Court Opinion

ID: 9845826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:29:02.277874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:23.072699
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.,* Concurring and Dissenting.
In this case each defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion of defendant Roberts but granted that of defendant Coleman.
Because of those attributes of our judicial system which are indigenous to the trial process (and which are adumbrated in my dissent in People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 801-802 [44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142]) I recognize that the trial judge is in a position far superior to a justice of this court in resolving factual issues. These issues encompass the pivotal one as to the existence or nonexistence of the constitutionally defined basis without which the court is peremptorily forbidden to grant a new trial (or, on appeal, to reverse a judgment).
By “constitutionally defined basis” I refer to that articulated by California Constitution, article VI, section 4½,1 interpreted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 [12] [299 P.2d 243]. It is, of course, true that the subject section of the Constitution “should control the action of the trial court in considering a motion for a new trial, but when the trial court has . . . granted the motion, the sole issue be*95fore the appellate court is whether the trial court has abused its discretion.” (Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco (1957) 47 Cal.2d 729, 744 [18] [306 P.2d 432].)
I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion of defendant Roberts. Furthermore, assuming (only for the purposes of this dissenting and concurring opinion) the errors declared by the majority, I am not of the view (in the light of the entire record) that a result more favorable to defendant Roberts would have been reached in the absence of those errors. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of, and would affirm, the judgment against Roberts. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4½; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 [12] [299 P.2d 243].)
In respect to defendant Coleman, from my disadvantageous position faetwise, I cannot validly conclude that the trial court as a matter of law abused its discretion in granting her motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I concur with the majority in affirming that order.

"Sec. 4½. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’'