Court Opinion

ID: 9566425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:39:10.757304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:43.615737
License: Public Domain

Cooper, Judge,
dissenting.
The prosecutor used nine of the ten peremptory strikes he exercised to exclude blacks from the jury. During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor articulated the reasons for his exercise of each of the strikes, and the trial judge concluded that the State had exercised all of its nine peremptory strikes in a race-neutral manner. I dissent because I believe that the trial court’s conclusion is in error.
The prosecutor’s reason for striking one prospective juror was that the prospective juror had worked at his present job for only a few months thus indicating an unstable work history. The majority contends that there was only one prospective juror with a similar work history who was selected for the jury. My review of the record reflects that there were several prospective jurors with similar work histories who were found acceptable to the State. In addition to the prospective juror acknowledged by the majority to have a similar work history, another prospective juror explained that she was a nurse but not presently employed. One prospective juror admitted that he was not presently working and that he had previously worked for only a year with the City of College Park, and another explained that she was not working but was recently divorced and starting a new life for herself. One juror stated that she worked only two days a week at a retail establishment and played tennis the remaining days. Several other prospective jurors were housewives or mothers not employed outside the home. Thus, I find that the prosecutor’s explanation of “unstable work history” applied equally to more than one of the prospective jurors. The majority concedes that this explanation was “suspect,” but concludes that this was the only one of the prosecutor’s nine explanations that appears suspect. I do not agree that it was the only suspect explanation and would further point out that the rule of Batson is violated if the State exercised any of its peremptory strikes for racially discriminatory reasons. Powell v. State, 182 Ga. App. 123 (2) (355 SE2d 72) (1987).
The prosecutor contended that he struck one of the prospective jurors because the juror had taken disability leave, and the prosecutor was concerned that the juror would be unable to sit through the trial. However, the record reflects that the prospective juror unequivocally stated that his disability, an enlarged heart, would not affect his ability to sit on the jury. The prosecutor did not question this prospective juror any further, and the record is devoid of any evidence which would support the prosecutor’s stated concern that the juror might have problems sitting through the trial. In light of the strong prima facie case established by the prosecutor’s exercise of nine peremptory strikes to excuse blacks, the prosecutor’s explanations were required *796to be “concrete, tangible, race-neutral and neutrally-applied.” Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 560 (423 SE2d 245) (1992). I cannot conclude as readily as the majority that “[i]n general, the prosecutor’s explanations were clear, specific, related to the case to be tried and race-neutral.” Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.
Decided July 14, 1993 —
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1993 —
Jeanne M. Canavan, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Charles W. Smegal, Vivian D. Hoard, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Because I would reverse the trial court’s ruling on the Batson issue and grant appellant a new trial, I find it unnecessary to address appellant’s remaining enumerations of error.
I am authorized to state that Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.