Court Opinion

ID: 9384018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:39.25184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.792222
License: Public Domain

J-A05019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ANTWAN JOVAN WASHINGTON                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 575 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 4, 2022,
                in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003985-2018.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                           FILED MARCH 31, 2023

        Antwan Jovan Washington appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his pleas to murder of the third degree and two counts of

aggravated assault,1 an aggregate term of 27 to 55 years of imprisonment.

He challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing. We affirm.

        The sentencing court summarized the facts of this case:

              On July 31, 2018, several officers with the Allentown Police
        Department responded to a report of a shooting inside a residence
        located [in Allentown]. Inside the residence, police located
        Britney Garland (31), [C.M.] (16), and Adrien Welch (19), the
        victims, who were suffering from gunshot wounds. They were
        transported by ambulance to Lehigh Valley Hospital. [C.M.] was
        shot eight separate times, including five times in her torso, once
        in her right arm, and twice in [her] left arm. She was pronounced
        dead by physicians at the emergency room. Britney Garland was

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1).
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         shot multiple times in her legs and she suffered from a fracture to
         her right femur. Adrien Welch was shot once in his right leg.

               Investigating    officers  subsequently     learned    that
         [Washington] lived at the residence with Ms. Garland and her two
         children.   They ended their relationship earlier that week.
         [Washington] left to go to New York and told her to sell his car.
         He subsequently returned to the residence. Upon his return, he
         found Ms. Garland cooking a meal for Mr. Welch and [C.M.]. Mr.
         Welch and Ms. Garland were dating one another.

               [Washington] interacted with Ms. Garland and/or Mr. Welch,
         after which he proceeded up to the second floor. He procured a
         handgun from a bedroom, returned to the first floor, and began
         shooting, striking all three victims. [Washington] fled from the
         residence. He surrendered himself to the police at his former
         attorney’s office on August 2, 2018. The gun was recovered from
         a drop-down ceiling at [Washington’s sister’s apartment].

Sentencing Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 2–3.

         Police charged Washington with criminal homicide and two counts each

of attempted homicide and aggravated assault.             On August 19, 2021,

Washington entered guilty pleas to murder of the third degree and two counts

of aggravated assault. The only agreement was that his sentences for the two

counts of aggravated assault would run concurrently. The court scheduled

sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report

(PSI).

         On February 4, 2022, the sentencing court imposed sentence in this

case. At Count 1, murder of the third degree, the court sentenced Washington

to 20 to 40 years of imprisonment. At Count 4, aggravated assault, the court

sentenced Washington to 7 to 15 years of imprisonment.               At Count 5,

aggravated assault, the court sentenced Washington to 54 months to 10 years

of imprisonment. The court ordered that Washington’s sentences at Counts 1

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and 4 would run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 27 to 55

years of imprisonment.

     Washington moved to reconsider or modify his sentence on February

14, 2022. The sentencing court denied Washington’s motion the next day.

Washington timely appealed. Washington and the sentencing court complied

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

     Washington presents one issue for our review:

     Whether the lower court abused its discretion in imposing
     manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentences when the court
     failed to consider any significant mitigating factors, failed to apply
     and review all the necessary factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 9721(b) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d) or otherwise failed
     to set forth appropriate reasons for its decision other than those
     already considered in the definition of the offenses?

Washington’s Brief at 6.

     Because Washington challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing,

he must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by meeting four requirements:

     (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the
     issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the
     sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a
     separate section of the brief setting forth a concise statement of
     the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
     discretionary aspects of a sentence; and (4) presenting a
     substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
     appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or
     sentencing norms.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015)). Here,

Washington filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his issue, and included

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a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Furthermore, he raised a substantial

question by claiming that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence

and did not consider mitigating factors. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell,

117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Raven, 97

A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Therefore, Washington has invoked our

jurisdiction over his claim.

      Turning to the merits, we review a challenge to the sentencing court’s

exercise of discretion for an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v.

Aulisio, 253 A.3d 338, 344 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment;
      thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless
      the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
      In more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: An abuse of
      discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court
      might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of
      manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

             The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
      concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
      sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
      penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
      individual circumstances before it.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169–170 (Pa. Super.

2010)).

      In imposing sentence, a court is obligated to consider factors including

“the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant,” as well as the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

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§ 9721(b). A court that imposes a sentence outside the standard range of the

guidelines must state its reasons for doing so on the record.        Id.; see

Commonwealth v. Mrozik, 213 A.3d 273, 278 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 204

Pa. Code § 303.13(c)).

      When this Court reviews a sentence within the sentencing guidelines,

we must affirm unless “the case involves circumstances where the application

of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).

