Court Opinion

ID: 9698473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:51:39.889316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.255116
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the court’s holding that official immunity is applicable to nuisance and negligent failure-to-warn claims, our analysis should have ended there. The petition for review in this case raised two discrete issues: (1) “Is vicarious official immunity inapplicable, as a matter of law, to a claim for nuisance?” and (2) “Is vicarious official immunity inapplicable, as a matter of law, to a claim for negligent failure to warn of potential dangers from airborne molds and bacteria?” We granted the petition for review to answer those two limited questions. The court now reaches beyond the two issues accepted for review and concludes that official immunity is not available to a claim for nuisance in this case because genuine issues of material fact exist, precluding summary judgment, with respect to what can only be characterized as a fictional violation of the MPCA permit and Maplewood’s conditional use permits (CUPs) under which the compost site operated, and minor violations of Maple-wood’s CUPs, which the district court found caused no harm, a finding that was not challenged on appeal. The court notes that, unlike the court of appeals, its analysis focuses “[not] on the nuisance but rather on the nature of the underlying governmental activity that caused the nuisance.” Of course, the reason the court of appeals focused on the “nuisance” was because the issue in front of it was whether the official immunity defense was applicable to nuisance and negligent-failure-to-warn claims. The question of whether fact issues precluding summary judgment existed was not briefed or argued at the court of appeals or raised in the petition for review in this court. Finally, it should be noted that neither the complaint nor the amended complaint allege failure to comply with the Maplewood CUPs as a basis for liability under its nuisance theory.
I.
In going beyond the issues accepted for review, the court makes a number of serious errors. The first being that the court decides issues of fact and law that were not addressed below. This is clearly improper under our jurisprudence. See Thiele v. Stick, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988). In doing so, the court takes on the role of fact finder and makes findings that are not supported by the recprd before us.
Ignoring the record, the court relies on the factual statement from respondents’ summary judgment memorandum at the district court, which it adopts almost verbatim. For example, with respect to the county’s MPCA permit, the court finds that:
In the MPCA’s “Permiti-by-Rule Facility Notification Form,” Ramsey County certified on May 23, 1990 that it would compost grass and leaves and that the total “facility design waste capacity at the site would be 9,000 cubic yards.” * * * This capacity limit followed the MPCA mandate that “about one acre of land is needed for each 3,000 to 3,500 cubic yards of yard waste collected.” Based on this certification, on July 5, 1990, the MPCA approved Ramsey County’s application to compost a maximum of 9,000 cubic yards of grass and ■ leaves on the Beam Avenue site. * * *
From 1990-1996, Ramsey County certified in required annual forms to the MPCA that the Beam Avenue site’s yard waste capacity was 9,000 cubic yards. *309The Slettens allege that Ramsey County significantly exceeded its represented and authorized design capacity. In 1993, for example, Ramsey County received 27,480 cubic yards of yard waste and transferred only 6,240 cubic yards, leaving 21,240 cubic yards to be managed on the site, or 12,240 cubic yards over the permitted amount for compost. The permit violations led to the alleged formation of anaerobic bacteria and other pathogenic bioaerosols, as well as odorous compounds such as ammonia and hydrogen sulfide. Ramsey County’s compost expert, Dr. Elliot Epstein, stated in a 1997 book that ammonia is released from decomposing grass clippings and when anaerobic conditions occur, odorous sulfide compounds such as hydrogen sulfide are produced.
(Footnotes omitted.)
These alleged “facts” are inconsistent with the record before us.1 It is clear from the record that there were no volume restrictions set by any of the Maplewood . CUPs or the MPCA permit. Careful review of the record reveals that the figure of 9,000 cubic yards of “grass and leaves,” which the court points to as a mandate, was derived from MPCA guidelines that, according to the affidavit of Rebecca Wirth, the MPCA Senior Pollution Control Specialist in charge .of regulating yard waste sites in Minnesota, do not have the force of law. In her affidavit, Wirth describes the yard waste composting permit process that covered the site at issue here. With respect to the facts found by the court, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 13 of Wirth’s affidavit bear repeating:
• 4. I am very familiar with the yard waste and solid waste composting rules in effect in this state from 1990 through the present. I personally rewrote those rules in 1995. The rewritten rules became effective in September of 1996.
