Court Opinion

ID: 9906430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 07:09:46.176148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:23.318440
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed November 30, 2023

                                    In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  __________

                              No. 11-22-00222-CR
                                  __________

                      RONNIE JACKSON, Appellant

                                       V.

                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 35th District Court
                             Brown County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CR28209

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, Ronnie Jackson, was indicted for the offense of attempted
aggravated kidnapping, a second-degree felony.      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 15.01, 20.04 (West 2019). After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted and
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice.
        In eight issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under
Rules 401, 403, and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Appellant
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of his 2000
and 2013 indecent-exposure offenses, and the testimony of: (1) Frances Diaz, who
testified that Appellant was looking at other young girls besides the victim while in
Hobby Lobby; (2) David McNeal, who identified Appellant to police, and told the
trial court that Appellant asked about the consequences of human trafficking;
(3) Isidro Laureles, who testified that Appellant showed him a disturbing video;
(4) N.B., the victim of Appellant’s 2013 indecent-exposure offense; (5) J.W., the
victim of Appellant’s 2000 indecent-exposure offense, along with the two
responding officers; (6) Stormy Raines, who saw Appellant masturbating in public
in 2019; and (7) Christy Mares, who testified that Appellant followed her and her
daughter in another store some time in 2020. We affirm.
                                      I. Factual Background
        On September 15, 2020, around 7:00 p.m., Isis Ruiz-Vargas and her four-
year-old daughter, L.R., 1 were in Hobby Lobby in Early, Texas. Appellant, who had
been in Hobby Lobby since 6:25 p.m., followed Ruiz-Vargas and L.R. throughout
the store. Appellant made Ruiz-Vargas feel uncomfortable as he passed her and L.R.
multiple times.
        Ruiz-Vargas took L.R. to look at dolls and dollhouses before they left. As
they began to walk to the checkout line, L.R. ran to the Christmas decorations. Ruiz-
Vargas saw Appellant, who was standing by the Christmas ornaments, “sway his
arms” at L.R. like he was trying to “scoop her in.” After Appellant lunged for L.R.,
getting “[w]ithin inches” of her, Ruiz-Vargas grabbed L.R. and went to find help.

        1
          A pseudonym is used for the child victim throughout the opinion to protect the child’s identity.
See, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). The adult victims are also identified by pseudonyms in this opinion.

                                                    2
      The first Hobby Lobby employee that Ruiz-Vargas alerted was Cason Taylor,
who testified that Ruiz-Vargas “looked like she was scared.” Ruiz-Vargas told
Taylor, “‘[s]omebody tried to take my daughter from me,’” and identified Appellant
as he “made a bee line for the door.” Taylor described Appellant’s clothing,
including his distinct “boonie hat.”        Ruiz-Vargas and other witnesses called
Appellant’s hat a “fisherman hat” or “safari hat.”
      The Early Police Department posted still photographs on Facebook from
Hobby Lobby’s surveillance video footage seeking information about Appellant’s
identity. David McNeal recognized Appellant as his former employee and called
the police. McNeal identified Appellant and reported that “maybe a week before”
September 15, Appellant told him that he suspected an acquaintance was engaged in
trafficking and kidnapping people. Appellant then asked McNeal: “What do you
think would happen if someone was [sic] to be doing that? What would their
punishment be?” McNeal wondered why anyone would ask that question and said
“it struck a nerve.”
      Appellant was ultimately apprehended and charged with attempted
aggravated kidnapping. See PENAL §§ 15.01, 20.04. Appellant waived his right to
a jury trial and his trial proceeded before the trial court.
      At trial, the State presented eighteen witnesses, including Ruiz-Vargas, and
several Hobby Lobby employees.           Frances Diaz was working as an assistant
manager and the head of the floral department on September 15, 2020. She saw
Appellant in the floral department “for an extended amount of time where he
appeared to be looking at . . . little girls.” Diaz testified that Appellant was acting
“creepy” and she was concerned that he was “a predator.” According to Diaz,
Appellant was looking at “at least four” people, including two teenagers, and a
mother and daughter.

