Court Opinion

ID: 9719924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:09:14.020434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:11.183927
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I concur in affirming the judgment but disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting impeachment of defendant by the use of a prior conviction.
Defendant’s contention is grounded upon People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]. The apparent rationale of my majority brethren’s opinion is that because “[t]here thus was available to the People for impeachment purposes no prior other than the [similar] one in 1969,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted defendant to be impeached with the 1969 robbery prior.
The majority’s rationale posits a broad-brush admissibility for impeachment purposes of a nonremote prior similar to the current alleged offense so long as the prior is the only one available to the People for impeachment purposes. In this regard, the majority’s carte blanche *693approach flies in the face of Beagle’s admonition that those prior convictions which are for the same type crime as that currently alleged should be admitted sparingly because of their unduly prejudicial effect. (6 Cal.3d at p. 453.) The observation in Beagle that, as a general rule, felony convictions bearing on veracity are admissible, does not detract from the caution the trial court has been mandated to exercise. This is particularly true in dealing with a similar prior in view of the “inevitable pressure” on jurors to believe “if he did it before he probably did it again.” (Ibid.) Admissibility which is allowed “sparingly,” as thus cautioned by the state Supreme Court, can only embrace admissibility which is granted in the exceptional case.
At the time when the trial court was called upon to rule on the Beagle exclusionary motion, nothing in the evidence indicated that this case was an exceptional one favoring admissibility of the similar prior. Before the court ruled on the motion, defendant had been identified at trial by two eyewitnesses as the alleged offender. Eyewitness identification as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief is routine; it does not make for an exceptional case.
Admission of a similar prior is so prejudicial that, in obedience to Rist, the trial court should proceed with great caution. Only when it appears that the need for impeachment is greater than the certain prejudice should the similar prior be admitted. Manifestly, such will be a rare case. That is, prior convictions for the same crime will be admitted sparingly.
Upon an examination of the entire cause, I am of the opinion that the court’s abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of the 1969 prior did not resuit in a miscarriage of justice. The defendant did testify. The juiy had all the facts before it. The case for the prosecution was very strong. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Another court, upon a fact situation much weaker for the prosecution, has held the introduction of a similar prior to be reversible error. (People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782 [129 Cal.Rptr. 529].)
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 3. 1977.