Court Opinion

ID: 9915499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 16:05:19.101242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:52.695523
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 124,524

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                         SHAWN P. O'BRIEN,
                                            Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed January 5, 2024. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

        Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant, and Shawn P.
O'Brien, appellant pro se.

        Brian Deiter, assistant district attorney, Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., HURST, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: In this direct appeal, Shawn P. O'Brien contests his convictions for
three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and five counts of sexual
battery. O'Brien claims several trial and procedural errors and contends that there was
insufficient evidence presented to prove his guilt of sexual battery. The record compels us
to affirm his convictions for aggravated indecent liberties with a child and three counts of
sexual battery. But the record also compels us to reverse two counts of sexual battery and
remand for new trial on those counts because the trial court prohibited O'Brien from
challenging the credibility of his accusers.

                                                     1
Acts committed in O'Brien's home were reported first, followed by reports of his actions
taken while he was working as a massage therapist.

       In January 2018, Megan Rubio—a licensed social worker for the Kansas
Department for Children and Families—received a sexual abuse report. Rubio
interviewed J.Y., the alleged victim, in February 2018 at J.Y.'s middle school. During that
conversation, J.Y., a minor, stated that she had been touched inappropriately by a man
named Shawn, but J.Y. chose not to disclose any other information about those events.
Rubio interviewed J.Y. again in June 2018 after the Department received another sexual
abuse report.

       During the June 2018 interview, J.Y., who was O'Brien's older son's friend, told
Rubio that she had spent the night at O'Brien's house when she was around nine years
old. During the sleepover, O'Brien gave J.Y. a massage "that started off as a head massage
and moved to inappropriate touching." J.Y. later elaborated and stated that O'Brien had
touched her breasts and the inside of her vagina under her clothes. J.Y. also said O'Brien
did this on three separate occasions. All incidents occurred when J.Y. was around 9 or 10
years old. Following this interview, Rubio reported J.Y.'s allegations to the police.

       More details about these incidents came out at the trial. J.Y. testified that she first
met O'Brien when she was 9 or 10 years old, and he was a family friend. J.Y. said the first
time the inappropriate touching occurred was during a sleepover at O'Brien's house.
Sometime during that night, O'Brien asked J.Y. whether she wanted a massage. When
O'Brien asked the question, J.Y. was in the living room of O'Brien's house, and there were
other children sleeping in the same room. J.Y. agreed to the massage. J.Y. said O'Brien
began by giving her a head massage before he eventually rubbed her breasts and vagina
under her clothing.

                                               2
       Another incident occurred during a night around Christmas the same year. O'Brien
again asked J.Y. whether she wanted a massage, but J.Y. told O'Brien no because she
wanted to go to sleep. O'Brien then explained he needed to practice on someone because
he had a test the next day at work. Eventually, J.Y. agreed to a massage. Once again, J.Y.
said this took place in the living room when other children in the room were sleeping.
Though she could not remember every detail about that night, J.Y. testified that O'Brien
again rubbed her breasts and vagina like he had before.

       J.Y. also recalled another incident in O'Brien's living room. Like the previous
incidents, O'Brien asked J.Y. whether she wanted a massage, and J.Y. said she did.
O'Brien began by massaging her head before he eventually pulled off J.Y.'s shirt and
began rubbing her breasts. Soon after, O'Brien went under J.Y.'s underwear and rubbed
her vagina again. During this incident, J.Y. recalled hearing a sound come from
somewhere inside O'Brien's home. When O'Brien heard the sound, he stopped and told
J.Y. to put her shirt back on before he left the room. J.Y. said O'Brien had given her other
massages as well, but those massages were just head massages that occurred during the
day.

       When asked whether she told anyone about the massages, J.Y. said she
remembered telling O'Brien's oldest son. J.Y. told no one else about the massages because
she did not know what O'Brien did was wrong. Again, she estimated she was 9 or 10
years old when the incidents took place. Eventually, J.Y. "came to the conclusion that
when you get massages, you don't really get violated like that." After coming to this
realization, J.Y. eventually told her mother about what O'Brien did and began seeing a
therapist. After telling her mother what happened, J.Y. was interviewed by law
enforcement officers and spoke about what happened. The subsequent investigation led to
criminal charges against O'Brien.

                                             3
One charge leads to several more.

       About a month after O'Brien's arrest in February 2020, the University of Kansas
sent a message to students, faculty, and staff telling them of the arrest of a local massage
therapist who provided massage therapy services to students at KU. After receiving this
message, several student-athletes came forward with allegations about O'Brien, even
though the message did not contain O'Brien's name. For about five years, O'Brien worked
with the University of Kansas to provide massage services for student-athletes on some
of the women's sports teams. In the end, O'Brien was tried for three counts of aggravated
indecent liberties with a child for the incidents involving J.Y., and five charges of sexual
battery of the student-athletes.

       One of those former student-athlete massage clients was H.G. H.G. testified she
had started getting massages in high school, but she started receiving them more often
when she attended KU. H.G. said she received massages to help increase flexibility and
prevent injuries.

       H.G. first learned about O'Brien's work from her husband, who had previously had
a massage from O'Brien. In total, H.G. got five massages from O'Brien, all between
February and March 2016. During the first massage session, H.G. noticed nothing
abnormal about the massage and scheduled another session with O'Brien. During the later
massages, H.G. recalled O'Brien rubbing his hand against her labia when he applied or
removed hot stones. When it first occurred, H.G. said she thought O'Brien had made a
mistake. When O'Brien did it again at a later massage, H.G. decided that O'Brien had
done so purposely. In all, H.G. recalled two instances of inappropriate conduct by
O'Brien and said she never gave O'Brien permission to touch her in this way. After the
fifth massage, H.G. found a different massage therapist. H.G. then spoke with a detective
who worked for the Lawrence Police Department about what happened.

                                              4
       Another student-athlete, E.R., began getting massages in the fall of 2018. E.R.
believed she received three or four massages from O'Brien.

       During one session, E.R. recalled having some discomfort in the calf or hamstring
area of one of her legs. O'Brien told E.R. to lay on her back, which confused her. O'Brien
began by massaging oils into her head. O'Brien then grabbed some hot stones and placed
them inside the front of E.R.'s shorts. The hot stone then started sliding to her groin area,
and E.R. said that she felt O'Brien's hand touch her vagina. As a result, E.R. said she
froze until the massage ended because she did not know what to do. When the session
ended, E.R. left the room and told her teammates about what occurred.

       E.R. said she did not tell any administrators or law enforcement officers about
what occurred because she felt she would be ignored. She knew that other teammates had
complained before about O'Brien, and nothing had happened. She also felt the team staff
would not be helpful because "the staff rarely even listened to anything we had to say
when it came to problems as a team. They usually told us to figure it out ourselves."

