Court Opinion

ID: 9895664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 15:00:37.312939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.765758
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10750    Document: 57-1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________
                                 No. 23-10750
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        TERRI LYNN HANKERSON,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cr-60227-JIC-1
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10750

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Terri Lynn Hankerson appeals her conviction for one count
        of theft of government funds and her sentence of five months’
        imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release with the
        first five months of supervised release to be served on home
        confinement. She makes two arguments on appeal. First, she
        argues that the district court erred by giving the jury a deliberate
        ignorance instruction because the evidence pointed to a lack of
        actual knowledge. Second, she argues that the district court erred
        when it declined to sentence her to probation instead of
        imprisonment, arguing that the court constrained itself incorrectly
        to the guidelines commentary. After review, we affirm.
                                I.    Background
               On October 25, 2022, a grand jury indicted Hankerson on
        one count of theft of government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 641. Hankerson pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to
        trial.
               Hankerson’s father, Tommie Hankerson (“Tommie”)
        received Social Security retirement beneﬁts via direct deposits
        between June of 1991 and February of 2020. In 2020, the SSA
        noticed that Tommie was receiving Social Security beneﬁts but not
        using his Medicare beneﬁts. It notiﬁed Dominick Stokes, an
        Assistant Special Agent with the SSA Oﬃce of the Inspector
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        23-10750                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        General. 1 Stokes ordered a copy of Tommie’s death certiﬁcate and
        determined that Tommie had died in June of 2016. Despite having
        died in June of 2016, Tommie continued to receive Social Security
        deposits into his bank account through February 2020. By the time
        the SSA caught the issue, Tommie’s account had been overpaid by
        $48,328.
               Testimony revealed that Hankerson, aged 58 at the time of
        her trial, was fairly involved with Tommie’s ﬁnances. Hankerson
        and her sister lived with their parents and managed their parents’
        finances. Hankerson was added as a joint account holder on
        Tommie’s bank account in 2014, 2 and she received a debit card for
        that account in 2015. She was the only person with access to the
        account.
               The government introduced bank statements showing
        consistent cash withdrawals and purchases from the account after

        1 Alana Oliver, an employee with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”),

        testified to the following. The SSA typically learns of a beneficiary’s death via
        state records or from reports from family members. But these methods are
        not always reliable. Sometimes the SSA is suspicious that a beneficiary has
        died, and so it conducts its own investigation. One situation that triggers such
        an investigation is when a beneficiary is still receiving SSA payments but not
        using his or her Medicare benefits. The SSA will try to track the beneficiary
        down by mailing and calling the beneficiary. And if the SSA suspects that
        someone other than the beneficiary is receiving the benefits, the SSA will refer
        the case to the Office of Inspector General.
        2 Tommie’s wife, Gwendolyn Hankerson (“Gwendolyn”) was also on the

        account, and Tommie’s son, Charles Holiday, was listed as a beneficiary.
        Gwendolyn passed away in February of 2014.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10750

        Tommie’s death. For example, there were withdrawals by a
        Sunpass account, deposits made for a cruise, and purchases for a
        Miami Heat game and concert tickets, all in Hankerson’s name.
        There were also direct deposits from Hankerson’s place of
        employment into the account until February of 2017.
               When Agent Stokes interviewed Hankerson, Hankerson
        conﬁrmed that her father had died and that she was aﬃliated with
        his bank account. Hankerson stated that she had used her father’s
        Social Security money to pay for his funeral expenses. Agent
        Stokes then asked her whether she had used the funds to make any
        other purchases in her name. Agent Stokes testiﬁed that, in
        response to his question, Hankerson began to cry, and admitted
        that she had made other purchases too. She then apologized and
        told Agent Stokes that “she knew she shouldn’t have done this, she
        went to law school, [and] she knew better.” She said that she would
        help pay it back.
               After the government rested, Hankerson testiﬁed to the
        following. After her father died, she went to the SSA with a copy
        of his death certiﬁcate. Her parents had told her that she and her
        siblings would inherit their parents’ retirement savings in the bank
        account in question. She was made a joint owner of the bank
        account at some point in the early 2000s. She knew her father
        received “retirement annuities, pension [payments,] and SSA
        beneﬁts.” While she initially denied looking at her father’s bank
        account statements while he was alive, she later admitted that she
        looked at the statements when her father was alive as part of her
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        23-10750                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        eﬀorts to manage his ﬁnances when he could no longer do so. But
        she did not view the account statements after he passed away.
        Instead, she kept track of the balance of the account by visiting
        ATMs and checking the balance. In July of 2016, when she visited
        an ATM, she noted that there was less money in the account, which
        she believed was because the Social Security payments stopped.
        Between July 2016 and February 2020, she thought the deposits
        coming into the account were from her father’s retirement. She
        ﬁrst realized there was an issue with the Social Security beneﬁts
        when Agent Stokes came to her home to interview her in 2021.
        Hankerson explained that she did not intend to steal and did not
        know that the money came from the SSA.
               At the close of evidence, the government asked for a
        deliberate ignorance instruction. 3 Hankerson objected, arguing
        that the evidence did not show that she aﬃrmatively attempted to
        avoid learning about the source of the money. The district court
        overruled Hankerson’s objection. It explained that Hankerson had
        looked at her father’s bank account statements before her father’s
        death, but then stopped suddenly once he died. The court also
        characterized Hankerson’s failure to look at the bank statements a
        single time over the course of four years as “somewhat
        incredulous.” The court then issued the following instruction:

