Court Opinion

ID: 9779430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:50:32.611726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.356475
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Chief Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority that the statements were inadmissible as prior inconsistent statements. However, I do not believe that their admission prejudicially affected a substantial right of the appellant under the facts and circumstances of this case. Underlying this dissent is my basic belief that prosecution for child abuse deserves a different approach and treatment legally than do the other criminal offenses. Reported cases of child abuse increased 223% nationally since 1976 and child abuse related deaths have increased 23% between 1985 and 1986. Many states have enacted legislation to protect children and provide for this differential treatment. Arkansas, to a limited extent, did so when it enacted Act 405 of 1985. The act added to the list of hearsay exceptions a statement made by a child under 10 years of age concerning an act or offense against the child involving sexual offenses if the court finds that the statement offered possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness. Arkansas Rules of Evidence Rule 803(25)(A) recognizes the need for allowing hearsay statements of children to be admitted under certain circumstances. It acknowledges the need to put all of the evidence before the jury and let them determine what credit the child’s testimony is to be given. Although the procedural requirements of 803(25)(A) were not met, cross-examination about the prior hearsay statement provided adequate safeguards of the defendant’s rights in this particular case. The underlying reason for excluding hearsay is inability to confront the declarant, and such reasoning fails here. Had the judge, after a hearing conducted outside of the jury’s presence, admitted the statements under 803(25)(A), it would have been extremely difficult for the majority to find that the trial judge abused his discretion. I fail to see how a substantial right of the appellant’s was prejudiced by admission of the statement under one exception when the same statement was admissible, in the judge’s discretion, under another exception. For this reason I believe the statements made to the foster mother and counselor were properly admitted. In cases of sexual abuse of children, because of fear, embarrassment, punishment etc., the child may avoid naming the perpetrator or give inconsistent accounts. Because of the sensitive nature of these cases, the jury should be allowed to hear all evidence probative of the truth and be allowed to decide for themselves, as they did in this case,,if the child’s testimony is credible. The legislature mandated such special treatment by addition of the hearsay exception, and such treatment is appropriate here. We must strive to protect the interest of our children.