Court Opinion

ID: 9906666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 21:02:28.462503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:31.174130
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/4/23 Leamy v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. CA 1/1
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 KRIS LEAMY et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                                                        A167275
 v.
 EAST BAY MUNICIPAL UTILITY                                             (Contra Costa County
 DISTRICT,                                                              Super. Ct. No. MSC21-00753)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         In 2011, the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) purchased
property from Kris and Robin Leamy (the Leamys or plaintiffs) for
construction of a water pumping plant. During negotiations in 2009, a
representative of EBMUD told the Leamys the pumping plant would emit no
audible sound. After they sold the property, in 2013 and 2014, the Leamys
participated in public meetings at which EBMUD represented the sound
emitted from the plant with mitigation measures in place would be
approximately equivalent to that of a library. In 2019, however, Kris Leamy
visited a fully constructed plant and was “shocked” at the level of noise she
heard. The Leamys filed a lawsuit alleging several fraud-related and breach
of contract claims, seeking declaratory relief and rescission of the sale
agreement.
      The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of
EBMUD on the grounds that the applicable statutes of limitations barred
plaintiffs’ claims, and their fraud claims failed because EBMUD’s
representations were not statements of past or existing fact on which a fraud
claim could be premised. We will affirm.
           I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Leamys Sell Property to EBMUD
      EBMUD is a public agency that provides water to 1.44 million
customers. In doing so, EBMUD uses many miles of pipeline and 124
pumping plants, which move water from one pressure zone to another.
      In 2006, the EBMUD Board of Directors approved the “ ‘Water
Treatment and Transmission Improvements Program’ ” (WTTIP), a program
to construct and improve water facilities in the greater Lamorinda area,
which includes Lafayette, Orinda, Moraga, and Walnut Creek. As one aspect
of the WTTIP, EBMUD identified the need for a new pumping plant, the
Sunnyside Pumping Plant, to increase pumping capacity, replace aging
infrastructure, and provide water service to customers in the Valley View
Pressure Zone.
      In June 2011, to obtain a site for the Sunnyside Pumping Plant,
EBMUD purchased an undeveloped 0.58-acre portion of the Leamys’ 19-acre
property in Lafayette in lieu of acquiring it through the power of eminent
domain.
B. EBMUD Representations During Negotiations
      During negotiations for the sale of their property, the Leamys contacted
Paul Kenny, an EBMUD real estate representative, to inquire about the
potential noise that the Sunnyside Pumping Plant would produce after it was
constructed and running. Kris Leamy asked Kenny about “potential sound

                                      2
emitted” from the proposed Sunnyside Pumping Plant. Kenny represented to
her “that any sound emission from the pumping station would not be
audible.”
      In January 2009, Robin Leamy e-mailed Kenny to ask if there was a
nearby EBMUD pumping plant he and Kris could visit to determine the noise
level, size, and visual impact of the proposed project. Kenny suggested they
visit the Holly Pumping Plant, noting it was operational so they “should be
able to listen to it,” and that they would be able to determine the noise of the
future Sunnyside Pumping Plant by listening to the Holly Pumping Plant.
      Plaintiffs visited the Holly Pumping Plant on Sunday, February 1. The
next day, Robin sent Kenny an e-mail stating, in relevant part: “I did go by
the Holly Pumping Station this past weekend. Are there certain times those
stations run? I ask because on Super Bowl Sunday (right around 3:00 p.m.), I
couldn’t hear a thing (which is great). I’m just wondering if these things are
going continuously—or they kick in at certain intervals.”
      Kenny forwarded the e-mail to David Rehnstrom, an EBMUD engineer,
asking him if the Holly Pumping Plant ran continuously. Rehnstrom told
Kenny that “on the maximum day demand (summer), the pumps may pump
16 hours and avoid the high energy use of noon to 6:00 pm,” during “lower
demand periods the pumps would operate less,” and that “[e]ither way, the
pumps should not pump 24 hours.”
      Kenny then arranged for an EBMUD engineer to visit the Holly
Pumping Plant with the Leamys to ensure the pumps were running at the
time of their visit. Kenny called Robin to inform him he had arranged for the
Leamys to visit the Holly Pumping Plant while it was running.
      On February 4, 2009, Robin e-mailed Kenny that he would check with
Kris “ ‘on timeframes to head to the Holly Pumping station with you during