5. Permits for yard waste composting facilities are covered under Minnesota- Rules Chapter 7001, part 7001.3050, entitled “Solid Waste Management Facility Permits.” Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of this rule. Subpart 3 of .part 7001.8050 provides that certain facilities, including compost facilities receiving yard waste only, will be. entitled to a “permit-by-rule, ” that is, the owner or operator is deemed to have obtained a solid waste ,management facility permit without making application for it, unless the commissioner of the Pollution Control Agency finds that the facility is not in compliance with the portions of the rules applicable to the facility. Nothing in subpart 3(C) of the rule limits the amount of material that can be composted at a yard waste facility, in contrast to other facilities covered by the permit-by-rule status. Yard waste composting facilities must comply with sub-parts 2 and, 3 of part 7035.2836. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Minn. R. 7035.2836. Nothing in subparts 2 and ■ 3 of part 7035.2836 limits the amount of yard tvaste that,can be composted at a yard waste facility (unlike some other facilities which are covered by part 7001.3050). Accordingly, the permit-by-rule under which yard waste composting facilities, including the Maplewood site, operate do not limit the amount of material that the facilities can handle, as long as the requirements of the rule, such as periodic turning, are met. The notification form filled out by an owner *310or operator of a yard waste composting facility is not a permit and does not have the force of law. Nor is the MPCA’s letter responding to the notification form a permit. The permit is the rule itself, which contains all of the requirements with which the owner or operator must comply.
6. I received and reviewed the annual reports filed by Ramsey County with respect to the Maplewood site. The amounts reported to be composted did not appear to be excessive for a 3-1 acre site. My publication, Introduction to Composting, indicates that “(o)n the average, about one acre of land is needed for each 3,000 to 3,500 cubic yards of yard waste collected.” Id. at II-l. As stated in the publication, however, the amount of land required depends on a number of variables, including the composting method and type of equipment used. The amount of land needed also depends, obviously, on the amount of yard waste removed from the site and not composted there. The annual reports from Ramsey County indicate that large quantities, presumably grass clippings, were removed from the site and not composted there.
7. In 1991, I served on an Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Group organized by Ramsey County to evaluate its yard waste compost facility in Maplewood and to advise the County on issues regarding that site. I toured the Maple-wood site on June 15, 1991. The Technical Advisory Group found it to be a model yard waste site. The quantity of leaves being composted at the site was by no means excessive, and there appeared to be ample room to turn the windrows.
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13. I am aware of no violation of the applicable state rules by Ramsey County in its operation of the Maplewood compost site. It was, as I previously stated, a model composting site.
(Emphasis added.)
A fair reading of Wirth’s affidavit can lead to only one conclusion. The Maple-wood compost site was not limited to accepting 9,000 cubic yards of yard waste. Nor is there any other evidence in the record indicating that the county’s authorization to operate the site hinged on an absolute limit of 9,000 cubic yards. Clearly, Minn. R. 7035.2836, subd. 2 (2001), does not, on its face, create such a limit. Further, given Wirth’s affidavit, the May 23, 1990, Permit-by-Rule Facility Notification Form, and the July 5, 1990, letter from Rodney Massey, Director of the MPCA’s Ground Water and Solid Waste Division, to Robert Fulton, the county’s Director of Public Health at its Solid Waste Division, no such absolute limit can fairly be implied from the rule. Finally, no such limit is imposed either directly or indirectly by any of the Maplewood CUPs. See note 4, infra. Nevertheless, the court finds that the MPCA’s approval was based on the submitted design capacity and that an absolute limit on yard waste volume was established at 9,000 cubic yards.2 The court is simply wrong.
