Court Opinion

ID: 9738177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:44:04.010355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.188559
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). The three trial courts denied Juneau Square’s motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The court of appeals held that the trial courts respectively abused their discretion in denying the motions, however, not on the merits but *143due to the failure of the trial courts to state on the record the reasons for denying the motions. The court of appeals did not remand the cases to the individual trial courts for those courts to create a record of the reasons that the motions to dismiss were not granted. Instead, the court of appeals decided that granting any motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution would be "fruitless” because it believed that any dismissal would necessarily be without prejudice. If the claims were dismissed without prejudice, the court of appeals reasoned, the plaintiffs would be free to refile identical actions after the date of dismissal.
The majority dismisses all the claims with prejudice without stating adequate reasons and without remanding to the trial courts to determine what the trial courts’ reasons were for denying the motions to dismiss. I believe the record does not support the methodology of either the court of appeals or the majority, and that both err by proceeding without a remand. Why should the respondents suffer when the three trial courts did not make proper findings? I suspect the individual trial courts found that the foreclosure actions need only be prosecuted if Juneau Square lost its claims in federal court and that holding the foreclosure actions for a decision in the federal action was proper.
If the court of appeals is reversed because it dismissed the cases without prejudice without identifying "good cause” for so doing, then the actions should be remanded to that court for good cause to be stated. To do otherwise is to ignore the work and decision of the court of appeals without giving that court an opportunity to state what the majority believes is lacking. Also, why should Marshall-Wiscon*144sin be punished when the court of appeals did not make findings leading to the good cause conclusion?
All that Juneau Square Corporation does before this court is challenge the Marshall-Wisconsin Company, Inc. to produce evidence in the record that an agreement actually existed between the attorneys on behalf of the parties not to require Marshall-Wisconsin to prosecute its foreclosure actions. This is a far cry from denying that an agreement existed or that there was no evidence of an agreement. If there was an agreement to suspend proceedings until after the federal action was finally resolved, the existence of the agreement would be consistent with the fact that Juneau Square only brought a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in the Menos case after the trial was concluded, rather than before or during the trial. There are entries in the Menos case that Attorney Kersten on behalf of Juneau Square requested the case be delayed on at least two occasions. That such an agreement may have existed is consistent with a motion to dismiss being brought only after trial in the Menos action. The cases should be remanded to the court of appeals for a listing of "good cause” or to the trial courts for the reasons relied on for denying Juneau Square’s motions to dismiss.
It is unfathomable how the majority can find Marshall-Wisconsin’s failure to prosecute as "egregious conduct” required in sec. 805.03, Stats., when neither the trial courts nor court of appeals on the same record denied the motions to dismiss or found a lack of prejudice for the dismissal. The trial courts each followed sec. 805.03, and in their discretion made "such orders in regard to the failure [to prosecute] as are just.” The fact that the trial courts denied the motions made it unnecessary for those courts to *145discuss the merits for dismissal without prejudice since the motions were denied, not granted.
The majority fails to remand or look at the record for its decision but rather states:
"Our examination of the briefs and of the authorities in the record cited by Marshall-Wisconsin in an attempt to explain the delay leaves us convinced that Marshall-Wisconsin has failed to meet its burden of moving forward in a reasonable manner with prosecution of the foreclosures or, in the alternative, providing the court with an adequate explanation for its protractive behavior.” Majority opinion at 133-134.
It is not for this court to look for an adequate explanation, but rather this court must look to the trial courts or court of appeals to determine whether they properly found good cause or lack of merit for motions to dismiss. Furthermore, we are not to rely on statements in briefs (not described or analyzed as to their inadequacies) or authorities (unlisted in the decision and not discussed) for decisions but on the record before the trial courts to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion and before the court of appeals to determine whether there was "good cause” for not dismissing with prejudice and to remand if those ingredients have not been discussed.
The cases cited by the majority at pages 19 and 20 of the slip opinion are relevant in the case where this court is reviewing a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss; however, in the instant actions, the cases were not dismissed but rather the motions to do so were denied.
