Court Opinion

ID: 9462315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:37:55.540245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:32.143773
License: Public Domain

ENGEL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The trial judge made the following findings of fact:
The plaintiff has advanced several possible work schedules that would accommodate him in his religious convictions, including third shift work upon Saturday night, Sunday work, or split shift or double' shift work during the week with a swapout upon the Saturday shifts. The evidence appears to preponderate against the feasibility of each of these suggested accommodations. Any doubling up on shifts or splitting shifts to accommodate the plaintiff would have imposed not only a variable individual scheduling problem for the defendant, but would also have involved a violation of seniority practices and an unequal assignment of overtime, matters contrary to company policies and objectionable to the plant union. With regard to a third shift assignment upon Saturday night or a Sunday assignment, not only does Sunday work require double time premium pay, but also the evidence reflects that satisfactory performance of electrical maintenance work requires that a crew of at least two, and preferably more, electricians be scheduled for any one shift. The work cannot be satisfactorily performed by the scheduling of a single electrician upon a shift. Likewise, the effective use of a maintenance crew requires the presence of other supporting personnel, including supply clerks, safety and first aid personnel. Accordingly, in the absence of scheduling a full crew upon a Saturday night or Sunday, a practice not customarily followed by the defendant and one that would require the defendant to pay double time on Sunday, the scheduling of an individual electrician to work during that period would be both inefficient and impractical for the defendant in terms of laying out the work and in terms of the work that could be performed by a one man crew. Moreover, this arrangement could involve excusing the plaintiff from a second or third shift assignment upon Friday, a matter that would in effect accord the plaintiff super seniority rights, a matter objectionable to the union.
My own review convinces me that the foregoing findings are amply supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
In Cummins v. Parker Seal Company, 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), the majority observed:
The District Court found that Appellee “made a reasonable accommodation to [Appellant’s] religious needs and that no further accommodation could be made at the time of [Appellant’s] dismissal from employment without creating an undue hardship on the employer’s business.” The court did not specify what “undue hardship” would have resulted and did not explain why an accommodation that was reasonable for over a year (from July 1970, when Appellant joined the World Wide Church of God, until his discharge) suddenly became unreasonable in September 1971. 516 F.2d at 547.
Here it would appear to me that the trial judge carefully avoided the error complained of in Cummins for he was most specific in setting forth what “un*524due hardship” would have resulted. Beyond that he did in fact explain why the accommodation which was made originally became unreasonable later when the company went on a five-day production schedule. It therefore comes as a surprise to me to learn that the findings here are likewise to be deemed clearly erroneous, and I find myself complaining much as did Judge Edwards in his dissent in Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), decided August 20, 1975, that
“As I view the matter, the majority opinion retries this case on the written record, giving no weight to the great advantage the trial judge has in seeing, hearing and judging the credibility of the witnesses.” Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., supra, at p. 528.
No error of law by the trial judge is pointed out by the majority opinion. While it is true that he did not have the benefit of Cummins and Reid, there is no suggestion that he was led into error for the want of such guidance. The absence of legal error is at least of some weight in judging the fairness with which the trial judge approached the facts before him. There are other equally persuasive indications that his decision was correct.
As I understand the principal thrust of the majority’s opinion, it is that although the company reasonably tried to accommodate to Draper’s religious views while it was on a four-day production schedule, it did nothing further when the increased demands for products required a five-day production work week. As I read the proofs, it is clear that the problem which would develop with a five-day production schedule was anticipated well in advance of the event by the management, and that it had already thought long and hard about possible means of accommodating Mr. Draper’s religious needs as a valued employee. The district court’s findings of fact address themselves specifically to the problems generated by the five-day production schedule and the consequent need for electrical maintenance work on Saturday. There is no gap either in logic or in proof.
What makes the district court’s findings here so especially entitled to credit is the fact that there is absolutely no suggestion of religious bias or prejudice in the record. Draper* was a valued and greatly needed employee who enjoyed a close friendship with the man who finally discharged him. These additional circumstances strongly support a finding that the company was willing to and did undergo considerable hardship in order to retain him. This is not a case where Draper’s discharge was pretextual, masking a latent bias against his faith or against him for adhering to it.
Finally, I am unable to veil a growing concern on my part that those who read our majority decision here and in Reid and Cummins may conclude that in this area of law our circuit in effect has instituted a practice of de novo review at the appellate level.
The area of accommodation to religious beliefs is a new and sensitive one. Nevertheless, I hope that we can ultimately approach it in a way which is more consistent with the essentially different roles of the trial and appellate courts.