*311The court concludes that the “ ‘facility-design capacity’ of 9,000 cubic yards per year [is an]' integral component! ] of its very existence and set[s] out clear parameters for its operation.”3 In light of the record before us, including Wirth’s affidavit, the rules regulating operation of the site, the Permit-By-Rule Facility Notifieation Form, the Maplewood CUPs, and the lack of any other evidence supporting its findings, the court is hard-pressed to arrive at that conclusion, a conclusion that is supported by no more than the court’s will.
With respect to the violation of the Ma-plewood CUPs,4 the trial court found and *313the record establishes that between 1995 and 1999 there were 427 scheduled pickups of grass clippings and that 36 of them were missed. That is, on 391 occasions, grass clippings were timely removed. The trial court also found that odor complaints received by the county and Maplewood during the years in which these grass clipping pickups were missed totaled three in 1995, one in 1996, none in either 1997 or 1998, and one in 1999. Thus, the trial court found that the missed pickups did not result in odor complaints. In dismissing the Slettens’ negligence claim related to the grass clippings, the trial court reasoned:
The bottom line with regard to the hauling of grass clippings is this: should the County lose official immunity protection for its operational level activities at the compost site due to 36 untimely grass clipping pickups. I conclude that it should not lose official immunity on this basis particularly because no harm resulted from the conduct. Moreover, even if official immunity does not apply, the Plaintiffs have failed to make any case for negligence relating to the hauling of grass. There are no damages arising from this conduct. No genuine issue of material fact exists. Proving harm related to slow grass pick up in the absence of odor complaints is unlikely. Summary judgment is not to be avoided simply because there is some metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.
(Citation omitted.)
Significantly, the trial court determined that,
even if official immunity does not apply, the plaintiffs have failed to make any case for negligence relating to the hauling of grass. There are no damages arising from this conduct. * * * Proving harm related to slow grass pick up in the absence of odor complaints is unlikely. Summary judgment is not to be avoided simply because there is some metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, in evaluating respondents’ negligence claim based on the same conduct, the trial court came to the unchallenged conclusion that in light of the lack of odor complaints the missed grass clipping pickups caused no provable harm and thus caused no damage. The trial court’s findings and conclusions with respect to grass clippings were not appealed to the court of appeals and are not subject to challenge in this appeal. The trial court’s findings with respect to the negli*314gence issue relating to the hauling of grass should doom respondents’ nuisance claim related to that issue to the same fate as the negligence claim. Of equal importance is the fact that the focus in a nuisance claim is on the alleged harm. Here, absent odor complaints, there not only is no damage, there is no harm and therefore no supportable nuisance claim. Yet the court gives the grass clipping issue new life under the guise of the nuisance claim. Remand for trial on the grass clipping issue in the context of the Slettens’ nuisance claim would seem to be a waste of judicial resources.
II.
The court’s handling of the grass clipping removal issue on the merits is equally troubling. The goal of official immunity is to protect public officials from personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties. Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988). Official immunity applies when the official’s conduct involves the exercise of judgment or discretion; it does not apply to ministerial duties. Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998). A discretionary decision involves individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the facts of a situation and the professional goal. Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.1998). A ministerial duty is one in which nothing is left to discretion; it is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. When entitlement to immunity is at issue, the focus of the inquiry must be on the precise conduct alleged to have caused the plaintiffs injury. Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 667 (Minn.1999) (Gilbert, J., dissenting). As noted above, in this case, the county’s failure to comply with the CUPs was not alleged as a basis for liability. Given the district court’s finding based on uncontra-dicted evidence, which has gone unchallenged on appeal, that the missed grass clipping pickups did not generate odor complaints and caused no damage, it follows that the county’s failure to comply with the CUPs cannot form the basis for denying official immunity. The court’s decision is akin to the court holding that the ministerial sidewalk “repair” ordinance in Wiederholt precludes official immunity even when the conduct alleged to have caused injury was the negligent “failure to clear” debris from the sidewalk.
III.
