Court Opinion

ID: 9839995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 21:03:52.861842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:53.643427
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/14/23 P. v. Taylor CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H048959
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. B1794662)

             v.

 DONTE TAYLOR et al.,

             Defendants and Appellants.

                                                I. INTRODUCTION
         A jury found defendants Donte Taylor and Meleesa Johnson1 guilty of several
offenses involving their sexual actions with a child, Johnson’s daughter. The jury
convicted Taylor of two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of
age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1–2),2 16 counts of oral copulation
or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b);
counts 3–18), and one count of possessing or controlling matter depicting a person under
18 years of age personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a);
count 20). Johnson was charged with and convicted of five of these same counts: four

         1
          Johnson’s first name is frequently referred to in the record as “Mellisa.” The
trial court verified near the end of the trial that Johnson’s first name is correctly spelled
“Meleesa.”
        2
          All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger
(§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 15–18) and one count of possessing or controlling matter
depicting a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in or simulating sexual
conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 20).3 The trial court sentenced Taylor to 290 years to
life in prison consecutive to a three-year determinate term, and Johnson to 60 years to life
in prison consecutive to a three-year determinate term.
       On appeal, Taylor contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS); (2) the
trial court erred by using CALCRIM No. 1193 to instruct the jury regarding the
permissible and impermissible uses of CSAAS evidence; (3) his sentence amounts to
cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the United States and California
Constitutions; (4) his case must be remanded for resentencing because the court failed to
pronounce a sentence for count 18; (5) the trial court should be directed to strike a
$129.75 criminal justice administration fee imposed against him; and (6) the abstract of
judgment must be corrected to specify the punishment for certain counts and to reflect
that the trial court stayed the imposed fines and fees. Johnson joins in Taylor’s
arguments regarding CSAAS evidence, the CSAAS instruction, and the criminal justice
administration fee. Johnson also separately contends that: (1) the trial court erred under
section 654 by imposing separate punishment for each of counts 15 through 18; and
(2) her case should be remanded for resentencing on count 20 under recent changes to
section 1170.
       For reasons that we will explain, we reject the assertions of error regarding the
CSAAS evidence and CSAAS instruction, the argument that the trial court erred under

       3
        After the close of evidence, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to
dismiss one count of employing, persuading, or inducing a minor’s involvement in
modeling, posing, or performing sexual conduct, a count that had been charged against
both defendants (§ 311.4, subd. (c); count 19).

                                             2
section 654 regarding Johnson’s sentence, and Johnson’s assertion that her case should be
remanded for resentencing on count 20. For both defendants, we order the portion of the
criminal justice administration fee that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021 to be vacated.
As amended, we will affirm the judgment for Johnson. Regarding Taylor, we will
reverse the judgment and remand the matter for resentencing due to the lack of an oral
pronouncement of the sentence on count 18. We will order the trial court to ensure that
the new abstract of judgment accurately and completely reflects the oral pronouncement
of judgment upon resentencing, including the sentence for each count and any fines and
fees imposed.
                                   II. BACKGROUND
       Johnson was the mother of a girl who was about nine years old at the time of the
charged acts. Defendants Johnson and Taylor were romantically involved with each
other, and they lived with Johnson’s daughter and others in Johnson’s father’s home.
Johnson’s father was often absent from the home due to work.
       During a dispute in the home on October 28, 2017, defendants struck Johnson’s
father, injuring him. Defendants left and then tried to re-enter the home, but Johnson’s
father would not let defendants back in and told them he would call the police, so
defendants left. The next morning, Johnson’s father found defendants in the house, so he
called the police. Defendants left the house, leaving Johnson’s daughter behind. As
Johnson’s father was on the phone with police, Johnson’s daughter approached him and
said she had to tell him something. Johnson’s father told the girl to wait and tell the
police what she had to say when the police arrived.
       When the police arrived, Johnson’s daughter reported that defendants had sexually
abused her. She retold her account of sexual abuse by defendants to police officers again
that same day, and then again to one of the same police officers a few days later. She
reported that Taylor had engaged in various sexual actions with her, including coming
into the bathroom “every single time” she took a shower to commit sexual actions with

                                             3
her. She stated that she kept a tally on paper of the number of times Taylor engaged in
some form of sexual activity with her as she came out of the shower, and that this tally
reached 62 times, though she had discarded the paper before she made her report to
police. She also stated that Taylor vaginally penetrated her with his penis more than one
time and up to 20 times, though she also stated that “[m]ost of the times were, like,
attempts.” She reported that Taylor made her engage in various sexual activities, and that
if she refused, he would “force” her to do so. The girl stated that at one point, Taylor told
her if she did not perform a sexual act, he would hurt her mother.
       Johnson’s daughter reported that Johnson was aware of Taylor’s actions and was
“happy” and “smiling” when Taylor would commit these actions. The girl reported that
at one point, both defendants engaged in various sexual acts with her that they captured
on video and in photographs. The girl reported that she fell asleep after various sexual
activity occurred in the home between her, Johnson, and Taylor, and that defendants then
awoke her to engage in more photographed sexual activity with them. The girl reported
that Johnson told her that engaging in this sexual activity was “totally normal.” She also
reported that on occasions Johnson would tell her to come “have fun” with her and
Taylor, meaning engaging in sexual activity, and that on one such occasion, defendants
took her to a hotel room that she thought was in San Francisco where they both engaged
in sexual activity with her. The girl reported that when she told Johnson she did not want
to engage in this activity, Johnson took her phone away and grounded her.
       The same day that Johnson’s daughter reported defendants’ actions to police,
police stopped the minivan defendants were driving, obtained a search warrant, and found
four cell phones in the vehicle. A search of Taylor’s cell phone found five videos and six
photographs of Johnson’s daughter engaged in sexual activity with defendants. An
analysis of data from the videos and photographs showed they were taken a few months
earlier on either June 10, 2017, or July 2, 2017 at the home of Johnson’s father. A
different phone taken from Johnson’s purse also contained photographs of the girl

                                             4
engaged in sexual activity, some of which were the same photographs as those found on
Taylor’s phone and some of which were different.
        At trial, the prosecution called Johnson’s father, Johnson’s daughter, and three
police officers to testify. The prosecution also called Dr. Anna Washington, a
psychologist who was recognized as an expert in CSAAS. Before Dr. Washington’s
testimony, the trial court read CALCRIM instruction No. 303, instructing the jury:
“During the trial certain evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider
that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.” The trial court also instructed the
jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows: “You will hear testimony from
Anna Washington regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Anna
Washington’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not
evidence that the defendants committed any of the crimes charged against them. [¶] You
may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [Johnson’s daughter’s]
conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who had been molested and in
evaluating the believability of her testimony.” The trial court later noted that the
prosecutor and counsel for both defendants requested that the trial court provide
CALCRIM No. 1193 before Dr. Washington’s testimony; defense counsel did not dispute
this.
        Dr. Washington testified that she was not familiar with the facts of the instant case
and that she had conducted no interviews regarding this case. She testified that CSAAS
is made up of five categories that are intended to “dispel some different myths about
child sexual abuse”: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed,
conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. She acknowledged that “all
children might have varied reactions to child sexual abuse,” and thus “some of the
categories might not apply to all children.” She stressed that CSAAS “should not be used
to diagnose[ ] a child with any particular disorder” and “it shouldn’t be used to determine
whether or not a particular defendant is guilty or not, for example.” Dr. Washington

