Court Opinion

ID: 9390625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 05:07:23.232638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.893219
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    April 27, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                   No. 359603
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
WALTER GALLOWAY,                                                    LC No. 19-006329-01-FC

                Defendant-Appellee.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       The prosecution appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order granting defendant’s
motion to suppress the statements he made during a custodial interview. We affirm.

                                          I. FACTS

        On March 3, 2019, Channing Strickland was leaving his sister’s home in Detroit when
defendant allegedly approached the house while holding a woman at gunpoint. The two men
engaged in a physical struggle, during which Strickland was shot and killed. After Strickland was
shot, defendant allegedly shot at witnesses, then stole a car and drove away.

        Defendant was taken into police custody and interviewed by two police officers on March
7, 2019. Before the interview, a police officer attempted to give defendant the required Miranda1
warnings. Defendant, however, interrupted the officer, insisted he knew his rights, and began
reciting the Miranda warnings. Defendant and the officer engaged in the following verbal
exchange regarding defendant’s Miranda warnings:

         Police Officer:       We just got a couple things we gotta cover, okay?

         Defendant:            Okay, no problem. Good job.

1
    Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

                                                -1-
                                 * * *

Police Officer:   All right. So, you know why you’re here Mr. Galloway?

Defendant:        No. I really don’t know. That’s why I was asking the
                  officer.

Police Officer:   Right. So, in order for me to tell you, I have to read you—
                  I—I have to give you your Constitutional rights, okay.

Defendant:        I—I already know. I know the stuff like the back of my
                  hand. I studied this stuff.

Police Officer:   You do? So, you know you have the right to remain silent.

Defendant:        Yeah, I know. Anything you say will be used against you. I
                  tell people in the street. Anything you say will be used, it
                  [indiscernible] in a court of law.

Police Officer:   Right. You have the right—

Defendant:        (Interrupting.) If you cannot afford this, if you can’t afford
                  that, the court appointed, [indiscernible] will be appointed
                  for you.

Police Officer:   Right to an attorney.

Defendant:        Blah blah blah blah. Yeah.

Police Officer:   All right. You understand that? You know if you can’t
                  afford that, you already said that. That one will be appointed
                  for you.

Defendant:        Yeah.

Police Officer:   And if you decide at any time to exercise any of those
                  rights—

Defendant:        You have the right to say, no, I don’t wanna talk.

Police Officer:   Absolutely.

Defendant:        I know I don’t have to talk right now.

Police Officer:   Okay.

Defendant:        But I have a testimony. So, God already granted me the
                  serenity to change the things I could and the power to know
                  the difference. So, I’ll give a real testimony. Y’all ready?

                                   -2-
                               Y’all watchin’? Y’all ready? Cause I’m ready. I was born
                               ready, 1983.

                                               * * *

       Police Officer:         Before, when we went over your rights, you said you
                               understood those and everything, right?

       Defendant:              Yes, I know all this stuff.

       Defendant then made several incriminating statements. At the end of the interview,
defendant was given a written copy of the Miranda warnings. An officer asked defendant to sign
the advice of rights form stating that he had been notified of his constitutional rights. As defendant
read the advice of rights form, the officer asked, “everything we went over, right?” Defendant
responded “uh-ha” in agreement, but refused to sign the form without his lawyer.

        Defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); three counts of assault with intent to murder, MCL
750.83; unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle, MCL 750.413; felon in possession of a firearm,
MCL 750.224f; and seven counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. Defense counsel moved to suppress defendant’s incriminating statements,
arguing that defendant never received his full Miranda warnings. The trial court granted
defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, holding that defendant was not given all required
Miranda warnings. This Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the trial
court’s order suppressing defendant’s statements.2

                                         II. DISCUSSION

        The prosecution contends that the trial court erred by suppressing defendant’s statements.
The prosecution argues that the record shows that defendant knew his Miranda rights, the Miranda
warnings were sufficient, any alleged defect in the police officer’s recital of the Miranda warnings
was caused by defendant’s own interruptions, and that defendant waived his right to hear the
Miranda warnings by interrupting and asserting that he knew his rights. We review de novo a trial
court’s decision to suppress evidence, and also review de novo questions of constitutional law.
People v Joly, 336 Mich App 388, 395; 970 NW2d 426 (2021). We review the trial court’s factual
findings for clear error, id., which occurs when this Court is “left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Abbott, 330 Mich App 648, 654; 950 NW2d 478
(2019).

