Court Opinion

ID: 9857449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:35:10.126429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:30.115145
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION TO REHEAR
McAMIS, P. J.
Defendant in error, Joseph Wood, Commissioner, has petitioned the Court for. a rehearing and for reconsideration of our holding that the case be remanded for a new trial. The burden of the petition , is that this Court should now render judgment for the ..amount of the verdict less $544.94. It is said this request is in order in view of the complexity of the questions involved.
To grant the request would probably have the effect of depriving the plaintiff in error of a trial by jury under the principles we attempted to settle in our original disposition of the case and we should not do so for that reason.
In addition it would'involve an accounting in this Court contrary to the rule that where the appellate court concludes there must be an accounting it will remand the case and will lay down the general principles to control but it will not undertake to give specific directions with reference to the accounting or attempt to make the accounting without a remand. Kenner v. City National Bank, 164 Tenn. 288, 47 S.W.2d 756.
The theory of the Commissioner, both in the Circuit Court and in this Court, has been that he is entitled to collect from defendant because the policy holders can file a claim for the unearned portion of the premiums. We do not think the right to file such claims necessarily fol*525lows from our holding that the policies were cancelled by operation of law, especially where the .policy holder had never actually paid defendant the amount of the premium. We note in this connection the charge of the declaration that the Commissioner is entitled to recover what “the defendant, in its fiduciary capacity has received on behalf of Universal”. (Italics ours)
Generally, the policy holder’s right to the return of unearned portions of the premium is contractual, i.e., based upon the provisions of the policy. Under our holding the policies were cancelled by operation of law on August 6, 1962. While the record is not such that we should determine the question at this time, it may be the policy holder’s action would be for breach of an executory contract. If so, it would be necessary to show damages resulting from' the breach and defendant contends no policy holder sustained any loss since defendant secured policies in other companies without additional cost to them. There may be some question also whether the Company (now the Commissioner as Liquidator) can recover without having executed the contract by furnishing protection beyond August 6, 1962. The fact that the Company set up charges against defendant on its books for the full premium, less commissions, does not make the contract any less executory and unexecuted. And, while the policies ran in the name of its customers defendant had an interest in their full execution since it furnished the funds for procuring the policies for its customers who in some respects may be considered third party beneficiaries. A duty to defendant to furnish this protection during the premium period may be implied in the purchase by defendant of the policies in question. It is well settled an insurance agent or broker may act for and in *526behalf of both the insurer and the insured. Also well settled is the rule that the promisee under a third party beneficiary contract may maintain an action on the contract. 17 Am.Jur.2d 713, 714, Contracts, Section 297.
. Under the circumstances the Court considers the verdict most inequitable and unjust, little less than an attempt by the Company (now the Commissioner as Liquidator) to collect something for nothing. We are not disposed to cut off a complete development of the case in the light of our previous holding by taking a leap in the dark by rendering a judgment for a specific amount. We think a new trial, if necessary with some amendments to the pleadings, is the only fair way to have the rights of the parties determined.
The petition is, accordingly, denied.
Cooper and Parrott, JJ., concur.