Court Opinion

ID: 9368702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 19:00:45.977856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.158242
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60380         Document: 00516635691              Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                February 6, 2023
                                         No. 21-60380                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   Arafat Shimenyi Mohndamenang,

                                                                               Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                              Respondent.

                             Petition for Review of an Order of
                             the Board of Immigration Appeals
                                 Agency No. A203 600 957

   Before Jones, Smith, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:

          Arafat Mohndamenang petitions for review of an order of the Board
   of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial by an immigration
   judge (“I.J.”) of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and pro-
   tection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 Arafat requested
   a stay of removal pending this petition for review; that request was carried
   with the case. We deny the petition and the stay of removal.

          1
              Petitioner’s brief refers to him as “Arafat.” We do the same.
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                                         No. 21-60380

                                                I.
           Arafat is a native and citizen of Cameroon. He applied for admission
   to the United States in 2019 and was subsequently charged with removability
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On November 13, 2019, he appeared
   and admitted that he was removable as charged but announced his intention
   to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on his political opinion
   and sought protection under the CAT.
           At his hearing before the I.J., Arafat, represented by counsel, admit-
   ted that he had no corroborative materials but testified that he feared return-
   ing to Cameroon because the government was killing “English-speaking
   Cameroonians” such as himself. He told the I.J. that he had been arrested
   by the Cameroonian government and was tortured daily while in detention.
   He testified that he had later been involved in a peaceful protest when the
   military appeared and shot dead some of the participants. He subsequently
   escaped Cameroon.
           The I.J. issued an oral decision denying Arafat’s application because
   his testimony was too vague to be credible and he had not corroborated his
   claims. 2 The I.J. further stated the claims could have been corroborated via
   “what could be reasonably available documents” such as “a letter from a
   family member or a friend, or someone who can comport this story.”
           In his appeal to the BIA, Arafat contended, in part, that the I.J. had
   erred in finding that he was not credible and that the I.J. should have devel-
   oped the record by asking him follow-up questions before making a credibility
   determination. Arafat submitted the 2019 Cameroon country report, several

           2
            The I.J. additionally denied Arafat’s application because of the then-effective
   third-country transit bar. That bar has subsequently been lifted and is not at issue in this
   proceeding.

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   newspaper articles describing the ongoing crisis in Cameroon, and affidavits
   from his wife, neighbor, family attorney, and uncle. Arafat asked the BIA to
   remand to the I.J. for further factual development. The BIA agreed and
   remanded “for consideration of the new evidence in the first instance, and
   for reassessment of [Arafat’s] credibility,” and counseled that “the parties
   should be allowed to submit additional pertinent evidence.”
          Arafat appeared pro se before a new I.J. with his new evidence and re-
   testified in more detail, but the new I.J. denied his application. This time,
   the I.J. found that Arafat was credible but had not offered sufficient corrob-
   orating evidence to support his testimony to establish his claim for asylum.
   The I.J. found that because none of the affiants “actually have any personal
   knowledge of the[] events” described in Arafat’s testimony, and because
   Arafat “provided no other evidence of any injuries he stated he suffers,”
   “essentially, the only thing respondent has to show that these incidents
   actually occurred . . . is his own testimony.”
          The I.J. held that “[e]ven if [Arafat] were to have been found to have
   provided sufficient corroboration, the Court would, in the alternative, deny
   his application for asylum because he failed to show past persecution or a
   well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground.” The
   I.J. denied Arafat’s withholding-of-removal claim because it was “factually
   related to an asylum claim, but the standard of proof is harder to meet than
   the well-founded fear requirement for asylum.” Finally, the I.J. denied Ara-
   fat’s CAT claim because first, “the harm [he] allegedly experienced did not
   rise to the level of persecution”; second, he “failed in his burden to show it
   [was] more likely than not he would be tortured by or at the instigation of or
   with the consent or acquiescence of a public official if returned to Camer-
   oon”; and third, there was not “independent evidence sufficient to meet
   [his] burden of providing eligibility for protection under the [CAT].”

