Court Opinion

ID: 9529087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:24.789878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:39.552487
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: Careful examination of the record in this case convinces me that the trial court was correct in finding defendant guilty and I would affirm the conviction. Since the majority has not seen fit to do likewise, I respectfully dissent. I believe, with the trial court — who had the benefit of firsthand observation, that the testimony of the victim was believable, was true, and was corroborated. Defendant made no objection to the competency of the child to testify. Both at the preliminary hearing and the trial, the child was extremely reluctant to relate what the defendant did to her. This reluctance is a direct and natural result of the shame and guilt she felt as a result of the incident. While the child’s teacher testified that the child did “say some pretty wild things” the teacher also said that she did not believe that the girl had ever told her a lie. In its finding of guilty the court stated that the testimony of the little girl was “quite definite and certain. Was not shaken on cross-examination.” This comports with the requirement of the law in cases of this nature which is that where the testimony of the prosecuting witness in a case of indecent liberties is clear and convincing it is sufficient to sustain a conviction although the testimony is not corroborated. People v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 2d 253, 161 N.E.2d 268. I ascribe no importance whatsoever to the fact that although the incident occurred on Thursday night the child did not tell anyone until Saturday night when she told her grandmother. The majority finds the two-day delay in complaining to her family entirely unreasonable. This finding is not only disagreeable to me, it is entirely at odds with the cases which have considered the matter of delay in reporting indecent liberties. The shame and embarrassment that came upon the victim as a result of the incident with defendant naturally preclude her wanting to discuss it with anyone. In People v. Padfield, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 307 N.E.2d 183, there was no complaint for approximately four months. The court stated that “The fact that the victim herein did not make a complaint until about four months after the incident is understandable. This is the type of offense which is embarrassing to the victim.” (16 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013.) In People v. Richardson the complaining witness, a seven-year-old daughter of defendant, made no complaint for one month. The Supreme Court found the lapse of time to be understandable because of the natural reluctance of the child to discuss the vile acts. It is worth noting that in the Richardson case the prosecuting witness on an occasion one year earlier had made a false accusation against defendant and her teacher, “story telling” similar to the case in question. In People v. Matthews, 17 Ill. 2d 502, 162 N.E.2d 381, conviction of a defendant for indecent liberties with a six-year-old child was sustained even though at trial the child pointed out a police officer as the perpetrator rather than the defendant. In People v. Halteman, 10 Ill. 2d 74, 139 N.E.2d 286, five days elapsed between the act and the child’s complaint. The fact that there were discrepancies in the child’s testimony at the preliminary hearing and the trial does not destroy her credibility. It is but one of the factors to be considered. Minor discrepancies in testimony taken at two different times do not destroy the credibility of the witness but only go to the weight of the testimony. People v. Strother, 53 Ill. 2d 95, 290 N.E.2d 201; People v. Lagios, 39 Ill. 2d 298, 235 N.E.2d 587. The majority states that “while there was testimony corroborating the child’s testimony that defendant was present in the trailer for some portion of the night in question, we find no evidence corroborating the child’s testimony of the alleged act.” Testimony of eyewitnesses to the alleged act is unnecessary — it is rarely available. Because of the reprehensible nature of the act, it is always committed in a place of privacy. Notwithstanding, I agree with the trial court that the testimony of the victim was corroborated, and soundly so. In People v. Walker, 13 Ill. 2d 334, 148 N.E.2d 748, it was held that corroborating evidence, facts and circumstances, when and where required in order to sustain a conviction, need not be as to the actual taking of indecent liberties. (Also see People v. Kirilenko, 1 Ill. 2d 90, 115 N.E.2d 297.) That corroboration consisted of the testimony of the girl’s mother and stepfather that defendant was in the residence where the child lived on the night in question. The trial court also felt that the physical appearance of the child on the Saturday evening following the Thursday night occurrence was corroboration. The majority states that it is improbable that the alleged actions complained of by the child might cause a persistent redness and irritation in the vaginal area. The physician who testified at the preliminary hearing stated that the irritation could have resulted from a wide variety of causes involving any sort of friction, The redness and irritation of the vaginal area could be readily explained by the emotional state of the victim following the incident. Her feeling of shame and guilt would cause her to attempt to “rub off” the contact made by defendant. It was such rubbing and scratching that drew her grandmother’s attention to the inflamed part in the first instance. In addition to this corroboration, there is another matter which corroborates the testimony of the child. The defendant had agreed to take a lie detector test. This was administered by an employee of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation at the State Crime Laboratory in DeSoto. Prior to the giving of the test the examiner gave the defendant the Miranda warnings and defendant thereafter proceeded to take the test. Following the test the defendant volunteered a statement to the examiner and a deputy sheriff of Perry County who had entered the room. At the trial the People attempted to offer defendant’s volunteered statement. The court sustained an objection made upon the ground that this statement was made outside the presence of defendant’s attorney. In my opinion the ruling was erroneous and the statement should have been admitted. It in no way concerned the result of the polygraph examination nor any questions or answers given thereat. Defendant had been given the Miranda warnings and understood his rights to keep silent. Nevertheless he volunteered the statement. The offer of proof made by the State indicated that the defendant’s statement to the examiner and the deputy sheriff was that he had just kissed the child on the face. In contradiction to this statement, the defendant testified at the trial that he had not even been at the child’s home on the evening in question and produced another witness who offered the same testimony. The volunteered statement of defendant is clearly an admission against his interest, made after receiving the Miranda warnings, and it should have been admitted into evidence and considered with the other testimony. Moreover, it constituted a square impeachment of defendant’s alibi testimony. I would affirm the judgment of guilty rendered by the trial court.