Court Opinion

ID: 9489883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:26:50.338031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:46.407422
License: Public Domain

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Rick Waggoner went pheasant hunting in the fall of 1990, violating a special condition of his probation and the federal statute barring felons from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922. When this and other probation violations came to light in 1992, the district court1 revoked probation, and Wag-goner served the remaining six months of his original sentence.
In 1995, Waggoner pleaded guilty to a § 922 violation for the conduct that led to his probation revocation. This appeal raises a sentencing issue — whether Waggoner’s base offense level for the § 922 violation should be reduced from twelve to six because he “possessed the firearm ... solely for lawful sporting purposes,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) (1989). The district court2 denied this reduction because hunting in violation of a eondition of probation is not a lawful sporting use. Waggoner appeals. We affirm.
I.
In June 1989, Waggoner pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful sale and barter of migratory birds, a felony, and to one count of unlawful possession of migratory birds, a misdemeanor. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a) and (b). Waggoner, then a federally licensed taxidermist, committed these offenses by unlawfully killing, mounting, and selling large numbers of protected migratory birds. The district court sentenced him to one year in prison and three years of probation. The judgment included a special condition that Waggoner “is not to participate in hunting activity while on probation.” In December 1989, the district court suspended the remainder of Waggoner’s prison term based upon his commitment to speak to conservation and hunting groups about the need to protect game and to comply with game laws. The court ordered Waggoner, during probation, “not to participate in hunting activity” and to perform one hundred hours of community service.
In March 1990, while speaking to a Ducks Unlimited gathering about the importance of obeying federal game laws, Waggoner illegally purchased two collector’s shotguns by falsely filling out the federal Firearms Transaction Record forms. That violated the condition of probation that he obey federal and state laws. Waggoner also purchased Iowa hunting licenses in 1990 and 1991 and successfully hunted pheasant on at least one occasion in the fall of 1990, which violated the special condition of probation set forth in the district court’s judgment and its December 1989 order. After a hearing, the court revoked probation because Waggoner’s “repeated violations of his probation are serious and fundamental.” The court sentenced Waggoner to six months in prison, extended his probation to five years, and imposed additional conditions of probation primarily directed at his continuing alcohol abuse.
*726II.
In June 1995, Waggoner pleaded guilty to the § 922 violation here at issue— being a felon in possession of four collector’s guns plus the shotgun used to hunt pheasants in 1990.3 The Guidelines in effect when Waggoner committed this violation authorized a reduction in determining the base offense level for a § 922 violation “[i]f the defendant obtained or possessed the firearm or ammunition solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection.” § 2K2.1(b)(l) (1989). This guideline reflects “the sentencing commission policy that some types of illegal possessions are relatively benign by virtue of the use for which such possession is intended—use that would be lawful if exercised by one not previously convicted of a felony.” United States v. Shell, 972 F.2d 548, 552 (5th Cir.1992) (emphasis in original). The 1989 Commentary confirmed that the inquiry focuses on “intended lawful use, as determined by the surrounding circumstances.” § 2K2.1, comment, (n. 2) (1989).4
The issue before us is narrow. The government concedes, correctly in our view, that Waggoner cannot be denied the reduction simply because a felon may not lawfully possess firearms for hunting or collection. See United States v. Prator, 939 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Buss, 928 F.2d 150, 152 (5th Cir.1991). The government also concedes that the four collector’s guns were possessed “solely for lawful ... collection,” thus warranting a § 2K2.1(b)(1) (1989) reduction. But the government argues the reduction must be denied because Waggoner’s use of the fifth firearm violated the no-hunting condition of his probation and therefore was not “solely for lawful sporting purposes.”
Waggoner argues that he is entitled to the reduction because his hunting activity did not violate any state or federal statute or regulation—he held a valid hunting license, hunted only in season, did not exceed applicable bag limits, and so forth. Waggoner concedes, as he must, that he is not entitled to a § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction if his intended sporting use was unlawful. See Shell, 972 F.2d at 552 (reduction not available if defendant hunted wild turkey “out of season, in an illegally baited area”). Thus, the issue is whether the gun used to hunt pheasants was possessed “solely for lawful sporting purpose” given Waggoner’s no-hunting condition of probation. Waggoner has the burden of proof on this issue. See United States v. Dinges, 917 F.2d 1133, 1135 (8th Cir.1990). However, the relevant facts are undisputed. This is an issue of Guidelines interpretation we review de novo. See United States v. Hensley, 36 F.3d 39, 41 (8th Cir.1994).
The Sentencing Commission did not define “lawful use” in § 2K2.1(b)(1). Therefore, we look to that phrase’s ordinary meaning—use that is “conformable to law” or “allowed or permitted by law.” United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 436, 121 L.Ed.2d 355 (1992). Viewed in that light, hunting in violation of two court orders does not appear to be lawful use. “[M]odem judicial decrees ... have the binding effect of laws for those to whom they apply.” Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 822, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2145, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Waggoner nonetheless argues that he is entitled to the reduction because he obeyed all Iowa hunting laws and regulations and therefore committed no crime when pheasant hunting in 1990. Even if the word “lawful” in § 2K2.1(b)(l) means conformance with the criminal laws (an issue we need not decide), Waggoner’s definition of crime is too narrow. He violated an express court order *727not to engage in “hunting activities,” an order entered to protect the public from the resumption of his prior illegal activities. The district court had inherent power to punish for contempt of that order, a power “absolutely essential to the performance of [its] duties.” Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450, 31 S.Ct. 492, 501, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911).
The purpose of criminal contempt.is to “punish the act of disobedience as a public wrong.” Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, S.P., Minn. & Omaha Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65, 45 S.Ct. 18, 19, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924). Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has both ratified and circumscribed the power to punish for contempt. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 169-72, 78 S.Ct. 632, 635-37, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227-28, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). The current statute authorizing federal courts to punish for criminal contempt is part of the criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 401. As the Supreme Court has stated, “Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). Thus, while the punishment imposed on Waggoner for violating these particular court orders was probation revocation, his conduct is properly considered unlawful in the criminal sense of that term.
Waggoner also argues that he has been denied the reduction simply because as a• felon he violated § 922 by hunting with a firearm. But Waggoner’s special condition of probation was not only that he refrain from hunting with a firearm — that would have been superfluous to the general condition that he obey all laws, including § 922. Rather, Waggoner was prohibited from all “hunting activity,” which would include activities such as hunting with bow and arrow, or enlisting friends or customers to shoot migratory birds that he could then illegally mount and sell. Waggoner violated this special condition. He committed the violation by using a firearm that was in his possession for this unlawful sporting purpose. For that reason, a reason peculiar to Waggoner’s § 922 offense, he was properly denied a § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction.
The sentence. of the district court is affirmed. Because the court’s judgment provided that Waggoner would remain on bond pending appeal, the case is ■ remanded for amendment of that judgment consistent with this opinion.

. The HONORABLE DAVID R. HANSEN, then United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, now a United States Circuit Judge.

. The HONORABLE MARK W. BENNETT, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

. Waggoner violated both § 922(g) and § 922(n) because he purchased the first two collector’s guns while the earlier indictment was pending.

. The current guideline has been renumbered § 2K2.1(b)(2). It provides for a reduction ”[i]f the defendant ... possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition." (Emphasis added.) This change clarifies the inquiry by moving the former application note’s reference to lawful use into the guideline itself. But the focus on use is unchanged. Therefore, the result in this case would be the same under the current guideline as well.