Court Opinion

ID: 9404631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 17:04:57.875286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.883367
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221538
                                                                                   FIFTH DIVISION

                                                                                         June 23, 2023

                                              No. 1-22-1538
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                                 IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 In re A.A., a Minor                                             )   Appeal from the
 (The People of the State of Illinois,                           )   Circuit Court of
                                                                 )   Cook County.
          Petitioner-Appellee,                                   )
                                                                 )
     v.                                                          )   No. 21 JD 122
                                                                 )
 A.A.,                                                           )   Honorable
                                                                 )   Patricia Mendoza,
          Respondent-Appellant).                                 )   Judge, presiding.

          PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
          Justices Mitchell and Navarro concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                               OPINION

¶1    After a bench trial, minor respondent A.A. was adjudicated delinquent of vehicular

hijacking and aggravated battery, and sentenced to 24 months of probation and 30 days of

supervision. She appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict because the

victim’s identification of her was unreliable. She also claims that, even conceding the State’s facts,

her conduct did not constitute a “taking” per the statute. Finally, she contends that the court did
No. 1-22-1538

not properly credit her for time spent in custody. We affirm her conviction but amend her mittimus

to reflect the proper time credit.

¶2                                       BACKGROUND

¶3     On January 28, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against A.A.,

charging her with vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 2020)) and aggravated battery (id.

§ 12-3.05(d)(1)) related to a January 27, 2021, incident. The record shows A.A. spent 56 days in

pretrial custody, including 28 days of electronic monitoring.

¶4     At A.A.’s bench trial, Kenneth Wolin, 72 years old, testified that on January 27, 2021, at

around 10:30 a.m., he was working as a Lyft driver. The weather was clear, but there was snow on

the ground. He drove to the 2900 block of West Walton Street in Chicago to pick up a fare. When

he arrived, two “girls” entered his vehicle. He saw them “[v]ery briefly” before they entered, but

noted they were dressed in “winter clothing.” Wolin identified A.A. in court as one of the

passengers.

¶5     Wolin drove the passengers to a destination near the 1400 block of Douglas Boulevard in

Chicago. When he arrived and stopped the vehicle, the “taller” of the two girls, seated directly

behind him, reached over the headrest and choked him for one to two minutes. The passengers

then instructed Wolin to exit the vehicle, and he complied. While exiting, he noticed one of the

passengers enter the driver’s seat of the vehicle. He then saw A.A. exit the vehicle, approach him,

and ask for the key fob for the vehicle. Wolin instead gave A.A. the key fob for his girlfriend’s

vehicle, which he also happened to have on him at the time. A.A. walked back towards Wolin’s

vehicle.

¶6     Wolin walked to a nearby school, told a security guard what happened, and asked the guard

to call the police. Chicago police officers arrived shortly thereafter and drove Wolin back to his

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No. 1-22-1538

vehicle. Upon arrival, Wolin noticed a cell phone in the back seat that did not belong to him, along

with his girlfriend’s key fob. While on scene, Wolin identified A.A. to the officers during a show-

up procedure.

¶7    Wolin testified as follows regarding the show-up:

                “Q. And was this identification procedure done with the minor respondent?

                A. Yes.

                Q. And where was the minor respondent located as this identification procedure

           took place?

                A. I was asked the first time they were over by the parkway and then the other one

           was behind the car by another squad car.

                Q. So specifically for this minor respondent, where was the minor respondent

           during the identification procedure?

                A. The first one was by the detective that was by the parkway.

                Q. And did you identify anybody during that identification procedure?

                A. I did.

                Q. And was the same person that you identified during that identification procedure

           the minor respondent that you pointed out in court today?

                A. Well, she was the shorter of the two if I recall. One was around five-foot-one.

           The other one was about five-foot-four and I believe it was the one that was five-foot-

           one that was talking to the officer, the little bit shorter one. *** and the other one then

           came later was about five-foot-four and she was—I identified her by the other car.

                Q. So was the first person that you identified this minor respondent?

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No. 1-22-1538

                A. I don’t know. I can’t—it looks like her, yes. It does appear to be her. She

           appears to be the little bit taller one which was by the other car.”

