Court Opinion

ID: 9429121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:43.496272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:17.288404
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The plurality’s meandering opinion contains in it a little something for everyone, and although it affirms the reversal of a judgment of conviction, it can scarcely be said to bespeak *520a total indifference to the legitimate needs of law enforcement agents seeking to curb trafficking in dangerous drugs. Indeed, in both manner and tone, the opinion brings to mind the old nursery rhyme:
“The King of France With forty thousand men Marched up the hill And then marched back again.”
The opinion nonetheless, in my view, betrays a mind-set more useful to those who officiate at shuffleboard games, primarily concerned with which particular square the disc has landed on, than to those who are seeking to administer a system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of the guilty and the vindication of the innocent. The plurality loses sight of the very language of the Amendment which it purports to interpret:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Analyzed simply in terms of its “reasonableness” as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of the investigating officers toward Royer would pass muster with virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly steeped in the mysteries of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Analyzed even in terms of the most meticulous regard for our often conflicting cases, it seems to me to pass muster equally well.
The facts of this case, which are doubtless typical of those facing narcotics officers in major airports throughout the country, may be usefully stated in a somewhat different manner than that followed in the opinion of the plurality. Officers Magdalena and Johnson, members of the “Smuggling Detail” of the Dade County Public Safety Department created in response to a growing drug problem at the Miami Air*521port, were on duty at that airport on January 3, 1978. Since this is one of the peak periods of the tourist season in south Florida and the Caribbean, we may presumably take judicial notice that the airport was in all probability very crowded and busy at that time.
The detectives first saw Royer walking through the airport concourse. He was a young man, casually dressed, carrying two heavily laden suitcases. The officers described him as nervous in appearance, and looking around in a manner which suggested that he was trying to detect and avoid police officers. Before they approached him, the officers followed Royer to a ticket counter. He there requested a ticket for New York City, and in paying for it produced a large roll of cash in small denomination bills from which he peeled off the necessary amount. He then affixed two baggage tags to his luggage and checked it. Rather than filling out his full name, address, and phone number in the spaces provided on the tags, Royer merely wrote the words “Holt” and “La Guardia” on each tag.
At this point, the officers approached Royer, identified themselves, and asked if he had a moment to talk. He answered affirmatively, and the detectives then asked to see his airline ticket and some identification.1 Although his ticket was for the name “Holt,” his driver’s license was in the name of “Mark Royer.” When asked to explain this discrepancy, he said that a friend named Holt had made the ticket reservation. This explanation, of course, did not account for his use of the name “Holt” on the baggage tags that he had just filled out.
By this time Royer had become all the more obviously nervous. The detectives told Royer that they suspected he was transporting narcotics, and asked if he would accompany *522them for further questioning to a room adjacent to the concourse “to get out of the general population of the Airport.” 389 So. 2d 1007, 1017 (Fla. App. 1980) (en banc). Royer agreed to go. The room was no more than 40 feet from the place where the detectives first approached Royer; it was described in the testimony of one of the officers as a “large storage closet” off a stewardesses’ lounge converted into a room used by the Smuggling Detail, ibid,.; the room contained a desk and two chairs. At this time the detectives also, without Royer’s consent, retrieved Royer’s suitcases from the place where they had been checked through on the flight to New York and brought them to the room off the concourse.
Once inside, the detectives asked Royer if he would consent to a search of the luggage so that they could dispel or confirm their suspicion that he was smuggling narcotics. The plurality’s opinion describes what then happened:
“Without orally responding to this request, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which the detective then opened without seeking further assent from Royer. Marihuana was found in that suitcase. According to Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase, Royer said, ‘no, go ahead,’ and did not object when the detective explained that the suitcase might have to be broken open. The suitcase was pried open by the officers and more marihuana was found. Royer was then told that he was under arrest. Approximately 15 minutes had elapsed from the time the detectives initially approached respondent until his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband.” Ante, at 494-495.2
