Court Opinion

ID: 9792171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:23.262452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.889634
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
While I agree that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs quantum meruit claim, because the majority opinion mischaracterizes the contract issue in this case and comes to the wrong result, I dissent.
The majority frames the issue assuming the following: the parties agree that the contract is unambiguous; interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law; and there are no issues of fact to be resolved. Thus, the majority contends that the only question is whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This analysis is flawed from the start.
Although both parties do say that the contract is unambiguous, they are wrong. While each party asserts that the contract is unambiguous to the extent that it must be interpreted in its favor, each party’s interpretation is very different. We are certainly not precluded from finding an ambiguity because each party has confidence in its own argument. Only if defendant’s interpretation is so clear as to preclude doubt by any reasonable person would summary judgment be appropriate. See Pacific Western Devel. Corp. v. Summitt Exchange Co., 118 Or App 693, 698, 848 P2d 1246 (1993). Because this contract is susceptible to more than one *763reasonable interpretation, I cannot concur in the majority opinion.
The agreement provided, in part:
“If, during said listing period, the property is sold or transferred by owner or by any other person, firm, corporation, or REALTOR; or if Broker or sub-agents produce(s) a purchaser ready and willing to purchase the property; or if within 120 days after the expiration of said listing period a sale is made to any person to whom the property has been shown by Broker or sub-agents, owner agrees to pay a fee of six % of the sale price, unless otherwise specified in writing on this contract.”
The addendum to the listing agreement provided, in part:
“The SOLE and EXCLUSIVE RIGHT to sell, exchange, rent or lease the herein described property is hereby granted to the undersigned Real Estate Broker. A full fee as stated above shall be paid to the Broker in the event of a sale by the owner(s) or person acting on behalf of the owner(s) during the term of this contract. In case owner(s) withdraw(s) the authority hereby given prior to said expiration date, owner(s) agree(s) to pay Broker the said fee just the same as if a sale had actually been consummated by Broker.”
The specific language relied upon by Prestige here and below is found in the addendum to the listing agreement: “In case owner(s) withdraw(s) the authority hereby given prior to said expiration date, owner(s) agree(s) to pay Broker the said fee just the same as if a sale had actually been consummated by Broker.” Prestige contends that the trial court erred in construing the agreement because it “gave no effect whatever” to this clause and thus ran afoul of ORS 42.230 by omitting a “bargained for” term. Further, Prestige asserts that the disputed provision permits only one reasonable construction: that the reference to “said fee” means six percent of the ‘list” price, which is the price for which Hanson agreed to sell the property.
The majority opinion holds that the “list” price is completely different than the “sale” price. However, it fails to *764reconcile the fact that under one other condition in the contract the list price becomes the sale price. The contract provides that if the broker provides a ready and willing buyer and the owner refuses to sell, the broker is still entitled to six percent of the sale price, even though no sale has occurred. The six percent must necessarily refer to the list price. Thus, the majority is in error when it holds “[t]he trial court did not err in holding that a commission involves a sale of the property.” 151 Or App at 761. Interpreting this contract to provide for a commission, based on the list price, if owner withdraws the authority to sell the property is both sensible and reasonable.
I am not, however, insinuating that the majority opinion’s interpretation of the contract is wrong. The point is, the disputed language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. It could mean that the realtor is entitled to a commission because the seller revoked its authority to list and sell the property before the expiration of the agreement. It could also mean that the realtor is entitled to a commission only if the seller sold the property after revoking the realtor’s authority before the expiration of the agreement. Both constructions are consistent with the language of the agreement and neither is so unreasonable that we may reject it as a matter of law. Accordingly, an ambiguity exists. The resolution of the ambiguity presents a question of fact and the majority opinion errs in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Riggs, Landau and Armstrong, JJ., join in this dissent.