Court Opinion

ID: 9556104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:00:20.901211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.448916
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     WANDA J. ODEN MEYERS, 1                          DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          SF-0752-17-0585-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                     DATE: August 15, 2023
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 2

           Wanda J. Oden Meyers, Culver City, California, pro se.

           Jeffrey Baldridge and Justin Strong, Los Angeles Air Force Base,
              California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her constructive removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a
     hearing. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for

     1
      This case was formerly captioned “Odenmeyers v. Department of the Air Force.” We
     have amended the caption to reflect that the appellant’s surname i s two words.
     2
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges a re not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Western
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a GS-09 Management Analyst for the agency’s Space
     Missiles Center (SMC) Development Planning Directorate. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 4 at 105-06, Tab 7 at 185. 3           In 2014, the agency underwent a
     reorganization in which the SMC Development Planning Directorate merged with
     the SMC Space Development Test Directorate. IAF, Tab 7 at 185. The ent ity
     created by this merger is known as the SCM Advanced Systems and Development
     Directorate (SCM/AD).       Id. As a result of the reorganization, the appellant’s
     Management Analyst position was abolished, and she was offered reassignment to
     a GS-09 Training Coordinator position in SCM/AD, which she accepted effective
     August 24, 2014. IAF, Tab 4 at 1, 105-06, Tab 7 at 185.
¶3         The appellant’s duties in this position involved monitoring, recording, and
     facilitating the training of agency military and civilian perso nnel, which was
     initially limited to 80 or 90 individuals who were former Development Planning
     Directorate employees stationed with the appellant at Los An geles Air Force
     Base. IAF, Tab 4 at 1, Tab 5 at 44-46, Tab 7 at 185. She performed these duties
     successfully during her first year in the position, through September 30, 2015. 4
     IAF, Tab 4 at 196-99.

     3
       We are mindful that the question of whether there is a nonfrivolous allegation of
     Board jurisdiction must be determined based solely on the sufficiency of the app ellant’s
     pleadings and evidentiary submissions, without regard to the agency’s conflicting
     arguments or interpretations of the evidence. See Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service,
     60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). We have considered the agency’s submissions for
     purposes of background and context so that we may better understand this pro se
     appellant’s claims.
     4
        The appellant’s performance year ran from April 1 through March 31, and her
     performance was rated on a two-tier scale of “meets” and “does not meet.” IAF, Tab 4
     at 198.
                                                                                      3

¶4        During this time, however, the merger process was continuing, and effective
     November 1, 2015, the agency assigned the appellant Training Coordinator duties
     for the remainder of the SCM/AD employees–former Space Development Test
     Directorate employees stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. IAF,
     Tab 5 at 50, Tab 7 at 185. According to the appellant, this more than doubled her
     workload. IAF, Tab 4 at 67, 95. According to the agency, with the assumption of
     these new duties, the appellant’s performance began to falter. Specifically, her
     performance was rated “does not meet” in two of five critical elements for the
     performance year ending March 31, 2016, and her October 11, 2016 progress
     review reflected continued unacceptable performance in the same critical
     elements. IAF, Tab 4 at 200-01.
¶5        On November 2, 2016, the agency placed the appellant on a 90-day
     performance improvement plan (PIP). IAF, Tab 5 at 55-65. After the close of the
     PIP period, the agency determined that the appellant had failed to demonstrate
     acceptable performance, and on May 17, 2017, it proposed her removal under
     5 U.S.C. chapter 43. IAF, Tab 7 at 5-10. The appellant responded to the proposal
     in writing. Id. at 17-178. On June 20, 2017, the agency directed the appellant to
     attend a June 22, 2017 meeting during which she would receive the agency’s final
     decision on her proposed removal. IAF, Tab 4 at 8. However, on June 21, 2017,
     the day before the scheduled meeting, the appellant resigned. 5 IAF, Tab 5 at 33,
     Tab 7 at 178.    Her letter of resignation stated that she was resigning “under
     duress and documented hostile working conditions.” IAF, Tab 7 a t 178.
¶6        The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing, indicating that
     she was appealing an involuntary resignation.        IAF, Tab 1 at 1 -2.       The
     administrative judge issued an acknowledgment order, notifying the appellant that
     the Board might lack jurisdiction over her appeal and informing the appellant of

