Court Opinion

ID: 9405675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 21:05:53.550695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.521389
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220323
                                  No. 2-22-0323
                            Opinion filed June 28, 2023
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Lake County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 19-CF-2798
                                       )
                                       )
ISRAEL SUASTE-GONZALEZ,                ) Honorable
                                       ) Mark L. Levitt,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.

                                           OPINION

¶1     Defendant, Israel Suaste-Gonzalez, entered open guilty pleas to two counts of criminal

sexual assault. The counts alleged that, in separate and distinct acts, he knowingly committed an

act of sexual penetration with M.M., the female victim, who he knew was unable to understand

the nature of the act and/or give knowing consent. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2020). ) After

defendant was sentenced, he hired new postplea counsel who, upon entering her appearance, filed

a facially valid certificate in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1,

2017). Over two weeks later, she filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which included a

disclaimer that stated that “defense counsel ha[d] not yet been furnished with any transcripts from
2023 IL App (2d) 220323

the case or plea and makes this motion without prejudice to or waiving the later discovery of errors

in the record.” Thereafter, the transcripts from the guilty plea and sentencing hearings were filed.

Counsel then filed an amended motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, which included the

same disclaimer; however, appended to the motion was the transcript from the guilty-plea hearing.

A new Rule 604(d) certificate was never filed. The court, ultimately, denied defendant’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant never filed a motion to reconsider the sentence.

¶2     Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) this cause should be remanded because postplea

counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate was filed before counsel obtained or read the reports of

proceedings for the sentencing and guilty-plea hearings and before counsel had filed any postplea

motion and (2) postplea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider the

sentence where the circuit court sentenced defendant after considering an improper factor and

without considering proper mitigating factors.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS

5/11-1.30(a)(6) (West 2020)), eight counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(1), (a)(2)),

and five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(a)(4)).

¶5     The trial court appears to have held on April 1, 2021, an off-the-record conference pursuant

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). Thereafter, on July 29, 2021, defendant

entered an open guilty plea to two counts of criminal sexual assault, in exchange for the State’s

agreement to nol-pros the remaining counts. At the guilty-plea hearing, defendant was admonished

that he was facing a possible sentencing range of between 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment, the offenses

were probationable, and any term of imprisonment was to be served consecutively, resulting in a

minimum term of 8 years’ imprisonment and a maximum term of 30 years’ imprisonment.

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¶6     The factual basis for the plea was as follows: M.M. has cerebral palsy and an intelligence

quotient of 61, and vocabulary testing placed her in an age range of approximately 10 to 11 years.

Between 2016 and 2018, M.M. was in a school program designed to teach life skills to adults with

disabilities. Defendant was a paraprofessional working in this program. On two separate occasions,

while defendant was working with M.M., he placed his finger into the sex organ of M.M., despite

knowing that she was unable to understand the nature of the act or give knowing consent. Based

on this description of the facts, the trial court accepted defendant’s plea of guilty.

¶7     After accepting the guilty plea, the court determined that it had misadvised defendant as to

the probationable nature of these offenses. Defendant was then advised that the offenses were

nonprobationable, and a date was set for the sentencing hearing.

¶8     On September 14, 2021, the State presented testimony from M.M.’s mother, Pauline M.,

and victim impact statements from M.M. and her father, Don M. Pauline spoke in depth about

M.M.’s intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, language delays, schooling in a special education

district, and struggle to walk as a child. M.M. shared that she feared defendant and new people

because she does not know if she can trust them, was upset that her other teachers did not protect

her, and was having “troubled thoughts” that impacted her ability to sleep since the incidents. Don

stated that, after the abuse occurred, he noticed a regression in tasks that M.M. had successfully

worked on for years. For instance, M.M. exhibited lack of conversation and eye contact; there was

also skin picking, renewed bedwetting, new speech impairments, loss of appetite, weight loss,

difficulty sleeping, and stomach pains. Don also talked about the impact that M.M.’s abuse has

had on his own and Pauline’s health.

