Court Opinion

ID: 9797538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:23:16.700981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:07.345053
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Chief Justice,
with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins, dissenting.
Children's freedoms have long been constrained in ways that would not be permissible for adults. Constraints on children are imposed in order to protect them, and sometimes society as a whole, from the consequences of their immaturity. Thus children may not exercise the fundamental right to vote. They generally may not make con*47tracts or smoke cigarettes or drink alcoholic beverages or consent to sexual intercourse. Without a parent's consent they may not become licensed drivers or get married or obtain general medical or dental treatment. Alaska's parental consent/judicial bypass act is in the tradition of these constraints on children's freedoms. It requires unemanci-pated girls sixteens years of age and younger who want to have an abortion to either obtain the consent of a parent, or the approval of a judge. The act is designed to ensure that each child makes a decision that is best for her. As such it serves a compelling interest. It is essential that abortion decisions made by young girls be well considered and fully informed, for such decisions may have profound and long-lasting consequences. I therefore believe that the act is constitutional and would reverse the decision of the superi- or court without requiring further evidentia-ry proceedings.1
I.
Our parental consent/judicial bypass act is the product of a series of Supreme Court opinions decided after Roe v. Wade.2 A review of these opinions casts light on the reasons for the act, and the interests it is designed to protect.
The starting point is Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth3 Under review in Danforth was a Missouri statute which regulated abortions in a variety of ways. One part of the statute required a woman to certify "that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion" prior to submitting to an abortion. The Danforth majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, held that this aspect of the statute was constitutional despite an argument that it violated Roe v. Wade by imposing an extra layer and burden of regulation on a woman's decision to have an abortion. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Despite the fact that apparently no other Missouri statute, with the exceptions referred to in note 6, supra, requires a patient's prior written consent to a surgical procedure, the imposition by § 8(2) of such a requirement for termination of pregnancy even during the first stage, in our view, is not in itself an unconstitutional requirement. The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent.
We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior written consent for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some types of surgery as, for example, an intra-cardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a specific mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.4!
Another aspect of the Missouri abortion statute under review was that it required that any unmarried girl under the age of eighteen obtain the written consent of a parent to an abortion unless the abortion was necessary to preserve the life of the girl. The Danforth majority held that this provision was unconstitutional.5 But in concluding that there was no state interest sufficiently strong to justify imposing in all cases a parental veto power, the Court also recognized the need for effective consent on the part of the girl.
*48We emphasize that our holding that § 8(4) is invalid does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy. See Bellotti v. Baird, ... The fault with § 8(4) is that it imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the restriction.6
Bellotti v. Baird was decided on the same day as Danforth.7 Bellotti involved an ambiguous Massachusetts statute. The defenders of the statute argued that it
prefers parental consultation and consent, but ... permits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the abortion without parental consultation, and, further, permits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent to obtain an order without parental consultation where there is a showing that the abortion would be in her best interests.8
Such a statute would be fundamentally different from a statute that authorized a parental veto applicable to all minors regardless of their maturity. The challengers to the statute, however, argued that the statute gave parents a veto right9 A unanimous Court held that the lower federal court should have abstained from deciding the case pending a decision by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts as to the meaning of the statute. The Court stated:
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, we today struck down a statute that created a parental veto. At the same time, however, we held that a requirement of written consent on the part of a pregnant adult is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion. In this case, we are concerned with a statute directed toward minors, as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed consent. Without holding that a requirement of a court hearing would not unduly burden the rights of a mature adult, ... we think it clear that in the instant litigation adoption of appellants' interpretation would "at least materially change the nature of the problem" that appellants claim is presented.10
Although Bellotti was a unanimous decision, Danforth was not. Four other justices joined in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion and four dissented in part. Justice Stewart joined in Justice Blackmun's opinion but he wrote a separate concurring opinion which was joined in by Justice Powell. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion further developed the statement in Justice Blackmun's opinion that not all minors regardless of age or maturity could necessarily consent to an abortion. Justice Stewart suggested that a statute which provides for either parental consent or judicial authorization would be constitutional. He wrote:
With respect to the state law's requirement of parental consent, § 8(4), I think it clear that its primary constitutional defi-clency lies in its imposition of an absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. The Court's opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird suggests that a materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for prompt (1) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the minor, or (i) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute condition upon the minor's right but would assure in most instances consultation between the parent and child.1
*49There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place.
1 For some of the considerations that support the State's interest in encouraging parental consent, see the opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Post, at 2856-57. 011
Justice Stevens's partial dissent in Dan-forth contains a useful explanation of the restraints that the state may impose on children and of the importance of parental involvement in abortion decisions. Justice Stevens wrote:
The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protective measures. Because he may not foresee the consequences of his decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons below a certain age may not marry without parental consent. Indeed, such consent is essential even when the young woman is already pregnant. The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on an adult would be constitutionally impermissible. Therefore, the holding in Roe v. Wade that the abortion decision is entitled to constitutional protection merely emphasizes the importance of the decision; it does not lead to the conclusion that the state legislature has no power to enact legislation for the purpose of protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect decision.
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The Court recognizes that the State may insist that the decision not be made without the benefit of medical advice. But since the most significant consequences of the decision are not medical in character, it would seem to me that the State may, with equal legitimacy, insist that the decision be made only after other appropriate counsel has been had as well. Whatever choice a pregnant young woman makes-to marry, to abort, to bear her child out of wedlock-the consequences of her decision may have a profound impact on her entire future life. A legislative determination that such a choice will be made more wisely in most cases if the advice and moral support of a parent play a part in the decisionmaking process is surely not irrational. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that the parental-consent requirement will necessarily involve a parent in the decisional process.
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The State's interest is not dependent on an estimate of the impact the parental-consent requirement may have on the total number of abortions that may take place. I assume that parents will sometimes prevent abortions which might better be performed; other parents may advise abortions that should not be performed. Similarly, even doctors are not omniscient; specialists in performing abortions may incorrectly conclude that the immediate advantages of the procedure outweigh the disadvantages which a parent could evaluate in better perspective. In each individual case factors much more profound than a mere medical judgment may weigh heavily in the scales. The overriding consideration is that the right to make the choice be exercised as wisely as possible.
The Court assumes that parental consent is an appropriate requirement if the minor is not capable of understanding the procedure and of appreciating its consequences and those of available alternatives. This assumption is, of course, correct and consistent with the predicate which under*50lies all state legislation seeking to protect minors from the consequences of decisions they are not yet prepared to make.12
Three years after the decisions in Dan-forth and Bellotti the Bellotti case returned to the Supreme Court.13 The Massachusetts Supreme Court had construed the statute to require parental consent to an abortion, but if both parents refused, a court could authorize an abortion for good cause. A minor seeking an abortion could not seek court authorization without notice of the judicial proceedings to her parents. Further, even if the court found the minor capable of making an informed and reasonable decision the court could refuse to authorize an abortion upon a finding that a parent's or the court's own contrary decision would be preferable.14
The Supreme Court of the United States found this statute to be defective in two respects: (1) it permitted judicial authorization "to be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and fully competent to make this decision independently"; 15 and (2) it "requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interests."16
The lead opinion in the second Belloifi case was authored by Justice Powell, joined by three other justices. The opinion relied on and expanded the parental involvement rationale expressed by Justice Stewart in his Danforth concurrence.17 Justice Powell also described in some detail the elements of a parental consent/judicial bypass statute that would pass constitutional muster:
We therefore conclude that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found impermissible in Danforth.18
Four other justices concurred in the result in Bellotti but took exception to the "advisory opinion" aspects of Justice Powell's opinion.19
Four years after the second Bellotti decision, the Court approved a parental consent/judicial bypass statute in Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft.20 Justice Powell wrote the lead opinion which was joined in by Chief Justice Burger and concurred in as to the result by Justices O'Connor, White and Rehnquist.21 Justice Powell stated based on the second Belloiti opinion:
*51A State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests." 22]
