Court Opinion

ID: 9901423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:02:18.000891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.592193
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 P. v. Mercer CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H050743
                                                                     (Santa Cruz County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Super. Ct. No. 21CR00430)

             v.

 DAMON MERCER,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                              I. INTRODUCTION
         Defendant Damon Mercer pleaded no contest to obtaining money or property by
false pretenses (Pen. Code, § 532, subd. (a))1 and misdemeanor violation of Labor Code
section 3700.5. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant
on probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including that he
participate in educational, therapeutic, and/or vocational programming as directed by his
probation officer. The court also ordered defendant to pay various amounts, including a
restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a court operations assessment of $40
(§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a court facilities assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373,
subd. (a)(1)).

         1
             All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
       On appeal, defendant contends that the probation condition requiring his
participation in educational, therapeutic, and/or vocational programming as directed by
the probation officer violates the separation of powers doctrine by delegating judicial
authority to the probation officer. Defendant also argues that the trial court violated his
right to due process under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas) by
ordering him to pay a total of $370 for the fine and assessments without first holding a
hearing to determine his ability to pay.
       For reasons we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.
                II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. The Offenses2
       The victim hired defendant to replace a deck around her entire house.
Unbeknownst to the victim, defendant used another person’s contractor’s license number
for the contract. That contractor did not know defendant. Defendant had other people
working with him on the deck job, but he did not have workers’ compensation insurance.
The victim paid defendant several thousand dollars, but he did not complete the job.
Further, the work that was done by defendant was deficient, and it was estimated that it
would cost $48,000 to correct the work.
       B. The Charges and Pleas
       On November 2, 2021, defendant was charged by information with obtaining
money or property by false pretenses (§ 532, subd. (a); count 1), fraudulent use of a
contractor’s license number (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7027.3; count 2), misdemeanor failure
to comply with the requirements of a home improvement contract (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 7159.5, subd. (a)(3); count 3), misdemeanor contracting without a license (Bus. & Prof.

       2
         The facts underlying defendant’s offenses are taken from the preliminary hearing
transcript, which provided the factual basis for his pleas.

                                              2
Code, § 7028; count 4), and misdemeanor violation of Labor Code section 3700.5
(count 5).
       In October 2022, defendant pleaded no contest to counts 1 and 5. He entered his
pleas with the understanding that, among other things, he would receive probation, “a lid
of 180 days,” a Harvey3 waiver would be entered for purposes of restitution and
sentencing, and his counsel would “argue a [section] 17(b) motion.” The remaining
counts were dismissed.
       C. The Probation Report
       According to the probation report, which was dated December 15, 2022, defendant
was 54 years old. The victim hired defendant in 2018 to replace a 4,000-square-foot deck
at the victim’s residence for $85,000.
       Defendant was interviewed by the probation officer on December 13, 2022.
Defendant told the probation officer that he met the victim while he was working as the
superintendent of an exterior paint job on the victim’s residence. Defendant denied
putting a contractor’s license number on the signed contract and stated his belief that the
victim put it on the contract in error. He also told the probation officer that the deck job
ran over budget and became difficult to finish but that he still tried to complete the
project. He was in a car accident, which slowed him down physically and caused
physical pain and depression. Defendant reported that he did not quit the job; the victim
fired him. He claimed that they agreed on a settlement amount of $8,000, that he made
payments of $6,000, but that the victim refused the last payment.
       Defendant indicated that he was willing to follow the terms and conditions of
probation, including paying restitution. When the probation officer asked how much
defendant could “afford to pay monthly, [defendant] was unsure but indicated he may be
able to afford $200 per month.”

