Court Opinion

ID: 9683702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:35:29.292262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.748773
License: Public Domain

BOND, Chief Justice
(dissenting on rehearing) .
The summary judgment procedure provided by Rule 166-A, promulgated by our Supreme Court, can be availed of to bring an action to final conclusion when the pleadings and admissions, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The function of affidavits on motion for summary judgment is to- show quickly and summarily what the parties can prove at the trial of the case. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 2 Cir., Ill F.2d 406. The purpose of this Rule is to simplify and shorten the trial and limit the issues.
The Rule, pertinent here, provides:
“(d) * * * If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, * * * and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly." (Italics supplied.)
“(e) * * * Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, * * * and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.”
Where, as here, it appears from the pleadings (affidavits) and the motions of the respective parties for summary judgment, and from statements of counsel, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that one or the other of the defendants is entitled to judgment as a *429matter of law, courts are required to enter judgment forthwith;' and such judgment is a final judgment in absence of any controversial issue shown. Creel v. Lone Star Defense Corp., 5 Cir., 1949, 171 F.2d 964. And, too, where the trial court had before it motion and countermotion for summary judgment, basing their respective claims only upon conflict concerning the decisive conclusion drawn from the undisputed facts in the record, a summary judgment rendered is a final judgment. Fox v. Johnson & Wimsatt, 1942, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 211, 127 F.2d 729.
Courts of Civil Appeals are strictly appellate and must accept the transcript of the record for the determination of all issues involved before the trial court. Such courts have no such power dehors the record to reverse a judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for new trial. Motion for rehearing, as here, upon factual issues not presented in the trial court, either in pleadings, affidavits, or proof, and not acted upon by such court, is not within the purview of an appellate court for review. In matters of controversy, not duly presented by assignments of error to the action of the trial court, the appellate courts are without power to go outside the record to base conclusions. Summary proceedings under the Rule, supra, was not intended to be a medium for the appellate court to determine abstract questions of law, nor, upon adverse decisions, to grant the losing party a new trial, solely and only to enable him to plead and prove an-, other and different lawsuit not presented to the trial court, thus resolving factual issues outside the aggrieved appealing party’s motion for summary judgment and granting him a new trial.
In the case here, as reflected by the unanimous opinion heretofore rendered by this court, with concurring written opinion by our Mr. Justice Cramer (which now becomes the dissenting opinion), it will be seen that The Praetorians (plaintiff) filed bill of interpleader alleging that the intervening defendant, Eunice Blackman, is claiming the ■ proceeds of the benefit certificate in question by virtue’ of being the daughter and beneficiary of the insured, and that the other intervening defendants (children of Sam T. Kaufman, deceased) are claiming the proceeds by virtue of the assignment; and -because of the - conflicting claims The Praetorians sought1 a determination of such alleged issues. In response to plaintiff’s demand, each of the-party-defendants filed answer: Eunice Blackman claiming the .fund as the named beneficiary, against the heirs of the as-signee, and, in affirmative pleading, catted upon them to “establish the amount of any debt or claim that the said Sam T. Kaufman owned and held against the said Dora Gottlieb (the insured) as may have been secured by said benefit’ certificate.” The said defendant-beneficiary further alleged “that neither the said Sam T.- Kaufman nor his heirs were in any manner or degree related to the said insured, Dora Gottlieb, nor had either of them any insurable interest in the life of said defendant’s mother (the insured) ; and that a valid assignment could not have been made unto the said Sam T. Kaufman except by assignment as security for debt of the said insured.” On the other hand, the other defendants (children of Sam T. Kaufman, deceased) filed answer, pertinent here, that they are entitled to all of the proceeds of said policy perforce of the assignment to their father (See original opinion), and “under the absolute assignment” sought judgment for the fund. In due order, the defendant-beneficiary requested of as-signee-defendants admission of facts. In compliance therewith, pertinent here, they gave evidence that neither they nor their father was related by affinity or consanguinity to Dora Gottlieb; that they had no knowledge of the assignment of the insurance certificate to their father prior to the death of the insured, Do.ra Gottlieb; that some of the records of Sam T. Kaufman came into their possession after his death; that they have no way of knowing whether or not all of the records of Sam T.