Court Opinion

ID: 9481870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:34:18.599904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:37.944120
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
David Adams appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus. Adams claims that his Oregon convictions for burglary, rape, and sodomy violated his right to due process of law because a state court judge entered judgment on stipulated facts and failed to advise him on the record of the legal consequences of the stipulation. We now affirm.
I
In November 1981, Adams, who was seventeen-years-old at the time, was indicted in the Lane County Circuit Court on charges of first-degree rape, sodomy, and burglary of a female schoolteacher. Adams agreed to stipulate to certain facts at trial rather than to proceed through the more usual presentations of evidence by both the prosecution and the defense. Adams so agreed on the advice of his attorney, who indicated that Adams’s prior juvenile record, along with the nature and circumstances of his crime, might lead to a harsher sentence if he was convicted following an extended trial. In addition, in return for Adams’s agreeing to a stipulated-facts trial, the state agreed to dismiss two other indictments then pending against him.
Adams repeatedly told his attorney that he wanted to testify. On three separate occasions, however, his attorney explained to Adams that, if he agreed to a stipulated-facts trial, he could testify only at sentencing.
The written stipulation, which tracked the language of the indictment, provided that “the evidence of the State would establish the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt:” on September 7, 1981, (1) Adams, without consent, legal authority, or other justification, entered and remained in the residence of one Marylee Donley with the intent to commit the crimes of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse (Count I); (2) *1371Adams unlawfully and knowingly caused his penis to penetrate Donley’s vagina, and at the time of this sexual intercourse, Don-ley was subjected by Adams to forcible compulsion (Count II); and (3) Adams unlawfully and knowingly caused his penis to contact Donley’s anus, and at the time of this deviate sexual intercourse, she was subjected by Adams to forcible compulsion (Count III). Stipulation at 1, State v. Adams, No. 10-81-10777 (Or.Cir.Ct., Lane County) (Jan. 18, 1982) [hereinafter “Stipulation”]. The stipulation concluded that “[b]ased on this stipulation, it is the expectation of the parties that the defendant will be found guilty of Count I, Count II, and Count III.” Id. at 2.
During the stipulated-facts trial, the following colloquy took place between the state trial judge and Adams:
THE COURT: You’ve discussed your manner of trial with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: You are freely and voluntarily waiving your right to trial by jury?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Election to waive jury will be entered.. You’re consenting to have this matter tried by stipulated facts?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
MR. HANSEN [DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, we’ve both reviewed the stipulation and executed it.
THE COURT: Stipulated facts will be filed with the clerk, and I’ll read those over. You may be seated.
All right, I would find the Defendant guilty of Count I, Burglary in the First Degree; Count II, Rape in the First Degree, and Count III, Sodomy in the First Degree.
Transcript of Proceedings, State v. Adams, No. 10-81-10777 (Jan. 18, 1982) [hereinafter “Trial Transcript”].
Between conviction and sentencing, Adams gave his attorney a written statement of his version of the assault in which he denied committing the crimes of rape and sodomy. However, Adams told his attorney that he did not want his attorney to withdraw the previously stipulated facts. At the sentencing hearing, the court questioned Adams on the circumstances of the rape. After listening to Adams’s testimony, the court imposed the statutory maximum of twenty years of imprisonment for the rape, a consecutive maximum of twenty years for the sodomy, but no additional sentence for the burglary. There was no direct appeal.
Adams subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief in Oregon state court, contending that his stipulated-facts trial was constitutionally invalid. He argued that he had not voluntarily and intelligently agreed to such a trial. At a hearing on this petition, the following colloquy took place between Adams and his new attorney:
Q Okay did you — did—when did you have discussions with your attorney regarding the stipulated facts trial? When in relationship to when you actually did it?
A Weeks prior to it.
Q Okay what did he tell you that a stipulated facts trial was?
A That I would be waiving my right to a jury and it would be my testimony against the victims. That I would get up and go to a regular trial without the jury.
