Court Opinion

ID: 9626747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:23:09.321526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:33.183825
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority takes me to task for suggesting that we should independently review the text, history, and purpose of OCGA § 13-1-11 and decide for ourselves the legislative intent of the phrase “any note or other evidence of indebtedness.” According to the majority opinion, once the Court of Appeals has interpreted a statute in a particular manner for a sufficiently long period of time, this Court must defer to that construction as though it had become part of the statutory text. In support of this notion, the opinion relies heavily on *847two cases holding that where this Court has definitively construed particular statutory language, and the General Assembly later amends the statute in other respects but leaves the language on which this Court based its construction intact, the prior construction of the particular statutory language controls.1
There is a profound difference between recognizing that considerations of stare decisis are at their apex when the General Assembly has arguably approved this Court’s prior construction of specific statutory language, albeit implicitly, and contending, as the majority opinion does, that the Court of Appeals has the power to bind this Court by deciding a question of statutory interpretation incorrectly and then following its own erroneous precedent for a sufficient length of time. The majority opinion’s position on this point contradicts the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which states plainly that “[t]he decisions of the Court of Appeals . . . shall bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedents,”2 and that “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”3 Thus, this Court is writing on a “clean slate” where, as here, it must decide an issue of first impression regarding statutory interpretation, and prior interpretations by the Court of Appeals should be considered for their persuasive value only.
The majority opinion responds to this point by arguing that it is merely applying a rule of statutory construction, and that what binds this Court is not the Court of Appeals’ 1977 decision in Burgess v. Clermont Properties, Inc.,4 but rather the unexpressed intent of the General Assemblies convened after 1977 that chose not to amend the statute in a way that would effectively overrule the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. Of course, it is this Court’s own misapplication of the rules of statutory construction that elevates the Court of Appeals’ erroneous statutory interpretation to the legal equivalent of the affirmatively expressed intent of later General Assemblies. In other words, the majority’s response is completely circular.
It is undisputed that the General Assemblies convened after 1977 have passed no legislation indicating whether they agree or disagree with the Court of Appeals’ decision in Burgess. I think we would do better to heed the United States Supreme Court’s oft-repeated warning about reading too much into legislative silence and inaction. As the high court has explained:
*848Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.... The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible. This Court has many times reconsidered statutory constructions that have been passively abided by Congress. Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis. “It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946). . . . Where, as in the case before us, there is no indication that a subsequent Congress has addressed itself to the particular problem, we are unpersuaded that silence is tantamount to acquiescence, let alone . . . approval. . . .5
Put another way, “[t]o explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities.”6 It is primarily the responsibility of this Court, not the General Assembly, to correct errors of statutory interpretation by the Court of Appeals, and we should not place this burden on the General Assembly’s shoulders.7
I turn now to the question certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”).8 RadioShack contends thatOCGA§ 13-1-11 applies to this case and limits the amount Cascade can recover in attorney fees after successfully prosecuting its suit to enforce the lease agreement. In support of this proposition, RadioShack relies on a line of cases from *849the Court of Appeals beginning in 19779 holding or stating that a commercial lease constitutes an “evidence of indebtedness” within the meaning of OCGA § 13-1-11.10 RadioShack maintains that the factual and procedural dissimilarities between this case and the Court of Appeals’ precedents are distinctions without a difference.
In response, Cascade correctly asserts that this Court has never decided whether a commercial lease constitutes an “evidence of indebtedness” under OCGA § 13-1-11, and the case thus presents a question of first impression in this Court. Cascade also notes that the General Assembly first adopted the relevant statutory language in 1891,11 yet it was not until more than 80 years later that the Court of Appeals itself first held that the statute applies to commercial leases. According to Cascade, the Court of Appeals took a wrong turn in Burgess in 1977 and has simply been following that erroneous precedent ever since. Alternatively, Cascade argues that this case is factually and procedur ally distinguishable from the Court of Appeals’ decisions on which RadioShack relies because RadioShack is still in possession of the premises, Cascade sued for more than just unpaid rent, and the attorney fees clause is part of a negotiated bilateral agreement between sophisticated commercial entities.
In my view, Cascade has the better argument. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Burgess extended OCGA § 13-1-11 well beyond its intended scope. The phrase “evidence of indebtedness” has the ring of a term of art, a suspicion supported by an examination of the terminology used throughout the rest of the statute. The statute opens with a declaration that an agreement to pay attorney fees “upon any note or other evidence of indebtedness” in addition to interest is valid and enforceable as part of the underlying debt when collected “by or through an attorney after maturity” as long as certain conditions precedent have been met.12 Specifically, the “holder” of the note or other evidence of indebtedness is required, “after maturity of the obligation,” to notify the “maker, endorser, or party sought to be held on said obligation” in writing that it intends to enforce the *850agreement to pay attorney fees and that the debtor has “ten days from the receipt of such notice to pay the principal and interest without the attorney’s fees.”13 The statute specifies that refusal of “a debtor” to accept delivery of the required notice is the equivalent of notice.14
