Court Opinion

ID: 9930294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 17:00:45.390489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:21.748323
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE          No. 20-36024
LIMITED,
                               D.C. No. 2:18-cv-
      Petitioner-Appellee,        01360-TSZ

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS)
LIMITED; DEVAS MULTIMEDIA           ORDER
AMERICA, INC.; DEVAS
EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS
PRIVATE LIMITED; TELCOM
DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED,

      Appellees-Intervenors,

 v.

ANTRIX CORP. LTD.,

      Respondent-Appellant.

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE          No. 22-35085
LIMITED,
                               D.C. No. 2:18-cv-
      Petitioner-Appellant,       01360-TSZ
2        DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS)
LIMITED; TELCOM DEVAS
MAURITIUS LIMITED; DEVAS
MULTIMEDIA AMERICA, INC.;
DEVAS EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS
PRIVATE LIMITED,

          Intervenor-Plaintiffs-
          Appellees,

    v.

ANTRIX CORP. LTD.,

          Respondent.

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE                       No. 22-35103
LIMITED,
                                             D.C. No. 2:18-cv-
          Petitioner,                           01360-TSZ

and

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS)
LIMITED; DEVAS MULTIMEDIA
AMERICA, INC.; DEVAS
EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS
PRIVATE LIMITED; TELCOM
DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED,
          DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.        3

           Intervenor-Plaintiffs-
           Appellees,

     v.

ANTRIX CORP. LTD.,

           Respondent-Appellant.

                       Filed February 6, 2024

     Before: Eric D. Miller and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit Judges,
             and Donald W. Molloy, * District Judge.

                              Order;
                 Statement by Judge O’Scannlain;
                    Dissent by Judge Bumatay

                           SUMMARY **

     Personal Jurisdiction / Foreign Sovereign Immunities
                              Act

   The panel filed an order denying petitions for rehearing
en banc and directing that no further petitions will be

*
 The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

entertained, in a case in which the panel held that the district
court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over Antrix
Corp. Ltd., an Indian corporation, under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, because plaintiff failed to
establish that Antrix had the requisite minimum contacts for
personal jurisdiction.
    In a statement respecting the denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge O’Scannlain wrote that he agreed with the views
expressed by Judge Bumatay in his dissent from the denial
of rehearing en banc.
    Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
Bumatay, joined by Judges Callahan, Ikuta, Bennett, R.
Nelson, and VanDyke, wrote that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, governing when foreign states may be sued
in federal court, does not require plaintiffs to also prove
“minimum contacts” to assert personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state, and this court’s error in holding otherwise
should be corrected through rehearing en banc.

                           ORDER

    The panel has unanimously voted to deny the petitions
for rehearing en banc. Judge Miller and Judge Koh have
voted to deny the petitions for rehearing en banc, and Judge
Molloy so recommends.
    The full court has been advised of the petitions for
rehearing en banc. A judge of the court requested a vote on
en banc rehearing. The matter failed to receive a majority of
votes of non-recused active judges in favor of en banc
consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35(f).
      DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.                5

    The petitions for rehearing en banc, (20-36024 Dkts. No.
111, 112; 22-35085 Dkt. No. 56; 22-35103 Dkt. No. 63), are
DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en
banc will be entertained. Judge O’Scannlain’s statement
respecting the denial of en banc rehearing and Judge
Bumatay’s dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing are
filed concurrently herewith.

O’SCANNLAIN, 1 Circuit Judge, respecting the denial of
rehearing en banc:

    I agree with the views expressed by Judge Bumatay in
his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, joined by CALLAHAN,
IKUTA, BENNETT, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit
Judges, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

    Federal courts “have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 404 (1821). We thus have a “virtually unflagging”
obligation to “hear and decide cases within [our]
jurisdiction.”   Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control

