Court Opinion

ID: 9775834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:10:45.125165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.302468
License: Public Domain

DOGGET, Justice,
dissenting.
“[A] right of individual privacy is implicit among those ‘general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government’ established by the Texas Bill of Rights.”
Texas State Employee’s Union v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.1987).
The assault on the right to privacy in Texas has begun. No longer will this court, so recently a guardian of that liberty, protect the personal autonomy of Texans. While today’s opinions deny the right of only one employee to seek redress when an employer circulates incorrect and damaging information, tomorrow other, more universal, personal rights are threatened. The right to privacy, previously defined by this court “as the right of an individual to be left alone, to live a life of seclusion, to be free from unwanted publicity,”1 encompasses a broad range of personal rights, from a married couple’s determination to use contraceptives to a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.
This right of privacy is intricately woven into the fabric of our constitutional and *214common law; the removal of even a few threads creates a danger that the rest will unravel. The threads left hanging today are disparaged as merely loose ones, not yet snipped, as unimportant reinforcing stitches in a large cloth. But privacy is no gunnysack; it is too fragile a right to withstand such rough treatment.
Reaching out to address issues not properly raised, today’s writings go to great lengths to question the continuing validity of the false light tort for invasion of privacy, which was previously well established in Texas. Because I believe this court should preserve rather than erode the right to privacy, I dissent.
I. The Dual Foundations of the Privacy Right
With the declaration that “[t]his court has never expressly held that a tort for false light invasion of privacy exists,” 844 S.W.2d at 200, Justices Phillips, Cook, and Hecht2 carve a major inroad into the right to privacy that has until today been ensured to all Texans. Yet they only accomplish with subtlety what concurring Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn would do more directly. Until now, this court has served as a guardian of a broad right to privacy, assured both by the common law and under the Texas Constitution, including protection against portrayal in a false light.
A.
While the right to privacy is often traced to an article co-authored by Louis D. Bran-déis,3 the legal and ethical concepts of a right to be let alone predate his explication of the term “privacy.” The concept pervades our jurisprudence; both the federal and state protection of a right to privacy arises from a combination of constitutional law, common law, and statutory regulation. Robert Aldrich, Privacy Protection Law in the United States 3-9 (Dep’t Comm.1982) (The “roots of privacy protection law in this country are found in the Constitution and the common law as well as in early statutes.”); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383 (1960). The fundamental nature of this right has been repeatedly recognized. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-27, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (right of privacy encompasses woman’s decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (use of contraception in the home by married persons is protected); Texas State Employee’s Union v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.1987) (privacy right bars mandatory polygraph testing).
The evolving concept of a right to privacy in Texas “exists prior to, and independent of, the Texas Constitution; it is a core democratic value expressed and protected in the [state] constitution.” James C. Harrington, The Texas Bill of Rights 39 (Supp.1992). In Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.1973), this court explicitly declared that “an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy constitutes a legal injury for which a remedy will be granted.’’ Id. at 860 (emphasis added). Allowing recovery for damages resulting from phone wiretapping, we defined privacy
as the right of an individual to be left alone, ... the right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality, the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
Id. We later relied on this same “statement of the Court revealpng] that the tort ‘invasion of privacy’ is actually a recognition of several ‘privacy interests’ considered to be deserving of protection." Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas *215Indus. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Gal.L.Rev. 383, 389 (1960)). We described four parts of the tort of invasion of privacy: (1) “Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;” (2) “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;” (3) “Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;” and (4) “Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” 540 S.W.2d at 682.
This same four-part tort4 has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1965), and recognized in other Texas courts. See J. Hadley Edgar, Jr. & James B. Sales, 3 Texas Torts and Remedies § 53.01[3], at 53-7 n. 11 (1990) (hereinafter Edgar & Sales) (the four parts of invasion of privacy are “accepted by most, if not all jurists and writers today”); Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (Industrial Foundation recognized the four parts of a tort of invasion of privacy previously acknowledged in Billings); Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 472 F.Supp. 145 (N.D.Tex.1979) (in Billings, Texas recognized all four categories of invasion of privacy, including false light, or logically would under that precedent).
An action for invasion of privacy inclusive of false light has been accepted by a substantial number of other states,5 and *216squarely rejected by only one.6 Texas is universally recognized by commentators and compendia7 as well as by the federal courts8 to have accepted the majority rule recognizing a false light cause of action.
