Court Opinion

ID: 9556481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 15:07:17.022646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:28.313725
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          AUGUST 17, 2023
                                                                     STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 151

Ronald Wayne Wootan,                                 Petitioner and Appellant
      v.
State of North Dakota,                              Respondent and Appellee

                                No. 20230036

Appeal from the District Court of Rolette County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Anthony S. Benson, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.

Brian D. Grosinger, State’s Attorney, Rolla, ND, for respondent and appellee.
                               Wootan v. State
                                No. 20230036

Jensen, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Ronald Wootan appeals a district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the State. The court concluded there were no genuine
issues as to a material fact and dismissed Wootan’s application for post-
conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. Wootan asserts the
court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues as to a material fact
and he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Wootan’s
application.

                                       I

[¶2] Wootan was initially charged with murder, attempted murder,
terrorizing, reckless endangerment, and preventing arrest or discharge of
other duties. As part of a plea agreement, the State moved to amend the
murder charge to manslaughter. Wootan subsequently pled guilty to
manslaughter, attempted aggravated assault on a peace officer, reckless
endangerment, and preventing arrest or discharge of other duties. Wootan was
sentenced to a total of 16 years, consisting of a 10-year sentence for
manslaughter with 2 years suspended, a 10-year sentence for attempted
aggravated assault to run consecutive to the manslaughter charge with 2 years
suspended, a 5-year sentence for reckless endangerment to run concurrent to
the aggravated assault sentence with three years suspended, and a 5-year
sentence, all suspended, for preventing arrest or discharge of other duties.

[¶3] Wootan applied for post-conviction relief, asserting he was entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel. A notice of
hearing was filed which scheduled an evidentiary hearing for December 28,
2022. On December 21, 2022, the State filed a motion for summary judgment.
At the scheduled evidentiary hearing the district court determined the motion
for summary judgment was untimely. The court exercised its discretion to
allow the motion and provided Wootan the appropriate time to respond.

                                       1
Wootan responded to the motion for summary judgment and the court issued
an order dismissing Wootan’s post-conviction application finding Wootan had
failed to identify a material fact at issue.

                                       II

[¶4] Wootan contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment
and he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

             “Post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and
      governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.” Myers v.
      State, 2017 ND 66, ¶ 7, 891 N.W.2d 724 (quoting Wacht v. State,
      2015 ND 154, ¶ 6, 864 N.W.2d 740). A district court may summarily
      dismiss a post-conviction relief application if there is no genuine
      issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
      as a matter of law. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(3). This Court reviews an
      appeal from summary dismissal of post-conviction relief as it
      would review an appeal from a summary judgment. Myers, at ¶ 7.
      “The party opposing the motion for summary dismissal is entitled
      to all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence and is
      entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises
      a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

Campbell v. State, 2021 ND 45, ¶ 8, 956 N.W.2d 387. Wootan asserts summary
judgment was improper because there is a genuine issue as to whether his
attorney provided ineffective assistance by providing Wootan with incorrect
advice about the terms of the plea agreement and by failing to reduce the terms
of the agreement to writing. Wootan argues his attorney provided him with
incorrect advice about the terms of the plea agreement, asserting he was told
his sentences would run concurrently.

[¶5] Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law
which we review de novo on the entire record. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83,
¶ 13, 959 N.W.2d 588. “Summary dismissal of a post-conviction application,
like summary judgment, is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact.” Id. A genuine issue of material fact only exists if reasonable
minds could draw different inferences and reach different conclusions as to the
disputed facts. Id.

                                        2
[¶6] “The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law
and fact and is fully reviewable by this Court.” Morales v. State, 2019 ND 137,
¶ 4, 927 N.W.2d 401 (quoting Brewer v. State, 2019 ND 69, ¶ 5, 924 N.W.2d 87).
Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unsuited to summary
disposition without an evidentiary hearing. Campbell, 2021 ND 45, ¶ 9. To
prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show
(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Stein v. State, 2018 ND 264, ¶ 6,
920 N.W.2d 477 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)
(providing the analytical framework for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims).

[¶7] To satisfy the first requirement of the Strickland test, Wootan’s evidence,
when taken in the light most favorable to Wootan, must show his attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Stein, 2018
ND 264, ¶ 12. “An attorney’s performance is measured through consideration
of the prevailing professional norms.” Id. at ¶ 6. There is a strong presumption
that an attorney’s representation fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. We have noted before that “misinformation about
the length of a sentence can be viewed as below the objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at ¶ 12. See also Sambursky v. State, 2006 ND 223, ¶¶ 17-
19, 723 N.W.2d 524. Wootan argues his attorney told him the sentences would
run concurrently. When taken as true, this mistake raises a genuine issue of
fact under the first prong of the Strickland test.

[¶8] To satisfy the second requirement of the Strickland test, Wootan “must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In his verified application, Wootan asserted
had he known his sentences could run consecutively he would not have pled
guilty and instead proceeded with trial and asserted self-defense. When taken
as true, this raises a genuine issue of fact under the second prong of the
Strickland test.

                                         3
[¶9] Wootan has clearly asserted that, but for counsel’s misinformation about
his sentences running concurrently, he would not have entered a guilty plea
and instead would have insisted on going to trial. While Wootan did not provide
an affidavit after the State moved for summary judgment, Wootan’s verified
application for post-conviction relief may be treated as an affidavit to provide
evidence to resist summary judgment. See Davies v. State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 14,
917 N.W.2d 8. Wootan’s application included admissible evidence in the form
of his own statements based on personal knowledge of statements made to him
by his attorney. These admissible statements are enough to raise an issue of
material fact. Wootan is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

[¶10] Wootan also argues his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to reduce the terms of the agreement to writing. We have
noted before that “[n]ot all plea agreements are reduced to writing.” State v.
Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 16, 606 N.W.2d 524. Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., requires
only a conditional plea must be consented to in writing by the defendant, any
defendant’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney. N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2).
Wootan’s pleas were not conditional and the plea agreement was not required
to be reduced to writing. It was not ineffective assistance of counsel for
Wootan’s attorney to not reduce the plea agreement to writing. This argument
fails the first prong of the Strickland test. The district court did not err in
granting summary judgment as to this issue.

                                     III

[¶11] The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Wootan’s
claim asserting his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to reduce the terms of the plea agreement to writing. However, the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on Wootan’s claim
asserting his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by stating
Wootan’s sentences would run concurrently, because Wootan raised a genuine
issue as to a material fact. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

[¶12] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers

                                       4
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr

                    5