Court Opinion

ID: 9481471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:19:52.860621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:20.132618
License: Public Domain

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
My colleagues conclude that the district court erred (1) by excluding from evidence the government’s prior bill of particulars, and (2) by refusing to instruct the jury that it could consider the November trades in deciding who was responsible for the October trades. As will appear, I consider neither ruling of the district judge to be erroneous. Nor would I find reversible error among the defendants’ other contentions. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I find disturbing, however, the government’s concession at the oral argument of this appeal that it had made no posttrial inquiry regarding defendants’ assertion that James Melton committed perjury in his trial testimony. I will elaborate on this matter, because I believe it bears heavily on the government’s obligations with respect to any fourth trial of this indictment.
A. Admission of the Prior Bill.
In its first bill of particulars, the government identified, as part of the “series” of fraudulent and manipulative transactions alleged in the indictment, trades in Union Carbide stock on October 29 and 30 and November 6 and 7, 1986. Prior to commencement of the third trial, however, the government filed an amended bill that eliminated reference to the November trades. At that trial, defense counsel, in the course of cross-examination of Boyd Jeffries, sought a ruling on the admissibility of the original bill:
Mr. Levine: We would like to offer in evidence the amended bill of particulars and the original bill of particulars, and confront Mr. Jeffries with the fact —well, we want to be able to offer the original bill and the amended bill and use them for argument in the case.
The Court: For what purpose?
Mr. Levine: The principal purpose, your Honor, is that the bill of particulars takes a different position with respect to the purchases on the 6th and 7th than the government’s only witness who tells them about the purchases.
The Court: That may be so, but you are going to offer the bill of particulars to prove what?
Mr. Levine.- To prove that it was the government’s position that the purchases on the 6th and the 7th were not made at the direction of GAF and Mr. Sherwin as alleged originally in the indictment.
Counsel summarized the intended use of the bill as follows:
The particular importance here is that the government is taking the position in this trial not to charge the defendants with the November 6th and 7th purchases, relying on the same witnesses, the same testimony, and basically the same evidence that it did in the first and the *1265second trial. This is a retrial. We believe we are entitled to put before the jury the argument that they believe their witnesses less, that they are vouching less for their witnesses and that testimony by amending the bill of particulars. That is the argument we would like to make.
I cannot agree with my colleagues that the district judge abused her discretion by excluding the bill. The evidentiary worth of the bill was limited to the proposition, as argued by defense counsel, that the government no longer believed it could prove that the November trades were part of the manipulative scheme charged. In my view, the fact that the government once thought it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the November trades were part of a larger manipulative scheme bears little relevance to the question whether Sherwin and GAF instigated conceededly manipulative trading in October. Judge Altimari correctly observes that “[bjills of particulars are generally of minimal probative value, and will tend to confuse the issues and mislead the jury if admitted as evidence." This case is no exception. Further, as we said recently in United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1015 (2d Cir.1990):
[W]e recognize “the long held view of this Circuit that the trial judge is in the best position to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to admit certain evidence.” United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1232 (2d Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir.1982)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984). “Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial judge to admit or reject evidence will not be overturned by an appellate court.” Id. (citing Birney, 686 F.2d at 106).
The majority places primary reliance upon United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1984). In McKeon, defense counsel, during the opening statement at a criminal trial, declared that expert testimony would prove that crucial documents had not been prepared on a copying machine located at the bank where the defendant’s wife worked. At a retrial, however, counsel’s opening statement set forth a new version of the facts, explaining that the defendant had asked his wife to prepare the copies at the bank. We held that the altered version was fairly attributable to the defendant, 738 F.2d at 33-34, and that the trial court properly admitted at the later trial the contradictory promise of proof at the prior trial as “evidence of fabrication demonstrating consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 34.
I agree with my colleagues that, under McKeon, there is no per se rule against the admission of bills of particulars. Nonetheless, two of the three limits that McKeon articulated for the use of prior opening statements, see 738 F.2d at 33, weigh decidedly against admitting the bill in our case.
Most fundamentally, I do not see any “assertion of fact inconsistent with similar assertions in a subsequent trial,” McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33, in this case. McKeon involved an assertion at the first trial that certain documents had not been prepared on a certain copying machine, and a flatly contradictory declaration at the second trial that they had been so prepared. Here, by contrast, the government simply revised its theory regarding what it could establish, in terms of a series of fraudulent or manipulative transactions, by introducing substantially the same evidence at the third trial that it had utilized at the second trial. It also seems to me that this rationale is an “innocent explanation” within the meaning of the third McKeon requirement, 738 F.2d at 33.
McKeon posited these limitations because “the evidentiary use of prior jury argument must be circumscribed in order to avoid trenching upon other important policies.” Id. at 32. I see the same necessity regarding the evidentiary use of prior bills of particulars, and thus discern no reversible error in the district court’s ruling on this issue.
