Court Opinion

ID: 9412043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:31.567548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:25.237391
License: Public Domain

J-S14028-23

                                   2023 PA Super 133

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CLINTON REED KUHLMAN                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1063 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 22, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-04-CR-0000160-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED: July 27, 2023

       Appellant, Clinton Reed Kuhlman, appeals pro se from the aggregate,

mandatory judgment of sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration, imposed

after he was convicted, following a non-jury trial, of 58 counts of possession

of child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and one count of criminal use of

a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).         After careful review, we

affirm.

       The facts and procedural history of this case stem from another case in

which Appellant was convicted, in 2015, of five counts of sexual abuse of

children (dissemination of photographs, videotapes, computer depictions and

films), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(c), ten counts of sexual abuse of children (child

pornography), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and one count of criminal use of a

communication facility. For these convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S14028-23

aggregate term of incarceration of one year less one day to two years less one

day, followed by ten years’ probation.

      In 2016, Appellant was released and began serving his term of

probation. Shortly after his release, Probation Officer Chris Sturgeon (“P.O.

Sturgeon”) met with Appellant to review the written rules of his supervision,

which included the following:

      1. You must successfully enroll in and complete a [c]ourt[-
      ]approved sexual offender treatment/counseling program. During
      the course of your therapy, you must complete any and all
      assessments or evaluations required by your treatment provider
      which may include a polygraph examination. You will comply with
      all conditions and recommendations of your treatment provider.
      You will pay all fees associated with the treatment program.

      6. You will not own, possess, or view any photographs, magazines,
      movies, websites, e-mails, D.V.D.[]s or videotapes depicting nude
      or partially nude men, women, or children. You will not access
      any sexually explicit telephone services. I understand that Beaver
      County Adult Probation Department has the authority to search
      and seize any materials that exist on my person, place, residence
      and/or vehicle without warrant if there is reasonable suspicion
      that these types of materials exist.

      8. Access to the Internet is limited to legitimate and business
      purposes only. You will submit to a search of your computer or
      any computer that you have access to for any violations
      throughout your supervision. Your computer may be seized for
      the purpose of this search and if any information on your computer
      violates the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the
      search may cease, and the proper law enforcement agencies will
      be notified.

      9. You may be subjected to and agree to Remote Internet
      Monitoring. You will pay all fees associated with this program.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9.

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       In 2020, a sexual-offender evaluation of Appellant was completed by

Julia Lindemuth, who is an approved therapist for sexual offenders by the

Sexual Offender Assessment Board.1

       On February 13, 2020, … Lindemuth emailed P.O. Sturgeon
       expressing concern that [Appellant] had unmonitored access to
       the internet and could potentially be viewing child pornography.
       In her email, Lindemuth advised P.O. Sturgeon that [Appellant]
       was cooperative, but minimized his responsibility and continued
       to claim that he did not know viewing child pornography was
       illegal. She further advised the probation officer that unmonitored
       internet access was potentially problematic for an online offender.
       [] Lindemuth told P.O. Sturgeon that Lindemuth is also employed
       as an evaluator by the Sexual Offender Board, a position that
       requires her to use her expertise to determine whether a
       defendant meets the criteria of a violent sexual offender.

       [Appellant] had told her he could not access the internet due to
       his illness. He also reported that he did not use the internet but
       would assist his mother on the computer. Furthermore, the
       therapist recommended [that] the probation officer … do a home
       visit and take a look at the computer history of [Appellant].

       After receiving this information, P.O. Sturgeon obtained
       permission from the head of Beaver County Adult Probation, Don
       Neill, to do a field visit of [Appellant’s] residence in order to follow
       up on the concerns of the therapist. On February 18, 2020, P.O.
       Sturgeon went to [Appellant’s] residence at 813 Coleman Drive at
       10:30 a.m. where he lived with his elderly mother. Present was
       fellow probation officer Ian Thomas and the Chief of Police of
       Rochester Township.            After several minutes[,] [Appellant]
       answered the door. P.O. Sturgeon explained that she was there
       to look at [Appellant’s] computers to see if he was currently
       viewing any form of pornography. [Appellant] was cooperative,
       consented to the field visit, and provided P.O. Sturgeon access to
       his Android phone and the locations of the two computers inside
       his residence.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s evaluation was delayed due to the fact that he had extensive
brain surgery to remove a tumor. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.

