Court Opinion

ID: 9393911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 16:08:27.100889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.134346
License: Public Domain

J-S05006-23

                             2023 PA Super 81

 IN RE: PETITION OF J.G.F.               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: PENNSYLVANIA STATE           :
 POLICE                                  :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :     No. 925 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at
                           No(s): CC-22-00082

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                            FILED: May 11, 2023

      The Pennsylvania State Police (hereinafter “PSP”) appeals from the

orphans’ court’s July 12, 2022 order granting Appellee’s, J.G.F., Petition to

Vacate and Expunge Involuntary Civil Commitment Records and Restoration

of Rights. After careful review, we reverse.

      The PSP summarizes the pertinent facts and procedural history of this

case, as follows:

      On May 3, 2020, J.G.F. was involuntary committed to Western
      Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (hereinafter “WPIC”), pursuant to
      section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7302
      (hereinafter “MHPA”), after an examination by Drs. Paul A.
      Valencia, MD[,] and Xixi Wong, MD[,] at the University of
      Pittsburgh Medical Center (hereinafter “UPMC”) and WPIC,
      respectively, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

      On March 22, 2022, J.G.F., by and through his counsel, filed a
      Petition to Vacate and Expunge Involuntary Civil Commitment and
      Restoration of Rights. In the Petition, J.G.F. generally alleged
      [that] the evidence upon which the commitment occurred was
      insufficient and sought expungement of the records regarding his
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      involuntary commitment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2)
      (hereinafter “section 6111.1(g)(2)”) and section 113 of the MHPA,
      50 P.S. § 7113 (hereafter “section 113 of the MHPA[”]). The final
      paragraph of the Petition requested that the [t]rial [c]ourt
      “[r]estore to petitioner any and all of his civil rights, which may
      have been impaired as a result of the aforementioned involuntary
      commitment.”

      A hearing was held on July 11, 2022. The PSP entered into
      evidence the certified record of the involuntary commitment of
      J.G.F. from May 3, 2020, upon stipulation.

      During the hearing[,] J.G.F. testified as to the facts and
      circumstances surrounding the 302 commitment. No facts or
      testimony [were] produced about J.G.F.’s current mental stability
      or ability to possess a firearm without risk of harm to himself or
      others.

      After the close of testimony[, the] PSP argued [that,] pursuant to
      In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. … 2017)[,] the [t]rial [c]ourt may
      only review what is contained within the certified 302 record[,] as
      section 6111.1(g)(2) reviews pose pure questions of law that
      require no further testimony. [The] PSP further argued that any
      relief as to the restoration of firearms rights pursuant to section
      6105(f) [was] waived because [J.G.F.] failed to cite that authority
      and specifically plead for relief under that authority. Further, [the]
      PSP argued that [J.G.F.] provided “absolutely zero testimony … as
      to why he is no longer a threat of harm to himself or others.”

      Following the hearing, the [trial court] took the matter under
      advisement…. On July 12, 2022, the [t]rial [c]ourt signed an order
      granting expungement of the involuntary commitment and
      restor[ing] … all civil rights that have been impaired[] as a result
      of the involuntary commitment. The [t]rial [c]ourt’s [o]rder was
      docketed July 18, 2022.

      [The] PSP’s [n]otice of [a]ppeal was sent in for filing on August
      11, 2022, and docketed August 17, 2022. … [T]he [t]rial [c]ourt
      entered an [o]pinion dated October 14, 2022, and docketed
      October 17, 2022.

PSP’s Brief at 5-7 (citations to the reproduced record omitted).

      In its brief, the PSP presents three issues for our review:

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        1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse its
        discretion in ordering the expungement of a record of involuntary
        commitment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2)[,] where the
        underlying facts, as recorded in the certified record, were
        sufficient to warrant an involuntary commitment under the
        [MHPA]?

        2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the restoration
        of firearms rights pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f) where [J.G.F.]
        failed to meet his burden in proving [he] was no longer a threat
        of harm to himself or others?

        3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit an error of law in ordering the
        restoration of firearm rights pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)
        where [J.G.F.] waived such a request for relief by failing to
        specifically plead for that relief in his original petition?

Id. at 4.1

        Before addressing the PSP’s issues, we begin by setting forth the legal

framework governing the issues before us in this case. Our Supreme Court

has explained:

        The legislature enacted Pennsylvania’s [MHPA], 50 P.S. §§ 7101–
        7503, to establish procedures “to assure the availability of
        adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill.” 50 P.S. §
        7102. The MHPA’s provisions “shall be interpreted in conformity
        with the principles of due process to make voluntary and
        involuntary treatment available where the need is great and its
        absence could result in serious harm to the mentally ill person or
        to others.” Id. One treatment option the MHPA governs is
        involuntary emergency examination and treatment, commonly
        referred to as a “302 commitment.” See 50 P.S. § 7302. Section
        302 of the MHPA provides that an involuntary emergency
        examination of a person may occur upon a physician’s
        certification. 50 P.S. § 7302(b). If the examining physician
        determines “that the person is severely mentally disabled and in
        need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be begun
        immediately” and may continue for up to 120 hours. 50 P.S. §
        7302(b), (d); see also 50 P.S. § 7301(a) (providing a person who
____________________________________________

1   We note that J.G.F. did not file an appellee’s brief in this case.

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     is “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment” may be
     subject to “involuntary emergency examination and treatment”).

