Court Opinion

ID: 9909313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 23:02:24.628472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:43.748929
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Valle CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F081260
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 1407606)
                    v.

 KELLY FABIAN VALLE,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Nancy A.
Leo, Judge.

         Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         After a previous confrontation with Christopher Diaz and Mark Ochoa at Diaz’s
home, defendant Kelly Fabian Valle returned with Eric Arguello, Victor Zapien, Jr., and
David Ferrel, Jr. Defendant, Ferrel, and Zapien were all armed with guns. During the
ensuing confrontation, Diaz and Ochoa were shot to death and Diaz’s friend, W.H., was
also shot at, but he managed to escape. At trial, defendant admitted shooting Ochoa, but
testified Ochoa fired the first shot and he fired back. Officer Larry Meyer pursued the
group’s fleeing truck, and during the pursuit, a passenger of the truck fired gunshots in
Meyer’s direction. The truck eventually stopped and the occupants other than the driver
(Arguello)—defendant, Ferrel and Zapien—exited. They were all ultimately
apprehended by law enforcement.
       In connection with the incident, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
of Diaz and Ochoa and found true related Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d)
and (e) firearm enhancements (counts I [Diaz] & II [Ochoa]), two counts of attempted
premeditated murder of Officer Meyer and W.H. (counts III [Officer Meyer] & V
[W.H.]) and found true related section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e) firearm
enhancements, possession of a weapon as an ex-felon (count VII), and active
participation in a criminal street gang (count IX). The court found true a section 667.5,
former subdivision (b) prison prior allegation. (Undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.)
       During defendant’s trial the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office started
investigating defendant’s trial attorney (Frank Carson) for capital murder and other
charges. For a month during defendant’s trial, the government wiretapped Carson’s
phone. Carson believed his communications and his investigator’s communications had
been intercepted, and the court conducted two in camera hearings and accepted the
detective’s representations that there had been no breach of attorney-client confidences in
relation to this case. After the verdicts, Carson withdrew as defendant’s counsel and was
later charged and acquitted of crimes in connection with the investigation. He ultimately
was reinstated as defendant’s counsel years later, after Carson was acquitted of the
charged offenses.

                                             2.
       Defendant challenges his convictions on several grounds. First, he contends the
government engaged in egregious misconduct by intercepting confidential attorney-client
communications mandating reversal or dismissal of the charges against him. He also
asserts insufficient evidence supports his convictions for attempted premeditated murder
of W.H. and Meyer (counts III and V); the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472 in the jury
instructions resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights; the prosecutor engaged in
prejudicial misconduct and the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced him requiring
dismissal or reversal. He further argues recent changes in the law, namely Assembly Bill
No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), and the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692, require reversal of his substantive gang
conviction (count IX), the gang-related firearm enhancements, and the prison prior
enhancement. He argues the People should be prohibited from retrying the gang-related
firearm enhancements on remand but should be allowed to retry count IX.
       We reverse defendant’s conviction on count IX for active participation in a
criminal street gang, the gang-related firearm enhancements attached to counts I, II, III,
and V, and the prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the People may
retry count IX and the gang-related firearm enhancements. In all other respects, we
affirm the judgment.
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant and his three codefendants, Zapien, Arguello, and Ferrell, were charged
with multiple offenses in relation to a shooting that led to the death of Christopher Diaz
and Mark Ochoa and a subsequent shooting at Officer Larry Meyer during their escape.
Before trial, the defendants moved to bifurcate the gang allegations and the court denied
the request. A mistrial was declared as to codefendant Ferrel midtrial because his
attorney was unable to proceed due to medical issues.

                                              3.
Prosecution Evidence
       Events Leading Up to the Shooting at Maxine Drive
       W.H. lived around the corner from Christopher Diaz in 2009 and they saw each
other daily. They would “[h]ang out, drink beers, [and] smoke weed.” They were in a
graffiti crew referred to as “BTL.” W.H. met Mark Ochoa, whom Diaz referred to as his
cousin, while hanging out at Diaz’s house. W.H. associated with the Norteño street gang
at the time, but he denied being a Norteño. He believed Ochoa also associated with the
Norteños, specifically, the South Side Modesto set. W.H. denied still associating with the
Norteño street gang at the time of trial and he reported that Diaz did not claim Norteño.
       A week before Diaz was killed, Diaz and W.H. were drinking in a park with
Arguello, whom they hung out with occasionally and referred to as “Flaco.” The police
pulled up and started questioning them. The police asked Arguello about the dot tattoos
on his hands and Arguello responded that he did not “bang.” W.H. was surprised by
Arguello’s answer and Diaz looked at Arguello “like he couldn’t believe it.” W.H.
believed Arguello identified with the “Norte” gang and Arguello had stated “he was big
time.” Arguello was always wearing a lot of red. Arguello appeared nervous after the
police left. He, Diaz, and W.H. proceeded to meet up with a group outside and were
drinking when a fight broke out between a male and Diaz. W.H. ran into the fight. When
W.H. and Diaz turned around, Arguello was gone. Arguello did not say anything before
leaving; he just took off. W.H. thought Arguello was a fake Norteño given Arguello’s
previous representations that he was “big time,” “down,” and “wasn’t scared.” Diaz
called Arguello out a few days later, saying, “‘Man, Flaco, you were gone with the
wind.’” Arguello seemed bitter. W.H. did not see Arguello again until the night of the
murders.
       August 2009 Shooting on Maxine Drive
       On August 31, 2009, W.H. had been at Diaz’s house since approximately noon;
Ochoa arrived around 3:00 p.m. They were hanging out, drinking, talking, and listening

                                            4.
to music in front of the house of Diaz’s neighbor, R.M. At some point, Arguello showed
up with defendant in a red, four-door, F-150 pickup truck. At trial, W.H. testified
defendant and Arguello arrived around 9:00 p.m., but he previously reported to police the
initial interaction occurred right before 11:00 p.m. They parked in front of Diaz’s house
and got out of the truck. According to W.H., Arguello and defendant were “drunk” and
“belligerent.” Defendant was “[s]loppy,” “swaying.” Diaz went over to talk to them. He
was mad because Arguello brought defendant to the house in that condition while Diaz’s
mother was inside. W.H. stayed with R.M. in front of R.M.’s house, but he heard them
talking. Arguello invited them to a party. An argument started and W.H. heard yelling.
He went over to see what was going on. When W.H. walked closer, he saw defendant
“acting hard,” staring at Diaz. Diaz was asking Arguello why he brought defendant over.
       Diaz’s mother, T.C., was inside the house and heard Ochoa arguing with someone.
T.C. went outside and saw Ochoa and defendant right in front of each other yelling back
and forth; Arguello was standing off to the side. According to T.C., defendant had a
shaved head and an “N” tattoo on the back of his head. Defendant seemed very drunk
and angry, and he was asking Ochoa “if he bangs, and he was saying that he was in
SPN.” Both T.C. and W.H. testified Ochoa told defendant his name and that “he was
from Deep South Side.” T.C. recounted that defendant and Ochoa moved closer toward
each other and were chest to chest when T.C. stepped in. She told them “there’s gonna
be no fighting here.” Defendant told her, “‘Shut up, bitch.’”
       At trial, W.H. testified defendant looked at T.C. and was “trying to hit on her.”
Defendant said, “‘What’s up, bitch?’” However, W.H. had previously reported to
Detective Hicks that defendant told T.C., “Shut the fuck up.” W.H. testified Diaz “lost it
at that point”; he was ready to fight. Diaz took off his shirt and said, “‘What’s up, fool?’”
Arguello backed up and was “kind of laughing.” Arguello said, “‘He’s drunk fool,’” and
that they would leave. W.H. testified, at that point, defendant turned his attention to
Ochoa because Diaz and Ochoa were following him out to the street. While looking at

                                             5.
Ochoa, defendant said “‘What’s up, fool? You bang? You bang?’” According to
Detective Hicks, W.H. previously reported defendant also asked “if they were active.”
Ochoa responded, “‘Hell, yeah, fool, South Side Modesto, Norte gang.’” Defendant told
Ochoa he had never heard of him or seen him, and he was going to “run” his name.
Defendant then asked Ochoa for his name and Ochoa responded, “‘Sharky, fool. Run
it.’” W.H. testified Ochoa was irritated defendant was “calling him on that.” Ochoa was
ready to fight with his fists up saying, “‘Fuck this shit, dude. What the fuck are you
about, you know?’” Defendant was laughing like it was a joke and Arguello was backing
up toward the truck saying they would leave. W.H. heard defendant say, “‘Fuckin’
leyvas,’” as they backed up. Defendant was on his phone as he walked behind Arguello
back to the truck. Diaz or Ochoa told Arguello not to “‘bring that fool back over here.’”
Arguello got in the driver’s seat of the truck. As defendant got into the truck, he was
angry and said, “‘We’ll be back, fool, we’ll be back,’” “‘pinta style, mother fuckers.’”
Arguello and defendant then left.
       T.C. testified Diaz and Ochoa were talking after Arguello and defendant left; they
did not seem upset by the interaction with defendant and Arguello. W.H. described the
confrontation between defendant and Ochoa as a “personal” issue when he discussed it
with Detective Hicks. W.H. denied it was a gang issue; he explained it was related to
defendant being disrespectful in front of T.C.
       W.H. testified he continued to hang out with Ochoa and Diaz for about an hour.
They wanted to smoke, so W.H. went to buy marijuana and went home to change. He
was gone for half an hour. Around midnight, as W.H. was walking back, he saw the
truck driving in the direction of Diaz’s house. W.H. noticed two more heads in the truck
and he started running down the street. (W.H. initially reported there were five people in
the truck but later stated there were only four.) W.H. saw the truck make a U-turn and
park two houses away from Diaz’s house. Diaz and Ochoa were in the street and Diaz
had his shirt off. Diaz’s neighbor R.M. was also there and said he was “‘gonna get a

                                             6.
bat’”; he left and did not return. W.H. saw all four doors of the truck open and watched
four people get out. According to W.H., Arguello got out of the driver’s side, defendant
exited the front passenger side, and two men with bandanas on their faces exited the
backseat from either side of the truck. The masked man that exited from the rear
passenger side had “Mongolian style hair”; W.H. identified him as Zapien at trial. The
masked man who exited from the rear driver’s side was bald; W.H. identified him as
Ferrel at trial. The group walked in a straight line slowly toward W.H., Diaz, and Ochoa.
       W.H. testified he, Diaz, and Ochoa were next to each other in the street in front of
Diaz’s house; Ochoa and Diaz had their fists clenched ready to fight. W.H. believed they
were about to have a fistfight; he denied having a gun or seeing Diaz or Ochoa with one
that night. Then, defendant pulled out a silver revolver and the two masked men pulled
out guns and they started running toward W.H., Diaz, and Ochoa. The man with the
Mongolian-style hair had a gun that looked like a black Glock, but it had an extended
clip. The other masked man had a dark-colored revolver.
       As they approached, W.H., Ochoa, and Diaz “got split up.” W.H. backed up and
was on the lawn. The masked man with the Mongolian-style hair was pointing his gun at
W.H., grabbing W.H.’s shirt, and pushing him back; he was saying, “‘Get on your knees,
mother fucker.’” The bald masked man “was bouncing around going, ‘Where’s Chris?
Which one’s Chris?’” Diaz was backing up towards his driveway. The bald masked man
approached Diaz and pointed a gun at him. Ochoa was in the street; he spun around and
was backing up with his hands up. Defendant was pointing his gun at Ochoa’s face,
saying, “‘Get on your knees, mother fucker’” and “‘What now bitch? What now?’”
W.H. could hear Arguello laughing from the street and saying, “‘Talk shit now, bitches.’”
       Then, W.H. saw defendant shoot Ochoa “[p]oint blank in the chest in the street
backing up” with the silver revolver. W.H. testified it was the first shot fired and
everybody looked in that direction. Ochoa fell back. W.H. pushed the male pointing the
gun at his head and turned and ran, zig-zagging in and out along the sidewalk and

                                             7.
driveways. He heard multiple gunshots fired as he was running; it sounded like they
were coming from multiple different guns. W.H. got around the corner and saw a spark;
he believed they were chasing him and that he was running for his life as he continued to
hear gunshots.1 W.H. jumped a fence into a yard. He did not hear any more gunshots at
that point. W.H. threw up and then peeked back over the fence. He saw the truck pulling
up around the corner and he could see the occupants looking around. The truck made a
U-turn and left.
       W.H.’s mother had been calling him on his cell phone; he returned the call to his
mother and told her where he was; she drove up and W.H. ran and got inside the car.
W.H. saw a carload of “Nortes” who were members of the LOC gang—Diaz’s brother’s
gang—in front of his mother’s car. The occupants asked what happened. W.H. told
them he did not know and said, “They fuckin’ killed them.” The car went looking for the
truck. W.H. and his mother drove around the neighborhood before going home. W.H.
spoke to Detective Evers about an hour later.
       T.C. testified she went inside and went to bed after coming outside during the
initial confrontation. She later woke up to multiple rounds of gunshots (though she told
Detective Hicks she was awakened by a slamming door). T.C. ran outside into the road
and did not see anyone. She ran back towards her house and saw Diaz lying in between
cars on the driveway. Diaz was on his back and blood was coming out of his side.
       Diaz had seven bullet wounds, including an entrance bullet wound on the back of
his right shoulder and another one on the left side of his chest. Another bullet wound was
found in the front part of Diaz’s right thigh. There were four “through-and-through
gunshot wounds.” Diaz died from the multiple gunshot wounds to his chest, back, and

       1When asked if he heard gunshots coming at him as he was running, W.H. responded: “I
don’t recall. I heard multiple gunshots. There was just guns going off.” He testified he knew
the guns were directed at him ‘[b]y the judgment [sic] of a spark.” Detective Jon Evers testified
W.H. did not mention during his interview about seeing sparks as he ran away.

                                                8.
extremities. Four projectiles—large caliber copper-jacketed lead slugs—were recovered
during an autopsy of Diaz’s body: one from his right thigh, one from his back, one from
his left chest cavity, and one that was located when his jean shorts were removed. T.C.
denied Diaz owned a gun. She found out after the incident that Ochoa had a gun.
       T.C.’s neighbor and his daughter were outside around 10:00 p.m. that night when
they saw Diaz and three other males in front of the house across the street. It looked like
the males were about to have a fight when T.C. came outside and told them to leave.
Two of the males left in a red truck. Then, around midnight, the same neighbor heard
gunshots in front of his house. A man later identified as Ochoa ran into the neighbor’s
house through the garage door and collapsed in the hallway; he had a gun in his left hand.
He was lying face down and then turned over; he was moaning. Ochoa asked the
neighbor for help; he looked like he had a bullet wound on his side. Ochoa handed the
neighbor a black semiautomatic pistol and told him, “‘Get rid of this.’” The gun was
later identified as a Glock; it had an empty nine-millimeter magazine. The neighbor’s
wife called 911.
       An autopsy of Ochoa’s body revealed a bullet wound in his right chest; shell
fragments, a possible projectile, a copper jacket fragment and a piece of a bullet were
also located during the procedure. The gunshot wound to Ochoa’s chest was determined
to be the cause of his death. A large capacity magazine with 30 live cartridges and a
black cellular phone were also recovered from the scene at the neighbor’s house. The
neighbor testified his pickup truck and van were parked in the driveway that evening.
The truck was hit by two bullets in the fender and one in the tire.
       Shooting Involving Officer Meyer During Subsequent Pursuit
       Officer Larry Meyer was working the night of August 31, 2009, in a black and
white, marked patrol car when he received a radio call regarding several shots fired in
northeast Modesto on Maxine Drive. Meyer started driving in that direction; Officer

                                             9.
Daniel Phillips was traveling in a car behind him. Meyer then received further
information by radio that a red Ford pickup truck may be associated with the shots that
were fired.
       As Meyer was responding to the shooting, he saw at an intersection a red Ford
pickup truck matching the description of the vehicle broadcasted on the radio. Meyer
broadcasted that he observed a truck matching the suspect vehicle on the radio. With
Officer Phillips behind him, Meyer began to follow the truck; he was waiting for backup
before making a felony stop. The truck was going the speed limit but then began to pick
up speed to 60 mph in a 35 mph zone. The truck proceeded through a stop sign at
approximately 60 mph. Meyer put on his emergency lights and siren to pull the truck
over and broadcasted on the radio that “they are running.” The truck continued driving at
60 mph and did not yield to the emergency lights and siren. As the truck made a right
turn on Boston Way, a passenger on the right side of the truck fired two or three shots in
Meyer’s direction. Meyer saw the muzzle flashes. He was about two to three car lengths
away. He backed off and reported over the radio they were shooting at him.
       Meyer continued to pursue the truck with his lights and sirens on. The truck
eventually pulled over on Sunny Park Drive and three people got out. Officer Meyer
testified, when the right rear passenger got out of the truck, he fired two to three more
rounds in Officer Meyer’s direction. Officer Meyer was in his car approximately three
car lengths away. The three individuals that got out of the truck started running
westbound behind the houses on that street. Meyer stayed in that location while the truck
took off.
       Officer Phillips continued to follow the truck after the three people got out. The
truck parked in a driveway and Officer Phillips and two other officers approached it. A
Hispanic male that Officer Phillips identified at trial as codefendant Arguello stepped out
of the driver’s side of the truck. Officer Phillips noticed a shell casing in the bed of the

