Court Opinion

ID: 9639444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:17:57.105087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:18.515766
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
We see-no reason to modify the conclusion at which we originally arrived. Title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 10138%~10138i/2z) is too express in its language to leave doubt that it regulated the manufacture of denatured alcohol. Title 3 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 10138%-10138%t) is primarily concerned with industrial alcohol, as its title and main provisions show. Denaturing plants are indeed mentioned in sections 10,13,14, and 15, and perhaps the titles overlap, but with that we have nothing to do. We cannot ignore sections 4, 5, and 9 of title 2 merely because title 3 gives powers to the eommission'er on the same subject. All his regulations are subject to the two titles, as far as relevant, however he may for convenience divide them.
We said before that section 6 had no relation to denatured alcohol, and as respects the first two paragraphs to that we adhere, and for the reason then given that “liquor” includes alcohol, but not denatured alcohol. Indirectly it does touch the manufacture of denatured alcphol, since it-sets a period and other conditions upon permits for the purchase of alcohol for manufacturing, of which one form is making denatured alcohol. If our language has been understood to the contrary, we take this occasion to correct it. *649The permits to purchase alcohol for denaturing, which section 4 requires, are subject to section 6.
But this does not change the result at bar. The permit reads as follows: “This permit authorizes the operation • of the above-described plant or warehouse, the purchase and receipt of alcohol thereat, and the removal of the manufactured product.” All this w.e understand as no more than a permit to manufacture denatured alcohol, as required by section 4. The words, “the purchase and receipt of alcohol thereat,” do not give the plaintiff the right to any specific alcohol. This he must get under permits to purchase under section 4, which, as we have just said, are all subject to the limitations of section 6. To what extent the Commissioner, by refusing such permits, may in substance revoke the permit to manufacture, we do not say, because it is not presented. It is enough that the permit at bar falls under section 9, and was valid ab initio, because it does not fall within section 6.
It is plain that, when the statute was passed, there was no suspicion of the ease with which denaturants could be removed. That, however, can mean no more than that some amendment in the act is necessary to cheek the grave evil which has now arisen.
Por these reasons we adhere to our earlier disposition of the ease.
Judge ROGERS, through illness, has not been able to take part in the decision on re-argument.