Court Opinion

ID: 9716016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:23:27.945356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.638830
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: A matter is collateral if it is relevant only to contradict the in-court testimony of a witness, that is, if it is not relevant for any other purpose. For example, in a case involving a 1970 accident, exactly when in 1973 the witness moved to Tennessee was a collateral issue. O’Brien v. Walker, 49 Ill. App. 3d 940, 364 N.E.2d 533 (1977). In the present case, evidence that McMullen may have been engaged in a drug purchase at the time of the incident is clearly relevant to the issues of the case and is not a mere contradiction of her in-court statement. Defendant did not commit the offense of vehicular invasion if he entered McMullen’s vehicle with her permission to sell her drugs. The evidence would also have been important to the other charges. Was this a case of a stranger forcing himself into McMullen’s car and attempting to take her money? Or was this a case where McMullen argued over the details of a drug transaction with an individual whom she knew? The trial court, prior to the presentation of evidence, granted the State’s motion in limine: “Now, if you can tie this — to backtrack, if you can tie it into one of the elements, that’s different. But frankly, whether or not the detention was lawful or not doesn’t turn on whether Melissa McMullen previously sold crack or bought crack. It just doesn’t. If she denies crack that day, buying or selling crack, then that is purely a jury question. They can decide from hearing from the defendant and from the victim whether or not that was a crack sale.” (Emphasis added.) It might be argued that evidence that McMullen purchased drugs on other occasions, from other individuals, is not very probative on the issue whether McMullen was purchasing drugs from defendant on the occasion charged. We would admit that evidence against defendant, however, if he were charged with selling drugs and argued there was some innocent explanation. Other crimes evidence is admissible, if relevant and not unduly prejudicial, to show anything other than a defendant’s mere propensity to commit a crime, such as intent, motive, knowledge, or absence of mistake. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 505, 622 N.E.2d 774, 785-86 (1993). Even evidence of other crimes admitted to show a propensity to commit crime is relevant. The concern with such evidence is not that it is not relevant, but that it is unduly prejudicial to the defendant. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 485, 603 N.E.2d 460, 471 (1992) (not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much). That concern is not present with a witness, such as McMullen. See People v. Paul, 304 Ill. App. 3d 404, 410, 710 N.E.2d 499, 503 (1999) (nondefendant witnesses need less protection against impeaching information, because such witnesses have less at stake). If the evidence is relevant, it generally should be admitted. The majority may believe defendant’s evidence that McMullen was a participant in a drug deal is weak but that is no basis for excluding the evidence. The jury, and not the court, is charged with assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence. “In evaluating the incremental probative value of the evidence, the trial judge must assume that the evidence will be believed by the trier of fact.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 403.1, at 190 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Cleary & Graham). The rule barring impeachment on collateral issues applies only to extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence of testimony other than from the witness himself. A major reason for the rule is to prevent the waste of time, and extrinsic evidence consumes more time than simple cross-examination of the witness. The trial court seemed to recognize that when it stated, in ruling on the motion in limine, that the jury could decide whether there was a crack sale “from hearing from the defendant and from the victim.” But then the jury was not allowed to hear from the victim. Outside the presence of the jury, McMullen denied that she knew Mark Davis and denied that she ever purchased drugs or crack cocaine at the Red Fox parking lot. That evidence should have been presented to the jurors, who were entitled to see and hear McMullen’s denial and determine the weight it should be given. Preventing McMullen’s testimony from being discredited should not have been the trial court’s primary concern. Matters bearing upon the credibility of the witness, such as bias, interest, corruption, or coercion, are never collateral and may be contradicted by other testimony. Cleary & Graham § 607.2, at 411. In People v. Hutson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 50, 584 N.E.2d 975 (1991), a mother accused her boyfriend of abusing her child. During the boyfriend’s trial, the court held that extrinsic evidence that the mother had neglected the child was properly excluded as collateral. Professor Graham agreed but noted the evidence should have been admitted if offered as relevant to establish the motive of the mother in accusing the boyfriend. Cleary & Graham § 607.2, at 411. The same is true in this case. The evidence complained of should have been admitted to show McMullen’s motive in accusing defendant, that motive being that she did not want to admit that she was engaged in a drug purchase. When the prosecution is presenting evidence, we follow the approach that the admissibility of relevant evidence is favored; evidence that is relevant should be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by other factors. Cleary & Graham § 403.1, at 189. When the defendant is presenting evidence, however, we want some assurance that the evidence is reliable. Our approach is mistaken and deprives defendant of his rights under the sixth amendment. See Paul, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 411, 710 N.E.2d at 504. We should treat the prosecution and the defense the same and allow the jury to weigh all the relevant evidence.