Court Opinion

ID: 9919628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 20:02:57.613172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:36.396706
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24

                           CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                   F085131
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 1063488)
                v.

 DARLENE RENEE FOUSE,                                             OPINION
          Defendant and Appellant.

        APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ricardo
Cordova, Judge.

        Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
        Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N.
Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                         -ooOoo-
                                      INTRODUCTION
        Defendant Darlene Renee Fouse appeals from the order following the grant of her
Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. (Undesignated statutory references
are to the Penal Code.) Defendant was convicted by a jury in April 2006 of two counts of
attempted murder of a peace officer, three counts of first degree robbery, one count of
assault likely to cause great bodily injury, and one count of conspiracy to commit first
degree robbery. After petitioning for resentencing under section 1172.6, defendant was
found not culpable for the attempted murders under the amended law (she was the
getaway driver). The court vacated the two convictions for attempted murder of a peace
officer, redesignated the offenses as two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace
officer, and added a conviction for felony evading a peace officer under the redesignation
procedure provided in section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
       Because the jury convicted defendant of the target offenses of robbery, she argues
the trial court erred in redesignating the attempted murders as assaults with a firearm on a
peace officer (lesser included offenses) and in adding a conviction for evading a peace
officer. Instead, she contends the resentencing procedure provided in subdivision (d)(3)
of section 1172.6 applied and limited resentencing to the robbery target offenses of which
she was charged and convicted. The People argue the trial court did not err in applying
both the resentencing and redesignation procedures under section 1172.6.
       In reviewing the plain language of section 1172.6, subdivisions (d)(3) and (e), we
agree with defendant. Since it is undisputed she was charged and convicted of the target
offenses, the statute required the court to resentence defendant on the remaining charges.
It did not permit the court to also redesignate the attempted murder convictions to assault
with a firearm on a peace officer and felony evading a police officer. Consequently, we
reverse the court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Following a series of violent home invasion robberies, a jury convicted defendant
in 2006 of three counts of first degree residential robbery in concert (§§ 211, 212.5, subd.
(a), 213; counts 32, 33, 34), one count of assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 35), two counts of attempted murder of a

                                             2.
peace officer (§§ 187, 664, subd. (e); counts 36, 37), and one count of conspiracy to
commit residential robbery (§§ 182, 212.5, subd. (a); count 38). She was sentenced to
two consecutive terms of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the attempted
murder counts, plus a determinate term of 11 years, composed of six years for one
robbery, two years for each of the other two robberies, and one year on the assault
charge. All terms were ordered to run consecutively, and a five-year term was imposed
and stayed on the conspiracy conviction.
       Our court affirmed defendant’s convictions but modified her sentence in the
unpublished opinion, People v. Fouse (Mar. 13, 2009, F050427) [2009 Cal.App.Unpub.
LEXIS 2102; 2009 WL 638777], which also details the facts underlying defendant’s
convictions. The opinion includes a synopsis of the counts with which defendant was not
charged, but with which her codefendants Anthony Lawrence Martinez, David Wayne
Morrison, and David Anthony Silva were charged and convicted, in order to give context
to some of the issues defendant raised. As to the charges against defendant, it provided in
relevant part:

       “Counts 32-35-September 10, 2003

              “In September 2003, [H.G. Sr.] resided … with his wife …, 14-year-
       old daughter …, and 23-year-old son [H.G. Jr.] [H.G. Sr.], a farm manager,
       had an office at his residence, as well as one at his work site. An alarm
       system that was connected to a security company and the sheriff’s
       department had been installed at the house on September 9.

               “At approximately 2:20 a.m. on September 10, [H.G. Sr.] got up to
       see his wife off to work and to check on some water he had running in his
       orchard. Everything seemed fine. Around 3:30 a.m., he was asleep when
       the alarm went off. Thinking there was a problem with the installation, he
       was hurrying to turn off the alarm, the control panel for which was by the
       front door, when three intruders entered the house by breaking open the
       dead-bolted front door. One held a shotgun to [H.G. Sr.]’s head and said
       that if he did not quickly turn off the alarm, the intruder would ‘“blow [his]
       brains out.”’ The intruder repeated this and banged [H.G. Sr.]’s head with

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the butt of the shotgun multiple times. [H.G. Sr.] was able to tell the
intruders were wearing masks. He heard three male voices.

