Court Opinion

ID: 9846897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:15.141479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:56.815491
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with Mr. Justice Tuckett’s dissent here, and with everything he said in the previous case.1 What he said inoculates logic and enunciation of sound legal principles against the pronouncements of the dissenters in the previous case and the depar*304ture therefrom of the new judge appointed to replace one of the members of the majority in the former opinion. Apparently the latter was impelled to refrain from participation in this fatuous case, blown out of all proportion by editorial policy and local TV facility during the pendency of this case, — of questionable journalistic propriety in my opinion.
From John Zenger and before, history has convinced me of the necessity for freedom of speech and the press, without which a republic would be meaningless. This freedom includes criticism of what I do or say, — which are facts, — and which facts are the tools that keep the presses oiled and rolling. But I believe even John Zenger would not have claimed a privilege to editorialize in an effort to influence a jury before its deliberations were finalized and before' the announcement of its verdict. But that is what appears to have happened in the instant case, where editors appear to have proselyted the public and apparently' s'ome 'of the members of this court by praising the wisdom of the dissenters, — and condemning the majority as having less than adequate legal qualification, and at least of possessing judgment of questionable or immoral propensities, — for some reason locked in the editors’ bosoms, — whether to sell papers, or simply demonstrate that the press has sufficient power, (and the last word in rebuttal) 'to'mold the will of-the judiciary, —I don’t know. -Whether right or wrong, there are they who will say, “That’s what happened in this case.”
The two dissenters in the former case cast their lot entirely under Title 10-8-41, U.C.A.1953. The author of the opinion in the present case pays no attention to those votes, but bases his conclusion entirely on Title 10-8-84, U.C.A.1953, and does not assign 10-8-41 as a basis for his conclusion. It would seem to me that this new departure amounts to a dissent from the dissenters. Under such circumstances it seems to be sort of an affirmance, not reversal of the former case.
It was no source of great comfort to me to see in print, going out to thousands of readers, while this case still was pending, a rather cheap cartoon, libelous in nature, depicting a couple of fag-fuming females, ladies of the pavement, as it were, grinning at a book labeled “Supreme Court Decision — Prostitution No Crime In Utah,” with a headline saying, “I’ll say this for the Supreme Court — they make a girl feel like a lady.” Nor did it make my day any brighter when this same newspaper, before this case finally was decided, editorialized that, “It is obvious that the Supreme Court erred' in this case,” that the opinion was “ill-advised,” that “To wipe away all such local ordinances, as the Supreme Court has wiped away local prostitution, would result in chaos,” (which obviously is an inaccurate statement, as Mr. Justice Tuckett’s opinion clearly demonstrates), and to be sufficient*305ly omniscient as to say, “We have confidence they (the majority) are big enough men to acknowledge the possibility of error-' and to give this matter another loolc,” and then to hammer the last nails, so to speak, into the hands of the triumvirate of the majority, to further editorialize that, “The Supreme Court is nozo reconsidering Us decision. Hopefully, it will reverse itself.” Fait accompli, and touche. (Emphasis added.)
Now, sending the printer’s devil home, let’s take a look at the facts and law in this case: In the former case Mr. Justice Tuck-ett simply said what every lawyer should know, that cities cannot exercise powers not delegated to them by the state or its constitution. He just as soundly and fundamentally said that the subject ordinance (32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power . not so delegated. So saying, he used what his critics, with some sort of apparent delight, considered to be a nasty, — or should I say “meretricious” word:2 “pre-empt.” I am convinced that under the authorities, the use of that word was accurate, albeit distasteful to some. Had he said that those powers not specifically delegated to cities are “reserved” to the state, the beehive probably would have been quiescent. Mr. Justice Tuckett then very carefully and just as judiciously pointed out that, notwithstanding the attempt of the City to exercise a power not delegated to it, nonetheless, and specifically, and under Titles 10-8-41 and 10-8-51, U.C.A.1953, it had plenary power and authority, respectively to: 1) suppress houses of ill repute for purposes of prostitution and 2) to provide for punishment of prostitutes. What more could a city ask for by way of coping with the pursuits of the oldest profession in the world? These rather extensive grants of power have persisted through the polygamy, “Commercial Street,” stockade and fancy hotel eras. I believe that if such existing ordinances were enforced with any degree of common sense, the situation effectively could be handled without resort to this “Johnnie-Come-Lately” (1963) vague, ambiguous, entrapment, pandering ordinance,3 undelegated to cities by the state.
*306The subject ordinance (32-2-1) riot only, is constitutionally unpalatable, but is such as. easily could lead to results antithetical to the laudable motives claimed for it.
