Court Opinion

ID: 9906631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:23:32.219047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:19.467107
License: Public Domain

J-S33021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAWN MCFARLAND                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 498 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0004150-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED: December 4, 2023

       Shawn McFarland (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on March 9, 2022, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas

after the trial court granted his post-sentence motion, and vacated his original

sentence. Appellant argues his due process rights were violated when the trial

court doubled his original sentence absent any post-sentencing conduct or

new information justifying the increase. For the reasons below, we agree the

trial court had no authority to increase Appellant’s aggregate sentence under

the facts presented herein, and remand for reinstatement of the original

sentence.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33021-23

       On November 9, 2021, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count each

of criminal mischief and possession of controlled substances (cocaine). 1 We

derive the following facts underlying Appellant’s plea from the affidavit of

probable cause attached to the criminal complaint.        See Police Criminal

Complaint, 4/17/21, Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1-3. On April 16, 2021, at

approximately 11:30 p.m., Pittsburgh police officers were dispatched to Butler

and Main Streets after an anonymous caller informed them that an individual

was slashing tires. See id. at 2. A second caller stated that the individual,

later identified as Appellant, went into a nearby bar and was bleeding from a

cut on his hand. Id. When the officers arrived, two witnesses told them that

Appellant was crossing the street and was in possession of a knife. Id. The

officers then saw Appellant throw something near a dumpster. Id. Appellant

initially resisted arrest, but subsequently relented. See id. When they placed

him under arrest, the officers noticed cuts on two of Appellant’s fingers. Id.

       Upon a search of the area, officers recovered a folding knife with fresh,

undried blood, and a clear plastic baggie of cocaine. See Affidavit of Probable

Cause at 2.     The witnesses told police they “heard the sound of air being

released from a vehicle tire” and watched Appellant “walk down the street

with a knife” before leaning against a car “as if to stab the tire[.]” Id. The

officers determined that “there were approximately 23 cars with tires

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

                                           -2-
J-S33021-23

slashed.” Id. at 3. They also learned that Appellant had “an active arrest

warrant out of the United States Marshal[’s S]ervice.” Id. at 2.

       Appellant was subsequently charged with criminal mischief as a third-

degree felony, possession of controlled substances, possession of an

instrument of crime, possession of a weapon, simple assault, and loitering and

prowling at night.2 As noted above, on November 9, 2021, Appellant pled

guilty to one count each of criminal mischief and possession of cocaine, in

exchange for which the Commonwealth agreed to amend the criminal mischief

charge to a second-degree misdemeanor,3 and withdraw the remaining

charges.    See N.T., 11/9/21, at 2.           The trial court ordered a presentence

investigation report (PSI) and scheduled sentencing for February 14, 2022.

       At the February 14th hearing, Appellant’s counsel argued that Appellant

was “exceptionally remorseful for the inconvenience” he caused both the

police and the victims, and insisted Appellant “was not himself that night[.]”

N.T., 2/14/22, at 4.       He attributed Appellant’s behavior to depression and

mental health struggles, noting that at the time of the incident, Appellant was

transitioning from one mental health medication to another.            Id.   Counsel

____________________________________________

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907(a), (b), 2701(a)(3), and 5506, respectively.

3 Criminal mischief is graded as a third-degree felony if, inter alia, the
defendant “intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000[,]” but is
graded as a second-degree misdemeanor if the loss is “in excess of $1,000[.]”
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(b). Here, despite the amended grading, Appellant was
directed to pay $5,005.18 in restitution to 13 victims. See Order of Sentence,
2/14/22 at 1 (unpaginated).

                                           -3-
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acknowledged that, on the night of his arrest, Appellant tested positive for

numerous drugs ─ including ecstasy, marijuana, methamphetamines, PCP,

cocaine ─ and alcohol.        See id. at 11.     However, while Appellant was an

admitted marijuana user, and pled guilty to possession of cocaine, he

maintained that “he did not ingest . . . the various cocktail” of drugs in his

system. Id. at 11-12. Counsel noted that Appellant’s “last case was almost

15 years” earlier, when he received a “significant federal sentence for a case

. . . with a firearm.”4 Id. at 10, 12. He further stated that because Appellant

was on supervised release at the time of this offense, he would “likely” receive

a “12- to 18-month violation with the federal government.” Id. at 12-13.