       3
           People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

                                              3
       Defendant provided the following personal information to the probation officer.
Regarding education, defendant reported that he had attended high school through
12th grade but did not obtain a diploma. He attended De Anza College and Foothill
College in the 1990’s. Regarding his health, defendant reported that he had experienced
various issues related to a car accident a few years ago, including “two or three herniated
discs.” Regarding employment, defendant reported that he had worked in construction
since he was 15 years old and that he was a project superintendent for several years. He
also had prior experience as a chef. Defendant reported that he was presently employed
as a cook on commercial squid fishing boats in southern California. The hours varied
between two and 100 hours per week. Defendant also worked as a “handyman on the
side.” He reported wages of $4,000 per month, assets of “$1,200 in Bitcoin,” and owing
$1,800 in state taxes.
       The victim told the probation officer that defendant became uncommunicative
when problems regarding the deck project were raised with him. The problems included
missing railings and unsafe stairs. Over four years later, the victim was still repaying a
loan taken out for the project and could not afford to hire someone to complete the
project. The victim sought $76,802 in restitution, which was based on the following:
$48,502 to correct and finish the deck work; $25,000 paid to defendant and obtained by
false pretenses; $3,000 paid to a third party to repair and finish the stairs to the deck; and
$300 paid to a third party to remove debris that defendant left after he abandoned the
project.
       The probation report included a section entitled “risk factors and criminogenic
needs.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) The probation report stated that based on a
risk assessment, “defendant would receive low intensity interventions if placed on
community supervision.” Based on a “needs assessment,” defendant’s “identified needs”
were described as “isolated/situational/temporary circumstances.” (Capitalization &
boldface omitted.) The probation report indicated that the “program/condition

                                              4
recommendation” was “cognitive behavioral therapy.” (Capitalization & boldface
omitted.)
       Regarding disposition of the case, the probation officer stated that defendant’s
conduct resulted in significant financial losses to the victim and defendant took only
“limited responsibility for wrongdoing.” However, the probation officer recommended
that defendant be granted probation, because he did not have a serious criminal history,
was not on probation at the time, was willing to comply with probation terms, appeared
capable of doing so, and imprisonment would “impede” his ability to pay restitution.
Among other terms and conditions, the probation officer recommended that defendant
serve 90 days in jail, “[p]articipate in cognitive behavioral therapy at Probation
direction,” and pay victim restitution in the amount of $76,802. The probation officer
also recommended a restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a probation revocation
restitution fine of $300 stayed (§ 1202.44), a court operations assessment of $40
(§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a court facilities assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373,
subd. (a)(1)).
       D. Sentencing
       The sentencing hearing was held on January 20, 2023. Defendant denied telling
the probation officer that he believed the victim had written a contractor’s license number
on the contract. Defendant indicated that the probation officer was mistaken in
attributing this statement to him in the probation report. Defendant indicated that he had
a friend “put [the contract] together” for him and that he “had no idea the license was
there.” Defendant also disputed the amount of restitution requested by the victim but
offered to stipulate to $50,000 in victim restitution. He moved to have the felony reduced
to a misdemeanor.
       The prosecutor opposed reducing the felony to a misdemeanor, declined to
stipulate to $50,000 in victim restitution, and requested that the court order the full
amount of restitution requested by the victim plus interest.

                                              5
       The trial court stated that it was not going to grant the motion to reduce the felony
now, but that “we’ll keep that open” for defendant to show he was “staying out of
trouble” and making restitution payments. The trial court indicated that the matter would
be set for a restitution hearing.
       The trial court proceeded to suspend imposition of sentence and place defendant
on probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including 90 days in jail.
When the court announced the probation condition requiring defendant’s participation in
cognitive behavioral therapy at the direction of the probation officer, the following
exchange occurred between defense counsel and the court:
       “[Defense counsel]: I would object to that term. While I’m sure that most people
can benefit from therapy, there does need to be a nexus between the offense caused and
the probation terms and there’s no allegations that this was caused by any kind of mental
health issues. And there’s simply no nexus between ordering [cognitive behavioral
therapy] and the charged offense.
       “THE COURT: He’ll participate in whatever educational, therapeutic, or
vocational programming your probation officer directs. That’s a normal term of
probation.
       “[Defense counsel]: That’s even broader than the one –
       “THE COURT: That’s what I’m ordering. If you want to appeal it, go ahead,
[defense counsel]. I guarantee you that will be approved by the Court of Appeal. I
guarantee it. [¶] I appreciate your objections, however.”
       The trial court thereafter pronounced additional terms and conditions of probation
and then ordered a restitution fine of $300 and court facilities and court operations
assessments of $70. After ordering these amounts, the following exchange occurred
between defense counsel and the court:
       “[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to make a finding under
[Dueñas], an inability to pay on those fines.

