Court Opinion

ID: 9375822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 22:01:13.971412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.984850
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13025    Document: 19-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2023    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13025
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        LARRY E. KLAYMAN,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        JULIA PORTER,
        HAMILTON FOX, III,
        MATTHEW KAISER,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13025

                       D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-80642-AHS
                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Larry Klayman appeals the district court’s orders denying his
        motion to remand and dismissing his complaint for improper claim
        splitting. After careful review, we affirm.
                                         I.
               Klayman is an attorney facing attorney-disciplinary proceed-
        ings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Coun-
        sel (“ODC”). The defendants—Hamilton Fox III, Matthew Kaiser,
        and Julia Porter—are officials of the ODC and the D.C. Board on
        Professional Responsibility. According to Klayman’s complaint,
        the defendants have engaged in a “pattern and practice” of pursu-
        ing baseless and politically motivated disciplinary investigations
        against him because of his “conservative/libertarian private and
        public advocacy,” with the goal of removing him from the practice
        of law and ultimately bankrupting him.
               This is not the first lawsuit Klayman has brought seeking to
        collaterally attack the ODC proceedings. As relevant here, Klay-
        man filed suit in this case, in state court, on the same day that a
        federal district court in the Southern District of Florida refused to
        remand a nearly identical case filed by Klayman. Instead, the court
        transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
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        22-13025               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Columbia, where the defendants were located and where six other
        lawsuits brought by Klayman raising similar claims were either
        filed or transferred.
                In that prior case, the district court rejected Klayman’s at-
        tempt to avoid federal jurisdiction by seeking less than $75,000 in
        damages and “primarily” injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
        Applying its “judicial experience and common sense,” the court
        found that it was “apparent the true amount-in-controversy ex-
        ceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” It noted that Klayman had “pre-
        viously filed six very similar actions to the present one, each one
        seeking in excess of $75,000,” and that he had filed “an almost iden-
        tical complaint in Florida state court (which was removed to fed-
        eral court), voluntarily dismissed the complaint, and then refiled
        the present Complaint alleging an amount-in-controversy just be-
        low the jurisdictional threshold.”
                Immediately after that prior case was transferred to the Dis-
        trict of Columbia, Klayman filed the present case in Florida state
        court seeking “injunctive relief only,” but leaving the underlying
        factual allegations essentially unchanged. The defendants re-
        moved to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and
        sought dismissal, and Klayman requested remand.
               The district court denied remand, concluding it had diver-
        sity jurisdiction. The court found that “a common sense reading
        of the Complaint establishes that the amount in controversy satis-
        fies the statutory threshold,” citing its reasoning from the prior
        case.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13025

                The district court then dismissed the complaint based on the
        “claim-splitting” doctrine, which prohibits plaintiffs from splitting
        closely related claims into separate lawsuits. In the court’s view,
        this doctrine applied because “[t]he present case involves both the
        same parties and arises from the same transaction or series of trans-
        actions as the previously filed case.” Klayman now appeals the de-
        nial of his motion to remand and the grant of the defendants’ mo-
        tion to dismiss.
                                          II.
               We start with whether the district court had subject-matter
        jurisdiction, which we review de novo. Gupta v. McGahey, 709
        F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (11th Cir. 2013). Federal courts have limited
        subject-matter jurisdiction and may “hear only cases for which
        there has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction.” Morrison v.
        Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260–62 (11th Cir. 2000).
                The district court found that it had diversity jurisdiction un-
        der 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction exists under § 1332 where (1) the
        parties are “citizens of different States” and (2) “the matter in con-
        troversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests
        and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It’s undisputed that the parties are
        diverse, so the only question is whether this case involves the req-
        uisite amount in controversy.
                 In the absence of a specific request for damages by the plain-
        tiff, a removing defendant bears the burden of proving by a pre-
        ponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is
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        22-13025                Opinion of the Court                         5

        satisfied. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329
        F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003). The defendant may meet this bur-
        den by submitting evidence or by showing that it is “facially appar-
        ent” from the pleading itself that the amount in controversy ex-
        ceeds the jurisdictional minimum. Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.,
        613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin.
        Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). But “a removing defend-
        ant is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all
        doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it.” Pretka v. Kolter City
        Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754–55 (11th Cir. 2010). And in resolv-
        ing these issues, the district court may rely on its “judicial experi-
        ence and common sense.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063.
                When a plaintiff seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief,
        as Klayman does here, the amount in controversy is measured by
        the value of the object of the litigation from the plaintiff’s perspec-
        tive. McKinnon Motors, 329 F.3d at 807; Ericsson GE Mobile
        Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d
        216, 218–19 (11th Cir. 1997). In other words, the value of injunctive
        relief “is the monetary value of the benefit that would flow to the
        plaintiff if the relief he is seeking were granted.” S. Fla. Wellness,
        Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (cleaned up). To satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement,
        the benefit to be obtained from the injunction must be “sufficiently
        measurable and certain,” not “speculative and immeasurable.” Er-
        icsson, 120 F.3d at 221–22.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13025

