Court Opinion

ID: 9833821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:03:28.089956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:07.072684
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee earnestly insists that we erred in holding that the sale of the property of the minors involved in this case by the trustee was invalid. The gist of the contention is that the Legislature had authority to authorize the probate court to determine whether it would permit the guardian to execute a mortgage or a deed of trust, and that the statute (article 4195) in using bo'th terms, the term “deed of trust” must b.e construed as an instrument containing a power in the trustee to sell. The contention is supported by a plausible argument. But while it is true thát the term “deed of trust” implies an instrument containing a power to sell, yet we do not think the implication must necessarily be given effect in every case. To illustrate, in the case of Jackson v. Harby, 65 Tex. 710, our Supreme *279Oourt Lad occasion to construe an instrument designated as a “trust deed to secure” a debt. During tbe course of the -opinion, the court said: “Deeds of trust conveying property directly to trustees, made to secure and pay particular creditors, though expressed in terms sufficient to pass title, if made for creditors generally, are construed to be mortgages, ‘with some of the qualities of an assignment super added.’ Baldwin v. Peet, 22 Tex. 718 [75 Am. Dec. 808]; Burrill on Assignments, 3d Ed. secs. 6, 7, 8. The instrument under which the plaintiffs claimed, was of this character.”
In McLane v. Paschal, 47 Tex. 365, it is said, quoting from the headnotes: “It is now finally and definitely settled by this court, that a deed of trust to secure the payment of a debt, does not operate as an absolute trans; fer of the property, on which it is executed, to the trustee, upon the trust mentioned in the deed, defeasible upon the conditions therein stipulated; but that such instrument is, in legai effect, a mere mortgage, with a power to sell.”
In view, therefore, of the solicitude of the Legislature in providing safeguards for the interests of minors in the forced sale of their property, we think the terms “mortgage” or “trust deed,” as used in the order of the probate court, authorizing the guardian in question to so incumber the property of his wards, should be construed as synonymous in spirit or purpose, and that if, in any case under the laws relating to the subject, as is contended, an emergency case arises which would authorize the probate court to confer upon the guardian a power to sell the property of minors incumbered without observing the safeguards generally provided, the order at least should specifically state that the trust deed might contain the power to sell. -
It can certainly be said that the records in the proceedings of the probate court under consideration present no emergency for the trustee in the deed of trust to execute the power of sale therein provided.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.