Court Opinion

ID: 9949721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 15:01:00.122274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:47.792305
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1034     Document: 010111013994       Date Filed: 03/12/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       March 12, 2024

                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1034

  YOULIAN ZHONG,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Colorado
                            (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00084-RM-2)
                         _________________________________

 Deborah L. Roden, Cheyenne, Wyoming, on the briefs for Defendant-Appellant

 Cole Finegan, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth S. Ford Milani, Assistant United
 States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, on the briefs for Plaintiff-Appellee
                        _________________________________

 Before EID, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                      _________________________________

 EID, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       Youlian Zhong appeals her mandatory minimum sentences for crimes related

 to her participation in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute large quantities of

 marijuana. Zhong contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that she did

 not prove she was eligible for the statutory safety valve for mandatory minimum
Appellate Case: 22-1034   Document: 010111013994        Date Filed: 03/12/2024      Page: 2

 sentences. We hold that Zhong is ineligible for the statutory safety valve because she

 did not disclose to the Government information sufficient to establish her mens rea

 for the crimes of which she was convicted, and therefore did not provide “all

 information and evidence” she had “concerning the . . . offenses” of conviction, as

 required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

                                          I.

        Youlian Zhong and her husband, Housheng Xian, conspired to grow more than

 1,500 marijuana plants, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, in the basement of

 their residence on Glencoe Street in Thornton, Colorado. They intended to process

 the marijuana and to distribute it for sale. In 2018, law enforcement uncovered their

 scheme, and searched their residence. The smell of marijuana was so strong that

 officers could smell it immediately upon entering the house. Officers found Zhong

 and Xian on the main floor of their residence, along with live marijuana plants,

 marijuana buds, and dozens of pounds of processed and packaged marijuana.

 Officers also encountered a basement packed with live marijuana plants, grow lights,

 fans, and soil.

        The Government arrested Zhong and Xian and charged them with three counts:

 (1) conspiring to manufacture and possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 and

 more marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vii);

 (2) manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana

 plants in violation of the same; and (3) using and maintaining the Glencoe Street

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 house for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing marijuana in violation of 21

 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2.

       After a joint trial, a jury convicted Zhong and Xian of all three counts. Counts

 1 and 2 each carried a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. See 21 U.S.C.

 § 841(b)(1)(A).

       Before the sentencing hearing, Zhong and Xian moved jointly for a non-

 guideline sentence of time served plus five years of supervised release. In their

 motion, Zhong and Xian argued that they met the requirements of U.S.S.G.

 § 5C1.2(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which together provide a “safety valve” for

 mandatory minimum sentences. The parties agreed that Zhong and Xian satisfied all

 but one of the requirements of § 3553(f). But the Government contested whether

 Zhong and Xian had “truthfully provided to the Government all information and

 evidence the defendant[s] ha[d] concerning the offense or offenses that were part of

 the same course of conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Accordingly, in support of

 their motion, Zhong and Xian filed a joint proffer letter, which they claimed

 “truthfully provid[ed] to the Government all information [Zhong and Xian] ha[d]

 concerning the offenses of conviction.” R. Supp. Vol. I at 32–35; see id. at 29–31.1

 Zhong’s and Xian’s joint proffer letter largely detailed the couple’s actions during

 the relevant period of time.

       1
        Although one copy of the letter was filed by Zhong’s attorney, and the other
 by Xian’s, the two copies of the joint proffer letter were substantively identical, and
 each purported to speak for both Zhong and Xian.
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       The joint proffer letter also contained some information about Zhong’s and

 Xian’s states of mind. Zhong and Xian admitted that they “knew that suspicious

 activities were going on,” and “knew that people were coming in and out of the

 home” where they were staying. R. Supp. Vol. II at 34. They also told the

 Government that they “believed that there was marijuana growing in the home[]

 because of things they saw in the home like the large fans and large trash bags.” Id.

