Court Opinion

ID: 9516921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:56:09.360198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:08.450167
License: Public Domain

JACK CARTER, J.;
concurring:
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a due-process violation is shown in this setting
when the defendant can establish “actual prejudice,” not just the threat of possible prejudice to his rights by virtue of the district attorney’s prior representation. Actual prejudice would occur, for example, if:
1. the prosecuting attorney has previously personally represented the defen*474dant in “a substantially related matter”; and
2. the prosecuting attorney obtained “confidential” information by virtue of that prior representation which was used to the defendant’s disadvantage.
Landers v. State, 256 S.W.3d 295, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).
We have found that the prosecutor previously represented Leslie Gene Goodman in a substantially related matter and obtained confidential information by virtue of that prior representation. The only remaining matter is whether the confidential information was used to the defendant’s disadvantage. If one must prove the prosecutor actually presented in open court during the trial evidence that demonstrates the use of a confidential communication, there will be no prosecutorial disqualifications in the State of Texas. It would take a particularly dull prosecutor to place into the trial record evidence demonstrating that he or she “used” the confidential information. Lawyers, including prosecuting attorneys, “use” information in a myriad of ways — most of which do not find their way into the trial record.
First, a prosecuting attorney has an enormous amount of discretion about which cases to pursue and uses whatever information, from whatever source, to make such prosecutorial decisions. If an indictment is filed, judgments about guilty pleas and the terms thereof allow a prosecutor to use whatever knowledge or information obtained by any source, including confidential information from a previous client. During the selection of a jury, lawyers routinely use information acquired by their own experiences, conversations, or possibly confidential communications. During the course of the trial, the prosecutor may use information, known only to the prosecutor, to prompt a line of direct or cross-examination. Witnesses may be found based on personal or confidential information. This is only a small number of the many ways lawyers might use confidential information in trial prosecution to a defendant’s disadvantage. Needless to say, none of this will be reflected in the trial record.
The point is that requiring actual proof in the record that such confidential information is “used to the disadvantage of the defendant” is virtually an impossible burden. In this case, we have found that Goodman has not directed us to “evidence or testimony” that shows he was actually prejudiced by the prosecutor’s previous representation of him. That burden of proof is not required in Texas civil cases where the stakes only involve money or property, but in criminal cases, where personal liberty is involved, we now require far greater proof for disqualification of the state attorney.12 It is true that prosecuting attorneys are elected officials, but a prosecutor is first an attorney subject to the same rules of conduct as all other attorneys and duty bound to uphold the integrity of legal proceedings. The rationale for the distinction between civil and criminal cases in Texas is that in civil cases, there is no necessity to prove that a due process violation occurred. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, *475213 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (“But there is no requirement in the civil context that the failure to disqualify counsel must rise to the level of a due-process violation.”). Unquestionably, when a due process violation is demonstrated, the prosecutor must be disqualified and error is apparent, but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a due process violation is the only instance in which a prosecutor should be disqualified. The requirement to prove a due process violation is one we have chosen to impose in Texas criminal cases even though that burden is not required in Texas civil cases or in criminal cases in several other states.
In Reaves v. State, 574 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla.1991), the Florida Supreme Court held that a conviction must be reversed if the trial court denies a pretrial defense motion to disqualify a prosecutor who previously has represented the defendant in any criminal matter that involved or likely involved confidential communications with the same client.
The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Stenger, 111 Wash.2d 516, 760 P.2d 357 (1988), held that the prosecuting attorney’s prior representation of a first degree murder defendant in unrelated criminal matters while the attorney was in private practice required disqualification of the attorney from participation in this death penalty murder prosecution, where the defendant had confided uncharged crimes, drug use, and anti-social behavior to the attorney during the prior representation. The court concluded that there were matters which could influence the attorney’s discretion to seek the death penalty.
The Arizona Supreme Court disciplined an attorney who formerly represented the defendant in three DUI cases and then prosecuted him in another DUI case. According to the court, the attorney’s conduct in prosecuting his former client created a substantial danger that confidential information revealed in the course of the attorney-client relationship would be used against the client by his former attorney. In re Ockrassa, 165 Ariz. 576, 799 P.2d 1350 (1990).
Other cases involved the same difficulty as presented here — the prosecuting attorney represented the defendant in prior cases wherein the defendant was convicted and those convictions are used to enhance punishment in the present case. The Indiana Supreme Court considered the enhancement allegations to be substantially related to the present prosecution and noted “that even though the defendant’s prior convictions were a matter of public record, it could not be said “without speculation that the prosecutor’s knowledge of these prior cases will not actually result in prejudice to defendant.” State v. Tippecanoe County Court, 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (Ind. 1982); see also State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 210 W.Va. 307, 557 S.E.2d 361, 370 (2001) (“[T]he circumstance we face here, where the prosecutor represented the defendant in connection with the predicate convictions, simply raises too great a danger that a client’s confidences may be betrayed. The Court therefore holds that a prosecutor is disqualified from representing the State in a recidivist proceeding ... where such lawyer acted as defense counsel in connection with the prior felony convictions that are the basis for such proceeding.”).13
We cannot expect a system of justice that is perfect and at all times achieves a just result. But the machinery of our criminal justice system should be struc*476tured, as much as is reasonably possible, to accomplish that goal. One of the ingredients of justice is that the trial “must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). Requiring a high standard of conduct for the administrators of our judicial system is a small price to pay to achieve justice.
With these comments, but also recognizing controlling precedent, I concur with the majority opinion.

. The Texas Supreme Court has held in civil cases that disqualification of counsel may only occur when "the matters embraced within the pending suit are substantially related to the factual matters involved in the previous suit.... Sustaining this burden requires evidence of specific similarities capable of being recited in the disqualification order. If this burden can be met, the moving party is entitled to a conclusive presumption that confidences and secrets were imparted to the former attorney.” NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989) (citations omitted).

. Admittedly, Texas is not the only state to require a showing of a due process violation. See Landers, 256 S.W.3d 295 (summarizing other jurisdictions with similar holdings).