Court Opinion

ID: 9408589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:00:37.495352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.984234
License: Public Domain

22-678-cr
    United States v. Yaghmour

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                       SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 13th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                GERARD E. LYNCH,
                JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                MYRNA PÉREZ,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    United States of America,

                                Appellee,

                      v.                                                     22-678-cr

    Georges Yaghmour,

                      Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________________

    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                       MICHAEL B. COHEN, Law Office of Michael B.
                                                   Cohen, Fort Lauderdale, FL.

    FOR APPELLEE:                                  MICHAEL P. DRESCHER (Gregory L. Waples, on
                                                   the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                                   Nikolas P. Kerest, United States Attorney for
                                                   the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT.
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont

(Crawford, C.J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Georges Yaghmour appeals from the district court’s judgment,

entered on March 17, 2022, following his guilty plea to conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(B). Based upon his guilty plea, Yaghmour was sentenced to sixty-three months’

imprisonment and no supervised release. Yaghmour challenges the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of the sentence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our

decision.

      This conviction arose from a large-scale cocaine transaction that involved Yaghmour and a

co-conspirator traveling from Canada to Vermont, on December 5, 2019, to meet with an

undercover Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and confidential informant who were

posing as cocaine transportation service providers. During the meeting, at the direction of his co-

conspirators in Canada, Yaghmour negotiated the payment of $1,000,000 for the transportation of

500 kilograms of cocaine from South America to Canada via Vermont. Several weeks later,

Yaghmour’s co-conspirator returned to Vermont with a $150,000 down payment for the

undercover agent’s purported transportation services. As part of the undercover operation, the

DEA subsequently seized approximately 300 kilograms of cocaine in South America, and then

received additional money in exchange for the anticipated delivery of the cocaine to Canada. By

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September 2020, the Canadian purchasers had become increasingly impatient about the anticipated

delivery. The undercover agent then arranged for a fifty-kilogram delivery of cocaine in Vermont.

After two co-conspirators were arrested at the meeting where they were to receive that delivery

and did not return to Canada with the cocaine, the paternal grandparents of one of the arrested co-

conspirators were kidnapped in upstate New York and taken to Canada, where they were held for

a ransom that included the return of the cocaine that their grandson was supposed to receive in

Vermont. After another controlled delivery of the cocaine led to additional arrests, Yaghmour

traveled to Florida to meet with the confidential informant to discuss the problems with the

transportation of the cocaine. Yaghmour was arrested upon his arrival in Florida.

      At sentencing, the district court adopted the parties’ stipulations that Yaghmour should only

be held accountable for between 150 to 450 kilograms of cocaine under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, and that he also was eligible for the safety-valve reduction under U.S.S.G.

§ 5C1.2. Under those stipulations, the Guidelines calculation resulted in an advisory range of

sixty-three to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment. The district court allowed Yaghmour to call

two witnesses, his sister and long-time girlfriend to, inter alia, support his argument for a

downward departure and/or variance from the Guidelines range based upon an imperfect defense

of coercion and/or duress. That argument was based upon violence that Yaghmour and his family

allegedly experienced in Canada, including the firebombing of his restaurant and houses, due to

gambling debts he owed to some of his co-conspirators. After hearing the testimony from the two

witnesses and the arguments from both sides, the district court sentenced Yaghmour to sixty-three

months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

       I.    Procedural Reasonableness

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       Yaghmour contends that the district court committed the following procedural errors

during sentencing: (1) improperly considering the “greater conspiracy involv[ing] the kidnapping

of an elderly couple, even though the government had conceded that [Yaghmour] had nothing to

do with the kidnapping,” Appellant’s Br. at 16; (2) failing to consider Yaghmour’s mitigating

factors, including coercion and duress; and (3) failing to downwardly depart from the advisory

Guidelines based on those mitigating factors. As set forth below, we find each of these arguments

unpersuasive.

       We review a district court’s sentencing decisions for reasonableness under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam). We have found procedural error where “the district court miscalculates the Guidelines;

treats them as mandatory; does not adequately explain the sentence imposed; does not properly

consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors; bases its sentence on clearly erroneous facts; or

deviates from the Guidelines without explanation.” Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007)). Where, as here, a defendant failed to raise the procedural objections at sentencing,

we review for plain error. United States v. Caltabiano, 871 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2017). Plain

error exists “only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is

‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s

substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (alteration in original)

(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).

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       First, although Yaghmour contends that the district court improperly considered the

kidnapping of the elderly couple by his co-conspirators, we disagree. It is clear from the record

that the district court understood that Yaghmour was not responsible for the kidnapping. The

government advised the district court at sentencing that Yaghmour was not involved in the

kidnapping, and the kidnapping was not included as “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3

in the district court’s Guidelines calculation. The district court did not even reference the

kidnapping until it “turn[ed] from the[] guideline calculations to the broader statutory factors set

out at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.” App’x at 111. Within its discussion of the Section 3553(a)

factors, the district court briefly mentioned the kidnapping because, even though Yaghmour was

not directly involved in it, the kidnapping illustrated the dangerous nature of the organization that

Yaghmour chose to associate with in a large-scale cocaine operation. In particular, the district

court explained:

       Obviously, you became involved in a very serious crime with very serious
       organized crime type figures, people who went so far as to kidnap an elderly couple
       and hold them for a day or two, people involved in international drug trafficking at
       substantial levels. So that shows a poor judgment and, and [sic] a criminal bent in
       your case. Something to think about.

App’x at 111–12.

