Court Opinion

ID: 9881050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 16:06:07.263121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.147036
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 200917

                                          No. 1-20-0917

                                Opinion filed September 29, 2023.

                                                                                     First Division

_____________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                         FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Cook County.
                                                )
              v.                                )     No. 19 CR 7197
                                                )
DESHAWN WALLACE,                                )     The Honorable
                                                )     Ursula Walowski,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment and
       opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1     Following a bench trial, defendant Deshawn Wallace was found guilty of being an armed

habitual criminal, in that he possessed a firearm with two prior qualifying felonies, and he was

sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant appeals contending that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress because police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk and then

search defendant for weapons. Defendant also contends the State failed to establish the statutory

elements of the armed habitual criminal statute beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore requiring

reversal of his conviction. We affirm.
No. 1-20-0917

¶2                                    BACKGROUND

¶3     Defendant was arrested after police stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger and

ultimately found him in possession of a handgun for which he did not have a Firearm Owners

Identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)) or a Concealed Carry License

(430 ILCS 66/1 et. seq. (West 2018)), as required. See People v. McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st)

163053, ¶ 28. Defendant was charged with one count of being an armed habitual criminal, along

with other offenses.

¶4     Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the inventoried weapon alleging police

lacked probable cause to conduct a search. Defendant called Chicago Police Officer Edward

Zeman, whose direct testimony and cross-examination revealed that he and his partner, a fellow

Chicago police officer, were on patrol May 2, 2019, due to a conflict between two street gangs

that had resulted in several shootings. Around 11 p.m., they stopped a car that had no rear brake

light. Officer Zeman, dressed in plain clothes, approached the front passenger side, where

defendant was seated, while his partner approached the driver’s side. As Officer Zeman

approached, he smelled alcohol and fresh cannabis emanating from the vehicle’s interior, which

contained three people, including defendant. Officer Zeman noted that it smelled like alcohol and

asked if they had been drinking, to which the rear passenger responded, yes. Officer Zeman

stated, “it smells like Remy” (a type of alcohol), and the rear passenger said yes and laughed. He

then observed a bag of fresh cannabis inside between the front passenger seat and center console,

just next to defendant’s leg. Officer Zeman noted that it was illegal to have open alcohol inside

the car; the narcotics and alcohol gave him a basis to search the vehicle.

¶5     During the encounter, defendant would not make direct eye contact with Officer Zeman,

his breathing was heavy, as his chest was moving up and down, and he “took a big swallow,” all

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No. 1-20-0917

of which Officer Zeman found to be unusual. While defendant’s right hand was in his right lap

area, his left hand was moving by his left waist, near the center console towards the cannabis.

Officer Zeman then observed a “large bulge” in defendant’s front jacket pocket. That is, he could

see both the bulge and cannabis from his vantage point outside the vehicle.

¶6      Officer Zeman requested that defendant step out of the vehicle, but defendant did not

comply and appeared hesitant to exit the car. Defendant then asked why and offered that he

could simply give Officer Zeman his identification instead. Officer Zeman testified again that

defendant’s behavior was abnormal. He feared defendant might have a weapon, so he reached

into the car and performed a protective pat-down over the bulged area of defendant’s jacket

while defendant was still seated. Officer Zeman felt “a hard metal object consistent with a

handgun” and then recovered what was later revealed to be a loaded Bursa Thunder

semiautomatic handgun from defendant’s jacket pocket as Officer Zeman called over his partner.

His partner handcuffed defendant, and Officer Zeman searched the vehicle. Defendant admitted

that he did not have FOID card or Concealed Carry License. At the suppression hearing

defendant did not establish when he made this admission.

¶7      The vehicle’s driver was not arrested, although Officer Zeman believed she received a

ticket from his fellow officer. It was later revealed that the stop occurred at 3758 W. Chicago

Avenue, and police did indeed recover and inventory the cannabis, but not any alcohol. 1 When

Officer Zeman first approached the vehicle, the back window was down, but not the window by

defendant. Defendant also did not bend down under his seat or make any “furtive movements.”

Following this evidence, the defense rested.

        1
         This evidence was revealed at trial, where Officer Zeman briefly testified as a witness for the
defense. For the sake of readability, we have included it in the fact section involving the suppression
motion.

                                                     3
No. 1-20-0917

¶8     The State moved to admit Officer Zeman’s body worn camera (body cam), capturing the

traffic stop, and it was entered into evidence following a stipulation and played before the court.

