Court Opinion

ID: 9640261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:01:57.208349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:26:04.704660
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            FILED
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
                                                                            AUG 22 2023
                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
KUMAR CHETTRI,                                   No.   20-73018

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A072-131-283

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted August 17, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Kumar Chettri petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(BIA) order denying his 2020 motion to reopen. Chettri was ordered removed in

absentia in 1996 and has since filed four unsuccessful motions to reopen in 2000,

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2011, 2018, and 2020. We denied Chettri’s petitions for review of the BIA’s

denial of his 2000 and 2011 motions, see Chettri v. INS, 33 F. App’x 350 (9th Cir.

2002); Chettri v. Lynch, 650 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir. 2016), and Chettri did not seek

review of the BIA’s decision denying his 2018 motion. In his denied 2020 motion,

Chettri requested that the BIA rescind his in absentia order of deportation as

improperly issued, reopen his proceedings so that he would be able to apply for

relief based on changed country conditions, sua sponte reopen his proceedings, or

reissue its denial of his 2018 motion so that he would be able to seek review of that

decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition for review.

      We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion

and will not overturn the decision unless the Board acted “arbitrarily, irrationally,

or contrary to law.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). BIA

decisions denying sua sponte reopening are reviewed only to determine if the

Board relied on an incorrect legal premise. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588

(9th Cir. 2016).

      1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it declined to rescind Chettri’s

in absentia removal order. Chettri argues that the removal order was improperly

issued because he did not receive a translation of the Order to Show Cause (OSC)

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in a language he could understand, nor an oral warning about the consequences of

failing to appear. As the BIA observed, motions to rescind in absentia removal

orders based on lack of notice must be filed with the Immigration Judge (IJ), not

the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2, 1003.23(b)(4)(iii). But to the extent Chettri’s

motion can be construed as a motion for the BIA to remand to the IJ to determine

whether to rescind the in absentia removal order, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in determining the removal order was properly issued.

      Chettri relies on a misreading of Matter of M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349 (B.I.A.

1998), to assert that his removal order must be rescinded because he never received

an oral warning of the consequences of failing to appear at his removal hearing.

Matter of M-S- concerned former INA § 242B(e)(1), which provided that

noncitizens removed in absentia were ineligible for certain forms of relief for five

years after removal if they were “provided oral notice, either in the alien’s native

language or in another language the alien understands, of the time and place of the

proceedings and of the consequences . . . of failing . . . to attend a proceeding.”

Matter of M-S- considered how this provision applied to a noncitizen removed in

absentia who sought to reopen proceedings to seek adjustment of status. See 22 I.

& N. Dec. at 356–57. Matter of M-S- discussed oral warnings as relevant only to

whether a noncitizen removed in absentia was subsequently barred from seeking

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certain forms of relief. Here, the Board did not hold that Chettri was ineligible to

apply for immigration relief; instead, it held that his motion to reopen in order to

do so was untimely and number-barred.

      Regarding Chettri’s observation that he did not receive a written translation

of the OSC in a language that he could understand, the record shows that he was

personally served with the OSC, understood from conversations with others that he

was supposed to appear in immigration court, and chose not to appear because he

was scared of being detained or deported. Though Chettri may not have

understood that failing to appear could result in in absentia removal, the regulation

only requires that the noncitizen “receive[d] notice” of the hearing, not that they

were made aware of the consequences of failing to appear. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2); see also Khan v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir.

2004) (noting that neither statutory notice requirements nor implementing

regulations “require that INS provide those notices in any language other than

English”).

      2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Chettri’s motion to

reopen based on changed country conditions. Chettri’s 2020 motion repeated

claims from his 2011 and 2018 motions that, contrary to the information in his

1993 asylum application and 2000 motion to reopen, he is a native and citizen of

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Nepal whose family members were murdered in a politically motivated attack by a

Maoist group. Chettri’s 2020 motion incorporated by reference the supporting

evidence submitted with his unsuccessful 2018 motion. The BIA therefore

concluded that the 2020 motion “d[id] not include any new, authenticated evidence

to establish [Chettri’s] identity or his claimed status as a citizen and national of

Nepal.”

