Court Opinion

ID: 9397081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:05:37.220504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.229020
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 22-0524
                             Filed May 24, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ZACHARY JAMES LINDAUER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.

Odekirk, Judge.

      Zachary Lindauer appeals his conviction, which he believes was the result

of an unfavorable evidentiary ruling. AFFIRMED.

      Ronald W. Kepford of Kepford Law Firm, Winterset, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                        2

GREER, Judge.

      During Zachary Lindauer’s trial over charges for third-degree sexual abuse,

a witness who allegedly saw Lindauer dancing with the woman it was claimed he

sexually assaulted did not show up to testify. Believing the testimony was critical

to his case, Lindauer requested that the district court allow the admission of the

witness’s discovery deposition testimony. The district court denied the request,

finding Lindauer did not show the witness was unavailable and, thus, the

deposition testimony was hearsay under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.804(a). The jury

found Lindauer guilty of the charged offense.     After that conviction, Lindauer

moved in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. The district court denied both

motions on the grounds argued and then sentenced Lindauer to prison.1 Lindauer

appeals.

      Factual Background.

      As students attending the University of Northern Iowa converged upon

campus in August of 2018, some of the students decided to go out to socialize at

the local bars. K.O., one of those students, went to an establishment with her new

roommate and the roommate’s friend. Before they did, however, the roommate

brought vodka to her car, where the trio drank “shots” of straight vodka. Not an

experienced drinker of alcohol, K.O. began to feel the effects of the hits. Next,

they drank at an “18 and up bar,” and K.O. decided to dance on the dance floor.

She and Lindauer started to dance together, and everyone at trial characterized

some of the dancing as “grinding.” Lindauer also described K.O. as being amorous

1Lindauer was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years, plus
a fine, surcharge, victim restitution fee, and sex offender civil penalty.
                                         3

with him, testifying that they engaged in kissing and she gave him a “hickey” on

his neck. Several persons at the bar saw the two dancing, including K.O.’s new

roommate. Without any reference to a specific date, another woman, Danasha—

the “missing witness”—also observed a woman and Lindauer dancing

provocatively and provided the details in a discovery deposition taken before trial.

       From there, Lindauer asked if they should go back to K.O.’s dorm room and

she agreed. Footage taken from campus cameras show the two walking the few

blocks back to the dorm; K.O. appeared to have balance issues and was aided by

a more-steady Lindauer. At first, K.O. took Lindauer to the wrong building, but

eventually video footage shows the two of them entering the elevator to go to

K.O.’s dorm room. That elevator footage confirms Lindauer was at the dorm for

approximately fifteen minutes.

       From there, the versions diverge.      K.O. testified that because of her

intoxication, she could not remember giving Lindauer permission to have sexual

intercourse with her and that she could not push him away from her. Lindauer

asserts she did give him permission after he had laid “her down on the futon on

her back” while “making out with her.” He also maintains she did not resist his

efforts to move her underwear aside and penetrate her vagina with his penis after

he had asked to do so. After the sexual act, Lindauer testified he asked if she

needed anything, K.O. said no, and he said good night then left.

       The next morning, after telling a high school friend at the dorm what had

happened and getting advice about what to do from that friend’s mother, K.O. went

to the hospital for an evaluation and made a report to law enforcement, including

the campus police and the Cedar Falls Police.        After the police successfully
                                          4

identified and located Lindauer, he was brought into an interview. Following an

investigation, Lindauer was arrested and charged with sexual abuse in the third

degree.

         Standard of Review and Preservation of Error.

         Rulings addressing the admissibility of hearsay are reviewed for correction

of errors at law. State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Iowa 2017). The State does

not contest error preservation.

         Discussion.

         For a brief period, Danasha and Lindauer interacted as friends through a

social media app called “Snapchat.” On an evening she could not pin down, at the

same bar where Lindauer met K.O., Danasha observed Lindauer with a “brown”

woman2 she did not know “making out . . . on the dance floor in front of everybody.”

She described both the woman and Lindauer as being “pretty sloppy” and “grossly

kissing each other and, like, drunk and sweaty, because it’s the dance floor.”

Danasha submitted to a discovery deposition and described these details. As trial

approached, Lindauer subpoenaed Danasha to testify at trial about her

observations of Lindauer and the woman. But, on the date Danasha appeared to

testify, the trial had to be continued because a juror fell ill. Because there had

been difficulties getting Danasha to appear to testify, Lindauer asked the district

court to address the subpoena with Danasha. On the record, the district court

spoke with Danasha and said, “Let the record reflect [Danasha] is receiving a copy

of the subpoena for Friday, January 7th, 2022, at 10 a.m. [Danasha], do you

2   K.O. is African American.
                                           5

understand you’ll need to reappear Friday at that time?” Danasha responded,

“Yep.”

         On the date Danasha was to appear again to testify, Lindauer learned that

she had been in a car accident in Minnesota. Danasha called to say she would

not be able to testify. The district court offered Lindauer the opportunity to present

Danasha’s testimony by live video, but Danasha declined the suggestion. Her

excuse was that she did not have the technology to make a video presentation

successful. Because Lindauer could not compel her testimony, he requested he

be allowed to read the discovery deposition that was taken earlier in the case and

argued Danasha now qualified as an “unavailable” witness under Iowa Rule of

Evidence 5.804(a), so the hearsay deposition testimony should be allowed. That

rule provides:

         A declarant is unavailable as a witness if the declarant:

                (1) Is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the
         declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege
         applies;
                (2) Refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court
         order to do so;
                (3) Testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
                (4) Cannot be present or testify at the trial because of death
         or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
                (5) Is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s
         proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means,
         to procure the declarant’s attendance.

Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(a). “[I]f a declarant is unavailable as a witness,” that witness’s

former testimony, including deposition testimony, is “not excluded by the rule

against hearsay.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(b). Lindauer appealed the district court’s

ruling over this issue, which stated:
                                          6

               The Court has reviewed both rule 5.804 and the cases
       referred to by the parties and having reviewed both the rule and the
       case law, I am going to find that the witness, [Danasha], is not
       unavailable for the purpose of the rule and I’m not going to allow the
       deposition to be read and would make some distinction.
               First of all, I’m concerned that this is not videotaped. The jury
       will have no opportunity to judge the demeanor of the witness as she
       would be testifying. Further, the purpose for which the deposition
       was taken was not for the purpose of evidence or—and it was not
       former testimony. For instance, in State v. Music, [No. 08-0993,
       2009 WL 1676898, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2009)] cited by the
       defense, I believe the offer in that case was of testimony from a
       probation revocation hearing which was actually, again, a contested
       proceeding in which the motivations of the parties in that case in
       questioning the witness were different than what they would have
       been in the present situation where the witness was merely being
       interrogated concerning the questions that were actually asked,
       which I have reviewed Court Exhibit 1, the deposition transcript.
               For those reasons, again, I will not treat the witness as
       unavailable pursuant to the hearsay rule and the request to read the
       deposition in lieu of her presence is denied.

Here, the district court did not address the factors found in rule 5.804(a) but instead

discussed the purpose and presentation format of the deposition testimony. So

we look to the 5.804 factors as the parties did in their appellate briefing. Most

pertinent is factor (5) because Danasha was absent from the trial and Lindauer

was not able “by process or other reasonable means to procure [Danasha’s]

attendance.” See Iowa R. Evid. 5.804(a)(5). To rely on this rule, Lindauer had the

burden to prove Danasha’s unavailability and that he used diligence in trying to

compel her attendance. See Music, 2009 WL 1676898, at *1. And as we said in

Music, “[t]he ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-

faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” Id. at *2;

accord id. at *1–2 (finding two failed attempts to subpoena, use of an investigator

to make contact, and research into the witness’s passport status were reasonable

efforts to compel the trial presence of the witness, so the deposition could be read
                                        7

at trial). The State maintains that Lindauer did not meet the burden to show

Danasha was unavailable. But it would be difficult to know what else Lindauer

could have done to have compelled Danasha to appear and testify when she

claimed she was stuck in Minnesota following a motor vehicle accident and knew

she was subpoenaed to attend trial. Counsel for Lindauer detailed the dilemma

and the effort made previously to compel attendance:

              My office received a message on 1-6-22 at 4:33 p.m. from the
      defense witness Danasha . . . . I didn’t receive it until this morning.
      I didn’t check my message until this morning. She indicated on the
      message that she was in Minnesota and her car was broken down
      and she said, I know I’m supposed to be in court tomorrow at 10 a.m.
      I called the courthouse and they told me to call you. And so then I
      called her this morning and she didn’t answer, but then they called
      me back around 7. She said she was in a car accident on Tuesday
      and they are stranded in Minnesota and they’re taking a bus back to
      Cedar Rapids and I asked her about what time. She said they
      weren’t coming back or their bus ticket wasn’t until 7 p.m. tonight and
      that she wouldn’t be back here until tomorrow.
              As the Court is aware, this is a witness that I have struggled
      to serve a subpoena, such that when she arrived here for testimony
      when she was located—well, I guess let me start with a history.
              We had hired a process server in early December to have her
      served and they were unable to locate her. They did file a return of
      service saying incorrect address. That was the address she gave to
      us. My office had called her around the time mid-December when
      she couldn’t be located and when she realized it was my office, she
      hung up and would refuse to take calls from us.
              We did hire a private investigator, Gratias Investigations has
      helped us with this case. So they hired, I think, Brian Shock to
      subcontract for them and he was able to get her served on New
      Year’s Eve basically, through extenuating efforts to locate
      [Danasha]. And when we arrived at court on Friday, that was when—
      or excuse me, Monday, that was when the issue with the juror being
      ill and court was going to be continued, so I requested that the Court
      allow me to serve [Danasha] with a different subpoena, anticipating
      that I was going to have a similar issue having her served, and as
      the Court is aware, she was served in open court and the Court did
      tell her to be here at 10 a.m.
              So I spoke to her about her ability to be here. She says she
      will not be in Iowa now. I asked her about her electronic capability.
      She said all she has is an iPhone and they’re staying with friends. I
                                            8

