Court Opinion

ID: 9387917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:01:03.302672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.097661
License: Public Domain

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2022                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

   TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S., AKA HALKBANK v.
                UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE SECOND CIRCUIT

    No. 21–1450. Argued January 17, 2023—Decided April 19, 2023
The United States indicted Halkbank, a bank owned by the Republic of
  Turkey, for conspiring to evade U. S. economic sanctions against Iran.
  Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that as an
  instrumentality of a foreign state, Halkbank is immune from criminal
  prosecution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The
  District Court denied the motion. The Second Circuit affirmed after
  first determining that the District Court had subject matter
  jurisdiction over Halkbank’s criminal prosecution under 18 U. S. C.
  §3231. The Second Circuit further held that even assuming the FSIA
  confers immunity in criminal proceedings, Halkbank’s charged
  conduct fell within the FSIA’s exception for commercial activities.
Held:
     1. The District Court has jurisdiction under §3231 over this criminal
  prosecution of Halkbank. Section 3231 grants district courts original
  jurisdiction of “all offenses against the laws of the United States,” and
  Halkbank does not dispute that §3231’s text as written encompasses
  the charged offenses. Halkbank instead argues that because §3231
  does not mention foreign states or their instrumentalities, §3231
  implicitly excludes them. The Court declines to graft such an atextual
  limitation onto §3231’s broad jurisdictional grant. The scattered
  express references to foreign states and instrumentalities in unrelated
  U. S. Code provisions to which Halkbank points do not shrink the
  textual scope of §3231. And the Court’s precedents interpreting the
  Judiciary Act of 1789 do not support Halkbank, as the Court has not
  interpreted the jurisdictional provisions in the 1789 Act to contain an
  implicit exclusion for foreign state entities. Pp. 3–5.
     2. The FSIA’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity
2         TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                                   Syllabus

    in civil actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities does
    not cover criminal cases. Pp. 5–14.
         (a) The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity originally
    developed in U. S. courts “as a matter of common law” rather than
    statute. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311. In 1976, Congress
    enacted the FSIA, which prescribed a “comprehensive set of legal
    standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against
    a foreign state.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S.
    480, 488. The text of the FSIA indicates that the statute exclusively
    addresses civil suits. The first provision grants district courts original
    jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to
    “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign
    state is not entitled to immunity.” 28 U. S. C. §1330(a). The FSIA
    then sets forth a carefully calibrated set of procedures and remedies
    applicable exclusively in civil, not criminal, cases. Further, Congress
    described the FSIA as defining “the circumstances in which foreign
    states are immune from suit,” not from criminal investigation or
    prosecution. 90 Stat. 2891. In stark contrast, the FSIA is silent as to
    criminal matters, even though at the time of the FSIA’s enactment in
    1976, the Executive Branch occasionally attempted to subject foreign-
    government-owned entities to federal criminal investigation. If
    Halkbank were correct, immunity from criminal prosecution
    undoubtedly would have surfaced somewhere in the Act’s text.
    Moreover, the FSIA’s location in the U. S. Code—Title 28, which
    mostly concerns civil procedure, rather than Title 18, which addresses
    crimes and criminal procedure—likewise reinforces the interpretation
    that the FSIA does not apply to criminal proceedings. Finally, this
    Court’s decision in Samantar, in which the Court analyzed the FSIA’s
    “text, purpose, and history” and determined that the FSIA’s
    “comprehensive solution” for suits against foreign states did not
    extend to suits against individual officials, 560 U. S., at 323, 325,
    similarly supports the conclusion here that the FSIA’s provisions do
    not extend to the discrete context of criminal proceedings. Pp. 5–9.
         (b) In response to all the evidence of the FSIA’s exclusively civil
    scope, Halkbank claims immunity from criminal prosecution based on
    one sentence in the FSIA, which provides that a “foreign state shall be
    immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of
    the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”
    28 U. S. C. §1604. Section 1604, however, must be considered in
    context. Section 1604 works in tandem with §1330(a): Section 1330(a)
    spells out a universe of civil cases against foreign states over which
    district courts have jurisdiction, and §1604 then clarifies how
    principles of immunity operate within that limited civil universe.
    Halkbank’s interpretation of §1604 is also difficult to square with its
                     Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                    3

                               Syllabus

  view of the exceptions to immunity contained in §1605, which
  Halkbank insists apply exclusively in civil matters. Halkbank’s §1604
  argument reduces to the implausible contention that Congress enacted
  a statute focused entirely on civil actions and then in one provision
  that does not mention criminal proceedings somehow stripped the
  Executive Branch of all power to bring domestic criminal prosecutions
  against instrumentalities of foreign states. Nothing in the FSIA
  supports that result. Pp. 10–12.
       (c) Halkbank’s remaining arguments lack merit. While the Court
  did state in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. that
  the FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
  state in federal court,” 488 U. S. 428, 439, the Court made clear that
  the FSIA displaces general “grants of subject-matter jurisdiction in
  Title 28”—that is, in civil cases against foreign states, id., at 437.
  Halkbank also warns that if the Court concludes that the FSIA does
  not apply in the criminal context, courts and the Executive will lack
  “congressional guidance” as to procedure in criminal cases. But that
  concern carried no weight in Samantar, which likewise deemed the
  FSIA’s various procedures inapplicable to a specific category of cases—
  there, suits against foreign officials. And in any event, the Federal
  Rules of Criminal Procedure would govern any federal criminal
  proceedings.      Finally, Halkbank argues that U. S. criminal
  proceedings against instrumentalities of foreign states would
  negatively affect national security and foreign policy. But the Court
  must interpret the FSIA as written. And if existing principles do not
  suffice to protect national security and foreign policy interests,
  Congress and the President may always respond. Pp. 12–14.
    3. The Second Circuit did not fully consider various common-law
  immunity arguments that the parties raise in this Court. The Court
  vacates the judgment and remands for the Second Circuit to consider
  those arguments. Pp. 14–16.
16 F. 4th 336, affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.

   KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which ALITO, J., joined.
                        Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 21–1450
                                   _________________

  TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S., AKA HALKBANK,
        PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                 [April 19, 2023]

  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The United States indicted Halkbank, a bank owned by
the Republic of Turkey, for conspiring to evade U. S.
economic sanctions against Iran. The United States
brought the prosecution in the U. S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Halkbank contends that
the indictment should be dismissed because the general
federal criminal jurisdiction statute, 18 U. S. C. §3231, does
not extend to prosecutions of instrumentalities of foreign
states such as Halkbank. Halkbank alternatively argues
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides
instrumentalities of foreign states with absolute immunity
from criminal prosecution in U. S. courts.
  We disagree with Halkbank on both points. We hold that
the District Court has jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §3231
over the prosecution of Halkbank. We further hold that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not provide
immunity from criminal prosecution. With respect to an
additional common-law immunity argument raised by
Halkbank, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand.
2      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

                               I
   Halkbank is a bank whose shares are majority-owned by
the Turkish Wealth Fund, which in turn is part of and
owned by the Republic of Turkey. In 2019, the United
States indicted Halkbank for a multi-year conspiracy to
evade economic sanctions imposed by the United States on
Iran. The indictment alleged that Halkbank, with the
assistance of high-ranking Turkish government officials,
laundered billions of dollars of Iranian oil and gas proceeds
through the global financial system, including the U. S.
financial system, in violation of U. S. sanctions and
numerous federal statutes. The indictment further claimed
that Halkbank made false statements to the U. S. Treasury
Department in an effort to conceal the scheme. Two
individual defendants, including a former Halkbank
executive, have already been convicted in federal court for
their roles in the alleged conspiracy. According to the U. S.
Government, several other indicted defendants, including
Halkbank’s former general manager and its former head of
foreign operations, remain at large.
   Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that an instrumentality of a foreign state such as Halkbank
is immune from criminal prosecution under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. §§1330, 1602
et seq. The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the motion, reasoning in relevant part
that the FSIA “does not appear to grant immunity in
criminal proceedings.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, 34a.
   Halkbank filed an interlocutory appeal, and the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 16 F. 4th
336 (2021). The Court of Appeals first determined that the
District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
criminal prosecution under 18 U. S. C. §3231. As to the
FSIA, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that
the FSIA confers immunity in criminal proceedings to
foreign states and their instrumentalities, but held that in
                  Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)            3

                      Opinion of the Court

any event Halkbank’s charged conduct fell within the
FSIA’s exception for commercial activities.
  We granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ___ (2022).
                              II
  Halkbank first contends that the District Court lacks
jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution.
  Section 3231 of Title 18 provides: “The district courts of
the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.” Via its sweeping language, §3231
opens federal district courts to the full range of federal
prosecutions for violations of federal criminal law. By its
terms, §3231 plainly encompasses Halkbank’s alleged
criminal offenses, which were “against the laws of the
United States.”
  Halkbank cannot and does not dispute that §3231’s text
as written encompasses the offenses charged in the
indictment. Halkbank nonetheless argues that the statute
implicitly    excludes     foreign      states   and     their
instrumentalities. In support of that argument, Halkbank
identifies certain civil and bankruptcy statutes that
expressly refer to actions against foreign states and their
instrumentalities. See 28 U. S. C. §§1330(a), 1603(a)–(b);
11 U. S. C. §§101(27), 106(a); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137,
§1, 18 Stat. 470, as amended, §3, 90 Stat. 2891. Because
§3231 refers generically to “all” federal criminal offenses
without specifically mentioning foreign states or their
instrumentalities, Halkbank reasons that foreign states
and their instrumentalities do not fall within §3231’s scope.
  We decline to graft an atextual limitation onto §3231’s
broad jurisdictional grant over “all offenses” simply because
several unrelated provisions in the U. S. Code happen to
expressly reference foreign states and instrumentalities.
Those scattered references in distinct contexts do not
shrink the textual scope of §3231, which operates “without
4      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

