Court Opinion

ID: 9907531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:08:10.66284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:35.691026
License: Public Domain

J-A15028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ZACHARIAS DEJENE                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 662 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 6, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0013874-2018

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 6, 2023

       Zacharias Dejene appeals the denial of his request for relief under the

Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He maintains

the court erred in denying his PCRA petition that raised several claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

       A jury found Dejene guilty of rape, sexual assault, and indecent assault.1

On the day of the assault, the victim and Dejene were at a weekend retreat

sponsored by a private organization associated with their university. The PCRA

court aptly summarized the victim’s testimony as follows:

          At some point during the evening, [the victim] went upstairs
          where her bedroom was located and shortly after [Dejene]
          also went upstairs. [The victim] testified that when she
          approached her bedroom [Dejene] was right behind her and
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3124.1, and 3126(a)(1), respectively.
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         told her that he had claimed that bedroom. She then
         returned to the first floor to see if someone would change
         rooms with her. This was confirmed by the testimony of Mr.
         [Phillip] Wang and Mr. [Douglas] Qian. When no one offered
         to change rooms [the victim] returned to get her
         belongings. While she gathered her things [Dejene] entered
         the room. He suggested they share the room and then
         closed the bedroom door. [The victim] responded that
         sharing a room would be inappropriate. [The victim], who
         was dressed in jeans, a turtleneck, and undergarments,
         testified that [Dejene] began grabbing at her clothes. [The
         victim] pushed him away and repeatedly told him “No” and
         to stop. [Dejene] then pushed [the victim] onto the bed and
         removed her jeans and underwear and demanded that she
         remove her turtleneck. [Dejene] straddled her with his penis
         exposed, whereafter [the victim] asked him to wear a
         condom fearing that penetration would occur. He ignored
         her and responded by yelling, “I’m going to fuck the shit out
         of you.” [Dejene] fell off the bed and [the victim] ran to the
         door only to be blocked by [Dejene]. Thereafter, [Dejene]
         pushed [the victim] back onto the bed and engaged in
         vaginal intercourse with her while repeating, “I’m going to
         [] fuck the shit out of you.” [The victim] testified that she
         was unsure if [Dejene] ejaculated during the intercourse.
         Upon hearing footsteps in the hallway, [the victim] leapt off
         the bed towards the door. [Dejene] again attempted to
         block her from leaving but [the victim] managed to exit.

PCRA Findings and Order of Court (“PCRA Op.”), filed 5/6/22, at 3-4

(footnotes omitted).

      When the victim returned to campus the next day, she went to the

health services center, and they recommended that she go to a hospital. At

the hospital, the victim received a rape kit examination by Amanda Pampena,

a Sex Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”). N.T., Trial, September 24-27, 2019,

at 198. Part of the examination included oral, vaginal, and cervical swabs.

Pampena testified at Dejene’s trial that she did not observe any injuries to the

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victim’s vaginal area but explained at trial that the absence of injury does not

mean that the victim’s vaginal area had not been penetrated. See id. at 209.

      The Commonwealth presented the testimony of an expert in forensic

biology, Elizabeth Wisbon. She testified that the initial screenings of the

vaginal swap from the rape kit detected male DNA. Id. at 347, 348, 351.

Further processing “resulted in no male DNA detected at quantitation.” Id. at

351. Wisbon testified that Dejene was “excluded as the contributor” of the

DNA recovered from the victim’s underwear. Id. at 353. She testified however

that “[t]he absence of male DNA does not mean that a sexual assault did not

take place.” Id. at 354.

      During cross-examination, Wisbon conceded that depending on the

circumstances, the absence of DNA could mean that no penial penetration

occurred. Id. at 357. The court then proceeded to question Wisbon. Relevant

to this appeal, the court inquired as follows:

         The Court: All right. And so if, for example - - and if you
         didn’t - - okay, so I think the jury is clear on what the results
         were. But my question is - - my last question is really when
         these swabs are taken from - - these are intimate samples,
         correct?

         [Wisbon]: Correct.

         The Court: What do you mean by intimate samples?

         [Wisbon]: An intimate sample, such as the vaginal vault
         swabs or the oral swabs are considered intimate when they
         are taken directly from a person’s body. We call them
         intimate because we know they’re taken from their body and
         we expect that the individual who had their body parts
         swabbed, their DNA would also be present on that swab

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       because if you were to swab my mouth, you’re going to
       collect some of my cheek cells.

       The Court: So if you have an intimate sample like a vaginal
       sample or the example you have of your [sic] inside of your
       mouth, if there is also male skin cells on those samples, how
       do the ratios of the amount of DNA compare versus an
       intimate person’s DNA amount versus a non intimate
       person’s skin samples.

       [Wisbon]: With skin samples, there is less DNA present on
       those samples than there would be if you were to swab an
       individual’s mouth or another orifice. The reason for that is
       your mouth is constantly generating cells. It heals very
       quickly. So when you swab a mouth, you gather hundreds
       upon hundreds of swabs [sic]. Whereas, the cellular
       material on your hands, because they are a little more rough
       and designed to be a little more resilient, they don’t shed as
       much skin cells. So not as much DNA is present if I were to
       handle an object versus if I were to spit on an object.
       There’s a lot more DNA and cells in my mouth that would be
       in the spit than if I were to touch it.

