Court Opinion

ID: 9625432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:40:56.134977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:08.573267
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice.
The controversy and resultant district court judgment which we review today centers around an infant boy whose parents under adverse conditions decided to give the baby — then 4 weeks old — for adoption, and then changed their minds shortly after-wards and prior to the institution of any adoption proceedings. The infant’s parents, in placing him with the proposed adoptive parents, each signed a consent to adoption which was not filed with the adoption court until over 6 weeks later, and only after an attorney for the parents had notified the adopting parents that the consents were revoked.
In the adoption proceeding, the parents were not made a party thereto by any service of process upon them. In the petition for adoption, the adopting parents did not make any allegations which would have placed in issue the validity of the revocation. On habeas corpus review, the district court held that the consents could be revoked and here were revoked under circumstances that allowed of such revocation. A more detailed statement of the background of events leading to the giving of the consents, and then to their revocation, is in order.
Before doing so, however, we emphasize again that the natural parents were not named as parties to the adoption proceeding, and were not served with process. It is only by reason of the consents which each parent had executed that the adoptive parents can contend that the parents were in the eyes of the law “parties” to the adoption proceedings. This follows, as it must, (if there is to be a semblance of constitutional due process to such an adoption proceeding) from the statutory provision that the consent of the parents being filed in the court “shall be deemed a sufficient appearance.” I.C. § 16-1506. In Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965), it was held that “consent or its *807procedural equivalent, notice, forms the basis of a proceeding for adoption . a jurisdictional fact and a condition precedent with which compliance is essential to full validity and effect of the decree.” Id. at 495, 401 P.2d at 547. Notice is a fundamental element of due process, and parents are entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 495, 401 P.2d 541. Here, notwithstanding that the parents advised the adoptive parents that the consents were revoked, the parents were not given notice that the adoptive parents were proceeding to seek an adoption decree predicated upon those consents, and they were not afforded the opportunity to be heard in the adoption court on the issue of claimed revocation of those consents.
In Leonard, the Court quoted, inter alia, the following passages from 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children § 44:
“The object of notice is not merely to bind those who have not consented and without whose consent the adoption cannot be made. It is more than this — it is to bind those who are entitled to be heard upon the question whether they have forfeited their rights in regard to consent, and to prevent them, if notified, from again raising this question. Although notice is not always specifically required, the judicial proceedings by which adoption is effected are prescribed as a duty of courts of record, wherefore it is presumed that the legislature intended that such proceedings should be in accordance with the usual practice of such courts, requiring notice as an element of due process.”
Id. at 494, 401 P.2d at 547 (emphasis added). Our adoption statutes make no provision for serving of process on the parents of a child whose adoption is sought by others, and, if we are to uphold the validity of the procedures provided in those statutes — which we should strive to do — it is only by judicially recognizing that the legislature has constituted a valid and unrevoked consent as being all at the same time a parental relinquishment, a general appearance, and a waiver of notice as well. This the Court has heretofore done. Absent a general appearance, which a valid unrevoked consent is deemed to be, there must be notice by service of process, and an opportunity to be heard. While a valid unrevoked consent suffices to serve such requirements of due process, withdrawal of the consent, if such takes place, is equally a withdrawal of the consent’s deemed legal effect as a general appearance and as a waiver of notice. While, as will appear hereinafter, there is throughout the states much case law, pro and con, and statutory provisions as well, governing revocation of consents insofar as they are parental relinquishments, there appears to be no case which holds that a waiver of notice cannot be withdrawn — not only in adoption proceedings but in any judicial proceeding. Nor does it appear that a written general appearance cannot be withdrawn prior to the filing of the action in which it is to be used. A purported revocation of consent, whether or not effective as a parental relinquishment appears to cancel at least the consent’s legal effect as a deemed general appearance and as a deemed waiver of notice, thus requiring that the parental relinquishment issue be placed before the adoption court. Such a procedure is the only sound one to follow in order to gain a judicial determination on the issue of validity of revocation and thereby obtain an adoption decree with res judicata effect.
HISTORY: Sometime in 1976, petitioner-respondent Kim Andersen (Kim), at that time unwed, became pregnant by petitioner-respondent Robert R. Andersen. The two were married after the baby was born. During her pregnancy, Kim enlisted the aid of her aunt and of a social worker in locating prospective adopting parents. Appellants Gordon and Sherrian Crapo were interested in adopting the as yet unborn child, and Kim determined that the Crapos should be the adopting parents. However, when Kim went into labor she changed her mind and informed the Crapos that the baby would not be available for adoption.
