Court Opinion

ID: 9795454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:29:18.445185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:00.645955
License: Public Domain

MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to clarify the reasons why I agree that Tuttle’s arrest for disorderly conduct was unlawful.
The State argues, and Judge Huguelet found, that the police had probable cause to believe that Tuttle had violated AS 11.61.110(a)(2). This portion of the disorderly conduct statute declares that it is a crime for a person (1) to “make[] unreasonably loud noise” (2) with reckless disregard for the fact that this unreasonably loud noise is “disturb[ing] the peace and privacy” of at least one other person, and (3) “after being informed that [the noise] is having [this] effect” — ie., after being informed that the noise is disturbing someone else’s peace and privacy.
Putting all three elements of this offense together, it is apparent that a person does not violate this statute merely by making an unreasonably loud noise that disturbs other people’s peace and privacy. Rather, the statute requires proof that the person persisted in making unreasonably loud noise after being explicitly warned that the noise was disturbing other people’s peace and privacy.
In Tuttle’s case, the police were called because the hotel clerk saw Tuttle urinating in the hallway and trying to get into one of the rooms. (The hotel clerk either did not know or failed to mention that Tuttle was a registered guest at the hotel.)
The audio recording made by Officer Sto-neking shows that, shortly after the police contacted Tuttle, he asked the officers, “What are you doing here, bothering me?” The other officer on the scene, Officer Kant, replied, ‘We got called [because you were] creating a disturbance.”
In its brief to this Court, the State suggests that this was the required warning to Tuttle — a warning that he was making an unreasonably loud noise that was disturbing the peace and privacy of other people. But this view of the facts is demonstrably false.
The police were not called to the hotel because Tuttle was making loud noises. Rather, the hotel clerk summoned the police because Tuttle had urinated in the hallway and was fumbling at the door to a room. Thus, to the extent that Tuttle might be said to have created a “disturbance” before the police arrived, that disturbance had nothing to do with noise.
Moreover, the audio recording of the police contact with Tuttle shows that, at this point in the discussion, Tuttle had not yet raised his voice to any significant degree. Both he and the officers were speaking in relatively normal conversational tones. No one in Tuttle’s situation would have interpreted Officer Kant’s remark about a “disturbance” as an accusation that Tuttle was currently making unreasonably loud noise.
The State also relies on the fact that Tuttle, after initially being fairly calm, raised his voice to the officers two or three times— prompting the officers to repeatedly advise him to lower his voice and calm down. But the audio recording reveals that the officers never informed Tuttle that he should quiet down because he was disturbing the other hotel guests. Rather, the audio recording shows that the officers were trying to deescalate their encounter with Tuttle.
Tuttle was obviously intoxicated, and his mood began to swing as the police encounter progressed. It appears that the officers *64were trying to keep Tuttle’s emotions in check, so that their encounter with him did not turn violent. But whatever the officers’ motivation for telling Tuttle to calm down, it is clear that they never said anything to Tuttle to suggest that his raised voice was disturbing the other guests, or that this was the officers’ concern.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in this case, Judge Huguelet found— based on the testimony of the officers, and also based on his listening to the audio record of the encounter — that Tuttle “started shouting and [the officers] weren’t able to calm him down”. Based on this fact, Judge Huguelet concluded that “[t]here was ample probable cause for [Tuttle’s] arrest.”
The first part of Judge Huguelet’s factual finding is confirmed by the evidence; Tuttle did start shouting — after the officers refused to leave him alone, and after Officer Stonek-ing took out her pepper spray, apparently making preparations to subdue Tuttle. However, the second part of Judge Huguelet’s finding is clearly erroneous. The officers were able to calm Tuttle down. Even though Tuttle remained upset with the officers, when the officers asked him to turn around and present his hands for handcuffing, Tuttle did so without a struggle.
But even if the facts had been as Judge Huguelet described, there would still be no probable cause to arrest Tuttle for violating AS 11.61.110(a)(2).
Tuttle did indeed raise his voice, and he even began shouting, after the police officers refused to leave him alone, and after Officer Stoneking picked up her can of pepper spray. But the State did not prove that Tuttle’s raised voice was unreasonable under the circumstances. Tuttle had already explained himself to the officers (that is, he explained that he was trying to get into his own room at the hotel), but the officers refused to leave him alone, and instead they began preparing to subdue him.
It is true that the officers had probable cause to believe that Tuttle had earlier urinated in the hotel hallway. But this act does not appear to be a crime under state law. Even assuming that this act was a misdemeanor under a local ordinance, the police had no authority to arrest Tuttle for that misdemeanor-because it did not occur in their presence.1
Thus, the question appears to be whether a person acts unreasonably by raising their voice after police officers contact the person, question the person, and then refuse to stop when the person asks to be left alone. The State presents no authority for the proposition that a raised voice under these circumstances would constitute an “unreasonably loud noise” within the meaning of the disorderly conduct statute.
Moreover, even if Tuttle’s raised voice had constituted an “unreasonably” loud noise under the circumstances, a further question remains: was Tuttle ever apprised that his raised voice was disturbing the peace and privacy of others? The answer, as revealed by the audio recording, is “no”. To the extent that Judge Huguelet might have found otherwise, that finding is clearly erroneous.
For these reasons, I agree with my colleagues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Tuttle for disorderly conduct.

. See AS 12.25.030-035; see also Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595, 600-01 (Alaska App.2006).