Court Opinion

ID: 9463798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:16:41.971356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:17.612151
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
Ernest Turley appeals from the District Court’s1 denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
On June 11, 1970, two armed men robbed the Laddonia State Bank in Audrain County, Missouri, of approximately $13,000. On July 1; 1970, petitioner and one Haynes were indicted by a grand jury of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and charged with robbing the bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). Trial was had before a jury, which *841returned a verdict of not guilty on November 23, 1970.
On January 4, 1971, the prosecuting attorney of Audrain County, Missouri, filed an information charging petitioner with robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 560.120 and 560.135. Petitioner moved to dismiss, alleging that his prior federal acquittal barred subsequent prosecution arising out of the same act. The motion was overruled, and the Missouri Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Turley v. Adams, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 690, 30 L.Ed.2d 674 (1972). On March 30, 1972, a jury found petitioner guilty of robbery in the first degree, and he was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Turley, 518 S.W.2d 207 (Mo.App.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 1956, 44 L.Ed.2d 454 (1975).
On February 18, 1976, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the petition. Turley v. Wyrick, 415 F.Supp. 87 (E.D.Mo.1976). Petitioner now timely appeals and alleges three related, but distinct, grounds for relief: (1) that the “dual sovereignty” doctrine permitting successive state and federal prosecutions for the same act has been “eroded” by subsequent decisions and should be discarded; (2) that the doctrine of collateral estoppel enunciated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), bars the state from re-litigating issues decided in petitioner’s favor at the prior federal trial; and (3) that the state is bound to observe the federal acquittal by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, U.S.Const., Art. IV, § 1, or by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
A. "Dual Sovereignty”
It is a basic principle of federalism that successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments do not constitute double jeopardy. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 1283, 3 L.Ed.2d 1258 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed.2d 314 (1922). This principle is based on the concept of “dual sovereignty” — i. e., one act may constitute separate and distinct offenses against both the state and federal governments. Thus, a defendant who is prosecuted by both the state and federal governments is not twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Petitioner contends that subsequent cases have eroded the dual sovereignty doctrine. He places particular reliance upon Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), which overruled Bartkus v. Illinois to the extent that Bartkus held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy does not apply to the states. We find nothing in Benton v. Maryland, however, that casts a shadow on the validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine enunciated in Bartkus and Abbate.
Petitioner’s reliance on Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964); and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), is similarly misplaced. None of those cases dealt with the double jeopardy issue in the context of successive federal-state prosecutions, and we find nothing in those cases which indicates that the Supreme Court no longer adheres to the dual sovereignty doctrine.
In decisions subsequent to Waller, Elkins and Murphy, this Court has consistently upheld the validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Sappington v. United States, 523 F.2d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 212 & n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859, 96 S.Ct. 112, 46 L.Ed.2d 85 (1975); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1362 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 773 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009, 92 S.Ct. 687, 30 L.Ed.2d 657 (1972). The other circuits are in agreement. *842See, e. g., Martin v. Rose, 481 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S.Ct. 86, 38 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973); United States v. Jackson, 470 F.2d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 3019, 37 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1973); United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S.Ct. 569, 34 L.Ed.2d 517 (1972); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624, 628 n.3 (10th Cir. 1971). We are apprised of no reason to depart from the sound logic of these cases.
B. Collateral Estoppel
Petitioner’s second contention is that the doctrine of collateral estoppel enunciated in Ashe v. Swenson, supra, barred the state’s prosecution in the instant case. In Ashe, the Court held:
[ W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
Id. 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (emphasis added). As the above-quoted language indicates, the flaw in petitioner’s argument is that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not apply when different sovereigns and, thus, different parties are involved in the litigation. United States v. Johnson, supra, 516 F.2d at 211; Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 1446, 14 L.Ed.2d 284 (1965). See also United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916, 93 S.Ct. 971, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973).2
C. Full Faith and Credit
Petitioner’s final contention is as unpersuasive as it is novel. He alleges that his prosecution by the State of Missouri amounted to a denial of full faith and credit to the federal judgment of acquittal. The federal judgment, however, only determined that petitioner did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); it did not determine whether petitioner violated Mo.Rev. Stat. §§ 560.120 and 560.135. There was thus no denial of full faith and credit. The remainder of petitioner’s allegation in this regard is merely a restatement of his collateral estoppel argument, discussed supra.
Having found no merit in petitioner’s arguments, we affirm the order of the District Court.

. The Honorable John K. Regan, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

. Petitioner’s collateral'estoppel argument fails for yet another reason. A defendant claiming an estoppel has the burden of proving what issues were necessarily decided in his favor at his prior trial. See, e. g., United States v. Cala, 521 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1971). In the instant case, petitioner failed to introduce a transcript of his federal trial in support of his motion to dismiss the state charge. Such failure makes it impossible for a court to ascertain the issues previously determined, and thus fails to meet the burden of proof. See, e. g., United States v. Smith, supra; United States v. Tierney, 424 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850, 91 S.Ct. 53, 27 L.Ed.2d 87 (1970); United States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 316 F.Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff’d, 441 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867, 92 S.Ct. 143, 30 L.Ed.2d 111 (1971).