Numerous Texas courts of appeals, following our decisions in Billings and Industrial Foundation, have applied or recognized the false light cause of action.9 How odd that the only source of new-found doubt as to the validity of the false light tort is found in today’s writings, which coincide with federal retrenchment and deference to the states for the protection of privacy rights.10
B.
Not only is this otherwise firmly entrenched common law privacy right eroded, but the interrelated constitutional parameters of that right are threatened. This court’s commitment to that liberty was, until today, unquestioned. In Texas State Employee’s Union, when state employees challenged mandatory state use of polygraph testing, this court found a “right of individual privacy implicit among those ‘general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government’ established by the Texas Bill of Rights.” 746 S.W.2d at 205. The Department’s policy was found *217to violate the state constitutional “pro-tectpon of] personal privacy from unreasonable intrusion.” Id.
Constitutional and common law rights of privacy have evolved together such that constitutional implications are frequently discussed by commentators in analyzing the false light tort. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 866-68 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton) (constitutional protection “embraces ... interests protected by the common law action”); see generally Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under The First Amendment, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 1205 (1976). State constitutional privacy guarantees have accordingly provided a basis for recognizing the false light cause of action. See, e.g., Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 835, 783 P.2d 781, 788 (1989).
Disregarding the constitutional dimensions of privacy facilitates the objective of the five members of this court who would substantially revise prior caselaw based on an arguably less fundamental common law foundation while narrowly limiting any constitutional privacy right to protection from governmental agency polygraph tests.11 Today’s attempt to pigeonhole privacy jeopardizes important interests — the right to choose whether to carry a child to term, to avoid unwarranted governmental invasions of privacy, to maintain some semblance of personal freedom in the technology age— by a mere declaration that at most these arise only from “common law” and possess no “constitutional” dimension. Justices Gonzalez and Comyn seek to distract attention from this reality in their unsupported declaration that “this case has absolutely nothing to do with constitutional privacy rights.” 844 S.W.2d at 203, n. 1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring and dissenting). Today’s writings provide a clear indication of the newly weakened status of all privacy rights in Texas at the hands of five members of this court. Today, the threads of the interwoven fabric of the common and constitutional law are unraveled leaving peepholes intruding into the privacy rights of Texans.
Each of the commentaries relied upon by Justices Gonzalez and Comyn as questioning false light actions also includes a direct attack on the very concept of a right to privacy. These justices join those who view not just false light but the entire concept of privacy in tort law as infused with “pettiness,” unable to “function as a constitutional concept” and who conclude that “the right of privacy ... failed in three-quarters of a century to amount to anything.” Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp.Probs. 326, 327, 328, 341 (1966) (emphasis added). Surely the landmark holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), grounding on this very right to privacy a woman’s vital right to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, and our subsequent ruling in Texas State Employee’s Union make this view untenable. Today’s writings would apparently return us to a time when enforcement of privacy rights was unknown.12
While false light shares similarities with the defamation tort, the two are demarcated by significant differences:
*218It is not ... necessary to the action for invasion of privacy that the plaintiff be defamed. It is enough that he is given unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed before the public in a false position. When this is the case and the matter attributed to the plaintiff is not defamatory, the rule here stated affords a different remedy, not available in an action for defamation.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, comment b (emphasis added). The remedy is different because “the two torts exist to redress different types of wrongful conduct.” Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 787; see also Joseph J. Hemmer, Jr., The Supreme Court and the First Amendment 211 (1986) (“False light involves the publication of false information about an individual, whether it is defamatory or not.”); Edgar & Sales § 53.05940, at 53-57 (discussing “some fundamental differences between the two torts”).13
The critical conceptual distinction now disregarded is that defamation law protects against injury to reputation; false light, like any other privacy protection law, preserves the right to be let alone. See Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 787; Renwick, 312 S.E.2d at 415 (Meyer, J., concurring and dissenting); Prosser & Keeton at 864; Recent Developments at 110; Wade at 1094; Thomas I. Emerson, The Right to Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 Harv.C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 329, 333 (1979); see also 57 A.L.R. 4th § 6, at 88-90, and cases cited therein. These are two separate interests. Two different injuries are suffered — with false light “[i]t is enough ... that the publicity [causes] severe emotional distress,” while with defamation there is required a showing of special damages arising from “harm to reputation.” Prosser & Keeton at 866. These differences weigh against elimination of the false light tort on grounds of overlap.
