Court Opinion

ID: 9676056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:13:28.10018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:43.175098
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion displays fine scholarship and a careful approach to the issues in this case. I agree with much of its content but do not agree with the ultimate result reached.
I would affirm the trial court’s finding that the Humboldt County ordinances are not an exercise of the county’s zoning power. They do not, therefore, conflict with the state law establishing a zoning exemption for agricultural land and structures under Iowa Code chapter 335.
I agree with the majority’s analysis of express preemption and find that the state has not exercised this right in the provisions of House File 519. I also join the majority in finding that there is no statement in this legislation indicating that uniformity or statewide regulation was intended to apply to animal feeding operations. I do not agree, however, that the Humboldt County ordinances are, nevertheless, invalid as in conflict with state law.
In its analysis of Iowa’s “home rule” laws as supportive of the result reached, the majority has veered away from the course set by our court for many years. Although acknowledging their existence, the majority has not responded to the thrust of our decisions that promote and solidify the concept of home rule. Those decisions gave structure to the home rule constitutional amendment that announced a 180 degree turn from our previous law.
The Iowa Constitution’s county home rule amendment of 1978 states in part:
Counties or joint county-municipal corporation governments are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs and government, except that they shall not have power to levy any tax unless expressly authorized by the general assembly.
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The proposition or rule of law that a county or joint county-municipal corporation government possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state.
Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 39A.
This constitutional principle is also found in our statutory law. Iowa Code section 331.301 (1995) states:
1. A county may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution, and if not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, exercise any power and perform any function it deems appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and property of the county or of its residents, and to preserve and improve the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents.
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3. ... A county may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state law.
4. An exercise of a county power is not inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law.
(Emphasis added.) These subparagraphs clearly show the legislative intent that home rule powers be stiffened and protected from state overriding, which is to be permitted only as a last resort.
Subparagraph six recognizes that as a part of the home rule powers granted by our constitution, a county may not set lower standards of law than those imposed by the state but may set higher standards. It states:
A county shall not set standards and requirements which are lower or less stringent than those imposed by state law, but may set standards and requirements which are higher or more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise.
Id. § 331.301(6).
The antithetical phrasing in this statute shows that the legislature’s concern was that state standards not be undercut by a coun*512ty’s adoption of weaker standards. Higher standards and requirements by counties were apparently not of concern.
Cities are the recipients of like treatment under the Iowa Constitution’s municipal home rule provision and state law. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; Iowa Code ch. 364. In 1978, immediately after the ratification of the county home rule amendment, we said, “Home rule empowers a city to set standards ‘more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise.’ ” Bryan v. City of Des Moines, 261 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1978) (quoting Iowa Code § 364.3(3)).
In Bryan, we noted that express limitations by statute on a city’s authority to establish employment qualifications were not involved. No mention of implied limitations, if any such principle exists, was made. Further, we said:
We hold the civil service commission’s sole prerogative to give promotional examinations does not constitute exclusive authority to establish promotional qualifications.
Id. Thus, we concluded the city’s education requirement was simply an additional qualification that the city could validly impose because it was not inconsistent with state law.
In City of Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1983), we breathed more life and meaning into what constitutes “inconsistency” with state statutes. This case is remarkably similar to the case at bar. In 1982, the defendant owned a forty-acre farm, owned by his family for seventy-five years, and located within the city limits of Council Bluffs. Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 811. That year, the city passed an ordinance that imposed a number of regulations on the keeping of farm animals. Section 4.20.280 required anyone who kept farm animals inside the city limits to obtain a permit and pay a $25 licensing fee. The permit could be obtained only after an inspection for compliance with the sanitation regulations set out in other sections of the ordinance. Those regulations dealt with manure removal, fences, animal populations, feeding conditions, feed storage, and minimum distances from residences. Id. at 812. In analyzing whether state law prohibited these ordinances, we said:
We first consider defendant’s contention that farm animal control cannot be the subject of a municipal ordinance. Defendant thinks the city lacks the power to regulate farm animals because the subject has been preempted by state law. It is a well established principle that municipal governments may not undertake to legislate those matters which the legislative branch of state government has preserved to itself. There are alternative ways for a state legislature to show such a preservation. One is of course by specific expression in a statute. Another is, as defendant suggests, by covering a subject by statutes in such a manner as to demonstrate a legislative intention that the field is preempted by state law. See City of Vin-ton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 867, 140 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1966); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 375 (1971).
