Court Opinion

ID: 9759255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:10:13.984852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.526263
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Under the facts and circumstances of the cause the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of facts presumably made by the trier of fact and the judgment of the trial court.
My major disagreement with the majority is in its treatment of “direct” versus “circumstantial” evidence in note 2. Putting aside whatever the evidentiary value of hearsay statements attributed to Margie Fernandez, wife of appellant, had she testified to the same matters, her evidence would still be classified as “circumstantial” in that it is “proof of a minor fact, which by indirection, logically and rationally demonstrates the factum probandum.” Beason v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 442, 67 S.W. 96, at 98 (1902); Crawford v. State, 502 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and cases cited at 769 (circumstantial evidence is direct proof of a minor fact which by logical inference demonstrates the ultimate fact to be proved); Ramos v. State, 478 S.W.2d 102, at 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); (Brown v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 449, 72 S.W.2d 269, at 271 (1934)).
Another disagreement is with its notion that “In the context of Rule 802, unobject-ed to hearsay has probative value as substantive evidence.” Maj. Opinion, n. 3, at 455. As the very authority the majority quotes on the next page makes clear, “Rule 802 does not accord probative value to hearsay evidence.”
With those observations I join the judgment of the Court.
MALONEY, J„ joins.