Q Did you assume that the judge would make the decision?
A Yes. That I would just go in front of the judge.
Q Did you assume that you would have the right to give testimony on your behalf?
A Yes. Yes I did.
Q —so during that stipulated facts trial it kind of came to your attention that this isn’t a regular trial?
A Yes.
Q Did you say anything to your attorney about it?
A Well my attorney — I kind of looked at him and he gave me a nod and I guess he knew what he was doing.
Q Okay did you talk with him specifically about it while you were doing it?
*1372A No.
Q Did you simply believe that he had things under control?
A Yes.
Q Okay were there any of these charges that you didn’t believe you were guilty of?
A Yes.
Q What, if any, of those?
A The rape and sodomy.
Transcript of Proceedings at 6, 8, 11-12, Adams v. Sullivan, No. 140,109 (Or.Cir.Ct., Marion County) (Nov. 4, 1983) [hereinafter "Post-Conviction Transcript”]. Adams was thereafter cross-examined by respondent’s attorney:
Q Had you completed the eleventh grade prior to this criminal proceeding?
A Yes I did.
Q And you got your GED out at OSCI?
A Yes.
Q Can you read?
A Yes I can.
Q All right, let’s go a piece at a time then. You were placed in a county jail and an attorney was appointed to represent you, correct?
A Yes.
Q At some time later there was a discussion about entering into a stipulated facts trial, correct?
A Yes.
Q And after that you received a document from your attorney which you have in your hand relating to the stipulated facts that were going to be introduced before the judge, didn’t you?
A Yes.
Q And you received that in the county jail, right?
A Yes.
Q And he left it with you so you could read it at your leisure, didn’t he?
A Uhm, man — well I’m not sure. I can’t say exactly if he did or not. He left me a lot of material so I’m not sure whether to answer yes or no because there was a lot of things that he did leave me.
Q All right returning again now to the stipulated facts document on the second page above your signature read that last paragraph out loud to the court, would you please.
A Based on this stipulation it is the expectation of the parties that the defendant will be found guilty of count one and two and count three.
Q What does that mean to you?
A That — that I will be found guilty based on this.
Q And you understood that at that time too, didn’t you?
A Yes.
Id. at 15, 17, 18.
After the state post-conviction hearing, a state court made the following factual findings: (1) at the stipulated-facts trial Adams understood the written stipulation and that judgment would be based solely upon it; (2) at the stipulated-facts trial Adams understood that he was waiving all of his statutory and constitutional trial rights; and (3) Adams voluntarily agreed to a trial based on the stipulated facts and voluntarily executed the stipulation. The court therefore denied Adams’s petition for post-conviction relief. This ruling was affirmed without opinion by the Oregon Court of Appeals; the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
Adams then filed the current habeas corpus petition, which the district court dismissed. We have jurisdiction over Adams’s timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
A
Adams argues that his stipulation of facts at trial constituted a de facto guilty plea and that he was therefore entitled to the procedural protections attendant to the entering of such a plea. Specifically, he claims that he was entitled to be advised by the judge in open court of his constitutional rights (a) against compulsory self-in*1373crimination, (b) to be tried by a jury, and (c) to confront his accusers, and that the court had a constitutional obligation to establish on the record that he voluntarily and intelligently waived these rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Quiroz v. Wawrzaszek, 749 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 2119, 85 L.Ed.2d 483 (1985).1 While we agree that a stipulated-facts proceeding is subject to certain constitutional restrictions, see infra Part III, we are not persuaded that the stipulation at issue was a de facto guilty plea.
Adams and the state agreed “that the evidence of the State would establish the [facts in question] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stipulation at 1. Following the recitation of facts, the stipulation stated, “Based on this stipulation, it is the expectation of the parties that the defendant will be found guilty of Count I, Count II, and Count III.” Id. at 1371.