1
  As a judge of this court in senior status, I no longer have the power to
vote on calls for rehearing cases en banc or formally to join a dissent
from failure to rehear en banc. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); Fed. R. App. P.
35(a). Following our court’s general orders, however, I may participate
in discussions of en banc proceedings. See Ninth Circuit General Order
5.5(a).
6    DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (simplified).
When reading jurisdictional statutes, our task is to simply
“apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation” and
ask whether Congress authorized suit. See id. at 128. It
should go without saying that we do not “ask whether in our
judgment Congress should have authorized . . . suit.” Id.
    In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) to govern when foreign states may
be sued in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. As a
default, the FSIA establishes that foreign states are immune
from the jurisdiction of federal courts. Id. § 1604. But
Congress set aside sovereign immunity for claims that fall
within certain specified exceptions. See id. §§ 1605, 1605A,
1605B. Those exceptions range from pursuing state
sponsors of terrorism to recovering damages for violations
of commercial agreements. And Congress did not mince its
words in providing jurisdiction for these claims. The FSIA
states that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall
exist” when enumerated claims are brought with proper
service. Id. § 1330(b) (emphasis added). Such mandatory
language leaves no room for courts to alter the immunity
inquiry. Put simply, “any sort of immunity defense made by
a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the
Act’s text. Or it must fall.” Republic of Argentina v. NML
Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 141–42 (2014).
    This case presents a straightforward question. Despite
the FSIA’s text, does the Act require plaintiffs to also prove
“minimum contacts” to assert personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state? Unlike every other federal court, the Ninth
Circuit answers “yes.” And saying “yes” is a big deal—it
means that we lock the courthouse doors to plaintiffs whom
Congress expressly granted access. So victims of terrorism,
those harmed by violations of international law, and persons
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.     7

who suffered from torture may be barred from seeking
justice in our courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1605A, 1605B.
Congress swung the doors open and we slammed them shut.
Our failure to correct this error violates the separation of
powers and anoints ourselves gatekeepers in a way not
contemplated by Congress or the Constitution.
    The problem started more than 40 years ago. Back then,
our court appended minimum contacts to the list of
requirements that plaintiffs must establish to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign state. See Thomas P. Gonzalez
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa Rica
(“Gonzalez”), 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980). There,
we said, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction under the [FSIA] requires
satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard.”
Id. We thus replaced the words “shall exist” in § 1330(b)
with “may exist” and substituted our own view that Congress
must have really wanted foreign states to also have sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States. Under our rule,
then, personal jurisdiction exists only when our judicially
created hurdle is satisfied.
    And we made this interpretive move under the most
dubious of guises—legislative history. While strongly
disfavored today, back in 1980, it was more common to
determine meaning not from statutory text, but from
legislative accoutrements. And that’s what we did. We
looked at a single House Committee Report and surmised
what we thought Congress really wanted. See Gonzalez, 614
F.2d at 1255 (“The legislative history of the Act confirms
that the reach of § 1330(b) does not extend beyond the limits
set by the International Shoe line of cases.”). “The question,
however, is not what Congress ‘would have wanted’ but
what Congress enacted in the FSIA.” Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
8    DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

    Today, it’s obvious that we cannot appeal to legislative
history to undo a statute’s plain meaning. See Epic Sys.
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 523 (2018). So we know that
Gonzalez’s interpretation is wrong. But even if that history
mattered, the Report doesn’t say what Gonzalez thought it
said about minimum contacts. The Report merely observed
that the Act’s exceptions “embodied” a minimum-contacts
analysis. Gonzalez, 614 F.2d at 1255 n.5 (quoting the
Committee Report). It says nothing about adding another
layer of minimum-contacts review before denying foreign-
state immunity. To my knowledge, no other court interprets
the FSIA this way.
    And nothing in the Constitution requires a minimum-
contacts analysis either. Federal courts have uniformly
recognized that foreign states are not entitled to the
protection of minimum contacts under the Fifth
Amendment. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Frontera Res.
Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic,
582 F.3d 393, 399–400 (2d Cir. 2009); Abelesz v. Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012). The
Supreme Court has also suggested the same. See Weltover,
504 U.S. at 619. So the Due Process Clause fails to justify
our wayward precedent.
    Despite all this, our court not only perpetuates, but
arguably expands, the minimum-contacts requirement here.
See Devas Multimedia Priv. Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 2023 WL
4884882, at *1–2 (9th Cir. 2023). While Gonzalez merely
dealt with the commercial activities exception, see 614 F.2d
at 1255, our court seemingly rules that the minimum-
contacts inquiry extends to all exceptions under the FSIA.
Devas, 2023 WL 4884882, at *1–2. In this case, we applied
it to a new context—the arbitral exception—for the first
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.     9