regard to the identity or status of the defendant.” C.
Keitner, Prosecuting Foreign States, 61 Va. J. Int’l L. 221,
242 (2021). Nor will we create a new clear-statement rule
requiring Congress to “clearly indicat[e] its intent” to
include foreign states and their instrumentalities within
§3231’s jurisdictional grant. Brief for Petitioner 11.
   Halkbank also points to §3231’s predecessor: a provision
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting district courts
“cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be
cognizable under the authority of the United States.” §9, 1
Stat. 76. In Halkbank’s view, other statutory provisions
from that same era—including several that referred to suits
against foreign actors—suggest that Congress would have
expressly      referenced    foreign   states    and     their
instrumentalities if Congress had intended the 1789
provision to reach those entities. And Halkbank says that
we should read §3231 like its predecessor provision. The
premise is unsupported. The 1789 provision, like §3231
itself, contains no exception for prosecutions of foreign
states or their instrumentalities. And this Court has never
suggested that the 1789 provision contains an implicit
exception. So the 1789 provision does not help Halkbank’s
argument that we should find an implicit exception in
§3231.
   Finally, Halkbank invokes a separate provision of the
1789 Judiciary Act granting district courts jurisdiction over
“all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” §9,
id., at 77. Halkbank asserts that this Court has construed
that provision not to confer jurisdiction over foreign state
entities. Brief for Petitioner 22, 25 (citing Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812)). It follows,
Halkbank says, that the 1789 Act’s similar general
reference to “all crimes and offences” and its successor
§3231’s reference to “all offenses” likewise must be
interpreted not to reach foreign states and their
instrumentalities.
                 Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)            5

                     Opinion of the Court

   We disagree with Halkbank’s reading of our precedents.
The case on which Halkbank primarily relies, Schooner
Exchange, indeed held that a district court lacked
“jurisdiction” over a suit claiming ownership of a French
warship docked in a Philadelphia port. 7 Cranch, at 146–
147. But Schooner Exchange did not address statutory
subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, as this Court has since
explained, Schooner Exchange concerned principles of
foreign sovereign immunity that “developed as a matter of
common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311
(2010). Contrary to Halkbank’s contention, the common-
law sovereign immunity recognized in Schooner Exchange
is a “rule of substantive law governing the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the courts,” not an exception to a general
statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 36 (1945); see also Ex parte
Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 587–588 (1943).
   In sum, the District Court has jurisdiction under 18
U. S. C. §3231 over this criminal prosecution.
                            III
  Relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
Halkbank contends that it enjoys immunity from criminal
prosecution. We disagree because the Act does not provide
foreign states and their instrumentalities with immunity
from criminal proceedings.
                            A
  The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity originally
developed in U. S. courts “as a matter of common law”
rather than by statute. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305,
311 (2010). In determining whether to allow suits against
foreign sovereigns, however, courts traditionally “deferred
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular,
those of the Executive Branch.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983); see also Rubin
6      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip
op., at 4); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689
(2004).
  In 1952, the State Department announced the
“restrictive” theory of foreign sovereign immunity, under
which immunity was typically afforded in cases involving a
foreign state’s public acts, but not its strictly commercial
acts. Rubin, 583 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5). In the
ensuing years, the process by which the Executive Branch
submitted statements regarding a foreign state’s immunity
sometimes led to inconsistency, particularly in light of the
case-by-case diplomatic pressure that the Executive Branch
received from foreign nations. Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487.
And when foreign states did not ask the State Department
to weigh in, courts were left to render immunity rulings on
their own, generally by reference to prior State Department
decisions. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U. S. ___, ___
(2020) (slip op., at 2); Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487.
  In 1976, Congress entered the fray and sought to
standardize the judicial process with respect to immunity
for foreign sovereign entities in civil cases. Congress passed
and President Ford signed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. The FSIA prescribed a “comprehensive set
of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every
civil action against a foreign state.” Id., at 488.
  To that end, the FSIA codifies a baseline principle of
immunity for foreign states and their instrumentalities. 28
U. S. C. §1604. The FSIA then sets out exceptions to that
principle—including, for example, the exception for
commercial activities. §§1605–1607.
  The FSIA defines a “foreign state” to encompass
instrumentalities of a foreign state—including entities that
are directly and majority-owned by a foreign state.
§§1603(a)–(b); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468,
473–474 (2003). (In this case, the United States does not
contest Halkbank’s status as an instrumentality of a
                  Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)              7

