Court Opinion

ID: 9452788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:51:59.190489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:21.429744
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As I read the majority opinion it finds that the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was for the jury for two reasons: (1) the evidence was necessarily susceptible of inconsistent inferences, and (2) plaintiff when injured intended to follow a customary practice which he had followed prior thereto. I would agree with the majority’s conclusion were we concerned solely with the principles governing contributory negligence which they discuss. But the fact is that one of defendant’s principal contentions is that plaintiff, as his own testimony shows, was guilty of conduct which under Pennsylvania law constituted contributory negligence per se. And there is no dispute that such conduct was the cause of his injury.
Defendant’s argument goes like this: Under 43 Pur.Stat. § 25-12, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry promulgated a regulation under the heading “Mandatory Requirements” which stated that “The cleaning and oiling of machinery while in motion is prohibited in all places where exposure to hazardous contact is involved”. An implementing regulation provides that the. regulations apply to both employer and employee. Under 43 Pur.Stat. § 25-15-criminal penalties are provided for violation of regulations adopted under the statute.
We thus have a mandatory regulation applicable to employees. Adherence to this regulation was not impractical or dangerous in the circumstances here involved. Violation of such a regulation is negligence per se under Pennsylvania law. Jinks v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356 (1936); D’Ambrosio v. City of Phila., 354 Pa. 403, 47 A.2d 256, 174 *416A.L.R. 1166 (1946); Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953); Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395, 68 A.L.R.2d 761 (1957); Natoli v. Deal, 210 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.Pa.1962). Thus, the court must act and may not leave the contributory negligence issue to the jury. D’Ambrosio v. City of Phila., above.
The plaintiff’s own evidence appears to show indisputably that the regulation is applicable. But plaintiff contends that the regulation had no application because plaintiff was not cleaning “machinery” at the time of the accident. He argues that the printing plate involved, which was clamped around the lower cylinder of the printing press rotating about 4,000-6,000 revolutions per hour, is not “machinery” within the meaning of the regulation. The majority opinion rejects this proposition and so do I. I think it strains credulity to say that the attached plate was not a part of the machinery for purposes of applying the regulation, even though the rotating cylinder was.
Except for this argument that the plate was not part of the machinery, the plaintiff does not appear to contend that the applicability of the regulation raised a jury issue as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence under the facts. Nevertheless, the opinion of the majority concludes that such is the situation here. But I cannot agree. First, I think the plaintiff’s own testimony shows that he was aware of the danger inherent in the cleaning process. Thus, he testified:
“Q. Do you ever use a cloth or anything like that to clean off the cylinder?
“A. I never use a cloth.
“Q. Always used your hand?
“A. Hand or they was trying to show me, I have seen them do it with cardboard but it is too much of a risk with cardboard; I wouldn’t do that.
“Q. Why is cleaning it off with cardboard too much of a risk?
“A. Because you would have been off balance and you would have to hold it with two hands and lean over. I have seen it myself, seen them do it on the other presses. They did but I never done it that way.”
And second, regardless of whether plaintiff, an experienced worker, fell or was pulled into the machine, his own testimony indisputably establishes that at the time of the accident he was engaged in cleaning the moving machinery. He testified :
“Then I leaned over the walk there to put my arm in to knock the pick off and I fell * * *
******
“Q. And then you stationed yourself in the area in front of the lower cylinder at a point where you estimated that the hickey would appear?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. And then when the hickey appeared you had your hand in a position to knock it off; is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. How far do you hold your hand from the cylinder while you are waiting for the piece of dirt to appear?
“A. Usually about an inch.
“Q. And you keep it there as the cylinder revolves under your hand?
“A. Until that area comes up to view.
“Q. And then you try to strike it off?
“A. That’s right.”
Plaintiff himself thus established that he was cleaning machinery while it was in motion at a point where exposure to hazardous contact was involved. It is true that plaintiff and others testified that the method used by plaintiff to remove dirt was customary practice. Under Pennsylvania common law this would normally create a jury issue as to whether plaintiff assumed the risk of an obvious danger. Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Company, 409 Pa. 578, 187 A.2d 646 (1963). But there is more to this case. The Pennsylvania legislature has by statutorily authorized regulation fixed a mandatory standard of *417care, “and customary disregard of this [a legislative mandate] is but customary negligence, rendering every one guilty of it responsible for the consequences resulting directly and solely from it.” Jones v. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644, 74 A. 613, 615 (1909). See also Price v. New Castle Refractories, 332 Pa. 507, 3 A.2d 418 (1939). We have here then a case where plaintiff’s own testimony shows that he violated a mandatory regulation which was not only applicable to him but was for his protection.
The majority seem to say that, even though plaintiff’s own testimony shows that he violated a mandatory regulation which it was feasible for him to obey and that injury causally resulted, a jury issue is nevertheless posed as to his contributory negligence. They rely heavily on Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffold Co., above. In that case there was a violation of certain regulations. The Court said:
“These regulations provide for the use of life belts and life lines where workmen ‘crawl out on thrustouts’ or projecting beams. However, the evidence was unanimous in this case that, under the prevailing conditions, the use of these safety measures would be impractical and imperil rather than insure the safety of the plaintiff.”
It is evident that the Supreme Court concluded from the undisputed evidence that at the time of the accident the regulation was not applicable to the plaintiff in that case. In contrast, it is clear that the regulation here pertinent was calculated to help insure the safety of the employee. The regulation did not impose any unsafe or impractical requirements. Indeed, had there been compliance there would have been no accident.
We are not dealing here with a claim asserted by the employee against his employer who on this record could well be found to have ordered the cleaning activity. This action is against the manufacturer and it is not charged, nor is there any evidence to charge it, with knowledge of the custom. Thus, there is no reason to say in this case that a jury issue is created as to this plaintiff’s contributory negligence merely because his employer could be found to have countenanced the dangerous practice involved.
I think defendant’s motion n. o. v. should have been granted.