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¶9     Defendant presented testimony and statements from numerous friends and family

members, all describing him as helpful, welcoming, supportive, caring, intelligent, honest, and

hard-working.

¶ 10   The State argued that defendant failed to take full responsibility for his actions, because,

in the presentence investigation report, he claimed that M.M. asked for help changing and cleaning

herself and this is what led to the instances of abuse. The State also asked the court to consider in

aggravation that defendant was in a position of trust and that this offense was committed against a

person with a physical disability, because M.M. had cerebral palsy, attention deficit disorder,

intellectual disabilities, and speech impairments. The State also noted that her conditions regressed

because of defendant’s actions. It asked for the maximum term of 30 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 11   In response to the State’s argument, defense counsel noted that M.M.’s disability should

not be considered as a factor in aggravation because considering it would be an improper double

enhancement, as her disability was an element of the offense. Raymond Kloss (plea counsel) then

highlighted the mitigating factors that were discussed by defendant’s witnesses and asked for the

minimum term of eight years’ imprisonment. Defendant gave a statement in allocution, addressing

M.M. and expressing his remorse and commitment to rehabilitation.

¶ 12   The circuit court noted that it considered all factors in aggravation and mitigation, paying

close attention to those that were highlighted at the hearing. It was impressed by the positive impact

defendant had on his community and, specifically, considered the impact of incarceration on

defendant’s family. In aggravation, the court noted that defendant abused his position of trust by

sexually assaulting a special needs adult. This impacted M.M., her family, and the community at

large. The court noted that it took a “special kind of depravity” to abuse a person such as M.M.,

who was in defendant’s care and regressed because of defendant’s conduct. The court sentenced

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defendant to two consecutive terms of 12 years’ imprisonment with a period of mandatory

supervised release to be set between 3 years and natural life.

¶ 13    On September 20, 2021, Renea Amen (postplea counsel) entered her appearance in

defendant’s case and filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. Counsel indicated that she would be filing a

motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea and did so over two weeks later, on October 7, 2021.

In the motion, counsel averred that it was “expressly understood that defense counsel has not yet

been furnished with any transcripts from the case or plea and makes this motion without prejudice

to or waiving the later discovery of errors in the record.” (Emphasis added.).

¶ 14    On November 5, 2021, the sentencing hearing transcript was filed. Four days later, on

November 9, 2021, at a status conference, postplea counsel stated that she had recently received

the “transcripts” and was reviewing them to determine if an amended motion to withdraw the plea

was appropriate. The guilty-plea hearing transcript was not filed until January 3, 2022.

¶ 15    On January 5, 2022, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea because, inter alia, postplea counsel had not reviewed the transcript of the guilty-plea

hearing prior to filing the motion to withdraw the plea and failed to file an affidavit with the

motion, in accordance with Rule 604(d), to support the facts that were contained in the motion but

fell outside the record.

¶ 16    On March 31, 2022, postplea counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw defendant’s

plea, which contained the same disclaimer that counsel had not “yet been furnished with any

transcripts from the case or plea”; however, counsel appended the guilty-plea hearing transcript to

the motion. Critically, no new Rule 604(d) certificate was filed. The motion alleged that

(1) defendant was confused about the class of the offense, whether the offense was probationable,

and the number of counts he was pleading to, because of the competing information he received

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from plea counsel and the court and (2) defendant did not knowingly and intelligently enter his

guilty plea, because he was not proficient enough in English to understand legal jargon.

¶ 17   On July 28, 2022, the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was continued, but

the State reiterated its position that postplea counsel did not strictly comply with Rule 604(d) where

she failed to file an affidavit in support of the facts included in the motion but outside the record.

The trial judge withheld ruling on the State’s motion to dismiss but reminded counsel that Rule

604(d) “compliance is to be strict and any failure to comply with the rule will result in the case

being remanded for strict compliance.”