Cities are not necessarily precluded from enacting ordinances on matters which have been the subject of state statute. The traditional test has been whether an ordinance prohibits an act permitted by a statute, or permits an act prohibited by a statute. See Towns v. City of Sioux City, 214 Iowa 76, 84, 241 N.W. 658, 662 (1932). In the past, even if- an ordinance passed this test it could be invalidated if the municipality was not expressly empowered by the state to enact it. See Dotson v. City of Ames, 251 Iowa 467, 470-72, 101 N.W.2d 711, 713-14 (1960); Merriam v. Moody’s Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
Id. at 812.
Regarding home rule and the meaning of “inconsistency” we said:
Iowa has since adopted the home rule constitutional amendment. See Iowa Const, art. Ill, § 38A. See also Iowa Code § 364.2(2) and (3) (1983). Under home rule, a city has the power to enact an ordinance on a matter which is also the subject of statute if the ordinance and statute can be harmonized and reconciled. City of Iowa City v. Westinghouse Learning Corp., 264 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Iowa 1978); Chelsea Theater Corp. v. Burling*513ton, 258 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 1977); Airport Commission for City of Cedar Rapids v. Schade, 257 N.W.2d 500, 505 (Iowa 1977); Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975).
We think the ordinance challenged here easily can be harmonized with state law. To be sure there are extensive state regulations and licensing provisions for farmers who keep or breed livestock. See Iowa Code ch. 162 (registration of animals); chs. 163-166C (prevention of disease among animals); section 163.26, et seq. (feeding garbage to animals); section 163.40, et seq. (breeding bulls); ch. 167 (use and disposal of dead animals); eh. 188 (estrays and trespassing animals). See also Iowa Admin. Code ch. 11 (regulation of poultry and egg production); ch. 12 (dead animal disposal); ch. 16 (prevention of livestock diseases); chs. 30-31 (regulation of dairy production).
Nevertheless we find no statute or regulation expressly permitting what the challenged ordinance prohibits or expressly prohibiting the city from requiring a permit and fee for keeping farm animals within city limits. The city plainly holds the power to adopt a farm animal control ordinance. Defendant’s contention to the contrary is without merit.
Id. at 812-13.
This case held the ordinances were not preempted by state law and were not inconsistent' with state law, where the keeping of farm animals was locally regulated. The ease is not authority for recognizing a doctrine of implied preemption in home rule cases. In fact, the phrase “implied, preemption” is never used in the opinion. The opinion merely recognizes, by dictum, that preservation of an area of law by the legislature may be expressed in a single statute or by covering a subject by statutes, an alternate means of express preemption.
City of Vinton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 140 N.W.2d 857 (1966), relied on by the majority as an example of expression of legislative intent, is an express preemption case. It is a criminal ease deciding whether a city’ could enact a reckless driving ordinance when the state statute had defined “reckless driving.” Engledow, 258 Iowa at 864-65, 140 N.W.2d at 860. The case held the city could not enact such an ordinance because the state statute came within the purview of a statute providing that the provisions of the chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state. Id. at 865,140 N.W.2d at 860. The case was decided in 1966 as an interpretation of state statutes in- effect before adoption of the municipal home rule constitutional amendment in 1968. As such, it lacked the driving force of the constitutional imprimatur of home rule. And, even taken at face value, the Engledow case was able to marshal only a five to four majority. It has no precedential value in deciding the case at bar.
Cases cited by the majority as illustrating city ordinances inconsistent with state law do not support the result reached by the majority. In Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, 222 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1974), the city established a human rights commission to decide grievances involving human rights violations. The state law specifically stated that its statutes were not intended to occupy the field. Cedar Rapids, 222 N.W.2d at 398. The case held that the ordinance was invalid aS inconsistent with the state human rights statute, however, because it did not provide for judicial review as provided under the state statute. Id. at 402. Thus, the ordinance was inconsistent and invalid because it authorized a lower standard than did the state. Moreover, the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission case is a due process case, a question not involved in the ease at bar. Other than illustrating “lower standards,” the ease has little relevance to the ease at bar.