     Section 301 further provides that a person is “severely mentally
     disabled” when mental illness causes the person’s “capacity to
     exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of
     his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs
     is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm
     to others or to himself[.]” 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Section 301(b)(1)
     lists the following criteria for showing a person is a clear and
     present danger of harm to others:

        (b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger.--(1)
        Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by
        establishing that within the past 30 days the person has
        inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on
        another and that there is a reasonable probability that such
        conduct will be repeated. If, however, the person has been
        found incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by
        reason of lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising
        from conduct involving infliction of or attempt to inflict
        substantial bodily harm on another, such 30-day limitation
        shall not apply so long as an application for examination and
        treatment is filed within 30 days after the date of such
        determination or verdict. In such case, a clear and present
        danger to others may be shown by establishing that the
        conduct charged in the criminal proceeding did occur, and
        that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will
        be repeated. For the purpose of this section, a clear and
        present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by
        proof that the person has made threats of harm and has
        committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.

     50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1).1
        1Section 301(b)(2) contains the criteria for determining that
        a person is a danger to himself or herself:

        (2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by
        establishing that within the past 30 days:

            (i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence
            that he would be unable, without care, supervision
            and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his
            need for nourishment, personal or medical care,
            shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there

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          is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily
          injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue
          within 30 days unless adequate treatment were
          afforded under this act; or

          (ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is
          the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate
          treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes
          of this subsection, a clear and present danger may be
          demonstrated by the proof that the person has made
          threats to commit suicide and has committed acts
          which are in furtherance of the threat to commit
          suicide; or

          (iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or
          attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that
          there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless
          adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the
          purposes of this subsection, a clear and present
          danger shall be established by proof that the person
          has made threats to commit mutilation and has
          committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat
          to commit mutilation.

       50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2).

     The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18 Pa.C.S.
     §§ 6101–6128, makes it unlawful for a person who has been
     involuntarily committed under Section 302 to “possess, use,
     control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm or to obtain a
     license to conduct any of those activities.       18 Pa.C.S. §
     6105(a)(1), (c)(4). However, the UFA provides two ways for the
     subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the Section
     6105(a)(1) firearm restrictions. [The first means] is a court-
     ordered expungement of the 302 commitment record under
     Section 6111.1(g)(2), which provides:

       (g) Review by court.—

                                   ***
          (2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant
          to section 302 of the [MHPA] may petition the court
          to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
          the commitment was based. If the court determines
          that the evidence upon which the involuntary
          commitment was based was insufficient, the court

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            shall order that the record of the commitment
            submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be
            expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall
            toll the 60-day period set forth under section
            6105(a)(2).

      18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2).

In re B.W., 250 A.3d 1163, 1165–67 (Pa. 2021) (one footnote omitted).

      In this case, the PSP first argues that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion in finding the evidence insufficient to support J.G.F.’s involuntary

commitment. According to the PSP, the court erroneously conducted a de

novo hearing, and then considered J.G.F.’s testimony at that proceeding in

concluding the evidence was insufficient. The PSP insists that our Supreme

Court in Vencil limited a sufficiency review in an involuntary commitment case

to the certified record and the facts known to the physicians at the time of the

involuntary commitment. Because, here, the court instead considered J.G.F.’s

hearing testimony in reaching its decision to expunge his involuntary

commitment record, the PSP concludes that the “[c]ourt misapplied the law

and committed reversible error.” PSP’s Brief at 9. For the following reasons,

we agree.

      “We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for expunction for an

abuse of its discretion.” A.M.M. v. Pa. State Police, 194 A.3d 1114, 1117

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

      [Our Supreme] Court clarified the appropriate review of a Section
      6111.1(g)(2) petition to expunge a 302 commitment record based
      on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302 commitment
      in … Vencil…:

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        Under section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the sufficiency
        of the evidence to support a 302 commitment presents a
        pure question of law, and the court’s sole concern is
        whether, based on the findings recorded by the physician
        and the information he or she relied upon in arriving at those
        findings, the precise, legislatively-defined prerequisites for
        a 302 commitment have been satisfied and are supported
        by a preponderance of the evidence. We emphasize that
        the trial court’s review is limited to the findings
        recorded by the physician and the information he or
        she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and
        requires deference to the physician, as the original
        factfinder, as the physician examined and evaluated the
        individual in the first instance, was able to observe his or
        her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge
        and experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is
        medically necessary.

