Court Opinion

ID: 9686872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:10:08.272505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:09.535298
License: Public Domain

J-S21011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DYLAN THOMAS WILLIAMS                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1252 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0000534-2020

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DYLAN THOMAS WILLIAMS                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1253 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0000535-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED: AUGUST 23, 2023

       Dylan Thomas Williams appeals from the aggregate judgment of

sentence of thirteen years and seven months to twenty-seven years and two

months of incarceration, followed by three years of probation, imposed as to

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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his jury convictions for various sexual offenses at docket number 534 of 2020

(“Docket 534”) and docket number 535 of 2020 (“Docket 535”). We affirm.

       Appellant was charged at Docket 534 for sexually assaulting C.B. when

she was fourteen and fifteen years old, and at Docket 535 for sexually

assaulting M.B. when she was twelve and thirteen years old.1 At the time of

the incidents, Appellant was between twenty and twenty-one years old, and

was dating and living with A.B., the older sister of C.B. and M.B. Appellant

and A.B. first lived in an apartment in Kingston, Pennsylvania and then moved

to an apartment in nearby Plymouth. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/21/22, at 30-31,

34, 117. Both girls were very close with A.B. and Appellant. C.B. visited them

at their Kingston apartment nearly every day. Appellant would pick her up

from school and the two would watch movies or play video games until A.B.

came home from work. Id. at 33-35. M.B. would also visit them at their

apartment and watch movies or play video games with Appellant, A.B., and

C.B. Id. at 116-19.

       When M.B. was twelve or thirteen, she was changing her shirt in a room

at her father’s house when Appellant walked in.        Although he did not say

anything at the time, he later messaged her that he “wouldn’t mind being

there next time.” Id. at 122-23. At some point after, Appellant fondled M.B.’s

breasts while he, M.B., A.B., and C.B. were watching a movie together on the

bed at the Kingston apartment. Id. at 119-21. During that incident, Appellant
____________________________________________

1 We note that the trial court did not set forth the facts of the underlying cases

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion to this Court.

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also rubbed his exposed penis against M.B.’s bare, lower back. Id. at 128-

29. Around the same time, Appellant began commenting that in four years

C.B., who was fourteen at the time, could run away with Appellant. Not long

after, his comments, which C.B. had initially interpreted as jokes, turned into

unwanted touching of C.B.’s breasts and buttocks while watching movies in

bed in Kingston. Id. at 37-44.

      In late August of 2019, Appellant and A.B., who was pregnant with

Appellant’s child, moved to the Plymouth apartment. From the move until

September 6, 2019, Appellant’s sexual contact with M.B., then thirteen, and

C.B., then fifteen, continued and, in fact, escalated. During an overnight stay

in September, Appellant once again touched M.B.’s breasts, this time

underneath her shirt. Id. at 124-25, 140. When she asked him why he was

doing that, he said “I don’t know. Just don’t tell anybody.” Id. at 125.

      In late August or early September, C.B. and Appellant were watching a

movie in the bedroom of the Plymouth apartment, waiting for A.B. to come

home. As C.B. began to fall asleep on her side, Appellant reached over, rolled

C.B. onto her back, held her hands above her head, removed her pants and

his pants, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Id. at 53, 70. The next

contact occurred when Appellant was watching a movie with C.B. and M.B.

C.B. was lying on the couch with a blanket over her. Appellant lifted her legs

up and sat down beneath her. He then removed his and C.B.’s pants, held

her legs down, and touched her with his penis. Id. at 46, 54-55. Finally, on

September 6, 2019, C.B. was at the apartment to help prepare for A.B.’s baby

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shower the following day.   After A.B. went upstairs to sleep at Appellant’s

suggestion, Appellant called C.B. over to the couch to look at a ring he was

considering buying to propose to A.B. C.B. sat on the couch to look at the

ring and then moved to the opposite end of the couch. Appellant followed

her, held her hand down by her side, put his hand down her pants, and placed

his finger inside her vagina. When C.B. protested, he told her to be quiet so

as not to wake A.B. Appellant then removed his pants and C.B.’s pants and

inserted his penis into her vagina. Id. at 49-51.