                                                6
       “THE COURT: No. [Defendant] has identified to Probation that he would be
able to pay $200 per month in restitution. He said that, I didn’t say that.
       “[Defense counsel]: He’s also said that he’s disabled, not working, and is going to
have probably somewhere in the tens of thousands of dollars of restitution to pay. [¶] I
appreciate that he has been accommodating in speaking to Probation, but I also think that
those of us who are familiar with this payment system or familiar with the kind of money
also need to put our own outside judgment on the matter. And it’s clear, from looking at
[Dueñas], that he doesn’t have the ability to pay those fines.
       “THE COURT: It is not at all clear and he’ll pay them.”
                                       III. DISCUSSION
       A. Probation Condition
       At sentencing, the trial court ordered that defendant, as a condition of probation,
“participate in whatever educational, therapeutic, or vocational programming [his]
probation officer directs,” which the court explained was “a normal term of probation.”
Consistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the preprinted form containing the
terms and conditions of defendant’s probation, which was signed by defendant, requires
him to “[p]articipate in an educational/vocational/therapeutic program [¶] [a]t the
direction of the probation officer.”
       On appeal, defendant contends that the probation condition violates the separation
of powers doctrine because the trial court “explicitly delegated judicial authority to
probation to determine what conditions to impose.” He requests that this court order the
trial court to “impose a specific term of probation.” Defendant also argues that his claim
has not been forfeited because it involves a pure question of law, and he further argues
that any objection would have been futile as the court “cut . . . off [his trial counsel] in
mid-sentence.” Defendant further contends that if his claim has been forfeited, his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object.

                                               7
       The Attorney General “do[es] not contend” that defendant’s claim has been
forfeited and instead argues that the probation condition does not unlawfully delegate
judicial authority.
       Although a claim may be forfeited by the failure to raise it below, a general
exception exists to the forfeiture rule “where an objection would have been futile.
[Citations.]” (People v. Abbaszadeh (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 642, 648.) In this case,
defendant’s trial counsel attempted to object to the probation condition requiring
educational, therapeutic, or vocational programming. However, the trial court interrupted
counsel midsentence and stated, “That’s what I’m ordering. If you want to appeal it, go
ahead . . . .” On this record, we will assume that defendant’s appellate contention
regarding an unconstitutional delegation of authority has not been forfeited, and we will
analyze the substance of defendant’s claim.
       A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster
rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. (§ 1203.1, subd. (j); People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) Further, the court “has authority to empower
the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions.” (People
v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240.)
       However, a trial court is also governed by the separation of powers doctrine.
“ ‘The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as
permitted by this Constitution.’ (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) Although the separation of
powers doctrine ‘does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect
another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially
impair the inherent functions of another.’ [Citation.] ‘Separation of powers does not
mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be
impracticable, if not impossible.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212
(D.N.).)