¶ 18   On September 7, 2022, a hearing was held on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. At

the start of the hearing, the State received a copy of defendant’s affidavit, supporting the facts

alleged in the motion. The State noted that its basis for the motion to dismiss was now irrelevant

because, facially, the defense was now in compliance with Rule 604(d). Thereafter, the court heard

testimony from plea counsel, who stated that he never had a concern about defendant

understanding the legal concepts or the plea, as he met with defendant in person and over the phone

several times. Plea counsel indicated to defendant, in advance of the guilty plea, that he was hoping

to get the State to agree to one count of a Class 1 felony. However, after the Rule 402 conference,

the offer with the State remained at two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Plea counsel

hoped that the sentence would be in the low teens but recognized that a higher sentence was

possible. Plea counsel advised defendant of this information because he did not want defendant to

be shocked if his sentence was, ultimately, at the upper end of the range. Eventually, the State

amended its offer to two counts of criminal sexual assault, with the sentences to be served

consecutively; this was the offer to which defendant ultimately pled. After the plea proceedings,

but before the sentencing hearing, defendant informed plea counsel that he thought he was pleading

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to only one count of a Class 1 felony. Plea counsel indicated that he found the conversation strange

because he had discussed the parameters of the plea with defendant for three hours.

¶ 19   Defendant then testified that, prior to the plea hearing, plea counsel relayed to him that he

believed the circuit court would be amenable to a plea for a Class 1 felony, where he could receive

the minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment. At the plea hearing, however, defendant did

not understand everything that occurred, because of the unfamiliar legal terms that were used.

Defendant did not remember hearing terms like consecutive or concurrent, or Class X felony or

Class 1 felony. Defendant stated that plea counsel advised him not to use an interpreter at the

proceedings. Defendant agreed with plea counsel’s testimony that, after the plea hearing, he raised

his concerns to plea counsel regarding the class of the offense and the potential sentencing range.

Defendant then testified regarding the sentencing hearing, where, despite being admonished of the

sentencing range, he believed he would be sentenced to the minimum, based on his discussions

with plea counsel. Defendant recalled being told after the sentencing hearing that plea counsel met

with his family and indicated that they could “cancel” the sentence and plea counsel would move

to withdraw as counsel.

¶ 20   After hearing the foregoing testimony, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion to

withdraw the guilty plea. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 21                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22   On appeal, defendant argues that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings

because postplea counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate was filed before counsel obtained or read the

reports of proceedings for the sentencing and guilty-plea hearings and before counsel had filed any

postplea motion. Additionally, defendant argues that postplea counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a motion to reconsider the sentence, where counsel failed to challenge an improper factor

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considered at sentencing and failed to assert that pertinent mitigating factors were not considered

at sentencing. For its part, the State insists that remand is not required where the Rule 604(d)

certificate was facially sufficient and the statements in the certificate were not rebutted by the

record. Moreover, the State argues that was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider

the sentence, as defendant’s sentences were appropriate and there was no reasonable probability

that a motion to reconsider would be successful. For the following reasons, we agree with

defendant’s first argument.

¶ 23    Rule 604(d) “governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to appeal

from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Curtis,

2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 29. The rule requires a defendant to file, within 30 days of sentencing,

a motion to withdraw his or her plea of guilty and vacate the judgment if the plea is being

challenged; if only the sentence is being challenged, the defendant must file, within 30 days of

sentencing, a motion to reconsider the sentence. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Further,

the rule provides in part:

               “The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor. When the

       motion is based on facts that do not appear of record it shall be supported by affidavit

       unless the defendant is filing the motion pro se from a correctional institution ***. *** The

       trial court shall then determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the

       defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel.

               *** The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that

       the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in

       person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the

       plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the

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        plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any

        amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those

        proceedings.” Id.

