Court Opinion

ID: 9707225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:05:51.122694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:07.075494
License: Public Domain

*380OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
On January 9, 1981, Francis J. McGovern retired after thirty years of service with the Delaware Joint Toll Bridge Commission. In December of 1980, just prior to his retirement, Mr. McGovern executed and filed a retirement application in which he selected two of several options for payout under the retirement plan offered by his employer. Under the options selected by Mr. McGovern, he would receive a lump sum payment of $27,105, a joint survivor annuity paying him $750 monthly for life, and if he predeceased his wife, she would receive a survivor’s annuity of $375 monthly for life.
Mrs. McGovern, who had been ill with Hodgkins disease since 1979, died of cancer on January 23, 1981. Five days later, on January 28, 1981, Mr. McGovern died. The Board determined that Mr. McGovern’s estate was due the lump sum of $27,105.00 plus $499.92, a portion of the first month’s annuity payment. Had Mr. McGovern chosen a living survivor annuitant, or no beneficiary at all, the sum of $151,311.45 would have been available to the living beneficiary or his estate.
Michael J. McGovern, Mr. McGovern’s son, requested that the Board review the amount payable to the estate, on the grounds that his father was not mentally competent when he executed the retirement papers. According to testimony of Michael McGovern, his sister, and friends of the elder Mr. McGovern, Mr. McGovern suffered during the last year of his life from alcoholism and apparent distress at the state of his wife’s health. Although Mrs. McGovern was told in March of 1980 that she was terminally ill, Mr. McGovern, refused to acknowledge that his wife was going to die. Occasionally, Mr. McGovern would admit that his wife was seriously ill, but Mr. McGovern’s friends testified that he was so sensitive to any conversation concerning his wife’s health that they would never mention it unless he introduced the subject. When Mrs. McGovern was hospitalized *381for almost two months during the last year of her life, Mr. McGovern visited her only once, for five minutes, and would sometimes insist that his wife was malingering, or that she had a bleeding ulcer. Additionally, although Mr. McGovern had an alcohol problem for many years, when his wife’s illness became apparent, he drank more heavily, even to the point of missing work and being too drunk to keep appointments. Finally, there was some evidence that Mr. McGovern was not always attuned to reality in other ways: after he retired, he would, on occasion, dress in his uniform and demand to be taken to work, and after his wife died, Mr. McGovern refused to eat and was heard having conversations with his dead father.
The Board advised the junior Mr. McGovern that his father’s retirement documents were binding and could not be changed. On November 25, 1981, an administrative hearing was conducted at which Mr. McGovern contended that on December 17, 1980, the day his father completed his retirement application forms, his father did not have the requisite mental capacity to execute a retirement application. After hearing testimony from Mr. McGovern’s friends and family, including a letter from the family doctor, and evidence from the retirement official who dealt with Mr. McGovern, a hearing examiner rejected this claim. The Board affirmed the hearing officer, based on its conclusion that Mr. McGovern did, in fact, possess the requisite mental capacity on the day in question and that he understood the nature of the transaction. Commonwealth Court reversed the Board, holding that it capriciously disregarded the evidence of Mr. McGovern’s incapacity, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 50, 481 A.2d 981. We granted allocatur to examine whether Commonwealth Court applied the appropriate standard of review of the Board’s findings of fact and whether that court’s statement of the law of capacity to enter into a legally binding contract was correct.
Commonwealth Court stated its standard of review as follows:
*382Our scope of review where the decision of the Board is against the appellant-claimant is to determine whether the board’s findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law, and can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the evidence. Brayo v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 62 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 234, 435 A.2d 1346 (1981).
The Brayo case, cited as authority for this standard of review, states:
Where, as here, the Claimant is the party with the burden of proof and fails to carry that burden, our Court has held that our scope of review is to determine whether the findings of fact are consistent with each other and with the conclusions of law and can be sustained without a capricious disregard of competent evidence which is the willful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness, whose testimony one could not possibly challenge. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 436, 415 A.2d 1275 (1980).
Brayo v. W.C.A.B. et. al., 62 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 234, 236-37, 435 A.2d 1346, 1347 (1981).
The Administrative Agency Law, on the other hand, which concerns appeals taken by persons aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth Agency, 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 702, provides a different scope of review of agency decisions:
After hearing, the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find that the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the provisions of Subchapter A of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the agency, or that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.
2 Pa.C.S.A. § 704. (Emphasis added.) Because the standard of review articulated by Commonwealth Court in this case finds no support in the Commonwealth Agency Act, we *383hold that Commonwealth Court’s review of the present case was conducted pursuant to an improper and illegal standard. The proper standard is that articulated in Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Act, supra.
[1] Since there is no allegation in this case that any party’s constitutional rights have been violated or that the proceedings were irregular, the question on review is whether the agency’s adjudication is supported by findings of fact which are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence.
The Board determined, in essence, that Mr. McGovern was mentally competent to execute his retirement papers and that he understood the nature of the transaction. In support of this adjudication, the Board found that although Mr. McGovern had an alcohol problem and was distressed about his wife’s illness with cancer, Mr. McGovern, some two months before his retirement, executed a will which even his son believed to be competently executed; he conducted his job over the years in a controlled and responsible fashion; he sometimes admitted and sometimes denied the seriousness of his wife’s illness; he appeared coherent and responsive to the retirement official on December 17, 1980 during the meeting at which he selected his retirement options; and after the meeting of December 17, he sent a check to the retirement fund, as discussed at that meeting, to purchase his military buy-back retirement time.
Whether these facts support a conclusion that Mr. McGovern was legally competent to execute his retirement papers on the day in question will depend on the legal definition of competence.
