Court Opinion

ID: 9770681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:07.420022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.874251
License: Public Domain

OPINION
NYE, Chief Justice.
Rose Sales Company (appellee) sued Texas Hauling Contractors Corporation (appellant) on a sworn open account for the pur*244chase price of a used motor. An invoice with a specific warranty was prepared by Rose Sales Company at the time the defendants received the motor in question. The defendant, purchaser, defended on the grounds that the motor was defective when purchased and that the motor was returned pursuant to an oral warranty that was different from that contained in the written invoice. Trial was to the court, sitting without a jury. Judgment was entered for Rose Sales Company for the purchase price of the motor and attorney’s fees. Defendant purchaser perfected his appeal to this Court. The question before this Court is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court’s judgment.
At trial, the defendant contended that its president, Floyd McLaughlin, telephoned Rose Sales Company on March 12, 1976, to inquire whether Rose Sales had a good used “366 engine” for a disabled truck. McLaughlin testified that he was informed that Rose Sales had such a motor to sell and that if the engine was not “good”, the purchaser could return the motor. Rose Sales contended on the other hand that the engine was sold under a specific warranty guaranteeing an exchange in the event the heads, crankshaft or block failed. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Rose Sales Company for $500.00, the purchase price of the used engine.
The trial court recited certain fact findings and legal conclusions in its judgment. It did not file separate findings of fact or conclusions of law. Since no findings of fact were filed by the trial court, we are relegated to an examination of the implied findings for support of the trial court’s judgment. Such recitation in the judgment itself are not proper. It tends to mislead the parties, sometimes resulting in the failure by them to request and receive specific findings of fact essential to an attack based on insufficient evidence of the various elements necessary to support a judgment. Recitations contained in the judgment cannot be substituted for separately filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As such, they do not afford any basis upon which a losing party may attack the trial court’s judgment. Morin v. Morin, 561 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Fenlon v. Jaffee, 553 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Roberson Farm Equipment Company v. Hill, 514 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Civ. App.—Texarkana 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
Where no findings of fact or conclusions of law have been filed, as in this case, the judgment of the court will be affirmed if there is any evidence of probative force to support it upon any theory authorized by law. Lassiter v. Biiss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Sup.1977); Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Sup.1962); Atlantic Richfield v. Trull, 559 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d w. o. j.); Don’s Marine v. Haldeman, 557 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Godde v. Wood, 509 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The Courts of Civil Appeals presume that the trial court found all necessary facts in favor if its judgment, and the reviewing court is bound by such implied findings if there is any evidence of probative value to support them. Atlantic Richfield v. Trull, supra; Don’s Marine v. Haldeman, supra; Pruske v. National Bank of Commerce of San Antonio, 533 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1976, no writ). In reviewing the evidence, we must consider only that evidence most favorable to the trial court’s presumed findings and disregard all contrary evidence. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Fenlon v. Jaffee, supra; Bowen v. El Paso White Truck Co., 434 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1968, no writ); Oxford Development Co. v. Eppes, 422 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
This case was filed upon a sworn open account, which was met by a denial under oath by the purchaser that each and every item stated in the account was not just or true. This sworn denial of the account sued upon placed the burden upon Rose Sales Company to prove its case as at common law and independent of Rule 185, Texas *245Rules of Civil Procedure. J. E. Earnest & Co. v. Word, 137 Tex. 16, 152 S.W.2d 325 (1941); Opryshek v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 367 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1963, no writ); Trice Contract Carpets & Furniture, Inc. v. Martin, 334 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1960, no writ); Davis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1951, writ ref’d); Burtis v. Butler Bros., 243 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1951, no writ).
The burden was upon Rose Sales Company to establish each and every item of its account by legal and proper evidence. The essential evidence of such proof includes the following: 1) sale and delivery of the merchandise; 2) that the prices charged for the goods were in accordance with an agreement, or in the absence of an agreement that they were usual, customary or reasonable; and 3) that as of the date of the delivery of the goods for thirty days thereafter the amount due remained unpaid. California Chemical Co. v. Sasser, 423 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); Bosco Bolt, Nut, Screw Co. v. Mercer Construction Co., 412 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); Burrus Mills, Inc. v. Hein, 399 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Opryshek v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra at 358; Trice Contract Carpets & Furniture Inc. v. Martin, supra at 558.
The parties agree on this appeal that the only real dispute is whether Rose Sales Company gave a binding oral warranty over the telephone to the president of Texas Hauling Contractors to the effect that if the used engine purchased was not “good”, Texas Hauling Contractors could exchange the motor. This dispute concerns the first element of plaintiff’s cause of action — i. e., a sale was consumated in accordance with the warranty listed on the invoice which guaranteed the heads, crankshaft and block of the motor.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s implied finding. Evarispo Espinoza, truck foreman for the purchaser, testified that he and the chief mechanic, Sam Zapata, went to Rose Sales Company on behalf of the purchaser to acquire a used “366 engine” and some other parts not material to this appeal. Espinoza testified that they dealt with Mike Rose of Rose Sales who prepared an invoice that Mr. Espinoza signed. He further testified that they took the engine from Rose Sales and delivered it back to the site at which Texas Hauling Contractors Corporation was then working. Mike Rose testified that he sold the motor to the employees of Texas Hauling Contractors Corporation and that he gave them the same guarantee given by Rose Sales on all of the motors that they sell. This guarantee is that the block, head and crankshaft are good. He further testified that Espinoza and Zapata started the engine and checked it out prior to the time they accepted and removed it from the premises of Rose Sales.
The record also indicates that shortly after this engine was installed in the purchaser’s disabled truck, it was returned to Rose Sales with a broken connecting rod. Mike Rose testified that even though this failure was not covered by the express warranty, he agreed to exchange it for a second used motor in order to try to keep the business relations between the parties continuing. He testified that two business partners, two mechanics, and he, himself, personally checked out the second motor to make certain that it was in good running condition. Mr. Espinoza and Mr. Zapata picked up this second engine and delivered it to Texas Hauling Contractors’ work site. Prior to taking the second engine, Mr. Zapata testified that he examined the engine while it was running, and then concluded that it was in good working order. The record indicates, however, that this second engine threw a rod after 97 miles of operation. This failure was not covered by the express written warranty.
The evidence is sufficient that the sale was consummated at Rose Sales’ place of business and that both parties agreed to the express warranties contained in the written invoice. There is testimony in the record that it is not customary in the trade *246to give any warranty on a used motor. However, contrary to the usual and customary practice in the industry, Rose Sales did guarantee the motor as to the head, crankshaft and block. The invoice, containing this warranty, was prepared and signed on the spot at the time of sale. The defect, if any, did not go to the parts warranted by Rose Sales.
The evidence regarding an alleged oral warranty is conflicting. The trial court, as the trier of facts in this case, was at liberty to believe all or none or any part of the testimony of any party or any witness. Under the above stated rule, we look only to that evidence favorable in upholding the trial court’s judgment. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court even if we might have reached a different conclusion.
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.