Court Opinion

ID: 9648870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:36:53.539242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.888355
License: Public Domain

*367NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s actions in the trial court did not rise to the level of contumacious conduct under Section 23 of the Act of 1836. Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23; 17 P.S. § 2041. The majority, it appears, has become so immersed in its analysis of subsection III of that Act, that it has overlooked the existence of two other subsections of that provision. The application of these other subsections to the instant appeal is summarily rejected at note 6 of the Majority Opinion (P. 109).
First, it is clear that the “obstruction” requirement of subsection III which forms the basis of the majority’s finding of no contempt in this case, is not a prerequisite under subsection I.1 Second, it is clear that disrespect shown to the court, by one of its officers, during the course of a judicial proceeding falls within the prohibition of subsection I. The majority concedes that “appellant’s remarks were, ., clearly impertinent.” (P. 110). “[A] remark [that is] calculated to belittle the court in the eyes of the persons in the courtroom, and thereby to impair its dignity and authority” has been recognized as contemptuous. Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, 621, 95 A.2d 222, 226 cert. denied 346 U.S. 858, 74 S.Ct. 72, 98 L.Ed. 371 (1953).
Thus the only question is whether or not an attorney, while acting in the role of an advocate on his client’s behalf, should be considered to fall within an officer of the court under subsection I. See Commonwealth v. Marcone, 487 Pa. 572, 582-583 n.7, 410 A.2d 759, 765 n.7 (1980):
Unquestionably, there is a marked difference between the nature of counsel’s responsibilities and those of other officers of the court. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 100 *368S.Ct. 402, 62 L.Ed.2d 355; Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 406 A.2d 735 (1979). “The word ‘officer’ as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word ‘officer’ as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term.” Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405, 76 S.Ct. 456, 459, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956). See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 2858, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973). The difference is most pronounced where counsel is fulfilling the role of an advocate in a court proceeding. However, whether this difference is best accommodated by excluding attorneys from the definition of “officer” under subsection I or in the definition of what conduct, by such an “officer”, is contemptuous, is an area in which reasonable men may differ.
I am of the view that the nature of the role of counsel must be considered in determining what conduct is contemptuous under subsection I, rather than concluding that attorneys should be excluded entirely from the proscriptions of the section. Here counsel’s role as an advocate does not justify his impertinence.
“Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of the proceedings.” Pa.Code of Professional Responsibility, Cannon 7 § EC 7-36. A lawyer is precluded from engaging “in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to the tribunal.” Id. DR 7-106(C)(6). Appellant’s response to the question of the suppression court as to whether counsel understood the hearsay rule’s application to the given situation moved beyond zealous advocacy to misconduct. Counsel deliberately and consciously questioned the court’s competence with the sole purpose of offending its dignity and authority. I am of the view that the challenged conduct constitutes “official misconduct” by an “officer” of the court sufficient to sustain a finding of contempt under subsection I of the Act.

. Section 23, subsection I, of the Act of 1836 provides in pertinent part:
Classification of penal contempts The power of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases, to-wit:
I. To the official misconduct of the officers of such courts; .