Court Opinion

ID: 9916759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:02:38.416654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:58.983487
License: Public Domain

IN THE

    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

                          STATE OF ARIZONA,
                              Appellee,

                                  v.

                  JOSE ADRIAN AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ,
                             Appellant.

                         No. CR-23-0053-PR
                        Filed January 10, 2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
                The Honorable Roger A. Nelson, Judge
                       No. S1400CR201900622

                            REMANDED

             Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
                       254 Ariz. 452 (App. 2023)

                         VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL:

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alexander W. Samuels
(argued), Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy
Solicitor General, Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Joshua C. Smith,
Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Dori L. Zavala, Zavala Law Offices, LLC, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Jose
Adrian Agundez-Martinez
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

Gary Kula, Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld, Zachary
Stern, Deputy Public Defenders, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office

Molly Brizgys (argued), Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman, PC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Nicholas Klingerman,
Quinton S. Gregory, Deputy County Attorneys, Attorneys for Amicus
Curiae Maricopa County Attorney’s Office

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in
which JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, KING and
BERCH (RETIRED) joined. *  JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored a
separate opinion.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court:

¶1            Since 1931, we have held that the state may prosecute adults
for criminal offenses they committed as juveniles. See Burrows v. State, 38
Ariz. 99, 111 (1931), vacated on other grounds by State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz.
279, 282 (1958); McBeth v. Rose, 111 Ariz. 399, 403 (1975). In 1996, voters
passed Proposition 102, known as the “Juvenile Justice Initiative.” As
relevant here, Proposition 102 amended our constitution by (1) removing
the superior court’s exclusive authority over juveniles who engage in
unlawful conduct and instead empowering the legislature and the people
to “enact substantive and procedural laws” concerning such juveniles; (2)
requiring the state to prosecute as adults all juveniles fifteen years of age or
older who commit violent felony offenses or who are chronic felony
offenders; and (3) directing that every juvenile convicted of a crime as an
adult or held responsible for unlawful conduct as a juvenile make prompt

*
  Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel has recused himself from this case.
Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Justice Rebecca
White Berch (Ret.) of the Arizona Supreme Court was designated to sit in
this matter.

                                       2
                    STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                         Opinion of the Court

restitution to any victims for injury or loss. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 22;
State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 214 ¶ 100 (2004). The following year, the
legislature enacted laws implementing Proposition 102. See 1997 Ariz.
Sess. Laws ch. 220 (1st Reg. Sess.).

¶2           The issue before us is whether the legislation implementing
Proposition 102 now prohibits the state from prosecuting adults for crimes
committed when they were juveniles. We conclude it does not.

                             BACKGROUND

¶3            Jose Agundez-Martinez sexually assaulted and abused three
young children on separate occasions from 2006 through 2008 when he was
between the ages of ten and twelve years. The State learned of these acts
after Agundez-Martinez’s eighteenth birthday. A grand jury indicted
Agundez-Martinez, who was then twenty-three years old, with two counts
of sexual conduct with a minor and three counts of child molestation.
(One of the latter charges was later amended to attempted child
molestation.) The State alleged that the offenses were dangerous crimes
against children (“DCAC”), which statutorily triggered mandatory,
enhanced sentences if the trier-of-fact found Agundez-Martinez guilty.
See A.R.S. § 13-705.

¶4             Agundez-Martinez moved to dismiss the indictment for lack
of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. He argued the juvenile court
possessed exclusive jurisdiction over him for felony acts he committed as a
juvenile unless, after a hearing, the court transferred jurisdiction to the
criminal division of the superior court. See A.R.S. § 8-327(A)–(B). And
because the juvenile court lost jurisdiction when Agundez-Martinez turned
eighteen, he argued it could no longer hold that hearing and transfer
jurisdiction, thereby depriving the superior court of its only mechanism for
obtaining jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning
that once Agundez-Martinez reached adulthood, the prosecutor had
discretion whether to file charges in adult court, and because Agundez-
Martinez was in fact an adult, the court possessed jurisdiction over the
prosecution.

¶5            A jury subsequently convicted Agundez-Martinez on all
counts. Pursuant to the mandatory sentencing scheme for DCAC offenses,
the court sentenced Agundez-Martinez to consecutive, mitigated prison
terms on all counts, which totaled fifty-one years.

                                     3
                    STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                         Opinion of the Court

¶6           The court of appeals vacated Agundez-Martinez’s
convictions and sentences and ordered his release.                  State v.
Agundez-Martinez, 254 Ariz. 452, 454 ¶ 1 (App. 2023). It reasoned that the
statutes implementing Proposition 102 provide that unlawful conduct
committed by a juvenile younger than fourteen years is only a delinquent
act and not a criminal offense. See id. at 458 ¶ 25. And “[b]ecause
delinquent acts may only be prosecuted in juvenile court or transferred to
adult criminal court via A.R.S. § 8-327,” the court concluded that “the State
cannot prosecute Agundez-Martinez for these offenses now that he has
reached adulthood.” See id. at 458–59 ¶ 26.

¶7             To avoid unnecessary delay if this Court disagreed with its
analysis, the court of appeals also addressed Agundez-Martinez’s Eighth
Amendment challenges to his sentences. See id. at 454 ¶ 2. First, it
concluded that sentencing a defendant as an adult for offenses committed
as a preadolescent juvenile only because he was an adult at the time of
prosecution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 464
¶¶ 56–57.      The court therefore held that if this Court affirms
Agundez-Martinez’s convictions, his sentences should be vacated and the
matter remanded to the superior court to determine whether another,
legitimate reason exists to punish Agundez-Martinez as an adult. Id. ¶ 57.
If not, the superior court must order his release. Id.

¶8              Second, the court of appeals found that sentencing
Agundez-Martinez to fifty-one years in prison as required by the DCAC
sentencing statute (§ 13-705) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
See id. at 465 ¶ 62. The court therefore held that if the superior court finds
Agundez-Martinez eligible for a criminal sentence, his convictions should
be modified to be non-dangerous, non-DCAC offenses, and the superior
court should then resentence him. See id. at 466 ¶ 66.

¶9             The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals’
primary holding that Agundez-Martinez’s convictions and sentences must
be vacated because he only committed delinquent acts and the State
therefore lacked statutory authority to prosecute him as an adult. We
accepted review because the petition raises important issues of statewide
interest that are likely to recur. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6,
section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

                                      4
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

¶10            We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State
v. Patel, 251 Ariz. 131, 134 ¶ 10 (2021). In doing so, we apply the plain text
of the provision if it is unambiguous. See Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co.,
255 Ariz. 409, 411 ¶ 8 (2023). If it is ambiguous, we interpret the text using
secondary interpretive principles, like examining the provision’s “subject
matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit
and purpose.” See id. (quoting Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v.
Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, 325 ¶ 11 (2014)).

A. Before Proposition 102, The State Was Authorized To Prosecute
Adults For Crimes They Committed When They Were Juveniles.

¶11           Before December 6, 1996, Proposition 102’s effective date, the
superior court possessed exclusive jurisdiction to hold children accountable
for committing unlawful acts. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15 (1996); A.R.S.
§ 8-202(A) (1994). Pursuant to that authority, the juvenile court could
adjudicate a juvenile delinquent or, after conducting a transfer hearing,
waive its jurisdiction and transfer the juvenile for criminal prosecution as
an adult. See State v. Marks, 186 Ariz. 139, 142 (App. 1996); Ariz. R. Juv. P.
13–14 (1996); see also A.R.S. § 8-201(21) (defining “juvenile court” as a
division of the superior court). Although the juvenile statutes were
amended through the years, the superior court’s exclusive jurisdiction over
juvenile crime—either in the superior court generally or its juvenile
division—remained constant from statehood until December 6, 1996.
Compare Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 6 (1910), with Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15 (1996).

