Court Opinion

ID: 9945599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 22:05:47.840642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:34.019570
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Hill CA4/3

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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061976

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 17CF3186)

 PRENTIS JOHN HILL,                                                    OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott A.
Steiner and Jonathon S. Fish, Judges. Affirmed.
                   Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Mandel, Seth M.
Friedman and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
                A killing that would otherwise be murder may be reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if the person killed “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Pen. Code,
                   1
§ 192, subd. (a).) A “heat of passion” means the person was provoked and: “The
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without
due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
                Prentis John Hill killed his girlfriend Shannon Likens. Hill stabbed Likens
19 times in the head with a screwdriver and strangled her. Hill testified at a jury trial that
he killed Likens right after she told him she was going to have sex with her ex-boyfriend.
The trial court instructed the jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense. The jury asked four questions about the law during its deliberations
and found Hill guilty of second degree murder with a deadly weapon.
                Hill claims: (A) the court’s responses to the jury’s questions were incorrect
and/or inadequate; (B) the prosecutor misstated the law and shifted the burden of proof
during closing argument; and (C) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
errors by the court and the prosecutor. We find no errors and affirm the judgment.

                                               I
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                On December 16, 2017, Hill was living with Likens. Hill was 39 years old
and Likens was 38 years old. Hill was six feet, two inches tall, and weighed 260 pounds;
Likens was five feet, ten inches tall, and weighed 208 pounds. The couple had met about
eight months earlier when they were both patients in a Costa Mesa psychiatric hospital.
Likens suffered from bipolar disorder.
                Hill and Likens shared a studio apartment (#209) in Santa Ana, which was
located on the second floor above retail businesses. In the adjoining apartment (#210)

1
    Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               2
lived a woman and her 18-year-old son. The woman had not spoken much to Hill and
Likens, other than exchanging pleasantries. The apartments had very thin walls.
              At about 11:15 a.m., the woman and her son heard yelling and screaming
coming from apartment #209. Hill was calling Likens names, such as “‘stupid b*tch.’”
The woman heard 15 to 20 blows and heard Likens “screaming at the top of her lungs
‘please help me.’” The woman’s son went to apartment #209 and banged on the door.
The son asked if everything was okay and if Likens needed any help. He said, “‘I’m
going to call the police.’” At that point the noise from apartment #209 ceased. At about
11:30 a.m., the woman’s son returned to their apartment and called 911.
              At about 11:34 a.m., the woman saw Hill running down the hallway with a
backpack and a laptop. The son followed after Hill telling him: “‘Is the woman okay?
Where are you going? I called the police.’” Hill said he was sorry about the noise and
went down the stairs. Hill walked to a nearby parking lot, got in a car, and drove away.
              At about 11:40 a.m., police arrived and went upstairs. Police knocked on
the door of apartment #209 and announced their presence, but there was no response.
There was blood on the doorknob. Police got a key from the on-site manager and were
able to enter the apartment.
              The first officer who entered saw Likens’ body lying between the bed and
the wall. Likens was unresponsive and severely injured; there was blood on her face.
There were also large volumes of blood splattered on the walls, the bed, and the
surrounding area. There was a bloody screwdriver on the dresser. The officer saw a
garment wrapped around Likens’ neck, which he removed in order to clear her airway.
The officer could not detect a pulse, so he and another officer performed CPR until
paramedics arrived. At no point did Likens show any signs of life.
              At about 6:00 p.m., Hill entered the Costa Mesa psychiatric hospital where
he and Likens had met. Prior to driving to the hospital, Hill had removed the front and
rear license plates from his car. Hill filled out an intake form and talked to an on-duty

                                             3
triage nurse. Hill was sobbing and he said he was really sad. Hill told the nurse, “‘I
didn’t mean to do it. I killed my girlfriend.’” Hill became more lucid as he demonstrated
making overhead stabbing motions. Hill said, “‘I stabbed her over and over and over
several times.’” The hospital contacted the police.

Court Proceedings
              The prosecution filed an information charging Hill with one count of
murder with malice aforethought. The information further alleged Hill had used a deadly
weapon (a screwdriver) in the commission of the offense.
              The forensic pathologist who had performed an autopsy on Likens’ body
testified at the jury trial. Likens had sustained at least 19 sharp-force injuries, which
included 17 injuries to her face, and two injuries to the right side of her head. Several of
the sharp-force injuries penetrated Likens’ skull and went into her brain. Likens also had
injuries and fractures to her neck. The doctor concluded the cause of Likens’ death was
“stab wounds of head with ligature strangulation.”
              During the defense portion of the trial, the triage nurse from the psychiatric
hospital testified Hill had checked “‘yes’” on some questions on the intake form. Hill
indicated: (1) he had difficulty eating or sleeping in the past two weeks, (2) he had
thoughts about killing himself, (3) he had a history of suicide attempts, and (4) he was
currently hearing voices or seeing visions.
              Two psychiatrists from the Costa Mesa psychiatric hospital testified at the
trial. One of them had previously treated Hill for suicide ideations (about eight months
before the homicide). The psychiatrist testified Hill had previously been diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, but she “was never one hundred percent certain that he was
schizoaffective. I thought he was more depressed.” Hill had not been diagnosed as
psychotic. The psychiatrist had prescribed Hill various medications for depression, mood
stabilization, hypertension, and anxiety. Another psychiatrist testified about a discharge

                                              4
summary she had written concerning Hill (almost two years prior to the homicide).
              Hill testified that he had formed a friendship with Likens at the psychiatric
hospital. Hill testified he had been employed and was covering all of Likens’ living
expenses. Hill said their relationship was good. Hill said that sometime after being
released from the hospital he felt better and so he “abruptly” stopped taking his
medications. Hill testified that in the days before the homicide he felt extremely anxious
and could not sleep. Hill said that on the night before he killed Likens, they had gone out
to dinner. During the dinner, Hill noticed Likens had been looking on a cell phone at a
social media page of a man. Likens said the man was her ex-boyfriend. Hill testified he
was upset, and he questioned Likens about the man, but things were okay.
              Hill testified that on the morning of the killing he was extremely anxious,
he was “falling apart,” and he could not sleep. Hill said he could not find his anxiety
medication, which he thought Likens had taken. Hill testified he was preparing to go to a
work event that morning, and he was frustrated because Likens was supposed to go with
him, but she was not getting ready. Instead, Likens was looking at her computer tablet
and was being “dismissive and very difficult.”
              Hill said that he eventually saw what was on the tablet, and he discovered
that Likens was again looking at her ex-boyfriend. Hill said he “completely . . . lost it.”
Hill testified Likens said, “Yeah, I’m looking at him, and I’m going to f*ck him.” Hill
said he then began attacking Likens. Hill testified: “I recall attacking her, and it was just
a rush of attacking her. It didn’t seem to last very long, but I do remember . . . stabbing
her with the screwdriver . . . I remember looking down at her and looking up at myself
and I had the screwdriver in my hand and looking down at her at all the blood. And I
couldn’t believe what I did and . . . I saw blood all over my shirt and I saw the gory scene
and . . . I walked over and I set the screwdriver down and I got my computer -- I took off
my shirt . . . and I left. That -- that’s what happened.”
              On cross-examination, Hill testified he did not remember strangling Likens,

                                              5
or her screaming for help while he was killing her, but he acknowledged those things had
happened. Hill also acknowledged that he knew it was wrong to kill Likens while he was
killing her, and that while he was stabbing Likens, he was calling her a “stupid b*tch.”
              Over three days of deliberations (14 hours), the jury submitted five juror
question forms requesting transcripts, items of evidence, and extra copies of the
instructions. The jury also asked four questions about the law (two on day one and two
on day three). The court discussed the jurors’ inquiries with counsel and then provided
the jury with written responses (the four substantive questions and the court’s responses
                                                           2
are reviewed in the discussion section of this opinion).
              The jury found Hill guilty of second degree murder and found true the
deadly weapon allegation. The trial court imposed a sentence of 16 years to life. Hill
filed this appeal and a related petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel (G061976).

                                              II
                                       DISCUSSION
              Hill contends: A) the trial court erred when it responded to the jury’s four
questions about the law; B) the prosecutor committed error during closing argument; and
C) his appointed trial attorney provided ineffective assistance.

A. The Court’s Responses to the Jury’s Questions
              Hill contends: “The judgment should be reversed because the trial court’s
responses to questions from the jurors about provocation were incorrect and inadequate.”
(Capitalization & boldfacing omitted.) We disagree.
              “After the jury have retired for deliberation . . . if they desire to be informed
2
  After closing arguments, the trial court judge became ill. A different superior court
judge instructed the jury and responded to the juror’s inquiries.

                                              6
on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into
court. Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel,
or after they have been called.” (§ 1138.)
              “In general, errors under section 1138 are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Doane (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 980 (Doane).) A ruling
constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) However,
under section 1138, “the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies only to ‘the
decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.’”
(Doane, at p. 980.) “‘If a supplemental instruction is given, [then] its correctness
presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.’” (Ibid.)
              In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review relevant principles of law
regarding voluntary manslaughter; 2) analyze the trial court’s responses to each of the
jury’s four substantive questions (for an abuse of discretion and/or an error of law); and
3) briefly address the parties’ remaining contentions.

              1. Relevant Principles of Law
              “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) The required “malice may be express or implied. [¶]
(1) Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take
away the life of a fellow creature. [¶] (2) Malice is implied when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a), italics added.)
              “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.”
(§ 192.) Generally, there are three kinds of manslaughter: voluntary, involuntary, and
vehicular. (§ 192, subds. (a)-(c).)

