Court Opinion

ID: 9960138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:00:59.384772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:13.217919
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11977   Document: 36-1    Date Filed: 04/15/2024   Page: 1 of 26

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-11977
                         ____________________

        RJ’S INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CROWN CASTLE SOUTH, LLC,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee,

        AT&T CORP.,

                                                           Defendant.

                         ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11977

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-25162-CMA
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               This case involves a property and contract dispute between
        RJ’s International Trading, LLC (“RJI”), and Crown Castle South,
        LLC (“Crown Castle”). The central issue in this case is whether,
        under Florida law, a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision can
        be interpreted as a real covenant such that it runs with the land and
        binds non-signatories. The district court concluded that it cannot,
        reasoning that an attorney’s fee provision does not touch and con-
        cern the land. RJI timely appealed that decision to this Court.
               The Florida Supreme Court, which is the final arbiter of
        Florida law, has not published a decision addressing this question,
        and the Florida intermediate appellate courts, in addressing analo-
        gous issues, have reached different conclusions. Given the uncer-
        tainty we face, principles of comity and federalism suggest that the
        Florida Supreme Court, and not this Court, should decide this issue
        of Florida law. See Steele v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1061
        (11th Cir. 2022); WM Mobile Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid
        Waste Auth., 972 F.3d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2020). We therefore
        respectfully certify the issues of Florida law discussed below to the
        Florida Supreme Court.
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        22-11977                Opinion of the Court                          3

           I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                To understand the dispute between RJI and Crown Castle,
        we must look back a few decades in the property’s history. In 1992,
        BellSouth Mobility, Inc., entered into a land lease agreement with
        Hidden Valley Corporation. Under their agreement, BellSouth
        agreed to use the property located at 9690 S.W. 170th Street, Mi-
        ami, Florida, (the “Property”) for the purpose of constructing,
        maintaining, and operating a communication facility. The lease
        provided “nonexclusive rights for ingress and egress . . . for the in-
        stallation and maintenance of utility wires, cables, conduits, and
        pipes over, under or along a twenty foot wide right of way.”
                In 1993, Hidden Valley executed, for BellSouth’s beneﬁt, a
        Grant of Non-Exclusive Easement Agreement (the “Easement
        Agreement”) “for utilities and vehicular and pedestrian ingress and
        egress over, across[,] and upon the Easement Property,” and “over,
        across, and upon the Easement Property for the purpose of . . .
        [c]onstructing, maintaining, repairing and replacing paved areas for
        vehicular and pedestrian ingress to and egress from the Beneﬁtted
        Property[ ] and . . . [c]onstructing, maintaining, and replacing util-
        ity facilities.” Later that year, RJ International Trading, Inc., bought
        the Property subject to the Easement Agreement.
               The Easement Agreement also includes the following fee
        provision:
                The parties hereto shall each have the right to enforce
                the terms of this Easement and the rights and obliga-
                tions created herein by all remedies provided under
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11977

              the laws of the State of Florida, including, without
              limitation, the right to sue for damages for breach or
              for injunction or for speciﬁc performance. In the
              event that it is necessary for either party hereto to ﬁle
              suit in order to enforce the terms hereof, then the pre-
              vailing party in such suit shall be entitled to receive
              reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs in addition
              to any other award that the court might make, from
              the non-prevailing party.
               In 1999, Crown Castle’s predecessor-in-interest, Crown Cas-
        tle South, Inc., subleased the Property from BellSouth. The Sub-
        lease Agreement granted to Crown Castle South, Inc.,
              the nonexclusive rights of ingress to and egress from
              the entire Adjoining Site, and access to the entire
              Tower and all Improvements (including any and all
              easements), at such times (on a 24-hour, seven (7) day
              per week basis), to such extent, and in such means and
              manner (on foot or by motor vehicle) as the Transfer-
              ring Entity deems necessary or desirable for its full
              use and enjoyment of the Reserved Space.
        In 2005, RJ International Trading, Inc., conveyed the property to
        RJI. In 2019, Crown Castle—the Appellant and the successor-in-
        interest to Crown Castle South, Inc.,—entered into a license agree-
        ment with Crown Castle Fiber LLC, under which the latter could
        “install, operate and maintain the Equipment at the Site within the
        Licensed Space.” This “Equipment” includes cables, wires, ﬁber,
        conduit, and other related hardware and software.
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                          5

                To summarize: when the facts that gave rise to this case oc-
        curred, RJI owned the property and leased it to BellSouth. Bell-
        South, in turn, subleased the property to Crown Castle, which then
        licensed its affiliate, Crown Castle Fiber LLC, to install and operate
        communications equipment on the property. This dispute, there-
        fore, lies between a subsequent purchaser (RJI) from the original
        grantor (Hidden Valley) on the one hand, and a sublessee (Crown
        Castle) of the original grantee (BellSouth) on the other.
                In February 2020, Crown Castle excavated a portion of the
        Property without RJI’s notice or consent and installed fiber-optic
        cables beneath and beyond the Easement. RJI told Crown Castle
        that the fiber-optic installation exceeded the Easement. Then, in
        December 2020, RJI sued for declaratory judgment, breach of the
        Easement Agreement, unjust enrichment, trespass, and injunctive
        relief.
               The district court dismissed the counts for declaratory judg-
        ment and injunctive relief, and Crown Castle eventually moved for
        summary judgment on the three remaining claims against it:
        breach of the Easement Agreement, unjust enrichment, and tres-
        pass. RJI, for its part, ﬁled a cross-motion for partial summary judg-
        ment on the issues of liability and equitable relief for its claims for
        breach of the Easement Agreement and trespass.
               For our purposes, we need only recount the district court’s
        treatment of RJI’s claim for breach of the Easement Agreement.
        The district court found that a valid Easement Agreement existed,
        creating an easement appurtenant that runs with the land and
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11977

        binds successors-in-interest and that could be enforced against a
        third-party non-signatory. The district court further concluded
        that the Easement Agreement did not contemplate underground
        rights, but rather only “a non-exclusive easement over, across and
        upon” the easement property. Having found Crown Castle liable
        for a breach, the district court denied Crown Castle’s motion for
        summary judgment as to breach of the Easement Agreement and
        granted RJI’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and eq-
        uitable relief for breach of the Easement Agreement, reserving the
        question of non-nominal damages for a jury. 1
               At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict award-
        ing: $1.00 for the breach of easement claim; $40,000.00 for the tres-
        pass claim; $637.74 for the unjust enrichment claim (which RJI
        opted to forgo in favor of retaining the breach of Easement Agree-
        ment remedies); and no punitive damages. The district court en-
        tered ﬁnal judgment in RJI’s favor, ﬁnding RJI was entitled to an
        additional $5,606.20 in prejudgment interest. It also declined to en-
        ter a permanent injunction in favor of RJI.
               We now reach the issues that gave rise to this appeal. After
        the district court entered ﬁnal judgment (which Crown Castle did
        not appeal), RJI moved for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party
        pursuant to the Easement Agreement’s fee provision.

        1 The district court later vacated its grant of equitable relief—an injunction

        requiring Crown Castle to remove the fiber-optic cables—and reserved the
        issue for trial.
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                          7

                RJI’s argument was relatively straightforward: RJI asserted
        that it was a prevailing party and that the Easement Agreement
        provides for “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs . . . from the non-
        prevailing party.” RJI contended that “the covenant running with
        the land clause states the easement agreement and its provisions
        inured for the beneﬁt of successors in interest” and that “[t]hus, RJI
        and Crown Castle had a right to enforce the agreement.” This co-
        vers, in RJI’s view, the fee provision’s use of the phrase “the parties
        hereto.”
               The district court denied the motion for entitlement to fees,
        reasoning that the fee provision was a personal covenant (and not
        a real covenant) because it does not “touch upon and concern the
        land” under Florida law. Because only real covenants run with the
        land, the district court concluded that the fee provision created
        rights and obligations only as to the original contracting parties—
        and not as to RJI and Crown Castle.
               This timely appeal followed.
                             II.    RELEVANT LAW
               Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we first set forth
        the legal principles relevant to this appeal.
               A.     Florida’s Law Governing Attorneys’ Fees
               “‘Our basic point of reference’ when considering the award
        of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the ‘American
        Rule’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless
        a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                  22-11977

        Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Si-
        erra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)). In diversity cases, a party’s en-
        titlement to attorneys’ fees is determined according to state law. Cf.
        All Underwriters v. Weisberg, 222 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000) (not-
        ing that a statutory right to fees is a substantive issue for Erie 2 pur-
        poses). “Florida generally follows the American Rule, under which
        each side pays its own attorney’s fees.” Azalea Trace, Inc. v. Matos,
        249 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Johnson v.
        Omega Ins. Co., 200 So. 3d 1207, 1214 (Fla. 2016)). Accordingly, un-
        der Florida law, “attorney’s fees may only be awarded by a court
        pursuant to an entitling statute or an agreement of the parties.”
        Dade County v. Pena, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1995). When a con-
        tract or statute provides for prevailing-party fees, “the test is
        whether the party ‘succeeded on any signiﬁcant issue in litigation
        which achieves some of the beneﬁt the parties sought in bringing
        suit.’” Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 819–10 (Fla. 1992)
        (alteration adopted) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
        (1983)).
               Under Florida law, “a contractual attorney’s fee provision
        must be strictly construed.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Americaribe-Moriarty
        JV, 906 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting B&H Constr. &
        Supply Co. v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Tallahassee Cmty. Coll., 542 So. 2d 382,
        387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). Therefore, “if an agreement for
        one party to pay another party’s attorney’s fees is to be enforced it
        must unambiguously state that intention and clearly identify the

        2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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        22-11977                Opinion of the Court                          9

        matter in which the attorney’s fees are recoverable.” Sholkoﬀ v. Boca
        Raton Cmty. Hosp., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
        1997). “If it is ambiguous, the court will not struggle by construc-
        tion of the language employed to infer an intent for fees that has
        not been clearly expressed; nor will it allow intentions to indemnify
        another’s attorney’s fees to be ambiguously stated and then re-
        solved by the ﬁnder of fact.” Id.
               Finally, strangers to an agreement (such as third-party bene-
        ﬁciaries) are generally not bound by prevailing-party provisions.
        See Civix Sunrise, GC, L.L.C. v. Sunrise Rd. Maint. Ass’n, Inc., 997 So.
        2d 433, 435 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“Because the appellees
        were not signatory parties to the lease, they are not entitled to re-
        cover their attorney’s fees under paragraph 20.”). But the result
        can be diﬀerent depending on the language of the agreement. See
        MSI Fin. Group, Inc. v. Veterans Const. Corp., 645 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla.
        3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (where promissory note stated that “all per-
        sons” would be liable for costs and attorney’s fees, assignee of note
        was entitled to recover fees).
               B.     Florida’s Law on Real and Personal Covenants
               Covenants are “promises in conveyances or other instru-
        ments pertaining to real estate” and can be either “real” or “per-
        sonal.” Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Inv. Ltd., 734 So. 2d 379, 382
        n.4 (Fla. 1999) (quoting 19 Fla. Jur. 2d Deeds § 168 (1998)). A real
        covenant “creates a servitude upon the reality for the beneﬁt of an-
        other parcel of land” and “binds the heirs and assigns of the origi-
        nal covenantor.” Id. (quoting 19 Fla. Jur. 2d Deeds § 174). A
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11977

        personal covenant “creates a personal obligation or right enforcea-
        ble only between the original covenanting parties.” Id. (quoting 19
        Fla. Jur. 2d Deeds § 174). Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal
        explained the diﬀerence as follows:
               A covenant running with the land diﬀers from a
               merely personal covenant in that the former concerns
               the property conveyed and the occupation and enjoy-
               ment thereof, whereas the latter covenant is collateral
               or is not immediately concerned with the property
               granted. If the performance of the covenant must
               touch and involve the land or some right or easement
               annexed and appurtenant thereto, and tends neces-
               sarily to enhance the value of the property or renders
               it more convenient and beneﬁcial to the owner, it is a
               covenant running with the land.
        Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheﬃeld Steel Prods., Inc., 105 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla.
        3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see Hayslip v. U.S. Home Corp., 336 So. 3d 207,
        209 (Fla. 2022) (“Covenants are divisible into two major classes: (1)
        real covenants which run with the land and typically bind the heirs
        and assigns of the covenanting parties, and (2) personal covenants
        which bind only the covenanting parties personally.”). “The pri-
        mary test whether the covenant runs with the land or is merely
        personal is whether it concerns the thing granted and the occupa-
        tion or enjoyment thereof,” or, on the other hand, whether it is
        merely “a collateral or a personal covenant not immediately con-
        cerning the thing granted.” Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d
        302, 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). More recently, the Fourth
        District Court of Appeal articulated a three-part test for
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                       11

        determining whether a covenant runs with the land—i.e., to estab-
        lish whether a covenant is a real covenant: “a plaintiﬀ must show
        (1) the existence of a covenant that touches and involves the land,
        (2) an intention that the covenant run with the land, and (3) notice
        of the restriction on the part of the party against whom enforce-
        ment is sought.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So.
        2d 261, 265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
                                 III.   ANALYSIS
               With these general legal principles in mind, we now address
        the issue before us. On appeal, RJI argues that the district court
        erred in denying its motion for attorneys’ fees for two reasons: (1)
        when viewing the Easement Agreement as a whole, the plain lan-
        guage of the Agreement establishes that Crown Castle is bound by
        the attorneys’ fees provision; and (2) the remedies provision
        touches and concerns the land and, therefore, binds successors as a
        covenant that runs with the land. In response, Crown Castle main-
        tains that “[t]he district court’s decision properly focused on the
        narrow issue of whether the Fee Provision runs with the land to
        subject a third party, which has limited access to the land, to this
        provision.” Therefore, Crown Castle asserts, “[n]otwithstanding
        any relationship to the easement, RJI and Crown Castle are not
        parties to the Easement Agreement and the Fee Provision, and they
        have no contract for fees between them.”
              RJI’s first argument—that the plain language of the agree-
        ment binds Crown Castle to pay prevailing party attorneys’ fees—
        hinges on our interpretation of “the parties hereto” as something
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11977

        broader than just “the signatories to the agreement.” 3 As we have
        explained, RJI is the subsequent purchaser from the original gran-
        tor (Hidden Valley) and Crown Castle is a sublessee of the original
        grantee (BellSouth). And the fee provision provides that “[t]he par-
        ties hereto shall each have the right to enforce the terms of this Ease-
        ment and the rights and obligations created herein . . . . [and i]n the
        event that it is necessary for either party hereto to file suit in order to
        enforce the terms hereof, then the prevailing party in such suit shall
        be entitled to receive reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs in
        addition to any other award that the court might make, from the
        non-prevailing party.” The salient question, then, is whether a sub-
        sequent purchaser from the grantor is a “party” who can enforce
        this fee provision against a sublessee of the grantee.
               RJI urges us to read “the parties hereto” broadly, based on
        the bedrock principle that we read contracts in their entirety to “ar-
        rive at a reasonable interpretation of the text of the entire agree-
        ment to accomplish its stated meaning and purpose.” Delissio v.
        Delissio, 821 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In partic-
        ular, RJI points to two other portions of the Easement Agreement

        3 We note that the district court did not find that RJI and Crown Castle are

        either “parties” to the agreement or “successors” to the original signatories,
        and instead considered them “successors-in-interest” with respect to the real
        covenant. And notably, in its order denying the fee motion, the district court
        admonished RJI for having “mischaracterize[d] the Summary Judgment Or-
        der” by suggesting that the order “conclude[ed] that Crown Castle and RJI
        were parties to the agreement.” We now address a more nuanced question,
        though, as to whether successors-in-interest are properly within the scope of
        “the parties hereto” for purposes of enforcing the fee provision.
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        22-11977                    Opinion of the Court                                  13

        that ought to inform our reading of the fee provision: first, its pref-
        atory language, which states that the Easement Agreement was ex-
        ecuted by Hidden Valley in favor of “BellSouth Mobility Inc, its
        successors and assigns.” Second, RJI highlights the “Covenant
        Running with the Land” paragraph, which states that all conditions
        of the Easement Agreement shall run with the land, “binding upon
        and inuring to the benefit of the Grantor or Grantee . . . and their
        respective heirs, successors and assigns, including, without limita-
        tion, all subsequent owners of the Easement Property[.]” In RJI’s
        view, assuming that it is a successor to Hidden Valley and Crown
        Castle is a successor to BellSouth, a holistic reading should mean
        that they are both enveloped within the meaning of “the parties
        hereto” for the purposes of enforcing the fee provision.
              We find no cases directly on point under Florida law (nor
        have the parties alerted us to any 4), but there are some that provide

        4 We find little help in the arbitration-clause cases that appear in the briefing.

        “In general, courts favor arbitration provisions and will try to resolve an am-
        biguity in an arbitration provision in favor of arbitration.” Vanacore Constr.,
        Inc. v. Osborn, 260 So. 3d 527, 530 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2018); see also Moses
        H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“The
        Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
        cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
        whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself
        or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”). But a
        contractual attorney’s fee provision, on the other hand, “must be strictly con-
        strued.” Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 906 F.3d at 1335; see also Sholkoff, 693 So. 2d at 1118
        (“[I]f an agreement for one party to pay another party’s attorney’s fees is to be
        enforced it must unambiguously state that intention and clearly identify the
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11977

