Court Opinion

ID: 9626834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:25:11.421168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:34.164844
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
Notwithstanding the court’s express declaration (Division 1 of the opinion) that the deed is not to be reformed to conform to the option, this court has conformed the deed to the option. The rules stated in Division 1 of the opinion ought to be applicable to this court as well as the trial courts.
A usufruct is the right to use and enjoy property of another. State v. Davison, 198 Ga. 27, 37 (31 SE2d 225) (1944). Hence a tenant is said to have a usufruct in the land of his landlord, — a right to use and enjoy. Code § 61-101. However, a right to use and enjoy another’s property may arise between parties who are not in a landlord-tenant relationship.
In Marshall v. Cozart, 94 Ga. App. 614 (95 SE2d 729) (1956), the only decision cited by the majority, the testator devised her home to her mother "for and during her natural life, with remainder ” to her son. The testator went further and said: "Even though I have given a life estate in my home ... to my mother, it is my wish that my husband ... be permitted to reside in said residence as long as he shall live and remain unmarried.” Marshall, supra, p. 618.
After finding that a precatory trust had been created by the testator, the Court of Appeals said that a dispossessory warrant would not lie to dispossess the widower because the will "in effect created a joint life estate” rather than a landlord-tenant relationship. Contrary to what the majority now say, the Court of Appeals did not find that the widower in Marshall had a life estate. It found that the widower "in effect” had a life estate.
The testator in Marshall clearly knew what a life estate was and had devised a life estate to her mother and had not devised a life estate to her husband. The Court of Appeals did not say to the contrary. That court merely said that the widower had rights for life, or until his remarriage, just as if he had been given a life estate.
The majority have misread the only decision cited and have misconstrued the will in that case. I submit that *821when this court has before it a will like the Marshall will, it will then, as it should, construe that will correctly and will refuse to follow today’s interpretation of Marshall v. Cozart.
Turning to the case now before us, it can be seen that there is no authority cited for the majority’s declaration that the grantor reserved a life estate for himself and his wife. Let us look then at the language used in the deed to determine the intent of the parties and the nature of the interest reserved. "Grantor reserves unto himself and his wife the right to reside in the residence located on the following described property for and during their natural life.” A "right to reside” is a right to use and enjoy, a usufruct, not an estate in land.
The majority are reforming this deed. The law made by the majority will have to be reformed later.