                                              8
       Based on the separation of powers doctrine, it has been stated that “judicial powers
may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. [Citation.] While the probation officer may
properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is
the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.
[Citations.]” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) The “general
rule [is] that a court may dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving
specification of details to the probation officer.” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
902, 919 (Victor L.).) “The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the
specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of
probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.” (People v. O’Neil
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359.) Safeguards against abuse of delegated
authority is important. In the related context of juvenile probationers, “California courts
have recognized that a juvenile court may place significant supervisory discretion in the
probation department’s hands, at least when the department’s decisions are subject to
judicial review. [Citations.]” (D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 208; see also id. at p. 208
[observing that “a similar degree of delegation to public officers” has been found
permissible in the context of juvenile dependency visitation orders “so long as the
juvenile court retains ultimate control”].)
       We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo. (In re
Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
       In this case, we do not read the challenged probation condition as delegating to the
probation officer the initial decision as to whether “an educational/vocational/therapeutic
program” is warranted. “ ‘A probation condition should be given “the meaning that
would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.” ’ [Citation.] Following that precept, we
read the challenged provision here not as delegating [the decision] to the probation
officer but as indicating the court’s advance approval” of an educational, vocational,
and/or therapeutic program. (D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 211.) Thus, consistent with

                                              9
the separation of powers doctrine, the trial court here performed its “duty to determine
the nature of the requirements imposed on” defendant (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 902) by “dictat[ing] the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving specification
of details to the probation officer” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919).
       Further, we do not believe the trial court’s delegation of the details of the specific
program within those three types of programs (educational/vocational/therapeutic) was an
improper delegation of authority. Although the probation condition in isolation may
appear broad, consideration of the condition in the context of the probation report
adequately circumscribes the nature of the probation condition and places appropriate
boundaries on the probation officer’s discretion in choosing an appropriate educational,
vocational, and/or therapeutic program for defendant. The trial court ordered the
programming in the context of defendant’s particular circumstances as set forth in the
probation report, and thus the probation report provides guidance to the probation officer
in selecting an appropriate educational, vocational, and/or therapeutic program. In
particular, the probation report stated that based on a risk and needs assessment,
“defendant would receive low intensity interventions if placed on community
supervision” and his “identified needs” were “isolated/situational/temporary
circumstances.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) Regarding defendant’s education,
the probation report stated that he had not obtained a high school diploma. Regarding
defendant’s vocation, the probation report indicated that defendant had been employed in
construction and as a cook but his trial counsel at sentencing contended defendant was
disabled and not working. Regarding therapeutic needs, defendant reported that after
being in a car accident, he experienced physical pain, was “slowed . . . down physically”
which scared him, and he became depressed. This report by defendant was in the context
of him not being able to complete the victim’s deck work. The probation report
recommended “[c]ognitive behavioral therapy.” On this record, the probation condition
requiring “an educational/vocational/therapeutic program” is reasonably related to, and

                                             10
would further, defendant’s ability to maintain gainful employment, which would, at a
minimum, facilitate his ability to pay fines and assessments and the anticipated victim
restitution order.4 The probation report – with its discussion of defendant’s level of
education, his claimed physical and mental health issues, the purported effect on his
ability to work, the resultant need for cognitive behavioral therapy, and the obvious need
for defendant to continue working in order to pay fines, assessments, and victim
restitution – supports a more constrained interpretation of any discretion conferred to the
probation officer by the probation condition requiring participation in “an
educational/vocational/therapeutic program.” Based on the record in this case, we
determine that the probation condition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
(See People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308 [explaining that “any attempt to
specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious practical
difficulties”; a “trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program,
both because it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and,
more fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial
questions of timing and availability”].) We observe that if, at some point, the probation
officer exercises the delegated authority to select a program that defendant believes is

       4
         Defendant in this appeal does not challenge the reasonableness of a probation
condition requiring participation in an educational, vocational, and/or therapeutic
program. We note that a trial court has the express authority to “require as a condition of
probation that the probationer go to work and earn money . . . to pay any fine imposed or
reparation condition, to keep an account of the probationer’s earnings, to report them to
the probation officer and apply those earnings as directed by the court.” (§ 1203.1,
subd. (d).) Further, pursuant to section 1203.1, a trial court has the authority to require
“any or all of the . . . conditions specified in this section,” which include counseling and
education programs, “and other reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the
breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and
generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (Id.,
subd. (j); see id., subd. (i)(1).)

