Court Opinion

ID: 9941796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 22:02:00.735074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:03.035901
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24 P. v. Garcia CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084717
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. VCF198745A)
                    v.

    JOHNNY CARDENAS GARCIA III,                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda
Myrle Reed, Judge.
         Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Erin Doering and Julie A.
Hokans, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION

       In 2008, appellant Johnny Cardenas Garcia III, Eduardo Madrigal, J.A., and J.O.,
                                                    1
were charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The information
further alleged the following enhancements and special circumstances: with respect to
Garcia and Madrigal, a gang-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and an
arming enhancement for the personal use of a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to all defendants, the information alleged that the murder was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street
gang with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
       In 2010, Garcia plead no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the
criminal street gang enhancement allegation. The trial court’s indicated sentence would
either be the middle term sentence of 16 years or the aggravated term of 21 years. The
trial court ultimately sentenced Garcia to a term of 21 years in state prison.
       In 2022, Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95
(now section 1172.6). Following the appointment of counsel, but before the submission
of briefing by the parties, the superior court denied Garcia’s petition, finding that he had
failed to make a prima facie case for resentencing relief.
       Garcia contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie
stage. Based upon the available record, we agree. We will therefore reverse the trial
court’s order and remand the matter back to the trial court with directions to issue an
order to show cause and to conduct further proceedings consistent with section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).

       1
         All undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

                                              2.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On August 26, 2008, the Tulare County District Attorney charged Garcia,
Madrigal, J.A., and J.O. with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The information
further alleged the following: as to Garcia and Madrigal, a gang-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and an arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1)); and as to Garcia and all three of his codefendants, that the murder was committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with
the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
       On March 10, 2010, Garcia plead no contest to an amended charge of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the gang enhancement allegation (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)) for an indicated sentence of 16 to 21 years in state prison. The parties
stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual basis for the plea.
The remaining allegations, including the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) arming
enhancement, were dismissed by the prosecutor in view of the plea. Garcia was
ultimately sentenced to the upper term of 21 years.
       On March 23, 2022, Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95. Garcia alleged that he could not be convicted of murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). He
specifically alleged that he was not the actual killer, and that he had entered a plea of no
contest to voluntary manslaughter as an aider and abettor. Garcia further observed that
he had not admitted the arming enhancement allegation.
       On April 1, 2022, the superior court appointed counsel to represent Garcia.
       On June 29, 2022, the superior court stated that its tentative decision was to find
that Garcia’s petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief. The court explained that
it had “reviewed extensively the probation report and other documents in the file,” and

                                              3.
asserted that “the file substantiates that [Garcia] was involved as the actual direct
perpetrator [or] at least as a direct aider and abettor.”
       Trial counsel requested more time to prepare as her office had only learned of their
appointment on Garcia’s case the day before the hearing. The court agreed to continue
the matter to the next day, but commented that it seemed futile to do so because “[t]he
probation report identifies [Garcia] as the direct stabber in this case.”
       On June 30, 2022, the trial court denied Garcia’s petition, finding that he failed to
make a prima facie case for relief.
       A timely notice of appeal followed.
                                 STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Underlying Case
       The following statement of facts is derived from the reporter’s transcript from
                                                                         2
Garcia’s preliminary hearing, which is the factual basis for his plea:
       On February 8, 2008, Patrol Sergeant Orlando Ortiz with the City of Farmersville
was dispatched to the area of Visalia Road and Filbert in Exeter. When Sergeant Ortiz
arrived on the scene, he found the body of Brian Barajas in a carport down an alleyway.
       During the course of the ensuing investigation, officers learned that Barajas was
involved in a brawl that culminated in his murder. Although there were multiple

       2
         The record supports the conclusion that the reporter’s transcript from Garcia’s
preliminary hearing was not before the trial court when it found Garcia had failed to
make a prima facie case for resentencing relief. We grant the Attorney General’s request
for judicial notice of this record. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) [permitting judicial
notice of court records]; 459 [we may take judicial notice of the records in our cases];
Penal Code, § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [authorizing the trial court to consider, at an
evidentiary hearing, “evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and
matters judicially noticed”].)

