Court Opinion

ID: 9372764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:20.995748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.255553
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                     2022 MSPB 35
                            Docket No. SF-0752-15-0877-I-1

                                William T. Thomas, IV,
                                       Appellant,
                                            v.
                                Department of the Army,
                                        Agency.
                                    October 20, 2022

           William T. Thomas, IV, Marina, California, pro se.

           Andrea Campanile, Esquire, Monterey, California, for the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                             Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 14-day suspension and a demotion to a
     nonsupervisory position.    For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     agency’s petition for review, MODIFY the analysis of the first specification,
     VACATE and REVERSE the initial decision with respect to the penalty, and
     SUSTAIN the agency’s removal action.
                                                                                            2

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         On September 18, 2015, the agency issued a decision removing the
     appellant from his position as a GS-9 Supervisory Human Resources Specialist
     based on the charge of conduct unbecoming a supervisor, supported by two
     specifications.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 27-29, Tab 12 at 14-16. 1
     The first specification alleged that, from February 2015 to August 6, 2015, the
     date of the proposal notice, the appellant’s supervisor spoke to him “numerous
     times” about his behavior towards his female subordinate employees, and that it
     was reported to the appellant’s supervisor that the appellant had made comments
     to the women that were unwanted and inappropriate, and told them that they were
     “sexy” or “beautiful,” which made them uncomfortable.             IAF, Tab 11 at 27,
     Tab 12 at 14. The second specification alleged that during the same timeframe,
     the appellant’s supervisor spoke to him “numerous times” about the amount of
     time he spent in his office, with the door closed, with a particular female
     subordinate employee, reportedly engaging in conversations that were personal in
     nature, and that he, as a supervisor, should have recognized that his actions could
     be construed as favoritism and were disrupting his office. IAF, Tab 11 at 27,
     Tab 12 at 14.
¶3         The appellant filed an appeal of his removal with the Board, and after
     holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining
     the agency’s charge, but mitigating the penalty. IAF, Tab 33, Initial Decision
     (ID). With respect to the first specification, the administrative judge found that
     the appellant made two female subordinates, E.M. and C.A., feel uncomfortable

     1
       The appellant elected to retire after the agency issued its decision to remove him, but
     before the effective date of the removal. IAF, Tab 11 at 25 , 27; Hearing Recording
     (testimony of the appellant). In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j), an appellant who
     retires after receiving the agency’s decision to remove him, but on or before the
     scheduled effective date of his removal, may still appeal his removal to the Board.
     Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1578-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
                                                                                      3

     by calling them “beautiful” on one occasion each, but she did not find that he
     called the women “sexy.” ID at 6-8. Nevertheless, she found that the agency
     proved its first specification. ID at 8. The administrative judge then sustained
     the second specification in its entirety, finding that the appellant spent “an
     inordinate amount of time” in his office, with the door closed, with a female
     subordinate, and that his actions caused others to perceive that he favored this
     employee, and created a disruption in the workplace because he was often
     unavailable to assist others. ID at 10. The administrative judge also found that
     the agency established a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the
     efficiency of the service. ID at 18.
¶4         Then,    the   administrative    judge   reviewed   the   agency’s   penalty
     determination. ID at 18-21. First, she found that “[a]lthough serious . . . the
     [appellant’s] misconduct [did] not involve more serious charges such as sexual
     harassment, making sexual advances, or inappropriate conduct towards [the
     female subordinate employee] during closed-door meetings.” ID at 20. Next,
     while she acknowledged that the appellant’s record of prior discipline was
     an aggravating factor and that the agency was entitled to hold the appellant, as a
     supervisor, to a higher standard of conduct, the administrative judge found that
     there were several mitigating factors weighing in favor of the appellant, including
     his length of service and “good performance.”             Id.   Additionally, the
     administrative judge credited the appellant’s claims that he was suffering from
     stress and tension in the workplace due to his relationship with his supervisor,
     and that he was suffering from depression, although she explained that these were
     not particularly strong mitigating factors because the appellant had not explained
     how they were related to his misconduct. ID at 20-21. Finally, she concluded
     that removal exceeded the bounds of reasonableness, and that the maximum
                                                                                            4