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). We did so even while a
majority of the panel recognized that “our precedent
applying the minimum-contacts test to the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign states has no foundation in
the Constitution or the FSIA, and it is contrary to the views
of other courts of appeals.” Devas, 2023 WL 4884882, at *4
(Miller, J., joined by Koh, J., concurring). So while the
majority of the panel disagrees with our precedent, it
expanded its troubling reach.
    This case presented an opportunity to correct our
erroneous precedent and apply the FSIA the way Congress
enacted it. But our court refuses to step in and denies en
banc review. And it’s hard to explain why. Sure, it’s true
that the specific dispute between Devas Multimedia and
Antrix Corporation raises some other complexities—like
whether Antrix is sufficiently controlled by India to be
considered a foreign state. But those other questions are
secondary to whether foreign states are entitled to a
minimum-contacts analysis in the first place. Those
subsidiary questions are thus distractions that should have
been left to the three-judge panel to resolve. At a minimum,
we should have overruled Gonzalez and discarded our
blanket bar to bringing claims against foreign states unless
plaintiffs can prove minimum contacts.
    After all, how many would-be plaintiffs gave up valid
claims in the Ninth Circuit because of our out-of-sync rule?
How many plaintiffs had to seek redress in other courts to
sidestep our precedent? And how many plaintiffs were
simply kicked out of our courts by the minimum-contacts
requirement? The effect of our ruling is unquestionably
significant. Under a proper reading of the FSIA, those
plaintiffs should be welcome to bring their claims in our
circuit.
10   DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

    Because we fail our “unflagging” duty to hear and decide
cases within our jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc.
                              I.
                              A.
    Let’s begin with a brief overview of the FSIA. The FSIA
“establishes a comprehensive framework for determining
whether a court in this country, state or federal, may exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign state.” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 610.
The Act “standardize[s] the judicial process with respect to
immunity for foreign sovereign entities in civil cases.”
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U.S. 264,
272 (2023).
   The FSIA starts from the “baseline” that foreign states
and their instrumentalities are entitled to sovereign
immunity in our courts. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604). But
Congress then specified certain exceptions when that
immunity is withheld. The FSIA provides that:

       (a) The district courts shall have original
           jurisdiction without regard to amount in
           controversy of any nonjury civil action
           against a foreign state as defined in
           section 1603(a) of this title as to any
           claim for relief in personam with respect
           to which the foreign state is not entitled
           to immunity either under sections 1605-
           1607 of this title or under any applicable
           international agreement.
       (b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
           shall exist as to every claim for relief over
       DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.    11

            which the district courts have jurisdiction
            under subsection (a) where service has
            been made under section 1608 of this
            title.

28 U.S.C. § 1330.
    So whenever an exception applies, Congress grants
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state “as to every claim
for relief” after proper service. Id. § 1330(b). Thus, the
FSIA “bars federal and state courts from exercising
jurisdiction when a foreign state is entitled to immunity, and
[then] confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear suits
brought by United States citizens and by aliens when a
foreign state is not entitled to immunity.” Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
434 (1989). In other words, Congress closed the door on
suits against foreign states, while leaving the keys for some
types of claims.
   The FSIA exceptions to immunity cover many subject
matters.
   •    Commercial Activities— Cases “in which the action
        is based upon a commercial activity . . . that . . .
        causes a direct effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
        § 1605(a)(2).
   •    Expropriation— Cases “in which rights in property
        taken in violation of international law are in issue and
        that property [has a connection to the United
        States].” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
   •    Arbitration— Cases “in which the action is brought
        . . . to confirm an award made pursuant to . . . an
        agreement to arbitrate” including when that award
12       DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

          “is or may be governed by a treaty or other
          international agreement in force . . . calling for the
          recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” 28
          U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
     •    Terrorism— Cases “in which money damages are
          sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
          death that was caused by an act of torture,
          extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
          taking, or the provision of material support or
          resources . . . [by] a state sponsor of terrorism.” 28
          U.S.C. § 1605A.
    As part of Congress’s “carefully calibrated scheme,” it
also established procedures governing suits under the FSIA.
Turkiye Halk Bankasi, 598 U.S. at 273. Congress included
many specifics, like a venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f),
service of process requirements, id. § 1608, and a bar on
punitive damages, id. § 1606. And foreign states are “liable
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.” Id.
    Finally, the FSIA does not just cover direct suits against
a foreign government. Instead, “[t]he FSIA defines a
‘foreign state’ to [also] encompass instrumentalities of a
foreign state.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi, 598 U.S. at 272 (citing
28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)–(b)). This definition “includ[es]
entities that are directly and majority-owned by a foreign
state.” Id. Thus, personal jurisdiction may exist over a
foreign sovereign and its state-owned companies.
                                B.
   Now, a quick rundown of this case. Antrix is a company
wholly owned by the Republic of India. India incorporated
Antrix to market goods and services created by the country’s
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.     13

