Court Opinion

ID: 9928324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 16:02:47.579907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:55.679492
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13731   Document: 108-1    Date Filed: 01/31/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 22-13731
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        PATRICK ROETHER,
        HOLLIE ROETHER,
                                                  Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        STATE OF GEORGIA,
        STATE OF TENNESSEE,
        COUNTY OF MCINTOSH,
        MCINTOSH COUNTY DFCS,
        COUNTY OF BENTON, et al.,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13731

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00083-LGW-BWC
                             ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Proceeding pro se, Patrick and Hollie Roether (“Roethers”)
        filed a 759-paragraph complaint against 152 defendants. They
        alleged that the defendants had a broad conspiracy to remove
        children from the custody of their parents to profit from increased
        federal funding, and to illegally arrest parents who protested their
        actions. The Roethers’s claims arise from their interactions with
        this alleged conspiracy.
                On appeal, the Roethers challenge several rulings made by
        the district court. They argue that the district court abused its
        discretion in (1) dismissing their complaint as a shotgun pleading;
        (2) staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss;
        (3) refusing to let them file electronically; (4) denying their motion
        for sanctions against defendant Dr. John Ledwich; and (5) refusing
        to transfer their case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, they
        argue that the district and magistrate judges should have sua sponte
        recused themselves because their rulings indicate they were not
        impartial. After review, we affirm on all issues.
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        22-13731                   Opinion of the Court                             3

                                    I.      Background
                On September 7, 2021, the Roethers filed their initial 93-page
        complaint against 40 named defendants and 100 unnamed “Doe”
        defendants, asserting a variety of allegations related to numerous
        different events. After the named defendants moved to dismiss, the
        district court found that the complaint was a shotgun complaint
        and ordered the Roethers to replead their claims. Because it
        ordered the Roethers to amend their complaint, it denied the
        pending motions to dismiss. The court gave the Roethers two
        weeks to amend their complaint and provided them with
        instructions on how to avoid dismissal.1
              On May 23, 2022, one day before the amended complaint
        was due, the Roethers moved for an extension. The court granted
        the Roethers an extension until May 31, 2022. On May 31, the
        Roethers ﬁled an amended complaint, but it was the wrong
        version. Thus, on June 6, 2022, the Roethers moved the district
        court to allow them to ﬁle the correct complaint. The court
        granted the motion.

        1 The district court advised as follows:

                Plaintiﬀs’ amended complaint 1) must assert only relevant
                allegations of fact and law in each count of their complaint and
                explain their connection to each defendant, 2) clearly identify
                the speciﬁc defendants against whom each claim is asserted,
                3) avoid vague, generalized, conclusory, and contradictory
                assertions, and 4) avoid incorporating prior counts into those
                which follow.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13731

                The Roethers’s amended complaint asserted 28 claims
        against 152 defendants 2 over the course of 149 pages and 759
        paragraphs. The Roethers alleged that the defendants have a broad
        conspiracy to remove children from the custody of their parents
        “for a proﬁt and a gain of Federal, State, and County Funding” and
        to illegally arrest parents who protest their actions. The Roethers
        asserted numerous claims and violations of their rights related to
        this alleged conspiracy. 3
                The defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that the
        amended complaint was a shotgun complaint. The district court
        held that, despite instructing the Roethers on how to ﬁx their
        complaint and allowing them to ﬁle two amended versions of it, it
        still contained many “conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts,” set
        forth “multiple causes of action in single counts,” and made
        “multiple claims against multiple defendants under single counts.”

