Court Opinion

ID: 9748834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:14:48.988016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.868796
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent since I perceive that the Chief Justice, writing the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, seeks to establish a per se rule that, henceforth, in any racially mixed criminal proceeding, the trial judge is best advised to forego discretion and conduct individual voir dire to ferret out any deep seated racial biases of the individual venirepersons.
In this case, the Chief Justice finds the existence of racial sensitivity, that is, a racial issue existed, when “... a prospective juror admitted during the group voir dire that he could not render a fair verdict due to racial considerations. At that point the racial issue existed, and it was necessary for the trial court to allow counsel to examine the remaining jurors individually to ascertain whether any juror harbored any racial prejudices or biases that would affect that juror’s ability to render a fair verdict.” (Emphasis added) (Opinion, p. 1362).
The Chief Justice does not explain why “at that point the racial issue existed” or why, if it did exist, it was not removed by the removal of that venireman from the panel and a request made to the remaining panel if anyone had the same problem.
In Commonwealth v. Richardson, 504 Pa. 358, 473 A.2d 1361 (1984), we decided that individual voir dire in non-capital cases would be appropriate where the defense could demonstrate that “membership in a certain group or minority would be emphasized by the evidence presented at trial,” thus making the case “race-sensitive.”
The essential facts in this case with respect to the potential bias of a jury are the same as in Richardson. The defendants are black and the victim is white and the defendants assert the defense of consensual intercourse. The Chief Justice at*583tempts to embellish these essential facts by adding that one juror admitted during voir dire that he would be unable to render a fair verdict due to racial bias.
Incredibly, the Chief Justice asserts that a racial issue was created by the admission of one juror during voir dire that he would not be able to judge the case fairly because of racial prejudice. To the contrary, what I perceive is that the panel was cleansed of racial bias and that the group voir dire had been effective.
Would the Chief Justice require individual voir dire if a venireman stood up in a case involving an assault upon a police officer and said that I can not judge this case fairly because I don’t trust policemen or I am partial to policemen?
Would the Chief Justice require individual voir dire in any case in which a venireman stood up and professed a prejudice against any of the parties or the prosecutors, etc., etc., etc.?
The Chief Justice’s concern for the avoidance of racial sensitivity in our criminal cases is laudable but misplaced in this case. Racial sensitivity is not created by the mere fact that a defendant is black, a victim is white, or that the defendant is charged with rape and the defense is that the intercourse was consensual. This contention was specifically rejected in Richardson where we concluded that a heightened sensitivity would be required when it could be demonstrated that the differences between the defendant and the victim would be emphasized at trial. No such allegations were made here and for that reason alone, Richardson is controlling in this case.
The Chief Justice’s effort is no more and no less than an attempt to expand the scope of circumstances requiring individual voir dire. The attempt is ill-advised and unwarranted and, in any event, cannot properly be done without overruling Richardson.
I would affirm the judgments of sentence.