Court Opinion

ID: 9939807
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Date Created: 2024-02-12 20:01:09.182848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:00.351750
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USCA11 Case: 23-11164    Document: 16-1      Date Filed: 02/12/2024    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11164
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JOSE ROMAN MUNOZ-AGUIRRE,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A216-021-676
                           ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                    23-11164

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Jose Munoz-Aguirre appeals the Board of Immigration
        Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
        orders denying his motions to suppress evidence and terminate
        proceedings based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation and
        finding that he was removable. He argues that all evidence of his
        alienage should be suppressed because his immigration status was
        initially discovered during an illegal traffic stop. He also requests
        that we remand his case to the BIA to allow for the possibility that
        the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) exercises its
        prosecutorial discretion not to have him removed in light of the
        Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Texas. 1 Because the
        BIA correctly determined that the unlawfulness of the traffic stop
        was immaterial to the disposition of his case due to the fact that
        Munoz-Aguirre stipulated to the IJ that he was removable, we
        affirm the BIA’s decision. We do not address Munoz-Aguirre’s
        request to remand his case to the BIA so that DHS might exercise
        its prosecutorial discretion because we lack jurisdiction over this
        request.
                                       I.      Background
               Munoz-Aguirre entered the United States from Mexico on
        April 1, 1996. During his time in the United States, he has worked

        1 United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023).
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        23-11164              Opinion of the Court                      3

        in manual labor positions. Since October 2016, he has worked as a
        farmer at Creek Farm Wash in Jemison, Alabama. According to
        Munoz-Aguirre’s sworn affidavit, he was on his way to work on
        January 8, 2018, when he approached law enforcement officers
        who were partially blocking a road on the farm. The officers did
        not have permission from the farm’s owner to be on the property
        and Munoz-Aguirre was not committing any traffic violations
        while driving on the farm. The officers signaled for Munoz-Aguirre
        to pull over. After stopping the vehicle, an officer asked Munoz-
        Aguirre a series of questions, including whether he was in the
        United States legally, to which Munoz-Aguirre responded “no.” As
        a result of this answer, Munoz-Aguirre was issued a Notice to
        Appear (“NTA”) which charged him with being removable
        pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the
        United States without being admitted or paroled.
               Munoz-Aguirre was scheduled to appear before an IJ in New
        Orleans, Louisiana on August 15, 2018. He retained counsel who
        filed a motion to change the venue of his removal proceedings
        from New Orleans to Atlanta, Georgia pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
        1003.20, arguing that Atlanta would be a more convenient location
        for both Munoz-Aguirre and his counsel. The IJ denied the motion
        noting that Munoz-Aguirre’s counsel “need[ed] to enter pleadings
        to the NTA” before a transfer of venue could be approved.
        Accordingly, Munoz-Aguirre’s counsel filed a second motion to
        change the venue, again arguing that Atlanta was a more
        convenient venue, but also admitting that Munoz-Aguirre was an
        alien who was present in the United States without being admitted
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11164

        or paroled. Munoz-Aguirre also admitted that “he [was]
        removable as charged” and “designate[d] Mexico as his country of
        removal.” Accordingly, the IJ found that good cause had been
        shown and granted the motion to change the venue to Atlanta.
               On February 4, 2019, Munoz-Aguirre appeared before an IJ
        in Atlanta. When the IJ asked how Munoz-Aguirre pleaded, his
        counsel stated that he denied the allegations and was going to file
        a motion to suppress the evidence of his alienage because he
        believed it had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The IJ noted that Munoz-
        Aguirre had already admitted in his second motion to change
        venue that he was removable, and it appeared he was now trying
        to go back on that concession after he had obtained the benefit of
        the venue change. Munoz-Aguirre agreed with the IJ that he had
        “resolved the pleadings by filing [his] [second] motion to change
        venue” but asserted that the admissions in that motion were “just
        a mistake” and “should’ve been a denial.” The IJ thus noted that
        she “had a pleading filed by an officer of the Court” and that there
        was “nothing . . . indicating that it [was] suspect.” Accordingly, the
        IJ found that “based [on] the admission in the Notice to Appear”
        that Munoz-Aguirre was not a citizen of the United States and was
        a national of Mexico. The IJ took note of Munoz-Aguirre’s
        objections to his alienage findings based on the earlier admissions
        and gave his counsel until the end of the month to file any motions
        or applications for relief.
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        23-11164              Opinion of the Court                      5