       Both Appellant’s mother and father testified that Appellant was a

“changed person” since his federal prison stint. See N.T., 2/14/22, at 6, 8-9.

Appellant apologized, asked the trial court for leniency, and claimed he did

not “knowingly ingest those substances[,]” admitting only that he was

drinking and smoking marijuana. Id. at 13.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it had

reviewed the PSI, and considered the statements of Appellant, his mother,

____________________________________________

4 According to the PSI, in December of 2009, Appellant pled guilty in federal

court to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and, in
March of 2010, was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. See Appellant’s
Presentence Report, 1/15/22, at 8. He was released under supervision in June
of 2017, and then reincarcerated in December of 2017. Id. Appellant was
then released on October 9, 2019, and serving a period of 23 months’
supervised release when he committed the instant offenses in April of 2021.
See id.

                                           -4-
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and his father. See N.T., 2/14/22, at 15. The court then sentenced Appellant

to two concurrent terms of one to two years’ imprisonment, one for each

count, and directed him to pay a total of $5,005.18 in restitution to 13

victims.5 See id. at 15-16; Order of Sentence, 2/14/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

Although the court noted that the sentence for the drug offense was within

the standard range, it did not indicate where the criminal mischief sentence

fell within the sentencing guidelines. See N.T., 2/14/22, at 15-16.

       On February 23, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for

modification of sentence, asserting that the sentence imposed for criminal

mischief was “not only an aggravated range sentence, but the statutory

maximum.”6        See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion for Modification of

Sentence, 2/23/22, at 2 (unpaginated). He stated the sentencing guidelines

called for a standard range sentence of one to nine months’ imprisonment,

and 12 months in the aggravated range. See id. Appellant argued the court

did not state reasons on the record justifying an aggravated range sentence

for his conviction of criminal mischief and failed to consider relevant mitigating

sentencing criteria. See id. at 2-3.

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth later clarified that “while 23 total victims were impacted,

it was only 13 that came forward to seek restitution[.]” See N.T., 3/30/22,
at 7.

6 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(2) (statutory maximum for second-degree
misdemeanor is two years’ imprisonment).

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        On March 3, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting Appellant’s

motion for modification, vacating the judgment of sentence, and scheduling a

new sentencing hearing for March 9, 2022.          See Order, 3/3/22.     Both

Appellant and the Commonwealth filed memoranda prior to the resentencing

hearing. In its memorandum, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the trial

court failed to state reasons on the record supporting an aggravated range

sentence for criminal mischief, but insisted there were “several aggravating

factors available[.]”     See Commonwealth’s Response to [Appellant’s]

Memorandum in Support of Sentencing, 3/9/22, at 3.

        At the March 9, 2023, resentencing hearing, the trial court stated that

it reviewed the PSI prior to sentencing, and “considered all the facts[,]”

including “the applicable sentencing guidelines in this case.” N.T., 3/9/22, at

3, 5. The court then asked, “What have I missed?” Id. at 5. When Appellant’s

counsel responded that a court must provide a factual basis to deviate from

the guidelines, the trial court asked, “Did I deviate from the guidelines?” Id.

at 6.     After briefly discussing the sentencing guidelines, the trial court

commented: “So I sentenced him to three months more than the standard

range? Is that your argument? And I didn’t give reasons?” Id. Appellant’s

counsel responded, “Correct.” Id.

        The Commonwealth argued the court’s sentence was appropriate and

noted that it had “outlin[ed] a few different factors” in its memorandum that

would be considered “aggravators[,”] including: (1) Appellant was on federal

supervised release at the time of the crime; (2) Appellant possessed a

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weapon, namely a knife, during the crime; and (3) the crime greatly impacted

the community as there were 13 victims.         See N.T., 3/9/22, at 7-9.      The

Commonwealth requested the court reimpose the same sentence. Id. at 7.

