Court Opinion

ID: 9940933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:14:36.969308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:03.001122
License: Public Domain

J-A03014-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: DAVID C. NOWAKOWSKI     :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                 :                  PENNSYLVANIA
                                 :
  APPEAL OF: DAVID C. NOWAKOWSKI :
                                 :
                                 :
                                 :             No. 870 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-MD-0000225-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM:                         FILED: February 14, 2024

       David C. Nowakowski appeals pro se from the order that denied his

petitions for review of the disapproval of his private criminal complaint. 1 We

affirm.

       We glean the following facts from the certified record. Appellant resides

at a property owned by his mother in Erie County, Pennsylvania. In 2022, he

became embroiled in a border dispute with a neighbor.         In essence, each

neighbor believed that the other was intruding upon her land. Appellant paid

for a survey which revealed that a fence line and parking area for the two

properties east of the property owned by Appellant’s mother encroached by

up to eleven inches. The neighbor conducted his own survey which produced

____________________________________________

1 Although the certified record contains documents to which Appellant attested

by signing a “Certificate of Counsel,” we see no indication that he is an
attorney who is licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth or anywhere
else.
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different results. Appellant took actions, such as removing some bricks from

an allegedly-encroaching driveway, that prompted the neighbor to come onto

his mother’s land to retrieve them.              There were verbal and physical

confrontations and calls to police, none of which resulted in the police issuing

citations.

       Appellant filed at least six private criminal complaints in 2022, on behalf

of either his mother or himself. In one, he requested “that the [c]ourt transfer

title of [the neighboring parcels] to [Appellant,]” in order to “discourage

complex systems of land theft intended to take advantage of the easy going

nature of an American citizenship, once described by the great General Patten

[sic] as a ‘therapeutic nation,’ when fearing comparison of our nation[’]s

fighting arm to that of the ultra[-]aggressive Nazi regime.”         PC-438-22,

undated, at 7-8.2 See also PC-439-22, undated, at 7-8 (same). In other

complaints, Appellant requested theft, harassment, assault, and trespass

charges be bought, in addition to $25,000 or $50,000 to be paid by the

neighbor.3    See PC-431-22, 5/23/22, at 4-5; PC-432-22, 5/23/22, at 4-5.

The Office of the District Attorney (“ODA”) declined to approve any of the first

five complaints, due to lack of prosecutorial merit.

____________________________________________

2 The earlier complaints were attached to the September 20, 2022 complaint.

3 The basis of the financial award, be it damages or restitution or something

else, is not specified.

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      Appellant filed the private criminal complaint at issue in this appeal on

or about September 20, 2022. Therein, Appellant indicated that he called the

neighbor a “fucking piece of shit” after overhearing the neighbor tell

Appellant’s mother that Appellant “was a ‘nut and was going to jail.’” PC-895-

22, 9/20/22, at 3-4. Appellant attached security camera photos from later

that day which he claims show the neighbor “looking for a confrontation.” Id.

at 4-5. He also stated that the neighbor represented himself as a personal

friend of District Attorney Elizabeth A. Hirz (“DA”), who was working with the

neighbor to bring criminal charges against Appellant, and that the neighbor

was “not done with [him] yet.” Id. at 4. This time, Appellant requested that

the neighbor be charged with criminal trespass, stalking, terroristic threats,

and corruption of a public official. Id. at 7. Further, Appellant accused the

DA of being “completely corrupt and incapable of carrying out her duties[.]”

Id. at 4.

      The ODA again declined to approve the complaint for prosecution, citing

lack of prosecutorial merit and insufficient information. On January 5, 2023,

Appellant filed a petition for review of the disapproval of the September 20,

2022 private complaint. The ODA undertook another review of the complaint

and on April 17, 2023, issued a second disapproval.       On April 27, 2023,

Appellant filed a “REPetition for REReview.” Therein, Appellant maintained

that the attorneys who disapproved the complaint on behalf of the DA

(“ADAs”) “have completely abused there [sic] discretion in a biased,

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unconstitutional, and faithless way.”   REPetition for REReview, 4/27/23, at

unnumbered 8. He argued that the ADA “ignore[d] photographic evidence, a

professional land survey, and a system of crimes that worsens over time” and

engag[ed] in worthless musings on the power of a DA to do what they please,”

instead of “engaging in the common sense of a duty[-]bound society,

grounded in fairness.” Id. at unnumbered 12.

