Court Opinion

ID: 9890590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 17:05:40.166488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:50.036482
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220324

                                Opinion filed October 13, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      KIM GRAKO,                                      ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                      ) of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
             Plaintiff-Appellant,                     ) La Salle County, Illinois,
                                                      )
             v.                                       ) Appeal No. 3-22-0324
                                                      ) Circuit No. 19-L-74
                                                      )
      BILL WALSH CHEVROLET-CADILLAC,                  ) Honorable
      INC., d/b/a Bill Walsh Automotive               ) Troy D. Holland,
      Group; WILLIAM K. WALSH; and                    ) Judge, Presiding.
      KEVIN SCHULTZ,                                  )
                                                      )
             Defendants                               )
                                                      )
      (Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. d/b/a Bill )
      Walsh Automotive Group, and William K.          )
      Walsh, Defendants-Appellees).                   )
                                                      )
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices Peterson and Davenport concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                OPINION

¶1          Plaintiff, Kim Grako, filed a two-count amended complaint seeking relief against

     defendants, William K. Walsh and Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., for tortious interference

     with prospective economic advantage. Plaintiff alleged that Walsh leveraged his status as a client

     of her former employer to secure her termination. Following deposition practice, the circuit court
     granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005(c) of the Code of

     Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). For the reasons that follow, we

     reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.

¶2                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶3          As tortious interference claims require, this matter involves no fewer than three relevant

     actors. Grako alleges that she was fired from her former employer, Ramza Insurance Group, Inc.

     (Ramza Insurance), due to the purported interference of Walsh, a client of Ramza Insurance.

¶4          Grako began working at Ramza Insurance on October 25, 2016. Ramza Insurance is a

     full-service insurer, primarily offering policies to public entity businesses, including public

     schools, with offices located in Streator and Ottawa, Illinois. Several individuals worked in

     Ramza Insurance’s Ottawa office during the time span pertinent to this lawsuit, including

     Christine Allen, a secretary; Kevin Schultz, an independent contractor; and Craig Ramza Jr.,

     president of the company. Linda Hays, vice president of Ramza Insurance, and Grako worked at

     one of Ramza Insurance’s Streator offices.

¶5          Based on the pleadings and depositions within the record, Grako filed for bankruptcy

     protection pursuant to federal law under Chapter 13 in November 2017. In June 2018, Grako

     returned a vehicle purchased from Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., and discharged the

     associated debt.

¶6          The record reveals that Walsh had several personal insurance policies with Ramza

     Insurance. It also indicates that Bill Walsh-Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., bore the financial brunt of

     Grako’s bankruptcy discharge of her vehicle. Walsh, an agent of Bill Walsh-Chevrolet-Cadillac,

     Inc., learned of the discharge in early November 2018. To Walsh’s displeasure, the process of

     repossessing Grako’s vehicle was at his expense. On November 7, he texted Grako, “R u kidding

                                                       2
     me after all I’ve done for you?” After exchanging texts the following day on the financial burden

     to retrieve the vehicle, Walsh concluded his conversation with Grako by stating: “We are pulling

     all of our business from ramza tomorrow.”

¶7          Around this time, Walsh communicated his discontentment with Grako to his friend

     Schultz. Schultz chronicled their conversation in a string of text messages to Allen, serving as an

     intermediary messenger between the displeased Ramza Insurance client and Ramza Insurance

     employees. According to Schultz, Walsh asked whether Grako worked at Ramza Insurance.

     Schultz’s message also included the following:

                    “We have MAJOR [expletive] problems!!! MAJOR!! Walsh is going to pull ALL

                    their business is [sic] [Grako] works for us. She stuffed them For over $15,000!!!!

                    [Walsh] has been texting me all night and I just replied ***. He is like MAJOR

                    LEAGUE p*** ***. This is NOT NOT NOT good.”

¶8          Allen later forwarded these messages to Hays, who was Grako’s supervisor. Allen and

     Hays engaged in their own text conversation on the topic. Allen explained that Walsh was

     extremely unhappy with Grako and did “not want to be supporting where she works.” Hays

     replied, “I’m sure [Schultz] will be all over Craig [Ramza Jr.] with that in the morning, unless

     he’s already texting him.” Allen also provided the financial implications of what Walsh’s

     departure would cause for the company, recounting the policies that he had with Ramza

     Insurance at that time.