                                        3
daylight hours—I’ll be back to you by tomorrow on this.’ ” The Leamys never
followed up with Kenny to arrange a visit to a pumping plant when it was
running. Satisfied with their prior visit, and in reliance on the lack of any
audible noise from the Holly Pumping Plant, the Leamys completed the sale
of their property to EBMUD in 2011.
C. 2013 and 2014 Public Meetings
         In July 2013, EBMUD employees met with the Leamys in the first
“Leamy Realty Group” meeting. At the meeting, Kris commented that she
had been told that there would be “no noise” at the Sunnyside Pumping
Plant. An EBMUD representative responded that was not the case and
EBMUD had “never stated such information.” He indicated, however, that
EBMUD had hired a sound architect to determine how best to mitigate pump
noise.
         EBMUD’s sound architect conducted short-term and long-term ambient
noise surveys on and around the property where the Sunnyside Pumping
Plant would be built. Kris was informed of those surveys, permitted at least
one noise meter to be located on their property, and requested that a
measurement device be placed on EBMUD’s southern property line. She also
requested that sound testing occur after the Labor Day holiday weekend so
that the measurement would be more representative of typical noise in the
area. In an e-mail to Rehnstrom, Kris offered that “should the research find
that there will be discernible noise beyond what EBMUD is willing to pay for
as part of the mitigation process, [she] would like the opportunity to
contribute to the mitigation efforts.”
         Later that fall, EBMUD distributed a document entitled “Sunnyside
Pumping Plant Environmental Noise Assessment and Preliminary Design
Recommendations,” which provided substantial detail about its noise

                                         4
mitigation plans. The report described the sound pressure levels of its
equipment (transformers, pumps, and exhaust fans) as perceived at three feet
away and discussed that the sound level would drop as the distance from the
plant is doubled. The report stated that the operation of its transformer
would result in sound levels of 31 dBA1 at the closest property line, while
levels at more distant property lines would be lower. The report stated that
30 dBA was equivalent to the amount of sound emitted by a library. The
operation of the exhaust fan would result in sound levels of 31 to 32 dBA at
the closest property line. For the pumps, the report found that the “worst
case operational noise level” at the closest property line would be 47 dBA,
which would exceed the City of Lafayette’s noise ordinance. The report
recommended sound mitigation strategies to reduce the noise emissions from
pump operations. With the acoustical treatments recommended, and in the
“worst case” scenario where three pumps were operating, the sound level
would be 35 dBA at the closest property line; with a single pump operating it
would be 31 dBA.
      EBMUD also conducted multiple public meetings, known as “Citizens
Liaison Committee” (CLC) meetings, with the Leamys and other community
members in 2013 and 2014. At the first CLC meeting in December 2013,
EBMUD’s noise architect, Fred Svinth, presented the results of the ambient
noise investigation and elaborated on the investigation conducted at and near
the Sunnyside Pumping Plant location, including on plaintiffs’ property.
Plaintiffs attended that meeting. Svinth told participants that without

      1 “A decibel (dB) is a unit that describes the amplitude of sound and is

expressed on a logarithmic scale. A common metric is the overall A-weighted
sound level measurement (dBA), which measures sound in a fashion similar
to the way a person perceives or hears sound.” (King & Gardiner Farms,
LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 885, fn. 36.)

