Court Opinion

ID: 9366696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 18:08:10.816216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.548251
License: Public Domain

J-S42016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: ADOPTION OF D.N.L.H.,               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR CHILD                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: R.H., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 865 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
                              at No(s): 021-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: JANUARY 27, 2023

        Appellant, R.H. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered on March 14,

2022 granting a petition filed by D.L. (“Mother”) to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights to his son, D.N.L.H. (“Child”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b). We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case:

        […] Child [was born] [i]n August [], 2012. Following [] Child’s
        birth, Mother and Father began a co-parenting relationship with []
        Child, during which Father would occasionally stay with Mother
        and perform parental duties on behalf of [] Child. The extended
        family contacts for [] Child include Father’s own mother []
        (hereinafter “Grandmother”), who passed away after appearing to
        provide testimony in this matter. While [] Child was still at a very
        young age, Mother entered a job training program called “job
        corps,” which required her to reside separately from [] Child for a
        period of between six and nine months. During this time, Mother
        signed paperwork directing that the public assistance she received
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       on behalf of [] Child be transferred to Grandmother. Father
       continued to maintain the same level of contact with [] Child
       during this time period.

       Following Mother’s return from the job corps program, Father
       became incarcerated [] around 2015. While incarcerated, Father
       lost contact with Mother, and by extension, [] Child. Upon his
       release, Father indicated that he attempted to see [] Child each
       day until Mother filed a Protection from Abuse (PFA) [p]etition
       against him. After a final PFA order was entered in January 2018,
       Father testified that he no longer had contact with [] Child out of
       an abundance of caution because he did not want to be accused
       of violating the PFA order. The PFA order did not include any
       specific custody terms, but only indicated that the parties were to
       abide by the terms of their current custody order, and that Father
       could modify those terms by petitioning the custody court. Mother
       [] married [another man (“Stepfather”)] in September 2020. The
       PFA [order] expired in January of 2021, and shortly thereafter,
       [on February 19, 2021,] Mother petitioned [the trial c]ourt to
       terminate Father’s parental rights [so that, ultimately, Stepfather
       could adopt Child].

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 2-3. “The hearing on Mother’s [p]etition

spanned several days, first taking place on July 22, 2021, then on October 13,

2021, and finally concluding after testimony was taken on February 22, 2022.”

Id. at 1. At each hearing, Mother and Father were represented by counsel.

Id.   The trial court also appointed both an attorney to represent Child’s legal

interests and a separate guardian ad litem who were both present for all three

hearings. Id.       On March 14, 2022, the trial court granted Mother’s petition

and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights.       This timely appeal

resulted.1
____________________________________________

1  Due to a breakdown in the judicial system, Father was not properly served
with the trial court order. As a result, the trial court granted Father additional
time to file a notice of appeal. On July 15, 2022, Father filed a timely notice
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
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       On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
          law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
          parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) where
          [F]ather, based on all available resources and ability, exercised
          reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in his path
          and maintaining a relationship with [Child]?

       2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
          law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
          parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where the
          evidence indicated the lack of integrity of the proposed
          adoption and the unlikelihood that the proposed adoption
          would occur[?]

       3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
          law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
          parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where
          [Mother] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
          severing the parent-child bond would not have a detrimental
          effect on [Child] and would best serve the developmental,
          physical and emotional needs and welfare of [Child ?]

Father’s Brief at 4-5.

       In his first issue presented, Father claims that the trial court erred by

involuntarily terminating his parental rights under Section 2511(a) because

“[M]other actively prevented contact between [F]ather and [Child].” Id. at

19.   Father claims that he did not understand the terms of the PFA order

and/or the custody order that Mother subsequently obtained.           Id. at 20.

Further, Father asserts that, following the issuance of the PFA order, Mother

____________________________________________

of appeal, and a corresponding concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 18, 2022.