 They admitted that they “also knew that people came and went from the home, had

 keys to access the home and moved things around,” and in particular, “knew that the

 large trash bags in the kitchen would be taken away and then other bags would

 appear.” Id. Accordingly, “[i]t was apparent to both Mr. Xian and Mrs. Zhong

 during the time . . . that there was something illegal happening that involved growing

 marijuana.” Id. Zhong and Xian also explained that “[t]he reason that the couple

 knew there was marijuana in the basements was because of the suspicious activities,

 specifically: (1) they were living for free; (2) people were coming in and out of the

 home with keys; (3) items in the home would be moved around and the people who

 came and went took things and brought things related to growing marijuana; and

 (4) there were large fans and large trash bags in the homes.” Id. Accordingly, they

 took “full responsibility that they knew there was marijuana growing in the homes

 and knew that they were living in the homes for free to in some way assist the people

 who were growing the marijuana.” Id.

       Zhong’s and Xian’s joint proffer letter also disclaimed any knowledge or

 intent beyond what they outlined. For instance, they told the Government that they

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 “did not want to ask questions,” and that “[t]here was never an explicit conversation

 about the arrangement.” R. Supp. Vol. II at 34. Zhong and Xian claimed that,

 although they did favors for one of their hosts, “[n]one of these errands were drug-

 related as far as the couple knew,” and they only “would do what they were asked out

 of respect . . . as new immigrants to town.” Id. at 33. They told the Government they

 “wish[] they had more information that could be provided and wish[] they knew more

 information.” Id. at 34. However, they claimed “that they deliberately tried to be

 ignorant of the specifics of what was going on.” Id.

        In response to the joint proffer letter, the Government requested some

 additional information from Zhong and Xian prior to the sentencing hearing. In

 particular, the Government questioned whether Zhong and Xian provided all

 information necessary to prove that they intentionally assisted in marijuana

 trafficking or agreed to participate in marijuana trafficking, as convicted. In

 response, Zhong and Xian submitted a joint addendum with some additional

 information about their offenses of conviction. In response to the Government’s

 mens rea questions, Zhong and Xian said that “[t]hey knew there was marijuana

 trafficking going on around them and while did not have an explicit discussion

 regarding living for free in the houses, knew or most definitely should have known

 that living for free was a benefit they were getting as a result of their assistance in the

 marijuana trafficking.” R. Vol. II (sealed) at 57.

        The district court heard testimony from Zhong and Xian at the sentencing

 hearing. The court considered such testimony for the purpose of evaluating the

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 credibility and consistency of Zhong’s and Xian’s joint proffer letter and addendum,

 but ultimately reviewed the written materials on their face. See 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(f)(5) (requiring a defendant to provide the Government with all information

 “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing”).

       In an oral ruling, the district court denied Zhong’s and Xian’s motion for a

 non-guideline sentence. For numerous reasons, the district court concluded that

 Zhong and Xian did not meet their burden to prove by a preponderance of the

 evidence that their written responses to the Government were truthful and complete

 as required by § 3553(f)(5). The district court largely rested on findings that Zhong’s

 and Xian’s joint proffer letter and addendum were not credible and self-

 contradictory, and that their credibility was further undermined by testimony at the

 sentencing hearing.

       The district court did not rely on one defect alone, and remarked that there

 were “so many layers” and “so many levels” to the discrepancies in Zhong’s and

 Xian’s joint proffer letter and addendum. For instance, the district court found not

 credible Zhong’s and Xian’s account of why they came to the United States; their

 description of how they became involved in the conspiracy; their claim that they did

 not see members of the conspiracy in their residence; their representations about

 when they lived where; their proffer that, although they should have known

 marijuana was being grown in their residence, they did not necessarily know; and

 inconsistent testimony and written materials about whether and how Zhong and Xian

 paid the unusually large utility bills from their residence. The district court found

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 that Zhong’s and Xian’s proffer letter and addendum “either make no sense, were

 directly contradicted by the testimony” they offered at the hearing, “or are impossible

 to understand.” R. Vol. III at 220–21; see also id. at 221 (“I don’t accept this

 explanation at all.”). The district court also observed that “the testimony and/or the

 letter is plainly, unambiguously, and completely in contradiction to the verdict,”

 because Zhong’s and Xian’s admitted mental states gave them “knowledge,” but did

 not “give [them] intention” as convicted. Id. at 162. However, the district court

 declined to reach the question of whether Zhong and Xian were disqualified on that

 basis. See id. at 163 (“Let’s stop and say we don’t have to reach that – if we do, it’s

 over . . . .”). Instead, the district court rested on the internal contradictions in

 Zhong’s and Xian’s proffer letter and addendum.