¶ 24    It is well settled that the certificate filed by counsel must strictly comply with the

requirements of Rule 604(d). People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33, 35 (1994). If counsel’s certificate

does not meet this standard, the reviewing court must remand the matter to the trial court “for the

filing of a new Rule 604(d) certificate, for the filing of a new motion to withdraw guilty plea or to

reconsider sentence, and for a new hearing on the motion.” People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 31.

In addition, even where a Rule 604(d) certificate is facially valid, remand is required if the record

refutes the certificate, because “ ‘Rule 604(d) contemplates more than the mere pro forma filing

of a motion.’ ” People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶¶ 8, 10 (quoting People v. Keele,

210 Ill. App. 3d 898, 902-03 (1991)). Here, there is no dispute that postplea counsel’s Rule 604(d)

certificate is facially valid. Thus, the issue is whether, as defendant claims, the record refutes the

certificate and demonstrates that counsel failed to comply with the rule. “Whether counsel

complied with Rule 604(d) is a legal question that we review de novo.” Gorss, 2022 IL 126464,

¶ 10.

¶ 25    Defendant contends that postplea counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d), because she

filed her certificate of compliance prematurely; the motion to withdraw the guilty plea expressly

stated that counsel had not been furnished, and thus had not read, any “transcripts from the case or

plea”; and there is no indication from the record that counsel reviewed the transcripts and consulted

with defendant, at least, regarding the sentencing hearing.

¶ 26    Defendant relies on People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 34. In Easton, our supreme court

highlighted the importance of consultation in furthering the purpose of Rule 604(d) by finding that

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the prior language of Rule 604(d)—which used the conjunction “or” rather than the current

conjunction “and”—should be read to require that counsel certify that she or he has consulted with

the defendant to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the

plea of guilty. Id. ¶¶ 32, 36. The supreme court reasoned that reading the conjunction “or” to mean

“and” was necessary to protect a defendant’s interests and ensure that all alleged improprieties

could be addressed in the circuit court before an appeal. Id. ¶ 32. The Rule 604(d) certificate

conveys to the court “the details of counsel’s consultation with the defendant” and “serves as

evidence that the requisite consultation has taken place.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 34; see Gorss, 2022 IL 126464,

¶ 26 (noting that a Rule 604(d) certificate is evidence that a consultation between the defendant

and his or her attorney has taken place). Accordingly, the objective of the certificate is to “describe

past conduct—i.e., the factual circumstances of an interaction with defendant that has already

taken place.” Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 34.

¶ 27   Also instructive is People v. Marquez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110475. In Marquez, we held that

a Rule 604(d) certificate filed before sentencing was premature. Id. ¶ 8. There, prior to the

defendant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate as

well as a motion to withdraw the plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the

motion. After the defendant was sentenced, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the

previous motion to withdraw the plea. A renewed certificate of compliance in accordance with

Rule 604(d) was never filed. Id. ¶ 4. In reaching our decision, we indicated a rough timeline for

the sequence of events in accordance with Rule 604(d): “(1) entry of plea, (2) sentencing, (3) filing

of motion, (4) appointment of counsel for the proceedings on the motion, and (5) filing of

certificate.” Id. ¶ 7. At a minimum, we noted that a Rule 604(d) certificate should be filed before

or simultaneously with the hearing on the motion in the trial court. Id. ¶ 6 (citing People v. Shirley,

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181 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (1998)). However, we stressed that the certificate should not be filed until

after the sentencing hearing because Rule 604(d) requires counsel to certify that she or he has made

any necessary amendments to the postplea motion, and the sentencing proceedings may themselves

provide grounds for a motion. We reasoned that allowing counsel to file a certificate before making

the necessary amendments to the postplea motion would be meaningless, because the certificate

would not ensure that counsel considered all relevant bases for relief. Id. ¶ 8.

¶ 28   We find Easton and Marquez compelling. Here, postplea counsel entered her appearance

and filed a Rule 604(d) certificate before filing any postplea motion and before receiving and

reading the reports of proceedings from the guilty plea and sentencing hearings. Specifically, the

Rule 604(d) certificate was rebutted by the record because counsel expressly stated in her motion

to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea that the “transcripts from the case or plea” had not yet been

furnished to her.

