Court Opinion

ID: 9411575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 06:00:23.375681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:20.496436
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ALECIA B. TAMAYO,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        AT-1221-17-0449-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: July 26, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Alecia B. Tamayo, Stockbridge, Georgia, pro se.

           Rebecca E. Pope, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal based on 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
     one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affe cted the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review.   Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.          Except as expressly
     MODIFIED to clarify that the appellant also failed to establish Board jurisdiction
     based on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant served as a Supervisory Transportation Security Officer. On
     or about March 13, 2015, she filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC), OSC Docket No. MA-15-3045, in which she claimed that she made a
     number of protected disclosures to management officials in which she alleged
     discrimination based on sex, disability, and age, and retaliation for engaging in
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, 2 and that those disclosures
     evidenced on the agency’s part a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
     mismanagement, and an abuse of authority.        Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
     at 72. On April 22, 2015, OSC advised the appellant that it does not take action

     2
       As of the time the appellant filed this OSC complaint, she had filed two EEO
     complaints. She subsequently filed three more.
                                                                                       3

     on allegations of discrimination and retaliation for filing EEO complaints and that
     therefore it was closing its file. 3 Id. at 79.
¶3         On or about July 4, 2016, the appellant filed a second complaint with OSC,
     OSC Docket No. MA-16-4467. 4 On February 14, 2017, OSC advised her of its
     preliminary determination to close its inquiry into the complaint. IAF, Tab 1
     at 213-14. It described the appellant’s complaint as consisting of allegations that
     agency officials discriminated against her based on sex, age, and disability;
     retaliated against her for engaging in EEO activity; and subjected her to
     harassment and disparate treatment in retaliation for disclosing to agency
     leadership that it lacked accountability. Id. OSC stated that it would take no
     further action on the appellant’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation for
     engaging in EEO activity, explaining that such matters are more appropriately
     resolved through the EEO process.            Id. at 213.   Regarding the appellant’s
     harassment and disparate treatment claim, OSC indicated that it considered it as a
     potential claim of retaliation for whistleblowing in violation of 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8), but found that it could not conclude that she had made a protected
     disclosure, and that therefore it found no basis for further investigation of the
     matter as a violation of that statutory provision. OSC did, however, allow the
     appellant an opportunity to submit further comment. Id. at 214.
¶4         In her response to OSC, the appellant repeated the claims she made in her
     first complaint that she made disclosures that evidenced the agency’s violation of
     law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and abuse of authority. Id. at 25.
     She argued that, in reprisal for her disclosures, the agency issued her an “untrue”
     letter of counseling (LOC) on August 6, 2016, based on “Inappropriate

     3
       Because the appellant had not alleged retaliation for whistleblowing, OSC did not
     provide her with rights to file an IRA appeal before the Board, IAF, Tab 1 at 79.
     4
       The appellant did not submit a copy of this complaint into the record in her IRA
     appeal.
                                                                                           4

     Comments,” id. at 26, 29, and denied her “fair” ratings and performance reviews
     which, in turn, prevented her from receiving promotions and other employment
     opportunities. Id. at 27. The appellant also claimed that some of these adverse
     agency decisions were due to her having filed her first and second OSC
     complaints. Id. at 28. With her response to OSC, the appellant submitted various
     documents from her EEO complaints.          Id. at 45-52.    On April 4, 2017, OSC
     upheld its earlier determination to close its file and apprised the appellant of her
     opportunity to file an IRA appeal with the Board. 5 Id. at 12-15.
¶5         In her IRA appeal, the appellant claimed that, by her filings, she disclosed
     that the agency violated the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in
     Employment Act and committed other prohibited personnel practices including
     disability discrimination; that the agency violated her rights as a “known” EEO
     complainant; that she complained to leadership about its lack of accountability,
     and that, under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), all of these disclosures evidenced on the
     agency’s part violations of law, rule, and regulation, gross mismanagement, and
     abuse of authority. She noted her two OSC complaints and appeared to allege
     retaliation based on them.        She repeated her claim that, because of her
     disclosures, she received an “untrue” LOC, and was denied fair ratings and
     reviews, leading to her being denied promotional and other employment
     opportunities. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 7-11. She requested a hearing. Id. at 1. With her
     appeal, the appellant submitted in excess of 200 pages of attachmen ts including
     copies of her correspondence with OSC regarding her complaints, id. at 14-21,
     30-31, 39-40, 67-80, 194-202, 213-18; and documents relating to her allegations

