Court Opinion

ID: 9628784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:32:00.244955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:11.026833
License: Public Domain

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
On rehearing in his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the State, after obtaining an admitted illegal statement from the juvenile-defendant, had the burden of showing that every piece of evidence introduced against him at trial was derived from a source other than the defendant. Defendant cites as his authority 10 O.S.1971, § 1109(a), which begins:
“No information gained by questioning a child shall be admissible into evidence against the child unless the questioning . is done in the presence of said child’s parents, guardian, attorney, or the legal custodian of the child, and not until the child and his parents, or guardian, or other legal custodian shall be fully advised of their constitutional and legal rights, . . .”
The critical issue before us concerns the word, “information” as used in the statute cited above, and whether it refers narrowly only to a statement, confession or admission made by the juvenile during the questioning, or more broadly to evidence which can be admitted through a third party whose identity was discovered through questioning of the juvenile-defendant. We are of the opinion that the former is the proper interpretation.
This is a case of relative first impression in this State. The only prior decision of this Court dealing with interpretation of this specific part of the statute was J. T. P. v. State, Okl.Cr., 544 P.2d 1270 (1975), which stated at page 1277:
“. . .A failure by the prosecution to show compliance with ... [10 O.S. 1971, § 1109(a)] will render the admission or confession of a child inadmissible into evidence against him without the necessity of further inquiry into circumstances. The statement which is the product of that interrogation [outside presence of parents who waived constitutional rights] must be excluded from evidence.” (Emphasis added, footnote omitted)
The defendant argues the exclusionary rule delineated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), should exclude all evidence radiating from the illegal statement as fruits of the poisonous tree. But Wong Sun deals with a constitutional issue while the case at bar is concerned with a statutory right. We are of the opinion that, provided defendant was given his Miranda rights prior to questioning, the burden of proving independent source of evidence does not rest on the shoulders of the State. In this case there is evidence that the Miranda rights were read to the defendant (October 30, 1974, Hearing, page 32).
We further note that of the six witnesses to which defendant now objects on grounds that the State failed to prove its burden of independent source, the testimony of only one — Sheriff Brice Coleman — was objected to at trial, and that came during the cross examination.
We therefore dismiss this assignment of error.
Defendant next argues that refusal of the trial court to order identification of the informants utilized by the State denied his right of a fair trial. Defendant contends the identity of the informants is needed to determine if the evidence presented against him at trial came from a source other than his illegal statement. We dismiss this assignment in that it was not presented in the initial appeal to this Court and the cited authority, Scott v. City of Tulsa, Okl.Cr., 555 P.2d 1047 (1976), does not control. See, Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 22 O.S., Ch. 18, App.
*539As his final assignment of error, defendant contends he was denied his constitutional right of compulsory process when the trial court quashed his subpoenas for two co-defendants on word from their attorneys that the co-defendants would plead the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify. The co-defendants were held in jail at the time and following a hearing out of presence of the jury, the trial court granted the motion to quash the subpoenas. It is within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum which is, in essence, what the subpoenas are. See, Crutchfield v. State, Okl.Cr., 553 P.2d 504 (1976). In light of the cumulative nature of their proposed testimony, plus the fact that they would undoubtedly have refused to testify as cases were pending against them, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and so dismiss this assignment of error.
IT IS THEREFORE the order of this Court that the petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED, and the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.
H. J. BUSSEY, P. J.
C. F. BLISS, Jr., J.
TOM BRETT, J.