¶8    Wolin affirmed that, before testifying, he reviewed police-recorded video of the show-up,

which accurately depicted the events. The State entered the video, People’s exhibit 1, into

evidence, and published it to the court. The video, included in the record on appeal, depicts the

interior of a police vehicle. Two voices are audible, one an officer who enters the front seat, and

the second apparently from Wolin, originating from the back seat. The officer states that other

officers will show Wolin someone and that Wolin should do the best he can. Wolin asks if the

officers will show him pictures, to which the officer responds that Wolin will be shown a “person,

the actual person.” Shortly thereafter, a second officer approaches the driver’s side window and

tells the first officer to instruct Wolin to look out of the back window of the police vehicle, which

the first officer does. The officer then asks, “can you see her?,” and continues, while confirming

an inaudible response from Wolin, “that looks like one of them?” The officer then continues, “I

don’t know if you can see black pants on, but black puffy coat?,” to which Wolin responds in the

affirmative.

¶9    Wolin confirmed that when he saw A.A. during the identification procedure, she wore the

same clothing as when he first picked her up.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Wolin agreed that both passengers wore black jackets. He agreed

that the video did not depict him mentioning either passenger’s height but did not recall if he told

officers on scene anything about their height. Wolin believed the passengers were teenagers based

on his experience as a high school counselor. The initial ride lasted around 10 to 15 minutes, during

which he did not hear any conversation between the passengers. He paid attention to the road

during the ride. In response to the question, “So you did not give a description about hair. You did

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No. 1-22-1538

not give a description about weight?,” Wolin responded, “They had heavy jackets on. I really

couldn’t tell.” Defense counsel inquired about A.A.’s alleged location during the show-up, to

which Wolin replied, “The one was standing on the street talking to one of the detectives over by

the park side and the other one was not initially there. I don’t know where she came back from,

but eventually she was there.” Wolin stated A.A. was speaking to “one detective” at the time he

identified her at the show-up. He did not recall officers saying the person he viewed would likely

be the offender.

¶ 11 On redirect, Wolin confirmed that A.A. was the offender who spoke to Wolin on the street

after he exited the vehicle. At that time, Wolin could see portions of her face.

¶ 12 Chicago police detective Andrew Kovac testified that he responded to the incident on

January 27, 2021, at around 10:50 a.m. There, he met and spoke to Wolin, along with other officers

already on the scene. While on the scene, two women approached Kovac and pointed someone

out. Kovac identified A.A. in court as the person the women pointed out. Later, at the police

station, Kovac learned A.A.’s home address was on the 2900 block of West Walton.

¶ 13 The State rested, and A.A.’s counsel moved for a directed verdict, which the juvenile court

denied. A.A. then rested. During closing arguments, the State argued in relevant part that Wolin

identified A.A. as the offender who demanded the key fob from him and also emphasized the

show-up identification. Defense counsel argued that Wolin’s identification was suspect, in part

because he only described the offenders as “taller and shorter,” and did not testify clearly regarding

whether A.A. was the taller or shorter offender. Counsel also emphasized Wolin’s lack of

specificity in the description he provided to the officers. Finally, counsel argued that the video

indicated the show-up was overly suggestive.

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No. 1-22-1538

¶ 14 The court found A.A. liable on both counts and adjudged her delinquent. In so finding, the

court noted that the State could have introduced other evidence and found it “frustrating” that it

had failed to do so. The court continued that it found A.A. liable of vehicular hijacking because

the incident happened in a short period of time, and A.A. was detained near the scene, where Wolin

identified her. The court also noted that because A.A. demanded the key fob, “it would be hard to

say that there is no common plan or design” with her co-offender regarding the aggravated battery

charge, even if A.A. was not the offender who choked Wolin. The court sentenced A.A. to 24

months’ probation and 30 days in the juvenile detention center, which the court stayed. This appeal

followed.

¶ 15                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 16 A.A. raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient because Wolin’s

identification was unreliable; (2) even conceding the identification, her conduct did not satisfy the

taking element of a vehicular hijacking charge; and (3) her mittimus should be corrected to reflect

her proper time credit. We first address the sufficiency of the evidence.