It is well established that the State Employee’s Retirement System creates a contract between the Commonwealth and its employees. Kline v. Morrison, 353 Pa. 79, 44 A.2d 267 (1945). When a member retires and elects a retirement option, he enters into a contract with the Board. Bowers v. State Employe’s Retirement System, 29 Pa. Comwlth.Ct. 561, 371 A.2d 1040 (1977). If the benefit *384contract is freely entered into with an understanding of its terras, the contract cannot be set aside. Buchan v. State Employee’s Retirement Board, 79 Pa.Comwlth.Ct. 635, 470 A.2d 208 (1984).
Here the contract is challenged on the grounds that Mr. McGovern lacked the mental capacity to enter into an agreement. Under Pennsylvania law, it is presumed that an adult is competent to enter into an agreement, and a signed document gives rise to “the presumption that it accurately expresses the state of mind of the signing party.” Taylor v. Avi, 272 Pa.Super. 291, 296, 415 A.2d 894 (1979). To rebut this presumption, the challenger must present evidence of mental incompetency which is “ ‘clear, precise and convincing’.” Elliott v. Clawson, 416 Pa. 34, 204 A.2d 272 (1964).
This Court has held that where mental capacity to execute an instrument is at issue, “the real question is the condition of the person at the very time he executed the instrument or made the gift in question____ We further held that a person’s mental capacity is best determined by his spoken words and his conduct, and that the testimony of persons who observed such conduct on the date in question outranks testimony as to observations made prior to and subsequent to that date. Sobel v. Sobel, 435 Pa. 80, 83, 254 A.2d 649 (1969). (Emphasis added). “Mere mental weakness, if it does not amount to inability to comprehend the contract, and is unaccompanied by evidence of imposition or undue influence,” is insufficient to set aside a contract. Law v. Mackie, 373 Pa. 212, 95 A.2d 656 (1953). Finally, a presumption of mental incapacity does not arise merely because of an unreasonable or unnatural disposition of property. Lawrence’s Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 65, 132 A. 786 (1926).
Contrary to these principles concerning the Pennsylvania law of competence, Commonwealth Court in this case adopted a new standard of competence based on the Re*385statement of Contracts, 2d. Section 15 of the Restatement, relied on by the court below, states:
§ 15. Mental Illness or Defect
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.
(2) Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance under Subsection (1) terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in whole or in part or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be unjust. In such a case a court may grant relief as justice requires.
This Court has never adopted Section 15 of the Restatement, which requires a post-hoc determination of reasonableness, and we decline to do so now. In fact, because the provisions of Section 15 establish new tests for incompetence which conflict with those previously established by this Court, Commonwealth Court exceeded its authority in purporting to adopt Section 15 of the Restatement.
Accepting, as we do, that the common law of incompetence as it has been articulated in our prior cases is the law that controls this case, even if it were conceded that Mr. McGovern may have been incompetent to execute any legal document at certain intervals of time within months of his wife’s death, substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that on December 17, 1980, he was lucid and understood the terms of the retirement contract. This evidence, which consists of testimony of the retirement official who met with Mr. McGovern on December 17, is significant because it concerns Mr. McGovern’s state of mind on the date in question. Sobel v. Sobel, supra. Moreover, in support of the official’s observations, immediately after the *386December 17th meeting, Mr. McGovern mailed a check to the retirement fund to purchase his military buy-back time, which was discussed at that meeting. Such an act is consistent with the Board’s determination that Mr. McGovern acted with deliberation and understanding on December 17, 1980.
It is our conclusion, therefore, that Commonwealth Court was in error in reversing the Board’s determination, which properly applied the law of incompetency and which was supported by substantial evidence.
Ironically, the junior Mr. McGovern’s explanation of what his father did in this case may be very close to the truth:
Q. Let me ask you the critical question. Why did he [the elder Mr. McGovern] designate a joint survivor of benefits on that application after all the counseling and the dialogue that you had with him regarding the pension? Can you attribute anything for that choice?
A. [The junior Mr. McGovern]. I think my father had ... arrived at a frame of reference in his mind that was — permitted him to function, and I think that this frame of reference was totally out of touch with the reality of his real life situation. I think he had convinced himself that my mother was going to outlive all of us and that he was just — he just refused to accept, I think he just refused to accept the truth that my mother was dying and that he decided that this illusion that he created for himself that he was going to live and that my mother was going to live and was not sick at all was the truth and that she was going to live for twenty years or whatever.
They were going to have a golden retirement together and that he decided to name her at the last minute to ensure that he was right; that we were all wrong and that he was right, that she was going to live forever____
The real thrust of Mr. McGovern’s claim in this case is that his father’s designation of his mother as a secondary beneficiary was unreasonable and unwise. From some points of view, that may be true, but no one can say that belief that *387another will overcome a terrible disease and live is lunatic; no one can successfully assert that such a belief, even against the medical evidence, renders one incompetent. Such a belief may be, from some points of view, thoughtless, against scientific probabilities, irrational, and when combined with what amounts to a testamentary disposition of property in favor of the ill person as opposed to another who seems to be healthy, it may even be said to be selfish and heedless of the needs of others. But whatever may be said about it, it cannot, without more, be said to prove incompetence. Thus, the claim that is made here in the name of incompetence is in reality a challenge to the wisdom, the desirability, the thoughtfulness and the rationality of the disposition. But such a challenge may not succeed, for neither courts nor disappointed heirs may alter the disposition of the property of a deceased person merely on the grounds that that person acted in a way that the challenger believes to be irrational.
Order of Commonwealth Court is reversed and the determination of the Pennsylvania State Employee’s Retirement Board is reinstated.
NIX, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion which McDermott, j., joins.