Court Opinion

ID: 9727379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:33:14.134667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.803855
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
The Commonwealth appeals from a judge’s allowance of the defendants’ motions to revise or revoke their sentences. On July 15, 1987, the judge sentenced each defendant to concurrent terms on multiple convictions of inde*113cent assault and battery on a child and rape of a child.2 On August 12, 1987, the defendants each filed a motion to revise or revoke the sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Grim. P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979).
On June 24, 1992, the defendants requested that their rule 29 motions be heard. On October 1, 1992, the trial judge held a hearing and allowed the defendants’ motions. The judge revised their sentences to 64 months with the remainder suspended for seven years under the supervision of the probation department. The Appeals Court stayed the orders pending appeal. We allowed the Commonwealth’s application for direct appellate review. We vacate the judge’s orders, and order the original sentences be reinstated.
The Commonwealth’s right to appeal. The defendants argue that the Commonwealth has no right to appeal the allowance of a motion brought pursuant to rule 29. Rule 29 (a) states: “The trial judge upon his own motion or the written motion of a defendant filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence, within sixty days after receipt by the trial court of a rescript issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within sixty days after entry of any order or judgment of an appellate court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction, may upon such terms and conditions as he shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done.” The defendants suggest that the omission of a specific right to appeal from the language of G. L. c. 278, § 28E (1990 ed.), indicates a legislative intention to preclude the Commonwealth from appealing a judge’s order on a motion to revise or revoke. In addition, the defendants claim that the Commonwealth may not appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 28E (1990 ed.), which *114states: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the commonwealth by the attorney general or a district attorney from the superior court to the supreme judicial court in all criminal cases from a decision, order or judgment of the court (1) allowing a motion to dismiss an indictment or complaint, or (2) allowing a motion for appropriate relief under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.” The defendants argue that motions under rule 29 are not motions for appropriate relief. We reject that argument.
In Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529 (1981), the Commonwealth sought to challenge a judge’s order granting a defendant’s motion for a finding of not guilty, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (1). The Commonwealth both appealed the judge’s order and brought a complaint for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We dismissed the complaint under G. L. c. 211, § 3, because we held that G. L. c. 278, § 28E, gave the Commonwealth the right to appeal from the allowance of Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) motion. Id. at 534. We noted that the reference in G. L. c. 278, § 28E, “to a motion for appropriate relief must be read more broadly than to refer only to pretrial motions.” Id. at 535. We determined that, in common parlance, motions under rule 30, requesting postconviction relief, were motions for appropriate relief under G. L. c. 278, § 28E, and that, therefore, a motion for a required finding of not guilty under rule 25 also would be such a motion.3 Cf. Commonwealth v. Yelle, 390 Mass. 678, 684-685 (1984) (Commonwealth has no right to an interlocutory appeal from the allowance of a motion to admit evidence).
Then, in Commonwealth v. Layne, 386 Mass. 291 (1982), we allowed the Commonwealth to appeal a judge’s revision *115or revocation of sentence, although we did not discuss the statutory authority for such an appeal. We now hold that the allowance of a defendant’s rule 29 motion to revise or revoke his or her sentence is a “motion for appropriate relief under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Consequently, G. L. c. 278, § 28E, allowing the Commonwealth to appeal “a decision, order or judgment of the court . . . (2) allowing a motion for appropriate relief under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure” is applicable.4 Therefore, the Commonwealth has the right to appeal the judge’s allowance of the rule 29 motions.5
The merits. On May 6, 1992, LeFave had her first hearing before a parole board panel. Her request for parole was denied unanimously. Her appeal to the panel was denied on June 16, 1992, and LeFave failed to pursue any further administrative remedies. On June 4, 1992, Amirault had her first hearing before a parole board panel and her request for parole was denied unanimously also. She did not appeal to the panel or pursue any other administrative remedies. On June 24, 1992, the defendants asked the trial judge to rule on the rule 29 motions they had filed on August 12, 1987, the time of their convictions.6 The judge scheduled a hearing *116at which he noted: “It would be the usual intention of a sentencing Judge to intend the Defendants to serve two-thirds of the sentence imposed, which would be 64 months, unless there was something about their service of their sentence which made them subject to a violation and led the [p] aróle [bjoard to denying it, but policy considerations would not be a factor.” The judge ruled that he had intended at the time of sentencing to sentence the defendants to 64 months. Consequently, he allowed their motions and revised the sentences to 64 months served with the remainder of seven years suspended under the auspices of the probation department.
The Commonwealth asserts that the judge improperly considered events taking place after sentencing when he considered and then allowed the rule 29 motions.7 This, the Commonwealth suggests, was a usurpation of the role of the parole board which violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the doctrine of separation of powers.8 We agree.
The granting of parole is a discretionary act of the parole board. Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 396 Mass. 1018, 1018 (1986). Woods v. State Bd. of Parole, 351 Mass. 556, 559 (1967). It is a function of the executive branch of government. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 664, 669 (1992). Baxter v. Commonwealth, 359 Mass. 175, 179 (1971). By allowing a motion to revise or revoke sentences when the parole board does not act in accordance with a judge’s expectations, the judge is interfering with the execu*117live function. The judge cannot nullify the discretionary actions of the parole board.9
The purpose of review under rule 29 (a) is to “permit a judge to reconsider the sentence he has imposed and determine, in light of the facts as they existed at the time of sentencing, whether the sentence was just [emphasis in original]. Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. 305, 313-314 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Layne, supra at 295. See also Commonwealth v. Foley, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 245 (1983). At the time of sentencing, the judge imposed sentences that he noted were within the guidelines. In considering requests for revision of those sentences under rule 29 the judge may not consider the denial of parole.10 See Commonwealth v. Layne, supra at 295; Commonwealth v. Sitko, supra at 314. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a). The judiciary may not act as a super-parole board.
We vacate the judge’s orders and remand to the Superior Court where the original sentences are to be reinstated.

So ordered.

Violet Amirault was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eight to twenty years on the rape convictions and three concurrent eight to ten year terms on the indecent assault and battery convictions.
Cheryl LeFave was sentenced to three concurrent terms of eight to twenty years on the rape convictions and four concurrent eight to ten year terms on the indecent assault and battery convictions.

In Commonwealth v. Therrien, supra at 531, we noted that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States would not prevent the Commonwealth’s appeal in that case. “ ‘[Wjhen a judge rules in favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that ruling without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.’ United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-353 (1975).”

Were the dissent to prevail, then in cases such as this, where a judge abuses his or her judicial authority and violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by overruling the parole board, the abusive action would go uncorrected. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend any such result. On appeal, the public has a right to expect the Supreme Judicial Court to correct any abuse of judicial power, if not under the statute, G. L. c. 278, § 28E, then at least under its superintendence powers. See G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Because we conclude that G. L. c. 278, § 28E, permits an appeal in these circumstances, we do not discuss the relief available pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Each motion to revise or revoke stated that “said sentence is unduly harsh in the circumstances of this case and that as a result, justice may not have been done.” The Commonwealth argues that the motions were defective on their faces because no affidavits supported the assertions and therefore the notice provisions were not met. Because we decide the case on different grounds, and in the Commonwealth’s favor, we do not address the Commonwealth’s argument that the motions were inadequate as filed.

 The Commonwealth does not argue that rule 29 (a) requires a motion to revise or revoke a sentence must be filed and decided within sixty days after certain judicial determinations adverse to the defendant. See supra at 113. We therefore do not discuss that issue.

 Article 30 reads: “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”

We distinguish the case relied on by the defendants, Commonwealth v. Foley, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 238 (1983). In Foley, the Appeals Court held that it appeared that justice may not have been done and allowed a motion to revise the sentences to conform with the judge’s intent. Id. at 245. The judge was aware of the parole regulations and intended the defendant to be eligible for parole in eighteen months. Id. He was mistaken, however, as to the length of time to which he would have to sentence a defendant in order for the defendant to be eligible for parole in eighteen months. The Appeals Court therefore revised the defendant’s sentence to reflect the judge’s intention as to parole eligibility. Id. at 246. That is not what the judge’s order did in these cases. To the extent that Foley is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

 We recognize that, in imposing sentences, judges necessarily consider parole eligibility dates. Consideration of that factor after trial is not the same as revision of sentences based on denial of parole.