                      Opinion of the Court

foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. Brief for United
States 28; see also 16 F. 4th, at 342, n. 8.)
  Since the FSIA’s enactment, this Court has repeatedly
stated that the statute applies in “civil” actions. See, e.g.,
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5); Republic of Argentina v.
NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 141 (2014); Altmann, 541
U. S., at 691; Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 488. Although the
Court has not expressly held that the FSIA covers only civil
matters, the Court has never applied the Act’s immunity
provisions in a criminal case.
  We now hold that the FSIA does not grant immunity to
foreign states or their instrumentalities in criminal
proceedings. Through the FSIA, Congress enacted a
comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in
civil actions against foreign states and their
instrumentalities. That scheme does not cover criminal
cases.
                               1
  To begin with, the text of the FSIA indicates that the
statute exclusively addresses civil suits against foreign
states and their instrumentalities. The first provision of
the FSIA grants district courts original jurisdiction over
“any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to “any
claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity.” 28 U. S. C.
§1330(a) (emphasis added); 90 Stat. 2891.
  The FSIA then sets forth a carefully calibrated scheme
that relates only to civil cases. For instance, the sole FSIA
venue provision exclusively addresses venue in a “civil
action” against a foreign state. §1391(f ). The Act similarly
provides for removal to federal court of a “civil action”
brought in state court. §1441(d). The Act prescribes
detailed rules—including those governing service of “the
summons and complaint,” §1608(a)(1), along with “an
8      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint,”
§1608(d), as well as for any judgment of default, §1608(e)—
that relate to civil cases alone. So, too, the Act’s provision
regarding counterclaims concerns only civil proceedings.
§1607. Finally, the Act renders a non-immune foreign state
“liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual,” except that a foreign state (but not an
agency or instrumentality thereof) “shall not be liable for
punitive damages.”         §1606.     Each of those terms
characterizes civil, not criminal, litigation.
   Other parts of the statute underscore the FSIA’s
exclusively civil focus. Congress codified its finding that
authorizing federal courts to determine claims of foreign
sovereign immunity “would protect the rights of both
foreign states and litigants in United States courts.” §1602
(emphasis added). The statutory term “litigants” does not
ordinarily sweep in governments acting in a prosecutorial
capacity. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1119 (11th ed. 2019)
(defining “litigant” as “A party to a lawsuit; the plaintiff or
defendant in a court action”). What is more, Congress
described the FSIA as defining “the circumstances in which
foreign states are immune from suit,” not from criminal
investigation or prosecution. 90 Stat. 2891 (emphasis
added).
   In stark contrast to those many provisions concerning
civil actions, the FSIA is silent as to criminal matters. The
Act says not a word about criminal proceedings against
foreign states or their instrumentalities. If Halkbank were
correct that the FSIA immunizes foreign states and their
instrumentalities from criminal prosecution, the subject
undoubtedly would have surfaced somewhere in the Act’s
text. Congress typically does not “hide elephants in
mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,
531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).
   Context reinforces text. Although the vast majority of
litigation     involving    foreign     states    and    their
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                      Opinion of the Court

instrumentalities at the time of the FSIA’s enactment in
1976 was civil, the Executive Branch occasionally
attempted to subject foreign-government-owned entities to
federal criminal investigation. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation of Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298, 318–
320 (DC 1960); In re Investigation of World Arrangements,
13 F. R. D. 280, 288–291 (DC 1952). Given that history, it
becomes even more unlikely that Congress sought to codify
foreign sovereign immunity from criminal proceedings
without saying a word about such proceedings.
  Congress’s determination about the FSIA’s precise
location within the U. S. Code bolsters that inference.
Congress expressly decided to house each provision of the
FSIA within Title 28, which mostly concerns civil
procedure. See 90 Stat. 2891. But the FSIA did not alter
Title 18, which addresses crimes and criminal procedure.
  Finally, this Court’s decision in Samantar supports the
conclusion that the FSIA does not apply to criminal
proceedings. In Samantar, we considered whether the
FSIA’s immunity provisions applied to a suit against an
individual foreign official based on actions taken in his
official capacity. 560 U. S., at 308. Analyzing the Act’s
“text, purpose, and history,” the Court determined that the
FSIA’s “comprehensive solution for suits against states”
does not “exten[d] to suits against individual officials.” Id.,
at 323, 325.
  As in Samantar, we conclude here that the FSIA’s
provisions concerning suits against foreign states and their
instrumentalities do not extend to a discrete context—in
this case, criminal proceedings.        The Act’s “careful
calibration” of jurisdiction, procedures, and remedies for
civil litigation confirms that Congress did not “cover”
criminal proceedings. Id., at 319. Put simply, immunity in
criminal proceedings “was not the particular problem to
which Congress was responding.” Id., at 323.
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                     Opinion of the Court