Department of Space and the Indian Space Research
Organization. Devas was a private company created by a
group of American investors and executives to develop
telecommunications services in India. The two companies
agreed to work together to build, launch, and manage
telecommunication satellites. To carry out this agreement,
they signed a contract which included an arbitration
provision. Eventually, Antrix sought to terminate the
agreement; Devas responded by initiating arbitration. A
foreign arbitration tribunal found for Devas and awarded it
$562.5 million in damages. Devas and Antrix then filed
dueling petitions in the Indian courts—Devas’s to confirm
the award and Antrix’s to set it aside.
    While the Indian proceedings were pending, Devas
sought to confirm the award elsewhere. It petitioned to
confirm the arbitration award in the Western District of
Washington, where Antrix has business relationships with
several firms. Devas relied on the arbitral exception to the
FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). Although it was
uncontested that Antrix is a “foreign state” under the FSIA,
service was proper, and Devas’s claim falls under the arbitral
exception, Antrix still argued personal jurisdiction was
improper.
    The district court rejected Antrix’s jurisdictional
challenge. It first held that personal jurisdiction was
satisfied under the FSIA, because the “parties d[id] not
dispute that personal jurisdiction exists as a matter of
statute.” The district court then concluded that foreign states
are not entitled to minimum contacts under the Due Process
Clause and, even if they were, Antrix had sufficient contacts.
And the district court held that the Republic of India
“exercises sufficient control” over Antrix such that it should
be treated the same as the country for purposes of the due
14   DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

process analysis. As a result, the district court ruled that
personal jurisdiction was proper, confirmed the award, and
entered judgment for $1.293 billion (after the inclusion of
pre-award and post-award interest). Antrix then appealed
from the district court’s judgment.
    After that notice of appeal, there were two developments.
First, the Indian government placed Devas into liquidation
on the grounds that it had fraudulently conducted its affairs.
As a result, several shareholders of the company and its
American subsidiary intervened. The district court then
permitted the intervenors post-judgment discovery and
granted them leave to register the judgment. Both Antrix
and Devas (under the control of a liquidator) appealed the
order granting them leave to register the judgment.
    Second, during the appeal, an Indian court set aside the
arbitration award. Antrix now claims that the award is no
longer enforceable, which Devas and the intervenors
dispute. Because these events occurred after the notice of
appeal here, Antrix sought a limited remand to determine
whether the district court should reverse its judgment on the
merits.
    On appeal, our court brushed past all these developments
and complications and simply held that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Antrix. The panel ruled
that the district court was bound to apply the minimum-
contacts analysis from Gonzalez because (1) the Supreme
Court has not contradicted our prior holding and (2) our
court’s minimum-contacts inquiry is based on a statutory
interpretation of the FSIA. The panel then easily rejected the
argument that minimum contacts were satisfied here.
Because it concluded that the district court lacked personal
      DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.               15

jurisdiction, the panel didn’t address any other question on
appeal.
    Judge Miller wrote a concurrence, joined by Judge Koh.
He explained that “our precedent applying the minimum-
contacts test to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
foreign states has no foundation in the Constitution or the
FSIA, and it is contrary to the views of other courts of
appeals.” Devas, 2023 WL 4884882, at *4 (Miller, J.,
concurring). He recommended that, “[i]n an appropriate
case,” we should reconsider our erroneous precedent en
banc. Id.
    So the sole question for the en banc court was whether
plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal
courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states
under the FSIA. Of course, answering that question may
lead to other questions.1 But that’s no reason to punt on this
case. As we often do, we could have left those subsidiary
questions to the three-judge panel or district court after
correcting our precedent. We were wrong to shy away from
this significant question.
    I now turn to that question.

