Court Opinion

ID: 9792981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:40:22.29908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:09.730643
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
On petition for rehearing, en banc, with Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice Hodges not participating. Mr. Justice Groves delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant was sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act, the jury having found that he had been thrice previously convicted of felonies. The record disclosed that, as to one of these convictions (in New Mexico), he was without counsel at the time of sentencing. We announced an opinion on March 22, 1971, reversing and remanding to the trial court for resentencing under the authority of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). Under the remand the court was not to consider the New Mexico conviction.
Thereafter the Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing presenting the point that the matter of sentencing was not a part of the “conviction,” contemplated by our Habitual Criminal Act, C.R.S. 1963, 39-13-1 et seq. Without acting upon the petition for rehearing, we withdrew the original opinion and an opinion written by District Judge Robert Miller was announced on April 12, 1971. This basically accepted the Attorney General’s position and affirmed the sentence of the trial court.
The defendant then filed a petition for rehearing, calling attention to the fact that the question of whether the sentence was a part of the “conviction” was first raised on the Attorney General’s petition for rehearing and the defendant had not had an opportunity to present his argument on the point. We granted the defendant’s petition for rehearing and briefs have been filed on the isssue.
The only matter now presented, which we have not previously considered, is the effect of Crim. P. 32(c) which provides in part, “A judgment of conviction shall *263consist of a recital of the plea, the verdict or findings, the sentence, and cost[s] if any are awarded against the defendant.” Our Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1961. Our Habitual Criminal Act was adopted in 1945. It does not use the term “judgment of conviction,” but rather refers to previous “conviction” and persons previously “convicted.”
We, therefore, must determine the legislative intent in using the term. Since the rule definition of “judgment of conviction” was not in existence at the time the General Assembly adopted the Habitual Criminal Act, we are convinced that the legislature in employing the words “conviction” and “convicted” intended to use them in their popular sense, i.e., a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty.
“In the restricted or technical legal sense in which it is sometimes used, the word ‘conviction’ includes the status of being guilty of, and sentenced for, a criminal offense, whether that status is established after confession of guilt by a guilty plea or after determination by a jury verdict upon an assertion of innocence. Stated otherwise technically the word means the final consummation of the prosecution against the accused including the judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to an ascertainment of his guilt.
“In its general and popular sense and frequently in its ordinary legal sense, the word ‘conviction’ is used in the sense of establishment of guilt prior to and independently of judgment and sentence by a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty. [Citing cases.]” State v. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1970).
The opinion written by Judge Miller as announced on April 12, 1971, is adhered to and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.