Again in Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Supreme Court approved of a parental consent/judicial bypass statute.23 Currently it appears that all of the members of the United States Supreme Court believe that a judicial authorization procedure that meets the conditions of the second Bellotti case is constitutional. The Court's most recent expression of views on the subject appears in Lambert v. Wicklund.24 There the Court unanimously upheld a Montana act which called for parental notification subject to judicial bypass if, among other things, "the minor is 'sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion.' " 25
IL
Following the criteria established in the second Bellotti case forty-two states have enacted either parental consent or parental notification statutes with provisions for a judicial bypass.26 Alaska's parental consent/judicial bypass system encompassed in AS 18.16.020 and .080 is part of this movement. It applies to unmarried minors sixteen years of age or younger. Such a minor may not obtain an abortion unless one of her parents consents or unless a court authorizes her to consent without the consent of a parent.
All the criteria established by Bellott are satisfied by the Alaska provisions. If the minor satisfies the judge that she is "sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide intelligently whether to have an abortion" the court must issue an order authorizing her to consent to an abortion without a parent's concurrence.27 Even lacking such maturity, the court must authorize the minor to consent on her own where "the consent of the parent[ ]" "is not in [her] best interest." 28 Examples such as physical, sexual, or emotional abuse are given as instances where parental consent is not in the minor's best interest, but these are not the only possible reasons for such a finding. The proceedings are anonymous.29 And they are expedited. The hearing must take place within forty-eight hours of the filing of the petition and the court must make a decision immediately after the hearing.30 If no hearing is held within five days after the petition is filed, a constructive order authorizing the minor to consent to an abortion must issue.31 Moreover, standard forms for the petition *52are available at all court locations, there are no filing fees or court costs, an attorney from the Office of Public Advocacy will be appointed to represent the minor without cost to her, and telephone hearings are available.32
IIL
In my view the act is constitutional. Since this case will be before us again after the evidentiary hearing required by today's opinion, I will only outline here the reasons for this conclusion.
The legislature has set out the purposes of the act as follows:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this Act to further the important and compelling state interests of
(1) protecting minors against their own immaturity;
(2) fostering the family structure and preserving it as a viable social unit;
(3) protecting the rights of parents to rear children who are members of their household; and
(4) protecting the health of minor women.! 33]
In support of the act the legislature made the following findings:
(1) immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences;
(2) the physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and can be lasting particularly when the patient is immature;
(3) the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not necessarily related;
(4) parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's or surgeon's best medical judgment concerning the child;
(5) parents who are aware that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that the daughter receives adequate medical attention after the abortion;
(6) parental consultation is usually desirable and in the best interest of the minor; and
(7) parental involvement legislation enacted in other states has shown to have a significant effect in reducing abortion, birth, and pregnancy rates among minors.! 341
Without minimizing the importance of the other purposes, in my view the purpose of protecting minors against their own immaturity is compelling even when considered alone. Further, the first six legislative findings noted above seem beyond reasonable controversion.35 Justice Blackmun observed in Danforth that it is "imperative" that adult women have full knowledge of the nature and consequences of a decision to have an abortion; this is surely even more true with respect to girls under the age of seventeen.
The state has a strong interest in encouraging that unemancipated minors seek counsel from their parents when deciding whether to have an abortion. Parents are generally better able than others to advise their children on matters involving sensitive personal value judgments. Justice Stevens's partial dissent in Danforth, quoted above at pages 6-8, and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Danforth quoted above on pages 5-6, eloquently and persuasively make the case for this interest. The act is well designed to promote parental consultation. But it does so without going over the line and granting a blanket parental veto power that would conflict with a minor's rights under Roe v. Wade. When a girl believes that she should not consult with her parents, she is free to go before a judge using simplified and expedited procedures and free legal counsel in order to show that she has sufficient maturity to *53make the decision on her own. This alternative also serves the imperative that abortion decisions be made with full knowledge and understanding of their nature and consequences.
The superior court ruled that the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution 36 was violated by the act because minors may consent without parental approval to medical care for "conditions related to pregnancy" but require parental approval-or judicial authorization-for an abortion. I do not agree. In my view a minor who decides to give birth is not similarly situated with one who decides to have an abortion. In the former case the interest in a healthy baby becomes critical and can justify not requiring parental consent for prenatal care. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine that the law would countenance forcing a young woman to have an abortion against her will. But refusing to consent to an abortion for a young woman too immature to make her own decisions is an act of a different kind and character.
IV.
For the reasons outlined above I would reverse the decision of the superior court and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of the state.

