Court Opinion

ID: 9764103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:10:16.647813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:53.580103
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s disposition of all issues except two.
On the issue of delay damages, I would remand to the trial court for recomputation of delay damages on the basis of Hughes’ share of the verdict without respect to the comparative causation of the parties as suggested by the majority. I would not utilize the majority’s theory of comparative causation as the basis for computation of an award of delay or any other damages because this theory of recovery is not extant either in any legislation or in any judicial determination in this Commonwealth, and the majority concedes as much. The majority believes that such a basis for allocation of damages in strict product liability recovery is, nonetheless, rooted in equitable principles. Accordingly, the majority would remand for the trier of fact to employ a comparative causation determination between two *553tortfeasors both held to be strictly liable, or, at the parties’ option, to the trial judge, instead of a jury.
As I previously stated, such a theory of recovery does not exist either by grace of statute or decisional law in this Commonwealth. However, without passing upon its viability, I believe that this type of recovery theory is a more appropriate expression of legislative, rather than judicial will. See e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, dealing with comparative negligence. Hence, my dissent.