Court Opinion

ID: 9379635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 21:02:14.036869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.764626
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/23 P. v. Eskridge CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B320037

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. NA024604)
           v.

 GREGORY ESKRIDGE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Gregory Eskridge appeals the trial court’s 2022 denial of
his request for a hearing to make a record of youth-related factors
relevant to his parole suitability pursuant to People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). The People agree that if this
court construes Eskridge’s notice of appeal to encompass his
Franklin request, Eskridge is entitled to a limited remand under
Franklin. We construe the appeal as including the trial court’s
denial of the Franklin hearing request and remand to the trial
court for a hearing regarding youth-related factors.

                  PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In 1996, Eskridge was convicted of second degree murder
(Pen. Code,1 § 187), attempted murder with premeditation and
deliberation (§§ 187 & 664), and assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). As to each count, the jury found that Eskridge
personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial court found true the allegation
that Eskridge had been convicted of a prior strike under the three
strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).)
The court sentenced Eskridge to a term of 58 years to life. It is
uncontested that Eskridge was 20 years old at the time the
offenses were committed.
      In 2019, Eskridge filed a petition for vacatur of his murder
conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) and

      1 Allfurther statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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former section 1170.952 (now § 1172.6) and a motion for a
hearing pursuant to sections 3051 et seq. and 4801, subdivision
(c) (the Franklin motion).
       The trial court considered and denied the section 1170.95
petition and the Franklin motion at the same hearing on
April 21, 2022. The court denied the Franklin motion on the
basis that Eskridge was sentenced pursuant to the three strikes
law and therefore ineligible.
       Eskridge timely appealed on April 25, 2022. The notice of
appeal indicates that the date of the order from which appeal was
sought was April 21, 2022. With respect to the nature of the
proceeding, the notice of appeal indicates that it is not an appeal
following a jury or court trial or a contested probation violation
hearing, but “[o]ther,” specifically, “Denial of motion under
1170.95.”

                          DISCUSSION

Franklin Hearings

       Section 3051, subdivision (b), requires the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing”
during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a defendant’s incarceration
if the defendant was 25 years old or younger at the time of the
offense. Section 3051, subdivision (h), excludes several categories
of juvenile offenders from eligibility for a youth offender parole
hearing, including defendants who are sentenced under the three

      2 EffectiveJune 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

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strikes law. Section 4801, subdivision (c) “requires the Board not
just to consider but to ‘give great weight to the diminished
culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.’ ”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
       In Franklin, our Supreme Court held “sections 3051 and
4801 contemplated ‘that information regarding the juvenile
offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the
offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to
facilitate’ consideration by the Board . . . . [Citation.] Because
assembling such information was ‘typically a task more easily
done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense’ [citation], [the
Supreme Court] remanded the case to the trial court to give
Franklin a chance to ‘put on the record the kinds of information
that sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender
parole hearing’ [citation]. [The Supreme Court] authorized the
trial court to receive ‘any documents, evaluations, or testimony
(subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at
[Franklin’s] eventual youth offender parole hearing.’ ” (In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446.) In Cook, the Supreme Court
held that the opportunity to present evidence relevant to an
eventual youth offender parole hearing was available to all
eligible youthful offenders regardless of whether their convictions
were final. (Id. at p. 450.) Most recently, in People v. Delgado
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 95, 102 to 104, the Fourth Appellate
District, Division Three, held that a youthful offender sentenced
under the three strikes law who was ineligible for a youthful
offender parole hearing was nonetheless entitled to a Franklin
hearing. Delgado reasoned that although section 3051 excluded

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defendants sentenced under the three strikes law, section 4801,
subdivision (c) applied to all parole hearings and also required
consideration of youth-related factors. (Id. at pp. 103–104.)

Scope of Eskridge’s Notice of Appeal

       The People concede, and we agree, that if properly raised
before this court, Eskridge is entitled to a limited remand to
make a record of youth-related factors relevant to his eventual
parole hearing. The People challenge this court’s jurisdiction to
consider Eskridge’s Franklin contention because Eskridge did not
reference that portion of the judgment in the notice of appeal.
The People cite to a civil case, Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 625, for the proposition that “It is
elementary that an appeal from a portion of a judgment brings up
for review only that portion designated in the notice of appeal.”
       Under the circumstances, we find Unilogic inapplicable.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(4) provides that with
respect to criminal appeals: “The notice of appeal must be
liberally construed. [With exceptions not relevant here], the
notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order
being appealed.” “No statute or rule purports to restrict criminal
appeals to issues stated in the notice of appeal. The rules do not
suggest the notice of appeal is to operate as a statement of
claims, or that it must include all contentions that may be raised
in the briefs.” (People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1109,
disapproved of on another ground in In re Chavez (2003)
30 Cal.4th 643, 656.) A liberal construction of the notice of
appeal implements “the strong public policy favoring the hearing

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of appeals on the merits.” (Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 960.)
       We conclude that Eskridge’s notice of appeal was
sufficient—he correctly specified the date of the hearing on which
his Franklin motion was denied. The common understanding at
the time the court made its ruling on April 21, 2022, was that
Franklin did not extend to defendants who were sentenced
pursuant to the three strikes law. Franklin had only been
applied to defendants who were not excluded from eligibility for
youth offender parole hearings under section 3051. People v.
Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 95, which held as a matter of first
impression that defendants who had been sentenced under the
three strikes law were entitled to a Franklin hearing, was not
issued until April 29, 2022, after the trial court denied Eskridge’s
Franklin request and after Eskridge filed his notice of appeal.
Only two issues were decided in the April 21, 2022 hearing—that
Eskridge was prima facie ineligible for section 1170.95 relief and
ineligible for a Franklin hearing. Both were decided in a cursory
fashion. It was not burdensome for the People to parse the issues
the trial court decided, nor were the People unfairly surprised
that Eskridge challenged the denial of the Franklin hearing in
light of the recent significant developments in the law. To
construe the notice of appeal as the People urge would deprive
Eskridge of an important opportunity that could impact his
liberty on the basis of a technicality. (People v. Robinson (1954)
43 Cal.2d 143, 145 [construing notice of appeal liberally to
“permit a hearing on the merits and avoid a dismissal because of
some technical defect or irregularity”]; accord, People v. Maggart
(1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 84, 87, fn. 1; see In re Gregory M. (1977)
68 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089–1090 [addressing issues respecting

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jurisdictional hearing on appeal although notice of appeal
specified appeal was from order granting probation].)
      We reverse the trial court’s denial of Eskridge’s motion for
a Franklin hearing and remand the matter for further
proceedings.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Eskridge’s motion for a Franklin
hearing is reversed and the matter is remanded for the trial court
to hold a hearing at which Eskridge may present evidence of
youth-related factors relevant to his eventual parole hearing.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           MOOR, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             KIM, J.

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