Court Opinion

ID: 6412195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:53:31.87677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:24.567540
License: Public Domain

Bigelow, J.
The statute under which this indictment is found is certainly expressed in very general terms, which leave room for doubt as to its time construction. But interpreting its language according to the subject matter to which it relates, and in the light of the existing state of the law, which the statute was intended to alter and enlarge, we think its true meaning can be readily ascertained.
The statutes relating to embezzlement, both in this country and in England, had their origin in a design to supply a defect *64which was found to exist in the criminal law. By reason of nice and subtle distinctions, which the courts of law had recognized and sanctioned, it was difficult to reach and punish the fraudulent taking and appropriation of money and chattels by persons exercising certain trades and occupations, by virtue of which they held a relation of confidence or trust towards their employers or principals, and thereby became possessed of their property. In such cases the moral guilt was the same as if the offender had been guilty of an actual felonious taking; but in many cases he could not be convicted of larceny, because the property which had been fraudulently converted was lawfully in his possession by virtue of his employment, and there was not that technical taking or asportation which is essential to the proof of the crime of larceny. The King v. Bazeley, 2 Leach, (4th ed.) 835. 2 East P. C. 568.
The statutes relating to embezzlement were intended to embrace this class of offences; and it may be said generally that they do not apply to cases where the element of a breach of trust or confidence in the fraudulent conversion of money or chattels is not shown to exist. This is the distinguishing feature of the provisions in the Rev. Sts. c. 126, §§ 27-30, creating and punishing the crime of embezzlement, which carefully enumerate the classes of persons that may be subject to the penalties therein provided. Those provisions have been strictly construed, and the operation of the statute has been carefully confined to persons having in their possession, by virtue of their occupation or employment, the money or property of another, which has been fraudulently converted in violation of a trust reposed in them. Commonwealth v. Stearns, 2 Met. 343. Commonwealth v. Libbey, 11 Met. 64. Commonwealth v. Williams 3 Gray, 461. In the last named case it was held, that a person was not guilty of embezzlement, under Rev. Sts. c. 126, § 30 who had converted to his own use money which had been delivered to him by another for safe keeping.
The St. of 1857, c. 233, was probably enacted to supply the defect which was shown to exist in the criminal law by this decision, and was intended to embrace cases where property had *65been designedly-delivered to a person as a bailee or keeper, and had been fraudulently converted by him. But in this class of cases there exists the element of a trust or confidence reposed in a person by reason of the delivery of property to him, which he voluntarily takes for safe keeping, and which trust or confidence he has violated by the wrongful conversion of the property. Beyond this the statute was not intended to go. Where money paid or property delivered through mistake has been misappropriated or converted by the party receiving it, there is no breach of a trust or violation of a confidence intentionally reposed by one party and voluntarily assumed by the other. The moral turpitude is therefore not so great as in those eases usually comprehended within the offence of embezzlement, and we cannot think that the legislature intended to place them on the same footing. We are therefore of opinion that the facts proved in this case did not bring it within the statute, and that the defendant was wrongly convicted. Exceptions sustained