Court Opinion

ID: 9555608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:07:34.997748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:08.502666
License: Public Domain

J-A12022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 CURTIS PALMORE                          :
                                         :
                     Appellant           :   No. 1384 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 21, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0012494-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED AUGUST 14, 2023

      Appellant, Curtis Palmore, appeals from the order entered April 21,

2022, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      On a previous appeal, a panel of this Court summarized the relevant

facts of this case as follows.

       On July 7, 2012 on the 5500 block of Harmer Street in
       Philadelphia, [Pennsylvania,] several members of the Howell
       family, who reside on that block, were having a barbeque in
       celebration of a birthday. Also present at the party was
       [Appellant,] who at the time was a close friend of one of the
       Howell family members who lived on the block, Charnea Howell.
       [During the] party, one of the members of the Howell family,
       Gregory, spilled a tray of grease from the grill on [Appellant].
       A cousin of Charnea Howell, Nadirah Howell, offered to remedy
       the situation; however, [Appellant] began calling her offensive
       names which prompted Nadirah to throw her drink in
       [Appellant's] face. A scuffle ensued between [Appellant] and
       several male members of the Howell family. [Appellant] ran
       away from the cookout.
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        Several minutes later, [Appellant] returned to the party. He
        instigated another fight with the male Howell family members.
        [During the] fight, [Appellant] pulled a silver gun from his waist
        area and fired once, striking Daywone Howell in the leg.
        Daywone was taken to a local hospital and several hours later
        positively identified [Appellant] after being shown a photo
        array.

Commonwealth v. Palmore, 2017 WL 3084825, at *1 (Pa. Super. July 20,

2017) (quotation omitted).

       At the conclusion of a jury trial, on October 28, 2014, Appellant was

convicted of possessing a firearm while prohibited, carrying a firearm without

a license, and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia. Id. “On January

20, 2015, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate [seven and

one-half] to 15 years’ incarceration.”           Id.   On July 20, 2017, this Court

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court

subsequently denied allocatur on January 9, 2018.                   Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Palmore, 178 A.3d 733 (Pa. 2018).

       Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on May 8, 2016. The PCRA

court subsequently appointed counsel, but on June 25, 2019, counsel filed a

no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.

1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion requesting to proceed pro se. A Grazier1

hearing was held, after which the PCRA court granted Appellant leave to

proceed pro se.       PCRA Court Order, 9/30/19, at 1.           Nonetheless, upon

____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

                                           -2-
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Appellant’s request, the PCRA court appointed Lawrence O’Connor, Esquire,

(“Attorney O’Connor”) to serve as standby counsel and then, on October 1,

2021, vacated Attorney O’Connor’s standby status, and appointed him as

Appellant’s counsel. Attorney O’Connor filed an Amended PCRA petition on

November 3, 2021. On March 30, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order

pursuant to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,

indicating its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. PCRA

Court Order, 3/30/22, at *1-*9 (unpaginated). On April 21, 2022, the court

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:2

        1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Appellant’s]
           PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was
           presented to establish that the trial court issued an illegal
           sentence by failing to calculate and include in the sentencing
           order [] 864 days of time credit to which [A]ppellant was
           entitled for the period of his pretrial incarceration?

        2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA
           petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented
           to establish violations of [A]ppellant’s constitutional rights
           under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

        3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Appellant’s]
           PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was
           presented to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for
           failing to present available defense evidence and
           witness[es]; failing to object to the introduction of hearsay
           evidence and the corresponding failure to ensure that the
           court [gave] a curative jury instruction; and failing to
           request and ensure the proper application of time credit on
           the sentencing order?

____________________________________________

2 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of discussion and disposition.

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        4. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Appellant’s]
           PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was
           presented to establish that appellate counsel was ineffective
           for failing to raise and preserve all appropriate claims on
           appeal?

        5. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Appellant’s]
           PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was
           presented to prove the existence of newly discovered
           evidence that would have exonerated [A]ppellant had it been
           available at trial?

        6. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an
           evidentiary hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

       Our standard of review is as follows:

        Our review of a PCRA court's decision is limited to examining
        whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the
        record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
        error. We view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
        of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. With
        respect to the PCRA court's decision to deny a request for an
        evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing,
        such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and
        will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The PCRA
        court's credibility determinations, when supported by the
        record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo
        standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions[.]