       Another former student-athlete, A.D., received her first massage from O'Brien in
September 2019. A.D. told O'Brien she had some soreness in both her hamstrings, as well
as some generalized back pain. O'Brien instructed A.D. to lay on her stomach and placed
hot stones around her right and left groin area. O'Brien also wedged another hot stone
near her vagina. While still on her stomach, A.D. said O'Brien started to massage the area
where the crease of her thigh met her vagina, and O'Brien's hand contacted A.D.'s vagina.
O'Brien then instructed A.D. to lay on her back so he could massage a muscle in her
armpit area, which he said would relieve some of her back pain. A.D. recalled O'Brien
then putting his hand inside her sports bra and touching her nipple with his index and
middle fingers. O'Brien then grabbed A.D.'s breast before massaging the area between her
breasts.

                                              5
       B.A., another former student-athlete, also testified. Like A.D., B.A. first began
getting massages in September 2019. During her first session with O'Brien, B.A. told him
she needed him to work on her midback and knee areas. O'Brien began by having her lay
on her stomach, and he placed hot stones on her hamstrings, one under her shorts at the
bottom of her buttocks, and one through the top of her shorts. O'Brien then started
massaging B.A.'s buttocks before moving to the area of B.A.'s sports bra. O'Brien
eventually grabbed B.A.'s right breast before placing another hot stone in between her
breasts. Later, O'Brien started dragging his fingers down B.A.'s stomach from her sports
bra to her pubic bone multiple times. O'Brien then told her to lay on her back, at which
point he worked on her quadriceps before he started to massage the area under her shorts
where the crease of her thigh met her vagina. After this, O'Brien told B.A. she could
leave because her session ended.

The defendant presented several witnesses.

       O'Brien called several witnesses to testify in his defense. All testified they were
former massage clients and O'Brien did nothing inappropriate during their massages.

       O'Brien testified. He said he provided new clients with an intake form that
included, among other things, a medical waiver section that stated all massage therapy
was strictly nonsexual. O'Brien estimated that he retained around 6,000 different intake
forms from clients. That said, O'Brien could not recall which student-athletes completed
the form. Similarly, O'Brien said J.Y. never completed an intake form because the
massages were performed in his living room.

       When asked about his massage techniques, O'Brien said he used hot stone therapy.
He said he often used the hot stones because he found they reduced discomfort in the
muscles, including discomfort in the groin area. No matter if his client was a man or
woman, he placed the hot stones in the same place. He said he never intended to use the

                                              6
hot stones in that area so that he could be close to a client's groin, and he denied ever
touching a client's groin inappropriately when using the technique. He also specifically
denied ever touching J.Y. inappropriately, saying that he only ever massaged her head,
neck, and shoulders. Similarly, O'Brien denied ever touching H.G., A.D., E.R., and B.A.
inappropriately. O'Brien maintained that "[a]s a professional massage therapist, you
would not touch somebody's vagina."

       Catherine O'Brien testified. She helped O'Brien manage the massage therapy
business. Catherine said she knew about the intake forms her husband had clients
complete, but she did not know whether any of the complaining witnesses had completed
the form. She also said she never observed any of O'Brien's clients ask for their money
back or seem distraught after receiving a massage from O'Brien. Similarly, she never
observed any of the student-athletes O'Brien worked with arguing about which massage
therapist would treat them.

       Both of O'Brien's sons testified. O'Brien's oldest son testified that J.Y. did not
spend time alone with their father when she spent the night, but O'Brien's younger son
testified that O'Brien had given a massage to J.Y. Even so, both testified that O'Brien
never inappropriately touched J.Y.

O'Brien is convicted and sentenced.

       The jury found O'Brien guilty as charged. The district court imposed concurrent
lifetime sentences in prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years for each
conviction for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The court imposed one-year jail
sentences for each sexual battery conviction, each sentence to be served consecutively
with each other after O'Brien completes his felony sentence.

                                              7
       O'Brien, through his counsel, raises several issues in this appeal. First, he contends
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him on the five sexual
battery convictions. Second, he argues that the court erred when it did not sever the trial
of the three aggravated indecent liberties with a minor felony charges from the trial of the
five misdemeanor sexual battery charges. Then, O'Brien raises a legal error, claiming the
court should have instructed the jury about consent. He also claims the court abused its
discretion when it prohibited him from asking questions about any possible civil lawsuits
the alleged victims may be contemplating. O'Brien also claims legal error when the court
prevented him from asking a witness about the possible bias of J.Y.'s mother. He argues
the court should have given the jury a limiting instruction about its consideration of an
out-of-court statement. He also contends the admission of an unredacted photo of a text
message was erroneous. O'Brien argues that a prosecutor's comments during closing were
prosecutorial error. Finally, O'Brien suggests that cumulative errors require reversal of his
convictions.

       Without the benefit of his counsel's assistance, O'Brien has filed his own brief
raising several more issues. We will address those claims after our analysis of the issues
listed above.

There is sufficient evidence to support the sexual battery convictions.

       O'Brien challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving the sexual battery
charges.

                "'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we
       review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational
       factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [During our
       review, we will] not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the
       credibility of witnesses.'" State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021).

                                                    8
       The elements listed in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5505(a) define sexual battery as "the
touching of a victim who is 16 or more years of age and who does not consent thereto,
with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the offender or another."

       The testimony from H.G., E.R., A.D., and B.A. all described similar actions by
O'Brien. All of them testified that O'Brien touched their breasts or their vaginas or both
during their massages. While no one disputes that O'Brien was massaging the student-
athletes when these crimes were committed, the issues are where O'Brien touched the
women and why he did so. Even O'Brien testified that "[a]s a professional massage
therapist, you would not touch somebody's vagina."

       O'Brien argues that the nature of the touching and the intent to touch must be
proved separately. In other words, he argues just because he may have touched their
breasts or their vaginas, that does not prove he had an intent to arouse his or the student-
athletes' sexual desires.

       He cites State v. Ta, 296 Kan. 230, 290 P.3d 652 (2012), as support. The court in
Ta dealt with Ta's touches along with some statements the defendant made about his
sexual urges. In Ta, the defendant touched a child's face, hair, and chin. The defendant
had also "made several statements in which he reiterated that he had strong urges to have
sex with small children." 296 Kan. at 233. The question in Ta focused on whether the
statements about Ta's urges were used to interpret the touching of the child's face, hair,
and chin as improper. But our Supreme Court was unconvinced by this attempt to prove
improper intent by inferences drawn from a statement of the defendant.