                                             10.
truck later that morning. It was identified as a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber brass shell
casing. Two .40-caliber shell casings were found on Boston Way.
       Sergeant Aaron Tait was initially dispatched to Maxine Drive but later went to the
crime scene at Sunny Park Drive. He located Officer Meyer’s patrol vehicle parked on
Sunny Park Drive. Law enforcement also located a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson brass
casing on Sunny Park Drive and booked it into evidence.
       Apprehension of Defendant, Ferrel, and Zapien
       Sergeant Kelly Scott was tasked with conducting a yard-to-yard search for the
truck’s occupants that night within a certain given block of a gated residential community
around 3:00 a.m. Approximately an hour into the search, he was informed by a tactical
officer on a police helicopter of a “heat signature of an unknown object in a backyard” of
a residence on Hearthstone Lane. Sergeant Scott went to the residence, knocked on the
door, and swept the yard. His team released a police canine into the backyard of the
residence and then went back there. Scott moved toward a cardboard box in the middle
of the backyard and put his foot inside. He discovered a shirtless man, identified at trial
as Zapien, hiding inside and immediately retracted his foot and alerted the other officers.
Scott described the individual as a heavier set male with a long, dark ponytail. After
Zapien was removed from the box, a cellular phone was also found inside. A black
T-shirt was located on a roof line inside that backyard. Zapien had a long “Mongolian-
type” ponytail and several tattoos, and he was wearing blue jean shorts and black and
white Nike-type shoes. He had abrasions and lacerations on his arms and torso.
       Scott’s team continued its search of the area and observed the front door of
another residence on Hearthstone Lane standing open. They swept the exterior and
cleared the interior of the residence. Sergeant Scott was notified by radio that another
officer saw someone in the backyard hiding under some debris. Officer Phillip Weber
identified the individual as codefendant Ferrel. Photographs of Ferrel depicted him

                                            11.
wearing a red belt that had the buckle “hollowed out so you could see the number 14 in
red.” Two handguns—Smith & Wesson revolvers—were laying on the ground in the
backyard right outside of a glass door; one was stainless steel and the other had a blue or
black finish. Six casings were found in the stainless steel Smith & Wesson, indicating
the gun had been fired six times; three of the six cartridges in the dark revolver had been
fired. Another handgun, a 40-caliber Glock with an extended 30-round magazine, was
found later that morning on top of the roof of the residence near the gutter. A red
baseball cap with the letters “SF” was also located on some trash cans or bags in the
backyard.
       Defendant was apprehended nearby on Temescal Drive. He had a buzz cut and a
large red “N” tattoo was visible on his head. Pictures of defendant reflected he had a
“Ceres” tattoo on his stomach. A .40-caliber Glock magazine loaded with 15 Winchester
cartridges and a chair propped next to the south fence were found in the backyard of a
home on Temescal.
       Subsequent Investigation
       The prosecution’s firearm expert received the four handguns retrieved after the
shooting: (1) a .40-caliber Glock Model 22 semiautomatic found on the roof of the home
on Hearthstone Lane where Ferrel was apprehended; (2) a .357 magnum Smith &
Wesson Model 27 revolver with a black finish found in the backyard of the home on
Hearthstone Lane where Ferrel was apprehended; (3) a .357 magnum Smith & Wesson
Model 66 stainless steel revolver also found in the backyard of the home on Hearthstone
where Ferrel was apprehended; and (4) a Glock Model 27, which was associated with
Ochoa. He testified both Smith & Wesson revolvers could fire .38 special ammunition.
       The firearms expert concluded eight of the 12 expended cartridge cases retrieved
from the Maxine Drive crime scene matched the test fires from the Glock Model 22. The
Glock Model 22 test fires also matched the casings found in the 2400 block of Boston

                                            12.
Way, the 2100 block of Boston Way, the 1900 block of Sunny Park Drive, and in the bed
of Arguello’s truck.
       The bullet and jacket fragment retrieved from Ochoa’s chest had the combined
weight of a single .38- or .357-caliber bullet and could have been shot from either Smith
& Wesson revolver. A .38-caliber bullet recovered from the shingles of Diaz’s house
was consistent with coming from the dark finished .357-caliber Smith & Wesson. The
bullet recovered from Diaz’s clothing was consistent with a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson
bullet; the expert opined it was “highly likely” it was fired from a Glock pistol. Another
.40-caliber bullet recovered from Diaz’s chest was too deformed for the expert to
compare it. The .38-caliber bullets recovered from Diaz’s chest and thigh matched the
Smith & Wesson Model 27 revolver. Three .40-caliber shell casings found on the 2600
block of Maxine and one located outside of a neighbor’s residence matched the Glock
Model 27 associated with Ochoa.
       The People introduced recordings from phone calls Ferrel, defendant, and Zapien
made from jail. Ferrel was recorded stating, “It’s all bad,” the police found two
“heaters,” meaning guns, including a long black one; but he did not think the police had
found “the other one.” Ferrel stated his “.40” was on the roof of someone’s house.
During another conversation, Zapien told his aunt he “need[ed] a miracle.” He promised
not to run if she put up her house for bail; he “just need[ed] to get out for a little bit …
before it’s all bad.” He told his aunt he “fucked up.” Defendant was also recorded
saying, “it’s all bad.”
       Gang Evidence
       Detective Robert Gumm testified as a gang expert. He testified regarding the
history of the Norteño gang and its common signs and symbols. He explained the
primary activities of the Norteños include robberies, burglaries, vehicle thefts, and violent
crimes such as assaults, assaults with deadly weapons, felony assaults, drive-by

                                              13.
shootings, and attempted murders and murders of rival gang members. He explained
Smyrna Park Norteños use the acronym “SPN,” and they control the Smyrna Park area in
Ceres. “DSSN” stands for “Deep South Side Norteños,” also referred to as “Deep South
Side Modesto” or “DSSM,” which is a subset in south Modesto. Gumm testified the
subsets, including Smyrna Park and Deep South Side Modesto, regularly get along but
there is some conflict from time to time and Norteños have victimized other Norteños in
assaults or even murder. Typically, active Norteños do not fight with other active
Norteños; “it’s gonna be people that they deem are inactive that are kind of no longer
putting in work for the gang.” “Respect is everything in the gang,” and one’s
“willingness to put in respect for the gang, especially violent crimes, bring you a higher
level of respect because you’re willing to do that for the gang.” Gang members will
respond to disrespect with violence because, if they do not, it shows they are weak and
“not handling business,” diminishing their strength in the gang.
       Law enforcement considers whether an individual meets two of 10 criteria in
validating whether someone is a criminal street gang member including: associating with
gang members; admitting being a gang member; wearing colors consistent with being in
a gang; possessing physical evidence of a gang such as a red or blue rag; being identified
by a reliable sources as a gang member; tattoos consistent with the gang; using words,
phrases, or terms associated with a gang; being arrested for a crime consistent with gang
activity; being found in a judicial proceeding as a gang member; and jail classification as
a gang member.
       Gumm explained the Deep South Side Modesto set of the Norteños is well-
established. If an individual claimed membership but was not actually a member, that
person “would be regulated.” He discussed a “red-on-red” homicide of Victor Gaona,
who was killed because he was claiming Norteño but he was not actually from Deep
South Side. He explained the term “leyva” used by a gang member to another person
who is claiming gang membership would be considered a “put down.” The term “check

                                            14.
up” when an individual claims gang membership means to “use channels such as the
shot-caller of that gang to check and make sure that you are part of that gang and not just
claiming it”; essentially, checking on one’s status in the gang to confirm the person is
active. If the check up reveals the person is “no good,” the individual would “be
regulated or marked for an assault.” If the person was determined to be inactive, the gang
may also call for a physical assault. If an inactive member disrespected a higher ranking
gang member, a violent assault or even murder could be expected.
       Gumm investigated defendant using police reports, his contacts from law
enforcement, and probation officer reports and determined he matched seven of the 10
criteria used to validate gang membership. He discussed a traffic stop on March 27,
2004, during which defendant was in one of two cars that officers saw racing on a
roadway. Defendant was with Luis Gutierrez, Ferrel, and Abel Rodriguez and a stolen
.380 handgun was found under defendant’s seat; another handgun registered to Gutierrez
was found in the glove box. Abel Rodriguez is a “documented Norteño gang member.”
Gumm testified regarding another law enforcement contact with defendant on May 23,
2004, regarding a noise disturbance. At the time, defendant was wearing a red hat and
red shirt; red is consistent with being a Norteño. On July 10, 2004, defendant was alone
and driving a speeding truck that police tried to stop. He failed to stop and the police
pursued him. During the pursuit, two items were thrown from the vehicle. After the
pursuit ended, defendant was uncooperative, and the police located a one-gallon bag of
marijuana in the truck; another one-gallon bag of marijuana and a handgun were the
items thrown from the truck. Defendant was wearing red and white shoes with red laces
on them at the time, and the assigned detective documented that defendant “associates
with known gang members.” On November 23, 2004, police conducted a traffic stop of a
vehicle driven by Hector Lopez, who was wearing a red shirt, and in which defendant and
Ferrel were occupants. During the stop, Lopez stated he used to hang out with Norteños
but no longer did. Defendant did not admit gang membership but stated he hung out with

                                            15.
Norteños, and Ferrel denied gang affiliation but was wearing a black and red jacket. On
June 20, 2006, police contacted defendant with Luis Gutierrez and Timothy McKenzie.
At the time, McKenzie was a documented SPN gang member. On August 10, 2006,
police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant; Paul Ramirez and Julian
Berrera were occupants in the vehicle. A pair of handcuffs that had been stolen from a
police detective were located in the vehicle, and Ramirez reported having seen defendant
with the handcuffs before. Defendant denied gang affiliation. He was wearing a red and
gray shirt, a red and white A’s hat, and red and white Nike shoes. Gumm testified the
color of the hat was symbolic of active Norteño gang membership. The officers also
documented a large “N” tattoo shaded red on the back of defendant’s head with “Hustler”
across it. At the time, Berrera was a documented Norteño and Ramirez was documented
as a known SPN gang member. On September 19, 2006, defendant was observed by
police drinking in Smyrna Park; he was wearing red and white shoes and a red and white
hat at the time. On October 27, 2006, defendant and Julian Berrera were contacted in the
street by the Central Valley Gang Impact Task Force. Berrera admitted he had been a
Norteño for a long time. On May 26, 2007, the chief of police observed several males at
Smyrna Park, including defendant, Julian Berrera, Patelio Hernandez, Mark Meyer, Paul
Ramirez, Ferrel, Julian Orosco, and Christopher Colon. Colon was an active Norteño
gang member at the time and Meyer had a “14” tattooed on him. Officers tried to contact
the group and two of the males started to walk away. A “marijuana package for sales was
found on the ground next to them.” All eight males were detained, and all of them
admitted to being Norteños. When defendant was arrested for the current incident,
Gumm observed a large block “N” tattoo on the back of defendant’s head that is shaded
red with “Hustler” across it.
       Gumm also investigated the codefendants. He detailed the codefendants’ prior
contacts with police that related to the criteria used to validate gang membership. Gumm
testified regarding a June 12, 2003, incident during which law enforcement was

                                           16.
investigating Manuel Rivera for driving while intoxicated. When the officers attempted
to arrest Rivera, he struggled with them and the other occupant of the car started to
advance towards the officers before the officers ordered him back into the car at
gunpoint. A search was done of the vehicle’s occupants including Victor Zapien, and
police found a large fixed-blade knife on Zapien. Police also recovered a video camera
with footage from that night in which Rivera and Zapien were flashing gang signs and
Zapien is heard saying “RNS for life.” In the video, Rivera was showing others how to
make Molotov cocktails and then they were driving around and getting ready to throw a
Molotov cocktail at a house but people were present and they did not throw it. The police
recovered a Molotov cocktail from the car consistent with the one seen on the video.
Gumm also discussed an October 12, 2003, incident during which there was a
disturbance that occurred in a residential area near a wine and cheese festival. Residents
of a home, who were admitted Sureño gang members or associates, reported a group of
males that included Zapien and Robert Alvarez were yelling at them, “‘Fuck you,
scraps’” and “‘Norte.’” Zapien and Alvarez threw rocks at people in the backyard and
Alvarez threw a large chunk of concrete that hit a female in the head.
       Gumm discussed Arguello’s prior contacts with police, including an incident on
August 21, 2009, during which Christopher Diaz and others were present. During the
course of the incident, it was documented that Diaz and Arguello were known Norteños.
Arguello was wearing a red belt that hung down to his knees and had tattoos of the one
and four dots on his right and left hands. Police asked Arguello whether he was a
Norteño gang member, and he responded he had been a Norteño for a long time but was
not one anymore. Gumm did not think anything would happen to a gang member who
denied gang membership in front of other active Norteños.
       Gumm also explained Ochoa was field interviewed on December 17, 2006, and
was documented as a Norteño based on his self-identification. During an investigation of
Ochoa’s room related to this case, a hat with “DSSM” written on it, referring to “Deep

                                            17.
South Side Modesto,” was recovered. Ochoa also claimed “‘Deep’” in a field interview
with the sheriff’s department.
       The People introduced evidence regarding two separate predicate offenses. On
February 13, 2007, Zapien, Esteban Zapien, and Anthony Valdobinos were standing
outside of a residence yelling, “‘This is all about Riverbank, Riverbank Vatos Locos.’”
Then, Valdobinos fired a shotgun at the house, striking the house and a vehicle parked
outside. After the shooting, Valdobinos’s house was searched and police recovered
Norteño paperwork with “14,” “XIV,” “Norte,” and “187 scraps” written on it. The
prosecution introduced the information and minute order related to the resulting case.
The People also introduced the complaint in case No. 09-73110 against Christopher
Raymond Colon alleging he committed attempted murder (§§ 664, 187; count 1) on
August 29, 2009, with a section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancement, and assault
with a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2) with a great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7).
       Based on Gumm’s investigation and the two predicate offenses, he opined the
Norteños are engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. He opined Ferrel, Zapien, and
Arguello all met the criteria that validate gang membership. He further opined that all the
defendants were active participants in the Norteño criminal street gang at the time of the
charged offenses. In reaching his opinion, Gumm considered the circumstances of the
incident, including the initial contact Arguello and defendant had at Diaz’s house during
which Ochoa was asked, “‘Where are you from? Are you active?’” This was “an initial
gang challenge” to find out if they were active “that set off a chain of events of
disrespect.” Defendant told Ochoa “he was going to check on him, that he didn’t know
who he was,” and Ochoa responded, “‘I don’t know who you are either. I’m going to
check on you,’” which was a direct challenge to defendant’s status in the gang. Gumm
testified, by challenging each other’s active status, they were disrespecting each other so
“there’s going to be an assault or some kind of violence.” Defendant and Arguello then

                                             18.
left and returned with two other “very violent” gang members, and all of them were
armed with guns.
       Detective Gumm opined the initial exchange was done in association with the
Norteño criminal street gang and the crimes charged in this case promoted or assisted
criminal conduct by the gang itself by “taking care [of] what is perceived as a possible
threat or an enemy, which are inactives.” There were objective signs of gang
membership during the incident, including Ferrel wearing a red belt that was 12 inches
too long for his body and hung past his knees, and Zapien sporting a Mongolian-style
haircut, which is “a Norteño haircut.”
       Section 1118.1 Motion to Dismiss
       Defendant’s counsel moved to dismiss the attempted murder charge as to Officer
Meyer and the section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancements after the People rested.
He argued there was no evidence the gun was fired at Officer Meyer. Specifically,
“there’s absolutely no forensic evidence or anything that indicates that there’s any shots
directed at him in an attempt to hit him. What you have is you have speeding cars going
60 miles per hour, these things are happening, including the shots out the window in the
course of a curve and all that. No bullet strikes on the car, on the pavement, on houses,
on anything. There’s absolutely nothing to indicate that.” He also contended there was
no evidence the shooting occurred for the benefit of the gang and that “a shooting occurs
in conjunction with some associates[,] doesn’t make it within the purview of 186.22.”
       Zapien’s counsel joined in the motion and also sought to dismiss the attempted
murder charge as to W.H., arguing there was no evidence W.H. was the subject of
attempted murder. Arguello’s counsel argued he could not be guilty of attempted murder
as to Officer Meyer based on his driving the fleeing car. He argued, for Arguello to be
guilty as an aider and abettor he needed to have done more, such as set up the car with the

