Court Opinion

ID: 9569807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:40.119417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:03.687385
License: Public Domain

Dore, C.J.
(dissenting) — The question in the subject case is who is entitled to exercise the option to purchase the "Home Place". The majority holds that: purchase options are not always "personal" to the optionee; Washington's anti-lapse statute may apply to testamentary options; and that, applying the anti-lapse statute to the option in this case, the surviving children of Francis Niehenke, the testator's grandnieces and grandnephews, are entitled to exercise Francis Niehenke's purchase option. I agree that purchase options are not always "personal" to the optionee and that, in some cases, the anti-lapse statute may apply to testamentary options. I disagree, however, with the majority's application of the anti-lapse statute in this case. The anti-lapse statute should not be applied where, as here, the testator names alternate optionees and clearly expresses his intent that if a first optionee does not exercise an option, then alternate optionees will enjoy the right to exercise that option.
Raymond Niehenke's will provides that:
I give, devise and bequeath unto the following relatives the option to purchase the farmlands as hereinafter set forth,
‘ ' i'. My nephew, FRANCIS NIEHENKE, shah have the option to purchase . . . the farmland and buildings commonly *651described as the "Home Place" ... In the event my nephew, FRANCIS NIEHENKE, does not exercise said option . . . my nephews, ALVIN GUSKE and ELMER GUSKE, shall have the option to jointly purchase said farmland upon the same terms and conditions .... [Devises to Edward Niehenke and Alvin Guske, two other of the testator's nephews, followed, and each option included an alternate optionee.]
It is my wish and desire that my farmland continue to stay within the family for as long as possible. In the event that the optionees above stated do not exercise said right of purchase, then, . . . any of the residuary beneficiaries shall have the right to purchase upon the same terms and conditions except that it shall be sold to the one offering the most money.
The options as above provided must be exercised within three (3) months from the date of my death, provided, ... if the first optionee fails to exercise said option, then the alternate optionee shall have four (4) months from the date of my death in which to exercise said option ....
Clerk's Papers, at 8-10.
Raymond Niehenke bequeathed the residue of his estate to 11 other nieces and nephews "or their respective issue by right of representation". Clerk's Papers, at 11.
This court, when interpreting a will, must give effect to the "the supreme rule", the intent of the testator. In re Estate of Mell, 105 Wn.2d 518, 524, 716 P.2d 836 (1986); In re Estate of Soesbe, 58 Wn.2d 634, 636, 364 P.2d 507 (1961). That intent must be ascertained from the language of the will itself, if possible. In re Estate of Bergau, 103 Wn.2d 431, 435, 693 P.2d 703 (1985). The court considers the will in its entirety and construes specific provisions in light of the entire document. In re Estate of Riemke, 80 Wn.2d 722, 727, 497 P.2d 1319 (1972). Although the court may apply rules of construction and presumptions in its efforts to discern the testator's intent, all rules and presumptions are subordinate to that intent. Riemke. The court must not apply rules of construction or presumptions in a way that overrides the testator's evident purpose or dispositional scheme. Riemke, at 733; In re Estate of Soesbe, 58 Wn.2d at 637. Thus, it will not apply the presumption favoring application of Washington's anti-*652lapse statute where the testator clearly provides for a different distribution. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wn.2d 849, 854, 490 P.2d 731, 47 A.L.R.3d 352 (1971); see also In re Estate of Allmond, 10 Wn. App. 869, 871, 520 P.2d 1388, review denied, 84 Wn.2d 1004 (1974).
The majority at page 640 asserts that:
There is considerable doubt in the present case whether the testator intended to disinherit Francis' children in the event Francis predeceased him; ....
I do not think there is any doubt that the testator intended that the alternate optionees, not Francis' lineal descendants, exercise the purchase option in this case. First, the language of the option to purchase provision itself is clear and unambiguous. It explicitly states that if Francis does not exercise his option, for whatever reason, then Elmer and Alvin Guske "shall have the option to jointly purchase said farmland". (Italics mine.) The testator's clearly expressed desire that specifically named alternate optionees exercise the purchase option precludes application of the anti-lapse statute.
Secondly, designating alternate optionees while excluding lineal descendants of a primary optionee is consistent with the will as a whole. Raymond Niehenke's will contains a careful plan of disposition, which prefers nephews and nieces over other, more remotely related, family members. Thus, the primary and the alternate optionees named in the purchase option section are nephews. Further, the residuary beneficiaries to whom Raymond Niehenke gives the right to purchase, if the primary and alternate optionees do not exercise their options, are also Niehenke's nieces and nephews. The preference that the testator accorded nieces and nephews in his dispositional scheme conforms with his stated purpose to keep the farmland "within the family for as long as possible." Allowing the alternate optionees, rather than Francis Niehenke's descendants, to exercise the right to purchase thus furthers the testator's clear intent and realizes his dispositional purpose.
*653Finally, Raymond Niehenke was aware that any one of his nephews or nieces, including the primary optionees, might predecease him. In the residuary clause he refers to the beneficiaries "or their respective issue by right of representation". Clerk's Papers, at 11. Had the testator intended that Francis Niehenke's lineal descendants enjoy the right to exercise the purchase option, he could have provided "If my nephew, Francis Niehenke, or his respective issue by right of representation, do not exercise said option." The testator did not so provide, but the majority, without authority, rewrites the will, inserting language the testator did not use and overrides the testator's intent. This it cannot do.
The majority relies on In re Estate of Passanisi, 124 Misc. 2d 326, 476 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1984), in support of its conclusion. In Passanisi, at 326, the testatrix devised her home to her son, Francisco Passanisi:
"on condition, however, * * * that [he] shall pay my son MICHAEL PASSANISI, ... Ten Thousand and 00/100 . . . Dollars, in any manner which is agreeable between my two sons."
The testatrix further stated that if Francisco "refuses or cannot pay" the $10,000, then she devised the property to both sons, share and share alike. Finally, the testatrix included a general substitutional gift article, which provided that if either Michael or Francisco should predecease her, leaving issue surviving, then that portion of the estate to which her son would have been entitled, had he survived her, should pass to his surviving issue.
First, the Passanisi court at page 330 based its holding on specific "quoted words . . . [read] in the context in which they appear . . The language in this case, and the context in which it appears, is entirely different than that in the Passanisi case. Secondly, the testatrix in Passanisi did not share the intent and purpose of the testator in this case. Thirdly, the testatrix in Passanisi included a general substitutional gift provision in her will, in which she designated the surviving issue of the primary beneficiaries as *654alternate recipients of the option. The testator in this case included a residuary clause in his will, but chose not to designate the surviving issue of all the primary optionees as recipients. The testator excluded two of the primary optionees, Francis Niehenke and Edward Niehenke, and their respective issue as recipients. This inequity apparently offends the majority. Majority, at 640-41. The majority, however, cannot override the testator's will to achieve what it believes is a more just result. The Passanisi case is distinguishable from the subject case on several grounds, and the majority's rebanee on Passanisi is misplaced.
The majority also relies on the reasoning of Tuecke v. Tuecke, 257 Iowa 199, 131 N.W.2d 794 (1964): if Francis survived, he probably would have exercised his option and, on his death, he probably would have devised the "Home Place" to his offspring. This reasoning is entirely speculative. Further, the Tuecke court based this hypothetical on different facts than are presented here. In Tuecke, at 201, the testator devised to his son, Alfred, "the option ... to purchase the . . . interest in my farm . . .". The testator in Tuecke did not designate alternate optionees whom he wished to exercise the option. In these circumstances, the court concluded that the purchase option was a valuable property right which could descend to Alfred's children and which was subject to the anti-lapse statute. Tuecke v. Tuecke, 257 Iowa 199, 131 N.W.2d 794, 795, 797 (1964). The Tuecke court's reasoning is not persuasive and cannot support the majority's reasoning in this case.
Conclusion
In summary, I believe that the clear language of Raymond Niehenke's will devises to the alternate optionees the right to purchase the "Home Place". The majority frustrates the testator's intent and scheme of distribution, set forth in the clear language of his will, when it applies the anti-lapse statute and allows Francis Niehenke's descendants to exercise the option to purchase the "Home Place". I would reverse and hold that:
*6551. The alternate optionees, Elmer and Alvin Guske, are the rightful holders of the option to purchase the "Home Place";
2. The alternate optionees, as holders of the option to purchase, were entitled to the "landlord's share" of the proceeds from the crops growing at the time of the testator's death and harvested in August 1987; and
3. The trial court properly denied attorney fees. The Court of Appeals erred when it awarded attorney fees incurred during litigation regarding ownership of the option to pin-chase, because litigation of this issue could not result in benefit to the estate. The parties are not entitled to attorney fees for proceedings before this court.