The court also points out that Ramsey County first raised the vicarious official immunity defense on remand from the court of appeals. The court then notes that the Slettens were not permitted to offer rebuttal evidence relating to “the ordinance and rule violations on capacity and expert testimony, arguing there was a per se violation of these limitations” in response to Ramsey County’s vicarious official immunity claim. By doing so, the court suggests that precluding the Slettens from presenting this rebuttal evidence was unfair. It was not.
The court’s discussion ignores two important facts. The first being that the complaint in this matter did not allege violations of the Maplewood CUPs. To the extent that the complaint alleged violations of the MPCA permit, it did not do so with any specificity. The need for rebuttal evidence apparently arose as a result of the county raising vicarious official immunity as a defense. The problem, of course, and the second fact the court ignores, is that immunity is a defense. A government defendant can only determine if it has any immunity defenses after the plaintiff has first identified the conduct and legal theo*315ries on which the defendant’s liability is premised.
Here, the complaint did not identify the conduct or the legal theories the court now relies on. The county had to conduct extensive discovery to identify the precise conduct that created the claimed liability. It was only after pinning down the precise conduct during- discovery that the county was in a position to determine available defenses. Evidently, the court believes that the general allegations of violations of statutes and rules included in respondents’ amended complaint are enough to support respondents’ reliance on alleged violations of the CUP and the MPCA permit. Yet, if respondents intended these general allegations to incorporate claims based on grass removal and volume restrictions, this intention should have been disclosed during discovery. But it wasn’t. Because the immunity defense was raised in response to the complained-of conduct as identified during discovery, respondents were properly precluded from adding additional evidence with respect to conduct and legal theories not previously identified. Respondents’ rights were not violated by the exclusion of additional evidence and new legal theories. Respondents’ failure to identify alleged violations of the Maple-wood CUPs and the MPCA permit as a basis for liability during discovery precludes any claim based on such violations now. To suggest that after the defendant identified a defense applicable to the complained-of conduct the plaintiff should be allowed to add new legal theories to avoid the defense stands normal litigation practice on its head.
IV.
Finally, by addressing issues beyond those raised in the petition before the court, the court not only violates our jurisprudence, but also makes a mockery of the fair administration of justice and denies due process to Ramsey County. The issue of whether summary judgment is precluded by- the existence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to the county’s violation of rules and permits was neither raised nor briefed by either party. Nor does it appear from the record below that it was raised at the court of appeals. We have made clear that “an appellate court should consider only those issues that were presented and considered by the trial court.” In re Welfare of the Children of Coats, 633 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Minn.2001) (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582). Moreover, our jurisprudence requires that we limit our review to issues raised in the petition for review. See Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.2002) (limiting analysis to issue raised in petition); Anderly v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Minn.1996) (declining to reach an issue that was not raised in the petition for review when a joint party seeking to raise the issue failed to file a petition). In keeping with this general rule, we have held that “it is proper for an appellate court to decide an issue not raised on appeal only when the reasoning relied upon by the appellate court is neither novel nor questionable. Needless to say, an appellate court should exercise this authority only sparingly.” State v. Glidden, 455 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn.1990). We have also made clear that, in the absence of proper briefing, we will not address issues raised by the parties. State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. by the Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.1997) (declining to reach an issue in the absence of adequate briefing).
Today, the court violates these principles without justification. Fairness requires that a party receive notice of and have the opportunity to address issues being decided on appeal. Here, the issue of *316whether summary judgment in favor of Ramsey County is precluded by genuine issues of material fact with respect to the county’s purported violations of rules and permits was not raised in the petition for review or briefed to either the court of appeals or this court, nor has Ramsey County ever had notice of or the opportunity to address that issue.
Therefore, I dissent.

. At the risk of looking as though I am engaging in the same kind of fact-finding that I criticize the court for engaging in, I note that a detailed discussion of the facts is made necessary by the court's loose use of the record.

