Court Opinion

ID: 9838430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 14:08:04.132535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:24.808640
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Landon D. May,                                  :
                      Appellant                 :
                                                :
               v.                               :
                                                :
Jane Doe, Department of                         :    No. 1036 C.D. 2022
Corrections                                     :    Submitted: May 12, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                   FILED: September 6, 2023

               Landon D. May (May), pro se, appeals from the Centre County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) August 22, 2022 order1 dismissing May’s
Complaint against Jane Doe2 and the Department of Corrections (collectively, DOC)
(Complaint) with prejudice. Essentially, May presents one issue for this Court’s
review: whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law by
sustaining DOC’s Preliminary Objections and dismissing May’s Complaint.3 After
review, this Court affirms.

       1
            Although the trial court’s order was dated August 22, 2022, it was not docketed until
August 24, 2022.
          2
            Jane Doe is “an as-yet-unidentified employee of the [Department of Corrections (]DOC[)]
whose duties include managing/supervising the operation of [] DOC’s Security Processing Center
. . . . “ Complaint ¶ 2.
          3
            In his “Questions Involved,” May presents three issues for this Court’s review:
               1. [DOC] addressed the merits of [] May’s claim during
               administrative review and failed to raise a preliminary objection to
               his capacity to sue. Then, for the first time, objecting in demurrer,
             May is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix (SCI-
Phoenix).4 On January 27, 2020, Jessica Leigh Johnson (Johnson) placed a $33.21
order, as May’s agent, with ThriftBooks.com for seven books to be delivered to May
at DOC’s SCI-Phoenix’s Security Processing Center (SPC).5 See Complaint ¶¶ 5-7;
see also Exs. A-1, A-2, B. Despite that the SPC received some of the books on
February 5, 2020, and the remainder of the books on February 6, 2020, DOC only
delivered two of the books to May. See id. ¶¶ 8-11; see also Exs. C-1 - C-2. The
value of the books DOC has not delivered to May is $25.28 (inclusive of tax). See
id. ¶ 12.
             On February 24, 2020, May filed a grievance with the Facility
Grievance Officer requesting the remaining five books, or the $25.28 reimbursement
(Grievance). See id. ¶¶ 13-14; see also Ex. D. On March 10, 2020, the Facility
Grievance Officer denied the Grievance, stating that DOC only received two of the
books. See id. ¶ 15; see also Ex. E. May appealed to the Facility Manager, who
upheld the Facility Grievance Officer’s denial, asserting: “[Y]our books were
delivered to the [SPC,]” but the high volume of book deliveries causes delays, and

             [DOC] argued that [May] was not injured. Was that argument
             merely a repackaged challenge to standing, and therefore waived?
             2. When ruling on a demurrer, all well-pleaded facts and inferences
             are in the plaintiff s favor. Since May pleaded the existence of an
             agency relationship, did the [trial] court err in failing to account for
             that when sustaining [DOC’s] preliminary objections?
             3. There’s a vast body of [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court authority -
             plus detailed administrative codes and departmental regulations -
             governing prisoners’ right[s] to receive mail. So did the [trial] court
             err when it held [DOC] could not be liable to [] May when [DOC]
             neglected to deliver his properly addressed mail?
May Br. at 2.
      4
        See www.inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (last visited Sept. 5, 2023).
      5
        The Complaint does not specify who Johnson is or how an agency relationship was
formed.
                                                2
“[o]nce the mailroom receives your book [sic] from [the] SPC, it will be processed
the same day and sent to the housing unit you are assigned to.” See id. ¶¶ 16-18; see
also Exs. F, G. May appealed to the Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals,
which, on June 22, 2020, denied May relief, reiterating that the SPC had forwarded
to him the two books it had received.6 See id. ¶¶ 19-20; see also Exs. H, I. By July
3, 2020 letter, May notified DOC that he had exhausted his administrative remedies
and demanded $25.28, therein asserting that sovereign immunity would not shield
the tortfeasors from a negligence action or DOC from vicarious liability. See id. ¶
21; see also Ex. J.
              On August 17, 2020, May filed the Complaint in the trial court asserting
a negligence claim against Jane Doe under the personal property exception to what
is commonly referred to as the Sovereign Immunity Act (Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §
8522(b)(3), for the lost books, and declaring that DOC was vicariously liable for
Jane Doe’ negligence. See Complaint ¶¶ 23-28. May sought an injunction directing
DOC to locate and deliver the books or, in the alternative, to pay him $25.28 in
compensatory damages and costs. See id. at 5.
              DOC filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint in the nature of a
demurrer, arguing that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which the
court could grant relief. DOC argued that the single, barebones averment of DOC’s
vicarious liability was insufficient to satisfy the fact pleading rules. DOC also
asserted that since May failed to allege that he paid for the books, he did not suffer
actual loss or damages and, therefore, May failed to state a valid negligence claim.
              On February 8, 2021, the trial court sustained the Preliminary
Objections, declaring that May failed to establish actual loss or damages necessary

       6
          The Chief Grievance Officer added that his office “attempted to contact the company
[that] the books were ordered from, to no avail.” Complaint Ex. I.
                                             3
to prove negligence. The trial court dismissed the Complaint, but permitted May to
file an amended complaint within 30 days. May did not file an amended complaint.
               May appealed to this Court, which, on February 17, 2022, quashed
May’s appeal as interlocutory. See May v. Jane Doe, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 649 C.D. 2021, filed Feb. 17, 2022) (May I). May
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which denied allocatur on August 2,
2022. On August 10, 2022, May filed a Praecipe for Entry of Final Judgment in the
trial court.   On August 22, 2022, upon May’s “failure to file an [a]mended
[c]omplaint,” the trial court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. Trial Ct.
8/22/2022 Order. May appealed to this Court.7
               Without the trial court having ordered him to do so, on September 1,
2022, May filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b). On September 9,
2022, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) (1925(a) Opinion),
concluding that it adequately stated the reasons for its decision in its February 8,
2021 order in May I.
               May argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his action against
DOC. Specifically, May claims that DOC waived its challenge to his standing by
not raising it relative to his Grievance; that the trial court erroneously disregarded
his agency relationship with Johnson, which was created when he authorized
Johnson to place the book order, so any loss is his; and that the trial court improperly
absolved DOC of its duty to deliver his mail after it was under DOC’s care, custody,
and control.      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule) 1028(a)(4)

       7
         “[This Court’s] review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and
dismissing a complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law.” Ward v. Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 142 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting
Pub. Advoc. v. Brunwasser, 22 A.3d 261, 266 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).
                                               4
authorized DOC to object to the Complaint based on its legal insufficiency
(demurrer). See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4).

              “The question presented in a demurrer is whether, on the
              facts averred, the law indicates with certainty that no
              recovery is possible. In reviewing a [trial] court’s decision
              to grant a demurrer, our Court’s standard of review is de
              novo.” Stilp v. Gen. Assembly, . . . 974 A.2d 491, 494
              ([Pa.] 2009) (citations omitted). Thus, we will affirm a
              trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and
              dismiss[ing] . . . a complaint “only in cases that are clear
              and free from doubt that the law will not permit recovery”
              by the appellant. Cap. City Lodge No. 12, Fraternal Ord.
              of Police v. City of Harrisburg, . . . 588 A.2d 584, 586-87
              ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). In ruling on preliminary objections
              in the nature of a demurrer, this Court accepts as true all
              well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all
              inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in favor of the
              nonmoving party. Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
              Dep’t of Ins., . . . 616 A.2d 1060, 1063 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]
              1992). However, we “need not accept as true conclusions
              of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
              allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Id. (citing Dep’t
              of Pub. Welfare v. Portnoy, . . . 566 A.2d 336 ([Pa.
              Cmwlth.] 1989)). And, in the face of doubt, our resolution
              should be in favor of reversing the grant of the demurrer.

Vasquez v. Berks Cnty., 279 A.3d 59, 75-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
              Relevant here, May sought monetary damages from Jane Doe and DOC
on the basis that DOC employees, particularly Jane Doe, had a duty to care for his
belongings, she breached that duty,8 her breach was the direct and proximate cause
of May’s harm, and “DOC is vicariously liable for the negligence of its servant
[Jane] Doe.” Complaint ¶ 27; see also id. ¶ 23-27. May added that sovereign
immunity was waived in this instance under Section 8522(b)(3) of the Act. See id.
¶ 28.

        8
          May declared that although the precise nature of Jane Doe’s carelessness was not known,
it could be inferred from the facts - res ipsa loquitur. See Complaint ¶ 24.
                                               5
            This Court has explained:

            Pursuant to [a]rticle [I], [s]ection 11 of the Pennsylvania
            Constitution, [Pa. Const. art. I, § 11,] the General
            Assembly declared that ‘the Commonwealth, and its
            officials and employees acting within the scope of their
            duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and
            official immunity and remain immune from suit except as
            the General Assembly shall specifically waive the
            immunity.’ 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310.
Minor v. Kraynak, 155 A.3d 114, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (footnote omitted).
            This Court determines whether a Commonwealth
            employee is protected by sovereign immunity by
            considering “whether the . . . employee was acting within
            the scope of his or her employment; whether the alleged
            act which causes injury was negligent and damages would
            be recoverable but for the availability of the immunity
            defense; and whether the act fits within [1] of the [now 10]
            exceptions to sovereign immunity.”

