Court Opinion

ID: 9386064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 13:10:50.642088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.635647
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Huff and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              THOMAS A. CARR
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0607-22-2                                       JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                   APRIL 11, 2023
              MARIBETH C. CARR

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
                                              Rondelle D. Herman, Judge

                              Susan C. Armstrong (Armstrong Law Firm, pllc, on briefs), for
                              appellant.

                              Richard L. Locke (Shannon S. Otto; Locke & Otto, on brief), for
                              appellee.

                     The Henrico County Circuit Court (the “trial court”) awarded Maribeth C. Carr (“wife”) a

              divorce from Thomas A. Carr (“husband”). On appeal, husband contends the trial court erred in

              awarding wife spousal support because she failed to prove her need for spousal support.

              Husband also asserts the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its consideration of the factors

              set forth under Code § 20-107.1(E) in support of its award of spousal support. Finally, husband

              claims the trial court erred by not awarding him a divorce from wife on the basis that she

              deserted their marriage. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgments.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                                          BACKGROUND1

        “When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, [this Court] view[s] the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party,”—here, wife—“granting [her] the benefit of any

reasonable inferences.” Nielsen v. Nielsen, 73 Va. App. 370, 377 (2021) (quoting Congdon v.

Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003)).

        The parties married on June 24, 1989, and have three adult children. For most of the

marriage, wife stayed at home to care for the children while husband worked. Beginning in 2010,

wife began to work full-time as a real estate agent. In 2015, wife told husband that she felt unhappy

with their marriage, and the parties participated in marriage counseling sessions. In March 2016,

the parties executed a “Collaborative Participation Agreement” to use the collaborative process to

dissolve their marriage without litigation. They paused the collaborative process shortly thereafter

when wife was diagnosed with a medical illness requiring extensive treatment.

        In January 2017, wife moved out of the marital residence. In December 2017, she asked

husband to reconcile, and the parties attempted to reconcile until December 2019. Notwithstanding

their attempts at reconciliation, the parties continued to live separately. At the end of 2019, they

resumed the process to dissolve their marriage and engaged in that collaborative process until the

end of 2020. The parties ended the collaborative process after failing to resolve all their issues.

        On January 13, 2021, wife filed a complaint for divorce and requested the trial court grant

her a divorce on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for more than one year.

She also asked the court to equitably distribute the parties’ assets, award her pendente lite and

        1
          Portions of the record in this case were sealed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates
unsealing relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues husband has raised. Evidence and
factual findings below that are necessary to address the assignments of error are included in this
opinion. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed
record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case.
The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va.
283, 288 n.1 (2017).
                                                 -2-
permanent spousal support, and grant her attorney fees and costs. Husband filed a counterclaim

requesting a divorce on the grounds of desertion, “or, in the alternative, on the ground of the parties’

one-year separation.” He also sought an award of equitable distribution and his attorney fees and

costs. After a pendente lite hearing, the trial court ordered husband to pay wife $8,500 per month in

spousal support during the pendency of the litigation

        On October 25, 2021, the trial court entered an order incorporating the parties’ equitable

distribution agreement. In addition to other provisions in the agreement, husband agreed to pay

wife $1,110,124, plus a portion of the distributions he would receive from the sale of his interest in

the company “SYCOM” to his new employer, InterVision.

        On November 17, 2021, the case proceeded to trial with respect to the issues of spousal

support, the grounds for divorce, and life insurance.2 Wife testified that the parties had “built a

really nice life,” which included a country club membership, a vacation home, private schools for

their children, multiple vacations per year, and foreign travel. As to her income as a real estate

agent, wife testified that she earned $70,485.75 in 2021, “about half” of what she earned in 2020.

Wife also submitted, without objection, an income and expense statement showing that her monthly

expenses totaled $21,379. She testified that the expenses listed therein were “at or below the

standard of living that [she] had during the marriage.”

