Court Opinion

ID: 9891960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 21:09:39.131127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:38.183279
License: Public Domain

[Cite as New Albany-Plain Local Schools Bd of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2023-Ohio-3806.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

New Albany-Plain Local Schools                      :
Board of Education et al.,
                                                    :                Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733,
                Appellants-Appellants,                             22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743,
                                                    :              22AP-744, 22AP-746, 22AP-747,
v.                                                                 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750,
                                                    :              & 22AP-751
Franklin County Board of Revision et al.,                          (BTA Nos. 2022-1515, 2022-1260,
                                                    :              2022-1507, 2022-1503, 2022-1501,
                Appellees-Appellees.                               2022-1708, 2022-1446, 2022-1447,
                                                    :              2022-1448, 2022-1449, 2022-14311, &
                                                                   2022-1714)
                                                    :
                                                                      (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                                                    :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on October 19, 2023

                On brief: Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC, Mark H. Gillis, and
                Kelley A. Gorry, for appellants.

                On brief: Zaino Hall & Farrin, LLC, Steven K. Hall, and
                Robert C. Maier, for appellee ANSA Propco Partnership, LP.

                On brief: Vesha Law Firm, LLC, Sterling Weiser,
                Nicholas C. Vesha, and Jim Lewis, for appellees Dhanlazmi,
                LLC, and Riaan Raman, LLC.

                On brief: Bailey Cavalieri, LLC, Joshua D. DiYanni, and
                Graycen M. Wood, for appellees 32 Viotis Dr., LLC, Eakin
                Place Holdings, LLC, and Eakin Brooksedge Apartments,
                LLC.

                On brief: Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, and Kelvin M. Lawrence,
                for appellees UHS-161 N. Fourth, LLC; District at Linworth
                TIC1, LLC; District at Linworth TIC2, LLC; District at
                Linworth TIC3, LLC; District at Linworth TIC4, LLC; District
                at Linworth TIC5, LLC, and; District at Linworth TIC6, LLC.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                            2
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

              On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
              William J. Stehle, for appellees Franklin County Auditor and
              Board of Revision.

                      APPEALS from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals

BOGGS, J.

       {¶ 1} Presently before this court are 12 appeals from 8 decisions of the Ohio Board
of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), in each of which the BTA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an
appeal from a decision of the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”). Appellants are
the New Albany-Plain Local Schools Board of Education (case No. 22AP-732), the South-
Western City Schools Board of Education (case Nos. 22AP-733, 22AP-737, and 22AP-738),
the Columbus City Schools Board of Education (case Nos. 22AP-743, 22AP-744, 22AP-746,
22AP-747, 22AP-748, and 22AP-749), and the Worthington City Schools Board of
Education (case Nos. 22AP-750 and 22AP-751). Appellees in each appeal include the BOR,
the Franklin County Auditor, the Ohio Tax Commissioner, and the owner or owners of the
properties at issue. At appellants’ request, this court has coordinated these appeals for
purposes of oral argument and determination. (Dec. 13, 2022 Journal Entry.) For the
following reasons, we reverse the BTA’s decisions.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} Each of these appeals stems from a decision of the BTA dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction an appellant board of education’s appeal of a decision of the BOR, concerning
the valuation of property located within their respective school districts for tax year 2021.
In dismissing the appeals, the BTA relied on its recent decision in North Ridgeville City
Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2022-1152, 2022 Ohio Tax
LEXIS 2518 (Oct. 31, 2022). In North Ridgeville, the BTA applied recent amendments to
R.C. 5717.01, the statute that governs appeals to the BTA, enacted by 2022 Am.Sub.H.B.
No. 126 (“H.B. 126”). The BTA stated that, as amended, R.C. 5717.01 prohibits a board of
education from appealing a board of revision’s decision regarding the valuation of property
the board of education does not own or lease. Id. at *4. Applying that reasoning in these
appeals, the BTA held that it lacked jurisdiction because the appellants boards of education
did not own or lease the properties at issue.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                           3
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

       {¶ 3} In their appeals to this court, the boards of education argue that the BTA’s
analysis in North Ridgeville was erroneous and that the H.B. 126 amendments to R.C.
5717.01, upon which the BTA relied, are inapplicable.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶ 4} In each of the 12 appeals before this court, the appellants boards of education
raise 11 identical assignments of error:
              1. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA
              relied solely upon its erroneous decision in North Ridgeville[.]

              2. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because in
              North Ridgeville, the BTA ignored the plain meaning of the
              unambiguous words the General Assembly used in the
              revisions to R.C. 5717.01[.]

