Court Opinion

ID: 9840957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:53.334236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:57.789295
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 P. v. Rainey CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                             A166802
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                      (Contra Costa
 v.                                                                County Super. Ct. No.
 CLYDE RAINEY,                                                     05-980708-2)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Clyde Rainey challenges an order denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95)1 on the
ground defendant failed to state a prima facie case for relief. The Attorney
General concedes the record of conviction does not conclusively establish
defendant is ineligible for resentencing, and we agree. Accordingly, we
reverse and direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause under
section 1172.6 and proceed accordingly.
                                                    BACKGROUND2
         “On Halloween night, October 31, 1996, 20-year-old Koupou Saechao
was twice shot in the back while in front of his aunt’s apartment building in

         1    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
        Much of the background is taken from our prior opinion affirming
         2

defendant’s conviction. (People v. Rainey (Feb. 7, 2001, A088153) [nonpub.
opn.].)

                                                               1
North Richmond. The aunt heard two gunshots, and then Saecho came to the
door and collapsed in her arms. Saecho said a ‘black guy’ shot him. Saechao
died four days later, on November 4.
      “The police arrested 16-year-old appellant on November 6, 1996.
Appellant is African American. Appellant initially denied involvement in the
shooting, then said that he and 14-year-old Donald C. tried to rob Saechao
and Donald shot the victim when a patdown found nothing to steal.
Ultimately, after talking with his mother at the police station, appellant
confessed that he was the one who shot Saechao. When speaking to the
police, appellant denied being a member of a gang, or participating in the
shooting as a gang initiation.
      “Appellant’s trial defense was that he was guilty of no more than
manslaughter or second degree murder because he shot the victim as part of
a gang initiation, not robbery, and suffers from developmental limitations
that impede his ability to premeditate.” (People v. Rainey, supra, A088153.)
      The jury was instructed, among other things, on felony murder as a
possible basis for convicting defendant as well as the personal use of a
firearm enhancement. The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder,
committed during an attempted robbery and found true the personal use of a
firearm enhancement, and the trial court sentenced him to life without the
possibility of parole. (People v. Rainey, supra, A088153.)3

      3 After this court affirmed the judgment in People v. Rainey, supra,
A088153, defendant sought writ relief from his life without the possibility of
parole sentence pursuant to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460. We
granted the petition and remanded the matter for resentencing in conformity
with Miller. (In re Rainey (Feb. 28, 2014, A138921) [nonpub. opn.].) On
remand, the trial court reimposed a life without the possibility of parole
sentence, and this court recently affirmed that judgment in People v. Rainey
(Aug. 25, 2023, A164100) [nonpub. opn.].

                                       2
       In June 2022, defendant, in propria persona, filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The People filed opposition,
contending defendant was ineligible for relief because he “was convicted on
the personal use of [a] firearm enhancement” and therefore, “indisputably
acted as the actual killer as a matter of law.” In reply, defendant, now
represented by counsel, maintained the “court cannot say that the jury’s
verdicts conclusively find that [he] was ‘the actual killer’ or that he acted
with the intent to kill,” as the “jury could have relied on the felony murder
instructions and found that an uncharged co-participant was ‘the actual
killer.’ ”
       After reviewing the record of conviction, the trial court issued an order
denying defendant’s petition.
                                  DISCUSSION
       “Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017–2018 Reg.
Ses.)] amended murder liability under the felony-murder and natural and
probable consequences theories. The bill redefined malice under section 188
to require that the principal acted with malice aforethought. Now, ‘[m]alice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)” (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428,
433; accord, People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile), abrogated
by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th
839, 869.) The bill also amended section 189 to provide that a defendant who
was not the actual killer and did not have an intent to kill is not liable for
felony murder unless the defendant “was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Gentile, at pp. 842–843.) In addition, Senate Bill

