Court Opinion

ID: 9948575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:03:38.823783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:40.916406
License: Public Domain

IN THE

    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
                                 IN RE:
                        ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS,
                                Debtor.

                          No. CV-23-0123-CQ
                          Filed March 7, 2024

       Certified Question from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                     The Honorable Paul Sala, Judge
                          No. 2:22-bk-08511-PS
                        QUESTION ANSWERED

COUNSEL:

Kenneth L. Neely, Nicholas T. Van Vleet, Geoffrey M. Khotim, Neeley Law
Firm, PLC, Chandler, Attorneys for Erica Krystal Riggins

Theodore P. Witthoft, Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, P.L.L.C., Scottsdale,
Attorneys for David A. Birdsell

James E. Barton, II, Jacqueline Mendez Soto, Daniella Fernandez Lertzman,
Barton Mendez Soto PLLC, Tempe, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizonans
Fed Up With Failing Healthcare

Pamela Bridge, Community Legal Services, Phoenix; J. Leslie McLean,
DNA People’s Legal Services, Flagstaff; Anthony L. Young, Alan R. Solot,
Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Tucson; and Andrew P. Schaffer, Brenda
Munoz Furnish, Michelle Johnson Simpson, William E. Morris Institute for
Justice, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Community Legal Services,
DNA People's Legal Services, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, and William E.
Morris Institute for Justice

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Hayleigh S. Crawford, Deputy
Solicitor General, Luci D. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General’s Office

April Maxwell, Maxwell Law Group, Mesa, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
                    IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                           Opinion of the Court

Arizona Consumer Bankruptcy Counsel, LLC

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICES MONTGOMERY and KING joined. JUSTICE
BOLICK, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL and JUSTICE BEENE,
dissented.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1            The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Arizona certified the following question for our review: “Whether the
passage of Proposition 209 [(“Prop. 209”)] repealed or affected the validity
of A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) [(“subsection (A)(11)”)].”

¶2             We hold that the voters did not expressly repeal subsection
(A)(11) by passing Prop. 209. Subsection (A)(11) did not exist when Prop.
209 was drafted and circulated; thus, subsection (A)(11) was not presented
to the voters for consideration. We further hold that because Prop. 209 does
not conflict with subsection (A)(11), it did not implicitly repeal the
subsection and we give effect to both legislative enactments. Thus,
subsection (A)(11) remains operable.

                             BACKGROUND

¶3            On July 6, 2022, Governor Ducey signed Senate Bill 1222 (“S.B.
1222”). See 2022 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 346, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.). This bill
amended A.R.S. § 33-1126, which governs the exemptions a debtor may
claim over certain types of money assets. In addition to making minor
stylistic changes throughout the statute, S.B. 1222 created a new
exemption—subsection (A)(11)—for certain kinds of federal and state tax
credits.

¶4            On the same day the Governor signed S.B. 1222 into law,
Prop. 209’s proponents filed the initiative petition with the Arizona
Secretary of State (the “Secretary”) for inclusion on the November ballot.
Prop. 209 was a comprehensive initiative measure that purported to
constrain “predatory debt collection” by amending several existing Arizona

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

statutes, including § 33-1126. In § 33-1126(A)(9), Prop. 209 added an
inflation index to the bank-account exemption and increased its value from
$300 to $5,000. Prop. 209 did not otherwise amend § 33-1126. Voters
approved Prop. 209 on November 8, 2022.

¶5             The version of § 33-1126 that Prop. 209 amended, however,
did not include S.B. 1222’s legislative amendments, namely the addition of
subsection (A)(11). Arizona law provides that the text of proposed
initiatives “shall indicate material deleted, if any, by printing such material
with a line drawn through the center of the letters of such material and shall
indicate material added or new material by printing the letters of such
material in capital letters.” A.R.S. § 19-123(A)(1); accord A.R.S. § 19-112(B).
Prop. 209 completely omitted subsection (A)(11) from its text; it was not
included as stricken, capitalized, or ordinary typeface text. See Ariz. Sec’y
of      State,      2022      Publicity     Pamphlet         104–05     (2022),
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/BallotMeasures/2022/azsos_2022_publi
city_pamphlet_standard_english_web_version.pdf.