                                              5
testified that CSAAS does not determine whether abuse occurred, but rather helps “dispel
or challenge” “common myths about child sexual abuse.” She then testified about four of
the five CSAAS categories (secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, and
delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure), and why a victim of child sexual abuse
might engage in behavior in these areas that some people might find counterintuitive.4
Dr. Washington also recognized that “victims of child sexual abuse respond in various
ways depending on individual characteristics and circumstances of the sexual abuse.”
       Neither defendant testified, called any witnesses, or presented any evidence. In
the trial court’s instructions to the jury following closing arguments, the court repeated
CALCRIM Nos. 303 and 1193.
                                    III. DISCUSSION
       A. CSAAS Evidence – Both Defendants
       Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting CSAAS
evidence through Dr. Washington’s testimony.
       Prior to trial, defendants moved in limine to exclude CSAAS expert testimony.
Defendants’ motion recognized that “[c]ase law thus far has examined CSAAS and
admitted it for the limited purpose of rehabilitation of persons as a class.” The defense
motion asserted that this use has been permitted because of “the unexamined assumption
that CSAAS evidence is a reliable reflection of how children, as a class, respond when
faced with attempting to communicate the fact of abuse to a disbelieving world of
adults.” The motion stated that the defense “challenges this basic assumption that this
evidence is reliable,” because “the subject of expert testimony must be reliable evidence
and free from speculation even when it is not evidence of a scientific nature. CSAAS
does not meet these criteria.” As a result, the defense moved the trial court to exclude

       4
        The prosecution did not seek to have Dr. Washington testify about the fifth
CSAAS category, retraction, as the evidence did not indicate that Johnson’s daughter
sought to retract the allegations.

                                              6
any expert testimony regarding CSAAS for any purpose, or alternatively to exclude any
testimony “that CSAAS factors show that a sexual molestation actually occurred, the
complaining witnesses were victims of sexual molestation, that the complaining
witnesses are credible or telling the truth, or any other testimony suggesting children who
make accusations of child abuse should be believed.” The defense also moved the trial
court to require the prosecution to make an offer of proof identifying any myths it
intended CSAAS testimony to dispel, to limit CSAAS testimony to dispelling such
myths, to instruct the jury “regarding the limited purpose and use to which the expert
testimony of CSAAS can be used,” and to conduct a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code
section 402 at which the prosecution would be required to lay the foundation for the
reliability of CSAAS evidence and to lay the foundation for the qualifications of any
expert witness on the subject.
       The prosecution moved in limine to allow CSAAS evidence through an expert
witness, asserting that because Johnson’s daughter did not disclose the abuse
immediately, “[a] CSAAS expert can explain delayed disclosures, incremental
disclosures, and children’s memory as it relates to sexual events.” In addition, the
prosecution opposed the defense’s motion to exclude CSAAS expert testimony, asserting
that the prosecution anticipated the defense would challenge the girl’s credibility because
she “delayed reporting and gave inconsistent statements,” and thus CSAAS evidence
should be permitted “to explain such conduct.”
       During trial, but prior to Dr. Washington’s testimony and after Johnson’s
daughter’s testimony, the trial court heard argument on the matter out of the presence of
the jury and ruled that Dr. Washington could testify about CSAAS. The trial court ruled:
“Ultimately, whenever any witness is on the stand -- and that also applies to currently an
11-year-old witness -- their credibility is a factor in the consideration by the jury.
Whether counsel argue one way or the other, what a witness says on the stand is up to the
jury whether it is to believe all, part, of none of it.” The court stated that it was “clear”

                                               7
that Johnson’s daughter’s testimony was going to be “challenged” and “questioned,” and
that in light of case law stating that CSAAS evidence is generally admissible, “such an
expert is appropriate and relevant.” The trial court also stated: “[T]here was a delay in
reporting of the incidents. There was concealment. There are allegations that there are
conflicts in her testimony. [¶] And this expert as proffered would provide information in
opinion as to victims as a class and not to any particular victim.” The trial court thus
ruled that Dr. Washington could testify as to the first four CSAAS categories, noting that
it would provide CALCRIM No. 1193 to the jury.
       On appeal, defendants contend that their state and federal constitutional rights to
due process were violated by the admission of CSAAS evidence because the evidence
allowed the jury to make the “unreasonable inference” that because Johnson’s daughter
“acted in ways that children who have been molested act, as described by Dr.
Washington, she was a credible witness, despite evidence to the contrary.” They contend
that CSAAS evidence should be inadmissible as unreliable because it “always supports a
conclusion that the abuse actually occurred.” To the extent that defendants’ trial counsel
failed to articulate their objection to this evidence in a way that preserves this issue for
appeal, they assert that they were deprived of their right to effective assistance of counsel.
              1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       Expert opinion testimony is admissible when the subject matter is “beyond
common experience,” and the opinion would assist the jury. (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a).) “ ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court’s
discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426 (McDowell).)
       “Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of five commonly
held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. [Citation.] While CSAAS

                                               8
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established
in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias).) CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for
the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are
not inconsistent with having been molested.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
385, 394.) “For instance, where a child delays a significant period of time before
reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed
reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser
who occupies a position of trust.” (Ibid.) CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove
that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to
rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to
explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301, fn. omitted
(McAlpin).)
              2. Analysis
       The trial court determined that Dr. Washington’s CSAAS testimony was relevant
because Johnson’s daughter’s credibility was placed at issue. Defendants do not
specifically challenge the trial court’s ruling in this regard, and we find no abuse of
discretion in this ruling. Defendants sought to establish through their cross-examination
and in argument that Johnson’s daughter’s testimony contained “contradictions and
inconsistencies,” focusing on a lack of detail about the instances she reported, the
presence of other people in the house, the lack of corroborating witnesses, and asserted
contradictions in her accounts about the incident in the hotel. Johnson’s daughter also