        “[H.G. Sr.] managed to turn off the alarm. The intruders took him
into the living room, where he was placed face down on the floor, his hands
and ankles were restrained with black plastic ties, and his head was
covered. As one of the intruders ran down the hallway toward the
children’s rooms, another put his foot to [H.G. Sr.]’s neck, applied
pressure, and asked him where the money was. The shoe felt heavy. The
intruder told [H.G. Sr.] that his son was covered in blood, and that if he
loved his son, he would tell the intruder where the money was. [H.G. Sr.]
told him that there was money in his wallet in the laundry room. The
intruder then asked where the ‘clavo’ was. In the Spanish culture, ‘clavo’
is a slang term that means ‘stash.’ [H.G. Sr.] understood it to mean money
or jewelry, and he told the intruder that he did not know what he was
talking about. The intruder then got angry and kicked [H.G. Sr.] in the side
of the face.

       “Meanwhile, [H.G. Jr.] was awakened when his locked bedroom
door was kicked in. What appeared to be a shotgun and a flashlight were
pointed at him. He could hear the alarm in the background. It went off
after 15 to 25 seconds. [H.G. Jr.] was told to lie face down on his stomach,
and his wrists and ankles were restrained with black zip ties and a blanket
was thrown over him. [H.G. Jr.] could hear three male voices. The
intruders spoke in English, except that [H.G. Jr.], who understood Spanish,
heard the term ‘ese’ four or five times when one intruder addressed another.
The two intruders in his room used the term and seemed to have Hispanic
accents.

        “[H.G. Jr.] heard one of the intruders tell his sister to get up and then
to get on the ground. He then heard what sounded like someone being
struck. Although he did not hear his sister make any sound, he yelled out
not to hurt her, that she was only 14. The intruders repeatedly asked [H.G.
Jr.] where the money was; when he insisted there was no cash in the house,
he was kicked a few times in the back of his head with something that felt
sturdy, like a boot. At some point, [H.G. Jr.] could hear his father insisting
that there was no money. When the intruders were asking [H.G. Jr.] where
the money was, they said that if he was lying, his father was going to get
hurt worse, and that [H.G. Jr.] should look at him, that he was bleeding all
over. [H.G. Jr.] knew they were lying, because he could hear his father and
had not heard him being struck or asking not to be hit.

        “Eventually, one of the intruders asked [H.G. Sr.] how to turn off the
front lights. [H.G. Sr.] told him the location of the switch, then heard a car

                                       4.
nearby that sounded like its muffler was torn up. The car was leaving. The
house was quiet then. [H.G. Jr.], who had been left alone in his room after
it was searched and items were taken, managed to free himself and then his
father and sister. They discovered the telephones were missing from the
wall and their cell phones were in the toilet, so [H.G. Jr.] activated the
panic button on the alarm to summon help.

       “The incident lasted 40 to 50 minutes, during which the house was
ransacked. The intruders took a number of items, including jewelry,
money, and a video camera. Authorities recovered some of the items
following the arrests in this case. [H.G. Sr.] suffered cuts and bruises to his
head and face from being kicked and struck with the gun butt. He also had
bloody marks on his ankles from having his feet tightly bound. [The
daughter] sustained a facial abrasion and marks on her wrists and ankles.
[H.G. Jr.] had marks on his wrists and ankles that were visible for about a
month. None of the family sought medical attention.

        “Shoe prints were found between the residence and the road. Boots
subsequently seized from Silva could not be excluded as the source of some
of the impressions. Boots subsequently seized from Martinez could not be
excluded as the source of other of the impressions. There were tire tracks
in the orchard near the house that appeared to go from the road, into the
orchard, and then out onto the road again. The shoe prints led toward the
area where the tire prints were found.

“Counts 36-37-September 10, 2003

       “Early on the morning of September 10, 2003, Stanislaus County
Sheriff’s Detective Nuno was assigned to be part of the arrest team, if
residential robbery suspects, who were under surveillance, committed a
robbery. Sergeant Allen, who was the team supervisor, was with Nuno in
one vehicle, while the rest of the SWAT team and a couple of other
detectives were in other vehicles. Nuno and Allen were in an unmarked car
that was equipped with lights and a siren. Nuno was driving.

       “At approximately 4:30 a.m., Nuno and Allen were at the staging
area …, when they received information that the individuals were believed
to have committed a residential robbery in the area. The surveillance team
reported the suspects’ location; Nuno had previously been informed that the
suspect vehicle was brownish or golden and had the words ‘Cold Pimp’n’
on the back.

        “Nuno and Allen, who were in the lead vehicle, and the rest of the
arrest team moved to intercept the suspects. Once the team was in position,

                                      5.
Nuno activated his lights and siren. The suspect vehicle slowed down as if
it was going to stop, but then accelerated. A pursuit ensued that covered
seven to 10 miles and lasted approximately 10 minutes.

