Court Opinion

ID: 9539050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:45:52.931791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:24.785622
License: Public Domain

LENT, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that an attempt to possess cocaine is not a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. I cannot agree.
ORS 475.992(4)(b) provides:
“It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance * * *. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
* * * *
“(b) A controlled substance in Schedule II [I assume cocaine falls here], is guilty of a Class C felony.” (Emphasis added.)
After the accused had pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of an attempt to commit this Class C felony, ORS *408lGl.JOñílHd),1 these proceedings were commenced, charging that the “conviction constitutes a conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”
The Oregon State Bar and the accused have stipulated:
“On June 28, 1982, while waiting outside of Judge Bonebrake’s office to see the judge, the accused, Gerald M. Chase, got up from his seat and was seen to drop a matchbox and cigarette rolling papers. Judge Bonebrake’s secretary, Harlene Crossen, and three other witnesses, Carole Robertson, Frank Rózales, and Bruce Johnson, all observed said items fall from the accused’s pocket. The matchbox was later discovered to contain .27 grams of cocaine. A special prosecutor was called in to handle the case. Mr. Chase was charged with and pled guilty to Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance (cocaine); a Class A Misdemeanor.”
The majority accurately quotes the Trial Board’s findings of fact:
“Mr. Chase testified that he was given the cocaine in a matchbox by an in-law in Seattle, had left it in his automobile, and did not know the cocaine was in his possession when it fell from his clothing. He testified that he had put a matchbox in his pocket thinking it contained matches.”
Apparently, the majority adopts this same “finding.”
The finding is absolutely accurate and is absolutely beside the point. The accused did so testify. Whether that testimony is true is an entirely different matter.
The parties stipulated that if a detective named Sheland were called he would testify to the accuracy of his report, which was received in evidence before the Trial Board. That report, which describes Sheland’s interview with the accused at the accused’s apartment some nine days after the incident in Judge Bonebrake’s anteroom, discloses that the accused first denied any memory of the matchbox falling from his clothing. After the detective reminded the accused that both a package of “zig-zags”2 and the matchbox were seen *409falling from his clothing, the accused (according to the exhibit)
“then said that the match box had been given to him earlier in the day. I followed up on that by asking who gave it to him and he then advised he picked it up off a coffee table. He remembered it was an older small match box and that now he remembered it was earlier on that day he had been at Paddy’s Restaurant, about 1st & Yamhill by his office in Portland and just found the box sitting on the table. He picked it up because he needed matches. He never did open the box and had no idea it held cocaine. [There follows the accused’s version of why he patted his pockets when he arose in Judge Bonebrake’s anteroom and how he noticed later in the day that he had seen his doctor and had noted that the “zig-zags” were missing.]
“I [detective Sheland] then reviewed his story as given and he advised that was what happened.
“I again asked if he was aware of the contents of the match box and he advised he was unaware. He also advised that at no time had he opened the box or touched any of the contents.”
In his testimony the accused “explained” what he felt to be discrepancies in the detective’s report. He testified that he told the detective that his visit to the doctor was earlier than the incident in the judge’s anteroom, but he did concede that he had told the detective that he had taken the matchbox from a table at Paddy’s. He testified:
“It says, T followed up on that day by asking who gave it to him and he then advised, he picked it up off a coffee table.’ Again, that is not a totally accurate reflection of our conversation. I told him that I had gone to Paddy’s for coffee and that upon leaving, and I can’t recall, I have so many of them and I can’t recall if I grabbed it from the bar. But what I evidently told him during the conversation was that I picked it up off the table. On each one of the individual tables, they usually have an ashtray and this is early in the morning. So, everything is clean and set for the day’s business. There is usually an ashtray with a box of matches inside the ashtray.
“And what I told him was that I had gone there for coffee and then when I left I picked it up off the table, out of the ashtray and table.
“In the context, like I described to you before, there is some language about, ‘It was an older, small matchbox.’ You’ve got to understand that when he came to my door and brought this to my attention, I was scared. I was frightened. *410And I was grasping for straws and certain things were going through my head. And that’s the part about the older matchbox. But, the thing that I want to point out in addition to that it says, ‘And now that he remembered it was early on that day, he had been at Paddy’s Restaurant,’ and I guess the only thing that I take objection to in regard to this report is that I was very specific with him about, you know, time and place and how this had occurred and that’s it’s written in terms of early or later. And then we get to the discrepancies like in regard to the visit to the doctor’s office and how these things just come out of order.”3
In fairness to the accused, I must note that he explained that his story to the detective was to protect his source in Seattle.
Apparently the majority believes the version that although he had obtained a matchbox in Seattle containing cocaine, he just didn’t know that box was in his clothing but thought it was in his automobile. I don’t know what version to believe. I do know that he testified that he advised his attorney that “I did in fact, have knowledge of the cocaine in the matchbox, but that I didn’t have any idea that I had that on my possession at the time.”
Apparently as a result of plea bargaining the accused decided to plead guilty to the “attempt” charge.
Under the version given before the Trial Board, the accused knew that he had some cocaine in a matchbox and knew the matchbox was in his automobile. In other words, he “knowingly” possessed cocaine. Under the version given by the accused to detective Sheland, he didn’t know he had cocaine at all, and one must wonder why he would plead guilty to an attempt “knowingly or intentionally” to possess cocaine. If the “Seattle” story is true, we know that he “knowingly” had possession of cocaine a very short time before the incident in Judge Bonebrake’s anteroom. For the purposes of this opinion, I shall assume, arguendo, that under the charge in this proceeding we are not permitted to go behind the conviction of an “attempt” and reach the question of whether he had *411possession of cocaine, a Class C felony.4 See ORS 9.527(2), providing that the record of the conviction shall be conclusive.
The majority has produced a truly brilliant review of both the weaknesses and strengths of the case law concerning when a crime involves moral turpitude. The majority’s reasoning from that review is seductive. Were we dealing here with legislatively proscribed conduct that, in itself, was not considered by the legislature to be socially less offensive than that to which the name “felony” should be applied, I might succumb. In the kind of misdemeanor here involved I cannot.
This conduct is only a misdemeanor because in the apparent reach of symmetry with respect to inchoate crimes the legislature decided to treat an attempt to commit a Class C felony as only a misdemeanor. The legislature has prescribed a general scheme that reduces attempts to commit specified classes of crimes from the classification of the crime itself to the next lower classification in the hierarchy of crimes. Although the crime attempted may be such as to warrant classification as a crime calling for heavy penalty, the attempt steps down the classification and, therefore, the penalty. ORS 161.405. That does not change the nature of the crime attempted.
Where we must decide whether an attempt to commit a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude, I believe that we must look to whether the felony itself would be a crime involving moral turpitude. The majority concludes that the crime of possession of cocaine is not a crime involving moral turpitude. I disagree, both in the abstract and in application to this particular case.
The majority relies on cases that concerned violation of the laws concerning “alcohol prohibition.” Each of those cases involved possession or manufacturing for personal use of alcohol. As the majority recognizes, those cases did not involve “trafficking” or sale of alcohol.
The majority relies on cases continuing the distinction “in our present era of [drug] prohibition.” The first case, *412State v. Harvey, 275 SC 225, 268 SE 2d 587 (1980), concerned whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask a defense alibi witness about the witness’ prior guilty plea to a charge of possession of marijuana. The rule of law was that a witness could not be impeached by specific acts of misconduct except for crimes involving moral turpitude. As the majority here states, the South Carolina court stated that “exhaustive research” had produced no decision that simple possession of marijuana was a crime involving moral turpitude. The court then held that simple possession was not a crime of moral turpitude. I suggest that the South Carolina court embarked on the wrong “exhaustive research.” That the court found no case holding that it was a crime involving moral turpitude is meaningless. It should have been looking for a case that held that simple possession of marijuana did not involve moral turpitude. True, State v. Harvey, supra, can now be accurately cited for the rule that simple possession of marijuana does not involve moral turpitude, but the basis of the decision is suspect.
The majority next relies on State v. Lilly, 278 SC 499, 299 SE 2d 329 (1983), for holding that simple possession is not a crime involving moral turpitude. That is what the court, in a per curiam opinion, said, not what it held. It held that possession with intent to distribute did involve moral turpitude. What it said was based on its own case of State v. Harvey, supra.
The next case is a decision by an intermediate court of appeals, Pearl v. Fla. Bd. of Real Estate, 394 So 2d 189 (Fla App 1981), a two-to-one decision involving revocation of a real estate salesman’s license. The majority states that the opinion “reviewed drug offense cases and observed that none of these held moral turpitude to be involved in the possession of controlled substances.” 299 Or at 403. My reading of the opinion tells me that the court first reviewed a group of Florida cases that had nothing to do with drug offenses. A second category of cases reviewed from other jurisdictions likewise were not drug offense cases. The third category reviewed by the Florida intermediate court of appeals found that certain crimes in certain states did involve moral turpitude:
Missouri: sale of opium.
*413California: physician’s failure to keep a record of narcotics dispensed to a known addict.
Texas: sale of morphine.
Arizona: sale of drugs for non-medical use.
The majority states that the Florida court could find no case in which possession constituted moral turpitude. The Florida court said no such thing.
The Florida court said:
“None of these authorities [above described] involves mere possession of drugs. The cited authorities persuade us that mere possession of a controlled substance is not a crime [involving moral turpitude].”
394 So 2d at 192. I nominate this for one of the outstanding non sequiturs of our time. Not one of those cases was concerned with the mere possession of a controlled substance. The true quest would be to find a case holding that mere possession did not involve moral turpitude. The Florida court majority went on to take into account the “totality of circumstances” and the finding (below) of treatment and rehabilitation. (The majority in the case at bar recognizes that such subsequent conduct has no bearing on the central question.) The court concluded that the purpose of the real estate licensing statutes was
“to insure the protection of the public from unscrupulous and dishonest real estate brokers. Its purpose is to guard against fraudulent real estate practices.”
394 So 2d at 192.
Although one purpose of Oregon law may be to protect the public from dishonest and unscrupulous attorneys, I sincerely hope the majority, by citing the Florida case, is not holding that that is the only purpose of our statutes and the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is true that the object of sanctions in attorney disciplinary cases is the protection of the public rather than punishment of the attorney, but the statutes and the Code of Professional Responsibility, in identifying conduct for which sanctions may be imposed, reaches further. In fact, the majority of the canons, which are part of the Code, as well as the Disciplinary Rules, are not directly concerned with dishonesty or unscrupulousness.
*414I am astonished by the majority’s reliance on the fourth case cited in the opinion, namely, In re Higbie, 6 Cal 3d 562, 493 P2d 97, 99 Cal Rptr 865 (1972). There the disciplinary proceeding arose out of the lawyer’s conviction on a guilty plea of failure to pay the federal transfer tax on transfer of marihuana (as it is known to the Feds). The lawyer was engaged in a scheme to smuggle marijuana from Mexico to California to help out a bunch of his Yuppie friends, who wanted to indulge their habit. He was actually involved in a smuggling operation but copped out to the tax offense.
“The United States Attorney’s motivation to reduce the charge apparently derived from the difficulty in proving respondent’s fraudulent intent and from the possible success of respondent’s establishing a defense of entrapment.”
493 P2d at 100. The court noted that the statute
“contains no requirement of wrongful intent or intent to defraud the government [and that] an individual may be convicted [of the federal crime of failure to pay the tax] by virtue of his possession of marijuana and his failure, however inadvertent, to pay the tax.”
493 P2d at 102. The court then held that because the statute did not require a showing of an intent to defraud, the failure to pay the tax (to which the lawyer had pleaded guilty) did not involve moral turpitude.
In its brief the California State Bar actually urged that, given the widespread use of marijuana today, only the use of marijuana for “illicit traffic” could be found to be conduct involving “moral turpitude as a matter of law.” 493 P2d at 103. The court agreed, stating that possession alone
“does not constitute ‘an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity . . . contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’ (In re Craig, supra, 12 Cal.2d at p. 97, 82 P.2d at p. 444), or indicate that an attorney is unable to meet the professional and fiduciary duties of his practice.”
493 P2d at 103. This is pure dictum; this was not a possession case. The court concluded that the attorney, although not motivated to defraud the government in the smuggling scheme, had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy that included conduct that did involve moral turpitude. The court suspended the lawyer from practice.
*415The majority, on the basis of these authorities, concludes that mere possession of “prohibited substances” does not involve moral turpitude but that trafficking in those substances would involve moral turpitude. This lumping together of all controlled substances conceals the fact that marijuana is truly different from such manufactured substances as heroin, cocaine, LSD, angel dust, methamphetamines, etc.
A person could easily grow a small quantity of marijuana exclusively for his own use. His possession of that marijuana (as distinguished from the growing stage) and consumption of it would not be a part of the trafficking which often takes place in marijuana. The same is not true with respect to the other controlled substances above named.
One who does not manufacture or produce heroin or cocaine but comes into possession of heroin or cocaine has necessarily obtained it as the final result of trafficking in drugs. Someone has produced the finished product. It has been distributed and sold. The ultimate purchaser is a part of that trafficking. Indeed, were it not for the ultimate purchaser, the whole, worldwide illicit traffic in substances such as cocaine would collapse. The purchaser at the very least must be regarded as fostering the illicit trafficking, which now consumes so much of society’s resources in attempting to eradicate the trafficking.
The three cases (two jurisdictions) decided by senior appellate courts on which the majority relies all involved marijuana. (We don’t know what substance was involved in the Florida case.) The case before us does not involve attempted possession of marijuana. It involves attempted possession of cocaine. I would hold that the knowing or intentional unlawful possession of cocaine involves moral turpitude and that the attempt to commit that felony is a crime involving moral turpitude.
I understand the majority to say by footnote 4 of its opinion that it does not today decide whether an attorney at law could be sanctioned for possession of any controlled substance in circumstances that would support a felony conviction, regardless of whether the attorney is prosecuted and convicted. I caution the members of the Oregon State Bar that *416“mere” possession, in a case properly charged in disciplinary proceedings, may result in sanctions.
I do not reach what would be the appropriate sanction in this case, but if the court could be persuaded to my point of view, the court would have to consider which of the accused’s versions of his acquisition of this cocaine is true, if any is true.
Peterson, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 ORS 161.405(l)(d) provides that an attempt to commit a Class C felony is a Class A misdemeanor.

 Although it is not entirely clear, I gather from other testimony that zig-zags are papers for rolling cigarettes.

 No elaboration is required to point out that this garbled version of what occurred at Paddy’s Restaurant is diametrically opposed to the testimony of the accused concerning his obtaining possession of the cocaine in Seattle.

 In In re Higbie, 6 Cal 3d 562, 493 P2d 97, 99 Cal Rptr 865 (1972), a case cited by the majority and discussed infra, the California court went behind the federal court conviction of failure to pay a tax and considered the actual facts that the lawyer had engaged in a conspiracy to smuggle marijuana.