1
  For example, Antrix argues that its corporate status may independently
mean it deserves due process protection. While that question adds
another wrinkle to this case, it would not prevent the en banc court from
answering whether a foreign state is entitled to a minimum-contacts
inquiry under the FSIA or the Due Process Clause. We could have then
remanded to the district court to see whether Antrix should be treated the
same as India. See Frontera, 582 F.3d at 400–01 (remanding to the
district court to determine whether a state-owned corporation was
entitled to due process).
16    DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

                             II.
    While the Supreme Court has called the FSIA
Congress’s “comprehensive framework” for resolving
claims of sovereign immunity, Weltover, 504 U.S. at 610,
the Ninth Circuit thinks it is not quite comprehensive
enough. Forty years ago, our court held that Congress’s
command that personal jurisdiction “shall exist” when an
enumerated exception is met, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), was
really just the starting point. We then rewrote the statute to
add a minimum-contacts requirement. Only after satisfying
our minimum-contacts inquiry does our court permit
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state.
    This is not the law enacted by Congress and signed by
the President. We have no authority to make up our own
rules, especially when dealing with international affairs. See
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. 202, 208 (2018)
(“[C]ourts traditionally deferred to the decisions of the
political branches . . . on whether to take jurisdiction over
actions against foreign sovereigns.” (simplified)). And
nothing in the Due Process Clause mandates our statutory
interpretation. Rather than extending our dubious precedent,
we should have used this case to discard it.
     A. The FSIA’s Text Doesn’t Require Minimum
        Contacts
    Despite the clear command that personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state “shall exist” when an enumerated
exception applies, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), we adjoined a new
requirement to the FSIA in Gonzalez. In that case, we said
that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction under the Act requires
satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard.”
Gonzalez, 614 F.2d at 1255. We thus added a layer of
review found nowhere in the text.
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.    17

    What supported this minimum-contacts regime? The
tersest of reasoning.
    Gonzalez first looked to the phrase “direct effect” in one
exception—the commercial activities exception—and
seemingly read an across-the-board minimum-contacts
requirement from those two words. The commercial
activities exception provides for jurisdiction “upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2). Gonzalez explained that the term “‘direct
effect’ . . . ha[s] been interpreted as embodying the minimum
contacts standard” of International Shoe and its progeny.
614 F.2d at 1255. As support, Gonzalez cited two opinions
suggesting that § 1605(a)(2) incorporates the minimum-
contacts requirement. Id. (citing Carey v. Nat’l Oil Corp.,
592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979) and East Eur. Domestic
Int’l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 388–90
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)). But see Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC,
816 F.3d 383, 394 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that “the ‘direct
effect’ requirement does not incorporate the ‘minimum
contacts’ test”).
    Next, Gonzalez looked outside the text—to legislative
history. It stated that “[t]he legislative history of the Act
confirms that the reach of § 1330(b) does not extend beyond
the limits set by the International Shoe line of cases.”
Gonzalez, 614 F.2d at 1255.
    That’s the entirety of Gonzalez’s textual analysis. Based
on these flimsy data points, Gonzalez broadly proclaimed:
“Personal jurisdiction under the Act requires satisfaction of
the traditional minimum contacts standard.” Id.
18    DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

     The errors here are obvious—
    First, Gonzalez didn’t ground its analysis in the text of
§ 1330(b). And it is hard to imagine a clearer statute. It
states that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall
exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have jurisdiction under [an FSIA exception and] where
service has been made[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). That
presents a simple if-then statement. When subject-matter
jurisdiction and service are proper under the FSIA, the
district court “shall” have personal jurisdiction. The word
“shall” connotes a “mandatory” requirement. Sebelius v.
Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 154 (2013). When
“the statutory language is mandatory,” Congress “does not
[provide for] discretion.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007).
    Every circuit that has analyzed the FSIA has refused to
find a statutory minimum-contacts requirement under
§ 1330(b). See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of
Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Frontera, 582
F.3d at 396; Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 694; S & Davis Int’l, Inc.
v. The Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.
2000). The FSIA thus “clearly expresses the decision of the
Congress to confer upon the federal courts personal
jurisdiction over a properly served foreign state.” TMR
Energy, 411 F.3d at 303.
    Second, Gonzalez simply mixes up subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The commercial
activities exception, along with the other FSIA exceptions,
provides subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts. See
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
706 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A federal court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state unless the
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.     19

