Court Opinion

ID: 9918465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 01:00:46.509555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.380929
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30053     Document: 00517032045       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/12/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                               ____________                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                 No. 23-30053
                                                                         FILED
                                                                   January 12, 2024
                               ____________
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                             Clerk

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Taylor Chiasson,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:21-CR-267-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
         Taylor Chiasson appeals an above-guidelines sentence the district
   court imposed based on Chiasson’s extensive criminal history. He argues the
   court erred by considering testimony by two non-victim witnesses and by
   relying on “bare arrests” in Chiasson’s record. We AFFIRM.
                                       I.
         In March 2021, Chiasson was arrested and charged with being a felon
   in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Though
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   Chiasson’s explanation about how he came to possess the gun changed
   multiple times, he eventually claimed the gun belonged to an acquaintance.
   While in pretrial custody, “in an effort to have the case dismissed,” Chiasson
   unsuccessfully attempted to convince this acquaintance to sign an affidavit
   stating the gun was hers. Chiasson ultimately pled guilty to violating
   § 922(g)(1).
          Chiasson’s Presentence Report (“PSR”) listed his numerous prior
   criminal convictions and arrests. Although only 33 years old, Chiasson had
   14 prior adult convictions. All but three convictions listed in the PSR
   contained descriptions of Chiasson’s conduct leading up to the arrest. The
   PSR also noted 19 arrests spanning from 2008 to 2020 that either had no
   recorded disposition or had been dismissed. The PSR described the
   circumstances for eight of the 19 arrests.
          At the sentencing hearing on January 12, 2023, the district court
   confirmed there were no outstanding objections to the PSR or its guidelines
   calculation. The guidelines range was 57 to 71 months imprisonment based
   on an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of V. No party
   objected to the PSR’s conclusion that “there [were] no identifiable victims
   in this offense.” Before Chiasson’s counsel presented argument for a
   downward variance, the court stated, “from my review of his criminal
   history, it doesn’t look like the State did much at all for 20 something years
   to this gentleman.”
          Chiasson’s counsel urged a downward variance to 30 months
   imprisonment. She recounted Chiasson’s abuse as a child, his father’s recent
   diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease, and the effects Hurricanes Laura and Delta
   had on Chiasson. The present firearm incident, counsel argued, was an
   outlier in Chiasson’s otherwise positive trajectory as he “pick[ed] up the
   pieces of his life.” Chiasson also addressed the court, explaining how he came

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   into possession of the gun. He acknowledged he should have called the police
   rather than take the gun. He also explained that the onset of his father’s
   illness refocused his life and motivated him to stay out of trouble.
          To rebut this narrative, the government offered testimony by two of
   Chiasson’s neighbors. Defense counsel objected under Federal Rule of
   Criminal Procedure 32, which, she argued, prohibits sentencing testimony by
   “anyone from the public . . . if they’re not identified as a victim.” The
   district court overruled that objection. The court observed it was “allowed
   to consider the past criminal history of the Defendant,” and the witnesses’
   testimony “just expound[ed] on that criminal history,” similar to letters
   received “from third parties about different defendants that [the court]
   review[s] for purposes of sentencing.”
          The first government witness, Toby Osborne, lived across the street
   from Chiasson. Osborne recounted how Chiasson’s presence turned a once
   close-knit family neighborhood into a volatile scene. Osborne described
   almost 30 police visits to Chiasson’s house between 2015 and 2020. He
   suspected Chiasson conducted drug activity out of his house because people
   came by at all hours of day and night, including one instance when Osborne
   saw police “removing multiple illegal marijuana plants from the home.”
   Osborne recounted one occasion where his children witnessed Chiasson
   kicking out his own front door in the middle of the night while ignoring
   officers’ commands—with weapons drawn—to exit the house. Chiasson also
   violated numerous ordinances concerning clean up after Hurricane Laura,
   including one occasion where city inspectors found a dog’s rotting carcass in
   debris stacked in Chiasson’s driveway. Chiasson’s presence created so much
   anxiety that Osborne felt compelled to borrow a gun for protection. Osborne
   also discussed an arrest record he found on Google to show Chiasson had
   escaped the consequences of his actions.