       The Supreme Court held that to use a defendant's mental state to define or
determine whether a touching is lewd "would allow punishment for impure, criminal
thoughts, and it is a fundamental principle that 'the law does not punish criminal

                                              9
thoughts.'" 296 Kan. at 242. The Ta court instructed that we are to look at the nature of
the touching:

       "[W]hether a touching is lewd should be determined by considering the common
       meaning of the term 'lewd,' that is whether a touching is 'sexually unchaste or licentious;
       suggestive of or tending to moral looseness; inciting to sensual desire or imagination;
       indecent, obscene, or salacious.' In considering if a touching meets this definition, a
       factfinder should consider whether the touching 'tends to undermine the morals of a child
       [and] . . . is so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable
       person.' [Citations omitted.]" 296 Kan. at 242-43.

       We hold that Ta is not controlling precedent here. O'Brien's touching went well
beyond the touching of a young girl's face and hair. The touching of breasts and vaginas
is explicitly sexual when made during a massage. The jury who saw and heard O'Brien
and the student-athletes had the opportunity to decide if O'Brien's touching was proper;
the jury decided it was not.

       Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact-
finder could have found O'Brien guilty of sexual battery. The victims' testimonies
demonstrated that O'Brien inappropriately touched them. A reasonable inference from
this testimony would be that O'Brien did so with the intent to satisfy his sexual desires,
despite his testimony that a professional massage therapist would not touch someone's
vagina. The State presented sufficient evidence to find O'Brien guilty of sexual battery.

The court did not err in denying O'Brien's motion to sever the charges.

       O'Brien argues the district court erred by not severing the trials of the aggravated
indecent liberties with a child counts and the sexual battery charges. Before trial, O'Brien
asked the district court to sever the charges involving the minor from the charges
involving the adults. The court denied O'Brien's motion. On appeal, he argues the many

                                                    10
differences between the prosecutions compel separate trials and asks us to reverse and
remand for new separate trials. He points to the different ages of the victims: a nine-year-
old girl and college-age student-athletes. He contends that the difference between the
possible penalties—three off-grid felony crimes and class A misdemeanors for the sexual
battery counts—shows the charges should be tried separately. And the differences in the
times and locations of where the crimes were allegedly committed—his home and on the
KU campus—also made joinder of the counts improper.

       This question is controlled by the application of K.S.A. 22-3202(1):

               "Two or more crimes may be charged against a defendant in the same complaint,
       information or indictment in a separate count for each crime if the crimes charged,
       whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are
       based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
       together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."

       When the district court decided this issue, it concluded the aggravated indecent
liberties with a child and sexual battery charges were properly joined because they had a
similar character and arose out of a common or similar scheme. The court pointed out
that the victims "all described very similar touchings, where they were touched, how they
were touched." In the accounts the victims gave during their testimonies, they said
O'Brien would begin a massage normally before later touching them inappropriately
during the same massage. O'Brien's methods were nearly identical in each instance. The
court thus found that all of the crimes involved inappropriate touching of victims, and
each time O'Brien committed the alleged offenses, he did so under the ruse of giving a
massage. This conclusion is supported by substantial competent evidence.

       We find no flaw in the court's reasoning. It is true that the ages of the victims were
different, but O'Brien's conduct each time remained the same. He touched each victim
inappropriately during a massage. Both aggravated indecent liberties with a child and

                                                  11
sexual battery criminalize this type of touching. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5505(a);
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3)(A).

       It is the age of the victim and the offender that causes the disparity in the level of
punishment here, not the conduct of the offender. O'Brien's aggravated indecent liberties
with a child conviction was an off-grid felony because J.Y. was 9 or 10 years old when
the crimes occurred, and O'Brien was older than 18 years old. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5506(c)(3).

       O'Brien's last point about different locations is also unconvincing. Even though the
time and physical location of each crime differed, it occurs to us O'Brien committed the
crimes when he had the opportunity to perform massages on the victims. He seized the
opportunity when it arose. We do not see this as a valid reason to separate the trial of
these charges.

       O'Brien has failed to persuade us that the court abused its discretion on this point.

There was no need for the court to instruct the jury on consent.

       O'Brien next argues that the district court committed clear error by not instructing
the jury about the law of withdrawn consent. Because O'Brien did not ask the court to
give such an instruction, he must now show clear error in order to obtain relief on this
point. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3414(3).

       When reviewing whether the failure to give a jury instruction was clearly
erroneous, we must decide whether the instruction was legally or factually appropriate,
using an unlimited standard of review. State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630, 639, 479 P.3d 167
(2021). In deciding whether an instruction was factually appropriate, we must determine
whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

                                              12
defendant, that would have supported the instruction. State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 255,
485 P.3d 614 (2021).

       This issue arose from rape cases where consent was withdrawn. O'Brien relies on
State v. Flynn, 299 Kan. 1052, 329 P.3d 429 (2014). In Flynn, a jury found Flynn guilty
of rape but acquitted him of five other charges. A panel of this court later reversed Flynn's
rape conviction, finding the district court committed clear error when it failed to instruct
the jury on withdrawn consent in accordance with a prior case, State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan
392, 133 P. 3d 14 (2006). In Bunyard, the court had ruled that a defendant is allowed a
reasonable time to discontinue sexual intercourse when consent is withdrawn and that
withdrawn consent is communicated to the defendant. 281 Kan. at 416.

       In the Supreme Court's review of Flynn, the court reversed Flynn's rape conviction
because the trial court committed clear error by not instructing the jury about the law of
withdrawn consent. 299 Kan. at 1069. And the court specifically disapproved the
"'reasonable time'" language from Bunyard, finding such language "contrary to the plain
language of the rape statute." Flynn, 299 Kan. at 1066-67.

       But the Flynn court reaffirmed the conclusion from Bunyard that the jury must be
told that consent for intercourse may be given and then withdrawn but must be
communicated to the defendant:

       "[W]hen evidence is presented involving post-penetration withdrawal of consent, the trial
       court must do more than simply instruct the jury on the statutory elements of rape.
       Instead, in such cases, in addition to the rape elements instruction, the trial court must
       instruct the jury that rape may occur even though consent was given to the initial
       penetration, but only if the consent is withdrawn, that withdrawal is communicated to the
       defendant, and the sexual intercourse continues when the victim is overcome by force or
       fear." Flynn, 299 Kan. at 1067.

                                                    13
We note that in Flynn and Bunyard, consent for intercourse was initially given and then
withdrawn.

       The problem we have with O'Brien's argument is that this is not a rape case in
which consensual sexual intercourse started and then consent had been withdrawn. These
are massage cases that turned into illicit touching. Because consent for sexual touching
was never given, consent could not be withdrawn. It is true that the victims consented to
receiving a massage, but it is also true that none of them consented to O'Brien touching
their breasts or vaginas. O'Brien recognized that such touching was not appropriate for a
massage therapist.

       We find more appropriate the reasoning in State v. Parker, 48 Kan. App. 2d 68,
282 P.3d 643 (2012), where Parker pretended to be a therapist in a hospital. He was
convicted of several sex crimes including aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Parker
claimed the victim "consented to be treated by hospital staff and that she believed that he
was a therapist," which meant she consented to Parker's inappropriate touching. 48 Kan.
App. 2d at 80.

       The panel rejected this reasoning, stating that the victim might have consented to
therapeutic rubbing of her leg—had Parker been a therapist—but "[t]here was no
evidence that [the victim] consented to anyone rubbing her leg to satisfy that person's
sexual desires, which is what the jury found Parker did here. The jury could reasonably
find that [the victim] didn't consent to any of Parker's actions." 48 Kan. App. 2d at 80.

       Even looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to O'Brien as required by
Holley, under these facts an instruction on consent was factually inappropriate. No
dispute surrounded the consent the victims gave concerning receiving a massage. The
dispute centered on O'Brien inappropriately touching the victims during a massage,
which he acknowledged would not be appropriate for a massage therapist to do. That is a

                                             14
far different situation than a couple beginning sexual intercourse and then one of the pair
attempting to withdraw consent. There is simply no evidence that the student-athletes
consented to any sexual touching. After all, there is a great difference between touching
that seeks to ignite passion and touching that relieves soreness in ligaments and muscles.
And the jury found O'Brien guilty of multiple counts of sexual battery. This suggests that
the jury found O'Brien guilty of touching his victims inappropriately with the intent to
arouse himself. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5505(a).

       The district court did not err in failing to give an instruction on consent.

The district court precluded defense counsel from presenting evidence bearing on the
credibility of two of O'Brien's accusers.

       During the cross-examination of E.R. and A.D., O'Brien's defense counsel sought
to introduce evidence of a possible financial motive behind the witnesses' accusations of
sexual battery. In cross-examination of E.R., after establishing she did not report the
incident right away, defense counsel asked E.R. whether she was "contemplating filing a
lawsuit about this incident." The trial court sustained the State's objection on the ground
of relevance.

       A.D. was the next witness, and when defense counsel asked "did you also contact
[an attorney] about this," the State objected: "Your Honor, this is just going down the
same irrelevant path regarding a potential civil suit that has nothing to do with these
proceedings in terms of whether these incidents happened with these women or not."
Defense counsel responded, "Well, Your Honor, it is. The fact of the matter is [the
prosecutor] also asked who all she contacted; and second, I believe the fact that there
are—they are pursuing civil claims and may receive damages is relevant to their
motivation for bringing this all up." The court ruled, "I will sustain the objection. I do not
believe it's relevant."

                                              15
       After the State rested, the parties met before the defense presented its case. During
the conference, some mention was made of an out-of-state witness that was going to
testify for the defense. Defense counsel advised:

       "During the course of this representation, I got an e-mail from an attorney asking if Mr.
       O'Brien had liability insurance, which has promoted the questions that I have indicated,
       and I have subpoenaed her, and she is supposed to be here Thursday and she is coming
       from Kansas City, Missouri. I guess I—I am proffering that the only function of her
       testimony was to testify that I got an e-mail asking if there was liability insurance. If you
       are going to rule that that is irrelevant, I would prefer to let her know in advance not to
       make the trip."

       The trial court responded that "[i]t's irrelevant. I think it's—it's the same relevance
as a car wreck case where we don't let juries know who has insurance and how much and
what the parameters are. Insurance is not related to this case." Defense counsel
responded, "Again, it's not whether he has insurance, but whether or not they were
contemplating filing a lawsuit." But, ultimately, the judge responded:

               "That is true, but people can still contemplate filing lawsuits. I just am not aware
       of any situation where in a criminal trial that has been brought forward as evidence for
       the jury to consider that a lawsuit may or may not be filed. I can tell you in the last case
       that I tried last week that in the jury room, the jury said to me, Are they going to file a
       civil lawsuit? So that will—I am sure that will be something that is already in their mind
       without us dirtying up the record with inadmissible evidence."

       We review the trial court's decision to limit cross-examination for an abuse of
discretion. "A district court abuses its discretion when (1) no reasonable person would
have taken the view adopted by the district court; (2) the judicial action is based on an
error of law; or (3) the judicial action is based on an error of fact." State v. Thomas, 307
Kan. 733, 739, 415 P.3d 430 (2018). As explained below, when the district court

                                                     16
determined that evidence of a witness' motivation for testifying was irrelevant, its
decision to limit cross-examination was based on an error of law.

       O'Brien was denied the right to present relevant evidence to the jury.

       All persons accused of crimes have the right to confront the witnesses against
them at trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. O'Brien, too, had
this trial right to confront witnesses, and one important component in confrontation is the
right to expose a witness' motivation in testifying. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17,
94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) ("We have recognized that the exposure of a
witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination."). "'The primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause is to give the accused the opportunity for cross-examination to
attack the credibility of the State's witnesses.'" Thomas, 307 Kan. at 738 (quoting State v.
Friday, 297 Kan. 1023, Syl. ¶ 1, 306 P.3d 265 [2013]). Cross-examination has long been
recognized as "the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth
of his [or her] testimony are tested." Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.

       To prove a constitutional violation based on the denial of the right to confront
adverse witnesses, a criminal defendant must show that the trial court prohibited them
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. Such a confrontation would have
exposed the jury to facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness. See State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. 708, 721, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022).

               "'Because a district court may exercise reasonable control over the scope of
       cross-examination, appellate courts review the court's decision to limit cross-examination
       for an abuse of discretion.' And to the extent this issue also involves the district court's

                                                     17
       decision to limit cross-examination based on evidentiary rulings, those rulings are also
       reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.]" 316 Kan. at 721.

       In O'Brien's case, the jury was instructed that each crime was a separate and
distinct offense to be decided separately and uninfluenced by its decision on any other
charge. In the charges against O'Brien for sexual battery of E.R. and A.D., they were each
the sole victim and sole prosecution witness supporting their respective cases. There was
no corroborating physical or forensic evidence nor any third-party eyewitness testimony
supporting either victim's allegations. To be sure, such additional evidence is not
required, when, as here, the jury finds a victim's testimony to be credible and believable.
But the credibility of the victims' testimony was critical and all-important because there
was no other evidence to corroborate that testimony. O'Brien had the proper and
important right to cross-examine E.R. and A.D. about their motivation in testifying. See
Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17. Exposing the accusers' motivation in testifying could discredit
the substance or weight of the testimony in the eyes of the jury. Given the particular facts
of the two sexual battery offenses involving E.R. and A.D.—in which there is only one
witness—the credibility of that witness is an absolutely critical component of the State's
case and the defendant's defense.