Consistent with Officer Zeman’s testimony, the video shows him approaching the passenger-side

of the vehicle and affirms his interchange with the back right passenger, whose window was

almost half-way down. Officer Zeman queried, “You all just drinking?” to which the back right

passenger answered yes, while looking at Officer Zeman. When Officer Zeman further stated, “It

smells like Remy, right” that same passenger laughed, looked away, and said, “Yeah, exactly.”

The video also depicts Officer Zeman shining his flashlight and looking into both the rear

passenger seat and the front passenger seat. During this time, defendant gave a sideways glance

to Officer Zeman and then looked to his left and then straight forward.

¶9     The video further shows that as the driver exited the vehicle under the other officer’s

direction, Officer Zeman opened the front passenger door. Defendant continued to stare straight

forward and only made eye contact after Officer Zeman asked him to “hop out for me.”

Defendant hesitated. Instead of complying with the request, he looked down and then straight

forward while moving his left hand from the top of the center console down to the area,

apparently between his seat and the console, and he looked down toward that area a second time.

Defendant also took a visible gulp before turning to Officer Zeman and asking, “for what, you

want my ID?” Officer Zeman said no, that he asked defendant to step out because there was open

alcohol in the car, although he did not “care about the little bit of weed or whatever that you got

there, right.” Defendant looked down as Officer Zeman moved closer to defendant and

performed the protective pat down over defendant’s right jacket pocket (which showed a slight

bulge), unzipping the pocket, and recovering the handgun. Defendant remained seated with his

                                                 4
No. 1-20-0917

seatbelt on the entire time. Officer Zeman took the handgun and apparently unloaded it while his

partner handcuffed defendant, leading him to the police vehicle.

¶ 10   Defendant argued in closing that the police lacked probable cause to support the vehicle

stop and search of defendant. The defense noted the officer found the cannabis was of no

concern, and defendant had the right to question why he was being asked to exit the vehicle. The

defense argued, “[i]t was purely a stop to search anybody,” and there was no indication the

officer was in danger. The State countered that officers conducted a valid traffic stop for a

broken brake light, then smelled cannabis and alcohol emanating from the car, observed

defendant’s unusual behavior, as well as the bulge in his right pocket, all of which supported the

pat-down and search.

¶ 11   The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found Officer Zeman

testified credibly and consistently with the body cam video. The court found the traffic stop was

justified by the brake light violation and further found police had reasonable suspicion to

perform a protective pat-down of defendant while inside the vehicle given the visible bulge and

defendant’s actions. The court explained, “what I find is a significant point i[s] that when

[Officer Zeman] reached in[,] he went directly to that jacket pocket and patted it down[,] and he

explained the reason for that is because he saw the bulge there that corroborates the officer.”

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied.

¶ 12   At trial, the parties stipulated that if called, Officer Zeman would testify as at the

previous suppression hearing. They also stipulated to the body cam video and records revealing

that defendant did not possess a FOID card or a concealed carry license. Finally, the State

entered certified copies of conviction showing defendant previously had been convicted of armed

robbery (08 CR 12591) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (15 CR 5613), and the defense

                                                  5
No. 1-20-0917

stipulated that these were defendant’s convictions. The State rested, and the defense called

Officer Zeman, who added a few details about the traffic stop. The defense then rested.

¶ 13    At the trial’s conclusion, the court found defendant guilty of being an armed habitual

criminal (count 1), and the other counts were merged into count 1. 2 Defendant moved for a new

trial, arguing the court erred in denying the motion to suppress, but this was denied. The court

sentenced defendant to six years in prison for being an armed habitual criminal. This appeal

followed.

¶ 14                                            ANALYSIS

¶ 15    Defendant first challenges the denial of his suppression motion. When reviewing the trial

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily apply a two-part standard of

review. People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 33. We give great deference to the court’s factual

findings and will reverse them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while

we review de novo the court’s legal ruling on whether evidence should be suppressed. People v.

Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶¶ 22, 23. A reviewing court may consider all trial evidence in

determining whether the court’s decision denying a motion to suppress was correct. People v.

Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶¶ 35-36. To prevail at the trial level, the defendant bears the burden

of producing evidence and establishing a prima facie case that the search and seizure was

unreasonable before the burden then shifts to the State. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23; People v.

        2
          The report of proceedings shows that the trial court found defendant guilty on counts 1-6, and
merged all counts into count 1 (armed habitual criminal). However, the court noted prior to sentencing
that it had found defendant guilty of counts 1-4 and 6-7, which merged into count 1. The court stated it
found defendant not guilty of count 5. The half sheet shows the trial court found defendant guilty of
counts 1-4 and counts 6-7, with all counts merging into count 1. The mittimus shows the trial court found
defendant guilty of counts 1-4 and count 6, with all counts merging into count 1. We find the oral
pronouncement at sentencing controls, and therefore defendant was found guilty of counts 1-4 and 6-7.
See People v. Clark, 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 21.

                                                    6
No. 1-20-0917

Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23. Also, the ultimate burden always remains with the

defendant. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23.

¶ 16   Defendant does not challenge the initial stop of the vehicle in which he was a

passenger, as there was probable cause for the police to believe a traffic violation occurred. See

People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20. Rather, defendant contends that police lacked

reasonable suspicion to perform the subsequent protective pat-down of him. He maintains there

was no reason to believe he was armed and dangerous.

¶ 17   Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution protect every person

from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6.

Reasonableness under the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable

cause. People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 89 (2010); Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23.

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances, considered as a whole, are sufficient to

justify the belief by a reasonably cautious person that the defendant is or has been involved in a

crime. People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 472 (2009). Nonetheless, a police officer may detain a

person without having a warrant with probable cause to arrest. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st)

170753, ¶ 26. Specifically, a limited exception to the warrant requirement under Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), permits a police officer to briefly stop (and therefore necessarily seize)

a person for temporary questioning if he reasonably believes the person has committed, or is

about to commit, a crime. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 26. Notably, the usual traffic

stop is analogous to a Terry investigative stop. People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005).

¶ 18   In addition, it’s well established that following a lawful traffic stop, police can, as a

matter of course, order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle while completing the

stop without violating any fourth amendment protections. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415

                                                  7
No. 1-20-0917

(1997); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433 (2001). During the stop, officers may also

question the driver and passengers, provided the inquiries do not unnecessarily extend the

duration of the stop. People v. Sutton, 2020 IL App (1st) 181616, ¶ 21. An officer may then

subject a person to a limited search for weapons (“frisk”) only if he reasonably believes that

person is armed and dangerous. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433; 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2018).

This search is for the protection of the police officer and others in the vicinity, not to gather

evidence. Id. at 432. Whether the vehicle stop was valid is a separate inquiry from whether the

weapons frisk was valid. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433.

¶ 19   For the frisk, reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgment and

inferences about human behavior. People v. Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 31. Nervous,

evasive behavior or unusual conduct is a pertinent fact in determining reasonable suspicion, as is

the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area. Id. ¶¶ 25, 31. Moreover, a “bulge in a validly

stopped suspect’s clothing is a circumstance which is generally sufficient to warrant a frisk.”

People v. Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 18 (1991). In judging a police officer’s conduct, we

apply an objective standard, considering whether the facts available to the officer at the moment

of the seizure justify the action taken. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 29.

¶ 20   Here, the totality of the circumstances justified Officer Zeman’s limited search for

weapons from defendant. See Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 32; McMichaels, 2019 IL

App (1st) 163053, ¶¶ 22-23. First, Officer Zeman was justified in ordering the occupants out of

the vehicle while completing the stop, and moreover, had probable cause to search the vehicle

for alcohol given the smell emanating from inside and that the passenger essentially admitted

consuming alcohol therein. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415; Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433.

                                                   8
No. 1-20-0917

¶ 21   Second, defendant’s hesitation following this lawful request, combined with Officer

Zeman’s observations that defendant refused to make direct eye contact during the encounter,

exhibited heavy breathing, made a large gulp, and moved his left hand by the center consul and

his left waist, and significantly, had a large bulge in his front jacket pocket, presented Officer

Zeman with reasonable suspicion that defendant was presently armed and dangerous. See

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (finding a large bulge in the defendant’s

jacket pocket justified the protective pat down); McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st) 163053, ¶23;

Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶¶ 31-32. This was so much so that Officer Zeman reached

into the car to perform the protective pat-down over the bulged area as defendant was seated, and

Officer Zeman specifically testified that he feared defendant had a weapon. Cf. People v. Smith,

2015 IL App (1st) 131307, ¶ 36 (noting, the defendant’s furtive movement in the vehicle, alone,

was insufficient to support the vehicle search, where the officer failed offer specific and

articulable facts supporting he feared for his safety); People v. Surles, 2011 IL App (1st) 100068,

¶¶ 10, 40 (finding protective pat-down search unlawful where officers testified they do

“protective pat downs on basically everybody” and the defendant did not display conduct

creating fear or threat of violence).

