Court Opinion

ID: 9931640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:09:24.077474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:58.126806
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2431-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SANDRO VARGAS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted January 24, 2024 – Decided February 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-08-1756.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Stephen Anton Pogany,
                   Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      After a jury convicted defendant Sandro Vargas of the first-degree murder

of Patricia Hiciano, the court imposed a thirty-year sentence with a thirty-year

period of parole ineligibility. We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence

on his direct appeal, State v. Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. 598, 619 (App. Div. 2020),

and the Supreme Court denied his petition for certification, State v. Vargas, 244

N.J. 302 (2020). Defendant appeals from an order denying his post-conviction

relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                          I.

      We described the evidence presented at defendant's trial in our decision

on defendant's direct appeal. See Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. at 604-07. We

summarize the evidence to the extent necessary to provide context for our

discussion of the issues presented on appeal.

      Defendant had an intimate relationship with Hiciano, a single mother of

four children. Id. at 604. A few months before Hiciano's murder, defendant

pushed his way into her home, and defendant and Hiciano argued. Ibid. At a

pre-trial N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, Hiciano's teenage daughter testified that

defendant was drunk, and she heard defendant threaten Hiciano, stating, "if you

can't be with me, then you can't be with anyone." Ibid. Hiciano's daughter then

testified at trial that defendant said, "he was tired of telling [Hiciano] that if she

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wasn't with him[,] she wouldn't be with anybody." Ibid. During a custodial

interrogation following his arrest, defendant confirmed he was last intimate with

Hiciano about five months before her murder. Ibid.

      On the evening of Hiciano's murder, defendant appeared at the restaurant

at which Hiciano worked. Id. at 605. As defendant ate dinner and drank several

beers, he was joined by a friend, Jose Luis Silva Lopez. Ibid. At trial, Lopez

testified defendant told him he intended to have sex with Hiciano at a hotel later

that evening and then showed Lopez a photo of Hiciano with her new boyfriend.

Ibid. Lopez explained defendant appeared jealous and told Lopez that he had a

compromising video of Hiciano that could get her in trouble with her boss. Ibid.

      Lopez and Hiciano later accepted defendant's offer to drive them to their

homes. Ibid. Defendant drove his wife's Honda. Ibid. Relying on video

surveillance recordings from various points along defendant's route, the State

established defendant's whereabouts after he left the restaurant. Ibid.

      Defendant first dropped Lopez off at his home. Ibid. Defendant then

drove with Hiciano to a hotel where Hiciano left defendant's vehicle and walked

away. Ibid. Defendant followed Hiciano slowly in the car, then drove off when

Hiciano went into a pizzeria to buy a pizza she had promised her children. Ibid.

Hiciano waited at the pizzeria for over twenty minutes, and then walked roughly

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half a mile toward her home with the pizza. Ibid. As she approached her

building shortly before 10:30 p.m., she spoke by phone to a friend, saying she

would call the friend back once she arrived home. Ibid.

      Surveillance recordings showed that while Hiciano was getting the pizza,

defendant had parked his car around the block from Hiciano's building and then

got out. Ibid. Defendant had sufficient time to arrive at Hiciano's building prior

to her arrival with the pizza. Ibid.

      A resident of the first-floor apartment at the building testified that shortly

after 10:30 p.m., she heard a scuffle in the vacant apartment above her, including

muffled screams and the sound of athletic shoes—like those defendant had worn

that evening—squeaking on the floor.          Ibid.   Another recording showed

defendant returning to his car minutes later and leaving the area. Ibid. A

recording made about an hour later showed defendant arriving home. Id. at 605-

06.

      Hiciano did not return home that evening.          The following morning,

Hiciano's daughter called defendant, but her call went to voicemail. Id. at 606.

She then called one of Hiciano's co-workers, who happened to be with

defendant, and Hiciano's daughter spoke with defendant at that time. Ibid.

Defendant said he had not seen Hiciano in a while, pretended he had a bad phone

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connection, and hung up the phone. Ibid. Hiciano's daughter then reported her

mother missing to the police. Ibid.

      Later the same day, Hiciano's sister spoke with defendant concerning

Hiciano's whereabouts. Ibid. At that time, defendant said he had dropped

Hiciano off in front of her building the night before, left, and had not seen her

again. Ibid.