       The Court: All right. So if you - - all right. So let’s say I was
       choking on a piece of food and you stuck your finger inside
       my throat to help me and you got the food out, and then
       somebody swabbed the inside of my mouth, whose DNA is
       more likely to show up on a swab?

       [Wisbon]: It would be your - - the DNA from Your Honor’s
       mouth.

       The Court: Now, does that mean that there’s none of your
       DNA in my mouth?

       [Wisbon]: It does not mean that. There could be very small
       amounts, but because there is so much of your own DNA in
       your mouth, it kind of overshadows it. If you think of two -
       - I’ll use this paper and this tissue. So this is the DNA from
       my finger, which I used to help Your Honor stop from
       choking. This is the DNA from Your Honor’s mouth. So when
       I put the two together, you can no longer see the DNA from
       my finger because there is so much DNA from Your Honor’s
       mouth. It doesn’t mean that my DNA isn’t there. It’s just
       difficult to obtain with our testing because there’s so much

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         more of the mouth that was swabbed. The same would be
         true for other mucous membranes.

         The Court: All right. So applying it to this case, if I’m hearing
         you correct, confirm or deny this, so with regards to this
         whole situation of like a penis, for example, and a vagina, it
         could be that there was no penetration at all by a penis of a
         vagina, right?

         [Wisbon]: Yes.

         The Court: Or it could be that there was, but the penis skin
         cells are so overshadowed by the multitude of vaginal skin
         cells.

         [Wisbon]: Correct.

         The Court: I understand.

Id. at 363-367. When defense counsel asked if she agreed that “absolutely

no DNA that belongs to Zacharias Dejene was recovered according to this

report,” Wisbon responded, “For all of the samples that were interpretable,

yes.” Id. at 367-368.

      Dejene took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he had

consensual oral sex with the victim. Id. at 421. Trial counsel also presented

four character witnesses. Each testified that Dejene had a reputation in the

community for having a good moral character and being trustworthy. Id. at

469, 473, 476, 479.

      During jury instructions, the court explained to the jury that the

Commonwealth bore the burden of proving Dejene’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. See id. at 528-529. It said that a reasonable doubt included “a doubt

that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to pause or hesitate

before acting in a matter of importance in his or her own affairs”; “must fairly

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arise out of the evidence that was presented or out of the lack of evidence

presented with respect to some element of the crimes charged”; and “must

be a real doubt.” Id. at 529. The court then gave its own illustration of

reasonable doubt.

        Now, what I just read to you is the textbook definition of
        beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is read in every
        courtroom in this courthouse pretty much the same way,
        but like most textbook definitions, it leaves a little bit to be
        desired.

        So it is my practice to give you a common[]sensical
        hypothetical situation from every[]day life that might help
        you to understand what we mean when we say beyond a
        reasonable doubt so that you know the level of certainty
        that’s required in a criminal case.

        So this is the hypothetical situation that I’m going to throw
        at you.

        Let’s say that it is, I don’t know, let’s say that it’s Tuesday
        morning, just a few days ago, all right, and let’s say your
        alarm clock goes off and you wake up in the morning, jump
        out of bed and you say, Hot damn, today is the day I get to
        go downtown to serve jury duty.

        So you go over to the closet and you pull out the outfit that
        you had planned to wear the night before because you want
        to look your best, and lo and behold, you notice when you
        pull out the shirt for the outfit there’s a big crease right
        across the front of the shirt. You must have put too many
        clean clothes in too small of a closet.

        So what do you do? Well, you’re not thinking very clearly.
        You go downstairs real quick. You get yourself a cup of some
        kind of caffeine. You feed the pets, and you come back
        upstairs, and by this time, you decide I haven’t had my
        morning caffeine yet, it hasn’t kicked in, it’s too late for me
        to try to figure out a whole new outfit. So I’m just going to
        put up the ironing board real quick and plug in the iron so I
        can iron that shirt real quick.

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       So that’s what you do. You put up the ironing board, plug in
       the iron and you go to take your shower while that’s heating
       up. You get out of the shower, you towel yourself off, you
       come out, you put your under-things on, and you go over
       to the ironing board, the iron is nice and hot, you put the
       shirt down, and real quick you just press off the wrinkle out
       of that shirt. But before you get dressed, you decide, [w]ell,
       I’m going to brush my teeth before I put this nice recently
       ironed shirt on because I don’t want to slop toothpaste all
       over it.

       So you go in the bathroom, you brush your teeth, you do
       your hair, you come back out, and you get dressed in that
       freshly pressed shirt and the rest of your clothes. All right?

       You then go to the top of the steps, you head downstairs,
       you pour yourself one more to-go cup of caffeine, you say
       good-bye to the pets, and you get in your car, you pull out
       of your driveway, you drive to the end of your street.

