Court Opinion

ID: 9685431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:37:14.193839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.814229
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(concurring). I agree with the result in the majority opinion that § 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 USC 1144, does not expressly preempt a jury award of future pension benefits in a Toussaint action.1 However, I write separately to highlight certain facts which provide additional support for applying the "remote relationship” exception in this case and, alternatively, to offer what I believe to be a more workable approach to erisa preemption than that adopted in the majority opinion.
i
In support of its holding, the majority has apparently relied on the "tenuous, remote [and] peripheral” relationship exception derived from Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 463 US 85, 100, n 21; 103 S Ct 2890; 77 L Ed 2d 490 (1983). The plaintiffs damage award, in the words of the Court in the majority opinion, does not sufficiently relate to the Park West pension plan because the award, though based in part upon the terms of the plan, places no "fiscal, administrative, or legal burden upon the plan itself.” Ante, pp 218-219. See ante, pp 215-216, 221, The majority properly derives *223its reasoning from the United States Supreme Court decision in Fort Halifax Packing Co, Inc v Coyne, 482 US 1; 107 S Ct 2211; 96 L Ed 2d 1 (1987), wherein a Maine severance pay statute was upheld against an erisa preemption challenge.
However, in my view, if the majority chooses to apply the "remote relationship” exception in this case, it should emphasize some additional facts. The Court has apparently relied solely on the fact that the plaintiff has not made a claim of liability under the erisa or against the plan itself (nor against any administrator or fiduciary of the plan). I agree with the Court that this is an important consideration. However, in my opinion, this fact, standing alone, is insufficient to justify the application of the "remote relationship” exception in this case. I would also stress the nature of the plaintiffs suit to support a holding that the damage award in this case is related too peripherally to the erisa plan to warrant preemption.
The sole basis for the plaintiff’s claim of wrongful discharge is Michigan common law. An action for breach of an employment contract, such as the plaintiff’s, has traditionally been an area of state regulation, one that Congress presumably did not intend to preempt. Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724, 740; 105 S Ct 2380; 85 L Ed 2d 728 (1985). See also Mackey v Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc, 486 US —; 108 S Ct 2182; 100 L Ed 2d 836 (1988) (Congress did not intend to preempt the application of state garnishment procedures to erisa welfare benefit plans); American Telephone & Telegraph Co v Merry, 592 F2d 118, 121 (CA 2, 1979) (Congress did not intend the erisa to alter traditional support obligations, and, therefore, the state garnishment of a spouse’s pension income to enforce alimony and support orders is not preempted). The rights and duties of *224the parties herein have their genesis in a contract of employment founded entirely upon state law, rather than upon the erisa or an erisa plan. The Park West plan was introduced at the trial in this case merely to serve as a measure of damages suffered as a result of the employer’s breach under Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). Furthermore, the plan itself has remained entirely unaffected throughout this suit because state law requires the breaching employer to pay such damages out of its own assets, rather than out of the plan. In my view, these facts provide further support for applying the "remote relationship” exception in this case.
ii
Although I find the foregoing analysis persuasive, I believe a more practicable approach to erisa preemption can be elicited from the plain language of § 1144. Congress has specifically provided that "this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 USC 1144(a) (emphasis added). Although this provision is extremely broad, it is not all-encompassing. Lane v Goren, 743 F2d 1337, 1339 (CA 9, 1984). For instance, 29 USC 1144(b)(2)(A) precludes preemption of any state law "which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Similarly, § 1144(b)(4) provides that the preemption provision "shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a State.” Congress has further explained the scope of erisa preemption in the definitional section, 29 USC 1144(c)(2), wherein the term "state” for preemption purposes is characterized as "a State, any political subdivisions thereof, *225or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee beneñt plans covered by this subchapter (Emphasis added.)
A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that where a statute supplies its own glossary, a court must apply the terms as expressly defined. Erlandson v Genesee Co Employees’ Retirement Comm, 337 Mich 195, 204; 59 NW2d 389 (1953); McRaild v Shepard Lincoln Mercury, Inc, 141 Mich App 406, 410; 367 NW2d 404 (1985). See, generally, 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, §§223-226, pp 412-413. Thus, interpreting the language of § 1144 using the definitions Congress itself has supplied, a state law is preempted if it "relate[s] to” an erisa plan and "purports to regulate” its terms and conditions. This approach to erisa preemption has been adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits.2 Lane, supra; Martori Bros Distributors v James*226Massengale, 781 F2d 1349 (CA 9, 1986), cert den 479 US 1018; 107 S Ct 435; 93 L Ed 2d 385 (1986); Rebaldo v Cuomo, 749 F2d 133 (CA 2, 1984), cert den 472 US 1008 (1985). See also Sommers Drug Stores v Corrigan Enterprises, Inc, 793 F2d 1456 (CA 5, 1986), cert den 479 US 1034; 107 S Ct 884; 93 L Ed 2d 837 (1987).
The United States Supreme Court has pronounced that a state law "relates to” an employee benefit plan if it "has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw, supra at 97. Given this expansive definition, it would appear that the damage award herein relates to the Park West plan since the jury referred to the plan when it calculated the amount of the plaintiffs lost pension benefits. Nonetheless, even assuming the award satisfies the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a state law which "relates to” an erisa plan, in order to trigger preemption under § 1144, the state action must also "purport to regulate” a term or condition of the plan.
The defendants and amicus curiae, Michigan Manufacturers Association, have maintained throughout this appeal that the amount of the jury award conflicts with the amount the plaintiff would have received under Article VI, §5 of the Park West plan and incorporated erisa provisions, 29 CFR 2530.200a-2530.200b-3. Thus, it is arguable that the jury award indirectly regulates the terms of the plan.
*227After examining these provisions, I have concluded that they simply do not apply in the instant case. Article VI, § 5 of the Park West plan provides for vested, not future, pension credits in the event an employee is terminated. Similarly, the cited CFR provisions, which are promulgated pursuant to 29 USC 1054(h)(3)(A) involve the determination of an "employee’s accrued benefit.” There is simply no language in the erisa regulations or in the plan itself concerning the determination of future benefits under an employment contract. Thus, it would be improper to blindly apply them to the plaintiffs Toussaint claim without regard to the scope of the provisions themselves.
In conclusion, therefore, I would apply § 1144(c)(2) to the erisa preemption provision, § 1144(a), and hold that the plaintiffs jury award is not preempted since it in no way "purports to regulate” any term or condition of the Park West pension plan.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result of the majority opinion.
Levin, J., concurred with Riley, C.J.

 Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980).

 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated its disapproval of this approach, although it expressly declined to decide whether § 1144(c)(2) limits the erisa preemption provision. See Authier v Ginsberg 757 F2d 796, 799, n 4 (CA 6, 1985), cert den 474 US 888 (1985).
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that reliance on § 1144(c)(2) "purports to regulate” language to limit erisa preemption "would be contrary to the legislative history of erisa. Congress rejected explicitly a proposed preemption provision which reached only specific subjects covered by erisa in favor of the current broad language of Section 1144(a).” Id.; see also Shaw, supra at 98-99, ns 18-20 (explaining § 1144(a)’s evolution from narrow conflict of content approach to its broad present form).
I agree with the Sixth Circuit that Congress purposefully drafted § 1144(a) in its current broad language. It is indisputable that Congress intended to preempt state laws relating to benefit plans, rather than laws relating to specific matters covered by the erisa, i.e., reporting, disclosure, funding, vesting, fiduciary responsibility, etc. Shaw, supra at 98.
In my opinion, however, applying § 1144(c)(2) to § 1144(a) does not contravene Congress’ intent in this regard. Support for this position can be found in the express language of § 1144(c)(2), which comports with that of § 1144(a) (the erisa supersedes state laws that "relate to any employee beneñt plan[s]”). Section 1144(c)(2) similarly addresses only "State” action which "purports to regulate . . . the terms and conditions of employee beneñt plans . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The *226definition in § 1144(c)(2) does not mention the purported regulation of the specific subjects of the ekisa. Thus, it is possible to apply § 1144(c)(2) to § 1144(a) without undermining congressional intent. In fact, as mentioned previously, a basic rule of construction mandates the application of statutorily defined terms. Erlandson and McRaild, supra.
In conclusion, therefore, § 1144(c)(2) should be applied to § 1144(a). Such an application is not only consistent with the express language and legislative history of the erisa preemption provision, but also mandated by the rules of statutory construction.