Court Opinion

ID: 96452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:41:34+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:54.371402
License: Public Domain

201 U.S. 529 (1906)
CLEVELAND
v.
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
No. 183.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 27, 28, 1906.
Decided April 9, 1906.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.
*535 Mr. Newton D. Baker and Mr. D.C. Westenhaver for appellants.
Mr. Andrew Squire and Mr. John W. Warrington, with whom Mr. William B. Sanders was on the brief, for appellee.
*537 MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The system of railways operated by the appellee comprises about two hundred and thirty-six miles of track. The lines in controversy are but seven miles of this aggregate, and rest for their initial grant on the ordinance of the twenty-fifth of August, 1879, to the Kinsman Street Railroad Company. This *538 grant expired on the twentieth of September, 1904, unless extended by subsequent ordinances. That it was so extended is the contention of the appellee, and that it has the right to operate its railways on the streets in controversy until February, 1908, under the contracts constituted by those ordinances and their acceptance. A special reliance is based on the ordinance authorizing a change to electricity as a motive power in compliance with which, it is alleged, that the appellee expended a sum not less than $700,000. The city takes issue with these contentions. It asserts that the original grant to the Kinsman Company was not extended as a matter of fact and could not be extended as a matter of law, the city not having the power to prolong the life of the original grant. The argument advanced is somewhat roundabout. Its ultimate reliance is upon certain sections of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, from which it is deduced that it was incompetent for the council to authorize an extension to expire at a different time from the main grant. To hold otherwise, it is said, would be to hold that the council would have power to grant extensions in perpetuity, while by section 2502 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio there can be no grant or a renewal of a grant for a greater period than twenty-five years.
Ordinarily it would be more orderly to consider the power of the city before considering its exercise or the intention to exercise it. For our purposes, however, it becomes convenient to consider first the intention of the city by the ordinances in question.
The purpose of the ordinances, we think, presents no insolvable doubts. Indeed we think it is clear that the city intended to secure, and did secure for its citizens, valuable transportation facilities and intended to extend that part of the system of railways consisting of the Kinsman street line and its extension until February, 1908. There can be no other reasonable meaning of what the city did or of the language it used. It recognized a main line not in one ordinance but many ordinances, and the purpose was to join the initial grant and its *539 extensions together, and continue it, and those combined, until 1908. There could have been no mistake in the language used or misunderstanding of it. We might suppose a mistake in one ordinance but we cannot suppose a mistake in four ordinances. The matters dealt with were important, and it is a reasonable presumption that no provision concerning them escaped attention or was misunderstood. The situation must be kept in mind. The Woodland Avenue Railway Company (successor to the right of the Kinsman Street Company) operated a road on the west side of the Cuyahoga river; the West Side Street Railroad Company operated on the east side. They were independent companies, and the interchange of traffic between them was obviously a public advantage. This was accomplished by the consolidation of the companies and the ordinance fixing the terms and conditions of the consolidation. By that ordinance through cars were provided for and a single fare was established "from any point to any point on the lines and branches of the consolidated road." This imposed duties on the companies and it also secured to them rights. The grants of the constituent companies expired at different times, respectively 1904 and 1908, and it is contended that by the mere union of the lines the duties and rights of the companies continued for the longer term. This, however, we are not required to determine.
In April, 1887, an ordinance was passed to authorize the consolidated company to lay a double track in Franklin avenue. In this ordinance the words upon which the controversy turns as to the extension of the grant to 1908 occur for the first time. The grant was on the express condition that no increase of fare should be charged by the company "on any part of its main line or said extension, so that but one fare, not to exceed five cents, shall be charged between points on said company's main line or extension . . . and the right herein shall terminate with the present grant of the main line, to wit, on the tenth day of February, 1908." This language is substantially repeated in the three other ordinances. We think there can be *540 no doubt of its purpose, and if it were any part of our function to pass upon the wisdom of actions we might say it was a wise purpose, certainly had much reason to commend it. Why break up, or risk the breaking up, of a union of lines and the interchange of their traffic in a continuous carriage of passengers at one rate of fare? The extension was not for an unreasonable time. One of the grants did not expire until 1908, and it was reasonable to continue the other till that time. What policy or purpose could be urged against it? The suggestion of counsel for appellants does not commend itself. The suggestion is that possibly it was the purpose of the city to preserve different dates for the expiration of the grants, so that, the company coming to the city with its line in fragments, the city could consider whether concessions in the public interest might not be required as a condition of the renewal of rights. To adopt the suggestion we must suppose a situation more difficult than that presented. Forethought of the public interests must be attributed to the city council when it passed the consolidation and other ordinances. There was an immediate public benefit to be considered, and the time of extension was not so long as to cause a dread of unforeseen conditions or to make necessary a provision for them. Besides, inducement to the company had to be offered and secured. However, a discussion of policies is unnecessary. We find the ordinances plainly written, and we turn to the construction of the power of the city to grant the extension.
