Court Opinion

ID: 9785375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:37:43.385412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:21.473163
License: Public Domain

BUSTAMANTE, Judge (dissenting). {49} I dissent. My specific rationale is my disagreement with the opinion’s conclusion that a completed tort by D1 prior to exposure to medical care providers is necessary in order to impose liability after D2 injures a plaintiff such as we have here. Judge Alar-id’s special concurrence aptly demonstrates why a completed tort is not necessary. {50} In addition, the opinion and the special concurrence endorse a very narrow view of the record in order to find a view of the evidence which supports the jury verdict. I agree that we normally interpret records in the light most favorable to the verdict. I question that approach here because of the difficulty with the instructions noted by the special concurrence and because it fails to account in any way for the other theories of negligence Plaintiff posited. Given the lack of special interrogatories, no one knows what negligence the jury found. Thus, we cannot really assess whether its finding of no damage is supported by substantial evidence. {51} I am also motivated by frustration flowing from the unduly complicated and uncertain nature of the law in this area. This case was tried after our opinion in Lems v. Samson, 1999-NMCA-145, 128 N.M. 269, 992 P.2d 282, but before the Supreme Court’s opinion in the same case. Even with the Supreme Court opinion I think the parties would have been hard-pressed to accurately decipher the law, much less translate it to reasonably understandable jury instructions. Given these difficulties — which have occupied the attention of this panel for many hours — I would remand for a new trial in the hope that our attempt at elucidation has been fruitful.