¶12           This Court has twice addressed whether the pre-1996 juvenile
jurisdiction provisions permitted the state to prosecute adults for crimes
committed when they were juveniles. In Burrows, the state charged a
nineteen-year-old man with a murder committed when he was a juvenile.
38 Ariz. at 101, 106. At issue was whether he could be prosecuted, tried,
and sentenced as an adult. Id. at 106–07. The Court concluded that
Arizona’s juvenile laws affect “the treatment and not the capacity of the
offender.” Id. at 110. Thus, it found that these laws did not establish an
age below which a juvenile could never be held accountable as an adult for
criminal conduct. See id. at 111. Instead, they “provide[d] a special
method of treatment for minors under the age of eighteen who have
violated the criminal law, and, even with such children, [left] the
application of the juvenile or criminal code to the discretion of the trial

                                      5
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

court.” Id.; see also Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148, 151 (1985) (citing
Burrows in identifying the juvenile code’s purpose).         Because the
defendant was an adult when charged, the Court determined that the
juvenile laws did not apply, and the state properly prosecuted him under
the adult criminal code. See Burrows, 38 Ariz. at 111.

¶13           More than forty years after Burrows, this Court addressed the
same issue in a different procedural context.                  In McBeth,
seventeen-year-old defendants in three consolidated cases were referred to
the juvenile court for committing unlawful acts. 111 Ariz. at 400. In two
cases, the juveniles turned eighteen before a delinquency adjudication
hearing commenced, and the state successfully moved to dismiss the
proceedings. See id. In the third case, the state successfully moved to
dismiss the juvenile petition at an adjudication hearing held one week
before the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday. See id. In each case, the state
later charged the defendant in superior court with criminal offenses. See
id.

¶14            The McBeth Court concluded that the state could prosecute
the defendants as adults even after the juvenile court had assumed
jurisdiction but did not transfer the cases to adult court. See id. at 403.
The Court relied substantially on Burrows. See id. at 402. It stated that
under Burrows, “a juvenile could commit a crime, and his age made it no
less a crime,” although the law provided special methods for dealing with
juveniles.    Id.   Importantly, however, “[t]his age factor was to be
determined as of the time of prosecution. If the age factor was not present
at the time of prosecution the accused was to be tried as an adult.” Id.

¶15           The Court was not persuaded to reach a different conclusion
than it did in Burrows simply because the juvenile court initially assumed
jurisdiction. See id. As to the two defendants who turned eighteen before
an adjudication hearing, the Court reasoned that when an offender is no
longer younger than eighteen years and had not yet been adjudicated
delinquent, “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to try him.” See id. As
for the third defendant who could have been adjudicated delinquent or
transferred to the adult court before her eighteenth birthday, the Court
concluded that once the juvenile court dismissed the petition, nothing was
left pending to be transferred, and the state was free to file criminal charges
after the defendant’s eighteenth birthday. See id. at 402–03.

                                      6
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

¶16           In sum, if the issue here had been raised before December 6,
1996, Burrows and McBeth would direct us to conclude that
Agundez-Martinez could be legally prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced
for crimes he committed as a juvenile. See also Marks, 186 Ariz. at 142
(“[T]he juvenile court’s ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ over juvenile
matters does not deprive the superior court at large of subject matter
jurisdiction over a felony committed by a juvenile.”). We must decide
whether the adoption of legislation implementing Proposition 102 changes
the analysis and outcome directed by Burrows and McBeth.

B. After Proposition 102, The State Remains Authorized To Prosecute
Adults For Crimes They Committed When They Were Juveniles.

¶17            Proposition 102 sought to make juveniles more accountable
for their unlawful conduct. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 22 (stating that
the initiative’s primary provision serves “to preserve and protect the right
of the people to justice and public safety, and to ensure fairness and
accountability when juveniles engage in unlawful conduct”); Davolt, 207
Ariz. at 214 ¶ 100 (observing that “[t]he stated intent of Proposition 102 was
to make possible more effective and more severe responses to juvenile
crime”). It did so in several ways, three of which are relevant here.

