Court Opinion

ID: 9895281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 17:09:08.86006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:56.546988
License: Public Domain

J-S32017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: W.P., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: D.F., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 633 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-DP-0000251-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.P., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: D.F., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 634 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-DP-0000252-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:            FILED: NOVEMBER 6, 2023

     In this consolidated matter, D.F. (Mother) appeals the orders of the York

County Court of Common Pleas (the juvenile court) to change the permanency

goal of the dependency proceedings involving Mother’s two children: five-

year-old daughter, W.P.; and three-year-old son, T.P. The orders changed

the primary goal of the family’s permanency plan from reunification to

adoption, pursuant to the Juvenile Act. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.
J-S32017-23

On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion,

because the record demonstrates Mother’s substantial progress under the

permanency plan and thus does not support a goal change.           After careful

review, we conclude that the court acted within its broad discretion, and we

affirm.

      The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows: The family

came to the attention of the York County Office of Children, Youth and Families

(the Agency) in May 2021. Mother was involved in a car accident in the early

hours of the morning with her daughter in the car. It was later determined

that Mother had been driving under the influence of drugs. The Agency initially

created a safety plan involving a kinship placement, but when the plan failed

several weeks later, the Agency filed dependency petitions. In June 2021, the

juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent and placed them in the

home of a foster parent.

      During the 21 months between the dependency adjudication in June

2021 and the goal change hearing in March 2023, the juvenile court

acknowledged that Mother made significant progress with the reunification

plan; however, in the months immediately leading up to the goal change

decision, the court also concluded that Mother’s progress had plateaued. The

record provides the following timeline:

               •   The November 2021 permanency review order
                   noted that Mother had begun substance abuse
                   treatment,    was    employed,     had    attended
                   supervised visitation with the Children, and that
                   she resolved her criminal case by pleading guilty to

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                  DUI, for which she was sentenced to 270 days of
                  house arrest and five years of probation.

              •   In February 2022, Father died from a suspected
                  drug overdose.

              •   In March 2022, Mother had tested positive on a
                  drug screen and thus violated a condition of her
                  sentence. Although she was briefly incarcerated,
                  she soon returned to house arrest.

              •   In its May 2022 permanency review order, the
                  court determined that Mother’s progress was
                  moderate.      Mother tested negative for illicit
                  substances, maintained her employment, and
                  visited the Children.

              •   In August 2022, the supervised visits were moved
                  to Mother’s home.

              •   By October 2022, Mother had maintained housing
                  and employment; her drug test results were
                  “appropriate;” and she did not miss any visits. The
                  Agency indicated that Mother had made significant
                  progress, and thus was not immediately seeking
                  termination of Mother’s rights, even though the
                  Children had been in placement for 15 months.

              •   In December 2022, however, Mother was placed
                  back on house arrest after she tested positive for
                  phentermine, a prescription weight-loss drug.
                  Mother claimed she received the pill from a friend
                  without realizing that it was a prescription drug. As
                  a result of this positive test, the Agency did not
                  move forward with its plan to afford Mother
                  unsupervised visits or overnight visits with the
                  Children. Around this time, Mother was prescribed
                  Adderall     for    ADHD       [(Attention-Deficient/
                  Hyperactivity Disorder)].

              •   In January 2023, Mother’s visits returned to fully
                  supervised.    The court heard testimony that
                  Mother’s boyfriend was living in the home, which
                  was particularly problematic because the boyfriend
                  had a criminal history for drug offenses. Mother
                  had missed three visits. The service provider,

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                     Catholic Charities, was also concerned that
                     Mother’s levels of Adderall would fluctuate and
                     were not consistent. Mother had also initially
                     tested positive for methamphetamines, but one of
                     those tests was ultimately deemed a false positive;
                     another test was awaiting confirmation.

                 •   In March 2023, the court learned that Mother had
                     again tested positive for methamphetamines, but
                     that these tests were confirmed and were not false
                     positives. The court further concluded that Mother
                     did not sufficiently course-correct since the
                     January 2023 permanency review hearing, as we
                     explain in detail infra.