              3. The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by
              failing to recognize that the General Assembly’s use of the
              phrase “a subdivision that files” in R.C. 5717.01 as the operative
              language in present tense applies prospectively only [to]
              present and future actions and does not include past actions[.]

              4. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the
              BTA failed to apply the rules of grammar and violated the rules
              of statutory construction in North Ridgeville in interpreting
              the present tense language in R.C. 5717.01 as including any
              complaints filed prior to the effective date of the legislation[.]

              5. The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville after
              correctly determining that the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 are
              clear and unambiguous but then utilizing the General
              Assembly’s perceived legislative intent as support for its
              interpretation of the revisions directly inconsistent with the
              actual words used by the General Assembly[.]

              6. The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by
              rewriting the language of the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 as
              follows: “except that a subdivision with respect to property the
              subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision
              of the board of revision.” North Ridgeville, at *2 (“Therefore,
              we hold that boards of education now have no appeal rights to
              this Board unless the board of education owns or leases the
              property”); Id. at *5 (“***in order to lawfully appeal a board of
              revision decision to this Board, the appellant cannot be a
              subdivision that does not own or lease the property at issue in
              the original complaint”).
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                             4
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

              7. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful as the BTA
              failed to recognize in North Ridgeville that the General
              Assembly’s retention of the former appeal right in R.C. 5717.01
              preserves the existing appeal rights of those entities for any
              complaint filed prior to the effective date of the revisions[.]

              8. The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by
              concluding that the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 did not
              incorporate the new definitions of “subdivision” [or rather
              “legislative authority of a subdivision”], “original complaint”
              and “counter-complaint” from revised R.C. 5715.19, effective
              for tax year 2022, when the plain meaning of the language used
              by the General Assembly in the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 clearly
              and unambiguously incorporates these definitions[.]

              9. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the
              BTA held in North Ridgeville that the new definitions in R.C.
              5715.19, effective for tax year 2022, had no new meaning when
              the General Assembly retained the terms “board”, “legislative
              authority”, “public official”, and “complaints” from former R.C.
              5717.01 in the revisions to R.C. 5717.01[.]

              10. The BTA erred in North Ridgeville in concluding that
              “jurisdiction is not conferred on appeal merely because the
              underlying cause of action was validly filed” when Appellant
              Board of Education never argued that the right to appeal was
              vested in a validly filed complaint[.]

              11. The BTA erred in North Ridgeville by comparing the
              revisions to R.C. 5717.01 to the revisions to R.C. 5717.04
              because the language the General Assembly used in the
              revisions to R.C. 5717.04 is not even remotely comparable to
              the words the General Assembly used in the revisions to R.C.
              5717.01[.]

(Emphasis sic.) (Appellants’ Briefs at 1-5.) The assignments of error identify what the
appellants contend are legal errors in the North Ridgeville decision since the BTA’s
decisions in these appeals contain little analysis beyond citation to North Ridgeville.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
       {¶ 5} “When reviewing a BTA decision, we determine whether the decision is
reasonable and lawful; if it is both, we must affirm.” NWD 300 Spring L.L.C. v. Franklin
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 151 Ohio St.3d 193, 2017-Ohio-7579, ¶ 13, citing R.C. 5717.04. The
BTA’s factual findings are entitled to deference if they are supported by reliable and
probative evidence, but an appellate court “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                             5
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ” Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 412, 2016-Ohio-1506, ¶ 26, quoting Gahanna-
Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232 (2001). We review
questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation, de novo.         Sheffield
Crossing Station, L.L.C. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-687, 2020-
Ohio-6938, ¶ 3; Rock City Church v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-
372, 2023-Ohio-1339, ¶ 5, citing Thomas v. Logue, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-385, 2022-Ohio-
1603, ¶ 12.
       {¶ 6} These appeals present legal questions regarding the BTA’s jurisdiction,
resolution of which turns on the proper application of R.C. 5717.01. See Ross v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 155 Ohio St.3d 373, 2018-Ohio-4746, ¶ 8. Specifically, we must
determine the impact of the H.B. 126 amendments to R.C. 5717.01, and whether those
amendments apply to an appeal on a complaint that was filed before the H.B. 126
amendments took effect if the decision being appealed was issued after the effective date of
the H.B. 126 amendments. These are questions of law that we review de novo.
IV. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 7} The BTA, county boards of revision, and boards of education are all creatures
of statute, and as such they have only the jurisdiction, power, and duties the General
Assembly has expressly given them. Ross at ¶ 9, citing Steward v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 547
(1944), paragraph one of the syllabus; Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Revision,
140 Ohio St.3d 522, 2014-Ohio-4353, ¶ 23; Hall v. Lakeview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
63 Ohio St.3d 380, 383 (1992). Here, we are concerned with the statutory authority of
boards of education to challenge real-property valuations, their ability to appeal a board of
revision’s decision to the BTA, and the BTA’s jurisdiction to adjudicate such an appeal.
       {¶ 8} “[T]here is no inherent right to appeal an administrative decision; rather, the
right must be conferred by statute.” Yanega v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 156 Ohio
St.3d 203, 2018-Ohio-5208, ¶ 10, citing Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Deerfield
Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177 (2001). Moreover, “ ‘[w]here a statute
confers the right of appeal, adherence to the conditions thereby imposed is essential to the
enjoyment of the right conferred.’ ” Id., quoting Am. Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander,
147 Ohio St. 147 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, we turn to the statutory
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                              6
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

