Court Opinion

ID: 9480982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:04:08.301881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:01.580429
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s treatment of court-martial voting procedures in imposing mandatory minimum life sentences. The majority opinion improperly extends the jurisdiction of this court in disregard for the independent military justice system established and supervised by Congress. The majority also misapprehends the limited nature of the review we are called upon to undertake in this case and seeks to announce and apply a new rule of constitutional procedure that is not within the relief we can properly provide on collateral review. Finally, in resolving the apparent conflict in the statutes relating to court-martial voting procedures the majority ignores Congress’ recognized policy preference for efficient judicial resolution of criminal proceedings as interpreted by the military courts.
I. JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE HABEAS PETITION
Just as the Constitution empowers Congress to establish lesser civil courts and to define the jurisdiction thereof, so “[t]he Framers expressly entrusted” to Congress the task of protecting the rights of men and women in the armed forces within the framework of discipline and duty demanded of the military. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953). “Military law ... is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. [Civil courts exert] no supervisory power over the" courts which enforce it____” Id. Congress has taken great care to provide a complete system of review within the military justice system. Just as its counterparts in the civil courts:
As an independent tribunal, the Court of Military Appeals renders vital decisions on the constitutional rights of service-members and the prerogatives of commanders. It has demonstrated a willingness to strike down provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial and departmental regulations, and to interpret provisions of the Uniform Code of Military *1263Justice in a manner that adds to or detracts from procedural requirements or regulations. It regularly applies decisions of the Supreme Court in resolving appellate issues.
H.R.Rep. No. 549, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1983 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2177, 2182. The military justice system affords military prisoners the opportunity for collateral, as well as direct review of their convictions by military courts. See Ct.Mil.Rev.R.Pract. & P. 20, reprinted in 10 U.S.C.A. foil. § 866. Congress now provides for direct review of military decisions by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 10 U.S.C. § 867a.
The appellate decisions of military courts are “final and conclusive;” such decisions are “binding” upon all courts of the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 876. Although this provision does not entirely displace civil courts’ jurisdiction over an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a military prisoner, United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349-50, 89 S.Ct. 528, 529-30, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969), “these provisions do mean that when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S.Ct. at 1049.
Under the majority’s approach, apart from considering four “helpful” factors in analyzing the scope of our jurisdiction on habeas, the federal courts would be left with “a large amount of discretion” to determine whether review is appropriate. Supra, at 1508. I believe this standard is too broad; the law in this circuit is not so imprecise:
Federal civil courts have jurisdiction only over military habeas petitions which allege that petitioners have been imprisoned “as a result of proceedings which denied them basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution.” Id. [Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953).] We then review this issue only to determine “whether the military have given fair consideration” to petitioner’s claim. Id. at 144, 73 S.Ct. at 1050. If such consideration has been given, we may only review the issue if it is both “ ‘substantial and largely free of factual questions.’ ”
Lundy v. Zelez, 908 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Burns, 346 U.S. at 139, 73 S.Ct. at 1047; Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir.1990)).1
*1264As a threshold matter, Dodson’s claim relating to the appropriate voting procedure in sentencing him to life imprisonment does allege a violation of his constitutional right to due process. But merely alleging a due process violation does not suffice to establish jurisdiction where the military courts have already fully and fairly considered the constitutional claim. In this case, Dodson briefed the issue of voting procedures before the military appellate courts, which rejected his argument after full and fair consideration; Dodson does not contend that the military review procedure was in any way lacking on this issue.2
Because Dodson raises a constitutional issue which was fully and fairly considered by the military courts, we have no jurisdiction to review his petition unless the issue is a “substantial” one. In a decision relied on heavily by the majority, the Fifth Circuit specifically cautioned: “We emphasize that only substantial constitutional questions should be cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings. As Judge Friendly has commented in a different context, ‘Today it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a “constitutional” claim,’ because there ‘has been a vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for which a resourceful lawyer can find a constitutional basis.’ ” Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 200 n. 23 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 156 (1970)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1505, 47 L.Ed.2d 760 (1976).