*523The plurality inferentially concedes, as of course it must, that at the time the suitcases were opened and 65 pounds of marihuana were disclosed, the officers had probable cause to arrest and detain Royer. But working backward through this very brief encounter, the plurality manages to sufficiently fault the officers’ conduct so as to require that Royer’s conviction for smuggling drugs be set aside. Analyzed in terms of the “reasonableness” which must attend any search and seizure under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I find it impossible to conclude that any step in the officers’ efforts to apprehend Royer fails to meet that test.
The plurality concedes that after their initial conversation with Royer, the officers had “grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions . . . .” Ante, at 502. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 697-700 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). I agree that their information reached at least this level.3 The detectives had learned, among other things, that (1) Royer was carrying two heavy suitcases; (2) he was visibly nervous, exhibiting the behavior of a person trying to iden*524tify and evade police officers; (3) at a ticket counter in a major import center for illicit drugs, he had purchased a ticket for a city that is a major distribution center for such drugs; (4) he paid for his ticket from a large roll of small denomination bills, avoiding the need to show identification; (5) in filling out his baggage tags, Royer listed only a last name and the airport of destination, failing to give his full name, address, and phone number in the provided spaces, and (6) he was traveling under an assumed name.4
The Florida court felt that even these facts did not amount to articulable suspicion, reasoning that this behavior was “at least equally, and usually far more frequently, consistent with complete innocence.”5 389 So. 2d, at 1016. This eval*525uation of the evidence seems to me singularly akin to observing that because a stranger who was loitering near a building shortly before an arsonist set fire to the building could not be detained against his will for questioning solely on the basis of that fact, the same conclusion would be reached even though the same stranger had been found loitering in the presence of four other buildings shortly before arsonists had likewise set them on fire. Any one of these factors relied upon by the Miami police may have been as consistent with innocence as with guilt; but the combination of several of these factors is the essence of both “articulable suspicion” and “probable cause.”6
*526The point at which I part company with the plurality’s opinion is in the assessment of the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct following their initial conversation with Royer. *527The plurality focuses on the transfer of the place of the interview from the main concourse of the airport to the room off the concourse and observes that Royer “found himself in a small room — a large closet — equipped with a desk and two chairs. He was alone with two police officers who again told him that they thought he was carrying narcotics. He also found that the officers, without his consent, had retrieved his checked luggage from the airline.” Ante, at 502-503.
Obviously, this quoted language is intended to convey stern disapproval of the described conduct of the officers. To my mind, it merits no such disapproval and was eminently reasonable. Would it have been preferable for the officers to have detained Royer for further questioning, as they conced-edly had a right to do, without paying any attention to the fact that his luggage had already been checked on the flight to New York, and might be put aboard the flight even though Royer himself was not on the plane? Would it have been more “reasonable” to interrogate Royer about the contents of his suitcases, and to seek his permission to open the suitcases *528when they were retrieved, in the busy main concourse of the Miami Airport, rather than to find a room off the concourse where the confrontation would surely be less embarrassing to Royer? If the room had been large and spacious, rather than small, if it had possessed three chairs rather than two, would the officers’ conduct have been made reasonable by these facts?
The plurality’s answers to these questions, to the extent that it attempts any, are scarcely satisfying. It commences with the observation that “the officers’ conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention otherwise authorized by the Terry line of cases.” Ante, at 504. Earlier in its opinion, the plurality set the stage for this standard when the familiar “least intrusive means” principle of First Amendment law is suddenly carried over into Fourth Amendment law by the citation of two cases, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146, see ante, at 500, neither one of which lends any support to the principle as a part of Fourth Amendment law. The plurality goes on to say that had the officers returned Royer’s ticket and driver’s license, the encounter clearly would have been consensual. The plurality also states that while there were good reasons to justify moving Royer from one location to another, the officers’ motives in seeking to examine his luggage render these reasons unavailing — a conclusion the reason for which wholly escapes me. Finally, the plurality suggests that the officers might have examined Royer’s bags in a more expeditious way, such as the use of trained dogs.
All of this to my mind adds up to little more than saying that if my aunt were a man, she would be my uncle. The officers might have taken different steps than they did to investigate Royer, but the same may be said of virtually every investigative encounter that has more than one step to it. The question we must decide is what was unreasonable about the steps which these officers took with respect to this sus*529pect in the Miami Airport on this particular day. On this point, the plurality stutters, fudges, and hedges:
