Court Opinion

ID: 9916935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 21:00:40.616329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:09.343966
License: Public Domain

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                                               UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                 No. 21-1157

        STANFORD LANCE WEAVER,

                     Plaintiff - Appellant,

        v.

        UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

                     Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
        J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (1:19-cv-02700-JMC)

        Argued: December 5, 2023                                         Decided: January 9, 2024

        Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Jonathan Joseph Marshall, JENNER & BLOCK, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
        Appellant. Michael David Weaver, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington,
        D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michelle S. Kallen, JENNER & BLOCK LLP,
        Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Adair Ford Boroughs, United States Attorney, Marshall
        Prince, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina; Stephan J. Boardman, Chief Counsel, Appellate
        and Commercial Litigation, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C.,
        for Appellee.
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        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Plaintiff Stanford Lance Weaver appeals from the district court’s order dismissing

        as time-barred his lawsuit against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and denying

        leave to amend his complaint as futile. In dismissing Weaver’s complaint, the district court

        adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation after reviewing the report under

        a clear error standard of review. Because Weaver provided objections to the magistrate

        judge’s report that were sufficiently specific to warrant de novo review by the district court,

        we vacate and remand.

                                                         I.

               On September 23, 2019, Weaver filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of the

        Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654. 1 In the

        complaint’s one-paragraph Statement of Claim, Weaver alleged that USPS violated the

        FMLA when, between September 2014 and May 2016, it denied him leave during his

        wife’s pregnancy and following the birth of their child. He also alleged that USPS retaliated

        against him “for FMLA leave in 2015.” J.A. 9. 2

               USPS moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Weaver’s claims as time-barred.

        In its motion, USPS argued that Weaver failed to comply with the two-year statute of

        limitations for filing an FMLA claim involving a non-willful violation of the statute; failed

               1
                In his original complaint, Weaver also cited the Fair Labor Standards Act.
        However, Weaver did not appear to raise any allegations that would implicate the Fair
        Labor Standards Act, and Weaver does not pursue a Fair Labor Standards Act claim on
        appeal.
               2
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

                                                         3
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        to allege a willful violation of the FMLA that could invoke the FMLA’s three-year statute

        of limitations; and failed to comply with the three-year statute of limitations even if it

        applied because that limitations period lapsed by May 2019—more than three months

        before Weaver filed his complaint on September 23, 2019. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1)–(2)

        (FMLA statute of limitations).

               Weaver then filed a motion to amend his complaint and also filed a response to

        USPS’s motion to dismiss. The district court denied without prejudice his motion to amend

        because he failed to attach a copy of his proposed amended complaint to the motion, and

        Weaver then filed a second motion to amend his complaint that followed the required

        procedure. His proposed amended complaint expanded on his allegations, most notably

        adding that he was terminated on September 23, 2016; that his September 23 termination

        was “a result of four letters of warning . . . dated 10/2014, 6/2015, 2/2016, and 6/2016”;

        and that USPS’s FMLA violations were willful. J.A. 38–39. In his response to USPS’s

        motion to dismiss, Weaver argued that the three-year statute of limitations applied, and that

        his complaint was timely because it was filed exactly three years after his September 23,

        2016, termination.

               USPS opposed Weaver’s motion to amend, contending that it was futile. In support

        of its motion, USPS submitted two documents related to Weaver’s termination: 1) a June

        3, 2016, letter from USPS, which indicated that Weaver would be removed from service

        July 5, 2016, and 2) a September 23, 2016, letter from a union representative, stating that

        the union was “withdrawing” a case involving Weaver “from the grievance/arbitration

        process.” J.A. 50. USPS argued that the two documents established that the June 3 letter

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        notified Weaver of his termination, and that his removal from service on September 23 was

        delayed from the July 5 date stated in the letter solely because of the labor grievance. USPS

        further argued that, under Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the June

        3 notice of termination started the statute of limitations period, and the complaint was

        therefore untimely even under the three-year limitations period.

               The magistrate judge agreed with USPS and concluded that, regardless of whether

        the two- or three-year statute of limitations applied, Weaver’s complaint was untimely

        under the FMLA. In doing so, the magistrate judge acknowledged Weaver’s claimed

        September 23, 2016, termination date. But the magistrate judge found that “Weaver’s

        statute of limitations began to run when he was notified of his termination on June 3, 2016,

        and Weaver filed this action more than three years after that date.” J.A. 54–55.

        Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended granting USPS’s motion to dismiss and

        denying Weaver’s motion to amend as futile.

               Weaver timely objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The

        district court found that Weaver’s objections did “not specifically address the Magistrate

        Judge’s findings concerning the untimeliness of his Complaint” and concluded that it

        would therefore review the magistrate judge’s report only for clear error. Weaver v. U.S.

        Postal Serv., No. 1:19-CV-2700-JMC, 2020 WL 3603773, at *3 (D.S.C. July 1, 2020).

        After concluding that the magistrate judge had not clearly erred, the district court adopted

        the magistrate judge’s report, denied Weaver’s motion to amend as futile, and dismissed

        his complaint with prejudice. Id.

