Court Opinion

ID: 9702643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:20:02.734175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.146926
License: Public Domain

*258Boyle, J.
(dissenting). The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test because this information is inadmissible under the physician-patient privilege found in MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157.1 disagree.
To the extent the physician-patient privilege might affect this case, it has been abrogated by MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9:2325(1X9). I read subsections 9 and 10 of the statute1 as an expansion of the implied consent statute to cover the situation in which an individual suspected of violating the laws precluding driving while intoxicated is transported to a medical facility because of a medical emergency and given a blood-alcohol test for the purpose of medical treatment.
The majority’s assumption that the statute is an "accident exception” to a broadly applicable2 physician-patient privilege "contained” in subsection 9, ante at 242, and that if the exception does not apply, the privilege requires suppression of the evidence, is incorrect.3 The Legislature’s purpose in enacting subsection 9 was to facilitate, not *259restrict, the admission of blood-alcohol test results in criminal prosecutions. The language, historical context, and common-sense construction of the statute confirms that subsection 9 does not "contain” the physician-patient privilege. Rather, it is a reporting statute that abrogates the privilege for blood samples requested by the prosecutor "for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subsection.”
i
Subsections 9 and 10 cannot be understood without an examination of their history. These subsections were added by amendment in 1982 PA 310 in the aftermath of two decisions by this Court. See People v Keen, 396 Mich 573; 242 NW2d 405 (1976); McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384; 245 NW2d 18 (1976). In Keen, the Court held that a blood-alcohol test was not admissible in a criminal prosecution for manslaughter, but only in prosecutions for driving under the influence of liquor or driving impaired. In McNitt, a civil case, the Court held that a blood test taken in a hospital from an unconscious driver "who did not consent” was not admissible as evidence. The statute then in effect required that
a person under arrest "shall be advised of his right to refuse” a test and "if he refuses” the request "no test shall be given.” [397 Mich 393.]
Because McNitt’s state of unconsciousness precluded a request in conformity with the statute, the Court concluded that the result was not admissible in evidence. Id. at 393-394.
In apparent response to Keen, subsection 1 of § 625a was amended in both 1978 and 1980 to *260expand the types of criminal prosecutions in which implied consent would be applied. See 1978 PA 572; 1980 PA 515. The amendments added operating while visibly impaired, negligent homicide, and manslaughter to a list that had previously included only driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
In apparent response to McNitt, the Legislature added subsections 9 and 10. See 1982 PA 310. Subsection 9 specifically responds to the rationale in McNitt, and squarely rejects it:
[T]he results of a chemical analysis of that sample shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for a crime described in subsection (1) . . . regardless of whether the person had been offered or had refused a chemical test.
In addition, and even more persuasive evidence of the legislative intention to facilitate admissibility,4 the Legislature also explicitly responded to another rationale advanced in McNitt. In McNitt, the Court rejected the argument that the results were admissible under common law. It instead concluded that statutory authority was necessary to authorize the administration of blood tests because hospital authorities had probably taken the blood at the request of a police officer, rather than for diagnostic purposes.5 In subsection 9, the Legis*261lature specifically addressed this distinction between law enforcement and diagnostic purposes by providing for admissibility of a sample withdrawn "for the purpose of medical treatment.”6
Although the statute provides that a "person disclosing information in compliance with this subsection shall not be civilly or criminally liable,” a final reference to McNitt establishes that compliance with this subsection does not, as the majority assumes, mean that medical personnel must verify that there has been an accident. As the Court observed in McNitt, 397 Mich 391, n 9,
The exculpation from liability is we think triggered by "the request of a police officer.” Absent disclaimer by the officer that he is acting under the statute, hospital personnel are protected in relying on such a request as authorization to proceed to administer a test under the statute without independent investigation and determination whether statutory requirements have been observed.
In like manner, the exculpation from liability granted by § 625a(9) is triggered by the prosecuting attorney’s request for the information. A common-sense construction of the statute would suggest, as McNitt observed, that the Legislature did not intend that medical personnel be placed in the dilemma of refusing the request for blood re-*262suits until they had independently determined that the patient had been involved in an "accident.”
ii
In my view, the issue is not whether an "accident” occurred, but rather whether what occurred is the kind of event the Legislature contemplated when it authorized medical personnel to make diagnostic blood-alcohol tests obtainable by the prosecutor for use in evidence.7
I agree with the majority that the word accident is ambiguous. However, construing subsection 9 of § 625a in pari materia with the remainder of § 625a and § 625b, I would conclude that the word "accident” in subsection 9 means an incident where, because of a medical emergency, an individual is transported to a medical facility,8 and is suspected of operating or being in actual physical control upon the public highway of a motor vehicle in violation of those laws specifically described in § 625a(l)(a), (b).
This construction harmonizes the language of the statute and advances the state’s compelling interest in controlling the devastating human and financial toll caused by intoxicated drivers. It is also consistent with our conclusion in People v *263Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 326; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), that an expectation of privacy in blood-alcohol results under subsection 9 is not an expectation the Legislature considers "reasonable.” The majority correctly observes that in Perlos we recognized that the Legislature had not created a generally applicable exception to the physician-patient privilege. However, the actual holding of Perlos is that the physician-patient privilege did not preclude obtaining the blood-alcohol results.
In fact, we observed in Perlos that while the Legislature had abrogated the statutory privilege, the Legislature had not abolished the longstanding common law and that the statutorily created physician-patient privilege was "subject to many exceptions in states where it exists by virtue of statute.” Id. at 327. It is more consistent with the balancing of public and private interests addressed in Perlos to conclude, that subsection 9 does not abrogate a privilege for medical records generally, than it is to conclude that the privilege would surmount the common-law exceptions unless an "accident” had occurred.
This construction would also avoid creating a gap in the implied consent statute. The purpose of the statute is to force a driver suspected of being intoxicated either to consent to a blood-alcohol test or face consequences, including suspension of his operator’s license and imposition of six points on his driver’s record. See MCL 257.625a(6)(b)(iii); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(b)(iii). The majority carves out an exception for defendants who are incapable either of consenting to or refusing a blood-alcohol test at the time they are found by police. It allows them to subsequently refuse to submit the only test results available — those obtained at the hospital— without facing any consequences.
The word "accident” does not restrict a hospi*264tal’s duty to release the results of blood tests that were taken for medical purposes, any more than the word "driver” does.9 Given that one justification of physician-patient privilege is to facilitate private communications, it would be anomalous to conclude that society recognizes no privacy interest in blood-test results where an "accident” occurred, but would recognize a privacy interest in such results where a medical emergency necessitated hospital transport and similar suspicion obtained.10
III
Nor can I agree that the majority’s conclusion is supportable from a policy perspective. Under a variety of theories, many state courts have held that because the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, the results of blood-alcohol tests are subject to the common-law authority of the court. Irrespective of the particular rationale advanced for the result, the premise of these decisions is that the privilege must yield to the public interest in respect to blood tests taken in relation to criminal charges11 involving drunk driving.
In State v Robbins, 549 NE2d 1107 (Ind App, 1990), the defendant, who had been involved in a one-car accident, claimed that blood-alcohol results were inadmissible under an implied consent law *265that allowed testing of a person involved in "a motor vehicle accident” that involved serious bodily injury or the death of another. The court rejected the claim, noting that the section had been added to fill a gap in the statute, and that to read the section as a limitation on implied consent "would be at odds with the rest of the chapter”:
[T]he statute does not create any rights in' a criminal defendant, but rather limits his right to invoke a privilege. [Id. at 1109-1110.]
Other courts have addressed the privilege statutes (as opposed to the implied consent statutes). In State v Erickson, 241 NW2d 854, 864 (ND, 1976), the court held that blood samples taken pursuant to the state’s implied consent laws were not "information” within the physician-patient privilege and therefore would not be excluded when the privilege was invoked. In State v Betts, 235 Or 127, 140-141; 384 P2d 198 (1963), on the other hand, the court held that physician-patient privilege statutes should be limited to criminal proceedings:
A physician attending a defendant is frequently the sole or most competent source of very relevant evidence. In the present case the physician was the person best qualified to testify to a relevant fact, — was the defendant intoxicated? In other cases the question could be, — was the defendant under the influence of narcotics or how recently did the defendant’s wound appear to have been inflicted? It seems obvious that the testimony of the treating physician is highly important in many criminal cases.
We conclude that the dubious benefit provided by throwing the veil of privilege over the patient-physician relationship is outweighed in criminal proceedings by the advantage to the public secured *266by the efficient administration of criminal justice which is obtained by permitting the introduction of competent and relevant evidence which the physician can give about his patient. Upon the basis of this belief the Oregon statutes are interpreted as limiting the physician-patient privilege to civil proceedings.
In State v Zielke, 137 Wis 2d 39, 41; 403 NW2d 427 (1987), the Wisconsin Supreme Court squarely addressed and rejected the argument that "the implied consent law is the exclusive means by which police may obtain chemical test evidence of driver intoxication, and therefore failure to comply with the procedures set forth in the implied consent law required suppression.”
