Court Opinion

ID: 9704107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:22:31.999272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:56.809743
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, J.,
concurring specially. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) procedures are not required in this case. I write separately, however, because I would reach the same result by applying the ICPC regulations. See Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, ICPC Regulations, available at http://icpc.aphsa.org/home/regulations.asp (ICPC Regulations). I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the ICPC Regulations conflict with the plain language of the statute; I would therefore apply them to this case. This result is consistent with other states’ treatment of the ICPC in out-of-state placements with non-custodial parents.
We interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Victoria, 153 N.H. 664, 666 (2006), and should therefore interpret the ICPC to effectuate the purpose of the statute as put forth in Article I. The purpose of the ICPC is to ensure that “[e]ach child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities . . . .” RSA 170-AH, Article 1(a) (2002).
The majority is concerned about conflicting language in the statute and the ICPC Regulations, particularly the potential of Regulation No. 3 to expand the application of the ICPC. The majority reasons that the Regulations’ inclusion of parental placements within the ambit of those covered by the ICPC conflicts with the language of the statute, which the majority reads to apply only to non-parental placements. I read the ICPC to apply to out-of-state parental placements in very limited circumstances. If the purpose of the compact is to ensure that each child is placed in a suitable environment, it would make no sense, as more fully explained below, to read the ICPC to exempt from ICPC requirements the placement *792of a child with a non-custodial parent who is actually unfit to care for the child or who has previously been deprived of custody for neglect or abuse. See Appeal of N.H. Troopers Assoc., 145 N.H. 288, 290 (2000) (“We interpret a statute to lead to a reasonable result.”).
Article VIII of the ICPC exempts placements with parents from ICPC procedures if a parent or guardian sends the child. RSA 170-A:1, Article VIII. Thus, if the sending entity is not a parent or guardian, the ICPC applies, regardless of who receives custody of the child. Regulation No. 3 mirrors this restriction. Regulation No. 3(6)(a) sets forth the requirements for a sending party in an exempt placement. It states that a placement with a parent will be exempt so long as the sending person or agency is one “whose full legal right to plan for the child: (1) has been established by law at a time prior to initiation of the placement arrangement, and (2) has not been voluntarily terminated, or diminished or severed by the action or order of any court.” Id. This is simply a reiteration of ICPC Article VIII.
Regulation No. 3 also requires ICPC procedures if the receiving parent is found to be unfit. Regulation No. 3(6)(b) sets forth the requirements for the receiving party. It states:
The compact does not apply whenever a court transfers the child to a non-custodial parent with respect to whom the court does not have evidence before it that such parent is unfit, does not seek such evidence, and does not retain jurisdiction over the child after the court transfers the child.
Thus, under the Regulations, the limited placements with a non-custodial out-of-state parent that would require ICPC procedures would be those in which: (1) the sending person or agency has no authority to send the child (which is included in the text of the ICPC); (2) the receiving non-custodial parent has been found unfit by a court; or (3) the court retains jurisdiction over the child after the placement (which is not at issue in this case).
I agree with the majority that a regulation contradicting the terms of a governing statute has no effect. See Kimball v. N.H. Bd. of Accountancy, 118 N.H. 567, 568 (1978). If, however, a regulation does not exceed the authorizing statute’s grant of power to the governing agency, and neither adds to nor detracts from the statute, it will be followed. See Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transportation, 152 N.H. 565, 571 (2005). Article VII of the ICPC requires the executive to designate an officer who, “acting jointly with like officers of other party jurisdictions, shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.” RSA 170-A:1, Article VII. I read Regulation No. 3 to be *793consistent with the statutory grant of authority in Article VII and consistent with the text and purpose of the ICPC, and would thus apply it here.
The majority reasons that Regulation No. 3 is inconsistent with the ICPC statute because the former requires ICPC procedures for limited parental placements. Article VIII and the Regulation, however, have identical requirements for the sending entity. The only possible difference between Regulation No. 3 and the statute, therefore, is the Regulation’s requirement that ICPC procedures be followed when a court finds the receiving parent to be unfit, or has previously deprived the parent of custody. If this is inconsistent with the text of the statute, then the statute must exempt from ICPC procedures placements with parents who are found to be unfit to care for the child. The legislature has stated that the text of the ICPC “shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof.” RSA 170-A:1, Article X. I cannot, therefore, read the ICPC to exempt from ICPC procedures placement of a child with a non-custodial parent who is actually unfit to care for the child or who has previously been deprived of custody for neglect or abuse. I would thus read Regulation No. 3 to be consistent with the ICPC.