¶ 22   Officer Zeman then felt a hard metal object consistent with a handgun, and on further

search, his suspicions were confirmed since defendant was indeed carrying a semiautomatic

handgun, admittedly without the appropriate licensure. In addition, it was late evening, officers

were patrolling the area due to a gang conflict resulting in several shootings, and Officer Zeman

testified that in his experience, defendant’s behavior was unusual. See Salgado, 2019 IL App

(1st) 171377, ¶ 25; cf. People v. Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d 576, 581-83 (2004) (finding the officer

had no reason to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, where the defendant was

                                                  9
No. 1-20-0917

compliant with the officer’s requests, it was not a high-crime area, the defendant only exhibited

some nervousness, and he could have placed his hand in his pocket for any number of innocent

reasons).

¶ 23   Again, “when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious

behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or

others, the officer may conduct a pat-down search to determine whether the person is in fact

carrying a weapon.” Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 432; Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 17.

Indeed, it’s well-recognized that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially

hazardous. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 131307, ¶ 24. Plus, we give due weight to the specific

reasonable inferences an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433. The trial court did just that, finding Officer Zeman credible and his

actions objectively reasonable based on the specific and articulable facts that defendant was

illegally armed. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411 (noting, the touchstone of a fourth amendment

analysis is always reasonableness); McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st) 163053, ¶ 22 (noting the

Terry standard). While any of these factors alone might not have been sufficient to justify the

search, together they were. The opposite conclusion is not warranted, and therefore, the trial

court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Davis, 352 Ill. App. 3d

at 579. Defendant did not fulfill his burden of producing evidence establishing that the search

and seizure were unreasonable. See Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23; Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st)

170753, ¶ 23.

¶ 24   In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s suggestion that the officers were

required to first determine if defendant was carrying a FOID card and Concealed Carry license

before conducting the protective pat-down, search for weapons, and detention pursuant to Terry.

                                                 10
No. 1-20-0917

In so arguing, defendant relies on two cases which have since been vacated and do not represent

authoritative law. See Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 33 (rejecting a similar argument).

He also relies on an Illinois dissent and inapposite cases from other jurisdictions. Thus, he has

not adequately supported his contention with binding or relevant authority, violating our supreme

court rules. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (requiring an appellant’s argument to

contain the contentions of the appellant and reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities

relied on, and noting points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief).

¶ 25   Notwithstanding that, the existence of a possible innocent explanation, like defendant’s

possession of the required gun licenses, did not negate reasonable suspicion in this case given the

totality of factors presented to the police. See supra, ¶¶ 21-23; McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st)

163053, ¶ 32; People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 39. Defendant’s hesitancy and

unusual behavior, together with his failure to volunteer that he had the requisite gun licensure,

inspired suspicion that defendant illegally possessed the gun. See McMichaels, 2019 IL App

(1st) 163053, ¶ 38; People v. Hood, 2019 IL App (1st) 162194, ¶ 71. Absolute certainty was not

required, and the frisk in this case was no more than necessary to secure officer safety given the

practical considerations of everyday life, as a dead or shot police officer cannot request licensure.

See Salgado, 2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶¶ 36; McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st) 163053, ¶¶ 34-

35 (noting, public policy demands that police must be safe in the performance of their duties).

¶ 26   Last, defendant did not offer evidence or argument about when the detention in this case

transformed into an arrest, or exactly when officers established that defendant lacked the

requisite licensure. See People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 46 (handcuffing does not

automatically transform a Terry stop into an illegal arrest); McMichaels, 2019 IL App (1st)

163053, ¶ 37. As a result, his claim that officers arrested him first without inquiring about the

                                                 11
No. 1-20-0917

gun licensure is not well-taken. As set forth, the burden of establishing an unreasonable search

and seizure remained with defendant.

¶ 27   Defendant also argues the body cam footage did not corroborate Officer Zeman’s

testimony that defendant was breathing heavily or in an unusual pattern. He maintains the body

cam footage established that defendant avoided making eye contact in part due to Officer Zeman

waving a flashlight in his face.