                                              9
testified that she still loved her mother, and during trial she provided a card to be given to
her mother. Dr. Washington’s testimony provided relevant information to the jury in
deciding whether the girl’s conduct was inconsistent with the conduct of someone who
had been molested. For example, Dr. Washington testified about how the normalizing
behavior of perpetrators of child sexual abuse facilitates secrecy, how victims of child
sexual abuse might react to feeling stuck or entrapped in the relationship with their
abusers, and, in particular, how people might have a misconception “that children will
share all the details right away and that those details will be shared in a consistent
manner,” whereas in reality, “children might share little bits and pieces of information
over time and also that some of that information is incomplete or inconsistent as well.”
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the testimony
involved a matter “beyond common experience” that would assist the jury. (Evid. Code,
§ 801, subd. (a).)
       Beyond the relevance of the testimony in this particular case, defendants assert
that CSAAS evidence should be generally inadmissible because it is unreliable and
because, by its very nature, CSAAS evidence will always support the conclusion that
abuse actually occurred because it suggests that both intuitive and counterintuitive
behavior support an alleged victim’s credibility. They assert that while “California has
accepted the admissibility of CSAAS evidence, courts have acknowledged the inherent
problems with such evidence,” citing cases largely from other jurisdictions. Defendants
acknowledge that in McAlpin, the California Supreme Court held that CSAAS evidence
could assist jurors by dispelling common misperceptions about victim behavior, and that
this court is bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
pp. 1300–1302.) However, defendants argue that McAlpin is “no longer an accurate
reflection of current understandings of how children respond to abuse,” and that recent
decisions from Courts of Appeal applying McAlpin were wrongly decided. Defendants
assert that jurors are no longer likely to hold the misconceptions that CSAAS evidence

                                              10
addresses, and that the admission of CSAAS evidence deprived them of due process by
permitting the jury to infer that Johnson’s daughter was a credible witness.
       Our Supreme Court held in McAlpin that CSAAS expert testimony is admissible
to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse and to
explain seemingly contradictory behavior of a child sexual abuse victim. (McAlpin,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301.) The California Supreme Court’s decisions are binding on
all lower courts in this state. (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 528.) “CSAAS
evidence has been admitted by the courts of this state since the 1991 McAlpin decision.”
(People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch).) “Further, reviewing courts
have routinely held the admission of CSAAS evidence does not violate due process.
[Citations.]” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) Defendants’ references to
decisions from other jurisdictions that reached a different outcome do not affect the
binding nature of the McAlpin decision. The McAlpin decision “is binding on all lower
courts in this state. [Citation.] That other jurisdictions may disagree with it does not
change its impact on California cases. [Citation.]” (Munch, supra, at p. 468.)
Accordingly, we adhere to precedent from our Supreme Court that CSAAS evidence is
generally admissible for the limited purposes for which it was admitted in the instant
case. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of this
evidence.5 (McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 426.)
       Defendants also assert that if this issue is forfeited because trial defense counsel
did not specifically articulate a due process objection, they received ineffective assistance
of counsel. We have analyzed defendants’ claims on the merits without considering them

       5
        Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
CSAAS evidence. However, they also state that the correct standard of review is de novo
where the question presented is whether the trial court correctly construed the Evidence
Code in admitting the evidence. Even under the de novo standard of review, our
conclusion would remain the same.

                                             11
forfeited, in part because the trial court granted defendants’ pretrial motion that any
defense objections concerning the admissibility of evidence “also be deemed objections
under Article 1, Section[s] 7, 13, 15, and 16 of the California Constitution, and under
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” Thus, defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim is inapplicable.
However, even if defendants had not properly preserved this issue at the trial level, the
failure to preserve this issue would not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel. “ ‘ “ ‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. [Citations]’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653.)
Where, as here, an objection to evidence would have been properly overruled, defense
counsel’s failure to make such objection does not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. (People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 465 [counsel’s performance
was not deficient for failing to object where “any such objection would have been
meritless and properly overruled”]; People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 127 (Bell)
[counsel was not ineffective for “failing to raise a futile objection” to evidence].) Any
objection to the CSAAS evidence grounded in due process concerns would have been
properly overruled based on California Supreme Court precedent. Defendants’
ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore fails.
       Finally, even if the trial court should have excluded the CSAAS evidence,
defendants were not prejudiced by the evidence’s admission. Johnson’s daughter
described specific sexual acts that defendants committed upon her, and the video and
photographic evidence from defendants’ cell phones corroborated that some of these acts
occurred and generally bolstered Johnson’s daughter’s credibility. Johnson’s daughter
provided largely consistent accounts in three interviews with law enforcement and in her

                                              12
testimony during trial. While the prosecutor discussed the CSAAS evidence in her
closing argument, she did so in the context of asserting that the girl’s behavior did not
mean that her testimony was not credible, and she specifically reminded the jury of the
limited purpose for which they could consider this evidence. The judge twice instructed
the jury concerning the limited use for which the CSAAS evidence could be considered,
and we presume the jury generally understands and follows instructions. (People v.
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670 (McKinnon).) Dr. Washington also testified that
CSAAS does not establish that abuse actually occurred; it only helps to dispel any
misconceptions about how victims of child sexual abuse might be expected to react. In
this situation, even if the trial court improperly admitted the CSAAS evidence, and even
if the admission amounted to a violation of defendants’ due process rights, we find
beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless, and thus reversal is not
warranted. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)
       B. CSAAS Instruction – Both Defendants
       Defendants contend that the trial court erred by using CALCRIM No. 1193 rather
than CALJIC No. 10.64 to instruct the jury regarding the CSAAS evidence. Defendants
argue that CALJIC No. 10.64 correctly instructs the jury that CSAAS research “begins
with the assumption that a molestation has occurred, and seeks to describe and explain
common reactions of children to that experience.” In contrast, defendants argue,
CALCRIM No. 1193 “does not inform the jurors that CSAAS assumes the truth of the
complaining witnesses’ claims. It fails to instruct the jury that the evidence is relevant
only to educate the jurors about how molested children may act in general. Instead, it
tells the jurors they may consider the evidence in ‘evaluating [victims’] believability,’ ”
which defendants assert improperly invites the jury to consider CSAAS evidence to
support an alleged victim’s allegations against a defendant. As a result, defendants assert
that the trial court erred in using CALCRIM No. 1193, and that the alleged error deprived
them of their due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

                                             13
               1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate court
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law. [Citation.]” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
       “A jury instruction may ‘ “so infuse[ ] the trial with unfairness as to deny due
process of law.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or
deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question
is ‘ “whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “It is well established that the
instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “If the charge
as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘ “reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the
Constitution.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655.)
               2. Analysis
       Defendants did not object to CALCRIM No. 1193 below. In fact, the trial court
stated that the prosecutor and counsel for both defendants asked the trial court to provide
CALCRIM No. 1193 before Dr. Washington’s testimony. The trial court then asked
counsel if they wished to add anything to this statement, and counsel for both defendants
replied negatively. Then, at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, defense
counsel again did not object to the trial court’s stated intent to give CALCRIM No. 1193
to the jury. Based on this, the Attorney General urges this court to apply the doctrine of
invited error, barring defendants from raising this issue.
       “ ‘When a defense attorney makes a “conscious, deliberate tactical choice” to
[request or] forego a particular instruction, the invited error doctrine bars an argument on
appeal that the instruction was [given or] omitted in error.’ [Citations.]” (McKinnon,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 675, brackets in original.) “[T]he doctrine does not apply if