       You stop for the stop sign, because you are a law-abiding
       citizen, and you put on your turn signal getting ready to
       make your turn to head downtown.

       As you are sitting at that stop sign, however, a thought
       flashes across your mind. You say to yourself, Wait a
       minute. Did I remember to pull the plug on that iron,
       because nobody is going to be home before me. The only
       ones in the house are going to be those pets, and if they
       start chasing each other around the house, they could knock
       over the ironing board, and that iron is right next to my
       bedroom curtains. It could catch the curtains on fire. I could
       come home to a smoldering ruin.

       So what do you do? Well, at that point, do you immediately
       screech your tries, pull a U-turn and go racing back to your
       house to check on that iron? No, you don’t do that. Why?
       Because you don’t have to. Because you have evidence that
       you have to go over. You have evidence you have to review.

       So while you sit there at the stop sign in your mind’s eye,
       you review the evidence of what you did that morning. You
       remember the alarm clock getting you up. You remember
       getting up. You remember going over to the closet. You
       remember opening the closet. You remember getting the
       shirt out. You remember that you went downstairs. You got

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       your coffee. You fed those pesky pets. You came back
       upstairs. You set up the ironing board. You plugged in the
       iron, and then while it was heating up, you remember you
       went and took your shower. You got out of the shower and
       you came out and you remember you put your underclothes
       on. You came over and you picked up the iron and you used
       the iron and you pressed off that shirt. You remember you
       went back in, brushed your teeth, came back out, you put
       on that shirt and then the rest of your clothes, and then you
       went over to the top of the steps to head downstairs and
       get yourself another - - wait a minute. In reviewing the
       evidence, you remember that at one point after you got
       dressed, you were trying to put your wristwatch on and you
       accidentally dropped your wristwatch on the carpeted floor
       of your bedroom, and you remember that when you bend
       over to get your wristwatch, you were at eye level with the
       outlet and you pulled the plug out of the wall.

       So did you have a doubt as you sat there at the stop sign as
       to whether you unplugged the iron? Well, of course you had
       a doubt, because there are few decisions that any of us
       make in life without some degree of doubt. The question is
       not merely did you have doubt? The question is was it a
       reasonable doubt? And I would submit to you that doubt
       was never a reasonable doubt, because you were able to
       resolve the doubt by examining the evidence. All right?

       So that is an example of the kind of level of certainty that
       we talk about when we talk about beyond a reasonable
       doubt, and I used an example from every[]day life because
       I think it’s something that everybody can understand.

       So I hope that that helps you to understand a little better
       what we’re talking about when we’re talking about beyond
       a reasonable doubt. All right?

       To summarize, you may not find the defendant guilty based
       on the mere suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has the
       burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
       doubt. If it meets that burden, then the defendant is no
       longer presumed to be innocent and you should find him
       guilty.

       On the other hand, if the Commonwealth does not meet its
       burden, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

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Id. at 530-536.

      The court also instructed the jury on consent. After reading the standard

charge on consent, the court stated the following:

         Now the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond
         a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim did not give a
         legally effective consent.

         Thus, you cannot convict the defendant unless you are
         satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the victim] did not
         give a legally effective consent.

         In other words, it’s the defendant’s job to set up the
         defense. It is the Commonwealth’s job to knock it down like
         a bowling pin.

Id. at 574-575.

      The jury returned a guilty verdict for the above-referenced offenses and

the court sentenced Dejene to four to eight years’ incarceration for rape

followed by four years of reporting probation and a consecutive term of one

year of reporting probation for sexual assault. See Order of Sentence, filed

12/19/19. Dejene did not file a direct appeal.

      Dejene filed a counseled PCRA petition in June 2020, raising multiple

ineffectiveness claims, among other claims. The PCRA court granted an

evidentiary hearing limited to the following ineffectiveness claims:

         -   Failing to demand that the Commonwealth provide an
             expert opinion regarding DNA evidence prior to trial;

         -   Failing to consult with or call a DNA expert;

         -   Failing to object to the trial court’s          biased   and
             inappropriate questions regarding DNA;

         -   Failing to handle the DNA evidence effectively affected
             [Dejene’s] decision to testify;

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           -   Failing to object to the trial court’s inappropriate
               diminishing of the reasonable doubt instruction; and

           -   Failing to object to the trial court’s inappropriate burden
               shifting during jury instruction.

Memorandum of Law in Support of Zacharias Dejene (“PCRA Memo.”) filed

6/9/20 at 22-43, 69-75; Order of Court, filed 1/29/21. Although Dejene had

proffered the testimony of three DNA experts, the order scheduling the

evidentiary hearing limited Dejene to calling one of the experts, without

determining which of the three should testify. See Order of Court, filed

1/29/21.

     At the evidentiary hearing, Dejene presented the testimony of Dr.

Theodore Kessis, an expert in the field of molecular biology and forensic DNA

analysis. He also presented trial counsel, Matthew Ness, Esquire; Dejene’s

father; and Dejene. The Commonwealth countered with testimony from its

trial expert, Elizabeth Wisbon. Following the hearing, the court denied

Dejene’s PCRA petition, and this timely appeal followed.