     reasonable penalty was a 14-day suspension and a demotion to a nonsupervisory
     position. 2 ID at 21.
¶5         The agency has filed a petition for review, arguing, among other things, that
     the administrative judge trivialized the seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct,
     and improperly substituted her own judgment for that of the deciding official in
     determining the reasonableness of the penalty. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 1 at 9-17. The appellant filed an opposition to the agency’s petition for
     review. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                           ANALYSIS
     The agency proved that the appellant’s conduct towards his female subordina tes
     was inappropriate and unwanted.
¶6         In finding that removal was an unreasonable penalty for the appellant, the
     administrative judge relied in part on a mischaracterization of the nature of his
     misconduct under the first specification of the agency’s charge. Specifically, the
     agency charged the appellant with conduct unbecoming a supervisor, 3 with its
     first specification alleging:
           Beginning in February 2015 through the present, [the appellant’s
           supervisor] had to speak to [him] numerous times regarding [his]
           conduct towards [his] female subordinate employees. It was reported

     2
       The administrative judge also found that the appellant did not prove his affirmative
     defenses, concluding that he failed to establish his claims of disability discrimination,
     both a failure to reasonably accommodate claim and a status -based disability claim, as
     well as his claims of age discrimination, harmful procedural error, and due process
     violations. ID at 11-18. Neither party disputes these findings on review, and
     accordingly, we will not discuss these claims further. The administrative judge also
     determined not to award the appellant interim relief under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)
     because of his status as an annuitant under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System.
     ID at 23. Neither party raises this matter on review, and agai n we will not discuss it
     further.
     3
       The administrative judge erred in stating that the agency charged the appellant with
     merely conduct unbecoming, ID at 3-10, when the agency had in fact charged the
     appellant with conduct unbecoming a supervisor, IAF, Tab 11 at 27, Tab 12 at 14.
     Neither party raises this matter on review, so we will not address it further.
                                                                                      5

           to [the supervisor] that [the appellant was] making comments to
           females that were unwanted and inappropriate in the workplace.
           Even though [the appellant] may have believed that [he was] paying
           a compliment by telling [his] subordinate female employees that they
           were “sexy” or “beautiful,” in fact, [he] made them feel
           uncomfortable.     [The appellant’s] conduct is unbecoming a
           supervisor.
     IAF, Tab 12 at 14.
     The administrative judge erroneously found that this specification alleged only
     that the appellant told his subordinate female employees that they were “sexy” or
     “beautiful” and made them feel uncomfortable.        ID at 4.    She sustained the
     specification, finding that he called his subordinate employees E.M. and C.A.
     “beautiful” on one occasion each, but that he had not called them “sexy.” ID
     at 6-8.     As a result of her narrow view of the first specification, when she
     reviewed the agency’s penalty determination, concerning the nature and
     seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct, she concluded that:
           [T]he appellant’s sustained misconduct consisted of two incidents of
           telling female[] subordinates they were beautiful there by making
           them uncomfortable, as well as failing to realize his meetings with
           E.M. in his office with the door closed would result in the perception
           of favoritism and disruption. Although serious . . . [his] misconduct
           does not involve more serious charges such as sexual harassment,
           making sexual advances, or inappropriate conduct during closed door
           meetings.
     ID at 20.
¶7         The administrative judge erred in limiting the specification to two instances
     of the appellant calling female subordinates “beautiful,” and in doing so,
     trivialized the severity of his behavior. In actuality, the appellant’s misconduct,
     as charged by the agency, spanned several months and went well beyond two
     instances of calling E.M. and C.A. “beautiful,” which the agency merely used as
     an example of the appellant’s misconduct. The materials the agency relied upon
     when proposing removal, which were provided to the appellant and which he
     addressed in his response to the proposal notice, provide further details regarding
                                                                                        6

