Court Opinion

ID: 9353767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 19:01:09.581991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:40.041978
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51215     Document: 00516608369          Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/12/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                                                       January 12, 2023
                                   No. 21-51215                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                              Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Lirio Lizzette Valenzuela,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:20-CR-2402

   Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Lirio Valenzuela appeals her conviction for possession and smuggling
   of controlled substances. Valenzuela asserts that the trial court abused its
   discretion in admitting evidence of a prior drug smuggling offense under Rule
   404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We conclude that the district court
   did not abuse its discretion either in finding that the prior criminal act was
   relevant to Valenzuela’s knowledge in the instant drug trafficking case or in
   finding that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially
   outweigh its probative value. We AFFIRM.
Case: 21-51215          Document: 00516608369                Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                            No. 21-51215

                                                  I.
           Valenzuela crossed into the United States from Mexico on October
   23, 2020, where a Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) canine at the
   border checkpoint signaled the presence of controlled substances in her
   vehicle. CBP officers testified that Valenzuela—who was traveling alone—
   said she had nothing to declare, was unemployed, and was traveling to visit
   her son in Texas. Upon searching her vehicle, the officers discovered drugs
   hidden in the spare tire well, behind a quarter panel, in the doors, and under
   the dashboard. Valenzuela and the government later stipulated that at least
   500 grams of methamphetamine mixture and 400 grams of fentanyl mixture
   were present in her car, and that she was the vehicle’s registered owner.
           The only factual issue at Valenzuela’s trial related to her state of mind
   regarding the transportation and possession of controlled substances, as the
   charged crimes required her to act knowingly or intentionally. 1 Valenzuela
   insisted that she did not know drugs were present in her vehicle when she
   crossed into the United States. She testified to answering an online
   advertisement offering to pay individuals to carry money from the United
   States to Mexico for a currency exchange business. Valenzuela asserted that
   she met this employer in Ciudad Juarez, where he installed a GPS tracker in
   her car, and she then drove to Texas. Until federal officials at the border
   informed her that the car contained controlled substances, Valenzuela
   testified, she did not know she was carrying anything illegal.
           To show that Valenzuela knew the drugs were in her vehicle, the
   government introduced evidence of her 2003 guilty plea in Texas state court

           1
             See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (criminalizing “knowingly or intentionally
   import[ing] . . . a controlled substance . . . .”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful
   for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
   possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”).

                                                   2
Case: 21-51215      Document: 00516608369           Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                     No. 21-51215

   for possession of marijuana. In committing that previous crime, the
   government contended, Valenzuela drove across the U.S.-Mexico border
   alone in a vehicle she owned, indicated she had nothing to declare, told
   officers that no one else had control over or modified her vehicle, and was
   found to have 61 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment in her gas
   tank. The government argued that this evidence showed “motive,
   opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, and lack of mistake” given several
   points of similarity between the incidents, rendering it admissible under Rule
   404(b). In both cases, the government asserted, Valenzuela “was the sole
   occupant/driver of a vehicle,” “entered the United States through a port of
   entry,” “was driving a vehicle in which drugs were secreted,” “used
   unsubstantiated claims as to why she was asked to drive the vehicle into the
   United States,” and “claimed she had no knowledge of the drugs found
   inside the vehicles she was driving.”
          Valenzuela submitted a motion in limine to exclude this extrinsic
   evidence as highly prejudicial and inadmissible propensity evidence, which
   the district court denied. The district court rejected defense counsel’s
   renewed objection at trial, but the court provided a limiting instruction to the
   jury on the proper use of extrinsic evidence. The jury found Valenzuela guilty
   on four of the six counts charged—two counts of importing a controlled
   substance under 21 U.S.C. § 960 and two counts of possession with intent to
   distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Valenzuela timely
   appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
   evidence from her 2003 guilty plea.

