Court Opinion

ID: 9484408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:52:51.276511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:13.993761
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In this case the only defense, and one that was valid in law, was that Washington was the agent of a buyer (Verenda Starks, who was buying the drugs from a drug house on behalf of Petronella) and therefore he could not be guilty of the sale of a controlled substance. In a supplemental instruction responding to jury questions, the trial judge misrepresented the defense and instructed the jury that Washington was a seller, and that Washington claimed to be the agent of the undercover police officer (Petronella) who set up Starks in the operation for which Washington was prosecuted. I believe the charge vitiated Washington’s agency defense and thereby lowered the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all elements of a narcotics sale. If I am correct, this is a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth *1453Amendments as interpreted in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and Sullivan v. Louisiana, - U.S. — -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-701, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1888-91, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
Judge Meskill’s opinion holds that Washington did not raise his agency instruction due process claim before the state appellate courts and therefore his claim is procedurally defaulted. This decision is made unusual by the fact that the state conceded the procedural default issue until this court raised the question sua sponte. Judge Kearse’s opinion argues that procedural default occurred at the trial level.
Judge Meskill contends that a court of appeals may raise a procedural default defense sua sponte where the state has conceded the issue, so long as the concession is the result of an innocent error rather than a deliberate tactical decision. Further, citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) and Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), Judge Meskill argues that a court of appeals should raise the procedural default defense sua sponte unless the federal court may “dispose of a habeas matter without reaching the merits,” Opinion at 1449, or “where nonexhaustion is primarily the fault of the state court system itself.” Opinion at 1449.
Nonetheless, as Judge MeskilPs opinion acknowledges, a court of appeals should consider a procedural default claim waived if it is evident that a “miscarriage of justice” has occurred. Judge Meskill appreciates that “miscarriage of justice” should be defined more loosely in this context, where the state has conceded the exhaustion question, than in either the typical procedural default context, in which a petitioner must demonstrate “actual innocence,” Murray, 477 U.S. at 497, 106 S.Ct. at 2650 or in the Granberry nonex-haustion situation. Opinion at 1450. Accordingly, Judge Meskill divides “miscarriage of justice” into two categories: first, cases involving “a federal violation which challenges the validity of the trial itself,” Opinion at 18 (such as Double Jeopardy claims); and second, eases involving “federal violations that were motivated by malice and not caused by mere inadvertence or poor judgment.” Id. Judge Meskill concludes that Washington’s ease falls within neither of these categories; since Washington challenges the validity of his conviction and not the validity of the trial itself and there is no evidence “aside from the federal violation itself indicating that the state judge intentionally violated [Washington’s] rights.” Opinion at 18-19.
I have two disagreements with the opinion. First, I think that it fails to account for an important category of cases in which it is inappropriate for a court of appeals to raise a procedural default defense sua sponte. Judge Meskill derives his “miscarriage of justice” category from the Granberry Court’s statement that “if a full trial has been held in the district court and it is evident that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, it may also be appropriate for the court of appeals to hold that the nonexhaustion defense has been waived in order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warranted.” 481 U.S. at 135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675. I believe that this language supports a broader reading of the “miscarriage of justice” category than provided in Judge Mes-kill’s opinion. In particular, “miscarriage of justice” should include cases where the record is well developed and the merits strongly support the petitioner’s claim.
Granberry provides for a broader interpretation of “miscarriage of justice” than Judge Meskill’s opinion suggests. Granberry requires a court of appeals to determine “whether the interests of justice would be better served by addressing the merits of the habeas petition or by requiring additional state proceedings before doing so.” Granberry, 481 U.S. at 136, 107 S.Ct. at 1676. As Judge Meskill’s opinion recognizes, a defendant in a procedural default situation deserves even greater consideration because he or she has no further recourse to either state or federal relief. Nonetheless, Judge Meskill takes the limited view that the “miscarriage of justice” category applies only where state *1454courts act as “extralegal tribunals” or where they act with malice. Judge Meskill seems to believe that it would be inappropriate to find a “miscarriage of justice” based on an analysis of the merits because “[a]n innocent man wrongly convicted because of a federal statutory or constitutional error has not undergone worse treatment merely because the whole world can spot the error, and not just the legally sophisticated.” Opinion at 1450.
