Court Opinion

ID: 9369390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 18:00:50.201288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.744325
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ____________

                                       No. 20-2840

                                      ____________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                   AMIN A. RASHID,
                                              Appellant
                                    ____________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                        (District Court No. 2-08-cr-00493-001)
                         District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe
                                     ____________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                  February 6, 2023
                                   ____________

     Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed February 8, 2023)
                                      ____________

                                        OPINION*
                                      ____________

CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
       Federal prisoner Amin Rashid sought compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The District Court denied Rashid’s motion and subsequent request for

reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.

                                            I.1

       Rashid moved pro se for compassionate release based on his ailing sister, personal

health risks resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, and a wrongful conviction claim.

The District Court denied relief. It concluded that Rashid had administratively exhausted

only his request concerning his sister, which was not an extraordinary and compelling

reason for compassionate release.2

       Rashid moved for reconsideration. He abandoned the personal and sibling health-

related claims, reiterated his wrongful conviction claim, and added a challenge to his

sentence. The District Court denied reconsideration. Rashid appealed.3

1
  Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.
2
  The District Court observed that Rashid’s wrongful conviction claims had been
repeatedly rejected. Indeed, based on a lengthy history of vexatious filings, Rashid is
subject to an order limiting his ability to file motions attempting to re-litigate issues
previously decided by the District Court. That order is not before the Court in this
appeal.
3
  An appeal in a criminal case must be filed within fourteen days of the order being
appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Rashid’s notice of appeal was filed within
fourteen days of the order denying the motion for reconsideration but not the order
denying compassionate release. A motion for reconsideration is not listed in Fed. R.
App. P. 4(b)(3) as extending the time to appeal the underlying order. The time limit for
filing a criminal appeal is rigid but not jurisdictional, however. See United States v.
Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012). The Government did not invoke the time
limit here (and indeed has conceded timeliness). We therefore will consider both orders.
We note, however, that while the substance of Rashid’s pro se brief concerns his request
for compassionate release, he states that he “seeks to appeal only the order denying his
motion for reconsideration.” Rashid Br. 1, n.2.
                                             2
                                             II.4

                                             A.

       A District Court may grant compassionate release if a sentence reduction is

warranted for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and, if so, if a reduction is

“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” and

“supported by the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” as

applicable. United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2021). District Courts

“wield considerable discretion” in this determination. Id. at 262. We review the denial

of compassionate release for abuse of discretion and will not disturb the determination

unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the District Court committed a

clear error of judgment. Id. at 259.

       The District Court correctly concluded that Rashid failed to exhaust administrative

remedies for all claims apart from the request to care for his sister. As to that request, the

District Court determined that the Sentencing Commission did not identify sibling care as

an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassionate release and that “Rashid has

not otherwise shown that release is warranted.” Appendix (“App.”) 21.

       We see no abuse of discretion. Although the District Court was not bound by the

Sentencing Commission’s guidance, it was free to consider it. See Andrews, 12 F.4th at

259–60. Rashid also did not “otherwise show[]” that his sister’s health gives rise to an

“extraordinary and compelling” need for compassionate release. App. 21. Rashid had

4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021).
                                              3
the burden to establish his entitlement to relief. See United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371,

375 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). He merely stated, without support, that his sister suffers

health issues, including emphysema. He did not show that his assistance with her care is

required or, indeed, that his release would impact her care at all. On this sparse record,

we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the District Court erred.

       Rashid does not meaningfully address on appeal the claim concerning his sister’s

care. He instead argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to decline

to consider whether purported errors in his conviction and sentence qualify, along with

sibling care, as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for relief. The District Court

correctly declined to consider these claims. Rashid’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies barred the District Court from addressing them. See United States v. Raia, 954

F.3d 594, 596–97 (3d Cir. 2020).

                                             B.

       A District Court may grant reconsideration if a party establishes an intervening

change in law, new evidence, or a clear error of law or fact. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel.

Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). We review the denial of

reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d

436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012).

       Rashid failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration, instead reiterating his

unexhausted challenges to his conviction and sentence. The District Court therefore did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

                                              4
                                           III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders denying

compassionate release and reconsideration.5

5
  Rashid filed a motion requesting a stay pending our Court’s decision in United States v.
Banks, Nos. 19-3812 and 20-2235. That decision was entered on November 30, 2022,
and is the subject of one of Rashid’s subsequently-filed letters pursuant to Fed. R. App.
P. 28(j). The motion to stay is therefore denied as unnecessary. It is apparent from
Rashid’s Rule 28(j) letter that he wishes to employ our decision in Banks to raise entirely
new grounds for compassionate release. Because these arguments were not raised in the
original motion for compassionate release, we will not consider them in the first instance
here. See Raia, 954 F.3d at 596 (holding that a motion under § 3582 must be presented to
the sentencing court in the first instance).
                                              5