Court Opinion

ID: 9624490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:04:55.906587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:48.125742
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This case confounds me. My confusion undoubtedly springs from the trial court’s attempt to resolve simultaneously the issues of postseparation support, alimony, and equitable distribution, but is worsened by the manner in which these issues were “resolved.” Nevertheless, I reluctantly agree with the majority’s opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff one-half of Defendant’s 401(k) account. However, I vote to reverse the trial court’s order because: (1) I conclude that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to award postseparation support beyond the date of the order’s entry because the order also awarded alimony, and (2) I disagree with the majority’s opinion that the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff is entitled to alimony. Thus, I dissent.
Preliminarily, I note that this Court reversed and remanded the 23 February 2005 “Equitable Distribution Order.” The trial court’s 18 May 2007 “Order on Remand,” however, purported to leave “[a]ll remaining provisions of the [Equitable Distribution] Order, not inconsistent with the terms [of the Order on Remand] ... in full force and effect.” Because the Order on Remand does not contain all of the findings necessary for a complete review of Defendant’s appeal, we find ourselves in the curious position of having to compare the two orders to discern which provisions of the Equitable Distribution Order survived our reversal. The two orders are not readily comparable, and the trial court’s action hinders and impedes our review.
Next, I agree with the majority that Defendant failed to assign error to “several items” that are clearly subject to challenge on appeal. Having thoroughly and exhaustively reviewed the record in this case, however, I submit that Defendant was as puzzled by the trial court’s orders as I am, as the orders defy simple analysis. For example, in the Equitable Distribution Order, the trial court conflated the issues of equitable distribution and postseparation support, stating,
*29Plaintiff is entitled to nineteenth [sic] months of retirement benefits she has not received since the date of the parties’ separation at $924.91 plus interest and her share of any increases, which equals at least $17,573.29. These monies are not post-separation support, but are the Plaintiffs vested asset[,]
but then awarding, from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence,
$18,000.00 to Plaintiff as her past due share of Defendant’s retirement payments for the 19 months between date of separation and the date of trial. This award is post-separation support granted.
Aside from the plain contradiction in the trial court’s classification of Plaintiff’s share of Defendant’s retirement income, a determination that has potential tax ramifications, the trial court apparently picked the sum of $18,000.00 out of a hat.1 Given the opportunity to clarify
its order by this Court’s first opinion in this case, the trial court stated in the Order on Remand that:
Defendant shall pay the sum of $350.00 per month to Plaintiff as post separation support. The first prospective payment shall be due on March 1, 2005 and shall continue until such time as the former marital home is sold. As for retroactive post separation *30support, from his net share of the sale proceeds of the former marital residence, the Defendant shall pay $18,000.00 to Plaintiff for the time between the date of separation and the date of trial.
3. Defendant shall pay the sum of $3,150.00 to Plaintiff within 120 days of the entry of this Order as post separation support payments due for September, 2006 through May, 2007.
We are left to presume that the sum of $18,000.00 awarded as “retroactive post separation support” is the same $18,000.00 the trial court found and concluded was Plaintiffs vested asset.2 We are likewise left to presume Defendant began making postseparation support payments of $350.00 beginning in March 2005 as previously ordered, but that he stopped making those payments in September 2006. In any event, I am loathe to affirm an order which defies review.
Moreover, I hesitate to affirm an order which clearly contradicts the provisions of our General Statutes. Postseparation support is “spousal support to be paid until the earlier of... [t]he date specified in the order for postseparation support [or] [t]he entry of an order awarding or denying alimony." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(4) (2005) (emphasis added); Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264 (2005); Rowe v. Rowe, 131 N.C. App. 409, 507 S.E.2d 317 (1998). In this case, the order awards alimony. The order also awards postseparation support to be paid beyond the date of the order’s entry. Such action plainly contradicts the legislative directive.
More importantly, I would hold that the trial court’s action in entering an order awarding alimony deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to award postseparation support prospective from the order’s entry. In re T.R.R., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 790 (2006) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction is “ ‘¡jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought[]’ ”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999)) (emphasis added); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(4) (defining postseparation support). It is well-established that an issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a case and may be raised by a court on its own motion. “ ‘A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a *31nullity.’ ” T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964)). The trial court’s award of postseparation support beyond the date of the order’s entry should be vacated.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
By his second assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiff one-half of his 401(k) account. In an equitable distribution action, the trial court is required to provide for an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property and divisible property. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(a) (2005). To do so, the court must determine what is marital property and what is divisible property. Id. “Marital property” includes “all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties, and presently owned[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(l) (2005). “Divisible property” includes, inter alia-.
All appreciation and diminution in value of marital property and divisible property of the parties occurring after the date of separation and prior to the date of distribution, except that appreciation or diminution in value which is the result of postseparation actions or activities of a spouse shall not be treated as divisible property.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(4)(a) (2005). While marital property is valued as of the date of separation, divisible property must be valued as of the date of distribution. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(b) (2005).
As the majority notes, the trial court did not value the marital residence as of the date of separation. Interestingly, a review of the transcript from the hearing held prior to the entry of the Equitable Distribution Order reveals that the first half of the hearing was dedicated to resolving this very issue. Furthermore, as the majority states, the trial court’s order necessarily fails to account for post-separation appreciation or diminution in value of the marital residence because both the sale price of the house and the date of distribution are unknown. In light of these unknowns, I question whether the trial court’s order completely resolves the equitable distribution claim and whether this appeal is interlocutory. In its discussion of the alimony award, the majority tacitly acknowledges the interim nature of the distributive award, stating that the trial court’s alimony determinations are “subject to reconsideration following the final *32equitable distribution])]” (Emphasis added.) At a minimum, however, the trial court’s order does not comply with our equitable distribution statutes.
Nevertheless, by his second assignment of error, Defendant only argues that the trial court was bound by the parties’ admission that Plaintiff was entitled to receive $42,098.38 from Defendant’s 401(k) retirement account. Defendant does not argue that the trial court’s order violates our statutes. I agree with the majority that the parties’ admission is not binding upon the trial court and, therefore, vote to overrule Defendant’s second assignment of error.
ALIMONY
By his first assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff is entitled to alimony. I agree.
The majority reasons that “[p]laintiff’s dependent spouse status is not determined based upon events set to occur in the future, but is established according to plaintiff’s accustomed standard of living prior to the parties’ separation.’’ (Emphasis added.) The majority then states that “the trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that during the marriage and at the time of the hearing, plaintiff had an income-expenses deficit of $627.00 per month.” (Emphasis added.) The findings of fact recited in the majority’s opinion do not support the majority’s statement that, during the marriage, Plaintiff had an income-expenses deficit of $627.00. According to the findings, Plaintiff was earning $1,192.00 less per month at the time of the hearing than on the date of separation. Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Plaintiff’s income-expenses deficit at the time of the hearing is in plain opposition to its statement that Plaintiff’s dependent spouse status is determined according to Plaintiff’s accustomed standard of living prior to the parties’ separation.
Although I agree with the majority that our current statute authorizes a trial court to hear and award a claim for alimony prior to the entry of a judgment for equitable distribution and that the trial court’s alimony determinations are subject to reconsideration following the final equitable distribution, this solution to the problems raised by this appeal is unappealing. As one leading scholar noted after the current statute’s enactment,
hearing the alimony claim [before the completion of an equitable distribution] is likely to be a waste of judicial and other resources and will certainly bring added expenses to the parties. The caveat to this statement would involve the unlikely event *33that the results of equitable distribution would not change the alimony duration or amount, or the dependency status — an eventuality that, given the potential of the expanded factors that can be used to increase the assets and income of the supporting spouse, is so unlikely as to stretch the imagination.
Sally Burnett Sharp, Step by Step: The Development of the Distributive Consequences of Divorce in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 2017, 2085-86 (1998) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Professor Sharp’s prognostication has come true in this case. See, e.g., Helms v. Helms, 179 N.C. App. 225, 633 S.E.2d 891 (2006) (unpublished) (addressing the trial court’s initial attempt to resolve this matter).
In light of the flawed nature of the trial court’s orders, I cannot agree with the result reached by the majority. In my opinion, the trial court’s determinations that, for purposes of alimony, Plaintiff is the dependent spouse and Defendant is the supporting spouse should be reversed. The trial court’s award of alimony should also be reversed, and I would remand this case to the trial court. On remand, I would instruct the trial court to enter one order containing all of its findings. I would further remind the trial court that postseparation support terminates upon the entry of an award of alimony. If the trial court chooses to delay an alimony award until the marital home sells, the trial court should also delay its determination of the spouses’ statuses until that time. I note with interest that this result comports with the result urged by Plaintiff in her first brief to this Court, in which she wrote:
The trial court set no deadline for the sale of the former marital home, thus allowing [Defendant] to pay [Plaintiff] alimony [sic] in the sum of $350.00 indefinitely, and preventing [Plaintiff] from receiving her $924.91 monthly share of [Defendant’s] retirement benefits. While [Plaintiff] contends that the trial court was correct in [its] determination that she is the dependant [sic] spouse and [Defendant] is the supporting spouse, based on the foregoing “distribution” of marital assets, she. recognizes the need for the trial court to properly deal with equitable distribution before there is any reconsideration of classification as a dependant [sic] spouse.
(Emphasis added.) I dissent from the majority’s opinion to the extent it affirms the trial court’s award of postseparation support and alimony. Otherwise, I concur.

