Court Opinion

ID: 9513351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:34:33.831884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.054978
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
[¶ 37] Because the majority’s opinion affirming the district court’s order that Kenneth Donarski contribute to the college education of his adult child is contrary to law and public policy, I respectfully dissent from part VIII of the majority’s opinion.
[¶ 38] The parties conceded at oral argument that absent a statute to the contrary, parents generally have no duty to support their adult children. Under our statutes, parents’ duty to support their child will generally terminate when the child is age 18. See Freyer v. Freyer, 427 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D.1988). But the majority boldly states at ¶ 19: “In a divorce action, the court has authority to order payment of post-minority support, including college expenses, under appropriate circumstances.” The majority *139tells us to “see” Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶ 14, 574. N.W.2d 855, N.D.C.C. 14-09-08.2(4), and Davis v. Davis, 268 N.W.2d 769, 778 (N.D.197.8),. overruled on other grounds, Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center, 419 N.W.2d 886 (N.D.1988), for support of this assertion.
[¶ 39] Zarrett involved a stipulation— something not present here. Davis, a pre-Child Support Guidelines ease, allowed the creation of trust funds for minor children, but did so under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25, allowing courts to require reasonable security.
[¶ 40] In 1993, the Legislature enacted N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(4):
“This section does not preclude the entry of an order for child support which continues after the child reaches age eighteen, if the parties agree or if the court determines the support to be appropriate.”
[¶41] The majority’s attempt to rely on this language as a grant of additional authority to the trial court is contrary to the plain language of the statute, and contrary to the legislative history. The language, “does not preclude,” is not a grant of authority. See Bangen v. Bartelson, 553 N.W.2d 754, 756-57 (N.D.1996) (The effect of the “does not preclude” language of N.D.R.Civ.P. 57 is to not foreclose court’s reliance on specific statutory authority under N.D.C.C. §§ 32-23-02. and 32-23-03.); City of Grand Forks v. Risser, 512 N.W.2d 462, 463, 465 (N.D.1994) (Evidence N.D.C.C. § 39-20-02 “does not preclude” is admissible because it is relevant evidence under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(2).). “May” would “confer a power, privilege, or right.” North Dakota Legislative Drafting Manual 105 (1997).
[If 42] There have long been limited circumstances under which parents have had a statutory legal duty to support adult children. See, e.g., Wiedrich v. Wiedrich, 179 N.W.2d 728, 730 syl. 5, 731 (N.D.1970) (“The mother and the father of any person who is unable to maintain himself because of mental or physical defects have the duty to maintain and care for such person” even after reaching majority, under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-10.). The language, “does not preclude,” makes it clear other, statutory circumstances when parents are held responsible for the care of their adult children are “not preclude[d]” by the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2. The legislative history reflects the change relied on by the majority is only intended to “clarify,” and not to change the “policies that underlie the current law.” Hearing on H.B. 1181 Before the -House Human Services Comm., 53rd N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 18, 1993) (testimony of Blaine Nordwall, Assistant Attorney General representing the Dept, of Human Services) [“Hearing on H.B. 1181 ”]. Nordwall explained Section 3 of the bill, which contained all the amendments to N.D.C.C. §.14-09-08.2, including subsection 4:-
“SECTION 3 (page 5, line 13) amends the law governing the continuation of support for children who reach age 18 before high school graduation.
— The policies that underlie the current law would continue under the amendment.
— The amendment clarifies the requirements for the affidavit that continues the support.
— The amendment provides that the right of support is not lost simply because the affidavit is not filed before the child reaches age 18 (subsection 3 at page 6, line 10).
— The amendment clarifies that this is not the only basis under which support could continue after age 18 (subsection 4 at page 6, line 15).”
Hearing on H.B. 1181 (emphasis added). The majority’s reliance on N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2 is wholly unjustified.
[¶ 43] The majority cites no applicable law to justify its action opening the door for vast incursion of the courts into the lives of ordinary citizens.1 While the majority cites cases from Alabama and New Jersey to ex*140plain what limits are to be placed on a court’s authority to award post-minority support for college education, these cases show North Dakota courts do not have the authority to award post-minority support in the first place. Both Alabama and New Jersey recognize the power of a court to order post-minority support for college education is statutory. Ex Parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986, 989 (Ala.1989); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J.Super. 26, 69 A.2d 752, 754 (App.Div.1949). While both of the states have general support statutes similar to ours, both the Alabama and New Jersey courts have interpreted children to mean dependent children, even if over the age of majority. Ex Parte Bayliss at 989; Cohen, 69 A.2d at 754. For us to reach this result, however, we must ignore N.D.C.C. § 14-10-01, which states the term “child” means “minor” and a minor is a person under 18. See Freyer v. Freyer, 427 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D.1988). Apparently, the Alabama and New Jersey courts were not so bound.
[¶ 44] Under the majority’s analysis, post-minority support is not limited to college expenses; there is no age limit on adult children eligible for support; there is no requirement a child be mentally or physically disabled; there is no requirement of a specific statutory authorization for a particular purpose. Under the majority’s analysis, except for. college expenses, apparently all that is required is the court determine the support to be “appropriate.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2(4).
[¶ 45] Under the majority’s analysis, a trial court in a divorce case could apparently order one or both parents to provide an allowance to their mentally and physically able middle-aged adult children as long as the court determines the support to be “appropriate.” And a trial court could order divorcing parents to treat all them adult children the same, by providing the same support for all, or equalizing for previous gifts as long as the court determines the support to be “appropriate.” Such decisions have previously belonged exclusively to the parents. See Mertz v. Arendt, 1997 ND 113, ¶ 16, 564 N.W.2d 294 (unequal gift to adult child upheld over challenge from siblings); Matter of Estate of Herr, 460 N.W.2d 699, 703 (N.D. 1990) (“a parent may disinherit children”); Flaherty v. Feldner, 419 N.W.2d 908, 911 (N.D.1988) (VandeWalle, J., concurring in result) (“a parent may, in his will, disinherit a child without laboring under an insane delusion”). Unfortunately, this clearly established law is apparently irrelevant under the majority analysis.
[¶ 46] I would reverse the district court’s order of support for an adult child.
[¶ 47] Dale V. Sandstrom