¶6             The reason for Prop. 209’s omission of subsection (A)(11) is
manifest—Prop. 209 was drafted and circulated for signatures well before
the legislature passed S.B. 1222 and transmitted it to the Governor. The
process of qualifying an initiative for the ballot is protracted and may take
months or even years to complete. Initiative proponents must first apply
for a serial number with the Secretary, and this application must include
the “text of the proposed law.” A.R.S. § 19-111(A). Next, the proponents
must circulate their petition for signatures, and the signature sheets “shall
be attached to a full and correct copy of the title and text of the measure.”
Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9); accord A.R.S. §§ 19-112(B)–(C), -121(A)(3).
“The text shall indicate material deleted, if any, by printing the material
with a line drawn through the center of the letters of the material and shall
indicate material added or new material by printing the letters of the
material in capital letters.” A.R.S. § 19-112(B) (addressing requirements for
signature sheets).

¶7             Initiative petitions must then be “filed with the secretary of
state not less than four months preceding the date of the election.” Ariz.
Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(4). Upon a successful filing, the Secretary

       shall cause to be printed . . . a publicity pamphlet that
       contains . . . [a] true copy of the title and text of the measure

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

       or proposed amendment. Such text shall indicate material
       deleted, if any, by printing such material with a line drawn
       through the center of the letters of such material and shall
       indicate material added or new material by printing the
       letters of such material in capital letters.

A.R.S. § 19-123(A)(1). Here, because the 2022 election was scheduled on
November 8, the filing deadline for Prop. 209 occurred in early July.

¶8            Although the Governor signed S.B. 1222 into law on July 6, it
did not take effect until September 24 because the Arizona Constitution
delays the effective date of non-emergency legislation to allow challenges
via referendum. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). Thus, subsection (A)(11)
did not legally exist at any point during Prop. 209’s qualification process,
and it did not become operative until well after Prop. 209’s filing deadline.

¶9             On December 27, 2022, Erica Riggins (“Debtor”) filed the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition giving rise to this certified question. In her
petition, Debtor claimed an exemption under subsection (A)(11). The
Chapter 7 Trustee (“Trustee”) objected to Debtor’s claimed exemption,
arguing that Prop. 209 repealed the subsection (A)(11) exemption.
Observing that “hundreds of bankruptcy cases with the same issue are
currently pending in the Arizona Bankruptcy Court,” and noting the
absence of Arizona authority “addressing whether a voter initiative can
repeal or affect a statutory provision that became effective after the
submission of the initiative to the Arizona Secretary of State,” the
bankruptcy court certified this question to us. We accepted review to
resolve this issue pursuant to our jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(6) of
the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-1861.

                               DISCUSSION

¶10          We review a question of statutory construction de novo. BSI
Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018).

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

                                      I.

                                      A.

¶11           Trustee argues that Prop. 209 expressly and implicitly
repealed subsection (A)(11). We first consider whether Prop. 209 expressly
repealed the subsection.

¶12            “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the text.” Franklin
v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., 255 Ariz. 409, 411 ¶ 8 (2023). “We interpret statutory
language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related
statutes on the same subject.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11
(2019). If a statute’s text is plain and unambiguous, it controls unless it
results in an absurdity or a constitutional violation. 4QTKIDZ, LLC v. HNT
Holdings, LLC, 253 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 5 (2022). However, “if the statute is
ambiguous, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation,
such as the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its
historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and
purpose.” Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Brain, 234 Ariz. 322,
325 ¶ 11 (2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible,
to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered
superfluous.” Nicaise, 245 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 11.

¶13           There is no dispute that an initiative that proposes statutory
amendments by deleting text shall “indicate material deleted, if any, by
printing such material with a line drawn through the center of the letters of
such material.” A.R.S. § 19-112(B); accord A.R.S. § 19-123(A)(1). The
purpose of this requirement is “to call attention to” the amended language.
Wilhelm v. Brewer, 219 Ariz. 45, 49 ¶ 18 (2008).

¶14           Here, Prop. 209 failed to notify voters that it would repeal or
otherwise affect subsection (A)(11) because the subsection was omitted
from (1) the application for serial number filed with the Secretary (A.R.S.
§ 19-111(A)); (2) the petition sheets that voters signed (A.R.S.
§ 19-112(B)–(C)); and (3) the publicity pamphlet (A.R.S. § 19-123(A)(1)).
Consequently, voters were not apprised of subsection (A)(11)’s existence,
much less Prop. 209’s purported design to excise it, when voting on Prop.
209. Therefore, the Prop. 209 text that voters approved is the statutory text
contained in the publicity pamphlet that omits subsection (A)(11).

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

¶15            Where Arizona statutes require ballot materials to
affirmatively notify voters of a proposed express repeal by strikethrough
text, we are reticent to conclude that an express repeal can be accomplished
in any other manner. A contrary conclusion would contravene the purpose
of the strikethrough requirement to notify voters of the proposed statutory
amendment, see Wilhelm, 219 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 18, and render the statutory
strikethrough requirement mere surplusage, see Nicaise, 245 Ariz.
at 568 ¶ 11.