      Five days later, police discovered Hiciano's body in a vacant second-floor

apartment of her building. Id. at 606. The evidence presented at trial established

she had been strangled to death. Ibid. DNA matching defendant was found

under Hiciano's fingernails and small pieces of debris found on the floor of

defendant's wife's Honda matched debris recovered from the vacant apartment

in which Hiciano's body was found. Ibid.

      The police questioned defendant concerning Hiciano. During the initial

questioning, defendant insisted he had dropped Hiciano off across the street

from her building and stated that when he did so, there was a group of men and

a woman who had congregated there. Ibid. During his two interviews with the

police, defendant changed his story when confronted by the police with

information they had obtained in video surveillance recordings and their

investigation. Ibid. Defendant finally insisted he last saw Hiciano when she left

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his car after she exited it in front of the hotel. Ibid. Defendant asserted that

Hiciano proposed to have sex with him but had changed her mind, got out of the

car, and walked away. Id. at 606-07. Defendant denied entering Hiciano's

building and killing her. Id. at 607.

      Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses at trial, and his trial

counsel argued in summation that: the police planted the debris in the Honda;

Hiciano would not have gone to the second-floor apartment without a struggle,

and no witnesses from the apartment building testified about hearing a struggle;

there were discrepancies in the State's timeline of the events; and the DNA could

have come from Hiciano's prior contacts with defendant. Ibid. In its summation,

the State reviewed the evidence and argued in part that defendant's threatening

statement to Hiciano, as recounted by her daughter, provided proof of

defendant's motive for the murder. Ibid.

      Following our affirmance of defendant's conviction and sentence on his

direct appeal, Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. at 619, and the Supreme Court's denial of

his petition for certification, Vargas, 244 N.J. at 302, defendant filed a pro se

PCR petition. The petition did not include any averments of fact supporting a

cognizable PCR claim. Instead, defendant listed only three "points" he sought

to have PCR counsel "raise or look into." Those three points were described as

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follows: (1) an unspecified statement by Jose Lopez; (2) Hiciano's daughter's

statement that defendant had "threaten[ed]" Hiciano; and (3) "[t]he officer that

was use[d] to [interpret for defendant]" during his interviews with the police

was not "certified."

      Defendant's assigned PCR counsel later filed an extensive brief in support

of the petition, arguing defendant's trial and appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance and defendant otherwise was denied a fair trial by the trial

court. More particularly, the brief included the following arguments:

            POINT I

            BUT FOR TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE
            REPRESENTATION,  THE    DEFENDANT'S
            STATEMENTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD
            ADMISSIBLE.

            POINT II

            THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED HIS
            CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON HIS
            OWN BEHALF.

            POINT III

            THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED HIS
            CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A
            DEFENSE.

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POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL
JURY AND HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL BECAUSE OF IMPROPER CHARGES TO
THE JURY.

POINT V

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE   OF   TRIAL   COUNSEL    IN
VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW
JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS.

POINT VI

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
COMPLAINED OF RENDERED THE TRIAL
UNFAIR.

POINT VII

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.

POINT VIII

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED WITH
REGARD    TO   THE    ALLEGATIONS    OF
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR.]

POINT IX

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR [PCR] SHOULD
NOT    BE  BARRED    BY     PROCEDURAL
CONSIDERATION.

                                           A-2431-21
                   8
       After hearing argument on the petition, the court issued a written

statement of reasons rejecting defendant's claims. The court reasoned that

defendant failed to sustain his burden of establishing a prima facie ineffective

assistance of counsel claim under the standard established by the United States

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted

for application under our State Constitution by our Supreme Court in State v.

Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The court further concluded defendant otherwise

failed to demonstrate he was denied his right to a fair trial.

       The court entered an order denying defendant's PCR petition without an

evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed. Defendant presents the following

arguments for our consideration:

             POINT I

             DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE
             CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
             COUNSEL BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED
             TO ADVISE DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO
             TESTIFY AT THE MIRANDA[1] HEARING, AND
             HAD HE DONE SO, THE RESULT WOULD HAVE
             BEEN DIFFERENT.

             POINT II

             DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE
             CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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                                         9
            COUNSEL BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED
            TO ADVISE DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO
            TESTIFY AT TRIAL DESPITE HIS HAVING NO
            CRIMINAL RECORD THAT COULD BE USED TO
            IMPEACH HIM, AND HAD HE DONE SO, THE
            RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

            POINT III

            DEFENDANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE
            CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
            AND   APPELLATE      COUNSEL      BECAUSE
            NEITHER COUNSEL ARGUED THAT THE TRIAL
            COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE REQUIRED
            INSTRUCTION WHEN N.J.R.E. 404(b) EVIDENCE
            IS ADMITTED AT TRIAL, AND HE WAS
            THEREFORE ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING.
                               II.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. We may "conduct a de novo review" of

the court's "factual findings and legal conclusions" where, as here, the PCR court

has not conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence,

463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal

proceeding the right to the assistance of counsel in their defense. The right to

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counsel requires "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Nash,

212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

       To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show a "reasonable likelihood" of success under the two-prong

test outlined in Strickland. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992); see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. The Strickland test requires

that a defendant show (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment" and (2)

counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "With respect to both prongs of the

Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR

bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the

evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted). If a

defendant fails to sustain his burden under either prong of the standard, a

defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

       Under the first prong, a defendant must show "counsel's acts or omissions

fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in

light of all the circumstances of the case." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366

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                                       11
(2008) (citation omitted). Our analysis under the first prong is highly deferential

to counsel. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 318-19 (2005) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). There is "'a strong presumption' that [counsel] provided reasonably

effective assistance" and counsel's "decisions followed a sound strategic

approach to the case[,]" State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), even when a strategic decision turns out to be a

mistake, State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 42 (1991). A defendant may rebut

the presumption of effectiveness by proving trial counsel's actions were not

"sound trial strategy." Arthur, 184 N.J. at 319 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689).

        Under the second Strickland prong, a defendant must "affirmatively

prove" "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Gideon, 244

N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). "A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

Ibid. (citations omitted). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is

an exacting standard." Ibid. (quoting Allegro, 193 N.J. at 367). A defendant

"must affirmatively prove prejudice" in a PCR petition to satisfy the second

prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

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      Defendant first argues the PCR court erred by rejecting his claim that trial

counsel was ineffective at the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing during which the trial court

considered the admissibility of his statements to the police. Defendant 's claim

is founded on the contention that his statements to the police should have been

deemed inadmissible because he did not understand his Miranda rights "due to

the 'mixed bag' of English and Spanish spoken to him" when advised of his

rights.

      Defendant argues the PCR court erred by rejecting his claim that trial

counsel was ineffective in prosecuting his motion to suppress his statements to

police because the PCR court found, in part, that defendant was aware of his

right to remain silent by virtue of his prior employment as a police officer in the

Dominican Republic. Defendant further argues there is no competent evidence

supporting the PCR court's finding that individuals in the Dominican Republic

have the same rights to remain silent as those enjoyed by individuals in the

United States, and the court could not properly take judicial notice of those

purported facts.

      We agree the PCR court erred by citing a travel website as support for its

determination that individuals in the Dominican Republic enjoy the same right

to remain silent as individuals in the United States. Moreover, even if a right to

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                                       13
remain silent comparable to that which exists in the United States was extant in

the Dominican Republic while defendant served as a police officer there, the

suppression motion record is bereft of evidence establishing defendant was

aware that he enjoyed the same rights when he was arrested and questioned by

the police in the United States following Hiciano's murder. And, neither the

motion court nor the PCR court could correctly assume defendant was aware of

his right to remain silent under the laws of the United States and State of New

Jersey because the State has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to

remain silent. See State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 211 (2022).

      The PCR court's error in relying on what it concluded in part was

defendant's knowledge of his right to remain silent based on his prior

employment in the Dominican Republic does not, however, require a reversal of

the court's order denying the PCR petition. That is because, based on our de

novo review of the record before the PCR court, we agree that defendant failed

to sustain his burden of establishing a prima facie ineffective assistance of

counsel claim under the Strickland standard.

      Defendant claims trial counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing

by failing to call defendant as a witness. Defendant argues counsel's failure to

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                                      14
call him as witness deprived him of "the opportunity to present evidence that

would have" resulted in the suppression of his statements to the police.

According to defendant's brief on appeal, if he had been called as a witness at

the suppression hearing, "he would have been able to testify as to the true

circumstances, and in particular, that he was having trouble understanding the

Spanish-speaking detectives that were translating" during his police interviews

and "that there was also a lot of confusion on [his] part resulting therefrom."