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          Arafat appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the I.J.’s denial on all
   claims. The Board affirmed the denial of the asylum and withholding-of-
   removal claims on account of Arafat’s lack of corroboration. The BIA then
   affirmed the denial of CAT protection “for the reasons stated in the [I.J.’s]
   decision, which includes his finding of the lack of independent evidence con-
   cerning the respondent’s claimed fear of torture.”
          Arafat timely petitioned this court for review, raising three issues:
   first, whether the BIA erred in requiring him to provide additional specific
   evidence supporting his credible testimony without following the procedures
   laid out in Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (BIA 2015). Second,
   whether the BIA ignored substantial record evidence, including country-
   conditions evidence that corroborated his claims for asylum, withholding of
   removal, and CAT protections. Third, whether the BIA erred in affirming
   the denial of his CAT claims.

                                         II.
          “When considering a petition for review, this court has the authority
   to review only the BIA’s decision, not the [I.J.]’s decision, unless the
   [I.J.]’s decision has some impact on the BIA’s decision.” Wang v. Holder,
   569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302
   (5th Cir. 1997)). “We review the BIA’s factual findings under the substan-
   tial evidence standard” and do not disturb such findings unless the evidence
   compels a contrary conclusion. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511,
   517–18 (5th Cir. 2012). We review legal conclusions de novo “unless a con-
   clusion embodies the [BIA’s] interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a
   statute that it administers.” Id. at 517 (alteration in original) (quoting Singh
   v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006)). Such conclusions receive
   Chevron deference. Id.

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                                        III.
          We begin with Arafat’s contention that the I.J. violated the procedure
   for corroborating evidence as laid out by Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
   at 521–23.
          Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “[t]he testi-
   mony of an applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden with-
   out corroboration.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). But this is so only “if cor-
   roboration is not reasonably available to the applicant.” Rui Yang v. Holder,
   664 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis removed). In other words, cor-
   roborating evidence must be provided unless the applicant demonstrates that
   he “does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”
   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
          The I.J. determined Arafat to be credible but dismissed his claims of
   asylum and withholding of removal because Arafat had not provided what the
   I.J. determined to be sufficient corroborating evidence. As part of that deci-
   sion, the I.J. found that the affidavits Arafat had submitted from his wife,
   uncle, neighbor, and family lawyer could not corroborate Arafat’s testimony
   because none of the affiants had been present at the alleged beatings. The I.J.
   further held that supporting documents would have been reasonably available
   to Arafat.
          On petition for review, Arafat contends that the agency erred by re-
   quiring specific corroborating evidence from persons who were “present” at
   Arafat’s protests and beatings without (a) giving Arafat a chance to explain
   why that evidence was not reasonably available and (b) addressing whether
   Arafat’s explanation was sufficient. He contends that the agency was re-
   quired to do so because of the BIA’s interpretation of procedural require-
   ments regarding corroborating evidence in Matter of L-A-C-:
         [W]hen the [I.J.] determines that the applicant should have

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           submitted specific evidence to corroborate credible testimony
           . . . the [I.J.] should: (1) give the applicant “an opportunity to
           explain why he could not reasonably obtain such evidence,”
           (2) “ensure that the applicant’s explanation is included in the
           record,” [and] (3) “clearly state for the record whether the [ap-
           plicant’s] explanation is sufficient . . . .”
   Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757, 770 (5th Cir. 2020) (fourth alteration in
   original) (quoting Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 518–22).
           The BIA’s interpretation of ambiguous terms in the INA is accorded
   Chevron deference. 3 But we need not reach the issue of whether such pro-
   cedures are in fact required by the INA because the I.J. never required
   “specific corroborating evidence” from Arafat. The I.J. did not hold one
   missing piece of evidence to be the sine qua non to corroboration. Instead, the
   I.J. engaged in a comprehensive analysis of why Arafat’s credible testimony
   was not corroborated by the evidence provided; the I.J. decided that such
   evidence would have been reasonably available to Arafat. In such a case, the
   BIA’s procedures do not apply. 4

                                               IV.
           Arafat further contends, however, that even if the I.J. did not err pro-
   cedurally, the judge erred in determining that Arafat had not provided suffi-
   cient corroborating evidence to grant his petitions for asylum and with-

           3
            Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
   526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); see also Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d at 770–71 (applying Chevron
   deference to another of the BIA’s interpretations of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
           4
              This holding was confirmed by the BIA, which stated, “The record does not
   reflect that the [I.J.] restrictively required any specific corroborating evidence. Rather,
   the [I.J.] found that, overall, the respondent did not sufficiently corroborate his testimony
   . . . .”