claim falls within an exception to immunity under the
FSIA.”). But subject-matter jurisdiction is a separate
question from personal jurisdiction, which is governed by
§ 1330(b). So holding that § 1605(a)(2) creates a universal
minimum-contacts requirement for § 1330(b) conflates the
two concepts and makes no textual sense.
    Third, Gonzalez was wrong to alter the clear text of
§ 1330(b) based on legislative history. While there was once
a time when courts would look to legislative history to
discern a statute’s meaning, that time has long since passed.
See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 412 n.29 (1971) (only looking to the “statutes
themselves” after concluding that the legislative history was
“ambiguous”). Today, the rule is simple: “legislative history
is not the law.” Epic Sys. Corp., 584 U.S. at 523. “[I]t is the
statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the
authoritative expression of the law.” City of Chicago v.
Env’t Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994). So “to interpret
the statute, we look first to the statute’s language itself and
the specific context in which that language is used.”
Resisting Env’t Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL
v. EPA, 716 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013) (simplified).
   Even for those who find legislative history persuasive, it
does not support Gonzalez’s minimum-contacts test for the
FSIA. Gonzalez’s analysis of that legislative history
consisted merely of a block quote of a House Committee
Report:

       (b) Personal Jurisdiction. Section 1330(b)
       provides, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute
       over foreign states (including political
       subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities
       of foreign states). It is patterned after the
20   DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

      long-arm statute Congress enacted for the
      District of Columbia. Public Law 91-358,
      sec. 132(a), title I, 84 Stat. 549. The
      requirements of minimum jurisdictional
      contacts and adequate notice are embodied in
      the provision. Cf. International Shoe Co. v.
      Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90
      L.Ed. 95) (1945), and McGee v. International
      Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (, 78
      S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223) (1957). For
      personal jurisdiction to exist under section
      1330(b), the claim must first of all be one
      over which the district courts have original
      jurisdiction under section 1330(a), meaning a
      claim for which the foreign state is not
      entitled to immunity. Significantly, each of
      the immunity provisions in the bill, sections
      1605-1607, requires some connection
      between the lawsuit and the United States, or
      an express or implied waiver by the foreign
      state of its immunity from jurisdiction. These
      immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the
      necessary contacts which must exist before
      our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction.
      Besides incorporating these jurisdictional
      contacts by reference, section 1330(b) also
      satisfies the due process requirement of
      adequate notice by prescribing that proper
      service be made under section 1608 of the
      bill. Thus, sections 1330(b), 1608, and 1605-
      DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.      21

        1607 are all carefully          interconnected.
        (Footnotes omitted.)
Gonzalez, 614 F.2d at 1255 n.5 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1487, at 13–14 (1976)).
    Although unclear, perhaps Gonzalez relied on the
Report’s statement that the “requirements of minimum
jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied in”
§ 1330(b). Id. But that doesn’t support appending an
additional minimum-contacts inquiry to § 1330(b). The
Report was just noting that the FSIA’s enumerated
exceptions by themselves satisfy the requirement of “some
connection between the lawsuit and the United States, or an
express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its
immunity from jurisdiction.” Id. So the Report determined
that satisfying one of these exceptions meets “the necessary
contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise
personal jurisdiction.” Id. It says nothing about a minimum-
contacts analysis over and above satisfying a statutory
exception. And if all that were not enough, the arbitral
exception was added more than a decade after the
Committee Report, making application of a minimum-
contacts test here even more dubious. See Pub. L. No. 100-
669, § 2, 102 Stat. 3969, 3969 (1988).
    All told, this was the time to correct our circuit’s misstep.
All parties agree that an FSIA exception applied and service
was proper. Devas, 2023 WL 4884882, at *1. With those
two requirements satisfied, Congress’s command should
have been mandatory. Rather than adhering to the plain text
of the statute, we instead expanded our precedent to cover
all FSIA exceptions.
22    DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