. The court relies on the Maplewood CUPs' requirement of "continuous” monitoring to support its finding that a volume restriction existed. The court also claims that Ramsey County was to continuously monitor the site to prevent anaerobic fermentation. While the CUPs did require that a monitor be present when the site was open, there is nothing in the record identifying what was to be monitored. The court's finding that the monitor was to be monitoring the volume of the materials at the site and preventing anaerobic fermentation is nothing more than pure speculation. One could just as easily speculate that the monitor was there to ensure that garbage and trash were not being deposited at the site.

.As discussed above, that conclusion is unsupported by the record. There is even less support in the record for the assertion that the facility design capacity was 9,000 cubic yards “per year.” Even if a 9,000 cubic yard limit on yard waste is assumed, it is likely that the limit was applied to the maximum amount of yard waste permitted at the site at any given time. There is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise, and there is nothing in the record to suggest Ramsey County was over the 9,000 cubic yard limit at any given time. Under the court’s reading, if the site reached the asserted 9,000 cubic yard limit during the first half of the composting season, it could not accept any additional yard waste for the remainder of the season. Because no permit violations have been established, the court cannot properly conclude that permit violations led to the alleged formation of anaerobic bacteria, pathogenic bioaerosols, and odorous compounds.
Further, the court's reliance on Dr. Epstein’s statements from his 1997 book is, to say the least, curious. Dr. Epstein's book simply describes the composting process. As the book notes, anaerobic conditions occur during the composting process when there is not enough oxygen available to maintain aerobic conditions. While anaerobic conditions do lead to an increased release of anaerobic bacteria, pathogenic bioaerosols, and odorous compounds, whether such conditions take place depends on how frequently the windrows are turned. Having held that the district court's conclusion that the county is entitled to vicarious official immunity with respect to the turning of the windrows at the site was not error, it is difficult to understand how the court now concludes that the act of managing anaerobic conditions is not entitled to immunity. Moreover, Dr. Epstein did not suggest and the record does not support a finding that the release of anaerobic bacteria, pathogenic bioaerosols, and odorous compounds was in any way related to, much less caused by, the alleged permit violations. Therefore, assuming there were permit violations, the permit violations did not lead to the release of anaerobic bacteria, pathogenic bioaerosols, or odorous compounds. Finally, the statements from Dr. Epstein’s book relied on by the court only address the release of odorous compounds. As discussed below, the Slettens cannot sustain a claim based on odors.

.The 1991 CUP was conditioned on the following requirements:
1. The site may be open to the public between March 24 and December 6 of each year.
2. The site may be open to the public between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.
3. The County shall provide at least one monitor at the site for all hours that it is open to the public. If the city or County ‘determines there is a need for more site monitoring, the County shall assure that the site has adequate monitoring.
4. The site shall accept only the following materials: garden waste, lawn cuttings, weeds, prunings of soft bodied plants, leaves along with materials like pine cones, fruit and small twigs that people pick up with their yard waste.
5. The City prohibits the dumping or storing of the following materials: wood chips, brush and branches, garbage or refuse [at] the site.
6. The County shall have the grass clippings removed from the site as often as necessary to prevent odors.
7. The City Council shall review this permit in 5 years.
The 1994 CUP included the same conditions as required by the 1991 CUP, but required that grass clippings be removed from the site at least three times a week. In addition, the CUP changed the periodic review of the permit from five years to annually. Further, the CUP required fulfillment of these additional terms:
8. The County shall manage the compost site to minimize the amount of objectionable *312odors. Management procedures shall include the following:
a) Procure, maintain and use wind direction and speed monitoring equipment at the site. The County shall provide this equipment so it is accessible to the City staff.
b) Record wind speed and direction every two hours during pile turning and the haul-out of materials.
c) During April through October, turn the piles of materials only when the wind is blowing from the southeast, south or southwest and at least five miles per hour. During November through March, the wind must be calm or from the east, south or west. The piles shall only be turned between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Monday through Friday.
