Court Opinion

ID: 9716910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:53:40.6286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.946257
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the majority has obscured, rather than clarified, the requirements for determining relevance for purposes of admitting third-party culpability evidence by injecting the “reasonable possibility” rule into the nexus requirement. The substitution of the “reasonable possibility ” concept for the “clearly linked ” formulation, the apparent source of past confusion in our caselaw, creates new ambiguity, in my opinion. Moreover, as applied by the en banc court in this case, this “reformulation” of the relevance test diminishes, if not eliminates, the nexus requirement in spite of the court’s expressed intention to the contrary. However, if the court intends, as it otherwise states, to retain the nexus requirement for admissibility and to preserve the authority of the trial court to “exclude evidence of third-party motivation unattended by proof that the party had the practical opportunity to commit the crime,”1 on the factual proffer actually before the trial court, as opposed to that supplied by impermissible inferences and speculation, it cannot be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. For these reasons, the reasons stated in the division opinion of the majority in Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608 (D.C.1994), vacated, 661 A.2d 1094 (D.C.1995) (Winfield I), and those which follow, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
I. The Proffer and the Trial Court’s Decision
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, the majority relies upon a characterization of the *8proffer in the brief of amicus curiae, rather than the facts as presented in the trial court.2 One fact critical to the trial court’s decision, but omitted from the facts upon which the en banc majority relies, was that the witness who allegedly heard the killer state on the night of the murder, “You won’t tell this,” examined a photo array which included Huffs picture but did not identify Huff as the person who made the statement. This was an important factor which guided the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to exclude the evidence.3 In ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court, in its careful decision, made this point explicitly, stating:
A defense witness who viewed a photographic array which included the photograph of Mr. Huff did not identify him as the person who allegedly said, open quote, “You won’t tell this,” close quote.
Although appellant’s counsel contended that the photograph of Huff was not a recent one, she declined the court’s suggestion that she make arrangements to show the witness a more recent photograph. Later, in its ruling, the court again stated as a basis for its ruling that “a defense witness claimed that a person other than Mr. Huff said to [the victim], ... “You won’t tell this.’ ”
Other inadequacies in the proffer, including the ambiguity in the statement attributed to the shooter, also informed the trial court’s discretion. The shooter’s meaning in saying “[y]ou won’t tell this” is not clear. The shooter could have meant that the victim would not be able to tell on him as she had on others. In that sense, the statement did not reflect that the shooter’s motive for the murder was related to the motives of Artis, Bias and Huff. The trial court found the words not to be “so distinctive that they necessarily tie Mr. Huff to the shooting by relating back to the words spoken by Mr. Artis in Mr. Huff’s presence.” At the time of the prior shooting, these words were not used. Instead, Artis told Davis that she would be killed because she was the only one who could testify against him concerning an earlier robbery involving Artis and Bias in which Huff was not involved, according to the proffer. The trial court determined that the ambiguity of the proffered evidence including the shooter’s statement, was such that it would not “tend to create a reasonable doubt that [Winfield] who was apparently known by many of the eyewitnesses did not commit the murder.” See Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1989) (Third-party culpability evidence “need only tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.”) (emphasis in original). The trial court also determined that, in light of the ambiguity of the statement, the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the tendency of the evidence to mislead the jury. See Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C.1979).
However, the majority posits that Huff had the ability to locate the victim, Ms. Davis, on the night of the shooting, a fact which appellant neither proffered nor contended in the trial court. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that would lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Huff knew how to locate Davis that night. Appellant did not claim that either Huff or the victim lived in the area where she was gunned down or that either ever had been there before. Appellant did not identify the area from which Davis was abducted earlier. In the motion in limine, the proffer states that it was appellant, not Huff, who lived approximately one-half block from the basketball court where Ms. Davis was killed.
In making its ruling, the trial court accurately took into account the absence of a proffer that Huff was near the scene of the crime or knew where Ms. Davis could be located that night. The trial court stated in this regard:
There is no evidence that Mr. Huff was anywhere near the scene of the murder of July 26th, 1990. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Huff knew that Ms. Davis had testified before the Superior Court grand jury on July 26th. There is no *9evidence that Mr. Huff knew where Ms. Davis could be located on the night of her death.
Further, as stated in the majority opinion in Winfield I:
[Although there was evidence that Huff had a motive to commit the crime and a proffer that Huff had committed other acts of violence against the victim on another occasion, no evidence was proffered tending to show that Huff was implicated in the commission of the offenses for which appellant was on trial. Appellant conceded in the motion that he was not connected to Artis, Huff, and Bias.... Not a single person who witnessed the crime, even those who viewed photo arrays with Huffs picture in it, identified him either as the perpetrator of the crime or as someone who was even in the area of the crime scene at any time that night.
(Emphasis added.) Id. 652 A.2d at 613. Therefore, consistent with our prior opinions, the trial court found lacking the requisite nexus between Huffs motive and prior crime and the crime charged.4
The majority supplies the critical fact missing from the proffer in order to find the requisite nexus to Davis’ murder. It does so by assuming that “having abducted and assaulted Davis before, Artis and Huff had demonstrated their ability to find her whether or not they actually knew her whereabouts.” Majority opinion at 4. The flaw in this assumption is that it has no factual basis in the record to support it. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the facts before the trial court when it made its ruling. The proffer, as pointed out in the majority opinion at 5, was that
Davis was kidnapped from the District of Columbia and taken to Maryland by Artis, who was joined at some point in the abduction by Edward Huff.5
(Emphasis added.) Thus, even at the time of the kidnapping, the proffer shows only Artis’ knowledge of Davis’ whereabouts one month earlier. Appellant’s counsel conceded that she was not claiming that Artis and Bias, other individuals allegedly involved in the prior crimes, were responsible for Davis’ murder because both were in jail at the time. Therefore, the parties and the trial court focused upon the possibility of Huffs culpability only. Although identifying Huff as the remaining likely suspect, appellant, unlike the en banc majority, did not proffer any facts tending to show that Huff knew how to find Davis.6
In finding that Huff also knew where to find the decedent the night of the murder, the en banc majority must first impute to Huff Artis’ knowledge, or speculate that Ar-tis told Huff where he had located Davis earlier. The majority then must assume either that the kidnapping and murder occurred in the same general area, or that armed with whatever knowledge Huff might have obtained from Artis, if any, Huff was able to trace the victim to the basketball court at the critical time when she met her death. The problem with these assumptions is that we have no information that Huff obtained any such information from Artis, or if he did, that he acted on it. The majority’s assumptions stretch well beyond the limits of inferences permissible by our jurisprudence, which requires that reasonable inferences be made from proof of other facts. See United Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 119 A.2d 925, 927-28 (D.C.1956). “Conclusions may be drawn by inference from established facts but not from other inferences, because conclusions so reached are merely conjectural.” Id.
*10The trial court relied upon legal principles extracted from Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516-17, just as the en banc court does today. In that regard, the trial court adhered to the principles governing relevance for purposes of admissibility of third-party culpability evidence, including the rule “that relevance ... requires] a ‘link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue.’ ” See majority opinion at 5 (quoting Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516); see also Winfield I, supra, 652 A.2d at 612. What accounts for the difference in the en banc court’s outcome can be attributed only to (1) the impermissible substitution of speculation for a proffer of facts, or (2) the “reasonable possibility” rule which the majority inserts into the nexus requirement. Having examined the former, I turn now to an examination of this new gloss which the majority places upon the nexus requirement.
II. The “Reasonable Possibility” Rule
The majority expresses its intention to adhere to central principles of our previously well-settled rules governing the admissibility of evidence purporting to show that another person committed the crimes charged. It preserves the evidentiary rule enunciated in our prior decisions, and applied by the panel majority in this case, that before evidence can be admitted that a person other than the accused committed the crime, there must be a “link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue.” See majority opinion at 4 (citing Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516) (citations omitted); Winfield I, supra, 652 A.2d at 613. Likewise, the majority adheres to the rule that a third-party’s motive alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite link and that some other evidence tending to connect that person with the commission of the crime is required.7 Freeland v. United States, 631 A.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C.1993); Shepard, supra note 3, 538 A.2d at 1118. These principles, which have guided our decisions in numerous cases over the years and which are consistent with the general rule elsewhere, should be preserved.8 However, in an effort to clarify the meaning of the nexus requirement and eliminate the confusion engendered by a “clearly linked” explanation found in our prior decisions, the court now reintexprets the “reasonable possibility” language from Johnson, supra. At the same time, the court disavows our prior decisions to the extent that they impose some “more exacting standard of relevance.”9 This reformulation of the relevance test attaches new meaning to Johnson’s “reasonable possibility” language, and it diminishes the well-recognized nexus requirement between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue as the foundation for admissibility of evidence that a person other than the accused committed the charged offense.10
In Johnson, this court used the “reasonable possibility” formulation in an effort to explain what we meant in earlier cases where we stated that the foundational requirement for the admission of third-party culpability evidence is that it be “clearly linked” to the commission of the charged offense. Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516. Significantly, we retained in Johnson several other critical principles, including: (1) that the evidence must “establish[ ] the necessary link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime”; (2) that the evidence “need only tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense”; and (3) that our focus “is on the effect the evidence has upon the defendant’s culpability, and not the third-party’s culpability.” Id. at *11516-17 (emphasis in original). I do not understand the majority’s opinion to reject these tenets. However, the majority now holds that admissibility of third-party culpability evidence is determined by reference to the usual test of relevance articulated in Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978), as “explicated by Johnson’s reasonable possibility formulation.”11 It is the latter part of the holding which creates the problem, in my view. First, it unnecessarily imposes an additional requirement to the relevance test, the meaning of which is not clear. Second, in spite of the en banc majority’s view that this formulation insures the exclusion of irrelevant and speculative evidence, this court has recognized previously the exact opposite view in Johnson, as reflected in the following passage from the opinion, which followed the court’s “reasonable possibility” explanation:
What we mean by “clearly link,” as used first by this court in Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097, is proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. This proof permits the admission of evidence which otherwise is generally excluded because it is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party’s guilt.
Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516 (emphasis added).12 That acknowledged risk of admitting irrelevant evidence is heightened by today’s ruling.
Moreover, this approach is inconsistent with the majority’s efforts to harmonize the admissibility requirements for such evidence with the customary standard of relevance. See Punch, supra, 377 A.2d at 1358 (“[relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence or non-existence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence”) (citations omitted); accord, King v. United States, 618 A.2d 727, 728 (D.C.1993). That standard requires generally that the evidence sought to be introduced have some connection with the defendant and the crime charged. Punch, 377 A.2d at 1358. Similarly, we have required consistently that, in order to be admissible, third-party culpability evidence must have “some link or nexus between [the] proffered events and the crimes involved in the case before the court.” Winfield I, supra, 652 A.2d at 613 (citing Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516 and Beale, supra note 4, 465 A.2d at 803). Despite the “reasonable possibility” explication in Johnson, even in that case, this court did not relax the relevancy requirement which included a foundational proffer of “a set of facts or circumstances, which, in the aggregate, establishes the necessary link, connection or nexus between the proffered evidence and the crime at issue.” Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516.
Under the majority’s modified rule, it is apparently sufficient to proffer only the motive and prior crime of a third party against the victim,- provided the third party remains at large somewhere in the community, leaving any connection with the crime charged to mere conjecture. The majority’s approach casts an extremely wide net. Since being at large in the community can apply to virtually anyone, including others with a motive and a hostile history with the victim, the result of applying the new rule appears to be to eliminate the requirement for showing opportunity and presence, and therefore the nexus to the crime charged as a foundation for third-party culpability evidence. This opens the door for the introduction in a criminal trial of all manner of evidence about the criminal circles of which a victim might have been a part.
The difficulty with our prior decisions, as the majority points out, stems from the phrase “clearly linked,” found in Beale, supra note 4, 465 A.2d at 803 and Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097, and I have no quarrel with *12the majority’s determination to discard it.13 However, there remains in our jurisprudence other principles, which the majority preserves, which are sufficient, in my view, to provide guidance for the trial court in meeting its obligation to assure that a defendant has a “ ‘meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’ ”14 and at the same time “accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” See Nelson v. United States, 649 A.2d 301, 304 (D.C.1994) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). The adoption of the “reasonable possibility” rule is not necessary to accomplish that purpose and provides no meaningful amplification. Moreover, the uncertainty left by today’s efforts to reformulate the evidentiary rule to include an undefined “reasonable possibility” standard, no less than the “clearly linked” lexicon which this court now rejects, portends continued difficulties for the trial court and counsel in attempting to apply the rule of relevance in this area, in my opinion. Stripped of the “explication] by Johnson’s reasonable possibility formulation,” as adopted by the majority, the remaining rules are workable and consistent with the general principles of relevance in this jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in the majority opinion in Win-field I, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court in its formulation of the new rule and in its application to the facts of this ease.