     Dejene raises the following issues:

           1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
              to the erroneous jury instructions and examples given by
              the trial court with respect to the definition of reasonable
              doubt and the burden of proof which had the effect of
              both lowering the constitutionally required burden of
              proof and shifting it to the defense?

           2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in his handling of
              the DNA evidence insofar as:

                  a. Trial counsel did not demand nor seek an order
                     demanding that the Commonwealth produce
                     reports summarizing the opinions of its DNA
                     experts;

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              b. Trial counsel did not retain a DNA and/or Sexual
                 Assault Nurse Examine (SANE) expert to assist
                 counsel in handling the DNA and SANE evidence
                 and to offer evidence to rebut misleading
                 impressions/evidence       offered    by     the
                 Commonwealth and the trial court regarding
                 penetration and the evidentiary value of the
                 presence/absence of DNA;

              c. Trial counsel failed to object to the trial judge’s
                 biased questioning of the Commonwealth’s DNA
                 expert;

              d. Because of trial counsel’s failure to hire the
                 appropriate expert/experts, he was unable to
                 effectively assist Mr. Dejene with his decision to
                 testify?

        3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit
           relevant character traits when offering evidence of Mr.
           Dejene’s good character?

        4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a
           missing evidence jury instruction with regard to the
           alleged torn turtleneck and the missing text messages
           from the complaining witness’ text message chain in
           order to assist the jury in according the appropriate
           weight to the Commonwealth’s evidence?

        5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective insofar as not
           requesting a mistake of fact jury instruction from the
           [c]ourt?

        6. Whether the cumulative errors warrant a new trial?

        7. Whether the PCRA Court erred by limiting Mr. Dejene’s
           PCRA presentation of expert testimony to one (1) expert
           witness and thereafter entering an order dismissing the
           PCRA on the grounds that counsel failed to carry the
           burden of production?

Dejene’s Br. at 11-12.

     When reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we determine whether the

PCRA court’s determinations “[are] supported by the evidence of record and

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[are] free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1118

(Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the PCRA court’s

factual findings unless the certified record does not support them. See id. We

review its legal conclusions de novo. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d

244, 259 (Pa. 2011).

                  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

     Dejene’s first five issues address the alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel. We presume counsel to be effective.

        To establish ineffectiveness, a petitioner must plead and
        prove the underlying claim has arguable merit, counsel’s
        actions lacked any reasonable basis, and counsel’s actions
        prejudiced the petitioner. Counsel’s actions will not be found
        to have lacked a reasonable basis unless the petitioner
        establishes that an alternative not chosen by counsel offered
        a potential for success substantially greater than the course
        actually pursued. Prejudice means that, absent counsel’s
        conduct, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of
        the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

            Jury Instruction – Reasonable Doubt and Consent Defense

     Dejene argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction. Dejene maintains that the court’s

instruction “was confusing, erroneous and lessened the Commonwealth’s

burden proof.” Dejene’s Br. at 24. He alleges “[t]he [c]ourt reduced

reasonable doubt into a memory test.” Id. Dejene argues that the court’s

example “conflated the concept of weighing of evidence” with retracing one’s

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steps. Id. He further argues that the court’s analogy placed the burden on the

members of the jury to rely on their knowledge rather than the evidence. By

telling the jurors that the standard reasonable doubt explanation was “like

most textbook definitions, it leaves a little bit to be desired,” the court

“direct[ed] the jurors to disregard the standard instruction in exchange for his

‘real world’ example.” Id. at 26.

      In Dejene’s view, the court’s hypothetical improperly suggested that

mere hesitation alone – in the court’s example, hesitating at the stop sign –

was sufficient to raise reasonable doubt. He maintains that in this regard the

hypothetical was in conflict with the standard instruction, which states that

“the facts cause a reasonable person to hesitate in a matter of importance,

reasonable doubt exits.” Id. at 29.

      He also argues that counsel erred in failing to object to the court’s

explanation of the Commonwealth’s burden to prove a lack of consent. He

maintains that the court improperly shifted the burden of proof when it stated,

“In other words, it’s the defendant’s job to set up the defense. It is the

Commonwealth’s job to knock it down like a bowling pin.” Id. at 30 (quoting

N.T. at 574-575).

      In his witness letter to PCRA counsel, Attorney Ness explained that he

had “observed [Judge Tranquilli] to have used a version of [the reasonable

doubt] example in prior trials” and in some of those occurrences “juries have

still returned verdicts of ‘not guilty.’” Amended PCRA Petition, filed 5/7/21,

Exhibit 25, p. 4. Because of this, counsel concluded that “objecting to the

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example would not ‘un-ring the bell.’” Id. Regarding the court’s statement

about consent, counsel concluded that “given the primary instruction was read

to the jury, objecting to [it] would not ‘un-ring the bell.’” Id.