                                               7
              The voluntary manslaughter statute only refers to a killing “upon a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion.” (§ 192, subd. (a).) However, an additional element of
voluntary manslaughter is provocation. (See § 188, subd. (a)(2).) “Whether the
homicide amounts to murder or to manslaughter . . . does not depend upon the presence
or absence of the intent to kill. In either case there may be a present intention to kill at
the moment of the commission of the act. But when the mortal blow is struck in the heat
of passion, excited by a quarrel, sudden, and of sufficient violence to amount to adequate
provocation, the law, out of forbearance for the weakness of human nature, will disregard
the actual intent and will reduce the offense to manslaughter. In such case, although the
intent to kill exists, it is not that deliberate and malicious intent which is an essential
element in the crime of murder.” (People v. Freel (1874) 48 Cal. 436, 437, italics added.)
              A homicide that would ordinarily be considered murder is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter “if the killer’s reason was actually obscured as the result of a
strong passion aroused by a ‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an “‘ordinary [person] of
average disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from
this passion rather than from judgment.”’” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,
163, italics added.) That is, voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) has both subjective
and objective elements: the defendant actually killed in the heat of passion (the
subjective element); and the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion—the
provocation—would arouse passion in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person (the
objective element). (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253.)
              The provocation “must be caused by the victim . . . or be conduct
reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.” (People v.
Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.) “No specific type of provocation is required. [Citation.]
The provocation may be anything which arouses great fear, anger or jealousy. [Citation.]
Generally, it is a question of fact for the jury whether the circumstances were sufficient to
arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable person. [Citation.] However, where the

                                               8
provocation is so slight or so severe that reasonable jurors could not differ on the issue of
adequacy, then the court may resolve the question.” (People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704–1705.)
              A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as
a lesser included offense of murder where there is evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that sufficient provocation was present. (People v. Thomas (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 630, 643 (Thomas).) When a defendant puts provocation at issue by making
a sufficient showing to raise a reasonable doubt, the prosecution must prove malice
beyond a reasonable doubt by proving sufficient provocation was lacking. (Ibid.)

              2. The Court’s Responses to the Jury’s Four Substantive Questions
              First question and response. The jury asked for “clarification” of
CALCRIM No. 3428 (mental impairment) as compared to CALCRIM No. 520 (second
degree murder). Specifically, the jury asked: “If mental impairment is valid/reasonable,
do all 4 criteria for 520 apply (in reference to implied malice)?” The trial court
responded: “Yes, please re read 520 in conjunction with 3428 . . . .”
              In short, we find the trial court was correct as to the law and the court did
not abuse its discretion by directing the jury to reread the relevant instructions.
              As to CALCRIM No. 3428 (mental impairment), the court instructed the
jury: “You have heard evidence that the defendant may have suffered from a mental
disease, defect or disorder. You may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose
of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted with the intent
or mental state required for that crime.
              “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted with the required intent or mental state, specifically: [¶] First degree
murder with ‘premeditation and deliberation’ (Calcrim 521); or [¶] Second degree
murder based on expressed malice —’malice aforethought’ (Calcrim 520); [¶] or [¶]

                                              9
Second degree murder based on implied malice — ‘knew his act was dangerous to human
Life’ (Calcrim 520). [¶] If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of the crime.” (CALCRIM No. 3428.)
              As to CALCRIM No. 520 (second degree murder), the court instructed the
jury: “There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice.
Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder. [¶] The
defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] “The defendant had
implied malice if: [¶] 1. The defendant intentionally committed the act; [¶] 2. The
natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the
time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; AND [¶] 4. He deliberately
acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (CALCRIM No. 520.)
              Here, the jury’s request for clarification asked whether the defense of
mental impairment (CALCRIM No. 3428) applied to all four elements of the crime of
implied malice murder (CALCRIM No. 520). The trial court responded in the
affirmative. The court’s response was a correct statement of the law and Hill does not
appear to be challenging the legal accuracy of the court’s first response.
              The trial court also directed the jury to reread the two relevant instructions
in conjunction with each other. Hill appears to maintain that the court’s response was
inadequate and required further amplification. We disagree. We find the court’s
response to the jury’s first substantive question was adequate and plainly not an abuse of
its discretion. (See People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 16, 23–25 [no abuse of
discretion, after consulting counsel and considering the matter, to direct jury to re-read
instructions as to which the jury had requested clarifications].)

