Court Opinion

ID: 9462095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:31:50.986381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:24.015698
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision because I believe that a notice by the federal Environmental Protection Agency that a firm is violating a federally approved air pollution regulation is, under the specific factual configuration here, judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19702 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency issued a national primary ambient air quality standard regulating the permissible concentration of sulfur oxides.3 Under the Act, each state is required to develop and submit for approval by the Administrator an implementation plan, designed to achieve the Administrator’s air quality standards.4 Once a state’s plan has been ratified by the EPA, it becomes enforceable as a federal regulation.
After the Administrator approved the Pennsylvania plan, which included a provision intended to achieve compliance with the Administrator’s limitation on the proportion of sulfur oxides in the ambient air, West Penn did not exercise its right to challenge the EPA’s approval in the federal courts.5 West Penn did, however, in accordance with the terms of the Pennsylvania plan, petition the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) for a variance from the plan’s sulfur oxide emission6 restriction as it applied to the company’s Boiler No. 33 at its Mitchell Power Station.
*315On September 13, 1973, before DER had acted on West Penn’s request for a variance, West Penn received from EPA a notice that Boiler No. 33 was in violation of the federally approved Pennsylvania implementation plan. Subsequently, on September 19, 1973, DER granted West Penn a temporary variance from the sulfur oxide emission restriction, conditioned upon West Penn’s proceeding with the installation of a flue gas desulfurization device, referred to as a “scrubber.” The EPA has not approved this variance from the Pennsylvania plan.7 West Penn, dissatisfied with the state’s conditioning the variance upon the installation of a scrubber, appealed the DER’s order to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.8
West Penn then sued9 the Administrator of the EPA, the DER, and the Secretary of the DER. The company requested a declaratory judgment that West Penn was not in violation of the Pennsylvania implementation plan and that the defendants had no right to reject West Penn’s proposal for achieving compliance by use of a tall stack.10 The firm also asked for preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the Administrator from proceeding to enforce the September 13, 1973 notice of violation and preventing DER and its Secretary from enforcing their order, in response to West Penn’s variance application, directing the utility to install a scrubber.
Motions to dismiss with respect to all the defendants were granted by the district court. The trial judge concluded that the action against DER was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As to the Secretary of DER, the court held that, although the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit the suit, the district court had no jurisdiction because insofar as the suit was a challenge to the Pennsylvania implementation plan, it was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1857h — 5(b)(2).11 In any event, the trial judge held that he had no authority to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Secretary of DER in issuing variances for EPA approval.12 As detailed more fully in the majority opinion, the district court, relying in large measure on 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) and Getty Oil,13 also rejected all the proffered bases for its jurisdiction to hear the suit against the Administrator of the EPA.
*316As the majority discerns, one of the arguments pressed by West Penn is that, aside from any variance, a tall stack strategy is a permissible method of complying with the implementation plan, and therefore West Penn is not contravening the plan. However, the majority states that such a contention does not constitute a justiciable issue between West Penn and the Administrator under the APA, first, because the issuance of a notice of violation by the EPA is not “final agency action,” and second, because the Administrator is invested with substantial discretion in determining whether compliance procedures should be initiated. I disagree.14
The APA is to be liberally construed in favor of affording judicial review of administrative actions. In the words of Justice Harlan in the landmark case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the “ ‘generous review provisions’ [of the APA] must be given a ‘hospitable’ interpretation.” 15 Judicial supervision of agency conduct is not precluded “unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”16 The APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’ ” 17 As this Court recently declared, albeit in the context of a case in which we found an express Congressional prohibition against judicial review of the agency action in question:
Federal agencies should not be able to retreat behind the concept of no judicial review unless Congress has specifically authorized such a ban.18
SECTION 1857h-5(b)(2) DOES NOT BAR WEST PENN’S SUIT
As the majority states, this Court’s interpretation in Getty Oil of 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) does not impede West Penn’s attempt to have the trial court decide whether the company has fulfilled its responsibilities under the Pennsylvania plan. Instead of seeking judicial review of the EPA’s approbation of the Delaware implementation plan, Getty asked the state for a variance delaying the effective date of the plan’s restriction on the sulfur content of fuels burned in a particular region of the state. The state administrative agencies denied the variance, but the state courts temporarily restrained Delaware from enforcing the restriction. While the state was so restrained, however, the EPA demanded compliance. Getty asked this Court to set aside EPA’s order on the grounds that primary air quality standards had already been reached and that compliance, prior to the development of alternative technology, would impose an unreasonable economic burden. The panel held that we could not in the procedural posture of that case entertain economic or technological objections to the plan.
