Court Opinion

ID: 9721573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:02:38.778206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.336860
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I am unable to join with the majority in holding that the State’s use of five of its six peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons did not violate defendant’s right to equal protection of the law. I believe the reasons offered by the State for excluding certain venirepersons from the jury were pretextual as proscribed in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Consequently, for the following reasons, I must dissent. Initially, I find it exceedingly troublesome that the trial court requested the State to proffer reasons for use of its peremptory challenges if defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Pursuant to Batson, a trial court may request reasons for use of peremptory challenges only after defendant has made a prima facie case. (People v. Wiley (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 464, 475.) As our supreme court recognized in Wiley, when the two-step Batson procedure is decomposed into a single decision, it frustrates any attempt to determine whether the trial court properly applied the standards outlined in Batson. (Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d at 475.) Given the significant confusion created by the trial court’s perverted application of Batson, I would at least remand this cause for proceedings consistent with Batson. See People v. Bohanan (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 348. Second, I recognize, as has the majority, that reasons such as "lengthy unemployment” have been used to exclude prospective jurors. I submit, however, that peremptory challenges based on such facially neutral rationales, i.e., low income, lack of sufficient education, lack of home ownership, are extremely suspect because of their disparate impact on minority groups. (See Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. Grim. L. & Criminology 1 (1988).) Without requiring any relationship to specific juror bias or relation to the particular case (accord Batson 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24), peremptory challenges based on facially neutral rationales can easily serve as a pretext for purposeful discrimination. In the present case, for instance, the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude Therlena McDavid because she was unemployed. However, the record discloses that Ms. McDavid had only been unemployed for one month as she had been employed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in June, just one month prior to jury selection in this case. See People v. Thornton (1993), 256 Ill. App. 3d 708, 713 (wherein this court held that a peremptory challenge based on the fact that a venireperson had been unemployed for two months was pretextual and not race-neutral). Moreover, the record further reveals that prior to working for the IRS, Ms. McDavid was employed on a contractual basis with the University of Illinois, the United States Customs Service and a brokerage firm. The State did not articulate, and the trial court did not require the State to specify how, based on her employment status, Ms. McDavid exhibited any specific bias related to this case. Cf People v. McDonald, (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 182, 198-99. The State offered as an additional reason to exclude Ms. McDavid, and several other African-Americans, the fact that they did not own homes. As an explanation, the State suggested the fact that a person owns a home would make him or her a more responsible juror than someone who does not. This is an absurd proposition which the State did not, and probably could not, support with any factual or statistical data. I believe no rational relation exists between the prospective jurors’ status as homeowners and this particular case. Without question, the exclusion of one venireperson on the basis of race is sufficient to justify a reversal. (People v. Nicholson (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 273, 278.) I believe the trial court’s ruling that the State’s explanation for its peremptory challenge against Ms. McDavid was clearly erroneous. Likewise, I challenge the State’s use of its peremptory challenge against Vernestine Walker. The proffered reason for Ms. Walker’s exclusion was that her brother was charged with murder approximately 20 years ago. Ms. Walker stated that she did not attend any of the proceedings and that she believed her brother received fair treatment. Standing alone, the 20-year-old charge against Ms. Walker’s brother does not demonstrate any specific bias on Ms. Walker’s part as related to this case. Furthermore, I am persuaded, after reviewing the record, that the reason proffered by the State for Ms. Walker’s exclusion was pretextual. First, the charge against Ms. Walker’s brother is quite old. Second, in the cases cited by the majority supporting the exclusion of Ms. Walker, the excluded venirepersons had a family member who was actually convicted of a crime (People v. Hooper (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 469), or the charge against the family member was currently pending (People v. Powell (1991), 224 Ill. App. 3d 127). Third, in the present case, we cannot determine the important fact of whether Ms. Walker’s brother was actually convicted, given the State’s failure to discover this unknown information. Moreover, as defendant points out, the pretextual nature of the State’s explanation is highlighted by the fact that a white venireperson was accepted as a juror even though his brother had been charged with a crime just l1/2 years prior to this trial. I find it interesting that, unlike Ms. Walker, the accepted juror had attended the court proceedings against his brother, and he was not completely satisfied that his brother received fair treatment from the criminal justice system. The State’s reasons for excluding white venirepersons despite similar characteristics and no meaningful distinctions from an African-American venireperson who was excluded will not be considered race-neutral. People v. Smith (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 812, 815. Similarly, I find that the reason proffered to exclude Rhonda Jackson was pretextual. In peremptorily challenging Ms. Jackson, the State reasoned that she had a friend whose brother was charged with drug trafficking and that Ms. Jackson accompanied her friend to the courthouse where, according to Ms. Jackson, the case against the friend’s brother was eventually dismissed. The majority acknowledges that Ms. Jackson stated she did not know many details of the case and that she believed her friend’s brother received fair treatment. However, I fail to understand how the majority concludes that the mere fact that Ms. Jackson accompanied her friend to the courthouse for moral support allows for a reasonable belief that she "may favor the defendant.” To be considered race-neutral, the State’s reason for excluding venirepersons must show that the prospective jurors "exhibit a 'specific bias’ related to the particular cause to be tried, rather than the fact that their race *** will bias them in favor of the defendant.” Smith, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 814. For the reasons stated, I am constrained to disagree with the majority that the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s proffered reasons for peremptorily challenging certain African-American venirepersons was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, I would reverse defendant’s convictions and remand this cause for a new trial.