                                           3
Case: 21-51215          Document: 00516608369               Page: 4      Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                            No. 21-51215

                                                 II.
          When a party timely objects to a trial court’s evidentiary decision, this
   court reviews that decision for abuse of discretion. 2 “A trial court abuses its
   discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
   erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 3 If we find abuse of discretion, we
   employ a harmless error standard under which “[r]eversal is not required
   unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence
   contributed to the conviction.” 4
                                                III.
          Rule 404(b) provides generally that “[e]vidence of any other crime,
   wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
   that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
   character.” 5 Evidence of a defendant’s “propensity” to commit a
   subsequent crime based on previous criminal acts “is said to weigh too much
   with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
   general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
   charge.” 6 Evidence of another crime or wrong may nonetheless be admissible
   for “another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
   preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
   accident.” 7 In United States v. Beechum, this court articulated a two-part test
   to evaluate the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b):

          2
              United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1998).
          3
              United States v. Kinchen, 729 F.3d 466, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
          4
              United States v. Flores, 640 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
          5
              Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
          6
              Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (citation omitted).
          7
              Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

                                                  4
Case: 21-51215           Document: 00516608369                Page: 5    Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                            No. 21-51215

          First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence
          is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character.
          Second, the evidence must possess probative value that is not
          substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet
          the other requirements of rule 403. 8

   The government bears the burden at trial to demonstrate “that a prior
   conviction is relevant and admissible under 404(b).” 9
          Valenzuela first argues that evidence of her prior crime is irrelevant
   because it is too dissimilar to the subsequent trafficking crime. Evidence is
   relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
   would be without the evidence” or it is “of consequence in determining the
   action.” 10 The relevance of extrinsic evidence “is a function of its similarity
   to the offense charged.” 11 The government offered evidence of Valenzuela’s
   previous offense in this case to show that she was not carrying the drugs by
   mistake, rendering it more probable that she knew the drugs were in the car.
          This case is different from the previous crime, Valenzuela argues,
   because her son facilitated the act by showing her a Facebook advertisement,
   she proceeded to trial, she possessed a different menagerie of drugs, the
   drugs were primarily in the trunk instead of the gas tank, she owned the car
   for a few years, and this time the federal government prosecuted her rather
   than a state, among other minor distinctions. The government responds that
   the crimes are similar because they both comprised Valenzuela, as sole
   occupant of a vehicle, smuggling controlled substances from Ciudad Juarez

          8
               582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
          9
               United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 494 (5th Cir. 2014).
          10
               Fed. R. Evid. 401.
          11
               Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.

                                                  5
Case: 21-51215         Document: 00516608369              Page: 6       Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                          No. 21-51215

   to El Paso in hidden compartments and making negative customs
   declarations at the border.
           We agree with the government’s position, noting that this court has
   repeatedly held that previous smuggling activities may be relevant to intent,
   knowledge, and absence of mistake in subsequent trials for smuggling. 12 We
   have also said that “[f]or the purposes of determining relevancy, ‘a fact is
   similar to another only when the common characteristic is the significant one
   for the purpose of the inquiry at hand.’” 13 “Therefore, similarity, and hence
   relevancy, is determined by the inquiry or issue to which the extrinsic offense
   is addressed.” 14 Here, the government intends for the extrinsic evidence to
   show that Valenzuela knew she carried controlled substances in her car, and
   her proffered differences—such as the location of the drugs or the length of
   time she owned the car—do not materially detract from the inference that
   she had experience with the smuggling of controlled substances. We
   conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
   evidence of the defendant’s other cross-border smuggling-related crime

           12
             See Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 871 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence of
   the defendant’s prior smuggling of noncitizens is relevant to his intent in a subsequent case
   of smuggling noncitizens); United States v. Cheramie, 51 F.3d 538, 541–42 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior drug smuggling activities was admissible to
   show knowledge and intent); United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 827 (5th Cir. 1990)
   (holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior interstate mailings of drugs was admissible
   to show knowledge and intent in the charged mailing).
           13
             Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911 (quoting Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar
   Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954, 955 (1933)).
           14
                Id. We further explained, “the meaning and nature of the ‘similarity’
   requirement in extrinsic offense doctrine are not fixed quantities. Each case must be
   decided in its own context, with the issue to which the offense is directed firmly in mind.”
   Id. at 911 n.15.

