Court Opinion

ID: 9715351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:00:59.774778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.769647
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). The issue is whether the trial judge abused his discretion, requiring resentencing, when he considered defendant’s remorse among several factors as substantial and compelling reasons to depart below the statutory minimum sentence. I would hold that there was no abuse of discretion in this case.
i
As is stated in my dissenting opinion in People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 90; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), a *13majority of this Court adopted a view that improperly added limitations to judicial discretion that the Legislature did not intend. MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4) provides that a court may depart from a mandatory minimum sentence if it finds on the record that there are “substantial and compelling” reasons to do so. The Fields majority effectively replaced this test with one that requires that only “objective and verifiable” factors may be considered by the court. The Legislature specified no limitations on the types of factors the sentencing court may consider. It only specified the threshold that the sentencing court must reach, and that threshold is that the circumstances of the case must establish a substantial and compelling case for sentencing departure.
In this case, the majority provides that it adopted the basic tenets set forth in People v Hill, 192 Mich App 102; 480 NW2d 913 (1991). I agree with the dissenting opinion in Hill that
[t]he test created by the majority is a judicial invention never contemplated by the Legislature. The key terms “objective” and “verifiable” remain undefined and are therefore unworkable. We cannot look to the Legislature for guidance, because the Legislature has not used these terms. [192 Mich App 121.]
[T]he majority has impermissibly allowed its personal views regarding drug policy to influence its decision. Clearly, the underlying purpose and intent of the majority’s opinion is to impose standards and hurdles that no defendant can overcome. [192 Mich App 123.]
Under the statute, the test is not whether each factor considered was objective and verifiable, but whether the nature and extent of the factors rise to the level of substantial and compelling reasons, in the *14mind of the sentencing judge, to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence. I continue to disagree with the decision to rewrite the statute at issue.
n
Having stated my disagreement with the Fields test, I alternatively note that, even under that test, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence. The trial judge made extensive remarks regarding his decision to depart below the mandatory minimum and made sure to emphasize the requirement that he rely on objective and verifiable factors under Fields. After reviewing the applicable case law, he stated:
“The mandatory minimum sentence is a legislative expression of an appropriate sentence to discipline the wrong doer, protect society, deter others, and is, thus, presumptively valid. The substantial and compelling reasons required by the statute before imposing the sentence less than the statutory minimum refer to objective and verifiable reasons and do not include . . . subjective facts. Included among the factors which may be considered by the Trial Court in determining whether there are substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence are: Facts which mitigate Defendant’s culpability, Defendant’s prior criminal record, Defendant’s age, and Defendant’s work history.”
* * *
It is my intention to deviate. And I have to tell you and the Court why. The first reason is that you have no prior record. Now, you have to take responsibility for what you did, but society has to know the fact that there is some good in what you didn’t do, and that is you had no prior record. I’m also very impressed by your letter of remorse. I *15am impressed by the remorse that you’ve shown. . . . And remorse is very important to the re-establishment and to behavior modification. Another reason, substantial and compelling, is that he assisted the Police. He has no Constitutional duty to assist the Police. . . . Further, I consider his family ties. I, being a parent and a grandparent, know the importance of family ties and rehabilitation of children .... And then, of course, your age. I don’t have to make any further comment. We do, in America, give some credence to age as being significant.
The trial judge listed five factors for his departure: (1) defendant had no prior record, (2) he was remorseful, (3) he assisted the police, (4) he had strong family support, and (5) he was only seventeen at the time of the offenses. These remarks were made only after reciting the factors listed by the Court in People v Downey, 183 Mich App 405, 414; 454 NW2d 235 (1990), citing this Court in People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972). In Snow, this Court directed sentencing judges to be guided by the following criteria in fashioning the appropriate sentence: (1) disciplining of the wrongdoer, (2) the protection of society, (3) the potential for reformation of the defendant, and (4) the deterring of others from committing similar offenses. The Downey Court went on to state that “the factors which go into determining the rehabilitative potential of the defendant may be considered when determining if substantial and compelling reasons exist to deviate from the presumptive sentence.” 183 Mich App 414. Downey later stated:
[A] defendant’s protestations of remorse and Ms actions after his arrest wMch are relied upon to show Ms remorse and rehabilitative potential are much more subjective and thus would not, absent other exceptional circumstances, be *16appropriate factors to consider. [183 Mich App 415-416 (emphasis added).]
Following disagreement in the Court of Appeals regarding this issue, a superpanel in People v Hill, supra, expressly rejected the Downey limitation that only prearrest conduct could be considered:
[T]he trial court may consider postarrest facts, although consideration of postarrest facts should be undertaken with much greater caution than consideration of prearrest facts because of the risk that defendants will create postarrest events to influence the sentencing judge. [192 Mich App 115.]
The majority in Hill did not approve of or reject any specific factors. It did however, affirm the “objective and verifiable” test.
Similarly, a majority of this Court in People v Fields expressly overruled the notion that factors that arise after the defendant’s arrest are disfavored. Fields further stated that these factors should be assigned the same weight as preexisting factors such as age or employment history. 448 Mich 77.
In Fields, the majority said that it was adopting the “substantial and compelling” test set forth in People v Hill, supra. The Fields Court also affirmed the “Downey-Krause-Hill”1 test. Id. at 79. In those three cases though, as noted above, the Courts did not say that remorse could never be a departure consideration. Downey merely stated that mere protestations of remorse, and postarrest actions showing remorse and potential for rehabilitation, without other exceptional circumstances, would not be appropriate. Fields *17expressly rejected the Downey conclusion regarding postarrest factors and gave them more weight. Therefore, in our case, the trial judge appeared to be looking at defendant’s remorse in a permissible manner, i.e., to assess the defendant’s rehabilitative potential, which the Court of Appeals said in Downey should be considered in determining if there are substantial and compelling reasons to depart from a presumptive sentence. In other words, the trial judge might have been looking beyond the defendant’s “mere protestation,” and instead considered objective evidence of remorse including the defendant’s cooperation with police. It appears that the trial judge looked to defendant’s remorse and his family ties in assessing defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, which is a proper factor. In explaining his intent to depart, he made the following observations:
Now, in sentencing you, I do take into consideration the case of People v Johnson, found at 116 Michigan Appeals 452 [323 NW2d 439 (1982)]. There, the Corut said that the criminal sentence should fit the offender, rather than the offense alone. And it should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender, in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential. The four factors that I consider in sentencing you, sir, are: The reformation of the offender, the protection of society; the disciplining of the wrong-doer; and the deterrence of others from committing like crimes. [Emphasis added.]
[R]emorse is very important to the re-establishment and to behavior modification.
*18* * *
Further, I consider his family ties. I . . . know the importance of family ties and rehabilitation of children. With my wife and God’s help, I’ve never had to rehabilitate children. However, seven years as a Juvenile Judge told me there is no such thing as a rotten person. You know, there’s good in everybody. And, the family helps bring out the good. The family is necessary—the support of the family is necessary to keep a person straight. [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, under Downey, remorse is an inappropriate factor “absent other exceptional circumstances.” The facts of this case present several factors, one of which, according to Fields, should be given special attention.2
Under the test adopted in Fields, the factors considered in this case were proper. Therefore, as a matter of law, the consideration of remorse and family ties in assessing defendant’s potential for rehabilitation was proper.
HI
In order to give further support for upholding the decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals under Fields, it is necessary to apply the facts of the instant case to the principles set forth by the Fields majority.