      Appellant’s   counsel,   however,    requested    the   court   impose   two

concurrent terms of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment, citing the following

mitigating factors: (1) Appellant was transitioning mental health medications

and therapy at the time of the offense; (2) Appellant has the support of his

family; (3) Appellant was working prior to the crime and was very remorseful;

(4) Appellant’s last offense occurred in 2007; (5) although Appellant had prior

drug convictions, they were not for the type of drugs found in his system on

the night in question, so he believed “his drink was spiked[;]” and (6)

Appellant was facing a “12 to 18 month . . . federal hit for his parole violation.”

Id. at 11-12.

      After further argument by both counsel, the trial court noted that it had

“reread and re-evaluated the contents of the” PSI, and made the following

comments before imposing sentence:

      I have considered the statements made by [Appellant] today.

            I have considered the arguments of Counsel. I have
      considered the specific argument of Defense Counsel that claims
      there should be mitigation in this case.

           I have considered all other factors that I may take into
      account, as well as the contents of the Motion to Modify the
      Sentence that originally was imposed in this case filed by
      [Appellant].

            I have also considered the Commonwealth’s response to
      that Motion in support of sentencing, that it appears that I may

                                       -7-
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       have overlooked aggravating factors by not specifying them on
       the record at the previous sentencing.

             One of which, the Commonwealth argues that the
       commission of additional criminal activity while on federal
       supervised release, rather than a mitigating factor or
       circumstance.

             The inconvenience that this must have caused the number
       of victims in this case, although they only charged as one
       particular Count, Criminal Mischief.

             The amount of damage. The extent of damage. The
       number of individual victims that were affected by [Appellant’s]
       actions.

             For all those reasons, . . . at Count 1, [criminal mischief,]
       this case warrants, if any that I have come across, an upward
       departure from the standard range of the sentencing guidelines,
       and my sentence for [Appellant] is not less than one or more than
       two years in a State Correctional Facility[.]

                                       *       *   *
             Additionally, at Count 6, [possession of cocaine, Appellant]
       is sentenced to not less than one nor more than two years in a
       State Correctional Facility[.]

              This sentence shall be served consecutive to the sentence
       I just imposed at Count 1. . . .

N.T., 3/9/22, at 24-26 (emphasis added). Thus, the new aggregate sentence

was double the original sentence imposed. The court also reimposed the order

of restitution.     See Order of Sentence – Resentencing, 3/9/22, at 1

(unpaginated).

       On March 21, 2022, Appellant filed a second, timely post-sentence

motion,7 arguing that the increased sentence imposed by the trial court upon
____________________________________________

7 Although this motion was filed 12 days after sentencing, the 10th day fell on

Saturday, March 19, 2022; thus, Appellant had until Monday, March 21st to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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resentencing raised a presumption of vindictiveness. See Appellant’s Post-

Sentence Motion for Modification of Sentence, 3/21/22, at 3.                Further,

Appellant insisted that the court did not increase the sentence based upon

new information or “identifiable conduct of” Appellant occurring after the

original sentencing hearing. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). Therefore, he, once

again, requested the court vacate the judgment of sentence, and resentence

him to two concurrent terms of six to 12 months’ imprisonment. See id. at

5. The trial court scheduled a hearing for March 30, 2022.

       At the second post-sentence hearing, Appellant argued the court

“doubl[ed]” his sentence absent any additional factors. See N.T., 3/30/22, at

3. The trial court, however, stated that it did not “double his sentence[,]” but

rather “sentenced him consecutively.”            Id.   Moreover, the court explained

that, when imposing the original sentence, it “underestimated or understated

. . . the impact” of the crime on the victims. Id. When Appellant’s counsel

argued that an increased sentence must be based on “new objective

information,” the court stated it was “a sentencing de novo” so that it was

permitted to “[s]tart over[.]” Id. at 4. The Commonwealth agreed, noting

that “there were aggravating factors that maybe were missed prior” and

____________________________________________

file a timely post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (post-
sentence motion must be filed within 10 days of imposition of sentence); 1
Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when last day of time computation falls on weekend or
holiday, that day is omitted from computation).

                                           -9-
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Appellant’s request for resentencing “essentially opened the door for [the

court] to reconsider.” Id. at 5.

