Court Opinion

ID: 9891338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:03:31.273055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:02.199211
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 458
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                         DIVISION II
                                         No. CV-22-586

 MINERAL SPRINGS - SARATOGA      Opinion Delivered October 18, 2023

 SCHOOL DISTRICT; AND ARKANSAS
                                 APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
 SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION
                                 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
                      APPELLANTS
                                 COMMISSION
                                 [NO. G806592]
 V.

 BRON BELL; AND DEATH AND
 PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
 TRUST FUND                      AFFIRMED
                       APPELLEES

                                 CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

       Appellants Mineral Springs - Saratoga School District and the Arkansas School

Boards Association (collectively, the District) appeal a decision of the Arkansas Workers’

Compensation Commission finding that appellee Bron Bell suffered a compensable injury

while performing employment services. We affirm.

       The facts before us are relatively undisputed. In 2018, Bell was employed by the

Mineral Springs - Saratoga School District as an agricultural instructor and facilities

administrator. His day consisted of teaching six classes, with one prep period. In addition to

his instructional responsibilities, he was responsible for ensuring that District facilities were

in compliance with Arkansas law. His normal working hours were between 7:00 a.m. and

4:00 or 4:30 p.m. He was a salaried employee, and while he may have been required to clock
in and out in the morning and afternoon, he was not required to clock out during his thirty-

minute lunch break. Bell had shop classes both immediately before and after his lunch break.

The shop students would first meet in the classroom, where Bell would take roll, and then

they would all proceed to the shop, at which time he would issue tools to them. Because

safety was a priority, at the end of each shop class, Bell was responsible for making sure all

the tools were brought back into the classroom, placed where they belonged, and checked in

to ensure the tools were ready for the next class. He would also make sure everyone had

exited the building before he left for lunch. Bell estimated he had only fifteen minutes

remaining for lunch after his shop duties were completed, even though state law requires the

lunch break to be a thirty-minute duty-free lunch. Bell was unaware of this requirement until

after his accident. He also was unaware at the time of the accident that he could leave the

premises for lunch. It was his further understanding that, while on campus, he was obligated

to counsel students, prevent fights, and report any suspected abuse.

       On September 27, 2018, while on his lunch break, Bell was injured as he exited the

school cafeteria. Bell had just finished teaching one of his shop classes and had hurried to

the cafeteria, which was in another building, to grab his lunch. Because he only had a short

time for lunch, he intended to return to his office to eat and prepare for his next class. He

entered the cafeteria through a back door, where his wife, who was also a teacher, was waiting

for him. She had prepared his lunch and placed it in a to-go container. She handed him the

container, and he turned to exit the cafeteria.

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       As he was exiting the cafeteria through the back door to return to his office with his

lunch, he either slipped or tripped on the outside concrete stoop, causing him to fall forward

into a neighboring building. He did not fall to the ground; rather, the right side of his body

hit the metal exterior wall of the building, breaking his fall. No one witnessed the accident,

although a fellow teacher inside the other building heard the impact.

       After steadying himself, Bell went back to his classroom and cleaned up the mess. He

then reported the incident to the school nurse, who sent him to the doctor. It was later

determined that he had dislocated his right shoulder.

       Bell filed a claim for workers’-compensation benefits. The District controverted the

claim in its entirety, alleging that Bell had not been performing employment services at the

time of the accident.

       A hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) took place on October 6, 2021.

Bell testified to the foregoing facts and that he considered himself to be at work when the

accident occurred because he believed that if he was on campus, he was at work and

responsible for the students. He further testified that he did not have any official duties

assigned during his lunch break, and while students may filter into the classroom a few

minutes early, he did not issue tools or begin instruction until class started. He did, however,

have to remain in his classroom to check in and put up the tools from his previous class and

prepare for his next class before he left for lunch. The District then called its superintendent,

Billy Ray Lee, Jr., as a witness. Lee testified that Arkansas law requires the District to provide

teachers with at least one thirty-minute duty-free period during the day during which they

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have no responsibilities. Since Lee was not superintendent when Bell was injured, he could

not independently verify that the former administration had adhered to that requirement.

He noted that Bell had testified that he had no dedicated responsibilities during his lunch

break, which was consistent with state law. He further testified that teachers are not required

to remain on campus during their lunch break and could leave to run personal errands so

long as they returned to their classrooms before the end of the thirty-minute period.

       After the hearing, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that Bell had not sustained

a compensable injury. The ALJ determined that Bell had not been performing employment

services at the time of the accident because he was not directly or indirectly advancing the

interests of his employer when the incident occurred. Instead, Bell was “on a personal

mission to return to his office for the single purpose to engage in a personal endeavor, which

was to eat his lunch.”

