Court Opinion

ID: 2964553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:22.229572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.495886
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1443

                                   EUGENE ANDERSON,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                           BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1578

                                   EUGENE ANDERSON,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                           BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The  opinion  of  this  Court  issued  on  February  3,  1997,  is
        corrected as follows:

            Page  19, delete  the last  sentence of the  opinion.   Replace it
        with  the following:    Costs in  No.  96-1443 awarded  to the  School
                                ______________________________________________
        Committee and O'Neill.
        _____________________

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1443

                                   EUGENE ANDERSON,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                           BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1578

                                   EUGENE ANDERSON,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                           BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Matthew  Cobb with  whom  Paul F.  Wood was  on  brief  for Eugene
            _____________             _____________
        Anderson.
            Michael   C.  Donahue  with  whom  Malcolm  Medley  and  Kevin  S.
            _____________________              _______________       _________
        McDermott were on brief for Boston School Committee, et al.
        _________

                                 ____________________

                                   February 3, 1997
                                 ____________________

                                         -3-

               COFFIN, Senior  Circuit Judge.   These are  two consolidated
                       _____________________

          appeals.  One is  brought by plaintiff Eugene Anderson,  a Boston

          public school teacher, contesting  directed verdicts on all seven

          claims he brought  against his then principal, Thomas P. O'Neill,

          Jr.,  and the  Boston  School  Committee.    In  the  other,  the

          defendants appeal  from the district court's  denial of sanctions

          and  an  attorney's fee  award.   In  the plaintiff's  appeal, we

          affirm the judgment.   In the defendants' appeal, we  deem this a

          case where we  feel we need  the reasoning of the  district court

          and so remand.

                          I.  Plaintiff's Appeal: The Merits

               At  this  juncture, there  are  directed  verdicts on  seven

          counts  which are  contested by  plaintiff1, as  well  as several

          evidentiary rulings.  The litigation resulted in  over 100 docket

          entries  from complaint to filing  the notice of  appeal and five

          days  of jury  trial,  at  the end  of  which  the court  granted
                              
          ____________________

               1  The counts and the affected defendant(s) are as follows:

                    I.   Racial       discrimination       (equal
                    protection),        42 U.S.C.  1983,  against
                    O'Neill.
                    III.  Racial  discrimination,  Title VII,  42
                              U.S.C.  2000e et  seq., 1964  Civil
                              Rights Act, against the School
                              Committee.
                    IV.   Racial discrimination, Mass. Gen.  Laws ch. 151B,
                              against the School Committee.
                    V.   Massachusetts  Civil  Rights Act,  Mass.
                              Gen.   Laws   ch.  12,    11(H),(I)
                    against        O'Neill.
                    VI.  Libel and Slander, against O'Neill and
                              the School Committee.
                    VIII.Malicious Prosecution, against O'Neill.
                    IX.  Intentional   Infliction  of   Emotional
                              Distress, against O'Neill. 

                                         -3-

          defendants' motions  for directed verdict.   We have meticulously

          reviewed both the  transcript and  the exhibits.   The smoke  now

          dissipated,  we are compelled to conclude that there is no longer

          any discernible fire.    In view  of  the fact  that  such  ample

          opportunity was afforded below to  pursue all avenues in  support

          of the claims, we do not feel it incumbent on us to replay all of

          the  evidence.  We shall content ourselves with a capsule summary

          of  events and  a brief  consideration of  the viability  of each

          claim as of the end of the evidence.

               Factual Background.  Plaintiff, a black person,2 had been  a
               __________________

          public school teacher  for ten years  when, in  1989, he drew  an

          assignment  as an  art  teacher to  the Solomon  Lewenberg Middle

          School  in Mattapan, of which  O'Neill was the  principal.  There

          was  an obvious  miscommunication, for  when  plaintiff appeared,

          O'Neill felt that there  was no vacancy because another  teacher,

          Molloy, a white person, had already filled it.  He sent plaintiff

          back  twice, but plaintiff finally  was placed in  the school, in

          addition  to Molloy,  and  given an  adequate  room, only  to  be

          reassigned to a less  satisfactory room shortly after.3   He also

          had trouble obtaining adequate art  supplies.  Soon after arrival

          at  the school,  plaintiff  was asked  to  attend an  orientation

          meeting;  when he arrived, O'Neill accused him of breaking a lock

                              
          ____________________

               2    The  parties use  both the  terms "black"  and "African
          American;" we will use "black" here for the sake of ease.   

