Court Opinion

ID: 9669276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:47:32.08841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:54.922959
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Taylor,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority holding that the normal fourteen-year-old Copeland boy was guilty of negligence as a matter of law for engaging in swimming in the pit in which *330he was drowned. His,, father and mother alleged he did not understand its dangers. The effect of the majority holding is to deny them, merely on the ground he was fourteen years old and normal, the privilege of developing detailed evidence on the issue, which, under proper procedure, cannot be pleaded. The allegation that he was robust and healthy, adds nothing of value to the fact that he was normal, so far as his judgment and understanding concerning dangers are concerned. Both morons and prodigies in judgment can be robust and healthy. A normal fourteen-year-old boy is one of average intelligence for that age group and is merely free from mental diorder. See Webster’s New International Dictionary for the meaning of “normal.”
The bottom of the pit was not open and patent on the occasion in question. It lacked from 30 to 50 feet perpendicular of being level, the muddy water keeping the fact as to what portion of' the water was over his head from being an open and patent . danger. Can it properly be said as a matter of law that every fourteen-year-old boy of the average intelligence of that age group would ascertain by measurement, or otherwise, all portions of the “treacherous water hole,” where its depth was over his head, especially when he saw other boys in the water? Can it rightly be said as a matter of law that he would have the judgment to grasp, and the discretion to stop to consider, that the pit was one from which, in view of its “abrupt and steeply inclined” banks, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to rescue a drowning person?
We know the boy was of an age when he still had five years to go before he was out of that group commonly known as “teen-agers,” who, to say the least, could not all be held as a matter of lato to have reasonably sound and prudent discretion and judgment with respect to the unusual swimming dangers shown by the petition. Five years, under wise provision of our law, would have had to elapse before he could have his disabilities of minority removed. Arts. 5921 and 5921a V.R.C.S. The majority refer to a fourteen-year-old minor’s right to select his own guardian, in justification of their holding, citing in support article 4126 R.C.S. 1925, and refer to his being allowed a driver’s license. Under the terms of the article cited such a minor cannot be accorded the right of selecting a guardian except under supervision of a court, and that only when the court is satisfied “that the person selected is suitable and competent.” The driver’s license that may be granted to a fourteen-year-old minor can be granted only after a hearing and under *331judicial supervision. Subdivision 1, Sec. 4, Art. 6687b, V.A.C.S. Thus it is seen that the judgment, discretion and understanding of minors of this age group is recognized under law as being limited, and subject to legal restriction and inquiry, — all of which discounts rather than supports the majority view.
I am of opinion that the well-considered unanimous opinion of the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals in this case (228 S. W. 2d 967, is both well grounded in the authorities and sound, and that the following rule stated by that court is correct:
“The question of whether or not a normal boy of the age, experience, capacity, intelligence and understanding of the deceased Copeland boy (as pleaded) had sufficient discretion to know and understand the dangers of swimming in the pit in question and the consequences of such, is a fact question for the fact-finding body. In determining such a fact issue the fact-finding body may take into consideration the individual qualities of the child as compared with those of other children its age, as well as all of the circumstances involved in the death of the child, including any existing special dangers in connection ivith swimming in the pit, but the age of the child alone is one of the circumstances to be considered.” (Emphasis added).
Attention is invited to the authorities referred to and discussed in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, reference to which is made to avoid undue length and repetition. See also the article in full by Professor Leon Green of the University of Texas, 27 Texas Law Review, p. 113, in addition to the short excerpt cited by the majority.
This is a negligence case under the holding in Banker v. McLaughlin in which the attractiveness of the pit merely has bearing on knowledge that the owners had that children resorted to it, and had been doing so for such time that they were no longer trespassers. It is not a case involving a useful water tank maintained by landowners for watering stock. As showing the present status in Texas of the doctrine of liability for useless water hazards created by landowners on their premises causing the drowning of a child, see the following statement (8 A.L.R. 2d p. 1260) in an annotation of that subject:
“And after a considerable period of time in which the doctrine was refused credence in Texas, it was unequivocally. adopted there in Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W. 2d 843, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1231, particular emphasis being placed *332therein on the fact that the presence of children could be reasonably anticipated by the owners, and the fact that the particular hazard was no longer serving any useful purpose to the owner.” (Emphasis added)
It will hardly be questioned that evidence cannot properly be pleaded in detail. I am therefore unable to agree that this case, containing in the petition the issuable general facts both of the boy’s understanding and normality, should be disposed of finally without a hearing on the merits, upon which detailed evidence, not proper to be pleaded, but proper to be adduced on a trial, could be developed. In my opinion it should not be assumed that no detailed facts, additional to the general facts of the boy’s normality and age, touching his judgment and understanding, could be developed by his parents, since they allege both his normality and that he did not appreciate and understand the dangers. Without a trial on the merits justice in the cause can hardly be ascertained, since we cannot consistently say as a matter of law that the parents, who knew more about their son than anyone else, are correct in saying he was normal, but are not correct in saying and cannot' prove, that he did not appreciate and understand the dangers.
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Opinion delivered October 18, 1950.