Court Opinion

ID: 9952454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:08:50.151066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:39.196674
License: Public Domain

Pelaez v City of New York
               2024 NY Slip Op 30826(U)
                     March 15, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 150563/2018
                 Judge: Shlomo S. Hagler
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
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                       publication.
                                                                                                INDEX NO. 150563/2018
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 150                                                                    RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/15/2024

                            SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                      NEW YORK COUNTY
           PRESENT:        HON. SHLOMO S. HAGLER                           PART                                17
                                                                Justice
           -------------------X                                            INDEX NO.           150563/2018
            ROLANDO PELAEZ,
                                                                           MOTION DATE          02/06/2023
                                             Plaintiff,
                                                                           MOTION SEQ. NO.           004
                                       -v-
            THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SKANSKA USA BUILDING                       DECISION + ORDER ON
            INC.,42ND STREET DEVELOPMENT PROJECT INC.,
                                                                                   MOTION
                                             Defendant.
                                                           -------X

            THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SKANSKA USA BUILDING INC.                            Third-Party
                                                                                 Index No. 595957/2018
                                              Plaintiff,

                                        -against-

            TRI STATE DISMANTLING CORP.

                                              Defendant.
                                                           ----X

           The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,
           94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108, 109, 110, 111,112,113,114,115,
           116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127 ,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,
           137,138,139,140,141,142,144,145,146,147,149
           were read on this motion to/for                            JUDGMENT - SUMMARY

                  Plaintiff Rolando Pelaez moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability under

           Labor Law § 240 ( 1). Defendants The City of New York, Skanska USA Building Inc.

           ("Skanska"), and 4TS II LLC (collectively "Defendants") cross-move for summary judgment

           dismissing plaintiffs claims under Labor Law§§ 240 (1), 241 (6), 200, and common law

           negligence. At oral argument held on August 9, 2023, the Court denied defendants' cross-motion

           as to Labor Law§§ 241 (6) and 200 and common law negligence. As such, plaintiffs claim

           under Labor Law§ 240 (I) is the only issue still outstanding on this motion and cross-motion.

            150563/2018 PELAEZ, ROLANDO vs. CITY OF NEW YORK                                    Page 1 of 11
            Motion No. 004

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                                                            Facts

            Plaintiffs Deposition

                   This action arises out of an accident that occurred on June 15, 2017 when plaintiff was

            employed with third-party defendant Tristate Dismantling Corp. ("Tristate") (Plaintiffs

            November 30, 2020 EBT, Plaintiffs Ex. 13 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 103] at 74). The accident took

            place on the 19th floor of a building located at 4 Times Square in Manhattan ( id. at 77-78). At

            the time of the accident plaintiff and other employees of Tristate were performing demolition

            work on the entire floor (id at 88). Plaintiff was wearing safety goggles and a hard hat (id. at 83-

            84). He and a coworker were instructed to "rip up the pipe, and be very careful, and that's it" (id

            at 88). Plaintiff testified that his foreman, Gilberto, who also worked for Tristate, gave plaintiff

            those instructions (id. at 77, 90). The pipes were located on the ceiling (id. at 88). A Sawzall was

            used to cut the pipes down from the ceiling (id. at 92). Plaintiff further testified that the foreman

            "had two people to perform that job and do the work that day so it was the guy that cuts with the

            Sawzall, so that was the other guy. And myself, I would be there to help him" (id).

                   The pipes that plaintiff and his coworker were instructed to cut down were approximately

            4 to 6 inches in diameter and 15 to 16 feet in length (id at 95-96). The pipes were hanging from

            the ceiling with "hooks" and "you have to cut that in order to bring the tube down" (id. at 96).

