Court Opinion

ID: 9925569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 09:09:50.003859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.585436
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 18, 2024

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                             NO. 01-20-00253-CR
                           ———————————
                  JOSE MANUEL ESCOBEDO, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 212th District Court
                          Galveston County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 18-CR-3020

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Jose Manuel Escobedo guilty of arson with intent to destroy or

damage a habitation or place of worship. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 28.02(d)(2)

(stating arson of habitation or place of worship is first-degree felony). After
Escobedo pleaded true to the allegations in two enhancement paragraphs, the jury

assessed his punishment at 40 years in prison as a habitual offender. See id.

§ 12.42(d) (increasing punishment range to life or between 25 and 99 years for

offender who has been convicted of two prior felonies consecutively before instant

offense). On appeal, he contends that the notice of enhancement was insufficient to

subject him to punishment as a habitual offender because it did not allege that the

prior felonies occurred consecutively. He also argues that the jury charge

incorrectly instructed the jury as to the range of punishment. We affirm.

                                   Background

      Escobedo was charged by indictment with arson with intent to destroy a

habitation or place of worship. Three days before trial, the State filed notice

seeking enhancement of his sentence. The notice included two separate felony

convictions in Texas. The jury found Escobedo guilty. Escobedo elected to have

the jury decide his punishment.

      Prior to arraignment on the enhancement paragraphs during the punishment

phase of trial, the State moved to amend the enhancement notice to correct the

location of the prior felonies, listing that the two prior convictions occurred in

California rather than Texas. Escobedo did not object to the amendments. The

amended enhancement stated as follows:

            And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the
      charged offense, (hereafter styled the primary offense), on the 13th day

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      of March, 1998, in cause number 98CF0187 in the Superior Court of
      Orange County, California, the defendant was finally convicted of the
      felony offense of Poss. Firearms Public School.

            And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the
      charged offense (hereafter styled the primary offense), on the 15th day
      of May, 2003, in cause number 02NF1842 in the Superior Court of
      Orange County, California, the defendant was finally convicted of the
      felony offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.

      In the presence of the jury, the State arraigned Escobedo on the

enhancements, and he pleaded true to both. The State then offered, and the court

admitted, evidence related to the convictions. The evidence included judgments of

prior convictions against Escobedo and stipulations signed by the State,

Escobedo’s trial counsel, and Escobedo. The parties stipulated that Escobedo was

the person convicted in the judgments. Escobedo did not object to the admission

of this evidence.

      The State published to the jury a judgment naming Escobedo and showing

he was sentenced on March 13, 1998 for possession of firearms in a public school

and sentenced to 3 years’ confinement. The State also published an abstract

judgment for a prison sentence for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

He committed the crime in 2002 and pleaded guilty in 2003. He was sentenced to

six years’ confinement.* The stipulations were also published to the jury.

*
      The evidence included judgments for several other convictions, but those
      convictions were not used to enhance Escobedo’s sentence and are not relevant to
      this appeal.
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       Neither side objected to the jury charge. The trial court read the charge to the

jury. It stated:

             The First Enhancement paragraph in the indictment further
       alleges that, prior to the commission of the primary offense, the said
       Jose Manual Escobedo, committed the felony offense of Possession of
       a Firearm in a Public School and was convicted on the 13th day of
       March, 1998, in Cause No. 98-CF-0187, in the Superior Court of
       California, County of Orange, California.

             The second enhancement paragraph in the indictment further
       alleges that, prior to the commission of the primary offense and after
       the conviction in Cause No. 09-CF-0187 [sic] was final, the said Jose
       Manuel Escobedo, committed the felony of Unlawful Possession of a
       Controlled Substance and was convicted on the 15th day of May 2003,
       in Cause No. 02NF1842, in the Superior Court of California, County
       of Orange, California.

             The Defendant has entered a plea of True to these allegations.
       You are therefore instructed to find the allegations in the enhancement
       paragraphs are True.

             You are therefore instructed to assess his punishment at
       confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
       Criminal Justice for a period of not less than twenty-five (25) years
       nor more than ninety-nine (99) years or life.

       Escobedo did not object during the reading of the jury charge. During

closing arguments, Escobedo’s trial counsel told the jury that the minimum

punishment was 25 years’ confinement and argued that such a punishment would

be significant. The State asked the jury to start deliberating at 50 years’

imprisonment. The jury assessed punishment at 40 years’ imprisonment.

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                              Notice of Enhancement

      In his first issue, Escobedo argues that there was error in the enhancement

notice. Specifically, he argues that the enhancement “failed to track the statutory

elements necessary to subject appellant to habitual status.”

      With no enhancements, the punishment range for a first-degree felony is

confinement for 5 to 99 years or life with a fine of up to $10,000. TEX. PENAL

CODE § 12.32. The minimum can be raised to 15 years if the defendant has

previously been convicted of a felony other than a state jail felony.

