Court Opinion

ID: 9604387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:21:03.528509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:11.578563
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. The unambiguous statute (Code §§ 69-101, 69-102) beyond all doubt seeks the single objective of insuring the people a voice in any proposed legislative change in the form of their local government. This democratic purpose is in no remote degree affected by whether that local government is called a “Town” or a “City.” Both are municipal governments, serving identical purposes and having identical relationship to the people. The controlling rule for construing laws requires us to give effect to this plain legislative intent. Code § 102-102 (9); Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 (15 S. E. 2d 210); Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464 (1) (62 S. E. 2d 209).
I have never been impressed or persuaded by what seems to me to be mere judicial gymnastics of this court in its numerous decisions that seek to draw a legal distinction between municipal corporations based solely upon whether they are named towns or cities. Wight & Weslosky Co. v. Wolff & Happ, 112 Ga. 169 (37 S. E. 395); Atkinson v. State, 112 Ga. 402 (37 S. E. 746); Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Jordan, 113 Ga. 687, 688 (39 S. E. 511); Mayor &c. of Smithville v. Dispensary Commrs. of Lee County, 125 Ga. 559 (54 S. E. 539).