      Here, the PCRA court found that both claims lacked arguable merit. The

court determined that “[i]t is apparent from the record, that the trial court

significantly follow[ed] the [Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury

Instruction] on reasonable doubt and accurately defined the concept for the

jury.” PCRA Op. at 33. It further concluded that the court gave its reasonable

doubt hypothetical after providing “the standard instruction, which not only

provided context for the example but reiterated the Commonwealth’s burden.”

Id. Regarding the court’s statement about the Commonwealth’s burden to

prove a lack of consent, the PCRA court determined that “[t]he instruction

accurately reflected the Commonwealth’s burden to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the victim did not give consent.” Id. at 35.

      We agree that the underlying objection to the reasonable doubt

instruction lacked arguable merit. We do not examine various parts of jury

instructions in isolation. Rather, we review the whole charge in its entirety.

See Commonwealth v. Frein, 206 A.3d 1049, 1077 (Pa. 2019). Trial courts

are “free to use their own expressions, so long as the concepts at issue are

clearly and accurately presented to the jury.” Id. “There is error in jury

instructions only when the trial court abuses its discretion and inaccurately

states the law.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1231 (Pa.Super.

2018).

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      Here, the court gave the jury its reasonable doubt hypothetical only

after giving the standard jury instruction for reasonable doubt. The instruction

thus as a whole gave a correct statement of reasonable doubt. The court was

free to use its “own expressions.” Moreover, we perceive no prejudice from

counsel’s failure to object to the reasonable doubt instruction. Dejene’s

complaint is that the hypothetical suggested that the jury could find

reasonable doubt if it hesitated while recalling the evidence, rather than if “the

facts [would] cause a reasonable person to hesitate in a matter of

importance[.]” Dejene’s Br. at 29. In our view, the difference inured to

Dejene’s benefit because if anything, the hypothetical suggested a lower

hurdle for finding reasonable doubt.

      As for the instruction on consent, we do not think Dejene has shown

prejudice. Dejene testified that the interaction with the victim was consensual.

In that context, the court correctly informed the jury that the burden was “on

the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged

victim did not give legally effective consent.” N.T. Trial at 574. The court then

attempted to restate the instruction succinctly, saying, “In other words, it’s

the defendant’s job to set up the defense. It is the Commonwealth’s job to

knock it down like a bowling pin.” Id. at 574-575. Even assuming that an

objection to the statement that “it’s defendant’s job to set up the defense”

would have had arguable merit, Dejene cannot show that that statement

caused him prejudice because he testified that the victim consented. Dejene

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failed to carry his burden of showing that if counsel had objected, the outcome

of the proceeding would probably have been different.

                                DNA Testimony

      Dejene raises numerous claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness regarding

the DNA testimony at trial. First, he claims that counsel “failed to seek opinions

of the Commonwealth’s expert [Elizabeth Wisbon] prior to trial and was thus

unprepared when those opinions were given.” Dejene’s Br. at 37. These

opinions included Wisbon’s testimony that the “absence of male DNA does not

mean that a sexual assault did not take place” and that “the uninterpretable

DNA from the exterior crotch panel of the underwear was because not enough

DNA was obtained from that particular sample.” Id. at 39, 40 (citing N.T.,

Trial at 354, 358) (internal quotations omitted). Dejene contends that these

opinions were “unfair and improper.” Id. at 39. He maintains that if counsel

had inquired about Wisbon’s report before trial, he could have hired an expert

witness to rebut the testimony. Dejene argues that even though there was no

evidence of his DNA, Wisbon’s opinions left “the jury with the impression that

his DNA was actually present.” Id. at 41.

      The PCRA court rejected Dejene’s claim. It noted that counsel testified

that he had conversations with the lab technician regarding the DNA results

before trial. See PCRA Op. at 19. It also found that counsel effectively cross-

examined Wisbon about her testimony that a lack of DNA was not evidence

that a sexual assault did not occur. The court determined that counsel “elicited

testimony from Ms. Wisbon that depending on the variables, a lack of male

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DNA could also be consistent with no penile penetration, which was consistent

with the defense theory.” Id. at 19-20. (footnote omitted).

      The PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free of

legal error. Although counsel may not have known that Wisbon would testify

that the lack of DNA was not indicative that a sexual assault did not occur,

counsel testified that in his experience “it would not be unusual for a lab

technician from the Allegheny County Crime Lab to testify that theoretically,

anything was possible.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 5/25/21, at 94. Additionally,

counsel testified that before trial, he had a 45-minute phone conversation with

a crime lab technician, reviewing the lab test results. See id. at 107, 108.

Thus, the evidence presented at the PCRA hearing evidenced that counsel was

not unprepared as Dejene suggests.

      Dejene also claims that “counsel failed to object to biased questioning

by the trial judge,” referencing the court’s finger-and-mouth analogy. See

Dejene’s Br. at 42. The PCRA court rejected this claim, finding that the court

instructed the jury “both in the opening and closing charge . . . that any

questions asked by the court do not reflect [its] opinion regarding the evidence

and that no significance should be attached to them in comparison to other

questions asked of a witness.” PCRA Op. at 26 (citing N.T. Trial at 38, 584).

