Court Opinion

ID: 9428308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:23.95227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:06.880717
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
concurring.
In 1888 this Court reversed a decree enjoining the construction of a bridge over a navigable river. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1. The Court’s opinion in that case did not question the right of the private parties to seek relief in a federal court; rather, the Court held that no federal rule of law prohibited the obstruction of the navigable water*299way.1 Congress responded to the Willamette case in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 by creating a federal prohibition of such obstructions absent a permit from the Secretary of War. 26 Stat. 426, 454. At the time the statute was enacted, I believe the lawyers in Congress simply assumed that private parties in a position comparable to that of the litigants in the Willamette case would have a remedy for any injury suffered by reason of a violation of the new federal statute.2 For at that time the implication of private causes *300of action was a well-known practice at common law and in American courts.3 Therefore, in my view, the Members of Congress merely assumed that the federal courts would follow the ancient maxim “ubi jus, ibi remedium” and imply a private right of action. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39-40.4 Accordingly, if I were writing on a clean slate, I would hold that an implied remedy is available to respondents under this statute.
*301The slate, however, is not clean. Because the problem of ascertaining legislative intent that is not expressed in legislation is often so difficult, the Court has wisely developed rules to guide judges in deciding whether a federal remedy is implicitly a part of a federal statute. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, all of my present colleagues subscribed to a unanimous formulation of those rules, and in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, a majority of the Court joined my attempt to explain the application of those rules in that case. The Cort v. Ash analysis is therefore a part of our law.5
In these cases, I believe the Court correctly concludes that application of the Cort v. Ash analysis indicates that no private cause of action is available. I think it is more important to adhere to the analytical approach the Court has adopted than to base my vote on my own opinion about what Congress probably assumed in 1890. Cf. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Asm., 450 U. S. 147, 151 (Stevens, J., concurring). I therefore join Justice White’s opinion for the Court.

 The Willamette Court explained the issue presented as follows:
“The gravamen of the bill was, the obstruction of the navigation of the Willamette River by the defendants, by the erection of the bridge which they were engaged in building. The defendants pleaded the authority of the state legislature for the erection of the bridge. The court held that the work was not done in conformity with the requirements of the state law; but whether it were or not, it lacked the assent of Congress, which assent the court held was necessary in view of that provision in the act of Congress admitting Oregon as a State, which has been referred to. The court held that this provision of the act was tantamount to a declaration that the navigation of the Willamette River should not be obstructed or interfered with; and that any such obstruction or interference, without the consent of Congress, whether by state sanction or not, was a violation of the act of Congress; and that the obstruction complained of was in violation of said act. And this is the principal and important question in this case, namely, whether the erection of a bridge over the Willamette River at Portland was a violation of said act of Congress. If it was not, if it could not be, if the act did not apply to obstructions of this kind, then the case did not arise under the constitution or laws of the United States, unless under some other law referred to in the bill.” 125 U. S., at 7-8.

 The then-current edition of Cooley’s treatise on the Law of Torts 790 (2d ed. 1888) described the common-law remedy for breach of a statutory duty in this way:
“[W]hen the duty imposed by statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individuals, the common law, when an individual is injured by a breach of the duty, will supply a remedy, if the statute gives none.”
A few years earlier this Court quoted with approval an opinion by Judge Cooley in support of its holding that a railroad’s breach of a stat*300utory duty to fence its right-of-way gave an injured party an implied damages remedy. See Hayes v. Michigan Central B. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 240.

 See Anonymous, 6 Mod. 27, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (1703) (per Holt, C. J.); 2 E. Coke, Institutes on the Laws of England 55 (6th ed. 1681); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *23, *51, *109, *123; 1 Comyns’ Digest 433-445 (1822); Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854). In Comyns’ Digest, at 442, the rule was broadly stated:
“So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.”

 As Justice Frankfurter stated in dissent in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 261-262:
“Courts, unlike administrative agencies, are organs with historic antecedents which bring with them well-defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U. S. 548; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515; Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282. A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a formulated sanction. When Congress has ‘left the matter at large for judicial determination,’ our function is to decide what remedies are appropriate in the light of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes by which courts compel performance of legal obligations. See Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 351. If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; cf. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1.”

 In a separate concurrence in this case, four Members of the Court have undertaken to explain the legal effect of certain “implied right of action” opinions decided more recently than Cort v. Ash. As The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, Justice Rehnquist, and I noted in our separate opinion in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 408, n. 1, “it is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can speak for the Court” or give an authoritative explanation of the meaning of its judgments.