                                            3
      Isidro Laureles is Appellant’s ex-girlfriend’s twenty-one-year-old son who
moved in with his mother and Appellant in July or August of 2020. Laureles testified
that Appellant showed him a “gruesome and terrifying” video, but did not provide
the details of the video’s contents.
      The trial court admitted into evidence the order of deferred adjudication
community supervision for Appellant’s indecent-exposure offense that Appellant
committed on October 17, 2013 in Odessa, and permitted the victim (N.B.) and the
handling police officers to testify about the circumstances of this offense. N.B. told
the trial court that she was in Wal-Mart in Odessa with her two-year-old daughter
when she sensed that Appellant was close behind her. She left the area because she
was afraid, but Appellant followed her. N.B. testified that Appellant exposed his
erect penis “several times,” and “was directing it to [her] daughter.” She went to the
front of the store and called the police; Appellant was later arrested.
      The State also called J.W. and two officers with the Garland Police
Department. On December 21, 2000, J.W. was Christmas shopping in K-Mart in
Garland. She first noticed Appellant when she walked into the store, and “became
more alert” by the third time she saw him near her. J.W. left the men’s slippers area
because Appellant made her feel uncomfortable. The next time she saw him was in
the card aisle, where he exposed his penis to her and began touching himself. Police
responded, confirmed Appellant’s identity, and arrested him for indecent exposure.
      The trial court also admitted evidence that on August 28, 2019, Appellant
entered a Factory Connection store near Hobby Lobby in Early, the same store where
he later attempted to abduct L.R. Appellant asked Stormy Raines, a Factory
Connection employee, about buying something for his wife. Appellant spent over
thirty minutes in the store “being awkward,” so Raines began watching him on the
store’s security camera.     She testified that when she realized Appellant was
masturbating she texted her boss; police arrived after Appellant had left the store.
                                           4
      Finally, Christy Mares testified that sometime in 2020, Appellant followed
her and her eleven-year-old daughter in the Big Lots store in Brownwood. He made
Mares feel uncomfortable when he made eye contact with her; Mares and her
daughter then left the store. Appellant was wearing his fisherman hat at the time,
which caught Mares’s attention when she saw Hobby Lobby’s surveillance
photographs on Facebook.
      The trial court found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense and sentenced
him to twenty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. This appeal followed.
                                    II. Discussion
      In eight issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence of Appellant’s
extraneous offenses or bad acts. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 403, 404.
      To convict Appellant of the charged offense, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant attempted to abduct L.R. with the intent
to: (1) hold her for ransom or reward; (2) use her as a shield or hostage; (3) facilitate
the commission of a felony or the flight after the attempt or commission of a felony;
(4) inflict bodily injury on her or violate or abuse her sexually; (5) terrorize her or a
third person; or (6) interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function.   PENAL § 20.04(a).       In addition, Appellant’s attempted aggravated-
kidnapping conviction required a showing that he had the specific intent to commit
the offense and did “an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tend[ed]
but fail[ed] to effect the commission of the offense intended.” Id. at § 15.01(a).
      A. Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). This
standard also applies to a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous-
                                           5
offense evidence. Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216–17 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022); Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.).
The trial court’s decision will be upheld as long as it was within the “zone of
reasonable disagreement.” Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018). Further, we will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, even if the trial
court’s reasoning is flawed, if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in
the record and is applicable to the case. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016).
      B. Applicable Law
      “Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.” Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d
235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 402). “Evidence is relevant
if it tends to make a fact ‘of consequence in determining the action’ more or less
probable than it would be otherwise.” Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 754
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 401).
      Evidence of a crime, wrong, or act other than the charged offense is not
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his character;
however, this evidence is generally admissible if the evidence is relevant to a fact of
consequence apart from its tendency to prove character conformity.              TEX. R.
EVID. 404(b)(1); Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216; Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756. Such
evidence may be admissible to show a defendant’s culpable mental state, intent,
opportunity, motive, preparation, plan, knowledge, or the absence of mistake or
accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Arevalo, 675 S.W.3d at 848. Thus, although
Rule 404(b) generally precludes the admission of character-conformity evidence, it
does not necessarily prohibit the admission of such evidence if it is offered to
establish some other purpose. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 342–43
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

                                           6
      Additionally, extraneous-offense evidence may be admitted to “illustrat[e]
other aspects of an indivisible criminal transaction, also known as same-transaction
contextual evidence.” Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Same-transaction contextual evidence ‘illuminate[s] the nature [and
context] of the crime alleged.’” Id. (quoting Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). A factfinder “is entitled to know all the facts that are
‘blended or closely interwoven’ with a continuous criminal episode.” Id.; Screws v.
State, 630 S.W.3d 158, 167–68 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.). Such evidence
must be necessary to the trier of fact’s understanding of the offense, such that the
charged offense would make little sense without the same-transaction evidence.
Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756.
      Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that relevant evidence may
nonetheless be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. So even if a trial court determines
that evidence is relevant and admissible for a non-conformity purpose, Rule 403 may
still preclude its admission if the trial court determines that the probative value of
the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403; Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216. Rule 403 favors the
admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will
be more probative than prejudicial. Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 34 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2021); Arevalo, 675 S.W.3d at 851. When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, a
trial court must balance:
      (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along
      with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency
      of the evidence to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, (4) any
      tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
      issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a

                                           7
         jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the
         evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
         consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence
         already admitted.
Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); Roe v. State, 660 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. ref’d.).
         Appellant challenges Diaz’s testimony under Rules 401 and 404(b), McNeal’s
testimony under Rule 403, the testimony of Laureles, N.B., Raines, and Mares under
Rules 403 and 404(b), and the admission of Appellant’s 2000 and 2013 indecent-
exposure offenses. We address the testimony of each witness and Appellant’s
corresponding evidentiary challenge in turn.
               1. Frances Diaz’s Testimony: Rules 401 & 404(b)
         Appellant complains in his first issue that the trial court erroneously permitted
Diaz to testify that she saw Appellant, on the day of the offense, in the floral
department of Hobby Lobby looking at young girls. The trial court correctly
determined that Diaz’s testimony was relevant, and part of the same criminal
transaction as the attempted aggravated kidnapping for which Appellant was being
tried.
         Other crimes, wrongs, or acts are considered same-transaction contextual
evidence when several crimes are so intermixed or connected with one another that
they form an indivisible criminal transaction, and full proof by testimony of any one
of them cannot be given without showing the others. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d
457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such evidence
is admissible “only to the extent that it is necessary to the [factfinder]’s
understanding of the offense.” Id.
         Diaz’s testimony that Appellant was looking at young girls in a creepy way,
like “a predator,” was relevant to show Appellant’s intent to violate or abuse L.R.

                                             8
sexually after he lunged for her. See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 880–81 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). This was also the beginning of a continuing transaction that
ended with Appellant’s unsuccessful attempt to abduct a four-year-old girl before
rushing out of the store. See PENAL §§ 15.01, 20.04(a)(4); Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d
at 756; Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 470. Therefore, this evidence was not only relevant
to show Appellant’s intent, it was also admissible as same-transaction contextual
evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
             2. David McNeal’s Testimony: Rule 403
      Appellant asserts in his second issue that the trial court erred when it admitted
McNeal’s testimony that Appellant asked him what a person’s punishment would be
for trafficking and kidnapping people. Because the trial court’s decision to admit
this evidence was within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we overrule
Appellant’s second issue.
      In conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the first two Gigliobianco factors focus on
the probative value of the proffered evidence. “Probative value” refers to: (1) how
strongly an item of evidence serves to make more or less probable the existence of
a fact of consequence to the litigation, (2) coupled with the proponent’s need for that
item of evidence. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. First, Appellant’s curiosity
about the consequences of “trafficking and kidnapping people” is relevant to show
what Appellant intended to do with or to L.R. had he successfully abducted her. See
PENAL § 20.04(a)(1)–(6). Second, with respect for the State’s need for the evidence,
the State’s only eyewitness to testify about this incident was Ruiz-Vargas. She saw
Appellant reach for L.R. as if he were trying to “scoop her in.” However, the State
was still required to prove that Appellant specifically intended to abduct L.R. with
the intent to commit one of the six aggravating factors listed in Section 20.04. See
PENAL § 20.04(a)(1)–(6).

