Court Opinion

ID: 9678345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:17:13.288888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:03.733928
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Article I, section 2, of the Texas Constitution says:
“All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and are instituted for their benefit.”
Today, the plurality attempts to lead this Court down the slippery slope of judicial activism by legislating in this particular case a constitutional rule of unprincipled, result-oriented decision-making as a means for judges to impose their views on others. See Voting Behavior On The Texas Court Of Criminal Appeals, 1991-1992, 34 So.Tx. L.Rev. 1, 36 (1993); Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. 929, 956-974 (1992) (and authorities cited therein); State Constitutions As Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. 707, 717 (1983). It should not be this Court’s role to correct the perceived injustice here by judicially legislating what it considers to be a socially or politically desirable result. See, e.g., People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866, 879-89 (1992) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Justice Stewart, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 5 (1981) (discussing the proper role of a judge). Under a proper application of principles of federalism, which, in this case, require this Court to exercise restraint, and based on this Court’s historical precedents, we should hold the inventory did not violate Article I, section 9. Because the plurality fails to exercise restraint and ignores our historical precedents, I dissent.

HEITMAN

Heitman merely recognizes and reaffirms this Court’s long-held power to interpret the Texas Constitution to provide greater protection than the Federal Constitution. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); see also Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). However, Heitman does not establish a specific rule of divergence from Fourth Amendment cases, or an analytical framework for deciding when the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution. Id., 815 S.W.2d at 690 (announcing that we decline to “blindly” follow Fourth Amendment cases and then remanding the case back to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for further consideration).1 If this case requires an application of Heitman, as the plurality asserts on page eight of its opinion, then the plurality, consistent with Heitman, should announce it will not “blindly” follow Fourth Amendment cases and remand this case to the Ninth Court of Appeals to let it decide whether the inventory violated Article I, section 9.
Heitman also overrules Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.Cr.App.) (plurality op.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 127, 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (majority op.), and Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (plurality op.), to the extent they hold we will “blindly” follow or be “bound” by Fourth Amendment cases in interpreting Article I, section 9. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690. However, these cases do not hold that we will “blindly” follow or be “bound” by Fourth Amendment cases, or that we will abdicate our power to interpret the Texas Constitution to provide greater protection than the Federal Constitution in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 799. There is a distinction between saying we will “follow” a decision in a particular case versus saying we will *44“blindly” follow or be “bound” by particular decisions in future cases.
Moreover, it should be noted that much of Heitman was based on questionable and inaccurate secondary authority advocating a “new federalism” which, two learned commentators argue, advocates that courts should abandon their judicial role and act as super-legislatures. See Heitman v. State, The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 962-67, 72-74 (pointing out that some proponents of the “new federalism” are uncomfortable with an inquiry into the history of the state constitution and a textual comparison with its federal counterpart, because such an approach would “deprive” legal scholars, judges, and others of the power to impose their views of justice upon the “unenlightened” masses). Heitman adds little to this state’s jurisprudence, and this Court’s prior cases still constitute valid precedent.