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          The second witness, David Benada, was a sheriff’s deputy who lived
   in Chiasson’s neighborhood. Benada also testified to the chaotic nature of
   their street after Chiasson moved in, including increased police activity.
   Since Chiasson’s arrest, however, Benada described how quiet the street had
   become. Benada also spoke to Chiasson’s many arrests, including those for
   “homicide, principal to homicide, to numerous drug charges to carnal
   knowledge charges to numerous weapons charges.” The court told Benada
   it already had that arrest information. After the government’s witnesses
   testified, it asked for an above-guidelines sentence to reflect the seriousness
   of the offense and to promote respect for the law.
          The district court varied upward by 25 months, sentencing Chiasson
   to 96 months imprisonment. The court explained that the guidelines did “not
   capture the extent of [Chiasson’s] past criminal history.” It noted that the
   PSR provided “a very detailed analysis of” Chiasson’s criminal record. His
   many light sentences, the court found, had no deterrent effect: “[T]his is
   based upon his extensive criminal history and certainly is based on his
   extensive criminal history not being a deterrent which is a factor within the
   3553(a) factors.” Chiasson had “been arrested time and time and time again.
   He’s been arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon time and time again.
   He’s been arrested for drug offenses. He’s been arrested for battery, carnal
   knowledge of a juvenile. It goes on and on and on.” Most of his arrests and
   convictions resulted in dismissals or suspended sentences. Finding Chiasson
   a danger to society and undeterred by prior sentences, the court believed an
   upward variance was warranted. Chiasson’s counsel noted her “objection for
   the record to the sentence [sic] upward variance.”
          Chiasson timely appealed.

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                                        II.
          We review de novo “whether a district court failed to comply with a
   Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 840
   F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2016). If the defendant fails to raise a specific
   objection to a substantively unreasonable sentence, then we review for plain
   error. United States v. Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2022).
                                        III.
          On appeal, Chiasson argues the district court committed two
   reversible errors. First, he says the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal
   Procedure 32 by permitting non-victim government witnesses to testify at his
   sentencing. Second, he claims the court wrongly relied on a “bare arrest”
   record to impose a substantively unreasonable sentence above the prescribed
   guidelines range. We consider each issue in turn.
                                        A.
          Chiasson first contends the district court violated Rule 32 by
   permitting non-victim witnesses to testify on behalf of the government at
   sentencing. We disagree.
          District courts have wide latitude to consider information that may be
   relevant to sentencing. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 categorically provides:
   “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
   background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
   which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose
   of imposing an appropriate sentence.” Similarly, when considering a
   disputed “factor important to the sentencing determination,” the
   Sentencing Guidelines permit district courts to “consider relevant
   information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence
   applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of

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   reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
   Manual § 6A1.3(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.).
   To be sure, though, facts supporting the imposed sentence “must be
   ‘reasonably reliable.’” United States v. Washington, 232 F.3d 209, 209 (5th
   Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Shacklett, 921
   F.2d 580, 584–85 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
          Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 addresses various
   circumstances in which a district court may or must permit certain persons
   to speak at sentencing. For example, Rule 32(i)(2) states: “The court may
   permit the parties to introduce evidence on the objections [to the PSR].”
   Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2). Rule 32(i)(4) specifies persons from whom the
   court “must” permit testimony: (1) “the defendant’s attorney,” (2) “the
   defendant personally,” (3) the “attorney for the government,” and (4) “any
   victim of the crime.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A), (B). This right to
   speak under Rule 32(i)(4) does not extend to other persons a defendant may
   want to testify on his behalf. See United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 191
   (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting argument that Rule 32 “gives [a defendant] the
   right to present witnesses on his own behalf” because “no cases . . . have
   recognized such a right and we are aware of none”).
          Chiasson contends Rule 32 provides the only two avenues for witness
   testimony at sentencing. In his view, either (1) testimony is permitted to
   support or contest an objection to the PSR, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2),
   or (2) testimony is limited to the four persons permitted to speak by Rule
   32(i)(4). In effect, Chiasson asks us to extend our decision in Jackson, which
   held that a defendant’s Rule 32 right to allocute did not give him the right to
   call other witnesses on his behalf. Based on Jackson, Chiasson argues Rule 32
   also limits the district court’s discretion to permit non-victims to testify on
   the government’s behalf. See 700 F.2d at 191. The testimony here, he argues,
   did not fall into either avenue provided by Rule 32 because there were no

