Court Opinion

ID: 9426969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:21.129838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.195142
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Disclaiming any attempt to do more than decide the narrow case before us, the Court reverses the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio based on repeated incantation of a single formula: “a performer’s entire act.” The holding today is summed up in one sentence:
“Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.” Ante, at 574-575;
I doubt that this formula provides a standard clear enough even for resolution of this case.1 In any event, I am not persuaded that the Court’s opinion is appropriately sensitive *580to the First Amendment values at stake, and I therefore dissent.
Although the Court would draw no distinction, ante, at 575, I do not view respondent’s action as comparable to unauthorized commercial broadcasts of sporting events, theatrical performances, and the like where the broadcaster keeps the profits. There is no suggestion here that respondent made any such use of the film. Instead, it simply reported on what petitioner concedes to be a newsworthy event, in a way hardly surprising for a television station— by means of film coverage. The report was part of an ordinary daily news program, consuming a total of 15 seconds. It is a routine example of the press’ fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system.
The Court’s holding that the station’s ordinary news report may give rise to substantial liability2 has disturbing implications, for the decision could lead to a degree of media self-censorship. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 150-154 (1959). Hereafter, whenever a television news editor is unsure whether certain film footage received from a camera crew might be held to portray an “entire act,”3 he may *581decline coverage — even of clearly newsworthy events — or confine the broadcast to watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture. The public is then the loser. This is hardly the kind of news reportage that the First Amendment is meant to foster. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 257-258 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270-272, 279 (1964).
In my view the First Amendment commands a different analytical starting point from the one selected by the Court. Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of the performer’s behavior — is this or is this not his entire act?— we should direct initial attention to the actions of the news media: what use did the station make of the film footage? When a film is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular news program, I would hold that the First Amendment protects the station from a “right of publicity” or “appropriation” suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or commercial exploitation.4
I emphasize that this is a “reappropriation” suit, rather than one of the other varieties of “right of privacy” tort suits identified by Dean Prosser in his classic article. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). In those other causes *582of action the competing interests are considerably different. The plaintiff generally seeks to avoid any sort of public exposure, and the existence of constitutional privilege is therefore less likely to turn on whether the publication occurred in a news broadcast or in some other fashion. In a suit like the one before us, however, the plaintiff does not complain about the fact of exposure to the public, but rather about its timing or manner. He welcomes some publicity, but seeks to retain control over means and manner as a way to maximize for himself the monetary benefits that flow from such publication. But having made the matter public — having chosen, in essence, to make it newsworthy — he cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, complain of routine news reportage. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 339-348, 351-352 (1974) (clarifying the different liability standards appropriate in defamation suits, depending on whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure).
Since the film clip here was undeniably treated as news and since there is no claim that the use was subterfuge, respondent’s actions were constitutionally privileged. I would affirm.

 Although the record is not explicit, it is unlikely that the “act” commenced abruptly with the explosion that launched petitioner on his way, ending with the landing in the net a few seconds later. One may assume that the actual firing was preceded by some fanfare, possibly stretching over several minutes, to heighten the audience’s anticipation: introduction of the performer, description of the uniqueness and danger, last-minute checking of the apparatus, and entry into the cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous commentary from the master of ceremonies. If this is found to be the ease on remand, then respondent could not be said to have appropriated the “entire act” in its 15-second newsclip— and the Court’s opinion then would afford no guidance for resolution of the case. Moreover, in future cases involving different performances, similar difficulties in determining just what constitutes the “entire act” are inevitable.

 At some points the Court seems to acknowledge that the reason for recognizing a cause of action asserting a “right of publicity” is to prevent unjust enrichment. See, e. g., ante, at 576. But the remainder of the opinion inconsistently accepts a measure of damages based not on the defendant’s enhanced profits but on harm to the plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant. See, e. g., ante, at 575 n. 12. Indeed, in this case there is no suggestion that respondent television station gained financially by showing petitioner’s flight (although it no doubt received its normal advertising revenue for the news program — revenue it would have received no matter which news items appeared). Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that petitioner can prove that his income was somehow reduced as a result of the broadcast, respondent will apparently have to compensate him for the difference.

 Such doubts are especially likely to arise when the editor receives film footage of an event at a local fair, a circus, a sports competition of limited *581duration (e. g., the winning effort in a ski-jump competition), or a dramatic production made up of short skits, to offer only a few examples.

 This case requires no detailed specification of the standards for identifying a subterfuge, since there is no claim here that respondent’s news use was anything but bona fide. Cf. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N. E. 2d 454, 455 (the standards suggested by the Supreme Court of Ohio, quoted ante, at 565). I would point out, however, that selling time during a news broadcast to advertisers in the customary fashion does not make for “commercial exploitation” in the sense intended here. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 806-807 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266 (1964).