      This claim is meritless. The trial court instructed the jury of its

responsibility to consider the evidence for itself. It also advised the jury that

the court’s questions were not a reflection of its “opinion about the evidence

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or about the case,” and that the jury should not interpret the court’s actions

as “trying to lead [the jury] to render a particular verdict.”

         Understand it’s the answers that are the evidence, not the
         questions.

         I may question some of the witnesses myself. Now, my
         questions will not reflect and are not designed to reflect my
         opinion about the evidence or about the case.

         My only purpose will be to ask about matters which, in my
         opinion, need to be more fully explored or explained for your
         benefit.

                                      ***

         Now, I have not attempted to indicate my opinion
         concerning the weight which you should give to the evidence
         or any part of it, and I do not want you to think that I have.

         If during the course of the trial I asked any questions of a
         witness, which I did, you are not to attach any[]more or less
         significance to those questions and answers than to any
         other questions and answers.

         If during the trial I exhibited what you felt to be annoyance
         or displeasure toward any witness or lawyer or if I made any
         comments or displayed any facial expression, you are not to
         assume that I am trying to lead you to render a particular
         verdict because I am not.

N.T., Trial at 38, 584-585.

      We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. As such, we

perceive no prejudice to Dejene. See Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 53 A.3d

66, 71 (Pa.Super. 2012). The PCRA court properly rejected this claim.

      Dejene next alleges that counsel erred by failing to hire a “DNA/SANE

expert.” Dejene’s Br. at 47. The PCRA court determined that counsel had a

strategic basis for not calling such a witness. It stated that counsel explained

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that he reviewed Wisbon’s report and that “he planned to call [Wisbon] if the

Commonwealth chose not to because he determined that their expert

supported the defense theory.” PCRA Op. at 22 (footnote omitted).

      Dejene fails to show prejudice. As the PCRA court pointed out, counsel

thoroughly cross-examined Wisbon. Counsel obtained Wisbon’s admission on

cross-examination that it was also possible that the absence of DNA meant

that “there was no penetration[,]” which was consistent with Dejene’s

testimony that he only performed oral sex on the victim. N.T. Trial at 357.

Moreover, Dr. Kessis testified that based on the facts of the case, he “would

expect to see DNA,” and indeed the DNA evidence at trial did not implicate

Dejene. N.T. PCRA Hearing at 71. Thus, calling a DNA expert to testify that

they would have expected to find Dejene’s DNA if penetration had occurred

would have been cumulative. Dejene thus has not shown that failing to present

the testimony of such an expert prejudiced him.

      Dejene’s final ineffectiveness claim regarding the DNA evidence is that

counsel “was unable to effectively assist Mr. Dejene with his decision to

testify” since he did not hire a DNA expert. Dejene’s Br. at 55. He maintains

that if he had known that there were DNA experts who could testify as to their

opinion that DNA should have been recovered, he would not have testified.

      The PCRA court noted that counsel testified that he advised Dejene to

testify since there was no DNA evidence linking him to the assault. The court

determined that even considering the expert testimony at the PCRA hearing,

“there is nothing of record to support [Dejene’s] assertion that a DNA expert

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would have been able to provide testimony that would ‘directly contradict’ [the

victim’s] testimony.” PCRA Op. at 28. The court also stated that expert

testimony would not have been “a direct contradiction of the victim’s

statement, as it was clear from both experts that a lack of DNA does not

preclude the conclusion that a sexual assault occurred.” Id.

      “The decision of whether or not to testify on one’s own behalf is

ultimately to be made by the defendant after full consultation with counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000). A defendant

making such a claim must show that: 1) “counsel interfered with his right to

testify” or 2) “counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a

knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.” Id.

      Here, Dejene failed to meet his burden. There is no evidence that

counsel interfered with his right to testify or that counsel gave him

unreasonable advice. Counsel’s advice that a lack of DNA evidence paired with

Dejene’s testimony would be to his benefit was not “so unreasonable as to

vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify[.]” See id. There is nothing

in the record suggesting Dejene did not make a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary decision to testify. The court committed no error in rejecting this

claim.

                              Character Evidence

      Dejene argues that counsel erred by “failing to elicit pertinent character

traits” that tended to exculpate Dejene. He maintains that if counsel had

presented testimony of Dejene’s character traits “for being peaceful, non-

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violent and law-abiding[,]” the testimony could have created a reasonable

doubt. Dejene’s Br. at 62, 64. Dejene also alleges that counsel erred by failing

to elicit testimony of his reputation for being truthful and honest.