¶ 17 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court construes the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational fact finder could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453,

¶ 37. The reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder regarding the

witness credibility or the weight of evidence. Id. Reversal based on insufficient evidence is only

appropriate where “the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify

a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 18 A.A. bases her sufficiency claim on the alleged unreliability of Wolin’s identification. In

assessing the reliability of an identification, the reviewing court considers the factors described by

                                                  6
No. 1-22-1538

the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See People v. Slim, 127

Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989). Identification testimony from a single witness, if found reliable, may be

enough to sustain a conviction. Id. The Biggers factors include (1) the witness’s opportunity to

view, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of prior descriptions, (4) the witness’s

level of certainty at the time of confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and

confrontation. Id. at 308. Opportunity to view is the most important factor, though none is

determinative. See In re O.F., 2020 IL App (1st) 190662, ¶ 32 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-

200).

¶ 19 Applying the Biggers factors, we find that a rational fact finder could have found Wolin’s

identification reliable and based A.A.’s guilt thereon. First, Wolin’s opportunity to view, the first

and most important Biggers factor, favors reliability. Wolin identified A.A. as the offender who

exited the vehicle, approached him, and demanded his key fob. The weather was clear, and there

is no evidence of visibility issues. This is a specific interaction with only one of the passengers,

lowering the likelihood that Wolin might have confused one passenger with another or another

individual with A.A. While the length of this interaction is not in the record, it was at least

sufficiently long for Wolin to look at A.A, receive a verbal instruction from her, and then comply

with that instruction. This may not have lasted minutes but was sufficiently long to support his

identification as reliable. See People v. Davila, 2022 IL App (1st) 190882, ¶ 40 (opportunity to

view factor favored reliability where “although [the witness] viewed defendant for only a short

period,” the “lighting conditions” and positions of the witness and defendant provided “a clear and

unobstructed opportunity to view”).

¶ 20 A.A. argues that Wolin’s opportunity to view was minimal because the initial interaction,

when the passengers first entered his vehicle, was brief and her clothing would have made it

                                                  7
No. 1-22-1538

difficult for Wolin to identify her. This argument fails because while the record indicates the

passengers wore heavy winter clothing, Wolin testified that A.A.’s face was at least partially

visible during their interaction on the street, during which he had direct interaction with A.A. only,

and he further testified that when he identified A.A., she was wearing the same clothing as when

he picked her up.

¶ 21 Regarding the second Biggers factor, we find that Wolin’s level of attention during the

interaction on the street also favors reliability. A.A. again emphasizes Wolin’s low level of

engagement with the passengers during the initial pickup and travel portion of the incident, but

this argument fails because it does not account for the subsequent interaction Wolin and A.A. had

on the street. This interaction occurred after the attack, during which time Wolin had the presence

of mind to give her the wrong key fob. These circumstances support a finding that his level of

attention was high, favoring reliability.

¶ 22 The third factor, the accuracy of Wolin’s prior description, weighs against reliability here.

Wolin’s description to the officers was vague, apparently consisting only of the offenders’ race

and clothing. Other courts have found similar descriptions too generic to support reliability. See

People v. White, 2017 IL App (1st) 142358, ¶ 18. This factor, however, does not outweigh the

others to render the identification generally unreliable, particularly when considered alongside the

final two factors. Wolin’s level of certainty at the show-up identification, as well as the time

between incident and confrontation, both favor reliability. Neither party disputes that the time lapse

supports reliability—Wolin identified A.A. at the show-up, still on-scene and only shortly after

the incident. Compare this scenario to the facts in White, where the defendant was arrested two

days after the incident, based on a generic description, but this still did not defeat reliability because

the witness identified the offender, with certainty, at a photo array identification just three hours

                                                    8
No. 1-22-1538

after the incident. Id. ¶ 19; see In re J.J., 2016 IL App (1st) 160379, ¶ 32. The facts here are

stronger than those in White. The level of certainty demonstrated by Wolin on the video also favors

reliability, particularly when considered in tandem with his testimony that he identified A.A. at

the show-up as one of the offenders.

¶ 23 We reject A.A.’s argument that the show-up was overly suggestive. The video is clear that

the officer does not suggest the person Wolin will view is likely the offender; instead, the officer

clarifies to Wolin that it will be an actual human, not a photograph, the officers will show him.

