Court Opinion

ID: 9857149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:51:59.963739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:04.224607
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
Once upon a time, there lived in a far away land some people called “Oregonians.” Because these people had traveled a long way to start a new life in the wilderness, they desired to adopt laws that would protect their privacy and possessory interests from government tyranny. To that end, they adopted a law called “Section 9.” It said:
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure-, * * (Emphasis supplied.)1
The people also said that if a person consented to a search of a place in which he had a privacy or property interest, then the search was “reasonable,” because that person had given up those interests with respect to that entry.2 After all, Oregonians were an intelligent and independent people who were capable of making up their own minds about whether to waive the protection of section 9. For many years, the people lived happily under the protection of section 9. Although there were occasional disputes about the meaning of section 9, no one doubted that a search by “consent” was a “reasonable search.”
In a village in the kingdom, there lived a man by the name of Weaver who sold used items to Oregonians. One day, the queen’s soldiers wished to investigate as to whether Weaver was obeying a law3 that required him to keep certain *369records regarding his sales. They went to his store but he was not there. However, in checking the records, they found that there were no transfer forms for used firearms.4 They asked the store manager if they could search the premises, believing that they might find firearms for which no transfer forms existed. The store manager telephoned Weaver and one of the soldiers, Hutchinson, explained to Weaver what they wanted to do. Weaver asked Hutchinson to meet with him to discuss the matter. Hutchinson went to where Weaver was working and again explained what the queen’s soldiers wanted to do. He requested that Weaver consent to a search of the store. Weaver telephoned his lawyer and had a conversation with him while Hutchinson waited outside. Then, Weaver asked Hutchinson to speak with his attorney and Hutchinson explained about the ordinance, the lack of transfer forms, and about the search that they wanted to conduct. He told the lawyer that he was willing to obtain a search warrant or Weaver could consent to the search.
Weaver and his attorney had another private discussion, and then, Weaver asked Hutchinson to speak with Weaver’s attorney for a second time. Hutchinson and the attorney negotiated an amendment to the written form of consent that Hutchinson had with him. Weaver and his attorney had another private conversation and then Weaver signed the consent form as amended by the discussion between Hutchinson and the attorney. The consent form read:
“CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WARNING: SEARCH BY CONSENT BEFORE ANY SEARCH IS MADE, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND YOUR RIGHTS
“(1) You may refuse to consent to a search and may demand that a search warrant be obtained prior to any search of the premises described below.
“(2) If you consent to a search, anything of value as evidence seized in the course of the search can be used in court against you.
*370“I HEREBY CONSENT TO A SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT OF THE FOLLOWING (DESCRIBE PREMISES, AUTO OR OTHER SUBJECT OF SEARCH): ENTIRE PREMISE OF ABE’S SECONDHAND STORE. FOR: ALL USED FIREARMS AND CORRESPONDING PAPER RECORDS, ONLY THOSE JEWELRY ITEMS + PAPER WORK WITH COMPLIANCE IRREGULARITIES, AND ONLY THOSE OTHER ITEMS OF REGULATED PROPERTY + PAPER RECORDS WITH COMPLIANCE IRREGULARITIES. BY DEPUTIES OF THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC SAFETY, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON.
“I HEREBY AUTHORIZE THESE OFFICERS TO SEIZE ANY ARTICLE WHICH THEY CONSIDER TO BE OF VALUE AS EVIDENCE.
“THIS STATEMENT IS SIGNED OF MY OWN FREE WILL WITHOUT ANY THREATS OR PROMISES HAVING BEEN MADE TO ME.” (Bold portion reflects the handwritten modifications to the form made at the request of Weaver’s attorney.)
After Weaver signed the consent, Hutchinson returned to the store, completed the compliance check, and seized a large number of firearms. As a result of the seizure, the queen’s soldiers charged Weaver with multiple crimes of failure to register the transfer of a handgun under ORS 166.410 and failure to register the transfer of a used firearm under ORS 166.427. Weaver asked for a trial before the queen’s magistrate. Before the trial, Weaver told the magistrate that his rights to privacy under section 9 had been violated by the soldiers when they searched his store and seized the firearms and the records. The magistrate found that Weaver’s consent was voluntary and not the result of any fraud, trickery or coerciveness but he said the firearms and the records could not be used in the trial. He held that the consent authorized a search but did not authorize the soldiers to seize any items “that would evidence a compliance irregularity.”5 As an alternative basis for his ruling, he held that because the consent was executed at 2 p.m. and the soldiers *371went into the store at approximately 12:30 p.m., the search was unlawful.
The queen was very unhappy because this meant that there could be no trial to determine if Weaver had violated the laws of the kingdom. She asked the intermediate high court to review the magistrate’s decision. According to the chronicle of the intermediate high court, the court heard the queen’s arguments and agreed with the magistrate’s alternative ruling. It concluded, “[t]he fact that defendant subsequently consented does not vitiate the unlawfulness of a search and seizure that violated the state and federal constitutions at its inception.” 121 Or App at 366.
So far as we know, Weaver lived happily ever after, and the prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” in section 9 had new meaning under the court’s ruling. Thereafter, all the people in the kingdom knew: once an unauthorized search begins, it can never be consented to, even if the person whose privacy interests were being invaded agrees to the search and seizure after being advised to do so by his attorney. The moral of this fable is that “reasonable” really means “unreasonable,” and that even if one consents to a search by signing a consent form that one’s lawyer helps write, the form still doesn’t mean what it says.
This moral parallels the logic of a famous nursery rhyme character:
“ ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more or less.’
“ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
“ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’ ” Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass ch 6 (1872).
To summarize: when the search began, it was unauthorized. The trial court and the majority say that that fact ends the inquiry. They err because they fail to consider whether the search and seizure that occurred before the consent was signed fall within the purview of the consent. So far as I can tell from the record, defendant and his attorney *372were aware of all the necessary facts6 and made an informed decision to consent to the search and the seizure. In fact, they delineated what could be searched. A knowing consent made subsequent to the inception of the search and seizure could relate back to the beginning of the search and act as a waiver of defendant’s section 9 rights regarding the privacy interests that were invaded before the consent form was signed. We should remand for the trial court to make that determination.
I dissent.
Richardson, C. J., and Deits and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.

 Article I, section 9, protects privacy and possessory interests from unlawful searches and seizures. A “search” occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded. An invasion of a “privacy” interest in property occurs when there is a significant unconsented-to interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests in property. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206-07, 729 P2d 524 (1986).

 In State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 351,833 P2d 1278 (1992), the court said that a warrantless search by police based on a consent to search is “reasonable” under section 9.

 Multnomah County Ordinance No. 647 authorizes police to enter second hand stores to determine whether compliance with record keeping requirements regarding the purchase and/or sale of regulated items, i.e., firearms, jewelry, electronic equipment, or other property that is frequently the subject of theft, is occurring.

 ORS 166.427 requires that a person engaged in the business of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring a firearm shall enter in a register the time, date and place of purchase or trade, the name of the person selling or trading the firearm, and identification numbers of the firearm.

 The consent form expressly authorizes the seizure of “any article which [the officers! consider to be of value as evidence.” Defendant and his lawyer should be held to an objective standard regarding the meaning of the language in the consent form. See State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or 613, 621 n 9, 801 P2d 749 (1990).

 The majority says that defendant and his attorney didn’t know that the search had commenced when they modified the consent form and defendant signed it. So long as the search did not exceed the scope of the consent, that fact should make no difference in the analysis.