. See majority opinion at 5.

. See majority opinion at 5-6.

. We review the trial court's decision to exclude such evidence for an abuse of discretion. Shepard v. United States, 538 A.2d 1115, 1116 (D.C.1988); Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591, 607 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2123, 77 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1983).

.See, e.g., Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1293, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In Beale, this court upheld the exclusion of third-party culpability evidence where it found lacking any nexus with the crime charged because there was no evidence "that these other individuals, assertedly with motives to kill the victim ..., were in the area at the time of the shooting” or "evidence specifically linking these [prior] events to the subsequent murder.” Id.

. The only details concerning the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping are found in the government’s motion in limine, which appellant did not dispute, and which the majority quotes in the opinion.

. If appellant’s counsel knew of any basis for claiming that Huff knew where to locate the victim, she never disclosed them to the trial court.

. The en banc majority cites as examples "practical opportunity to commit the crime, including at least inferential knowledge of the victim's whereabouts.” See majority opinion at 5.

. As stated in Winfield I, it has long been the general rule that
"[ejvidence of the motive of one other than the defendant to commit the crime is not admissible where there is no other proof in the case which tends to connect such other person with the offense with which the defendant is charged.”
Id., 652 A.2d at 613 (quoting 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 441 at 502).

. See majority opinion at 5.

. For cases from other jurisdictions explaining the requirement for proof or proffer of evidence tending to connect another person to the offense for which a defendant is charged, see the cases cited in Winfield I, supra, 652 A.2d at 613 n. 5.

. See majority opinion at 5.

. The en banc majority cites Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516, purportedly in support of the opposite proposition when it states the following:
That [reasonable possibility] standard insures the exclusion of evidence that "is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party’s guilt.”
Majority opinion at 5 (emphasis added).

. For example, in Brown, this court said that, "before evidence of guilt of another can be deemed relevant and thereby admissible, the evidence must clearly link that other person to the commission of the crime.” Brown, supra, 409 A.2d at 1097 (emphasis added).

. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)).