Court Opinion

ID: 9845718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:26:51.10837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:19.974613
License: Public Domain

Barrow, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
The nature of the offense for which the defendant did not appear was not, in my opinion, admissible into evidence. Proof of the nature of the offense was not needed to prove that the offense was a felony, nor was it needed to prove that the offense was “serious.” Thus, it had no probative value.
Admittedly, a criminal defendant may not preclude the Commonwealth from introducing otherwise admissible evidence by offering to stipulate the facts which the evidence would tend to show. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 91, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990). This, however, does not answer our question. We must decide whether evidence of the nature of the offense is “otherwise admissible.”
Both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized and followed the principle that the nature of a felony conviction has little *734probative value but contains great risk of undue prejudice to a defendant. Even though the fact of a conviction is admissible to impeach the credibility of a defendant, ‘ ‘neither the name of the felony, other than perjury, nor the details of the crime [are] admissible in evidence.” Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069; 1070, 254 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1979); see also McAmis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 419, 422, 304 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1983) (per curiam); Joyner v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 290, 299, 392 S.E.2d 822, 827 (1990); Powell v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 17, 23, 409 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1991). Even where a defendant testifies untruthfully on direct examination concerning the number of his prior felony convictions, the Commonwealth, although entitled to impeach him by proving the' actual number of felony convictions, may not, in doing so, prove the name or nature of prior convictions having little or no probative value. Powell, 13 Va. App. at 24-25, 409 S.E.2d at 626-27.
The underlying purpose of this rule is “to avoid undue prejudice against the accused’ ’ by the Unnecessary introduction of evidence of a crime for which he is not on trial. Sadoski, 219 Va. at 1070, 254 S.E.2d at 101. In other words, “all relevant evidence is not necessarily admissible; where the prejudicial effect of relevant evidence so outweighs its probative value that it may unduly influence the outcome of the case, it must be excluded.” Powell, 13 Va. App. at 24, 409 S.E.2d at 627.
The rationale of McAmis, Joyner and Powell excludes evidence that the crime with which the defendant was charged was robbery if its sole purpose is to prove that the charge was a felony. Such evidence, offered only for this purpose, has no probative value and a significant prejudicial effect.
Evidence of the name and nature of the offense had no probative value regarding the jury’s determination of whether the offense charged is a felony. A jury’s sole function is to resolve “disputed facts.” Speet v. Bacaj, 237 Va. 290, 296, 377 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1989). The defendant did not dispute that the offense with which he was charged was a felony. Even if the defendant had disputed the issue, whether the offense is a felony is a question of law, not of fact, to be resolved by the trial court, not the jury. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 679, 681, 36 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1946); Commonwealth v. Beavers, 150 Va. 33, 40, 142 S.E. 402, 404 (1928).
*735Proof that a defendant is charged with a felony, without proof of the name or the nature of the felony, is sufficient to prove the required element of Code § 19.2-128(B). Evidence of the indictment with the name and nature of the offense redacted would have sufficiently proved the fact that the defendant was charged with a criminal offense. Whether the offense was a felony is a question of law which should have been resolved by the court without apprising the jury of the name or nature of the offense.
Moreover, disclosure of the name and nature of a prior felony greatly increased the risk of prejudice that would follow from proof of the fact of a prior felony conviction. Powell, 13 Va. App. at 25, 409 S.E.2d at 627. A jury is more inclined to consider such evidence “as tending to show that [the defendant] is probably guilty ... or is a person of bad character.” Id. Thus, evidence that the defendant was charged with robbery had no probative value in proving that the offense was a felony, but had significant and undue prejudicial effect when admitted solely for that purpose. Admitting the evidence for that reason served only to undermine the long-held principle barring the admissibility of such evidence.
In addition, Judge Benton’s dissent persuasively expresses why the evidence of the nature.of the offense was also not admissible to prove that the offense was “serious,” and I agree with him in that regard.
I do not, however, concur with Judge Benton that the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding that the defendant’s failure to appear was willful. Instead, I am of the opinion that the testimony of the defendant’s attorney that he told the defendant of the trial date was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant actually knew the trial date. Therefore, I find it unnecessary to address, as does the majority, whether the defendant had constructive knowledge of the date and whether this is sufficient to support the conviction. Consequently, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.