Court Opinion

ID: 9907139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 19:00:53.028385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:26.776613
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-40811     Document: 00516989905         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/05/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                           FILED
                                                               December 5, 2023
                                  No. 19-40811
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Rolando Villarreal,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 7:16-CV-299
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Rolando Villarreal pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
   firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district
   court enhanced Villarreal’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
   18 U.S.C. § 924(e), finding that the ACCA’s sentencing enhancement was
   applicable because of a prior burglary and two prior aggravated assaults. Vil-
   larreal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging the enhancement.
   In light of Borden v. United States, we VACATE the sentence and RE-
   MAND the case to the district court with instructions to resentence Villar-
   real without the ACCA enhancement.
Case: 19-40811          Document: 00516989905            Page: 2       Date Filed: 12/05/2023

                                          No. 19-40811

                                               I.
           This case has an extensive procedural history, as it traversed decisions
   by the Supreme Court and this Court in defining the limits of the ACCA.1
   Villarreal’s appeal bounced between the district court, this Court, and the
   Supreme Court over the span of six years from the filing of his motion under
   28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court wrestled with at least three intervening
   Supreme Court cases and other decisions from this Court.
               On September 8, 2011, Rolando Villarreal was charged with one count
   under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) for being a felon in possession of
   a firearm and on February 6, 2012, pleaded guilty. At rearraignment, the
   judge told Villarreal that his sentence “[could] be up to ten years’
   imprisonment.” The government objected to Villarreal’s initial presentence
   report on the grounds that Villarreal was an armed career criminal under the
   ACCA, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA provides for a sentencing
   enhancement for persons convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon-in-
   possession) after three prior convictions “for a violent felony or serious drug
   offense.”2 It defines “violent felony” as a “crime punishable by
   imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” which:
           (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
           use of physical force against the person of another; or”
           (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of
           explosives, or”

           _____________________
           1
             See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); Borden v. United States,
   141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021); United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2019).
           2
               18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

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            (3) “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
            potential risk of physical injury to another.”3
            The first clause (1) is referred to as the “elements” or “force” clause,
   and the third clause (3) is the “residual” clause. A Borden claim speaks to the
   elements clause, and a Johnson claim challenges the district court’s use of the
   residual clause when sentencing.4
            Following the government’s objection, the revised PSR found that the
   ACCA’s sentencing enhancement was applicable because Villarreal had been
   convicted for a prior burglary of habitation and two prior aggravated assaults,
   and he was subject to a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The
   district court overruled Villarreal’s objections to the use of the burglary
   conviction and sentenced him to 188 months. Villarreal appealed his
   sentence arguing, inter alia, that “the district court erred by imposing the
   enhanced penalties [of the ACCA] . . . based on his prior Texas burglary
   conviction.”5 His appeal did not challenge the use of the aggravated assault
   convictions as a basis for his enhancement. This Court rejected Villarreal’s
   challenge to the use of the burglary conviction and affirmed the district
   court’s judgment on April 17, 2013.6
            In June 2015, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Johnson v.
   United        States,       holding   that     the   ACCA’s        residual     clause      was
   unconstitutionally vague.7 The Supreme Court held that Johnson applied

            _____________________
            3
                18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B).
            4
                See generally Johnson, 576 U.S. at 593–97; Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822–25.
            5
                United States v. Villarreal, 519 F. App’x 236 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
            6
                Id. at 237.
            7
                Johnson, 576 U.S. at 593–95.

