Court Opinion

ID: 9368004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:08:09.754964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.926416
License: Public Domain

J-S39039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JUAN JR. CRISTO-MUNOZ                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 937 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-36-CR-0001591-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2023

        Appellant Juan Jr. Cristo-Munoz appeals from the order denying his

timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant contends

that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant about the

possibility of proceeding to trial and arguing diminished capacity from

voluntary intoxication.      After review, we affirm based on the PCRA court’s

opinion.

        The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history

of this matter as follows:

        On February 19, 2017, [Appellant], then 18 years old, was
        charged with two counts of criminal homicide, two counts of
        robbery, burglary and criminal conspiracy[FN1] from an incident
        involving the brutal torture-killings of two disabled brothers,
        Richard Walton and Leroy Kinsey, on February 19, 2017.
        [Appellant] and his co-conspirator, 19-year-old Joshua Michael
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S39039-22

     Proper,[FN2] forced their way into the brothers’ home in Lancaster
     City, demanded money from the victims and then repeatedly
     stabbed them. Kinsey was stabbed at least ten times. Walton
     was stabbed 54 times with a sword taken from the home. The co-
     defendants then fled to the basement of the home, where officers
     ultimately found them after responding to a 911 call for a burglary
     in progress placed by a third occupant of the home who had fled
     to the roof.

            18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), 18
        [FN1]

        Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a),
        respectively.

            On April 11, 2017, the Commonwealth consolidated this
        [FN2]

        case with the homicide charges filed against Proper at
        Information No. 1592-2017.

     Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P, 802, the Commonwealth filed a notice of
     intent to seek a sentence of death against [Appellant] on March
     22, 2017.[FN3] However, on April 11, 2018, [Appellant] agreed to
     enter a guilty plea to the charges of first-degree murder, burglary,
     robbery, and conspiracy to commit burglary in exchange for the
     Commonwealth dropping the death penalty.
        [FN3]Specifically, the Commonwealth believed it could prove
        the following statutory aggravating circumstances: (1)
        defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a
        felony, specifically, burglary and robbery; (2) in the
        commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created
        a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the
        victims of the offense (Ryan Taska); (3) the killing was
        committed by means of torture (victim Leroy Kinsey); and
        (4) the defendant has committed multiple murders. See 42
        Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6), (7), (8) and (11).

     Pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea tendered on April 11, 2018,
     the court imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life
     without the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder
     convictions.[FN4] No post-sentence motions were filed.
        [FN4]Pennsylvania law mandates that if a person is found
        guilty of first-degree murder and does not receive the death
        penalty he or she will receive a sentence of life
        imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 18
        Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1).

                                    -2-
J-S39039-22

     On May 10, 2018, [Appellant] filed a timely direct appeal to the
     Superior Court of Pennsylvania from the judgment of sentence
     imposed on April 11, 2018. A three-judge panel of the Superior
     Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished
     memorandum filed on April 16, 2019, See Commonwealth v.
     Cristo-Munoz, [780 MDA 2018] 2019 WL 1749210 (Pa. Super.
     [filed Apr. 16,] 2019) [(unpublished mem.)].

     On March 18, 2020, [Appellant], acting pro se, filed a timely
     motion for post conviction collateral relief. In this pleading,
     [Appellant] challenged the effective assistance of his trial counsel,
     Edwin G. Pfursich. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania
     Rules of Criminal Procedure, on September 21, 2020, Christopher
     P. Lyden, Esquire, was appointed to represent [Appellant] on his
     collateral claims and was granted leave to file an amended [PCRA]
     petition.

     On December 1, 2020, Attorney Lyden mailed Petitioner a “no
     merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d
     927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988), stating that after his review of the pro se PCRA
     petition and the record of the case, he found no meritorious
     issues.    In his pro se objections to the “no merit” letter,
     [Appellant] alleged for the first time that trial counsel was
     ineffective for failing to advise him regarding the possibility, based
     on his mental health history and use of alcohol, prescription and
     illegal narcotics, of mounting a “diminished capacity” defense to
     the first-degree murder charge. Upon review of all the pleadings,
     the court issued an order on April 1, 2021, directing Attorney
     Lyden to review and respond to the new issue raised by
     [Appellant].