The question of the intention of the ordinances being settled, the question of the power of the city council is settled, in so far as this case can be distinguished from Cleveland v. Cleveland City Railway Company, 194 U.S. 517. In the latter case we had occasion to consider the power of the city to pass the ordinances relied on by the appellee in the case at bar, and their effect as contracts between the city and the companies. The suit was brought to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance passed October 17, 1898, reducing the fare on the Kinsman Street Railroad to four cents, under a right reserved to "increase *541 or diminish the rate of fare" on said road as the city might "deem justifiable and expedient." The Cleveland City Railway Company, successor of the Kinsman Street Company, contended that the power had been given up in subsequent ordinances, and the decision sustained the contention. The sections of the Revised Statutes of Ohio were quoted and by them it was said "there was lodged by the legislature of Ohio in the municipal council of Cleveland comprehensive power to contract with street railway companies in respect to the terms and conditions upon which such roads might be constructed, operated, extended and consolidated, the only limitation upon the power being that in case of an extension no increase in rate of fare should be allowed." This extract leaves nothing to be said as to the power of the city and the rest of the opinion leaves little to be said as to the question of the ordinances constituting contracts with the company. All the considerations which could be urged against them as such were discussed and passed on, and the ordinances involved were those relied on by the appellee in the present case, to wit, the ordinance making the grant to the Kinsman Street Company of August, 1879, the ordinance consolidating the West Side Railroad Company and the Woodland Avenue Railroad Company, and the ordinance of April 8, 1887, and August 12, 1887. There was a reference to the provision of the ordinance of April 8, and its repetition in the ordinance of August 12, making the time of the termination of the grants that "of the main line, to wit, on the tenth day of February, 1908." The reference was not casual. The provision was regarded as an element in the purpose of the extension of the roads and as a means of securing the public advantages of the union of the lines and one rate of fare over all of them.
Another contention was noticed which was pressed there and it is again pressed here, based on section 2502 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, that a municipal corporation could not, during the term of the grant or the renewal thereof, release the grantee from any obligation or liability imposed by the grant. *542 This provision was urged as preventing a surrender by the city of the power reserved in the grant to the Kinsman Street Railway Company, because the reservation was an obligation and liability imposed upon the railroad corporation. Section 2501 was urged as precluding any attempt to treat the consent of the city to extensions, consolidations, or change of motive power as of renewals of the rights renewed by the ordinance of 1879, because it was contended that the positive provisions of that section permitted such renewals only at the expiration of original grants. Both contentions were rejected. Of section 2502 it was said that the laws of Ohio permitted a modification of a contract between a municipality and the owner of a street railroad, and section 2501 had been held to authorize renewals to be made before the expiration of the original grant. To support the latter conclusion we cited State v. East Cleveland Railroad Co., 6 Ohio Circuit Court Rep. 318, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Appellants concede the authority of that case, but say the ordinance it passed upon left no doubt of the intention of the city, whereas in the case at bar, considering the provisions of the statutes and the ordinances, all intendments must be held to be against an intention to renew the original grant. In other words, the contention is that while "no set form of words is necessary," it is yet urged that "such result can only be effected by apt words evincing a plain and unmistakable purpose to make a renewal." It is not a question of power, therefore, to pass the ordinances, but of the intention of the city in passing them, and the latter we have sufficiently considered. It is only necessary to add that we do not find uncertainty in them and cannot, therefore, yield to the conclusion deduced from its supposed existence. The situation was plain and the city council met it with a definite and reasonable plan. It must not be overlooked that if the city gave rights it secured benefits and that the rights could not be exercised without large expenditures of money or be of any value unless assured of stability. Seven hundred thousand dollars, the appellee urges, it expended on the change to electrical *543 power, and the allegation is hardly made doubtful by the answer. We cannot believe that the expenditure of that sum was unworthy of consideration by the city, or that the city intended to exact it as an obligation that could be imposed on the company, or regarded it as anything but a benefit to the city, to be recompensed and secured by the ordinance which was passed.
It is urged by the appellee that the roads operated by it constituted a unified system, and by virtue of the ordinance of July 17, 1893, fixing the time of the expiration of the grant thereby made the twenty-sixth of January, 1910, and the ordinance of February, 1894, in which the date of the expiration of the grant there provided for was the first day of July, 1914, extended the time of all the grants composing the system until 1914. We do not think this question properly arises on the record, and we, therefore, do not pass upon it.
Decree affirmed.