       “Nuno followed the vehicle from a rural area into a residential
neighborhood in Turlock. There, the car slowed down and began making
turns. The rear doors opened a couple of times, then, … near the
intersection of Angelus and Spruce, the vehicle slowed almost to a stop.
Nuno slowed down as well, and pulled toward the driver’s side passenger
area of the vehicle. The right rear door opened completely, and Martinez
got out. He was wearing black clothing, a black beanie-type hat, black
boots, and a bandolier, and had a shotgun in his hand. As he turned toward
Nuno and Allen, the shotgun also turned in their direction. Allen opened
his door, stepped half out of the car, which was still moving, and fired
several shots at him. Because Allen was behind the door of the car and the
window was not rolled down, he fired through the window, which
shattered. The shots also damaged the vehicle’s outside mirror. The Cold
Pimp’n vehicle was about 10 to 15 feet in front and to the right of his and
Nuno’s position at that point. As Martinez ran toward a residence on the
south side of Angelus, Allen reacquired the target, stood up, and fired
again. He was standing behind the door of his and Nuno’s car, which was
now slightly rolling away from him.

        “Immediately after Allen fired the second time, he and Nuno heard
loud booms, which Allen believed to be gunfire. They were coming from
the suspect vehicle, toward Allen. Allen had stepped out of the car in
which he had been riding, and was standing right next to it. He was still
somewhat in the doorway, with the car moving away from him. When he
first heard the gunshots, Nuno’s car had not completely cleared his
position. The suspect vehicle was still in front of Nuno’s car,
approximately four to five car lengths away. The lower driver’s side
portion of Nuno’s windshield broke, and he realized he was being shot at.
Glass from the windshield cut his left cheek, and the bullet, which struck
the driver’s side door frame, was probably inches from his face. Nuno
heard several booms. Allen heard two or three shots. Nuno was not sure
which shot hit the windshield, but it was neither the first nor the last.

        “As this was going on, the suspect vehicle started to move. Nuno
accelerated to catch up to it, and Allen followed Martinez. At the
intersection of Angelus and Spruce, approximately 100 yards from where
Martinez had exited the vehicle, the two passenger side doors opened. As
the car was either completely stopped or moving slowly, Morrison got out
of the rear passenger side. Nuno did not see anything in his hands. Silva

                                     6.
got out of the front passenger side. He was dressed in dark clothing and
holding a chrome-colored handgun.

        “Because Silva was holding a firearm, Nuno positioned his car at an
angle and began to shoot at him through the broken-out passenger window.
He could not tell whether any of his shots struck Silva, who disappeared
into the darkness, as did Morrison. Having lost sight of them, Nuno came
around the driver’s side of the suspect vehicle, at which point he saw the
driver exit. It was Fouse. Nuno gave chase as she ran into a yard across
the street, then took her into custody without further resistance.

        “Fouse was taken into custody around 4:45 a.m. A subsequent
search of the vehicle revealed a number of items that the [H.G. Sr. family]
later identified as belonging to them, as well as a black baseball cap and
black ski mask. The ski mask had two eyeholes, and a mouth opening that
had been closed by some means. A camouflage hood was found on the rear
floorboard. A shotgun was found in the front yard of [a] residence [on]
Angelus, where Martinez had jumped the fence into the backyard and fled
from Allen. In the backyard was a bandolier with shotgun shells in it.

        “[Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Deputy] Ward assisted in taking Silva
into custody about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. Silva was hiding in the carport of [a
residence on] South Orange Street. When apprehended, he had a cell phone
in his hand. Eight black plastic zip ties, each individually secured in a loop,
were found underneath the vehicle where Silva had been hiding. Although
Silva only had a pocketknife on his person, two black nine-millimeter
magazines for a semiautomatic weapon were found in the backyard of the
residence, about 15 to 20 feet from the carport. One contained 10 rounds
and the other contained nine. A black Browning High-Power
semiautomatic handgun with a magazine in it was subsequently located in
the backyard of [a neighboring residence on] Spruce. The two backyards
were separated by a fence with a gap in it, and the two magazines were
some six to 10 feet from the black handgun.

        “Although the black handgun was photographed where found and
Deputy Luck, then a Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department trainee, was
assigned to watch the evidence in the area, the gun was no longer there a
couple of hours later when sheriff’s personnel returned to collect it, and
Luck was no longer in the immediate area. A resident of the house agreed
to assist Deputy Reed, Luck’s field training officer, in trying to recover the
handgun. The following day, this person directed Reed to an apartment
complex in Turlock and retrieved what appeared to be the gun. A check of
the weapon’s serial number revealed it had been taken in the [Jimmy L.]
robbery. Subsequent comparison revealed that one of the unfired cartridges

                                      7.
       in the magazines found in the backyard [of a residence on] South Orange
       most likely was cycled through this gun.

              “A silver-colored Smith and Wesson .357-caliber revolver was
       found in an adjacent backyard [on] South Orange. The revolver, which was
       capable of holding six rounds, contained six empty shell casings.

