Court Opinion

ID: 9919422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:08:55.488426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:12.481403
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gun Owners of America, Inc.,             :
Gun Owners Foundation, Terrence          :
Ledwell, Laura Leonard-McBride,          :
Edward McBride, and James Sandefur       :
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
City of Philadelphia and Mayor           :
James F. Kenney,                         :   No. 1196 C.D. 2022
                         Appellants      :   Argued: November 8, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                  FILED: January 18, 2024

               Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, Terrence
Ledwell, Laura Leonard-McBride, Edward McBride, and James Sandefur
(collectively, Gun Owners) sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of an
Executive Order of the Mayor of the City of Philadelphia (City) prohibiting guns in
City-owned recreational areas. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
(trial court) granted the injunction, holding that the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms
Act of 19951 (UFA) preempted the Executive Order. The trial court denied the City’s
post-trial motion. The City appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.

      1
          18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6128.
                                         I. Background
               In September 2022, the Mayor issued the Executive Order, which
provided, in pertinent part:
               1. Weapons Prohibited. No one carrying firearms or
               other deadly weapons[2] is permitted to enter or remain in
               or on any indoor or outdoor recreation premises operated
               by the Department of Parks and Recreation (the
               “Department”), including any recreation center, ballfield,
               court, playground, pool, tot lot, or similar facility, but
               excluding park trails and passive park space (collectively
               “City Recreation Facilities”). This Management and
               Operational Policy Prohibiting Firearms and Other Deadly
               Weapons at City Recreation Facilities (this “Policy”) shall
               apply exclusively to the list of City-owned premises
               attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Commissioner of the
               Department may designate additional City Recreation
               Facilities subject to this Policy provided that an up-to-date
               list of all premises covered by this Policy shall be posted
               on the Department’s publicly accessible website.
Phila. Exec. Order 4-2022 (Sept. 27, 2022).
               Gun Owners commenced this action in the trial court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Executive Order.
They asserted that the Executive Order violates the UFA’s preemption of local
firearms regulations3 and the Pennsylvania Constitution.4

       2
        The challenge in this case relates only to firearms, not to other weapons addressed in the
Executive Order.
       3
         Section 6120(a) of the UFA provides: “No county, municipality or township may in any
manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of firearms,
ammunition or ammunition components when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited
by the laws of this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6120(a).
       4
          Article I, section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The right of the citizens
to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 21.

                                                  2
               Gun Owners sought a preliminary injunction to forestall enforcement
of the Executive Order during the pendency of their complaint in the trial court. The
trial court accordingly scheduled an emergency hearing just three days after Gun
Owners filed their complaint. At the hearing, the trial court stated that it would
consider Gun Owners’ motion as one for preliminary relief. Reproduced Record
(RR) at 28a-29a. However, the trial court then decided to convert the hearing to one
regarding permanent injunctive relief, on the basis that the case “hinge[d] purely on
legal questions.” Id. at 4a. The City objected, but the trial court nonetheless
proceeded with a final injunction hearing. On October 3, 2022, the trial court entered
an order granting permanent injunctive relief. This appeal by the City followed.

                                         II. Discussion
               In its only argument relevant to our disposition of this appeal,5 the City
posits that the trial court should not have granted a permanent injunction after an
emergency hearing held just days after Gun Owners filed their complaint. We agree.
               The City alleges that the trial court erred6 in conducting a final
injunction hearing and granting permanent injunctive relief without allowing
discovery and only days after Gun Owners filed their complaint. The City asserts

       5
           The City also asserts two other issues. First, the City contends that the UFA preempts
only attempts to regulate firearms and that the Executive Order is not doing so. Second, the City
maintains that in issuing the Executive Order, it is not acting as a government entity, but as a
property owner, and that it has the right to regulate conduct on its property without regard to the
preemptive authority of the UFA. The City maintains that its management of its own recreational
facilities is a matter of purely local concern not subject to preemption by state statute. Because we
conclude that we must vacate the trial court’s order on other grounds, we do not reach either of
these issues.
       6
         Where a lower court has issued a permanent injunction based on a determination that the
party seeking the injunction established a clear right to relief as a matter of law, our standard of
review of that question of law is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Big Bass Lake Cmty.
Ass’n v. Warren, 23 A.3d 619, 624 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (additional citation omitted).