¶16          Trustee acknowledges that Prop. 209 fails to eliminate
subsection (A)(11) by strikethrough text because it omits any reference to
the subsection. Nonetheless, Trustee argues that Prop. 209’s prefatory
language that § 33-1126 “is amended to read” achieves the same result
because it supplants the entirety of the existing statute, including
subsection (A)(11), with the ensuing text.

¶17           Trustee is correct that Prop. 209 informed voters through a
prefatory clause that “[s]ection 33-1126, Arizona Revised Statutes, is
amended to read.” See 2022 Publicity Pamphlet at 104. Prop. 209’s
proposed amendments to the statute following the prefatory statement
contained strikethrough text indicating that subsection (A)(9)’s “three
hundred dollars” was to be repealed and replaced by “$5,000,” as well as a
lengthy provision written entirely in capital letters adopting a new inflation
index. As discussed, Prop. 209 did not include any reference to subsection
(A)(11), nor could it.

¶18            Trustee’s position that a prefatory clause similar to Prop. 209’s
repeals any other statutory provision absent from the initiative’s text is
enticing in its simplicity, but it is inconsistent with our jurisprudence. In
Territory v. Ruval, 9 Ariz. 415 (1906), we held that:

       [W]here an amendment is made by declaring that the original
       statute ‘shall be amended so as to read as follows,’ retaining
       part of the original statute and incorporating therein new
       provisions, the effect is not to repeal, and then re-enact, the

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

       part retained, but such part remains in force as from the time
       of the original enactment.

Id. at 417 (quoting Black on Interpretation of Laws, § 133).

¶19           We later held in Arizona Downs v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 73
(1981), that:

       The challenged provision under which petitioner claims a
       preference for racing dates was left untouched by the
       amended provision. The result of such an amendment to [a
       statute] is not a repeal and re-enactment. The unamended
       portion of the original statute remains in force from the time
       of the original enactment.

Id. at 75 (citing Ruval, 9 Ariz. at 415). We extract from Ruval and Arizona
Downs the principle that a prefatory clause similar to Prop. 209’s, followed
by proposed statutory amendments, leaves “untouched” existing statutory
provisions that, as here, do not contain strikethrough text and are not
subject to the proposed amendments. Thus, a provision “left untouched”
by a subsequent amendment is not repealed.

¶20            Here, where our statutes require strikethrough text as an
initiative’s exclusive method to amend a statute by deletion and Prop. 209
employed this method to amend § 33-1126, the wholesale omission of
subsection (A)(11) is tantamount to being “left untouched.” Prop. 209
merely reflected what language it sought to delete and add; it was not an
entire repeal and reenactment of the statute. See Ariz. Downs, 128 Ariz. at 75.
Thus, Prop. 209 did not expressly repeal subsection (A)(11).

                                      B.

¶21          Although we conclude that Prop. 209 did not expressly repeal
subsection (A)(11), we address whether the proposition’s effect on
subsection (A)(11) is ambiguous. Even if we were to conclude that such
ambiguity exists, it would not alter our conclusion.

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

¶22         Statutory ambiguity may arise for various reasons, and we
have previously catalogued its myriad sources:

       An ambiguity in a statute is “not simply that arising from the
       meaning of particular words, but includes such as may arise
       in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when
       all its provisions are examined.” 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 195.
       An ambiguity may also be found to exist where there is
       uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms of a statute. The
       problem in interpreting the statute at issue is not that certain
       words or groups of words have more than one meaning, but
       it is the failure to include necessary words which causes
       confusion as to the scope of the statute. Due to the omission
       the statute can reasonably be construed in more than one way.

State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 269–70 (1985) (internal citation omitted).

¶23          Here, if an ambiguity exists, it is similar to the one in
Sweet—omission of “necessary words.” See id. Prop. 209 is silent on its
effect on subsection (A)(11). One reasonable interpretation is that Prop.
209’s opening sentence amending § 33-1126 renders the ensuing text the
exclusive object of the voters’ approval, irrespective of its silence on
subsection (A)(11). Another equally reasonable reading of Prop. 209,
however, is that voters did not intend to expressly repeal anything absent
strikethrough text.

¶24            Entertaining the notion that Prop. 209’s effect on the
subsection may be ambiguous, we invoke other, including secondary, tools
of statutory construction. See Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 234 Ariz.
at 325 ¶ 11. These interpretative aids reinforce our conclusion that Prop.
209 did not expressly repeal subsection (A)(11).

