Court Opinion

ID: 9814659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:00:47.870759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:15.451476
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40634         Document: 00516880157             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  August 31, 2023
                                       No. 22-40634                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   Elizabeth Perez, as next friend of O.P., a minor,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Weslaco Independent School District,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 7:21-CV-352
                      ______________________________

   Before Haynes and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges, and deGravelles,
   District Judge. *
   Per Curiam: *
          Elizabeth Perez filed an administrative complaint alleging that the
   Weslaco Independent School District failed to provide her son, O.P., with a
   free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with
   Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The district court granted judgment
          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Middle District of Louisiana, sitting by
   designation.
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                       No. 22-40634

   on the administrative record in favor of Weslaco. For the reasons discussed
   below, we AFFIRM.
                                  I.     Background
             A. Statutory Background
          As this is an IDEA case, we begin by discussing relevant provisions of
   the statutory framework. The IDEA mandates that public schools provide a
   “free appropriate public education” to every “child[] with [a] disability.” 20
   U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).      The statute in turn defines a “child with a
   disability” as (1) a student with “a qualifying disability” who (2) “by reason
   thereof, needs special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A); see
   also Lisa M. v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 205, 215 (5th Cir. 2019).
          The provision of IDEA-related services proceeds as follows. First, a
   parent may request that a school district conduct a “full and individual initial
   evaluation” of their child to determine whether he or she is eligible for IDEA-
   services. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a), (c)(2)(i). The school district is then
   required to conduct the evaluation, “[u]s[ing] a variety of assessment tools
   and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic
   information about the child.” Id. § 300.304(b)(1). If the evaluation reveals
   that the student qualifies as a “child with a disability,” the school district
   must next prepare an individualized education program (“IEP”) to provide
   that student with a “free appropriate public education.” Fry v. Napoleon
   Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). An IEP is prepared by the child’s
   parents, teachers, and school officials, and must be “reasonably calculated to
   enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
   circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1,
   580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017).
          If, however, a parent questions “the identification, evaluation, or
   education placement of the child,” the parent may commence a formal

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   adjudicative process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). In Texas, a parent begins
   that process by filing a due process complaint with the Texas Education
   Agency, which triggers a due process hearing before a special education
   hearing officer. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1165. A “party aggrieved by
   the findings and decision” of the administrative process may “bring a civil
   action with respect to the complaint” in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. §
   1415(i)(2)(A).
               B. Factual Background
           We turn now to the facts of this case. As noted above, Perez is the
   mother of O.P., a student in the Weslaco Independent School District
   (“Weslaco”). When O.P. was in the sixth grade, he failed the reading section
   of the State of Texas Assessments of Academic Readiness exam. Troubled
   by his performance, Perez took O.P. to a private psychologist, Dr. Rodriguez-
   Escobar, who diagnosed O.P. with Autism Spectrum Disorder, ADHD-
   inattentive type, unspecified anxiety, communication disorders, and
   educational problems. Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar noted, however, that her
   evaluation was not intended to replace a special education evaluation, and
   she advised Perez to consult with Weslaco to determine whether O.P. was
   eligible for special education services.
           Perez provided Weslaco with Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar’s report. After
   reviewing the report, Weslaco personnel consulted with O.P.’s teachers and
   ultimately determined that O.P. was ineligible for special education services
   at that time. Nevertheless, Weslaco determined that O.P. was eligible for
   Section 504 1 services, which Perez consented to. The next year, Weslaco

           _____________________
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              Section 504 refers to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), which
   prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating against individuals with
   disabilities. Under § 504, public schools must evaluate students with disabilities and create
   plans to aid students’ access to the general curriculum. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33. However,

