Court Opinion

ID: 9402428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 18:00:51.732705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:59.586197
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 SRINIVASA SAI TEZA
 MUKKAVILLI,

                      Plaintiff,
                                                         Case No. 22-cv-2289 (TNM)

                       v.

 UR M. JADDOU, Director, U.S. Citizenship and
 Immigration Services, et al.,

                       Defendants.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Indian national Srinivasa Sai Teza Mukkavilli invested nearly one million dollars in an

equestrian center in rural America. He did so for a shot at lawful permanent residency through

the “investor visa” program. But he has not received a visa. So Mukkavilli sued the Director of

the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Secretary of State under the

Administrative Procedure Act. He argues that USCIS unlawfully withheld and unreasonably

delayed his investor visa and petition for permanent residency. Mukkavilli also argues that

USCIS’s decision to stop expediting various visa petitions was arbitrary and capricious. Among

other things, he seeks an order compelling the agency to adjudicate his visa petition within two

weeks and vacatur of certain ﬁnal agency actions. �e Government moves to dismiss.

       �e Court will grant that motion. It lacks jurisdiction over Mukkavilli’s claims that the

agency is unlawfully withholding a rural visa number (Count I), adjudication of his permanent

residency petition (Count II), and an investor visa number (Count III). And Mukkavilli fails to

                                                1
state claims for the rest: USCIS’s denial of an expedite is committed to agency discretion by law

(Count IV) and it has not unreasonably delayed adjudication of his investor visa petition (Count

V).

                                                  I.

                                                 A.

       First, some background on the investor visa program and how those visa petitions are

processed. �e Immigration and Nationality Act provides visas to immigrants who help create

American jobs. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5). Foreign investors can obtain visas several ways.

One is to contribute to a USCIS-designated “regional center”—an entity that creates jobs

indirectly through economic growth. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E).

       Congress established the regional center program as a ﬁve-year pilot. See Departments of

State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1992,

Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 610(a) (Oct. 6, 1992) (previously codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 note). It set

aside 300 visas a year for foreign investors who met certain criteria. See id. After its initial

sunset, Congress periodically reauthorized the program until 2021. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv.

Program Oﬀ., No. 22-cv-1576, 2022 WL 17173186, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2022) (summarizing

this history). But in June 2021, the program lapsed for nine months. See id.

       �en, in March 2022, Congress revamped it. See EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022

(“Reform Act”), Pub. L. 117-103, 136 Stat. 1070 (2022) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)).

Apparently, some regional centers were fraudulent and raised national security concerns. See,

e.g., Mirror Lake Vill., LLC v. Wolf, 971 F.3d 373, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Henderson, J.,

concurring) (noting these problems); see also News Release, Grassley, Leahy Introduce New EB-

5 Investor Visa Integrity Reforms (Mar. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/WB34-F743. So Congress

                                                  2
reformed the program, reauthorized it through 2027, and changed parts of the investor visa

process. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E).

       One change is particularly important here. �e Reform Act reserves percentages of visas

for three types of foreign investors: twenty percent for investors in rural areas, ten percent for

investors in high unemployment areas, and two percent for investors in infrastructure projects.

See id. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i). In other words, the Act made it easier for investors who qualify for

one of these categories to get a visa.

                                                 B.

       After making a qualifying investment, a foreign national may petition USCIS for

classiﬁcation as an immigrant investor using an I-526 petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6. Such

petitions must include evidence that the investor has put “the required amount of capital at risk

for the purpose of generating a return,” supporting documentation, and fees. Id. § 204.6(a), (j).

�ose petitions are one of the ﬁrst steps to becoming a lawful permanent resident. See Palakuru

v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp. 3d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2021).

       Under the Reform Act, immigrant investors may ﬁle Form I-485 to obtain a green card at

the same time as Form I-526. See Pub. L. 117-103, § 102(d), 136 Stat. 1070, 1075 (2022)

(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1255); see also Green Card for Immigrant Investors, USCIS,

https://perma.cc/67VK-6ZEW. If USCIS approves these petitions, the immigrant is promoted to

“conditional” lawful permanent resident status for two years. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.2(a); see also

Wang v. USCIS, 375 F. Supp. 3d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2019). After that waiting period, the investor

may petition for those conditions to be removed using yet another form if he has satisﬁed the

investment and job-creation requirements. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.6.

       But properly ﬁling the investor visa petition is only half the battle. �ere must also be a

                                                  3
visa available for the type of immigrant applying. Often, the odds are slim. A limited number of

employment-based visas are available each year, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d), and the same is true for

investor visas, see id. § 1153(b)(5)(A). Complicating matters further, each country can claim

only seven percent of the available visas, regardless of demand. See id. § 1152(a)(2). In sum,

the number of investor visas is limited, and even if one is available, an immigrant may be out of

luck if too many of his countrymen have already claimed visas.

       When demand exceeds supply for investor visas or for those from a given country,

applicants are put on a waiting list. See id. § 1153(e)(3). Each applicant in the queue is assigned

a “priority date”—typically the day on which he ﬁled his petition. 22 C.F.R. § 42.54. To help

applicants understand whether a visa may be available for those who ﬁled when they did, the

State Department publishes a chart each month listing generic cut-oﬀ dates for categories of

petitions. �e January 2023 chart 1 reads:

Employment-based         CHINA           INDIA           MEXICO           PHILIPPINES
5th Unreserved
(including C5, T5, I5,   22MAR15         08NOV19         C                C
R5)
5th Set Aside:
                         C               C               C                C
Rural (20%)
5th Set Aside: High
                    C                    C               C                C
Unemployment (10%)
5th Set Aside:
                         C               C               C                C
Infrastructure (2%)

       �e bottom three rows correspond to the Reform Act’s new categories for rural, high

unemployment, and infrastructure investors—visas are “reserved” for these investors. As the

January 2023 chart indicates, visas remain “current” (marked with a C)—or available—under all

1
  �is chart is lightly edited to remove irrelevant columns and rows. See Visa Bulletin for
January 2023, Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/Z94U-X2GT.

                                                 4
three categories. �e “5th Unreserved” category corresponds to all other investors. And it has

cut-oﬀ dates for Chinese and Indian investors, indicating that investor visas have run out for

those countries, at least for now. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i)(II) (reserved visas not used

within two ﬁscal years will be made available to those in the unreserved category).

