Court Opinion

ID: 9952048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 16:15:17.093778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:45.119173
License: Public Domain

J-A03042-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RONALD HARVEY FOSTER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 368 WDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 16, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-04-CR-0002368-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED: March 19, 2024

       Ronald Harvey Foster (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the order

dismissing his first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We

affirm.

       This Court previously summarized the underlying facts:

             This case arises from a drug deal gone bad. Many of the
       facts are undisputed. On several occasions, Appellant sought to
       purchase marijuana from Dane Mathesius, one of the two murder
       victims. When Mathesius appeared at an abandoned building to
       consummate the transaction, Appellant, Lawrence Reddick,
       Deontae Jones, and Rasheid Hicks were waiting. Present with
       Mathesius was sixteen-year-old William Booher and thirteen-year-
       old N.R.

            Mathesius stopped his car, and Reddick climbed into the rear
       passenger seat. Reddick brandished a firearm and directed
       Mathesius to pull over. Reddick then robbed Mathesius, Booher,

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       and N.R. At the conclusion of the robbery, Reddick fatally shot
       both Mathesius and Booher.

             The primary issue at trial was Appellant’s awareness of
       Reddick’s intent to rob Mathesius. Appellant admitted he set up
       the drug deal. He also admitted he agreed to have Reddick
       accomplish the transaction, as Appellant feared that Booher
       intended to rob Appellant.

              In contrast, the Commonwealth presented testimony that
       Appellant planned the robbery with Reddick. Hicks testified that
       he heard Appellant plan the robbery with Reddick the night before
       it occurred. Xavier Fisher also testified to Appellant’s involvement
       in planning the robbery the night before. Jones testified that
       Appellant had informed him of his intent to rob Mathesius a week
       prior to the robbery.

Commonwealth v. Foster, 221 A.3d 1239, 505 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(unpublished memorandum at 1).

       On November 14, 2016, the Commonwealth filed an information

charging Appellant with two counts of criminal homicide, three counts of

robbery, and one count each of conspiracy to commit robbery and criminal

use of a communication facility.2

       Appellant was represented by Paul Gettleman, Esquire (trial counsel).

On January 13, 2017, Appellant, who was 17 years old at the time of the

alleged offenses, filed a petition to transfer his case to juvenile court

(decertification petition). The defense retained Dr. Nancy Kunsak, a licensed

psychologist, “to assess [Appellant’s] mental status at the time of the

shooting.” Supplement to PCRA Petition, 5/17/21, Exhibit A (Kunsak Report)

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 3701(a)(1)(i) and (ii), 903(a)(1), 7512(a).

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at 2. On March 16, 2017, Dr. Kunsak submitted a seven-page report in which

she diagnosed Appellant with “Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity,

Combined Type” (ADHD).           Id. at 6.      Dr. Kunsak concluded Appellant was

unable “to anticipate the outcome of a sequence of events or his own choices,”

and “was fully influenced by faulty reasoning and shortsightedness” when he

involved himself in the alleged offenses. Id. at 7. Dr. Kunsak stated Appellant

“expresses appropriate remorse and regret,” but opined it was “doubtful that

[Appellant] understands the role his involvement had in the deaths that

occurred.” Id.

       On June 16, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw the

decertification petition. That same day, Appellant (who was 18 years old by

that time) underwent an extensive colloquy regarding his decision to withdraw

his decertification petition.      See N.T., 6/16/17, at 3-19.         The trial court

granted the motion to withdraw, finding Appellant’s decision was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/21, at 22.

       On September 5, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of third-

degree murder,3 three counts of robbery, and one count each of conspiracy to

commit robbery and criminal use of a communication facility.

       The    trial   court   scheduled        sentencing,   ordered   a   presentence

investigation report, and directed that Appellant undergo a mental health

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

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evaluation and a drug and alcohol evaluation. Trial Court Order, 9/5/17. At

the October 17, 2017, sentencing hearing, trial counsel presented testimony

from six witnesses, including Appellant and his mother. See N.T., 10/17/17,

at 21-43. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 34 to 70 years in

prison.

      Represented by new, court-appointed counsel (appellate counsel),

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. The trial court denied the motion, and

Appellant timely appealed.      On September 9, 2019, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Foster, 221 A.3d 1239 (unpublished

memorandum at 13). On June 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Foster, 236 A.3d 1038

(Pa. 2020).

