Court Opinion

ID: 9368997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:08:36.912497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.100381
License: Public Domain

J-A27029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.W.E., JR., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: T.E., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1052 MDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Decree Entered June 27, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                                 2022-0080A

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

        T.E. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental rights

as to his minor child, T.W.E., Jr. (“Child”). We affirm.

        Child was born in September 2019. A few weeks after Child’s birth, York

County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“the Agency”) received a referral

regarding concerns about Child’s mother’s (“Mother”)1 ability to care for Child

due to mental health issues. Father was incarcerated at that time due to his

fourth DUI arrest and driving on a suspended license. N.T., 6/27/22, at 27.

Child was adjudicated dependent on October 1, 2019. Child was placed in the

custody of the Agency and in the care of his maternal grandmother (“Maternal

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   Mother is not a party to this appeal.
J-A27029-22

Grandmother”). Child has remained in this pre-adoptive home since that time.

Id. at 32-33, 43, 70.

      Approximately two and one-half years after the adjudication of

dependency, on April 22, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights. The court held a hearing on the petition

on June 27, 2022.

      The Agency presented the testimony of case worker Heather Sterner.

Sterner testified that Father’s goals were to maintain stable housing and

income, comply with random drug testing, complete a parenting capacity

evaluation, and attend visitation. Id. at 27. She stated that Father was

incarcerated for approximately one year, from August 30, 2019 to August 29,

2020, and is currently on parole. Id. at 27-28. Sterner testified that since

being released from prison, Father has maintained stable housing. Id. at 29.

Father has also had a few different jobs, although none for long periods of

time. Id.

      Sterner stated that Father’s drug tests have been clean, but the Agency

had no documentation that Father had attended AA meetings as was

recommended. Id. at 37. Father also completed a parenting capacity

evaluation by Dr. Jonathan Gransee in February 2021. Id. at 35. Dr. Gransee’s

recommendations included continuing to attend therapy to develop skills that

would improve Father’s self-esteem, assertiveness, and decision-making

abilities as they relate to caring for Child, and attending couple’s counseling

                                      -2-
J-A27029-22

with Mother. Sterner testified that Father has not developed such skills or

attended couples counseling. Id. at 36.

       Sterner testified that since the Agency’s involvement with the family in

October 2019, Father’s visitation has always been supervised except for a

period of approximately two months, from October 2021 to December 2021,

when visits became unsupervised. Id. at 31-32. Visits reverted to supervised

in December 2021 after an incident in which Mother drove with Child while

intoxicated. Id. at 32. Father did not object to visits being returned to

supervised.2 Sterner stated that Father was consistent with visitation in 2021

but was “off and on with his consistency with visits” in 2022. Id. at 30-31.

Father’s last visit with Child was on April 27, 2022, which was two months

prior to the termination hearing. Id. at 30. Father has largely not attended

Child’s medical or professional appointments. Id. at 38-40.

       Sterner testified that Child has been in care for approximately 33

months, which is well outside of the time frame for permanent placement. Id.

at 41. Sterner stated that the Agency was willing to give Father more time

because he was making some progress on his goals. Id. at 41-42. Sterner
____________________________________________

2 Father contends he made an “implied” objection to visitation reverting to
supervised at the hearing on December 28, 2021. See Father’s Br. at 12-13.
However, the record belies Father’s contention and instead reveals he failed
to make a clear and specific objection. See N.T., 12/28/21, at 5-6. “In order
to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and
specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial
court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in
waiver of that issue.” McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259, 1274
(Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Father has waived this
argument.

                                           -3-
J-A27029-22

also said there were issues due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 42.

However, she testified that after 33 months, Father was still not able to

provide for the care, protection, safety, and development of Child. Id. at 40.

      Sterner testified that Child is in a safe, pre-adoptive home and has lived

there since he was one month old. Id. at 32-33, 43. Sterner stated Child has

a loving bond with Maternal Grandmother and looks to her to have his daily

needs met. Id. at 33. Sterner explained that Child has a “small type of

parental bond” with Father, but the bond was more like that of an uncle. Id.

at 34-35. She opined that it was in the best interest of Child for Father’s

parental rights to be terminated and Child would suffer no detrimental impact.

Id. at 42-43.

      Father testified that he works at a restaurant and has turned over his

pay stubs every other week to the Agency. Id. at 55-56. He stated that since

visits went back to supervised in January 2022, there were times when his

approved supervisors, who were his sister, niece, and a friend, would go to

Maternal Grandmother’s house and bring Child back to Father’s house to visit.

Id. at 56-59. He believed that the Agency was not aware of these visits and

incorrectly stated that he last visited Child on April 27, 2022. Id. Father

testified that although he was permitted to visit Child at Maternal

Grandmother’s house, he did not get along with her and was allergic to her

cats. Id. at 56, 59. Father said that he recently visited Child a few times at

Child’s maternal grandfather’s house, who does not live with Maternal

Grandmother. Id. at 65.

                                     -4-
J-A27029-22

      Child’s counsel indicated that although Child cannot articulate his desires

due to his age, he is very happy and well-cared for in Maternal Grandmother’s

home. Id. at 69-70. Childs’s Guardian ad litem concurred with Child’s counsel

and stated that it was in Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be

terminated. Id. at 70.

      The trial court found that the Agency proved by clear and convincing

evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated under Section

2511(a)(2) and (8) and Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act. Father filed a

notice of appeal and raises the following issues:

         1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding
            that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing
            evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be
            terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2)[?]

         2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding
            that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing
            evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be
            terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8)[?]

         3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding
            that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing
            evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be
            terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)[?]

Father’s Br. at 4.

      We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). In termination cases, we “accept the findings of fact and

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the

record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption

                                      -5-
J-A27029-22

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support

in the record, we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law

or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super.

2018). We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

      A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of

establishing grounds for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” In

re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473 (citation omitted). Clear and convincing

evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d

726, 728-29 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to

terminating parental rights:

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
         Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
         the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
         One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

                                      -6-
J-A27029-22

          concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
          between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
          effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of section

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

      Father first contends that the court erred in finding termination proper

under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (8). As only one basis for termination under

Section 2511(a) is necessary, we will focus our attention on the court’s

termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), which

states:

          (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
          child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
          following grounds:

                                      ***

          (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
          or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
          essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
          his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
          causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
          will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

      Section 2511(a)(2) thus requires the moving party to prove three things

by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

                                      -7-
J-A27029-22

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa.Super. 2008)

(citation omitted). “The grounds for termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are

not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also include acts of

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of M.A.B.,

166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      Moreover, this Court has emphasized:

         A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
         parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
         firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
         maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
         are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
         convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
         while others provide the child with his or her physical and
         emotional needs.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).

      Father argues that the record does not support a finding that he is

unwilling or incapable of remedying the conditions and causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to perform parental duties. Father’s Br.

at 10. He points out that the allegations that led to the adjudication of Child

were concerns about Mother and that he was incarcerated at the time of the

adjudication. Id. Father maintains that once he was released from prison, he

                                      -8-
J-A27029-22

worked diligently to complete his reunification goals and the visits had

progressed to unsupervised in October 2021. Id. at 11.

      The trial court did not err in finding termination proper under Section

2511(a)(2). Although Father completed some of his single case plan

objectives, and consistently visited Child for the most part, other evidence

demonstrated that the reasons that Father has been unable to parent Child

will not resolve. At the time of the filing of the petition and the termination

hearing, Father’s visits with Child continued to be supervised. Further, Father

had not availed himself of the opportunity to visit Child at Maternal

Grandmother’s house. Father was also minimally compliant with the

recommendations set forth in the parenting capacity evaluation and was not

actively involved in Child’s medical appointments. Child had been in care for

almost three years, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to find

that the Agency established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father

had a continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to discharge parental

duties, that the incapacity caused Child to be without parental care, control,

or subsistence, and that the cause for the incapacity cannot or will not be

remedied.

      Father next claims the court erred in finding termination proper under

Section 2511(b). The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but

on the child. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Under Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider “the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to determine if

                                     -9-
J-A27029-22

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles such

as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287

(Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond, “with

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.”

Id. However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the

termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super.

2011). Rather, the trial court must consider whether severing the bond “would

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. (citation

omitted). The court must also examine any pre-adoptive home and any bond

between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

      Here, the trial court determined that the Agency had established by clear

and convincing evidence that termination was proper under Section 2511(b).

The record supports the court’s finding. Sterner testified that Child has a loving

bond with Maternal Grandmother, with whom he has lived for the majority of

his young life, and looks to her to have his daily needs met. Although Child

had a small bond with Father, he views Father as more like an uncle than a

father. We perceive no reasonable basis on which to challenge the court’s

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights would be in Child’s best

interest.

      Decree affirmed.

                                     - 10 -
J-A27029-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/07/2023

                          - 11 -