Adams never stipulated that he was guilty of the crimes of burglary, rape, and sodomy; in fact, Adams pled not guilty to all three counts on which he was convicted by the trial court. Adams only stipulated that the enumerated facts were supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence that the state possessed and would present at trial. A stipulation to facts from which a judge or jury may infer guilt is simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt, or a guilty plea. “A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711-12. If the Boykin Court itself recognized this distinction, then we are hardly in a position to ignore it — or to hold, as our dissenting colleague would, that the full Boykin protections extend to the circumstance of a stipulation. See post at 1381-1383.2
We have previously ruled in analogous circumstances that a defendant in Adams’s position is not entitled to the full protections that attend the entry of a guilty plea. In United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.1975), we considered whether Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which imposes certain procedural requirements upon a federal court’s acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, also applies to its acceptance of a stipulation of facts for a criminal trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. We determined that Rule 11 does not apply to stipulations and emphasized that to read Rule 11 otherwise
would unduly encumber trials now often shortened by stipulation of evidence and [stipulations] to identify exhibits, to specify the chain of custody, and other important matters. To require a Rule 11 examination on every stipulation containing a vital admission of the defendant would add ritualistic formalities where none are needed nor required.... If Rule 11 were to be applied only to stipulations constituting de facto pleas of guilty, when and how is that determination to be made? Every stipulation of a vital fact is an admission tending to establish guilt. Rule 11 specifically applies to pleas of guilty and nolo contendere and not to trials. These are areas with a clear division between them. They are either black or white. To create a gray area where stipulations, as a part of a trial, would be governed by the rules on the acceptance of pleas would further *1374complicate the trial judge’s duties and push him further into the role of an advocate.
Terrack, 515 F.2d at 561 n. 3 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Schuster, 734 F.2d 424, 425 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (holding that a plea of not guilty combined with a stipulation of facts that strongly suggests guilt does not constitute a de facto guilty plea and therefore does not implicate the procedural protections of such a plea), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189, 105 S.Ct. 959, 83 L.Ed.2d 965 (1985); United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (9th Cir.1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 1426, 59 L.Ed.2d 636 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 545 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir.1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110, 97 S.Ct. 1148, 51 L.Ed.2d 565 (1977); United States v. Garcia, 450 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam) (same); accord Lyons v. Pearce, 298 Or. 569, 694 P.2d 978 (1985) (same, as a matter of Oregon law).
We recognize that Terrack differs from the case before us in two significant respects. First, Adams was convicted in state court, not in federal court; Rule 11, therefore, does not apply here. See Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 226, 46 L.Ed.2d 147 (1975). Second, Adams has challenged the procedural aspects of his convictions on constitutional grounds, not on statutory or rule-based grounds.
Nonetheless, we conclude that the rationale of Terrack is equally applicable in the current context and, indeed, is persuasive. The fact that Adams was convicted in a state proceeding rather than a federal proceeding is of no moment; he has brought a federal constitutional challenge, and the level of procedural protection mandated by the federal Constitution for the entry of a stipulation or plea to be valid is certainly no greater in a state forum than it is in a federal forum. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 653, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2261-62, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting on other grounds).3
Similarly, we can conceive of no reason why the Constitution might require the trial court to construe Adams’s stipulation as a de facto guilty plea if Rule 11, in an analogous circumstance, would not. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee’s note on 1974 amendments (explaining that Rule 11(c), as amended, codifies the requirements of Boykin); United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.1984) (same). After all, Rule 11 grants federal defendants broader protections than the Constitution. See Haase, 800 F.2d at 127 (constitutional rights that attend entry of a guilty plea have “more limited scope” than rights conferred by Rule 11); see also United States v. Sherman, 474 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir.1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“When compliance with Rule 11 is not in issue because *1375the plea is taken in state court ... the validity of the plea rests on compliance with the less rigorous demands of due process.”)- Indeed, if the Constitution mandated broader protections than Rule 11, the Terrack decision would make little sense even in the federal realm: what Rule 11 requires would be largely irrelevant — and hardly worthy of analysis — if the dictates of due process required more.