Defendant's brief also asserts that "his primary language was Spanish" and

"although he was living in the United States[,] his ability to understand was very

limited." Defendant further asserts in his brief on appeal that trial counsel did

not advise him "he could be called as a witness" at the suppression hearing.

      We reject defendant's claim trial counsel was ineffective in prosecuting

the motion to suppress defendant's statements to the police because it is

supported solely by the arguments of counsel in defendant's brief on appeal.

Stated differently, none of the assertions of purported fact on which defendant's

claim is based are supported by competent evidence presented to the PCR court.

      It is well established that "bald assertions" are insufficient to sustain a

defendant's burden of establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance

under the Strickland standard. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170

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                                       15
(App. Div. 1999). PCR petitions must be "accompanied by an affidavit or

certification by defendant, or by others, setting forth with particularity," State v.

Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014), "'facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's

alleged substandard performance,'" State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013)

(quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170).

      Defendant's claims concerning his purported confusion and inability to

understand his Miranda warnings—that the record otherwise shows were

provided through a Spanish interpretation provided by a police officer and were

written in Spanish and reviewed and signed by defendant—and his attorney's

alleged failure to inform defendant he could testify at the hearing, find no

support in any competent evidence presented to the PCR court. Proffers of fact

offered by counsel at argument on a PCR petition and assertions of fact in a brief

to the court do not establish facts supporting a PCR claim. See Jones, 219 N.J.

at 312. For those reasons alone, the PCR court therefore correctly rejected

defendant's claim his trial counsel was ineffective in prosecuting the motion to

suppress defendant's statements to the police.

      Lacking any competent evidence establishing grounds supporting

defendant's motion to suppress his statements to the police, defendant failed to

sustain his burden under Strickland's first prong. An attorney's performance is

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                                        16
not constitutionally deficient by failing to prosecute a claim or make an

argument that lacks support in the facts and is therefore meritless. See generally

State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) (holding "[i]t is not ineffective

assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion"); State

v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) ("The failure to raise unsuccessful legal

arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel" (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)).

      For the same reasons, the court correctly determined defendant failed to

sustain his burden of establishing, under Strickland's second prong, that there

was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged errors in prosecuting

the suppression motion, the result of the suppression hearing would have been

different.   466 U.S. at 693-94.      As noted, defendant had the burden of

affirmatively proving prejudice under Strickland's second prong as a result of

his counsel's purported error. Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551. Defendant did not

sustain that burden because he failed to present any competent evidence

establishing that had he testified at the hearing, there is a reasonable probability

the court would have suppressed his statements to the police.

      In sum, the court correctly denied defendant's claim trial counsel was

ineffective during the prosecution of the motion to suppress defendant's

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                                        17
statements to the police. As correctly determined by the PCR court, and even

absent its reliance on defendant's prior employment as a police officer in the

Dominican Republic, defendant failed to present competent evidence satisfying

his burden under both prongs of the Strickland standard. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687.

      Defendant also contends the PCR court erred by rejecting his claim trial

counsel was ineffective by not presenting defendant as a witness at trial.

Defendant argues counsel advised him it would be best if he did not testify at

trial, failed to inform him the decision whether to testify was his "alone to

make," and failed to prepare defendant to testify. Defendant further argues that

he proffered before the PCR court that "he would have testified that he was

innocent of the murder, and the State would not have been able to attack his

credibility with any prior criminal convictions because he did not have any."

      Defendant's arguments the PCR court erred by rejecting his claim trial

counsel was ineffective by not calling him as a witness at trial fail because,

again, all the factual underpinnings of the claim are unsupported by competent

evidence. The record lacks any certifications, affidavits, or other competent

evidence establishing what counsel advised or failed to advise defendant about

testifying at trial and, perhaps more importantly, defendant failed to provide an

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affidavit or certification setting forth the facts about which he would have

testified at trial if he had been called. Defendant's vague, scant, and conclusory

putative proffer to the PCR court, and the conclusory assertions in his brief on

appeal, do not satisfy his burden of presenting competent evidence establishing

facts sufficient to satisfy his burden under the Strickland standard. See Jones,

219 N.J. at 312; Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

      As the PCR court aptly recognized, defendant failed to sustain his burden

under the Strickland standard on his claim trial counsel was ineffective by

allegedly failing to call defendant as a witness at trial, advise defendant he could

testify at trial, and prepare defendant to testify at trial. We therefore affirm the

court's rejection of the claim.