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citations

omitted).3
____________________________________________

3 In the PCRA court’s 1925(a) opinion, the court indicated that “it stated on

the record the reasons for its entry of the [o]rder that is the subject of this
[a]ppeal” during a hearing that was conducted on March 10, 2022. PCRA
Court Opinion, 8/1/22, at 1. A review of the transcripts from the March 10,
2022 hearing reveals that the court, in essence, relied upon its 907 notice,
which it believed adequately addressed Appellant’s claims. See N.T. Hearing,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -4-
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       In his first issue, Appellant claims he is “entitled to have [his] judgment

of sentence vacated” and to be resentenced because the trial court failed to

credit him with time served prior to his trial.     Appellant’s Brief at 16.   In

particular, Appellant argues that the trial court omitted 864 days of pretrial

incarceration from the sentencing order, resulting in an illegal sentence. The

Commonwealth, as well as the PCRA court, concluded that Appellant’s claim

is not cognizable under the PCRA. We agree.

       This Court previously explained:

        The PCRA sets forth its scope [in pertinent part] as follows:

              This subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of
              remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from the
              judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising
              issues waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from
              collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.

              42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9542. … In construing this language,
              Pennsylvania Courts have repeatedly held that the PCRA
              contemplates only challenges to the propriety of a
              conviction or a sentence.

____________________________________________

3/10/22, at 3-4. “Ordinarily, the remedy for non-compliance with the
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) is a remand to the trial court with directions that an opinion
be prepared and returned to the appellate court.” Gibbs v. Herman, 714
A.2d 432, 435 (Pa. Super. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Although we do not approve or sanction the PCRA court's failure to comply
with Rule 1925(a), our review of the court’s 907 notice does, in fact,
adequately apprise us of the PCRA court's reasoning in relation to the issues
raised herein. We therefore decline “to delay this case further by remanding
for the preparation of a 1925(a) opinion[] and proceed to review the merits
of Appellant's claims.” Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 178 (Pa.
Super. 2008), citing Commonwealth v. Griffin, 785 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa.
Super. 2001).

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        Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 843 (Pa. Super.
        2011) (en banc), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 846 (Pa. 2012) (case
        citations omitted) (emphasis [omitted]).

        In [Commonwealth v. Perry, 563 A.2d 511 (Pa. Super.
        1989)], this Court held that a PCRA petition is not the proper
        method for contesting the [Department of Corrections’
        (“DOC”)] calculation of sentence. See [id.] 512–[5]13. The
        Perry Court explained:

              If the alleged error is thought to be the result of an
              erroneous computation of sentence by the Bureau of
              Corrections, then the appropriate vehicle for redress would
              be an original action in the Commonwealth Court
              challenging the Bureau's computation. If, on the other
              hand, the alleged error is thought to be attributable to
              ambiguity in the sentence imposed by the trial court, then
              a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum lies to the trial
              court for clarification and/or correction of the sentence
              imposed.

              It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a
              trial court's alleged failure to award credit for time served
              as required by law in imposing sentence, that a challenge
              to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable as a due process
              claim in PCRA proceedings.[4]

        Id. (citations and emphasis omitted) (footnote added).

Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394–395 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(parallel citations omitted).

       Herein, a review of the certified record reveals that, at the time the trial

court imposed Appellant’s sentence, it specifically granted him “[c]redit” for

time served, and directed “the [Philadelphia] Prison System” to calculate the

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA was revised after this Court’s decision in Perry to specifically
permit a petitioner to challenge the legality of his or her sentence. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(2)(vii); see also Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d
554, 560 (Pa. 2022) (“This Court long has held that challenges to the legality
of a sentence fall within the purview of the PCRA.”)

                                           -6-
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total amount. Trial Court Sentencing Order, 2/20/15, at 1. “Thus, Appellant’s

[claim] that he challenges the legality of his sentence is inaccurate. His real

allegation of error is that the DOC failed to follow the court’s sentence.”

Heredia, 97 A.3d at 395. Because Appellant is not “challenging the propriety

of [his] conviction or [his] sentence,’” he has failed to raise a claim that is

cognizable under the PCRA.5 Id., citing Masker, 34 A.3d at 843; see also

Perry, 563 A.2d at 513.            Appellant, therefore, must seek relief in the

Commonwealth Court.6

       In his second issue, Appellant raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

In particular, Appellant claims that the “prosecutor made improper remarks

during [] his opening and closing statements, baselessly insinuating that

[A]ppellant would or could bring harm to the Commonwealth’s witnesses.”

