Court Opinion

ID: 9459117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:11:25.621319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:01.960793
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I concur fully in Judge Robb’s dissenting opinion, but I wish to add one further point. The majority reverses Mills’ conviction by holding that the pre-detention inventory search which produced the evidence against him was illegal because he was not expressly offered the opportunity to avoid detention by posting collateral for the relatively minor offense for which he was being arrested. The reversal thus turns on the single factual question of whether he was given the opportunity to post collateral at the station house during the booking procedure that ultimately included the search declared illegal today.
As discussed more fully in Judge Robb’s opinion, this question was neither raised nor decided in the trial below, thus necessitating the remand proceedings we ordered to examine the circumstances of Mills’ booking. Because of Officer Ivery’s intervening death and the inability of any other party to the book*1243ing procedure to recall any details thereof, the remand proceedings were almost wholly unproductive of relevant evidence concerning Mr. Mills’ booking. Coupled with the majority’s decision to entirely disregard Mr. Mills’ version of the events leading to his search, we are left with no direct evidence in this record on the critical question of whether he was given the opportunity to post collateral. The majority’s conclusion that Mills was denied that opportunity thus rests entirely on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence of very limited probative value.
Attempting to bolster their argument with testimony from the key Government witness — Officer Ivery — the majority, however, seeks to draw that inference from testimony that is not relevant to the question the majority opinion is based upon:
At trial, Officer Ivery testified that when he arrested Mills he did not ask whether Mills had sufficient money to post collateral for the offense . . . (majority opinion at 12)
The testimony to which this statement refers is as follows:
[Defense counsel]. Did you ask Mr. Mills whether or not he had sufficient money to post collateral for the offense you intended to charge him with?
[Officer Ivery]. No, sir, I did not.
Q. At that point you called the scout car from the station.
A. I called a scout ear as soon as I felt it was necessary. I don’t know at what point it was. (Tr. 47-47a)
This colloquy referred only to the time when Officer Ivery initially stopped Mills on the street — before he had verified that Tatum, the registered owner of the car, had authorized Mills to drive it. At that point in time, the facts known to Officer Ivery required him to consider the possibility that the car might have been stolen. Since auto theft is not a minor offense for which collateral may be posted, Officer Ivery’s failure to mention collateral to Mills at this time is absolutely irrelevant to the question of whether, having eliminated the possibility of such charges, Officer Ivery subsequently gave Mills the chance to post collateral at the station house.
Following its summary of Officer Ivery’s testimony, the majority opinion concludes that
the foregoing record amply establishes that Mr. Mills was not given an opportunity to post collateral.
In addition, we note that there is not a glimmer of a suggestion in Officer Ivery’s testimony — in either direct or cross-examination, either at the pretrial hearing or at trial — -that the booking of Mr. Mills, and conduct of an inventory search incident thereto, was accompanied by a reference, avowedly not accorded on the street, to any opportunity to post collateral, (majority opinion at 1237)
It is a grossly improper evaluation of the testimony to say that “the foregoing record amply establishes” (emphasis added) the fact. The majority blithely ignores the fact that the reason Officer Ivery’s testimony is devoid of such a suggestion is that he was never asked whether Mills had been given a chance to post collateral when he was booked. So it is equally true that Officer Ivery’s testimony reveals “not a glimmer of a suggestion” that Mr. Mills was not accorded “any opportunity to post collateral” at the station house. The majority’s conclusion is at best completely speculative and at the worst plainly erroneous. The direct evidence in the record, both at trial and at the remand hearing, is wholly silent on the question of Mills’ opportunity to post collateral. To the extent that the majority relies on Officer Ivery’s testimony, it reaches a conclusion on an issue that was not being litigated and concerning which the witness never addressed himself. His intervening death makes the majority’s use of his testimony to support their speculative inference a matter of great consequence — to this case and to our
*1244system of justice. It refuses to conform to established appellate procedures in criminal cases.
I am authorized to state that Judge Robb concurs in this opinion.