        2 The defendants include several counties—McIntosh County, Brantley
        County, Benton County, Houston County, Carroll County, Williamson
        County—and their employees; the states of Georgia and Tennessee; South
        Georgia Medical Center; Dr. Ledwich; Dr. Daniel Collipp; and 100 unnamed
        defendants.
        3 Their claims include, for example, allegations of illegal searches and arrests,

        claims related to their treatment while detained, claims related to the custody
        and medical treatment of their children, claims related to false statements and
        procedural irregularities in state court, claims under the False Claims Act, and
        claims against Georgia and Tennessee for “deceptive business practices.”
        Notably, the Roethers alleged that they were “citizens of the Kingdom of
        Y’Israel,” and, therefore, they were not subject to the laws of the United States
        or the laws of any state.
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        22-13731              Opinion of the Court                       5

        Accordingly, the district court dismissed the amended complaint
        with prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading.
              Along with dismissing the Roethers’s complaint as a shotgun
        pleading, the district court made four procedural rulings that the
        Roethers challenge on appeal.
              First, after ﬁling their initial motions to dismiss, some
        defendants moved to stay discovery pending resolution of the
        motions to dismiss. The magistrate judge granted the stay. It
        reasoned that some defendants were likely to achieve dismissal for
        various reasons, including colorable claims of immunity from suit,
        and that discovery would not be necessary to meet the defendants’
        non-factual defenses. After the original motions to dismiss were
        denied, several defendants reﬁled their motion to stay discovery
        pending the resolution of anticipated renewed motions to dismiss.
        By the time the district court considered the motion to stay, the
        renewed motions to dismiss had been ﬁled. The district court
        ultimately granted the motion to stay over objection by the
        Roethers.
              Second, the Roethers moved to ﬁle electronically. The
        magistrate judge denied this motion based on the local
        administrative rules. The Roethers later moved to serve the
        defendants by e-mail, to receive documents by the e-mail ﬁling
        system, and to ﬁle with the court via e-mail. Again, the magistrate
        judge denied this motion based on the local rules, as well as the
        Federal Rules.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13731

               Third, after the Roethers ﬁrst moved to amend their
        complaint, defendant Ledwich responded that the motion should
        not be granted because an amendment would be futile, the many
        extensions and missed deadlines suggested the Roethers were
        acting with dilatory motives, and the Roethers had burdened the
        court with repetitive motions. The Roethers moved for sanctions
        against Ledwich and his counsel for making these arguments. The
        magistrate judge denied the motion, reasoning that sanctions were
        not appropriate because Ledwich’s statements had a reasonable
        factual basis, were based on a reasonable legal theory, and were not
        clearly made in bad faith. The district court overruled the
        Roethers’s objections.
                Fourth, the Roethers moved to transfer their case to the U.S.
        Supreme Court. They argued that, because Mr. Roether is
        allegedly an “Ambassador for the Kingdom of Y’Israel,”4 the
        Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over their case. The
        district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Kingdom of
        Y’Israel is not a nation recognized by the United States.
               The Roethers appealed.
                                   II.     Discussion
              On appeal, the Roethers argue that the district court erred
        by (1) dismissing their complaint; (2) granting a discovery stay

        4 According to the Roethers, the “Kingdom of Y’Israel is a nation made up of

        the men and women which are chos[]en by God to be his people and who
        obey his Torah.”
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        22-13731               Opinion of the Court                        7

        pending resolution of the motions to dismiss; (3) denying their
        motions to proceed electronically; (4) denying their motion to
        sanction Ledwich; and (5) denying their motion to transfer the case
        to the U.S. Supreme Court. They also argue that the district and
        magistrate judges should have sua sponte recused from the case due
        to their perceived lack of impartiality. After careful review, we
        affirm on all issues.
        A. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the Roethers’s
           complaint as a shotgun pleading.
               The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
        discretion in dismissing their complaint as a shotgun pleading.
                “We review a dismissal on Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of
        Civil Procedure] shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of
        discretion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th
        Cir. 2018). The district court does not abuse its discretion “so long
        as [its] choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” In re
        Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
               District courts have an inherent power to control their
        docket. Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1295. This power includes “the ability to
        dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Id. Shotgun
        complaints violate Rule 8 by failing to provide a short and plain
        statement and by failing to provide defendants with adequate
        notice of the claim against them. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). We
        have “little tolerance” for shotgun complaints, which “waste scarce
        judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery,
        wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13731

