Court Opinion

ID: 2966138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:49:20.014334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:08.717712
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATIONNOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 99-1169

                     SHARON HUGHES MENDONCA,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

             IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

            [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
               Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                
                                
                                
                                
     
     Sharon Hughes Mendonca on brief pro se.
     David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Joan E.
Smiley, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Anthony W. Norwood, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for appellee.

December 30, 1999

                                
                                

            Per Curiam.  Petitioner Sharon Hughes Mendonca, on
  behalf of her husband Crisanto Mendonca (a citizen of Cape
  Verde), appeals from the denial of a petition under 28 U.S.C.
  § 2241 for habeas corpus relief.  Petitioner there sought to
  challenge a discretionary decision of the Board of Immigration
  Appeals (BIA) denying her husband's application for adjustment
  of status, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255; she also requested an order
  compelling his naturalization.  The district court dismissed
  for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Mendonca v. INS,
  52 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D. Mass. 1999).  
            With respect to the naturalization issue, we affirm
  substantially for the reasons recited by the district court. 
  See id. at 163-64.  With respect to the adjustment-of-status
  issue, we affirm on the merits.  Respondent is mistaken in
  asserting that § 309(c)(4)(E) of IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
  Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, divests the district court of
  habeas jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Requena-Rodriguez v.
  Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1999); Goncalves v.
  Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 120-21 (1st Cir. 1998) (construing §
  309(c)(4)(G)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999).  
            In turn, whether federal courts in such "transitional
  rules" cases possess residual jurisdiction under § 2241 to
  review discretionary determinations of the BIA is a question
  not subject to ready resolution.  See, e.g., id. at 125 n.17
  (noting, without addressing, argument from amici that "habeas
  jurisdiction also traditionally allowed review, under a
  'manifest abuse of discretion' standard, of the exercise of
  discretion to deny relief").  However, the question how far
  habeas jurisdiction extends is one of great practical
  importance, and there is no reason to address it in this case. 
  Even assuming that habeas jurisdiction does extend in this
  matter to abuses of discretion--and this is very much an
  arguendo assumption--there is nothing in this case that
  remotely suggests such an abuse by the BIA.  Accordingly,
  whatever the scope of habeas corpus, there is no basis for
  setting aside the BIA's refusal to adjust status.
            Our affirmance on this ground does not offend Steel
  Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
  We think that the question whether § 2241 encompasses such
  claims, rather than being jurisdictional in nature, instead
  goes to the merits.  "[T]he absence of a valid (as opposed to
  arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
  jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional
  power to adjudicate the case."  Id. at 89 (characterizing as
  non-jurisdictional the question whether a citizen-suit
  provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
  Act of 1986 permits suits for past violations); see also, e.g.,
  Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, ____, 1999 WL 969263, at *5-*6
  (10th Cir. 1999); Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Public
  Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 100 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1999).  
            Affirmed.