       Although the Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed the goal

change, the court nevertheless determined that reunification could not be

achieved within a reasonable timeframe.1 Technically speaking, the court kept

concurrent goals in the permanency plan, but the court changed the primary

goal to adoption and the secondary goal to reunification.

       Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents the following issues for

our review:

              1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse
                 its discretion in accepting the report and testimony of
                 the caseworker despite testimony from other sources
                 that disputed that caseworker and the caseworker’s
                 own testimony on [the] failure to investigate the
                 stated concerns?

              2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse
                 its discretion when it changed the court ordered goal
                 from reunification to adoption without clear and

____________________________________________

1 Given that the GAL was not in agreement with the juvenile court, we are

disappointed that the GAL did not file a brief to assist us in this appeal.

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                 convincing evidence that a change of goal would serve
                 the best interests of the Children?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

       We    address Mother’s issues contemporaneously.2           We begin by

observing the relevant standard of review.           “[T]he standard of review in

dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s

inferences or conclusions of law.          Accordingly, we review for an abuse of

discretion.” In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

       We have explained:

          Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent
          children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
          6301-6365], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the
          federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy
          underlying these statutes is to prevent children from
          languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack
          of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental
          commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the
          1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the
          ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including
          change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety,
          permanency, and well-being of the child must take

____________________________________________

2 As an initial matter, we note that Mother did not divide the argument section

of her brief into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. We remind
Mother that such formatting is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and that
circumvention of the Rules of Procedure could result in waiver. Here, Mother
folds her first argument regarding the court’s credibility findings into her
second, primary argument that the court’s decision to change the permanency
goal lacked evidentiary support.

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         precedence over all other considerations, including the
         rights of the parents.

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing In re N.C., 909

A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006)) (further citations and footnotes omitted)

(emphasis original).

      Although the relevant statutory provisions of the Juvenile Act do not

reference the phrase “goal change,” the phrase has become a term of art.

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1183, n.6. The concept of a “goal change” is consistent with

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g), which requires the juvenile court, at the conclusion

of a permanency review hearing, to “order the continuation, modification or

termination of placement or other disposition which is best suited to the

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.” Id.

Such a decision is synonymous with a decision to continue or change the

permanency plan goal. Id.

      To arrive at this decision, the juvenile court must consider the following

matters at the conclusion of each permanency review hearing:

            (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of
            the placement.

            (2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
            compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
            child.

            (3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
            circumstances    which    necessitated the     original
            placement.

            (4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
            placement goal for the child.

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          (5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
          child might be achieved.

          (5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize
          the permanency plan in effect.

          (6) Whether the child is safe.

                                     […]

          (9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of
          the last 22 months or the court has determined that
          aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable
          efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
          child from the child's parent, guardian or custodian or to
          preserve and reunify the family need not be made or
          continue to be made, whether the county agency has
          filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental
          rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a
          qualified family to adopt the child unless:

                (i) the child is being cared for by a relative best
                suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of
                the child;

                (ii) the county agency has documented a
                compelling reason for determining that filing a
                petition to terminate parental rights would not
                serve the needs and welfare of the child; or

                (iii) the child's family has not been provided with
                necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
                child's parent, guardian or custodian within the
                time frames set forth in the permanency plan.

                                     […]

          (12) If the child has been placed with a caregiver,
          whether the child is being provided with regular, ongoing
          opportunities to participate in age-appropriate or
          developmentally appropriate activities. In order to make
          the determination under this paragraph, the county
          agency shall document the steps it has taken to ensure
          that:

                (i) the caregiver is following the reasonable and
                prudent parent standard; and

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                 (ii) the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to
                 engage in age-appropriate or developmentally
                 appropriate activities. The county agency shall
                 consult with the child regarding opportunities to
                 engage in such activities.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f).

