Court Opinion

ID: 9787313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:14:35.660682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:54.623471
License: Public Domain

COATS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Almost all courts that have considered the question have held that Blakely v. Washington1 only applies retroactively to cases that were not yet final at the time of the Blakely decision. I would follow those decisions in order to avoid undue disruption with minimal benefits.
We are required to apply federal law in determining the retroactivity of the Blakely decision. As we pointed out in Haag v. State,2 "[the scope of the retroactivity of constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court is governed by federal law." 3 Under federal law, "a new rule for conduct of criminal prosecutions [applies] retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final."4 The parties *42to this case and most courts that have addressed the retroactivity of the Blakely decision agree that, under federal law, Teague v. Lanes5 governs the retroactive application of new rules to cases that are final when the new rule is announced.6 The overwhelming majority of courts have held that Blakely should not be applied retroactively to cases that were final at the time of the Blakely decision.7 I would follow this overwhelming precedent.
The Office of Public Advocacy, in an ami-cus brief, argues that even if we conclude that Blakely is not retroactive under federal law, we must separately determine if Blakely must be applied retroactively under state retroactivity law. But because Blakely is a federal decision, we are required to apply federal law to determine whether Blakely is retroactive. In my view, we would only be required to extend Blakely further under state law if we adopted the Blakely rule under the Alaska Constitution.
In general, the appellate courts of this state will consider adopting a new rule under the state's constitution only if the defendant can advance persuasive reasons for such a decision.8 Smart and Sobocienski have not advanced such an argument. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely, in State v. Malloy9 the Alaska Supreme Court considered the Apprendi v. New Jersey10 decision and did not see any inconsistency between the Apprendi holding and the pre-2005 presumptive sentencing provisions.11 Although this is a weak indication of what the Alaska Supreme Court might do, the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court did not see a conflict between Appren-di and the former sentencing provisions suggests that the supreme court would not favor adopting Blakely under the Alaska Constitution and applying Alaska law on retroactivity.
Alaska's presumptive sentencing structure, as set out in the former sentencing code, was adopted by the Alaska legislature to reduce unjustified disparity in the sentencing of criminal defendants and to make criminal sentencing a more fair and predictable process by limiting the sentencing judge's discretion.*4312 The former code did not apply presumptive sentencing to first-felony offenders convicted of class B and C felony offenses.13 First offenders convicted of class A felony offenses faced presumptive terms.14 The legislature required presumptive sentences for most repeat felony offenders.15 (Presumptive sentencing did not apply to murder and kidnaping offenses.)16 Once a defendant faced a presumptive sentence, a sentencing judge could deviate from the presumptive sentence only by finding one of many enumerated aggravating or mitigating factors or by referring the case to a three-judge panel.17
In Austin v. State,18 we attempted to carry out the legislature's express goal of having more uniformity in sentencing by extending the logic of presumptive sentencing to a first-felony offender convicted of a class C felony. Because Austin was a first-felony offender, to whom presumptive sentencing did not apply, the sentencing judge was legally authorized to sentence him up to the 5-year maximum sentence without finding any aggravating factors. In Austin, we concluded that, since a second felony offender would face a presumptive sentence of 2 years of imprisonment, it would be illogical for the sentencing judge to sentence a first-felony offender to more than the presumptive term for a see-ond-felony offender unless the sentencing judge found that the case was exceptional.19
In State v. Jackson,20 we used a similar analysis in setting out sentencing guidelines for first-felony offenders convicted of class B felonies. Again, the former code did not apply presumptive sentencing to first-felony offenders who were convicted of class B felonies. But we set out sentencing guidelines based upon the logic of presumptive sentencing and our decision in Austin.21 The purpose of the Austin and Jackson decisions was to carry out the legislative goal of making sentencing more logical, uniform, and fair by limiting and directing the judge's sentencing discretion.
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, held that "any [disputed] fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."22 In Blakely, the Court clarified that judges' discretion in sentencing reaches only the maximum sentence that can be proved solely on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.23 Under our former sentencing code the sentencing judge was not authorized to exceed an applicable presumptive term of imprisonment unless the State proved aggravating factors.24 The former sentencing code required that aggravating factors be proved to the sentencing judge by clear and convincing evidence.25 This sentencing scheme violated Blakely because Blakely required any fact (other than a prior conviction) that raised the maximum sentence that the defendant faced to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.26
The majority concludes that the primary reason to apply Blakely retroactively is because the defendant was deprived of his right to have the State prove an aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. But it is unlikely that there are many cases where a judge *44would have found an aggravator by clear and convincing evidence but would not have found it under the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. And, under our decision in Cleveland v. State,27 the judge would only have to find one aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt to comply with Blakely. After that, the judge could find all other aggrava-tors by clear and convincing evidence.28
There are many aggravating factors, and some are almost always present for some offenses. For instance, in almost every case of manslaughter a defendant will have "employed a dangerous instrument in furtherance of the offense.29 This aggravator will almost always be present, and, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, will satisfy Blakely. Similarly, a defendant who commits a foreible sexual assault will almost always cause physical injury to his victim, another aggravating factor.30 So this aggravator will be present in almost every case and the case will comply with Blakely.
In our former sentencing decisions, we pointed out that when an aggravator is almost always present in an offense, it should only be used to increase the defendant's sentence in unusual cases.31 But after Blakely, these aggravating factors that are almost always present for a particular offense will satisfy Blakely and will allow the court to find other aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence.
When we apply Blakely retroactively, the result is that in some cases, such as manslaughter and forcible sexual assault, Blakely will be satisfied in almost every case. In other cases the State will have to prove an aggravator long after the offense. Defendants who conceded aggravating factors at their original sentencing can claim that they would not have conceded had they known they were entitled to a jury trial. In those cases where the aggravating factors must now be proved to a jury, the State will face some difficult decisions about whether it is worth reopening those cases, assuming that the evidence and witnesses are still available.
The State has made charging decisions and courts have imposed sentences based upon the sentencing laws that were in effect at the time the sentence was imposed. These decisions might have been very different if the Blakely decision had been foreseeable. Sentencing aggravators that the State might have been able to prove easily at the time of the defendant's original sentencing might now be difficult or impossible to prove in a jury trial conducted years later. 'The State might be in a position of having to call crime victims, long after the event, to testify about an incident that the victims have put behind them. By making Blakely retroactive, we are not advancing an important constitutional principle. We are creating a major administrative problem. Whether a person gets his sentence reduced may turn more on good fortune than anything else. It seems to me that the overwhelming majority of courts that have declined to extend Blakely retroactively have concluded that retroactively changing the law that applies to sentencing would be unfair and unduly disruptive. I would follow this overwhelming majority.