        Because Zhong and Xian were not eligible for safety-valve relief, the district

 court sentenced Zhong and Xian to the mandatory minimum of 120 months in prison

 on Counts 1 and 2, and to 48 months in prison on Count 3, to run concurrently.

        Zhong timely appealed.2

                                            II.

        “A defendant has the burden to prove that he or she qualifies for the safety

 valve by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Cervantes, 519 F.3d

 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008). “We review a district court’s factual determination on

 safety-valve eligibility for clear error, including whether a defendant has provided

 2
   Xian also appealed. His appeal, No. 22-1030, is resolved in a separate disposition,
 released concurrently with this opinion.
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 the government with complete and truthful information.” Id. We will find a district

 court’s factual findings clearly erroneous only if they are “without support” or if they

 “leave us with a definite and firm conviction that they are incorrect.” Id. This

 deferential standard of review reflects the fact-dependent nature of the safety-valve

 analysis and the district court’s role in evaluating a defendant’s credibility and

 weighing the evidence. See United States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1129

 (10th Cir. 2003).

                                          III.

       Before the sentencing hearing, a defendant seeking safety-valve relief must

 “truthfully provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the defendant

 has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct.”

 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). “‘All’ means all.” Allen v. Env’t Restoration, LLC, 32 F.4th

 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2022). When a jury convicts a defendant of an offense with a

 mens rea element, the jury convicts the defendant of having certain information.

 And, as we have previously concluded, a district court may not grant a defendant’s

 request for safety-valve relief when to do so would “directly undermin[e] the jury’s

 verdict.” United States v. Montijo-Dominguez, 771 F. App’x 870, 877 (10th Cir.

 2019) (unpublished) (Kelly, J.). Therefore, a district court must find that a defendant

 who has not provided the minimum information necessary to demonstrate his or her

 own mens rea has not provided “all information” he or she has concerning the

 offense. In other words, a defendant who is convicted of having a certain state of

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 mind must provide information about that state of mind to the Government in order to

 qualify for safety-valve relief under § 3553(f)(5).

       Zhong did not truthfully provide to the Government all information she had

 concerning the offense prior to the sentencing hearing, because she did not provide

 information sufficient to prove that she possessed the mens rea for the crimes of

 which she was convicted.

       For Count 1, the Government alleged that Zhong “did knowingly and

 intentionally combine, conspire, confederate, and agree, with interdependence, to

 manufacture and possess with the intent to distribute 1000 and more marijuana

 plants,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vii). R. Vol. I at 265.

 The jury was instructed that, to find Zhong guilty of Count 1, the Government must

 have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Zhong “knew the essential objective of

 the conspiracy” to “violate the federal drug laws,” and that she “knowingly and

 voluntarily involved . . . herself in the conspiracy.” Id. at 271. In particular, the jury

 was instructed that “proof is not sufficient if it merely shows that [Zhong] knew

 about the existence of the conspiracy or [was] associated with members of the

 conspiracy,” and that “the evidence must show [Zhong] knowingly joined the

 conspiracy with the intent to advance its purposes.” Id. at 272. The jury was further

 instructed that for Zhong to have done something “knowingly,” she must have done it

 “voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.” Id. at 281.

       For Count 2, the Government alleged that Zhong “did knowingly and

 intentionally manufacture and possess with intent to distribute 1000 and more

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  marijuana plants, a Schedule 1 controlled substance, and did knowingly and

  intentionally aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, and procure the same,” also in

  violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vii). R. Vol. I at 265. The jury was

  instructed that Count 2 required that Zhong “knowingly or intentionally possessed a

  controlled substance as charged,” and that she “possessed the substance with the

  intent to distribute it.” Id. at 274. As with Count 1, the jury was instructed on what

  it means to commit an act “knowingly,” that is, “voluntarily and intentionally, and

  not because of mistake or accident.” Id. at 281.

        For Count 3, the Government alleged that Zhong “did unlawfully and

  knowingly use and maintain a place located at 12662 Glencoe St, Thornton Colorado,

  for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled

  substance, and did knowingly and intentionally aid, abet, counsel, command, induce,

  and procure the same,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). R. Vol. I at 265–66.