                                               4.
witnesses to the incident, the following version of events represents non-hearsay evidence
that was adduced at the preliminary hearing:
       At approximately 3:20 p.m. on August 8, 2008, A.G. was looking out of the
window of his residence when he saw Eduardo Madrigal, with whom A.G. was
personally acquainted, stab Barajas with a brown knife. Madrigal was one of a group of
three people who were “[s]tabbing,” “punching,” or “holding” Barajas’s arms. Barajas
fell to the ground after “they were done stabbing him.” Eventually, Madrigal and the
three other assailants fled.
       On February 8, 2008, Garcia, Madrigal, and J.A. were all at the residence of H.R.
H.R. claimed that all of them were affiliated with the Northern or Norteño criminal street
gang. That afternoon, Garcia showed H.R. his new black switch-blade knife.
       At approximately 3:20 p.m., H.R. was inside his house when he heard someone
outside yell, “quit running, you fucking buster.” H.R., a Norteño gang member,
understood that the term “buster” was a term of disrespect that Sureños use towards
          3
Norteños. When he looked outside, H.R. observed Barajas, a Sureño, yelling at and
chasing J.O., a Norteño.
       Garcia, Madrigal, and J.A. proceeded down a nearby alleyway, in the direction of
the disturbance. When H.R. followed them, he observed Barajas yell, “buster,” as
Barajas swung a large board at J.O. in a nearby carport. J.O. punched Barajas in the face,
causing Barajas to drop the board. Garcia, Madrigal, and J.A. began “jumping” Barajas,
hitting and kicking him.
       George Torres, a Sureño, came running down the alleyway carrying a baseball bat.
H.R. ran towards Torres, scaring him away. When H.R. turned back around, Barajas was

       3 The parties and witnesses referred to “Sureños” and “Southerners” and
“Norteños” and “Northerners” interchangeably. For ease of reference, we refer to the
relevant criminal street gangs as either Sureños or Norteños.

                                            5.
“full of blood,” and was not moving. H.R. claimed that he never saw anyone stab
Barajas.
         Following the attack, Garcia, Madrigal, J.A., and J.O. fled in different directions.
Garcia ran into H.R.’s backyard. He told H.R. that he had hidden his knife in a sprinkler
box in the apartment complex next door to H.R.’s home.
         Detective Sergeant Mike Marquez with the Farmersville Police Department spoke
with H.R. H.R. advised Sergeant Marquez that Garcia told him (H.R.) where the knife
used in the attack on Barajas was hidden. Based upon this information, Sergeant
Marquez searched for and then found the knife, which was black.
         J.A. testified at Garcia’s preliminary hearing pursuant to an agreement with the
prosecutor. According to J.A., at about 3:20 p.m. on the day of the incident, he was in
H.R.’s backyard when he saw Garcia, Madrigal, and J.O. fighting with Barajas in the
alleyway carport. J.A. claimed that he did not see who had stabbed Barajas. But, after
the attack, J.A. observed Garcia and Madrigal run into H.R.’s backyard. Garcia bent
down and wiped blood off of a black knife, onto his pant leg.
         Approximately one week after the incident, J.A. spoke to Garcia about the fight.
According to J.A., Garcia told him that he had stabbed Barajas approximately three or
four times.
         Dr. Gary Walter, the pathologist who subsequently performed Barajas’s autopsy,
testified that Barajas had suffered eight sharp force trauma wounds to his body, most
likely from a knife, and that he had superficial abrasions on his body. Dr. Walter could
not determine whether the sharp force trauma wounds to Barajas’s body had come from
one knife or multiple knives. However, of the five deeply penetrating sharp force trauma
wounds Barajas had suffered, the fatal injury was caused by a laceration to Barajas’s
heart.

