Court Opinion

ID: 9915532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 17:08:21.929799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:24.379723
License: Public Domain

J-S37022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  STERLING ENOS                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 27 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003712-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED JAUNARY 5, 2024

       Sterling Enos (“Enos”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

after he pled guilty to aggravated assault and possessing an instrument of

crime (“PIC”).1 We affirm.

       Enos’s conviction arises from his assault of his longtime friend, Ashley

Mercer (“Mercer”),2 at a small gathering Mercer held with her adult son and

her twelve-year-old granddaughter in attendance. See Trial Court Opinion,

1/31/23, at 1. When Mercer asked Enos to leave, he grabbed a butcher knife,

and chased her around her apartment. See id. at 1. During the altercation,

Enos took a fire extinguisher from the hallway outside Mercer’s apartment and

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 907(a).

2 Mercer, whose birth name was      “Shawn,” testified she has used the name
“Ashley” for the last thirty-eight years. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 15, 20.
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struck Mercer in the head several times with it. See N.T., 12/1/21, at 11.3

Mercer is blind.

       Enos entered an open guilty plea to aggravated assault and PIC. On

June 14, 2022, the trial court convened a sentencing hearing and had a

presentence investigation report (“PSI”). See N.T., 6/14/22, at 3-4. Enos,

through counsel, highlighted mitigating factors including abuse he suffered as

a child due to his sexual orientation4 and requested a “county sentence and

immediate parole.” See id. at 7-8. The Commonwealth requested a sentence

of three-and-a-half to seven years of imprisonment and a probationary tail

and emphasized several aggravating factors. See id. at 9-13, 29. Mercer

gave a statement to the court. See id. at 16-27. Enos exercised his right of

allocution and noted, in relevant part, that he suffers from two forms of cancer

____________________________________________

3 We note the trial court’s and Enos’s summary of the facts differs slightly from

the facts Enos admitted at the guilty plea hearing, particularly as to when Enos
attacked Mercer with the fire extinguisher. Compare Trial Court Opinion,
1/31/23, at 1 (indicating that Enos used the fire extinguisher before police
arrived); Enos’s Brief at 5 (same) with N.T., 12/1/21, at 11 (suggesting that
Enos used the fire extinguisher after police arrived). It appears that the trial
court and the parties have relied on the transcript of the preliminary hearing.
At the preliminary hearing, Mercer testified that after Enos attacked her inside
her apartment, Enos assaulted her in the hallway outside with the fire
extinguisher before police arrived. See N.T., 4/29/21, at 8-10. Mercer also
indicated that after being struck with the fire extinguisher, she managed to
get back in her apartment. See id. at 12, 14. She testified Enos used a table
as a battering ram against her door while paramedics were outside her
apartment building. See id. at 14-15. Mercer stated she waited for a lull in
Enos’s attack to run out of her apartment, but Enos attacked her again before
she escaped through the front of her apartment building. See id. at 15-16.

4 Counsel did not specify Enos’s sexual orientation.

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and his mother is ill. See id. at 31-33. Enos expressed his desire not to die

in jail and to see his mother one more time. See id. Enos apologized to

Mercer and asked for her forgiveness. See id. at 31-32.

       The trial court sentenced Enos to three-and-a-half to seven years of

imprisonment and a consecutive three years of reporting probation for

aggravated assault.5 The court found it “frightening” that Enos attacked his

longtime friend inside her home and in front of other people, including Mercer’s

granddaughter. See id. at 34. The court also noted that Enos renewed his

attack when Mercer attempted to flee from her apartment building and the

paramedics did not enter the building out of fear for their safety. See id. The

court further ordered anger management and dual diagnoses programs and

indicated that it was aware that Enos previously had difficulties complying with

probation. See id.6

____________________________________________

5 As noted at sentencing, Enos had a prior record score of five and the offense

gravity score for aggravated assault was eight. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 28.
The sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence of between
twenty-seven to thirty-three months of incarceration, plus or minus nine
months for aggravating or mitigating factors. See id.; see also 204 Pa. Code
§ 303.16(a) (7th edition amendment 5, effective 1/1/20). Thus, the trial
court’s minimum sentence of three-and-a-half years (forty-two months) was
at the top end of the sentencing guidelines’ aggravated range.

