Court Opinion

ID: 9940554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:00:40.422745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:00.058974
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-40425       Document: 00517063680             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/14/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                             FILED
                                   _____________
                                                                             February 14, 2024
                                    No. 19-40425                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                consolidated with                                   Clerk
                                    No. 21-40543
                                  _____________

   United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                           versus

   Julio Cesar Cardenas,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 1:12-CR-512-1

                    ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Defendant Julio Cesar Cardenas seeks a reduction of his sentence for
   “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and because of an amendment to

          _____________________
          *
              Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
   should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
   forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 19-40425        Document: 00517063680             Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/14/2024

                                        No. 19-40425
                                      c/w No. 21-40543

   the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied his re-
   quest for a reduction in his sentence on both grounds. We AFFIRM.
                                   I. Background
           On May 31, 2013, a jury convicted Julio Cesar Cardenas of charges
   related to drug trafficking and conspiracy. For three of the counts under
   which the jury convicted Cardenas, the district court sentenced him pursuant
   to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Because Cardenas had prior felony drug con-
   victions under Texas law, Cardenas received mandatory life sentences for his
   convictions under these three counts. Cardenas was also convicted under six
   other counts. The district court sentenced Cardenas for these counts under
   § 841(b)(1)(B). Unlike the three § 841(b)(1)(A) counts, these six counts did
   not carry mandatory life sentences. 1
           Cardenas moved for release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In
   this motion, Cardenas contended that “extraordinary and compelling rea-
   sons” warranted a sentencing reduction because the First Step Act amended
   § 841(b)(1)(A), reducing the mandatory term of imprisonment for a defend-
   ant with two prior serious drug felony convictions from life to 25 years. 2 The
   district court denied this motion and Cardenas’s motion to reconsider.
           Separately, the district court had previously issued an order stating
   that it was considering, on its own motion, a reduction of Cardenas’s sen-
   tence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court did so to

           _____________________
           1
            In total, Cardenas was convicted under sixteen counts. The seven other counts
   not mentioned in this paragraph are of no relevance to the disposition of this appeal.
           2
              Cardenas also argued he was entitled to release because “his chronic
   gastrointestinal disease, hypertension, cyst-tumor and chronic sinus problem place[d] him
   in the crossfire of Covid-19.” On appeal, Cardenas does not argue that COVID-19 is an
   additional reason for granting his motion for release for “extraordinary and compelling
   reasons.”

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                                     No. 19-40425
                                   c/w No. 21-40543

   evaluate whether Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines warranted a
   reduction in Cardenas’s sentence . In his response and objection to the ad-
   dendum to the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR Response”), Car-
   denas argued that the district court should reduce his total sentence to 360
   months, even though he was serving three mandatory life sentences. The
   district court denied Cardenas’s request and his motion to reconsider the de-
   nial of his request.
                                 II. Discussion
          Cardenas challenges the district court’s denial of the motions for
   release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and pursuant to
   Amendment 782. We consider each of these challenges in turn.
                                          A.
          Cardenas brings three challenges to the district court’s denial of the
   motion for release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” “We review
   the ultimate decision to deny compassionate release for abuse of discretion.”
   United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023). “[A] court abuses
   its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous
   assessment of the evidence.” Id. (alteration in original).
          Cardenas first contends the district court erred in concluding that he
   failed to show “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that would warrant
   release.   A “prisoner [may] move for a sentence reduction . . . when
   ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant.’” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
   § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).
          Cardenas identifies two reasons he contends are “extraordinary and
   compelling.” First, he points to the First Step Act’s non-retroactive changes
   to § 841(b)(1)(A) which, according to Cardenas, would “reduce [his]
   sentencing enhancements from life imprisonment to a term of 25 years, if