____________________________________________

5 We have defined a legality of sentence claim as one that involves a sentence

that is not authorized by law, a double jeopardy claim, or a claim based upon
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). Appellant’s claim, therefore,
does not fit within this paradigm, as he seeks relief based upon an alleged
improper calculation of his sentence. As such, Appellant’s challenge belongs
in the Commonwealth Court.

6 In reliance on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d

746 (Pa. Super. 2008), Appellant claims that, because he was “incarcerated
on a parole detainer and had not posted bail on his new offense, the
sentencing court was obligated to credit the time served in custody prior to
disposition of the new offense to the new offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. In
Mann, this Court address a sentencing court’s decision to deny “credit for
time-served applied to the new sentence” and, instead, directed it to “be
reserved to ‘go to [the appellant’s] state [parole violations].’” Id. at 748. As
indicated above, however, the trial court’s sentencing order did, in fact,
include credit for time served. See Trial Court Sentencing Order, 2/20/15, at
1. Hence, Appellant’s reliance on Mann is misplaced, as it is inapposite to the
current matter.

                                           -7-
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Appellant’s Brief at 23. In addition, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth

“fail[ed] to disclose the Internal Affairs [] misconduct documents for Officer

[Joseph] Cooney” and that this failure “violated [A]ppellant’s constitutional

right[s] as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).” Id.

      Importantly,

       [t]o be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must establish, by
       a preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence
       resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42
       Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2). These errors include a constitutional
       violation [], which “so undermined the truth-determining
       process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
       have taken place.” Id. Additionally, [an] appellant must show
       his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, and “the
       failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial ... or on direct
       appeal could not have been the result of any rational strategic
       or tactical decision by counsel.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(3),
       (a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the highest appellate
       court in which [appellant] could have had review as a matter of
       right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
       9544(a)(2). An issue is waived if appellant “could have raised
       it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a
       prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
       9544(b).

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (some citation

omitted).

      As indicated above, Appellant currently raises fact-based claims of trial

court error, including improper prosecutorial remarks and a Brady violation,

but fails to do so within the context of a challenge to trial counsel’s

effectiveness.   As such, Appellant could have litigated this issue on direct

appeal but failed to do so. See Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111

A.3d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (“At the PCRA stage, claims of trial

                                       -8-
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court error are either previously litigated (if raised on direct appeal) or waived

(if not).”); see also Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (Pa. 2013)

(“We must note first that all of the Brady violations [the a]ppellant allege[d]

in this [case] could have been raised at trial and/or on direct appeal.”          …

“Accordingly, this issue is waived.”).         Based upon the foregoing, we conclude

Appellant’s second appellate issue is waived.

       Appellant’s third and fourth appellate issues involve allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel, set forth against both trial and appellate

counsel.7    “[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the appellant] bears the

burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804

(Pa. 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (Pa.

2008). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must establish:

        (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
        basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3)
        [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such
        that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
        proceeding would have been different absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 373–374 (Pa. 2011), citing

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Failure to meet

any prong of the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth

v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 224–225 (Pa. 2007). Counsel cannot be deemed

____________________________________________

7 Appellant combined these two issues in the argument section of his brief.

See Appellant’s Brief at 16-22.

                                           -9-
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ineffective for failure to assert a baseless claim. Commonwealth v. Payne,

794 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. 2002).

      Furthermore, to demonstrate prejudice, Appellant must show there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d

822, 833–834 (Pa. 2005). When it is clear that a petitioner's ineffective

assistance claim has failed to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness

test, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone, without a determination

of whether the first two prongs have been met. Rainey, 928 A.2d at 224-225;

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 701 (Pa. 1998) (“If it is clear

that [the a]ppellant has not demonstrated that counsel's act or omission

adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings, the claim may be

dismissed on that basis alone and the court need not first determine whether

the first and second prongs have been met.”).

      Herein, Appellant argues that both trial counsel and appellate counsel

provided ineffective assistance, citing several facets of counsels’ supposed

deficient performance. First, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to ensure that he received “the 864[-]day time credit on the

sentencing order.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant also challenges appellate

counsel’s performance on this basis.      See Appellant’s Brief at 21 (alleging

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing “to include the legality of sentence

claim in [Appellant’s] appellate brief”).      As addressed above, Appellant

challenges the calculation of his time credit, not his entitlement to it. Such

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claims are handled by the DOC and, if an error has occurred, Appellant must

seek relief in the Commonwealth Court. As such, we decline to hold that trial

or appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance on this basis.