               3   The room  had no  storage closet, but  did have  an open
          storage area.  It  was large, well-lighted by windows,  and had a
          wall length blackboard.

                                         -4-

          at the art room.  In fact, plaintiff said, there was a door hinge

          without any lock on it.  Apparently there were no consequences to

          this incident.

               Later in September  and in October,  O'Neill visited two  of

          plaintiff's  art  classes  for  45 and  55  minutes  and prepared

          evaluations of  his teaching.   Plaintiff was criticized  for his

          lesson planning, classroom management, and maintaining a learning

          environment, but was given satisfactory ratings for other factors

          such as use of materials, treatment of students, and professional

          cooperation   Plaintiff responded vigorously to both evaluations.

               O'Neill was on leave during the 1990-1991 school year during

          which time  Anderson had  one satisfactory evaluation  by another

          superior.   In September of  1991, when O'Neill  had returned, he

          summoned  plaintiff to  a formal  hearing concerning  an incident

          when Anderson appeared at  school, allegedly with alcohol on  his

          breath, detected  by the assistant principal,  Philogene, a black

          person,  by another superior, Giacalone, and by others.  For this

          he was given  a warning.  Later, in December  of 1991 and January

          of  1992,  O'Neill  issued  two  more  evaluations,  giving  many

          "unsatisfactory"  ratings and noting that students in plaintiff's

          class  were  using  foul  language, playing  cards,  and  reading

          comics.

               Finally,  on January 24,  1992, O'Neill  was visited  in his

          office by three  black girl  students who wanted  to talk to  him

          about Anderson's behavior.  Two of them complained that plaintiff

          had made sexual advances  to them by touching them  and by making

                                         -5-

          inappropriate remarks.   The third stated  that she had  observed

          such conduct.  They also said that he had made unwanted telephone

          calls to them at home.  O'Neill then consulted with the office of

          the  East  Zone  Superintendent  of the  Boston  Public  Schools,

          Clifford B. Janey, the city's General Counsel, and the Department

          of Safety.  Janey, a black person, in turn  instructed O'Neill to

          conduct  a full  investigation.   This  was undertaken,  although

          there is no evidence detailing how  it began, how the police were

          involved, or what steps were taken.  In early February, plaintiff

          was relieved of  his duties and  transferred pending hearing  and

          resolution.   A criminal complaint  was later filed  after a show

          cause hearing.  A bench trial in the spring of 1993 resulted in a

          judgment of guilty, but  later a jury trial in  December resulted

          in a not guilty verdict.

               This suit was filed shortly thereafter.

               Analysis: 
               ________

                    Racial discrimination. We first consider  the claims of
                    _____________________

          racial discrimination, which are embraced  by Counts I (42 U.S.C.

           1983), II  (42 U.S.C.  2000e et  seq.), and IV (Mass.  Gen. Laws

          ch. 151B).  The striking  fact about this case is that  after all

          of the discovery  and five days of  trial, no evidence  of either

          pretext or  racially motivated  discrimination was  presented for

          jury consideration.   No  conversations evidencing  racial animus

          were presented,  nor any instances of  unexplained more favorable

          treatment of similarly  situated whites.   There was no  evidence

          that the accusations of  lock breaking or of appearing  at school

                                         -6-

          under the influence  of alcohol were  racially motivated or  even

          initiated by  Principal O'Neill.   As  for the  evaluations, they

          could possibly be viewed by a jury as  stemming from too rigorous

          a sense of  management, order,  and discipline, but  there is  no

          racial  innuendo in  O'Neill's extensive  notations, discussions,

          and suggestions for improvement.

               Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges all this in  his motion for a

          new  trial, where, in arguing  that the court  erred in excluding

          evidence of the subsequent in-house handling of sexual harassment

          claims  against  two  white  school employees,  he  argued:  "The

          admission of  this evidence would  have provided the  'race' that

          the  Court  was looking  for at  Directed  Verdict."   Unless the

          exclusion  of this evidence was  reversible error, the charges of

          racial  discrimination  must  be  held  not  to be  supported  by

          evidence sufficient to reach a jury.

               The  evidence  proffered  was  that, six  months  after  the

          complaints   against  plaintiff,   two  white   Lewenberg  School

          employees were accused of inappropriate sexual  conduct involving

          female  students.  (A custodian was accused of kissing a student,

          and a   shop  teacher  was accused  of telling  a student,  found

          hiding  under  a  stairway, that  she  would  have  to "kiss  the

          teacher" before she  would be let out.)   In both instances,  the

          complaints  were handled  without involving  the police,  through

          meetings  with  the  students, the  employees,  a  parent,  and a

          guardian.  Plaintiff argues that O'Neill's failure to call in the

          police and to require signed statements, and his personal meeting

                                         -7-

          with the students  and parents contrasts  sharply with what  took

          place after the complaints were lodged against plaintiff.

               Plaintiff faces the  considerable hurdle of establishing  an

          abuse of  discretion  by  the district  court  in  excluding  the

          evidence.   That court's  basic determination was  that plaintiff

          had not carried  his burden  of showing that  the white  employee

          cases were "similarly situated" to that of plaintiff, in order to

          lay a  basis for the  admission of  the evidence.   In the  first

          place there is no evidence that there was any precise policy that

          mandated a specific course of action that in practice was applied

          differently  to whites and blacks.  Certainly the manner in which

          O'Neill  sought and  followed  guidance in  following  up on  the

          complaints  against plaintiff does not suggest any predisposition

          to  treat plaintiff any differently from anyone else found in his

          predicament.

               But,  most pertinently,  a simultaneous  complaint by  three

          female  students  involving  touching,  suggestive  remarks,  and

          observation  of  other  such  conduct,  together   with  unwanted

          telephone  calls at  home, would seem  to involve  a demonstrably

          different order  of magnitude  than the solitary  charges against

          the two white employees.  See Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp.,
                                    ___ _______    _______________________

          78  F.3d  747,  751 (1st  Cir.  1996).    Moreover,  there is  no

          indication  that  any  changes   in  approach  had  been  invoked

          subsequent  to the  January  complaints.   We  conclude that  the

          district court did  not exceed  its discretion  in excluding  the

          evidence.                 

                                         -8-

               Libel  and Slander.   Plaintiff relies  heavily on  the four
               __________________

          performance evaluations made by  O'Neill to make out a  jury case

          of  defamation.   But  these, as  well  as statements  concerning

          plaintiff's  breaking  a lock  and  his  "erratic" behavior,  are

          subject to the qualified privilege  of an employer or  supervisor

          to   monitor,  discuss,  and  attempt  to  improve  subordinates'

          performance.    Much of  what plaintiff  complains about  was not

          contested.  Much was obviously the Principal's opinion as to what

          was good or bad educational practice.   But none of it could have

          been  found to have been knowingly false or in reckless disregard

          of the truth.   Judd v. McCormack,  535 N.E.2d 1284, 1289  (Mass.
                          _____   _________

          App.  Ct. 1989) (reversing for  failure to direct  a verdict even

          though  "tasteless  and  harsh"  language  was  used);  Bratt  v.
                                                                  _____

          International  Business Machines  Corp., 467  N.E.2d  126, 131-32
          _______________________________________

          (Mass. 1984).

               Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.   Under Mass. Gen.  Laws ch.
               ______________________________

          12,  11(H)(I),  interference with rights of  another "by threats,

          intimidation or coercion" gives rise to a cause of action.  These

          predicate words have been  sternly construed by the Massachusetts

          Supreme  Judicial  Court.    "Threat"  involves  an  "intentional

          exertion of pressure  to make another fearful . .  . of injury or

          harm."  "Intimidation"  involves "putting in fear for the purpose

          of compelling or deterring conduct."  And "coercion" involves the

          "application to  another of such force, either physical or moral,

          as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not

                                         -9-

          otherwise have done."  Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts
                                 __________________________________________

          v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Mass. 1994).
             _____

               Nothing in the evidence remotely suggests pressures of these

          magnitudes  being brought  to bear  on plaintiff.   Even  his own

          self-serving  testimony  on cross  examination  that  one of  the

          complainants against him, April  Allen, told him that O'Neill  in

          talking with her twice  said that he had seen  plaintiff touching

          her,  contrary to  her own  supposed belief,  falls far  short of

          indicating any such pressure on her which could forcefully impact

          on him.

