Court Opinion

ID: 9353825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:12.352777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:53.940288
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23 Badart v. Dept. of Industrial Relations CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

EGAN BADART,                                                 B313987

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                  20STCP01699)

DEPARTMENT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

     Defendant and
Respondent.

      APPEAL from a dismissal order of the Superior Court of
the County of Los Angeles, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
      Mailly Law, Guy E. Mailly, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Department of Industrial Relations, Casey Raymond, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                        I.    INTRODUCTION

      The trial court dismissed plaintiff Egan Badart’s petition
for writ of administrative mandate challenging certain
assessments and penalties imposed by the Department of
Industrial Relations (the Department) on the grounds he failed to
timely post bond or request waiver of the requirement. On
appeal, plaintiff contends the dismissal violated his due process
rights and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We affirm.

     II.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.         Wage and Penalty Citations

           On December 18, 2018, the Department issued to plaintiff
and others1 (1) a wage assessment citation (wage citation)—
WA 479801—for failure to pay minimum wages (Labor Code,
§ 11972), failure to pay overtime wages (§558, subd. (a)) and
failure to comply with the itemized wage statement provision
(§226, subd. (e)(1));3 and (2) a penalty assessment citation

1      In addition to plaintiff, the citations named two
corporations and a limited liability company―Leelin Enterprises,
Inc. (Leelin, Inc.), Goodness Corporation of California (Goodness),
and Pamilja, LLC (Pamilja)―and three individuals―Michael,
Mendrei, and Menard Leelin.

2     All further statutory references are to the Labor Code,
unless otherwise indicated.

3    The wage citation assessed a total of of $3,102,978.69 in
wages and civil penalties.

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(penalty citation)—PA 479802—for failure to provide itemized
wage statements.4 The citations advised plaintiff of his rights
(1) to appeal the citations before an administrative hearing
officer; and (2) to seek review of the hearing officer’s decision by
filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court.

B.    Administrative Hearing

      In January 2019, attorney Serafin Tagarao, from the firm
of Carothers, Disante & Freudenberger, requested a citation
appeal hearing on behalf of plaintiff and certain other entities5
named in the citations. In August 2019, an administrative
hearing officer held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1197.1.6
      On April 1, 2020, the hearing officer issued his findings and
order on the citations, including a finding that plaintiff “directed
the underpayments of minimum . . . and overtime [wages] and
the failure to keep accurate records and issue legally required
compliant wage statements.” The officer therefore concluded that
plaintiff was “subject to individual liability under . . . sections 558
and 1197.1 and [was] thus jointly and severally liable for the

4    The penalty citation assessed an additional civil penalty of
$492,000.

5     Attorney Tagarao informed the hearing officer that, in
addition to plaintiff, he represented Goodness, Leelin, Inc., and
Pamilja.

6     As discussed below, during the hearing, plaintiff submitted
as an exhibit a civil complaint filed against him by Goodness,
Leelin, Inc., Mendrei Leelin, and Menard Leelin.

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entirety of the two citations, as affirmed.” On that same date, the
hearing officer served by mail a notice of findings on civil penalty
citation/assessment advising plaintiff that he had the right to
petition for writ of mandate in the superior court within 45 days
of service of the notice.

C.    Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request to Waive Bond

       On May 18, 2020, attorney Tagarao filed a petition for writ
of administrative mandate in the trial court seeking to set aside
the hearing officer’s decision against plaintiff. In the last
paragraph of the petition, plaintiff advised that he would “be
filing a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
995.240 to petition [the court] to waive the bond requirement
pursuant to . . . section 1197.1 upon the assignment of a case
number.”
       On July 1, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion to waive the bond
requirement “on the ground that [he was] unable to give the bond
as principal because he [was] indigent and . . . unable to obtain
sufficient sureties . . . .” The motion was supported by plaintiff’s
declaration stating that he had “loaned most of [his] available
financial assets” to other entities named in the citations and that
he had no income other than social security.
       In August 2020, the Department demurred to the petition,
arguing, among other things, that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider a portion of the requested writ because
plaintiff failed to timely submit a bond or request a waiver. The
Department also opposed the motion to waive the bond on the
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the

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untimely waiver request and that plaintiff had failed to carry his
burden of demonstrating indigence.
      Plaintiff opposed the demurrer and also filed a reply in
support of his motion to waive the bond, contending that because
he timely filed his writ petition and gave notice of his intent to
request a bond waiver, the trial court could consider his motion
absent prejudice to the Department. Plaintiff also maintained
that he had satisfied his burden to show that he was indigent.

D.    Rulings on Petition and Motion

       On December 18, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the
demurrer and bond waiver request. During the hearing, in
response to observations by the court, the Department explained
that although it originally sought, on demurrer, dismissal of only
a portion of the petition, it now sought dismissal of the entire
petition; it therefore requested that the court set an order to show
cause (OSC) hearing regarding dismissal.
       Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order
sustaining the demurrer, in part, and denying plaintiff’s request
for bond waiver. The court found that plaintiff did not timely file
his request for a waiver and also found, in the alternative, that
plaintiff’s factual showing of indigence was insufficient. The
court therefore denied the request to waive bond and set an OSC
“re dismissal for failure to post a bond.”