        3 The government also asked for a deliberate ignorance instruction during a

        preliminary charge conference after the government rested, but the court
        denied the request. It stated that, at that point, there had only been evidence
        supporting actual knowledge rather than a course of avoidance.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10750

              Deliberate avoidance of positive [knowledge], which
              is the equivalent of knowledge, occurs, for example,
              if a defendant possesses a package and believes it
              contains a controlled substance, but deliberately
              avoids learning that it contains the controlled
              substance so he or she can deny knowledge of the
              package’s contents. So you may ﬁnd a defendant
              knew about the possession of a controlled substance,
              if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt,
              Number one, that the defendant actually knew about
              the controlled substance, or Number two, the
              defendant had every reason to know, but deliberately
              closed her eyes. But I must emphasize that
              negligence, carelessness[,] or foolishness is not
              enough to prove that the defendant knew about the
              possession of the controlled substance.
               The jury returned a guilty verdict as to Count 1. Based on a
        total oﬀense level of 12 and a criminal history category of I,
        Hankerson’s guideline imprisonment range was 10 to 16 months.
        The combination of her total oﬀense level and criminal history
        category also placed Hankerson in Zone C of the Sentencing Table.
        U.S.S.G. § 5(A). The United States Probation Oﬃce explained that
        because her guideline range was in Zone C of the Sentencing
        Table, Hankerson’s minimum term could be satisﬁed by “(1) a
        sentence of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence of imprisonment that
        includes a term of supervised release with a condition that
        substitutes community conﬁnement or home detention according
        to the schedule in subsection (e) [of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1], provided that
        at least one-half of the minimum term is satisﬁed by
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        23-10750              Opinion of the Court                        7

        imprisonment, § 5C1.1(d).” Additionally, the probation oﬃce
        explained that, although Hankerson was statutorily “eligible for a
        term of not less than one nor more than ﬁve years’ probation”
        under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1), because the guideline range was in
        Zone C of the Sentencing Table, she was ineligible for probation
        under the guidelines, citing U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1, comment n.2.
               At the sentencing hearing, neither party objected to the PSI.
        The government recommended a sentence at the low end of the
        guidelines. It requested 10 months, which included ﬁve months of
        imprisonment, followed by ﬁve months in a halfway house, two
        years of supervised release, restitution, and a forfeiture order. It
        argued that the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense,
        Hankerson’s characteristics, general deterrence, respect for the law
        and just punishment, the seriousness of the oﬀense, and avoidance
        of sentencing disparities among other defendants supported its
        recommendation.
               Hankerson requested a non-imprisonment sentence. She
        argued that she had a clean record before this incident and she had
        already been punished by losing her job with the state, pension, and
        state beneﬁts, and that it would cost thousands of dollars to
        incarcerate her, and incarceration would prevent her from paying
        the government back. She then allocuted and apologized for her
        actions, requesting a probationary sentence so she could work to
        pay back the government.
              The court adopted the PSI’s calculations and determined
        that Hankerson was not eligible for probation. The court
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10750

        considered the statements of all parties, the PSI, the guidelines, and
        the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court characterized
        Hankerson’s actions as “inexplicable,” and noted that the
        explanation she provided on the witness stand was “incredulous.”
        The court also emphasized the importance of deterrence in this
        case, stating that sentences in cases like this “should tell the public
        that if you steal government funds, particularly taxpayer funds, that
        there’s punishment attached, punishment suﬃcient to deter other
        people from committing a similar crime.” The court then imposed
        the government’s proposed sentence of ﬁve months’
        imprisonment, followed by ﬁve months’ home conﬁnement and
        three years’ supervised release. The court also ordered Hankerson
        to pay $48,328 in restitution. Hankerson did not object to the
        sentence or manner in which it was imposed. She requested bond
        pending appeal, which was denied. After entry of ﬁnal judgment,
        Hankerson appealed.
                                II.    DISCUSSION
                Hankerson argues that the district court erred by giving a
        deliberate ignorance jury instruction. She also contends that the
        district court erred when it declined to sentence her to probation,
        arguing that the court incorrectly constrained itself to the
        guidelines commentary. We address each argument in turn.
               A. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction
               Hankerson argues that the district court erred in providing
        a deliberate ignorance instruction to the jury, because the evidence
        pointed to only a lack of actual knowledge and there was no
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        23-10750               Opinion of the Court                          9