       As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). And
K.S.A. 60-420 broadly permits a party to present evidence to impair the credibility of a
witness. The State cites no rule of evidence or caselaw precluding the admission of
evidence that a witness intends to file a civil claim over the subject matter of his or her
testimony. The State simply continues to argue that evidence of a possible financial
motive by E.R. or A.D. is not relevant. But relevant evidence is "evidence having any
tendency in reason to prove any material fact." K.S.A. 60-401(b). A witness' or victim's
credibility is material if it has a legitimate and effective bearing on the jury's
determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25,
43, 290 P.3d 562 (2012). Because of the unique circumstances in this case—where

                                                   18
O'Brien's guilt is based solely on a single witness' testimonial reliability—the relevance
of evidence bearing on the credibility of the witness is unquestionably material. The
victims' testimony was the only evidence presented at trial in support of the sexual
battery charges, necessarily making credibility relevant.

       As the State acknowledges, our Supreme Court has recognized that "an ongoing
civil lawsuit" involving a defendant and affecting the financial interest of a State's
witness is relevant impeachment evidence that may be explored on cross-examination
during the criminal trial. Thomas, 307 Kan at 739-40. But here, the State argues, there is
no evidence of an existing civil action, and O'Brien does not contend there is any case
that has been filed (or settled) regarding the sexual batteries. Here, the question put to the
witnesses was whether they were contemplating such a lawsuit. We find no Kansas case
specifically addressing impeachment of a witness who is contemplating filing a civil
claim for damages against a defendant, and we suspect such information would rarely be
known to defense counsel. Nonetheless, whether a claim is contemplated or has been
filed, the witness' motivation for testifying remains a relevant inquiry.

       We find that State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St. 3d 160, 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983), presents
a reasoned analysis of the issue. In Ferguson, the prosecution objected to cross-
examination of the victim about her knowledge of a certain law firm. In response, defense
counsel "then proffered, in effect, that the victim was contemplating a civil action against
[defendant's] former employer as a result of the incident between the victim and
[defendant]." 5 Ohio St. 3d at 165. The Ferguson court held that an "accused is permitted
to cross-examine the prosecuting witness as to the witness' pending or contemplated civil
action against the accused, in order to demonstrate any possible bias or prejudice arising
out of the witness' financial interest in the outcome of the prosecution." 5 Ohio St. 3d at
167; see also State v. Arlington, 265 Mont. 127, 141-42, 875 P.2d 307 (1994) (adopting
the prevailing view from Ferguson finding a witness' contemplated civil suit is relevant to

                                              19
show motive and bias but district court error excluding such testimony was harmless
under the facts of the case).

       Here, defense counsel had information (the e-mail from an attorney) from which
counsel could infer the witnesses had contacted an attorney about filing a civil suit. Thus,
counsel had a good faith basis for questioning E.R. and A.D. about their intentions. That
defense counsel may not have known the answer to the question does not undercut its
relevance. The only people who, without speculating, could answer a question about the
possible financial motive were E.R., A.D., and the attorney. Yet, the district court would
not permit any of the witnesses with knowledge to answer the question, and in so doing,
deprived the jury of relevant information and deprived O'Brien of his constitutional right
to cross-examine his accusers.

       The scope and subject matter of cross-examination are limited to responsive
questions based on direct examination and questions relating to possible biases and
motivation for testifying. State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 182, 14 P.3d 409 (2000),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Milo, 315 Kan. 434, 510 P.3d 1 (2022). The cross-
examination by O'Brien's counsel was both responsive to the State's inquiry about
individuals to whom the victims had spoken to about the incident, and it was related to
the witnesses' motivation for testifying. Our United States Supreme Court has stated that
"'trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to
impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" Frantz, 316 Kan. at 720
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674
[1986]). But none of the limitations on cross-examination mentioned in Frantz apply
here. Nonetheless, even when the denial of a party's inquiry into a witness' possible bias
or motivation for testifying is error, as we find here, "the error may be harmless and does
not automatically require reversal." Jacques, 270 Kan. at 182.

                                             20
       The district court error is not harmless.

       We turn now to the question of harmless error. An error is harmless when the
benefitting party demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. See State v.
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 [1967]). This court considers several factors when
assessing whether a trial court's error in refusing to allow cross-examination about
possible bias or motivation was harmless, including:

       "(1) [T]he importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the
       testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
       contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of the cross-
       examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case."
       Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, Syl. ¶ 3.

       Applying those factors here, (1) E.R. and A.D. were the sole witnesses testifying
about the incidents, so their testimony was critically important; (2) their testimony was
not cumulative; (3) there was an absence of corroborating evidence and O'Brien's
testimony was contrary to that of the victims; (4) the trial court did not otherwise limit
cross-examination; (5) the strength of the State's case corresponds to the strength of the
witnesses' credibility—the outcome of the charges involving E.R. and A.D. rises and falls
on the credibility of the victims' testimony.

       In sum, in reviewing the entire record, we find that the factors do not support a
conclusion that the district court's restriction on cross-examination was harmless. "The
reliability of a witness is an essential jury consideration, one upon which guilt or
innocence may ultimately rest." State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, 991, 399 P.3d 168 (2017).

                                                   21
O'Brien is permitted to present, and the jury is entitled to consider, evidence relating to a
witness' credibility in reaching its verdict. In the sexual battery charges involving E.R.
and A.D., given the particular facts here, we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the district court's error in precluding cross-examination regarding E.R. and
A.D.'s motives will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial. Thus, we reverse on
those convictions and remand for a new trial.

We find no error in the district court limiting the examination of a witness about
O'Brien's relationship with J.Y.'s mother.

       O'Brien contends the district court erred when it did not allow defense counsel to
question a defense witness, Matt Freed, about the relationship between O'Brien and J.Y.'s
mother. He argues that this information would have explained why J.Y. made up these
allegations against him.

       During the trial, defense counsel asked Freed whether he knew J.Y.'s mother.
Defense counsel also asked Freed whether he knew what J.Y.'s mother's attitude was
toward O'Brien.

       At a bench conference outside the hearing of the jury, the State objected on
relevancy grounds. The defense counsel proffered to the court that there was some
tension between J.Y.'s mother and O'Brien. And that may have been motivation for her to
pressure J.Y. into making statements and accusations against O'Brien. The district court
sustained the objection, finding such a line of questioning irrelevant because there had
been no testimony that J.Y. had told her mother about what happened or that her mother
had told any law enforcement officials about what occurred. It was the court's
understanding that a mandated reporter had brought these allegations to the authorities'
attention.

