Court Opinion

ID: 9965375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 15:01:00.356306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:56.176133
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2063   Document: 48     Page: 1   Filed: 05/02/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

  KIRSCH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
                 Appellant

                            v.

                GAF MATERIALS LLC,
                        Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-2063
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021-
 00192.
                  ______________________

                  Decided: May 2, 2024
                 ______________________

    AMY HAYDEN, Russ August & Kabat, Los Angeles, CA,
 argued for appellant. Also represented by MARC A.
 FENSTER, JONATHAN MA, BENJAMIN T. WANG.

     JOHN NEUKOM, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, San Fran-
 cisco, CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by
 EDWARD TULIN, Gish PLLC, New York, NY.
                 ______________________

     Before PROST, BRYSON, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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                                         GAF MATERIALS LLC

 STARK, Circuit Judge.
      Patent owner Kirsch Research and Development, LLC
 (“Kirsch”) appeals a final written decision of the U.S. Pa-
 tent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in an inter partes
 review (“IPR”) that found all claims of its U.S. Patent No.
 6,308,482 (“’482 patent”) unpatentable over prior art. We
 affirm.
                               I
      Kirsch’s ’482 patent, “Reinforced Roof Underlayment
 and Method of Making the Same,” “relates generally to a
 weather-resistive barrier for a roofing structure, and spe-
 cifically to a reinforced roof underlayment having an im-
 proved strength and durability to provide a waterproof
 layer resistive to deterioration from external elements.”
 ’482 patent 1:13-17. The patent describes a reinforced
 “roofing underlayment . . . positioned between a roof sup-
 port structure and an overlayment” (e.g., shingles). Id. at
 2:46-48. The underlayment has “an interwoven scrim with
 at least one layer of waterproof material affixed thereto,”
 where “[t]he scrim comprises a mesh of interwoven strands
 of thermoplastic having a tensile strength sufficient to re-
 sist tearing.” Id. at 2:36-39.
     In an exemplary embodiment of the underlayment, two
 “layers of waterproof material 14 [are] affixed to both sides
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 of the reinforcing scrim 12,” as shown in Figure 1, repro-
 duced below. Id. at 3:63-64.

     The layer of “waterproof material 14 is preferably a
 layer of thermoplastic film which is extruded over each side
 of the scrim 12, so that the reinforcing scrim 12 is sand-
 wiched between the two thermoplastic layers 14.” Id. at
 3:67-4:3. The specification describes this sandwiching ar-
 rangement as the preferred embodiment, id. at 3:66-4:5,
 but also notes that “certain applications may allow the re-
 inforcing scrim 12 to have only one of its sides coated with
 a thermoplastic layer 14.” Id. at 4:6-8. Furthermore, while
 the underlayment “is preferably formed by co-extruding
 layers of thermoplastic film 14 over the reinforcing scrim
 12, . . . it is understood that the thermoplastic layers 14
 may be affixed to the reinforcing scrim 12 using an adhe-
 sive or any other manner of attachment.” Id. at 4:10-15.
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     As illustrated in Figure 3, reproduced below, the un-
 derlayment may also include additional layers, including
 “a slip-resistant surface 30” that “prevent[s] a person from
 slipping” and a “radiant barrier layer 32 preferably com-
 pris[ing] a metalized layer” that “reflect[s] solar energy.”
 Id. at 4:24-38.

     Representative claim 1 recites:
     1. A roofing underlayment positioned between a
        roof support structure and an overlayment,
        comprising:
            a reinforcing scrim of interwoven strands
            for supporting tensile forces in multiple di-
            rections; and
            at least one layer of thermoplastic material
            affixed to a side of the reinforcing scrim by
            extrusion lamination for providing a
            weather-resistant barrier.
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 Id. at 7:21-27 (emphasis added).
     GAF Materials LLC (“GAF”) petitioned for IPR of all
 claims of the ’482 patent based on several prior art refer-
 ences including, as relevant here, U.S. Patent No.
 4,684,568 to Lou (“Lou”). Lou describes “a process for mak-
 ing a coated fabric that would be suitable for use . . . as a
 roofing-tile underlayment.” J.A. 5193 at 1:37-40. This pro-
 cess “includes the steps of applying a continuous coating of
 polypropylene to a surface of a vapor-and-liquid-permea-
 ble, base sheet of synthetic organic fibers and then calen-
 dering [i.e., using rollers to flatten] the coated surface.” Id.
 at 1:46-49. Lou further provides that “[a]lthough the coat-
 ing and calendering steps are depicted as separate opera-
 tions in the drawing, the steps can be performed as a
 continuous process.” Id. at 2:50-52. The coating and cal-
 endering steps are illustrated in Lou’s Figures 1 and 2, re-
 spectively, reproduced below:

 J.A. 5192.
     In its petition, GAF argued that the ’482 patent’s “af-
 fixed . . . by extrusion lamination” limitation was a prod-
 uct-by-process claim element that “would not have been
 expected to impart any distinctive structural or functional
 characteristics to the final underlayment product.” J.A.
 1030. Hence, in GAF’s view, the challenged claims of the
 ’482 patent could be found anticipated even if no prior art
 disclosed the claimed process. GAF’s petition further
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 argued that “Lou also discloses the process step of affixing
 the thermoplastic material by extrusion lamination” by de-
 scribing an extruder depositing “a thin continuous coating
 [of polypropylene polymer] on the surface of sheet 1,” which
 is then “pressed by a calendaring nip formed by heated roll
 50 and unheated backup roll 60.” J.A. 1031.
     Kirsch, in its patent owner response, argued against
 GAF’s product-by-process interpretation of claim 1, con-
 tending that “extrusion lamination is not a process limita-
 tion because a product made by extrusion lamination
 exhibits particular structural features, such as superior
 bonding of the layers.” J.A. 1217. Kirsch further pointed
 to a claim construction order issued in the Eastern District
 of Texas, which found that “extrusion lamination” was not
 a product-by-process limitation. See J.A. 1219; see also J.A.
 6763-64.
     Over the course of the IPR proceedings, and particu-
 larly after the Board in its institution decision advised the
 parties that “certain of Patent Owner’s arguments . . . ap-
 pear to present a potentially closely related issue of claim
 construction,” J.A. 1162, the parties’ dispute over the scope
 of the “affixed . . . by extrusion lamination” limitation
 evolved. The issue was thoroughly briefed, including in
 several responses, replies, and expert reports filed by each
 party, and was argued during the oral hearing before the
 Board.
      In its final written decision, the Board found that the
 parties’ dispute over the proper interpretation of the “ex-
 trusion lamination” limitation “present[ed] an implied is-
 sue of claim construction” which it must resolve. J.A. 12.
 To do so, the Board first rejected GAF’s contention that the
 “extrusion lamination” limitation is a product-by-process
 claim element, noting that this conclusion was “consistent
 with the claim construction orders entered by the U.S. Dis-
 trict Court” in litigation involving the ’482 patent. J.A. 20.
 Because GAF has not challenged on appeal the Board’s
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 decision not to construe the term as a product-by-process
 limitation, it is undisputed before us that the “extrusion
 lamination” term is not a product-by-process limitation.
     The Board then addressed what it understood to be the
 parties’ competing proposed constructions. Kirsch con-
 tended that the extrusion lamination limitation of claim 1
 requires an extruded molten polymer (i.e., the claimed
 thermoplastic material) to “join (referred to in the art as
 ‘laminating’) different structures together.”        J.A. 16.
 Therefore, according to Kirsch, claim 1 requires at least
 three distinct layers: the scrim, the thermoplastic material,
 and a third layer joined to the scrim by the thermoplastic
 material. Kirsch frequently refers to this third layer as ei-
 ther the “slip-resistant layer” or “metallized layer” (i.e., the
 radiation barrier layer) described in the specification. See
 J.A. 16 (“[T]he polymer melt is used to laminate the rein-
 forcing scrim with a top layer . . . such as a slip-resistant
 material . . . or a metallized layer.”). GAF countered that
 only two layers are necessary – the scrim and the thermo-
 plastic material – because the thermoplastic material itself
 is both a layer and a binder. See J.A. 18 (“[T]he experts
 agree on how extrusion lamination is defined in terms of
 requiring . . . binding that extrudate/polymer melt to at
 least a substrate/other layer.”) (internal quotation marks
 omitted).
     Understanding that the parties principally disputed
 whether the “extrusion lamination” term of claim 1 would