                                          9
      Intent is critical in determining whether a person committed aggravated
kidnapping, and even more so when the charged offense is attempted aggravated
kidnapping.    The State’s evidence of Appellant’s requisite intent consisted of
Appellant’s statement a week prior to the offense when he asked about the
consequences of kidnapping, his 2000 and 2013 indecent-exposure offenses,
testimony that he followed women and their young daughters in various stores, and
his public masturbation in 2019. This evidence, including his curiosity about the
punishment for kidnapping and human trafficking a week before the offense, was
relevant to show his intent to abuse L.R. or violate her sexually, which accompanied
his attempt to abduct her. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Thus, the first two
factors weigh in favor of the admission of this evidence. See id.
      The final four Gigliobianco factors focus on the potential negative effects of
the proffered evidence. The third factor addresses the tendency of the evidence to
suggest a decision on an improper basis. Id. Indeed, evidence of a sexual nature
that involves children is inherently inflammatory and prejudicial. Roe, 660 S.W.3d
at 785.     All the evidence of which Appellant complains is undoubtedly
inflammatory, given its graphic, predatorial, or sexual nature. However, Rule 403
only protects a criminal defendant against unfair prejudice, not all prejudice. Ruiz v.
State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 865 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d).
      Irrespective of Appellant’s claim of prejudice, Appellant’s statement to
McNeal is highly probative of Appellant’s preparation, common scheme or plan, or
motive to abduct L.R. with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her or to violate or
abuse her sexually. See PENAL § 20.04(a)(4); Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 451
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“the ‘plan’ exception allows admission of evidence to show
steps taken by the defendant in preparation for the charged offense”).
      Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted this evidence. Moreover, any prejudicial effect of the admitted evidence is
                                          10
mitigated here because the trial was to the trial court. See Corley v. State, 987
S.W.2d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (“[W]hen a case is tried to a
trial court rather than to a jury, the danger that the trier of fact will consider
extraneous offense evidence for anything other than the limited purpose for which it
is admitted is reduced, and the likelihood that the extraneous evidence will unfairly
prejudice the defendant is diminished.”). The trial court explicitly admitted the
contested evidence to consider it only for the limited purposes of “intent, motive,
lack of mistake, and the other exceptions . . . under 404(b).” We presume that the
trial court, as the trier of fact, followed its own limiting instruction. See Roe, 660
S.W.3d at 785.
      We conclude that the probative value of McNeal’s testimony was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and any prejudicial effect
of the evidence beyond its limited purposes for admissibility were minimal.
             3. Isidro Laureles’s Testimony: Rules 403 & 404(b)
      Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court erroneously admitted
Laureles’s testimony in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b). The State purportedly
offered this testimony to show Appellant’s intrigue in causing bodily injury to
others, and the trial court agreed to consider it only for the limited purpose of
showing Appellant’s intent.
      In assessing whether evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” was properly
admitted, we generally consider the initial proffer in addition to what was admitted
at trial. Fischer v. State, 268 S.W.3d 552, 557–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Here,
however, Appellant failed to renew his objection to the proffered evidence after
Laureles’s testimony failed to match the extent of the State’s proffer. Trial courts
are limited to the information available at the time they make their evidentiary
rulings and they must be given “an opportunity to correct their own mistakes at the
most convenient and appropriate time—when the mistakes are alleged to have been
                                         11
made.” Hull v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (discussing
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1); see State v. Heath, 642 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.—Waco
2022, pet. granted) (finding no abuse of discretion based on the information the trial
court “had before it at the time of its ruling”). We thus consider whether the trial
court abused its discretion when it permitted Laureles to testify based on the State’s
proffer.
         Prior to questioning Laureles, the State advised the trial court that Laureles
would testify that he observed Appellant watching a video showing a human being
dismembered, and he noticed that Appellant appeared to be interested in the video’s
contents rather than being disturbed by it. Laureles would also purportedly testify
that he believed Appellant found the video on “the dark web,” which indicates it
depicted an actual human being dismembered rather than actors using special effects.
The trial court determined that simply discussing Appellant watching the video is “a
stretch,” but could be relevant to the aggravating factors the State was required to
prove.
         We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Laureles
to discuss the mere fact that Appellant watched a disturbing video and later showed
it to him. After Appellant’s trial counsel objected, the trial court explained, “if this
was a regular kidnapping and not aggravated, then I wouldn’t find any relevance to
it . . . [b]ut the aggravated aspect, they have to show that additional element.” The
trial court found that Laureles’s testimony on this point created only a “limited
prejudicial effect” because the State did not intend to show the actual video and the
trial court stated that it would only consider the testimony “for purposes of intent.”
         Based on the State’s submission, the trial court had enough information to
determine, within the zone of reasonable disagreement, that the evidence was
relevant to a material, non-propensity issue—Appellant’s intent and motive to
kidnap L.R. See Roe, 660 S.W.3d at 784. Had Laureles testified that the video
                                           12
depicted human dismemberment, and that Appellant was intrigued by it, such
evidence would have been probative of Appellant’s intent to inflict bodily harm on
L.R. after abducting her. See PENAL § 20.04(a)(4).
      We further conclude, after balancing the Gigliobianco factors, that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the probative value of Laureles’s
testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Proof of intent in this case, as
in most cases, required evidence of Appellant’s words and actions leading up to the
attempted abduction. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (“We cannot read an accused’s mind, and absent a confession, we must infer
his mental state from his acts, words and conduct.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, Appellant’s intrigue with a disturbing, purportedly real video of
human mutilation is indeed relevant to show what Appellant intended to do to L.R.
had he successfully abducted her. See PENAL § 20.04(a)(1)–(6).
      As for the potential negative effects of the proffered evidence, Laureles’s
testimony regarding the video itself was “not particularly probative or prejudicial.”
See Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Battaglia v.
State, No. AP-74,348, 2005 WL 1208949, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 18, 2005)
(not designated for publication)). But, for the same reason, admission of the fact
that Appellant watched a gruesome video was not unfairly prejudicial on the issue
of Appellant’s guilt. Battaglia, 2005 WL 1208949, at *7. Here, the danger of the
trial court considering Laureles’s testimony for an improper purpose, especially
given its vagueness, was minimal.         See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Laureles’s
testimony.
      Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred when it
admitted Laureles’s testimony, any such error would have been harmless. A trial
                                          13
court’s erroneous admission of evidence that does not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights will be disregarded as non-constitutional error.               TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is implicated when the trial court’s error had a
substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the factfinder’s verdict.
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
          In assessing the likelihood that the factfinder’s verdict was adversely affected
by the claimed error, we consider the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) the
character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with
other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the
existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; (4) whether the State
emphasized the complained-of error; (5) the trial court’s instructions; (6) the theory
of the case; and (7) relevant voir dire. Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2023) (citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 356–58 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002); Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 332–33 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet.
ref’d).
          Applying the harm factors, we find that any error in the admission of evidence
that Appellant watched a grisly video—the content of which was not revealed by the
witness—had only a slight influence or effect, if any, on the trial court’s verdict. See
Cook, 665 S.W.3d at 599–600. Other admitted evidence also showed that Appellant
(1) spent over an hour in Hobby Lobby watching young girls before attempting to
abduct L.R., (2) had a history of following women and young children in stores,
(3) publicly masturbated in a department store, (4) asked his former boss about the
punishment for trafficking and kidnapping people, and (5) had an empty shed on his
property in a rural area approximately ten minutes from the location of the offense.
          Likewise, the State did not mention Appellant watching a gruesome video in
its closing argument, it was not an issue in voir dire due to Appellant being tried by

