Court Opinion

ID: 9764333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:19:14.817834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.875383
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I take no exception to reserving jurisdiction in the trial court to permit the Chancellor to modify the decree with respect to the tax liability resulting from the sale of properties, if that seems appropriate. But I disagree that the overall division of property in this case can be said to be clearly erroneous. The Chancellor’s division of the two farms, ostensibly non-marital assets, is entirely equitable since marital funds were used in part to acquire them. Too, if the equities favor allowing a portion of the farms to the appellee, there is no logical reason why a proportionate share of the appreciated value should not also be awarded her. The Chancellor doubtless took these factors into account, as well as the fact that the appellant committed $246,092 in marital funds to pay off farming liabilities of his son, a material aspect of the overall division which the majority opinion disregards. We have construed Act 705 of 1979 as investing broad discretion in the Chancellor to divide properties equitably in divorce [Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983)] and I see no compelling reason why we should revise his division in this case.