Court Opinion

ID: 9959371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 16:11:19.406008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.768139
License: Public Domain

J-S20044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ROBERT SITLER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2946 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 19, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000389-2013

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED APRIL 11, 2024

       Appellant, Robert Sitler, appeals from the order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Montgomery County that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. A jury found

him guilty of homicide by vehicle,1 and the trial court, sitting without a jury,

found him guilty of summary offenses under the Vehicle Code.2          Appellant

challenges the denial of two ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a).

2 The court found him guilty of violating the following statutes: reckless
driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a); following too closely, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a);
driving vehicle at safe speed, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361; maximum speed limits, 75
Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(1); driving on roadways laned for traffic, 75 Pa.C.S. §
3309(1); and overtaking vehicle on the left, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3303(a)(1).
J-S20044-23

denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing before the PCRA court. Upon

review, we affirm.

                             I.      BACKGROUND

      On direct review, we set forth the following summary of the facts and

procedural history in this matter:

      On November 12, 2012, just before 9 p.m., [Appellant] was
      driving his truck along a two-lane road with a center turning lane.
      His girlfriend, Denise Dinnocenti, and her children were
      passengers in the truck. [Appellant] was driving Dinnocenti to a
      dance rehearsal, which started at 9 p.m.

             Regina Qawasmy was driving in front of [Appellant], who
      was following very closely behind her, approximately two or three
      feet. In an effort to make [Appellant] follow less closely, she
      applied her brakes at least five to seven times. As she prepared
      to turn right, she noticed a young man, later identified as [16-
      year-old] Timothy[ Paciello], standing in the center lane waiting
      to cross the street. Prior to turning, Qawasmy began to decrease
      her speed. Suddenly, Qawasmy heard the revving of an engine
      and then saw a flash, which she later learned was [Paciello] flying
      into the air.

             According to Dinnocenti, [Appellant], while driving behind
      Qawasmy, became frustrated because she was taking too long to
      turn. He sped around Qawasmy on the left and into the center
      lane, going 50 miles per hour (“mph”) in a 35[-]mph zone.
      [Appellant] did not see [Paciello] in the lane and as a result, struck
      him with his truck, causing [Paciello] to fly into the air and then
      slide down the street.

            After striking [Paciello], [Appellant] pulled into a nearby
      parking lot. He handed his keys over to Dinnocenti and instructed
      her and her children to tell the police that she was driving. When
      police arrived, Dinnocenti did as [Appellant] had said and told
      them that she was driving. At the scene and in a later written
      statement, [Appellant] likewise claimed that Dinnocenti was
      driving. The police later recovered surveillance footage from the
      Sunoco gas station across the street from the accident. The

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     footage showed [Paciello] walking into the center lane and then
     out of sight of the video. A few moments later, [Appellant]’s truck
     is seen speeding down the center lane. Officer Matthew Meitzler,
     who was one of the officers that arrived on scene, informed
     Dinnocenti that there was footage of the accident. Eventually,
     both Dinnocenti and [Appellant] admitted that he was driving the
     vehicle.

            This was not the first time [Appellant] caused a death while
     driving. In Alabama in 2004, he caused the death of Mary Francis
     Stewart. While driving in heavy fog, [Appellant] drove closely to
     the vehicle in front of him. In an effort to get around the vehicle,
     he sped into the lane for opposing traffic and crashed into an
     oncoming vehicle, killing the driver, Ms. Stewart. [Appellant] pled
     guilty to manslaughter for causing the death of Ms. Stewart while
     operating a motor vehicle.

           [Appellant] moved in limine to preclude the evidence of the
     Alabama conviction. The trial court concluded that the evidence
     was highly prejudicial and granted the motion.                 The
     Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court, arguing
     among other issues, that the trial court erred in granting the
     Motion in Limine. This Court, sitting en banc, agreed and reversed
     the ruling. See Commonwealth v. Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 165
     (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc).

          The case then proceeded to a three-day trial, after which
     [Appellant] was convicted of the above-referenced crimes. He
     was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight and one-half to
     [seventeen] years’ incarceration.     [Appellant] filed a post-
     sentence motion which the trial court denied.

Commonwealth v. Sitler, 2018 WL 4041664, *1-2 (Pa. Super., filed Aug.

