Court Opinion

ID: 9576250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:22:18.219008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:31.344807
License: Public Domain

Judge Timmons-Goodson
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. While I believe that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Mr. Hightower was murdered during the commission of an armed robbery, I do not believe that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant perpetrated these crimes. Therefore, the trial court should have allowed defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder.
A motion to dismiss is properly denied only “[i]f there is substantial evidence — whether direct, circumstantial, or both — to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). “Substantial evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Pryor, 59 N.C. App. 1, 5, 295 S.E.2d 610, 614 (1982). Thus, to be “substantial,” the evidence of guilt “must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary.” State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 361, 444 S.E.2d 879, 902 (1994), grant of post-conviction relief aff'd, 352 N.C. 336, 532 S.E.2d 179 (2000).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most beneficial to the State. State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998). Exculpatory evidence offered by the defendant is not taken into account, except to the extent that it explains, clarifies, or coincides with the State’s body of facts. State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 535, 308 S.E.2d 258, 262-63 (1983). Additionally, although the propriety of dismissal turns on the peculiar facts of the case under consideration, prior decisions can be instructive as to whether the court should have granted a motion to dismiss given a particular set of circumstances. See State v. White, 293 N.C. 91, 235 S.E.2d 55 (1977) (relying on case with strikingly similar facts as support for decision reversing denial of motion for nonsuit).
At trial, the premise of the State’s theory was the “felony murder rule,” pursuant to which a murder committed during the perpetration *394of a felony is “deemed to be murder in the first degree.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1999). According to the State, the underlying felony was armed robbery — the unlawful taking or attempted taking of “ ‘personal property from another or from any place of business’ with the possession, use, or threatened use of a [dangerous weapon].” State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 280, 498 S.E.2d 823, 832 (1998) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a)(1993)). Hence, to withstand defendant’s motion for dismissal, it was incumbent upon the State to come forward with substantial evidence that defendant killed Mr. Hightower while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an armed robbery of the victim or the convenience store. In my judgment, the State failed to meet this burden.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed that at or near 9:00 a.m. on the morning of 17 July 1996, defendant entered the Simply Amazing Grocery Store in Gastonia, North Carolina, wearing a pair of black Nike tennis shoes. Minutes later, the body of Max Hightower, an employee of the store, was discovered lying in a pool of blood behind the counter. The victim had been brutally beaten about the head and face. His blood covered the immediate area within three feet of the body and spattered the adjacent wall nearly forty inches up from the floor. Nike shoe impressions consistent with the shoes worn by defendant were found in the blood surrounding the body, and a bloody Nike shoe print was visible on the front of the victim’s T-shirt. The cash register emitted a beeping noise, signaling that it had been improperly used, and roughly eight to twelve two-dollar-bills had been taken from a plastic container kept under the counter. A large wooden stick, covered on one end with the victim’s blood, was found in a grassy area beside the store.
Defendant, after initially denying his presence, admitted that he had been in the convenience store on the morning of the murder. His statements to the police and his testimony at trial revealed that he arrived at the store after the victim had been attacked. When he saw the victim’s body, he went behind the counter to render assistance, but became frightened when the victim’s hand moved toward him. Defendant kicked at the victim’s chest to keep him from rising. As he backed away from the victim’s body, he stumbled over a large stick, knocking a pack of cigarettes onto the floor. In his haste to leave, defendant grabbed the stick and the cigarettes and ran out the door. Once outside, he threw the stick beside the building and fled.
Defendant’s evidence further showed that witnesses observed one or more individuals not matching his description waiting in front *395of the store at or near the time of the crimes. Additionally, while the investigation uncovered several latent fingerprints from items on and around the counter, none of the prints collected at the scene were found to match those of defendant. Moreover, in view of the State’s theory that defendant’s financial needs motivated him to commit these crimes, I think it significant that investigators found a handgun under the counter, several dollars in rolled coins stacked behind the cash register, and nearly $300 in cash in the victim’s wallet. Similarly, despite the evidence that the area immediately surrounding the body was covered with the victim’s blood, forensic testing did not indicate the presence of blood anywhere on defendant’s tennis shoes, nor did the tests reveal that the shoes had been cleaned.