              “Nuno assisted in capturing David Michael Silva, who was hiding in
       a duplex laundry room on Spruce, near Angelus. David Michael Silva was
       taken into custody between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m.

              “Just before 8:00 a.m., Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective Cook
       found Martinez hiding in the backyard of [a] residence … at the corner of
       South Avenue and South Orange Street. A black zip tie and a loaded
       Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun (also known as a Moss) were recovered from
       the area in front of [a] residence [on] Angelus. A black strap containing 12
       gauge shotgun rounds was found in the backyard of the residence.

              “Around 1:30 p.m., Morrison was taken into custody inside [a]
       residence [on] South Avenue.” (People v. Fouse, supra, F050427, fns.
       omitted.)
       The jury was instructed in relevant part, in order to find defendant guilty of the
crime of attempted murder as charged in counts 35 and 36, or lesser included offenses
thereof, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “The crime of robbery
was committed;” (2) “That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;” (3) “That a co-
principal in that crime committed the crime of … attempted murder, or lesser included
offenses thereof;” and (4) “The crimes of … attempted murder, or lesser included
offenses thereof were a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime
of robbery.”
Petition for Resentencing and Evidentiary Hearing
       On January 4, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6 (former § 1170.95).1 Following an evidentiary hearing held on September 26–27,

       1Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered then effective section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute at
that time, although prior changes had been implemented effective January 1, 2022. There is no

                                                8.
2022, the trial court concluded defendant could no longer be guilty of attempted murder
under California law as amended by the changes to section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019, and, accordingly, vacated her attempted murder convictions.
         At the evidentiary hearing Roy Pettit, who was with the Stanislaus County
Sheriff’s Department in September 2003, testified regarding his involvement in an aerial
surveillance team that was assisting the sheriff’s department in an investigation they were
conducting regarding a series of robberies. He was an observer in an aircraft that was
surveilling a car, a Buick with a big “Cold Pimp’n” insignia on the back window on
September 10, 2003. The car was parked in an orchard across the street from a house and
it was “blacked out,” meaning its lights were off. He turned on a video machine on the
plane to start recording. The camera used forward looking infrared (FLIR) that records
whatever the camera sees and interprets; the camera sees heat and light in a range the
human eye cannot detect. The People then introduced the surveillance footage at the
hearing.
         Former Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective Marcelino Nuno testified regarding
his encounter with the same Buick with the “Cold Pimp’n” insignia on the back window.
He explained the Buick was involved in a high-speed pursuit on September 10, 2003.
Nuno had information a home had been invaded immediately preceding the pursuit of the
Buick.
         Defendant was driving the Buick during the pursuit. Nuno was driving a law
enforcement vehicle and Sergeant Lloyd Allen was in his car. Nuno explained he
activated his emergency vehicle lights, believing the people they had been following the
previous 30 days were in the Buick, namely, David Silva, David Morrison, and Anthony
Martinez. The Buick ran through stoplights and stop signs. At some point shots were

dispute in this case that turns on any of these changes. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the
statute as section 1172.6.

                                                 9.
fired from the Buick. Nuno explained they got on Spruce and “people started exiting the
car after one of the occupants[, identified as Martinez,] exited the vehicle. As it was
taking off, shots were being fired from the vehicle.” Martinez ran towards a residence
after exiting the vehicle. Allen fired shots at Martinez. Then, Silva fired four to five
shots and one of the rounds hit Nuno’s front windshield, “[k]ind of directly in front of”
Nuno; he was behind the steering wheel driving. The bullet ended up lodged in the
doorframe of the driver’s side door. Nuno suffered a cut to his upper cheek but was not
seriously injured. Allen was transitioning out of the car when the shots were fired. Allen
also shot at the second passenger who exited the vehicle.
       The car in front of Nuno continued forward to the T-intersection of Angelus and
Spruce at a high rate of speed and eventually stopped. Nuno saw David Silva, the front
passenger of the vehicle, get out next; he was holding a chrome handgun. The rear
passenger, identified as Morrison, also got out of the same side of the vehicle. The car
continued to move when they exited. Silva glanced in Nuno’s direction and was running.
Nuno positioned his vehicle to the left side of the car, grabbed his rifle, placed it out the
passenger side window, and shot a couple rounds toward Silva. Allen was back where
Martinez had exited the vehicle. Seconds after Morrison, Martinez, and Silva got out of
the Buick, the car stopped and defendant got out of the driver’s seat. Defendant ran in an
easterly direction into a yard and Nuno followed her on foot. He eventually caught up to
her and she stopped on his command. Nuno did not see anything in defendant’s hands
and she did not make any aggressive moves toward him. Nuno was aware that Silva and
Martinez abandoned their weapons prior to being arrested and Nuno testified he did not
have information that anybody other than Silva fired on anyone at the scene.
       Following the presentation of evidence at the evidentiary hearing, the court
concluded it did not find that defendant would have been convicted of attempted murder
on both of the officers based on the current law. The court reasoned there was “no
evidence here that [defendant] encouraged the shooting or did anything to make the