       asked her about her ability to appear by video, her appearance, that
       type of thing because it sounds like they’re not in a good position and
       she basically indicated to me that she would not like to participate by
       video.

       But here, we need not decide whether Lindauer proved Danasha was

unavailable; even if she was, the court could still properly deny the admission of

her deposition testimony because it lacked relevance. See State v. Tech, 240

N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1976) (“It is ordinarily within the trial judge’s discretion to

decide whether to exclude evidence on grounds of relevancy.”); see also State v.

Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 2020) (“[A] district court has no discretion to

deny the admission of hearsay if the statement falls within an enumerated

exception, subject, of course, to the rule of relevance under rule 5.403.” (alteration

in original) (citation omitted)). At trial, the State argued:

       There was no indication, based on the State’s side of the
       investigation, that this witness had any relevant testimony to this
       case, so the deposition in this case was much more of a fact-finding
       investigation where the prosecutor . . . asked this witness basically
       why she was here, if she even knew why she was there, but it was
       not intended to be a supplement for trial testimony.

The trial court seemed persuaded by this argument.              And relevancy of the

testimony as presented in the deposition is problematic.          The State correctly

described what the testimony lacked by way of detail, arguing:

       If you read . . . the deposition transcript, you’ll see that this witness
       was not able to say what day, was not able to identify the person the
       defendant was dancing with and for all we know, this could have
       been a different night that the defendant was in Cedar Falls with a
       different female.

With the lack of detail over the date Danasha saw the dancing between Lindauer

and a woman, and with the inability to identify the woman as K.O., the

trustworthiness and probative value of the deposition testimony is not sufficient to
                                          9

allow its admission. See State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 432 (Iowa 2022) (“A

vague statement that does not establish a clear fact may be less trustworthy.”).

       Finally, in its appellate briefing, the State, recognizing that the actions to

compel the witness might constitute good faith efforts to secure her attendance,

then advocated for a harmless error finding. The State asserts that hearsay

evidence from the deposition testimony would not have affected the jury’s finding

of guilt because the statements offered would have been cumulative to other

evidence that was admitted at trial.           See Hamilton v. O’Donnell, 367

N.W.2d 293, 295 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (noting that, where other testimony was

offered that filled in the gaps of the excluded evidence, “the exclusion [of evidence]

constitute[s] harmless error”); see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.103 (“A party may claim

error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial

right of the party . . . .”). There was other testimony at trial about the dance floor

antics. K.O. remembered that she was “dancing on [Lindauer].” Her roommate

testified that she observed K.O. dancing, describing the moves as grinding

because “she was kind of moving her bottom half on the male’s bottom half.” And

her roommate commented that K.O. “just wasn’t really acting like a drunk person,

I guess.” Finally, Lindauer testified that he and K.O. were dancing and kissing

while on the dance floor and that K.O. gave him a “hickey.” Thus, even if the district

court should have allowed the deposition testimony to be read, there was already

evidence specific to the interaction on the dance floor between Lindauer and K.O.3

3All the same, Lindauer confirmed at the end of the trial, after the evidence was
presented, that he agreed to forego the effort to get Danasha’s testimony. As we
know, the district court suggested that Danasha might testify by video-
conferencing. In a formal record, Lindauer’s counsel summarized her discussion
                                        10

      Conclusion.

      For all of the reasons discussed above, we affirm Lindauer’s conviction.

      AFFIRMED.

with Lindauer over “our ability to call [Danasha] via video conference and given the
technical difficulty I think we would have struggled with to make that happen,
Mr. Lindauer and I decided not to call her and so I just wanted the Court to make
sure that Mr. Lindauer was okay with that.” He responded in the affirmative when
asked by the court. Thus, no one attempted to try the option suggested by the
district court, and we do not know if that would have solved the problem.