                                            19.
intent to facilitate the shooting. He also argued there was insufficient evidence to support
the gang enhancements; rather, the dispute was personal.
       The prosecutor argued there was evidence Meyer saw the gunman point the gun
out the window of the truck and shoot multiple shots in his direction; Meyer moved the
car to the left and stopped it to avoid being hit; and a .40-caliber shell casing was found
in the bed of the truck. There was also evidence when the gunman exited the truck, he
turned around and fired again in the direction of Meyer’s vehicle. She further argued the
crimes were done in association with the gang such that the gang enhancement applied.
       The court denied the motion, concluding there was sufficient evidence to send the
charges to the jury for their determination.
Defense Evidence
       Defendant testified on his own behalf. On August 30, 2009, defendant went to a
friend’s house around 9:30 to 10:00 a.m. and started drinking beer; they had a six-pack.
The friend’s brother invited defendant to a birthday party at a taqueria so they left and
went to the party around 12:30 p.m. Defendant was drinking and eating and met
Arguello at the party later that afternoon around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. Arguello’s family
owned the restaurant and Arguello was working the cash register. Arguello asked
defendant if he wanted to join him to get cigarettes at the store and defendant agreed.
Arguello was drunk at that point and defendant was also intoxicated. After they went to
the store, they went to Arguello’s “friend’s house” to invite him to come to the birthday
party. Defendant testified he was carrying a .357-caliber, six-shot, silver Smith &
Wesson Model 66 revolver that night. He normally carried a gun for protection even
though he is not supposed to have one. He admitted he was an active Norteño gang
member at that time, and he had an “N” tattoo on the back of his head.
       They pulled up, got out of the truck, and walked towards Diaz’s house. Defendant
testified he now knew the males in front of the house to be Diaz, Ochoa, R.M., and W.H.
Arguello started talking to Diaz and invited him to the party. Defendant shook hands

                                               20.
with the other males there and told them his name and he was from Ceres. After
defendant introduced himself, Ochoa was “trying to find more stuff out.” He was moving
closer to defendant. Defendant held his ground and they continued talking aggressively.
At one point, defendant thought they were going to fight. Defendant initially denied
asking Ochoa any questions but later testified he thought he asked Ochoa where he was
from. He admitted he was drunk and likely speaks louder when he is drunk. Ochoa told
defendant his name and where he was from.
      Meanwhile, Diaz went into the house and then came back out with a
semiautomatic gun in his hand. Diaz kept the gun at his side and said, “‘You guys better
leave.’” T.C. came out a few seconds after Diaz. When Diaz heard her coming out, he
put the gun away in his waistband. T.C. said, “‘You guys need to leave now. Leave my
house now.’” She was mad and yelling. Defendant and Arguello turned around and left.
Defendant denied making any threats, saying he was going to “check” Ochoa out, or
stating they would be back, “pinta style.” He also denied being upset about being asked
to leave, though he did not understand what he did wrong.
      When defendant got in Arguello’s truck, he called Ferrel because he was supposed
to pick him up to come to the party. Defendant had known Ferrel for eight or nine years.
Defendant had met Zapien “a couple years before” and met him a few times. Defendant
testified both Ferrel and Zapien were Norteños at the time.
      Ferrel was not answering, so defendant called Zapien. Zapien was with Ferrel.
Defendant and Arguello went to pick them up. On their way to the party, defendant told
Arguello to go back to Diaz’s house. Defendant wanted to “go fight one of those guys.”
He denied intending to kill anyone. There was no discussion about whether anyone was
armed, but it was common for gang members to pack a gun. Defendant knew Ferrel
owned a black handgun—the .40-caliber gun that was found on a roof that night. Diaz
told the others that the guys there “were on [him]” earlier. When they got to Diaz’s
street, Zapien said he knew the guy who lived there. As they arrived at Diaz’s house,

                                           21.
Zapien said, “‘Don’t worry about it. I’m going to take care of it. I’m going to talk to this
guy. He’s cool. Don’t worry.’”
       The four of them got out of the truck and walked on the sidewalk. Ferrel and
Zapien were in front and defendant and Arguello were walking behind them. As they
were walking up, Zapien asked, “‘Where’s Chris?’” Defendant did not recall W.H. being
there. Ochoa was on the grass and Diaz walked toward Zapien and they exchanged a few
words. Then, defendant heard a gun rack and Ochoa said, “‘What’s up?’” Ochoa fired
the first shot in defendant’s direction and Diaz also pulled out a gun. Defendant pulled
out his silver revolver and shot back at Ochoa four or five times. He believed he hit
Ochoa once. He denied shooting him “point blank” or that anyone was saying, “Get
down on your knees.” He testified he shot at Ochoa because Ochoa shot at him. Ochoa
began to run across the street, shooting at the same time. Ochoa was shooting at
defendant the whole time he was running, approximately four or five shots. Defendant
was not chasing Ochoa but instead was running back to the truck; he denied shooting
Diaz at any point. Defendant testified he only shot Ochoa to defend his own life and he
felt bad about it. He denied it had anything to do with the Norteño gang.
       Defendant got in the front passenger seat of the truck, Ferrel was behind him,
Arguello was in the driver’s seat, and Zapien was behind Arguello; they drove off. He
denied the truck drove around looking for W.H. As they were driving, they saw a lot of
police cars going past them. Eventually, a police car got behind them and turned on its
headlights and sirens. They started to drive faster. There was a quick five- to 10-minute
chase, though it seemed like a long time. They were making turns and defendant was in
the front telling Arguello “‘Oh watch out’ or ‘turn here,’ kind of trying to help him out.”
As the truck was making a turn, defendant heard one or two gunshots and saw a gun
pointing upwards in front of his window. He believed the gun was fired straight up into
the air. The truck stopped and defendant, Zapien, and Ferrel got out; defendant did not
see anyone turn and shoot at the police officer. They ran towards the houses and jumped

                                            22.
the fence. As they were jumping to climb the fence, defendant heard someone fall and a
gun go off; defendant believed it was Ferrel’s. After jumping the fence, defendant was
by himself in a backyard; he did not know where the others went. He kept running and
jumping fences. He ended up seeing Ferrel and Zapien in another backyard, dropped his
gun so he could climb the fence, and continued into another yard. Eventually, the police
caught them all.
       Though a mistrial was declared for Ferrel, Ferrel still testified on behalf of the
defense. On August 30, 2009, Ferrel had been drinking all day with Zapien and another
person; it was his 30th birthday the next day. Defendant told Ferrel about a party and
arrived later to pick up Ferrel and Zapien. Before leaving, Ferrel grabbed his Glock .40-
caliber handgun with an extended clip, a 30-round magazine; he always took his gun for
protection when he left the house.
       As they were driving, Ferrel thought they were headed to the party. When they
pulled onto Maxine Drive, Ferrel and Zapien asked if the party was there and stated they
knew the guy who lived there; Ferrel had met Diaz once before. They got out of the car
and walked up to Diaz’s house; Zapien was saying, “‘Where’s Chris? Where’s Chris?’”
He denied any of them were wearing a mask. Diaz walked to the middle of the driveway,
shook hands with Zapien, and they started talking; there were two other guys “minding
their own business” on the other side of the cars. Ferrel saw someone who he could now
identify as Ochoa running from the side of the house, racking a gun, and saying, “‘What?
What? What’s up?’” Ferrel heard a gunshot and saw a flash out of the corner of his eye.
He saw Diaz turn and pull out a big gun. Ferrel pulled out his gun and shot at least six
times in Diaz’s direction because he did not want Zapien to be shot. Then, Ferrel ran
back to the truck and got in the back passenger side.
       When everyone got back in the truck, they left. As they were driving, at some
point a police car turned on its lights and sirens behind them. The truck sped up. Ferrel
put his hand out the window and shot two or three times in the air; he denied turning

                                             23.
around and aiming or shooting at the police officer. The police car “backed up” and the
truck made a few more turns. They decided to get out because they could not see the
police car anymore. Ferrel jumped out of the truck and started running. He denied
shooting at any officers when he got out of the car; he testified “the cops were barely
turning around the corner; so they were still far away.” He hoisted himself over a fence,
fell to the ground, and his gun went off. He unloaded the gun because he realized he
almost shot himself and kept running. He saw defendant and Zapien again and they went
into a backyard. He realized he could not get out of the backyard because he could not
move his arm as he injured it in the fall. The others left and he saw the police out front
when he looked around the corner of the house. Ferrel realized he still had his pistol so
he threw it on top of the house. He crawled inside a roll of carpet where he was caught
and arrested. He testified he did not realize Ochoa or Diaz had been shot that night until
he saw it on the news the next day. Ferrel testified he is a Norteño; however, he denied
the charged offenses were gang related.
       Detective Phillip Weber testified regarding two text messages from Zapien to Diaz
in the early hours of August 30, 2009. In the first message, Zapien indicated he had
“yayo,” which Weber explained “was slang for cocaine.” In a subsequent message,
Zapien wrote “C wats good wit that 45. I got loot and a 9.” Weber also discussed
previous messages from Zapien that month to other recipients in which he indicated he
was selling several guns and was interested in trading or buying a gun.
       The defense presented testimony from Jacobus Swanepoel, a retained criminalist
and firearms expert. Swanepoel opined that a fragment collected at the crime scene had
probably come from a .45-caliber bullet, which was unlikely to have been fired from any
of the four guns seized by police. However, he could not rule out the possibility that, as
the prosecution’s expert believed, the fragment had come from a .40-caliber bullet.

                                            24.
Second Section 1118.1 Motion to Dismiss Following Close of Evidence
       After both sides rested, defendant’s counsel renewed his earlier motion to dismiss
the gang enhancements. He challenged Detective Gumm’s contention the charged
offenses were done “in association” with the Norteño gang and instead argued this was a
“personal issue.” The prosecutor argued the actions were done in association with the
gang to willfully promote felonious criminal conduct by the gang. The court concluded
there was sufficient evidence for the enhancements to go to the jury and denied the
motion to dismiss.
Verdict
       The jury convicted defendant, Zapien, and Arguello of intentional, deliberate,
premeditated murder of Diaz (count I) and Ochoa (count II) and found that defendant,
Zapien, and Arguello were principals in the offenses and violated section 186.22,
subdivision (b) and at least one of the principals in the offenses personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury, as defined
in section 12022.7, or death to any person other than an accomplice pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e). However, as to counts I and II, the jury found not
true allegations the offenses were gang related pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1); are special circumstances within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3)
and (22); defendant intentionally killed the victims while the defendant was an active
participant in a criminal street gang as defined in section 186.22, subdivision (f).
       The jury also convicted defendant, Zapien, and Arguello of intentional, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder of Officer Larry Meyer (count III). It found true
allegations Larry Meyer was a peace officer/firefighter at the time of the offense and that
defendant, Zapien, and Arguello, were principals in the offense and violated section
186.22, subdivision (b) and that at least one of the principals in the offense personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury, as
defined in section 12022.7, or death to any person other than an accomplice pursuant to

                                             25.
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e). The jury found not true an allegation count III
was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the Norteño
criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The jury found
defendant, Zapien, and Arguello not guilty of the second count of attempted murder of
Officer Larry Meyer alleged in count IV.
       The jury also convicted defendant, Zapien, and Arguello of intentional, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder of William W.H. (count V) and found true
allegations that defendant, Zapien, and Arguello were principals in the offense and
violated section 186.22, subdivision (b) and that at least one of the principals in the
offense personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great
bodily injury, as defined in section 12022.7, or death to any person other than an
accomplice pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e). The jury found not
true an allegation count V was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with the Norteño criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members pursuant to section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1).
       The jury also convicted defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of Penal Code former section 12021, subdivision (a) (count VII) and convicted
defendant, Zapien, and Arguello of active participation in a criminal street gang in
violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a) (count IX). Arguello was also
convicted of evading a police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2,
subdivision (a) (count VI).
Postverdict Proceedings
       A court trial was held on defendant’s priors on April 21, 2014. The court found
true an allegation defendant suffered a section 667.5, former subdivision (b) prior

                                             26.
conviction as alleged in the information and the matter was referred to probation for
sentencing.
       A sentencing hearing was initially set for May 20, 2014, but the matter was
continued to June 11, 2014, in light of a motion to compel discovery filed by defendant.
The motion sought to compel production of (1) “An inventory and transcript of all
wiretapped communications of [defendant’s counsel Frank Carson] and/or [his] office
intercepted during the duration of [defendant’s] trial from May to October 2012” and (2)
“An inventory and copies of any and all emails intercepted or received during the
duration of [defendant’s] trial whether from or to [Frank Carson] or investigator Jack
Able and his associates” and any related law enforcement reports, notes, or summaries.
In the memorandum in support of the motion, Carson explained he was “exploring a
motion for a new trial based on the misconduct of the District Attorney during trial and
the repeated purposeful breach of the attorney/client and work product privilege that
denied defendant a fair trial.”
       Carson filed a declaration in support of the motion to compel, averring he became
aware his communications were being intercepted during the trial “because of
developments that corresponded with what [he]’d discussed via phone calls that led [him]
to believe the government knew of efforts [he] was making to develop witness[es] and
defenses to charges.” He asserted his “investigator’s e-mails were intercepted by the
District Attorney’s Office concerning a possible cell phone expert opining as to what the
records would show of the location of the principal prosecution witness … [W.H.] before
and after the shooting.” He stated his “investigator Jack Able was shown his private
generated e-mail by District Attorney investigators questioning him not long ago
concerning this issue.” He further averred: “During the course of the almost 6 month
trial, I spoke extensively about the case via phone with colleagues, investigators, and
witnesses. [¶] Developments in the trial were indicative of my confidential
communications being compromised.”

                                            27.
       The People opposed the motion and attached a declaration of Detective Jon Evers
to their response. In part, Evers averred he was assigned to assist a multiagency
investigation into the murder of Korey Kauffman and, as part of that investigation, “there
was a wire intercept order that ended on July 21, 2012.” He reiterated the court
previously conducted an in camera hearing during which Evers testified regarding these
issues and the issue was previously decided. Evers further discussed a request by defense
investigator Jack Able on an Internet Web site made 10 days after the wire intercept
concluded, “making it impossible for this communication to have been intercepted during
the course of this wiretap.” He affirmed that an interview was conducted with Jack Able
on November 12, 2013, during which Able confirmed he was investigating “the missing
persons case of Korey Kauffman on behalf of Frank Carson” and he “confirmed he sent
the email/posting to his list serve members on July 31, 2012,” and that it related to the
Kauffman case.
       At the hearing on June 11, 2014, Carson explained that during trial, he expressed
to the court there were “indicators” his “communications were being intercepted.”
Carson contended “the privilege for law enforcement” (Evid. Code, § 1040) had been
waived as a result of Evers’s averments in his declaration, and he should have the right to
cross-examine Evers. The court held another in camera hearing with Detective Evers
regarding whether confidential communications were intercepted. It concluded
afterwards it was satisfied there was “absolutely nothing to disclose.” Accordingly, the
court denied the motion to compel discovery and stated it would proceed with sentencing.
       At that point, Carson stated he would need to withdraw from the case as
defendant’s attorney; he would not “proceed any further” because he could not
“ethically.” Carson stated, “I can’t proceed and continue representing my client if I’m in
possession of information that I can’t impart until, as I would like to, if I’m aware of facts
that directly would help him.” “[R]ather than proceed when I know that I am constrained
from helping my client to the fullest extent that I can or that I should be able to, then, …

                                             28.
at this juncture what I’d like to do is consider, so that I can either brief this or, again,
consult, get an ethics ruling on this thing about what I can disclose and what I need to do,
consider withdrawing.” Carson told the court to proceed with sentencing Arguello and
Zapien and that he would come back in a week or two for defendant’s sentencing.
       Prior to a July 11, 2014, hearing, Carson filed a motion to withdraw based on a
conflict of interest he alleged prevented him “from filing the necessary and appropriate
motion for a new trial; based on counsel’s representation being compromised by police
and prosecutorial misconduct and breach of the attorney/client and work product
confidences.” At the hearing, the court granted Carson’s motion to withdraw and
indicated attorney John Hillenbrand would be appointed as replacement counsel. Carson
was subsequently charged with murder in 2015 and acquitted of the charges in 2019.
       Hillenbrand made an appearance three days after being appointed as defendant’s
counsel and asked to continue the matter for 10 days. At the next hearing, Hillenbrand
indicated he needed more time to review the file and asked to put the matter over until
September. At the September hearing, counsel requested a further continuance until
November 2014. Then counsel requested an additional continuance in November and
stated the transcript he received was incomplete as it did not include any of the hearings
outside of the jury’s presence. The matter was reset for January 2015. Sentencing was
ultimately continued further and, in August 2015, defense counsel Hillenbrand filed a
motion to compel discovery related to a district attorney investigator, Detective Evers,
and Detective Frank Navarro’s entry of Carson’s office on August 9, 2012, documents
related to electronic surveillance of Carson in 2012, and documents related to the
interceptions of communications of Frank Carson and his investigator Jack Able. The
People opposed the motion, denying the request was supported or that there was
governmental interference. Specifically, they argued, “[w]hile investigation of
Defendant’s former defense counsel occurred, there was no information obtained related
to the instant case, nor was any information shared with the prosecutor in this matter.”