                                             11
unnecessary or inappropriate, he can seek judicial intervention by moving to modify the
probation order to ensure that the program is necessary and properly related to his
rehabilitation. (See id. at p. 308.)
       Defendant, in support of his contention that the probation condition improperly
delegates the trial court’s authority to the probation officer, primarily relies on Smith,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897. We are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on Smith. In
Smith, the trial court imposed a probation condition requiring the defendant to
“ ‘participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as
directed by the probation officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 901.) The appellate court first determined
that the condition was not an improper delegation of authority for failing to specify the
nature of the treatment, counseling, or therapy. (Id. at pp. 902-903.) Rather, when
considering the probation condition “in context” with the record, including another
probation condition and the court’s oral comments, the appellate court concluded that
“the condition passes muster.” (Id. at pp. 902, 903.) However, the appellate court
nevertheless found an unconstitutional delegation of authority because the probation
condition “delegate[d] to the probation officer the discretion to decide whether [the
defendant] must attend a residential program, as opposed to an outpatient program.”
(Id. at p. 903, italics added.) The appellate court reached this conclusion based on the
fact that “[a] residential program can impose far greater burdens on a person’s liberty
interests than an outpatient program” and, “[g]iven the significant liberty interests at
stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the decision to require a defendant to
attend residential treatment. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Unlike the probation condition at issue
in Smith, which delegated to the probation officer the authority to determine whether a
residential program, as opposed to an outpatient program, would be required, the
probation condition in the instant case did not give the probation officer any such
authority.

                                              12
       In sum, in view of the record in this case, defendant fails to establish that the
probation condition constituted an unconstitutional delegation of authority by the trial
court to the probation officer.
       B. Fine and Assessments
       Defendant contends that the trial court violated his right to due process under
Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 by imposing a $300 restitution fine, a $40 court
operations assessment, and a $30 court facilities assessment without first holding a
hearing to determine his ability to pay these amounts.
       The Attorney General contends that under due process principles, defendant’s
restitution fine was not unconstitutional.5 Regarding the court facilities and court
operations assessments, the Attorney General argues that the failure to hold an ability to
pay hearing was harmless “because there is nothing in the record to indicate that
[defendant] did not have the present ability to pay the relatively small fines.” To the
extent this court finds a due process violation and that the error was not harmless, the
Attorney General argues that “the proper remedy is to remand to give [defendant] the
opportunity to request a hearing on his ability to pay.”
       Where, as here, the statutory minimum restitution fine of $300 is imposed, a trial
court by statute may not consider a defendant’s ability to pay. (§ 1202.4, subds. (b)(1) &
(c).) Likewise, the court operations assessment and the court facilities assessment are
mandated by statute and require imposition without regard to a defendant’s ability to pay.
(§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) [court operations assessment of $40 “shall be imposed on every

       5
        We note that the Attorney General also contends that although Dueñas relied on
due process principles in analyzing a defendant’s ability to pay a restitution fine, the issue
should instead be analyzed, according to the Attorney General, under the excessive fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Under this framework, the
Attorney General argues that defendant’s restitution fine was not excessive. We decline
to review defendant’s restitution fine under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment as urged by the Attorney General because defendant has not raised an Eighth
Amendment challenge.