“What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions.” Ante, at 503.
But since even the plurality concedes that there was articula-ble suspicion warranting an investigatory detention, the fact that the inquiry had become an “investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room” would seem to have little bearing on the proper disposition of a claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. The plurality goes on to say:
“At least as of that moment, any consensual aspects of the encounter had evaporated, and we cannot fault the Florida District Court of Appeal in concluding that Terry v. Ohio and the cases following it did not justify the restraint to which Royer was then subjected. As a practical matter, Royer was under arrest.” Ibid.
Does the plurality intimate that if the Florida District Court of Appeal had reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the holdings of Terry and the cases which follow it, it would affirm that holding?7 Does it mean that the 15-minute duration of the total encounter, and the even lesser amount of elapsed time during which Royer was in the “interrogation room,” was more than a Terry investigative stop can ever consume? These possible conclusions are adumbrated, but not stated; if the plurality’s opinion were to be *530judged by standards appropriate to Impressionist paintings, it would perhaps receive a high grade, but the same cannot be said if it is to be judged by the standards of a judicial opinion.
Since the plurality concedes the existence of “articulable suspicion” at least after the initial conversation with Royer, the only remaining question is whether the detention of Royer during that period of time was permissible under the rule enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Although Terry itself involved only a protective patdown for weapons, subsequent cases have expanded the permissible scope of such a “seizure.” In Adams v. Williams, supra, we upheld both a search and seizure of a pistol being carried by a suspect seated in a parked automobile. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), we allowed Government officials to stop, and divert for visual inspection and questioning, automobiles which were suspected of harboring illegal aliens. These stops, including waiting time, could clearly have approximated in length the time which Royer was detained, and yet Martinez-Fuerte allowed them to be made “in the absense of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.” Id., at 562 (emphasis supplied). Unless we are to say that commercial drug trafficking is somehow quantitatively less weighty on the Fourth Amendment scale than trafficking in illegal aliens, I think the articulable suspicion which concededly focused upon Royer justified the length and nature of his detention.8
The reasonableness of the officers’ activity in this case did not depend on Royer’s consent to the investigation. Nevertheless, the presence of consent further justifies the action taken. The plurality does not seem to dispute that Royer *531consented to go to the room in the first instance. Certainly that conclusion is warranted by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227 (1973). The facts are similar to those addressed in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), where a majority of the Court determined that the consent to accompany police officers had been voluntary. Royer was not told that he had to go to the room, but was simply asked, after a brief period of questioning, if he would accompany the detectives to the room. Royer was informed as to why the officers wished to question him further. There were neither threats nor any show of force. Detectives Johnson and Magdelena were not in uniform and did not display weapons. The detectives did not touch Royer and made no demands. In fact, Royer admits that the detectives were quite polite.9
The plurality concludes that somewhere between the beginning of the 40-foot journey and the resumption of conversation in the room the investigation became so intrusive that Royer’s consent “evaporated” leaving him “[a]s a practical matter . . . under arrest.” Ante, at 503. But if Royer was legally approached in the first instance and consented to accompany the detectives to the room, it does not follow that his consent went up in smoke and he was “arrested” upon entering the room. As we made clear in Mendenhall, logical analysis would focus on whether the environment in the room rendered the subsequent consent to a search of the luggage involuntary.
*532As we said in Mendenhall, “the fact that she was [in the room] is little or no evidence that she was in any way coerced.” 446 U. S., at 559. Other than the size of the room, described as “a large storage closet,”10 there is nothing in the record which would indicate that Royer’s resistance was overborne by anything about the room. Royer, who was in his fourth year of study at Ithaca College at the time and has since graduated with a degree in communications, simply continued to cooperate with the detectives as he had from the beginning of the encounter. Absent any evidence of objective indicia of coercion, and even absent any claim of such in-dicia by Royer, the size of the room itself does not transform a voluntary consent to search into a coerced consent.
For any of these several reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal.

