Court Opinion

ID: 9629486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:33.356527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.858394
License: Public Domain

HUDOCK, Judge,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. While I share the majority’s reverence for the Double Jeopardy Clause and fully understand its historical basis, I do not believe that when a defendant himself frustrates the quest for truth, which is what a trial is supposed to be, he should be rewarded by discharge. I believe that appellant’s conduct here, whether designed to do so or not, so skewed the truth seeking process that manifest necessity for a mistrial existed.
In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) the U.S. Supreme Court held that where defense counsel made improper and prejudicial comments *171during his opening statement, a mistrial was properly declared and retrial not barred. The Court stated:
Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in an acquittal or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a criminal proceeding is terminated without resolving the merits of the charges against the accused. Because of the variety of circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do not invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury ... the prosecutor must demonstrate “manifest necessity” for the mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant.
Id. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830, 54 L.Ed.2d at 728.
The Court went on to state that the words “manifest necessity” do not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge, and that the word “necessity” cannot be interpreted literally. Rather, a “high degree” of necessity is required before a mistrial could be appropriate over defendant’s objection.
The Court further noted that the difficulty which led to the mistrial in that case “falls in an area where the trial judge’s determination is entitled to special respect”. Id. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 833, 54 L.Ed.2d at 731.
The majority points out that there were other alternatives open to the trial judge, such as a curative instruction. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Washington, supra, recognized that some trial judges may have proceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions, but the court refused to hold that the availability of such an alternative precluded a mistrial being declared on the grounds of “manifest necessity”. The court reiterated that in a literal sense the mistrial was not “necessary” but that “the overriding interest in the evenhanded administra*172tion of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment [of defense counsel]”. Id. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 833, 54 L.Ed.2d at 732.
In the case sub judice, the entire record must be read to appreciate the seriousness of defendant’s unsolicited comment that “... Charlie was not guilty. Why should I be found guilty?” The trial court’s opinion and the majority opinion here set forth only twenty or so lines of the transcript of trial testimony preceding the challenged remarks. In that context, I agree that the remark is ambiguous, if not meaningless, for the identity of “Charlie” and his connection to the case is not made known. However, after reading the entire record, it becomes abundantly clear who “Charlie” is—he is the conspirator about whom the victim testifies at great length and in graphic detail. She tells how “Charlie” held her while appellant raped and sodomized her and how appellant held her while “Charlie” did the same. No juror could have heard this, and testimony about “Charlie” from other witnesses, without knowing that appellant was advising them of the fact that “Charlie” had been acquitted of these charges. This is especially prejudicial since “Charlie” testified he had consensual sex with the victim on the evening in question. Under these circumstances, I would give great deference to the trial judge who “saw and heard the jurors during their voir dire examination”, who is “most familiar” with the evidence and background of the case”, who has “listened to the tone of the argument” and has “observed the apparent reaction of the jurors”, and who is far more “conversant with the factors relevant to the determination than any reviewing court can possibly be”. Id. at 513-514, 98 S.Ct. at 834-835, 54 L.Ed.2d at 733.
Of course, as Arizona v. Washington instructs, paying great deference to a trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial does not mean that his decision is beyond being questioned. He still must exercise “sound discretion” in declaring a *173mistrial, recognizing “ ‘the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.’ ” Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 835, 54 L.Ed.2d at 733, quoting, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).
Here the court considered arguments from both counsel before making its decision. In its opinion in support of the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court set forth the reasons for its decision. It believed that the prosecutor had not provoked or in any way suggested the making of the statement by defendant, and that the statement was highly prejudicial to the Commonwealth. The court further noted that “even with curative instructions from the court, the fact than an alleged accomplice/co-conspirator was found not guilty could not be erased from the jurors’ minds”. Thus it is clear that the court did consider and reject the only alternative to a mistrial under the facts presented, a curative instruction. While the court did not take an evening to ponder and research the matter as the trial court did in Arizona v. Washington, supra, it did not need that amount of time to consider the only realistic option available.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Howard, 375 Pa.Super. 43, 543 A.2d 1169 (1988) for the proposition that reference by the prosecution to the prior conviction of one of four co-conspirators did not warrant a new trial. From that the majority reasons that reference to a co-conspirator’s prior acquittal, therefore, does not per se require a mistrial. I do not believe that conclusion is warranted. The facts of Commonwealth v. Howard were that defense counsel injected the fact that the co-conspirator had been convicted, and that, he having thus opened the door, the prosecutor was free to refer to that fact also. The case does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor may under all circumstances refer to the conviction of a co-conspirator without prejudicing the defendant at trial.
*174I would hold that since appellant himself poisoned the waters of truth, he should not benefit from his wrongdoing.
Neither party has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias; [footnote omitted] in these circumstances, “the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments” [citation omitted] must prevail over the defendant’s “valued right” to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 516, 98 S.Ct. at 835-836, 54 L.Ed.2d. at 734-735.
The trial court here properly declared a mistrial for reasons of manifest necessity, and, accordingly, I dissent.