     Thereafter, Attorney Lyden filed an amended petition on April 21,
     2021, which raises the sole issue of whether defense counsel were
     ineffective for failing to advise [Appellant] that a diminished
     capacity defense because of voluntary intoxication could be
     presented during a trial. The Commonwealth filed a response to
     the amended petition on May 21, 2021, conceding the need for an
     evidentiary hearing on this claim. Accordingly, a hearing was held
     on November 29, 2021, at which time the court heard testimony
     from defense attorneys Edwin G. Pfursich and Joseph P. McMahon
     [(collectively Defense Counsel)], and [Appellant].        Proposed
     findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by [Appellant] on
     December 23, 2021, to which the Commonwealth filed an answer
     on January 16, 2022.

                                     -3-
J-S39039-22

PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-4 (some footnotes omitted and formatting altered).

The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on June 30, 2022, and Appellant

filed a timely appeal.   Both the PCRA court and Appellant complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

      1. Did the PCRA court err by failing to find that [Appellant]
         entered an invalid plea where [Defense Counsel] failed to
         discuss with [Appellant] the possibility of defending the
         charges at trial by claiming diminished capacity from voluntary
         intoxication?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (formatting altered).

      Appellant argues that Defense Counsel knew that he had consumed

alcohol on the night of the offenses but failed to thoroughly discuss the

possibility of proceeding to trial and defending the homicide charges by

claiming voluntary intoxication. Id. at 11. Appellant contends that he would

not have plead guilty if he was aware of the possibility of presenting this

defense, and therefore, he entered an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea.

Id. at 11-12.

      In reviewing Appellant’s claims, we are guided by the following

principles:

      [O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
      limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
      supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
      error.    The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
      supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
      apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions.

                                      -4-
J-S39039-22

      Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
      counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
      evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
      to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
      is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
      basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
      and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
      the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered). “Allegations of ineffectiveness in

connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if

the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing

plea.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted).   “Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of

counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”

Id. (citation omitted).

      The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
      dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements for relief
      based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, ... under
      which the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient
      stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by
      facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent
      plea. This standard is equivalent to the “manifest injustice”
      standard applicable to all post-sentence motions to withdraw a
      guilty plea.

Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added).

      Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly,
      voluntarily and intelligently entered. There is no absolute right to

                                       -5-
J-S39039-22

     withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow a
     defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the
     trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing, a defendant must
     make a showing of prejudice amounting to “manifest injustice.”
     “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered
     into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” A defendant’s
     disappointment in the sentence imposed does not constitute
     “manifest injustice.”

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.2003).

     Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there
     is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
     not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
     The reasonable probability test is not a stringent one; it merely
     refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
     outcome.

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). “A defendant is permitted to withdraw his

guilty plea under the PCRA if ineffective assistance of counsel caused the

defendant to enter an involuntary plea of guilty.”       Commonwealth v.

Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

     Moreover, “[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty

plea was aware of what he was doing[, and the defendant] bears the burden

of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

     The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant may
     not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under
     oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who
     elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open
     court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for
     withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at
     his plea colloquy.

                                    -6-
J-S39039-22

Id. (internal citation omitted). Further:

      In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty
      plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant
      understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This
      determination is to be made by examining the totality of the
      circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus, even
      though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy,
      a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances
      surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had
      a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea
      and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.

Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citation omitted and formatting altered).

      Additionally, a claim of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication

cannot be asserted by mere evidence of intoxication, but rather the assertion

requires evidence that demonstrates the defendant was intoxicated to such

an extent that he was unable to form the requisite intent. Commonwealth

v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (Pa. 2006).          Moreover, “[a] defense of

diminished capacity is only available to a defendant who admits criminal

liability but contests the degree of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Laird, 726 A.2d

346, 353 (Pa. 1999).

      Instantly, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s testimony that he

was intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form specific intent to kill

was not credible, and continued that initially, Appellant asserted his innocence

and blamed co-defendant Joshua Proper for committing the murders alone.

Further, trial counsel, Attorney McMahon testified at the PCRA hearing that he

discussed the defense of voluntary intoxication with Appellant prior to him

                                     -7-
J-S39039-22

agreeing to the negotiated plea. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 2, 8, 10, 11.