        partial guidance. In Civix, Florida’s Second District Court of Ap-
        peal reversed the trial court’s grant of attorney’s fees to a prevailing
        party on similar, but not precisely analogous, facts. 997 So. 2d at
        434. There, Civix had purchased property that was the subject of a
        99-year lease. Id. Among the various terms of the lease, the lessee
        was required to operate a golf course on the property and sell a set
        number of memberships to any affiliated golf club or country club
        to residents of the adjacent developments, which were run by
        homeowner and condominium associations. Id. Some time after
        Civix bought the property, it stopped operating the golf course and
        revealed a plan to develop the property in some other fashion. Id.
        The associations then sued Civix to prevent it from executing that
        development plan. Id. The associations prevailed in relevant part,
        winning a declaration that the lease’s covenants continued to en-
        cumber the property and that they were intended beneficiaries of
        certain paragraphs of the lease agreement, including the provisions
        that required Civix to operate a golf course and sell memberships
        to the associations’ residents. Id. The associations then sought
        their attorney’s fees pursuant to a paragraph in the lease that stated
        that “[a]ny party failing to comply with the terms of this lease
        agreement shall pay all expenses, including a reasonable attorneys’
        fee, incurred by the other party hereto as a result of such failure.”
        Id. Civix opposed the motion, arguing that the fee provision only

        matter in which the attorney’s fees are recoverable.”). We think it unwise,
        thus, to take guidance from arbitration-provision cases in our parsing of an
        attorney’s fee clause.
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        22-11977                Opinion of the Court                          15

        inured to the benefit of “parties” to the lease. Id. The trial court
        rejected Civix’s view and awarded the associations their fees, rea-
        soning that the associations, as intended third-party beneficiaries,
        were able to avail themselves of the fee provision. Id. On appeal,
        the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that while
        the associations had “established that they were the intended ben-
        eficiaries of the lessee’s promise to operate a golf course, nothing
        in the lease indicates the parties intended for them to benefit from,
        or for that matter be subject to, the attorney's fee provision.” Id. at
        435.
                In Harris v. Richard N. Groves Realty, Inc., 315 So. 2d 528 (Fla.
        4th Dist. Ct. App 1975), the Fourth District Court of Appeal con-
        sidered a similar fee dispute between the would-be buyers, seller,
        and broker of a failed real estate deal. In that case, the Harrises
        entered a contract to buy real property from Kirkwood Invest-
        ment, contingent upon two subsequent conditions being satisfied.
        Harris, 315 So. 2d at 528. The Harrises paid an $8,750 deposit to
        Richard N. Groves Realty, the broker to the transaction. Id. But
        the Harrises were not able to satisfy either of the two conditions
        upon which the contingent contract depended, so the sale fell
        apart. Id. The Harrises demanded that Groves return their deposit,
        which Kirkwood maintained it was entitled to keep because the
        Harrises defaulted on the contract, and litigation ensued. Id. at 529.
        After a hearing on Groves’s petition for declaratory judgment, the
        trial court entered final judgment awarding the $8,750 deposit to
        Groves and Kirkwood. Id. Groves then moved for attorney’s fees,
        based on the following provision in the purchase contract between
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11977

        Kirkwood and the Harrises: “In connection with any litigation aris-
        ing out of the contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to re-
        cover all costs incurred, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id.
        The trial court, based on that clause, ordered the Harrises to pay
        Groves’ fees. Id. On appeal, however, the Fourth District Court
        of Appeal reversed, reasoning that—notwithstanding the broad ref-
        erence to “any litigation arising out of the contract”—the term
        “prevailing party” was properly read to be limited to the parties to
        the contract, i.e. the Harrises and Kirkwood, and could not extend
        to include non-party Groves. Id.
               These cases, and others in the same line, create a rule coun-
        seling that attorney’s fee provisions are not likely to be enforceable
        by or against a third party. We recognize, however, that there is
        an additional wrinkle in our case—neither RJI nor Crown Castle is
        truly a stranger to the contract, because they each stand in some
        sort of privity of estate with the original contracting parties. To
        that point, while we again find no case directly on point under Flor-
        ida law, we have identified some guideposts.
                 In Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Metropolitan Dade
        County, 592 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the appellate
        court held that a successor-in-interest to a contract was required to
        fulfill a contractual duty to defend where that duty was undertaken
        by the predecessor-in-interest. Westinghouse, 592 So. 2d at 1135. In
        other words, even though the successor was not a signatory, it was
        bound to the predecessor’s commitment and the counterparty was
        entitled to enforce that commitment. We note, though, that in
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        22-11977                Opinion of the Court                           17