The statute provides that if the conditions precedent have been met, then the agreement to pay attorney fees is enforceable. However, even when the agreement is enforceable, the statute limits the amount of attorney fees the holder of the note or other evidence of indebtedness can recover from the debtor. If the debt instrument “provides for attorney’s fees in some specific percent of the principal and interest owing thereon,” the agreement to pay attorney fees is enforceable “up to but not in excess of 15 percent of the principal and interest owing on said note or other evidence of indebtedness .”15 If the debt instrument provides for the payment of “reasonable attorney’s fees without specifying any specific percent,” the attorney fees provision is construed to require payment of “15 percent of the first $500.00 of principal and interest owing on such note or other evidence of indebtedness” plus “10 percent of the amount of principal and interest owing thereon in excess of $500.00.”16 “[S]ecurity deeds” and “bills of sale to secure debt” are expressly included in the coverage of the statute.17
It is obvious from context that not every scrap of paper with a writing scribbled on it qualifies as a “note” within the meaning of the statute. The statute’s repeated use of terminology drawn from the world of banking and commercial paper — “principal,” “interest,” “maturity,” “holder,” “maker,” “endorser,” “debtor,” “security deed,” and “debt” — tells us that OCGA§ 13-1-11 employs the word “note” in the far more limited sense of “a written paper acknowledging a debt and promising payment.”18 It is equally clear that the word’s constant companion in the statute, “evidence of indebtedness,” has a similarly limited meaning. In order to constitute an “evidence of indebtedness” under OCGA § 13-1-11, the writing in question must at least share the attributes of a “note” rendered critical by the statutory text, namely, a designation of the “principal,” “interest,” and date of “maturity.” Commercial leases generally do not refer to “principal,” “interest,” or a date of “maturity,” nor does the specific lease in question. In common parlance, it would be quite odd to hear someone *851referring to his or her unpaid rent as “principal” or describing the date the rent check is due as the “date of maturity.”19
Rejection of RadioShack’s attempt to shoehorn its lease with Cascade into OCGA § 13-1-11 finds further support in the use of the term “evidence of indebtedness” in other legal sources around the time of the statute’s adoption in 1891.20 For years, the General Assembly had been using the phrase “evidence of indebtedness” in connection with banks and various types of commercial paper.21 Contemporaneous decisions of both this Court22 and the United States Supreme Court23 reflect a similar pattern of usage. Moreover, Georgia law employed the phrases “evidence of debt” and “evidence of *852indebtedness” interchangeably,24 and Black’s Law Dictionary, which was first published around the same time, specifically defined the phrase “evidence of debt” as “[a] term applied to written instruments or securities for the payment of money, importing on their face the existence of a debt.”25
The statute now codified at OCGA § 13-1-11 has been amended only a handful of times since its enactment in 1891, most significantly in 1900 and 1953.26 However, none of the amendments even remotely suggests an intent on the part of the General Assembly to expand the meaning of “evidence of indebtedness” to include commercial leases.27 It is also worth noting that another Georgia statute currently in force specifically defines the term “[e]vidence of indebtedness” as “a note, draft, or similar negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument.”28
Finally, the construction I would place on OCGA § 13-1-11 better accords with the statute’s established purpose of protecting relatively economically powerless borrowers from sharp dealing by unscrupulous lenders. As this Court explained over a century ago:
Before the passage of this act [in 1891], a stipulation to pay attorney’s fees subjected the debtor to a penalty for a failure to pay his indebtedness, even though he honestly could not pay, and made no resistance to the creditor’s suit. This was the evil at which the act was directed, the remedy being to relieve the debtor from the payment of attorney’s fees except where he litigated with the creditor, and resisted the suit on grounds which were not in any part upheld, except where “a plea [was] filed by the defendant and not sustained.”29
As the Court correctly notes, a tenant sued for past due rent by her landlord may be as deserving of protection from an unfair attorney fees clause as a strapped borrower who takes out a loan from the bank. However, that fact does not provide us with a basis for expanding the scope of OCGA § 13-1-11 beyond what the General *853Assembly that enacted it intended. Moreover, a year before the Court of Appeals decided Burgess, the General Assembly chose a different approach to address the potential for abuse of attorney fees clauses in residential lease agreements.30
Decided October 29, 2007
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2007.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Bruce A. Taylor, Jr., Burke A. Noble, for appellant.
Hartman, Simmond, Spielman & Wood, David L. Pardue, Jill R. Johnson, for appellee.
The cardinal rule in statutory interpretation is to discern the legislative intent. In my view, the text, history, and purpose of OCGA § 13-1-11 all point in the same direction: the phrase “any note or other evidence of indebtedness” in OCGA § 13-1-11 was never intended to include routine lease agreements. Accordingly, I would hold that the statute does not apply to leases, disapprove the Court of Appeals’ rulings to the contrary, and answer the Eleventh Circuit’s certified question in the negative.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.