       An investor may access this chart to see whether a visa may be available for immigrants

like him. First, the investor must ﬁgure out whether he is in the reserved or unreserved category.

Second, he must compare his priority date with the one listed in the chart. If his priority date

falls before the cut-oﬀ date in the applicable box, visas remain available. But if his priority date

falls after the cut-oﬀ date, the visa supply has run out. If there is a “C” in the applicable box,

visas remain available for immigrants like him regardless of his priority date.

       For example, if an Indian national invested the required amount in a regional center and

successfully petitioned for an investor visa back in 2017, he would fall in the “unreserved”

category, which has a cut-oﬀ date of November 8, 2019. According to the January 2023 chart,

visas are available for investors like him. But if an Indian national invested after November 8,

2019, and does not qualify for one of the reserved categories, he is out of luck.

       Because USCIS processes petitions daily and updates its bulletin monthly, sometimes the

cut-oﬀ date moves backward or “retrogresses.” See Adjudicative Review, USCIS Policy Manual,

Vol. 7, Part A, Ch. 6, USCIS, https://perma.cc/CG9A-QTFR. As USCIS explains, “[s]ometimes

[an immigrant visa number] that is current one month will not be current the next month, or the

cut-oﬀ date will move backwards to an earlier date . . . when the annual limit for a category or

country has been used up or is expected to be used up soon.” Id. So unlike many other waiting

lists, having waited longer does not necessarily mean one is any closer to a visa.

       USCIS’s approach to processing investor visas has also changed over time. Historically,

                                                  5
it took a “ﬁrst-in, ﬁrst-out” approach—adjudicating investor visa petitions based on date ﬁled.

See USCIS Adjusts Process for Managing EB-5 Visa Petition Inventory, USCIS, (Jan. 29, 2020),

https://perma.cc/A76G-J3GK (“Processing Announcement”). For example, a Chinese investor’s

petition ﬁled on July 1 would be adjudicated before a Mexican investor’s petition ﬁled days later.

       But this system made little sense if all the visas for China were already taken. So to

increase eﬃciency, USCIS shifted to an “availability approach.” Id. Now, it prioritizes petitions

from countries “where visas are immediately available, or soon available” based on those

country limits it publishes monthly. Id. �us, no matter who ﬁled ﬁrst, if visas are available for

Mexico but not for China, the Mexican investor gets priority. USCIS also considers whether it

has already reviewed the underlying project. See Questions and Answers: EB-5 Immigrant

Investor Program Visa Availability Approach, USCIS, (Sept. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/UTZ9-

GGRK (“Questions and Answers”). USCIS implemented this processing change in March 2020

and applied it to all pending investor visa petitions. See Processing Announcement.

       Recall that the program authorizing visas for investors in regional centers lapsed for

about nine months while Congress reworked it. See supra Part I.A. During this time, visa

processing was placed on hold. See USCIS, EB-5 Reform & Integrity Act of 2022 Listening

Session at 4, https://perma.cc/G29S-QMPP. After the Reform Act passed, USCIS resumed

processing. It informed investors that it would process pre-Act petitions based on the law and

regulations in eﬀect when they were ﬁled. See EB-5 What’s New, Alerts, https://perma.cc/ST77-

N7B6 (“EB-5 Alerts”); see also Eligibility Requirements, USCIS Policy Manual, USCIS, Vol. 6,

Part G, Ch. 2, https://perma.cc/7BWV-837U (“Eligibility Requirements”). Relevant here, pre-

Reform Act applicants are not eligible for the new visa set-asides, one of which reserves twenty

percent of visas for investors in rural areas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i). �is matters

                                                6
because more visas are “current” (available) for investors in the Act’s new set-asides. See, e.g.,

Visa Bulletin Chart.

                                                 C.

       Mukkavilli is an Indian national who invested in a USCIS-approved regional center. See

Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 100, 122, ECF No. 11. He claims he chose one in Appalachia

called Tryon International Equestrian Center because its website boasted that USCIS was

expediting its investors’ visas. See id. ¶¶ 100–03. �e web address Mukkavilli provides, see

Compl. ¶ 82, is now defunct. But the original website pledged “priority processing speeds” for

those who invest in its regional center and cites promising statistics. See EB-5 Fast,

https://perma.cc/4S22-F5KH (cited in Da Costa, 2022 WL 17173186, at *9). But it also includes

several disclaimers in ﬁne print. See id. For example, the website notes that past processing

times are not indicative of future results, and that investment in the center “involves a high

degree of risk of the loss of the investment[.]” Id.

       Based on the website’s advertising, and despite the disclaimers, Mukkavilli invested

nearly a million dollars in the regional center and applied for an investor visa in September 2020.

See id. ¶¶ 105, 122; see also Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. At that time, investor visas were “current”

(available) for Indian nationals. See Compl. ¶ 107; see also Visa Bulletin for September 2022,

Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/KA2Z-J2LK.

       Months later, Mukkavilli contacted USCIS to ask about the expedite Tryon advertised.

See Compl. ¶ 108. USCIS responded that it had initially granted some expedites connected to

the Center because of the impending 2018 World Equestrian Games. See Ex. C, ECF No. 1-3

(“USCIS Letter”). But any additional expedites given after the Games were mistakes. See id.;

see also Compl. ¶ 109. So USCIS rejected Mukkavilli’s request for an expedite simply because

                                                  7
he is aﬃliated with the Tryon Center, but it informed him that he could apply for an expedite

under other criteria. See USCIS Letter; see also Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 21, ECF No.

14 (citing Requests to Expedite Applications or Petitions, USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 1, Part A,

Ch. 5, https://perma.cc/W4BW-B5ZE).

       In May 2022, while his investor visa petition was pending, Mukkavilli ﬁled a Form I-485

to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. See Compl. ¶ 111. At that time, the Visa

Bulletin listed both the “reserved” and “unreserved” categories for Indian nationals as current—

meaning visas were available. See Visa Bulletin for May 2022, U.S. Dep’t of State,

https://perma.cc/MVL8-FZCC. But between September and October 2022, USCIS’s practice of

reserving rural visas under the Reform Act’s new set-asides changed the number of visas

available in the “unreserved” category. See Compl. ¶ 114.