The trial court imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life without the

possibility of parole on the two first-degree murder convictions, and the

Commonwealth dropped the death penalty sentence it was seeking.

     On this record, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claims

that he would have gone to trial and not plead guilty if he had known about

the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication are not

credible, and Appellant cannot establish prejudice as he did not enter an

involuntary or unknowing plea resulting in a manifest injustice. See Kelley,

136 A.3d at 1013; see also Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 369.

     Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the well-

reasoned conclusions of the PCRA court, we affirm based on the PCRA court’s

opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/5/22, at 1-13.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/02/2023

                                   -8-
                                                                                  Circulated 01/09/2023 03:59 PM

                                                                    July 29, 2022

                                                                    Re: Juan Cristo- Munoz Jr.
                                                                    Cp Cr No: 1591-2017
                                                                    Superior Cr No: 937 MDA 2022

                                  Index of Opinion

1.   Index of Opinion
2.   Opinion in Support of Order of June 30, 2022
3.   Order Denying Amended/Petition for Post — Conviction Collateral Relief Act
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY,PENNSYLVANIA
                           CRIMINAL.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

                      IV.                                        No. 1691 - 2017

      .JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, .JR.

                                                                                              sanoo Aomro
                 OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER OF JUNE 30, 2022

                                                                                          s
8Y:    ASHWORTH, P.J_, JULY 5, 2022                                                       0

                                                                                          w
       Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., filed an amended petition pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 954146. That amended petition was denied by

order entered on June 30, 2022, following an evidentiary hearing. This opinion is filed in

support of that decision.

1.     Background

       The relevant facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows_ On

February 19, 2017, Cristo-Munoz, then 18 years old, was charged with two counts of

criminal homicide, two counts of robbery, burglary and criminal conspiracy' from an

incident involving the brutal torture-killings of two disabled brothers, Richard Walton and

Leroy Kinsey, on February 19, 2017. Cristo- Munoz and his co-conspirator, 19-year-old

'18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(A), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i), 18 Pa.C.S.A_ § 3502(a)(1)(i), and 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 903(A), respectively.
    Joshua Michael Proper, 2 forced their way into the brothers' home in Lancaster City,

    demanded money from the victims and then repeatedly stabbed them. Kinsey was

    stabbed at least ten times. Walton was stabbed 54 times with asword taken from the

    home. Notes of Testimony ( N.T.), Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 25-26, The co-defendants

    then fled to the basement of the home, where officers ultimately found them after

    responding to a911 call for a burglary in progress placed by athird occupant of the

    home who had fled to the roof. Id. at 24.

           Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 802, the Commonwealth filed a Notioe of Intent to Seek

    aSentence of Death against Cristo- Munoz on March 22, 2017. 3 However, on April 11,

 2018, Cristo-Munoz agreed to enter aguilty plea to the charges of first-degree murder,

 burglary, robbery, and conspiracy to commit burglary in exchange for the

Commonwealth dropping the death penalty. N.T., Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 30.

          Pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea tendered on April 11, 2018, the court

imposed consecutive mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole on the

first-degree murder convictions. 4 N.T., Guilty Plea/Sentencing at 32, No post sentence

motions were filed.

2 On April 11, 2017, the Commonwealth consolidated this case with the homicide charges filed
against Proper at Information No. 1592-2017.

3 Specifically, the Commonwealth believed it could prove the following statutory aggravating
circumstances: ( 1) defendant committed akilling while in the perpetration of afelony,
specifically, burglary and robbery; (2) in the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly
created agrave risk of death to another person in addition tc the victims of the offense (Ryan
Taska); (3) the killing was committed by means of torture ( victim Leroy Kinsey); and (4) the
defendant has committed multiple murders. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9711(d)(6), (7), (8) and ( 11).
4 Pennsylvania law mandates that if aperson is found guilty of first-degree murder and does not
receive the death penalty he or she will receive asentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1).
                                                2
        On May 10, 2018, Cristo-Munoz filed atimely direct appeal to the Superior Court

of Pennsylvania from the judgment of sentence imposed on April 11, 2018. 5 A three-

judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished

memorandum filed on April Z6, 2019, See Commonwealth v. Cristo-
                                                              Munoz, 216 A.3d

394, 2019 WL 1749210 (
                     Pa. Super. 2019).