     During each encounter, C.B. told Appellant not to touch her and, every

time, his response was the same: “Don’t tell anybody, I’m not going to do it

again. Calm down. Be quiet.” Id. at 53-54. C.B. told her boyfriend after

Appellant began touching her and, after the first time Appellant had sexual

intercourse with C.B., she told her grandmother and asked for advice. Her

grandmother told her to tell Appellant not to do it again or she would tell

somebody. Id. at 60-62, 65. Around September 12 or 13, 2019, M.B. told a

school counselor.   Id at 126.   When nothing immediately happened, M.B.

disclosed Appellant’s touching to a friend and C.B. on September 14, 2019.

C.B. called their grandmother and the friend told her parents, who called the

police. Later that day, Appellant and A.B. picked up C.B. and M.B. from their

father’s house for a pre-arranged stay at the Plymouth apartment for the

weekend.    Not long after, the police retrieved C.B. and M.B. from the

apartment. Id. at 63-65, 126-28. As C.B. left, Appellant asked her if she had

told anybody. Id. at 65.

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      After the police removed M.B. and C.B., Appellant called his work friend,

Michael Siley.   During a subsequent conversation, Appellant admitted to

sleeping with C.B. twice and accidentally touching M.B.’s breasts. Id. at 155-

58. When confronted, Appellant also admitted to A.B. that he had sex with

C.B. twice. Id. at 176. Within days, both M.B. and C.B. were taken to the

Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) for forensic interviews. Later, M.B. reported

to a school nurse, Michelle Binker, that she had been raped by Appellant and

requested a pregnancy test. Id. at 129-30, 219-20. Upon questioning by

Detective Stephen Gibson, M.B. clarified that Appellant had not raped her and

that she made the statement to obtain a pregnancy test in order to disprove

an unrelated school rumor. Id. at 129-31, 208-09.

      As a result of the foregoing, Appellant was charged at Docket 534 with

aggravated indecent assault, two counts of statutory assault, corruption of

minors, indecent assault, and rape, all of which related to conduct against C.B.

At Docket 535, pertaining to M.B., Appellant was charged with two counts of

corruption of minors and two counts of indecent assault. Appellant proceeded

to a consolidated jury trial on April 21, 2021. The Commonwealth presented

testimony from C.B., M.B., A.B., their grandmother, Mr. Siley, and Detective

Gibson. Appellant played the girls’ CAC videos and presented testimony from

Ms. Binker.

      At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant at Docket 534

of one count each of aggravated indecent assault, corruption of minors,

indecent assault, and rape, and two counts of statutory sexual assault. At

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Docket 535, Appellant was found guilty of one count of corruption of minors

and two counts of indecent assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of incarceration of fifteen to thirty years, followed by three

years of probation. That sentence included a mandatory minimum sentence

of ten to twenty years for the rape conviction.       Having determined that

Appellant was a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), Appellant was also

subjected to lifetime sexual offender registration.

      Appellant filed a post-sentence motion and the Commonwealth

responded. Following a hearing, the trial court denied in part and granted in

part Appellant’s motion.    The court denied Appellant’s challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his rape conviction and the weight of the

evidence, and reserved Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for

collateral review. However, the court found the mandatory sentence did not

apply to Appellant’s rape conviction because the conduct occurred before the

effective date of the relevant statute. See Order, 3/8/22, at unnumbered 1-

3. Therefore, it vacated the rape sentence and granted Appellant’s motion for

resentencing. The court also granted resentencing at Docket 535 because

Appellant was mistakenly sentenced on two counts of corruption of minors

and only one count of indecent assault. Id. at unnumbered 3.

      On March 31, 2022, the trial court resentenced Appellant to a shortened

aggregate sentence of thirteen years and seven months to twenty-seven years

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and two months of incarceration, followed by three years of probation.2

Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions. On April 18, 2022, the trial court

entered an order correcting the sentencing order to reflect the agreement of

the parties that the maximum sentence for rape should have been 132

months, not 122, in accordance with the aggregate sentence imposed. On

August 9, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-

sentence motions.

