Court Opinion

ID: 9566246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:35:32.929984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:58.028452
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
dissenting.
The majority opinion, relying on an analysis from State v. Creason, 313 N.C. 122, 326 S.E.2d 24 (1985), holds that a defendant may not be convicted under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(l) for both the sale and the delivery of a controlled substance arising from one transaction. I disagree.
Creason is cited by the majority to support the collapse of what has historically been two separate offenses, sale or delivery, into one offense, the “transfer of a controlled substance by sale or delivery.” Creason involved an exploration of the legislative intent of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(l) focusing on the single offense of possession. The analysis there was between possession “with the intent to sell” and possession “with the intent to deliver.” Creason, 313 N.C. at 129, 326 S.E.2d at 28.
This Court in Creason held that the legislative intent in making possession with the intent to “sell or deliver” a crime was to prevent the transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another. Id. The Court went on to state that “[w]hile the sale of narcotics and the delivery of narcotics are separate offenses, State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976), the possession of narcotics with the intent to ‘sell or deliver’ is one offense.” Creason, 313 N.C. at 129, 326 S.E.2d at 28 (emphasis added). The Creason reasoning is inapposite to the case at bar.
N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(l) makes it unlawful to: (1) manufacture a controlled substance, (2) sell a controlled substance, (3) deliver a controlled substance, (4) possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver a controlled substance. Creason was only concerned with the defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance. In Creason, the Court held that this was an intent crime, the elements being (1) possession of the drug, and (2) defendant’s intention to “sell or deliver” the drug.
In the present case, defendant was convicted of selling the controlled substance and of delivering the controlled substance. *385Neither offense is an intent crime, that is, intent is not an element of either offense. The majority fell into error in attempting to apply the reasoning of Creason to this appeal. To the contrary, Creason held that the sale of narcotics and the delivery of narcotics are two separate offenses, citing State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357.
A sale is a transfer of property for a specified price payable in money. State v. Albarty, 238 N.C. 130, 76 S.E.2d 381 (1953). In the context of controlled substance statutes, “deliver” means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance. N.C.G.S. § 90-87(7) (1985); State v. Medina, 87 N.M. 394, 395, 534 P.2d 486, 487 (1975).
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case was entirely correct in holding that the sale of a controlled substance is a separate act from the delivery of a controlled substance and therefore a separate crime. See State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. at 498, 223 S.E.2d at 364; see also State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 330 S.E.2d 476 (1985); accord State v. Creason, 313 N.C. at 129, 326 S.E.2d at 28.
The distinct acts (manufacture, sell, deliver, possess) denounced by statute have consistently been held to constitute separate and distinct offenses. State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 103, 340 S.E.2d 450, 460 (1986); State v. Aiken, 286 N.C. 202, 206, 209 S.E.2d 763, 766 (1974) (“One may sell an article or substance which he does not possess”).
The majority, sub silentio, by its decision overrules at least three of the decisions of this Court and three of the Court of Appeals.
In State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 340 S.E.2d 450, this Court quoted with approval from State v. Anderson, 57 N.C. App. 602, 606, 292 S.E.2d 163, 166, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 559, 294 S.E.2d 322 (1982), the following: “ ‘The distinct acts denounced by the statute (manufacture, sell, deliver, possess) have been held to constitute separate and distinct offenses. [Citing authorities.]’ ” Perry, 316 N.C. at 103, 340 S.E.2d at 460.
In Creason, we reiterated that the sale of narcotics and the delivery of narcotics are separate offenses.
Again, in State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 330 S.E.2d 476, this Court held that a verdict finding that defendant “feloniously *386did sell or deliver” cocaine was fatally defective and ambiguous because sale and delivery are distinct and separate offenses.
This Court held in State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357, that charging a defendant with “sale and delivery” of marijuana is one criminal act not defective because the two offenses could have been charged as separate offenses. There was no prejudice to defendant.
See also State v. Aiken, 286 N.C. 202, 209 S.E.2d 763 (where the Court held that possession of controlled substance and sale of a controlled substance were separate offenses and that a defendant could be convicted of both and sentenced to prison for each); State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195 S.E.2d 481 (1973) (where the Court held that sale and possession of narcotics are separate and distinct offenses).
See also State v. Pulliam, 78 N.C. App. 129, 336 S.E.2d 649 (1985); State v. Clark, 71 N.C. App. 55, 322 S.E.2d 176 (1984).
To the same effect, in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11, 71 L. Ed. 505, 511 (1927), Brandéis, J., writing for the Court, said: “But possessing and selling are distinct offenses .... There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction . . . .”
The Court of Appeals also held, unfortunately, that “while it is appropriate to separate these offenses [sale and delivery] for the purpose of charging a defendant, we do not believe the Legislature intended to punish a defendant twice for one transfer of the same contraband.” State v. Moore, 95 N.C. App. 718, 721, 384 S.E.2d 67, 68-69 (1989). I disagree. The General Assembly has proscribed not just the transfer of controlled substances, but has specifically proscribed both their sale and their delivery. The intent of the General Assembly was to charge and punish separately both for the acceptance of money for the sale of a controlled substance and for the delivery of the substance, even where both occur in the same transaction. The trial court did not err in punishing the defendant for both.
Justice MARTIN joins in this dissenting opinion.