                                                14
defendant merely acquiesced in the absence of an instruction. [Citation.]” (Bell, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 109.) For the doctrine to apply, “ ‘[t]he record must reflect that counsel
had a deliberate tactical purpose.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 109.) “Invited error will be
found . . . only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting or acceding
to the complained-of instruction. [Citations.]” (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90,
114.) “[T]he record must show only that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical
choice between having the instruction and not having it. If counsel was ignorant of the
choice, or mistakenly believed the court was not giving it to him [or her], invited error
will not be found. If, however, the record shows this conscious choice, it need not
additionally show counsel correctly understood all the legal implications of the tactical
choice. Error is invited if counsel made a conscious tactical choice.” (People v. Cooper
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 831 (Cooper).) When the invited error doctrine applies, the
defendant is barred from challenging the trial court’s instruction on appeal. (People v.
DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 138.)
       Here, defense counsel did not merely acquiesce to the trial court giving
CALCRIM No. 1193. Instead, defense counsel affirmatively requested that the trial court
provide this instruction before Dr. Washington testified. The record does not disclose
any specific deliberate tactical purpose defense counsel had for requesting this instruction
as opposed to CALJIC No. 10.64 or some other instruction regarding CSAAS. The trial
court’s summary did not disclose why defense counsel requested this instruction.
However, defense counsel specifically requested the instruction. The trial court gave
both defendants’ counsel the opportunity to add anything to its summation and they
declined. Although it appears that defense counsel may have made a “conscious choice”
to ask the trial court to give CALCRIM No. 1193 (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 831),
we need not decide whether the invited error doctrine applies in this case. As we will
explain, even if the doctrine of invited error does not bar defendants from raising this
issue, we determine that the trial court did not err in giving CALCRIM No. 1193.

                                             15
       The trial court did not err in giving CALCRIM No. 1193 because it is not
reasonably likely that jurors understood the instruction as permitting the use of CSAAS
evidence for the improper purpose of proving that defendants sexually abused Johnson’s
daughter. CALCRIM No. 1193 informs jurors that they may use CSAAS evidence to
evaluate whether the alleged victim’s behavior, which may appear inconsistent with
being molested, was actually not inconsistent with the behavior of a child sexual abuse
victim. To the extent that CALCRIM No. 1193 allowed the jury to consider CSAAS
evidence in their evaluation of the believability of Johnson’s daughter’s testimony, the
instruction is proper. CSAAS evidence is relevant and admissible when an alleged
victim’s credibility has been attacked. (See McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1302
[CSAAS evidence would assist the trier of fact by providing the jury with information
needed to objectively evaluate an alleged victim’s credibility and was relevant because it
tended to rehabilitate the testimony of a corroborating witness].) The jury could use the
CSAAS evidence in evaluating whether Johnson’s daughter’s testimony was believable.
The instruction specifically instructs the jurors that they must not consider CSAAS
testimony as evidence that defendants committed the charged crimes. Thus, nothing
about the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 supports defendants’ argument that their due
process rights were denied.
       When combined with Dr. Washington’s testimony emphasizing the limited role of
CSAAS evidence, the instruction would not cause the jury to believe that they could
consider the CSAAS evidence as proof that defendants sexually abused Johnson’s
daughter. As defendants acknowledge, the Court of Appeal in People v. Gonzales (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494 (Gonzales) rejected a similar argument to the one defendants raise
here. In Gonzales, the court noted that CALCRIM No. 1193 “must be understood in the
context” of the CSAAS expert’s testimony, which in that case stressed that “CSAAS is
not a tool to help diagnose whether a child has actually been abused.” (Gonzales, supra,
at p. 503.) In this context, the court held, a reasonable juror would understand

                                            16
CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury could use the expert’s testimony to conclude
that the alleged victim’s behavior “does not mean she lied when she said she was
abused.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 504.) The court held that the jury would understand that
it could not use the CSAAS expert’s testimony to conclude that the alleged victim “was,
in fact, molested.” (Ibid.) The court concluded: “The CSAAS evidence simply
neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus, under CALCRIM
No. 1193, a juror who believes [the expert’s] testimony will find both that [the alleged
victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her believability one way
or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence does not show she had been molested. There
is no conflict in the instruction.” (Ibid.) Other courts have come to similar conclusions
regarding CALCRIM No. 1193. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176;
Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474.) We agree with the reasoning in those
cases. Because there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied
the instruction in the matter asserted by defendants, the trial court did not err in
instructing the jury on the use of CSAAS evidence with CALCRIM No. 1193, and
defendants’ due process rights were not denied.
       In addition, even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1193, any such error would not constitute reversible error. The repeated admonitions
from the trial court to not use the testimony to determine whether abuse occurred, the
prosecutor’s reminders in her closing argument that the evidence could only be used for
a limited purpose, and Dr. Washington’s testimony that CSAAS does not determine
whether abuse occurred all demonstrate the jury would not have improperly used the
CSAAS evidence. The strong evidence against defendants, including the video and
photographic evidence that corroborated some of Johnson’s daughter’s testimony, also
supports the conclusion that defendants would have been convicted of the same offenses
regardless of any alleged error in the instruction. Even if the trial court erred in using

                                              17
CALCRIM No. 1193 and the error was of federal constitutional dimension, we find the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.
       C. Defendant Taylor’s Resentencing on Count 18
       Taylor’s presentencing report recommended a sentence for each of the 19 counts
Taylor was convicted of, including a sentence of 15 years to life for count 18 (the final
count of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger),
with a total aggregate term of 290 years to life consecutive to three years in prison. At
the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally imposed the recommended sentence for each
of counts one through 17 and for count 20, along with the recommended aggregate term.
However, the trial court did not orally pronounce a sentence for count 18. Clerk’s
minutes from the sentencing hearing reflect a sentence of 15 years to life imposed for
count 18. Taylor contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that despite the notation
in the clerk’s minutes, remand is required to permit the trial court to resentence Taylor on
count 18.
       We agree that remand for resentencing is appropriate. The trial court must
pronounce judgment in open court and on the record. (See § 1193, subd. (a).) “The trial
court is generally required to include all aspects of a judgment in its oral pronouncement
of judgment. [Citation.] Any discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced
and as recorded in the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result
of clerical error. [Citation.] The abstract of judgment ‘does not control if different from
the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to
digest or summarize.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 (Leon).)
       In the instant case, while the aggregate sentence the trial court imposed indicates
the court intended to impose a consecutive sentence of 15 years to life for count 18, the
trial court did not orally pronounce a sentence for count 18. Thus, the trial court did not
include “all aspects” of its judgment in its oral pronouncement. (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th
at p. 855.) The clerk’s minutes do not substitute for the lack of an oral pronouncement on

