Court Opinion

ID: 9881096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:09:42.340186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:03.188070
License: Public Domain

J-S19024-22

                               2023 PA Super 189

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee               :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 ZAHIR DESHON WATKINS                      :   No. 2209 EDA 2021
                                           :
                    Appellant

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2021
     in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0003701-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

      Whether use of a License Plate Reader (“LPR”) system to track

Appellant’s movements is a search under the Fourth Amendment is a question

of first impression before this Court. The purpose a license plate attached to

a vehicle is to provide information, and such license plate is in plain view when

the vehicle is operated on the roadways. Thus we find there is no reasonable

expectation of privacy, and such use of the LPR is not a search.

      Zahir Deshon Watkins appeals from the September 27, 2021 aggregate

judgment of sentence of time-served to 23 months’ imprisonment imposed

after he was found guilty in a bench trial of possession with intent to deliver

a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance,

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use, possession of

drug paraphernalia, and driving on roadways laned for traffic – driving within

single lane.1 After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

              On April 22, 202[0], Philadelphia Police Officer
              Anthony Mergiotti (“[Officer] Mergiotti”) informed the
              Bensalem Township Police Department [] of a suspect
              believed to be selling narcotics at [a convenience
              store] located on [] Hulmeville Road [in] Bensalem
              Township[, Pennsylvania].           [Officer] Mergiotti
              provided the Bensalem [Township] Police Department
              with the suspect’s vehicle registration information: a
              Volkswagen with license plate number LFR[XXXX].
              Officer Brian Bielecki (“[Officer] Bielecki”) of the
              Bensalem        [Township]       Police     Department
              subsequently entered this registration information
              into the Bensalem [Township] Police Department’s
              License Plate Reader (“LPR”) system.[FN]          Upon
              entering this license plate into the database, [Officer]
              Bielecki discovered that the vehicle frequently
              traveled on the roadways near the Bensalem
              Township high school.

              On June 17, 202[0], Officer Connor Farnan (“[Officer]
              Farnan”), Officer Tyson Mathew (“[Officer] Mathew”),
              and [Officer] Bielecki from the Special Investigations
              Unit (“SIU”) of the Bensalem [Township] Police
              Department were in the Bristol Pike area [of Bensalem
              Township] in an unmarked vehicle conducting
              surveillance [for] an unrelated investigation. At
              approximately 7:44[ p.m., Officer] Bielecki received
              an email alert that the vehicle with the license plate
              LFR[XXXX] recently passed Bensalem [Township]
              High School, traveling southbound on Hulmeville
              Road. The three officers discussed this development

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), (a)(31)(i), (a)(32), and 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3309(1), respectively.

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          and decided to locate the vehicle and gather evidence
          to corroborate the information received from [Officer
          Mergiotti] pertaining to [the vehicle’s] involvement in
          suspected drug sales.

          The officers found the vehicle and began to follow. At
          the time, the three officers did not intend to complete
          a vehicle stop. However, as they pursued the vehicle
          on Bristol Pike, the three officers observed the vehicle
          leave the lane of travel approximately three times,
          which is a violation of the Vehicle Code. [See 75
          Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).]        Due to safety concerns,
          [Officer] Mathew subsequently initiated a traffic stop.
          [Officer] Mathew switched on his lights and the vehicle
          pulled over to the side.        [Officer] Mathew then
          approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke
          with the driver, who was later identified as Appellant.
          Meanwhile, [Officer] Bielecki approached the front
          right side of the vehicle and spoke with the only
          passenger[.]

          As he was speaking to [the passenger, Officer]
          Bielecki detected an odor of burnt marijuana and
          observed approximately six air fresheners hanging
          from the rearview mirror. In light of his training and
          experience, multiple air fresheners are known to serve
          as masking agents, used to hide the smell of
          marijuana. [Officer] Bielecki asked [the passenger] if
          she had any marijuana in the [vehicle,] and she
          advised him that she had a bowl in her purse.
          Meanwhile, [Officer] Mathew returned to his police
          vehicle to check Appellant’s license and registration.
          [Officer] Mathew found no warrants and no
          outstanding issues. Before returning to Appellant’s
          vehicle, [Officers] Bielecki and Mathew briefly
          conferred and [Officer] Bielecki informed [Officer]
          Mathew that he smelled marijuana and that [the
          passenger] admitted to having drug paraphernalia in
          her purse.

