Court Opinion

ID: 9561935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:19:02.526596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.080679
License: Public Domain

Moore, J.
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I agree with the majority opinion that judgment should be arrested in cases 7141 and 7143. But in my opinion there should be a new trial in 7142.
In addition to the fatal defects in the warrants in cases 7141 and 7143, discussed in the majority opinion, these warrants are bad for duplicity. In a warrant or indictment consisting of several counts, each count should be complete in itself and the defendant should be named in each count. State v. McCollum, 181 N.C. 584, 107 S.E. 309.
*180In case 7142 the warrant charges “transporting and possession of a quantity of non-tax paid whisky for the purpose of sale. . .” Thus the warrant charges in one count two offenses, transporting (G.S. 18-2) and possession for the purpose of sale (G.S. 14-32). State v. Sigmon, 190 N.C. 684, 130 S.E. 854. An indictment or warrant which charges more than one offense in the same count is bad for duplicity. State v. Cooper, 101 N.C. 684, 8 S.E. 134.
A motion to quash for duplicity should be made before pleading to the charge, and if made after plea it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and is not allowable as a matter of right. State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604. If the motion is made after verdict it comes too late. State v. Avery, 236 N.C. 276, 72 S.E. 2d 670; State v. Mundy, 182 N.C. 907, 110 S.E. 93.
There was no motion to quash for duplicity in the instant case, and the point -is not raised on appeal. The matter of duplicity is discussed here because it emphasizes the error in the court’s instructions to the jury.
The majority opinion points out that the warrant deals generally with the operation of a motor vehicle on a street or highway and concludes therefrom the reference to possession of whiskey for the purpose of sale is mere surplusage, that the warrant only charges unlawful transportation. But it should be borne in mind that it is unlawful to possess whiskey for sale, under the statutory prohibitions, at any place, even in 'a moving motor vehicle.
The trial judge instructed the jury:
“He (defendant) is charged first of all with transportation of non-tax paid whisky and possession of non-tax paid whisky for the purpose of sale.
“It is against the law . . . for any person in North Carolina to transport -any amount of non-tax paid whisky. . . .
“(and the possession of any person in such a quantity as thirty gallons would carry with it the implication that the person had it for unlawful disposition or for sale.) ”
Later in the charge, the court stated to the jury:
“. . . (y)ou will proceed to consider whether or not you find him guilty of transportation of and possession of non-tax paid whisky.” (Defendant was not charged with “possession,” but was charged with “possession for the purpose of sale.” State v. Cofield, 247 N.C. 185, 100 S.E. 2d 355.)
Thereafter, the instructions as to the warrant in case 7142 deal only with the contentions of the State and defendant with respect to transportation of intoxicating liquor.
*181I agree that the court correctly charged the law respecting transportation of liquor. But the «charge was both erroneous and incomplete as to possession for the purpose of sale. As a literary matter, I agree that it is a possible, though not a necessary, construction of the court’s charge on possession and possession for sale that it is merely explanatory of the instruction as -to transportation. But nowhere does the court expressly inform the. jury that it is to disregard “possession for the purpose of sale” and consider only whether the defendant is guilty of transporting intoxicating liquor. Moreover, at no place in the charge is the jury informed what «possible verdicts it may render.
In case 7142 the jury returned a general verdict of guilty. We do not know whether it intended to return a verdict of guilty of, transporting intoxicating liquor, a verdict of guilty only of possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, or a verdict of guilty of both. If it intended either of the -two latter verdicts, the verdict is based on an incomplete and incorrect charge. In my opinion the jury did not have proper legal direction and guidance in case 7142 and was left to its own devices in arriving at a verdict. I vote for a new trial in case 7142.
Higgins and Rodman, JJ., join in this opinion.