Court Opinion

ID: 9381914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 06:00:07.761828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.733329
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2023 MSPB 14
                            Docket Nos. DC-0752-12-0366-X-1
                                        DC-0752-12-0366-X-2

                                    Mary A. Abbott,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                             United States Postal Service,
                                         Agency.
                                      March 23, 2023

           Allison E. Eddy, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Jasmin A. Dabney, Landover, Maryland, for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                             Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         This compliance proceeding was initiated by the appellant’s February 21
     and October 17, 2017 petitions for enforcement of the Board’s December 20,
     2016 Final Order. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-
     0366-B-1, Final Order (Dec. 20, 2016) (B-1 Final Order); Abbott v. U.S. Postal
     Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-C-1, Compliance File (C-1 CF),
     Tab 1; Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-C-2,
     Compliance File (C-2 CF), Tab 1. On July 27, 2017, the administrative judge
     issued the first of two compliance initial decisions finding the agency not in
                                                                                           2

     compliance with the Board’s order. 1         C-1 CF, Tab 11, Compliance Initial
     Decision (C-1 CID).      On April 27, 2018, the administrative judge issued the
     second compliance initial decision, again finding the agency not in compliance
     with the Board’s order. C-2 CF, Tab 10, Compliance Initial Decision (C-2 CID).
¶2         For the reasons discussed below, we REOPEN these cases on our motion
     under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118 and MODIFY the compliance initial decisions to find
     that the appellant is not entitled to back pay for the period following her
     disability retirement.   In addition, we now find the agency in compliance and
     DISMISS the petitions for enforcement.

                                       BACKGROUND
     The Appellant’s Suspension Appeal
¶3         The appellant was employed as an EAS-17 supervisor for the agency in
     Newport News, Virginia.          Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-12-0366-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. On January 6,
     2012, the agency proposed placing the appellant on enforced leave, claiming there
     was no available work within her medical restrictions. IAF, Tab 8 at 61. On
     February 6, 2012, the agency issued a final decision effecting the enforced leave
     action against her, commencing February 8, 2012. Id. at 17. On February 9,
     2012, the appellant appealed the agency’s enforced leave action to the Board.
     IAF, Tab 1. She argued that she was able to perform the essential functions of
     her position despite her medical restrictions and that the agency’s refusal to allow
     her to return to work constituted disability discrimination. IAF, Tab 12 at 2-5.

     1
       Due to administrative error, following the issuance of the first compliance initial
     decision, the appellant’s first petition for enforcement was not immediately referred to
     the Office of General Counsel to obtain compliance. Because the subject matter of the
     appellant’s first and second petitions for enforcement are substantially similar, we
     hereby JOIN the two petitions for enforcement. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(a)(2).
                                                                                          3

¶4         On or about February 7, 2012, the appellant applied for disability
     retirement with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). IAF, Tab 27 at 17.
     In April 2012, OPM prepaid to the appellant the sum of $4,487.00 as part of her
     disability retirement annuity.     Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-12-0366-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 6 at 6.               On
     June 4, 2012, OPM granted the appellant’s disability retirement application,
     which terminated the appellant’s employment. IAF, Tab 27 at 38.
¶5         On June 23, 2014, the Board issued an opinion holding that the agency’s
     action constituted an enforced leave constructive suspension within the Board’s
     jurisdiction and remanded the appeal to the administrative judge for adjudication
     on the merits. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶¶ 10-11 (2014).
     On March 22, 2016, following remand, the administrative judge affirmed the
     agency’s enforced leave constructive suspension and found that the appellant
     failed to prove her affirmative defense of disability discrimination. Abbott v. U.S.
     Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-B-1, Remand File, Tab 10,
     Remand Initial Decision. The appellant petitioned for review.
¶6         On December 20, 2016, the Board issued a nonprecedential final order
     reversing the agency’s suspension action. B-1 Final Order at 1-12. The Board
     found that the agency failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the appellant
     was unable to perform the essential functions of her position due to her medical
     restrictions. Id. at 10. However, the Board affirmed the administrative judge’s
     finding that the appellant failed to establish her affirmative defense of disability
     discrimination because the record supported the administrative judge’s conclusion
     that the agency sufficiently attempted to reasonably accommodate the appellant’s
     disability   prior   to   the   commencement      of   her   disability   retirement. 2

     2
      On May 18, 2017, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a decision
     concurring with the Board’s finding on the appellant’s disability claim. Abbott v. U.S.
                                                                                     4

     Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. Based on its findings, the Board ordered the agency to cancel its
     suspension action and to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, with
     interest, and provide other benefits as appropriate. Id. at ¶¶ 23-25. The Board’s
     order did not specify the appropriate time period for the back pay award.

