Court Opinion

ID: 9377790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 19:02:51.641905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.834454
License: Public Domain

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

                                                         Electronically Filed
                                                         Supreme Court
                                                         SCWC-26118
                                                         08-MAR-2023
                                                         08:09 AM
                                                         Dkt. 18 OPA

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                               ---o0o---

        STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  vs.

         JASON K. PERRY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

                                  and

  RYAN H. ONUMA, DELANEO K. PUHA, JAMISON MITCHELL, MARVIN T.
CADIZ, VAUGHN N. KAAUMOANA, and DAVID V.C. MAGALEI, Defendants.

                             SCWC-26118

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                (NO. 26118; CASE NO. 1PC021000796)

                           MARCH 8, 2023

 RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

                                  I.

     A jury found Jason Perry guilty of two murders that

occurred several days apart.    Then, answering special verdict

forms, the jury found that he committed one murder as a
principal and accomplice, and the other murder as an accomplice.

For purposes of a mandatory minimum term in the second murder,

the jury answered an interrogatory.   It found Perry had

possessed or used a semi-automatic firearm while engaged in the

offense.

     The trial court enhanced each of Perry’s murder in the

second degree (second-degree murder or murder) prison terms

beyond the ordinary statutory maximum.   And it ran those

sentences consecutively.   Perry is serving two consecutive life

without the possibility of parole terms.

     Perry argues that his second-degree murder conviction based

only on accomplice liability should be reversed.    Perry did not

shoot anyone, his argument runs, and because the jury found that

he possessed a semi-automatic firearm during the crime, the

guilty verdict was “irreconcilably inconsistent.”

     Perry also maintains that the court unlawfully enhanced his

two second-degree murder prison terms.   He says the court made

factual findings to support a sentence beyond the ordinary

statutory maximum, violating his right to a jury trial.     Perry

further claims that his simultaneous murder convictions were not

“previous convictions” that subjected him to enhanced terms of

imprisonment under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-657

(Supp. 1998).

                                 2
     We reject Perry’s arguments.       First, the jury’s verdict was

not irreconcilably inconsistent.       Second, the two guilty

verdicts established that Perry was “previously convicted” of

second-degree murder, a finding detached from the right to a

jury trial.

                                 II.

     In one indictment the State charged Jason Perry with two

counts of murder in the second degree.       The State alleged he had

committed two murders, days apart, each violating HRS § 707-

701.5 (1993).    The second involved the shooting death of a

possible witness to the first murder.       Both counts charged Perry

as a principal and accomplice.

     In 2003, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit tried Perry

separately from several co-defendants.       One of those co-

defendants cut a deal and testified at trial for the State

against Perry.    Perry testified, too.     Both were present at the

shooting death of the possible witness.       They pointed fingers in

count 2, saying the other was the triggerman.

     The jury found Perry guilty of murder in the second degree

in count 1.   The foreperson signed and dated a guilty as charged

verdict form.    The jury also answered two questions.     On a

“Special Verdict” form, the jury found that Perry had committed

murder in the second degree “by his own conduct.”       It also found

that Perry had committed murder in the second degree “by the

                                   3
conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable.”

Thus, the jury concluded that Perry had committed the first

murder both as a principal and an accomplice.

     Count 2 also resulted in a murder in the second degree

verdict.   Like count 1, the foreperson signed and dated a guilty

as charged verdict form, and the jury answered a special verdict

form.   Unlike count 1, the jury did not find that Perry had

committed murder in the second degree “by his own conduct.”              The

jury, however, did find that he had committed murder in the

second degree “by the conduct of another person for which he is

legally accountable.”     Thus, the jury concluded that Perry

committed the second murder as an accomplice.

     That should have been it for count 2.         No more questions

asked or answered.     The court however gave a mandatory minimum

semi-automatic firearm interrogatory.        After the verdict form’s

“guilty as charged in Count 2 of Murder in the Second Degree”

language, the court queried:

           Has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
           on or about the 26th day of January, 2002, in the City and
           County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, the Defendant, Jason
           K. Perry, had a semi-automatic firearm in his possession or
           threatened its use or used a semi-automatic firearm while
           engaged in the offense of Murder in the Second Degree?