       �us, Mukkavilli’s visa petition was no longer current as of the October 2022 visa

bulletin. See id. �e October 2022 visa bulletin informed Indian nationals that if they had ﬁled

before November 8, 2019, no visas were available to them. Compare Visa Bulletin for

September 2022, Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/KA2Z-J2LK, with Visa Bulletin for October

2022, Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/JTW4-G9W8. Because no visa is available for

Mukkavilli—an Indian national in the “unreserved” category—USCIS is not acting on his

petitions under its “availability approach” to processing. See Compl. ¶ 129. While Mukkavilli

refers to this as an “adjudication hold policy,” see, e.g., id. ¶ 138, it is merely what happens to

petitions when visas run out.

       So Mukkavilli sued. �e core of his suit is that USCIS is unreasonably delaying a

decision on his investor visa petition. See id. ¶¶ 159–274 (Count V). He also argues that USCIS

is unlawfully withholding (1) a rural visa for him under the Reform Act’s new set-asides, see id.

                                                  8
¶¶ 125–31 (Count I), (2) ﬁnal adjudication of his adjustment of status petition, see id. ¶¶ 133–41

(Count II), and (3) adjudication of his investor visa petition if his adjustment of status petition is

approved (Count III), see id. ¶¶ 142–49. Mukkavilli also contends that USCIS arbitrarily and

capriciously cancelled its prior decision to expedite visas—including his own—for investors in

Tryon. See id. ¶¶ 151–56. Finally, Mukkavilli seeks fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

See id. ¶¶ 275–78.

       �e Government moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to

state a claim. �e Court held a motions hearing, see Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (Hr’g Tr.), ECF No. 18,

after which it ordered supplemental brieﬁng, see Order, ECF No. 17; Gov’t Suppl. Mem., ECF

No. 19; Pl.’s Suppl. Mem., ECF No. 20. �e Government’s motion to dismiss is ripe.

                                                  II.

       Under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court presumes that a claim “lies outside [its] limited

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Plaintiﬀs

bear the burden of overcoming that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Because subject matter jurisdiction

implicates this Court’s power to hear a claim, the Court gives the allegations “closer scrutiny”

than would be required for a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Nepal v. Dep’t of State,

602 F. Supp. 3d 115, 123 (D.D.C. 2022). And the Court “may consider materials outside the

pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction[.]” Jerome

Stevens Pharma., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

       To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). �e plaintiﬀ

must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

                                                   9
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While the complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations, it must provide more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

       Courts “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and . . . grant the plaintiﬀ the

beneﬁt of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d

643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). But the Court credits neither legal conclusions couched

as factual allegations, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, nor inferences unsupported by the facts of the

complaint, see Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006). �e Court may consider

“any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint, and matters of which

[courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,

624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

                                                 III.

       �e Government moves to dismiss both for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim. First, it argues that Mukkavilli’s unlawful withholding claims (Counts I–

III) are not ripe, and that he fails to state a claim on Count I. At the motions hearing and in

supplemental brieﬁng, the Government also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Counts

I–III because Mukkavilli fails to allege a discrete, required agency action. Second, the

Government avers that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review his claim that USCIS arbitrarily

and capriciously cancelled expedites for certain EB-5 visas because the decision was

discretionary (Count IV). �e Government also argues that Mukkavilli fails to state a claim on

Count IV. �ird, the Government argues that Mukkavilli fails to state a claim for unreasonable

                                                 10
delay (Count V). �e Court addresses each argument in turn. 2

                                                 A.

         �e Government moves to dismiss Mukkavilli’s claims of unlawful withholding (Counts

I–III) on ripeness grounds. “[A]n Article III court cannot entertain the claims of a litigant unless

they are constitutionally and prudentially ripe.” Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165

F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Constitutional ripeness—like standing—requires an injury that is

ongoing or “certainly impending.” Id.

         Prudential ripeness, on the other hand, prevents courts “from entangling themselves in

abstract disagreements over administrative policies, [and] protect[s] the agencies from judicial

interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its eﬀects felt in a concrete

way by the challenging parties.” In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To

avoid such entanglement, courts balance their interests and those of the agency “in delaying

review against the [plaintiﬀ’s] interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency

action.” See id. (cleaned up). A motion to dismiss on ripeness grounds is analyzed under Rule

12(b)(1). See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

         Recall that Mukkavilli argues that USCIS is unlawfully withholding (1) a rural visa

number to him under the Reform Act’s set-asides, see Compl. ¶¶ 125–31, (2) adjudication of his

2
  �e Court will grant the Government’s motion to waive compliance with Local Civil Rule
7(n)’s requirement that it submit an index of the administrative record. See MTD at 12 n.5;
accord Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 50 n.6 (collecting authorities explaining that an index is
unnecessary in cases involving agency inaction). While Mukkavilli claims he “reserves the right
to add additional reasons” to his Complaint after the record is produced, the Court disagrees.
Production of the record is unnecessary to resolve the arguments in the Government’s motion. If
Mukkavilli wishes to add to his Complaint, he must move for leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2); LCvR 7(i).

                                                 11
petition to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident, see id. ¶¶ 133–41, and (3) an investor

visa number, see id. ¶¶ 143–49. �e crux of the Government’s ripeness argument is that these

claims are “wholly contingent upon future events, and thus do[] not present a live case or

controversy.” MTD at 12–13.

       According to the Government, there is no live case about whether USCIS is withholding

a visa reserved for rural areas because “there has not been any ﬁnal agency action” approving his

initial investor visa petition—likely because no investor visas are available for Indian nationals

who ﬁled when he did. See id. at 13. So too for his adjustment of status petition and investor

visa number. See id. at 16–18. On prudential ripeness, the Government suggests that this Court

should let the administrative process run its course before issuing a decision. See id. at 13. �e

Court disagrees with both theories. 3

       Mukkavilli claims he was injured by USCIS’s unlawful withholding of visa numbers.

See Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Pl.’s Resp.) at 1–2 & n.1, ECF No. 15. �e agency inaction

is what inﬂicts his injury. Accord Gomez v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145, 200 (D.D.C. 2020)

(agency inaction on diversity visas harmed plaintiﬀs); Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808

F.3d 905, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (agency inaction in generating reports harmed organization that

would use them). And the Government cites no case, nor is this Court aware of any, holding that

similar unlawful withholding claims are not constitutionally ripe. Indeed, under the

Government’s logic, no case like Mukkavilli’s would ever be ripe because all requests for visas

hinge on future events.