       To the extent Yaghmour challenges the consideration of the kidnapping to that limited

extent, we find his argument unavailing. When applying Section 3553(a), the sentencing court is

“entitled to consider any ‘information concerning the background, character, and conduct’ of the

defendant.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 287 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3661). Thus, in its discretion, the district court is not limited to acts that constitute “relevant

conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines, but rather may consider the broader circumstances

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surrounding the defendant’s criminal activity, including the level of dangerousness posed by the

criminal organization with whom the defendant affiliated. 1 See, e.g., United States v. Wernick,

691 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Our conclusion that [the defendant’s acts] are not technically

‘relevant conduct’ to the specific offense charged in [the indictment] does not imply that those

acts are not highly relevant (in a non-technical sense) to the district court’s evaluation [of the

Section 3553(a) factors].”); see also United States v. Jenkins, 2022 WL 3138879, at *7 (2d Cir.

Aug. 5, 2022) (summary order) (holding that two murders that were not “relevant conduct” under

Sentencing Guidelines were properly considered by the district court under the Section 3553(a)

factors as to defendant’s involvement in a “violent motorcycle gang”). Such circumstances can

be relevant to several of the Section 3553(a) factors, including “the nature and circumstances of

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Indeed,

at one point during the sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged that “the kidnapping and the

amount of the quantity [of cocaine] is a serious factor to be considered by the Court.” App’x at

107. Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the district court’s consideration of the kidnapping

under the Section 3553(a) factors to the extent it demonstrated Yaghmour’s willingness to

negotiate a large-scale cocaine transaction on behalf of a dangerous group of individuals.

       Second, we find similarly without merit Yaghmour’s assertion that the district court failed

to consider the mitigating factors articulated by defense counsel in support of a more lenient

sentence. The district court allowed Yaghmour to call two witnesses at the sentencing hearing to

1
  We note that, by his own account, Yaghmour was undoubtedly aware of the violent nature of
this drug conspiracy prior to joining it because, as discussed supra, he asserted that some of the
co-conspirators had firebombed his restaurant and home before he decided to participate in the
conspiracy.

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support his arguments as to the mitigating factors.        Moreover, the district court explicitly

referenced several mitigating factors in its discussion of the Section 3553(a) factors, including that

Yaghmour was a skilled practitioner in the culinary arts with a plan for his future, and that he had

a supportive family. Although the district court did not address every mitigating factor raised by

Yaghmour, we have emphasized that a sentencing judge is “under no obligation to engage in an

express discussion of every argument made by a defendant at sentencing” and we “entertain a

strong presumption that the sentencing judge has considered all arguments properly presented to

her, unless the record clearly suggests otherwise.” United States v. Robinson, 799 F.3d 196, 202

(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there is no indication in the

record that the district court failed to consider Yaghmour’s arguments and mitigating factors in its

analysis of the Section 3553(a) factors.

       Finally, we likewise conclude that the district court committed no procedural error in

declining to grant a downward departure from the advisory Guidelines range based on mitigating

factors. “[A] district court’s decision not to depart from the Guidelines is generally unreviewable,

unless it misunderstood its authority to do so.” Id. at 201. If a defendant argues that a sentence is

procedurally unreasonable because there was such a misunderstanding, the “defendant must point

to clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope of his departure

authority.” United States v. Scott, 387 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Here, after defense counsel described his motions for a downward departure

and/or variance, the district court explicitly noted that it had considered “all departure authority

contained in the Guidelines policy statements,” App’x at 109, and there is no evidence in the record

that the district court, in exercising its sentencing discretion, misapprehended that authority.

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Although Yaghmour points to the lack of any explanation by the district court for denying his

departure motions, “[a] district court is not obliged to give reasons for refusing to depart,” and the

absence of an explanation, generally, “does not support an inference that the district court

misapprehended its scope of authority.” Scott, 387 F.3d at 143; accord United States v. Young,

811 F.3d 592, 599 (2d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the district court committed no procedural error

in connection with the downward departure motions.

       II.   Substantive Reasonableness

       Yaghmour also suggests that that the sixty-three-month sentence was substantively

unreasonable in light of the mitigating factors presented to the district court at sentencing. We

disagree.

       Yaghmour “bears a heavy burden because our review of a sentence for substantive

reasonableness is particularly deferential.” Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289. Under that standard, we

find an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court only where the sentence imposed is either

“shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States

v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). This Court does not “substitute [its] own judgment for

the district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any

particular case but will instead set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in

exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible

decisions.” United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). As we have observed before, “in the

overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad

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range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v.

Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).

       The district court’s imposition of a sixty-three-month sentence, which was the lowest

sentence in the applicable Guidelines range, was well within the district court’s discretion under

the facts of this case. With respect to nature and circumstances of the offense, the district court

noted that “this was a large-scale cocaine trafficking,” namely, the transaction involved “a million

dollars, more than half of which was actually paid, and the amounts [of cocaine] involved were

significant, close to 500 kilograms.” App’x at 111. The district court further explained that it

had considered and balanced the other Section 3553(a) factors, including Yaghmour’s strong

family support and future plans with his restaurant business, but that it had placed particular

emphasis on “the seriousness of the crime,” involving “so much money and such a large quantity

of drugs,” as “one of the most important factors.” App’x at 111, 113.

       Yaghmour’s substantive reasonableness argument turns on his belief that the district court

did not give his mitigating factors “sufficient weight.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. However, rather

than considering “what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor” in assessing

substantive reasonableness, we “consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court,

can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.” United States v.

Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, we conclude that the seriousness of

the crime can bear the weight the district court assigned it, and that the sentence at the low end of

the Guidelines range is not “shockingly high,” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123, even in the context of the

mitigating factors asserted by Yaghmour.

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      Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the sentence on substantive reasonableness

grounds.

                       *                    *                     *

       We have considered Yaghmour’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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