Kim’s baby was born on May 26, 1977. Approximately four weeks later, Kim once *808again decided to let the Crapos adopt the baby and called them on June 23, 1977, to inform them of this decision. The next morning both Kim and Robert met the Crapos at a restaurant, the Crapos taking the baby. The parties then went before a notary public at a local bank where the signatures of both the Andersens and the Crapos were placed on consent to adoption forms which Kim had obtained from an attorney during her pregnancy.
The Andersens then left for California. Shortly after arriving there, the Andersens made two phone calls to the Crapos requesting that the baby be returned. The Crapos refused. The Andersens made a third phone call in which they apologized for their demands, stating that they would not attempt to regain custody. At this point, the Crapos obtained an unlisted number, and the Andersens were unable to make further phone contact.
The Andersens then retained a California attorney who, after pledging that he could get the baby back for a fee of $6,000, sent a letter to the Crapos on August 9, 1977, stating as follows:
It is my understanding that they [the Andersens] turned over custody of the minor child to you. There was never any formal court action or legal proceeding by which you became the legal guardian, custodian, or parents of said child. Therefore, you only hold the child at the consent of my clients, the legal parents. They have informed me that they have made demand on you for the return of their child, and you have refused to turn over the child to them.
Your withholding of the child has no legal basis, as it is against the consent of the parents. The natural parents are lawfully entitled to the child immediately. I am putting you on notice of the parents’ action in this matter, as they would like me to make arrangements with you for the return of the child.
Upon receipt of this letter, the Crapos immediately contacted their own counsel who, on August 15, 1977, sent Andersen’s attorney a letter narrating the history of the events to that date and stating:
Prior to departure, both she [Kim] and Mr. Andersen signed formal consents to adoption, before a notary.
A petition for adoption has been filed.
The Crapos have been appointed temporary guardians of the child.
The Crapos fully intend to fight any effort to interfere with their custody and adoption of this child.
The record shows, however, that although the petition for adoption was filed on August 12,1977, the order granting temporary custody, ex parte, did not issue until August 16, the day after the letter was sent. The Crapos did not allege in their adoption proceeding that the revocation of consents was claimed by the Andersens, nor did they cause process to be served on Andersens.
The Andersens, unable to pay the California attorney’s legal fee, sought other counsel there and were advised to retain Idaho counsel. This they did upon their return to Idaho in late September. According to the Andersens and their counsel, a diligent search on their part failed to unearth either the Crapos or the location of the adoption proceedings which, as mentioned above, had been underway since August 12, 1977. A final order of adoption issued on October 31, 1977. No appeal was taken from this order.
The Andersens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on November 16, 1977, with the District Court of Bingham County. The writ was granted on the same day and served on the Crapos on December 1, 1977. A hearing was held on December 9, following which the trial court entered a final judgment on December 23 which set aside the adoption decree and required the return of the adopted child to the Andersens. The Crapos appeal from that judgment. Their motion to the trial court for a stay order was denied on March 14, 1978. We granted a stay of enforcement effective during the pendency of the appeal or until further order of this Court and set the cause for *809oral argument in early June. Following oral argument additional briefing was submitted.
I
Appellants Crapos argue at the outset that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that respondents Andersens failed to provide an answer to the return on the writ. They argue that without such an answer the return to the writ stands as the complaint and, since its allegations are deemed admitted, the writ must be dismissed. This ground was not stated in the motion to dismiss the writ nor was it argued below. Consequently, it cannot properly be raised on appeal. Moreover, the argument exalts form over substance since it is standard procedure to treat the petition itself as the answer to the return when the petition fully serves to traverse the allegations of the return and when no further affirmative pleading appears necessary. Cole v. Cole, 68 Idaho 561, 573, 201 P.2d 98, 106 (1948).
Appellants’ more central argument with regard to the habeas corpus proceeding is that it functioned as a collateral attack on the adoption order. The Crapos argue that their attorney’s letter of August 15, 1977, served as notice to the Andersens that a petition for adoption had been filed. They argue further that the Andersens’ contention that they and their attorney were unable to locate the adoption proceedings is implausible in the extreme and cannot excuse their failure to intervene. Finally, Crapos urge that the Andersens failed to perfect a timely appeal and by the doctrine of res judicata are barred from bringing their habeas corpus petition.
