Court Opinion

ID: 9941136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 21:11:43.247561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:15.427453
License: Public Domain

02/15/2024
                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                                 AT JACKSON
                               Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2023

THOMAS BURRELL v. TIPTON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION ET
                          AL.

                      Appeal from the Chancery Court for Tipton County
                             No. 37772 Kasey Culbreath, Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                 No. W2023-00312-COA-R10-CV
                             ___________________________________

Appellant attorney appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to appear pro hac vice on
procedural grounds. We affirm.

     Tenn. R. App. P. 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Chancery Court
                              Affirmed and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

Percy Squire, Columbus, Ohio, Pro se.

Amber G. Shaw and Henry B. Talbot, Covington, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tipton
County Election Commission.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION1

                           I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff Thomas Burrell (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se petition for a

1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

          This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
          or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
          would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
          shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not
          be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
common law writ of certiorari (“the Initial Petition”) in the Tipton County Chancery Court
(“the trial court”) against Defendants/Appellees the Tipton County Election Commission
(“Appellee”), commission chairman Jimmy Vandergrift, and commissioners Letitia
Wilson, Chris Brent, Kay Bergen, Theta Rone, and Cindy Pinner (collectively, “the Tipton
County Defendants”), as well as Mark Goins, the Coordinator of Elections for the
Tennessee Division of Elections.2 On October 19, 2022, Appellant Percy Squire
(“Appellant”) filed a motion to appear pro hac vice on behalf of Plaintiff under Rule 19 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. On the same day, Plaintiff filed
two “verified” motions seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
barring the commencement of early voting or the tabulation of votes pending resolution of
this matter. Both motions were signed by Appellant as the purported counsel for Plaintiff,3
but only the second motion contained the signature of Plaintiff in the verification section.

     On October 25, 2022, the Tipton County Defendants filed a response in opposition to
the Rule 19 motion. Therein, the Tipton County Defendants asserted that the Initial Petition
was not filed pro se, as it purported to be, but had been sent from Appellant’s office. The
Tipton County Defendants further alleged that pleadings were not properly served or
signed by local counsel. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 19(g) (“Both the Tennessee lawyer and the
lawyer appearing pro hac vice shall sign all pleadings, motions, and other papers filed or
served in the proceeding[.]”). The Tipton County Defendants also asserted that Appellant
failed to provide a full history of the discipline to which he had been subjected in other
jurisdictions, including but not limited to, a suspension, an order to pay restitution, and a
contempt finding against him. As such, the Tipton County Defendants urged the trial court
to deny Appellant’s motion to appear pro hac vice. On October 31, 2022, Mr. Goins joined
in the response filed by the Tipton County Defendants.

     On November 2, 2022, the Tipton County Defendants responded in opposition to
Plaintiff’s effort to set a hearing on the motion for temporary injunctive relief. Specifically,
the Tipton County Defendants asserted that the requests for injunctive relief were not ripe
as Appellant’s pro hac vice appearance had not yet been decided. The Tipton County
Defendants further argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
Initial Petition was defective in that it was not sworn and did not state that it was the first
application for the writ.

       On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended petition for a writ of certiorari
(“the Amended Petition”). The Amended Petition was again filed pro se. On November 9,
2022, the Tipton County Defendants filed an answer to the Amended Petition, raising as
defenses that the Amended Petition was not “sworn to before the clerk of the circuit court,
the judge, any judge of the court of general sessions, or a notary public” and that the

       2
         The allegations in the Initial Petition are not relevant to this appeal.
       3
         The second motion only contained Appellant’s electronic signature. Local counsel did not sign
either motion.
                                                -2-
Amended Petition “does not state that it is the first application for the writ.” As such, the
Tipton County Defendants asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

       On November 4, 2022, Appellant filed a second motion to appear pro hac vice. The
Tipton County Defendants responded in opposition on November 9, 2022. Appellant filed
a response on November 10, 2022. A hearing on the motion to appear pro hac vice was set
for the same day. According to both parties, on this date, the trial court ruled from the
bench that it would deny Appellant’s motion to appear pro hac vice.4

       In the afternoon of November 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed what was captioned as a
“Verified Petition.” The notarized Verified Petition contained a verification by Plaintiff
under penalty of perjury that the allegations were true and based on personal knowledge.
Plaintiff also asserted that it was the first application for a writ because the Initial Petition
was filed without subject matter jurisdiction. On the same day, Plaintiff also filed another
verified motion for injunctive relief; this motion was filed pro se.

       Before the trial court had entered an order memorializing its oral ruling, on
November 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Rule 41.01(1)
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

       Eventually, on February 6, 2023, the trial court entered two separate orders
simultaneously.5 First, the trial court entered a detailed order denying Appellant’s request
to appear pro hac vice. Therein, the trial court cited a number of sanctions that had been
imposed on Appellant by other jurisdictions, including a suspension from the practice of
law in November 2011. The trial court also entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s case
without prejudice under Rule 41.01.

       Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this Court on March 2, 2023.6 On March 10,
2023, this Court entered an order asking Appellant to explain whether he was appealing
the denial of his motion to appear pro hac vice and, if so, directing him to file an application
for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure.7 Appellant responded that he was appealing only the denial of his motion to
appear pro hac vice. On April 14, 2023, Appellant filed an application for permission to
appeal to this Court under Rule 10. Appellee filed a response in opposition on May 4, 2023,

        4
           No transcript or statement of the evidence exists in the record to show the trial court’s oral ruling.
But neither party denies that the trial court did orally deny the motion on this date. Specifically, Appellant
concedes in his brief that “On November 10, 202[2], in the Chancery Court a hearing was conducted in
relation to the Undersigned’s pro hac vice motion. The Chancery [Court] orally denied the Motion.”
         5
           Both indicate that they were received by the clerk’s office at 1:35 pm.
         6
           The notice of appeal was filed in the name of Appellant, rather than Plaintiff.
         7
           Rule 19 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court states, in relevant part, that “[a] trial or
intermediate appellate court’s denial of a motion to appear pro hac vice . . . may be appealed pursuant to
Rule 10, Tenn. R. App. P.” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 19(h).
                                                     -3-
at the request of this Court. Mr. Goins filed a response on May 12, 2023, taking no position
as to whether Appellant’s application should be granted.

      On June 14, 2023, this Court granted Appellant’s application on the following
narrow issue:

       Whether the trial court erred in denying Applicant’s pending motions for pro
       hac vice admission notwithstanding the fact that, prior to the entry of the
       order denying the pending motions, Plaintiff had filed a notice of voluntary
       dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.01(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
       Procedure.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

        This is a unique case under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Under Rule 10, an extraordinary appeal by permission may only be granted if one of the
following circumstances is present: “(1) if the lower court has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review, or (2) if
necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal as otherwise provided in these
rules.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Tennessee courts interpreting Rule 10 have held that an
extraordinary appeal should not be granted unless “the challenged ruling represents a
fundamental illegality, fails to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law,
is tantamount to the denial of a party’s day in court, is without legal authority, is a plain
and palpable abuse of discretion, or results in either party losing a right or interest that may
never be recaptured.” Kaur v. Singh, No. W2016-02058-COA-R10-CV, 2017 WL 445149,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017) (citing State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 791
(Tenn. 2007)).

       This appeal, however, is not governed solely by Rule 10. Instead, it involves a
request by an out-of-state attorney to appear before a Tennessee court under Rule 19 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. See generally Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19.
Pursuant to Rule 19, a lawyer not licensed to practice law in Tennessee may file a motion
“in a particular proceeding” before the relevant court or agency showing that the lawyer
has complied with the conditions contained in the rule. But in its discretion, the court may,
“in a particular proceeding pending before it,” deny the motion when certain conditions are
met.8 Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19(b). And Rule 19 specifically provides that the method for

       8
           The conditions are as follows:

                (1) the applicant’s conduct as a lawyer, including conduct in proceedings in
       Tennessee in which the applicant has appeared pro hac vice and conduct in other
       jurisdictions in which the lawyer has practiced, raises reasonable doubt that the lawyer will
       comply with the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct and other rules and law
       governing the conduct of lawyers who appear before the courts and agencies of the State
                                                   -4-
appealing the denial of a motion to appear pro hac vice is via a Rule 10 extraordinary
appeal. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 19(h).

        Thus, we proceed to consider the question presented by this appeal: whether the trial
court erred in adjudicating Appellant’s motion to appear pro hac vice in light of the
procedural posture of the case. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 19(b). We conclude that the trial court
did not err. In our view, the issue is governed by Rule 19(b), which gives the trial court
discretion to deny a motion to appear pro hac vice “in a particular proceeding pending
before it[.]” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19(b). At the time that the trial court entered its written order
denying the Rule 19 motion, Plaintiff had already given notice of his voluntary dismissal
of the action pursuant to Rule 41. But Tennessee courts have held in a different context
that a lawsuit remains “pending” despite the filing of a notice of voluntary nonsuit until the
order of nonsuit is entered by the trial court. See Garen v. Bowman, No. M2010-00512-
COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4024907, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010) (in a case involving
the prior suit pending doctrine, holding that “the entry of an order of voluntary dismissal
is required before the voluntary dismissal takes effect. Until that time, the lawsuit remains
pending.”). Moreover, we note that in this particular case, the parties agree that the trial
court had announced its oral ruling denying Appellant’s motion to appear pro hac vice prior
to the filing of the notice of nonsuit. This is somewhat similar to where, despite the
pendency of a motion to recuse, a trial court may enter an order on a motion that had been
ruled upon orally prior to the filing of the recusal motion. See, e.g, Austermiller v.
Austermiller, No. M2022-01611-COA-T10B-CV, 2022 WL 17409921, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 5, 2022) (“[W]hen a Rule 10B recusal motion is pending, the trial court may
enter orders that are based upon rulings the court made from the bench before the recusal
motion was filed.”). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to
appear pro hac vice despite the unique procedural history of this case.9

        of Tennessee; or
                (2) the applicant has engaged in such frequent appearances as to constitute regular
        practice in this state.

Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 19(b).
          9
            We note that the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a voluntary nonsuit is taken, the
rights of the parties are not adjudicated, and the parties are placed in their original positions prior to the
filing of the suit.” Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012); see also Justice v. Craftique Constr.,
Inc., No. E2019-00884-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 142146, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021) (“A plaintiff’s
voluntary nonsuit ‘terminates the action without an adjudication of the merits’ and leaves the parties ‘as if
no action had been brought at all.’” (quoting 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 11 (2020))). But see
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mackey, No. M2003-03106-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2636706, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 18, 2004) (“A voluntary dismissal remains of record as does the complaint it dismisses. The dismissal
does not vitiate the fact that the action was commenced. Indeed, the complaint remains of record, though
dismissed, unlike criminal charges that have been expunged. . . . To hold that the voluntary dismissal of a
civil action equates to the action never having been filed requires a strained reading of the statute, which is
inappropriate.”). Appellant has not asserted in either his Rule 10 application or his brief that the nonsuit of
the case vitiates the trial court’s denial of his motion to appear pro hac vice for purposes of future requests
to appear under that rule or the rules of other jurisdictions. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19(d)(4) (requiring the
                                                    -5-
       In his brief to this Court, Appellant raises a second issue: that the trial court should
not have ruled on the Rule 19 motion because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the matter. Although this issue was not specifically designated as an issue by this
Court’s order granting Appellant’s Rule 10 application, we will exercise our discretion to
address it as “necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal[,]” Tenn. R.
App. P. 10(a), as well as because it involves an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) (stating that review will generally only extend to those issues
presented for review, except that the “appellate court shall also consider whether trial and
appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter”).

        In this case, Appellant asserts that the trial court never acquired subject matter
jurisdiction over the case because neither the Initial Petition nor the Amended Petition were
verified, as had been argued by the Tipton County Defendants in their answer. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (“The petition for certiorari may be sworn to before the clerk of the
circuit court, the judge, any judge of the court of general sessions, or a notary public, and
shall state that it is the first application for the writ.”); Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Tenn. Sup. Ct.
v. Cawood, 330 S.W.3d 608, 609 (Tenn. 2010) (“[A] a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over a statutory petition for certiorari that is not supported by oath or
affirmation.” (citing Depew v. King’s, Inc., 197 Tenn. 569, 276 S.W.2d 728, 728–29
(Tenn. 1955))). Appellant therefore contends that the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction never attached and that the trial court’s order denying his motion for admission
pro hac vice is void. See Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999) (“Judgments or orders entered by courts without subject matter jurisdiction
are void[.]”). We consider the question of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction de
novo, with no presumption of correctness. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727,
729 (Tenn. 2000).

       Respectfully, we disagree with Appellant’s argument on appeal. As an initial matter,
we note that the question in this case is not whether the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s petitions for a writ of certiorari, but whether the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s motion to appear pro hac vice under Rule
19. Rule 19, again, provides that a trial may deny a motion to appear pro hac vice when
such a motion is filed “in a particular proceeding pending before it[.]” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
19(b). And regardless of whether any or all of the various petitions for a writ of certiorari
could ultimately be dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a proceeding of
some kind was nevertheless pending at the time that the trial court adjudicated the motion
to be admitted pro hac vice, as discussed supra.10 Cf. Garen, 2010 WL 4024907, at *2.

lawyer seeking admission under Rule 19 to include in an affidavit attached to his motion “a statement
concerning whether lawyer has been denied admission pro hac vice . . . in any jurisdiction”). We therefore
do not address that question in this appeal.
        10
           And as a reminder, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never adjudicated by the trial court
and was not the basis of the ultimate dismissal of the case.
                                                    -6-
Thus, at the time that the trial court adjudicated the Rule 19 motion, all of Rule 19’s subject
matter jurisdiction requirements had been met.

