Court Opinion

ID: 9380966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:06:55.920161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.655814
License: Public Domain

J-A03002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    KENSEY SHANFELT                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED                       :   No. 1804 EDA 2022
    INSURANCE COMPANY                          :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County Civil Division at No(s):
                                  No. 21-1614

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED MARCH 21, 2023

        Appellant Kensey Shanfelt (“Appellant”) appeals from the June 29,

2022, order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County, which

granted Appellee Progressive Advanced Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”)

motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Appellant’s complaint for

declaratory judgment in its entirety with prejudice. After a careful review, we

affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On July 23,

2021, Appellant filed a complaint against Progressive seeking a declaratory

judgment that she is entitled to stacked Underinsured Motorist Benefits.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant alleged that, on June 4, 2012, her father, Kenneth W. Shanfelt (“Mr.

Shanfelt”), purchased an automobile insurance policy (“the policy”) from

Progressive, which identified Mr. Shanfelt as the named insured with Appellant

and her mother, Holly J. Shanfelt (“Mrs. Shanfelt”), as insured drivers. The

policy listed three covered vehicles: a 2010 Ford Focus, a 2008 Ford Escape,

and a 2000 Ford Taurus. Appellant averred that at all relevant times she

resided with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Shanfelt. She also averred the three

listed vehicles were owned by Mr. and Mrs. Shanfelt.

      The policy’s declaration page outlined Underinsured Motorist Benefits in

the amount of $100,000 each person/$300,000 each accident separately for

all three automobiles listed in the policy.   However, on June 4, 2012, Mr.

Shanfelt, the named insured, executed an Underinsured Motorist Stacking

Waiver. Neither Mrs. Shanfelt nor Appellant executed an Underinsured

Motorist Stacking Waiver related to the policy.

      Thereafter, twice in 2015, Mr. Shanfelt requested vehicles be removed

from the policy and replaced with different vehicles. Each time, no additional

changes were made to the policy, and another Underinsured Motorist Stacking

Waiver was not executed.

      Appellant alleged that, on June 12, 2017, Mrs. Shanfelt and Appellant

purchased a 2013 Ford Edge. She asserted Mr. Shanfelt was not an owner of

the 2013 Ford Edge. Appellant averred Mrs. Shanfelt requested that one of

the vehicles, which was owned by Mr. Shanfelt and Mrs. Shanfelt, be removed

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from the policy, and the 2013 Ford Edge, which was owned by Appellant and

Mrs. Shanfelt, be added to the policy. No further changes were made to the

policy. Neither Appellant nor Mrs. Shanfelt executed an Underinsured Motorist

Stacking Waiver.

      On April 13, 2021, while Appellant was operating the 2013 Ford Edge in

Lehigh Township, she was struck by another driver, Shelly Carney (“Ms.

Carney”), who was operating a 2019 Nissan Rogue. Appellant alleged she

suffered serious and permanent injuries from the accident. Ms. Carney had an

automobile insurance policy with Geico Secure Insurance Company (“Geico”),

which provided for      a bodily injury     liability limit of $100,000     each

person/$300,000 each accident. Geico tendered to Appellant the individual

policy limit of $100,000.

      Appellant then made a demand of stacked Underinsured Motorist

Benefits in the amount of $300,000 from Progressive; however, Progressive

denied the demand. Accordingly, Appellant filed the instant complaint seeking

a declaration that she is entitled to stacked Underinsured Motorist Benefits in

the amount of $300,000 as it relates to the April 13, 2021, motor vehicle

collision.

      On September 27, 2021, Progressive filed an answer with new matter.

As it relates to the three vehicles initially listed in the policy (the 2010 Ford

Focus, the 2008 Ford Escape, and the 2000 Ford Taurus), Progressive averred

“[t]he owners of the vehicles are not identified by the application and hence

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the remaining allegations [regarding ownership] are denied.” Progressive’s

Answer with New Matter, filed 9/27/21, at ¶ 6. As to Appellant’s assertions

she resided with Mr. and Mrs. Shanfelt; Appellant and Mrs. Shanfelt were

exclusively the owners of the 2013 Ford Edge; and, Mr. and Mrs. Shanfelt

were the sole owners of prior vehicles listed on the policy, Progressive

responded as follows: “[a]fter reasonable investigation, answering defendant

is unable to admit or deny these allegations and will insist upon strict proof of

same at the time of trial.” Id. at ¶¶ 8, 16, 18, 19.

      In its new matter, Progressive asserted the named insured, Mr.

