Court Opinion

ID: 9549633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:22:32.858745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:39.265532
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, Justice,
dissenting.
I direct my attention to this statement of the majority, which I take to be the crux of the affirmance:
“ * * * Since we consider the loan repayment as part of the property division, we are not called upon to determine the reasonableness of the fee charged in this case and whether the trial court abused its discretion.”
and confess myself simply unable to understand the logic or the principle of law upon which it is based.1 I know of no rule of law that permits a district court or this court to approve an attorney fee without a showing that it is necessary and reasonable, nor do I know of any rule of law that permits a district court or this court to effect a property division that is not based upon reasonable debits and credits. While I do not question the power and authority of the district court, in a proceeding for judicial separation as well as divorce, to fix and approve property divisions and allowances for fees, I think that when the legislature vests the district court with power to enter “such decrees as shall appear just and equitable” in the disposition of property,2 it imposes upon the trial court, and upon this court in review, the unavoidable duty to do just that. To me the determination of whether something is just and equitable includes examination of the necessity for and reasonableness of any items charged against either party. Plaintiff has strongly contested the reasonableness of the fee, both in the court below and here. He thereby questions the reasonableness of the property division.
What attorney fees the defendant may choose to pay, or what fees the father may choose to lend plaintiff, are matters strictly between them, but when it is sought to pass the burden of such arrangements on to the husband, I think that there must be evidence that based upon the usual standards prevailing in the community and the Bar of that community, the services rendered by the attorney were necessary and the charges therefor were reasonable.
Without expressing an opinion as to the necessity and reasonableness of the fee— since there is no record upon which such a judgment can be made — I would reverse the action of the district court and remand *888the proceeding with direction to take evidence and render a decision upon that question.

. I am also nonplussed with the apparent attitude of the majority that neither the defendant nor her attorney is involved in the order since it is an order to pay money to one not a party to the suit. Is this a judgment in favor of Mr. Waggoner, not a party to the suit, against the plaintiff? If the latter does not choose to pay it, can Mr. Waggoner cause execution to issue upon plaintiffs property? Can he ask that plaintiff be cited for contempt?

. Section 20-47.3, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.