Court Opinion

ID: 9630437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:11:03.94858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:38.448855
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge.
I.
First National Bank of St. Louis appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rodney and Diane Glass. The judgment awarded damages pursuant to section 443.130, RSMo 2000, for First National’s failure to timely provide a sufficient deed of release on a mortgage that was satisfied.1 This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const, article V, sec. 10. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
II.
On December 21, 1999, the Glasses executed a deed of trust in favor of First National for the purchase of their home. On June 13, 2001, the Glasses satisfied the mortgage when they refinanced the loan with a different mortgage company. On July 24, 2001, First National’s loan servicing center mailed the Glasses a letter acknowledging that the loan was paid in full.
On or about August 3, 2001, the Glasses mailed an undated demand letter by certified mail to First National requesting a deed of release. The letter included proof of satisfaction of the loan and a check to cover the cost of the recording fees for the deed of release. On August 6, 2001, First National received the letter and one of its employees signed the return receipt. First National’s loan servicing center could not confirm the date that deed of release was sent to the recorder, but testimony from one of their employees indicated that it was “probably” sent the week of June 19, 2001. The deed of release, however, was not recorded until October 9, 2001 (64 days post demand), and the Glasses were not tendered a copy of the deed until November 13, 2001 (99 days post demand).
The Glasses filed suit against First National seeking penalties for its failure to provide a timely deed of release pursuant to section 433.130. The Glasses also filed claims for invasion of privacy, unreasonable publicity of another’s private life, interference with prospective advantage, punitive damages and attorneys fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Glasses on the claim that First National failed to provide a timely deed of release and awarded them ten percent of *665the amount of the deed of trust, the statutorily prescribed penalty. The trial court granted summary judgment to First National on the remainder of the Glasses’ claims. First National appeals.
III.
Appeal from a grant of summary judgment is essentially reviewed de novo.2 The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered and accords the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.3 “Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party’s motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the summary judgment motion.”4 “The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law.”5
Section 443.130 is an “enforcement mechanism for section 443.060.01 ... which requires a mortgagee to deliver a ‘sufficient deed of release of the security instrument’ upon satisfaction of the instrument.” 6 Section 443.130 provides:
1.If any such person, thus receiving satisfaction, does not, within fifteen business days after request and tender of costs, deliver to the person making satisfaction a sufficient deed of release, such person shall forfeit to the party aggrieved ten percent upon the amount of the security instrument, absolutely, and any other damages such person may be able to prove such person has sustained, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction. A business day is any day except Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays.
2. To qualify under this section, the mortgagor shall provide the request in the form of a demand letter to the mortgagee, cestui qui trust, or assignee by certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter shall include good and sufficient evidence that the debt secured by the deed of trust was satisfied with good funds, and the expense of filing and recording the release was advanced.
3. In any action against such person who fails to release the lien as provided in subsection 1 of this section, the plaintiff, or his attorney, shall prove at trial that the plaintiff notified the holder of the note by certified mail, return receipt requested.7
Section 443.130 is “penal in nature, so it must be strictly construed.”8 Any demand letter “purporting to invoke section 443.130 should closely track the language of the statute to place the mortgagee on notice that the statutory demand is being made.”9 ‘While no particular language is specifically required to be included in the letter, the letter must somehow put the lender on notice that a demand is made under section 443.130.”10
The letter mailed by the Glasses to First National stated:
*666Dear Sir/Madam:
Please consider this our demand letter and written request for a deed of release of the mortgage/deed of trust on our home at 12706 Wynfield Pines Court, Des Peres, Missouri 63131.
Our home was recently refinanced and your loan, which was secured by a mortgage/deed of trust on the above property, has been paid off and satisfied with good funds. Recognizing this, you acknowledged receipt of payment in full of our loan on June 13, 2001 in a letter dated July 24, 2001. A copy of such letter is enclosed. For your convenience, this loan was referenced as loan number 2010185700.
Enclosed please find a check in the amount of $24.00 as and for costs, including recording fees, for the filing and recordation of the deed of release. I have also enclosed evidence that the aforesaid mortgage/deed of trust has been paid off and the expense of filing and recording the release has been advanced.
I trust that this letter and the accompanying check will enable you to deliver the requested deed of release promptly. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
None of the material facts are in dispute concerning the satisfaction of the loan, the contents of the demand letter, or the receipt of the letter and its enclosures. What First National argues is that the contents of the demand letter fail to sufficiently track the statutory language of section 443.130 so as to provide adequate notice of the demand. Specifically, First National complains that the demand letter failed to reference the section number of the statute or provide the deadline for providing a copy of the release or for recording the deed of release. First National also claims the Glasses lack standing because it claims that the new mortgage holder is the person who satisfied the loan. First National further argues that even if the Glasses had standing, and even if the demand letter was sufficient, that the Glasses failed to establish that they were prejudiced by not receiving a timely release.
