Court Opinion

ID: 9925767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 22:02:14.900167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.745722
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Rhynes CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085253
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF161828A)
                    v.

    BOBBIE DALE RHYNES,                                                                   OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Colette M.
Humphrey, Judge.
         Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ismah
Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Smith, J.
                                     INTRODUCTION
       In 2015, appellant Bobbie Dale Rhynes was charged with the first degree murder
                                        1
of Carl Everett Woolwine (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1). The information
further alleged that Rhynes personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Thomas Ray Ertz and Joan
Allaine Noble were charged with being accessories after the fact (§ 32, counts 2 & 3).
       In 2017, following a hung trial, Rhynes plead no contest to voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted to using a firearm in the commission of the
offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Rhynes to an aggregate term of
14 years in state prison.
       In 2022, Rhynes filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95
(now renumbered as section 1172.6). The trial court appointed counsel to represent
Rhynes and the prosecutor filed an opposition to Rhynes’s petition. Following argument
by the parties, the trial court denied Rhynes’s petition at the prima facie stage, finding
him ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
       On appeal, Rhynes contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition at the
prima facie stage. We conclude that the record of conviction shows, without factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence of exercise of discretion, that Rhynes was convicted
as the actual killer. He is therefore ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
We therefore affirm.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On June 9, 2017, pursuant to an amended information, the Kern County District
Attorney charged Rhynes with the murder of Carl Everett Woolwine (§ 187, subd. (a);
count 1) and voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 2). The information further

       1
         All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

                                              2.
alleged that Rhynes had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused
great bodily injury or death during the commission of count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)),
and that Rhynes had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission
of count 2.
       That same day, Rhynes pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (count 2) and
admitted the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm use enhancement. In view of his
plea, count 1 was dismissed.
       On June 22, 2017, the trial court sentenced Rhynes to the upper term of 11 years
for voluntary manslaughter, and a term of three years for the section 12022.5, subdivision
(a) firearm enhancement.
       On June 6, 2022, Rhynes filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95. The prosecutor filed an opposition to the petition and requested summary
denial, arguing that Rhynes was tried and convicted as the actual killer.
       On October 12, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Rhynes’s petition. Trial
counsel submitted on the petition filed. The trial court denied the petition, explaining that
because Rhynes had admitted to being the actual killer, he was unable to make a prima
                                                 2
facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.
       A timely notice of appeal followed.
                               STATEMENT OF FACTS
       At his change of plea hearing, Rhynes stipulated to the preliminary hearing
transcript as the factual basis for his plea. The following statement of facts is derived
from the preliminary hearing transcript:

       2
         The Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without
substantive change, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.)

                                             3.
       Rhynes, Ertz, Noble, Nicholas Cates, and Woolwine, worked together at the Alta
Sierra Ski Resort. Ertz and Noble were in a dating relationship.
       On the afternoon of October 10, 2015, Ertz, Cates, Rhynes, and Woolwine drove
to a hunting trail. Cates dropped Ertz and Rhynes off, and he and Woolwine went to a
higher area of the sky resort and parked to observe the area.
       During the excursion, Woolwine remarked to Cates “that he wanted to go back to
the office and watch Noble work.” Cates thought that the comment was strange so he
went down the mountain to tell Noble what Woolwine had said. Woolwine subsequently
returned to a maintenance shop at the resort.
       At some point, Cates picked up Rhynes and Ertz and brought them back to the
office where Noble was working. Cates told Rhynes and Ertz about Woolwine’s
comment. Rhynes appeared upset. He suggested, “let’s go bury [Woolwine].” Rhynes
instructed Cates to bring Woolwine back to the office area, and Cates complied.
       When Cates returned, Woolwine asked Cates if they saw anything to shoot while
they were hunting. Rhynes commented that they had not seen any bucks, but “he had his
eye on something.”
       Eventually, when some vehicles in the parking lot nearby left, Rhynes told Cates
“let’s go.” Cates began to feel sick. He did not want to go with the group because “he
knew what they were going to do.”
       Cates told Rhynes that he was not feeling well and that he needed to use the
restroom. Rhynes and Ertz drove off with Woolwine while Cates and Noble remained at
the office.
       When they arrived at the maintenance shop building, Ertz confronted Woolwine
about the comment Woolwine made about Noble. Ertz told sheriff’s deputies that as he
and Woolwine were talking, Rhynes walked up to Woolwine and shot him in the head
with a nine-millimeter pistol. Ertz went inside the nearby office where Cates and Noble
were at, and he began to vomit.

