Court Opinion

ID: 9656355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:47:06.871608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.039962
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the defendant failed to preserve his objection to the introduction of the evidence. I take issue with the majority reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a task this court generally refuses to undertake. Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 621-22, 299 N.W.2d 829 (1981). See also State v. Stanfield, 105 Wis. 2d 553, 565, 314 N.W.2d 339 (1982) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting). It is clear from the opinion of the court of appeals that the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review.* Therefore, no reason exists in this case to depart *372from our general rule, except that the majority obviously disagrees with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals and wishes to undertake its own independent review of the evidence presented at trial. This temptation should be resisted. As Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court has said:
“No judicial system is perfect and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality, we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 101 S Ct 1673, 1682-83 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring opinion).
If the majority is saying the court of appeals used the wrong standard of review, I remind the majority that *373“the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979).

 The court of appeal’s entire discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence is as follows:
“The finding that the appellant was the operator of a motor vehicle rests on circumstantial evidence. Appellant contends that evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt.
“The question on review is whether the circumstantial evidence of appellant’s guilt is sufficiently strong to exclude “every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 34, 233 N.W.2d 420, 426 (1975). The scope of our review is whether the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the state, is such that the trier of fact could be convinced beyond a *372reasonable doubt that appellant operated a vehicle under the influence. State v. Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630, 645, 292 N.W.2d 641, 648 (1980).
“Mr. William Tenney testified that about 12:50 a.m., June 23, 1980, he was driving his Oldsmobile west on Highway 10 in Waupaca County when an eastbound pickup truck collided with the Oldsmobile, that after the accident he saw defendant lying on the ground in the vicinity of the truck, and that no other person was in the immediate area. The truck had been eastbound and invaded the westbound lane. Tenney veered south to avoid the truck, hit its passenger side, and ended up with the front of the Oldsmobile over the shoulder in the ditch. The truck ended up on the eastbound lane. Tenney did not leave his Oldsmobile until the first officer arrived. That officer testified that the persons at the scene consisted of Tenney, two women passengers sitting in his car, one bystander and appellant, who was lying ten feet behind the truck on the shoulder of the eastbound lane. The truck was facing west. The officer testified that appellant was bleeding about his head. The officer told the bystander to tell appellant not to get up. Defendant made no admissions after the accident. Neither appellant nor the bystander testified, no witness testified to having seen appellant drive, and the ownership of the truck is not of record.
*373“The conclusion is irresistible that appellant was in the truck when it collided with the Oldsmobile. Had no bystander been present when the oificer arrived, the evidence would have excluded any reasonable hypothesis that a person other than appellant drove or operated the truck just before its collision. But the evidence fails to exclude the possibility that the bystander could have heen the driver of the truck. The circumstantial evidence that appellant drove the truck is therefore insufficient.”