Court Opinion

ID: 9753453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:14:40.124982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:36.835317
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
with whom Associate Judge WASHINGTON joins, concurring:
I concur in the judgment and join the court’s opinion. I write separately, however, to add a few words about the nature and significance of the issue that the agency must decide on remand.
At first blush, one might conclude that, in the context of this case, there is little difference between “unsafe working conditions” (ie., “smoking is dangerous to everyone’s health, including mine”) and “medical reasons” (ie., “smoking can make me ill”). But as the court points out, the agency’s rejection, based on a credibility determination, of Ms. Branson’s medical grounds does not deal with the much broader safety claim that Ms. Branson is presenting here. Ms. Branson’s attorney made the scope of that claim apparent at the hearing when he stated:
We feel that our case is such that even a perfectly healthy person can quit their [sic] job if their [sic] boss insist[s] on smoking in the office. It is as simple as that.
*981Ms. Branson’s brief on appeal does not retreat from that position. In other words, Ms. Branson claims that her former employer provided an unhealthy environment for everybody, including her. This claim is not dependent on her assertion that she is allergic to smoke; Ms. Branson implies that any worker can resign, and recover unemployment compensation, when a co-worker’s smoking is disagreeable to her.
In some ways, the present case is a less than ideal vehicle for the exploration of Ms. Branson’s thesis. The agency’s final decision states, inter alia, that “employer’s testimony contradicting claimant’s version disclosed that when specifically asked if employer’s smoking would bother her, claimant answered, ‘there would be no problem.’ ” The appeals examiner found the employer’s testimony credible, and we have no basis for questioning the examiner’s finding. Moreover, it is undisputed that we are dealing here with an employer who had a filtration machine designed to counter the effects of his smoking. The agency also found, based on the examiner’s credibility determination, that Ms. Bran-son never made a timely complaint to her employer regarding the allegedly dangerous condition, and the employer testified that he was unaware of any complaint until Ms. Branson tendered her letter of resignation.
Nevertheless, it was the obligation of the agency to make a finding on the question whether the employer’s smoking constituted an unsafe condition as alleged. Although the parties have not cited it, there is a significant body of law on the subject. See generally Sonya A. Soehnel, Annotation, Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Employee’s Refusal to Work in Areas Where Smoking Is Permitted, 14 A.L.R.4th 1234 (1982 & Supp.2001), and authorities there cited.1 *982The agency should consider these and other pertinent authorities, as well as the particular facts of this case, in reaching its decision on remand.

. In Lapham v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 103 Pa.Cmwlth. 144, 519 A.2d 1101, 1102 (1987), in holding that a claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation after resigning on account of exposure to cigarette smoke, the court stated:
The evidence of the toxic nature of tobacco smoke and its injurious and deleterious effects on health is very strong, not only to the smokers, but also to the nonsmokers who are exposed to "secondhand” smoke.
In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 145 N.J.Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976), the court took judicial notice of the toxic nature of cigarette smoke and its well known association with emphysema, lung cancer and heart disease, citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, P.L. 89-92, July 27, 1965, 79 Stat. 282, and the Surgeon General's report of 1972 entitled The Health Consequences of Smoking. Both recognized the dangerous nature of cigarette smoke and declared it a national policy to warn the public of its danger. The Surgeon General discouraged cigarette smoking. His reports indicate that the mere presence of cigarette smoke is an air pollutant and makes involuntary smokers of all who breathe the air. It is especially harmful to the health of those who have chronic heart conditions, pulmonary problems, and allergies to tobacco smoke.
In Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth Unemployment Bd. of Review, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 302, 426 A.2d 719 (1981), on the other hand, the court held that the claimant, who had a nicotine allergy, was not entitled to compensation after she resigned “for health reasons” allegedly generated by exposure to cigarette smoke. The court held, inter alia, that
[ajlthough it is now generally accepted that cigarette smoke may be harmful to smokers and non-smokers alike, we cannot presume for unemployment compensation purposes that anyone exposed to cigarette smoke in one’s work environment is so physically harmed that a voluntary termination of employment will be automatically justified and unemployment benefits granted. Thus, we must treat this case as any other that involves a voluntary termination for health reasons.
Id. at 721.
Although neither of these cases, or any other decision cited in Ms. Soehnel’s Annotation, is squarely on point here, these authorities *982illuminate the context in which the agency must make its decision on remand.