The jury answered “Yes.”

     The court and parties saw a disconnect.          Citing Garringer

v. State, the State pointed out there is no mandatory minimum

term based on a firearm enhancement for an accomplice to murder.

                                     4
80 Hawaiʻi 327, 334-35, 909 P.2d 1142, 1149-50 (1996) (precluding

mandatory minimum term sentence based on HRS § 706–660.1(3)

(1993) unless defendant personally possessed or threatened use

of a firearm).   The State declined to move for a mandatory

minimum.   The circuit court commented that “a reasonable

inference” for the interrogatory’s answer was that the jury

found Perry possessed a firearm based on accomplice liability.

Ultimately, the court decided the interrogatory didn’t matter;

the State couldn’t and wasn’t moving for a mandatory minimum

term in count 2.

     The State moved for consecutive term sentencing and

extended sentencing per HRS §§ 706-656 (1993 & Supp. 1998) and

706-657.   In both counts the circuit court increased second-

degree murder’s ordinary life with the possibility of parole

sentence to life without the possibility of parole.   Then, the

court ran Perry’s two murder convictions consecutively.

     Perry appealed.   In a 2007 Summary Disposition Order, the

Intermediate Court of Appeals rejected his six points of error.

Perry’s attorney filed a petition for writ of certiorari a few

days late.   This court denied his petition; it was untimely.

     Fifteen years later Perry resuscitated his appeal.     On his

own, he filed a Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40 post-

conviction relief petition.   His appellate counsel, Perry wrote,

had missed the cert application deadline and was ineffective.     A

                                 5
new circuit court judge agreed.    The court appointed counsel.

The ICA, in turn, vacated its May 18, 2007 Judgment and “re-

enter[ed] judgment on the Summary Disposition Order, entered

April 26, 2007.”   Perry could seek cert and appeal the ICA’s

decision.

     Perry did, and we accepted his cert application.

                               III.

     Perry raises two points of error.    First, he argues that

the jury’s verdict in count 2 was ambiguous and inconsistent.

Second, he argues the court enhanced his sentences by making

factual findings, thereby violating his right to a jury trial.

                                  A.

     Perry does not decry the court’s substantive offense and

accomplice liability instructions.     Rather, he argues that count

2’s verdict form created ambiguity because the court placed the

mandatory minimum firearm interrogatory on it.    He also argues

that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent.

     First, Perry maintains that “the inclusion of the firearm

question on the verdict form pertaining to guilt misled the jury

into believing that that question must be answered as part of

the finding of guilt.”   He believes “the court created ambiguity

by embedding the firearm enhancement question into the finding

of guilt.”

                                  6
     We disagree.    Looking at the court’s instructions together,

its placement of the mandatory minimum-related special

interrogatory on the verdict form was not “prejudicially

insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.”    See

Stanley v. State, 148 Hawaiʻi 489, 500, 479 P.3d 107, 118 (2021).

     The court’s jury instructions detailed the elements of

second-degree murder and the elements of accomplice liability.

Heeding the court’s instructions, the jury unanimously found

that the State had proven each element of murder in the second

degree in count 2.    Then it selected the guilty as charged

verdict form.   The verdict form signaled the jury’s beyond a

reasonable doubt finding in the shooting murder.    We are

unconvinced that the jury felt it had to answer a non-elemental

firearms question “as part of” its guilty verdict or that

placing this question on the verdict form created an “ambiguity”

with the jury’s guilty verdict.

     Next, Perry maintains that the guilty verdict and the

special verdict were “irreconcilably inconsistent.”    Perry

understands that “courts should attempt to first reconcile

seemingly-inconsistent verdicts before vacatur.”    State v.