Finally, Adams himself has suggested that we should consider Rule 11 jurisprudence to be a relevant framework for our analysis, noting that the constitutional rights of which he claims to have been unlawfully deprived “are codified in the procedures guaranteed by Rule 11” and appear in substantially identical form in the procedural rules of the Oregon Revised Statutes.
In short, we hold that Adams was not entitled to the full constitutional protections that apply to the tendering of a guilty plea.
B
In determining that the parties’ stipulation did not constitute a guilty plea, we consider the purposes of the defendant and his counsel in choosing this method of presenting evidence to the trier of fact. The affidavit of Adams’s trial counsel, submitted during the Oregon post-conviction proceeding and refiled as an exhibit to the state’s motion for summary judgment below, explained the defense’s thinking as follows:
The evidence against Mr. Adamas [sic] was fairly overwhelming. It included bite marks on the victim’s body that were matched by plaster molds and experts from California to Mr. Adams’[s] own teeth. These bites were in places that were incosistent [sic] with Mr. Adams’[s] description of how things occurred.
Mr. Adams did express to me repeatedly that his preference and desire would be to take the stand and make his own statement to the judge. It was the State’s position that if there was going to be any testimony by the defendant, they would want to have a complete full trial. If there was going to be a trial, then there was no need for them to dismiss the other charges that were currently pending against Mr. Adams, charges that they would insist on pursuing and requesting the maximum [penalty for]. His prior juvenile record made it seem imminently [sic] reasonable that consecutive sentences might well be in order. * * * * *
I had the stipulation put in writing specifically to avoid a lengthy and inflammatory recitation of the facts by the District Attorney. Mr. Adams signed the stipulation in open court.
Affidavit of R. Chris Hansen at 2, 3-4, Adams, No. 140, 109 (Sept. 1,1983) [hereinafter “Affidavit”].
In the defense’s own understanding, therefore, Adams clearly did not plead guilty; he professed his innocence and pursued a trial strategy designed to avert what his attorney perceived to be potentially more damaging and perhaps prejudicial: a full-scale recitation of the evidence before the judge or jury. Perhaps wisely, the defense viewed the stipulation as (a) the most effective and least inflammatory method for presenting the facts to the trial court and (b) the most effective means of foreclosing any effort by the state to prosecute Adams to the full extent of the law. Indeed, Adams himself has admitted that a prime motivation for his agreeing to the stipulation was to have two indictments pending against him dropped. Under such circumstances — where the defense itself does not intend its actions to be construed as an admission of guilt and where it has strategic reasons to support its decision to stipulate — it would be curious indeed for the trial court to hold that the parties’ stipulation does constitute a plea of guilty.
C
The dissent suggests that Quiroz v. Wawrzaszek, 749 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 2119, 85 L.Ed.2d 483 (1985), controls this case. We do not agree. In Quiroz, we were *1376confronted with a petition for habeas corpus filed by an Arizona state prisoner who had, pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, “submitted [his] case to the state trial court for decision on the police reports.” Id. at 1377. We determined that “the due process protections for the waiver of constitutional rights apply equally to the submission procedure used [t]here as they would to the entry of a plea of guilty.” Id.
In Quiroz, however, the state’s attorney conceded at oral argument “that the submission process [wa]s tantamount to a plea of guilty and require[d] the federal constitutional protections attendant to a plea of guilty.” Id. That concession forced us to address Quiroz as a guilty-plea case; the lack of a similar concession here allows us to analyze Adams’s stipulation for what it truly is: a method for introducing evidence and no more.
