seen from the format of the Tort Immunity Act, this is exactly what the Legislature intended to avoid. This avoidance is further supported by the fact that Part 3 of Article II, section 2-301, expressly excludes chapter 34, section 301.1, supra, from the Act.  We therefore conclude that the plaintiff herein may have a cause of action against Williams for his wilful and wanton conduct by virtue of the Tort Immunity Act; however, this would be limited as against him individually. The trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint against the defendant county which was based upon the wilful and wanton misconduct of Williams in the performance of his duty. Judgment affirmed. SEIDENFELD, J., concurs. DAVIS, J., dissents.