               After the February 4, 2019, hearing, Munoz-Aguirre filed
        three motions: a motion to suppress, a motion for discovery, and a
        motion to terminate removal proceedings. These three motions
        all raised the same argument, that officials unlawfully seized
        Munoz-Aguirre and interrogated him in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment and therefore all evidence of his alienage should be
        suppressed, and the removal proceedings should be dismissed.
        Munoz-Aguirre attached an affidavit from himself and Cullom
        Walker, the owner of the farm, which asserted that Munoz-Aguirre
        had not committed any traffic violation prior to being stopped and
        that the officer did not have permission to be on the farm. In a
        summary order, the IJ denied the motion to terminate removal
        proceedings noting that Munoz-Aguirre’s removability was
        “established in written pleadings filed within [the second
        counseled] motion to change venue.” The IJ also summarily
        denied the motions to suppress and for discovery.
               After Munoz-Aguirre’s motions were denied, he applied for
        asylum. At the hearing to address his asylum claims, Munoz-
        Aguirre again attempted to bring up his Fourth Amendment
        arguments, but the IJ did not allow testimony on the subject and
        determined that it was already preserved for a potential appeal.
        Following the hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying
        Munoz-Aguirre’s claims for asylum and relief from removal and
        ordered him removed to Mexico. Munoz-Aguirre appealed this
        decision to the BIA.
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11164

                On appeal to the BIA, Munoz-Aguirre again argued that the
        initial traffic stop, which led to the discovery of his alienage,
        violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore any evidence of his
        alienage should be excluded. He concluded his brief before the BIA
        by asserting that “a recent change in DHS immigration policy”
        meant that “the U.S. [would] no longer deport people solely
        because they [were] undocumented” and that he could benefit
        from this policy. The BIA dismissed Munoz-Aguirre’s appeal,
        reasoning that the constitutionality of his alleged seizure was “not
        dispositive of [his] appeal” because “the only evidence establishing
        [his] alienage in this case consist[ed] of [his] own admission,
        through his counsel” that he was a Mexican national who was
        present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. The BIA
        thus determined that the IJ “correctly found that alienage ha[d]
        been established through the written pleadings in the motion to
        change venue, shifting the burden onto [Munoz-Aguirre] to
        establish that he was lawfully present in the United States[.]”
        Because Munoz-Aguirre had not met this burden, the BIA
        determined that the IJ properly ordered that he be removed.
        Munoz-Aguirre timely appealed the BIA’s decision.
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        23-11164               Opinion of the Court                        7

                             II.     Standard of Review
               We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment and
        review the IJ’s decision as well to the extent that the BIA expressly
        adopts or agrees with it. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399,
        403 (11th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, we review our subject matter
        jurisdiction de novo. Blanc v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 996 F.3d 1274, 1277
        (11th Cir. 2021).
                                   III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Munoz-Aguirre argues that evidence of his
        alienage should have been suppressed under the exclusionary rule
        because in his view the officers egregiously violated his Fourth
        Amendment rights by stopping him based solely on his race and
        ethnicity. He asserts that his alienage was only discovered because
        of this unlawful stop, and therefore any evidence of his alienage
        should be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
        He also argues that we should remand his case to the BIA in light
        of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Texas, which
        allowed DHS’s policy of affording prosecutorial discretion for
        aliens who are only removable based on their alienage to take
        effect. The government responds by arguing that even assuming a
        Fourth Amendment violation did occur, it would not operate to
        exclude Munoz-Aguirre’s concession regarding his alienage in his
        venue motion. Upon careful review, we agree with the
        government.
               We begin with Munoz-Aguirre’s argument that evidence of
        his alienage should be excluded because his initial traffic stop
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                         23-11164