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   retroactively to cases on collateral review.8 In light of these developments at
   the Supreme Court, Villarreal promptly filed his motion to vacate his
   sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on June 6, 2016. His pro se motion asserted
   that the ACCA enhancement was in error in light of Johnson, specifically
   citing to the ACCA’s residual clause. The district court found that, in light
   of Johnson, Villarreal’s motion may have been timely and ordered the
   government to respond. Unsure whether the motion was timely, the district
   court allowed Villarreal to file a supplemental memorandum to provide “any
   other information or legal authority regarding the timeliness of his § 2255
   motion (apart from what is set out in his initial briefing).”
          Prior to the government’s response, Villarreal filed a supplemental
   memorandum in which he moved to amend his petition under Fed. R. Civ. P.
   15(a) & (d). The supplemental memorandum stated, in part:
          As Villarreal could be convicted under the Texas statute for
          causing serious bodily injury or assaulting a peace officer absent
          proof he used physical force, his prior offenses are not crimes
          of violence based on the residual clause (or force clause) of the
          ACCA . . . Fifth Circuit decisions recognize that to qualify as a
          crime of violence under the residual clause, or force clause for
          that matter, a statute must focus on the means used to commit
          the crime, not its result. Using force is a crime of violence,
          causing injury is not.
          In response, the government did not contend that Villarreal’s
   sentence enhancement was not pursuant to the residual clause. Rather, it
   argued that Villarreal’s aggravated assault convictions fell under ACCA’s
   “elements” or “force” clause. Villarreal filed his response, arguing that his
          _____________________
          8
              Welsh v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 135 (2016).

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                                           No. 19-40811

   burglary conviction could not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA
   in light of the Supreme Court’s June 23, 2016, decision in Mathis v. United
   States.9 One day before Villarreal filed his response, this Court handed down
   United States v. Herrold, which itself reviewed Mathis.10 Herrold held that
   Texas’ burglary of habitation no longer qualifies as a violent felony under
   § 924(e).11 About two months after his response, Villarreal asked “that
   Judicial Notice be taken in light of United States v. Herrold.” Villarreal also
   raised for a third time his request to be appointed counsel, which the district
   court finally granted.
           The magistrate judge issued an initial report that recommended
   granting Villarreal’s § 2255 motion in light of Johnson and Herrold.12 Both
   parties objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. The magistrate
   judge then asked for additional briefing in light of United States v. Clay, which
   held that “a prisoner bringing a successive § 2255 petition must show that it
   is ‘more likely than not’ that the sentencing court relied on the residual
   clause to prove that his claim ‘relies on’ Johnson.”13 After briefing, the
   magistrate judge recommended dismissing Villarreal’s petition for

           _____________________
           9
              579 U.S. 500 (2016). In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that a prior conviction
   does not qualify as the generic form of a predicate violent felony offense listed in the ACCA
   if an element of the crime of conviction is broader than an element of the generic offense
   because the crime of conviction enumerates various alternative factual means of satisfying
   a single element. Id.
           10
             883 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 S.
   Ct. 2712 (2019).
           11
                Id.
           12
             Villarreal objected to the magistrate judge’s conclusions with respect to his
   aggravated assault convictions. The government objected that Villarreal’s petition was
   untimely.
           13
                Clay, 921 F.3d at 553.

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                                              No. 19-40811

   untimeliness. Villarreal objected and the district court adopted the
   magistrate’s recommendation. Villarreal appealed.
           This Court denied Villarreal’s motion for a certificate of appealability
   (“COA”), finding Villarreal had failed to show that “jurists of reason would
   find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of a denial of a
   constitutional right.”14 Villarreal petitioned for certiorari, with the following
   questions presented:
                      I. Whether a statute has as an element the use of force
           against the person of another when a conviction under that
           statute can be based on a reckless mental state.
                      II. Whether reasonable jurists could debate the district
           court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Villarreal’s motion to vacate.15
           The Supreme Court granted Villarreal’s petition and vacated the
   judgment, remanding the case to our Court in light of Borden v. United
   States.16 In Borden, the Supreme Court held that a criminal offense that
   requires only a mens rea of recklessness cannot count as a “violent felony”
   under the elements clause of the ACCA.17
           Our Court then issued a remand to the district court in which “[w]e
   express[ed] no opinion on whether Villarreal should be allowed to amend his
   petition . . . which [is a] matter[] left to the sound discretion of the district

           _____________________
           14
             United States v. Villarreal, No. 7:16-CV-299, 2020 WL 9255215, at *1 (5th Cir.
   Dec. 29, 2020) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 142 S. Ct. 56 (2021) (unpublished) (quoting
   Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
           15
            Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Villarreal v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 56 (2021)
   (mem.) (No. 20-7790).
           16
                Villarreal, 142 S. Ct. at 56–57.
           17
                Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1817.

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                                           No. 19-40811

   court.” After this Court remanded, the United States filed a motion to
   reconsider the remand order. It argued that because Villarreal did not have a
   COA, the court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case as it did. We
   subsequently withdrew the remand order and remanded for consideration of
   whether Villarreal was entitled to a COA. Villarreal moved for a COA, and
   the government agreed a COA should issue. After a proposed COA, and
   Villarreal’s objection to that proposal, the district court adopted the
   magistrate judge’s originally proposed COA. Villarreal appealed, and this
   court eventually amended the COA. The amended COA reads: “[d]oes
   Movant’s petition assert a claim that Movant’s sentence was improperly
   enhanced under the ‘elements’ or ‘force’ clause of the Armed Career
   Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on the predicate offense
   that allowed conviction for reckless conduct?”
                                                 II.
          “In challenges to district court decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we
   measure findings of fact against the clearly erroneous standard and questions
   of law de novo.”18 The dispositive question in this appeal is whether
   Villarreal’s § 2255 motion asserted a Borden claim. If so, then we must reach
   the merits of the case and address whether Villarreal is entitled to the
   requested relief as a matter of law.
                                                III.
          First, we find that Villarreal did assert a Borden claim in his § 2255
   motion. Villarreal has consistently asserted the claim that his ACCA
   sentence could not be justified by his prior Texas aggravated assault
   convictions because the statute of conviction did not meet the requirements

          _____________________
          18
               United States v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1994).

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                                          No. 19-40811

   of the elements or force clause as it allowed for a conviction for reckless
   conduct. That is a Borden claim, the issue framed by the COA.
           As an initial matter, we note that “[p]ro se habeas corpus petitions
   must be construed liberally.”19 That is especially true in this case, as
   Villarreal’s motion has bounced between the district court, this Court, and
   the Supreme Court over the span of six years, traversed by multiple
   intervening cases from the Supreme Court.
           In June 2016, Villarreal filed his handwritten pro se petition arguing
   that none of his prior convictions could be the basis for an ACCA
   enhancement under the now-unconstitutional “residual” clause. In his
   September 28, 2016, supplemental memorandum, Villarreal additionally
   argued that his prior convictions did not meet the ACCA force or elements
   clause because the Texas assault statute “[f]irst off . . . only provides that the
   government prove that a defendant created a risk of harm to another.” The
   supplemental memorandum spelled out the elements of the Texas
   aggravated assault statute, which allows a conviction when a person
   “recklessly causes bodily injury.”20 The supplemental memorandum also
   stated: “Petitioner contends that both priors of aggravated assault are void of
   the use of force and physical force clauses of [the ACCA]. . . . absent proof
   he used physical force, [Villarreal’s] prior offenses are not crimes of violence
   based on the . . . force clause.” The supplemental memorandum explained
   that:
           [A]n assault under [the relevant Texas aggravated assault
           statutes] could be committed absent the use of destructive or

           _____________________
           19
             United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (citing
   Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir.1988)).
           20
                TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §22.01(a)(1)(3) (emphasis added).

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          violent force . . . Petitioner Villarreal contends that the Texas
          assault statute could be violated not only in a nonviolent
          manner, yet by the mere act of some sort of physical contact
          like touching . . . Fifth Circuit decisions recognize that to
          qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause, or force
          clause for that matter, a statute must focus on the means used
          to commit the crime, not its result.
          The supplemental memorandum pressed the claim that, under the
   relevant case law at the time, his aggravated assault convictions did not meet
   the elements or force clause requirement as the Texas aggravated assault
   statute allowed convictions for reckless conduct.
          It is not true then, as Appellee argues, that construing the above
   language to read like a Borden claim “would require this [C]ourt to stretch
   the principle of liberal construction of pro se pleadings beyond recognition.”21
   Of course, Villarreal is not prescient—he could not have known that the
   technical “label” courts would use to describe the kind of claim he advanced
   in his supplemental memorandum would be called a “Borden” claim. While
   labels are useful analytical tools in distinguishing between different types of
   claims, they are not dispositive. Rather, although there is limited case law in
   the Fifth Circuit discussing the standard to assess whether something is a
   new claim or an argument in furtherance of an existing claim, at minimum
   this Court looks to the substance of the claim.22 And in this case, as spelled
   out in the supplemental memorandum, the substance of Villarreal’s claim is
   that his predicate aggravated assault convictions did not meet the elements

          _____________________
          21
               United States v. Martin, 68 F.3d 464, 464 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished).
          22
               See Russell v. Denmark, 68 F.4th 252, 269 (5th Cir. 2023).

