Court Opinion

ID: 9609699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:30:15.970285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:44.126339
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the opinion authored by Bistline, J. However, in view of the opinion of Shepard, J., wherein he concurs in part and dissents in part, I feel I should explain my position insofar as the case of Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d 49 (1969), is concerned.
In Phillips this court discussed the import of the doctrine of merger insofar as the effect it has on a separation agreement of the parties when the provisions of that decree are “merged” in a divorce decree. Therein the court stated at 386, 462 P.2d 49:
“If the agreement is so merged into the decree, the rights and duties of the parties are no longer determined by reference to the agreement or contract of the parties, but rather are determined by and enforced through the judgment and the decree of the court.”
I continue to adhere to that statement.
In the instant case after the proceedings for divorce had been instituted the parties entered into a “Property Settlement Agreement” wherein the parties agreed as to what property was their community property, and also listed the separate property of the husband. The agreement also made provision for the support and maintenance of their minor children, and also provided for the husband to pay the wife $800 per month as alimony as long as she remained unmarried and living. These monthly payments could be increased by an increase in the cost of living index up to $850 per month.
The property settlement agreement also provided that in the pending divorce proceedings, if a divorce be granted to either or both parties, it was to be controlling as *741to the property settlement and should be submitted to the court for approval “but not merged as a part of judgment.”
The original decree of divorce entered on November 25, 1969, insofar as alimony was concerned, provided:
“That the defendant is ordered and directed to pay to the Clerk of the District Court of Ada County, State of Idaho, on or before the 15th day of each and every month, the sum of $800 per month as alimony, so long as the plaintiff lives and remains unmarried, and the Clerk is hereby directed to pay said amount to plaintiff; provided, however, that the award for alimony be adjusted to reflect the increases in the cost of living index prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Government between January 1 and December 31 of each year, commencing with the year 1971, and further provided that said adjustments by reason of cost of living increases shall not cause the alimony to exceed $850.00 per month.”
When the trial court ordered Mr. Sullivan to pay $800 per month (plus cost of living increases up to $850 per month) as alimony, it disregarded the nonmerger provisions of the property settlement agreement as concerned alimony. If Mr. Sullivan was dissatisfied with that portion of the decree, insofar as it split the alimony provisions from the property settlement provisions of the agreement, it was incumbent upon him to appeal from that portion of the decree, which he did not do. The effect of the provision of the decree insofar as alimony is concerned brought it within the jurisdiction of the court to modify. I.C. § 32-706 (as it existed at the time of modification). Turner v. Turner, 90 Idaho 308, 410 P.2d 648 (1966); Phillips v. Phillips, supra.
No , appeal having been taken from that portion of the decree, it became res judicata as to the authority of the court to modify the alimony award as an independent provision separate from the provisions of the property settlement agreement pertaining to division of the property.