Court Opinion

ID: 9901844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:04:23.319107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.790180
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,399

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                      LOGAN R. NEISWENDER,
                                           Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Shawnee District Court; C. WILLIAM OSSMANN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed November 22, 2023. Affirmed.

        Emily Brandt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Jodi Litfin, deputy district attorney, Michael Kagay, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., SCHROEDER and CLINE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: As part of a global plea agreement, Logan R. Neiswender pled
guilty to one count each of possession with intent to distribute and possession of
methamphetamine. Before sentencing, Neiswender moved for a dispositional or
durational departure, and he reiterated those arguments during the sentencing hearing.
The district court ultimately denied Neiswender's request for dispositional departure but
granted his request for durational departure. Neiswender appeals, arguing that the district
court erred by not allowing him to exercise his right to allocution before being sentenced.
He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for

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dispositional departure. Our record shows that the district court erred by not allowing
Neiswender to exercise his right to allocution before being sentenced, but the error was
harmless. Our record also shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Neiswender's request for dispositional departure. Thus, we affirm Neiswender's
sentence.

                                          FACTS

       In 2021, the State filed multiple cases against Neiswender. In case No. 21-CR-
1132, the State charged Neiswender with one count each of possession of
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In
another case, No. 21-CR-2345, the State charged Neiswender with one count each of
possession with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.

       As part of a global plea agreement, Neiswender pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine in case 21-CR-1132 and possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine in case 21-CR-2345. In exchange for pleading guilty, the remaining
charges in both of those cases were dismissed, and the State also agreed to dismiss
another case, No. 21-CR-2287, in its entirety. Under the plea agreement, the parties also
agreed to open sentencing.

       Before sentencing, Neiswender filed a motion for dispositional or durational
departure. In the motion, Neiswender argued that the district court should grant his
motion because he had a low criminal history score, had no criminal history before these
cases, had accepted responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty, had no bond
violations, maintained a job while out on bond, and had consistently attended outpatient
treatment to rectify his drug problem.

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       During the sentencing hearing, Neiswender reiterated many of these arguments
and again requested a dispositional or durational departure. The State opposed
Neiswender's motion and asked the district court to impose standard sentences in both
cases. To support its argument, the State pointed to the weight of the methamphetamine
discovered in connection with his possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine
charge in case 21-CR-2345. The State also pointed to the number of cases that had been
filed against him in a short period of time.

       Ultimately, the district court denied Neiswender's motion for dispositional
departure but granted his motion for durational departure. In case 21-CR-2345, the
district court sentenced Neiswender to 38 months' imprisonment. In case 21-CR-1132,
the district court sentenced Neiswender to 11 months' imprisonment. The sentences ran
consecutive, for a total sentence of 49 months' imprisonment.

       Neiswender timely appeals.

                                               ANALYSIS

Did the district court violate Neiswender's right to allocution?

       On appeal, Neiswender argues that the district court violated his right to
allocution.

       Previously, our Supreme Court stated:

               "'Allocution' is defined as the '[f]ormality of court's inquiry of prisoner as to
       whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against
       him on verdict of conviction.' Black's Law Dictionary 70 (5th ed. 1979). Such allocution
       is provided a criminal defendant under K.S.A. 22-3422. Historically, the term 'allocution'

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       has been applied also to the right to speak at sentencing. Kansas provides a defendant this
       right under K.S.A. 22-3424(4)." State v. Webb, 242 Kan. 519, 522, 748 P.2d 875 (1988).

       Currently, the right to allocution is codified in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3424(e),
which states, in part: "Before imposing sentence the court shall: . . . (4) address the
defendant personally and ask the defendant if the defendant wishes to make a statement
on the defendant's own behalf and to present any evidence in mitigation of punishment."

       During the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Neiswender if he wished to
make a statement on his behalf, but the district court did so after pronouncing the
sentence. Since the district court failed to ask Neiswender if he wished to make a
statement before sentencing, the district court erred, which the State acknowledges.

       In previous cases, our Supreme Court has applied the harmless error standard to
violations of a defendant's right to allocution. See, e.g., State v. Valladarez, 288 Kan.
671, 687-89, 206 P.3d 879 (2009); State v. Bowen, 259 Kan. 798, 810-11, 915 P.2d 120
(1996); State v. Hunt, 257 Kan. 388, 405-06, 894 P.2d 178 (1995); State v. Borders, 255
Kan. 871, 881, 879 P.2d 620 (1994). But Neiswender urges this court to not apply the
harmless error standard. He argues that K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3424(e)(4) provides two
rights: (1) the right to make a statement; and (2) the right to offer evidence in mitigation
of punishment. Neiswender agrees that courts should apply the harmless error standard
when a district court violates a defendant's right to present mitigating evidence, but he
believes that such standard should not apply when a district court violates a defendant's
right to make a statement on his or her behalf. He also cites two cases to support his
argument: State v. Heide, 249 Kan. 723, 822 P.2d 59 (1991), and State v. Wielgus, 14
Kan. App. 2d 145, 783 P.2d 1320 (1989).

