Court Opinion

ID: 9439900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:53:01.61134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:41.706805
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I believe the panel opinion in this case is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, - U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). I reach this conclusion for primarily two reasons.
First, Ratzlaf held that in order to sustain a conviction for “structuring” under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(3) the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. In my view, the clear implication, if not the plain language, of Ratzlaf precludes a structuring conviction based on the “reckless disregard” theory utilized in this case. Second, in denying the petition, the majority virtually ignores the fact that our decision in United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir.1993) (en bane), which upheld a reckless disregard jury instruction, was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court “for further consideration in light of’ Ratzlaf See Donovan v. United States, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 873, 127 L.Ed.2d 70 (1994). Because the Court had just decided Ratzlaf, one would think that if Aversa was consistent with that case the Court would simply have denied the writ of certiorari. The most logical inference from this state of affairs is that the Court viewed our pre-Ratzlaf decision in Aversa as contrary to Ratzlaf, and wanted to give us a chance to remedy it. We should do so.
Because I believe the panel opinion misinterprets settled law, I dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc.