Court Opinion

ID: 9680787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:37.720544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.497295
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
At the outset, I question the majority’s reliance on Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. App.1994), for the proposition that section 198.070.10 of the Omnibus Nursing Home Act (ONHA) implicitly creates a private cause of action for nursing home employees terminated in violation of the statute. The Clark court failed to account for section 198.067 of the ONHA, which autho*806rizes the Department of Social Services, or the Attorney General on the Department’s behalf, to bring an action in circuit court seeking civil penalties or injunctive relief against a nursing home that violates section 198.070.10. The existence of sanctions under section 198.067' brings this case squarely within a well-established rule of statutory construction, that “[w]hen the legislature has established other means of enforcing its statutes, this Court will not recognize a private civil action for a violation unless such appears by clear implication to have been the legislative intent.” Dierkes v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mo., 991 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Mo. banc 1999); Johnson v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. banc 1994); R.L. Nichols Ins., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 865 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 (Mo. banc 1993); Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Mo. banc 1982). My struggle to find a clear implication that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action for violations of section 198.070.10 is all the more difficult in the face of another provision of the ONHA that does indeed expressly create a private cause of action. See section 198.093 (giving nursing home residents, as opposed to nursing home employees, a private cause of action for violations of sections 198.088 to 198.090).
In fact, Clark’s holding is based as much on the court of appeals’ application of a common law public policy exception to the at-will employee doctrine as it is statutory interpretation. See Clark, 872 S.W.2d at 525. The public policy exception, according to Clark, is that an at-will employee who is discharged for reporting a violation of law by an employer is exempted from the general rule barring the employee from bringing a private cause of action against the former employer for wrongful discharge. Id. But, regardless of whether a private cause of action is said to be implicitly created under section 198.070.10 by the legislature — as the majority suggests — or created by the courts pursuant to the public policy exception, in my opinion, the cause of action is barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Until today, the law in Missouri regarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity was clear. The general precept was that “sovereign immunity [was] the rule and waiver [was] the exception.” Bartley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cty., 649 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Mo. banc 1983). Recognition of this precept prompted this Court on numerous occasions to declare that statutory provisions that purportedly waive sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. See, e.g., McNeill Trucking Co., Inc. v. Mo. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 35 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Mo. banc 2001); State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Com’n v. Dierker, 961 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 1998); Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Mo. banc 1993); State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. banc 1985); Kanagwa v. State ex rel. Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Mo. banc 1985); Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 868; Beiser v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo. banc 1979); Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. banc 1975); Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832, 837 (1952). Indeed, this Court has held that a statute will abrogate a governmental entity’s immunity from tort liability only if the statute expressly so states. State ex rel. Reg’l Justice Info. Serv. Com’n v. Saitz, 798 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Mo. banc 1990); Community Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Dir. of Revenue, 752 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Mo. banc 1988). See, e.g., Pratt, 687 S.W.2d at 186-87 (holding that statutory provision granting a governmental entity the power to “sue or be sued” did not amount to an express waiver of sovereign immunity).
*807In its opinion, the majority concedes that the “intent of the legislature to waive sovereign immunity must be express rather than implied.” Alas, the majority then concludes that an express legislative intent can be found in the ONHA, even though, as the majority further concedes, plaintiffs underlying private cause of action was itself created implicitly, rather than explicitly. Such a conclusion begs the following question: How can the legislature expressly waive sovereign immunity to a private cause of action that the legislature did not expressly create in the first place?
The court of appeals cases relied on by the majority do not provide an answer to this question and are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In both Kee-ney v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 70 S.W.3d 597 (Mo.App. 2002), and H.S. v. Board of Regents, 967 S.W.2d 665 (Mo.App.1998), the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) was held to include a waiver of sovereign immunity to tort suits brought under the MHRA. However, in contrast to the majority opinion, the Keeney and H.S. courts found the existence of a waiver only after first recognizing that the MHRA expressly created a private cause of action. Keeney, 70 S.W.3d at 599-600 (citing section 213.111); H.S., 967 S.W.2d at 673 (same). Likewise, the tax cases cited by the majority, Sprint Communications Co. v. Director of Revenue, 64 S.W.3d 832 (Mo. banc 2002), and Matteson v. Director of Revenue, 909 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1995), are distinguishable because under the statutes implicated in those cases, unlike here, the legislature expressly created a procedure by which individuals could seek redress from the State.
In my view, an express intent on the part of the legislature to waive sovereign immunity in tort suits brought by nursing home employees cannot be gleaned from the ONHA. Even assuming that creation of a private cause of action is implicit in section 198.070.10 as per Clark, I nevertheless cannot understand how the legislature can be said to have expressly intended to waive sovereign immunity to a cause of action that it did not expressly create. Even in the most favorable light, the majority’s new-found waiver of sovereign immunity is nothing more than the product of an inference on an inference. Further, to the extent that Clark ⅛ recognition of the private cause of action was based on public policy rather than statutory interpretation, the majority’s ultimate finding of an express waiver of sovereign immunity is even more troubling.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.