              Second question and response. The jury asked for “clarification” of
CALCRIM No. 570 (voluntary manslaughter) and CALCRIM No. 522 (provocation).
Specifically, the jury asked: “If the jury agrees that the defendant is not of average

                                             10
disposition, do we have [to] still treat the defendant as if he had an average disposition?”
The trial court responded, “yes. Your question regarding ‘disposition’ is answered in the
entire 570 instruction.”
              In short, we find the trial court was correct as to the law and the court did
not abuse its discretion by directing the jury to reread the entire relevant instruction.
              As to CALCRIM No. 570 (voluntary manslaughter), the court instructed
the jury: “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter
if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. [¶]
The defendant killed someone . . . in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The defendant was
provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; and [¶] 3. The
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without
due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgement [(sic)].
              “Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It
can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation
and reflection. [¶] In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of
provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight
or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or
long period of time.
              “It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is
not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the
defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding
whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition,
in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather
than from judgment.
              “To prove the defendant guilty of murder, the People have the burden of

                                              11
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill as a result of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of murder.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
              As to CALCRIM No. 522 (provocation), the court instructed the jury:
“Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and may reduce a
murder to manslaughter. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for
you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was
provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second
degree murder. Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant
committed murder or manslaughter.” (CALCRIM No. 522.)
              As noted, the jury asked: “If the jury agrees that the defendant is not of
average disposition, do we have [to] still treat the defendant as if he had an average
disposition?” The trial court responded in the affirmative, which we find to be legally
accurate as to the objective element of voluntary manslaughter. (See People v.
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163 [voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) is
present “if the if the killer’s reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion
aroused by a ‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an ‘“ordinary [person] of average
disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this
passion rather than from judgment”’”], italics added.)
              The trial court’s response also appropriately directed the jurors to consider
the remainder of the instruction. That is, even though the jurors may have found Hill not
to be a person of average disposition, they were still to “consider whether a person of
average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have
reacted from passion rather than from judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570, italics added.)
              Hill argues: “Nothing in CALCRIM No. 570 requires jurors to treat a
defendant as though he had an average disposition.” We disagree.
              Again, voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) has both subjective and

                                              12
objective elements: the defendant actually killed in the heat of passion (the subjective
element); and the circumstances giving rise to the passion—the provocation—would
arouse passion in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person (the objective element).
(People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1253.) The jury’s question appeared to be
directed to the objective element—would the provocation cause a person of average or
ordinary disposition to act under a heat of passion—and the court’s response correctly
answered the jury’s question as to the objective element.
              Hill also argues: “The instruction to ‘treat the defendant as if he had an
average disposition’ was in substance an instruction that appellant was a person of
average disposition.” Again, we disagree.
              The jury’s question was: “If the jury agrees that the defendant is not of
average disposition, do we have [to] still treat the defendant as if he had an average
disposition?” (Italics added.) It appears the court took the jury’s question at face value,
meaning the court accepted the jurors’ premise that they did not find Hill to be of average
disposition. The court then properly answered “yes” to the jury’s question about the
objective element of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and further appropriately
directed the jury to read the entire relevant instruction. (See CALCRIM No. 570.) It
does not appear from the second written response that the court was directing the jury to
make any factual findings, one way or the other.

              Third question and response. The jury quoted the following portion from
CALCRIM No. 570 (voluntary manslaughter): “‘The defendant is not allowed to set up
his own standard of conduct.’” The jury asked: “Is this saying that the defendant, if he is
in the heat of passion, is unable to set up his own standard [of] conduct OR is this saying
that the defendant cannot set up his own standard of conduct. Ex: he is unable to set up
his own standard because he is in a heat of passion.” The court responded: “The
instructions must be considered in their entirety. In [CALCRIM No.] 570 the phrase, ‘the

                                             13
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct’ is only a portion of the
entire definition. It is to be read with the next portion of the instruction.”
              Here, in its third substantive question, the jury quoted only a portion of the
jury instruction explaining the law of voluntary manslaughter: “‘The defendant is not
allowed to set up his own standard of conduct.’” (CALCRIM No. 570.) In its response,
the trial court directed the jury to read the next portion of the instruction: “You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient.
In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average
disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from
passion rather than from judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570.) Hill does not dispute that the
official jury instruction accurately states the law. Thus, we find that the trial court’s
response was legally accurate. (See Doane, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.)
              As far as an abuse of discretion, Hill argues: “Any reasonable judge would
have understood . . . that referring the jurors back to the portion of [CALCRIM No. 570]
discussing a person of average disposition was not going to help.” We disagree.
              When a deliberating jury asks the court a question about the law, it seems
that the most prudent course of action is often to simply redirect the jurors to focus on the
relevant instruction. Thus, we find the court did not abuse its discretion when it directed
the jury to read the phrase it had quoted in the context of the entire instruction. (See
People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97 [a trial court has discretion to “decide as to
each jury question whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely
reiterate the instructions already given”]; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 699–
700 [“it is not reasonably likely the court’s response misled the jury,” where the court
reread a previously misunderstood instruction]; People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
212, 224 [the trial court correctly responded to a jury question about heat of passion by
having the jury reread the relevant pattern instruction].)

