Court Opinion

ID: 9771789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:53:29.065026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:36.768641
License: Public Domain

HOYT, Justice,
concurring.
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of point of error one because it gives the appearance that more than one offense occurred. On May 1, 1985, the appellant along with a co-defendant robbed a business establishment. The facts show that only the establishment was robbed, although separate indictments were returned *147naming the two attendants as complainants.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has previously addressed the situation where a single violation resulted in separate indictments and complainants. Ex parte Crosby, 703 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). In Ex parte Crosby, the defendant broke into the home of W.A. and Mary Thurston and after causing serious bodily injury to both, stole Mr. Thurston’s wallet. The State indicted the defendant for aggravated robbery of Mr. Thurston and named him as the complainant in one case, while simultaneously naming Mrs. Thurston as the complainant in a second robbery case. Because both indictments charged violation of the same statutory provision, and because theft was an integral part of the charged offense, i.e., robbery of Mr. Thur-ston, only one conviction could stand. Id.
In the case at bar, the appellant was indicted twice for a single robbery of a business establishment. While prosecution to judgment on either may act as a bar to prosecution on the other, neither could be subject to the Speedy Trial Act. Once the appellant was successfully indicted, any subsequent indictment for the same offense may be subject to a motion to quash, but not the Speedy Trial Act. The second indictment’s genesis, for speedy trial bar purposes, would be the same as that of the first indictment. See Robinson v. State, 707 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ward v. State, 659 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Because the Speedy Trial Act did not apply to the first indictment, it would be inapplicable to the second.
I would simply hold that art. 28.061 of the act is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and whether the appellant made an art. 28.061 objection below is immaterial.
With this exception, I concur in the majority opinion.