The majority cites as the only reason why Dodson’s petition raises a substantial constitutional issue his claim that he “was incarcerated without due process of law.” Judge Friendly’s observation holds equally true of claims alleging a deprivation of due process in the criminal proceeding. To conclude that this issue is “substantial” simply because it raises due process concerns is to render meaningless any limitation on our habeas jurisdiction. Every claim asserting a deprivation of any constitutional right can easily be recast in terms of due process. Likewise, every infraction of procedural rules or misapplication of substantive law can be said to implicate due process; it requires no great skill or intelligence on the part of defense counsel to add those two words to what may be at best a marginal constitutional argument. As this case demonstrates, were we to regard every allegation of denial of due process as “substantial,” we would quickly begin to exercise essentially supervisory control over every legal decision rendered by the military courts with which we may disagree. That result is certainly not in accordance with the elaborate framework established by Congress for an independent and self-contained military justice system.3
*1265I do not view Dodson’s claim as raising a “substantial” issue of constitutional law. As the majority concludes, Congress, in protecting the rights of armed services personnel, may constitutionally provide for a conviction by two-thirds of the court-martial members even where the sentence under law carries a minimum mandatory life term. It seems no great leap to conclude that Congress is equally empowered to provide for a life sentence in such circumstances without requiring concurrence by three-fourths of the members, and that such a scheme would pass constitutional scrutiny. Dodson’s only real claim, as the majority views it, is not that a two-thirds sentencing vote is fundamentally unfair or otherwise inherently improper, but rather that Congress and the President have in fact prescribed a three-fourths vote on the sentence.
Significantly, Dodson makes no effort to demonstrate how, even if such a technical voting requirement exists for the imposition of a mandatory sentence, he was prejudiced by its violation. As to this troubling absence of any real prejudice to Dodson, the majority can only conjecture that there might be some theoretical possibility that the convening authority, having obtained a valid conviction for premeditated murder, might choose not to proceed with a rehearing on the sentence, the only legal outcome of which would be a life sentence identical to the one Dodson has already received. Instead, the convening authority might simply let the conviction go unaccompanied by any punishment. Not only does such a fanciful scenario ignore the realities of law enforcement and the criminal justice system everywhere, it effectively duplicates the provisions for clemency and pardon already extant in the military justice system to which Dodson has full recourse.
Although a claim that a procedural safeguard exists and was violated may raise a question of constitutional magnitude, Dodson’s assertion of a technical defect, the remedy of which would have absolutely no effect on his term of incarceration, does not justify this court’s interjection of its own interpretation of Congress’ intent; it is simply not a “substantial” constitutional issue.4 I conclude that the issue Dodson raises does not render jurisdiction proper in this case, and I would dismiss the petition on that basis.
II. LIMITATION OF REMEDY UNDER TEAGUE V. LANE.
Even if we have jurisdiction to consider his petition for relief, and assuming that his claim has merit, Dodson is not before us on direct appeal.5 We must first determine, therefore, whether the relief sought would create a new rule of constitutional procedure under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).6 *1266“If so, we [may] neither announce nor apply the new rule [on collateral review] ... unless it falls into one of two narrow exceptions.” Saffle v. Parks, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1259-60, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).
A “new rule” is one which “was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’ ” Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (emphasis in original)). Because the underlying purpose for habeas review is to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements as they existed at the time of trial, the Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘The “new rule” principle ... validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents ... even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.’ ” Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)). Where the relief sought does not involve any specific prior precedent, but rather seeks to extend the reasoning of prior case law, “our task is to determine whether a [military court] considering [Dodson’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.” Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260.
I believe that the three-fourths voting requirement which the majority now establishes as a constitutional prerequisite in mandatory sentencing cases such as this is a new rule not compelled or dictated by any prior precedent. The majority cites no case which has reversed or vacated a mandatory life sentence on the basis of such a rule. Instead, it relies on dicta to the effect that a three-fourths concurrence in a mandatory life sentence passes constitutional muster as support for its conclusion that a Iessthan-three-fourths concurrence necessarily fails constitutional scrutiny. See Anderson v. Hunter, 177 F.2d 770, 771 (10th Cir.1949) (“[I]t is sufficient if two-thirds or more ... concur in the conviction and three-fourths or more concur in the sentence.”) (emphasis added); McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir.1959) (identical language), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816, 80 S.Ct. 1253, 4 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1960).7 These cases do not dictate or compel the result reached by the majority; just because one ratio is sufficient does not mean that a lesser ratio is not.