          The officers decided to implement an investigative
          tactic wherein they ask both occupants to exit the
          vehicle to be questioned separately. [Officer] Mathew
          returned to the driver’s side and asked Appellant to

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            step out of the vehicle. Appellant refused. At this
            point, out of concern that Appellant would flee,
            [Officers] Mathew and Bielecki both reached into the
            [vehicle] and restrained Appellant: [Officer] Mathew
            from the driver’s side and [Officer] Bielecki from the
            passenger’s side. As [Officer] Mathew restrained
            Appellant, he smelled raw marijuana emanating from
            the vehicle.    Throughout this process, Appellant
            informed the officers that he did not consent to [a]
            search of his car. Several additional officers arrived
            on scene to assist [Officers] Mathew and Bielecki.

            After several minutes, officers physically removed
            Appellant from his car and, pursuant to Bensalem
            [Township] Police Department policy, completed an
            inventory search on scene to ensure the safety of
            Appellant’s belongings. The vehicle was subsequently
            towed to a secure lot at the Bensalem [Township]
            Police Department headquarters. On June 18, 2020,
            Magisterial District Justice Michael Gallagher signed a
            search warrant for the vehicle. During a search
            pursuant to the warrant, [Officers] Mathew and
            Bielecki recovered $1,844.00 in cash, 227.6 grams of
            marijuana, a digital scale, and plastic baggies. On
            June 19, 2020, [Officer] Bielecki arrested Appellant
            pursuant to an arrest warrant.

            [FN] LPRs are located around Bensalem Township as
            well as inside of police cars. An LPR records every
            license plate that comes within its camera lens frame,
            takes a picture, and uploads the license information
            (where the car was located when it came into the
            camera frame) into its database. If one of the
            captured license plates is expired, or the vehicle has
            been marked stolen, for example, the system sends
            an email to an active-duty police officer to inform him
            or her that the vehicle is nearby and provides its
            location. Officers can access this database and review
            a vehicle’s LPR history.

Trial court opinion, 12/16/21 at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony and some

footnotes omitted).

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       Appellant was subsequently charged with PWID and related offenses in

connection with this incident. On April 26, 2021, Appellant filed an omnibus

pretrial suppression motion challenging the legality of the traffic stop as well

as the ensuing search and seizure. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court

denied Appellant’s suppression motion on August 5, 2021. That same day,

Appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial.

       As noted, the trial court found Appellant guilty of PWID, possession of a

controlled substance, possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal

use, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on roadways laned for

traffic – driving within single lane.          Appellant was found not guilty of

obstructing administration of law or other government function.2             On

September 27, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term

of time-served to 23 months’ imprisonment.            Appellant was immediately

paroled. This timely appeal followed on October 25, 2021.3

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              A.     Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s
                     motion to suppress where the use of a [LPR
                     system] to track Appellant’s movements
                     constitutes a search?

              B.     Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s
                     motion to suppress where the search of

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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                   Appellant’s vehicle was not justified as a
                   reasonable inventory search?

Appellant’s brief at 9.

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a

suppression motion is well settled.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court’s factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

      Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his

suppression motion because the use of historical LPR data to track and locate

his vehicle constituted a search subject to the protections of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant’s brief at 18.

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       Relying, in part, on the United State Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012),4 Appellant contends that he possessed

“a reasonable expectation of privacy in his daily movements and in being able

to drive around in his [vehicle] without being followed.” Appellant’s Brief at

14-15. Appellant avers that LPR data “was used to track [his] movements

and to ultimately follow him and surveil him in hopes that he would be caught

in the commission of a crime.” Id. at 15. Appellant argues that because he

“had an expectation of privacy in the movement of his vehicle … the extensive,

electronic tracking and monitoring of his movements constitutes a search”

that was conducted in violation of both the United States and Pennsylvania

Constitutions. Id. at 18. We disagree.

       “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”          Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation

____________________________________________

4 In Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that “the [g]overnment’s

installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitute[d] a search” for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (footnote omitted). In so ruling,
the Jones Court reasoned that a Fourth Amendment search occurred because
the government physically intruded upon a constitutionally protected area,
namely the target’s vehicle, when the government physically attached a GPS
tracking device to the vehicle. Id. at 404-405, 413-414.

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marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009); see also U.S.

Const. amend. IV.5

       This Court has recognized that “[t]he protection of the Fourth

Amendment does not depend on a property right in the invaded place but does

depend on whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment

has    a   legitimate     expectation     of   privacy   in   the   invaded   place.”

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 166 A.3d 1249, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1207 (Pa. 2018).

              To prevail on a suppression motion, a defendant must
              demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
              area searched or effects seized, and such expectation
              cannot be established where a defendant has
              meaningfully abdicated his control, ownership or
              possessory interest.

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation and

bracket omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 856 (Pa. 2019), cert. denied,

___U.S.___, 140 S.Ct. 2650 (2020).

____________________________________________

5 Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as

follows:

              The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
              papers and possessions from unreasonable searches
              and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or
              to seize any person or things shall issue without
              describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
              probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
              subscribed to by the affiant.