framework that sets forth the process for filing challenges to real-property valuations for
tax purposes and for appealing the determinations of those challenges.
       A. R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01
       {¶ 9} R.C. 5715.19 outlines the procedure for challenging real-property valuations
for tax purposes before a county board of revision, and R.C. 5717.01 sets out the procedure
for appealing a board of revision’s decision to the BTA. The statute most directly at issue
here is R.C. 5717.01, which specifies, in part, who may appeal a board of revision’s decision
to the BTA. In R.C. 5717.01, however, the General Assembly ties the authority to file an
appeal to the authority to file a complaint against valuations or assessments under R.C.
5715.19. R.C. 5717.01 only allows entities authorized by R.C. 5715.19 to file a complaint with
the board of revision to appeal a decision to the BTA. Both statutes, therefore, inform our
analysis.
       {¶ 10} Under the pre-H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5717.01, and subject to an exception
addressed below in the post-H.B. 126 version of the statute, “[a]n appeal from a decision of
a county board of revision may be taken to the [BTA] * * * by * * * any board, legislative
authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by [R.C. 5715.19] to file complaints against
valuations or assessments with the auditor,” for determination by the county board of
revision. Thus, to determine who may appeal a board of revision’s decision to the BTA
under R.C. 5717.01, we must turn to R.C. 5715.19 and its designation of who may file
complaints against valuations or assessments.
       {¶ 11} “R.C. 5715.19(A) ‘establishes the jurisdictional gateway to obtaining review
by the boards of revision’ ” of complaints relating to valuations or assessments of real
property. Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision,
137 Ohio St.3d 266, 2013-Ohio-4627, ¶ 11, quoting Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lucas
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, ¶ 10.             R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)
authorizes the filing of a complaint against any of six enumerated determinations “for the
current tax year,” id., including “[t]he determination of the total valuation or assessment of
any parcel that appears on the tax list[.]” R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)(d).
       {¶ 12} As to who may file a complaint, the pre-H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5715.19,
which was in effect when the complaints underlying these appeals were filed, stated, in part:
              (A) * * * the board of county commissioners; * * * the board of
              township trustees of any township with territory within the
              county; the board of education of any school district with any
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                         7
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

             territory in the county; or the mayor or legislative authority of
             any municipal corporation with any territory in the county may
             file such a complaint [i.e. “a complaint against any of the
             [enumerated] determinations for the current tax year”]
             regarding any such determination affecting any real property
             in the county[.]

             ***

             (B) Within thirty days after the last date such complaints may
             be filed, the auditor shall give notice of each complaint in which
             the stated amount of overvaluation, undervaluation,
             discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect
             determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred
             dollars in taxable value * * * to each board of education whose
             school district may be affected by the complaint. Within thirty
             days after receiving such notice, a board of education * * * may
             file a complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of
             alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory
             valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated
             in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current
             valuation.

(Emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the appellants boards of education were
authorized under the pre-H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5715.19(A) and/or (B) to file complaints
regarding the valuations of the properties at issue.       Nor is there any dispute that
appellants—as “board[s]” authorized by R.C. 5715.19 to file complaints against valuations
or assessments—would be authorized under the pre-H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5717.01 to
appeal the BOR’s decisions to the BTA.
      B. H.B. 126
      {¶ 13} In April 2022, while the underlying valuation challenges were pending before
the BOR, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 126, which took effect on July 21, 2022. As
relevant here, Section 1 of H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01, and Section 2
repealed the preexisting versions of those statutes. Section 3(A) of H.B. 126 states that,
except for newly enacted R.C. 5715.19(I), which prohibits the settlement of property tax
disputes through private-payment agreements, the amendments to R.C. 5715.19 “appl[y] to
any original complaint or counter-complaint, as those terms are defined in that section,
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                                                8
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