      Second, Appellant argues that trial counsel “fail[ed] to object to the

introduction of an unsigned statement made to police by Charnea Howell” and,

as such, provided ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Brief at 18. In addition,

Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “ensure the trial

court g[a]ve a curative instruction to the jury prior to [its] deliberation” after

the admission of the unsigned statement.        Id.   Appellant also challenges

appellate counsel’s effectiveness on this same basis.         See id. at 20-21

(alleging appellate counsel failed to preserve Appellant’s “hearsay claim” and

“corresponding failure to provide a curative jury instruction” on appeal). In

contrast to Appellant’s claim, trial counsel did, in fact, object to the

introduction of Charnea Howell’s unsworn statement at trial. See N.T. Trial,

10/23/14, at 3-14. In this same vein, appellate counsel raised the following

issue on Appellant’s direct appeal: “Did the trial court err by overruling the

objection of defense counsel to [evidence] from Charnea Howell [consisting of

a] hearsay statement asserting that Appellant [] shot the complainant?”

Palmore, 2017 WL 3084825 at *1; see also id. at *3 (holding that

Appellant’s “first issue regarding the admission of Charnea Howell’s hearsay

statement” was meritless). Hence, Appellant’s claims that trial counsel failed

to object to the statements’ admission, or appellate counsel failed to raise this

issue on appeal, lack merit as both claims are belied by the record. Further,

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we conclude that Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to request a curative instruction to the admission of Charnea Howell’s

unsigned statement, and appellate counsel for not raising this issue on appeal,

fails for lack of prejudice. Indeed, Appellant does not set forth any argument

demonstrating that, had trial counsel requested a curative instruction, the

outcome would have been different. The same is true regarding Appellant’s

claim against appellate counsel.    Instead, Appellant alleges that counsels’

“failures . . . substantially prejudiced [A]ppellant and had an adverse outcome

o[n] the case.”     Appellant’s Brief at 19.   Such a generic and conclusory

allegation of ineffectiveness is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice.    See

Spotz, 870 A.2d at 833-834 (explaining that an appellant must demonstrate

that, “but for counsel’s error,” there is a reasonable probability that “the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different”). Hence, Appellant is

not entitled to relief.

      Third, Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s “refusal to present the

testimony of witness[,] Caleb Allen,” resulted in ineffective assistance.

Appellant’s Brief at 18. In support of his claim, Appellant argues that “Allen

intended to testify that he identified a man named Clifton Rudd to police as

the actual shooter,” not Appellant.     Id.    Our Supreme Court previously

explained:

       There are two requirements for relief on an ineffectiveness
       claim for a failure to present witness testimony. The first
       requirement is procedural. The PCRA requires that, to be
       entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must include in
       his PCRA petition “a signed certification as to each intended

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       witness stating the witness's name, address, date of birth and
       substance of testimony.”        42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1);
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15).        The second requirement is
       substantive. Specifically, when raising a claim for the failure to
       call a potential witness, to obtain relief, a petitioner must
       establish that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was
       available; (3) counsel was informed or should have known of
       the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was prepared to
       cooperate and would have testified on defendant's behalf; and
       (5) the absence of such testimony prejudiced him and denied
       him a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Carson, 741 A.2d 686,
       707 (Pa. 1999).

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 438 (Pa. 2014) (parallel citations

omitted).

      A review of the certified record reveals that, in Appellant’s Amended

PCRA petition, he did not include the certification information as required by

Section 9545(d)(1) or Rule 907(A)(15). Hence, Appellant failed “to comply

with the simple and straightforward rules governing entitlement to an

evidentiary hearing.” Reid, 99 A.3d at 438. In addition, as explained by the

PCRA court, Appellant failed to demonstrate that Allen was prepared and

willing to testify on his behalf. To the contrary, “trial counsel initially stated

that Allen was reluctant about testifying.” PCRA Court’s 907 Notice, 3/30/22,

at *8 (unpaginated); see also Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726,

748 (Pa. 2004) (holding that the appellant’s failure to demonstrate that the

proposed witnesses “were willing and able to testify” at his trial prevented him

from establishing that “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present th[e]

witnesses”). Moreover, Appellant failed to establish that the absence of Allen’s

testimony prejudiced him and, instead, relies upon generic and conclusory

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argumentation to support his claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 19 (alleging trial

counsel’s “failures . . . substantially prejudiced [A]ppellant and had an adverse

effect on the outcome of the case”). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude

that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Fourth, Appellant argues that trial counsel inexplicitly “fail[ed] to seek

a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s inflammatory remarks during opening and

closing statements.” Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Appellant, however, failed to

identify this issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Interest of D.C., 263

A.3d 326, 335 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“This Court will not consider a claim of error

when an appellant fails to raise the claim in the trial court at a time when the

error could have been corrected” and “issues not included in an appellant's

Rule 1925(b) [s]tatement are waived.”), citing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge is waived.

      Finally, we turn to Appellant’s remaining claim of ineffective assistance,

lodged against appellate counsel.      Appellant argues that appellate counsel

“fail[ed] to properly perfect [his] direct appeal,” submitted a deficient

appellate brief, and otherwise failed to “preserve all of [A]ppellant[‘s] issues

on appeal.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. We discern no basis for Appellant’s

claim. Appellant did file a counseled direct appeal. In so doing, Appellant

raised two issues, namely, a challenge to the admission of Charnea Howell’s

“hearsay” statement and a claim questioning the sufficiency of the evidence.

See Palmore, supra. In reviewing Appellant’s claims, this Court made no

mention of any deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief or even concluded

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that Appellant waived any arguments on appeal. See id. We therefore hold

that Appellant’s unsubstantiated claim of ineffectiveness fails.

      In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief based upon

a claim of after-discovered evidence. In particular, Appellant argues that an

eyewitness, Elijah Burke, “offered exculpatory information that would serve to

establish [A]ppellant’s innocence.”       Appellant’s Brief at 25.      Appellant

summarily argues that Burke’s potential testimony was “obtained after trial

and could not have been obtained at trial through reasonable diligence, as

[A]ppellant was incarcerated and unable to perform his own investigation.”

Id. We disagree.

      To obtain relief on this basis, Appellant must plead and prove by a

preponderance of the evidence the “unavailability at the time of trial of

exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have

changed the outcome of the trial had it been introduced.”           42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(vi). Moreover, Appellant must show that the after-discovered

evidence:

       (1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the
       trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
       corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to
       impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result
       in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008). To determine

whether the evidence is “of such nature and character” to compel a different

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verdict in a new trial, a court should consider “the integrity of the alleged

after-discovered evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the

overall strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Commonwealth

v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d

826 (Pa. 2010).

      Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s after-discovered evidence

claim fails—and does so for two reasons. First, Appellant’s explanation of why,

with due diligence, Burke’s testimony could not have been obtained before

trial is lacking. Appellant’s sole reason for not locating Burke to procure his

testimony is his incarceration.    Appellant, however, was represented by

counsel who could have been instructed to locate Burke and secure him as a

potential witness.    Second, Appellant is unable to establish that Burke’s

testimony, even if it had been offered, would alter the outcome of his trial, as

multiple eyewitnesses identified Appellant as the shooter. As the PCRA court

explained, “the [surviving] victim gave a statement to the police from the

hospital that day[,] recounting the shooting and he later identified [Appellant]

as the shooter from a photo array. Charnea Howell also gave a statement to

police.   … Her brother, Jamar Howell, and cousin, Nadirah [Howell], also

identified [Appellant] was the shooter to the police.” PCRA Court’s 907 Notice,

3/30/22, at *3 (unpaginated).      Based upon the amount of identification

evidence against Appellant, we also conclude that Burke’s late-proffered

testimony was unlikely to change the result of Appellant’s trial and he is not

entitled to relief.

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      In his final appellate issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred

in dismissing his PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. This Court has

repeatedly stated, that the right to an evidentiary hearing for a PCRA petition

is not absolute.   Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (citation omitted). If the petitioner’s claim is without support in

the record or other evidence, the PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing.

Id.   As required, we have examined the issues raised in Appellant’s PCRA

petition, and we have concluded that there were no genuine issues of material

fact. Id. (citation omitted). Hence, we similarly conclude that the PCRA court

did not err in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary

hearing.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Nichols did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

matter.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2023

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