                                             14
the trial court, and the trial court is presumed to follow its instruction to consider this
evidence solely for the purpose of Appellant’s intent. See Roe, 660 S.W.3d at 785.
       Given the minuscule likelihood that the trial court’s verdict was adversely
affected by the complained-of testimony, we find any alleged error was harmless.
See Cook, 665 S.W.3d at 599–600.             Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is
overruled.
       4. Appellant’s 2000 and 2013 Indecent Exposures: Rules 403 & 404(b)
       In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that the trial court erroneously admitted,
in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b), evidence of Appellant’s 2013 indecent-
exposure offense for which he was placed on deferred adjudication. Appellant
contends in his fifth issue that the testimony of N.B.—the victim of his 2013 indecent
exposure—violated Rules 403 and 404(b). In his sixth issue, citing the same
evidentiary rules, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted
testimony about Appellant’s 2000 indecent-exposure offense.
       As an initial matter, the State’s burden for admitting evidence of extraneous
offenses “is high: a trial court cannot admit extraneous-offense evidence unless a
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
extraneous offense.” Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 757 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, in addition to showing that Appellant was placed on deferred
adjudication for his 2013 indecent-exposure offense, the victim of the offense and
responding officers also testified about the circumstances of the offense. Based upon
the testimony and evidence before the trial court, there was sufficient evidence such
that a trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed
this offense. See id.
       Appellant’s commissions of indecent exposure in 2000 and 2013 were
relevant to intent, identity, and absence of mistake. In Wishert v. State, we upheld
the admission of uncharged sexual assaults against children during the appellant’s
                                            15
trial for continuous sexual abuse of a child. 654 S.W.3d at 333–34. In doing so, we
concluded that the appellant’s prior sexual abuse of other children tended to “make
a fact of consequence more probable,” and “show [the appellant’s] motive,
opportunity, and intent to commit other, similar incidents of sexually abusive
conduct for which [the appellant] was on trial.” Id. at 333. Such is the case here.
      Another rationale for admitting extraneous-offense evidence is to prove the
identity of the offender. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79,
88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The theory of relevancy to prove identity “is usually
that of modus operandi in which the pattern and characteristics of the charged crime
and the uncharged misconduct are so distinctively similar that they constitute a
‘signature.’” Segundo, 270 S.W.3d at 88 (citing Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711,
740–41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). “No rigid rules dictate what constitutes sufficient
similarities.” Id. “[R]ather, the common characteristics may be proximity in time
and place, mode of commission of the crimes, the person’s dress, or any other
elements which mark both crimes as having been committed by the same person.”
Id. Even one unique characteristic may be a “signature.” Id.
      Encompassed within Rule 404(b)’s permissible purpose of modus operandi is
the “doctrine of chances” theory to show lack of consent, motive, and the manner of
committing an offense. Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881. “[E]vidence of a remarkably
similar act might be admissible to prove the corpus delicti (the crime itself), intent,
or lack of consent under the ‘doctrine of chances.’” Id. (quoting Daggett v. State,
187 S.W.3d 444, 452 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “The admissibility of evidence
under the doctrine of chances depends on a showing of ‘highly unusual events [that]
are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.’” Valadez v.
State, 663 S.W.3d 133, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d
at 347).