            They had already cut down approximately four to five pipes that day before the accident

            occurred (id at 95). Plaintiffs partner used the Sawzall the entire time and was up on an A-

            frame ladder in order to cut the pipes (id. at 97). Plaintiff testified that he never went on the

            ladder and stayed on the floor while the pipe was being cut by his partner ( id. at 97). His partner

            would make two cuts "at the beginning and at the end" of the pipe in order to bring the pipe

            down (id.). Specifically, when asked if his partner "would cut one end of the black pipe, then cut

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             Motion No. 004

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           however many hooks were holding that section of the pipe up, and then make a cut to the other

           end of the black pipe," plaintiff answered "Yes" ( id at 104). 1 Plaintiff testified that his partner

           "would have to go up and cut it. I would be on the floor holding it so it wouldn't fall" (id at 98).

           He would hold the pipe with both hands and would grab the pipe when his partner cut the hooks

           "[a]s the pipe was coming down" (id). Plaintiff testified that this was the way he always did it

           and that it was the "logical way" (Plaintiff's June 10, 2021 EBT, Plaintiffs Ex. 14 [NYSCEF

           Doc. No. 104] at 22-23).

                     At the moment of the accident, plaintiff's partner had already made the first cut of the

           pipe and had cut down all the hooks, so the final cut of the black pipe was all that remained

           before the pipe would fall (Plaintiff's Ex. 13 at 106). Describing the accident, plaintiff testified

           as follows:

                    I was on the left side of the guy when he was cutting the pipe. I was towards the
                    end of it, and then there was a leak so I told the guy to wait to cut the pipe while I
                    go get a [bucket], and then he completely ignored me and he continued cutting.
                    So not even 20 seconds passed for me to get the [bucket], and he cuts and cuts,
                    and then I don't know what else to tell you, because I pretty much fell asleep on
                    the floor

           Id. at 107.

                     Plaintiff was standing next to his partner who was on the ladder at the time of the

           accident (Plaintiff's Ex. 14 at 71 ). He testified that he had been holding the cut end of the pipe

           and noticed that it had begun to leak (id. at 71-72). He testified that he asked his partner "to wait

           for me to get a bucket to collect the water that was leaking. I asked him many times to stop

           cutting so that I could go and get the bucket, but he didn't listen to me" (id. at 73). He further

           testified that he made eye contact with his partner while he was using the Sawzall and asked him

            1 At plaintiff's second deposition on June 10, 202 l, plaintiff stated differently that all hangers must be cut before any

           sections of the pipe could be cut (Plaintiff's Ex. 14 at 24).
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             Motion No. 004

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            "many times and he did not pay any attention" (id at 76-77). When the pipe made contact with

            the plaintiff, he was moving back to hold the end of the pipe after placing the bucket on the floor

           (id. at 74). Plaintiff believes the pipe hit him because his partner did not listen to him to stop

            cutting when plaintiff went to get the bucket (id at 75).

           Skanska 's Deposition

                   Patrick Mawhinney testified on behalf of defendant Skanska. He began working for

            Skanska in April 2014 as a project engineer (Mawhinney's EBT, Plaintiffs Ex. 15 [NYSCEF

           Doc. No. 105] at 7). He began working on the project at 4 Times Square in March 2016 (id at

            10). Skanska was the general contractor on the project and was hired by the Durst Organization

           ("Durst") to serve in that role (id at 11). The 19th floor of the building came under Skanska's

            scope of work "sometime between 2016 and 2017" ( id at 18). Skanska engaged Tristate as a

           demolition subcontractor for "full demolition of the offices on the [19th] floor" with approval

           from Durst (id at 19). Even though Tristate performed the demolition, Mawhinney testified that

            Skanska had employees, including himself, monitoring the work done on the 19th floor (id).

            With respect to the safety protocols initiated on the site by Skanska, Mawhinney testified that

            Skanska "give[s employees] orientation the first day on site. There's signage everywhere stating

           the safety policy, we have monthly safety meetings, we did toolbox talks weekly that go over

            policy and they review it themselves every day" (id at 28-29).