For a sentence outside the guidelines, we must affirm unless “the sentence is

unreasonable.” Id. § 9781(c)(3). We have concluded that a sentence is not

unreasonable where the sentencing court fully considered the factors before

it, even if the defendant disputes the weight given to those factors.

Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 12 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      Here, Washington argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion

by considering only the crime and impact on the victims, ignoring mitigating

factors such as his clean prior record and rehabilitative needs.      He also

contends that the court’s stated reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines

for his aggravated assault conviction are inadequate.        He disputes the

sentencing court’s perception of the “benefit” of his agreement to plead to

murder of the third degree.

      At sentencing, the court explained its reasoning as follows:

            All right. The record shall reflect the Court has thoroughly
      reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report along with all the
      attachments to that report which included the letters from the
      various family members on behalf of [C.M.], as well as the other
      accompanying documents including a mental health evaluation

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     which was completed sometime last year, doesn’t seem to have a
     date on it, but it was completed while [Washington] was in
     custody. I have also reviewed the letters which have been
     introduced as exhibits D-1 today, which were forwarded to me
     earlier, as well as the other photographs offered by the defense in
     exhibit D-2, and the photograph of [C.M.] as Commonwealth
     Exhibit 1.

           [Every day,] sad cases come before this Court and today is
     no different. The tragedy suffered from both sides cannot be
     doubted. It is very likely that you did not have any ill will toward
     [C.M.], Mr. Washington. But you, of course, are here and she is
     not. A number of your family members expressed the concern
     that you had been characterized as a monster, either in the media,
     which frankly I don’t ever recall seeing, or by other individuals.
     And you are not a monster, you are a living person who is here
     and [C.M.] is not. You will be able to have a relationship with your
     children. [C.M. will] not.

            There does seem to be some misunderstanding by some
     individuals, perhaps on both sides of this case, about the level of
     malevolence that the law requires to sustain a conviction of
     murder in the third-degree. Just to clarify for both sides, for
     murder of the third-degree—I am reading from the standard jury
     instruction, 15.2502C—[“]for murder of the third-degree a killing
     is with malice. If the perpetrator’s actions show his or [her
     wanton] and willful disregard of, and unjustified, extremely high
     risk that his or her conduct would result in death or serious bodily
     injury to another.

            [“]In this form of malice, the Commonwealth need not prove
     that the perpetrator specifically intended to kill another. The
     Commonwealth must prove however, that the perpetrator took
     action while consciously, that is knowingly disregarding, the most
     serious risk he or she was creating. By his or her disregard of that
     risk, the perpetrator demonstrated his or her extreme indifference
     to the value of human life.[”]          The second alternative for
     paragraph three in that instruction reads, “For murder of the third-
     degree, a killing is with malice [if] the perpetrator acts with a
     wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness
     of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty indicating
     an unjustified disregard for the probability of death, or great
     bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human
     life.”

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            In large part Mr. Washington, you received the benefit of
      the plea bargain because your case was pled as murder of the
      third-degree, instead as originally charged as murder of the first-
      degree, where you could have faced life in prison without parole.
      Your actions by sparing [C.M.’s] family of a trial to go through the
      ordeal of hearing that testimony are captured within that plea
      bargain. The injuries that you inflicted on Ms. Garland and Mr.
      Welch were obviously not as serious, still demonstrated at the
      very least a recklessness on your part toward their safety. Twice
      in the PSI you were quoted as saying, “You’d be speaking to the
      Court to explain those circumstances on that date.” I’m not sure
      I heard a complete explanation. But I understand that it was a
      confusing day for you. There may have been a variety of things
      that were affecting you on that date. And perhaps Ms. Garland
      was closest in saying the devil himself had some influence.

             The facts, even though as described as Ms. Garland would
      indicate, that even if Mr. Welch had a gun, after he fled you
      continued to fire. Both wounding Ms. Garland and killing [C.M.] I
      will take into account the admirable role you played for members
      of your family and other individuals in society in fashioning this
      sentence, but I also have to address the clear record of the
      repeated shots that wounded [C.M.], ultimately taking her life,
      that you inflicted.

N.T., Sentencing, 2/4/22, at 105–109.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The sentencing court’s

statements indicate that it considered Washington’s evidence in mitigation and

all required sentencing factors. Washington’s sentence for murder of the third

degree, while at the statutory maximum, was within the standard range. We

affirm this sentence because we do not find the application of the guidelines

to be clearly unreasonable.    As to Washington’s sentence for one count of

aggravated assault, the sentencing court stated that it based its deviation

from the standard range on the severe wounds that Washington caused by

repeated gunshots. We conclude that this was an adequate basis to impose

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a 7-to-15-year sentence, and the sentence is not unreasonable. We therefore

affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023

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