The majority opinion “acknowledge^] that dicta in two other non-binding. cases could be construed to hold that no three-fourths vote on sentencing was required in mandatory sentence cases.” Supra, at 1258. Indeed, the language of Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 850, 65 S.Ct. 1086, 89 L.Ed. 1971 (1945), appears to reject any constitutional requirement for three-fourths concurrence in a mandatory life sentence.
[A]fter conviction has been voted in a prosecution for murder or rape, the only punishments permissible under the law *1267are death and life imprisonment. The vote on punishment, therefore, is but a choice between these two; and, unless there is a unanimous vote in favor of the death penalty, life imprisonment necessarily follows.
146 F.2d at 744 (emphasis added);8 see also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1685, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969) (“A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant’s peers which must decide unanimously, but by a panel of officers empowered to act by a two-thirds vote.”), overruled on other grounds, Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); Brown v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 487, 489 (10th Cir.) (“The mandatory provisions ... imposed a compulsory duty upon the board to sentence petitioner to death or life imprisonment upon a finding of guilt. It had no alternative but to comply with the legislative direction.”), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 969, 69 S.Ct. 940, 93 L.Ed. 1120 (1949).
The statutory provisions relating to courts-martial generally do not compel any rule establishing a minimum concurrence in a mandatory life sentence. The statutory provision prescribing a minimum life sentence can easily be read as obviating the need for any fixed number of concurrences where the death penalty is not imposed. Indeed, the majority opines: “The government’s [position] that a three-fourths vote for a mandatory sentence is unnecessary appears logical at first glance.” Thus the Court of Military Appeals, writing in 1987, after Dodson’s conviction had become final, noted that “It is open to question whether the procedure followed ... was proper____ It seems possible ... that the voting requirement in paragraph 76(b) of the 1969 Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code’s mandatory life imprisonment for felony-murder — e.g., if three-fourths of the members refused to vote for a sentence which included life imprisonment.” United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A. 1987). Even if the majority’s resolution of the apparent ambiguity in the statutes is correct, its reasoning is not so apparent as to compel that result. The constitutional voting requirement is a new rule which the majority seeks to announce and apply in this habeas proceeding.
Finally, the majority’s heavy reliance on the voting procedure enumerated in the Manual for Courts-Martial is no answer to the “new rule” analysis of Teague. Within the broad limits of the constitution itself, the specific requirements of due process in military tribunals are established and defined by Congress. The interstitial rules of procedure established by the Executive are void insofar as they conflict with such duly enacted legislation. See United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A.1987) (“Long ago, this Court decided that the President, through the Manual, ‘may place an additional burden upon the ... [military judge] and the president of courts-martial not expressly imposed by the Code, but [which] ... is not prohibited by the Code.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951)). Depending on the resolution of the apparent conflict between the statutes involved, the provision of the Manual requiring a minimum concurrence in mandatory sentences may or may not conflict with the statutory scheme. Although the majority concludes that the minimum concurrence provision does not conflict with the statutory requirement of a mandatory life sentence, nothing compels that result. As I discuss below, the statutes can easily be read as limiting the discretion of the court-martial panel in imposing a prescribed sentence so that the provision of the Manual conflicts with the legislative scheme and is void. See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 390 (2d ed. 1920) (Where Congress has mandated a sentence, “the office of the court simply is to cause the legal sentence to be entered of record by the judge advocate, no discretion being allowed *1268and no deliberation or vote being called for.”). I am not the first to reach such a conclusion. United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A.1987) (“the voting requirement in [the] Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code’s mandatory life imprisonment____”).
The majority’s reliance on the provision of the Manual as compelling the conclusion that a minimum concurrence is required in mandatory sentencing cases is an exercise in circular reasoning. The majority resolves the question of whether the voting requirement in the Manual is invalid under the mandatory sentencing scheme by citing the voting requirement in the Manual. In the context of “new rule” analysis under Teague, the Manual’s provision compels, in the majority’s view, the conclusion that the Manual’s provision is valid. Not only does the majority place the regulatory cart before the ox of statutory interpretation, but by virtue of the novel positioning it concludes that it must be so arranged.