 The plurality recites these facts by noting that while Royer “produced” the ticket and identification, he did so “without oral consent.” Ante, at 494. See n. 2, infra.

 Why it should make the slightest difference that Royer did not “orally” consent to the opening of the first bag, when in response to the request by the officers that he consent to a search Royer produced a key and unlocked it, is one of the many opaque nuances of the plurality’s opinion.

 1 also agree with the plurality’s intimation that when the detectives first approached and questioned Royer, no seizure occurred and thus the constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment were not invoked. Ante, at 497. “[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 19, n. 16. See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-557 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); id., at 560, n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Herbst, 641 F. 2d 1161, 1166 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 851 (1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F. 2d 979, 984-985 (CA5 1981); United States v. Turner, 628 F. 2d 461, 462-465 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 988 (1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429, 432-433, and n. 6 (CA5 1980); United States v. Fry, 622 F. 2d 1218, 1220-1221 (CA5 1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F. 2d 1036, 1038-1042 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 910 (1980).

 The facts of this case bear a strong resemblance to those we examined in United States v. Mendenhall, supra. In that case, DEA agents in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport observed Mendenhall as she was the last passenger to deplane from a flight originating in Los Angeles. Once inside the terminal, Mendenhall, who appeared very nervous, slowly scanned the populace of the concourse and then walked very slowly toward the baggage area. Rather than claim any baggage, however, Mendenhall asked for directions to the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. At the counter, which was located in another terminal, Mendenhall, who carried an American Airlines ticket for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh, asked for an Eastern Airlines ticket for the same trip. Before Mendenhall could board the Eastern Airlines flight, agents stopped her for questioning. Three Members of this Court concluded that, based on these observations alone, the agents had a reasonable suspicion which justified the stop. 446 U. S., at 560-565 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part). Two Members of the Court did not reach the question, finding instead that Mendenhall had never been “seized.” Id., at 546-557 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.). To the extent that the present case differs from Mendenhall, the basis for a reasonable suspicion is stronger on the facts before us now.

 The Florida District Court of Appeal took specific exception to the officers’ conclusion that Royer appeared to be nervously attempting to evade police contact. The lower court said that since police officers are not psychiatrists, this conclusion “must be completely disregarded.” 389 So. 2d, at 1016, n. 4. This Court, however, has repeatedly emphasized that a trained police officer may draw inferences and make deductions that could elude any untrained person observing the same conduct. See, e. g., *525United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We have noted as an example the behavior of a suspect who appears to the officer to be evading police contact. See, e. g., United States v. Mendenhall, supra, at 564 (opinion of Stewart, J.); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 878, 884-885 (1975).

