Court Opinion

ID: 9854736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:12:55.919787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:19.288975
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice
(dissenting),
The quoted portion of 15 Am.Jur., Damages, Sec. 70 (p. 478) merely enumerates items, some of which may possibly be recovered in an action growing out of a given accident. Such quotation does not state that “ill health or disability naturally resulting from the wrong or injury” and “loss of time and earning capacity” are recoverable as separate elements of damage in the same action. Note that the expression “such as” is used before the elements of damage are set forth. The question in the instant case is not whether one can recover for ill health or permanent disability, but *206rather whether a recovery for such ill health or permanent disability necessarily includes loss of earning capacity. Certainly one does not have loss of earning capacity without ill health or permanent disability.
The first and second paragraphs of section 75 of 15 Am.Jur., Damages, are set out in the majority opinion.
The first paragraph of said section 75, defines permanent injuries or lasting impairment of health as the loss resulting from complete or partial disability in health, mind, or person. Cited in the footnote to such first paragraph is the case of Reed v. Jamieson Invest. Co., 168 Wash. 111, 10 P.2d 977, 15 P.2d 1119. In that case plaintiff struck all allegations for loss of earning capacity from his complaint, and was awarded damages for permanent injuries and medical expenses.
The second paragraph of this section states that the measure of damages for permanent injuries or lasting impairment of health is compensation for the disabling effect of the injury and this includes damages for loss of time and impairment of earning power. This is exactly the gist of my contention, i. e., loss of time and impairment of earning power are included in the damages for the disabling effect of the injury.
In the case of Fruechting v. Gilley, Okl., 259 P.2d 530, 534, relied upon by the majority opinion herein, is found the following language:
“In the case before us there is no allegation of loss of earning power accrued or certain to accrue in the future. There is no prayer for recovery of damages for impairment of earning power. We cannot assume that the scars suffered by plaintiffs were ‘lifelong’ in the absence of any testimony to that effect.
“The injuries of plaintiffs may or may not have been permanent. They may or may not have reduced the earning power of plaintiffs. The injuries were not of such nature and severity as to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of making proof of their permanency.”
The court there seems to be indicating that if the plaintiffs had alleged and proven that their injuries were permanent, loss of earning power would have been included. With that, I agree.
I do not consider the case of Peppers Gasoline Co. v. Weber, 186 Okl. 471, 98 P.2d 1087, 1092 as authority for allowing recovery for permanent injury and pain and suffering and with partial loss of earning capacity. Such question as an additional separate element of damage was not before the Court. In the opinion it is said:
“Since it is not contended that error was committed in instructing the jury that loss of ‘earning power’ could be considered, further discussion is unwarranted.”
To my way of thinking, the measure of damages given in the instruction to the jury in the case of Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Wimmer, 80 Okl. 11, 194 P. 107, allowed plaintiff therein damages only for loss of earning capacity and for pain and suffering. The question involved was whether mutilation and mortification by reason of disfigurement was a proper measure of damage.
At page 114 of this opinion the court says.:
“The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Britt v. Car. No. R. Co., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S.E. 601, sustained the admission of a statement by the plaintiff to the effect that it almost broke his heart to know that he would be a cripple for life, saying: ‘This, however, is a part of the suffering, like the physical suffering, the decreased earning capacity, the cost of nursing and medical attention, which are a part of the “present and prospective loss” resulting from the injury, and the immediate and necessary consequences thereof.’ ”
The North Carolina Court set out 3 elements of damage, pain and suffering, de*207creased earning capacity and medical expenses.
The only part of the instruction of which complaint was there made was paragraph 5 and that because humiliation and mortification by reason of disfigurement were as-sertedly not correct measures of damage.
The phrase “loss of health” appears in element of damage No. 4 in that case. It follows “Such prospective suffering”. Element No. 5 is as to pain and anguish plaintiff had suffered to that date. Apparently, element No. 4 is for future pain and suffering and anguish. “Loss of health” would result in pain and anguish in the future.
The majority opinion in this case quotes from the cases of Enid City Railway Co. v. Reynolds, 34 Okl. 405, 126 P. 193, 195, and Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Green, 91 Okl. 200, 217 P. 155, the following from the instructions on measures of damage:
“Third, the probable effect of the injuries in the future upon her health, and generally any reduction of her power and capacity to perform the services and work to which she was accustomed and pursue the course of life which she might otherwise have done.”
The joining of probable effect of the injuries on future health and on reduction of earning capacity under “Third” would seem to indicate that they are to be considered together as one element and not separately. I think all that follows the word “generally” in such instruction is merely descriptive of the effect of the injury to one’s health as reflected in decreased capacity.
The case of Haggard v. Rogers-Schmitt Ware & Iron Co., Mo.App., 249 S.W. 712, a 1923 Missouri case, is cited by the majority, to the effect that payment for future loss of earnings and damages for permanent disability are not the same thing and that the former is not necessarily included in the latter.
The later case of Murphy v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 772, 244 S.W.2d 31, 36, also decided by the Missouri Court, is not cited by the majority. In that case, in reversing, the court says:
“ * * * it appears that the instruction submitted double compensation in that it allowed awards for impairment of earning capacity and for permanent injuries as separate elements of damage. We cannot say that the jury did not follow the instruction. * * * ”
For the reasons above stated I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that HALLEY, J., concurs in these dissenting views.