       The trial court emphasized that Appellant “already had some mitigation”

because the Commonwealth charged only one count of criminal mischief,

when it could have charged 13 separate counts. N.T., 3/20/22, at 8. The

court further explained that it previously “overlooked the gravity and scope of

the impact on the victims.” Id. See also id. at 10 (“I made a mistake the

first time. I underestimated the impact on the victims.”). Thus, the trial court

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. See Order, 3/30/22. This timely

appeal follows.8

       Appellant presents one issue for our review:

       Were Appellant[’s] due process rights, under the Fourteenth
       Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 § 9 of
       the Pennsylvania Constitution, violated when the trial court in his
       case increased the one-to-two year aggregate sentence of
       imprisonment imposed on him on February 14, 2022[,] to a two-
       to-four year sentence, doing so after he filed a post-sentence
       motion seeking a reduction in his sentence, and doing so absent
       the presentation of any information at the resentencing hearing
       showing relevant post-sentence conduct on his part, or post-
       sentence events relevant to his case, that justified such an
       increase?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Preliminarily, we note that in the past this Court has considered a claim

asserting judicial vindictiveness in resentencing to be a challenge to the

____________________________________________

8 Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

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discretionary aspects of sentencing.9 See Commonwealth v. Watson, 228

A.3d 928, 934 (Pa. Super. 2020); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110,

122 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). However, more recent decisions of both the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court consider such a claim to challenge

the legality of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554,

567-68 (Pa. 2022) (appellant’s claim that “resentencing court lacked authority

to extend his term of incarceration beyond the length of the original sentence

because . . . no event occurred between the two sentencing hearings that

could (or would) have justified the imposition of a lengthier sentence”

challenged legality of sentence);10 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 226 A.3d
____________________________________________

9   It merits mention Appellant treated this claim as a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentencing, by raising it in a post-sentence motion,
filing a timely appeal, and including in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement
of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal to invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction.    See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion for Modification of
Sentence, 3/21/22, at 3; Appellant’s Brief at 22-24.                  See also
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc).

10 We note that the facts in Prinkey were somewhat distinguishable.      In that
case, the defendant obtained PCRA relief from this Court, which concluded
that appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting one of the defendant’s convictions. Prinkey, 277
A.3d at 557. On remand for resentencing, “the Commonwealth for the first
time notified [the defendant] that it was seeking” a 25-year mandatory
minimum sentence for one of the remaining convictions. Id. Over objection,
the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, opining that it
“lacked discretion to do otherwise.” Id. at 558 (citation omitted). Thus, the
Prinkey Court stated that the defendant’s claim “turn[ed] upon the
Commonwealth’s allegedly vindictive decision to seek the mandatory
minimum, which by its very nature purported to strip the trial court of its
traditional sentencing authority.”    See id. at 567 (emphasis added).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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598, 602 (Pa. Super. 2020) (claim that court was not permitted to “sua sponte

increase a defendant’s sentence where it . . . decided the original sentence

imposed was too lenient” challenged legality of sentencing). Therefore, “[o]ur

standard of review . . . is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Asbury, 299 A.3d 996, 998 (Pa. Super. 2023).

       In his sole claim on appeal, Appellant contends his due process rights

were violated when the trial court imposed an increased aggregate sentence

following his request for post-sentence relief absent any post-sentence

conduct or information justifying the increase. See Appellant’s Brief at 25.

       As this Court, sitting en banc in Barnes, explained:

             When a due process violation is raised regarding
       resentencing, this court must satisfy itself that an increase in a
       sentence is not the result of judicial vindictiveness. See
       Commonwealth v. Walker, . . . 568 A.2d 201 ([Pa. Super.]
       1989), disapproved of on other grounds by Commonwealth
       v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 20–22 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc ).
       In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 . . . (1969),
       overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S.
       794 . . . (1989), the United States Supreme Court remarked:

          Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness
          against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
          conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
          after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness
          may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the
          right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
          process also requires that a defendant be freed of

____________________________________________

Nonetheless, as quoted above, the Prinkey Court characterized the claim as
challenging the trial court’s authority to impose an increased sentence upon
resentencing absent additional events or facts occurring between the two
sentencing hearings to justify the increase. See id. at 567-68.

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         apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of
         the sentencing judge.