       Bell appealed the denial to the Full Commission. The Commission reversed the

decision of the ALJ and found that Bell had suffered a compensable injury. In so finding,

the Commission stated:

               In the case at bar, the claimant was within the time and space boundaries of
       his employment, he was paid for his time and, even though he was on his lunch break,
       he was on the jobsite when he sustained his injury. Additionally, as in [University of
       Arkansas for Medical Sciences v.] Hines, [2019 Ark. App. 557, 590 S.W.3d 183], the
       claimant was required to leave his break and return to work if he was needed to assist
       with a student incident. The claimant testified that he was required to assist if, for
       example, a fight between students started. The claimant testified further that he had
       assisted breaking up a fight on his lunch break in the past. Also, it is significant to
       note that up to the time of this work accident the claimant, and quite possibly other
       school employees, believed they were required to remain on campus during lunch. (J.
       Ex 1., p. 20)

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              In addition to this duty, even if he was on his lunch break, the claimant would
       be required to report any incidents that mandatory reporters are required to report.
       This fact is supported by the testimony of Billy Lee, the superintendent of the
       respondent school district.

       ....

              Clearly, the respondent-employer derived a benefit from the claimant
       remaining on campus during his lunch break. Despite claimant’s lunch period being
       designated “duty free,” clearly, he was on duty whenever he was on campus. It was of
       no consequence that the claimant was on his lunch break when the accident occurred
       because he was on call at the time. See Univ. of Ark. For Med. Sciences v. Hines, supra
       and Ray, [66 Ark. App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558 (1999)].

       The District has appealed the Commission’s decision finding Bell’s injury

compensable. Citing Ganus v. St. Bernard’s Hospital, LLC, 2015 Ark. App. 163, 457 S.W.3d

683, and Robinson v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center, 88 Ark. App. 168, 196 S.W.3d 508

(2004), the District argues that Bell was on a personal errand at the time of the accident, that

he had no required duties at that time, and that the District gleaned no benefit from his

getting lunch; thus, Bell was not performing employment services when he fell. The District

also distinguishes the three cases cited by the Commission in its opinion—Ray v. University of

Arkansas, 66 Ark. App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558; Kimbell v. Ass’n of Rehab Industry, 366 Ark. 297,

235 S.W.3d 499 (2006); and Hines, supra. The District notes that, unlike the appellant in

Ray, Bell was not required to remain on campus to be available during his lunch break and

was not required to do anything for any student or school official during that break, and

unlike the appellant in Kimbell, he was not speaking with or assisting any student at the time

of his accident. Then, in contrast to Hines, the District argues that Bell was not on call or on

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duty during his lunch break; instead, he was duty-free and was not required to remain on

campus or anywhere where students might be. The District further noted that, unlike the

accident in Hines, Bell’s accident occurred in an area where there were no students, and Bell

was avoiding places where he could have assisted students. Finally, the District, citing the

opinion of the dissenting commissioner, argues that, applying the Commission’s standard

in this case, Bell is performing employment services any time he is on campus or anywhere

a student may be present, depending on how he perceives his responsibilities. This standard

ignores the requirement that the employee must be doing something required by his

employer for the injury to be compensable. It further argues that Bell’s status as a mandatory

reporter does not render his injury compensable because he is always required to report

regardless of his location, and that, if this is the standard, he technically never leaves his

employment and is always at work.

       Relying on Privett v. Excel Specialty Products, 76 Ark. App. 527, 69 S.W.3d 445 (2002);

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002); Wallace v. West Fraser

South, 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006); and Ray, supra, Bell argues that he was

performing employment services because, while on campus, he was required to assist with

any problems that might arise and that he spent part of his lunch period putting shop tools

safely away and preparing for his next class.

       Thus, the primary issue before us is whether there was substantial evidence to support

the Commission’s determination that Bell was performing employment services at the time

of his injury.

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       In reviewing a decision of the Commission, this court reviews the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s

findings and affirms if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Kroger Ltd. P’ship v.

Bess, 2018 Ark. App. 404, 555 S.W.3d 417. Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds

could have reached the same conclusion without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id. The

issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from that of

the Commission but whether reasonable minds could reach the result found by the

Commission. Id. It is the Commission’s duty, not ours, to make credibility determinations,

to weigh the evidence, and to resolve conflicts in the medical testimony. Id.

       A compensable injury includes an accidental injury causing internal or external

physical harm to the body arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires

medical services or results in disability or death. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl.

2012). A compensable injury does not include an injury that was inflicted upon the employee

at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-

102(4)(B)(iii). The supreme court has interpreted the term “employment services” as

performance of something that is generally required by an employer. Cook v. ABF Freight Sys.,

Inc., 88 Ark. App. 86, 194 S.W.3d 794 (2004). We use the same test to determine whether

an employee was performing “employment services” as we do when determining whether an

employee was acting within “the course of employment.” Id. at 89, 194 S.W.3d 796. The test

is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment

                                               7
when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer's

interest directly or indirectly. Id. at 89–90, 194 S.W.3d 796.