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   contacted Perez to discuss O.P.’s Section 504 accommodations. Perez did
   not immediately respond, so Weslaco proceeded without her. Weslaco
   collected information from O.P.’s teachers, adjusted his accommodations,
   and again determined it was unnecessary to refer him to special education
   services at that time. However, Weslaco notified Perez of her right to request
   a special education evaluation pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.301.
           Perez did not request an evaluation—instead, litigation commenced
   when Perez filed a request for a due process hearing with the Texas
   Education Agency. In this request, she alleged that Weslaco violated the
   IDEA by (1) failing to identify O.P. as a student in need of special education
   services; (2) depriving O.P. of a free appropriate public education; and
   (3) denying O.P. and Perez certain procedural protections guaranteed by the
   Act.
           After obtaining Perez’s consent, Weslaco then evaluated O.P. In
   doing so, it relied on the results of assessments and tests from several
   different professionals, including a speech pathologist, a diagnostician, and a
   licensed specialist in school psychology. That comprehensive evaluation
   determined that O.P. (1) did not meet the coding criteria for a qualifying
   disability, (2) did not need special education services as a result of any
   disability, and (3) therefore, was not eligible for a free appropriate public
   education under the IDEA.
           Following Weslaco’s final eligibility determination, a special
   education hearing officer conducted a due process hearing. The hearing
   officer reviewed Perez’s evidence—namely Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar’s
           _____________________
   eligibility for § 504 accommodations does not necessarily equate to eligibility for a free
   appropriate public education under the IDEA—in other words, it’s entirely possible for a
   child to qualify for accommodations under the former but not the latter. See Est. of Lance
   v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 990–91 (5th Cir. 2014).

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   report—and the results of Weslaco’s evaluation. After this extensive review,
   the hearing officer then issued an opinion concluding that Perez had failed to
   meet her burden to show that Weslaco had incorrectly evaluated O.P.
   Therefore, the hearing officer upheld Weslaco’s determination that O.P. was
   ineligible for special education services.
          Perez then filed this civil action in federal district court, and the
   parties subsequently filed cross motions for judgment on the administrative
   record. The district court concluded that (1) Weslaco correctly determined
   that O.P. was not a “child with a disability”; (2) because he was not a child
   with a disability, O.P. was not eligible for special education services; and
   (3) although Weslaco had committed several procedural violations of the
   IDEA, those violations were harmless because they did not impact the
   ultimate eligibility determination. The district court accordingly granted
   judgment in Weslaco’s favor, and Perez timely appealed.
                     II.   Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          The district court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A),
   and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In the IDEA context, there
   are two levels of review. At the first, the district court reviews the hearing
   officer’s decision “virtually de novo.” See Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court must
   give the hearing officer’s findings “due weight,” but it then “must arrive at
   an independent conclusion based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
   (quotation omitted).
          At the second level, we review the district court’s “legal
   determinations de novo and factual questions for clear error.” Spring Branch
   Indep. Sch. Dist. v. O.W. by Hannah W., 961 F.3d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quotation omitted). Clear error exists only if we are “left with the definite
   and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” E.R. ex rel. E.R. v.

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   Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 766 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We apply these standards in
   IDEA cases, notwithstanding their resolution before the district court on
   summary judgment motions. See Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d
   341, 347 (5th Cir. 2000).
                                 III.   Discussion
          On appeal, Perez raises two main points of error with the district
   court’s judgment. First, she asserts that the district court erred in upholding
   Weslaco’s determination that O.P. lacked eligibility for special education
   services. Second, she agrees with the district court that Weslaco committed
   several procedural violations of the IDEA—but she urges that the district
   court erred in concluding that those procedural violations were not
   actionable.
           We begin with the determination of eligibility, as resolution of that
   issue will facilitate the outcome of the latter issue. Recall that the IDEA is
   limited only to “children with disabilities,” not every student who is struggling
   with something. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also
   Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rel. Patricia F., 503 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.
   2007) (“Only certain students with disabilities, however, are eligible for
   IDEA’s benefits.”). Therefore, Weslaco was required to provide O.P. with
   special education services only if O.P. (1) had a qualifying disability and
   (2) “by reason thereof, need[ed] special education and related services.” 20
   U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1).
          Weslaco conducted a full and independent initial evaluation and
   determined that O.P. did not satisfy those prerequisites; therefore, it
   concluded O.P. was ineligible for special education services. The hearing
   officer and district court both independently reviewed the results of
   Weslaco’s evaluation. But, weighing the record evidence, the decisions

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   below each concluded that Weslaco had correctly determined O.P.’s
   eligibility.
           We decline to disturb the district court’s decision on appeal. “As is
   par for the course in contentious IDEA cases, the record includes evidence
   that supports each side.” Lisa M., 924 F.3d at 216. But reviewing the district
   court’s factual findings under the clear error standard, we cannot “revers[e]
   unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
   committed.” Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our
   own appellate review does not leave us with such a conviction—rather, we
   are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
   district court’s approval of Weslaco’s determination that O.P. was ineligible
   for special education services.
           To start, Perez submitted lesser evidence demonstrating O.P.’s
   eligibility. Her primary support was Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar’s evaluation,
   which diagnosed O.P. with various impairments. However, that evaluation
   was properly discounted for two main reasons. First, the evaluation “lacked
   educational context”—Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar did not review education
   records, solicit feedback from O.P.’s teachers, or observe O.P. in a classroom
   setting.       Therefore, her evaluation did not have “proper foundation.”
   Second, Dr. Rodriguez-Escobar did not herself recommend special education
   services or indicate that her evaluation was meant as a replacement for a
   special education evaluation. Rather, her report instructed Perez to consult
   with Weslaco to determine whether O.P. was eligible for such services. In
   any case, as courts have observed, “[t]he IDEA does not require school
   districts to defer to the opinions of private evaluations procured by a parent.”
   Miller v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs. Bd. of Educ., 64 F.4th 569, 576 (4th Cir.
   2023). Therefore, Weslaco was not required to adopt Dr. Rodriguez-
   Escobar’s determinations wholesale, nor was the district court required to
   give it greater weight.

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          By contrast, Weslaco’s evaluation, which indicated that O.P. did not
   need special education services as a result of a qualifying disability, was based
   on more evidence. Though the evaluation was not perfect, Weslaco did use
   “diverse tools and information sources” to assess O.P.’s eligibility. See 20
   U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A).      Indeed, it solicited reports from a variety of
   professionals—a diagnostician, a licensed specialist in school psychology,
   and a speech pathologist. These professionals assessed O.P. using multiple
   formal and informal tests, personally observed O.P., interviewed O.P.’s
   teachers, and carefully reviewed his cumulative school records.
          Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly
   erred in upholding Weslaco’s eligibility determination. Rather, the record
   confirms the finding that O.P. did not meet the eligibility criteria for special
   education. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Weslaco
   did not deny O.P. a free appropriate public education.
          We turn now to Perez’s remaining arguments, which are procedural.
   None of them, however, require us to disturb the district court’s judgment.
   As the district court correctly noted, procedural violations of the IDEA do
   not warrant a remedy unless a plaintiff shows that the violation resulted in
   the student being denied a free appropriate public education. Adam J., 328
   F.3d at 812; see also L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 879 F.3d
   1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Only procedural violations [of the IDEA] that
   cause a party substantive harm will entitle plaintiffs to relief.”); R.B. ex rel.
   F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007)
   (observing that a procedural violation alone “cannot qualify an otherwise
   ineligible student for IDEA relief”); J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224
   F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting “[student] was properly found to be
   ineligible for special education,” therefore, “he was not denied a free
   appropriate public education”). Perez has not made that showing. See, e.g.,
   Seth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961, 972 (5th Cir.

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   2016). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that any such procedural
   violations are not actionable here.
                                IV.      Conclusion
          We conclude that the district court did not err in granting judgment
   on the administrative record in favor of Weslaco.             Accordingly, we
   AFFIRM.

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