¶25           First, under the omitted-case canon, which we previously
have applied, see Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co., 244 Ariz. 553, 564–65 ¶ 41,
565 ¶ 41 n.4 (2018), “a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered,”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 93 (2012). Thus, it is appropriate to treat the omission of subsection
(A)(11) from the ballot as an “omitted case” carrying no legal effect. In
expressing neither approval nor disapproval of subsection (A)(11), the

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

voters did nothing. This inaction is the antithesis of expressly repealing
subsection (A)(11).

¶26            Second, our rejection of Trustee’s claim that Prop. 209
expressly repealed subsection (A)(11) also aligns with our consistent
“reject[ion of] the idea that silence is an expression of legislative intent.” See
Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 194 Ariz. 22, 26 ¶ 21
(1999); Gersten v. Sun Pain Mgmt., P.L.L.C., 242 Ariz. 301, 304 ¶ 9 (App.
2017). In light of the requisite statutory method of using strikethrough text
to accomplish repeals, the voters’ passage of a measure that simply omitted
subsection (A)(11) is tantamount to legislative silence, not an express repeal.
Although we typically presume that voters know the law of the state, City
of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160, 162 (1973), that presumption is defeated
where, as here, the voters were affirmatively led to believe that express
repeals would be accomplished with strikethrough text in their ballot
materials.

¶27            Third, Prop. 209’s context, language, subject matter, historical
background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose—the core
secondary principles of statutory interpretation—demonstrate an
enhancement of debtor protections through limited revisions to § 33-1126.
Concluding that the electorate intended to repeal subsection (A)(11), which
also enhances debtor protections, would be wholly inconsistent with Prop.
209’s explicit purpose. See Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 234 Ariz.
at 325 ¶ 11.

                                       II.

¶28           Our conclusion that Prop. 209 did not expressly repeal
subsection (A)(11) requires us to consider Trustee’s argument that the
voters implicitly repealed the subsection.

¶29           The doctrine of repeal by implication is disfavored in Arizona.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 333 ¶ 28 (2001). “Rather,
when two statutes appear to conflict, whenever possible, we adopt a
construction that reconciles one with the other, giving force and meaning
to all statutes involved.” Id. This statutory harmonization principle is
readily applied here because Prop. 209 and subsection (A)(11) do not
conflict—Prop. 209 and subsection (A)(11) both enhance debtor protections;

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

Prop. 209 increased the value of a bank-account exemption and indexed it
for inflation, while subsection (A)(11) added a tax-credit exemption.

¶30             Despite Prop. 209 and subsection (A)(11)’s harmonious
pro-debtor purposes, Trustee argues that Prop. 209’s inclusion of ten
exemptions necessarily excludes all others, including subsection (A)(11).
We reject this invocation of the expressio unius canon. See City of Surprise v.
Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206, 211 ¶ 13 (2019) (noting that the
interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “the
expression of one item implies the exclusion of others”). First, the expressio
unius canon should be used with caution; it is appropriate “only when the
unius . . . can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in
the grant or prohibition involved.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 107 (emphasis
in original). There is no reason to assume that Prop. 209’s ten provisions
were intended to represent the entire universe of available money-asset
exemptions. See A.R.S. § 33-1133(A) (“Nothing in this article shall be
construed to displace other provisions of law which afford additional or
greater protection to a debtor’s property.”). In fact, § 33-1126 is merely one
statute in a complex property scheme that spans numerous statutes. See,
e.g., A.R.S. § 33-1131 (setting forth exemptions pertaining to “a debtor’s
wages, salary or compensation”); see generally A.R.S. §§ 33-1121 to -1133
(setting forth Arizona’s various personal property exemptions). Second,
neither the initiative proponents nor the voters crafted the ten exemptions
contained in Prop. 209’s amended version of § 33-1126. These legislative
exemptions already existed, and the voters merely sought to amend one of
them to enhance debtor protections. The legislature enacted subsection
(A)(11) with precisely the same purpose and effect. And, as noted, “[t]he
result of such an amendment to [a statute] is not a repeal and re-enactment.”
Ariz. Downs, 128 Ariz. at 75.

¶31          The parties urge us to consider voter intent to resolve this
case. Although voter intent may be relevant to an implicit repeal analysis,
Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 505 (1984), we need not consider it
here because there is no conflict between the pro-debtor purpose and effect
of Prop. 209 and subsection (A)(11). Prop. 209 did not implicitly repeal
subsection (A)(11).

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                       IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                              Opinion of the Court

                                       III.

¶32            The dissent contends that we err in applying an implicit
repeal analysis and, instead, would hold that Prop. 209 repealed subsection
(A)(11) “not by implicit repeal but by operation of law.” Infra ¶ 52. For this
proposition, the dissent relies on A.R.S. § 1-245, 1 which provides in relevant
part that a former statute is “deemed repealed and abrogated” “in all cases
provided for by [a] subsequent statute,” regardless of whether the
provisions of the former statute are “consistent or not with the provisions
of the subsequent statute.” Id. In essence, the dissent claims that § 1-245,
alone, resolves this certified question, thereby obviating the need for an
implicit repeal analysis. But, as the dissent recognizes, § 1-245 is simply “a
legislative codification of the generally accepted rule that a subsequent
statute repeals an earlier statute, particularly if the two are in conflict or are
inconsistent.” Id. ¶ 53 (quoting State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206,
211 (1960)). Thus, the distinction that the dissent draws between “implicit
repeal” and “operation of law” is illusory.

¶33           Our implicit repeal jurisprudence is inextricably intertwined
with § 1-245’s substantive command. Indeed, the doctrine of implicit repeal
provides the mechanism by which our courts determine whether a
subsequent statute “provide[s] for” the same “cases” as a former statute, a
necessary prerequisite for applying § 1-245. In fact, § 1-245 deems as
repealed only those former statutes that address “cases provided for by the
subsequent statute.” Thus, when we inquire whether two legislative
enactments conflict, we are merely determining whether § 1-245’s trigger
condition has been met. The dissent does not cite any authority to the
contrary. And the dissent’s reliance on Anway only reinforces this
conclusion because that case expressly ties § 1-245’s application to an
antecedent determination that two statutes “are in conflict or are

1   A.R.S. § 1-245 provides in full:

         When a statute has been enacted and has become a law, no
         other statute or law is continued in force because it is
         consistent with the statute enacted, but in all cases provided
         for by the subsequent statute, the statutes . . . theretofore in
         force, whether consistent or not with the provisions of the
         subsequent statute, unless expressly continued in force by it,
         shall be deemed repealed and abrogated.
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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
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inconsistent.” See infra ¶ 53; 87 Ariz. at 211; see also Hounshell v. White, 219
Ariz. 381, 385–86 ¶¶ 12–13 (App. 2008) (noting that § 1-245 is a source of
implicit repeal).

¶34            Moreover, § 1-245 is not a true repealing statute. Rather, it
dictates that certain statutes “shall be deemed repealed” in certain “cases
provided for by the subsequent statute” and provides a method by which a
court can determine which of two applicable statutes, both of which
address the same substantive issue, controls in a given case. (Emphasis
added.) Although § 1-245 deems “consistency” between two statutes
irrelevant, we clarify that our consideration of statutory “inconsistency,”
both in this case and in our implicit repeal jurisprudence generally, is aimed
at the antecedent question of whether two statutes “provide[] for” the same
“cases.” See, e.g., Anway, 87 Ariz. at 211. If the statutes are in conflict or are
inconsistent, the subsequent statute controls, regardless of any consistency
of purpose, spirit, or effect. In any event, although § 1-245 provides that the
subsequent statute controls even if two statutes are consistent, whatever the
proper construction and general ambit of § 1-245, it is not dispositive of this
certified question because Prop. 209 does not in any manner address federal
or state tax-credit exemptions, the subject matter of subsection (A)(11).

¶35           The dissent offers only a conclusory statement that the
presence of a tax-credit exemption constitutes a “case[] provided for by”
Prop. 209. In an attempt to implicate the expressio unius canon, the dissent
asserts that “Prop. 209 enacted a comprehensive scheme governing
bankruptcy exemptions.” Infra ¶ 49 (emphasis added). If true, we would
embrace the dissent’s ultimate conclusion. But, as noted, Prop. 209 did not
enact a comprehensive scheme. Rather, it merely amended one preexisting,
unrelated exemption in § 33-1126(A)(9), a single statutory subsection in a
complex property scheme that spans numerous statutes—an act
distinguishable from a reenactment of a comprehensive statutory scheme.
See Part I(A) ¶¶ 18–20; Part II ¶ 30; Ruval, 9 Ariz. at 417; Ariz. Downs, 128
Ariz. at 75. This conclusion is bolstered by Prop. 209’s 100-word description
which, in part, describes its limited revisions to “[i]ncrease[] the value of
assets—a homestead, certain household possessions, a motor vehicle, funds
in a single bank account, and disposable earnings—protected from certain
legal processes to collect debt” and to “[a]nnually adjust[] these amended
exemptions for inflation beginning 2024.” See Protect Our Arizona v. Fontes,
254 Ariz. 288, 291 ¶ 2 (2023) (providing a full quotation of Prop. 209’s
100-word description). Expressio unius therefore is inapplicable here. See

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

Part II ¶ 30. And without expressio unius, there is no colorable argument
that subsection (A)(11)’s tax-credit exemption is a “case[] provided for by”
Prop. 209.

