Court Opinion

ID: 9574649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:44.592216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:47.445719
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
This case, like all too many lately, has had a see-saw journey through the various tribunals of this state. The administrative law judge found in favor of the employer. The full board reversed, finding for the employee. The superior court reversed the full board, finding for the employer. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, reinstating the award in favor of the employee. And now a majority of this court reverses the Court of Appeals.
This tortured journey does nothing to add to the stability and predictability of the law. It has taken place because courts have attempted to substitute their judgment for the judgment of an administrative agency designed to function effectively and expertly in the area of industrial accidents. Desiring to return discretion to the body *57designed by the legislature to exercise it, with the courts’ oversight limited to an “abuse of discretion” standard, I must resist the effort to stifle that discretion.
In Wise v. City of Adel, 195 Ga. App. 559 (394 SE2d 540) (1990), the Court of Appeals stated succinctly the rule of law applicable to this case:
OCGA § 34-9-240 provides that “[i]f an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was justified.” In Clark v. Ga. Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 884, 885 (345 SE2d 61) (1986), this court emphasized that “the board is vested with a broad discretion in determining whether proffered employment is refused justifiably.”
This court is now changing that rule by hemming in the discretion of the board and limiting it to specific factors.
The.majority’s division of the test in OCGA § 34-9-240 into two prongs is eminently logical. However, in an effort to salvage the capacity prong of the test by limiting the justification prong, the majority has actually destroyed the justification prong. Requiring some relation between the refusal to accept employment and the employee’s physical capacity or ability to perform the job merely restates the capacity requirement. There is no need to save either prong of the test because they refer to entirely different matters. The capacity prong of the test asks whether the employee has the appropriate ability and skill to do the job; the justification prong assumes capacity and asks whether there are other reasons why the employee may be justified in refusing the proffered alternative employment. In other words, the justification prong asks whether the refusal to accept alternative employment is reasonable.
In considering what reasons would make a refusal to accept alternative employment justified, we should consider the underlying purpose of OCGA § 34-9-240: mitigation of damages. In Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 412 Mich. 172 (312 NW2d 640) (1981), the Supreme Court of Michigan examined the doctrine of “favored work,” a judge-made analogue to the provisions of OCGA § 34-9-240, and concluded that the reasonableness of the employee’s refusal of alternative employment is an essential element to be considered.
The primary purpose of the doctrine is that of mitigation. . . . The common-law doctrine of mitigation is founded upon notions of reasonableness: “If the effort, risk, sacrifice, *58or expense which the person wronged must incur in order to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances, a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no disability against recovering full damages.” [Cit.] . . .
Application of a reasonableness standard requires a court to examine the facts and circumstances in each case. [The employer] argues that even if a claimant’s actions must be evaluated in terms of reasonableness, as a matter of law it is never reasonable to refuse favored work the employee is physically able to perform; in other words, the court may consider only facts and circumstances relating to physical capability. We disagree. The facts of the instant case especially illustrate that non-physical factors may also be relevant to important policies of the statute which should not be discouraged through a rigid application of the favored-work doctrine. [Id. at 312 NW2d 644-645.]
This case offers the perfect opportunity to apply a test of reasonableness. Acceptance of the proffered alternative employment by Wise would have required a net drop in income of $163 per month and loss of a job he had held for seven years. To suggest that a claimant in those circumstances would not be reasonable in refusing the proffered alternative employment is to ignore the economic realities of our time.
Imposition of the limitedness the majority suggests will strip the Board of Workers’ Compensation of the discretion vested in it by the legislature. The Court of Appeals aptly expressed that grant of discretion and the obligation it places on the judiciary in Clark v. Ga. Kraft Co., supra at 885:
Under [OCGA § 34-9-240], the board is empowered to determine whether a refusal of employment is justified. [Cit.] Such a determination is a discretionary one. [Cits.] In fact, the board is vested with a broad discretion in determining whether proffered employment is refused justifiably. [Cit.] In this regard, we note that the State Board of Workers’ Compensation is an administrative agency, [cits.] and that the courts must give due deference to the wisdom of the board in deciding discretionary issues within its area of expertise. [Cit]
The majority opinion in this case lacks that deference and attempts to control the discretion of the board. That is not our role. The legislature put the discretion in the hands of the board and this court’s *59proper role is to defer to that discretion unless it is manifestly abused. Applying a rule of reasonableness is not a manifest abuse of discretion.
Decided March 7, 1991 —
Reconsideration denied March 27, 1991.
Young, Young & Clyatt, Robert M. Clyatt, Daniel C. Hoffman, for appellants.
Morris & Webster, Craig A. Webster, for appellee.
Because I am convinced that the board properly exercised its discretion in the present case and that the majority’s rulings will cripple the board in carrying out the duties mandated by the legislature, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this dissent.