¶18           First, Proposition 102 divested the superior court of exclusive
original jurisdiction over juvenile matters, meaning it could no longer
manage a juvenile offender as it deemed best under the circumstances.
Instead, the proposition provided that the court’s jurisdiction and authority
in juvenile proceedings “shall be as provided by the legislature or the
people by initiative or referendum.” See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15; see also
Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 22 (authorizing “the legislature, or the people by
initiative or referendum,” to “enact substantive and procedural laws
regarding all proceedings and matters affecting [juveniles who engage in
unlawful conduct]”).

¶19            Second, Proposition 102 required the state to prosecute as
adults all juveniles fifteen years or older who are accused of violent felony
offenses or fall within the statutory definition of “chronic felony offenders.”
See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 22(1). Correspondingly, the proposition
prohibited county attorneys from deferring the prosecution of those
juveniles to resolve matters through community-based alternatives. See
id. § 22(2). Also, it required county attorneys to prosecute “[a]ll other
juveniles accused of unlawful conduct . . . as provided by law.” Id. § 22(1).

                                       7
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

In short, Proposition 102 required the state to prosecute the most serious
juvenile offenders as adults, subjecting them to the same sentencing
consequences, and required that other juvenile offenders be prosecuted as
provided by the legislature or the people.

¶20            Third, Proposition 102 provided that every juvenile convicted
of a crime as an adult or held responsible for unlawful conduct as a juvenile
must make prompt restitution to any victims for injury or loss. See id.

¶21            Proposition 102 itself did not prohibit the state from
prosecuting adults for crimes they committed as juveniles, and
Agundez-Martinez does not contend that it did. Instead, he argues that
the court of appeals correctly interpreted statutes enacted to implement
Proposition 102 as prohibiting such prosecutions by decriminalizing
offenses if committed when the offenders were younger than fourteen years
of age. See Agundez-Martinez, 254 Ariz. at 458 ¶ 25. We therefore turn to
that court’s statutory analysis.

¶22            The court of appeals grounded its decision on the interplay
among A.R.S. §§ 13-501(A)–(B), 8-201(12), and 8-202(I). See id. at 457–58
¶¶ 21–25. Section 13-501(A) mimics Proposition 102 by requiring a county
attorney to prosecute as an adult any juvenile who was fifteen years of age
or older at the time of the offense if the juvenile committed a violent felony
offense or was a chronic felony offender. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2,
§ 22(1). The substance of § 13-501(B) was not addressed by Proposition
102 but authorized by it. See id. § 22. Subsection (B) provides that
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection A of this section, the county attorney
may bring a criminal prosecution against a juvenile in the same manner as
an adult if the juvenile is at least fourteen years of age at the time the alleged
offense is committed” and is either a chronic felony offender or is accused
of committing at least one listed felony offense. § 13-501(B) (emphasis
added). If neither § 13-501(A) nor (B) applies to a juvenile offender, and
unless the juvenile has a historical prior felony conviction in adult court, see
§ 13-501(C), the state is limited to initiating delinquency proceedings in
juvenile court. See A.R.S. §§ 8-202; 8-301(2); 8-302.

¶23           When the legislature enacted § 13-501(A) and (B), it also
amended § 8-201 and § 8-202 to account for those provisions. See 1997
Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 220, § 1, § 4 (1st Reg. Sess.) (implementing S.B. 1446;
Juvenile Justice—Implement Proposition 102). Section 8-201(12) now
defines “delinquent act,” in relevant part, as:
                                        8
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

       [A]n act by a juvenile that if committed by an adult would be
       a criminal offense . . . . Delinquent act does not include an
       offense under § 13-501, subsection A or B if the offense is filed
       in adult court. Any juvenile who is prosecuted as an adult or
       who is remanded for prosecution as an adult shall not be
       adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile for the same offense.