When Congress prescribed a mandatory life sentence for military personnel convicted of premeditated murder who are not sentenced to death, it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that it meant what it said. No provision of the Manual could alter such a congressional mandate, much less bind a reviewing court to conclude that the statute means something else entirely. The majority’s conclusion otherwise is unsupportable.
Having concluded that the three-fourths sentencing requirement constitutes a “new rule” for purposes of Teague, I would not apply the rule under either of the two narrow exceptions. The first exception, relating to rules which place a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, is inapplicable. The second exception, involving “ ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,” does not encompass a rule such as the voting requirement adopted by the majority. Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1263 (quoting Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1075).
The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that a rule which merely “preserve^] the accuracy and fairness of ... sentencing judgments” qualifies under the second Teague exception. Rather, such a rule “must not only improve accuracy, but also ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer v. Smith, — U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2833, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. at 1075) (emphasis in original)). Given the extremely narrow scope of this second exception, I cannot conclude that the majority’s three-fourths voting requirement is “an ‘absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness’ ” so as to qualify as an exception to Teague.9 Sawyer, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2832. I would therefore dismiss Dodson’s petition as requesting relief which we are powerless to grant on collateral review.
III. STATUTORY VOTING SCHEME IN COURTS-MARTIAL
Alternatively, assuming that we have jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the relief requested is not barred on collateral review, I would deny the petition as meritless. Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that any person who is found guilty of premeditated murder “shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 918. An apparent ambiguity exists, however, because the Code permits conviction upon a concurrence of two-thirds of the court-martial members, id. § 852(a)(2), but generally requires agreement by three-fourths of the members in imposing a life sentence. Id. § 852(b)(2). Logically, where a bare two-thirds have convicted, concurrence by three-fourths in a life sentence may not always be forth*1269coming; nevertheless, a lesser sentence is not within the court-martial’s power to impose. In such a case, the majority concludes that a convicted murderer should undergo successive and repetitive sentencing hearings before different panels until eventually one court agrees in the life sentence by at least a three-fourths majority. Alternatively, the majority reasons that the convening authority may choose not to proceed, whereupon no sentence is imposed and the statute’s requirement for a mandatory minimum life sentence is effectively ignored. I do not believe that Congress intended such an illogical and inefficient process once the defendant has been duly convicted.
The majority violates a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation. Dodson’s petition does not state a constitutional claim if the statute does not require three-fourths concurrence in a life sentence in cases where a minimum mandatory life term is prescribed by law. The facially troubling statute, section 852(b)(2), does not specifically apply to mandatory sentences;10 rather, the majority interprets the voting language broadly as encompassing all sentences, mandatory or otherwise. This interpretation ignores the basic rule:
It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 2241, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3251, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S.Ct. 543, 545, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932)). Thus I would interpret section 852(b)(2), requiring a three-fourths concurrence in a life sentence, so as to limit its application to imposition of discretionary life sentences; no such concurrence is necessary where the life term is prescribed by law.11
The need for informality and expediency in the military court-martial requires that it remain relatively free of procedural inefficiency. Thus we have recognized “that in the military context [there is an] obvious policy preference by Congress for lessening the hung-jury problem in courts-mar*1270tial____” Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1547 (10th Cir.1986). The majority’s solution to the apparent ambiguity in the statutory voting scheme does little to further the underlying goal of efficiency in the military justice system. See Curry v. Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“[T]he fundamental function of the armed forces is ‘to fight or be ready to fight wars.’ ”) (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 76 S.Ct. 1, 5, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955)). Such a succession of duplicative sentencing hearings defeats the military’s primary purpose:
[Tjrial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army’s primary fighting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 17, 76 S.Ct. at 5.
Likewise, the majority's approach ignores the “balance” which Congress has already drawn between the military’s primary objective and the rights of service personnel. By requiring no more than a two-thirds concurrence in the conviction, and by providing for acquittal upon failure to convict, Congress has already provided the appropriate balance. See Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1546 (discussing the two-thirds conviction-or-acquittal rule, concluding that “This balancing does not seem constitutionally impermissible”). The majority’s plan effectively raises the number of votes necessary for conviction and punishment to three-fourths; failure to sentence by a three-fourths vote results in a sort of “mistrial,” with either no punishment or a new hearing to follow.