     5
       Regarding the appellant’s claims that agency officials committed pr ohibited personnel
     practices unrelated to alleged retaliation for whistleblowing, OSC advised her that she
     could request its Disclosure Unit to review them, IAF, Tab 1 at 14, and she did so,
     although without success, IAF, Tab 10 at 40-43.
                                                                                        5

     of discrimination and her EEO complaints, id. at 22-24, 34-38, 41, 45-52, 83-127,
     142-52, 174-78, 221-27. 6
¶6           The administrative judge issued a thorough order on jurisdiction and proof
     requirements in connection with the appellant’s IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 5. The
     appellant’s 270-page response consisted largely of documents she already had
     submitted. IAF, Tab 10 at 12-86, Tabs 11-12. The agency urged that the appeal
     be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 10 at 4-10.
¶7           In an initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge
     found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she engaged
     in whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure. IAF, Tab 13, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 6-8. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the alleged
     violations refer to violations of EEO statutes and policies as they related to the
     appellant, and that such allegations do not constitute protected disclosure s under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Further, the administrative judge summarily found that
     the appellant’s allegations did not fall under the expanded coverage of the
     Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-
     199, 126 Stat. 1465. ID at 7. As such, the administrative judge dismissed the
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 1, 8.
¶8           The appellant has filed a petition for review, generally reasserting the
     claims she made below, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1, and the agency
     has responded in opposition, PFR File, Tab 3.

                                            ANALYSIS
¶9           The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
     administrative remedy before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
     (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
     activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the

     6
         The appellant submitted a number of these documents in duplicate.
                                                                                          6

      disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take
      a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Linder v. Department of
      Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(e)(1).
¶10         Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to “seek corrective
      action from [OSC] before seeking corrective action from the Board” through an
      IRA appeal. Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 3,
      ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To satisfy this requirement,
      an appellant must articulate to OSC the basis for her request for corrective action
      “with reasonable clarity and precision.”     Id. (quoting Ellison v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 7 F.3d 1031, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).            An appellant may
      demonstrate exhaustion of her OSC remedy through her initial OSC complaint
      and other written correspondence to and from OSC concerning her allegations.
      Benton-Flores v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 6 (2014).
¶11         Because the administrative judge did not, in her initial decision, address the
      initial jurisdictional issue of exhaustion, we do so now. Based on our review, we
      find that, in her second OSC complaint, the appellant exhausted her
      administrative   remedies     regarding    her   claim    that,   in   violation   of
      section 2302(b)(8), the agency retaliated against her for her alleged protected
      disclosures regarding the agency’s violation of EEO statutes relating to
      discrimination and retaliation for engaging in EEO activity, and her claim that she
      was subjected to harassment for disclosing to agency leadership that it lacked
      accountability. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 7‑11, 213-14.
¶12         However, as to the first of these two claims, the Board recently reiterated its
      long-standing precedent and that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
      Circuit to the effect that disclosures that oppose practices made unlawful by
      Title VII do not constitute protected disclosures under section 2302(b)(8), and the
      Board further found that the WPEA does not extend the coverage of
      whistleblower protection statutes to Title VII-related matters.         Edwards v.
                                                                                             7

      Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-23, aff’d, No. 2022-1967, 2023 WL
      4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023).
¶13         Regarding the appellant’s allegation that the agency subjected her to
      harassment in retaliation for disclosing to agency leadership that it lacked
      accountability, the Board has held that “vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro
      forma allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading
      standard needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.” El v.
      Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921
      (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Keefer v. Department of Agriculture, 82 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 10
      (1999) (stating that conclusory allegations lacking in specificity that the appella nt
      has made protected disclosures do not constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of
      jurisdiction in an IRA appeal).       Here, the appellant’s statement that agency
      leadership lacked accountability is vague and does not reflect a disclosure of a
      matter protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). We therefore find that the appellant
      has failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶14         We further find that, in her second OSC complaint and                      in her
      correspondence to OSC following that filing, the appellant exhausted her
      administrative remedies regarding her claim that the agency retaliated a gainst her
      for filing OSC complaints.       IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 7-11, 28.         The whistleblower
      protection statutory scheme includes as protected activity cooperating with or
      disclosing information to the Inspector General of an agency or the Special
      Counsel.    5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). 7      Under this broadly worded provision,

      7
       During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
      Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
      December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of Title 5
      of the U.S. Code, including section 2302(b)(9)(C) to include as protected a disclosure to
      any other component responsible for internal investigation, but our decision in this
      appeal would be the same under both pre- and post-NDAA law.
                                                                                         8

      disclosures of information to OSC are protected regardless of their content, so
      long as such disclosures are made “in accordance with appl icable provisions of
      law.”    Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8.        Under the
      circumstances, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she engaged
      in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(B)(9)(C) when she filed her OSC
      complaints.
¶15           The next jurisdictional inquiry is whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the protected activity she engaged in was a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.       Corthell v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). One way an
      appellant may satisfy the contributing factor element at the jurisdictional stage is
      by making nonfrivolous allegations that the official(s) taking the personnel
      action(s) knew of the protected activity and that the personnel action (s) occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
      activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action (s), which is known as
      the “knowledge-timing” test. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Carney v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 7 (2014).
¶16           We find that the appellant’s allegation that her August 6, 2016 LOC, which
      led to her being denied “fair” ratings and performance reviews , which in turn led
      to her being denied promotions and other employment opportunities, all occurred
      not long after her March 13, 2015 OSC complaint and her July 4, 2016 OSC
      complaint, and that she therefore nonfrivolously alleged that she met the timing
      part of the test.    Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21
      (2015) (stating that a personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of
      the appellant’s disclosures satisfies the knowledge/timing test). However, while
      she alleged that various agency officials were aware of what she described as
      disclosures under section 2302(b)(8), IAF, Tab 1 at 8-11, Tab 10 at 17-21, she did
      not nonfrivolously allege that any officials involved in these personnel actions
      were aware of her OSC complaints.            She therefore has failed, under the
                                                                                         9

      knowledge/timing test, to nonfrivolously allege that her protected activity under
      section 2302(b)(9)(C) was a contributing factor in any personnel action taken
      against her. Stiles v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶ 23
      (2011) (finding that the appellant failed to establish contributing factor through
      the knowledge/timing test when he failed to show that any of the officials
      involved in his nonselection were aware of his protected disclosure ).
¶17         The knowledge/timing test is not the only way for an appellant to satisfy the
      contributing factor standard. Id., ¶ 24. If the appellant fails to satisfy that test,
      the Board shall consider other evidence, such as that pertaining to the str ength or
      weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the
      whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and
      whether those individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      Id. Here, even if the individuals named in the appellant’s second OSC complaint
      were involved in the LOC or the performance ratings she received, her conclusory
      allegations that the LOC was “untrue” and that her ratings and performance
      evaluations were not “fair” do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard
      required to establish jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, see El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6;
      Keefer, 82 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 10, and she also has failed to nonfrivolously allege
      that those individuals had a motive to retaliate against her. Nor can we find from
      the written record other evidence to support the appellant’s allegations. Stiles,
      116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶ 24.      We conclude therefore that the appellant failed to
      nonfrivolously allege that she engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C) that was a contributing factor in a covered personn el action.
¶18         Based on the appellant’s failure to establish Board jurisdiction over her IRA
      appeal, it was properly dismissed.
                                                                                     10

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      11

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
                                                                                12

entitled to representation by a court‑appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
                                                                                     13

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our we bsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           14

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.