Court Opinion

ID: 9602133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:03.784334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.031160
License: Public Domain

Hall, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially in Division 2.
The question here is whether the statement made by the defendant to his probation officer was inadmissible as a product of custodial interrogation without the prior warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. *215436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974). See Biddy v. State, 127 Ga. App. 212 (193 SE2d 31) on a statement made to a warden.
It is undisputed that the statement was a product of custodial interrogation. The Miranda decision places a duty upon the parole officers of a state, when they are investigating the commission of a fresh or new felony by a parolee, to comply with the mandate in Miranda, if the incriminating statements that they elicit from a parolee are to be admissible as evidence in the prosecution of a new offense. State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579 (442 P2d 11); 31 ALR3d 565, 673. It must be remembered that a probation officer is a law enforcement officer in Georgia with arrest powers. Code Ann. § 27-2713.
The search and arrest took place on May 30, 1973. An officer testified that defendant "was advised of his rights” when he was arrested. The probation officer testified that "after [defendant] was arrested, I went to the jail and talked to him for the purpose of obtaining the circumstances of his arrest.” The date of the custodial interrogation is not shown in the transcript.
To the best of my knowledge, neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court, has ever taken the position that the desire of a guilty man to confess his crime should be stifled, impeded, discouraged or hindered in any way. Nevertheless, it is important that the prosecution should use caution in reference to the testimony of probation officers in instances like the present case. Overkill can produce unnecessary error.