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     [Appellant’s] residence had a main floor, containing a kitchen,
     living room, and a couple of sitting areas, as well as a partially
     finished basement. The first computer was located on the main
     floor of the residence and, after review, [P.O.] Sturgeon testified
     that there was nothing inappropriate on that computer.

     When [P.O.] Sturgeon asked [Appellant] where his bedroom was,
     [Appellant] led her downstairs to a partially finished basement.
     The basement was partitioned, with the left-hand[]side containing
     [Appellant’s] bedroom and the right-hand[]side containing a
     utilities area. The second computer was located in an area of
     [Appellant’s] bedroom. When the probation officers examined the
     computer, they immediately began to see “pornography and child
     sex abuse images” on the computer. Upon viewing the images,
     P.O. Sturgeon testified that the probation officers immediately
     stopped the search and contacted their supervisor to advise them
     of the potential violation of [Appellant’s] rules of supervision.
     [Appellant] was detained for violation of his supervision rules.

     Subsequently, the Pennsylvania State Police obtained a search
     warrant to search [Appellant’s] computer.        The forensic
     examination of that computer revealed 58 photographs of child
     pornography on [Appellant’s] computer.

Id. at 10-12 (citations to the reproduced record omitted).

     Appellant was subsequently charged with 58 counts of possession of

child pornography and one count of criminal use of a communication facility.

On August 12, 2021, he filed a pretrial motion to suppress, arguing that the

evidence supporting his charges was the product of an illegal search and

seizure because P.O. Sturgeon lacked reasonable suspicion that his computer

contained contraband.     On April 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a

suppression hearing. On April 26, 2022, the court issued an order and opinion

denying Appellant’s suppression motion. The case proceeded to a non-jury

trial, at the close of which Appellant was convicted of all charges. He was

sentenced on August 22, 2022, to the aggregate term set forth supra.

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       On September 14, 2022, Appellant, who at the time was represented by

counsel, filed the instant, pro se appeal challenging his judgment of sentence.

On September 21, 2022, counsel for Appellant filed a second appeal, docketed

at 1109 WDA 2022, challenging the same judgment of sentence at the same

trial court docket.2 As the appeals appeared duplicative, this Court, on

November 1, 2022, entered a Rule to Show Cause Order at the instant appeal

directing pro se Appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be

dismissed as duplicative to the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022.

       On November 10, 2022, Appellant filed an application requesting that

the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 be dismissed.           Appellant explained he had

requested counsel withdraw immediately after sentencing, but that counsel

had failed to do so and instead filed the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022. Because

of this, Appellant requested the unwanted appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 be

dismissed as duplicative.        Therefore, on November 18, 2022, this Court

entered an order dismissing the appeal at 1109 WDA 2022 as duplicative to

the instant appeal.

       After Appellant filed his notice of appeal, the trial court directed him to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

and he timely complied. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, indicating

____________________________________________

2 We note that counsel was permitted to withdraw by this Court, at 1109 WDA

2022, on November 10, 2022, following an October 25, 2022 trial court order
which permitted counsel to withdraw following a hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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that it was relying on its April 26, 2022 suppression opinion to address

Appellant’s claims.

      Herein, Appellant states three issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court err[ed in denying the suppression
      motion (evidence seized from [Appellant’s] computer) as [P.O.] …
      Sturgeon did not have a reasonable suspicion that the computer
      contained contraband or that [Appellant] violated the conditions
      of his supervision in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.[] §[]9912(d)(2),
      Pennsylvania Const. Art. 1[]§[]8 and/or U.S. Const. Amend. 4?

      2. Whether the Commonwealth committed [p]rosecutorial
      [m]isconduct during the suppressi[on] hearing and violate[d
      Appellant’s] 14th [A]mendment rights to due process[ w]hen [it]
      presented, used or should have known the testimony from [P.O.]
      … Sturgeon, pursuant to Julia Lindemuth, was false[?]

      3. Whether the trial court err[ed] by relying on [P.O.] …
      Sturgeon[’s] perjuried [sic] and false testimony to deny the
      suppression motion[,n]amely, the testimony surrounding Julia
      Lindemuth[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

      In Appellant’s first issue, he contends that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress.

      An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
      to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
      whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
      the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
      facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
      the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
      supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
      findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
      erroneous.    Where the appeal of the determination of the
      suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
      suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an

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       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned

up).

       Instantly, Appellant contends that the evidence of child pornography

recovered from his computer should have been suppressed because P.O.

Sturgeon lacked reasonable suspicion to search the computer. According to

Appellant, the sole basis for the search was Lindemuth’s email, which he

claims used only vague and uncertain language that showed a “mere

suspicion, not reasonable suspicion.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He argues that,

unlike other cases where we found reasonable suspicion to search a

parolee/probationer, here, there was no “specific and articulable facts based

off of … personal knowledge and observations of criminal activity and

probation violations” to show that P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable suspicion to

search his computer. See id. at 15-16 (citing Commonwealth v. Banks,

249 A.3d 1146 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (concluding

that reasonable suspicion existed to search Banks, who had committed parole

violations on other occasions, based on a call from his cousin informing Banks’

parole officer that Banks was selling narcotics out of his home, that he had

firearms, and there were known gang members going in and out of his

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residence);3 Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(finding that a probation officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and search

Moore after receiving a tip from a known, reliable informant that Moore had

crack cocaine on his person and was located in an area of high drug activity,

and the officer observed Moore in that location)). Appellant insists that, unlike

in Banks or Moore, here, “Lindemuth[’]s email did not specify or articulate

facts of criminal activity or probation violations to establish reasonable

suspicion.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Therefore, he contends that the court

should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence found on his

computer.

       In rejecting Appellant’s suppression argument, the trial court reasoned

as follows:

       The aim of probation and parole is to rehabilitate and reintegrate
       a lawbreaker into society as a law-abiding citizen.
       Commonwealth v. Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1212 (Pa. Super.
       2012).    The institution of probation and parole assumes a
       probationer or parolee is more likely than the ordinary citizen to
       violate the law. Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 619
       (Pa. Super. 2002). Consequently, probationers and parolees have
       limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished
       expectation of privacy. Id. See also Chambers, supra (stating
       probationers’ and parolees’ Fourth Amendment constitutional
       rights are virtually indistinguishable).      The Superior Court
       explained that probation officers, like parole officers[,]

          [a]re in a supervisory relationship with their offenders. The
          purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in their
____________________________________________

3 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, non-

precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1,
2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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       rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to
       protect the public. Supervision practices shall reflect the
       balance of enforcement of the conditions of parole and case
       management techniques to maximize successful parole
       completion through effective reentry to society. As such,
       probationers and parolees are subject to general and
       individual rules of conduct and supervision described at
       sentencing and/or in the parole agreement.

     Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 536 (Pa. Super. 2014).
     See also Commonwealth v. Cruz-Rivera, 249 A.3d 1125 (Pa.
     Super. 2021).

     The statute governing the supervisory relationship between
     probation officers and probationers and the rights of the
     probationers, in effect at the time of the search in this case,
     provided in relevant part:

     42 Pa.C.S.[]§[]9912, the statute governing probationers, states
     in pertinent part:

       (a) General rule.-- Officers are in a supervisory relationship
       with their offenders. The purpose of this supervision is to
       assist the offenders in their rehabilitation and reassimilation
       into the community and to protect the public.

       (b) Searches and seizures authorized. --

              (1) Officers and, where they are responsible for
              the supervision of county offenders, State
              parole agents may search the person and
              property of offenders in accordance with the
              provisions of this section.[]

                                     ***

              (2)(iii) Nothing in this section shall be construed
              to permit searches and seizures in violation of
              the Constitution of the United States or section
              8 of Article I of the Constitution of
              Pennsylvania.[]

                                     ***

       (d)(2) A property search may be conducted by an officer if
       there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other
       property in the possession of or under the control of the

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        offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations
        of the conditions of supervision.[]

                                      ***

        (d)(6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall
        be determined in accordance with constitutional search and
        seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision.      In
        accordance with such case law, the following factors, where
        applicable, may be taken into account:

           (i) The observations of officers.