¶9          After taking a day off to recuperate from a medical procedure, Grako reached out to Hays

     via text on Friday, November 9, 2018, to confide in her that she was a “nervous wreck” and to

     ask Hays whether she had spoken to Ramza Jr. or Allen. Hays responded that she could not

     speak with Grako at that time. Grako messaged Hays that evening, explaining that she could not

                                                      3
       access her personal Ramza Insurance account. She sent another message the following morning,

       asking whether she would be fired. Hays responded that they would have a discussion the

       following Monday. Per Hays, the decision to terminate Grako was still up in the air at this point.

¶ 10          Grako continued to message Hays requesting clarity on her job status. Frustrated that

       Grako was dictating the time and manner in which she and Hays would meet, Hays met with

       Grako at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday November 10, 2018, and terminated her employment at Ramza

       Insurance “based on her own attitude, [and] her own way of speaking to me.” According to

       Hays, her termination had “nothing to do with” the Walsh incident.

¶ 11          In May 2019, Grako filed a single-count complaint against defendants, alleging tortious

       interference. In November 2019, defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the

       Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)), arguing in part that Grako failed to plead factual

       allegations sufficient to support her tortious interference claim. The court granted defendants’

       motion without prejudice in December 2019. Grako then filed her first amended complaint on

       January 9, 2020, alleging Walsh tortiously interfered with her employment relationship, resulting

       in her termination. According to the pleading, Grako was informed that the reason for her

       termination was that she “p*** off a major client” and that the client had requested the same. She

       also alleged that in pursuance of her termination, Walsh acted as an agent of Bill Walsh

       Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.

¶ 12          Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and requested Illinois Supreme Court

       Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) sanctions on December 22, 2021, relying upon the deposition

       testimonies of Hays, Schultz, and Ramza Jr.

¶ 13          Hays testified that, in her role as vice president, she had hiring and firing authority of

       Ramza Insurance employees. She had pursued Grako for employment based off of prior

                                                        4
       pleasurable interactions. Hays testified that she fired Grako based on her past employment

       history with Ramza Insurance and that it had nothing to do with the Walsh incident. Hays

       averred that Grako was at times disrespectful, pushy, and caused Hays stress. According to Hays,

       she had no plans to meet with Grako prior to the Walsh incident.

¶ 14          Schultz testified that, as an independent contractor for Ramza Insurance, he shares fifty

       percent of new property and casualty insurance commissions with the company. Ramza

       Insurance established a business agreement with Schultz around 2011. Based on Schultz’s

       estimation, the company’s share of commissions from his work exceeds $50,000 annually.

       Schultz described Walsh as a lifelong friend, someone who he has always called “Billy.” Walsh

       was also one of Schultz’s clients. Although Schultz had no recollection of the specific

       conversation giving rise to the text exchange with Allen, he recalled that Walsh told Schultz if

       Grako was employed with Ramza Insurance “we’ve got an issue[.]” In addition to his text

       conversation, Schultz spoke to Hays regarding the incident. 1 According to Schultz, Walsh never

       requested that he terminate Grako’s employment. Similarly, he never requested Grako’s

       discharge nor was he in a position to do so. The proposition that Grako would be terminated

       from Walsh threatening to pull his insignificant amount of business from Ramza Insurance is

       “ludicrous.” When asked why he acted impetuously in his texts to Allen, Schultz explained that

       he did not want to lose a friend’s business or anybody’s business.

¶ 15          Craig Ramza Jr. testified that Walsh was a client of Ramza Insurance in November 2018.

       Walsh had anywhere from one to three personal insurance policies with Ramza Insurance. In the

       aftermath of the Walsh incident, Ramza Jr. testified that Walsh frequently called the Ramza

              1
               Hays testified that she had no recollection of speaking with Schultz.

                                                           5
       Insurance offices, looking to speak with Grako. Ramza employees would inform him that she

       was not available. Walsh’s pattern of persistently calling the offices “put pressure on the rest of

       the agency.” Ramza Jr. minimized the importance of Walsh as a personal client, describing him

       as a needle in the haystack and further providing that “I would never fire one of my employees

       simply based off a complaint from a customer.” Ramza Jr. described situations where Grako was

       in a “certain mood” and would have profanity-laden correspondences with clients and Ramza

       Insurance agents alike. As he summarized, Grako “was a good employee when she wanted to be,

       but just some of her actions and her reactions were not good representation” for Ramza

       Insurance.