24, 2018) (record citations omitted; case citation formatted). In addition, we

note that on the first day of trial, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to

insurance fraud, conspiracy to commit insurance fraud, false reports to law

enforcement, conspiracy to commit false reports to law enforcement, unsworn

falsifications to authorities, conspiracy to commit unsworn falsifications to

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authorities, corruption of minors, conspiracy to commit corruption of minors,

obstructing the administration of law, and conspiracy to commit obstruction

of the administration of law. N.T. 2/6/17 (Open Guilty Plea), 3-4, 12-14.3

       Appellant appealed, challenging the admission of his prior manslaughter

conviction and the sufficiency of the evidence. Sitler, 2018 WL 4041664, at

*2-4. This Court affirmed the judgments of sentence, and our Supreme Court

denied a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Sitler, 195

A.3d 1024 (Pa. Super. 2018) (table) (1989 EDA 2017), allocatur denied,

203 A.3d 200 (Pa. 2019) (table) (604 MAL 2018).

       Appellant timely filed pro se his instant PCRA petition.        Counsel was

appointed and filed an amended petition. Amended PCRA Petition, 3/1/22.

Counsel adopted claims from the pro se petition alleging that trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by, inter alia, not objecting to a jury instruction

concerning the admission of his prior vehicular manslaughter conviction from

Alabama and not requesting funds for presenting an accident reconstruction

expert to rebut the Commonwealth’s expert testimony.                Amended PCRA

Petition, 3/1/22, § 7(a)-(b); Pro Se PCRA Petition, 2/13/20, 12-17, 21-24;

Appointment Order, 2/20/20, 1.                 In the counseled petition, Appellant

requested an evidentiary hearing at which he proposed that he would present

testimony from himself, trial counsel, and an accident reconstruction expert

____________________________________________

3  18   Pa.C.S.   §§    4117(a)(2),   903(a)(1)/4117(a)(2),    4906(b)(1),
903(a)(1)/4906(b)(1), 4904(a)(1), 903(a)(1)/4904(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i),
903(a)(1)/6301(a)(1)(i), 5101, and 903(a)(1)/5101, respectively.

                                           -4-
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identified as Kevin O’Connor.         Amended PCRA Petition, 3/1/22, ¶¶ 11-12.

PCRA counsel certified the proposed testimony for a hearing, noting that

Appellant would call the expert to testify “if [he was] financially able to do so.”

Id. at 13-15.

       The Commonwealth filed a response requesting the dismissal of the

petition. Commonwealth Answer and Motion to Dismiss, 6/21/22. The PCRA

court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Rule 907 Notice, 8/16/22. The court informed

Appellant that it was denying his request for a hearing because he failed to

provide certificates signed by his proposed witnesses and the certificate signed

by his counsel did not substantially comply with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). Id.

at ¶ 13. The court notified Appellant that his claim about the jury instruction

lacked arguable merit. Id. at ¶ 15. The court determined that it offered two

separate instructions about that evidence, it disagreed with Appellant’s

interpretation of the first instruction, and ruled that the combination of the

instructions properly informed the jury that it could not consider the prior

conviction as evidence showing criminal propensity.4 Id. at ¶¶ 15-19. The

court also informed Appellant that his claim concerning the failure to request

funds for an expert witness failed under all three prongs of the ineffective

assistance of counsel standard where the evidence presented at a pretrial

hearing on a motion for expert funds supported the conclusion that Appellant

____________________________________________

4 The same jurist presided in this case at trial and on collateral review.

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was not indigent. Id. at ¶¶ 20-25 & nn. 2-3. The court found that that the

claim was only developed “in the abstract” and that there was no reasonable

probability that rebuttal testimony from an expert witness would have

changed the result of his trial. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

      After Appellant filed a counseled response, addressing the adequacy of

his request for an evidentiary hearing and the proposed merit of his

ineffectiveness claim concerning the jury instructions, the court dismissed the

petition. Response to Rule 907 Notice, 10/14/22, ¶¶ 6-20; Dismissal Order,

10/19/22, 1. Appellant timely appeals. Notice of Appeal, 11/17/22, 1.

                                II.   ISSUES

      Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

       I.   Did the lower court err in its determination, without a
            hearing, that trial counsel provided to Appellant effective
            assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to
            the trial court’s improper cautionary instruction which
            advised the jury that it could consider Appellant’s prior
            conviction as evidence of his [propensity] to commit
            crimes[?]

