Court Opinion

ID: 9477250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:18:20.254969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:46.577028
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I wholeheartedly agree with the compelling dissenting opinion of Judge Mil-bum, I add this separate point of emphasis.
The 1972 Amendments to the Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act “represents in some respects a compromise from the original proposals. However, the final product provides the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ... the tools needed to implement an effective enforcement program to secure equal employment opportunity for all our citizens.” Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Forward (Comm. Print 922).
The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that Congress wanted to be certain that bona fide claims would not be lost on mere technicalities involving filing deadlines or because of a lack of diligence or discernment on the part of the agencies, including the EEOC, designated to enforce the law. Speaking of the 1972 Amendments’ changes in the filing time requirements, Senator Harrison Williams, and Senator Jacob Javits, after noting that aggrieved persons are often lay persons, said:
[W]ide latitude should be given individuals in such cases to avoid any prejudice to their rights as a result of government inadvertence, delay or error.
118 Cong.Rec. 1846 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1972).
The majority opinion can have the likely effect of forcing into already overcrowded courts complaints initially filed and referred to the agency for conciliation efforts. This is what Congress was seeking to avoid through the compromise. Senator Roman Hruska was particularly concerned at the possibility of employers being required to fend off lawsuits before a number of separate forums. In response, Senators Williams and Javits declared that: “[i]t is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of [the] EEOC or the Attorney General, as appropriate. However, as the individual's rights are paramount under provision of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3462 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972).
With these amendments the jurisdiction of Title VII was expanded to embrace complaints of discrimination in federal, state and local government employment as well as gender discrimination. EEOC Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II 1972). This expanded jurisdiction opened a floodgate of complaints of discrimination in that the public awareness of the remedy was heightened. This avalanche of cases was piled atop the caseload in 1972 that numbered 16,348, whereas the Commission was able to complete investigation of only 5,090 of them. See 188 Cong.Rec. 1650 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1972). In my view, the majority opinion penalizes victims of discrimination for the pervasiveness of discrimination.
I conclude by noting this deep irony: the aggrieved filed their complaints with the EEOC in a timely manner. By engrafting a laches defense onto the statute this court majority is doing the opposite of what Congress intended. Therefore, I must and do dissent.