Bringas, 149 Hawaiʻi 435, 443, 494 P.3d 1168, 1176 (2021).      But

citing Garringer, Perry says “[t]he court’s attempt to reconcile

the inconsistent verdict fails because it was legally impossible

for the jury to find Mr. Perry guilty of the firearm enhancement

                                  7
based on the possession of the firearm by an accomplice.”    How,

Perry seems to ask, could a jury convict him as an accomplice to

a shooting murder and at the same time find he possessed or used

a semi-automatic firearm?

     Reasonably, we believe.   And if there’s “a reasonable way

to reconcile” a jury’s findings, then a conviction stands.

Bringas, 149 Hawaiʻi at 443, 494 P.3d at 1176 (explaining “[t]he

requirement that an appellate court search for any reasonable

way to reconcile a jury’s verdicts serves to avoid speculation

into the jury’s confidential deliberations and to safeguard the

result of those deliberations, if at all possible.”)

     An accomplice to murder can possess a firearm during the

criminal event without pulling the trigger.   And a person can be

convicted of a shooting-related murder without pulling the

trigger.   See HRS § 702-221 (1993) (“A person is guilty of an

offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct

of another person for which he is legally accountable, or

both. . . .   A person is legally accountable for the conduct of

another person when: . . . He is an accomplice of such other

person in the commission of the offense.”); HRS § 702-222 (1993)

(“A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission

of an offense if: (1) With the intention of promoting or

facilitating the commission of the offense, the person: (a)

Solicits the other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or

                                 8
attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it”).

     The jury’s verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent.

Contrary to Perry’s position, it was not legally impossible for

the jury to find the State had proven the elements of murder in

the second degree based on accomplice liability and that Perry

had possessed a semi-automatic firearm.    Garringer does not make

Perry’s scenario legally impossible for purposes of an

accomplice’s murder conviction.    Rather, Garringer just makes it

impossible for an accomplice to receive a mandatory minimum term

under HRS § 706-660.1 for possessing a semi-automatic firearm.

Id. 80 Hawaiʻi at 334-35, 909 P.2d at 1149-50.

     Also, a semi-automatic finding is unnecessary to a second-

degree murder verdict.    It does not touch any element to murder

in the second degree.    Bringas, 149 Hawaiʻi at 444, 494 P.3d at

1177 (jury finding regarding mitigating defense of “mutual

affray does not negate any element of [second-degree murder].”)

The inessential interrogatory did not impact the jury’s verdict

in count 2 (recited on both the guilty as charged verdict form

and the special verdict form) that Perry committed each element

of murder in the second degree.

     Lastly, the State did not move for a mandatory minimum in

count 2.   So the interrogatory did not prejudice Perry.

                                  B.

     We turn to Perry’s enhanced sentencing argument.

                                  9
     There are only two ways that a person convicted of

violating HRS § 707-701.5, murder in the second degree, may

receive a life without the possibility of parole sentence: when

(1) “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,

manifesting exceptional depravity” or (2) “the person was

previously convicted of the offense of murder in the first

degree or murder in the second degree[.]”   HRS § 706-657.

     Perry argues the court unlawfully sentenced him to life

without the possibility of parole in counts 1 and 2.    He

contends: (1) the jury, not the judge, should have found that he

“was previously convicted” of murder and (2) “previously

convicted” means prior – not contemporaneous – murder

convictions.

     Perry also argues that the court violated his right to a

jury trial in count 1 because it remarked that the victim “was

tortured before she died” and Perry’s “actions and decisions

were cruel and reprehensible.”   He claims these statements show

that the court fact-found to enhance his sentence, and fact-

finding is for the jury, not the judge.

     First, we address Perry’s right to jury trial argument.

Since his conviction occurred after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), he may raise a challenge based on this issue.

Flubacher v. State, 142 Hawaiʻi 109, 118, 414 P.3d 161, 170

(2018) (holding that Apprendi, is “the line of demarcation” for

                                 10
“determining whether extended term sentences imposed without

jury findings are subject to collateral attack”).