                                             18
count 18, as this document may not add to or modify the court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment. Therefore, we will remand this matter for resentencing.
       D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment – Defendant Taylor
       Taylor asserts that his sentence of 290 years to life consecutive to three years in
prison amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and federal
Constitutions because it serves no legitimate penal purpose. He argues that he “has
effectively received a sentence of life without parole, since he has no chance of ever
being released on parole.” He further argues that such a sentence does not further any
of the goals of California’s penal system: to punish a convicted defendant for the harm
caused, to deter future criminality, or to protect society. The Attorney General asserts
that Taylor’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his crimes and thus it does not
constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment.
       “[T]he full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions
when resentencing a defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th
415, 424–425.) Because we will remand this matter for resentencing due to the lack of
a pronouncement of the sentence for count 18, the trial court may revisit all prior
sentencing decisions. Thus, it is premature to address Taylor’s argument that his
sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment.
       E. Criminal Justice Administration Fee – Both Defendants
       The trial court imposed a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee upon both
Taylor and Johnson, pursuant to Government Code sections 29550, 29550.1, and
29550.2. Following defendants’ judgment, Government Code section 6111 was amended
to provide: “On and after July 1, 2021, the unpaid balance of any court-imposed costs
pursuant to . . . subdivision (c) or (f) of Section 29550, and Sections 29550.1, 29550.2,
and 29550.3, as those sections read on June 30, 2021, is unenforceable and uncollectible
and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” (Gov. Code,
§ 6111, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 11.) In other words, “by its plain

                                              19
terms,” Government Code section 6111 “make[s] any unpaid portion of the identified
assessments, as they existed on June 30, 2021, ‘unenforceable and uncollectible’ as of
July 1, 2021. [Citation.]” (People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626.) Further,
“the statute also mandates that any portion of a judgment imposing those fees be vacated.
Accordingly, based on the plain language of the statute, the unpaid balance of the . . .
criminal justice administration fees must be vacated.” (Id. at pp. 626–627, fns. omitted.)
The Attorney General concedes that both defendants are entitled to vacation of the unpaid
balance of this fee. Therefore, we will direct vacation of the unpaid balance of the
criminal justice administration fee for both defendants.
       F. Defendant Taylor’s Abstract of Judgment
       The trial court sentenced Taylor to consecutive terms of 15 years to life for each of
counts three through 17. The abstract of judgment form contains a section for the court
to list any counts for which the defendant is sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. This
section of Taylor’s abstract of judgment merely contains an asterisk instead of listing the
counts the 15-years-to-life sentence applied to. Taylor’s abstract of judgment does not
explain what the asterisk refers to. Nowhere does Taylor’s abstract state that the 15-
years-to-life sentence was imposed for each of counts three through 17. Taylor therefore
requests correction of the abstract of judgment to reflect that he received a sentence of
15 years to life for each of these counts.6
       In addition, the trial court imposed various fines and fees on Taylor, but it then
stayed those fines and fees based on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas). Taylor’s abstract of judgment states: “FINE/FEE STAYED P[E]R

       6
        Taylor’s brief states “the abstract should be amended to indicate that [Taylor]
received a sentence of 15 years to life for each of counts seven through 17.” However,
the court imposed the 15-years-to-life sentence for each of counts three through 17, not
seven through 17, and the abstract of judgment does not annotate the sentence for any of
these counts. We therefore treat Taylor’s argument as covering counts three through 17,
as the Attorney General suggests.

                                              20
DUENAS.” It does not specifically list which fine(s) and/or fee(s) were stayed. Taylor
thus contends that reference to a state restitution fine, a court operations assessment, and
a criminal conviction assessment imposed by the trial court “should be stricken from the
abstract of judgment.” The Attorney General agrees that the abstract does not clearly
indicate that all fines and fees imposed by the court were stayed, and therefore the
abstract should be amended. The Attorney General does not address Taylor’s contention
that the applicable fines and fees be “stricken” from the abstract, but instead asserts that
the abstract should be amended “to clearly state that the challenged fines and fees were
imposed and stayed.”
       “ ‘It is not open to question that a court has the inherent power to correct clerical
errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.] The
power exists independently of statute and may be exercised in criminal as well as in civil
cases. [Citation.]’ . . . Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate
courts . . . that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of
abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing
courts. [Citations.]” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
       We agree with the parties that the abstract of judgment fails to reflect that the trial
court sentenced Taylor to consecutive terms of 15 years to life for each of counts three
through 17. Upon resentencing, the abstract will need to reflect the sentence the court
imposes for each of counts three through 17. The abstract will also need to reflect the
sentence the trial court imposes for count 18. We also agree that the abstract does not
clearly reflect which imposed fines and fees the trial court stayed. Taylor cites no
authority for the proposition that the fines and fees should be ordered “stricken” from the
abstract when those fines and fees have been stayed. On remand for resentencing in
Taylor’s case, the trial court will have the opportunity to ensure that the new abstract of
judgment is a complete and accurate recitation of the oral pronouncement of judgment.

                                              21
       G. Penal Code 654’s Applicability to Defendant Johnson
       The probation officer’s presentencing report advised that section 654 did not
prohibit Johnson from being punished for each of the counts for which she was found
guilty. The report stated: “Based on the information provided by the [prosecutor],
Count 18 occurred on separate occasion and Counts 15, l6, l7, and 20 occurred on the
same occasion. Given counts 15, 16, and l7 can be viewed as the same occasion and
subject to concurrent sentencing, the undersigned believes each had separate objectives
and were predominantly independent of each other . . . .” In her sentencing
memorandum, Johnson noted the probation officer’s statements regarding section 654,
but she did not specifically contend that section 654 applied to bar her punishment on one
or more counts. In a supplemental sentencing memorandum, Johnson did not raise the
section 654 issue. The prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum asserted that section 654
does not require punishment to be stayed for any of Johnson’s counts. The prosecutor’s
memorandum asserted Johnson committed “[t]hree separate and distinct actions” on the
night where she and Taylor videorecorded their abuse of Johnson’s daughter, discussing
three sexual acts the video and images depicted between Johnson and her daughter. The
prosecutor’s memorandum noted that Johnson’s daughter then slept for a period of time,
woke to find defendants engaging in sexual intercourse in the bed next to her, and fell
asleep again before “[h]ours later, her mother, Defendant Johnson, woke her again” and
again engaged in a sexual act with her daughter. The prosecutor’s memorandum
continued: “The night on video with Defendant Johnson, she changed positions.
Changing body positions[ ] allowed time to stop the assaultive behavior, which
Defendant Johnson did not do. That night there was even a break for a few hours before
Defendant Johnson sexually assaulted her daughter again.”
       At sentencing, Johnson briefly raised the section 654 issue, arguing: “The law is
quite clear in 654 that if it happens at the same time, it should be considered one offense.
It should be sentenced for one offense, not for four different 15 years to life.” The

