Court Opinion

ID: 9733675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:13:49.204307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:35.159173
License: Public Domain

STONE, J., Dissenting.
I have no quarrel with the principles of law enunciated by the majority opinion; rather, I find in the terms of the contract “some consideration other than the services to be rendered,” a consideration stressed by Gressley v. Williams, 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 642 [14 Cal.Rptr. 496], cited by the majority.
Appellant’s initial letter addressed to respondent, which is set forth in the majority opinion, reflects that appellant asked for a job so that he could move Ms family from Argentina to the Umted States. Respondent’s reply, which is also quoted in the opimon, advised appellant: “I am in receipt of your letter of April 25 in which you advise that you would like to immigrate to the United States. . . . As for myself, I can only offer you a job as foreman, at a salary of $450.00 per month. I can also provide you with a very small house, but no furmture. ... I cannot make a commitment, as to the length of time I would keep you, as that would depend entirely upon what we think of your production.” (Italics added.)
Thereafter appellant requested a letter for deposit with the United States Consul in Argentina, reflecting that employment awaited appellant in the Umted States. In reply, respondent’s ranching division manager wrote appellant: “In reply to your letter of September 6, 1960, we are offering you permanent employment upon your arrival, to the extent of satisfaction to both you and ourselves, on our ranch at Livingston, California as a foreman. The starting rate would be $400.00 per month.”
Following the exchange of correspondence wMch comprises the contract, appellant qmt his job in Argentina and moved Ms wife and six children to Livingston. This moving, it seems to me, constitutes part performance of the contract in reliance upon the promise of “permanent employment upon your arrival, to the extent of satisfaction to both you and ourselves, ...”
*434It seems to me that my colleagues take too narrow a view of the scope of the contract by ignoring the fundamental or motivating reason for the contract in the first instance, namely, appellant’s moving from Argentina to the United States. Appellant’s opening letter in the exchange of correspondence which constitutes the contract, expressed this purpose. Respondent’s letter agreeing to give appellant permanent employment was not for the sake of a job as such, but to induce the American Consul in Argentina to give appellant clearance to move to the United States. The clear and unambiguous language employed in the exchange of letters reflects that all parties contemplated employment not as a job but as a means to an end. Under these circumstances I believe the contract for permanent employment must be interpreted to mean employment for a reasonable time, and terminable for cause only, not at will. (32 Cal.Jur.2d, §43, p. 452.)
Furthermore, it would offend public policy to hold that after assuring the United States Consul that appellant had a permanent job waiting for him in this country, respondent could discharge appellant without cause the day after his arrival. This is the practical interpretation of the holding that the contract of employment was terminable at will. It would circumvent the requirement of the United States that an immigrant so circumstanced file a letter assuring permanent employment to prevent the immigrant, his wife and his children, from becoming public charges.
This is not to say that respondent had no just cause for discharging appellant. The judgment was entered upon a nonsuit and we must, as pointed out in the majority opinion, disregard all conflicting evidence and give to plaintiff’s evidence all probative force to which it is legally entitled. (Meyer v. Blackman, 59 Cal.2d 668, 671-672 [31 Cal.Rptr. 36, 381 P.2d 916] ; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Trial, §§ 125, 126, 127, pp. 1857-1859.) Respondent’s proof may reveal just cause for appellant’s dismissal, but respondent should be required to prove that issue. The matter should not be determined by a nonsuit upon the legal ground that the contract was terminable at will.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 17, 1965. Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.