Court Opinion

ID: 9796088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:48:26.770106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:57.718629
License: Public Domain

*1177KENNARD, J., Dissenting.
While being pursued by sheriffs deputies, defendant ran toward the front of a travel trailer. When Sergeant Tom Murdoch, with gun drawn, looked around a comer at the back of the trailer, he saw defendant with a gun pointed toward the front of the trailer. As Murdoch came up behind defendant, the latter looked over his shoulder at Murdoch. After Murdoch repeatedly ordered defendant to drop the gun, defendant tossed the gun to the ground and started mnning. Moments later he fell and was arrested. When defendant’s gun was recovered, its safety mechanism was not on and there were 15 rounds in its magazine but no round in the chamber.
Defendant was convicted of, among other things, assault with a firearm on a peace officer and attempted murder. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction for attempted murder, but it reversed the assault conviction in light of this court’s holdings in People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908, 865 P.2d 704] (Colantuono) and People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197] (Williams). In Colantuono, this court held that the crime of assault requires the commission of “an act that by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another” (7 Cal.4th at p. 214, italics added), that is, an act “immediately antecedent to battery” (id. at p. 216). In Williams, this court reiterated that view, stating that assault requires “ ‘ “an act done toward the commission of a battery” ’ ” that must “ ‘ “immediately” ’ precede the battery” (26 Cal.4th at p. 786, italics added); that is, it requires an act where the “ ' “next movement would, at least to all appearance, complete the battery . . .” ’ ” (ibid.). Applying those decisions here, the Court of Appeal held that because defendant did not point the gun at Sergeant Murdoch, no reasonable person could conclude that defendant’s conduct would directly and immediately result in the unlawful use of force upon another.
Reversing the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the majority here reinstates the assault conviction. The majority is wrong; the Court of Appeal was right.
Under the test set forth in Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th 206, and in Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th 779, the pertinent inquiry is whether in this case defendant’s “next movement” would have completed the battery. (Colantuono, supra, at p. 216; Williams, supra, at p. 786.) The answer is “no.” To fire the gun at the pursuing Sergeant Murdoch, defendant would have had to turn around (instead of just looking over his shoulder at Murdoch), pull back the slide of the gun to release a round into the firing chamber, aim the gun at Murdoch, and then pull the trigger. Had defendant pointed his gun at *1178Murdoch after releasing a round into the chamber, he unquestionably would have committed an assault. But, as just explained, that was not the scenario here.
Although defendant’s conviction for assault was improper—because he did not commit an act that would have directly and immediately resulted in injury (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 787; Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 217)—he was properly convicted of attempted murder, as the Court of Appeal concluded. An anomalous conclusion? Yes, but one compelled by Colantuono and Williams. Unlike the requisite act for assault, the act necessary for attempted murder and other criminal attempts “need not be the last proximate or ultimate step toward commission of the substantive crime.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 376 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].)
The majority tries to find a way around its holdings in Colantuono, supra, 1 Cal.4th 206, and Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th 779. First, it asserts that this case concerns only the nature of the act required to commit an assault, whereas Colantuono and Williams concerned the mental state required to commit an assault. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1167-1169, 1171.) That effort fails, because under this court’s decisions the requisite act and intent are inseparable. (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 786 [“a specific intent to injure is not an element of assault because the assaultive act, by its nature, subsumes such an intent”]; see Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 217 [the intent of committing a battery is subsumed in an act that by its nature will likely result in physical force on another].) The majority cannot have it both ways.
Second, the majority asserts that defendant’s assault conviction can be affirmed by viewing the requisite act for assault as requiring only the ability to inflict injury on the “present occasion.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1167-1168, 1171, 1174, 1176.) This is an apparent attempt by the majority to relax the requirement of Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 787-788, and Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 217, that assault requires the commission of an act that “directly” and “immediately” precedes a battery. Here, defendant’s act did not satisfy that requirement. Therefore, as construed by the majority, the phrase “present occasion” encompasses an act that goes beyond the test articulated in Williams and in Colantuono, unsettling the law of assault.
The way out of this legal morass is easy. Simply recognize that assault is a specific intent crime, as I advocated in my dissents in Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pages 225-228, and in Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 791-796. A specific intent crime is an offense that requires the defendant to not only intend to do an act but to also intend to achieve a consequence, such
*1179as (in the case of assault) the intent “to commit a violent injury on the person of another” (Pen. Code, § 240), whereas a general intent crime requires only that the defendant intend to do the act (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]). That assault is a specific intent crime is established by the legislative history of the offense; by the statutory language expressly stating that assault requires an attempt (Pen. Code, § 240), which in turn requires a specific intent {id., § 21a); and by this court’s commonsense observation in People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775 [228 P.2d 281], that one “could not very well ‘attempt’ or try to ‘commit’ an injury on the person of another if he had no intent to cause any injury to such other person.” (See Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 791-796 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 225-228 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
Here, defendant had the specific intent to inflict injury on the pursuing Sergeant Murdoch, as shown by the jury’s conviction of him for attempted murder, a crime that requires the specific intent to unlawfully kill. (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664, subd. (e), 187, 189.) With the specific intent to injure Sergeant Murdoch, defendant pointed a loaded gun in the direction where he expected Sergeant Murdoch to appear. Thus, if assault were viewed as a specific intent crime, as I think it should be, defendant would be guilty of assault as well as attempted murder. But under this court’s existing decisions, assault is a general intent crime that requires an act where the “next movement” would complete the battery. (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 786; Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 216.) As explained above (ante, at pp. 1167-1168), here defendant’s next movement would not have completed the battery and therefore, as the Court of Appeal correctly concluded, he cannot be convicted of assault.1
*1180I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Werdegar, J., concurred.

 The majority cites a number of decisions to support its conclusion that defendant’s act was sufficiently close to inflicting injury to sustain the assault conviction. The cases, however, are inapposite. Seven of the cited cases, People v. Lee Kong (1892) 95 Cal. 666 [30 P. 800], People v. Yslas (1865) 27 Cal. 630, People v. McMakin (1857) 8 Cal. 547, People v. Thompson (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 780 [209 P.2d 819], People v. Simpson (1933) 134 Cal.App. 646 [25 P.2d 1008], and People v. Hunter (1925) 71 Cal.App. 315 [235 P. 67], were decided when specific intent to injure was required for an assault (see, e.g., People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 221-222 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]; People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 775; People v. Dodel (1888) 77 Cal. 293, 294 [19 P. 484]; People v. Bird (1881) 60 Cal. 7, 8) and the assaultive act did not have to be the immediate antecedent of harm as required by Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th 779, and Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th 206. People v. Raviart (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 258, 266-267 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 850], makes the same mistake as the majority. People v. Ranson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 317, 321 [114 Cal.Rptr. 874], viewed assault as a specific intent offense and was decided accordingly. People v. Valdez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 103, 113 [220 Cal.Rptr. 538], concerns the effect of the victim’s avoidance or preventative measures, an issue not presented here.