Court Opinion

ID: 9530905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:05:00.581502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:17.256493
License: Public Domain

*235Kaul, J.
(dissenting): I agree with the court’s disposition of the state’s claim that the delay was caused by defendant’s failure to request a tidal within the statutory ninety-day period. However, this does not fully resolve the question whether the delay in bringing defendant to trial was contributed to or caused by the fault of defendant.
The record discloses that following the arguments of counsel on defendant’s motion for discharge, prior to trial on January 20, 1971, the trial court ruled as follows:
“The Court: Dan, I am going to overrule your motion. This case would have been tried in November, except that there was some kind of a falling-out between this man and his then lawyer, Mr. Mermigis. I don’t know exactly what has happened since then. I’m not going to sustain your motion; I do respectfully overrule you. You have made your record and preserved your point.”
Defendant’s counsel at this point was Mr. Daniel R. Denk who had been appointed counsel for defendant following a second pretrial conference on November 2, 1970, which was called at the instigation of defendant since he and his previously retained counsel had apparently had a parting of the ways. As a result defendant’s trial, which had been set for the week of November 16, 1970, was continued.
While the trial court fails to state with any specificity the reason for overruling defendant’s motion for discharge on January 20, 1971, the tenor of the court’s ruling indicates the reason to have been a finding by the court that the delay was caused by fault of the defendant as provided in paragraph (1) of K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402.
The posture of the case as it is presented on appeal requires this court to construe the trial court’s ruling to be other than a finding of fault on defendant’s part or to reject the trial court’s finding and make its own finding on appeal that the delay was not caused by the fault of defendant.
Due to the state of this record I would remand the case with directions that the trial court explicitly determine whether the delay was caused by the fault of defendant, stating the facts upon which such finding is based or in the alternative discharge the defendant.
Fontron and Fromme, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.