Court Opinion

ID: 6317752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-02-25 20:02:22.371555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:44.031063
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/25/22 Conservatorship and Estate of E.P. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

Conservatorship of the Estate                                  2d Civil No. B310235
of E.P.                                                      (Super. Ct. No. 1132787)
                                                             (Santa Barbara County)

SHARON C. KENNEDY, as                                        PUBLIC—REDACTED
Conservator, etc.,                                           VERSION OF OPINION

     Petitioner and Respondent,
                                                          Redacts material from sealed
v.                                                        record.1 (Cal. Rules of Court,
                                                         rules 8.45, 8.46(f)(1) and (f)(2).)
ANNE P.,

     Objector and Appellant;

E.P.,

     Real Party in Interest.

         This case involves material from a sealed record. In
         1

accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(f)(1) and
(f)(2), we have prepared both public (redacted) and sealed
(unredacted) versions of this opinion. We hereby order the
unredacted version of this opinion sealed.

                                                     1
       A conservator petitioned the probate court for substituted
judgment to amend the conservatee’s revocable trust. (Prob.
Code,2 § 2580 et seq.) At the conservatee’s request, the trial court
sealed portions of the record. The conservatee’s sister and
potential heir objected to the petition and sealing order. The
probate court granted the petition with the record sealed. The
objector appeals. We affirm.3
                               FACTS
       Edwin and Victoria P. had three children, J.P., Anne P.,4
and E.P. Edwin and Victoria are now deceased. J.P. is
profoundly disabled. Anne is his conservator.
       E.P. is mildly developmentally disabled. Sharon Kennedy,
a licensed fiduciary, is conservator of E.P.’s estate. Dee Duncan
is conservator of E.P.’s person.
       E.P. is the sole income and principal life beneficiary of the
E.P. Revocable Trust (hereafter “the Trust”). The Trust was last
amended in 1998. The 1998 version of the Trust provides that
upon E.P.’s death, the corpus would be distributed “to the
charitable organization where [E.P.] was housed or was a client
at the time of her death.” At the time of the amendment, E.P was
living at the Devereux Foundation. E.P now lives in a home
owned by her conservatorship estate. She does not expect to
reside with a charitable organization in the future. Kennedy is
the sole trustee.

      2  All statutory references are to the Probate Code.
      3  Appellant’s motion to unseal the record is denied.
       4 We refer to Anne P. by her first name for clarity, not out

of disrespect.

                                  2
                                         Petition
         Kennedy petitioned for substituted judgment to exercise
the right of the conservatee to modify the Trust.
         The petition alleged that E.P. is 61 years old, has no spouse
or domestic partner, and no children. Dana Longo has been
appointed by the court to serve as her attorney.
         The petition was based on information Kennedy received
from Longo. Longo’s declaration was attached to the petition. He
declared as follows: “Although E.P. suffers from disabilities, she
is articulate, confident and unequivocal in stating her desires
pertaining to the disposition of her assets upon her death.”
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         Longo opined that E.P. has the capacity to form and
express her estate planning wishes. E.P. does not want her
estate planning documents to be made public, and is strongly

                                            3
opposed to Anne receiving a copy. Kennedy applied to file records
under seal.
                             Opposition
       Anne filed opposition to the petition for substituted
judgment on the grounds that E.P. lacks the capacity to make a
will or trust and that she is highly susceptible to undue influence
and manipulation.
       Anne alleged that her attorney, Robert Baskin, spoke with
Longo. Longo said he was drafting a new trust for E.P. that
would leave a significant portion of her estate to New Directions.
The conservator of E.P.’s person is the executive director and
highest paid employee of New Directions.
       Duncan worked for many years at the Devereux
Foundation where E.P. resided from 1983 until 2002. Duncan
became acquainted with the families of Devereux patients who
had money and cultivated a relationship with E.P.’s mother.
After Duncan became the conservator of E.P.’s person, E.P. ended
communication with Anne and lifelong friends. Until then, Anne
had a positive relationship with E.P. Duncan has interfered with
E.P.’s relationships and isolated her.
                     Psychological Evaluation
       At a hearing on the petition, the trial court announced that
it was considering appointing psychologist Rebecca Goodman to
do a capacity evaluation. Anne’s attorney agreed. E.P.’s attorney
stated that E.P. already has a report from Goodman. The report
concluded, in part: “It is my judgment that [E.P.] has capacity to
choose to whom she gifts or bequeaths money . . . . She has clear
and consistent preferences about to whom she would gift or
bequeath money. These are described above. I see no evidence