The majority opinion affords no deference to the considered judgment of the military courts in interpreting the statutory provision in question, despite the fact that we exercise no supervisory power over those courts. In United States v. Shroeder, 27 M.J. 87 (C.M.A.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S.Ct. 1121, 103 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989), the Court of Military Appeals framed the issue thus:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE MEMBERS, AS REQUIRED BY R.C.M. 1006(d)(5), THAT A SENTENCE WHICH INCLUDES CONFINEMENT FOR LIFE MAY ONLY BE ADJUDGED IF AT LEAST THREE-FOURTHS OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT VOTE FOR THAT SENTENCE.
The court’s decision: “We decide [the] issue against appellant.” 27 M.J. at 88. The court was very specific: “Likewise, we conclude that the requirement in Article 52(b)(2) that there must be a three-fourths vote of the members in favor of a sentence ‘to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years’ was not intended to negate the mandatory minimum confinement for life prescribed by Article 118____” Id. at 89 (emphasis added). The Shroeder court anticipatorily rejected the majority’s approach of conducting additional sentencing hearings:
If, as here, the military judge instructs the court members that they must adjudge a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, as prescribed by Article 118, the need is greatly reduced for utilizing a rehearing on sentence or a reconsideration of sentence as a means to impose the mandatory sentence which Congress prescribed. While these means are available to effectuate the requirements of Article 118, we have no doubt that Congress preferred that the mandatory sentence be adjudged initially — rather than for an illegal sentence to be adjudged and then corrected by a rehearing or reconsideration.
Id. Finally, the court acknowledged that under the statute, “Admittedly, since the court members must vote on the sentence, they can engage in ‘jury nullification’ and can adjudge a sentence of less than the minimum confinement prescribed by the Code. Of course, such action — which the military judge’s instruction was intended to forestall — would be irresponsible as well as unlawful and certainly should not be en*1271couraged.’ Id. at 90 (emphasis added).12
The majority primarily relies on the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial, in effect at the time of Dodson’s conviction, as supporting its view. Given the specificity of the Shroeder court’s holding, I conclude that the Court of Military Appeals was correct in surmising that “the voting requirement in paragraph 76b(2) of the 1969 Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code’s mandatory life imprisonment____” United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A. 1987). Accordingly, because the provision of the Manual conflicts with the statutory minimum life sentence in cases of premeditated murder, I conclude that the statutory provision, not the Manual, should be enforced.
I find no support for the majority’s conclusion that Congress intended a three-fourths concurrence in a mandatory minimum life sentence. Indeed, I consider the judgment of the Court of Military Appeals to the contrary to settle the issue. It is not the place of this court to supervise or correct erroneous statutory interpretations by military courts relating to the operation of the military justice system. E.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953); 10 U.S.C. § 876. I would therefore defer to the military courts’ interpretation of the statutory scheme as it has been applied in this and other cases.
CONCLUSION
I would affirm the district court’s refusal to grant habeas relief on the basis that we lack jurisdiction to review the petition, and that the petition requests relief which is barred on collateral review. Alternatively, I would conclude that the voting procedure followed by the court-martial in imposing sentence complied with the express statutory requirements. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority of cases in this circuit have held that constitutional issues fully and fairly considered by the military court generally cannot be reviewed on habeas. See, e.g., Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1542 n. 6 (10th Cir.1986) C'[T]his circuit has refused to review military courts’ determinations of constitutional issues where the issues were fully and fairly litigated before the military tribunals.”); Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2921, 91 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); Wolff v. United States, 737 F.2d 877, 879 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 575, 83 L.Ed.2d 514 (1984); Kehrli v. Sprinkle, 524 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 3165, 49 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1976); King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir.1970); McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643 (10th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816, 80 S.Ct. 1253, 4 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1960); Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17 (10th Cir.1959); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 320 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918, 78 S.Ct. 349, 2 L.Ed.2d 278 (1958); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486-87 (10th Cir.1953). Other opinions have proceeded to review the merits of constitutional claims where no significant factual issues exist and no full consideration had been given to the claim by the military courts. See Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d at 1542 n. 6 (“Here the record indicates that the military courts gave at least some consideration to petitioner's ... claims [but] the Government does not argue that full and fair consideration by the military courts makes judicial review inappropriate.’’). Likewise, where the claim asserted is viewed as "substantial,” review is permitted even if already considered by the military courts. See id. (”[W]e will [review the claim] here, since the constitutional issues raised are substantial and largely free of factual questions____”); Kennedy v. Commandant, U.S. Disc. Barracks, 377 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.1967) (reviewing claim stemming from denial of legally trained counsel).
