Court Opinion

ID: 9648163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:06:48.385876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.764510
License: Public Domain

*20ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
Mr. Justice Culver
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State in its motion for rehearing takes the position that under the'1913 deed from Swearingen and Follensbee to Hirsch and Wells the dedication of the property referred to as the park or parkway being “to the public” was irrevocable under the circumstances in this case. The State further insists that the attempted rededication in 1915 executed by Rincon Improvement Company by Hazen Follensbee, Vice-President, dedicating the property “to and for the use of the public forever, for the use of the public as a public park,” and the instrument executed in 1917 by Swearingen and Follensbee declaring that the intention of the dedicators in the 1913 deed was that the strip of land be dedicated “to the public use for park purposes only” could not operate to limit the easement and the general right already vested “in the public.” They rely on Lamar County v. Clements, 49 Texas 347, 354; Adams v. Rowles, 149 Texas 52, 228 S.W. 2d 849; Fort Worth & D. S. P. Ry. Co. v. Judd, (Texas Civ. App. 4 S.W. 2d 1032, wr. dism.) ; City of Corsicana v. Zorn, 97 Texas 317, 78 S.W. 924. These cases assert the general rule that where lots are sold with reference to a recorded plat then as against' purchasers of such lots the dedication is irrevocable, absent consent by those purchasers. That undoubtedly is a sound statement of the law but we are not concerned here with that proposition.
In the first place we say that the dedication “to the public” would seem to indicate a use and enjoyment of the property by the general public, as for a meeting place' or for some kind of diversion. Secondly, the instruments executed in 1915 and 1917 do not attempt revocation but rather purport to explain what was meant by dedication “to the public.” Presumably these instruments have been of record during all of these years and while the record does not show any express consent or concurrence by subsequent purchasers, neither are any objections alleged to have been raised. It is difficult to see how the rights of such purchasers might thus have been infringed upon in any manner. For example, the following statement appears in 26 C.J.S., Dedication, Sec. 46a (3), p. 500:
■ “Thus, when nothing appears in the act of dedication to indicate for what particular use the donation of land is made to the public, parol evidence is admissible to define and limit any purpose for which it was in fact' devoted.”
*21This case comes to us on the pleadings. The only matters of evidence shown in the record are the documents attached to the plaintiff’s petition as exhibits. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals in its ruling that the pleas in abatement filed by the State and the City are to be treated in the nature of exceptions to the merits of the alleged cause of action and therefore all of the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition are to be .taken as true. Our decision here generally is to be construed only as holding that the respondent, Clark, has stated a cause of action.
The City calls our attention to the fact that a portion of the real estate used here for tourist court purposes was never at any time owned by the original grantors who purported to make the dedication, but was derived from other sources. We do not attempt here to pass upon the effect of that fact on Clark’s claim for damages.
We might say that in the absence of maps or plats of the property claimed to have been owned by Clark giving lot and block numbers and showing its relation to streets and highways, it has been quite difficult to understand the lay of the land, which may account for some of the immaterial errors, the parties say, we have made in summarizing the facts, such as our reference to Timón Boulevard as being a part of Highway 181 since that highway was rerouted in 1951 so that now it embraces only that portion of Timón Boulevard where the bridge and its approaches are being* constructed.
All motions for rehearing are overruled.
Opinion delivered July 6, 1960.