                                             22
       When a criminal defendant claims that a district court interfered with his or her
constitutional right to present a defense, we review the issue de novo. But "[a]
defendant's right to present evidence in support of a defense is subject to certain
restraints: the evidence must be relevant, and evidentiary rules governing admission and
exclusion of evidence" will be applied. State v. Seacat, 303 Kan. 622, 638-39, 366 P.3d
208 (2016).

       We question the significance of this issue. The record shows that J.Y.'s mother did
not testify for the State, nor was she called by the defense. Nothing in the record suggests
that J.Y.'s mother made J.Y. report the allegations against O'Brien. At most, J.Y. testified
that her mother was very angry with O'Brien after J.Y. told her what happened. But this is
not an indication J.Y.'s mother made J.Y. report O'Brien to law enforcement. This seems
to be a natural reaction any parent would have if the parent's child said he or she had been
sexually assaulted by a family friend.

       J.Y. reported the allegations against O'Brien to her therapist. And when law
enforcement officers originally sought to interview J.Y. about what happened, J.Y.'s
mother told the officers that they were apprehensive about continuing the process. "They
said that it was very belated and that they no longer had any contact or connection with
[O'Brien], and [J.Y.] was really nervous about participating in the investigation."

       We find no error in the district court sustaining the State's relevancy objection to
this line of testimony from Freed.

Failing to give a limiting instruction about an email exhibit was not clear error.

       O'Brien's next argument concerns the district court's failure to give a limiting
instruction for an exhibit the State admitted during trial. State's exhibit 1 is a copy of the
email KU sent to students, faculty, and administrators in March 2020. When the State

                                              23
moved to admit this exhibit, the district court stated it would admit it solely to
demonstrate the email had been received, not for the truth of any statements made in the
email. O'Brien requested no limiting instruction, and none was given. Thus, we review
for clear error. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3414(3).

       We are dealing with hearsay. Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-460, hearsay is defined
as "[e]vidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at
the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." Additionally, K.S.A. 60-406
states: "When relevant evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is
inadmissible as to other parties or for another purpose, the judge upon request shall
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." (Emphasis
added.) No request was made here, but the court did limit the application of the exhibit
when it was admitted.

       Was this failure to give a limiting instruction clearly erroneous? In other words,
would the jury's verdict be different had a limiting instruction been given?

       The email was vaguely written and did not contain O'Brien's name. It simply
explained that a local massage therapist, who had been an independent contractor with
KU, had recently been arrested for aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and KU had
begun investigating the massage therapist's interactions with student-athletes. All those
statements were known to the jury based on the testimony of the witnesses from the case.
We fail to see how a limiting instruction would have changed the verdict.

       This is not clear error.

Did the district court err in admitting unredacted copies of text messages?

       O'Brien's next argument concerns photographs of text messages the district court

                                              24
admitted during trial. He contends the messages contained inadmissible hearsay
statements, which the jury was allowed to consider because the photographs were not
redacted. O'Brien focuses on the admission of State's exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8. Those
exhibits contained photographs of text messages between B.A. and two other student-
athletes who were not part of the case.

       When the State sought to admit these exhibits, O'Brien objected. In referring to
exhibits 5 and 6, the district court overruled O'Brien's objection because it deemed the
statements from the out-of-court individuals inconsequential. The court also noted that it
would make clear to the jury it should only consider the statements made by B.A.
Similarly, the district court overruled O'Brien's objection to exhibits 7 and 8 because the
statements were inconsequential and contained limited factual statements. And again, the
district court said it would instruct the jury only to consider the statements made by B.A.

       A similar situation arose in State v. Williams, No. 114,310, 2017 WL 2833449
(Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). In Williams, the district court admitted email
conversations between Williams and an unknown third party—named Ray—over
Williams' hearsay objection. The district court "ruled that the email conversations did not
constitute hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of statements made by
the party with whom Williams was communicating; rather, the statements merely placed
Williams' own statements in the emails in proper context." 2017 WL 2833449, at *4.

       On appeal, Williams argued the district court erred in admitting the email
conversations. Another panel of this court disagreed, finding that the emails did not
constitute hearsay. 2017 WL 2833449, at *4-5. In so finding, the panel stated: "'"If an
utterance previously made out of court is offered in evidence merely for establishing what
was then said [in response], and not for establishing the truth of the statement, the
testimony is not hearsay."' 250 Kan. at 567." 2017 WL 2833449, at *5.

                                             25
       The panel clarified that "[t]he truth that the State contended was to be found in the
exchange was not Ray's remarks but Williams' statements in response; and Williams'
statements in response evidenced a transaction in which Williams provided passwords
that gave Ray access to photos of Williams' stepdaughter." 2017 WL 2833449, at *5.

       Like Williams, the State's use of the text message conversations here were not
admitted for the truth of the non-witnesses' statements. Instead, the exhibits were
admitted so the jury could consider the statements made by B.A. Without allowing the
jury to see the messages from the non-witnesses, B.A.'s responses would have made little
sense. Because the photographs of the conversations were unredacted, the jury could
place B.A.'s statements in the proper context so it could consider what she said.

       Because the court limited the admission of these photos to B.A.'s statements, we
find no error in admitting the unredacted photographs.

We find no prosecutorial error in the closing remarks of the prosecutor.

       O'Brien contends two statements made by the State's attorney during closing
arguments were prosecutorial error and they deprived him of a fair trial. In the first
statement, the prosecutor said, "I have never been sexually assaulted by Mr. Shawn
O'Brien. I am surprised I wasn't called to testify in this case." In the second statement, the
prosecutor remarked that "[t]he Crimson and Blue certainly was not watching out for
these girls." O'Brien did not object to the State's closing argument during trial, but we
will review a prosecutorial error claim even if there is no trial objection. See State v.
Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 864, 416 P.3d 116 (2018).

       Trial advocacy is a skilled profession.

                                              26
               "A prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments and drawing 'reasonable
       inferences from the evidence but may not comment on facts outside the evidence.' Any
       argument 'must accurately reflect the evidence, accurately state the law, and cannot be
       "intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or to divert the jury from its
       duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the controlling law."' [Citations
       omitted.]" State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 524, 343 P.3d 1128 (2015).

We will always consider the context of any challenged statements. See State v. Anderson,
308 Kan. 1251, 1261, 427 P.3d 847 (2018).

       To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, we must decide whether
these comments "fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's
case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial." State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060
(2016). If we find error, we will then "determine whether that error prejudiced the
defendant's due process rights to a fair trial." 305 Kan. at 109. In evaluating prejudice, we
will hold the "prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the
trial in light of the entire record.'" 305 Kan. at 109. In other words, when "'there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict,'" the error is harmless. 305
Kan. at 109.