The second Iowa case cited by the majority in support of its distinction concerning “inconsistency” is City of Iowa City v. Westinghouse Learning Corp., 264 N.W.2d 771 (Iowa 1978), another due process case. It cites and follows Cedar Rapids in that the city of Iowa City established a local civil rights commission but failed to provide any hearing before the commission from which a review might be taken to the district court. City of Iowa City, 264 N.W.2d at 773. The *514ordinance transferred to the courts the task of originally deciding whether a discriminatory practice existed, rather than having the courts review an administrative decision, as provided by the state civil rights statute. The ordinance completely reversed the legal procedure provided by state statutes and was therefore inconsistent and invalid. Id. This case is another due process ease invalidating an ordinance that established lower standards than the state statutes provided. The ordinance conflicted with Iowa Code section 331.301(6) and was therefore invalid. Beyond this illustration, it has no relevance to the instant issues.
Similarly, in Decatur County v. PERB, 564 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa 1997), we held an ordinance inconsistent with a state statute. Here, the ordinance tried to make a collective bargaining issue not a mandatory bargaining subject when state statutes clearly stated it was. Decatur County, 564 N.W.2d at 396. The home rule amendment did not validate the ordinance because it was clearly inconsistent and not amenable to harmonizing. Id. at 397-98. Lower or higher standards relating to “inconsistency” were not involved.
By contrast, we have consistently upheld the constitutional grant of home rule in other cases decided since 1978. In City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1990), we held a city ordinance regulating the parking and storage of lawfully unregistered vehicles was not inconsistent with state law. In language resonating with an issue structure strikingly like the case at bar, we said:
In considering Gruen’s claim we are obliged to interpret the state law in such a manner as to render it harmonious with the ordinance. See Iowa Code § 364.2(8); Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1975). If the statute and the ordinance cannot be reconciled, the statute prevails. See Iowa Code § 364.2(3); Green, 231 N.W.2d at 890. A municipality may enact ordinances on matters which are also the subject of state statutes. Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812. Indeed, a municipality is free to set standards “more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise.”
Iowa Code § 364.3(3); Bryan v. City of Des Moines, 261 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1978). Limitations on a municipality’s power over local affairs are not implied; they must be imposed by the legislature. Bryan, 261 N.W.2d at 687.
Gruen’s argument boils down to one proposition: because the general assembly has provided that he may lawfully possess unregistered vehicles under certain conditions, the city may not in any manner regulate where or how he parks those vehicles. We do not accept this proposition.
Under the Cain analysis, it is clear that the ordinance does not prohibit an act permitted by Iowa Code section 321.48(1). See Cain, 342 N.W.2d at 812. It is lawful to possess unregistered vehicles in Des Moines under both the ordinance and the statute. It is equally clear that the ordinance does not permit an act prohibited by the statute, or invade an area of law reserved by the legislature to itself. See id. Iowa Code section 321.48(1) does not prohibit the city from regulating the parking and storage of lawfully unregistered vehicles, nor does Gruen point us to any other state law which preempts Des Moines City Code section 2A-7(S).
The statute and the ordinance may be harmonized: Gruen may lawfully possess unregistered vehicles in Des Moines, but he may not store them in a residential neighborhood unless in an enclosed building. Even then, of course, he may not conduct his used car business at his residence if to do so would violate a valid zoning law. See generally Iowa Code ch. 414 (Municipal Zoning).
Gruen, 457 N.W.2d at 342-43.
In Sioux City Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Sioux City, 495 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1993), we reviewed the home rule constitutional and statutory law and concluded that the city’s anti-nepotism resolution that adopted additional qualifications for employment, promotion and discharge of employees was not inconsistent with state statutes. We said:
The associations argue that the City’s anti-nepotism policy creates qualifications *515for employment, promotion, transfer, and discharge which are not authorized by the specified sections in Iowa Code chapter 400 regarding civil service employment. While chapter 400 includes some criteria which must be considered and some criteria which must not be considered in employment action, the Iowa legislature did not intend the chapter to provide the exclusive basis for employment decisions. A civil service employer may impose additional qualifications and criteria. See Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 601 (court recognized authority to determine minimum fitness for deputy sheriff position through the establishment of vision, standards); Borlin v. Civil Service Comm’n, 338 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Iowa 1983) (court recognized authority of municipality to establish restrictions on secondary employment); Bryan, 261 N.W.2d at 685 (court recognized authority to establish minimum educational requirement was within the city’s power to establish qualifications for promotion in the police department).
Iowa Code section 400.9 gives the civil service commission the power to conduct promotional examinations for the purpose of “determining the qualifications of applicants for promotion to a higher grade under civil service.” This section does not expressly preclude the City from.adopting additional criteria for qualification and promotion. In Bryan, we stated ,“[p]ass-ing a promotional examination is essential to a promotion but is not made the exclusive measure of qualifications.... We hold the civil service commission’s sole prerogative to give promotional examinations does not constitute exclusive authority to establish promotional qualifications.” We held that the City of Des Moines could require its police officers to' have some college education to be eligible for a promotion. We believe that Bryan controls in this case; the civil service commission’s power to conduct promotional exams does not expressly prohibit the City of Sioux City from adopting additional criteria for promotion.
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Section 400.17 provides additional minimum qualifications for civil service employment and again does not expressly limit the public employer’s ability to establish additional criteria not prohibited elsewhere.
Sioux City Police Officers’ Ass’n, 495 N.W.2d at 694-95.
Sioux City Police Officers’Ass’n highlights the adoption of higher standards and regulations that we held valid under the city’s home rule authority and not “inconsistent” with state statutes.
The law and spirit of home rule was emphasized in Polk County Board of Supervisors v. Polk Commonwealth Charter Commission, 522 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 1994). We held that the county home rule amendment, Iowa Const, art. III, § 39A, controlled the extent of the charter commission’s powers since the commission was a creature of the legislature. Polk County, 522 N.W.2d at 792. Thus, the old Dillon rule that allowed only those powers expressly granted by the legislature did not apply. Following the constitutional directive, we construed the commission’s powers liberally, as a local institution, in order to promote the objectives of the constitutional amendment and the legislature. Id.
We considered the home rule amendment again in City of Clinton v. Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1995). The question was whether a home rule charter adopted by Clinton in 1987 was contrary to Iowa law. We cited the municipal home rule amendment of 1968 and held there was nothing inconsistent with state statutes and the Clinton home rule charter. Regarding home rule we said:
We expanded our historical review of home rule following the adoption of the constitutional amendment and the City Code of Iowa. We concluded the intention of the framers of the constitutional amendment was to grant cities power to rule their local affairs and government subject to the superior authority of the general assembly.
Sheridan, 530 N.W.2d at 692-93 (citations omitted).
Applying the constitutional amendment, we said:
*516The constitutional amendment granted home rule power to determine local affairs and government The City of Clinton is organized under a home rule charter form of government permitted by the amendment and specifically allowed under the City Code of Iowa. The City of Clinton’s charter expressly authorizes initiative and referendum adoption and repeal of ordinances. The home rule amendment granted the city power to determine its local government. The city is no longer dependent upon the legislature to grant it power. “Any limitation on a city’s power by state law must be expressly imposed.” Bryan v. City of Des Moines, 261 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1978). We find no irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the City Code of Iowa and the initiative and referendum provisions of the Clinton home rule charter.
Id at 694.
Rejecting the argument that the charter provisions were inconsistent with state election laws and again rejecting the Dillon rule, we said:
Here, the attorney general suggests, in the absence of express statutory authority, the submission of an initiative or referendum would be invalid. This suggestion is a carry-over of the Dillon rule under which a municipal corporation possessed and exercised only those powers granted by the legislature in express words.
To require specific statutory authority to permit an initiative or referendum vote is contrary to the intent of the amendment that rejected the Dillon rule. Cities no longer have only those powers granted by the legislature. Bryan, 261 N.W.2d at 687. We find no irreconcilable conflict between the election laws and the initiative and referendum provisions of the Clinton home rule charter. If the general assembly intended to preempt municipal initiative and referendum powers, it could have done so by express and unambiguous statutory language. See Chelsea Theater Corp. v. City of Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 1977). We find no preemption problem.
Id. at 695.
