Court Opinion

ID: 9883887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:24:04.675034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.652229
License: Public Domain

JONES, Justice
(dissenting):
This Court has now decided — erroneously in my opinion — that malice, in its legal definition, means a wrongful act purposefully done and without just cause or legal excuse, rather than the intent or state of mind with which such wrongful act is committed. I respectfully dissent.
The fallacy of so defining malice is apparent in the following example: A defendant is charged with homicide. The state concedes that the element of premeditation necessary for first degree murder is lacking, but contends that the evidence is sufficient for a jury’s finding of malice in support of a guilty verdict for second degree murder. The defendant says that he killed the victim in a heat of passion under such extenuating circumstances as would allow the jury to return a verdict for first degree manslaughter rather than second degree murder.
In other words, the triable issue for determination by the jury is whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter in the first degree. Continuing our example, the trial court instructs the jury as follows:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, I charge you that the legal distinction between second degree murder and first degree manslaughter is malice; that is, the element of malice is essential to the offense of second degree murder, while malice is not an essential element of first degree manslaughter. Unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously took the life of the victim, as I will now define the term malice to you, you cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. Malice, in the common acceptation, means hatred or ill will toward another ; but in law, malice means a wrongful act purposefully done and without just cause or legal excuse.”
For the purpose of appellate review, the hypothetical setting above is essentially the situation here before us.1 Look- again at the key words “malice means a wrongful act . . . ” Do these words, in the trial court’s definition of malice, provide the jury an intelligible definition as they seek to determine whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder'(for which a finding of malice is essential), or first degree manslaughter (where the element of malice is nonessential) ?
Obviously, the question is self-answering. If malice is the wrongful act, then there is nothing left for the jury’s determination. The homicide, here admitted by the defendant, is a wrongful act and, thus of itself (according to this definition), constitutes the element of malice. The definition, “malice is a wrongful act,” does not leave to the jury the determination that malice may be inferred from the doing of a wrongful act,.but instructs them definitively that malice is a wrongful act. Therefore, the Court’s definition of malice is the equivalent of a directed verdict of *352conviction for murder in the second degree.
Add, now, the words “purposefully done” so that we are looking at the phrase “malice means a wrongful, act purposefully done.” Do these last two words in any way change or modify our analysis of the definition thus far? The answer must he, “No”; and this for the reason that “purposefully done” describes equally the two possible jury verdicts. No qualifying or distinguishing feature as between second degree murder and first degree manslaughter is denoted by the addition of these two words. “Purposefully done” only adds the element of intent which is an essential element of both offenses.
Now, to complete the definition, add the remaining words, “and without just cause or legal excuse,” so that the full language reads, “malice means a wrongful act purposefully done and without just cause or legal excuse.” Again, we ask, do these concluding words serve in any way to qualify or render less valid our initial analysis of the trial court’s definition of malice? And, again, we must answer, “They do not.” “Without just cause or legal excuse” are terms equally applicable to second degree murder and first degree manslaughter. This can be forcibly demonstrated by reverting the phrase from the negative to the positive and observing that one who commits a homicide with just cause or legal excuse would be guilty of neither offense.
All that I am trying to say was said long ago, and said better, by Justice Clopton in Cribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 6 So. 109 (1888);
“In Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31, [malice] is thus defined: ‘Malice, as an ingredient of murder, is but a formed design by a sane mind, to take life unlawfully, without such impending danger to be averted thereby as will render it excusable, and without such provocation as will repel the imputation of formed design.’ Manslaughter in the first degree, which is the voluntary depriving a human being of life, is unlawful. The characteristic which distinguishes it from murder, is the absence of malice. Though the taking of life under provocation is neither justifiable nor excusable, is intentional and unlawful, yet the provocation may be so great, and calculated to exasperate as to deprive the homicide of its malicious character. The definition of malice, as given in the charge, would constitute every intentional and unlawful homicide malicious, though committed in heat of passion, excited by sufficient provocation.”
After stating the foregoing definition of malice in the context of the alternative verdicts of murder and manslaughter, the Court then concluded:
“Malice, as an ingredient of murder may be defined, in legal phrase, as the killing of a human being without legal justification, excuse, or extenuation.”
The majority opinion takes this last quoted sentence from Cribbs as authority for affirming the correctness of the definition of malice given in this case. The fallacy here is twofold:
1) This concluding sentence of the Court’s definition of malice is legalistic in form and inappropriate for a jury instruction, and
2) it includes the term “extenuation,” which appropriately distinguishes malice from manslaughter and which is altogether missing from the charge in this case. Stated another way, legal justification or excuse are complete defenses to both murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree; but extenuation would serve only to reduce murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first degree.
There is an old retort by one advocate to another which admonishes, “Strive mightily for what you believe is right, but at least consider the possibility that you may *353be wrong.” Mindful of this admonition (compounded by a 6 to' 1 vote), I must nevertheless express my personal view that the jury instruction approved by the Court ’in this case degrades English grammar and fails to furnish the jury a clear definition of malice.

. The first two sentences of the trial court’s jury instructions in our hypothetical situation constitute a reasonable summary of the charge given in the instant case before us, and the last sentence is an exact quote from the instant case.