                                             22
prosecutor argued that Johnson’s daughter had not only testified about Johnson’s actions
on the night of the videorecording and photographing, but also about another time when
Johnson “sexually assaulted her and touched her,” and when the girl told Johnson she did
not like it, Johnson responded by taking away her daughter’s phone. The prosecutor then
discussed Johnson’s actions during the night of the videorecording and photographing,
arguing that Johnson had an opportunity to reflect and stop her actions in between each
act, including the last act that occurred after Johnson’s daughter went to sleep for a few
hours. The prosecutor concluded her argument on this issue as follows: “In my closing
argument in this trial, I told the jury that they have before them more than four counts.
They have possibly five. The time the phone was taken away -- the three -- before the
individuals -- or the defendants had sex. And then the fifth after.” [¶] The four charged
were representative of at least four separate and distinct acts done by Defendant Johnson
to her biological daughter.”
       The trial court ruled that section 654 did not apply to limit punishment on any of
the counts of which Johnson was convicted. The trial court ruled that Johnson’s actions
“involved more than a single act or course of conduct,” and it found “that the course of
conduct that would be the separate acts of sexual abuse reflect multiple intents and
objectives.”
       Johnson contends that the trial court erred in refusing to apply section 654 to stay
her sentences on counts 16 through 18. She argues that the acts that formed the basis for
counts 15 through 17 “were carried out in the same location, on the same night, in
relatively quick temporal succession, incident to the same general intent: apparently, an
intent to produce video of the acts.” Johnson further asserts the prosecutor gave
contradictory accounts of the factual basis for count 18, arguing to the jury that Johnson
was guilty of this count based on her actions that occurred the same night of the conduct
charged in counts 15 through 17 and then arguing at the sentencing hearing that count 18
was based on Johnson’s actions on a different date where Johnson took away her

                                             23
daughter’s phone. She argues that “the prosecutor’s attempt to suggest that Count 18
was based on conduct that had never been asserted to be the basis of that conviction
previously called for close scrutiny, and that claim should not stand up on appeal.”
Johnson thus concludes that she should only be punished for one of these four counts –
count 15 – and that the punishment for counts 16 through 18 should be stayed under
section 654. The Attorney General counters that the trial court properly refused to stay
Johnson’s sentence on counts 16 through 18 pursuant to section 654.
              1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of
offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making
this determination. [Citation.]” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092,
1113.) “A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate,
involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) When the facts are
undisputed, however, “the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review
de novo. [Citations.]” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312 (Corpening).)
       Section 654, subdivision (a), states in relevant part: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than
one provision.”7 “The statutory purpose underlying section 654 ‘is to ensure that a
defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his [or her] culpability.’ [Citation.]

       7
         Section 654 was amended after Johnson’s trial with an effective date of
January 1, 2022. (§ 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
“Previously, under section 654 ‘the sentencing court was required to impose the sentence
that “provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment” and stay execution of the
other term. [Citation.] . . . [S]ection 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to
impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court
imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45.)

                                              24
To that end, the statute prohibits courts from imposing multiple punishment for the same
act or omission but, as the California Supreme Court recently observed, the application of
section 654 can leave courts with more questions than answers. [Citation.] This is
because ‘[n]either the text nor structure of section 654 resolves when exactly a single act
begins or ends, for example, or how to take account of the fact that virtually any given
physical action may, in principle, be divided into multiple subsets that each fit the
colloquial definition of an “act.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Kelly (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
886, 904.)
       “Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654
requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may
include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several
acts pursued with a single objective. [Citations.] We first consider if the different crimes
were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be
punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more
than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of
conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.
[Citations.]” (Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 311.)
       For step one of the section 654 analysis, “[w]hether a defendant will be found to
have committed a single physical act for purposes of section 654 depends on whether
some action the defendant is charged with having taken separately completes the actus
reus for each of the relevant criminal offenses. [Citations.]” (Corpening, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 313.) For step two of the analysis, “[a] defendant may be punished multiple
times for the same act without violating section 654 under specific circumstances. For
example, if there are multiple victims [citation], if the act is committed with different
criminal objectives [citation], or if a series of acts are committed within a period of time
during which reflection was possible [citation], section 654 does not apply.” (People v.
Kelly (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1136.) “It is defendant’s intent and objective, not

                                             25
the temporal proximity of his [or her] offenses, which determine whether the transaction
is indivisible. [Citations.]” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 (Harrison).)
“We have traditionally observed that if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or
were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to
have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once. [Citation.] [¶]
If, on the other hand, defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he [or she] may be punished for
each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the
violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       In Harrison, the California Supreme Court held that section 654 did not prohibit
multiple punishments for a defendant who committed three acts of forcible sexual
penetration within a period of seven to 10 minutes. (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at
pp. 325–326, 338.) The court held that multiple punishments were not prohibited merely
because the defendant directed the three acts toward the same area of the victim’s body,
or because the defendant’s actions would have constituted one forcible penetration but for
the victim’s acts of resisting. (Id. at pp. 337–338.) The court continued: “Moreover,
there is no legal or logical bar to separate punishment where, as here, each of defendant’s
‘repenetrations’ was clearly volitional, criminal and occasioned by separate acts of
force. Defendant urges that no greater punishment should befall him simply because the
initial offense was interrupted by the victim’s struggle. By the same token, however,
defendant should also not be rewarded where, instead of taking advantage of an
opportunity to walk away from the victim, he voluntarily resumed his sexually assaultive
behavior.” (Id. at p. 338.) Likewise, in People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 553
(Perez), our Supreme Court held: “A defendant who attempts to achieve sexual
gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his [or her] victim is
substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act. We

                                            26
therefore decline to extend the single intent and objective test of section 654 beyond its
purpose to preclude punishment for each such act.” Thus, the court found that where the
defendant committed various forcible sexual acts on the victim in a period of 45 minutes
to an hour: “None of the sex offenses was committed as a means of committing any
other, none facilitated commission of any other, and none was incidental to the
commission of any other. We therefore conclude that section 654 does not preclude
punishment for each of the sex offenses committed by defendant.” (Id. at pp. 549, 553–
554.)
              2. Analysis
        We hold, consistent with our Supreme Court under analogous circumstances in
Harrison and Perez, that section 654 does not restrict Johnson from being punished for
each of her acts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with the child. This holding
applies regardless of whether the trial court based its decision on actions in count 18 that
occurred on the same night as those in counts 15 through 17 or on actions that occurred
on a different occasion. If the factual basis for count 18 involved Johnson’s actions on
the night of the videorecorded and photographed conduct, section 654 does not apply.
Johnson’s daughter provided information about at least four distinct sexual acts that
Johnson engaged in with her on the night in question, some of which occurred before the
girl fell asleep and at least one of which occurred after she was awakened hours later.
Johnson does not dispute that these four counts represent four different physical acts of
oral copulation or sexual penetration, and each of these actions represented its own
distinct actus reus. Thus, the first part of the section 654 analysis is satisfied. As to part
two of the analysis, while Johnson argues that the acts were carried out “at the same time,
in the same location, and with the same intent,” the record reveals that “[n]one of the sex
offenses was committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated commission
of any other, and none was incidental to the commission of any other,” and thus section
654 does not preclude punishment for each of Johnson’s acts of child sexual abuse.