      On April 27, 2021, represented by new counsel (PCRA counsel),

Appellant filed the instant, timely PCRA petition. The petition alleged, inter

alia, trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for advising Appellant to withdraw the

decertification petition and for failing to present certain mitigating evidence at

sentencing.    PCRA Petition, 4/27/21, at 5-6.        The petition also alleged

appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to preserve these claims in a

post-sentence motion or on appeal. Id. at 6-7, 9-11.

      On October 15, 2021, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. Trial

counsel testified that he believed “the facts [relating to the petition] for

decertification were horrendous” and the chances of the trial court granting

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decertification were “remote.”     N.T., 10/15/21, at 17. Trial counsel testified

that he discussed with Appellant and Appellant’s mother the prospects of going

forward with the decertification petition, “and ultimately we all decided that

we should just go to trial.” Id.

      Dr. Kunsak testified that she discussed with trial counsel “how difficult

it would be to build a case for [Appellant] to be tried as [a juvenile] as opposed

to an adult.” Id. at 155. Dr. Kunsak testified that trial counsel indicated he

did not anticipate Dr. Kunsak having to testify at a decertification hearing, as

trial counsel believed that decertification “was going to be a fruitless pursuit.”

Id. at 155, 172. Dr. Kunsak also testified that trial counsel never contacted

her about testifying at Appellant’s sentencing hearing. Id. at 156.

      On December 16, 2021, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA

petition. PCRA Court Order and Opinion, 12/16/21.

      No timely appeal followed.      The PCRA court appointed new counsel

(PCRA appellate counsel) and, on November 1, 2022, Appellant filed a petition

to reinstate his appeal rights, nunc pro tunc.     On March 2, 2023, the PCRA

court granted the petition and reinstated Appellant’s PCRA appeal rights, nunc

pro tunc. On March 31, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The PCRA

court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained

of on appeal, but filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

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        Appellant presents two issues for our review:4

              1.     [Did the PCRA court err] by finding that neither trial
        counsel nor appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
        adequately advise [Appellant] concerning the withdrawal of the
        decertification petition … [and] for failing to raise this claim [on
        appeal?]

               2.    [Did the PCRA court err] by finding that neither trial
        counsel nor appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present
        mitigation evidence at the time of sentencing … [and] for failing
        to raise this claim [on appeal?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

        “We review the denial of PCRA relief by examining whether the PCRA

court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023) (citing

Commonwealth v. Housman, 226 A.3d 1249, 1260 (Pa. 2020)). The scope

of our review is “limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial

level.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011) (citation

omitted).

        Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel. “[W]e begin, as we

must,      with    the     presumption         that   counsel   acted   effectively.”

Johnson, 289 A.3d at 979 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d

998, 1005 (Pa. 2013)); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345,

380 (Pa. 2011) (“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s brief identifies a third issue, but his counsel withdrew the claim,

stating it lacks merit. See Appellant’s Brief at 9, 13, 31-33.

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counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)).

      A PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a
      preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)).

     To establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must plead and

prove:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
      suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
      measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
      of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
      Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing the
      ineffective assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v.
      Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). … Additionally,
      counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a
      meritless claim. Finally, because a PCRA petitioner must establish
      all the Pierce prongs to be entitled to relief, we are not required
      to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific
      order; thus, if a claim fails under any required element, we may
      dismiss the claim on that basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified).

      In his first issue, Appellant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to advise Appellant not to withdraw the decertification petition, and appellate

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counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal.             See

Appellant’s Brief at 14-20.

      We begin by considering whether the decertification petition has

arguable merit. We have explained that

      a claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
      accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth
      v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) (“if a petitioner raises
      allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do not establish the
      underlying claim ..., he or she will have failed to establish the
      arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether the facts
      rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation modified; brackets omitted).

      The Juvenile Act provides that, except in the case of the most serious

crimes,

      if it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding that the
      defendant is a child … the court shall forthwith halt further criminal
      proceedings, and, where appropriate, transfer the case to the
      division or a judge of the court assigned to conduct juvenile
      hearings.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). However, “[i]n determining whether to transfer a

case charging murder or any of the offenses excluded from the definition of

‘delinquent act’ in [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 6302, the child shall be required to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the

public interest.” Id.; see also K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 128 (Pa. Super.