       More, unused reserved visas will ﬂow back into the unreserved visa category after two

3
  �e Government was unclear in its brieﬁng and during the motions hearing whether it argues
constitutional or prudential ripeness. See MTD at 11–13, 16–17; Hr’g Tr. at 32–33. So the Court
addresses both.

                                                 12
years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i)(II). So as the Government conceded at oral argument,

while there is no visa available for Mukkavilli now, there may be in the future. See Hr’g Tr. at

35. �at admission further undercuts the argument that Counts I–III are constitutionally unripe.

       �e Government’s passing reference to prudential ripeness fares no better. �is case

presents no abstract disagreements over administrative policies. See, e.g., In re Aiken County,

645 F.3d at 436 (ﬁnding issue prudentially unripe because various contingencies regarding a

license application, and the agency’s position on it, will be resolved in the future). And whether

or not the Government is unlawfully withholding something from Mukkavilli is “a purely legal

question, [which] is presumptively reviewable.” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757

(D.C. Cir. 2003).

       More, Mukkavilli challenges the inner workings of the administrative process for visa

petitions, so there is no prudential reason for the Court to wait until the administrative decision

“has been formalized and its eﬀects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Wyo.

Outdoor Council, 165 F.3d at 50. Mukkavilli is already feeling the eﬀects of the alleged

unlawful withholding. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 120–22, 130. For these reasons, the Court will

decline the Government’s invitation to dismiss Counts I–III on ripeness grounds.

                                                 B.

       Still, the Court has a duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Penkoski v.

Bowser, 548 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (D.D.C. 2021). And it ﬁnds that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Mukkavilli’s unlawful withholding claims for a diﬀerent reason.

       Under the APA, this court may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(1). But an unlawful withholding claim “can proceed only where a plaintiﬀ asserts that an

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah

                                                 13
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (reversing lower court ﬁnding of subject matter

jurisdiction). �is “limitation . . . rules out judicial direction of even discrete agency action that

is not demanded by law . . . [or] agency regulations[.]” Id. at 65 (cleaned up). As the Supreme

Court has explained, this provision of the APA “carried forward” the traditional writ of

mandamus remedy. Id. at 63. And the mandamus remedy “was normally limited to enforcement

of a speciﬁc, unequivocal command, [and] the ordering of a precise, deﬁnite act . . . about which

an oﬃcial had no discretion whatever.” Id. (cleaned up).

       �e D.C. Circuit evaluates APA unlawful withholding claims and mandamus claims using

the same standard. Compare Norton, 542 U.S. at 63–64, with In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531

F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008). �is makes sense because unlawful withholding and mandamus

claims seek the same remedy: an order that USCIS take a discrete, legally required action. Cf.

Compl. ¶¶ 280, 281, 283 (asking the Court to compel USCIS to take various actions related to

Mukkavilli’s visa petitions). To show that he is entitled to such an order, Mukkavilli must

demonstrate “(1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or

oﬃcial is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists.” Am.

Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Unless all these requirements are

met, “a court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Gov’t Suppl. Mem. at

3–7.

       As the Circuit recently emphasized, the “clear and indisputable right to relief and clear

duty to act standards are . . . stringent.” Illinois v. Ferriero, 60 F.4th 704, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

To meet them, Mukkavilli must show that a law commands the relief he seeks, not merely

authorizes it. See id. And even if he can establish the “clear duty to act” requirement, separation

of powers concerns may still inhere. See id. at 715. �us, courts must “carefully examine

                                                  14
precisely what form of relief is sought by a plaintiﬀ to determine whether it seeks reallocation of

government resources or some other action that is ordinarily beyond the power of mandamus.”

Id.

       Mukkavilli has not shown that he has a clear and indisputable right to relief for Counts I–

III, or that USCIS is violating a clear duty to act. Cf. Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153

(D.D.C. 2017) (holding that immigrants failed to show that agency action on their visa petitions

was unlawfully withheld). �erefore, the Court will dismiss these claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Accord Ferriero, 60 F.4th at 713; Beshir v. Holder, 10 F. Supp. 3d 165, 171

(D.D.C. 2014); Uranga v. USCIS, 490 F. Supp. 3d 86, 98–101 (D.D.C. 2020).

                                                 1.

       Mukkavilli alleges that USCIS is unlawfully withholding a rural visa number from him.

See Compl. ¶¶ 125–31. 4 Recall that Mukkavilli applied for an investor visa before the Reform

Act passed. See id. ¶ 105; see also supra Part I.C. Recall too that the Reform Act allocated

twenty percent of visas for rural investors, but that once the agency resumed its processing, it

used pre-Act standards for pre-Act petitions. See EB-5 Alerts; see also Eligibility Requirements

(describing diﬀerent standards for pre-Act petitions). In other words, pre-Reform Act ﬁlers—

including Mukkavilli—do not qualify for the new rural set-aside.

       While Mukkavilli contests the wisdom of this policy choice, he does not show that he has

a clear and indisputable right to a rural visa number, or that USCIS is violating a clear duty to act

by not issuing him one. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 65. Mukkavilli asserts that USCIS’s choice not

4
  Mukkavilli refers at times to a “high unemployment area[]” visa. If Mukkavilli is arguing he is
also entitled to a “targeted employment area” visa under the Reform Act, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b)(5)(D)(viii) (deﬁning such areas as “rural” or one designated as high unemployment),
that claim fails for the same reasons stated in Part III.B.1. For clarity, the Court simply refers to
a rural visa for Count 1.

                                                 15
to consider his visa application under the Reform Act’s new rural category “misreads the statute

and violates congressional intent.” Compl. ¶ 127. But nothing in the Reform Act mandates that

USCIS issue him a rural visa number. Nor does he show he had an indisputable right to such a

number in the ﬁrst place.

       On the contrary, as the Government points out, the Reform Act’s new categories apply

only prospectively. See MTD at 15. �is Court recently held as such. See Del. Valley Reg’l Ctr.,

LLC v. DHS, No. 23-cv-119, 2023 WL 3863637 (D.D.C. June 7, 2023). It incorporates the

reasoning of that opinion by reference and notes a few highlights.

