Court Opinion

ID: 9679182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:43:38.650782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.069651
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion herein because I do not believe that defendant Poppert is guilty of negligence as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case.
At the time the plaintiff was stopped at the stop sign, defendant Poppert was stopped 3 feet behind her. Plaintiff proceeded to move forward and defendant Poppert then took his eyes from her vehicle to look to the left and to the right, or west. Leaving his left foot on the clutch and Ms right foot on the brake, he permitted Ms car to roll forward to the stop sign. With no warning and without a signal, and at a place where there is a *513question as to whether plaintiff could be expected to stop in the absence of an emergency, the plaintiff came to a sudden stop. The testimony of defendant Poppert, which seems to be supported by the physical facts, is that his automobile lightly tapped the plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff’s testimony is that she stopped her vehicle, a 1957 Ford, 1 or 2 inches back from the stop sign, and then proceeded forward out into Twentieth Street; that when she had moved 6 feet she noticed a white vehicle come up over the railroad tracks; and she applied her brakes and stopped again. There is no testimony the plaintiff signaled her intention to stop, nor that it was necessary to stop where she did to avoid a collision with the white car coming over the tracks. Exhibits 5 and 6 indicate that there is no obstruction to vision for traffic coming from the west on Twentieth Street. Exhibit 6 shows that a car proceeding 6 feet from the stop sign would still not be in the right-of-way for the intersection of Railroad Avenue with Twentieth Street.
We have a jury question as to whether defendant Pop-pert had a reasonable opportunity under the facts of this case to avoid the slight collision with plaintiff’s vehicle, and also a question as to whether plaintiff’s predicament was not the result of her sudden, wholly unexpected stop. There is a question as to whether defendant Poppert had an opportunity to bring his vehicle to a complete halt before tapping the plaintiff’s automobile when plaintiff stopped suddenly and without warning. At the very least, there is present a question as to whether reasonable minds might differ on the question as to whether defendant Poppert exercised due care and caution under the circumstances of the particular situation. To me, a jury question was clearly present. I would affirm the judgment herein.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.