filed for tax year 2022 or any tax year thereafter.”1 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, Section
3(A).
        {¶ 14} As amended by H.B. 126, R.C. 5717.01 retains, without modification from the
prior version of the statute, the designation of who may appeal a board of revision’s decision
to the BTA, but H.B. 126 added to R.C. 5717.01 an exception that limits the circumstances
in which a political subdivision may appeal. As amended, R.C. 5717.01 states:
                 An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision * * *
                 may be taken by * * * any board, legislative authority, public
                 official, or taxpayer authorized by [R.C. 5715.19] to file
                 complaints against valuations or assessments with the auditor,
                 except that a subdivision that files an original complaint or
                 counter-complaint under that section with respect to property
                 the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the
                 decision of the board of revision with respect to that original
                 complaint or counter-complaint.

(Emphasis added.)
        {¶ 15} The exception, like the general rule, refers to R.C. 5715.19 to define its
applicability, but it also uses three terms—“subdivision,”                     “original complaint,” and
“counter-complaint”—that did not appear in the former version of R.C. 5715.19(A) or (B).2
In amended R.C. 5715.19(A), the General Assembly defined “original complaint” as a
complaint filed under R.C. 5715.19(A) and a “counter-complaint” as a complaint filed under
R.C. 5715.19(B). The General Assembly did not define “subdivision” in amended R.C.
5715.19, but it is well-established that a school district is a political subdivision created by
the General Assembly. Avon Lake City School Dist. v. Limbach, 35 Ohio St.3d 118, 122
(1988).
        {¶ 16} The H.B. 126 amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A) rephrased but did not
substantively alter the list of persons and entities authorized to file complaints against real-
property valuations.3 Amended R.C. 5715.19(A) and (B) state, in relevant part:

1 Section 3(B) of H.B. 126 states that R.C. 5715.19(I) applies to any private payment agreement entered into

on or after the effective date of H.B. 126.
2 There is one use of the term “original complaint” in former R.C. 5715.19(D), which addresses the continuing

effect of an “original complaint” for the current tax year that the board of revision does not determine within
the time prescribed.
3 The General Assembly removed from that list the “board of county commissioners,” the “board of township

trustees of any township with territory in the county[,] the board of education of any school district with any
territory in the county[,]” and the “legislative authority of any municipal corporation with any territory in the
county,” but it added to the list the more general “legislative authority of a subdivision.” The General Assembly
also added to R.C. 5715.19(A) a definition of “legislative authority,” which includes “a board of county
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                                                9
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

                 (A) * * * Subject to division (A)(6) of this section4, * * * the
                     legislative authority of a subdivision * * * may file such a
                     complaint [i.e., “a complaint against any of the
                     [enumerated] determinations for the current tax year”]
                     regarding any such determination affecting any real
                     property in the county[.]

                 (B) A board of education, subject to this division * * * may file
                     a counter-complaint in support of or objecting to the
                     amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation,
                     discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect
                     determination stated in a previously filed original
                     complaint or objecting to the current valuation * * * only if
                     the original complaint states an amount of overvaluation,
                     undervaluation,     discriminatory      valuation,    illegal
                     valuation, or incorrect determination of at least [$17,500]
                     in taxable value.

        {¶ 17} The question before this court resolves to whether the H.B. 126 amendments
to R.C. 5717.01—and particularly the newly added exception—apply to these appeals from
BOR decisions issued after the July 21, 2022 effective date of H.B. 126. The BTA answered
that question in the affirmative and held that the exception precluded the appellants boards
of education from appealing the BOR’s decisions. The boards of education, on the other
hand, maintain that the exception cannot apply to an appeal of a board of revision’s decision
on a complaint against valuation or assessment filed prior to July 21, 2022.

commissioners, a board of township trustees of any township with territory in the county, the board of
education of any school district with territory in the county, or the legislative authority of a municipal
corporation with territory in the county.”

