Court Opinion

ID: 9391588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 18:00:45.911558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.781035
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14266   Document: 45-1     Date Filed: 05/02/2023   Page: 1 of 19

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-14266
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        BRESHAWN HAMILTON,
        a.k.a. 2k20wit_rabbitt,
        a.k.a. rabbitt1340000,
        a.k.a. keysavage_22,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                         ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-14266

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60010-RS-1
                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
                Breshawn Hamilton appeals his total 40-year sentence and
        lifetime term of supervised release, imposed after he pleaded guilty
        to various counts of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity,
        sending extortionate interstate communications, and possessing
        and producing child pornography. On appeal, he argues that the
        District Court erred in applying an enhancement pursuant to
        U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4). The government responds that even if the
        District Court erred, the alleged error in calculating Hamilton’s
        guideline range was harmless because his total offense level would
        have remained the same without the enhancement. Hamilton also
        contends that the District Court erred by failing to separately state
        its reasons for imposing a lifetime term of supervised release. For
        the reasons explained below, we affirm the District Court’s sen-
        tence.
                                         I.
              A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a
        20-count superseding indictment against Breshawn Hamilton in
        2021. The grand jury indicted Hamilton on: five counts of entice-
        ment of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Counts 1
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        21-14266                   Opinion of the Court                               3

        through 5); five counts of production of child pornography, in vio-
        lation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Counts 6 through 10); three counts of
        receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
        (Counts 11 through 13); two counts of distribution of child pornog-
        raphy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Counts 14 and 15);
        three counts of sending extortionate interstate communications, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) (Counts 16 through 19); and one
        count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count 20).
              Hamilton pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19,
        and 20. In exchange, the remaining charges (Counts 2, 4, 5, 7, 11–
        15, and 17) were to be dismissed after sentencing. The District
        Court accepted the plea and adjudged Hamilton guilty.
                The probation office created a presentence investigation re-
        port (“PSR”) pertaining to Hamilton. In calculating Hamilton’s of-
        fense level, the PSR grouped Counts 1 and 16 into “Count Group
        1” because they involved the same victim, Victim 1. Likewise,
        Counts 9 and 18 were grouped into “Count Group 2,” as both per-
        tained to Victim 5. The remaining counts were not grouped, and
        each formed a “Count Group” on its own, each dealing with Ham-
        ilton’s conduct towards a specific and distinct victim.
              The offense levels for each Count Group are summarized
        below 1:

        1 The instant appeal only involves the calculation of the base offense level for
        Count Group 8. For that reason, we do not explain how the base offense level
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       21-14266

                              Count Group             Adjusted Offense
                                                           Level
                                      1                      40
                                      2                      38
                                      3                      40
                                      4                      38
                                      5                      40
                                      6                      40
                                      7                      18
                                      8                      46
                Count Group 8 contained Count 20 of the Indictment—pos-
        session of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The base offense level for a
        violation of § 2252(a)(4)(B) is 32. 2 Pursuant to § 2G2.1(b)(1), the
        PSR assessed a four-level increase because the offense involved a
        minor who was under 12 years old. The PSR also assigned Hamil-
        ton a two-level increase under § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) because the offense
        involved the commission of a sexual act or sexual contact, a two-
        level increase under § 2G2.1(b)(3) for knowingly engaging in distri-
        bution, and a two-level increase under § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) because the
        offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer

        for each count group was calculated. Because the calculation of Count Group
        8 is pertinent to Hamilton’s appeal, we do discuss in detail how that base of-
        fense level was calculated.
        2 The guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.
        The cross-reference at § 2G2.2(c)(1) is applicable here, which resulted in a base
        offense level of 32 under § 2G2.1(a).]
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        21-14266                   Opinion of the Court                               5

        service to engage in sexually explicit conduct with a minor. Finally,
        as relevant here, the PSR enhanced Hamilton’s base offense level
        by four levels because “the offense involved material that por-
        tray[ed] (A) sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of
        violence; or (B) sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or tod-
        dler.” § 2G2.2(b)(4). These enhancements resulted in an adjusted
        offense level of 46 for Count Group 8.
                Starting with Count Group 8, which was the highest offense
        level, the PSR then calculated the combined adjusted offense level
        for all count groups using § 3D1.4. 3 This four-level increase led to
        a combined adjusted offense level of 50. Under § 4B1.5(b)(1), that
        combined adjusted offense level received a five-level enhancement
        because Hamilton was a repeat and dangerous sex offender against
        minors. Hamilton also received a reduction of three levels for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1. Hamilton’s final total of-
        fense level was 52; however, pursuant to Chapter 5, Part A, of the
        Sentencing Guidelines, in instances where the total offense level is
        calculated in excess of 43, the offense level is to be treated as level
        43, so the PSR listed Hamilton’s total offense level as 43.
                Hamilton had zero criminal history points, which equated
        to a criminal history category of I. Based on a total offense level of
        43 and a criminal history category of I, the guideline imprisonment