                                              14
              Fourth question and response. The jury’s question stated: “570. What is
average disposition? Can we consider historical life experiences, upbringing, socio-
economic background? Can the court provide examples of someone of average
disposition?” The court responded: “It is not the court’s role to tell you what your
findings should be. It would be inappropriate for the court to provide examples of ‘a
person of average disposition in the same situation knowing the same facts.’ In the sixth
paragraph of 200 you are instructed that terms that are not specifically defined in these
instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”
              In short, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because a trial
court is not required to provide a jury with the meaning of a term that does not have a
legal definition. (See People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 901 (Raley).) In Raley, a
jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder with a torture-murder special
circumstance. (Id. at p. 881.) The court instructed that a torture murder is committed
“for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.” (Id. at
p. 898.) During its deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of the term “‘sadistic
purpose,’” but the court did not provide one. (Id. at p. 901.) On direct appeal, defendant
argued this was error, but the California Supreme Court disagreed because “there is no
legal definition of the term. The jurors’ common understanding of the term was all that
was required. ‘There is no need to instruct a jury on the meaning of terms in common
usage, which are presumed to be within the understanding of persons of ordinary
intelligence.’” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
              The same rationale applies here. The jury asked the trial court: “What is
average disposition?” But there is no legal definition of the term average disposition.
Therefore, the court was not obligated to provide the jury with a definition. (See Raley,
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 901.) Neither was the court obligated to provide the jury with
examples of a person of average disposition. (See § 1127 [“The court shall inform the
jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted

                                              15
to them and of the credibility of the witnesses”].)
              Hill argues that the case of People v. Miller (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 233
(Miller) compels a different result. We disagree.
              In Miller, a jury convicted defendant of robbery and assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Miller, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 234.)
During its deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of the term “great bodily injury,”
but the trial court “replied that it was a fact question to be determined by the jury.” (Id. at
p. 236, fn. 2.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the trial court had committed
reversible error: “This court has recently held that . . . the trial judge is not required on
his own motion to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the words ‘great bodily injury’
[citation]. However, where the jury during its deliberations indicates confusion over the
meaning of the term and specifically requests a definition of the term, we believe the
court must honor the request. When the jury asks for clarification, it no longer can be
presumed that the jury understands the meaning of the term. Only by answering the jury
request does the court fulfill its duty to instruct on those elements of the case necessary
for the jury to reach an informed decision [citation].” (Id. at p. 236, fn. omitted.)
              What distinguishes the trial court’s response in Miller from the trial court’s
response in this case is that the term “great bodily injury” has a legal definition. (See
People v. Drayton (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 612, 614 [“‘Great bodily injury is bodily injury
which is significant or substantial, not insignificant, trivial or moderate’”].) Conversely,
the term average disposition has no legal definition; therefore, the holding of Miller,
supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 233, does not apply. Rather, the holding of Raley applies. (See
Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 901, fn. omitted [“there is no legal definition of the term.
The jurors’ common understanding of the term was all that was required. ‘There is no
need to instruct a jury on the meaning of terms in common usage, which are presumed to
be within the understanding of persons of ordinary intelligence’”].)
              In sum, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to

                                              16
define the nonlegal term average disposition, nor did the court err when it declined to
provide the jury with examples of a person of average disposition. Indeed, we find the
court wisely referred the jury to another relevant instruction that said: “Some words or
phrases . . . have legal meanings that are different from their meanings in everyday use.
These words and phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. . . . Words and
phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied using their
ordinary, everyday meanings.” (CALCRIM No. 200.)
              To reiterate and conclude as to the trial court’s responses to the jury’s four
substantive questions, we find the court correctly stated the law and/or the court did not
abuse its discretion in any of its responses.

              3. The Parties’ Remaining Contentions
              Hill argues, “reversal is required even if this Court concludes the
instructions actually given by the trial court in response to the jurors’ question[s] were
correct. This is because it cannot reasonably be disputed that the jurors were confused
about provocation from the start of their deliberations until they rendered a verdict. This,
too, requires reversal.” In support of this proposition, Hill cites People v. Ross (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 1033 (Ross), but we find Ross to be inapposite.
              In Ross, a male defendant and a female victim, “engaged in a hostile verbal
exchange, at the culmination of which she slapped [the defendant, who] responded with a
blow that fractured her cheekbone.” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.) The jury
convicted defendant of aggravated assault and battery after the trial court instructed the
jury, over defendant’s objection, that a person charged with assault cannot successfully
plead self-defense if he was engaged in mutual combat with the alleged victim. (Id. at
p. 1042.) The trial court refused the deliberating jurors’ request to provide a legal
definition of “‘mutual combat,’” telling them there was no legal definition and instead to
rely on their common, everyday understanding of those words. (Ibid.) The appellate