Only two cases, Wallis v. O’Kier, 491 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901, 95 S.Ct. 185, 42 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); and Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379, 384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 881, 77 S.Ct. 104, 1 L.Ed.2d 81 (1956), purported to reach the merits of a habeas petitioner’s constitutional claims without explaining why jurisdiction was proper. In both cases, the court quickly and easily dismissed the claims as *1264meritless. To the extent that the majority reads these cases to support the proposition that civil courts have unfettered discretion to review military habeas petitions involving any legal issue of constitutional law, I do not share that interpretation.

. The majority views the exercise of habeas jurisdiction as an appropriate means of policing the military courts: "the military courts must give adequate consideration to the issues involved and apply proper legal standards." Thus, despite the fact that Dodson thoroughly briefed and argued this issue to both the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review and the Military Court of Appeals, because both courts summarily rejected the argument without discussion the majority believes we have jurisdiction to review the correctness of those affirmances. That viewpoint is directly contrary to this circuit’s existing precedent. Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d at 145 (“When an issue is briefed and argued before a military board of review, we have held that the military tribunal has given the claim fair consideration, even though its opinion summarily disposed of the issue with the mere statement that it did not consider the issue meritorious or requiring discussion."). The fact that the military courts dealt with this issue in summary fashion rather than at great length does nothing to expand our jurisdiction over this habeas petition.

. A constitutional claim is all that is necessary for a United States court to review a state court conviction on habeas. If there is any single legal concept applied and adopted uniformly in every case on this issue, it is that our review of military court decisions on habeas is more limited than our review of state proceedings. E.g., Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S.Ct. at 1048; Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d at 145 n. 3. The military courts’ determination of constitutional issues, unlike that of state courts, is entitled to deference. We defeat that deference by reviewing every military court decision relating to the constitution; therefore, only those constitution*1265al issues which are truly “substantial” are properly reviewable in civil courts.

.The cases in this circuit which have dealt with "substantial” constitutional issues involved much more serious allegations of fundamental unfairness in the criminal proceeding than does Dodson's petition. For instance, in Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d at 1542, the habeas petitioner claimed denial of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in that he had been convicted by only two-thirds of a six-member court martial panel. In the civil context, the right to trial by jury is so fundamental and essential in criminal cases that it implicates the inherent fairness of the proceeding. Likewise, in Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d at 339, the petitioner alleged an effective denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he was refused a law-trained defense counsel. Such a deprivation, if true, would likely be viewed as a breach of a "watershed" constitutional right. By contrast, under the majority’s analysis, Dodson’s sentence was not fundamentally unfair, but merely lacked procedural symmetry in the method of voting on conviction and the imposition of the minimum mandatory life term.

. As I discuss below, I view Dodson’s constitutional due process claim to be meritless. Even were I to accept the majority’s analysis, however, the rule Dodson seeks and the one which the majority adopts would be barred under Teague v. Lane. Because Teague bars this court from even announcing a new rule on collateral review, I address the Teague issue prior to analyzing the constitutional standard which the majority announces. See 109 S.Ct. at 1069 ("Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question.

. Although Teague v. Lane involved collateral review of a state court decision, I believe that it applies equally to any collateral review of a final judgment, including a habeas petition from a military prisoner. The same considera*1266tions of comity and finality cited by the Court in Teague are equally important in cases involving military courts-martial. In defining a "new rule," the Teague Court specifically stated that "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (emphasis added). Accord, United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("To be sure, not all postjudgment changes in law may be raised in a [federal prisoner’s] section 2255 proceeding.") (citing Teague v. Lane); Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 232 n. 1 (6th Cir.1989) (limiting the holding in Teague to new constitutional rules of procedure, implying that Teague otherwise applies to federal prisoners’ petitions for collateral review), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990).

