Court Opinion

ID: 9950778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:05:49.455884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:42.276611
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                2024 IL App (4th) 231501-U
 This Order was filed under
                                                                                 FILED
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                  March 12, 2024
                                          NO. 4-23-1501
 not precedent except in the                                                    Carla Bender
 limited circumstances allowed                                              4th District Appellate
 under Rule 23(e)(1).             IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL

                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                                )      Rock Island County
PRECIOUS N. SIMS,                                            )      No. 20CF1052
           Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                             )      Honorable
                                                             )      Peter W. Church,
                                                             )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Harris and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2              Defendant, Precious N. Sims, appeals the trial court’s order denying her pretrial

release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255 and

102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4              On December 21, 2020, the State charged defendant, born on October 21, 1999,

with first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2020)) and possession of a stolen motor

vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)). According to the State, defendant stabbed

Rodney Griffin during a robbery and was found in unlawful possession of his vehicle.

¶5              One day after defendant filed a motion for pretrial release, the State, on December
8, 2023, filed a verified petition to deny defendant that release. The State urged the trial court to

detain defendant based on the dangerousness and willful-flight standards. The court found the

State failed to prove sufficiently its willful-flight claim, so we will not address it further here.

The State listed the following charges that were pending against defendant at the time of the

charged offenses: “19 CM 11126-Criminal Damage to Property[;] 20 CM 603-Criminal Damage

to Property and Criminal Trespass to Land[; and] 20 CM 604-Criminal Damage to Property and

Criminal Trespass to Land.” According to the State, the criminal-trespass charges are based on

defendant’s returning to a residence after having been told by the police she had trespassed. In

addition, the “20 CM 604” case, although a misdemeanor, includes the allegation defendant set a

chair on fire and tried to set the house on fire. The State reported defendant twice failed to appear

in court. The State further provided the following factual basis in support of its petition:

                        “On 12/18/20, East Moline Police and Fire responded to

                880 Avenue of the Cities, East Moline to conduct a welfare check

                on victim Rodney Griffin. Griffin’s employer had gone to Griffin’s

                residence when he had not shown up for work and was able to see

                him lying on the floor and injured. Officers found Griffin to have

                suffered multiple stab wounds and he was pronounced dead.

                Griffin’s vehicle, a Chevy Trax *** was found to be missing. The

                vehicle was later located in Davenport Iowa occupied by the

                defendant and co-defendant. Upon being taken into custody, the

                defendant was interviewed. Post-[Miranda (see Miranda v.

                Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966))], she admitted going to Griffin’s

                home on 12/17/20 with the co-defendant to rob Griffin. According

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               to the defendant both she and the co-defendant participated in

               stabbing Griffin until he died.”

¶6             A hearing was held on the issue of defendant’s pretrial detention on December 13,

2023. The State’s proffer mirrored the information in its petition. No additional evidence was

proffered.

¶7             In support of defendant’s position, defense counsel provided a proffer. Counsel

stated Steven Sims, defendant’s father, was employed as a truck driver and his wife worked

locally. They were willing to take defendant into their home and provide for her and to ensure

defendant took her medication and attended medical appointments. Steven also had an extensive

security system in his home, which would alert him if defendant attempted to leave. According

to counsel, Chantelle Leachman, who worked for the jail, and Robert Young would testify

regarding defendant’s mental-health history since the date she was taken into custody in 2020.

This mental-health history included the finding of unfitness to stand trial, defendant’s treatment

in the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS), and her behavior after her return from

DHS. Their testimony, counsel proffered, would establish defendant had been taking her

prescribed medications and her behavior significantly improved. Counsel argued the case had

been pending for “roughly three years” with hundreds of pages of discovery and the State

summed up its case in just one paragraph. Defense counsel further emphasized the following

from the discovery in the case:

                       “I would suggest to the Court that [defendant] is a victim of

               sex trafficking. Her codefendant is a sex trafficker and the victim

               is—would have been an alleged john. I don’t think the State would

               dispute that information because that is information that we

                                                  -3-
learned through discovery.