      The trial court scheduled the matter for oral argument. While Appellant

acknowledged “the necessity for district attorneys to sort of have ultimate and

overriding control over issues like this,” he indicated that he sought review

because the ODA failed to offer any “descriptive information” about what was

missing from the complaints or the “real reasonings behind their denials.”

N.T., 6/12/23, at 3-4.

      The ADA indicated that the phrase “lacks prosecutorial merit” in this

case meant “that the [ODA] is not capable of prosecuting civil crimes.” Id. at

11.   She explained that Appellant and his neighbor “are arguing over a

boundary line or a property line, to which the Commonwealth has no say in,

no knowledge of, and does not get involved with[.]” Id. The ADA expounded:

“I have no idea who is right or who is wrong, but in terms of a boundary

dispute, I cannot charge [the neighbor] with violating this boundary dispute,

while also [Appellant] is admitting to doing the exact very same thing.” Id.

at 12. The ADA further described how she had learned not to get involved in

these property-line disputes through another case that went on for years of

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back-and-forth summary and misdemeanor charges, but it was to no avail

without the establishment of where the boundary line actually was. Id. at 13-

14. As for claims of disorderly conduct and the like, the ADA stated that she

lacked proof that these actions taken on private property posed any threat of

a public disturbance. Id. at 12.

      Appellant responded that, as it was the first time he heard more than a

boilerplate reason for the disapprovals, he was not sure “whether or not it’s

appropriate to appeal and try to move forward or not,” although he insisted

that the claims of trespass and vandalism could be separated from the civil

issues.   Id. at 16.   The ADA responded that each disapproval included an

invitation to call if Appellant had any questions, and had Appellant availed

himself of that invitation, she would have explained it to him. Id. at 18.

      The trial court took the matter under advisement and on June 26, 2023,

entered an order denying Appellant’s Petition and REPetition. Therein, the

court stated that Appellant failed to establish that the DA abused its discretion

such that its decision should be overridden. Specifically, Appellant did not

convince the court that the ODA acted “in bad faith, fraudulently, or

unconstitutionally,” or that the disapproval was “arbitrary or pretextual.”

Order, 6/26/23, at unnumbered 3.

      Appellant filed a timely appeal in this Court, which we transmitted to the

trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905. After Appellant paid the appropriate fee,

the notice was docketed in the trial court and the trial court ordered Appellant

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to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.           Appellant filed a statement in this

Court, which we again transmitted to the appropriate filing location. In his

statement, Appellant complained that the ADA and trial court premised their

decisions upon the erroneous belief that he and his neighbor had competing

legitimate surveys, while Appellant was the only one whose survey was

performed by a professional.              See Statement of Error, 8/31/23, at

unnumbered 1-2. Appellant alleged that the ADA’s “lies” about the neighbor’s

survey evinced the lack of good faith in the disapproval. Id. at unnumbered

2. The trial court issued a brief statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) in

response, and this case is ripe for our adjudication.4

       Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

       [1]. Does the denial of the affiant’s private criminal complaint
       under the argument that the instant action “lacks prosecutorial
       merit” illustrate an example of bad faith, fraud, or
       unconstitutionality on the part of the [ADA] culminating in an
       abuse of discretion[?]

       [2]. Did Judge Ridge error [sic] in his decision to avoid a de novo
       review of the four corners of the private complaint ignoring
       significant evidence and the absence of discretion by the [ADA]
       highlighted by false statements[?]

       [3]. Does the review process of private criminal complaints in
       the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania offer adequate due process or
       are the majority of an aff[i]ant’s interactions with the office of the
       district attorney and courts of common pleas subversive and
       designed to not just limit access to criminal justice, but also force
       innocent Americans to stomach the behavior of criminal elements
       under the ruse of a perverted sense of civil obedience?
____________________________________________

4 The ODA has declined to file an appellate brief, relying upon the trial court’s

opinion to express the ODA’s position.

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Appellant’s brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       We begin with a review of the applicable law.           As this Court has

observed:

              The District Attorney’s function is to represent the
       Commonwealth in criminal prosecutions. The District Attorney
       exercises this responsibility by first evaluating complaints to
       determine whether criminal charges should be brought against an
       individual. The private prosecutor, even if he or she was the
       victim, has no legitimate interest, other than as a member of the
       general public, in seeing a violator of the laws brought to justice
       by the Commonwealth and punished for his misdeeds.

Commonwealth v. Pritchard, 596 A.2d 827, 831 (Pa.Super. 1991) (cleaned

up). Accordingly, “[i]t would make little sense to grant to the attorney for the

Commonwealth broad prosecutorial discretion in his role as advocate for the

Commonwealth,” if a private citizen had “the ability to file complaints without

the approval of the District Attorney whenever an alleged victim makes out a

complaint involving some type of violent act” or other illicit activity.     Id.

Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has established a mechanism for citizens to

request the initiation of a criminal prosecution.

       Pennsylvania’s criminal complaint processes are governed by the Rules

of Criminal Procedure.     Pursuant to Rule 503, “[i]n every court case a

complaint shall be filed with the appropriate issuing authority.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

503.    The issuing authority is “any public official having the power and

authority of a magistrate, a Philadelphia arraignment court magistrate, or a

magisterial district judge.”   Pa.R.Crim.P. 103.    A criminal complaint must

contain, inter alia, the name and signature of an affiant who is leveling

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accusations against a named or otherwise described defendant.                          See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 504(1)-(3), (13).

       In cases in which “the affiant of the complaint is not a law enforcement

officer,   the   complaint     shall   be      submitted   to    an   attorney   for   the

Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without unreasonable

delay.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A). If the Commonwealth attorney approves the

complaint, she so indicates and transmits it to the issuing authority.                 See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(1). If the attorney for the Commonwealth “disapproves

the complaint, the attorney shall state the reasons on the complaint form and

return it to the affiant.      Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of

common pleas for review of the decision.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(2).

       Regardless of the basis asserted by the ODA for disapproving a private

criminal complaint, a trial court considering a petition for review “may only

overturn that decision if the private complainant demonstrates that the

disapproval decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was

unconstitutional.”5 In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94, 109 (Pa. 2023). Our High Court

has specified that “bad faith is demonstrated when the prosecutor acted with

a fraudulent, dishonest, or corrupt purpose.”              Id.    “The private criminal

____________________________________________

5 Prior case law had established different standards depending on whether
disapproval was based upon legal conclusions, policy considerations, or a
hybrid of the two. Our Supreme Court eliminated the distinctions in In re
Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2023), and set the above universally-applicable
standard of review.

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complainant has the burden to prove the district attorney abused his

discretion, and that burden is a heavy one.”         In re Private Criminal

Complaints of Rafferty, 969 A.2d 578, 581 (Pa.Super. 2009).

      When the trial court’s ruling on its review of the district attorney’s

disapproval is appealed to this Court, we are “limited to ascertaining the

propriety of the trial court’s actions.       Thus, our review is limited to

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error

of law.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 669 A.2d 984, 990 (Pa.Super. 1995)

(en banc) (emphasis in original) (cited with approval as to this point in In re

Ajaj, supra at 110).

      With these principles in mind, we turn to Appellant’s questions. His first

two issues are interrelated. The first directly attacks the ADA’s disapproval

decision, while the second more properly challenges the trial court’s

assessment of that disapproval. We consider the arguments Appellant offers

as to both questions in conducting our review of the trial court’s decision.

      Appellant asserts that the bad faith of the ADA’s disapproval for lack of

prosecutorial merit and insufficient information is illustrated by the failure to

consider his video surveillance footage and professional land survey.          He

claims that the ADA’s disregard of the still photographs he attached to the

complaint as being “of no value” reveals that the ADA is “idiotic and despotic.”

Appellant’s brief at 15-16.     He maintains that his property survey was

performed by a professional, and the ADA lied when she construed his

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neighbor’s “false land survey” created by the neighbor and a third party

“through their own measurements” as a “conflicting survey.”           Id. at 15.

Appellant also claims that the ADA’s addition of “insufficient information” to

the reason of “lacked prosecutorial merit” after the re-review of the complaint

evinces the ADA’s bias and attempt to “illegally avoid review of the evidence

provided by [Appellant].” Id. at 16.

         Finally, Appellant argues that the trial judge erred “in his decision to

avoid a de novo review of the four corners of the private complaint,” and

instead both “failed to recognize that the [ADA] was lying to his face in his

courtroom” and “also failed to see [the] lack of cogence in the [ADA]’s

argument.”      Id. at 17. For example, Appellant bemoans that the trial court

did not in its Rule 1925(a) writing discuss an alleged instance of trespass

where he had “isolated the video frame that showed the exact moment the

offender crossed the property line,” yet the ADA still “remained unable to

execute her duties due to her own inability to comprehend that the offending

neighbor executed his criminal activities under his own mistaken beliefs.” Id.

at 20.