       Appellant simultaneously filed the instant, timely appeal and a concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued a responsive

Rule 1925(a) opinion. In this Court, Appellant presents the following issues:

       1.     Whether the imposition of longer, consecutive sentences
              after a successful challenge to the imposition of a mandatory
              sentence resulted in an excessive, unreasonable and
              vindictive sentence?

       2.     Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the
              forcible compulsion element of rape?

____________________________________________

2 To achieve this reduced aggregate sentence, the court shortened the rape

sentence, extended the terms of incarceration for statutory sexual assault at
Docket 534, and shortened the term of incarceration for the indecent assault
conviction at Docket 535 that was incorrectly imposed as if for a charge of
corruption of minors originally.    Additionally, instead of running some
sentences concurrently as in the original sentencing order, the court ran all
sentences consecutively upon resentencing.

As discussed infra, the resentencing order contained a mathematical error that
was corrected by an amended sentencing order. Specifically, the individual
sentences imposed add up only to 316 months because the trial court
mistakenly imposed a maximum term of 122 months, instead of 132 months,
for the rape conviction.

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      3.     Whether the jury unanimously found [Appellant] guilty of
             rape by forcible compulsion due to the lack of specificity in
             the Information and jury instructions?

      4.     Whether the evidence at trial was so weak and inconclusive
             that the court abused its discretion in denying a new trial?

      5.     Whether the court erred in denying a post sentence hearing
             on ineffectiveness of counsel, given that [Appellant] had
             new counsel, there was error apparent of record at trial, and
             the refusal to conduct such a hearing has created an undue
             delay in considering these issues?

      6.     Whether the SVP finding should be reversed or remanded
             for a new hearing because the report improperly relied on
             unproven and inaccurate allegations?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (cleaned up).

      Appellant first alleges that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive and

increased individual sentences “was vindictive and not based on principles of

the Sentencing Code, but rather to mathematically come as close to the

previously imposed sentence as possible while remaining within the standard

range of sentencing guidelines.” Appellant’s brief at 19.      Appellant argues

that because no new information was introduced, other than the inapplicability

of the mandatory sentence, “an increase in the sentences was not warranted.”

Id. at 21.

      The Commonwealth contends that this issue implicates the discretionary

aspects of sentencing as it challenges the court’s decision to impose

consecutive sentences. See Commonwealth’s brief at 15. Since Appellant

failed to include a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief, the

Commonwealth asks this Court to find the issue unreviewable. Id. Appellant,

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on the other hand, maintains that this issue, which asserts a claim of

vindictiveness, implicates the legality of his sentence and is reviewable despite

the lack of a Rule 2119(f) statement. See Appellant’s reply brief at 3 (citing

Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554 (Pa. 2022). Assuming for the

sake of argument that Appellant’s challenge implicates the legality of his

sentence and therefore is not waived by failing to include a Rule 2119(f)

statement, we find his vindictiveness claim infirm.

      As   detailed   above,    Appellant’s   aggregate    sentence    following

resentencing was reduced from fifteen to thirty years of incarceration, to

thirteen years and seven months to twenty-seven years and two months.

Despite receiving a shorter aggregate sentence upon resentencing, Appellant

claims that the trial court was vindictive in increasing some of his individual

sentences and running them consecutively in what he purports is an

impermissible attempt to maintain the original aggregate sentence.          See

Appellant’s brief at 19. However, “[w]e have held that preserving the integrity

of a prior sentencing scheme is a legitimate sentencing concern [and] a trial

court properly may resentence a defendant to the same aggregate sentence

to preserve its original sentencing scheme.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167

A.3d 110, 124 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (cleaned up). Stated simply, given

that Appellant received a lesser aggregate sentence upon resentencing, he

“was not the victim of a vindictive sentence on the part of the trial court[.]”

