Court Opinion

ID: 9482929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:05:22.248947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:17.851941
License: Public Domain

ARNOLD, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Seventh Amendment entitled Hornsby to a jury trial, I respectfully dissent.
The Seventh Amendment states that “[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury, shall be preserved....” In general, if any claim in a case is legal, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). The Court holds that both of Hornsby’s claims — reinstatement and back pay — were equitable, and that the District Court therefore properly denied his request for a jury trial. I agree that reinstatement is an equitable remedy, but I do not agree that back pay, at least in this case, is also an equitable remedy. And if back pay is a legal remedy, as I believe it is, this Court is denying Hornsby his constitutional right to a jury trial.
Suppose Hornsby had brought an action claiming that he had been fired in breach of his employment contract and asking only for back pay, that is, for the pay that he would have received absent the breach up until the time of judgment. Or suppose he had claimed a wrongful discharge under state tort law and, again, asked only for his back pay. In this event, I take it, everyone would agree that a jury trial is required. A money judgment is traditionally legal relief, and this holds true both in common-law tort or contract actions, and, apparently, in actions under any federal statute with the exception of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (jury trial available on request of any party in actions for back pay under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
In the present case the claim for back pay is joined with an equitable claim for reinstatement. Why should this make a difference? It is commonly said that the back-pay request is “incidental” to the equitable claim for reinstatement, and is therefore itself equitable. Thus, the theory appears to be that a clearly legal claim for money becomes equitable, and the constitutional right to a jury is lost, simply because the plaintiff also seeks a form of equitable relief. This appears to be nothing more than an application of the traditional clean-up doctrine, under which a court of equity, once it obtains jurisdiction, *1135can give complete relief, including relief that, if sought alone, would be considered legal. This doctrine, basically a rule of judicial economy, grew up in the days, now long gone in the federal courts, of separate courts of equity and law. In that context, it made sense. Otherwise, someone seeking both legal and equitable relief would have to bring two cases in two different courts. The Supreme Court has clearly held, however, that the clean-up doctrine is not to be transplanted into modern, merged federal practice in such a way as to infringe on the Seventh Amendment. Thus, when legal and equitable claims are joined, the legal claim, including all issues of fact common to both claims, must be submitted to a jury. Beacon Theatres, Inc., supra; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). The opposite view, that the jury nature of a claim, so to speak, disappears when it is joined with an equitable claim, was vigorously advocated by the dissent in Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 517-18, 79 S.Ct. at 960 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and just as vigorously rejected by the Supreme Court.
Why should not this analysis, which appears well settled, be followed here? Our own cases seem inconsistent on the proper characterization of back pay. It is said that a Title VII claim for back pay is equitable, while a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983 claim for back pay is legal. See Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962 (1981) (en banc); Sisco v. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982). Title VII, however, appears to be the only exception to the general rule that back pay is legal relief. Although I cannot see how to justify this anomaly, the difference in treatment may have resulted from the particular language Congress chose in allowing back pay in Title VII cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay is included in what the statute calls equitable remedies and is to be awarded “as the court deems appropriate.” Id. It is this complete discretion given to the courts in determining the availability and amount of back pay that the courts have emphasized in holding that back pay under Title VII is equitable rather than legal relief.
How should we resolve this split of authority in doubtful cases? On the one hand, we risk giving the plaintiff a jury trial when the Seventh Amendment might not actually require one. On the other hand, we risk denying the plaintiff a jury trial when the Seventh Amendment does require one. As between these two choices, it is better to err in favor of giving the plaintiff a jury trial when the Seventh Amendment might not require it. There is no constitutional right to a nonjury trial. Consequently, if an equitable claim is tried to a jury, the error may well be harmless; and even if it is not, the case may simply be remanded to the judge who presided over the jury trial to enter findings of fact. If, however, a legal claim is not tried to a jury upon proper request, the mistake is of constitutional import, and the case must be remanded for an entirely new trial. Therefore, if not because of the constitutional importance of a potential mistake, at least for the sake of judicial economy, we should resolve close cases in favor of a jury.
The Court suggests two reasons for denying Hornsby a jury trial. First, it says that the underlying statute, 45 U.S.C. § 60, is a criminal statute. I fail to see how this fact cuts against a trial by jury. If anything, it should cut in favor of a jury trial. Clearly — although under the Sixth rather than the Seventh Amendment — a criminal prosecution of the Railway Company under Section 60 would entitle the Railway to a jury trial. Why, then, is a plaintiff who sues civilly for monetary damages for violation of Section 60 not entitled to a jury trial? Although the Supreme Court has not directly spoken on this particular Seventh Amendment issue with regard to a criminal statute, Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987), is analogous. In Tull the Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial on the issue of liability in an action seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. Although Section 60 is a criminal-penalty statute, a civil suit by *1136Hornsby for reinstatement and back pay is factually quite close to Tull.
Second, the Court suggests that while Section 60 creates a private cause of action for “equitable relief, including backpay,” ante at 1132, it does not create a private cause of action for compensatory damages. This is offered as another reason to deny a litigant suing for relief under Section 60 a jury trial. I respectfully disagree. First, I have already expressed my view that back pay in the present context is legal, not equitable, relief, and hence, for that reason alone, the Seventh Amendment guarantees a litigant the right to a jury trial. Moreover, I disagree that Section 60 would not have allowed a private cause of action for compensatory damages and, consequently, a jury trial, if Hornsby had included such a claim in his complaint. The Supreme Court has recently held as much. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, — U.S. — , 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1032, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277-78, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979)), the Court held that once it has been determined that a private right of action exists, we are to “presume the availability of all appropriate remedies [specifically including damages] unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” In the case before us, by entertaining the issues it does, the Court admits that a private right of action to enforce Section 60 exists. Thus, according to Franklin, we have the power to award any and all appropriate relief including, if Hornsby had so requested, compensatory damages. If he had done so, surely the Court would not have denied him the right to a jury trial.
I respectfully dissent.