Court Opinion

ID: 9965499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 17:01:09.583038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:08.182534
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13770    Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 05/02/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-13770
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       THOMAS F. SPELLISSY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:05-cr-00475-JDW-TGW-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 23-13770

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Thomas F. Spellissy, a former federal prisoner no longer in
       custody, appeals the district court’s order denying his pro se peti-
       tion for writ of error coram nobis. He argues that: (1) based on the
       Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Percoco v. United States, 598
       U.S. 319 (2023), and Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023),
       the conduct for which he was charged and convicted of is no
       longer proscribed; (2) his convictions are invalid based on McDon-
       nell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), and Skilling v. United
       States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), as he’s already argued in prior appeals;
       and (3) he was factually innocent because the government offered
       no evidence showing that he conspired to commit bribery, or
       honest-services wire fraud, to obtain money or property. After
       thorough review, we affirm.
              We review a district court’s denial of a petition for writ of
       error coram nobis for abuse of discretion, “keeping in mind that an
       error of law is an abuse of discretion per se.” United States v. Peter,
       310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).
              The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides federal
       courts with the authority to issue writs of error coram nobis. Unit-
       ed States v. Mills, 221 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2000). A writ of
       error coram nobis is a remedy to vacate a conviction and is availa-
       ble, unlike relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, when the petitioner has
       served his sentence and is no longer in custody. Peter, 310 F.3d at
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       23-13770               Opinion of the Court                         3

       712. The coram nobis writ is an extraordinary remedy that is only
       available “in compelling circumstances where necessary to
       achieve justice.” Mills, 221 F.3d at 1203.
               A court can only provide coram nobis relief if: (1) no other
       avenue of relief is available or has been available; and (2) the peti-
       tioner presents a fundamental error that made the proceedings
       irregular and invalid. Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734
       (11th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has told us that an error is
       sufficiently fundamental to make the proceedings irregular and
       invalid when, for example, “a defendant whose original sentence
       had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions
       secured without the assistance of counsel” -- in other words,
       where there was “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”
       United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 187 (1979). Similarly, a ju-
       risdictional error is, by its nature, of such a fundamental character
       as to render proceedings irregular and invalid; this is because
       “[w]hen a court without jurisdiction convicts and sentences a de-
       fendant, the conviction and sentence are void from their incep-
       tion and remain void long after a defendant has fully suffered
       their direct force.” Peter, 310 F.3d at 715 (quotations omitted).
             The coram nobis writ also requires that the alleged error
       must be one that has not been “put in issue or passed upon.”
       Moody v. United States, 874 F.2d 1575, 1576 (11th Cir. 1989). This
       requirement is consistent with the law-of-the-case doctrine, under
       which both district and appellate courts are generally bound to
       follow a prior appellate decision in the same case. Thomas v. Unit-
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-13770

       ed States, 572 F.3d 1300, 1303 (2009). The law-of-the-case doctrine
       “generally operates to preclude a reexamination of issues decided
       upon appeal, either by the district court on remand or by the ap-
       pellate court itself upon a subsequent appeal.” Westbrook v. Zant,
       743 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1984) (quotations omitted).
              Under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, it is illegal for any person to devise,
       or intend to devise, a scheme to defraud, or obtain money or
       property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, via wire.
       18 U.S.C. § 1343. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the term “scheme” in-
       cludes a scheme to deprive someone of the “intangible right of
       honest services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
               In Percoco, a private citizen was convicted of hon-
       est-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and
       1349, based on conduct that occurred during an 8-month break in
       his employment at the New York governor’s office. Percoco, 598
       U.S. at 322–23. During his hiatus, Percoco accepted a bribe from
       a real estate developer to assist the developer with obtaining state
       funding on a project. Id. at 323. At trial, the court instructed the
       jury that Percoco had a duty to provide honest services to the
       public if (1) he “dominated and controlled any governmental
       business,” and (2) government officials relied on him because of
       his special relationship with the government. Id. at 324–25. On
       certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id.
       at 333. It held that the district court’s jury instruction on the duty
       to provide honest services was erroneously vague, and the result-
       ing error was not harmless. Id. at 330–32. However, the Supreme
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       23-13770               Opinion of the Court                       5

       Court rejected Percoco’s argument that a private citizen can nev-
       er be convicted of honest-services fraud, reasoning that citizens
       can serve as agents of the government. Id. at 329. It explained
       that, because “an agent of the government has a fiduciary duty to
       the government and thus to the public it serves . . . individuals
       who are delegated authority to act on behalf of a public official
       and to perform government duties have a duty to provide honest
       services.” Id. at 329–30 (quotations omitted).
              In Ciminelli, the defendant, a private citizen, and others,
       were convicted of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1343,
       and conspiracy to commit the same under § 1349, based on a bid-
       rigging scheme that enabled Ciminelli’s construction company to
       win bids for state-funded projects, which were administered by a
       nonprofit organization. 598 U.S. at 310. In the operative indict-
       ment, and at trial, the government relied solely on the Second
       Circuit’s right-to-control theory of wire fraud, which enabled the
       government to establish wire fraud by showing that Ciminelli
       schemed to deprive a victim of “potentially valuable economic
       information necessary to make discretionary economic deci-
       sions.” Id. Consistent with that theory of liability, the district
       court instructed the jury that, under § 1343, the term “property”
       included “intangible interests, such as the right to control the use
       of one’s assets.” Id. at 311. Thus, the jury could find that Ci-
       minelli harmed the nonprofit’s right to control its assets if the
       nonprofit was deprived of “potentially valuable economic infor-
       mation that it would consider valuable in deciding how to use its
       assets.” Id.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-13770

               On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
       manded, holding that the Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory
       could not form the basis for a conviction of fraud under federal
       law because “[t]he right to valuable economic information needed
       to make discretionary economic decisions [wa]s not a traditional
       property interest.” Id. at 316–17. The Supreme Court, however,
       re-affirmed that the intangible right of honest services constituted
       a protected property interest, noting that Congress included the
       “intangible right of honest services” in 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Id. at
       313, 315.
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
       ing Spellissy’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. For starters,
       Spellissy’s arguments based on McDonnell and Skilling were previ-
       ously raised and rejected by this Court, and he has not shown ei-
       ther that controlling authority has since made a contrary decision,
       or that the previous decisions were clearly erroneous. See Thom-
       as, 572 F.3d at 1303; see also Westbrook, 743 F.2d at 768. As for
       Spellissy’s argument that he was factually innocent, he has not set
       forth any new evidence or cited any authority showing that the
       conduct, for which he was charged and convicted of, is no longer
       proscribed. See Peter, 310 F.3d at 711, 715.
               Moreover, we find no merit to Spellissy’s argument that
       Percoco and Ciminelli established a fundamental error rendering his
       criminal proceeding irregular or invalid, because Spellissy’s jury
       instructions did not contain the flawed instructions or legal theo-
       ries at issue in those cases. Unlike in Percoco, the jury at Spellissy’s
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       23-13770                Opinion of the Court                         7

       trial was not instructed that a private citizen could be convicted of
       honest-services wire fraud if he “dominated and controlled” gov-
       ernment business. Rather, Spellissy’s indictment alleged -- and
       the district court correctly found -- that William E. Burke, a pri-
       vate contractor employee to whom Spellissy made illegal pay-
       ments and who was an employee of a private contractor assigned
       to a division of the United States Special Operations Command,
       was a public official, acting on behalf of the Department of De-
       fense. See United States v. Spellissy, 710 F. App’x 392, 393 (11th Cir.
       2017) (unpublished); United States v. Spellissy, 243 F. App’x 550,
       550–51 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). Thus, the district court’s
       instruction -- that the definition of public official “includes an em-
       ployee of a private corporation who acts for or on behalf of the
       federal government pursuant to a contract” -- was in line with the
       traditional agency theory that Percoco expressly acknowledged as
       valid. 598 U.S. at 329–30. Further, the district court’s instruction
       that public officials “owe a duty to the public to act in the public’s
       best interest,” and if an official “makes his decision based on [his]
       own personal interests -- such as accepting a bribe -- the official
       has defrauded the public of the official’s honest services,” also
       conformed with the Supreme Court’s reasoning that agents of the
       government have a duty to provide honest services. Id. So, unlike
       in Percoco, Spellissy’s jury instructions did not violate his due pro-
       cess rights by being too vague. Id.
              Finally, unlike in Ciminelli, the government’s theory of lia-
       bility was not the right to control the right to “valuable economic
       information needed to make discretionary economic decisions”--
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       8                      Opinion of the Court               23-13770

       which the Supreme Court held was not a traditional property in-
       terest that could form the basis of a fraud conviction. See Ci-
       minelli, 598 U.S. at 316–17. Instead, Spellissy was charged and
       convicted of conspiring to bribe a public official in an attempt to
       deprive the public of the right to the official’s honest services.
       Contrary to Spellissy’s assertion, Ciminelli expressly recognized
       that the “intangible right of honest services” is a statutorily pro-
       tected property interest. 18 U.S.C. § 1346; Ciminelli, 598 U.S. at
       313, 315. Therefore, the jury instructions on honest services in
       Spellissy’s case provided the jury with the requisite clarity and
       guidance about what conduct was proscribed. See Percoco, 598
       U.S. at 331. And neither Percoco nor Ciminelli had the retroactive
       effect of rendering the conduct, for which Spellissy was charged
       and convicted of, non-criminal. See Peter, 310 F.3d at 711, 715.
             AFFIRMED.