Court Opinion

ID: 9562270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:25:08.431149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:16.720807
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur, but it is time to reexamine the precedent that it is proper to qualify jurors with respect to relationships they may have *282with interested insurance carriers. We are not “bound” by our own precedent when it appears that it should be changed, and I find no Supreme Court ruling on this issue that would control. Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III.
For the reasons advanced in the concurring opinions in Franklin v. Tackett, 209 Ga. App. 448, 450 (433 SE2d 710) (1993), and Gonzalez v. Wells, 213 Ga. App. 494 (445 SE2d 332) (1994), the practice engaged in this case should no longer be followed. It is not universal. See Hope Windows, Inc. v. Snyder, 158 SE2d 722, 723-724 (Va. 1968); Metcalf v. Consolidated Badger Cooperative, 137 NW2d 457, 464 (14) (Wis. 1966); Redman v. McDaniel, 333 P2d 500, 502 (1-2) (Okla. 1958). See also Wheeler v. Rudek, 74 NE2d 601 (4 ALR2d 748) (Ill. 1947).
Here the question was asked of all jurors: “Is any member of the panel an officer, employee or stockholder or related by blood or marriage to any officer, employer, or stockholder of Allstate Insurance Company?” What inference would a juror draw from such a question?
Asking the question tells the prospective jurors that insurance is involved. It is an easy deduction that the insurance company inquired about is defendant’s, and to take the further step that it meant defendant’s insurance company and not defendant personally who would pay the judgment. In today’s world of mandatory automobile insurance and deep pocket mentality, jurors may be biased against defendant by the asking of such a question. The law must maintain an even playing field if cases are to be tried fairly.
Another aspect of the issue is that mention of insurance in such a way that jurors could conclude that defendant has insurance does not tell them there is a limit. Defendant’s insurance in fact may not cover the whole amount plaintiff seeks, or the whole amount the jury awards while thinking it is covered. This would increase the prejudice to defendant.
As said by the Supreme Court in Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41, 42 (402 SE2d 269) (1991), disapproved on other grounds, Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 (418 SE2d 27) (1992), “neither the wealth of the plaintiff nor the defendant is relevant. . . . Because of its irrelevance and prejudicial value, ... a litigant’s insurance policy is not only inadmissible, it can be the ground for a mistrial. [Cit.] Such evidence is highly prejudicial and it can influence the entire case, no matter which side attempts to introduce it.” Whether the jury is informed by evidence or by a question during voir dire, the result is the same.
*283Decided July 14, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 31, 1995
Cannon, Meyer Von Bremen & Meier, Michael S. Meyer Von Bremen, for appellant.
B. T. Edmonds, Jr., for appellee.