Court Opinion

ID: 9768161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:44:51.599806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:37.015260
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part. I agree with the majority opinion on direct appeal but dissent from the majority’s conclusion on cross-appeal. The issue on cross-appeal is whether federal funds used to pay for two crossbuck signs at a railroad crossing in Marianna in 1981 shields the railroad from all liability for what plaintiffs contend became an abnormally dangerous railroad crossing 12 years later. A subsidiary issue is whether this immunity exists for the railroad even when no survey of the crossing has been made by a diagnostic team during this 12-year period. I do not read the dictum in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), to provide blanket immunity to the railroad when proof that conditions have changed over time was offered at trial and when there has been no proof of monitoring by any government agency during the 12-year period. Otherwise, the federal government could pay for one crossbuck sign and protect the railroad from liability for decades. That defies common sense and is contrary to public policy. The common law in Arkansas provides that where there is evidence to show that a railroad crossing is abnormally dangerous, that becomes a jury question. A jury must then decide whether the railroad breached its duty of ordinary care to give a warning reasonably sufficient to permit the traveling public to use the crossing with reasonable safety. Northland Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 309 Ark. 287, 830 S.W.2d 850 (1992); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Biddle, 293 Ark. 142, 732 S.W.2d 473 (1987); A.M.I. Civil 3d 1805. In Northland Ins. Co., we stated that AMI 1805, relating to the railroad’s duty at abnormally dangerous crossings, should be given when there is proof tending to show the warning devices are inadequate. The majority opinion hinges its conclusion on CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, supra, but, again, that case does not resolve the issue before this court. In Easterwood, the Court stated that when federal regulations relating to warning devices are applicable, state tort law is preempted. Those regulations read: (3) (i) Adequate warning devices, under § 646.214(b)(2) or on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals when one or more of the following conditions exist: (A) Multiple main line railroad tracks. (B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied by a train or locomotive so as to obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing. (C) High Speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at either single or multiple track crossings. (D) A combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic. (E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, substantial numbers of schoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, unusually restricted sight distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these conditions. (F) A diagnostic team recommends them. (ii) In individual cases where a diagnostic team justifies that gates are not appropriate, FHWA may find that the above requirements are not applicable. (4) For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA. 23 CFR §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). In Easterwood, the Court concluded that the regulations did not apply due to lack of federal participation in paying for the warning devices. Thus, preemption did not occur. The opinion, in addition, did not confront the critical issue in this case — does preemption occur more than a decade later when there is proof that conditions have changed at the crossing and no diagnostic team has reevaluated the crossing? Without clear direction in Eas-. terwood that preemption occurs even when proof is offered that compliance with federal regulations has not transpired, I am reluctant to convey blanket immunity on the railroad. The other cases cited by the majority, while endorsing a principle of general preemption, also fail to come to grips with and discuss the precise issue raised in the case at hand. See Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R., 93 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 1996); Aronijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 87 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 1996); Michael v. Norfolk S. Ry., 74 F.3d 271 (11th Cir. 1996); Elrod v. Burlington Northern R.R., 68 F.3d 241 (8th Cir. 1995); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 39 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 1994); Dallari v. S. Pac. R.R., 923 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Cartwright v. Burlington N. R.R., 908 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Ark. 1995). That issue is does preemption occur when the federal system has broken down and monitoring by diagnostic teams has failed to take place. To maintain the fiction under such circumstances that the initial federal funding of a crossbuck sign presupposes a finding by the Secretary of Transportation that the crossing is still safe seems particularly ludicrous. Furthermore, in Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R., supra, the Eighth Circuit stated that there was a fact question relating to whether the crossbuck signs were “operating” or whether they had lost their reflectivity. If the crossbuck signs were not operating, the Eighth Circuit opined that the railroad was not entitled to federal preemption. It seems to me to be a very thin line indeed between failure of crossbuck signs to reflect properly and the inadequacy of passive crossbuck signs as a warning device altogether. Along the same line is the case of Michael v. Norfolk S. Ry., supra. There, the installed warning gate was arguably shorter than what federal regulations required. The Eleventh Circuit noted that this lapse, if proven, would void any claim for preemption. Both Kiemele and Michael stand for the proposition that federal preemption may not occur under the facts of individual cases. Both the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and two decisions by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas have found that blanket federal preemption does not occur under CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra. See Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1994); Birmingham v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. PB-C-96-573 (E.D. Ark. June 18, 1997); Williams v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 849 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Ark. 1994). In Shots, the fiction that the Secretary of Transportation approved the warning devices at the crossing at issue is taken to task. Regulations b(3) and (4), according to the Seventh Circuit, merely set out criteria and not what was required at the particular crossing at issue. The two district court opinions (Williams and Birmingham) emphasize that there was inadequate proof that a diagnostic team had evaluated the pertinent crossings. This lapse in evaluation of the crossings raised a material issue of fact regarding whether preemption ever occurred which precluded summary judgment in both instances. In the instant case, the Sharps presented proof of noncompliance with federal regulations which should at the very least raise a fact issue regarding the application of preemption of state common law and immunity for the railroad. That proof included not only the fact that one crossbuck sign on Sharp’s side of the tracks was inadequate but also proof of the following b(3) conditions that would require a gate and flashing lights: • multiple tracks • high volume of vehicular traffic • number of school buses • no diagnostic team evaluation. There was also proof that multiple accidents had occurred at this precise crossing. Surely, this proof of inadequacy was sufficient to thwart summary judgment. There is, finally, the point that with such full-blown immunity, there is no incentive for Union Pacific to measure safety at railroad crossings. The majority opinion concludes that federal preemption is absolute even when federal safety regulations are not followed and that the railroads of this land have been “stripped” of all decision-making authority concerning safety at railroad crossings. I cannot go that far because federal regulations and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, supra, do not contemplate that the railroad is out of the picture altogether or immune from liability when the federal system fails to operate. The Court made that clear in Easterwood: Indeed, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings. The former section envisions railroad involvement in the selection of warning devices through their participation in diagnostic teams which may recommend the use or nonuse of crossing gates. §§ 646-214(b)(3)(i)(F) and (3)(ii). Likewise, § 646.214(b)(4), which covers federally funded installations at crossings that do not feature multiple tracks, heavy traffic, or the like, explicitly notes that railroad participation in the initial determination of “the type of warning device to be installed” at particular crossings is subject to the Secretary’s approval. The Secretary’s regulations therefore cover the subject matter of the state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670-71. What is contended in the instant case is that the diagnostic team, with railroad participation, has failed to evaluate a dangerous crossing in Marianna, and proof was provided to support that contention. Far from my advocating a “revolving door” on preemption, when the federal apparatus has broken down, preemption simply does not occur. Otherwise, the public is protected neither by federal law nor common law tort. It is beyond dispute that the intention of the Secretary of Transportation in adopting the regulations was not to leave the traveling public vulnerable and without any mechanism to assure safety. I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of summary judgment on cross-appeal.