¶ 24   A.A. generally attempts to discount the value of Wolin’s identification by emphasizing his

apparent confusion at trial regarding whether A.A. was the “taller” or “shorter” offender and where

she stood during the show-up. This passage is admittedly concerning, but it does not render his

entire testimony invalid such that no rational fact finder could have credited it. Most importantly,

Wolin’s testimony identifying A.A. as the offender who exited the vehicle and requested his key

fob is direct, clear, and distinct from that passage. Moreover, while Wolin did not testify clearly

regarding where A.A. stood on the scene during the show-up, his testimony is clear and certain

that he identified A.A. while on scene. The juvenile court was better positioned to consider the

impact the confused portion of Wolin’s testimony had on his credibility as a whole, and his

testimony, taken as a whole, was not so obviously unreliable or incredible that we may substitute

our judgment for that of the court on this issue, even if we were inclined to do so. See Hardman,

2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37; People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 283 (2004).

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No. 1-22-1538

¶ 25 Additionally, there was other evidence against A.A. that supported the court’s finding aside

from Wolin’s identification, most importantly the fact that A.A. gave as her home address the same

address from which Wolin testified he picked up the passengers. 1

¶ 26 In sum, Wolin directly identified A.A. in court as the offender who exited the vehicle to

demand the key fob. Based on this interaction, Wolin had the opportunity to view A.A., while

training his focus on her, and he then later identified her shortly thereafter while on scene. On this

record, along with the other evidence indicative of A.A.’s guilt, we find a rational fact finder could

have found Wolin’s identification of A.A. reliable. Thus, A.A.’s sufficiency of the evidence claim

fails.

¶ 27 A.A. next argues that even conceding the State’s evidence, her conduct as alleged did not

satisfy the elements for a vehicular hijacking charge because she did not “take” Wolin’s vehicle. 2

Specifically, she contends that because Wolin gave her the wrong key fob, neither she nor her co-

offender had the ability to operate the vehicle and thus could not “take” it.

¶ 28 We note that neither party satisfactorily stated the standard of review applicable to this issue.

A.A. appears to contend this is an issue reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, and the State

does not contest that characterization. However, we find that this is not a sufficiency issue. For

purposes of this claim, A.A. cedes identification and only challenges whether her conduct as

alleged satisfied the statute. In other words, both parties agree on the facts but dispute whether

those facts establish the charge. This presents a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation, which

we review de novo. People v. Hutt, 2023 IL 128170, ¶ 41.

         1
          A.A. complains that this testimony was objected to at trial. The court overruled the objection. She
does not argue this ruling was error on appeal, however.
        2
          We note A.A. did not raise this argument at any point in the trial proceedings, but the State does
not argue forfeiture before this court, and thus we may consider the claim. See People v. Bahena, 2020 IL
App (1st) 180197, ¶¶ 28-29.
                                                     10
No. 1-22-1538

¶ 29 When interpreting a statute, a court’s goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, the

most reliable indicator of which “is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary

meaning.” People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 30. A statute cannot be interpreted to lead to absurd

results. Id. If a statute’s language is ambiguous such that the legislature’s intent is not apparent

from its face, the interpreting court may use tools of statutory construction to help determine

legislative intent. Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Co., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 24.

Those tools include legislative history and the rules of statutory construction, including expressio

unius est exclusio alterius (expressio unius) and the rule of lenity. Expressio unius maintains that

if the legislature explicitly includes certain language in one statutory section, the exclusion of that

language in another section can be interpreted as intentional. People v. Foster, 2021 IL App (2d)

190116, ¶ 11. Under the rule of lenity, when legislative intent cannot be satisfactorily determined

from a criminal statute’s language or through the tools of statutory construction, the court should

construe the statute to favor defendants. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶¶ 12, 43.

¶ 30 Vehicular hijacking occurs when a defendant, “knowingly takes a motor vehicle from the

person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent

use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 2020). “[T]akes” is undefined by the statute. 3 We note that

both parties discuss the meaning of “possession” and “take” in the context of other statutes that

predated vehicular hijacking, including possession of a stolen motor vehicle (People v. Rivera, 141

Ill. 2d 528 (1990)) and armed robbery (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (1992)), but neither

framework is instructive here. The legislature passed vehicular hijacking as a new, specifically

        3
         Defendant inaccurately cites Reese for the proposition that “actual physical possession” is required
to demonstrate taking; in fact, the paragraph cited directly refutes that point, as does the fact that the phrase
does not appear in the statute itself. See Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 1 (“We hold that the offense encompasses
taking actual physical possession of a vehicle but may also be committed when a defendant exercises control
of the vehicle by use of force or threat of force with the victim still present.”).
                                                       11
No. 1-22-1538

defined crime, separate from the crimes discussed in Rivera and Strickland. See Reese, 2017 IL

120011, ¶ 40 (“in creating the new offense of vehicular hijacking, the legislature plainly intended

to address criminal conduct distinct from robbery of a motor vehicle,” though the new crime does

“encompass situations when a victim is actually dispossessed of a vehicle”).