Section 8-202(I) addresses prosecuting juveniles as adults and provides:

       Persons who are under eighteen years of age shall be
       prosecuted in the same manner as adults if either:

       1. The juvenile court transfers jurisdiction pursuant to
       § 8-327.

       2. The juvenile is charged as an adult with an offense listed
       in § 13-501.

¶24            The court of appeals reasoned that because § 8-201(12)
“explicitly excepted from the definition of ‘delinquent act’ offenses under
A.R.S. § 13-501(A) and (B),” and the legislature did not provide that other
juvenile offenses constitute criminal offenses if filed in adult criminal court,
all juvenile offenses not listed in § 13-501(A) and (B) can only be
“delinquent acts” and not criminal offenses. See Agundez-Martinez, 254
Ariz. at 458 ¶¶ 22, 25. Because neither § 13-501(A) nor (B) addresses
unlawful acts committed by juveniles younger than fourteen years of age at
the time of the offense, the court concluded that such acts are “by
definition” delinquent acts and not criminal offenses. See id. ¶ 25. Under
§ 8-202(I), delinquent acts can only be prosecuted in the juvenile court or
transferred to adult court under § 8-327. See id. The court therefore held
that the State was not authorized to prosecute Agundez-Martinez because
he could only be accused of committing delinquent acts, and the juvenile
court no longer possessed jurisdiction to transfer his case to adult court.
See id. ¶ 26; see also A.R.S. § 8-246(A) (providing that the juvenile court
generally loses jurisdiction when a defendant reaches adulthood).

¶25           We disagree with the court of appeals’ interpretation of
§ 8-201(12) as decriminalizing unlawful acts when committed by an
offender younger than fourteen years of age at the time of the act.
Section 8-201(12) defines “delinquent act” as an act that if committed by an
adult would be a criminal offense. That definition is essentially unaltered
                                       9
                      STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                           Opinion of the Court

since before this Court decided Burrows and McBeth. See Gammons, 144
Ariz. at 149 & n.3. Yet nothing in § 8-201(12) suggests that, contrary to
those decisions, the legislature has established an age below which a
juvenile can never commit a criminal offense. See Burrows, 38 Ariz. at 111;
McBeth, 111 Ariz. at 402.

¶26            Section 8-201(12)’s exclusion of some offenses from the
definition of “delinquent act” does not establish that offenses committed by
juveniles under fourteen years of age are not criminal offenses. Contrary
to the court of appeals’ interpretation, § 8-201(12) does not “explicitly
except[]” all offenses listed in § 13-501(A) and (B) from the definition of
“delinquent act,” thereby arguably implying that all other unlawful acts
committed by juveniles are not criminal offenses. See Agundez-Martinez,
254 Ariz. at 458 ¶¶ 22, 25. It excludes only those listed offenses that are
“filed in adult court” against “juveniles.” § 8-201(12); see also § 8-201(4)
(defining “adult court” in relevant part as the criminal division of the
superior court). The exclusion thus focuses on where proceedings are
initiated at the time the accused is a juvenile rather than on the nature of
the act.

¶27            Section 8-201(12)’s exclusion language is not, as the court of
appeals suggests, rendered superfluous by continuing to follow Burrows
and McBeth. See Agundez-Martinez, 254 Ariz. at 458 ¶ 22. That language
clarifies that charges filed against juveniles in adult court do not concern
“delinquent acts” and are thus outside the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
the juvenile code’s application. See, e.g., § 8-201(11) (limiting delinquency
hearings in juvenile court to adjudicating whether a juvenile committed a
“delinquent act”); § 8-321(A) (authorizing prosecutors to divert the
prosecution of a juvenile accused of committing certain “delinquent
act[s]”); Ariz. Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-304(A), (B)(1)(a) (authorizing the
juvenile court to commit juveniles adjudicated as committing a “delinquent
act” to the custody of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections).
Likewise, the exclusion removes any doubt that a juvenile convicted in
adult court is not convicted of a “delinquent act” and therefore must
generally be treated as an adult. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-501(F) (providing that
a juvenile convicted in adult court of a criminal offense must be sentenced
as an adult); see also Ariz. Const. art. 22, § 16 (“It shall be unlawful to confine
any minor under the age of eighteen years, accused or convicted of crime,
in the same section of any jail or prison in which adult prisoners are
confined.”).