¶36           Contrary to the dissent’s conclusion, § 1-245 does not operate
to repeal subsection (A)(11) for purposes of this certified question. Thus,
we are left with the long-established principle that, unless there is an
express “repealing clause,” “it is the rule that when a law is amended by
adding thereto, all portions of the law are to be given effect, if possible, and
only those earlier portions which cannot be reconciled reasonably with the
later and added enactment are considered as repealed.” Biles v. Robey, 43
Ariz. 276, 281 (1934). Subsection (A)(11) remains operative.

                                      IV.

¶37           This case does not turn on the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”),
but it does implicate its principles and purpose to deter the legislature’s
frustration of voter initiatives. The VPA prohibits the legislature from
amending a voter-passed measure “unless the amending legislation
furthers the purposes of such measure” and a supermajority of legislators
supports the amendatory legislation. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C).
Here, because the legislative act preceded the voter initiative, the VPA is
inapplicable. Nevertheless, we explain why our holding accords with the
VPA’s purpose.

¶38            The VPA “altered the balance of power between the electorate
and the legislature, which share lawmaking power under Arizona’s system
of government.” Ariz. Early Childhood Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 221 Ariz.
467, 469 ¶ 7 (2009). “Backers of the measure were concerned that the
legislature was abusing its power to amend and repeal voter-endorsed
measures.” Id. Thus, the VPA serves as a defensive bulwark protecting
“Arizona’s strong public policy favoring the initiative and referendum.”
See W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 428 (1991); Ariz. Free
Enter. Club v. Hobbs, 253 Ariz. 478, 482 ¶ 7 (2022).

¶39           We are cognizant that our holding in this case—that voters do
not expressly repeal statutory provisions omitted from an initiative that
delineates repeals exclusively by strikethrough text—may be perceived to
risk mischief by the legislature that the VPA is designed to avert. This
concern, however, is misplaced. First, if the legislature enacts or amends a

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                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
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statute that affects a pending initiative, the more recently enacted
voter-approved measure will prevail if the two laws conflict. See UNUM,
200 Ariz. at 333 ¶ 29 (“Generally, where it appears by reason of repugnancy,
or inconsistency, that two conflicting statutes cannot operate
contemporaneously, the ‘more recent, specific statute governs over [an]
older, more general statute.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Lemons, 141
Ariz. at 505)). Second, the VPA’s purpose is to prevent subsequent
legislative amendments and repeals. To be sure, a voter-approved measure
will retain the VPA’s protections prospectively. Thus, our holding is
consistent with the VPA’s protection of voter-enacted laws.

¶40            Prop. 209, itself, illustrates the principle that a more recently
enacted voter-approved measure will prevail if it conflicts with a legislative
enactment passed during the pendency of the initiative. In addition to
amending § 33-1126, Prop. 209 amended § 33-1101 by increasing the former
homestead exemption from “one hundred fifty thousand dollars” to
“$400,000.” However, while Prop. 209’s proponents collected signatures,
the legislature passed House Bill 2617 (“H.B. 2617”), increasing the
homestead exemption from “one hundred fifty thousand dollars” to
“$250,000.” See 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 368, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.).
Consequently, Prop. 209 amended an out-of-date version of § 33-1101’s
homestead exemption. Although the homestead exemption is not before
us, and we decline to issue an advisory opinion, see Bennett v. Brownlow, 211
Ariz. 193, 196 ¶ 16 (2005), we note that resolution of the divergence between
the legislatively approved homestead exemption and the voter-approved
homestead exemption hinges on whether Prop. 209’s higher value is
repugnant to H.B. 2617’s lower value. If the two enactments materially
conflict, Prop. 209 will prevail because it is the more recent enactment. See
UNUM, 200 Ariz. at 333 ¶ 29. Thus, application of our longstanding
implicit repeal analysis, consistent with the VPA’s purpose, forecloses the
legislature’s frustration of voter-approved measures.

