Court Opinion

ID: 9760735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:11:02.446434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:16.499665
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion because I do not agree that the chancellor erred in finding that Dr. Tortorich’s P.A. had goodwill value independent of Dr. Tortorich’s presence and reputation. In effect, the majority has ruled as a matter of law that solo professional practices can have no goodwill value independent of the practitioner. The majority decision, however, is contrary to our Supreme Court’s holding that the question of goodwill valuation is one for the finder of fact in such cases. In Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987), the Supreme Court clearly held that whether or not goodwill is marital property is a question of fact which is determined by evidence establishing the salability or marketability of that goodwill as a business asset of a professional practice. Id. at 205-06. In the case at bar, there was ample evidence supporting the chancellor’s finding of goodwill as a business asset of the professional corporation. Richard Schwartz testified at length concerning his expert opinion that the business goodwill of the professional association was worth approximately $180,000. Although there was expert opinion to the contrary, the trial judge in her letter opinion specifically found that “Mr. Schwartz presented a more acceptable, more substantiated, more knowledgeable and more reasonable valuation of the business ...” Although this is clearly a fact question which has been resolved by the fact finder on the basis of credibility, the majority ignores those issues and resolves the question as if it were a matter of law. I dissent.