       In Wielgus, a panel of this court dealt with a somewhat similar situation. There,
the district court refused the defendant's request to make a statement during allocution.

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After concluding that the district court erred in doing so, the panel vacated Wielgus'
sentence and remanded for resentencing without applying the harmless error analysis. 14
Kan. App. 2d at 145-46.

       Similarly, in Heide, the district court failed to ask Heide if he wished to make a
statement or present any evidence in mitigation of his punishment. After concluding that
the district court erred in doing so, our Supreme Court vacated Heide's sentence and
remanded for resentencing without applying the harmless error analysis. 249 Kan. at 731.

       But both cases were decided before Borders. There, our Supreme Court—for the
first time—clarified and applied the harmless error standard to the denial of a defendant's
right to allocution. See 255 Kan. at 881; see also Bowen, 259 Kan. at 810-11 (Borders
was the first case to clarify substantial prejudice/reversible error standard applies to
denial of right to allocution). Since then, our courts have continued to apply the harmless
error standard when reviewing a denial of allocution. See Valladarez, 288 Kan. at 687-
89; Bowen, 259 Kan. at 810-11; Hunt, 257 Kan. at 405-06. And as the State points out,
this court is duty-bound to follow our Supreme Court precedent unless there is some
indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. State v. Patton,
315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022). Having found no such indication, we will apply
the harmless error standard when reviewing Neiswender's claim.

       The right to allocution is a statutory right, not a constitutional right. See State v.
Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 750-51, 163 P.3d 1232 (2007); Webb, 242 Kan. at 529. Where
an error implicates a statutory but not a federal constitutional right, the party benefiting
from the error must persuade the court that there is no reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome in light of the entire record for it to be deemed harmless. State
v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 983, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).

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       As stated earlier, the district court allowed Neiswender to make a statement on his
behalf, albeit after the district court had already pronounced the sentence. When
Neiswender did so, the following exchange occurred:

                 "THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll be happy to listen to Mr. Neiswender if there's
       something he wants to tell me.
                 "DEFENDANT NEISWENDER: I would just think that sending me to prison or
       jail would not benefit me at all. It would, kind of, probably put me back down in that
       hole.
                 "THE COURT: You understand you were originally charged with a crime that
       would've left you with potentially 98 months in prison. Do you understand that?
                 "DEFENDANT NEISWENDER: Yes, I do.
                 "THE COURT: What did you think was going to happen when you're carrying
       around that much methamphetamine having already been bonded out on another drug
       charge?
                 "DEFENDANT NEISWENDER: To be honest with you I was not thinking. I
       mean, I was on drugs. My head wasn't clear. But I do have a clear head now, and I made
       my life better and I'm trying to continue that way.
                 "THE COURT: All right. Well, I think I've given the defendant the benefit of the
       doubt here by setting this up so that he's not serving any more than the standard range on
       the offense for possession with intent to distribute. So I'm going to deny the oral request
       to modify."

       Neiswender argues that the district court's error was not harmless because
Neiswender "was not given the opportunity to persuade the district court that he was
deserving of a departure to probation." The State counters by arguing that the district
court's error was harmless because the district court allowed Neiswender to make a
statement, albeit after it had already imposed the sentence. The State also argues that the
error should be deemed harmless because Neiswender's statements reflected similar
arguments made by his counsel that the district court rejected. The State also points out
that the district court did not change the sentence it imposed after hearing Neiswender's
statements.

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       Even though the district court erred by not allowing Neiswender to make a
statement before sentencing, the district court did allow him to make statements on his
behalf. Additionally, the statements Neiswender made were nearly identical to the
arguments his counsel made when asking the district court to grant Neiswender's motion
for dispositional departure, which the district court denied.

       Under these circumstances, we deem the error by the district court harmless. The
statements provided by Neiswender contained no new information, meaning the district
court had previously considered the arguments when rejecting Neiswender's motion for
dispositional departure. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the
outcome in light of the entire record. See McCullough, 293 Kan. at 983.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by partially denying Neiswender's motion for
departure?

       In his second issue on appeal, Neiswender argues that the district court abused its
discretion by not granting his motion for dispositional departure.

       Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(a), a district court must "impose the
presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing guidelines unless the judge finds
substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure sentence." When determining
whether such reasons exist, a district court may consider—but is not limited to—whether
the nonexclusive list of mitigating factors listed in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6815(c) support
granting a departure. Our statutes define mitigating factors as "substantial and compelling
reason[s] justifying an exceptional sentence whereby the sentencing court may impose a
departure sentence outside of the standard sentencing range for a crime." K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-6803(n).