                              2
  In response to all of that evidence of the FSIA’s
exclusively civil scope, Halkbank emphasizes a sentence of
the FSIA codified at 28 U. S. C. §1604: “Subject to existing
international agreements,” a “foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605
to 1607 of this chapter.” Halkbank contends that §1604
renders it immune not only from civil suits but also from
criminal prosecutions.
  In complete isolation, §1604 might be amenable to that
reading. But this Court has a “duty to construe statutes,
not isolated provisions.” Graham County Soil and Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S.
280, 290 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). And
the Court must read the words Congress enacted “in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,
489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989). When we consider §1604
alongside its neighboring FSIA provisions, it becomes
overwhelmingly evident that §1604 does not grant
immunity to foreign states and their instrumentalities in
criminal matters.
  Section 1330(a) is the place to start. This Court has
explained that “Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in tandem.”
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U. S. 428, 434 (1989). Indeed, the public law containing the
FSIA begins with §1330 and then later follows with §1604.
See 90 Stat. 2891–2892. Recall that §1330(a) confers
district-court jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action
against a foreign state” as to “any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity.” Section 1604 then confers immunity
on foreign states unless an enumerated statutory exception
applies. See §§1605–1607.
  Reading the two provisions together (as we must) and
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                       Opinion of the Court

sequentially (per Congress’s design), the natural inference
is that §1604 operates exclusively in civil cases. Section
1330(a) spells out a universe of civil (and only civil) cases
against foreign states over which district courts have
jurisdiction, and §1604 then clarifies how principles of
immunity operate within that limited civil universe.
   We thus decline to read §1604’s grant of immunity to
apply in criminal proceedings—a category of cases beyond
the civil actions contemplated in §1330(a), the jurisdictional
grant to which §1604 is substantively and sequentially
linked. Before making that leap, we would expect to find
some express textual indication regarding §1604’s
purportedly broader-than-civil scope. But none exists.
   Moreover, Halkbank’s interpretation of §1604 is difficult
to square with its interpretation of §1605, an FSIA
provision delineating exceptions to the immunity granted
in §1604. Halkbank reads §1604 to confer immunity in both
civil and criminal cases. But Halkbank then turns around
and insists that the exceptions to that immunity specified
in §1605—exceptions which, per the statute, apply “in any
case”—attach exclusively in civil matters.            Brief for
Petitioner 43.
   In other words, Halkbank sees §1330 as operating only in
civil cases, §1604 in both civil and criminal cases, and §1605
only in civil cases. In Halkbank’s view, the FSIA’s scope
awkwardly flip-flops from civil to civil-and-criminal back to
civil again in sequential provisions. Congress did not write
such a mangled statute. The better and more natural
reading is that §§1330, 1604, and 1605 operate in tandem
within a single universe of civil matters.
   The FSIA’s remaining provisions described above—
namely, those detailing elaborate procedures and remedies
applicable exclusively in civil cases—strongly buttress the
conclusion that §1604 “lays down a baseline principle of
foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions,” and from
civil actions alone. Cassirer, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5)
12     TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

(emphasis added). Considering the FSIA “as a whole,”
there is “nothing to suggest we should read” §1604 to apply
to criminal proceedings. Samantar, 560 U. S., at 319.
  In sum, Halkbank’s narrow focus on §1604 misses the
forest for the trees (and a single tree at that). Halkbank’s
§1604 argument reduces to the implausible contention that
Congress enacted a statute focused entirely on civil actions
and then in one provision that does not mention criminal
proceedings somehow stripped the Executive Branch of all
power to bring domestic criminal prosecutions against
instrumentalities of foreign states. On Halkbank’s view, a
purely commercial business that is directly and majority-
owned by a foreign state could engage in criminal conduct
affecting U. S. citizens and threatening U. S. national
security while facing no criminal accountability at all in
U. S. courts. Nothing in the FSIA supports that result.
                              B
   Halkbank advances three additional reasons why this
Court should read the FSIA to immunize foreign states and
their instrumentalities from criminal proceedings. None is
persuasive.
   First, Halkbank emphasizes this Court’s statement in a
1989 case that the FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court.” Amerada
Hess, 488 U. S., at 439. But Amerada Hess was not a
criminal case. Rather, it was a civil case brought under the
Alien Tort Statute and under the federal courts’ general
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Id., at 432 (citing 28
U. S. C. §§1333, 1350). This Court has often admonished
that “general language in judicial opinions” should be read
“as referring in context to circumstances similar to the
circumstances then before the Court and not referring to
quite different circumstances that the Court was not then
considering.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419, 424 (2004).
Amerada Hess made clear that the FSIA displaces general
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                      Opinion of the Court

“grants of subject-matter jurisdiction in Title 28”—that is,
in civil cases against foreign states. 488 U. S., at 437 (citing
28 U. S. C. §§1331, 1333, 1335, 1337, 1338). The Court had
no occasion to consider the FSIA’s implications for Title 18’s
grant of criminal jurisdiction over “all” federal criminal
offenses. 18 U. S. C. §3231.
  At any rate, Amerada Hess’s rationale does not translate
to the criminal context. The Court’s holding as to the
nonapplicability of general civil jurisdictional grants was
based on the FSIA’s own civil jurisdictional grant and the
“comprehensiveness” of the statutory scheme as to civil
matters. 488 U. S., at 434–435, and n. 3, 437 (citing 28
U. S. C. §1330(a)). But the FSIA contains no grant of
criminal jurisdiction and says nothing about criminal
matters—a distinct legal regime housed in an entirely
separate title of the U. S. Code. The FSIA did not implicitly
repeal or modify 18 U. S. C. §3231’s core grant of criminal
jurisdiction.
  Second, Halkbank warns that courts and the Executive
will lack “congressional guidance” as to procedure in
criminal cases if we conclude that the FSIA does not apply
in the criminal context. Brief for Petitioner 37. But that
concern carried no weight in Samantar, which likewise
deemed the FSIA’s various procedures inapplicable to a
specific category of cases—there, suits against foreign
officials. In any event, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure would govern any federal criminal proceedings.
And although Halkbank argues that Congress would not
have been “indifferent” to criminal jury trials involving
instrumentalities of foreign states, id., at 38, juries already
resolve similarly sensitive cases against foreign officials
after Samantar.
  Third, Halkbank briefly raises a consequentialist
argument. According to Halkbank, if the FSIA does not
apply to criminal proceedings, then state prosecutors would
also be free to commence criminal proceedings against
14     TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