     Based on the determinations under Section 6351(f), the juvenile court

must then determine the best permanency plan option under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

6351(f.1), which includes reunification and adoption.

     Instantly, the juvenile court conducted a permanency review hearing on

March 29, 2023. After hearing the testimony, the court determined that the

primary goal of the permanency plan should be adoption and the secondary

goal should be reunification. In its detailed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the

court explained its findings and reasons for the goal change:

        The court heard testimony that was positive to some
        degree. Mother continued residing at the same location and
        working with the providers. There was concern that Mother
        was either overusing or being prescribed Adderall by her
        OB-GYN. Given the vast differences in Mother’s levels of
        Adderall on drug tests, the agency wanted Mother to switch
        to a psychiatrist who could supervise, diagnose, or
        implement medication management. Mother did switch to
        a different physician, however, that physician was a family
        doctor, not a psychiatrist. The Agency reported working on
        having collaboration between Mother’s doctors on this issue.

        The court also heard testimony from an advocate from
        Catholic Charities, […], that Adams County Probation
        contacted her to report that Mother lost her job for not
        reporting to work for two weeks straight. Mother did find
        another job and was in her second week of work at the time
        of the hearing. [The Catholic Charities advocate] reported
        that visits with the Children went well, but Mother was not
        always in the moment with the Children, sometimes not

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       sitting with them for the two-hour visit and constantly
       thinking about next tasks. [The advocate] testified that on
       four or five occasions since the last hearing, T.P. broke away
       from Mother’s hand as they were leaving for visits and would
       run outside into the parking lot. [The advocate] also
       reported that Mother parents out of guilt as is common for
       parents with children in foster care. Mother buys the
       Children gifts to the extent that it has become a problem.
       [The advocate] indicated that is an issue they have been
       working on from the beginning, but Mother continues to buy
       the Children things. Mother has brought gifts to every visit
       except for two since Christmas. W.P. now expects gifts and
       asks Mother what did she buy her at visits. Mother has been
       instructed not to bring presents unless it is a holiday or until
       further discussion after the passage of some time.

       There was also concern regarding Mother’s previous
       boyfriend. As stated above, Mother has not notified anyone
       that her boyfriend was living in the home and this was
       viewed as a safety concern. The boyfriend had been in the
       home during one home visit. Additionally, on January 25,
       2023, [the] boyfriend was in the background on a Zoom visit
       and his computer was observed in the home on February
       28, 2023. [The advocate] testified that she pulled up the
       boyfriend’s record on the PA docket in Mother’s presence
       and there were drug charges so there was also concern of
       possible drug history for him.          Mother subsequently
       indicated that she broke up with [the] boyfriend. However,
       [the advocate] testified that on March 14, 2023
       [(approximately two weeks before the goal change
       hearing)], Mother told another advocate that “once she gets
       the kids back,” she and [the] boyfriend “are going to discuss
       their future together.” In addition, [the] Agency caseworker
       […] reported that Mother had three drug tests that were
       positive for methamphetamines on February 23, 2023,
       February 24, 2023, and March 3, 2023. This was confirmed
       by a lab. However, Mother raised concerns because she has
       had false positives before and these three drug tests were
       not sent out to ascertain her levels, as is her standing
       request.

       Due to the concerns regarding Mother’s parenting, her use
       of her prescribed Adderall, Mother’s focus at visits, and
       other concerns, the Agency was not able to recommend
       moving forward with partially unsupervised visits until

                                    -9-
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          Mother had met some of her therapeutic goals. An attorney
          appearing on behalf of the guardian ad litem stated that the
          guardian ad litem recommended against changing the goal
          because     Mother    was    trying    very    hard,   though
          acknowledging that “Mother’s progress has slowed a bit.”
          Mother’s progress has slowed a bit to a point in which the
          Children had already been in placement for twenty-one
          months at the time of the permanency review hearing.
          Additionally, the Agency was still not yet able to recommend
          partially unsupervised visits, and Mother’s compliance and
          progress were both rated as minimal.

                                     […]

          After twenty-one months, there is a continuing need for
          placement. The Children are both together in a safe
          placement that is appropriate and where they will continue
          to receive therapy. Despite progress in certain areas that
          necessitated the original placement, Mother’s compliance
          and progress remain minimal and there are still no
          unsupervised visits.

          Given the current status, the current goal of reunification
          does not seem feasible in the short term. It is clear that
          reunification is not imminent, although the Children have
          been in placement for twenty-one months. “The court
          cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need
          for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
          and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901
          A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006)]. The Children are safe
          and together in their current placement. This court believes
          that it was in W.P. and T.P.’s best interest to change the
          primary goal to adoption and the concurrent goal to
          reunification.

T.C.O. at 6-9; 14-15 (style adjusted).

     On appeal, Mother maintains that the record does not support a goal

change.    She argues that she had made substantial progress under the

permanency plan, and that the court’s findings to the contrary are without

evidentiary support.     Mother takes issue with several specific findings,

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including the court’s questioning of her ongoing Adderall use. On this point,

we agree with Mother.

     At the subject permanency review in March 2023, the Agency argued

that the juvenile court should not expand Mother’s visitations – which is to

say, the court should delay reunification – because the Agency was still

concerned with the Children’s safety. Chief among those concerns, were the

propriety of Mother’s Adderall prescription for ADHD and, somewhat ironically,

Mother’s inability to focus during the visits.   The court agreed with the

Agency’s position.

     We can appreciate that the Agency initially had legitimate concerns that

Mother might have been misusing, abusing, or selling the pills. Mother had

not always been forthright with the caseworker and service provider; and

Mother’s sobriety was relatively recent. The imposition of measures to ensure

Mother’s proper use of the medication would be reasonable. Yet, the concerns

were still not allayed even after the court heard testimony during the

December 2022 permanency review hearing, wherein the service provider

testified that Mother’s pills were accounted for.   N.T., 12/5/22 at 18-19.

During the January 2023 permanency review, the court heard testimony from

Mother’s drug counselor at the Open Arms Recovery Center and from Mother’s

probation officer who both testified that they had no concerns regarding the

appropriateness of Mother’s medication for Adderall. See N.T., 1/18/23 at

12; 21-22.

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      Upon closer inspection of the record, we observe that the Agency was

also concerned that the medication was being overprescribed; the Agency

even questioned whether Mother had ADHD. See N.T., 1/18/23 at 60. The

Agency convinced the juvenile court that Mother’s diagnosis and treatment

plan was dubious, because the prescribing doctor was an OB-GYN. See N.T.,

3/29/23 at 42-43.

      However, the record shows that the prescribing doctor, Dr. Peck, was

affiliated with Open Arms Recovery Center and was the doctor who prescribes

medications for all the patients. Id. at 33-34. Presumably then, Dr. Peck has

experience    with     patients   in   recovery,   specifically   Mother’s   recovery,

notwithstanding the fact that she was also an OB-GYN.               Still, the Agency

insisted that Mother see another doctor, and Mother complied. Id. at 43-44.

But this second doctor evidently practiced family medicine, and the Agency

was still unconvinced that Mother should be taking Adderall. The Agency felt

that a psychiatrist would be better suited to treat Mother, because Mother was

a recovering addict. N.T., 1/18/23 at 60.          The Agency ultimately took the

position that Mother should not be entitled to partial visitation until she

progressed on certain objectives, including seeing a psychiatrist to evaluate

her Adderall usage. See N.T., 3/29/23 at 63-64. At the time of the subject

permanency hearing in March 2023, the Agency had yet to connect Mother

with a psychiatrist.

      We are troubled by the vague notion that a parent’s adherence to a

treatment plan for a properly rendered diagnosis could be grounds for a goal

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change. As we are not bound by the juvenile court’s inferences, we conclude

that there was no basis to doubt the propriety of Mother’s diagnosis and

treatment other than conjecture.

