Court Opinion

ID: 9380659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 20:03:23.590093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.653298
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 200138-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/20/23. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-20-0138
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                               not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                               under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Effingham County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 18-CF-360
                                          )
JACOB FAIRBANKS,                          )     Honorable
                                          )     Allan F. Lolie Jr.,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The defendant’s conviction is affirmed where the evidence presented at trial was
               not closely balanced, and, thus, the defendant cannot establish that the trial court’s
               failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)
               constituted plain error.

¶2       The defendant, Jacob Fairbanks, appeals his conviction for possession of cannabis with

intent to deliver. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to ensure that

the jurors understood the four principles embodied in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July

1, 2012). The defendant acknowledges that counsel did not object to the trial court’s questioning

of the jurors, nor did counsel preserve the error in a posttrial motion, and thus, has forfeited this

issue on appeal. The defendant, however, urges us to review this claim under the plain-error

doctrine. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                                                  1
¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The defendant was charged by indictment with one count of possession of cannabis with

intent to deliver more than 10 grams, but not more than 30 grams, of cannabis, in violation of

section 5(c) of the Cannabis Control Act (Act) (720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 2018)). A jury trial was

conducted on January 27 and 28, 2020, and the defendant was ultimately found guilty. During

voir dire, the trial court questioned a panel of 24 potential jurors regarding the four principles

enumerated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). The trial court specifically

stated each of the four principles to the entire panel. The trial court then questioned each potential

juror individually asking first if they heard the four principles, to which all stated “yes.” During

the trial court’s individual questioning, it asked two potential jurors if they agreed with and

accepted the four principles as true, and then asked the remaining 22 potential jurors if they

accepted the principles as true. Each potential juror indicated “yes.” From the first panel of 24

potential jurors, 12 were chosen to serve on the jury.

¶5     The trial court then questioned a second panel of 12 potential jurors to obtain an alternate

juror. The trial court again specifically stated each of the four principles to the entire panel. The

trial court then questioned each potential juror individually asking first if they heard the four

principles, to which all stated “yes.” During the trial court’s individual questioning, it asked one

potential juror if she agreed that the four principles were true and then asked the remaining 11

potential jurors if they accepted the principles as true. Again, each potential juror indicated “yes.”

From the second panel of 12 potential jurors, an alternate was chosen.

¶6     The defendant’s jury trial continued with testimony presented by five witnesses. Gina

Griffis testified that on September 19, 2018, she and an acquaintance met with the defendant at the

Crossroads Bank’s parking lot in Effingham, Illinois, to purchase cannabis from the defendant.

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Griffis stated that she knew the defendant as “Banks” from working with him in the past. Griffis

purchased cannabis from the defendant, but could not remember the amount, only that she gave

the defendant $20 for the cannabis. Griffis testified that after she purchased the cannabis, a police

officer pulled into the parking lot as Griffis was pulling out. According to Griffis, the police officer

followed her for a couple of blocks and then stopped her vehicle. The police officer asked Griffis

what she was doing, and she told the officer that she owed the defendant some money. Griffis

testified that she did not owe the defendant any money, but that she told the officer that she did

because she knew the officer would find the cannabis. Griffis testified that she did not want to tell

the officer where she got the cannabis or what she was doing. On cross-examination, Griffis stated

that she believed that she had contacted the defendant to purchase the cannabis. On redirect

examination, Griffis reiterated that she did not know how much cannabis she purchased from the

defendant, but assumed it was approximately one gram.