      II.   Did the lower court err in its determination, without a
            hearing, that trial counsel provided to Appellant effective
            assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to petition
            the court for expert witness fees to retain the services of an
            accident reconstruction expert, where Appellant had
            become indigent and was unable to afford such expert to
            properly defend himself at trial[?]

     III.   Did the lower court err in denying Appellant an evidentiary
            hearing pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act inasmuch
            as Appellant had issues [of] meritorious of review that could
            only be properly considered following an evidentiary
            hearing[?]

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Appellant’s Brief at v (questions renumbered for ease of review; answers of

the lower court omitted; original in all caps).

                               III. ANALYSIS

      Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

      [W]e must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are
      supported by the record and whether the court’s legal conclusions
      are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable to the
      prevailing party. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations,
      when supported by the record are binding; however, this [C]ourt
      applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions. We must keep in mind that the petitioner has the
      burden of persuading this Court that the PCRA court erred and
      that such error requires relief. Finally, this Court may affirm a
      valid judgment or order for any reason appearing of record.

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

                                       A.

      Appellant claims that that the lower court erred by denying relief on his

claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to

the jury instruction offered by the lower court prior to admission of his prior

manslaughter conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 21-24. He argues that the PCRA

court ignores the plain wording of its former instruction, and that the

instruction should be read as improperly recommending that the jury could

conclude that he had a criminal propensity from which they could be inclined

to infer his guilt. Id. at 21-22.

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      The first two issues in this appeal review the effectiveness of Appellant’s

trial counsel. In addressing effectiveness claims:

      [W]e begin, as we must, with the presumption that counsel acted
      effectively. To prove otherwise, a petitioner must satisfy the
      performance and prejudice standard set forth in Strickland v.
      Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
      (1984), by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court has
      applied the Strickland test by requiring a petitioner to establish
      three elements: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2)
      no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3)
      the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      the result of the proceeding would have been different absent the
      error.

                                       …

            If a petitioner’s claim fails under any required element of
      the Strickland test, the claim may be dismissed on that basis. A
      court is not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness
      claim in any order of priority; if a claim fails under any necessary
      element, the court may proceed to that element first.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979-80 (Pa. 2023) (quotation

marks and most citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court instructed the jury, prior to the admission of the

prior manslaughter conviction, as follows:

      Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to direct you that the evidence
      about the prior incident -- the Alabama incident is not to be
      regarded as evidence shown that the person is a bad person or
      has bad character but has criminal tendency for which you may
      be inclined to infer guilt. It will be relevant as the Commonwealth
      will make out its case to show only knowledge of recklessness and
      not to show bad character.

                                      -8-
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N.T., Trial, 2/7/17, 8-9. The related Pennsylvania suggested jury instruction

for the admission of evidence of other offenses as substantive proof of guilt

provides:

      This evidence is before you for a limited purpose, that is, for the
      purpose of tending to [show [give specifics]] [contradict [give
      specifics]] [rebut [give specifics]] [give specifics]. This evidence
      must not be considered by you in any way other than for the
      purpose I just stated. You must not regard this evidence as
      showing that the defendant is a person of bad character or
      criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.

Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 3.08(2).

      Appellant argues that, by using the phrase “but has criminal tendency

for which you may be inclined to infer guilty” in the instruction, the trial court

“changed the entire directive to the jury as to what the jury could consider.”

Appellant’s Brief at 21. As a result, he asserts that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by not objecting to the instruction as an incorrect

statement of the law. Id. at 22.

      The PCRA court notes that its instruction “differ[ed] only slightly from”

the standard suggested criminal jury instruction by replacing the word “or”

from the suggested instruction with “but has” before the phrase criminal

tendencies. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 8. Despite this alteration, the court

alleges that the instruction as stated to the jury was proper because it “clearly

instruct[ed] the jury … to not use the prior conviction as evidence of bad

character.” Id. The court advises that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim was

meritless because a “reviewing court must consider the entire charge, not

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merely isolated fragments.” Id. citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 685

A.2d 96, 102 (Pa. 1996).

      Assuming “even if any juror was potentially confused over the

cautionary instruction at issue,” the PCRA court directs our attention to this

second relevant cautionary instruction that was given before the jury began

deliberations:

      Now, in this case, and you have heard the Commonwealth at least
      mention this, you have heard evidence tending to prove that the
      defendant was guilty of vehicular manslaughter for which he is not
      on trial. I am speaking of the testimony to the effect that
      Sergeant Carl Radcliff testified to the fact of a vehicular
      manslaughter conviction in Alabama in 2006.