Getty interpreted section 1857h-5(b)(2) to foreclose later judicial inquiry with respect to issues which could have been raised before a court of appeals in a suit challenging federal approval of a state implementation plan within 30 days after such approval. West Penn’s contention that it has acted in conformity with the plan, however, unlike Getty’s argument, does not take exception to the validity of the plan. At least with respect to this issue, West Penn in essence con*317cedes the legitimacy of the Pennsylvania plan and asserts that the company has obeyed it. This issue could not have been raised in a suit contesting EPA’s approval of the plan. Thus section 1857h-5(b)(2) does not furnish “clear and convincing evidence,” or indeed any evidence, that Congress intended to prevent judicial review of the question whether West Penn may comply with the Pennsylvania plan by constructing a tall stack.
THE SEPTEMBER 13, 1973 NOTICE OF VIOLATION ISSUED BY EPA REPRESENTS FINAL AGENCY ACTION
In order to assess whether the notice of violation constitutes “final” agency action “committed to agency discretion by law” within the meaning of the APA19 — a characterization of the EPA’s role made by the majority in sustaining the district court — it is necessary to outline the statutory enforcement procedures under the Clean Air Act. Whenever the EPA learns that any person is in violation of a federally-sanctioned implementation plan, the Administrator “shall notify the person in violation of the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding.” 20 If the failure to conform to the plan continues beyond 30 days from the date of the notice of violation, the Administrator may commence a civil enforcement action in the district court or “may issue an order requiring such person to comply” with the plan.21 Any such order “shall not take effect until the person to whom it is issued has had an opportunity to confer with the Administrator concerning the alleged violation.22 Whether or not any enforcement suit has been filed or any compliance order issued, however,
[a]ny person who knowingly violates any requirement of an applicable implementation plan . . more than 30 days after having been notified by the Administrator shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.”23
The penalties for failure to obey a compliance order are the same as those for failure to abate pollution within 30 days of a notice of violation.24 If a conviction under this section is not the offender’s first, the penalties are doubled.25
Determination of the “finality” of agency action under the APA must be viewed pragmatically. In Frozen Food Express v. United States, for example, the ICC had issued an order stating that specified goods did not qualify for the “agricultural commodities” exemption from the statutory requirement that motor carriers possess a permit or certificate. The Supreme Court ruled that this was a final order. Although the decree under attack did not directly command the plaintiff carrier to do or not to do any particular act, the Court considered the order final and justiciable because it had “an immediate and practical impact” on motor carriers and shippers:
The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. . . . The “order” of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. . . . Carriers who are *318without the appropriate certifícate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks.26
As I have previously observed, the triad of Supreme Court decisions in Frozen Food, Storer Broadcasting27 and CBS has an overarching importance which reaches beyond the particular facts involved in those cases. In view of the continuing significance afforded to those decisions by the courts, the principles adopted in them constitute a “rule” of federal administrative law which favors review where the impact of agency action is, as in this case, concrete and immediate.28
Here, further proceedings within the agency are not necessary before the Administrator’s decision is enforceable against West Penn.29 The notice of violation, independent of any further proceedings thus has a coercive effect upon the utility. Continuation of West Penn’s present compliance strategy beyond 30 days from the date of the notice would render the company subject to the possibility of a $25,000 fine for each day of continued violation and would impose on the corporate officers the risk of imprisonment if the EPA’s interpretation of the implementation plan is eventually adjudicated correct.
On the other hand, compliance with the plan as construed by the Administrator would require the immediate commeneement of the installation of a multimillion dollar scrubber device30 or the prompt shutdown of the power plant. The choice faced by West Penn is analogous to that of the drug companies in Abbott Laboratories; if the drug manufacturers wished to conform to the agency’s labeling requirements,
[T]hey must change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; they must destroy stocks of printed matter; and they must invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies. The alternative to compliance would risk serious criminal and civil penalties . . . ,31
Thus the notice of violation here, like the regulation in Abbott, is final agency action because it impels the company to accede to the dictates of the Administrator.32
Also, the notice of violation here is reviewable as final action because judicial resolution of the question whether West Penn’s proposed mode of pollution control is interdicted by the state plan would not unduly disrupt the systematic processing of the case within the EPA.
[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process of administrative decision-making has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined.33
*319The notice that West Penn has failed to adapt to the Pennsylvania plan represents the Administrator’s definitive interpretation of the plan. His conclusion was not merely tentative. Nor did the company’s complaint present to the district court an abstract question or a hypothetical situation. No further administrative proceedings were necessary before a suit could be commenced by the EPA compelling compliance with the plan and extracting the statutory penalty. Although the Administrator may decide when enforcement measures should be taken and whether the agency should issue a compliance order34 or go directly to the district court, those determinations ordinarily will not include a re-interpretation by the Administrator of the implementation plan. Thus there were no on-going administrative functions which could be disrupted by the judicial review requested by West Penn.
