Court Opinion

ID: 88893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:51+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:34.454233
License: Public Domain

86 U.S. 519 (____)
19 Wall. 519
BURKE
v.
MILTENBERGER.
Supreme Court of United States.

*522 *523 Mr. P. Phillips, with whom was Mr. J.B. Beckwith, for the appellant.
Mr. T.J. Durant, contra.
*524 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question in this case for our consideration is, whether the Provisional Court of Louisiana, established by the President on the 20th of October, 1862, had ceased to exist, by the terms of the order creating it, on the 3d day of June, 1865, when the plantation in dispute was sold by the marshal of that court, on a fi. fa. regularly issued, and purchased by Miltenberger, who took immediate possession of it, and has remained in possession ever since.
The institution of this court was a necessity, on account of the disturbed state of affairs in Louisiana, caused by the civil war, and the authority of the President to establish it was sustained in the case of The Grapeshot, reported in 9th Wallace.[*] The duration of the court was limited to the restoration of civil authority in the State, and it is insisted that this limitation expired when the last Confederate general, Kirby Smith, surrendered, which was on the 26th of May, 1865; but this position is inconsistent with the fact conceded on the argument, that military rule prevailed in the city of New Orleans, and the State of Louisiana, for a long time after this event, and after the sale in controversy was made. This in itself is conclusive proof that civil authority was not then restored, and that the Provisional Court was in the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.
We do not care, however, to rest our decision on this ground alone, although it is sufficient to dispose of this case, as that court may have transacted business after the military occupation ceased, and it is important, therefore, to settle when its jurisdiction terminated.
*525 It is very clear that the restoration of civil authority in any State could not take place until the close of the rebellion in that State; and the point of time at which this occurred has been the subject of consideration by this court in several cases involving the application of statutes of limitation.[*] The principle established by these cases is, as the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States, that its commencement and termination in any State is to be determined by some public act of the political departments of the government. This action has fixed the 2d day of April, 1866, as the day in which the rebellion closed in all the States but Texas, and the 20th of August following, as the date of its entire suppression.
It does not, however, follow that the President's proclamation of April 2d, 1866, ipso facto, dissolved the Provisional Court of Louisiana, although it unquestionably authorized its dissolution. It is plain to be seen that its dissolution, without proper provision for the business before it, as well as that which had been disposed of, would have produced serious injury, and this state of things, requiring the action of Congress, was doubtless recognized by the President, as nothing is said in the proclamation about this court. If it was subject to be dissolved as soon as the proclamation appeared, and was no longer a court de jure, it still had a de facto existence until its actual dissolution. This took place on the 28th of July, 1866,[] when Congress provided for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States. The power of Congress to do this was recognized in The Grapeshot, and, indeed, we do not see how it could be questioned, if, as we have decided, its establishment was a rightful exercise of the constitutional authority of the President, during a state of war.
It is contended by the plaintiff in error that an order of General Banks, in military command at New Orleans, during *526 the period of this controversy, which is set out at length in the brief of counsel, operated as an injunction upon the proceedings of the marshal, and that, therefore, the sale of the plantation was unauthorized. The answer to this position is that, in the state of the pleadings and evidence, we are not at liberty to pass upon the legality of this order, or to determine what effect should be given to it if properly issued. It is not in the record at all, and for aught that appears, was never brought to the notice of either of the courts in Louisiana engaged in the decision of the case.
It may be that the courts of the country would take judicial notice that Louisiana, at the time mentioned, was in the military occupation of our forces, under General Banks, but we know of no rule of law or practice requiring this, or any other court, to take notice of the various orders issued by a military commander in the exercise of the authority conferred upon him.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  Page 130.
[*]  United States v. Anderson, 9 Wallace, 56; The Protector, 12 Id. 700; Adger v. Alston, 15 Id. 560.
[]  14 Stat. at Large, 344.