Court Opinion

ID: 9352706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 16:00:55.511239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.379495
License: Public Domain

20-2315
     Ye v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Brennan, IJ
                                                                           A206 059 678

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 9th day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 9                 Chief Judge,
10            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
11            ALISON J. NATHAN,
12                 Circuit Judges.
13   _____________________________________
14
15   TIANYIN YE,
16                         Petitioner,
17
18                   V.                                          20-2315
19                                                               NAC
20
21   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
22   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
23                 Respondent.
24   _____________________________________
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                     John Son Yong, Esq., Law Office
27                                        of John Yong, New York, NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                  Attorney General; Zoe J. Heller,
 3                                  Senior Litigation Counsel; Roberta
 4                                  O. Roberts, Trial Attorney, Office
 5                                  of Immigration Litigation, United
 6                                  States Department of Justice,
 7                                  Washington, DC.
 8
 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

12   is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Tianyin Ye, a native and citizen of                       the

14   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 6, 2020,

15   BIA   decision     affirming   a   May     3,     2018,    decision   of    an

16   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

17   withholding   of    removal,   and       relief    under    the   Convention

18   Against Torture (“CAT”).       In re Tianyin Ye, No. A206-059-678

19   (B.I.A. July 6, 2020), aff’g No. A206-059-678 (Immig. Ct.

20   N.Y. City May 3, 2018).        We assume the parties’ familiarity

21   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s

23   and the BIA’s opinions.        See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

24   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                     We review the

25   agency’s adverse credibility determination for substantial

26   evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

                                          2
 1   Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive     unless     any    reasonable           adjudicator          would         be

 3   compelled      to   conclude      to       the        contrary,”          8        U.S.C.

 4   § 1252(b)(4)(B).         “Considering        the         totality             of        the

 5   circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

 6   base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

 7   responsiveness      of   the    applicant        or    witness,       .       .    .   the

 8   consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and

 9   oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath,

10   and considering the circumstances under which the statements

11   were made), the internal consistency of each such statement,

12   . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.”

13   Id.   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).          “We     defer      .   .   .     to      an       IJ’s

14   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

15   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

16   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”                       Xiu Xia Lin

17   v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

18   Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.            Substantial evidence supports the

19   agency’s determination that Ye was not credible as to his

20   claim   that   police     detained     and   beat       him     for       practicing

21   Christianity in an unregistered church in China.

22         The agency reasonably relied on the inconsistency between

                                            3
 1   Ye’s asylum application and his testimony regarding whether

 2   his parents or a friend introduced him to Christianity.                 See

 3   8 U.S.C.    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).         Ye   failed     to    provide   a

 4   compelling explanation for the inconsistency, see Majidi v.

 5   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

 6   do   more    than    offer    a   plausible    explanation        for   his

 7   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

 8   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

 9   his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and he

10   does not challenge the IJ’s finding in his brief, see Zhang

11   v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)

12   (recognizing that we generally do not address issues not

13   raised in the briefs).

14        The    agency   also    reasonably   found   that    the     striking

15   similarities between Ye’s mother’s and his family friend’s

16   supporting affidavits impugned his credibility.                See Mei Chai

17   Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007)

18   (“[T]his court has . . . firmly embraced the commonsensical

19   notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an

20   indication that the statements are ‘canned.’”); Singh v.

21   B.I.A., 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding agency’s

22   reliance    on   “nearly     identical    language   in    the     written

                                         4
 1   affidavits     allegedly       provided       by   different      people”).

 2   Although, as Ye argues, the affidavits are not carbon copies

 3   of   each   other,    they    are   nonetheless       strikingly    similar

 4   because the sentences and paragraphs in the six-paragraph

 5   statements mirror each other in content with only slight

 6   variations     in    word    choice.       Further,    the   IJ   continued

 7   proceedings in order for Ye to submit evidence explaining the

 8   similarities, but a sample affidavit he purportedly gave his

 9   mother   and   friend       provided   only    generic   information     to

10   include and thus did not explain the similar structure and

11   content of the affidavits.          See Mei Chai Ye, 489 F.3d at 526;

12   see also Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.

13        The agency also reasonably relied on Ye’s change in

14   demeanor after the concerns with the supporting affidavits

15   were identified.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Gao v.

16   Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (according “great

17   deference” to IJ’s demeanor findings (internal                    quotation

18   marks omitted)).       That demeanor finding is supported by the

19   record, and Ye does not challenge it in his brief.                See Zhang,

20   426 F.3d at 541 n.1, 545 n.7.

21        The inconsistency, similarities between the affidavits,

22   and demeanor findings provide substantial evidence for the

                                            5
 1   agency’s adverse credibility determination.     See 8 U.S.C.

 2   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Mei Chai

 3   Ye, 489 F.3d at 526 (concluding that submission of similar

 4   affidavits “undermined [applicant’s] general credibility”).

 5   The adverse credibility determination is dispositive because

 6   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief rest on the

 7   same factual predicate.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,

 8   156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 9       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

10   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

11   stays VACATED.

12                               FOR THE COURT:
13                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14                               Clerk of Court

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