Court Opinion

ID: 7819740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:49:43.764005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:28:52.171304
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result, but I consider the language of the opinion to state a new concept of jurisdiction, differing from that upon which we based our finding that there was jurisdiction in International Paper Company v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W. 2d 488. The policy reasons given there for construing the statute liberally in favor of jurisdiction did not become, either singly or collectively, a factual basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in Arkansas. They were nothing more than they purported to be — policy reasons for a liberal construction. I submit that the fact that Peters was at all times a resident of Arkansas cannot confer jurisdiction on our commission. Neither can the securing of compensation to Arkansas physicians and hospitals. Nor can the combination. We did not, and should not, under our statute, adopt the rule advocated by Prof. Larson, i.e. that some substantial interest should suffice. If it should, the General Assembly, not this court, should say so. It was clearly established in Tidwell that there must be a statutory basis for the entertainment of a claim, and without it, a claimant is left either to a common law remedy or to the compensation laws of the state in which the injury took place. There was no coverage here or in Tidwell, insofar as the Arkansas law is concerned, except for employment carried on in this state. It cannot be otherwise. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1302 (c) (Repl. 1960). It is interesting to note, as we did in Tidwell, that Prof. Larson notes six grounds upon which applicability of a particular compensation act has been asserted. One of these is the place where the employee resides. But he was not sure that a state could apply its statute on that ground under federal constitutional limitation. He did feel sure that a state was free to apply its laws if it was the place where the injury occurred, where the contract was made or where the employment relation exists or is carried out. Still, we approach this matter and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission did, with a prima facie presumption that the Commission had jurisdiction. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1324 (Repl. 1960) and we did not, as appellant suggests, hold differently in Duke v. Pekin Wood Products Co., 223 Ark. 182, 264 S.W. 2d 834. This means to me that the mere filing of a claim makes out a prima facie case of jurisdiction, which is sufficient unless the respondent brings in evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. Barnhart, Use of Presumptions in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 128, 132; Continental Gin Co. v. Benton, 104 Ark. 367, 149 S.W. 528; Nunez v. O.K. Processors, 238 Ark. 429, 382 S.W. 2d 384. See also, Hollenberg v. Lane, 47 Ark. 394; Cartwell v. Menifee, 2 Ark. 356; Craig v. Sims, 160 Ark. 269, 255 S.W. 1; IX Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.) 293, § 2494. The situation is not unlike that arising in a civil case where the burden of showing want of jurisdiction lies upon a party moving to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Arkansas Land & Cattle Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 248 Ark. 495, 452 S.W. 2d 632. As I see it, it was not shown by appellant that the commission did not have jurisdiction. The commission held that it did and reached the following pertinent conclusions: As we review the facts in this case we find that the claimant is a resident of Alma, Arkansas, and was a resident of that city in August of 1970. On or about August 28, 1970, the claimant went to the Fort Smith, Arkansas, Employment Security Division Office seeking employment. This office had already been advised by the respondent of certain employee needs. The claimant was directed by the Fort Smith Employment Security Office to the job site in Oklahoma. The claimant met the Superintendent of the respondent at the site, was interviewed and an application taken, but the claimant was advised that there was no opening at that particular time. The respondent noted the claimant’s phone number and address in Alma, Arkansas, and a few days after the interview the Superintendent of the respondent called the claimant and asked him if he was still interested in the job. The claimant replied that he was and the claimant was told to report to work and that he would be put on the water truck. In response to this telephone call the claimant reported to the job site in Oklahoma and was employed by the respondent. Claimant continued to reside in Alma, Arkansas, and commuted to and from the job site each day. When the claimant was injured he was taken from the job site to a Fort Smith hospital by a Fort Smith ambulance and treated exclusively by the Fort Smith, Arkansas, physicians. Payroll checks to the claimant were drawn on a Fort Smith, Arkansas, bank. There was also testimony that the Workmen’s Compensation claim of the claimant is being serviced out of Little Rock, Arkansas, office of the respondent as opposed to an Oklahoma office. The claimant accepted employment for a temporary job in Oklahoma and was later offered full time employment with the company in Arkansas. The respondent, Missouri City Stone, is a Missouri corporation with its main office in Dallas, Texas, and its parent company, Markham and Brown, is a Texas corporation with its offices in Dallas. Missouri City Stone had only one project in Oklahoma and that was the project where the claimant was injured. Missouri City Stone maintained only a temporary trailer which served as an office at the site in Oklahoma, but maintains a permanent office in Sweet Home, Arkansas, near Little Rock, Arkansas, upon property owned by it. The respondent owns no property in Oklahoma. The testimony in the case reveals that the Superintendent of the respondent on the Oklahoma job maintains his home both before and after the accident in Little Rock, Arkansas. The evidence further reveals that employees of the Missouri City Stone on the project in Oklahoma were Arkansas residents who worked in Arkansas before and after this accident for the respondent. The commission might have added that most of the work of appellant which had been performed under its general superintendent had been done in Arkansas; that, in addition to being a shop, the field office in Little Rock affords a place where the company payrolls are made; the checks for the payroll on the Oklahoma job were made out in Fort Smith, Arkansas; and that appellant had been domesticated in Arkansas. This case is similar to Tidwell in that the employer was localized as a resident and the employee was at all times a resident. The only possible distinction is the place where the contract was entered into. I do not believe that appellant introduced sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie presumption. Peters testified that he accepted the job at his home, when he was called there by appellant’s general superintendent by telephone. The place of making of the contract was at least a question of fact. A contract is entered into at the place where the offer is accepted and when made by telephone, it is regarded as made at the place from which the accepting party speaks. 17A CJS 352, Contracts § 356; 17 Am. Jur. 2d 392, Contracts § 53. There was not sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie presumption of jurisdiction and, to say the least, there was substantial evidence to support the finding.