Court Opinion

ID: 9668711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:23:37.883194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:47.591670
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
Counsel for the appellant have filed a vigorous petition to rehear, in which it is sought to distinguish the present case from Carne v. Maryland Casualty Co., 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259, insofar as the assignability of the cause of action is concerned. In the petition to rehear, it is stated:
“The facts in the case of Dr. Carne, Admx., are completely distinguishable from those in the case at bar. There, the right of action did not survive because suit on it was not commenced before Dr. Carne’s death. ’ ’
This petition further states:
“However, the question of what happens after death of a party is of no concern in the case at bar, because the parties are still living. Therefore, since the suit at bar was commenced (before death) while the parties are still alive (that is, before death) it is a survivable *606canse of action under T.C.A. 20-602 and the 'interest’ in the cause may be transferred (or assigned) under T.C.A. 20-601.”
As pointed out in our original opinion, the assignability of a chose in action depends- on whether or not it would survive and pass to the personal representative of a decedent. If it would so-survive, it may be assigned. If it would not survive, it is not assignable. This is the rule stated in Haymes v. Holliday, 151 Tenn. 115, 268 S.W. 130. The fact that complainant attempted to take an assignment from the named insured and to bring an action as assignee while all of the parties are living does not make the cause of action assignable. The as-signability of a chose in action depends not upon whether or not an action brought thereon may be revived, but upon whether or not the cause of action would survive death.
In the Carne case, this Court unequivocally held that a cause of action of the same character as that sued on in the present case is not assignable under the law of Tennessee.
It is next contended in the petition to rehear that, in deciding this case, we overlooked the case of Horton v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 25 Tenn.App. 593, 164 S.W.2d 1011, in which certiorari was denied by this Court by opinion reported in 179 Tenn. 220, 164 S.W.2d 1016.
We did not overlook this case. It is simply not applicable. The Horton case was an action brought by a judgment creditor of the insured against the insurance company to collect a $5,000.00 judgment which had been *607rendered by default against the named insured, who bad breached the provision of the policy requiring the assistance and cooperation of the insured. It was not an action ex delicto to collect any part of a judgment in excess of the policy limit, but was an action ex contractu by the judgment creditor as a third party beneficiary under the terms of the policy. The Court held that the named insured had breached the policy provision requiring assistance and cooperation on his part, that this provision was made a condition precedent to liability under the terms of the policy, and that the rights of the third party beneficiary could not rise higher than the rights of the named insured. In holding the judgment creditor could not recover, this Court, at 225 of 179 Tenn., at 1018 of 164 S.W.2d, stated:
“The complainant here sues upon the policy and may not be heard to repudiate any of the provisions thereof.”
Other contentions made in the petition to rehear were fully considered by us in the preparation of our original opinion and were found to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied.