Court Opinion

ID: 9889582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 18:08:49.816909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:18.227462
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 In re Lilly R. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re LILLY R., A Person Coming                                B315074
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00722A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

                Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

FAIZAH S.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Dismissed.
      Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Faizah S., mother of infant Lilly R., appeals from the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order
declaring Lilly a dependent child of the court, removing her from
Faizah, and placing Lilly with her father, Pedro R., with
monitored visits by Faizah. The juvenile court sustained a
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360,
subdivision (c),1 assuming jurisdiction based on a previously
sustained petition under former section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
and proceeding to a new disposition hearing at which the court
issued the challenged orders.
       While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court held a
review hearing under section 364 and terminated its jurisdiction
with orders awarding Pedro sole custody of Lilly and requiring
Faizah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored. Faizah separately
appealed from these orders terminating jurisdiction and
determining custody and visitation (exit orders).2 This court

1     Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
2     “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has
been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4
authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation

                                 2
subsequently dismissed Faizah’s appeal from the exit orders after
her counsel filed a no-merit brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, and Faizah did not file a supplemental
brief raising issues for our consideration. (See In re Lilly R.,
(July 27, 2023), B322321.)
        Because we cannot provide Faizah any effective relief—that
is, relief that “can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
277)—we conclude her appeal is moot. In addition, we invited the
parties to file briefs addressing whether we should exercise our
discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal under In re
D.P. Neither party filed a response. Accordingly, we decline to
exercise our discretion to consider Faizah’s moot appeal on its
merits and dismiss.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Faizah and Pedro are Lilly’s parents. Lilly was born in
February 2021.
      Two days later the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral
reporting that, while at the hospital for Lilly’s birth, Faizah
tested positive for methamphetamine on two separate tests
administered 12 hours apart. Lilly’s toxicology screen was
negative, and she had no medical issues. Faizah admitted past

order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become
part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the
family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order.’” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.)

                                 3
use of methamphetamine but denied using any drugs during her
pregnancy.
       On February 17, 2021 the Department filed a petition on
Lilly’s behalf under former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), for
Faizah’s alleged substance abuse and Pedro’s alleged failure to
protect.3 The petition was subsequently amended to remove the
count pertaining to Pedro.
       On April 5, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the amended
petition and found Lilly to be a person described by former
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based upon Faizah’s substance
abuse. The count sustained by the court stated: “The child Lilly

3      Former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provided, in relevant
part, that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a
result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian
to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the
child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.” Effective
January 1, 2023, Senate Bill No. 1085 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1) amended section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
by enumerating the existing bases for dependency jurisdiction in
separate subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) through (D). The legislation
also added section 300, subdivision (b)(2), which now provides, “A
child shall not be found to be a person described by this
subdivision solely due to any of the following:
[¶] (A) Homelessness or the lack of an emergency shelter for the
family. [¶] (B) The failure of the child’s parent or alleged parent
to seek court orders for custody of the child. [¶] (C) Indigence or
other conditions of financial difficulty, including, but not limited
to, poverty, the inability to provide or obtain clothing, home or
property repair, or childcare.”

                                 4
R[.]’s mother, F[.]S[.] has a history of substance abuse including,
amphetamine and methamphetamine and is a current abuser of
methamphetamine and amphetamine, which renders the mother
incapable of providing regular care of the child. On 02/11/2021,
the mother had a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine.
The mother used methamphetamine and amphetamine during
the mother’s pregnancy of the child. The child is of such young
age requiring constant care and supervision and the mother’s
substance abuse interferes with the mother providing regular
care and supervision of the child. Such substance abuse by the
mother, endangers the child’s physical health and safety and
places the child at risk of serious physical harm and damage.”
       On April 21, 2021 the juvenile court held the disposition
hearing. The court found Lilly was a person described by former
section 300 and terminated its jurisdiction with an order for the
parents to participate in a period of Department supervision.4
The court terminated the case because it found no nexus between
concerns of Faizah’s drug use and Lilly’s safety. The court
ordered Lilly released to Faizah and Pedro under the supervision
of the Department. Both parents agreed to a voluntary family
maintenance services contract, in which Faizah agreed to
participate in drug testing, a substance abuse program, and
parenting and family preservation services.

4      Section 360, subdivision (b), provides that “[i]f the court
finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may,
without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court,
order that services be provided to keep the family together and
place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the
supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with
Section 301.”

                                 5
       In July 2021 the Department filed a section 360,
subdivision (c), petition.5 That petition alleged the disposition
had been ineffective because Faizah failed to submit to drug
testing on nine occasions from April to July 2021, and “failed to
consistently participate in a substance abuse program. The
mother and the child’s father . . . have failed to consistently
participate in Family Preservation causing Family Preservation
services to be terminated. Further, on 7/23/21 the mother and
father refused Family Preservation services. Remedial services
failed to resolve the family’s problems in [that] the parents have
failed to participate in services to address the mother’s substance
abuse. Such failure to comply with Juvenile Court ordered
services by the mother and the father endangers the child’s
physical safety and places the child at risk of serious physical
harm, damage and danger.”
       On September 10, 2021 the jurisdiction and disposition
hearings were held. The juvenile court took notice of the prior
sustained section 300 petition, court findings, and orders. The
court sustained the section 360, subdivision (c) petition and
declared Lilly a dependent of the court. The court further
ordered that Lilly remain in Pedro’s custody under the

5      Section 360, subdivision (c), provides that “[i]f the family
subsequently is unable or unwilling to cooperate with the services
being provided, the social worker may file a petition with the
juvenile court pursuant to Section 332 alleging that a previous
petition has been sustained and that disposition pursuant to
subdivision (b) has been ineffective in ameliorating the situation
requiring child welfare services. Upon hearing the petition, the
court shall order either that the petition shall be dismissed or
that a new disposition hearing shall be held pursuant to
subdivision (b).”

                                 6
Department’s supervision with monitored visits with Faizah,
ordered reunification services for Faizah, and ordered Faizah to
participate in drug treatment, parenting and individual
counseling, and drug testing. The court admonished Faizah that
she had failed to hold up her end of the bargain by complying
voluntarily with drug testing and the case plan.
       Three days later Faizah filed the present appeal seeking
review of the juvenile court’s September 2021 jurisdiction
findings and disposition order.
       While this appeal was pending, in July 2022 the juvenile
court held a review hearing under section 364, terminated
jurisdiction, awarded Pedro sole legal and physical custody of
Lilly, and ordered Faizah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored, with
no visit to occur if Faizah was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.6 Faizah separately appealed from these orders. (In re
Lilly R., supra, B322321.) In that appeal, Faizah’s counsel filed
an opening brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. stating there were
no arguable issues, and advising Faizah of her opportunity to
show that an arguable issue exists. Faizah did not file a
response. Because Faizah did not file a supplemental brief, this
court dismissed her appeal pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (See
In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096.) That
dismissal is now final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1).)
       This court invited the parties to submit letter briefs
addressing whether this appeal is moot and whether this court

6     We take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code
sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459 of the record in Faizah’s
appeal from the juvenile court’s July 2022 termination of
jurisdiction and exit orders. (In re Lilly R., supra, B322321.)

                                 7
should exercise its discretion to reach the merits. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Neither party filed a response.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     The Mootness Doctrine in Dependency Appeals
        “A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’”” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In dependency cases, the reviewing court
decides on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events
render a case moot and whether the court’s decision would affect
the outcome of a subsequent proceeding. (Ibid.) A dependency
case becomes moot when events “render[ ] it impossible for [a]
court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.” (Ibid.; see In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering whether
a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can
provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) To show
the reviewing court can provide effective relief, the appellant first
“must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome [the
appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P., at p. 276.)
       In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, the Supreme Court
explained that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’
[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from

                                 8
a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a
parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by
a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) Examples of non-moot
cases include those where a jurisdiction finding affected parental
custody rights, curtailed a parent’s contact with his or her child,
or resulted in disposition orders that continued to adversely
affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-278.) In re D.P. further noted that
“speculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid mootness. (Id.
at p. 278.) But “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal
or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,”
however, “the case is not moot, and merits review is required.”
(Id. at p. 283.)
       “When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is
moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits
nevertheless.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see id. at
p. 282 [reviewing court has “‘inherent discretion’” to reach the
merits of an appeal even where the case is moot].) A reviewing
court decides on a case-by-case basis whether to reach the merits
of a moot appeal. (Id. at p. 287.) Generally “when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination’” courts may appropriately consider the merits of a
moot appeal. (Id. at p. 282.)
       Dependency appeals are uniquely prone to mootness, and
often “[p]arents may appeal an order that is later changed, or
jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an appeal is

                                 9
finally resolved, as in this case.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285.) Accordingly, In re D.P. identified several additional
factors reviewing courts may consider when deciding whether
discretionary review is warranted. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First,
whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current
or future dependency proceedings (for example, by influencing a
child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency
petition or a juvenile court’s determination about whether to
order further reunification services). (Id. at p. 285.) Second,
“whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) The
“more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, a court may also consider “why the appeal became moot”:
“[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor discretionary review of cases
rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable
behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on
appeal.” (Ibid.)
       In deciding whether to exercise their discretion, reviewing
courts “should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection
for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as
well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-
being of the child.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; see
§ 300.2, subd. (a).)

B.     Faizah’s Appeal Is Moot
       As noted above, in this appeal Faizah challenges the
September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring
Lilly a dependent child of the court, removing Lilly from Faizah,

                                 10
and placing Lilly with Pedro, with monitored visits by Faizah.
But her appeal from those orders was rendered moot by the
subsequent July 2022 orders terminating jurisdiction and
awarding Pedro sole custody of Lilly. Although Faizah appealed
from the July 2022 exit orders, her appeal was dismissed under
In re Phoenix H. and that dismissal is now final. An exit order is
a final judgment and is not subject to collateral attack through an
appeal from a previous disposition order. (See § 302, subd. (d)
[“Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at
the time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction . . . shall be
a final judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction
is terminated.”]; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [where the juvenile court terminates its
jurisdiction and issues an exit order, “the exit order ‘shall be a
final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile
court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’”].)
       Because Faizah’s appeal from the exit orders was dismissed
and is now final, we do not have jurisdiction to review and change
them, and “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct
further hearings in the now-closed case.” (In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164; see In re Michelle M. (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [“where jurisdiction has been terminated
and is final . . . jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
appellate court”]; see also § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear proceedings regarding custody “until the time
that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.620(a) [same].) Accordingly, even if we
were to reverse the September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition
orders, that would have no effect on the July 2022 exit orders.

                                 11
      In short, because we cannot provide Faizah any effective
relief—that is, relief that “‘can have a practical, tangible impact
on the parties’ conduct or legal status’” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 277)—we conclude this appeal is moot.

C.     Discretionary Review of Faizah’s Moot Appeal Is Not
       Warranted
       Despite our request for additional briefing, Faizah did not
submit a response asking us to exercise our discretion to decide
this moot appeal on the merits. Additionally, Faizah’s appeal
does not present circumstances that generally warrant
discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood of a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material
question that remains for the court’s determination. (See In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
       Further, this is not a case rendered moot “by the prompt
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Rather, the juvenile court restricted
Faizah’s custody and visitation rights because she failed to
submit to drug testing and comply with court-ordered substance
abuse and parenting programs and counseling. Denying merits
review in this case would not “perversely incentivize
noncompliance” with a juvenile court’s orders. (Ibid.)
       Finally, the jurisdiction findings based on Faizah’s drug
use are not sufficiently “egregious” or “stigmatizing” conduct
warranting exercise of our discretion to reach the merits of this
moot case. While dependency jurisdiction by definition
necessarily involves conduct harmful to children, our assessment

                                 12
of severity or perniciousness is a relative analysis. We do not
find the jurisdiction findings against Faizah to be based on
particularly stigmatizing or pernicious conduct such that our
concerns over not insulating erroneous and stigmatizing
jurisdiction findings from review would prompt us to review the
merits in light of all other factors. Therefore, on balance the
factors the Supreme Court identified in In re D.P. do not warrant
discretionary review of Faizah’s moot appeal.
       We note that Faizah is not without a remedy. Under
section 302, subdivision (d), she may seek modification of the exit
orders if she can “demonstrate ‘there has been a significant
change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order
and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.’”
(In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)

                          DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.

      SEGAL, J.

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