        Wife acknowledged that her 2021 income did not account for income she would receive

from investing her share of the equitable distribution settlement. She also testified that she made a

$250,000 down payment on a new condominium home using money she borrowed from her father

and that she repaid her father using the equitable distribution settlement. During cross-examination,

however, wife admitted that her father had gifted her the $250,000 to purchase the home. At the

        2
            Husband did not appeal the trial court’s rulings regarding life insurance.
                                                  -3-
time of trial, wife had $977,563 in her bank account and $160,000 in a separate investment

account.3

       Husband introduced testimony from an expert financial planner who opined as to the

additional annual income wife could receive if she invested her assets. The expert assumed that

wife would receive an inheritance in the future, that wife’s annual income was $150,000, and that

wife was willing to make “substantially risky investment[s].” The expert concluded that, if wife

invested between $1,100,000 and $1,300,000 in a portfolio consisting of “[a]bout 60 percent in

stocks and 40 percent in bonds,” she could expect a seven percent return on her investment resulting

in additional annual income between $66,000 and “just over” $90,000.

       During cross-examination, husband’s expert financial planner admitted that if wife did not

receive an inheritance in the future, she could expect only a five percent return on her investments,

two percent of which would be “income.” The remaining three percent of her return would be

comprised of asset appreciation and require her to liquidate part of her original investment. The

expert further admitted that he did not know wife’s risk tolerance for investing and that, if she was

risk adverse, her rate of return would be lower. The expert conceded that, if wife was “very risk

adverse,” he had “no ability to assume what the rate of return would be.” Neither party offered any

other evidence or testimony regarding wife’s risk tolerance.

       As to his income, husband testified that he had a base salary of $306,000 with a potential for

a $120,000 bonus. He admitted that he had approximately one million dollars in cash at the time of

trial and that he “should be able to get the same return” on his investments as wife. Husband also

acknowledged that he and wife were “entitled to live at the same standard of living” as they did

       3
          In explaining the amount of money in her bank account, wife testified that she received
$159,000 from the sale of her interest in a mobile home park in addition to her share of the equitable
distribution settlement.
                                                -4-
during their marriage, which he estimated at costing $22,796 per month, including retirement

savings.

       At the conclusion of trial, the court directed the parties to file written closing arguments.

Wife requested she be awarded $10,000 per month in permanent spousal support. In opposition,

husband argued that wife had deserted the marriage and that she failed to prove her need for spousal

support given her “acquired wealth and her demonstrated ability to support herself.” Husband

further argued that wife’s income and expense statement was “a sham.”

       Following the parties’ submission of their written closing arguments, the trial court issued a

thirteen-page letter opinion addressing all unresolved matters between the parties. As to the

grounds for divorce, the trial court found that husband failed to prove wife deserted the marriage,

noting the parties’ “unsuccessful efforts to amicably divorce.” The court granted wife a “no-fault”

divorce based on the parties’ one-year separation.

       The trial court then devoted the vast majority of its letter opinion to addressing each of the

statutory factors—listed in Code § 20-107.1(E)—for awarding spousal support. The court found

that, at the time of the hearing, wife was earning approximately $70,485 per year but had a five-year

average income of $105,408. It further found that wife could invest the funds she received from the

equitable distribution settlement, which could yield “$20,000 to $90,000 in additional earnings per

year depending on the amount invested and risk tolerance.” The trial court noted, however, that it

“cannot demand the liquidation of her assets causing a reduction in the current value of her

portfolio” and that “[w]ife could invest in a way that did not reduce the current value such that she

                                                 -5-
would receive about $20,000.” Because it found that wife’s expenses were “inflated,” the court

stated that it would not consider “all or part of” certain monthly expenses totaling $8,710. 4

        Ultimately, the trial court concluded that both parties were “millionaires due to the equitable

distribution and have the means to support themselves”; as a result, “[t]he main issue for

contemplation is whether the [w]ife is entitled to an award of spousal support to afford her the same

standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.” The court described that standard as an

“affluent lifestyle.” After considering all the factors under Code § 20-107.1(E), including husband’s

ability to pay, the trial court awarded wife $10,000 per month in spousal support.