Shanfelt, signed a valid Section 1738 stacking rejection on June 4, 2012, and

a new stacking waiver is not required when a vehicle listed in the policy is

replaced by another vehicle. Thus, Progressive argued stacking is not available

pursuant to the policy at issue.

      On July 27, 2022, Progressive filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Progressive averred it is undisputed the named insured, Mr.

Shanfelt, executed a valid waiver of stacked Underinsured Motorist Benefits

on June 14, 2012, with three vehicles listed in the policy. Progressive further

averred it is undisputed that, twice in 2015 and once in 2017, vehicles were

removed and added; however, each time, three vehicles remained listed in

the policy. Progressive asserted that “[a]t all relevant times since the waiver

form was signed the policy issued by Progressive insured three vehicles with

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$100,000      per   person/$300,000            per   accident   non-stacked   benefits.”

Progressive’s Motion, filed 7/27/22, at ¶ 12.

       Progressive asserted “[t]he declarations pages issued by Progressive in

force at the time of the loss noted that the coverages for the three listed

vehicles, which included the 2013 Ford Edge…, was non-stacked.” Id. at ¶ 13.

Accordingly, Progressive contended that, since the initial waiver of stacking

form was in effect at the time of Appellant’s accident, she is not entitled to

the stacking of Underinsured Motorist Benefits such that Progressive is entitled

to judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law.

       On February 18, 2022, Appellant filed a reply in opposition to

Progressive’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therein, Appellant

averred the trial court should deny Progressive’s motion since (1) there is a

dispute regarding material issues of fact (i.e., ownership of the vehicles

subject to the policy), and (2) Progressive is not otherwise entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

       On June 29, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting Progressive’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings1 and dismissing Appellant’s complaint

for declaratory judgment in its entirety with prejudice. The trial court filed an

____________________________________________

1 It is well-settled that “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to
a demurrer. It may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Southwestern
Energy Production Co. v. Forest Resources, LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 185
(Pa.Super. 2013) (quotation omitted).

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opinion in support of its order on that same date. This timely appeal followed.

On August 1, 2022, the trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement,2 and Appellant timely complied on August 17, 2022.

       In her court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant raised the

following issues (verbatim):

       1. The trial court erred by granting Defendant’s Motion for
          Judgment on the Pleadings because:
              a. The Order and Amended Memorandum Opinion are
                 contrary to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
                 and Pennsylvania public policy;
              b. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law permits
                 intrapolicy stacking of underinsured motorist benefits;
              c. Any waiver of stacking was void based upon the failure
                 of the Defendant/Appellee to request and receive
                 updated waivers when the policy was amended on April
____________________________________________

2 We note Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3) provides as follows:
      (3) Contents of order. The judge’s order directing the filing and
      service of a Statement shall specify:
      (i) the number of days after the date of entry of the judge’s order
      within which the appellant must file and serve the Statement;
      (ii) that the Statement shall be filed of record;
      (iii) that the Statement shall be served on the judge pursuant to
      paragraph (b)(1) and both the place the appellant can serve the
      Statement in person and the address to which the appellant can
      mail the Statement. In addition, the judge may provide an email,
      facsimile, or other alternative means for the appellant to serve the
      Statement on the judge; and
      (iv) that any issue not properly included in the Statement timely
      filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be deemed
      waived.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3) (italics in original).
      In the case sub judice, the trial court’s order complies with Subsection
1925(b)(3) in all respects. Further, we note the certified docket entries reveal
the Prothonotary served the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order upon Appellant in
accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 236.

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                 23, 2015, and July 2, 2015, to add and/or remove
                 vehicles from the policy;
              d. Any waiver of stacking was void based upon the failure
                 of the Defendant/Appellee to offer Plaintiff/Appellant a
                 new waiver when the policy was amended on April 23,
                 2015, and July 2, 2015, to add and/or remove vehicles
                 from the policy;
              e. Any waiver of stacking was void because the vehicle
                 added to the policy was owned by a person who was not
                 previously the owner of any vehicle insured under the
                 policy, thereby requiring the Defendant/Appellee to
                 obtain a new waiver; and
              f. Th[e] Court erred by failing to distinguish between the
                 legal requirements for obtaining a waiver for a
                 replacement vehicle rather than a vehicle owned by
                 different persons, including a person not previously
                 insured under the policy.

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 8/17/22, at 1-2. The trial court filed

a Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 24, 2022.