Id. at 122 (quoting La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992));
see also Section 8522 of the Act.

            Thus, “[t]o impose liability on a Commonwealth party,
            (1) the alleged negligent act must involve a cause of
            action that is recognized at common law or by a statute,
            and (2) the case must fall within one of [the] exceptions
            to sovereign immunity listed in Section 8522(b)” of [the
            Act]. Bufford v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 670 A.2d 751, 753
            (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)). [May],
            therefore, bore the “initial burden” of setting forth a
            claim for negligence against [Jane Doe/DOC] where
            damages would be recoverable under the common law
            or a statute creating a cause of action. LaChance v.
            Michael Baker Corp., 869 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Cmwlth.
            2005), as amended (Feb. 10, 2005); see also Williams v.
            Phila. Hous. Auth., 873 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)
            (“The threshold question in a case of . . . sovereign
            immunity is whether [May] would have an action in
            damages at common law or statute if [Jane Doe/DOC]
            could not claim the defense of governmental or sovereign
            immunity.”).

                                         6
Young v. Wetzel, 260 A.3d 281, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (bold and underline
emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
             In order to satisfy the first immunity waiver requirement, there must be
a cause of action involving negligence recognized at common law or by statute. See
Young. This Court has explained: “To state a negligence claim, ‘the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant
breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
suffered an actual loss or damage.’” Id. at 289 (quoting Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d
458, 461 (Pa. 1998)) (bold and underline emphasis added).
             Here, the trial court found that May averred sufficient facts in the
Complaint to show that his claim met the first three negligence requirements.
Specifically, the trial court observed that DOC did not argue that it did not owe May
a duty or that it did not breach that duty. See Trial Ct. 2/8/2021 Op. at 3. The trial
court further declared that May sufficiently pled causation under a res ipsa loquitur
theory. See id. However, the trial court concluded that since Johnson ordered and
paid for the books, May did not incur actual loss or damages. See id. at 4.
             Because DOC did not raise standing in its Preliminary Objections,
May’s claim that DOC waived its standing challenge by not raising it relative to his
Grievance lacks merit. May’s argument that the trial court absolved DOC of its duty
to deliver his mail also lacks merit since the trial court observed that DOC did not
challenge the duty it owed May. Finally, contrary to May’s assertion, the trial court
did not disregard May’s purported agency relationship with Johnson. Rather, the
trial court properly accepted that allegation as fact and focused on the elements May
had to satisfy to state a valid negligence claim, which included that “the plaintiff

                                          7
[May] suffered an actual loss or damage.”9 Young, 260 A.3d at 289 (quoting Martin,
711 A.2d at 461).
               Based on this Court’s review, and accepting as true all well-pleaded
facts as we must, see Vasquez, May made clear in the Complaint that Johnson
ordered and paid for the subject books. See Complaint ¶ 6; see also Exs. A-1, A-
2, B. May offers no legal basis for his recovery for Johnson’s loss or damages under
these circumstances, and this Court has found none. Because May failed to state
sufficient facts entitling him to either the books or reimbursement therefor, he failed
to plead actual loss or damages. By failing to properly plead facts necessary to
support one of the required negligence elements, he did not satisfy the first immunity
waiver requirement necessary to state a valid legal claim upon which the trial court
could grant relief.10 See Young. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or err as a matter of law by sustaining DOC’s Preliminary Objections.
               Because the trial court properly sustained the Preliminary Objections
and May failed to file an amended complaint, the trial court properly dismissed
May’s Complaint with prejudice. Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order is
affirmed.

                                              _________________________________
                                              ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

       9
           “[‘A]gency[’] results only if there is an agreement for the creation of a fiduciary
relationship with control by the beneficiary[.]” Smalich v. Westfall, 269 A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. 1970).
Assuming that such relationship existed in the instant matter, May did not claim that he pre-paid
or reimbursed Johnson for the book order, such that he was entitled to the missing books or the
sum Johnson paid for them.
        10
            Since both a valid negligence claim and circumstances that fall under one of the
immunity exceptions in Section 8522(b) of the Act are necessary to impose liability on DOC and/or
its employees, in the absence of a valid negligence claim in the first instance, this Court need not
proceed to determine whether the case falls under one of the immunity exceptions. See Young.
                                                 8
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Landon D. May,                       :
                 Appellant           :
                                     :
            v.                       :
                                     :
Jane Doe, Department of              :   No. 1036 C.D. 2022
Corrections                          :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2023, the Centre County
Common Pleas Court’s order dated August 22, 2022 (entered August 24, 2022) is
affirmed.

                                   _________________________________
                                   ANNE E. COVEY, Judge