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   holding of removal. 5 Such a decision is highly discretionary: We do not over-
   turn findings of fact unless we determine “not only that the evidence sup-
   ports a contrary conclusion, but also that the evidence compels it.” Chen v.
   Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).
           To support his testimony, Arafat showed the I.J. his injured foot and
   provided country reports from 2018 and 2019 along with newspaper articles
   documenting the situation. The government provided evidence showing that
   Anglophones had engaged in “mass protests,” to which “security forces re-
   sponded with bullets and teargas” on the same day that Arafat alleged he was
   detained by the military. Arafat also provided affidavits from his wife, uncle,
   neighbor, and family lawyer.
           Arafat claims that the I.J. did not consider this record evidence and
   asks for remand. See Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 412–13 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (reversing a claim when the agency did not consider substantial record evi-
   dence). The oral decision, however, makes clear that the I.J. did consider
   all of Arafat’s evidence and properly decided that it was not sufficient to cor-
   roborate his testimony.
          Specifically, because none of the affiants had been present for the
   events they recounted and were “merely reciting what the respondent or
   someone else told them,” the I.J. held that the affidavits could not count as
   corroboration. Without these, there was no primary-source evidence linking
   Arafat to the claimed torture, military beatings, or detention, so the I.J.
   found there to be insufficient corroboration. The pieces of evidence possibly
   to the contrary—namely, Arafat’s injured toe and the country and newspaper

           5
             The decision was also affirmed by the BIA, so we may review. “We agree with
   the [I.J.] that the respondent’s corroborative evidence did not sufficiently support his
   testimony.” See Wang, 569 F.3d at 536.

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   reports—are not sufficient to show that the I.J.’s holding was substantially
   in error. The country and newspaper reports, while making it possible that
   Arafat suffered what he claimed to suffer, offer only circumstantial evidence.
   In this posture, we “should accept the agency’s factual findings if those find-
   ings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . . [and]
   should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative
   findings that could [also] be supported by substantial evidence.” Arkansas v.
   Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (citation omitted).
          Arafat contends that “the government corroborated key elements of
   his claims by conceding that he participated in the September 2017 protest
   and by submitting newspaper accounts of the military responding to protests
   with gunfire and tear gas.” Though the government did submit these ac-
   counts, there is no evidence in the record that the government conceded
   Arafat’s presence at the September 2017 protests. The portions of the rec-
   ord cited by Arafat merely show the government’s questioning Arafat’s
   account of the protest, which does not suffice to constitute concession.
          Arafat further states that the I.J. was wrong to hold that he “provided
   no evidence of any injuries he incurred as a result of his September 22, 2017,
   arrest and subsequent 29-day detention.” At trial, Arafat tried to show the
   I.J. the injured foot at the hearing, but the I.J. stopped him, saying “stop,
   stop, stop.” It is unclear from the record whether Arafat actually showed the
   I.J. his injured foot or whether the I.J. erred in stating that there was no
   evidence of injuries.
          Regardless, we deny Arafat’s petition. Under our deferential standard
   of review, we may not grant review unless we find that “any reasonable ad-
   judicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.
   § 1252(b)(4)(B), or that the evidence presented is “so compelling that no
   reasonable factfinder” could find that he is ineligible for relief or protection

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   from removal,” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992). The
   I.J. found that “[e]ssentially, the only thing [Arafat] has to show that these
   incidents actually occurred and the way they actually occurred is his own tes-
   timony.” Without more, the fact of injury cannot show that it was sustained
   in the alleged manner.