The district court held that “the remedy of habeas corpus in the opinion of the Court is a proper remedy to reach the issues,” namely, the question of “whether or not the natural parents had revoked their consent” to the adoption proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the habeas proceedings to a Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment due to fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party. We cannot say that the district court erred in making this approach. As earlier pointed out, a consent serves not only as a relinquishment, but is deemed to also serve as a general appearance. In turn, a general appearance by consenting parents would constitute the consenting parents as parties to the action, and thereby accord them status to appeal and present post-judgment motions. Here, however, the Andersens did not perceive that they had appeared generally, having revoked the consents prior to the time the consents were filed in the adoption court. We are unable to see where the Crapos could complain had the Andersens sought relief by a Rule 60(b) motion, or where they can complain where relief was sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. In either event, the issue to be decided is identical, i. e., did they have the right and cause to revoke their consents. The validity of an adoption decree has been many times tested by the collateral attack of a habeas corpus proceeding. Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943); Vaughn v. Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923); Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917); In re Martin, 29 Idaho 716, 161 P. 573 (1916). See In re Hendrickson, 159 Mont. 217, 496 P.2d 1115 (1972); 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 70. In 92 A.L.R.2d at 827, it is stated:
In addition, a party who is entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding or whose consent to an adoption is necessary may attempt in a collateral proceeding to attack a decree rendered in an adoption proceeding without notice to or consent by such party. (Emphasis added.)
In 39 Am.Jur. Habeas Corpus § 91 is this statement: “A decree for the adoption of a child may be attacked collaterally by a parent in a habeas corpus proceeding to recover custody of the child, where the parent was not a party to the adoption proceedings and had no actual or constructive notice thereof.” In short, appellants Crapos’ procedural objection to the habeas proceeding merely restates their contention on the merits that the adoption decree was valid and *810binding on the Andersens. That contention is inextricably bound up with the Andersens’ counter argument on the merits, namely, that they withdrew their consent, were never parties to the proceedings since they were never served with notice, and that the adoption decree is therefore void. It is then to the merits of this dispute that we must turn.
II
It is readily admitted by both parties that absent circumstances not relevant in this case, “consent or its procedural equivalent, notice, forms the basis of a proceeding for adoption.” Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 495, 401 P.2d 541, 547 (1965). As a strict corollary, it follows that lack of consent by the natural parents renders an adoption decree void. As the Court of Appeals of Oregon has stated:
Under our adoption laws, consent of the parents, guardian or other person in loco parentis (except under certain contingencies not involved here), is jurisdictional, and in the absence of such consent the court is without power to proceed. [Citations omitted.] If the court proceeds without the required consent “its decree will be a nullity, not voidable but void * * Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 219, 20 P. 842, 849 (1888).
Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or.App. 450, 513 P.2d 1216, 1217-18 (1973).
In Idaho, the parallel statutes read as follows:
16-1504. Consent of parents, guardian, nearest relative, or next friend of child — Exceptions.—A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without the consent of its mother, if living, nor without the consent of its guardian if one has been legally appointed or, if no living parents or guardian, then of its nearest relative; if no relative, then by the consent of some person appointed by the judge to act in the proceedings as the next friend to such child.
16-1506. Proceedings on adoption.— . Any person or persons whose consent is required shall execute such consent in writing, and acknowledge the same before any officer authorized by the laws of this or any other state to take acknowledgment of deeds, which consent being filed in the court where the application is made, shall be deemed a sufficient appearance on the part of such person or persons.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that the consents were given in writing before a notary public, i. e., before an officer authorized by the laws of Idaho to take acknowledgment of deeds. Similarly, there is no question here of fraud, duress or undue influence on the part of the Crapos in obtaining the consents. On the contrary, the trial court found that the Crapos “pleaded with the natural parents not to deliver the child and the consents unless the acts were to be final.” The trial court in its memorandum decision concluded that the consents were in compliance with the statutory minimum and were valid: “The natural parents had full knowledge of the meaning of their acts in acknowledging consents to adoption and delivering the child for that purpose.”
