Court Opinion

ID: 9916668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 15:00:23.471368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:50.906204
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SAEED TAVAKKOL,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          SF-0752-19-0587-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: January 9, 2024
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Saeed Tavakkol , Federal Way, Washington, pro se.

      Steven B. Schwartzman , Seattle, Washington, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his alleged involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                 2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.      Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).          After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
find the issues of jurisdiction and timeliness inextricably intertwined, we
AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                BACKGROUND
      The appellant was an Operations Industrial Engineer with the U.S. Postal
Service’s Seattle Network Distribution Center (NDC). Initial Appeal File (IAF),
Tab 10 at 41. He filed the instant appeal, in which he alleged that, beginning in
December of 2013, he was the victim of harassment based on race and national
origin and in retaliation for whistleblowing and Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) activity.    IAF, Tab 6 at 4-24, Tab 8 at 8-14.       He claimed that this
harassment included the agency issuing him a letter of warning and a letter of
concern, and placing him on a performance improvement plan (PIP). IAF, Tab 6
at 12, 15-16.
      He also alleged verbal harassment, such as his work-assigned “mentor”
informing the appellant that he carried a gun in his car at all times and claiming
the appellant would “get a knife in the back.”     Id. at 4-5, 20.   Moreover, he
alleged that the agency ordered him to perform custodial and maintenance work,
forced him to take unnecessary online communication courses, surveilled him at
work, and interrogated him and that he was not allowed to speak on
teleconferences.   Id. at 6-8, 10-13, 15-16.   He further alleged that the agency
                                                                                 3

failed to promote him and that he was humiliated in a meeting following his filing
of a worker’s compensation claim. Id. at 5-6, 13-14.
        According to the appellant, as a result of these actions, he was diagnosed
with various medical problems, including a generalized anxiety disorder, inability
to concentrate with dizziness, neck pain, and insomnia. Id. at 6. Allegedly as a
result of these conditions, he requested sick leave from February 2 to May 23,
2015.    IAF, Tab 10 at 52, 58.     On February 19, 2015, he submitted medical
documentation substantiating his need for leave through May 23, 2015, and the
agency approved his request. Id. at 52.
        The appellant’s manager also construed this medical documentation as a
request for reasonable accommodation. Id. at 57. Accordingly, he referred the
appellant to the agency’s Seattle District Reasonable Accommodation Committee
(DRAC).      Id.   In March 2015, the DRAC denied the appellant’s request for
reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tab 10 at 55-56. In doing so, it found that the
appellant was a person with a disability, but that he was not entitled to the sole
requested accommodation of working under someone other than the Plant
Manager of the NDC. Id. The appellant filed an EEO complaint with the agency,
alleging that the denial of accommodation and other actions preceding it were the
result of discrimination and reprisal. Id. at 9, 17-18.
        The appellant did not return to work on May 26, 2015, the first workday
following the period of incapacitation covered by his medical documentation.
The agency placed him in an absent without leave (AWOL) status beginning on
May 26, 2015. Id. at 51. The appellant never returned to work, and he eventually
resigned, effective July 20, 2015.      Id. at 41-47.     He alleges here that his
resignation was involuntary.
        On March 29, 2019, an administrative judge of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) granted summary judgment in favor of the
agency on the appellant’s EEO complaint. Id. at 17-38. The agency subsequently
issued a notice of final action on the matter, implementing the EEOC’s decision.
                                                                                        4

Id. at 9-10.   The issues presented in the EEO case involve many of the same
allegations of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment at issue in
this appeal. Id. at 18-19. However, the administrative judge’s decision and the
agency’s notice of final action in the appellant’s EEO case did not address his
alleged involuntary resignation, and the agency did not process the EEO
complaint as a “mixed case.” 2 Neither the FAD nor the EEOC decision informed
the appellant of his appeal rights before the Board. Id. at 9-10, 37-38.
      The appellant subsequently filed the instant appeal on July 26, 2019. IAF,
Tab 1. The administrative judge informed the appellant that his appeal might be
untimely and set forth the appellant’s burden of proving, as a Postal Service
employee, that he had Board appeal rights. IAF, Tab 3, Tab 12. After the parties
responded, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding a hearing. IAF, Tab 16, Initial
Decision (ID) at 1.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant was a Postal management
“employee” with adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75.                ID
at 9-10.   The administrative judge then found that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that the agency’s conduct rose to the level of coercion
necessary to overcome the presumption that his resignation was voluntary. ID
at 12-13. He also disagreed with the appellant’s argument that the denial of his
reasonable accommodation request effectively took away his job.                ID at 10.
Thus, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without holding the

2
  A mixed case arises when an appellant has been subject to an action that is appealable
to the Board, and he alleges that the action was effected, in whole or in part, because of
discrimination. Miranne v. Department of the Navy, 121 M.S.P.R. 235, ¶ 8 (2014). An
appellant has two options when filing a mixed case: he may initially file a mixed -case
complaint with the agency, followed by an appeal to the Board, or he may file a
mixed-case appeal with the Board and raise his discrimination claim in connection with
his appeal. Id. When an employee files a timely mixed-case complaint with the
agency, the employing agency must issue a final agency decision on the employee’s
discrimination claims and provide the employee with notice of his rights to file an
appeal with the Board. Id., ¶ 9; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(d)(3).
                                                                                   5

appellant’s requested hearing.     IAF, Tab 1 at 2; ID at 1, 14.    Because of his
finding regarding jurisdiction, the administrative judge did not address whether
the appeal was untimely filed. ID at 14 n.3.
         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 1. He repeats many of his arguments from below, asserts that the initial
decision contains numerous factual errors, argues that his mental and physical
health problems were exacerbated by the agency and prevented him from
working, and claims that his Official Personnel File (OPF) denotes that he was
terminated as opposed to having resigned. Id. at 4-14. The agency has submitted
an untimely response to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1, Tab 4;
5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Office of the Clerk of the Board notified the agency
that its response was untimely and provided the agency an opportunity to submit a
motion to accept the response as timely or to waive the time limit. PFR File,
Tab 5.     The agency has not filed such a motion.        Therefore, we have not
considered the agency’s response. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g) (explaining that an
untimely pleading on review generally must be accompanied by a motion showing
good cause for the untimely filing).

                  DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
         The administrative judge found that the appellant, a Postal Service
employee, was eligible to file a Board appeal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 because
he was a management or supervisory employee with at least 1 year of current
continuous service in the same or similar position. ID at 5-6. The parties do not
challenge this finding, and we see no reason to disturb it on review.

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his resignation was the result of
a hostile work environment.
         The appellant’s arguments involve an allegation that he was subjected to a
hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-24, Tab 8-14; PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7,
11-12. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
                                                                                        6

allege that the agency’s actions and conduct was so intolerable that he had no
choice but to resign when he did. ID at 13. We agree. 3
      An employee-initiated action, such as a retirement or resignation, is
presumed to be voluntary and thus outside the Board’s jurisdiction, unless the
employee presents sufficient evidence to establish that the action was obtained
through duress or coercion or shows that a reasonable person would have been
misled by the agency.      Gibeault v. Department of the Treasury, 114 M.S.P.R.
664, ¶ 6 (2010).     An appellant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of Board
jurisdiction over an appeal of an alleged involuntary separation only if he makes a
nonfrivolous allegation casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness. Id. A
nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could establish a
prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. However,
the appellant ultimately bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction over his
appeal by a preponderance of the evidence.          Vitale v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 17 (2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).
      Here, the appellant did not allege that he was misled by the agency. 4
Instead, he argues that the agency created a hostile work environment that forced
him to resign.     Coercive involuntariness is a narrow doctrine.        Brown v. U.S.
Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 10, aff’d per curiam, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed.
3
   The appellant suggests that he was forced to resign because his OPF states
“Terminated” as his “Employment Status.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. We are not
persuaded. The appellant submitted a resignation, which the agency processed as such.
IAF, Tab 10 at 41-42. Although the agency may have designated the appellant as
“terminated” on his OPF, without further explanation, this reference appears to reflect
that he is no longer an agency employee.
4
  The appellant asserts misrepresentation on review, but appears to be citing to the legal
standard for involuntary resignations. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14. He makes no specific
allegations of misrepresentation. Id. Similarly, he used the word “misrepresentation”
below when making certain allegations of harassment. E.g., IAF, Tab 6 at 5-6.
However, neither below nor on review did he claim he relied on an agency
misrepresentation in making his decision to retire. See Morrison v. Department of the
Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶¶ 10, 13 (2015) (finding an appellant was entitled to a
jurisdictional hearing when he made a nonfrivolous allegation that his retirement was
involuntary because he materially relied on agency misinformation).
                                                                                        7