         In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we
         have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more
         severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the
         reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those
         reasons must be based upon objective information
         concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
         defendant occurring after the time of the original
         sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which
         the increased sentence is based must be made part of the
         record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased
         sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.

      Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725–26 . . . (footnote omitted) (emphasis
      added). Although Pearce dealt with an increased sentence
      following the grant of a new trial, we have held that Pearce's
      rationale for providing reasons on the record applies also when
      the original sentence is vacated and a second sentence is imposed
      without an additional trial. See Commonwealth v. Greer, . . .
      554 A.2d 980, 987 n.7 ([Pa. Super.] 1983) (noting that Pearce
      applies to harsher sentence imposed by trial court after trial court
      granted post-trial request for resentencing). Thus, under Pearce,
      whenever a trial court imposes upon a defendant a more severe
      sentence following resentencing, the reasons for such sentence
      must be made a part of the record. “Absent evidence [that] a
      sentencing increase is justified due to objective information
      concerning a defendant’s case, the presumption of vindictiveness
      cannot be rebutted.” Commonwealth v. Serrano, 727 A.2d
      1168, 1170 (Pa. Super. 1999).

Barnes, 167 A.3d at 123–24 (some emphases omitted and some added;

footnotes omitted).

      In Prinkey, our Supreme Court elaborated on the continued vitality of

Pearce’s presumption of vindictiveness in light of the High Court’s subsequent

decision in Smith. The Court explained that, while the Smith Court held “the

Pearce presumption does not apply in every case where a convicted

defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial[,]” it still “persists unless some

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event occurs after the successful appeal . . . which provides the court with a

greater amount of sentencing information.”         Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 565

(citations & quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

      Thus, the Pearce presumption will not apply when the
      resentencing that results in a higher sentence follows some post-
      appeal occurrence that makes it likely that the court obtained
      new details about the defendant’s moral character and suitability
      for rehabilitation.    Where no such event occurs, yet the
      defendant’s new sentence is higher than the original sentence, the
      Pearce presumption applies with full vigor. And when it does, it
      acts as a prophylactic measure that forbid[s] . . . the imposition
      of a greater punishment than was imposed after the first trial,
      absent specified findings.

Id. (citations & quotation marks omitted; emphases added).

      Turning to the present matter, Appellant insists the presumption of

vindictiveness applies in his case because his “aggregate sentence was

increased by the same judge who [ ]sentenced him originally, with the

increase following in the wake of [his] submission of a post-sentence motion.”

Appellant’ Brief at 29. Although the trial court cited certain facts in support of

the increased sentence ─ such as the number of victims and Appellant’s prior

criminal record ─ Appellant emphasizes that those facts were already known

to the court at the time of the original sentencing hearing. See id. at 32-34.

Indeed, as he points out, none of the aggravating facts refer to “conduct on

the part of [Appellant] occurring after . . . the original sentencing proceeding[,

or] relevant . . . events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing

proceeding.” Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted). Accordingly, Appellant argues

the presumption of vindictiveness was unrebutted, and requests that we

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vacate the judgment of sentence and reinstate the original sentence imposed

on February 14, 2022.11 See id. at 35.

       At the March 30, 2022, hearing on Appellant’s second post-sentence

motion, the trial court justified its decision to increase the aggregate sentence

based on the following: (1) the re-sentencing was de novo so the court could

“[s]tart over[,]” and (2) the court realized it had “overlooked the gravity and

scope of the impact on the victims” when it imposed the original sentence.

See N.T., 3/30/22, at 4, 8. In its opinion, the trial court simply details the

factors which it believes supports the lengthier sentence imposed. See Trial

Ct. Op., 12/1/22, at 4-5 (explaining that at the time of the offense, Appellant

was on federal supervised release, was under the influence of a “veritable

cocktail of miscellaneous controlled substances[,]” was armed with a knife

which he used to randomly slash tires and wielded in a menacing fashion at

witnesses, engaged in a “senseless rampage . . . that affected nearly a dozen

property owners[,]” and fled from police when confronted).