                                              27
(Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 553–554.) Each act by Johnson reflected its own volition,
its own criminal intent, and its own act of child sexual abuse, with time to reflect in
between each act, including during the time her daughter was asleep. Instead of taking
advantage of an opportunity to walk away from the victim, Johnson voluntarily resumed
her sexually abusive behavior. Johnson’s repeated acts of child sexual abuse during this
time reflect substantially more culpability than a defendant who commits only one such
act. Thus, section 654 does not limit her punishment for counts 15 through 18.
       Johnson argues in her reply brief that “there was but a single intent and no
movement to any different location here,” and thus section 654 would apply if all the
actions in counts 15 through 18 occurred on the same night. We reject Johnson’s
argument that a “single intent” was involved. The California Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument to the one Johnson makes here in Perez, holding that the defendant’s
argument that his “sole intent and objective was to obtain sexual gratification” for each
count was “much too broad and amorphous to determine the applicability of section 654.”
(Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 552.) The court stated: “Assertion of a sole intent and
objective to achieve sexual gratification is akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as
the sole intent and objective in committing a series of separate thefts. To accept such a
broad, overriding intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly
separate offenses would violate the statute’s purpose to insure that a defendant’s
punishment will be commensurate with his [or her] culpability. [Citation.] It would
reward the defendant who has the greater criminal ambition with a lesser punishment.”
(Ibid.) Each of Johnson’s acts of child sexual abuse was occasioned by its own criminal
intent to achieve another instance of sexual gratification. The cases Johnson cites for the
proposition that she had a single intent in her actions are inapposite. (See People v. Islas
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129–130 [section 654 applied where the defendants were
convicted of burglary and false imprisonment and “the burglary conviction was based
entirely on entry with the intent to commit felony false imprisonment”]; People v.

                                             28
Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1216 [multiple punishment for rape and kidnapping was
prohibited under section 654 because the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
committing the rape]; People v. Martinez (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 851, 858 [section 654
prohibited multiple punishment where assault with intent to commit rape and false
imprisonment offenses involved “the same criminal event” of the defendant assaulting his
victim and holding her “for a few moments to attempt to convince her not to complain to
the police.”].)
         Thus, if the factual basis for count 18 was Johnson’s actions on the same night as
her conduct in counts 15 through 17, section 654 would not apply. If the factual basis for
count 18 was Johnson’s actions on a different occasion, the separation in time would only
further demonstrate that section 654 does not apply.
         Johnson argues that the prosecutor supplied contrasting positions as to the factual
basis for count 18. Thus, Johnson asserts that at a minimum, “the sentence on Count 18
must be stayed under section 654 as it is not clear what factual determinations the jury
can have possibly made about that count that would distinguish it from conduct punished
in the other three counts, and, in fact, the prosecutor’s suggestions in the sentencing
hearing about the factual basis for this count had never actually been argued to the jury.”
This argument does not warrant application of section 654. As we state above, even
assuming that the jury concluded that Johnson’s conduct in count 18 occurred on the
same night as the actions in counts 15 through 17, section 654 does not warrant relief for
the reasons stated above. Thus, the trial court had a sufficient factual basis to conclude
that section 654 did not apply. If the trial court did conclude that the factual basis for
count 18 involved a different occasion, the trial court did not err in this respect.
Johnson’s daughter testified about a different date when both defendants took her to a
hotel in what she believed was San Francisco and engaged in sexual acts including oral
copulation with her, which would supply a factual basis for such a finding by the trial
court.

                                              29
       Johnson cites People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820 in support of her argument that
the trial court should not have considered the prosecutor’s argument that count 18
involved Johnson’s actions on a different occasion. In Siko, the California Supreme
Court held that the defendant “committed two criminal acts, but was convicted of three
violations: rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct with a child,” and therefore he should not
have been punished separately for all three convictions. (Id. at p. 823.) The court
rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant committed one or more lewd
acts other than the rape and sodomy, stating: “There is no showing that the lewd-conduct
count was understood in this fashion at trial. Indeed, a review of the record demonstrates
the contrary.” (Id. at pp. 825–826.) The court based this position on the fact that “the
jury’s lewd-conduct verdict included a specific finding” that the lewd conduct that
formed the basis for the defendant’s conviction was, in fact, the rape and sodomy. (Id. at
p. 826.)
       As we have concluded, section 654 does not restrict Johnson from being punished
for each of her acts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with the child even if the
factual basis for all four counts involved the same night. Siko merely held that
section 654 applied because defendant did not commit lewd acts other than the charged
rape and sodomy. Here, regardless of the prosecutor’s statements in the sentencing
hearing, the evidence demonstrates that Johnson committed at least four acts on the same
night that formed the basis for the verdicts in counts 15 through 18. Based on this
evidence, section 654 does not apply. Any error by the prosecutor in characterizing the
factual basis for count 18 does not alter the conclusion that section 654 does not apply to
Johnson.
       Johnson committed her crimes through distinct physical acts, reflecting multiple
intents and objectives. Section 654 does not limit her punishment. (Corpening, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 311.)

                                             30
       H. Amendments to Section 1170
       Finally, Johnson argues that because the trial court imposed the three-year
aggravated term for count 20, resentencing is warranted for the trial court to consider the
impact of two recent amendments to section 1170 on her case. First, Johnson asserts that
remand is required under changes to section 1170 that now make the middle term the
presumptive sentence unless certain circumstances exist. Second, Johnson contends that
her case must be remanded for resentencing under amendments to section 1170 that
require the trial court to impose the low term if the defendant’s psychological, physical,
or childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, subject
to a weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Attorney General
concedes that both changes, which took effect while this appeal was pending, apply
retroactively to Johnson. However, the Attorney General asserts that Johnson is not
entitled to remand for resentencing under either provision.
              1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       While this appeal was pending, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats.
2021) (Senate Bill 567), which amended section 1170 and became effective on January 1,
2022. “Pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170, subdivision (b) has been amended
to make the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment; a court
now must impose the middle term for any offense that provides for a sentencing triad
unless ‘there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of
a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond
a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464 (Lopez).) Senate Bill 567’s
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), are ameliorative in nature and “apply
retroactively to all cases not yet final as of January 1, 2022. [Citation.]” (Lopez, supra,
at p. 465.)

