Court Opinion

ID: 9576442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:24:25.257068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:42.535253
License: Public Domain

Judge CRISWELL
dissenting.
My view of this record convinces me that the evidence here failed to provide a proper basis for the appointment of a guardian for the minor. Thus, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the order of appointment.
It is conceded that the mother is not an unfit parent. While the evidence would support the inference that she may have misused some of the funds provided by the minor’s father for his support, all of the parties, including the mother, have agreed to the appointment of a financial institution as the guardian of the minor’s property. Hence, any past financial transgressions will not reoccur, and the remedy for any past actions is not the appointment of a guardian of the person of the minor.
Also, while it may well be that the mother responded with immaturity to her teenage son’s efforts at independence, such immaturity as she may have exhibited has had little adverse effect upon her son. He is well-adjusted and has had, over the years, an exemplary school record.
Section 15-14-204(1), C.R.S.1999, provides that, if the court “finds it will be in the best interests of the minor,” a guardian may be appointed for that minor, providing the court also finds that: (a) “the parent-child legal relationship has been terminated;” (b) the legal custody of the minor has been suspended by court order; (c) the minor “is found to have been abandoned by the parents;” or (d) the parents request the appointment of such a guardian.
Section 15-14-207(2), C.R.S.1999, then provides that, if “the requirements of section 15-14-204 have been met, and the welfare and best interests of the minor will be served,” the court may appoint such a guardian. (Emphasis added) This statute also provides that:
In other cases the court may dismiss the proceedings or make any other disposition of the matter that will best serve the interest of the minor. (Emphasis added)
Finally, § 15-14-207(3), C.R.S.1999, authorizes the court to appoint a “temporary *792guardian” for a period not to exceed nine months if such appointment is “necessary.”
Here, except for the assertion that the mother has been guilty of “emotional abandonment,” there is no claim that any of the requirements of § 15-14-204(1) for the appointment of a guardian has been established by the evidence. And, the majority has properly refused to interpret this statute to include this concept. Not only is there no evidence of a legislative intent to include that concept within the otherwise well-accepted meaning of the term “abandonment,” but had there existed such an intent, the General Assembly has failed to promulgate sufficient standards to determine when such an “emotional abandonment” is to be deemed to have occurred. The present statute, therefore, fails to place anyone on notice of when the appointment of a guardian on this basis is justified.
Further, I cannot conclude that § 15-14-207(2), in authorizing the court in “other cases” (i.e., when proof of the existence of the criteria established by § 15-14-204(1) has not been made) to make “any other disposition,” authorizes the appointment of a guardian whether or not the statutory criteria are found to exist. While the statute does not specifically delineate the nature of such “other disposition,” I am convinced that it does not include the actions taken by the court here.
Finally, while § 15-14-207(3), C.R.S.1999, authorizes the appointment of a temporary guardian “if necessary,” I would hold that this statute authorizes such an appointment only if there is no parent available to act as a natural guardian, or if an emergency exists and such a temporary guardian is required during the pendency of proceedings to determine whether any of the necessary requirements for the appointment of a guardian exist.
With respect to this latter subject, however, there is nothing in the court’s order to suggest that the appointment here was only of a temporary guardian under § 15 — 14— 207(3). On the contrary, the court relied upon the theory of an “emotional abandonment” under § 15-14-204(1) and the provisions of § 15-14-207(2) to justify the order entered by it. In addition, none of the parties before us has argued that the court’s order can be justified based upon its authority to appoint a temporary guardian. Such a theory is one that has been adopted by the majority on a wholly “non parte” basis.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s order of appointment.