        constituted an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.
        Whether this traffic stop was an egregious constitutional violation
        or not is irrelevant because the only evidence that the BIA relied
        upon in affirming the IJ’s decision was Munoz-Aguirre’s concession
        in court filings that he was an alien present in the United States
        without being paroled or admitted. 2
               “[A] distinct and formal admission or concession by an
        attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his client as a
        judicial admission.” Dos Santos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 982 F.3d 1315,
        1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). Therefore, “when an
        attorney makes a tactical admission before an [IJ], that admission is
        binding on his alien client and may be relied upon as evidence of
        [removability].” Id. (quotations omitted). Only limited “egregious
        circumstances” allow an alien to be released from his counsel’s
        concession of removability. Id. Three factors are to be utilized in
        determining if “egregious circumstances” surround a removability
        admission: “(1) whether the concession was untrue or incorrect, (2)
        whether the concession was so unfair that it led to an unjust result,

        2 To the extent that Munoz-Aguirre is arguing that DHS would not have

        discovered his identity and initiated removal proceedings against him absent
        the alleged unlawful traffic stop—and therefore he would not have been in
        court to make a concession regarding his alienage—such an argument is
        foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
        1032 (1984). In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]he
        ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding
        is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded
        that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” Id. at 1039. Thus,
        the fact that Munoz-Aguirre was hailed into court cannot be suppressed.
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        23-11164                Opinion of the Court                          9

        and (3) whether the concession was the result of unreasonable
        professional judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). We have
        recognized “holding an alien to a true concession is not ‘egregious’
        in any respect,” and therefore, if a challenged concession is not
        untrue or incorrect, “we stop there.” Id.
                Here, the BIA correctly determined that the legality of
        Munoz-Aguirre’s traffic stop was not dispositive of his challenge to
        the IJ’s finding that he was removable. Even if the exclusionary
        rule applied to Munoz-Aguirre’s initial statement to law
        enforcement, it would not result in the suppression of his counsel’s
        admission in the change of venue motion that Munoz-Aguirre was
        an alien who was present in the United States without being
        paroled or admitted into the country. Munoz-Aguirre failed to
        argue below, and does not argue now, that any of the three factors
        for being released from his removability concession are present.
        That is, he has not shown that the concession was (1) false; (2) so
        unfair as to lead to an unjust result; or (3) the result of unreasonable
        professional judgment. Indeed, Munoz-Aguirre’s counsel made
        the concession because he wanted the benefit of litigating the case
        in Atlanta and not in New Orleans, and Munoz-Aguirre has never
        argued that tactical decision constituted unreasonable professional
        judgment. Then, after having achieved the change in venue he
        sought, he attempted to reverse course. Accordingly, the BIA did
        not err in holding Munoz-Aguirre to this concession and affirming
        the IJ’s removal order.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-11164

               Turning to Munoz-Aguirre’s request for us to remand the
        case to the BIA so that he might receive the benefit of prosecutorial
        discretion following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
        v. Texas, we lack jurisdiction over such a request. Under the
        Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), our jurisdiction is
        limited to reviewing final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
        Furthermore, the INA deprives us of subject matter jurisdiction
        over specific types of immigration actions, including over
        “decision[s] or action[s] by the Attorney General to commence
        proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
        any alien[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). We have held that the plain
        language of § 1252(g) “bars us from questioning [DHS’s]
        discretionary decisions to commence removal[.]” Alvarez v. U.S.
        Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016).
        Accordingly, we cannot entertain Munoz-Aguirre’s request to
        remand the case to the BIA so that he might be afforded
        prosecutorial discretion.
            PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN
        PART.