 Harvey v. J. H. Harvey Co., 276 Ga. 762, 762-764 (582 SE2d 88) (2003); Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 88-90 (495 SE2d 13) (1998).

 Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. Ill (emphasis supplied).

 Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI (emphasis supplied).

 141 Ga. App. 112 (232 SE2d 627) (1977).

 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 185 & n. 21 (90 SC 314, 24 LE2d 345) (1969).

 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119-120 (60 SC 444, 84 LE 604) (1940).

 See Girouard v. United States, supra, 328 U. S. at 69-70 (“We do not think under the circumstances of this legislative history that we can properly place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court’s own error.”).

 Georgia law authorizes this Court to answer certified questions from any state appellate court, any federal district court or court of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA § 15-2-9; Ga. Supreme Court Rules 46-48; cf. Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] §§ 1-14 (1995), 12 U.L.A. 71-79 (Supp. 1997). For an in-depth discussion of the history, purpose, and proper use of inter-jurisdictional certification procedures, see 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 4248, at 482-516 (3d ed. 2007). See also City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 470-471 & n. 22 (107 SC 2502, 96 LE2d 398) (1987) (where a legislative enactment is neither ambiguous nor obviously susceptible of a limiting construction, “[a] federal court may not properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a statute” through use of the certification procedure); Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The purpose of certification is to ascertain what the state law is, not, when the state court has already said what it is, to afford a party an opportunity to persuade the court to say something else.”).

 Burgess, supra, 141 Ga. App. at 112 (2) (“[W]e find no reason why a lease may not be an ‘evidence of indebtedness.’ ”).

 See Logistics Intl. v. RACO/Melaver, LLC, 257 Ga. App. 879, 881 (2) (572 SE2d 388) (2002) (“Under Georgia law, a lease can be ‘evidence of indebtedness’ within the meaning of OCGA§ 13-1-11.”); Ins. Indus. Consultants v. Essex Investments, 249 Ga. App. 837, 844 (4) (549 SE2d 788) (2001) (same); Ga. Color Farms v. K.K.L., L.P., 234 Ga. App. 849, 852 (3) (507 SE2d 817) (1998) (same); Holmes v. Bogino, 219 Ga. App. 858, 859 (2) (467 SE2d Í97) (1996) (same); see also Duff's Enterprises v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 170 Ga. App. 9, 10 (1) (316 SE2d 21) (1984) (applying OCGA§ 13-1-11 in commercial lease case); Kasum Communications v. CPI North Druid Co., 135 Ga. App. 314, 314-315 (217 SE2d 492) (1975) (same).

 1890-91 Ga. Laws (vol. 1), p. 221.

 OCGA§ 13-1-11 (a).

 OCGA§ 13-1-11 (a) (3).

 OCGA§ 13-1-11 (a) (3).

 OCGA §13-1-11 (a)(1).

 OCGA§ 13-1-11 (a) (2).

 OCGA§ 13-1-11 (b).

 O’Brien’s Irish Pub v. Gerlew Holdings, 175 Ga. App. 162, 166 (4) (332 SE2d 920) (1985) (quoting Kirkland v. Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 728 (155 SE2d 701) (1967)).

 The majority opinion erroneously states that “[t]he only terminology in the statute which is ordinarily limited to commercial paper is ‘maker’ and ‘endorser,’ and those terms are only used with the alternative ‘or party sought to be held on said obligation.’ ” The statute also employs the terms “maturity and “holder,” both of which are generally limited to the field of commercial paper when used in connection with writings. See Black’s Law Dictionary 423, 749 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “date of maturity as “Commercial law. The date when a debt falls due, such as a debt on a promissory note or bond,” and “holder” as “[a] person who has legal possession of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to receive payment on it” or “[a] person with legal possession of a document of title or an investment security”).

 The legislative history available for the original act itself, such as it is, sheds little light on the question at issue in this case. See Journal of the Senate 48-49 (July 10, 1891).