                                              10.
shooting easier.” Thus, the court concluded, it “would find the defendant did not have
the intent to kill. She did not do anything to assist the conduct of the aider and abettor.”
The court found defendant’s actions after Silva shot showed she was trying to get away
rather than aiding or abetting or encouraging Silva to fire a weapon at the officer.
Redesignation of Attempted Murder Convictions
       In considering resentencing after the evidentiary hearing, the court stated People v.
Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505 held subdivision (e) of former section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6, “appears to invest the superior court with considerable discretion in
redesignating the petitioner’s murder convictions as underlying felonies and
resentenc[ing] a petitioner to an appropriate term of years based on his or her individual
capability [sic].” The court stated it did not recall if the jury was instructed on assault
with a firearm as a lesser offense to the attempted murder, but the court thought it was
“really what happened here.” That is, defendant “may have abetted in the assault on a
peace officer with a firearm, and that does not require the specific intent to kill.”
       Based on this conclusion, the court indicated it was inclined to sentence defendant
to two lesser counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(d)(1)), a strike offense, for a term of two years consecutive for each victim (one-third the
midterm of six years), for a total of four years. The court also indicated it believed it was
appropriate to sentence defendant to a consecutive sentence of an additional eight months
for evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), but it did not know whether defendant
had adequate notice of this. The court stated, though “the defendant has not been
provided notice of that in terms of any pleading,” it “is not a surprise” based on the
evidence. The court permitted the parties an opportunity to brief the issue regarding its
proposed redesignation.
       On September 30, 2022, the court held another hearing at which defendant’s
counsel argued the attempted murders should not be redesignated as assaults with a
firearm on a police officer. In support, counsel argued defendant had no firearm and the

                                              11.
court must find sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt under an aider and abettor
theory. However, there was no evidence defendant had knowledge of Silva’s intentions
or that defendant specifically intended to assist Silva. Additionally, there was no action
on defendant’s part to do so. Defense counsel asserted defendant did “nothing other than
what she had been doing the entire time, which is driving,” and the court made factual
findings that defendant’s intent was to evade officers.
       The court reiterated the disposition it deemed appropriate and noted the jury was
provided instructions that allowed it to find defendant not guilty of attempted murder and
consider the assault with a firearm. The court stated the statute “does allow if it’s related
to the charged offense—charged action here is … Silva firing a weapon at the two
officers.” The People agreed with the court that there was sufficient evidence in the
record and that defendant had notice of the assault with a firearm charge.
       The court then ordered counts 36 and 37 be redesignated as assault on a peace
officer using a firearm on an aiding and abetting theory and that defendant be sentenced
to two years (one-third the midterm of six years) consecutive, as to each count. The court
also added a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 for felony evading a police officer
as count 40 and sentenced defendant to eight months (one-third the midterm of two
years), plus additional fees or fines for the added conviction. Accordingly, defendant’s
new aggregate sentence was 14 years 8 months. The court noted defendant had been in
custody more than 14 years 8 months and told defendant the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation would send her back, process her, and give her parole
instructions.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
       On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which became effective on January 1, 2019. Senate Bill

                                             12.
1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It amended section 188, which defines malice, and
section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.)
       Accordingly, section 188 now provides that, “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e)
of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) The change reflects the
Legislature’s intent that “[a] person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that
person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
       Additionally, section 189 previously stated, “All murder … which is committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 288,
288a, or 289, or any murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from
a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to
inflict death, is murder of the first degree.” Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189, in
part, by adding subdivision (e), which provides:

       “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony
       listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
       one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
       [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
       aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
       assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
       [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
       acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision
       (d) of Section 190.2.”