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   sentenced today.” But this court has rejected that same argument twice. See
   United States v. Elam, No. 22-40373, 2023 WL 6518115, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 5,
   2023) (per curiam); United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL
   4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023) (per curiam). In sum, “a prisoner
   may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a
   compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither
   extraordinary nor compelling.”             McMaryion, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2. 3
   Given this court’s decisions in Elam and McMaryion, “we cannot say that the
   district court abused its discretion” in concluding that the First Step Act
   does not support Cardenas’s motion for release. Elam, 2023 WL 6518115, at
   *2. 4
           Second, Cardenas argues the Supreme Court’s decision Wooden v.
   United States, 595 U.S. 360, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022), created an
   “extraordinary and compelling” reason entitling him to the relief he
   requests. According to Cardenas, the Supreme Court’s holding in Wooden
   requires that his three earlier Texas state-law convictions be treated as “one
   criminal episode,” which would result in “a statutory enhancement of 15-

           _____________________
           3
             Cardenas argues that the district court’s holding “that nonretroactive changes in
   law, alone, cannot serve as the basis for compassionate release . . . runs contrary to this
   Court’s holding in” United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2021). Not so. In
   Cooper, this court merely remanded to “the district court to consider, in the first instance,
   whether the nonretroactive sentencing changes to [the defendant’s] . . . convictions, either
   alone or in conjunction with any other applicable considerations, constitute extraordinary
   and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence.” Id. at 289 (emphasis added). In so
   doing, this court “offer[ed] no views as to the merits of the [prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)]
   motion.” Id.
           4
            To the extent Cardenas argues recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
   support his request for release, he is incorrect. “[C]hanges to the Sentencing Guidelines
   can give rise to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), not § 3582(c)(1).” McMaryion,
   2023 WL 4118015, at *2.

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   years of imprisonment instead of life.” 5 Not so. “[A] prisoner cannot use
   § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence; such
   arguments can, and hence must, be raised under Chapter 153.” Escajeda,
   58 F.4th at 187 (emphasis in original). Because Cardenas’s “claims would
   have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under
   § 3582(c).” Id. at 188. As such, Wooden did not create an “extraordinary
   and compelling” reason entitling Cardenas to relief under § 3582(c).
           Finally, Cardenas argues the district court failed to provide a sufficient
   explanation for its decision to deny the motion for release. A “district court
   is not required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, and it may,
   in its discretion, dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without
   a detailed explanation. Nor is a district court required to articulate anything
   more than a brief statement of reasons.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S.
   481, 501, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). Thus, this court has “repeatedly held
   that perfunctory orders justify a discretionary decision to deny relief under
   § 3582(c)(1).” Escajeda, 58 F.4th at 188.
           The district court’s seven-page order denying the motion for release
   and three-page order denying Cardenas’s motion to reconsider discuss the
   nonretroactive changes the First Step Act made to § 841(b)(1)(A). Only after
   considering those changes and the “circumstances [Cardenas] cites” did the
   district court decline to find “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.”
   Thus, the district court did not commit a procedural error by failing to
   adequately consider the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1); see also Escajeda,
           _____________________
           5
             Cardenas appealed his sentence to this court. See United States v. Cardenas,
   606 F. App’x 246, 246 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). He argued, inter alia, that the district
   court erred by “treating his three related prior felony drug convictions as separate
   convictions instead of as a single conviction[.]” Id. This court concluded that the district
   court did not err in treating the convictions as separate because they “were committed
   sequentially, not simultaneously” and affirmed his sentence. Id. at 247.

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   58 F.4th at 188 (holding the district court did not commit “procedural error
   by perfunctorily denying [defendant’s] motion in a one-page order”).
          For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   denying Cardenas’s request for release under § 3582(c)(1).
                                             B.
          Cardenas also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for
   a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 to the Sentencing
   Guidelines. “Amendment 782 reduced by two levels the Base Offense Level
   assigned a defendant by the Guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table in Section
   2D1.1.” United States v. Hernandez, 647 F. App’x 426, 427 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (per curiam). Amendment 782’s two-level guideline reduction applies to
   Cardenas’s six § 841(b)(1)(B) counts but does not apply to the three
   § 841(b)(1)(A) counts, for which Cardenas received statutorily mandated life
   sentences. Nevertheless, Cardenas argued in his PSR Response that the
   district court could lower his total sentence to 360 months because of
   Amendment 782. In other words, rather than serve life in prison, Cardenas
   would “be out of jail when he would be 69 years of age” if the district court
   granted his request. The district court denied Cardenas’s request simply
   because he is “subject to a statutory minimum sentence of life
   imprisonment” and, therefore, “his sentence remains the same.” 6
          On appeal, Cardenas does not directly attack the district court’s
   conclusion and instead changes his argument. Cardenas now argues the
   district court erred by not finding him eligible for a sentencing reduction
   under Amendment 782 for “all his . . . convictions” for which he “was not
   subject to a statutory life sentence.” (emphasis added). In other words,
          _____________________
          6
            The district court reached the same conclusion in denying Cardenas’s motion to
   reconsider.

