Court Opinion

ID: 9696948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:02:04.647766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.925636
License: Public Domain

RODOWSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In addition to the unwarranted extension of Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328 (1986), as described in Part I of Judge Cathell’s dissenting opinion, I believe that the Court, by superimposing the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) on a negligence action for personal injuries, has created a hybrid that imposes liability without fault—a result under the CPA that never could have been intended by the General Assembly to apply to claims for personal injuries.
I
A legal premise of the majority opinion is that a cause of action lies under the CPA if the deceptive trade practice *545occurred before the lease, when the practice had the “capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading” the consumer, here, respondent’s mother. Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl. Vol.), § 13-301(1) of the Commercial Law Article (CL). In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), the claim that was asserted under the CPA was for personal injuries. We held that a claim under the CPA did not lie in that case because the Legislature did not intend “the CPA to be applicable to statements or omissions concerning the leased premises occurring during the term of the lease.” Id. at 683-84, 645 A.2d at 1158. From this the majority assumes that Richwind stands for the opposite result in the converse factual situation, that is, that the CPA applies to personal injury claims if the deceptive trade practice occurs before the transaction has been consummated, and the practice misleads the consumer into entering into the transaction.1 Under the majority’s analysis, the critical time for a cause of action under the CPA in the circumstances involved here was before the respondent’s mother committed to lease the apartment.
The factual foundation for the majority’s CPA cause of action consists entirely of the following passage from the direct examination of respondent’s sister, Chekeda Hatcher (Ms. Hatcher). The background of the testimony is that Ms. Hatcher, her mother, the infant plaintiff, and another brother had been living in Apartment 205 at 1411 Division Street in Baltimore City. In January 1990, the family moved to Apartment 310 in the same building because Apartment 205 was too small.
“Q Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what was the condition of Apartment 310 when you first moved in?
*546“A It wasn’t freshly painted. It was paint like paint chips all—the wall, the ceiling and around the door frame and in the windowsills and stuff.
“Q Can you tell us specifically in what rooms did you see •this condition?
“A It wasn’t in the bathroom. It was like in that first room and then—mainly in the middle room.
“Q Did you ever see [the petitioner] in Apartment 310?
“A Yes.
“Q Did you ever see [the petitioner] in Apartment 310 when you first moved in?
“A Uh-huh.
“Q Okay, can you tell us about that?
“A He had came up there, I guess, how my mother was talking, I guess, I don’t know. But he was up there with my mother.
“Q That was when you first moved into the apartment?
“A Uh-huh.”
In my opinion “when [the family] first moved in” refers to a time after the tenancy began.2 Under Ms. Hatcher’s testimony the jury could infer that the petitioner had notice of chipping paint at that time. The circuit court instructed on the negligence count that, if the petitioner had actual notice of chipping paint (not limited to lead-based), and if the jury further found that the petitioner “had reason to know that any peeling paint in these premises may contain lead-based paint,” and if the other elements of a negligence action were present, then the jury could find for the respondent. This instruction *547was predicated on standard landlord-tenant law under which the landlord, once having received notice of a defect, and, having reason to know that it is dangerous, has a duty to repair. The jury found for the landlord on the negligence count.
In instructing on the CPA count, the court told the jury that it must find “that at the beginning of the lease of Apartment 310” the petitioner “was aware of the [presence of] chipping and flaking lead-based paint.” From Ms. Hatcher’s testimony that there was flaking paint in the apartment, observable to her while the petitioner was in Apartment 310 when the family “first moved in,” it is a fair inference that the flaking paint was also present prior to the beginning of the lease. But, evidence of notice after the family moved in is not evidence that the landlord had notice prior to the beginning of the tenancy.
Because the respondent failed to produce any evidence that the petitioner had notice of flaking paint as of the critical time for CPA purposes, there could be no cause of action under the CPA; consequently, the circuit court’s inclusion in the CPA instruction of a requirement for notice of flaking lead-based paint would be immaterial, unless no pre-lease notice of flaking paint is required. Even assuming that a CPA action lies for personal injuries, this case does not involve whether a landlord must know that flaking paint is lead-based paint in order for the action to lie. Rather, the issue is whether the landlord must have pre-lease notice of flaking paint for a CPA action to lie.
Inasmuch as there is no evidence that the petitioner was on pre-lease notice of flaking paint, the only way in which an action under the CPA could lie, under the majority’s view of a CPA action and under the facts of this case, is if notice is not required for a CPA action. The majority glosses over this substantial problem by creating a presumption that the landlord is on pre-lease notice of any condition that a reasonable inspection of the apartment would have revealed. Further, the majority uses that fiction to create a deceptive trade *548practice by holding that there is an implied misrepresentation resting on the landlord’s silence in not having advised the tenant prior to the lease about flaking paint on the premises. In'short, the CPA action created by the majority rests on nondisclosure of that of which the landlord had no notice at the critical time. That is, to my mind, liability without fault, and I do not believe that the General Assembly intended the CPA to have that effect in personal injury actions.
II
Creating a presumption that a landlord knows of conditions that would be revealed by a reasonable pre-occupancy inspection of the premises is indistinguishable from declaring that there is a general tort duty to make a pre-occupancy inspection, even in the absence of a contractual requirement. As recently as 1994, this Court said that
“a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises in order to determine whether such conditions exist. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 cmt. b (stating that a lessor ‘is under no duty to his lessee ... to make such an inspection’). See also Kleiman v. Mono of Maryland, Inc., 254 Md. 548, 553-55, 255 A.2d 393, 396-97 (1969) (adopting § 357 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and stating that a landlord is under no duty to inspect the property unless a contract so provides); [State ex rel. Bohon v.] Feldstein, 207 Md. [20,] 33, 113 A.2d [100,] 106 [ (1955) ]; New Summit Associates v. Nistle, 73 Md.App. 351, 361, 533 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1987).”
