Court Opinion

ID: 9476024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:46:16.306579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:05.916637
License: Public Domain

ERVIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached in this case. I write separately, however, to express my concern about one facet of the decision, the construction of “claim” under § 287 of the False Claims Act. The attempt to define a “claim” in Part II of the opinion seems both unnecessary and inaccurate. The erroneous jury instructions are dispositive of Duncan’s appeal; we need not assume the troublesome task of defining a “claim” under § 287.
The opinion assumes this task and provides a view of “claim” which I do not share. My reading of the cases convinces me that “claim” enjoys a more restrictive reading in the False Claims Act than the opinion indicates. Especially compelling are cases on the civil analog to § 287, 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The initial False Claims Act had both criminal provisions, R.S. § 3490 (1874), and civil provisions, R.S. § 5438 (1874), so comparisons between the two seem appropriate. See United States v. Winchester, 407 F.Supp. 261, 271-72 (D.Del.1975). These cases suggest that only actions causing the government to pay out money are claims within the False Claims Act. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599, 78 S.Ct. 950, 952, 2 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1958) (test is whether the government suffers “immediate financial detriment”). Where the defendant simply tries to reduce his accountability to the government, this does not constitute a “claim” under the statute. See, e.g., Black Prince Distillery, Inc. v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 1169 (D.N.J.1984) (taxpayér’s effort to reduce tax liability is not a “claim” under the False Claims Act).
Here, the receipts Duncan submitted, including his airline ticket voucher, would merely reduce his accountability or liability for the funds advanced him by the Army. The fact that the government “potentially suffers a monetary loss,” as the opinion states, does not seem to satisfy the “immediate financial detriment” test in McNinch. Moreover, the opinion’s assertion that, if a different structure was employed and Duncan had submitted a voucher for “reimbursement,” this would constitute a “claim” is precisely the point, but the opinion takes only the first half of it. In my view, the cases indicate that the structure is crucial in determining whether or not a “claim” is made upon the government. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 231-33, 88 S.Ct. 959, 961-62, 19 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1968); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542-44, 63 S.Ct. 379, 383-84, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1942). *157Since Duncan did not seek a reimbursement, he did not make a “claim” within the False Claims Act.