III
Having determined that the stipulation was not a de facto guilty plea and that Adams was therefore not entitled to the full measure of protection that attends such a plea, we must now determine what due process protections are required for the present stipulation and convictions to be valid. The answer here is clear and mandated by our prior decisions: Adams’s convictions are valid only if he voluntarily and intelligently agreed to the stipulation. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir.1986); Schuster, 734 F.2d at 426; Miller, 588 F.2d at 1264; Garcia, 450 F.2d at 288. Reviewing de novo the district court’s denial of Adams’s petition for habeas relief, see Weygandt v. Ducharme, 774 F.2d 1491, 1492 (9th Cir.1985), we address first the voluntariness and then the intelligence of Adams’s plea.
A
Adams claims that his agreement to a stipulated-facts trial was involuntary. The state court that heard Adams’s post-conviction petition found otherwise:
3. Petitioner voluntarily agreed to a trial based on stipulated facts and voluntarily executed the stipulation setting forth the facts on which he was tried.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment at 2, Adams v. Sullivan, No. 140,109 (Jan. 1, 1984) [hereinafter “Findings”]. We presume the factual elements in the state court’s findings to be correct if amply supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-52, 101 S.Ct. 764, 767-72, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981).
Here the record does support the state court’s finding, and we therefore reject Adams’s argument that his agreement to a stipulated-facts trial was involuntary. Adams was faced with an admittedly difficult choice. He could proceed to an extended trial on the merits, replete with witnesses and potentially damning evidence, or he could agree to a stipulated-facts trial and receive a dismissal of two other indictments pending against him. As his attorney indicated, he chose to proceed to trial by stipulated facts because, after consultation with his attorney, he determined that the benefits outweighed the costs. Indeed, the defense decided to have the facts “put in writing specifically to avoid a lengthy and inflammatory recitation of the facts.” Affidavit at 3-4. Furthermore, Adams indicated to the trial judge that his attorney had discussed the manner of trial with him:
THE COURT: You’ve discussed your manner of trial with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: You are freely and voluntarily waiving your right to trial by jury?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Election to waive jury will be entered. You’re consenting to have this matter tried by stipulated facts?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
Trial Transcript at 2. The record indicates that, rather than being coerced, Adams weighed the costs and benefits of the stipulated-facts trial procedure and made a rational decision to pursue that route.
In short, we reject Adams’s argument that his actions at trial were involuntary and accept the Oregon state court’s deter*1377mination that he “voluntarily agreed to a trial based on stipulated facts and voluntarily executed the stipulation setting forth the facts on which he was tried.”
B
Adams next argues that he did not act intelligently in agreeing to a stipulated-facts trial. This question, too, an Oregon state court addressed and answered following a hearing on Adams’s state petition for post-conviction relief:
1. At the time of petitioner’s trial on stipulated facts, petitioner understood the facts set forth in the written stipulation presented to the court; petitioner understood that the court would determine petitioner’s guilt or innocence solely on the basis of such stipulated facts; and petitioner understood that it was expected that the court would find petitioner guilty on the basis of such stipulated facts.
2. At the time of petitioner’s trial on stipulated facts, petitioner understood that by proceeding in such manner he would be giving up all of his statutory and constitutional trial rights, including, but not limited to, the right to testify and to confront and cross-examine witnesses produced against him.
Findings at 2. Here again, the record amply supports the state court’s conclusion that Adams’s action was a “knowing, intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Indeed, Adams testified at his post-conviction hearing that he was aware at trial of the consequences of the stipulation:
Q All right returning again now to the stipulated facts document on the second page above your signature read that last paragraph out loud to the court, would you please.
A Based on this stipulation it is the expectation of the parties that the defendant will be found guilty of count one and two and count three.
Q What does that mean to you?
A That — that I will be found guilty based on this.
Q And you understood that at that time too, didn’t you?

A Yes.

