Court Opinion

ID: 9527832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:34:40.904973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:14.590313
License: Public Domain

GREENWOOD, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), I believe, mandates a decision that in divorce proceedings a trial court judge may, as a matter of law, bar the accrual of interest or decrease the rate of interest from that statutorily established on a judgment if the equities in a divorce proceeding justify such action.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, Pope upheld the power of the judge to require payment of interest at a rate higher than that statutorily imposed, if the judgment debtor failed to pay the judgment for child support arrearages within a specified time. Similarly in this case, appellant wished to argue for an abatement of interest accrual if he made payments on the judgment as agreed. Both involved only prospective interest accrual, and would provide an incentive to the debtor to make payments as ordered by the court.
The majority contends that the statutory interest is mandatory, first, because the word “shall” in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986) eliminates the possibility of any discretion, and second, because the general *652provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) must be governed by the more specific provisions of § 15-1-4. However, Pope deviates from the statutory rate despite the conflict between the two statutes and the compulsory “must” in § 15-1-4. In fact, Pope, in effect, establishes that § 30-3-5(1) controls § 15-1-4, contrary to the majority opinion. As stated in Pope, “Sec. 15-1-4, which requires ... judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under Sec. 30-3-5 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight percent where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and equitable.” Id. at 754.
Furthermore, consistent with Pope, the trial judge in domestic matters should have considerable latitude in exercising the court’s discretion and equitable powers to fashion remedies which best serve not only the parties, but, more importantly, the children of the parties. It is certainly conceivable that the court could reason that a delinquent support obligor would be more likely to pay such a judgment with an abatement or suppression of interest that would allow for an eventual satisfaction of the judgment. As a matter of policy, this may be preferable to no payments at all. The trial judge is in the best position to determine the method most likely to actually produce support payments.
To try to distinguish Pope and allow higher, but not lower than the statutory interest rate violates principals of fairness and evenhandedness. It would be more consistent to overrule Pope. However, given the precedent of Pope, I believe this Court should reverse and hold that in divorce cases the court may prospectively reduce or suspend interest accrual on judgments for delinquent child support, as a legitimate exercise of the equitable powers of the court.