¶41            A contrary holding may result in unintended and
contradictory consequences, as this case illustrates. For example, if Prop.
209 had repealed subsection (A)(11), expressly or implicitly, the VPA may
bar the legislature from reenacting a similar tax-credit exemption. Implicit
repeals, like express repeals, trigger the VPA. See Cave Creek Unified Sch.
Dist. V. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 7–8 ¶¶ 24–25 (2013). Thus, if the voters repealed
subsection (A)(11), even a supermajority of legislators may be insufficient
to later reenact that provision because the only permissible amendments to

                                      14
                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                            Opinion of the Court

a voter initiative are those that further its purposes. See Ariz. Const. art. 4,
pt. 1, § 1(6)(C). A reenactment of a tax-credit exemption, although
pro-debtor, arguably would directly contravene the purpose of the voters’
purported repeal of subsection (A)(11).

                                      V.

¶42              Debtor argues that Prop. 209’s failure to reference subsection
(A)(11) in its text violates article 4, part 2, section 14 of the Arizona
Constitution (“§ 14”), 2 because it is an improper amendment by reference.
See, e.g., In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 594 (1926) (“The mischief aimed at by its
adoption was the common practice, still followed by the Congress of the
United States, of amending the statutes by simply directing the insertion,
omission, or substitution of certain words without setting out in full the act
as it was intended it should be after amendment.”); State v. Fridley, 126 Ariz.
419, 421 (App. 1980) (“This constitutional provision is designed to prevent
amendments by merely striking out or adding sentences in a contextual
vacuum.”). We decline to address the merits of this argument as moot
because it is unnecessary to answer the certified question before us. See
Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 72 n.9 (1998).

                               CONCLUSION

¶43          In answering the certified question, we hold that Prop. 209’s
passage did not expressly or implicitly repeal subsection (A)(11). Thus,
subsection (A)(11) remains operable.

2
  Article 4, part 2, section 14 of the Arizona Constitution provides that “[n]o
Act or section thereof shall be revised or amended by mere reference to the
title of such act, but the act or section as amended shall be set forth and
published at full length.”
                                      15
                      IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                      JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, Concurring

MONTGOMERY, J., concurring:
¶44            I fully concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusion. I only
write separately to underscore another issue with the dissent’s application
of A.R.S. § 1-245.

¶45            No previous interpretation of § 1-245 dealt with the scenario
we face here. Instead, all prior cases dealt with serial enactments by the
same lawmaking source—the legislature. See, e.g., Willard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz.
417, 423 (1926) (addressing legislative amendments to the Financial Code of
1922), overruled on other grounds by Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269 (1952); State
v. Angle, 54 Ariz. 13, 20 (1939) (noting that “a later valid act of the legislature
supersedes all previous acts with which it is in conflict, whether it expressly
repeals the earlier provisions or not”); State v. Cassius, 110 Ariz. 485, 487
(1974) (discussing subsequent acts of legislature); Webb v. Dixon, 104 Ariz.
473, 476 (1969) (discussing legislative enactments under Title 16 in 1933 and
1960).

¶46           In this case, we have the unusual scenario in which two
separate, constitutionally recognized sources of lawmaking authority
validly enacted laws that amended the same statute—and for all practical
purposes at the same time—though not the same part of the statute. The
dissent’s approach to § 1-245 would necessarily and needlessly frustrate the
exercise of constitutional lawmaking authority by the legislature. Instead,
our caselaw makes clear, equally applicable in the instance of separate
lawmaking authorities, that “[t]his Court . . . has a duty to harmonize
statutes and will not construe a statute as repealed by implication if it can
avoid doing so.” State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 224, 227
(1971); see also, State v. Santillanes, 541 P.3d 1150, 1155 ¶ 16 (Ariz. 2024)
(stating that “this Court has repeatedly made clear that ‘repeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be indulged, if there is any other
reasonable construction’” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Gila County, 56 Ariz. 499,
502 (1941))). Should such a scenario as this one present itself again in the
future, parties will want to address the dissent’s proffered application of
§ 1-245 considering our constitution’s provisions for shared lawmaking
authority.

                                        16
                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                         JUSTICE BOLICK, Dissenting

BOLICK, J., joined by BRUTINEL, C.J., and BEENE, J., dissenting:

¶47           The majority correctly observes how the situation that
presents itself here is highly unusual. We often confront conflicting,
overlapping, amended, and ambiguous statutes and have adopted and
applied standard rules of construction to analyze them. But those rules are
largely inapplicable under the circumstances here.

¶48           The majority’s principal emphasis is whether Proposition 209
(“Prop. 209”) implicitly repealed A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11). Supra ¶¶ 28–31.
The majority acknowledges that because the proposition was crafted before
subsection (A)(11) was enacted, but was adopted afterward, the drafters
could not have meant to repeal subsection (A)(11) because it did not exist.
See supra ¶ 6 (“The reason for Prop. 209’s omission of subsection (A)(11) is
manifest—it was drafted and circulated for signatures well before the
legislature passed” the bill enacting the subsection). The majority
ultimately concludes that “Prop. 209 did not implicitly repeal subsection
(A)(11).” Supra ¶ 31.

