Court Opinion

ID: 9640734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:13:48.405465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.501425
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
At the time of appellant’s trial, the elements of the affirmative defense of insanity consisted of the following:
(1) At the time of the conduct charged,
(2) the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect,
(3)(a) did not know that his conduct was wrong, or
(b) was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 8.01.1
Thus, before the trial court was required to give a charge on the affirmative defense of insanity, there had to be some evidence in the record to support each element listed above. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that lay testimony is often competent evidence on the issue of insanity, but found, however, that there was no testimony demonstrating that appellant possessed a mental disease or defect.
The majority now finds that nonexpert witness testimony may be sufficient to meet the requirement of Article 46.03, Section 1(a) Y.A.C.C.P., that there be competent evidence of insanity before the affirmative defense is submitted to the jury.
The old Penal Code (prior to January 1, 1974) provided that in order to establish the insanity defense, the evidence had to show that the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense was such that he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act charged. When the new Penal Code was drafted, the phrase “mental condition” was changed to the more specific “mental disease or defect”. This clearly shows the Legislature’s intent to require a showing of a recognizable medical ailment. At least one commentator agrees:
“The [next] element of this test is the requirement of ‘mental disease or defect’. It seems that this test would require that the disease or defect be a recognizable medical disorder....” Branch’s Texas Annotated Penal Statutes, Section 8.01 (3d Edition), p. 280. (Emphasis added).
In Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this Court wrote the following:
“While the defense is expressed in terms of a ‘mental disease or defect,’ the issue is not strictly a medical one. It is an issue that invokes ethical and legal considerations as well.” 566 S.W.2d at 948.
The opinion in Graham goes on to say that the determination of insanity can not be *737based solely on medical evidence alone. Implicit in the text, however, is the ac-knowledgement that medical testimony is indeed essential in raising the issue of insanity for, indeed, the affirmative defense of insanity is largely made up of a “medical” component. This “mental disease or defect” component is one that limits the availability of the defense. Graham v. State, supra, at 952.
Although this Court has not in the past explicitly held that medical testimony is required to show the “mental disease or defect” element of the affirmative defense of insanity, we have impliedly recognized this requirement in a number of cases. In Denison v. State, 651 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), this Court held that where the burglary victim who happened to be a nurse testified that the defendant’s behavior was “inappropriate” and this “inappropriate conduct” could have been caused by mental illness, this testimony alone was totally insufficient to raise the defensive issue of insanity.
In Cato v. State, 534 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the defendant was charged with murdering his wife. At trial he testified that a few days prior to the offense, he experienced visions concerning his wife. He further testified that he remembered nothing about the actual killing except that he was arguing with his wife when she hit him causing him to pass out and when he awoke his wife had been strangled. After reviewing the entire record the Court found that there was no indication in the evidence that at the time of the offense, that “appellant, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.” Cato v. State, supra, at 138. See also Judge Clinton’s dissenting opinion in Madrid v. State, 595 S.W.2d 106, 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), where he noted that “[s]ince the defense was supported by psychiatric and other testimony, the trial court submitted insanity as an affirmative defense.” (emphasis added). The majority fails to recognize that, without some testimony of medical ailment or disorder, the jury is without any evidence to determine if a defendant suffers from a mental disease or ailment.
Moreover, even if medical testimony is not required in order to establish the “mental disease or defect” element, the lay witness evidence fails to establish an issue to insanity. Here the complaining witness’ sister testified that, in her opinion, appellant was either drunk, addicted to drugs, or “he was not right in his mind.” Appellant relied upon this testimony to assert that he was entitled to an instruction on insanity. That the witness surmised that the appellant “was not right in his mind” in no way shows a “mental disease or defect.” Denison v. State, supra, at 760; Cato v. State, supra, at 138. Nothing in the record even suggests that at the time of the offense appellant was suffering from any recognizable medical disorder. Therefore, the trial court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of insanity.
I, therefore, dissent to the action of the majority in the instant cause.
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.

. Effective August 29, 1983, the statute was amended to read: "(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” (emphasis added). The offense in the instant case occurred on January 23, 1983.