Court Opinion

ID: 9497289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:47:33.919433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:06.197238
License: Public Domain

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The central issue in this appeal is whether the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination is supported by “specific, cogent” reasons that are “substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to grant Kaur’s petition we must determine that her evidence “was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); see also id. at 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812 (“[W]e must find that the evidence not only supports [granting the petition], but compels it....”) (emphasis in original). Here, the court fails to apply this extremely deferential standard of review, a standard which is especially appropriate when we review credibility findings. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003). Because on this record a “reasonable finder of fact would not be compelled to conclude that [her] claim is credible,” Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir.1999), I would deny Kaur’s petition for review.
The IJ made his adverse credibility finding after presiding over a live hearing. He heard Kaur’s testimony on direct and cross-examination, questioned her himself, and cast an experienced eye on the supporting documents she proffered to establish her entitlement to asylum. I disagree with the majority’s divide-and-conquer approach to undermine the adverse finding. The reasons supporting the IJ’s conclusion that Kaur was not credible should not be *891evaluated seriatim, but rather as they interrelate to answer the key underlying question — whether she was telling the truth. Mindful of the stringent standard of review, the IJ’s articulated reasons for finding Kaur’s testimony untruthful, considered together, are sufficiently cogent and substantial.
Even applying the majority’s improper analytical approach, the record does not compel us to grant Kaur’s petition. The IJ listed six reasons for his adverse credibility determination, five of which concerned the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at the hearing: (1) the IJ doubted Kaur’s account of her father’s gunfight with the militants; (2) he was skeptical about Kaur’s lack of knowledge regarding her father’s apparent disappearance; (3) he found it implausible that Kaur never learned the name of the man who smuggled her into Canada; (4) he factored in Kaur’s willingness to lie and misrepresent her true identity to gain entrance first to Canada and then to the United States; and (5) he determined that the photocopied passport Kaur provided at her asylum hearing was fraudulent.
In my view, the court improperly rejects these reasons as insufficient. Particularly troubling is the majority’s refusal to credit the IJ’s evaluation of Kaur’s photocopied passport. This is not a case where the petitioner was for some reason unable to provide legitimate identification documents and admitted as much to the IJ. Rather, Kaur solemnly proffered as authentic a copy of a passport that the IJ determined was fraudulent — a determination that his experience uniquely qualifies him to make. The photocopied passport she submitted at the hearing was the principle document establishing Kaur’s identity. As the true identity of the petitioner is clearly at the heart of every asylum petition, the fact that Kaur provided fraudulent identification was certainly relevant to the IJ’s evaluation of her credibility.
I also disagree with the court’s conclusion that Kaur’s “misrepresentations to Canadian and United States immigration officials and use of a false passport are entirely consistent with her asylum claim.” Maj. at 889. While it is certainly plausible that someone desperate to flee persecution would travel under false documents and lie to border agents in order to make good her escape, this doesn’t explain or justify Kaur’s admittedly fraudulent entry into the United States from Canada. At some point the alien’s justification for “doing everything necessary to flee persecution” reaches the limit of judicial tolerance in a proceeding to determine the legitimacy of her entitlement to refugee status; it should not be allowed to forever insulate any and all misrepresentations from playing any part in the factfinder’s credibility calculus. The IJ’s consideration of the undisputed fact that Kaur lied to Canadian and United States officials did not detract from the cogent reasoning which led to his determination that Kaur was not credible. It certainly does not compel the opposite finding.
Finally, the court’s conclusion regarding the IJ’s sixth reason for his adverse credibility finding — Kaur’s failure to provide evidence corroborating her claim — fares no better. An asylum petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is eligible for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a). In a case where the immigration judge reasonably doubts the petitioner’s testimony, the failure to present corroborating evidence should doom the asylum petition. See id. (“The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”); Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he regulations unambiguously contemplate cases where an ap*892plicant’s testimony alone will not satisfy his burden of proof.”). Here, the IJ had legitimate, articulable doubts about the truth of Kaur’s story. It was therefore entirely appropriate for him to note the absence of any other evidence that might have bolstered the believability of her testimony.
The fundamental role of the IJ is to decide whether the petitioner is telling the truth. See Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir.1985) (“[The IJ] is, by virtue of his acquired skill, uniquely qualified to decide whether an alien’s testimony has about it a ring of truth.”). At its heart, our job as appellate judges is not to nitpick this finding of fact, but rather to evaluate the articulated basis for the subsequent legal conclusions of the IJ and BIA. Far too often, as here, we lose sight of this delegation of responsibilities and upstage the role of factfinder to reach the opposite result. Such outcome-oriented review must be terribly demoralizing to conscientious immigration judges who strive to separate truth from fiction when listening to evidence offered in the obvious self-interest of the asylum seeker. Sadly, we do not give the finder of fact the respect that the record suggests is due in this case.
I dissent.