4 R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) states, a “legislative authority of a subdivision * * * shall not file an original complaint

with respect to property the subdivision * * * does not own or lease unless” both the following conditions are
met:

        (a) If the complaint is based on a determination described in division (A)(1)(d) or (e) of this
        section, the property was (i) sold in an arm’s length transaction, as described in section
        5713.03 of the Revised Code, before, but not after, the tax lien date for the tax year for which
        the complaint is to be filed, and (ii) the sale price exceeds the true value of the property
        appearing on the tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount of the filing
        threshold determined under division (J) of this section;
        (b) If the complaint is filed by a legislative authority or mayor, the legislative authority or, in
        the case of a mayor, the legislative authority of the municipal corporation, first adopts a
        resolution authorizing the filing of the original complaint at a public meeting of the legislative
        authority.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                             10
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

       C. North Ridgeville
       {¶ 18} The BTA first considered the impact of the H.B. 126 amendments in North
Ridgeville, 2022 Ohio Tax LEXIS 2518. It began by considering when the H.B. 126
amendments to R.C. 5717.01 took effect, and it held, “based on the straightforward
application of [the] unambiguous law,” that the amendments took effect on July 21, 2022,
by operation of law. Id. at *6-7. The BTA acknowledged the General Assembly’s statement
in Section 3(A) of H.B. 126 that most of the changes to R.C. 5715.19 apply only to original
complaints and counter-complaints filed for tax years 2022 and thereafter, but it reasoned
that the lack of any mention of R.C. 5717.01 in Section 3 “demonstrates the intent for the
changes [to R.C. 5717.01] to be operational on the effective date of the legislation.” Id. at
*7.
       {¶ 19} The BTA rejected the board of education’s argument that applying the
amended version of R.C. 5717.01 to appeals from BOR decisions rendered on complaints
that had been filed prior to July 21, 2022 would constitute an improper, retroactive
application of the amended statute. It explained that the right to appeal to the BTA is
independent of the right to file a complaint for determination by the BOR and that a right
to appeal is not fixed “merely because the underlying cause of action was validly filed.” Id.
at *8. It held that extinguishment of the statutory right to appeal as of the effective date of
H.B. 126 did not constitute a retroactive application as to appeals filed thereafter, even if
the underlying complaint had been filed prior to the effective date of H.B. 126. Id. The
amended statute would be applied retroactively, it posited, only if it were applied to
extinguish appeals that were pending on the effective date of the amendments. Id.
       {¶ 20} Finally, the BTA rejected the argument that the General Assembly’s
incorporation into the relevant statues the terms “original complaint” and “counter-
complaint,” coupled with the statement in Section 3(A) of H.B. 126 that the amendments
to R.C. 5715.19, other than the enactment of R.C. 5715.19(I), apply to “any original
complaint or counter-complaint, as those terms are defined in that section, filed for tax year
2022 or any tax year thereafter,” impacted the board of education’s appellate rights. The
BTA reasoned that “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” were “common terms”
that were “well established within the legal framework of ad valorem real property
taxation,” id. at *10, and that the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the BTA itself
had routinely used those terms prior to the enactment of H.B. 126, id. at *11. It stated, “it
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                            11
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

would be wrong to conclude that they have no legal meaning until an appeal emanates from
a complaint filed for tax year 2022 or later.” Id.
       {¶ 21} Having concluded that the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 took effect on
July 21, 2022 and applied prospectively in North Ridgeville, which appeal had been filed
after that effective date, the BTA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
exception in amended R.C. 5717.01 precluded the board of education’s appeal with respect
to the valuation of property it did not own or lease. Id. at *13.
       {¶ 22} The assignments of error in these appeals stem from the premise that the
BTA’s decision in North Ridgeville, upon which the BTA relied here, constituted an
erroneous interpretation and application of amended R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01.
       D. The amendments to R.C. 5717.01 took effect on July 21, 2022
       {¶ 23} Before turning to the dispositive assignments of error, we first agree with the
BTA that H.B. 126, including its changes to R.C. 5717.01, took effect on July 21, 2022. If no
referendum petition is filed within 90 days after legislation that is subject to referendum is
filed by the governor with the secretary of state, the law becomes effective immediately
upon expiration of that 90-day period by operation of law. State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly
v. Brunner, 115 Ohio St.3d 103, 2007-Ohio-4460, ¶ 9, citing Article II, Section 1c, Ohio
Constitution. Here, that date was July 21, 2022.
       {¶ 24} Because we conclude, as addressed more fully below, that the newly added
exception in R.C. 5717.01 applies only to appeals from decisions on “original complaints”
or “counter-complaints” filed after the effective date of H.B. 126 and does not preclude
these appellants’ appeals, we need not consider whether application of the exception to
appeals from complaints filed under the pre-H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5715.19 would
constitute an improper retroactive application.
       E. The exception in R.C. 5717.01, as amended by H.B. 126, applies only
       to appeals from board of revision decisions on original complaints or
       counter-complaints filed under amended R.C. 5715.19

