Court Opinion

ID: 9579404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:50.605755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:29.614963
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the tried court’s order of February 11, 1982, which order held that the proceedings in this case were, in effect, terminated on December 31, 1981 with the issuance of a writ of possession. The trial court and the majority in this case primarily rely upon Leverette v. Moran, 153 Ga. App. 825 (266 SE2d 574) (1980). The facts of this case are different from those in Leverette and therefore the holding in Leverette is not *95dispositive of the issue with which we are faced. The affidavit seeking the writ of possession filed in Leverette had absolutely no allegation or averment whatsoever deeding with past due rent. In the case sub judice, there was added to the form affidavit the following language: “and that defendant is indebted to Plaintiff for past due rent in the total amount of $340,370.17.” Although in February of 1982 the trial court decided that the writ of possession entered in December of 1981 terminated all issues, the findings and conclusions which form the predicate for the very writ of possession referred to clearly indicate to the contrary. In the order containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the trial court’s determination of the amount of rent to be paid into the registry of the court pursuant to Code Ann. § 61-304, the trial court stated as follows: “The Court’s findings herein relating to the amount of rent owed to Plaintiff by Defendant and the substantial completion of the premises by Plaintiff were based on the evidence presented at the above-described hearing, and do not constitute a final determination of these issues, which are expressly reserved for determination by a jury.” The defendant did not pay the $340,370.17 as ordered by the court within the short time allotted and, therefore, a writ of possession was issued and executed. However, during the interim between the entry of writ of possession on December 31,1981 and the February 11, 1982 order which is the subject of this appeal, both parties filed motions, pursued discovery and obtained various orders from the court. It is my opinion that the record in this case clearly shows that the December 31,1981 order resolved, at most, the issue of possession and that all other issues remain for further determination. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resolution of those issues.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Sognier and Judge Pope join in this dissent.