Court Opinion

ID: 9648488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:23:46.330775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:31.967730
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully I dissent. KRS 342.125 allows for reopening based upon “a showing of change of conditions,” not restricted to physical condition. Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968), should be interpreted to mean only that the “change of conditions” contemplated by the statute is normally a change in “physical condition,” not to mean exclusively a change in physical condition.
The majority opinion holds that the general statement of the law in Osborne v. Johnson admits of no exception. The statutory language is not exclusive. There should be exceptions where the facts warrant it. This is such a case.
Here, in 1978 the employer avoided a 100% occupational disability award by creating a new job for the disabled worker. The 1978 Opinion and Award states:
“[W]e would have to find this man 100% occupationally disabled if he were not working, of course this can be re-opened upon a change of condition pursuant to KRS 342.125.”
The appellant argued that the employee should have appealed the award if dissatisfied with 50%. But that was only a part of the Board’s “Findings.” The other part was that the case “can be reopened upon a change of condition.” This language, when referenced to the type of injury (traumatic amputation of the employee’s fingers) could only mean a change in working conditions and not a subsequent change in physical condition. The change in physical con*429dition was sudden and complete at the time of injury. In the particular circumstances of this case it would be as reasonable, if not more reasonable, to assume that the employer accepted all of the Board’s 1978 findings (or would have appealed), as to assume the employee should have appealed.
The new job that was created has now been eliminated. The employee testified that the last position to which he was finally shifted is not suitable to his condition of disability. The majority opinion focuses on the employer’s testimony regarding statements by the employee suggesting that he was retiring, rather than leaving because of his disability. But the employee testified that he had neither the physical nor mental capabilities to perform this new job. This evidence supports the award.
The Board kept faith with its previous opinion. It found the employee had undergone a “change of conditions” entitling him to an increased award for total occupational disability, limiting its decision to the facts of this case. Had the Board found otherwise, it would encourage employers to place a seriously injured employee in a light duty position, and then effect his termination after the occupational disability award becomes final. The majority opinion in this case may provide such encouragement.
The evidence at the time of the 1978 award supported a finding that this employee was 100% disabled. It was only the fact that he had a special job created for him that kept him from getting this award. KRS 342.620(11) defines “disability” as meaning “a decrease of wage earning capacity due to injury or loss of ability to compete to obtain the kind of work the employee is customarily able to do ....” Although the key word is “capacity” and continued employment at an equal or greater earnings need not be critical to the issue, as a practical matter it is difficult for the Board to avoid taking into consideration continued employment at equal or greater pay in making an award. Had the Board awarded 100% initially in this case, it would have appeared grossly unfair.
The Board has found that there has been a change in occupational condition, not just economic condition. The record sufficiently supports the finding of the Board. I would affirm.
AKER, J., joins in this dissent.