Court Opinion

ID: 9561183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:04:47.448201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:40.924219
License: Public Domain

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part II of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent with regard to Part I, because I believe the majority misapplies the exceptionally deferential standard of review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).
With the AEDPA standard of review, Congress set the bar exceptionally high to ensure that federal courts afford the utmost deference to a state court adjudication. See Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir.2003) (“This standard is properly deferential because of the important role that state courts play in applying federal constitutional guarantees and because of federalism concerns that are evoked when we assess whether a state court system holds a state prisoner in violation of the federal constitution.”). Therefore, a federal court.may not grant habeas relief from a state court conviction unless it concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. *1086§ 2254(d) (emphasis added); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-39, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 155 L.Ed.2d 877 (2003).
It is clearly established that a “criminal defendant ... being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). I do not disagree with the majority’s general assessment that, given the trial judge’s knowledge of the holdout juror’s concerns, the trial court’s supplemental instructions and the manner in which the judge selectively commented on the evidence likely affected the jury’s verdict. Therefore, in my view, the California Court of Appeal was simply wrong in concluding that the trial judge’s comments on the evidence were “scrupulously fair” and not coercive.
Yet, to grant relief under the AEDPA, it is simply not enough for us to conclude that the state court decision is wrong. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). Even if we are “left with a firm conviction that the state court was erroneous,” we cannot grant relief unless the state court’s application of clearly established Supreme Court holdings1 was objectively unreasonable. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citations omitted); Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir.2004) (“The petitioner must demonstrate not only that the state court’s application of governing federal law was erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable.”) (citing Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166). “A state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if ‘the state court identifies the correct governing legal principles from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’ ” Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 762 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495) (alterations in Ramirez). See also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166.
In this very difficult ease, I believe the majority has “fail[ed] to give proper deference to [the] state court[] by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (citations omitted). See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (reversing us because we failed to observe the distinction between an incorrect application and an unreasonable application); Packer, 537 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 362 (same). “Even if we agreed ... that there was jury coercion here,” we should not grant of relief if “it is at least reasonable to conclude that there was not....” Packer, 537 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 362. In other words, to affirm the district court’s grant of relief, we must conclude that, in context and considering all of the circumstances of this particular case, no rational court applying Lowenfield could conclude that the verdict was anything but coerced.
In this case, the California Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge’s supplemental instruction and considered his comments on the evidence (even if the court did not expressly restate every fact or circumstance in its decision). In concluding that the verdict was not coerced, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the trial judge did not tell the jury what verdict to reach or expressly indicate what conclusion ought to be reached from the evidence upon which the judge commented. The *1087trial judge did not indicate which of the witnesses (the petitioner or his co-defendant) was more credible. He did not express any notion of the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. He also did not tell the jury that it had an obligation to reach a verdict. Further, the trial judge did not affirmatively poll the jury or ask the jury about its numerical division. That the trial judge ultimately learned of the jury’s division and of the specific concerns of the holdout juror is problematic. That he then selectively summarized the evidence is equally troublesome. But I can find no clearly established federal law indicating that a trial judge may not comment on the evidence when he knows the numerical division of the jury, and no Supreme Court holding requires a state court judge (when commenting on the evidence) to recite any and all evidence that might be relevant, contradictory, or even exculpatory.
I agree with the majority that the evidence the trial judge selectively presented and summarized (given the holdout juror’s concerns), may have had a coercive effect on the jury. I dissent because it may at least be reasonable to conclude that it did not. See Packer, 537 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 362. On this basis, I would reverse the district court’s grant of relief on the basis that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

. "[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)).