Cir. 2011). To establish involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an employee
must show that the agency effectively imposed the terms of his resignation, he
had no realistic alternative but to resign, and his resignation was the result of
improper acts by the agency. Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 19. The touchstone of
the   voluntariness   analysis   is   whether,   considering   the   totality    of   the
circumstances, factors operated on the employee’s decision-making process that
deprived him of freedom of choice. Id. When alleging involuntary resignation
due to harassment and a hostile work environment, the appellant must
demonstrate that the employer engaged in a course of action that made working
conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in his position
would have felt compelled to retire. Id., ¶ 20. The Board addresses allegations of
discrimination and reprisal for either prior EEO activity or whistleblowing
activity in connection with an alleged involuntary retirement only insofar as those
allegations relate to the issue of voluntariness. Id. Generally, a feeling of being
unfairly criticized and difficult or unpleasant working conditions are not so
intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to retire or resign.               Miller v.
Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (2000).
      Although the appellant below labeled the agency’s conduct as harassment,
duress, and coercion, and continues to do so on review, the specific factual
allegations on which he relies do not support his claim. IAF, Tab 7 at 4; PFR
File, Tab 1   The Board has found that an appellant must make specific and
detailed allegations, and that vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma
allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading
standard. Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶¶ 6-7 (2016), aff’d
per curiam, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), overruled on other grounds by
Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n. 11. Therefore, we have
considered those specific factual allegations, and generally disregarded the
appellant’s legal characterizations of the agency’s action as meeting the legal
standard for an involuntary resignation.         The appellant provides a lengthy
                                                                                   8

timeline, and therefore we limit ourselves to some examples to illustrate the
deficiency of his assertions.
      As one example, the appellant asserted that an agency manager accused
him of being a terrorist. IAF, Tab 6 at 22. He repeats this argument on review.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.     The administrative judge did not address this specific
claim. However, in the affidavit from which the appellant draws his conclusion,
the individual merely states that, through a conversation with the appellant, he
learned that the appellant was “involved as a leading figure in overthrowing the
Government of Iran, how he is not allowed back in the country and his
involvement in some sort of activity with American embassy in Iran.” Id. This is
significantly different than calling the appellant a terrorist. The appellant does
not deny the underlying information, or explain how the affiant’s knowledge of
this information amounts to an accusation that the appellant is a terrorist.
      Similarly, the appellant asserted that he was “repeatedly humiliated in
public meetings” for filing an allegedly frivolous workers’ compensation claim.
IAF, Tab 6 at 5. The appellant does not raise this argument on review, and the
administrative judge did not specifically address it. In support of this allegation,
the appellant provided an excerpt from an affidavit completed by one of the
managers who allegedly humiliated him. The manager stated in his affidavit that
he would routinely discuss in staff meetings that “some frivolous [workers’
compensation] claims are rejected.” Id. at 5-6. This appears to be a statement of
fact and the appellant provides no evidence suggesting it was directed at him.
      The appellant also re-raises incidents that the administrative judge
concluded were too remote in time from the appellant’s resignation or that the
appellant could have pursued through his then-ongoing EEO complaint against
the agency.    ID at 2, 10-13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-12.         We agree with the
administrative judge that, under these circumstances, the appellant failed to allege
facts that would cause the reasonable person in his position to retire.
                                                                                       9