B. The Requested Instruction.
After the government’s rebuttal summation, the defendants asked for, and were denied, an instruction that the jurors “may *1266consider the evidence of the November purchases in reaching [their] conclusion as to who was responsible for the October purchases of Union Carbide.” This request responded to the government’s characterization of the defense closing arguments premised upon the November trades as a “smokescreen.”
The defense theory was that Jeffries & Company manipulated the price of Union Carbide stock on its own initiative, and for its own purposes, in both October and November. Essentially, the government argued in rebuttal that defense counsel was seeking to draw attention away from the proof of criminality in October by emphasizing the trades that Jeffries & Company engaged in the following month.
I fail to see how this argument is inappropriate or unfair. Understandably, defense counsel wanted the chance to respond, to urge once again the asserted relevance of the November trades. However, Fed.R.Crim.P. 29.1 gives the prosecution the final opportunity to argue to the jury. A defendant is not entitled to have the trial judge voice what is in effect his surrebuttal by characterizing commentary on the evidence as a “curative instruction".
The district court instructed the jury concerning defendants’ contention that Jefferies & Company “did not act as their agent.” As indicated above, the defense theory was that Jefferies & Co. had motives to manipulate Union Carbide stock on its own behalf, and in fact did exactly that. Perhaps the district court might have been obliged to respond affirmatively to a request that its instruction be amplified to charge that defense theory more precisely. No such request, however, was made. Accordingly, as I see it, no reversible error occurred in this regard. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 (objection to instruction must “stat[e] distinctly the matter to which [the] party objects and the grounds of the objection”); Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1021 (in absence of proper objection, instruction reversible only for plain error); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 228 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990).
C. Testimony of James Melton.
James Melton, the chief trader at Jef-fries & Company, was a key witness for the prosecution. Melton testified that Boyd Jeffries instructed him to support the price of Union Carbide stock at $22.00 per share on October 29, 30 and 31. Further, Melton testified that on each of these days he placed a telephone call shortly after the close of the Pacific Stock Exchange from Jeffries & Company’s Los Angeles office to Sherwin’s office at GAF. There was no record of these telephone calls over Jef-fries & Company’s conventional phone lines, but the parties stipulated that Jef-fries & Company had fifteen outbound WATS lines for long-distance calling in its Los Angeles office. These calls, Melton said, were made pursuant to Jeffries’ instructions to inform Sherwin of Union Carbide’s closing price and the number of shares that Melton had purchased. On one of these three days, Melton recalled, Sher-win was not available but promptly returned the call.
After the close of the government’s case, the defendants were surprised to discover that the telephone company maintained toll records of calls placed on WATS lines. The defendants introduced these records, which provided no indication of the calls to Sherwin that Melton had claimed to have made. Defense counsel argued vigorously in summation that it had been proven that Melton testified falsely. On rebuttal, the government countered by arguing that Melton, testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, had no motive to lie. The government concluded this portion of its argument as follows: “Now, the calls from James Melton to James Sherwin do not show up on the AT & T WATS records, but there is too much evidence from too many sources for those calls not to have happened.”
Conceding that they neither objected to the government’s argument in this regard nor requested a curative instruction, defendants now contend that their convictions must be reversed because the government embraced demonstrably perjurious testimo*1267ny. The defendants’ position is not that the government deliberately elicited falsehoods, but that it should have renounced, rather than relied upon, Melton’s testimony in light of the subsequently discovered telephone records.
Melton’s testimony regarding the telephone calls was significant. It was the only evidence directly linking the alleged key operatives in the manipulative scheme. Indeed, Melton repeatedly testified that he recalled speaking with Sherwin only on the three days in October 1986, and that Sher-win merely replied “thank you” after Melton delivered his information.
Nevertheless, in view of the late discovery and introduction of the documentary evidence, and the framing of the issue in terms of credibility by all parties at trial, I discern no reversible error here.
I relate this history concerning Melton’s testimony because I believe it relevant to further proceedings in this case on remand. Oral argument of this appeal included the following exchange concerning this matter:
Judge Mahoney: Has there been any inquiry by the US attorney’s office since the close of trial?
Mr. Loewenson: Not of telephone companies. I want to be careful, but most important to be candid with the court. No inquiry has been made either of AT & T or of Pacific Bell or Jefferies.
Judge Mahoney: Has any inquiry been made that would cast any light on the question whether there is an explanation for these phone calls not being in the records, other than their not having been made or there being some inexplicable errors in the records?
Mr. Loewenson: No, your Honor. And I am not sure that further inquiry would be of assistance in determining the issues that are relevant today, namely, whether Melton deliberately committed perjury.
In view of the disposition of this appeal, the government will be faced with a very different issue that will be relevant tomorrow; whether to proceed with a fourth trial of this indictment, and what evidence it may tender in good faith at any such trial. The government correctly explains that the late discovery and introduction of the telephone records precluded any meaningful investigation of this situation during the third trial. It did not preclude such an inquiry in the course of the appeal, and I candidly express my disappointment that the government felt no obligation to undertake one. In any event, it appears clear to me that the government is inescapably obliged to investigate fully the contradiction between Melton’s testimony and the telephone records before again proffering Melton’s testimony to the district court.