        In our view, the fact that the Initial Petition or the Amended Petition may, in
hindsight, have been subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not
alter this conclusion. Indeed, admission pro hac vice is something of a threshold issue that
arises before other disputes concerning the case are adjudicated. In particular, Rule 19
provides that a lawyer seeking to appear under the rule should “file a motion in the court
or agency before which the lawyer seeks to appear not later than the first occasion on which
the lawyer files any pleading or paper with the court or agency or otherwise personally
appears.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19(d). This makes sense, as an out-of-state attorney has no
ability to appear on behalf of a client in a Tennessee tribunal unless and until he or she is
admitted pro hac vice. The question of whether a lawyer may represent a client therefore
appears to be a matter that should often be decided prior to any consideration of the merits
of the case—the client’s chosen out-of-state counsel cannot make his or her arguments
concerning subject matter jurisdiction or other disputes unless and until the pro hac vice
issue is determined. Indeed, that consideration is especially true here, as by the time that
the trial court entered its order denying the motion for pro hac vice admission, Plaintiff had
filed a Verified Petition seeking to correct the deficiencies pointed out in the Initial Petition
and the Amended Petition.11 It therefore makes sense that a trial court would adjudicate a
motion to appear pro hac vice before entertaining the question of whether it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the underlying petition.

       Our analysis is supported by a recent case that considered an analogous argument
in the recusal context. Specifically, in Matter of Conservatorship of Tapp, a petition for
the appointment of a conservator was granted. No. W2021-00718-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL
1957540, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2023). Months later, one co-conservator filed a
motion to re-transfer assets to a trust. Id. at *2. The trial court granted the motion. The case
proceeded for several years and was subject to much inter-family dispute, including one
appeal. Id. at *3.

        Eventually, the ward died, and four of the ward’s siblings and two other relatives
filed a complaint to set aside the trust and for a will contest. A few months later, the six
petitioners filed a petition to recuse the trial judge. The co-conservators filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that not only should the complaint be dismissed but the motion for recusal
also because the matter was improperly filed as part of the conservatorship case. Thus, the
co-conservators argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

        11
            While the Verified Petition may have suffered from its own jurisdictional infirmities, that
question had not been litigated or adjudicated in the trial court. Cf. Reid v. Lutche, No. M1997-00229-
COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 55783, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2001) (“Petitions for a common-law writ of
certiorari must be filed within sixty days after the entry of the order or judgment at issue. This statutory
time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional.” (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102)).

                                                   -7-
complaint. Id. at *4. The petitioners responded in opposition, arguing that the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction and that the recusal motion “had priority and must be heard
before any other pending motions[.]” Id. at *5. The trial court heard all the outstanding
motions together and granted the co-conservators’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. Id.

        On appeal, the petitioners argued that the trial court erred in, inter alia, entering an
order dismissing the case, before disposing of the motion to recuse as required by our
recusal rule. Id. at *6–7 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.02 (“While the motion [to recuse]
is pending, the judge whose disqualification is sought shall make no further orders and take
no further action on the case, except for good cause stated in the order in which such action
is taken.”)). The co-conservators argued, however, that the trial court was not required to
rule on the recusal motion before addressing the motion to dismiss “because the petitioners’
trust contest complaint was a legal nullity and the petitioners were never proper parties
before the court.” Id. at *8 (footnote omitted). We disagreed, however, and determined that
rulings on recusal and substantive issues should not be “intertwined” and a recusal motion
is not rendered moot simply because one side asserts that the underlying cause should be
dismissed as a nullity. Id. at *8–11. We therefore vacated the orders addressing the
substance of the action and remanded to a new trial judge for rehearing. Id. at *11.

        The situation presented here is not identical. Importantly, Rule 19 does not contain
express language mandating that a motion to be admitted pro hac vice must be adjudicated
prior to addressing any other pending issues. But the issue here is not whether the trial court
erred in not addressing a pro hac vice motion prior to dismissing a case. The question is
simply whether the trial court erred in adjudicating the pro hac vice motion notwithstanding
Appellant’s argument that, in retrospect, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
case. In Tapp, we essentially ruled that under Rule 10B, a recusal motion was a threshold
issue that must be decided regardless of the propriety of the underlying action. While the
same mandatory language is not at issue here, a motion for pro hac vice admission is similar
to a recusal motion in that it can constitute a threshold issue that may be decided before the
underlying petition is addressed in any manner. Thus, the trial court has subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate a pending Rule 19 motion so long as the requirements of Rule 19
are met: that a motion seeking admission is filed “in a particular proceeding pending before
it.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 19(b). Because the motion for pro hac vice admission here was filed
in a particular proceeding pending before the trial court, the trial court properly exercised
its subject matter jurisdiction in ruling on that request.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Tipton County Chancery Court is affirmed, and this cause is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with
this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Percy Squire, for which execution
may issue if necessary.

                                             -8-
      S/ J. Steven Stafford
      J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

-9-