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   objections to the PSR and because the witnesses were not persons described
   by Rule 32(i)(4).
           Chiasson misreads Rule 32. By its terms, the Rule does not purport to
   restrict a district court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to permit
   testimony relevant to sentencing. Rather, Rule 32 specifies classes of persons
   to whom “the court must” give the “[o]pportunity to [s]peak.” See Fed. R.
   Crim P. 32(i)(4) (emphasis added). But the Rule does not say or imply that
   those persons are the only ones who may be permitted to testify at sentencing.
   To read the Rule that broadly would sharply reduce the “information” a
   district court may “receive and consider” in assessing a defendant’s
   sentence, contrary to the express terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3661. See ibid.
   (providing “[n]o limitation shall be placed” on such information). 1 Chiasson
   cites no case supporting his reading of Rule 32, nor can we find one.
           The cases Chiasson does cite fail to support his argument. As noted,
   our Jackson decision held that a defendant’s personal right to allocate under
   Rule 32 does not require a court to permit testimony from other defense
   witnesses. 700 F.2d at 191. We face a different issue, however: whether a
   court can permit non-victim testimony offered by government witnesses.
   Jackson does not speak to that question.
           Nor is Chiasson helped by United States v. Johnson, 956 F.3d 740 (5th
   Cir. 2020). There, we vacated a sentence because the district court relied on
   facts contained in a probation officer’s undisclosed recommendation. Id. at

           _____________________
           1
              See also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (“[T]he fundamental
   sentencing principle [is] that a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
   largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
   which it may come.” (cleaned up)); Washington, 232 F.3d at 209 (permitting non-victim
   testimony); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (permitting courts to consider any “relevant information”
   if it has “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”).

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   742, 747. Contrary to Rule 32(e)(2), the defendant did not receive those facts
   “at least 35 days before sentencing,” which deprived him of “reasonable
   notice . . . to engage in adversarial testing at sentencing.” Id. at 744 (citations
   omitted). Here, again, we face a different situation. Chiasson does not claim
   he was denied notice under Rule 32(e)(2). Nor did the district court’s
   variance rely on, or even reference, secret information obtained exclusively
   from government witnesses. To the contrary, before the two witnesses even
   testified, the court stated it was concerned that Chiasson’s light state
   sentences did not adequately deter him from criminal conduct. Finally, as
   discussed below, Chiasson’s PSR explained the circumstances behind each
   arrest or conviction that troubled the court, and Chiasson did not even object
   to the PSR.
           In sum, the district court did not violate Rule 32 by allowing the two
   non-victim witnesses to testify on behalf of the government at sentencing.
                                              B.
           Chiasson next argues that the district court wrongly relied on bare
   arrest records to vary his sentence upward. We disagree.
           We review this issue for plain error because Chiasson failed to raise it
   at sentencing. Chiasson objected to his sentence only on two grounds: the
   previously-discussed Rule 32 issue and the substantive unreasonableness of
   the upward variance. Neither objection “reasonably ‘informed the court of
   the legal error at issue’—i.e., improper reliance on a bare arrest record.”
   Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th at 482 (quoting Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,
   140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020)). 2 “Accordingly, we will reverse only if [Chiasson]
           _____________________
           2
             We disagree with Chiasson that his Rule 32 argument preserved the objection
   because the witnesses went on to reference bare arrests. His Rule 32 objection argued that
   the witnesses should not have been allowed to testify at all, not that they would reference
   bare arrests. Chiasson could have objected to any references in their testimony to bare

