Court Opinion

ID: 9754370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:57:31.32818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:52.780636
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion holds that the doctrine of promissory estoppel can elevate an employee’s *129handbook into an implied contract where it is conceded that there is no intent by the employer to be bound by the handbook.1 The majority opinion’s analysis is contrary to the well-established law in this Commonwealth that an employee handbook does not bind the employer unless it expresses a clear intent by the employer to be bound. It also makes dramatic inroads into the employment at-will doctrine, adding a new exception to the only recognized exception to the doctrine, a termination that violates public policy.
There is hardly a more settled principle under Pennsylvania law that an employee' handbook does not overcome the employment at-will presumption unless the handbook’s language clearly expresses that the employer intended such a result. Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-University Hospital, 417 Pa.Super. 316, 323, 612 A.2d 500, 503 (1992); Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Ass’n, 416 Pa.Super. 37, 42, 610 A.2d 495, 497 (1992); Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for Youth, Inc., 374 Pa.Super. 522, 530, 543 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1988); Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 376 Pa.Super. 90, 97, 545 A.2d 334, 338 (1988); Reilly v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 367 Pa.Super. 411, 415, 532 A.2d 1212, 1216 (1987); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 222, 511 A.2d 830, 841-842 (1986). The employee handbook sub judice does not express any clear intention by the employer to be bound by its contents. Quite to the contrary, the handbook’s first page contains, in block text, a disclaimer:
I hereby acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Delaware Valley Medical Center’s Employee Handbook which covers rules, policies and regulations pertaining to my employment. I understand and acknowledge that this Employee Handbook is not a contract of employment for any *130specified period of time. I understand that I may voluntarily leave my position upon proper notice or be terminated by the Medical Center at any time and for any reason. Any oral or written statements or promises to the contrary are hereby expressly disavowed by the Medical Center and are not relied upon by the undersigned. I further understand that the contents of this Handbook are subject to change at any time at the discretion of the Medical Center.
The majority opinion appears to recognize that under Pennsylvania law, that this employee handbook evidences no intent by the employer to be bound. It concludes that the “appellant was initially employed at will, and nothing in the employee handbook was sufficient to change the employee’s status by conferring contractual rights.” Opinion at 1318.
Notwithstanding, the majority argues that the employee handbook expresses a policy regarding leaves of absence that is enforceable against the employer under the principles of promissory estoppel. The tenor of its analysis is that where an employer expects, if not demands, its employees to abide by policies expressed with particularity in an employee handbook, an employee can justifiably rely on the fact that the employer will adhere to the handbook’s policies also. It cites for support of this proposition. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).2
The majority analysis seems to be espouse a revision of principles that are well-settled under Pennsylvania law. As stated supra, an employee handbook must contain a clear expression of an employer’s intent to be bound by its contents for the principle of at-will employment to be obviated. The majority opinion appears to recognize this legal doctrine, as noted supra, and also that this handbook displays no intent to be bound. Notwithstanding, for the purposes of promissory estoppel, the majority opinion concludes that the employee *131handbook evidences an intent for the employer to be bound by its provisions.
I do not see how one can have it both ways. It is difficult to see how the employee handbook does not evidence an intent to be bound for the purposes of treating the booklet as a contract yet still evidence an intent for the employer to be bound for the purposes of promissory estoppel. Either the handbook expresses a clear intent by the employer to be bound or it does not. Since the majority opinion concedes that the employee manual does not evidence an intent to be bound, its inquiry should go no further. Accordingly, the premise of its argument, that the employer expected the handbook to represent the mutual obligations of the employer and the employee, is erroneous.
The Washington state decision that the majority opinion cites as its principal authority for applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel to employee handbooks is neither controlling nor contrary to our analysis. Directly after the Thompson court’s analysis regarding circumstances where an employee manual might bind an employer, the court stated as follows:
It may be that employers will not always be bound by statements in employment manuals. They can specifically state in a conspicuous manner that nothing contained therein is intended to be part of the employment relationship and are simply general statements of company policy. Additionally, policy statements as written may not amount to promises of specific treatment and merely be general statements of company policy and, thus, not binding. Moreover, the employer may specifically reserve a right to modify those policies or write them in a manner that retains discretion to the employer.
Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 230-81, 685 P.2d at 1088. Accordingly, where, as here, an employer specifically disclaims any intent to be bound by the employee handbook, the employer is not bound by policy aspirations expressed in it. If anything, Thompson is in accord with traditional Pennsylvania law *132regarding employee handbooks, and militates that the lower court should be affirmed.
It appears to me that the majority opinion’s analysis establishes what appears to be an internally inconsistent and illogical exception to the general rule applicable to employee handbooks. The general rule is that such handbooks do not bind an employer unless there is a clear intent in that handbook the employer be bound. Yet the majority posits that an exception to this is when the handbook articulates certain policies which the employee could justifiably expect would be followed. I would submit that the rule and the exception share the selfsame inquiry: whether the handbook clearly evidences an employer’s intent to be bound by it. One can opine that the handbook evidences a clear intent to be bound, or one can claim the opposite, but one cannot do both.
Any attempt to resurrect the promissory estoppel doctrine in this context in any event is untenable in light of our Commonwealth’s Supreme Court ruling in Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90, 569 A.2d 346 (1990). In Lankenau, an employee was terminated for allegedly removing five refrigerators from the place of his employment.. The employee stated he was given oral approval by the employer’s storeroom manager to remove the refrigerators, and thus, the employer should be estopped from firing him for this reason. In the course of overruling a Superior Court en banc decision which ruled the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevented the employer from terminating its employee, our Supreme Court declared as follows: “[a]n employee may be discharged with or without cause, and our law does not prohibit firing an employee for relying on an employer’s promise.” Id. at 95, 569 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added); accord Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Ass’n, 416 Pa.Super. 37, 610 A.2d 495 (1992).
It is true that our Supreme Court declared the foregoing in reference to whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel is an exception to the employment at-will doctrine. Lankenau, supra, 524 Pa. at 95, 569 A.2d at 348. The Court’s word choice supra, however, instructs the Bench and Bar that the court would look with disfavor at trying to evade the employ*133ment at-will doctrine through the use of promissory estoppel. Moreover, it is apparent from the Court’s reasoning that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not a viable exception to the employment at-will doctrine. As the Court expressly reiterated in Lankenau, quoting with approval Clay v. Advance Computer Applications, 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917 (1989): “[exceptions to [the employment at-will doctrine] have been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy.” Lankenau, supra, 524 Pa. at 95, 569 A.2d at 348, quoting Clay, supra, 522 Pa. at 89-90, 559 A.2d at 918. Promissory estoppel, accordingly, just as equitable estoppel, must fail as an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.3
Viewed in light of Lankenau’s reaffirmance of the employment at-will doctrine, the majority’s declaration that this admittedly at-will employee may recapture her job (or a similar one) for “at least” a “reasonable period of time” is suspect. Such a conclusion rests decidedly uneasily with our pronouncements that an employer may terminate an at-will employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Nix v. Temple University, 408 Pa.Super. 369, 375, 596 A.2d 1132, 1135 (1991); Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Company, 394 Pa.Super. 363, 368, 575 A.2d 944, 946 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 601, 589 A.2d 691 (1991). I find it interesting that the majority does not undertake to declare what the duration of this new employment period will be. It leaves to some other court in the future to ponder the potentially unanswerable question of what the “reasonable period of time” exactly is that the employer must retain this employee with no contractual rights to continued employment.
The majority opinion’s analysis has the potential for far-reaching repercussions. The most assured result is that it will make the law relating to employee handbooks analytically *134unworkable. Its reasoning will also engender trial court confusion in ascertaining the law applicable to employee handbooks. I submit that the majority opinion’s analysis has muddied the waters of what is the purest of doctrinal streams in our Commonwealth’s jurisprudence.4
*135For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. I would find that the lower court’s granting of the appellee’s preliminary objections was appropriate and should be affirmed.