      This evidence is before you for a limited purpose; that is, for the
      purpose of tending to show that the defendant had knowledge of
      recklessness of his conduct, that he consciously disregarded it,
      and that the defendant knew his driving behavior created a
      substantial risk of death.

      This evidence must not be considered by you in any way other
      than for the purpose I just stated. You must not regard this
      evidence as showing that the defendant is a person of bad
      character or criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined
      to infer guilt.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 9, quoting N.T. 2/8/17, 370-71 (removing

emphasis included in the court’s reproduction of the quote; including

paragraph breaks present in the notes of testimony). The court reasons that

by reading both instructions, “it is clear that the [trial c]ourt informed the jury

not to consider [Appellant’s] prior conviction as showing criminal tendency.”

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 9-10.             Appellant discourages us from

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considering the importance of this second instruction because “the damage

was done” with the first instruction and “[n]o accurate jury instruction at the

end of the case could cure such a taint.” Appellant’s Brief at 23.

       Upon reading the initial instruction in its full context, we agree with the

PCRA court that there was no arguable merit to Appellant’s ineffective claim.

Appellant’s theory for a misstatement of law is based only by reading the

phrase “has criminal tendency for which you may be inclined to infer guilt” out

of context from the remainder of the sentence in which it is used.            The

remainder explicitly told the jury that the prior conviction from Alabama was

not to be used to show two things about Appellant: (1) that he was “a bad

person;” or (2) that he “ha[d] bad character but ha[d] criminal tendency for

which [the jury] may [have been] inclined to infer guilt.” N.T., Trial, 2/7/17,

8-9.

       The second thing the jury was told to not extrapolate from the prior

conviction was that Appellant had both “bad character” and a “criminal

tendency,” which in these contexts could be read as referring to the same

personal defect or that the “tendency” aspect was a derivative characteristic

of “bad character.” In either interpretation, the inclusion of “but has" before

“criminal tendency” in the first sentence of the initial instruction merely

compounded the number of things the court properly told the jury to

disregard.   The court thereafter explicitly told the jury of the “relevant”

purpose of the evidence concerning the prior conviction, “to show only

knowledge of recklessness,” while reiterating that the evidence was “not to

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show bad character.”     When read as a whole, the instruction did not, as

Appellant suggests, show that the jury was told to disregard the evidence of

the prior conviction as “bad character” but simultaneously consider it as proof

of a “criminal tendency.” Because the instruction did not suggest an improper

use of the prior conviction, we ascertain no error in the PCRA court’s finding

that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacked arguable merit.

      Even if the first instruction had awkward syntax, we would consider the

second instruction relevant for reviewing the prejudice prong of the

ineffectiveness standard and agree with the PCRA court that the second

instruction cured any confusion caused by the first instruction.         While

Appellant suggests that the second instruction could not have had any curative

effect, he cites no caselaw to support that proposition. Appellant’s Brief at

23. We find that his bald assertion to that effect is incorrect.    See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 568 (Pa. 2009) (holding that

Small’s trial counsel was not ineffective in connection with a “prior bad acts”

instruction where counsel informed the trial court of the possible confusion in

its original instruction, and was able to get the court to issue a very clear,

limiting instruction benefiting Small).

                                          B.

      Appellant also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

request funds from the trial court to retain a witness to rebut the testimony

of the Commonwealth’s expert witness on accident reconstruction. Appellant’s

Brief at 24-29.    He asserts that trial counsel consulted with an accident

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reconstruction expert, but Appellant “r[a]n out of funds” by the time of trial

and was unable to afford the services of the rebuttal witness. Id. at 24. He

acknowledges that his counsel had unsuccessfully sought funding to hire a

private investigator and a toxicologist in 2013, but he faults counsel in his

claim for not seeking funds for an accident reconstruction expert in late 2016

and early 2017, leading up to his trial.5 Id. at 24-25.