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   shows error that is plain and affects his substantial rights, and even then, only
   if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” United States v. Carr, 83 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           A sentencing court may consider prior criminal conduct that resulted
   in arrest but not conviction, so long as the record contains information with
   “sufficient indicia of reliability” regarding the conduct at issue. U.S.S.G.
   § 6A1.3(a). 3 A court may not rely on bare arrest records, however. Zarco-
   Beiza, 24 F.4th at 482. “Bare” in this context means “the reference to the
   mere fact of an arrest—i.e. the date, charge, jurisdiction and disposition—
   without corresponding information about the underlying facts or
   circumstances regarding the defendant’s conduct that led to the arrest.” Ibid.
   (citation omitted). A record is not bare, by contrast, “when it is accompanied
   by a factual recitation of the defendant’s conduct that gave rise to a prior
   unadjudicated arrest and that factual recitation has an adequate evidentiary
   basis with sufficient indicia of reliability.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
           Chiasson argues the district court obviously erred by relying on his
   bare arrest records. Had the court not done so, Chiasson contends, there is a
   reasonable probability the court would not have varied upward.
           Our analysis is guided by Zarco-Beiza, which held that a district court
   did not plainly err by referring to a bare arrest record at sentencing. 24 F.4th

           _____________________
   arrests but did not. See, e.g., Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th at 482 (bare arrest objections must
   specifically alert the court to “the legal error at issue”).
           3
             See also United States v. Fields, 932 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding “[i]t is
   well-established that prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction may be considered
   by the sentencing judge” if the information “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support
   its probable accuracy” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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   at 483–84. We first identified what part of the PSR constituted a bare arrest
   record. There, it was a DWI charge that “contained only ‘the date, charge,
   jurisdiction and disposition’ and included no ‘corresponding information
   about the underlying facts or circumstances regarding the defendant’s
   conduct that led to the arrest.’” Ibid. (citation omitted). We then found that
   the court had, in fact, “relied on” that charge because its “comments at the
   sentencing hearing and . . . the statement of reasons demonstrate[d] that the
   pending DWI charge was at least one factor the district court relied upon at
   sentencing.” Ibid. Nonetheless, the defendant failed “at the third prong of
   plain error review” because, viewing the whole of the sentencing hearing, it
   was not likely that the court would have reached a different sentence absent
   that improper reliance. Id. at 484.
          Following Zarco-Beiza, we find no error here, plain or otherwise.
   Although the PSR and the witnesses’ testimony did reference some bare
   arrests, Chiasson fails to show that the district court relied on any of those
   records in imposing sentence. See id. at 483 (finding reliance where the
   district court “specifically noted” or “referenced the pending DWI
   charge”). To the contrary, the record of the sentencing hearing shows there
   was ample factual support in the PSR for each prior arrest (or conviction)
   referenced by the court in imposing an upward variance. See, e.g., United
   States v. Whitehead, 986 F.3d 547, 550 n.3 (5th Cir. 2021) (district court did
   not err “in considering [defendant’s] arrest history” because it “was not
   dealing with a ‘bare arrest record’” when “the PSR includes details about
   the facts underlying [defendant’s] arrests, based on police reports”).
          Here are a couple of examples. The district court referenced
   Chiasson’s arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In support of
   that, the PSR explained that Chiasson was arrested in 2016 after “officers
   conducted a ‘knock investigation’ and the defendant was found to be in
   possession of an AR-15 style rifle.” The court also noted that Chiasson had

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   multiple arrests for drug related offenses. There was also factual support for
   this reference in the PSR, which stated, for instance, that in 2008 officers
   found “a bag of suspected marijuana” while arresting Chiasson at a motel
   where he fraudulently used a credit card and had sex with a juvenile. Chiasson
   fails to identify any example of the court actually relying on a bare arrest
   record. 4 To the contrary, the record shows that the court varied upward—
   not because of Chiasson’s bare arrests—but because of his extensive criminal
   history (including 14 adult convictions in a mere 33 years of life) and because
   he was obviously undeterred by his numerous lenient state sentences.
                                                IV.
           The sentence is AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           4
              At oral argument, Chiasson contended the district court’s references to arrests
   for controlled substance and a felon-in-possession offenses were to bare arrest records. We
   disagree. First, the district court referenced a dismissed arrest for possession of a controlled
   substance. But a paragraph in the PSR explains the circumstances leading up to a dismissed
   arrest for possession of marijuana and illegal use of controlled dangerous substances in the
   presence of a juvenile. Second, the district court referenced multiple arrests for being a
   felon in possession of a firearm. But the court had ample factual support for at least two
   such arrests: the instant arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm and Chiasson’s
   arrest for possessing an “AR-15 style rifle.”

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