Court Opinion

ID: 9558081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:02:39.124434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:17.222444
License: Public Domain

[40] I concur in the majority opinion that the appellant's conviction should be affirmed. However, this writer believes that the trial court erred in excluding testimony of two medical experts. The appellant attempted to introduce testimony of a psychologist and a neuropsychiatrist to rebut the State's evidence that he acted with malice aforethought.
[41] This Court has held in numerous cases that where a defendant is charged with a crime which requires an element of specific intent, he may rebut or explain his intent and mental purpose required to constitute the offense. The defendant must be permitted to present evidence to disprove his felonious intent.Ryans v. State, 420 P.2d 556 (Okla. Cr. 1966); Cawley v. State,96 Okla. Cr. 53, 248 P.2d 273 (1952); Smith v. State,38 Okla. Cr. 416, 262 P. 507 (1927); see also Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351
(Okla. Cr. 1962).
[42] In this case, the appellant was charged under Title 21 O.S.Supp. 1980 § 701.7[21-701.7], which provides that:
 A person commits murder in the first degree when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.
[43] The critical issue before the jury was whether Daugherty acted with malice aforethought. The State had the burden of proving that Daugherty possessed a deliberate intention to kill his victim. The State sought to fulfill this burden of proof through circumstantial evidence of the appellant's conduct. On the other hand, I *Page 565 
believe that the appellant had the right to introduce relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence that he acted with malice aforethought.
[44] The appellant offered into evidence the testimony of Doctor Ferguson, a licensed psychologist, and Doctor Prosser, a neuropsychiatry specialist. These doctors are eminently qualified and honored in their respective fields of expertise. They both testified that they had performed extensive psychological tests with the appellant. Neither of the experts was allowed to fully testify about the test results or their medical conclusions based upon their personal examinations.
[45] After the trial court sustained the State's objection that the testimony was "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial" the appellant made an offer of proof. The appellant proffered testimony that the two expert medical witnesses would testify to the following:
 (1) Daugherty's emotional stability and his intellectual abilities;
 (2) His capacity to distinguish between right and wrong on certain issues;
 (3) His level of social maturity and its effect on his ability to reason and make judgments;
 (4) That statements elicited from Daugherty in his medical history were consistent with statements he had given on four prior occasions;
 (5) Lastly, Dr. Prosser would testify about his test results using hypnosis and truth serum.
[46] In regard to the hypnotic and truth serum tests the appellant concedes that a single test using hypnosis or truth serum would be inadmissible. However, he argues that these tests given in conjunction with the other psychiatric tests, personal observations, and in collaboration with other medical experts, were admissible under the rationale stated in Brown v. State,304 P.2d 361 (Okla. Cr. 1956). I agree.
[47] This writer is of the opinion that the trial court erred in ruling that the testimony of Drs. Prosser and Ferguson invaded the province of the jury. I find that in a first degree murder prosecution evidence regarding the relationships between the parties, the state of mind of the parties, the accused's mental ability and social maturity, and the accused's consistent statements were all relevant on the issue of intent. The exclusion of this testimony deprived the appellant of a viable defense on the issue of malice.
[48] In Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Cr. 1962), this Court addressed a similar situation. In Carter the defendant was convicted of first degree manslaughter. The jury found that the defendant caused the death of his mother, while driving under the influence of alcohol. At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce expert medical testimony to establish that he had a history of blackouts as a result of a prior head injury. This Court held that the expert testimony was relevant and admissible on the issue of the defendant's mens rea. It was error for the trial court in Carter to exclude the medical testimony. Since a person unconscious at the time of the alleged criminal act may or may not be guilty of first degree manslaughter.
[49] The Court in Carter v. State, supra, stated that:
 "In a criminal prosecution, any legal evidence from which the jury may adduce guilt or innocence is admissible if, when taken with other evidence in the case, its relevancy appears, and the rejection of competent testimony offered by defendant constitutes prejudicial error." (Quoting MacLaurin v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 324, 246 P. 669 (1926).
[50] The exclusion of the expert medical testimony deprived Daugherty of a viable defense. It was evidence that should have gone to the jury to assist them in their determination of whether he acted with malice aforethought. Because of the trial court's exclusion of this evidence I cannot concur in the affirmance of the first degree murder conviction. I would reduce the judgment to second degree murder, which does not require the jury to find that the defendant acted with malice. The record *Page 566 
amply supports such a conviction and I would modify the sentence to ten (10) years' imprisonment.
[51] I also find it necessary to comment on the separate opinion filed by Judge Brett in which he concurs in part and dissents in part.
[52] First, it is argued that the State has not adequately shown that the appellant's statements were voluntarily and intelligently obtained by the police. The record is clear that the appellant's mother was present during the entire interrogation. Investigator Mayo fully explained to both the appellant and his mother their constitutional rights. Both acknowledged that they understood their constitutional rights prior to the appellant making any statements. Additionally, both were advised as to the nature of the interrogation before any questioning commenced. I find that the State has shown that Daugherty and his mother intelligently waived their rights prior to the interrogation. To require the State to carry any greater burden would unreasonably hamper legitimate procedures used by law enforcement officials in carrying out their duties.
[53] It is also proposed that this Court overrule Thomas v. State,40 Okla. Cr. 204, 267 P. 1040 (1928). Judge Brett argues that "where the principal was impliedly acquitted of a charge, it was manifestly unfair to press that charge against an aider and abetter whose responsibility in the crime was not greater." This writer is unaware of any legal authority to support this proposed pronouncement of law. Knowing no authority, I would not disturbThomas v. State, supra.
[54] In Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a federal statute which mandated that one who aids or abets in the commission of a crime is punishable as a principal. TheStandefer Court stated that the "statute `abolished the distinction between principals and accessories and [made] them all principals' . . . Read against its common-law background, the provision evinces a clear intent to permit the conviction of accessories to federal criminal offenses despite the prioracquittal of the actual perpetrator of the offense." [Emphasis added.] The Court concluded:
 In denying preclusive effect to Niederberger's acquittal, we do not deviate from the sound teaching that `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' This case does no more than manifest the simple, if discomforting, reality that `different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.' While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required. [Citations omitted.]