Richwind, 335 Md. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1155. In enacting the CPA, the General Assembly could not have intended to overturn several centuries of landlord-tenant law concerning the absence of a duty to inspect.
Golt, 308 Md. 1, 517 A.2d 328, on which the majority relies, does not support creating the duty. As Judge Cathell points out in his dissenting opinion, Golt rests on the principle that the landlord was chargeable with knowledge of the applicable legal requirement that the premises be licensed. That deci*549sion is not precedent for imputing to the landlord knowledge of facts of which there is no notice.
Further, the majority’s combination of presumed knowledge and implied misrepresentation creates, in effect, a warranty of habitability. The General Assembly has never enacted a warranty of habitability on a statewide basis for the market in previously-occupied, residential-rental properties, and this Court should not use the CPA to create one.
By Chapter 481 of the Acts of 1971, the General Assembly did enact an implied warranty of fitness for human habitation applicable to rental dwellings in Baltimore City. See Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1980 ed., 1997 Cum. Supp.), § 9-14.1. That enactment requires notice and, if notice is given, the remedies available and the time within which to seek those remedies are restricted. In relevant part § 9-14.1 provides:
“(a) In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling intended for human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the dwelling is fit for human habitation. If the dwelling is not fit for human habitation, the tenant, in addition to any remedies which he otherwise has, is entitled to the following remedies that shall be exercised within thirty (30) days of occupancy:
“(1) An action or proceeding for breach of contract or warranty which may include a prayer for rescission of the contract.
“(2) Rescission of the contract including the return of all deposits and money towards rent paid during the period of the breach of the warranty of habitability and within the thirty (30) days of occupancy period. Provided, however, that no action or proceeding for breach of the warranty of habitability shall be instituted by any tenant unless the landlord has notice of the conditions on the premises which constitute the breach of the warranty of habitability.
“(b) Definitions.
*550“(2) For the purpose of this section ‘notice’ shall mean (a) a violation notice from the Department of Housing and Community Development or any other municipal or governmental agency, (b) a letter sent by the tenant or his agent to the landlord by certified mail, or (c) actual notice of the defects or conditions.”
Nothing in the CPA undertakes to eliminate the notice requirement under the Baltimore City Local Law. Indeed, the CPA could not do so because any conflict between the CPA and § 9-14.1 must be resolved in favor of the Public Local Law. See Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 1, § 13.
It is true that the Baltimore City Housing Code establishes standards for the maintenance of property, including that it be kept “in safe condition, and fit for human habitation.” See Baltimore City Code (1976, 1983 Repl.Vol.), Art. 13, § 702. In addition to administrative enforcement, that statute creates a duty enforceable in a negligence action. But, both the administrative enforcement and the private remedy for damages are subject to the requirement that the landlord have notice of the violation. See Richwind, 335 Md. at 673-75, 645 A.2d at 1152-54.
At one point in the Richwind opinion, this Court referred to Article 13, §§ 702 and 703 of the Baltimore City Code as establishing an implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 671, 645 A.2d at 1151. We said that the warranty “necessarily includes flaking, loose or peeling lead-based paint within the scope of hazardous conditions.” Id. It is perhaps this passage that led the circuit court in the instant matter to include lead-based paint specifically in its instruction on the CPA. As the majority notes, Baltimore City Code, Article 13, § 703(2)(c) requires the interior of premises to be “kept clean and free of any flaking, loose or peeling paint and paper” without limitation to lead-based paint. Nevertheless, even though Richwind refers to Baltimore City Code §§ 702 and 703 as creating warranties, it is clear that Richwind holds that an element of *551any action based on those warranties is notice.3
Ill
Implied misrepresentation is the device that the majority uses to get this action under the CPA label in an attempt to justify eliminating any notice requirement from what is otherwise a personal injury negligence action. The argument runs this way. The Baltimore City Code requires rental premises to be free from flaking paint. When the landlord rents without telling the tenant about flaking paint, which the landlord is presumed to know, the landlord misrepresents the condition of the premises. If the paint, in fact, is flaking lead-based paint, and injury is proximately caused, tort damages for personal injury may be obtained under the consumer protection mantel.4
I, on the other hand, submit that if the overlay of the CPA and of the Housing Code on the pre-lease negotiations in the instant matter results in an implied representation, any implied representation is, under Golt, simply that the landlord will comply with the law and repair an unsafe condition that is known to him or of which he has reason to know.
Further, the majority should not authorize converting negligence actions into implied misrepresentation actions because of the great incentive that claimants have to use a CPA action for as many negligence and products liability cases as the ingenuity of counsel can conceive. This is because the CPA changes the ordinary American rule and authorizes the court to award reasonable attorney’s fees. CL § 18-408(b). An *552anomalous and unfair result of the majority’s holding, whereby an ordinary negligence action is converted into a misrepresentation violative of the CPA, is that a consumer who is injured by the negligence of a merchant may recover counsel fees on top of tort damages, but, when two motor vehicles, driven by strangers, collide, the party who is not at fault must pay counsel fees out of the tort recovery.
I would not transform the CPA into the basis for an omnibus claim that eliminates any of the elements of recognized causes of action for personal injuries. Here the respondent lost his negligence claim by the verdict of a properly instructed jury. The additional cause of action that the majority today creates under the CPA is landlord tort liability, but without the element of notice.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Judges Raker and Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.