     5
      The agency had prepared a decision letter through which the charge of unacceptable
     performance would have been sustained and the appellant removed effective June 22,
     2017. IAF, Tab 7 at 174-76.
                                                                                       4

     her jurisdictional burden, including the need to make nonfrivolous allegations of
     Board jurisdiction in order to obtain her requested hearing. IAF, Tab 2 at 2 -4.
     The administrative judge ordered her to file evidence and argument on the issue.
     Id. at 4. Both parties responded, and after the record on jurisdiction closed, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction without a hearing.   IAF, Tabs 4-7, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID).
     Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a
     nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary based on intolerable
     working conditions or a coercive threatened adverse action. ID at 10-14.
¶7        The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative
     judge’s jurisdictional analysis and arguing that the administrative judge erred in
     finding that she failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdict ion.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has responded to the petition
     for review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File,
     Tabs 5-6.      After the record on review closed, the appellant filed a
     pleading which she characterized as a “petition to withdrawal and dismiss case
     #SF-0752-0585-I-1 as of August 3 rd 2018.” PFR File, Tab 7. The agency has
     objected to the appellant’s request. PFR File, Tab 8.

                                        ANALYSIS
¶8        Withdrawal of an appeal or of a petition for review i s an act of finality that
     has the effect of removing the appeal from the Board’s jurisdiction. Okello v.
     Office of Personnel Management, 112 M.S.P.R. 563, ¶ 5 (2009); Wilson v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 41 M.S.P.R. 628, 629 (1989). Hence, a withdrawal must be by
     clear, unequivocal, and decisive action. Leno v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     90 M.S.P.R. 614, ¶ 3 (2002). In this case, we find that the appellant’s request to
     withdraw is not clear and unequivocal because she has not specified whether she
     wishes to withdraw the petition for review only or the appeal in its entirety. PFR
     File, Tab 7 at 1.   We therefore deny the appellant’s request. If the appellant
                                                                                       5

      wishes to withdraw her appeal in its entirety, she should raise the issue with the
      administrative judge on remand.
¶9          Employee-initiated actions are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board
      lacks jurisdiction over voluntary actions.     Polen v. Department of Defense,
      72 M.S.P.R. 1, 5 (1996).      However, employee-initiated actions that appear
      voluntary on their face are not always so, and the Board may have jurisdiction
      over such actions under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 as “constructive” adverse actions.
      Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 7 (2013).         The Board has
      recognized a variety of fact patterns that may support a finding of a constructive
      adverse action within its jurisdiction. Id., ¶ 8. However, all constructive adverse
      actions have two things in common: (1) the employee lacked a meaningful choice
      in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the
      employee of that choice. Id. Assuming that the jurisdictional requirements of
      5 U.S.C. chapter 75 are otherwise met, proof of these two things is sufficient to
      establish Board jurisdiction. Id. If the appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation
      that her resignation or retirement constituted a constructive removal, then she is
      entitled to a hearing on the jurisdictional issue. Campbell v. Department of the
      Treasury, 37 M.S.P.R. 92, 94 (1988).       In this case, the administrative judge
      found, and we agree, that the appellant’s allegations seem to suggest a claim of
      involuntariness under two theories—that the appellant had no choice but to resign
      due to intolerable working conditions and that the agency’s proposed adverse
      action was one that the agency knew could not be substantiated. ID at 10, 13.
¶10         When intolerable working conditions are alleged, the Board will find a
      resignation involuntary only if the appellant demonstrates that the agency
      engaged in a course of action that made working conditions so difficult or
      unpleasant that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to
      resign.   Markon v. Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 577-78 (1996).         In
      examining this issue, the Board will consider the totality of the circumstances.
      Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 97 M.S.P.R. 68, ¶ 13 (2004), aff’d, 158 F.
                                                                                         6

      App’x 267 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In addition, although a resignation or retirement is
      not considered involuntary merely because an employee chose to resign in the
      face of an agency’s threat to remove her for cause, the agency must nonetheless
      have had “reasonable grounds for threatening to take an adverse action.” Schultz
      v. United States Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If the agency knew
      that the reason for a threatened removal could not be substantiated, the threatened
      action by the agency is purely coercive and the resulting resignation may be
      involuntary. Id.
¶11         In deciding whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      involuntariness, the administrative judge in this case declined to consider matters
      predating her November 2, 2016 PIP. ID at 11. Although we agree with the
      administrative judge that the most probative evidence of involuntariness usually
      concerns matters close in time to the alleged constructive removal, ID at 9, 11;
      see Terban v. Department of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
      the appellant in this case has alleged a continuous and related series of coercive
      agency actions beginning shortly after June 29, 2015, when she requested
      reasonable accommodation for conditions arising out of a congenital heart defect ,
      IAF, Tab 4 at 1, 83, 216. Specifically, the appellant requested and was granted,
      2 days of telework per week effective September 7, 2015, in order to better
      manage work-related stress that could adversely affect her condition.             Id.
      at 208-16.   We therefore find that this time period represents an appropriate
      starting point for the inquiry.
¶12         According to the appellant, after she disclosed her disabling heart condition,
      her first- and second-level supervisors began a campaign of bullying and
      harassment against her. Specifically, she alleges that her supervisors delayed in
      ruling on her request for reasonable accommodations, and th at the agency then
      “dumped”     the   additional     workload   on   her   in   November 2015,   without
      providing her the proper tools to do the job. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-10, 18, 20. In
      December 2015, the appellant filed an informal equal employment opportunity
                                                                                          7