                                       5
mitigation measures, the noise levels produced by three operating pumps at
the nearest property line could exceed 40 dBA. Svinth indicated with his
recommended “ ‘acoustical louvers in place’ ” and three pumps running, the
noise levels at the near property line would be 35 dBA and 32 dBA at the
façade of the closest neighbor’s house.
      Plaintiffs also attended subsequent CLC meetings in March and June
2014, at which EBMUD discussed the projected noise impacts of the project
and the findings from the December 2013 CLC meeting. Kris considered
“[a]ll examples provided to us and neighbors” by EBMUD to represent
“effectively inaudible sound emission.”
D. Visit to Las Aromas Pumping Plant
      In 2019, plaintiffs’ neighbor, Holly Bender, e-mailed Rehnstrom and
asked him about a pumping plant that would “give me a similar idea of what
our station will sound like.” Rehnstrom recommended visiting the Las
Aromas Pumping Plant, a “newer pumping plant with modern noise control
measures” located in Orinda.
      Bender, Kris, and Rehnstrom visited the Las Aromas Pumping Plant.
Bender was “alarmed at the loud and uncomfortable noise” they all heard.
Kris was “shocked by the level and sound of noise.” In her declaration, Kris
stated that if she and Robin had known there was “even a remote possibility”
that the Sunnyside Pumping Plant would emit the same level of noise, they
never would have sold their land to EBMUD. The parties did not dispute
that the sound emitted by the Las Aromas Pumping Plant visited by Kris in
2019 did not reflect the level of noise that will emanate from the Sunnyside
Pumping Plant.

                                          6
E. Rehnstrom’s Deposition
      At his deposition, Rehnstrom stated that after he visited the Las
Aromas Pumping Plant with Bender and Kris, he found out there was some
faulty noise construction at that plant. He also stated if power were shut off
to the plant, EBMUD would need to bring in a portable generator.
Rehnstrom also testified that until the Sunnyside Pumping Plant is built and
running, there is no way to tell with certainty how loud it will be during
operation. He could not say whether there would be no audible noise at the
Sunnyside Pumping Plant.
F. Summary Judgment Proceedings
      The Leamys filed their complaint in April 2021, and the first amended
complaint, the operative pleading, two months later.
      The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. EBMUD
asserted that all of plaintiffs’ claims must fail because they were barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations and laches, plaintiffs could not establish
the elements of their various causes of action, and EBMUD was immune from
liability on their common law claims. In their opposition to EBMUD’s
motion, plaintiffs argued that EBMUD’s motion must be denied because
(1) EBMUD failed to disclose the Holly Pumping Plant was not operating
when Robin visited in 2009, and (2) EBMUD concealed from plaintiffs that
there was no way to tell with any certainty what level of sound the plant will
emit once built.2
      The trial court granted EBMUD’s motion for summary judgment and
denied plaintiffs’ motion. The court ruled EBMUD had demonstrated all of
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations,

      2 Plaintiffs argued that the “statute of limitations did not start to

accrue until the deposition of Mr. Rehnstrom in this litigation.”

                                        7
because even assuming EBMUD’s statements in 2009 constituted
misrepresentations or material omissions, plaintiffs were on inquiry notice
this was not the case by 2013 and 2014. Further, plaintiffs failed to present
evidence raising a triable issue of fact that EBMUD made any actionable
misrepresentations of past or existing material facts about the pumping plant
that had yet to be built.
      Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.3
                                II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
      On appeal from a summary judgment, we independently review the
record before the trial court to determine whether there is any triable issue of
material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Saelzler v. Advanced Group
400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) When, as in this case, the defendant moves
for summary judgment, the defendant bears the initial burden to show that
the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the claim or that the
defendant has a complete defense to the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subds. (a), (o), (p)(2); Saelzler, at p. 768; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–850.) Once the defendant has met this burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “set forth the specific facts showing that a
triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 849.) Resolution
of the statute of limitations is normally a question of fact, but “where the
uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one

      3 Plaintiffs do not challenge the denial of the new trial motion on

appeal.

                                         8
legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.)
B. Statute of Limitations
      Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in ruling their claims were
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. We disagree.
      In the operative complaint, plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action for
(1) rescission, (2) declaratory relief, (3) cancellation of instrument, (4) breach
of contract, (5) concealment, (6) intentional misrepresentation, (7) negligent
misrepresentation, and (8) fraud. A three-year statute of limitations governs
an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338,
subd. (d).) A four-year statute of limitations generally applies to breach of
contract claims, but where a contractual claim is based on a failure to
disclose material facts, a three-year statute of limitations applies. (See Vera
v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 65–66.) “A claim for declaratory
relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as the legal or equitable
claim on which it is based.” (Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A.
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.)
      “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the
cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ [Citations.] An
important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’
which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or
has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807 (Fox).) As our Supreme Court explained
in Fox, “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or
should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not
encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive
knowledge of an injury if they have ‘ “ ‘information of circumstances to put