                                                17
court held it was error to give the mutual combat instruction at all because the “the
doctrine applies only to a violent confrontation conducted pursuant to prearrangement,
mutual consent, or an express or implied agreement to fight.” (Id. at p. 1036.) As to
whether the trial court’s instructional error was prejudicial or not, the appellate court held
that the lower court’s error was prejudicial (not harmless) because “it is entirely likely
that the case was decided on the basis of a mistaken understanding of ‘mutual combat.’”
(Id. at p. 1057, relying on People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
               Here, unlike Ross, this court has not found that the trial court committed
any instructional errors, either in its initial instructions, or in its responses to the jury’s
questions. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to address the alleged prejudicial effect of
any instructional errors, as in Ross. Further, we also question defendant’s assumption
“that the jurors were confused about provocation from the start of their deliberations until
they rendered a verdict.” We think it is also a reasonable inference that one or more
jurors may have simply desired further clarification of the relevant legal concepts. In any
event, the jurors were able to reach a unanimous verdict, which presumably means that
whatever confusion may have existed was apparently resolved.
               Finally, the Attorney General contends that we should not address any of
Hill’s claims regarding voluntary manslaughter. The Attorney General argues Hill was
not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction at all because “the provocative acts in
this case . . . were insufficient to cause an average person to lose reason and judgment
under an objective standard.” We disagree. (See Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at
p. 643 [a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of murder where there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that sufficient provocation was present].)
               The Attorney General acknowledges our Supreme Court has previously
held that evidence sufficient to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction includes
verbal taunts by an unfaithful spouse and the infidelity of a lover. (People v. Berry

                                                18
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 513; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328-329.)
Nonetheless, the Attorney General argues this court “should urge the California Supreme
Court to reconsider those antiquated precedents.” Respectfully, we decline to urge the
                                                         3
Supreme Court to reconsider its precedential holdings.

B. Prosecutorial Error
              Hill contends the prosecutor erred during closing argument by improperly
shifting the burden of proof and misstating the law. We disagree.
              In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) review relevant legal principles
regarding prosecutorial error; 2) summarize the trial court proceedings; and 3) analyze
Hill’s three claims of prosecutorial error.

              1. Relevant Legal Principles
              We evaluate claims of prosecutorial error (or prosecutorial misconduct)
under well-established standards. “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade
either the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
              “‘A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other
attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests,

3
 We note that the legislative branch is generally tasked with the responsibility of
amending the law. For instance, the Legislature has amended the involuntary
manslaughter statute, in part, as follows: “For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or
heat of passion . . . , the provocation was not objectively reasonable if it resulted from the
discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation . . . .” (§ 192, subd. (f).)

                                              19
and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state.’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th
800, 819-820.) However, “‘the term prosecutorial “misconduct” is somewhat of a
misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act with a culpable state of
mind. A more apt description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666–667.)
              In reviewing a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, “we must view the
statements in the context of the argument as a whole.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1158, 1203 (Cole).) Generally, a prosecutor has “‘wide latitude to discuss and draw
inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and whether ‘the inferences the prosecutor draws
are reasonable is for the jury to decide.’” (Ibid.) The relevant question is “‘whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of-
remarks in an objectionable fashion.’” (Id. at pp. 1202–1203.)

              2. Trial Court Proceedings
              The following is a portion of the prosecutor’s initial closing argument:
“The defense is entitled to certain instructions, and [provocation] is one of them. And
this is the defense[’s] attempt to reduce Mr. Hill’s crime. If certain facts exist, then he is
entitled to it. And provocation can reduce a first-degree murder to second-degree. And it
can reduce a second-degree murder to manslaughter. But you have to look at the
provocation and make a reasonable determination. Provocation, someone abusing their
child in front of you. Someone assaulting a loved one in front of you. A whole host of
things. What it’s not is someone telling you to ‘F’ off or making a statement that I’m
going to go do ‘X’ to try to get a rise out of you. That’s ridiculous.
              “The weight and significance of a provocation is for you to decide. This is
where your good and reasonable judgment comes into play. As a lesser and necessarily
included offense, the law provides that Mr. Hill is entitled to your consideration, as . . . if
he did not commit murder, did he commit some lesser offense. This is not anything I

                                              20
charge because Mr. Hill committed murder. But the law says that a person charged with
murder under certain circumstances is entitled to lesser include[d] offenses. And one of
the lesser included offenses to homicide is manslaughter. And the theory here is heat of
passion. It’s either self-defense, imperfect self-defense, or heat of passion.
              “The heat of passion argument is that the defendant was provoked. As a
result of the provocation, the defendant acted irrationally and under the influence of
intent [(sic)] emotional -- emotions that obscured his reason or judgment and that the
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly without due
deliberation and, in turn, passion rather than judgment. And a reasonable person is
someone -- and the idea is that you’re so overwhelmed that you’re incapable of making a
thoughtful decision. That you’re just reacting. That might get you a single stab. That
might get you a little choking, but it doesn’t give you what he did.