Defendant Zielke was charged with homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle as the result of his allegedly having struck from behind a motorcycle stopped at a red light. The impact caused the motorcycle to collide with another vehicle after which it flew through the air, crashed, and caused extensive burns to the passenger and the motorcycle driver, who died from their injuries. Zielke, who appeared confused and had himself been burned, was taken to the hospital for treatment. A blood sample was taken that was not preceded by the statutory form of rights set out in the implied consent law.
The district court held that failure to advise the defendant as provided by the implied consent law required suppression of the evidence in the prosecution of the criminal offense. The supreme court reversed, concluding that, although the state’s failure to advise the defendant as provided by law would forfeit the state’s right to revoke a driver’s license for refusal to submit to a test and deprive it of the evidentiary benefit of the refusal, id. at *26751, it did not preclude admission of other legally obtained evidence in a prosecution of offenses related to the operation of a vehicle while intoxicated:
[T]he intent of the legislature in passing the implied consent law was to facilitate the gathering of evidence against drunk drivers in order to remove them from the state’s highway. ...
[N]othing in the statute or its history permits the conclusion that failure to comply [with the statute] prevents the admissibility of legally obtained chemical test evidence in the separate and distinct criminal prosecution for offenses involving intoxicated use of a vehicle. Such a holding would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result. ... In light of the clearly articulated intent of the legislature . . . and the absence of explicit legislative direction to suppress chemical test evidence for noncompliance ... it would be absurd to infer that the legislature intended that critical evidence . . . must be excluded .... To so hold would give greater rights to an alleged drunk driver under the fourth amendment than those afforded any other criminal defendant. [137 Wis 2d 46, 51-52.]
I likewise find no indication in subsection 9 of a legislative intention to undermine the substantive benefits to the public in effectively enforcing the law by requiring suppression of vital evidence through the physician-patient privilege.
iv
In addition, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence because, even assuming for the sake of argument that the requirements of subsection 9 are not satisfied, the privilege does not entitle the defen*268dant to the remedy he is seeking.12 The privilege, which the defendant may certainly continue to assert, is limited to "person[s] duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery,” and applies only when not waived. On the record before me, I cannot say that either of the conditions will be satisfied, let alone both (which would be necessary if the evidence is to be excluded by way of the privilege).
First, it is far from clear that the testimony of a physician or surgeon will be necessary to introduce the blood-test results at trial. This statutory privilege, which did not exist at common law, is limited to persons "authorized to practice medicine or surgery.” MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. Compare People v Baker, 94 Mich App 365, 368; 288 NW2d 430 (1979) (the privilege does not cover optometrists), with Saur v Probes, 190 Mich App 636, 638, n 1; 476 NW2d 496 (1991) (the privilege does cover psychiatrists, who are physicians). In Gilcrist v Mystic Workers, 188 Mich 466, 477; 154 NW 575 (1915), this Court held that although a physician could not testify regarding an insured’s admission, "[t]he statute does not exclude the testimony of the nurse.” Id.
If the blood-test results can be admitted into evidence without the testimony of a physician, the privilege will not become an issue in this case.
In other circumstances, one could soundly argue *269that the Legislature also intended that other hospital staff would be covered by the privilege when disclosure to them "is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the physician is consulted.” Rudnick v Superior Court of Kern Co, 11 Cal 3d 924, 932; 114 Cal Rptr 603; 523 P2d 643 (1974). Such an expansion would be unwarranted, however, in cases in which the people are seeking the only solid evidence whether or not a driver was intoxicated. The Legislature’s intention in this area is exceedingly clear, as seen through its repeated elimination of obstacles to prosecutors for obtaining blood-test results. See above, pp 262-264. Under these circumstances, the privilege (if it applied) would serve no legitimate purpose and would simply allow a driver to conceal whether or not he had been intoxicated.
Second, even if the privilege did prevent admission of the test results during the prosecutor’s case in chief, the defendant might waive that privilege through his conduct or otherwise. For example, when a patient, makes his condition an issue by testifying at trial, he waives the physician-patient privilege as it relates to that fact. See People v Kayne, 268 Mich 186, 190; 255 NW 758 (1934); People v Hunter, 374 Mich 129, 133-137; 132 NW2d 95 (1965). If the defendant testifies at trial that he was not intoxicated at the time he drove, the privilege would be waived as it relates to that issue, and the blood-test result would be admissible.
v
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the trial court denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Griffin, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 These provisions are now found at MCL 257.625a(6)(e); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(e). We will assume that the previous version of the statute applies because the parties appear to agree that it does and, more importantly, the differences between that version and the current version, which would be in effect at the time of a trial, are so slight that they do not affect the result.

