Court Opinion

ID: 9371525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 16:04:56.895192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.345437
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
                                            RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023
                                                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

              Supreme Court of Kentucky
                              2022-SC-0041-TG
                               (2022-CA-0093)

KERAM CHRISTENSEN                                                  APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HON. GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
                            NO. 19-CR-01444

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                 AFFIRMING

      Keram Christensen received a sentence of seventy years’ imprisonment

following his conviction on 313 counts of possessing matter portraying a sexual

performance by a minor, eight counts of distributing matter portraying a sexual

performance by a minor, one count of promoting a sexual performance by a

minor (victim under 18), one count of promoting a sexual performance by a

minor (victim under 16), and one count of using an electronic communications

system to induce or procure a minor to commit a sexual offense. In an opinion

rendered this same date, we affirmed his convictions and sentence.1 During

the pendency of his direct appeal, the Kenton Circuit Court entered an order

forfeiting Christensen’s cash bond and he appealed to the Kentucky Court of

      1Christensen v. Commonwealth, 2021-SC-0504-MR (February 16, 2023,
unpublished) (“Christensen I”).
Appeals. In the interest of judicial economy, we granted transfer and now

affirm.

      The historical facts and procedural history underlying Christensen’s

convictions are set forth in Christensen I and need not be repeated in detail

here. For purposes of this appeal, only a brief summary of those facts is

necessitated. In August 2019 Christensen used an online dating service in an

attempt to entice a child to engage in illegal sexual conduct. Shortly thereafter,

the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) generated a

Cyber Tipline Report which was forwarded to the Covington Police Department

for further investigation. A search was conducted pursuant to a warrant and

multiple incriminating pieces of evidence were recovered, resulting in

Christensen’s arrest and indictment on 65 counts of possessing matter

portraying a sexual performance by a minor and one count of distribution of

matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. He was subsequently

released to home incarceration on October 2, 2019, after personally posting a

$100,000 cash bond. Conditions of release included Christensen having no

access to the internet or a smart phone. On April 14, 2021, after a

comprehensive forensic review of his electronic devices revealed additional

incriminating evidence, Christensen was arraigned on an indictment charging

him with the 324 offenses previously listed.

      On the same day as his second arraignment, on motion of the

Commonwealth Christensen’s bond was revoked following a hearing. Evidence

was produced showing a search of Christensen’s cell phone and camera

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revealed he continued to view child pornography. A search of his residence

uncovered binders with printed matters portraying child pornography and

sexual performances by a minor. Additionally, proof was presented that

Christensen had created social profiles on at least two different websites

indicating his desire to meet “nudist boys and men, fathers and sons . . .” or

“fathers and sons, families, etc.” and offering to communicate through an

encrypted messaging application.

      After his suppression motion was denied, Christensen entered a

conditional guilty plea and received a sentence of seventy years’ imprisonment

which this Court affirmed in Christensen I. During the pendency of his direct

appeal, the Commonwealth moved to forfeit the entirety of his cash bond. By

order entered on December 21, 2021, the trial court concluded Christensen

violated the conditions of his bond and had continued the course of criminal

conduct which had led to his indictment and convictions. Finding

Christensen’s violations were willful and noting the severity of the conditions

violated—including resumption of the criminal conduct for which he was

ultimately convicted on hundreds of counts of child pornography—the trial

court concluded forfeiture of the bond was appropriate. Christensen’s appeal

was transferred to this Court to be resolved contemporaneously with his direct

appeal.

      For his sole allegation of error, Christensen argues forfeiture of the

entirety of his cash bond was excessive and does not comport with the

violations for which his bond was revoked. He concedes the determination of

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the amount of bond to be forfeited lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court but urges this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

We decline Christensen’s invitation.

      Forfeiture of a defendant’s bail is appropriate if he “shall willfully fail to

comply with the conditions of his release[.]” KRS2 431.545. If a defendant

violates the terms of his release, a trial court may order his arrest and require

him to “show cause why his bail bond should not be forfeited or the conditions

of his release be changed, or both.” RCr3 4.42(1). If, after a hearing, the trial

court finds by clear and convincing evidence the defendant has willfully

violated one or more terms of his release, forfeiture may be ordered. RCr

4.42(3). The trial court has sole authority to determine whether to impose,

forfeit, or remit bond. Commonwealth v. Carman, 455 S.W.3d 916, 925 (Ky.

2015) (citing Clemons v. Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Ky. App. 2004)).

Such decisions will only be reversed when a reviewing court discerns an abuse

of discretion. Clemons, 152 S.W.3d at 260. See Long v. Hamilton, 467 S.W.2d

139, 141 (Ky. 1971) (“Appellate courts will not attempt to substitute their

judgment for that of the trial court and will not interfere in the fixing of bail

unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretionary power.” (internal

citations omitted)). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

      2   Kentucky Revised Statutes.

      3   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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principles.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581

(Ky. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

      It is undisputed Christensen violated the conditions of his release. Clear

and convincing evidence was presented at an adversarial hearing before the

trial court. It is also undisputed the trial court was acting within its discretion

in deciding to forfeit Christensen’s bond. The sole issue before us then is

whether the trial court abused its discretion when determining the amount of

bond which would be forfeited. We conclude it did not.

      “There are no clear-cut rules defining what is and what is not

‘excessive.’” Clemons, 152 S.W.3d at 260. “When considering whether or not

justice requires the enforcement of a forfeiture, a court must look at several

factors, including: (1) the willfulness of the defendant’s breach of the bond, (2)

the cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government, and (3) any

explanation or mitigating factors.” United States v. Ciotti, 579 F.Supp. 276,

278 (W.D.Pa. 1984). Christensen’s conduct was serious and willful, subjecting

the bond to forfeiture. KRS 431.545; RCr 4.42. The money posted belonged to

Christensen, and he alone was responsible for continuing his course of

criminal conduct. The Commonwealth was required to further investigate

Christensen’s actions which potentially endangered additional minors and

worked an injury to the public interest. Christensen offered nothing in

mitigation related to his egregious violations of the terms of his bond. Applying

the abuse of discretion standard, we simply cannot say the trial court’s

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decision was in error. Although the amount of forfeiture was significant, it was

not inappropriate under the circumstances.

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is

affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Chase Cox

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General

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