Court Opinion

ID: 9454411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:45:56.188403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:06.587422
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
My colleagues have denied bail on appeal from a conviction for unauthorized use of an automobile because their de novo review of the record leads them to think that appellant is dangerous. The basis for this finding is a criminal record which consists of 20 arrests for drunk, disorderly and drinking in public, *1278and several larceny-type convictions.1 The probation report, which we ordered produced in this Court, reveals that appellant’s arrests, including the instant case, spring from his heavy drinking.2 One instance in which his probation was revoked was also a direct result of his drinking. The child of alcoholic parents, this 23 year old man, whom testing reveals to have superior intelligence, seems on the road to the same end. Obviously, if his drinking were controlled, so would be his criminal activities.
The Bail Reform Act requires under § 3148 that the appellant be released “unless the court or judge has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.” The majority herein have made no finding that conditions of release which curbed and treated appellant’s alcoholic tendencies would not “reasonably assure” lack of dangerousness. One condition of release could be, for instance, enrollment in the community mental health facility for his neighborhood, and participation in therapy sessions for alcoholics. He could be required to check in three times a week at the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic, at 1400 Q Street, N. W., to assure that he has remained free from the use of alcohol. These are only examples of an approach'far more appropriate under the Bail Reform Act than the majority’s finding that a criminal record, which includes not one crime of violence, and apparently no criminal activities unrelated to drinking, makes this appellant a dangerous character./
The District Court in this case set a low money bond, without further conditions, an action which appears inappropriate in light of appellant’s record. A flexible use of conditions of release, such as those outlined above, to minimize dangerousness is as desirable in the release of those who can afford bail as well as those who can not. And while I believe that this Court may review de novo the record on the issues of dangerousness and flight, I believe that the conditions outlined above are reasonably calculated to negative dangerousness.
The judge below also erred in refusing to reexamine his bail determination when it appeared that no bondsman would write a bond for appellant. It is the duty of the District Court to make use of the flexibility of the Bail Reform Act to provide substitutes for bail bond, lest “the professional bondsmen hold the keys to the jail in their pockets.” 3 To do otherwise would make the bondsmen the real decision-makers and relegate the court to “the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail.” 4
And since appellant could obtain bond if he had five hundred dollars to post as security, the setting of a financial condition necessarily raises the question whether “the court has practiced that ‘invidious discrimination’ whereby a person remains incarcerated solely because of his limited financial means.”5 In light of these considerations, I would remand with directions to explore terms of release which would deal with his drinking problem.

. The presentence report indicates only convictions for housebreaking and petit larceny. The government’s opposition lists two more, a shoplifting conviction in 1963 and larceny in 1964.

. Even if arrests not resulting in convictions may ordinarily be accorded some weight as indications of dangerousness, it is clear enough in the present case that the real risk is appellant’s disposition to alcohol, not crime.

. Pannell v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 380, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (1963) (Wright, X, concurring).

. Id.

. Russell v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (1968).