¶7     Effingham police officer Daniel Dust then testified that at approximately 1:51 p.m. on

September 19, 2018, he responded to the parking lot of Crossroads Bank in Effingham, Illinois,

after receiving a report of suspicious activity involving an orange pickup truck. As Officer Dust

was pulling into the south entrance to the bank, he observed an orange truck preparing to leave the

parking lot from the north exit. Upon his arrival, Officer Dust observed a pedestrian near the truck

walking on the south end of the bank. According to Officer Dust, he was able to recognize and

identify the pedestrian as the defendant from Officer Dust’s prior contact with the defendant earlier

that day. Officer Dust stated that he followed the truck in an attempt to initiate a traffic stop. He

observed the driver commit a turn signal violation, stopped the truck, and approached its driver’s

side. Officer Dust identified the driver as Gina Griffis. According to Officer Dust, Griffis showed

signs of nervousness, which to him was an indication of suspicious activity. Based upon Griffis’s

                                                   3
behavior, Officer Dust requested Effingham Police Lieutenant Andy Warner1 to bring his K-9

partner, Narco, to the scene to perform a K-9 free air search. While waiting for Lieutenant Warner

to arrive, Officer Dust began completing a written warning for Griffis. Lieutenant Warner arrived

at the scene and the K-9 performed the free air search, with the K-9 eventually alerting on the

truck. Officer Dust acknowledged that he did not conduct the K-9 free air search, since he was not

trained to use the K-9 partner.

¶8      After the K-9 alerted on the truck, Officer Dust and Lieutenant Warner searched the truck

and located a backpack in the rear toolbox in the truck. The backpack was then searched, and two

small bags of cannabis were found, which Officer Dust identified as People’s Exhibit 1. Officer

Dust testified that after finding the cannabis, he, Lieutenant Warner, Effingham police detective

Andy Meyers, and Effingham police officer Jake Lustig went to the defendant’s residence,

expecting to find him there based on Officer Dust’s prior knowledge of the defendant. According

to Officer Dust, the defendant’s residence was located directly across the street from the

Crossroads Bank. Officer Dust stated that the defendant’s residence was only three to five blocks

aways from the location where he had stopped Griffis’s truck.

¶9      Officer Dust testified that he knocked on the residence door but could not remember who

answered the door. He was able to determine that the defendant and another individual were in the

residence, and then the defendant exited the residence. Officer Dust placed the defendant under

arrest based upon the information Officer Dust received during the traffic stop of the truck.

According to Officer Dust, the defendant was placed in Officer Dust’s squad car, and he observed

the other three officers conduct a search of the residence. After the search, Officer Dust was

        1
          At the time of the initial traffic stop, Lieutenant Warner held the rank of sergeant and Officer Dust
referred to Lieutenant Warner and “Sergeant Warner” in Officer Dust’s testimony.
                                                      4
provided a box containing a scale and a quantity of cannabis in a plastic bag, which Officer Dust

identified as People’s Exhibit 2. Once he returned to the police station, Officer Dust weighed the

cannabis located in the defendant’s residence, which weighed 30 grams. Officer Dust then

identified People’s Exhibit 3 as the scale located in the defendant’s residence. On cross-

examination, Officer Dust acknowledged that the defendant consented to the search of his

residence and volunteered the location where the cannabis would be found.

¶ 10   Joshua Sterns then testified that he was employed with the Illinois State Police in its

Forensic Science Laboratory in Springfield, Illinois. Mr. Sterns was certified as an expert in the

field of forensic science. Mr. Sterns identified People’s Exhibits 1 and 2, and testified regarding

the testing procedures he performed on both exhibits. According to Mr. Sterns, he tested the

substances found in both exhibits, which all tested positive for cannabis. Mr. Sterns also weighed

the cannabis in the two plastic baggies in People’s Exhibit 1, with the cannabis weighing 3.117

grams in total, and the cannabis in the plastic bag in People’s Exhibit 2, with the cannabis weighing

23.816 grams.

¶ 11   Effingham Police Lieutenant Warner testified that on September 19, 2018, he was a

sergeant with the Effingham police and a K-9 handler of his dog, Narco. Lieutenant Warner stated

that at approximately 2 p.m. on September 19, 2018, he responded to the traffic stop of an orange

pickup truck being conducted by Officer Dust. Lieutenant Warner stated that since he had the K-

9, he was routinely asked to “back up” traffic stops. Upon arriving, Lieutenant Warner spoke with

Officer Dust who requested a K-9 sniff test. Lieutenant Warner described how a K-9 sniff test is

performed, the specific training he received with Narco, and his training in narcotics investigations

overall. Turning to the instant traffic stop, Lieutenant Warner testified that he deployed Narco on

the truck and observed Narco’s behavior during the sniff test process. Lieutenant Warner stated

                                                 5
that, ultimately, Narco gave a “final response,” indicating the presence of a narcotic. According to

Lieutenant Warner, Narco gave his “final response” to the backpack located in the toolbox of the

truck.

¶ 12     Lieutenant Warner then notified the other officers present, and they began a search of the

truck. According to Lieutenant Warner, he searched the backpack first and found two clear plastic

baggies containing a green leafy substance, which he believed to be cannabis. Lieutenant Warner

then identified People’s Exhibit 1 as being the two small plastic baggies of cannabis found in the

backpack. Lieutenant Warner continued by stating that he and the other officers then traveled to

the defendant’s residence where another individual answered the door, and the defendant came to

the door and then outside. Lieutenant Warner confirmed that Officer Dust placed the defendant

under arrest and placed him in custody. According to Lieutenant Warner, he believed Detective

Meyers requested permission from the defendant to search the residence, but that Lieutenant

Warner was not present at that conversation.

¶ 13     Lieutenant Warner testified that he searched the residence, and in a hallway cupboard, he

located a wooden box that contained a “larger, clear plastic bag, like Ziploc style bag” that

contained a green leafy substance and a scale. Lieutenant Warner testified that, based upon his

narcotics training, he believed the delivery of cannabis was being done at the residence. Lieutenant

Warner based his belief on several factors, such as the presence of the cannabis and the scale being

in close proximity, which he explained indicated the sale of cannabis because the scale would be

used to take the cannabis from the large bag and make it into smaller bags for sale. Lieutenant

Warner added that the scale was not big enough to weigh the large bag of cannabis. Further,

Lieutenant Warner stated that the total weight amount of the cannabis being 30 grams could be

indicative of sales rather than personal use. According to Lieutenant Warner, it would take a long

                                                 6
period of time to use such a large amount of cannabis for personal use because the cannabis would

tend to “be stale or have a shelf life.” Further, Lieutenant Warner testified that based upon his

experience, the amount of cannabis found in the defendant’s residence was not consistent with

someone who only possessed cannabis for personal use. Usually, according to Lieutenant Warner,

the amount for personal use would be “a much smaller amount like we found at the traffic stop.”

Lieutenant Warner stated various factors in support of his opinion, such as the costs of the

cannabis, the difficulty of carry around such a large amount of cannabis if a person was only using

a small amount, and the possibility the cannabis would start to age and lose its potency.

¶ 14    Lieutenant Warner then identified People’s Exhibit 2 as the large bag of cannabis found in

the defendant’s residence. According to Lieutenant Warner, after he located the large bag of

cannabis, he spoke with the defendant who claimed ownership of the items located in the wooden

box being the cannabis and scale. Lieutenant Warner then identified People’s Exhibit 3 as the scale

located in the wooden box. He further testified that although he never had the opportunity to test

the scale at the time of the defendant’s arrest, Lieutenant Warner did observe cannabis residue on

the scale.

¶ 15    Effingham Police Narcotics Detective Meyers was the last witness to testify and described

his training and duties as a narcotics detective. Detective Meyers stated that on September 19,

2018, he responded to the traffic stop being conducted by Officer Dust and Lieutenant Warner.

Detective Meyers observed the K-9 performing the free air sniff and then the search of the truck

being executed. Detective Meyers stated that he personally observed the two bags of suspected

cannabis that were located during the search. Detective Meyers continued, testifying that he had a

conversation with Gina Griffis, and based upon that conversation, he and the other officers formed

a plan to meet at the defendant’s residence. According to Detective Meyers, the officers expected

                                                7
to find the defendant at the residence, and Detective Meyers had seen the defendant earlier that

day. Detective Meyers also confirmed that the defendant’s residence was located directly across

the street from Crossroads Bank.

¶ 16   Detective Meyers then testified that upon reaching the residence, the defendant was placed

into custody, and that the defendant gave Detective Meyers consent to search the defendant’s

residence and personal belongings. During the search, a box was located, and a larger bag of

cannabis and a digital scale were found in the box. According to Detective Meyers, based upon his

training and experience, this indicated the sale of cannabis rather than for personal use. Detective

Meyers explained that, with regard to the scales: “Usually drug dealers will weigh out the amount

to make sure that they are not giving the buyer over or under what the agreed amount was.”

Detective Meyers further opined that the amount of cannabis found was not indicative of personal

use, due to his experience with people “that they can be in possession of anywhere from 2.5, maybe

even up to 5 grams of cannabis is the normal personal use that I’ve seen.” Detective Meyers

identified People’s Exhibit 1 as the two bags of cannabis recovered during Griffis’s traffic stop

and People’s Exhibit 2 as the large bag of cannabis recovered from the defendant’s residence.

Detective Meyers then testified regarding the coloration of the cannabis at the time of trial as being

a “brownish yellowish color,” indicating it was dried out and aged, rather than fresh.

¶ 17   The State rested its case-in-chief and the defendant moved for a directed verdict, which

was denied by the trial court. After being properly admonished by the trial court and conferring

with counsel, the defendant did not present any testimony or evidence. Counsel gave closing

arguments to the jury and the trial court gave its instructions to the jury. After deliberations, the

jury found the defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver cannabis. The trial court

subsequently sentenced the defendant to two years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of

                                                  8
Corrections with a mandatory supervised release term of one year. The defendant filed a posttrial

motion to reconsider on February 26, 2020. The defendant’s posttrial motion did not contain an

alleged error regarding the claim on appeal. This appeal followed.

¶ 18                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19   The defendant’s only contention on appeal centers on the trial court’s questioning of the

prospective jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Rule 431(b)

ensures a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury is realized. People v. Westfall, 2018 IL App

(4th) 150997, ¶ 78. The rule requires trial courts to question jurors about their understanding and

acceptance of four basic principles of law known as the Zehr principles (see People v. Zehr, 103

Ill. 2d 472 (1984)). Those principles are that (1) the defendant is presumed innocent, a presumption

that stays with him throughout the proceedings; (2) the State is required to prove the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the defendant is not required to prove his innocence; and

(4) the defendant is not required to testify and, if he chooses not to do so, jurors may not draw any

negative inferences from this fact. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 606 (2010) (citing Ill. S.

Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)); see also Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. The trial court is required to

give all prospective jurors an opportunity to indicate whether they both understand and accept each

of these four principles. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 607. While Rule 431(b) does not specify the

manner in which jurors must be asked whether they understand and accept the four principles, it is

clear that jurors must be asked those two simple questions: “do you understand” and “do you

accept.” People v. Stevens, 2018 IL App (4th) 160138, ¶ 26. Review of compliance with Rule

431(b) is a purely legal question, subject to de novo review by this court. People v. Belknap, 2014

IL 117094, ¶ 41.

                                                 9
¶ 20     In this case, the trial court recited all four principles to the entire panel of prospective jurors

and then individually questioned each prospective juror. The trial court asked each potential juror

if they heard the four principles, to which all stated “yes.” During the trial court’s individual

questioning, it asked two potential jurors if they agreed with and accepted the four principles as

true, one potential juror if she agreed that the four principles were true, and the remaining 33

potential jurors if they accepted the principles as true. Each potential juror indicated “yes.”

However, the trial court did not ask any of the jurors whether they understood the Zehr principles.

Thus, there is no dispute that the court did not fully comply with Rule 431(b). See People v.

Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 32 (the trial court’s failure to ask jurors if they understood the four

Zehr principles is error in and of itself). The defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited appellate

review of this claim by failing to object during voir dire or preserve the error in a posttrial motion.

See Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 47. The defendant asks this court to review his claim pursuant to

the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 21     To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged

error in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Here, the defendant

did not object to the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 431(b) or include that issue in his

posttrial motion. Accordingly, we agree that the defendant has forfeited appellate review of his

claim.

¶ 22     The plain-error doctrine, however, allows a court of review to consider unpreserved claims

of error in specific circumstances. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2010). We will apply the

plain-error doctrine when a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) the evidence was so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless

of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so fundamental that it undermined the fairness of

                                                    10
the defendant’s trial and threatened the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the strength

of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). The first step of plain-error

review is determining whether any error occurred. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124-25

(2009). Here, we have already concluded that the trial court erred in violating Rule 431(b) by

failing to inquire whether the jurors understood the Zehr principles.

¶ 23      In plain-error review, the burden of persuasion rests with the defendant. People v.

McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 (2009). The defendant argues the evidence in this case was closely

balanced and, therefore, plain-error review is appropriate under the first prong of the plain-error

analysis. We disagree.

¶ 24      Under first-prong plain error, a reviewing court must decide whether the defendant has

shown that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the

scales of justice. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51. To determine whether the evidence at

trial was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a

“qualitative, commonsense assessment” of it. Id. ¶ 53. That inquiry “involves an assessment of the

evidence on the elements of the charged offense or offenses, along with any evidence regarding

the witnesses’ credibility.” Id. Considering whether evidence is closely balanced does not involve

the sufficiency of the close evidence but, rather, the closeness of sufficient evidence. Id. ¶ 60.

¶ 25      Here, the defendant was charged with possession of more than 10 grams, but less than 30

grams, of cannabis with intent to deliver, pursuant to section 5(c) of the Act. 720 ILCS 550/5(c)

(West 2018). The statute required the State to prove three elements: (1) that the drugs were in the

defendant’s immediate possession or control, (2) that the defendant knew that they were present,

and (3) that the defendant intended to deliver them. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407

(1995).

                                                 11
¶ 26   In support of his assertion that the evidence in this case was closely balanced, the defendant

argues that the jury could have reasonably found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that

the defendant intended to deliver the cannabis found inside the residence. Intent to deliver is

necessarily proved by circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable inference of intent to deliver

narcotics arises from the possession of contraband in excess of any amount that could be designed

for personal use. Id. at 408. Other relevant factors include the defendant’s possession of weapons,

large amounts of cash, beepers, cellular telephones, and drug paraphernalia. Id.

¶ 27   The defendant argues that there was minimal circumstantial evidence to show that he

possessed cannabis with the intent to deliver. The defendant argues that the earlier sale of three

grams of cannabis to Gina Griffis was the only evidence that indicated that the defendant “may

have” intended to deliver the cannabis found inside his residence.

¶ 28   The defendant argues that the testimony of Detective Meyers and Lieutenant Warner, that

the amount of cannabis found in the defendant’s residence was more consistent with the sale of

rather than the personal use of cannabis, was inaccurate. The defendant claims that neither witness

testified regarding how much cannabis could be consumed by a frequent cannabis user. In further

support of his claim, the defendant argues that this court has recognized that more than 30 grams

of cannabis is consistent with personal use. See People v. McCarty, 356 Ill. App. 3d 552, 565-66

(2005) (more than 30 grams of marijuana, standing alone, “could arguably represent several

weeks’ worth of a personal supply for a frequent user”). Further, the defendant argues that it is

now legal for any individual over the age of 21 years old to possess up to 30 grams of cannabis, a

legal recognition that this amount is consistent with personal use. See 410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)(1),

10-10(a)(1) (West 2020).

