Court Opinion

ID: 9486491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:49:45.773569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:45.050207
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the denial of rehearing in banc:
The imperfections of our “direct evidence” rule are plain to see. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 798 (D.C.Cir.1993) (Williams, J., concurring). But it represents our effort, most expressly stated in Seigert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 800-02 (D.C.Cir.1990), aff'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), to reconcile the extension of Bivens liability to constitutional torts based on motive, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), with the ’ Supreme Court’s determination in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), that qualified immunity should afford officials substantial protection not merely from ruinous financial liability, but also from the burdens of litigation, including the burdens of discovery. Id. at 814-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39.1 It was, of course, precisely because of the Court’s recognition that “questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment”, id. at 816, 102 S.Ct. at 2737, that it reformulated qualified immunity in Harlow to exclude subjective intent. There may well be better reconciliations than the “direct evidence” rule, ranging from officials’ full exposure to conventional discovery, to withdrawal of Bivens liability for constitutional torts involving subjective intent. Drawing the line depends, under the Supreme Court’s view of the Bivens remedy, on the trade-off between the benefits of assuring citizens compensation for *1526unconstitutional acts and the costs of exposing officials to many suits that, though ultimately meritless, can only be proven merits less after great expense in time, stress and money. Indeed, as Justice Harlan observed in Bivens itself, the “range of policy considerations” to be taken into account is “at least as broad as the range a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2010, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). As existing precedents and our status in the judicial hierarchy preclude us from adopting many of these solutions, it seems to me on balance preferable to continue with the imperfections of Seigert until the Supreme Court resolves the issue.

. Although our "direct evidence” rule is a variation on what is often referred to as a "heightened pleading” standard, in fact the "standard” normally has nothing to do with pleading, but simply allows summary judgment to be granted before the plaintiff has had as great an opportunity to subject defendant to discovery as is conventionally available. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir.1991); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1320-21 (D.C.Cir.1991) (relying on numerous attachments and affidavits); but cf. Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 76 (D.C.Cir.1991).