Court Opinion

ID: 9679092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:40:31.910788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:48.703727
License: Public Domain

ONION, Judge
(dissenting).
I feel compelled to dissent to the overruling of appellant’s ground of error #2, which complaint appellant first embodied in his amended motion for new trial. Even without consideration of whether the stipulation entered complies with Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., it is observed that the record is silent as to a waiver by the appellant of the appearance, confrontation or cross-examination of the complaining witness J. M. Soliz. A silent record will not support the waiver of a valuable constitutional right such as the right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70. Cf. Article I, Sec. 10, Texas Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St.
In absence of Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., it would be possible to remand this cause to the trial court in order to determine if the appellant after consultation with counsel intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to confrontation. Hullum v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 415 S.W.2d 192; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408.
If, however, the provisions of Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., are applicable to the instant case, then such remand would be merely an exercise in futility. Therefore, *380a discussion of the applicability of Article 1.15, supra, is called for.
Former Article 12, V.A.C.C.P., 1925, was amended in 1931 to permit a defendant to waive a jury trial and enter a plea of guilty before the court in felony cases less than capital. At the same time, among other things, former Articles 11 and 658 were amended and former Article 10A was enacted. See Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43, sec. 8.
The emergency clause of such amendment reads in part:
“The fact that under present laws, a defendant is not permitted, upon entering a plea of guilty, to waive the right of a trial by Jury, and in order to reduce the expense of law enforcement and to hasten the disposition of felony cases wherein pleas of guilty are entered, creates an emergency * *
There was, however, a specific procedural requirement contained in the amendment permitting such guilty pleas before the court. It reads, “Provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the State to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the Court as the basis for its verdict, and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea of guilty without sufficient evidence to support the same.”
This procedural requirement was entirely different from that authorized in many other jurisdictions and in pleas of guilty in misdemeanor cases in Texas. Cf. Hendrick v. Beto, D.C., 253 F.Supp. 994, aff. 5 Cir., 360 F.2d 618. The reason for such requirement was discussed by Judge Davidson in his concurring opinion in Braggs v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 334 S.W.2d 793.
Though the statute was silent as-to the matter, the question soon arose as to whether the evidence required could be produced by way of stipulations. This court in decisions too numerous to cite held that stipulations might be utilized if certain requirements were met. See, however, Villarreal v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 214 S.W.2d 464; Shepherd v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 235, 284 S.W.2d 155; Ex parte Clark, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 385, 299 S.W.2d 128; King v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 494, 320 S.W.2d 842; Watson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W.2d 934. This was particularly true if the appellant had waived the appearance, confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and had personally and with counsel agreed with the State as to the stipulation of evidence of probative value. Rendon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 397 S.W.2d 430; Pitcock v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 223, 324 S.W.2d 866; Braggs v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 334 S.W.2d 793. A study of the cases in which stipulations were upheld clearly indicates that there was certainly no uniformity in the manner in which they were entered. In some opinions no mention is made of the right of confrontation. In others it is stated that the failure of the appellant to object at the trial or on motion for new trial constituted a waiver of such right. See Shepherd v. State, supra.
In 1959 Article 12 was amended to include a plea of nolo contendere and required the same procedure to be used. Acts 1959, 56th Leg., 3rd C.S., p. 377, ch. 2, sec. 2. See also Martinez v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 266, 340 S.W.2d 56; Aguillar v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 189, 339 S.W.2d 898; Bomar v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 307, 356 S.W.2d 931.
In the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, former Article 12 become a source for Article 1.15, supra, and that article was also drafted to conform to the other provisions of the Code which permitted a defendant to waive trial by jury and enter a plea of not guilty before the court in felony cases less than capital. See Articles 1.13 and 1.14, V.A.C.C.P.
Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., 1965, reads:
“No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless in *381felony cases less than capital the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of a trial by jury in writing; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the State to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evidence may he stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed, with all of such evidence, in the file of the papers of the cause. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.” (Emphasis Supplied)
A study of the various drafts of Article 1.15, supra, by the State Bar of Texas Committee on the Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as amendments subsequently made in the Legislature, clearly indicates a desire to authorize by statute the use of stipulations in producing the evidence required, as well as a need for uniformity in so doing, including the written waiver of the right of confrontation. There also existed a need for more accurate record keeping1 since federal courts by habeas corpus actions had begun inquiring into old convictions to determine if the petitioner had been deprived of his federal constitutional rights at his state criminal trial.
It must be remembered that by this time the United States Supreme Court had established its “theory” to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights contained in the Federal Constitution. That Court had held that what the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands in state criminal proceedings is a fair trial; that the rights guaranteed by the federal Bill of Rights are essential to a fair trial, and that accordingly a state court defendant will be denied the fair trial guaranteed him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if he is deprived of any of these rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 93 A.L.R.2d 733; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934.