       The PCRA court informs us that it denied the instant claim based on a

failure to sustain all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard. PCRA Court

Opinion, 1/17/23, 10. As for arguable merit, the court reasoned that, based

on the evidence presented with respect to the 2013 funding request motion –

i.e., Appellant paid in full a $10,000 retainer fee for his attorney, he had spent

over $1,900 on prison calls, and he owned a property in Florida with his ex-

wife – Appellant was not indigent and thus a subsequent request for expert

fees would have been meritless. Id. at 10-11. With respect to the reasonable

basis prong, the court asserts that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for

forgoing a subsequent request for expert funds after the 2013 request was

denied. Id. at 11. Lastly, the court notes two reasons for denial of the claim

for lack of prejudice.     Id. at 11-12.       First, it asserts that it did not find a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different had the second motion for expert funds been filed.               Id. at 11.

____________________________________________

5 We note that that a different jurist from the one who had sat as the trial
court and the PCRA court denied the 2013 request. See Order Denying Motion
for Appointment of Expert, 9/26/13, 1.

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Second, it finds that Appellant failed to properly plead and offer to prove his

claim. Id. at 11-12.

      Concerning the lack of claim development discussion, the PCRA court

notes that, in his amended PCRA petition, Appellant identified a proposed

accident reconstruction expert and stated that the expert would testify at a

PCRA hearing and would have appeared at trial if he had been paid an

“appropriate fee.” PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 12, citing Amended PCRA

Petition, 3/1/22, 5. The court referred to this ineffectiveness claim as one “in

the abstract” and noted that Appellant failed to establish that the witness was

available and willing to testify at the time of trial and failed to set forth the

substance of the proposed testimony from the proposed witness. PCRA Court

Opinion, 1/17/23, 12.

      Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s arguable merit reasoning by

noting that the 2013 ruling on his initial expert funds motions was not

dispositive of his financial status for a later request prior to trial and that

“there is no evidence in the record as to what [his] financial situation was

three years later in the fall of 2016.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. As for the court’s

discussion of the development of his claim, he asserts that his “pleadings

allege[d that] the witness was available, was willing to testify, but that

payment was the issue.”      Id. at 27.   He reasons that his claim had merit

because he “would have testified to his indigency in 2017” and “[t]rial counsel

would have testified that he never filed a motion seeking funds” for his

proposed accident reconstruction expert’s appearance. Id. Concerning the

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PCRA    court’s   lack   of   prejudice     finding,   Appellant   argues   that   the

Commonwealth’s expert witness lacked expertise in accident reconstruction

techniques and that his proposed witness would have “had an engineering

background and specific training, education, and experience in accident[ ]

reconstruction principles.” Id. at 28-29. Accordingly, he asserts, “[t]o boldly

say that the far superior defense expert would not have changed the outcome

of the proceedings is nothing more than pure speculation on the part of the

[PCRA] court.” Id. at 29.

       Relevant to this claim, this Court has held:

       In order to demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to call
       a witness, a petitioner must prove that the witness [ ] existed, the
       witness [was] ready and willing to testify, and the absence of the
       witness [’] testimony prejudiced petitioner and denied him a fair
       trial. In particular, when challenging trial counsel’s failure to
       produce expert testimony, the defendant must articulate what
       evidence was available and identify the witness who was willing to
       offer such evidence.

Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)

(quotation marks, quotation, and citations omitted).

       Additionally,

       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to
       present an expert witness, appellant must present facts
       establishing that counsel knew or should have known of the
       particular witness. Moreover, trial counsel need not introduce
       expert testimony on a client’s behalf if counsel is able to effectively
       cross-examine prosecution witnesses and elicit helpful testimony.

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Commonwealth v. K.M., 680 A.2d 1168, 1172 (Pa. 1996) (citations

omitted).   “The mere failure to obtain an expert rebuttal witness is not

ineffectiveness. Appellant must demonstrate that an expert was available who

would have offered testimony designed to advance appellant’s cause.”

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1143 (Pa. 2011).

      Upon reviewing the PCRA court’s stated reasons for denying the claim,

we are unable to join in the court’s analysis as to the arguable merit and

reasonable basis prongs of the ineffectiveness standard.             It does not

automatically follow that because Appellant was not indigent at the time of his

2013 request for expert witness funds that also he must not have been

indigent near the time of his trial that occurred years later. This is especially

true in the instant case where Appellant had increased litigation costs caused

by the Commonwealth’s appeal of the grant of his pre-trial motions in limine.