     his misconduct. See Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force, 97 M.S.P.R. 389,
     ¶ 8 (2004) (finding that for due process purposes, the issue is whether the notice
     of   proposed      removal,    along    with    the    supporting    documentation
     contemporaneously provided to the appellant, afforded him sufficient notice of
     the charges against him to make a meaningful reply to the proposal).           They
     consist of multiple employee statements setting forth numerous examples of his
     egregious behavior towards his female subordinates. IAF, Tabs 11-14. However,
     because the administrative judge took an inappropriately narrow view of the
     charge, she made no factual or credibility findings regarding these allegations.
     ID at 6-8. Thus, before we address the penalty, we must first address whether the
     agency proved that the appellant committed the conduct alleged in its first
     specification, i.e., whether from February 2015 through August 2015, he made
     unwanted and inappropriate comments in the workplace to his female
     subordinates. IAF, Tab 12 at 14.
¶8         An initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law,
     summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
     administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal reasoning, as well as the
     authorities on which that reasoning rests.       Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980).            To resolve credibility issues,
     an administrative judge must identify the factual questions in dispute, summarize
     the evidence on each disputed question, state which version she believes, and
     explain in detail why she found the chosen version more credible, considering
     such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity and capacity to observe the event
     or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior inconsistent statement
     by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the contradiction of the
     witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency with other
     evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events; and
     (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453,
     458 (1987).     The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
                                                                                             7

      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
      v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, when
      an administrative judge’s findings are not based on the observation of witnesses’
      demeanor, the Board is free to reweigh the evidence and substitute its own
      judgment on credibility issues. Id. at 1302. Moreover, the Board may overturn
      an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are incomplete,
      inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a
      whole. Faucher v. Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 203, ¶ 8 (2004).
¶9          The administrative judge made no findings regarding the first specification
      besides her finding that the appellant called E.M. and C.A. “beautiful.” Because
      the record is sufficiently well-developed and we need not base our findings on
      witness demeanor, the Board will make its own credibility determinations as to
      the remaining portions of the first specification. See Uske v. U.S. Postal Service,
      60 M.S.P.R. 544, 557 (1994), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In so doing,
      we note that several relevant witnesses provided written statements but did not
      testify at the hearing. As set forth below, we find that there is ample evidence
      supporting a finding that the agency proved its first specification in its entirety.
¶10         At   the    hearing,   E.M.   testified   that   the   appellant   behaved       in
      an unprofessional and unacceptable manner towards her, constantly making
      inappropriate comments to her, such as commenting on what she was wearing,
      telling her she “looked nice,” and telling her that she “should wear dresses more
      often because [she] has nice legs.” Hearing Recording (HR) (testimony of E.M.).
      She further testified that the appellant would “leer” at her, and that one time she
      caught him “staring at [her] butt” while she was wearing a suit.            Id.   E.M.
      explained that she tried to get the appellant to stop his inappropriate behavior,
      telling him that he was going too far or that he crossed a line, but his behavior did
      not change. Id.
                                                                                           8

