Court Opinion

ID: 9860620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:27:51.2824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:11.904850
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Because the majority opinion seriously misconstrues both the law and the facts in this case in a variety of ways, I respectfully dissent. At the time of this court’s first opinion in this case, the statute regarding a criminal defendant’s use of psychotropic medication provided as follows: “A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under medication.” 725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1994). The statute was amended effective December 31, 1996, and now provides: “A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or medications.” 725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1996). The State contends that the amended statute applies to the instant case. Defendant responds that the statute does not apply to his case because his plea and sentencing occurred before the effective date of the amendment. The appellate court has issued conflicting rulings on the retroactivity of the psychotropic drug statute (725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1996)). Compare People v. Perry, 292 Ill. App. 3d 705 (1st Dist. 1997), and People v. Gibson, 292 Ill. App. 3d 842 (5th Dist. 1997) (holding that statute applies retroactively), with People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (2d Dist. 1996), People v. Jamerson, 292 Ill. App. 3d 944 (3d Dist. 1997), and People v. Straub, 292 Ill. App. 3d 193 (4th Dist. 1997) (holding that statute does not apply retroactively). A reviewing court should apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right. First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1996). Where an amendment is procedural in nature, no vested rights are involved. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290; see also Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597 (1953) (“there is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure”). A statute which prescribes the method by which a right is enforced is procedural and therefore subject to retroactive application. People v. Ruiz, 107 Ill. 2d 19, 22-24 (1985); People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 440 (1973). In light of these settled retroactivity principles, it is obvious that the current version of the psychotropic drug statute applies to the instant case. Section 104 — 21, in either its current or former version, does not create a substantive right. Rather, it merely prescribes a method for enforcing a criminal defendant’s substantive right not to be tried while unfit. The former version of the statute directed trial courts to hold a fitness hearing when there was evidence that a defendant was taking psychotropic medication. The current version of the statute prohibits trial courts from presuming a defendant unfit for trial solely by virtue of the receipt of psychotropic drugs. Both versions of the statute concern only “the machinery to be used by the circuit court” in assessing a defendant’s fitness to stand trial. Ruiz, 107 Ill. 2d at 23. The amendment is therefore procedural and hence applies retroactively to cases pending on direct review such as this. In People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996), this court stated that an amendment to section 104 — 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 — 21 (West 1996)), the psychotropic drug statute, is procedural in nature and therefore retrospectively applicable to matters pending on the effective date of the amendment. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d at 162. In another opinion announced on the same day as Nitz, however, this court held, in a footnote without explanation, that the amended psychotropic drug statute did not apply to a case pending on direct review. People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464, 475 n.l (1996); see also People v. Perry, 292 Ill. App. 3d 705, 716-17 (1997) (noting contradiction between Nitz and Birdsall). The majority attempts to reconcile Nitz and Birdsall by noting that Nitz held that the General Assembly may not pass legislation retroactively changing the judicial construction of a statute. 182 Ill. 2d at 334-35. The majority contends that Nitz therefore precludes application of the current statute to the instant case. Reading “the entirety of the Nitz opinion” as the majority urges (182 Ill. 2d at 334), however, compels precisely the opposite conclusion. Because Nitz was a post-conviction case, applying the amended statute therein would have amounted to a legislative alteration of a final judicial decision, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine. Conversely, Nitz dictates that cases which are instead pending on direct review are immediately subject to legislative changes in judicial procedure. The majority provides absolutely no explanation for its rejection of this well-settled legal principle other than reliance on the erroneous Birdsall precedent. The opinion in People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249 (1998), also invoked by the majority, contains no substantive holding whatsoever on the issue of retroactivity, but instead merely cites to the unsupported footnote in Birdsall. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d at 275 n.2. Clearly, Nitz was right, Birdsall was wrong, and the current statute applies to cases pending on direct review. Defendant further argues, however, that retroactive application of the psychotropic drug statute would violate section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1996)), which provides, in relevant part, as follows: “No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1996). Defendant’s argument that retroactive application of the statute would violate this section fails to account for a crucial provision therein. When a statute has been amended, section 4 indeed prohibits courts from construing the new law to affect any right or claim existing under a former law. Section 4 then adds, however, this significant caveat: “save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1996). Far from refuting the rule of construction that procedural amendments are to be retroactively applied, then, section 4 instead codifies and reinforces this traditional legal principle. Accordingly, this court should apply the current version of section 104 — 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/104 — 21 (West 1996)) to defendant’s contentions regarding his receipt of psychotropic medication. I also strongly disagree with the majority’s creation of a new standard of review to be employed by this court following remand for further fact-finding such as in the instant case. The majority cites no authority for its new “sui generis” standard (182 Ill. 2d at 341-42), and such a standard cannot be justified under established legal principles. The circuit court is required to order a fitness hearing when a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness is raised. 725 ILCS 5/104 — 11 (West 1996). Whether a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness has been raised is a determination within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 431 (1978). The trial court’s determination of this question therefore should not be disturbed absent an abuse of its discretion. We are not justified in departing from this well-settled standard of review simply because we have “retained jurisdiction” over a case during remand. Application of the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the facts of the instant case compels the conclusion that defendant was not entitled to a fitness hearing. On remand, medication logs for 1992 were introduced which established that defendant received a daily dose of 100 milligrams of the psychotropic medication Thorazine from June 20 through July 17, July 20 through September 26, September 28 through October 31, and November 2 through 4. Thereafter, a dose of 50 milligrams of Thorazine was given on November 11, November 13 through 21, and November 23 through 30. All doses were given at night as a sleeping aid. Defendant entered his plea on October 21, 1992. His sentencing hearing was held on November 23 and 24, 1992. At the hearing on remand, Curtis Eugene Pierce, Fulton County jail administrator, testified that defendant was incarcerated at the jail from March 12 to November 5, 1992. Pierce testified that defendant was occasionally irritable and disrespectful towards jail staff both before and after June 20, 1992. Pierce also testified that defendant was transferred out of the jail on November 5, 1992, because he injured another inmate with a sharpened object. Leland F. Keith, chief deputy sheriff of Mason County, testified that defendant was transferred to the Mason County jail on November 5, 1992, where he remained for approximately one month. Keith testified that he did not notice anything unusual about defendant’s behavior while he was incarcerated there. Gayle Carper, co-counsel for defendant at the time of his plea and sentencing, testified that while defendant sometimes exhibited an inability to follow conversations and make eye contact, his behavior was not noticeably different from that of other jail inmates she had interviewed. Carper stated that during her conversations with defendant regarding his guilty plea, he appeared to be thinking logically, although he also appeared depressed. Philipp E. Bornstein, a clinical psychiatrist, then testified that Thorazine is a nonaddictive, psychotropic medication which is commonly used in the treatment of major mental disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. He stated that an average dose for such treatment is 400 to 600 milligrams. Dr. Bornstein further testified that Thorazine is sometimes given in smaller doses as a sleeping aid to persons who, because of prior substance abuse, are at risk of becoming addicted to traditional sleeping pills. He testified that ingestion of a 100-milligram dosage of Thorazine for this purpose would have no antipsychotic effects at all. Rather, the only noticeable effect would be diminished anxiety and increased ability to sleep. Dr. Bornstein concluded, after reviewing the medication logs and the trial court records in the instant case, that the Thorazine administered to defendant did not hinder his ability to understand the charges against him and make rational decisions about pleading and sentencing options. If anything, Dr. Bornstein suggested, the medication may have improved defendant’s ability to think clearly by lessening his anxiety and allowing him to rest well. Samuel Dedman Shillcutt, a neuropsychopharmacologist, then testified that a 100-milligram dose of Thorazine would not have a substantial effect on a person’s ability to reason. Shillcutt stated that his review of the record in this case indicated that defendant was not uncooperative with counsel, did not exhibit disordered thought, and was not illogical in his reasoning. Shillcutt therefore concluded that the Thorazine administered to defendant did not affect his behavior with regard to participating in his defense. Alesia McMillen, defendant’s lead trial counsel, then testified that defendant was cooperative and responsive in preparing his defense. McMillen stated that she became upset when defendant chose to reject the plea agreement she had brokered and to seek the death penalty instead. She told defendant that she thought she should withdraw as his attorney because she could not support his decision to seek a death sentence. Mc-Millen testified that defendant asked her not to withdraw, told her that he thought she had done a good job representing him, and tried to comfort her. She said that defendant nevertheless continually maintained that seeking the death penalty was the right decision for him. She said that while she did not dgree with this decision, she nevertheless felt that defendant was competent to make it, and that the decision was not irrational. John R. Day, a clinical psychologist, then testified that he examined defendant in a series of three visits in June, July and August of 1992. At the time of the latter two visits, defendant was taking Thorazine as a sleeping aid, although Dr. Day was not then aware of this fact. Dr. Day testified that he had worked with many patients being administered Thorazine and that a 100-milligram dose of the medication has no effect on a person’s ability to make reasoned judgments. He further testified that he had never seen any negative side effects result from a 50- to 100-milligram dose of Thorazine. Dr. Day stated that during his examinations of defendant, defendant’s speech was coherent and responsive. In Dr. Day’s opinion, defendant was fully able to understand the nature of the charges against him and cooperate in his defense. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist trained in neuropsychology, then testified that he examined defendant on September 22, 1995, in order to evaluate defendant’s psychological condition as well as his likely personality functioning and understanding at the time of his plea and sentencing hearing three years earlier. Dr. Gelbort testified that defendant showed signs of cognitive dysfunction associated with possible substance abuse and physical abuse. He further testified that while Thorazine can improve a person’s thought processes by reducing anxiety, it can also impair judgment by making one less aware and adaptive. Dr. Gelbort testified that a 100-milligram dose of Thorazine was at the lower end of prescribed usage, and so would not generally be employed for antipsychotic effect. He also testified that Thorazine’s major side effect, motor dysfunction, typically occurs at higher dosage levels. Nevertheless, he stated that diminished cognitive capacity could result from a 100-milligram dose of Thorazine. Finally, Dr. Gelbort stated that he believed that defendant’s ability to make a reasoned decision at the time he rejected his plea offer and sought the death penalty was affected by his use of Thorazine. The court then filed a memorandum opinion in which it found that defendant took the psychotropic medication Thorazine as a sleeping aid on the dates and in the amounts indicated in the logs. The court found that Thorazine is typically prescribed in a dosage range from 50 to 2,000 milligrams, and that defendant’s use of 50 to 100 milligrams was therefore in the low end of the dosage range. The court further found that Thorazine was prescribed because defendant had trouble sleeping due to anxiety, and that defendant had very little trouble sleeping after he began taking the medication. The court also noted that defendant had stated that he rejected the negotiated plea and instead sought the death penalty because he was young, had previously been incarcerated, and did not wish to spend the rest of his life in prison. The court found this decision to be logical, although not one a majority of persons under similar circumstances might be expected to make. The court found that at the time defendant entered his plea, he expressed both an ability to work with his legal counsel and a faith in counsel’s efforts. The court also found that, at the time of his plea, defendant had recently been examined by a psychologist, and his trial counsel believed him to be fit to enter the plea. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Thorazine defendant was taking at the time of his plea and sentencing did not appear to have a medically significant effect. The evidence adduced on remand fully comports with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s use of Thorazine as a sleeping aid was not medically significant with regard to his fitness to stand trial. Substantial medical testimony supported the court’s finding that the 50- to 100-milligram doses of Thorazine administered to defendant did not create a bona fide doubt as to his fitness. All of the individuals who negotiated, counseled, and worked with defendant at the time of his plea and sentencing, including a practicing psychologist, testified that defendant actively participated in his defense and fully appreciated the consequences of his decisions. The only expert who testified that defendant was affected by the medication, Dr. Gelbort, did not examine, or even meet, defendant until more than three years after the sentencing hearing, and even he admitted that the dosage given to defendant was lower than that typically used for antipsychotic purposes. In light of this evidence, I would hold that the trial court did not err in failing to order a fitness hearing. I would therefore proceed to consider defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICES MILLER and BILANDIC join in this dissent.