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This Court has traditionally followed Fourth Amendment cases in interpreting Article I, section 9, and the plurality offers no explanation on why it chooses to depart from this Court’s historical precedents. See State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (the doctrine of stare decisis requires that “when a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared and uniformly followed, it should not be abandoned except upon the most urgent reasons”) (Baird, J.). After the U.S. Supreme Court “federalized” most of this state’s criminal law in the 1950s and 1960s, this Court said it generally would follow Fourth Amendment cases in interpreting Article I, section 9. See Eisenhauer, 754 S.W.2d at 162; Osban, 726 S.W.2d at 111; Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 799; Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Before the 1950s and 1960s, the primary source of Texas citizens’ rights was the Texas Constitution, and most constitutional cases in Texas were decided under the Texas Constitution. See generally State Constitutions As Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. at 717; State Courts And Constitutional Rights In The Day Of The Burger Court, 62 Va.L.Rev. 873, 938 (1976). Therefore, this Court’s pre-1950s interpretation of Article I, section 9, should offer strong guidance on how we should interpret it now. See Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 956-962, 962 (and cases cited therein); State Constitutions As Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. at 718-20 (one jurist has identified several criteria to use in addressing independent state ground questions: text of the constitution, its legislative history, preexisting state law, structural differences between federal and state constitutions, matters of particular state interest or local concern, state traditions and public attitudes). Even Heitman suggests our historical precedents are a relevant consideration.2 See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 688 (preexisting state law can assist in defining the scope of a state constitutional right).
Before the 1950s and 1960s, this Court also generally followed Fourth Amendment cases in interpreting Article I, section 9, because of the textual similarities of the two provisions, and because the two provisions embody the same basic protections. See, e.g., Giacona v. State, 372 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1962) (op. on reh’g); Crowell v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 299, 180 S.W.2d 343 (1944); Cagle v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928, 937-38 (1944); Hawley v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 243, 296 S.W. 556, 557 (1927); see also Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 956-974 (and authorities cited therein). And, in some cases, Texas courts afforded less protection than the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Welchek v. State, 93 Tex.Crim. 271, 247 S.W. 524 (1923); Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 956-974 (and authorities cited therein).
Cagle is illustrative. In Cagle, this Court addressed whether a search warrant authorized the seizure of certain items under the Texas Constitution, and whether Texas’s ap*45plicable state exclusionary rule prohibited the admission of these items into evidence.3 Cagle, 180 S.W.2d at 937-38. The applicable state exclusionary rule, like current Article 38.23, prohibited the admission of any evidence obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions. In Cagle, this Court, following a long line of cases, said,
“.... the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question here presented should be first consulted; and, where applicable and controlling, they should be followed.”
(emphasis added). Cagle, 180 S.W.2d at 937. The Cagle court identified a U.S. Supreme Court case as “applicable and controlling” and applied it to Article I, section 9, without considering whether Article I, section 9, afforded any broader protection than the Fourth Amendment. Cagle, 180 S.W.2d at 937-38.
Neither the legislature through the legislative process nor the people of this state through constitutional amendment have overturned this Court’s historical decisions generally interpreting Article I, section 9, consistently with Fourth Amendment cases. See Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 799. Texans have not hesitated to change the Texas Constitution when circumstances required. See THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, TEXAS ALMANAC 1994-95, 336 (Mike Kingston ed., 1993). Under principles of federalism and stare decisis, we should exercise restraint and defer to the legislative processes on the issue presented by the petition for discretionary review. See Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 799.
Though the plurality purports to rely on what it calls the “History and Application” of Article I, section 9, it cites not one Texas case to support its conclusion that history supports its holding today. Instead, the plurality relies on an unpersuasive discussion on what it calls the “Framers’ Intent”4 and a “History and Application” of something other than relevant Texas constitutional decisions. This approach ignores the most important part of any analysis of independent state ground questions.
Other historical considerations also suggest the exercise of restraint here. Federal courts have dominated each state’s search and seizure law for almost 40 years. Under principles of “old” federalism, involving the separation of powers between the states and the federal government under the Federal Constitution, the area of “independent state grounds” is not ripe for adjudication until the states regain some of the sovereignty they lost in the 1950s and 1960s. This is another reason we should continue this Court’s tradition of deference to the U.S. Supreme Court on search and seizure issues.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9