 read on a two-layer product, as GAF argued, or would only
 cover products containing three or more layers, which was
 Kirsch’s contention, the Board sided with GAF. Reviewing
 both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the Board re-
 jected Kirsch’s argument “that the recitation in claim 1 of
 ‘extrusion lamination’ requires that the recited roofing un-
 derlayment must include an additional layer besides the
 scrim and the thermoplastic material.” J.A. 20. The Board
 further reasoned that while “claim 1 does not exclude the
 presence of additional layers in the roofing underlayment[,]
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 . . . we find nothing in the language of the claims or in the
 specification of the ’482 patent that requires claim 1 to in-
 clude such additional layer.” Id. (emphasis in original).
 According to the Board, a two-layer product was also con-
 sistent with the addition of the “extrusion lamination” lim-
 itation during prosecution because it “specifies how the
 recited thermoplastic material must be affixed . . . but does
 not alter the recited function of the thermoplastic mate-
 rial.” J.A. 22 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
 in original). Lastly, the Board credited GAF’s expert, Mr.
 Kaczkowski, who opined that extrusion coating would be
 considered by a person of ordinary skill in the art as being
 a type of extrusion lamination “if, for example, it results in
 the extrudate being permanently bonded to the substrate.”
 J.A. 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). On this basis,
 the Board disagreed with Kirsch’s insistence that extrusion
 coating and extrusion lamination are mutually exclusive
 processes. Id.
     Applying its interpretation of the “extrusion lamina-
 tion” limitation, as permitting a two-layer embodiment and
 not being mutually exclusive from extrusion coating, the
 Board found that all claims of the ’482 patent were either
 anticipated by Lou or obvious over combinations that in-
 cluded Lou. Specifically, the Board found that Lou dis-
 closed the “affixed . . . by extrusion lamination” limitation
 because “Lou’s method extrudes molten polymer[,] . . . uses
 pressure, not merely a coating process, and expressly pro-
 vides that the coating and calendering steps can be per-
 formed as a continuous process.” J.A. 38. In the Board’s
 view, by describing a process of extruding polymer onto a
 sheet and applying heat and pressure, Lou disclosed em-
 bodiments “substantially the same as embodiments de-
 scribed in the specification of the ’482 patent” and, hence,
 satisfied the proper construction of “extrusion lamination.”
 Id.
    Kirsch timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
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                                II
       Kirsch raises three issues on appeal. First, Kirsch ar-
 gues that the Board committed procedural error by resolv-
 ing a claim construction dispute without providing Kirsch
 adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second,
 Kirsch challenges the Board’s construction of the “affixed
 . . . by extrusion lamination” claim term. Finally, Kirsch
 contends that the Board’s finding that the ’482 patents are
 anticipated by Lou is not supported by substantial evi-
 dence. We address, and reject, each of Kirsch’s arguments
 in turn.
                                A
     Kirsch argues that the Board abused its discretion by
 construing the “extrusion lamination” limitation despite
 not being expressly asked to do so in GAF’s petition. We
 disagree. IPR proceedings are governed by the Adminis-
 trative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Under
 the APA, we must “hold unlawful and set aside agency ac-
 tion, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, ca-
 pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
 accordance with law,” made “without observance of proce-
 dure required by law,” or “unsupported by substantial evi-
 dence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). An IPR petitioner is required to
 identify in its petition any claim term for which it proposes
 a construction.        See 35 U.S.C. § 312; 37 C.F.R.