       Under the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the

Hawaiʻi Constitution, a jury, not a judge, makes the factual

findings used to impose a sentence beyond the offense’s ordinary

statutory maximum.    See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; Flubacher,

142 Hawaiʻi at 118-19, 414 P.3d at 170-71.   But using prior or

concurrent convictions to exceed a statutory max is different.

Convictions float outside the constitutional ambit.    A judge may

make those findings without violating the jury trial right.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v.

Maugaotega, 115 Hawaiʻi 432, 446 n.15, 168 P.3d 562, 576 n.15

(2007) (describing the “prior-or-concurrent-convictions

exception” as facts which have already been subject to the jury

trial right and been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.)

       Perry’s simultaneous convictions mean that no jury fact-

finding was needed to enhance his sentences.    The jury found

beyond a reasonable doubt that Perry committed murder in the

second degree – twice.    It didn’t need to find anything more for

Perry to be eligible for enhanced sentencing under HRS § 706-

657.    And the court didn’t need to find anything beyond those

                                 11
convictions to determine that Perry “was previously convicted of

the offense of murder in the first degree or murder in the

second degree.”   HRS § 706-657.

     We turn to Perry’s position that the court violated his

jury trial right in another way.        At the sentencing hearing, the

court remarked that before Perry killed the victim in count 1,

she was “tortured.”   The court also described Perry’s actions as

“cruel and reprehensible.”   Those comments, Perry believes, show

that the court fact-found, and thereby unconstitutionally

enhanced his sentence per HRS § 706-657’s “the murder was

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional

depravity” provision.

     Perry is mistaken.   The court did not effectively find that

he had committed a “conscienceless or pitiless crime which is

unnecessarily torturous to a victim.”       HRS § 706-657.

Before its sentencing remarks, the court had already imposed the

life without the possibility of parole sentences.       HRS § 706-

657’s “previously convicted” criteria supported the enhanced

sentence.   So only one question remained:      Would counts 1 and 2

run concurrently or consecutively?

     The court made its comments within the context of HRS

§ 706-606 (1993) and the State’s motion for consecutive

sentencing.   Courts consider the “nature and circumstances of

the offense” at every sentencing hearing.       HRS § 706-606(1).

                                   12
And when it comes to a consecutive sentence, the court “shall

consider the factors set forth in section 706-606.”    HRS § 706-

668.5(2) (1993).

     Perry’s argument in this respect fails another way.    The

State moved for enhanced sentencing based on Perry’s conviction

for two murders.    Not because he killed a person in an

“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting

exceptional depravity” way.

     Lastly, Perry says counts 1 and 2 are not “previous

convictions.”   Perry argues that “previous conviction” means a

prior murder conviction; that is, a murder conviction that

occurred before another murder conviction.    Because the jury

convicted Perry of two murders at once, his argument goes, how

can the murder convictions defy time and happen “previously”?

     That’s a cogent argument.    Until HRS § 706-657 is read.    In

1996, the legislature defined “previously convicted” as “a

sentence imposed at the same time or a sentence previously

imposed which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated.”

(Emphasis added.)    “The legislature’s intent was to permit a

court to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole when the defendant commits two or more

murders.”   Commentary to HRS § 706-657 (citing S. Stand. Comm.

Rep. No. 2592, in 1996 Senate Journal at 1210; H. Stand. Comm.

Rep. No. 221-96 in 1996 House Journal at 1122-23).    As the

                                 13
legislature put it: “The bill now clarifies that two murders,

regardless of when the person formulated the intent or state of

mind to kill the two persons, permits the court to sentence a

person convicted of two murders to life imprisonment without

parole.”   S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2592 on H.B. No. 2620 in 1996

Senate Journal at 1210.

                                IV.

     We affirm the ICA’s October 7, 2022 Judgment on Appeal and

the July 28, 2003 Judgment in the Circuit Court of the First

Circuit.

Cynthia A. Kagiwada                   /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
                                      /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Steven K. Tsushima                    /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for respondent
                                      /s/ Michael D. Wilson
                                      /s/ Todd W. Eddins

                                14