¶ 28   Having viewed the body cam video in full, we disagree. The video shows defendant

displaying nervous, evasive behavior that was very much at odds with the back passenger, who

made ready eye contact with Officer Zeman, notwithstanding that the flashlight was shown in his

face several times. This weakens defendant’s flashlight argument. We also note that the video

mostly shows defendant from a side view and the shoulder up, so would not capture heavy

breathing or every detail perceived by Officer Zeman. For example, there were periods when

defendant was obscured by the glare of the flashlight or Officer Zeman was not directly facing

him with his body worn camera. Notwithstanding that, the video does capture the visible gulp

defendant takes before further delaying his exit from the vehicle. Moreover, the trial court found

Officer Zeman credible, and that the video corroborated Officer Zeman’s testimony in significant

respects without contradicting it. We cannot say that determination is against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

¶ 29   For all these reasons, defendant’s fourth amendment claim fails.

¶ 30                           Armed Habitual Criminal

¶ 31   Defendant next contends he was improperly convicted of being an armed habitual

criminal because the State failed to establish a necessary predicate conviction. Defendant notes

the facts are not in dispute but only whether those facts satisfy the elements of the armed habitual

                                                12
No. 1-20-0917

criminal statute. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de

novo. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶¶ 14-15; People v. Allen, 322 Ill. App. 3d 724, 725

(2001). Section 24-1.7 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2018))

provides:

“(a) A person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he *** possesses ***

any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more times of any combination of the

following offenses:

(1) a forcible felony as defined in Section 2-8 of this Code;

(2) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon; aggravated unlawful use of a weapon; aggravated

discharge of a firearm; vehicular hijacking; aggravated vehicular hijacking; aggravated battery of

a child as described in Section 12-4.3 or subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05; intimidation;

aggravated intimidation; gunrunning; home invasion; or aggravated battery with a firearm as

described in Section 12-4.2 or subdivision (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), or (e)(4) of Section 12-3.05; or

(3) any violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act that is

punishable as a Class 3 felony or higher.” 3 Id. Being an armed habitual criminal is a Class X

felony. Id.

¶ 32    Here, defendant’s conviction for armed habitual criminal was based on the two prior

predicate offenses of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (case No. 15 CR 5613) and armed

robbery with a firearm (Case No. 08 CR 12591). Armed robbery with a firearm is a forcible

felony under the armed habitual criminal statute. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(1) (West 2018); 720

        3
          “ ‘Conviction’ means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon
a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of
competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.” 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 2018).

                                                   13
No. 1-20-0917

ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2018). 4 Defendant challenges only the State’s reliance on the armed robbery

offense. He argues that he was age 17 when he committed the armed robbery with a firearm, and

at present, any resultant guilty finding would be a juvenile adjudication, rather than a

“conviction.” See 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2018); People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 22;

see also People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 176 (2006) (noting, juvenile adjudications do not

constitute convictions). He therefore contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that his armed robbery offense was a predicate “conviction” under section 24-1.7 of the

armed habitual criminal statute. We disagree.

¶ 33    We look first to the plain language of section section 24-1.7, so as to give effect to the

legislature’s intent. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its

plain and ordinary meaning. People v. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 18. Where, as here, the

language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort to

further aids of statutory construction. Id. In addition, we will not read into the statute exceptions,

conditions, or limitations not expressed by the legislature. In re N.C., 2014 IL 116532, ¶ 50.

Section 24-1.7 provides that a defendant is guilty of being an armed habitual criminal “after

having been convicted” of several enumerated predicate felonies, including “a forcible felony as

defined in Section 2-8 of this Code.” 5 “Having been convicted” is a perfect passive participle

construction and used to emphasize that a first action (here, a conviction) has been completed

        4
           “ ‘Forcible felony’ means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery,
burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated
battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West
2018).
         5
           “Conviction” means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon
a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of
competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury. 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 2018).

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No. 1-20-0917

before the second action begins (being found an armed habitual criminal). See

www.thelatinlibrary.com/101/Participles.pdf. Grammatically, it is the equivalent of saying, “if

he/she was convicted.”