 The privilege did not exist at common law. Developments in the law: Privileged communications, 98 Harv L R 1450, 1530, n 1 (1985) (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence [McNaughton rev], § 2380, p 819).

 In attempting to harmonize the legislative expression of intent in the physician-patient privilege with that expressed in MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)0), in People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), we referred to subsection 9 as a minor exception to the privilege. However, we did not endorse the proposition that, if § 625a(9) does not apply, the physician-patient privilege requires exclusion of blood-alcohol test results. Indeed, in McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384, 392; 245 NW2d 18 (1976), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Levin, expressly, reserved the question whether the implied consent statute had supplanted the common law.

 Further evidence of the legislative intent to broaden admissibility to permit effective prosecution is found in the fact that the amendment, 1982 PA 310, also struck the sentence in the 1980 statute that had provided:
Failure to fully comply with the [defendánt’s] request shall bar the admission of the results into evidence by the prosecution.

 The Court stated the following:
*261There is no suggestion that the hospitals would have allowed their personnel to draw blood for determination of alcohol content without a "request of a police officer” or that they would have allowed this to be done if they did not have the resulting statutory protection from civil and criminal liability. [397 Mich 391.]

 The section of the statute interpreted in McNitt as requiring an offer of tests and blood analysis at the request of a police official was reenacted, and presently appears as MCL 257.625a(6)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(c).

 The majority assumes that the word "accident” modifies the phrase "for use in a criminal prosecution as provided in this subsection.” Such a construction, however, fails to explain why the Legislature might have intended to modify the explicit directive in subsection 9 that the tests "shall be admissible ... for a crime described in subsection (1).” Subsection 1 expressly includes driving under the influence and impaired driving, neither of which necessarily or even commonly involve an accident.

 It is not necessary to decide here whether the word "accident” has a different meaning for purposes of arrest, see Tope v Howe, 179 Mich App 91; 445 NW2d 452 (1989), or to decide whether other authority would authorize or require police officers to transport an individual to a medical facility. See City of Troy v Ohlinger, 438 Mich 477; 475 NW2d 54 (1991).

 That is, it could not be seriously suggested that a court must exclude blood-test results simply because a defendant disputes the state’s allegation that he was operating a vehicle.

 In my view, it is much more likely that the Legislature intended to encourage medical treatment for unconscious persons suspected of violating drunk-driving laws than that they created policy on the basis of the dubious proposition that those intoxicated to the point of stupor might be encouraged to pull off the road.

 Courts recognizing their authority to narrowly construe the physician-patient privilege for purposes of enforcement of laws relating to drunk driving do not necessarily apply the same rationale to civil cases. See Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d 278; 536 NE2d 1126 (1989).

 The defendant has not raised other possible grounds for suppression for obvious reasons. The blood-test results cannot be suppressed by means of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because, once the blood is legally drawn, the defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in test results revealing the blood-alcohol content. See People v Perlos, supra, 436 Mich 326.
In addition, the privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and . . . the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis . . . [does] not involve compulsion to these ends.” Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 761; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966).