                                              13.
       The legislation also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95), which provides a
procedure by which defendants whose cases are final can seek retroactive relief if the
changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 4.) Initially, this section permitted those “convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts ….” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, subd. (a).) In
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature
amended the language of section 1172.6 to expand the scope of the petitioning procedure
to defendants convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a now prohibited
theory.
       Pursuant to amended section 1172.6, upon receiving a petition, if the petitioner has
requested counsel, the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court
shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the petitioner has made such a showing entitling relief,
the court “shall issue an order to show cause.” (Ibid.) “Within 60 days after the order to
show cause has issued, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       If, at the hearing, the prosecution fails to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, “the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancement attached to the conviction, shall be
vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6,

                                             14.
subd. (d)(3), italics added.) “The petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as the
target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the petitioner is entitled
to relief pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was charged generically,
and the target offense was not charged. Any applicable statute of limitations shall not be
a bar to the court’s redesignation of the offense for this purpose.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (e.).)
“Section 1172.6, subdivision (e), neither defines ‘target offense or underlying felony’ nor
specifies the process by which the court should identify that offense or felony.” (People
v. Arellano (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 418, 432, review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S277962;
accord, People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, 737.) However, courts have
interpreted this phrase to mean “the ‘offense’ upon which liability was based for either
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule.” (Arellano,
supra, at p. 435; accord, Howard, supra, at p. 737.)
II.    Analysis
       Defendant contends the court erred in redesignating the attempted murder
convictions as assaults on peace officers and evading police because the jury convicted
her of “what was alleged to be the target offenses underlying the attempted murder
convictions, which were robberies.” She asserts the jury was instructed under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine that it could convict her of attempted murder upon a
finding (1) a robbery was committed; (2) defendant aided and abetted the robbery; and
(3) a coprincipal in the offense committed attempted murder. She argues, because she
was convicted of the underlying and target offenses—robberies—the court erred in
redesignating the attempted murders as nontarget offenses—two counts of assault with a
firearm on a peace officer and one count of evading a peace officer. Accordingly, the
convictions on those counts must be dismissed. Alternatively, she contends insufficient
evidence supports a finding she aided and abetted the assaults with a firearm on the
police officers (counts 36 and 37), relying in part on the trial court’s initial statements

                                              15.
that there was no evidence she “encouraged the shooting or did anything to make the
shooting easier” and that she did nothing but try to “get away rather than aiding or
abetting or encouraging [Silva] to fire the weapon.”
       The People concede “the target offense for purposes of the natural and probable
consequences instruction read to her jury on the attempted murder counts was robbery.”
They also agree with defendant’s contention “she was charged with (and convicted of)
three counts of robbery.” However, they argue defendant’s “culpability in these crimes
extended far beyond just the robbery counts.” They assert it was “undisputed” defendant
“acted as the getaway driver from the robbery and drove the getaway vehicle through a
seven- to 10-minute high-speed police chase in which she ran stop signs and stop lights,
and which culminated in one of her codefendants firing a weapon at two officers in a
patrol car.” They argue, “[t]hus, by redesignating the attempted murder of a peace officer
counts as assaults on a peace officer with a firearm—which does not require intent to kill
(§ 245, subd. (d)(1))—and by adding a felony evasion count, the trial court was acting in
accordance with the purpose of section 1172.6 to ensure that [defendant] was punished
commensurate with her individual criminal culpability, and not more.” They also
contend sufficient evidence supports both convictions of assault on a police officer,
asserting the natural and probable consequences doctrine “remains a valid theory of
liability for other offenses.”
       We conclude the court erred in redesignating defendant’s attempted murder
convictions as two counts of assault on a peace officer and felony evasion.
       Initially, the issue before us turns on the interpretation of section 1172.6,
subdivisions (d)(3) and (e). “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we
review de novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “‘“‘“As in any case
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.”’”’”

                                             16.
(Ibid.) “‘“[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute … in order to determine the
scope and purpose of the provision …. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the
words in question ‘“in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the
statute ….” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory
enactment … by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole.’”’” (Ibid.)
       In reviewing the plain language of section 1172.6, subdivisions (d)(3) and (e), we
agree with defendant’s first contention—because it is undisputed the target offenses were
charged (and defendant was convicted thereof), the statute required the court to
resentence defendant on the remaining charges. It did not permit the court to redesignate
the attempted murder convictions to assaults with a firearm on a peace officer and felony
evading a police officer. That is, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides that when
an attempted murder conviction is no longer valid under the amended law, the prior
conviction “shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Relevant here, “[t]he petitioner’s conviction shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the
petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was
charged generically, and the target offense was not charged.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (e), italics
added.) But, because here the target offenses were charged, section 1172.6, subdivision
(e)’s redesignation procedure did not apply. Indeed, to hold otherwise would avoid the
plain meaning of the language of the statute and render meaningless the conditional
language of section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
       Said differently, section 1172.6 does not provide a procedure by which the court
could redesignate the attempted murder convictions to other offenses in this case because
the target offenses were charged (and defendant was convicted thereof). Rather, it
expressly directs the trial court to vacate the attempted murder convictions and sentence
the defendant “on the remaining charges.” Thus, the court exceeded its statutory