Id. § 12.42(c)(1). Section 12.42(d) of the Penal Code establishes a more stringent

punishment range for three-time repeat felony offenders. It states that:

      [I]f it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a state jail
      felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the defendant has
      previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the
      second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred
      subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on
      conviction the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the
      Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not
      more than 99 years or less than 25 years.

Id.§ 12.42(d). For the habitual offender provision to apply to sentencing, the

chronological sequence of events must be proved as follows: (1) the first

conviction becomes final; (2) the offense leading to a later conviction is

committed; (3) the later conviction becomes final; (4) the offense for which

defendant presently stands accused is committed. Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286,

290–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The State bears the burden to prove beyond a

                                          5
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s second previous felony conviction was

committed after the defendant’s first previous felony conviction became final. Id.

at 291. When there is no evidence to show that the offenses were committed and

became final in the proper sequence, the defendant’s sentence may not be

enhanced under the habitual offender statute. Id. If a defendant pleads true to the

enhancement allegations, the State’s evidentiary burden to prove the enhancement

allegations is satisfied, and the defendant cannot complain on appeal that the

evidence is insufficient. Hopkins v. State, 487 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016); Magic v. State, 217 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,

no pet.).

       Escobedo does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the

enhancement paragraphs. Instead, he argues that the notice of enhancement was

defective because it did not contain language regarding the sequence of his two

prior convictions. The State responds that Escobedo did not object or otherwise

raise an issue regarding the notice in the trial court, and therefore any complaint

about it on appeal is waived. We agree.

       Escobedo did not raise any objection in the trial court to the use of the prior

convictions to enhance the punishment range to the habitual status. Any challenge

to the adequacy of the notice is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Terrell v.

State, No. 01-14-00746-CR, 2016 WL 4374959, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

                                          6
Dist.] Aug. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding

appellant’s failure to object waived challenge to adequacy of notice of

enhancement to habitual felony offender).

      Moreover, even if he had objected, Escobedo could not prevail. Escobedo

pleaded true to the enhancement allegations. This relieved the State of its burden to

prove the existence of the prior convictions, their sequential nature, and that

Escobedo was the person who committed them. See Hopkins, 487 S.W.3d at 587

(stating when defendant pleads true to enhancement allegations, State is relieved of

burden to prove them); Magic, 217 S.W.3d at 70 (same). In Hopkins, the appellant

argued that the sequence of the second alleged conviction in the notice pleading

was unclear because the State omitted the year of that conviction. Hopkins, 487

S.W.3d at 586. The appellant argued that the State had the burden to present

evidence of the sequence. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the

defendant pleaded true to the enhancements, the State’s burden to prove the

allegations, including their sequence, was satisfied. Id. at 586–87. Additionally, the

court noted that the record supported the enhancement allegations and their

sequence. Id. at 587. As in Hopkins, Escobedo pleaded true to the enhancements,

and the record supports the enhancement allegations. The evidence showed that

Escobedo previously had been finally convicted of two felonies and that the second

                                          7
felony conviction occurred after the first felony conviction became final. We

overrule Escobedo’s first issue.

                                   Jury Charge

      Escobedo next argues that the jury charge improperly instructed the jury as

to the minimum punishment because the notice of enhancement did not state that

the two prior convictions used to enhance his sentence occurred in sequential

order. We disagree.

      We review potential jury charge error using a two-step review to determine

whether reversal is required. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); Vernon v. State, 571 S.W.3d 814, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2018, pet. ref’d). We first decide whether error exists in the charge. Ngo, 175

S.W.3d at 744. If we determine an error exists, we next determine whether

sufficient harm resulted from the error requiring reversal. Id. The level of harm

necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant properly objected to the

error. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). When as

here, the appellant fails to preserve error, we review the charge error under the

“egregious harm” standard articulated in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1984); Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)

(citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).

                                        8
      We first determine whether error occurred; if error did not occur, our

analysis ends. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The

State provided Escobedo notice of two prior felony convictions it intended to use

to enhance his punishment. The trial court and Escobedo questioned the venire

members on the habitual punishment range, Escobedo pleaded true to both

enhancements, and he agreed to stipulate that he was the person named in the

judgments for the two enhancements. He did not object to the admission of the

judgments into evidence. The evidence showed that Escobedo previously had been

finally convicted of two felonies and that the second felony was for an offense that

he committed after the first felony conviction became final. The jury charge

included the sequential language from the habitual offender statute. Escobedo’s

proper punishment range was confinement for 25 to 99 years or life as a habitual

offender. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d).

      Having concluded that there was no error in the jury charge, we overrule

Escobedo’s second issue.

                                         9
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Peter Kelly
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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