¶ 29   Counsel’s certificate is not prospective. The certificate is not to be used as a checklist of

what counsel will do. Counsel’s certificate is evidence to the reviewing court that consultation has

taken place with the defendant after counsel has received and read the trial court file, the report

of proceedings of the guilty plea, and the report of proceedings from the sentencing hearing.

Postplea counsel’s premature filing here is evidence of nothing. The record shows that the relevant

transcripts had not been filed, rendering it not possible for counsel to have read those documents

before filing her certificate. Additionally, counsel was not capable of affirming that she adequately

consulted with defendant about the transcripts of the “case [and the] plea” when she did not have

those transcripts in her possession. Further, counsel’s statements on November 9, 2021, that she

reviewed the transcripts from the proceedings also appear to be rebutted by the record, as not all

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the relevant records were filed until January 3, 2022. As such, we find that counsel’s Rule 604(d)

certificate was rebutted by the record.

¶ 30   The State contends that the record does not impeach the facially valid Rule 604(d)

certificate. Despite postplea counsel’s express statement, after filing her Rule 604(d) certificate,

indicating that she had not yet been furnished with any relevant transcripts, the State asserts that it

was obvious from the record that consultation occurred. It asserts that (1) counsel had to have

consulted with defendant regarding his contentions of error in the guilty plea because she was new

to the case and there was no other way, besides consultation, that she could have learned of

defendant’s contentions of error; (2) counsel must have read the transcripts before filing her

amended motion to withdraw the plea, because all of her amendments were based upon the events

that transpired at the guilty-plea hearing; and (3) counsel appended the transcript of the guilty plea

to her amended posttrial motion.

¶ 31   The State’s approach, i.e., that logic dictates that a review of the record and an adequate

consultation occurred, was rejected by the supreme court in Gorss. There, the supreme court noted

that, although counsel need not recite verbatim the form provided in Rule 604(d), the court would

not rely on speculation to ensure that an adequate consultation took place. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464,

¶ 27. Citing Justice McLaren’s dissent in People v. Peltz, 2019 IL App (2d) 170465, the court

noted that remand was required where it was forced to speculate whether (1) counsel saw no error,

told the defendant this, and advised the defendant not to withdraw his plea; (2) counsel discovered

an error but the defendant decided not to pursue the issue; or (3) counsel discovered an error but

did not advise the defendant about the error because the defendant had already decided on a course

of action. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 27 (citing Peltz, 2019 IL App (2d) 170465, ¶ 49 (McLaren, J.,

dissenting)).

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¶ 32    Here, the State is asking us to presume that consultation took place. We decline to do so.

Postplea counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 604(d), averring that she had read the court

file and the report of proceedings from the plea and sentencing hearings and consulted with

defendant regarding his contentions of error in these proceedings. However, twice, in her initial

and amended motions to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, counsel backtracked and noted that she

had not, in fact, received or read the “transcripts from the case or plea” (emphasis added), although

she had certified that she had met her obligations. We have determined that counsel’s statement

that she had not been furnished “transcripts from the case” includes the transcript from the

sentencing hearing. The sentencing hearing transcript was not filed until November 5, 2021, six

weeks after counsel filed her Rule 604(d) certificate. Thereafter, no new Rule 604(d) certificate

was filed.

¶ 33   It is not for this court to speculate as to whether an examination of the record and

consultation with defendant occurred. There is no indication on this record that counsel actually

discussed with defendant the contentions of error in the guilty plea or sentence after counsel was

furnished with the appropriate transcripts. This is especially troubling considering the fact that a

motion to reconsider the sentence was not filed and two potential sentencing issues are discussed

by defendant on appeal: (1) defendant was not told that there was a mandatory supervised release

(MSR) term of between three years and natural life, which was not harmless error, because that

MSR term plus defendant’s prison sentence might exceed the maximum sentence defendant was

told he could receive and (2) defendant was not told until after the guilty plea that the charges he

was pleading guilty to were not actually probationable. Each of these issues was something that

should have been discovered upon examination of the record and discussed with defendant;

however, because of counsel’s statements rebutting the Rule 604(d) certificate, we are left in the

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untenable position of speculating whether (1) counsel saw no error upon reviewing the transcripts

and conveyed this to defendant; (2) counsel discovered the sentencing errors, discussed them with

defendant, and decided not to raise the errors in a posttrial motion; or (3) counsel discovered the

sentencing errors but did not convey them to defendant because defendant had already decided he

wanted to withdraw his plea. Here, the combination of counsel’s premature certificate, her

statements rebutting the certificate, and the filing dates of the transcripts for the guilty plea and

sentencing hearings leave us simply unable to conclude that she consulted with defendant after

examining the case file and the reports of proceedings from the sentencing and guilty-plea

hearings. Strict compliance with the rule demands that a new certificate should have been filed by

counsel after counsel met her obligations, assuming those obligations were ever met.

¶ 34   Next, the State cites People v. Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993 (remand for strict

compliance would be pro forma where there was no indication that counsel failed to comply with

Rule 604(d)’s substantive requirements by filing his certificate before filing an amended motion

to reconsider), and People v. Walker, 2021 IL App (1st) 190139-U, to support its contention that,

while the Rule 604(d) certificate may have contained a technical inaccuracy, there was nothing to

suggest that the purpose of Rule 604(d) was undermined or defendant was deprived of a fair

opportunity to present his claims of error. The State’s reliance on these cases is misplaced and

does not alter our conclusion.

¶ 35 For example, in Walker, the circuit court discovered that defense counsel had not ordered

the transcripts from the guilty plea or sentencing hearings at the time counsel filed his Rule 604(d)

certificate. Id. ¶ 9. The court refused to hold a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea until

counsel had received those transcripts. Id. ¶¶ 14, 18. The reviewing court held that it would be

merely pro forma to remand the cause for strict compliance with Rule 604(d) and new postplea

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proceedings, because it was readily apparent from the record that the circuit court recognized the

inaccuracies in the certificate and resolved those inaccuracies by ordering the missing transcripts

and continuing the proceedings until all the missing materials were given to counsel. Id. ¶¶ 18-

19.

¶ 36   Walker is factually distinguishable from this case. Here, the circuit court did not recognize

the inaccuracies in the record and, thus, did not take corrective steps to cure those inaccuracies.

Unlike Walker and Montag, remand here will not be a pro forma activity. Rather, it would serve

the substantive purpose of requiring postplea counsel to comply with Rule 604(d) and file a new

certificate of compliance and then conduct new postplea proceedings. The uncertainty regarding

counsel’s examination of the report of proceedings, consultation regarding potential sentencing

errors, and the decision concerning the filing of a motion to reconsider the sentence would be fully

fleshed out in new postplea proceedings accompanied by an unrebutted certificate. Because this

case deals with more than technical inaccuracies in the record, and remand could substantively

impact this case, we find Montag and Walker to be inapposite.

¶ 37   In sum, after considering the contents of the certificate, the timing of the filings, and the

substance of postplea counsel’s filings, we conclude that this cause should be remanded to the

circuit court to proceed in accordance with Rule 604(d).

¶ 38                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39   For the reasons stated, we vacate the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and remand this cause for new postplea proceedings, including the filing

of a Rule 604(d) certificate in strict compliance with the rule.

¶ 40   Vacated and remanded.

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                  People v. Suaste-Gonzalez, 2023 IL App (2d) 220323

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 19-CF-2798;
                           the Hon. Mark L. Levitt, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Amaris Danak, of State
for                        Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Eric F. Rinehart, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino,
for                        Edward R. Psenicka, and Lynn M. Harrington, of State’s Attorneys
Appellee:                  Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

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