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moved, did not disclose her new address to Father, and blocked Father and

paternal relatives on social media. Id. at 20-21. Finally, Father contends that

due to his “limited cognitive abilities and scarce financial resources, it was

impossible for [F]ather to overcome the barriers to contact erected by

[M]other.” Id. at 23. Father asserts that his status as a resident of Allegheny

County foreclosed his efforts to secure         pro bono legal services in

Westmoreland County. Id. at 24. Father also maintains that his cognitive

impairments prevented him from handling this matter pro se, since he lacked

academic and computer skills needed to pursue litigation. Id. at 24-25.

      We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness,

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d

580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate

courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility

determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R.,

256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d

343, 358 (Pa. 2021).

      Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of parental

rights proceedings.    See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.         Section 2511(a)

provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial

court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of

the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must then

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consider whether termination would best serve the child under subsection (b).

Id. § 2511(b).

     Initially, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:

     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

        (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
        six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
        either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
        parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
        parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

     Our Supreme Court has stated:

     Appellate review in cases involving involuntary termination of
     parental rights is limited to determining whether the trial court's
     determination is supported by competent evidence. When
     applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept
     the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
     if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial
     court's factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
     appellate court may not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it
     has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of
     discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest
     unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters
     not that an appellate court might have reached a different
     conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of
     discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for
     the trial court's decision, the decree must stand.

     Parents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions regarding
     the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot be denied
     that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent
     and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is
     an undeniable importance in a child's relationship with a biological

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     parent. In recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination
     of parental rights, the moving party must establish the statutory
     grounds by clear and convincing evidence; that is, evidence that
     is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a trier of
     fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth
     of the precise facts in issue.

     To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), the party
     seeking termination must prove that the parent by conduct
     continuing for a period of at least six months immediately
     preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled
     purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
     or failed to perform parental duties. Parental duties are not
     defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts long have interpreted
     parental duties in relation to the needs of a child, such as love,
     protection, guidance and support. Parental duties are carried out
     through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the
     parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive actions
     undoubtedly includes communication and association.            The
     performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert
     himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's
     life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable
     firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of
     preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more
     suitable time to perform parental responsibilities. Of importance
     is the General Assembly's emphasis in Section 2511(a)(1) on the
     six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination
     petition when evaluating a parent's conduct. Although courts are
     to avoid the mechanical application of the Adoption Act, we may
     not ignore that the General Assembly has drawn focus to the six
     months immediately preceding the filing of the termination
     petition. Indeed, [our Supreme] Court addressed this aspect of
     Section 2511(a)(1) and reaffirmed that for an analysis
     thereunder, the most critical period for evaluation is the six
     months immediately preceding the filing of the termination
     petition.

     When considering a request to terminate rights under Section
     2511(a)(1), a parent's failure or refusal to perform parental duties
     must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the
     case. [Our Supreme Court] has explained that:

        a finding of abandonment, which has been characterized as
        one of the most severe steps the court can take, will not be
        predicated upon parental conduct which is reasonably

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        explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the
        parent's control. It may only result when a parent has failed
        to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental
        relationship.

     Decades ago, [our Supreme] Court clarified that a parent's efforts
     are always considered in light of existing circumstances. Thus,
     the focus of the inquiry is on whether, under the circumstances,
     the parent has acted with reasonable firmness in refusing to yield
     to the obstacles that have prevented the performance of parental
     duties.

     To that end, even where the evidence clearly establishes a parent
     has failed to perform affirmative parental duties for a period in
     excess of six months as required by Section 2511(a)(1), the court
     must examine the individual circumstances and any explanation
     offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the
     totality of circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the
     involuntary termination of parental rights. Consideration of the
     totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following:
     (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the
     post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if any,
     including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact
     with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental
     rights would have on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). [To]
     reiterate [] the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to [the]
     mandate that courts avoid a mechanical application of the law
     regarding the termination of parental rights. The law must be
     applied with the purpose of serving the needs and welfare of each
     individual child in his or her particular circumstances. It is within
     this framework that a court determines whether a parent has
     faced barriers that prevented the parent from maintaining the
     parent-child relationship. What constitutes a barrier in the context
     of a Section 2511(a)(1) analysis is a finding within the discretion
     of the trial court, and what may constitute a barrier necessarily
     will vary with the circumstances of each case. In some instances,
     obstructive behavior by the child's custodian presents a barrier to
     the parent's ability to perform parental duties, which mitigates the
     parent's failure to maintain the parent-child relationship. In other
     instances, trial courts have found substance abuse, mental health
     issues, homelessness, joblessness, criminal charges, or a
     confluence of some or all of these issues created barriers to the
     maintenance of the parent-child relationship. In all instances, the
     trial court consider[s] the explanation offered by the parent when
     deciding whether termination of parental rights was warranted.

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In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591–593 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations,

quotations, and original brackets omitted).

       Here, in involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(1), the trial court opined:

       The evidence presented [] indicated that [] Child had not seen
       Father since some time in 2017,[2] prior to Mother obtaining a
       three-year [PFA] order against him on January 24, 2018. The
       consent order entered on the PFA specifically states that the
       parties are to follow the current custody order and that, if Father
       wishes to modify the terms of the custody order, he was to utilize
       the court system. Father discontinued any contact with [] Child
       from that point forward.

       Father’s argument on this point is that Father did everything in his
       power to maintain a relationship with [] Child but was
       stone-walled by Mother, thus, the fact that he had not maintained
       contact with [] Child or performed parental duties should not be
       held against him. Father testified extensively as to his learning
       disabilities creating difficulty for him to read and comprehend the
       various court orders pertaining to the custody of [] Child, but
       Father also indicated that he and [Grandmother] with whom []
       Child resided on a temporary basis, were previously afforded some
       type of custody while Mother participated in her job corps
       program. He testified as to his reliance on family members and
       paramours to keep him informed, especially after Mother obtained
       a PFA against him. He also testified that neither the Allegheny
       County court staff nor anyone in his personal life explained the
       terms of the PFA order and whether it had an impact on his
       custodial rights. He stated that he was unaware of where Mother
       resided after the PFA was entered, but this is not uncommon in
       custody matters involving instances of abuse.           Mother also
       testified that she blocked Father on social media platforms
       because she did not want him to have contact with her while the
       PFA was in effect.

____________________________________________

2 We reiterate that Child was born in August, 2012. As such, Child was
approximately five years old the last time Father saw him.

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      The closest that Father came to taking any action on his own was
      to ask Mother’s brother and other people in his social circle if they
      could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to resume
      having contact with [] Child. While this may be considered
      minimal effort by Father, the notion that Father did everything in
      his power to overcome Mother’s efforts to keep [C]hild from him
      was not established by the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 4-5.

      We agree with the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate

Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(1). Here, while the trial court focused

on the six-month period preceding the filing of Mother’s petition, it carefully

considered Father’s failure or refusal to perform parental duties in relation to

the circumstances of the case. Here, there is no dispute that Father has not

seen or contacted Child since 2017.          Father has simply not carried out

parental duties such as providing love, protection, guidance and/or support

through affirmative actions such as communication and association to develop

and maintain the parent-child relationship. The trial court considered Father’s

testimony regarding his learning disabilities and Father’s argument that he

relied extensively on family members to keep him informed. See id. at 4-5.

Ultimately, however, the trial court determined that Father put forth “minimal

effort” when his only action “was to ask Mother’s brother and other people in

his social circle if they could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to

resume having contact with Child.” Id. at 5.      The trial court also examined

the   purported   barriers   that   prevented   Father   from   maintaining   the

parent-child relationship.    While Mother filed a PFA against Father which

created a barrier for him, the trial court determined that Father did relatively

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little to overcome that barrier. Moreover, we note that there is no dispute

that Mother obtained a PFA against Father based upon his own conduct. See

N.T., 7/22/2021, at 74 (Mother testified that she filed a PFA petition when

Father “found out that [she] was messing with someone else [and Father]

sent some guy to [her] house to shoot [her] house up” while she was at home

with her children, but that the plan was later aborted).       Such conduct is

neither reasonably explained nor beyond Father’s control. Father has simply

failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship

and, instead, created his own impediments to having a relationship with Child.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err

as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1).