                                               6.
The Preliminary Hearing
       At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties stipulated to the following allegations
for purposes of the preliminary hearing: the gang allegations as to all defendants and the
special circumstance allegations as to Garcia and Madrigal. Trial counsel for all four
defendants declined to offer an affirmative defense or to call witnesses since “it [was]
only the preliminary hearing.” However, trial counsel for Garcia joined co-counsel’s
argument, claiming that Garcia was acting in defense of another during the commission
of the attack.
       The trial court raised the application of the natural and probable consequences
doctrine with respect to J.O.’s liability for Barajas’s murder. The prosecutor countered
that the target offense was “murder, nothing else,” but added that case authority
supported the conclusion that J.O. could be liable for murder based upon the intended
target offense of section 415, disturbing the peace. However, the prosecutor asserted that
he was not limiting himself to the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
       Relying upon People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, the trial court held
that the evidence was sufficient to hold all of the defendants to answer as they had been
charged in the complaint. (See Id. at p. 1055 [shooting of rival gang member during
retreat after a fight was natural and probable consequence of gang fight instigated by
gang challenge].)
Garcia’s Sentencing Hearing
       Pursuant to his plea agreement, Garcia would either be sentenced to the middle
term of 16 years or the aggravated term of 21 years in state prison, the ultimate decision
would be committed to the discretion of the trial court. Garcia waived his right to a
hearing under “Blakely [v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296].”
       At the sentencing hearing, Garcia and his family submitted letters to the court
which were not made part of the record. Garcia also addressed the court. Although he

                                             7.
apologized for his “participation in an event that resulted in [Barajas’s] death,” he never
made a clear admission to having stabbed Barajas.
         At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the presence of several
aggravating circumstances, including: the crime involved great violence (former Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), that Garcia was armed with a weapon during the
commission of the offense (id., rule 4.421(a)(2)), and that the victim was particularly
vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)). The court’s findings were based upon the probation
officer’s report and the reporter’s transcript from the preliminary hearing.
         Addressing Garcia directly, the court concluded, “while the victim may have been
involved in aggressive behavior beforehand, the circumstances as reflected in the
preliminary hearing transcript [showed] that the victim, Mr. Barajas, had been
incapacitated. He was on the ground. He was no longer a threat to you or to anyone
around you. Yet, you proceeded to take a knife and inflict mortal wounds on
Mr. Barajas.”
         The trial court further found that Garcia had engaged in violent conduct in the
past, indicating that he represented a serious danger to society (former Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)), his prior convictions were increasingly more serious (id., rule
4.421(b)(2)), and that his prior performance while on probation had been unsatisfactory
(id., rule 4.421(b)(4)).
         Trial counsel asserted that there were mitigating circumstances present, but the
court found counsel’s assertions unpersuasive. The trial court denied counsel’s claim that
Barajas had provoked the altercation, that Garcia had been acting under duress, and that
Garcia had made an early admission of responsibility. The prosecutor offered a joint
resolution of Madrigal’s and Garcia’s cases. However, Madrigal was initially hesitant to
accept a plea agreement. The trial court explained that the fact that Garcia was ready to
enter a plea, despite his codefendant’s hesitation, did not constitute an early admission of
guilt.

                                               8.
The Superior Court’s Ruling on Garcia’s Petition for Resentencing
       At the hearing on Garcia’s petition for resentencing, the superior court explained
that its tentative decision was to deny Garcia’s petition, because he “ha[d] not satisfied
the prima facia [sic] that he participated in this offense under the felony murder rule with
a different target offense, or that he was an aider and abettor under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.”
       Trial counsel acknowledged that it appeared from the probation report’s recitation
of the facts of the offense that “perhaps [Garcia] was, in fact, in possession of a weapon
and did the stabbing.” But trial counsel argued that the essential facts of whether Garcia
was in possession of a knife and personally stabbed the victim were not “actually
adjudicated or found true.”
       The court responded, “I understand, but the [Penal] [C]ode requires [Garcia] to
carry the burden showing the prima facie case. The Court is allowed to review
documents in the file, and [Garcia] simply has not met his burden in that regard. [¶] …
[¶] So the Court denies [Garcia]’s petition for resentencing based on failure to a …
establish prima facia [sic] case for relief.”
                                         ANALYSIS

I.     The Superior Court Erred in Denying Garcia’s Petition at the Prima Facie
       Stage
       Garcia contends that the superior court erred by denying his petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage.4 According to Garcia, nothing in the record of

       4
           The parties agree that the superior court erred by relying on the probation
officer’s report in determining that Garcia had failed to make a prima facie showing for
section 1172.6 resentencing relief. As the Attorney General observes, “[a] probation
report ‘ordinarily is not part of the record of conviction.’ ” (People v. Soto (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 813, 816, fn. 2, quoting People v. Oehmigen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.).

                                                9.
conviction conclusively demonstrates that he is ineligible for resentencing relief
under section 1172.6. The People counter that Garcia is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law because the preliminary hearing transcript establishes, without factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion, that he was the actual killer. We
agree with Garcia.
       A.      Section 1172.6
       “Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). [Citation.] It provides
that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person:
(1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a
direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] The Legislature also amended the
natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188,
which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50-51; People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.)
       “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted
under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended,” initially
codified in former section 1170.95. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The
initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction
for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced

We agree as well. However, because we review the correctness of the trial court’s ruling
and not the reasons for its ruling (see People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976), we do
not address the trial court’s ruling further.

                                                10.
on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been convicted of murder as a result
of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill 1437.” (People v.
Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
      Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 775) made substantive amendments to former section 1170.95 that were consistent
with our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972
(Lewis), and also “ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn.
18; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
      On June 30, 2022, the statute was renumbered as section 1172.6 without further
substantive changes. (See People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 715, fn. 3.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides the following:

      “(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
      probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to
      a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder
      under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a
      petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder,
      attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on
      any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:

             “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
             that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
             murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
             theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
             person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
             probable consequences doctrine.

             “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
             manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
             which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
             murder.

                                            11.
               “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
               murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January
               1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
        The superior court shall appoint counsel if requested by petitioner. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) After service of the petition, the prosecutor shall file and serve a response.
The petitioner may file and serve a reply after the response is served. (Id. at subd. (c).)
“After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court
shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause,
it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c).)
        The prima facie determination is a question of law, and the superior court may
deny a petition if the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) At the prima facie stage, the court’s inquiry “ ‘is limited to
readily ascertainable facts from the record (such as the crime of conviction), rather than
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion (such as
determining whether the petitioner showed reckless indifference to human life in the
commission of the crime).’ ” (People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 125,
quoting People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980.)
        The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

                                             12.
       If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she is entitled to
relief under section 1172.6, the superior court must issue an order to show cause and hold
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       We review de novo an order denying a petition under section 1172.6 without
issuing an order to show cause. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251;
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545; People v. Harrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
       B.     Analysis
       In his petition, Garcia alleged: (1) that the prosecution filed an information
allowing it to proceed under a theory of murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or another theory under which malice was imputed to him; (2)
that he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of
murder, and (3) that he could not presently be convicted of murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) The trial court was
required to accept these allegations as true unless, “the record of conviction conclusively
demonstrate[d] [that Garcia] was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.” (People v.
Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251.)
       The record here did not. Garcia was charged for first degree murder with three
other codefendants. Because the crime of murder was charged generically, the
information allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Davenport
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 484 [“ ‘The allegation that a murder was committed
“ ‘willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought’ ” is a well-recognized way of
charging murder in [a] generic sense,’ ” which “does ‘not limit the People to prosecuting
[defendant] on any particular theories.’ ”]; see also People v. Didyavong (2023) 90

                                            13.
Cal.App.5th 85, 96, fn. 4 [“A murder charged generically does not limit the prosecution
to any particular theories of liability.”].)
       Moreover, evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing was inconclusive as to
whether Barajas had been stabbed by one or more than one person, and while the
evidence showed that Garcia may have been armed with a knife, the evidence also
showed that he was not the only one. Indeed, an arming allegation was charged as to
both him and Madrigal.
       In pleading no contest to voluntary manslaughter, Garcia did not admit to a
specific theory of guilt. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(2); People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 987 [petitioner was not ineligible for relief where, “[i]n entering his
plea, petitioner did not admit to or stipulate to any particular theory of murder”]; People
v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977 [petitioner who pleaded to a charge that he
“ ‘did willfully, unlawfully, and with deliberation, premeditation, and malice
aforethought murder’ ” the victim was not ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law
because the charge was a “generic murder charge [that] allowed the prosecution to
proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and probable consequences”].)
       In some cases, the record may reveal that a petitioner has admitted more than the
elements of the offense charged. These additional admissions may preclude resentencing
relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 234; see e.g.,
People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 330 [“a petitioner who admitted being the
actual killer as part of a guilty plea” would be ineligible for relief as a matter of law]
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) But, absent such
admissions, a defendant’s plea to the crime of murder, as it was generally charged prior
to the passing of Senate Bill 1437, did not inherently imply that he or she had admitted to
acting with either express or implied malice. (People v. Rivera, at p. 235.)
       Here, Garcia did not specifically admit to the truth of facts showing that he was
the actual killer, or even that he had acted with malice during the commission of the