. In a general discussion of court-martial procedure, one prior opinion cites the general statutory provision that “no person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or confinement for more than ten years except with the concurrence of three-fourths of the members present when the vote is taken." Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1541 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1986) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(1) and (2)). As the majority acknowledges, the issue in Mendrano did not involve the voting requirements relating to the sentence after conviction, nor did the court discuss the effect of a mandatory minimum life sentence on the general sentencing requirement of section 852(b). Although very broad language in Mendrano might suggest a minimum voting concurrence in the sentence, nothing therein compels such a requirement.

. The majority "simply disagree[s]” with the holding of Stout insofar as it may be read to permit less than a three-fourths concurrence in the sentence. It is difficult to understand, if the majority’s rule actually conflicts with existing case law from our sister circuit, how it could be promulgating anything but a new rule. Cf. Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 ("The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule.... ’’).

. Nor do I read the majority opinion to adopt such a view. Nowhere does the majority suggest that the requirement of a three-fourths voting concurrence in a mandatory life sentence is so fundamental that even absent any apparent conflict in the statutory scheme such a rule must be applied. I find it impossible to conclude that a three-fourths vote on the life sentence is “fundamental” to fairness given the majority’s view that a two-thirds vote of conviction suffices even under a mandatory minimum life sentence scheme.

. I recognize that the otherwise unambiguous language of a statute is generally conclusive. In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440, 1442 (10th Cir.1990) (citing Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274, 1283 (10th Cir.1988)). Here however, the relevant statutes read together cannot be reconciled without interpreting either the provision for mandatory life sentence upon conviction by two-thirds vote or the general voting scheme requiring a three-fourths concurrence in a life sentence.

. Military authorities have recognized that the court martial panel generally has discretion to impose any sentence within an acceptable range dictated by Congress. See D. Schlueter, Military Criminal Justice, § 15-17 (2d ed. 1987). Historically, however, military law has taken a very different view of the court-martial’s role in imposing a mandatory sentence. Where Congress has mandated a sentence, "the office of the court simply is to cause the legal sentence to be entered of record by the judge advocate, no discretion being allowed and no deliberation or vote being called for." W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 390 (2d ed. 1920). A vote is required only where "the sentence is left by the Code to the discretion of the court____’’ Id. As early as 1863 William DeHart observed:
In cases not within the discretion of the court to affix the punishment, it inevitably follows that the punishment is in accordance with the law, and the finding of the court, and cannot be modified by any individual opinion of a member____ The oath which every member takes, requires and obliges him to "administer justice according to the articles of war," and of course, it follows, that upon conviction of a prisoner for a particular offense, every member must vote the punishment which the law has prescribed. Such cases do not admit of an appeal to the conscience for the solution of any doubts which may exist, for where the law has prescribed a rule, no doubt can be entertained.
W.C. DeHart, Observations on Military Law, 189-90 (1863); see also id. at 191-92 (discussing duty of every panel member, upon failure to agree on death penalty to vote for imposition of some legal sentence). Thus the vote on mandatory life imprisonment where the court fails to agree unanimously on the death penalty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 852(a) is largely ceremonial, and does not require due process safeguards which must ordinarily accompany the exercise of sentencing discretion.

. The majority cites the Shroeder decision, but asserts: "However the [Shroeder] court’s formulation of the issue misstates the actual question before the court____ The court was addressing whether the military judge could instruct the court-martial that their sentence must include life imprisonment, not whether the sentence must be supported by a three-fourths vote.” The majority apparently would find comfort in a three-fourths concurrence that results from an instruction to the panel members that they must reach this result. I am unable to find the distinction between a ceremonial vote, the outcome of which is mandated by the court prior to deliberations, and no vote at all. The voting procedure used by the military judge in Dodson’s sentencing was simply an effective means of taking the sentencing discretion away from the panel members insofar as the term of imprisonment was concerned — the same effect achieved by the approved instruction in Shroeder.