It is unconstitutional because, as Mr. Justice Tuckett so clearly stated in his opinion, the authority sought to be employed, —that of punishing pandering (76-53-8) and profiting from earnings of fallen women (76-53-10), has been “reserved” to the state, or “pre-empted” by the state, whichever synonym one cares to employ. There is great wisdom displayed on the part of the legislature in reserving such power to the state, since the violation of either of the chapters cited above, is a felony, and respectively calls for up to 20 years in prison, for pandering, and from two to 20 years in prison for profiting by the earnings of fallen women, where, among other things, the malefactor is subject to 20 years’ irriprisonment for “keep[ing] a list of female persons to call or to be called for the purpose of prostitution.” This is exactly what this ordinance, the destruction of which worries Justices Ellett, Crockett, and now Judge Cowley, and some editors, proposes to do, with but a small fine or jail sentence. It would occur to me that Mr. Justice Ellett’s comment in his dissent in the former case that “I cannot think of a better way to prohibit the keeping of disorderly houses than to dry up the sources of revenue” (under the ordinance, 32-2-1, which is a misdemeanor ordinance), better would have been employed in a concurrence with Mr. Justice Tuckett.
I can think of a much better way to dry up the source of revenue, and that is to dry up the true source of revenue, i. e., panderers and those profiting by the earnings of fallen women, by prosecuting them, not under a misdemeanor ordinance, such as 32-2-1 calling for a small fine or jail sentence, bat under state statutes 76-53-8 and/or 76-53-10, calling for up to 20 years. If such procedure under the state statutes were effectively employed and those statutes enforced, my humble prognostication is that the source of revenue would dry “up” in a jet plane, and there would be an exodus post haste of procurers and their charges, that the majority of this court appears to have been charged editorially by word and cartoon of seeking to “court.”
It seems perfectly sensible to me that the legislature should authorize cities 1) to suppress houses of ill repute (10 — 8—41. U. C.A.) and 2) punish prostitutes, (10-8-51) under misdemeanor penalties, reserving to the state the authority to punish as felony, with a greater penalty, the much more *307heinous crimes of encouraging and imprisoning women for sex purposes, and taking a cut in the take. It seems that this is the very reason why the state also reserved authority to punish more severely than would he the case of a misdemeanor, the crimes of adultery (76-53-2, U.C.A.), incest (76-53-4), placing one’s wife in a house of prostitution (76-53-9), detaining a female in a house of prostitution for debts incurred (76-53-11), transporting females for prostitution (76-53-12), and sodomy (76-53-22). Others could be enumerated. If Mr. Justice Tuckett’s opinion be “unrea-son,” then give me liberty or give me death, — or a Linotype machine.
The ordinance is so vague as to have led the drafters of its successor to use the word “meritorious” rather than “meretricious.” I would appreciate it if someone could tell the average legendary “reasonable, prudent man” when he has committed a “meretricious” act, — or “meritorious” act for that matter. “Meretricious” has so many synonymic or pseudonimic kinfolk as to make the word, if not understandable, at least misunderstandable. The venerable Webster, who did not edit the work now commercialized by use of his name, of course doesn’t know that “meretricious,” besides having to do with prostitution also is defined as “alluring with false show,” “gaudily and deceitfully ornamental” and “tawdry.” The miniskirt ór bikini might subject one to penalty as being “meretricious” 'by some judge or jury that thinks the wearer didn’t hew to the hemline. The same line of reasoning could attach to “lewd,” as generalized in the ordinance, which may be characterized by some to apply to the bikini or miniskirt, but by others as a simple, artistic modeling of the body beautiful. The Venus de Milo, if living, could get a few months in jail and a fine under this fine ordinance in displaying her armless or harmless self for the sculptor who fashioned her. Who knows what is meretricious under this ordinance, — the saint or the sinner? I have never heard of a church organist being prosecuted for an ogle-eyed stare, with a suggestive nod of the head directed toward the vicar.
. The payoff comes in subsection 8 of the ordinance, which makes it a crime to “aid, abet, allow, permit, or participate in the commission of any of the acts prohibited in subsections one through seven above.” Under this subsection, let the person beware who is asked, “Where can I get a girl,” (or for that matter, a call-girl) who responds by saying, “See the taxi driver, the bellhop, the bartender, the upstairs maid, or somebody, — I’m not sure.” Let him who knows that somebody seeks in the way of female companionship “refuse” to prevent the latter from doing so or even “Allow” him to do it. He would be guilty under the vagaries of this unnecessary ordinance, which appears to me to be an excrescence on reasonable law enforcement. *308He would be guilty if he “permitted” one to go to a place of ill repute, under this ordinance. Surely there must be something in the English language that could tell a reasonable person what, if he did it, could toss him in jail, more sensibly than this, and I repeat, fatuous ordinance.
