Court Opinion

ID: 9646624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:26.826073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.037888
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is but a parody of a well-reasoned decision on the question of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 The majority recognizes (as it must) the existence and controlling nature of precedents such as Angarano v. United States, D.C.App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), rehearing denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc), and Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 379 F.2d 113 (1967). Those decisions make it clear that to make reversal appropriate, not only must defense counsel have been grossly incompetent — which is recognized by all to be true in this case — but moreover that that incompetence must have blotted out the essence of a substantial defense.
The majority opinion contains many words, but those words obfuscate rather than elucidate. If one reads the majority opinion carefully, it is apparent that not a hint of a substantial defense was blotted out by defense counsel’s inept performance. Illustrative of this fact is the emphasis placed in the majority opinion upon the idea that appellant’s mother “partially corroborated” (slip op. at 808-809) appellant’s alibi defense.
We are, of course, obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. That evidence includes a detective’s testimony — credited by the trial court — that appellant admitted that he was at the scene of the crime. At trial, appellant claimed to have been at home when the offenses were committed, an alleged fact which he supposedly remembered because it was his nephew’s birthday. Appellant’s mother had no idea whether appellant was at home at the time, but quite understandably knew that the date of the crime happened to be the birthday of her grandson. I am at a loss to understand how the majority finds meaningful corroboration of a supposed alibi in the fact that the crimes were committed on the date of appellant’s nephew’s birthday.
*817The majority also seems dismayed that appellant, obviously without the substance of any defense at all, was “particularly easy prey” (slip op. at 809) for the cross-examination of the prosecutor. There is no hint by the majority that the cross-examination was improper; the majority seems simply to wish that appellant had been more proficient at coping with it. The majority opinion could persuade only someone who strongly wishes to be persuaded.
Little purpose would be served by my writing at length. The able trial judge who conducted the hearing on the motion for a new trial wrote a carefully considered Memorandum and Order. So that this case may be considered in its proper perspective, I simply quote with approval the trial court's opinion, deleting only that portion of it which dealt with the speedy trial issue.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Criminal Division
Criminal No. 42964-76
UNITED STATES v. QUINTON ASBELL
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant, Quinton R. Asbell, for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of robbery and second degree burglary on July 18, 1978, and later committed to the custody of the Attorney General under Section 5010(b) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. Upon consideration of defendant’s motion, the opposition thereto, a reply memorandum, the trial transcript, and the testimony adduced during the two-day motions hearing, the Court concludes that the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel has not been violated.
FACTS
On September 17, 1975, two individuals entered a construction site trailer at Suit-land Parkway and Staunton Roads, S.E., Washington, D. C. and robbed at gunpoint the occupant of the trailer, Mr. Randolph Appenzeller, of money, a ring and surveying equipment. During the holdup, Mr. Ap-penzeller’s co-worker, Mr. Massey, entered the trailer but was ordered outside by the robbers. The defendant was arrested two days later for receiving stolen property at another construction site after police had been notified that several individuals were attempting to sell surveying equipment. Mr. Appenzeller and Mr. Massey were brought to the scene and identified the equipment as that taken from them on September 17,1975. Mr. Massey also identified the defendant as one of the individuals he saw inside the trailer. The defendant admitted to the police that he had been at the construction site where Mr. Appenzeller was robbed, but denied having gone inside the trailer.
In April, 1976, the defendant was tried and acquitted in the juvenile branch of this Court of receiving stolen property. Mr. Appenzeller testified at these proceedings as a government witness. At some point during the trial, Mr. Appenzeller told the attending police officers that the defendant was one of the persons involved in the September 17, 1975, robbery. The defendant was arrested on May 18, 1976, and indicted on January 26, 1977, for armed robbery, robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, second degree burglary while armed and second degree burglary.
On July 17, 1978, the armed robbery and related offenses trial began with Mr. Ap-penzeller and Mr. Massey identifying the defendant as one of the robbers. These two witnesses also testified that the same property recovered from the defendant on September 19, 1975, had been stolen from the construction trailer on September 17, 1975. Detective Leadman testified that the defendant had made a statement after his arrest which placed him at the scene of the robbery on September 17, 1975. The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery and second degree burglary.
*818DISCUSSION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently has reaffirmed its adoption of the test in Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 379 F.2d 113 (1967), which holds that to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show “that there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense ...” 126 U.S.App.D.C. at 339-40, 379 F.2d at 116-17. See Oesby v. United States, 398 A.2d 1, 3-A (D.C.App.1979). Incompetence alone is insufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. Such incompetence must be such as to blot out the essence of a substantial defense. The Court is satisfied that trial counsel was grossly incompetent in his representation of the defendant, but finds that such incompetence, under the totality of the circumstances, has not caused the defendant actual prejudice by blotting out the essence of a substantial defense.
(A) Gross Incompetence of Trial Counsel
The right to effective assistance of counsel attaches before trial, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 n.14 (1970), and extends through the post-trial proceedings. Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 4.The record before the Court indicates that throughout his representation of the defendant, trial counsel failed to take a number of important actions. The Court finds as a fact that:
1. Trial counsel failed to conduct a full interview with the defendant to determine all relevant facts known to the defendant.
2. Trial counsel failed to keep the defendant informed of his case or prepare him adequately for trial.
3. Trial counsel failed to conduct a prompt investigation of the case and failed to interview any of the witnesses called by the government.
4. Trial counsel failed to engage in any meaningful discovery with the government with regard to the facts of this case.
5. Trial counsel failed to engage in any meaningful plea discussions with the prosecutor.
6. Following the verdict, trial counsel did not submit favorable information to the court for purposes of sentencing.
7. Trial counsel apparently has not retained any records with regard to this case.
The sum total of the facts recited above amounts to gross incompetence on the part of defendant’s trial counsel. See Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 7; United States v. Sweet, Criminal No. 9994-75, 106 D.W.L.R. 1677, 1684, Stewart, J. (September 15, 1978).
(B) Blotting Out of a Substantial Defense
The second part of the Bruce test requires the defendant to prove that trial counsel’s incompetence caused him actual prejudice by blotting out the essence of a substantial defense. The burden of proving actual prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is considerable. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 435 (D.C.App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024, 97 S.Ct. 644, 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976). A substantial defense lost due to incompetence must be shown to be a defense as a matter of law, and one that is available from the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Angarano v. United States, 312 A.2d 295, 300 (D.C.App.1973). In determining whether the essence of a substantial defense has been blotted out, this Court must examine trial counsel’s conduct and the nature of the defense in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 8 n.15.