The majority, in concluding that the State’s evidence was sufficient to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss, failed to give defendant’s exculpatory evidence due consideration. In my opinion, the majority’s indifference to the evidence tending to absolve defendant of guilt is contrary to our Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 308 S.E.2d 258. In Bates, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule. The State’s theory was that the defendant murdered the victim during his attempt to rob the victim of personal property found at the scene.
The evidence revealed that on the night of the incident, the defendant arrived at the home of Mary Godwin in a battered and agitated state. His “clothing was covered with blood and dirt.” Id. at 530, 308 S.E.2d at 260. According to Mrs. Godwin, “[the] defendant appeared to be severely injured and was pleading for help.” Id. In a field approximately 300 feet from the Godwin residence, law enforcement officers found the body of Roy Warren lying next to an automobile. Several scuff marks were visible in the soil surrounding the body, and spots of blood appeared on the side of the car. Articles of personal property belonging to both the defendant and the victim were scattered about an area approximately seventy feet away from the body. There, additional scuff marks were found, as was blood consistent with the blood types of both the defendant and the victim. The officers also located a .22 caliber revolver lying amidst the other personal items. An autopsy subsequently performed on the body revealed that the victim had endured several small cuts and abrasions, thirty-two stab wounds, and two gunshot wounds inflicted at close range.
The defendant testified that he had given the victim his mother’s gun in exchange for $30.00. He stated that on the day of the incident, *396he asked the victim to return the gun, because his mother had discovered it missing. The victim agreed, and the two made arrangements to meet at a field near the defendant’s house. Later, the victim arrived as planned, but refused to return the gun unless the defendant returned the $30.00. An argument ensued, and when defendant turned to leave, the victim stabbed him in the back. The defendant stumbled, regained his balance, and started running toward the nearest house. The victim then fired two warning shots and threatened to kill the defendant if he did not stop running.
The defendant stopped in the area where the personal items were later found. The victim caught up with the defendant and struck him in the head with the gun. The victim then threw the defendant to the ground, and the two began to fight. When the defendant tried to wrestle the gun away from the victim, it discharged, enabling the defendant to free himself and crawl back to the car. As the defendant was entering the vehicle, the victim grabbed him from behind and pulled him to the ground. Another struggle occurred, and the defendant received a second stab wound to the chest. The defendant pulled the knife from his chest and stabbed the victim repeatedly. The victim eventually released him, and the defendant made his way to the Godwin residence.
The Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant’s testimony did not contradict the prosecution’s case in any way, “[the] testimony in its entirety [was to] be characterized as a clarification of the State’s testimonial and physical evidence.” Id. at 535, 308 S.E.2d at 263. The Court then reversed the defendant’s conviction based on the following reasoning:
When defendant’s explanatory testimony is considered along with the physical evidence presented by the State, the logical inference is that the decedent lost the[] items of personal property during the struggle with defendant. There is simply no substantial evidence of a taking by defendant with the intent to permanently deprive [the victim] of the property. We therefore hold that defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with the dangerous weapon should have been granted. . . . Because there was insufficient evidence to support the commission of the underlying felony, there is also insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of felony murder.

Id.

*397Applying the reasoning in Nates to the case before us, defendant’s testimony, which is entirely harmonious with the State’s physical and testimonial evidence, clarifies the facts presented. Thus, the logical inference arising from the evidence is that defendant happened upon the scene of a brutal crime, that he became frightened after attempting to render assistance, that he tripped over the murder weapon in his haste to leave, and that he grabbed the weapon and ran out of the store. While the State’s evidence, “taken in the strongest view adverse to defendant,... ‘excite[s] suspicion in the just mind that he is guilty, . . . such view is far from excluding the rational conclusion that some other unknown person may be the guilty party.’ ” State v. Lee, 294 N.C. 299, 303, 240 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1978) (quoting State v. Goodson, 107 N.C. 798, 12 S.E. 329 (1890)).
In sum, it is my opinion that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant committed the crimes against Mr. Hightower and, thus, the court should have granted his motion to dismiss. Accordingly, I vote to vacate defendant’s conviction and remand this matter to the Superior Court for a new trial.