The Fields majority took upon the task of assigning weight to certain sentencing departure factors. For example, it opined that courts should place particular emphasis on mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense. The majority provided that in People v Bates, 190 Mich App 281, 282-283; 475 NW2d 392 *19(1991), where the defendant’s only participation consisted of providing transportation for the seller, it was appropriate for a court to assign considerable weight to these facts in deciding whether to depart from the minimum sentence. Fields, supra at 76. The Fields majority also stated that “the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement officials should be given special attention by the sentencing court.” Id. at 77. A combination of age and employment history of a particular defendant can also be “especially noteworthy” according to the Fields majority. Id. at 78, citing the facts in People v Harvey, 203 Mich App 445; 513 NW2d 185 (1994), where the defendant was thirty-three and had been employed with General Motors for fourteen years. Additionally, in People v Shinholster, 196 Mich App 531; 493 NW2d 502 (1992), the government’s actions in the case, although not rising to the level of entrapment, purposefully escalated the crime. This factor, the Fields majority thought, was of particular importance and weighed heavily in favor of a deviation from the statutory minimum. Fields, supra at 79. Finally, in People v Poppa, 193 Mich App 184; 483 NW2d 667 (1992), the Court decided not to depart when the defendant claimed that his extensive cooperation with law enforcement combined with his assertion that he had problems resulting from his emigration from Romania and that he had difficulty adjusting to his newfound freedoms in America, caused him to commit crime. The Fields majority agreed.
In applying these principles to the present case, the trial judge’s consideration of defendant’s lack of a prior record and age was approved. Fields, supra at 77. Also, the fact that defendant assisted the police *20“should be given special attention by the sentencing court.”
Such assistance enables the authorities to more effectively fight drug-related crime, thus advancing the fundamental goal of MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401). House Legislative Analysis, HB 4190, Third Analysis, May 17, 1978. We note that the federal sentencing guidelines allow courts to depart below statutory minimum sentences under similar circumstances, as do the sentencing laws of several states. [Id. (citations omitted).]
This “special” factor was not present in Fields, and the Court did not provide a rating for the consideration of family support or a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.
Because the factors considered are permitted under our case law, the trial judge’s determination that objective and verifiable factors present in this case constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Fields, supra at 78. Even if one were to argue that remorse cannot be considered, it is clear that the remorse analysis, at least partially, went toward assessing defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. This factor is proper under both Snow and Downey, supra. As for any completely subjective or improper consideration of remorse, it could not have been error rising to an abuse of discretion when one considers the strength of the objective and verifiable factors present. Any error was harmless. Therefore, a remand for resentencing is not only inappropriate, but also a waste of judicial resources. It is clear from the lengthy sentencing transcript that the trial judge had decided to depart from the minimum sentence. Ordering the trial *21court to remove any subjective portion of the consideration of remorse will not change this determination.
rv
The majority has chosen to limit the statute by requiring an automatic resentencing when it determines that one of many factors considered was not “objective and verifiable.” Under this rule, if an appellate court wants to vacate a departure, it need only state that one factor was subjective. The majority now creates yet another hoop through which the sentencing judge must jump. A sentencing court is directed to not only list solely objective and verifiable factors, but must also “ ‘specifically articulate the reasons why the factors it identifies and relies upon collectively provide “substantial and compelling” reasons’ ” to depart below the mandatory minimum sentence. Ante, p 9. Again, our statute provides:
The court may depart from the minimum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (2)(a)(ii), (in), or (iv) if the court finds on the record that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. [Emphasis added.]
The plain language of the statute requires the court to make findings on the record that there axe substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence. Apparently, this language is insufficient, as the majority finds it necessary to emphasize that the findings must amount to a “specific articulation” and explain reasons “why” the factors “collectively provide” substantial and compelling reasons to depart. Under the plain language of the statute, the court cannot simply list factors. It must “find on the record that there are substantial and *22compelling reasons to [depart].” I am lost with respect to the distinction between the statutory language and the newly stated requirements. It appears that the majority is merely providing yet another hurdle for, or warning to, the judge who chooses to depart from a mandatory minimum sentence.
Perhaps the majority is of the opinion that the trial judge’s ten-page statement of substantial and compelling reasons for departure was insufficiently articulated, or that his reasons were not collectively relied upon, or that he did not specifically state that the reasons were collectively relied upon. The result is that appellate courts now have an additional reason to send the case back for resentencing.
v
For these reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeals determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the facts of the present case provided substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence.

 People v Krause, 185 Mich App 353; 460 NW2d 900 (1990).

 This will be explained in detail in the next section.