Court Opinion

ID: 9564992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:52.29837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.430711
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result and the reasoning of Justice Bistline’s opinion, except to the extent that his opinion implies that Swanson’s resignation could have been self-effectuating to terminate her employment without the acceptance of the director of DHW.
The director of DHW has been given the power and duty to “[ejmploy such personnel as may be deemed necessary.” I.C. § 39-106(b). This is the only statutory authorization by which DHW may employ. The record here indicates that Swanson was a classified employee of DHW who had a permanent appointment and who was subject to removal or discipline only under the provisions of Chapter 53, Title 67, Idaho Code, and the rules of the Idaho personnel commission. IDAPA 28.03.A.7. As a permanent classified employee Swanson was subject to separation by dismissal or resignation. IDAPA 28.03.A.21, 28.03.-A.49. Dismissal would have required a showing of cause. IDAPA 28.19.A.1. Resignation is defined to mean “the separation of an employee from state service made at his or her request, excluding retirement.” IDAPA 28.03.A.49.
Under the rules of the personnel commission resignation is a process that is initiated by the request of an employee and is completed by the separation of the employee from state service. A request for separation by resignation is not self-effectuating. Some action must be taken by the appointing authority to separate the employee from employment. In the absence of effective delegation to some other official in DHW, the director as the appointing authority under I.C. § 67-5302(2) must take action to separate the employee from state service.
Swanson tendered a resignation, but there is no evidence indicating that the director of DHW took action to separate Swanson from her service with the department before Swanson rescinded it. There is no evidence that the director’s authority to separate an employee from service had been delegated to Leon Martin, Swanson’s *612supervisor, or Pat Burrell, the chief of the bureau in which Swanson worked. Swanson admits that she called Burrell on the same day that she tendered her resignation, and that Burrell said she would stand behind Martin’s decision. Since there is no evidence that either Martin or Burrell had authority to separate Swanson from her service with the department, Swanson remained an employee of the department at the time she rescinded her tendered resignation. This negates the conclusion of the industrial commission that Swanson voluntarily terminated her employment.
In its decision denying compensation the industrial commission cited Batts v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 179 Ind.App. 405, 385 N.E.2d 1174 (1979) for the proposition that an at-will employee may unilaterally terminate the employment relationship. That case is clearly distinguishable from the facts here. The employer there was a private employer whose relationship with its employees was not governed by statutes and rules similar to those regulating the employment of state employees in Idaho. The employer had accepted the employee’s resignation before the attempted withdrawal. Here, there was no acceptance. For that reason, in addition to those stated by Justice Bistline, Swanson was entitled to unemployment benefits.