       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” US Const, Am V.
Michigan’s constitution also guarantees that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against
himself or herself. Const 1963, art 1, § 17; People v Cortez (On Remand), 299 Mich 679, 691;

2
 People v Galloway, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 20, 2022 (Docket
No. 359603).

                                                 -3-
832 NW2d 1 (2013) (opinion by METER, J.). To protect this Fifth Amendment right, “the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct
1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Those procedural safeguards must come in the form of four
warnings provided to a suspect before custodial interrogation:

       “[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to
       remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
       [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot
       afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
       desires.” [Florida v Powell, 559 US 50, 59-60; 130 S Ct 1195; 175 L Ed 2d 1009,
       quoting Miranda, 384 US at 479 (alterations by the Powell Court.]

        Thus, to protect the constitutional guarantee against compelled self-incrimination, the
police must give the “Miranda warnings” before a custodial interrogation. People v Mathews, 324
Mich App 416, 425; 922 NW2d 371 (2018). The Miranda warnings themselves are not a
constitutional right; rather, they are mandated to protect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 11-12; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). The United States
Supreme Court “has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed.”
Powell, 559 US at 60. Instead, reviewing courts must inquire whether the warnings issued in a
given situation reasonably conveyed the Miranda warnings and thereby protected the
constitutional rights of the suspect. Id.

        In Mathews, this Court held that Miranda warnings must advise the interviewee of the right
to have counsel present before and during questioning. In Mathews, the defendant was interviewed
by the police while in custody after the police generally advised her of her right to counsel. Before
questioning, the officer told her “you have a right to a lawyer, if you cannot afford a lawyer, one
will be provided for free.” Id. at 422. The defendant also was provided written warnings that
stated:

       Before any questions are asked of you, you should know: (1) you have a right to
       remain silent; (2) anything you say may be used against you; (3) you have a right
       to a lawyer, and (4) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided free. [Id.
       at 421-422.]

        This Court held that the warnings were defective because they did not sufficiently convey
to the defendant her right to consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have an attorney
present during the interrogation. Id. at 421. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
suppress the defendant’s statement, reasoning that “Miranda was focused on the right to counsel
[during custodial interviews] as a corollary to the right against compelled self-incrimination” and
that “it is this right to counsel in connection with custodial interrogation that must be overtly
conveyed to a suspect under Miranda.” Id. at 439. The Matthews Court concluded that “the
essential information required by Miranda includes a temporally related warning regarding the
right to consult an attorney and to have an attorney present during the interrogation, not merely
general information regarding the ‘right to an attorney.’ ” Id. at 438. Thus, the “basic temporal

                                                -4-
information is key to ensuring that a defendant understands what the right to counsel entails, i.e.,
that it applies before and during the interrogation as opposed to some future point.” Id. at 439.

        As in Mathews, the Miranda warnings given to defendant in this case were deficient
because the warnings did not specify that defendant had the right to counsel before and during
interrogation. The prosecution argues that if the warnings were incomplete, it is because defendant
interrupted the police officer as he read defendant his Miranda warnings, assured the officers that
he knew his rights, and began reciting his rights. Despite defendant’s assurances that he knew the
Miranda warnings and understood his constitutional rights, however, it nonetheless was incumbent
upon the officers to provide defendant with the full Miranda warnings. The Miranda warnings
are “an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere”
and must be given regardless of the interviewee’s “age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities[.]” Miranda, 384 US at 468-469. Despite defendant’s interruptions and
assurances, interrogation could not successfully take place until he was told that he had the right
to consult with counsel both before and during the interrogation. Because the Miranda warnings
given to defendant in this case were incomplete, the trial court did not err by suppressing
defendant’s statements made during interrogation.

        The prosecution argues that the police officers in this case advised defendant that they had
to read the Miranda warnings before he was interviewed from which defendant should have been
able to infer that he was entitled to a lawyer immediately. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Although the officer in this case stated that he had to go over defendant’s rights before the
interview, then told defendant he had the right to an attorney, he nonetheless gave no temporal
context in connection to that right. Moreover, Miranda warnings are designed to explicitly state
the suspect’s rights without the suspect having to infer his or her rights. “Rather than assume
people are capable of inferring their constitutional rights, Miranda provides specific, clear-cut
warnings.” Mathews, 324 Mich App at 440. “In the face of Miranda’s clear dictates, we fail to
see how a warning lacking this essential information regarding the right to consult an attorney and
have an attorney present during an interrogation can be considered adequate.” Id.

