Court Opinion

ID: 9561481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:10:17.169368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:49.966976
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Ms. Freeman, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The relevant portion of Southern Fire and Casualty Company’s application for insurance which was signed by Ms. Freeman appears as an exhibit at the end of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Southern Fire &c. Co. v. Freeman, 222 Ga. App. 308, 312 (474 SE2d 195) (1996). I agree with the majority that the application does contain the requisite statement regarding optional PIP coverage as required by OCGA § 33-34-5 (b) and that Ms. Freeman did sign that statement. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the requisite statement was in boldface type as required by the statute. The statement that was *62signed by Ms. Freeman is in heavy type, and the application does also contain less heavy type. However, the applicable statute did not require “heavy” type, but boldface type. “The common sense definition of boldface is that print which exhibits a face sufficiently heavy in appearance to cau se it to be more conspicuous than the prinwhich surrounds it.” Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 259 Ga. 257, 258 (379 SE2d 778) (1989).
Decided May 5, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied May 30,1997.
A review of the policy application shows that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, the requisite statement is not “set off by itself.” Although it is on a separate line, neither that separate line nor the statement’s heavy type justifies the majority’s conclusory assertion that the statement “is in boldface type.” To determine whether the requisite statement is in “boldface” type, as opposed to just heavy type, Goddard, supra, requires that we examine the print surrounding the statement. Much of that surrounding print is in heavy type. Immediately below the statement is a definition in heavy type. Immediately above the statement are boxes to be checked signifying acceptance or rejection of various optional coverages. Those boxes are conspicuous due to their columnar format, and each of the four columns are headed by the word “Reject” or “Accept” in heavy type. Above these headings is a mixture of heavy and less heavy type. Although the first letter in each word in the statement is capitalized, the same is true with regard to some of the surrounding heavy print. More importantly, all of the heavy type found in surrounding print is at least as heavy as the type in the requisite statement. Henry v. Gulf Ins. Co., 214 Ga. App. 516 (448 SE2d 230) (1994). See also Safeco Ins. Cos. of America v. Harris, 214 Ga. App. 207 (447 SE2d 128) (1994) (the requisite statement was conspicuous only because of its color and not because of its heavy appearance). Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the requisite statement is not “different enough to be conspicuous[.]” Windsor Ins. Co. v. Jeffery, 204 Ga. App. 557, 558 (1) (420 SE2d 15) (1992). Therefore, in my opinion the policy application does not satisfy the requirements of the then applicable statute as construed by this Court in Goddard. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Freeman, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that judgment, and I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.
*63McClain & Merritt, William S. Sutton, Michael L. Miller, for appellant.
B. Samuel Engram, Jr., for appellee. Hawkins & Parnell, Michael J. Goldman, Stephen M. Brooks, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Arnold E. Gardner, Kari A. Mercer, amici curiae.