REVIEW SHOULD NOT BE DENIED HERE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS IN THE FUTURE
As discussed earlier, since the issue of its compliance with the plan could not have been adjudicated in an action taking exception to federal approval of the plan, West Penn would be free to assert in any litigation brought to compel obedience to the plan or to a compliance order — as well as in any suit to impose a penalty — that it has already conformed to the plan by installing a tall stack. The possibility of a subsequent enforcement proceeding, however, does not generally prevent review of agency action at the request of an aggrieved party where, as here, that party may reasonably be intimidated into acquiescing in the administrative ruling before he can obtain a hearing at the enforcement stage.35
Under the statutory scheme before us the Administrator may indefinitely delay voking the power of the district courts so as to force West Penn into what the EPA considers compliance with the plan. Yet for each day of violation beyond an initial 30 day period West Penn would possibly incur a substantial fine. Thus, because of the potential liability if its good-faith interpretation of the plan is incorrect, West Penn may not be able, as a practical matter, to defy the EPA for any prolonged period. Therefore, whether or not due process is satisfied by the enforcement action, that proceeding, the timing of which is entirely within the control of the agency, provides an inadequate forum under the APA for adjudicating the rights of the utility.
The state legislation before the Supreme Court in the historic case of Ex parte Young possessed a similar in terrorem effect.36 That case, of course, arose long before the enactment of the APA and in any event involved state rather than federal administrative actions. The Court’s description of the impact of the legislation, however, may be instructive here. The railroads in Young sought an adjudication that the rates set by the state regulatory commission were so low as to be confiscatory. State law imposed a fine of up to $5,000 as well as imprisonment for each transaction in which the rate charged exceeded the regulated rate. The Court stated, “The officers and employees could not be expected to disobey any of the provisions of the acts or orders at the risk of such fines and penalties being imposed upon them, in case the court should decide that the law was valid. The result would be a denial of any hearing to the company.”37
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IS NOT ACTION “COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION BY LAW" SO AS TO PRECLUDE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial consideration of West Penn’s assertion that its tall stack strategy is in *320harmony with the state plan is not prohibited by the fact that Congress has left to the Administrator the tactical decisions when and by what method the EPA can most effectively execute the implementation plans. Although the APA provides an exception to the regime of judicial supervision in those cases where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,”38 that exception is applicable only in those discreet and infrequent situations where Congress explicitly expressed an intent that the judgment of the executive branch be wholly unfettered. The Supreme Court has explained that this is “a very narrow exception. . . . [I]t is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ”39
Although some aspects of a given decision may be committed entirely to the policy judgment of an expert administrator, where legal standards are implicated the courts are available to persons aggrieved by the decision in order to assure that the agency has adhered to the proper standards in carrying out its duty.40
An “all or nothing” approach to reviewability would, in specific cases, either be unfair to persons aggrieved by agency action, or impose an unwise burden upon the agency or the courts. Accordingly, separable issues appropriate for judicial determination are to be reviewed, though other aspects of the agency action may be committed to the agency’s expertise and discretion.41
In the case at hand, the question whether tall stacks meet air purity requirements of the applicable implementation plan is a legal issue wholly divorced from the Administrator’s exercise of discretion in concluding at what time and in what manner the plan should be enforced in order to maximize the public benefit. A resolution now by the district court of the issue raised by West Penn would be confined to an interpretation of the plan and need not in any way interfere with the proper and expeditious functioning of the EPA.
CONCLUSION
Since the APA embodies a presumption of federal review, since the issuance of a notice of violation in this context has an immediate and grave impact on the alleged polluter, since adjudication of a claim that the alleged polluter is obeying the applicable implementation plan would not interfere with the discretionary functions entrusted to the Administrator, and since no other effective judicial review is available, I would hold that the APA furnishes a basis upon which an alleged polluter may obtain a forum for prompt resolution of his claim that he has accommodated his conduct to the implementation plan.
There is a strong public interest in the expeditious resolution of this type of dispute. If West Penn is relegated to reliance on some distant enforcement hearing, the threat of a $25,000-a-day penalty may impel the company to undergo an unnecessary expense of millions of dollars, which will have to be borne either by the firm’s shareholders or, more likely, its ratepayers. On the other hand, if the Administrator’s interpretation of the plan is correct, in the absence of a hearing, West Penn may in good faith continue to imperil the public health and welfare by exceeding the permissible *321concentration of pollutants. Accordingly, I would remand the cause to the district court for consideration whether the proposed tall stack fulfills the requirements of the plan.42

. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1967).

. Pub.L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.

. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4, the Administrator is directed to fix national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for air pollutants detracting from the public health or welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3.
Primary ambient air quality standards are those necessary, in the Administrator’s judgment, to protect national health. Secondary ambient air quality standards are those necessary, in the Administrator’s judgment, to preserve the general welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b).

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857C-5.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) permits a party aggrieved by the Administrator’s approval of any implementation plan to seek review in the court of appeals for the appropriate circuit within 30 days of the Administrator’s action.

. Although West Penn Power sought variances from several of the plan’s emission limitations, only the sulfur oxide restriction is relevant to this appeal.

. A variance from an EPA accepted state implementation plan must be approved by the EPA before the polluter is sheltered from federal enforcement of the emission limitations contained in the implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-8; 1857e-5(d); 1857c-5(a)(3). For a discussion of the procedure for obtaining EPA approval of such a variance, see Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975). West Penn did not ask the district court to compel the Administrator to approve the variance, and we need not therefore decide whether such a remedy would be available to the company.

. See 35 Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 4004(4.1), 4013.5 and 71 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 1710.41.

. West Penn’s original complaint did not name the Secretary as a defendant.

. The primary and secondary ambient air quality standards issued by the Administrator define maximum permissible concentrations of sulfur oxides in the atmosphere. A scrubber is intended to achieve these standards by removing the pollutants from exhaust gases before they are discharged. In contrast, tall stacks are designed to reduce the atmospheric concentrations by dispersing the compounds over a wider area.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 provides, in relevant part:
(b)(1) ... A petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving . any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of this title . . may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such . . . approval . . ., or after such date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.

. West Penn did not appeal the dismissal of DER. The majority affirms the dismissal as to the Secretary.

. Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 937, 35 L.Ed.2d 256 (1973).

. Of course, I express no opinion on the merits of West Penn’s claim that tall stacks are sufficient, an issue which was not addressed by the district court and which the parties have not briefed or argued here.

. 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).

. Id. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962).

. 387 U.S. at 140, 87 S.Ct. at 1511.

. Pollard v. Romney, 512 F.2d 295, 298 (3d Cir. 1975).

. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) provides in pertinent part: This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that—
(1) statutes preclude judicial review .
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
5 U.S.C.A. § 704 provides in part:
[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(l).

. Id.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4).

. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(l).

. Id.

. Id.

. 351 U.S. 40, 43-44, 76 S.Ct. 569, 571, 100 L.Ed. 910 (1956). See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956); Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149-51, 87 S.Ct. 1507.

. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956).

. PBW Stock Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 485 F.2d 718, 741 (3d Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1993, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974).

. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(e)(l).

. West Penn represented to the district court that installation of a scrubber at the plant in question would require an expenditure in excess of $23 million and that operation of the equipment would increase operating costs by $6.5 million annually. The Administrator has not disputed the order of magnitude of these figures.

. 387 U.S. at 151-53, 87 S.Ct. at 1517.

. See also National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 443 F.2d 689, 698 (1971).

. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assoc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 70-71, 91 S.Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970).

. A compliance order was issued to West Penn on February 18, 1975, subsequent to the decision by the district court.

. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681; United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956).

. 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

. Id. at 146, 28 S.Ct. at 448.

. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

. East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council v. Rumsfeld, 471 F.2d 524, 534 (9th Cir. 1972); Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).

. East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council, 471 F.2d at 533. See, e. g., Dunlop v. Bachowksi, 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1973); Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1971); Reddy, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 492 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1974).

. Since the majority reaches the merits of the applicability of the APA to this dispute, I assume, without deciding, that if the APA is not itself jurisdictional in nature, Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326, 330-31 (3d Cir. 1970), jurisdiction would be under one of the general grants of jurisdiction, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1337. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974). Although the district court rejected § 1337 as a basis for jurisdiction, it did so apparently in reliance on section 1857h-5(b)(2). The majority’s statement, at fn. 26, that West Penn does not appeal that ruling by the trial judge appears to take an unnecessarily restrictive view of West Penn’s contentions.