Court Opinion

ID: 9905357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 09:08:05.401034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:05.275206
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00063-CR

              CODY WILLIAMS, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
                 Bowie County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 21F1633-102

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

           As a result of his violent encounter with a juvenile he met online, a Bowie County jury

convicted Cody Williams of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an

amount of one gram or more but less than four grams,1 aggravated kidnapping,2 unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon,3 and aggravated robbery.4 The jury assessed Williams’s

punishment at four years’ imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance, fifty years’

imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping, eight years’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon, and twenty years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery. The trial court

imposed the assessed sentences and ordered that they run concurrently.

           In this appeal, Williams appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance in

an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams.5 Williams contends that the trial court

erred when it struck a venireperson for cause and denied his request to sever the charge of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon for a separate trial and that the judgment of

conviction should be modified to reflect the correct statute of offense. Because we find that

Williams was not harmed by the trial court’s dismissal of the venireperson for cause and that the

trial court did not err when it denied Williams’s untimely request to sever the charge of unlawful

1
    See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (Supp.).
2
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(b).
3
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(1) (Supp.).
4
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2).
5
 In our cause numbers 06-23-00064-CR, 06-23-00065-CR, and 06-23-00066-CR, Williams appeals his convictions
for aggravated kidnapping, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and aggravated robbery, respectively.
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possession of a firearm by a felon, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

However, we will modify the judgment to reflect the correct offense of conviction and statute of

offense.

        We set forth the evidence introduced at trial in our opinion in cause number 06-23-

00064-CR, which addresses the appeal of Williams’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping.

Therefore, we will not repeat that recitation in this opinion.

I.      The Trial Court’s Dismissal of Venireperson Number Three for Cause Was
        Harmless

        A.       Standard of Review

        Williams asserts in his first issue that the trial court erred when it struck venireperson

number three for cause because he could not consider the full range of punishment.6 “Both the

State and [Williams] are entitled to jurors who can consider the entire range of punishment for

the particular statutory offense—i.e., from the maximum to the minimum and all points in

between.” Cardenas v. State, 325 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Johnson v.

State, 982 S.W.2d 403, 405–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). “If a juror cannot consider an offense’s

full range of punishment, the juror is subject to a challenge for cause.” Dominguez v. State, No.

06-13-00164-CR, 2014 WL 1856848, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 8, 2014, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Cardenas, 325 S.W.3d at 184).

        We review a trial court’s dismissal for cause of a venireperson for abuse of discretion,

and we will “reverse only if a clear abuse of discretion is evident.” King v. State, 29 S.W.3d

6
 Williams also asserts that the trial court erred by striking venireperson number three because he could not follow
the law regarding unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and the State agrees. However, it appears that the
trial court struck venireperson number three only because he could not consider the full range of punishment.
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556, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993)). “We review the trial court’s decision in light of the venireperson’s voir dire as a whole.”

Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In our review, “considerable

deference is given to the trial court because it is in the best position to evaluate the

venire[person]’s demeanor and responses.” King, 29 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985)). “When the [venireperson]’s answers are vacillating, unclear or

contradictory, particular deference is accorded to the trial court’s decision.” Id. (citing Colburn

v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).

       B.      Background

       During the State’s voir dire, the following exchange occurred:

               [BY THE STATE]: . . . . Does anybody believe that they will have a hard
       time rendering a judgment on punishment in regards to the minimum or the
       maximum amount on these cases? For an example, life is on the table in this case.
       I had a jury trial last year where we went through the same situation and I had
       jurors that could agree. After the fact we went back there and talked to them and
       two of the ladies said, well, he didn’t kill anybody so we couldn’t give him life in
       prison. Well, they should have told me that in voir dire, which would have let me
       know that they cannot consider the full range of punishment. It would have taken
       somebody to die for them to give the person life in prison. Now, do I have
       anybody with that thought process here? Number ten? You got to stand up for
       me.

             VENIREPERSON NUMBER TEN: Just the same thing. He didn’t kill
       anybody, he shouldn’t get life in prison.

       ....

               VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: I feel the same way.

       ....

               [BY THE STATE]: Number three, Mr. Betts, and he -- and you stated?
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                VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: If he -- if it wasn’t someone killed
       in here, I don’t -- I think that should be an opportunity for that person to not have
       full life.

              [BY THE STATE]: And so it would take a dead body on the ground for
       you to give somebody life in prison?

                VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: In some scenarios, yes.

                [BY THE STATE]: What scenario would not?

              VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: It would depend probably for me
       the severity of the robbery or the length of the kidnapping. I think that for prison,
       you know, there is some type of reform in there for that.

                [BY THE STATE]: Correct.

               VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: Which if you have life, of course,
       there’s no reform. You’re not able to.

              [BY THE STATE]: Well, everybody is going to be able to parole out no
       matter what. And so it just depends on how good you act. In the event that -- so I
       guess you’re saying you can consider it.

                VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: Yes, sir.

                [BY THE STATE]: You just have to listen to the facts.

                VENIREPERSON NUMBER THREE: Yes.

Later, the State sought to strike venireperson number three for cause because he was not able to

consider the full range of punishment, and over Williams’s opposition, the trial court struck the

venireperson.

       C.       Analysis

       Williams argues that the exchange between the State and venireperson number three

showed that, although venireperson number three initially stated reluctance to assess a life
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sentence when no one had been killed, he ultimately acknowledged that he would be able to do

so. The State argues that a reasonable interpretation of the exchange was that the venireperson’s

response referred only to “dead body” offenses, so the record showed he would not consider the

full range of punishment.

