Court Opinion

ID: 9776007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:24.603032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.763177
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this appeal because in the absence of a proper sentence we are without power to hear the case on its merits.
Although Article 44.24(b), V.A.C.C.P., authorizes this Court to reform and correct the judgment, the sentence and judgment are not the same thing, but are distinct and independent. Arts. 42.01 and 42.02, V.A.C. C.P.; Morgan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 515 S.W.2d 278; Scott v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 461 S.W.2d 619. Pronouncement of sentence is jurisdictional for an appeal to this Court, and a purported sentence which does not meet all the elements of the statutory definition is no sentence at all. Casias v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 503 S.W.2d 262. The defective sentence constitutes a jurisdictional barrier preventing our consideration of the case on its merits. This barrier to the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction dictates that this appeal be dismissed. The other defects sought to be “corrected” by the majority may be corrected by the trial court upon its resumption of jurisdiction over this case following our dismissal. For this Court to consider the merits, when we have no jurisdiction to do so, is usurpation. Stuart v. Anderson, 70 Tex. 588, 8 S.W. 295 (1888).
Because the sentence in the case at bar recites conviction for two distinct offenses, it is void on its face for uncertainty, and is therefore insufficient to support jurisdiction in this Court. The majority cite four cases as authority for reforming the sentence instead of dismissing the appeal: Clark v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 289 S.W.2d 248; Shapley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 431 S.W.2d 3; Cunningham v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 906; and Franco v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 491 S.W.2d 876. Franco is not in point: The opinion in Franco recites that the judgment was reformed; no reformation of the sentence was ordered. Art. 44.-24(b) authorizes reformation of a judgment, but not of a sentence. Shapiey also is not in point: The sentence in Shapiey recited conviction for embezzlement, and therefore was not void on its face for uncertainty, and did support the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Only upon consideration of the merits was it revealed that the judgment and sentence erroneously recited embezzlement instead of theft. Thus, Shapiey does not support exercise of our appellate jurisdiction in the instant case.
Although Cunningham and Clark, both supra, appear to have been decided on sentences suffering a defect like the one before us now, in neither case was the jurisdictional issue addressed, nor was any authority cited for the power to reform a sentence. Thus, they are not authority on the jurisdictional issue.
*481The exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is not a matter of discretion.1 Just as we may not decline to hear an appeal when jurisdiction is properly invoked, we likewise may not hear an appeal when jurisdiction is lacking. See my concurring opinion in Means v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 552 S.W.2d 166 (1977).
The majority today, as in Ex parte Shields, Tex.Cr.App., 550 S.W.2d 670 (1977) (opinions on rehearing) refuse to address the fundamental jurisdictional issue presented. These jurisdictional matters define the limits of this Court’s power. The issue is not a matter of insignificant technicalities, but of the practical limits of this Court’s power. The people of Texas and the bench and bar are entitled to a ruling on the limits of that power. It is the duty of this Court, when the issue arises, as in the instant case and others recently before us,2 to address this fundamental issue. The refusal of this Court to account for the source of its power is repugnant to the basic principles of a government answerable to the people. The majority not only fail to show authority for taking jurisdiction of this case, but refuse to even address the issue.3
I dissent to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. However, in view of the majority’s position, I will no longer urge consideration of the issue. We are all bound by the decisions of the Court. See, e. g., Childs v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 547 S.W.2d 613, 615, n. 2; Banks v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 940, 942, n. 1.
PHILLIPS, J., joins this dissent.

. Contrast our discretionary jurisdiction in original habeas corpus matters, as discussed in Ex parte Norvell, Tex.Cr.App., 528 S.W.2d 129, 130.

. See, e. g., Ex parte Dickey, Tex.Cr.App., 543 S.W.2d 99; Hurd v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 548 S.W.2d 388; Ex parte Shields, supra; Means v. State, supra; Ex parte Guzman, Tex.Cr.App., 551 S.W.2d 387 (No. 54253, 1977).

. In contrast to today’s expansion of appellate jurisdiction in the face of no statutory or constitutional authority, see Ex parte Guzman, Tex.Cr.App., 551 S.W.2d 387 (No. 54253, 1977), in which the dissent urged restriction of habeas corpus jurisdiction in the face of statutory authority and constitutional protection for the availability of the writ.