Further, the federal courts had made clear that they were the ultimate forum in determining whether there had been a waiver of a federal constitutional right in a state criminal proceeding.
Still further, the United States Supreme Court had always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357. It has been said that the waiver of constitutional rights will not be “lightly inferred” and the courts will “indulge every reasonable presumption against [the] waiver” of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. Such waiver may be defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, *38216 L.Ed.2d 314, 317; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255. And as has already been observed, “ [p] resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Carnley v. Cochran, supra; see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. Cf. the later decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974. It must be remembered that the burden of proof of demonstrating that an accused has intelligently and knowingly waived any of his constitutional rights rests squarely upon the prosecution. This formulation of a federal waiver standard of “knowingly and intelligently” adopted principally from Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, presented a clear contrast with the traditional state formulations of waiver. The United States Supreme Court made plain, however, that conventional notions of waiver, i. e., failure to object, failure to raise question before judgment cannot be used to obstruct the adequate vindication of federal rights. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837.
It was against this background that the State Bar Committee and the Legislature had to labor in their study of the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is obvious that the Legislature felt that the State had a vital interest in maintaining control of its own criminal proceedings and in insuring in some degree the finality of its own judgments and that the procedure described was designed to assist in these purposes.2
The various proposed drafts, as well as the statute enacted, show without exception that the Legislature further intended the procedure prescribed to apply to pleas of not guilty, as well as to pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. See 44 Tex.L.Rev. 983, 1006. In fact, some discussion even centered around extending these requirements in other parts of the Code to all types of trials regardless of the plea for some of the same reasons set out above.
Shortly after the enactment of the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, this writer made the following observation in his Special Commentary to Article 1.15, supra, (See footnote 2) :
“This article formerly applied only to pleas of guilty (or nolo contendere) before the court in non-capital cases. A pitfall to be avoided by all concerned is that the new article is now applicable to pleas of not guilty before the court where the jury has been waived in felonies less than capital, and if during such trial a stipulation is entered into, it must comply with written consent, waiver and stipulation and other procedure required by this article rather than the usual trial stipulation. A few reversals will probably forcefully call this to the attention of everyone.” See also 1 Branch’s Anno. P.C. 2d Ed., 1968 Supplemental, p. 438, 440; 28 Texas Bar Journal, No. 8, p. 727, 728; 44 Tex.L.R. 983, 1006.
In almost three years since the effective date of the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure (January 1, 1966) the case at bar is the first case on appeal where the precise question here involved has been raised. In every record that has been examined by this writer which involved a plea of not guilty before the court and stipulation of evidence, there has been a faithful compliance with Article 1.15, supra. To me this demonstrates a wide spread knowledge and understanding of the requirements to be met and further demonstrates no great difficulty involved in meeting those requirements.
In 1967, Article 1.15, supra, was amended to make it expressly applicable to “capital cases where the State has waived the death penalty.” (Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1733, *383ch. 659, sec. 2). No effort was made to indicate that the procedural requirements were not to be applicable to pleas of not guilty before the court. In fact, this amendment strengthens the contrary conclusion.
Here we are faced with a statute that expresses its purpose in plain and unambiguous language and its meaning is clear and obvious. There exists no necessity for construction or interpretation by this Court. See 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes, Sec. 123, p. 173. It is not the function of this Court to set aside the clear intent of the Legislature and by our opinions re-draft this statute to suit ourselves. To do so is nothing more than raw judicial legislation. Nevertheless, the majority plunges ahead.
Ignoring the legislative history, the majority in order to justify construing Article 1.15, supra, quotes the article out of context in order to raise the necessary ambiguity or uncertainty. Then, without rhyme or reason, the majority holds that the limitation as stipulations refers to evidence to support a plea of guilty and is not mandatory where the plea is not guilty. As an exercise in justification the majority opinion does not succeed.
Certainly uniformity as to stipulations in all types of cases would be highly desirable, but the lack of uniformity furnishes no basis for this Court’s majority to continue their emasculation of this article which was so effectively begun in Zulpo v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 415 S.W.2d 650; Zulpo v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 415 S.W.2d 653; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 416 S.W.2d 425.
To me there is more at stake here than the proper affirmance or proper reversal of the case at bar.
I can think of only one authority which might support the majority’s interpretation:
“ ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more or less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master, that’s all.’ ” Carroll, “Through the Looking Glass” (Alice in Wonderland), Chpt. 6.
Since the case at bar is silent as to any waiver of the federal and state constitutional right of confrontation and since there was no attempt at all to comply with any of the mandatory provisions of Article 1.15, supra, as to stipulations, I would reverse this conviction.
I vigorously dissent.

. Evidence, stipulated or otherwise, offered by the State to show the guilt of the defendant under old Article 12 did not have to be preserved. Broyles v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 556, 159 S.W.2d 881. Then, as now, stipulations preserved only in the court reporter’s notes can be destroyed after a full year. Article 2324, V.A.C.S. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770.

. The changes wrought by Article 1.15, supra, and the reasons therefor are discussed by Judge Morrison in his Interpretative Commentary to such article and by this writer in his Special Commentary, both of which are found in Volume I of Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal Procedure, pp. 86-87.