Court Opinion

ID: 9931659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 17:00:57.13793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:16.351385
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5107     Document: 010110997614      Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 1

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                               Tenth Circuit

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      February 9, 2024
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  CHARLES CLINE,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 22-5107

  CLINICAL PERFUSION SYSTEMS,
  INC.,

        Defendant - Appellee,

  and

  KEVIN ESAU; TYLER MCKEON,

        Defendants.
                          _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Oklahoma
                         (D.C. No. 4:22-CV-00314-CVE-CDL)
                        _________________________________

 Donald M. Bingham, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, Oklahoma,
 for Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Cline.

 J. Miles McFadden (R. Tom Hillis, with him on the brief), Titus Hillis Reynolds Love,
 Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee Clinical Perfusion Systems, Inc.
                        _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Appellate Case: 22-5107    Document: 010110997614         Date Filed: 02/09/2024       Page: 2

                          _________________________________

       In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Cline

 appeals the dismissal of his operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) under Federal

 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cline was terminated by Defendant-Appellee

 Clinical Perfusion Systems, Inc. after a medical emergency led to a several-month

 stay in the intensive care unit (ICU), where Cline was on a ventilator, feeding tube,

 and was heavily sedated. He brought disability discrimination claims under the

 Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the Oklahoma Anti-

 Discrimination Act (OADA); and age discrimination claims under the OADA. The

 district court dismissed his FAC with prejudice.

       Cline first argues that the district court erred in dismissing his disability

 discrimination claims. To establish a disability discrimination claim under the

 Rehabilitation Act (which uses the same substantive framework for liability as the

 ACA and OADA), a plaintiff must plausibly allege either that he is able to perform

 the essential functions of his job notwithstanding the disability, or that he could

 perform those functions with a reasonable accommodation by his employer. Adair v.

 City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016). The parties here agree that

 Cline could not perform the functions of his job while sedated in the ICU, and

 therefore his disability discrimination claims turn on whether Cline plausibly alleged

 that he could perform the functions of his job with an accommodation of leave time

 during his recovery. We conclude he did not. While Cline alleged that “[a]

 reasonable accommodation was available to [Clinical Perfusion Systems]: granting

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 Cline paid or unpaid leave for a reasonable period of time,” he failed to support this

 with an essential factual allegation—a duration of leave that would have constituted a

 reasonable and sufficient period of time. (Aplt. App. 12-13 ¶ 42). Therefore, we

 conclude the district court properly granted Clinical Perfusion Systems’ motion to

 dismiss with respect to Cline’s disability discrimination claims under the

 Rehabilitation Act, ACA, and OADA.

       Cline next argues that the district court erred in dismissing his age

 discrimination claim. To establish an age discrimination claim under the OADA, a

 plaintiff must plausibly allege that age was a but-for cause of his termination. Jones

 v. Okla. City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2010). The district court

 concluded that “[n]othing in [Cline’s FAC] satisfies that requirement or demonstrates

 the causal connection between [Cline’s] age and his termination.” (Aplt. App. 141).

 For pleading purposes, we disagree. Cline alleged alternatively that his age was “the

 sole factor, the primary factor, the determinative or determining factor, or a

 significant motivating factor” in Clinical Perfusion Systems’ decision to terminate

 him. (Id. at 16 ¶ 57). Cline also alleged that Clinical Perfusion Systems gave a false

 reason for his termination and that he was replaced with two younger, less qualified

 employees. We find these allegations sufficient to allege an alternative claim that age

 was a but-for cause of Cline’s termination. Therefore, we conclude the district court

 erred by dismissing Cline’s age discrimination claim under the OADA.

       Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore AFFIRM the district

 court’s dismissal of Cline’s disability discrimination claims, REVERSE the district

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 court’s dismissal of Cline’s age discrimination claim, and REMAND for further

 proceedings.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

          a. Facts Alleged in Cline’s Operative First Amended Complaint

          According to the First Amended Complaint (FAC), Charles Cline is a

 perfusionist. (Aplt. App. 8 ¶ 21). “A perfusionist is a licensed medical professional

 who is a member of a cardiovascular surgical team.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 19). A perfusionist

 “operates a heart-lung machine, and during surgery maintains blood flow to the

 patient’s tissues and regulates levels of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the blood.”

 (Id.).

          Kevin Esau and Tyler McKeon own Clinical Perfusion Systems. Clinical

 Perfusion Systems hired Cline to be a perfusionist in 2017. At the time, Cline had

 twenty-five years of experience. During his tenure at Clinical Perfusion Systems,

 Cline was “an exemplary employee and a respected perfusionist with a strong work

 ethic.” (Id. at 8 ¶ 21).

          On March 27, 2021, Cline lost consciousness while stopped at a traffic light in

 Tulsa, Oklahoma—possibly due to hypotension. When emergency medical personnel

 arrived, they performed eighteen minutes of CPR on Cline, breaking some of his ribs

 and cracking his sternum. He was subsequently intubated and sent to the ICU at

 Saint Francis Hospital. As alleged, the intubation caused severe damage to his throat

 that required ICU treatment from March 27 through May 3, and inpatient

 rehabilitation from May 3 through June 11.

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       During his ICU stay, Cline was on a ventilator that was connected to his lungs

 through a cannula—a tube in his throat. He also needed a gastric feeding tube. He

 was heavily sedated and could not speak, eat, or care for himself. He suffered kidney

 failure, which caused bloating and weight gain.

       While Cline was in the ICU, Esau and McKeon observed him and spoke with

 his wife, Nicole Pardini. At one point in late April, Pardini told Esau that she had

 been invited to sign a “Do Not Resuscitate” authorization, but that she had declined

 to do so.

       On May 3, 2021—the day Cline was to be transferred from the ICU to

 inpatient rehabilitation, and slightly more than one month after the onset of his

 disability—Esau and McKeon called Pardini and told her that Cline was being

 terminated. They allegedly falsely attributed their decision to the financial condition

 of Clinical Perfusion Systems. Pardini asked whether they would keep Cline’s job

 open until he recovered, but they declined to do so. Cline was sixty-one years old at

 the time.

       The FAC alleged that at that point, Cline’s impairments were expected to last

 “more than six (6) months.” (Id. at 12 ¶ 40). But Cline’s recovery took less time

 than expected. After he was transferred to inpatient rehabilitation, Cline gradually

 improved. He was taken off heavy sedation two weeks in, and at some point

 regained the ability to speak (provided he covered the cannula in his throat). Cline

 was discharged to his home on June 11, 2021, and his attending physician cleared

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 him to return to work without restriction on July 28, 2021—almost three months after

 he was terminated, and four months after the onset of his disability.

       Soon thereafter, Cline asked for reinstatement (either at his old position or “a

 lesser position”), but McKeon declined his request. Cline alleges that he was the

 only employee that Clinical Perfusion Systems fired in 2021. Cline also alleges that

 when Clinical Perfusion Systems decided to terminate him, it had either “recently

 hired or was in the process of hiring two . . . individuals as perfusionists, each of

 whom was far younger than Cline was, and each of whom was far less qualified and

 far less experienced than Cline was.” (Id. at 16 ¶ 58).

       Cline still suffers side effects from his injuries, including pain when he speaks

 or swallows. He has since moved to California, where he works full-time as a

 perfusionist.

       b. Procedure

       Within 180 days of his discharge, Cline filed a charge with the Oklahoma

 Attorney General’s Office of Civil Rights Enforcement. That office issued him a

 Notice of Right to Sue on April 20, 2022. Cline filed his initial complaint against

 Clinical Perfusion Systems, Esau, and McKeon on July 19, 2022. He then filed the

 operative FAC on July 28, 2022, alleging facts supporting federal diversity

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 for all claims and federal question jurisdiction

 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for his federal statutory claims. The FAC asserted the

 following alternative claims against Clinical Perfusion Systems: (1) disability

 discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); (2) both disability

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 and age discrimination under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA), 25

 Okla. Stat. § 1302(A); (3) disability discrimination under the Affordable Care Act, 42

 U.S.C. § 18116; and (4) breach of contract under Oklahoma law. Against Esau and

 McKeon, the FAC asserted two claims under Oklahoma law: (5) tortious interference

 with Cline’s contract of employment; and (6) the tort of outrageous conduct.

