Court Opinion

ID: 9593416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:22.582256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:36.970606
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur fully in Justice Arabian’s lead opinion insofar as it analyzes and resolves the validity of the trial court’s summary judgment ruling under the “duty” approach to the doctrine of assumption of risk that has been endorsed by a majority of this court in Knight v. Jewett (1992, S019021), ante, page 296 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696].
In addition, for the reasons discussed in part II of the lead opinion, I also agree that, in the absence of an applicable statutory provision creating an expanded duty of care, the general rule limiting the duty of care of a coparticipant in an active sport to the avoidance of intentionally injurious or reckless misconduct applies to a ski boat driver towing a water-skier. Because in this case defendant was at most negligent, and clearly neither intended to injure plaintiff nor engaged in conduct so reckless as to fall totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport of waterskiing, I would join in the lead opinion’s conclusion that the summary judgment in favor of defendant should be affirmed, were I to agree with the lead opinion that Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, subdivision (d),1 imposes no duty of care on a ski boat driver vis-á-vis the skier being towed by the driver.
II
I part company with the lead opinion, however, on the narrow question of the proper interpretation of section 658, subdivision (d), which embodies the somewhat esoteric statutory law applicable to water-skiers and those persons who choose to tow them. Whereas the lead opinion concludes that section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to protect only third persons with whom *365a water-skier might collide or whose property might be damaged by such a collision, I conclude, for the reasons discussed hereafter, that section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to protect not only third parties—but also the towed water-skier—from a collision caused by the operator of the boat that is towing the skier.
As the lead opinion indicates, section 658, subdivision (d), provides in full: “No person shall operate or manipulate any vessel, towrope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with, or strike against, any object or person. This subdivision does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices being towed by the same vessel.”
The lead opinion suggests that the language of section 658, subdivision (d), “provides no clear answer” to the question whether the water-skier who is being towed is within the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted. (Lead opn., ante, p. 349.) Although acknowledging that the language of the subdivision’s initial sentence (“[n]o person shall operate . . . any vessel. . . so as to cause the water skis ... or any person thereon, to collide with . . . any object or person”) is “sufficiently broad to include water-skiers themselves within the protected class” (lead opn., ante, p. 349), the opinion asserts that the second and concluding sentence of the subdivision (“[tjhis subdivision does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis . . . being towed by the same vessel”) “suggests that the statute was not designed to create a duty of care on the part of the driver of the vessel to the persons being towed.” (Lead opn., ante, p. 349.)
I disagree with the inference that the lead opinion draws from the concluding sentence of section 658, subdivision (d). In my view, rather than indicating that towed water-skiers are not generally within the class of persons the subdivision was intended to protect, the concluding sentence of section 658, subdivision (d), simply creates a limited exception for collisions between multiple skiers towed by a single boat, and does not deny a towed skier the protection of the statute with regard to a collision with an object, such as an overhanging tree, that is not being towed by the boat. Indeed, if, as the lead opinion suggests, the first sentence of the subdivision was not intended to protect towed water-skiers under any circumstances, there would have been no need to create the limited exception set forth in the concluding sentence of the subdivision. Thus, I believe that the language of section 658, subdivision (d), in itself, demonstrates that the provision was generally intended to protect towed water-skiers as well as third parties.
*366The lead opinion suggests, however, that its conclusion that section 658, subdivision (d) was intended to protect only third parties (and their property) and not towed water-skiers is “even more reasonable when subdivision (d) is considered in the context of other subdivisions of section 658.” (Lead opn., ante, p. 349.) In my view, exactly the opposite is true. When the language of the other subdivisions of section 658 is taken into account, I believe it becomes even clearer that section 658, subdivision (d), was intended for the benefit of the towed water-skier as well as for the benefit of third parties.2
Section 658, subdivision (a) provides that “[n]o person shall operate a vessel... for towing a person or persons on water skis . . . unless there is in the vessel a person at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the persons being towed.” In my view, this subdivision plainly reveals that the Legislature was concerned with the protection of the towed water-skier as well as third parties.
The lead opinion maintains, however, that section 658, subdivision (a) “is plausibly interpreted as a measure to ensure that drivers do not inadvertently steer water-skiers into the path of third persons or objects” (lead opn., ante, p. 350), suggesting that this subdivision was intended to protect only such third persons or objects and not the towed water-skiers themselves. With all *367respect, I do not believe that interpretation is a plausible reading of section 658, subdivision (a). In my view, a statute prohibiting any person from operating a ski boat “unless there is in the vessel a person at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, to observe the progress of the person being towed,” can reasonably be interpreted only as having been enacted at least as much for the protection of the towed water-skier as for the protection of third parties with whom a skier might collide. On its face, section 658, subdivision (a), applies even when there are no other persons in the vicinity who might be injured by the water-skier, and it is evident that in many circumstances the presence of an observer will be important only to safeguard the well-being of the towed water-skier and not third persons. To my mind, the lead opinion’s suggestion that the Legislature, in adopting a mandatory observer-requirement, did not intend to protect water-skiers, but only third parties, belies common sense. (See also § 658.7, subd. (a)(1) [requiring operator of vessel involved in towing a skier to display a ski flag to indicate a downed skier].)
