Court Opinion

ID: 9550742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:41:33.133007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:17.041220
License: Public Domain

GRABER, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The evidence concerning the murder of Johnson was admissible to prove the identity of Wilder’s murderer. I agree with the majority’s description of the test but disagree with the majority’s application of the test.
A. IT IS RATIONAL TO INFER THAT THE MURDERS WERE COMMITTED BY ONE PERSON.
The trial court made extensive, written findings of fact, the accuracy of which defendant does not dispute. See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (appellate court is bound by trial court’s finding of historical fact if supported by the record). The court arranged its findings in the form of a chart, as follows:
“The following chart lists similarities between the two homicides:
Factor Johnson Wilder
Date 3/20/87 10/9/87
Day of week Friday Friday
Time of death 2 AM - 5 AM 2 AM - 5 AM
Place Victim’s 1 bedr’m apartment Victim’s 1 bedr’m apartment
Nearness to def s ‘kitty-corner’ & 1/2 mile away or a
Mother’s house within eyesight 15-min. walk
Ap’t room where body found Livingroom Bedroom
Location of Body On floor Partly on bed; feet on floor
*203Position of body On back Probably on back before body moved
Clothes on body Partly nude Nude
Body condition Head injuries (probably by blunt instrument Head injuries (probably by fist)
Unconsciousness at time of death Inconclusive Inconclusive
Cause of death Asphyxiation by ligature strangulation Asphyxiation by ligature strangulation
Ligature Telephone cord Telephone cord
Type of phonecord. Wall to phone unit cord Wall to phone unit cord
Alcohol consumption by both defendant and victims Yes Yes
Victims’ blood alcohol level .17% .29%
Presence of def s fingerprints Yes Yes
Sexual activity before death Yes - ‘vigorous’ Yes - ‘vigorous’
Relationship between defendant and victims Def. knew victim Def. knew victim
Evidence of burglary, robbery or theft No No
Evidence of forced entry to victim’s premises No No”
In State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 806 P2d 110 (1991), this court noted that there are three main factors in the determination of the degree of similarity: the time lapse between the two crimes, the geographic distance, and the resemblances between the methods of the crimes. The time lapse here was relatively brief; the murders occurred about six months apart. The crimes were in the same neighborhood; the murders occurred within walking distance of each other. *204The third factor in determining the degree of similarity is the method of committing the crimes. The method of committing these two murders was the same and was distinctive: each victim was strangled with the part of her telephone cord that runs between the wall jack and the base of the telephone; the cord was wrapped multiple times, forcefully, around each victim’s neck; and each victim also received injuries by blows to the left side of the head.
The majority reasons that, because telephone cords are readily available in apartments, using telephone cords to kill is not distinctive. 313 Or at 200. That reasoning gives too little emphasis to the specific way in which the killings occurred; the precise manner of using the wall-to-telephone cord as a weapon was the same, and that use was combined with blows to the head of each victim.
Moreover, the majority’s analysis confuses opportunity with action and intuition with fact. Nearly every apartment in Portland contains a raincoat, but it could be distinctive to suffocate multiple victims with the lining of a raincoat. Most apartments contain dictionaries, but it could be distinctive to beat two people to death with a dictionary.
Whatever the majority’s feeling about the commonness of the method of killing here, the record before us demonstrates that these crimes were distinctive. Even without the combination of factors discussed above, the use of a telephone cord alone is a rare occurrence. The record in this case demonstrates that, between 1982 and 1989,19 murders in Portland were committed by strangulation. Only two of those victims were strangled with a telephone cord: Johnson and Wilder. The state also presented statistics from three other cities, which demonstrated that strangulation by telephone cord is very rare.1
In addition to (1) geographic proximity, (2) temporal proximity, and (3) the highly unusual method of killing, there were other significant similarities in the methods of the crimes, including these: (4) the day and time chosen by the killer (each crime was committed on a Friday night/Saturday *205morning between 2 and 5 a.m.); (5) the type of victim selected (the victims were single adult women in their middle years); (6) the type of assault that preceded each murder (each victim was subjected to assaultive vaginal sex; each victim was at least partly nude and at least partly lying on her back when found); and (7) the means that the killer used to gain access to the victims (the victims were very intoxicated and in their own apartments, which bore no signs of forced entry or theft).
For the purpose of determining whether a crime is a signature crime, some similarities “may be so unusual as to be significant even standing alone,” but “[m]ost often the significance of the similarities will arise out of their combination.” State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 214, 785 P2d 350 (1990). In this case, the method of killing is so unusual as to be significant standing alone, but it does not stand alone. There are numerous similarities between the Wilder and Johnson murders. Even when all the dissimilarities recited by the majority are considered, the totality of the record convinces me that the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence2 that both crimes can be attributed to one criminal.
B. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT DEFENDANT MURDERED JOHNSON.
There is no dispute that Johnson was murdered. Defendant argues, however, that the state failed to prove that he was the person who committed that murder; he asserts that “the evidence that defendant murdered Bobbie Jean Johnson is skimpy.” The trial court applied a standard of clear and convincing evidence and found that “there is virtual certainty” that defendant was the perpetrator of both crimes.
We need not decide in this case whether the state is correct that it had to prove defendant’s guilt of the Johnson murder only by a preponderance of the evidence, because the record supports the trial court’s finding under a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Johnson’s neighbor testified that she and Johnson had bought two six-packs of Colt .45 beer on March 19, the day before Johnson was killed. The neighbor was in Johnson’s company, on and off, all day on March 19 and into the *206early morning hours of March 20, just before Johnson was killed. The neighbor left Johnson’s apartment at about 1:00 a.m. on March 20; at that time, only two white ceramic ashtrays were on Johnson’s coffee table. Later that morning, when Johnson’s body was found, there also were two Colt .45 cans on the coffee table; they had defendant’s fingerprints on them. In addition, a white envelope, which had not been there at 1:00 a.m., was found on the coffee table; it bore handwriting that matched defendant’s handwriting.
There also was evidence that defendant knew Johnson and had expressed a sexual interest in her. Defendant was staying at his mother’s home at the time of Johnson’s murder. Johnson’s apartment was across the street.
There was no evidence to suggest that anyone other than defendant was in the victim’s apartment between 1:00 a.m. on March 20 and the time the body was discovered a few hours later.
Although the evidence was circumstantial, it clearly and convincingly established that defendant murdered Johnson. In the words of the trial court, “[t]here is substantial certainty that defendant committed the [Johnson] homicide.”
C. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE.
The foregoing sections demonstrate that the evidence concerning the murder of Johnson was relevant to prove the identity of Wilder’s murderer in defendant’s trial, which was the purpose of the offer of that evidence. The evidence thus met the requirements of OEC 401, OEC 402, and OEC 404(3). There is, however, another step in the analysis.
As this court held in State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 538, 725 P2d 312 (1986), the trial court must determine whether the probative value of evidence of another crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or by considerations of delay or of confusing or misleading the jury. OEC 403. In this case, defendant argues that probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. *207The trial court’s written opinion concerning the evidence of the Johnson murder set out the weighing process in detail:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
<<* * * * *
“8. Proof of the prior Johnson homicide during the Wilder trial will not confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause undue delay or unecessary [sic] cumulative evidence under ORE 403. While the evidence certainly will be prejudicial to defendant, all evidence against a defendant in a criminal case is prejudicial, and a defendant must cope with those consequences. Because of the similarity of facts in the two homicides, the prejudice will not be ‘unfair’ within the meaning of ORE 403. The probative value of such testimony outweighs the prejudicial danger.
<C* * * * *
“10. The factual weighing of probative versus prejudicial value under ORE 403 is determined by the following facts, among others previously discussed: (1) The State has a strong need for evidence of the prior crime because evidence against defendant in the Wilder case is circumstantial and no eyewitnesses are available to link defendant to that homicide;[3] (2) There is substantial certainty that defendant committed the other homicide, as outlined in ¶¶ 4 and 9; (3) The evidence of the other crime is not any more inflammatory than the evidence of the Wilder homicide itself, except for the fact that Johnson suffered slightly more severe injuries prior to death than Wilder.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
<<* * * * *
“4. The certainty of the other crime evidence is substantial. The prior crime and the charged crime are ‘so nearly identical in method as to earmark both as the handiwork of the defendant.’ State v. Collins, 73 Or App 216, 220 (1985), citing State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 208 (1975).
“5. The State does not need to prove that the other crime has 100 percent congruity with the charged offense.
*208‘The prior facts need not be identical. The greater the degree of similarity of the prior acts, the greater the relevancy; the less similarity, the less probative value.’ State v. Johns, supra at 555. See also, State v. Smith, 271 Or 294, 296 (1975).
“6. The jury can draw the inference properly ‘that the person who committed the other crime was the same person who committed the crime for which he is being tried. ’ State v. Collins, supra, quoting State v. Manrique, supra, 271 Or at 207. See also, Huddleston v. United States, 485 US 681, 108 S Ct 1496 (1988) (construing identical language in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)).
“ 7. The other crime evidence of the Johnson homicide has substantial probative value to a central issue in the charged homicide. That value is not outweighed by the ‘danger of unfair prejudice, confusing [sic: confusion] of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’ ORE 403. Evidence of the Johnson homicide will not ‘tempt the jury to decide the case on an improper basis’ or to decide the case ‘on the improper basis that the defendant is a bad person.’ State v. Johns, supra at 558.”
The trial court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and we generally defer to the trial court’s decision whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 29-30, 828 P2d 1006 (1991). The weighing process here was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. The trial court properly could decide that the probative value of the evidence of the Johnson murder was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.
I dissent.4

 By way of comparison, in State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 112, 806 P2d 110 (1991), the use of electrical cords ripped off lamps and appliances to tie the victims was considered to be an important part of the “signature.”

I agree with the majority that this is the standard of proof that is required.

3 The inclusion of this factor rests on dubious logic. The state’s need for the evidence increases its probative value, but at the same time and in the same measure increases the prejudice to defendant from its admission. The need for the evidence does not affect any unfairness that might be present, one way or the other. In my view, the need for the evidence is logically irrelevant to the weighing process under OEC 403.

 This dissent responds only to the majority’s basis of decision. I express no view concerning any other issue in the case.