 § 42.104(b)(3). GAF acknowledges that it did not explicitly
 argue in its petition for construction of the “extrusion lam-
 ination” term. This is not dispositive of the parties’ dis-
 pute, however.
     Instead, as Kirsch acknowledges, see Appellant Br. at
 41, under certain circumstances “the Board may adopt a
 claim construction of a disputed term that neither party
 proposes without running afoul of the APA.” Qualcomm
 Inc. v. Intel Corp., 6 F.4th 1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2021). In
 particular, the Board is permitted to adopt a claim con-
 struction when both parties “dispute[] the meaning and
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 scope of [a limitation] during the IPR proceeding,” even if
 no party expressly requests construction. Google LLC
 v. EcoFactor, Inc., 92 F.4th 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2024). As
 long as the parties are “afforded both notice and oppor-
 tunity to address” the proper interpretation of such a dis-
 puted claim term, the Board’s construction does not violate
 the APA. See id.
      Here, it was clear from GAF’s petition and Kirsch’s re-
 sponse that the parties had a dispute over the proper con-
 struction of the “extrusion lamination” term. And Kirsch
 was provided ample notice of and opportunity to address
 the issue of the term’s proper construction. In addition to
 the parties debating the proper interpretation of the term
 in their regular briefing (i.e., petition, patent owner re-
 sponse, reply) and at the oral hearing, the Board addition-
 ally permitted each party to submit an extra brief
 specifically addressing the proper construction of extrusion
 lamination. This was consistent with the notice the Board
 provided the parties at least as early as the institution de-
 cision, when it observed that “certain of [Kirsch’s] argu-
 ments . . . appear to present a potentially closely related
 issue of claim construction, underdeveloped on the present
 record, with respect to the term ‘extrusion lamination.’”
 J.A. 1162. The Board therefore advised that “[t]he parties
 should address this term, in accordance with our Rules,
 during trial to the extent they believe it necessary.” Id.
      Kirsch’s suggestion that it was surprised by the
 Board’s treatment of the claim construction dispute is un-
 persuasive. Kirsch itself had flagged the claim construc-
 tion issue in its patent owner response, writing: “Although
 [GAF] and [its expert] Mr. Kaczkowski do not offer any
 claim constructions in this IPR, it is clear that both have a
 different definition of ‘extrusion lamination’ than how a
 POSITA would understand the term.” J.A. 1225-26. Con-
 sistent with Kirsch’s statement notifying the Board that it
 had a claim construction dispute before it, Kirsch’s counsel
 explicitly told the Board at oral hearing that the “extrusion
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 lamination” term “needs to be construed,” adding that
 Kirsch “took the position in our papers that it should be
 construed as the plain and ordinary meaning which . . . re-
 quires multiple layers.” J.A. 1588 at 33:13-16. Plainly,
 again, Kirsch had notice and an opportunity to be heard on
 the claim construction dispute.
     Kirsch raises one additional procedural objection. It
 argues that the Board failed to include a “pressing” re-
 quirement in its construction of the “extrusion lamination”
 term. Kirsch contends that both parties agreed that the
 proper construction of “extrusion lamination” includes a
 “pressing” requirement (e.g., extruding the thermoplastic
 material onto the scrim and pressing them together to bind
 them), yet the Board omitted it without explanation. We
 perceive no error. Instead, we understand the Board’s con-
 struction as implicitly including a pressing requirement.
 This seems evident from, for example, the Board’s recogni-
 tion that both parties’ experts agreed “extrusion lamina-
 tion” includes “extrusion coating” that results in a
 permanent bonding of “extrudate/polymer melt to at least
 a substrate/other layer,” when such permanence is accom-
 plished “through at least the act of pressing.” J.A. 18.
 When the Board credited one of these experts to later con-
 clude that “extrusion coating” is a type of “extrusion lami-
 nation” when it “results in the extrudate being
 permanently bonded to the substrate,” J.A. 23, the Board
 also embraced the expert’s agreed-upon pressure require-
 ment. That the Board understood its construction to in-
 clude a pressure requirement is further confirmed by its
 subsequent conclusion that Lou, which teaches extrusion
 and pressing (referred to in Lou as calendering), antici-
 pates the challenged claims. J.A. 26.
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                              B
     We next consider whether the Board properly con-
 strued the disputed claim term. We conclude that it did.
     We review the Board’s claim construction de novo and
 any subsidiary factual findings based on extrinsic evidence
 for substantial evidence. See Google, 92 F.4th at 1054.
 Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary
 meaning, which is the meaning understood by one of ordi-
 nary skill in the art when read in the context of the claims,
 specification, and prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH
 Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a rea-
 sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
 clusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.
 197, 229 (1938).
     Addressing the parties’ disputes, the Board construed
 “at least one layer of thermoplastic material affixed to a
 side of the reinforcing scrim by extrusion lamination” (em-
 phasis added) as (i) requiring only two layers (a scrim and
 a thermoplastic material) while permitting a third or addi-
 tional layers, and (ii) not being mutually exclusive from
 “extrusion coating.” We agree with the Board that both the
 intrinsic and extrinsic evidence support its construction.
     The plain language of claim 1 is sufficiently broad to
 encompass embodiments that contain only two layers – a
 scrim and thermoplastic material – and does not require a
 third layer (e.g., a slip-resistant layer or radiant barrier
 layer) joined to the scrim. Claim 1 is a “comprising” claim
 that recites the following necessary structures: “a reinforc-
 ing scrim . . . and at least one layer of thermoplastic mate-
 rial affixed to a side of the reinforcing scrim by extrusion
 lamination for providing a weather-resistant barrier.” ’482
 patent 6:23-27 (emphasis added). Clearly, this language
 requires at least a reinforcing scrim layer and at least one
 layer of thermoplastic material; equally clearly, this lan-
 guage permits additional layers of thermoplastic material
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 and, being a comprising claim, additional layers generally.
 But no language in claim 1 requires any such additional
 layers.
      The specification, which never uses the terms “extru-
 sion lamination” or “extrusion coating,” is largely unhelpful
 in arriving at the proper construction of “extrusion lamina-
 tion.” The specification describes only multilayer embodi-
 ments, but not in a manner that excludes a two-layer
 embodiment. 1 At least some of these multilayer embodi-
 ments contain third (and more) layers that are expressly
 claimed in claims depending from claim 1. See, e.g., id. at
 6:28-35 (claim 2 adding “a layer of slip-resistant material”
 and claim 4 adding “a radiant barrier layer”); J.A. 1229
 (Kirsch’s patent owner preliminary response arguing that
 “the polymer melt is used to laminate the reinforcing scrim
 with . . . a slip-resistant material . . . or a metallized layer
 [i.e., radiant barrier layer]”); see also Philips, 415 F.3d at
 1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a par-
 ticular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the lim-
 itation in question is not present in the independent
 claim.”).
     As the Board observed, if we adopted Kirsch’s proposed
 construction, which would require claim 1 to include one or
 more of these types of third layers, claims 2 and 4 “would
 make little sense.” J.A. 21.
     Next, we consider the prosecution history. Claim 1 as
 originally proposed did not include the “extrusion lamina-
 tion” language.     See J.A. 5033 at 11:3-8.        During

     1   During oral argument, GAF’s counsel conceded
 that all figures in the specification show only multilayer
 (i.e., more than two layers) embodiments. Oral Arg. at
 24:05-25,        available        at:     https://oralargu-
 ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-2063_0307202
 4.mp3.
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 prosecution, claim 1 was amended to include the disputed
 term in an effort to overcome a rejection based on prior art
 that employed a calendering process. In remarks accom-
 panying the amendment, Kirsch distinguished extrusion
 lamination, “which bonds the various layers together,”
 from the prior art calendering, which “affixes the various
 layers together.” J.A. 5071 (emphasis added). We agree
 with the Board that this amendment, and the applicant’s
 explanation of it, focuses on “how the recited ‘thermoplastic
 material’ must be ‘affixed’” rather than how many layers
 must be affixed together, and therefore contains “nothing
 to suggest that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
 have understood that amendment to add a requirement of
 an additional layer of thermoplastic material, separate and
 apart from the ‘at least one layer of thermoplastic material’
 already recited in the original claim.” J.A. 22. In sum,
 then, we agree with the Board that a skilled artisan would
 view the intrinsic evidence, taken as a whole, as supporting
 the Board’s construction of “extrusion lamination” (requir-
 ing only two or more layers) and not the narrower construc-
 tion advocated by Kirsch (requiring at least three layers).
     The extrinsic evidence the Board considered only adds
 to our confidence in this conclusion. The Board relied on
 GAF’s expert for its findings on the relationship between
 “extrusion lamination” and “extrusion coating.” Substan-
 tial evidence supports the Board’s determination that a
 person of skill in the art would understand the “extrusion
 lamination” of claim 1 not to be mutually exclusive from
 what such an artisan would understand to be “extrusion
 coating.” The Board was free to credit, as it did, the testi-
 mony of GAF’s expert, Mr. Kaczkowski, who explained that
 “an extrusion coating process, which results in the extru-
 date being permanently bonded to the substrate[,] would
 be understood, by a person of ordinary skill in the art, to be
 extrusion lamination.” J.A. 6523 at 28:17-20; see J.A. 23;
 see also Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
 2010) (“We defer to the Board’s findings concerning the
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 credibility of expert witnesses.”). Kirsch’s contention that
 its own evidence could support the opposite conclusion does
 not alter our holding. To the contrary, where, as here, two
 “inconsistent conclusions may be reasonably drawn from
 the evidence in record, [the Board’s] decision to favor one
 conclusion over the other is the epitome of a decision that
 must be sustained upon review for substantial evidence.”
 Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d
 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
      Lastly, Kirsch argues that the Board erred in finding
 that its adopted construction was consistent with the con-
 struction adopted by the Eastern District of Texas. In eval-
 uating the same “extrusion lamination” limitation from the
 same patent claim, the district court held that the proper
 construction was “by being melted in an extruder, and
 forced onto the reinforcing scrim through a die of the ex-
 truder.” J.A. 6764. This construction is fully consistent
 with the Board’s construction, as it results in a claim scope
 that encompasses a two-layer product in which the thermo-
 plastic material has been “melted in an extruder, and
 forced onto the reinforcing scrim through a die of the ex-
 truder,” and affixed to no additional layers. The district
 court’s construction also does not exclude extrusion coat-
 ing, as it includes “coating a surface with a polymer that is
 extruded,” which is the construction of “extrusion coating”
 provided by Kirsch’s own expert. J.A. 6660. Finally, we
 are also unpersuaded by Kirsch’s speculative contention
 that the Board overlooked pertinent context from the dis-
 trict court litigation.
     Thus, again, the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence sup-
 port the Board’s construction of “extrusion lamination,”
 which neither limits the scope of claim 1 to embodiments
 containing three or more layers nor renders extrusion lam-
 ination and extrusion coating mutually exclusive.
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                              C
     Applying its construction, which we have now adopted
 as well, the Board found that prior art reference Lou antic-
 ipates the challenged claims of the ’482 patent. We find
 substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion. See
 HTC Corp. v. Cellular Commc’ns Equip., LLC, 877 F.3d
 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding anticipation, including
 whether prior art discloses every limitation, is question of
 fact reviewed for substantial evidence).
     Most of Kirsch’s challenges to the Board’s conclusion
 are dependent on our accepting its position on claim con-
 struction, and, hence, are of no consequence now that we
 have adopted that construction. The only additional argu-
 ment made by Kirsch concerns whether Lou discloses
 “pressing.” As we have explained, we understand the
 Board’s construction as implicitly including a “pressing” re-
 quirement. However, the Board’s finding that Lou met this
 requirement because “Lou also uses pressure, not merely a
 coating process,” is supported by substantial evidence. J.A.
 38; see also J.A. 5193 at 2:50-51 (Lou stating “the coating
 and calendering steps . . . can be performed as a continuous
 process”); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
 2011) (holding “what a reference teaches” is question of
 fact). Kirsch itself has recognized that calendering “uses
 hydraulic heat and pressure to join layer[s] together.” J.A.
 1217 (emphasis added). Therefore, Kirsch’s appellate chal-
 lenge fails.
                              III
     We have considered Kirsch’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm.
                        AFFIRMED