Court Opinion

ID: 9703870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:11:06.487767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.555237
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The court cloaks its opinion in a deferential standard of review which is inappropriate for this appeal. Judicial review of an administrative decision is confined to a “complete review of questions of law and to limited review of questions of fact.” See Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167,170 (Me.1974) (emphasis added); 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C)(4) (1979) (court may reverse administrative decision if affected by error of law). An evaluation of the rationality of the tax assessor’s determination is appropriate when the issue raised on appeal is the valuation of a taxable item, but we do not examine questions of law under such a deferential standard of review. See Frank, 329 A.2d at 170.
Here, the facts as disclosed in the de novo hearing before the Superior Court are undisputed. The question of law presented on this appeal is whether the State Tax Assessor erred in interpreting the sales tax provisions to apply to the individually unique end products that result from the professional and creative advertising services performed by Jackson Advertising. The Bureau of Taxation, in Bulletin Number 38, states that advertising agents are sellers of tangible personal property and that the tax “applies to the entire amount charged to clients for items of tangible personal property such as drawings, paintings, designs, photographs, lettering, assemblies and printed matters.” Me. Bureau Tax’n, Sales and Use Taxation Instruction Bulletin No. 38 at 22 (July 1, 1964). The Tax Assessor applied the interpretation of the sales tax provisions, as embodied in Bulletin Number 38, in imposing the present assessment. We cannot transmute this question of law into one of fact and hide behind a deferential standard of review. Rather, as presented to us by the parties on appeal, we must review the Tax Assessor’s decision for any error of law. See Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 166-67, 163 A.2d 356, 358-59 (1960) (court construed sales tax provisions to determine that State Tax Assessor erred in interpreting term “tourist camp” to include boys’ and girls’ camp).
Under the sales tax statutory scheme, the State of Maine imposes a sales tax at the rate of 5% on the retail sales of tangible personal property. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1811 (1978). Tangible personal property is defined as “personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, touched or in any other manner perceived by the senses, but shall not include rights and credits, insurance policies, bills of exchange, stocks and bonds and similar evidence of indebtedness or ownership.” Id. § 1752(17). The tax base of tangible personal property is the sale price and includes the cost of labor and services that are a part of the sale. Id. § 1752(14). As a general rule, sales of services are not taxed. The statute sets forth narrowly defined services that are taxable as exceptions to the general nontaxability status. Id. § 1752(17-A) (Supp.1988).
The Legislature has provided no explicit guidance as to the tax treatment of the work product of full service advertising agencies such as Jackson Advertising. Jackson Advertising’s work results in end products that can be “seen ... [and] touched” — the video of Gifford’s television commercial, the Eastland Shoe layout, and the Northland brochure. The question remains, however, whether the Legislature intended to tax end products of minimal value that are merely conduits through which Jackson Advertising provides its clients with the services the agency is retained to provide.
We have twice addressed the issue of whether, under 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17) (1978), a sale is one of services or one of tangible personal property. In Community Telecasting Service v. Johnson, 220 *1370A.2d 500 (Me.1966),1 we enunciated criteria for distinguishing a sale of services from a sale of personal property.
[W]here the creation of property to be transferred requires high skill and the materials involved are of relatively little value and the principal value of the finished product lies in the services to be rendered, and the product is of little value to anyone other than the buyer, the transaction may be deemed a sale of service rather than goods. The relative dollar value of the service as against that of the product, sometimes expressed in percentages, has been held significant.
Id. at 503. Without applying these factors in determining whether art work and slides created by the television broadcasting company for the purpose of advertising its customers' businesses were tangible personal property, we merely declared ipse dixit that the advertising materials were tangible personal property and therefore subject to the sales tax provisions. Id.
I agree with the court’s conclusion that the result in Community Telecasting confounds any attempt to apply the criteria. I do not however join the court in its attempt to recharacterize the criteria adopted by Community Telecasting as mere dictum. Although in Community Telecasting we did not apply the criteria to the art work and slides, we expressly applied them in our determination that pamphlets containing results of market surveys sold to the television station were not tangible personal property and therefore not subject to a use tax in contravention to the State Tax Assessor’s determination. Id. at 505-506. In the later case of Measurex Systems, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 490 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Me.1985), we quoted with approval the standards stated in Community Telecasting as “criteria to be used in determining whether a sale is one of services or tangible personal property." Rather than circumvent the criteria adopted by this court, I would conclude that Community Telecasting’s holding, ipse dixit, that art work and slides are tangible personal property, is of no precedential value.
Further, I would conclude that, based on the undisputed testimony and exhibits introduced at the hearing, Jackson Advertising sustained its burden of proving that the advertisements produced for its clients fall within the Community Telecasting definition of a sale of services. The materials involved in the production of the Gifford’s television commercial, the Eastland Shoe layout, and the Northland brochures are of relatively little value. The principal value to the customers was in the professional services provided by Jackson Advertising, creative services comprised of technical expertise and aesthetic judgment. The end products were tailored to individualized, unique specifications, were of minimal intrinsic value, and of no value to anyone but the particular client.
If the court disclaims the applicability of the criteria set forth in Community Telecasting and restated in Measurex Systems, ascertainment of the legislative intent must be derived solely from the language of the statute. The statutory scheme imposes a tax on the sale price of tangible personal property and includes therein the service and labor that are incidental to the creation of tangible personal property. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(14) (1978). In determining the meaning of “tangible personal property,” we must consider the provisions of sections 1752(14) and 1752(17). See Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me.1983) (“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that in order to determine the legislative intent in relation to a particular section of a comprehensive statute, courts should consider the statutory scheme in its entirety.”); Freeport Minerals Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 437 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1981). The inclusion of labor and services in the sales price of tangible personal property in section 1752(14) does not manifest a legislative intent to expand the definition of tangible personal property, see 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17), to encompass the realm of professional services that use a tangible item of minimal intrinsic value as a conduit for the delivery of such services.
*1371A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that “[sjtatutes imposing taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in the citizen’s favor and may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.” Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. at 165, 163 A.2d at 358. See also Blaney v. Town of Shapleigh, 455 A.2d 1381, 1386 (Me.1983) (“When a statute imposing or enforcing a tax or other burden on the citizen is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court will interpret the statute in a light most favorable to the citizen.”); McCarty v. Greenlawn Cemetery Ass’n, 158 Me. 388, 392-93, 185 A.2d 127, 129 (1962); Millett v. Mullen, 95 Me. 400, 415, 49 A. 871, 873 (1901). A fair construction of the sales tax provisions leads to the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to impose a sales tax on the end products of the professional advertising services provided by Jackson Advertising. Although the Legislature may enact statutes imposing a sales tax on service industries, except for those taxable services enunciated in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17-A) (Supp.1988), the present statutory scheme does not demonstrate such an intention. Accordingly, I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment vacating the Tax Assessor’s determination either pursuant to the criteria in Community Telecasting or the established principles of statutory interpretation.

. It should be noted that this decision predated the enactment of 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17-A).