Court Opinion

ID: 9862920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:28:48.433653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:38:11.199204
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The issue in this case is whether discretionary damages under § 17.50(b)(1) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act shall be deemed as found to support the judgment when the jury finds that the defendants acted knowingly, but is not asked to set the amount of damages. *449In my opinion, Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure unequivocally requires that we deem a finding of discretionary damages.
Larry and Billie Martin sued McKee Realtors and its salespersons Jean Rush and Ruby Lyons (McKee) under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The Martins pled that McKee acted knowingly, and they specifically asked for discretionary damages under § 17.50(b)(1). The jury found McKee had violated the DTPA, that the violations were committed knowingly, and that they were a producing cause of damages. No issue was submitted asking the jury to determine the amount of discretionary damages to be awarded. Neither party requested the issue, and neither objected to its omission. The jury awarded actual damages of $2,800, and attorney’s fees. The trial court rendered judgment for the actual damages and attorney’s fees found by the jury, mandatory additional damages of $2,000, and $5,400 in discretionary damages under § 17.50(b)(1) of the DTPA.
When a controlling issue in a jury trial is omitted without objection, Rule 279 requires the issue be deemed as found by the trial judge in support of the judgment rendered. The relevant language of Rule 279 provides:
[Wjhere such ground of recovery ... consists of more than one issue, if one or more issues necessary to sustain such ground of recovery ... and necessarily referable thereto, are submitted to and answered by the jury, and one or more of such issues are omitted, without such request, or objection, and there is evidence to support a finding thereon, ... such omitted issue or issues shall be deemed as found by the court in such a manner as to support the judgment.
(emphasis added). The fundamental premise of this rule has always been that,
... when the trial court has expressly submitted some issues and excluded others, and neither party has put in writing a request for the submission of those excluded, they must be regarded in the appellate court as having acquiesced in such action and consented for the trial judge to determine from the evidence the issue not submitted.
Moore v. Pierson, 100 Tex. 113, 94 S.W. 1132 (1906), quoted in Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 369-70, 135 S.W.2d 79, 84 (1940). Applied to the present case, this rationale requires that the amount of discretionary damages be deemed found.
Two issues are necessary to recover discretionary damages under § 17.50(bXl): first, whether the conduct was committed knowingly; and second, the amount of discretionary damages to be awarded. This amount may be deemed found only if the issue of the defendant’s knowledge is necessarily referable to the ground of recovery; that is, if it “gives notice of the ground of recovery or defense relied upon and which would be completed by deemed or expressed findings on omitted issues.” G. Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas 206 (1959).
It cannot seriously be contended that the issue submitted did not refer to discretionary damages under § 17.50(bXl). The defendant’s knowledge is an element in a DTPA action only when discretionary damages are sought. Moreover, the Martins specifically alleged knowing conduct by McKee as the basis for such damages. There being no question raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an award of discretionary damages and no objection to the failure to submit the issue to the jury, the only course open to this court under Rule 279 is to deem that the trial judge found discretionary damages equal to the $5,400 included in the judgment. See Harmes v. Arklatex Corp., 615 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.1981); Strauss v. LaMark, 366 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.1963); Prairie Cattle Co. v. Fletcher, 610 S.W.2d 849 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1980, writ dism’d).
The cases relied on by the majority are not in point. The opinion in Glen Falls Insurance Co. v. Peters, 386 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.1965), and the others cited merely recognize that an independent ground of recovery is waived when no issue is sub*450mitted. This is not such a case. The issue of McKee’s knowledge was submitted to the jury, and was answered in favor of the Martins.
It seems of no consequence that the omitted issue would have determined the amount of damages. Rule 279 makes no distinction, and the seminal decision of this court in Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co., supra, included a damage issue in the negligence cluster of issues illustrating an appropriate case for a deemed finding. 134 Tex. at 372-73, 135 S.W.2d at 85. It is not necessary, however, to decide whether damages generally may be deemed found. In this case, the legislature specifically tied together the defendant’s knowledge and the amount of discretionary damages to form the grounds for recovering discretionary damages under § 17.50(b)(1).
Unlike the majority, I find no language in § 17.50(b)(1) altering the result mandated by Rule 279. The statute provides: “If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three times the actual damages in excess of $1000[.]” The majority holds that a deemed finding cannot be made, emphasizing that discretionary damages are to be awarded by “the trier of fact.” In a jury trial, of course, the jury is the trier of fact; therefore, the majority concludes that “[i]t was within the jury’s exclusive discretion, as mandated by section 17.50(b)(1), to determine whether or not an award of treble damages under the DTPA was proper.”
The majority overlooks the fact that the jury is the intended trier of fact in every case covered by Rule 279. The majority’s interpretation of the words “trier of fact” is unsupported by any expression of legislative intent, and it flouts long-established rules of statutory construction. It is elementary that courts must determine the legislative intent by looking to the purpose of the act and the evil addressed. Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.1968); Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138 (1939); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 83 S.W.2d 929 (1935). Likewise, we must presume that when the legislature enacted a new provision, it was aware of the existing condition of the law, and our duty is to construe new enactments in harmony with existing law as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence. State v. Dyer, 145 Tex. 586, 200 S.W.2d 813 (1947); McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 166 S.W.2d 125 (1942).
When the legislature amended § 17.-50(b)(1) in 1979 to make certain damages discretionary with the trier of fact, its manifest purpose was to overrule Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1977), insofar as Woods held that treble damages were mandatory. There is no indication, however, that the legislature also intended to overturn Rule 279. The rule requiring a deemed finding when no objection is raised has been a fixture in Texas appellate procedure since 1897. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. art. 1331 (Sayles 1897). Absent a clearly expressed contrary intent, we cannot presume that the legislature sought to bar enforcement of this rule. Cf. Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.1975) (court would not presume legislative intent to abolish the common law rule requiring presentment of a note prior to acceleration).
The legislative intent to make treble damages discretionary would not be frustrated by a deemed finding of the amount of discretionary damages. The damages awarded under § 17.50(b)(1) are still in the discretion of the trier of fact, but because McKee did not object to the failure to submit the issue to the jury, the trial judge became the trier of fact. See Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper, supra. This interpretation promotes uniformity in the law by applying Rule 279 to all cases where an issue has been omitted.
The majority has focused on one provision of the entire Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and by mechanically interpreting that provision, has defeated the express purposes of the DTPA — to protect consumers and discourage deceptive trade practices. Proper statutory construction requires instead that the legislative intent be determined *451from the entire act, not just isolated portions. State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.1979); Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1978); City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273 (1951); State v. Dyer, supra. Obedience to the dual aims of the DTPA requires that discretionary damages be awarded to protect consumers like the Martins, and to deter knowing misconduct such as that of which McKee was found guilty.
The majority, in effect, reads the words “same trier of fact” into § 17.50(b)(1), thus carving out an exception to rule 279 in Deceptive Trade Practice Act cases. This adverse construction cannot be reconciled with § 17.44 of the DTPA and the numerous decisions of this court mandating a liberal construction of the Act to achieve its underlying purpose to protect consumers. See TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.-44 (Vernon Supp.1982); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.1981); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.1980); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1977). The majority has gone to the opposite extreme by reading words into the statute to defeat recovery.
The majority treats this case as if Rule 279 did not exist. Instead of deeming that the trial judge made the necessary finding of discretionary damages, the majority holds that the Martins waived their right to these damages by failing to submit the issue to the jury. This holding does violence to the language of the statute, Rule 279, and prior decisions of this court; therefore, I dissent.