E.    OSC Hearing

     Prior to the OSC hearing, the Department filed a brief in
support of an order dismissing the case in its entirety, and

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plaintiff, now represented by new counsel, filed an opposition to
the OSC. On April 21, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the
OSC, following which it issued a minute order dismissing without
prejudice the writ petition for failure to post bond. It also entered
that same day a signed order of dismissal without prejudice as to
the entire action. On June 21, 2021, plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal.

                       III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Notice of Right to Appeal and Trial De Novo

      Plaintiff contends that, at the time the hearing officer filed
the decision on the citations, the Labor Commissioner7 had a
statutory duty under section 98.18 to provide notice of plaintiff’s
right to appeal the decision to the superior court and obtain a
trial de novo. According to plaintiff, the Department’s failure to
provide him with such notice violated his due process rights and
warrants reversal. We disagree.

7     The Labor Commissioner is the Chief of the Department’s
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. (§ 21.) Our references
to the Department will therefore include the Commissioner.

8     Section 98.1, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part:
“Upon filing of the order, decision, or award [on an individual
employee’s wage claim under section 98], the [Department] shall
serve a copy of the decision . . . . The notice shall also advise the
parties of their right to appeal the decision or award . . . .”

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            1.    Legal Principles

       The Labor Code provides more than one procedural
mechanism for enforcing its protections for employees.
“California’s Labor Code includes numerous statutes ‘designed to
protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers.’
[Citation.] Some statutes allow employees to sue for damages,
typically in the form of wage compensation. [Citation.] Others
allow the Labor Commissioner to issue citations and bring
administrative proceedings to recover lost wages on behalf of
affected employees or to impose regulatory penalties for various
forms of employer misconduct.” (LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388, 393 (LaFace).)
       An aggrieved employee may pursue an individual wage
claim in a judicial or administrative proceeding. (See §§ 218,
1104; Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1084.) In
addition, the Labor Code authorizes the Department to initiate
enforcement proceedings against an employer and seek various
remedies. (See e.g., §§ 1193.6, subd. (a) [authorizing the
Department to commence a civil action for “unpaid overtime
compensation” with or without the consent of the aggrieved
employee]; 558, subd. (a) [authorizing an administrative
proceeding to recover a civil penalty from an employer for
violating any provision regulating the hours and days of work].)
       The citations here were issued as part of an administrative
enforcement action by the Department under sections 1197.1,
558, and 226.3. Subdivision (b) of section 1197.1 sets forth the
Department’s authority to issue a citation for failure to pay

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minimum wages9 and provides, in relevant part: “If, upon
inspection or investigation, the [Department] determines that a
person has paid or caused to be paid a wage less than the
minimum under applicable law, the [Department] may issue a
citation to the person in violation. . . . The [Department] shall
promptly take all appropriate action . . . to enforce the citation
and to recover the civil penalty assessed, wages, liquidated
damages, and any applicable penalties imposed pursuant to
Section 203 in connection with the citation.”
       Decisions in administrative proceedings initiated by an
employee wage claim or a Department-initiated enforcement
action are both subject to appellate review, either by way of direct
appeal or administrative mandamus. “The Labor Code includes
penalty provisions that are reviewed by way of administrative
mandate or by a trial de novo following an informal hearing
process that may be requested after the issuance of an
administrative citation. (§§ 98–98.2 [Labor Commissioner is
authorized to investigate employee complaints, issue citations
awarding unpaid wages or penalties, and hold informal hearings
that are reviewed by a trial de novo in superior court], 226–226.5

9      Subdivision (b) of section 558 similarly provides: “If upon
inspection or investigation the [Department] determines that a
person had paid or caused to be paid a wage for overtime work in
violation of any provision of this chapter, . . . the [Department]
may issue a citation. The procedures for issuing, contesting, and
enforcing judgments for citations or civil penalties issued by the
[Department] . . . shall be the same as those set out in Section
1197.1.” Section 226.3 vests the Department with the authority
to assess and recover statutory penalties for violation of the
itemized wage statement requirements of section 226. (LaFace,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)

                                 8
[authorizing review by administrative mandate after informal
hearing for citation issued due to failure to properly itemize
wages and deductions on pay stub], 558, 1197.1 [citations
imposing penalties for violations of IWC orders follow the citation
and informal hearing process, with review by administrative
mandate].)” (LaFace, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)

            2.     Analysis

       Plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to notice of his
right to appeal and obtain a trial de novo proceeds from the
flawed premise that the hearing officer’s decision was rendered
under the provisions of sections 98 through 98.2. As noted,
however, the citations were issued as part of an administrative
enforcement action undertaken pursuant to sections 226, 558,
and 1197.1. Decisions in such actions are entitled to appellate
review, but only by way of administrative mandamus, not direct
appeal. Because plaintiff received notice of his right to file a
petition for writ of administrative mandate and pursued that
right in the trial court, we find no due process violation.

