Court Opinion

ID: 9409276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:30.456395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.985288
License: Public Domain

J-A11011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    STEPHEN T. ARCHER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JULIE P. KAUER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 24 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
                    Civil Division at No: No. 2021-1549-CD

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED: JULY 17, 2023

        Julie P. Kauer (“Mother”) appeals from the December 2, 2022 order that

awarded Stephen T. Archer (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) primary

physical custody of Parents’ son, W.A. (“Child”), born in July 2012.      After

careful review, we vacate and remand.

        We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record.    Parents resided together in Father’s residence in Ramey,

Pennsylvania, during the first year of Child’s life. See N.T., 8/17/2022, at 19-

20, 106. However, in November 2013, Mother entered a rehabilitation facility

due to her addiction to opiates.1 Id. at 31-32, 101. Child continued to live

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1Parents were married in September 2013. N.T., 8/17/2022, at 101. It is
unclear from the record when Parents divorced.
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with   Father   while   Mother   participated   in   rehabilitation   services   for

approximately three months.       Id. at 101.    Thereafter, Mother moved to

Pittsburgh to continue her treatment. Prior to the custody action commencing,

Child continued to live with Father during the school year and visited Mother

on weekends, during the summer, and Parents split holidays. Id. at 7, 100-

101.

       Mother currently resides in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, with her husband,

Adam Kauer. Id. at 5-6. Mother and Mr. Kauer have been in a relationship

since 2014 and married in 2019. They are self-employed owners of a cleaning

services company. Id. at 6.

       At the time of these proceedings, Father still lived in Ramey,

Pennsylvania with Child, his paramour, Becky Lavarchik, and occasionally Ms.

Lavarchik’s son, Z.M.    Id. at 95-96.    However, Father and Ms. Lavarchik

testified that they recently purchased a new house in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania,

and were in the process of moving.          Id. 95-96, 159.     Father has been

employed as a corrections officer for 17 years with the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections and currently works at State Correction Institution

(“SCI”) Houtzdale. Id. at 97. Ms. Lavarchik also works at SCI Houtzdale as

a registered nurse. Id. at 119. Due to Father’s work schedule, he has utilized

paternal grandparents, maternal grandparents, and, more recently, his

paramour, for childcare. Id. at 16-17, 107-108. Father testified that he is

currently working a temporary shift, overseeing construction at the prison,

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from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., but he will return to working 6:00 a.m. to 2:00

p.m. once the construction concludes. Id. at 98-99.

      Parents’ extra-judicial custody arrangement was largely successful for

eight years. Id. at 7-9. Accordingly, Child has always attended school in the

Moshannon Valley School District. Id. at 99. However, on November 4, 2021,

after a parent teacher conference, Mother approached Father to discuss Child

moving to Bethel Park and attending school there.         Id. at 9-10.    Mother

testified that Father did not like the idea, but he agreed to have a conversation

about it during the next custody exchange. Id. at 10. Mother believed that

Father verbally agreed to allow Child to live with her.      Id. at 34.   Father

testified that he never agreed to Mother’s plan. Father initiated the custody

action on November 22, 2021, seeking primary physical custody and shared

legal custody. Id. at 102.

      Thereafter, Parents attended a custody conference on January 11, 2022,

and participated in a custody mediation on February 22, 2022. On March 23,

2022, Mother filed an answer and counter-complaint, in which she also

requested primary physical custody of Child and requested a custody hearing.

      The custody hearing occurred on August 17, 2022.          Therein, Mother

testified and presented the testimony of Mr. Kauer and maternal grandmother,

Janet Caldwell. Father similarly testified and also adduced the testimony of

his father, Stephen Archer, Senior (“Paternal Grandfather”), and Ms.

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Lavarchik.   The court conducted an in camera interview of Child, then ten

years old, in the presence of counsel.

      By order and opinion entered December 2, 2022, the trial court awarded

Father primary physical custody, and Mother partial physical custody every

weekend but one per month from Friday at 3:00 p.m. until Sunday at 5:00

p.m.; during the summer, on a two-week alternating basis; and during

holidays, when Parents split their time with Child. The trial court also awarded

Parents shared legal custody of Child.

      On December 30, 2022, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On January 9, 2023, the trial court submitted a letter

pursuant to Rule 1925(a) stating that it would be relying upon the reasoning

provided in its opinion accompanying the December 2, 2022 order, and

requested its decision to remain undisturbed.

      Mother presents the following issues for review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
         failing to complete an independent consideration and
         assessment of all relevant factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
         5328[?]

      2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing
         to award Mother primary physical custody in light of the factors
         set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328[?]

      3. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing
         to consider [Child’s] preference[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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      Our standard and scope of review in this context is well-established:

      Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse
      of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the
      trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the
      law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or
      reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias,
      or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.

      In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the trial
      court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our
      role does not include making independent factual determinations.
      In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
      evidence, we must defer to the trial court who viewed and
      assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by
      the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
      Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are
      unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject
      the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of
      law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the
      trial court.

Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

      As with all custody-related matters, this Court’s “paramount concern is

the best interest of the child involved.”      Id. at 61 (internal citation and

quotation omitted). Indeed, Pennsylvania law provides that the trial court is

only empowered to change an existing custody order if the modification will

“serve the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338(a). To that end,

the Child Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) that

a court must consider prior to modifying an existing custody order. See E.B.

v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 460 (Pa. Super. 2019). While a court’s consideration

of these factors is mandatory, “it is within the trial court’s purview as the

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finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and critical in each

particular case.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, trial courts are

required to consider “[a]ll of the factors listed in section 5328(a) . . . when

entering a custody order.” J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super.

2011) (emphasis in original).

      These factors provide as follows:

      (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

         (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
         frequent and continuing contact between the child and
         another party.

         (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
         member of the party's household, whether there is a
         continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
         which party can better provide adequate physical
         safeguards and supervision of the child.

         (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
         to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
         protective services).

         (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
         of the child.

         (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's
         education, family life and community life.

         (5) The availability of extended family.

         (6) The child's sibling relationships.

         (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
         child's maturity and judgment.

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         (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
         other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
         reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
         child from harm.

         (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
         consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
         adequate for the child's emotional needs.

         (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

         (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

         (12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability
         to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

         (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party's effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

         (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party's household.

         (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
         member of a party's household.

         (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).      In order to evidence its consideration of these

required elements, trial courts must set forth a discussion of these best-

interest factors “prior to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of

appeal.” A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      We begin our review with Mother’s third issue, which is dispositive.

Mother asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider Section

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5328(a)(7), the well-reasoned preference of the child based on the child's

maturity and judgment. Mother’s Brief at 44. Specifically, Mother contends

that the court erred in finding that “Child did not expressly state his desire.”

Mother’s Brief at 44; see also Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/2022, at 2-3

(unpaginated). Rather, Mother argues that, during his in camera interview,

Child testified that he preferred to reside with her and attend the Bethel Park

School District. Mother’s Brief at 32, 44. We agree.

      In pertinent part, Child testified as follows on inquiry by the court.

      Q: So, [Child], as I understand it, pretty much for all your life,
      you’ve been living with [Father] during the school year --

      A: Uh-huh.

      Q: -- and going to [Mother’s] on the weekends. And then in the
      summers, you went to [Mother’s] during the week and [Father’s]
      on the weekend?

      A: Yes.

      Q: Okay. How has that been going?

      A: On my [Father’s] for the weekends?

      Q: For the way the schedule was, did it go pretty good?

      A: Yeah.

      Q: So I heard today that you told [Mother] or told someone that
      you wanted to go to the Bethel Park school?

      A: Yes.

      Q: How did that come about? Who gave you the idea of going to
      Bethel Park?

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     A: So when I’m with [Mother] every time, I -- so we drive past a
     lot of schools. I said I wanted to be there and I just want to be
     with [Mother]. I don’t want to live with [Father].

     Q: Okay. So what happened that you said that you want to live
     with [Mother] and not [Father]?

     A: So, I told [Mother] and she said, okay, and she told [Father];
     next thing you know, all this, we’re all here.

     Q: So did they tell you why you’re here?

     A: Yes.

     Q: Who told you?

     A: Wait.

     Q: Who told you why we’re here today, [Mother] or [Father]?

     A: Nobody.

     Q: Nobody. So you didn’t ask questions: why am I going to
     Clearfield Courthouse? Did you ever ask anyone that?

     A: No.

     Q: So they just got you up this morning, you put on a nice pair of
     pants and bowtie?

     A: No. Mediation, like the day before, my [Father] told me.

     Q: I’m talking about today, who told you?

     A: Because when we left, [Father] told me that we were going to
     mediation -- or, not mediation.

     Q: For today?

     A: Yeah, for today.

     Q: And [Mother] never told you that?

     A: No.

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N.T., 8/17/2022, at 8-9. Additionally, on cross-examination, Child indicated

that Mother did not tell him that Bethel Park School District is better than

Moshannon Valley.

      Q: When you said to the judge, you told [Mother] and then
      [Mother] told [Father]; do you remember saying that?

      A: Yes.

      Q: And then you said, and then all of this. So what did you mean
      by that?

      A: We’re here in the room for court.

      Q: Okay. And you blame [Father] for that?

      A: Yes.

      Q: Okay. Did [Mother] talk to you at all about what [Father] did?

      A: No.

      Q: Okay. Did she ever talk to you about Bethel Park being better
      than Mo Valley?

      A: No.

Id. at 9-10.

      Based on the foregoing testimony, it is clear that Child evinced a

preference for residing with Mother and attending the Bethel Park School

District. As such, the trial court erred by finding that Child had not stated a

relevant preference.    Because the custody order is not supported by

competent evidence with respect to Section 5328(a)(7), we conclude that the

court abused its discretion. See Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60.

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      Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court

for consideration of Child’s stated preference pursuant to Section 5328(a)(7),

along with all of the other custody factors, and to issue a new custody order.

Upon remand, we place no restrictions on whatever actions the trial court

wishes to take with respect to Child’s preference based on his maturity and

judgment, including supplemental fact finding.

      Based on this disposition, we need not consider Mother’s remaining

issues.

      Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

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