              “And it’s also not reasonable to think that a person would act so rashly
upon someone saying something to them. You must decide whether the defendant was
provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. Both provocation and heat of
passion must be affirmatively demonstrated. Again, it’s his word, but obviously
something enraged him. But the idea that you’re enraged and then your excuse is she
enraged me, so I get to kill her, and we don’t call it murder. Open season on wives that
have things to say that enrage -- and/or vice versa.”
              At that point, defense counsel said: “I’m going to object as improper
argument.” The court said: “Sustained. Just decide the case based on the facts. Go
ahead.” The prosecutor continued: “The direct, immediate influence of a provocation,
slight or remote provocation, is not sufficient. It is not enough that the defendant simply
was provoked. Think about that. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard
of conduct, all reasonable measures. The idea that [Likens] caused this and that
somehow he gets to say that he didn’t make any decisions that he just acted, isn’t the law,
and it’s not matched by the facts.”

                                             21
              The following is a portion of the defense counsel’s closing argument:
“Now, you’re going to get instructions. You’re going to be read the instructions in just a
little bit. You’re going to get a packet as well. But this is a quote from the instructions:
‘A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the
defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.’
              “I know the People said, well, maybe one or two stabbings. There’s
nowhere in the law that talks about the number of stabbings or the type of reaction a
person can have or must have if the average person is provoked into a visceral, angry,
intense, emotional reaction.”
              The following is a portion of the trial court’s instructions to the jury: “You
must follow the law as I explain it to you even if you disagree with it. If you believe that
the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my
instructions.” (CALCRIM No. 200.)

              3. Analysis and Application
              Hill raises three claims of prosecutorial error, but he did not object in the
trial court on any of these grounds, so these claims have been forfeited on appeal. (See
People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.) Nevertheless, we shall exercise our
discretion and address Hill’s claims. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–
162, fn. 6 [an appellate court has authority to reach a forfeited claim]; People v.
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146 [a reviewing court may exercise its discretion to
consider a forfeited claim to forestall an ineffective assistance of counsel claim].)

              First Claim of Prosecutorial Error. The prosecutor told the jury, “You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient.
Both provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.” (Italics
added.) Based on the italicized portion, Hill argues the prosecutor improperly shifted the

                                             22
burden of proof because: “Any juror would reasonably have understood this to mean
appellant was required to produce evidence establishing that he was provoked and acted
in the heat of passion.” We disagree.
              “In a homicide case, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder whenever there is evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a manslaughter, but not a murder, was
committed.” (Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.) “If the issue of provocation or
imperfect self-defense is thus ‘properly presented’ in a murder case [citation], the People
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that these circumstances were lacking in order to
establish the murder element of malice.” (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462,
italics added.)
              The prosecutor did not tell the jury that Hill was required to prove that he
was provoked and acting in the heat of passion; rather, the prosecutor used the passive
voice, reasonably indicating the prosecutor was arguing the evidence must show Hill was
provoked and acting in the heat of passion in order to reduce the crime from murder to
voluntary manslaughter. Further, the particular phrase used by the prosecutor—
”affirmatively demonstrated”—is consistent with how the concept has been described by
our Supreme Court. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826 [“Adequate
provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated”]; People v.
Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 624 [“Adequate provocation as an element of voluntary
manslaughter must be affirmatively demonstrated; it cannot be left to speculation”].)
              We do not think it is reasonably likely that the jurors interpreted the
prosecutor’s statement in the manner Hill suggests on appeal. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 1202–1203 [the relevant question is “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury construed or applied any of the complained-of-remarks in an objectionable
fashion’”].) Indeed, we presume that followed the court’s instruction regarding
involuntary manslaughter and the People’s burden of proof. (See CALCRIM No. 570

                                             23
[“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have
not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder”], italics added; see
also People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [“Jurors are presumed able to
understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the
court’s instructions”].)
              In sum, we do not find prosecutorial error based on Hill’s first claim on
appeal that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof.

