Court Opinion

ID: 9446084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:45:35.249382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:30.968274
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The original termination action of the Secretary, effective September 10, 1954, was explicitly rested by him upon Executive Order 10450,1 which in turn rested upon the Act of August 26, 1950.2-This appears upon the face of the Secretary’s “Findings and Final Determination” and from the “Notification of Personnel Action.”
I cannot read Charge 3, referred to by the majority, or any finding of the Secretary based thereon, as in any sense independent of Executive Order 10450 or the Act of August 26, 1950.
It is conceded that under the decision of the Supreme Court in Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 76 S.Ct. 861, 100 L.Ed. 1396, said Executive Order and Act did not authorize the Secretary’s action in this case. Accordingly, the basis for the original termination disappears, and with it the validity of that termination.
On October 12, 1956, a second “Notification of Personnel Action” was delivered to appellant. This in terms purported to terminate the employment as of the date of the original termination, September 10, 1954, and was not based upon Executive Order 10450 or the Act of August 26, 1950. But this action of course could not relate back as attempted, and at most could be effective only as of the time it was taken, October 12, 1956.

. 18 Fed.Reg. 2489 (1953).

. 64 Stat. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952), 5 U.S.C.A. § 22-1.