C.
A cause of action that denies parties, particularly media defendants, a truth defense has the potential of chilling speech. That is precisely why we in the past have applied special substantive free speech rules in addition to procedural requirements. See Star Telegram v. Walker, 834 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.1992) (freedom to print already public information). There is no reason why such special rules cannot be applied in the false light context,14 particularly when media defendants are involved.15
An appropriate standard for liability such as that “the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E(b), has been found to offer ample protection for free expression and to discourage any false light litigation explosion. See Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d at 788-89 (finding the Restatement’s standards adequate to preserve, free speech). In no way does the false light action “restrict speech in any manner beyond our existing tort law;” indeed, Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn amply demonstrate that “many jurisdictions have preserved their protection of speech by [adopting reasonable limitations on] false light actions.” 844 S.W.2d at 210 (Gonzalez, J., concurring and dissenting). One leading commentator and advocate for freedom of expression has concluded that “false-light invasion of privacy actions ... serve the state interests in deterring the publication of damaging false *219information and protecting reputation.” Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 Ariz.St.L.J. 423, 441 (1988).16
This liability standard also comports with the broad guarantees of article one, section eight of the Texas Constitution, that persons speak freely, unhindered by interference from government or private persons, but with post-speech remedies for abuse of that privilege. See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding).17 Rather than striking a balance that bolsters freedom of expression, today’s action simply denigrates the right to privacy.
II. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Conceding that recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is widely permitted, see 844 S.W.2d at 202 & n. 3,18 and aware that neither the parties nor ami-cus argue that Mendez has failed to plead a cause of action, Justice Phillips nevertheless declares Mendez has no claim as “a matter of law.” Id. at 202. “Even if ... true [that Mendez’s employer falsely depicted him as a thief to coworkers and his community] this conduct is not sufficiently outrageous to raise a fact issue” for jury consideration. Id. “Not sufficiently outrageous”? What could be more outrageous than an employer falsely and deliberately blackening the name of a worker to coworkers and other potential employers?
The court of appeals properly reviewed the evidence presented in this case to determine whether liability attached. But instead of an analysis of specific evidence, today we receive broad pronouncements that serve to strangle all potential future litigation of this type. Under today’s restrictive interpretation of “outrageous,” even an employer’s admission to having falsely advertised that an employee was a thief would not be viewed as sufficiently “intolerable” to justify legal recourse. Id. In short, under today’s opinions, a worker’s good name legally counts for nothing.19
III. Disposition
Today’s misguided writings lead to an equally misguided result. Mendez is sent back to the trial court to submit to the jury a question about a tort, the existence of which two members of this court refuse to recognize, four refuse to discuss, and the remaining three say has already been recognized by this court. This case is based upon events that occurred seven years ago; perhaps in another seven years, after pursuing another trial and appeal, these parties will finally be accorded a real answer.
The multiple waivers of error by Diamond Shamrock should dictate that the judgment for Mendez be affirmed. Not until coming to this court did Diamond Shamrock ever suggest that a false light action was unavailable under Texas law. No such objection was lodged at any time in either the trial court or the court of appeals. Nor did Diamond Shamrock in objecting to the false light jury instruction tender any proper alternative instruction as required by Tex.R.Civ.P. 278. While these failures dictate against a remand, certainly rendition against Mendez as urged both by Justice Hecht, 844 S.W.2d at 213 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (referring to the Mendez cause of action as merely “hypo*220thetical”), and Justices Gonzalez and Cor-nyn, id. at 203 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting), is even more inappropriate. This suggested disposition is propelled by reaching out to decry the false light tort in reliance on a recent decision unfairly refusing to remand for a new trial. See Westgate Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 459 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
The suggestion that Mendez could have anticipated the standard adopted here, 844 S.W.2d at 213 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting), ignores the state of the law at the time this case was tried.20 When the elements of the cause of action are unsettled and error has been preserved, remand is appropriate. See Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 588 (Tex.1992) (on motion for rehearing).
IV. Conclusion
Little did Roque Mendez know that the few discarded nails he threw into his lunch bag rather than the trash bin would be used to begin nailing shut the coffin lid on privacy actions. I certainly reject today’s writings, which signal the commencement of the not so slow death of this vital right. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in full; the right of privacy should be fully guaranteed.
MAUZY and GAMMAGE, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Motion for rehearing overruled.

. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex.1973).

. Justice Hecht’s "Concurring and Dissenting Opinion” fully embraces the views of Justices Phillips and Cook concerning privacy and differs only as to whether what is termed Mendez's "hypothetical cause of action” should be stopped now instead of later. 844 S.W.2d at 213 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).

. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890).

. The essence of the Mendez complaint is that, by publicizing a statement about him that was inaccurate or untrue, Diamond Shamrock is responsible for "an unwarranted invasion of [his] right of privacy." Billings, 489 S.W.2d at 860. Some commentators contend that there should be only one broad tort category, with no specifically identified subparts. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy — Cognizahility and Elements 2[a], at 39 (1987). The parts and the whole cannot be easily separated, and the subsets sometimes overlap, precluding neat categorization other than under the general heading of invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.2d 474 (1964); Recent Developments- at 197 (same facts characterized as both one of false light invasion of privacy and of disclosure of private facts).

. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., 435 So.2d 705 (Ala.1983); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.2d 474 (1964); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 (1989); McCammon & Assocs. v. McGraw Hill Broadcasting Co., 716 P.2d 490 (Colo.App.1986); Florida Pub. Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977); Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, 433 So.2d 593 (1983), review denied, 443 So.2d 979 (Fla.1984); Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F.Supp. 635 (S.D.Ga.1982); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Holbrook v. Chase, 12 Media L.Rptr. 1732, 1736 (Idaho Dist. Ct.1985); Lepold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 559 P.2d 334 (1977); Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993 (1973); Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So.2d 453 (La.App.1974); Hamilton v. Lumbermen’s Casualty Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La.Ct.App.1955); Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me.1976); Dempsey v. National Enquirer, 687 F.Supp. 692 (D.Me.1988); Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 299 Md. 697, 475 A.2d 448 (1984); Kelson v. Spin Publications, 16 Med.L.Rptr. 1130, 1988 WL 52192 (D.Md.1989); Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 620 F.Supp. 1066 (D.Md.1985); Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977); Montesano v. Las Vegas Review Journal, 99 Nev. 644, 668 P.2d 1081, 9 Med.L.Rptr. 2266 (1983); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1294, 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1986) (applying New Jersey law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (1977); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J.Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967); Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399 (1970); Gruschus v. Curtis, 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1965) (discussing New Mexico law); Ault v. Hustler, 13 Med.L.Rptr. 1657, 1986 WL 20896 (D.Or.1986); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981); Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F.Supp. 522 (D.S.C.1969); Montgomery Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806 (S.D.1979); International Union v. Garner, 601 F.Supp. 187 (M.D.Tenn.1985); Cordell v. Detective Pubs., Inc., 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir.1969) (discussing Tennessee law); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983); Miller v. Charleston Gazette, 9 Med.L.Rptr. 2540 (W.Va.Cir.Ct.1983); Harrison v. Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781 (D.C.Cir. 1978). See 57 A.L.R. 4th § 3[a], at 58-77; Recent Developments at 196-242. All of these courts "[e]ither specifically or as a matter of necessary implication ... recognized or upheld as cognizable in principle” a cause of action "either expressly designated or inherently sounding in false light.” 57 A.L.R. 4th § 3[a], at 58-59.

.Only a sharply divided North Carolina court has squarely declined to adopt the tort, in Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 121 (1984), and its conclusion has never previously been accepted in any other state.
Explicitly recognizing an existing tort for invasion of privacy, Missouri simply declined to decide whether this tort encompassed or existed separately from false light; either way, a false light action was not precluded. Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo.1986). One of Justice Gonzalez’s own sources concedes this question is unresolved in Missouri, see Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 364, 368-69 (1989), while another maintains that Missouri does recognize the false light action. See 57 A.L.R.4th § 3[a], at 65, and cases cited therein.
Similarly, Ohio has refrained from deciding whether or not the tort of invasion of privacy extends to false light actions. Yeager v. Local Union 20, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); but see Angelotta v. ABC, 820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.1987) (Ohio does not recognize a false light claim).
Neither New York nor Virginia declined to recognize the action; rather, both noted the existence of a statutory basis for the claim. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 434 N.E.2d 1319 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146, 103 S.Ct. 787, 74 L.Ed.2d 994 (1983); Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 521 F.Supp. 1204 (W.D.Va.1981) (noting the similarity to the New York statute).
In Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 216 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607, 610 (1981), the court concluded that "a cause of action was stated" based on pleadings complaining both of publicizing private information and placing the plaintiff in a false light. Other South Carolina cases also appear to recognize the validity of a false light tort. See 57 A.L.R. 4th § 3[a], at 67-68.