Post-Conviction Transcript at 18 (emphasis added). Adams’s trial attorney also submitted evidence to the state court which rejected Adams’s post-conviction argument that his plea had not been voluntary or intelligent. His affidavit reads in part as follows:
After reviewing the files, I do recall fairly clearly the circumstances surrounding the stipulated facts trial. The evidence against Mr. Adamas [sic] was fairly overwhelming. It included bite marks on the victim’s body that were matched by plaster molds and experts from California to Mr. Adams’[s] own teeth. These bites were in places that were incosistent [sic] with Mr. Adams’[s] description of how things occurred. Mr. Adams did present me with a written statement as to his version of the assault on Ms. Donley_ This statement was presented, incidentally, after the stipulated facts trial took place and prior to sentencing. I asked Mr. Adams at that time whether he wanted to attempt to withdraw the stipulated facts trial when I received this written statement, and he said he did not want to do that.
Prior to the trial date, I had discussed with Mr. Adams, on at least two separate occasions, the effect and impact of the stipulated facts trial. I did so because Mr. Adams, while fairly intelligent, was unsophisticated in the more arcane aspects of the criminal law, including the meanings of a stipulated facts trial. Mr. Adams did express to me repeatedly that his preference and desire would be to take the stand and make his own statement to the judge.... I explained to him on at least two separate occasions and then again on the morning that we actually went before Judge Beckett with the stipulation, that any statement he would make to the Court would have to be at sentencing and would not be at the stipulated facts trial. I tried to do this *1378in as non-technical a fashion as possible, and I clearly recall that Mr. Adams understood what I was telling him and that, albeit reluctantly, he would agree.
On January 18, 1982, we went before Judge Beckett with the stipulation. The stipulation was in writing, and Mr. Adams had a chance to read it in advance and I explained the words to him. I had the stipulation put in writing specifically to avoid a lengthy and inflammatory recitation of the facts by the District Attorney. Mr. Adams signed the stipulation in open court.
Affidavit at 2-4 (emphasis added). This further supports the state court’s conclusion that Adams acted intelligently in agreeing to a stipulated-facts trial.
In short, given Adams’s own testimony at his post-conviction hearing and the other evidence in the record, we hold that Adams has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness accorded to the state court’s finding that he understood the nature and consequences of his agreement to a stipulated-facts trial. We therefore reject his claim that he acted unknowingly.
IV
It would be inappropriate to conclude this opinion without responding to two contentions raised in the dissent. First, the dissent argues that Adams was a minor at the time of his trial in state court and that, under Oregon law, his case therefore should have been heard by a juvenile court. The dissent notes that the record before us discloses no hearing on whether Adams should be tried in an adult court. The dissent concludes from this fact both that there was no such hearing and that we must determine whether, in the seeming absence of such a hearing, the trial court properly had jurisdiction over Adams. Yet the dissent itself concedes, as it must, that Adams “has not raised the jurisdictional question” here. Post at 1387. In fact, insofar as we are aware, the question was never raised anywhere. Contrary to the dissent’s argument, we are aware of no authority for the proposition that it is incumbent upon this appellate court sua sponte to raise, address, and resolve this fundamental state law question.4
The dissent also seems to contend at length that in sentencing Adams the state trial court treated him unfairly because Adams is a black man and the victim a white woman. We fail to perceive the relevance of the later-imposed sentence to the question of whether Adams had acted voluntarily and intelligently when he agreed to and underwent a stipulated-facts trial. We also note that the trial court addressed specifically the severity of the sentence it imposed on Adams. It rejected the contention by Adams’s attorney that the state was counseling a harsh sentence because of the races of the criminal and the victim:
Well, I’ve been in the business of criminal justice, if you want to call it that, for — since 1967 or '68. I’ve prosecuted murders, manslaughters, negligent homicides. I’ve prosecuted people that have beat babies, killed them, starved babies to death, beat up kids, knifed each other, shot each other, killed people with crescent wrenches. I’ve sat in this courtroom and watched rapes and assaults.
You are, sir, one of the most dangerous persons I think I’ve ever read a report about. I think what it points out is you’re in there doing a burglary and the woman hits you because she catches you in the act. She rolls over in bed and there you are on the floor.