               Malicious  Prosecution.    Plaintiff  contends  that he  has
               ______________________

          fulfilled   the   two   threshold   requirements   of   malicious

          prosecution: initiation of  criminal proceedings with  malice and

          without probable  cause, and  termination of such  proceedings in

          his favor.  He fails on both counts.  First, there is no evidence

          of precisely how the criminal proceedings were initiated.  As the

          Massachusetts Appeals  Court noted  in Ziemba v.  Fo'cs'le, Inc.,
                                                 ______     ______________

          475 N.E.2d  1223, 1226  (Mass. App.  Ct. 1985), even  the act  of

          calling the police is not the equivalent of instituting  criminal

          proceedings.  It may well be that such a decision was made by the

          police themselves.

               Equally   important,  the   fact  that   the  bench   trial,

          unimpeached by any evidence of perjury by  defendant O'Neill (who

          did not testify  at either  the show cause  hearing or the  bench

          trial), or of subornation  of perjury, resulted in a  judgment of

          guilty is  a complete bar to the action.  Della Jacova v. Widett,
                                                    ____________    ______

                                         -10-

          244 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Mass. 1969).  It should not  be necessary to

          add that  plaintiff's testimony  of an  alleged statement  by his

          accuser April Allen concerning O'Neill's supposed statements that

          he  had seen plaintiff lay hands on  her, may not be dignified as

          evidence of subornation of perjury.

               Intentional  Infliction of  Emotional Distress.   Again, the
               ______________________________________________

          Massachusetts  Supreme Judicial  Court has  sharply circumscribed

          the reach of this tort.  In Sena v. Commonwealth, 629 N.E.2d 986,
                                      ____    ____________

          994  (Mass. 1994)  the court stated  that to  sustain a  claim of

          intentional infliction of  emotional distress,  a plaintiff  must

          show  1) that  the defendant  intended to  cause, or  should have

          known  that his conduct would cause,  emotional distress; 2) that

          the  defendant's conduct was extreme  and outrageous; 3) that the

          defendant's conduct caused the  plaintiff's distress; and 4) that

          the  plaintiff  suffered severe  distress.  Id.  (citing Agis  v.
                                                      ___          ____

          Howard Johnson Co.,  355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1976).   The Agis
          __________________                                           ____

          court  cited approvingly  such language  as "beyond  all possible

          bounds  of  decency"  and  "utterly intolerable  in  a  civilized

          community."   355 N.E.2d at 319.  However one may view any of the

          actions attributable  to Principal O'Neill, one  could not fairly

          apply any of these rubrics to them.                          

               Evidentiary Issues.  Of  the three evidentiary issues argued
               __________________

          by  plaintiff,  we  have  already disposed  of  one,  the court's

          exclusion of  the evidence  concerning the  handling  of the  sex

          harassment complaints against the two white  employees.  A second

          involves  the granting of defendant's motion in limine to exclude

                                         -11-

          April Allen's  statements about O'Neill's conversation  with her.

          But,  as our above discussion reveals, the same testimony came in

          on the cross examination of plaintiff.  We see no need to revisit

          in any detail what was already exposed.  

               The  last claim is  simply that the  court excluded evidence

          that early in 1992  O'Neill called into his office  the proffered

          witness,  a former male student,  and another who  was accused of

          improper conduct and  made them sign statements he  had prepared.

          Plaintiff  sees  this incident  as  evidence  of O'Neill's  modus

          operandi.  But O'Neill is not alleged to have engaged in any such

          conduct in this case;  his supposed statements to April  Allen of

          what he  said he  saw are of  an obviously  different modus  than

          calling a student into  his office and forcing  the signing of  a

          previously prepared  written statement.  The  evidence would have

          little relevance,  if any,  but would  have  been freighted  with

          prejudice.  The court did not abuse its discretion.