                                                 3
that a court may not convert a motion for a preliminary injunction into one seeking
a permanent injunction unless all of the parties consent. Here, it is undisputed that
the City expressly objected to converting the preliminary injunction hearing into a
final injunction proceeding at such an early stage.
                We agree with the City that the trial court erred by converting the
preliminary injunction hearing to a final hearing on the merits of the permanent
injunction in the face of the City’s objection. This Court has held that a court
generally may not change the nature of a preliminary injunction hearing by
converting it to a permanent injunction proceeding unless all of the parties have
agreed to the change. See, e.g., Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d
1137, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); New Milford Twp. v. Young, 938 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2007).7 In Big Bass, we observed:
                This Court has held that a court may not treat a hearing for
                a preliminary injunction as a final hearing and as a basis
                for a permanent injunction, unless the parties stipulate to
                the contrary . . . . As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
                explained:

       7
           In Wolk v. School District of Lower Merion, 197 A.3d 730 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court
opined:
                We are not, at this juncture, prepared to say that a court may never
                [convert a preliminary injunction hearing into a permanent
                injunction hearing] in the absence of a stipulation, given that there
                may be scenarios in which a proponent of an injunction would fail
                to proffer any additional material evidence to be considered by the
                court, upon an appropriate request for such a proffer. We believe,
                however, that the scenarios in which an additional hearing could be
                obviated, in the absence of agreement, should be infrequent . . . .
Id. at 741-42. Here, there is no indication that the trial court requested a proffer of additional
material evidence by the City or that the City failed to proffer any requested evidence. Therefore,
this case does not appear to constitute one of those infrequent scenarios that would justify an
exception to the general rule.

                                                 4
                       The mere holding of hearings with regard to
                       a motion for a preliminary injunction does
                       not somehow morph that motion into a
                       request for a permanent injunction. In fact,
                       our rules specifically contemplate that
                       hearings may be held on requests for
                       preliminary injunctions . . . .
               The trial court erred in converting the hearing on the
               preliminary injunction to a final hearing on the merits of
               the permanent injunction because it did so without a
               stipulation from the parties.
950 A.2d at 1149 (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted). Gun
Owners have offered no persuasive reason to distinguish this case from the
applicable precedents.
               Notably, the trial court’s belief that Gun Owners’ complaint raised
purely legal questions did not allow the trial court to convert a preliminary injunction
proceeding into a final injunction hearing over Gun Owners’ objection. This Court
recently vacated a similarly premature disposition of an injunction request that
turned on a legal issue. See Prestige Design on Germantown LLC v. City of Phila.
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 245 C.D. 2022, filed Apr. 19, 2023).8 In Prestige Design, the
plaintiff filed a civil complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief and also filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction. Id., slip op. at 3. However, two days after the
City responded to the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, and without any
evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the action on the basis that “‘the entirety
of the relief sought in the [c]omplaint [was] identical to the relief sought in the
[m]otion [for a preliminary injunction].’” Id. (quoting trial court’s opinion pursuant
Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)). On appeal, we vacated the dismissal, explaining that

       8
         This unreported opinion is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                 5
             it is inappropriate for a court to treat a hearing for a
             preliminary injunction as a final hearing on a request for a
             permanent injunction unless the parties stipulate to the
             contrary . . . . This is because “[i]t is . . . unfair to reach a
             final decision after a preliminary proceeding. A litigant
             may not prepare as completely as he would have had he
             realized that he was not going to receive a second chance
             to present his case.”
Id., slip op. at 8 (quoting City of Chester v. Chester Redevelopment Auth., 686 A.2d
30, 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (additional citation omitted)).
             Here, the City points out that it had only 29 hours to file a brief in
response to what the trial court later deemed a case-dispositive motion by Gun
Owners. The City posits that it did not have a fair opportunity to develop its legal
arguments fully. In addition, with only three days to prepare for the hearing, the
City insists that it was unable to present its full case, which it asserts would have
“underscore[d] the Executive Order’s significance as both a proprietary function and
a purely local matter, as it is tied to issues of employee safety and property
management. It was also key to making a record on the balancing of equities for
injunctive relief.” City’s Br. at 37.
             Specifically, with respect to balancing the equities, “[a] permanent
injunction order requires the moving party below to establish that (1) the right to
relief is clear; (2) the relief is necessary to prevent an injury which cannot be
compensated by damages; and (3) greater injury will occur from refusing the
injunction than from granting it.” City of Phila. v. A Kensington Joint, LLC, 301
A.3d 988, 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (additional citation omitted). The City maintains that
             [t]he trial court’s truncated procedure deprived the City of
             its procedural due process right to a fair and meaningful
             opportunity to develop its case and create a fulsome record
             for this appeal. By contrast, awaiting a full record and

                                            6
             merits briefing would not have prejudiced [Gun Owners].
             The trial court could have simply entered a preliminary
             injunction requiring the City to cease enforcing the
             Executive Order during the pendency of this case.
City’s Br. at 37. We agree with the City that the trial court was required to weigh
evidence and balance the equities and that such a weighing process required the trial
court to allow the parties sufficient time to fully prepare, develop, and present their
evidence on that issue. We also agree that three days to prepare its entire case,
without being allowed the benefit of any discovery or even responsive pleadings,
impermissibly hampered the City’s ability to present its evidence concerning the
balance of the equities.
             For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this
matter for further proceedings.