 While the plurality does not address the use of “drug courier profiles” in narcotics investigations, it affirms a decision where the Florida District Court of Appeal took the liberty to fashion a bright-line rule with regard to the use of these profiles. The state court concluded that conformity with a “drug courier profile,” “without more,” is insufficient to establish even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 389 So. 2d, at 1017, n. 6 (emphasis deleted).
In 1974 the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration instituted training programs for its narcotics officers wherein instruction was given on a “drug courier profile.” A “profile” is, in effect, the collective or distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers. As one DEA agent explained:
“Basically, it’s a number of characteristics which we attribute or which we believe can be used to pick out drug couriers. And these characteristics are basically things that normal travelers do not do ... .
“Essentially, when we started this detail at the airport, we didn’t really know what we were looking for. The majority of our cases, when we first started, involved cases we made based on information from law enforcement agencies or from airline personnel. And as these cases were made, certain characteristics were noted among the defendants.
“At a later time we began to see a pattern in these characteristics and began using them to pick out individuals we suspected as narcotic couriers *526without any prior information.” United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (ED Mich. 1977).
Few statistics have been kept on the effectiveness of “profile” usage, but the data available suggest it has been a success. In the first few months of a “profile” program at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 141 persons were searched in 96 different encounters; drugs were discovered in 77 of the searches. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (ED Mich. 1976), aff’d, 556 F. 2d 385 (CA6 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1011 (1978). A DEA agent working at the La Guardia Airport in New York City estimated that some 60% percent of the persons identified as having “profile” characteristics are found to be carrying drugs. United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494, 501, n. 8 (CA2 1979).
Because of this success, state and local law enforcement agencies also have instructed narcotics officers according to “drug courier profiles.” It was partly on the basis of “profile” characteristics that Detectives Johnson and Magdalena initially began surveillance of Royer. Certainly in this case the use of the “profile” proved effective.
Use of “drug courier profiles” has played an important part in a number of lower court decisions. See, e. g., United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F. 2d 218 (CA2 1980); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F. 2d 1338 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 907 (1980); United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494 (CA2 1979); United States v. Diaz, 503 F. 2d 1025 (CA3 1974); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F. 2d 9 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 923 (1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429 (CA5 1980); United States v. Ballard, 573 F. 2d 913 (CA5 1978); United States v. Smith, 574 F. 2d 882 (CA6 1978); United States v. Scott, 545 F. 2d 38 (CA8 1976), cert. denied 429 U. S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Beck, 598 F. 2d 497 (CA9 1979). In fact, the function of the “profile” has been somewhat overplayed. Certainly, a law enforcement officer can rely on his own experience in detection and prevention of crime. Likewise, in training police officers, instruction focuses on what has been learned through the collective experience of law enforcers. The “drug courier profile” is an example of such instruction. It is not intended to provide a mathematical formula that automatically establishes grounds for a belief that criminal activity is afoot. By the same reasoning, however, simply because these characteristics are accumulated in a “profile,” they are not to be given less weight in assessing whether a suspicion is well founded. While each case will turn on its own facts, sheer logic dictates that where certain characteristics repeatedly are found among drug smugglers, the existence of those characteristics in a *527particular case is to be considered accordingly in determining whether there are grounds to believe that further investigation is appropriate. Cf. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
The “drug courier profile” is not unfamiliar to this Court. We have held that conformity with certain aspects of the “profile” does not automatically create a particularized suspicion which will justify an investigatory stop. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). Yet our decision in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), made it clear that a police officer is entitled to assess the totality of the circumstances in the light of his own training and experience and that instruction on a “drug courier profile” would be a part of his accumulated knowledge. This process is not amenable to bright-line rules such as the Florida court tried to establish. We are not dealing “with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” United States v. Cortez, supra, at 418. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979).

 See also ante, at 501 (“The question before us is whether the record warrants that conclusion”); ante, at 507 (“[W]e think that the Florida District Court of Appeal cannot be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had been exceeded”). Certainly we owe no such deference to the Florida court’s conclusion. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515-516 (1963) (citing Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 181 (1953)); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-386 (1927).

 The detention of Royer would also pass muster under this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if the officers had “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt” prior to their adjournment to the room. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (1949). But since the officers clearly had an articulable suspicion to justify the detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the probable-cause issue need not be decided in this case.

 Contrary to the Florida court’s view, this phase of the encounter contrasts sharply with the circumstances we examined in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979). In that case, police officers deliberately sought out the suspect at a neighbor’s house and, with a show of force, brought the suspect to police headquarters in a police car, placed him in an interrogation room, and questioned him extensively after giving him a Miranda warning. Unlike in Dunaway, Royer, after brief questioning, was asked to cooperate by accompanying the officers to a room no more than 40 feet away, so that the questioning could proceed out of the view of the general public.

 The characterization of the room as a “closet” is quite misleading. The room contained one desk and two chairs. It was large enough to allow three persons to enter with two heavy suitcases. It also is relevant that it was the Florida court, not Royer, who focused on the size of the room. Royer appealed his conviction arguing that his consent to a search was invalid as a matter of law because he was not informed that he could refuse consent. A panel of the Florida court properly rejected this contention, relying on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 234 (1973), where we said that “proof of knowledge of a right to refuse [is not] the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.” It was during rehearing by the court en banc that the conviction was reversed with the court finding that when Royer was taken into the private room he was in effect placed under arrest.