Court Opinion

ID: 9660326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:10:22.844757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:17.741795
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
f 23. (concurring). I concur in the mandate reversing and remanding this case for a trial on the issue of the alleged medical malpractice committed by Dr. Bodemar. I cannot join its rationale.
¶ 24. I frame the issue as follows: whether a diagnosis is a "treatment," "operation," or "omission" within the meaning of the statute. It is fundamental that this court does not reach constitutional issues unnecessarily. Here, I conclude that the statute itself resolves the issue of whether a diagnosis comes within the terms of Wis. Stat. § 893.55: it does not. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
¶ 25. The relevant facts are undisputed. Cheryl Makos had a growth on her left leg biopsied on February 13, 1985. Dr. Steven Bodemer examined the biopsied tissue. His diagnosis was that the growth was not malignant. That diagnosis was later found to be incorrect: it was malignant. Unfortunately for Cheryl Makos, the misdiagnosis was not discovered until the five year statute of repose had run. Even more tragically, it killed her. She died on May 19,1995.
¶ 26. The statute, in relevant part, states: "[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from any treatment or operation performed by, or from any omission by, a person who is a health care provider. . .shall be commenced within. . .(b). . .five years from the date of the act or omission."
¶ 27. A diagnosis is neither an operation nor an omission. Thus, the only issue is whether a diagnosis is a "treatment" within the meaning of the statute.
*56¶ 28. The statutes are replete with instances in which the legislature indicates that there is a difference between "diagnosis" and "treatment." See Wis. Stats. § 448.01(8) (" 'Podiatry' or 'podiatric medicine and surgery' means that branch or system of treating the sick which is limited to the diagnosis, or mechanical, medical or surgical treatment or treatment by the use of drugs, of the feet") (emphasis added); § 448.01(9) (" 'Practice of medicine and surgery' means:. . .(b) [t]o apply principles or techniques of medical sciences in the diagnosis or prevention of any of the conditions described in par. (a) and in sub. (2)") (emphasis added); § 448.08 (" 'Hospital' means an institution. . .which is primarily engaged in providing facilities for diagnostic and therapeutic services for the surgical and medical diagnosis, treatment and care . . .") (emphasis added); § 655.02(l)(i) ("[T]his chapter applies to. . .[a]n entity operated in this state that is an affiliate of a hospital and that provides diagnosis or treatment of, or care for") (emphasis added); § 655.27(3)(b)2 ("With respect to fees paid by physicians, the rule shall provide for not more than 4 payment classifications, based upon the amount of surgery performed and the risk of diagnostic and therapeutic services provided or procedures performed.") (emphasis added). In addition, when defining the "practice of medicine and surgery," the legislature refers separately to the "examfination] into the fact, condition or cause of human health or disease," i.e., diagnosis, and the treatment of human health or disease: "or, to treat, operate, prescribe or advise for the same." Wis. Stat. § 448.01(9)(a). Accordingly, it can safely be said that the legislature does distinguish the terms, and uses the term "treatment" when it means treatment, not diagnosis. Its failure to use the term diagnosis in this statute is, I believe, conclusive on the *57issue of whether the legislature intended to include diagnosis within the term treatment. It did not. Had the legislature so intended, it would have used both, as it did many times in treating the same general subject matter of medical practice and health care liability.
¶ 29. Counsel for the plaintiff did not raise this statutory construction argument in its brief. When asked why at oral argument, plaintiffs counsel considered it and seemingly without benefit of research or reflection, opined that it might be inconsistent with Martin to hold that the term treatment in this statute of repose does not include diagnosis. Counsel's concerns are without merit.
¶ 30. In Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), the statute under scrutiny was the informed consent statute, Wis. Stat. §448.30. That statute was rich with legislative and case law history. Specifically, we noted that in adopting § 448.30, the Wisconsin legislature codified the standard articulated in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975). Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174. We cited to the Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1981 A.B. 941: "This bill places in the statutes the standard of care that physicians are required to meet under Scaria." Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174. In that case, the plaintiffs injuries resulted from complications associated with an aortogram, a diagnostic procedure.
¶ 31. We took care to point out that only with respect to the informed consent statute was there no difference: "The distinction between diagnostic and medical treatments is not in and of itself significant to an analysis of informed consent." Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 175 (emphasis added). Throughout the case, we went to great lengths to distinguish the two terms: "We are *58not dealing primarily with the professional competence nor the quality of the services rendered by a doctor in his diagnosis or treatment." Id. at 173 (emphasis added). "[W]hat is reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an intelligent decision with respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis." Id. at 174 (emphasis added). Also see, Id. at 175 ("with respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis"); Id. at 176 ("the existence of any methods of diagnosis or treatment"); Id. ("with respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis"); Id. ("£o treat a patient or attempt to diagnose a medical problem"); Id. ("to request an alternative treatment or method of diagnosis"); Id. at 182 ("the choices of treatment or diagnosis, a reasonable person.. .would have wanted to know.") (emphasis added).
¶ 32. Thus, in Martin, the history of the informed consent statute compelled the result. Here, in construing this statute of repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), we have no such history. We have the words of the statute before us, and the words do not include the term "diagnosis." When faced with the task of construing this limiting statute, we must interpret the statute strictly:
[T]his court, in accordance with generally accepted standards of jurisprudence, has interpreted statutes of limitation so that no person's cause of action will be barred unless clearly mandated by the legislature. . . .In accordance with that general philosophy of insuring that litigants shall have their day in court unless clearly barred, words of doubtful or ambivalent import have been construed by this court to bar only those actions the legislature intended to extinguish.
Saunders v. DEC International, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 74, 270 N.W.2d 176 (1978).
*59¶ 33. This statute fails to show a clear mandate to include diagnosis within its ban. The legislature has shown by repeated example it knows the difference between "treatment" and "diagnosis." Had the legislature intended that diagnosis be part of the statute, it could have easily done so as it had in numerous instances. It did not.
¶ 34. I would prefer that we request further briefs from the parties on the issue as I have framed it. Failing that, I join the mandate of the lead opinion but not its rationale. I would hold that a misdiagnosis as occurred here does not come within the meaning of the statute. I concur.1
¶ 35. I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. Wilcox joins this concurring opinion.

 The dissent raises the possibility that the rationale of this concurring opinion raises equal protection concerns. I disagree. The statute is presumed constitutional. Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Health & Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 98-99, 375 N.W.2d 220 (1986). It is presumed the legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing diagnosis from treatment. Id. One can easily conclude that the legislature perceived that differences such as frequency of claims, amounts of claims, or a myriad of other differences justified the distinction.