                                          16
      Here, after comparing the circumstances of each incident, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted these prior offenses, given
the similarities between the attempted aggravated kidnapping for which Appellant
was on trial and his prior indecent-exposure offenses. All three offenses occurred in
stores in which Appellant would follow his targets through aisles and departments.
Each victim described how Appellant followed them throughout the store, causing
them fear and discomfort each time he reappeared. Both Ruiz-Vargas and N.B. had
their young daughters with them. All other dissimilarities between the offenses—
the years that had passed between the commission of these crimes, the ages of the
victims, and the severity of Appellant’s ultimate conduct—are immaterial to
Appellant’s motive and intent to abduct L.R. for his sexual gratification. Segundo,
270 S.W.3d at 89–90.
      Furthermore, under the “doctrine of chances,” any plausible argument that
Appellant was not following Ruiz-Vargas and her daughter with a sexually-
motivated objective significantly “diminishes if the same scenario is repeated with
other women on other occasions.” Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881. As such, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Appellant’s
extraneous conduct.
      With respect to Rule 403, because evidence of a prior sexual offense is
especially probative of a defendant’s propensity to commit another sexually-
motivated offense, such as aggravated kidnapping with the intent to violate the
victim sexually, the balancing analysis will not normally favor the exclusion of
evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual offenses. See Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 333.
As set forth above, the trial court correctly pointed out that intent was “a critical
issue,” and Appellant’s prior offenses were highly probative of his motive and intent
during the commission of the instant offense. The State’s case could have been
significantly weaker or more circumstantial without the admission of the details of
                                           17
Appellant’s indecent exposures, which supports the conclusion that the State’s need
for the evidence was high. See Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 267 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2019).
      Appellant’s 2013 and 2000 indecent-exposure offenses were admissible for
the noncharacter-conformity purpose of showing Appellant’s intent and modus
operandi under the “doctrine of chances,” and the probative value of this evidence
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R.
EVID. 403, 404(b); Valadez, 663 S.W.3d at 143. Because we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence, we overrule
Appellant’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues.
              5. Stormy Raines’s Testimony: Rules 403 & 404(b)
      In Appellant’s seventh issue, he raises similar challenges under Rules 403 and
404(b) to Raines’s testimony that Appellant masturbated in Factory Connection in
2019. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that
Appellant’s public masturbation was relevant to a noncharacter-conformity purpose,
and that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b)(2); Corley, 987
S.W.2d at 621.
      “[T]he prosecution may always offer evidence to show motive.” Colone, 573
S.W.3d at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this incident was sexual
in nature and had occurred a year before the attempted aggravated kidnapping of
L.R. at a store in the same shopping center as the instant offense, the misconduct
was relevant to show Appellant’s intent, motive, plan, and absence of mistake. See
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); Colone, 573 S.W.3d at 267; De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347–
48; Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The evidence
was also admissible for the noncharacter-conformity purpose of showing