The underlying issue on appeal, therefore, is whether or not natural parents, prior to the entry of a final order of adoption in a private adoption placement, have a right to revoke consents which were concededly valid at the time they were given.
The trial court took its bearings with regard to this question from the survey of the law on that topic made by Chief Justice Shepard in his dissenting opinion in Duncan v. Davis, 94 Idaho 205, 211, 485 P.2d 603, 609 (1971):
[T]he various states are split in three categories, (1) consent is absolutely revocable until a final adoption decree, (2) revocation will be allowed at the discretion of the court, and (3) in the absence of fraud or duress, consent is final and irrevocable.
The majority in Duncan found that there had been no fraud or duress in procuring a consent to adoption of her child from an unwed Indian mother. Nonetheless, the *811Court scrutinized the consent closely and affirmed the decision of the trial court that the mother had not made “a completely voluntary, free and knowing surrender of her child.” Id. at 207, 485 P.2d at 605.
Relying on the Duncan case for guidance, the trial judge noted that, even in the more difficult case of agency placements, Idaho had rejected the rule holding consents irrevocable in the absence of legal cause.1 A fortiori in the case of a private placement, the trial court concluded that Idaho would align itself with those jurisdictions which grant discretion to the court in allowing natural parents to revoke their consent “absent an estoppel to do so.” The trial court then found as a matter of fact that “[a]t the time they revoked their consent, there was not sufficient reliance or circumstances giving rise to an estoppel to assert such right.”
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court placed great reliance upon the termination of parental rights statute, I.C. §§ 16-2001 to 2015, and its requirement that such a result be achieved judicially and not by contractual relinquishment. We do not believe that the termination statute is controlling rather than I.C. §§ 16-1501 to 1512, the adoption statute. At a January 30, 1978, hearing on a motion for amendment of findings, counsel for Crapos argued cogently that the adoption statutes must govern, providing that these provisions had never been repealed either expressly or impliedly by the termination statutes. The trial court agreed, saying:
I have recognized that such a consent is not void. Obviously it is not. There are probably literally hundreds of adoptions accomplished through consents executed between parties without any judge involved that later are a foundation for an adoption.
Nonetheless, the trial court felt it relevant on the question of revocation that the legislature, in the termination of parental rights context, had seen fit to distinguish formal judicial consents from mere extrajudicial agreements. In other words, the more formal the execution of a consent, the more respect it will be given and the greater the burden a court will impose on those who attempt to revoke it. We agree with the court’s reasoning.
Factors which will be considered in determining whether or not natural parents should be estopped to revoke their valid consents include:
the circumstances under which the consent was given; the length of time elapsing, and the conduct of the parties, between the giving of consent and the attempted withdrawal; whether or not the withdrawal was made before or after the institution of adoption proceedings; the nature of the natural parent’s conduct with respect to the child both before and after consenting to its adoption; and the “vested rights” of the proposed adoptive parents with respect to the child.
In re Adoption of Capparelli, 180 Or. 41, 175 P.2d 153, 155 (1946). In the present case, the trial court found that the consent, though valid, was executed at a time when the mother “was extremely distraught, concerned and upset.” After delivery of her baby in late May, Kim went to live at her parents’ home where, according to the trial court, “she, her children, and her boyfriend were basically persona non grata.” Adding to the pressure was the fact that, according *812to Kim, her parents were both alcoholics. The following scene, testified to by Kim at the habeas hearing, was said to be typical:
Q. Were there any situations in the house that might describe to the Court what the environment was really like?
A. There’s a lot of things. One instance, when I went to get the baby formula I came home and my little boy had diarrhea and my dad had a knife out. My mother — my little baby was naked— my mom was trying to bathe them and the two little girls were down the stairs screaming that Grandpa was going to kill Grandma. I mean, seems like that happened all the time. My other — my little boy had diarrhea everywhere. My dad was rubbing it on the wall. I mean they were insane. So I grabbed my kids and left. And things like that happened all the time, the whole time I was there.
Kim, Andersen and the social worker all testified to the fact that Kim was extremely weak and ill after release from the hospital. The baby was constantly sick and awake crying during most of the night. Andersen would sneak into the house late at night to care for the child so that Kim might get some sleep.