¶ 16          After briefing, the court heard arguments on defendants’ motion on June 8, 2022, and

       took the matter under advisement. The circuit court issued a written order on July 19, 2022,

       granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment but denying their request for Rule 137

       sanctions. The court found that there was no direct evidence that Walsh requested Grako’s

       termination from Ramza Insurance. There was also no direct evidence that Walsh was a “major

       client,” as Grako alleged in her complaint. Finally, there was no evidence whatsoever that Walsh

       provided false information to Ramza Insurance agents.

¶ 17          Grako timely appealed.

¶ 18                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19          On appeal, defendants argue that the circuit court was correct in finding there was

       insufficient evidence within the record to conclude that Walsh intentionally interfered with

       Grako’s employment as is required by the third element of her tortious interference action. The

       court’s order also cast doubt on whether Grako’s at-will status affords her a reasonable

       expectation of continued employment as is necessary to satisfy the first element. We disagree

                                                        6
       and find that the court erred in its ruling by failing to apply all reasonable inferences in Grako’s

       favor and by misapplying tortious interference law.

¶ 20          Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions,

       and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that

       there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to

       judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). Disposing a case through

       summary judgment is a drastic measure. Hanley v. City of Chicago, 343 Ill. App. 3d 49, 53

       (2003). We review a circuit court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL

       112064, ¶ 30.

¶ 21          Illinois recognizes two similar but distinct torts of tortious interference in the

       employment context: tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference without a

       contractual relationship. See Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551 (1980).

       Their elements are similar, but not identical. Id. at 552. The central difference between the two is

       the greater degree of protection afforded to parties with contractual relations. Id. at 551. A

       contractual relation is “sacrosanct” and “takes precedence over the conflicting rights of any

       presumptive interferor, including his [or her] right to compete and his [or her] own prospective

       advantage.” Id. (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 129, at 945 (4th ed.

       1971)). The impetus behind these causes of action, however, remains much the same:

       sanctioning the meddling in another’s business affairs.

¶ 22          Unlike employees with formal contractual arrangements, at-will employees possess an

       actionable interest in their “future relations between” employee and employer. Restatement

       (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. g (1979). The tort recognizes that a person’s business relationships

       constitute a property interest and, as such, are entitled to protection from unjustified tampering

                                                         7
       by another. Chicago’s Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago’s Pizza Franchise Ltd. USA, 384 Ill. App. 3d 849,

       862 (2008). Therefore, while parties to a formal contractual business relationship are afforded a

       greater degree of protection from another’s interference, one’s business expectancy under an at-

       will arrangement nonetheless confers legal protection until said agreement is terminated. See

       Miller v. Lockport Realty Group, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373-74 (2007); Soderlund Brothers,

       Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 615-16 (1995) (discussing heightened protection

       afforded to parties with contractual relationships); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979).

       The tortious interference subset without a contractual relationship requires plaintiff to put forth

       similar evidence to establish a prima facie case. See Ricco v. Southwest Surgery Center, LLC, 73

       F. Supp. 3d 961, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (noting the evidentiary requirements for a claim of tortious

       interference with employment expectancy mirrors those for a tortious interference with business

       expectancy or economic advantage claim).

¶ 23           Considering Grako’s prospective interest as an at-will employee, 2 her cause of action lies

       under tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, 3 the elements of which are

       well established:

                                “ ‘To state a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective

                        economic advantage, a plaintiff must allege (1) a reasonable expectancy of

                        entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the

               2
                  An at-will employee’s hope for his or her employment relationship to continue confers “no legal
       right but only an expectancy” that is actionable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768, cmt. i (1979).
                3
                  Illinois courts use various titles to describe the same tort, including tortious interference with a
       prospective economic advantage, tortious interference with prospective business relationships, and
       tortious interference with prospective expectancies. See Delphi Industries, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 945
       F.2d 215, 217 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991). The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers the label of intentional
       interference with prospective contractual relation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979). For
       coherence and ease of discussion, we refer to this tort as tortious interference with prospective economic
       advantage within this opinion.
                                                              8
                      expectancy, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference by the defendant that

                      induced or caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and (4) damage to

                      the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s interference.’ ” Voyles v. Sandia

                      Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 300-01 (2001) (quoting Anderson v. Vanden

                      Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406-07 (1996)).

       See Storm & Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1052 (1998) (an employee’s

       action for tortious interference with a contract terminable at will “is classified as one for

       intentional interference with prospective economic advantage”).

¶ 24                          A. Existence of a Valid Business Relationship or Expectancy

¶ 25          To satisfy the first element of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,

       the record must reveal supportive evidence that Grako had a reasonable expectation of continued

       employment. Our analysis begins with the circuit court’s note of uncertainty surrounding

       whether an at-will employee may bring a tortious interference with employment claim in Illinois

       and whether the employee’s at-will status negates an expectation of continued employment.

       According to the court’s order, the issue of whether an at-will employee can sustain a tortious

       interference claim remains unsettled. To support this assertion, the court cites our supreme

       court’s decision in Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 511 (1991), and the Seventh

       Circuit’s decision in Webb v. Frawley, 906 F.3d 569, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2018). We find those

       opinions inapposite.

¶ 26          Our supreme court in Fellhauer merely addressed a division among appellate districts on

       whether an at-will employee may make a claim for tortious interference with contractual

       relations. 142 Ill. 2d at 510. Fellhauer did not resolve this division, as noted in Webb, because

       the supreme court did not challenge the appellate court’s determination that the at-will plaintiff’s

                                                         9
       claim sounded in intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. at 510-12;

       Webb, 906 F.3d at 580-81.

¶ 27          We find no need to opine on the issue, as it is not properly before this court. The parties

       agree, as evidenced through the pleadings, that the rubric upon which Grako brings the instant

       action is a claim for intentional interference without a contractual relationship. Indeed, the circuit

       court’s order granting summary judgment identifies Grako’s cause of action not as one for

       interference with contractual relations, but one for intentional interference with an employment

       relationship.

¶ 28          Collectively, Fellhauer, caselaw preceding that decision, and its progeny, make it clear

       that an at-will employee may bring a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage

       action. Within the ambit of tortious interference law, as varied as it may be, our sister districts

       have uniformly upheld this tenet. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365, 381

       (2004) (finding a law firm’s at-will contract with institutional client created a relationship

       sufficient to support an action for tortious interference); La Rocco v. Bakwin, 108 Ill. App. 3d

       723, 731 (1982) (placing less import on the nature of the agreement and more on the alleged

       interference to find that intrusion into an attorney’s relationship with his client supported tortious

       interference with business relationship despite terminable at will relationship); Olaf v. Christie

       Clinic Ass’n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 191, 195 (1990) (explaining that a tortious interference claim

       without an enforceable contract, such as a physician-patient’s terminable at will relationship,

       may be brought as a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage);

       Kemper v. Worcester, 106 Ill. App. 3d 121, 125 (1982) (holding a bank president had a sufficient

       relationship with the bank, arising from the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. § 38 (2018)), to

                                                         10
       support an action for tortious interference with advantageous or contractual relations, despite the

       relationship being terminable at will).

¶ 29          On this subject, the Restatement of Torts remarks that “liability for inducing breach of

       contract is now regarded as but one instance, rather than the exclusive limit, of protection against

       improper interference in business relations.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. c (1979).

       A contract terminable at-will, for example, creates a valid and subsisting interest of continued

       employment to which a third-party may not improperly interfere. See Restatement (Second) of

       Torts § 766, cmt. g (1979); but see Cashman v. Shinn, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 1118-19 (1982)

       (finding the presumption that an at-will employee’s employment will continue is not absolute).

¶ 30          This court has long held the same, explaining that under this cause of action the

       relationship between parties is a secondary consideration to which an enforceable contract is not

       a prerequisite. Rather, our focus is on the interference of the relationship itself. Lusher v. Becker

       Brothers, Inc., 155 Ill. App. 3d 866, 869-70 (1987) (citing La Rocco, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 731);

       see City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363 (1973) (noting the

       elements of a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage include “the existence

       of a valid business relationship (not necessarily evidenced by an enforceable contract)”

       (emphasis added)); see also Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 484 (1998) (“The

       focus *** is not on the conduct of the client in terminating the relationship, but on the conduct of

       the party inducing the breach or interfering with the expectancy.”). We will not disrupt what has

       already been decided and, accordingly, find that Grako’s at-will status does not bar her tortious

       interference claim.

¶ 31          As for evidence bearing on Grako’s expectation of continued employment, Ramza Jr. and

       Hays ascribed a certain brashness to Grako as the reason for her discharge. Hays testified that

                                                        11
       Grako was fired based upon her performance and indicated a frustration that Grako attempted to

       dictate how they met to discuss the Walsh incident as another reason. All deponents downplayed

       the sway Walsh conceivably would have over the decision to fire Grako. Yet there is no

       indication within the record that Grako’s discharge was imminent prior to the Walsh incident.

       Indeed, Hays testified that, prior to the incident, there was no scheduled meeting to discuss

       Grako’s job performance and she did not plan to meet with Grako prior to the Walsh incident. As

       such, we find that the record supports a reasonable inference that Grako possessed a sufficient

       expectation of continued employment.

¶ 32                          B. Knowledge of Business Relationship or Expectancy

¶ 33          The parties do not dispute that Grako has advanced sufficient evidence to support the

       second element of her tortious interference claim. In his answer to the first amended complaint,

       Walsh conceded he was aware that Ramza Insurance was Grako’s employer. The text messages

       exchanged between Schultz and Allen indicate that Walsh sought and procured this knowledge.

       Cf. Harris v. Franklin-Williamson Human Services, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908 (S.D. Ill. 2000)

       (tortious interference claim failed where plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants were

       aware of business relationship).

¶ 34                              C. Intentional and Unjustified Interference

¶ 35         Defendants argue that the circuit court correctly found Grako failed to establish the third

       element of her tortious interference claim, which requires a showing that Walsh’s interference

       prevented the realization of her continued employment at Ramza Insurance. See Chicago’s

       Pizza, Inc., 384 Ill. App. 3d at 863. In granting summary judgment, the circuit court focused on

       the nature of the purported interference, finding Grako failed to produce any evidence that Walsh

       conveyed false information, did not show that Walsh was a “major client” of Ramza Insurance,

                                                       12
       and did not provide direct evidence that Walsh requested her termination. Rather, it found that

       the only direct evidence indicated Grako’s termination was for “other reasons unrelated to”

       Walsh.

¶ 36            To be found liable for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a

       defendant’s interference must be intentional and improper. Restatement (Second) of Torts

       § 766B (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, cmt. a (1979). It is insufficient for a

       plaintiff to show that the defendant merely succeeded by ending the business relationship or

       interfering with the expectancy; rather, “purposeful interference”—a showing that the defendant

       has committed some impropriety—is needed. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 181 Ill. 2d at 485.

       Section 767 of the Restatement lists several factors which courts consider in determining

       whether an alleged interferer’s conduct reaches actionable impropriety, including (1) the nature

       of the interfering conduct, (2) the interferer’s motive, and (3) the proximity or remoteness of the

       interferer’s conduct to the interference. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979).

       Concerning an interferer’s motive, it may become important to determine whether an interferer

       was motivated “by a desire to interfere with the other’s” business expectancy. See Restatement

       (Second) of Torts § 767, cmt. d (1979). If that desire was the sole motive behind the interference,

       it is “almost certain” to qualify as improper interference. Id. As the Restatement makes plain, the

       “motive to injure another or to vent one’s ill will on him [or her] serves no socially useful

       purpose.” Id. While our supreme court has not formally adopted the Restatement, it continues to

       serve as helpful persuasive authority in tortious interference evaluation. See Atanus v. American

       Airlines, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 549, 554 (2010).

                                                           13
¶ 37                                       1. Falsity as a Prerequisite

¶ 38          In granting summary judgment, the circuit court relied upon a statement of law cited in

       Calabro v. Northern Trust Corp., 2017 IL App (1st) 163079-U, ¶ 18, an unpublished Rule 23

       order from the First District, which states “Illinois courts in employment and other contexts have

       consistently held that an intentional interference claim requires the provision of false

       information.” (Emphasis in original.) We believe this statement of tortious interference law was

       painted with too broad a brush, the court erred in relying upon this nonprecedential order, and

       falsity is not a prerequisite to Grako’s tortious interference claim.

¶ 39          The Restatement provides that one cannot be found liable for “merely” providing

       “truthful information to another.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772, cmt. b (1979). That is,

       much like its relationship to defamation actions, truthful statements serve as an absolute defense

       if the purported interference involves the conveyance of information. See id. Here, the circuit

       court awarded summary judgment in part based on plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence that

       defendant provided false information, relying on the Calabro decision and the cases cited within

       Calabro that espouse this principle of law. A review of these cases reveal, however, that the

       alleged interference at issue strictly involved the conveyance of information.

¶ 40          In Calabro, the plaintiff, a chief compliance officer for an investment corporation, was

       terminated after his employer gained information from an anonymous source that he was

       removed as a corporate executive of a trust during his prior employment, a fact he failed to

       disclose during the interview process. Calabro, 2017 IL App (1st) 163079-U, ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff

       filed a petition for pre-suit discovery pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 (eff. Jan. 1,

       2018), claiming intentional interference and seeking to learn the identity of the source of this

       information. Calabro, 2017 IL App (1st) 163079-U ¶¶ 2, 7. The circuit court dismissed

                                                         14
       plaintiff’s petition with prejudice, explaining a party is not liable for tortious interference “as a

       result of merely providing truthful information.” Id. ¶ 9. The First District upheld the dismissal

       of plaintiff’s petition on this ground. See id. ¶¶ 17-20.

¶ 41           In Voyles, our supreme court found that a homeowner failed to state a claim for tortious

       interference against a mortgage servicer after her credit report revealed delinquent payments to

       the servicer, which in part resulted in a mortgagee denying her application for a loan. 196 Ill. 2d

       at 293. The homeowner’s tortious interference action was premised upon the servicer’s reports

       containing allegedly false information. Id. at 294. Finding that the reports were indeed “accurate

       and proper,” the court held the servicer did not unjustifiably interfere. Id. at 301.

¶ 42           The interference complained of in the other cases Calabro cites also involve the

       exchange of information singularly. See Atanus, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 555-56 (relying on Voyles in

       holding that the exchange of gate access records that contained truthful information could not

       support the employee’s intentional interference claim); Soderlund Brothers, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d

       at 622-23 (finding letter of competitor primarily contained opinion); see also Delloma v.

       Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 174 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding summary judgment in

       favor of former employer where former employer’s response to prospective employer’s inquiry

       was truthful).

¶ 43           Based on the foregoing, a more accurate statement of tortious interference law is when

       the alleged interference is premised strictly upon the conveyance of information, a plaintiff must

       prove that such information is false in order to prevail. Soderlund Brothers, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d

       at 620 (“There is no liability for interference with a prospective contractual relation on the part of

       one who merely gives truthful information to another.” (Emphasis added.)); Cf. Restatement

       (Second) of Torts § 772, cmt. b (1979). Here, the alleged interference does not involve the mere

                                                         15
       exchange of truthful information; rather, Grako alleges that Walsh, enraged by Grako’s return of

       her vehicle and discharge of the loan, leveraged his personal ties and influence over Ramza

       Insurance to get her fired. The Atanus court drew this distinction when the plaintiff attempted to

       cite our supreme court’s decision in Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 181 Ill. 2d at 471, to assert that proof

       of falsity is not a requirement of his claim. Atanus, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 555. The court clarified

       that unlike his claim, “the alleged interference in Dowd & Dowd had nothing to do with giving

       information; instead, the defendants in Dowd & Dowd were accused of soliciting a major client

       from their former law firm prior to their departure from the firm” as the means of their

       interference. Id.

¶ 44           Within her first amended complaint, Grako asserts that Walsh not only informed Ramza

       Insurance agents of her bankruptcy and the associated debt discharge, but also threatened to

       withdraw his business from Ramza Insurance and communicated his displeasure upstream to

       Grako’s superiors. The text exchange between Allen and Hays confirms that Walsh was a Ramza

       Insurance client and did not want to “support[ ] where [Grako] works.” Hays’s testimony reveals

       the immateriality of the truthful information that Walsh conveyed on the decision to terminate

       Grako. According to Hays, Grako previously informed her of the bankruptcy, a fact she was

       made aware of “during the whole process.” The truthful information that Walsh conveyed that

       was previously unknown to members of Ramza Insurance, therefore, was that Bill Walsh

       Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. was financially impacted from Grako’s bankruptcy filing.

¶ 45           However, the primary interference alleged is the coercion Walsh purportedly exerted over

       Ramza Insurance in threatening to pull his business. This threat was corroborated by Walsh’s

       texts to Grako and, separately, by Walsh’s conversation with Schultz, memorialized in texts

       between Schultz and Allen. In that exchange, Schultz described Walsh’s dissatisfaction as a

                                                        16
       “MAJOR [expletive] Problem[ ]!!!” Allen forwarded that message to Hays, explaining “Walsh is

       going to pull ALL their business is [sic] [Grako] works for us.” Therefore, the allegations within

       Grako’s complaint involve interference distinct from “merely giv[ing] truthful information”

       concerning her bankruptcy and its effect on Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.’s finances.

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 (1979).

¶ 46                          2. Characterization of Defendant as a “Major Client”

¶ 47          We also find the circuit court placed too great a weight on Grako’s inability to produce

       evidence that Walsh was one of Ramza Insurance’s “major client[s],” as she alleged within her

       first amended complaint. What matters is that he was, in fact, a Ramza Insurance client. The

       descriptions in the deposition testimony of Ramza Jr., Hays, and Schultz of the extent that

       Walsh’s threat impacted Grako’s termination stands in stark contrast to the urgency Schultz

       conveyed in his text messages to Allen. We believe, whether Walsh was a major client or not, the

       determination of the extent of Walsh’s influence over the decision to terminate Grako is an

       undetermined question of fact best reserved for the trier of fact.

¶ 48          Having found that the inducement is distinct from merely giving information, we believe

       the alleged inducement here aligns with what the Restatement classifies as inducing by refusal to

       deal. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, cmt. e (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766,

       cmt. l (1979). This may occur where a third party induces the breach of an employment

       relationship by “threatening not to enter into, or to sever, business relations” with another.

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. l (1979). Although an individual has no legal

       obligation, barring a contract, to do business with another, there remains a “general duty not to

       interfere intentionally with another’s reasonable business expectancies of trade with third person,

       whether or not they are secured by contract” unless such interference is not improper.

                                                        17
       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. b (1979). Thus, Walsh’s animosity towards Grako

       would be a legitimate reason to refuse to give Ramza Insurance his continued business. See

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. l (1979). However, tortious interference arises when

       the individual takes an additional step; in this context, when pressure—financial or otherwise—is

       exerted to affirmatively induce a breach of agreement. A question of material fact remains

       whether this additional step occurred here.

¶ 49          This is also not the exclusive means of interference supporting Grako’s lawsuit. When

       read in the light most favorable to Grako, the record creates separate questions of material fact

       about whether Walsh leveraged his relationship with Schultz to secure Grako’s termination and

       whether Ramza Insurance capitulated based on its financial interest in appeasing Schultz.

       Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, cmt. e (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt.

       k (1979) (“There is no technical requirement as to the kind of conduct that may result in

       interference” “it may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral pressure.”).

¶ 50          Schultz described his relationship to Walsh as a lifelong friendship. Hays, who had firing

       authority and made the decision to terminate Grako, knew of this friendship and was aware of

       Schultz’s barrage of seemingly urgent text messages. Schultz testified that his immoderate

       reaction was based on his friendship with Walsh. According to Schultz, he did not want to lose a

       friend’s business. Walsh also told Schultz that Grako’s employment at Ramza Insurance created

       “an issue.” Beyond the exchange of text messages with Allen, Schultz spoke with Hays

       concerning the Walsh incident. Per his estimation, Ramza Insurance derives over $50,000

       annually from his business. He also testified that neither he nor Walsh, through him, requested

       Grako’s termination. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact remains whether Walsh’s

                                                       18
       interference, through his own conduct or through Schultz, impermissibly secured Grako’s

       termination.

¶ 51                                             3. Causation

¶ 52          We similarly find error with the circuit court’s causation ruling. The court granted

       summary judgment, in part, based on Grako’s inability to produce direct evidence that Walsh

       asked Ramza Insurance to terminate her and, contrastingly, found that her termination resulted

       from Ramza Insurance’s own reasons unrelated to Walsh.

¶ 53          The proximity of a third-party’s conduct to the resultant interference is one factor courts

       weigh in determining whether the interference was improper. Restatement (Second) of Torts

       § 767, cmt. h (1979). Causation relates to the third element of intentional interference with

       prospective economic advantage, requiring the interference to “induce[ ] or cause[ ] a breach or

       termination of” plaintiff’s reasonable business expectancy. Anderson, 172 Ill. 2d at 406.

       Therefore, included within our intentional and improper interference analysis, we must review

       whether the record supports a reasonable inference that Grako’s termination would not have

       resulted but-for Walsh’s actions and whether his actions bear a proximate relation to the adverse

       employment action. Advantage Marketing Group, Inc. v. Keane, 2019 IL App (1st) 181126,

       ¶¶ 44, 48 (finding an employer sufficiently alleged a former employee’s breach proximately

       caused injury for its breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with prospective economic

       advantage claims to survive employee’s motion to dismiss); compare Haupt v. International

       Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (an employer’s cost-saving rationale for

       termination was insufficient to preclude the reasonable inference that supervisor’s interference

       was the but-for cause of termination), with Hess v. Kanoski & Associates, 668 F.3d 446, 454 (7th

                                                       19
       Cir. 2012) (failure to provide evidence that interferer’s alleged disparaging comment to a client

       was heard by employer prevented a finding that the statement caused termination).

¶ 54           We disagree with the court’s contention that the record reflects Grako’s termination was

       an “independent decision and act[ ] of Ramza Insurance and its corporate officers” when Grako’s

       supervisor testified that the meeting resulting in Grako’s termination would not have occurred

       but for the Walsh incident. Schultz testified that Walsh conveyed “[i]f Kim Grako was there,

       we’ve got an issue.” This fact alone supports that the interference was accomplished with the

       purpose of injuring Grako’s employment. Kapotas v. Better Government Ass’n, 2015 IL App

       (1st) 140534, ¶ 80 (intentional interference claims require facts suggesting that the defendant

       acted with the purpose of injuring plaintiff’s expectancies). It also indicates that Walsh used

       Grako’s employer to vent his ill will and that his sole motivation was the desire to intermeddle

       with her business expectancy, which if proven, all but confirms that his interference was

       improper. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, cmt. d (1979). Hays locked Grako out of

       Ramza Insurance’s internal systems the day after learning about the Walsh incident. Grako’s

       termination was solemnified the day following. The circumstantial timeframe of her firing raises

       an inference of impropriety and adds credence to a remaining question of material fact on the

       nexus between Walsh’s displeasure and Grako’s termination. See Restatement (Second) of Torts

       § 767, cmt. h (1979). As explained above, the degree of interference, if any, and the sphere of

       influence that Walsh possessed and exercised over Ramza Insurance remain material issues of

       fact.

¶ 55                               D. Damages Resulting from Interference

¶ 56           Based on our analysis above, we find that when construing the record in the light most

       favorable to Grako, a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Walsh’s

                                                        20
       purported interference resulted in her termination from Ramza Insurance, which, if proven,

       would satisfy the fourth and final element of her claim.

¶ 57          This decision should not be construed as an opinion from this court on the merits of

       Grako’s tortious interference claim against Walsh and Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. We do

       find, however, that the evidence before us presents numerous factual questions regarding

       Walsh’s conduct and its possible impact over Grako’s termination that precludes entry of

       summary judgment in defendants’ favor.

¶ 58                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 59          The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed and remanded for further

       proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 60          Reversed and remanded.

                                                       21
             Grako v. Bill Walsh Chevrolet-Cadillac Inc., 2023 IL App (3d) 220324

Decision Under Review:         Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, No. 19-L-74;
                               the Hon. Troy D. Holland, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                      Christopher Jahnke, of Frankfort Law Group, of Frankfort, for
for                            appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                      Timothy B. Cantlin, of The Cantlin Law Firm, of Ottawa, for
for                            appellees.
Appellee:

                                              22