The Glasses’ letter identifies itself as being a demand letter and requests a deed of release. The letter identifies the subject property by address and the loan number of the mortgage. The letter highlights the attachments to the letter that provide good and sufficient evidence that the debt secured by the deed of trust was satisfied with good funds, including First National’s own acknowledgement that the loan had been satisfied. In a separate paragraph, the letter references the inclusion of a check advancing the expense of filing and recording the release. In the exhibits to Glasses’ summary judgment motion, they include proof that their demand letter was sent by certified mail and that the bank’s representative signed the return receipt that was returned to the Glasses. The language in the demand recites some of the section’s language almost verbatim.
The demand letter is not required to reference section 443.130 specifically or list the deadline for providing the former debtor with a copy of the release; nor must the Glasses establish that they suffered any prejudice to qualify for relief under the statute. There is also no prohibition placed on a debtor preventing refinancing by another lender as a means to satisfy the loan. The mortgage contract runs between First National and the Glasses. It was the Glasses who satisfied the loan obligation.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Price attempts to rewrite this Court’s opinions in *667Garr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 457 (Mo. banc 2004), and Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 150 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. banc 2004), by inventing additional requirements not present in section 443.130. The opinion then erroneously claims that this opinion overrules both Garr and Brown sub silentio.
Neither Garr nor Brown rewrote the statute to require specific mention of section 443.130 or the fifteen-day response deadline as the dissent alleges. Both opinions required that the demand letter as a whole place the lending institution on notice that a demand for a deed of release is being made under section 443.130.11 In Brown, this Court made perfectly clear that: ‘While no particular language is specifically required to be included in the letter, the letter must somehow put the lender on notice that a demand is made under section 443.130.” (Emphasis added).12
The demand letter in Garr was defective because it demanded an “immediate” deed of release and did not comport with the statutory language allowing for a fifteen business-day response time.13 The demand letter in Brown failed to request the deed of release and merely demanded that release be made and recorded. Because the Browns failed to include any other language tracking section 443.130, their letter as a whole did not place their lender on notice that demand was being made under the statute.14
In contrast, the first sentence of the Glasses’ letter clearly indicates that they are demanding and requesting the deed of release, i.e. the persons who should receive the release. The Glasses’ letter also provides documentation establishing they have satisfied the loan, and section 443.130.1 requires the deed of release to be delivered to the person making satisfaction. The payment for recording the deed simply satisfies the additional requirement in section 441.130.2, and it is completely irrelevant to the requirement in section 443.130.1 that First National send the deed of release to the Glasses. Even if First National had recorded the deed of release within the statutory deadline, which it failed to do, that would not have excused its obligation to provide the Glasses with the deed as required by section 443.130.1. The Glasses’ demand letter, as a whole, placed First National on notice without directly referencing the statute.15
Section 443.130 was intentionally directed at financial institutions that fail to provide timely deeds of release, which explains the legislature’s desire to create a penalty, even in absence of measurable damages. It is the dissent that misreads the spirit of this law, and its attempt at rewriting the statute is merely an attempt to legislate from the bench.
A sophisticated business entity, such as First National, would be placed on sufficient notice that a demand for a deed of release is being made when receiving a letter, such as the Glasses’, that so closely tracks the statutory language of section 443.130. Indeed, First National conceded in oral argument that it was fully aware of section 443.130, and further conceded that the Glasses’ letter was a demand letter.16 *668First National simply failed to provide the Glasses with the properly demanded release within the proscribed time frame, and its arguments to the contrary are without merit.
First National also challenges the constitutionality of section 443.130, claiming that it violates due process, equal protection, unlawful takings, and the excessive fines clauses of the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. This Court, in its prior decision in this same matter, declared that First National’s constitutional arguments “are not real or substantial.” 17 This Court will not review those arguments a second time because “[a] previous holding is the law of the case, precluding re-litigation of issues on remand and subsequent appeal.”18
IV.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH, TEITELMAN and RUSSELL, JJ., concur.
PRICE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; LYNCH, Sp.J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
LIMBAUGH, J., not participating.

. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted.

. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). See also Rule 74.04.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Garr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 2004).

. Section 443.130. It should be noted that the statute was amended in 2004, changing, inter alia, the fifteen-day response time to forty-five days.

. Garr, 137 S.W.3d at 460.

. Id.

. Brown v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 150 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Mo. banc 2004).

. Garr, 137 S.W.3d at 460; Brown, 150 S.W.3d at 288.

. Brown, 150 S.W.3d at 288.

. Garr, 137 S.W.3d at 460.

. Brown, 150 S.W.3d at 288.

. Garr, 137 S.W.3d at 460.

. Although it attempts to couch its argument as being in conformity with First National’s, the dissenting opinion of Judge Lynch plays the role of advocate and puts forth an argument not offered by either party. The distinc*668tion this dissent attempts to make between what constitutes a demand versus a request, a distinction that the parties apparently felt had no merit, is little more than form over substance. The Glasses’ letter more than adequately articulates the Glasses' formal legal claim to the deed and for First National to feign ignorance is incomprehensible.

. Glass v. First Nat. Bank of St. Louis, N.A. 186 S.W.3d 766 (Mo. banc 2005).

. Williams v. Rimes, 25 S.W.3d 150, 153— 154 (Mo. banc 2000).