     Vencil, 152 A.3d at 246 (rejecting de novo review subject to clear
     and convincing burden of proof for [s]ection 6111.1(g)(2)
     petitions).

Genits v. Commonwealth, No. 191 EDA 2021, unpublished memorandum

at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 8, 2021) (quoting B.W., 250 A.3d at 1167)

(emphasis added).

     Thus, it is clear that,
     [s]ection 6111.1(g)(2) requires judicial review of “the sufficiency
     of the evidence upon which the commitment was based.” 18
     Pa.C.S.[] § 6111.1(g)(2) (emphasis added). “[T]he evidence
     upon which the commitment was based” is the information
     contained in the physician’s record of the examination of the
     individual and the resultant findings. See 50 P.S. § 7302(b)
     (requiring the physician to make a record of the examination and
     his or her findings). Therefore, the plain language of section
     6111.1(g)(2) directs a trial court to review the physician’s
     findings, made at the time of the commitment, to determine
     whether the evidence known by the physician at the time, as
     contained in the contemporaneously-created record, supports the
     conclusion that the individual required commitment under one (or
     more) of the specific, statutorily-defined circumstances. See 50
     P.S. § 7301.

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Vencil, 152 A.3d at 242. “[T]he appropriate standard of proof applicable to

the physician’s record findings is a preponderance of the evidence standard,

which is generally applicable to civil matters and has been classified as ‘a more

likely than not inquiry,’ supported by the greater weight of the evidence;

something a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a

decision.” Id. at 246 (citations omitted).

      In the instant case, the orphans’ court summarized the evidence

presented at the hearing on J.G.F.’s petition to expunge, as follows:

      [J.G.F.] testified that, on May 3, 2020, he had stopped at a
      convenience store in Monroeville and, while there, purchased and
      drank [a] blended drink of ice tea and beer. According to [J.G.F.],
      he became lightheaded from the drink, and, suspecting that the
      drink may have been tainted, he requested and received a ride
      from Monroeville Police to UPMC East Hospital for drug testing. At
      some point after arriving at the hospital emergency room, [J.G.F.]
      made a request to use a restroom. That request was answered
      by a directive from two UPMC police officers that [J.G.F.] remain
      in the emergency room and use a urinal bottle. [J.G.F.] complied,
      but asserts that, as he did so, the officers “started laughing at me
      really hard.” [J.G.F.] reacted by throwing the container at one of
      the police officers and, as the second officer approached, striking
      that officer. [J.G.F.] avers, however, that the contact with the
      second officer was accidental. Following the outburst, [J.G.F.] was
      sedated, placed in restraints, and transported to UPMC Western
      Psychiatric Hospital (“WPIC”), where he remained for three days.
      The report entered by the referring physician at UPMC East
      Hospital described [J.G.F.] as “delusional, possibly paranoid,
      believing someone is poisoning his beer, that someone killed his
      dog and raped his girlfriend[.”] The report stated that [J.G.F.]
      “threw urine at staff and [was] physically and verbally abusive[,”]
      and that [J.G.F.] “likely will require inpatient treatment, including
      medication and therapy.”

      At WPIC, [J.G.F.] was examined by Dr. Xixi Wong. Dr. Wong
      found [J.G.F.] to be “calm and cooperative” and stated that
      [J.G.F.] understood the patients’ rights which were recited to him.

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      The justification entered for involuntary treatment was “an acute
      medical crisis in the emergency room.” The proposed course of
      treatment was “further evaluation, treatment and stabilization.”
      [J.G.F.] has testified, that, apart from an initial injection of Haldol
      administered at UPMC East Hospital, he received no treatment at
      either facility: “No medication. No nothing. I was released after
      72 hours.” [J.G.F.] testified that he met with a doctor at WPIC
      only twice, upon admission and at discharge.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/17/22, at 3-4 (citations to the record omitted).

      Ultimately, the court determined that J.G.F.’s “own testimony set forth

a credible account of events which asserted that his outburst at the UPMC East

facility had resulted from the humiliation of being observed and laughed at as

he was compelled to urinate publicly into [a] container.” Id. at 4. In rejecting

the PSP’s allegation that the evidence was sufficient to support J.G.F.’s

involuntary commitment, the court explained:

      A difficulty with the [PSP’s] contention that the certified record
      provides sufficient evidence to have warranted an involuntary
      commitment pursuant to [s]ection 302 of the [MHPA] is that
      [J.G.F.] has testified that, although he was referred to
      WPIC, little was provided at that facility by way of
      examination or treatment: “they took me at 6:30 in the
      morning to [WPIC] and I was there for three days. No
      medication. No nothing. I was released after 72 hours[.”]
      Consistent with [J.G.F.’s] assertion, an examination of the WPIC
      record discloses that [J.G.F.] understood the rights explained to
      him, and indicates no course of further treatment.

