Court Opinion

ID: 9795834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:39:46.881212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:06.751845
License: Public Domain

*173JONES, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the Court’s analysis and conclusions, including that part of Section IV upholding the penalty provisions of Idaho Code § 18-1502(d) on substantive due process grounds. However, I disagree with regard to that part of Section IV upholding those provisions against appellants’ equal protection challenge. My view is that the State’s confusing behavior on the issue of suspending driving privileges of only one class of adults — those in the 18-20 age group — results in a failure to pass the rational relationship test under an equal protection analysis.
The appellants argue that the penalty provisions are unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds because there is no rational relationship between the crime of underage possession of alcoholic beverage and the punishment of driver’s license suspension, particularly for those who are adults. In support of their position, they cite a 1984 opinion of the Idaho Attorney General, which so concluded.1 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-5. The 1984 Opinion dealt with a predecessor statute that required the Idaho Department of Transportation to suspend the driving privileges of persons under the age of 19 who were convicted of alcohol offenses not related to the operation of a motor vehicle. The Opinion concluded that the suspension provision “is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds — and probably on substantive due process grounds — because the suspension of driver’s licenses of minors following convictions for offenses having no rational relationship to the operation of a motor vehicle does not substantially further a legitimate, articulated state purpose.” Id. at 1. The Opinion applied the rational relationship test to the substantive due process and equal protection analyses. The Opinion further concluded that the statute failed to provide procedural due process in the suspension proceedings provided for therein.
In their argument before the district court, the appellants noted that a legal guideline issued by a deputy attorney general on October 16, 1991, concluded the procedural due process defect had been cured by subsequent amendments to the code section in question but that the substantive due process and equal protection problems had not been addressed by subsequent legislation. The guideline indicated, however, that two court cases from other jurisdictions — State v. Day, 84 Or.App. 291, 733 P.2d 937 (Or.App.1987) and Commonwealth v. Strunk, 400 Pa.Super. 25, 582 A.2d 1326 (Pa.Super.1990) — had upheld similar statutes against constitutional attack, although “neither court has persuasively articulated a rational relationship between the state’s valid goal of enforcing statutes dealing with underage drinking and the chosen penalty of suspending driving privileges.”
The tentative conclusion in the 1984 Opinion that the suspension provision relating to those under age 19 is “probably” unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds is unsupported under this Court’s holdings regarding the rational relationship test. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 396, 987 P.2d 300, 308 (1999); Sanchez v. City of Caldwell, 135 Idaho 465, 467, 20 P.3d 1, 3 (2001).
The same rational relationship test applies in an equal protection analysis. On this ground, it is my conclusion that the penalty provisions in question fail the test. The reason is that the State has acted erratically and in a somewhat contradictory manner since at least 1983 in establishing policy with regard to the suspension of driving privileges of young citizens for their violation of statutes pertaining to alcohol possession and use. The State’s own actions east doubt on the rationality of the relationship between the crime and the punishment.
We start with the 1983 statute providing for the suspension of driving privileges for those under 19 who violate the specified alcohol statutes. 1983 Statutes, eh. 266, § 1. The 1984 Opinion stated there was no rational relationship between the punishment and the crime. Aside from the question of how *174much, if any, weight this provides from a legal standpoint, the conclusion of the Legislature’s official counsel points to the lack of a legislatively established nexus between the underage alcohol offense and the license suspension punishment. In 1987 the Legislature increased the age for imposition of the penalty to persons under 21. 1987 Statutes, ch. 212, § 1. However, in 1989, the Legislature lowered the age for license suspension to 17 or under. 1989 Statutes, ch. 155, § 10. In 1990, the Legislature stated the suspension age was to apply to those under 18. 1990 Statutes, ch. 280, § 1. Then came the legal guideline indicating that previous legislation had not addressed the substantive due process and equal protection problems identified in the 1984 Opinion. The State v. Day and Commonwealth v. Strunk opinions cited in the guideline offer no help with regard to the equal protection issue, because neither case dealt with that issue. Both were concerned with substantive due process. In 1994, the Legislature enacted the current statutory scheme, raising the suspension age by three years, so as to apply to offenders under 21. 1994 Statutes, eh. 133, § 1.
Further confusion results from other provisions of the Idaho Liquor Act, which is compiled as §§ 23-101 through 23-807. I.C. § 23-101. This includes I.C. § 23-604, which subjects persons under 21 who consume or possess alcoholic beverages to the punishment set out in I.C. § 18-1502. The heading of that section reads, “Minors — Purchase, consumption or possession prohibited.” This statute obviously applies to persons who are not minors because, as defined in I.C. § 32-101, males and females “under eighteen (18) years of age” are minors, while those 18 and older are adults. However, I.C. § 23-101, which sets out the purpose of the Idaho Liquor Act, states that the Act “is not designed to abridge the personal privilege of a responsible adult to consume alcoholic liquor as a beverage, except in cases of the abuse of that privilege to the detriment of others.” There appears to be some tension between I.C. § 23-101 and I.C. § 23-604 insofar as they use the terms “minor” and “adult”. Combined with the assertions in the 1984 Opinion and 1991 guideline that a legislative nexus has not been established between statutes dealing with underage drinking and the license suspension penalty, one can conclude that a rational relationship does not exist for treating one category of adults — those who are 18, 19 and 20 — differently than all other adults. An interesting side note is provided in I.C. § 18-1502C. That statute provides that persons under the age of 18 who are found to be in possession of marijuana are to have their driving privileges suspended. There is no indication of what the policy reason is for this differential between the license suspension ages for alcohol violators as opposed to marijuana violators. Those 17 and under who violate the marijuana laws are subject to license suspension while those 20 and under who violate underage drinking laws are subject to the same type of suspension.
The Court has cited a case, People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal.App. 4th Supp. 6, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 (1991), wherein the court upheld restrictions on driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol. However, the nexus between the crime and the punishment was supported by detailed legislative findings in the California vehicle code. 5 Cal.Rptr.2d at 493. Here, the State’s legal counsel twice indicated the lack of such a nexus and the suspension age has bounced between 17 and 20 with no apparent explanation. As a result of this confusion, I would hold the penalty provisions violative of equal protection with regard to the category of adults aged 18-20.

. It should be noted that an official opinion of the Attorney General is not binding on this Court. "While not binding on this Court, those opinions are entitled to consideration.” Ehco Ranch, Inc. v. State ex rel. Evans, 107 Idaho 808, 811, 693 P.2d 454, 457 (1984).