Court Opinion

ID: 9953459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:37.667847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:08.746735
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362767
                                                                     Livingston Circuit Court
JOSEPH HENRY SANTANA,                                                LC No. 21-026752-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, Joseph Santana, appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(c) or (f), and unlawful imprisonment, MCL
750.349b(1)(c). Santana was sentenced to 14 to 30 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-I conviction
and 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his unlawful imprisonment conviction. We affirm Santana’s
convictions, vacate in part the judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

        The complainant and Santana started dating in 2017. During the relationship, they engaged
in “light bondage” as part of their sexual escapades. They broke up in 2019. Santana attributed
the breakup to the complainant’s mental-health issues. She, however, testified that the relationship
ended because Santana was mentally manipulative. In January 2021, she contacted Santana
because she wanted “closure” regarding their relationship. They met in a parking lot and talked in
Santana’s vehicle. After, Santana drove her to his sister’s home without giving her the option of
leaving his vehicle. The complainant testified that she then returned with Santana to his apartment,
where they had consensual sex. Afterward, she told him she no longer wanted a sexual relationship
with him.

        Over the next month, they continued to talk. On February 24, 2021, Santana asked the
complainant to meet him for drinks. She agreed. Santana then went to a store and purchased a
roll of duct tape. Santana and the complainant met at a bar, had some alcoholic drinks, and then
returned to Santana’s apartment. The complainant testified that Santana initiated intimate contact

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while they were watching television in the bedroom. Because she did not want the contact, she
stood to leave.

        The complainant testified that Santana responded by taking off her shirt and pulling down
her pants. She fell face-forward onto the bed and he pressed his knee to her hip in order to hold
her in place. He then duct taped her arms and legs, put on a condom, and penetrated her vagina
with his penis. She told him to stop and cried. She stated that she eventually told him that, although
she wanted to continue, she needed a cigarette first. Santana cut the tape and she left his apartment.
Outside, Santana got into her vehicle and tried to stop her from driving away. She insisted that he
leave the vehicle and, after he did, she drove away.

       The complainant reported the assault to the police and was eventually examined at a local
hospital by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). She reported to the nurse that she had been
sexually assaulted. The nurse documented that the complainant had various abrasions, bite marks,
and bruises on her body, but was unable to do an internal vaginal examination because the
complainant was in too much pain.

         At trial, defendant described his and the complainant’s sex life as “adventurous.” He
testified that the sexual intercourse, including binding the complainant’s arms and legs with duct
tape, was consensual. He added that he stopped having intercourse with the complainant when
she got tense because he thought she was having a panic attack. The jury, however, found that he
was guilty of the crimes as charged.

                                          II. VOUCHING

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       In both the brief filed by his appellate counsel and in his Standard 4 brief, filed under
Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004-6, Standard 4, Santana argues that witnesses
improperly vouched for the complainant’s credibility. Because he did not object to the allegedly-
improper vouching at trial, this issue is unpreserved. See People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252;
934 NW2d 693 (2019). As a result, we review this issue for plain error affecting Santana’s
substantial rights. See id.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        “A witness may not comment on, or vouch for, the credibility of another witness.” People
v Lowrey, 342 Mich App 99, 109; 993 NW2d 62 (2022). Likewise, it is improper for a witness to
“opine about the defendant’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App
69, 81; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). “Such conduct invades the province of the jury to determine issues
in a case.” Lowrey, 342 Mich App at 109 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

        Santana first claims that the SANE nurse vouched for the complainant’s credibility by
referring to the complainant as a “survivor.” He identifies the following instances where the nurse
used the term “survivor.” First, when describing what a SANE nurse is and does, the nurse stated:

               So a sexual assault nurse examiner is a registered nurse who has specialized
       training in sexual assault or forensic nursing. We do a full medical exam for a

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       survivor of sexual assault, which includes a head-to-toe assessment. We treat any
       minor medical injuries. We also may refer them to follow-up medical injury—you
       know, for follow-up medical injuries. We treat minor pain or we also treat for
       sexual assault diseases such as ST[I]s. And then we also do evidence collection if
       the patient requests it.