       �e Reform Act contains many indicators that it applies prospectively. Consider ﬁrst the

eﬀective dates sprinkled throughout the Act. In the EB-5 visa reform section—which contains

the new set-aside categories—Congress stated that “[t]he amendments made by this section shall

take eﬀect on the date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub. L. 117-103, § 102(e), 136 Stat. 1070,

1075 (2022) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 note). And in the section reauthorizing and reforming

the regional center program, Congress stated that “[t]he amendment made by this subsection

shall take eﬀect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.” Id. §

103(b)(2), 136 Stat. 1070, 1100 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 note).

       Other courts have noted that similar eﬀective dates are probative (indeed, sometimes

conclusive) evidence of solely prospective application. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,

511 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1994) (explaining that a similar statement “does not even arguably

suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date”); Lytes v. D.C.

Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ﬁnding that a delayed eﬀective date

was dispositive).

                                                 16
       More, the Reform Act explains in one provision that pre-Act standards apply to pre-Act

ﬁlers. Investors seeking to “pool” their investments “shall ﬁle for classiﬁcation” under two

diﬀerent statutory sections depending on whether they ﬁled “before [or after] the date of the

[Reform Act’s] enactment[.]” Id. § 105(a), 136 Stat. 1070, 1103 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1154(a)(1)(H)). And that new section of the Act “shall apply to any petition . . . that is ﬁled

with the Secretary of Homeland Security on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” Id.

§ 105(b), 136 Stat. 1070, 1103 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1154 note).

       �ese changes, and others, are a clean break from the prior regime. �e best reading of

the Reform Act is that it overhauled the regional center program, setting aside new percentages

of visas and raising the ﬁnancial stakes to qualify for them. See Del. Valley Reg’l Ctr., 2023 WL

3863637, at *2, 9.

       A default rule of interpretation conﬁrms this reading. Statutes typically only cover

conduct after their enactment. So too for immigration regulations. See Sage IT v. Cissna, 314 F.

Supp. 3d 203, 208 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting claim that new USCIS regulation should apply

retroactively). �is presumption against retroactivity is “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence”

because “fairness dictate[s] that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is

and to conform their conduct accordingly.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265–66.

       To be sure, the presumption typically applies to protect the objecting party from

interference with their “substantive rights, liabilities, or duties[.]” Fernandez-Vargas v.

Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006). While there is no need to protect USCIS, retroactive

application could harm post-Act investors because fewer reserved visas would be available to

them. Accord Del. Valley Reg’l Ctr., 2023 WL 3863637, at *10. In any event, Mukkavilli

presents no evidence rebutting the presumption against retroactivity. Indeed, he does not

                                                 17
meaningfully engage with USCIS’s textual and structural arguments on this point. Instead, he

claims that the agency’s retroactivity argument is a post-hoc rationalization for its prior actions,

which it failed to reasonably explain. See Pl.’s Resp. at 7. �e Court disagrees. Whether the Act

applies only prospectively is relevant to whether Mukkavilli can show an entitlement to its set-

asides.

          In sum, Mukkavilli must show that he has a clear and indisputable right to qualify for the

Act’s rural visa set-aside. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 65. Because he fails to do that, the Court will

dismiss Count I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Ferriero, 60 F.4th at 713. 5

                                                   2.

          Similarly, Mukkavilli alleges that USCIS is unlawfully withholding adjudication of his

adjustment of status petition and withholding an investor visa number. See Compl. ¶¶ 133–41,

143–49. Mukkavilli alleges that a decision to adjust his status or issue a visa number is discrete

and that USCIS “has a non-discretionary duty to make a decision” on it. Id. ¶¶ 133–34, 143. Yet

in support he points only to general regulations governing adjustment-of-status applications and

statutory silence. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 27–29; Pl.’s Resp. at 8–15; Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2–4.

          First, the regulations. Mukkavilli states that “regulations independently and collectively

demonstrate a decision on [his petition] is required.” Id. ¶ 30. But their text belies that

conclusory claim. �ese regulations merely grant USCIS jurisdiction to decide such petitions,

see 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1), and specify steps the agency must take if it approves or denies the

5
  USCIS also moves to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for the
same reasons just discussed: that the Act does not apply retroactively. See MTD at 13–16.
Mukkavilli merely alleges, without further explanation, that USCIS’s refusal to give him a rural
visa number “is unlawful because it misreads the statute and violates congressional intent.”
Compl. ¶ 127. But the Court need not credit such conclusory assertions. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. �us, 12(b)(6) is an independent basis for dismissal of Count I.

                                                  18
application, see id. § 245.2(a)(5); see also id. §§ 103.2(b)(19), 103.3. �ey impose no clear duty

on USCIS. Cf. Beshir, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 173 (ﬁnding no duty for USCIS to adjudicate

adjustment of status petitions).

         Next, the statute. Mukkavilli claims that 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) supports his unlawful

withholding claims. See Pl.’s Resp. at 9–10, 12–17; see also Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. at 3–5. �is is so

because it does not require a visa to be immediately available when USCIS adjudicates an

adjustment of status application. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. at 9. Based on that statutory silence,

Mukkavilli spins out an argument based on § 1255(a)’s structure and history, concluding it was

Congress’s intent to “knowingly reject[] the requirement to have a current visa number at

approval.” See, e.g., id. at 13–15. �e Court declines to draw inferences about Congress’s

intent, especially where those inferences stem from statutory silence. See, e.g., Oklahoma v.

Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2496–97 (2022). And the text of § 1255(a) includes no

mandatory duty to issue decisions on adjustment of status petitions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

Quite the opposite. It states that an alien’s status “may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in

his discretion” if he meets certain requirements. See id.

         Finally, Mukkavilli argues that “[w]here Congress has speciﬁcally provided a deadline

for performance, courts in the Ninth Circuit enforce it.” Compl. ¶¶ 136, 145. Perhaps. But he

points to no deadline by which USCIS must act on his adjustment of status petition or issue him

an investor visa number. �us, even if the non-binding cases he cited were persuasive, he would

still lose.

         A decision on an adjustment of status petition—for Mukkavilli or any other immigrant—

is a matter of agency discretion, not something demanded by law. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 65.

Mukkavilli points to no statute or regulation mandating that USCIS act on his adjustment of

                                                 19
status petition or to issue him an investor visa number. See id. at 66. 6 �us, the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Counts II and III. Cf. Ferriero, 60 F.4th at 713; Beshir, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 173.

                                                 C.

        Next up is Mukkavilli’s claim that USCIS arbitrarily ended expedites for the regional

center in which he invested. See Compl. ¶¶ 151–56. �e Government argues that the Court

lacks jurisdiction over this claim because the decision was committed to agency discretion by

law, and, alternatively, that he fails to state a claim. See MTD at 19–22. �e Court agrees that

Mukkavilli fails to state a claim. 7

        Recall that USCIS expedited some visas tied to the Tryon Center. See, e.g., Compl.

¶¶ 100, 183; USCIS Letter. It apparently did so to help complete the center before the 2018

World Equestrian Games. See USCIS Letter. But USCIS also explained that it mistakenly

continued expediting some investor visas after the 2018 Games. See id. Mukkavilli now claims

that its decision not to expedite his 2020 petition was arbitrary and capricious for various

6
  Mukkavilli also argues that USCIS’s “adjudication hold policies” are unlawful. Compl.
¶¶ 133, 137. Recall that the agency has no such policy. See supra Part I.C. Rather, under its
availability approach to processing, USCIS puts visa petitions from oversubscribed countries on
the back-burner to allow it to process petitions more eﬃciently. See id. More, Mukkavilli claims
that the “policy” is illegal because it “contravenes Congressional intent.” Compl. ¶¶ 138, 147.
But he never explains why, and the Court need not credit such conclusory allegations, especially
given that no such policy exists.
7
  �e D.C. Circuit has held that a complaint seeking review of an action committed to agency
discretion by law under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) “has failed to state a claim under the APA and
therefore should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6),” not Rule 12(b)(1). See Sierra Club v.
Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 526 (D.C. Cir.
2009). �ere is some tension between these holdings and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, which holds that to have subject matter jurisdiction
over an “unlawful withholding” claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), one must allege a discrete, non-
discretionary duty. See 542 U.S. at 63–64; see supra Part III.B.1. �e inverse of a non-
discretionary duty is that an action is discretionary, implicating § 701(a)(2). It seems strange that
these provisions—almost two sides of the same coin—are governed by diﬀerent standards. But
the Court need not resolve this incongruity to decide the § 701(a)(2) and § 706(1) claims here.

                                                 20
reasons. See Compl. ¶ 154. He insists that USCIS disregarded his reliance interests, did not

engage in reasoned decision-making or allow him to respond, and oﬀered a pretextual reason for

rescinding the expedite. See id.

       While many ﬁnal agency actions are reviewable under the APA, this Court may not

review one that is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see also

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 829 (1985). An action is committed to agency discretion if a

statute provides “no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of

discretion.” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. �is is so because courts lack a “concrete limitation[] to

impose on the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Sec’y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d

151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

       To evaluate whether an action is committed to the agency’s discretion, this Court

considers “both the nature of the administrative action at issue and the language and structure of

the statute[.]” Id. Mukkavilli points to no statute that authorizes USCIS to expedite investor visa

petitions. See generally Compl. Indeed, at times he argues that USCIS acted unlawfully by

expediting at all. See, e.g., id. ¶ 222; see also Hr’g Tr. at 12–13.

       Regardless, such a decision is committed to agency discretion by law. See MTD at 20–

22. �e Reform Act’s predecessor—which governed when Mukkavilli petitioned—states that the

Secretary “may give priority to petitions ﬁled by aliens seeking admission[.]” Pub. L. No. 102-

395, § 610(d) (Oct. 6, 1992), as amended by Pub. L. 108-156 (Dec. 3, 2003) (repealed Mar. 15,

2022). And the Reform Act includes similar language, explaining that the Secretary “may

process petitions in a manner and order” he establishes. See Pub. L. 117-103, § 103(b)(1), 136

Stat. 1070, 1075 (2022) (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(E)(ii)).

       Both versions suggest that the decision to expedite a petition—or not—is committed to

                                                  21
the Government’s discretion. �e “usual presumption is that ‘may’ confers discretion.” Zhu v.

Gonzalez, 411 F.3d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up); see also Citizens for Responsibility &

Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the word ‘may’

imposes no constraints on the [agency’s] judgment”). And the Circuit has held that similar

provisions commit decisions to agency discretion, shielding them from judicial review. For

example, it found that the Attorney General has “complete discretion” to waive requirements for

work visas where the statute states he “may” “waive the [statutory] requirements” “when [he]

deems it to be in the national interest[.]” Zhu, 411 F.3d at 293, 295–96.

         So too here. Neither version of the investor visa statute supplies standards for courts to

judge the agency’s exercise of discretion. Decisions about processing and prioritization are left

to the Secretary. USCIS conﬁrms this on its website, stating that the “decision to accommodate

an expedite request is within [its] sole discretion.” See Requests to Expedite Applications or

Petitions, USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 1, Part A, Ch. 5, https://perma.cc/W4BW-B5ZE. And it

lists the criteria that it considers, including ﬁnancial consequences, emergencies, other urgent

humanitarian reasons, and more. See id. In other words, the decision to grant an expedite is “a

matter of grace” that requires a “favorable exercise of discretion.” Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct.

1614, 1619 (2022).

         Because “no standards for judging the agency action are discernable, meaningful judicial

review is impossible, and agency action is shielded from the scrutiny of the courts[.]” Make the

Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2020). �e Court will therefore dismiss Count IV

for failure to state a claim. 8

8
    Mukkavilli conceded that Count IV is his “weakest claim.” See Hr’g Tr. at 12.

                                                  22
                                                D.

       Finally, Mukkavilli argues that USCIS has unreasonably delayed a decision on his

investor visa petition. See Compl. ¶¶ 159–274. He contends that a delay of about 25 months

violates the APA, which requires USCIS to act “within a reasonable time.” Id. ¶ 117; see also id.

¶ 105 (stating that he petitioned for an EB-5 visa in September 2020). 9 �e Government argues

that Mukkavilli fails to state a claim for unreasonable delay. See MTD at 23–41. �e Court

agrees with the Government.

       “�ere is no per se rule as to how long is too long to wait for agency action[.]” In re Am.

Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Addressing an

unreasonable delay claim is “ordinarily a complicated and nuanced task requiring consideration

of particular facts and circumstances before the court.” So courts in this Circuit consider the so-

called TRAC factors:

       (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;

       (2) when Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it

       expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply

       content for this rule of reason;

       (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable

       when human health and welfare are at stake;

9
  �e Government argues that Mukkavilli’s petition has been pending for “less than two years”
because the eight months during which Congress failed to reauthorize the program should not
“be counted against the agency.” MTD at 29–30. �e Court is inclined to agree because USCIS
lacked any authority to issue visas for regional centers during this time. Accord Da Costa, 2022
WL 17173186, at *6 (collecting cases holding the same). But even if the petition has been
pending for more than two years, as Mukkavilli asserts, see Pl.’s Resp. at 28, the Court ﬁnds that
the delay is not unreasonable.

