Court Opinion

ID: 9728048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:56:48.609557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.435018
License: Public Domain

Carter., J.,
dissenting.
Eugene E. Stewart and Carolyn A. Stewart brought this proceeding in the juvenile court for Dawes County alleging that Barry Gene McCauley, born on April 28, 1962, had been in their custody since a few hours, after his birth, that they had furnished him adequate care, food, clothing, shelter, love, and affection, with the permission and consent of his parents, and that the child’s parents are now threatening to take the custody of the child, which the Stewarts alleged would not be for the best interest of the child. The petition alleged the re*421fusal of the county attorney to bring the action, or to consent to its bringing by a reputable person within the county, as required by section 43-205, R. S. Supp., 1963.
Sections 43-201 to 43-220, R. R. S. 1943, as amended, constitute an exclusive act which authorizes proceedings thereunder only by the county attorney or a reputable person having the consent of the county attorney. Without such consent a private litigant has authority to bring the action. The intention of the Legislature to so limit the bringing of such actions is made clear by section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1963, wherein it is stated in part: “As used in sections 43-201 to 43-220, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) This act shall be construed as referring exclusively to sections 43-201 to 43-220; * * I submit that an action brought under this act by someone other than the county attorney in the absence of a pleading that it was consented to by the county attorney is fatally defective. The trial court so found and sustained the motion of the county attorney to strike the petition, the motion being properly treated as a demurrer, and dismissed the action when plaintiffs elected to stand on the petition. I submit that the action of the trial court was correct and that its judgment should be affirmed.
The plaintiffs contend that the county attorney was disqualified by interest, with which I fully agree. It is my position, however, that such a situation does not authorize the beginning of the action without compliance with the terms of the statute. The plaintiffs should have proceeded to obtain the consent of an acting county attorney and pleaded it in their petition, and, in failing to do so, a cause of action could not be stated. The statute does not contemplate the commencement of such an action and the obtaining of subsequent consent. The condition is precedent to the bringing of any action at all.
“One whose authority to prosecute an action is limited by statute must plead facts which bring him within, such statutory limitations.” Sommerville v. Board of *422County Commissioners, 117 Neb. 507, 221 N. W. 433. The act before us was intended to authorize the state by the county attorney, or someone to whom he. gave consent, to bring an action under this section. The action is granted by statute and was not existent at common law. In Duhrkopf v. Bennett, 108 Neb. 142, 187 N. W. 813, we said: “Where a right has been created by statute which did not exist at the common law, the legislature may impose restrictions thereon, and the conditions so imposed qualify and are an integral part of the act and must be fully complied with in the manner therein prescribed.” In Swaney v. Gage County, 64 Neb. 627, 90 N. W. 542, We said: “It must be conceded that the legislative body, which created the right of action, ■ had absolute power to determine the conditions under which it must be brought, * * *. As we have heretofore said, this was new and independent legislation, and the act was complete in itself. It established the rule for the class of cases to which it relates.” In Clay County v. Bottorf, 166 Neb. 262, 88 N. W. 2d 898, we said: “The statute above quoted is indispensable to the cause of action asserted by appellee. It creates a right that did not exist at common law. It requires as a condition precedent to the existence and enjoyment of the right that the incompetent be possessed of an estate * * *. It is by the statute made a condition of the right and of the remedy. Appellee could only allege a cause of action by asserting that the requirements; of the condition implicit in the statute did exist * * *.” See, also, County of Keith v. Creamer, 170 Neb. 362, 102 N. W. 2d 632; County Board of Platte County v. Breese, 171 Neb. 37, 105 N. W. 2d 478.
Unless, the statute is followed as enacted, the limitation imposed by the Legislature on the bringing of such actions: becomes a meaningless restriction and opens the door to a multitude of unauthorized proceedings. It was the intent of the Legislature that the act' was for the benefit of the state in protecting neglected, dependent, *423or delinquent children, and not for the benefit of private., litigants. To hold, as does the majority opinion, the statute is extended by judicial pronouncement to bring private litigants within its scope. It creates a cláss not authorized by the act.
The majority opinion states that section 43-205, R. S. Supp., 1963, was not intended to make the county attorney the judge with the final decision, but was intended as a check on its indiscriminate exercise. I submit that the statute is subject to no such construction. It means just what it says and nothing more. It in fact provides that no action may be brought unless the conditions precedent contained therein have been met. It authorizes the bringing of the action by the state through the county attorney or a reputable person to whom consent is given by the county attorney. Unless the conditions are met, no authority exists for bringing the action.
I am in accord with the statement of the majority that when the court takes jurisdiction of a child in a proceeding properly before it, the child becomes a ward of the court. But an infant cannot become the ward of a court where there is nothing before it, including a petition that does' not' state a cause of action under the applicable statutory authority. Such a situation is no different than where the court arbitrarily undertakes to' deal with an infant without a pleading of any kind before it. The term “ward of the court” has been applied to many classes of people other than children, including Indians, seamen, incompetents, and others. But none becomes a ward of the court until the court’s jurisdiction is in-voked by a proper pleading. It is a fallacy, indeed, to contend in such cases that the jurisdiction of a court attaches ipso facto without a proper pleading and that a court may grant relief on some theory outside the usual methods of bringing issues before the court. The court may not exercise its powers over a ward of the court until such time as the ward has been brought within its *424jurisdiction and its power to adjudicate properly invoked. Where an action grounded on statute is not in compliance with its terms, the power of the court to adjudicate does not exist and the action is for dismissal.
It seems clear that the district court for Dawes County has no pleading before it that states a cause of action, for the simple reason that it was not brought by the state in the manner and subject to the restrictions imposed by the statute. The majority opinion purports to supply a cause of action in a situation which the Legislature does not permit. The equities that may exist cannot be used to escape the limitations imposed by the legislative authority. The statute must be strictly construed and applied, since the statute is the right, it being in derogation of the common law.
The majority opinion purports to invest jurisdiction in the district court under a situation which the statute by plain language does not permit. Its; conclusion appears to be based on the unsupportable theory that the end justifies the means. If such statutes are to be extended under the guise of judicial construction to mean something not authorized, the whole principle of statutory construction will be convulsed into inconsistency, instability, and chaos. The fact that a litigant chose a wrong remedy, or one not available to him, is no justification for creating a nonexistent remedy to meet the exigencies of the situation. It is the function of courts to declare the law as it is, not that which it wishes that it were.
Pollock and Sidner, District Judges, join in this dissent.