        Westinghouse, the parties stipulated that Schindler, the successor,
        was a “successor in interest to the contract, and as such, was bound
        by the terms of the contract from that point forward.” Id. We, of
        course, have no such concession here. Cutting the other way, in
        Dawdy v. Leonard, 145 Fla. 562, 567 (Fla. 1940), Florida’s highest
        court determined that while a sublease “operated to create a privity
        of estate between the landlord and [the sublessee], it did not create
        a privity of contract between the landlord and [the sublessee].” (em-
        phases added). Dawdy would suggest to us that—although Crown
        Castle is bound to certain portions of the Easement Agreement—
        it may not, as a non-signatory, be bound to the whole of the con-
        tract. Westinghouse, in contrast, contemplates that a successor-in-
        interest may, at least in some circumstances, be bound to a contract
        it did not sign.
               So where does all this leave us? As a general rule, we strictly
        construe contractual fee provisions and, where the contract is not
        unambiguously clear, we “will not struggle by construction of the
        language employed to infer an intent for fees that has not been
        clearly expressed.” Sholkoff, 693 So. 2d at 1118; see also Int’l Fid. Ins.
        Co., 906 F.3d at 1335. We find ourselves now, on the record before
        us and the parties’ submissions, and based on the law as it exists,
        struggling to infer an intent for fees—to RJI, and from Crown Cas-
        tle—from a contract that neither of those parties drafted or signed.
        We, therefore, decline to reverse the district court on this basis. Cf.
        Huck v. Kenmare Commons Homes Assoc., Inc., --- So. 3d --- , 2023 WL
        4613062, at *3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. July 19, 2023) (“Because the
        Hucks did not make the parking promise—there is no binding
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11977

        contract here, supported by consideration—it could bind them
        only if it could be said to ‘run with their land.’”).
               The second question before us is whether the prevailing-
        party fee provision in the Easement Agreement is enforceable by
        and against RJI and Crown Castle as a real covenant running with
        the land. This is a matter of first impression for this Court; what’s
        more, it also appears to be a matter of first impression for Florida’s
        appellate courts.
               Finding nothing precisely on point in our review of Florida
        case law, we (and the district court below) have identified three
        cases addressing similar issues: Caulk v. Orange County, 661 So. 2d
        932 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), J.H. Williams Oil Co. v. Harvey,
        872 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004), and Hayslip v. U.S. Home
        Corp., 336 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 2022). But in our view, we cannot relia-
        bly predict how the Florida courts would rule in this case based on
        those three precedents.
               First, in Caulk, Caulk (the original grantor) conveyed real
        property to Hibbard (the original grantee) by a deed that reserved
        a right for Caulk to take “any and all proceeds arising out of . . .
        condemnation . . . by any government authority.” 661 So. 2d at
        933. Hibbard sold the land to Hibbard Oil Co., which then sold the
        land to Amoco Oil Company. Id. Neither of those two subsequent
        deeds included the language reserving condemnation proceeds to
        Caulk. Id. Fifteen years after Caulk conveyed the land to Hibbard,
        the land was condemned, and Caulk claimed interest in the pro-
        ceeds based on her original deed. Id. The trial court allowed her
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                       19

        to intervene but ultimately denied her request for apportionment
        of proceeds, finding that the deed covenant was personal and not
        real. Id. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that
        “[t]he covenant in Caulk’s deed to Hibbard is incapable of running
        with the land,” explaining that:
              Although the covenant “concerns” the land, it does so
              only tangentially. Unlike covenants respecting min-
              eral rights and crops, for example, which directly im-
              pact the use of the land, the covenant in the instant
              case has no eﬀect whatever on the land. The only
              thing the covenant in the instant case really “touches”
              and “concerns” is the intangible personal property,
              namely cash, that may be paid by a condemnor.
        Id. at 934. Caulk appears to articulate a rule that covenants tangen-
        tially concerning the land, and really concerning cash to be paid,
        are personal covenants that do not run with the land.
                In Harvey, however, the Second District Court of Appeal
        called into question whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal pro-
        nounced such a rule in Caulk. There, a trust held by several mem-
        bers of the Harvey family (the “Trust”) sold land to Chevron Oil
        Company pursuant to a reservation agreement, which provided
        that if certain portions of the land were ever taken by eminent do-
        main, the Trust would receive the eminent domain proceeds. Har-
        vey, 872 So. 2d at 288. The agreement was recorded in the public
        record and specifically bound Chevron’s and the Trust’s successors
        and assigns. Id. Chevron then conveyed the land to Williams,
        “[s]ubject to . . . [a]ll easements, reservations, exceptions and
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                22-11977