The defendant contends that several of his substantial defenses were blotted out by trial counsel’s incompetence. First, defendant suggests that trial counsel’s failure to file pretrial motions to suppress the in-court identification of the complaining witness and to suppress an inculpatory statement made by defendant to the police after his arrest blotted out his defenses of misidenti-*819fication and alibi. The defendant also contends trial counsel should have filed motions to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay and failure to provide a speedy trial. Finally, defendant claims that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and prepare an alibi defense resulted in that defense being blotted out by witness memory loss.
1. Failure to File Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statement
Defendant claims that a motion to suppress an alleged involuntarily procured statement by defendant should have been made by trial counsel. This statement, which was made to the police at the time of defendant’s original arrest, placed the defendant at the scene of the robbery. Although no pretrial motion had been filed, the trial Court entertained defendant’s oral motion to suppress the statement. The basis of defendant’s oral motion was that the defendant’s signature did not appear on the waiver [of] rights form. After a bench conference, this motion was held in abeyance until a detective appeared and testified that he had read the defendant his rights prior to the defendant’s statement. Trial counsel did not renew his motion to suppress after this testimony. The Court has examined the record and finds as a fact that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, that he understood his rights and that he thereafter made the statement voluntarily. An attorney is not required to undertake what appears to be fruitless tasks, including the filing of meritless motions. See Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 8. Thus, trial counsel’s failure to file a pretrial motion or renew his motion to suppress after the detective testified did not prejudice, much less blot out, defendant’s defense of misidentification or alibi.
2. Failure to File Motion to Suppress Identification
Defendant contends that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the identification testimony of the complaining witness because of a suggestive pretrial identification. The complaining witness, Mr. Appen-zeller, testified at trial that he first identified the defendant seven months after the incident as one of the individuals who robbed and assaulted him. This identification took place during the defendant’s juvenile trial. The police officers allegedly pointed to the defendant and asked Mr. Appenzeller whether the defendant was one of his assailants.
The Supreme Court, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), said that an in-court identification of a defendant might constitute a denial of due process if the pretrial identification procedures were “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.” Id. 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972. More recently, in reaffirming the Stovall principle, the Court has held that the taint of improper pretrial identification procedures could be obviated by showing that the witness’ original observation of the defendant was reliable. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). Holding that reliability, not deterrence of improper police procedures, was the “linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony,” id., the Court stated that the indicia of reliability included the opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. “Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.” Id.
The trial testimony concerning Mr. Ap-penzeller’s first identification of the defendant does not indicate whether it was made under impermissibly suggestive circumstances. Defendant has not provided the Court with any additional evidence of suggestiveness. Nevertheless, the Court finds that even if such evidence were produced, Mr. Appenzeller’s original observation of the defendant was sufficiently reliable to remove any taint caused by suggestiveness in the original identification procedures.
*820Mr. Appenzeller testified at trial that two black males, one tall and thin, the other shorter and pudgy, first came into the well-lit construction trailer at midday on September 17, 1975, and asked him whether he was interested in buying radios. Appenzel-ler was not interested. Approximately four hours later, Appenzeller saw these same two individuals come back inside the trailer while he was talking on the telephone. After Appenzeller put the receiver down, he had a gun placed to his head, and was tied up, beaten and robbed. Mr. Appenzeller testified that the defendant was the short pudgy man who participated in the robbery and assault. While Appenzeller’s first positive identification of the defendant took place seven months after the robbery, the record indicates that he was certain at this later date that the defendant was one of his assailants. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Mr. Appenzeller’s in-court identification of the defendant was proper. Trial counsel’s failure to make the meritless motion to suppress identification caused the defendant no actual prejudice.
3. Failure to File Motion to Dismiss for Pre-indictment Delay
Defendant contends that trial counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment because of excessive pre-indictment delay. There was a sixteen month period of time between the robbery and the filing of the indictment charging the defendant with armed robbery and lesser crimes.
A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made “concrete and ripe for adjudication” not by a mere lapse of time, but by “proof of actual prejudice.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977);1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978). Defendant claims actual prejudice because the potential alibi witness, his mother, can no longer remember whether she was with the defendant on the day the offense was committed. Standing alone, such speculative allegations of faded witness memory do not constitute actual prejudice. See United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, the defendant’s mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not remember in May of 1976 whether the defendant was with her during the time of the robbery on September 17, 1975. This testimony suggests that even if the indictment had been filed promptly after Mr. Appenzeller’s identification in April 1976, the defendant’s alibi defense would not have, been prejudiced. Trial counsel's failure to file such a motion to dismiss caused the defendant no actual prejudice.
***** *
5. Failure to Investigate and Prepare Alibi Defense
Trial counsel did not adequately investigate the possibility of, or prepare, an alibi defense for the defendant. This was clearly a breach of trial counsel’s duty to conduct an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of a given case. See Hampton v. United States, 340 A.2d 813, 817 (D.C.App.1975). The issue remains whether the defendant’s purported alibi defense was “substantial.”
The defendant testified at the evidentia-ry hearing and during the trial that he had been with his mother at the time of the robbery. Detective Leadman testified at trial that the defendant made a statement to him on September 19, 1975, which placed the defendant at the scene of the robbery at 4:30 p. m., on September 17, 1975. The defendant’s mother testified at the eviden-tiary hearing that she does not remember whether her son was with her at the time of the robbery on September 17, 1975. The defendant has produced the names of no other potential alibi witnesses. Trial counsel testified that the defendant never told him before trial about the alibi witness. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant did not have a substantial alibi defense.3
Even assuming that a substantial alibi defense existed, trial counsel’s conduct did not blot it out. Defendant’s mother testified that by the time the defendant was arrested on May 18, 1976, she did not remember whether the defendant was with *821her on the date of the robbery. Thus, even an immediate investigation by trial counsel upon his appointment eight months later on February 9, 1977, would not have revived the memory of defendant’s only alibi witness. Additionally, the jury in defendant’s trial did hear the defendant’s version of his alibi defense. While this testimony was first brought out on cross-examination, the Court finds that this adversary context did not blot out the essence of the defendant’s alibi defense.
This Court deplores the evidence of trial counsel’s incompetence as demonstrated by the record before it. The ruling herein should not be interpreted as an acquiescence in or approval of such incompetence.4 However, the law is clear that trial counsel’s conduct must blot out the essence of a substantial defense before a new trial will be granted. This is a difficult burden and one which has not been met by the defendant.
In view of the foregoing, it is, this 9th day of November, 1979,
ORDERED, that the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel be, and hereby is, denied,
/s/ John R. Hess John R. Hess Judge
I am as displeased as the majority by the quality of representation which appellant received. So, obviously, was the trial judge. Nonetheless, the trial judge correctly applied the law to the facts. The majority is unwilling to do so.2