      Father’s next two issues pertain to the trial court’s application of 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) and, therefore, we will examine them together. First,

Father asserts that “[a]lthough [S]tepfather is willing to adopt [Child], the

integrity of the proposed adoption is lacking[,]” and, therefore, the trial court

erred by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(b). Father’s Brief, at 28. Father avers that Stepfather has been married

three times, including his current marriage to Mother, and has engaged in

“adulterous affairs” and “open sexual relationships” in the past.     Id. at 28-

29. Father also contends that Mother and Stepfather began their relationship

when Stepfather was still married to his second wife, there is a 36-year age

difference between Mother and Stepfather, they “have little in common,” and

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it “appears [S]tepfather and [M]other entered into this marriage as an aid to”

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights. Id. at 30-31. In summation

regarding the proposed adoption, Father argues:

       [The] trial court should be concerned with not only whether the
       adoption will occur, but whether the family unit will remain intact
       in the future. Stepfather’s lack of respect for the sanctity of
       marriage and a strong proclivity to move from relationship to
       relationship calls into question the integrity of the proposed
       adoption. If [S]tepfather moves on from his current relationship
       with [M]other, like he has done with so many other relationships
       in the past, [Child] will be left without a father for a second time.

Id. at 30-31. In his third issue presented, Father claims the trial court erred

as a matter of law or abused its discretion in generally applying Section

2511(b) because Mother failed to prove that severing the bond between Father

and Child would not have a detrimental effect on Child. Id. at 32-36. Father

argues that Child’s preference was not considered and that the trial court

failed to consider testimony from the court-appointed guardian ad litem who

“did not believe that terminating [F]ather’s parental rights would be in the

best interests of the minor child.” Id. at 36.3

       This Court has previously determined:

       A petition to terminate a natural parent's parental rights, filed by
       one natural parent against the other under Section 2512(a)(1), is
       cognizable only if an adoption of the child is foreseeable. 23
       Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b); In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098,
       1107 (Pa. 2011); see also In re B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 154 (Pa.
       1977) (stating petition filed by one biological parent for
       involuntary termination of other biological parent's parental rights
____________________________________________

3 We note that neither the guardian ad litem nor Child’s counsel filed a brief
in this case.

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      can survive only “in connection with a plan for adoption”; affirming
      denial of biological mother's petition for involuntary termination of
      biological father's parental rights, even upon proof of natural
      father's abandonment of child, absent mother's plan to have child
      adopted by step-parent or any other person). Even when a
      Section 2512(a)(1) petition might satisfy the statutory
      requirements for termination, a court still cannot grant the
      petition without a corresponding plan for an anticipated adoption
      of the child. In re Adoption of L.J.B., supra at 228, 18 A.3d at
      1107. See In re Adoption of J.F., 572 A.2d 223, 225 (Pa. Super.
      1990) (construing language in subsection (b), albeit under a prior
      version, to mean that biological parent may not petition to
      terminate other biological parent's parental rights unless adoption
      is planned). A “contemplated adoption” is required in this context
      because Section 2512(a)(1) was not designed as a punitive
      measure to penalize an ineffective or negligent parent. In re
      B.E., supra at 156.

In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2012).

      Involuntary termination under Section 2512(a)(1),

         is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide
         a means for changing the surname of the child. Rather, the
         purpose of involuntary termination of parental rights is to
         dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption
         when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the
         continuing needs of the child.

      Once a natural parent's rights are terminated, the concomitant
      adoption fosters a new parent-child relationship. Such a rule is
      sound because termination of the natural parent's rights prior to
      adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for purposes of
      protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit.

In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1107–1108 (Pa. 2011) (internal

citations, quotations, original brackets, and footnotes omitted). “Strict

compliance with the Adoption Act is a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction

to hear a petition to terminate parental rights in connection with a proposed

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adoption.”   In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284–1285 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

      Moreover,

      [a]ssuming    the   termination     pleading   meets    threshold
      requirements, the court proceeds with the two-part test for
      termination of parental rights under Section 2511 of the Adoption
      Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The initial focus is on the conduct
      of the parent whose rights are at issue.