     B. The Due Process Clause Doesn’t Require
        Minimum Contacts
    Perhaps realizing Gonzalez’s shaky textual foundation,
some of our later precedents began couching our minimum-
contacts inquiry as a constitutional requirement. See
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1528–29 (9th Cir.
1989) (sourcing the requirement in the “constitutional
constraints of the Due Process clause”); Altmann v. Republic
of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2002) (after
concluding that the FSIA is satisfied, conducting a
minimum-contacts analysis “[a]ssuming that a foreign state
is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause”). But
the Due Process Clause does not rescue our improper
addition of a minimum-contacts requirement. As a matter of
original meaning and modern precedent, the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not extend the
benefit of minimum contacts to foreign states.
    Start with modern jurisprudence. The Supreme Court
has never said that the Due Process Clause applies to foreign
states. In fact, it has suggested the opposite. Nearly 60 years
ago, the Court held that “[t]he word ‘person’ in the context
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot,
by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to
encompass the States of the Union.” South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). Later, while leaving
whether “a foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due
Process Clause” open, the Supreme Court strongly hinted
that foreign states should be treated the same as domestic
States—meaning no due process protection. Weltover, 504
U.S. at 619 (citing Katzenbach’s holding that “States of the
Union are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the Due Process
Clause”).
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.    23

    Since Weltover, the consensus of circuit courts has
followed the Supreme Court’s lead and definitively held that
foreign states are not entitled to the protections of the Due
Process Clause.
    The D.C. Circuit gave the most thorough explanation. It
said that conferring due process protections to foreign states
was “not only textually and structurally unsound, but it
would distort the very notion of ‘liberty’ that underlies the
Due Process Clause.” Price, 294 F.3d at 99. According to
that court, common usage of the term “person” didn’t
“include the sovereign.” Id. at 96 (quoting Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)). Indeed, the
court said, “foreign states stand on a fundamentally different
footing than do private litigants who are compelled to defend
themselves in American courts.” Id. at 98. Unlike most
“person[s],” “foreign nations are the juridical equals of the
government that seeks to assert jurisdiction over them.” Id.
    And structurally, the D.C. Circuit described foreign
states as “entirely alien to our constitutional system.” Id.
at 96. Even though domestic States “derive important
benefits and must abide by significant limitations as a
consequence of their participation,” they receive no
protection under the Due Process Clause. Id. Given this, the
D.C. Circuit reasoned that foreign states must also be
excluded. Id. at 97. It would be “strange,” the court
observed, if domestic States, which were “integral and active
participants in the Constitution’s infrastructure,” were
unprotected by the Due Process Clause while foreign states
were. Id. at 96.
   “[H]istory and tradition” also counseled in favor of
excluding foreign states from the Due Process Clause,
according to the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 97. As a historical
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matter, the “principles of comity and international law . . .
protect[ed] foreign governments.” Id. Thus, “[t]he most a
foreign state can demand is that other states observe
international law, not that they enforce provisions of
domestic law.” Id. (quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign
States and the Constitution, 73 Va. L. Rev. 483, 520 (1987)).
So “foreign states have available to them a panoply of
mechanisms in the international arena through which to seek
vindication or redress.” Id. at 99 (citing Damrosch, supra,
at 525).
    Based on all this, the D.C. Circuit held that “[n]either the
text of the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions construing
the Due Process Clause, nor long standing tradition provide
a basis for extending the reach of this constitutional
provision for the benefit of foreign states.” Id.
    The Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit agree. See
Frontera, 582 F.3d at 400 (“[F]oreign states are not
‘persons’ entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause.”);
Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 694 (“Other circuits have confronted
the issue and have held that foreign states are not ‘persons’
entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause. . . . We
agree.”). After Weltover, no other circuit court has ruled
otherwise. 2

2
  Before Weltover, the Third Circuit and Fifth Circuit ruled that foreign
states are entitled to due process. See Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653
F.2d 812, 819 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (“We must also inquire . . . whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the due process
clause.”); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 n.5 (5th Cir.
1985) (“As with all suits, however, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
must comply with the due process clause.”). Both circuit courts cited
Second Circuit precedent which has since been overruled. See Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
308 (2d Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera, 582 F.3d at 399.
     DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.     25