Now, for a person who is not dangerous, and is a property crime criminal, escape would come first to the fore. Maybe an assault upon the victim to get out of the house, any violence necessary to leave.
But angry rape and sodomy, mad sexual attack, tells me that there is something seriously wrong with you. Nobody, nobody who is anywhere near average commits a sex act when they are mad and angry. That shows to me that you are very much a dangerous person.
*1379And I don’t care, I guess, at this point how young or old you are. I’ve seen so many 17-, 18-, 16-year-old kids now that that shock is starting to wear off.

I don’t care what sex you are. I don’t care what race you are. I don’t care what race the victim is.

But I see you as a real danger, especially when you’re angry, and it appears to me you’re an angry person.

Transcript of Proceedings on Appeal at 18-19, State v. Adams, No. 10-81-10777 (Mar. 24, 1982) (emphasis added); see also id. at 17 (Adams’s testimony that when the victim “hit me with some kind of ceramic piece, my anger just — I sort of just — my anger took over”). We think that the trial court’s comments on this point adequately explain the court’s conduct and provide in themselves a sufficient response to the dissent.
V
Adams, a relatively educated young man, wanted the benefits of a stipulated-facts trial: a hoped-for lighter sentence, the dismissal of two other indictments pending against him, and the avoidance of a drawn-out presentation of the facts. He also wanted the benefits of a more elaborate trial, including the opportunity to testify in his own behalf. Faced with a mutually exclusive choice between these two options, he chose a stipulated-facts trial. Because his choice was voluntary and intelligent, we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.

. Adams apparently concedes and the record indisputably reveals that he did voluntarily and intelligently waive his second "Boykin right,” the constitutional right to a jury trial, after being questioned by the trial judge in open court. The pertinent issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to procure voluntary and intelligent waivers of the other two “Boykin rights.”

. Nor do the parties’ expectations change the analysis. With all due respect to the dissent, an expectation that the trier of fact will find that the facts as stipulated demonstrate the defendant’s guilt does not render the stipulation a de facto guilty plea. When presented with a stipulation of fact, an Oregon trial court is under no statutorily or judicially imposed obligation to find the defendant guilty. See Lyons v. Pearce, 298 Or. 569, 571-73, 694 P.2d 978, 980 (1985). The stipulation is only a method for introducing the evidence, and the parties’ expectations are only their views on what the trial’s outcome will be.

. Indeed, if it has any significance at all, the federal-state distinction seems to weigh against appellant’s position. Terrack involved the direct appeal of a federal conviction; the present case, on the other hand, involves the collateral review of state convictions — which have already been collaterally reviewed and thereafter validated by the state judicial system. In a similar context, another court has explained:
The standard of review in a collateral attack upon a guilty plea [under 28 U.S.C. § 2255] is entirely different from that on a direct appeal. In collateral proceedings the courts have held that a conviction will be vacated for a Rule 11 violation only if it amounts to “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice (citations omitted).” Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir.1978). . . . On direct appeal, the rule generally applied is that "any noncompliance with Rule 11 is reversible error.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170 n. 9, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)....
United States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142, 149 n. 5 (7th Cir.1979) (per curiam); see also Haase v. United States, 800 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir.1986) (collateral Rule 11 challenges under section 2255 are reviewed under a more deferential standard than direct Rule 11 challenges).
If a more deferential standard applies to the collateral review of a federal guilty plea than applies to the direct review of that same plea, then certainly an even more deferential standard must apply when, as here, the court collaterally reviews a state guilty plea. Comity, respect for the state’s own procedural rules, and respect for the state’s sovereign interest in the administration of its own criminal justice system pose an additional reason for deference that is wholly absent from the purely federal context.

. Unlike the dissent, we express no opinion as to whether Adams himself, if he so elects, may in the future raise the jurisdictional argument in Oregon or federal court.