Furthermore, contrary to the lead opinion’s assertion, the provisions of another subdivision of section 658—section 658, subdivision (e)—lend no support to the lead opinion’s interpretation of section 658, subdivision (d). Section 658, subdivision (e), provides that “[n]o person shall operate water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person.” (Italics added.) Although the lead opinion declares that “[o]bviously, the class of persons protected by subdivision (e) is limited to third persons and their property, since the water-skier is in no position to harm anyone else” (lead opn., ante, p. 350), the language of subdivision (e) (“no person shall operate water skis . . . so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person“ [italics added]) certainly is not limited to the protection of third parties. Were a water-skier to operate his or her skis or aquaplane in a manner which endangered the life, limb, or property of the driver or the passengers in the ski boat—for example, by engaging in a reckless stunt which caused a ski or some other object to fly into the boat—a ski boat driver or passenger injured by such misconduct of the water-skier clearly would appear to fall within the class of persons protected by section 658, subdivision (e). In short, nothing in the language or purpose of section 658, subdivision (e), suggests that either that subdivision, or section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to protect only third persons or their property.
Thus, section 658, viewed as a whole, confirms the conclusion that the Legislature, in adopting the provisions of section 658, subdivision (d), acted for the benefit of both third persons and the towed water-skier in specifying that the operator of a ski boat is under an obligation to avoid operating the vessel in such a way as to cause the skier to collide with any object or person.
*368Finally, the legislative history of the statute provides yet additional support for this conclusion. Section 658, subdivision (d), was initially enacted as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme establishing statewide standards for recreational boating activities throughout California. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1454, §§ 1-4, pp. 3736-3749.) This 1959 legislation, which was based on a model “State Boat Act” proposed by the Council of State Governments, followed two legislative studies of the safety problems resulting from the increasing popularity of recreational boating in California, the rise in boating and waterskiing accidents, and the absence of uniform standards. In a summary contained in the initial study, a legislative committee observed that legislation in this area “should be aimed at protecting and promoting boating, safeguarding those who participate, as well as innocent bystanders.” (Sen. Interim Com. Rep. on Bay Development and Small Boat Harbors, p. 22, 1 Appen. to Sen. J. (1957 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) And in the second study, which proposed the actual legislation that ultimately was enacted into law, the report explicitly stated that the act’s safety regulations were intended to prevent an operator of a recreational boat from “endanger[ing] the life, limb or property of any person including his own.” (16 Assem. Interim Com. Rep. (1957-1959) No. 5 (Mar. 16, 1959) p. 18, 2 Appen. to Assem. J. (1959 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) This legislative history, and the breadth of the resulting legislation, is plainly inconsistent with the lead opinion’s conclusion that section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to protect only third parties, and not the towed water-skier.
Accordingly, I conclude plaintiff is within the class of persons section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to protect. In light of this determination, were the trier of fact to find that defendant violated section 658, subdivision (d), it would follow, under Evidence Code section 669, that defendant violated his legal duty of care to plaintiff, unless the trier of fact also were to find defendant had proved that, in operating the vessel, he did “what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (b)(1).) Because the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to the summary judgment motion raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant’s conduct breached a legislatively created duty of care owed to plaintiff under section 658, subdivision (d), and Evidence Code section 669,1 conclude that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of defendant under the doctrine of assumption of risk.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and permit the case to proceed to trial. Of course, plaintiff may not prevail at trial, and even if the trier of fact does find that defendant’s conduct breached a legal duty to plaintiff and was a contributing cause of plaintiff’s *369injury, the trier of fact still would be free, under comparative fault principles, to allocate the greater share of the responsibility for the injury to plaintiff, in view of the role plaintiff’s own conduct played in bringing about his injury. (See, e.g., Metzger v. Barnes (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 6, 9-11 [141 Cal.Rptr. 257] [upholding jury verdict apportioning 90 percent of responsibility for waterskiing accident to plaintiff water-skier].)
Lucas, C. J., concurred.

Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Harbors and Navigation Code.

Section 658 provides in full:
“(a) No person shall operate a vessel on any waters for towing a person or persons on water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device unless there is in the vessel a person at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the persons being towed.
“This subdivision does not apply to motorboats less than 16 feet in length actually operated by the person or persons being towed and so constructed as to be incapable of carrying the operator in or on the motorboat. The department may establish rules and regulations governing the operation of those watercraft, which rules and regulations shall provide the greatest possible safety of persons and vessels.
“(b) No person shall operate a vessel on any waters of this state towing a person or persons on water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device nor shall any person engage in waterskiing, aquaplaning, or other similar activity at any time between the hours of sunset to sunrise, except that those hours do not apply to those waters of this state as to which prohibited hours for those activities are fixed by local ordinances, laws, or regulations enacted pursuant to this chapter.
“(c) Subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to a performer engaged in a professional exhibition or a person or persons engaged in a regatta, vessel or water ski race, or other marine event authorized pursuant to Section 268.
“(d) No person shall operate or manipulate any vessel, towrope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with, or strike against, any object or person. This subdivision does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices being towed by the same vessel.
“(e) No person shall operate water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.”