      (EEO) complaint, alleging that her second-level supervisor discriminated against
      her based on disability, age, race, color, sex, and national origin by, among other
      things, assigning her additional work and obstructing her performance of that
      work. IAF, Tab 4 at 91-97. The appellant subsequently filed a formal complaint.
      Id. at 89.     The record shows that the appellant took a leave of absence from
      March 23 through May 1, 2016, which she appears to allege was due to a
      compensable condition of work-related stress. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; IAF, Tab 4
      at 217-20.       She alleges that shortly thereafter, her second -level supervisor
      confronted her about her EEO complaint. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. According to the
      appellant, the agency later reprimanded this supervisor for her behavior. Id.
¶13           In June 2016, the appellant received her annual performance evaluation for
      the year ending March 31, 2016, which reflected unacceptable performance in two
      critical elements. IAF, Tab 4 at 201. In August 2016, the appellant filed an EEO
      complaint concerning her first-level supervisor and containing similar allegations
      to those contained in her previous EEO complaint, which was still pending before
      the agency. 6 Id. at 85-88. During this time, the appellant’s relationship with her
      first- and second-level supervisors continued to deteriorate. The appellant alleges
      that they subjected her to overbearing scrutiny, harassment, and humiliation, and
      the record shows that she raised these issues with her superiors outside EEO
      channels on several occasions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-12; IAF, Tab 4 at 259-71,
      278, 286-87, 313.
¶14           At the beginning of October 2016, the agency moved the physical location
      of the appellant’s office in an attempt to alleviate the friction between her and her
      supervisors. IAF, Tab 4 at 51, 265, 311, Tab 7 at 186-87. Shortly thereafter, the
      appellant received a negative interim performance review, and on November 2,
      2016, her first-level supervisor placed her on a PIP. IAF, Tab 4 at 200, Tab 5
      at 55-62.     The PIP notice stated that the appellant would be provided with

      6
          It is not clear what became of this second EEO complaint.
                                                                                       8

      training, assistance, and feedback during the PIP period, but it also warned her
      that her telework arrangement could be canceled before the expiration of the
      90-day PIP period if she failed to improve her performance in the near term. IAF,
      Tab 5 at 61-62.
¶15        After being placed on the PIP, the appellant disputed the reasons for the PIP
      and requested to be placed under different supervision. IAF, Tab 4 at 46 -55. The
      agency granted this request, and a new first-level supervisor was assigned to
      oversee the PIP. IAF, Tab 7 at 189. Nevertheless, the appellant’s new first -level
      supervisor continued to consult with her former supervisor regarding the
      parameters of the appellant’s job duties and to obtain access to certai n
      information that he needed to administer the PIP. IAF, Tab 7 at 190. During the
      first 45 days of the PIP, the appellant’s new supervisor gave her feedback and
      guidance approximately once a week and identified numerous deficiencies in her
      work output. IAF, Tab 5 at 64-65, 79-80, 94-96, 135, Tab 6 at 20-22, 50-51,
      82-83. The appellant responded to this feedback on several occasions, objecting
      to her new supervisor’s continued consultation with her former supervisor,
      contesting the propriety of her increased workload, and explaining variously that
      the performance feedback was inaccurate or that any deficiencies in her work
      product were due to lack of support and inability to access certain information.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 17-19, 44-47, 48.
¶16        On December 20, 2016, the appellant’s new supervisor met with her and
      informed her that her performance midway through the PIP was still
      unsatisfactory, and that he would be terminating her telework agreement effective
      January 3, 2017, because working full-time in the office would allow for closer
      supervision and afford her a better opportunity to improve her performance. IAF,
      Tab 4 at 29, Tab 6 at 91, Tab 7 at 190. However, through January and up to the
      end of the PIP, on February 8, 2017, the appellant continued to receive feedback
                                                                                            9

