Court Opinion

ID: 9553384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:28:47.366143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:58.265112
License: Public Domain

HATHAWAY, Judge
(dissenting).
Although abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy are encompassed within the activities included within the constitutionally protected right of privacy, Roe and Doe, I respectfully submit that my brethren of the majority and the cases upon which they rely have misread Doe v. Bolton, wherein the high court approved of a section in the Georgia statute affording broader protection than appellees were given in the case at bench. Although the court invalidated the portion of the Georgia statute providing for committee approval of abortions, with guidelines, the court noted that the Grady Memorial Hospital, apparently a non-denominational hospital for indigents, was afforded protection in the statute in that the hospital did not have to accept patients for abortions, stating:
“. . . Viewing the Georgia statute as a whole, we see no constitutionally justifiable pertinence in the structure for the advance approval by the abortion committee. . . . The woman’s right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician’s best judgment and the physician’s right to administer it are substantially limited by this statutorily imposed overview. And the hospital itself is otherwise fully protected. Under § 26-1202 (e) the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. It is even free not to have an abortion committee. Further, a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are in the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the individual and to the denominational hospital. Section 26-1202(e) affords adequate protection to the hospital and little more is provided by the committee prescribed by § 26-1202(b)(5).” 410 U.S. at 197, 93 S.Ct. at 750, 35 L.Ed.2d at 215-6.
In Nyberg v. City of Virginia, supra, heavily relied upon by the majority, it was recognized that the high court held in Roe and Doe that an applicant was not entitled to an abortion upon demand, as specifically pointed out in Chief Justice Burger’s specially concurring opinion, and also that the high court in Doe upheld the Georgia statutory protections afforded the hospital, i. e., the right not to accept a patient for abortion. The court falls into error by reading that provision as being available *483only for denominational hospitals, overlooking the high court’s endorsement of the provision as affording protection to Grady Memorial Hospital, an apparently non-denominational hospital. In any event, the availability of the statutory protection of the right to decline admission of a patient for purposes of abortion was not made to appear to rest upon the denominational status of the hospital or the lack thereof.
Multitudinous activities are included within the protective mantle of the precious right to be left alone and governmental interference with those activities is proscribed as an invasion of the individuals’ right to privacy. Translation of that protection into the imposition of an affirmative duty upon every hospital capable of performing an abortion, or any other medical service, the obligation to do so, is unjustified.
A look at other fundamental rights points up the problems accompanying such a broad holding. The right to travel has been held to be a fundamental right, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Vast and constant transportational activity takes place in all levels of government. Should courts require that available transportation within these governmental functions be open to travelers, or should the judiciary mandate establishment of a transportation system for purposes of carrying out the fundamental right of travel? The right to procreation has been held a fundamental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). This would not seem, however, to require the establishment of clinics to further the right.
Courts are ill-equipped to assess and determine the capabilities of a hospital to furnish particular of the multitudinous services which may arise in the physician-patient relationship and adjudislate1 which of those services the facility is duty-bound to furnish. The Legislature, the Board of Regents and the administration of the University and the hospital are in a position to determine the nature and extent of services that should be made available at the University Hospital and to provide for the payment of such services. Many considerations obviously arise in reaching such decision, not the least of which include the teaching orientation of the hospital, the burden which may be imposed by undertaking a particular activity, the risk of liability and the provision of adequate malpractice insurance coverage.
By no means should courts through insensitive judicial mandate require that all hospitals perform all possible services, simply because they may be capable of doing so. Specialization and limitation of services may frequently be necessary. Establishment of priorities in the public health sector falls beyond the judicial perogative. The fine-tuning required to make available the best over-all medical services must remain within the deft touch of the medical community.
I would affirm.

. Adjudislate, to judicially legislate. A practice beyond the legal jurisdiction of the judiciary, but not beyond its power. The only available means for dealing with adjudislation is through review in the higher echelons of the appellate judiciary. Effectiveness of such review is in proportion to the degree of judicial restraint which the highest appellate court imposes.