Court Opinion

ID: 9496040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:16:42.395107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:20.445770
License: Public Domain

BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Today’s opinion concludes that it was error to look to the circumstances surrounding an ambiguous state court order in determining whether the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was procedurally defaulted. Today’s decision ignores the clear teachings of the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) and Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). I respectfully dissent.
I
Kelly Koerner is currently serving a life without parole sentence in Nevada for the murder of his former wife. After Koerner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, he elected not to appeal his conviction. Koer-ner then initiated a number of collateral challenges to his conviction in the Nevada state courts.1
In his third round of state collateral challenges (“Third Petition”), Koerner raised a claim for the first time that he was denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed to- file a direct appeal. The Nevada district court denied this claim and five others on the ground that Koerner’s petition was a successive petition under Nevada law and all of the claims had been decided in previous collateral proceedings. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.745(3) (West 1993).
The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Koerner’s appeal, but for slightly different reasons than those on which the state district court relied. According to the Nevada Supreme Court, all of Koerner’s claims were barred because they had (1) been decided on their merits in previous collateral proceedings or (2) could have been raised in previous collateral proceedings but were not. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.810 (West 1993); see also Dromiack v. Warden, 97 Nev. 348, 349-50, 630 P.2d 751 (1981) (holding that the failure to assert all *1054claims in one petition is a waiver absent a showing that the claims could not reasonably be raised in previous petition).
After Koerner filed his present federal habeas petition, the federal district court concluded that Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was procedurally barred under Nevada law because it was raised for the first time in Koerner’s Third Petition. Further, the federal district court concluded that Koerner did not show “cause and prejudice” for this procedural default and dismissed Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim without addressing its merits. I would affirm.
II
In contrast to the court’s opinion, I accept the teaching of the Supreme' Court’s precedents. These precedents establish that the district court had a duty to go beyond the face of the Nevada Supreme Court order dismissing Koerner’s Third Petition and to look to the circumstances surrounding that order in making its procedural default determination.
A
Federal courts cannot review a constitutional claim raised in a habeas petition if the claim was denied by the state courts on an “independent and adequate” state ground. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). In determining whether a state court has relied on an “independent and adequate” state ground in denying a petitioner’s federal claims, the Supreme Court has provided us with three important lessons:
First, if the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims “fairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law,” a federal court may presume the availability of federal habeas review unless the state court opinion provides a “plain statement” indicating that the decision relies on an “independent and adequate state ground.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The presumption in favor of federal review, called the Harris presumption, stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-63, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).
Second, where the last state court order addressing a claim does not fairly appear to rest on or to be interwoven with federal law, a plain statement is not required of the state court in order for the claim to be barred by an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735-36, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Third, because no plain statement is required when a state court order does not fairly appear to rest on or to be interwoven with federal law, federal courts must look to “surrounding circumstances” in order to determine the basis of a state court order. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-03, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); see also Coleman 501 U.S. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (looking to external sources to clarify a state court order).
B
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision addressing Koerner’s Third Petition does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law. As a result, the district court could not rely on the plain statement requirement of the Harris presumption, and had to look to “surrounding circumstances” to clarify the basis of the Nevada Supreme Court’s order dismissing Koerner’s Third Petition appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct. 2590; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735-40, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.1991) (“Coleman significantly undercuts Harris by cut*1055ting away the ‘plain statement’ part of the [Harris ] presumption.”). The district court engaged in the required inquiry and correctly determined that the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because Koerner could have raised his ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument in prior petitions but did not do so.
All of the six claims in Koerner’s Third Petition were denied either because the claims were rejected on their merits in the two previous collateral challenges or because the claims could have been raised in the prior collateral challenges, but were not. Today’s opinion recognizes these as mutually exclusive options. If Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was not rejected on its merits in Koerner’s two previous collateral challenges, then the only reason Koerner’s claim was dismissed in the Nevada state courts was because it should have been raised in Koerner’s earlier collateral challenges, but was not.