¶ 34   In addition, under subsection (a)(1) of the statute (“a forcible felony as defined in Section

2-8 of this Code”), the predicate offense still must constitute a crime when the defendant illegally

possesses the very firearm that triggers application of the armed habitual criminal statute. For

example, armed robbery was a forcible felony when defendant committed that crime in 2008,

and it remained a forcible felony when defendant committed the offense of being an armed

habitual criminal in 2019. See 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2018). As such, it could rightfully serve as

a qualifying predicate conviction underlying defendant’s present offense. Indeed, it is well

established that a defendant found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal is punished for the

new and separate crime of possessing a firearm, not for his prior acts or convictions. People v.

Bailey, 396 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463 (2009); People v. Leonard, 391 Ill. App 3d 926, 931 (2009).

The prior convictions serve only as elements of the new crime. Id.; see also People v. Davis, 408

Ill. App. 3d 747, 751 (2011) (noting, “a defendant’s prior crimes count as elements of a violation

of the armed habitual criminal statute”).

¶ 35   Here, it is beyond dispute that defendant committed the predicate offense of armed

robbery in 2008 at age 17, and the guilty finding for that offense resulted in a conviction in adult

criminal court (not juvenile court). Later, in 2014, the legislature amended the juvenile statute, so

that an armed robbery offense committed at age 17 would result in only a juvenile adjudication.

See Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 7. While defendant would like us to read that amendment into

the armed habitual criminal statute, we cannot. The amendment is not retroactive, and

defendant’s “invitation is one for the legislature, not this court.” People v. Irrelevant, 2021 IL

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No. 1-20-0917

App (4th) 200626, ¶ 37; 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2018); see also 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018). In

other words, no rule of construction authorizes this court to declare that the legislature did not

mean what the plain language of the statute imports, nor may we rewrite a statute to add

provisions or limitations the legislature did not include. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 28.

In view of the plain language of the armed habitual criminal statute and the fact that it references

past convictions for predicate offenses, we conclude that defendant was “convicted” of armed

robbery in 2008 (which remained a forcible felony in 2019), and this was sufficient to serve as a

predicate offense to being an armed habitual criminal. Accord Irrelevant, 2021 IL App (4th)

200626, ¶¶ 35-37; see also Fitzsimmons v. Norgle, 104 Ill. 2d 369, 372-73 (1984) (a juvenile

defendant subject to adult court may have a “conviction”).

¶ 36   In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Gray, 2021 IL

App (1st) 191086. In Gray, the court held that the defendant’s narcotics delivery offense,

committed when he was age 17 in 2002, could not serve as a predicate for being an armed

habitual criminal based on the plain language of subsection (a)(3) of the statute. See 720 ILCS

5/24-1.7(a)(3) (West 2018) (noting, a predicate offense is “any violation of the Illinois

Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act that is punishable as a Class 3 felony or

higher” (Emphasis added.)). Gray observed that the narcotics offense, if committed in 2016,

would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication and not a conviction due to the 2014 legislative

amendment to the juvenile statute. See Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 7. The court reasoned, “In

view of the changes to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, for most offenses age of the defendant

operates as an element of the offense.” Gray, 2021 IL App (1st) 191086, ¶ 15. Honing in on that,

plus the present tense language of subsection (a)(3), Gray held that the 2002 drug offense was

not a predicate offense, and the State failed to prove defendant guilty of being an armed habitual

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No. 1-20-0917

criminal. See also Dawson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 48 (holding armed robbery by a 17-

year-old was not a predicate offense for being an armed habitual criminal).

¶ 37   Gray is not controlling. We disagree with Gray that age operates as an element of the

armed habitual criminal offense. Not every prerequisite to a conviction constitutes an element to

an offense. Rather, there are two essential elements in all criminal offenses, (1) a voluntary act

(720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2018)) and (2) a mental state (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2018)). People v.

Taylor, 68 Ill. App. 3d 680, 684 (1979) (“Criminal liability, with the exception of so-called strict

liability crimes, is dependent upon the simultaneous occurrence of the defendant’s requisite

mental state and the criminal act”).

¶ 38   Under section 24-1.7 of the Code, an armed habitual criminal is a person who knowingly

possesses a firearm after already being convicted of two qualifying offenses. See id.; see also

720 ILCS 5/4-2 (West 2018) (defining possession as a voluntary act); People v. Ramirez, 2023

IL 128123, ¶ 22 (noting, “when a possessory offense does not prescribe a particular mental state

and is not an absolute liability offense, knowledge is the appropriate mental state”). Thus, the

elements of the offense include (1) knowing possession of a firearm and (2) the aforementioned

two past qualifying convictions. Age is simply not included in the “voluntary act,” and as such,

is not an element of the offense. 6 In fact, the statute does not contain any reference to age. Cf.

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95 (West Supp. 2021). Rather, “[a]ge *** is merely the factor which

authorizes the application of the juvenile system,” which is part of the unified circuit court. In re

Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204, 212-13 (1979). Whether a person is tried in juvenile or criminal court is a

matter of procedure. People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (1989). Thus, as the State notes,

       6
        Age also is not an element of a forcible felony. See 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2018).

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No. 1-20-0917

“defendant’s age does not change the fact that he was ‘convicted,’ nor does it change the fact that

armed robbery is a forcible felony.”

¶ 39   We also find defendant’s reliance on Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, misplaced. Stewart, while

addressing a similar issue involving predicate offenses committed by juveniles, dealt with an

entirely different statute, that involving Class X sentencing under the Unified Code of

Corrections:

“(b) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after

having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same

elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony was committed)

classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and those charges are separately brought

and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X

offender.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016).

¶ 40   Although the Class X sentencing statute similarly required at least two predicate offenses

before it could be utilized, that statute addresses a sentencing enhancement and not substantive

offenses. See Leonard, 391 Ill. App 3d at 932. The Class X sentencing statute “simply

prescribe[s] the circumstances under which a defendant found guilty of a specific crime may be

more severely punished because that defendant has a history of prior convictions,” but the

convictions are not elements of the most recent felony offense. People v. Dunnigan, 165 Ill. 2d

235, 242 (1995). The State has no burden to prove these convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 156 (1993). Plus, in evaluating the enhancement, the Class X

sentencing statute expressly calls for a reassessment of the prior conviction (using the language,

“an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now *** classified in Illinois”),

whereas the armed habitual criminal statute does not. Moreover, in Stewart, the supreme court

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found the Class X sentencing statutory language ambiguous and the matter resolved by

subsequent legislation, which added a subsection elucidating that the first qualifying offense for

Class X sentencing must have been committed when the person was 21 years of age or older.

The court found this legislation was intended to clarify the statute’s meaning. Stewart therefore

held that “defendant’s 2013 conviction for an offense committed when he was 17 years old was

not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing.” Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 41   As set forth, we do not find the statute in this case ambiguous, and even if we did, there is

no subsequent legislation resolving the matter in defendant’s favor. See People v. Dawson, 2022

IL App (1st) 190422, ¶ 23, appeal pending (discussing the legislative history of the armed

habitual criminal statute); see also In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 341 (2010) (noting, “where the

legislature has employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied

where excluded”).

¶ 42   We further note that Gray was issued on October 12, 2021. The supreme court issued

Stewart on October 20, 2022, and then granted the petition for leave to appeal in Gray a month

later, on November 30, 2022. See People v. Gray, No. 127815 (Nov. 30, 2022). To us, this

suggests that Stewart is not controlling in regards to the armed habitual criminal statute.

¶ 43   Last, we reject defendant’s contention that his defense counsel was constitutionally

ineffective. Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective “for stipulating that [he] had been

convicted of two qualifying felony offenses,” but his claim fails for several reasons. First, we

observe that defense counsel merely stipulated that defendant had been convicted of the two

prior offenses but did not stipulate they were “qualifying.” Second, to succeed on such an

ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must establish that counsel’s representation was

deficient and but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability the trial result would have

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No. 1-20-0917

been different. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. In this case, defendant cannot show

that counsel’s stipulation was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional

norms given the state of the law at the time of his February 26, 2020, trial. See id.; People v.

English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 34. At the time of defendant’s trial, “case law squarely supported the

principle that a conviction obtained when a criminal defendant was a minor could be used as a

qualifying predicate offense, and that a conviction is a conviction, regardless of the criminal

defendant’s age.” 7 See People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 191615, ¶ 30. Again, Gray was not

decided until 2021. We note that counsel is not incompetent for failing to accurately predict that

existing law will change. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 34. Defendant therefore has failed to

establish defense counsel’s deficiency, so his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.

¶ 44                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 45    For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 46    Affirmed.

        We note that People v. Miles, 2020 IL App (1st) 180736, which is the only case that could have
        7

conceivably supported defendant’s current argument, was decided on January 17, 2020, but rehearing was
denied on March 25, 2020, after defendant’s trial. Miles also addressed the Class X sentencing statute, not
the armed habitual criminal statute.

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