                         II.  Defendants' Appeal: Fees and Sanctions

               Principal O'Neill  and the School Committee  appeal from the

          court's  denial of their motions for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ.

          P. 11 and 28 U.S.C.  1927 and for attorney's fees and costs under

          42 U.S.C.  1988.

               The procedural background is brief.  In their answers to the

          complaint, in  early 1994,  appellants invoked violation  of Rule

          11.  Nothing  transpired on  the sanctions front  until April  of

          1995,  when  appellants  sent   counsel  for  Anderson  a  letter

          protesting the allegations and serving notice that, if trial were

                                         -12-

          to take place, they would pursue their Rule 11 remedy.   The next

          event  took place on February  27, 1996, shortly  after the court

          had  directed the verdicts, when  appellants filed a  new Rule 11

          motion.   This, however, was  filed without having  waited for 21

          days after service before filing, as required by   c(1)(A) of the

          rule.   It  was denied  on March  15 and on  March 18  an amended

          motion, with additional allegations, was served;  it was filed on

          April 16,  1996.  In mid-March  motions were filed under     1927

          and  1988.   All  were  denied by  the  court without  hearing or

          comment in late March and early April.

               Appellants base their claims for sanctions on what they term

          unfounded and  uninvestigated allegations of  race discrimination

          on   the    part   of    O'Neill;    allegations   of    systemic

          underrepresentation of  blacks in Lewenberg School and elsewhere,

          together with discriminatory policies  and customs resulting from

          reckless  indifference on  the part  of the  city and  the School

          Committee; misleading and erroneous  damages evidence on the part

          of Anderson; and allegations of  false accusations of alcohol and

          drug abuse, coercion of young female students, and perjury on the

          part of O'Neill.

               Anderson  merely presents the same facts  in haec verba from

          his main brief, reargues that the district  court was in error in

          directing the  verdicts, contends  that he had  established prima

          facie  cases on  every count,  and points  out that  he dismissed

          claims for disparate impact and municipal (Monell) liability.  He
                                                     ______

          cited   no  cases.      He  dismisses   appellants'  motions   as

                                         -13-

          "incomprehensible, not timely, violating every 'safe harbor' rule

          known, and, generally, . . . a waste of everybody's time."

               The questions  which this background presented  to the court

          involved  the procedural one of timeliness and undue delay of the

          various  motions  and  the  substantive  ones  whether reasonable

          inquiry  was made  by plaintiff's counsel, Ryan v.  Clemente, 901
                                                     ____     ________

          F.2d  177 (1st Cir. 1990),  and whether claims  were unfounded or

          were  so revealed  as  the case  progressed.   The  motions  also

          implicitly  involved the  allocation  of  responsibility, if  any

          existed, between plaintiff  and his counsel.   The only  question

          which  faces us  at this  juncture, however,  is whether  we have

          enough basis to affirm, to modify, or to reverse.

               We are  therefore  required  to focus  sharply  on  our  own

          precedents  in order to  determine whether the  district court in

          denying sanctions and fees  in this case should have  accompanied

          those decisions with some  explanation.  We tread  very carefully

          in this  area, for the district court is entitled not only to the

          ordinary deference due the  trial judge, and additional deference

          in the  entire area of sanctions, but  extraordinary deference in

          denying sanctions.  