¶ 31   We agree with the parties that whether the State must show an offender either operated the

vehicle at issue, or had the capability to do so, to demonstrate taking is not clear from the face of

the statute. This leads to an ambiguity we may resolve through the tools of statutory interpretation.

Palos, 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 24. That analysis leads us to the conclusion that A.A.’s conduct here

satisfied the taking element.

¶ 32 First, as other courts have emphasized, the legislative history of the vehicular hijacking

statute reveals the legislature’s focus was on protecting a vehicle’s driver and other occupants. In

People v. Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1999), the court stated, after reviewing the Senate

proceedings regarding the statute, “[I]t is clear that the vehicular hijacking statute was enacted to

combat the tragedies *** of car hijacking where someone armed or unarmed attacks a car, and ***

snatches the driver out.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 847. Echoing this sentiment, a

panel of this court in People v. Pryor, 372 Ill. App. 3d 422 (2007), explained that vehicular

hijacking’s legislative history shows the statute “has more to do with the injury to the victim than

the taking of property.” Id. at 437. Based on this history and the intent it reveals, we believe the

statute covers A.A.’s conduct here. The legislature’s primary concern in enacting the vehicular

hijacking statute was to prevent offenders from using force or threat to cause drivers to relinquish

their vehicles; whatever use that offender might then put the vehicle to after the fact is not relevant

to that concern.

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No. 1-22-1538

¶ 33 Here, the record shows A.A. and her co-offender used force against Wolin, specifically by

choking him, then ordered Wolin out of the vehicle, an order with which he complied. One

offender then stayed with the vehicle while Wolin left the scene, and his vehicle, behind. This

conduct completed the elements of the statute, and the fact that A.A. and her co-offender were then

unable to drive the vehicle away from the scene is irrelevant. In so holding, we do not attempt to

define specifically what “take” means or does not mean in any conceivable scenario under the

statute; only that it does constitute a taking in situations where, as here, a driver is removed from

their vehicle by force, thus leaving it in the possession of the offender, regardless of whatever use

the offenders then make of the vehicle.

¶ 34 In light of this history, we are further persuaded that A.A.’s conduct is covered by the statute

through consideration of the general principle that we must not interpret a statute to lead to absurd

results. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 30. Should we accept A.A.’s interpretation, many circumstances

where an offender uses force to dispossess a driver of their vehicle would not constitute vehicular

hijacking, an absurd result because it would run directly counter to the legislature’s intent behind

the statute. Consider, for instance, the situation where an offender uses force to remove a vehicle’s

owner from the vehicle but cannot then operate the vehicle because of a mechanical issue or lack

of gas. Similarly, under A.A.’s conception, it might not constitute vehicular hijacking if, after the

offender uses force to remove the driver from a vehicle, that offender then causes the vehicle to be

towed to another location, instead of operating the vehicle themselves. And what of a victim who

was not fortunate enough to receive aid from police officers shortly after the incident, but instead

is forced away from the scene entirely, while the offender remains with the vehicle until a new key

is generated? Is a vehicular hijacking not accomplished until said key is used to start the vehicle

and drive it away? These hypotheticals illustrate that the specific use, if any, the offender puts a

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No. 1-22-1538

vehicle to after using force to remove a driver should not be relevant to a vehicular hijacking

charge, and thus A.A. should not escape guilt here because of her good fortune regarding the key

fob.

