Court Opinion

ID: 9460349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:47:47.595776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:52.358457
License: Public Domain

WILKEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In spite of the conscientious effort my two distinguished colleagues have made in examining the law, especially as it relates to corroboration in sexual assault cases, I submit that they have reached the wrong result in this particular case. I believe this is apparent from the law in this jurisdiction, when applied to the facts herein, both as stated in the majority opinion of Judge Wisdom. Chief Judge Bazelon’s concurrence is a thoughtful essay with which anyone would find it difficult to take issue, but with all due respect, it does not point the way to a decision in Wiley’s case. In my view, the errors of the majority are clearly demonstrable as two:
1. The requirement of specific medical corroboration of one single fact conflicts with our previous decisions, and leads with inevitable logic to the conclusion that no rape conviction is sustainable without medical testimony confirming penetration, despite the established medical view that in many instances after the event a medical examination cannot determine one way or another whether forcible penetration took place; and
2. In the circumstances of this case, given the uncontradicted testimony of the 12 year old victim on the question of forcible penetration and the testimony of appellant Wiley, the majority has focused on the wrong issue on which corroboration is relevant.
I. The Standard of Corroboration in this Jurisdiction.
With admirable clarity, Judge Wisdom has set forth the standard we have required in this jurisdiction: “This Circuit has avoided imposing rigid rules concerning corroboration. (Citation omitted) In general, the degree of corroboration required will vary according to the danger of fabrication by a particular complainant. With respect to the corpus delicti, for example, it is not al*557ways necessary to introduce independent evidence to corroborate each and every element of the offense. Rather, ‘independent corroborative evidence will be regarded as sufficient when it would permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s account of the crime was not a fabrication’ ”. For these principles Gray1, Terry2, Huff3, and Jones4 are cited.
Our most recent decision is United States v. Gray, 30 March 1973.5 Gray requires the affirmance of Wiley’s conviction here, for precisely the same issue as to the absence of medical corroboration of the complainant’s testimony as to sexual intercourse was raised in Gray.
“Appellant urges that corroboration of the corpus delicti requires independent evidence tending to establish each and every material element of the offense. Specifically, he contends that because the Government’s proof as to penetration rested wholly on the complainant’s testimony, his conviction must be reversed. Although there are statements in Allison v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 409 F.2d 445 and United States v. Bryant, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 420 F.2d 1327 that support appellant’s position, our more recent decisions make it clear that Allison and Bryant no longer reflect the controlling law.” (citations omitted) “Simply put, the principle emerging from these cases is that the independent corroborative evidence will be regarded as sufficient when it would permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s account of the crime was not a fabrication.”6
While it may be argued, or denied, that the overall corroborative circumstances were stronger in Gray than in Wiley’s case, corroboration here (particularly when analysis is made of what question needed corroboration, see III.B. infra) was strong enough at least to go to the jury.
Gray is one of many cases establishing that medical proof of forcible penetration may be impossible to obtain. “Although gynecological examination of the prosecutrix was inconclusive, she testified unequivocally that her attacker had achieved penetration.”7
And, as to the real contested issue in Wiley’s case — not whether the offense was committed but who committed it— we said in Gray: “Corroboration is also required as to identification of the assailant; but our eases have traditionally recognized that, as to this element, a lesser standard of proof is required. And where there is a convincing identification, one that minimizes the danger of mistake or falsification, no further corroboration is required. (Citations omitted) Here the victim identified appellant to police by name.”8 And so the victim here pointed out Wiley to officers on the street.
Bearing in mind Judge Tamm’s admonition in United States v. Jones,9 our decision immediately prior to Gray, that “[t]he wealth of opinions in this circuit regarding the vagaries of the independent corroboration requirement for sex related offenses renders a lengthy dissertation inappropriate,”10 I only list “the guidelines which we must respect” from Jones:
“(1) Corroboration of the testimony of complainants in ‘sex cases’ is an in*558dispensable pre-requisite to conviction. (2) There must be corroboration as to both the corpus delicti and the identity of the assailant. (3) The need for corroboration depends upon the danger of falsification. (4) Since in general the danger of an erroneous identification in a rape case is not of the same magnitude as the danger of a fabricated rape, the facts of a particular case may be such that a convincing identification by the complaining witness based upon an opportunity to observe need not be further corroborated. (5) The corroboration testimony need not be ‘direct’ but may be circumstantial, for ‘[i]f by “direct corroboration” is meant the testimony of an eyewitness, the result would be in most cases that conviction could not be had except upon the defendant’s confession.’ (6) Corroboration in a case involving an alleged sex offense is any evidence, outside of the complainant’s testimony, which has probative value — any evidence which could convince the trier of fact that the crime was committed. (7) While corroboration is initially a matter for the trial court, just as in any question concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of the ease to the jury, it is the jury’s function to decide whether the standard of corroborative proof has been met. (8) Finally, every case must be evaluated on its own merits, ... we must determine whether the trial judge erred in sending the ease to the jury. Can we say that given proper instructions as to corroboration a reasonable juror could not conclude that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged? Patently, the answer to that question must be no.”11
Given the guidelines and tests of Jones, involving carnal knowledge of a 15 year old, and Gray, our last two decisions in this field, let us examine what corroboration there was of Wiley’s guilt.
II. Corroboration of Wiley’s Guilt
First, the evidence to be corroborated. The testimony of the 12 year old victim as to the sexual assault in the apartment is, to my mind, clear, coherent, and without any internal contradictions. It is fairly set forth in Judge Wisdom’s opinion. In the interest of brevity, it will not be repeated here, but we should not forget that the victim provided a complete documentation of every essential detail, unshaken on cross-examination, and uncontradicted except by the bare denial of the appellant.
Second, appellant Wiley’s testimony does not contradict the victim's assertion that a sexual assault took place. Indeed, appellant confirms it. According to his story, he was awakened by Miss Smith (Wiley’s girlfriend) who asked him to stop Cunningham from taking indecent liberties with the 12 year old. “ . . .he saw that Cunningham was bothering Miss Lewis (the victim), told him to stop it.” (Majority opinion, p. 549) Wiley says he then went back to sleep; the victim says he participated in the rape. At no time did Wiley testify that Cunningham did not, or could not, have raped the girl.
With this as the basic evidence, how much corroboration was needed to send the case to the jury? Here is what the District Judge had:
1. The victim reported the offense immediately. After fleeing the apartment, she found a phone booth, started to call, but on seeing Wiley and Cunningham approaching, hung up and slipped away. She was seen at this time by Officer Gordon, who noticed her because she was crying, obviously upset, had a disarrayed blouse, and was not wearing a coat although it was a cold day. She found another phone, called the police. When Officers Dye and Kraigler arrived, she pointed out Wiley and Cunningham by name, and stated she had been raped by them.
2. Her crying and other visible signs of emotional distress, noted first with*559out suggestion by Officer Gordon, then by Officers Dye and TCraigler.
3. Her disheveled clothing and her disarranged blouse, noted by all officers.
4. Her being on the street on a cold day without a coat, sufficiently odd to attract Officer Gordon’s attention.
5. Finding the coat in the apartment at 240 W. Street, N.W., from whence she had fled, and claimed to have left the coat in her haste and emotional distress.
6. The complete absence of any motive on the victim’s part to fabricate a story of Wiley’s guilt. A portion of appellant’s own testimony confirms this; he claimed “that he and Miss Lewis were good friends.” (Majority opinion, p. 549) She, the victim, testified that Wiley “never said nothing to me out of the way”. (Majority opinion, p. 548)
Taking this Court’s test in Jones, “Can we say that ... a reasonable juror could not conclude that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged? Patently, the answer to that question must be no.”
III. Errors of the Majority in the Corroboration Required
A. Departure from this Court’s Previous Decisions
As late as 30 March 1973, we said in Gray12, “Appellant urges that because the Government’s proof as to penetration rested wholly on the complainant’s testimony, his conviction must be reversed. Although there are statements in Allison v. United States13 and United States v. Bryant14 that support appellant’s position, our more recent decisions make it clear that Allison and Bryant no longer reflect the controlling law (citing Terry15, Huff16, and Jones17).” Fifteen days earlier we had noted in Jones: “(5) The corroboration testimony need not be ‘direct’ but may be circumstantial, for ‘[¿]/ by “direct corroboration” is meant the testimony of an eyewitness, the result would be in most cases that conviction could not be had except upon the defendant’s confession.’ (Citation omitted) (6) Corroboration in a case involving an alleged sex offense is any evidence, outside the complainant’s testimony, which has probative value — any evidence which could convince the trier of fact that the crime was committed. (Citation omitted) ”18
