Court Opinion

ID: 9455316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:18:35.679591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:33.139181
License: Public Domain

SOLOMON, District Judge
(dissenting) :
We may be nearing the day when a co-defendant’s confession in a joint trial will be barred, but I do not believe Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), or any other case cited by the majority goes that far.
Here, a police officer testified that after the arrest of Runnels, a co-defendant, Runnels confessed that on the day of the crimes O’Neil asked him if he wanted “to make a couple of hits.” According to the officer, Runnels said that the two of them entered the victim’s car and at gunpoint took the victim’s money. They forced the victim to drive several blocks and get out of his car. They then drove away in the victim’s car. In his defense, Runnels took the stand and denied making the confession. He testified that he and O’Neil did not commit the crimes and that they were at O’Neil’s house at the time. O’Neil also took the stand, and he too testified that they were at his house at the time of the crimes. Two other defense witnesses corroborated this testimony.
In Bruton, the Government introduced co-defendant Evans’ confession, but Evans refused to testify. The Supreme Court set aside Bruton’s conviction because Evans’ refusal to take the stand “posed a substantial threat to [Bruton’s] right to confront the witnesses against him” and denied Bruton a fair trial. 391 U.S. at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628.
According to the majority here, the State’s introduction of Runnels’ confession created a Bruton situation which was not cured by Runnels’ subsequent testimony because Runnels refused to acknowledge the confession as his.
The majority believes that Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed. 934 (1965), and Bruton require a confession to be excluded whenever the co-defendant denies that he made it. In Douglas, the defendant was convicted, in a separate trial, of assault with intent to murder. At the trial, the prosecutor asked leading questions to tell the jury about a confession of Loyd, an accomplice. According to the confession, Douglas shot the victim. Loyd refused to testify.
The Supreme Court reversed Douglas’ conviction because Douglas could not cross-examine Loyd “to test the truth of the statement itself,” 380 U.S. at 420, 85 S.Ct. at 1077, and held that Douglas was unfairly prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine Loyd.
The Supreme Court also stated that “effective confrontation of Loyd was possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as his.” 380 U.S. at 420, 85 S.Ct. at 1077. Relying on this statement, the majority here holds that O’Neil’s conviction must be reversed because Runnels did not affirm the confession as his.
I do not believe Bruton and Douglas require exclusion of the confession here. In each case, the co-defendant refused to testify, and he therefore could not be cross-examined. Here, Runnels testified and his testimony was subject to cross-*325examination. O’Neil elected not to cross-examine Runnels because Runnels supported O’Neil’s alibi when he testified that O’Neil was with him at O’Neil’s house at the time of the crimes.
The majority also cites West v. Henderson, 409 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1969), and Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968), in support of its position.
In West, the defendant and two others were tried for first degree murder in Tennessee, where the jury fixes the punishment and has the power to impose a death sentence. The prosecutor introduced the statement of one of the co-defendants, who denied making the statement. According to the Sixth Circuit, this statement, which the prosecutor called a “confession,” was “a studied effort on the part of [the co-defendant] to exculpate himself and to inculpate [the defendant].” 409 F.2d at 97. The Court held that introduction of the confession was fundamentally unfair to the defendant and reversed his conviction.
In Townsend, Terry was placed in solitary confinement after an attempted prison break and was interrogated about the details of the incident. He confessed that he, Townsend, and two others planned the break and attempted to carry it out. At the joint trial of Terry and Townsend, the prosecutor introduced the confession. Terry denied that he confessed. The Sixth Circuit reversed Terry’s conviction because it found that the State had pressured Terry into confessing by placing him in solitary confinement on a diet of bread and water and without medical treatment. The Court also reversed Townsend’s conviction because Townsend could not cross-examine Terry on the details of the confession.
In West, the defendant’s life depended on his being able to show that the co-defendant’s story, which placed the primary blame on the defendant, was false and that the co-defendant wanted to shift the blame for the crime to the defendant. In Townsend, the defendant might have shown that the co-defendant implicated him because the co-defendant wanted to get out of solitary confinement.
Here, as in West and Townsend, O’Neil could not question Runnels on the details of the confession. But here, unlike West and Townsend, O’Neil did not want to question Runnels about the confession. O’Neil knew that the jury would not believe the alibi to which both he and Runnels testified unless Runnels could convince the jury that he did not confess. It was important for O’Neil that Runnels appear to be a witness worthy of belief. O’Neil was anxious to avoid doing anything which might damage Runnels’ credibility.
If Runnels had acknowledged the confession, the testimony of the officer would have been admissible against Runnels. O’Neil could have cross-examined Runnels on the confession. Rios-Ramirez v. United States, 403 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 951, 89 S.Ct. 1292, 22 L.Ed.2d 486 (1969); Santoro v. United States, 402 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1968).
If the State had not presented Runnels’ confession as part of its case, and if Runnels had testified that he and O’Neil were at O’Neil’s house at the time of the crimes, the State could have used the confession to impeach Runnels’ testimony. Cf. Lewis v. Yeager, 411 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Ballentine, 410 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1969).
In either case, O’Neil would be privileged to cross-examine Runnels. The best O’Neil could hope for would be for Runnels to testify that the confession was false and that O’Neil did not commit the crimes. Here, Runnels gave O’Neil all that and more. He denied that he confessed and said that O’Neil was not at the scene of the crimes.
Unless we are willing to hold that use of a co-defendant’s confession is impermissible when the co-defendant admits that he confessed and when the State uses the confession for impeachment, I do not see how we can decide that the *326use of the confession under the facts here by a state court was impermissible or that, if it was error, it was error of constitutional proportions. I do not believe Bruton requires that we go that far, and I believe that such a decision would be contrary to the recent decisions of this and other Courts of Appeals in Rios-Ramirez, Santoro, Lewis, and Ballentine.
I would reverse the decision below and hold that the use of Runnels’ confession did not deprive O’Neil of a fair trial.