     The real problem with the court’s findings, is that a portion of Mother’s

progress was reduced to a catch-22. To explain, in the months leading up the

subject permanency review hearing, reunification turned on the expansion of

Mother’s visits. On one hand, the juvenile court was particularly concerned

with Mother’s hyperactive behavior and encouraged Mother to work on it. See

N.T., 12/5/22, at 62. The Agency also argued that Mother’s inability to focus

posed safety concerns for the Children, and thus was a barrier to expanded

visitation. See, e.g., N.T., 1/18/23, at 42; N.T., 3/29/64.   But on the other

hand, the Agency questioned Mother’s ADHD diagnosis and treatment plan.

The Agency directed Mother to seek a third professional opinion, this time by

a psychiatrist, before it could recommend expanded visitation.      The court

agreed.

     Perhaps a psychiatrist is the best option for Mother’s long-term

medication management and treatment, and the juvenile court was free to

order further evaluations. But in the meantime, Mother’s continued Adderall

usage should not have been held against her as a basis to delay the expansion

of Mother’s visits – which is to say, a reason why the goal should be changed

from reunification to adoption. As we discuss infra, there were other, valid

reasons for the goal change, however the sheer fact that Mother was

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prescribed Adderall by the doctor from Open Arms Recovery Center should

not have been one of them.

      Thus far, we have articulated how our inferences differ from those of

the juvenile court, as is permitted by our standard of review.      But as our

Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned, adherence to this standard also

means that “we are not in a position to make close calls” based on fact-specific

determinations:

         Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during
         the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided
         over several other hearings with the same parties and have
         a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best
         interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must
         defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and
         can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness
         and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success
         of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court
         would have made a different conclusion based on the cold
         record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and
         the credibility determinations of the trial court.

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.

      With this in mind, we discuss the reasons why we conclude that the

juvenile court’s decision was proper.     The record indicates that Mother’s

highwater mark occurred around October 2022. At that point, the Children

had been in placement for 15 months, but Mother had made significant

progress and unsupervised and/or overnight visitation seemed imminent. In

its wisdom, the juvenile court determined that a goal change was not in the

Children’s best interests, notwithstanding the length of their placement. Soon

thereafter, however, Mother made a series of choices, which led the court to

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conclude that visitation could not be expanded without posing safety risks to

the Children.    In turn, the court had to reassess Mother’s progress and

concluded that reunification was no longer feasible in the short term.

      First, there was Mother’s improper use of a prescription diet pill. Mother

was not forthright with the Agency after testing positive. Mother’s excuse for

taking these pills – the pills belonged to a friend, and she did not realize they

were prescription – could seem plausible. But it was not unreasonable that

the court would treat Mother’s use of the diet pill as a potential safety risk,

given Mother’s history with addiction.     Once the drug screen showed that

Mother had taken an unauthorized medication, the court had to reassess the

situation and reconsider whether the visits should be expanded.              The

reassessment took time, and in the interim, the Children had to remain in

placement. Moreover, Mother’s use of the pill constituted a parole violation,

the result of which could have threatened the permanence of any potential

reunification.

      Second, Mother allowed her boyfriend to be in the home during her

visits. A parent’s decision to introduce children to their romantic partner is

not necessarily problematic. But here, the boyfriend had a criminal history of

drug offenses. Given Mother’s recent sobriety, it was not unreasonable for

the court to question Mother’s judgment and again reassess whether

reunification could be safely achieved while Mother was involved with this

individual. Mother argues that the record does not support the court’s finding

that the boyfriend lived with Mother. While it was not unreasonable for the

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juvenile court to make this inference, whether the boyfriend actually lived in

Mother’s home is mostly beside the point. Mother was in a relationship with

the boyfriend, and he clearly stayed at Mother’s home for some measure of

time, most notably when the Children were in the home during one of Mother’s

visits.