        restrictions of record,” including, specifically, the eminent domain
        agreement with the Trust. Id. (some alterations in original). Later,
        the Florida Department of Transportation took the parcel by emi-
        nent domain and named both Williams and the Trust in the suit,
        and the Trust filed a cross-claim against Williams to enforce the
        reservation agreement. Id. at 288–89. The trial court ruled in the
        Trust’s favor at summary judgment. Id. at 289.
                On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal agreed that
        Williams was estopped by deed from claiming entitlement to the
        condemnation proceeds. Id. “The language of the reservation
        agreement,” the court reasoned, “expressed the intention of the
        Trust and Chevron that the title to the property be taken subject
        to this reservation.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court dis-
        tinguished Caulk, which Williams had offered as support for his
        claim. Id. For two reasons, the Harvey court found Caulk unper-
        suasive. First, Caulk’s reservation was only found in the original
        deed by which Caulk conveyed the property to Hibbard, and that
        language was not included in the deeds for the subsequent convey-
        ances. See id. Second, the court noted that Caulk’s holding was
        based on “the language of that particular deed, not upon whether
        such an interest qualifies as one that could run with the land.” Id.
        Therefore, the Harvey court found that Caulk’s observation that the
        reservation of proceeds did not sufficiently concern the land was
        “dicta.” Id. The court concluded that “the language in the deeds
        and the reservation agreement at issue [in Harvey] clearly indicates
        that the parties intended to bind all successors and assigns and that
        the subsequent conveyance was subject to this reservation.” Id.
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                       21

               Finally, we turn to the Florida Supreme Court’s recent deci-
        sion in Hayslip. There, U.S. Home built and sold a home to an orig-
        inal purchaser, with transfer of title conveyed via special warranty
        deed that included an arbitration provision and a waiver of judicial
        remedy. Hayslip, 336 So. 3d at 208. The covenants and conditions
        of that deed provided that the deed bound both the original pur-
        chasers and subsequent purchasers and speciﬁcally referenced the
        arbitration provision as an “equitable servitude[], perpetual and
        run[ning] with the land.” Id. at 209. The deed also expressly stated
        that the grantee agreed to bind its heirs, successors, and assigns to
        the deed’s terms. Id. The original purchasers sold the home to the
        Hayslips by a deed that provided the conveyance was “subject to
        easements, restrictions, reservations and limitations.” Id. (altera-
        tion adopted). Seven years later, the Hayslips sued U.S. Home, al-
        leging the builder had improperly installed stucco in violation of a
        Florida Building Code provision. Id. U.S. Home moved to compel
        arbitration, which the court granted. Id.
               On appeal, the Second District Court held that the arbitra-
        tion clause was valid and binding and that it was a covenant run-
        ning with the land. Id. The district court certiﬁed a question to the
        Florida Supreme Court, which the Florida Supreme Court re-
        phrased as follows: “[d]oes a deed covenant requiring the arbitra-
        tion of any dispute arising from a construction defect run with the
        land, such that it is binding upon a subsequent purchaser of the real
        estate who was not a party to the deed?” Id. at 208.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11977

                The Florida Supreme Court accepted review and concluded
        that such an arbitration provision runs with the land because it
        “touches and concerns the property itself [and] ‘aﬀects the mode
        of enjoyment of the premises.’” Id. at 210 (quoting Winn-Dixie
        Stores, 964 So. 2d at 264 (internal quotation omitted)). The court
        explained that “the thing required to be done” in the case before
        it—ﬁxing a defect in the home’s construction—could only be rem-
        edied through those arbitration proceedings. Id. (quoting Hagan,
        186 So. 2d at 310). Said diﬀerently, the court found that the arbitra-
        tion clause “touches the enjoyment of the land because the
        Hayslips beneﬁt from the defective stucco being resolved.” Id.
               RJI urges us to follow Harvey and Hayslip, insisting that the
        attorneys’ fee provision—like Hayslip’s arbitration provision—is
        part and parcel of seeking full enjoyment of the land, and that it
        flows to all successors—like the Trust’s reservation in Harvey.
        Crown Castle, on the other hand, contends that the district court
        correctly followed Caulk to the necessary conclusion that the fee
        provision is not a real covenant because it concerns the land “only
        tangentially” and “has no effect whatever on the land.” Caulk, 661
        So. 2d at 934. In our case, after all, as in Caulk, “the only thing the
        covenant . . . really ‘touches’ and ‘concerns’ is the intangible per-
        sonal property, namely cash, that may be paid.” Id.
               We find that both interpretations are reasonable under ex-
        tant Florida law. On one hand, in Caulk, the Fifth District Court of
        Appeal appeared to hold that a covenant for payment of cash is
        merely tangential to the land and, thus, does not touch and concern
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        22-11977               Opinion of the Court                         23