                                                12
¶ 29   The defendant also argues that the “presence of the scale did not add enough probative

value to the question of [the defendant’s] intent to deliver.” According to the defendant, even

“[s]omeone who buys cannabis for his own use, without any intent to deliver, may be just as likely

to possess a scale in order to make sure he has not been shorted by a dealer.” See People v. Warren,

2016 IL App (4th) 120721-B, ¶ 31 (noting officer’s testimony that some drug users use scales to

avoid getting “shorted”). The defendant points out that there was no proof the scale was in

functioning condition and, importantly, no other indicia of intent to deliver was found inside the

defendant’s residence, such as other packaging materials, cash, guns, or police scanners. The

defendant asserts that based on the scarce amount of evidence found at the defendant’s residence,

the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant’s earlier sale to Gina Griffis was a

“one-off transaction with an old friend, and that the cannabis in the residence was not meant to be

delivered.”

¶ 30   The State argues that although the defendant attempts to provide an “innocent explanation”

to the elements of the State’s case, the defendant’s explanations are speculative and not based on

the evidence presented at trial. The State points out that this court has also described just over 28

grams of cannabis as a “hefty quantity”; however, we note that the court acknowledged in the same

case that such quantity could arguably represent several weeks’ worth of a personal supply for a

frequent user. McCarty, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 566. Further, the State cites to another case where the

possession of just over 28 grams of cannabis, in combination with expert testimony that the amount

was 14 times larger than a typical amount for personal use and the fact that the defendant “carried

no paraphernalia for personal use of the drugs,” provided the jury with a sufficient basis to find

the intent to deliver. See People v. Blan, 392 Ill. App. 3d 453, 457-58 (2009).

                                                 13
¶ 31   The State directs this court to the testimony that the defendant possessed 23.8 grams of

cannabis and sold 3.1 grams of cannabis to Gina Griffis. Further, the testimony of Lieutenant

Warner and Detective Meyers, in which they opined that the quantity of cannabis found in the

defendant’s residence was indicative of the sale, rather than personal use, of cannabis. The State

refutes the defendant’s contention that the large amount of cannabis found in his residence could

be consistent with the personal use of a frequent cannabis user, pointing out that no evidence was

presented that the defendant even used cannabis, let alone supported him being a frequent user.

Regarding the scale found with the large bag of cannabis, the State argues that the scale had what

appeared to be cannabis residue on it. The State also cites to the testimony of Lieutenant Warner,

who stated that the scale was not big enough to weigh the large bag of cannabis, and the testimony

of Detective Meyers that “drug dealers will weigh out the amount to make sure that they are not

giving the buyer over or under what the agreed amount was.”

¶ 32   The State urges this court to reject the defendant’s reliance on Warren, 2016 IL App (4th)

120721-B, for the proposition that those personally using “may be just as likely to possess a scale

in order to make sure he has not been shorted by a dealer.” The State argues that no such similar

testimony was presented in the instant case. In further support if this argument, the State argues

that the scale was probative of intent to deliver, despite there being no evidence presented that the

scale was functioning properly. The State argues that Lieutenant Warner’s testimony was that there

was cannabis residue on the small scale that was located with the large bag of cannabis. Finally,

the State argues that the defendant’s prior sale of three grams of cannabis to Gina Griffis is

probative of the defendant’s “intent to distribute it” and “his ongoing business of selling it.” See

People v. LeCour, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1009 (1995). The State directs this court to consider the

                                                 14
evidence presented that directly refutes the defendant’s contention that his sale of cannabis to Gina

Griffis was a “one-off transaction with an old friend.”

¶ 33   We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments and agree with the State. There was

no evidence at trial that the defendant used, let alone was a heavy user of cannabis, to counter the

State’s evidence that the large amount of cannabis recovered was for distribution. There was also

no evidence that Griffis was “an old friend” of the defendant. Although the defendant now argues

these points on appeal, these arguments are not supported by the testimony at trial. Because we do

not find the evidence to be so closely balanced that the Rule 431(b) error severely threatened to

tip the scales of justice against the defendant, we decline to consider the defendant’s claim under

the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 34   Finally, although we have not found plain error in this matter, we encourage the trial courts

to use the express terms enumerated in Rule 431(b) and remind the trial courts to question potential

jurors whether they “understand” and “accept” the four principles of Rule 431(b).

¶ 35                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

¶ 37   Affirmed.

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