      A resignation is not involuntary when an appellant has the option to stand
and fight the alleged discrimination, retaliation, and harassment through an EEO
complaint rather than resign.         See Axsom v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 17 (2009) (concluding an appellant had the option to stand
and fight rather than resign when he had an EEO action pending well before his
resignation).    Further, alleged incidents of discrimination and harassment
preceding a decision to resign by several months figure only tangentially into a
resignation decision.    Id., ¶ 16.    A period of extended leave during which an
employee has little, if any, contact with the allegedly hostile supervisors in the
months leading up to his decision to resign further weakens any inference that
any alleged harassment and discrimination on their part weighed heavily in the
employee’s decision. Id. We find all of these circumstances present here.
      As one example, the appellant asserted that his “mentor” made comments
such as “go back to your country,” that the appellant did not “have the right
accent,” and that the appellant needed to “play the game otherwise people [will]
put a knife in your back.” 5 Id. at 4. He repeats this argument on review. PFR
File, Tab 1 at 6-7. We agree with the appellant that, as alleged, the first two of
these three comments are unacceptable in the workplace. However, the focus of
an alleged involuntary resignation is on the circumstances immediately preceding
the appellant’s action. Miller, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 10. Here, the appellant fails to
identify when these comments were made, and suggests they occurred throughout
his time at the agency dating back to 2013. IAF, Tab 6 at 4. The appellant
ceased working on February 2, 2015. He resigned over 5 months later. IAF,
Tab 10 at 41-47. This time lapse undercuts the appellant’s assertion that these
workplace incidents at least 5 months earlier, and potentially years earlier, caused

5
  Regarding the knife comment, the “mentor” stated in the affidavit excerpt that he “was
trying to make [the appellant] understand, the different culture, different ethnic
background.” IAF, Tab 6 at 4. This explanation is drastically different than
referencing a literal knife in the back.
                                                                                10

him to retire.   Searcy v. Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 13
(2010).
      The appellant also asserted that sometime between March and October
2014, his mentor told him that he carried a gun in his car at all times, which the
appellant perceived as a threat. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-5. He argues on review that
management failed to take any action to address his safety concerns. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 7. He also realleges that the agency harassed him by presenting him
with, and then placing him on, a PIP in November and December 2014. IAF,
Tab 6 at 9-10; PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. The appellant raised these claims in his
EEO complaint, as well as in his initial appeal. IAF, Tab 10 at 18-19, 27-28,
30-31.
      As for the mentor’s comment about keeping a gun in his car, although very
concerning, this event occurred at a minimum 8 months before the appellant’s
resignation, and potentially predated his resignation by over a year. IAF, Tab 6
at 4-5; see Miller, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 10. While management’s failure to address
the appellant’s safety concerns is troubling, this failure likewise occurred months
prior to his resignation.   Further, an employee is not guaranteed a stress -free
working environment.        Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15; see Baldwin,
109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶¶ 19-20 (2008) (finding that an appellant who alleged he was
assigned to perform a difficult cleaning task without assistance, unjustifiably
threatened with discipline, subjected to unwarranted investigations, and
accompanied by agency police at his worksite failed to nonfrivolously allege that
a reasonable person in his position would have been compelled to resign); Miller,
85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (observing that difficult or unpleasant working conditions
are generally not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign).
      The appellant argues on review that he was too ill to pursue his EEO claim.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12. We are not persuaded. His assertion is belied by his
statement that he continued to pursue his EEO complaint by amending it in July
2015, to include his alleged involuntary resignation.      Id. at 6.   Further, his
                                                                                 11

resignation letter, which he submitted to the agency the same month, contains
detailed allegations reflecting the appellant’s ability to continue to advocate on
his own behalf. IAF, Tab 10 at 42-47. In that letter, he asserted that many of the
same events he raises here led to his resignation, such as reporting safety
violations, his illness, and his placement on a PIP. Id. at 43-44.
      Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that the environment
and events described by the appellant do not rise to the level of coercion
necessary to overcome the presumption that his resignation was voluntary.

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his resignation was the result of
a denial of reasonable accommodation.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to allege that the
agency denied him a reasonable accommodation, thus forcing him to resign. ID
at 10. On review, the appellant questions the fact that his manager referred him
to the DRAC for consideration of his potential reasonable accommodation
request. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. He also argues that the DRAC process, and the
denial of his requested accommodation by the DRAC, effectively coerced him to
retire. Id. at 4-6, 12.
      All constructive adverse action claims have two things in common: (1) the
employee lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s
wrongful actions that deprived the employee of that choice. Bean v. U.S. Postal
Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 (2013).             The denial of a reasonable
accommodation that would have permitted an employee to continue working
despite his medical conditions, and that leads to the employee’s resignation, is a
wrongful action that can be the basis of an alleged involuntary retirement claim.
Hosozawa v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 2, 6-7 (2010)
(finding that an appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her retirement was
involuntary when she alleged that the agency denied her request for a reasonable
accommodation that would have permitted her to continue to work full-time
                                                                                            12

