Court Opinion

ID: 9447210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:28:59.155883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:56.752567
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
An examination of the record plainly showing that the court is without jurisdiction to consider and determine the matters discussed in the opinion of the majority, I dissent from the opinion undertaking to do so.
The only order entered in the cause was the one of July 11, 1959, at page 28 of the Record, “temporarily and until further order of this court” restraining and enjoining “from proceeding further * * * ” The only appeal by anyone is that filed August 5, 1959, by respondents, appearing at pp. 28-29 of the record:
“Notice of appeal
“Now comes Frank 0. Evans and John C. Bracy, counsel for appellants, and hereby give notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the final judgment entered in this cause on the 11th day of June, 1959.”
No final judgment having been entered, there was no final judgment to appeal from and, therefore, no appeal. If, though the appeal was in terms from a final judgment, it may, since it named the date of the order, be regarded and treated as an appeal from the interlocutory order, the action of this court, in considering and determining the questions dealt with, would, in my opinion, be no better based. This is because, as stated in Note 260, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292, “The granting or refusal of an injunction pending the suit rested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its order would not be disturbed on appeal unless it was violative of the rules of equity, or unless there was an abuse of *118discretion, or unless the injunction was improvidently allowed.”, citing many cases. See also cases cited in Note 260, 1959 Supp.
This court, in Miami Beach Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Callander, 5 Cir., 256 F.2d 410, at page 415, citing many cases stated:
“We have repeatedly held that an order for a temporary injunction does not and cannot decide the merits of the case.”
In Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 242 F.2d 45, 47, we declared :
“We regard the principle declared in the Mytinger case [Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., v. Numanna Laboratories Corp., 7 Cir.], 215 F.2d 382, at page 383:
“ ‘On appeal from decree from preliminary injunction sole issue before court was whether district court abused discretion, and merits of controversy would be left open for further consideration and future determination.’ (emphasis supplied) as correct and controlling here, * * * ”
While in Willoughby v. Brannen, 5 Cir., 271 F.2d 432, 433, we reaffirmed the principle, stating that on an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction the only matter of which this court had jurisdiction and with reference to which it could speak was an appeal from a temporary injunction. Further, on in the same case, at page 433, we stated:
“When, therefore, it was stated in the opinion: that the cause was moot, since the season to which it was confined expired in August; it is manifest that it was not attempting to deal, as of course it could not, with the merits of the action of which, since the appeal had not brought them up, it had no jurisdiction. As the opinion shows by later declaring: ‘Time has wiped the slate clean, the order is moot’, it was dealing with, and only with the subject matter which the appeal had brought into the court, the temporary injunction.” Cf. Zwack V. Kraus Bros. & Co., 2 Cir., 237 F. 2d 255.
It seems entirely clear to me that the only matter before us for decision is whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction until the case could be heard on its merits. The record shows that the case bristles with issues which must be tried and settled on the merits before plaintiff’s home can be taken from her, and it seems equally clear to me that the order of the district court granting the interlocutory injunction should not be reversed as erroneous, but affirmed as in accordance with right and equity.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the opinion, as rendered without jurisdiction, and from the order of reversal, as unwarranted and unjust.
Rehearing denied: HUTCHESON*
Circuit Judge, dissenting.