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                                     No. 19-40425
                                   c/w No. 21-40543

   Cardenas no longer asks to be released after 360 months as he did in his PSR
   Response; now, he simply asks for a reduction in his sentences for certain
   counts that do not carry a mandatory life sentence. But “[t]o preserve an
   issue for appeal, the objection below must fully apprise the trial judge of the
   grounds for the objection so that evidence can be taken and argument
   received on the issue.” United States v. Huerra, 884 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.
   2018) (citation and quotations omitted). Because Cardenas failed to do that,
   the plain-error standard of review applies. See United States v. Duhon,
   541 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The plain-error standard of review
   applies when a party challenges a district court’s sentencing decision on
   grounds it did not present to the district court.”).
          Plain-error review “involves four steps, or prongs.” Puckett v. United
   States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). “First, there must be
   an error or defect—some sort of [d]eviation from a legal rule—that has not
   been intentionally relinquished or abandoned[.]” Id. (alteration in original)
   (citation and quotations omitted). “Second, the legal error must be clear or
   obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. “Third, the error
   must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
   case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district
   court proceedings.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “Fourth and
   finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the
   discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only
   if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
   judicial proceedings.”     Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
   (citation and quotations omitted).
          Cardenas’s argument fails under prongs three and four, given this
   court’s decision in Huerra. In that case, a prisoner was serving a mandatory
   life sentence concurrently with a shorter sentence. Huerra, 884 F.3d at 520.
   The prisoner argued the district court erred with respect to the shorter

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   sentence. See id. at 519–20. Under plain-error review, this court concluded
   “the sentencing error did not affect Huerra’s substantial rights” because the
   error affected the shorter sentence and did not impact the mandatory life
   sentence. Id. at 520. As such, the prisoner failed to satisfy the third prong.
   Id. For similar reasons, this court held the prisoner also failed to satisfy the
   fourth prong. See id. (“The fourth plain-error requirement is . . . absent”
   because the prisoner’s “concurrent life sentence for Count 12 means that he
   can show no meaningful benefit . . . from vacating this [shorter] sentence on
   Count 13.” (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted)).
           Here, even if the district court reduced Cardenas’s sentences for his
   six § 841(b)(1)(B) counts, Cardenas would still be serving mandatory life
   sentences for his three § 841(b)(1)(A) counts. Thus, the district court’s
   failure to reduce his § 841(b)(1)(B) sentences has no impact on the total
   amount of time Cardenas will spend in prison. Therefore, Cardenas’s
   challenge to the district court’s denial of his request for a sentence reduction
   fails under plain-error review. 7
                                      CONCLUSION
           For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in denying
   Cardenas’s request for a reduction in his sentence.
           AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           7
              Cardenas argues the district court erred by relying on the 2013 version of the
   Sentencing Guidelines when it should have relied on the 2018 version. But Cardenas fails
   to identify any material differences between the 2013 and 2018 versions, nor does he explain
   how these differences impacted his sentence. Cardenas has inadequately briefed this issue
   and, therefore, has waived it. See United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283, 304 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (“It is well settled in this circuit that a defendant waives an issue if he fails to adequately
   brief it.” (citation and quotations omitted)); see also FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“The
   appellant’s brief must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them[.]”
   (emphasis added)).

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