despite her medical conditions). However, here the appellant has not alleged any
facts that would lead to the conclusion that the agency’s actions were wrongful.
       An agency is required to reasonably accommodate an employee’s medical
conditions if he can otherwise perform his job. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m) (defining
a “qualified” individual as one who can perform the essential functions of the
position in question with or without reasonable accommodation), 1630.9(a)
(setting forth the requirement to provide reasonable accommodation to an
“otherwise qualified” employee).               The medical documentation the appellant
submitted to the agency in February 2015 indicated that, in addition to requiring
leave, the appellant needed “a change in employment” and to return to work in “a
different position.”    IAF, Tab 10 at 57.           Thus, the agency acted properly by
initiating discussions with the appellant regarding reasonable accommodation.
See Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶¶ 13-19
(2015) (finding that an agency acted properly by preventing an appellant from
returning to work when he did not provide medical documentation the agency
needed to determine his ability to perform his essential job functions and whether
he posed a direct threat due to his medical condition), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed.
Cir.   2016);     29   C.F.R.     § 1630.2(o)(2)-(3)        (listing    types   of   reasonable
accommodation, including job restructuring and reassignment to a vacant
position,   and    stating      that   “[t]o    determine     the      appropriate   reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process” with the disabled individual).
       The appellant’s only requested accommodation was to return to work in a
position that did not report to the NDC Plant Manager. IAF, Tab 10 at 55-56. As
the DRAC held, the EEOC’s guidance states that, in most circumstances, an
employer does not need to change a person’s supervisor as a form of reasonable
accommodation.           Id.;     EEOC,         Enforcement      Guidance:           Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
                                                                                      13

Question 33 (Oct. 17, 2002). Accordingly, the DRAC did not act wrongfully in
denying his request for accommodation. IAF, Tab 10 at 55-56.
      The appellant suggests on review that the DRAC ignored his requests
regarding his reasonable accommodation request, but he provides no specifics.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 12.       We find his statement to be conclusory, and thus
frivolous. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s)(1) (explaining that a nonfrivolous allegation
is one that is more than conclusory). The agency referred the appellant to the
DRAC on February 11, 2015, within 2 days after he submitted medical
documentation that suggested he might require a reasonable accommodation to
perform his duties. IAF, Tab 10 at 57. The DRAC proceeded to communicate
with the appellant, gather information from him, and issue a decision by the end
of March 2015. Id. at 55-56. The decision provided the appellant with the option
to request reconsideration through a human resources manager. Id. at 56. The
appellant does not state exactly what steps he took following the DRAC decision
and does not claim he requested reconsideration of the DRAC decision. Thus, we
lack any specific information from which to conclude that the agency acted
improperly by not responding to the appellant.                See Rosario-Fabregas,
122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 18 (explaining that an appellant’s failure to engage in the
interactive   process   prevented an agency from           identifying a     reasonable
accommodation).
      As the administrative judge observed, the agency ordered the appellant to
return to work after May 23, 2015, absent continued medical restrictions
justifying additional leave. Id. at 51; ID at 10. There is no evidence that the
agency suggested that he no longer had a job.          IAF, Tab 10 at 51; ID at 10.
Accordingly, the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege that his resignation
was the result of a wrongful processing or denial of his reasonable
accommodation request. 6
6
  The administrative judge, in finding the Board lacked jurisdiction, declined to address
the issue of timeliness. ID at 14 n.3. We modify this language in the initial decision to
find that the issues of timeliness and jurisdiction are inextricably intertwined. See
                                                                                     14

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 5 (finding timeliness and jurisdiction inextricable
intertwined in an involuntary retirement appeal because the resolution of the timeliness
issue depends on whether the appellant was subjected to an appealable action). We
therefore do not separately address the timeliness issue.
7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      15

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                16

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     17

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           18

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Jennifer Everling
                                      Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.