       On March 18, 2020, 6 Cristo-Munoz, acting pro se, filed atimely' motion for post

conviction collateral relief. In this pleading, Cristo-Munoz challenged the effective

assistance of his trial counsel, Edwin G. Pfursich. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, on September 21, 2D20, Christopher P.

Lyden, Esquire, was appointed to represent Cristo-Munoz on his collateral claims and

was granted leave to file an amended petition.

5 Pursuant to this court's directive, Cristo-Munoz's counsel furnished aconcise statement of
errors complained of on appeal on June 8, 2018, which sets forth four bases for this appeal: ( 1)
Defendant was not provided the opportunity to speak at his sentencing hearing or testify against
his oo-defendant, Joshua Proper; (2) the facts of the case, as outlined by the Commonwealth,
were inaccurate and based upon a "corrupt source," Mr_ Proper; (3) the Assistant District
Attorney insulted Defendant and called him a " monster"; and (4) Defendant was subjected to
torture and malnourishment during his stay at Lancaster County Prison. See Statement of
Errors at ¶¶ 1-4. Counsel for Cristo-Munoz noted in the Statement of Errors that it was his
conclusion that Cristo-Munoz's issues were 'without merit," and that counsel intended to file a
brief pursuant to Anders v. Callfornla, 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967). Id. at 2.
6The pleading is deemed filed on the date of mailing rather than the date of docketing pursuant
to the °prisoner mailbox rule." Effort Main Document Only.See Commonwealth v. Crawford,
17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) (" Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem apro se
document filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing,').
7 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), apetition for relief must be filed within one year of the
date the judgment of sentence becomes final. Here, Cristo-Munoz's judgment of sentence was
affirmed on April 16, 2019. As Cristo-Munoz did not file apetition for allowance of appeal with
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, his judgment of sentence became final on May 16, 2019,
when the period for filing apetition expired. Cristo-Munoz filed his pro se PCRA petition on
March 18, 2020; as aresult, it is timely.

                                                3
       On December 1, 2020, Attorney Lyden mailed Petitioner a " no merit" letter

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A. 2d 927 ( 1988), and

Commonwealth v. Finlay, 379 Pa. Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 ( 1988), stating that after

his review of the pro se PCRA petition and the record of the case, he found no

meritorious issues. In his pro se objections to the "no merit" letter, Cristo- Munoz alleged

for the first time that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him regarding the

possibility, based on his mental health history and use of alcohol, prescription and illegal

narcotics, of mounting a "diminished capacity" defense to the first-degree murder

charge. Upon review of all the pleadings, the court issued an order on April 1, 2021,

directing Attorney Lyden to review and respond to the new issue raised by Petitioner.

       Thereafter, Attorney Lyden filed an amended petition on April 21, 2021, which

raises the sole issue of whether defense counsel were ineffective for failing to advise

Cristo-Munoz that adiminished capacity defense because of voluntary intoxication

could be presented during atrial. See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶
                                                               M21-24. The

Commonwealth filed aresponse to the amended petition on May 21, 2021, conceding

the need for an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Accordingly, ahearing was held an

November 29, 2021, at which time the court heard testimony from Defense Attorneys

Edwin G. Pfursich and Joseph P. McMahon, and Petitioner Cristo-Munoz. Proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by Petitioner on December 23, 2021,

to which the Commonwealth filed an answer on January 16, 2022.

       By order filed June 30, 2022, the amended PCRA petition of Cristo-Munoz was

denied. This opinion is offered in support of that order.

                                               4
It.   Discussion

      Cristo-Munoz claims that his defense attorneys provided ineffective assistance of

counsel for not explaining the defense of diminished capacity, voluntary intoxication,

and that if they had explained that defense that he would not have pleaded guilty to a

term of life imprisonment for the double homicide. For the reasons that follow, Cristo-

Munoz's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected.