2019) (“A preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater

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weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement

for preponderance of the evidence.” (citation omitted)).

      Because Appellant was charged with murder, he was not entitled to a

transfer to juvenile court as a matter of right.         Id.    To prevail on his

decertification petition, Appellant had the burden of establishing that the

transfer would serve the public interest. Id.

      “The decision whether to grant an application for transfer to the Juvenile

Court of a minor charged with murder is within the sound discretion of the

hearing judge.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 664 A.2d 597, 598 (Pa. Super.

1995) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion which will warrant reversal

of the trial court’s decision to retain a murder case in the Criminal Division

may not merely be an error of judgment, but must be a misapplication of the

law or an exercise of manifestly unreasonable judgment based upon partiality,

prejudice or ill will.” Id. at 599 (citation omitted).

      “In determining whether the child has so established that the transfer

will serve the public interest, the court shall consider the factors contained in

[42 Pa.C.S.A. §]      6355(a)(4)(iii)….”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a); accord

Commonwealth v. Green, 291 A.3d 317, 318 n.1 (Pa. 2022).                    Section

6355(a)(4)(iii) provides that transfer is warranted only if the trial court finds

      that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public
      interest is served by the transfer of the case…. In determining
      whether the public interest can be served, the court shall consider
      the following factors:

            (A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

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              (B) the impact of the offense on the community;

              (C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual
              posed by the child;

              (D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly
              committed by the child;

              (E) the degree of the child’s culpability;

              (F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives
              available under this chapter and in the adult criminal justice
              system; and

              (G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision
              or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following
              factors:

                     (I) age;

                     (II) mental capacity;

                     (III) maturity;

                     (IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
                     the child;

                     (V) previous records, if any;

                     (VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent
                     history, including the success or failure of any
                     previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate
                     the child;

                     (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to
                     the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;[5]

                     (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;

                     (IX) any other relevant factors….

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii) (footnote added).

____________________________________________

5 Juvenile court jurisdiction expires when a delinquent child “attains 21 years

of age.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(a)(5).

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      “[F]or purposes of analyzing the factors in [Section] 6355(a)(4)(iii), a

trial court may (but need not) assume that the juvenile is guilty and

committed the alleged acts constituting the offense.” Commonwealth

v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 508 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis added).

      Appellant asserts trial counsel never properly assessed whether the

Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) factors could have been established in Appellant’s

favor. Appellant’s Brief at 16. However, Appellant fails to demonstrate that

the factors could have been established even if trial counsel had acted

differently.

      Appellant’s PCRA petition alleged trial counsel should have pursued the

decertification petition because he “possessed a promising expert report” from

Dr. Kunsak.    PCRA Petition, 4/27/21, at 23-24, 27.    On appeal, however,

Appellant concedes that, at the PCRA evidentiary hearing, “Dr. Kunsak

testified that she never assessed [Appellant] concerning the 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

6355(a)(4)(iii) factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 17; see N.T., 10/15/21, at 195

(Dr. Kunsak admitting she is “not aware of what the factors are.”). The PCRA

court determined Dr. Kunsak’s report did not support decertification, in part

because it relied on Appellant’s self-serving denial of culpability for the

underlying offenses. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/21, at 26-28; see also

id. at 26 (quoting the holding of Brown, supra, that a trial court considering

decertification may assume the juvenile is guilty).

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      Appellant now argues that because Dr. Kunsak’s report did not support

decertification, trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining some other

report. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. However, whether a more favorable

report could have been obtained remains mere conjecture. Appellant had the

opportunity to substantiate his claim at the PCRA evidentiary hearing, where

he was required to prove facts establishing the merit of his underlying

decertification petition. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 813 A.2d 761, 771

(Pa. 2002) (ineffectiveness claim rejected where petitioner “did not present

anything at the PCRA evidentiary hearing which would have produced a

different result [on the underlying issue]….    Counsel cannot be faulted for

failing to discover or present evidence if [petitioner] fails to meet the burden

of establishing that the evidence exists.”).

