Court Opinion

ID: 9719624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:57:18.561608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:08.475301
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.
Raymond Bunn was indicted in Fulton County on charges of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault and violating his oath as a public officer by committing murder, felony murder and aggravated assault. These charges arose out of the shooting death of Corey Ward by Bunn, which occurred while Bunn was an Atlanta Police Department officer on patrol. After his indictment, Bunn filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.21 on the basis that he reasonably believed his actions in shooting Ward were necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury to himself or his partner2 pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).3
The original trial judge, stating that she could not “determine as *21a matter of law that [Bunn] was justified in killing” Ward, denied the motion. Bunn appealed this and other rulings to this Court. In Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410 (3) (667 SE2d 605) (2008), we held that a defendant need only prove he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the wrong standard had been used, we remanded the case to the trial court to allow it to analyze Bunn’s motion under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Bunn v. State, supra. On remand, the case originally handled by Judge Lane was reassigned. The trial court subsequently entered an order in which it stated that, after reviewing the record, it adopted Judge Lane’s findings of fact and that, after applying the preponderance standard in Bunn v. State, supra, it found Bunn carried his burden of proof and granted his motion for immunity from prosecution. By so ruling, the trial court in effect dismissed the entire indictment. See State v. Yapo, 296 Ga. App. 158 (1) (674 SE2d 44) (2009) (grant of immunity from prosecution is in substance a dismissal of the pertinent counts of the indictment). The State appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1); State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781 (684 SE2d 269) (2009).
The State asserts that the trial court erred by granting Bunn’s immunity motion because justification was not shown by a preponderance of the evidence. The same record was before this Court in Bunn v. State, supra, in which we stated that
[t]he record shows that, on July 14, 2002, Bunn, a City of Atlanta police officer, was on routine patrol with his partner. Upon spotting an apparent vehicle break-in, the officers moved their vehicle so as to block one of the exits from the parking lot where the break-in was allegedly taking place. The alleged burglar jumped into a van, which began to move toward the officers, who were shouting for it to stop. The van continued toward the officers, and Bunn shot and killed the van’s driver, Corey Ward. *22reasonably would have held the perception that the driver of the vehicle would not stop, and that he posed an imminent threat to his life and physical well-being. The only effective means [Bunn] had to attempt to stop or pre-empt the danger was his weapon. [Bunn] fired his service weapon in his own self-defense at the driver and was justified in doing so.
*21Id., 284 Ga. at 410.4 The State does not deny that Bunn adduced evidence that supported the above sequence of events, which are also found in Judge Lane’s order. Based on these findings of fact, the trial court expressly found that Bunn
*22The State argues that the trial court was not authorized to reject Judge Lane’s conclusion that the evidence did not show justification because Judge Lane heard the actual testimony of the witnesses and noted in her order that certain conflicting fact questions remained. As to the actual testimony of the witnesses, the trial court expressly adopted those factual findings that were made by Judge Lane in her order. As to the evidentiary conflicts regarding certain matters noted by Judge Lane, aside from the fact that most of them were irrelevant to an assessment of Bunn’s claim of immunity from prosecution based on a justification defense,5 those conflicts were assessed in light of Judge Lane’s improper legal conclusion that Bunn was required to prove “as a matter of law” that he was justified in killing Ward. That error by Judge Lane was corrected when this Court held in Bunn v. State, supra, that the proper standard of review was the preponderance of the evidence. Id., 284 Ga. at 413 (3).
“Preponderance of evidence” means that superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.
OCGA § 24-1-1 (5). Nothing in this standard requires the elimination of all fact disputes as a matter of law. Rather, “[t]he standard requires only that the finder of fact be inclined by the evidence toward one side or the other.” Murray v. State, 269 Ga. 871, 873 (2) (505 SE2d 746) (1998).
*23On appeal of an order denying a motion for immunity from prosecution,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we accept the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them. [Cit.]
Mullins v. State, 287 Ga. 302 (1) (695 SE2d 621) (2010). See also State v. Yapo, supra, 296 Ga. App. at 159-160 (2). Based on the facts set forth above, the tried court’s determination that Bunn is immune from prosecution because he acted in self-defense in discharging his service weapon, although based upon conflicting evidence, was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting Bunn’s immunity motion.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.

 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides that “[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor [with an exception inapplicable here].”

 Bunn’s assertion that his actions in shooting Ward were necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury to himself or his partner distinguishes this case from Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (105 SC 1694, 85 LE2d 1) (1985), cited by the dissent, in which the United States Supreme Court addressed the use of deadly force by police officers for the purpose of apprehending nonviolent fleeing felony suspects. Even in preventing escape, however, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. As applied in such circumstances, the Tennessee statute would pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 11-12 (II) (B).

 OCGA § 16-3-21 provides:
(a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force; however, except as provided in Code Section 16-3-23, a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily *21harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

 In considering this appeal, we have reviewed the record and transcript filed in this Court as part of this earlier proceeding.

 E.g., although Judge Lane noted that fact questions remained as to the “intent [of Bunn or Ward] as they chose their respective paths that night,” the law is well-established that the subjective intent of a defendant is irrelevant to the assessment of a claim of justification. See Lewis v. State, 270 Ga. 891, 893 (2) (515 SE2d 382) (1999) (justification defense assessed on whether circumstances would have “excited the fears of an objective reasonable person”). Likewise, fact questions regarding what the occupants of the Tahoe knew and what Bunn’s partner (who admitted he tripped over a curb, fell and completely missed what occurred during the pertinent time period) may or may not have seen clearly have no relevance under the facts in this case to a determination whether Bunn himself reasonably believed at the time he fired his service weapon that his action was necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or his partner. OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).