¶11        E.M. also testified that the appellant told her that he had feelings for her,
      which she interpreted as him expressing a sexual interest in her and wanting “to
      be with her.”    Id.   In response to his expression of interest, E.M. told the
      appellant that he crossed a line and not to speak to her like that again. Id. She
      then went to her coworker, A.S., and told him that the appellant was “hitting on”
      her and making her feel uncomfortable. Id. Because of the appellant’s behavior,
      E.M. stated that she would hide out in a coworker’s office to avoid the appellant,
      hated coming to work, and felt like she was “battling” each day in the office. Id.
¶12        E.M.’s testimony is consistent with her previous written statement,
      IAF, Tab 13 at 5-7, as well as the contemporaneous statements of her coworkers.
      The record contains a statement from A.S. confirming that E.M. approached him
      in late February or early March 2015, “on the verge of tears,” and told him that
      the appellant “had been making advances towards her and that his behavior was
      making her feel very uncomfortable.” IAF, Tab 12 at 18-19. There is also a
      memorandum for the record dated June 24, 2015, from another coworker, T.L.,
      stating that E.M. had approached him in mid-May 2015 seeking advice about
      “harassment issues” with the appellant, telling him that the appellant “was
      consistently hitting on her.” IAF, Tab 13 at 9. C.S., another subordinate, stated
      that the appellant was often “flirtatious” in the office, and that she had warned
      him about his behavior, but he would just “laugh it off.” IAF, Tab 26 at 11; HR
      (testimony of C.S.).
¶13        The appellant was also accused of behaving inappropriately with another
      female subordinate, C.A., who resigned from the agency in May 2015, citing
      numerous issues with the appellant, including that he had “gone out of his way to
      call attention to [her],” when she was talking with a coworker, by telling her
      “how nice [she] looked that day.” IAF, Tab 13 at 12-13. C.A. did not testify at
      the hearing, but another employee, P.Y., confirmed in his testimony that the
      appellant told C.A. in P.Y.’s office that she was “beautiful” or “pretty,” “like an
      angel.”   HR (testimony of P.Y.).     In fact, P.Y. was so concerned about the
                                                                                          9

      appellant’s comments that he suggested that the appellant follow up with C.A. to
      make sure she was not upset, and reported the comments to the appellant’s
      supervisor. Id. P.Y’s testimony is consistent with the remaining record. The
      agency file contains a memorandum for the record written by the appellant’s
      supervisor dated March 20, 2015, stating that on that date, an employee reported
      to him that the appellant was making inappropriate and unwanted comments to
      C.A., including that he called her “beautiful.” 4 IAF, Tab 14 at 7. C.A. told the
      appellant’s supervisor that the appellant’s behavior toward her was inappropriate
      and made her feel uncomfortable. Id.
¶14        The appellant denies the allegations, claiming that he never engaged in
      inappropriate conduct, but instead some of his comments, like referring to
      employees looking “nice,” were misconstrued. HR (testimony of the appellant);
      IAF, Tab 12 at 5.      He also claims that E.M. was a problem employee and
      fabricated the allegations against him, and that his supervisor had “ill will”
      toward him, which resulted in this removal action.           HR (testimony of the
      appellant); IAF, Tab 11 at 31-40.
¶15        Assessing the conflicting evidence in light of the Hillen factors, we find
      that the statements and testimony provided by the agency’s witnesses were
      consistent with each other and not inherently improbable.        The testimony and
      statement of E.M., the testimony of P.Y., and the statement of C.A. wer e based on
      their direct observations of the appellant’s behavior.      The statements of E.L.,
      A.S., and the appellant’s supervisor were based on their observations when
      meeting with E.M. and C.A. and contemporaneous reports by E.M. and C.A.
      about the appellant’s inappropriate behavior. While the appellant suggests that
      the reason for the statements and testimony of E.M. and his supervisor may have

      4
        The memorandum also alleged that the appellant told C.A. “that her toes were sexy or
      pretty, or something to that effect,” however, there was no te stimony at the hearing
      regarding this statement. IAF, Tab 14 at 7.
                                                                                         10

      been that they were biased against him, the weight of the evidence suggests
      otherwise. Further, there is no indication the remaining agency witnesses were
      biased against the appellant. Thus, we find the agency’s witnesses to be more
      credible than the appellant concerning the allegations in the first specification
      that the appellant engaged in numerous acts of inappropriate and unwanted
      behavior towards his female subordinate employees from February through
      August 2015.
¶16            Our findings are consistent with the limited credibility findings made by the
      administrative judge who, based on her observation of E.M.’s demeanor at the
      hearing, credited E.M.’s testimony when finding that the appellant had called her
      “beautiful,” finding that her testimony was consistent with her previous written
      statement and her conversations with A.S., and that her testimony was
      straightforward and detailed.       ID at 6.    Similarly, the administrative judge
      credited P.Y.’s testimony to find that the appellant had referred to C.A. as
      “beautiful,” finding that there was no appearance of bias against the appellant or
      any motive to fabricate the event. ID at 7. Accordingly, we find that the agency
      proved the full scope of the conduct alleged in its first specification. IAF, Tab 12
      at 14.

      Removal was within the bounds of reasonableness in light of the seriousness of
      the appellant’s misconduct in relation to his duties as a Supervisory Human
      Resources Specialist.
¶17            Generally, in an adverse action appeal taken under chapter 75, the agency
      must prove its charge by preponderant evidence, establish a nexus between the
      action and the efficiency of the service, and establish that the penalty imposed
      was within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness.           Hall v. Department of
      Defense, 117 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 6 (2012). In this matter, we have found that the
      charge, including both specifications, has been proven. The administrative judge
      determined that nexus existed, and neither party has challenged that finding on
                                                                                     11

      petition for review.   Therefore, we must now determine the propriety of the
      penalty.
¶18        In assessing the reasonableness of the penalty, the Board will consider a
      nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
      5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). Those factors are: (1) the nature and seriousness
      of the offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and
      responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or technical or
      inadvertent, or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently
      repeated; (2) the employee’s job level and type of employment, including
      supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence of the
      position; (3) the employee’s past disciplinary record; (4) the employee’s past
      work record, including length of service, performance on the job, ability to get
      along with fellow workers, and dependability; (5) the effect of the offense upon
      the employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect upon
      supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability to perform assigned duties;
      (6) consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the
      same or similar offenses; (7) consistency of the penalty with any applicable
      agency table of penalties; (8) the notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the
      reputation of the agency; (9) the clarity with which the employee was on notice of
      any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had been warned about
      the conduct in question; (10) potential for the employee’s rehabilitation;
      (11) mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense such as unusual job
      tensions, personality problems, mental impairment, harassment or bad faith,
      malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the matter; and (12) the
      adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in the
      future by the employee or others. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305–06. Not every
      factor is relevant in every case.    Chavez v. Small Business Administration,
      121 M.S.P.R. 168, ¶ 9 (2014) (finding that a deciding official does not have to
      consider each of the Douglas factors in making his penalty determination);
                                                                                       12

      Hooper v. Department of the Interior, 120 M.S.P.R. 658, ¶ 10 (2014); Wentz v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 91 M.S.P.R. 176, ¶ 14 (2002).
¶19        When all of the agency’s charges are sustained, as they are here, the Board
      will review the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency
      considered all of the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within
      the tolerable limits of reasonableness.         Powell v. U.S. Postal Service,
      122 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 12 (2014). In making this determination, the Board must give
      due weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline
      and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace
      management’s responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been
      properly exercised. Id. The Board will modify or mitigate an agency-imposed
      penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or
      the penalty clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.      Id.; Stuhlmacher v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20 (2001).
¶20        It is well established that the most important factor in assessing whether the
      agency’s chosen penalty is within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness is the
      nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its relation to the employee ’s duties,
      position, and responsibilities.    Downey v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      119 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 9 (2013); Kirkland-Zuck v. Department of Housing & Urban
      Development, 90 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 19 (2001), aff’d, 48 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir.
      2002). Here, we agree with the agency that the administrative judge failed to
      recognize the seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10.
      The appellant’s behavior was inappropriate and divisive, made his subordinates
      uncomfortable, and poisoned the working environment. IAF, Tab 12 at 18-19,
      Tab 13 at 5-7, 12-14, 16-17, Tab 14 at 7, Tab 26 at 11-12; HR (testimony of E.S.,
      testimony of C.S., testimony of P.Y., testimony of the appellant’s supervisor ).
      E.M. explained the effect of his actions on her emotional and mental well-being,
      stating that she “hated coming into work because [she] felt it was hostile,” and
      went so far as to hide in a coworker’s office simply to avoid the appellant. IAF,
                                                                                      13