      Chettri argues that the BIA improperly disregarded his evidence by relying

on its previous denial of the 2018 motion, which, in Chettri’s view, applied an

incorrect authentication standard and made an unauthorized credibility

determination. Chettri could have raised these arguments if he had petitioned for

review of the BIA’s denial of his 2018 motion, but he failed to do so. And though

his 2020 motion requested that the BIA reissue its denial of the 2018 motion, the

BIA declined to do so. Chettri does not challenge that part of the BIA’s decision in

his petition for review. We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its

discretion by determining that it had already considered and rejected Chettri’s

arguments regarding changed country conditions.

      3. The BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening was not premised on legal

error. Chettri argued in his 2020 motion that a combination of factors—“the

failure to receive oral warnings at the time of issuance of the OSC,” mistreatment

                                            5
upon his arrival in the United States, “abuse by his former spouse,” “the murder of

his family in Nepal,” and ineffective assistance of his former counsel—created an

“exceptional situation” warranting sua sponte reopening. In addition to his

arguments regarding legal error in the BIA’s denial of his 2018 motion, Chettri

asserts that the BIA committed legal error when analyzing his claims regarding

oral warnings and ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). As discussed above, we

see no error in the BIA’s conclusion that an oral warning was not required for

Chettri’s in absentia removal.

      Chettri’s IAC claim concerns the performance of his former counsel, who

prepared Chettri’s unsuccessful 2000 motion to reopen to apply for protection

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), a form of relief that did not become

available until after Chettri was ordered removed. The 2000 motion perpetuated

Chettri’s admittedly false claims from his 1993 asylum application that he was a

citizen of India who had suffered torture and death threats based on his Hindu

descent. The IJ denied the motion to reopen as untimely, explaining that a

noncitizen whose removal order became final prior to March 22, 1999 was eligible

to have his proceedings reopened to apply for CAT protection only if he filed a

motion prior to June 21, 1999. Because Chettri did not file his motion until March

29, 2000, it was untimely.

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      Chettri argues that his former counsel was ineffective because she “filed a

motion under the CAT for the Petitioner . . . without even verifying any of the

information with the Petitioner or obtaining a supporting declaration,” therefore

perpetuating his false claims to Indian citizenship. Under Matter of Lozada, an

immigration petitioner making an IAC claim generally must: (1) submit an

affidavit detailing the agreement with their former counsel; (2) notify their former

counsel and afford them an opportunity to respond; and (3) state whether they filed

a disciplinary complaint. See 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled in

part on other grounds by Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (2009). If a

petitioner does not comply with Matter of Lozada, their IAC claim can succeed

only if their counsel’s performance was facially deficient and prejudiced the

petitioner. See Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2019).

      Chettri did not comply with Matter of Lozada, and he has not established

that his former counsel’s performance was facially deficient or prejudicial. It was

not facially unreasonable for Chettri’s counsel to rely on the information in his

asylum application. Additionally, including a declaration from Chettri would not

have affected the outcome of the 2000 motion because the IJ denied the motion as

untimely and did not reach the merits. Chettri could not have claimed the changed

country conditions exception to untimeliness in 2000 because he did not learn

                                          7
about the murder of his family members until 2008. Further, as the BIA noted,

Chettri did not exercise due diligence in raising his IAC claim because he would

have learned about the underlying facts by 2011 at the latest, and he did not raise

the IAC claim until 2020. See Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 54 F.4th 597, 606 (9th

Cir. 2022) (“The party invoking equitable tolling must have been prevented from

obtaining vital information bearing on the existence of the claim despite the

exercise of all due diligence.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We

conclude that the BIA’s analysis of Chettri’s IAC claim was not legally erroneous.

      The motions for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 1) and supplemental motion for

stay of deportation (Dkt. No. 5) are denied.

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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