Id. at 125 (finding no vindictiveness where the defendant’s aggregate

sentence remained the same following remand); see also Commonwealth

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v. Rosario, 2023 WL 4104055 (Pa.Super. filed June 21, 2023) (non-

precedential decision) (applying Barnes, holding that the presumption of

vindictiveness was rebutted by the trial court’s explanation that it intended to

preserve   the   original   sentencing   scheme   and   Rosario   benefited   on

resentencing by receiving a shorter aggregate sentence, despite two of the

individual sentences being increased).     Thus, regardless of how we review

Appellant’s sentencing issue, his claim warrants no relief.

      Appellant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the

element of forcible compulsion as to his rape conviction.         According to

Appellant, there was insufficient evidence of a threat through physical force

or psychological coercion during either instance of sexual intercourse. See

Appellant’s brief at 22-23. He maintains that C.B.’s description of the events

varied and that she “did not voice any objection that could be heard by others

who were in the room or in close proximity while she claimed she was being

forcibly raped” and “suffered no injuries[.]” Id. at 23-24.

      We consider this claim pursuant to the following principles.

      In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we must determine
      whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable
      inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most
      favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all the
      elements of the offense. Additionally, to sustain a conviction, the
      facts and circumstances which the Commonwealth must prove
      must be such that every essential element of the crime is
      established beyond a reasonable doubt. Admittedly, guilt must be
      based on facts and conditions proved, and not on suspicion or
      surmise. However, entirely circumstantial evidence is sufficient
      so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to
      the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

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     Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
     factfinder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as
     a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
     combined circumstances. The fact finder is free to believe all,
     part, or none of the evidence presented at trial.

Commonwealth v. Eckrote, 12 A.3d 383, 385–86 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(cleaned up).

     It is well-established that in order to prove the forcible compulsion
     component, the Commonwealth must establish, beyond a
     reasonable doubt, that the defendant used either physical force,
     a threat of physical force, or psychological coercion, since the
     mere showing of a lack of consent does not support a conviction
     for rape by forcible compulsion. . . . [F]orcible compulsion
     includes not only physical force or violence, but also moral,
     psychological or intellectual force used to compel a person to
     engage in sexual intercourse against that person’s will. Further,
     the degree of force required to constitute rape is relative and
     depends on the facts and particular circumstances of a given case.

Id. at 387 (cleaned up).

     Here, C.B. testified that during the first incident, which began as she

was falling asleep, Appellant held both of her hands above her head as he

removed their pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. See N.T. Jury

Trial, 4/21/22, at 53, 70. During the second incident, he held her hand down

as he inserted his finger into her vagina and when she protested, he told her

to be quiet and then once again removed their pants and inserted his penis

into her vagina.   Id. at 49-51.   Thus, Appellant physically restrained her.

Moreover, these acts occurred within the context of an escalating pattern of

unwanted sexual advances from someone C.B. considered like a brother and

who always responded to her protests in the same way: “Don’t tell anybody,

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I’m not going to do it again. Calm down. Be quiet.” Id. at 53-54. Based on

the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth established that an act of sexual intercourse

was performed by forcible compulsion.

      Appellant next contends that the jury’s verdict as to rape was not

unanimous.    See Appellant’s brief at 25-26.    According to Appellant, the

criminal information averred that the rape occurred sometime between

September 2018 and September 2019, and the jury was not instructed “that

they had to find unanimously that he committed the same act on the same

date and that act constituted forcible compulsion.” Id. at 25. Thus, assailing

the jury instruction, he argues that “it is impossible to know which encounter

or encounters each juror was basing his or her verdict upon. However, to be

unanimous, the jurors would have to agree that the elements of the offense

had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to one of the

incidents.”   Id. at 26.   Given the purportedly inadequate instructions,

Appellant posits that the verdict cannot be considered unanimous.