. Although I disagree with the result reached by the majority opinion, I join in the opinion insofar as it rejects the state's argument that the constitutional right to privacy has no operative effect unless and until it is implemented by the legislature.

. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 LEd.2d 147 (1973).

. 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 LEd.2d 788 (1976).

. Id. at 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 2831.

. See id. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831.

. Id. at 75, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (citations omitted).

. 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 LEd.2d 844 (1976).

. Id. at 145, 96 S.Ct. 2857.

. See id. at 145-46, 96 S.Ct. 2857.

. Id. at 147, 96 S.Ct. 2857 (citations omitted).

. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 90-91, 96 S.Ct. 2831.

. Id. at 102-104, 96 S.Ct. 2831.

. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979).

. See id. at 630, 99 S.Ct. 3035.

. Id. at 651, 99 S.Ct. 3035.

. Id.

. See id. at 633-41, 99 S.Ct. 3035.

. Id. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (footnotes omitted).

. See id. at 652-53, 99 S.Ct. 3035, Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment. The ninth justice, Justice White, dissented, but in doing so expressed his approval of a blanket parental consent requirement and Massachusetts' parental consent/judicial bypass system. See id. at 656-57, 99 S.Ct. 3035.

. 462 U.S. 476, 493, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 LEd.2d 733 (1983).

. See id. at 477-78, 505-06, 103 S.Ct. 2517.

. Id. at 491-92, 103 S.Ct. 2517 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983)).

. 505 U.S. 833, 899, 112 S.Ct 2791, 120 LEd.2d 674 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter); id. at 970, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas voting to uphold the parental consent/judicial bypass option of the statute in question); id. at 922 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part indicating agreement in principle with a "parental-consent requirement (with the appropriate bypass).").

. 520 U.S. 292, 117 S.Ct. 1169, 137 LEd.2d 464 (1997).

. Id. at 294, 117 S.Ct. 1169 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-42, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 LEd.2d 797 (1979)). There is a dispute on the Court as to whether parental notification must be subject to a judicial bypass in order to be constitutional. But this dispute did not have to be resolved in Lambert nor in the case upon which Lambert principally relied, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 LEd.2d 405 (1990), because the Court found that the bypass provisions satisfied the criteria established in the second Bellotti case. Lambert, 520 U.S. at 295, 117 S.Ct. 1169.

. See Nicole A. Saharsky, Consistency as a Constitutional Value: A Comparative Look at Age in Abortion and Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 85 Minn. L.Rev. 1119, 1170 n. 164 (2001).

. See AS 18.16.030(e).

. See AS 18.16.030(b)(4)(B).

. See AS 18.16.030(k).

. See AS 18.16.030(c); Alaska R. Prob. P. 20(d).

. See Alaska R. Prob. P. 20(f).

. See AS 18.16.030(n); AS 44.21.410(a)(4), as amended by ch. 67 § 38, SLA 2001.

. Ch. 14, § 1(a), SLA 1997.

. Id., § 1(b).

. Again, I do not mean to suggest that the seventh finding concerning the effects of legislation in other states is wrong, only that it is not obviously right.

. See Alaska Const. art. I, § 1.