       Of all the cases cited by the District in support of reversal, Ganus is the most factually

similar to the present case. Ganus was a nurse in a cath lab at the hospital. She argued that,

although she had a nurse covering her patient when she was on her lunch hour, she was

subject to being called back to the unit if there was a problem. In affirming the Commission’s

decision finding that she was not performing employment services when she fell in the

cafeteria during her lunch break, we stated that even though there may be evidence that

could support a finding different from the Commission’s, such was not a proper basis for

reversal. Ganus, 2015 Ark. App.163, at 9, 457 S.W.3d at 688. This court noted that the

evidence relied on by the Commission was that Ganus was on a personal errand to retrieve

food for her own benefit; the employee handbook provided that an employee should be

considered to be “completely relieved” of her work responsibilities while on break; and

Ganus left her patient in the hands of another employee before she went to retrieve her

lunch. Id.

       As in Ganus, Bell testified that he believed he was required to intervene if an issue

arose while he was on campus and on his lunch break. Also as in Ganus, Superintendent Lee

testified that Bell’s lunch break was required by law to be duty-free. The similarities end

there. Although Ganus argued that she was subject to being called back to the unit if there

was a problem, her employee handbook indicated that an employee was considered

completely relieved of his or her duties while on break. In this case, and unlike Ganus, Bell

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testified that he was unaware that he could leave campus during his lunch break and of the

requirement that he have a thirty-minute lunch break that was duty-free. Superintendent Lee

could offer no testimony to the contrary.

       It is axiomatic that questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight

to be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission.

Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008). As such, we are

foreclosed from determining the credibility and weight to be accorded to each witness’s

testimony. Id. Here, there was no testimony presented to contradict Bell’s testimony that he

was on duty while on campus or that he was unaware of the law requiring that his lunch

break be duty-free. Superintendent Lee testified that, while state law requires the District to

provide Bell with a duty-free lunch period, he was not aware of the District’s actual policy at

the time of the injury. The Commission found Bell to be a credible witness. Thus, evidence

was presented upon which the Commission could find that Bell was required to remain on

campus; that he was not, in fact, duty-free during his lunch break; and that he was, therefore,

performing employment services at the time of his injury.

       This case is also factually similar to Hines, supra. Hines, who was a surgical-services

patient-unit coordinator at a hospital, slipped and fell injuring herself while walking to the

lobby during one of her breaks. She was talking on the phone to her granddaughter when

she fell. She testified that she did not clock out during her breaks if she remained in the

building and that, if there was an emergency and she was in the building, she was required

to return to her unit. There was evidence that hospital policy required her to clock out if she

                                              9
left the building during her breaks, but she testified that she was not allowed to leave. The

ALJ found that Hines had failed to prove that she was performing employment services at

the time of her fall. The Commission, in a split decision, reversed the ALJ finding that Hines

was within the time and space boundaries of her employment. It noted she was paid for her

time, she was required to leave her break and return to work if she was needed to assist with

an emergency or if a trauma occurred, and even though she was not at her designated work

station, she was on the jobsite when she sustained her injury.

       We affirmed the Commission’s decision. In doing so, we noted that Hines had

testified that, during her break, she remained on duty and in the building; she was clocked

in; and she remained on call and available to work. Hines testified that if she had been called

to return to her desk because of an emergency or trauma, she would have been required to

do so and that this had happened three or four times in the past. Given this testimony, the

Commission concluded that Hines was performing employment services because the

hospital derived a benefit from her “remaining in the building, immediately available to

resume her duties.” 2019 Ark. App. 557, at 4, 590 S.W.3d at 185. Thus, the fact that she

was on a personal call at the time of her injury was of no consequence because the evidence

indicated her employer required her to resume her duties when called.

       Here, as in Hines, Bell slipped and fell while on a break and while performing a

personal task. As in Hines, Bell did not clock out during his break, and he testified that he

was required to assist with student conflicts or other emergencies if needed while on his

break, which had happened at least one time. Additionally, while there was evidence that

                                              10
Bell could leave campus during his break, and his break was required by law to be duty-free,

Bell testified that he was unaware that he was allowed to leave campus or that he was relieved

of his duties during that time. The State’s witness could not contradict this testimony or

prove that the District’s policy was in compliance with the law at the time of the injury. Bell

also testified that part of his lunch break was spent logging tools in and out and preparing

for his next class.

       As stated above, the ALJ in this case found that, under these facts, Bell failed to prove

that he was performing employment services at the time of his injury. The Commission on

these same facts determined otherwise. Given the facts of this case, it could easily be argued

that either one of these decisions is supported by the evidence. As a result, our standard of

review is critical to our analysis. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences

deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and affirm if

reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion without resort to speculation or

conjecture. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result

from that of the Commission but whether reasonable minds could reach the result found by

the Commission. As reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as that of

the Commission, we affirm.

       Affirmed.

       BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.

       Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Guy Alton Wade and Phillip M. Brick, Jr., for

appellants.

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Laura Beth York, for separate appellee Bron Bell.

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