       In support of the new sentence, the Commonwealth urges this Court to

“take[ the trial court] at its word about misapprehending the record” and not

permit Appellant “a windfall of a reduced sentence based upon the [t]rial

[c]ourt’s admitted mistake . . . regard[ing] the number of victims and impact

on the community of his criminal actions.”         Commonwealth’s Brief at 42.
____________________________________________

11 Appellant “has abandoned any claim that the original one-to-two year
sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him on February 14, 2022 was too
harsh[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 36.

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Indeed, it insists that because the trial court “articulated a reason for the new

sentence that was not vindictive[,]” we should conclude the court rebutted the

presumption of vindictiveness. Id. at 49.

      Upon our review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that

the presumption of vindictiveness was not overcome in this case, and we are

constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for imposition of

the   original       sentence.     This   Court’s   decisions    in   Coleman     and

Commonwealth v. Nickens, 923 A.2d 469 (Pa. Super. 2007), are

controlling.

      In Nickens, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate

term of 20 to 72 months’ imprisonment after revocation of his probation at

three dockets. Nickens, 923 A.2d at 471. The defendant filed a motion to

modify his sentence, and, in response, the Commonwealth filed “an answer”

with “[n]ew [m]atter[,]” requesting the court increase the defendant’s

sentence.      Id.    The Commonwealth did not file a separate post-sentence

motion.     Two months later, the trial court entered an order denying the

defendant’s post-sentence motion, and “simultaneously modif[ying] the

sentence       upward”     based   upon     “the    reasons     enumerated   in   the

Commonwealth’s answer.” Id. (record citation & quotation marks omitted).

      On appeal, this Court vacated the new sentence and remanded for

reinstatement of the original sentence. See Nickens, 923 A.2d at 472. We

determined that the trial court had no authority to increase the defendant’s

sentence absent a post-sentence motion filed by the Commonwealth seeking

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such relief, and that the Commonwealth’s answer and new matter was not “an

equivalent to a post-sentence motion.” See id. at 472. Thus, the Nickens

panel opined “the sentencing court had no basis on which to impose a harsher

sentence” and the court erred when it “essentially increased [the] sentence

sua sponte[.]” Id.

      The Coleman Court relied upon the ruling in Nickens to conclude that

the trial court in that case erred by increasing the defendant’s sentence under

facts similar to those presented in this appeal. In Coleman, the defendant

was convicted of burglary, criminal contempt for violating a protection from

abuse (PFA) order, and related charges following a bench trial. Coleman,

226 A.3d at 600.      At the August 23, 2018, sentencing hearing, after

consideration of the PSI, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an

aggregate term of 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by two years’

probation. Id. at 601. The defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion

seeking reconsideration of his sentence. Id. No post-sentence motion was

filed by the Commonwealth.

      On August 30, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the

defendant’s motion. Coleman, 226 A.3d at 601. The court pointed out that

between the time of the conviction and original sentencing, the defendant

“pleaded guilty to violating the PFA order again.” Id. The court then stated

“that after the original sentencing, he ‘went home and thought to [himself],

[he] may have done the wrong thing and gave too many breaks and that [he]

didn't take enough seriousness [sic] of the domestic violence.’” Id. (record

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citation omitted). Consequently, the court re-sentenced the defendant to a

term of 14 to 28 months’ incarceration, followed by four years’ probation ─ an

increase of two months to the minimum sentence, four months to the

maximum sentence, and two additional years of probation. Id. After a second

post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law, the defendant filed an

appeal to this Court. See id. at 602.

       First, the Coleman panel emphasized three facts that were not in

dispute:

       1) the Commonwealth did not request a modification of [the
       defendant’s] sentence, either in writing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
       721 or orally at the hearing; 2) the trial court was not correcting
       a patent or obvious mistake in [the defendant’s] original sentence;
       and 3) the original sentence imposed upon [the defendant] was
       not illegal.

Coleman, 226 A.3d at 602 (footnotes omitted). Next, the panel reviewed the

Nickens decision, and concluded the defendant’s “situation [was] virtually

indistinguishable[.]” Id. at 603. The Coleman Court opined:

       [D]espite the fact the Commonwealth did not file a post-sentence
       motion, the trial court sua sponte reconsidered its sentence and
       increased [the defendant’s] sentence. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
       720, Pa.R.Crim.P. 721,[12] and Nickens, the trial court was
       without authority to do so. . . .