Moreover, the sentencing notes of testimony reveal that Appellant remained

in custody in this case and other criminal matters in the period following the

denial of the August 2013 request for funds. N.T. 5/25/17, 5-6. (noting that

Appellant received a credit for pre-trial detention in this case from December

10, 2012 through October 20, 2013, and then began serving time in other

matters).

      Appellant notes “there is no evidence in the record as to what [his]

financial situation was three years later in the fall of 2016,” but that assertion

points to his own failure to proffer evidence in support of his supposed

indigency in the course of the pre-trial litigation of this case. Appellant’s Brief

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at 25. Even without a hearing, Appellant could have proffered to the PCRA

court bank records, financial documents, or invoices for legal services in the

relevant period to support his theory that he was a suitable candidate for

indigent aid. Any pleading failure in those respects, however, is immaterial

where the PCRA court failed to even consider the possibility that Appellant was

indigent near the time of trial based on the prior denial of his request for funds

to retain an expert witness.

      In any event, we conclude that the PCRA court properly denied

Appellant’s claim for lack of prejudice because Appellant failed to demonstrate

a reasonable probability that a request for funds to retain an accident

reconstruction expert as a rebuttal witness would have changed the result of

his trial. In his amended PCRA petition, Appellant failed to proffer sufficient

evidence that would permit a prejudice finding in his favor. Mostly notably,

he failed to provide the PCRA court with any suggestion of how the proposed

testimony from an expert witness would have successfully rebutted the

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. At most, he alleged that, “if financially able

to do so, [he would have] call[ed] Kevin O’Connor to testify that had he been

asked to appear as an expert witness at trial he would have done so with the

payment of the appropriate fee, and would have provided testimony on

defendant’s behalf to rebut the prosecution’s accident reconstruction expert

witness.” Amended PCRA Petition, 3/1/22, § 12. That proffer may have been

sufficient for proving that trial counsel’s failure to request indigent funding

deprived him of a rebuttal witness, but it did nothing to advance Appellant’s

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burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to

pursue funds for an expert rebuttal witness. To the extent that the PCRA court

described the instant claim as only being asserted “in the abstract,” and thus

meritless on that basis, we agree.

      We also find that the PCRA court did not err or abuse its discretion with

respect to its conclusion that there was no reasonable probability that expert

rebuttal testimony would have changed the outcome of the proceeding given

the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt.     Here, the Commonwealth

presented expert testimony from Detective David Schanes on the subject of

crash reconstruction, and he testified that Mr. Paciello came to a final rest at

distance of 182 feet from the point of impact and that Appellant was driving

at least fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone when he struck

and killed Mr. Paciello. N.T. 2/8/17, 88-97, 156-61.

      Appellant proposed in his pro se PCRA petition that a rebuttal expert

would have been helpful to challenge Detective Schanes’ testimony in three

respects. First, he alleged that Detective Schanes used a flawed formula for

making his speed estimate. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 2/13/20, 23 (“there are

plenty of research papers and studies that show that the ‘Searle’ formula that

Detective Schanes used for his speed estimations is not only outdated … but

is also the wrong formula for that type of accident here … the Searle formula

is inappropriate for forward trajectory accidents.”) (emphasis removed).

Second, he asserted that Detective Schanes had insufficient training to allow

him to be up to date on more recent research on accident reconstruction

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studies. Id. at 24 (“It also likely would have shown that Detective Schanes’

lack of training for 18 years had him out of touch with the relevant up-to-date

science for accident reconstruction”).   Lastly, he asserted that there were

flaws in the detective’s methodology that could have been highlighted by an

expert. Id. (“The expert said things like Schanes failing to record the Event

Data Recorder information from the truck in question and failing to take more

consideration of the ‘wrap and carry’ involved in this accident (which would

have changed the ‘throw distance’ of Mr. Paciello) were fatal flaws to the

investigation’s accuracy.”).

      Each of Appellant’s proposed uses for a rebuttal witness, however, were

the subject of trial counsel’s extensive cross-examination of Detective

Schanes.    See N.T. 2/8/17, 102-03 (addressing the detective’s lack of

documentation for formal training following a 1999 collision reconstruction

case beyond a training that occurred in 2005); id. at 243-44 (review of the

formula applied by the software used by the detective to determine the truck’s

speed at the time of the impact); id. at 247-48 (confronting the detective

about the lack of acknowledgement of “wrap and carry” involvement in his

accident reconstruction report); id. at 249-53 (questioning about the

applicability of the Searle formula and how the formula does not factor in

individual shapes of particular models of vehicles and the size or shapes of

pedestrians struck in collisions); id. at 254-56 (questioning about the use of

a Leica Scanner to determine the speed of Appellant’s truck as it was viewed

in a video showing the truck decelerating after the impact); id. at 259-60

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(questioning about the possibility of recovering information from the event

data recorder from Appellant’s truck and the confirmation that an attempt for

recovery was made and the recorder was “blank”).

