Court Opinion

ID: 9827927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:56:12.759346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:39.306664
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[9] Appellant in a very able argument, in its motion for rehearing, contends that this court has erred in its construction of district court rule 67 and rule 24 of this court as amended January 24, 1912. Most of appellant’s argument does not reach the point involved, but is based upon the theory that in our opinion we held that the assignment of error as presented to this court was insufficient to entitle it to consideration. Such was not our decision. What we did decide was that under rule 67 of the district court, construed with amended rule 24 of this court, the appellant must have presented to the trial court in its motion for a new trial the very point which it intended to assign as error in this court, and in such language that it would be “clearly identified and understood by the court.” The assignments of error, followed by the propositions and statements as they were presented to this court, were clear and comprehensible. From them we could not help but understand the point of appellant’s contention. But if the assignment of error had come to us, as the motion for a new trial was presented to the trial court, unsupported by the clear legal propositions and argument in. appellant’s brief, we do not believe that we would have understood that appellant was complaining because ap-pellee had not affirmatively shown upon the trial that it had notice of the' condition of the track in time to have repaired same before the injury. If this matter had been presented to the trial court as clearly and forcefully as it was presented to this court, who can say that a new trial would not have been granted, and this appeal rendered unnecessary? That is the very purpose of rules 67 and 24. District court rule 67 reads as follows: “Each ground of a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment shall briefly refer to that part of the ruling of the court, charge given to the jury, or charge refused, admission or rejection of evidence, or other proceedings which are designed to be com-, plained of, in such way as that the point-of objection can be clearly identified and understood by the court.” The language seems clear and the adoption of that rule could have been for no other purpose than to require every controverted point to be presented to the trial court in the motion for a new trial in such a clear and particular manner as to render it comprehensible to the judge. But, under the indulgént consideration of the courts, this rule was ignored by the bar until the breach, rather than the rule, became the procedure. And, to correct that condition, we have no doubt the Supreme Court adopted the amendment to rule 24 of this court. The amended rule, with the new portion italicized, • reads as follows: “The assignment of error must distinctly specify the grounds of error relied on and distinctly set forth in the motion for a new trial im the cause, and a ground of error not distinctly set forth in a motion for a new trial in the cause, and not distinctly specified in reference to that which is shown in the record, or not specified at all, shall be considered as waived, unless it be so fundamental that the court would act upon it without an assignment of error as mentioned in rule 23.” It will be noted that the only change refers to motions for new trials and requires this court to ignore assignments of error “not distinctly set forth in the motion for a new trial in the cause.”
[10] In this court the'propositions under assignments of error are a necessary portion of the point for consideration, unless the assignment itself presents but one point of law, and is in form of a proposition. If assignments are not so prepared, this court will ignore the point. Not so in the trial court. The motion for a new trial is presented without such particularity, and there has been a tendency to make them perfunctory proceedings. The policy of the law is to limit and curtail litigation. Appeals are not to be encouraged, and, whenever possible, litigation should end in the trial courts. This we *473conceive to have 'been the purpose of the Supreme Court in passing rules that, if enforced, will prevent an appeal until every opportunity has been given to the trial court to discover and correct its own errors.
[11] Appellant also complains of the refusal of this court to reverse the judgment because it is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence. It is true as contended that this court has the power to disregard the verdict of a jury where it is “clearly and manifestly wrong.” But this power is exercised by this court only in cases which have shown gross wrong, or where the verdict shocks the conscience. Where there is a conflict in the evidence upon which the minds of men of ordinary judgment may honestly differ, this court will not disturb the verdict.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.