        public’s respect for the courts.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quotation
        omitted). “And although we are to give liberal construction to the
        pleadings of pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to
        conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, 490 F.3d 826, 829
        (11th Cir. 2007).
               There are four main types of shotgun complaints: (1) “a
        complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
        allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count
        to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination
        of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with
        conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
        to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that fails to
        separate each claim for relief into a different count; and (4) a
        complaint that alleges multiple claims against multiple defendants
        in each count, without identifying which defendants are
        responsible for which claims or which of the defendants the claim
        is against. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
        1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015).
                If a court identifies that a complaint is a shotgun complaint
        and the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must give the
        plaintiff one chance to replead, with instructions on the
        deficiencies. See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991),
        overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314
        F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (overruling Bank as
        to counseled plaintiffs, but leaving rule as to pro se plaintiffs intact);
        see also Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1295–96. If the amended complaint does
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        22-13731                Opinion of the Court                          9

        not remedy the defects and the plaintiff does not move to amend,
        then the court may dismiss the complaint. Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1296.
        The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
        Roethers’s amended complaint. As the district court noted, the
        Roethers’s amended complaint “commit[ted] three of the four
        ‘sins’ of shotgun pleadings . . . .”
              First, the amended complaint included many “conclusory,
        vague, or immaterial facts” that were “not obviously connected to
        any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. For
        example, the complaint’s sixteen-page “Introduction” includes
        many immaterial facts about the Roethers’s religious beliefs,
        marital relationship, and their rejection of government authority.
        And despite the district court cautioning the Roethers to trim the
        facts from the original complaint, the amended complaint
        “ballooned” from 93 to 149 pages, and from 355 to 759 paragraphs.
               Second, the Roethers do not separate their “claims for relief”
        into separate counts. For instance, their first claim for relief alleges
        eight unlawful arrests against both Patrick and Hollie Roether
        spanning over nine years in two states, in addition to several
        unlawful searches of their dwelling. Their second claim for relief
        deals with the custody of their five children over seven years in two
        states. And their twenty-fifth claim for relief alleges several
        defendants violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
              Third, the Roethers allege multiple violations by multiple
        defendants without identifying which defendant is responsible for
        which wrong. For example, their seventeenth claim for relief
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         10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13731

         alleges that different combinations of defendants, both named and
         unnamed, illegally provided medical examinations and treatment
         to Y.R. and L.R.
                Given that the amended complaint was the third complaint
         the district court allowed the Roethers to submit, and the district
         court gave the Roethers a prior opportunity to amend and specific
         instructions on how to avoid dismissal, dismissal was an
         appropriate remedy. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
         discretion in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.
         B. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to stay discovery pending the
            resolution of the motions to dismiss.
                The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
         discretion in staying discovery pending the resolution of the
         renewed motions to dismiss because the defendants had not yet
         renewed their motions to dismiss when they moved to stay
         discovery.
                 “We review the district court’s discovery rulings . . . for an
         abuse of discretion.” Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d
         1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2004). Because of the great cost of discovery,
         “when faced with a motion to dismiss a claim for relief that
         significantly enlarges the scope of discovery, the district court
         should rule on the motion before entering discovery orders, if
         possible.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368
         (11th Cir. 1997). Staying discovery pending the resolution of
         renewed motions to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion because
         of the likely cost and complexity of discovery on the Roethers’s 28
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         22-13731                Opinion of the Court                           11