      The PCRA court analyzed the Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) factors and

concluded Appellant’s decertification petition lacked merit:

            The crimes [charged against Appellant], robbery and
      criminal homicide, had the most serious impact imaginable on the
      victims. The impact on their families and the communities cannot
      be overestimated. [Appellant’s] threat to the public safety, as the
      person who planned the robbery, is great. The nature of the
      circumstances, ambush and armed robbery of three unsuspecting
      juveniles, including a thirteen year old boy, at a drug deal set up
      by [Appellant], is of the most serious character.         Although
      [Appellant] was not the actual shooter, the testimony
      demonstrated his planning role in the scheme, and his efforts to
      conceal evidence after the fact, and therefore his high level of
      culpability. The alternatives available in the juvenile system
      would clearly have been inadequate to address [Appellant’s]
      needs….

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             The [PCRA c]ourt does not believe that [Appellant] would
      have been amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation
      as a juvenile. He was nearly eighteen years old at the time of the
      offense.     Although he was diagnosed with “Attention-
      Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, combined presentation[,]” and had
      abused marijuana, he was of average intelligence, able to manage
      his school work, and performed well in football. His criminal
      sophistication was demonstrably high, although his prior record
      was not substantial.        The [PCRA c]ourt does not believe
      [Appellant] could have been rehabilitated for such serious crimes
      in the short time that would have been available before the
      juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired.

            The [PCRA c]ourt finds that [Appellant] has failed to present
      evidence that would prove that [Appellant’s] decertification would
      have served the public interest. Rather, the [PCRA c]ourt finds
      that [Appellant’s] decertification would have demeaned the
      seriousness of his crimes. [Appellant] therefore fails to prove …
      arguable merit…. Because his claim has no arguable merit[,] …
      [Appellant’s] counsel was not ineffective.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/21, at 26, 28-29.

      The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis.           We agree that

Appellant’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit and, therefore, his first

ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel fails.

      Regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we

observe the following. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of

ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of

representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa.

2022). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry

is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in

fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective,

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then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the

underlying issue.”    Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.

Super. 2010).       Here, we concluded trial counsel was not ineffective.

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,

premised on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, fails. See id.

        In his second issue, Appellant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing, and appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal.          See

Appellant’s Brief at 21-30. Appellant notes trial counsel presented testimony

from six character witnesses during the sentencing hearing, but asserts “there

was no mention of [Appellant’s] mental health diagnosis and how it affected

him.”    Id. at 24.   Rather, Appellant argues, trial counsel only presented

witnesses who testified Appellant “was a good kid” and asked for leniency.

Id. Appellant maintains trial counsel should have called Dr. Kunsak and Dr.

Daniel Graff to testify at the sentencing hearing.       Id. at 27-28.     Their

testimony, Appellant asserts, would have explained his medical diagnosis, his

“lack of decision-making capabilities,” and his potential for rehabilitation. Id.

at 24-27. Appellant further argues trial counsel should have asked Appellant’s

mother, who did testify at sentencing, to testify regarding Appellant’s medical

history and diagnosis. Id. at 24-26. We will separately address Appellant’s

claim as to each proposed witness.

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     To prove trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, a PCRA

petitioner must demonstrate:

     (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
     for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
     the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
     for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
     witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
     trial.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 167 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

     At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Dr. Kunsak testified that she was

available and willing to testify at Appellant’s sentencing hearing.          N.T.,

10/15/21, at 156.    Trial counsel acknowledged he knew of Dr. Kunsak’s

existence. Id. at 25-26. We may therefore consider whether the absence of

her testimony prejudiced Appellant.

