Court Opinion

ID: 9947844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 19:03:33.665029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:37.987878
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24 In re M.C. CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re M.C., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
 SERVICES AGENCY,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A168679
 v.
                                                                        (Alameda County
 Ashley K.,
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. JD-036148-01)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Ashley K. (Mother) appeals from an order adjudging her young son,
M.C., a dependent minor and placing him in out-of-home care. Her sole
argument on appeal is that reversal is required because of an inadequate
inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.,
ICWA). We agree that further inquiry and notice are required and therefore
vacate the finding that ICWA does not apply. In all other respects, the
juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
      M.C. came to the attention of respondent Alameda County Social
Services Agency (Agency) shortly after he was born one month premature in
April 20231 showing signs of withdrawal from drugs. A case worker
interviewed the parents the day after the boy’s birth. Mother at first
reported no Native American ancestry, but she soon reported that she had
ancestry through the Nez Perce Tribe. The infant’s father (Father), who is
not a party to this appeal, reported that he had Native American ancestry
but did not know the relevant tribe, and his parental notification of Indian
status form filed later that month contained the same information.
      The Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition around a week and a
half after the infant was born alleging that he was a child described by
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,2 subdivisions (b) (failure to
protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition’s attached Indian
Child Inquiry form (ICWA-010(A)) indicated there was no reason to believe
the infant was or may be an Indian child.
      According to the detention report dated April 23, Father did not want
the Agency to contact his parents (the paternal grandparents) about Agency
involvement since he did not want his parents to know that Mother had
tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother reported that she had family
in Southern California, but the detention report did not include names or
further detail.

