Court Opinion

ID: 9372405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 16:00:52.43734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.225149
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10856    Document: 32-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10856
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RAYMOND MALARA, III,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00066-KKM-AAS-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10856         Document: 32-1        Date Filed: 02/21/2023         Page: 2 of 7

       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-10856

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Raymond Malara, III, pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written
       plea agreement containing a sentence-appeal waiver, to one count
       of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, fentanyl, and
       marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). The
       district court sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment and 36
       months’ supervised release. On appeal, he argues that his trial
       counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a relevant conduct
       objection at sentencing when the district court held him
       accountable for 111.6 grams of methamphetamine sold to a co-
       conspirator. 1

       1 As part of the plea agreement, Malara admitted to the following facts.
       Between October 2020, and February 2021, law enforcement agents
       intercepted calls between Malara and several co-conspirators on authorized
       wiretaps, during which Malara and others discussed the purchase, distribution,
       and sale of controlled substances. From the intercepted calls, agents identified
       Malara as a cocaine trafficker. When officers searched his apartment, they
       found a large quantity of cash, 250 grams of cocaine, and 396 grams of
       marijuana. They also searched a BMW parked outside the residence and
       found between 100-200 fentanyl pills, and approximately 4 kilograms of
       marijuana. In addition to describing the above offense conduct that Malara
       admitted to in the plea agreement, his presentence investigation report (“PSI”)
       also stated that he was accountable for 111.6 grams of methamphetamine (aka
       “Ice”) sold to a co-conspirator on January 5, 2021. Malara objected, arguing
       that the Ice substance was “exotic marijuana,” not methamphetamine.
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       22-10856                  Opinion of the Court                             3

              In response, the government has moved to dismiss Malara’s
       appeal based on the sentence-appeal waiver, arguing that Malara is
       recasting a sentencing challenge as an ineffective-assistance claim
       in order to avoid the valid sentence-appeal waiver. Alternatively,
       the government argues that we should not address the ineffective-
       assistance claim on direct appeal because it was not raised before
       the district court and the factual record is not developed. Malara
       responds that the sentence-appeal waiver does not encompass
       ineffective-assistance claims, and it does not bar the instant appeal.
               After review, we conclude that the sentence-appeal waiver
       is valid and enforceable. To the extent Malara challenges the
       district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines, his claim is
       barred by the appeal waiver. We decline to address his ineffective-
       assistance claim on direct appeal. Therefore, we grant the
       government’s motion to dismiss.
               “We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de
       novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
       2008). We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and
       voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294
       (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51
       (11th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made
       knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show that either
       (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the

       However, he did not raise a relevant conduct objection to the finding holding
       him accountable for the methamphetamine.
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                22-10856

       waiver during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that
       the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the
       waiver. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
             Malara’s plea agreement contained the following waiver:
             The defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction
             and authority to impose any sentence up to the
             statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to
             appeal defendant’s sentence on any ground, including
             the ground that the Court erred in determining the
             applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United
             States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground
             that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s applicable
             guidelines range as determined by the Court pursuant
             to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the
             ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory
             maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the
             sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the
             Constitution; provided, however, that if the
             government exercises its right to appeal the sentence
             imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), then
             the defendant is released from his waiver and may
             appeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C.
             § 3742(a).
       (emphasis in original). Malara signed the plea agreement and
       initialed each page.
             The record establishes that, at the change-of-plea hearing,
       the magistrate judge questioned Malara about the sentence-appeal
       waiver and the four limited grounds under which he could appeal
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       22-10856                 Opinion of the Court                                5

       notwithstanding the waiver. Malara stated that he understood and
       that he was entering the waiver freely and voluntarily.2 The
       magistrate judge recommended that the district court accept
       Malara’s guilty plea, which the district court did. Accordingly, the
       record establishes that Malara’s sentence-appeal waiver was
       knowingly and voluntarily made and is enforceable. Bushert, 997
       F.2d at 1351; see also United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333
       (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal waiver where “the waiver
       provision was referenced during [the defendant’s] Rule 11 plea
       colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that she understood the
       provision and that she entered into it freely and voluntarily”).
       Indeed, Malara does not contest the validity of the waiver. Instead,
       he argues that it did not encompass a waiver of his right to raise a
       Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Malara’s
       argument is unpersuasive.
              Where a valid appeal waiver exists, a defendant may not
       “circumvent the terms of the sentence-appeal waiver simply by
       recasting a challenge to his sentence as a claim of ineffective
       assistance, thus rendering the waiver meaningless.” Williams v.
       United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, we
       generally do not consider ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
       on direct appeal. United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th
       Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d
       1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim that counsel’s

       2 Malara consented to the magistrate judge conducting the plea proceeding.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10856

       ineffective assistance rendered a guilty plea involuntary was not
       barred by an appeal waiver but declining to reach the merits of the
       claim on direct appeal). Rather, the preferred method for raising
       ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is in a motion to vacate
       sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which affords the district court
       the chance to develop the facts necessary to determine the
       adequacy of representation. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
       504–05 (2003).
               Here, Malara argues that his counsel was ineffective for
       failing to raise a relevant conduct objection to the 111.6 grams of
       methamphetamine attributed to him. He maintains that the
       distribution of the methamphetamine was not relevant conduct for
       which he could be held accountable and, had counsel objected on
       this ground, there is a reasonable probability that he would have
       received a lesser sentence. Although Malara argues that his claim
       is not waived because the appeal waiver does not apply to claims
       of ineffective assistance of counsel, the government’s point that
       Malara has repackaged a sentencing challenge under the guise of
       an ineffective-assistance claim in an attempt to circumvent the
       appeal waiver is well taken. Thus, to the extent that Malara argues
       that the methamphetamine was not relevant conduct, his claim is
       barred by his valid and enforceable sentence-appeal waiver.
              As for Malara’s ineffective-assistance claim, we decline to
       consider the merits of this argument on direct appeal because it was
       not raised before the district court and the record is not developed
       enough to assess the adequacy of counsel’s representation.
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       22-10856                 Opinion of the Court                             7

       Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504–05; Bender, 290 F.3d at 1284 (“We will not
       generally consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised
       on direct appeal where the district court did not entertain the claim
       nor develop a factual record.”). Malara is free to bring this
       ineffective assistance claim anew in a § 2255 proceeding. 3
       Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.
              DISMISSED.

       3 We express no opinion as to whether the sentence-appeal waiver would
       otherwise bar claims of ineffective assistance at sentencing. That issue—if
       raised by the government in a § 2255 proceeding—is for the district court to
       address in the first instance.