       The police officer’s statement in this case that defendant could “decide at any time to
exercise any of those rights” also was not sufficient to inform defendant that he had the right to an
attorney before and during the interview. In Powell, the following warning was given to the
defendant:

       “You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent,
       anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a
       lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer,
       one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have
       the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”
       [Powell, 559 US at 54.]

         The United States Supreme Court found that the officers in that case did not entirely omit
any information Miranda required them to impart because they informed the defendant of his right
to talk to an attorney before answering the officers’ questions and to assert that right at any time
during the interview. Id. at 62. The Court concluded that the language “at any time,” in

                                                -5-
combination with the warning that the defendant could talk to counsel before being questioned,
was sufficient to inform the defendant that he had the right to counsel while being questioned.

        Here, the officer did not specifically inform defendant that he had the right to counsel
during the interview. Without that information being stated, the statement that defendant could
“decide at any time to exercise any of those rights,” was not sufficient to advise defendant of the
right to counsel during interrogation. Although defendant may have been able to infer that he was
immediately entitled to a lawyer from the police officer’s use of the phrase “any time[,]” the
purpose of the Miranda warnings is to prevent individuals from having to infer or guess what their
rights are.

        The prosecution also suggests that defendant waived his right to receive Miranda warnings
by interrupting the police officers while they were giving the warnings and insisting that he knew
the rights addressed by the Miranda warning. We disagree. A defendant may waive the
constitutional rights that are the subject of the Miranda warnings “provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 US at 444. Here, however, the
prosecution suggests that defendant waived his right to receive his Miranda warnings; that is, he
waived the obligation of the officers to advise him of his constitutional rights. As discussed, there
is no constitutional right to be given the Miranda warnings; it is not a constitutional right that a
defendant may waive. Rather, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that certain
warnings must be given by police to a defendant to apprise the defendant of certain rights and
thereby guard against the defendant’s self-incrimination. Although a defendant may waive the
constitutional rights protected by the Miranda warnings after receiving the Miranda warnings, a
defendant may not dispense with the officers’ obligation to give the Miranda warnings, which
would undermine the stated purpose of Miranda by allowing a defendant to waive constitutional
rights without being fully advised of the rights being waived. After Miranda warnings are given,
a person may knowingly and intelligently waive the rights protected by the warnings and agree to
answer questions or make a statement to police, but “unless and until such warnings are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against” the defendant. Miranda, 384 US at 479.

        There may be circumstances in which a defendant’s interrupting of an officer’s reading of
Miranda warnings constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Treesh v Bagley, 612 F3d 424, 433 (CA 6, 2010). In that case, Treesh was read the Miranda
warnings by a police officer. When the officer asked if Treesh understood the rights just read to
him, Treesh failed to respond. The officer began to read the Miranda warnings again, and Treesh
interrupted the officer, saying “Yeah, yeah, I know.” Treesh then recited the Miranda warnings,
only partially correctly, and told the officer that he understood his rights. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that under those circumstances the Ohio Supreme Court had not misapplied
federal law by concluding that Treesh knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment
rights. See id. Importantly, however, Treesh’s waiver was not a waiver of the reading of Miranda
warnings; it was a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights after first being apprised of those rights
through Miranda warnings. To allow a suspect to waive the reading of the Miranda warnings, and
thereby waive the Fifth Amendment rights that are the subject of the Miranda warnings without
having received the warnings mandated by Miranda, would be to permit waiver of constitutional
rights that cannot be demonstrated to be knowing and intelligent. In other words, a defendant may

                                                -6-
waive the constitutional rights articulated in the Miranda warnings, but cannot waive the duty of
the officers to advise him or her of those rights.

        To summarize, the inquiry is not whether a defendant already knows the constitutional
rights advised of in the Miranda warnings; the obligation of the police to provide Miranda
warnings is not limited to those suspects who are uninformed. Rather, the police are required to
provide Miranda warnings to all suspects before custodial interrogation regardless of the suspect’s
intelligence, education, or level of legal expertise. The Miranda warnings make the individual
“more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system.” Miranda, 384 US at
469. “[A] warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome [the
interrogation’s] pressures and to ensure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege
at that point in time.” Id. Regardless of whether a person claims to know his or her constitutional
rights, the police have an obligation to impart the Miranda warnings. There is no guarantee that
an individual fully knows his rights, even if he says he does, and the Miranda warnings serve as a
reminder to even a knowledgeable individual that interrogation by police is an adversarial
situation.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Deborah A. Servitto
                                                               /s/ Michael F. Gadola

                                                 -7-