         claims for relief. And while the Roethers argue that the defendants
         had not yet filed their renewed motions to dismiss when they
         moved to stay discovery a second time, the renewed motions to
         dismiss had been filed by the time the court granted the motion to
         stay discovery.
         C. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to prevent the Roethers from
            filing electronically.
                The Roethers argue that, because of the difficulties they face
         with paper filings, the district court abused its discretion by denying
         their motions to file electronically.
                 “We . . . review a district court’s application of local rules for
         an abuse of discretion.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302
         (11th Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 provides that a
         pro se litigant “may file electronically only if allowed by court order
         or by local rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (5)(d)(3)(B)(i). The Southern
         District of Georgia’s local rules prohibit pro se litigants from filing
         electronically: “A party proceeding pro se, unless that party is an
         attorney in good standing and admitted to practice before the Bar
         of this Court, shall not file electronically.” See S.D. Ga. Local R. 5.5
         (cross-referencing the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
         of Georgia, Administrative Procedures for Filing, Signing and
         Verifying Pleadings and Papers by Electronic Means, which sets
         forth the above cited rule). The district court did not abuse its
         discretion in denying the Roethers’s motions to file electronically
         based on the plain text of local rules which are specifically
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         12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13731

         authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P.
         5(d)(3)(B)(i). 5
         D. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny the Roethers’s motion
            for sanctions.
                The Roethers argue that the district court abused its
         discretion in denying their motion for sanctions against Ledwich
         because he made various false statements about their litigation
         efforts in one of his filings below.
                 We “review all aspects of a district court’s [sanctions]
         determination for abuse of discretion.” Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d
         1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1993). Sanctions are to be imposed when a
         pleading (1) has “no reasonable factual basis,” (2) “is based on a
         legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success” and is not “a
         reasonable argument to change existing law,” or (3) is “in bad faith
         or for an improper purpose.” Id. at 1104 (quotation omitted). This
         test is analyzed under an objective framework; “courts determine
         whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could believe
         his actions were factually and legally justified.” Kaplan v.
         DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).

         5 The Roethers also argue, for the first time on appeal, that the district and

         magistrate judges should have recused themselves because their rulings on
         electronic filing suggested the judges were not impartial. But “rulings adverse
         to a party” do not “constitute pervasive bias” necessitating recusal. Hamm v.
         Members of Bd. of Regents of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, the
         district and magistrate judges did not err in failing to recuse themselves.
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         22-13731                    Opinion of the Court                                 13

                The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
         Roethers’s motion for sanctions against Ledwich. Ledwich’s
         statements that the Roethers were delaying in bad faith and filing
         repetitive motions had a reasonable factual basis. For example, the
         Roethers filed many motions for e-filing and venue that delayed the
         proceedings, and so Ledwich’s motion had some reasonable
         chance of success. Finally, the Roethers presented no reason to
         think that Ledwich’s statements were made in bad faith or for an
         improper purpose. 6

         6 The Roethers also argue that the district court abused its discretion in failing

         to transfer the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. They argue that because
         Patrick is allegedly an ambassador of the Kingdom of Y’Israel, and they are
         suing, among others, the State of Georgia and the State of Tennessee, they are
         entitled to original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.
         The district court did not abuse its discretion. While the Supreme Court has
         original jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and cases in which a
         state is a party, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, it does not appear Patrick is an
         ambassador “accredited to the United States by [a] foreign power[],” as the
         Kingdom of Y’Israel is not recognized by the United States. See Independent
         States      in     the     World,         U.S.        Department      of      State,
         https://www.state.gov/independent-states-in-the-world/ (last accessed Jan.
         12, 2024) [https://perma.cc/SBN9-72UR] (The State Department list of the
         195 independent countries recognized by the United States includes the “State
         of Israel” but not the “Kingdom of Y’Israel”); see also Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S.
         302, 303 (1925) (Ambassadors are “diplomatic and consular representatives
         accredited to the United States by foreign powers[.]”). Nor is this a case
         “between” states, as Tennessee and Georgia are both defendants. 28 U.S.C. §
         1251(a).
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         14                   Opinion of the Court                 22-13731

                                III.   Conclusion
              For all the reasons discussed, we affirm the district court.
              AFFIRMED.