Court Opinion

ID: 9711107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:33.871779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.344921
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I dissent because I think this case is very similar to Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 272, wherein the plaintiff employee’s negligence action was dismissed because the injury he sustained was held to be exclusively compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)). Chmelik was injured as he left work when he walked across the parking lot provided by his employer and was struck by Yana’s automobile and suffered serious injury. The court held that the injury occurred “in the course of” Chmelik’s employment, referring to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. The court, in holding also that the accidental injury “arose out of” Chmelik’s employment, stated: “Ordinarily, an injury does not arise out of the employment unless the danger causing the injury is peculiar to the work and the risk is not one to which the public generally is subjected, (Lagomarcino-Grupe Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Com. 383 Ill. 95;) however, if an employee is exposed to a risk common to the general public to a greater degree than other persons by reason of his employment, the accidental injury is said to arise out of his employment. Payne and Dolan v. Industrial Com. 382 Ill. 177; Hinckley & Schmitt v. Industrial Com. 391 Ill. 577; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 68 L. Ed. 366.” (Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 272, 277-78.) The court then refuted the plaintiff’s arguments: “First, that the use of the parking lot is in no manner connected with the employer-employee relationship, and, second, that employees using the lot are exposed to no greater perils than the general public. We do not agree with either contention. As to the first, it is more than clear that the parking lot was provided and used as an incident of the employment. The lot was used as an adjunct of the employer’s plant, it was furnished and maintained by the employer to facilitate arrival and departure from work, and it was contemplated that employees would use the lot in going to and from their employment. As to the second contention, it would be sufficient to say there is no showing that the public used the lot or were exposed to its perils. But even if such a showing had been made, it would be of little avail to plaintiff. The regular and continuous use of the parking lot by employees, most particularly at quitting time when there is a mass and speedy exodus of the vehicles on the lot, would result in a degree of exposure to the common risk beyond that to which the general public would be subjected. Cf. Biggs v. Farnsworth, 336 Ill. App. 417; Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. 150; Murphy v. Meittinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252. We conclude that the accidental injury here did arise out of and in the course of the employment ***.”31 Ill. 2d 272, 279-80. In the instant case, the facts are virtually identical, except for the fact that the claimant’s wife was the operator of the car which struck the claimant and the car malfunctioned. The majority has not explained, however, why the outcome should be different from Chmelik as a result. Certainly it appears that, if the claimant’s wife had struck and injured a different employee, the injuries would be compensable under the Act. Thus, I do not understand why the majority concludes that, although an employee was accidentally struck by a car driven by his wife as the employee was crossing an employer-controlled parking lot at the end of the work shift, his injuries are not compensable under the Act. While it is true that deference should be given to the Commission’s fact-finding expertise, we should not do so at the cost of disregarding our own precedent. MR. JUSTICE WARD joins in this dissent.