           (ii) Information provided by others.

           (iii) The activities of the offender.

           (iv) Information provided by the offender.

           (v) The experience of the officers with the offender.

           (vi)  The   experience       of     officers    in     similar
           circumstances.

           (vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the
           offender.

           (viii) The need to verify          compliance        with   the
           conditions of supervision.

     In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2013), the
     Supreme Court explained:

        Section 9912(d)(2) is a specific provision addressing a
        narrow circumstance: the conditions under which a county
        probation officer may conduct a warrantless search,
        including a requirement that the probation officer must
        possess reasonable suspicion that the property contains
        contraband or other evidence of violations of the
        probationer’s terms of probation. The provision is clear and
        unambiguous and lists no exception. The reason for the
        restrictions … are obvious: searches implicate constitutional
        rights (even though the Fourth Amendment rights of
        probationers are diminished).

     [Id. at 744.]

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                                     ***

     “The policy behind [Section 9912] is to assist the offenders in their
     rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to
     protect the public.” Moore, supra at 620 (emphasis [omitted]).
     “Essentially, Section 9912 authorizes county probation officers to
     search a probationer’s person or property, if there is reasonable
     suspicion to believe the probationer possesses contraband or
     other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.”
     Chambers, supra at 1214[] (citing 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9912(d)(1)(i),
     (d)(2)). “Reasonable suspicion to search must be determined
     consistent with constitutional search and seizure provisions as
     applied by judicial decisions; and in accordance with such case
     law, enumerated factors, where applicable, may be taken into
     account.” [Id.] (citing 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9912(d)(6)).

     In establishing reasonable suspicion, the fundamental inquiry is
     an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer
     at the moment of the intrusion warrant a [person] of reasonable
     caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. This
     assessment, like that applicable to the determination of probable
     cause, requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances,
     with a lesser showing needed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion
     in terms of both quantity or content and reliability. Moore, supra
     at 619-20[] (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     “[T]he threshold question in cases such as this is whether the
     probation officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or
     a violation of probation prior to the … search.” In re J.E., 907
     A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, the fact that a
     probationer signs a consent form permitting warrantless searches
     as a term of his probation is insufficient to permit a search absent
     reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 1120. Rather, the
     probationer’s signature acts as acknowledgment that the
     probation officer “has a right to conduct reasonable searches of
     [the probationer’s] residence listed on the [probation] agreement
     without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. [] Williams, [692 A.2d
     1031, 1036] … ([Pa.] 1997).

     The [c]ourt finds in light of the totality of the circumstances that
     P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable suspicion regarding whether
     [Appellant] was using the internet for non-legitimate business
     purposes and whether he was in possession of child pornography
     as prohibited under the Rules for Sexual Offenders. In this case,

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     P.O. Sturgeon was supervising [Appellant] with knowledge that he
     had been convicted of [five] counts of distribution of child
     pornography, [ten] counts of possession of child pornography, and
     [one] count of criminal communications facility.

     The [c]ourt also finds critical that … Lindenmuth--the board-
     certified therapist for [Appellant’s] sexual offender treatment--
     evaluated [Appellant] for sexual offender treatment in light of her
     clinical judgement and experience. Based upon this expert
     evaluation, … Lindemuth was concerned that [Appellant] had
     unmonitored access to a computer. … Lindemuth was further
     concerned that [Appellant] continued to minimize his
     responsibility for distribution and possession of child pornography
     by continuing to state that he did not know that it was illegal to
     view child pornography.        [Appellant’s] evasive explanations,
     viewed in the light of … Lindenmuth’s professional experience,
     reasonably put the therapist on notice that [Appellant] could be
     the violating the rules of supervision. These red flags resulted in
     … Lindemuth[’s] emailing P.O. Sturgeon, expressing her
     concerns[,] and recommending that inspection of [Appellant’s]
     computers be conducted to determine whether he was in
     compliance with the sex offender rules of Beaver County
     Probation. The same day [P.O.] Sturgeon received the email, she
     received authorization from [the Head of Adult Probation,] Don
     Neill[,] to do the home inspection.