  To convict Zhong of Count 3, the jury was required to find that she “maintained a

  place . . . for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing marijuana,” and that she

  “knew that the place was used for such a purpose.” Id. at 276. The same instruction

  regarding “knowing[]” acts again applied. Id. at 281.

        The district court also instructed the jury on aider and abettor liability for

  Count 2 and Count 3. The jury was instructed that, to find Zhong guilty as an aider

  or abettor, the jury must be convinced that Zhong “intentionally

  associated . . . herself in some way with the crime and intentionally participated in it

  as . . . she would in something . . . she wished to bring about”; that is, that Zhong

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  “consciously shared in the other person’s knowledge of the underlying criminal act

  and intended to help him or her.” R. Vol. I at 278.

        When the jury convicted Zhong of all three counts, it necessarily found,

  beyond a reasonable doubt, that Zhong had a certain mens rea for each crime. For

  Count 1, the jury convicted Zhong of participating in the conspiracy not only

  “knowingly,” but also “intentionally,” and “voluntarily,” and of joining the

  conspiracy “with the intent to advance its purposes.” R. Vol. I at 265, 271, 272, 281.

  For Count 2, the jury convicted Zhong of either “intentionally” manufacturing and

  possessing marijuana herself, and of doing so “with intent” to distribute it, or it

  convicted her of aiding and abetting the crime by “intentionally” associating herself

  with it and “intentionally” participating in it, with the “conscious[]” knowledge of the

  crime and “inten[t]” to help its principal. Id. at 265, 274, 278, 281. And for Count 3,

  the jury convicted her of “knowingly us[ing] and maintain[ing] a place . . . for the

  purpose of manufacturing and distributing marijuana,” and of doing so “voluntarily

  and intentionally,” or of “intentionally” aiding and abetting such crime. Id. at 265–

  66, 276, 278, 281.

        Zhong’s joint proffer and addendum were not sufficient to show the mens rea

  for any crime of which the jury convicted her. Zhong admitted to knowing there was

  suspicious and illegal activity in her home involving marijuana. She even admitted

  to knowing that her role, living in the house, would in some way assist those growing

  and distributing the marijuana. But she stopped short of admitting that she intended

  to join the conspiracy, or that she did so voluntarily, or that she joined with the intent

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  to advance the conspiracy’s purposes. She disclaimed any intent voluntarily to aid or

  to abet the principals of the crimes of conviction—much less intent to commit the

  crimes directly. Because Zhong was convicted of crimes of intent, and because she

  did not provide information sufficient to show her intent, she did not provide “all

  information” within the meaning of § 3553(f)(5).

         The closest Zhong got to admitting her mens rea was in her addendum to her

  joint proffer letter. In response to Zhong’s joint proffer, the Government notified

  Zhong that it did “not think that the facts in [her] letter make out the elements of

  aiding and abetting liability or co-conspirator liability.” R. Vol. II (sealed) at 57.

  The Government explained that the “letter admits that [Zhong and Xian] were aware

  that some of their actions might be assisting marijuana trafficking and/or that

  marijuana trafficking was occurring around them,” but “does not admit that they

  intentionally assisted in marijuana trafficking (for aiding and abetting) or agreed to

  participate in marijuana trafficking (for co-conspirator liability).” Id. Accordingly,

  the Government warned Zhong that “to agree that [the proffer] letter is sufficient

  would require [the Government] to essentially stipulate that [Zhong and Xian] were

  wrongfully convicted.” Id. In response, Zhong told the Government that she and

  Xian “knew there was marijuana trafficking going on around them and while [they]

  did not have an explicit discussion regarding living for free in the houses, knew or

  most definitely should have known that living for free was a benefit they were getting

  as a result of their assistance in the marijuana trafficking.” Id.; see also id. (“[I]f it

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  was not obvious, they most definitely should have known” that the garbage bags in

  their kitchen “contained marijuana.”).