      The Commonwealth counters that Appellant waived this claim by failing

to timely and specifically object to the jury instruction at trial.      See

Commonwealth’s brief at 21. We agree. It is axiomatic that “[i]n order to

preserve a claim that a jury charge was erroneously given, the Appellant must

have objected to the charge at trial.” Commonwealth v. Lake, 281 A.3d

341, 347–48 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

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      Here, after the trial court instructed the jury, the court asked whether

either attorney had any objections. Appellant’s counsel responded, “No, Your

Honor.” See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/21/22, at 285. Moreover, as to any challenge

to the unanimity of the verdict, Appellant asked that the jury be polled and

each juror indicated that he or she agreed with the verdict. See id. at 289-

90. Based on the foregoing, Appellant has failed to preserve a challenge to

the court’s instruction. Even if Appellant had preserved this claim of error,

the record establishes that the jury’s verdict was unanimous. Accordingly, he

is not entitled to relief.

      Next, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a new trial based upon the claim that the verdicts were against the weight

of the evidence. See Appellant’s brief at 26-27. In Appellant’s view, “[t]he

jury failed to give adequate weight to the lack of corroboration, the lack of

medical evidence, the lack of a prompt complaint, and the inconsistent

statements, therefore the trial court abused its discretion in denying the

motion for a new trial.” Id. at 27-28.

      Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
      discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
      had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
      appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
      and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
      court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
      denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict
      was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
      trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

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Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      The trial court found that “[n]othing in the record leads to the conclusion

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. After having had an

opportunity to view the exhibits and observe the witnesses at trial and listen

to their testimony, this court was not at all shocked by the jury’s verdict.”

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/22, at unnumbered 11. Rather, the court concluded

that “[t]he weight of the evidence overwhelmingly established [Appellant’s]

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”      Id.    Upon review, Appellant points to

nothing in the certified record to evince that the trial court's decision was

manifestly unreasonable, a result of misapplication of the law, or based upon

"partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Clay, supra at 1055 (cleaned up). As

we discern no abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part, no relief is due.

      In his penultimate issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

depriving Appellant of a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel and instead deferring the issue to a future collateral appeal through

the PCRA. See Appellant’s brief at 28. We review this claim with the following

principles in mind:

      Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of
      ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.          See
      Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577-80 (Pa. 2013).
      Instead, such claims are to be deferred to PCRA review. However,
      our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the general
      rule. In Holmes, the Court held that a trial court has discretion
      to address ineffectiveness claims on direct review in cases where
      (1) there are extraordinary circumstances in which trial counsel’s
      ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and “meritorious to
      the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests

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      of justice;” or (2) “there is good cause shown,” and the defendant
      knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek
      subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. Id. at
      563-64. More recently, our Supreme Court adopted a third
      exception, which requires “trial courts to address claims
      challenging trial counsel’s performance where the defendant is
      statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review.”

Commonwealth v. James, ___ A.3d. ___, 2023 WL 3939576, at *3

(Pa.Super. June 12, 2023) (cleaned up).

      Here, Appellant raised fourteen claims of ineffectiveness by trial counsel,

plus an additional allegation of cumulative prejudice.       See Post-Sentence

Motion, 4/11/22, at 6-12. Appellant contends that some of his allegations of

ineffectiveness are apparent on the record.           Moreover, he posits that

extraordinary   circumstances    exist   justifying   consideration   of   all   his

ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal because he already has new counsel

and “[i]t will soon be two years since the guilty verdict in this case and

Appellant will not have had the chance to argue the ineffectiveness of his trial

counsel.” See Appellant’s brief at 28-29.

      At the outset, we reject Appellant’s invocation of a time-restriction

reason supporting review because he still has more than adequate time to

seek collateral review before his PCRA eligibility will expire. In declining to

hold a hearing, the trial court found that he had not raised any “meritorious

and apparent claims” and that this was “not an extraordinary case” warranting

review of such claims on direct appeal.       Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/22, at

unnumbered 11. After reviewing the certified record, we conclude that the

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trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant’s prolix

ineffectiveness claims were best deferred until collateral review.