                                         9
[them] on inquiry’ ” ’or if they have ‘ “ ‘the opportunity to obtain knowledge
from sources open to [their] investigation.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In other words,
plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming
aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that
would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Id. at pp. 807–808, fn.
omitted.)
      For purposes of summary judgment, we look to the allegations of the
operative complaint to understand the claims at issue. (Jacobs v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 444 (Jacobs)
[“ ‘scope of the issues to be properly addressed in [a] summary judgment
motion’ is generally ‘limited to the claims framed by the pleadings’ ”].) All of
plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same set of allegations that they sold their
land to EBMUD in reliance on Kenny’s representation in 2009 that “sound
emission from the pumping station would not be audible,” and would be
similar to the level of noise emitted by the Holly Pumping Plant, which
unbeknownst to plaintiffs, they visited when it was not operating.
      In support of its motion for summary judgment, EBMUD presented
ample evidence that plaintiffs should have suspected by 2014, at the latest,
that audible noise would be emitted by the Sunnyside Pumping Plant when it
was operating.
      In 2009, Robin visited the Holly Pumping Plant at 3:00 p.m. during the
Super Bowl and heard no noise coming from the plant. He e-mailed Kenny
the next day to ask whether there are certain times the station runs because
he “couldn’t hear a thing.” Kenny did not respond to that e-mail, but called
Robin to tell him he had arranged a visit for the Leamys to the Holly
Pumping Plant when EBMUD “could ensure it was running.” Although
Robin initially told Kenny he would get back to him about times they could

                                       10
visit, he never followed up to arrange a visit. These undisputed facts show
that as early as 2009, Robin questioned whether the Holly Pumping Plant
was operational during his unplanned visit at which he heard “couldn’t hear
a thing.”
      By 2013 and 2014, plaintiffs were on notice that Kenny’s
representation that there would be no audible sound from the Sunnyside
Pumping Plant was not true. At the July 30, 2013 Leamy Realty Group
meeting, Kris commented that she was told there would be “no noise” from
the plant and was told by an EBMUD employee that EBMUD had never
stated such information. EBMUD’s statement directly denying it had made
such a representation put plaintiffs on notice of a factual basis for their
claims. In addition, at that meeting, EBMUD explained that it had hired a
sound architect to conduct studies to determine how best to mitigate pump
noise, again putting plaintiffs on notice that they should investigate how loud
the noise produced by an operational plant would be. Sound was also a topic
at the CLC meetings for the Sunnyside Pumping Plant where the anticipated
sound of the plant was discussed over the course of several meetings. Those
discussions, including the presentation of Fred Svinth’s noise analysis, which
indicated specific decibel levels that could be expected from the equipment at
the plant and efforts EBMUD would make to mitigate excessive noise, put
plaintiffs on notice the Sunnyside Pumping Plant would emit audible noise
once built.
      Finally, plaintiffs’ own correspondence with EBMUD shows they were
on notice the plant would produce audible noise. In August and September
2013, they made multiple requests regarding sound testing, including that
EBMUD wait until after the holiday weekend and place a measurement
device along EBMUD’s southern property line so it would reflect ambient