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                                        No. 19-40811

   or force clause requirement of the ACCA as they allowed for convictions for
   reckless conduct without the requisite mens rea. That is a Borden claim.
          The dissent faults us for attempting to “shoehorn” the Texas aggra-
   vated assault statute’s mens rea requirement into Villarreal’s “actual”
   argument, “which is about the actus reus.” Sophistry aside, Villarreal pressed
   the claim that the Texas assault statute only requires proof that a defendant
   created a risk of harm to another, i.e., that his sentence was enhanced under
   a statute that allows for convictions for reckless conduct. Villarreal cited to
   the relevant statute, which again on its own terms allows for convictions
   when a person “recklessly causes bodily injury.”23 The COA, as amended by
   this Court, asks whether Villarreal’s petition asserts a claim that his sentence
   was improperly enhanced under the ‘elements’ or ‘force’ clause of the
   ACCA “based on the predicate offense that allowed conviction for reckless
   conduct?” Considering Villarreal’s incarcerated pro se status, his petition
   asserted exactly that—Villarreal argued that his sentence was improperly
   enhanced under a statute that allows for convictions for reckless conduct
   lacking the requisite mens rea.
                                            IV.
          As Villarreal’s § 2255 motion, as amended by the supplemental
   memorandum, included a Borden claim, this Court will reach the merits of
   his claim. We hold that Villarreal’s sentence enhancement under the ACCA
   must be vacated.
          Villarreal’s sentence is “in excess of the maximum authorized by
   law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). After Borden, convictions under the relevant
   aggravated assault statute here, Texas Penal Code §§ 22.02(a)(1) and

          _____________________
          23
               TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §22.01(a)(1)(3).

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   22.02(a)(2), cannot constitute predicate offenses under the ACCA because
   the offenses do not require the “physical use of force against the person of
   another.”24 In this case, because Villarreal’s sentence was enhanced based
   on two predicate aggravated assault convictions that do not qualify as violent
   felonies, Villarreal’s sentence enhancement under the ACCA must be
   vacated. The government, while rightfully duty bound to defend its position
   in this years-long litigation, responsibly concedes that should this Court find
   Villarreal asserted a Borden claim, he would be entitled to the requested
   relief.
                                            *****
             Villarreal’s request for relief has been bouncing among the federal
   courts for over six years. But no more. Because we find that Villarreal
   asserted a Borden claim in his § 2255 motion, and because his two predicate
   aggravated assault convictions are not violent felonies for purposes of the
   ACCA, we VACATE Villarreal’s sentence and REMAND the case to the
   district court with instructions to resentence Villarreal without consideration
   of the ACCA.

             _____________________
             24
              United States v. Gomez Gomez, 23 F.4th 575, 577 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Borden,
   141 S. Ct. at 1821–22, 1825) (explaining that “[c]onviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)
   requires a prior ‘aggravated felony’ conviction. The term ‘aggravated felony’ is defined to
   include ‘crime[s] of violence,’ which are defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. See 8
   U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). That provision in turn defines a ‘crime of violence’ as ‘an offense
   that has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person ... of another.’ 18
   U.S.C. § 16(a). The Supreme Court held in Borden that an offense requiring the ‘use of
   physical force against the person of another’ does not include offenses with a mens rea of
   recklessness . . . . The prior Texas offense to which Gomez Gomez pleaded guilty includes
   three indivisible mental states, one of which is recklessness . . . . For this reason, Gomez
   Gomez’s predicate conviction does not qualify as a ‘crime of violence’ in light of Borden,
   and accordingly, it does not fit the definition of ‘aggravated felony’ for the purpose of 8
   U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).”).

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   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          Villarreal’s sentence probably could not have been handed down after
   Borden.1 Seeing merit in the merits, the majority hastily casts aside proce-
   dural strictures. Since letting Villarreal amend his claim is obviously prohib-
   ited by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), the majority stretches the “claim” in Villar-
   real’s petition well beyond what our law can bear.
              I respectfully dissent.