       {¶ 25} Because they are dispositive, we turn to the appellants’ eighth and ninth
assignments of error, in which they argue that the exception in amended R.C. 5717.01 does
not apply to these appeals because appellants are not subdivisions who filed an “original
complaint” or “counter-complaint,” as those terms are defined in amended R.C.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                                               12
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

5715.19(A).5 Appellants rephrase and consolidate their eighth and ninth assignments of
error in their appellate briefs as follows:
                 THE BTA COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
                 THE REVISIONS TO R.C. 5717.01 DID NOT INCORPORATE
                 THE NEW DEFINITIONS FROM R.C. 5715.19 WHEN THE
                 GENERAL ASSEMBLY CLEARLY INTENDED SUCH
                 INCORPORATION.

See, e.g., case No. 22AP-732, Appellant’s Brief at 25.

        {¶ 26} Our paramount concern in construing a statute is legislative intent. State ex
rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, ¶ 21, citing
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 21. To discern
legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language, reading the words and phrases
in context, according to rules of grammar and common usage. R.C. 1.42; State ex rel.
Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362,
¶ 40. We may not delete or insert words but must give effect to the words the General
Assembly has chosen. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40
(2001). When a statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. See id. at 40.
        {¶ 27} When statutes explicitly refer to each other, they are to be read in pari
materia. Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959,
¶ 89, citing Brooks v. Ohio State Univ., 111 Ohio App.3d 342, 349 (10th Dist.1996); Ohio
Bus Sales, Inc. v. Toledo Bd. of Edn., 82 Ohio App.3d 1, 7 (6th Dist.1992), citing Beach v.
Beach, 99 Ohio App. 428, 434 (2d Dist.1955). “It is the duty of this court to construe
statutes which explicitly refer to each other so that they are consistent and harmonious with
a common policy and give effect to the legislative intent.” Brooks at 349, citing Suez Co. v.

5 After oral argument in these cases, the Third District Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Marysville

Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 3d Dist. No. 14-23-03, 2023-Ohio-2020,
which presented the same issues—and, indeed, the same 11 assignments of error—as this case. The Third
District reversed the BTA’s decision, which like the decisions in these appeals was based solely on North
Ridgeville, but the Third District decided the appeal based on the first four assignments of error, whereas we
focus on assignments of error eight and nine. It concluded that the BTA erroneously overlooked that the
exception in amended R.C. 5717.01 is phrased in the present tense and is tied to the filing of a complaint or
counter-complaint, not the filing of an appeal. Id. at ¶ 29-31. It stated, “given the use of the present tense in
the statute and absent any express evidence of intended retroactivity and/or applicability to previously
pending complaints, we find that the use of the language ‘a subdivision that files an original complaint or
counter-complaint’ signifies a legislative intent that the amended statute be applied prospectively to appeals
stemming from complaints filed after the July 21, 2022 effective date of the new statute, as opposed to
prohibiting appeals from [decisions on] complaints that were filed prior to that date.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at
¶ 36.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                             13
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

Young, 118 Ohio App. 415 (6th Dist.1963). The fact that the General Assembly
simultaneously amended both R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01 in H.B. 126 provides additional
support for reading the statutes together. See Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., 63 Ohio
App.3d 115, 118 (10th Dist.1989) (“Since both statutes were amended at the same time by
the same Act and both were amended to prohibit age discrimination and to provide a
remedy * * *, and in light of the express cross-reference in each to the other statute, the two
statutes should be read in pari materia.” (Emphasis sic)). In any event, R.C. 5715.19 and
5717.01 are inextricably connected.
       {¶ 28} As amended by H.B. 126, effective July 21, 2022, R.C. 5717.01 defines who
may appeal a BOR’s decision to the BTA with a general rule, subject to an exception. The
general rule is retained in whole from the prior version of R.C. 5717.01. It states, “an appeal
may be taken by * * * any board [or] legislative authority * * * authorized by [R.C. 5715.19]
to file complaints against valuations or assessments.” Appellants here are “board[s]” or
“legislative authorit[ies]” who were authorized by R.C. 5715.19 to file complaints against
valuations or assessments. The prior version of R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) authorized a “board of
education of any school district with any territory in the county” to file a complaint against
valuations or assessments.     The amended version of R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) authorizes a
“legislative authority of a subdivision” to file complaints against valuations or assessments,
subject to certain prerequisites set out in R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) and (B). The amended statute
defines “legislative authority” to include “the board of education of any school district with
territory in the county.” Therefore, under the general rule in R.C. 5717.01, the appellants
boards of education would be entitled to appeal the BOR’s decisions. We must therefore
consider whether the exception added to R.C. 5717.01 by H.B. 126 strips them of that
authority.
       {¶ 29} Amended R.C. 5717.01 restricts the universe of potential appellants
authorized by the general rule, stating, “except a subdivision that files an original complaint
or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does
not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that
original complaint or counter-complaint.” Unlike the general rule in amended R.C. 5717.01,
which retains from the prior version of the statute the subject “any board [or] legislative
authority * * * authorized by [R.C. 5715.19] to file complaints against valuations or
assessments,” the exception refers to “a subdivision that files an original complaint or
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                           14
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

