Court Opinion

ID: 9639044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:02:32.087056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:11.658299
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING STATEMENT BY
McEWEN, P.J.E.:
¶ 1 While the Opinion of the Majority reflects a perceptive analysis and provides a persuasive expression of rationale, I am, most respectfully, compelled to this dissent since I am of the view that under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, the evidence of appellant’s conviction in another jurisdiction, for acts which occurred subsequent to the offenses at issue in this trial,8 was inadmissible under the facts of this case.
¶ 2 The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, which were adopted in 1998 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to govern questions of admissibility of evidence,9 provide in relevant part:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
(2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), (2).
¶ 3 As did the trial court, the Majority relies upon the decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Knowles, 431 Pa.Super. 574, 637 A.2d 331 (1994), wherein a panel of this Court held that “[ejvidence of prior sexual relations between defendant and his or her victim is admissible to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with the victim.” Id. at 333.10 This *689exception to the general rule of exclusion of “bad acts” evidence has been designated as the “lustful disposition exception.” See: People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 175-176, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707, 717-718 (2003). It merits mention, however, that the Knowles decision of this Court has not been cited as authority in Pennsylvania during the eleven years since its 1994 publication. One possible explanation for that lack of echo is the intervening adoption in 1998 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of comprehensive Rules of Evidence, in which the Supreme Court, contrary to the approach taken in the Federal Rules of Evidence and by this Court in Knowles, supra, chose not to incorporate the lustful disposition exception into the body of law of Pennsylvania evidence. See: F.R.E. 413, 414.11 The result of the ruling of the Majority, however, effectively accomplishes that incorporation, and, as purposeful and as wise such a holding may be, it is my view that it remains for the Supreme Court to formally amend the Rules or to create a judicial exception to the Rules.12
¶ 4 Thus, I would grant the request of appellant for a new trial.

. I do agree with the majority that it is of no significance or relevance that the acts at issue were committed subsequent to the criminal conduct which resulted in the instant prosecution.

. See: Footnote 5, infra.

.The Majority also cites Commonwealth v. Dillon, 863 A.2d 597 (Pa.Super.2004) lep banc), and Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 836 A.2d 966 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 695, 845 A.2d 817 (2004), in support of its decision. In my view, those cases are distin*689guishable from the present case in that the evidence there was offered for different purposes: in Dillon the proffered evidence rebutted the defense of lack of prompt complaint, and in O’Brien the proffered evidence was introduced to show a common plan or design, and was dependent for its admission upon a threshold showing of a similar fact pattern between the prior crimes and the one at issue.
Here, however, the prosecution presented the evidence of appellant's prior conviction to show, inter alia, "that [appellant had] a desire for illicit relationships with his own daughter,” N.T. November 29, 2001, p. 142. Such a "desire” is unquestionably a matter of character, or lack thereof, the evidence of which is governed by Pa.R.E. 404, which provides that "[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... ” Pa.R.E. 404(a).

. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide in relevant part as follows:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
F.R.E. 413(a).
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
F.R.E. 414(a).

. The Supreme Court may opt to embrace the holding of Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992) — which was decided more than six years prior to the adoption of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence— but it seems more likely that the Court would choose to do so by amending the Rules of Evidence rather than pursue a common law approach to evidentiary questions, a course which the adoption of a comprehensive body of rules of evidence was clearly intended to eliminate. See: Pa.R.E. 101(a) ("These rules of evidence shall govern proceedings in all courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's unified judicial system, except as otherwise provided by law.”). Cf: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336 (Pa.Super.2005) wherein this Court affirmed a trial judge's ruling that a Polaroid picture of the child victim, showing the victim in a nude posed state, was relevant, but did not address the admissibility of such photo under Pa.R.E. 404.