        Husband filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court incorrectly stated the

total amount of wife’s expenses, incorrectly determined wife’s income—including potential

investment income—and failed to provide “any concrete analysis that would indicate how the

[c]ourt could have arrived at the spousal support amount it awarded.” The trial court denied

husband’s motion, and this appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                         A. Spousal Support

        Husband contends the trial court erred in awarding wife spousal support because she

failed to prove her need for it. He argues that wife had “the ability to provide for her own

support” and that the trial court erred by failing to impute at least $65,000 of annual investment

income to wife and by considering the expenses listed in her income and expense statement despite

finding they were “inflated.” For the following reasons, this Court disagrees and affirms the

judgment of the trial court.

        4
        The trial court appears to have erroneously considered the income and expense
statement wife submitted at the pendente lite hearing that listed wife’s monthly expenses at
$26,909 instead of the statement submitted for trial which listed wife’s monthly expenses at
$21,379. For reasons explained below, we find that this error did not affect the judgment.
                                               -6-
       “In determining the appropriate amount of spousal support, the trial court must consider the

needs of the requesting party and the other spouse’s ability to pay.” Wyatt v. Wyatt, 70 Va. App.

716, 719 (2019) (quoting Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 401 (1992)). “When a court awards

spousal support based upon due consideration of the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.1, as

shown by the evidence, its determination ‘will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of

discretion.’” Chaney v. Karabaic-Chaney, 71 Va. App. 431, 435 (2020) (quoting Dodge v. Dodge,

2 Va. App. 238, 246 (1986)).

       At the outset, husband argues that the trial court should have imputed at least $65,000 of

annual investment income to wife because his financial planning expert testified that wife could

receive a seven percent annual return on her investments and withdraw “$65,000 to $91,000 per

year” without reducing the initial balance of her investment portfolio. 5 “The decision to impute

income is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its refusal to impute income will not be

reversed unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” Collins v. Leeds, 69 Va. App. 1, 9

(2018) (quoting McKee v. McKee, 52 Va. App. 482, 489 (2008) (en banc)). As the party seeking to

have income imputed to wife, husband was “required to present evidence ‘sufficient to enable the

trial judge reasonably to project what amount [of income] could be anticipated.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting McKee, 52 Va. App. at 489).

       In this case, husband’s financial planning expert qualified the testimony husband relies on in

support of his appeal. The expert explained that if wife did not receive an inheritance in the future,

she could only realize a five percent annual return on her investment, two percent of which would

       5
         Husband also argues that the trial court failed to specify the amount of wife’s
investment income. The trial court found that it could not “demand the liquidation of [wife’s]
assets causing a reduction in the current value of her portfolio.” It further found that husband’s
“expert also testified that the [w]ife could invest in a way that did not reduce the current value
such that she would receive about $20,000.” Accordingly, this Court addresses only husband’s
argument that the trial court should have imputed at least $65,000 of annual investment income
to wife.
                                                 -7-
be “income.” He further explained that the remaining three percent of wife’s return would be

comprised of asset appreciation and require her to liquidate part of her original investment. On

cross-examination, husband’s expert admitted he did not know wife’s risk tolerance for investing

and that her rate of return would be lower if she were risk adverse. Indeed, if wife were “very risk

adverse,” the expert conceded that he had “no ability to assume what the rate of return would be.”

        “The ‘credibility of the expert witness and the weight to be accorded the evidence’ is a

matter exclusively in the province of the factfinder . . . and is not ordinarily subject to appellate

review.” deCamp v. deCamp, 64 Va. App. 137, 155 (2014) (quoting Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19

Va. App. 687, 694 (1995)). In light of the assumptions made by husband’s expert and the trial

court’s discretion in weighing his testimony, the trial court was not plainly wrong or without

evidence to impute less than $65,000 in annual investment income to wife. Husband’s expert

witness even conceded that wife’s annual return on investment could be lower than five percent

given the assumptions he made about wife’s assets and risk tolerance without having concrete

knowledge of either. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by awarding spousal support based on

its decision to impute $20,000 annual investment income to wife. See id. at 150 (“Whether to

impute income to a spouse seeking support is simply one component of calculating the ‘amount’ of

support under the statutory factors listed in Code § 20-107.1(E).” (quoting Brandau v. Brandau, 52

Va. App. 632, 638 (2008))).

