Court Opinion

ID: 9694993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:03:24.418825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.494560
License: Public Domain

Neff, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately to express my belief that MCR 2.507(H) controls and provides all the necessary authority to enforce the settlement agreement in this case without disturbing well-established precedent and without unnecessarily inviting additional litigation.
The majority opinion adopts the reasoning of Capital Dredge & Dock Corp v Detroit, 800 F2d 525 (CA 6, 1986), and creates a new rule of law recognizing apparent authority of an attorney to bind a client in the context of settlement negotiations. The dissent in Capital Dredge points out strong Michigan precedent that ”raise[s] a substan*92tial question whether Michigan will follow the general rule allowing an attorney clothed in only apparent authority to compromise his client’s claim.” Id., p 534. In my view, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of apparent authority in this case.
The majority opinion states that there is an unresolved factual dispute between plaintiff and her attorney with regard to the attorney’s authority to settle, but concludes that the unresolved factual dispute is not dispositive of the issue before us. In my view, resolution of this factual dispute is certainly dispositive of this case. In addition, my review of the record reveals that the trial court adequately, though perhaps not artfully, resolved this dispute and, in effect, determined that plaintiff’s attorney had the actual authority to settle the case and that plaintiff merely had a change of heart. As noted in the majority opinion, at the hearing on defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court took no sworn testimony, but conducted a transcribed proceeding where it entertained the representations of plaintiff and both attorneys with regard to the events that occurred leading up to the settlement agreement and what was said between plaintiff and her attorney regarding the authority to settle. The trial court later entered a written opinion that details the dispute between plaintiff and her attorney, but then resolved the dispute by finding that plaintiff had a "change of heart.”1 This finding is not clearly erroneous._
*93Because I do not believe it necessary to create a new rule of law, one that is not supported by prior authority, I concur only with that portion of the majority opinion that relies on MCR 2.507(H) to conclude that a binding settlement agreement was reached between the parties. Litigants are not free to disregard a settlement agreement entered pursuant to this court rule in the absence of satisfactory evidence of mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage. Groulx v Carlson, 176 Mich App 484, 489, 492; 440 NW2d 644 (1989). There is no satisfactory evidence of mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage on the record before us and therefore no impediment to affirming the judgment of the trial court solely on the basis of MCR 2.507(H).

 The trial court’s, written opinion states in pertinent part:
The case Thomas v Michigan Mutual Insurance Co [138 Mich App 117; 358 NW2d 902 (1989)], provides controlling case law to the effect that defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is granted. Although a dispute may exist between Plaintiff and her attorney whether she did or did not accept the offer of $25,000.00 [sic] described to her over the phone, defense is correct when it argues it may properly rely upon a communication received from Plaintiff’s attorney that its settlement *93offer has been accepted. . . . The Court is satisfied that defense justifiably relied upon Plaintiff Attorney’s telephone and written communications that the “offer by defense for $20,000.00 was accepted. The facts in our present case are substantially similar to that in Thomas, supra, in that one attorney communicated to the other that its offer" was accepted. Further, the Court does not find that any fraud, duress, or misrepresentation by Defendant is alleged. America E. Nelson, M.D. states that she was concerned that additional medical testimony would show that her left knee also was suffering injury. However there is no showing that this concern was communicated to defense or even that this concern was communicated in writing to her own attorney or in some other way a verification that Attorney Bartnick understood that she was "conditionally” accepting the offer. This aspect remains a dispute between Plaintiff and her attorney as to whether she in fact orally told him that she had "conditional” concerns about her left knee. This allegation by Plaintiff is somewhat questioned in that during oral arguments on September 23, 1989 she expressed noteable [sic] "upset” in that her insurance attorney entered into a settlement with another plaintiff’s attorney involving an alleged dog attack by America E. Nelson’s dog against that plaintiff wherein the plaintiff received a settlement amount over $70,000.00. America E. Nelson, M.D. argued that if that settlement was entered for that amount, that she would be entitled to a similar settlement in the Consumers Power Company matter. As in Thomas, supra, this focus by America E. Nelson, M.D. is strongly indicative of a "change of heart” similar to what was found in the Thomas case.