¶ 35 We are also guided by the expressio unius tool of statutory construction in reaching this

conclusion. Specifically, the Illinois criminal trespass to vehicles statute explicitly contains a term

regarding operation of a vehicle: “A person commits criminal trespass to vehicles when he or she

knowingly and without authority enters any part of or operates any vehicle ***.” 720 ILCS 5/21-

2 (West 2020). Based on this language, we may conclude that when the legislature intends

operation to be an element of a criminal statute involving vehicles, it knows how to accomplish

that with direct language, and thus the lack of an operation element in the vehicular hijacking

statute can be construed as intentional. See Foster, 2021 IL App (2d) 190116, ¶ 15 (in context of

whether a statute included attempt offenses, court found it did not because in other statutes, “when

the legislature wanted to include attempts in a list of included offenses, it has done so expressly”);

see also Vestrup v. Du Page County Election Comm’n, 335 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2002) (the

absence of a term in one section of a statute, “despite its presence elsewhere,” suggests exclusion

was purposeful). 4

¶ 36 A.A. argues that we should look to the driving under the influence (DUI) statute, and

accompanying jurisprudence, to guide our interpretation of vehicular hijacking. Specifically, she

points to the fact that Illinois DUI law allows for conviction of an offender who is not currently

driving only if the offender is in “actual physical control” of a vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)

        4
         We note that other jurisdictions have made explicit reference to whether statutes similar to
vehicular hijacking in Illinois require that the offender then operate the vehicle. See Harper v. State, 121
A.3d 24, 31-32 (Del. 2015) (Delaware statute states that it is not a defense if offender does not physically
drive or operate the vehicle); Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 189 (Md. 1999) (explaining that Maryland law
does not require “movement or asportation”).
                                                    14
No. 1-22-1538

(West 2020). Actual physical control “is determined on a case-by-case basis” through

consideration of factors including whether a defendant possesses the ignition key or has the

physical ability to operate the vehicle. See People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 17. She

contends this definition should be applied to the “taking” language in the vehicular hijacking

statute. We disagree.

¶ 37 The legislative intent behind the DUI statute is to prevent intoxicated individuals from

operating a vehicle; the operation is the harmful act. See City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill. 2d

399, 405 (1997) (explaining that a goal of DUI law to encourage “those who plan to drink at a

party or tavern to arrange lodging or safe transportation home before they set out”). It is for this

reason that “actual physical control” of a vehicle in the DUI context generally requires the

capability to operate the vehicle, such as access to the keys. See Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512,

¶¶ 17-18. Conversely, as explained above, the vehicular hijacking statute concerns conduct

separate from operation. We therefore distinguish “take” in the vehicular hijacking context from

“actual physical control” in the DUI context; these are separate provisions intended to apply to

separate conduct, and should be interpreted accordingly.

¶ 38 Finally, A.A. contends that the rule of lenity requires us to rule in her favor here because

the definition of “take” is ambiguous. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. The rule of lenity, however,

does not apply here, because that rule is generally “subordinate to our obligation to determine

legislative intent. Id. Because we hold the legislature’s intent regarding this statute leads to the

conclusion that A.A.’s conduct would satisfy the taking element, the rule of lenity does not operate

to tilt the scales in A.A.’s favor. See id. ¶ 33 (“when the meaning of a statute becomes clear through

normal rules of statutory interpretation, resort to the rule of lenity is not required”).

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No. 1-22-1538

¶ 39 A.A.’s final claim is that the juvenile court erred in calculating her time credit. Specifically,

she contends the court’s sentence of 30 days of detention did not include an offset for her time

spent in pretrial custody. The State agrees.

¶ 40 Under section 5-710(1)(a)(v), (b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-

710(1)(a)(v), (b) (West 2020)), minor offenders are entitled to day-for-day credit for presentence

custody, including time on electronic monitoring. See In re Montrell S., 2015 IL App (4th) 150205,

¶¶ 63-65; In re Jarquan B., 2016 IL App (1st) 161180, ¶ 33. The record here shows A.A. was in

custody for a total of 56 days, but her mittimus does not reflect any credit for this time.

Accordingly, we agree with the parties here, and pursuant to our power under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we amend her mittimus to reflect her proper time credit.

¶ 41                                       CONCLUSION

¶ 42 A rational fact finder could have found A.A. guilty based on Wolin’s identification

testimony, and the legislative intent behind the vehicular hijacking statute reveals that her conduct

here satisfied the taking element of the charge. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding

of guilt and adjudication of A.A. as delinquent. Additionally, we amend her mittimus to reflect her

proper time credit, which satisfied the 30-day custody portion of her sentence.

¶ 43 Affirmed as modified.

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No. 1-22-1538

                         In re A.A., 2023 IL App (1st) 221538

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-JD-122;
                           the Hon. Patricia Mendoza, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jonathan Krieger, of State
for                        Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique
for                        Abraham, Joseph Alexander, and Taylor K. Santell, Assistant
Appellee:                  State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

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