        Even Zhong’s addendum is insufficient to show the mens rea for any crime of

  conviction. Even if Zhong “knew there was marijuana trafficking going on around

  them,” and “knew . . . that living for free was a benefit they were getting as a result

  of their assistance in the marijuana trafficking,” that would not be the same as

  intentional, voluntary conduct, undertaken with the intent to advance the purposes of

  the marijuana-growing conspiracy. R. Vol. II (sealed) at 57. Even if we gave the

  word “knew” an unjustifiably expansive reading, Zhong did not even admit that she

  “knew”: she admitted only that she either “knew or . . . should have known” that she

  was living for free in exchange for her assistance. Id. (emphasis added). As we have

  explained, the “should have known” language “is equivalent to a negligence

  standard”—not the higher mentes reae of knowledge, purpose, or intent. United

  States v. Kalu, 791 F.3d 1194, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, a jury which

  finds that a defendant “knew or should have known” the facts underlying her crime

  may convict her of a crime requiring negligence, but not a crime requiring

  recklessness, knowledge, purpose, or intent. Id. at 1208–09. By telling the

  Government that she knew or should have known, Zhong admitted, at best, that she

  had the necessary mens rea or she did not; that she committed the crimes of

  conviction or she did not.

        Accordingly, Zhong did not provide the Government with all of the

  information the jury found that she had. If the district court had found that Zhong

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  provided the Government with all the information she had concerning her offenses of

  conviction, it would have found that Zhong had no more information concerning her

  own mens rea on any offense. In other words, the district court would have found

  Zhong to have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she “should have

  known” the facts underlying each of her crimes, but that she did not necessarily

  intend to commit them. But the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Zhong

  did possess the necessary mens rea for each count, and therefore that she did have

  intent. Zhong cannot have disproved by a preponderance of the evidence what the

  jury found true beyond a reasonable doubt.

        For her part, Zhong says little. She acknowledges the issue in her opening

  brief. Aplt. Br. at 6 (“[T]he government alleged that the [proffer] letter did not admit

  Ms. Zhong intentionally assisted in marijuana trafficking in relation to the aiding and

  abetting charge, nor did Ms. Zhong admit to agreeing to participate in marijuana

  trafficking for co-conspirator liability.”). But despite a lengthy argument in the

  Government’s brief on appeal, see Aple. Br. at 16–20, she makes no response.

  Indeed, Zhong entirely fails to dispute any of the premises underlying our ruling:

  that a defendant must provide the Government “all information” she has; “all” means

  all; a defendant’s state of mind for the offenses of conviction is “information”; it is

  information the defendant “has”; and Zhong did not provide such information in this

  case. Accordingly, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that

  Zhong failed to provide the Government with all the information she had concerning

  the offense of conviction.

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                                            IV.

         Zhong does argue, on several other grounds, that the district court clearly erred

  in finding that she was not eligible for safety-valve relief. First, Zhong argues that

  the district court clearly erred in considering facts that she claims did not relate to her

  offense of conviction. Next, Zhong argues that the district court improperly relied on

  speculation regarding whether her handwriting matched checks paying utility bills at

  her residence. Zhong also argues that the district court clearly erred by failing to

  consider potential cultural differences; for instance, the possibility that a Chinese

  National may not recognize the smell of marijuana. Finally, Zhong argues that the

  district court clearly erred by failing to consider the underlying policy purpose of

  § 3553(f)(5).

         We need not reach Zhong’s other arguments for reversal. “[E]ven where the

  lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of

  reasoning,” this Court “will affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that

  finds support in the record,” and the record here requires us to affirm the district

  court. United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003). Even if the

  district court erred in any or all of the ways Zhong argues, none of these other

  arguments affects our conclusions that she failed truthfully to disclose her mens rea

  for her crimes of conviction to the Government, and therefore that the district court

  did not clearly err in denying her safety-valve relief.

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                                             V.

         If a jury convicts a defendant of a crime involving mens rea, the defendant

  must provide the Government with information sufficient to prove such mens rea in

  order to meet the requirement that she “truthfully provide[] to the Government all

  information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense . . . .” 18 U.S.C.

  § 3553(f)(5). The phrase “all information” means “all information,” and that

  includes a defendant’s mens rea. Because Zhong did not provide the Government

  with information sufficient to prove the mens rea required for the crimes of

  conviction, she has not met her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

  that she qualifies for safety-valve relief. The district court did not clearly err in so

  concluding.

  AFFIRMED.

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