               Appellants  make  the broad  argument,  based  on a  blanket

          observation in Metrocorps,  Inc. v. Eastern  Mass. Junior Drum  &
                         _________________    _____________________________

          Bugle Corps Ass'n., 912 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990), that,  whether
          __________________

          or not sanctions are ordered or denied, reasons must be given, if

          meaningful  review is to be  had.  In  Metrocorps, sanctions were
                                                 __________

          sought  because of  a party's  failure  to comply  with discovery

                                         -14-

          requirements.   Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  37, however,  specifies  that

          sanctions  may be  avoided only  if substantial  justification is

          shown.  We held that "[t]he  clear language of the rule imposes a

          duty on the  district court." Id.  at 2.   We also addressed  the
                                        ___

          alternative  ground for sanctions,  Rule 11, and  cited Morgan v.
                                                                  ______

          Massachusetts  General  Hospital, 901  F.2d  186,  195 (1st  Cir.
          ________________________________

          1990),  which  in turn  cited Carlucci  v. Piper  Aircraft Corp.,
                                        ________     ______________________

          Inc., 775 F.2d  1440, 1446-47  (11th Cir. 1985)  for the  general
          ____

          proposition  that a district court  must state reasons  so that a

          meaningful review may be had.  We then went on to say, "[i]f this

          is the  district court's  burden when  sanctions are  imposed, it

          follows  naturally that  a  similar obligation  exists where,  as

          here, sanctions are  requested by  one party, but  denied by  the

          court."  901 F.2d at 195.  

               But  Carlucci  itself  not only  addressed  the  unexplained
                    ________

          positive imposition of sanctions,  but a discovery sanction under

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 limited to "reasonable expenses  caused by the

          failure" to obey  an order.  Understandably,  the appellate court

          felt it needed some  basis on which to review  the reasonableness

          of  the amount.  Moreover, in Morgan, where the hospital's motion
                                        ______

          for  fees  had  been  denied  without  reasons,  we prefaced  our

          analysis with the observation that "From the record before us, we

          are unable to determine the basis of the district court's denial"

          of the motion.  901 F.2d at 195.  We added  that the fee decision

          "must  both be  explained and  be supported  by the  record." Id.
                                                                        ___

          These statements,  of course,  were sufficient to  have justified

                                         -15-

          our action  in requiring reasons, without resort  to the Carlucci
                                                                   ________

          blanket prescription.

               Later, in  the same year,  in Figueroa-Ruiz v.  Alegria, 905
                                             _____________     _______

          F.2d  545, 549 (1st Cir. 1990), we  remanded a case in which Rule

          11 sanctions had been denied, because we found the decision to 

          be capable of bearing a number of meanings.  We added:
                 
               While  we do not hold that the district court must make
               findings and give explanations every time a party seeks
               sanctions under Rule 11, we do require a statement when
               the reason for  the decision is not obvious or apparent
               from the record.

          We then cited, with a see, Morgan.
                                ___  ______

               Then  came Metrocorps, with  no reference  to Figueroa-Ruiz.
                          __________                         _____________

          Finally, in Witty  v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 517  (1st Cir. 1993), where
                      _____     _______

          the  district court had, early on, denied a fee application under

           1988  as   untimely,  and  later  denied   without  opinion  two

          subsequent motions to revisit the issue, we said:

               So long as a  district court's reason for  denying fees
               or  monetary  sanctions   is  (1)  well   founded,  (2)
               sufficient to the  stated end, and (3) apparent  on the
               face  of  the record,  a  reviewing  tribunal will  not
               insist on unnecessary punctilio. (Citing, among others,
               Figueroa-Ruiz and Morgan, but  not Metrocorps.)  Id. at
               _____________     ______           __________    ___
               521.

          We  observed  that it  was  "perfectly  clear that  the  district

          court's  thinking had not changed" between the first and last two

          decisions. Id.
                     ___

               From these precedents, we discern the continuing basic theme

          that although the rationale for a  denial of a motion for fees or

          sanctions under Rule 11,  1927, or   1988 should be unambiguously

          communicated, the lack of explicit findings is not fatal where   

                                         -16-

          the record itself, evidence or colloquy, clearly indicates one or

          more sufficient  supporting reasons.   The  occasional statements

          referring to  an inflexible requirement for  explicit findings in

          every case do not reflect our present considered judgment.

               Reflection reveals that appellate  review of denials of such

          motions calls for somewhat more restraint than review of positive

          actions  imposing  sanctions and  shifting fees.   In  the latter

          event the  decision of the trial  court is a relatively  rare and

          always  deliberate event.  In the former event, motions are often

          perfunctorily made  and generally denied.  To  require in run-of-

          the-mill cases, where it  is obvious that the conduct of  a party

          and  his attorney was within  the bounds of  reason, decency, and

          competence, that the trial court stop and frame specific findings

          would be to add irresponsibly to its already considerable burden.

