Court Opinion

ID: 9617585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:58:11.892932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:12.649609
License: Public Domain

Carley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I am constrained to concur in the majority opinion affirming the superior court’s determination that, on the basis of the records in these cases, the appellees were entitled to unemployment benefits. However, in my opinion, the only reason that the application of the *896“any evidence” rule does not require the reversal of the superior court’s decision in this case is that there were no rules or regulations adopted by the school district requiring that a teacher take the exam every time or mandating that a teacher participate in specified study programs. “By simply promulgating or communicating, and uniformly enforcing, any reasonable work rule, an employer can readily avoid two untoward consequences: throwing the employee out of work, and being liable for his or her unemployment benefits. If the employee refuses to comply with a specific, equitably applied and reasonable rule, then the employer may fire him or her for misconduct and be confident that no unemployment compensation benefits under OCGA § 34-8-158 (2) will be paid.” Millen v. Caldwell, 253 Ga. 112, 114 (317 SE2d 818) (1984). I must opine that had there been such a rule or regulation in this case, and had the evidence shown deliberate conscious disregard of such rule, the application of the any evidence rule would have precluded the superior court from disturbing the administrative determination.
Decided January 3, 1989 —
Rehearing denied January 23, 1989
Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, James E. Humes II, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Marion O. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, Wayne P. Yancey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Annette M. Cowart, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
Milton D. Jones, for appellee (case no. 77916).
Hirsch, Beil & Partin, John P. Partin, for appellee (case no. 77917).