Court Opinion

ID: 9593388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:02.179677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:40.475443
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). I share the views set forth by Justice Riley. However, I write separately to register my concern that the majority’s unwarranted expansion of Funk will not serve the public interest. Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974).
The concept of "duty,” in a negligence action, is "an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p 358. See also Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 22; 312 NW2d 585 (1981); Duvall v Goldin, 139 Mich App 342, 349; 362 NW2d 275 (1984).
In Funk, supra at 101, 102, the Court, while recognizing that "[o]rdinarily a landowner is not responsible for injuries caused by a carefully selected contractor to whom he has delegated the task of erecting a structure,” and while realizing that "[mjishaps and falls are likely occurrences in the course of a construction project,” nevertheless imposed a duty upon general contractors and owners
to assure that reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority are taken to *675guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen. [Id., p 104.]
The policy considerations underlying that decision were described by the Court as follows:
The policy behind the law of torts is more than compensation of victims. It seeks also to encourage implementation of reasonable safeguards against risks of injury.
Placing ultimate responsibility on the general contractor for job safety in common work areas will, from a practical, economic standpoint, render it more likely that the various subcontractors being supervised by the general contractor will implement or that the general contractor will himself implement the necessary precautions and provide the necessary safety equipment in those areas. [Id.]
According to the Funk Court, its decision was set against the factual backdrop of an immediate employer who "conspicuously failed to provide any safety equipment,” a general contractor who was "fully knowledgeable of the employer’s dereliction,” and an owner who "exercised an unusually high degree of control over the construction project from its very inception.” Id., pp 102, 105.
Now, in the present case, the majority of this Court has gone a long step further — and in my mind, a step too far — imposing liability in a situation where the owner and general contractor have taken the reasonable measures called for in Funk to insure the safety of construction workers on the project.
The defendant owner, Detroit Edison, created a centralized system of safety information for the project. It established the Depot Safety Organiza*676tion, which administered the dissemination of safety information and established a general first-aid facility. Each of the contractors on the job site was contractually required to operate safety programs for its employees. Those requirements were described by Edison’s safety supervisor as follows:
Each employer was required to have a program that would incorporate as a basic minimum, the requirements of all miosha construction standards as well as any additional things that might be deemed generic to the site itself. Among that — in addition to that, each employer was required to conduct weekly safety meetings with every employee and that they were required to designate a competent employee of management that would act as their safety representative in any meetings requiring that knowledge be put forth to all the contractors in general.
Information was disseminated to the safety representatives and then further passed on down to the employees, any information that would come up as far as potential problems that might be coming up on the site, if a large load was going to be lifted or this or that, something that might require specific attention of individual employees.
Each employer was required to investigate accidents, to submit their injury reports to the first aid. There was one general first aid facility so that all contractors, all employers didn’t have to supply their own. We wanted to try and centralize everything as much as we could with respect to the flow of information back from the contractors to make sure that they were in fact putting out the information and giving their employees what can be termed a reasonable [sic] safe place to work.
Edison coordinated the safety programs of the individual contractors and observed the basic safety operation throughout the project. The general contractor, Bechtel, implemented a Bechtel *677safety program for Bechtel employees and monitored the safety programs of other contractors. Contractors such as plaintiff’s employer, Babcock & Wilcox, were contractually required to provide Bechtel with a copy of their safety programs, to conduct weekly safety meetings, and to provide minutes or reports of those meetings. Babcock & Wilcox did in fact conduct weekly safety meetings over the six months during which plaintiff had been on the project. Plaintiff attended every one of those weekly safety meetings.
The imposition of liability on either Edison or Bechtel defeats the ostensible goals underlying the Funk decision — the call for owners and contractors to provide "relatively safe working conditions” by implementing "reasonable safety measures.” Funk, supra, pp 102-103. Both defendants in this case did exactly that — they provided a safe work environment by creating safety programs and insuring that all workers on the project were educated and informed about safety concerns. Although the present plaintiff, highly intoxicated at the time, was involved in a serious accident, there is no evidence in this record of continual or obvious safety derelictions such as those to which the Court pointed in Funk. Nonetheless, despite assurances by the Funk Court that its ruling did not portend the imposition of liability " 'upon every property owner who enters into a construction contract,’ ” id., p 108, it appears now that owners and contractors will be saddled with liability even if they have implemented the presumed mandate of Funk. The danger that lies in this precedent was explained by an Oregon court,
An owner who reserves the right to impose or require safety precautions for the benefit of his contractor’s workmen derives no possible pecuni*678ary benefit from the reservation because he has contracted for a finished product. Therefore, if duties not otherwise required of owners are imposed because of the reservation of a right to require safety precautions, it is obvious that owners will not actively concern themselves with the workmen’s safety. [Wilson v Portland General Electric Co, 252 Or 385, 396; 448 P2d 562 (1969). See also Wienke v Ochoco Lumber Co, 276 Or 1159; 558 P2d 319 (1976).]
Justice Coleman echoed this concern in her dissent in Funk, supra, p 116, when she stated:
The majority opinion creates concepts which represent a significant departure from time tested theories of tort liability. Landowners must now disavow all but the most casual personal interest in projects undertaken on their property or assume responsibility for any on-site injuries. General contractors must now be prepared to assume responsibility for any injury received by the employee of a subcontractor, no matter how negligent the employee may be.
Justice Coleman’s observation applies with equal, if not greater, force to the case at hand. Because I conclude that the majority’s decision constitutes the unwarranted expansion of an imprudent doctrine, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.