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       The Courts of Appeal are currently split regarding the applicable standard for
determining whether there is harmless error when a defendant was sentenced under the
former version of section 1170, subdivision (b), and the amended version applies
retroactively. (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500–501
[reviewing court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance true]; Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11 [harmless error if “reviewing court can conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
aggravating factors on which the trial court relied in exercising its discretion to select the
upper term”]; People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962, 982 [reviewing court “must
ask both whether we can be certain the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt
the aggravating circumstances relied on by the court and whether the trial court would
have exercised its discretion in the same way if it had been aware of the statutory
presumption in favor of the middle term”]; People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1098, 1112 [reviewing court must first determine beyond a reasonable doubt that “the
jury would have found true at least one of the aggravating circumstances that the trial
court relied on,” and then whether, if the trial court relied on other aggravating
circumstances, “it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser
sentence in the absence of the error.”].)
       Following Johnson’s sentencing, the Legislature also amended section 1170 by
adding subdivision (b)(6). This subdivision states that notwithstanding the change
making the middle term the presumptive sentence, “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition
of the lower term” if, in relevant part, it finds that “a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense” was that “[t]he person has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,

                                               32
or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6), (b)(6)(A), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3.) This change likewise “applies retroactively to nonfinal cases on direct appeal.
[Citations.]” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1095 (Gerson).) Where a
defendant falls within the amended statute following his or her sentencing, remand for
resentencing is required “ ‘unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court
would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.” ’ [Citation.] This is because defendants are ‘ “entitled to sentencing
decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1096; see also People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453, 462–
463, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275788; People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
226, 242.)
              2. Analysis
       We conclude that remand is not warranted under either of the recent changes to
section 1170 Johnson cites. As to Johnson’s first issue, we need not decide which
standard applies in determining whether there is harmless error concerning Johnson’s
sentencing under the former version of section 1170, subdivision (b), because we
conclude that all the aggravating factors relied on by the trial court for count 20 would
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury and the trial court would not
have chosen a lesser sentence than the one it imposed. Accordingly, under any of the
standards set forth above, the error was harmless. Regarding Johnson’s second issue
concerning section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), while the trial court was presented with
evidence of Johnson’s past trauma, we conclude that the record clearly indicates that the
trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of its
discretion later specified by the legislative amendments to this section.
       As to the first matter, the trial court concluded in imposing the upper-term
sentence for both defendants that defendants’ crimes “involved great violence, great
bodily harm, dread of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing high degree of cruelty,

                                              33
viciousness, or callousness.” The evidence in the record establishes these aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury heard Johnson’s daughter’s testimony about
her mother’s role in the sexual abuse, including Johnson’s role in preserving the abuse on
video and in photographs. A phone found in Johnson’s purse contained photos capturing
this sexual abuse. The jury heard testimony about how Johnson not only stood by
passively as Taylor sexually abused Johnson’s daughter, but how Johnson actively took
part in creating, possessing, and controlling matter depicting her daughter engaging in
sexual conduct. The girl convincingly testified about the violence, bodily harm, and
dread that Johnson’s actions inflicted upon her, and the high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness involved in Johnson’s actions. When the prosecutor showed
the girl two photos of the sexual abuse to identify the adults depicted in the photos, the
girl demonstrated the trauma inflicted upon her by expressing dread of seeing the photos.
       As the trial court stated in sentencing Johnson: “[A]s the victim’s biological
mother, at a minimum, it was expected that she would protect the victim from any harm.
Not only did she not protect, she was an active and ongoing participant in the sexual
abuse with her acts and words. [¶] She turned her child into nothing more than a sexual
device with no sense of concern for the victim’s emotional and physical well-being. It
should also be noted that the defendant participated in the recordings of some of these
incidences and retained images. [¶] The victim was particularly vulnerable. The victim
in this case was 9 years old and was subjected to control and sexual abuse of Defendant
Taylor and Defendant Johnson. This Court can, frankly, not think of any instance where
a victim could have been more vulnerable than what was reflected in this trial.” The trial
court also noted that the record reflects that Johnson and Taylor both “initiated and
induced each other” to sexually abuse Johnson’s daughter. Johnson did not merely
possess and control matter depicting her daughter engaging in sexual conduct; she
sexually abused her daughter to create this material. The jury heard evidence about how
Johnson tried to normalize this behavior, telling her daughter that it was “totally normal”

                                             34
and asking her daughter to come “have fun” with her and Taylor. When Johnson’s
daughter expressed displeasure at the abuse, the jury heard, Johnson responded by taking
away her daughter’s phone and grounding her.
       On this record, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that all the aggravating
factors would have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury and that the
trial court would have exercised its discretion in the same way if it had been aware of the
statutory presumption in favor of the middle term. Accordingly, under any prejudice
standard the trial court’s failure to apply later-amended section 1170, subdivision (b),
was harmless.
       As to the second matter, we conclude that the record clearly indicates the trial
court would have imposed the same sentence had it been aware of its responsibility to
make the determination section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), now requires. The trial court
was aware that Johnson reported several acts of psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, as noted in the presentencing report. The trial court addressed these issues before
sentencing Johnson, stating: “The Court has considered these relevant factors offered on
behalf of Defendant Johnson, including indications of a troubled childhood, sexual abuse,
abuse of drugs, and potential or current mental health challenges. However, none of
these issues explain in any way or qualify the level of depravity shown in this case.”
Thus, the record suggests that the trial court rejected the notion that Johnson’s reported
childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of her offense in count 20.
However, even assuming that Johnson could demonstrate that her reported childhood
trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of her offense, the record clearly
indicates that the trial court would have found that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, and thus the court would not have ordered imposition
of the lower term. As noted above, the trial court listed several aggravating factors that it
found applied to Johnson. The trial court also found that Johnson “engaged in violent

                                             35
conduct which indicates a serious danger to society,” demonstrating that the trial court
would have found that imposing the lower term for count 20 would have been contrary
to the interests of justice. The trial court also noted that the only factor in mitigation was
that Johnson did not have a prior criminal record. However, the trial court stated that
“any weight given to this factor is outweighed by all the other factors mentioned
previously in aggr[av]ation.” This further demonstrates that the court would have found
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. Therefore,
remand is not warranted because the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would
not have imposed the lower term even if it had been aware of the later changes to
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)
       I. Conclusion
       We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the CSAAS
evidence, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the use of CSAAS
evidence with CALCRIM No. 1193. We accept the Attorney General’s concessions that:
(1) remand for resentencing in Taylor’s case is required due to the lack of an oral
pronouncement of a sentence on count 18; (2) vacation of the unpaid balance of the
criminal justice administration fee is warranted for both defendants; and (3) the abstract
of judgment fails to reflect the trial court’s sentence for Taylor on each of counts three
through 17, and that the trial court stayed the imposed fines and fees. Because we
remand Taylor’s case for resentencing, we do not address whether Taylor’s sentence
constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment.
       As for Johnson, she committed her crimes through distinct physical acts, reflecting
multiple intents and objectives, and section 654 does not limit her punishment. Remand
for resentencing on count 20 is not warranted under recent changes to section 1170 that
apply retroactively.

                                              36
                                   IV. DISPOSITION
       For defendant Johnson, the portion of the $129.75 criminal justice administration
fee that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021, is vacated. The clerk of the superior court is
directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the vacatur of any balance of the
criminal justice administration fee that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021. The clerk
shall forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. As amended, the judgment for defendant Johnson is
affirmed.
       For defendant Taylor, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the
trial court for resentencing. At resentencing, the trial court shall pronounce a sentence for
count 18, and the trial court may revisit all prior sentencing decisions. The trial court
shall also vacate the portion of the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee that
remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021. Upon resentencing defendant Taylor, the trial court
shall ensure that the new abstract of judgment accurately and completely reflects the oral
pronouncement of judgment, including the sentence for each count and any fines and fees
imposed.

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                          BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P.J.

BROMBERG, J.

People v. Taylor et al.
H048959