                                       11
noise closer to plaintiffs’ planned home location. And in September 2013,
Kris wrote to EBMUD and offered to help with noise mitigation costs if they
were beyond what EBMUD was willing to pay. As the trial court observed,
plaintiffs “must have known there would be sound generated by the Plant as
they offered to pay for additional sound mitigation if necessary.” (See Fox,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 [“A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of
action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its
elements.”]; Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 875 [when a
plaintiff becomes “aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent
person suspicious” that a wrong has occurred, the plaintiff has “a duty to
investigate further, and [is] charged with knowledge of matters which would
have been revealed by such an investigation”].)
      Plaintiffs contend the statute of limitations did not begin to run as
early as 2013 or 2014, both because they did not have reason to suspect a
wrongful injury and because a reasonable investigation by them at that time
would not have revealed the factual basis for their cause of action. They
argue the trial court wrongly focused on the difference between the
representation of no audible noise in 2009, and the public conversations in
2013 and 2014, about the levels of noise the plant would produce. Rather,
they assert, the “salient divergences” for purposes of their claims are between
the 2013 promise in Svinth’s noise assessment that the sound would resemble
a library and the much louder sound observed at the Las Aromas Pumping
Plant in 2019, and the 2013 description of 31 dBA and Rehnstrom’s 2022
admission that EBMUD could not really tell how loud the plant would be
until it was up and running.
      As explained above, however, all of plaintiffs’ claims are based on
statements EBMUD made in 2009 that the plant would produce no audible

                                       12
noise, which induced them to sell their property in 2011. By 2013, they were
aware that was not true. “Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations
begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that [their] injury
was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to
[them]. . . . “[T]he limitations period begins once the plaintiff ‘ “ ‘has notice or
information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry . . . .’ ” ’
[Citation.] A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to
establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery.
Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive
to sue, [they] must decide whether to file suit or sit on [their] rights. So long
as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; [they]
cannot wait for the facts to find [them].” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra,
44 Cal.3d at pp. 1110–1111, fn. omitted.) Here, the undisputed facts show
plaintiffs were on notice in 2013 that the alleged representation that the
plant would be inaudible was untrue, both because EBMUD denied that
representation, and because it held extensive discussions with plaintiffs and
other community members about the level of noise that would be generated
by the plant and EBMUD’s planned efforts at mitigation.
      Nor did plaintiffs present any evidence raising a triable issue of fact as
to a later discovery date. Although they argue that they did not discover the
level of noise that might be emitted by the Sunnyside Pumping Plant until
their visit to the Las Aromas Pumping Plant in 2019, they concede that the
sound emitted by the Las Aromas plant does not reflect the level of noise that
will emanate from the Sunnyside Pumping Plant. Nor did plaintiffs present
any evidence to suggest the Sunnyside plant will have faulty noise
construction like the Las Aromas plant did.

                                         13
      We also find unpersuasive plaintiffs’ claim that an investigation in
2013 or 2014 would not have revealed a basis for their claim because
Rehnstrom testified at his deposition in 2022 that there is no way to know for
certain how much sound the Sunnyside Pumping Plant will emit until it is
actually built. First, as EBMUD points out, plaintiffs did not identify
Rehnstrom’s testimony as a basis for delayed discovery in their complaint. In
any event, even if they had, his statements that there is no way to know the
precise level of sound that will be emitted once the plant is built does not
change the fact that plaintiffs were on inquiry notice by 2014 that they
should investigate EBMUD’s representation of no audible noise.4
      Finally, plaintiffs’ reliance on Shaffer v. Debbas (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
33, 38–39, in support of their delayed discovery argument is unpersuasive.
Shaffer concerned equitable estoppel, not delayed discovery. In Shaffer, the
defendants were equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations
defense as to the plaintiffs’ emotional distress claims because their promises
to make necessary repairs induced the plaintiffs not to file their lawsuit. (Id.
at pp. 43–44.) Here, by contrast, the Leamys assert they did not know of, and
could not have discovered, their injury. They did not plead equitable
estoppel, allege facts to support it, or argue that theory in their opposition to
summary judgment below. We will not reverse the judgment on that basis
now. (See Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 444 [scope of issues on
summary judgment are limited to claims framed by the pleadings]; May v.

      4 Similarly, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact because

EBMUD did not disclose in its 2013 noise assessment that a portable
generator may be required if the power to the plant is cut. Plaintiffs’
operative complaint did not include any allegations regarding omissions
related to portable generators, and EBMUD submitted evidence the need for
portable equipment arises during public safety power shut-off events that did
not exist at the time EBMUD purchased plaintiffs’ property.