      Tab 13 at 7; HR (testimony of E.M.). The other target of the appellant’s conduct,
      C.A., resigned, citing a multitude of issues with the appellant.     IAF, Tab 13
      at 12-13.
¶21        The seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct is amplified by his role as a
      supervisor. It is well settled that, because supervisors occupy positions of trust
      and responsibility within an agency, the agency has a right to expect a higher
      standard of conduct from them. Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R.
      173, ¶ 14 (2010); Gebhardt v. Department of the Air Force, 99 M.S.P.R. 49, ¶ 21
      (2005), aff’d, 180 F. App’x. 951 (Fed. Cir. 2006). It is particularly noteworthy
      that the appellant directed his inappropriate comments towards his subordinates,
      over whom he possessed supervisory power, thus violating the authority the
      agency vested in him as a supervisor.
¶22        Furthermore, while the appellant’s misconduct would be serious in an y
      context, when considered in the context of the appellant’s position as a
      Supervisory Human Resources Specialist, we find his misconduct to be
      exceptionally serious. The importance of a healthy and effective human resources
      department for an agency cannot be overstated. The Civil Service Reform Act of
      1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 3, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978), states: “[I]n order to provide
      the people of the United States with a competent, honest, and productive Federal
      work force reflective of the Nation’s diversity, and to improve the quality of
      public service, Federal personnel management should be implemented consistent
      with merit principles and free from prohibited personnel practices.”       Human
      resources employees, such as the appellant, play crucial roles in maintaining the
      quality of public service, because it is the responsibility of the human resources
      component of an agency “to retain Governmentwide approaches, authorities,
      entitlements, and requirements” in areas including “[a]ccountability for adherence
      to merit system principles” and “[e]mployee protection from prohibited personnel
      practices.” Office of Personnel Management, Human Resources Flexibilities and
      Authorities   in   the    Federal       Government,   3,   10    (August    2013),
                                                                                       14

      https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/reference-materials/
      handbooks/humanresourcesflexibilitiesauthorities.pdf.      An    effective   human
      resources component is “vital to the health of the Federal civil service.” Merit
      Systems Protection Board, Research Brief, The State of the Federal HR
      Workforce: Changes and Challenges, 1 (May 2020), https://www.mspb.gov/
      studies/publications/State_of_the_Federal_HR_Workforce_Changes_and_
      Challenges.pdf.
¶23        The appellant’s misconduct is antithetical to his responsibilities as a
      Supervisory Human Resources Specialist and strikes at the very core of his job
      duties to assist in protecting the merit systems principles and prevent prohibited
      personnel practices.    In addition, his inappropriate behavior toward female
      subordinates perpetuated a working environment that was detrimental to his staff,
      and hindered his department’s ability to perform its functions.      IAF, Tab 12
      at 18-19, Tab 13 at 5-7, 12-14, 16-17, Tab 14 at 7, Tab 26 at 11-12; HR
      (testimony of E.M., testimony of C.S., testimony of P.Y., testimony of the
      appellant’s supervisor). Thus, the appellant’s misconduct is contrary to the entire
      purpose of the department he was hired to serve and was exceptionally serious.
¶24        The deciding official considered the other relevant Douglas factors when
      determining that removal was the appropriate penalty, including the appellant’s
      daily contacts with the public and staff members, his previous disciplinary
      history, the clarity of which he had notice that his conduct was unacceptable, his
      rehabilitation potential, and her loss of confidence in the appellant’s ability to
      hold a supervisory position without posing a liability risk for the agency.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 27-28; HR (testimony of the deciding official). Weighing these
      factors against the relevant mitigating factors, she concluded that removal was the
      only option. IAF, Tab 7 at 28; HR (testimony of the deciding official).
¶25        We agree with the deciding official’s assessment of the facto rs.         The
      appellant had direct and daily interactions with numerous agency employees, as
      well as adult students at the agency facility, and thus, his repeated inappropriate
                                                                                          15