Pa Const. art. I, § 8.

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      It is well-established that,

            [a]n expectation of privacy is present when the
            individual, by his conduct, exhibits an actual
            (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the
            subjective expectation is one that society is prepared
            to recognize as reasonable. The constitutional
            legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not
            dependent on the subjective intent of the individual
            asserting the right but on whether the expectation is
            reasonable in light of all the surrounding
            circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc)

(citations omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court concluded that the LPR system used by the

Bensalem Township Police Department to monitor Appellant’s vehicle

movement did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, nor was

it the functional equivalent of the GPS tracking device at issue in Jones.

      Specifically, the trial court reasoned as follows:

            In this case, there is no expectation of privacy in a
            license plate, as they are often scanned throughout
            the normal course of traffic. Further, an LPR scans
            and gathers license plate information with no physical
            intrusion onto the drivers’ property.        Lastly, no
            caselaw in Pennsylvania equate an LPR with a GPS
            tracking device because this is an issue of first
            impression. While this Court finds the practice of
            reading and compiling license plate information
            troubling, it determined that the facts in this case are
            insufficient to establish the use of an LPR as the
            equivalent of physically placing a GPS device on a car.
            Therefore, because this Court did not find that the
            utilization of an LPR constitutes a search under the
            Fourth Amendment, this Court did not err in denying
            Appellant’s motion to suppress.

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Trial court opinion, 12/16/21 at 9 (footnote and extraneous capitalization

omitted).6

       Because the purpose of a license plate is to provide public information

and is in plain view on a vehicle, Appellant does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in his movements captured by the LPR system. Thus,

we decline to find that Bensalem Township Police Department’s use of an LPR

system data to track and, ultimately, locate Appellant’s vehicle constituted a

“search” under the Fourth Amendment.

       We find this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d

622 (Pa.Super. 2020), affirmed, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied,

___U.S.___, 142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022), instructive. In Dunkins, a panel of this

court held that Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches

did not entitle defendant to suppression of cell site location information

(“CSLI”) used by law enforcement to determine defendant’s location during

robbery.     Id. at 631.     The Dunkins Court concluded that the defendant

authorized his college to collect and share CSLI when he consented to college’s

internet use policy, which stated that they had right to share internet data

transmitted over institutional assets. Id.

____________________________________________

6 We decline to adopt that portion of the suppression court’s reasoning that

“…the practice of reading and compiling license plate information [is]
troubling.” See trial court opinion, 12/16/21 at 9.

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      In affirming this decision on appeal, our Supreme Court in Dunkins

reasoned that:

            To prevail on a suppression motion implicating the
            Fourth    Amendment,      a     defendant     must
            demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy
            in the area searched or effects seized, and such
            expectation cannot be established where a defendant
            has meaningfully abdicated his control, ownership or
            possessory interest.

Dunkins, 263 A.3d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis

added).

      Although not binding on this Court, the decision of the Federal District

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Bowers,

2021 WL 4775977 (W.D.Pa. 2021), is persuasive. The Bowers Court held

that the defendant failed to meet his burden to show that he has a reasonable

expectation of privacy in his location and physical movement as captured

through LPR technology, because LPR data did not provide “near-perfect

surveillance” of the vehicle, unlike CSLI, and was more akin to security camera

footage. Id. at *3-4. Thus, the acquisition of this LPR data “was not a search

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

      Likewise, the recent decision of the Federal District Court for New Jersey

in United States v. Graham, 2022 WL 4132488 (D.N.J. 2022), is instructive.

The Graham Court held that law enforcement’s use of an automated LPR

database did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, and that “[d]efendant has failed to meet his burden to show that

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he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location and physical

movement as captured through ALPR.” Id. at *5, citing Bowers.

      Similarly, in the instant matter, Appellant cannot reasonably prevail on

his claim that he was subjected to an illegal search under the Fourth

Amendment. Appellant clearly did not maintain an expectation of privacy

for the license plate number, which is attached in plain view to the exterior

of his rental vehicle and which he voluntarily drove, nor did he possess an

expectation of privacy in the location of his vehicle on a public thoroughfare.

      In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the United States

Supreme Court has held that the Government conducts a “search” within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it “accesses historical cell phone

records   that   provide   a   comprehensive    chronicle   of   the   user’s   past

movements.” Carpenter v. U.S., ___U.S.___, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).

The Carpenter Court explained that because individuals “compulsively carry

cell phones with them all the time,” tracking the location of a cell phone

provides “near perfect surveillance.”    Id. at 2218.       The Carpenter Court

reasoned that the all-encompassing and revealing nature of historical CSLI

data collected over a period of time implicates privacy rights protected by the

Fourth Amendment.      Id. at 2219-2220.       Thus, an “individual maintains a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movement as

captured through CSLI.” Id. at 2217.

