Court Opinion

ID: 9838106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 12:07:48.652509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:15.932798
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                          No. COA22-965

                                    Filed 05 September 2023

Onslow County, No. 21-JB-201

IN THE MATTER OF: S.C.

       Appeal by Juvenile-appellant from order entered 23 June 2022 by Judge James

L. Moore Jr. in Onslow County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9

August 2023.

       Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General, Janelle E.
       Varley, for the State.

       Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi
       Reiner, for juvenile-appellant.

       MURPHY, Judge.

       Juvenile-appellant, Karen,1 appeals the trial court’s adjudication and

disposition orders sentencing her to eight months’ probation. Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-

2405(4), a trial court must advise a juvenile of her right to remain silent against

prejudicial self-incrimination during an adjudicatory hearing. We hold, as the State

concedes, that Karen’s statutory right under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405(4) were violated

when she testified without the trial court first conducting a colloquy regarding her

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of all juveniles and for ease of reading.
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                                  Opinion of the Court

right to avoid self-incrimination.    Accordingly, we vacate the adjudication and

disposition orders and remand for a new hearing.

                                  BACKGROUND

      On 10 November 2021, the State filed a juvenile petition alleging that Karen

committed misdemeanor assault against Iris in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c)(1).

At the 24 March 2022 adjudicatory hearing, Karen denied the allegation. Karen’s

attorney made a motion to dismiss after the close of the State’s evidence, which the

trial court denied. Karen’s attorney then called her to the witness stand to testify.

The trial court did not ask Karen any questions or engage in a colloquy with her

before she testified about the assault allegation. Nor did the trial court inform Karen

of her right to remain silent; that her testimony could be used against her; or that

she was entitled to invoke her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

      The contested adjudicatory hearing concluded in the trial court finding Karen

responsible for the lesser included offense of simple assault. Karen’s attorney gave

notice of appeal from the trial court’s adjudication, and no formal disposition order

was entered until 23 June 2022. Karen was sentenced to probation for the simple

assault and appealed. On 1 June 2023, we allowed Karen’s Motion for Peremptory

Setting and Motion to Expedite Consideration.

                                     ANALYSIS

      Karen argues that the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405(4) by allowing

her to testify without first advising her regarding her privilege against self-

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                                           IN RE: S.C.

                                       Opinion of the Court

incrimination. Additionally, Karen contends that the error was prejudicial because

her testimony was self-incriminating.2 We agree.

       “Our courts have consistently recognized that the State has a greater duty to

protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a criminal

prosecution.” In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. 205, 207 (2011), disc. rev. improvidentially

allowed, 365 N.C. 416 (2012) (quoting In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 575 (2005)).

N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405 provides, in pertinent part, that “the court shall protect the

following rights of the juvenile and the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian to

assure due process of law,” including “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405(4) (2022) (emphasis added). “[B]y stating that the trial court

shall protect a juvenile’s delineated rights, [the General Assembly] places an

affirmative duty on the trial court to protect . . . a juvenile’s right against self-

incrimination.” In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. at 208 (emphasis added).                  “The plain

language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405 places an affirmative duty on the trial court to protect

the rights delineated therein during a juvenile delinquency adjudication.” In re J.B.,

261 N.C. App. 371, 373 (2018), disc. rev. denied, 372 N.C. 104 (2019).

       While N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405 “does not provide the explicit steps a trial court must

follow when advising a juvenile of [her] rights, the statute requires, at the very least,

2 The State agrees with Karen that the trial court did not comply with N.C.S.G. 7B-2405(4) and thus
did not properly adjudicate Karen. Further, the State does not dispute Karen’s argument that the
testimony was self-incriminatory and therefore prejudicial.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

some colloquy between the trial court and the juvenile to ensure that the juvenile

understands [her] right against self-incrimination before choosing to testify at [her]

adjudication hearing.” In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. at 208-209. Here, the trial court

did not, at any time, discuss with, or inquire from, Karen whether she understood the

implications of testifying.   Karen incriminated herself when she testified to

assaulting Iris both on direct and cross examination. On direct examination, Karen

incriminated herself by giving the following testimony:

             [COUNSEL]: Based on her demeanor at the time did you
             believe that there was a chance she may strike you?