The plurality holds Article I, section 9, provides a privacy interest in closed containers which is not overcome by the general policy considerations of an inventory. Based on the foregoing discussion, I would uphold the inventory here because there is “applicable and controlling” U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which is set out at pages three through six of the majority opinion. See, e.g., Cagle, 180 S.W.2d at 937-38; see also Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44-45 (upholding, under the Fourth Amendment, a departmentally established inventory of container items found in the trunk of an impounded car).
Moreover, there are other reasons, apart from whether we should “blindly” follow U.S. Supreme Court cases, to uphold the inventory in this case. Article I, section 9, says:
“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures and searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” (emphasis added).
The plurality accepts the federal rationale for upholding inventories: protection of the owner whose property is in police custody, protection of law enforcement agencies from civil claims for lost or stolen property, and protection of the officers and others from potential danger. The plurality says appel*46lant’s privacy interest in the closed key box was not overcome by the general policy considerations underlying an inventory because protection of the agency from claims of theft “can be satisfied by recording the existence of and describing and/or photographing the closed or locked container.”
However, because “reasonableness” is the constitutional standard, I would hold it is reasonable for experienced law enforcement policy-makers to determine that a lawfully arrested car owner, who is inclined to make a false claim, could be expected to claim the police took property from an area the police were not permitted to inventory.5 See State v. Roth, 305 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Iowa 1981). Under the majority’s rationale and holding, the agency would not be protected from such a claim. Therefore, the plurality’s holding is inconsistent with the general policy considerations of an inventory.
Moreover, these considerations outweigh any limited privacy interest appellant had in the closed containers in his car. I would hold a person in appellant’s position has a limited expectation of privacy in the contents of a legally impounded ear that does not outweigh the general policy considerations underlying an inventory.
More importantly, the plurality ignores the plain language of Article I, section 9, which permits reasonable searches and prohibits unreasonable searches. The constitutional standard is “reasonableness.” The plurality never expressly says the inventory was unreasonable; instead, it bases its holding on its predilections the police could have used other means, short of opening the key box, to protect the agency from claims of theft.6 However, Article I, section 9, does not require what is the “most reasonable” or what a plurality of this court believes is “more reasonable.” Cf. Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44 (the existence of “less intrusive alternatives” does not necessarily render the police policy unreasonable). The inventory here was “reasonable” because of appellant’s limited expectation of privacy in the contents of the legally impounded ear, the general policy considerations underlying an inventory, and, according to the plurality opinion, the inventory was conducted in accordance with established and uniformly applied departmental policy. A plurality of this Court should not exercise the extraordinary power of second-guessing a uniformly applied departmental policy on inventories that, according to the plurality, does not offend the Federal Constitution.

TEXTUAL EXAMINATION

To support the result it wants to reach in this case, the plurality also engages in an unpersuasive discussion on what it calls a “textual examination” of Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment. The plurality apparently concedes that both constitutional provisions embody the same basic protections. However, the majority fails to discuss why it chooses to depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent developed over the last 200 years by life-time appointed judges, and our historical precedents. See Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (in interpreting Article I, section 9, we examine for guidance, among other things, Fourth Amendment analogues); State Constitutions As Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. at 717; Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 956-974 (and authorities cited therein).

COMPARABLE JURISPRUDENCE

The text of the plurality opinion also says the comparable jurisprudence of California, South Dakota and Alaska is consistent with the result it reaches to day. See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975); Mozzetti v. *47Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84 (1971). To the extent these eases are relevant to how we should interpret the Texas Constitution, they do not support the analytical framework the plurality uses or the result it reaches.
Mozzetti was decided on Fourth Amendment grounds; therefore, it is irrelevant to an independent state ground analysis. Id., 94 CaLRptr. at 414, 484 P.2d at 86. The Brisendine court used a principled analysis, based on earlier state court precedents applying state constitutional law, in interpreting the search and seizure provisions of California’s constitution to provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to privacy interests in container items in the context of an inventory. Id., 119 Cal.Rptr. at 325-31, 531 P.2d at 1109-1115. And in 1982, Californians abrogated Brisendine by constitutional amendment. See In re Lance, 37 Cal.3d 873, 210 CaL.Rptr. 631, 634, 694 P.2d 744, 747 (1985). And in 1990, apparently after California courts proceeded far down the slippery slope of judicial activism, Californians attempted to further limit the California courts from imposing their views on the citizenry through Proposition 115 entitled “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act” whose stated purpose was to adopt “comprehensive reforms_needed in order to restore balance and fairness to [California’s] criminal justice system” by, among other things, abrogating several judicial decisions and requiring California courts to construe certain enumerated criminal rights consistently with the Federal Constitution. See generally Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 CaL.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077 (1990). The California “new federalism” experience offers no support to what the plurality does today, and it actually supports an exercise of restraint.
Opperman also used a principled analysis, based on earlier U.S. Supreme Court authority and state court precedents applying state constitutional law, in deciding the South Dakota Constitution provided more protection than the Fourth Amendment to privacy interests in container items in the context of an inventory. Id., 247 N.W.2d at 675. And, in State v. Flittie, the South Dakota Supreme Court “modified” Opperman, based on U.S. Supreme Court authority, to provide less protection than what it had granted in Op-perman. Flittie, 425 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (S.D.1988). The Chief Justice characterized this “modification” as a “reversal” of Opperman. Flittie, 425 N.W.2d at 6 (Wuest, C.J., specially concurring). And, in State v. Hejhal, the South Dakota Supreme Court, based in part on U.S. Supreme Court authority, held a police inventory of the contents of a defendant’s wallet, which is more intrusive on privacy interests than the inventory in this ease, did not violate the South Dakota Constitution. Id., 438 N.W.2d 820, 821-22 (S.D.1989). One dissenting opinion lamented that Opper-man was being “whittled away.” Hejhal, 438 N.W.2d at 822 (Henderson, J., dissenting). The South Dakota “new federalism” experience does not support what the plurality does today, and South Dakota cases after Opper-man actually support upholding the inventory in this case. See Hejhal, 438 N.W.2d at 822.
Daniel also used a principled analysis, based on earlier U.S. Supreme Court authority and state court precedents applying state constitutional law, in deciding the Alaska Constitution provided more protection than the Fourth Amendment to privacy interests in container items in the context of an inventory. Id., 119 CaLRptr. at 325-31, 531 P.2d at 1109-1115. Moreover, Alaska, unlike Texas, has traditionally granted its citizens more personal freedom than required by the Federal Constitution. For example, Alaska was the only state in the nation to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana in the privacy of one’s home. Texas has no such tradition.
The cases cited in footnote eight of the plurality opinion also do not support the analytical framework the plurality uses or the result it reaches. Most of the cases cited in footnote eight also used a principled analysis, based on earlier state court decisions applying state constitutional law, in interpreting the particular state constitutional provision to provide greater protection than Fourth Amendment cases on various search and seizure issues. See State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300, 1310 (1992); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660, *48666-67 (1992); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793, 799-80 (1990) (interpreting the New Jersey Constitution to provide New Jersians a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage they leave on the curb for collection); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 138-44 (1984) (also recognizing a “substantial difference” between the texts of the Washington and Federal Constitutions); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 948-52 (1982).
In Ault, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on prior cases and textual differences between the Arizona and Federal Constitutions, not applicable to Texas. State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545, 552 (1986). In Hill-man, the Colorado Supreme Court, in upholding a warrantless search of garbage left by the side of the road for collection, interpreted the Colorado Constitution consistently with Fourth Amendment cases. People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1276-78 (Co.1992). In Kaluna, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in striking down a strip search, used a principled analysis, based, in part, on policy reasons for departing from Fourth Amendment cases. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51, 58-60 (1974). In Parms, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a DWI roadblock violated both the Louisiana and Federal Constitutions without setting out any specific rule of divergence from Fourth Amendment cases, and also noted the “explicit” textual differences between the two relevant constitutional provisions, which is not applicable to Texas. State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293, 1301-1303 (La.1988). In Brown, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the Montana Constitution consistently with Fourth Amendment cases while noting the Montana Constitution grants “rights beyond that inferred from the” Federal Constitution because of significant textual differences between the two relevant constitutional provisions. State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (1988). Pellicci interpreted the New Hampshire Constitution consistently with Fourth Amendment cases. State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710, 713-19 (1990), and 580 A.2d at 719-23 (Brock, C.J., concurring specially). And, Johnson decided a warrantless arrest issue under the New York Constitution because it could not find a controlling U.S. Supreme Court case or other Fourth Amendment cases for guidance. People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 623-24, 488 N.E.2d 439, 444-45 (1985).
The plurality opinion also asserts the out-of-state cases in footnote nine, that follow Fourth Amendment cases, apparently do so solely to maintain uniformity among the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and those states’ highest courts, which “conflicts” with a highest state court’s duty to protect state constitutional rights. However, these eases also do not support the proposition for which the plurality cites them.
For example, the Florida Supreme Court had interpreted the search and seizure provision of the Florida Constitution, which was similarly worded to Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment, as providing more protection than the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 637-39, 103 S.Ct. 3100, 3101-02, 77 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Floridians, like Californians, promptly amended their constitution to require their courts to interpret Florida search and seizure law consistently with U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions. See id. That is why the Florida Supreme Court in Bernie v. State7 interpreted that amendment to the Florida Constitution as not providing any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, and not solely because of a desire to maintain uniformity or to avoid its duty to safeguard state constitutional rights. The Florida Supreme Court failed to exercise restraint, and Floridians amended their constitution to prevent the judiciary from judicially legislating what it considered to be socially desirable results. This amendment also prevents the Florida courts from interpreting the Florida Constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitution in appropriate cases.
In two of the cases cited in footnote nine, the defendants did not properly brief or raise independent state grounds. See In the Matter of the Welfare of E.D.J, 492 N.W.2d 829, *49830-31 (Minn.App.1992), rev’d, 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn.1993) (adopting a stricter standard than required by Fourth Amendment cases in determining whether a seizure has occurred); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). In another case, the Michigan Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent, actually interpreted its state constitution as providing more protection than the Eighth Amendment on an issue totally unrelated to this case. See Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 879-89. In another case, the Iowa Supreme Court advanced several policy reasons other than a “desire to maintain uniformity” not to interpret the Iowa Constitution as providing greater protection than the Federal Constitution. See State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 207-08 (Io.1982). Two other cases cited in footnote nine declined to interpret the relevant provisions of their constitutions more broadly than the Federal Constitution primarily because their constitutional provisions, like Texas’, are similarly worded to the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Geraldo, 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 429 N.E.2d 141, 145 fn. 5 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962, 102 S.Ct. 2038, 72 L.Ed.2d 486 (1982); Dixon v. State, 737 P.2d 942 (Okla.Crim.App.1987). In the other case cited in footnote nine, the court gave no reasons for interpreting its state constitution consistently with the Federal Constitution. See State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095 (Me.1991).
The plurality’s analytical framework and holding are not consistent with the comparable jurisprudence discussed at pages 16 to 19 of the majority opinion.