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               Weaver moved for reconsideration, explaining how his objections to the magistrate

        judge’s report and recommendation specifically addressed whether his complaint was

        timely under the FMLA. The district court denied the motion as “repetitive,” and Weaver

        timely appealed. 3

                                                     II.

               On appeal, Weaver contends that the district court erred by rejecting his objections

        to the magistrate judge’s report and by reviewing the report only for clear error. Because

        we agree with Weaver that this issue is dispositive, we do not reach Weaver’s additional

        arguments related to the contents of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

                                                     A.

               We review the sufficiency of objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation de

        novo. Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2023).

                                                     B.

               After a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation, any party may object

        to the report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “If the grounds for objection are clear, district court

        judges must consider them de novo.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

        (“A [district] judge . . . shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report

        or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”); Fed. R.

        Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

        judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). Otherwise, the district court need

               3
                   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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        only review the magistrate judge’s report for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory

        committee’s note to 1983 amendment.

               We have recognized that not all objections are clear enough to trigger de novo

        review. For example, a plaintiff must do more than generally state “I object” to mandate

        de novo review by a district court. Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460 (quoting Lockert v. Faulkner,

        843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)). But the bar for de novo review is low: objections

        need only “reasonably . . . alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.”

        United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007). And objections “need not be

        novel to be sufficiently specific.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460.

               When deciding whether a party alerted the district court of the true ground for an

        objection, we are mindful of the requirement that we construe pro se filings liberally.

        Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “Thus, when reviewing pro se objections to a

        magistrate[ judge’s] recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated

        grounds to which the litigant appears to take issue.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460–61 (citing

        Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2017)).

               For example, in Martin v. Duffy, we found a pro se plaintiff’s objections sufficient

        to warrant de novo review even though they merely restated most of the plaintiff’s claims

        from his complaint. Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–46. Since restating the claims was sufficient

        to “alert[] the district court that [the pro se plaintiff] believed the magistrate judge erred in

        recommending dismissal of those claims,” we held that the district court was required to

        review dismissal of the claims de novo. Id. at 246.

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               Here, Weaver—who proceeded pro se before the district court—provided three

        specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report. First, he argued the magistrate judge

        should have granted his motion to amend before reviewing USPS’s motion to dismiss.

        Second, he argued that the magistrate judge misapplied Delaware State College v. Ricks,

        and that, under a correct application of Ricks, the September 23 termination should have

        started the statute of limitations for his claim. Finally, Weaver argued that even if the statute

        of limitations began to run on the June 3 notification date, the magistrate judge should have

        recommended equitably tolling the statute of limitations.

               The district court found those objections did “not specifically address the Magistrate

        Judge’s findings concerning the untimeliness of his Complaint” and that Weaver

        impermissibly attempted to “rehash[]” “the same factual allegations that were before the

        Magistrate Judge.” Weaver, 2020 WL 3603773, at *3. We disagree.

               First, each of Weaver’s objections took issue with a specific portion of the

        magistrate judge’s report, as well as the ultimate recommendation that the district court

        dismiss his complaint as untimely. Not only did the objections identify the portions of the

        report to which Weaver objected, but they also articulated how Weaver believed the

        magistrate judge’s reasoning was incorrect. For example, in discussing Ricks, Weaver

        explained his view that the June 3 letter did not start the statute of limitations on his claim

        because USPS did not follow the correct procedures for approving the notice of removal.

        Therefore, “[e]ven if we did not apply the liberal construction provided to pro se litigants,”

        Weaver “reasonably alerted the district court of the true ground for the objection[s].”

        Elijah, 66 F.4th at 461 (cleaned up).

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               Second, while some of Weaver’s objections mirrored the arguments he presented to

        the magistrate judge, “[i]t is immaterial that his objections resembled arguments he had

        made previously; district courts must solely consider the specificity, not the novelty, of

        objections to magistrate [judge] recommendations.” Id. Indeed, in our recent opinion in

        Elijah v. Dunbar, we pointed to the district court’s opinion in this case as one of many

        examples of a district court erroneously disregarding objections based on a mistaken belief

        that objections may not “rehash” arguments made before a magistrate judge. See id. at 460

        n.4 (identifying eight district court opinions that fail to follow the rule laid out in Martin).

        So, Weaver’s objections readily satisfied the low bar of alerting the district court of the

        grounds on which he objected, and the district court was therefore required to review

        Weaver’s objections de novo.

                                                      C.

               “[W]e generally don’t reach factual or legal questions in a magistrate judge’s report

        that were not first subject to de novo review by the district court.” United States v. De

        Leon-Ramirez, 925 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we decline to address the

        remainder of the issues raised by the parties and remand for de novo review by the district

        court. By doing so, “we ensure appropriate district court review while leaving the door

        open for future appeals.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 461.

                                                      III.

               Because Weaver made several specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report

        and recommendation, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for de novo review.

                                                                       VACATED AND REMANDED

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