               Here, the district court did not err by denying Klayman’s
        motion to remand. Despite seeking injunctive relief only, Klay-
        man’s complaint makes abundantly clear that the value of the ob-
        ject of the litigation measured from his perspective exceeds the
        $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. See McKinnon Motors, 329 F.3d
        at 807. The complaint sought “injunctive relief barring Defendants
        from continuing their unethical, illegal and unconstitutional har-
        assment and conduct” against Klayman. It alleges that the defend-
        ants’ meritless investigations had “severely financially harm[ed]”
        him, costing him “hundreds of thousands of dollars in money” and
        curtailing his ability to acquire and represent new clients. Without
        injunctive relief, the complaint stated, the defendants’ continuing
        conduct would “bankrupt[] him with the huge expenditure of time,
        resources and money” necessary to defend himself, since it was “a
        sure bet that they will knowingly pursue this meritless issue to the
        very end.” Put differently, Klayman viewed the injunctive relief as
        necessary not only to preserve his ability to earn a living, but also
        to prevent a further “huge expenditure” of money that would ulti-
        mately bankrupt him.
               Given that Klayman had already spent “hundreds of thou-
        sands of dollars” to defend against the ongoing ODC investiga-
        tions, which he believed would be pursued “to the very end,” it is
        reasonable to infer that the future defense costs he sought to fore-
        stall were of similar value, or at least in excess of $75,000, even if
        there remains some uncertainty about the amount. See S. Fla.
        Wellness, 745 F.3d at 1316; Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063; Pretka, 608 F.3d
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        22-13025                Opinion of the Court                          7

        at 754–55. We therefore conclude that it is facially apparent from
        the complaint itself—putting aside Klayman’s prior litigation his-
        tory—that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional
        minimum. See Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061.
               Notwithstanding Klayman’s attempt to avoid federal juris-
        diction, we hold that diversity jurisdiction existed because the
        value of the injunctive relief Klaymen sought was “sufficiently
        measurable and certain” and exceeded the $75,000 threshold. See
        Ericsson, 120 F.3d at 221–22. We affirm the district court’s denial
        of remand.
                                          III.
                We ordinarily review de novo the district court’s grant of a
        motion to dismiss. Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 857 F.3d 833,
        837 (11th Cir. 2017). We review a dismissal for improper claim
        splitting for an abuse of discretion where it rests on the court’s case-
        management discretion. Id. at 837–38; see also Kennedy v. Florid-
        ian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1236 n.7 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We re-
        view a dismissal for improper claim splitting for an abuse of discre-
        tion.”).
                In essence, the claim-splitting doctrine “requires a plaintiff
        to assert all of [his or her] causes of action arising from a common
        set of facts in one lawsuit.” Kennedy, 998 F.3d at 1236 (quotation
        marks omitted). The doctrine prevents a plaintiff from prosecuting
        a second suit “before the first suit has reached a final judgment,”
        promotes judicial economy, and shields parties from “vexatious
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13025

        and duplicative litigation while empowering the district court to
        manage its docket.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
                To determine whether a plaintiff has improperly split his
        claims among lawsuits, we examine “(1) whether the case involves
        the same parties and their privies, and (2) whether separate cases
        arise from the same transaction or series of transactions.” Vanover,
        857 F.3d at 841–42 (quotation marks omitted). “Successive causes
        of action arise from the same transaction or series of transactions
        when the two actions are based on the same nucleus of operative
        facts.” Id. at 842. While this test borrows from the res judicata test,
        the question “is not whether there is finality of judgment, but
        whether the first suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the
        second suit.” Id. at 841 (quotation marks omitted).
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion or other-
        wise err in dismissing the present case for improper claim splitting.
        Klayman filed the present case while the prior case was pending,
        immediately after the prior case was transferred to the District of
        Columbia. See Kennedy, 998 F.3d at 1236. The two lawsuits in-
        volve the exact same parties. See Vanover, 857 F.3d at 841–42. And
        an analysis of the pertinent factual allegations found in the com-
        plaints in both cases reveals that both lawsuits arise from the same
        nucleus of operative facts. See id. Both complaints alleged the
        same pattern and practice of politically motivated and abusive dis-
        ciplinary investigations against Klayman, based on essentially the
        same set of underlying facts.
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        22-13025                Opinion of the Court                         9

              Klayman nevertheless claims that the present case is distin-
        guishable for two reasons. Neither is persuasive.
               First, that Klayman seeks injunctive relief rather than dam-
        ages is irrelevant to the claim-splitting inquiry. The question is
        whether the claims arise from the same factual predicate and in-
        volve the same parties, not whether the plaintiff requested the
        same remedy in both cases. See Vanover, 857 F.3d at 841–43.
               Second, Klayman argues that the underlying facts are differ-
        ent because this case includes a new allegation of unlawful activity,
        based on an October 2021 letter and email informing Klayman of
        “another investigation” stemming from his litigation activity. But
        as the district court explained, this investigation was simply part of
        the same alleged pattern of activity—or “series of transactions”—
        that gave rise to the harms Klayman alleges. In other words, “the
        factual bases for both lawsuits are related in time, origin, and mo-
        tivation, and they form a convenient trial unit, thereby precluding
        [Klayman] from splitting [his] claims among the lawsuits.” Id. at
        842–43.
               Not only that, but the October 2021 correspondence pre-
        dated the filing of the prior case in January 2022, which means that
        it could have been raised in the first action. See In re Piper Aircraft
        Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that res judicata
        prohibits relitigating a claim “that was or could have been raised in
        that action” (emphasis added). As a result, a final judgment in the
        prior case would have precluded a second suit based on the Octo-
        ber 2021 correspondence. See id. The claim-splitting doctrine
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-13025

        applies in these circumstances to shield the defendants from Klay-
        man’s “vexatious and duplicative litigation.” See Kennedy, 998
        F.3d at 1236; Vanover, 857 F.3d at 841.
               For these reasons, the district court correctly determined
        that the claim-splitting doctrine prevented Klayman from simulta-
        neously pursuing nearly identical claims against the same parties in
        different courts. See Vanover, 857 F.3d at 841–43. We affirm.
              AFFIRMED.