        All three defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 1 The district

 court granted the motion in full and dismissed Cline’s FAC with prejudice. Cline

 now appeals the dismissal of his disability and age discrimination claims against

 Clinical Perfusion Systems. 2

                             II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal of Cline’s FAC under

 Rule 12(b)(6). Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 2019). “Dismissal

 under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if the complaint, viewed in the light most

 favorable to plaintiff, lacks enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

 its face.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d

 729, 764 (10th Cir. 2019)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

        1
          Defendants also moved for dismissal due to improper venue under Rule
 12(b)(3), but their briefing below only made arguments supporting dismissal under
 Rule 12(b)(6). The district court only addressed Rule 12(b)(6), and that is all that is
 at issue before this court.
        2
          Cline does not appeal the dismissal of his claims against Esau and McKeon,
 nor does he appeal the dismissal of his contract claim against Clinical Perfusion
 Systems.
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 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint “must

 give just enough factual detail to provide ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

 grounds upon which it rests.’” Warnick v. Cooley, 895 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir.

 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare

 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

        a. Cline’s Disability Discrimination Claims

        Cline’s FAC asserted disability discrimination claims under three statutes:

 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); the Oklahoma Anti-

 Discrimination Act (OADA), 25 Okla. Stat. § 1302(A); and Section 1557 of the

 Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Disability discrimination claims

 under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the substantive

 standards for disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities

 Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (providing

 that standards applied under Americans with Disabilities Act apply to employment

 discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d

 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2010) (“We apply the standards from the American with

 Disabilities Act in analyzing a Rehabilitation Act claim.”). Therefore, both

 Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases are applicable when analyzing Cline’s Rehabilitation

 Act claim.

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        This court has also found that, if a plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim fails

 under the ADA, it fails under the OADA. See Barzellone v. City of Tulsa, 210 F.3d

 389, 2000 WL 339213, at *5 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion)

 (“Barzellone’s claim under the Oklahoma Anti Discrimination statutes fails for the same

 reasons her ADA and Title VII claims fail.” (footnotes omitted)) 3; Wilson v. State Ins.

 Fund ex rel. State of Okl., 106 F.3d 414, 1997 WL 12929, at *2 (10th Cir. 1997)

 (unpublished table opinion) (“For essentially the same reasons set forth in our analysis

 of the ADA claim, plaintiff’s state statutory claims,” including a claim under the OADA,

 “also fail”). Therefore, the success of Cline’s OADA claim also depends on whether he

 stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA framework.

        Finally, with respect to Cline’s ACA claim, Clinical Perfusion Systems suggests

 that the ACA might not have created a general employment discrimination cause of

 action, but instead might only prohibit “an employer that receives Federal financial

 assistance that is principally engaged in providing health care or health coverage, such as

 a hospital or nursing home, from discriminating in employee health benefits.” (Aplee.

 Br. 8-9) (quoting Section 1557: Frequently Asked Questions, FAQ #17, U.S. Department

 of Health and Human Services, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-

 1557/1557faqs/index.html). We need not decide in this appeal whether the ACA created

 a general employment discrimination cause of action because, even assuming it did, the

 Rehabilitation Act’s substantive standards would apply, and we ultimately conclude that

        3
         Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive
 value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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  Cline failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act’s standards. See 42 U.S.C.

  § 18116(a) (“The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under . . . section

  794 [of title 29, U.S.C. (the Rehabilitation Act)] . . . shall apply for purposes of violations

  of this subsection.”); Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 8 F.4th 370, 378

  (5th Cir. 2021) (“For disability-discrimination claims, the ACA incorporates the

  substantive analytical framework of the [Rehabilitation Act].”); Doe v. BlueCross

  BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2019) (“By referring to four

  statutes” in the ACA, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, “Congress

  incorporated the legal standards that define discrimination under each one.”).

         To state a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act:

         “[A] plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a ‘handicapped individual’ under the
         Act, (2) that he is ‘otherwise qualified’ for the [position], (3) that he was
         [discriminated against] solely by reason of his handicap, and (4) that the
         program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance.”