                                                23
       (4) the eﬀect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing

       priority;

       (5) the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and

       (6) the court need not ﬁnd any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to

       hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

       �e Government suggests in supplemental brieﬁng that courts need not conduct TRAC

analysis if no clear, non-discretionary duty has been identiﬁed. See Gov’t Suppl. Mem. at 2 n.1,

7. �is seems right because even if the Court ﬁnds the delay unreasonable, if there is no clear,

non-discretionary duty to act, there is nothing the Court may mandamus. See, e.g., Norton, 542

U.S. at 63, n.1 (“[A] delay cannot be unreasonable with respect to action that is not required.”).

But even assuming the TRAC factors apply, Mukkavilli has stated no plausible claim for relief

that USCIS unreasonably delayed adjudication of his investor visa.

                                                 1.

       �e Court ﬁrst resolves a threshold objection: Mukkavilli argues that the question of

unreasonable delay should not be evaluated at the motion-to-dismiss stage because it is too fact-

intensive. See Pl.’s Resp. at 20–21. �e Court disagrees.

       Courts in this Circuit routinely apply the TRAC factors at the motion-to-dismiss stage to

determine whether a plaintiﬀ has alleged facts suﬃcient to state a plausible claim for

unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 50 n.5 (collecting cases). Mukkavilli

argues that fact disputes exist, citing several documents he obtained through FOIA. See Hr’g Tr.

                                                24
at 4–5. 10 While the Court has reviewed these exhibits, they do not persuade it that further

discovery is warranted here. Mukkavilli fails to distinguish his case from other unreasonable

delay cases evaluated at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Gov’t Reply at 5–6, ECF No. 16.

       Mukkavilli also says this Court should not credit the Government’s version of the facts in

analyzing the TRAC factors. See Pl.’s Resp. at 21. �e Court treats his allegations as true, as it

must. But it may take judicial notice of information posted on oﬃcial government websites

without transforming the Government’s motion into one for summary judgment. See, e.g.,

Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 163 n.3 (D.D.C. 2021).

       �e Court analyzes the TRAC factors in groups.

                                                 2.

       �e ﬁrst and second TRAC factors assess “whether the agency’s response time complies

with an existing speciﬁed schedule and whether it is governed by an identiﬁable rationale.” Ctr.

for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. FDA, 74 F. Supp. 3d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 2014). �ese two factors are

“typically considered together,” Milligan v. Pompeo, 502 F. Supp. 3d 302, 317 (D.D.C. 2020),

though the ﬁrst is the “most important,” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d at 855.

       Recall that USCIS manages investor visa petitions using an “availability approach,”

prioritizing petitions for aliens from countries with available visas. See Processing

Announcement. �en, when visas are available for investors from a certain country, the “ﬁrst-in,

ﬁrst-out” method kicks back in. See Questions and Answers. �is is an identiﬁable rationale.

And it makes sense based on USCIS’s priorities, which include eﬃciency and processing

10
    As the Government notes, some of these documents are appended to Mukkavilli’s original
Complaint and others are attached to his Opposition. See Gov’t Reply at 4, n.2, ECF No. 16
(listing exhibits). None are attached to his Amended Complaint. �ey are thus arguably not
properly before the Court now.

                                                25
investor visas from “traditionally underrepresented countries.” MTD at 25. �is Court echoes a

growing chorus holding that USCIS’s investor visa adjudication process is governed by a rule of

reason. Accord Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 51; see also DaCosta, 2022 WL 17173186, at *8

(collecting authorities holding the same).

       Mukkavilli argues that Congress wants visas adjudicated within 180 days. See Compl.

¶ 191. He cites 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) in support, which states that “[i]t is the sense of Congress

that the processing of an immigration beneﬁt application should be completed not later than 180

days after the initial ﬁling of the application.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Reply at 34. But a “sense of

Congress resolution is not law.” Emergency Coal. to Def. Educ. Travel v. Dep’t of Treasury, 545

F.3d 4, 14 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Mukkavilli thus wisely concedes that this provision is “not

mandatory.” Compl. ¶ 193; see also id. ¶ 194 (calling the provision a “legislative aspiration”).

Several courts agree. See, e.g., Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 153–54; Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at

51–52. Even if this provision provides some “indication of the speed with which [Congress]

expects the agency to proceed,” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80, it does not change the Court’s rule-of-

reason analysis.

       Mukkavilli levies a few other counterarguments. First, he claims that USCIS lacks a rule

of reason because it “systemically prioritizes later ﬁled petitions over earlier ﬁled petitions.”

Compl. ¶¶ 167–68. And he argues that investor visa petitions ﬁled after his have already been

decided because of USCIS’s visa expedites for the Tryon Center. See id. ¶¶ 176, 183–84. But he

provides no factual support for these conclusory assertions. Nor does he allege that other

immigrants from his country with later-ﬁled petitions were expedited ahead of him. And, as

explained, USCIS informed Mukkavilli that it had mistakenly expedited some visas tied to

Tryon. See USCIS Letter. �is does not disturb the Court’s conclusion that USCIS processes

                                                 26
investor petitions reasonably. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining courts need not credit

unsupported allegations). A few mistakes do not invalidate a reasoned system.

          Second, Mukkavilli raises several complaints about transparency. For example, he argues

that USCIS improperly relies on unspeciﬁed “other factors” to prioritize investor visa petitions.

See Compl. ¶ 170 (citing Questions and Answers). And he argues that the agency does not

explain how cases are assigned to an adjudicator. See id. ¶ 171. But the fact that USCIS does

not explain how cases are assigned to an adjudicator is not dispositive of whether its method of

processing petitions is reasonable. Besides, USCIS explains on the same website Mukkavilli

cites that another factor is whether the investor’s “underlying project has been reviewed.” See

Questions and Answers.

          Third, Mukkavilli points to USCIS’s slow pace in adjudicating investor visas. See

Compl. ¶¶ 177–81. He argues that because the agency is processing “historically low” numbers

of petitions despite increasing its staﬀ, its processing method must be unreasonable. See id. ¶¶

179–82. �is logic does not follow. While a backlog certainly exists, see, e.g., USCIS

Announces New Actions to Reduce Backlogs, USCIS, https://perma.cc/NBW4-6ZAQ, USCIS is

working to combat it, see, e.g., id. Indeed, its shift to the visa availability approach was one

response. See Processing Announcement. More, courts have regularly found that waiting times

like Mukkavilli’s are not unreasonable. See, e.g., Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (collecting

cases).

          In sum, TRAC factors one and two favor USCIS.

                                                 3.

          Next up is the fourth TRAC factor, or the “eﬀect of expediting delayed action on agency

activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Here, the D.C. Circuit has

                                                 27
underscored that courts should assess whether USCIS is juggling competing priorities with

limited resources. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094,

1100–02 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For courts “have no basis for reordering agency priorities.” In re

Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991). �e Circuit has thus “refused to grant

relief,” despite all the other TRAC favors favoring it, when “a judicial order putting the petitioner

at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.”

Id.

       So too here. Were the Court to compel USCIS to adjudicate Mukkavilli’s petition, it

would move him ahead of other similarly-situated investors simply because he sued. More,

forcing the agency to act on his petition when there are no investor visas for Indian nationals, see

supra Part I.B (discussing the Visa Bulletins), raises signiﬁcant separation of powers concerns,

see Ferriero, 60 F.4th at 715 (noting that separation of powers may counsel against mandamus

relief). �is is so because Congress has capped the number of employment-based visas

available, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d), and the number of visas available per country, see id. §

1152(a)(2). And there are no more investor visas available to Indian nationals. See supra Part

I.B. So not only would an order move Mukkavilli ahead in line, it would also command USCIS

to exceed the country caps Congress prescribed.

       Mukkavilli’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, he claims that compelling action

on his petition would not move him to the front of the line because there is no line. See Compl.

¶¶ 221–23. Rather, according to Mukkavilli, USCIS has a “pool” of investor visa petitions,

which it decides in an “arbitrary order.” Id. ¶ 221. Not so.

       As explained, USCIS processes petitions reasonably by prioritizing investors whose

countries have available visas. See supra Part III.A.2. �en, it uses a ﬁrst-in, ﬁrst-out approach.

                                                 28
See id. So compelling USCIS to act on his petition would allow him to jump the line of other

Indian nationals who invested in a regional center who ﬁled petitions earlier.

       Second, he argues that USCIS already prioritizes regional center petitions for investors.

See Compl. ¶ 216. Maybe so, but USCIS also prioritizes petitions based on whether visas are

available to investors from particular countries, and there are none for India.

       Third, Mukkavilli contends that compelling action on his petition will not interfere with

agency priorities because the agency could process all petitions if it wished to. See id. ¶¶ 208–

15. �is is unpersuasive. Mukkavilli oﬀers no support for this assertion beyond his opinion that

USCIS is moving slower than necessary given its resources.

       Fourth, and ﬁnally, Mukkavilli claims that the regional center program “never lapsed”

and accuses USCIS of improperly focusing on immigration investigations rather than

adjudications. See id. ¶¶ 242–61. �e Court is hard-pressed to understand how these arguments

relate to the TRAC analysis. And as USCIS points out, they suﬀer from factual and logical

inconsistencies. See MTD at 30–31.

       In sum, granting Mukkavilli the relief he seeks would interfere with agency priorities,

move him ahead of similarly situated investors, and potentially violate the separation of powers.

�e fourth TRAC factor thus decisively favors USCIS.

                                                 4.

       �e Court looks next to TRAC factors three and ﬁve. �ese involve “the interests

prejudiced by delay,” including the impact on “human health and welfare.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at

80. Mukkavilli argues that he cannot travel or tend to his parents, and that the delay has caused

his family anxiety and stress. See Compl. ¶¶ 119–20. He also claims that he passed up other

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employment-visa opportunities because he thought his investor visa would be processed quickly.

See id. ¶ 121. And he explains that he lost almost a million dollars. See id. ¶ 122.

       �e Court has no doubt that Mukkavilli has an interest in prompt adjudication. But many

other investors do too. More, to receive an investor visa, Mukkavilli knew that he had to put his

money “at risk.” See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.6. At most, factors three and ﬁve only slightly favor

ﬁnding an unreasonable delay. Even so, they do not tip the balance against the other factors that

favor the Government. Accord Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 53. USCIS juggles competing

priorities when it adjudicates visas, including congressionally mandated country and program

limits. Mukkavilli’s individual interests do not overcome these systemic interests.

                                                5.

       Finally, the sixth TRAC factor is neutral. It instructs courts that they “need not ﬁnd any

impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably

delayed.’” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Mukkavilli argues that USCIS “promised expedited

treatment” for his investor visa, but then cancelled the expedite without notice. Compl. ¶ 268.

       �e Court ﬁnds this bad-faith argument unpersuasive for a few reasons. First, Mukkavilli

alleges it was the center’s website that promised him that his petition would be expedited, not

USCIS. See id. ¶¶ 99–103; see also EB-5 Fast, https://perma.cc/4S22-F5KH. Second, one of

Mukkavilli’s exhibits shows that USCIS notiﬁed him that it was not going to expedite his

petition, and that past expedites had been mistakes. See USCIS Letter. Perhaps wisely,

Mukkavilli drops these arguments in support of the sixth factor in his opposition. See generally

Pl.’s Resp.

       �e sixth factor is thus neutral and does not alter the Court’s analysis.

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                                                 IV.

       In sum, the Court will dismiss Mukkavilli’s unlawful withholding claims (Counts I–III)

for lack of jurisdiction. And he fails to state a claim for Count I. �e Court will also dismiss

Mukkavilli’s claim that USCIS arbitrarily refused to expedite his petition for failure to state a

claim because that decision was committed to agency discretion by law (Count IV). Finally, the

Court ﬁnds that Mukkavilli states no claim for unreasonable delay under the TRAC factors

(Count V). Because Mukkavilli is not a “prevailing party,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412, his request for

attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, see Compl. ¶¶ 275–78, will be denied. For

these reasons, the Court will grant the Government’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order will

issue today.

                                                                              2023.06.15
Dated: June 15, 2023                                                          12:35:37 -04'00'
                                                              _____________________________
                                                              TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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