               In  this case,  however,  a number  of  factors coalesce  to

          convince us of the need for help from the district court.  In the

          first place, we need its assessment of the weight of arguments as

          to  untimeliness  and  undue delay  in  the  pursuit  of Rule  11

          sanctions.    We are also  unable to ascertain without  such help

          whether  "reasonable inquiry"  was made  of some  of the  charges

          levied  by  plaintiff.    Should available  public  records  have

          indicated an absence of  systemic recklessness and discrimination

          in the Boston school system?  Were the alleged victims (Allen and

          O'Connor) of  plaintiff's advances  interviewed?  Why  were they,

          although present at  the courthouse, not  called as witnesses  by

          plaintiff?    Similar questions  are raised  in  our minds  as to

                                         -17-

          Stutman, the  union representative, Philogene, who  initiated the

          complaint  of  alcohol  abuse,  other teachers,  police  and  the

          Department of Safety.   Were plaintiff's explanations  concerning

          the missing tape consistent and credible?4

               Finally, what  weight  should be  given,  if any,  to  prior

          court-administered warnings  to counsel.   One was our  own case,

          Cummings v. Hanson, 1995 U.S.App.Vol.LEXIS 36978 (December 1995),
          _________   ______

          in which we affirmed  sanctions against this plaintiff's attorney

          for bringing a claim in the wrong forum and cautioned him against

          repetition.    And  although  the   Massachusetts  Appeals  Court

          decision in Doe  v. Nutter,  McClennen & Fish,  668 N.E.2d  1329,
                      ___     _________________________

          1331  (41 Mass. App. Ct. 1996),  affirming sanctions and awarding

          double costs against  plaintiff's counsel in the instant case for

          a frivolous appeal, was  issued subsequent to the actions  of the

          district court  below in denying sanctions,  both a Massachusetts

          Superior Court justice and a single  justice of the Massachusetts

          Appeals   Court   had   previously   imposed   sanctions  against

          plaintiff's attorney for filing suit against  defendants although

          he was aware that he did not have a viable cause of action.

               In  raising these  points,  we do  not  profess to  have  an

          informed opinion.   Indeed, that is why  we feel it  necessary to

          remand  the  case  so that  the  district  court  may review  its

                              
          ____________________

               4    Anderson  claimed  at  one  point  to  possess  a  tape
          recording of April Allen  telling him that O'Neill was  trying to
          get him in trouble;  however, Anderson was unable to  produce the
          tape, and indeed was inconsistent about the exact contents of the
          tape  as well as  about the identities  of those for  whom he had
          played it.

                                         -18-

          decisions on  the several motions for sanctions  and fees, assess

          any  responsibility as  between plaintiff  and counsel,  and make

          known to us its reasons for the actions taken.

               In the appeal on  the merits (No. 96-1443), the  judgment is

          affirmed.  

               In the fee appeal  (No. 96-1578), we adopt the  procedure of

          presently retaining  jurisdiction and  remanding to the  district

          court for  the  limited purpose  of  revisiting the  motions  for

          sanctions and fees.  Cf. United States v. Quinones, 26  F.3d 213,
                               ___ _____________    ________

          219 (1st Cir. 1994).  

               The court  may either  (a) vacate  the judgment  and conduct

          such  proceedings  as  it  deems  necessary  to  reach   a  final

          conclusion or  (b)  reaffirm  the  judgment  previously  imposed,

          filing  with  the  clerk  of  the  district   court  its  written

          rationale.    The  court  may,  but  need  not,  request  written

          submissions and/or argument from counsel and/or convene a hearing

          for the purpose of deciding which course to pursue.

               The  district court  shall notify  the clerk  of this  court

          within  sixty days  of  the date  hereof as  to  which option  it

          chooses.  In the meantime, we retain appellate jurisdiction.

          It is so ordered.  
          _________________

          Costs in No. 96-1443 awarded to the School Committee and O'Neill.
          ________________________________________________________________

                                         -19-