      Defendant also asserts the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to request a limiting instruction under

N.J.R.E. 404(b) describing the proper use of Hiciano's daughter's testimony that

defendant had threatened Hiciano "if he could not have her, no one would." The

argument is based on the inaccurate premise that the trial court admitted the

statement under N.J.R.E. 404(b) when, in fact, the trial court determined the

statement was inadmissible under the Rule.          In our view, trial counsel's

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performance was not deficient by failing to request an instruction under a Rule

that the trial court had determined did not support admission of the evidence.

      In any event, we recognize that on defendant's direct appeal, we

determined the trial court erred by failing to admit evidence of the threat under

N.J.R.E. 404(b), Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. at 610, and that generally, admission

of evidence under N.J.R.E 404(b) requires a jury instruction detailing the

permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence in a jury's deliberations, see

State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 161 (2011).

      However, we agree with the PCR court that under the circumstances

presented, admission of the evidence of defendant's threat without the required

N.J.R.E. 404(b) instruction did not deprive defendant of a fair trial . That is

because the evidence of defendant's guilt—including the recordings, DNA,

debris found in defendant's wife's Honda, and defendant's conflicting and

inconsistent statements about his whereabouts and actions, many of which are

contradicted by recordings—is overwhelming. As such, there is no reasoned

basis to conclude the absence of the instruction resulted in an unfair trial. See

Vargas, 463 N.J. Super. at 618 n.9 (collecting cases finding the absence of a jury

instruction concerning the proper use of N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence did not

require reversal).

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                                       20
      Because we are not persuaded the absence of a jury instruction under

N.J.R.E. 404(b) deprived defendant of a fair trial, we reject his argument the

PCR court erred by denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing

to request the jury instruction. Moreover, even if counsel's performance was

deemed deficient for failing to request the instruction under Strickland's first

prong, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails because he cannot, and has

not, affirmatively proven a reasonable probability that but for the error, the

result of the trial would have been different. See Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551.

Defendant's failure to sustain his burden under Strickland's second prong alone

requires a denial of his ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to

request a N.J.R.E. 404(b) instruction. See Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 350 ("Although a

demonstration of prejudice constitutes the second part of the Strickland analysis,

courts are permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a defendant has

been prejudiced, and if not, to dismiss the claim without determining whether

counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient." (citation omitted)).

      Defendant also claims appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise

meritorious issues in support of defendant's direct appeal. See State v. Gaither,

396 N.J. Super. 508, 513 (App. Div. 2007) (finding the Strickland standard is

also applied to a claim appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance). We

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                                       21
reject the argument because it is untethered to any citation to the record or

applicable law demonstrating appellate counsel failed to raise an available

meritorious argument, or that there is a reasonable probability that but for any

purported error to properly raise an available argument, the result of the appeal

would have been different.

      We recognize appellate counsel did not argue on appeal that the trial court

erred by failing to provide the N.J.R.E. 404(b) instruction. However, even if

appellate counsel erred by failing to do so, defendant makes no showing he

suffered prejudice under the Strickland standard as a result and, for the reasons

we have explained, the absence of the instruction did not deprive defendant of a

fair trial and, in our view, would not have required a reversal of his conviction

on appeal. We therefore conclude appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue

on direct appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the

Strickland standard because there is no reasonable probability that but for

counsel's purported error, the result of defendant's appeal would have been

different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94.

      In making each of his arguments on appeal, defendant also argues the PCR

court erred by denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing.          The

argument finds no support in the record or applicable law.

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                                      22
            A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only
            upon[:] the establishment of a prima facie case in
            support of [PCR], a determination by the court that
            there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be
            resolved by reference to the existing record, and a
            determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary
            to resolve the claims for relief.

            [R. 3:22-10(b).]
"To establish such a prima facie case, the defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the

merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). Because defendant did not

establish a prima facie case supporting any of his claims, the court correctly

denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

       Any remaining arguments presented on defendant's behalf that we have

not expressly addressed are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

       Affirmed.

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                                      23