                                                  I.
          Before we even reach the question of “Did Villarreal assert a Borden
   claim?”, this case should end based on the jurisdictional constraints provided
   by the certificate of appealability (“COA”).
          “We have jurisdiction to address only the issue[s] specified in the
   COA.” United States v. Daniels, 588 F.3d 835, 836 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
   curiam). The COA is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Moore v.
   Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 2008). And, of course, “federal
   courts are duty-bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction sua
   sponte, even on appeal.” Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d
   457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004).
          That necessarily raises the question: “Did the majority answer the
   issue specified in the COA?” The COA reads, “Does Movant’s petition
   assert a claim that Movant’s sentence was improperly enhanced under the
   ‘elements’ or ‘force’ clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
   18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on the predicate offense that allowed conviction for
   reckless conduct?” (Emphasis added.)
              The majority says, “Villarreal has consistently asserted the claim
          _____________________
          1
              Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (plurality).

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   that his ACCA sentence could not be justified by his prior Texas aggravated
   assault convictions because the statute of conviction did not meet the
   requirements of the elements or force clause as it allowed for a conviction for
   reckless conduct.” (Emphasis added). Yet the majority does no work to sub-
   stantiate the latter part of its bold assertion. The majority cannot identify
   even one iota of language to suggest that Villarreal took issue with the Texas
   aggravated assault statute because “it allowed for a conviction for reckless
   conduct.”2 He plainly did not do that.
           Instead, the majority addends the latter phrase to pretend that its
   inquiry fits within the language of the COA. The COA asks whether Villar-
   real’s “petition assert[s] a claim” that his sentence was improperly enhanced
   “based on the predicate offense that allowed conviction for reckless con-
   duct.” But, although the Texas aggravated assault statute incidentally
   requires a mens rea of recklessness, that is not the basis of Villarreal’s petition.
   So, in what will become a double feature, the majority turns a blind eye to its
   jurisdictional limits and functionally answers a similar but distinctly broader
   question: “Does Movant’s petition assert a claim that Movant’s sentence
   was improperly enhanced under the ‘elements’ or ‘force’ clause of the
   [ACCA], . . . ?”3 That, however, is not the question before us. Exeunt stage
   left.

                                                 II.
           Yet the majority ventures on to a more egregious second act. Recall
   how the majority characterizes Villarreal’s claim: “Villarreal has consis-

           _____________________
           2
              In fact, Villarreal’s claim is plainly about the actus reus of the Texas aggravated
   assault statute; the only reference to mens rea comes from the fact that Villarreal quoted the
   relevant part of the statute in full. See infra.
           3
               Regrettably, one cannot effectively emphasize ellipses.

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                                            No. 19-40811

   tently asserted the claim that his ACCA sentence could not be justified by his
   prior Texas aggravated assault convictions because the statute of conviction
   did not meet the requirements of the elements or force clause as it allowed for
   a conviction for reckless conduct.” (Emphasis added.)
           As the majority notes, that is a Borden claim.4 But—crucially—it is
   not Villarreal’s claim. Rather, his claim is more accurately characterized as
   follows: “Villarreal has consistently asserted the claim that his ACCA sen-
   tence could not be justified by his prior Texas aggravated assault convictions
   because the statute of conviction did not meet the requirements of the ele-
   ments or force clause as it allowed for a conviction absent physical force.”5
           The majority’s attempt to shoehorn a reference to the Texas aggra-
   vated assault statute’s mens rea requirement into Villarreal’s argument is, at
   best, misleading. In the midst of quoting Villarreal’s actual argument, the

           _____________________
           4
             At one other place in the opinion, the majority might be read to suggest a much
   broader conception of what constitutes a Borden claim: “A Borden claim speaks to the
   elements clause, and a Johnson claim challenges the district court’s use of the residual
   clause when sentencing.” But, despite the lack of clarity here, the majority’s narrower
   construction of a Borden claim elsewhere counsels reading this not as a complete definition
   of a Borden claim, but only as pointing out one way in which a Borden claim is different from
   a Johnson claim.
           5
             The supplemental memorandum has two crucial passages (as quoted and altered
   by the majority): First, “Petitioner contends that both priors of aggravated assault are void
   of the use of force and physical force clauses of [the ACCA]. . . . [A]bsent proof he used
   physical force, [Villarreal’s] prior offenses are not crimes of violence based on the . . . force
   clause.” And second,
           [A]n assault under [the relevant Texas aggravated assault statutes] could
           be committed absent the use of destructive or violent force . . . Petitioner
           Villarreal contends that the Texas assault statute could be violated not only
           in a nonviolent manner, yet by the mere act of some sort of physical contact
           like touching . . . Fifth Circuit decisions recognize that to qualify as a crime
           of violence under the residual clause, or force clause for that matter, a stat-
           ute must focus on the means used to commit the crime, not its result.

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                                            No. 19-40811

   majority not-so-casually addends—as if it were a part of Villareal’s argument:
   “The supplemental memorandum spelled out the elements of the Texas
   aggravated assault statute, which allows a conviction when a person ‘reck-
   lessly causes bodily injury.’” (Emphasis added by the majority.) In reality,
   that provision of the statute has nothing to do with Villarreal’s argument,
   which is about the actus reus.6 Essentially, the majority has allowed the fact
   that Villarreal has quoted the relevant part of the statute in full to permit his
   claim to encompass all claims challenging that part of the statute.
           Obviously, Villarreal need not “know[] . . . the technical ‘label’ courts
   would use to describe the kind of claim,” but surely he must make the claim
   that Borden embodies—a claim that, in its substance, is plainly about mens
   rea.7 Pretending otherwise is way out of step with our precedent. See, e.g.,
   Russell v. Denamark, 68 F.4th 252, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that quot-
   ing the Sixth Amendment does not encompass all Sixth Amendment claims).
   And the majority, intermittently, recognizes this. Each time the majority
   appends something like “allowed for a conviction for reckless conduct” to
   its description of a Borden claim, the majority is right about what Villarreal
   had to say for his claim to be a Borden claim.
           But the majority’s approach has no limiting principle. According to

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           6
              After labeling the distinction between actus reus and mens rea “[s]ophistry,” the
   majority obfuscates the difference between “creat[ing] a risk of harm to another” (an actus
   reus element) and acting recklessly (a mens rea element). The former is about the nature
   of the act itself and the latter about the mental state of perpetrator. This distinction is basic,
   and Borden is plainly about the latter. See infra note 7.
           7
              The second sentence of the Borden plurality encapsulates its substance: “The
   question here is whether a criminal offense can count as a ‘violent felony’ if it requires only
   a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. We hold
   that a reckless offense cannot so qualify.” See 141 S. Ct. at 1821–22 (emphasis added). Yet
   the majority functionally reads Borden to be in substance about what sorts of actus rei can
   serve as predicates under the ACCA.

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Case: 19-40811        Document: 00516989905              Page: 16       Date Filed: 12/05/2023

                                          No. 19-40811

   the majority, as long as a pro se8 habeas petitioner makes an argument about
   any part of a statute, and then quotes the statute in full, the courts must
   adjudicate all possible arguments about the applicability of that statute. At
   times, the majority appears surprisingly open about this. In one instance,9
   the majority says flatly, “A Borden claim speaks to the elements clause . . . .”
   If that were right (and complete), then anything that “speaks to the elements
   clause” falls within the ambit of Villarreal’s petition.
           But that is exceedingly broad. One may be tempted to ask: “So what?”
   This case is demonstrative of the core problem with such a rule. Villarreal’s
   appeal is now in its seventh year. Allowing claims to shift between substan-
   tively different grounds sows the seeds for endless habeas litigation.
           Because Villarreal did not assert a Borden claim, I respectfully dissent.

           _____________________
           8
             Fortunately, the majority is clear that its holding is “[c]onsidering Villarreal’s
   incarcerated pro se status.” Though, of course, that he is incarcerated is of no import,
   since “federal habeas petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated.” Ryan v. Gonzales,
   568 U.S. 57, 72 (2013).
           9
            Apparently in tension with its own—correct—narrower conception of a Borden
   claim. See supra note 4.

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