      very critical of her performance, and with which she continued to disagree. 7 IAF,
      Tab 6 at 93-95, 101, 104, 106-07, 119-20, 126-29, Tab 7 at 190.
¶17           After the agency proposed the appellant’s removal on May 10, 2017, she
      began an extended period of stress-related sick leave. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; IAF,
      Tab 4 at 10.       The appellant appears to allege that the Office of Workers’
      Compensation Programs deemed her stress to be compensable. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4.   According to the appellant, her leave was scheduled to end on June 23,
      2017. Id. However, on June 20, 2017, the agency instructed the appellant to
      attend a meeting on June 22, 2017, and receive its decision letter. IAF, Tab 4
      at 8. The appellant resigned the following day. IAF, Tab 5 at 33, Tab 7 at 178.
¶18           Taking all of the appellant’s allegations as true and interpreting the record
      in the light most favorable to her, we find that she has made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that her resignation amounted to a constructive removal within the
      Board’s jurisdiction and that she is therefore entitled to a hearing on that issue.
      See Swift v. U.S. Postal Service, 61 M.S.P.R. 29, 33 (1994).            Regarding the
      appellant’s ability to exercise free choice in her resignation, we observe that,
      approximately 6 months prior, the agency revoked her telework agreement, which
      the appellant asserts was in place as a reasonable accommodation to allow her to
      manage work-related stress that could cause fatal complications related to her
      heart condition. 8 IAF, Tab 4 at 1, 29, 83, 216. Indeed, 5 months after the agency
      revoked this accommodation, the appellant received the notice of proposed
      removal and took a leave of absence for work-related stress. It was just before
      this leave of absence was scheduled to end that the agency decided to deliver the
      removal notice. We find that an employee with compelling medical reasons to

      7
        The appellant’s supervisor extended the PIP period by 7 days to account for leave that
      the appellant took over the holidays. IAF, Tab 6 at 107.
      8
       We make no finding as to whether the appellant was “disabled” within the meaning of
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1), or whether the telework arrangement was a reasonable
      accommodation. However, the appellant certainly viewed it as such, and we find that
      she has made a nonfrivolous allegation that it was. IAF, Tab 4 at 211, 216.
                                                                                      10

      avoid excessive stress, and who was still in the midst of recuperating from a
      previous stressful event at work, could reasonably feel compelled to resign rather
      than appear at a meeting at which she had every expectation of b eing removed.
      See Koury v. Department of Defense, 84 M.S.P.R. 219, ¶ 14 (1999) (discussing
      the effect of health concerns on the issue of voluntariness).
¶19         We also observe that the appellant sought multiple avenues of redress to
      improve her working conditions before she resigned. Cf. Baker v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 84 M.S.P.R. 119, ¶¶ 22-23 (1999) (finding that the appellant failed to
      show that his resignation was involuntary because he failed to pursue other
      reasonable options before resigning).     Apart from her EEO compl aints, which
      were apparently still pending with the agency at the time of her resignation more
      than 18 months after she initiated EEO contact, IAF, Tab 4 at 76, Tab 5 at 31
      Tab 7 at 18, PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, the record shows that the appellant persistently
      sought relief through other means as well.        She repeatedly notified various
      individuals in her chain of command that she lacked sufficient resources, e.g.,
      training, an alternate training manager for when she was unavailable, and
      functioning information technology systems, to perform her new duties
      satisfactorily.   These communications began shortly after she took on the
      additional duties in November 2015, continued throughout the PIP period, and
      were reiterated in her response to the notice of proposed re moval. IAF, Tab 4
      at 28, 34-37, 46-47, 60, 62-64, 82-83, 141, 143, 147, 149-56, 159-63, 170-75,
      185-87, 252, 254, 256, 260-64, 268, 271, 273-82, 284, 289, 308, Tab 7 at 19-20.
      The record also shows that the appellant repeatedly sought reassignment during
      this time period, but to no avail. IAF, Tab 4 at 10-11, 80-83.
¶20         Although the appellant is part of a collective bargaining unit and does not
      seem to have pursued a grievance on any of these matters, IAF, Tab 5 at 29, 33,
      the Board has found that an appellant is not necessarily required to have pursued
      all statutory avenues of redress before her resignation will be found involuntary,
      Heining v. General Services Administration, 68 M.S.P.R. 513, 523 (1995).
                                                                                         11

      Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the appellant’s medical
      condition and her history of unsuccessful attempts to ameliorate her working
      conditions, we find that when she received the agency’s notice to appear at a
      meeting in 2 days and receive its decision letter, she could reasonably have
      believed that she was out of options. See Jones v. Department of the Treasury,
      107 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 10 (2007) (finding that time pressure is a factor to consider
      in determining whether a resignation or retirement was involuntary).
¶21         As for whether the appellant’s freedom of choice was proscribed by
      improper agency actions, we acknowledge that undergoing a PIP or facing an
      adverse action is inherently stressful and that no employee is guaranteed a work
      environment free from stress. Miller v. Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310,
      ¶ 32 (2000). However, the agency in this case knew that the appellant had a
      serious medical condition that required careful stress management, and during
      what was probably the most stressful time in her career, it revoked the telework
      arrangement that was previously in place to help her manage that stress. It may
      be that telework generally is a discretionary workplace flexibility that may be
      curtailed for employees “whose performance or conduct warrants more close
      supervisory direction than telework may provide.” IAF, Tab 4 at 29, 45;
      Department of Defense Instruction 1035.01, Telework Policy, Enclosure 3
      (Apr. 4,   2012),   https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/
      dodi/103501p.pdf. 9 However, when telework is in place as a form of reasonable
      accommodation, the agency’s authority to alter or revoke the arrangement is
      limited by the Rehabilitation Act.     The regulations of the Equal Employment
      Opportunity Commission (EEOC) implementing the statute require an agency to
      make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of
      a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can sho w that
      accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)-(p);
      9
       The Board may take administrative notice of public documents. See Azdell v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 88 M.S.P.R. 319, 323 (2001).
                                                                                         12

      see, e.g., Thomas v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶¶ 14-15 & n.3
      (2016) (finding that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency
      constructively suspended her when, among other things, the agency rev oked her
      telework, thus presenting her with the choice of taking leave or working against
      her doctor’s orders); Hamblin v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No.
      0720070041, 2009 WL 2985807, *5-*6 (Sept. 3, 2009) (finding that the agency
      committed disability discrimination when it revoked an employee’s reasonable
      accommodation of an early work schedule without proper justification).
¶22         A reasonable accommodation must be an effective accommodation, i.e. , one
      that allows the employee to perform the essential functions of her position.
      EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
      Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice 915.002 (Oct. 17,
      2002),    https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-
      accommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada.         According to the agency, the
      appellant was not satisfactorily performing the essential functions of her position
      while the telework arrangement was in place.         IAF, Tab 4 at 200-01, Tab 5
      at 55-65, Tab 7 at 190. Nevertheless, based on the results of the PIP, it also
      appears to be the agency’s position that revoking the telework agreement did not
      make a significant difference in the appellant’s ability to perform. IAF, Tab 7
      at 5-10, 190.   It is therefore far from clear that the appellant’s telework was
      undermining her performance, that it imposed an undue hardship on the agency,
      or that revocation of her telework was grounded in sound business practice. It
      may be that the appellant was not entitled to reasonable accommodation in the
      first place because she was not a “qualified” individual with a disability, i.e. , one
      who can perform the essential functions of her position with or without
      reasonable accommodation.       See Haas v. Department of Homeland Security,
      2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 28-29. Nevertheless, whether the appellant’s unsatisfactory
      performance was attributable to her own shortcomings or to the agency’s failure
      to furnish her the necessary resources is a dispute of fact that cannot be resolved
                                                                                      13

      without a hearing. For these reasons, and to the extent that the revocation of her
      telework agreement influenced her resignation, we find that the appellant has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that this agency action was improper.
¶23        As for the other matters that influenced the appellant’s resignation,
      including the agency’s alleged failure to provide her the i nformation and support
      she needed to do her job and the alleged hostility of her first - and second-level
      supervisors, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that
      these constituted improper agency actions as well. Likewise, the appellant has
      nonfrivolously alleged that the agency failed to give her the support, information,
      and resources that she needed to do her job during the PIP period which, if true,
      would amount to a failure to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to
      demonstrate acceptable performance, as required to support an adverse action
      under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43.      See 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(6); Santos v. National
      Aeronautics and Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021);
      5 C.F.R. §§ 432.103(d), .105(a). If, as the appellant alleges, the agency failed to
      provide her adequate support, information, and resources despite her many
      requests, this may be sufficient to support a finding that the agency knew that the
      reason for her removal could not be substantiated and that the threatened removal
      was purely coercive. See Adorador v. Department of the Air Force, 38 M.S.P.R.
      461, 466-67 (1988); Barthel v. Department of the Army, 38 M.S.P.R. 245, 251
      (1988).
                                                                                       14

                                          ORDER
¶24        For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to Western
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.