Court Opinion

ID: 9733435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:07:40.184201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.468289
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). The majority’s holding is succinctly stated: “We conclude . . . that the victim’s testimony may not be partly disregarded for purposes of lesser-included offense analysis.” This conclusion denies the jury’s role as fact-finder to sift and weigh evidence, and runs counter to longstanding case law estab*384lishing the jury’s right to disbelieve portions of a witness’ testimony while accepting others.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently stated in Penister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 94, 103, 246 N.W.2d 115, 120 (1976) :
On the basis of the facts revealed at trial, the jury could have chosen to reject [the prosecutor’s principal witness’] testimony in toto, but it chose not to do so. We have held that, even where a witness is inconsistent and where some of his testimony is incredible and contradictory, the jury is entitled to believe some, all, or none of his testimony.
This proposition was endorsed long ago. See e.g. Heibel v. Voth, 271 Wis. 350, 356, 73 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 (1955) ; Di Benedetto v. Milwaukee E.R. & L. Co., 149 Wis. 566, 570, 136 N.W. 282, 284 (1912). Even where a witness lies, the jury may accept portions of that witness’ testimony: “suspected exaggeration does not necessarily deprive testimony of all weight as a matter of law. Indeed, wilfully false testimony on one point does not require the jury to reject all of the witness’ evidence.” Mackowski v. Milwaukee Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 545, 550-51, 82 N.W.2d 906, 908-09 (1957). See also Nehls v. Nehls, 21 Wis. 2d 231, 237, 124 N.W.2d 18, 22 (1963); Wis J I — Criminal 305 (wilfully false testimony permits jury in its discretion to disregard all the witness’ testimony except where it is corroborated.)
Sarabia permits instructions to a jury based on a reasonable view of the evidence. It does not force an in toto choice of the more reasonable of the two views offered by the prosecution and the defense. A reasonable view of the evidence implies that the view may constitute an amalgam of evidence and testimony from various sources.
Reasonableness is dispositive under Sarabia. What views of the evidence are reasonable here? The defendant admitted the sexual intercourse without comment on consent, but denied the threat or use of force. This *385testimony is consistent with third-degree sexual assault, though the majority ignores it because it is exculpatory. Whether the defendant’s testimony is ignored, or recognized as consistent with third-degree sexual assault, two reasonable views of the victim’s testimony considered alone support instructions on second- and third-degree sexual assault.
I agree with the majority that a reasonable view of the evidence supports the second-degree instruction. However, a second reasonable view of the evidence establishes nonconsent but leaves reasonable doubt as to the use or threat of force which distinguishes second- from third-degree sexual assault.
The victim testified that defendant said he had a knife. However, she never saw a knife, or a clothing bulge which might conceal it. This testimony was inconsistent with an emergency room report which indicated that she stated a knife was “pulled” by the defendant. Further, no knife was discovered on the defendant, in the car, or elsewhere.
The victim also testified that the defendant grabbed her hair, shook her head and slapped her, and that he pinned her down and removed her clothing. Corroborating evidence is almost nonexistent. Hospital records show no indication that the victim exhibited choking marks. “There were no bruises on her body, although minor scratches were found on her back which she testified were not present prior to the assault.”
Viewing the victim’s testimony alone and reasonably, the evidence on use or threat of force is weak enough to create a reasonable doubt. A jury could also reasonably believe defendant used or threatened force.
This view of the evidence, the majority contends, would support lesser-included instructions ad infinitum: “[Disregarding the testimony of the victim . . . would be tantamount to automatic inclusion ... no reason would exist for stopping short of battery as an included offense.” No reasonable view would suggest battery *386here: even the defendant’s testimony is consistent with third-degree sexual assault.
The requirement of reasonableness limits frivolous instructions. The majority’s reductio ad absurdvm contention was rejected by the supreme court in State v. Bergenthal, 47 Wis. 2d 668, 674-75, 178 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971), quoted in Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d at 661-62, 348 N.W.2d at 531: “The key word in the rule is ‘reasonable.’ The rule does not suggest some near automatic inclusion of all lesser but included offenses as additional options to a jury.”
This is the holding of Belton which the majority misses when attempting to distill the “Belton rule” from that decision: “the Belton court refused to disregard the testimony of other witnesses and other evidence . . . when deciding whether the lesser-included offense should have been submitted.” It was not disregarding or weighing testimony which Belton refused to do. Belton refused to mandate an instruction for which no evidence existed: the lesser-included offense “could only be made out if the jury reached a conclusion as to occurrences not related in the testimony of any witness and obtained by a reconstruction of events.” 382 F.2d at 156. Justification of the lesser-included offense in Belton required the manufacture of testimony. This is substantially different from merely accepting as a reasonable view a reasonable doubt regarding part of a victim’s testimony. Regardless of this distinction, the Belton court notes that had the reconstruction of events by trial counsel been as good as that of appellate counsel, the lesser-included offense instruction should have been given. Id. Belton concludes by stating a preference for giving a lesser-included offense instruction in close cases.
Belton is consistent with Wisconsin law. Lesser-included instructions should not be given where supported only by fabrication, but if the “fabrication” approaches a reasonable view of the evidence, doubts should be re*387solved in favor of giving the instruction. I would remand for a new trial.