                                               29.
Additionally, “[d]efendant does not suggest that this evidence would relate to his guilt or
innocence and merely speculates this evidence may have played a role in his
representation,” and “there is a legitimate government interest in maintaining the integrity
of the investigation into the murder of Korey Kauffman.”
       In March 2016, a declaration by defendant was filed with the court in which,
among other things, defendant averred Carson never advised defendant during Carson’s
representation of him that Carson was under investigation by law enforcement or that he
believed his phones were being tapped and his conversations monitored during the time
he represented defendant. Defendant averred he believed his defense was compromised
by the lack of disclosure and that Carson was conflicted and defending himself during the
trial. At the related hearing, defense counsel Hillenbrand stated the declaration would be
an essential part of the motion for new trial and he requested an additional continuance.
       At a subsequent hearing on May 23, 2016, Hillenbrand declared he had “multiple
conflicts” he discovered while preparing the motion for new trial and could not “ethically
proceed with this motion.” On May 25, 2016, Alonzo Gradford was subsequently
appointed as counsel for defendant, but he reported at the next hearing he could not
accept the appointment after all. The next appointed attorney was also relieved based
upon a conflict of interest. Defendant was eventually represented by Lewis Wentz and
the sentencing hearing was again continued multiple times. Finally, Frank Carson
substituted back in as counsel in July 2019.
Motion for New Trial
       Carson filed a motion for new trial on defendant’s behalf detailing law
enforcement’s actions against Carson in relation to the murder charge ultimately brought
against him, which was prosecuted by Marlisa Ferreira, the prosecutor in defendant’s
trial. The motion alleged, in part:

       “On July 15, 2012, law enforcement from several agencies executed search
       warrants at several of Mr. Carson’s properties with cadaver-sniffing dogs.

                                               30.
       Prior to that, interviews had been conducted with Mr. Carson’s step
       daughter … and [an] employee …. Marlissa Ferriera [sic] on her own
       conducted surveillance of the Carson family members and went to
       Manteca, California, to interview an antique store owner about Mr. Carson
       and his wife. Ms. Ferriera [sic] passed herself off as an acquaintance of the
       Carson’s. On August 9, 2012, as Mr. Carson was preparing for trial,
       District Attorney Investigator Kirk Bunch, Turlock Police Officer Frank
       Navarro, and Modesto Police Officer Jon Evers invaded the law office of
       Mr. Carson and refused to leave. The officers searched the outgoing
       addressed mail on the front desk in Mr. Carson’s office. Mr. Carson had to
       call 9-1-1 and get the assistance of the Modesto Police Department to throw
       the rampaging officers out of the office. The officers did not have a
       warrant for their actions. Moreover, from June 21, 2012, through July 21,
       2012, they wiretapped Mr. Carson’s phone based on his being a murder
       suspect in the disappearance of Mr. [Korey] Kauffman. Mr. Carson and
       others suspected of being involved were arrested on August 14, 2015, for
       the murder of Mr. Kauffman. Mr. Carson was found not guilty of that
       alleged murder on June 28, 2019. The prosecution attorney was Marlissa
       Ferreira [sic]. She’s the same prosecutor who prosecuted [defendant].
       Ms. Ferriera [sic], in the course of the preliminary hearing against
       Mr. Carson (2015–2016), said that investigative work completed by Jack
       Able and Associates, an investigative firm Mr. Carson employed, was not
       done for [defendant]’s case, but rather the investigators Mr. Carson
       employed were actually tracking the Kauffman investigation. Ms. Ferreira
       asserted Mr. Able, Carson’s private investigator was hired ‘for an illicit
       purpose not for a legitimate purpose ….’” (Underscoring and italics in
       original.)
       The motion for new trial also alleged defendant “was not properly informed about
the dire, conflicted situation his attorney was in nor did he waive the conflict or weigh the
possible alternatives that may have been available to him.” A declaration by Carson was
attached to the motion for new trial in which Carson averred he never told defendant
during his representation that he was a murder suspect under investigation by the district
attorney’s office and the “conflict of interest” “greatly distracted [him] during the course
of the trial.” He asserted, he “was fearful that questions [he] was asked at trial might be
perceived as having an ulterior purpose for [his] own benefit in the case for which [he]
was personally suspect,” and he “regret[ted] [his] failure.” Defendant’s March 2016
declaration was also attached to the motion in which he averred Carson never advised

                                             31.
him he had a conflict or potential conflict with the office of the district attorney, and he
believed his defense was compromised by the lack of disclosure and that Carson “was
defending himself as well as [defendant] as the trial proceeded.” Defendant filed a
separate request for the court to take judicial notice of Stanislaus Superior Court case
No. 1490969, People v. Frank C. Carson, et al.
       The People opposed the motion and argued defendant could not establish he was
prejudiced by any alleged conflict. They also contended “several accusations in
[defendant’s] statement of facts” were “not supported by declarations under penalty of
perjury.” They argued Carson informed the court in defendant’s presence that he was
subject to wiretaps and had investigators arrive at his office to investigate. They argued,
moreover, the evidence supporting defendant’s guilt was “overwhelming” and defendant
failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
       At the hearing on the motion for new trial in January 2020, Carson argued there
was an inherent conflict and defendant could not have gotten a fair trial as a result. The
court denied the motion for new trial, finding “the evidence was overwhelming,” and
noting both of the codefendants were also convicted and their convictions survived the
appeal process. Additionally, the court stated, after observing Carson’s performance at
trial, it did not occur to the court at any time that Carson was not “performing at 100
percent by any means at all.”
Sentencing
       The court sentenced defendant to 25 years-to-life on count I plus a consecutive 25-
year-to-life term for the section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e) enhancement; a
consecutive 25-year-to-life term on count II plus a consecutive 25-year-to-life term for
the section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e) enhancement; consecutive 15-year-to-life
terms on count III and V, plus consecutive 20-year terms for the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (c) and (e) enhancement; a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the
midterm) on count VII; and a stayed term of two years (one-third the midterm) on count

                                             32.
IX, plus a one-year consecutive term for the section 667.5, former subdivision (b)
enhancement.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.       Government Did Not Engage in Misconduct that Violated Defendant’s
         Constitutional Rights or Mandates Reversal
         Defendant first contends the government engaged in egregious misconduct by
intercepting attorney-client communications and creating a conflict that forced his
counsel to withdraw. He argues reversal or dismissal is required because the misconduct
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his due process and fair trial rights.
The People disagree.
         A.    Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
         On August 20, 2012, the 43d day of trial, defendant’s attorney, Carson, notified
the court he had reason to believe his phone was being wire-tapped and asked the court to
inquire of the district attorney’s office whether his communications were being
intercepted. Carson explained, he was discussing impeachment of one of the experts in
this case and that evening Detective Evers and the district attorney’s investigator Kirk
Bunch and “Frank Navarro out of Turlock wound up in the lobby of [Carson’s] office
looking at the mail that was on a front desk.” Carson asked the court to obtain a
representation from Detective Evers about whether Carson’s “communications have been
compromised.” The prosecutor, Ferreira, stated she did not have any wiretaps going on
and did not know of any, but she would not be privy to that information if it was not her
wiretap. She represented she had spoken with her boss and her chief deputy, and she was
not informed of an ongoing investigation involving Carson. Carson responded Ferreira
also had represented to him she had no knowledge of a wiretap and he accepted that. But
he urged the court to inquire of Detective Evers if he is aware “of this kind of
monitoring.” The court scheduled an Evidence Code section 402 hearing with Detective
Evers.

                                             33.
       At the hearing, Carson asked Detective Evers if he was aware of any electronic
monitoring of “any of the attorneys sitting at counsel table” in 2012. Detective Evers
responded “that is privileged information” and requested “an in-camera hearing” under
Evidence Code section 1040. The court held an in camera hearing and, after the hearing,
the court found “that a privilege does exist for the detective.” The court explained its
only concern was “whatever might occur relative to this particular case and that’s what it
was limited to, whether any kind of attorney-client privilege has been breached in any
fashion.” The court explained it examined Detective Evers “extensively to ascertain that
… no confidential telephone calls were received between [Carson], [defendant], and
investigator, or anybody or anything associated with this case, and that held true for all
the defendants and all of the parties in this particular case.” The court concluded after
“extensive questioning of the detective, [it was] convinced that positively that this has not
occurred.”
       Carson expressed his concern “that the only representations this Court’s basing its
decision on are the ones from Detective Evers,” and that the defense was prepared to
impeach Detective Evers “based on a continuing course of conduct.” Carson asked the
court to order “these intercepts be preserved and they could be under seal initially” and
“that there be an inventory, then the Court can test the veracity of whatever
representations are being made.” The court declined counsel’s suggestions and reiterated
it had questioned the detective extensively to make absolutely certain there were no
compromises made in this particular case at all. The court stated it was “absolutely
satisfied there’s been no sort of breach in any communications” of Carson, defendant, his
investigators, any experts, or anything relative to this case and “that holds true for all the
defendants, all the defense attorneys.” The court further confirmed Detective Evers also
“had no communication with Ms. Ferreira on the issue.”
       As discussed, thereafter in July 2014, after the jury’s verdict in this matter and
before sentencing, Carson moved to withdraw. He was subsequently arrested, tried, and

                                              34.
acquitted in connection with the Kauffman murder. Following his acquittal, Carson was
reinstated as defendant’s counsel and filed a motion for new trial on defendant’s behalf in
July 2019.
       B.     Analysis
       Defendant argues the behavior of the district attorney’s office “shocks the
conscious [sic],” and “the charges should be dismissed or the judgment reversed and the
matter remanded for a new trial with conflict-free counsel.”
              1.     Defendant’s Right to Counsel Was Not Violated
       Defendant argues the government’s misconduct led his counsel to withdraw,
thereby violating his right to counsel. He further contends the “government here
egregiously interfered” with his “attorney-client relationship and right to counsel by
tapping Carson’s phones, and creating such a conflict for Carson,” defendant’s chosen
attorney, that Carson “and six other lawyers were forced to withdraw from [defendant]’s
case, causing substantial delay and leaving [defendant] without unconflicted counsel for
six long years.” (Boldface omitted.) In supplemental briefing, defendant further
contends his right to retained counsel of his choosing was violated on this basis.
       Initially, we cannot conclude defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
violated. “[A] court properly rejects a Sixth Amendment claim based on surreptitious
state participation in communications between a defendant and his or her attorney or the
attorney’s agent when the record demonstrates there was no realistic possibility of injury
to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th
846, 888–889; accord, Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 552 [“when
conversations with counsel have been overheard, the constitutionality of the conviction
depends on whether the overheard conversations have produced, directly or indirectly,
any of the evidence offered at trial”].)

                                            35.
       In People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th 846, the California Supreme Court
reviewed the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon the monitoring and recording of a
telephone call involving the defendant, his mother, and a defense investigator during
which “several subjects concerning the trial were discussed, including potential defense
witnesses and how the defense might respond to the prosecution’s evidence.” (Id. at p.
884.) Before jury selection began in the Alexander trial, the prosecution obtained a
warrant authorizing law enforcement agents to monitor and record conversations from
but not limited to the home of the defendant’s parents to attempt to prevent intimidation
or dissuasion of witnesses in the defendant’s case. (Ibid.) In addressing the defendant’s
claims, the Alexander court perceived “five distinct possible grounds for claims of error:
(1) a statutory violation of Evidence Code section 954, the attorney-client privilege; (2) a
violation of his federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) a violation of his federal
Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial; (4) a violation of his federal Fifth
Amendment right to substantive due process; and (5) a violation of his state constitutional
right to counsel.” (Ibid.)
       The Alexander court rejected the defendant’s claim the interception violated the
statutory attorney-client privilege, reasoning the defendant had “made no showing that
any witness disclosed any information from the call during the proceedings in violation
of Evidence Code section 954.” (People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 887.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings the calls’ contents were not
disclosed to the prosecutors. (Ibid.) The Alexander court further held interception of
attorney-client communications does not constitute a complete denial of the right to
counsel; rather, “unless the record supports ‘at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the
defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.’”
(Alexander, supra, at p. 888; accord, Weatherford v. Bursey, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 558.)
The Alexander court further concluded, even assuming the defendant’s state right to

                                              36.
counsel had been violated, the defendant could not show a reasonable probability he
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the violation. (Alexander, at p. 899.)
       Here, as in Alexander, at no point during the trial, the hearing on the motion for
new trial, or in this appeal has defendant identified any specific evidence the prosecution
offered that he suspects was developed because of intercepted communications. (See
People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 889.) And, notably, “this is not a situation
where the State’s purpose was to learn what it could about the defendant’s defense plans
and the informant was instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client relationship or where the
informant has assumed for himself that task and acted accordingly.” (Weatherford v.
Bursey, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 557.) Rather, there is no evidence any of the information
gained from the wire interceptions, including any alleged confidential attorney-client
communications, was possessed by or communicated to the prosecutor. (See id. at pp.
556–557 [“As long as the information possessed by [the undercover agent] remained
uncommunicated, he posed no substantial threat to Bursey’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Nor do we believe that federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the
difficulties of proof will be so great that we must always assume not only that an
informant communicates what he learns from an encounter with the defendant and his
counsel but also that what he communicates has the potential for detriment to the
defendant or benefit to the prosecutor’s case”].)
       Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, there was a breach of attorney-client
confidences amounting to a violation of defendant’s state right to counsel—of which we
note there is no evidence—as in Alexander, we also cannot conclude reversal or dismissal
is warranted. (See People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 895.) Here, defendant
“had counsel, and his attorney vigorously pursued his interests throughout the trial.”
(Alexander, supra, at p. 896; accord, People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 567–568
[noting “defense counsel actively participated in all aspects of the trial, including jury
selection, challenging evidence admissibility, cross-examining witnesses, proposing jury

                                             37.
instructions, presenting defense witnesses at penalty phase, and arguing vigorously
against a sentence of death”].) And, as discussed, there is no evidence the prosecution
gained anything from the interception of any calls. Nor is there any evidence defendant
was affected negatively in a way that could have changed the trial’s outcome (counsel’s
unsupported assertion notwithstanding). (See Alexander, at p. 899.) Indeed, the record
does not show the government’s conduct “impaired the preparation of [the] defense or
aided the state’s presentation of the evidence against [the defendant].” (People v. Suarez
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 183.)
       Defendant’s reliance upon Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 752
(Barber) to argue reversal or dismissal is required is misplaced. In Barber, an
undercover police officer posed as a codefendant and attended attorney-client meetings.
(Id. at pp. 745, 747–749.) During that time, the agent communicated regularly with his
superior officers and disclosed that “the defense was to become more ‘political.’” (Id. at
p. 749.) The petitioners learned of the breach in attorney-client confidences before the
date set for trial and they moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds the presence of the
agent at confidential attorney-client meetings had deprived them of their rights to
effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. (Id. at p. 745.) Their attorney
testified his clients became “‘paranoi[d]’” after learning they had been infiltrated by an
informant, and the breach had a demonstrated chilling effect on attorney-client
communications. (Id. at pp. 749–750, 756.) Specifically, the petitioners became
reluctant to speak though they had actively participated in meetings before and they were
distrustful of each other and of defense counsel’s assistant. (Ibid.) Defense counsel
opined, accordingly, his clients’ ability to assist in preparing a defense had been
“‘substantially impaired.’” (Barber, at p. 750.) On that record, the California Supreme
Court concluded the government’s action violated the right to counsel and the only
effective remedy was dismissal of the underlying charges. (Id. at pp. 759–760.) The

                                             38.
Barber court held “[t]he right to counsel … is violated when a state agent is present at
confidential attorney-client conferences.” (Id. at p. 752.)
       As the California Supreme Court explained in Alexander, “Barber involved an
application for a pretrial writ of prohibition, while the present case is an appeal from a
judgment of conviction and sentence.” (People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 896;
see People v. Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 567.) Accordingly, the present case is
subject to article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution: “No judgment shall be set
aside … for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (See Alexander, at p. 896;
Delgado, supra, at p. 567.) And, as discussed, there is no evidence or basis to conclude
the prosecution benefited from or the defense was harmed as a result of interceptions of
privileged communications. Furthermore, in Barber, there was evidence the defendants
“‘[had] been prejudiced in their ability to prepare their defense’” after they learned a
undercover officer had been in their midst.” (Alexander, supra, at p. 895; see Barber,
supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 756.) Whereas here, there is no such evidence the alleged
interception had a “chilling effect” on defendant’s relationship with counsel. Carson
expressed his suspicions regarding his communications being intercepted in open court
when defendant was present, and there was no evidence their relationship had become
strained at any time.2 Furthermore, the interceptions here were not the result of

       2Notably, despite the discussions in open court during which defendant was present,
defendant averred in his declaration below that Carson never advised him he believed his phones
were tapped or that his conversations were being monitored during his representation of
defendant. Defendant also stated he did not understand the significance of the wiretap discussion
to his rights when it was discussed or hear the court address how the wiretaps and Carson’s
concerns affected his rights. Defendant’s representations, thus, further belie his contention on
appeal that his relationship with counsel was affected during counsel’s representation based on
the alleged interception of privileged communications.