        I would also note that my client, [defendant], had

cooperated with the police upon her arrest and a lot of the

information they used to investigate the matter came from her, and

that she is currently also cooperating and has given additional

statements upon her return from DHS that would help in the

prosecution of the codefendant.

        My client was a 19-year-old at the date of this offense. Her

codefendant is roughly 60 years old and has a very lengthy—and

been to prison multiple times. He has a lengthy criminal history,

et cetera.

        I would also ask the Court to take judicial notice of certain

affirmative defenses that we had filed in this case regarding her

defenses that relate to coercion, et cetera. And these also relate to

her being—her status, as I would call it, as a victim of sex

trafficking.

        I would note in deference of that, her codefendant had

essentially got her addicted to crack cocaine so that he could

manipulate her. She had made allegations of sexual assault, abuse,

aggravated battery that he committed against her all in the—in the

time frame leading up to this event. So our affirmative defense

related to coercion, intoxication, et cetera, are all relevant towards

that particular argument.

                                  -4-
                       ***

                       *** [D]efendant herself told the police that she did certain

               things on the order of her codefendant. Her codefendant is in

               custody. He’s not going to get out of custody and he will no longer

               be able to have any say or control over her in any manner

               whatsoever. As long as she’s properly medicated and receiving

               counseling services, I do not believe she is a present threat to

               anybody including herself.”

¶8             The trial court found the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence

defendant should be detained under the dangerousness standard. The court found defendant had

been charged with a detainable offense and the presumption was great or the proof evident

defendant committed the offense. Regarding whether defendant was a threat and whether any

conditions could mitigate the threat, the court held as follows:

                       “The Court would turn first to the State’s argument

               regarding her threat to the community. There’s a lot of moving

               parts in all these cases. There’s certainly a lot of moving parts in

               this case. I understand the argument regarding her mental health,

               regarding her possibly being a participant in this under some form

               of coercion. That doesn’t obviate the fact that she, in fact, did

               admit to law enforcement upon her arrest *** she, in fact,

               participated in the stabbing of the victim in this case ***.

                       The Court also is aware of the lengthy mental health history

               here in terms of her prior court appearances. The Court, in fact,

                                                -5-
has, in this particular case, had [defendant] in this Court’s

courtroom on multiple occasions. The Court would note that at this

juncture, while in the custody of the [jail] and previously in the

custody of [DHS], her mental health has improved to the Court’s

observation greatly, but that’s not just the Court’s observation. We

have reports from DHS that also confirm that she had been

restored to fitness. She made great progress with her mental health,

and currently she is in a secure environment where she is being

offered all necessary and appropriate medication and, in fact, she is

taking the medication. While medicated in our custody, she’s

doing quite well.

        That said, this is somebody who at one point in the past,

whether she is a victim of sex traffic[king] or not, whether she was

placed in a position where she felt some level of coercion or not,

nevertheless, as the Court has found factually—and has alleged to

have stabbed the victim—I don’t have any degree of confidence

that—absent the current situation, that this is the least restrictive

environment for her in which show can receive these mental health

medications. That would then, basically, be a finding by the Court

that there are no conditions of release that could assure the Court

that she wouldn’t find herself in a similar situation and act out in a

similar fashion. And, obviously, if that were to happen again, that

would be a clear threat to the community.”

                                 -6-
¶9             The trial court entered a written order for detention. In support of its finding “less

restrictive conditions would not assure safety of *** the community,” the court wrote: “as stated

in open court. Defendant has multiple mental health issues which are being addressed in the jail

and is alleged to have actually stabbed the alleged victim.”

¶ 10           This appeal followed.

¶ 11                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12           On December 13, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the order

denying her pretrial release under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). She

also filed an accompanying memorandum.

¶ 13           On appeal, defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying her pretrial

release as the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence she poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any persons or persons or the community. On the notice-of-appeal form,

defendant provided the following, emphasizing the word “present”: “Insufficient facts alleged in

State’s proffer. Did not address the fact that she is not a present threat to the community.”