  Cohon ex rel. Bass v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 725 (10th Cir. 2011)

  (quoting Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir.

  1992)). The district court concluded that Cline satisfied the first element—that he

  was a handicapped individual—by plausibly alleging that due to his injuries, he had

  physical impairments that “substantially limited his ability to perform several major

  life activities.” (Aplt. App. 134). But, the court concluded, Cline failed to

  adequately plead the second element; that Cline was “otherwise qualified” for his

  position. This is the element of Cline’s disability discrimination claims at issue on

  appeal.

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        Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, there is a two-part analysis to

  determine whether an individual is “otherwise qualified” for a position. First, the

  plaintiff has the opportunity to show that he is “able to perform the essential

  functions of his job” notwithstanding his disability. Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823

  F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016). If he cannot do so, then the court “must determine

  whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable him to

  perform those functions.” Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778

  F.3d 877, 888 (10th Cir. 2015)). Here, at the time of Cline’s termination, he was

  unable to perform the functions of a perfusionist—he was an ICU patient and heavily

  sedated, on a feeding tube, and unable to speak, eat, or care for himself. Therefore,

  Cline’s disability discrimination claim turns on whether he plausibly alleged that he

  could perform the essential functions of his job with a “reasonable accommodation.”

        Given Cline’s state at the time of termination, it is undisputed that the only

  possible accommodation would have been a leave of absence. “[A] brief leave of

  absence for medical treatment or recovery can be a reasonable accommodation.”

  Robert v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., 691 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (10th Cir.

  2012). But “[t]here are two limits on the bounds of reasonableness for a leave of

  absence.” Id. at 1218. First, “[t]he employee must provide the employer an

  estimated date when [he] can resume [his] essential duties.” Id. Second, “[a] leave

  request must assure an employer that an employee can perform the essential functions

  of [his] position in the ‘near future.’” Id. (quoting Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d

  1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of

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  Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). Important here, this court has held that a leave

  of absence exceeding six months is per se unreasonable. Hwang v. Kan. State Univ.,

  753 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2014).

         In the FAC, Cline alleged, “[w]hen [Clinical Perfusion Systems] made the

  decision to discharge Cline, the expected duration of the impairments was more than six

  (6) months.” (Aplt. App. 12 ¶ 40). There are no other factual allegations in the FAC

  regarding the expected duration of Cline’s disability or the period of leave necessary as

  an accommodation. Therefore, the district court concluded, “any request for an

  accommodation of job-protected leave would have been for [more than six months] and,

  so, unreasonable under Hwang.” (Id. at 137). We agree.

         Cline argues that the FAC contains sufficient allegations that a reasonable

  accommodation was available: “[a] reasonable accommodation was available to

  [Clinical Perfusion Systems]: granting Cline paid or unpaid leave for a reasonable

  period of time and forbearance of termination during the period.” (Aplt. App. 12-13

  ¶ 42). Cline argues that, because he alleged that leave for a “reasonable period of

  time” was available as an accommodation, and because this court held in Hwang that

  leave for over six months is per se unreasonable, he sufficiently alleged, by

  implication, that less than six months of leave was available as a “reasonable

  accommodation.” (Aplt. Ry. Br. 4-6). But there are no factual allegations in the

  FAC to support Cline’s argument that the expected duration of his disability was

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  under six months. 4 See Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th

  Cir. 1996) (at summary judgment, finding no evidence that a leave of absence was a

  reasonable accommodation when the plaintiff “failed to present any evidence of the

  expected duration of her impairment as of the date of her termination”). The

  allegation that a “reasonable period of time” was required is conclusory. See Iqbal,

