Court Opinion

ID: 9768300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:55:00.167749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:36.369495
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion not only severely restrains the legislative intent of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 9.32 and 9.33, it enacts a rule of defense of third persons that will in large measure place the actor/defendor in peril for his actions. It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended this result. I will lay out what I believe to be the correct analysis of this legal issue.
Both my analysis and the majority analysis agree that the actor/defendor must believe that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person. Where we part ways is in the area of the actor/ defendor’s belief concerning retreat. The majority would have the actor/defen-dor reasonably believe that a reasonable person in the third person’s shoes would not retreat (the majority opinion uses the past tense — would not have retreated — but the problem is better analyzed in the present tense the actor believed when he took the action). My analysis would have the actor/defendant reasonably believe that he cannot retreat and still preserve the safety of the third party. The State of course would have the actor/defendant believe that he himself would have to be threatened with unlawful deadly force before he could aid a third person being similarly threatened — an analysis rejected by everyone concerned.
At the time the instant offense was committed, Section 9.32 provided:
A person is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 of this code;
(2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated; and
(3) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:
(A) to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other’s imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, rape, aggravated rape, robbery, or aggravated robbery.
In 1983, subsection (3)(B) was amended to substitute the term “rape” with the term “sexual assault.”
Section 9.33 provides:
A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third person if:
(1) under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 of this code in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and
(2) the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.
Initially, I recognize that an apparent conflict exists between the statutes. In self-defense involving the use of deadly force, the Section 9.32 duty to retreat may be logically and successfully coupled with the required belief that such force is immediately necessary to prevent the other’s unlawful use of deadly force; viz., if there is no immediate need for the use of deadly force in self-defense, then retreat must also *570be reasonable. Though not synonymous, these two requirements, retreat and immediate need for use of deadly force, complement each other throughout the various scenarios that unfold in self-defense against deadly force situations.
These two requirements, however, become paradoxical when applied to situations involving use of deadly force in defense of a third party. Section 9.33 seems to require that a protector choose between retreating from an altercation that he has not even entered into or saving someone in that altercation whose life is in danger. Thus, a conflict arises. In order to resolve this apparent conflict, a brief discussion of the concept of the duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly force in a self-defense situation is necessary.
Prior to the January 1, 1974, the effective date of the new penal code, there was no duty to retreat appended to the right of self-defense, and in some cases, specific statutory references dispensed with such a duty. See Article 1225, V.A.P.C. (1925). See also Stemlight v. State, 540 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases cited therein at 705.
The new penal code took a completely different course, codified the old common law, and provided that use of deadly force was justified only if the actor could not have reasonably retreated. Worded differently:
“if the actor may retreat in complete safety [to himself], then the use of defensive force is not necessary.”
Vol. II, Section 131(c), Criminal Law Defenses, Robinson (1984), p. 80. In Crimes of Violence, Section 612, Bailey and Roth-blatt (1973), p. 480-81, the writers state:
“ ... retreat need not be attempted when to do so will not diminish or will, in fact, increase the peril.”
In Vol. I, Section 235, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957), states at pages 509-15:
“These courts [that impose a duty to retreat] hold that before the right to kill in self-defense may be claimed, the defendant must have retreated either as far as he could, by reason of some wall, ditch or other impediment, or as far as the fierceness of the assault would permit him ... [which indicates] ... a retreat to the limits of personal safety.” (emphasis supplied).
Of course the relevant “safety” is that of the actor: if the actor may secure his own personal safety by retreat, then such retreat is necessary and the use of deadly force to protect one’s self will not be justified.
With this rule of retreat for one’s own personal safety in mind, I will address the apparent conflict in the present statutory scheme. Under Sec. 9.33, the actor’s use of deadly force in defense of a third person must be justified under Sec. 9.32, before the use of such force is permitted. Under Sec. 9.32, the actor has the duty to retreat if he can do so in complete safety. Thus, an actor is justified in using deadly force in defense of another only if he could not have reasonably retreated to prevent harm to himself.
As urged by appellant, and as found by the Tyler and Waco Courts of Appeals, this construction eliminates any useful application of the justification for use of deadly force in defense of another. As stated in Crawford v. State, 629 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex.App. — Waco, 1982, no pet.)
“ ... [The manner in which the statutes are worded] would require one who perceives another under attack by unlawful force, and believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to prevent the attack, to simply walk away if he can reasonably do so without injury to himself and leave the victim to the whims of the assailant.” (emphasis supplied)
Given this conflict, we are called upon to determine whether the statutes may be reconciled. Under Tex.Gov.Code Ann., § 311.-011 (Vernon’s 1986), this Court is required to read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of common usage. Under Sec. 311.023, in construing ambiguous statutes, we may *571consider, among other factors, the following:
(1) the object sought to be attained;
(2) any common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; and,
(3) the consequences of a particular construction.
The object of justifying the use of deadly force in self-defense is to guarantee the right of self-defense to persons facing deadly force attack by someone else. “One who is attacked may repel force with force in order to protect himself.” 21 Tex.Jur.3d Rights of Accused § 1712 (1982), and cases cited in footnote 46 at p. 566. Thus, the law permits a person to protect himself, even to the point of killing the aggressor, if he or she must do so to protect his or her own life.