      1 All date references are to the 2023 calendar year.

      2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
      The first thing the juvenile court did at the detention hearing after
appointing counsel for Mother, Father, and M.C., was ask both parents about
possible Native American ancestry. Mother said she was aware of affiliation
with the Nez Perce Tribe but reported she was not registered with the tribe.
Father said his mother had told him of Native American ancestry but he did
not know the relevant tribe. The court ordered that the parents complete
ICWA-020 forms so that notices could be provided to tribes. After discussion
of other issues, the infant was ordered detained.
      In early May the Agency provided notice of the proceedings to the
Sacramento office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Nez Perce
Tribe. The notice stated that M.C. might be eligible for membership in the
Nez Perce tribe through Mother. The form listed Mother’s and Father’s
names and birthdates, but no information was provided about grandparents
or any other relatives. Later in May the Agency provided the Nez Perce Tribe
with notice of a scheduled May 31 jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
      The disposition report dated May 31 includes additional information
about M.C.’s extended family. Mother reported that her mother (the
maternal grandmother, whose last name is different from Mother’s) was half
Native American with the Nez Perce Tribe. The report does not specifically
indicate whether the maternal grandmother is still alive, though it suggests
that she might not be. Mother said she was raised primarily by her paternal
grandmother, who had died a few years ago. The report also includes the
names of Mother’s brother, sister, and father, as well as the cities where they
live. Father reported that his parents and two sisters live in the Bay Area,
though their names are not listed in the disposition report. Father said his
family knew about M.C. and had asked to see him, but he had not told them
about Agency involvement, which was “difficult for him.” The report asked
the juvenile court to make a finding that the whereabouts of any
grandparents was unknown. This appears contrary to the report’s
statements that Mother’s father knew about the Agency’s involvement with
her family and supported her efforts to treat her substance abuse, and that
Father was in frequent contact with his parents.
      ICWA was not discussed during two brief hearings held in May. In
June, the Agency filed return receipts indicating the Sacramento BIA office
and the Nez Perce Tribe both had received notice. It also filed a letter from
the Nez Perce Tribe stating that neither Mother nor Father were enrolled in
the tribe or had “immediate Nez Perce ancestry.”
      At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on July 11, the juvenile court
found that M.C. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b)
and (g), adjudged M.C. a dependent child, ordered out-of-home placement for
the baby and reunification services for the family, and granted the Agency
discretion to allow unsupervised visits with Mother, who was in a residential-
treatment program. The court also found that ICWA did not apply. Mother
appealed.
                                      II.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Mother argues that reversal of the ICWA finding is required because
an insufficient ICWA inquiry was made of extended family members. We
agree.
      “ ‘ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by establishing minimum federal standards a state court must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family.’ [Citation.] Those
standards include notice to Indian tribes in state court proceedings to place a
child in foster care or to terminate parental rights ‘where the court knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved’ (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see
§ 224.1, subd. (d)(1); [citation]); that is, ‘any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); accord, § 224.1, subd. (a).) ‘Notice to
Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose, enabling a tribe to
determine whether the child involved in a dependency proceeding is an
Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise jurisdiction over,
the matter.’ [Citation.] ‘Oral transmission of relevant information from
generation to generation and the vagaries of translating from Indian
languages to English combine to create the very real possibility that a
parent’s or other relative’s identification of the family’s tribal affiliation is not
accurate. Accordingly, just as proper notice to Indian tribes is central to
effectuating ICWA’s purpose, an adequate investigation of a family member’s
belief a child may have Indian ancestry is essential to ensuring a tribe
entitled to ICWA notice will receive it.’ [Citation.]
      “The Legislature enacted changes to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
effective January 1, 2019, to conform its statutes to recent changes in federal
ICWA regulations, which now require state courts to ask each participant in
a child custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to
know if a child is an Indian child (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022)). [Citation.]
The ICWA investigatory process under state law is now expansive and
potentially onerous. The juvenile court and social services agency ‘have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether’ a minor in dependency
proceedings ‘is or may be an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a), italics added;
[citation].) ‘The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact.’ (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) If a child is placed into temporary custody of the social services
agency, the agency ‘has a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian
child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (b), italics added; see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)” (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 173–
174 (S.H.).)
      We agree with Mother that the Agency has not yet complied with these
ICWA inquiry duties, although we recognize that these duties are expansive
and potentially onerous. Specifically, there is nothing in the record to
demonstrate that the Agency questioned M.C.’s maternal relatives about
potential Native American ancestry. (See In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
303, 322 [“additional inquiry should have, at a minimum, included interviews
with Mother’s extended family members”]; § 224.2, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(a).)
      The Agency does not focus on its initial inquiry duties under
section 224.2, subdivision (b), and instead focuses on the steps that follow it.
If, after the initial inquiry, “the court [or] social worker . . . has reason to
believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have
sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the
child is an Indian child, the court [or] social worker . . . shall make further
inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that
inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The Agency contends
that it satisfied this duty when it “contacted the relevant tribe with the
information it had at the time and received a definitive response, rendering
further inquiry unnecessary.” According to the Agency, “Nothing in the
record suggests that, at that point in time [when it sent notices to the Nez
Perce Tribe], the parents had provided the Agency with any more information
about the family. Rather, the names and detailed location of Mother’s family
members first appear in the record on the disposition report filed three weeks
after the notice was sent.” This argument ignores that the Agency has a
continuing duty to inquire whether M.C. is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) We commend the trial court and the Agency for taking
prompt steps to inquire about the parents’ potential Native American
ancestry, and we acknowledge it was no doubt challenging to receive
inconsistent and incomplete responses. But ICWA and state law impose an
ongoing duty to determine potential Native American ancestry and does not
stop once a social services agency takes initial steps to comply.
      We accept that the Agency is not required “ ‘to cast about’ for
investigative leads” and need not inquire further if a parent withholds
information (as Father apparently did when he said he does not want the
Agency to contact his family). (In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323.)
But the record here reveals that there are known maternal relatives who
have not been questioned. And even if no additional information is learned
from maternal relatives on remand, the Agency must still provide additional
ICWA notice with the information it learned (the maternal grandmother’s
name) after it previously provided notice. It does not matter, as the Agency
argues, that M.C. would not appear eligible for membership in the Nez Perce
Tribe even if the maternal grandmother had a connection to the tribe since
the tribe’s letter stated that “an individual must have at least 1/4 Nez Perce
blood” in order to be an enrolled member. “A tribe’s right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its
existence as an independent political community.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 72, fn. 32; see also In re S.R. (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 [tribal membership determined by tribes, not courts
or social services agencies].)
      The parties disagree about the appropriate disposition upon a finding
that the Agency has not yet fully complied with ICWA. Mother argues that
this court should reverse the finding that ICWA does not apply, whereas the
Agency contends that we should find that the issue is not ripe for review. (In
re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1154.) In S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th
166, this court held that “when a social services agency accepts its obligation
to satisfy its inquiry obligations under ICWA, a reversal of an early
dependency order is not warranted simply because a parent has shown that
these ongoing obligations had not yet been satisfied as of the time the parent
appealed.” (Id. at p. 171.) Here, the Agency has not conceded error or
acknowledged its duty to question, to the extent possible, relatives identified
after it first sent ICWA notice, or to provide the Nez Perce Tribe with
information about the maternal grandmother. Under these circumstances,
we find it appropriate to take the approach outlined in In re Dominick D.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567–568. That is, we “vacate the finding that
ICWA does not apply, but we otherwise affirm and direct the juvenile court
on remand to order [the Agency] to comply with its inquiry and . . . notice
obligations under ICWA and related California law.” (Ibid.)
                                          III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The finding that ICWA does not apply is vacated, and the Agency is
directed to comply with its ongoing duties under ICWA. In all other respects,
the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
                            _________________________
                            Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

In re M.C. A168679