         The trial court found no failure on the part of the ADA to consider the

evidence presented by Appellant. Rather it credited her representations that

she could “only discern so much from” the still photographs,6 that the police

____________________________________________

6 N.T., 6/12/23, at 13.

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called during the incident involving the bricks “concluded that both parties

were in the wrong,” and that “the mutual disagreement over the property line,

the conflicting information regarding the property line, and the antagonistic

behavior by both parties” made a conviction “doubtful.” Trial Court Opinion,

9/12/23, at 2. Observing that Appellant produced no evidence to support his

claims that his neighbor’s survey was invalid, such as a copy of the survey, or

that the DA had a relationship with the neighbor that was the true, non-

pretextual reason for the disapproval, the trial court concluded that Appellant

failed to meet his burden of proof. Id. at 2-3.

      We discern no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

The record belies Appellant’s characterization of the ADA’s statements

concerning conflicting surveys as false.     The ADA’s representation was as

follows: “I know both -- from hearing from both parties, both parties have

gotten surveys done. Those surveys apparently conflict, whether one used

one company and one used the other, again, I’m not sure. I don’t practice in

civil.” N.T., 6/12/23, at 9. The key fact was not whose survey came from

where. Rather, it was that, in order to prove the trespass and theft claims

Appellant wished to bring, supposedly supported by his surveillance footage,

the Commonwealth would first have to prove where the boundary line actually

was situated and that the neighbor was wrong about where his property

ended. The adjudication of where a disputed boundary lies is a matter for civil

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litigation, not a criminal prosecution. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1051-1058 (pertaining

to an action in ejectment); 1061-1068 (governing actions to quiet title).

      As noted above, the ODA’s job is to represent the Commonwealth in

criminal matters if it deems it appropriate to seek justice for a violation of

penal laws. See Pritchard, supra at 831. “If a private prosecutor feels

individually harmed his remedy is a civil suit for damages.” Id. (emphases

added). The trial court here acted within its discretion in ruling that the ODA

did not disapprove the complaint for an improper basis where it determined

that Appellant had adequate civil remedies. See Commonwealth v. Cooper,

710 A.2d 76, 81 (Pa. Super. 1998) (affirming disapproval of private criminal

complaint where civil remedies were available to the affiant). Appellant’s first

two issues merit no relief.

      Appellant’s final issue is that Pennsylvania’s review process for private

criminal complaints fails to satisfy due process. He raises this claim for the

first time on appeal in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Further, he failed

to file proof of service of his challenge to the constitutionality of the applicable

general rules to the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania as mandated by

Pa.R.A.P. 522(a) (incorporating by reference the notice procedure detailed in

Pa.R.A.P. 521(a)).    Moreover, Appellant failed to develop his constitutional

challenge with citation to, and discussion of, pertinent legal authorities as

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prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).7 See 9795 Perry Highway Mgmt., LLC v.

Bernard, 273 A.3d 1098, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2022) (“This Court will not act as

counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”). For all

these reasons, Appellant’s due process issue is waived.8

       In conclusion, Appellant attempted to utilize the resources of the

Commonwealth to prosecute his mother’s civil boundary dispute, seeking to

have taxpayers assume their litigation costs for a quiet title or ejectment

action.    Furthermore, rather than calling the local police to report any

threatening or assaultive behavior, Appellant engaged in a practice of drafting

serial private criminal complaints full of unsupported allegations of corruption

and outrageous allusions to Nazis and other ad hominem attacks upon the DA

and her assistants. Despite this inappropriate behavior on Appellant’s behalf,

____________________________________________

7  For example, Appellant does not acknowledge or discuss long-standing
precedent holding that “the provision in the Rule allowing an appeal of the
district attorney’s disapproval of such charges to the court constitutes
sufficient checks and balances upon the district attorney’s actions to comply
with constitutional due process requirements.” In re Private Complaint of
Owens Against Coker, 810 A.2d 172, 177 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).

8 Appellant also failed to include the issue in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

However, Rule 1925(b) does not serve as an additional basis for finding waiver
here because the trial court’s order did not contain all elements mandated by
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3) (indicating that the order shall specify, inter alia, “both
the place the appellant can serve the Statement in person and the address to
which the appellant can mail the Statement”).             See, e.g., Rahn v.
Consolidated Rail Corporation, 254 A.3d 738, 747 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(explaining that deficient Rule 1925(b) compliance does not result in waiver
where the trial court’s order is itself deficient).

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the trial court patiently listened to his arguments and rendered a thoughtful,

reasonable decision supported by the law and the certified record.

Consequently, we have no hesitation in affirming the trial court’s ruling that

the DA properly exercised prosecutorial discretion in declining to approve

Appellants private criminal complaints.

      Order affirmed.

 2/14/2024

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