Court Opinion

ID: 9864771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:10:28.039898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:41.417650
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am in accord with the order of reversal of the judgment as to defendant Vigil, not only for the reasons expressed in the court’s opinion, but for additional reasons, presently to be stated, which should, I think, work reversal also as to the two remaining defendants. While I do not pause to discuss all the reasons that prompt this dissent, a few points are emphasized, and I venture to present some general observations which I believe have merit.
The charge is, that defendants, “did unlawfully, riotously, and with force and violence do an unlawful act against the person of one Arthur Benine, James Benine, and Albina Kralich, to wit, did then and there unlawfully assault, beat, bruise, and wound the said Arthur Benine, James Benine, and Albina Kralich, contrary,” etc. The statute of the prosecution’s reliance is section 196, chapter 48, ’35 C.S.A., which reads: “If two or more persons shall actually do an unlawful act with force or violence against the person or property of another, with or without a common cause of quarrel, or even do a lawful act in a violent or tumultuous manner, the persons so offending shall be deemed guilty of a riot, and on conviction shall severally be fined not exceeding two hundred dollars or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months.” The section quoted is substantially section 103, of an act passed in 1861 (Territorial Laws, ’61, page 311), having to do with “Offenses against the Public Peace and Tranquility.” The word “riot” imports an unlawful act or deed at the hands of an assemblage *166of persons, usually “three or more,” Webster’s Dictionary; (46 Am. Jur., p. 130, §9), but by our statute, “two or more.” If there is not an assemblage, there can be no riot; but the assemblage, in the first instance, need not be an unlawful one. An assemblage, originally lawful, may degenerate into an unlawful one, and the participants therein, if guilty of acts, which, if done by those assembled for that purpose, would constitute an offense, likewise will offend.
The weakness of the charge here, as I am persuaded, is, that, assemblage, assembling, or assembly, lawful or unlawful, is not alleged. “Though, in law,” says Mr. Bishop, “people lawfully together may commit riot, still the assemblage must first become unlawful; that is, the riotous purpose must be entertained. Hence the unlawfulness of the assemblage must in some way appear in allegation,” followed with allegations of specific law infractions, after the manner, say, of what is alleged here. 3 Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), page 1861, §995. The prosecutor must “allege an unlawful assembling together.” Commonwealth v. Gibney, 2 Allen (Mass.) 150. Noticing the absence of such allegations in that case, the Massachusetts court added: “If the case was a proper one for an indictment for a riot, as it probably was, that offence not being properly charged, the indictment is bad.” “Riot requires concerted action in furtherance of some common purpose, inasmuch as the absence of this element constitutes the offense either a rout or an unlawful assembly,” not of riot. 46 Am. Jur., p. 131, §12. So here. There were several two-men fights, but there was no evidence that the physical encounters were in “furtherance of any common purpose.” It follows, as seems clear, that defendants’ motion “that the case be taken away from the jury,” should have been granted.
Instruction number four, challenged because of the inclusion therein of certain language, which, for convenience of reference, I shall italicize, reads as follows: *167“The court instructs the jury, that, if it finds and believes, from the evidence introduced in the cause, that any defendant herein was unjustifiably attacked by another or by others, at the place of said alleged riot, and while engaged in the lawful pursuit of his own business and not participating in any riot, and/or, while the same was in progress, that said defendant had a lawful right to defend himself from such attacker, or attackers; and in so doing to use such force or means as were necessary, or would seem necessary, in the judgment of a reasonable man under like circumstances; and if he did so defend himself, said defendant would not be guilty of riot.” The instruction as given, minus the emphasized words, conforms to defendants’ requested instruction number one, which was refused. In connection therewith, as pertinently may be reemphasized, there was no allegation of assemblage. That there were numerous individual encounters, clearly appears. But only in a single instance, and that applied but to one of the defendants, was there evidence that they were engaged in physical altercations, and that, as is not disputed, was between him and only one other. The circumstances considered, the italicized words of the instruction operated to foreclose and make inoperative defendants’ defense, namely, that they were being assaulted by others, and only in self-defense did they have part in the unseemly happenings, and in each instance were acting as individuals, not in concert, against those attacking them. As counsel for defendants contends, the instruction, qualified by the questioned language, would be similar to a case where, defendant being charged with murder or assault, and self-defense was urged, the court should charge the jury, that, if they should believe from the evidence that defendant was “unlawfully attacked by another, while engaged in lawful pursuit of his own business, and not engaged in murder or assault,” then he should be acquitted, etc. In this connection, it is pertinent to mention, that, while the information charges these particular *168defendants with having assaulted, beaten and bruised those named in the information, neither those individuals nor other witnesses identified defendants, or any of them, as their alleged assailants. In short, as I conceive, the evidence for the prosecution not only wholly failed— which should have been adjudged, as moved by defendants — but their defense, which they were entitled to have considered by the jury, was, to all intents and purposes, made nugatory by the inclusion of the criticized language in the instruction under discussion.
The whole trouble had inception in a physical encounter between one of the individual defendants and one other person, who was not a prosecuting witness nor identified in the information as allegedly assaulted. The mentioned altercation attracted attention, and the curious gathered about the scene. There were divided sympathies, as the record abundantly shows, some, called “Spanish-Americans,” apparently believing that defendant Trujillo, a much decorated overseas veteran, still in uniform, was in the right, while those of “other descents,” or “White-Americans,” to quote from the record, thought his antagonist should be favored. Evidently, there was loud talking and not a little misbehaviour on the part of many on both sides. But the physical encounters, as I understand the record, invariably were individual. On the whole record, as I respectfully submit, the distinguished public official who conducted the prosecution, and confining it to those on one side of the misunderstanding, as he did, might better have summoned the leaders of the two groups before him, and, proceeding uncritically, explained to them the importance of the fact that the term “American” applies to every citizen, and, regardless of ancestry, none may claim to have or enjoy special rights or consideration. In short, that before the law all citizens stand on terms of equality, and that excellence is best exemplified by refrenation from comparisons based on accident of ancestry. What we are, not whence came our forebears, is *169the sole criterion. In any event, the record considered, I do not think defendants belong in jail, as was adjudged, nor,'were those of the other group involved, had they been prosecuted, deserving of incarceration. I would reverse the judgment generally, and conclude with the suggestion that those responsible for the prosecution seek dismissal of the case.
Mr. Justice Alter concurs in this dissenting opinion.