counter-complaint under” R.C. 5715.19 and to a BOR’s “decision * * * with respect to that
original complaint or counter-complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The terms “original
complaint” and “counter-complaint”—each of which appears twice in the exception—were
not present in former R.C. 5715.19(A) or (B), were not present in former R.C. 5717.01, and
do not appear in the general rule set out in amended R.C. 5717.01.
       {¶ 30} It was only with the passage of H.B. 126 that the General Assembly added the
terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” to R.C. 5715.19(A) and (B) and 5717.01
and defined those terms in R.C. 5715.19. Appellants contend that, because they filed their
complaints in these cases while the former version of R.C. 5715.19 remained in effect, they
are not “subdivision[s] that file[d] an original complaint or counter-complaint” and are
therefore not subject to the exception added to R.C. 5717.01 by H.B. 126. R.C. 5717.01.
Appellants instead maintain that they were “board[s] of education of any school district
with territory in the county” who filed “complaint[s]” under former R.C. 5715.19(A) or
“complaint[s] in support of or objecting to” another party’s complaint under former R.C.
5715.19(B). (See New Albany Appellant’s Brief at 29.) We agree.
       {¶ 31} Appellees acknowledge that the terms “original complaint” and “counter-
complaint” did not appear in the former version of R.C. 5715.19, but they argue that, prior
to the enactment of H.B. 126 and the incorporation of those terms into R.C. 5715.19 and
5717.01, courts had used those terms, which had acquired a settled meaning, to distinguish
between complaints filed under R.C. 5715.19(A) and (B). See, e.g., Dublin City Schools Bd.
of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 147 Ohio St.3d 38, 2016-Ohio-3025, ¶ 9.
Appellees’ arguments parallel the BTA’s analysis in North Ridgeville, where the BTA
likewise downplayed the import of the General Assembly’s incorporation of the terms
“original complaint” and “counter-complaint” into R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01. See North
Ridgeville at *12-13 (“we find no reason to extend the right of a subdivision to appeal after
the General Assembly revoked that right merely because it also codified a meaning for well-
understood terms in the same legislation”). Appellees essentially contend that the General
Assembly’s inclusion of those terms in the text of amended R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01 has no
effect on their appellate rights but instead simply codified the existing understanding and
common usage of those terms.
       {¶ 32} Even though the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” may
have been used in common parlance to distinguish between the types of challenges brought
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                            15
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

under former R.C. 5715.19(A) and (B), we may not overlook the General Assembly’s
intentional effort to incorporate those terms into the statutes and to define them for the
first time in H.B. 126. “ ‘When an existing statute is repealed and a new statute upon the
same subject is enacted to include an amendment, as in this case, it is presumed that the
Legislature intended to change the effect and operation of the law to the extent of the
change in the language thereof.’ ” Greenville Law Library Assn. v. Ansonia, 33 Ohio St.2d
3, 6 (1973), quoting Malone v. Indus. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 292, 299 (1942). Accordingly,
when the legislature uses different language within a statute, “we must assume it intended
different results from the different words employed.” Huntington Natl. Bank v. 199 S. Fifth
St. Co., LLC, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1082, 2011-Ohio-3707, ¶ 18.
       {¶ 33} Undermining the argument that the General Assembly was simply bringing
the statutory scheme into alignment with general usage of the terms “original complaint”
and “counter-complaint” is the General Assembly’s failure to consistently use those new
terms in place of the more general “complaints against valuations or assessments”
throughout amended R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01. Most notably, as stated above, the General
Assembly did not incorporate those new terms into the general rule regarding appellate
rights in R.C. 5717.01. Not only must we give effect to the General Assembly’s use of the
new terms in the exception, but we must also give effect to the legislature’s choice not to
incorporate those new terms into the general rule. Had the General Assembly’s intent been
simply to codify the allegedly common understanding of those terms, it could have
consistently substituted those terms in all related provisions that referred to complaints
against valuations or assessments under R.C. 5715.19, but it did not. Particularly, it could
have amended the general rule to authorize the filing of an appeal to the BTA by any
subdivision authorized by R.C. 5715.19 to file an “original complaint” or “counter-
complaint,” before excepting out subdivisions that do not own or lease the subject property.
       {¶ 34} The General Assembly’s use of different words within the interconnected
clauses of R.C. 5717.01 signals that it intended the words to have different meanings. See
Obetz v. McClain, 164 Ohio St.3d 529, 2021-Ohio-1706, ¶ 21. Indeed, having not altered
the general rule that “any board [or] legislative authority * * * authorized by [R.C. 5715.19]
to file complaints against valuations or assessments” may appeal to the BTA, there was no
reason for the General Assembly to introduce the new terms “original complaint” and
“counter-complaint” into R.C. 5717.01 at all, unless it intended them to have some import.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                                             16
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