      behavior with women is particularly concerning. See Williams v. Department of
      the Army, 102 M.S.P.R. 280, ¶ 9 (2006) (finding that the appellant’s frequent
      contact with customers was an aggravating factor). Further, the appellant’s prior
      disciplinary record establishes that he has a history of behaving inappropriately
      toward his female subordinates, as he was suspended for 13 days in 2008 for
      sending pornographic emails using his Government-issued computer to another
      female subordinate employee. 5 IAF, Tab 26 at 16-26.
¶26         The appellant was on notice that this type of behavior towards subordinate
      female employees constituted misconduct. His previous suspension served as a
      general warning that his conduct towards female subordinate employees was
      inappropriate. Jinks v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 106 M.S.P.R. 627, ¶ 25
      (2007) (stating that prior discipline can be considered as notice that the appellant
      had been warned about the type of misconduct involved).          Furthermore, in the
      months preceding the appellant’s removal, his supervisor warned him “numerous
      times” that his comments and behavior were inappropriate. IAF, Tab 12 at 14;
      HR (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). The record contains evidence that
      the appellant was verbally counseled at least four times between January and
      March 2015 regarding his behavior towards his female subordinates. IAF, Tab 14
      at 7-11. There is no doubt that the appellant had ample notice that his conduct
      was inappropriate and unacceptable.
¶27         The agency attempted to deter the appellant’s behavior, practicing
      progressive discipline by issuing him a suspension and several verbal counselings
      before resorting to removal.      Nevertheless, his behavior continued unabated.
      Evidence of multiple unheeded warnings weighs heavily in support of removal,
      because it demonstrates that the appellant cannot, or will not, correct his

      5
       The appellant was also suspended in 2014 for 3 days after he failed to conduct initial
      or mid-year performance discussions with a female subordinate, and then forged the
      documents to falsely reflect that he had done so. IAF, Tab 14 at 13 -18.
                                                                                            16

      behavior, demonstrating that he lacks any rehabilitative potential. See Fuqua v.
      Department of the Navy, 31 M.S.P.R. 173, 178 (1986) (finding that the
      appellant’s continuing misconduct, despite the agency’s repeated attempts to
      improve his behavior through counselings, warnings, and prior disciplinary
      actions, served to establish the appellant’s lack of rehabilitative potential).
      In this regard, we observe that an agency need not tolerate inappropriate conduct
      of a sexual nature until it becomes so pervasive and severe that it exposes the
      agency to liability under equal employment opportunity statutes. See Lentine v.
      Department of the Treasury, 94 M.S.P.R. 676, ¶ 13 (2003) (finding that an agency
      need not wait to discipline an employee until sexually offensive conduct becomes
      so pervasive and offensive that it constitutes unlawful discrimination under a
      hostile work environment theory).
¶28         The relevant mitigating factors that weigh in favor of the appellant include
      his nearly 20 years of service with the agency at the time of the misconduct at
      issue in this appeal, his prior military service, his successful performance and
      performance awards, and his claims of stress, tension with his supervisor, and
      diagnosis of depression. 6 HR (testimony of the appellant); IAF, Tab 11 at 27-28.
      We have considered these factors, but they simply do not outweigh the factors
      supporting removal in this matter. Therefore, we find that there is no basis to
      mitigate the appellant’s removal. We reverse the administrative judge’s findings
      to the contrary, and sustain the agency’s removal action. ID at 20-21.

      6
        The administrative judge credited the appellant’s claim that stress and tensions in the
      workplace, as well as his diagnosis of depression, were mitigating factors, even though
      the appellant did not explain how they were related to his misconduct. ID at 21. While
      we have considered the appellant’s claims, because the appellant failed to explain how
      stress from the workplace or his depression impacted his conduct at issue, we have not
      given the claims substantial weight. See Roof v. Department of the Air Force,
      53 M.S.P.R. 653, 658 (1992) (finding that an administrative judge did not err in
      excluding evidence purporting to support mitigation, in part, because the appella nt
      failed to establish a causal connection between the mitigating circumstance and the
      misconduct involved).
                                                                                           17

                                             ORDER
¶29         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fa ll within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      7
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       18

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
                                                                                19

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     20

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board ’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5
U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction exp ired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of A ppeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             21

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.