        Regardless of wife’s annual investment income, husband argues that the trial court erred in

awarding wife spousal support at all because she failed to prove her claimed monthly expenses. In

support of his argument, husband points out that the trial court itself found some of the expenses

listed in wife’s income and expense statement were “inflated, unreasonable, or inaccurate.” Given

the court’s factual findings and husband’s claim that additional expenses were “exposed as being

                                                  -8-
entirely unreliable on cross examination,” husband argues that the trial court should have “totally

rejected” wife’s income and expense statement.6

        In essence, husband claims the trial court erred by “accept[ing] [wife’s] unreliable

evidence.” It was in the province of the trial court as the trier of fact, however, to determine what

weight to afford the evidence wife presented. See Sobol v. Sobol, 74 Va. App. 252, 272 (2022) (“It

is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be

given to their testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.”

(quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 686 (1999))); see also Pilati v. Pilati, 59 Va. App.

176, 183 (2011) (“What weight, if any, to assign to this [or that] factor in the overall decision lies

within the trial court’s sound discretion.” (alteration in original) (quoting Robbins v. Robbins, 48

Va. App. 466, 481 (2006))).

        Husband did not object to wife’s income and expense statement nor her testimony in support

of her claimed expenses therein. Moreover, husband conceded that wife was “entitled to live at the

same standard of living” as during their marriage, which he estimated as costing $22,796 per month.

Accordingly, wife’s claimed expenses were supported by evidence and the trial court had discretion

to determine what weight, if any, to afford them. Indeed, the trial court made explicit note in its

opinion letter as to which of wife’s claimed expenses it did not consider in determining the amount

of spousal support to award. In denying husband’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court

considered and rejected the same evidentiary arguments husband now advances on appeal. Under

        6
          Husband also asserts that in making its final ruling, the trial court considered the income
and expense statement wife submitted at the pendente lite hearing, rather than the one she submitted
at the final hearing. He assumes this mistake accounts for $5,530 of wife’s $10,000 monthly
spousal support order because that is the difference between the two expense reports. The record
shows that the court considered the parties’ standard of living during the marriage, considered their
respective incomes, and the other statutory factors under Code § 20-107.1(E). The court fashioned
a spousal support order based on maintaining roughly equivalent standards of living. Accordingly,
we cannot say the error on the expense figures affected the judgment.
                                                 -9-
these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife spousal support

based in part on wife’s income and expense statement. See Conley v. Bonasera, 72 Va. App. 337,

346 (2020) (“[F]actual findings made by a court in support determinations are entitled to great

deference and will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion.”).

        In his next challenge to the award of spousal support, husband contends that the trial court

erred in failing to sufficiently articulate its consideration of the Code § 20-107.1(E) factors in

support of the award. Husband asserts that “there was nothing stated by the trial [c]ourt to explain

why it awarded wife $10,000 in spousal support” because it merely recited the statutory factors and

“briefly salute[d] [the] evidence it heard.”

        Code § 20-107.1(F) provides in relevant part that “[i]n contested cases in the circuit courts,

any order granting, reserving or denying a request for spousal support shall be accompanied by

written findings and conclusions of the court identifying the factors in subsection E which

support the court’s order.” That statutory obligation “requires more than merely communicating

‘the fundamental, predominating reason or reasons for the decision.’” Pilati, 59 Va. App. at 182

(quoting Kane v. Szymczak, 41 Va. App. 365, 373 (2003)). “Instead, to comply with Code

§ 20-107.1(F), the trial court should identify all relevant statutory factors supporting its decision

and provide an explanation of its resolution of any significant underlying factual disputes.” Id.

“While a trial judge must consider all the factors, the judge is not ‘required to quantify or

elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors.’” Id.

at 183 (quoting Duva v. Duva, 55 Va. App. 286, 300 (2009)). “What weight, if any, to assign to

this [or that] factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Robbins, 48 Va. App. at 481).

