Court Opinion

ID: 9736719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:03:52.592916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:08.404317
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting in part and specially concurring in part: What is the appropriate analysis and remedy for a violation of Supreme Court Rule 213? James Finan, plaintiffs expert, was disclosed and deposed as a former NTSB accident investigator and an operating practices inspector certified by the Federal Railroad Association. His disclosed expertise and opinions concerned the physical capabilities and performance for the train doors in question and the safety rules and practices regarding the doors. However, at trial Finan testified that Metra was like a parent not knowing what the child is doing, that Metra was “remiss in [its] duties as a parent company,” that Metra had a “relationship to oversee [its] contractors, to make sure that [its] contractors are performing in a safe and efficient manner.” These opinions, which speak to the relationship between Metra and CNW and to any duties of Metra and CNW, were not disclosed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 213 and, thus, violated Rule 213. The committee comments to Rule 213 state that, “in order to avoid surprise, the subject matter of all opinions must be disclosed pursuant to this rule *** and that no new or additional opinions will be allowed unless the interests of justice require otherwise.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g), Committee Comments. Upon written interrogatory, a party must disclose, the subject matter, conclusions, opinions, qualifications and reports of any witnesses who will offer any opinion testimony and seasonably supplement any previous answers when additional information becomes known. Department of Transportation v. Crull, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 536-37. The importance of an expert and the impact that expert has upon the trier of fact is undisputed. An expert is integral to a case because an expert can assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to decide a fact in issue "which is difficult to comprehend or to explain. See generally: Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 3d 964, 979 (1998); Thacker v. UNR Industries, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 343, 365 (1992); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Brescia, 285 Ill. App. 3d 671, 682 (1996). Separate and unique discovery rules have been established in recognition of the significance of an expert. If separate and unique discovery exists for the disclosure of experts, should not the analysis and remedy for a violation of that disclosure differ from the analysis and remedy for a violation of other discovery rules? Rule 213 establishes stricter standards regarding disclosure than did the now-repealed Rule 220. See generally Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 21; Department of Transportation v. Crull, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 538-39; Adami v. Belmonte, 302 Ill. App. 3d 17, 24 (1998). If a stricter Rule 213 replaced Rule 220, should not the analysis and remedy for a violation of Rule 213 require a stricter and different analysis than a violation of Rule 220? We have answered “yes” in Adami, Seef and Regala v. Rush North Shore Medical Center, 323 Ill. App. 3d 579 (2001), and have moved from a “harmless” or “no prejudice” analysis employed in Rule 220 violations to a per se analysis as exhibited in Regala. And, although the majority cites Regala in a footnote and states that it does not establish a per se analysis, the Regala opinion, citing Seef, states otherwise. See Regala, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 384-86. The Rule 213 disclosure requirements are mandatory and subject to strict compliance by the parties. Seefv. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 21; Department of Transportation v. Crull, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 539; Adami v. Belmonte, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 24. The testimony of an expert is so powerful that any expert testimony at trial not previously disclosed is itself prejudicial and requires a new trial. See, e.g., Regala, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 584-86. And, because Finan’s testimony impacted upon the allocation of fault between Metra and CNW¡ a new trial as to both Metra and CNW should be granted. Admittedly, this analysis is neither facile nor Mosaic but it appears consistent and equal; in Regala, plaintiffs were granted a new trial and here, defendants are requesting a new trial. Recognizing the difficulties with this analysis, the guidance of the supreme court is earnestly desired for the intermediate and trial courts so that the last days of Rule 220 and the reasons for its demise do not return. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this cause for a new trial on the Rule 213 issue. On all other issues, I concur.