                                              39.
“trickery” as in Barber, but rather “occurred pursuant to a judicially approved warrant” as
in Alexander. (Alexander, supra, at p. 895.) Thus, Barber is inapposite.
       We also cannot conclude alleged governmental misconduct resulted in a violation
of defendant’s right to retained counsel of his choosing. It is true “[t]he right to the
effective assistance of counsel ‘encompasses the right to retain counsel of one’s own
choosing. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Underlying this right is the premise that ‘chosen
representation is the preferred representation. Defendant’s confidence in his lawyer is
vital to his defense. His right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must
be respected wherever feasible.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784,
789.) But here, Carson moved to withdraw based on an authorized investigation. His
withdrawal and any related conflict was not the result of prosecutorial or governmental
misconduct, but rather based upon a valid investigation into his potential involvement in
a crime. Thus, we cannot conclude alleged governmental misconduct resulted in a
violation of defendant’s right to retained counsel of his choosing.
       In support of his arguments, defendant relies upon People v. Velasco-Palacios
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, in which it was undisputed the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct “when he provided defense counsel with a fraudulent transcript of
defendant’s police interrogation while the plea bargaining process was ongoing.” (Id. at
p. 448.) In response to the misconduct, the defendant’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss
“and he and [the] defendant waived the attorney-client privilege so they could testify at
the evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid.) Based on the waiver and the People’s unsubstantiated
claim defense counsel had privately admitted the defendant did not have a viable defense,
the public defender’s office removed defendant’s counsel. (Ibid.) On that record, the
court concluded it was “abundantly clear” prosecutorial misconduct led to the defendant
losing his attorney as his trial counsel. (Ibid. [“There is simply no realistic difference
between government action that improperly removes a defendant’s counsel directly and
government misconduct that necessarily leads to a defendant’s counsel being forced to

                                             40.
withdraw. In both scenarios government misconduct leads to the loss of a defendant’s
original counsel, and in both scenarios the defendant’s right to counsel had been
prejudiced”].)
       However, here, unlike in People v. Velasco-Palacios, the government did not
falsify evidence or engage in egregious conduct that caused Carson to withdraw. To the
contrary, it is undisputed any interception in Carson’s communications was pursuant to a
judicially authorized warrant. And the government did not take part in misconduct by
engaging in a valid investigation into a crime. Thus, while defendant characterizes the
situation as a “government-created conflict,” this was not a situation as in People v.
Velasco-Palacios where the government manufactured grounds that ultimately led to the
defendant losing his counsel. Rather, counsel withdrew after he believed he could not
ethically proceed in light of the sanctioned investigation.
              2.     Alleged Governmental Misconduct Did Not Result in Violation of
                     Defendant’s Due Process Rights
       Defendant also asserts “this is one of the few cases where the government’s
egregious misconduct violated [his] Fifth Amendment right to due process.” We
disagree.
       We cannot conclude the interceptions violated defendant’s due process right to a
fair trial under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

       “The determination of whether the government engaged in outrageous
       conduct in violation of defendant’s due process rights is a mixed question.
       The first step involves the consideration and weighing of the evidence and
       assessing the credibility of the witnesses to determine factually whether,
       and to what extent, governmental misconduct occurred. This factual
       determination is clearly one that is subject to a deferential standard of
       review. But the second step—whether the governmental conduct
       constitutes outrageous conduct in the constitutional sense of violating
       defendant’s due process rights—involves the application of law to the
       established facts and is primarily a legal question. The rights of the
       respective parties here are extremely important ones, namely, defendant’s
       right to a fair trial and the People’s right to prosecute persons believed to be

                                             41.
       responsible for the commission of serious crimes.” (People v. Uribe (2011)
       199 Cal.App.4th 836, 857–858.)
Accordingly, the Uribe court held, a “trial court’s finding that the governmental conduct
was outrageous in violation of defendant’s due process rights thereby warranting
dismissal is subject to independent review.” (Id. at p. 858.)
       Here, as in Alexander, “there has been no showing that (1) the purpose of
intercepting the [communications] was to discover defense strategy, (2) information in
[them] was communicated to the prosecutor[], or (3) law enforcement agents utilized, or
even could have utilized, information conveyed in the [communications].” (People v.
Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 891–892.) Furthermore, we also cannot conclude the
challenged actions here were “so egregious as to shock the conscience” as to render the
conduct arbitrary and violative of defendant’s substantive due process rights. (Id. at p.
892 [“Arbitrary official action can violate a defendant’s substantive due process rights,
but ‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be “arbitrary in the
constitutional sense”’”]; accord, County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) 523 U.S. 833,
846.) Here, as in Alexander, the interception occurred “pursuant to a judicially approved
warrant,” and no evidence suggests law enforcement exploited any information gained by
sharing it with the prosecutor or utilizing it in another way to benefit the prosecution’s
case. (See Alexander, supra, at p. 892.) Indeed, there was no evidence any information
germane to defendant’s case was even intercepted. Thus, we conclude defendant’s due
process rights were not violated.
              3.     Defendant Has Not Shown He Was Prejudiced By Any Alleged
                     Conflict of Interest
       Defendant also argues the court failed to make a proper inquiry into the issue of
conflict of interest and reversal is required based upon Carson’s conflict. He contends
the court knew Carson was under investigation in August 2012 and “it had an affirmative
duty to make inquiry and take action to protect [defendant]’s right to unconflicted
counsel,” but the “court made no inquiries and did nothing.” Specifically, the court

                                             42.
never informed defendant of a potential conflict of interest nor secured a conflict waiver
from him. Additionally, the court erred by “reappointing Carson after he was acquitted
of capital murder charges, but while he was still facing trial on perjury charges and thus
still had a conflict of interest.” We are not persuaded.

               “‘“The right to effective assistance of counsel, secured by the Sixth
       Amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the
       California Constitution, includes the right to representation that is free from
       conflicts of interest.”’ [Citations.] While the classic example of a conflict
       in criminal litigation is a lawyer’s dual representation of codefendants, the
       constitutional principle is not narrowly confined to instances of this type.
       [Citation.] A conflict may also arise when an attorney’s loyalty to, or
       efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by the attorney’s own interests.
       [Citation.] [¶] Under the federal Constitution, prejudice is presumed when
       counsel suffers from an actual conflict of interest. [Citation.] This
       presumption arises, however, ‘only if the defendant demonstrates that
       counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual
       conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”’
       [Citations.] An actual conflict of interest means ‘a conflict that affected
       counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of
       loyalties.’ [Citation.] Under the federal precedents, which we have also
       applied to claims of conflict of interest under the California Constitution, a
       defendant is required to show that counsel performed deficiently and a
       reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result
       of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Gonzales and
       Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 309–310.)
       “When a trial court knows or should know that defense counsel has a possible
conflict of interest with his client, it must inquire into the matter [citations] and act in
response to what its inquiry discovers [citation].” (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d
1115, 1136.) “If the court determines that a waiver of a conflict of interest by the
defendant is called for, it must assure itself that ‘“(1) the defendant has discussed the
potential drawbacks of [potentially conflicted] representation with his attorney, or if he
wishes, outside counsel, (2) that he has been made aware of the dangers and possible
consequences of [such] representation in his case, (3) that he knows of his right to
conflict-free representation, and (4) that he voluntarily wishes to waive that right.”

                                              43.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] A trial court’s failure to inquire into the possibility of a conflict
of interest or to adequately respond to its inquiry is reversible error only if the defendant
shows ‘that an actual conflict of interest existed and that that conflict adversely affected
counsel’s performance.’” (Id. at pp. 1136–1137.) “‘To determine whether counsel’s
performance was “adversely affected” … requires an inquiry into whether counsel
“pulled his punches,” i.e., whether counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as
he might have, had there been no conflict. [Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we
are … bound by the record. But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do
something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the
record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been
made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have
been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused
any such omission.’ [Citations.]” (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1001;
accord, People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 753 [“An
adverse impact on performance is shown by demonstrating counsel did or did not do
something he otherwise might have done absent the conflict”].)
       Here, we cannot conclude Carson’s performance was adversely affected by any
potential conflict of interest as to require reversal on this basis. That is, defendant fails to
show Carson “pulled his punches” based on his alleged fear of prosecution. Though
Carson stated in his declaration he “was fearful that questions [he] was asked at trial
might be perceived as having an ulterior purpose for [his] own benefit in the case for
which [he] was personally suspect,” and he “regret[ted] [his] failure,” neither he nor
defendant identified any specific questions he failed to ask or any specific way in which
any alleged conflict actually affected his performance. (See People v. O’Malley, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 1002 [“Defendant relies on defense counsel’s statement during the in
camera hearings expressing doubt about his own ability to continue with the case, but he
identifies no instance in which the alleged conflict actually affected counsel’s

                                              44.
performance”]; People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 753
[rejecting claim right to counsel was impaired by attorney conflict where defendant
“fail[ed] to show the existence of any actual impact on his counsel’s performance”].)
Nor does the record reveal any argument or actions conflict-free counsel likely would
have made or undertaken but were not made or undertaken by Carson. To the contrary,
the record reflects Carson vigorously represented defendant, extensively cross-examining
and presenting witnesses, and repeatedly arguing motions and objections throughout trial.
To the extent defendant asserts the court erred in reappointing Carson, defendant’s own
declaration reflects he was aware of the potential conflict with Carson and he never
voiced an objection to his ultimate representation at sentencing.
       And defendant has not shown a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding
would have been different but for any alleged deficiencies in Carson’s performance. (See
People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 753 [“To obtain relief
for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both deficient performance
‘and a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the
proceeding would have been different’”].) As discussed, the record reflects Carson was a
zealous advocate for defendant throughout the trial. And the jury convicted all of the
defendants of the murders and attempted murders of Diaz, Ochoa, W.H., and Officer
Meyer as well as the substantive gang offense. From these verdicts, it is clear the jury
rejected defendant’s theory of self-defense. And we cannot conclude any alleged
deficiency in Carson’s performance affected the verdict.
       For all these reasons, we reject defendant’s first contention.
II.    Sufficient Evidence Supports Attempted Premeditated Murder Convictions
       Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to support his attempted
murder convictions as to Officer Larry Meyer (count III) and W.H. (count V).

                                             45.
       A.     Standard of Review
       On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is “‘“‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) The
reviewing court’s task is to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “The standard of review is the same
in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.” (People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) “‘We must also “accept logical inferences that the
jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.”’” (People v. Navarro, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 302.)
       It is the jury, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding
does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (Ibid.)
       B.     Applicable Law
       The elements of attempted murder are the specific intent to kill and a direct but
ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. (People v. Houston (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1186, 1217.) “‘A “person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or
she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of
the crime.”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]o be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a

                                             46.
person must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent
to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the
intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and
abettor must intend to kill.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015,
1054.) Intent to kill may “be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of
the crime.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) “‘There is rarely direct
evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually be derived from all the
circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’” (Ibid.)
       “‘Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime ordinarily
is a question of fact.… [¶] … [¶] Among the factors which may be considered in making
the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime,
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Nguyen supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant contends he was convicted as an aider and abettor of the attempted
premeditated murder charges. But, he argues, the evidence was insufficient to establish
he intended to kill Officer Meyer or that he aided or assisted in attempting to kill Meyer.
He asserts “the bullet was neither fired close to Meyer[] or in a manner that would have
inflicted a mortal wound.” He also contends there was no evidence he knew “of a plan to
kill Meyer[], formed the intent to assist in killing Meyer[], and then contributed to the
killing by act or advice.”
       Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude
sufficient evidence supports defendant’s conviction of attempted premeditated murder of
Officer Meyer (count III). That is, a reasonable factfinder could infer from the facts
defendant aided and abetted in the premeditated attempted murder of Officer Meyer.
Here, Officer Meyer testified he saw a gun come out of the right passenger side of the

                                             47.
truck and then he saw muzzle flashes and heard shots fired in his direction. As a result,
he backed off momentarily. It is undisputed defendant was the front right passenger of
the fleeing truck; thus, there was no question defendant was present at the scene when the
shooting occurred. And there was evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude defendant shared the shooter’s mens rea at the time of the offense. That is,
defendant himself testified he was “trying to help” Arguello out during the police chase
by directing Arguello while he was driving, evincing defendant’s motivation to evade law
enforcement. Defendant was acquainted with Zapien and Ferrel, the backseat passengers,
before the incident and knew them as fellow Norteño gang members. And defendant was
necessarily aware of the shooter’s willingness to use lethal force based on the deadly
shooting precipitating their flight; in fact, defendant had demonstrated his own
willingness to use lethal force. When the truck stopped, instead of disassociating from
the shooter, defendant fled the scene with the other two passengers, including the person
who shot at Meyer. (See People v. Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054 [factfinder can
consider presence at scene of crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense in considering whether actions amounted to aiding and abetting].) A jury could
reasonably infer from such evidence defendant had a strong motive to promote,
encourage, or instigate the attempt to kill the pursuing officer in furtherance of his
attempt to evade police, and he did in fact aid and abet a premeditated attempt to kill
Officer Meyer. (See People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741 [“evidence of motive is
often probative of intent to kill”].)
       In reaching our conclusion, we find instructive People v. Nguyen, supra, 61
Cal.4th 1015. In Nguyen, the front seat passenger of a car, in which the defendant was
the back passenger, fired multiple shots into a car next to it at a traffic signal. (Id. at p.
1027.) Specifically, the evidence introduced at trial reflected the car in which the
defendant was a passenger passed the victim’s car—the occupants of which were rival
gang members—the defendant stared back at the occupants of the victim’s car as the cars

                                               48.
passed each other; the car in which the defendant was an occupant idled in a parking lot
until the victim’s car passed and then it followed the car several blocks until pulling up
next to it at a stop light where the front passenger shot into the victim’s car. (Id. at p.
1053.) The victim, the driver of the other car, was shot in the neck. (Ibid.) Several days
after the shooting, the defendant visited a person who had been an occupant in the
victim’s car and asked, “What’s up with the cops?” (Id. at p. 1054.) The Nguyen court
held, considering this evidence in the context of the ongoing gang war between the
defendant’s gang and the victim’s gang “as well as the Asian gang practices” described
by the gang expert, the jury could have inferred the defendant knew of the shooter’s
intent to kill, shared that intent, and aided him by spotting potential targets. (Id. at p.
1055.) The court noted, “Although ‘gang evidence standing alone cannot prove a
defendant is an aider and abettor to a crime,’” the gang expert’s testimony “strengthened
inferences arising from other evidence specific to defendant’s role in the crime at issue.”
(Ibid.)
          As in Nguyen, the sufficiency of the evidence issue regarding Officer Meyer is
close. (People v. Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1056.) However, “[a] reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the judgment and considering the factors of presence, companionship, and conduct
before, during, and after the commission of the attempted murder of Officer Meyer, we
conclude the evidence permits a reasonable inference of guilt as an aider and abettor.
          The evidence in support of defendant’s conviction for premeditated attempted
murder of W.H. is stronger. Here, the evidence reflected defendant and Arguello had an
initial interaction with the individuals at Maxine Drive before defendant called Zapien
and Ferrel, fellow Norteño gang members. After picking up Zapien and Ferrel, the group
returned to the scene because, by his own admission, defendant wanted to fight. Though