      Our review of the cross-examination of Detective Schanes supports the

PCRA court’s lack of prejudice conclusion. Trial counsel adequately challenged

the detective’s analysis on the point of the impact and the manner in which

he calculated the speed of Appellant’s truck at the time of the impact. By

contesting the point of impact to begin with, counsel tried to undermine the

entire methodology used by the expert. Rebuttal by another expert witness

would not have yielded a reasonable likelihood of a different trial outcome for

Appellant.   Detective Schanes acknowledged a lack of recent training on

accident reconstruction in the years leading up to the accident, but his expert

status was still accepted by the trial court upon voir dire review.           The

testimony revealed that there was no additional information to be gleaned

from the event data recorder from Appellant’s truck and the detective

explained how the use of the available video evidence assisted his calculations

made in this case. Further challenging the applicability of the Searle formula

and its inability to address particular shapes of individual vehicles with the use

of a rebuttal expert likely would not have had an exculpatory impact on the

verdict. Finally, where the launch distance of the victim was 182 feet, the

evidence easily permitted the jurors as the trier of fact to conclude that

Appellant was traveling at a speed well above the posted speed limit at the

time of the impact and thus his recklessness caused the death of the victim.

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      We agree with the PCRA court that there was overwhelming evidence of

Appellant’s guilt and that Appellant was unable to show prejudice by

demonstrating that a successful petition for rebuttal expert funds would have

resulted in a different trial verdict. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Treiber,

121 A.3d 435, 466 (Pa. 2015) (Trieber’s claim of ineffective assistance based

on the failure to call an arson expert to rebut the Commonwealth’s arson

testimony from a state fire marshal was meritless where Treiber failed to

argue that trial counsel’s cross-examination of the fire marshal was

inadequate and appellate review demonstrated that counsel effectively cross-

examined the fire marshal and elicited helpful testimony in support of the

defense’s theory of the case).

                                      C.

      In the remaining claim, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred by

denying him an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 16-21. The PCRA

court denied a hearing based on Appellant’s supposed lack of compliance with

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1) due to his failure to append completed certifications

for his proposed witnesses with his petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 6-

7. The court also denied a hearing because Appellant’s claims were “meritless

on their face.” Id. at 7. Our above discussion of Appellant’s ineffective claims

supports the PCRA court’s latter holding. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 961

A.2d 80, 85 (Pa. 2008) (where a PCRA petition does not raise a “genuine issue

of material fact,” the reviewing court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing on the petition).

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       With respect to Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim concerning the jury

instruction as to his prior conviction in Alabama, we have concluded that the

trial court’s initial instruction did not include a misstatement of law when the

instruction is read in its proper context. In the alternative, we have held that

any ambiguity with that instruction was ultimately cured by a second

instruction about the prior conviction that the court included in its final jury

instructions and thus Appellant could not prove prejudice on that claim.

Because the instructions did not mislead the jury, there was no need for

testimony from trial counsel to discuss his views on the instructions or his

failure to take any actions with respect to the initial instruction.

       As for the ineffectiveness claim concerning the failure to secure funding

for an expert rebuttal witness, we have held that Appellant could not prove

prejudice    because      his   trial   counsel    effectively   cross-examined   the

Commonwealth’s expert witness and there was no likelihood that expert

testimony would have changed the verdict given the overwhelming evidence

of Appellant’s guilt. With respect to either claim, there was no apparent need

for an evidentiary hearing and the PCRA court properly denied one on that

basis.6 See Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. 2011)

(no evidentiary hearing required where there are no genuine issues of material

facts, no relief is due, and the hearing would serve no legitimate purpose).
____________________________________________

6 Given that we discern that there was no need for a hearing and that
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims were meritless on their face, we need not
address whether Appellant’s certification for a hearing complied with Section
9545(d)(1).

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                          IV.   CONCLUSION

     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err

or abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant’s post-conviction petition

without a hearing.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 4/11/2024

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