      Contrary to the contention made by the [PSP] during cross-
      examination that [J.G.F.] had asserted that “everything in the 302
      is just incorrect[,” J.G.F.] acknowledged that he had responded in
      an aggressive manner toward the UPMC police, throwing the
      container of urine toward them. [J.G.F.] acknowledged the
      conduct that had precipitated the 302 referral and the account
      of events as described by [J.G.F.] were found to be
      credible. Given that account of events, and the sparse WPIC
      record, it was determined that the evidence upon which the
      involuntary commitment was based was insufficient.

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Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

      It is obvious from the emphasized language of the court that, in

assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support J.G.F.’s involuntary

commitment, it considered his testimony at the hearing on his petition to

expunge. From that testimony, which the court found credible, it concluded

that his involuntary commitment was unnecessary based, at least in part, on

his statements that he was not thoroughly examined or provided any

treatment during his 72-hour commitment. Because the orphans’ court clearly

did not limit its review to the facts known to the physicians at the time they

ordered J.G.F.’s involuntary commitment, the court abused its discretion in

finding the evidence insufficient to support his involuntary commitment.

      Instead, we agree with the PSP that the information contained in the

physicians’ records of their examinations of J.G.F. and their resultant findings

were sufficient to support his involuntary commitment by a preponderance of

the evidence. As the PSP summarizes:

      In looking at the certified record, PSP Exhibit A ([reproduced
      record] 35-55), as required under Vencil, it is clear that sufficient
      evidence existed for an involuntary commitment. The first section
      302 application at UPMC was made because [J.G.F.] was unable
      to care for himself unless adequate treatment was afforded to
      him. The application states that [J.G.F.] was brought to UPMC
      East by EMS because of his belief that someone had poisoned his
      water and his demand to speak to police. It further states [J.G.F.]
      stated someone had killed his dog and raped his girlfriend. It also
      states that he threw urine and became physically combative with
      staff requiring restraints. Dr. Paul A. Valencia found [J.G.F.] to be
      “delusional,” “paranoid,” and a “potential harm to others as he
      threw urine at staff and [was] physically and verbally abusive.”
      Dr. Valencia ultimately found [J.G.F.] severely mentally disabled

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      and in need of treatment by checking box A on Part VI Physician’s
      Examination of the certified record.

      Once transferred to WPIC, [J.G.F.] was re-evaluated by Dr. Xixi
      Wong. Dr. Wong checked a box indicating that [J.G.F.] was in an
      acute medical crisis in the emergency room justifying the need for
      involuntary treatment. Dr. Wong further noted that [J.G.F.] was
      “calm, cooperative, states that he is on 302 [because] he wanted
      covid testing” and needed “acute inpatient psych admission for
      further evaluation, treatment and stabilization.”       Dr. Wong
      ultimately also found the [J.G.F.] to be severely mentally disabled
      and in need of treatment by checking box A on Part VI Physician’s
      Examination of the certified record.

      Two separate physicians at two separate facilities examined the
      [J.G.F.] and found him to be in need of involuntary treatment.
      Each physician’s decision must be afforded great deference due to
      their experience and training.         It is clear through their
      observations that [J.G.F.] was in the midst of a mental health
      crisis evidenced by his delusional and paranoid thoughts
      concerning someone poisoning his water, killing his dog, and
      raping his girlfriend. Further, he did not understand why he was
      being 302’d at UPMC, evidenced by him telling the doctor at WPIC
      [that] the 302 was based on [J.G.F.’s] desire to have covid testing.
      Additionally, [J.G.F.] also became physically combative and
      verbally abusive to the officers and security at UPMC and even
      threw urine on them. [J.G.F.’s] actions meet the definition of
      being severely mentally disabled because his actions and thoughts
      show his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion
      in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his
      own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and
      present danger of harm to others or himself.

PSP’s Brief at 14-16.

      According the appropriate deference to the two physicians who

examined J.G.F., we conclude that the preponderance of the evidence

supports their decisions that he was having a mental health crisis that

impaired his “capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the

conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal

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needs[,]” such that he posed “a clear and present danger of harm to others

or to himself[.]” 50 P.S. § 7301(a). Thus, we reverse the orphans’ court’s

order granting J.G.F.’s petition to expunge the record of his involuntary

commitment and reinstating his civil rights that were impaired by that

commitment.2

        Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2023

____________________________________________

2   Based on our disposition, we need not address PSP’s remaining two issues.

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