Court Opinion

ID: 9687957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:55:06.641208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:33.727120
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, J.
{dissenting). The writer finds himself unable to join in signing the majority opinion of his esteemed brothers of the bench. My opinion was written in January, 1970, as reflecting the prevailing law on the subject in Michigan, and notwithstanding the scholarly prevailing opinion herein, I am constrained to dissent.
This is an original action for superintending control by a state prisoner against the Michigan parole board. Plaintiff is presently serving a sentence of 2 to 15 years imposed in 1960 by the Honorable William John Beer, Circuit Judge of Oakland County.
On four separate occasions, the parole board allowed plaintiff to serve his sentence beyond the prison enclosure on parole status: (1) 1961, (2) 1964, (3) 1965 and (4) 1967. All of plaintiff’s paroles were revoked by the parole board: (1) 1963, (2) *7741965, (3) 1966 and (4) 1968. The issues in this action pertain to the parole order of 1965 placing plaintiff on parole for 24 months and the revocation of that parole order by the parole board at a hearing held on September 8, 1966.
On July 29, 1966, a parole violation report was received by the parole board charging plaintiff with six separate violations. At the hearing plaintiff requested that the board appoint an attorney for him which was refused. Plaintiff at the hearing admitted violation of counts 1, 3, 4, and 5. One of the counts charged that plaintiff had been convicted in the Southgate Municipal Court on a charge of simple larceny. Because this conviction was a violation of parole per se, he was found to be automatically in violation of parole and his case was continued for review in 18 months.
Plaintiff’s conviction in the Southgate Municipal Court was appealed by plaintiff to the Wayne County Circuit Court, where it was nolle prossed on August 16, 1967, for the reason “due to lapse of time from conviction in the lower court, necessary evidence and re's gestae witnesses are no longer available.” As a consequence of being informed of this action the parole board reopened the former hearing and held a further hearing on September 21, 1967. At this hearing plaintiff again admitted violation of parole by falsifying his report to his parole officer and by failure to keep his parole officer informed of his whereabouts, movements, activities and other violations. The parole board confirmed the violation of the previous parole and ordered that the violation penalty would be for the time he had served since his return, and that he be placed on parole for two years in Detroit. Plaintiff was found to be a parole violator the last time in August, 1968, by the parole *775board and returned to prison where he is now a resident.
Plaintiff raises three issues which are stated and dealt with in order.
(1) Was the 1966 parole revocation void because based on a misdemeanor conviction which was subsequently nolle prossed on appeal?
The statute authorizes the parole board to act within its discretion in exercising the power to amend, revise, modify or rescind an order of parole. MCLA § 791.236 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2306) and Lane v. Michigan Department of Corrections, Parole Board (1970), 383 Mich 50. Where an appellate court reverses a conviction which formed a part of the charged basis for parole revocation the prisoner is not entitled to discharge but rather to a reconsideration by the parole board of its prior action. The fact that at the rehearing the plaintiff again admitted violations of parole other than the conviction demonstrates that plaintiff has failed to show any error in this regard.
(2) Was plaintiff denied equal protection and due process of law when he was denied appointed counsel at the revocation of parole hearing?1
This question is answered in the negative because this Court decided the question in the case of Saunders v. Department of Corrections, Parole Board (1968), 15 Mich App 183.2 The reasoning of Saunders is applicable in this case.
(3) Does good behavior time allowance compel plaintiff’s present discharge and was he entitled to a hearing explaining how “dead time” was determined by the parole boards
*776Under the statute, a prisoner receives a fixed amount of good behavior time for each month he has served without infraction of the prison rules. The prisoner may also, at the discretion of the warden, be given “special good time” for exemplary conduct which may not exceed 50% of the regular good time allowance. CLS 1961, § 800.33 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1403). It is obvious that even if plaintiff received the maximum allowance under the statute, he could not possibly have to his credit sufficient good time to reduce a 15-year maximum sentence imposed in 1960 for a present date discharge. The computation by the department shows plaintiff’s maximum expiration dates as March 16, 1970, or April 16,1972, depending upon the allowance, if any, of special good time.
The parole hoard is empowered to cause the forfeiture of good time incident to parole revocation. MCLA § 791.238 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2308). The fixing of the date of delinquency and the forfeiture, if any, of good time upon the finding of parole violation was a subject inquired into at the violation hearings and satisfied the statute. 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d Ed) § 776, p 991.
The order for superintending control should be denied.

 The prevailing opinion herein refers to the August 15, 1968, revocation hearing. At that hearing the charges were denied.

 Leave to appeal denied (1969) 381 Mich 818, cert. den. (1970), 396 US 1025 (90 S Ct 602, 24 L Ed 2d 520).