Because the Regulations are not inconsistent, I would apply them in determining whether ICPC procedures apply to the facts of this case. In doing so, I look to other states’ application of the ICPC. When courts have required compliance with the ICPC, they did so because there was evidence that the out-of-state parent was unfit to care for the child or had previously been deprived of custody by a court. See, e.g., In re R.B., 647 S.E.2d 300, 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (ICPC applies when mother loses custody because of drug abuse and failure to provide adequate housing, then moves out of state and requests return of children); Green v. Division of Family Services, 864 A.2d 921, 928 (Del. 2004) (ICPC applies when out-of-state father with criminal record and no prior contact with eight-year-old child requests custody, raising concerns as to his fitness); H.P. v. Department of Children and Families, 838 So. 2d 583,584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (ICPC applies when out-of-state mother, who had lost custody in a divorce, requests custody); In re T.N.H., 70 S.W.3d 2, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (ICPC applies when out-of-state mother requests custody of daughter she abandoned eight years prior); Arizona Dept of Economic Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (ICPC applies when out-of-state mother, who lost custody in a divorce, requests custody); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County DHS, 771 So. 2d 907, 913 (Miss. 2000) (ICPC applies when mother, who previously had custody taken away for neglect, leaves Mississippi with her children while still under State supervision, non-fatally stabs her husband in an argument, and then requests custody of the children in *794Florida); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (ICPC applies when out-of-state father with substance abuse problems and “substantial criminal record” requests custody of child); In re Paula G., 672 A.2d 872, 872-73 (R.I. 1996) (ICPC applies when mother, who had previously lost custody of daughter, takes her out of state and leaves her with a non-relative while still under State supervision). There was no such evidence in this case that the mother was unfit or had been previously deprived of custody.
In contrast, when courts have exempted parental placements from the ICPC, the facts of those cases do not reveal evidence that the out-of-state parent was unfit to care for the child. See, e.g., Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Huff, 65 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Ark. 2002) (not applying ICPC when trial court found out-of-state mother had complied with the case plan designed by DCYF); In re Interest of Erie O., 617 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (not applying ICPC when court-appointed legal guardians moved out of state with children in their custody); Tara S. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (not applying ICPC when child services approved placement with out-of-state father and court did not retain jurisdiction).
In this case, the trial court specifically found that “[the State] has failed to prove that [the mother] has neglected the child as alleged in the petitions.” In the absence of such a finding, Regulation No. 3(6)(b) exempts the placement of the child from ICPC procedures. This is consistent with the majority of cases that have interpreted the ICPC pertaining to interstate placements with noncustodial parents.
This reading of the ICPC and the ICPC Regulations is also consistent with New Hampshire law regarding the placement of children with noncustodial parents residing within the state. See In re Bill F., 145 N.H. 267 (2000). If both the child’s parents lived in New Hampshire, and DCYF wished to maintain custody of the child against the wishes of the noncustodial mother who has not been charged with abuse or neglect of the child, she could request a hearing. Id. at 274. The mother would have the opportunity to present evidence as to why she should receive custody, and “[would] be awarded custody unless the State demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that.. . she has abused or neglected the child or is otherwise unfit to perform... her parental duties.” Id. This is essentially what happened in this case. The trial court heard evidence and decided that the State failed to prove the mother had abused or neglected the child. In light of such a finding, the parent “shall be awarded custody.” Id. Because of that finding, ICPC procedures do not apply, as per Regulation No. 3(6)(b), and the child should be returned to her mother in Arizona. If, in this case, DCYF had not raised the question of the mother’s fitness when it did, *795but rather produced evidence at a later hearing that the mother was unfit, then, as the above cases show, the ICPC would have applied. Because, however, DCYF chose to challenge the fitness of both parents at a single hearing, resulting in a finding that the mother had not neglected or abused the child, ICPC procedures are not required in this case.
I thus concur with the majority’s conclusion that ICPC procedures were not required in this case, but I would reach that result by applying the ICPC Regulations.