  556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

  by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Cline needed to plead specific facts

  illustrating why the expected duration of his disability was under six months, but he

  did not do so. 5

         4
            For this reason, we need not address Cline’s argument that the district court
  should have allowed him “to maintain inconsistent factual allegations about the
  expected duration of his impairment.” (Aplt. Br. 18). The district court stated,
  “[w]hile plaintiff may plead alternative legal theories, he may not plead alternative
  sets of facts.” (Aplt. App. 137 n.4). Although this statement of the law is incorrect,
  we do not see any alternative factual allegations in the FAC—the only factual
  allegation about the duration of Cline’s impairment, and the period of leave required
  as an accommodation, was that it would be “more than six (6) months.” (Id. at 12 ¶
  40). See United States v. Roe, 913 F.3d 1285, 1300 n.21 (10th Cir. 2019).
          5
            Cline cites a nonprecedential decision by this court for the proposition, “[a]n
  ADA plaintiff . . . is not required to set forth a prima facie case for each element of
  [his] claim in order to defeat a motion to dismiss.” (Aplt. Ry. Br. 6) (citing Iselin v.
  Bama Cos., 690 F. App’x 593, 597 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)). In Iselin, this
  court cited Iqbal and stated that the plaintiff “must simply provide enough factual
  allegations to ‘permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct’ so
  ‘that [he] is entitled to relief.’” Iselin, 690 F. App’x at 597 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
  679). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Iqbal also made clear that “[t]hreadbare
  recitals of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to state a claim, and
  Cline’s allegation regarding a “reasonable accommodation” is a “threadbare recital”
  without the support of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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         This court’s reasoning in Hwang supports our conclusion that Cline needed to

  plead facts to support his conclusory allegation that leave for a “reasonable period of

  time” was an available accommodation. In holding that leave over six months was a per

  se unreasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, this court stated, “[t]he

  Rehabilitation Act seeks to prevent employers from callously denying reasonable

  accommodations that permit otherwise qualified disabled persons to work—not to turn

  employers into safety net providers for those who cannot work.” Hwang, 753 F.3d at

  1162; see also Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169 (holding that leave for indefinite period was

  unreasonable accommodation under ADA and stating, “[the employer] was not

  required to wait indefinitely for [the employee’s] recovery”). This court’s case law

  indicates the importance of providing employers with notice of the expected duration of

  the employee’s recovery when either paid or unpaid leave is the suggested “reasonable

  accommodation.” The factual allegations in Cline’s FAC failed to indicate that Cline

  provided such notice to Clinical Perfusion Systems. 6

         Therefore, while the district court erroneously stated that Cline could not plead

  contradictory facts, the district court correctly held that Cline failed to state a claim under

  the Rehabilitation Act, the OADA, and the ACA.

         6
           We decide this case based on Cline’s failure to plead that he was “otherwise
  qualified” for his position, or that he could perform the essential functions of his
  position with a “reasonable accommodation.” Therefore, we do not need to
  differentiate between plaintiff’s alternative claims of disability—that he was actually
  disabled and that he was “regarded as” having a disability. See 42 U.S.C.
  § 12102(1)(A), (C). Both claims require sufficient factual allegations establishing
  that Cline was “otherwise qualified.” It is that common requirement that Cline has
  failed to satisfy in this case.
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        b. Cline’s Age Discrimination Claim

        Cline’s FAC also asserted an age discrimination claim under the OADA, 25 Okla.

  Stat. § 1302(A). Age discrimination claims under the OADA are analyzed under the

  substantive framework for claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

  (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See Bennett v. Windstream Comms., Inc., 792 F.3d

  1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment on OADA claim “for the

  reasons outlined” in the court’s ADEA analysis); LeFlore v. Flint Indus., Inc., 172

  F.3d 62, 1999 WL 89281, at *3 n.4 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 1999) (unpublished table

  opinion).

        The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against someone

  over the age of forty on the basis of his age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631. To state a

  plausible claim, the plaintiff must also allege that his age was a but-for cause of his

  termination. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009); see Lively v.

  WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 303 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding that

  “the but-for causation standard for [ADEA] claims applies not only at trial but at the

  pleading stage as well”). This causal standard, however, “does ‘not require plaintiffs

  to show that age was the sole motivating factor in the employment decision.’” Jones,

  617 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Wilkerson, 606 F.3d at 1266) (cleaned up). “Instead, an

  employer may be held liable under the ADEA if other factors contributed to its taking

  an adverse action, as long as ‘age was the factor that made a difference.’” Id.

  (quoting Wilkerson, 606 F.3d at 1266); see also 8 Larson on Employment

  Discrimination § 135.07 (2023) (“Gross does not require age to be the sole

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  motivation for the decision, nor does the fact that a plaintiff simultaneously alleges

  multiple types of discrimination (say age, race and disability) require dismissal of the

  case.”).