                                4
that these stated preferences were unduly influenced by anyone
else.” E.P.’s attorney read the report’s conclusion in open court.
                           Sealing Order
       The trial court made the following sealing order: “It is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUGED and DECREED that the
Confidential Estate Planning Document, Declaration of Counsel
for Conservatee, Application to File Records Under Seal,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Application, and Neuropsychological Capacity Evaluation of the
Conservatee by Rebecca Goodman, Ph.D., be filed by the Clerk of
the Court UNDER SEAL.”
                          DISCUSSION
                                  I
                      Statutory Authorization
       A conservator may file a petition for an order of the court
authorizing the conservator to exercise the right of the
conservatee to revoke or modify a revocable trust. (§ 2580, subd.
(b)(11).) The court may make such an order only if it determines
that a) the conservatee either does not oppose the proposed action
or if opposed lacks capacity for the proposed action; and b) the
proposed action will have no adverse effect on the estate or the
estate remaining will be adequate to provide for the needs of the
conservatee and those legally entitled to the conservatee’s
support. (§ 2582.) After a hearing, the court, in its discretion,
may approve, modify, or disapprove the proposed action.
(§ 2584.)

                                5
                                   II
                         Standard of Review
       We review the trial court’s grant of an application for
substituted judgment for an abuse of discretion. (§ 2584;
Conservatorship of Hart (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1253.)
                                  III
                        Evidentiary Hearing
       Anne contends the trial court erred in denying her request
for an evidentiary hearing.
       Anne relies on section 1022, which provides, “An affidavit
or verified petition shall be received as evidence when offered in
an uncontested proceeding under this code.” The general rule is
that affidavits may not be used as evidence at a contested probate
hearing. (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1308-
1309.) But the restriction on the use of affidavits is inapplicable
when the parties do not object to the use of affidavits and both
parties adopt that means in support of their positions. (Id. at
p. 1309.)
       Here both parties elected to proceed by way of affidavits to
support their positions. Anne’s responding papers did not
request an evidentiary hearing. It was only after Anne received
the trial court’s tentative ruling that she orally demanded an
evidentiary hearing. Anne presents no authority allowing her to
elect to proceed by declaration, then change her mind when it
appears the court is about to rule against her.
       Moreover, Anne did not submit an offer of proof and she
makes none in her briefs on appeal. That the trial court may be
aware of contested facts is not an offer of proof. The failure to
make an offer of proof in the trial court precludes consideration

                                6
on appeal of an allegedly erroneous exclusion of evidence. (Shaw
v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 282.)
       Anne contends that without an evidentiary hearing, there
is no admissible evidence to support the trial court’s order. But
Anne has waived that argument by electing to proceed by
declaration.
                                  IV
                                Notice
       Anne contends that proper notice of the petition was not
given.
       Anne relies on section 2581, subdivision (c), requiring
notice to beneficiaries under any document executed by the
conservatee that may have testamentary effect. Anne points out
that no notice was given to the Devereux Foundation.
       But Anne cites no authority giving her standing to object to
lack of notice to others. (In re J.T. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 707,
717 [to have standing, a party’s personal rights must be affected
by the ruling].)
                                   V
                        Modification of Trust
       Anne contends that section 2580 prohibits modification of
the Trust.
       Section 2580, subdivision (b)(11) provides, in part, “[T]he
court shall not authorize or require the conservator to exercise
the right to revoke or modify a revocable trust if the instrument
governing the trust . . . evidences an intent to reserve the right of
revocation or modification exclusively to the conservatee.”
       Anne claims a Trust provision requiring the trustor’s
signature on any modification evidences such an intent. Anne
does not cite the Trust provision.