                           *           *           *

      The second prong of the test [under Section 2511(b)] centers on
      the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,
      1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).      “A proper Section 2511(b) analysis
      focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best
      serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
      welfare of the child.” In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920 (Pa. Super.
      2008), appeal denied, 970 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2009). The court
      should examine intangibles such as “love, comfort, security, and
      stability” when determining the needs and welfare of the child.
      Id.

      Current case law indicates that while an averment of a
      contemplated adoption might be sufficient to obtain a hearing on
      the termination petition, at the termination hearing the petitioning
      parent must demonstrate the planned adoption is also in the
      child's best interests, before the court will terminate the parental
      rights of the responding parent. See In re Adoption of L.J.B.,
      supra at 1110–1111 (implying no gain to child or society is
      achieved by terminating one parent's rights to permit adoption by
      another who is unwilling or unqualified to adopt). Thus, as part
      of its Section 2511(b) analysis of the needs and welfare of the
      child in this context, the court must address and evaluate the
      “proposed adoption” that was averred in the termination petition.
      See generally id.

Id. at 1287 (brackets added).

      “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond

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analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.”   In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted). “When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to

use expert testimony. [Instead, s]ocial workers and caseworkers can offer

evaluations as well.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Further,

      in addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with [an adoptive] parent.

In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Above all else . . . adequate

consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s

own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination

of parental rights.”   In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quotation marks and

citations omitted).

      “We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate

support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious

disregard for competent and credible evidence.” In re Adoption of R.J.S.,

901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “The trial court, not

the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility

of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony.” Id. (citations

omitted).   “In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

      On Father’s two issues related to Section 2511(b), the trial court found:

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      []Father [contends] that the proposed adoption of [Child] would
      be suspect[.] Father points to Stepfather’s history of courting
      younger women but not maintaining a longstanding relationship
      with them before ending the relationship in pursuit of another.
      Even if the [c]ourt did agree that Stepfather’s relationship history
      suggests what Father contends, the [c]ourt cannot speculate as
      to how long the current marriage between Mother and Stepfather
      will last. According to the testimony presented, the parties intend
      to form an intact family, and the [c]ourt judged this testimony to
      be credible. […] In this matter, the [c]ourt found the evidence
      regarding the legitimacy of the intentions of Mother and
      Stepfather to move forward with the adoption process for [] Child
      to be credible.

      Father’s second point is also unpersuasive, in that Mother was able
      to establish that [] Child and Father have not had significant
      contact since prior to the filing of the PFA [petition] in 2018.
      Regardless of the reasons Father espoused for not pursuing a
      relationship with [] Child, the fact remains that for over four years,
      [] Child did not participate in building and maintaining a
      parent-child bond with Father. To say that would be detrimental
      to sever such bond would imply that one exists at all. Possibly the
      strongest evidence of this fact is that [] when [] the paternal
      grandmother to [] Child [] passed away in between scheduled
      hearing dates, Mother testified that she had asked [] Child if he
      wished to attend [her funeral], and he declined to do so. [] Child
      did not express any desire to contact Father or even any concern
      for Father’s emotional well-being following the passing of the
      paternal grandmother.        As such, the [c]ourt found that no
      beneficial bond exists between [] Child and Father.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 6.

      Upon our review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern

no trial court abuse of discretion or error of law in involuntarily terminating

Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b).         Mother and Stepfather

testified at length about their intent for Stepfather to adopt Child. The trial

court found this testimony credible and in Child’s best interest, and we will not

usurp those determinations. While Father suggests that the trial court should

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have examined whether the family unit will remain intact in the future, the

court was only required to address and evaluate the proposed adoption and

the best interest of Child, which it did. Furthermore, as the trial court noted,

it would be mere speculation to guess how long the current marriage between

Mother and Stepfather will last. Additionally, there was no evidence of any

bond between Father and Child and, therefore, it was reasonable for the trial

court to infer that no bond exists. Whereas, in contrast, there was evidence

that Stepfather provides financial, educational and emotional support for Child

and that they are bonded. Father’s own feelings of love and affection for Child,

alone, do not prevent termination of his parental rights. Accordingly, Father’s

last two appellate issues lack merit. For all of the foregoing reasons, it was

proper for the trial court to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to

Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b).

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2023

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