        evidence that she deliberately avoided learning the source of the
        money.
                A challenge to a deliberate ignorance instruction is re-
        viewed de novo. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir.
        1993). The district court has broad discretion to formulate its jury
        charge as long as the charge as a whole accurately reﬂects the law
        and facts. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir.
        2008). We will not reverse a “conviction based on a challenge to
        the jury charge unless we are left with a substantial and
        ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in
        its deliberations.” United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th
        Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Isnadin, 742
        F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We will not reverse a conviction
        because of a jury charge unless the issues of law were presented
        inaccurately, or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a
        substantial way as to violate due process.” (quotations omitted)).
               In determining whether there is suﬃcient evidence to
        support a jury charge, “we review the evidence in the light most
        favorable to the government.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518,
        533 (11th Cir. 1996). The defendant’s own testimony can be used
        as the basis for ﬁnding that a deliberate ignorance instruction is
        warranted. See id. Further, when a defendant chooses to testify,
        the defendant’s own testimony may be treated as non-credible and
        substantive evidence of his guilt. United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d
        1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10750

                We recognize deliberate ignorance as an alternative to an
        actual knowledge requirement that applies when a defendant is
        suspicious of the situation but does not make further inquiries so
        as to remain ignorant. United States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949, 952
        (11th Cir. 2006). Therefore, if “the facts support the inference that
        the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of
        the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of
        the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent
        prosecution,” then the deliberate ignorance instruction is
        appropriate. United States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d 1234, 1237–
        38 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “The standard is the same
        whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.” United States v.
        Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted). On
        the other hand, district courts err in giving the deliberate ignorance
        instruction when there is relevant evidence of only actual
        knowledge rather than deliberate avoidance. United States v. Steed,
        548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008).
               Here, the deliberate ignorance instruction was proper.
        Hankerson testiﬁed that she checked the statements on her father’s
        account while he was alive. And she knew that her father was
        receiving money from the SSA before his death. But Hankerson
        immediately stopped checking the statements on the account after
        her father’s death, despite making ongoing extensive expenditures
        from the account. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
        to the government, there is at least circumstantial evidence that
        supported an inference that Hankerson was deliberately ignorant
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        23-10750                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        of receiving funds that she was not entitled to. 4 See Calhoon, 97 F.3d
        at 533; Arias, 984 F.2d at 1143.
               B. Sentence
                Hankerson also argues, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, that the
        district court erred by imposing a sentence of imprisonment and
        determining that she was ineligible for probation because it was
        improperly constrained by the guidelines commentary. She argues
        that 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a) and the Sentencing Guidelines clearly
        permit probation in her case (which allegedly is supported by the
        § 3553(a) factors), and the guidelines commentary cannot expand
        the interpretation of that unambiguous language. Thus, she
        argues that we should reverse and remand for resentencing to
        include probation as an option.
                We generally review the procedural reasonableness of a
        sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). However, when, as here,
        a defendant does not raise a relevant objection at the time of
        sentencing, we review for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift,
        754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish plain error, the
        defendant must show: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain;
        and (3) the error aﬀected her substantial rights. Id. If these three
        conditions are met, we may then exercise our discretion to correct

        4 The government also argues that any error in giving the instruction was

        harmless, because a reasonable jury could have convicted her on a theory of
        actual knowledge. Because we find that the district court did not err in
        providing the instruction, we need not reach this argument.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10750