Yet, in spite of many and recent decisions of this Court to the contrary, my two colleagues focus entirely on the absence of one special type of evidence— medical testimony — to corroborate one element of the crime — penetration19 The majority opinion results in this rationale:
1. Proof of penetration is essential to prove rape or carnal knowledge (undisputed).
*5602. The victim’s testimony, if alone on this one element, is never sufficient to prove penetration (Gray, Jones, and other decisions are contra).
3. Hence, either medical evidence or third party eyewitness testimony is therefore indispensable to prove penetration.
This fails to recognize: (a) that in many cases of actual penetration medical testimony cannot conclusively say whether it occurred, (Gray, 477 F.2d at 446); (b) that in most rape cases there will not be a third party in such an intimate position that he can (or is willing to) testify to penetration; (c) hence, there can be no conviction without the defendant’s confession (Jones, 477 F.2d at 1218).
With all due respect to my two distinguished colleagues, what they have decided in Wiley’s case is not the law at present in this jurisdiction, may never have been the law, and certainly should never be the law in this or any other jurisdiction.
B. Focus on the Wrong Issue on Which Corroboration was Important
The majority opinion asserts “[t]he most effective corroboration of the complainant’s testimony would have been medical evidence,” and “[t]he Government’s decision to proceed without [the doctor] was irresponsible.”20 Just what would the evidence of the examining physician have added to the certainty or uncertainty that appellant Wiley raped the victim? We know that the victim was raped, at least by Cunningham. The jury had the victim’s testimony to this, and Wiley’s testimony does not contradict it. Furthermore, although of course the jury did not have this, we now judicially know that Cunningham did commit this offense; this fact was judicially established in United States v. Cunningham, No. 994-71, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, now on appeal in this Court, No. 73-1283. This was a separate trial of Wiley’s co-defendant, Cunningham, charged and tried in the same numbered case as Wiley.
So we know the victim was raped by Cunningham. Granting that the jury had only the victim’s testimony (uncon-tradicted as to the rape by Cunningham), the question before the jury was and here is, was she also raped by Wiley ? The physician’s testimony could not have answered that question. At the most, he could have testified to penetration and sperm in the vagina. But who was responsible? Cunningham, or Cunningham and Wiley ? Wiley’s defense was not that the rape did not, or could not have occurred; his defense was that he was asleep in the other room while Cunningham was with the 12 year old victim.
Obviously the jury disbelieved Wiley’s story on the critical issue. The physician’s testimony would not have been even relevant to the critical issue raised by Wiley: Was it Wiley who also raped the victim?
I am not overlooking the well understood principle that every element of an offense must be proved — but the law in this jurisdiction is that not every element of a sexual offense need be corroborated,21 Every element was PROVED. The 12 year old victim’s testimony was clear and unequivocal; she *561was raped by both Cunningham and Wiley, there was penetration and ejaculation by both. As to Cunningham, her story was not only clear and unequivocal, it was uncontradicted. In the offense of rape there must be corroboration, and Wiley denied his participation in the criminal act. I submit there was sufficient corroboration in all the surrounding, undisputed circumstances, both as to the occurence of the rape and Wiley’s participation. But looking at what the majority considers the critical point, insufficient corroboration, what is the specific corroboration my colleagues point to as essential, “most effective”, and missing: the physician’s testimony. But the physician’s testimony could never have corroborated the victim’s testimony on the issue in dispute: whether Wiley, in addition to Cunningham, did accomplish penetration and thereby perpetrate a rape.
Since the victim’s testimony as to the rape having been perpetrated was un-contradieted by any witness, including appellant Wiley, and certainly was strongly supported by all attendant circumstances, the corroboration needed here is not corroboration of the rape having taken place, but of Wiley’s participation therein. Consider what would have been the position of appellant Wiley and all the evidence before the jury, if the absent physician had appeared and testified to both penetration and sperm in the victim’s vagina. Wiley’s testimony would not, could not, have been different. He never testified Cunningham did not, could not, have raped the 12 year old girl. Wiley testified that he “got up, and when he saw that Cunningham was bothering Miss Lewis, told him to stop it. Wiley then went back to sleep. Later, he was awakened by Cunningham.”22 By then Miss Lewis had left the apartment and Wiley did not see her.
The absent physician’s testimony thus in no way could have corroborated any fact disputed by appellant Wiley. The vital corroboration needed here is as to Wiley’s participation; medical testimony could not supply this; any needed corroboration of the victim’s clear and unequivocal testimony is supplied by all the attendant circumstances.
I trust and would sustain the jury verdict here.23 Thus I respectfully dissent.