¶49           This approach is problematic in at least two significant
respects. There is no question that the statute and the proposition are
inconsistent: the statute provides an exemption that the proposition does
not. Prop. 209 enacted a comprehensive scheme governing bankruptcy
exemptions, including ten specific personal property exemptions from debt
execution. It could have, but did not, include the exemption embodied in
subsection (A)(11). Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of
statutory construction, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) (“The expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of others.”), we would have to rewrite the proposition
to include the legislative exemption.

¶50           The cases the majority relies upon, Territory v. Ruval, 9 Ariz.
415 (1906), and Arizona Downs v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 73 (1981), supra
¶¶ 18–20, are not relevant here. Here, Prop. 209 did not leave subsection
(A)(11) “untouched,” Arizona Downs, 128 Ariz. at 75, because as the majority
fully acknowledges, subsection (A)(11) did not exist when the proposed
statute was drafted.

                                      17
                     IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                         Justice Bolick, Dissenting

¶51           Moreover, if we green-light the legislature’s ability to
preemptively amend ballot measures prior to an election, we may
inadvertently turn a highly uncommon situation into a tool to blunt or
frustrate the effect of prospective ballot measures. We will then be faced
with deciding when to give full effect to the prior statute as amended, when
we will seek to harmonize the statute and the ballot measure, and when we
will hold that the ballot measure implicitly invalidates the statute. Compare
Hughes v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 165, 168 ¶¶ 14, 17 (2002) (holding that where
voters enacted two ballot measures that set different terms of office for the
state mine inspector, the Court should “combin[e]” and “harmonize[]”
them to give effect to each), with id. at 169–73 ¶¶ 21–41 (Feldman, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting that approach); see also State v. Arevalo, 249 Ariz. 370,
373 ¶ 9 (2020) (observing that the Court should not rewrite statutes).

¶52           Rather than following the majority’s approach, we would
hold that Prop. 209 supplants and supersedes subsection (A)(11) not by
implicit repeal but by operation of law. The legislature itself has supplied
the rule here. A.R.S. § 1-245 provides in relevant part as follows:

       When a statute has been enacted and has become a law, no
       other statute or law is continued in force because it is
       consistent with the statute enacted, but in all cases provided
       for by the subsequent statute, the statutes . . . theretofore in
       force, whether consistent or not with the provisions of the
       subsequent statute, unless expressly continued in force by it,
       shall be deemed repealed and abrogated.

¶53            As this Court previously stated, § 1-245 “is a legislative
codification of the generally accepted rule that a subsequent statute repeals
an earlier statute, particularly if the two are in conflict or are inconsistent.”
State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 211 (1960).

¶54           Thus, although the interpretative canons the majority
employs are useful where no statute controls, § 1-245 is the law and resolves
the question here. Section 1-245 specifically rejects the majority’s focus on
the “consistency” between Prop. 209 and subsection (A)(11), and instead
requires a new statute to expressly affirm the prior statute to avoid that
prior statute’s repeal and abrogation. Of course, Prop. 209 did not, and
could not, do so.

                                       18
                    IN RE: ERICA KRYSTAL RIGGINS
                        Justice Bolick, Dissenting

¶55            Rather, the voters themselves have provided the mechanism
for the legislature to amend statutes adopted by ballot measures, through
the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”). See supra ¶¶ 37–41. If subsection (A)(11)
furthers the purpose of Prop. 209, the legislature is empowered to adopt it
so long as it complies with the requirements set forth in the VPA. As we
reject the notion that the voters implicitly rejected subsection (A)(11), but
instead approved a comprehensive, self-contained bankruptcy exemption
statute, we disagree with the majority’s assertion, supra ¶ 41, that the
legislature would be powerless to change the voter-approved statute in a
way that furthers its purposes. The majority essentially creates an
end-around the VPA—so long as the legislature adopts a statute while the
ballot proposition is pending, the court will “harmonize” the two by adding
the statute to the measure approved by the voters.

¶56            Rather than the post hoc approach favored by the majority,
§ 1-245 and the VPA provide a bright-line rule: where a statute is
inconsistent with a subsequent ballot measure that does not expressly
preserve it, the ballot measure supersedes the statute. The prior statute can
be revised through the process set forth in the VPA but not through judicial
revision. Until that legislative process occurs, we should interpret and
enforce Prop. 209 exactly as the voters adopted it.

¶57          For the foregoing reasons and with great respect to our
colleagues, we dissent.

                                     19