              Second Claim of Prosecutorial Error. Hill argues: “The prosecutor twice
incorrectly stated the ‘person of average disposition’ in a manner that was contrary to
law.” (Boldfacing omitted.) We disagree.
              During closing argument, the prosecutor said: “And a reasonable person is
someone -- and the idea is that you’re so overwhelmed that you’re incapable of making a
thoughtful decision. That you’re just reacting. That might get you a single stab. That
might get you a little choking, but it doesn’t give you what he did.” (Italics added.)
Based on the italicized portion, Hill claims: “Thus the prosecutor argued the juror could
not find appellant killed [Likens] because he was provoked because a person of average
disposition would not have done ‘what [appellant] did.’ Such a person might have
stabbed her once or choked her a little, but not killed her.”
              The prosecutor also said: “And it’s also not reasonable to think that a
person would act so rashly upon someone saying something to them. You must decide
whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient.”
(Italics added.) Based on the italicized portion, Hill claims: “Any reasonable juror
would have understood the prosecutor as telling them they could not find appellant was
provoked unless the person of average disposition would have reacted ‘so rashly,’ i.e., as
rashly as appellant reacted.”

                                             24
              Again, we do not think it is reasonably likely that the jurors interpreted the
prosecutor’s two statements about a person of average disposition in the same manner
Hill interprets the prosecutor’s statements. Taken in the context of the closing argument
as a whole, the prosecutor was not simply explaining the relevant legal concepts
necessary for the jury to understand regarding voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion,
provocation, person of average disposition, etc.). The prosecutor also appeared to be
weaving into his explanations of the law his closing arguments to the jury based on the
facts of this case and generally arguing that Hill “did not kill as the result of sudden
quarrel or a heat of passion.” (See CALCRIM No. 570 [“In order for heat of passion to
reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the
direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it”].)
              The jury was free to reject the prosecutor’s interpretation of the evidence,
but the prosecutor was not restricted from making his arguments in a manner he deemed
to be persuasive. (See People v. Bandhauer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 524, 529 [“Counsel may
vigorously argue his case and is not limited to ‘Chesterfieldian politeness’”].)
              In sum, we do not find that the comments made by the prosecutor about a
person of average disposition constituted prosecutorial error. (See People v. Najera,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224 [“The trial court correctly instructed the jury to follow
the court’s instructions, not the attorneys’ description of the law, to the extent there was a
conflict. We presume the jury followed that instruction”].)

              Third Claim of Prosecutorial Error. The prosecutor told the jury, “And it’s
also not reasonable to think that a person would act so rashly upon someone saying
something to them. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether
the provocation was sufficient. . . . Again, it’s his word, but obviously something
enraged him.” (Italics added.) Based on the italicized portion, Hill argues, “it was error
for the prosecutor to suggest to the jurors that words alone could not be sufficient

                                              25
provocation.” We disagree.
              “The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but the
conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” (People v.
Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59, italics added.) That is, it is true that “words alone” may
be sufficient provocation, but it is the jury’s role to decide if the words used by the victim
were sufficiently provocative.
              Here, toward the beginning of the prosecutor’s argument regarding
provocation, the prosecutor said to the jury: “But you have to look at the provocation and
make a reasonable determination. Provocation, someone abusing their child in front of
you. Someone assaulting a loved one in front of you. A whole host of things. What it’s
not is someone telling you to ‘F’ off or making a statement that I’m going to go do ‘X’ to
try to get a rise out of you. That’s ridiculous.”
              Taken in context, the prosecutor did not appear to state—as a matter of
law—that words alone could never constitute sufficient provocation to reduce a crime
from murder to voluntary manslaughter (or from first degree murder to second degree
murder). Rather, it appears the prosecutor was arguing to the jury that Likens’ purported
statements to Hill on the morning of her killing were not sufficiently provocative. And
again, we presume that the jury followed the court’s instruction that “no specific type of
provocation is required.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
              To reiterate and conclude as to the prosecutor’s closing argument, we find
that none of the statements identified by Hill constitute prosecutorial error. (See Cole,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1203 [a prosecutor has “‘wide latitude to discuss and draw
inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and whether ‘the inferences the prosecutor draws
are reasonable is for the jury to decide’”].)

                                                26
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
               Hill contends: “Trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance by not
objecting when the trial court provided incorrect and inadequate responses to questions
about malice and provocation asked by the jurors during deliberations.” (Capitalization
& boldfacing omitted.) Hill also contends: “Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
if he did not adequately object to the legally incorrect arguments made by the
prosecutor.” (Capitalization & boldfacing omitted.)
               We find no merit to Hill’s contentions. We have rejected Hill’s claims
regarding the trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions. And we have rejected Hill’s
claims regarding prosecutorial error. As there was no legal basis for Hill’s trial counsel
to object, counsel’s failure to object did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms, which is a prerequisite to a finding of ineffective
           4
assistance. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686–688.)

4
 We are summarily denying Hill’s related petition for a writ of habeas corpus and its
associated motions in a separate order (G062797).

                                             27
                                       III
                                 DISPOSITION
           The judgment is affirmed.

                                             MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

                                       28