                                              49.
defendant denied knowledge Zapien or Ferrel had a gun, he admitted it was common for
gang members to be armed. Defendant, Zapien and Ferrel were all armed with guns and
there was evidence from which the jury could conclude they planned which individual
would target each victim—Ochoa, Diaz, or W.H.—based upon the evidence they split up
and each approached a target individual when they got out of the truck. There was also
evidence from which the jury could conclude Zapien held a gun to W.H.’s face, but W.H.
managed to push him away and then one of the individuals fired at W.H. while W.H. ran
away. A jury could reasonably infer from such evidence the shooter harbored an intent to
kill and took a “direct but ineffectual act” to accomplish the killing. (See People v. Pettie
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 53 [evidence shooter pointed gun at victim’s face and then
fired multiple shots as victim fled supported inference of intent to kill]; accord, People v.
Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690 [“‘The act of firing toward a victim at a close,
but not point blank, range ‘in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the
bullet been on target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill’”].) From such
evidence, the jury could also reasonably infer defendant knew of his coperpetrator’s
intent to kill W.H.; he intended to encourage or facilitate the commission of the offense,
and, in fact, aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated the commission of the crime. (See
People v. Pettie, supra, at p. 53 [jury could reasonably infer assault was planned in
advance and, by participating in assault on victim, defendant encouraged coperpetrator to
fire gunshots with the intent to facilitate his commission of attempted murder].) Thus,
substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction in count V.
       We also conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish both attempted murders
were deliberate and premeditated. “To begin with, as a substantive matter section 664[,
subdivision ](a) requires only that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated for an attempted murderer to be punished with life imprisonment.” (People
v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 621–622.) “Thus, section 664(a) states only that the murder
attempted must have been willful, deliberate, and premeditated, not that the attempted

                                             50.
murderer personally must have acted willfully and with deliberation and premeditation.
Put otherwise, section 664(a) states that if the murder attempted was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated, any ‘person guilty of that attempt’—not confined to persons who acted
willfully and with deliberation and premeditation—‘shall be punished by imprisonment
… for life.’” (Id. at p. 622.) And, in assessing the evidence for premeditation and
deliberation, “‘The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the
reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period
of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it include[d] an intent to
kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation ….’” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1117, 1124.) “In this context, ‘“premeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and
“deliberate” means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.”’
[Citation.] We normally consider three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding
of premeditation and deliberation is adequately supported—preexisting motive, planning
activity, and manner of killing—but ‘[t]hese factors need not be present in any particular
combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.’” (People v.
Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645.)
       Here, much of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation as to the attempted
murders of W.H. and Officer Meyer is the same as that showing an intent to kill. First,
with regard to W.H., there was evidence defendant had an initial altercation with Diaz
and Ochoa during which W.H. was present. Defendant threatened to return. He went
with Arguello to pick up Ferrel and Zapien—fellow gang members who were armed—
and then returned to the scene. From such evidence, a rational trier of fact could
conclude the initial confrontation provided a motive for defendant and his fellow gang
members to return and kill the group after he was disrespected. (See People v. Lunafelix
(1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 [“the law does not require that a first degree murderer
have a ‘rational’ motive for killing. Anger at the way the victim talked to him [citation]

                                              51.
or any motive, ‘shallow and distorted but, to the perpetrator genuine’ may be sufficient”];
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 27 [facts about defendant’s prior conduct or
relationship with victim from which jury could reasonably infer “motive” to kill victim
support finding of premeditation and deliberation].) And his return to the scene with
armed confederates also evinces planning activity. (See generally People v. Potts (2019)
6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027 [evidence defendant arrived at victims’ home carrying a weapon
suggests murders were planned].) There was also evidence that when they arrived at
Diaz’s residence, defendant went toward Ochoa; Zapien held W.H. at gunpoint; and
Ferrel was looking for Diaz before the shooting began; and W.H. testified both Ferrel and
Zapien wore masks, further evincing planning activity. A reasonable factfinder could
construe all of this conduct leading up to the shooting as planning activity. Viewing such
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict coupled with the evidence of motive,
we conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion the attempted murder of
W.H. was deliberate and premeditated. Indeed, there was evidence defendant himself
had an opportunity to reflect on and consider the group’s collective actions and he shared
the intent to kill.
       We also conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion the attempted
murder of Officer Meyer was deliberate and premeditated. After Officer Meyer began
pursuing the red truck and before the shots were fired in his direction, plenty of time
elapsed to permit the shooter to consider his actions. In addition, the evidence supported
a jury finding the shooter had to position himself so he could shoot backwards out of the
window, and he fired multiple shots in Officer Meyer’s direction. In turn, this supported
a conclusion the attempted murder was not done rashly but rather was deliberate and
premeditated. (See People v. Poindexter (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572, 588 [manner of
killing, three quick shots from a relatively close range, supported finding of
premeditation and deliberation].) And the evidence established every defendant had a
motive to kill Officer Meyer: to facilitate their escape. Viewing such evidence in the

                                            52.
light most favorable to the judgment, a rational trier of fact could conclude the attempted
murder of Officer Meyer was deliberate and premeditated. (See People v. Nguyen, supra,
61 Cal.4th at pp. 1055–1056.)
       We reject defendant’s second contention.
III.   CALCRIM No. 3472
       Defendant next challenges the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472 in the jury
instructions. We reject defendant’s contention.
       A.     Relevant Factual Background
       Without referencing any specific instruction, the prosecutor argued in closing that
self-defense is a perfect defense, but:

       “[i]t’s not available to those who seek to quarrel with the intent to create or
       excuse to use force [sic]. It’s not available to those who seek to quarrel.
       It’s not available to those who intend to create an excuse to use force. They
       were seeking a quorum [sic]. There was no other reason to go to [Diaz]’s
       house. They were going to a party, remember? It was … Ferrel’s birthday.
       The only, only reason to go to [Diaz]’s house was to take care of business,
       was to kill [Diaz] and [Ochoa] for disrespecting [defendant] because they
       were not going to put up with that.

               “They can stand up here and tell you how drunk they were but, boy,
       they have no problem telling you how they got there, who picked them up,
       where they were seated in the truck, how they carried their guns, who had
       what gun, who was there. Does that sound like people who are drunk to
       you? So drunk that they can’t form the intent to kill. Does that sound like
       people who are just there to, as [defendant] says, smooth things over? No.
       You don’t carry a .40-caliber semiautomatic with an extended clip with
       multiple rounds in it. They’re seeking a quarrel. They went there looking
       for a fight armed with loaded firearms. Not available to them.”
       Here, the jury was instructed on perfect and imperfect self-defense and defense of
another regarding the murder and attempted murder charges and their lesser included
offenses.
       The trial court also instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3472 (Right to
Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived): “A person does not have the right to self-defense

                                            53.
if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.”
Defense counsel did not object to the inclusion of this instruction.
       B.     Standard of Review
       Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7
Cal.5th 306, 326.) “An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo
and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.” (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) “In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court must
consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused
the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged
instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to
determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.’” (Ibid.)
       Heightened scrutiny is applied when evaluating errors that infringe upon a party’s
due process rights, e.g., the use of jury instructions that relieve the prosecution of its
burden to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (See
People Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243, 251.) Such errors are considered prejudicial
unless the reviewing court determines “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant contends the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472 diminished his plea of
self-defense and relieved the prosecution of its burden to affirmatively disprove self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to prove the malice element of murder.
Initially, he asserts the evidence did not establish he provoked a fight with the intent to
create an excuse to use deadly force; rather, he contends, W.H.’s testimony established
Diaz and Ochoa started the argument and defendant “merely responded to the quarrel

                                              54.
Diaz and Ochoa started.” He further argues, even though he returned for a fistfight, he
was not stripped of his right to self-defense if he reasonably or unreasonably believed in
the need to defend himself from an imminent threat of sustaining great bodily injury or
death. He contends, however, that CALCRIM No. 3472 erroneously led jurors to believe
that because defendant was involved in a prior argument, he forfeited his right to self-
defense when he returned. He argues the prosecutor’s argument “‘compounded the
error’” by telling the jury self-defense “‘would not work’” because “‘[i]t’s not available
to those who seek to quarrel with the intent to create [an] excuse to use force.’” He
argues the instruction deprived him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, and reliable
jury verdicts and should be assessed for prejudice as constitutional error under the
Chapman standard. He argues his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed on
this basis. The People respond defendant forfeited his claim by failing to object below.
Irrespective, the evidence justified the instruction and, even if it was given in error, a
result more favorable to defendant was not reasonably probable.
       While state law claims asserting error in jury instructions may be forfeited,
“failure to object to instructional error will not result in forfeiture if the substantial rights
of the defendant are affected.” (People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.) Here,
defendant claims the allegedly flawed instruction deprived him of due process, which
would affect his substantial rights if true, so his claim is not forfeited. (See ibid.)
However, we reject defendant’s claim on its merits.
       Initially, we note CALCRIM No. 3472 is generally a correct statement of law.
(People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334; accord, People v. Enraca (2012)
53 Cal.4th 735, 761–762 [holding self-defense and imperfect self-defense “‘may not be
invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a
physical attack or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which
his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified’”].) And we disagree with

                                               55.
defendant’s claim the challenged instruction, in context, was erroneous and misled the
jury.
        Defendant relies upon an opinion of a divided panel of Division Three of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940
(Ramirez) and People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 626 (Conkling) in support of his
argument. In Ramirez, the defendant argued CALCRIM No. 3472 erroneously “made no
allowance for an intent to use only nondeadly force and an adversary’s sudden escalation
to deadly violence.” (Ramirez. supra, at p. 945.) And the prosecutor exacerbated the
error by arguing “repeatedly based on the plain terms of this instruction that even if the
jury believed defendants sought to provoke only a fistfight, their bare intent ‘to use force’
as stated in the instruction—even nondeadly fisticuffs—meant they forfeited a claim of
imperfect self-defense.” (Id. at p. 943.) The prosecutor also forcefully argued “it [did
not] matter” whether the decedent was actually armed or defendant believed he or his
companions were about to be shot, thereby misleading the jury on the law of self-defense.
(Id. at p. 952.) The Ramirez majority held “CALCRIM No. 3472 states a correct rule of
law in appropriate circumstances,” but, in the circumstances of that case, it “did not
accurately state governing law.” (Ramirez, at p. 947.) Specifically, the “blanket rule”
provided in the instruction and reiterated by the prosecutor effectively told the jury “that
one who provokes a fistfight forfeits the right of self-defense if the adversary resorts to
deadly force.” (Ibid.) Additionally, the Ramirez court also instructed the jury with a
modified version of the standard imperfect self-defense instruction (CALCRIM No. 571)
that told the jury: “‘The principle of imperfect self-defense may not be invoked by a
defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the invitation of a physical
assault or the commission of a felony) has created circumstances under which his
adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified,’” which did nothing to counteract
CALCRIM No. 3472’s categorical terms or the prosecutor’s argument. (Ramirez, at p.
952.) The Ramirez court concluded the defendant was prejudiced because the court

                                             56.
effectively endorsed the prosecutor’s misstatement of law by failing to modify the
language of CALCRIM No. 3472 and erroneously foreclosed the defendants’ imperfect
self-defense claim. (Ramirez, at pp. 952–953.)
       Unlike the prosecutor in Ramirez who repeatedly insisted it did not matter if the
original victim escalated a nondeadly conflict to a deadly one, here, the prosecutor
referred to the general principle stated in CALCRIM No. 3472 in passing as part of her
argument the defendants went to Diaz’s house with firearms with the intent to kill. Thus,
her reference to the instruction in context was not a misstatement of the law. And, unlike
in Ramirez, she never suggested the language of the instruction meant the defendants did
not have the right to respond to a deadly attack, and neither side encouraged the jury to
misapply the instruction. Rather, the prosecutor told the jury if it believed the defendants
acted in self-defense, it should acquit them. She argued, however, the evidence did not
support a claim of self-defense, asserting defendant’s and Ferrel’s versions of events
were false. She highlighted, in part, evidence Diaz had gunshot entrance wounds on his
back, the downward trajectory of the bullet in Ochoa’s body suggested the shooter was
standing above him, and the defendants fled the scene and never mentioned in their jail
calls after the incident that they acted in self-defense. Notably, the jury here was also not
instructed with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 571 as in Ramirez.
       Conkling, supra, 111 Cal. 616, which defendant also cites in support of his
argument, also does not persuade us otherwise. In Conkling, the defendant was charged
with the murder of a neighbor with whom he had an ongoing dispute regarding access to
a road. (Id. at p. 620.) At trial, the defendant argued self-defense. (Id. at p. 621.) The
jury was instructed that killing someone for obstructing a road is not justified, and if it
believed the defendant killed the victim, “then, to render such killing justifiable, it must
appear that the defendant was wholly without any fault imputable to him by law in
bringing about the commencement of the difficulty in which the mortal wound was
given.” (Id. at p. 624.) The jury was further instructed “‘an honest apprehension of

                                             57.
danger to life or limb’” justifies taking a life only if the “‘apprehension [arose] out of a
reasonable cause, but a cause originating in the fault of the person himself, in a quarrel he
provoked, or in a danger he voluntarily brought upon himself by his own misconduct,
could not be considered “reasonable or sufficient in law to support a well-grounded
apprehension of imminent danger to his person.” (Id. at pp. 624–625.) The jury was also
instructed “a real or apparent necessity, brought about by the design, contrivance, or fault
of the defendant, cannot be availed of as a defense for the commission of a crime or a
homicide.” (Id. at p. 625.) In concluding these instructions violated the defendant’s
rights, the California Supreme Court found there was no evidence the defendant was the
“first assailant, and then withdrew, or attempted in good faith to withdraw from the affray
before he fired the fatal shot.” (Ibid.) Thus, the evidence did not warrant the instructions
“regardless of the soundness of the law covered by it.” (Ibid.) The Conkling court
concluded it could not “say that no injury resulted” because the jury could have
interpreted the instructions to mean that if the defendant’s attempt to travel the road was
wrongful then he could not claim self-defense, which was not the law. (Ibid.)
       First, the language of the instructions in Conkling was different from the standard
language of CALCRIM No. 3472 given here. And, here, unlike in Conkling, there was
evidence from which the jury could conclude defendant provoked a fight with Diaz and
Ochoa during the initial confrontation and Ochoa and Diaz were ready to have a fistfight
as a result. Then, defendant, armed with additional armed confederates, confronted Diaz
and Ochoa with deadly force, and Ochoa pulled a gun out in response. Because the
instruction here was supported by the evidence, Conkling is inapposite.
       For the same reason, we further reject defendant’s claim there was not substantial
evidence to support the inclusion of CALCRIM No. 3472. Here, W.H. testified
defendant was “acting hard” in the initial interaction with Diaz and Ochoa and he was
asking Ochoa where he was from, if he banged, and questioned whether Ochoa was

                                             58.
“active.”3 There was also evidence defendant referred to Diaz’s mother by the term
“bitch,” called Ochoa and Diaz “leyvas,” and stated he and Arguello would return “pinta”
style. W.H. testified defendant’s behavior angered Diaz and Ochoa to the point they
were poised for a fistfight during the initial interaction. And then defendant returned
armed with two more gang members and the resulting shooting occurred. The jury could
reasonably conclude from the evidence defendant provoked the fight, and CALCRIM
No. 3472 informed the jury the victims could respond to the attackers’ deadly assault
with a counterassault, and the attackers who provoked the fight could not assert self-
defense against the victims’ lawful resistance. (See Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 947; accord, People v. Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 760–762.)
       Irrespective, even assuming it was error to include the instruction because it was
unsupported by the evidence, it was “‘“only a technical error which does not constitute
ground for reversal.”’” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67.) And, to the extent
such an instruction was not applicable to the facts of the case, we presume the jury
followed the instruction to disregard it. Thus, we cannot conclude the inclusion of
CALCRIM No. 3472 constituted reversible error. (See People v. Eulian, supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at p. 1335 [if CALCRIM No. 3472 was erroneously given because it was
irrelevant under the facts, error was merely technical and not grounds for reversal];
People v. Frandsen (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 266, 278 [jury was presumed to disregard
CALCRIM No. 3472 if the jury found evidence did not support its application so its

       3In his reply brief, defendant contends the cited behavior was insufficient to amount to
provocation, citing People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 225. However, Najera
discussed provocation in the context of what amounts to sufficient provocation to meet the
objective standard for voluntary manslaughter. In that context, the Najera court held “‘“[a]
provocation of slight and trifling character, such as words of reproach, however grievous they
may be, … is not recognized as sufficient to arouse, in a reasonable man, such passion as reduces
an unlawful killing with a deadly weapon to manslaughter.”’” (Najera, at p. 226.) Here, we are
discussing provocation in the context of starting a fight or quarrel as opposed to considering
whether the provocation was sufficient to establish a killing was done in the heat of passion;
thus, Najera is inapposite.