     The Appellant’s First Petition for Enforcement
¶7         On February 21, 2017, the appellant filed her first petition for enforcement
     with the Board. C-1 CF, Tab 1. The appellant argued in her petition that the
     agency had not cancelled its suspension action, nor had it paid the appellant any
     of the back pay or other benefits she was owed. Id. at 4-5. On March 10, 2017,
     the agency responded to the petition for enforcement, arguing that the appellant’s
     choice to go on disability retirement obviated the need to reverse the enforced
     leave constructive suspension. C-1 CF, Tab 3 at 4-5. The agency further stated
     that it had not yet paid the appellant her back pay because it was waiting for
     additional data from OPM. Id. at 5. On March 15, 2017, the appellant replied to
     the agency’s response, arguing that her back pay should continue past the date her
     disability retirement commenced. C-1 CF, Tab 4 at 6-11.
¶8         On July 27, 2017, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial
     decision finding the agency not in compliance. C-1 CID at 2. The administrative
     judge found that the agency had not taken any action to reverse the suspension.
     C-1 CID at 4-5. Additionally, relying on Spencer v. Department of the Navy,
     82 M.S.P.R. 149, ¶ 17 (1999), the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     entitlement to back pay and other benefits was not limited by OPM’s award of
     disability retirement benefits and thus continued beyond the date she retired. C-1
     CID at 4-5. The administrative judge did not specify an end date for the back pay
     and other benefits.

     Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0366-B-1, Remand Petition for Review
     File, Tab 10.
                                                                                            5

     The Appellant’s Second Petition for Enforcement
¶9         On October 17, 2017, the appellant filed a second petition for enforcement.
     C-2 CF, Tab 1. The appellant alleged that, after the issuance of the July 27, 2017
     compliance initial decision, she received back pay from the agency purportedly
     covering the time period of February 8, 2012 (when her suspension began) to
     June 4, 2012 (the effective date of her disability retirement), but reasserted her
     position that the back pay period should continue past June 4, 2012. Id. at 5. The
     appellant also repeated her argument that the agency had not yet taken any steps
     to cancel her suspension. Id. at 6. On January 30, 2018, the agency responded to
     the second petition for enforcement. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-12-0366-A-2, Attorney Fee File, Tab 10. 3 The agency stated in an
     unsworn statement that the enforced leave letter which created the appellant’s
     suspension had been deleted from her electronic Official Personnel File.              Id.
     at 4-5. Regarding the back pay, the agency argued that paying back pay beyond
     the disability retirement date would not be appropriate unless the appellant had
     filed an involuntary retirement appeal, which she had not done.              Id. at 6-7.
     Moreover, the agency argued that the appellant had not shown she was ready,
     willing, and able to work at any time following the date of her disability
     retirement. Id. at 7-9. On February 6, 2018, the appellant replied to the agency’s
     response. C-2 CF, Tab 9. The appellant repeated her argument that the disability
     retirement award should not limit her back pay award and further argued that, in
     any event, she was ready, willing, and able to return to work. Id. at 8-15. The
     appellant also argued that the agency still had not provided any proof that it
     cancelled her suspension. Id. at 5-7.

     3
      It appears that, due to administrative error by the agency, the agency’s response to the
     acknowledgment order was inadvertently filed in a separate proceeding related to the
     appellant’s petition for attorney fees.
                                                                                        6

¶10         On April 27, 2018, the administrative judge issued an initial decision on
      the second petition for enforcement and again found the agency not in
      compliance. C-2 CID at 2. The administrative judge found that the agency still
      had not provided any evidence that it cancelled the appellant’s suspension. C-2
      CID at 6. With respect to the back pay, the administrative judge found that the
      agency failed to account for any interest owed on the back pay and also repeated
      her prior finding that the disability retirement award should have no impact on the
      appellant’s back pay award under Spencer. Id.     Neither party filed a petition for
      review with the Board.