                                        14
City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1337 [“ ‘ “Estoppel must be
pleaded and proved as an affirmative bar to a defense of statute of
limitations.” ’ ”]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698–700 [forfeiture rule applies to appellate review of
summary judgment].)
C. Actionable Misrepresentation
      The trial court also ruled that EBMUD was entitled to summary
judgment because the representations on which plaintiffs’ claims were based
were nonactionable opinions about a future event.
      “It is hornbook law that an actionable misrepresentation must be made
about past or existing facts; statements regarding future events are merely
deemed opinions.” (San Francisco Design Center Associates v. Portman
Companies (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 29, 43–44; Tarmann v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158 [“ ‘[P]redictions as to future
events . . . are deemed opinions, and not actionable fraud.’ ”)
      Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in concluding their claims were
based on mere expressions of opinion about future events, because EBMUD
had special expertise and its 2013 environmental noise assessment report
offered not just opinions but actionable misrepresentations about noise levels
of the Sunnyside Pumping Plant. Plaintiffs’ claims, however, are not based
on statements made by EBMUD in the 2013 noise assessment report, but
their reliance on EBMUD’s alleged assurances when they sold their land
about a lack of audible noise from the future plant. The representations

                                       15
made in 2013 were made after plaintiffs sold their property in 2011, and
therefore could not have induced them to sell.5
      Moreover, even if plaintiffs had alleged the representations by EBMUD
in 2013 and 2014 were misrepresentations, they did not present any evidence
raising a triable issue of fact that the pumping plant will operate outside
those projected sound levels. Plaintiffs did not dispute that the Las Aromas
Pumping Plant they visited in 2019 had some faulty noise construction and
does not represent the sound level the Sunnyside Pumping Plant will produce
once built. Moreover, EBMUD introduced evidence regarding the building
plans for the Sunnyside Pumping Plant and intended noise mitigation
measures, and plaintiffs did not dispute the plant would be constructed
consistent with those specifications. The assertion by plaintiffs that the
plant, once constructed, will produce sound exceeding the levels described in
the 2013 report is purely speculative.
      Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 892 and Daniels v. Oldenburg (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d
724, 727, is unpersuasive. In Jolley, a bank loan officer assured the plaintiff
homeowner that his loan modification application would “ ‘likely’ ” be
approved, but the bank instead demanded payment in full. (Jolley, at
pp. 881, 893.) In Oldenburg, the defendants leased a motel to the plaintiffs

      5 Plaintiffs argue in their briefs that the trial court improperly relied on

Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469–1471,
because unlike the statements made about uncertain future financial
markets in Cansino, the statements made by EBMUD in its 2013 noise
assessment were based on its experience and expertise on which plaintiffs
had a right to rely. While Cansino might be factually distinguishable, had
plaintiffs raised different claims in this lawsuit, the scope of our review is
limited by plaintiffs’ claims as alleged in the operative pleading. (Jacobs,
supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.)

                                         16
by representing they could keep it rented all the time, but the plaintiffs sued
for rescission when they were unable to rent the rooms. (Oldenburg, at
pp. 725–729.) Here, as the trial court noted, the Leamys’ allegations that the
“ ‘currently planned location of the [Sunnyside Pumping Plant] on the
purchased property, when combined with the very likely audible noise of an
actual operating pumping plant will constitute a nuisance to the Leamy[s’]
remaining property including their own home,’ ” is mere speculation.6
      In sum, we conclude the trial court properly granted EBMUD’s motion
for summary judgment because the record shows there was no triable issue of
material fact regarding any of plaintiffs’ claims and EBMUD was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
                             III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. EBMUD is to recover its costs on appeal.

      6 Nor does Rehnstrom’s statement in his deposition that he cannot say

with certainty exactly what level of sound the plant will emit once built
contradict the sound architect’s projections in 2013 and 2014, a decade before
the plant was constructed, about the anticipated noise levels based on the
surveys he had performed. As the trial court observed, “There is no evidence
that EBMUD made any affirmative statements that it could determine the
precise amount of sound that would definitely be produced by the Plant. It
was clear that all of the discussions were projections and scientific estimates
based on the surveys and related analysis of the environment and plans for
the Plant.”

                                      17
                                          MARGULIES, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A167275
Leamy v. East Bay Municipal Utility District

                                     18