Court Opinion

ID: 9863501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:31:22.990451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:49:00.235874
License: Public Domain

PELANDER, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 13 I respectfully dissent. It is undisputed that the minor “knowingly” directed his verbal barrage at a “school employee on school grounds” while the employee was “engaged in the performance of [her] duties.” § 15-507. Thus, the only issue is whether the evidence of the minor’s conduct and language supported a finding that he had “abused” the teacher’s aide, for purposes of § 15-507, as the juvenile court found. Because no valid basis exists for disturbing that finding, I would affirm.
¶ 14 The majority relies in part on several dictionary definitions of the term “abuse” to support its conclusion that § 15-507 does not proscribe the minor’s conduct. Those and other dictionary definitions, however, support a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary 70 (definition of the verb “abuse” includes “[t]o assail with contemptuous, coarse, or insulting words; revile”; synonyms include “mistreat” and “ill-treat”; and noting that “[a]buse applies to wrongful or unreasonable treatment by deed or word”); Black’s Law Dictionary 10 (7th ed.1999) (“abuse” means “[t]o depart from legal or reasonable use in dealing with (a person or thing)”); Black’s Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed. 1979) (“ ‘Abuse’ means to wrong in speech, reproach coarsely, disparage, revile, and malign.”).
¶ 15 Whether a person’s conduct or language constitutes “abuse” depends on a case-by-case factual analysis of the surrounding circumstances and context. Here, the minor repeatedly directed profanity to the teacher’s aide by telling her four times to “[f| — ■ off,” including after she had specifically requested him to accompany her to the school office; the minor took an aggressive stance toward the aide and spoke in a loud tone of voice; and some four to five other students were in the immediate vicinity of the occurrence. Given that context, contrary to the majority’s *127conclusion as a matter of law, the juvenile court could well have found as a matter of fact that the minor’s words were “a disparaging or hurtful attack on the aide personally.” ¶ 8. See The American Heritage Dictionary 406 (“disparage” means “[t]o speak of as unimportant or small; belittle,” or “[t]o reduce in esteem or rank”).
¶ 16 That the minor did not personalize his vulgarity, call the aide a name, or intimidate her does not make his language any less “contemptuous” or “coarse.” The American Heritage Dictionary 70. And, reasonable minds could conclude, as the juvenile court implicitly did, that the minor “depart[ed] from ... reasonable use in dealing with” the aide. Black’s Law Dictionary 10 (7th ed.1999). “In-your-face” profanity by a teenage student repeatedly directed at a teacher or aide who is performing her duties at school certainly may go beyond a mere administrative disciplinary matter and cross the line, however finely the line may be drawn, into delinquent/misdemeanor conduct. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in finding the then-thirteen-year-old minor’s behavior encompassed and proscribed by § 15-507.
¶ 17 The majority unduly emphasizes the 1989 legislative deletion of “insults” from the statute. Although any theorizing as to the legislature’s underlying reasoning and intended meaning of the amendment is speculative, the term “insults” arguably is more subjective and nebulous than “abuse.” But regardless of any alleged overlap or relationship between those terms, and assuming the statute is intended “to criminalize only truly abusive conduct,” ¶ 12, the delinquency adjudication here is neither prohibited by nor inconsistent with the amended statute.
¶ 18 Neither In re Julio L. nor In re Louise C. compels reversal here. Those cases involved a charge of disorderly conduct under § 13-2904(A)(1) and/or (3) which, unlike § 15-507, requires proof of “fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior,” § 13-2904(A)(1), and use of “abusive or offensive language or gestures ... in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation.” § 13-2904(A)(3). Because disorderly conduct is a more severe charge than abuse and requires proof of several additional elements, compare § 13-2904 with § 15-507, Julio L. and Louise C. are not controlling here.
¶ 19 As the court noted in Julio L., “not every violation of public decorum or of school rules gives legal cause for criminal adjudication,” Julio L., slip op. at ¶ 7, and there indeed may be “a difference between merely rude or offensive behavior and criminal conduct.” Id. at ¶ 10. But it is the legislature’s role, not this court’s, to state what constitutes a crime. See State v. Hickey, 114 Ariz. 394, 396-97, 561 P.2d 315, 317-18 (1977) (“[L]egislatures possess broad discretion to define criminal offenses and prescribe penalties therefor.”); State v. Ramsey, 171 Ariz. 409, 413, 831 P.2d 408, 412 (1992) (“The legislative department has the power to define what conduct constitutes a crime and the power to prescribe punishment for that conduct.”). I would affirm.