      To prevail on aclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel made in the post

conviction context, adefendant must overcome the presumption that counsel is

effective by establishing by apreponderance of the evidence that. the underlying claim

has arguable merit; trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and

the defendant suffered prejudice. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 616 Pa, 164, 187, 47 A.3d

63, 76 (2012) ( cuing Commonwealth v, Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 627 A.2d 973,

975-76 ( 1987)).

       With respect to whether defense counsel's acts or omissions were reasonable,

counsel is accorded broad discretion to determine tactics and strategy. Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 447 Pa_ Super. 534, 540, 670 A,2d 153, 155-56 ( 1996). The applicable test

is not whether alternative strategies were more reasonable, employing a "hindsight'

evaluation of the record, but whether counsel's decision had any reasonable basis to

advance the interests of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 361,

30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011). The appellate courts will conclude that counsel's chosen

strategy lacked areasonable basis only if the petitioner proves that "an alternative not

chosen offered apotential for success substantially greater than the course actually

                                             5
pursued." Id. at 361-62, 30 A.3d at 1127 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 587 Pa.

304, 312, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)).

       To establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different

but for counsel's ineffectiveness. Chmiel, supra at 362-63, 3Q A.3d at 1127-28. °We

stress that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or

ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy adefendant's burden to prove that counsel was

ineffective." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 292, 15 A.3d 431, 443

(2011)).

       Failure to establish any prong of the Pierce test will defeat an ineffectiveness

claim. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 620 Pa. 60, 73, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (2013). Thus,

where apetitioner has not met the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, the

claim may be dismissed on that basis alone without adetermination of whether the

arguable merit and client's interest prongs have been met. Commonwealth v. Wright,

699 Pa. 270, 320-21, 961 A.2d 119, 148-49 (
                                          2008); Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa.

11, 26, 887 A.2d 1218, 1227 (2005).

       In this case, Cristo-Munoz pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. As

athreshold matter, "[g]enerally, aplea of guilty amounts to awaiver of all defects and

defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the

sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d

286, 290 ( Pa. Super. 2017) (
                            citation omitted). Cristo- Munoz has not challenged the

                                             6
jurisdiction of this court or the legality of his sentence. Cristo-Munoz does dispute,

however, the validity of his guilty plea.

       "Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of aguilty plea will

serve as abasis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an

involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). "Where the

defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea

depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

       In assessing the voluntariness of aguilty plea, our Superior Court has noted that

"[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his

decision to enter aplea of guilty; rather [a]II that is required is that [the defendant's]

decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made."

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 ( Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

       With regard to the voluntariness of aplea, aguilty plea colloquy
       must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what the
       plea connoted and its consequences. Once the defendant has
       entered aguilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what he
       was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.

Commonwealth v. Willis, fib A.3d 997, 1002 ( Pa. Super_ 2013) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

       Here, Cristo-Munoz contends that Attorneys Pfursich and McMahon were

ineffective for failing to thoroughly discuss with petitioner the possibility of defending

                                               7
the criminal homicide charges by claiming voluntary intoxication." Suggested Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law at • 27. As made clear by our Supreme Court:

       [A] defense of diminished capacity grounded in voluntary intoxications is avery
       limited defense, which does not exculpate the defendant from criminal liability,
       but, if successfully advanced, mitigates first-degree murder to third-degree
       murder. The mere fact of intoxication is not adefense ;rather, the defendant
       must prove that this cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were
       so compromised by voluntary intoxication that he was unable to formulate the
       specific intent to kill. In other words, to prove avoluntary intoxication defense,
       the defendant must show that he was overwhelmed to the point of losing his
       faculties and sensibilities.Evidence that the defendant lacked the ability to
       control his actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill,
       and thus does not constitute support of avoluntary intoxication defense.

Commonwealth v. Bardo, 629 Pa, 352, 413-16, 103 A, 3d 678, 716 (2014) ( internal

citations and quotations omitted). Such adefense of diminished capacity " is only

available to adefendant who admits criminal liability but contests the degree of guilt.°

Commonwealth v. Spotz,587 Pa. 1, 46, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 353 ( 1999)).

       Initially, it must be noted that Cristo-Munoz first insisted that he was innocent of

the charges and that his co-defendant, Joshua Proper, committed the murders alone.

