Court Opinion

ID: 9476214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:50:19.220553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:11.396982
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that under subsection (b)(2), the administrative law judge must consider not only evidence of the claimant’s respiratory or pulmonary impairment, but also other evidence, if any, that is relevant to determining whether the claimant “is able to do his usual coal mine work.” 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(2) (1986).1 In my view, however, our disposition of this case is warranted only on the assumption that after a claimant successfully invokes the interim presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under § 727.-203(a), both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion shift to the director or employer to rebut the presumption under one of the provisions contained in § 727.203(b).2 I write separately, therefore, to clear up the confusion that I believe exists in decisions of this court concerning the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the issue of rebuttal under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b).
In Bizzarri v. Consolidation Coal Co., 775 F.2d 751 (6th Cir.1985), a panel of this court suggested in dictum that the Sixth Circuit had not yet authoritatively decided whether the rebuttal provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act operate to shift the burden of persuasion to the director or employer, or merely to shift the burden of production. Id. at 753-54. The Bizzarri court cited dictum in Prokes v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir.1977), which considered provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 and related Social Security Administration regulations, as support for its proposition that only the burden of production might shift. Bizzar-ri, 775 F.2d at 753. Unfortunately, Bizzar-ri did not discuss our more recent case of Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985), in which this court interpreted the rebuttal provision of 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3). The Gibas court expressly stated that proof of *139the rebuttal of an interim presumption rests with the director or employer. Id. at 1120 (“Saginaw had the burden of proving that Gibas was not totally disabled.”). Although the employer had produced some rebuttal evidence, the Gibas court reinstated an AU’s decision awarding benefits because the employer did not satisfy its burden of persuasion. Id. at 1120-21.
In the face of this holding in Gibas, the Bizzarri court was incorrect in opining that this circuit had not decided the question of the allocation of proof under section 727.203(b); the director or employer bears the burden of persuasion.3 This allocation of the burden is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority emanating from the other federal courts of appeals. See e.g., Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424, 435, 441 (4th Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 871-72, 93 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 757 F.2d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir.1985); Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir.1984); but see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 27, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2898, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976) (dictum discussing Black Lung Benefits Act before 1977 Amendments); Underhill v. Peabody Coal Co., 687 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir.1982) (dictum). More importantly, shifting the burden of persuasion is also consistent with the 1977 Amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act, under which 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) was promulgated. Those amendments were intended “to benefit more miners by expanding coverage and liberalizing eligibility restrictions.” Ramey v. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp., 755 F.2d 485, 493 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting); see also 43 Fed.Reg. 36, 819 (1978) (final rules promulgated August 18, 1978) (“It is expected that the application of these new standards will allow a greater number of victims of black lung disease to obtain benefits under the law.”). A contrary conclusion — that only the burden of production shifts — would inevitably result in more frequent denials of benefits, in contravention of the purpose of the 1977 amendments.
I conclude, therefore, that notwithstanding statements to the contrary in Bizzarri, this court has authoritatively held, and properly so, that the burden of persuasion shifts to the director or employer under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b). See Gibas, 748 F.2d at 1120. Because the director has failed to satisfy his burden of persuasion under subsection (b)(2), I concur.

. I also concur in Part I of the majority opinion.

. Only if York’s medical evidence established that he was totally disabled would the allocation of the burden of persuasion be rendered irrelevant to this case. The majority opinion implies that the medical evidence presented by York did show that he was unable to perform his coal mine work: "Dr. Cravens, Dr. Waterman, and Dr. Schmidt considered all of York’s disabilities in finding him totally disabled." In my view, however, the record does not support the conclusion that York’s evidence demonstrated, as a matter of law, that he was unable to do his coal mine work. First, both the ALJ and the Board noted that Dr. Schmidt made no assessment concerning the extent of York’s disability. In addition, although Dr. Cravens found York totally disabled and Dr. Waterman found York at least 37 percent disabled, both of these opinions were discounted by the ALJ and the Board as undocumented. Therefore, if the burden of persuasion were to remain at all times with the black lung claimant, I believe a remand would be necessary so that the ALJ could determine whether this inconclusive medical evidence, in conjunction with York’s and his wife’s testimony, satisfied the burden of persuasion. Only because the burden of persuasion shifts to the director is this disposition unnecessary; reversal without remand is appropriate in the instant case because the director's evidence is legally insufficient to carry his burden of persuasion under subsection (b)(2).

. In fact, three subsequent unpublished opinions have disregarded Bizzarri and cited Gibas for the proposition that, under 20 C.F.R. § 727.-203(b), the burden of production and the burden of persuasion shift to the director or employer. See Walker v. Consolidation Coal Co., 802 F.2d 460 (6th Cir.1986); Day v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 798 F.2d 469 (6th Cir.1986); Devine v. Pittsburg and Midway Coal Mining Co., 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.1985).