       On appeal, Appellant contends the following:

       I.     The trial court prematurely granted judgment on the
              pleadings without permitting the parties to conduct
              discovery on the disputed factual issues relating to the
              addition of a new vehicle on the motor vehicle insurance
              policy.

Appellant’s Brief at 10 (bold omitted).3

____________________________________________

3 While Appellant phrased her issue slightly different in the “Statement of the
Question Involved” portion of her brief, the issue we set forth is from the
Argument heading of her brief. As discussed infra, the entire Argument portion
of Appellant’s brief is dedicated to her averment the trial court erred in failing
to order additional discovery to resolve alleged disputed issues of material
facts. Thus, to the extent Appellant’s “Statement of the Question Involved”
raises a different issue than the one developed in the Argument portion of her
brief, absent relevant argument, we find it to be waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

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      Appellant contends there are genuine issues of material fact, and

Progressive improperly filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings prior to

the completion of discovery. Id. at 11. She suggests that, during oral

argument on Progressive’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, she

requested discovery regarding the ownership of the vehicles in the policy,

including the 2013 Ford Edge, as well as for discussions between Progressive’s

agent and Appellant “when the vehicle was added to the policy.” Id. at 12.

Appellant asserts the trial court did not have sufficient information to answer

the pertinent legal questions regarding Appellant’s right to Underinsured

Motorists Benefits since the issues “arise from facts not currently known

because of the lack of discovery.” Id. at 13. Consequently, Appellant contends

that, since factual issues remain to be resolved, “this Court should vacate the

grant of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and remand for further

discovery.” Id. at 16.

      Preliminarily, we address whether Appellant has properly preserved her

appellate issue for our review. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) provides, in relevant part,

“[i]ssues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with

the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

As this Court has recognized:

      Our Supreme Court intended the holding in [Commonwealth v.
      Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998),] to operate as a bright-line rule,
      such that failure to comply with the minimal requirements of
      Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues
      raised....Indeed, our Supreme Court does not countenance

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      anything less than stringent application of waiver pursuant to Rule
      1925(b)[.]

Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d

222, 224 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (some citations and internal quotation

marks omitted; emphasis in original).

      Moreover, in interpreting Rule 1925(b), our Supreme Court recently held

as follows:

             The purpose of a Rule 1925(b) statement is to facilitate
      appellate review and to provide the parties and the public with the
      legal basis for a judicial decision. To this end, Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii)
      provides that the Rule 1925(b) statement “shall concisely identify
      each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail
      to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P.
      1925(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added). Highlighting this need for
      conciseness, Rule 1925(b)(4)(iv) indicates that the Rule 1925(b)
      statement “should not be redundant or provide lengthy
      explanations as to any error.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv). On the
      other hand, the Rule 1925(b) statement cannot be too concise, as
      it must properly specify the errors to be addressed on
      appeal....Pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(5)(vii), “[i]ssues not included
      in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the
      provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”
             To ensure that a Rule 1925(b) statement is both concise but
      also sufficiently detailed to identify all of the issues desired to be
      raised on appeal, Rule 1925(b)(4)(v) provides that “[e]ach error
      identified in the Statement will be deemed to include every
      subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial court[.]” Pa.R.A.P.
      1925(b)(4)(v) (emphasis added).
                                      ***
            The text of these rules emphasizes that to be “subsidiary
      issues,” the unstated issue must be “included” within the stated
      issue….Conversely, an unstated issue is not subsidiary when it is
      separate and distinct from the stated issue.

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Commonwealth v. Price, 284 A.3d 165, 170-71 (Pa. 2022) (citations,

quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

         In the case sub judice, Appellant’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b)

statement made no reference to the trial court prematurely granting

Progressive’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or the trial court’s failure

to order additional discovery to resolve alleged disputed issues of material

fact.4    See Price, supra. Consequently, we find Appellant has waived for

appellate review her sole issue developed in her brief,5 and, thus, we affirm.

         Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

____________________________________________

4 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, which incorporated the June 29, 2022, opinion,
the trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, Progressive was entitled to
judgment on the pleadings. The trial court did not address the issue raised in
Appellant’s brief regarding whether additional discovery was required to
resolve disputed issues of material fact.

5 In accordance with Price, supra, we conclude the issue raised in Appellant’s
brief is not a “subsidiary issue” of the issues presented in her Rule 1925(b)
statement. That is, whether the trial court should have ordered additional
discovery to resolve disputed issues of material fact is not “included” within
the issues raised by Appellant in her Rule 1925(b) statement; but rather, it is
separate and distinct from the stated issues as set forth supra.

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