d) Keep a written record of:
1) The times of pile turning and the haul-out of materials
2) Compost pile temperatures
3) A description of the compost quality
4) The initial date and aging of the compost piles
9. The Community Development Department shall handle odor complaints during regular business hours and the police department shall handle odor complaints after regular hours. The inspector shall verify and measure whether there is an odor that violates the odor standards of this permit. To determine if there is a violation of this permit, the inspector shall follow the procedures in Attachment A of this permit. A violation of this permit shall occur when the inspector has recorded ten sniffings of the ambient air over a period of thirty minutes with a geometric average OIRS of (a) 3.0 or greater if the property at which the testing is being conducted contains a permanent residence, or (b) 4.0 or greater if the property at which the testing is being conducted does not contain a permanent residence. (See Attachment B of this permit for a description of the odor scale.) If there is a violation, the inspector shall investigate to establish the source of the odor. The City shall notify the County of the violation. The County shall advise the City of the reason for the problem and correct it to meet the standards of this permit. The County or site operator shall cooperate with the City or its representative regarding such investigations.
10. The County shall deposit with the City an escrow deposit of $5,200 on or before May 1, 1994. Thereafter, on or before January 1 of each year the County shall deposit with the City an escrow deposit of $2,000. The City shall use this deposit to:
a) Pay for City staff time or the costs to hire a third party to verify and measure odors, following complaints received by the City
b) Train City staff persons and others for wind and odor monitoring
c) Pay for an odor consultant to assist in preparing this permit or future revisions to this permit.
At the end of each calendar year, the City shall refund to the County any of the deposit not used by the City. If needed, the County shall pay for any consulting costs above the escrow deposit that the City needs to reevaluate this permit.
11. The site operator shall use water to suppress dust from the compost piles, as necessary.
12. Phalen Chain-of-Lakes Watershed Steering Committee’s technical staff shall review leeching of water issues and concerns on the site.
13. County shall monitor and remove no-napproved items from the site.
14. County to report by August 1, 1994 on:
a) Reduction of size,
b) Explore alternate site location,
c) Prohibit use by commercial businesses,
d) Report update on aspergillus fumigatus from other districts and sites,
e) Update from Soil Conservation.
The 1996 CUP included most of the requirements from the 1991 and 1994 permit and included several requirements related to the closing of the site as a compost facility:
10. The County shall be allowed to complete the process of composting the leaves that were collected in the fall of 1995 and spring of 1996 and that are on the site as of October 1, 1996. This material will be considered finished in the spring of 1997.
11. Beginning with material received in the fall of 1996, the site shall operate as a transfer site. Leaves received during April-May and October-November [shall be] transferred from the site on a regular basis. Leaves may not be stored on site for a period of longer than three (3) weeks. In the event of weather conditions, such as a snowstorm in the fall that preclude haul-out of leaves within three (3) weeks, the Director of Community Development may grant permission to the [C]ounty to store leaves on the north part of the site until such time that the leaves may be hauled out. Under such circumstances, leaves *313shall be removed from the site by April of the following year.
The County shall have the grass clippings removed from the site June-September at least three times a week or other days if necessary to help prevent objectionable odors.
12. The County shall place wood chips and finished compost on site for citizens to take.
13. The County is requested by the City to look for an alternate yard waste site in the northeast part of the County that would be used to reduce the traffic at the site on Beam Avenue.
14. The County shall make best efforts to develop a yard waste composting site on County property in the vicinity of the Workhouse, north of Lower Afton Road. The site would be up to 10 acres in size, and would not be open for residents to drop off material. The City will assist the County in obtaining permits for this site.
15. The southern part of the site on Beam Avenue shall not be used for yard waste management by the County after the spring of 1997.
16. Should the County be unsuccessful in siting and permitting a site in the vicinity of the Workhouse, then the City Council will review this permit and may allow the County to compost material on the northern portion of the site on Beam Avenue.
17. The County is granted permission to make improvements to the site, including: widening and paving the entrance road; installing a new, wider gate; installing four light posts and fixtures; and installing traffic control signs.