Court Opinion

ID: 9658860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:18:59.960519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:00.722046
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(concurring). This opinion is written to underscore that action of the trial court in making present provision for the future protection of the rights of the minor children involved.
The original judgment provided for the assignment of certain trusts to the clerk of the circuit court for Dane county. The amended judgment adds a provision, for purposes including the assurance that court-ordered child support payments will be made, enjoining the defendant from “alienating, selling, hypothecating, transferring, assigning, pledging, surrender, encumbering or otherwise disposing” of such trusts, adding “. . . nor shall the defendant otherwise act to prejudice the rights of . . . the minor children of the parties to the benefits of the provisions provided for them by this court.”
Such affirmative action by the court to provide for the future well-being of the minor children affected by this divorce does more than insure the continuity of child support payments. It provides an assurance that emergency needs in the area of medical, dental and surgical care can be met in the future. It lessens the possibility that improvidence or successor marriage obligations will deprive these children of the opportunity to continue their education beyond high school. Of equal importance is the fact that such sequestering of present assets to protect the children in the future recognizes that under the Wisconsin Family Code a division of estate in a divorce action must be fair to the children as well as to the contending spouses.
In Wisconsin the children “. . . are not to be buffeted around as mere chattels in a divorce controversy, but *246rather are to be treated as interested and affected parties. ...” 1
Since they are “interested and affected parties” their rights are to be considered in the division of the estate of the spouses as well as in the determination of custody arrangements and visitation privileges. The question must be asked: Does the proposed division of present assets of the parties adequately protect the rights of their children to uninterrupted child support, necessary medical expenses and an opportunity to continue education at the college level? If there is doubt as to whether the rights of the children are being so protected, the trial court should appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children in the action. Such providing of legal representation to determine and protect the rights of children in divorce actions has been authorized,2 recommended,3 suggested,4 and directed 3 by this court in specific situations. It is enough here to suggest that, given *247so spirited a contest between the spouses over the financial aspects of their going their separate ways, this was a case in which a guardian ad litem to speak up for the rights of the children might well have been appointed early in the proceedings. However, since the trial court did adequately provide for the future needs of the children, the purpose of providing such court counsel for the children has been accomplished. The provisions of the judgment protecting the children are not challenged by either parent. They may well have been suggested by them. It is evidence that, however, they may argue about how the turkey is to be carved as between them, they agree that something more than bones is to be left for their children.

 Wendland v. Wendland (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 145, 157, 138 N. W. 2d 185.

 “. . . to confer with the boy well in advance of the hearing at which his testimony is to be taken . . .” and “. . . may make such further investigation as he deems advisable after such conference.” Edwards v. Edwards (1955), 270 Wis. 48, 56b, 70 N. W. 2d 22, 71 N. W. 2d 366.

 “. . . where the trial court believes that what may be in the best interests of the children may not be brought out by the two contesting parties.” Wendland v. Wendland, supra, page 156.

 “. . . in those instances where the evidence is either nonexistent or inadequate to determine the comparative fitness of the parents and where the best interests of the child are, and “. . . in contested hearings where it is apparent that the dispute is centered on the desire of the parents rather than the best interests of the child.” Koslowsky v. Koslowsky (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 275, 283, 163 N. W. 2d 632.

 “. . . [to aid in considering] all available alternatives [which] must be evaluated in reaching the determination as to what order will best serve the child’s present and future well-being.” and “. . . to help make clear to the plaintiff and defendant that the controlling consideration is the welfare of their child, not their wishes or desires . . . .” Dees v. Dees (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 435, 444, 164 N. W. 2d 282.