Court Opinion

ID: 9492403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:40:36.304209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:17.597024
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to apply Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), despite the state’s forfeiture of that defense. Because evidence used at Lyons’s trial violated the presumption of innocence and because the prosecutor infringed on Lyons’s Fourth Amendment rights, I would affirm the district court’s decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
I agree with Judge Gilman that Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995), does not require us to apply Teague in this case because the state failed to raise this defense in the district court.1 Our view that a state forfeits its *348Teague defense if it does not raise it in the district court is therefore the holding of the court on this point.
I also agree with Judge Gilman that, although we are not required to invoke Teague when a state has forfeited it, we may exercise our discretion to invoke the defense sua sponte. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 227, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). I disagree, however, that a federal court should presumptively invoke the defense sua sponte. I believe that, when a state has failed to raise its Teague defense, a federal court should not invoke the defense sua sponte unless there are particularly strong reasons to overlook the state’s forfeiture.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to provide much guidance on when we should exercise our discretion to invoke Teague sua sponte, this court has had the opportunity to address the issue, and in each instance where the state has failed to raise Teague in the district court, we have declined to invoke the defense on our own. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 337 n. 1, 339 n. 3 (6th Cir.1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-9606 (May 24, 1999); Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 805 n. 1 (6th Cir.1995); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 n. 4 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). The fact that we have declined to invoke Teague when a state forfeits it indicates that we should not exercise our discretion to invoke Teague unless there are strong reasons to do so.
As a starting point, I would presume that the state, like any other litigant, loses a defense it fails to raise. This presumption is consistent with our general approach to waivers of claims and defenses in civil litigation, and it is consistent with our strict enforcement of the procedural requirements imposed on criminal defendants and habeas petitioners. See 2 James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 22.1, at 856 (3d ed.1998) (arguing that state attorneys “at the least should be held to procedural standards that are no less exacting than those applied to pro se prisoners”). Although holding the state to its Teague waiver might be viewed, as having the effect of “excusing” the petitioner’s earlier procedural errors, this outcome does not constitute a “double standard.” When a plaintiff makes a procedural error — say, filing a claim after the limitations period has passed — that is subject to an affirmative defense, the defendant must raise the defense in order to preserve it. Failure to do so will “excuse” the late filing. The result I argue for here is directly analogous and is thus no more bizarre than the normal operation of the rules of civil litigation.
Judge Clay argues in favor of the opposite presumption in part by pointing to provisions of AEDPA. He points out AEDPA’s rule that exhaustion issues are preserved unless expressly waived and that the new statute adopted much of Teague, concluding that the trend is to apply Teague and that states should not generally lose defenses they fail to raise. See ante at 344 n. 12. As an initial matter, given that AEDPA is not retroactive, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), I do not think it should be made retroactive simply by labeling its provisions a “trend.” Moreover, Congress’s adoption of Teague’s ret-roactivity principles does not strike me as affecting the parties’ pleading burdens, and its clear alteration of the pleading requirements for the exhaustion defense suggests, if anything, that Congress was content with prior law permitting implied Teague waivers. See Liebman & Hertz *349§ 22.1, at 852 (“Given that Congress is presumed to be aware of existing caselaw, the congressional choice to limit this requirement of an express waiver to the nonexhaustion defense signals Congress’ desire to maintain the practice of finding-waiver by default with respect to other state defenses. The circuit courts that have considered the issue thus far generally have concluded that the defenses that AEDPA creates (apart from the exhaustion defense) are waiveable, including by default.”) (footnotes omitted).
While I begin with this presumption that defenses not raised are forfeited, I recognize our discretion to raise Teague sua sponte and have looked for reasons to do so in this case. Beyond the general considerations underlying Teague itself, however, I have not identified any factors particular to this case that make sua sponte application of Teague appropriate.
Courts applying Teague when the state has not preserved it often refer generally to the interests of federalism, comity, and finality. See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 305 (5th Cir.1999) (“In the interests of finality and judicial economy, we choose to exercise our discretion and consider whether Fisher’s claim is barred.”); Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “comity and orderly procedure loom large”); Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 363, 136 L.Ed.2d 254 (1996), (approving application of Teague “out of respect for ‘the important policies underlying the finality of state court criminal judgments, [and] non-retroactivity principles’ ”) (quoting district court). Judge Gilman also refers to these interests in explaining his presumption in favor of applying Teague. I find it unsatisfactory to rely entirely on these general policies. In my view, the importance of the policies behind Teague is the reason we even consider applying Teague once the state has waived it.
Two other courts of appeals have tried to guide the discretionary decision to apply Teague by adapting the Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), test to this context. See Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1997); Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1534-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904, 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992). Unfortunately, some of the Granberry factors do not make much sense in the Teague context. Factors such as finality and federalism will generally weigh in favor of applying Teag-ue but can cut either way with respect to exhaustion. The procedural exhaustion context is special because it governs when, not whether, the federal court will reach the merits of the petition. The Granberry factors are therefore not necessarily the most important considerations for deciding when Teague should be invoked sua sponte.
One overriding consideration in Gran-berry — the interests of justice — is more easily transferred to the Teague context. The interests of justice may include actual innocence, whether the proper resolution of the merits of the claim is clear, and whether the district court granted habeas relief. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 135-36, 107 S.Ct. 1671; Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1537. The last of these is relevant for the reason discussed above, that it appears particularly unfair for the court of appeals to apply Teague once another federal court has declared that a constitutional violation occurred. In addition, “comity also calls for representatives of states not to agree to federal courts expending substantial time in addressing the merits of a case, only to argue belatedly that the merits should not have been reached.” Agard v. Portuondo, 159 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1998) (decision on rehearing), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1248, 143 L.Ed.2d 346 (1999). In this case, these factors weigh against sua sponte application of Teague.
Many factors logically may bear on whether we should consider Teague in a *350particular case after it has been waived.2 Here, the interests of federalism and comity are not different or more weighty than in the usual Teague-wwrer case. Both a magistrate judge and a district judge have declared that Lyons’s conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, the appearance of justice is compromised when the court of appeals steps into the role of the state’s attorney, raising a defense the state has waived in order to bar relief.
Because the Teague issue is dispositive of this case, there is no reason to address any other potential issues. To the extent that any opinions do so they offer only personal observations of the authoring judge.

. As Judge Gilman points out, Goeke has no bearing on the outcome in this case because, in Goeke, the state preserved its Teague defense by raising it in the district court. The *348state in the present case forfeited its Teague defense when it failed to raise the defense in the district court. See Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 805 n. 1 (6th Cir.1995) (explaining that the state forfeited Teague because it did not raise the defense in the district court even though it later raised it in a motion to amend the district court’s judgment).

. In addition to the factors already mentioned, courts have treated the failure to raise a retroactivity defense as excusable neglect when Teague itself was new, see, e.g., Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1288-91 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, A91 U.S. 1010, 110 S.Ct 3256, 111 L.Ed.2d 765 (1990), or when the state reasonably believed that the petitioner did not seek the benefit of a new rule, see Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 907, 142 L.Ed.2d 905 (1999). Courts have also refused to raise Teague after granting discretionary review — such as certio-rari or rehearing en banc — for the purpose of considering a substantive issue. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-29, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994); Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 498-99 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 421, 133 L.Ed.2d 338 (1995); but see Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 388-90, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994) (holding that the Teague question was fairly included in the substantive question on which certiorari was granted).