         The district court concluded that Cline failed to plausibly plead age

  discrimination because the facts alleged in the FAC did not support an inference that

  “age was the ‘factor that made a difference’ in his termination.” (Aplt. App. 141).

  Instead, the court reasoned,

         The amended complaint . . . alleges that plaintiff’s disability was the
         determinative factor in his termination. There may, of course, be multiple
         factors that lead to a plaintiff’s termination but, to allege age discrimination
         as one of them, plaintiff’s age must be a “but for” factor. Nothing in
         plaintiff’s amended complaint satisfies that requirement or demonstrates the
         causal connection between plaintiff’s age and his termination. Plaintiff must
         allege facts that support an inference that his age was a factor the [sic]
         contributed to the decision to terminate him. The facts in the amended
         complaint allege that plaintiff was terminated because of his inability to
         perform his duties as a perfusionist due to his disability.
  Id.

         The district court erred by concluding that the FAC failed to allege sufficiently

  that age was a but-for cause of Cline’s termination. Cline was entitled under Federal

  Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) to plead inconsistent legal theories and inconsistent

  facts. Roe, 913 F.3d at 1300 n.21; see Cella v. MobiChord, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-527-

  TC, 2020 WL 416668, at *10 (D. Utah Jan. 27, 2020) (unreported) (citing Roe and

  finding plaintiff was entitled to plead inconsistent motivations for termination).

  Therefore, the allegations in the FAC that Cline was terminated because of his

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  disability do not prevent Cline from alternatively alleging that he was terminated

  because of his age.

        We conclude that Cline’s FAC plausibly alleged that “age was the factor that

  made a difference” in his termination. Jones, 617 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Wilkerson,

  606 F.3d at 1266). Cline alleged that “the sole factor, the primary factor, the

  determinative or determining factor, or a significant motivating factor in making

  [appellee’s] decision to terminate Cline and its decision not to reinstate or rehire him

  was . . . (5) the fact that Cline was sixty-one (61) years old at the time the decisions

  were made.” (Aplt. App. 16 ¶ 57). While this is a conclusory statement, Cline

  supported his causation argument with sufficient factual allegations.

        First, Cline alleged that the reason given by Clinical Perfusion Systems for his

  termination—the business’s financial condition—was false. (Id. at 9 ¶ 26, 17 ¶ 60);

  see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“Proof

  that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of

  circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be

  quite persuasive.”). Second, Cline alleged that around the time when appellee made

  the decision to terminate him, appellee was in the process of hiring two younger, less

  qualified perfusionists to replace Cline. (Id. at 16-17 ¶¶ 58-60). This factual

  allegation supports the inference that Clinical Perfusion Systems’ proffered reason

  for terminating Cline was false, and that Cline’s age was the actual reason for his

  termination. These allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that Cline’s age was

  a but-for cause of his termination. See, e.g., Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986

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Appellate Case: 22-5107    Document: 010110997614        Date Filed: 02/09/2024     Page: 18

  F.3d 261, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding plaintiff stated ADEA claim when

  complaint alleged he was fired, he was replaced by younger, less qualified

  employees, and his employer suspiciously told him he was not fired for performance-

  based reasons); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding

  plaintiffs stated ADEA claim when complaint alleged they were qualified for

  position, a substantially younger person was given the position, and an official with

  decision-making authority said department needed “new blood”).

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

        In sum, Cline failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to establish plausible

  disability discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, OADA, and ACA.

  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The FAC contained no facts suggesting that the expected

  duration of Cline’s recovery was less than six months, and therefore Cline failed

  plausibly to allege that the only possible accommodation he could have been

  provided—a period of leave while he recovered—was “reasonable” under Hwang.

  However, Cline did present sufficient factual allegations to establish that his age was

  a but-for cause of his termination—he alleged that Clinical Perfusion Systems gave a

  false reason for his termination and that he was replaced with two younger, less

  qualified employees. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Cline’s

  disability discrimination claims, REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Cline’s

  age discrimination claims, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

  opinion.

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