                                             4.
         Cates, who had heard the gunshot, collected his belongings and began to walk
down the road, away from the resort. Before Cates left, Rhynes approached him and told
him to “calm down, that it was no big deal.”
         Ertz got into his truck and followed Cates. When Ertz caught up to Cates, he
assured Cates that he was not going to harm him and that he did not have a handgun.
Ertz told Cates that he was talking to Woolwine when Rhynes shot Woolwine. After
further discussion, Ertz and Cates drove back to the ski resort together to confront
Rhynes about what had happened.
         When Ertz and Cates got back to the office, Cates saw Rhynes “digging a hole
with a backhoe.” Cates asked Rhynes why he did not simply fire Woolwine. Rhynes
responded that “death didn’t bother him and he didn’t have a problem going to prison.”
         After Rhynes finished digging the hole, he asked Noble to help him place
Woolwine’s body inside. Noble complied. Afterwards, Rhynes and Noble moved
Woolwine’s van down the mountain “to get rid of it.”
         Cates was the only one to contact the police. On October 12, 2015, several
deputies from the Kern County Sheriff’s Department reported to the Shirley Mountain ski
resort area around 11:00 a.m. to secure the area. Law enforcement located a spent nine-
millimeter shell casing at the bottom of a trench area. Deputies also found a blood trail
on the north side of the trench.
         Woolwine’s body was found buried at the bottom of the trench. His van was
located on Highway 155, approximately three miles away from where the body was
found.
         An autopsy revealed that Woolwine had suffered a single, fatal gunshot wound
between his left eye and nose and an exit wound on the backside of his head. Rhynes
admitted shooting Woolwine, but claimed that it was an accident. According to Rhynes,
he pointed the gun approximately six to eight inches above Woolwine’s head in an
attempt to scare him.

                                             5.
                                           ANALYSIS
I.      Rhynes is Ineligible for Resentencing Relief as a Matter of Law
        Rhynes claims that the trial court erred by denying his petition for resentencing at
the prima facie stage. We disagree.
        A.      Section 1172.6
        “Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
 the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides
 that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person:
 (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a
 direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
 with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] The Legislature also amended the
 natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188,
 which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
 participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50-51; People
 v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708.)
        “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted
 under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended,” initially
 codified in former section 1170.95. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The
 initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction
 for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
 petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced
 on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result
 of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill 1437.” (People v.
 Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
        Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
 Bill 775) made substantive amendments to former section 1170.95 that were consistent
 with our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

                                                6.
(Lewis), and also “ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18;
People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
       On June 30, 2022, the statute was renumbered as section 1172.6 without further
substantive changes. (See People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 715, fn. 3.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) thus states:

       “(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
       probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to
       a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder
       under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a
       petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder,
       attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on
       any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:

              “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
              that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
              murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
              theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
              person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
              probable consequences doctrine.

              “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
              manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
              which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
              murder.

              “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
              murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January
              1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       The court shall appoint counsel if requested by petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
After service of the petition, the prosecutor shall file and serve a response. The petitioner
may file and serve a reply after the response is served. (Id. at subd. (c).) “After the
parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to

                                               7.
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue
an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       The prima facie determination is a question of law, and the trial court may deny a
petition if the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is
“limited.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations
on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she is entitled to
relief under section 1172.6, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       We review de novo an order denying a petition under section 1172.6 without
issuing an order to show cause. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251;
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545; People v. Harrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
       B.     Analysis
       The charging instrument and change of plea colloquy support the conclusion that
Rhynes was the sole perpetrator of Woolwine’s murder. Ertz and Nobel were never

                                              8.
charged with murder. Rather, they were charged with the crime of being an accessory
after the fact (§ 32), by “having knowledge that Bobbie Dale Rhynes[] had committed the
crime of murder, [they] willfully and unlawfully harbor[ed], conceal[ed], or aid[ed]
Bobbie Dale Rhynes, in such felony, with the intent that he[] would avoid or escape from
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment.” (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.)
       However, because murder was generically charged, and Rhynes did not admit to
having acted with malice or any specific theory of murder in entering his plea, that alone
did not foreclose him from resentencing relief. (See People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 987 (Flores) [petitioner was not ineligible for relief where, “[i]n
entering his plea, petitioner did not admit to or stipulate to any particular theory of
murder”]; see also, People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977 (Eynon) [petitioner
who pleaded to a charge that he “ ‘did willfully, unlawfully, and with deliberation,
premeditation, and malice aforethought murder’ ” the victim was not ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law because the charge was a “generic murder charge [that]
allowed the prosecution to proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and
probable consequences”]).
       However, the transcript from Rhynes’s preliminary hearing contains
uncontroverted evidence that he was the sole and direct perpetrator of Woolwine’s
murder, and that malice could not have been imputed to him. We acknowledge however
that there is a split of authority as to whether the superior court can rely on the
preliminary hearing transcript to determine a petitioner’s ineligibility for relief at the
prima facie stage.
       In Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 967, the appellate court rejected the Attorney
General’s reliance upon factual admissions made by the petitioner at his preliminary
hearing. (Id. at p. 976.) The court observed that “[b]eing held to answer on an allegation
does not constitute a factual finding that the allegation is true (and the allegation itself
does not establish its own truth). Being held to answer does not even constitute a