                                        10
                    STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                         Opinion of the Court

¶28            But § 8-201(12)’s exclusion does not alter its definition of
“delinquent act,” which establishes that juvenile offenses are substantively
the same as criminal offenses. See Burrows, 38 Ariz. at 111; McBeth, 111
Ariz. at 402. Whether the offender is held accountable as a juvenile or as
an adult depends entirely on the offender’s status at the time proceedings
are initiated and not on the nature of the act. See Burrows, 38 Ariz. at 111.
Other panels of the court of appeals have agreed with our interpretation in
opinions issued after Proposition 102’s enactment. See State v. Malvern,
192 Ariz. 154, 156 ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (“The distinction between a delinquent
act and a felony or misdemeanor, therefore, is not the nature of the act but,
rather, the status of the perpetrator. Although a juvenile’s acts may be
characterized as ‘delinquent acts’ rather than crimes for the purposes of
rehabilitation and punishment, the acts are, nonetheless, criminal in
nature.”); In re Cameron T., 190 Ariz. 456, 462 (App. 1997) (“[A]s was true
before Prop[osition] 102 was adopted, no statute or constitutional provision
precludes adult prosecution of a juvenile who is no longer under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”).

¶29            Other factors persuade us that post-Proposition 102
legislation did not change the state’s ability to prosecute adults for crimes
committed when they were juveniles, even if they were under fourteen
years of age. First, statutes concerning juveniles often use terminology
associated with crimes, thus bolstering our conclusion that juvenile offenses
are criminal offenses. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 8-249(C) (directing when a person
may file for the restoration of the right to possess or carry a firearm if
adjudicated delinquent for various “felony offense[s]”); § 13-501(C) (stating
that a juvenile must be tried as an adult if accused of committing a “criminal
offense” and has a prior felony conviction); § 13-2503(B) (classifying escape
from a juvenile secure care facility as a “class 5 felony”).

¶30            Second, by authorizing the juvenile court to transfer
delinquency proceedings to adult court pursuant to § 8-327, even those
involving persons younger than fourteen years, the legislature evidenced
its view that juvenile offenses are also criminal offenses. It would be
illogical to conclude that the legislature did not intend to hold persons
accountable for those same offenses if they fortuitously reached adulthood
before those offenses were discovered and could be transferred by the
juvenile court.

¶31        Third, the legislature’s amendments to the adult criminal
code did not prohibit the state from prosecuting an adult for crimes
                                     11
                     STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                          Opinion of the Court

committed as a juvenile younger than fourteen years. Section 13-501(A)
and (B) apply only to a person who is a “juvenile” at the time a listed offense
is committed and who is a “juvenile” when “accused” of that offense. All
other subsections of that statute plainly apply to juveniles, not adults. If
the legislature had intended to prohibit prosecuting adults for crimes
committed when they were younger than fourteen years, as the court of
appeals concluded, we would expect to see that prohibition in the adult
criminal code, not tucked into the definition of a “delinquent act” in the
juvenile code.

¶32            Fourth, adopting the court of appeals’ interpretation of
§ 8-201(12) would have absurd consequences. See France v. Indus. Comm’n,
250 Ariz. 487, 490 ¶ 13 (2021) (stating this Court avoids construing a statute
in a way that leads to an absurd result). Offenses listed in § 13-501(B) but
not charged in adult court when the offender was a juvenile would forever
remain “delinquent acts.” Although this list of offenses includes serious
class one felonies, under the court of appeals’ view the state could not later
prosecute the offender for the crime because it would be considered a
“delinquent act,” even after the juvenile reaches adulthood. Imagine, for
example, that a seventeen-year-old committed an offense listed in
§ 13-501(B) but authorities learned of it only after the offender became an
adult. Under the court of appeals’ interpretation, the state could not
prosecute the person because the offense would be “by definition” a
“delinquent act.” See Agundez-Martinez, 254 Ariz. at 458 ¶ 25. Thus, the
offender would not face any consequence for the act, including having to
pay restitution otherwise due to a victim as required by Proposition 102.
See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 22(1). A similar scenario would play out for
adults who, as juveniles, committed offenses not listed in either § 13-501(A)
or (B). Considering Proposition 102 and the implementing legislation’s
goal to hold juveniles more accountable for unlawful acts, not less
accountable, the legislature surely did not intend such consequences. We
also cannot ignore that the court of appeals’ interpretation could deprive
victims of their rights to justice and due process as contemplated in the
Victims’ Bill of Rights. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A).

¶33           In conclusion, our criminal code authorizes the state to
prosecute crimes against “persons.” See A.R.S. § 13-201 (“The minimum
requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of
conduct.”); see also, e.g., § 13-1405(A) (“A person commits sexual conduct
with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse
or oral sexual contact with any person who is under eighteen years of
                                      12
                    STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                         Opinion of the Court

age.”). “Person” includes every “human being.” § 13-105(30). Nothing
in our criminal code constrains the ability to prosecute adult “persons” for
crimes committed when the offender was a juvenile. And as previously
explained, the post-Proposition 102 legislation did not impose this
restriction. A crime is a crime. Whether it is adjudicated as a “delinquent
act” or prosecuted as a criminal charge depends entirely on the status of the
offender at the time the state initiates proceedings. See Burrows, 38 Ariz.
at 111; McBeth, 111 Ariz. at 402.        Consequently, because Agundez-
Martinez was an adult when indicted, the superior court possessed
jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence him for his criminal offenses.

C.   This Case Must Be Remanded For Resentencing.

¶34           Neither party petitioned for review of the court of appeals’
resolution of Agundez-Martinez’s Eighth Amendment challenges.
Indeed, the State informed us at oral argument that remand to the superior
court is consistent with the interests of justice. We therefore do not
address the constitutional issues. Although we leave the court of appeals’
opinion on these issues intact, we take no position on those issues and leave
them for a future case.

¶35           We must note, however, that we are troubled by the lengthy
adult prison sentences originally imposed for acts, albeit horrific,
committed by a young child, especially as the record indicates that similar
offenses did not recur as Agundez-Martinez aged. The absence of
statutory directives in situations like these may result in constitutional and
prosecutorial uncertainty. We therefore urge the legislature to act so the
courts are not forced to determine these directives on a case-by-case basis.

                              CONCLUSION

¶36          For the foregoing reasons, we vacate paragraphs twelve
through thirty-one of the court of appeals’ opinion. We remand to the
superior court to resolve the remaining issues as required by the court of
appeals’ opinion but not raised to this Court.

                                     13
                    STATE V. AGUNDEZ-MARTINEZ
                     MONTGOMERY, J., Concurring

MONTGOMERY, J., concurring:

¶37          I fully concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition. I
write separately only to note some considerations in advance of
resentencing upon remand.

¶38             Given the fact that the State did not seek review of the court
of appeals’ Eight Amendment analysis, careful consideration should be
given for which, if any, sentencing enhancement allegations the State may
pursue at resentencing. I note that the record includes a memorandum
from the State that details the plea offer made to the defendant, 1 which was
readily supported by other materials in the record, notably the psycho-
physiological evaluation. To be clear, though, the executive branch office
of a county attorney is responsible for determining what charges to file and
how to prosecute a case. A.R.S. § 11-532(A)(2) (stating that “[t]he county
attorney is the public prosecutor of the county and shall . . . [i]nstitute
proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or
reasonably suspected of public offenses when the county attorney has
information that the offenses have been committed”); State v. Murphy, 113
Ariz. 416, 418 (1976) (“The duty and discretion to conduct prosecutions for
public offenses rests with the county attorney.”).

1
   The Yuma County Attorney did offer the defendant a plea in which he
could have pled guilty to three amended counts of Attempted Molestation
of a Child, each a class three dangerous crime against children. The State
would have stipulated to a prison term of five to ten years with the
defendant eligible for 85% earned release credit on one count. For the
remaining two counts, the defendant would have been placed on lifetime
intensive probation that would have been subject to future modification.

                                     14