In addition, Kim had no money of her own, Andersen was jobless, and her parents refused to provide support even for formula for the new baby. Hanging over her, as the month of June progressed, was a deadline that she have her two older children in California by July 1 so that her husband by an earlier marriage might exercise his summer visitation rights. Lacking money for plane fares, Kim had to transport the children herself by car. It was in this context that Kim and Robert, on June 24, 1977, handed their baby to the Crapos over a restaurant table and then went to the bank to execute their consents before a notary public.
No sooner had they arrived in California than they felt remorse at having given away their child. That was when they began calling the Crapos requesting the return of their child and eventually sought California and then Idaho counsel. There, in the words of the trial court’s memorandum decision,
they attained a better realization of the nature and future consequences of their consent and they determined to change their minds and demanded the return of their child which in legal effect was a determination to revoke the consent they had given.
The court next addressed the question of “whether the natural parents followed their demands for custody and withdrawn consent with reasonable alacrity to forestall the adoption proceeding.” On this question, the court noted that the Andersens “did pursue the matter but not to the most intelligent use of facts which were known.”2 The court stated its belief that the Andersens’ failure to locate the adoption proceedings and appear therein was not a crucial issue, because “the battle lines had been already clearly drawn,” and the appellants Crapos were fully aware of that fact. Unfortunately, the adoption proceedings went forward with a Crapo decision to decline the initiative in placing in issue the Andersens’ attempts to revoke their consents and regain their child. Nor did they feel obligated to so inform the adoption court. Again, in the words of the trial court:
The adoption judge was presented a report prepared by the Department of Health and Welfare, gleaned from the proposed adoptive parents, that the natural parents had moved to California and had made several phone calls wanting the baby back, described as harassing in nature, in the middle of the night and when it appeared they were intoxicated. A letter from the parents’ attorney, dated August 9, 1977, received by Respondents two or three days later, demanding return of the child, was not mentioned in the adoption proceeding.
*813The Department of Health and Welfare did conduct the “thorough investigation” mandated by I.C. § 16-1506. At the time of the adoption proceeding, the Department stated that it had been unable to verify the status of Andersen since he had not been named on the birth certificate, and that it was not sure of Kim’s own status since she was listed on the birth certificate as “Staley” (her maiden name) but had signed the consent as “Kerns” (the name of her first husband). Under these circumstances, the Department particularly disapproved of the informal consent signing procedure since it was impossible to tell “the present legal status of this child,” or even “if the proper people executed the consents.” The Department further noted the fact that the natural parents had called demanding the child back and that future problems would probably arise because the identity of the adoptive parents was known to Kim and her relatives. The Department expressed high regard for the Crapos and their relation to Mrs. Crapo’s children from earlier marriages, concluding that while it could “recommend Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Crapo as suitable adoptive parents,” it was “unable to recommend the availability of this child or the suitability of this child for adoption.” This appraisal, certainly tantamount to disapproval, was not mentioned in the order of adoption.
Summarizing its review of the factors a court must consider in addressing the question of whether natural parents should be estopped to revoke their consents, the trial court concluded:
whereas here the proposed adopting parents knew of the vacillating feeling of the natural mother toward giving the child to adoption, knew of some of the conditions giving rise to her problem and under which she labored, and within a few weeks after the consents had been obtained were advised of the change of mind, the law should be that such an oppressed and emotionally unstable 21-year old natural mother should have the right to change her mind.
Therefore, the court concluded that at the time the Andersens revoked their consent, they were not estopped to do so. We agree. The record fully supports ¿his conclusion and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching it.
Case law from other jurisdictions must be studied critically since, as one court has remarked, in adoption cases, “the principal participants in one are no more alike to those in another than their fingerprints.” In re D_, 408 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Mo. App.1966). It- would be impossible to find another case in which both the circumstances of the parties and the statutory framework of the jurisdiction will be found identical. Moreover, for every proposition of law announced in one jurisdiction, the exact opposite may be found elsewhere. Still, we find it significant that other jurisdictions, under generally similar fact patterns, have reached the same conclusion we reach today.
In Warner v. Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Ky.1966), the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a trial court judgment denying adoption and directing the adoptive parents to restore custody of the child to its natural mother on the strength of her pleadings,
(1) that her consent to the adoption had been procured at a time when she was a minor and had no advice from anyone but her mother and her mother’s attorney, was without means to provide for the baby, and was under extreme pressure, (2) that she had now married the child’s father, and (3) that she and her husband desired to and could provide adequate support and care for the child.