foreign states and their instrumentalities. Halkbank
argues that those state prosecutions would raise foreign
policy concerns. But we must interpret the FSIA as
written. And the statute simply does not grant immunity
to foreign states and their instrumentalities in criminal
matters.
  In addition, it is not evident that the premise of
Halkbank’s consequentialist argument is correct. To begin
with, Halkbank offers no history of state prosecutors
subjecting foreign states or their instrumentalities to
criminal jurisdiction. And if such a state prosecution were
brought, the United States could file a suggestion of
immunity. A decision by a state court to deny foreign
sovereign immunity might be reviewable by this Court (a
question we do not here address). Moreover, state criminal
proceedings      involving    foreign    states   or    their
instrumentalities might be preempted under principles of
foreign affairs preemption (another question we do not here
address). Cf. American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U. S.
396 (2003). And if those principles do not apply or do not
suffice to protect U. S. national security and foreign policy
interests, Congress and the President may always respond
by enacting additional legislation.
  In short, Halkbank’s various FSIA arguments are infused
with the notion that U. S. criminal proceedings against
instrumentalities of foreign states would negatively affect
U. S. national security and foreign policy. But it is not our
role to rewrite the FSIA based on purported policy concerns
that Congress and the President have not seen fit to
recognize. The FSIA does not provide foreign states and
their instrumentalities with immunity from criminal
proceedings.
                           IV
  Although the FSIA does not immunize Halkbank from
criminal prosecution, Halkbank advances one other plea for
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                     Opinion of the Court

immunity. In the context of a civil proceeding, this Court
has recognized that a suit not governed by the FSIA “may
still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity under the
common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 324
(2010). Halkbank maintains that principles of common-law
immunity preclude this criminal prosecution even if the
FSIA does not. To that end, Halkbank contends that
common-law-immunity principles operate differently in
criminal cases than in civil cases. See Brief for Petitioner
34–35, 44. And Halkbank argues that the Executive
Branch cannot unilaterally abrogate common-law
immunity by initiating prosecution. Id., at 44.
  The Government disagrees. Reasoning from pre-FSIA
history and precedent, the Government asserts that the
common law does not provide for foreign sovereign
immunity when, as here, the Executive Branch has
commenced a federal criminal prosecution of a commercial
entity like Halkbank. See Brief for United States 21. In
the alternative, the Government contends that any
common-law immunity in criminal cases would not extend
to commercial activities such as those undertaken by
Halkbank. Id., at 16–21.
  The Court of Appeals did not fully consider the various
arguments regarding common-law immunity that the
parties press in this Court. See 16 F. 4th, at 350–351. Nor
did the Court of Appeals address whether and to what
extent foreign states and their instrumentalities are
differently situated for purposes of common-law immunity
in the criminal context. We express no view on those issues
and leave them for the Court of Appeals to consider on
remand. Cf. Samantar, 560 U. S., at 325–326.
                        *     *     *
  With respect to the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the District Court has jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §3231,
we affirm. With respect to the holding of the Court of
16     TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

Appeals that the FSIA does not provide immunity to
Halkbank, we affirm on different grounds—namely, that
the FSIA does not apply to criminal proceedings. With
respect to common-law immunity, we vacate the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand for the Court of Appeals
to consider the parties’ common-law arguments in a
manner consistent with this opinion.
                                            It is so ordered.
                   Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)               1

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                           _________________

                           No. 21–1450
                           _________________

  TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S., AKA HALKBANK,
        PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                          [April 19, 2023]

  JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.
  For almost a half century, judges have known where to
turn for guidance when deciding whether a foreign sover-
eign is susceptible to suit in an American court: Congress’s
directions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq. Sometimes the FSIA au-
thorizes American courts to hear cases against foreign sov-
ereigns; sometimes the statute immunizes foreign sover-
eigns from suit. Today, however, the Court holds that the
FSIA’s rules apply only in civil cases. To decide whether a
foreign sovereign is susceptible to criminal prosecution, the
Court says, federal judges must consult the common law.
Respectfully, I disagree. The same statute we routinely use
to analyze sovereign immunity in civil cases applies equally
in criminal ones.
                              I
  I begin from common ground. Congress has vested fed-
eral courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over cases in-
volving “offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18
U. S. C. §3231. The Court holds that this statute permits
federal courts to hear cases alleging offenses committed by
foreign sovereigns. I agree. As the Court explains, §3231’s
language grants subject-matter jurisdiction in broad terms
2      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

without regard to the nature of the defendant; nor are we
free to “graft an atextual limitation onto” the law that
would exempt foreign sovereigns from its reach. Ante, at 3.
Of course, Türkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank) asserts that it
is a sovereign entity and, as such, enjoys immunity from
prosecution. But that does not change a thing. Generally,
questions about sovereign immunity do not go to a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction (something a court must con-
sider in every case even if the parties do not). Instead, ques-
tions of sovereign immunity usually go to a court’s personal
jurisdiction over a particular defendant. And as with other
personal-jurisdiction defenses, a sovereign may waive its
immunity and consent to judicial proceedings if it wishes.
See PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).
   From that common ground, however, I part ways with the
Court. Like the Second Circuit, I would analyze Halkbank’s
assertion of sovereign immunity under the terms of the
FSIA. Start with 28 U. S. C. §1604, which sets forth the
FSIA’s general immunity rule. It provides in relevant part
that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the States except
as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.” Else-
where, the statute defines a “foreign state” to include an
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” §1603(a).
And the statute defines an “agency or instrumentality” to
include any “separate legal person,” such as a corporation,
that is an “organ” or “subdivision” of a foreign state and ma-
jority owned by a foreign state. §1603(b)(1)–(2).
   Applying those rules here yields a ready answer. Halk-
bank is a corporation that is majority-owned by the govern-
ment of Turkey. 16 F. 4th 336, 349 (CA2 2021). Accord-
ingly, it qualifies as a foreign state entitled to immunity
from suit under §1604 unless one of the exceptions provided
in §§1605–1607 applies. And, it turns out, one such excep-
tion does apply. Section 1605(a)(2) instructs that a foreign
                   Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)               3

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

sovereign is not entitled to immunity when “the action is
based upon” certain “commercial activity” in or affecting the
United States. In this case, the indictment sufficiently al-
leges that Halkbank has engaged in just those kinds of com-
mercial activities. See No. 15 Cr. 867 (SDNY, Oct. 1, 2020),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a–38a. Of course, this case comes
to us on a motion to dismiss the indictment, and the ques-
tion of immunity may be revisited as the case proceeds. But
for now, nothing in the law precludes this suit, just as the
Second Circuit held.
   That the FSIA tells us all we need to know to resolve the
sovereign immunity question in this case can come as no
surprise. This Court has long acknowledged that “the
[FSIA] must be applied by the district courts in every action
against a foreign sovereign.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 493 (1983). As we have put
it, “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sover-
eign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or
it must fall.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,
573 U. S. 134, 141–142 (2014). It’s a rule that follows di-
rectly from the statutory text because “Congress estab-
lished [in the FSIA] a comprehensive framework for resolv-
ing any claim of sovereign immunity.” Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 699 (2004).
                                II
  Despite all this, the Court declines to apply the FSIA’s
directions governing foreign sovereign immunity. It holds
that the statute’s general immunity rule in §1604 speaks
only to civil disputes. Any question about a foreign sover-
eign’s immunity from criminal prosecution, the Court in-
sists, must therefore be resolved under common-law princi-
ples. Ante, at 7, 15. In aid of its conclusion, the Court offers
three principal arguments. But to my mind, none packs the
punch necessary to displace the plain statutory text.
4      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

   First, the Court points to 28 U. S. C. §1330. That provi-
sion grants federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over
civil cases against foreign sovereigns when one of the excep-
tions provided in §§1605–1607 applies. From this grant of
civil jurisdiction, the Court reasons, it is a “natural infer-
ence” that §1604’s immunity rule must apply only in civil
cases. Ante, at 11. More naturally, however, it seems to me
that any inference from §1330 runs the other way. Section
1330 shows that when Congress wanted to limit its atten-
tion to civil suits, it knew how to do so. Section 1604 con-
tains no similar language restricting its scope to civil dis-
putes. Instead, it speaks far more broadly, holding that a
foreign state “shall be immune” unless a statutorily speci-
fied exception applies. Normally, when Congress includes
limiting language in one section of a law but excludes it
from another, we understand the difference in language to
convey a difference in meaning (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius). See, e.g., Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. 85,
94 (2023); Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean,
574 U. S. 383, 391 (2015). The Court’s interpretation of the
FSIA defies this traditional rule of statutory construction.
Today, the Court does to §1604 exactly what it recognizes
we may not do to §3231—grafting an atextual limitation
onto the law’s unambiguous terms (in this instance, adding
a “civil”-only restriction).
   Second, the Court suggests we should read §1604 as af-
fording immunity only in civil cases because §1605’s excep-
tions apply only in civil cases. Ante, at 11. But here both
the premise and the conclusion seem to me mistaken. If
some of §1605’s exceptions apply only in civil cases, others
speak more expansively. Take the exception relevant here.
The commercial-activities exception found in §1605(a)(2)
denies sovereign immunity “in any case . . . in which the ac-
tion is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state.” (Emphasis added). No-
where does this exception distinguish between civil and
                   Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)               5

