Court Opinion

ID: 9747420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:14:18.783228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:23.709208
License: Public Domain

PRYOR, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
The essence of appellant's challenge is that his conviction of narcotics offenses should be vacated because his trial attorney had a conflict of interest while representing him. The conflict, it is urged, stemmed from the representation of another person in a different prosecution which hampered counsel’s advocacy in this ease. Although the contention has some appeal, I am not persuaded, partly because of appellant’s own inaction.
As the majority opinion explains more fully, appellant was charged with narcotics offenses in the Superior Court. At a status hearing before trial, appellant’s trial counsel, on his own initiative, raised the question of a conflict of interest. In the District Court, he had represented a person charged with an unrelated offense, reputed to be a member of the R Street Crew. During the course of hearings in the District Court involving a search warrant related to the R Street Crew, it was represented that appellant had served as an informant for the government. The trial judge explained the nature of the concern to appellant and pointed out that he was delaying the status call to allow consideration of whether there should be a change of attorneys. Appellant, aware of the problem, raised no objection at that time. At a second status hearing, counsel, having investigated the matter, stated that he thought there was no conflict. Appellant again expressed no concern. Later a jury found appellant guilty of the offenses. Afterwards, appellant wrote to the trial judge alleging, for the first time, that his attorney had a conflict of interest. The denial of collateral relief on this ground is the primary focus of this appeal.
It is true, as has been stated, that we are now faced with the very question which coun*1140sel raised at that early status hearing. Indeed, appellant’s trial counsel was straightforward and consistent in his analysis of his responsibilities regarding plea negotiations and the trial itself. What has changed, of course, is appellant’s earlier inaction and his assertions after the jury’s verdict.
At the 23-110 hearing, it was offered that the plea to the other offense by the other defendant in District Court was concluded before counsel began representing appellant; that appellant was not an informant against the other defendant; and that the search warrant did not pertain to the defendant who pleaded' guilty. Appellant’s trial counsel was examined extensively regarding the performance of his duties in the conduct of appellant’s defense in the trial court. It was shown that appellant had consistently demanded a trial. Counsel stated that, given the post-conviction allegations, he possibly should have attempted “to persuade” appellant to consider alternatives other than trial. Lastly, appellant testified, among other things, that he did not trust his attorney.
The trial judge, having reviewed all of the evidence, and relying primarily on Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and related decisions, concluded there was no actual conflict of interests and no ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Cuyler decision reinforces the basic tenet that an accused is entitled to an advocate who is dedicated solely to the interests of the accused. In questions of this kind, there is some degree of restraint imposed upon trial judges and lawyers in recognition of the secrecy and confidentiality which flows between client and counsel. Thus, judges must be alert to problems, but yet can not reasonably inquire broadly and aggressively at every turn. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47, 100 S.Ct. at 1717-18. Ultimately, the judge is looking for an actual conflict of interest which will substantially affect the representation of the client.
Decisions in this subject area contemplate that an accused must give some signal to the court, if facts known to the accused create a possible or likely conflict in the representation. It is certain that the lawyers involved have a similar obligation. Again, the judicial response in this area must take into account the relationship between attorney and client as well as the circumstances which become known to the court, either as volunteered or in response to inquiry.
In appellate review of issues of this kind, we are cautioned “... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ...,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, and that is certainly an important factor in this instance. It is inescapable that the questions which were the focus of a series of trial court hearings could readily have been resolved by appellant himself. He knew from the beginning the nature of the problem. Indeed, he was advised before trial that he could obtain new counsel. The attorneys for both sides, and the judge, were in accord. Belatedly, after conviction, this claim was made. Thus, in my view, it must be said that appellant’s attorney, counsel for the government, and the trial judge, reacted appropriately to information known to them at the time. Quite simply, appellant is the only person who knew whether, under the circumstances, he wanted a different attorney. He chose to remain silent until after the trial.
On balance, I conclude there was no error and would affirm the denial of request for a new trial.