The court concluded:
If “sufficient reason is shown there may be a revocation before final judgment.” Skaggs v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1943). That the act of relinquishment or consent was performed under circumstances of temporary distress or discouragement is a sufficient reason.

Id.

The Court of Appeals of Oregon, in Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or.App. 450, 513 P.2d 1216 (1973), cited similar factors in over*814turning the decrees of the lower court permitting the adoption of an unwed mother’s twin daughters. The court, in finding that the natural mother was not estopped to withdraw her consent, noted that at the time the consent was executed, the woman “was alone, had no one to turn to for advice, was impoverished and on public welfare,” and that when she “did obtain legal assistance, she affirmatively withdrew her prior consent.” See also In re Adoption of Thompson, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955); Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 (1947); People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787, appeal dismissed sub nom. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S.Ct. 54, 30 L.Ed.2d 38 (1971); In re Adoption of Hunter, 421 Pa. 287, 218 A.2d 764 (1966); In re D.L.F.___, 85 S.D. 44, 176 N.W.2d 486 consent becomes irrevocable only where 30 days have elapsed after notice of the adoption hearing is received, see In re Anonymous, 55 A.D.2d 383, 390 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1977); where the court observed also the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial consents. Judicial consent there, similar to the consent of our termination statutes, Idaho Code ch. 20, tit. 16, requires that the consent be executed or acknowledged before a judge or surrogate of the court where the adoption proceedings are to be initiated and is irrevocable if the consent so states. However, at the time of execution, the consenting parent is to be informed in detail of the consequences of the act by the judge or surrogate.
We are not unaware of the fact that there are jurisdictions, under the facts of this case, which would likely affirm the adoption decree on the grounds that “the best interests of the child” would best be served in the home of the adoptive parents. Such courts, though recognizing an initial right to custody on the part of the natural parent, nonetheless hold that right totally subordinate to the concern of the state, as parens patriae, in promoting the child’s welfare and best interests. As such, they tend to recognize the rights of the “psychological parents,” who have formed a “focus relationship” or “affective relationship” with the child, over the rights of mere “flesh and blood” which are asserted by the “biological parents.” These jurisdictions hold the natural parents’ consents to be irrevocable absent fraud or some overriding equitable consideration. See In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 N.J.Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (App. Div.1971). See also In re Holman’s Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); In re Child, 1 Mass.App. 256, 295 N.E.2d 693 (1973); In re Hendrickson, 159 Mont. 217, 496 P.2d 1115 (1972).
The Idaho decisions, however, have stressed again and again, in a variety of contexts, the inherent rights of natural parents to the custody of their own children. See, for example, Clayton v. Jones, 91 Idaho 87, 416 P.2d 34 (1966); Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947); Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923); Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917). With such a background, we are more inclined to follow those jurisdictions which hold that, in the context of an adoption proceeding, the “contest between a parent and nonparent [may not] resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child.” People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, supra, 321 N.Y. S.2d at 72, 269 N.E.2d at 792.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon, in language that we adopt as our own, has recently settled this question as follows:
In the absence of any additional grounds for an “estoppel” ... a more “acceptable” economic or emotional environment has never been approved as an adequate basis for the termination of parental rights which an adoption over the objections of a natural parent represents. The “best interests” rule has consistently been tempered by the refinement that
“ * * * courts should not interfere with the natural relationship of parent and child upon the sole ground that the proposed adoptive parents are able to give the child superior advantages over *815those within the means or social status of the natural parents * *
Where, as here, a natural mother not represented by legal counsel at the time consent is given attempts to withdraw that consent within a few weeks and thereafter takes reasonable steps available to regain the custody of her child, neither so-called “vested rights” nor superior economic or social position of the proposed adoptive parents will serve to deprive that withdrawal of legal effect.
The hardships produced by a separation of the child and the petitioners [the adoptive parents] at this time are in substantial measure the result of the petitioners’ resistance to the natural mother’s efforts to regain custody. Those hoping to become adoptive parents cannot create their best argument for keeping a child’s custody by thwarting a natural parent’s known wishes.
Small v. Andrews, 20 Or.App. 6, 530 P.2d 540, 544-45 (1975).