Granberry itself, in my view, contradicts the opinion’s position that the conspicuousness of an error is unrelated to whether a court of appeals should raise a procedural default defense sua sponte. The Granberry passage concerning “miscarriage of justice” cited above states that a nonexhaustion defense may be considered waived “in order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warranted.” 481 U.S. at 135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675 (emphasis added). Evidently, the Granberry Court thought that the strength of a petitioner’s case was relevant to the question whether the interests of justice would be better served by addressing the merits of a habeas petition.
My disagreement with Judge Meskill’s opinion is not limited to his handling of the procedural bar — the question whether we should consider Washington’s claims on the merits — but extends also to his treatment of the merits themselves. Judge Meskill contends that the decision to raise the procedural default defense sua sponte alleviates the need to evaluate Washington’s claims on the merits. Opinion at 1448-49. Despite this claim, his opinion takes a position on the merits in footnote 1, stating that two of the three alleged trial errors standing alone did not have “1 “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” ’ and we would not issue the writ on the basis of either alleged error, standing alone.” (Citations omitted.)
As the opinion notes, Washington alleges that three errors in the trial instructions to the jury deprived him of a fair trial and violated his due process rights. First, the trial judge charged the jury that Washington would escape conviction if “he acted as an agent for Petronella.” (Washington’s defense was based on the theory that he was Starks’ agent and had nothing to do with Petronella). Second, the trial court removed from the pi’osecution the burden of proving accomplice liability, stating that “as a matter of law ... Verenda Starks was an accomplice.” Third, when asked by the jury to define and differentiate the terms “buyer” and “seller,” the court, instead, erroneously told the jury who it believed the buyer and seller to be.
Although Judge Meskill may be accurate in saying that the last two of these errors standing alone are insufficient to justify granting a writ of habeas, as a package, the trial errors were serious and should be enough to’ meet the merits-based “miscarriage of justice” category I believe the Supreme Court cases establish. My view is strengthened by the recent Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). The Sullivan Court found that a constitutionally defective jury instruction on the “reasonable doubt” standard represented a structural defect in the trial itself and, therefore, could not be reviewed under the harmless error test. Likewise, the trial errors committed in this case effectively took from the jury the task of determining whether the state had proved all elements of the crime. As a result, Washington’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
I turn to Judge Kearse’s opinion that there was procedural default at the trial level, for failure properly to object to the trial court’s erroneous supplemental instruction that it was the defense’s position that Washington acted as an agent of Petronella, the buyer. Defense counsel objected both to the court’s statement that the evidence indicated that Starks was a seller and to the court’s characterization of Starks’ and Washington’s roles as sellers. While the objections could have been more pointed, the court was certainly aware of the basic defense that Washington was the agent of the buyer, Starks, when she bought from the drug house, and not of Starks as seller to Petronella. The court stated to defense counsel:
The Court: As far as the charge is concerned, you have already indicated off the record that you are requesting a charge on *1455the defense agency — agency defense; is that correct?
Mr. Hahn: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: I will be so charging....
Trial Transcript, Petitioner’s Appendix at 75. Subsequently, defense counsel stated:
Your Honor, the Court has indicated that it will charge on agency, and I have a proposed charge which I would like to tender to the Court on agency. It may be the same one. It may be similar to the one the Court is going to use. If, by the facts, the jury does not find that my client was an agent of the buyer and acquits on criminal sale, then....
Appendix at 79 (emphasis added). The court in its original charge to the jury did give the agency instruction that “the Defendant Washington ... claims that during the transaction in this case that he was acting as the agent of the buyer, alleging that he was the agent of the buyer.” Appendix at 95.
The supplemental instructions and objections thereto must be read in light of these instructions and what followed, including the further instruction: “How do you decide whether or not the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt to your satisfaction that the defendant was not acting solely as a [sic] an agent of the buyer?” Appendix at 97. The supplemental instructions, by stating that the evidence indicated that Starks was a seller and characterizing both Starks’ and Washington’s roles as sellers, wiped out the sole defense and belied the original charge. I do not think that defense counsel, confronted suddenly with such a supplemental charge, can be required to frame his objections with the technical expertise of counsel who has been handed a written charge in advance as required by, say, the federal rules.
In my view, the supplemental charge blew the defense away by depriving the jury of the option of selecting Starks as the buyer. Because I view the objections taken in context as sufficient, I would proceed to the merits for the reasons stated above, in my discussion of Judge Meskül’s opinion. Reaching the merits, I would reverse. Because both of my colleagues’ opinions sua sponte raise unnecessary prudential barriers in a case where the defendant was deprived of fundamental fairness by the trial court’s supplemental charge, I dissent.