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      Carpenter, however, is distinguishable from the instant matter, as the

data retrieved by the LPR system was clearly not as pervasive as CSLI data

captured in that case. See Bowers, supra; Graham, supra. As the Federal

District Court for New Jersey explained in Graham:

            In contrast to CSLI and GPS technology, however,
            courts have held that law enforcement’s use of the
            [automated LPR] database does not infringe upon an
            individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy because
            it does not reveal intimate details of an individual’s
            daily life, nor does it track a person’s every
            movement[.]

Graham, 2022 WL 4132488 at *5 (citations omitted).

      Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly denied

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless search

of the LPR database and find that the LPR database is not the equivalent of

cell site location information data.

      Appellant next argues that “the trial court erred in denying [his] motion

to suppress because the search of [his] vehicle was not justified as a

reasonable inventory search.”     Appellant’s brief at 19.   Appellant contends

that “the search was not reasonable because it was for purposes of

investigation and not for the protection of Appellant or the Bensalem Township

Police Department.” Id. at 22. We disagree.

      As noted, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from

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unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Pa Const. art.

I, § 8.

           Generally, law enforcement must obtain a warrant
           prior to conducting a search; however, there are
           certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. One
           such exception, and the one at issue in the case sub
           judice, is an inventory search.

           The purpose of an inventory search is not to uncover
           criminal evidence, but to safeguard items taken into
           police custody in order to benefit both the police and
           the defendant. In the seminal case of [South Dakota
           v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)], the [United
           Stated Supreme] Court observed that inventory
           searches of impounded vehicles serve several
           purposes, including (1) protection of the owner’s
           property while it remains in police custody; (2)
           protection of the police against claims or disputes over
           lost or stolen property; (3) protection of the police
           from potential danger; and (4) assisting the police in
           determining whether the vehicle was stolen and then
           abandoned.

           An inventory search of an automobile is permissible
           when (1) the police have lawfully impounded the
           vehicle; and (2) the police have acted in accordance
           with a reasonable, standard policy of routinely
           securing and inventorying the contents of the
           impounded vehicle. In Commonwealth v. Henley,
           [909 A.2d 352 (Pa.Super. 2006) (en banc), appeal
           denied, 927 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2007)], the Pennsylvania
           Superior Court, citing Opperman, explained:

              In determining whether a proper inventory
              search has occurred, the first inquiry is
              whether the police have lawfully impounded
              the automobile, i.e., have lawful custody of the
              automobile. The authority of the police to
              impound vehicles derives from the police’s
              reasonable community care-taking functions.
              Such functions include removing disabled or
              damaged     vehicles    from    the    highway,

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               impounding automobiles which violate parking
               ordinances (thereby jeopardizing public safety
               and efficient traffic flow), and protecting the
               community’s safety.

               The second inquiry is whether the police have
               conducted a reasonable inventory search. An
               inventory search is reasonable if it is
               conducted pursuant to reasonable standard
               police procedures and in good faith and not for
               the sole purpose of investigation.

           A protective vehicle search conducted in accordance
           with standard police department procedures assures
           that the intrusion [is] limited in scope to the extent
           necessary to carry out the caretaking function.

Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 102-103 (Pa. 2013) (internal

quotation marks, footnote, and pinpoint citations omitted).

     Here, the trial court opined that the Bensalem Township Police

Department conducted a good faith inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle

that was reasonable pursuant to standard police procedures:

           In this case, Appellant was detained due to his failure
           to cooperate with the officers and their concern that
           he was a flight risk. As such, no one was present to
           operate his vehicle. Given that Appellant was stopped
           at an unsafe location; as cars trying to pass by would
           have had to move into oncoming traffic, the vehicle
           had to be impounded. Per Bensalem Police
           Department’s policy, when a vehicle is impounded,
           officers must complete an inventory search at the
           scene beforehand.        An inventory search requires
           officers to list all possessions and valuables found in
           the vehicle to ensure no item will be lost or damaged.
           The purpose of these inventory searches is not to
           obtain or collect evidence. Here, the inventory search
           was reasonable, as the car had to be impounded and
           policy requires officers to first note what items are
           inside. Therefore, this Court did not err in denying

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            Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

Trial court opinion, 12/16/21 at 10 (citations omitted).

      Upon review, we find the record supports the trial court’s findings and

adopt these well-reasoned conclusions as our own.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s September 27,

2021 judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      P.J. Panella joins.

      Judge Olson files a Dissenting Opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2023

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