(Emphasis in original.) In her memorandum, defendant provides additional argument,

emphasizing the absence of any evidence she is a danger to the community as she was free of her

trafficker’s influence, she assisted in the police investigation, and her mental illness was under

control through medication. Defendant further emphasized the Pretrial Fairness Act did not

authorize courts to detain defendants for their own well-being.

¶ 14           Under the Code, all criminal defendants are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). This presumption applies to even those accused of violent offenses,

and the State must justify pretrial detention. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18. To

deny a defendant pretrial release under section 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

                                                -7-
6.1(e)(1)-(3) West 2022)), as the State sought here, the State must prove by clear and convincing

evidence “the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2). Factors

that are to be considered by a trial court in determining dangerousness include the following:

                         “(1) The nature and circumstances of any offense charged,

               including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a

               weapon, or a sex offense.

                         (2) The history and characteristics of the defendant

               including:

                         (A) Any evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal history

               indicative of violent, abusive or assaultive behavior, or lack of

               such behavior. ***

                         (B) Any evidence of the defendant’s psychological,

               psychiatric or other similar social history which tends to indicate a

               violent, abusive, or assaultive nature, or lack of any such history.

                         (3) The identity of any person or persons to whose safety

               the defendant is believed to pose a threat, and the nature of the

               threat.

                         (4) Any statements made by, or attributed to the defendant,

               together with the circumstances surrounding them.

                         (5) The age and physical condition of the defendant.

                         (6) The age and physical condition of any victim or

               complaining witness.

                                                 -8-
                       (7) Whether the defendant is known to possess or have

               access to any weapon or weapons.

                       (8) Whether, at the time of the current offense or any other

               offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, aftercare

               release, mandatory supervised release or other release ***.

                       (9) Any other factors *** deemed by the court to have a

               reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation

               for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such

               behavior.” Id. § 110-6.1(g).

The threshold for “clear and convincing evidence” is proof that “leaves no reasonable doubt in

the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) People v. Bryson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170771, ¶ 84, 115 N.E.3d 362; see Bazydlo

v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1995).

¶ 15           We review whether a criminal defendant was properly denied pretrial release for

an abuse of discretion. See People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. This court will

find an abuse of discretion when the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful or when we

find no reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s decision. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 16           Here, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant

posed a present and real threat to the community. The State’s proffer establishes defendant

committed a violent offense, participating in the stabbing and death of the victim. It further

establishes defendant had a criminal history, which includes a 2020 misdemeanor criminal-

damage-to-property charge that includes an allegation defendant attempted to set a residence on

fire. While the evidence proffered at the hearing does not identify specific diagnoses, it is clear

                                                 -9-
defendant suffered severe mental-health issues. Her mental-health condition was so extreme she

was found unfit to stand trial and was admitted to DHS for treatment. While the evidence shows

defendant’s mental health had improved, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to

conclude defendant remained a present threat.

¶ 17           Defendant next argues the trial court erred in finding the State proved by clear and

convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the threat

defendant posed to the community. Defendant contends the State proffered no evidence on the

issue of pretrial conditions and made no argument on this issue. Defendant maintains the court

did not address the alternative conditions nor adequately explain why it believed those conditions

would not mitigate the threat. Defendant concludes by arguing the court’s belief defendant “is

doing quite well” in custody does not justify detaining her.

¶ 18           We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no condition or

combination of conditions could mitigate defendant’s threat to the community. Given the

proffers before the court, it is clear defendant suffered from mental illness and an addiction to

crack cocaine at the time she participated in the victim’s murder and when she attempted to set a

house on fire. That mental illness led her to be found unfit to stand trial and be admitted for

treatment. The proffer further establishes defendant has benefitted from that treatment. It was not

unreasonable for the court to have concluded defendant’s addictions and mental health improved

only while in custody and her being a threat to the community would not be mitigated if she

returned to the community, even while in the care of her father and his wife.

¶ 19                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 21           Affirmed.

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