                                               14.
assault on Barajas. Nor did Garcia admit to the arming enhancement allegation. At the
sentencing hearing, trial counsel claimed that “[Garcia] wasn’t necessarily the stabber in
this case. It was actually Eduardo Madrigal.” Trial counsel acknowledged that Garcia
had participated “in the incident … that took place,” but represented that the incident was
not the result of a planned attack on Barajas. According to trial counsel, the stabbing of
Barajas was an unintended consequence of a physical confrontation that had ensued when
Garcia came to the aid of his friend, J.O., who was being attacked by Barajas. Because
Garcia did not specifically admit to stabbing Barajas, possessing a deadly weapon during
the commission of the attack, or having acted with express or implied malice, the record
does not conclusively demonstrate that he is ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing
relief.
          The Attorney General attempts to resist this conclusion, arguing that there is
ample non-hearsay evidence in the record showing that Barajas was the actual killer, and
that the prosecutor never wavered from his effort to prove this theory. Relying upon the
preliminary hearing transcript, the Attorney General observes that J.A. testified that he
observed Garcia wiping blood off of his knife just after the attack, before hiding it. The
knife was recovered by law enforcement in the precise location where Garcia told H.R.
he had hidden it. Further, J.A. testified that Garcia had admitted to stabbing Barajas four
or five times. We find the Attorney General’s reliance upon the preliminary hearing
transcript problematic.
          Preliminarily, we observe that the extent to which the superior court is authorized
to rely upon the reporter’s transcript from the preliminary hearing at the prima facie stage
of section 1172.6 proceedings is unclear. The issue is currently pending review before
our Supreme Court in People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June
28, 2023, S279670.
          Nonetheless, we disagree with the Attorney General’s assertion that the
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates, without factfinding, that Garcia was the

                                               15.
actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to an express or implied malice murder. (Cf.
People v. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 658 [the uncontroverted testimony from the
petitioner’s preliminary hearing demonstrated, “ ‘[without] factfinding, weighing of
evidence, or credibility determinations,’ ” that he was the sole perpetrator of an attempted
murder, and thus, was ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing relief as a matter of
law].)
         Regardless of the prosecutor’s theory as to Garcia’s role in Barajas’s murder and
the strength of the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing which supports that
theory, Garcia never admitted to being the actual killer or having acted with malice. His
plea to the generic crime of voluntary manslaughter was not an admission to the truth of
these facts. As our colleagues explained in People v. Rivera: “ ‘The factual basis
required by section 1192.5 does not require more than establishing a prima facie factual
basis for the charges. [Citation.] It is not necessary for the trial court to interrogate the
defendant about possible defenses to the charged crime [citation], nor does the trial court
have to be convinced of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘[a] defendant is
not required to personally admit the truth of the factual basis of the plea, which may be
established by defense counsel’s stipulation to a particular document.’ [Citation.] Thus,
absent an indication that a defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the stipulation
to a factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[ ] a binding admission for all
purposes.’ ” (People v. Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 235.)
         Even assuming the preliminary hearing transcript contains compelling and
admissible evidence that points to Garcia’s guilt as the actual killer or a direct aider and
abettor, we do not review the record for substantial evidence at this stage of the section
1172.6 petition proceedings. Garcia’s petition may be denied at the prima facie stage
“[o]nly where the record of conviction contains facts conclusively refuting the allegations
in the petition.” (People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991, italics omitted,
citing Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963.)