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       Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6820(a), a defendant or the State may appeal a
departure sentence. On appeal, our review is limited to determining "whether the
sentencing court's findings of fact and reasons justifying a departure: (1) [a]re supported
by the evidence in the record; and (2) constitute substantial and compelling reasons for
departure." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6820(d).

       "Substantial means 'real, not imagined, and of substance, not ephemeral.' And a
compelling reason is one that 'forces the court, by the facts of the case, to abandon the
status quo and to venture beyond the sentence that it would ordinarily impose.'" State v.
Montgomery, 314 Kan. 33, 36, 494 P.3d 147 (2021) (quoting State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan.
719, 724, 176 P.3d 160 [2008]).

       This court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for departure for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Galloway, 316 Kan. 471, 476, 518 P.3d 399 (2022). In State v.
Morley, 312 Kan. 702, 479 P.3d 928 (2021), our Supreme Court clarified the framework
for applying the abuse of discretion standard to review of departure decisions, stating:

       "[A]ppellate review of the departure decision should follow a three-step framework: (1)
       determine whether the sentencing court's nonstatutory factor can be a mitigating factor as
       a matter of law under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6815(c); (2) if it can, then decide whether
       that nonstatutory factor's existence is supported by the record; and (3) if so, then
       determine whether the sentencing court acted reasonably when it concluded there was a
       substantial and compelling reason to depart in a particular case based on that nonstatutory
       factor by itself or collectively with other statutory or nonstatutory factors cited by the
       sentencing court.
               ". . . Put differently, the respective inquiries on each analytical step are: (1)
       whether the determination of a nonstatutory factor was guided by an erroneous legal
       conclusion; (2) whether substantial competent evidence supported the factual finding that
       the factor existed, i.e., an error of fact; and (3) whether a reasonable person would have
       taken the view adopted by the sentencing court. And it is important to emphasize that

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       only the first step involves a legal question, subject to unlimited review." 312 Kan. at
       711.

       "The remaining two questions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. . . . An abuse
of discretion occurs when the lower court's action is '(1) based on an error of fact, (2)
based on an error of law, or (3) unreasonable.'" Montgomery, 314 Kan. at 37 (quoting
Morley, 312 Kan. at 710-11). Because Neiswender does not point to any alleged errors of
fact or law, the question becomes whether no reasonable person would agree with the
district court's decision to deny Neiswender's motion for dispositional departure. See
Galloway, 316 Kan. at 476-77. As the party asserting the district court abused its
discretion, Neiswender bears the burden to demonstrate such abuse. See State v. Keys,
315 Kan. 690, 708, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). He fails to do so.

       As stated earlier, Neiswender moved for dispositional or durational departure
before sentencing. Neiswender argued that the district court should grant his motion
because he had a low criminal history score, had no criminal history before these charges,
accepted responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty, had no bond violations,
maintained a job while out on bond, and had consistently attended outpatient treatment to
rectify his drug problem. During sentencing, Neiswender reiterated many of these
arguments and again requested a dispositional or durational departure, but the district
court granted only Neiswender's motion for durational departure.

       In doing so, the district court identified three substantial and compelling reasons
for departure when granting the motion for durational departure: (1) Neiswender's
acceptance of responsibility; (2) Neiswender's appropriate behavior while on bond; and
(3) Neiswender's willingness to obtain treatment. On appeal, Neiswender points to these
factors, as well as the other reasons listed in his departure motion, and maintains that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to properly consider his other reasons or
evidence in support of his dispositional departure sentence. Nevertheless, these other

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reasons or evidence that Neiswender included in his departure motion are irrelevant to
our review in this appeal.

       As stated previously, our review of a departure sentence is limited to determining
"whether the sentencing court's findings of fact and reasons justifying a departure: (1)
[a]re supported by the evidence in the record; and (2) constitute substantial and
compelling reasons for departure." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6820(d). So, it is not this
court's function to review and deem factors not relied on by the district court as
substantial and compelling reasons, which is what Neiswender asks this court to do here.
Because Neiswender's other reasons or evidence cited in his departure motion were not
relied on by the district court as substantial and compelling reasons, they are irrelevant
and are not substantial competent evidence to justify a departure. Thus, Neiswender's
argument fails to explain how the district court abused its discretion.

       In sum, the district court relied on three substantial and compelling reasons for
departure when granting the motion for durational departure, and neither party disputes
those findings. Because our review is limited to assessing the factors relied on by the
district court, and not factors the district court did not rely on, Neiswender's argument
fails under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6820(d). Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court.

       Affirmed.

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