. 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 LEd.2d 403 (2004).

. 117 P.3d 775 (Alaska App.2005).

. Id. at 783 (citing American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2330, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). See also Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or. 379, 84 P.3d 133, 136-37 (2004) (utilizing Teague in reference to Appren-di's retroactivity); State v. Gomez, 163 SW.3d 632, 650-51 (Tenn.2005) (holding that application of Blakely is dictated by federal law).

. Haag, 117 P.3d at 783 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)).

. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 LEd.2d 334 (1989). «

. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522, 159 LBd.2d 442 (2004). The federal appellate courts have universally used Teague in determining that Blakely is not retroactive. See In re Zambrano, 433 F.3d 886, 888 (D.C.Cir.2006); United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir.2005); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (Oth Cir.2005); Never Misses A Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.2005); Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 613 (3rd Cir.2005); Cirilo-Munoz v. United States, 404 F.3d 527, 532 (1st Cir.2005); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir.2005); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 867 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 846 (10th Cir.2005); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir.2005); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.2005). Of the state courts that have considered Blakely, some have determined that Teague controls the retroactivity of this federal constitutional question. See In re Consiglio, 128 Cal.App.4th 511, 27 Cal.Rpir.3d 167, 169 (2005); State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 2005). Some state courts have utilized Teague because their state has adopted Teague as its own retroactivity test. See State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 115 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct.App.2005); State v. Wenzinger, P.3d --, -- 2006 WL 1493802 at *4 (Colo.Ct.App.2006). And other state courts have used Teague as the federal retroactivity test, while reserving the right to use their own state retroactivity principles to treat Blakely as a question of state law. See State v. Evans, 154 Wash.2d 438, 114 P.3d 627, 633 (2005).

. See Zambrano, 433 F.3d at 889; Gentry, 432 F.3d at 605; Morris, 429 F.3d at 69; Payne, 414 F.3d at 1036; Never Misses A Shot, 413 F.3d at 783; Lloyd, 407 F.3d at 613; Cirilo-Munoz, 404 F.3d at 533; Guzman, 404 F.3d at 141; Varela, 400 F.3d at 867; Price, 400 F.3d at 846; Hum-phress, 398 F.3d at 860; McReynolds, 397 F.3d at 481; Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273-74; Consiglio, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d at 170; Evans, 114 P.3d at 633; Langford v. State, 929 So.2d 598, 600 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.2006); Smith v. State, 922 So.2d 43, 46 (Miss.Ct.App.2006).

. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999).

. 46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002).

. 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 LEd.2d 435 (2000).

. Malloy, 46 P.3d at 957.

. See Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 829-33 (Alaska App.1982), modified and superseded on other grounds, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska App.1983).

. Id. at 830; former AS 12.55.125(d) and (e) (pre-March 2005 version).

. Former AS 12.55.125(c).

. Juneby, 641 P.2d at 830.

. Former AS 12.55.125(a).

. Juneby, 641 P.2d at 831.

. 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska App.1981).

. Id. at 658.

. 776 P.2d 320 (Alaska App.1989).

. Id. at 326-27.

. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.

. 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. at 2537.

. Former AS 12.55.155(a) and (D.

. Former AS

. Haag, 117 P.3d at 782.

. 143 P.3d 977 (Alaska App.2006).

. Id. at 987.

. See AS 12.44.155(c)(4); Krasovich v. State, 731 P.2d 598, 601 (Alaska App.1987).

. See AS 12.55.155(c)(1); Woods v. State, 667 P.2d 184, 187-88 (Alaska 1983).

. Krasovich, 731 P.2d at 603; Woods, 667 P.2d at 187-88.