Under this ordinance, with its loose, ambiguous language, there is no reason why the police officer here, the real solicitor of the infoi-mation, should not be charged and convicted first, since he most certainly “aided and abetted” before Allred did, and who solicited nothing. In the officer’s solicitation of Allred for information about some “lewd woman” or “meretricious” female who has not been shown to be lewd, meretricious or solicitous herself, is nothing short of entrapment, — with the wrong punishee, — the person who gave the information that presumably would help the officer to help punish prostitutes, — an informant’s tip,- — which informant now knows that he or she will go to jail under this stupid ordinance rather than the person sought to be suppressed and punished, —the prostitute. Allred, cab drivers, bartenders, bellboys and even managers of the so-called “expensive hotels, apartments and motels,” being a possible fruitful source of information to peace officers, will, after the. approval of the ordinance by this court, clam up because the .solicitor for information may be a1 policeman and the solicitce will, take no chances on incarceration when .his so-called benefactor turns against him and in turn informs against the informer. This is a dandy way to justify Mr. Justice Ellett’s thesis of drying up the source of revenue. What this ordinance does is to ,idry up the source of information and increase the source of revenue. Why the present local police administrators, including the city commissioners, cannot see the practical aspects of this conclusion, I don’t know. The flowery words of counsel for those people in this case impress me not when they say, “It would appear too clear for argument that the spread of loathsome venereal diseases can in large measure he attributed to prostitution and sex acts for hire. The prohibition against the commission of an act of sexual intercourse for hire has the beneficial double effect of preventing both it * * * and the spread of communicable disease. (Emphasis added.) Let’s pass an ordinance against kissing. One will get that author five that there is a greater spread of venereal disease by copulation “for free” or “for free flower love” than there is “for hire,” — in some considerable measure contributed to by teenagers, in and out of high school, college-age students, old goats, bachelors, married persons, and even churchgoers. One will get him also five if he can demonstrate to me or anyone else that during the four or five-year life of the ordinance in question there was a reduction in the venereal rate in Salt Lake City. In the “yesteryear” he talks about, where he. says the houses of ill fame were “often protected by *309public officials,” I would like to know, not only which public officials, but what the statistics on the incidence of venereal disease show as compared to those during the period this ordinance has been in existence, and one will get him another five if he can show it to be greater during the “yesteryear” era. Now that this court has placed the stamp of approval on this ordinance, I expect to have the semantics of counsel for the City and the misnomered amicus curiae vindicated by a glowing report in this “tomorrow year” of a substantial reduction in that incidence, — not an increase in municipal revenue on account of the now respected ordinance and its virtue, — • or lack of it.
In passing I wish to comment on the “flower” reference of counsel for the rehearing people, who quoted me as saying, “In the nature of things I accept the decisions of the Supreme Court, but reserve the right, until bondage ‘pre-empts’ [emphasis added] it, to criticize them. I reserve to the citizens of my state the same privilege with respect to my opinions.” 4 This seems to have been meant as some sort of aspersion to what he thinks was a stupid concurrence with Mr. Justice Tuckett’s opinion. Be that as it may, I am prepared to and do affirm that quotation, with emphasis, — but I did not have in mind the situation where both the City’s counsel and the news media mentioned did the criticizing before the jury returned with its verdict.
This ordinance should be declared unconstitutional, with “hopeful” “confidence that they are big enough men to acknowledge the possibility of error, and to give this matter another look.” The two dissenters here have given the matter another look and do not intend to depart from our honest convictions.
In saying all this, I must conclude that I believe the editorials mentioned were not inspired of malice, and I am satisfied that those who penned them are honest people, dedicated to their profession, as are the participating lawyers in this case. I may be doing the same thing that I criticize others of doing. Candidly, nonetheless and may-hap erroneously, I lend some credence- to my belief that possibly there may be 1.) an impulse editorially to over-emphasize in a conceded sensitive area of law enforcement, and 2) the desire on our part to defend the integrity of this court, — whose record, I think will stand the test of public scrutiny. I haven’t cancelled my subscription and don’t intend to, and hope that others will not cancel their subscriptions to our decisions because of what we say, — and as for me, if this be “unreasonable, give the press liberty or death,” — or the not always pleasant chore in arriving at decisions we individually arrive at after an honest appraisal of the facts and the law thereto ap; plicable.
CALLISTER, J., not participating.

. It is interesting to note that, while this ease was still hanging fire, it was noted editorially that Salt Lake City had passed a new ordinance to cope with the “shameful parade”-of West 2d South prostitutes. It failed to point out in the editorial that the legal' draftsmen of the ordinance condemned the “meritorious” instead of “meretricious” display, — which lends some credence to the idea that the ordinance is yague, and that lawyers like many others, may not know the meaning- of the terms, or don’t know how to spell.

. It is interesting to note the zealous plea of counsel for the City that “The expensive hotels, apartments and motels have replaced the bawdy houses of assignation and houses of prostitution of yesteryear which were commonly known • and designated as such in restricted areas opten protected, by pziblic officials.” (Emphasis added.) One wonders why, having such information, the City Attorney doesn’t name these “expensive hotels, apartments and motels,” some of which are situated within the shadows *306of the temples, dust off existing ordinances, or pass one and prosecute them if they be guilty, as they did Allred, under the authority of Title 10-8-41 and 10-8-51, U.C.A.1953. Such gratuity on trie part of counsel for tlie City, is almost as profound a pronouncement stated in its brief that, “A male person is most definitely singular and incapable of being construed in • the plural sense.”

. State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240.