                                              16.
       To that end, we conclude that an affirmative finding that Garcia acted with malice
during the attack on Barajas or that he was the actual killer would require factfinding that
is not permitted at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
798, 815 [the time for weighing and balancing and making findings on the ultimate issues
arises at the evidentiary hearing stage rather than the prima facie stage; the record should
be consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine readily ascertainable facts]; see
also, People v. Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 981-983 [in making an assessment
of the petitioner’s prima facie showing, the trial court should not have evaluated and
weighed the evidence based on testimony at the preliminary hearing but instead should
have accepted petitioner’s asserted facts as true, abrogated on other grounds in Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 963-964]; and, People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 720 [“a
court determination that substantial evidence supports a homicide conviction is not a
basis for denying resentencing after an evidentiary hearing…. Nor, then, is it a basis for
denying a petitioner the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing in the first place” (fn.
omitted].)
       The Attorney General further directs this court to admissions made by trial counsel
at Garcia’s sentencing hearing that he contends, show Garcia admitted to being the actual
killer. At sentencing, trial counsel asserted that “ ‘[Garcia] certainly understands that as a
result of his conduct, despite what others did, he took a life.’ ” But trial counsel’s
representation falls short of a clear admission by Garcia that Garcia was the actual killer,
versus an accomplice to an assault that resulted in Barajas’s death. Further, trial counsel
also represented that “[Garcia] wasn’t necessarily the stabber in this case. It was actually
Eduardo Madrigal.” Thus, contrary to the Attorney General’s assertion, Garcia did not
admit responsibility for being the actual killer.
       We acknowledge that at Garcia’s sentencing hearing, the trial court found that
Garcia was armed during the commission of the attack, and that Garcia used a knife to

                                             17.
inflict mortal wounds upon Barajas. However, the trial court’s findings were based upon
the probation officer’s report and the preliminary hearing transcript.
       The probation officer’s report is not part of the record of conviction. (People v.
Soto, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 816, fn. 2 [“A probation report ‘ordinarily is not part of
the record of conviction.’ ”]; see also, People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 179.)
Moreover, the facts recited in the probation officer’s report were derived from police
reports, which are generally inadmissible under the Evidence Code as case-specific
hearsay. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674-675.) This evidence would
be inadmissible at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing. (See §
1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) And, “[i]f such evidence may not be considered at an evidentiary
hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see how
such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p.
988, fn. omitted.)
       Although the preliminary hearing transcript is part of the record of conviction (see
People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223), and it contains admissible evidence, the
Attorney General does not explain why the trial court’s findings should be given
conclusive effect. (See People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1117, 1123
[discussing the application of claim preclusion, or collateral estoppel, to section 1172.6
proceedings at the prima facie stage where the petitioner had been convicted of murder,
as the actual killer, following a jury trial].)
       The version of section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) that was in effect at the time of
Garcia’s sentencing hearing in 2010 provided the following: “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice
of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.… The court
shall select the term which, in the court’s discretion, best serves the interests of justice....
In determining the appropriate term, the court may consider the record in the case, the

                                                  18.
probation officer’s report, other reports, including reports received pursuant to Section
1203.03, and statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution, the
defendant, or the victim, or the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, and any
further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Former § 1170, subd. (b).)
       Also at this time, former California Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b) had been
amended to eliminate the requirement that the sentencing factors be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. (See People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 836, fn.
3; Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2.) Thus, the trial court’s findings at Garcia’s sentencing hearing
were not necessarily based upon evidence that would have been admissible at a section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing, nor does the record show that these
findings made to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt degree of certainty required for a
conviction.
       Since the parties do not discuss the elements of claim preclusion and whether this
doctrine should apply to estop Garcia from arguing he is entitled to section 1172.6
resentencing relief, we need not and do not address it. The issue is deemed forfeited.
       Garcia did not admit to any of the aggravating circumstances found true by the
trial court. (See e.g., People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50 [“defendant’s plea of no
contest constituted an admission to the elements of the charged offenses only, and not to
any additional aggravating circumstances].) We therefore decline to rely upon the trial
court’s findings about the circumstance of Garcia’s crime as a basis to conclude that
Garcia is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
       We conclude that the record of conviction does not, based upon readily
ascertainable facts, demonstrate that Garcia is ineligible for resentencing relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We will therefore remand this matter back to the lower
court for further proceedings, including the issuance of an order to show cause and an
evidentiary hearing. (See § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)

                                             19.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying Garcia’s petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95 is reversed and the matter is remanded back to the trial court. On
remand, the trial court is directed to issue an order to show cause, and to hold an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                                            20.