                                             13
conviction”]; Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1) [court facilities assessment of $30 “shall
be imposed on every conviction”]; People v. Woods (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 269, 272;
People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.)
       In Dueñas, however, the appellate court concluded that imposition of the court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8) and court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373)
without a determination of the defendant’s ability to pay was “fundamentally unfair” and
violated due process under the federal and California Constitutions. (Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 1168.) The court also concluded that the execution of a restitution fine
under section 1202.4 “must be stayed unless and until the trial court holds an ability to
pay hearing and concludes that the defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution
fine.” (Dueñas, supra, at p. 1164.)
       The Courts of Appeal, including panels of our own court, have reached conflicting
conclusions about whether Dueñas was correctly decided. (See, e.g., People v. Santos
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 926-927 [applying “the principles articulated [in Dueñas]”];
id. at pp. 935-940 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.); People v. Adams (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 828, 832
[concluding that “Dueñas was wrongly decided”]; id. at pp. 832-833 (dis. opn. of Premo,
J.); People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 90 [finding that Dueñas was not
“persuasive”]; id. at p. 95 (dis. opn. of Premo, J.); People v. Greeley (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 609, 625 [determining that “Dueñas was wrongly decided”].) The issue of
whether an ability to pay determination must be made is currently pending before the
California Supreme Court. (See, e.g., People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 95
(Kopp) [agreeing with Dueñas that due process requires an ability to pay determination
before imposition of court operations or court facilities assessment], review granted
Nov. 13, 2019, S257844).
       While we await the California Supreme Court’s decision in Kopp, we need not
address in this case whether Dueñas was correctly decided.

                                             14
       First, even assuming defendant was entitled to a hearing regarding his ability to
pay, we observe that the trial court entertained an ability to pay objection by defendant’s
trial counsel and ruled on that objection. Defense counsel never requested a separate
hearing on the issue; he simply requested “the Court to make a finding under [Dueñas],
an inability to pay on those fines.” The court indicated it would not make such a finding
because defendant had “identified to Probation that he would be able to pay $200 per
month in restitution.” Defense counsel made a further argument to the court regarding
defendant’s inability to pay and concluded by stating that “it’s clear, from looking at
[Dueñas], that [defendant] doesn’t have the ability to pay those fines.” The court
disagreed, ruling, “[H]e’ll pay them.” The record thus reflects that the court heard
argument from defense counsel concerning defendant’s purported inability to pay, and
counsel never requested a hearing to, for example, present evidence concerning
defendant’s purported inability to pay.
       Second, even assuming defendant was entitled to and requested a separate ability
to pay hearing, we would find the claimed error in failing to provide such a hearing
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134,
139-140 [Dueñas error subject to harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of error];
People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035 [same]; People v. Aviles (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075 [same].) “ ‘Ability to pay does not necessarily require existing
employment or cash on hand.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]n determining whether a defendant has the
ability to pay a restitution fine, the court is not limited to considering a defendant’s
present ability but may consider a defendant’s ability to pay in the future.’ [Citation.]
This include[s] the defendant’s ability . . . to earn money after his release from custody.
[Citation.]” (People v. Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837, italics omitted.)
These factors in determining an ability to pay a restitution fine would appear to apply
equally to court assessments, to the extent an ability to pay determination is required
regarding such amounts.

                                              15
       In this case, although defendant’s trial counsel argued at the January 20, 2023
sentencing hearing that defendant was disabled and not working, the probation officer
had interviewed defendant only one month prior, on December 13, 2022. Defendant
reported that he was working, earning income, and could make monthly restitution
payments. Specifically, despite being in a car accident at some earlier unspecified time
and experiencing health issues, defendant told the probation officer that he was presently
employed as a cook on commercial squid fishing boats where he worked between two
and 100 hours per week, that he also worked as a “handyman on the side,” that he had
wages of $4,000 per month, and that he had assets of “$1,200 in Bitcoin.” Moreover,
notwithstanding his health issues and owing state taxes, defendant expressed his
willingness to pay restitution and indicated he could afford $200 per month. On this
record, we conclude that any error from purportedly failing to hold an ability to pay
hearing regarding the ordered $370 for a fine and assessments was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
                                   IV. DISPOSITION
       The order of probation is affirmed.

                                             16
                                 BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

BROMBERG, J.

ADAMS, J.*

People v. Mercer
H050743

      *
       Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.