The trial court imposed no further penalty for PIC.

6 The PSI indicated that Enos had a history of non-compliance with court
ordered conditions and homelessness. See PSI, 2/3/22, at 3.

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      Enos timely filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied by operation

of law. Enos timely appealed, and both he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Enos presents the following issue for our review:

      . . . Did the lower court abuse its discretion in sentencing [him] to
      three-and-a-half to seven] years [of] confinement based solely on
      the offense, but the court gave no consideration to [his] mitigation
      and rehabilitative needs?

Enos’s Brief at 3.

      Enos’s sole issue on appeal implicates the discretionary aspects of

sentencing.   “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not

entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992

A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Rather, when an appellant challenges the

discretionary aspects of her sentence, we must consider his brief on this issue

as a petition for permission to appeal. See Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690

A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,

522 A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Prior to reaching the

merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, this Court conducts a four-part

analysis to determine:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there
      is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A.§
      9781(b).

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Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted).

      In the instant case, Enos filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his

claim in a timely post-sentence motion, and included in his appellate brief a

separate Rule 2119(f) statement. Moreover, Enos’s Rule 2119(f) statement,

asserting that the trial court failed to consider all required factors pursuant 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (stating that “[a]

claim that the court erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without

consideration of mitigating circumstances raises a substantial question”).

Therefore, we will consider the merits of Enos’s claim.

      Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing is well-settled:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted). When the sentencing court applies the sentencing guidelines, this

Court may only vacate if the case involves circumstances where the

application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9781(c)(2); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 180 A.3d 368, 380 (Pa. Super.

2018).

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      Our legislature has determined that “the sentence imposed should call

for total confinement that is consistent with . . . the protection of the public,

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim

and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Moreover, “[i]n every case in which the court imposes

a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the court shall make as a part of

the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement

of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.”        Id.   The trial court,

however, need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing

a sentence.   See Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 1087, 1098 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 285 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2022).

      “[W]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI], it will be

presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 329 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).    “The sentencing judge can satisfy

the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record

by indicating that he or she has been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly

considering and weighing all relevant factors.” See id. (citation omitted).

      In the matter sub judice, Enos insists that the court failed to consider

mitigating factors, including his health issues, homelessness, acceptance of

responsibility, and expressions of remorse. He acknowledges that the trial

court had the benefit of a PSI but argues the court’s failure to give any weight

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to his rehabilitative needs and its emphasis on the facts of the case entitles

him to resentencing.

      The trial court asserts it considered the PSI before sentencing and that

the record belies Enos’s claim that it failed to consider mitigating factors. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/23, at 3-4.        The court concludes it properly

sentenced in the aggravated range where, inter alia, the extent and

persistence of Enos’s assault of Mercer in the presence of Mercer’s twelve-

year-old granddaughter justified the imposition of an aggravated range

sentence and made greater leniency inappropriate. See id. at 3.

      We conclude Enos’s argument that the trial court failed to consider all

Enos’s rehabilitative needs and other mitigating evidence merits no relief. The

parties presented thorough arguments concerning the mitigating and

aggravating circumstances in this case. See N.T., 6/14/22, at 7-13. Enos

offered his own statement before sentencing. See id. at 31-33. The court

had the benefit of a PSI, and the court stated that it reviewed the PSI and

fashioned its sentence accordingly. See id. at 3-4, 30-31, 34; Trial Court

Opinion, 1/31/23, at 4.    We discern no basis that the sentence is clearly

unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.           See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9781(c)(2), (d). Thus, Enos’s sentencing claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 1/5/2024

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