          Third, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother argues

that the result could be a false positive; indeed, Mother had previously tested

positive for methamphetamines only for those results to be deemed negative

following a confirmatory process. The positive results in question, however,

were confirmed to be positive following that same process.         Still, Mother

maintains that the confirmed screens could still be false positives, because the

Agency failed to ascertain the precise levels of methamphetamines in Mother’s

system.

          This case presents similar facts to those in Interest of S.C., 2023 WL

5345378 (Pa. Super. August 21 2023) (non-precedential decision). There,

the mother reasoned that her valid use of Adderall can sometimes present as

a false positive for methamphetamines. For support, she cited the testimony

of her family doctor. The local child protective services agency disputed that

medical opinion by citing its own witness, an expert toxicologist, who testified

that Adderall only presents as amphetamines, not methamphetamines.

Ultimately, the trial court had the discretion to decide who to believe. We

concluded that the trial court did not err when it weighed the testimony of the

toxicologist more heavily than that of the mother’s family doctor. Id. at *7.

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       Here, we are faced with a similar question. Mother asks us to infer that

there is a nexus between Mother’s levels of methamphetamines and the

accuracy of the confirmation process.             We cannot do this, as there is no

evidence in the record to clarify why or how the Mother’s more recent positive

tests were also false positives. We also note that the Agency countered, by

arguing    that     because      Mother   should     not   have    tested   positive   for

methamphetamines at any level, knowing the precise level is irrelevant to the

binary question of whether Mother had an illicit substance in her system. We

conclude that the juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion when it

determined that Mother did, in fact, use methamphetamines. In turn, we

conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on

the confirmed positive tests to determine that a goal change was in the best

interests of the Children.3

       In the event our discussion appears to focus exclusively on Mother’s

conduct, we reiterate that the primary consideration of dependency

proceedings is the safety, permanency, and well-being of the Children. See

N.C., supra.       The totality of these bases for the goal change here – the

prescription      diet   pill,   the   presence     of   the   boyfriend,   the   positive
____________________________________________

3 Mother’s positive tests for methamphetamines was central to both the
juvenile court’s decision to change the goal, as well as our own decision to
affirm. The notion that a dependency case may ultimately turn on a false
positive drug screen is distressing. Although we conclude that the record
supports    the     court’s finding  that   Mother    tested   positive  for
methamphetamines, we strongly encourage the juvenile court pay close
attention to this issue.

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methamphetamine screens – supports the juvenile court’s determination that

expansion of the visits could not be achieved without undue risks to the

Childrens safety, that Mother’s progress with the permanency plan had to be

reassessed, and that reunification was no longer imminent.

      We also cannot ignore that the plateau in Mother’s progress transpired

after the Children had been in placement for 15 months. To be clear, the

Juvenile Act does not establish a litmus test that requires a juvenile court to

alter the course of reunification, due simply to the amount of time a child has

been in placement. However, the Act does alert the juvenile courts to the

potential of foster care drift – i.e., mandating courts to query whether the

agency has initiated termination proceedings once a child has been in

placement for 15 months.      See In re P.Z., 11 A.3d 840, 847 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citing R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9)). Given the

potential for foster care drift, juvenile courts are encouraged to utilize

concurrent planning early in the case and include adoption as a potential

alternative to reunification. R.J.T., 8 A.3d at 1191.    “[C]oncurrent planning

is encouraged because it both protects the child from foster care drift, by

allowing agencies to consider adoptive resources (including kinship care) while

keeping alive the potential of reunification.” Id. (citation omitted). Instantly,

the juvenile court kept reunification a firm possibility, as evidenced by the fact

that the goal change still constituted concurrent planning – albeit with the

primary goal of adoption. Presumably then, Mother had retained access to

reunification services during the pendency of this appeal and still had an

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opportunity to course correct during the pendency of any subsequent

permanency review hearings.      Id. at 1187 n.9.   That notwithstanding, we

conclude the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion and changed the

permanency goals in this case.

     Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/06/2023

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