Court Opinion

ID: 9689273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:26:51.160887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:46.656730
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt to sustain a conviction. Consequently, I would reverse the conviction and vacate the resulting sentence.
In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, this Court views the trial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. The prosecutor is required to introduce some competent direct or circumstantial evidence on each element of the crime charged so as to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., People v Freeland, 101 Mich App 501, 504; 300 NW2d 616 (1980).
The charges against defendant arose out of the May 19, 1978, shooting of Andre Witcher at a party in the basement of a house in Detroit. The complainant testified that he was in the basement when people began running in all directions. He was grabbed by someone who asked him who he was. Witcher struggled with and struck the person and then ran for the stairs leading out of the basement. He testified that he heard a gunshot and jumped back. When he started for the stairs again, a second shot was fired which struck him in the chest. Witcher stated that he saw defendant with a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle after the first gunshot and that it was defendant who shot him. Witcher was hospitalized and, at the time of trial, confined to a wheelchair. Police investigating the incident found a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle and a *463.38 caliber handgun, both of which had been recently fired, in a trash receptacle behind the house. Other witnesses testified to seeing defendant with such a sawed-off rifle. In his opening statement and throughout trial, the prosecutor proceeded on a theory that defendant actually shot Witcher and was, under the circumstances, thereby guilty of assault with intent to murder. However, the final prosecution witness, a police officer who conducted ballistics tests, testified that the bullet which struck Andre Witcher was a .25 caliber projectile and was fired from a handgun. The officer concluded that the bullet could not have been fired from the .22 caliber sawed-off rifle found at the scene. Apparently, the tests were conducted after the commencement of trial and the results were a surpise to the prosecution. The jury was then instructed on two alternative prosecution theories: that defendant was guilty either as a principal or as an aider and abettor of the unknown person who actually shot Witcher.
The crime of assault with intent to commit murder requires proof of an assault committed with the specific intent to murder which, if successful, would have made the killing murder. People v Harris, 110 Mich App 636, 644; 313 NW2d 354 (1981), People v Eisenberg, 72 Mich App 106, 114; 249 NW2d 313 (1976). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, I conclude that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt as a principal. All of the evidence pointing to defendant’s possession or use of a weapon linked him to the .22 caliber rifle recovered by the police. However, police ballistic tests established that the weapon was not that used to assault the complainant. Indeed, the prose*464cutor conceded as much in his closing argument to the jury.
I also conclude that the evidence was insufficient to permit conviction under an aiding and abetting theory.
"To be held criminally liable for a specific intent crime as an aider or abettor, a defendant must have had either the requisite specific intent or known that the actual perpetrator had the required intent. People v Frederick Lester, 78 Mich App 21; 259 NW2d 370 (1977), People v Poplar, 20 Mich App 132; 173 NW2d 732 (1969). Intent is a question of fact to be inferred from the circumstances by the trier of fact. People v Spry, 74 Mich App 584; 254 NW2d 782 (1977), People v Sharp, 57 Mich App 624; 226 NW2d 590 (1975). It is likewise a factual issue whether a particular act or crime committed was fairly within the intended scope of the common criminal enterprise. People v Haack, 396 Mich 367; 240 NW2d 704 (1976), People v McGuire, 39 Mich App 308; 197 NW2d 469 (1972), People v Pearce, 20 Mich App 289; 174 NW2d 19 (1969), People v Poplar, supra.” People v Wirth, 87 Mich App 41, 46-47; 273 NW2d 104 (1978), People v Harris, supra, 642-643.
There was no evidence that defendant knew that the actual perpetrator had the specific intent to murder, for the reason that the evidence failed to point to any individual as the actual perpetrator. One witness, Carolyn Marshall, testified that Darryl "MC” McCorvey, one of the men accompanying defendant to the party, shot Andre Witcher. However, upon further questioning, she conceded that "MC” fired shots which did not hit anyone, that Witcher was hit by a third shot and that she did not know who fired that third shot.
Finally, the prosecution failed to elicit evidence *465that defendant himself, as an aider and abettor, possessed the specific intent to murder. Darryl McCorvey testified that the reason he, defendant, and the others went to the party was that they had heard that someone there was going to "jump on” defendant’s younger brother and threaten him with a gun. They intended, according to McCorvey, to take the younger brother from the party. Other witnesses testified that defendant and his cohorts were armed when they entered the party and that gunfire erupted shortly afterwards. Apparently, other unknown persons in the basement also possessed firearms; McCorvey was also wounded during the skirmish. No .25 caliber handgun was ever recovered, nor did any witness report seeing one. Any conclusion as to who fired the shot that wounded the complainant would be a speculative one at best. While the evidence allows an inference that defendant and his companions had less than pure motives when they entered the party, there was no competent direct or circumstantial evidence to support a conclusion that defendant had the specific intent to murder.
For these reasons, I would hold that the trial evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for assault with intent to murder, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor, and, therefore, I would reverse the conviction and vacate the resulting sentence. Because double jeopardy principles preclude retrial upon reversal for insufficient evidence, I would instruct the trial court to order the defendant discharged. Hudson v Louisiana, 450 US 40; 101 S Ct 970; 67 L Ed 2d 30 (1981), Burks v United States, 437 US 1; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978), People v McCurtis, 84 Mich App 460; 269 NW2d 641 (1978).