. The plaintiff in an equitable distribution action is required to provide detailed information regarding the identification, classification, and value of marital and separate property as of the date of separation by filing an equitable distribution inventory affidavit. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(a) (2005). The defendant is required to provide the same information after receiving the plaintiff’s affidavit. Id. “A party who fails to file the required equitable distribution inventory affidavit can be subject to sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37, up to and including dismissal of the claim.” Young v. Gum, 185 N.C. App. 642, 649, 649 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2007) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(a); N.C. Gen. Stat § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)), disc, review denied, 362 N.C. 374,-S.E.2d -(2008).
The majority opinion refers to Defendant’s “equitable distribution affidavit.” Presumably, the majority refers to a document in the record on appeal labeled “Equitable Distribution Affidavit of the Defendant.” This document is neither executed nor file-stamped. Interestingly, in his first brief to this Court in COA05-1346, the same attorney who represents Defendant in this appeal wrote:
The undersigned appellate counsel for Defendant performed a diligent search of ■ the Pender County Clerk of Court’s file with regard to this matter and he has been unable to locate any copies of a filed equitable distribution affidavit from either the Plaintiff or the Defendant, nor does the Exhibits/Evidence Log from the trial of this matter indicate that any such equitable distribution affidavit was entered into evidence.... The undersigned appellate counsel for Defendant has conferred with appellate counsel for the Plaintiff who has likewise not been able to locate any such equitable distribution affidavit.

. Nineteen months of the award of vested retirement benefits is $17,573.29. Nineteen months of postseparation support in the amount of $350.00 per month, however, is only $6,650.00.