Court Opinion

ID: 9409771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:00:59.437291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.344212
License: Public Domain

22-1756
   Cerisier v. City of New York

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 19th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:

              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
              BETH ROBINSON,
              MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   JAMES CERISIER,

                            Plaintiff-Appellant,

                            v.                                                    No. 22-1756

   CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
   OFFICER SAURABH SHAH, in his individual
   capacity,

                    Defendants-Appellees. ∗
   _____________________________________

   ∗
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                      NICHOLAS BOURLAND (Richard D.
                                              Emery, on the brief), Emery Celli
                                              Brinckerhoff Abady Ward &
                                              Maazel, LLP, New York, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees:                     PHILLIP W. YOUNG (Richard
                                              Dearing, Melanie T. West, on the
                                              brief), for  Hon.    Sylvia   O.
                                              Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel
                                              of the City of New York, New
                                              York, NY.

For Amici Curiae NAACP Legal                  Ashok Chandran, Kevin E. Jason,
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.            Catherine Logue, NAACP Legal
in support of Plaintiff-Appellant:            Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
                                              New York, NY.

For Amici Curiae Giffords Law                 Amelia T. R. Starr, Davis Polk &
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, in            Wardwell LLP, New York, NY.
support of Plaintiff-Appellant:

For Amici Curiae Institute for Justice,       Jaba Tsitsuashvili, Anna Goodman,
in support of Plaintiff-Appellant:            Institute for Justice, Arlington, VA.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Eric N. Vitaliano, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,             IT   IS   HEREBY    ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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      James Cerisier appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of Officer Saurabh Shah and the City of New York (the “City”), on his

claims of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and assault under New York law,

both stemming from a January 2019 traffic stop during which Officer Shah drew

his gun and pointed it at Cerisier for seven to ten seconds. On appeal, Cerisier

contends that the district court erred in holding that Officer Shah was entitled to

qualified immunity. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment, see Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2006), and will affirm when

there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      As relevant here, Officer Shah was on foot on the morning of January 28,

2019 conducting traffic enforcement on the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. After

witnessing Cerisier commit an illegal lane change, Officer Shah walked in front of

Cerisier’s vehicle – which was traveling “slowly” – and directed him to pull over.

App’x at 69. Cerisier first noticed Officer Shah when he was about “15 to 20 feet

away,” and proceeded to stop his car within “a few seconds.” Id. at 70–72, 208.

Cerisier then began to change lanes after Officer Shah directed him to do so,

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whereupon Officer Shah unholstered his weapon and pointed it at Cerisier for

seven to ten seconds. As Cerisier drove to the right and beside Officer Shah,

dashcam footage from Officer Shah’s parked patrol car shows that Officer Shah

lowered his firearm and ultimately holstered it after Cerisier pulled over. After

speaking with Cerisier for less than a minute, Officer Shah let him go with a

warning. Based on that series of events, Cerisier brought this action against Officer

Shah and the City.

      The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from suit

unless (1) “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” and (2) “the

right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). It is within our “sound discretion” to take up these questions in either

order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, we need address only

the second prong of the qualified-immunity test, without deciding whether Officer

Shah’s conduct did in fact violate Cerisier’s Fourth Amendment rights.

      In determining whether a right was “clearly established” at the time of the

challenged conduct, we must frame the right in light of the specific context of the

case, with all reasonable inferences drawn in Cerisier’s favor. See Tolan v. Cotton,

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572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (emphasizing the “importance of drawing inferences in

favor of the nonmovant, even when, as here, a court decides only the

clearly-established prong of the standard”). While “a case directly on point” is not

required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court has “repeatedly” instructed lower courts to avoid defining the right at “a

high level of generality.” Id. at 742. This is “especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine

how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted).

      Cerisier argues that, at the time he was stopped, it was clearly established

that the use of “significant force . . . without any justification” – in this case,

“pointing a loaded gun at a non-threatening and non-resisting individual” –

violates the Fourth Amendment.           Cerisier Br. at 21, 25 (capitalization

standardized). But Cerisier defines the right at much too high a level of generality.

Critically, his proposed framing overlooks the specific context of this case – a

traffic stop. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (holding that a right

                                         5
must be defined in light of the “particular circumstances” of the case). That context

matters because the Supreme Court “has traditionally drawn a distinction

between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment.”

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). Traffic stops, the Court has

explained, “are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” Arizona v.

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing that officers face an

“inordinate risk” when approaching a vehicle during a traffic stop).             We

accordingly define the right at issue here as the right not to be seized at gunpoint

– even momentarily – by an officer attempting to effectuate a lawful traffic stop on

foot when the driver is behind the wheel of a moving vehicle and is not

affirmatively threatening or actively fleeing the police.

      Cerisier has not cited any cases from this Circuit supporting his contention

that such a right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, and

the out-of-circuit cases on which Cerisier relies do not suggest otherwise. As an

initial matter, most of the cases Cerisier cites do not involve motor vehicles. See,

e.g., Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 813 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016); Mlodzinski v. Lewis,

648 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2011); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 1995);

                                          6
Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2010); McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292

(7th Cir. 1992); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007). The cases that do

involve motor vehicles, meanwhile, are distinguishable from the circumstances

here. In some cases, the challenged conduct involved the use of physical force

against a suspect. See, e.g., Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 1986) (officers

struck the plaintiff with a revolver and broke his companion’s arm); Deville v.

Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 162 (5th Cir. 2009) (officers broke the driver’s side window

of a vehicle, grabbed driver through the window, opened the door, and pulled her

out of the vehicle). In other cases, the officer brandished his weapon for an

extended period of time. See, e.g., Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 938 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir.

2019) (two minutes); Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981, 990 (8th Cir. 2018) (throughout

the incident, even after the officer realized the plaintiff was not the suspect he was

looking for); Marceline v. Delgado, No. 3:09-cv-1591 (VLB), 2011 WL 2531081, at *2

(D. Conn. June 23, 2011) (the entire encounter).

      Cerisier’s reliance on Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981), is similarly

misplaced. There, an undercover detective driving an unmarked patrol car had a

minor traffic altercation with the plaintiffs (a husband and wife), approached their

car, and then threatened to shoot one of them. Black, 662 F.2d at 185. The court

                                           7
held that “[f]or an unidentified officer to brandish his revolver eighteen inches

from [the husband’s] head with [the wife] in the precise line of fire and then

threaten to shoot, is conduct that shocks the conscience.” Id. at 189. Conversely,

Officer Shah, while on duty and in uniform, pointed his weapon for seven to ten

seconds while he was on foot and Cerisier was behind the wheel of his moving

vehicle. Once Cerisier pulled over, Officer Shah holstered his gun and told

Cerisier that he was free to leave. Based on these facts, we have no reason to

conclude that Officer Shah’s conduct was barred by clearly established law.

      We have considered Cerisier’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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