N.T_, PCRA Hearing at 63, 85, 95. Such aposition would preclude avoluntary

intoxication defense which requires an admission of criminal liability. However, when

Petitioner understood the felony murder rule, he knew he was facing asentence of life

without parole regardless of who actually committed the murders. Id. at 63 ,80. He then

admitted to counsel to participating in the killings. Id. at 57.

       Further, it is uncontested that Petitioner did not tell his defense counsel that he

was intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the specific intent to kill. N.T.,

                                               8
PCRA Hearing at 69. Having failed to provide counsel with this information, Cristo-

Munoz cannot now establish his attorneys were ineffective for failing to pursue a

defense that was not suggested by the evidence provided to them, Accordingly, there is

no arguable merit to Petitioner's claim that counsel should have pursued avoluntary

intoxication defense to the first-degree murder charges.

       The evidence available to defense counsel did not suggest that adefense based

on voluntary intoxication was viable. Cristo-Munoz was evaluated by alicensed

psychologist, Jonathan M. Gransee, Ph.D., nine months after the murders. See

Commonwealth Exhibit No. 2. During that interview, Petitioner related very particular

details about the murders. Id.; N.7., PCRA Hearing at 36. Specifically, Cristo-Munoz told

Dr. Gransee that had he planned ahead for these murders he would have burned down

the home to destroy the evidence, he would have been more careful about touching

items on the first floor that had fallen down, and he would not have let his blood from a

cut on his hand get on the mop handle he was using to clean up the blood on the

second floor. Id. at 35-36. Petitioner evidenced avery specific recall of the events on

the night of the murders, despite his consumption of beer and prescription drugs. Id. at

 16-17, 24, 37_

        Attorney Pfursich and Attorney McMahon testified at the evidentiary hearing that

 they did initially consider the diminished capacity defense of voluntary intoxication in this

 case. 8 N.T., PCRA Hearing at 61, 77-78. However, for voluntary intoxication to be

 8 Attorney Pfursich testified at the hearing that he actually considered two diminished capacity
 defenses in this case. N.T., PCRA Hearing at 64. The first defense counsel considered was
 diminished capacity due to mental disorders that might have affected Petitioner's cognitive
                                                    9
applicable, the person must have been so intoxicated that he lacked all control of his

faculties. Id. at 61-62. Counsel dismissed this defense after Cristo-Munoz gave his very

detailed chain of events to Dr. Gransee. Significantly, Petitioner's version of events was

different than anything that was included in the discovery. Id. at 71. Attorney Pfursich,

therefore, did not believe this was acase of Petitioner reading the discovery and

relating details not from specific recall but from the reports, as suggested by PCRA

counsel. Id. See also Id. at 29-30, 35-37; Suggested Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law at t31. As neither the facts of the case presented by Petitioner nor the

discovery supported adefense of voluntary intoxication, counsel appropriately did not

pursue it. Id. at 69.

       Moreover, Petitioner's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he was

intoxicated to the extent that he was unable to form the specific intent to kill is not

credible. He testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murders he

consumed a40-ounce beer, which was atypical amount that he would consume in

order to " get [ him] feeling good! N.T., PCRA Hearing at 20, 39. Sixty to ninety minutes

after consuming the beer, Cristo-Munoz and his co-defendant entered the victims'

house_ Id. at 24. Cristo-Munoz testified, in direct contravention to his statements made

at the time of the guilty plea, that he has no recollection of being in the residence or of

what happened there due to his intoxication that night. Id. at 24-25. He stated,

ability to form the specific intent to kill. Id, Dr. Gransee did diagnose Cristo-Munoz with several
mental health disorders; however, he opined that none of them would have affected his
cognitive ability to understand what he was doing. Id, at 6x-61. Therefore, counsel did not
pursue this defense.
                                                      10
"everything went to ablur." Id, at 24, Petitioner now claims that he lied to the court, his

defense counsel, and Dr. Gransee when he admitted his complicity in the murders and

argues that he was so intoxicated that night that he has no memory of the incident. Id.

at 40, 49. Such assertions are simply not credible and are belied by the evidence.