-Kaufman came into their possession or whether or not a debt existed; and all they know is, that the records reflect an absolute assignment to Sam T. Kaufman, made, signed and notarized by the insured, on forms of The Praetorians, and attached *430to the policy. Such pleadings and admission of facts were the sum total of the record upon the trial of this cause. On the record thus presented, the defendant Eunice Blackman and her attorneys of record filed motion for summary judgment in conformity therewith; and in like manner the Kaufman heirs filed their motion for judgment; each claiming the funds in accordance with their respective pleadings. And upon such pleadings and admission of facts, the judge of the trial court made order, directed to the Clerk of her Court, reading: “To the ’Clerk: You will notify Eunice Blackman, defendant in the above numbered cause, and The Praetorians, plaintiff in the above numbered cause, to appear before the 14th Judicial District Court on April 7, 1950, at 9 A.M., to show cause, if any they may have, why said motion for summary judgment on behalf of the heirs of Sam T. Kaufman should not be granted.” And in pursuance thereto, without further ado, the trial court sustained the defendant Blackman’s motion for summary judgment, overruled that of the Kaufmans, and entered the judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted.
Turning to appellees’ motion for rehearing, upon which the majority has reversed our original conclusion, it will be seen that appellees assign 18 points of error attacking only the action of this Court in holding that the assignment of the insurance policy in question as a matter of law is an absolute conveyance of all beneficial interests therein; thus leaving no interest to the named contingent beneficiary. Appel-lee Blackman and her attorneys assign no error to any adverse action of the trial court in rendering the summary judgment, or to this Court’s opinion on any factual issue of record. The motion, aside from the assignments of error, is for “new trial,” and for this Court to reverse and remand the cause on purported factual issues; or, again, for a trial on factual issue of debt against her own motion for summary judgment. They allege: “Maybe such debt, if any existed, had been paid off, without the insured obtaining a release thereon; that the assignment herein made was nothing other than a collateral security for debt, which was incumbent on appellants (the Kaufmans) to allege and prove. In any event, if we be mistaken as to who is to prove the existence of such debt, then equity and good conscience demand and justify, if need be, that this cause be remanded for a new trial, wherein appellee may establish the relationship between her mother, the insured, and the assignee. On retrial hereof the facts can be shown; that the insured was an aged, uneducated lady, in poor health; that the assignee, an insurance agent, wrote insurance policies for her; ofttimes extended financial credit to her thereon in a pecuniary business way. Appellees’ right to establish and prove, if such need be, that the assignment was merely a collateral security in favor of the assignee should not be prejudged.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Courts of Civil Appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction, in the sense that they have only such powers as the Constitution, or Laws enacted thereunder, give them. Their jurisdiction is statutory, and they may not exercise any power that is not conferred upon them by law. They are not clothed with equity powers extending to civil appeals from inferior courts, except as may be presented by assignments of error to the action of a trial court; and not vested with any discretionary power or right to grant “new trials,” except on assignments of error originating in and incident to the action of the trial court. Summary judgment proceedings upon-which this appeal is tried and prosecuted confer no such powers on the Court of Civil Appeals. The Rule, supra, promulgated by our Supreme Court, provides an effective agency for the dispensation of justice, creating a right for litigants to have the law authoritatively set forth in reference to their rights, when no factual situation, as in the case here, is presented to the trial court. The summary judgment procedure does not represent, or have for its purpose a departure from the Court’s, regular routine prescribed by law, or a means to advance moot questions. Actual rights arising from the controversy are-disposed of by the Court; its action is. adjudication, not a device for securing. *431judicial opinion in regard to an alleged situation, actual or fictional.
I adhere to our former opinion; dissent from the majority reversing and remanding this cause. Appellees’ motion for rehearing should be overruled.