Court Opinion

ID: 9854001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:59:01.27209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:52.375918
License: Public Domain

*705HINES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the majority has imposed an unnecessary bright-line rule precluding application of Bar Rule 9.4 in all cases in which disciplinary action was taken by a federal trial court, rather than another licensing jurisdiction. In doing so it has overruled In the Matter of Joyce Marie Griggs, 277 Ga. 663 (593 SE2d 328) (2004), which I believe was properly decided.
In Griggs, this Court imposed federal-to-state reciprocal discipline under Rule 9.4 where the federal proceeding was a disciplinary action with respect to which the respondent was afforded the essential requirements of due process as they exist under Bar Rule 4-201 et seq. Other states have taken the same action in similar circumstances and “recognize discipline or sanctions imposed in federal courts for the purposes of reciprocal discipline. [Cits.]” Charles W Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State Lawyers, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 1015, 1034, fn. 80 (2002). Courts that have bar rules similar to those in Georgia have deemed federal court action to be the action of “another jurisdiction” for purposes of reciprocal discipline, see In the Matter of Edwards, 668 SE2d 791, 794 (S.C. 2008); The Miss. Bar v. Alexander, 669 S2d 40, 42 (Miss. 1996), and some even have allowed reciprocal discipline from actions by the United States Patent and Trademark office, see In the Matter of Peirce, 128 P3d 443, 444 (Nev. 2006); People v. Bode, 119 P3d 1098, 1100 (IV) (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2005). In fact, only one judge in the country has opined that federal-to-state reciprocal discipline is not appropriate because a federal court is not “another jurisdiction,” see The Miss. Bar v. Shah, 749 S2d 1047, 1050 (Miss. 1999) (McRae, J., dissenting). The majority of this Court, however, now has taken that same position in lieu of holding more properly that reciprocal discipline from federal court action is not automatic, but should be analyzed with regard to whether the federal proceeding includes investigations, hearings and other due process guarantees associated with state disciplinary proeedings, see In the Matter of Allred, 777 P2d 905, 906 (N.M. 1989). Because there is no reason to refuse to recognize as reciprocal discipline action by a federal court taken under procedures that meet the requirements of due process and which is the functional equivalent of our state’s disciplinary proceedings, Griggs should not be overruled and this Court should continue to review cases involving federal-to-state reciprocal discipline on a case-by-case basis without applying the majority’s blanket prohibition on such action.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Carley join in this dissent.
*706Decided June 15, 2009 —
Reconsideration denied June 30, 2009.
William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Jones, Osteen & Jones, Billy N. Jones, for Stubbs.