Court Opinion

ID: 9961522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:29.247175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:52.707149
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re BECKETT, Minors.                                               April 18, 2024

                                                                     No. 367839
                                                                     Gladwin Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 22-000025-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right an order terminating her parental rights to her minor
children, (KB) and (AB), under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions), MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable
likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        The trial court took jurisdiction with respect to KB and AB following the authorization of
the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services’s (DHHS) petition for temporary custody
pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(2) (unfit home environment due to neglect). After more than a year
of respondent not complying with services to the court’s satisfaction, DHHS filed a supplemental
petition for permanent custody, which sought termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). The court authorized the petition, which alleged that
respondent continued to abuse methamphetamine and failed to engage with her service plan. The
trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights, finding the statutory grounds for termination
were met pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j),
and that it was in the best interests of KB and AB to do so. The trial court found that every service
available in Gladwin County had been offered to respondent, respondent did not have consistent
employment, she failed to complete or benefit from counseling and therapy, failed to complete the
recommendations given following a psychological evaluation, failed to participate in drug
screenings, and failed to complete substance abuse treatment.

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                                  II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

       Respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds for termination of
parental rights were established was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

         “To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established.” In re Moss, 301
Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings and
ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination for clear error. In re White, 303
Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing
court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to
the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-
297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).

       “To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Notably, the clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard
applied in civil cases[.]” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
       belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,
       evidence so clear, direct, and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to
       come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
       issue. [Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

The trial court “may take into consideration any evidence that had been properly introduced and
admitted at the adjudication trial . . . .” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 316; 964 NW2d 881
(2020). The trial court may also consider “any additional relevant and material evidence that is
received by the court at the termination hearing . . . .” Id.

        A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if “the conditions
that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In re White, 303
Mich App at 710 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This statutory ground exists when the
conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes
and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        The primary condition that led to the adjudication was respondent’s substance abuse, which
corresponded with physical abuse of her stepson and allegations of improper supervision. There
is sufficient evidentiary support for the court’s conclusion that respondent, despite having ample
time to complete services and participate in substance abuse treatment, failed to do so. Respondent
had 14 months to complete her service plan and make progress with her substance abuse disorder.
Respondent failed to complete substance abuse treatment, failed to complete and pass drug

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screenings, and failed to attend more than 25% of individual counseling sessions. Respondent was
offered a slew of services including counseling, “baby court,”1 parenting classes, and substance
abuse treatment, but the services were not sufficient to remove the barriers to reunification.
Respondent attempted inpatient rehabilitation services four times, but she never successfully
completed the programs. Respondent also attempted outpatient services without completion.
Respondent was offered 121 drug tests during the case’s pendency, but she only partook in 4 with
each returning positive for methamphetamine and THC. The trial court found there was no
reasonable likelihood that these conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time, and given
the lack of progress over this case’s pendency, this finding was not a clear error. Because only
one ground need be established for us to affirm, we decline to address the other grounds cited by
the trial court. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

                                        III. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights was in
the best interests of the child was a clear error. We disagree.

        “Even if the trial court finds that the Department has established a ground for termination
by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.”
In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). This Court reviews a
trial court’s best-interests determination for clear error. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276;
976 NW2d 44 (2021). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.

        “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). When making its determination, the trial court should weigh all of
the evidence available to it and may consider the following:

          [T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
          permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
          parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child was in
          care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the
          foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan. [In re
          Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346-347; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation marks and
          citation omitted).]

Moreover, “[a] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to
consider.” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434. While placement with a relative
weighs against termination, it is not dispositive because a trial court “may terminate parental rights

1
    Baby court is a program designed to provide services to children under age four and their families.

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in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

         The trial court reviewed the evidence presented by respondent and DHHS before finding
that it was in the best interests of KB and AB to terminate respondent’s rights. The court concluded
that the termination was appropriate because of respondent’s continued substance abuse,
specifically with methamphetamine. As discussed, there was evidence that respondent lacked
engagement and failed to complete any of her required services and was still abusing substances.
There was testimony that the children urgently needed permanence, and it was reasonable to infer
from respondent’s ongoing substance abuse that she could not provide a stable, permanent home
for KB and AB. The trial court did consider the bond between the children and respondent, but it
noted that a strong bond alone was not enough to prevent termination. Relative placement was
being considered, but there was testimony suggesting that the proposed relative placements were
not suitable. There was testimony that the foster home caring for KB and AB was adequate and
that their needs were being met. Considering all of the evidence, the court concluded that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, it was in the best interests of KB and AB to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. This determination was not clearly in error given the aforementioned findings.

        Affirmed.

                                                                /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                                /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                                /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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