. United States v. Gray, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 477 F.2d 444 (1973).

. United States v. Terry, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 422 F.2d 704 (1970).

. United States v. Huff, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 163, 165-166, 442 F.2d 885, 887-888 (1971).

. United States v. Jones, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 477 F.2d 1213 (1973) (Circuit Judges Tamm and Leventhal, Senior District Judge Wyzanski).

. 155 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 477 F.2d 444, Circuit Judges Leventhal and Robb, Senior District Judge Jameson.

. Id., at 445.

. Id., at 446.

. Id., at 446.

. United States v. Jones, supra note 4.

. Id. 477 F.2d at 1217.

. Id. at 1217-1218. Citations for each guideline omitted.

. United States v. Gray, supra note 3.

. 133 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 409 F.2d 445 (1969).

. 137 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 420 F.2d 1327 (1969).

. United States v. Terry, supra note 2.

. United States v. Huff, supra note 3.

. United States v. Jones, supra note 4.

. Id. 477 F.2d at 1218.

. “The most effective corroboration of the complainant’s testimony would have been medical evidence. Here, Miss Lewis was examined by a doctor shortly after the alleged incident. Notwithstanding the importance of the medical evidence, the Government was well aware of the significance of that evi-denee and had subpoenaed the doctor on the three prior dates set for trial. At the time of the fourth and final trial date, the doctor was on vacation. The Government’s decision to proceed without him was irresponsible. Medical evidence may not be an indispensable pre-requisite to conviction where other independent evidence is introduced to corroborate sexual intercourse. But in the instant case, no such evidence was presented. As a practical matter, the Government’s case rested almost exclusively on the testimony of the child. Any inference that sexual intercourse or penetration occurred must be based on her bare accusation. In these circumstances, the traditional purpose of the corroboration requirement — avoidance of fabricated charges — requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction.” Majority opinion supra at 551-552.

. Ibid. Government counsel had had the examining physician under subpoena and in courthouse attendance for three prior settings of the case. The doctor wasted numerous hours without the case ever going to trial. So, for any subsequent setting, the prosecuting attorney made an agreement with the doctor to appear without subpoena when called by phone. On the critical day the doctor was away on vacation. Record p. 49. Both sides had made motions for continuance, the Government because of the flight of co-defendant Cunningham, and the prosecution did not anticipate being put to trial, hence the failure to alert the doctor.

. United States v. Gray, supra note 1, 477 F.2d at 445; United States v. Jones, supra, note 4 477 F.2d at 1217-1218; United States v. Terry, 137 U.S.App.D.C. at 271-272, 422 F.2d at 708-709 (1970); United States v. Huff, 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 166, 442 F.2d at 888 (1971).

. Majority opinion, supra at 549.

. The portion of Chief Judge Bazelon’s opinion directly relevant to Wiley’s case is this: “Juries are more integrated than in the past and racial prejudice may be at a somewhat lower level. Numerous rape victims are black and their interests, as well as those of white women, may have been slighted by the concern for black defendants.” Concurring opinion, supra at 555.