       The first statement

       With context, the prosecutor said in the first statement:

       "I will respond to a couple things that [defense counsel] just spoke about. With respect to
       things that make sense and things that don't. How do you feel about Shawn O'Brien's
       adult male friend[s] coming in and testifying that they were never sexually assaulted by

                                                    27
       him? I have never been sexually assaulted by Mr. Shawn O'Brien. I am surprised I wasn't
       called to testify in this case."

       The prosecutor made this statement following defense counsel's closing
arguments. In that argument, defense counsel spoke about many things, including the
success of O'Brien's massage therapy business. Defense counsel argued that O'Brien
could not have created a successful massage business if people were routinely accusing
him of doing inappropriate things. Defense counsel's closing statement also coincides
with O'Brien's apparent strategy during trial when he called several clients to testify that
they had never been assaulted by O'Brien.

       The prosecutor's sarcastic remark in response to O'Brien's trial strategy, as well as
defense counsel's arguments during closing statements, is unskilled advocacy,
inappropriate for a serious prosecution, and unhelpful to the jury. Our Supreme Court has
cautioned that prosecutors should avoid repeated use of sarcasm "[b]ecause the line
between appropriate and inappropriate use of sarcasm is thin, making it easy to cross."
Longoria, 301 Kan. at 526.

       Even so, our Supreme Court has also stated that sarcasm is not inappropriate per
se. In other words, sarcastic remarks will not automatically be ruled as prosecutorial
error. Instead, sarcasm "should be thoughtfully tailored to specific arguments and
evidence." 301 Kan. at 526. The court has also stated that "[p]rosecutors may point out
inconsistencies in a defendant's statements and argue the evidence reflecting poorly on
the defendant's credibility. But in doing so, they may not accuse a defendant of lying."
State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 776, 490 P.3d 1206 (2021).

       Here, the prosecutor did not accuse O'Brien of lying. Instead, the prosecutor's
remark was a roundabout way of arguing the evidence reflected poorly on O'Brien's
defense. From our reading of the record, it seems the prosecutor's remark was intended to

                                                 28
convey to the jury that having several male clients testify they had never been assaulted
by O'Brien missed the thrust of the prosecution. The State never alleged he had assaulted
a male client. All of his victims were female. The comment was poor advocacy, but it did
not constitute prosecutorial error.

       The second statement

       The prosecutor also remarked that the "Crimson and Blue certainly was not
watching out for these girls." This statement refers to how the KU Athletics Department
dealt with reports from the student-athletes regarding O'Brien.

       O'Brien now argues that this constitutes prosecutorial error because the case was
not about how the KU athletic department responded or didn't respond to complaints
from some of its student-athletes. It was about whether the State proved its charges
against O'Brien beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Context controls our view of this statement. To us, the prosecutor's statement
amounts to a commentary on the evidence presented during trial. A.D. and B.A. both
testified they reported O'Brien's conduct to their team trainer. A.D. also said that after
making her report, the trainer dismissed her claims and told her not to worry about what
happened. Because of the trainer's inaction, A.D. endured another massage from O'Brien.
B.A. also said that before O'Brien inappropriately touched her, she had previously
reported his conduct to the trainer on behalf of another teammate. And E.R. testified that
she did not report O'Brien's conduct to the trainer because she knew other teammates had
complained and nothing changed.

       O'Brien's argument ignores how the inaction of the KU staff played into the rest
of the case. Defense counsel asked the student-athletes on cross-examination why they
had not reported O'Brien's conduct sooner. They all responded by saying they told their

                                              29
trainer about what happened and were largely ignored. But as A.D. explained, KU
eventually investigated these claims following the March 2020 email.

       In view of these facts, the statement amounted to a commentary on the facts
adduced at trial and is not prosecutorial error.

Cumulative error did not deprive O'Brien of a fair trial.

       For his final argument, O'Brien contends cumulative error deprived him of a fair
trial. We have found but one error, and it affects only the two counts involving E.R. and
A.D. As to the remaining three charges, we find no error and determine the cumulative
error doctrine simply does not apply to those counts. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262,
277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021).

None of the arguments raised in O'Brien's pro se brief compel relief.

       Many issues raised in O'Brien's pro se brief mirror the issues raised in his
appellate counsel's brief. They include the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial error
of statements made during closing arguments, improper comments on credibility, and the
district court's failure to instruct on certain defenses. We have already dealt with those
issues, and we need not repeat our holdings.

       O'Brien also raises other issues. One concerns the district court's failure to give an
instruction on immunity. This claim can be rejected immediately because O'Brien does
not qualify for immunity under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5231. None of O'Brien's actions
involved use of force in self-defense, to defend his home, to defend his place of business,
to defend an occupied vehicle against unlawful entry or attack, or to defend his property.

                                              30
       O'Brien argues his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to call the trainer many of the student-athletes spoke with. We decline to reach the
issue because claims of ineffective assistance are not generally considered for the first
time on direct appeal. State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 388, 253 P.3d 341 (2011).

       Next, O'Brien claims the massage techniques he used are standardized and
effective and the victims in the case misinterpreted his innocent actions. We see no
grounds for relief here. The jury heard testimony from many individuals, including
O'Brien. During O'Brien's testimony, he explained the technique he used when massaging
clients. The jury rejected his version of the facts, as well as his explanations for what
occurred, and convicted him as charged.

       O'Brien also claims he had issues with discovery. He fails to substantiate his claim
with relevant support, and includes no citations to the record. We find the issue waived or
abandoned. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. at 277 (issues not adequately briefed are
considered waived or abandoned).

       Finally, O'Brien claims he received an unconstitutional sentence. Again, with no
relevant support, his claim fails. We hold he has waived or abandoned the issue. See
Gallegos, 313 Kan. at 277.

       This trial came down to which version of the events the jury believed. The State
maintained that O'Brien, using the ruse of giving a massage, used each opportunity for
illicit touching. O'Brien maintained that he only performed professional, proper
massages. With the exception of our reversal involving the sexual battery claims by E.R.
and A.D., O'Brien's claims of error fail and we affirm his convictions and sentences for
three counts of aggravated indecent liberties and three counts of sexual battery.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

                                             31
                                                   ***

       HILL, J., dissenting: I agree with all the holdings of the majority in this case
except for their opinion that we should reverse and remand the convictions for two counts
of sexual battery.

       I would affirm those convictions. My friends see something substantial where
there is actually nothing but speculation and even that was not prejudicial to the accused.

