Court Opinion

ID: 9616317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:45:33.513006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:57.221153
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
I am constrained by the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (107 SC 1149, 94 LE2d 347) (1987) to concur with the affirmance of the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence of contraband in this case. I lament with Justice Scalia that “ [i]t may well be that... no effective means [to investigate suspicious circumstances] short of a search exist. But there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” Id. at 329.
As illustrated by this and other recent cases (see Amato v. State, 193 Ga. App. 459 (_SE2d_) (1989), drug traffickers are becoming more ingenious in their methods of concealing contraband in such a way that no ground exists for an investigating officer to find probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. Yet this officer may have a strong inarticulable hunch, based on extensive experience in law enforcement, that a situation is suspicious or the circumstances amiss. As here, the contraband may be concealed in such a way that the search cannot be justified under the several exceptions permitting warrantless searches. The “automobile exception” still requires probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is in the vehicle. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543) (1924). A search of the passenger compartment of the automobile may be made incident to a lawful arrest but such a search may not extend to compartments of the automobile not accessible to the arrestee. See Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685) (1969). The “plain view” doctrine requires that the object in plain view must, without further manipulation or search by the officer, establish probable cause to seize the plainly visible evidence. See Arizona v. Hicks, supra. Even consent may not justify the search if it does not expressly extend to the particular area searched. See State v. Diaz, 191 Ga. *539App. 830 (383 SE2d 195) (1989).
Decided November 14, 1989.
Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, Daniel A. Hiatt, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Grayson P. Lane, for appellee.
On the one hand, innocent individuals should not be subject to intrusive, property-damaging searches on a mere suspicion that something in or on the automobile is amiss. On the other hand, we cannot afford to allow drug traffickers, lawfully detained for an investigative stop or for some other unrelated offense, to be released to spread their poison in our society because they were clever enough to conceal their contraband in such a way that it does not arouse a suspicion sufficient to establish probable cause for a search. The investigating officer needs a practical solution to the problem identified by Justice Scalia — an effective means, short of an unconstitutional search, to investigate suspicious circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has held that exposure of personal effects located in a public place to a trained canine does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (103 SC 2637, 77 LE2d 110) (1983). Thus, the solution I propose is that a drug-sniffing dog accompany each officer patrolling a highway known to be a drug corridor. The positive reaction of a drug-sniffing dog would have provided the probable cause necessary in this case to search areas of the vehicle not otherwise subject to a search incident to the lawful arrest of the driver.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke joins in this special concurrence.