                                               9.
determination that the allegation is supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at pp. 975-
976.)
        Moreover, the admissions made by Eynon were that the charged murder had
occurred and that he had committed an act with the intent requisite to render him liable
for murder under then-existing law. (Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.) Thus,
even if the trial court had appropriately relied upon factual admissions in the preliminary
hearing transcript, these admissions did not demonstrate Eynon’s ineligibility for relief as
a matter of law. (Id. at p. 979.)
        In People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, the court held that a trial court
may rely on a preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage where the defendant
has admitted the transcript provides the factual basis for the plea. (Id. at p. 481.)
        In Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 974, this court rejected the People’s assertion
that portions of the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively demonstrated that the
petitioner, who had plead no contest to second degree murder, was ineligible for
resentencing relief under former section 1170.95. (Flores, at p. 987.) There, Flores and
his codefendant, Bowman, were jointly charged with murder. (Ibid.) In entering a plea
of no contest to second degree murder with an arming enhancement, the parties stipulated
that the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for the
plea. (Id. at p. 982.)
        On appeal from the summary denial of his petition for resentencing, Flores argued
that the trial court had erred by denying his petition at the prima facie stage. (Flores,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.) The People responded, in part, that the preliminary
hearing transcript affirmatively demonstrated that Flores was the actual killer. (Id. at p.
987.) At Flores’s preliminary hearing, an officer testified that Flores had claimed that
Bowman had shot the victim, and that Flores had accidentally run over the victim twice
as he (Flores) left the scene. The medical examiner identified the cause of death as
gunshot wounds and blunt force injuries. (Id. at pp. 988, 991.)

                                             10.
       This court observed that Flores had never admitted the truth of the officer’s
testimony that Flores had admitted to driving over the victim twice, and that Flores’s
stipulation that the preliminary hearing transcript was the factual basis for the plea was
“not a ‘ “binding admission for all purposes.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p.
991, citing People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 235.) Even so, the testimony
relied upon by the People did not exclude the possibility that Flores had been convicted
under a theory of imputed malice. (Flores, at p. 991.)
       In People v. Pickett (2022) 93 Cal.App.5th 982 (Pickett), the appellate court held
that reliance on the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage is appropriate
in some circumstances. There, the court addressed the following issue: “Whether a
court, in assessing the prima facie showing under section 1172.6, can rely on evidence
presented at the defendant’s preliminary hearing where the petitioning defendant was
convicted by plea in the underlying case and was appointed counsel but declined to file a
brief or raise any factual issue or argument in support of the petition.” (Id. at p. 991.)
The appellate court answered this question affirmatively, observing that uncontradicted
and compelling evidence from the preliminary hearing showed that Pickett had acted
alone and as the actual killer.
       Pickett, who had been represented by counsel throughout the former section
1170.95 petition proceedings, offered neither argument nor evidence to raise a factual
issue on this point. Thus, the appellate court concluded it could “assess Pickett’s prima
facie showing without ‘engag[ing] in “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence” ’
or making any credibility determinations (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972).” (Pickett,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.)
       This issue is imminently pending resolution by our Supreme Court. (See People v.
Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June 28, 2023, S279670.) In the
interim, we observe that Pickett and Flores are not incompatible decisions.

                                             11.
       Pickett concluded that reliance upon the preliminary hearing transcript at the
prima facie stage may be appropriate, depending upon the circumstances. There, just as
in the case at bench, the preliminary hearing transcripts showed there was only one cause
of death and there was no testimony showing that anyone other than Pickett was involved
in the shooting. (Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) Because the record of
conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, contained uncontroverted
evidence that Pickett alone had killed the victim, the court did not “ ‘engage in
“factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,” ’ ” by
denying Pickett’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 989.)
       On the other hand, in Flores, there were two possible causes of death and two
possible perpetrators of the murder. Moreover, even if the preliminary hearing testimony
relied upon by the Attorney General in arguing that Flores was the actual killer, it would
not have conclusively established that malice was not imputed to Flores. Flores did not
hold that reliance upon the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage is
impermissible. We merely concluded that the testimony relied upon did not conclusively
negate Flores’s assertions in his petition for resentencing, without factfinding, based on
the circumstances of the offense.
       “[N]o factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations” were or are
necessary here, as Rhynes was the sole, actual killer who was directly—not vicariously—
liable for Woolwine’s death. (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
Rhynes has never contested the fact that he killed Woolwine. Indeed, the only factual
dispute was whether he did so intentionally and with premeditation, or whether the
shooting was accidental. Based upon the record of conviction, Rhynes’s plea to
voluntary manslaughter affirmatively demonstrates, that as the sole and actual killer,
malice was not imputed to him. (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 970
[“voluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for

                                             12.
life”].) Thus, the trial court correctly held that Rhynes is ineligible for resentencing relief
as a matter of law.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying Rhynes’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                              13.