       Counsel had areasonable basis for advising Petitioner that it was in his best

interest to enter anegotiated plea to aterm of life imprisonment. Both counsel testified

at the hearing that, even if Cristo-Munoz's version of events that his co-defendant was

solely responsible for the murders was to be believed by ajury, the murders were

committed during the course of aburglary and robbery, which qualifies for second-

degree murder which carries amandatory life-without-parole sentence. N.T., PCRA

Hearing at 47, 62-63, 77. Thus, Petitioner was still facing asentence of life in prison for

felony murder. Id. at 95.

        Cristo-Munoz testified at the PCRA Hearing that if the voluntary intoxication

defense had been presented to him, he would not have entered aplea of guilty to first-

 degree murder but rather would have gone to that. N.T., PCRA Hearing at 33-34.

 Attorney McMahon testified unequivocally that he discussed voluntary intoxication with

 Cristo-Munoz prior to him agreeing to the negotiated plea. Id. at 87-88. Regardless, had

 Petitioner gone to trial, he was facing the death penalty if found guilty of first-degree

 murder, and counsel testified to the fact that there were significant, multiple aggravating

 factors and "very little" in the way of mitigation evidence. Id. at 82. Counsel weighed the

 odds at trial where Petitioner could get adeath sentence versus the benefits of aplea to

                                               11
life in prison. Id. Counsel had areasonable basis in advising Cristo-Munoz to enter the

plea and acted in his best interests.

        Finally, Petitioner did not suffer prejudice from counsel's actions_ Cristo-Munoz

must prove that there is areasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness; that is, that if he was

informed of the defense of voluntary intoxication that he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have gone to trial. Petitioner understood that if he went to trial and the jury

believed his version of the events he would still be found guilty of second-degree

murder because the murders happened as aresult of aburglary. N- T., PCRA Hearing at

47. He further understood that such aconviction would result in asentence of life in

prison without parole. Id. Therefore, even had Petitioner pursued avoluntary

intoxication defense to the first- degree murder charges, he would not have avoided a

life imprisonment sentence and would have faced the possible of adeath sentence — a

sentence he did not want. Id. at 47-48; 41. Accordingly, Petitioner's testimony that he

would have gone to trial and not pleaded guilty if he had known about the defense of

diminished capacity, voluntary intoxication is not credible.

 III.   Conclusion

        For the reasons set forth above, Juan Cristo-Munoz's amended PCRA petition

 was denied.

        Accordingly, Ienter the following:

                                              12
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
                                   CRIMINAL

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

                   V.                                       No. 1591 - 2017

     JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, JR.

                                      ORDER

      AND NOW, this 5th day of July, 2022, the Court hereby submits this Opinion in

support of the Order of June 30, 2022, denying Juan Cristo-Munoz's amended petition

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-48.

                                           BY T

                                             AT'D L. A• - - ORTH
                                            PRESIDENT JUDGE

Copies to:   Cody L. Wade, Assistant District Attomey
             Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire
             Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., #NJ- 1102, SCI Somerset, 1590 Walters Mill Road,
                   Somerset, PA 15510-0001

                                           13
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY ,PENNSYLVANIA
                          C R IM INA

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                                                No. 159'1 - 2017
                     V.

      JUAN CRISTO-MUNOZ, JR_

                                            ORDER

       AND NOW, this 3011 day of June, 2022, upon consideration of Petitioner Juan

Cristo-Munoz's amended petition for post conviction collateral relief, and following an

evidentiary hearing in this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that said petition is DENIED.

        Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim-P. 907(4), this Court advises Petitioner that he has the

 right to appeal from this Order. Petitioner shall have 30 days from the date of this final

 Order to appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Failure to appeal within 30 days

 will result in the loss of appellate rights.

         It is further ORDERED that Petitioner shall have the right, if indigent, to appeal in

 forma pauperrs and to proceed with assigned appellate counsel as provided in Pa.

 R.Ciim.P. 122_

                                                    BY TH

                                                      AVI s . AS FORTH
                                                      RESIDENT JUDGE
Copies to:   Cory L. Wade, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney
             Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire, MILLER LYDEN, 53 North Duke Street,
                    Suite 205, Lancaster, PA 17602
             Juan Cristo-Munoz, Jr., #NJ1102, SCI Somerset, 1594 Walters Milt Road,
                    Somerset, PA 15514-0001 (Certified Mail)