      The Joined Enforcement Proceedings Before the Board
¶11         On June 8, 2018, the Board issued an acknowledgment order in furtherance
      of obtaining compliance with respect to both the first and second compliance
      initial decisions. CRF, Tab 1; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(b)-(c).
¶12         On June 23, 2018, the agency submitted a pleading which declared under
      penalty of perjury that the letter effecting the appellant’s suspension was removed
      from the appellant’s personnel file in July 2017.       CRF, Tab 2 at 4-5.       On
      August 8, 2018, the agency submitted a supplemental response which provided a
      narrative explanation of its back pay award, along with evidence that interest was
      paid on the back pay. CRF, Tab 6 at 4-27. The agency also reiterated its belief
      that the back pay should not continue past the date of the appellant’s disability
      retirement (June 4, 2012). Id. at 8-11.
¶13         On August 22, 2018, the appellant replied to the agency’s supplemental
      response. CRF, Tab 7. The appellant repeated her argument that her back pay
      award should not be limited by her disability retirement award. Id. at 7-24. The
      appellant further claimed that the funds the agency paid to the appellant were
      both inaccurate and in need of further explanation. Id. at 24.
                                                                                       7

                                         ANALYSIS
¶14         When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it
      orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation she
      would have been in had the wrongful personnel action not occurred. House v.
      Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 530, ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the
      burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. An agency’s assertions of
      compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported
      by documentary evidence. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R.
      319, ¶ 5 (2011). The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by
      making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued
      noncompliance.” Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 325,
      ¶ 5 (2010).
¶15         The agency’s outstanding compliance issues were its obligations to:
      (1) cancel the suspension action; and (2) pay the appellant the correct amount of
      back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or
      Postal Service regulations. The agency has submitted multiple pleadings in its
      ongoing attempts to reach full compliance. The appellant has raised objections to
      the agency’s efforts to reach compliance on each requirement, which will be
      addressed in turn below.

      Cancellation of Suspension
¶16         The appellant argues that the agency has not provided evidence that it
      cancelled the suspension action. CRF, Tab 7 at 5-7. We disagree. The agency’s
      sworn statement that the letter which created the appellant’s suspension has been
      removed from her personnel file is sufficient to demonstrate compliance. CRF,
      Tab 2 at 4-5.   The appellant’s suspension was an enforced leave constructive
      suspension, rather than a traditional agency-initiated suspension, meaning that the
      documentation reflecting that suspension would be the letter forcing her to take
      leave. The removal of that letter from her personnel file effectively cancelled the
                                                                                       8

      enforced leave constructive suspension. Accordingly, we find that the agency is
      now in compliance with respect to the cancellation requirement.

      Back Pay
¶17         The appellant argues that the amount of back pay paid by the agency is
      incorrect, in terms of the accuracy of the amount actually paid and the scope of
      the award. CRF, Tab 7 at 7-24. As explained below, we find the agency to be in
      compliance in both aspects.

            Back Pay Scope
¶18         The parties’ primary disagreement pertains to the proper termination date
      of the back pay period. The appellant maintains that the back pay period should
      not be cut off by her retirement and should instead continue through the present,
      despite the fact that she retired. The agency argues that the appellant’s right to
      back pay should end on the date her disability retirement commenced. In both the
      first and second compliance initial decisions, the administrative judge agreed with
      the appellant, relying on Spencer. C-1 CID at 4-5; C-2 CID at 6-7. Upon further
      review of the parties’ submissions, we disagree with the administrative judge’s
      ruling and modify the compliance initial decisions to hold that the back pay
      period ends on the date the appellant retired, June 4, 2012.
¶19         We held in Spencer that the appellant’s disability retirement award did not
      preclude a back pay award stemming from a reversed removal decision. Spencer,
      82 M.S.P.R. 149, ¶ 17.        This was because, when the removal decision was
      reversed, the appellant was reinstated on the employment rolls and, as a result,
      OPM retroactively rescinded its award of disability retirement benefits. Id. The
      appellant now argues that this holding should be extended to her cancelled
      suspension.   But the appellant in this case is not in the same posture as the
      appellant in Spencer. She was not removed, nor did she appeal—let alone obtain
      a reversal of—her retirement, and thus she remains on disability retirement.
      Applying Spencer in this manner would be beyond the bounds of the Board’s
                                                                                             9