                                                6
Case: 21-51215            Document: 00516608369             Page: 7       Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                            No. 21-51215

   between the same two locations was sufficiently similar to be relevant for the
   purposes of 404(b).
           Valenzuela next asserts that the prejudicial effect of the extrinsic
   evidence far outweighs its probative value, thus failing Rule 403’s balancing
   test and Beechum’s second step. 15 We have stated that “[t]he task for the
   court in its ascertainment of probative value and unfair prejudice under rule
   403 calls for a commonsense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding
   the extrinsic offense.” 16 Nonetheless, this evaluation rests “within the sound
   discretion of the trial judge.” 17 And in Beechum, as here, the defendant’s
   mental state represented the sole question of fact for the jury, rendering
   extrinsic evidence particularly helpful. 18
           Valenzuela asserts that the length of time between the first offense and
   the instant case—seventeen years—is so great that the evidence lacks all
   probative value. We have never held that the age of a prior conviction triggers
   a per se bar under Rule 404(b), 19 although the passage of time represents one
   of the many factors within the trial judge’s discretion. Indeed, we have
   declined to find abuse of discretion where trial courts admitted evidence of a
   similar age to show a defendant’s intent. 20 Valenzuela does not provide this

           15
                Fed. R. Evid. 403.
           16
                Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914.
           17
                Id. at 915.
           18
             Id. at 915–16. Beechum clarifies that “[i]f the defendant’s intent is not contested,
   then the incremental probative value of the extrinsic offense is inconsequential when
   compared to its prejudice; therefore, in this circumstance the evidence is uniformly
   excluded.” Id. at 914.
           19
                See Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 872.
           20
              See United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1040 (5th Cir. 1996) (admitting a
   15-year-old conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana to show intent in
   a later drug trafficking trial); United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1997) (per

                                                  7
Case: 21-51215           Document: 00516608369               Page: 8       Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                             No. 21-51215

   court any reason to believe that the age of her prior conviction renders it less
   probative in her case. The passage of time may be less material here, given
   that the government introduced the extrinsic evidence to show Valenzuela’s
   knowledge of drug smuggling practices, and there is no indication that she
   would have forgotten the details surrounding her 2003 conviction at the time
   of her subsequent offense, particularly given that she served time in prison
   for that activity.
           Valenzuela also contends that the government did not need the
   evidence. It is true that prejudicial evidence may be inadmissible under Rule
   403 when the government does not require it to prove an element of the
   offense. 21 Yet Valenzuela’s mental state represented the sole issue in her
   criminal trial, and there is no indication that the extrinsic evidence was
   cumulative or bore other hallmarks of highly prejudicial evidence, such as
   violence or greater severity than the charged offense. 22 Indeed, the
   government needed the evidence to counter Valenzuela’s testimony that she
   was an unwitting participant in the smuggling activity. 23
           Finally, Valenzuela contends that the government’s closing argument
   encouraged the jury to find her guilty based solely on her previous conviction,
   rendering the evidence unduly prejudicial. Valenzuela’s argument does not
   address the prejudicial nature of the evidence, but rather alleged misuse at
   trial. Nonetheless, the government’s closing argument offered the extrinsic

   curiam) (admitting a 15-year-old conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine
   to show intent in a later trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana).
           21
             United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that “other
   substantial evidence going to the issue of intent” reduced the value of the extrinsic
   evidence in Rule 403 balancing).
           22
                Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 872.
           23
                See United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1980).

                                                   8
Case: 21-51215       Document: 00516608369            Page: 9     Date Filed: 01/12/2023

                                       No. 21-51215

   evidence not to mislead the jury into convicting her for a previous offense,
   but to show absence of mistake, which Rule 404(b) specifically allows. 24 The
   district court also mitigated any misuse by providing a limiting instruction
   cautioning the jury that Valenzuela was “not on trial for any other act,
   conduct or offense not alleged in the indictment.”
          Finding none of Valenzuela’s arguments under Beechum’s second step
   compelling either, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
   in admitting evidence related to her prior drug offense.
                                           ****
   We AFFIRM.

          24
             At closing argument, the prosecutor asked, “[w]ould someone who had been
   through that experience [a smuggling-related conviction] once before go to this job by
   mistake?”

                                             9