Court Opinion

ID: 9687658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:41:12.873777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:13.363239
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). It appears that the question boils down to whether a proceeding for probation revocation can be considered "pending” where the defendant has not been *713served or otherwise notified of the proceeding. The prosecutor argues that probation orders are at all times amendable under MCL 771.2(2); MSA 28.1132(2) on an ex parte basis with no requirement that defendant be given notice or opportunity to be heard regarding the amendment. People v Kendall, 142 Mich App 576, 579; 370 NW2d 631 (1985). Defendant says the proceedings, even ex parte proceedings, must be pending during the term of probation, otherwise the court loses jurisdiction. Here, defendant says, the operative amendment, which was filed October 26, 1988, and which was the basis for the second revocation of probation, was not valid because it was not issued within the term of probation which had ended August 13, 1987. I would agree with defendant’s position.
There is some confusion about the petition on which the October 26, 1988, revocation was based, and this is because there were in fact two petitions. The first petition, prepared and dated January 30, 1987, specifies two violations: (1) failure to report, and (2) failure to pay costs, attorney fees, and restitution. The bench warrant based on the first petition was never served, and it is not clear from the record where this petition and bench warrant languished. It was not date-stamped as having been filed with the county clerk until October 26, 1988. But this is not the petition and bench warrant upon which the revocation is based. The amended petition and bench warrant prepared and issued October 26, 1988, was served on defendant, but of course it could not have been served before October 26, 1988. That amended petition and bench warrant specifies four violations, the operative one being leaving the State of Michigan, as predicated on the November 13, 1987, felony conviction in South Carolina. It is the act of *714leaving the State of Michigan upon which any tolling analysis should depend. To hold that tolling is triggered by failure to report in November and December of 1986 would implicate due process considerations. Not reporting would extend probation ad infinitum. I do not see how such a holding could survive a challenge based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution.
There is no dispute that defendant was never served with or arraigned on the bench warrant dated January 30, 1987. The majority decides that defendant absconded probation by failing to report and that therefore his probationary sentence was tolled simply by that fact, not by the typing and signing of the unserved bench warrant dated January 30, 1987. The creation of that warrant does not figure in either the lower court’s or this Court’s deliberation process. We note it, but nowhere depend on it. The critical document is the amended petition for revocation of probation and bench warrant (one document) issued and served October 26, 1988, and the arraignment on the same date.
I would follow People v Jackson, 168 Mich App 280; 424 NW2d 38 (1988), and find that the so-called "amendment” of the petition of January 30, 1987, was violative of due process for lack of notice and, as a consequence, that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant after the probationary period ended on August 13, 1987. The petition and warrant filed October 26, 1988, and served promptly thereafter was too late.
I would reverse.