                   Specifically with respect to cutting pipes, Mawhinney stated that "it's contractor means

           and methods, you can use a chainfall or roustabout, depending on what they're using Skanska

            can say this is how you need to use this equipment" (id. at 34). Skanska "approved Tristate's

           means and methods for pipe demolition" (id. at 60). Mawhinney testified that Skanska would not

            provide workers with any equipment or materials such as "hard hats or harnesses" or "anchors or

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             Motion No. 004

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           netting" as that was the contractor's job (id at 65). When asked to confirm that there "was no

           wires, no ropes, just the worker with the end of the pipe and that's it," Mawhinney responded "I

           don't see anything" (id. at 47).

                                              Summary Judgment Standard

                  "[T]he proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are no

           material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" ( Ostrov v

           Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 152 [1st Dept 2012]). "Failure to make such prima facie showing

           requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers" (Alvarez v

           Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320,324 [1986] [internal citations omitted]). Once a movant has met

           this burden, "the burden shifts to the opposing party to submit proof in admissible form sufficient

           to create a question of fact requiring a trial" (Kershaw v Hospital for Special Surgery, 114 AD3d

           75, 82 [1st Dept 2013]). "[I]t is insufficient to merely set forth averments of factual or legal

           conclusions" (Genger v Genger, 123 AD3d 445, 447 [1st Dept 2014], quoting Schiraldi v US.

           Min. Prods., 194 AD2d 482,483 [1st Dept 1993]). Finally, evidence must be "construed in the

           light most favorable to the one moved against" (Kershaw, 114 AD3d at 82). Therefore, if there is

           any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied

           (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223,231 [1978]).

                                                            Discussion

                  Labor Law § 240 (1 ), also known as the Scaffold Law, provides, as relevant:

                          "All contractors and owners and their agents . . . in the erection,
                          demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a
                          building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished
                          or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists,
                          stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes,
                          and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated
                          as to give proper protection to a person so employed."

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            Motion No. 004

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                  '"Labor Law§ 240 (1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the

           scaffold ... or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm

           directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person"' (John v

           Baharestani, 281 AD2d 114, 118 [1st Dept 2001], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

           Co., 81 NY2d 494,501 [1993]). Importantly, Labor Law§ 240 (1) "is designed to protect

           workers from gravity-related hazards ... and must be liberally construed to accomplish the

           purpose for which it was framed" (Valensisi v Greens at Half Hollow, LLC, 33 AD3d 693, 695

           [2d Dept 2006] [internal citations omitted]). Section 240 (1) recognizes two different types of

           cases: those involving a "falling worker" and those involving a "falling object" (Narducci v

           Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259,267 [2001]). With respect to "falling object" cases,

           Section 240 (1) applies "where the falling of an object is related to a significant risk inherent in .

           . . the relative elevation ... at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured" ( id. at

           267-68 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). Liability in such cases will attach when

           the plaintiff demonstrates that the object was in the process of being "hoisted or secured" or

           where, at the time the object fell, it "required securing for the purposes of the undertaking"

           (Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC, 22 NY3d 658, 662-63 [2014]).

                  "[W]hen a worker is performing one of the inherently dangerous activities" within the

           scope of Section 240 (1 ), injury from the contractor or owner's failure to provide adequate

           worker safety devices is foreseeable (Ortega v City ofNew York, 95 AD3d 125, 128 [1st Dept

           2012]). "Thus, a plaintiff merely has to demonstrate that he or she was injured when an

           elevation-related safety device failed to perform its function to support and secure him from

           injury" (id. [internal citations omitted]; see also Perez v NYC Partnership Hous. Dev. Fund Co.,

           Inc., 55 AD3d 419, 420 [2008] ["it is sufficient for purposes of liability under section 240(1) that

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            Motion No. 004

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           adequate safety devices to prevent the [structure] from slipping or protecting plaintiff from

           falling were absent"] [internal quotation marks omitted]). As such, to prevail on a Section

           240 (1) claim, a plaintiff must show that the statute was violated, and that this violation was a

           proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d

           35, 39 [2004)).