        the error if, but only if, (4) the error seriously aﬀects the fairness,
        integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
                With respect to the second prong, “[w]hen the explicit
        language of a statute or rule does not speciﬁcally resolve an issue,
        there can be no plain error where there is [no] precedent from the
        Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v.
        Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
        With respect to the third prong, an error does not aﬀect a
        defendant’s substantial rights unless there is a “reasonable
        probability” of a diﬀerent sentence absent the error. United States
        v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). The substantial
        rights analysis is like harmless error review, but the defendant, not
        the government, “bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
        prejudice.” See United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1352 n.10
        (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, “if the eﬀect of the error is uncertain so
        that we do not know which, if either, side it helped the defendant
        loses.” Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300. The district court commits a
        signiﬁcant procedural error if it calculates the guidelines
        incorrectly, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence
        on clearly erroneous facts, neglects to explain the sentence, or
        treats the guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory. United
        States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 879 (11th Cir. 2011).
               Section 3561 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides
        that a “defendant who has been found guilty of an oﬀense may be
        sentenced to a term of probation unless[, among other factors,] . . .
        the oﬀense is a Class A or Class B felony . . . .” The guidelines
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        23-10750              Opinion of the Court                      13

        incorporate the same statutory restrictions on probation identiﬁed
        in § 3561. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(b). Hankerson’s oﬀense was a Class
        C felony. So, the probation references in 18 U.S.C. § 3561 and the
        guidelines did not apply.
               However, the class of felony is not the only factor in
        determining whether an individual is eligible for probation. The
        guidelines only authorize probation for guideline ranges within
        certain zones of the Sentencing Table. Hankerson’s guideline
        range was in Zone C of the Sentencing Table. The guidelines
        authorize a sentence of probation if:
              (1) the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the
                  Sentencing Table; or
              (2) the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the
                  Sentencing Table and the court imposes a
                  condition or combination of conditions requiring
                  intermittent       conﬁnement,         community
                  conﬁnement, or home detention as provided in
                  subsection (c)(3) of § 5C1.1 (Imposition of a Term
                  of Imprisonment).
        U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a). The text of this provision does not mention
        Zone C or D of the Sentencing Table. Comment 2 to § 5B1.1(a)
        states that “[w]here the applicable guideline range is in Zone C or
        D of the Sentencing Table . . . the guidelines do not authorize a
        sentence of probation.” U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1 cmt. (n.2). And we have
        cited to this comment, stating that the “Guidelines do not
        authorize a sentence of probation where the applicable Guidelines
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                    23-10750

        range is in Zone C or D of the Sentencing Table.” United States v.
        Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008). 5
               Hankerson argues that she was eligible for a probationary
        sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3561 and the plain language of the
        guidelines, and that the commentary to the guidelines suggesting
        otherwise is not controlling. She cites United States v. Dupree, in
        which we held that the guidelines commentary cannot expand the
        interpretation of unambiguous sentencing guidelines. 57 F.4th
        1269, 1273–77 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
               But her reliance on that decision is misplaced. The
        guidelines do not unambiguously state that probation is allowed
        for Class C felonies where the applicable guidelines range is in Zone
        C or D. While the guidelines do not expressly prohibit probation
        for Class C felonies, the guidelines only authorize probation when
        the applicable guideline range is in Zone A or B. The guidelines’
        express authorization of probation for Zone A and Zone B ranges
        and its silence as to ranges in Zone C implies the lack of
        authorization of probation for Zone C ranges. See United States v.
        Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1277 (11th Cir. 2013) (The negative
        implication canon “applies where items expressed are members of
        an associated group or series, justifying the inference that items not

        5 This implication is further supported by § 5C1.1 of the guidelines, which

        states that a minimum term of imprisonment may be satisfied by probation
        for Zone B. But here as well, probation is not listed for Zones C and D.
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        23-10750               Opinion of the Court                        15

        mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”
        (quotations omitted)).
                 Because the sentencing guidelines do not unambiguously
        state that probation is authorized for guideline ranges in Zone C or
        D, it is permissible to consider the guidelines commentary. Dupree,
        57 F.4th at 1273–77. That commentary, and our caselaw
        interpreting that commentary, makes clear that the guidelines do
        not authorize a sentence of probation where the applicable
        guidelines range is in Zone C or D. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1200; §
        5B1.1 cmt. n.2 (“Where the applicable guideline range is in Zone C
        or D of the Sentencing Table . . . the guidelines do not authorize a
        sentence of probation.”). Thus, because Hankerson’s applicable
        Guidelines range was in Zone C, it was not plain error for the
        district court to determine that she was ineligible for probation.
                Regardless, the record does not indicate that the district
        court treated the guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory.
        Hill, 643 F.3d at 879 (noting that a district court commits procedural
        error when it treats the guidelines as mandatory). The district
        court stated that it considered the statements of all parties, the §
        3553(a) sentencing factors, the “advisory guidelines,” and the PSI.
        Moreover, the record supports the district court’s decision to
        sentence her to both incarceration and home conﬁnement, in lieu
        of probation. Accordingly, the district court did not err, and we
        aﬃrm the district court.
               AFFIRMED.