    And the original meaning of the Due Process Clause
supports the view that foreign states are not entitled to the
protection of minimum contacts.
    To be fair, recent scholarship has suggested foreign
states were understood to be “persons” at the time of the
Founding. For example, one author argues that Founding-
era sources show “foreign states were viewed as ‘persons’
entitled to ‘process.’” Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and
Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 Fordham
L. Rev. 633, 637 (2019). As an example, Emmerich de
Vattel, an influential 18th-century international law scholar,
wrote, “[t]he law of nations is the law of sovereigns: free and
independent states are moral persons, whose rights and
obligations we are to establish in this treatise.” Emmerich
de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural
Law, bk. I, ch. I § 12 (1758) (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
1916).
   Another disagrees. According to this scholar, it is
“unlikely that the framers of the Fifth Amendment would
have viewed foreign states as persons given that foreign
sovereigns were treated as completely immune from suit at
the time of the founding.” Donald Earl Childress III,
Questioning the Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,
88 Fordham L. Rev. Online 60, 70 (2019).
     But even assuming some process is due—an emerging
consensus shows that the original understanding of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not require
minimum contacts for foreign states. Instead, these sources
all agree that the political branches may dictate what process
is afforded to foreign sovereigns. As Professor Wuerth
concludes, “[t]hat foreign states are protected by due process
does not tell us what the content of those protections
26   DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

are[.] . . . [W]hen it comes to personal jurisdiction, due
process limitations may be largely coextensive with the
process that Congress chooses to provide.” Wuerth, supra,
at 679–86; see Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1703, 1743 (2020)
(“The Fifth Amendment bars the execution of a federal
judgment only if the federal court lacked jurisdiction. And
Congress gets to answer th[e jurisdiction] question.”); Max
Crema & Lawrence B. Solum, The Original Meaning of
“Due Process of Law” in the Fifth Amendment, 108 Va. L.
Rev. 447, 530–31 (2022) (“Because the Due Process of Law
Clause requires process, . . . service on a defendant” may be
“sufficient to validate personal jurisdiction whether or not
the International Shoe Co. v. Washington minimum contacts
test was satisfied.” (simplified)).
    Indeed, the view that Congress could legislate the
bounds of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns finds support
in a well-known case from Justice Joseph Story. Riding
circuit in 1828, Justice Story considered whether a French
plaintiff could successfully obtain a default judgment against
a Massachusetts defendant who was living in Paris. Picquet
v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 609–10 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828)
(No. 11,134). The plaintiff argued that attaching the
Massachusetts property was a sufficient method of serving
process on the Paris-residing Massachusetts resident. Id.
Justice Story rejected the argument, concluding Congress
had not clearly chosen to authorize that kind of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and thus “there ha[d] been no
sufficient service of the process.” Id. at 613, 619. Even so,
he explained that it was well within the power of Congress
to have, “a subject of England, or France, or Russia . . .
summoned from the other end of the globe to obey our
process, and submit to the judgment of our courts.” Id.
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at 613. Congress need only do so clearly. Id. at 615 (“If
congress had prescribed such a rule, the court would
certainly be bound to follow it, and proceed upon the law.”).
In sum, Justice Story opined that foreign-based defendants
were owed no more than service authorized by Congress
before being haled into our federal courts.
    So modern jurisprudence, tugged by the gravitational
pull of original meaning, points to excluding foreign states
from the protection of minimum contacts. Like every other
circuit court post-Weltover, we should have followed suit.
This was yet another reason to take this case en banc.
                              III.
    Forty years ago, our court disregarded the plain language
of the FSIA to add minimum contacts to the requirements for
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state. And we did so
using questionable interpretive moves.           Today, the
consensus among circuit courts squarely rejects any
constitutional basis for a minimum-contacts regime. So, yet
again, the Ninth Circuit stands alone. And when it comes to
the law, experimentation isn’t usually a virtue.
    Our atextual reading creates a needless roadblock for
plaintiffs seeking to assert their rights against foreign states
and their agents. And we are simply incompetent to interfere
in these matters of foreign affairs. Imagine requiring a state
sponsor of terrorism to have minimum contacts with our
country before allowing our citizens to vindicate the death
or injury of a loved one at the hands of a terrorist. See 28
U.S.C. § 1605A. But that is the regime that the Ninth Circuit
erects.
   With no constitutional provision requiring otherwise, we
should have deferred to the political branches here. FSIA
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plaintiffs deserve a full opportunity to litigate their cases as
Congress determined. By freelancing in this area, we do the
legislative process, separation of powers, and rule of law a
disservice.
    Faced with an opportunity to correct course, we again
close the courthouse doors. And we refuse to act despite
overwhelming evidence that our position is wrong. Our
failure to fix our precedent is a serious mistake.
   I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc.