Court Opinion

ID: 9408897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 00:00:41.189278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.406364
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50135         Document: 00516819692             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                      July 13, 2023
                                         No. 22-50135                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   Robert Cuellar,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   GEO Group, Incorporated,

                                                                    Defendant—Appellee.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 5:20-CV-792

   Before Dennis, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Robert Cuellar was employed by GEO Group, Incorporated (“GEO”)
   as a detention officer. During his employment, he developed health problems
   that ultimately resulted in a sleep apnea diagnosis. Due to his illness, Cuellar
   requested that he no longer be scheduled for shifts longer than twelve hours,
   based on his physician’s recommendation. GEO denied his request, asserting
   that working shifts longer than twelve hours constituted an essential function

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50135      Document: 00516819692           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/13/2023

                                     No. 22-50135

   of Cuellar’s job. Cuellar sued GEO for failure to accommodate and retaliation
   in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. He appeals the district
   court’s grant of summary judgment in GEO’s favor. Because there is no
   genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cuellar has established a prima
   facie case on either of his claims, we AFFIRM.
                                           I.
          From 2009 to 2018, Cuellar worked as a detention officer at the South
   Texas Immigration and Customs Enforcement Processing Center, which is
   owned and operated by GEO Group. One of the requirements for the job of
   detention officer was to “work overtime as required,” including “up to
   sixteen (16) hours within a rolling 24-hour period.” Cuellar would,
   occasionally, be directed to work ten, twelve, fourteen, or sixteen hour shifts
   straight in a rolling 24-hour period.
          In 2013, Cuellar began experiencing symptoms of disordered sleeping,
   including daytime sleepiness, insomnia, nightmares, sleep deprivation, and
   snoring. After submitting to a sleep study, he was diagnosed with severe
   obstructive sleep apnea. Cuellar informed GEO’s human resources
   administrator, as well as two of the wardens, of his sleep apnea diagnosis and
   provided them a copy of his sleep study. In 2015, Cuellar filled out a self-
   identification form, indicating that he had a disability, and returned it to
   Warden Castro. In 2018, Cuellar twice fell asleep at the wheel of his vehicle
   after working a 16-hour shift; this resulted once in a collision and once in him
   veering into oncoming traffic.
          On May 15, 2018, Cuellar presented his supervisor and the human
   resources administrator with a note from his physician, which stated that, as
   a result of Cuellar’s disability, he was medically restricted from working a
   shift longer than 12 hours and therefore sought an accommodation. On May
   23, 2018, GEO placed Cuellar on administrative leave without pay, while

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   GEO determined if an accommodation was possible. On June 4, 2018,
   Cuellar was terminated by GEO. Cuellar filed suit in Texas state court on
   June 4, 2020, alleging violations of the Texas Labor Code and the Americans
   with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). GEO removed the case to federal court, and
   subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court
   granted GEO’s motion for summary judgment, and Cuellar appeals.
                                          II.
          This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
   novo. Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2021).
   Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to
   any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
   FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The court must “refrain from making credibility
   determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.
   Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). “A genuine issue of material fact
   exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
   for the non-movant. All facts and evidence must be taken in the light most
   favorable to the non-movant.” Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Moreno, 667 F.3d 539,
   549–50 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal marks and citations omitted). Rule 56 does
   not require the genuine issue of material fact “to be resolved conclusively in
   favor of the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that
   sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to
   require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at
   trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89
   (1968).
                                          III.
                                          A.
          Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code makes it unlawful for an
   employer to “fail[] or refuse[] to hire an individual, discharge[] an individual,

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   or discriminate[] in any other manner against an individual” on the basis of
   disability. TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.051. Because the Texas Labor Code
   mirrors the ADA, courts use the same framework to evaluate claims arising
   under either scheme. Clark v. Champion Nat’l Security, Inc., 952 F.3d 570,
   578 n.16 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, because Cuellar offers only circumstantial
   evidence to prove his claim, we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
   framework. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under this
   framework, an employee must first show a prima facie case of discrimination,
   and then the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reason for” the adverse employment action. Id. The
   employee would then need to present evidence that the articulated reason is
   pretextual. Id.
          To establish a prima facie discrimination case under the ADA, Cuellar
   must show that (1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for the job of
   detention officer, and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment decision
   because of his disability. Id. at 695–97. Cuellar argues that the district court
   erred in its determination that Cuellar failed to establish that he was qualified
   for the job of detention officer.
          To be qualified for the job, Cuellar must have been able to do the
   essential functions of a detention officer with or without a reasonable
   accommodation. See § 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Essential functions” are
   “fundamental,” as opposed to “marginal,” job duties, 29 C.F.R. §
   1630.2(n)(l), such that a job is “fundamentally alter[ed]” if an essential
   function is removed, 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, app. at 397. “Fact-finders must
   determine whether a function is ‘essential’ on a case-by-case basis.” LHC
   Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d at 698. The text of the ADA indicates where this inquiry
   should begin:

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          For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be
          given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job
          are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
          description before advertising or interviewing applicants for
          the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
          essential functions of the job.
   42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Further, the regulations promulgated by the Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) list seven non-
   exhaustive factors to guide the essential-function inquiry:
          (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are
          essential;
          (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or
          interviewing applicants for the job;
          (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the
          function;
          (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
          perform the function;
          (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
          (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
          (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar
          jobs.
   29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). “Both the statute and regulations indicate that we
   must give greatest weight to the employer’s judgment,” because “it is the
   only evidence the statute requires us to consider, absent a written job
   description.” Credeur v. Louisiana Through Off. of Att’y Gen., 860 F.3d 785,
   792 (5th Cir. 2017). Further, the EEOC states that “the inquiry into essential
   functions is not intended to second guess an employer’s business judgment
   with regard to production standards . . . nor to require employers to lower
   such standards.” 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, app. at 398.

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          The district court determined that Cuellar failed to demonstrate that
   he was qualified for employment as a detention officer because he failed to
   demonstrate that he could perform an essential job function—work 16-hour
   shifts—either without accommodation or with a reasonable accommodation.
   Cuellar argues that the 16-hour shift requirement was not an essential
   function and that the district court erroneously conflated Cuellar’s
   permanent sleep apnea condition with a request for a permanent
   accommodation. We address each argument in turn.
          The ability to work a 16-hour shift is an essential function. Cuellar
   concedes that the job description contains minimum requirements that
   specified that detention officers needed “to work overtime as required” and
   to “work up to sixteen (16) hours within a rolling 24 hour period.” Further,
   Cuellar acknowledges that he worked “up to sixteen hours a day”
   approximately “three to four times a month.” GEO’s procedure manual
   states that “a supervisor can and will require you to work overtime without
   notice . . . such that you may be required to work a maximum of (2)
   consecutive eight (8) hour shifts in a day.” Additionally, the Collective
   Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the employee union and GEO also
   notes the following:
          The parties agree that the availability to work overtime is an
          essential function of full-time Officers. The Company will first
          attempt to utilize Officers who volunteer for overtime.
          However, based upon business need and/or client directives,
          Officers may be required to work mandatory overtime. The
          Company will have the discretion to consider each Officer’s
          extenuating circumstances before requiring any Officer to work
          overtime.
   Cuellar argues that the district court, in considering such evidence, did not
   give weight to “the employee’s opinion about what functions are essential.”
   Because the warden temporarily modified the work schedules of other

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   employees—including for pregnant employees and employees with back and
   knee injuries—Cuellar argues that this renders the 16-hour requirement
   “marginal.” But Cuellar’s assertion alone is not sufficient; otherwise, “every
   failure-to-accommodate claim involving essential functions would go to trial
   because all employees who request their employer exempt an essential
   function think they can work without that essential function.” Credeur, 860
   F.3d at 793 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
   There is no evidence in the record that any other employee received a long-
   term exemption from working 16-hour shifts. There is, however, evidence in
   the record establishing that overtime work was a necessary part of the
   detention officer’s role—namely, that overtime was required to maintain full
   staffing at the facility at all times. If an officer called out, or if several
   detainees were sent to the hospital (requiring two officers to accompany
   them), GEO would need to ensure that other officers could fill in. And while
   GEO often had officers volunteer for such overtime, if there were not enough
   volunteers, other officers would be required to complete that overtime,
   which could require the officer to complete two back-to-back 8-hour shifts.
          Cuellar does not dispute that he was unable to work 16-hour shifts, i.e.,
   he could not perform the essential function without an accommodation. We
   therefore must next determine if Cuellar could perform the essential function
   with a reasonable accommodation. Here, Cuellar’s only requested
   accommodation was to be permanently restricted to 12-hour shifts. “The
   ADA does not require an employer to relieve an employee of any essential
   functions of his or her job, modify those duties, reassign existing employees
   to perform those jobs, or hire new employees to do so.” Burch v. City of
   Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1999). Because one of the essential
   functions of a detention officer was to work up to a 16-hour shift, if Cuellar
   cannot perform that duty, he cannot be reasonably accommodated as a matter
   of law. Id. Cuellar’s argument—that he was not seeking a “permanent”

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   accommodation—does not change that conclusion. Merely because Cuellar
   did not request a “permanent” accommodation does not mean that the
   requested accommodation was not for an indefinite duration. Cuellar’s
   physician noted that Cuellar could not work over 12 hours and that his sleep
   apnea condition—which was the cause for such a conclusion—would be a
   lifelong condition.
                                          B.
            Cuellar next argues that he raised a genuine issue of material fact
   regarding his retaliation claim. An employer violates the Texas Labor Code
   only if it “retaliates against a person who (1) opposes a discriminatory
   practice; (2) makes or files a charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies,
   assists, or participates in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
   hearing.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.055. “To establish a prima facie case of
   retaliation, an employee must show: (1) [he] engaged in an activity protected
   by the TCHRA, (2) [he] experienced a material adverse employment action,
   and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
   action.” Texas Dep’t of Transportation v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 58 (Tex.
   2021). “[T]he conduct relied on by the employee must, at a minimum, alert
   the employer to the employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful
   discrimination is at issue.” Id. at 59. Here, Cuellar fails to show that he put
   GEO on notice of a discrimination allegation. Accordingly, Cuellar has failed
   to allege a prima facie claim for retaliation.
                                          IV.
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
   court.

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