                                               59.
erroneous inclusion did not result in reversible error]; People v. Olguin (1994) 31
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381 [rejecting argument erroneous instruction on contrived self-
defense kept jury from evaluating defendant’s self-defense claim, concluding any error
was harmless where jury was instructed to disregard inapplicable instructions].)
       Furthermore, the prosecutor did not rely on CALCRIM No. 3472 to urge the jury
to reject defendant’s self-defense theory on an improper basis. And the California
Supreme Court has held a jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates “a
complete rejection of the evidence on which defendant relied to establish self-defense.”
(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 874; see id. at p. 872 [finding no prejudice in
the use of allegedly erroneous self-defense instructions, including an instruction on
contrived self-defense], abrogated on other grounds by People v. Crayton (2002) 28
Cal.4th 346, 364–365.) From this record, we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
alleged instructional error did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts.
       We reject defendant’s third contention.
IV.    Assembly Bill 333 Requires Reversal of Gang-related Firearm Enhancements
       and Count IX
       Defendant next asserts his conviction for active participation in a criminal street
gang in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a)—count IX—and the gang-related
firearm enhancements attached to counts I and II (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)) and III and
V (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)) must be reversed based on changes made to section 186.22
by the enactment of Assembly Bill 333. We agree with defendant and conclude he is
entitled to reversal of his conviction on count IX and the gang-related firearm
enhancements.
       A.     Statutory Changes to Section 186.22 and Enactment of Section 1109
       While defendant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill
333, the STEP Forward Act of 2021, which, in part, amends section 186.22 to impose

                                              60.
new substantive and procedural requirements for gang allegations. The legislation went
into effect on January 1, 2022.
       First, Assembly Bill 333 amended the definition of a “‘criminal street gang,’”
requiring proof the gang is an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more
persons, whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
activity (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added). Next, the law created a stricter requirement
for proof of “‘a pattern of criminal gang activity,’” which is necessary to prove the group
with which the defendant is associated is indeed a criminal street gang. (See § 186.22,
subds. (e)–(f).) Previously, the prosecution needed to prove only that those associated
with the gang had committed at least two offenses from a list of predicate crimes on
separate occasions within three years of one another. (See former § 186.22, subd. (e).)
Under the newly amended law, the offense with which defendant is currently charged
cannot be used as one of the two predicate offenses. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2).) In addition,
the last of the predicate offenses must have “occurred within three years of the prior
offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been
committed.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) The predicate offenses must have been committed
“on separate occasions or by two or more members,” and must have been for the
“common[] benefit[] [of] a criminal street gang,” and “the common benefit from the
offenses is more than reputational.” (Ibid.) Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the list of
offenses that may be used to establish a pattern of criminal gang activity. (Compare
former § 186.22, subd. (e)(1)–(33) with current § 186.22, subd. (e)(1)(A)–(Z)).
Additionally, it defines “to benefit, promote, further, or assist” throughout section 186.22
to mean “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit
is more than reputational.” (Id., subd. (g).) The legislation notes examples of
nonreputational common benefits “may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or
motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or
silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.” (Ibid.)

                                             61.
       Finally, Assembly Bill 333 adds section 1109, which requires bifurcation of gang
enhancements charged under section 186.22, subdivision (b) or (d) to be tried separately
from the underlying charges upon request from the defense. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.)
Section 1109 also requires the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) be tried separately from all other counts that do not
require gang evidence as an element of the crime (§ 1109, subd. (b)).
       B.     Defendant Is Entitled to Reversal of His Gang-related Firearm
              Enhancements and Count IX
       In People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, the California Supreme Court held
Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 altering the substantive requirements
necessary to prove the substantive gang offense and gang enhancements operate
retroactively under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. (Tran, at p. 1207.)
The Tran court explained,

       “Estrada ‘stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary
       indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment
       (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective
       date.’ [Citation.] Estrada applies to statutory amendments ‘which
       redefine, to the benefit of defendants, conduct subject to criminal
       sanctions.’ [Citation.] Here, ‘Assembly Bill 333 essentially adds new
       elements to the substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22—
       for example, by requiring proof that gang members ‘collectively engage’ in
       a pattern of criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses were
       committed by gang members, that the predicate offenses benefitted the
       gang, and that the predicate and underlying offenses provided more than a
       reputational benefit to the gang.…’ [Citations.] These changes have the
       effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22
       offense and the imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to
       defendants like Tran. [Citation.]’” (People v. Tran, supra, at pp. 1206–
       1207.)
Accordingly, it is undisputed defendant may seek the benefit of Assembly Bill 333’s
amendments to section 186.22.

                                               62.
       Defendant argues the predicate offense involving Christopher Colon “appears to
have been committed by him alone,” so it can no longer be a predicate offense because it
was not committed by two or more “members” of the gang (as opposed to any persons) or
serve as evidence of a pattern of criminal gang activity. He also argues there was no
evidence the predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal street gang” and “the
common benefit of the offense [must be] more than reputational.” He further contends
the People’s gang expert used the current offense as well as evidence of two predicate
offenses involving Colon and Esteban Zapien to establish the pattern of gang activity, but
the current offense can no longer be used to establish a pattern of gang activity. The
People agree the gang allegations need to be reversed because the jury’s findings “do not
comply with the new statutory terms.”
       Initially, we agree defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction for active
participation in a criminal street gang (count IX). “The essential elements for a
conviction under section 186.22[, subdivision] (a) are: ‘(1) active participation in a
criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive; (2)
knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity; and (3) the willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance in any felonious
criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7
Cal.5th 415, 422.) And, as the parties do not dispute, the evidence presented at trial is
now insufficient to establish “‘a pattern of criminal gang activity’” and, thus, a “‘criminal
street gang’” as necessary to sustain defendant’s substantive gang conviction and
enhancements pursuant to amended section 186.22. (§ 186.22, subds. (e), (f).) The
predicate offense evidence was insufficient to comply with the amended law. There was
no evidence either predicate offense commonly benefitted a criminal street gang, and the
common benefit was more than reputational as necessary to establish a “‘pattern of
criminal gang activity’” under the amended law. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1); see People v.
Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346 [“Although the People did submit evidence of two

                                             63.
predicate offenses that were committed in the new time frame, the People did not prove
that the predicate offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang and that the
benefit was more than reputational”].)
       Additionally, we also agree the gang-related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53,
subds. (c), (e)/(d), (e)) must be reversed. These enhancements require a finding “the
person violated subdivision (b) of section 186.22.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A).) As we
have already concluded, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to meet the
current requirements. Thus, we also reverse defendant’s gang-related firearm
enhancements to counts I, II, III, and V. (See People v. Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 346 [“Assembly Bill 333’s changes to section 186.22 affect not only the gang
enhancement allegations under that statute but other statutes that expressly incorporate
provisions of section 186.22”]; accord, People v. Lopez (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 7, 25
[holding Assem. Bill 333’s amendments to § 186.22, subds. (e) & (f) lawfully apply to
§ 182.5, which incorporates those sections]; People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232,
240 [“The express reliance by … the firearm enhancement statutes … on the definition of
a criminal street gang in section 186.22 means that appellants are entitled to the benefit of
this change in the law as to” those enhancements and special circumstance allegations],
review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275449.)
       C.     Prosecution May Retry Count IX and the Gang-related Firearm
              Enhancements
       The parties agree, as do we, the People may retry defendant on the substantive
gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count IX). “‘Because we do not reverse based on the
insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the
time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial.’”
(People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669; accord, People v. Figueroa (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 65, 72 [“Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial because the law
at that time would have rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper

                                             64.
and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence”];
see People v. Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275, 280 [“When a statutory amendment
adds an additional element to an offense, the prosecution must be afforded the
opportunity to establish the additional element upon remand”].)
       Defendant, however, contends the People should be prohibited from retrying the
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), (e)(1) enhancements to counts I and II and the section
12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(1) enhancements to counts III and V because the jury
found the gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) on each of these counts not true. He
acknowledges that inconsistent verdicts or findings are allowed to stand but asserts,
“[A]llowing the People to retry the gang enhancement[s], giv[es] the People a second bite
at the apple after they did not prove the gang allegations beyond a reasonable doubt under
the old, less restrictive elements, would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the state
and federal constitution[s].” He asserts, in People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903,
910 the California Supreme Court held a “not true” finding on an enhancement allegation
precludes retrial of that allegation. Accordingly, he argues, because he cannot be retried
on the section 186.22, subdivision (b) enhancements that the jury found “not true,” he
cannot be retried on the gang-related firearm enhancements that require retrying of the
gang enhancements. Thus, he asserts, the gang-related firearm enhancements must be
reversed and dismissed. He further contends retrial is also prohibited by the rule
articulated in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 that the double jeopardy clause
of the United States Constitution precludes imposition of a more severe punishment on
resentencing when a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction.
       As both parties agree, the jury’s “not true” findings as to the section 186.22,
subdivision (b) enhancements and the jury’s true findings as to the gang-related firearm
enhancements were necessarily inconsistent. And it is settled “an inherently inconsistent
verdict is allowed to stand; if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a
conviction on another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is

                                             65.
inconsistent with a conviction of the substantive offense, effect is given to both.” (People
v. Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 911; accord, People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491,
600; People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860.) “‘[A]n inconsistency may show no
more than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of
a verdict.’” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 513; see People v. Lewis (2001) 25
Cal.4th 610, 656.)
       Considering these established principles, defendant’s proposed remedy cannot
stand. To hold the People are not allowed to retry the gang-related firearm enhancements
because of the “not true” finding as to the section 186.22, subdivision (b) enhancement
allegations would not “give effect” to the jury’s “true” finding as to the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (d), (e) and (c), (e) enhancements, but rather only give effect to the jury’s
findings as to the section 186.22, subdivision (b) findings.
       Indeed, our highest court affirmed this conclusion in Bravo-Fernandez v. United
States (2016) 580 U.S. 5 in which it held the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial
based on issue preclusion when a jury returns irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts of
conviction and acquittal, and the convictions are later vacated for legal error unrelated to
the inconsistency. (Id. at pp. 17–18.) The Bravo-Fernandez court explained, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the jury necessarily resolved the issue
seeking to be precluded in his favor; but he “cannot meet that burden where the trial
yielded incompatible jury verdicts on the issue the defendant seeks to insulate from
relitigation.” (Id. at p. 19.) This is because “[i]t is unknowable ‘which of the inconsistent
verdicts—the acquittal[s] or the conviction[s]— “the jury really meant.”’ [Citations.]”
(Ibid.) Said differently, “[t]he convictions’ later invalidation on an unrelated ground does
not erase or reconcile that inconsistency: It does not bear on ‘the factual determinations
actually and necessarily made by the jury,’ nor does it ‘serv[e] to turn the jury’s
otherwise inconsistent and irrational verdict into a consistent and rational verdict.’” (Id.
at p. 21; see United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 69 [“Respondent is given the

                                             66.
benefit of her acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and it is neither
irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on
which the jury convicted”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude retrial of the gang-related firearm enhancements is not
prohibited by the jury’s “not true” findings as to the section 186.22, subdivision (b)
enhancement allegations. Rather, because we do not reverse the section 12022.53
subdivisions (d), (e) and (c), (e) enhancements for insufficient evidence, the People may
retry them on remand.
       People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 482 does not persuade us otherwise. The
Henderson court held the prohibition against double jeopardy precludes imposition of the
death sentence after reversal of a judgment sentencing the defendant to life
imprisonment. (Id. at pp. 495–497.) Our conclusion does not permit the People to seek a
greater punishment on remand. Rather, they may only retry the section 12022.53
allegations and the section 186.22, subdivision (a) count, of which defendant was already
convicted, and only an equal or lesser sentence may result.
V.     Prosecutor Did Not Engage in Prejudicial Misconduct
       Defendant next argues the prosecutor’s misconduct rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair, denying him due process mandating reversal of his convictions.
He asserts the prosecutor intentionally elicited prejudicial evidence, which disparaged the
defense and suggested the prosecution had evidence outside the record.
       A.     Relevant Background
       Throughout the trial, there was a significant amount of argument regarding
whether the prosecutor’s office should be required to disclose W.H.’s address to the
defense attorneys since W.H. was in the state witness protection program. Initially, the
court ordered the prosecution to disclose W.H.’s address and then excluded W.H.’s
testimony as a sanction for the prosecution’s failure to provide the defense with the

                                             67.
address. However, after the People filed a writ of mandamus and petition for review
related to the order, the court reconsidered its order and permitted W.H. to testify without
requiring the prosecution to disclose his address.
       There was also extensive testimony at trial regarding money paid to W.H. by the
California Witness Relocation Assistance Program. Initially, W.H. received $3,800, but
during trial he was given additional money to relocate again. During cross-examination
the following exchange took place between defendant’s counsel and Detective Hicks
about additional payments to W.H.:

             “Q. Well—well, how is it conveyed about how much money is
       supposed to be paid to the Government witness?

              “A. Those determinations were made months ago. He hasn’t
       received any of the money.

              “Q. Well, wait a minute. He’s received more than $3,800?

              “A. Correct.

              “Q. All right. So all that money, now—I mean, you’re saying that
       whenever there is—this jury was being told that the totality of what he was
       supposed to be paid was $3,800; you acknowledge today that that was
       never the case, don’t you?

              “A. That’s not correct.”
       On continued cross-examination, Zapien’s counsel also questioned Hicks about
payments to W.H.:

             “Q. Detective Hicks, regarding this money issue that [defendant’s
       counsel] raised giving [W.H.] money, you said he’s been given money a
       couple of times? Do I remember that correctly?

              “A. Yeah. Yes, sir.

             “Q. And how many times have you facilitated providing money to
       [W.H.]?

              “A. Twice.

                                            68.
            “Q. So [W.H.] has—the first time had been given a check for
      $3800; correct?

             “A. Yes.

           “Q. All right. And then there was a need to give [W.H.] additional
      money; is that correct?

             “A. Yes.

             “Q. The second time?

             “A. Yes, sir.”
      Hicks confirmed funds had been expended three times for W.H.’s benefit.
Zapien’s counsel then questioned Hicks about the amount of the additional payments and
Hicks responded he did not know the exact amount but provided estimates. Then,
Arguello’s counsel questioned the reason for the additional funds:

            “Q. The reason he wanted the money was to move someplace where
      nobody would be able to find him?

             “A. No.

            “Q. Was the reason he wanted the money was to help with moving
      expenses he’d incur ordinarily?

             “A. He wanted the monies to move so he could be safe.”
      During redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Hicks why he
requested to move W.H. after W.H. testified, and Detective Hicks explained W.H.’s
address had been compromised. The prosecutor asked, “By whom?” and Detective Hicks
responded, “Defense attorneys.” No objections were lodged to the prosecutor’s question
or to Hicks’s response by any of the defense attorneys.
      On recross-examination, the following exchange then took place between
defendant’s counsel and Hicks:

              “Q. Well, whenever—in terms of [W.H.]’s address being
      compromised, you were aware that the—some members of the defense was
      [sic] trying to serve his girlfriend; right?

                                           69.
             “A. Yes.

            “Q. All right. And so—and then—and you’re aware as well that the
      defense was authorized by the Court to do that; isn’t that true?

             “A. I don’t think that’s true.”
      Hicks later confirmed he was not aware of a court order prohibiting defense
counsel from trying to serve W.H.’s girlfriend. In response to questioning by Arguello’s
counsel on additional recross-examination, Hicks testified an agent of the defense team,
an investigator, learned of W.H.’s address and there was an individual searching the area.
He also affirmed the defense investigator was under court order not to disclose the
address to anybody outside of the defense investigative team. The prosecutor objected
and the court sustained objections to Arguello’s counsel’s questions to Hicks regarding
whether counsel would lose his bar card if he disclosed W.H.’s address. At one point
Arguello’s counsel asked Hicks: “And as a result of [W.H.] being moved, the defense
was no longer able to surveil this person; am I right? Because you whisked him out of
there before the defense had any chance to pursue a defense investigation, such as
following [W.H.] around to see if he hangs around with gangster homies?” At that point,
the prosecutor asked for a sidebar, and the court agreed the question was “inappropriate.”
As counsel started having a back and forth, the court ordered a recess. Then, the
following exchange occurred outside the presence of the jury:

             “THE COURT: I don’t mind you asking questions to—obviously, if
      there’s been an insinuation that the defense had either done something
      wrong, I don’t mind you following up with that. But clearly a lot of that is
      not—it’s outside the scope for the trial.