It could have instead simply continued, “except that a subdivision that files a complaint
under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not
appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that complaint.” Although that
is essentially how the BTA has read amended R.C. 5717.01, that is not what the plain
language of the amended statute, with its use of different terms in the general rule and the
exception, says.
        {¶ 35} “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that ‘the General Assembly is not
presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute it is
inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.’ ” State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336
(1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479
(1959). We therefore may not treat the General Assembly’s incorporation of the terms
“original complaint” and “counter-complaint” into R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01 as
meaningless. By the General Assembly’s incorporation and definition of the new terms
“original complaint” and “counter-complaint” into R.C. 5715.19 and its simultaneous
enactment in R.C. 5717.01 of an exception that defines its application by reference to those
new terms, we must conclude that R.C. 5717.01’s references to an “original complaint or
counter-complaint under” R.C. 5715.19 necessarily refer to a complaint filed under
amended R.C. 5715.19(A) or (B). Thus, reading amended R.C. 5715.19 and 5717.01 in pari
materia, the exception in R.C. 5717.01 that restricts a subdivision’s right to appeal a BOR
decision to the BTA applies only to appeals from a BOR’s decision on an “original
complaint” or “counter-complaint” filed after the effective date of H.B. 126.6 To infer
otherwise, this court would have to delete (or at least ignore) the General Assembly’s
express use of the newly added and defined terms “original complaint” and “counter-
complaint” in R.C. 5717.01. We may not do so. See State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580,
2004-Ohio-5989, ¶ 14.

6 Beyond our determination that the newly added and defined terms “original complaint” and “counter-

complaint” refer to complaints filed pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(A) and (B) after the effective date of H.B. 126,
we likewise conclude that, pursuant to Section 3(A) of H.B. 126, a BOR decision on a complaint filed prior to
the effective date of H.B. 126 is not a decision on an “original complaint or counter-complaint, as those terms
are defined in [amended R.C. 5715.19], filed for tax year 2022 or any tax year thereafter.” The BOR’s decisions
on the complaints underlying these appeals, which challenged valuations for tax year 2021 and were filed
before the effective date of H.B. 126, were therefore not decisions “with respect to [a subdivision’s] original
complaint or counter-complaint” because the relevant amendments to R.C. 5715.19 apply only to challenges
for tax year 2022 and thereafter.
Nos. 22AP-732, 22AP-733, 22AP-737, 22AP-738, 22AP-743, 22AP-744                            17
22AP-746, 22AP-747, 22AP-748, 22AP-749, 22AP-750, & 22AP-751

V. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 36} The appellants boards of education in these appeals are not “subdivision[s]
that file[d] an original complaint or counter-complaint under” R.C. 5715.19, as the
complaints that gave rise to these appeals were filed prior to the effective date of H.B. 126,
under the former version of R.C. 5715.19, which did not include the terms “original
complaint” or “counter-complaint.” As used in the exception added to R.C. 5717.01 by H.B.
126, “an original complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19]” refers to a
complaint filed under amended R.C. 5715.19. Therefore, the exception does not preclude
the boards of education from maintaining their appeals to the BTA. Instead, as “board[s]
* * * authorized by [R.C. 5715.19] to file complaints against valuation or assessments,” R.C.
5717.01, appellants were entitled to appeal the BOR’s decisions under the general rule in
R.C. 5717.01.
       {¶ 37} For these reasons, we sustain the boards of education’s eighth and ninth
assignments of error and deny their remaining assignments of error as moot.               We
accordingly reverse the decisions of the BTA and remand these appeals to the BTA for
further proceedings consistent with this decision and the law.
                                                    Decisions reversed; causes remanded.
                           MENTEL and LELAND, JJ., concur.