Court Opinion

ID: 9807713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:14:01.773242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:21.469106
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting.
I must confess my inability to appreciate the distinctions drawn by the Court. It is admitted that the plaintiff can recover for any damage done to his property, and it is difficult to imagine a much greater injury to a man’s home than rendering it uninhabitable. I can readily see that it is not practical to award damages to the entire community for injuries to health for two reasons, (1) the extreme difficulty of measuring such damages, and (2) because of the imminent danger of bankrupting the town. The latter is apparently the basic reason in Hughes v. City of Auburn, N.Y., 46 L.R. A., 636, the case relied upon, by this Court, and the only case cited tending to' sustain its opinion. Even that case, decided by a divided Court, gives as one of its reasons that the plaintiff’s intestate was not the owner of the property. In Allen v. Boston, 159 Mass., 324, 337; 38 Am. St. Rep., 423, the Court says: “The defendant also argues that the only damage the plaintiff can recover, if any, would be the injury to his property; and that injury to his health or business was wrongly allowed to be included in the damages. Such damages were specially alleged, and axe clearly recoverable.”
In the case at bar the damages are suffered by the owner of the property, are specially alleged and found, and can be easily and definitely computed, being the actual money paid out, and the value of his time lost on account of the negligence of the defendant. This is clearly stated in his Honor’s charge. The opinion of the Court also cites Dillon Mun. Corp., Sec. 983. That section is not the one that applies to the case at bar. In Section 980, which does apply, the learned author says: “For illustration, if a city neglects its ministerial duty to cause its sewers to be kept free from obstruc*99tions, to tbe injury of a person wbo bas an interest in tbe performance of that duty, it is liable, as we shall see, to an action for tbe damages thereby occasioned.” Tbe italics are those of tbe author. Tbe cases of McIlhenney v. Wilmington, 127 N. C., 146 (50 L. R. A., 470), relating to tbe misconduct of a policeman, and Peterson v. Wilmington, at this term, referring to the fire department, are equally devoid of application to tbe case at bar. In this case tbe injury was apparently caused by’the active negligence of tbe defendant’s officers and agents in diverting water by means of a ditch, and then permitting this ditch to be obstructed not only with sand, but with “dead cats, chickens, pigs, and other dead animals.” This seems to me gross negligence, which is clearly actionable. It is true the town authorities might be indicted either as at common law for maintaining a public nuisance, or for neglect of duty under The Code. State v. Hawkins, 77 N. C., 494; State v. Hatch, 116 N. C., 1003; State v. Dickson, 124 N. C., 871. But there are very few private citizens, and especially those dependent upon their daily labor, willing to undergo the trouble, expense and possible danger of antagonizing the governing body of a municipality. Moreover, such a course, while perhaps beneficial to the community, would not afford any personal compensation for the injuries received. As I see no error in the trial of the case, I must dissent from the opinion of the Court.