      authority. The Board’s authority under the Back Pay Act is limited to granting
      back pay for the personnel action that was corrected; here, that was the
      suspension.   See 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1)(A).         To extend the back pay period
      beyond her disability retirement date would be to grant back pay for the
      termination of her employment, i.e., for a removal or constructive removal.
      Because the appellant did not appeal her retirement as a constructive removal, the
      Board is without authority to grant back pay beyond the reversed suspension.
      Thus, the appellant’s back pay under this appeal cannot extend beyond the date of
      her disability retirement.
¶20         Before the administrative judge, the appellant argued that Smith v.
      Department of the Army, 458 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006), allowed the Board to
      grant back pay for an unappealed personnel action. The Federal Circuit held in
      Smith that the Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
      (EEOC)    finding   that     the petitioner   was   subjected   to   illegal   disability
      discrimination required that the Board award damages not just for the personnel
      action at issue, but also for the discrimination.      Id. at 1365-70.     The Federal
      Circuit further found that, because the illegal discrimination directly led to a
      separate personnel action that was never appealed to the Board, the Board was
      empowered by Title VII to order back pay for that separate personnel action in
      order to grant relief for the discrimination, even though that personnel action was
      not appealed. Id. Here, Smith does not apply because both the Board and the
      EEOC expressly found no discrimination by the agency. As such, the Board’s
      authority here is limited to remedying only the actual personnel action appealed. 4

      4
       Because we are not addressing the unappealed personnel action, we do not reach the
      agency’s contention that the appellant was not ready, willing, and able to work.
                                                                                       10

            Paid Back Pay Funds
¶21         Finally, with respect to the actual amount of back pay paid by the agency,
      we find the agency in compliance.        The agency’s documentation shows its
      calculations regarding salary, benefits, deductions, and interest are all accurate
      for the back pay period approved in the preceding section. The appellant claims
      that the agency improperly deducted $117.46 from her back pay for retirement,
      but did not add to her retirement or Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). CRF, Tab 7 at 24.
      This argument appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the retirement
      deduction. The agency’s withholding of the $117.46 was not for the appellant’s
      TSP contribution—it was the 0.8% retirement deduction required of all Federal
      employees hired prior to December 31, 2012. See 5 U.S.C. § 8422(a)(3)(A). As
      such, the agency’s withholding of these funds was proper.
¶22         The appellant is similarly mistaken with respect to the $4,487.00 withheld
      from her back pay. The appellant interprets the agency’s narrative statement to
      mean that it paid the appellant these funds. However, the agency’s statement
      indicates that the appellant was paid this amount by OPM in 2012 as a
      prepayment on her disability retirement award. CRF, Tab 6 at 6. As a result, the
      agency was required by regulation to pay those funds back to OPM to avoid her
      gaining a windfall. Id.; see 5 C.F.R. 550.805(e). As the appellant has not in any
      way disputed the agency’s statement that she originally received those funds from
      OPM, we find the withholding to be appropriate.
¶23         Regarding the interest owed on the back pay, the agency’s documentation
      demonstrates that it paid the appellant the correct amount of interest. The interest
      accounted for all gross back pay owed to her, minus the funds attributed to her
      OPM repayment and her terminal leave payment. 5            CRF, Tab 6 at 19-27.

      5
        Terminal leave payments are not eligible for interest under the Back Pay Act. See
      5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(2)(A); see also Athey v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 42, 60-61
      (2015), aff’d, 908 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
                                                                                           11

      Consequently, the agency has demonstrated that it is in full compliance regarding
      the interest owed to the appellant.
¶24         In light of the foregoing, because the agency’s combined submissions
      demonstrate that the agency has provided the appellant back pay and benefits for
      the period of her suspension through the date of her disability retirement, we find
      that the agency has now reached full compliance. Accordingly, the Board finds
      that the agency is in compliance and dismisses the petitions for enforcement.
      This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in these
      compliance proceedings.       Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
      section 1201.183(b) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                        NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                              YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                             ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

      6
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                    13

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                14

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
                                                                                     15

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                      16

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.