                                   III. Conclusion
             Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court’s order is vacated, and
this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                        ___________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision in this case.

                                          7
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gun Owners of America, Inc.,             :
Gun Owners Foundation, Terrence          :
Ledwell, Laura Leonard-McBride,          :
Edward McBride, and James Sandefur       :
                                         :
            v.                           :
                                         :
City of Philadelphia and Mayor           :
James F. Kenney,                         :   No. 1196 C.D. 2022
                         Appellants      :

                                      ORDER

      AND NOW, this 18th day of January, 2024, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) is VACATED.            This matter is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing
opinion.
      Jurisdiction is relinquished.

                                       ___________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gun Owners of America, Inc.,              :
Gun Owners Foundation, Terrence           :
Ledwell, Laura Leonard-McBride,           :
Edward McBride, and James Sandefur        :
                                          :
               v.                         :   No. 1196 C.D. 2022
                                          :   Argued: November 8, 2023
City of Philadelphia and Mayor            :
James F. Kenney,                          :
                         Appellants       :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

CONCURING OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                   FILED: January 18, 2024
             I concur in the result reached by the Majority, namely, vacating the
October 3, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial
court) and remanding for further proceedings. I also concur in part with the
Majority’s rationale, but I write separately to clarify and emphasize what I believe
is the controlling factor that mandates a remand.
             First, although it is true that the trial court scheduled a hearing on the
Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (Motion) filed by Appellees Gun
Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, Terrence Ledwell, Laura
Leonard-McBride, Edward McBride, and James Sandefur (Gun Owners) only three
days after Gun Owners filed it with their complaint, at no time could there have been
any mystery regarding the relief Gun Owners were seeking. The complaint, the
Motion itself, all subsequent filings from the parties, and the trial court’s own
scheduling order clearly indicate that the parties understood that Gun Owners were
seeking permanent injunctive relief. (Original Record, Document Nos. 2-4, 11, 13.)
Thus, this is not a case where a trial court “converted” a request for preliminary
injunctive relief into one seeking permanent relief and entered permanent relief
accordingly. Rather, the request for permanent relief was before the trial court from
the beginning and openly was acknowledged by all of the parties.
             Second, and as the trial court pointed out, the overarching issue
presented in Gun Owners’ complaint and Motion was a legal one.                   Further
“discovery” would have achieved little and would not have assisted the trial court
much, if at all, in weighing the equities in favor of and against an award of permanent
relief. The Executive Order at issue, its impact on the City of Philadelphia and its
residents, the competing interests of the parties, and the potential harm identified by
both sides are clear and need little factual development. Given this clarity and the
gravity of the issue, I do not believe that a limited period of three days to prepare for
a hearing would, in itself, preclude the trial court from issuing permanent relief.
Instead, where such relief clearly is requested and the issue requires little factual
development, I see no reason why a trial court could not entertain a request for, and,
if warranted, award permanent injunctive relief even over the objection of a party.
See Wolk v. School District of Lower Merion, 197 A.3d 730, 741-42 (Pa. 2018).
             Nevertheless, where, as here, the trial court first determines on the
record at the injunction hearing that only preliminary relief will be considered, and
then, after the hearing has concluded, determines that it will apply the permanent
injunction standard and award permanent relief, a remand is warranted. The trial

                                       PAM - 2
court clearly represented to the parties that it would consider only preliminary relief
and would apply the preliminary injunction standard to the evidence presented.
(Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 9/30/22, at 7, 11; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 028a-
29a.) Then, after further argument from the parties, the trial court stated that it would
take the issue under advisement and indicate in its written decision the standard it
applied. (Id. at 13; R.R. at 030a.) This was error and is, in my opinion, the
controlling factor that constrains us to vacate and remand. Without a stipulation of
the parties and without any clear indication from the trial court prior to and during
the hearing regarding whether preliminary or permanent injunctive relief was being
considered, the parties could not adequately present their cases. That type of
“conversion” after the conclusion of an injunction hearing violates fundamental
principles of due process.
                Accordingly, and with these alternate emphases, I concur in the
result.

                                             ________________________________
                                             PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

Judge Covey joins in this Concurring Opinion.

                                       PAM - 3