        3 Under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a), “the combined offense level is determined by tak-
        ing the offense level applicable to the Group with the highest offense level and
        increasing that offense level” as described in below. See section II, infra.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   21-14266

        term, according to the PSR, was life. The guideline range for su-
        pervised release was five years to life.
               Hamilton filed numerous objections to the PSR. As relevant
        here, he objected to the enhancement for engaging in sadistic or
        masochistic conduct under § 2G2.1(b)(4), arguing that there was no
        evidence to support that enhancement. The government did not
        specifically address this objection in its response, simply saying:
        “See previous responses in opposition to Hamilton’s earlier objec-
        tions.” 4
               At sentencing, Hamilton’s counsel objected to the computa-
        tions of his total offense level, but agreed with the statutory maxi-
        mums for the charges. The government maintained that Hamil-
        ton’s offense level was properly calculated. The government fur-
        ther requested that the District Court overrule all of Hamilton’s
        objections to the PSR and impose a sentence of life. The Court
        overruled Hamilton’s objections to the PSR.
             After affording Hamilton his right of allocution, the Court
        imposed its sentence. The Court said:
               These were children involved here. . . . And I do have
               to consider still the factors under [18 U.S.C. §] 3553
               and also with respect to that he was 19 or 20, his age,
               but yet also the allegation that he has been a victim of
               sexual assault himself.

        4 It is unclear which responses the government was referring to with this
        statement, which also applied to 23 other objections made by Hamilton.
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        21-14266               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Hamilton’s age and status as a sexual assault victim, however, did
        not mitigate “the totality of the circumstances.” The Court also
        remarked that while Hamilton was a first-time offender, he was
        also not a “first time offender in the true sense” because there were
        seven young girls who had been victimized by Hamilton over a
        period of time.
                The Court stated that it would not grant Hamilton’s request
        for the statutory minimum sentence, but it did not feel that a life
        sentence was appropriate either, given Hamilton’s age and history.
        According to the Court, its job was to “sentence [Hamilton] to a
        sufficient time I think is reasonable, sufficient but not greater than
        necessary to achieve the factors, [and] that’s what I’m going to do.”
        The Court “considered the statements of all the parties, the presen-
        tence report, which contains the advisory guidelines and the statu-
        tory factors as set forth in 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).”
                The District Court sentenced Hamilton to 40 years’ impris-
        onment—40 years for each of Counts 1 and 3; 30 years each for
        Counts 6, 8, 9, and 10; two years for each of Counts 16, 18, and 19;
        and 20 years for Count 20, all to be served concurrently. Upon re-
        lease from prison, Hamilton would be placed on supervised release
        for a term of life. The Court asked the parties if there were objec-
        tions to the Court’s findings of fact or to the way the sentence was
        pronounced; defense counsel renewed its previously made objec-
        tions but otherwise made no additional objections. Final judgment
        was entered against Hamilton.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 21-14266

                Hamilton timely appealed. He raises two arguments on ap-
        peal. The first is that the District Court erred in overruling his ob-
        jection to the four-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4) be-
        cause he claims there was no evidence that the offense involved
        material portraying “sadistic or masochistic conduct or other de-
        pictions of violence” or “sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant
        or toddler.” § 2G2.1(b)(4). Second, Hamilton argues—for the first
        time on appeal—that the District Court erred because it did not
        state its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release of life.
        We address each argument in turn.
                                          II.
               Hamilton’s first argument on appeal—that the District
        Court erred in overruling his objection to the four-level increase in
        his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)—is a challenge
        to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We review a sen-
        tence’s reasonableness for abuse of discretion, regardless of
        whether that sentence falls inside or outside of the guideline range.
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
                To be procedurally reasonable, a district court must
        properly calculate the guideline range, treat the Sentencing Guide-
        lines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors, not consider clearly
        erroneous facts, and adequately explain the chosen sentence. Id.
        Because the Guidelines treat any offense level over 43 as being 43,
        an erroneous application of the Guidelines is harmless if the offense
        level otherwise stays above 43. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d
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        21-14266                Opinion of the Court                           9

        1191, 1220 n.39 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sanchez, 30 F.4th
        1063, 1076 (11th Cir. 2022).
               Under the 2018 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, when deter-
        mining the combined offense level, the district court must deter-
        mine the number of units by counting the highest offense level as
        one unit. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a) (2018). The court must then count
        any offense levels one to four levels less serious than the highest
        offense as one unit and any offense levels five to eight levels less
        serious as one-half unit. Id. §§ 3D1.4(a), (b). Any count group that
        is nine or more levels less serious than the count group with the
        highest offense level is disregarded and will not increase the appli-
        cable offense level. Id. § 3D1.4(c). Where the number of units is
        more than five, five levels should be added to the highest offense
        level. Id. In a case where the defendant’s offense is a covered sex
        crime and the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving
        prohibited sexual conduct, a five-level increase applies. 5 Id.
        § 4B1.5(b)(1). Any offense level that exceeds 43 is treated as an of-
        fense level of 43. Id., Ch. 5, Part A, cmt. (n.2).
              Although the guideline provision applicable to a defendant
        convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is ordinarily
        U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, “[i]f the offense involved causing, transporting,
        permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a mi-
        nor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of

        5 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) only applies in cases where neither § 4B1.1 nor
        § 4B1.5(a) apply. Neither of those guidelines are applicable to Hamilton.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14266

        producing a visual depiction of such conduct,” § 2G2.1 applies via
        cross-reference.6 Id. §§ 2G2.2(a), (c)(1). Under Application Note 7
        to § 2G2.2, the cross-reference in subsection (c)(1) is “to be con-
        strued broadly and includes all instances where the offense in-
        volved employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing,
        transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or adver-
        tisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the pur-
        pose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” Id.
        § 2G2.2, cmt. (n.7).
                Section 2G2.1 provides for a base offense level of 32.
        Id. § 2G2.1(a). A four-level enhancement applies if the offense in-
        volved a minor under the age of 12. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A). A
        two-level enhancement applies if the offense involved the commis-
        sion of sexual contact. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A). If the offense involved
        material that portrays either “(A) sadistic or masochistic conduct or
        other depictions of violence; or (B) an infant or toddler,” the of-
        fense level is increased by four levels. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(4). A two-
        level enhancement applies if the offense involved the use of a com-
        puter or an interactive computer service to persuade, induce, en-
        tice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of a minor to engage in sexually
        explicit conduct or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in
        such conduct. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B).

        6 The cross-reference only applies if the resulting offense level under § 2G2.1
        is greater than under § 2G2.2. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1).
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        21-14266               Opinion of the Court                      11

               Here, we need not address Hamilton’s claim that his con-
        duct did not merit an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D2.1(b)(4).
        Even if we assume that Hamilton is correct and recalculate his total
        offense level without the § 2D2.1(b)(4) enhancement, his total of-
        fense level would still be above the maximum contemplated by the
        Guidelines, resulting in the same advisory guideline range of 43.
        Section 2G2.1’s base level applies given Hamilton falls within the
        cross-reference from § 2G2.2(c)(1) to § 2G2.1, which Hamilton
        does not contest. The base level for Count Group 8 would still be
        32 under § 2G2.1(a). Hamilton would still have received a four-
        level enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(1), a two-level enhancement
        under § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A), a two-level enhancement under
        § 2G2.1(b)(3), and a two-level enhancement under
        § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B). This would make his subtotal for that count
        group 42. Based on § 3D1.4, the total number of units and resulting
        increase in offense level would still be four. When added to the
        greater adjusted base level, the resulting combined total would be
        46.
              Hamilton would still have received a five-level enhance-
        ment for engaging in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sex-
        ual conduct under § 4B1.5(b)(1) and a three-level reduction for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility under §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b). This would
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14266

        bring his total offense level to 48. 7 With or without the
        § 2D2.1(b)(4) enhancement, then, Hamilton’s total offense level is
        above 43—the maximum level contemplated by the Guidelines. As
        such, any error the District Court may have made in calculating
        Hamilton’s total offense level was harmless.
                                             III.
               We now turn to Hamilton’s second challenge—that the Dis-
        trict Court failed to state its reasons for the supervised release term
        it imposed, as Hamilton claims is required by 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(c)(1). A defendant’s challenge to a district court’s failure to
        comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) is reviewed de novo, even if the
        defendant did not object below. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d
        1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th
        1295, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2022).
               If a sentence is of the kind and within the range recom-
        mended by the Guidelines, and that range exceeds 24 months,
        § 3553(c)(1) requires a district court to state in open court the rea-
        sons for imposing its sentence at a particular point within the
        range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). The district court is not required to
        state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the
        § 3553(a) factors or discuss each of them. United States v.
        Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). “The sentencing

        7 Because Hamilton’s situation is one of the “rare cases” where a total offense
        level of more than 43 resulted from the Guidelines, his offense level would be
        treated as 43. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt. (n.2).
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        21-14266                    Opinion of the Court                                13

        judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]
        has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
        exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v.
        United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). A
        district court’s explanation of a sentence may be brief and may de-
        rive substance from the context of the record, the defendant’s his-
        tory and characteristics, and the parties’ arguments. Id. at 356–58,
        127 S. Ct. at 2468–69. In determining whether a district court’s
        statement of reasons complies with § 3553(c), we do not rely solely
        on the court’s summary statement at the close of the hearing but
        will instead review “the transcript of the sentencing hearing
        and . . . what transpired, taken together with the court’s closing re-
        marks.” United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir.
        1990).
               We have not held, in a published decision, that 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(c)(1) applies explicitly to terms of supervised release. 8 Sec-
        tion 3553(c) states that “[t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall
        state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
        sentence.” § 3553(c) (emphasis added). And according to 18 U.S.C.

        8 We have, however, applied § 3553(c) to a term of supervised release in un-
        published opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 754 F. App’x 858, 862
        (11th Cir. 2018). But in similar unpublished opinions, we have also applied the
        plain error standard rather than de novo review. See, e.g., United States v.
        Washington, 626 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the district
        court did not plainly err by failing to explain its decision to impose a three-year
        term of supervised release separately from its decision to sentence the defend-
        ant to 37 months’ imprisonment).
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        14                          Opinion of the Court                        21-14266

        § 3583(a), a district court “may include as a part of the sentence a
        requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised
        release after imprisonment. . . .” § 3583(a) (emphasis added). Su-
        pervised release, then, is one component of the sentence imposed
        by a district court. 9 Because § 3553(c) applies to the entire sen-
        tence, and the term of supervised release is part of that sentence,
        § 3553(c) necessarily applies to the term of supervised release as
        part of the sentence imposed. And under our decisions in Bonilla
        and Woodson, we review challenges to a district court’s compli-
        ance with § 3553(c) de novo, even if, as here, the defendant did not
        raise that argument below. See Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1181; Wood-
        son, 30 F.4th at 1307.
               Nothing in § 3553(c) requires a district court to make two
        separate explanations—one for the term of imprisonment and one
        for the term of supervised release. Every one of our sister circuits
        that has considered the issue agrees on that point. See United

        9 Hamilton acknowledges this point. See Appellant Br. at 41 (“A sentence of
        supervised release is part of the sentence imposed by the district court.”) (em-
        phasis added). Instead, Hamilton cites United States v. Veteto, 920 F.3d 823
        (11th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that a district court must “tailor its com-
        ments to show that the sentence [of supervised release] is appropriate, given
        the factors to be considered as set forth in § 3553(a).” Appellant Br. at 41–42
        (quoting Veteto, 920 F.2d at 826) (alteration in brief). But Veteto did not ad-
        dress the issue of a district court failing to give separate reasons for imprison-
        ment versus supervised release; in fact, it did not address supervised release at
        all. It dealt with a general challenge to the sufficiency of a district court’s ex-
        planation for its sentence.
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        21-14266                  Opinion of the Court                              15

        States v. Domínguez-Figueroa, 866 F.3d 481, 486 (1st Cir. 2017);
        United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496 502 (3d Cir. 2013); United States
        v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 2015); United States
        v. Presto, 498 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bloch,
        825 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d
        915, 922 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Penn, 601 F.3d 1007, 1011–
        12 (10th Cir. 2010).
                The reason a separate explanation is not required under
        § 3553(c) is fairly obvious. With the exception of punishment
        (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) and the kinds of sentences available (§ 3553(a)(3)),
        the factors to be considered in imposing a term of supervised re-
        lease are the same as the factors to be considered in imposing a
        term of imprisonment. Compare § 3583(c) with § 3553(a). 10 In
        fashioning the sentence, then, the district court considered all the
        evidence relevant to those factors when it determined the term of
        imprisonment—it had no additional information to consider in im-
        posing the term of supervised release. To require the court to me-
        chanically repeat its § 3553(a) findings would be redundant and in-
        efficient.
               To be sure, under § 3553(c)(1), a district court must suffi-
        ciently explain its reasons for imposing the sentence—including
        both imprisonment and supervised release—at any particular point

        10 “The court . . . in determining the length of the term . . . of supervised
        release, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
        (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14266

        within the guideline range. But a district court’s reasoning inevita-
        bly supports both the imprisonment and supervised release por-
        tions of the district court’s sentence. A district court need not ad-
        dress each component separately so long as it gives a sufficient ex-
        planation—that is, so long as the district court “set[s] forth enough
        to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ ar-
        guments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal de-
        cisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.
               The District Court was required to sentence Hamilton to a
        supervised release term between five years and life. 11 As noted, in
        determining the term of supervised release the Court had to con-
        sider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
        and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1)), general deter-
        rence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), specific deterrence and protection of the
        public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), the defendant’s need for educational or vo-
        cational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
        (§ 3553(a)(2)(D)), pertinent policy statements (§ 3553(a)(5)), the
        need to avoid sentence disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)), and restitution to
        victims (§ 3553(a)(7)). § 3583(b).
               Here, the District Court did just that. Hamilton argues that
        the District Court “stated no reason at all for imposing a supervised
        release term of ‘life’ on Mr. Hamilton,” Appellant Br. at 42, and that
        the reasons given by the Court “did not address the supervised

        11 “[T]he authorized term of supervised release . . . under section . . .
        2252 . . . is any term of years not less than 5, or life.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).
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        21-14266                Opinion of the Court                        17

        release portion of the sentence.” Id. While the District Court did
        not separately address the § 3553(a) factors specifically with respect
        to the term of supervised release, it gave many reasons for impos-
        ing its overall sentence—reasons that applied as much to the term
        of imprisonment as to the term of supervised release. This was all
        the Court was required to do.
               The Court had all the evidence available in considering the
        need for the sentence, and thus the term of supervised release, to
        provide general and specific deterrence. The Court’s reasoning in-
        dicates that it gave thoughtful consideration to Hamilton’s age, sta-
        tus as a first-time offender, and his prior sexual abuse, but was also
        concerned that he had abused more children than the government
        knew about and even more concerned for the safety of children
        should Hamilton not be supervised post-release. To accommodate
        these dueling concerns, the District Court imposed a much shorter
        term of imprisonment than the guidelines called for, but coupled it
        with a lifetime term of supervised release.
               Hamilton is not without recourse, and is not necessarily
        locked into a lifetime term of supervised release. The Sentencing
        Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1987, gives district
        courts flexibility to address post-release changes and issues with re-
        spect to supervised release. According to the Sentencing Reform
        Act, a district court may:
               modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of super-
               vised release, at any time prior to the expiration of the
               term of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions
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        18                          Opinion of the Court                        21-14266

                of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12 relating
                to the modification of probation and the provisions
                available to the initial setting of the terms and condi-
                tions of post-release supervision.
        § 3583(e)(2).
               Before it may exercise this discretion, the district court must
        consider “the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
        (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)”—the same fac-
        tors that it must consider when imposing a term of supervised re-
        lease in the first place. § 3583(e). The difference is that in consid-
        ering whether to revise the term of supervised release at a later
        time, a district court can take into account evidence not available
        when it initially fashioned its sentence. 13 Hamilton may petition
        the District Court to modify his term of supervised release in the
        future. 14 See United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 937 (11th Cir.

        12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c)provides procedural guidelines
        for modification of supervised release.
        13 This flexibility to refashion the term of supervised release “at any time” is
        unique and is not something a district court can do with respect to a term of
        imprisonment. A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defend-
        ant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a statute or rule.”
        United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2015). 18 U.S.C.
        § 3583(e)(2) provides this authority for supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
        outlines the very limited circumstances under which modification of a sen-
        tence of imprisonment might be appropriate.
        14 After he serves at least one year of his supervised release, Hamilton may
        also petition the District Court to terminate his term of supervised release,
        “pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relat-
        ing to the modification of probation, if [the District Court] is satisfied that such
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        21-14266                  Opinion of the Court                            19

        2016). The District Court may also act to modify Hamilton’s su-
        pervised release without a motion from Hamilton.15
                In sum, the District Court’s statement of reasons complied
        with § 3553(c)(1). It explained which of the § 3553(a) factors it
        found most persuasive and stated that it had considered the parties’
        arguments and the PSR in sentencing Hamilton. The Court also
        indicated that, in determining its sentence, it considered Hamil-
        ton’s age, as well as Hamilton’s claim that he had been a victim of
        sexual assault himself. This explanation was sufficient as to Ham-
        ilton’s overall sentence, which was comprised of a term of impris-
        onment of 40 years and a lifetime term of supervised release.
               AFFIRMED.

        action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest
        of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
        15 This would most likely occur upon recommendation of the probation office
        or United States Attorney’s office. In such a scenario, though, the District
        Court would be required to hold a hearing—at which Hamilton would have
        the right to counsel and an opportunity to speak and present evidence on his
        own behalf—prior to modifying the conditions of his supervised release. See
        Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(1).