Much of the heartache of this case could have been avoided had the legislature, in observation of the provisions of the termination act, seen fit to insist upon more formal proceedings in obtaining a natural parent’s consent to adoption in the context of private placements. As pointed out above, the adoption statute, I.C. § 16-1506, permits a petitioner to obtain the required consent in a highly informal manner. This consent need only be in writing and acknowledged before any officer authorized to take an acknowledgment of a deed; in other words, a notary public. This is a far cry from a judicial proceeding.3 When this consent is filed in the court where the adoption petition is presented, it is deemed a sufficient appearance on the part of the person or persons. There is no specific requirement that notice of the proceeding be given to the parents who have executed such consents, and, as mentioned at the outset, the consents serve also as waivers of notice and as an appearance, sufficient on the part of the consenting parents.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that due process requires that before an individual can be deprived of life, liberty or property by adjudication, he must be given notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to his case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). In D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972), the same Court held, however, that those due process rights of notice and hearing prior to civil judgment are subject to waiver. The standard for a valid waiver stated in that case was the same as that applied in criminal eases, i. e., was the waiver voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, and with full awareness of the legal consequences? This standard is, as it should be, equally applicable when the waiver is a concomitant part of the consent by the natural parents to the adoption of their child. Cf. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Leonard v. Leonard, supra. The informal consent procedure provided for by I.C. § 16-1506 fails to make any allowance for requiring a showing that the waiver effected thereby is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
At the same time, and contrariwise, the Idaho termination statutes provide for formal proceedings and thus afford far greater protection in terms of consent. The underlying philosophy is to strengthen and pre*816serve family life whenever possible, and that, when the parent-child relationship is severed, a judicial determination is required rather than severance by contractual arrangements. I.C. § 16-2001. I.C. § 16-2006 provides for the situation where parents consent to termination, and therefore no subsequent hearings are required on the merits of the petition. However, the consent must be witnessed by a district judge or magistrate and follow a form which is provided in the statute. After a petition is filed and the time and place of the hearing determined, the parents or any other concerned party must be personally served. If reasonable efforts fail to obtain personal service, then service must be obtained by registered or certified mail at the last known address and by publication. “Notice and appearance may be waived by a parent in writing before the court or in the presence of, and witnessed by, a clerk of court or a representative of an authorized agency, provided that such parent has been apprised by the court or by such person of the meaning and consequences of the termination action.” I.C. § 16-2007.
The district court thoroughly noted the shortcomings of the nonjudicial consent provisions as compared to the judicial consent of termination proceedings. While the decision of the court was not based thereon, the court did not act improperly in considering the vast difference between the two qualities of consents available. A judicial consent is to be preferred.
Until such time as the legislature offers positive and detailed guidance on this issue, the parties to private adoptions will continue to incur inevitable risks in their informal dealings with one another.
We affirm the district court order granting the writ of habeas corpus and voiding the adoption decree. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.

. The present case is distinguishable from Duncan in that it does not involve an agency placement. Thus it does not come within the rule proposed by the dissent in Duncan which would permit “revocation only by proof of fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching and the like” in those cases “where the parents have surrendered their child to the custody of an agency licensed by the State Department of Public Welfare.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 211 — 212, 485 P.2d at 609-610 (quoting approvingly from Catholic Charities of Diocese of Gaiveston v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960)). That agency placements present policy considerations requiring tighter controls over attempted revocations is clear from the fact that even a jurisdiction which, in the private placement context, recognizes an absolute right to revoke at any time prior to entry of a final adoption decree, holds a consent to be irrevocable if executed in compliance with the statutory requirements for agency adoptions. In re Hiidenbrand, 405 Pa. 579, 176 A.2d 900 (1962).

. The investigation and report of the Department of Health and Welfare stated:
Petition for adoption without a case number and without a name for the child was filed in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, on the 15th [sic] day of August 1977. This was signed by Reginald R. Reeves, Esq., Petitioners attorney.

. The choice of words used by the district court is noteworthy:
The natural parents are not truly parties to the ordinary adoption proceeding and their acknowledged consent can involve a consent that can be used in most foreign state courts, and any Idaho court, though the consent does not name and designate the particular court. It can be of the nature that it simply says that in some court at some time the child can be adopted; hardly, then, the ordinary encompassed meaning of being a party to the proceeding.
The consents in this case gave no indication of any court in which they might be filed, or even that they were intended for court use. The consents contained no statement that use could be made of them as general appearances or as waivers of notice.