Court Opinion

ID: 9714288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:34:48.062823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.028588
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
Raymond Wood died following injuries sustained when the scaffold on which he was working collapsed. Cecelia Wood, his widow, brought an action under the wrongful death act (MCL 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922) seeking, inter alia, damages for loss of his society and companionship. Defendants were Detroit Edison, owner of the project, and Parsons & Company and Marley Corporation, the subcontractors responsible for the design and erection of the scaffolding. Michigan Mutual, the workers’ compensation carrier of decedent’s employer, was joined as a defendant on the theory of negligent safety inspection. Jury trial was demanded.
During the pendency of the circuit court action, plaintiff, who had remarried, filed a motion in limine seeking a protective order to prohibit at trial any mention of remarriage or prospective remarriage of Cecelia Wood and to ensure that she be referred to only by the name "Wood”. The motion was denied. The court reasoned that if loss of society and companionship were claimed as damages, all facts pertaining to such loss, including remarriage, should be considered.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that *285evidence of remarriage should not be allowed, and remanded the case for trial with instructions that the protective order be issued. This Court granted leave to appeal limited to the issue whether, in light of the amendatory language of 1971 PA 65 (MCL 600.2922[2]; MSA 27A.2922[2]), the remarriage of a plaintiff surviving spouse is admissible in a wrongful death action.
In 1971 the Legislature amended §2 of the wrongful death act to provide:
"(2) Every such action shall be brought by, and in the names of, the personal representatives of such deceased person, and in every such action the court or jury may give such damages, as, the court or jury, shall deem fair and just, under all of the circumstances to those persons who may be entitled to such damages when recovered including damages for the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable and reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, While conscious, undergone by such deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the inflicting of such injuries and his death. The amount of damages recoverable by civil action for death caused by the wrongful act, neglect or fault of another may also include recovery for the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased. Such person or persons entitled to such damages shall be of that class who, by law, would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the deceased had he died intestate. The amount recovered in every such action shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and next- of kin who suffered injury and in proportion thereto. Within 30 days after the entry of such judgment, the judge before whom such case was tried or his successor shall certify to the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate of such deceased person the amount and date of entry thereof, and shall advise the probate court by written opinion as to the amount thereof representing the loss suffered by the surviving spouse and all of the next of kin, and the proportion of such total loss suffered by the *286surviving spouse and each of the next of kin of such deceased person, as shown by the evidence. After providing for the payment of the reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable, the probate court shall determine as provided by law the manner in which the amount representing the total loss suffered by the surviving spouse and next of kin shall be distributed, and the proportionate share thereof to be distributed to the surviving spouse and the next of kin. The remainder of the proceeds of such judgment shall be distributed according to the intestate laws.” (Amendments emphasized.)
The amendments followed closely this Court’s decision in Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 383 Mich 251; 174 NW2d 836 (1970), which held that loss of companionship was not a pecuniary injury for purposes of the wrongful death act. The Legislature inserted three additions into this statutory section:
(1) recovery of damages for loss of society and companionship was specifically authorized;
(2) the phrase "under all of the circumstances” was inserted; and
(3) the method of distribution was included.
Plaintiff argues that these changes were directed solely to address this Court’s ruling in Breckon and did not authorize admission into evidence of either the fact or the possibility of a plaintiff’s remarriage.
Defendants contend that the phrase "under gill of the circumstances” is unambiguous, clearly serving to broaden the scope of damages recoverable following a wrongful death and allowing the court to consider any and all evidence affecting the amount of damages to be awarded.
The rule in Michigan, and that followed by a majority of jurisdictions, is that "evidence of plain*287tiffs remarriage or the probability of her remarriage is irrelevant and, therefore, was properly excluded, in determining the damages she suffered upon the death of her spouse”.1 (Emphasis supplied.) The rationale for the rule rests predominantly on three factors:2
(1) A cause of action for wrongful death arises at the time of death. Thus, the amount of damages suffered is fixed as of that time and is to be determined as of that date.
(2) To allow evidence of a subsequent marriage to influence the amount of damages awarded for the loss of society and companionship of a prior marriage is highly speculative. Comparing one relationship to another in an attempt to determine damages invites qualitative inquiry inappropriate to the probing scrutiny of the trial court.
(3) Similar to the collateral source rule, evidence of the effects of a subsequent marriage should have no bearing on the amount due a plaintiff following a wrongful death. Compensation received from another source should not affect the responsibility owed to the injured party by the tortfeasor.3
Evidence of the possibility of remarriage is held not admissible for the purpose of mitigating damages for essentially the same reasons.
In accordance with such reasoning, while we continue to believe that the fact of remarriage is irrelevant to mitigate damages in a wrongful death action, we feel that a protective order which enables a plaintiff to be addressed by a name other than that which she is currently using is not *288proper. We agree with the following reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Jersey:
"It would be offensive to the integrity of the judicial process if the plaintiff, after taking an oath to be truthful, were permitted to misrepresent her marital status to the jury. Of course, the defendants may not inquire into the details of the remarriage nor may they offer evidence concerning it. However, the desirable exclusion of evidence relating to the remarriage may not be carried to the point of affirmatively misrepresenting the truth to the jury.”4 Dubil v Labate, 52 NJ 255, 261-262; 245 A2d 177, 180 (1968).
The Illinois Supreme Court, in addressing this issue, stated, "We believe the judicial process in its search for truth need not resort to the condonation of perjury to accomplish its objective”. Watson v Fischbach, 54 Ill 2d 498, 503; 301 NE2d 303, 306 (1973).
Contemporary society offers a woman various options regarding her choice of name upon marriage. She may choose to retain her birthname or she may adopt the name of her husband. Following a subsequent remarriage, for any number of reasons, she may prefer to still be known by the name she has previously used. It is incumbent upon the courts to honor her choice and address a woman by the name she has selected so as to avoid any sense of false portrayal.
We therefore hold that evidence of a plaintiff surviving spouse’s remarriage may not be used to determine damages. If the plaintiff continues to regularly use the name Wood — Ms. or Mrs. Wood —after a remarriage, she is entitled to a protective order prohibiting referring to her or addressing *289her by the name of her present husband; the defendant’s lawyer has no right to address or refer to her by a name which she does not choose regularly to use. If, however, at the time of trial she regularly uses her new husband’s name she cannot properly ask the court to require the defendant’s lawyer to address or refer to her by a name which she no longer regularly uses. An appropriate limiting instruction may be requested by plaintiff in this regard. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Kavanagh, Williams, and Levin, JJ., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.

 Bunda v Hardwick, 376 Mich 640, 656; 138 NW2d 305 (1965).

 See Anno: Admissibility of evidence of, or propriety of comment as to, plaintiff spouse’s remarriage, or possibility thereof, in action for damages for death of other spouse, 88 ALR3d 926.

 Bunda, supra, 652-653.

 We differ from the view taken in the New Jersey case that the trial judge is required to instruct the jury, at the beginning of the case, that the plaintiff has remarried.