Court Opinion

ID: 9861722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:22:57.4813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:52.046453
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the sentences authorized for the two offenses at issue in this case, taken together, violate the proportionality clause found in article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). In my view, the availability of different sentences for the same misconduct is simply a matter of legislative judgment and not violative of article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution. As the majority opinion recounts, armed robbery is a Class X felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 6 and 30 years. 720 ILCS 5/18 — 2(b); 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(3) (West 1994). Armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon, such as a handgun, is also a Class X felony but is punishable by a term of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/33A — 3(a); 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(3) (West 1994). The majority believes that the existence of different ranges of penalties for the two offenses, which may be based on the same underlying misconduct, violates the proportionality clause of the constitution. I do not agree. Article I, section 11, provides: "All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. No person shall be transported out of the State for an offense committed within the State.” This provision is the successor to article II, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, which provided, in pertinent part, "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense ***.” Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, §11. The adjuration in the present constitution to determine "[a]ll penalties *** according to the seriousness of the offense” is customarily referred to as the proportionate penalties clause, even though the term "proportioned” appears nowhere in it. The proper scope and operation of this portion of article I, section 11, was recently described in People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 209-10 (1995), in which this court explained: "While this provision places some restraint on the right of the legislature to establish penalties for crimes (People v. Simmons (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 264, 270), this court has repeatedly stated that 'the constitutional command that "penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense” would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was "cruel,” "degrading” or "so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.” ’ (People v. Gonzales (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240, quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory (1894), 148 Ill. 413, 421-22; ***.)” In my view, the proportionate penalties language of article I, section 11, does not preclude the legislature from defining offenses that share the same elements but authorize different penalties. If the potential punishment for each offense alone passes muster under that provision, I do not believe that the punishments, when considered together, can be deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate, even though their underlying offenses are based on the same misconduct. A sentence must be judged not simply in relation to another number — "15 is greater than 6” — but in relation to an offense. Here, if the sentence for each offense, standing alone, is constitutionally valid, then neither sentence should be considered disproportionate simply because one exceeds the other. The sentences might be subject to challenge on some other ground, but not as disproportionate penalties. In the present case, the majority makes no effort to establish that the penalty for armed violence committed with a category I weapon is disproportionate to that offense. It might be thought that the existence of separate offenses and their distinct penalties allows the prosecutor undue authority in determining which offense to charge, but similar forms of prosecutorial discretion have generally been upheld against constitutional challenge. See People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 234-36 (1995); People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 379 (1989); People v. Mc-Collough, 57 Ill. 2d 440, 444 (1974); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124-25, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 765-66, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204-05 (1979). A contrary result was reached in People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172 (1990), on which the majority in this case principally relies; I dissented in Christy, and I continue to believe that that decision was wrong. JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.