. I concur in the conclusions reached by the majority on the other issues.

 Lovasco held that in cases of pre-indictment delay, “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.” 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2048. Later federal court decisions have held that the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice even before analysis of the reasons for the delay is conducted. See, e. g., United States v. West, 568 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice, so the reasons for the delay — apparently due to lack of communication between the United States Attorney’s Office and the detective assigned the case — do not enter into the analysis.

 Dr. O. V. Aiken, a social worker at the Lorton Youth Center, testified at the motions hearing that the defendant told her after his conviction that he was with a Mr. Michael Haywood during the robbery, but that Mr. Haywood, and not the defendant, had control of the gun. This testimony had no impact on the Court’s view of the alibi defense.

 Defendant has placed considerable reliance on the decision of Judge Stewart of the Superi- or Court in United States v. Sweet, Criminal No. 9994-75, W.D.L.R. Vol. 106, No. 180 p. 1677. Sweet is factually analogous primarily because it involves the same trial counsel as the instant case. In Sweet, the court held that trial counsel blotted out a substantial defense by failing to interview and call as a witness an individual who testified at the post-trial hearing that the complainant in the rape case talked with him the day after the defendant allegedly raped her. The complainant told this witness that she had made up the rape story so as to avoid an embarrassing situation. No such substantial defense was blotted out in the instant case. Rather, the government developed substantial circumstantial evidence as well as direct identification testimony implicating the defendant. Unlike Sweet, trial counsel’s incompetence did not reduce the trial to a “swearing contest” but, instead, had little, if any, impact on the outcome of the trial.

. In a comparable case, another division of this court considered an equally incompetent performance by the same defense counsel. That division readily concluded that no essence of a substantial defense had been blotted out, followed the relevant precedents, and affirmed the convictions by an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. Gillespie v. United States, No. 80-819, July 27, 1981.