The majority at majority opinion at 134-135 compares these cases to Taylor v. State Highway Comm'n., *14645 Wis. 2d 490, 494, 173 N.W.2d 707 (1970) by applying the rule to "punish the plaintiff who has engaged in dilatory tactics." The majority is not in a position to determine dilatory tactics nor should it "punish" the plaintiff, especially where the three trial courts have each denied the motions to dismiss on the same records and the court of appeals has found no prejudice, even though not stating the good causes for such determination.
The majority goes so far to avoid the lack of precedence for its action as to state: "While Marshall-Wisconsin did not disobey a court order, as did the prosecuting party in Trispel, its conduct in prosecuting these actions was nevertheless sufficiently egregious to warrant dismissal, on the merits, for failure to prosecute.” Majority opinion at page 21. A finding of egregious conduct or the need to punish a litigant should be reserved to the trial court and a failure to obey its order and this court should only determine an abuse of discretion.
Juneau Square did not base a motion in the individual trial courts specifically on sec. 805.03, Stats., on which the majority bases its reasoning and in the Menos case it made no motion until after trial. Under sec. 805.03 it is up to the individual trial judge in each particular case to determine whether the plaintiffs conduct, or lack of it, justifies a dismissal. In deciding the question, the judge is entitled to take into account his own thinking, the court’s calendar and the rate of case intake and disposition. Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 91, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985). Trial courts are given discretion to make whatever orders "as are just.” Section 805.03 should only be applied to dismiss an action in cases of "egregious conduct” by a party. Id. at 95. When this court finds egregious conduct, it *147does not find the trial courts abused their discretion but rather preempts their statutory discretion.
In two of the foreclosure cases, Menos and Marshall Street, the first motion to dismiss under sec. 805.03, Stats., was apparently filed after trial. In the other, Vartanian, apparently no motion to dismiss under sec. 805.03 was ever filed, but the issue was raised on appeal. By the majority now dismissing for failure to prosecute without remanding to the trial courts for such action, the most Marshall-Wisconsin can do is to explain the delay in prosecution. There is no opportunity to look for alternatives to dismissal and no opportunity for Marshall-Wisconsin to cure its behavior. The dismissal motions and this court’s granting them on appeal violate Marshall-Wisconsin’s due process rights. If due process rights of Marshall-Wisconsin are violated, this surely would be "good cause shown” for the court of appeals dismissing without prejudice under sec. 805.03.
This court should not on the record in this case find that Marshall-Wisconsin "failed to produce evidence constituting 'good cause’ for the delay in prosecution of the actions." Majority opinion at 139. This finding of fact reverses the application of the law made in three trial courts and the court of appeals. There is no reference by the majority to the record as being persuasive as to why the trial courts and court of appeals are in error.
The historic value of the truth that there was a nonexecuted agreement to not proceed in state courts is the entry made by a clerk in the Menos action on a docket card that the action was being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal action. This plus a formal stay entered by the trial court in the Wil-Ten action lend support to Juneau Square acquiescing in *148the delay. Marshall-Wisconsin is entitled at least to a factual hearing in the trial courts as to any agreement between the parties for delay or its absence or knowing permitted acquiescence by Juneau Square. This court has never before required "documented proof of a court-ordered stay in the proceedings or a formal, written agreement between the parties" (majority opinion at 141 to avoid a punitive finding of egregious conduct in delay. This is the most sweeping part of the holding by the majority.
Without any foundation at all the majority finds: "Marshall-Wisconsin has had ample notice of the potential for dismissal with prejudice of these actions” with which "it could have avoided this result had it either proceeded diligently with prosecution of these actions or obtained a stay." Majority opinion at 142. The record does not bear out this conclusion.
Even if the majority’s decision is made in an effort to terminate this long litigation, the decision will not have that result. The parties admitted at oral argument that no matter what the result of the appeal, the case had to be remanded to the trial courts for an accounting of the proceeds of the parking lots that have been on the properties involved for some time. Therefore, it would take little effort for the trial courts to create a record for dismissing the actions with prejudice, if the respective judges decide within their discretion to dismiss.
I dissent and would modify and affirm the court of appeals decision either remanding to the court of appeals for good cause findings for dismissal of the causes without prejudice or remanding the cases to the three trial courts for findings of reasons for the denials of the motions for dismissal in each of the *149three cases as to why they found no abusive failure to prosecute.