Second, when queried about the paperwork associated with the examination, she testified:

                A lot of times you have to build rapport with your survivors. So if I just
       started asking what happened, you know, you don’t build that relationship, that
       comfort. So we do—I always do start with their name, kind of small talk, ask
       medical information. We need to know their medical history, what meds are they
       on, past medical history, surgeries. So that when we are doing our medical exam,
       you know, if they’ve had a hysterectomy, we know that we’re not going to find a
       cervix. Right? So, we need to know what we’re looking for and get kind of their
       background information. And then depending on how the survivor is doing with
       the questions, we will move into what happened during the assault and then, you
       know, so that gives me an idea of where do I need to look for injuries. So then from
       there I will go onto doing a head-to-toe assessment. We start at the head normally
       unless there is significant injury to the face, we may start somewhere else. So cause
       the last thing we want to do is put the survivor through more pain by taking photos
       and touching. So we kind of do move around to make it as comfortable as possible
       for the survivor.

Next, when asked whether she worked fulltime as a SANE or whether she was on call, she
explained that she would “give call hours and then when there is a survivor of sexual assault that
needs an exam done” she would come in and complete the examination. Finally, when describing
an evidence-collection kit, the nurse stated:

               So the evidence collection kit is a kit that comes from our State Police crime
       lab. It is a box. Inside that box it has envelopes and then inside the envelopes it
       has dryer boxes and it has Q-tips that we use. It also has what we call a buccal
       swab and we swab and get our survivor’s, or our patient’s own DNA also. It has
       envelopes for us to collect other samples like hair samples or maybe at times we
       find condoms or tampons or—so we can collect that kind of stuff. We also, the ten
       pages that we complete comes in that kit, and then there is a form for consent on
       how we bill. We never bill a patient but we do either bill their insurance or the
       State of Michigan.

        Santana argues that calling the complainant a “survivor” meant the nurse believed the
complainant’s story about the sexual assault. He contends the jury likely relied on this vouching
when convicting him. However, the nurse did not actually describe the complainant as a survivor.
Instead, she only used the term “survivor” when speaking in general terms about her job and job
duties. Vouching occurs when one witness opines that another witness is telling the truth or worthy
of belief. Lowrey, 342 Mich App at 109. Because the nurse did not actually refer to the
complainant as a survivor, nor did she opine that the complainant was telling the truth or worthy
of belief, we conclude that the nurse did not improperly vouch for the complainant.

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        In his Standard 4 brief, Santana argues that the trial judge vouched for the complainant by
referring to her as a “victim.” However, the instances of the judge referring to the complainant as
a “victim” occurred when the jury was not present. As a result, the jury could not possibly be
swayed by the trial judge’s use of the term “victim” when referring to the complainant.

        Santana lastly asserts that a police officer improperly referred to the complainant as “the
victim.” The officer testified that, while searching Santana’s apartment, the police “took the duct
tape because we were informed that the victim arrived—had duct tape on her.” Here, the officer’s
referral to the complainant as “the victim” is not improper. First, Michigan caselaw does not
prohibit witnesses from referring to a complaining witness as a victim during criminal sexual
conduct prosecutions. Indeed, MCL 750.520a(s) defines a “victim” as the “person alleging to have
been subjected to criminal sexual conduct.” Thus, the complainant in this case, who alleged that
she was subjected to criminal sexual conduct is, by statutory definition, a victim. Second, the
officer did not vouch for the complainant’s credibility by calling her a victim. Instead, his
comment was made in connection with describing the steps taken during the investigation of her
complaint. He did not testify that he believed her allegations were truthful, nor did he testify that
he had confirmed the allegations that she had made. As a result, his testimony, which did not
comment on or provide an opinion on the credibility of the complainant, is not improper vouching.

        Santana also argues that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to object
to the alleged vouching by the nurse, the trial judge, and the police officer. However, because no
improper vouching occurred, any such objection would have been meritless. A defendant’s lawyer
is not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection. People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28, 34;
989 NW2d 250 (2022).

                                    III. ABANDONED ISSUES

        Santana raises several additional issues in his Standard 4 brief. The prosecution contends
that each issue has been abandoned. We agree.

         “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with
little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588
NW2d 480 (1998). Here, Santana first argues that the prosecution withheld and/or failed to
disclose evidence that the complainant had previously made a false accusation that she had been
sexually assaulted. Other than that bare accusation, however, he had provided no citation to the
record or offers of proof, nor has he directed this Court to any legal authority to support his
position. Second, he contends that reversal is required because the prosecution collected evidence
from the SANE examination in violation of the complainant’s physician-patient privilege. Again,
however, he only announces his position and leaves it to this Court to discern the basis for his
claim. Third, Santana asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing the
complainant to perjure herself on the stand without correcting it. As with the prior two arguments,
Santana had done little more than announce his position and demand reversal of his convictions.
Finally, he argues that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise the above issues. Yet, he
continues to fail to support his position with citation to legal authority, and again does not offer
any analysis of the issue. Because each of the above arguments amounts to nothing more than the

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announcement of a position without any support analysis, we conclude that each issue has been
abandoned on appeal, and we decline to consider them.

                                          IV. SENTENCING

                                    A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Santana lastly argues that resentencing is required because the trial court erroneously
scored offense variables (OVs) 3 and 10. “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s
factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of
the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Clear error is present
when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that an error occurred.” People
v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed
by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which
an appellate court reviews de novo.” Hardy, 494 Mich at 438.

                                            B. ANALYSIS

        Santana first challenges the assessment of 10 points for OV 3. “OV 3 designates the
number of points to be scored for physical injury to a victim.” People v Johnson, 342 Mich App
90, 94; 992 NW2d 668 (2022). The court must assess ten points if a “[b]odily injury requiring
medical treatment occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1)(d). Here the court assessed ten points
for OV 3 because the complainant was provided prophylactic medications to protect against
sexually transmitted diseases. “[T]he administration of prophylactic medication to prevent
pregnancy or disease following a sexual assault is sufficient by itself to require assessment of 10
points for OV 3.” Johnson, 342 Mich App at 97-98. As a result, the trial court did not err by
assessing ten points for OV 3.

        Next, Santana argues the trial court erred when it assessed 10 points for OV 10. Under OV
10, a trial court must assess ten points if “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical disability,
mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her
authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b).

        During the sentencing hearing, the prosecution advocated for the assessment of 15 points
for OV 10, claiming Santana exhibited predatory conduct before assaulting the complainant. As
an alternative argument, the prosecution suggested OV 10 be assessed ten points, stating: “If the
court’s not inclined to grant [an assessment of 15 points], I would ask for ten points on that in that
[Santana] exploited the domestic relationship in order to get her there. So I think that might be the
more appropriate scoring.” The court stated that it agreed and assessed ten points.

       However, in order “to qualify as a ‘domestic relationship’ ” there must be a familial or
cohabitating relationship.” People v Jamison, 292 Mich App 440, 447; 807 NW2d 427 (2011). A
mere dating relationship is not sufficient. Id. In this case, the complainant and Santana are not
family members and did not live together. Accordingly, the court’s apparent finding that there
was a domestic relationship between Santana and the complainant was clearly erroneous.

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        Resentencing, however, is unnecessary because the trial court ultimately reached the
correct result. Santana was found guilty of CSC-I and unlawful imprisonment. His unlawful
imprisonment conviction was based upon evidence that he had physically restrained the
complainant to accomplish the CSC. Santana’s restraint of the complainant began when he
forcibly removed her clothing against her will and pinned her to the bed using his knee. He then
used duct tape to hogtie her, thereby immobilizing her arms and legs, while she was pleading with
him to stop. In this incapacitated and helpless condition, Santana sexually assaulted the victim on
his bed.

        The intent of OV 10 is “the assessment of points for the exploitation of vulnerable victims.”
People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 157; 749 NW2d 257 (2008). The term “exploit” means “to
manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical purposes,” MCL 777.40(3)(b), and “vulnerability”
means “the readily apparent susceptibility of a victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or
temptation.” MCL 777.40(3)(c) (emphasis added). Santana was found guilty of physically
restraining the complainant so that he could sexually assault her. In the complainant’s vulnerable
condition, Santana exploited her physical disability for the purpose of his own selfish or unethical
purposes. Because Santana exploited the victim’s physical disability (after creating it), the trial
court was required to assess 10 points under OV 10.

        “This Court will not reverse when a lower court reaches the right result for the wrong
reason.” People v Hawkins, 340 Mich App 155, 195; 985 NW2d 853 (2022). Although the trial
court’s analysis under OV 10 was erroneous, its assessment of 10 points was ultimately correct.

        Finally, although not raised as an issue upon appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred
by ordering Santana to be “subject to lifetime monitoring” under MCL 750.520n. That statute
provides that a defendant “shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring” only when
convicted of CSC-I or CSC-II and the crime was “by an individual 17 years old or older against
an individual less than 13 years of age . . . .” MCL 750.520n(1). Notably, Santana was not
convicted of CSC-I on the basis of his or the victim’s ages, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and the only
testimony about their respective ages was that defendant was 27 years old and the victim was 28
years old in 2019, when they broke up. Therefore, by the time the assault occurred in 2021, the
complainant was necessarily older than 13 years of age. As a result, the requirement of lifetime
monitoring under MCL 750.520n(1) was improperly assessed. Consequently, we vacate in part
the judgment of sentence and remand to the trial court.

      Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court for entry of an amended
judgment of sentence consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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