                   In support of his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that his injury stemmed

           "directly from the flow of gravity upon the pipe," which fell due to defendants' failure to provide

           plaintiff and his partner with adequate safety devices to "lower the pipe in a safe and controlled

           manner" (Plaintiffs Memo of Law [NYSCEF Doc. No. 108] at 6). Plaintiff argues that "despite

           chainfalls and roustabouts being methods by which pipes ... could be lowered, no wires, ropes,

           or other devices were provided so as to control the descent of the pipe" (id.).

                   In opposition, and in support of their cross-motion, defendants argue that "it is not

           enough that a device 'should' have been provided for the undertaking; plaintiff must establish

           that the safety device was required for the specific work being performed" (Defendants' Aff. in

           Support [NYSCEF Doc. No. 113] at 7). Defendants argue that the only device enumerated in the

           statute that plaintiff alleged was not present were ropes, and it is neither customary nor required

           for such safety devices to be used when performing the kind of demolition work that plaintiff

           was performing at the time of his accident and had performed "hundreds oftimes" before (id at

           8-9).

                   Plaintiff has met his prima facie burden for summary judgment on liability. He offered

           uncontroverted evidence through his and Mawhinney' s depositions that there were no safety

           devices to assist him and his partner in taking down the pipes, and he established that the lack of

           adequate safety devices provided by defendants was a proximate cause of his injury. Further,

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            Motion No. 004

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           Mawhinney testified that there are safety devices that could have been used to help plaintiff as he

           was doing this demolition work, such as chainfalls or roustabouts (Plaintiffs Ex. 15 at 34).

           Contrary to defendants' arguments, plaintiff does not carry the burden of showing that the safety

           device "was required for the specific work being performed" (id at 7 [emphasis added]). The

           purpose of Section 240 (1) "is to protect workers and to impose the responsibility for safety

           practices on those best situated to bear that responsibility," namely owners and contractors (Ross

           v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 500). As such, plaintiff need only show that the

           absence of adequate safety devices was a proximate cause of his injury at the worksite, which he

           has done (see, e.g., Ortega, 95 AD3d at 128; Mercado v Caithness Long Island LLC, 104 AD3d

           576, 576-77 [1st Dept 2013] [granting summary judgment on liability because "[p]laintiff

           established that his injuries were caused, at least in part, by the absence of proper protection

           required by the statute"]; Cardenas v One State St, LLC, 68 AD3d 436, 438 [1st Dept 2009]

           [granting summary judgment to plaintiff on liability because "plaintiff offered uncontroverted

           evidence that he was not provided with any safety equipment to aid in accomplishing the task he

           was instructed to perform, and that the failure to provide any such device was the proximate

           cause of his injuries"]).

                   Defendants' argument that the use of such safety devices is not necessary under the

           Industrial Code or OSHA regulations is unavailing. Section 240 (1) is not concerned with

           provisions of the Industrial Code or any statute outside the Labor Law statute so an argument

           that safety devices are "not required" under any statute or code besides the Labor Law statute

           itself is irrelevant.

                   Defendants offer an expert affidavit of professional engineer Bernard P. Lorenz, P .E.

           (Lorenz Aff. [NYSCEF Doc. No. 130] ,r 2). In his affidavit Mr. Lo_renz opines that the use of a

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            Motion No. 004

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           safety device enumerated in Section 240 "would have prevented the intended demolition work,

           the removal of the pipes from the ceiling level" and "would require mathematical calculations in

           order to determine the center of gravity of each individual pipe section to be removed" (id. ,r,r 6-

           7). He opines that plaintiff and his coworker were demolishing the pipe "in a safe and proper

           manner in accordance with construction industry custom and practice" and safety devices like

           ropes, stays, and hangers were not required (id ,r 8).

