Court Opinion

ID: 9517862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:35:21.291437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:09.161488
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. In my opinion improper comment during closing argument was so clearly prejudicial that the appellate court judgment reversing the conviction should be affirmed. The record shows the following during the cross-examination of the defendant: “Q. Okay, so you are pretty familiar with the place [Neal’s Lounge] then? A. Yes. Q. And the people in the place and employees and so forth are pretty familiar to you, wouldn’t that be true? A. Yes. Q. Who was in Neal’s at the time you went there January 29, 1973? A. There were quite a few people in there. Q. Who, in particular that you knew? A. George Johnson, Willie Cathrew, a guy by the name of Russell, Joe Moore, Herman Carter. There was a lot of others, but I can’t remember everybody’s name. Q. Those names you happen to remember right now? A. Yes.” The assistant State’s Attorney, in closing argument, said: “*** he said he went into the tavern, remained there from 8:20 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. the following morning. And I asked the defendant if he was familiar with the place, knew the place, people in the place were familiar with him. He said they were. And I asked him what particular individuals were in the place at that time, and he named a number of names, about five in all, a Cathrew, Moore, Carter, and a couple of others I can’t recall. As I recall there were about five names of people that were there when he was; none of them were called to testify. MR. BARTON [defense counsel]: I object to this Judge and move for mistrial. I would like the jury to be instructed to disregard that. MR. INMAN [assistant State’s Attorney]: Your Honor, if I may call three cases to the court’s attention on that point. THE COURT: The objection is overruled; motion for mistrial is denied. You may proceed. MR. INMAN: These five people were not here. You never heard them testify from that stand; these five people who, if they saw defendant at that time and place, could have established that alibi for the defendant. But these five people were not here. Where they were, why they weren’t here, why they were not subpoenaed by the defendant I don’t know. I didn’t know of them until this morning. But when you come to consider the defendant’s testimony in connection with this, remember it is his testimony only that is called to establish his alibi, his testimony only out of the six who might have been called to testify.” The majority, relying upon People v. Lion, 10 Ill.2d 208, and People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 522, concludes: “The prosecutor here was referring only to the obvious in commenting that the defense had not produced anyone from the club, including the men the defendant named in his testimony, to testify.” 63 Ill.2d at 360. Lion does not support the majority’s position. In that case the court referred to “certain remarks” made by the prosecuting attorney and stated that he had “commented upon the fact that defendant had not seen fit to call the hospital attendants” who presumably could have testified that he was intoxicated when brought to the hospital. Without discussion or explanation of its rationale, the court disposed of the defendant’s contentions by reference to People v. Sicks, 299 Ill. 282, People v. Tanthorey, 404 Ill. 520, and Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, none of which bear even remote resemblance, factually, to this case. People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 522, is so clearly distinguishable on its facts that no further discussion of that opinion is required. The record shows that defendant testified at a morning session of the trial. Following the testimony of another defense witness the court recessed until 1 p.m. The People then called one rebuttal witness, and closing arguments commenced at approximately 2 p.m. No showing was made that the People attempted to locate or subpoena the persons whose names were elicited during the cross-examination of defendant, and the record fails to show that they were not available to testify. This case is similar to the situation presented in People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32. In Munday, the circuit court permitted the State’s Attorney, in closing argument, to comment on defendant’s failure to call a co-defendant as a witness. In reversing the conviction the court said: “When objection was made to the argument *** the court overruled it, and the jury were thereby given to understand that he had correctly stated the law. The jury were thus told, as plainly as though they had been instructed in writing, that it was the duty of plaintiff in error, under the law, to call his co-defendants as witnesses, and that they had a right to consider that as a circumstance against him and to give it such weight as they deemed it entitled to. No duty devolved upon plaintiff in error to call anyone as a witness. It was his privilege to produce witnesses and to make a defense or not, as he chose. The duty devolved upon the State to prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt before the jury were warranted in convicting him. The duty did devolve upon plaintiff in error not to put it without the power of the State to produce any material witness, and if he did so the State had the right to show that fact as a circumstance against him. No such situation is presented here. To say that it was the duty of plaintiff in error, under the law, to produce witnesses who were equally accessible to the State and who were supposed to be in possession of facts having a bearing upon the truth or falsity of the charge against him would be placing a burden upon him that the law does not require or tolerate. Such a rule would be in conflict with the doctrine of the presumption of innocence. It is unfortunate that in a case involving so much time, labor and expense a prosecutor in his zeal to secure a conviction should permit himself to overstep proper bounds and by improper means attempt to create a conviction in the minds of the jury of the guilt of the defendant.” 280 Ill. 32, 46-47. In People v. Rubin, 366 Ill. 195, the State’s Attorney had commented on the defendant’s failure to call his employees as witnesses. Relying on Munday, the court reversed the conviction. In this case, where one of the two eyewitnesses was unable to identify defendant, error of this magnitude cannot be held to be harmless. Defendant did not receive a fair trial, and the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed.