Court Opinion

ID: 9549191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:14:44.537398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:58.401462
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting)-
I dissent to the majority opinion.
Strict construction of the letter of paragraph (d) of 85 O.S.1961, Sec. 48 results in a conclusion that is inconsistent with the obvious purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting Sec. 48. More consideration should be given to the entire section. A construction of a statute should, if possible, be avoided which results in a conclusion not contemplated by the Legislature and which is inconsistent with the legislative intent. I would apply a liberal construction to the section, as the last sentence appears to imply the adjective “dependent” in connection with the nouns “parents,” “brothers” and “sisters.” Section 48 requires the husband of a woman employee, whose death resulted from a cause other than that for which she had received a compensation award, and before she received the' full sum awarded her by the Industrial Court, to be dependent upon her. Or should the case be that an injured employee die from causes other than the injury for which he had been awarded compensation without having received the same, or a part thereof, leaving no wife and no heirs other than the children over the age of 18 years who are not dependent, blind, or crippled, the award may not be revived for their benefit since such children do not meet the requirements of the Act, but the award abates. The final paragraph “(d)” of Sec. 48, reads:
“If there be no surviving wife (or dependent husband) or child under the age of eighteen (18), or dependent blind or crippled child of any age, then to the parents share and share alike, and if no parents, then to the brothers and sisters, share and share alike.”
The quoted language of this part of the statute is plain, but there is other language in the section of which the quotation is a part that creates an ambiguity as to whether the nouns “parents,” “brothers” and “sisters” were inferred to mean dependent parents, brothers or' sisters. Giving consideration to the entire statute dictates a liberal construction to words of the last paragraph thereof recognizing that there is implied in paragraph “(d)” the same adjective as is expressly contained in the preceding portions of the section.
The fundamental purpose of the Legislature in enacting Workmen’s Compensation Laws was to henefit injured workmen and their dependents in order to afford them a living and prevent them from becoming public charges. Cummons v. Bragg, 183 Okl. 122, 80 P.2d 287, 290. Corbin v. Wilkinson, 175 Okl. 247, 52 P.2d 45 shows the recognition by this court of the legislative purpose of extending to the injured workman’s dependents, ■ where the workman’s death resulted from other causes than for which compensation had been awarded him, in the adding.to Workmen’s Compensation Laws by Chapter 29, S.L. 1933, 85 O.S.1961, Sec. 48. We there said the protection was extended to protect the workman’s dependents, not that it go to his estate where his creditors might reach it. To now say, as in effect the majority says, that-it was the legislative intent that a sister who lives' far removed from this state, and the place'of'residence therein of-the workman, and to whom the workman owed no duty to support or maintain, should benefit from his death is not only inherently inconsistent in concept with our previous holdings, but is repugnant to the requirements-of dependency of closer kin, those in the workman’s immediate family. A presumption exists that the Legislature intended to apply the same rule to the different -states of fact where they are manifestly within one and the same reason. It is not within a standard of logical justification of the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Laws to say that. *832handicapped children of the workman, or if the deceased workman is female, her surviving husband, must be dependent upon her to entitle revivor, as does Sec. 48, but a sister need not be a dependent to be entitled to a revivor of an award. Surely the adjective “dependent” as used elsewhere in Sec. 48 is implied in the section’s last sentence in connection with the nouns, “parents,” “brothers” and “sisters,” of the deceased workman.
The manifest intent of the Legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words of a statute, we said in Huston v. Scott, 20 Okl. 142, 94 P. 512, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 721, and in Bell v. United Farm Agency, Inc., Okl., 296 P.2d 149, that which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter thereof, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers. See, also, De Hasque v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 68 Okl. 183, 173 P. 73, L.R.A.1918F, 259. In considering a legislative enactment the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intention. A statute may speak as plainly by inference as in any other manner.
Persons must be the dependents of a deceased employee as well as his heirs at law to be entitled to an award of compensation under the death benefits. provision itself of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. Fox-Vliet Wholesale Drug Co. v. Chase, Okl., 288 P.2d 391; Sample v. State Industrial Commission, Okl., 262 P.2d 889. Is not the requirement of dependency implied or inferred where an award made in favor of an injured workman remains not fully drawn at his death? To say it is not also required would be to say the legislative intent was to enact contradictory provisions, or provisions at variance with the policy of the Workmen’s Compensation Law as a whole. The rule of construction according to the spirit of the law is applicable here, as an adherence to the letter only of the isolated paragraph “(d)” of 85 O.S.1961, Sec. 48 results m inconsonance and absurdity. A construction that an award may be revived by a dependent parent, brother or sister is sensible, practical and liberal.
In this matter it was stipulated that Della Harold was not a dependent. I take that to mean that she was not, nor had she any reasonable future expectancy, at the time of the death of the workman relying on the workman for support or financial aid. She is not therefore a person in whose name and for whose benefit the award may be revived.
The order and award should be vacated.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice BERRY concurs in the views herein expressed.