. The larger question—whether the CPA applies at all to personal injury claims—was not argued or directly addressed in Richwind. In Berg v. Byrd, 124 Md.App. 208, 720 A.2d 1283 (1998), a landlord-tenant lead paint case, the only issue was whether the injury, for which noneconomic damages were sought, arose after the effective date of the cap on noneconomic damages. Again, the larger question was not argued to, or directly addressed by, the Court of Special Appeals.

. The majority opinion [op. at 512] states that Ms. Hatcher testified "that the petitioner was in the apartment before the lease began, talking to her mother." (Emphasis added). I cannot conclude that the testimony, quoted above, is susceptible of that interpretation. Further, if the majority’s interpretation were correct, and the respondent’s mother, the consumer here, had this conversation with petitioner in Apartment 310 before the lease began, then the consumer would have seen the flaking paint prior to the lease as easily as did her daughter, Ms. Hatcher, and the consumer would not have been misled.

. The notice need not be that the flaking paint is lead-based. We have recently so held in Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 361, 744 A.2d 47, 56-57 (2000), a negligence action. My disagreement with the majority is directed to eliminating—by the device of putting a CPA label on a personal injury action—the requirement in personal injury actions that the landlord have notice of flaking paint on the premises, whether lead-based or not.

. Whether the majority’s personal injury action under the CPA is subject to a contributory negligence defense is for another day.