Court Opinion

ID: 9737478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:26:22.680661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.214674
License: Public Domain

SHARPNACK, C.J.,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent. Where an appellant moves to dismiss the appeal and there is no opposition by the Appellee or any cross-appeal pending, we should dismiss the- case. See G.C. Murphy Co. v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Security Div., 137 Ind.App. 476, 477, 210 N.E.2d 51, 51 (1965) (granting appellant’s motion to dismiss where no cross-errors had been filed by the appel-lees and where no opposition was made to the motion to dismiss); Federal Tire Co., Inc. v. Wingler, 137 Ind.App. 527, 527, 210 N.E.2d 258, 258 (1965); Felzien v. Felzien, 137 Ind.App. 435, 436, 209 N.E.2d 524, 525 (1965) (granting appellant’s motion to dismiss where the controversy between the parties had been settled); State v. Chapius, 187 N.E.2d 105, 105 (Ind.Ct.App.1963). While the majority appears to characterize the motion as something other than a motion to dismiss, I have no reason to conclude that it is anything but a motion to dismiss indicating the appellant’s clear intention to have the entire case dismissed.
Furthermore, it is not for us to compel Appellants to continue litigation they wish to drop. I disagree with the majority’s speculation that the agreement reached between these parties is illusory. The motion to dismiss stating that the parties had reached a settlement on visitation issues is directly contrary to this conclusion and we have no other facts before us to indicate that this matter has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the parties. The majority also relies upon the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine in denying the motion to dismiss. However, two of the cases cited in support of this public interest exception involved appeals that became moot not through the parties taking affirmative steps to resolve their conflicts, but by mere natural expiration of the event that produced the conflict. See Board of Sch. Trustees of Muncie Community Sch. v. Barnell by Duncan, 678 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (appeal by student against pchool for expulsion became moot when period for which student had been expelled had passed); Sowers v. Laporte Superior Court, No. II, 577 N.E.2d 250, 251 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (appeal by inmate whose request to perpetuate testimony under Ind. Trial Rule 27 was denied presented a potentially moot question because his claim against the State had either been approved, thereby providing him with compensation, or denied, *58allowing him to proceed with his lawsuit in which normal discovery was available to him). The third case cited, Evans v. Tuttle, held that promulgation of new regulations did not render an appeal moot because the new regulation only “alters the mechanism used to achieve the same result.” Evans v. Tuttle, 613 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). These cases do not support the application of the public interest exception to the case before us. Addressing issues that have become moot because relief can be no longer be fashioned does not necessarily affect the parties. However, to address questions made moot by a mutual resolution of the disagreement by other means denies the parties the opportunity to settle a matter on their own. Such a result is contrary to a policy that supports such settlements.
This appeal should be dismissed.