Court Opinion

ID: 9408799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 18:03:46.804639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:46.919681
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/13/23 P. v. MacFarland CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         A165503
 v.
 CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL                                                     (Del Norte County
 MACFARLAND,                                                             Super. Ct. No. CRF-19-9209)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Christopher Michael MacFarland appeals after a jury
convicted him of possession of child pornography and found true additional
allegations that he had a prior conviction requiring him to register as a sex
offender. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by giving instructions
that reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof as to the prior conviction
allegations, requiring reversal of the jury’s true findings as to those
allegations. We affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         The People charged defendant with two counts of possession of matter
depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct (hereafter “possession of child

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pornography”) (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)1) and further alleged as to each
count that defendant had previously been convicted of offenses requiring
registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act (§ 311.11, subd. (b)).
The People also alleged these prior convictions qualified as “strikes.” The
following is a brief summary of the trial evidence.
      In June 2017, Del Norte County Sheriff’s deputies executed a search
warrant at defendant’s home. The deputies seized defendant’s cellphone from
his person and his HP laptop. The cellphone contained videos showing
defendant sneaking around his home, filming a child going to the bathroom
and taking a shower, and various photos of a child’s buttocks. There were
indicia that a number of searches for child pornography were performed on
the HP laptop, which contained images of child pornography. The number of
images and searches on the laptop indicated the images were not the result of
“pop-ups” or involuntary redirection by websites to other websites.
      In May 2019, Del Norte County Sheriff’s deputies executed another
search warrant of defendant’s home and seized a Dell laptop. There were
indicia that searches for child pornography were performed on the laptop,
which contained over 300 images of child pornography and/or pornography
involving “age questionable” persons. The sheer number of images made it
unlikely they were the product of “pop-ups” or website redirection.
      With regard to the prior conviction allegations, a retired captain of the
Coos County Sheriff’s Office in Oregon testified that in 2003, when defendant
was roughly 21 years old, defendant admitted he “sexually abus[ed]” E.R. and
K.R., who were around nine to ten years old. Another retired Coos County
Sheriff’s deputy testified that in 2002, defendant admitted inappropriately

1
      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

                                       2
touching C.S. and A.B., who were around seven years old. The People
presented evidence that defendant was charged and convicted of two counts
of sexual abuse in the first degree and two counts of attempted sexual abuse
in the first degree in connection with these investigations. Detective Asbury
of the Del Norte County Sheriff’s Office testified that due to his Oregon
convictions for first degree sexual abuse, defendant was required to register
as a sex offender under California’s Sex Offender Registration Act, and that
he was so required when both the 2017 and 2019 warrants were executed.
      The trial court instructed the jury with several CALCRIM instructions,
including CALCRIM No. 220 that the People’s burden of proof as to the
charges was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That instruction further
relayed that whenever the court told the jury that the People must prove
something, the People must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless
specifically instructed otherwise. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard was reiterated several times in other instructions, including the
instruction concerning the additional prior conviction allegations. As
relevant here, CALCRIM No. 1145 set out the elements of the charged
possession of child pornography offenses, then told the jury the following
concerning the prior conviction allegation: “If you find the defendant guilty of
this crime as charged in Count 1 or 2, you must then decide whether the
People have proved the additional allegation. You must decide whether the
People have proved this allegation for each crime beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . . To prove the prior conviction allegation, the People must prove that the
defendant has at least one prior conviction for committing or attempting to
commit an offense requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration
Act, . . . specifically: Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, in violation of the
Oregon Revised Statutes, 163.427.”

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      CALCRIM No. 375 instructed that the jury could, but need not,
consider the evidence of the uncharged Oregon offenses for the limited
purpose of deciding identity, intent, motive, knowledge, lack of mistake or
accident, and existence of a plan. Similarly, CALCRIM No. 1191A told the
jury it could, but need not, consider the evidence of the uncharged offenses of
sexual abuse in the first degree and attempted sexual abuse in the first
degree—i.e., the Oregon offenses—to conclude defendant was “disposed or
inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude
that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit” the charged crimes
of possession of child pornography. Both CALCRIM Nos. 375 and 1191A
instructed the jury it could consider the uncharged offenses for the purposes
set forth in those instructions only if the People proved the uncharged
offenses by a preponderance of the evidence. They also told the jury that if it
did conclude defendant committed the uncharged offenses, that conclusion
was not sufficient to prove the charged offenses, and the People must still
prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The jury convicted defendant of both charged counts and found true the
additional allegations that defendant had at least one prior conviction for
committing or attempting to commit sexual abuse in the first degree. After
the jury rendered its verdict, the trial court addressed the bifurcated issue of
the alleged prior strike convictions and found the strike allegations true. The
court sentenced defendant to consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the two
counts. Defendant appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Defendant argues the instructions violated his due process rights
because they were confusing and allowed the jury to find the prior conviction

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allegations true if the prosecution proved them only by a preponderance of
the evidence. As we will explain, we find no error.
      “ ‘ “ ‘A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to
erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the
defendant.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 905.) A
reviewing court reads the instructions as a whole to determine whether there
is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an
impermissible manner. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803
(Wilson).) In assessing the probable impact of the instructions on the jury,
we also consider the arguments of trial counsel. (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1202 (Young).) We presume the jurors understood and
correctly applied the instructions. (Wilson, supra, at p. 803; see, e.g., People
v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016.) We review the claim of
instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
      As a preliminary matter, we observe the record does not reflect any
inquiries from the jury regarding the application of the instructions presently
at issue, and no objections by defendant’s trial counsel on the grounds
presently raised. “[I]f the instructions were susceptible of the interpretation
defendant now asserts, counsel likely would have objected at trial on this
basis. Such omissions suggest ‘ “the potential for [confusion] argued now was
not apparent to one on the spot.” ’ ” (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)
      More to the point, CALCRIM No. 1145, which covered both the
elements of the charged offenses and the additional prior conviction
allegations, read: “The defendant is charged in Counts 1 and 2 with
possessing [child pornography] in violation of . . . section 311.11(a). [¶] To
prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

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[¶] 1. The defendant possessed or controlled matter that contained an image
of a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct; [¶] 2. The
defendant knew that he possessed or controlled the matter; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. The defendant knew that the matter contained an image of a minor
personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct. [¶] . . . [¶] If you find
the defendant guilty of this crime as charged in Count 1 or 2, you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation. You must
decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime beyond a
reasonable doubt and return a separate finding for each crime. To prove the
prior conviction allegation, the People must prove that the defendant has at
least one prior conviction for committing or attempting to commit an offense
requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act, or an attempt
to commit such an offense, specifically: Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, in
violation of the Oregon Revised Statues, 163.427.” (Italics added.) This
instruction clearly told the jury that the prosecution had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had at least one prior
conviction requiring sex offender registration.
      Turning to CALCRIM No. 375 and CALCRIM No. 1191A, those
instructions plainly told the jury that a different standard of proof—proof by
a preponderance of the evidence—applied if the jury were to consider the
evidence concerning the uncharged offenses for the purpose of concluding
defendant had the propensity to commit the charged offenses, or for the
purpose of deciding identity, intent, motive, knowledge, lack of mistake or
accident, and existence of a plan. Nothing in these instructions authorized
the jury to use the preponderance standard for anything other than
considering the uncharged acts for the narrow purposes set out in the
instructions. Both instructions also reiterated that the People still needed to

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prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. And beyond the
above-mentioned language in CALCRIM No. 1145, another instruction made
clear that whenever the People must prove something, that meant the People
needed to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless otherwise specified. On
this record, we do not find it reasonably likely the jury understood it could
make true findings as to the prior conviction allegations if the People proved
them only by a preponderance of the evidence.
      Consideration of the arguments of counsel only solidifies that
conclusion. During closing argument, the prosecutor briefly discussed the
Oregon offenses and the instructions that allowed the jury to consider that
evidence as propensity evidence or as evidence to support facts such as
motive and lack of mistake in determining whether defendant was guilty of
the charged offenses of possessing child pornography. After discussing this
with the jury, the prosecutor said: “But, of course, the prior offenses are only
one factor to consider. I’ve got to prove everything else beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Italics added.) Then during his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor
delineated the differing standards applicable if the jury were to use the
uncharged Oregon offenses and convictions as proof supporting the current
charges, and if the jury were to use the Oregon convictions to find true the
additional allegations that defendant had prior convictions that required him
to register as a sex offender: “So we have to prove that by a preponderance of
the evidence if you are going to use it for evidence to prove that these current
charges happened. But we have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt if
you are going to find that he was required to register as a sex offender, based
on those convictions.”
      True, defense counsel stated during his closing argument that the prior
convictions “require a preponderance of the evidence.” But he proceeded to

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clarify that the jury could consider the Oregon offenses after finding them
true by a preponderance of the evidence if the jury would be using them to
support the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed
the charged counts of possessing child pornography. Viewed together with
the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument, it is not reasonably likely the
jury understood the instructions in the manner defendant posits.
      Contrary to defendant’s next claim, the verdict forms do not assist his
position. The verdict forms for the additional allegation as to count 1 read:
“We the jury, having found the defendant guilty of Count 1, beyond a
reasonable doubt we find the additional allegation alleged against defendant
. . . : [¶] TRUE that the defendant had at least one prior conviction for
committing or attempting to commit Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, in
violation of Oregon Revised Statute 163.427.” (Bold omitted.) The verdict
form for the additional allegation as to count 2 was materially identical.
Defendant argues a reasonable juror would have read the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” language as describing the finding of guilt on Count One.
But even defendant acknowledges the comma placement suggests the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied to the additional
allegation. In any case, under either interpretation, and considered along
with the aforementioned instructions and arguments, the verdict forms are
either neutral in our assessment of the jury’s understanding of the
instructions, or they bolster the improbability that the jury understood the
instruction in the manner asserted by defendant.
      Defendant argues People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178 (Cruz)
supports his claim of error. But Cruz is inapposite. In Cruz, the challenged
instruction told the jury: “ ‘In determining whether defendant has been
proved guilty of any sexual crime of which he is charged, you should consider

                                       8
all relevant evidence, including whether the defendant committed any other
sexual crimes, whether charged or uncharged . . . .” (Italics added.) The
instruction continued: “ ‘If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant committed any such other sexual offense you may, but are not
required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual
offenses. [¶] If you find that the defendant had this disposition you may, but
are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the
crime or crimes of which he is accused.’ ” (Cruz, at pp. 1183–1184, italics
added.)
      The Cruz court concluded this instruction violated the implied rule in
People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Villatoro), that charged offenses
could be used to show propensity to prove other charged offenses if the People
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1185–1186.) Cruz also indicated the instructions “presented the jury with
a nearly impossible task of juggling competing standards of proof during
different phases of its consideration of the same evidence” because: “In effect,
the instruction given here told the jury it should first consider whether the
offenses charged in counts 1, 2, and 3 had been established by a
preponderance of the evidence, while holding its ultimate decision on the
same offenses in suspension. Then the jury was required to decide whether
the preponderance finding showed a propensity, and whether this propensity,
in combination with the other evidence, proved those offenses a second time,
this time beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 1185–1187.)
      In this case, unlike Cruz, defendant is not complaining about
instructions permitting the use of charged offenses as propensity evidence to
prove other charged offenses. (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184.)
Indeed, as to charged offenses, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 1191B

                                       9
which—in line with Cruz and Villatoro—instructed the jury that if the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
either of the crimes charged in counts 1 and 2 (i.e., possessing child
pornography), then the jury could infer defendant’s propensity to commit the
other charged offense.
      In essence, defendant appears to be complaining that the instructions
permitted use of uncharged offenses as evidence of propensity and other
facts, though the convictions for those uncharged Oregon offenses were the
basis for the additional prior conviction allegations under section 311.11,
subdivision (b). But again, the jury here was clearly instructed that the
preponderance standard applied to the potential use of the uncharged Oregon
offenses for the limited purpose of proving propensity or other material facts
such as motive and lack of mistake. Moreover, the jury was expressly
instructed that if it found defendant guilty of either count 1 or 2, then it must
decide whether defendant had at least one prior conviction requiring him to
register as a sex offender, and the People needed to prove this additional
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. In effect, and in contrast with Cruz,
the instructions in this case told the jury it should first consider whether the
uncharged Oregon offenses had been established by a preponderance of the
evidence before deciding whether such offenses showed a propensity, and
whether this propensity evidence, in combination with the other evidence,
proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Then only if the jury
found defendant guilty of counts 1 or 2, could the jury proceed to decide
whether the People proved—beyond a reasonable doubt—the additional
allegation that defendant had a prior conviction requiring sex offense
registration.

                                       10
      We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant’s belated reliance on People
v. Quintanilla (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 572, which he cites for the first time in
his reply brief. Quintanilla held that a charged domestic violence offense
cannot be used as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1109.
(Quintanilla, at pp. 575, 582–583.) Among the court’s reasons for so
concluding was its belief that the Legislature did not mean “for juries to
weigh the evidence supporting domestic violence charges under two different
standards of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt on each charged offense, but
preponderance of the evidence for purposes of assessing a defendant’s
propensity.” (Id. at p. 583.) Because the trial court had “told the jury to
consider charged offenses under the preponderance standard for purposes of
drawing a propensity inference, while also weighing the same evidence under
the reasonable doubt standard for purposes of deciding Quintanilla’s guilt on
each charge,” Quintanilla commented “[s]uch mental gymnastics may or may
not be beyond a jury’s ability to perform.” (Ibid.)
      Notably, the California Supreme Court subsequently held that a
charged sex offense can be used as propensity evidence under Evidence Code
section 1108—a provision parallel to Evidence Code section 1109—and it
disapproved of Quintanilla to the extent it was inconsistent with that
holding. (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1162–1164, fn. 5.) Villatoro then
upheld a modified instruction that allowed the jury to use charged offenses to
draw an inference of propensity if they were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Id. at pp. 1167–1168.) In sum, defendant’s reliance on Quintanilla is
misplaced, and the instructions given in this case do not contravene Villatoro.
      In conclusion, we do not find a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instructions to permit true findings as to the prior conviction
allegations under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Finding no

                                       11
error, we need not address defendant’s claim that the alleged error requires
reversal. (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)
                                     DISPOSITION
         The judgment is affirmed.

                                        _________________________
                                        Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. MacFarland (A165503)

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