Court Opinion

ID: 9717810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:10:38.140915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.580197
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: In my opinion the trial court order on review was not appealable, and I, therefore, respectfully dissent. In my view today’s decision extends the right of appeal under Rule 307(a)(1) (87 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). The court’s conclusion, that the order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration constituted an appealable order, is founded upon a misreading of the cases cited in support of the conclusion. In School District No. 46 v. Del Bianco (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, a case in which I concurred, the appeal was from a trial court’s denial of a combined motion by defendant to proceed to arbitration and to stay any further proceedings. There the court held, “The application was for a stay order, injunctive in nature, and its denial was in effect the denial of an interlocutory injunction. Consequently, such order was appealable ***.” 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 152-53. In Property Management, Ltd. v. Howasa, Inc. (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 536, the defendants filed a combined motion to compel arbitration and to stay any further proceedings. The motion was allowed and the plaintiff appealed. On the basis of Del Bianco, the court stated, “We believe an order granting a stay of proceedings is in effect the granting of a preliminary injunction which is appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1).” 14 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539. The majority opinion admits that the two Federal cases cited in support of its position were appeals from orders “granting or refusing a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.” 98 Ill. 2d at 271. This is not the background of the present case; defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint and to compel arbitration never sought a stay order, nor was one ever allowed or denied. The trial court, after studying the parties’ memorandum in support of their positions and listening to oral argument, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered defendant to file its answer to plaintiff’s complaint within 28 days. It is from this order that the defendant appealed. It is basic law that where a court lacks jurisdiction in a proceeding it cannot be acquired by the litigant’s consent or agreement. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the appellate court, on the ground that it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.