      “Failure to present available character witnesses may constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 785 A.2d 998,

1000 (Pa.Super. 2001). A defendant may introduce evidence of his or her

character traits that are relevant to a crime charged. See Pa.R.E. 404(a). In

a rape case, admissible evidence of the defendant’s relevant character traits

may include evidence of traits such as “non-violence or peaceableness,

quietness, good moral character, chastity, and disposition to observe good

order.” Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 454 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). “[I]n a case where there are only two direct witnesses

involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and

character evidence is critical to the jury’s determination of credibility.” Harris,

785 A.2d at 1000.

      Evidence of a defendant’s character for truthfulness is admissible where

it is relevant to an element of the crimes charged or where the Commonwealth

has   attacked     the   defendant’s      reputation   for   truthfulness.    See

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Furthermore,

“evidence of good character . . . may be considered by the jury in connection

with all of the evidence presented in the case on the general issue of guilt or

innocence.” Commonwealth v. Luther, 463 A.2d 1073, 1077 (Pa.Super.

1983). The jury “is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”

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Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

      Here, the Commonwealth charged Dejene with rape, sexual assault, and

indecent assault. None of these crimes have an element for which truthfulness

would have been relevant. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3124.1, and

3126(a)(1). Nor did the Commonwealth attack Dejene’s reputation for

truthfulness at trial. Dejene’s claim insofar as it relates to counsel’s failure to

inquire about Dejene’s reputation for truthfulness has no merit.

      Regarding character evidence of his alleged trait of non-violence, Dejene

claimed below that “counsel was clearly aware of the availability of character

witnesses who would have testified to Mr. Dejene’s character for being

peaceful, non-violent and law abiding.” PCRA Memo. at 47. He maintained that

counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to present such testimony. Dejene

also attached an exhibit four letters from the same four defense witnesses

called during his trial. See id. at Exhibit 12. Each affidavit provides that the

witness would have testified to Dejene’s nonviolent character trait had they

been asked by counsel.

      This claim of ineffectiveness has arguable merit. Since Dejene was

charged with crimes of violence, namely rape and sexual assault, evidence of

his character for being a non-violent person was relevant and admissible. See

Radecki, 180 A.3d at 454. However, Dejene fails to show prejudice. The jury

heard testimony from four witnesses that Dejene possessed good moral

character. This was “substantive” evidence and “an independent factor which

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may of itself [have] engender[ed] reasonable doubt or produce[d] a

conclusion of innocence.” Luther, 463 A.2d at 1077. Although not identical,

there is some overlap between good moral character and a propensity for non-

violence. In view of the significant testimony that he possessed good moral

character, the absence of the additional character testimony does not

undermine confidence in the verdict. Dejene has not shown a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have

been different.

                       Missing Evidence Jury Instruction

      Dejene alleges that counsel should have asked for a missing evidence

instruction for two pieces of “evidence”: text messages from the victim’s

phone and the victim’s turtleneck worn on the night of the assault. Regarding

the text messages, Dejene claims that the messages introduced at trial were

“not complete and sections of the conversations were removed.” Dejene’s Br.

at 71. He contends that the text messages were material because they

“include[d] the complainant’s words, thoughts and feelings immediately after

the alleged incident[.]” Id. at 72. As for the turtleneck, Dejene maintains that

it was material evidence because it was relevant to the victim’s testimony that

she noticed that her turtleneck was ripped when she went to the hospital and

that it was not ripped before the sexual assault. See N.T., Trial, at 117. Dejene

argues that by failing to request a missing evidence instruction, counsel

forfeited the reasonable probability of an acquittal. He alleges that absent the

instruction, “there is a reasonable likelihood” that the jury gave weight to the

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victim’s testimony that Dejene ripped her turtleneck and that she texted about

the assault shortly after it occurred. Id. at 73-74.

      To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to request a jury

instruction, a petitioner must prove he was entitled to the instruction based

on the evidence presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d

244, 299-300 (Pa. 2011). Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury

Instruction 3.21B regarding missing evidence provides that:

         If three factors are present, and there is no satisfactory
         explanation for a party’s failure to produce an item, the jury
         is allowed to draw a common-sense inference that the item
         would have been evidence unfavorable to that party. The
         three necessary factors are:

         First, that the item is available to that party and not to the
         other;

         Second, that it appears the item contains or shows special
         information material to the issue; and

         Third, that the item would not be merely cumulative
         evidence.

Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 3.21B (emphasis in original).

      Here, Dejene was not entitled to a missing evidence instruction. Dejene

claims that “chains [of the text messages] are not complete and sections of

the conversations were removed.” Dejene’s Br. at 71. He directs us to one

portion of the victim’s testimony regarding the text messages in support of

his argument that the victim did not explain why there were “incomplete text

chains[.]” Id. at 72. He notes that she testified “I believe the first message

[of the second screenshot] was probably responding to something else, but

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then the second message, I went back and I said, ‘oh my god, I can’t.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (citing N.T., 9/25/19, at 128). However, a review of

the context of the victim’s testimony reveals that the Commonwealth did not

ask the victim and she never agreed that there were messages missing.

         Q [The Commonwealth]: This is the first page of
         Commonwealth Exhibit No. 3. What message do you say
         there? What is that?

         A [the victim]: So at 2:30, I started messaging. I said, “Oh,
         my God guys, I’m at this retreat thing and Zack Dejene is
         also here and he fucking just forced himself on me.”

         Q: And I will move it up higher so you can get a better look.
         What else is there?