                                  7
      The only such provision is in paragraph 4.1.2 of the Trust
under the heading “Power to Amend.” It provides: ‘The Settlor
may amend any of the terms of this Trust Agreement at any time
during the Settlor’s lifetime by an instrument in writing signed
by the Settlor and delivered to the Trustee.”
      That is a standard clause reserving to the settlor the right
to amend the Trust. It delineates how the settlor may exercise
that right. It does not evidence the intent to reserve the right
exclusively to the conservatee.
                                 VI
       Sealing Order - E.P.’s Constitutional Right to Privacy
      Anne contends neither the conservator nor the conservatee
have the right to prevent disclosure of E.P.’s proposed estate plan
to the public or interested parties.
      The California Constitution guarantees “[a]ll people” the
right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) “All people” includes
conservatees. The right includes “intimate personal decisions
[and] conducting personal activities without observation,
intrusion or interference.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) The right to privacy extends to
estate planning documents. (Estate of Gallio (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 592, 594 [right precludes discovery of a living
person’s will], overruled in part on other grounds by In re Brace
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 925; see also § 16069, subd. (a)(1) [trustee
not required to provide the terms of a revocable trust to a
beneficiary].)
      Anne claims E.P. waived her right of privacy by placing her
mental state at issue. But E.P. did not place her mental state at
issue. Anne did. It was Anne, not E.P., who claimed that E.P.
was subject to undue influence. Moreover, the moving papers

                                 8
were filed by Kennedy. Anne cites no authority giving Kennedy
the power to waive E.P.’s right to privacy, particularly when such
a waiver would be contrary to E.P.’s expressed wishes.
        Anne argues section 2583 requires the probate court to
consider all the circumstances in granting or denying a
substituted judgment petition. She claims the probate court
cannot consider all the circumstances if it seals part of the record.
But the record is not sealed from the probate court. It has full
access to all the documents filed. Anne cites nothing in the
record to show that the trial court did not consider all the
relevant circumstances.
        Anne claims the sealing order denied her due process. But
she cites no authority giving her due process rights in another
person’s estate plan. Anne’s reliance on Estate of Buckman
(1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 560, is misplaced. There the court
held that an executor appointed under a will had a due process
right to notice and hearing before being removed. Anne is not
E.P.’s executor, trustee, or conservator. She has no interest in
E.P.’s Trust or estate plan.
        Anne argues the probate court failed to make the finding
required by California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d). That rule
provides:
        “The court may order that a record be filed under seal only
if it expressly finds facts that establish:
        “(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the
right of public access to the record;
        “(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record;
        “(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding
interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;
        “(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and

                                 9
       “(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the
overriding interest.”
       The probate court found: “The overriding interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the conservatee’s
Neuropsychological Capacity Evaluation and the conservatee’s
testamentary desires overcomes the right of public access to such
report and to the provisions of her estate plan and is sufficient to
support the sealing of the report and of paragraph 2 of Article III
of the [E.P.] Trust as set forth in the Amended and Restated
Trust and paragraphs 5–10 and 14 (partial) of the Declaration of
Dana F. Longo, attorney for the conservatee. Such provisions are
not required to be included in the Petition for Substituted
Judgment to Exercise Right of Conservatee to Modify Revocable
Trust and to Execute Pour-Over Will on Behalf of Conservatee
and to Authorize Transfer of Assets of Conservatorship Estate to
Trustee.”
       First, Anne fails to point to anywhere in the record where
she raised the issue in the probate court. She claims she did not
receive a copy of the sealing order until after the hearing. But
she does not explain what prevented her from raising an
objection after she received the order. Had she done so, the
probate court could have amended its order. The failure to object
in the probate court waives the issue on appeal. (Avalos v. Perez
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 773, 776.)
       Second, the probate court substantially complied with
California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d). The court expressly
found that E.P. has an overriding interest in her privacy that
overcomes the right of public access. The court also expressly
found that the overriding interest is sufficient to support sealing
of the record. The court’s order is limited to specific paragraphs

                                10
and is thus narrowly tailored. That there is a substantial
probability that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the
record is not sealed and that no less restrictive means exist are
obvious from the circumstances that led to the sealing order.
E.P. does not want Anne to know her estate plan. She has that
right. Anne suggests no other way to protect E.P.’s right.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment (order) is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
respondent and real party in interest.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             PERREN, J.

                                 11
                   Colleen K. Sterne, Judge

           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

               ______________________________

      Law Office of Robert M. Baskin and Robert M. Baskin for
Objector and Appellant.
      Miller & Berryhill, Mary Jane Miller; Ferguson Case Orr
Paterson and Wendy C. Lascher for Petitioner and Respondent.
      Fauver, Large, Archbald & Spray and Dana F. Longo for
Real Party in Interest.

                              12