Court Opinion

ID: 9514643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:53.549897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.657122
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 24.] Within two days of receiving the mistakenly issued building permit, Even was clearly advised that he could not build a “pole type” construction garage under the zoning ordinance. At that time, he had approximately $4,470.00 in building materials on the job site. There was no satisfactory showing that these building materials were not useable or returnable and refundable. Even if the building materials were the poles themselves, they would have value elsewhere.
[¶ 25.] Yet, the majority determines that the people and the city of Parker are estopped from challenging the mistakenly issued building permit.
Estoppel against public entities is little favored and will only be applied when exceptional circumstances demand its application to prevent manifest injustice. Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Tripp County, 404 N.W.2d 519 (S.D.1987); City of Rapid City v. Hoogterp, 85 S.D. 176, 179 N.W.2d 15 (1970). The party seeking protection of the estoppel doctrine bears the burden of establishing the existence of the necessary exceptional circumstances. Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454, 459 (S.D.1980); Hoogterp, 85 S.D. at 179-80, 179 N.W.2d at 17.
*677Rios v. S.D. Dept. of Social Services, 420 N.W.2d 757, 760 (S.D.1988).
[¶ 26.] Contrary to the implication made by the majority opinion, the issue is not the dollar amount involved, but whether Even met his burden of showing a substantial harm as a result of some affirmative action by the Board. The majority opinion cites to Erickson v. County of Brookings, 1996 SD 1, 541 N.W.2d 734 as “solid precedent” for its decision. However, the county in Erickson was estopped from raising lack of notice to the Attorney General as an affirmative defense because of “intended deception.” 1996 SD 1 at ¶ 15, 541 N.W.2d at 737. Although the Zoning Administer admitted he should have more carefully reviewed Even’s application for a building permit, there has been no claim that the Board or City engaged in any intentional deception to entice Even into purchasing building supplies. See Smith v. Neville, 539 N.W.2d 679, 682 (S.D.1995) (stating: “Generally, to work an estoppel, there must be some intended deception in the conduct or declaration of the party to be estopped.”). I submit that the facts of this case do not present an “exceptional circumstance” justifying the application of estoppel to a public entity.
[¶ 27.] I further submit that this is the skimpiest showing of estoppel against a public entity in South Dakota legal history and that we will regret it. Therefore, I dissent.
[¶ 28.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this dissent.