     The PCRA court reviewed Dr. Kunsak’s report and specifically found that

it did not have “high mitigating value[.]” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/21, at

8. The PCRA court stated:

     At best, [the report] is largely conclusory, providing few examples
     to support the statements it makes. At worst, it is contradicted
     by the voluminous evidence that was received at trial, and even
     makes statements that could well be construed as aggravating.
     For example, it states that [Appellant] has “not learn[ed] from
     past disciplinary measures to modify his behavior” despite the fact
     that “[h]e often was punished for the outcome of his behavioral
     choices….” Thus, the report indicates that [Appellant] has a
     history of refusing to behave in an acceptable way despite
     repeated attempts at correction. Further, the report states,
     “[Appellant] often does not see how he is responsible for bad
     choices when they are a product, in part, of someone else’s
     influences.” It would appear the report may be suggesting that
     [Appellant], rather than displaying genuine remorse, instead
     shifts the blame for [his] actions to others. Next, the report states

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       that “many individuals like [Appellant] have problems with
       authority because those in charge—parents, teachers, employers,
       coaches—can see what he cannot see.” Thus, the report further
       reinforces the view that [Appellant] has refused to conform his
       conduct to the reasonable expectations of everyday authorities
       because he sees things differently. Nevertheless, the report
       agrees that [Appellant] is of average intelligence, that he has the
       ability to complete his class work, and that he benefited
       emotionally and behaviorally from … play[ing] on the Aliquippa
       football team.

Id. at 8-9.

       Moreover, the PCRA court made clear that it was aware of Appellant’s

ADHD diagnosis at the sentencing hearing:6

       It appears to the [PCRA c]ourt that the serious mental health
       condition that [Appellant] claims he had that the [PCRA c]ourt
       failed to consider was … ADHD[]. The transcript of the sentencing
       hearing plainly shows that the [PCRA c]ourt reviewed with counsel
       the reports and evaluations that had been prepared prior to
       sentencing, including the pre-sentence report, a mental health
       evaluation, a drug and alcohol evaluation, and the sentencing
       guidelines. N.T., 10/17/17, at 4-7. The pre-sentence report
       stated that [Appellant] had been diagnosed with ADHD. Thus, the
       [PCRA c]ourt was already aware of the diagnosis.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/21, at 8.7

       The PCRA court concluded,

       to the extent there is any mitigating value to [Dr. Kunsak’s] letter,
       report, and testimony, the [PCRA c]ourt cannot say that they
       provide any substantive information that was not already captured
____________________________________________

6 The same judge presided over Appellant’s trial, sentencing, and PCRA
petition.

7 Where the trial court has the benefit of a presentence investigation report,

“we can assume [it] was aware of relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.
Super. 2010).

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      by the pre-sentence report, mental health evaluation, and drug
      and alcohol evaluation, or the evidence presented at trial…. The
      [PCRA c]ourt therefore finds that [Appellant] failed to prove that
      he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present this
      evidence at sentencing.

Id. at 10.

      The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis. We agree that Appellant

failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the absence of Dr. Kunsak’s

testimony.

      Appellant next argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr.

Daniel Graff to testify at sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 27-28. Appellant

claims Dr. Graff was Appellant’s pediatrician and “would have appeared for

testimony concerning [Appellant’s] medical records.”        Id. at 28.   Though

Appellant’s brief asserts Dr. Graff “is still an active pediatrician in Beaver

County,” Appellant cites to nothing in the record establishing Dr. Graff’s

availability and willingness to testify on Appellant’s behalf. Id. at 27. Our

review discloses Dr. Graff did not testify at the PCRA evidentiary hearing and

Appellant’s brief fails to specify the expected substance of his testimony. See

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 17 (Pa. Super. 2020) (rejecting

an ineffectiveness claim for failure to call a witness where the proposed

witness did not testify at PCRA evidentiary hearing and petitioner did not

demonstrate how the witness’s testimony would have been helpful).

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim regarding Dr. Graff fails.

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      Finally, Appellant asserts trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

not eliciting testimony from Appellant’s mother regarding Appellant’s medical

history. Appellant’s Brief at 26. Appellant argues his mother “would have

testified regarding the day-to-day impact of [Appellant’s] mental health

diagnosis….”    Id.   However, Appellant’s brief fails to specify the expected

substance of this testimony, and Appellant’s mother did not testify at the PCRA

evidentiary hearing. See Selenski, 228 A.3d at 17. As such, Appellant failed

to establish prejudice resulting from the absence of this testimony.

      Because    Appellant    failed   to   plead   and   prove   trial   counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, his

claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to raise this issue lacks

merit. Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270.

      For the above reasons, neither of Appellant’s issues merit relief.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.

      Judge Kunselman did not participate in the consideration or decision of

this case.

DATE: 03/19/2024

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