Court Opinion

ID: 9454141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:37:37.756346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:59.447748
License: Public Domain

GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
With apparent zeal to grant equitable relief to the appellant in this case it appears that the majority has overlooked the rights of the appellee; and the appellee has done nothing but conduct this litigation in a fair, just and upright manner according to the rules. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion or with the result reached. There is nothing in the record to show that the district court which denied the relief sought failed to give proper consideration to all factors involved, or that there was any abuse of discretion or error of judgment. I do not approve of the notion that this court, viewing the case on appeal, is better able to render a proper and just judgment than was the district court, absent some error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge. There is no such showing here.
Rule 60(b) (6) F.R.Civ.P. gives the courts ample power to grant relief from judgments whenever such action is shown to be appropriate to accomplish justice. But the rule was not intended to relieve a party from calculated and deliberate choices freely made. No snap judgment by default is involved here. The appellant is not shown to have been laboring under any disability or unusual conditions. Suit was filed on August 22, 1962. Default judgment was not entered until June 18, 1963. Over two and one-half years later, and not before, the appellant called the matter to the attention of the trial court. The court ruled, properly in my opinion, that the *250appellant had shown no reason why the judgment should be cancelled and offered nothing to the court to support the claim of excusable neglect.
Judgments import verity. Finality of judgments is vital, important and necessary. A judgment should not be disturbed for light or transient reasons. Trial courts should not be reversed unless error is shown. Sympathy for a litigant is not a proper basis for reversal. There is no showing as to why the appellant failed to assert his discharge in bankruptcy as a defense. To the contrary the record indicates that he invited the judgment by default.
Considering all facts involved it is my view that the judgment should be affirmed. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950).