Court Opinion

ID: 9744814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:17:15.853545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.059940
License: Public Domain

SONENSHINE, J., Concurring.
I concur in the result but write separately because I cannot agree with most of the majority’s reasoning and find much of the dicta disturbing. Indeed, although the precise question we address is one of first impression, the answer is quite simple.
These indigent litigants are not entitled to taxpayer-funded counsel because they do not face the loss of physical liberty, and no other state or federal constitutional considerations mandate such representation.
As my brethren note, our United States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 [101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158-1260, 68 L.Ed.2d 640], held one has an absolute right to appointed counsel only when facing the deprivation of physical liberty. Such is not the case here because the county may not enforce a reimbursement judgment by contempt. (Crider v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 227, 228 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 757].)
Of course, that conclusion does not end the discussion but the result is the same. Indeed, the Lassiter court cautioned, “[A]s a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his [or her] right to appointed counsel.” (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 26 [101 S.Ct. at p. 2159].) It explained the presumption of no right to appointed counsel is weighed against “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” (Id. at p. 27 [101 S.Ct. at p. 2159].) The private interest at stake here is money which, simply stated, is not enough to even move the scale in favor of representation, let alone tip it.