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Appellant’s modus operandi under the “doctrine of chances.” See De La Paz, 279
S.W.3d at 348.
      The trial court’s admission of this evidence under Rule 403 was likewise
within the zone of reasonable disagreement. In addition to the inherent probative
force to show Appellant’s intent, motive, and lack of mistake or accident, the State
needed evidence of Appellant’s prior misconduct to prove the aggravating element
in his attempted kidnapping of L.R. And, as with the trial court’s previous rulings,
it agreed to consider the evidence for its stated limited, permissible purposes, and
we presume that it did. Corley, 987 S.W.2d at 621. Therefore, we conclude that
there was minimal, if any, danger of the trial court as the trier of fact having
considered this evidence for an improper purpose. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641;
Corley, 987 S.W.2d at 621. Accordingly, Appellant’s seventh issue is overruled.
               6. Christy Mares’s Testimony: Rule 404(b)
      Finally, in Appellant’s eighth issue, he raises challenges under Rules 403 and
404(b) to Mares’s testimony that he followed her and her daughter in Big Lots in
2020. We note at the outset that Appellant did not make a Rule 403 objection to
Mares’s testimony. He only objected to the admission of this evidence under
Rule 404(b).
      To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must
present a specific, timely objection or motion to the trial court which states the
specific grounds for the desired ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Montelongo v.
State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444,
448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Further, the complaint and arguments raised on
appeal must comport with and correspond to the objections made, if any, at trial or
they are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d
912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Dominguez v. State, 474 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013,
                                         19
no pet.). As such, an objection asserted at trial on one ground cannot support a
different contention on appeal. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990); Arevalo, 675 S.W.3d at 845. Because the complaint that Appellant
advances on appeal does not comport with the objection he made at trial, Appellant
has waived and failed to preserve his Rule 403 complaint for our review.
      As to his contention that Mares’s testimony violated Rule 404(b), we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of this evidence. Similar to the trial
court admitting evidence of Appellant’s other uncharged conduct, the trial court
could have reasonably found distinctively consistent and similar patterns and
characteristics between Appellant’s encounter with Mares and the attempted
aggravated kidnapping of L.R., such that they constituted a “signature.”             See
Segundo, 270 S.W.3d at 88. Appellant was wearing the same style hat as he wore
on September 15, 2020. He followed a Hispanic-looking woman and her young
daughter in a store and made them feel uncomfortable. Both Ruiz-Vargas and Mares
described feeling nervous or uncomfortable after making eye contact with Appellant.
And, Ruiz-Vargas’s unsafe feeling was not unique—the evidence showed that
Appellant made numerous women feel uncomfortable by following them in other
stores for the purpose of seeking sexual gratification.
      Events leading up to the commission of an offense may provide evidence of
“a backstory,” or motive without violating Rules 403 and 404(b). See Colone, 573
S.W.3d at 266–68. This was the most recent incident that preceded Appellant’s
attempted aggravated kidnapping of L.R. When considered with the other admitted
evidence, its probative force contributed to proving Appellant’s scheme of following
women and children in public then acting out sexually. Because we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence, Appellant’s
eighth issue is overruled.

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                               III. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

November 30, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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