Similarly, the object of justifying the use of deadly force in defense of a third person is to allow the actor to protect the victim from deadly force attack by the aggressor, unfettered by fear of legal reprisal. “The ordinary doctrine is that whatever one may do for himself he may do for another....” Id. Thus, the use of deadly force is permitted in order to preserve the life of a third party.
With regard to the use of deadly force, these two objectives are counterbalanced by society’s interest in the preservation of life: deadly force may be used only if there is no other reasonable option that will preserve the safety of the person under attack. Professor Robinson, in Criminal Law Defenses, supra, states:
“ ... [T]he protection of life has such a high place in a proper scheme of social values that the law cannot permit conduct which places life in jeopardy, when the necessity for doing so can be avoided by the sacrifice of the much smaller value that inheres in standing up to an aggression.”
Id. at 84-5. In order to preserve the valud of life, the legislature requires that, prior to the use of deadly force in self-defense, the :actor must not have had a reasonable opportunity to retreat.
At this juncture, the conflict in the statutes becomes troublesome. Certainly, when a person is himself under attack by deadly force, prior to using deadly force in self-defense he must retreat if he can do so without unreasonable risk to his own personal safety. As discussed earlier, and as urged by the State, Sec. 9.33 seems to require that when a person is faced with deadly force attack upon a third party, that person must likewise retreat if he can do so without unreasonable risk to his own personal safety. Obviously, this construction does not serve to effectuate the object . of Sec. 9.33, which is to encourage persons to act in defense of others. This reading also presents an inherent conflict of duty within Sec. 9.33 itself by simultaneously requiring retreat from a situation where deadly force is immediately required to save the third party’s life, but where the actor (not being the object of the attack) is in no danger at all.
Given the previous rules of construction, we must determine whether there is another interpretation of the statutory language which will effectuate the object of the statutes without requiring, as did the Waco and Tyler Courts of Appeals, that part of one statute be declared in fatal conflict with the other. Fortunately in this case, such an interpretation is possible.
The object of Sec. 9.32 is self-defense. This objective, however, must not be obtained at the unnecessary cost of human life. Thus, if the actor facing deadly force attack can reasonably retreat and not exercise deadly force in counter attack, the actor is required to do so. His safety is preserved, and so is the life of the attacker. Similarly, the object of Sec. 9.33 is preservation of the life of the third party. If that objective may be obtained without the use of deadly force, then the actor must take such action.
Based upon these goals and considerations, I would therefore hold that the retreat requirement of Sec. 9.32 is to apply to Sec. 9.33 in the following manner: where the circumstances raise the possibility of *572use of deadly force in defense of a third party, and if the actor may retreat and still ■preserve the safety of the third party he or she seeks to protect, then the actor must retreat and not exercise deadly force against the attacker. The standard of maintaining the safety of the third person is the same standard as that of maintaining one’s own personal safety in self-defense. This construction accommodates the objective of Sec. 9.33, which is to preserve the life of the person under attack, and balances that objective with society’s interest in always avoiding the unnecessary loss of human life, in this case, that of the attacker. To the extent that Crawford, supra, is in conflict, it should be overruled.
Moreover, this construction does not require elimination of the statutory language. The Waco and Tyler Courts of Appeals simply deleted the retreat requirement from Sec. 9.33, finding that including such a duty did not make sense. Other authorities support such a deletion.1
Appellate courts are required, however, to strive to interpret statutes without changes to the particular wording, and with an eye for reconciling possible conflicts whenever possible. We are guided by Tex.Gov.Code Ann., § 311.021 (Vernon’s 1986), titled “Intention in Enactment of Statutes”, which states;
In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
(1) compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended;
(2) the entire statute is intended to be effective;
(3) a just and reasonable result is intended;
(4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and
(5) public interest is favored over private interest.
This construction, as set forth above, resolves the conflict with no change to the wording of the statutes by applying the reasons supporting the retreat requirement to the object of the particular statute. In Sec. 9.32, the object is preservation of ones own life, and in Sec. 9.33, the object is preservation of the third party’s life. This interpretation better reflects the legislative intention presumptions set forth above from the Government Code. Such a construction is, therefore, more acceptable under statutory construction rules.
The majority analysis, requiring that the actor believe that a reasonable person in the third person’s situation would not retreat, sounds nice and neat at first blush. It works well in one of the possible scenarios; where the actor believes the third person needn’t retreat and in fact does not. But what of the situation where the actor isn’t sure the third person can or should retreat? It is quite foreseeable that an actor would have sufficient facts perceived to believe deadly force is immediately necessary, but not have facts to evaluate whether the third person should retreat (an entirely different matter). What of the situation where the actor thinks the third person should retreat but that person doesn’t? Must the actor stand by and watch until the situation (as he perceives it — not as the third person perceives it) changes? What about the situation where the actor believes the third person needn’t retreat but that person is in fact retreating? Under the majority’s holding there is no answer to these scenarios that effectuates the clear legislative intent manifested by § 9.32 and § 9.33. — protection of third persons against unlawful deadly force. Rather, the majority stifles the contemplated action of an actor.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
W.C. DAVIS, J., joins.

. McClung’s Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice (revised edition, 1983), contains the following statement on page 328:
"Do not include the duty to retreat in the charge on defense of a third person. It would be most inconsistent to give a person the right to defend a third person, but require him, as a reasonable man, to run before defending the third person. See Crawford v. State, 629 SW (2) 165 (Waco App); Dobbs 100 SW 946.”