Court Opinion

ID: 9494590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:41:15.565356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:29.416009
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judge SILVERMAN
joins, dissenting:
With respect, and with regret, I must dissent from the comb’s opinion; we simply don’t have jurisdiction under any of the theories advanced by the majority.
Socop-Gonzalez (“Socop”) first raised the issue of equitable tolling at oral argument before the en banc court; we have jurisdiction only over issues raised before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). While Socop’s plight may be sympathetic, nothing, not even forty-four pages of energetic legal massage by the majority, can cure the jurisdictional defect in this case. Socop’s petition for review challenging the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I
In April 1996, Socop filed a timely appeal with the BIA seeking review of the Immigration Judge’s decision denying his request for asylum and withholding of deportation. Socop, indeed acting on poor advice given to him by an INS officer, sought to withdraw his pending appeal with the BIA in April 1997. On May 5, 1997, the BIA granted his request, which constituted a final administrative determination in his case. Socop thereafter decided that he never should have withdrawn his appeal and filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. However, Socop’s motion was seven days late: a petitioner must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2).
Socop dealt with his legal hurdle by vigorously arguing to the BIA that the INS was equitably estopped from enforcing the ninety-day limitations period. In particular, he relied upon In re Petition of LaVoie, 349 F.Supp. 68, 72 (D.Vi.1972), in which a district comb held that the INS was equitably estopped from enforcing a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The BIA, however, was unpersuaded by Socop’s equitable estoppel argument, and denied his motion as untimely.
*1198Socop then petitioned for review by this court. Socop reasserted his equitable es-toppel argument, which the panel rejected. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 208 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this case.... ”)• After we agreed to hear the case en banc, Socop continued to press his equitable estoppel argument in his briefs.
At the en banc oral argument, however, Socop suddenly changed course. Socop now argues that the ninety-day period was equitably tolled. As we have repeatedly explained, equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are two distinct doctrines. See, e.g., Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing differences between the two doctrines); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1015-17 (9th Cir.1998) (same); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir.1981) (same). Equitable estoppel holds that a party may be precluded from taking a position because of his affirmative misconduct. See, e.g., Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1016-17. Equitable tolling provides that a party’s excusable ignorance may toll the limitations period. See, e.g., Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1015. Under equitable estoppel, the primary focus is the nature of the INS’s conduct. Under equitable tolling, the primary focus is whether Socop’s ignorance of the limitations period is excusable. Each issue is distinct and separate. Socop only raised estoppel before the BIA; he now raises tolling for the first time.
Congress has confined our jurisdiction to only those issues that the petitioner raised before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (repealed 1996);1 see also Vargas v. U.S. Dept. of Immigration and Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir.1987) (“Failure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA ... deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.”). Because Socop failed to raise the issue of equitable tolling with the BIA, we are without jurisdiction.
II
The majority advances three unconvincing arguments in its strain to find jurisdiction under equitable tolling. First, the majority relies upon Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 87 S.Ct. 1188, 18 L.Ed.2d 244 (1967). In Honda, depositors of the Yokohama Specie Bank filed claims against the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Court of Appeals had held that the depositors’ claims were time-barred. See Hondo v. Katzenbach, 356 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C.Cir.1966). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the limitations period was equitably tolled. Honda, 386 U.S. at 486, 87 S.Ct. 1188.
The majority concedes that the depositors raised equitable tolling, as distinguished from equitable estoppel, with the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the majority remarkably concludes that Honda stands for the proposition that if a party raises only equitable estoppel, the court may still consider whether equitable tolling applies. The fact that the depositors in Honda did not argue equitable tolling, apart from equitable estoppel, in their opening Court of Appeals brief, is irrelevant. The majority overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court never suggested that the depositors failed to raise equitable tolling with the lower courts.2 This omission is unsurprising given that the government *1199did not argue that the depositors had waived equitable tolling. We cannot assume that the Supreme Court independently discovered that the depositors failed to raise the issue in its opening brief with the Court of Appeals.
In any event, the majority’s reliance upon Honda is misplaced. The majority overlooks a critical distinction between Honda and this case: unlike the Immigration and Nationality Act, under the Trading with the Enemy Act there is no jurisdictional bar to consider issues that were not properly raised below. Honda cannot support the majority’s excusal of Socop’s belated attempt to raise equitable tolling.
Ill
The majority next claims that we should assert jurisdiction to avoid “penaliz[ing] Socop for his lawyer’s failure to seize on equitable tolling.” Majority Opinion at 1185. In essence, the majority claims that we should excuse Socop’s failure to raise equitable tolling because the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are easily confused with one another. While the subtleties between the doctrines may help explain Socop’s lawyer’s poor performance, it cannot cure the jurisdictional defect in this case. “Failure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA ... deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.” Vargas, 831 F.2d at 907-08. Scoop’s lawyer’s poor performance is simply irrelevant to the jurisdictional question.
TV
Finally, the majority incredulously claims that the BIA considered whether the limitations period should be equitably tolled. The fact that the majority makes this argument last is telling. There is not even a hint anywhere in the BIA’s decision that it considered equitable tolling, as opposed to equitable estoppel. Of course, this is not at all surprising given the fact that Socop only argued equitable estoppel in front of the BIA. Even if the BIA had addressed equitable tolling in its decision, it would merely be relevant to whether Socop raised the issue with the BIA. We only have jurisdiction over issues that were actually raised by the petitioner below; we cannot acquire jurisdiction simply because the BIA decides to review an issue sua sponte. See Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction over an issue not raised in front of the BIA even though a BIA dissenter expressly considered the issue). In any event, because Socop’s BIA filings unambiguously show that he was only arguing equitable estoppel, the fact that the BIA might have considered the issue is irrelevant to the jurisdictional question.
The underlying circumstances of this case are unfortunate. But “bad facts” cannot create jurisdiction where none exists. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s grant of Socop’s petition for review.

. Congress repealed § 1105(a). See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612. Nonetheless, as the majority concedes, ante at 1183, because Socop is subject to IIRIRA's transitional rules, it remains applicable to his case. See § 309(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 3009-625.

. The Supreme Court did note that the depositors "largely” argued equitable estoppel with the Court, and that the lower courts had *1199limited its discussion to equitable estoppel. Honda, 386 U.S. at 486, 87 S.Ct. 1188.