Court Opinion

ID: 9531362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:10:12.763325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:25.716156
License: Public Domain

PERRY, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur with the majority upon the proposition that the trial court was in error in granting the defendant’s motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto.
I think it must be conceded the majority opinion is grounded upon the assumption there is substantial evidence that the defendant Wilcox observed the approach of the Garland car in which the plaintiff was riding when he was 600 feet distant therefrom and that therefore a jury might find he failed to do that which a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances.
This assumption, in my mind, is untenable because *339there is no substantial evidence upon which such an assumption can be made.
The defendant Wilcox’s testimony, which is the only evidence upon this point, is as follows:
“Q Would you tell me how far you were from this curve when you first saw the Garland car approaching?
“A I could only estimate between 100 and 200 yards.
# * # # #
“Q Well, then, you say that when you first saw the Garland car you were from 100 to 200 yards, not feet, south of the curve, is that right?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q That would be from 300 to 600 feet?
“A That’s correct.”
This could only be interpreted as meaning the defendant Wilcox estimated he saw the approaching Garland car when he was at a distance somewhere between 300 and 600 feet. This is clear, for he did not say “I saw the Garland car 600 feet ahead.”
In Scarpelli v. Portland Elec. Power Co., 130 Or 267, 276, 277, 278 P 99, this court, in discussing evidence relative to distances, stated:
“A mental impression fails to rise to the dignity of admissible testimony if it consists of nothing more definite than a guess or a conjecture: * * *. In order to be admissible a fact should not be so indefinite that no certain and definite inference can be drawn from it: Chamberlayne on Evidence, § 1743. As a general rule a party is never permitted to put in evidence a fact which does not directly prove the fact in issue, but which is only a step in that direction and from which therefore various indefinite inferences as to the principal fact might be drawn, unless he follows it up with other *340accompanying facts which make definite and certain the inferences as to the main fact. * * *”
The majority opinion does not attempt to set forth any other evidence from which even an inference conld be drawn that the defendant Wilcox saw the approaching car at a distance of 600 feet.
Defendant Wilcox testified he was following the Maddy car, which first was struck by the Garland ear, a distance of three to four ear lengths, and Maddy testified he observed the Garland car as it came around the curve 100 feet ahead. In fact, all of the oral testimony of the witnesses, together with the pictures, maps and location of the debris upon the highway, indicates that the Garland automobile must have been much nearer 300 feet than 600 feet away when first observed by the defendant Wilcox.
This court has on many occasions held that purely speculative inferences or conclusions do not constitute substantial evidence which will sustain a verdict or judgment. Anderson v. Sturm, 209 Or 190, 303 P2d 509; Lemons et al. v. Holland et al., 205 Or 163, 284 P2d 1041, 286 P2d 656; Scarpetti v. Portland Elec. Power Co., supra.
It seems to me that such an estimate has no probative value; the range of the estimate is so indefinite that in the absence of the evidence which would limit its wide field the jury can only speculate that the distance was 600 feet and not 300 feet.
Keeping in mind this rule of law, — that the evidence to permit a recovery must be substantial and not speculative, — to me it would be entirely unwarranted for any court to permit a jury to speculate upon an estimate of such latitude as to where the defendant was when he first observed the approaching Garland car.
*341The majority opinion of the court seems to lose sight of the fact that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the defendant Wilcox, and assumes that there is time in this case for the defendant, faced with an emergency, to act. The law does not require the impossible. This is demonstrated by the decision of this court.
“When there is insufficient time available for reflection, and a judicious choice between methods, the one, who is thus compelled to act in haste, is not liable for an unfortunate result, provided he exercised in the emergency the degree of care generally displayed under like circumstances by the law’s standard, a reasonably prudent individual. Under such circumstances the result, if unfortunate, is attributed to an unavoidable accident: Marshall v. Olson, 102 Or 502 (202 Pac. 736); Stabenau v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 155 N.Y. 511 (50 N.E. 277, 63 Am. St. Rep. 698); Solatinow v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. Ry. Co., 70 N.J. Law, 154 (56 Atl. 235); Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Browdy, 206 Ill. 615 (69 N.E. 570); 20 R.C.L., Negligence, § 22; 45 C.J., Negligence, § 92, p. 710.” Scarpelli v. Portland Elec. Power Co., supra, 130 Or 267, 280.
In the case of Hamilton v. Finch, 166 Or 156, 166, 109 P2d 852, 111 P2d 81, we quoted with approval the following from Rollison v. Railroad, 252 Mo 525, 541, 160 SW 994:
“ ‘To predicate negligence on two seconds of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement. We cannot adjudicate negligence on such pulse beats and hair-splitting, such airy nothings of surmise.’ ”
As shown by the majority opinion, the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding and the automobile driven by the defendant Wilcox were approaching each other at a rate of approximately 100 miles per hour, or about 147 feet per second. If the distance was 300 *342feet, the defendant had two seconds in which to act, if 600'feet, from four’to five seconds. “We recognize that fact of ‘reaction time,’ that is, the time that elapses ‘from the moment one sees danger until he can actually get into action to avoid it.’ ” Wiebe v. Seely, administrator, 215 Or 331,' 366, 335 P2d 379.
It is clear from the record, that the negligence of the defendant Robert Kenneth Garland was the primary and dominant cause of the accident and that his negligence created an emergency to be faced by the defendant Wilcox. Therefore, even assuming the defendant Wilcox had five seconds in which to act, I am of the opinion that the emergency doctrine is applicable as a matter of law so as to preclude speculating on whether or not it would have been wiser for the defendant to have stopped his automobile or sooner tried to turn off the road through a ditch six to eight feet deep. Hamilton v. Finch, supra; Havens v. Havens, 266 Wis 282, 63 NW2d 86, 47 ALR2d 1.
I would affirm the judgment of the learned circuit judge.