Court Opinion

ID: 9524529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:53:46.111525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:47.778050
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE dissenting: This is just the sort of case that has brought appellate courts into disrepute. After being convicted of drunken driving, the defendant, Charles Morrison, was placed on one year of probation, sentenced to 30 days in jail, ordered to participate in a treatment program for his alcohol problem, and fined $350. This court chooses to reverse the fine and remand for a further evidentiary hearing. What does the record show? This defendant, with a traffic record containing numerous convictions for speeding and other traffic violations, previously had his license suspended for drunken driving in 1975. The current conviction for an offense of drunken driving on October 3, 1981, established that while, under the influence of intoxicating liquor and without insurance, he drove into the rear end of a parked car causing $3,800 damage to the hapless owner of that parked vehicle. He has agreed to make restitution for that damage at the rate of $50 per month. - This court reverses the fine and thereby substitutes its judgment for that of the sentencing judge. The majority opinion finds that the defendant lacked either the present or the future ability to pay the fine. Such a finding is not merely erroneous. It does violence to the precept that the decision of the trial judge in imposing sentence is entitled to great weight. It invites frivolous appeals. It indicates a willingness on the part of the appellate court to tinker with every aspect of the judicial process, no matter how small. The defendant in this case is a 52-year-old unemployed carpenter. He is married. His wife is employed full time as a secretary. He draws unemployment compensation. He was able to post a $100 cash bond. He considered himself financially able to pay off the victim at the rate of $50 per month. From this record, the trial court concluded that the defendant was able to pay a $350 fine, of which sum, part would be paid by his posted bond. Why must it be said that this decision of the trial judge was erroneous? I don’t know. It is clear that the trial court is not required to specifically make a finding that the defendant had the financial resources and the future ability to pay a fine. That finding is implicit in the imposition of a fine where the trial judge was aware of the facts in the record which would support such a finding. People v. Bishop (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 521. Moreover, the requirement that the trial court determine that the defendant have financial resources or future ability to pay a fine, must not be construed as permitting a fine only when a defendant has sufficient cash to pay the fine with no discomfort to himself. The purpose of a fine is punishment, and a fine must be of an amount sufficient to impress upon the defendant the seriousness of his offense and the necessity of discontinuing his illegal actions. Considering this defendant’s past and present record of traffic offenses, he must be considered a menace on the highways. His age, his marital status with an employed wife, his skill as a carpenter, and his own self assessment that he could pay $50 per month restitution to the victim, all indicate that the defendant would be able in the future to pay the $350 fine. Finally, if the majority really believes that the $350 fine imposed by the trial court is not supported by the record, the correct remedy would be an outright reversal of the fine. Remandment for purposes of an additional evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant’s ability to pay a fine is an affront to the taxpayers and to the judicial process. This additional hearing will consume the time and effort of the public defender, the State’s Attorney, the circuit clerk, the court bailiff, the sheriff, and the court reporter. The cost and wasted time of court personnel will exceed the amount of the fine even if collected. This says nothing about the costs already expended on this frivolous appeal. In the interest of judicial economy, the fine in this case should be voted either up or down, not reversed and remanded. Though outright reversal would be wrong, reversal with remand is even worse. As stated in my opening sentence, this is just the sort of case that has brought appellate courts into disrepute. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.