         A: I said, “It was so fucking disgusting.”

         Q: That’s page 1 of that 3. This would be page 2 of 3. Does
         the message continue?

         A: I believe the first message was probably responding to
         something else, but then the second message, I went back
         and I said, “Oh I can’t. So we’re at this Airbnb, and I took a
         room, and he just set his stuff in my room and fucking
         refused to leave. So I said, Okay, I’ll take a different room.”

N.T., Trial at 128-129. Furthermore, Dejene does not explain what part of the

messages were “tactically and intentionally photographed to cut certain parts

of the conversation out.” Dejene’s Br. at 72. Thus, he fails to show that any

of the messages were missing and as such a missing evidence instruction

would not have been proper. Counsel committed no error.

      As for the turtleneck, there is no evidence that it was in the

Commonwealth’s or the victim’s possession at the time of trial. Additionally,

the victim’s turtleneck did not show “special information material” to the case.

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The SANE nurse testified on cross examination that if she had noticed

something about the victim’s clothing, she would have “photographed and

advised to turn it in” but that in this case, she did not take any photographs

of any torn clothing. See N.T., Trial, at 214. Thus, the testimony of the SANE

nurse provided relevant evidence of the victim’s claim and an instruction

regarding its absence would have been cumulative. Counsel was not

ineffective for failing to ask for the instruction and the PCRA court committed

no error.

                       Mistake of Fact Jury Instruction

      Dejene argues that counsel should have requested a mistake of fact jury

instruction. Dejene states that while the current law of this Commonwealth

does not recognize mistake of fact as a defense to rape, this Court should find

that counsel should have asked for the instruction.

      This claim is meritless. Mistake of fact was not a defense to the crimes

charged. Counsel did not err by not requesting such a jury instruction. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa.Super. 1982) (holding

that the defendant’s belief as to the victim’s state of mind is not a defense as

to the crime of rape). Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise

a meritless claim. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Pa.

2006).

                        ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

      Dejene claims that the court erred by limiting the number of experts he

could present at the PCRA hearing. Although he acknowledges that it is within

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a court’s discretion to limit the admission of evidence, Dejene maintains that

by doing so here, the court prevented him from meeting his burden.

      The PCRA court determined that two expert witnesses were not

necessary for purposes of the evidentiary hearing because the testimony of

both witnesses would have been “cumulative and not corroborative” of the

testimony of the witness who did testify. Statement In Lieu of Opinion, filed

7/21/22, at 4. It concluded that both witnesses were experts in the field of

DNA testing and analysis and that both would testify that:

         1. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertions and the
            judge’s misleading questioning based upon [the victim’s]
            version of the events they would have expected to have
            DNA present in the swabs[;]

         2. DNA would likely not have been swamped out and
            undetectable[;]

         3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire such expert
            witnesses[.]

Id. at 3 (quoting PCRA Memo. at 30).

      The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the court.

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014). “Evidence is

admissible if, and only if, it is relevant.” Commonwealth v. Weaver, 768

A.2d 331, 332 (Pa.Super. 2001). The court may exclude relevant evidence

where its probative value is outweighed by “needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. Additionally, an abuse of discretion occurs where the

court’s decision is the “result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly

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erroneous.” Hoover, 107 A.3d at 729 (citation omitted). It also occurs when

the court has overridden or misapplied the law. See id.

      Dejene’s claim is meritless. Although the court permitted Dejene only to

call Dr. Kessis, the testimony of the additional proposed expert witnesses was

cumulative to Dr. Kessis’s testimony. See Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr.,

926 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa.Super. 2007); PCRA Memo at 34 (stating Dr. Kessis

and Mehul B. Anjaria, both experts in DNA testing, “agree that a rape, as

described by [the victim], would have certainly resulted in the deposition of a

detectable amount of Mr. Dejene’s DNA”); PCRA Memo at 35 (stating both

experts “would testify that, according to science, the rape as described by [the

victim] did not occur”); PCRA Memo at 34 n. 31 (stating another expert, Dr.

Suzanne Rotolo, completed a report that read “I would expect DNA to be

present”). Thus, the court did not prevent Dejene from satisfying his burden

of pleading and proving his right to relief and it did not abuse its discretion.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a) (petitioner bears the burden of pleading and

proving right to PCRA relief).

                            CUMULATIVE ERROR

      Dejene argues that the “cumulative errors here warrant reversal” of the

PCRA court’s order. Dejene’s Br. at 81. He notes that “[i]t is well-settled that

no number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if

they fail to do so individually.” Id. at 79. However, “when the failure of

individual claims is grounded in lack of prejudice, the cumulative prejudice

from those individual claims may properly be assessed.” Id. at 80 (citing

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Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012)). Thus, he claims

“that the multitude of errors in this case warrant relief insofar as the

cumulative prejudice suffered by Mr. Dejene.” Id. Here, after reviewing

Dejene’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that did not prejudice him

individually, we conclude that the claims in the aggregate do not prejudice

him.

       Order affirmed.

Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

Judge Colins files a concurring statement.

DATE: 12/6/2023

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