CONCLUSION

Today, the plurality attempts to make this Court’s voice one of power, not reason. The plurality opinion applies no objective criteria, and ignores relevant historical precedents in reaching a result it deems socially desirable for the “unenlightened masses.” The constitutional rule advocated by the plurality today is the Texas Constitution means whatever five elected judges to this Court says it means. Texas citizens must be informed they have the power to change decisions like this to ensure reasonable measures to protect local law enforcement agencies from false civil claims for lost or stolen property. Cf. Casal, 462 U.S. at 637-39, 103 S.Ct. at 3100-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Forty years of this kind of judicial activism is enough, and I dissent.
WHITE, J., joins.

. On remand, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found the inventory of the contents of Heitman's locked briefcase, which is more intrusive on privacy interests than the inventory here, was reasonable under Article I, section 9, and we refused the petition for discretionary review. Heitman v. State, 836 S.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd).

. Heitman cites several Texas cases that have interpreted various provisions of the Texas Constitution to provide greater protection than their federal counterparts; however, none of these cases interpreted Article I, section 9. Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 688-89.

. This was the predecessor to the current version of Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P.

. Our prior cases foreclose any discussion on the “Framers' Intent."

. This case involves a police inventory of “a closed plastic key box located under the driver’s seat,” which, according to the plurality, was pursuant to "established departmental policy.” When the officers inventoried the key box, they already had found approximately $500,000 cash in the trunk.

. What this case boils down to is the plurality’s announcement of what it considers to be a "better" or "more reasonable" policy on how law enforcement authorities should conduct, and make policy with respect to, inventories. However, the issue is whether the policy, chosen by accountable law enforcement officials, is "reasonable.”

. 524 So.2d 988 (Fla.1988) (cited in the plurality opinion at page 40, footnote 9).