                                            17.
authority by redesignating the attempted murder convictions as assaults with a firearm on
a peace officer and felony evading of a police officer.
       The authorities the People rely upon are inapposite. They all discuss the discretion
afforded to a court in redesignating a conviction that is now invalid as a result of the
changes to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019, where the target or underlying
offenses were not charged as necessary to trigger the application of subdivision (e) of
section 1172.6. We discuss each of them in turn.
       In People v. Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 727 (Howard), the defendant and two
of his codefendants were charged with the murder of a woman shot and killed during a
burglary of her home in 2010. (Id. at pp. 729, 731–732.) The defendant was convicted of
first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance, and the jury found he had
been armed in the commission of the offense. (Id. at pp. 729–730, 732.) On direct
appeal, the felony-murder special circumstance was reversed because the evidence was
insufficient to show the defendant (who was not the actual killer) acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (Id. at pp. 730, 733.) The defendant then moved to vacate his
murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6. (Howard, at pp. 730, 733.) The parties agreed the defendant’s murder
conviction should be vacated and that the underlying felony was burglary, but they
disagreed on the degree of the offense. (Id. at pp. 730, 733–734.) The court vacated the
defendant’s murder conviction and redesignated it as first degree burglary plus a one-year
arming enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). (Howard, at pp. 730, 734.)
       On appeal, the Howard court held “the court properly redesignated the underlying
felony as first degree burglary pursuant to [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (e)
because the evidence at trial established—beyond dispute—that defendants burglarized a
residence,” and that doing so did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. (Howard,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 730; see id. at pp. 738, 740.) The Howard court explained,
“the plain language of [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (e) contemplates a situation

                                             18.
where—as here—the underlying felony was not charged.” (Id. at p. 738.) And,
comparing that provision with former section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) supports the
conclusion “the Legislature intended to grant the trial court flexibility when identifying
the underlying felony for resentencing under subdivision (e).” (Howard, at p. 739, italics
added.) The Howard court held, “[b]y vacating Howard’s murder conviction and
designating that conviction as first degree burglary, the court calibrated Howard’s
punishment to his culpability for aiding and abetting a residential burglary.” (Ibid.) It
further confirmed the court properly designated the offense a violent felony and imposed
a one-year arming enhancement “because the evidence established those enhancements
relative to the underlying felony, burglary.” (Id. at p. 742; see id. at pp. 730, 740–742;
but see People v. Arellano, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [concluding § 1172.6, subd.
(e) does not permit court to add enhancements in redesignating vacated conviction; rather
specific language states, “‘for resentencing purposes,’ the newly redesignated conviction
shall include only the offense upon which liability for murder or attempted murder was
based”], review granted.)
       In People v. Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 505 (Silva), the defendant was convicted
in a jury trial with two codefendants of two counts of first degree murder arising out of a
home invasion robbery. (Id. at pp. 509–513.) He successfully petitioned for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. (Silva, at pp. 510, 513.) In
redesignating the defendant’s convictions under former section 1170.95, subdivision (e),
the court vacated the two murder convictions and resentenced the defendant on six home
invasion robberies or attempted robberies based on the number of robbery victims alleged
in the original information. (Silva, at pp. 510, 515.) On appeal, the defendant challenged
his sentence, asserting it was constitutional error under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to impose sentence upon him for six robbery offenses of which he was
never found guilty by a jury. (Silva, at p. 517.) He also argued his murder convictions

                                             19.
should have been redesignated as generic, second degree robberies rather than home
invasion robberies in concert. (Id. at p. 518.)
       The Silva court held, in part, there was “no statutory impediment to the imposition
of sentence on more counts on resentencing under [former] section 1170.95, subdivision
(e) than the number of murder convictions originally sustained.” (Silva, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 531.) The Silva court also concluded “the federal and state
Constitutions pose no bar to the redesignation of additional counts, so long as the
petitioner receives notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the prosecution bears its
burden of proving guilt on the redesignated counts.” (Silva, at p. 532.) It reasoned,
“[s]ubdivision (e) of [former] section 1170.95 appears to invest the superior court with
considerable discretion in redesignating the petitioner’s murder convictions as underlying
felonies and resentencing a petitioner to an appropriate term of years based on his or her
individual culpability.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, “the court may consider the full extent of
the petitioner’s criminal conduct, and the redesignation may reflect, among other things,
the number of crime victims, not just the number of murder charges on which the
petitioner was convicted. [Citation] The focus is on achieving a just sentence—not
making sure the redesignated offenses line up numerically with the vacated murder
convictions.” (Ibid.)
       The Silva court further rejected the defendant’s claim the court could not
redesignate the vacated convictions to “past alleged crimes that remain unadjudicated”
reasoning, “[i]n cases in which the underlying felony or target offense was never charged,
the resentencing judge necessarily must identify the appropriate redesignated offense and
make factual findings on the petitioner’s guilt.” (Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 530.)
Accordingly, “[i]if a judge may redesignate a murder as a crime that was never charged,
as is implicit in subdivision (e), we see no reason why he or she cannot redesignate a
murder as a charge once made but dropped in circumstances where the dismissal was not
for lack of evidence, but in reliance on the felony-murder rule then in effect.” (Ibid.)