                                         V.
          Arafat disputes the I.J.’s dismissal of his CAT claim. Such a claim
   requires him to show that it is “more likely than not that he or she would be
   tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”              8 C.F.R.
   § 1208.16(c)(2). To determine whether a petitioner has made out this claim,
   courts consider, inter alia,
          (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
          (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the
          country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;
          (iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
          rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and
          (iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the
          country of removal.
   8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).
          The I.J. dismissed Arafat’s CAT claim for three reasons. First, the
   I.J. held that the one alleged incident of detention and resulting mistreatment
   did not “rise to the level of persecution” and thus did not constitute past
   torture. Second, he found that Arafat’s evidence failed to show it was more
   likely than not that he would be tortured by a state actor if he returned to
   Cameroon because “[i]n light of . . . recent and wide sweeping changes, it is
   unlikely the government or military have any inclination to want to torture
   the respondent should he be returned to Cameroon.” Finally, the I.J. noted
   that “the record does not contain independent evidence sufficient to meet
   [Arafat’s] burden of proving eligibility for protection under the [CAT].”

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   The BIA affirmed the I.J.’s holding on all three bases.
          Arafat disputes all of this, claiming that he was tortured multiple
   times, and even if he were not, one incident can constitute torture, and that
   the I.J. was incorrect that country conditions in Cameroon had changed.
   Without reaching the merits of these claims, however, we uphold the I.J.’s
   dismissal of the CAT claim for the same reason we affirmed the dismissal of
   the asylum and withholding-of-removal claims: There are no grounds to
   reverse the I.J.’s holding that Arafat had not provided sufficient corroborat-
   ing evidence to support his testimony.
          The petition for review is DENIED. The request for a stay of re-
   moval is DENIED as moot.

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   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
          Section 208 of the INA is ambiguous regarding “the procedural
   requirements for submitting corroborating evidence.” Matter of L-A-C-, 26
   I. & N. Dec. at 518. “The BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it
   gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of
   case-by-case adjudication.’” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17 (2009)
   (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). I would adopt the
   BIA’s interpretation of § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) as laid out in Matter of L-A-C-:
          [a]t the merits hearing, in circumstances where the
          Immigration Judge determines that specific corroborating
          evidence should have been submitted, the applicant should be
          given an opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably
          obtain such evidence. The Immigration Judge must also ensure
          that the applicant’s explanation is included in the record and
          should clearly state for the record whether the explanation is
          sufficient.
   26 I. & N. Dec. at 521 (citations omitted).
          The majority concludes that “we need not reach the issue of whether
   such procedures are in fact required by the INA because the I.J. never
   required ‘specific corroborating evidence’ from Arafat.” This is because,
   according to the majority, “[t]he I.J. did not hold one missing piece of
   evidence to be the sine qua non to corroboration.” The BIA in Matter of L-A-
   C- did not say that the procedures in § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) only apply if the
   evidence is the “sine qua non” to corroboration, and I would find that the
   procedures may still apply even if there are multiple pieces of missing
   evidence.
          This case, however, falls under a category that the BIA sidestepped:
   “circumstances in which the absence of corroborating evidence may be so
   glaring that no explicit opportunity to explain its absence needs to be given.”

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   Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 521 n.4. Mohndamenang was given ample
   opportunity over multiple proceedings to explain the lack of corroborating
   evidence. During the first proceeding, the IJ said “I don’t have any
   corroborative materials.” Mohndamenang testified that he was unable to
   procure corroborating evidence at the time. On appeal from his first
   proceeding, Mohndamenang submitted several pieces of evidence that he
   claimed corroborated his account. The BIA remanded the case so that this
   new evidence could be considered and so that “additional pertinent
   evidence” could be submitted. During the next hearing, The IJ gave
   Mohndamenang multiple opportunities to explain why several parts of his
   story remained uncorroborated. His answers were insufficient.
         These proceedings constituted an opportunity for Mohndamenang to
   explain the lack of corroborating evidence. He did not. I agree that his
   petition for review should be denied.

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