. In various parts of the majority opinion it is asserted that there is an enforceable contract; that there may be “additional consideration” to presumably support a leave of absence agreement; and finally that the leave policy is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The majority, however, only undertakes an extensive analysis of whether the leave policy is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. As the majority has failed to provide an adequate explanation of any contractual theory upon which relief may be granted, I will only address the majority's promissory estoppel argument.

. Although the lower court dismissed the appellant’s complaint at a preliminary stage in the litigation for failure to state a cause of action, the majority opinion's analysis appears to dictate that the appellant be rehired.

. As noted supra, the majority opinion does not appear to argue that an employer’s promise to an employee binds the employer under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Rather, the argument appears to be that the doctrine binds an employer who acts consistently with an employee handbook which the employer and employee mutually agree is binding under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

. For an interesting judicial lamentation on the effect of expansive judicial creation of perceived infringement of employee rights, it is interesting to note the comments of a California appeals court decision. The majority opinion writer in an intermediate appellate court decision, after feeling constrained by judicial precedent to affirm a seven million dollar award for improper discharge and allied claims, opined:
This area of the law is quickly running out of control and the citizens of California will be the ultimate victims and losers. Court-made law, imposed without public hearings or a public debate of the issues, cannot be dictated in this regard by this court. But, it is clear that commerce in California cannot flourish with such multi-million dollar verdicts readily attainable. Legislative caps or limits have been imposed in certain areas of medical malpractice and workers compensation. If the Legislature fails to act in this area, we can see that, in due course, business enterprises will flee the state. It is not our obligation to make the laws, but it is our responsibility to point out where laws are needed.
We also agree with the learned lament expressed by our esteemed colleague, infra.
Hunio v. Tishman Const. Corp. of Cal., 14 Cal.App.4th 1010, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 253, 266 (2 Dist.1993).
The writer, Judge Aranda, joined in the remarks of Associate Justice Ortega, which are as follows:
I reluctantly concur. I agree with the majority’s analysis and write only to lament the extent to which employees can claim emotional distress because their working conditions are less than ideal. To paraphrase what happened here, the employer created an "intolerable" situation for Hunio by the following: "We'll make him quit by giving him small raises and small bonuses." (Maybe if they had given him big raises and big bonuses, he would have quit sooner.) Many employees should be so lucky. Only in Wonderland, one would think, could such be considered the creation of an intolerable work situation. But the jury weighed the evidence, and, under the current state of the law, I can’t find a way to conclude there was insufficient evidence.
We all know people who are dissatisfied with their jobs, but who nonetheless stick it out — especially during periods when jobs are hard to come by. We all know someone who has put up with a rough situation for a few years so he can get to his retirement. In California, however, it seems that merely having a good job with good pay is not enough. If the job isn’t "fulfilling” or doesn’t build the employee’s "self esteem,” the employer is somehow derelict, in spite of providing good pay and good benefits. While many employees fully expect to ride high during the good times, they are quick to jump on *135the emotional distress wagon as soon as the situation takes a downturn.
No one would want to go through a period from one day to the next whether termination is around the corner. But auto workers and aero-space workers, for example, have gone through years of such distress and haven't cracked up, but rather have stuck it out hoping for the best and preparing for the worst. When the worst has happened, most have gotten on with their lives and sought something else. I don’t think it is unusual for someone with a long history of employment to have at one time or another worked for a nasty boss. No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to guarantee that a worker will spend a career without having to endure personal animosity from a co-worker or supervisor.
We seem to be on the verge of guaranteeing the right to a “nice and easy’’ career. I don't see how a company can operate when it must cater to those of such tender sensibilities. Maybe that’s one of the reasons some of the companies are moving way. Hunio can live in ease, but a cumulation of this type of litigation promises nothing but ill for employees of companies which can no longer absorb this type of a business cost.
Hunio, supra, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 253 at 267.