Court Opinion

ID: 9461317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:11:29.158341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:59.737700
License: Public Domain

KILKENNY, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I fully concur in the majority’s disposition of the first grievance. However, I am unable to agree with the majority’s views on the second and third grievances and express my views on those subjects as follows:

*110
Second Grievance

Here, in my opinion, the district court erroneously left to the arbitrator the function of deciding whether the contract excluded the particular grievance from arbitration. In avoiding the issue, the court opined, “We cannot say as a matter of law that this grievance is non-arbitrable.” The court should have examined the contract and decided whether the totally unrelated termination of two employees, who were employed in different departments, should have been submitted to arbitration before a single arbitrator. Under International Union of Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 92 S.Ct. 1710, 32 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964); and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962), it was the duty of the district court to decide whether Article 14, section 3 of the agreement1 prohibited arbitration on the single grievance concerning the discharges of the employees Berg and Bohn. In my opinion, the court should have determined whether, in fact, the Union dropped the Bohn grievance and demanded arbitration on the Berg grievance only. The record is silent on this subject. As above stated, it was the function of the lower court to decide whether the parties had agreed to arbitration on this issue, as well as to speak on the scope of the arbitration clause. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra.

Third Grievance

Here again, the lower court failed to decide whether the grievance was subject to arbitration as required by Atkinson, Flair Builders and Wiley & Sons, Inc., supra. On this grievance, appellant relied upon the exclusionary clause in Article 14, section 4, which barred the arbitration of a grievance where the ap-pellee did not request an arbitration panel within the 60-day period mentioned in the exclusion.2 The district court held: “An arbitrator should decide the threshold question enroute to the merits.” I disagree. The court, rather than the arbitrator, should decide whether under the contract, the 60-day exclusion clause was intended to apply to a delay that may have been occasioned by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
I would vacate the judgment of the court on all three grievances and remand for further proceedings.

. “3. Each referral to arbitration shall embrace but one (1) such matter in dispute, unless otherwise stipulated by agreement between the Union and the Company.”

- “4. . . . However, the right to arbitrate any such dispute shall be deemed waived if, within sixty (60) days following the date upon which written demand for arbitration is made in accordance with Paragraph 2, the parties have not jointly selected an arbitrator. Likewise, the right to arbitrate any such dispute shall be deemed waived, if, within a period of six (6) months following the selection of an arbitrator as provided herein, or by the expiration date of this Agreement, whichever occurs first, a hearing before the arbitrator in such dispute has not taken place, provided the arbitrator selected is available during the specified period.”