Court Opinion

ID: 9586994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:07.974075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:58.391485
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Code Ann. § 1-808) provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required. ...”
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of our Georgia Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”
Spence was arrested for and held under three charges — theft of his father’s former wife’s wedding rings; theft of an outboard motor; and theft of a television set. The evidence indicated that Spence had sold the television set for $50, and the motor for $65.
For these charges of theft by taking, bond was set at $30,000 for each offense — a total of Ninety Thousand Dollarsl
It must be noted that the only charges lodged against Spence, and the only charges for which the bail of $90,000 was set, were the offenses of theft by taking, which were either misdemeanors or felonies, depending upon whether the objects stolen had values in excess of $500. OCGA §§ 16-8-2, 16-8-12 (Code Ann. §§ 26-1802, 26-1812).
The majority states that bail of $90,000 for the suspected theft of items which are worth, at most, a few hundred dollars was not “so excessive as to constitute an abuse of the judge’s discretion.” (Op., p. 341).
What, I inquire, would be excessive bail for three suspected thefts (of which two are likely misdemeanors) of property worth, at most, a few hundred dollars?
Two Hundred Thousand Dollars? Five Hundred Thousand Dollars?
One Million Dollars?
The majority cites in support of its position our case of Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585 (134 SE2d 790) (1964) — indeed, that is the only authority cited in that division of the opinion.
In that case, Jones was convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to twelve months on the public works, six months in jail, and a fine of $1,000. The trial court fixed bail at $20,000.
*346This Court held that to be excessive, holding:
“Excessive bail is the equivalent of a refusal to grant bail, and in such cases habeas corpus is an available and appropriate remedy for relief.” 219 Ga. at 587. The court ordered Jones released, unless the trial court reduced the bail from $20,000 to $5,000. (Jones was already convicted, had no fixed residence anywhere, lived on a government pension paid from California, was a sojourner in Georgia, had been in and out of jail since coming to Georgia, had been arrested in ten different states, and additionally had served a federal sentence along with sentences in six different states. Compare that to the case of a 19-year-old, charged with three thefts of family property, held under pre-trial bail of $90,000.)
Were Spence not the principal suspect in the murder of his mother, I am satisfied that no judicial officer, from committing magistrate to Supreme Court Justice, would ever sanction such a bail requirement.
The fact of the matter is that the only reason the bail was set so high was that he was suspected of murder.
(The fact of the matter is that Spence’s bail would be quite reasonable were he charged with murder.)
The fact of the matter is that he was not charged with murder — only theft by taking.
The fact of the matter is that the majority today approves a new system of bail, wherein a man may now be denied bail upon suspicion alone, provided there is at least some offense, misdemeanor or otherwise, with which he might formally be charged.
The fact of the matter is under the majority opinion, a man might be denied bail altogether by virtue of the existence — undisclosed and unformulated — of a suspicion latent somewhere within the mind of some police official!
That is distressing.
I further dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which approves the admission against Spence of the testimony of his lawyer.
When Spence was arrested, he called his brother-in-law, Sanders, who visited him in jail. Note the following testimony of Sanders:
“Question: You are an attorney, weren’t you?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question: And he [Spence] was looking to you to advise him?
“Answer: I advised him.”
The majority excuses this intrusion into the attorney-client relationship by stating “that no attorney-client relationship existed, nor could appellant have reasonably believed that Sanders represented him on the murder charge.”
*347Why, I inquire, did Spence (at the time a 19-year-old high school student) call Sanders to the jail?
As family friend? As brother-in-law?
What, I inquire, was it that Spence needed to discuss with Sanders?
Relations with his father? Difficulties in school?
What, I inquire, could Spence — staring out from behind the bars of the Richmond County jail — “reasonably believe” (in the language of the majority, supra) to be the function of his lawyer brother-in-law?