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

criminal actions. Besides, even if the Court’s premise were
correct and §1605’s exceptions (somehow) applied only in
civil actions, what would that prove? It might simply mean
that Congress wanted a more generous immunity from
criminal proceedings than civil suits.
  Finally, the Court points to the FSIA’s provisions regu-
lating the venue and removal of civil actions against foreign
sovereigns. Ante, at 7–8 (discussing §§1391(f ) and 1441(d)).
But once more, it seems to me this shows only that Congress
knew how to speak specifically to civil suits when it wished
to do so. Congress may have had reason to be especially
concerned about the venue for civil suits too, given that al-
most all efforts to hale foreign sovereigns into U. S. courts
have involved civil claims. Indeed, the parties and their
amici struggled to find examples of criminal charges
brought against foreign sovereigns either before or after the
FSIA’s adoption—not only in the United States, but in any
country. Compare Brief for United States 25–26 with Reply
Brief 7–9. I might be willing to spot the Court that the
venue and removal provisions could help illuminate §1604’s
scope if that statute were ambiguous. But no one suggests
that we have anything like that here. Section 1604 is as
clear as a bell and we must abide by its direction that for-
eign sovereigns “shall be immune” absent some express
statutory exception.
                             III
   After declaring that the FSIA applies only to civil suits,
the Court holds that “the common law” controls the dispo-
sition of any claim of foreign sovereign immunity in crimi-
nal cases. Ante, at 15. Yet rather than decide whether the
common law shields Halkbank from this suit, the Court
shunts the case back to the Second Circuit to figure that
out. All of which leaves litigants and our lower court col-
leagues with an unenviable task, both in this case and oth-
ers sure to emerge. Many thorny questions lie down the
6      TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

“common law” path and the Court fails to supply guidance
on how to resolve any of them.
   Right out of the gate, lower courts will have to decide be-
tween two very different approaches. One option is to defer
to the Executive Branch’s judgment on whether to grant im-
munity to a foreign sovereign—an approach sometimes em-
ployed by federal courts in the years immediately preceding
the FSIA’s adoption. The other option is for a court to make
the immunity decision looking to customary international
law and other sources. Compare Brief for United States 21–
26 with Brief for Professor Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk et al. as
Amici Curiae 6–25.
   Whichever path a court chooses, more questions will fol-
low. The first option—deferring to the Executive—would
seem to sound in separation-of-powers concerns. But does
this mean that courts should not be involved in making im-
munity determinations at all? And what about the fact that
the strong deference cases didn’t appear until the 20th cen-
tury; were courts acting unconstitutionally before then? If
not, should we be concerned that deference to the Execu-
tive’s immunity decisions risks relegating courts to the sta-
tus of potted plants, inconsistent with their duty to say
what the law is in the cases that come before them? See,
e.g., Brief for Professor Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk et al. as
Amici Curiae 17–21.
   The second option—applying customary international
law—comes with its own puzzles. If the briefing before us
proves anything, it is that customary international law sup-
plies no easy answer to the question whether a foreign sov-
ereign enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution. Com-
pare Brief for Professor Roger O’Keefe as Amicus Curiae
11–16 with Brief for Mark B. Feldman et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 12–13. Nor is it even altogether clear on what author-
ity federal courts might develop and apply customary inter-
national law. Article VI of the Constitution does not list
                   Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)               7

       GORSUCH, J., concurring inGpart
                      Opinion of       and,dissenting
                                   ORSUCH  J.         in part

customary international law as federal law when it enu-
merates sources of “the supreme Law of the Land.” And
Article I vests Congress rather than the Judiciary with the
power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law
of Nations.” §8, cl. 10. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U. S. 692, 739–742 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4–5); Nestlé USA,
Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concur-
ring) (slip op., at 3).
   Perhaps Article III incorporated customary international
law into federal common law. But since Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal courts have largely
disclaimed the power to develop federal common law out-
side of a few reserved areas. See Sosa, 542 U. S., at 740–
742 (opinion of Scalia, J.). And whether customary inter-
national law survives as a form of federal common law after
Erie is a matter of considerable debate among scholars.
Compare C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Mod-
ern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997), with H. Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
1824 (1998). Must lower courts confront this long-running
debate to resolve a claim of foreign sovereign immunity in
criminal cases? And if there is no federal law at work here
that might apply under the Supremacy Clause, only general
common-law principles, what constraints remain on state
prosecutions of foreign sovereigns?
                             *
  Today’s decision overcomplicates the law for no good rea-
son. In the FSIA, Congress supplied us with simple rules
for resolving this case and others like it. Respectfully, I
would follow those straightforward directions to the same
straightforward conclusion the Second Circuit reached:
This case against Halkbank may proceed.