        In this case, the trial court’s thirteen-page letter opinion addressed each of the Code

§ 20-107.1(E) factors for awarding spousal support and explained its factual findings as to the

                                                 - 10 -
evidence in relation to those factors. In doing so, the court considered the parties’ respective

incomes, assets, and expenses, as well as their standard of living and the circumstances regarding

the dissolution of their marriage. Only after “[h]aving considered the [statutory] factors, the

wife’s needs, the standard of living during the marriage and the husband’s ability to pay,” did the

trial court award wife spousal support. Although husband asserts he cannot discern how the trial

court calculated the spousal support award, “[t]he General Assembly did not intend the statutory

decisionmaking factors to devolve into an algorithm and thereby project a pretense of certitude.”

Pilati, 59 Va. App. at 183. This Court finds that the trial court’s written findings in support of its

spousal support award complied with the requirements of Code § 20-107.1(F).

        Moreover, although the trial court acknowledged that the parties had the ability to support

themselves, the record reflects that husband earned more than wife, and he even conceded that wife

was entitled to maintain the same standard of living as during the marriage. Husband does not

dispute his ability to pay spousal support. After hearing the evidence and arguments and

considering all the statutory factors, the trial court found that “[t]he main issue for contemplation

[wa]s whether the [w]ife [wa]s entitled to an award of spousal support to afford her the same

standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage,” which it described as an “affluent lifestyle.”

Because the trial court’s written findings demonstrate that it gave due consideration to the factors

enumerated in Code § 20-107.1(E), it did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife spousal support

in the amount of $10,000 per month. Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

See Chaney, 71 Va. App. at 435.

                                       B. Grounds of Divorce

        The trial court granted wife a divorce based on the parties living separate and apart for more

than one year. Husband asserts the trial court erred by not granting him a divorce based on wife’s

alleged desertion. Specifically, husband argues that wife “did not present any evidence that justified

                                                 - 11 -
. . . her leaving and refusing to return to the marital home.” This Court disagrees and affirms the

trial court’s judgment.

        “Where dual or multiple grounds for divorce exist, the trial judge can use his [or her] sound

discretion to select the grounds upon which he [or she] will grant the divorce.” Fadness v. Fadness,

52 Va. App. 833, 840 (2008) (quoting Konefal v. Konefal, 18 Va. App. 612, 613-14 (1994)).

“Circuit courts are ‘not compelled “to give precedence to one proven ground of divorce over

another.”’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 220 (1992)). Although husband

requested a divorce based on desertion, both parties also requested a divorce on the basis that they

had been separated for more than one year. Therefore, even if the trial court had concluded that

wife deserted the marriage, it could nevertheless have chosen to grant husband a divorce on his

requested no-fault grounds. As husband even admits in his briefs, a finding of desertion would not

require the trial court to grant a divorce on those grounds when the evidence was sufficient to prove

the alternate no-fault grounds.

        The parties had lived separate and apart since January 2017, approximately four years

before wife filed her complaint for divorce. Neither party claims the one-year period of separation

required for a no-fault divorce had not been satisfied by the time of trial and entry of the divorce

decree. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the divorce based on the

duration of the parties’ separation.

        Husband further contends that the trial court’s erroneous determination on the specific issue

of wife’s desertion affected its determination of spousal support. “[I]n determining whether to

award support and maintenance for a spouse,” the trial court must “consider the circumstances and

factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including adultery and any

other ground for divorce.” Code § 20-107.1(E) (emphasis added). Husband claims the court should

                                                 - 12 -
have considered wife’s desertion in this context and refused to award her spousal support. 7 This

Court finds no merit in that claim.

