Court Opinion

ID: 9852494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:31:35.061634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.688869
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court of the United States and this court have consistently held that the validity of a search warrant, such as the one involved here, depends upon the information set out in the affidavit. In State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N. W. 2d 21, this court said: “In passing on validity of a search warrant the court may consider only information brought to the attention of the magistrate. For the affidavit of a tip from an informant to be sufficient the magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were' located where he claimed they were, and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible. Affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a common sense, realistic fashion.” (Emphasis ours.) The majority opinion here requotes most of that language, reaffirmed in State v. Glouser, ante p. 190, 226 N. W. 2d 328, but entirely omits the first sentence of the quotation.
In the case at bar there was ample evidence in the affidavit that the informant was credible, but there was no information as to any “of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were located where he claimed they were.” The majority opinion concludes that because apparently more than one informant had told the police that Jessie Brown was expecting a large shipment of heroin, therefore the number of informants justifies an inference of personal knowledge on the part of each of them. I can find no support anywhere for the conclusion that if there is more than one informant the affidavit does riot have to reflect any of the underlying circumstances from which any informant concluded that narcotics were located where he claimed they were. If that conclusion were true, any statement by an informant that narcotics were present at any location would be in itself sufficient *806to justify an inference of personal knowledge, and remove the necessity of showing any of the underlying circumstances except the previous reliability of the informant. The majority opinion recites that the evidence at the suppression hearing established that the informant actually had been in the house and had seen the heroin. That single fact, if contained in the affidavit, would have made it sufficient, but that information was not in the affidavit.
•• The issue becomes a clearcut one of whether this court may consider only information brought to the attention of the magistrate in the complaint and affidavit, or whether that information may be supported and supplemented by additional information not included in the affidavit. It is advisable, particularly in narcotics cases, to avoid any requirement that an affidavit must be so intimately detailed that it may reveal the identity or probable location of an informant. Nevertheless, it is only nécessary that an affidavit state the fact that an informant is or has been in a position to observe or know of activities at or around the location involved or by the individuals concerned sufficient to lead the police to reasonably conclude that the information given to them was “more substantial than a casual rumor or an accusation based merbly on an individual’s general reputation.”
• An affidavit for a search warrant such as the one involved here “must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common sense and realistic fashion.” Any common sense and realistic interpretation of the affidavit in this case demonstrates that the affidavit did not inform the magistrate of any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded thát the narcotics were located where he claimed they were. The majority opinion must therefore rest upon the fact that the evidence at the suppression hearing was sufficient to validate an otherwise insufficient affidavit. That conclusion may be entirely appropriate but it *807clearly departs from the rules previously followed by the Supreme Court of the' United States and by this court. Stripped óf excess verbiage, the affidavit here, insofar as “underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded” were concerned, was the same as the affidavit in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723. That case has not been overruled nor modified on the issue involved here.