                                        3
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) added section 1170.95, subsequently
renumbered to section 1172.6, “to provide a procedure for those convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to seek relief,” retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted
under the new law. (Gentile, at p. 843; People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, 223 & fn. 3.)
      Under section 1172.6, “the process begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met
[citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708 (Strong).)
      “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the
petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
      The court’s “prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘ “[T]he court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility issues without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).)
      Importantly, “[i]n reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) In determining whether defendant has made a prima

                                         4
facie showing for resentencing, we may consider the record of conviction,
which includes jury instructions given at trial. (Id. at pp. 971–972; People v.
Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 932, 935.) However, we must keep in
mind, “the ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ”
(Lewis, at p. 972.) An evidentiary hearing is required unless the record
conclusively establishes the defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. (Strong, supra,13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “We independently
review the trial court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a
prima facie showing for relief.” (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982,
989.)
        The trial court here concluded, at the prima facie stage, that the record
established that defendant was “the actual killer” and therefore was
ineligible for sentencing relief. In doing so, the court identified two aspects of
the record. First, the “the jury found [defendant] guilty of murder in the
first-degree as well as [found] true allegations that he personally used a
firearm.” The court stated this finding refuted defendant’s contention he
could not now be convicted under the current law because he “was found to be
the sole person to have used a gun to shoot [the victim] in the back, thereby
killing him.” Two, the record revealed that “after the jury convicted
[defendant], he admitted to ‘murdering’ the victim when interviewed by the
probation officer who prepared the pre-sentencing report in this case.”
        Defendant maintains, and the Attorney General concedes, neither of
the reasons identified by the trial court forecloses eligibility for resentencing
as a matter of law. The Attorney General’s concession is well-taken.
        Although the jury was instructed on and found true the personal use of
a firearm enhancement, that instruction did not require the jury to determine

                                         5
defendant was the actual shooter.4 Instead, the instruction only required the
jury to find defendant “intentionally displayed a firearm in a menacing
manner, intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck or hit a human being
with it.” (CALJIC No. 17.19.) As noted in this court’s opinion affirming the
judgment, defendant alternatively confessed to the murder, accused his
accomplice of the murder, and denied any liability whatsoever. (People v.
Rainey, supra, A088153.) This means, the jury could have concluded
defendant merely brandished the firearm “in a menacing manner” before his
accomplice ultimately shot and killed the victim.
      Nor does defendant’s confession establish as a matter of law he was the
actual killer.5 Although the jury rejected defendant’s theory that he had no
involvement in the murder, it did not necessarily reject his theory that his
accomplice was responsible for the murder. We agree with the Attorney
General’s assessment that defendant’s confession to the probation officer
“merely added to his collection of inconsistent statements,” and “[r]esolving
that inconsistency by pronouncing [defendant] the actual killer was the kind
of factfinding that a superior court may conduct ‘only after issuing an order to

      4    The jury was instructed on CALJIC No. 17.19, which stated: “It is
alleged that the defendant personally used a firearm during the commission
of the crime charged. [¶] If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged
[or a lesser and included felony offense], you must determine whether the
defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of [that] [felony].
[¶] . . . [¶] The term ‘personally used a firearm,’ as used in this instruction,
means that the defendant, must have intentionally displayed a firearm in a
menacing manner, intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck or hit a
human being with it.”
      5 In an interview with the probation department, defendant stated “ ‘I
murdered somebody for no reason during a robbery. I shot him in the back
twice. My partner and I held him at gunpoint, pat him down and I shot him;
he had no money.’ ”

                                       6
show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing,’ not at the prima facie stage.”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [at the prima facie stage, the court “should
not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion’ ”].)
      We therefore conclude defendant’s petition states a prima facie case,
and the record does not conclusively refute his allegations of eligibility.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the petition without issuing an
order to show cause.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is reversed. On
remand, the trial court shall issue an order to show cause under section
1172.6.

                                        7
                                         _________________________
                                         Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Bowen, J.*

**Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A166802, People v. Rainey

                                     8