     The [c]ourt further notes, in assessing the totality of the
     circumstances, that when P.O. Sturgeon went to [Appellant’s]
     residence, [Appellant] answered the door and was informed by
     the probation officer why she was there.           She explained
     specifically why she wanted to inspect his home, and [Appellant]
     gave full permission to allow her to enter his residence. The
     [c]ourt further notes that it was [Appellant], rather than anyone
     else, who informed the probation officer that there was one
     computer upstairs and a second computer in his basement
     bedroom.

     The [c]ourt also notes the limited basis of the search. When the
     probation officers went downstairs to [Appellant’s] bedroom, and
     they initially saw the pornographic images which were apparent
     from their face, they immediately stopped the search and
     contacted their supervisor, who then contacted the Pennsylvania
     state police.

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      Finally, the [c]ourt finds persuasive that the search warrant is
      otherwise uncontested by both the Commonwealth and the
      [d]efense. Considering this evidence in light of the totality of the
      circumstances, the [c]ourt concludes that there was reasonable
      suspicion to conduct the warrantless search.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/22, at 7-11.

      We agree with the trial court that P.O. Sturgeon had reasonable

suspicion to search Appellant’s computer based on the totality of the

circumstances known to her. Namely, Appellant was serving probation for

committing crimes of possessing and disseminating child pornography using

the internet. Lindemuth notified P.O. Sturgeon that she felt Appellant was

minimizing his responsibility for those crimes and being evasive, which raised

‘red flags’ for her when she discovered that Appellant had unmonitored

internet access.     Appellant’s probation conditions expressly permitted P.O.

Sturgeon to conduct a warrantless search of Appellant’s person and residence,

and Appellant consented to P.O. Sturgeon’s entry into his home.        Further,

Appellant informed P.O. Sturgeon where his two computers were located after

she explained to him why she was there. The totality of these circumstances

show that P.O. Sturgeon possessed reasonable suspicion that contraband or

evidence of a probation violation would be found on Appellant’s computer, and

that her search thereof was within the bounds of her authority as Appellant’s

probation officer.    See Commonwealth v. Sperber, 177 A.3d 212 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (finding a parole officer had reasonable suspicion to search

Sperber’s person, car, and phone where police had an anonymous tip and

reports from other parolees that Sperber had a smart phone and was

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accessing social media; Sperber had been previously convicted of child-

pornography offenses; Sperber’s conditions of parole provided for warrantless

searches of his person and property; and Sperber voluntarily consented to the

search). Thus, Appellant’s first issue is meritless.

      In Appellant’s next issue, he claims that the Commonwealth committed

prosecutorial misconduct and “violated his due process rights by presenting

P.O. Sturgeon[’s] perjured testimony at the [s]uppression hearing and trial….”

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. According to Appellant, in February of 2021, he

was found to be in violation of his probationary term by “refusing and fail[ing]

to complete the sexual offender program ordered by the” trial court, yet at

the suppression hearing in this case, P.O. Sturgeon “testified that [Appellant]

was compliant with the program.” Id. at 25-26. Appellant claims that P.O.

Sturgeon’s suppression-hearing testimony was patently false, given the

evidence that she knew he had previously been found to be in violation of his

probationary term.    Because the Commonwealth introduced this ostensibly

perjured testimony, Appellant claims that it committed prosecutorial

misconduct.

      Relatedly, Appellant contends in his third issue on appeal, that this

alleged fabrication by P.O. Sturgeon should have caused the trial court to

reject her suppression-hearing testimony as incredible.          Because P.O.

Sturgeon’s testimony was the only evidence to support the legality of the

search of his computer, Appellant claims that the court erred by denying his

motion to suppress.

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      Appellant’s arguments are waived.      He does not cite to where he

objected to P.O. Sturgeon’s at-issue, suppression-hearing testimony, and/or

raised his prosecutorial-misconduct claim before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.”). Moreover, Appellant cannot now argue that

the trial court erred in relying on P.O. Sturgeon’s testimony in denying his

motion to suppress where no objection to that evidence was lodged.

Accordingly, Appellant’s second and third issues are waived and/or meritless.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/2023

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