 See, e.g., 1890-91 Ga. Laws (vol. 2), p. 136, § 2 (authorizing transfer of “all the assets, property, obligations to, and evidence of, indebtedness [sic] belonging to [a] private banking company to “the Bank of Sumter incorporated by this charter” and providing that “in said corporate name it may sue for, collect and enforce all such obligations or evidences of indebtedness to said private banking company) (emphasis supplied); 1890-91 Ga. Laws (vol. 1), p. 143, § 6 (relating to “suit[s] . . . brought upon any evidence of indebtedness given for [the purchase of] fertilizer”) (emphasis supplied); 1888-89 Ga. Laws (vol. 2), p. 603, § 5 (incorporating the Rome Banking and Trust Company and authorizing it to “purchase, sell or exchange bonds, stocks, bills of exchange, coin and bullion; to discount and negotiate notes and drafts, hills of exchange and other evidences of debt',... [and] to receive and keep on special deposit all valuables, such as gold, silver or paper money, bullion, precious metals, jewels, plate, certificates of stock or evidence of indebtedness, deeds or muniments of title, or other valuable papers of any kind”) (emphasis supplied); 1878-79 Ga. Laws, p. 184, § 4 (capping interest rate legally chargeable at 8% generally and at 7% absent a special showing “upon any account, note, bond, bill, draft or other evidence of indebtedness”) (emphasis supplied); 1866 Ga. Laws, p. 139, § 1 (providing for establishment of lost or destroyed documents “in all cases where suit may have been instituted on any bond, bill, note, draft, check, or other evidence of indebtedness”) (emphasis supplied).

 See, e.g., Brooks v. Fowler, 82 Ga. 329, 333 (9 SE 1089) (1889); Crawford v. Pritchard, 81 Ga. 14, 17-18 (6 SE 689) (1888); Rutledge v. Hudson, 80 Ga. 266, 268-269 (5 SE 93) (1887); Tumlin v. Vanhorn, 77 Ga. 315, 318, 321 (3 SE 264) (1887); Crane v. Goodwin, 77 Ga. 362, 364 (1886); Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Cunningham, 75 Ga. 366, 367 (1885); Thompson v. Mitchell, 74 Ga. 797,798-799 (1885); Littlefield & Bro. v. Clary, 66 Ga. 322, 323-324 (1881); Colquitt & Baggs v. Stultz, 65 Ga. 305, 308 (1880); Carter v. Monroe, 65 Ga. 542, 544, 546 (1880); Wright v. SouthWestern R.R. Co., 64 Ga. 783, 799 (1880).

 See, e.g., Nat. Sec. Bank v. Butler, 129 U. S. 223, 226 (9 SC 281, 32 LE 682) (1889); Missouri v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, 340, 343 (8 SC 929, 31 LE 769) (1888); Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 202 (6 SC 565, 29 LE 855) (1886); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 65 (6 SC 608, 29 LE 805) (1886); Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 276-277 (26 LE 742) (1881).

 See, e.g., Ga. Const, of 1868, Art. V, Sec. XVII.

 Black’s Law Dictionary 442 (1st ed. 1891).

 1968 Ga. Laws, p. 317, § 1; 1957 Ga. Laws, p. 264, § 1; 1953 Ga. Laws (Jan.-Feb. Sess.), pp. 545-547, § 1; 1946 Ga. Laws, p. 766, § 1, Ex. 2-B; 1900 Ga. Laws, p. 53, § 1.

 In 1978, the year after the Court of Appeals decidedBMrgess, we thoroughly reviewed the development of the statutory text over time. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. of Ga. v. Brooks, 242 Ga. 109, 112-114 (249 SE2d 596) (1978).

 OCGA §7-1-4 (18).

 Demere v. Germania Bank, 116 Ga. 317, 319 (42 SE 488) (1902); see Miller v. Roberts, 9 Ga. App. 511, 515-516 (71 SE 927) (1911) (“It is a familiar notion, often given expression in our jurisprudence, that it is one of the objects of the law to prevent debtors, urged by the pressure of the necessity of securing credit, or money, or extension of indebtedness, from yielding to such unjust or unreasonable exactions as a hard creditor may see fit to make.”).

 The statute, now codified at OCGA § 44-7-2 (c), provides as follows:
Aprovision for the payment by the tenant of attorney’s fees of the landlord upon the breach of a rental agreement by the tenant, which provision is contained in a contract, lease, license agreement, or similar agreement, oral or written, for the use or rental of real property as a dwelling place shall be void unless the provision also provides for the payment by the landlord of the attorney’s fees of the tenant upon the breach of the rental agreement by the landlord.