Court Opinion

ID: 9703092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:39:40.937145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.604546
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. While I agree with this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973), that flight alone does not constitute probable cause for a lawful arrest, in the instant case there is more than mere flight. Here, the police officer, who made his observations from about two car lengths away in broad daylight at 12:50 p.m., saw appellant stand on a public street corner, reach into his pocket and hand a small unknown and concealed object to another individual who then gave appellant an unknown amount of cash. Based upon the officer’s experience, he found this behavior to be consistent with the illicit sale of drugs. Acting on a reasonable suspicion that a drug transaction had just been completed, the uniformed police officer exited his marked vehicle to investigate, at which time appellant inexplicably ran away after looking in the officer’s direction. The officer then chased appellant, as was his lawful right, and seized him. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 370, 378 A.2d 835, 838 (1977) (there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a police officer from approaching a person on *458the streets-in order to make an inquiry) (citations omitted).1 The officer’s belief that appellant had conducted an illegal drug sale was confirmed when he searched appellant and found a brown paper bag in the right-hand pocket of his jacket containing sixteen vials of crack cocaine.
Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, which he finds to be reasonably trustworthy, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Rodrigues, 526 Pa. 268, 273, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991). Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. Commonwealth v. Norwood, 456 Pa. 330, 334, 319 A.2d 908, 910 (1974) (citations omitted). While a single surreptitious “commercial transaction” may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their “mere presence.” See *459Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (“deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate “consciousness of guilt”); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person fleeing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect’s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers’s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items).
The effect of the majority opinion seriously undermines the ability of law enforcement officers to battle the proliferation of illegal drugs by giving free reign to the furtive sale of drugs on our public streets. A suspicious transaction, which includes the exchange of money for unknown items (such items being consistent and similar in size and configuration to items used in the illicit sale of drugs and exchanged in a manner not consistent with a normal commercial transaction), can give rise to reasonable suspicion as to allow an officer to inquire and investigate. Under a totality of those circumstances, this type of suspicious transaction combined with the seller’s flight upon the sight of a uniformed officer in broad daylight, clearly gives rise to probable cause to seize the individual.
Accordingly, because I believe that under the facts and circumstances of this case a prudent police officer could reasonably believe that a criminal drug offense had been committed, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.

. An officer's mere pursuit of a fleeing suspect does not give rise to a Constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). In the instant matter, the majority, in footnote 2, erroneously characterizes the United States Supreme Court’s holding in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), as being that "contraband disposed of or abandoned in the course of an unjustified pursuit by police is not the fruit of illegal police conduct and is not a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment requiring suppression of evidence obtained.” (Emphasis added). This characterization, set forth in dicta, improperly suggests that the Court in Hodari D. found that the pursuit by the police was unlawful. However, at no time did the majority address or characterize the pursuit by the police. Rather, the sole issue addressed by the Hodari D. Court was the limited issue of whether a fleeing juvenile was seized under the Fourth Amendment where, despite a police officer’s show of authority attempting to make the juvenile stop, the juvenile failed to halt. The Court held that unless a person is physically seized or actually submits to a show of police authority, there is no seizure. In the case below, the majority’s characterization of the pursuit in Hodari D. as "unjustified” is actually drawn from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, 499 U.S. at 630, 111 S.Ct. at 1552, and is irrelevant to this case.