The factual and procedural background of this case establish that Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was never addressed on its merits by the Nevada courts. As the court’s opinion recognizes, Koerner did not fairly present his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim during the course of his first two rounds of post-conviction challenges. The Nevada district courts ruled on the merits of thesé first two challenges in reasoned orders that did not once mention Koerner’s un-raised ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed both Nevada district court decisions for the reasons stated in the state district court orders.
There is no reason to believe that the Nevada Supreme Court ever ruled on Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim before Koerner filed his Third Petition. Koerner even admitted in his Third Petition that he was raising his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for the first time and that the claim had not been addressed previously, although Koerner now argues to the contrary.
As Koerner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not presented or ruled on by the Nevada courts during the course of Koerner’s first two state petitions, the Nevada Supreme Court’s denial of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in the Third Petition must be because Koer-ner could have raised this claim in an earlier collateral proceeding, but he faded to do so. The Nevada Supreme Court’s invocation of the procedural bar based on Koerner’s failure to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in earlier collateral proceedings is an “independent and adequate” state ground of decision that bars federal habeas review. See Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1999) (Nevada law “clearly requires a petitioner to raise all claims in his first petition unless he can demonstrate cause and prejudice” and Nevada has a “clear and regularly applied rule that a petitioner must pursue all avenues for relief if he wishes to preserve his claims”); see also Valerio v. Crawford, 806 F.3d 742, 778 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing the continuing vitality of Bargas).
The district court reviewed the state court decisions and state court filings in this case, determined that the Nevada Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because it had not been raised in Koerner’s previous petitions, and concluded that Koerner’s claim was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court on an “independent and adequate” state ground — Koerner’s failure to raise the issue in his previous petitions. I find no error in the district court’s conclusion.
*1056C
Today’s opinion holds that a federal court may only look to the state court opinion at issue in determining whether a state court opinion relies on a procedural default. If a state court opinion is ambiguous on its face, today’s opinion makes it impossible to find a procedural default because any such state court opinion does not “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Despite its assertion to the contrary, today’s opinion applies the plain statement requirement of Hams. See 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038.
Utilizing the Harris approach in these circumstances directly conflicts with Coleman and. Ylst In both cases, the Supreme Court looked beyond the face of “ambiguous” state court orders in order to determine whether or not the state court relied on an “independent and adequate” state ground. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 805-06, 111 S.Ct. 2590; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546; see also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 2581, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) (reversing the Ninth Circuit in part because, despite the possibility that a state court ruled on the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[t]he record ... reveals no such ruling”).
In Ylst, the Supreme Court discussed the question how to determine if one type of ambiguous state court order, the unexplained order, rests primarily on federal law. It stated:
The question is not an easy one. In Coleman ..., although the order was unexplained, the nature of the disposition ... and surrounding circumstances ... indicated that the basis [of the ambiguous decision] was procedural default.
Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct. 2590 (emphasis added). In Coleman, the Supreme Court looked to the filings in state court proceedings to determine the basis of the ambiguous state court order. See 501 U.S. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In Ylst, the Supreme Court looked to prior state court decisions for the same reason. See 501 U.S. at 805-06, 111 S.Ct. 2590. The district court in this case came to the correct decision after consulting these same sources.
The opinion of the court writes around these teachings, claiming that the recent en banc decision in Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d at 771-775, dictates a different answer. In an effort to reconcile Valerio and Coleman, I believe Valerio’s references to an “ambiguous” state court order should be understood in light of the state court opinion and the record in that case, rather than looking solely to the face of the state court’s opinion. Cf. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (concluding that an unexplained state court order was a decision on the merits in part because no contextual clues existed for clarifying the order). If today’s understanding of Valerio is correct and it was improper for the district court in this case to go beyond the face of the Nevada Supreme Court’s last order, we are in open defiance of the Supreme Court precedents in Coleman and Ylst. As I cannot reconcile today’s opinion with Coleman and Ylst or agree with today’s broad reading of Valer-io, I must dissent.
Ill
The district court correctly found, after consulting the record in this case, that Koerner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim cannot be heard in federal court because it was procedurally default*1057ed in the Nevada courts on an independent and adequate” state ground.
I would affirm the district court.

. At the time Koerner initiated his collateral challenges to his conviction, Nevada provided two routes for collaterally challenging a conviction: a petition for post-conviction relief under Nev.Rev.Stat. Chapter 177 and a petition for writ of habeas corpus under Nev.Rev. Stat. Chapter 34. See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519, 526-530 (2001). Subsequently, Nevada repealed the procedures under Nev.Rev.Stat. Chapter 177, leaving only the procedures available under Nev.Rev. Stat. Chapter 34. See Pellegrini, 34 P.3d at 528-530.