Court Opinion

ID: 9703405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:54:46.63519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.658938
License: Public Domain

BOIS, J.,
dissenting:
The sixth amendment guarantee of a right to speedy trial is a relative one depending on the circumstances of each case and is to be tempered by the interests of public justice. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), provided guidance for assessing what delay is impermissible in criminal cases. Four criteria for evaluating whether the guarantees were violated were identified therein, but specific time limits were neither required nor provided for. The Court found “no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.” Id. at 523. It further found that none of the criteria identified were either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a *968deprivation of the right of a speedy trial, but rather that they were merely related facts to be considered with all other relevant circumstances. The conclusion was drawn that “courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id. at 533.
Article 14, part 1 of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial. However, the right is one to “orderly expedition and not mere speed.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), quoted in State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 412, 260 A.2d 547, 554 (1969), reversed on other grounds, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). A majority of the court has recognized that this right is “necessarily relative and must be considered with regard to the practical administration of justice” and if a case is disposed of according to the prevailing proceedings of law free from arbitrary, vexatious and oppressive delays, it is considered to be in accordance with such a constitutional requirement. State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 830, 395 A.2d 189, 190 (1978); State v. Blake, 113 N.H. 115, 121-22, 305 A.2d 300-05 (1973); Riendeau v. Milford Municipal Court, 104 N.H. 33, 34-35, 177 A.2d 396, 398 (1962).
Even though Barker v. Wingo prescribes “flexible” standards based on practical considerations, the thrust of legislation, rules, and court decisions, in enacting or recommending specific time limits has been to focus on the rights of defendants and largely ignore the “practical administration of justice” and the protection of the public interest.
Considering all of the facts in the instant case, weighing defendant’s case history, and then applying the balancing test to protect the rights of the defendant while maintaining a responsive posture toward public concern, I would hold that defendant was not denied the right to a speedy trial.