Court Opinion

ID: 9843670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:41:31.675845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:51.332237
License: Public Domain

*223MARING, Justice,
concurring.
[¶ 14] I concur in the majority opinion, but write specially to emphasize a judge’s duty to perform his judicial duties impartially and unbiased.
[¶ 15] The trial judge prepared a memorandum opinion and ultimately signed findings of fact which indicate he believed that provocation by nonviolent actions mitigated the committal of domestic violence. The trial judge stated in his memorandum opinion:
Applying the doctrines in Krank to this case, the Court finds that domestic violence has been committed by both parents and both parents are fit. Stuart admits to three incidents. The Court finds those to have happened and there is some mitigation on his part as they were committed after actions by Marla that would have made most reasonable persons commit domestic violence.
[[Image here]]
... As to the three incidents where Stuart committed domestic violence on Marla and she did not commit domestic violence on him, the Court believes the record in this case contains sufficient evidence that would mitigate Stuart’s actions. The court does not mean to send a message that somehow the person who strikes first should be held blameless. However, if one looks at the actions of Marla prior to Stuart striking her in those three incidents, there are probably few people who would not have an anger that would not rise to violence. Perhaps if this case is appealed that issue can be explored. One would hope that a women would not be able to totally foreclose her husband’s chance at custody by leaving her two year old son in a pickup while she skinny dips with another man and then comes home and taunts her husband with these facts. The court finds the domestic violence to be roughly proportional and the domestic violence factor ceases to exist.
Two of the court’s findings of fact incorporate the above portions of the memorandum opinion:
X
Stuart committed domestic violence against Marla on three occasions in which she did not commit domestic violence, after actions by Marla that would have made most reasonable persons commit domestic violence.
[[Image here]]
XIV
In the three incidents where Stuart committed domestic violence on Marla and she did not commit domestic violence on him, there is sufficient evidence to mitigate Stuart’s actions. In one incident, Marla left her two year old son in a pickup truck while she went skinny dipping with another man and then came home and taunted her husband with these facts.
[¶ 16] While the trial judge does indicate in his memorandum opinion, “Perhaps if this case is appealed that issue [mitigation] can be explored,” it is difficult to understand any basis for a question as to the law of this state. As noted in the majority opinion, “[d]omestie violence is only mitigated when it is committed in self-defense. N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2).” This court has addressed domestic violence in the context of custody on a number of occasions, and pointed out domestic violence which is provoked by “button pushing” is not acceptable. Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 413-14 (N.D. 1996); Engh v. Jensen, 547 N.W.2d 922, 925 (N.D.1996); Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 164 (N.D.1995). In fact in Heck, we stated N.D.C.C. § 14 — 09—06.2(l)(j) is intended to counteract myths concerning domestic violence, one of which is that “victims provoke or deserve the violence,” (citation omitted). Heck at 164. We further stated:
Domestic violence is not caused by stress in the perpetrator’s life, alcohol consumption, or a particular victim’s propensity to push a perpetrator’s buttons (citation omitted). Rather, domestic violence is a learned pattern of behavior aimed at gaining a victim’s compliance (citation omitted).
Heck at 164-65.
[¶ 17] Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
*224B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
[[Image here]]
(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it....
[[Image here]]
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.
The purpose of Canon 3 is clear. A judge must perform his duties in an impartial and unbiased manner. Unfortunately, the trial judge’s statements in his memorandum opinion and his findings of fact, X and XIV, raise an appearance of gender bias whether intended or not. The language utilized by the trial judge can be construed to say that a husband is “justified” in committing domestic violence against a wife who “taunts” him she has been with other men. The Commentary to Canon 3(B)(5), N.D.C.J.C. states: “A judge must perform judicial duties impartially and fairly. A judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.” The final report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts dated October 10, 1996, sums up our responsibility: “Equity and justice are the fundamental goals of our court system.” The North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness, A Difference in Perceptions: The Final Report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts, October 10, 1996, at 127. The Commission on Gender Fairness points out, “While it is not possible to develop empirical data about possible bias in contemporary considerations of extramarital conduct, it is undisputed that historically the sexual conduct of women parents was judged more harshly than that of men parents.” Id. at 62. The judiciary must be dedicated to the elimination of gender bias from our courts. See Vitko v. Vitko, 524 N.W.2d 102, 105 (N.D.1994)(Justice Levine’s concurring opinion discussing the judiciary’s responsibilities under Canon 3(B)(6), N.D.C.J.C.); Johnson v. Johnson, 544 N.W.2d 519, 522 (N.D.1996)(noting it is “reprehensible and unacceptable” to permit the suggestion in the record that physical violence would have been appropriate against Sybil Johnson).
[¶ 18] The trial court’s custody determination was induced by an erroneous view of the law. I would reverse the custody award and remand it to the trial court to determine whether Stuart overcame the statutory presumption which arises against him based on the trial court’s finding of fact that Stuart’s violence was greater. I would direct the trial court to redetermine custody from that point in this case.
[¶ 19] MAKING and MESCHKE, JJ., concur.