       Virginia courts have repeatedly recognized that “[a] spouse may be free from legal fault in

breaking off cohabitation, and hence entitled to support and maintenance, even though she cannot

establish that the other spouse’s conduct constituted the foundation of a proceeding for divorce,”

such as cruelty. Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va. App. 385, 390 (1986); see, e.g., Capps v. Capps, 216

Va. 382, 385 (1975) (holding that wife “was free from legal fault” where she left her husband

because of a single incident of his physical abuse even though she was not entitled to a divorce

grounded upon his cruelty). Here, “[i]n consideration of the totality of the evidence,” the trial court

expressly found that husband “did not meet the burden of proof,” and therefore “there is insufficient

evidence to establish desertion pursuant to . . . Code § 20-91(6).” The record provides ample

support for that determination, including the parties’ initial attempts to reconcile, engagement in

marital counseling, and execution of an agreement to dissolve their marriage through a collaborative

divorce process—all prior to wife’s departure from the marital home in January 2017. Additionally,

wife’s medical complications, which began in March 2016, resulted in the parties putting the

pending divorce process on hold while she received extensive treatment.

       All combined, the recent “deaths of her mother and brother as well as” wife’s own medical

battles “caused a strain on the marriage,” and wife did not receive the requested level of care and

support from husband. See Breschel v. Breschel, 221 Va. 208, 212 (1980) (holding that “a wife is

free from legal fault in leaving her husband where she reasonably believes her health is endangered

by remaining in the household and she has unsuccessfully taken whatever reasonable measures

might eliminate the danger without breaking off cohabitation”). As the trial court did not err in

       7
         See Code § 20-91(9)(c) (providing that a divorce granted on no-fault grounds “shall in no
way lessen any obligation any party may otherwise have to support the spouse unless such party
shall prove that there exists in the[ir] favor . . . some other ground of divorce”).
                                                      - 13 -
finding husband’s evidence insufficient to establish wife’s desertion, its refusal to deny wife spousal

support on those grounds was proper.

        Likewise, in determining the nature, amount, and duration of the spousal support, the trial

court did not err in refusing to assign fault to wife under Code § 20-107.1(E)’s thirteenth factor.

That factor requires the court to consider “the circumstances and factors that contributed to the

dissolution” of the marriage, “specifically including any ground for divorce, as . . . necessary to

consider the equities between the parties.” Code § 20-107.1(E)(13) (emphasis added). However,

the “circumstances and factors” the court may consider “are not limited to the legal grounds for

divorce” and instead “encompass[] all behavior that affected the marital relationship, including any

acts or conditions which contributed to the marriage’s failure, success, or well-being.” Wyatt, 70

Va. App. at 719 (alteration in original) (quoting Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 102 (1993)).

        In considering both parties’ behavior leading up to the dissolution of the marriage, the trial

court found that

                [a]lthough the [h]usband alleged desertion as a grounds of divorce,
                . . . the evidence was insufficient. Both [parties] allege intimate
                relationships with other people outside of the marriage during times
                of separation. There were stressors in the marriage that were beyond
                the [p]arties’ control which unfortunately dampened the marriage
                such as the history of cancer causing the death of her mother and
                brother as well as the [w]ife’s own battle.

It was proper for the trial court to not assign fault to wife for leaving the marital home in January

2017 based on husband’s unproven desertion claim. 8

        Accordingly, this Court finds the trial court’s judgments are supported by the evidence: the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting wife a divorce on no-fault grounds, in finding that

        8
         Even if the trial court had considered wife’s alleged desertion in this context, its effect
would nevertheless be limited to consideration of “the needs of the requesting party and the other
spouse’s ability to pay.” Wyatt, 70 Va. App. at 719 (quoting Alphin, 15 Va. App. at 401).
                                                - 14 -
husband did not prove wife’s desertion, and in determining that none of the parties’ behaviors

leading up to the dissolution of the marriage justified denying wife spousal support.

                                     C. Appellate Attorney Fees

        Wife asks this Court to award her appellate attorney fees and costs “[b]ased on the record in

this case” and “the lack of merit to [h]usband’s appeal.” Notwithstanding her request, the parties

agreed, as part of their equitable distribution settlement, that “each side is going to pay their own

attorney’s fees in the current divorce action.” Given that agreement, this Court denies wife’s

request for an award of appellate attorney fees and costs. See Jones v. Gates, 68 Va. App. 100, 106

(2017) (“[I]f a property settlement agreement contains a provision awarding attorney’s fees, the

court must follow the terms of that agreement, to the extent allowable by law.”).

                                            CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

                                                 - 15 -