. See, e.g., Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy—Cognizability and Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22, § 3[a], at 68 (1987); Victor A. Kovner, et al., Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, in 2 Communications Law 1991, at 238 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 324, 1991) (hereinafter Recent Developments); see also Edgar & Sales §§ 53.05[1]-0.5[4], at 53-30 to 53-38.

. See, e.g., Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir.1987); Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 107 S.Ct. 1295, 94 L.Ed.2d 151 (1986); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107, 105 S.Ct. 783, 83 L.Ed.2d 777 (1985); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883, 105 S.Ct. 252, 83 L.Ed.2d 189 (1984); Brueggemeyer v. Associated Press, 609 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.1980); Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 472 F.Supp. 145 (N.D.Tex.1979).

. See Boyles v. Kerr, 806 S.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, writ granted); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Floyd v. Park Cities People Inc., 685 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, no writ); Nat'l Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enterprises, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).

. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989).

. The affirmative grant of rights in state constitutions often extends protections to individuals even absent state action. See, e.g., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 134 Cal.Rptr. 839, 842 (1976) (applying privacy guarantee in Cal. Const, art. I, § 1 to private university); Leach v. Drummond Medical Group, Inc., 144 Cal.App.3d 362, 192 Cal.Rptr. 650, 658 (1983) (applying California petition clause, Cal. Const, art. I, § 3, in dispute against private medical group); Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Ill.App.3d 616, 18 Ill.Dec. 89, 91-92, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244-45 (1978) (allowing sex discrimination claim against private firm under Ill-Const. art. I, § 17); Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); see also Christine M. Durham, Obligation or Power? The New Judicial Federalism and the Policy-Making Roles of State Supreme Courts, 2 Emerging Issues in State Const. L. 219, 229 (1989).

. Frequent reference is also made to the writing of Professor Zimmerman, who has been an outspoken critic of tort protection of privacy rights. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L.Rev. 291 (1983).

. Indeed, an article relied on to suggest that the two torts are identical clearly praises any such overlap while noting that "[t]he difference between the two torts is now well known.” John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right to Privacy, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 1093, 1094, 1120-22 (1962).

. The cases cited in support of this proposition do not criticize the false light tort, but rather apply exactly the type of restrictions that the concurrence implies to be lacking. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984); Berry v. NBC, Inc., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th cir.1973).

.These rules should not, however, be overly restrictive. As at least one observer has remarked, "the areas of conflict between the right of privacy and freedom of the press are quite limited.” Thomas I. Emerson, The Right to Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 329, 331 (1979).

. Professor Smolla further concludes that "[w]hen the plaintiff is a private figure and the speech does not involve any issue of public concern, ... no first amendment restrictions will apply, relegating ... protection solely to that available under applicable common law rules.” Id. at 467.

. For additional reasons supportive of such a standard, see Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 10.02[3][b], at 10-11 (1992).

. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).

.The claim that this result is necessary to safeguard the employment-at-will doctrine, 844 S.W.2d at 202, is also misplaced. Under this long-established doctrine, see East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99 (1888), Mendez could be dismissed for some reason or no reason. What is in question here is not the power to terminate but whether, once properly terminated, an employee can thereafter be blacklisted by deliberate falsehoods.

. Of the three Texas appellate opinions that have before applied this standard, two were not reviewed in this court, Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ), and the third was announced only after trial in this case. Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied). Mendez only followed the Fifth Circuit in assuming that Texas, based on existing law, would apply a negligence standard in false light actions brought by a private individual. Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1984). See also Edgar & Sales at § 53.05[3], at 53-36.