Court Opinion

ID: 9713867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:34.674184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.079253
License: Public Domain

McGINLEY, Judge,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the learned majority’s decision to reverse the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s (Board) order that reversed the WCJ’s decision to equally apportion wage loss and medical benefits between AIG and PSM with respect to Claimant’s claim petition.
I agree with the Board that the WCJ erroneously applied Section 322 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 677, which authorizes the WCJ to apportion benefits when an employee sustains multiple work injuries with more than one employer. I agree this Court has determined that Section 322 of the Act also authorizes the WCJ to apportion benefits when an employee sustains multiple work injuries with the same employer where the injuries are covered by different insurance companies. Franklin Steel Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Clark), 665 A.2d 1310 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995).
I differ from the majority as follows. I do not believe that the apportionment analysis of Section 322 is applicable here. In this case, Claimant suffered a work-related back injury on January 4, 1996, and suffered a work-related injury to the same body part on October 9,1996.
*1270Claimant’s physician, Dawn Rider Foster, M.D. (Dr. Rider Foster), whom the WCJ found credible, testified within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that after the January 4, 1996, injury and before the October 9, 1996, injury Claimant suffered from “[c]hronie lumbar pain secondary to a work-related injury in January of 1996 with a small herniated disc at L5 SI and T10; possible lumbar radiculopathy at that time.” Deposition of Dawn Rider Foster, M.D., February 16, 1998, (Dr. Rider Foster Deposition) at 35.
Dr. Rider Foster also testified that Claimant never recovered from the January 4, 1996, injury. Dr. Rider Foster Deposition at 39. After the October 9, 1996, incident, Dr. Rider Foster opined that Claimant suffered from:
progression or worsening of the L5 SI herniated disc secondary to the motor vehicle accident that he sustained in October of 1996 while at work, lumbar radiculopathy, worsening of his lumbar pain. I would say an acute lumbar strain on top of the herniated disc.... The cause was his initial work-related injury January of 1996 when he had an 850 pound refrigerator [the record indicates that instead of a refrigerator, it was a pizza oven] fall on top of him, and this was exacerbated by the second injury he had in October of 1996, the motor vehicle accident. (Emphasis added).
Dr. Rider Foster Deposition at 36.
Dr. Rider Foster believed that Claimant’s inability to perform his job at the time of the January 4,1996, injury was due to both the January 4,1996, and October 9, 1996, incidents.
In Franklin Steel, there were starkly different causes of the disabilities. Robert C. Clark suffered injuries to two different shoulders in two incidents, not an injury to the same body part as happened here. Like the Board I believe the true and precise issue is whether Claimant suffered a recurrence or an aggravation as a result of the October 9, 1996, incident. I agree with the Board that the “pro rata” remedy of Section 322 of the Act does not control.
In this regard I empathize with the Board. The Board found itself in that minefield of workers’ compensation law that involves the subtle distinction between aggravation and recurrence. The phrase “aggravation of a pre-existing condition” denotes a new work-related injury while a “recurrence of a prior injury” denotes an injury directly related to a prior injury. Reliable Foods, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Horrocks), 660 A.2d 162 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995).
In SKF USA Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Smalls), 728 A.2d 385 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowaiice of appeal denied, 561 Pa. 663, 747 A.2d 903 (1999), this Court addressed the distinction between a recurrence and an aggravation:
In most situations where this sort of dispute arises, both the original injury and the subsequent occurrence contribute in some way to the disability at issue. Nonetheless, in order to adjudicate the rights of the parties, we frequently must attribute causation of the current disability to one event or the other. Thus, we have held that if a compensable disability results directly from a prior injury but manifests itself on the occasion of an intervening incident which does not contribute materially to the disability, then the claimant has suffered a recurrence.... Conversely, of course, where the intervening incident does materially contribute to the disability, a new injury, or aggravation, has occurred.... Whether or not the intervening incident materially contributed to the disability is a question of fact to be determined by the WCJ.
SKF USA, Inc., 728 A.2d at 387-388.
This Court further explained that it is the role of the WCJ to make the factual *1271finding of causation which then leads to the legal conclusion that the claimant sustained a separately compensable injury, an aggravation; or renewed symptoms of the old injury, a recurrence.
Here, Claimant was working in a light duty capacity because of the first injury. Then, he was injured in a collision while driving a truck in the course and scope of his employment. The resulting injury, as Dr. Rider Foster credibly described, was a worsening of Claimant’s herniated L5-S1 disc.
Neither directly nor straightforwardly asked of Dr. Rider Foster by counsel was the crucial question whether the October 9, 1996, subsequent accident substantially or materially contributed to Claimant’s total disability.1
Although not as precise as desired, given Dr. Rider-Foster’s credited testimony, I agree with the Board’s conclusion that sufficient credited information was elicited from Dr. Rider-Foster to inescapably conclude that Claimant suffered an aggravation. I would affirm.2

. Blame should not be visited on counsel for this omission. Essentially, the contest was between the medical experts, and as so often the case, hinged upon which one would be believed. Claimant’s counsel was entitled to a favorable verdict so long as Dr. Rider Foster was believed. Counsel for PSM, the first insurer, did ask its medical expert the crucial question and so did counsel for AIG, the second insurer. The WCJ specifically rejected the opinions of the insurers’ medical experts where such opinions conflicted with those of Dr. Rider Foster. Counsel could not know the WCJ's credibility determinations in advance. Perhaps for tactical reasons, counsel for PSM and AIG chose not to ask this critical question of Dr. Rider Foster, given that Dr. Rider Foster was Claimant’s expert and counsel did not know what answer she would give. However, because the precise inquiry was not made, I believe the WCJ embarked on an erroneous course to pro rata apportionment based upon an incorrect interpretation of Dr. Rider Foster’s opinion.

. As no party challenged the method of calculating apportionment made by the WCJ, and because I do not believe that benefits should be apportioned here, I will refrain from addressing the majority’s calculation of benefits.