                   Despite these contentions, it has been established in the First Department that

           "defendants' argument that failure to provide an appropriate safety device was either

           impracticable under the circumstances or would not have prevented the accident is unavailing"

           (Pichardo v Urban Renaissance Collaboration Ltd Partnership, 51 AD3d 472, 472-73 [1st Dept

           2008]). Similarly, "the testimony and expert opinion that a safety device was neither necessary

           nor customary is insufficient to establish the absence of a Labor Law § 240 ( 1) violation"

           (Gonzalez v Paramount Group, Inc., 157 AD3d 427,428 [1st Dept 2018] [internal quotation

           marks omitted]). Even plaintiffs own testimony that he has performed this demolition work

           "hundreds of times prior" in a similar manner without safety devices is unavailing to show that a

           safety device in this instance is not necessary under Section 240 (1) (Defendants' Aff. at 9).

                   Next, despite Mr. Lorenz's opinion that providing safety devices would prevent the

           intended demolition work, the First Department has held that using safety devices to prevent the

           uncontrolled descent of an object is not contrary to the purpose of demolition work (Mayorga v

            75 Plaza LLC, 191 AD3d 606,607 [1st Dept 2021] ["Further, regulating [the object's] descent to

           prevent it from falling would not have been contrary to the purpose of work"]). In light of the

           "uncontroverted fact" that there is no dispute that no safety devices were provided to plaintiff

           and his coworker, "it would be error to submit to the jury for their resolution" the dispute

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             Motion No. 004

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           between plaintiff and defendants' expert "as to what safety devices, if any, should have been

           employed" (Gonzalez, 157 AD3d at 428).

                  In opposition to plaintiff's motion and in support of their own cross-motion, defendants

           also argue that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident (Defendants' Aff. at 9).

           Defendants argue that plaintiff was "fully aware that it was his responsibility to maintain his hold

           on the [pipe] while his partner cut the other end of the pipe" and because he "released a pipe that

           he, and he alone, was tasked with holding," he bears sole responsibility for the accident (id. at 9-

           10).

                  The defense of sole proximate cause "generally applies where the worker misused,

           removed, or failed to use an available safety device that would have prevented the accident, or

           knowingly chose to use an inadequate device despite the availability of an adequate device"

           (Boyd v Schiavone Const. Co., Inc., I 06 AD3d 546, 548 [1st Dept 2013]). Here, there is no

           dispute that there was no safety device provided to the plaintiff. By arguing that the plaintiff was

           the sole proximate cause of his own accident because he walked away from his job of holding

           the pipe, defendants essentially argue that plaintiff was meant to be his own safety device, which

           is completely contrary to the purpose of Section 240 ( 1) in the first place. Plaintiff cannot be the

           sole proximate cause of his accident when no safety devices were provided (see DeRose v

           Bloomingdale 's Inc., 120 AD3d 41, 45 [1st Dept. 2014]). In any event, the evidence is

           uncontroverted that plaintiff attempted to communicate with his partner to stop cutting before he

           walked away to get the bucket. By communicating with his partner, plaintiff fulfilled his

           obligation under the Labor Law and could not have been the sole proximate cause of the accident

           even when his coworker continued to cut the pipe after the plaintiff walked away.

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            Motion No. 004

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                   Plaintiff has met his burden for summary judgment on liability by showing that the lack

           of adequate safety devices was a proximate cause of his accident. Defendants conversely did not

           show their entitlement to dismissal of plaintiffs Section 240 (1) claims because there is no

           triable issue of fact that plaintiff's injury occurred "because of the absence or inadequacy of a

           safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" (Narducci, 96 NY2d at 268). Defendants

           also failed to raise a triable issue of fact that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the

           accident.

                                                         Conclusion

                   Accordingly, it is

                   ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law

           § 240 (1) is granted; and it is further

                   ORDERED that defendants' cross-motion to dismiss plaintiff's Labor Law§ 240 (1)

           claim is denied.

                                                                                SHl.OMO S. HAGLER, J.S.C.

                                    ~
            CHECK ONE:                   CASE DISPOSED                    NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                         GRANTED         □ DENIED         GRANTED IN PART          □ OTHER
            APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                     SUBMIT ORDER

            CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:        INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN       FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT    □ REFERENCE

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            Motion No. 004

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