        the land so as to run with it (and bind heirs, assigns, or successors).
        And this seems consistent with a historical understanding of real
        covenants as those that “create[] a servitude upon the reality for
        the benefit of another parcel of land,” and personal covenants as
        those which “create[] a personal obligation or right enforceable at
        law only between the original covenanting parties.” Cove Club, 734
        So. 2d at 382 n.4. The payment of cash, whether as condemnation
        proceeds or prevailing-party attorneys’ fees, cannot truly be said to
        create a servitude upon the reality for the benefit of an adjoining
        parcel.
                On the other hand, though, in Harvey, the Second District
        Court of Appeal found enforceable a substantially similar covenant
        for the transfer of cash proceeds, where the language of the instru-
        ment “expressed the intention of the Trust and Chevron that the
        title to the property be taken subject to this reservation.” 872 So.
        2d at 289.
               But Harvey and Caulk, while having some instructive value,
        are a bit far afield factually from this case. Hayslip comes closer to
        our precise question, holding that an arbitration provision runs
        with the land when it “affects the mode of enjoyment of the prem-
        ises.” 336 So. 2d at 210. Still, though, we hesitate to assume Hayslip
        would control here because, as we see it, the fee provision at issue
        here is a step further removed from the land than the arbitration
        provision was in Hayslip. In Hayslip, arbitration was the means of
        resolving alleged defects in the property. Hayslip had to arbitrate
        with the developer to force the developer to fix defective stucco—
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11977

        part of the property. The arbitration was thus one step removed
        from the property itself.
               By contrast, the fee provision here is two steps removed.
        The parties have already litigated their dispute over Crown Castle’s
        trespass and breach of the easement. And through that litigation,
        RJI has already been awarded both equitable and legal remedies.
        Attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party are, therefore, a second step
        removed from the land—money to make RJI whole for having had
        to enforce the easement, which has already been accomplished. Cf.
        Huck, 2023 WL 4613062, at *2 (“Running with the land, in essence,
        is a substitute for consideration. It turns a promise that would be
        binding only on the maker into a contract-like obligation that is
        binding on the maker’s successors, even though they personally
        never signed onto the promise. Indeed, if the promise can be said
        to run with the land, purchase of the land with notice is enough.”).
                 Because of the uncertainty we face in resolving this issue, it
        is not for us to guess how the Florida courts might interpret this
        area of Florida law. Rather, given two reasonable and competing
        interpretations of the Florida law at issue, and the lack of clear con-
        sensus among Florida’s appellate courts, we believe the proper
        course is to certify this dispositive issue to the Florida Supreme
        Court. See WM Mobile Bay, 972 F.3d at 1251; In re Mooney, 812 F.3d
        1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). “As a matter of federalism and comity,
        it is often appropriate to certify dispositive issues of Florida law to
        Florida’s highest court for decision.” Steele, 51 F.4th at 1065; accord
        Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413
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        22-11977                Opinion of the Court                         25

        (11th Cir. 1997). Indeed, “[c]ertification of state law issues to state
        supreme courts is a valuable tool for promoting the interests of co-
        operative federalism.” Nielsen, 116 F.3d at 1413.
              We therefore certify to the Florida Supreme Court the fol-
        lowing question under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150:
               1) Under Florida law, when an easement agreement
                  contains a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provi-
                  sion, is the fee provision a real covenant such that
                  it runs with the land?
                Our phrasing of this question “is intended only as a guide.”
        United States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). It is not
        our intention to restrict the Florida Supreme Court’s consideration
        of the issues or its scope of inquiry. See WM Mobile Bay, 972 F.3d at
        1251. The Florida Supreme Court “may, as it perceives them, re-
        state the issues and modify the manner in which the answers are
        given.” Id. And “[i]f we have overlooked or mischaracterized any
        state law issues or inartfully stated any of the questions we have
        posed, we hope the [Florida] Supreme Court will feel free to make
        the necessary corrections.” Id. (quoting Spain v. Brown & William-
        son Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000)).
                               IV.    CONCLUSION
                For these reasons, we defer our decision in this case until the
        Florida Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider and
        determine whether to exercise its discretion in answering our cer-
        tified question. The entire record of this case, including the parties’
        briefs, is transmitted to the Florida Supreme Court.
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        26                 Opinion of the Court              22-11977

              QUESTION CERTIFIED.