              “[ARGUELLO’S COUNSEL]: The problem I had, Your Honor, was
      that the witness had said on the one hand that the reason to spend all these
      tax dollars was that [W.H.] was in fear of his safety and that he was being
      moved to protect him from physical harm, which is quite reasonable, but
      then we’re also told that he was moved simply because the defense team
      learned of his whereabouts. There’s strong implication that he was
      somehow in fear of his safety because of something that might result from
      that.

                                           70.
              “THE COURT: Right. I understand—

              “[ARGUELLO’S COUNSEL]: The jury may not be aware there’s
       absolutely zero threat no matter—I didn’t know who it was. I didn’t know
       what city the guy was in.

               “THE COURT: I have no problem with your follow-up questions on
       that, but a lot of your questions were just not really for the jury to consider,
       such as what would happen if—for a violation of any kind of court order. I
       think that was clearly outside.

              “[ARGUELLO’S COUNSEL]: Well, I think—

              “[PROSECUTOR]: It’s beyond that though Judge. I’ll let you finish,
       but I want to make a record.

              “[ARGUELLO’S COUNSEL]: —there was, in fact, zero threat of harm.
       The defense attorneys and their agents are permitted by law from disclosing
       the address; if they don’t know that, they may well believe that the
       investigator’s free to go tell … anyone else what the address is.”
       Defendant’s counsel then argued the prosecutor opened the door to questioning
about the defense investigator through a “rehearsed exchange” regarding W.H.’s address
being compromised. Defendant’s counsel argued, “The direct implication is that defense
counsel can’t be trusted nor can the defendants, so that goes to them being dangerous,
gangsters, danger, killing, all these things. Again it’s an effort to poison the jury about
the whole side over here. So they’ve opened the door.” Arguello’s counsel suggested the
“implication of impropriety by the defense” could be rebutted by the investigator
testifying to the legitimate, legal reasons he may have had to go to W.H.’s address.
       The court responded, “The only reason the whole thing came up was because it
had to do with monies, it had to do with extra monies that were paid to relocate him
again. I don’t think we need to get into a separate trial why he was relocated. And I do
agree with you that the very line of the responses about his … safety and the defense I
can clearly understand.”
       Zapien’s counsel then argued the issue of W.H.’s safety being compromised was
“highly offensive and prejudicial to the defense, and I think we should be allowed to go

                                             71.
into it.” Arguello’s counsel then stated he only planned to ask Hicks whether he received
any reports from W.H. of any threats from any of the defendants. The prosecutor and the
court agreed that question was proper. In response to such questioning, Hicks testified
W.H. never reported receiving threats from any of the defendants before he was relocated
a second time.
       B.     Standard of Review
       “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a
denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or
the jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44; see People v. Mendoza (2007) 42
Cal.4th 686, 700; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167.) “The focus of the
inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the intent or
bad faith of the prosecutor.” (People v. Mendoza, supra, at p. 700.) “‘A defendant’s
conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, however, unless it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been
reached without the misconduct.’” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1010.)
       “‘As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial
misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the
impropriety.’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) An exception is made if a
timely objection or request for admonition would have been futile, or if “‘“an admonition
would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.”’” (Ibid.) “The reason for this
rule, of course, is that ‘the trial court should be given an opportunity to correct the abuse
and thus, if possible, prevent by suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of

                                             72.
the jury.’” (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 241.)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant argues the prosecutor violated her duty not to admit inadmissible
evidence and by attacking the integrity of defense counsel by eliciting Hicks’s testimony
that W.H. was relocated because the “defense attorneys” “compromised” W.H.’s address.
He contends, when defense counsel “tried to obtain information from Hicks to rebut the
appearance of impropriety created by the prosecutor, she objected numerous times.”
Then, the defense attorneys objected on various grounds and, though defendant’s counsel
did not use the words “prosecutorial misconduct,” there can be no doubt the court
understood his objections as such. He also contends the prosecutor should have recused
herself from prosecuting defendant because “she and her office simultaneously
investigated and prosecuted Carson during [defendant’s] trial,” and she prosecuted both
cases. The People respond evidence regarding W.H.’s relocation and the reasons for it
was not relevant to any contested issue at trial. However, the issue of money was brought
up by defense counsel in cross-examination and “[t]he prosecutor’s follow-up questions
about [W.H.] being given money to relocate was a reasonable response to that line of
questioning.” They deny the prosecutor’s conduct was deceptive or reprehensible and
assert it was not misconduct for her to fail to recuse herself.
              1.     The prosecutor did not engage in prejudicial misconduct in her
                     redirect examination of Detective Hicks
       “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense
counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.” (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p.
832.) And, “‘[i]t is, of course, misconduct for a prosecutor to “intentionally elicit
inadmissible testimony.”’” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.) Under
certain circumstances, however, a defendant may “open the door” to the introduction of
evidence that has been otherwise excluded. (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th

                                             73.
238, 275 [“A prosecutor, of course, may seek to disprove on cross-examination what
defense counsel sought to prove on direct examination”]; People v. Blanco (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1167, 1176 [“The defense choice of strategy often makes admissible in
rebuttal certain evidence which would not be admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-
chief”].)
       Assuming, arguendo, defendant’s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct was
adequately preserved, we reject it on its merits. Here, defense counsel questioned
Detective Hicks at length regarding additional payments given to W.H. Accordingly, the
prosecution was entitled to clarify the reason for the additional payments to W.H. (See
People v Page (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 574 [where defense counsel “opened the
door” to testimony by his question on cross-examination, “[i]t was hardly ‘misconduct’
for the prosecutor to seek clarification of the response through further questioning”].)
And even if counsel’s question regarding who compromised W.H.’s location was
irrelevant or improper, we cannot conclude this question in context amounted to
deceptive and reprehensible conduct or that defendant was prejudiced as a result.
Defense counsel was able to clarify on cross-examination that W.H.’s address was
learned of by a defense investigator who was under court order not to disclose the address
to anyone outside of the defense team, including to the defendants. Defense counsel also
elicited testimony from Hicks that he was unaware of any threats from any of the
defendants against W.H. And we cannot conclude it is reasonably probable a result more
favorable to defendant would have been reached without the alleged misconduct.
(People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1010.)
              2.     It was not misconduct for the prosecutor to fail to recuse herself
                     from defendant’s case
       Defendant next argues the prosecutor’s failure to recuse herself from this case
amounted to prejudicial misconduct. He asserts she had “an actual conflict that required
her to recuse herself because she and her office simultaneously investigated and

                                            74.
prosecuted Carson during [defendant’s] trial.” He further contends the prosecutor had
“personal animus towards Carson,” and “vice ver[s]a,” asserting the record reflects the
prosecutor had an “axe to grind” against Carson and defendant suffered as a result. He
argues the prosecutor should have recused herself when the investigation into Carson
began. The People respond defendant forfeited his claim by failing to raise the issue
below. They further contend his claim fails on its merits because there was no evidence
the prosecutor was biased against defendant or that the ongoing investigation into Carson
had any impact on defendant’s case. They assert, the verdicts in this case were returned
on September 28, 2012, but Carson was not even arrested in connection with the
Kauffman murder until August 2015, almost three years later. Thus, there was no
conflict of interest during defendant’s trial. On reply, defendant asserts his motion for
new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct preserved the issue.
       Even assuming, arguendo, the issue was adequately preserved, the claim fails on
its merits. Defendant fails to establish the prosecutor’s failure to recuse herself during
defendant’s trial constituted misconduct. A “conflict” exists whenever there is a
“‘reasonable possibility that the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary function in
an evenhanded manner.’” (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 592; see People v.
Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148.) But the conflict is disabling only if it is “‘so grave
as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the
criminal proceedings.’” (Eubanks, supra, at p. 592; see Conner, supra, at p. 148; accord,
§ 1424 subd. (a)(1) [a motion may be filed “to disqualify a district attorney from
performing an authorized duty” that “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a
conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a
fair trial”]; see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 377.)
       Here, despite defendant’s assertions, there was no evidence the prosecutor had a
conflict of interest during defendant’s trial. To the contrary, the prosecutor represented
she had no knowledge of the wiretap or investigation into Carson when the issue was

                                             75.
raised to the court. While defendant cites to a discussion in the motion for new trial
regarding the prosecutor’s alleged contact with witnesses in the matter related to Carson,
there is no evidence cited in support of those statements, nor did the motion for new trial
even allege when the alleged contact occurred.
       To the extent defendant asserts the contentious nature of the trial establishes the
prosecutor had a “personal animus” against his counsel, we disagree. “‘[T]hat a public
prosecutor might feel unusually strongly about a particular prosecution … does not
inevitably indicate an actual conflict of interest, much less a constitutional bar to
prosecution.’ [Citation.] ‘Zealous advocacy in pursuit of convictions forms an essential
part of the prosecutor’s proper duties and does not show the prosecutor’s participation
was improper.’ [Citation.] Recusal is justified only when the prosecutor has ‘an interest
in the case extraneous to [his or her] official function.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 376.) The record fails to support a conclusion
the prosecutor had a conflict during the trial compelling her to recuse herself.
Consequently, her failure to recuse herself did not constitute misconduct.
VI.    Cumulative Error
       Defendant argues the cumulation of the numerous errors in this case prejudiced
him. Specifically, he asserts he was denied a fair trial by egregious governmental and
prosecutorial misconduct, “fueled by a Judge who refused to act to protect [defendant]’s
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” Here, however, there is no series of prejudicial
errors to cumulate. Accordingly, defendant cannot demonstrate the cumulative effect of
the alleged errors resulted in prejudice. (See In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483
[“claims previously rejected on their substantive merits—i.e., this court found no legal
error—cannot logically be used to support a cumulative error claim because we have
already found there was no error to cumulate”].)

                                             76.
VII.   Prison Prior Enhancement Should Be Stricken
       Defendant next contends his one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed
pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b) must be stricken under Senate Bill 136,
which was signed into law on October 8, 2019, and became effective on January 1, 2020.
The People concede Senate Bill 136 applies retroactively to this case and the prison prior
enhancement should be stricken. (See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742.) On
remand, we direct the trial court to strike this enhancement.
       At the time defendant was charged, convicted, and sentenced, section 667.5,
former subdivision (b) provided, in part:

       “[W]here the new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence or a
       sentence of imprisonment in a county jail under subdivision (h) of Section
       1170 is imposed or is not suspended, in addition and consecutive to any
       other sentence therefor, the court shall impose a one-year term for each
       prior separate prison term or county jail term imposed under subdivision (h)
       of Section 1170 or when sentence is not suspended for any felony ….”
       After defendant was sentenced, but while his case was still pending on appeal, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill 136. Effective January 1, 2020, subdivision (b) of section
667.5 provides, in pertinent part:

       “[W]here the new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence or a
       sentence of imprisonment in a county jail under subdivision (h) of Section
       1170 is imposed or is not suspended, in addition and consecutive to any
       other sentence therefor, the court shall impose a one-year term for each
       prior separate prison term for a sexually violent offense as defined in
       subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ….”
       (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
       In other words, a prior prison term enhancement will only apply if a defendant
served the prior prison term for a qualifying “sexually violent offense.” The Legislature
did not expressly declare or in any way indicate it did not intend Senate Bill 136 to apply
retroactively. “When an amendatory statute … lessens the punishment for a crime …, it
is reasonable for courts to infer, absent evidence to the contrary and as a matter of
statutory construction, that the Legislature intended the amendatory statute to

                                             77.
retroactively apply to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible—that is, to all cases
not final when the statute becomes effective. [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 961, 972.) Additionally, while defendant’s appeal was pending, the
Legislature enacted section 1172.75 (former § 1171.1), which further declares invalid any
sentence enhancement imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to former subdivision
(b) of section 667.5, except for those enhancements imposed for a prior conviction for a
sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of section 6600 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, and provides for resentencing pursuant to that section.
       Accordingly, because defendant’s prior prison term was not served for a sexually
violent offense, the related enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5, former
subdivision (b) is now unauthorized and must be stricken on remand.
VIII. Defendant’s Remaining Claim Is Moot
       Defendant also argues the matter should be remanded to permit the trial court to
exercise its discretion regarding whether to strike or reduce the gang-related firearm
enhancements. Because we are reversing these enhancements on other grounds and a
new sentencing hearing will necessarily result, defendant may raise this argument below,
if necessary.
       A.       Applicable Law
       In People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, the California Supreme Court held a
trial court could strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement and, in its place,
impose a lesser enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c). (Tirado, at
p. 697.) The Tirado court explained “courts are not categorically prohibited from
imposing uncharged enhancements and … the power to do so is not conditioned on the
charged and adjudicated enhancement being legally or factually inapplicable.” (Id. at p.
699.) Furthermore, “the current language of section 12022.53” does not bar a court from

                                             78.
imposing an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) when those
enhancements are not specifically listed in the accusatory pleading. (Ibid.)
          In so holding, the Tirado court noted, section 12022.53, subdivision (j) “is the
subdivision that authorizes the imposition of enhancements under section 12022.53.”
(People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700.) Notably, section 12022.53, subdivision
(j) provides: “For the penalties in this section to apply, the existence of any fact required
under subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either
admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact. When an
enhancement specified in this section has been admitted or found to be true, the court
shall impose punishment for that enhancement pursuant to this section rather than
imposing punishment authorized under any other law, unless another enhancement
provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of imprisonment.” (Italics added.)
          To determine whether subdivision (j) of section 12022.53 authorized the court to
impose an enhancement under subdivision (b) or (c) after striking a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement, the Tirado court considered whether the existence of facts
required by section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) were alleged and found true.
(People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700.) The Tirado court concluded “those
requirements were met here.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Tirado court held: “When an
accusatory pleading alleges and the jury finds true the facts supporting a section
12022.53(d) enhancement, and the court determines that the section 12022.53(d)
enhancement should be struck or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may,
under section 12022.53(j), impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).”
(Ibid.)
          B.     Analysis
          Defendant asserts the court imposed 25 years to life on the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (d), (e)(1) enhancements to counts I and II, and 20 years to life on the

                                               79.
section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(1) enhancements to counts III and V. He notes
“[e]ffective January 1, 2018, section 12022.53(h), allowed a court to exercise its
discretion under section 1385 to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement at the time of
sentencing.” Additionally, in 2022, the California Supreme Court held in People v.
Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688 that trial courts also have discretion to impose a lesser
firearm enhancement. Accordingly, he argues “[b]ecause nothing in the record indicates
the trial court considered and rejected striking or imposing lesser firearm enhancements,
the matter should be remanded for resentencing.” The People agree the matter should be
remanded to give the court an opportunity to impose a lesser included firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53.
       The Supreme Court has held: “A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose
sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a
defendant’s record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, … the appropriate remedy is to
remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; see People v.
McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)
       Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to additional 25-years-to-life terms on the
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), (e)(1) enhancements to counts I and II and 20-years-
to-life terms on the section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(1) enhancements to counts III
and V without further comment. The record before us does not reflect the trial court
knew it had discretion to impose lesser firearm enhancements at the time of sentencing;
nor does it reflect a clear indication by the trial court it would not have imposed lesser
enhancements if it had discretion to do so. However, as discussed, we are reversing
count IX and the gang-related firearm enhancements on other grounds and striking the
prison prior enhancement. Thus, a new sentencing will necessarily result. Should the

                                             80.
gang-related firearm enhancements ultimately be reimposed, defendant may raise this
contention at resentencing.
                                      DISPOSITION
       We reverse count IX, the section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), (e)(1) enhancements
to counts I and II, the section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(1) enhancements to counts
III and V, and strike the prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). The
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The People shall have 60
days from the date of the remittitur in which to file an election to retry defendant on
count IX, the section 12022.53, subdivisions (d), (e)(1) enhancements to counts I and II,
and the section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (e)(1) enhancements to counts III and V. If
the People elect not to retry defendant on this count and these enhancements, the trial
court shall modify the judgment by striking count IX, the section 12022.53, subdivisions
(d), (e)(1) enhancements to counts I and II, and the section 12022.53, subdivisions (c),
(e)(1) enhancements to counts III and V and hold a new sentencing hearing. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                   PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

                                             81.