Court Opinion

ID: 9827123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:11:18.644183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:23.786130
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
After careful consideration of appellee’s motion for a rehearing, we have found no sufficient reason for changing the views expressed in our former opinion. We concede that our decision is in conflict with the decision of another Court of Civil Appeals in Railway Co. v. Kern, 100 S. W. 971, and we trust that the fact of sijch conflict will be held to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, where the question of law, upon which we hold that the case should be reversed, can be finally settled.
As to the true principle upon which the rule rests which excludes statements made while attempting to effect a compromise, and as to when that rule should be enforced, we concede that much contrariety of decision exists. Professor Wigmore, in his recent and valuable treatise on Evidence, says that the true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it does not ordinarily proceed from or imply a belief that a particular fact exists, but rather a belief that the further prosecution of the claim would in any event cause such annoyance as is preferably avoided by making a concession; and we quote as follows from that author: “By this theory the offer is excluded because, as a matter of interpretation and inference, it does not signify an admission at all. There is no concession of claim to be found in it, expressly or by implication. It would follow, then, conversely, that if a plain concession is in fact made, it is receivable, even though it forms part of an offer to compromise; and this much has long been well understood.” 2 Wigmore on Evid. § 1061.
A later, and equally valuable, treatise on the same subject uses this language: “The peace offer may have been made by a plaintiff who agrees to accept a payment of money or other act in discharge of his claim, not as constituting a measure of his true demand, but as a concession made as an inducement for the purpose of obtaining an adjustment. If such an offer should not be accepted by the alleged debtor, the fact of his concession on account of a consideration which has failed should not prevent the plaintiff, if forced, after all, to resort to legal proceedings, or to continue them, if already begun, from recovering on his entire claim with the same effect as if his suggestion in the interest of harmony had not been made. In other words, the party who declares that he is willing to accept a given equivalent for his claim is entitled to insist, if his offer be refused, that he shall not be prejudiced by having made it. Nor should he be permitted to suffer from having intimated a willingness to consider a peace offer if his adversary should see fit to make one. That the plaintiff should thus avoid the effect of his statement, it must affirmatively appear that a bona fide desire existed on his part to adjust a disputed claim in this way rather than to formulate a demand which was then^really relied upon by him as the limits of his just rights. Where the statement is made not for the purpose' of compromise, in the sense of buying immediate peace, but for attaining a different, though somewhat similar, object (e. g., to procure an arbitration), the statement is available as an admission. The typical peace offer is perhaps more frequently made by the debtor than by the creditor, by the defendant than by the plaintiff. Whichever party may make it, the rule of procedure is the same. Such an offer, or, in case something is actually claimed or conceded on account of its truth, so much of the offer as *197is made by tbe party, not because be believes it to be true and just, but because be hopes to avoid, by making it, tbe annoyance and expense of litigation, will be denied all evi-dentiary force as an admission. Tbe circumstances attending the making of such offer will not be permitted in any way to operate to bis prejudice.” 2 Obamberlayne on Evid. §§ 1445, 1446, 1447.
In tbe case at bar tbe plaintiff stated in tbe letter, which we held was admissible against him, that be alleged bis damages to be the sum of $500, which be offered to accept as a compromise. As stated in our former opinion, when the letter is put in evidence, tbe plaintiff will have tbe right to give testimony explaining to tbe jury why be fixed that sum as tbe total amount of bis damages; but tbe appellant will have tbe right to contend that it constituted a statement that he was only entitled to $500 as compensation for the injury which be bad sustained. We do not bold that tbe jury would be compelled to accept that sum as tbe total amount which tbe plaintiff is entitled to recover, if tbe defendant is held liable; but we adhere to our bolding that appellant has the right to have tbe jury consider tbe statement referred to in determining bow much the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
As shown by other sections in tbe textbooks referred to, tbe modern tendency is to depart from tbe strictness with which some courts have enforced tbe rule excluding such testimony, and to admit in evidence many statements formerly held to be inadmissible; and one of tbe authors referred to says: “As a matter of logic no reasonable question can exist as to tbe right of any litigant to seek to establish such a fact. If the claim of tbe party in question that be did not mean what be has said or intend tbe implications of what be has done is obviously a circumstance proper for tbe consideration of the jury, it may fairly be regarded as an in-firmative consideration affecting tbe weight of tbe evidence, viewed in its assertive capacity. Whenever it occurs that one of two equally legitimate inferences may rationally be drawn from tbe doing by a person of a given act, or tbe making of a particular statement, it is, in point of reason, proper to submit to tbe jury, under appropriate instructions, tbe question as to which is tbe proper conclusion for tbe mind to reach. Where tbe jury, as reasonable men, might find that a given statement now said by tbe declarant to have been made by way of compromise, was, in reality, an admission, an entire exclusion of tbe evidence is often far too severe an administrative expedient to be employed by a court of justice for tbe protection of a rule of public policy, however salutary. Tbe peculiarity of tbe procedural rule in question, therefore, is this: It absolves tbe declarant from any obligation to explain that he made bis concession of liability for tbe sake of buying peace, leaving to tbe jury to determine bow far such is tbe fact. Tbe rule refuses to recognize any logical or reasonable possibility that any other motive could have influenced the litigant’s conduct if tbe hope of buying peace might have done so.” 2 Obamberlayne Evid. § 1449.
Motion overruled.