             [KAREN]: Yeah. That she might try to beat me?

             ...

             [COUNSEL]: Did you ever hit her in the back of the head?

             [KAREN]: No. I just punched her face.

      After the initial questioning by her attorney, Karen again incriminated herself

by admitting on cross-examination that she “pushed” Iris:

             [STATE]: Yes, [Karen], just one—one question. You said
             before that “after she called me daddy long legs I”—
             something her. Did you say punched her or pushed?

             [KAREN]: Pushed.

             [STATE]: Pushed. Thank you.

      The State also benefited from re-eliciting Karen’s admission on cross-

examination to secure a simple assault adjudication instead of an assault inflicting

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                                  Opinion of the Court

serious injury. The State’s closing argument relied on Karen’s incriminatory

testimony:

             Your Honor, as to the facts that aren’t in dispute that there
             was some kind of verbal negative interactions like an
             argument, cursing, shouting match, insults being thrown
             around, but by [Karen’s] own admission “after she called
             me daddy long legs, I pushed her,” so there’s—there’s no
             dispute per the testimony that the—that [Karen] put
             hands on [Iris] first. So because of that I would ask you to
             find her guilty.

      After the State’s closing argument, the trial court adjudicated Karen

responsible for the simple assault, which Karen admitted to during her responses to

the State’s inquiries.

      We held in J.B. that “failure to follow the statutory mandate when conducting

an adjudication hearing constitutes reversible error unless proven to be harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re J.B., 261 N.C. App. at 373–374 (citing In re J.R.V.,

212 N.C. App. at 209). Likewise, in J.R.V., where “there was absolutely no colloquy

between the juvenile and the trial court,” it was determined that “the trial court’s

failure to follow its statutory mandate” was error. In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. at 209.

Nevertheless, we found harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in J.R.V. because

“the juvenile’s eventual testimony was not incriminating[] [as] it was either

consistent with the evidence presented by the State or favorable to the juvenile[.]”

Id. at 210. The State has the burden of proving that a violation of a constitutional

right is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McKoy, 327 N.C. 31, 44 (1990).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Here, the State concedes reversible error.

      In J.B., “the State offered [the complaining party’s] testimony to establish the

basis of the assault charge that [the juvenile] threw the milk carton hitting [the

complaining party] in the face.” In re J.B., 261 N.C. App. at 374. Later, when “[the

juvenile] made incriminating statements as he admitted to throwing the milk carton

out of frustration . . . the State used the admission to further support” its assertion

against the juvenile. Id. We held that “[the juvenile’s] testimony and the manner in

which the State attempted to use the testimony was prejudicial.” Id. Like in J.B.,

here, Karen’s testimony was undoubtedly incriminatory as she admitted having

either “pushed” or “punched” Iris during their altercation. The State’s re-eliciting of

Karen’s admission on cross-examination to secure a simple assault adjudication

against her was prejudicial.

      The trial court did not conduct the colloquy as required by statute, which

violated Karen’s rights, and rendered her testimony inadmissible and prejudicial.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405(4) (2023). As the trial court failed in its duty to protect [Karen’s]

constitutional right against self-incrimination, we vacate the adjudication order and

remand for rehearing.

                                   CONCLUSION

      The trial court erred by failing to comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405(4). The trial

court failed to have a colloquy with Karen to advise her of her privilege against self-

incrimination before she testified. Further, Karen’s self-incriminating testimony was

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                                 Opinion of the Court

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We vacate the trial court’s adjudication and

disposition orders and remand for a new adjudicatory hearing on simple assault.

      VACATED AND REMANDED.

      Judges HAMPSON and WOOD concur.

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