Court Opinion

ID: 9597152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:56:01.488874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:36.982349
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(Concurring Separately).
I join in the Court’s reversal of the conviction of defendant Hygh. The impoundment and search of defendant’s automobile violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and by article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. However, I cannot agree with two assumptions implicit in the majority opinion: first, that the scope of the warrant requirement under article I, section 14 is congruent with that developed by the federal courts under the fourth amendment; second, that the remedy for a violation of Utah’s search and seizure provision is the same as the remedy for a violation of the federal provision — exclusion of the evidence seized.
The federal law regarding warrantless searches and seizures has become a laby*272rinth of rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions. Police officers and judges attempting to make their way through this labyrinth often imperil both the rights of individuals and the integrity and effectiveness of law enforcement. See, e.g., Wermiel, Recent Rulings Leave Police More Confused About What’s Legal, Wall St.J., August 9,1985, at 1, col. 1. In many cases, the exclusionary rule, adopted by the federal courts as the sole remedy for fourth amendment violations, appears to have influenced, if not controlled, the scope of the constitutional right it was designed to further. Many of the arcane rules developed to justify warrantless searches seem to have been fashioned solely to avoid the consequences of the exclusionary rule.
Sound arguments may be made in favor of positions at variance with the current federal law respecting both the scope of the individual’s right to be free from war-rantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any violation of that right. Acceptance by this Court of such arguments under the Utah Constitution’s search and seizure provision might result in simpler rules that can be more easily followed by police officers and the courts. At the same time, these rules might provide the public with greater and more consistent protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by eliminating many of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been developed in recent years.1
One way to improve predictability might be to sharply limit the sweep of exceptions to the warrant requirement that often raise questions of police overreaching. In their place, clear-cut rules could be adopted — for example, a flat requirement that a warrant must be obtained before any nonconsensual search of property not in the immediate physical control of a suspect is conducted.2 Such a rule would be an improvement over present law, both for the individual and for the police. The individual would be assured that, in most cases, his property would not be searched or seized unless the reasons for the search or seizure have first been presented to a neutral magistrate and a warrant issued. At the same time, police officers would not be forced to speculate about what may or may not be subject to search without a warrant. Warrantless searches would be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification— to protect the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Once the threat that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant.
Such a requirement would present little impediment to police investigations, especially in light of the ease with which warrants can be obtained under Utah’s telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-4(2) (1982 ed.). See State v. Lopez, Utah, 676 P.2d 393 (1984). Perhaps most importantly, such a rule could be readily *273understood and complied with by police officers, and evidence uncovered in compliance with it would more than satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution.
Sound arguments can also be made against acceptance of the federal version of the exclusionary rule as the sole remedy for unlawful searches and seizures. See generally Coe, The A.L.I Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 Ga.L.Rev. 1 (1975); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo.L.J. 1361 (1981). Although this Court has tacitly followed the federal lead on this matter, I have found no case in which this Court has decided to adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the question of what remedy is available for an unlawful search or seizure under our state constitution. Perforce, this Court has never considered the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the exclusionary rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies, such as the imposition of civil liability on police officers.
I do not suggest that without further consideration this Court should either adopt the hypothetical warrantless search and seizure rule discussed above or reject the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of article I, section 14. I only contend that such arguments should not be foreclosed from consideration by our unana-lyzed acceptance of the federal position. The federal law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible interpretation of the search and seizure protections contained in the Utah Constitution.3 If, after consideration, we conclude that we can strike a balance between the competing interests involved so as to better serve them all, then we should not hesitate to do so. See generally Linde, E Pluribus— Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga.L.Rev. 165 (1984); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2089-91 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has attempted to provide police with relatively clear standards for warrantless automobile searches by sweeping away many of the subtle and inconsistent rules that governed this area. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), the Court held that if police officers lawfully stop a vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of all compartments and containers within the vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere in the car. In my view, this belated attempt to bring consistency and coherence to automobile searches fails because it essentially guts the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement as it pertains to automobile searches. See 456 U.S. at 827, 102 S.Ct. at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is little reason to believe that effective law enforcement requires this sacrifice of the interests protected by the warrant requirement. See, e.g., The Supreme Court-1981 Term, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 176, 184-85 (1982).

. "Immediate physical control" refers to an area within which a suspect could reasonably be expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence during an encounter with police officers. The exception would be limited by its justification and would not generally permit warrantless searches of car trunks, for example, or containers beyond the suspect's reach.

. Developing a jurisprudence of state constitutional law is not a novel idea. For example, the state of Washington has interpreted its constitutional search and seizure provisions differently than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment. See Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L.Rev. 331 (1985). The state of Alaska has also construed its search and seizure provision to provide broader protection. Reeves v. State, Alaska, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (1979).