       During the cross-examination of E.R. and A.D., defense counsel asked the two
student-athletes about a possible lawsuit. Before they could answer, the prosecutor
objected on the grounds of relevance. Each time the court sustained the objections. On
the second objection, defense counsel commented, "The fact of the matter is [the
prosecutor] also asked who all she contacted; and second, I believe the fact that there
are—they are pursuing civil claims and may receive damages is relevant to their
motivation for bringing this all up." In sustaining the objection, the judge agreed with the
prosecutor, stating she did "not believe it's relevant."

       After the State rested, the parties met before the defense's case-in-chief. During the
conference, some mention was made of an out-of-state witness who was to testify for the
defense. Defense counsel stated that,

       "During the course of this representation, I got an e-mail from an attorney asking if Mr.
       O'Brien had liability insurance, which has promoted the questions that I have indicated,
       and I have subpoenaed her, and she is supposed to be here Thursday and she is coming
       from Kansas City, Missouri. I guess I—I am proffering that the only function of her
       testimony was to testify that I got an e-mail asking if there was liability insurance. If you
       are going to rule that that is irrelevant, I would prefer to let her know in advance not to
       make the trip."

                                                    32
       The trial court responded that "[i]t's irrelevant. I think it's . . . the same relevance
as a car wreck case where we don't let juries know who has insurance and how much and
what the parameters are. Insurance is not related to this case." Attempting to persuade the
judge, defense counsel argued, "Again, it's not whether he has insurance, but whether or
not they were contemplating filing a lawsuit." But ultimately, the judge responded,

               "That is true, but people can still contemplate filing lawsuits. I just am not aware
       of any situation where in a criminal trial that has been brought forward as evidence for
       the jury to consider that a lawsuit may or may not be filed. I can tell you in the last case
       that I tried last week that in the jury room, the jury said to me, Are they going to file a
       civil lawsuit? So that will—I am sure that will be something that is already in their mind
       without us dirtying up the record with inadmissible evidence."

       We note that this proffer presented the court with nothing substantive—just "an
attorney from Kansas City." There is no evidence that a lawsuit had been filed or even
would be filed. There is only defense counsel's supposition that the victims were maybe
contemplating a lawsuit. With this scant information, any fact-finder, judge, or jury was
invited to speculate about this subject. It does not amount to evidence of motivation.

       Kansas cases ruling on this subject fall into two general categories. The first are
cases when there is a pending lawsuit at the time of the criminal trial. See State v.
Rowland, 172 Kan. 224, 229, 239 P.2d 949 (1952); State v. Thummel, No. 119,331, 2020
WL 741689, *5-8 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion). The second category contains
cases that have been settled before the criminal trial. See Thomas, 307 Kan. at 740. This
case belongs into neither category because there is no evidence in the record to support
the existence of any lawsuit or settlement nor any intent to file a civil suit. This brings us
to our fundamental concern on this issue.

                                                     33
Was O'Brien denied the right to present important information to the jury?

       During their trials, all accused of crimes have the right to confront the witnesses
against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. One important
topic in confrontation is the right to expose a witness' motivation in testifying. See
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).
O'Brien had this trial right. But there are recognized limits to cross-examination that
come into play that we must explore.

       Prior cases teach us that several important legal concerns must be balanced when
resolving these questions. The permissible bounds of cross-examination are limited by
the rules of evidence and judicial discretion. See State v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 854, 888
P.2d 845 (1995); State v. Washington, 275 Kan. 644, 674, 68 P.3d 134 (2003). The
limitations on cross-examination are based on a court's reasonable interpretation and
application of the Kansas rules of evidence. Those rules ensure the fairness, reliability,
and efficiency of trials. State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. 708, 720-21, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022); see
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; State v. Humphrey, 217 Kan. 352, 363-64, 537 P.2d 155
(1975). In the absence of clear abuse and prejudicial error, the trial court's decision will
stand. State v. Vargas, 260 Kan. 791, 798, 926 P.2d 223 (1996). That should occur here.

       The scope and subject matter of cross-examination are limited to responsive
questions based on direct examination and questions relating to possible biases and
motivation for testifying. State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 181-82, 14 P.3d 409 (2000),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Milo, 315 Kan. 434, 510 P.3d 1 (2022). At times
the denial of a party's inquiry into a witness' possible bias or motivation for testifying is
error, but "the error may be harmless and does not automatically require reversal."
Jacques, 270 Kan. at 182.

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       This subject of limiting cross-examination, as many subjects in the law are, is
measured for reasonableness. Our United States Supreme Court has stated that trial
judges "'retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" Frantz, 316 Kan. at 720 (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674
[1986]). A criminal defendant is guaranteed an opportunity for effective cross-
examination. This is not a guarantee that the cross-examination is effective in whatever
way and to whatever extent the defense might wish. See Frantz, 316 Kan. at 720. O'Brien
exercised his right to cross-examine.

       To prove a constitutional violation based on the denial of the right to confront
adverse witnesses, a criminal defendant must show that the trial court prohibited them
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. Such a confrontation exposes the jury
to the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness. See Frantz, 316 Kan. at 720-21. Here is where O'Brien's
argument to reverse fails. O'Brien has shown no prejudice to his defense because the trial
court sustained the objection to this question.

       The question we must answer, then, is whether a defendant presented sufficient
information for the jury to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness' motives and
bias. United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. at 680 (limits on cross-examination violate Confrontation Clause where they
prevent defendant from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to
show a prototypical form of bias of the witness). In other words, the court must determine

                                             35
"whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of
the witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination."
United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
at 680).

       In this prosecution, we must ask if O'Brien's questions could lead to evidence that
would give the jury a significantly different impression of the two student-athletes'
credibility? I conclude there is none. This line of inquiry is simply an invitation to
speculate. Who was the target of this possible lawsuit: O'Brien, the University, or the
coaches to whom complained?

       Here, the exclusion of the testimony on cross-examination was reasonable. The
overwhelming evidence relating to the methods O'Brien used to exploit his victims while
placed at the mercy of his massages would not be undercut by a possible motivation to
testify based on two victims' contemplation of a civil lawsuit. The jury would likely not
find credibility issues with the victim witnesses based on this motivation. Further, the
outcome would likely be the same had the testimony been included. There is therefore no
reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict or that the error prevented the
defendant from effectively presenting his defense.

Is this error harmless?

       An error is harmless when the benefiting party shows beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of
the entire record. This means the party proved there is no reasonable possibility that the
error affected the verdict. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386
U.S. 987 [1967]).

                                              36
       In my review of this record, I find no important information that could affect the
credibility of these two student-athletes was kept from this jury.

       The court charged with managing this trial did not err when it sustained the
objection. I find no error here. But, even if there was error, it was harmless because there
is no reason to believe this ruling affected the verdict. O'Brien's convictions should stand.

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