Court Opinion

ID: 9461555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:17:13.316402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:07.341297
License: Public Domain

*534ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting
Since this is a criminal case, the law imposes a more stringent burden of proof on the prosecution than it would impose, in the same circumstances, upon a plaintiff claiming negligence in a civil action. The prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although in this case the Government is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences because it has a favorable verdict, I cannot agree that the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence upon which a jury could convict the defendant.
The Government charges that the defendant caused the death of a person by operating a vehicle “in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others.” 20 V.I.C. § 504. We first must interpret this statutory standard against which the defendant’s conduct is to be judged.
Reckless driving . . . connotes culpable or criminal negligence amounting to a careless disregard of the rights or safety of others “the consequences of which could reasonably have been foreseen by the driver....”
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 179 Pa. Super. 255, 258, 115 A.2d 904, 905 (1955), quoting Commonwealth v. Forrey, 172 Pa. Super. 65, 68, 92 A.2d 233, 234 (1952). The word “reckless” in a statute providing for criminal liability has a clear and commonly understood meaning of something more than mere failure to exercise due care. People v. Bearden, 290 N.Y. 478, 49 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1943); Commonwealth v. Aurick, 342 Pa. 282, 288, 19 A.2d 920, 923-24 (1941); State v. Rachels, 218 S.C. 1, 61 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1950). Moreover, the driving of an automobile at a high rate of speed is insufficient by itself to support a conviction for “reckless driving”; other facts showing a reckless disregard of the consequences must be proven. State v. Andrews, 108 Conn. 209, 214, 142 A. 840, 841 (1928); People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 144, 183 N.E. 273, 275 (1932).
*535In this case, the Government relied primarily on three pieces of evidence: (1) the testimony of Samuel Garnet, who estimated defendant’s speed at 70 m.p.h., (2) the nature of the victim’s injuries, and (3) the damage to the defendant’s car.
I disagree with the majority that Garnet was “in a good position to judge the speed of the oncoming car” because he knew the speed of his own car. Since Garnet and the defendant were proceeding in opposite directions, an accurate estimate of speed would have been difficult at best even in daylight. Here, however, Garnet made his estimate at night. Moreover, no proof was offered concerning the length of time during which Garnet had an opportunity to observe defendant’s car and form an opinion as to its speed. I therefore do not believe that Garnet’s testimony concerning the speed of the defendant’s car was competent, or if it was, that it is entitled to much weight in this criminal case.
The serious nature of .the plaintiff’s injuries adds little because a vehicle operated at a speed of 40 m.p.h., the speed limit on Centerline Road, or at 50 m.p.h., not necessarily a “reckless” rate of speed, might have inflicted similar injuries, depending upon the weight of the car and other physical facts. None of these have been established. The damage to defendant’s car also might have been sustained at speeds of 40 or 50 m.p.h., again depending upon factors such as the weight of the victim, and the age, condition, and quality of the body of the defendant’s car. The record is not helpful concerning any of these factors.
I believe the record simply contains insufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction. Entirely too many imponderables are present. Defendant, an experienced driver, was driving on a blacktopped, two-lane highway running in a straight east-west direction for several miles. Photographs entered in evidence indicate that the stretch of highway where the accident occurred is not densely populated. *536The speed limit was 40 m.p.h. Only a street light “in the near vicinity” penetrated the darkness, and blacktopped highways are known for their inability to reflect light. The record does not establish the distance between the light and the point of contact with the victim, the candle power of the light, or the degree and area of illumination. The record also does not indicate whether the night was moonlit or dark.
On the other hand, the record does disclose circumstances which could have prevented defendant from seeing the victim, even if defendant had been driving at a speed of only 40 m.p.h. Defendant was driving east to west on the appropriate lefthand side of the highway. The victim was a passenger in a car proceeding in the opposite direction. When the victim alighted from the car on the north side of the highway, he waited for the car to proceed easterly and then started south across the road. Thus, while he was crossing the eastbound lane to the south side’ of the highway, he was concealed momentarily from the defendant’s view by the car from which he had alighted and which was proceeding in the direction of the defendant. Additionally, since the victim was crossing the highway north to south and perpendicular to the route in which defendant was traveling, defendant in all probability could not have seen the victim until the victim entered the westbound lane and came within range of defendant’s headlights. If the beam of the headlights was focused properly, it was directed toward the defendant’s westbound lane only. Under these circumstances, a person operating a motor vehicle even at a relatively slow speed quite conceivably might not have seen a pedestrian crossing the highway until it was too late.
I would reverse the judgment and sentence of the district court with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal.