Court Opinion

ID: 9581036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:12.352186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:40.085449
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the majority’s holding is based upon its misidentification of the issue presented for resolution in this *467case. This Court granted certiorari to review the holding in Benefield v. State, 264 Ga. App. 511 (591 SE2d 404) (2003) that no reversible violation of the accused’s right to a jury poll occurred when, despite a juror’s negative response to one of the two questions posed by the trial court, further deliberations were not conducted. There is precedent for the proposition that such a violation can result when a trial court ignores a juror’s negative poll answer and fails to order that deliberations continue. White v. Seaboard C.L.R. Co., 139 Ga. App. 833, 837 (1) (229 SE2d 775) (1976) holds, with no citation of any supporting authority, that, in those circumstances,
[n]o motion by the parties [is] necessary — this should [be] done by the court on its own motion. There having been no legal verdict, there could be no valid judgment____[C]ounsel [is] not required to “voir dire” [the negatively responding] juror ... further, [if] he already ... answered that it was not his verdict.
However, that is not what occurred in this case. Contrary to the circumstances presented in White, neither the trial court nor defense counsel heard the twelfth juror when she responded “no” to the first of the two poll questions. Consequently, we do not need to consider whether Hanson v. State, 258 Ga. 564, 568 (4) (a) (372 SE2d 436) (1988) and Jackson v. State, 184 Ga. App. 123 (361 SE2d 14) (1987) remain viable authority for the proposition that further deliberations are waived unless expressly requested.
Here, the record demonstrates that, rather than actively ignoring the negative response, the trial court and defense counsel merely misunderstood the twelfth juror and assumed that she, as did all the others before her, gave affirmative answers to both of the poll inquiries. Thus, the actual issue in this case is whether the juror’s negative answer to the first question requires a new trial when the failure to conduct further deliberations is a result of a misinterpretation of the response and when the answer to the second question is unequivocally affirmative. In my opinion, there was no reversible error under the circumstances presented here.
A new trial would be authorized if the record supported a finding that Benefield was denied the benefit of the jury poll that he requested. “In criminal cases the privilege of polling a jury is the legal right of the defendant, and does not depend upon the discretion of the court. [Cits.]” Maddox v. State, 233 Ga. 874, 876 (2) (213 SE2d 654) (1975).“ ‘The obj ect of the poll is to ascertain before the public and the prisoner that the verdict agreed upon in the jury room is still the unanimous verdict of the jury.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Tucker v. State, 252 Ga. 263 (349 SE2d 172) (1984). In other words, in *468Georgia, as in other jurisdictions, the purpose of a jury poll is to give each juror an opportunity to withdraw the consent to the verdict which he or she ostensibly gave in the jury room. See Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 456, 459 (4) (238 SE2d 100) (1977). See also United States v. Blackston, 547 FSupp. 1200, 1220 (II) (S.D. Ga. 1982) (applying federal law). “It is within the power of any juror, before leaving the jury-room, or even after coming into court, to recede from the verdict to which he has previously assented, at any time before it has become too late to poll.” Cooper v. State, 103 Ga. 63, 65-66 (29 SE 439) (1897). Thus, the poll inquiries formulated by the trial court must be designed to “provide sufficient instruction and ample opportunity for a juror to change his or her mind. [Cit.]” Mitchell v. State, supra at 459 (4).
“[W]e have held that the questions, ‘Was that your verdict?’ and ‘Is it now your verdict?’ meet the minimum requirements of the defendant’s right to a poll of the jurors. [Cit.]” Tucker v. State, supra. However, we have also recognized that the polling process is readily misunderstood by the jurors. Green v. State, 246 Ga. 598, 604 (17) (272 SE2d 475) (1980). That is especially true with regard to the somewhat ambiguous question regarding the “verdict” which “was” reached in the jury room. A reasonable juror might misinterpret that question as an inquiry into the voting process, concluding that it seeks to establish whether he or she consistently voted for the guilty verdict throughout the deliberations or, in the alternative, ever cast a not guilty ballot. As demonstrated by Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 377, 381 (8) (523 SE2d 581) (1999), a juror who eventually supported the guilty verdict, but only after initially rejecting it, might well respond “no” when asked whether the published verdict “was” his or her verdict. Here, the trial court, after conducting the poll, expressly informed the jurors that “if any of you had said that it is not your verdict that was published or it is not your verdict now, what I would have done would have been sent you back to the jury room and let you deliberate again.” (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, having heard that, the twelfth juror would have spoken up if the “verdict that was published” was not the one to which she had finally agreed in the jury room. She did not raise any such contention. Thus, it seems apparent that she understood the poll question about whether the verdict “was” hers as meaning whether she had always been of the opinion that Benefield was guilty. See Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 377, supra.
Moreover, although a trial court certainly should pose both of the poll inquiries, they are not necessarily of equal importance. The question regarding the verdict reached in the jury room is pro forma and borders on the rhetorical, since there is only the remotest of possibilities that, in the absence of perceived unanimity there, the jurors would return to the courtroom and announce that they have *469reached a verdict. The other inquiry is the one which is most calculated to achieve the purpose of the poll, which is to establish whether each individual juror continues to adhere to the previously announced verdict or will choose instead to change his or her mind and destroy the unanimity earlier reached. See Wilson v. State, 93 Ga. App. 375, 376 (2) (91 SE2d 854) (1956). Therefore, the reported cases unsurprisingly focus mainly on the second question. See Larry v. State, 266 Ga. 284, 287 (5) (466 SE2d 850) (1996); Rosser v. State, 156 Ga. App. 463, 464 (2) (274 SE2d 812) (1980); White v. Seaboard C.L.R. Co., supra. See also Ponder v. State, 11 Ga. App. 60 (74 SE 715) (1912) (dealing with the separate poll question of whether a juror consented to verdict “freely and voluntarily,” which, according to Hudson v. State, 237 Ga. 241 (3) (227 SE2d 257) (1976), need not be asked when conducting a poll).
Cases which address the inquiry about the verdict agreed to in the jury room clearly demonstrate that it is of lesser significance than the second. One such case is Person v. State, 235 Ga. 814, 816 (4) (221 SE2d 587) (1976), in which a “juror was polled as follows: ‘Q. Is this your verdict? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was it your verdict in the jury room? A. Partially. Q. Is it now your verdict? A. Yes. It is.’ ” Despite the fact that the juror did not give an unqualified affirmative answer when asked whether she had agreed with the verdict in the jury room, this Court unanimously rejected the assertion that the verdict was not unanimous. “There is no merit in this contention. The juror stated that it was her verdict. [Cits.]” Person v. State, supra. The only difference between that case and this is that here the juror gave a negative response to the poll question regarding her concurrence in the verdict reached in the jury room. Insofar as the concept of unanimity is concerned, however, no distinction can be drawn between partial and complete disagreement. If a juror only “partially” agrees with a verdict, then there is not unanimous agreement therewith. Thus, the Person decision clearly supports a holding that where, as here, the juror expresses unequivocal present agreement with the verdict returned in open court, any equivocation as to process heading to the verdict in the jury room does not require a reversal of the conviction. Under those circumstances, the defendant has not suffered any harm, since each individual juror has openly expressed concurrence in the verdict which was publicly announced. Here, as in Person, supra, “[t]he juror stated that it was her verdict.”
Indeed, in Hanson v. State, supra at 568-569 (4) (b), this Court did not find any reversible error where the juror, having initially indicated that he “still [had] some questions in [his] mind,” thereafter acknowledged his present agreement with the announced guilty verdict. If a trial court does not err in accepting a public verdict about which a juror “still” expresses doubts, then certainly it does not err *470when it accepts a public verdict which a juror never questions. Despite any disapproval of the verdict ostensibly agreed to in the jury room, the record here shows without doubt that the twelfth juror agreed with the verdict finding Benefield guilty which was announced in his presence and before the court. Thus, the purpose of the jury poll to assure that the jury reached a unanimous verdict before entry of the judgment of conviction and imposition of the sentence was fully satisfied here.
Decided September 13, 2004
Reconsideration denied October 12, 2004.
Barry V. Smith, James C. Bonner, Jr., Bret E. Rudeseal, Sarah L. Gerwig, for appellant.
Leigh Patterson, District Attorney, Charles S. Cox, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The maj ority recognizes that today’s decision is inconsistent with Hanson and Person, since it is forced to overrule both of those cases in order to reverse Benefield’s convictions. I submit that Hanson and Person are the better-reasoned opinions and that, as controlling precedent, they mandate an affirmance of the holding of the Court of Appeals that no reversible error occurred here. If there was any possibility that the jury in this case never reached unanimous agreement as to Benefield’s guilt, I would concur in the reversal of his convictions. Under the circumstances, however, it is clear that each and every juror found that he was guilty of the child molestation charges and publicly announced his or her agreement with those guilty verdicts in the courtroom. Thus, I am compelled to dissent, because the majority can justify today’s decision only by the most hyper-technical elevation of the mere form that the jury poll should take over the actual substance sought to be achieved by that procedure.