Id. at 603-04.

____________________________________________

12 Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 and 721 set forth the procedures for filing post-sentence

motions, including the requirement that a motion must be filed within 10 days
of imposition of sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (defendant must file
post-sentence motion within 10 days); 721(B)(1) (Commonwealth must file
motion for modification of sentence within 10 days).

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J-S33021-23

       The facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in Coleman.

Here, on February 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of one to two years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, Appellant

filed a post-sentence motion for modification of his sentence.                The

Commonwealth did not file a motion for modification, and, in fact, during the

March 9th hearing, asked the trial court to “reimpose the sentence [it] did

originally.” N.T., 3/9/22, at 7.        However, despite the absence of any new

evidence, or post-sentencing conduct on the part of Appellant, the trial court

reconsidered its prior sentence and, sua sponte, imposed an increased

aggregate term of imprisonment. Pursuant to Coleman and Nickens, the

trial court had no authority to do so. See Coleman, 226 A.3d at 603-04;

Nickens, 923 A.2d at 472.

       The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Coleman by arguing that

the trial court in the present case misapprehended the record, while the court

in Coleman “simply decided that [the] original sentence was too lenient[.]”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 31.           We conclude this is a distinction without a

difference. The information the trial court relied upon to justify an increased

aggregate sentence in this case was part of the record at the original

sentencing hearing. Indeed, both the affidavit of probable cause13 and the

____________________________________________

13 At the November 9, 2021, guilty plea hearing, the trial court explicitly stated

that it had “read the affidavit of probable cause” and asked Appellant’s counsel
if he had “any objection to incorporating that into the record[,]” to which
counsel replied, “No, Your Honor.” See N.T., 11/9/21, at 4.

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J-S33021-23

PSI provide detailed accounts of the events on the night in question. The

affidavit of probable cause indicates that “there were approximately 23 cars

with tires slashed[,]” and the PSI lists the 13 victims to whom Appellant owed

restitution.   See Affidavit of Probable Cause at 3; Appellant’s Presentence

Report at 4. In addition, the PSI enumerates Appellant’s six prior convictions,

and details the circumstances surrounding his federal supervised release,

including the fact that his release had been revoked on another prior occasion.

See Appellant’s Presentence Report at 8. Therefore, we conclude the trial

court’s justification for the increased sentence ─ that it simply “overlooked the

gravity and scope of the impact on the victims” at the original sentencing ─ is

insufficient under Coleman.

      We also emphasize that pursuant to Pearce and its progeny, in order

to satisfy the requirements of due process and overcome the presumption of

judicial vindictiveness, an increased sentence following resentencing “must be

based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part

of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing

proceeding[,]” or “new details about the defendant’s moral character or

suitability for rehabilitation[,]”   See Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 565 (citation &

quotation marks omitted); Barnes, 167 A.3d at 123 (emphasis added),

quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. Here, the trial court did not rely upon any

post-sentencing conduct by Appellant, or “new details about [Appellant’s]

moral character or suitability for rehabilitation[,]” to justify the imposition of

an increased sentence. See Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 565 (citation & quotation

                                      - 20 -
J-S33021-23

marks omitted). Thus, the trial court had no authority to impose the March

9, 2022, sentence.

      Lastly, we note that neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth

provide any authority for the court’s assertion that it could impose an

increased sentence because it was conducing a sentencing de novo. See N.T.,

3/30/22, at 4.   Rather, the case law is clear that Pearce and its progeny

control.

      Therefore, because we conclude the trial court’s decision to increase

Appellant’s aggregate sentence upon his motion for modification, absent any

request by the Commonwealth, raises a presumption of judicial vindictiveness

which is not rebutted by evidence of post-sentencing conduct or new

information supporting an increase, we are constrained to vacate the

judgment of sentence imposed on March 9, 2022, and remand for the trial

court to reinstate the sentence imposed on February 14, 2022.

      Judgment of sentence vacated.         Case remanded for resentencing

consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      President Judge Emeritus Bender joins this Memorandum.

      President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a Dissenting Memorandum.

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J-S33021-23

DATE: 12/4/2023

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