       However, even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred, our review of the

record shows that the error was harmless.            Even if the trial court errs in dismissing a

venireperson for cause, the error must be disregarded if it does not affect the defendant’s

substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001). “[A] substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 4 (citing King v.

State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Neither the State nor the appellant has

“the burden to demonstrate whether appellant was harmed.”            Id. at 5.   Rather, “it is the

responsibility of the appellate court to assess harm after reviewing the record.” Id.

       Williams argues that he was harmed because he was deprived of the participation of

venireperson number three, a qualified juror. In a non-capital felony case, when the trial court

errs by granting the State’s challenge for cause, harm is established when the record shows that

the State exercised all of its peremptory challenges. Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 795 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986); Weaver v. State, 476 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In this case,

both the State and Williams were entitled to ten peremptory challenges. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 35.15(b). The State’s jury panel list showed that it only exercised seven of its

ten peremptory challenges. Because the State might have used one of its unused peremptory

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challenges to exclude venireperson number three, the record does not show that venireperson

number three “would have served except for the [trial] court’s [error].” Pearce v. State, 513

S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see Culley v. State, 505 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1974). As a result, the record does not show that Williams was harmed by the alleged trial

court error.

        Based on this record, we find that any error by the trial court was harmless. We overrule

Williams’s first issue.

II.     Williams’s Motion to Sever Was Untimely

        In his second issue, Williams asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

sever the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm from the three other charges. He argues that

he was entitled to a severance and that he was prejudiced in regard to the other three charges

because the jury was informed of his prior felony conviction.

        A.     Procedural Background

        In January and February 2022, a Bowie County grand jury issued separate indictments

that charged Williams with possession of a controlled substance, aggravated kidnapping,

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and aggravated robbery. On January 9, 2023, the

State filed its notice of intent to consolidate the four cases for trial pursuant to Section 3.02 of the

Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02. On January 10, 2023, the trial court

entered its order consolidating the four cases for trial. On March 7, 2023, the final pretrial

hearing was held, and Williams announced that there were no matters to take up. One week

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later, on the day of trial, Williams asserted an “oral motion to sever the unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon” charge, which the trial court denied.

       B.      Williams’s Motion Was Untimely

       When, as here, several offenses arise out of the same criminal episode, they may be

consolidated for trial. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02(a). Subject to exceptions not applicable in

this case, “[w]henever two or more offenses have been consolidated or joined for trial under

Section 3.02, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.” TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 3.04(a) (Supp.). Further, when a timely request for severance under Section 3.04(a) is

made, “the defendant’s right to a severance is absolute, and severance is mandatory.” Coleman

v. State, 788 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Waythe v. State, 533 S.W.2d 802,

803–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).

       In Thornton v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of when a

motion for severance under Section 3.04(a) must be filed to be timely. Thornton v. State, 986

S.W.2d 615, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam). The court determined that “a motion to

sever is a ‘pleading of the defendant’ as defined by Art[icle] 27.02(8)” of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure “and is governed by Art[icle] 28.01” of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. Id. at 617; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 27.02(8), 28.01, § 1. Because

Article 28.01 requires the pleadings of the defendant to be determined at “a pre-trial hearing

before it is set for trial upon [the] merits,” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01, § 1, the court

determined that, to be timely, the motion to sever must be brought pre-trial as required by Article

28.01. Thornton, 986 S.W.2d at 617–18.

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         As noted, a pretrial hearing was held in this case almost two months after the cases were

consolidated for trial and one week before the cases were set for trial on the merits. The record

shows that no motion for severance was ever filed, and an oral motion for severance was not

asserted at the pretrial hearing. As a result, Williams’s oral motion for severance, which was

asserted on the day of trial, “was untimely because it was not made pre-trial as required by

Art[icle] 28.01.” Id. at 618; see Anderson v. State, No. 04-15-00573-CR, 2016 WL 3773600, at

*1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 13, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Logan v. State, Nos. 2-02-191-CR, 2-02-192-CR, 2-02-193-CR, 2-02-194-CR,

2003 WL 22253894, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Hemphill v. State, Nos. 03-99-00784-CR, 03-99-00785-CR, 2000

WL 962846, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).

Because Williams’s motion was untimely, the trial court did not err by denying it. See Anderson,

2016 WL 3773600, at *1; Logan, 2003 WL 22253894, at *2. We overrule Williams’s second

issue.

III.     The Judgment Must Be Modified

         Williams also asserts that the trial court’s written judgment referenced the wrong statute

of conviction and should be modified. The State agrees.

         In this case, Williams was convicted under an amended indictment that charged him with

possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but

less than four grams. Methamphetamine is listed as a penalty group 1 substance. TEX. HEALTH

& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(6) (Supp.). Possession of a substance listed in penalty group 1

                                                 9
in an amount of “one gram or more but less than four grams” is an offense under Section

481.115(c) of the Texas Health and Safety Code.           TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.115(c) (Supp.). Nevertheless, the trial court’s written judgment lists the “Offense for

which Defendant Convicted” as “POSS CS PG2 >= 1G<4G” and the “Statute for Offense” as

“481.116(c) HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE.”

       We have the authority to modify a judgment “to make the record speak the truth when the

matter has been called to [our] attention by any source.” French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). As a result, we will modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the

correct offense of conviction and statute for the offense. We sustain this issue.

IV.    Disposition

       For the reasons stated, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the “Offense

for which Defendant Convicted” is “POSS CS PG1 >= 1G<4G” and that the “Statute for

Offense” is “481.115(c) HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE.” As modified, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                     Jeff Rambin
                                                     Justice

Date Submitted:        November 14, 2023
Date Decided:          November 27, 2023

Do Not Publish

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