      Finally, Appellant argues that his SVP designation should be reversed or

remanded for a new SVP hearing because the report relied on unproven

allegations and inaccuracies.    See Appellant’s brief at 30-31.       The only

inconsistency espoused in his brief is that the report referenced the offenses

taking place over one year, which is consistent with the criminal information,

whereas the trial testimony indicated a period of less than six months. Id. at

30.   The Commonwealth contends that Appellant waived this claim by

stipulating to the admission of the report at the time of sentencing and failing

to develop the claim within his brief. See Commonwealth’s brief at 27-28.

Indeed, instead of specifying the inaccuracies or unproven allegations in his

brief, Appellant rather hinges the resolution of his claim on this Court’s then-

pending decision in Commonwealth v. Aumick, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL

3939850 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc), in which we ruled on this precise issue.

      In Aumick, we held that the Sexual Offender Assessment Board

(“SOAB”) member “was permitted to consider the affidavit of probable cause,

criminal information, criminal complaint, preliminary hearing transcript, and

the investigative reports prepared by Child Protective Services when assessing

Aumick.” Aumick, supra at *8.

      Pursuant to revised Subchapter H, the SOAB must undertake a
      comprehensive assessment of a defendant convicted of a sexually
      violent offense by considering the fifteen factors set forth in
      section 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). Section 9799.24(c) expressly requires
      that “[a]ll State, county and local agencies, offices and entities in

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      this Commonwealth, including juvenile probation officers, shall
      cooperate by providing copies of records and information
      as requested by the board in connection with the court-
      ordered assessment . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(c) (emphasis
      added). Moreover, within ninety days of a defendant’s qualifying
      conviction, the SOAB must prepare a written report regarding its
      assessment which includes, at a minimum, the following
      information: (1) a concise narrative of the individual’s conduct;
      (2) whether the victim was a minor; (3) the manner of weapon or
      physical force used or threatened; (4) if the offense involved
      unauthorized entry into a room or vehicle occupied by the victim;
      (5) if the offense was part of a course or pattern of conduct
      involving multiple incidents or victims; and (6) previous instances
      in which the individual was determined guilty of an offense subject
      to this subchapter or of a crime of violence as defined in section
      9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent
      offenses).

      Given these statutory mandates, it is clear that the legislature
      intended that the SOAB member consider . . . the information
      contained in records provided by state, county and local agencies,
      offices and entities in this Commonwealth when making an SVP
      assessment and preparing a statutorily compliant written report.
      To be sure, it would be the rare occasion on which the SOAB
      member would be able to fulfill its statutory obligations if its SVP
      assessments and written reports were limited to facts contained
      in a plea colloquy, admitted into evidence, or determined by the
      trier of fact.

Id. (emphases in original, cleaned up).

      Moreover, this Court emphasized the significance of the context of an

SVP hearing, where “the judge is not tasked with evaluating the veracity of

the facts underlying the expert’s testimony.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather,

the information “presented at an SVP hearing [is] not being offered for the

truth of the matter asserted,” but rather “to supply the basis for the expert’s

opinion in accordance with our Rules of Evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).

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      Here, Appellant stated he had no objection to the admission of the SOAB

evaluator’s report other than a general objection to the proceeding itself. See

N.T. SVP Hearing, 1/6/22, at 3-4.             In argument, he highlighted the

discrepancy in one year versus six months mentioned above, disagreed with

the finding of “other specific Paraphilic Disorder[,]” and challenged the

reference to petitions filed against Appellant for protection from abuse. Id.

at 5-6.     Based on the foregoing, Appellant waived any challenge to the

admission of the SVP report. See id. at *9 n.14 (finding challenge to the

admissibility of the report waived for failing to object to its admission during

the SVP hearing). As for Appellant’s challenge to the SVP report’s reliance on

allegedly unproven allegations or inconsistencies with the trial testimony,

Aumick controls and this issue fails.

      Since Appellant has failed to raise any challenge compelling us to disturb

his convictions or judgments of sentence, we affirm the judgments of

sentence.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed.

      Judge Pellegrini joins this Memorandum.

      Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/03/2023

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