As these eases show, we have thoroughly studied these issues before, though in different clothing. In fact, we have established the law, mandating the holding that the Humboldt County ordinances are valid under home rule law. The case of City of Council Bluffs v. Cain did so in validating the city ordinances regulating the keeping of farm animals in the city. The case is not different in legal principle, and controls the issue of regulating farm animal production in the county. Size of hog operations and greater numbers do not change the law in this matter. In accord are the cases of Bryan, Gruen, and Sioux City Police Officers’Ass’n.
The clear import of these cases applying home rule constitutional and statutory law is that only a high degree of inconsistency will invalidate a local ordinance. Moreover, before a subject area may be deemed to be preempted, the legislature must expressly declare it to be preempted by unambiguous statutory language. I believe that the legislature in enacting House File 519 did not include Unambiguous language of subject-wide preemption that invalidates the Humboldt County ordinances. All of these ordinances fit within the sphere of home rule as authorized by our constitution and statutes.
Words of preemption are conspicuously absent from the language of House File 519. To fill that void, regarding ordinance 24 regulating manure application and groundwater protection, plaintiffs claim that preemption language is found in Iowa Code section 455B.172(5). That language is the use of the word “exclusively” regarding the responsibility of the Department of Natural Resources for adopting standards and issuing licenses for commercial cleaning of livestock confinement structures and disposal of waste. However, Iowa Code section 455E.10(2) states:
Political subdivisions are authorized and encouraged to implement groundwater protection policies within their respective jurisdictions, provided that implementation is at least as stringent but consistent with the rules of the department.
These statutes are in conflict with each other in indicating what local regulations in the area of groundwater protection are sane-*517tioned. An ambiguity exists that is not resolved by resorting to Iowa Code section 4.7 which directs that a special statute prevails over a general statute. I do not reach the application of section 4.7 because the constitutional provisions of home rule prevail over other statutory rules. The home rule constitutional amendment authorizing local ordinances is paramount unless the local ordinance is “inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly.” Here, ordinance 24 is not inconsistent because the laws of the general assembly are ambiguous. It cannot be said that ordinance 24 “prohibits an act permitted by statute, or permits an act prohibited by a statute” in the face of statutes that are in conflict and therefore ambiguous. Stated otherwise, exclusivity is not established unambiguously, and there is no express preemption by the legislature of this subject area.
The Humboldt County ordinances include higher and more stringent regulations but none of them prohibits large livestock confinement feeding operations in the county. If an operator complies with the regulations, large livestock confinement feeding operations are permitted.
In considering questions of home rule, we have consistently quoted and applied the statutory component of home rule that empowers counties as follows:
A county shall not set standards and requirements that are lower or less stringent than those imposed by state law, but may set standards and requirements which are higher or more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise.
Iowa Code § 331.301(6). This section establishes a floor rather than a ceiling for what standards and regulations a county is authorized to enact. It is the essence of home rule that counties are permitted to have “higher and more stringent” and thus stricter laws than those imposed by the state. Those local laws are ab initio and conceptually “inconsistent” because they are “higher and more stringent.” But this difference is constitutionally and statutorily not only permitted but encouraged.
These laws are given only passing recognition and are in fact ignored by the majority in its analysis that embraces the idea that “any attempt by a local government to add to [state] requirements would conflict with state law.” In deciding this case through this analysis, the majority has failed to follow the precedents set by our cases and has, as Justice Harris decries, returned to the Dillon rule that was rejected by the home rule constitutional amendment. Whether the Dillon rule has been excavated from the grave or preemption has re-emerged under the new name of inconsistency, or inconsistency has swallowed the law permitting higher and more stringent standards, the majority has drained the vitality from home rule. Little is left to local government that could withstand the avarice of an inconsistency meaning so pervasive.
Land contours, soil types, drainage efficiencies, population centers, rain levels, even air currents, vary from locale to locale. Characterizing a subject as having statewide importance does not lessen the impact of problems encountered locally. That is the message embraced by the citizens of Iowa in adopting the home rule amendment.
If the legislature believes the subject matter of the Humboldt County ordinances should be preempted by state statutes, the law provides the clear means. An express preemption statement of unambiguous language would determine the issue, if that is the will of the legislature. Contentious issues of policy should not be left to travel the circuitous, linguistic paths of the courts.
The district court properly followed the course we have charted in upholding and advancing the purpose of the home rule constitutional amendments and their supporting statutes. I would affirm the district court on all issues.