                                             20.
The Silva court further rejected the defendant’s claim the court could not redesignate his
murder convictions as first degree robberies (rather than generic second degree
robberies), relying upon the conclusion in Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pages 738–
740, that “a resentencing court could redesignate a vacated murder conviction as a lesser
offense commensurate with [the defendant’s] participation in the underlying felony, not
just generically, but with the petitioner’s individual culpability in mind based on the
evidence at trial.” (Silva, at p. 519.) The Silva court expanded, “[w]hat Howard did not
say explicitly, but what it authorized in practice, was factfinding by the resentencing
judge, something we believe is implicit in the redesignation process.” (Id. at p. 520.)
The Silva court also agreed with the defendant that due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard on any request by the prosecution to designate an unadjudicated
offense for resentencing under subdivision (e) of former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6),
reasoning in part the “subdivision (e) proceeding is not simply a resentencing, but also a
redesignation of one or more criminal offenses which mimics a criminal conviction.” (Id.
at p. 523; see id. at pp. 520–524.) It concluded the defendant was given the requisite
notice and not deprived of the opportunity to be heard before he was resentenced. (Id. at
pp. 525–526.)
       In People v. Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474 (Watson), the defendant was
convicted by plea of second degree murder in 1988, and he moved to vacate his
conviction and be resentenced under former section 1170.95 in 2019. (Watson, at pp.
477–478.) The trial court found the defendant was entitled to relief under former section
1170.95, vacated his murder conviction, and redesignated that conviction as two offenses:
first degree burglary and first degree robbery. (Watson, at pp. 477, 480.) It sentenced the
defendant to six years on the burglary conviction and imposed but stayed execution of a
sentence on the robbery conviction pursuant to section 654. (Watson, at pp. 477, 480.)
       On appeal, the Watson court rejected the defendant’s argument the plain language
of former “section 1170.95, subdivision (e) requires a court ‘to select one felony as the

                                            21.
designated underlying offense, and sentence him only as to that one.’” (Watson, supra,
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 483.) Rather, it concluded, “the trial court did not err in designating
Watson’s vacated murder conviction as both first degree burglary and first degree
robbery pursuant to [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (e).” (Id. at p. 492.) The
Watson court relied, in part, on section 7 to conclude the Legislature’s use of the singular
form of the phrase “underlying felony” in subdivision (e) “was not necessarily intended
to restrict courts to designating only one underlying felony under [former] section
1170.95, subdivision (e).” (Watson, at p. 485.) Rather, "[t]he plain language of the
statute … confirms that the Legislature did not intend to require courts to designate only
one felony in all cases.” (Id. at p. 487.) Additionally, the “evidence establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that Watson aided and abetted both a burglary and a robbery prior to
[the] killing.” (Id. at p. 486.) The Watson court further stated it “agree[d] with the
Howard court’s reasoning that reading [former] section 1170.95, subdivisions (d)(3) and
(e) together reflects a legislative intent to grant trial courts flexibility in designating the
underlying offense for resentencing purposes.” (Id. at p. 488.) And, concluding
“subdivision (e) requires a court to redesignate a vacated murder conviction as only one
underlying felony—even when the evidence shows beyond dispute the commission of
more than one underlying felony—would run directly contrary to this principle.” (Ibid.)
The Watson court further held, the trial court calibrated the defendant’s punishment to his
culpability for committing both of those crimes, and to prohibit it from doing so on the
facts of the case “would run contrary to the express purposes of the statute.” (Id. at p.
492.)
        Notably, these cases provide that the court has varying degrees of discretion in
redesignating the invalid conviction(s) under section 1172.6, subdivision (e), where the
target or underlying offense was not charged and the defendant was not convicted
thereof. (See Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 530 [“In cases in which the underlying
felony or target offense was never charged, the resentencing judge necessarily must

                                               22.
identify the appropriate redesignated offense and make factual findings on the
petitioner’s guilt”].) But, as discussed, section 1172.6, subdivision (e) was not triggered
here because the target or underlying offense, robbery, was charged. Rather, here, the
court erred in failing to simply vacate the attempted murder convictions and resentence
defendant on the remaining charges as required by the plain language of section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).
       Accordingly, we conclude defendant’s first contention has merit and the trial
court’s order must be reversed on that basis.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The order is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with
this opinion.

                                                                                   PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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