B.    Conflict of Interest

       Plaintiff next contends that the hearing officer violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to investigate a
conflict of interest when it arose during the administrative
hearing. According to plaintiff, the hearing officer either knew or
should have known that there was an actual conflict of interest
requiring a continuance because plaintiff submitted an exhibit

                                 9
showing that his counsel was simultaneously representing
parties with conflicting interests.

      1.    Background

       At the outset of the citation proceedings, attorney Tagarao
informed the hearing officer that he would be representing
Pamilja, Goodness, and Leelin, Inc., in addition to plaintiff.
During the hearing, plaintiff submitted as an exhibit a complaint
that showed he was a defendant in a civil action brought by,
among others, Pamilja, Goodness, and Leelin, Inc. The lawsuit
had been filed by an attorney other than Tagarao. In his
decision, the hearing officer concluded that the complaint was
“not proof of anything except the initiation of said lawsuit in Los
Angeles [County] Superior Court.” But his decision did not state,
imply, or discuss whether attorney Tagarao was representing
parties with interests in the administrative proceeding that
conflicted with plaintiff’s interests.
       During the subsequent proceedings in the trial court on the
writ petition, plaintiff was represented by attorney Tagarao at
the hearing on the demurrer and bond waiver motions; there was
no mention of any conflict in the papers filed before the hearing;
and attorney Tagarao did not raise the issue of any potential
conflict of interest during the hearing. Moreover, even after
plaintiff retained new counsel prior to the OSC, the court was not
apprised of any issue concerning the alleged conflict.

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      2.    Forfeiture

       The Department contends that plaintiff waived his Sixth
Amendment challenge based on the alleged conflict of interest by
failing to raise it in the trial court. We agree.
       It is well established that a party who fails to raise an
irregularity in a proceeding at the time it occurs, forfeits the
opportunity to assert it for the first time on appeal. “[A]s a
general rule, ‘the failure to object to errors committed at trial
relieves the reviewing court of the obligation to consider those
errors on appeal.’ [Citations.] This applies to claims based on
statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of
fundamental constitutional rights. [Citations.]” (In re Seaton
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198.)
       The record does not reflect that plaintiff raised the issue of
a potential conflict during the administrative proceeding.
Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel had an opportunity to address the
issue in his OSC brief or, at a minimum, raise it at the OSC
hearing. His failure to do so in either proceeding deprived the
hearing officer, trial court, and the Department of the
opportunity to respond to the issue. Plaintiff therefore forfeited
the conflict of interest claim on appeal.
       Even if we considered the issue on appeal, we would reject
it. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel only applies, by its
express terms, to “criminal prosecutions.” (U.S. Const., 6th
Amend.) Thus, the constitutional right to counsel provided for in
the Sixth Amendment and the California Constitution (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 13) “is guaranteed specifically in criminal
prosecutions. The guaranty does not, by virtue of the specific
language of these provisions apply to civil proceedings.

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Administrative proceedings are civil in nature.” (Borror v.
Department of Investment (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 531, 539–540.)

C.    Bond Waiver Request

      Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s ruling on the
timeliness of his bond waiver request violated his right to due
process as an indigent. But in doing so, he concedes that he did
not post bond or file a request to waive bond within the 45 day
time limit in section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3).10 He also
concedes that the two cases relied upon by the trial court—
Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, Inc. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
124, 140 and Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334,
347—hold that the time limit to post bond or seek a waiver is
mandatory and jurisdictional and that their holdings under
section 98.2 apply with equal force to petitions filed under section
1197.1. Plaintiff nevertheless urges us to deviate from that
authority and excuse the late filing of his motion to waive bond
because he gave notice of his intent to seek a waiver of the bond
before the Department sought to dismiss the writ.
      We decline plaintiff’s invitation to deviate from the well-
established, and well-reasoned, authority holding that a failure to

10     Section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(2) authorizes a party
seeking review of a decision by the hearing officer to file a
petition for writ of mandate “within 45 days of service of the
notice of findings, findings, and order thereon.” Subdivision (c)(3)
provides: “As a condition to filing a petition for a writ of
mandate, the petitioner seeking the writ shall first post a bond
with the [Department] equal to the total amount of any minimum
wages, contract wages, liquidated damages, and overtime
compensation that are due and owing . . . .”

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timely file a request to waive bond is a jurisdictional defect that
deprives a trial court of the authority to consider a petition for
writ of administrative mandate. We therefore conclude the trial
court did not err by dismissing the writ.11

11    Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the court’s
alternative ruling that plaintiff failed to carry his burden to
demonstrate that he was indigent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.240.)

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                      IV.   DISPOSITION

     The order of dismissal is affirmed. The Department is
awarded costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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