Court Opinion

ID: 9724896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:19:32.532124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:07.557888
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The parties and this court agree that the admissibility of the testimony in issue is to be determined under the language of section 8— 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 8 — 201.) The opinion determines the issue by carrying forward an interpretation of section 2 of the former act in regard to evidence and depositions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 51, par. 2), frequently termed the Dead Man’s Act. A notable distinction or change is that the words “same transaction” of the former Evidence Act are replaced by the words “same event” in the Code. Actually, the change of terms was made in an amendment of the Evidence Act effective in 1973. As a matter of language, the respective terms do not have identity or' comparability in scope or use. In Webster’s Third International Dictionary “an event” is described as an occurrence “occupying a restricted portion of *** space or time” or a “happening represented by a point.” It is thus restricted to a particular happening at a particular time. This particularity is emphasized by requiring that the testimony relate to “the same conversation or event.” A first synonym of the word “same” is “identical.” The same dictionary described the word “transaction” in broader terms of prosecuting negotiations or carrying on business. It is not necessarily limited as to specific time or place. Thus, it has been said that a series of “events” might constitute a “transaction.” (Comment, Illinois’ Amended Dead Man’s Act; A Partial Reform, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 700, 711.) Since the amendment of 1973', which substituted the words “same event” for the words “same transaction,” legal writers have debated the desired merits and scope of the Dead Man’s Act. In the recent enactment of section 8 — 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1982, the legislature made considerable change of language which generally simplified the statement of the statute. It did not, however, abandon the narrow connotation of the words “same event” and return to the broader interpretation of “same transaction” found in the cited Perkins v. Brown (1948), 400 Ill. 490, 81 N.E.2d 207. The majority opinion finds that a defendant was called as an adverse party “about an event” and concludes that that “ ‘event’ includes all of the connected incidents and conversations leading up the signing of the deed ***,” so that such party may thereafter testify upon the entirety without particularity concerning that which was asked. The construction of the companion words “same conversation” in the statute suggests an apparent anomaly. If the personal representative calls a witness to testify to the “same conversation,” does this also permit testimony as to the preceding and subsequent “conversations” without any regard to the span of time, identity, or place in the use of the word “same”? There has been long debate concerning the problems inherent in the conflicting evidentiary goals, where an original party has died or is incompetent. Neither the legal profession nor the legislature have found a better resolution than to limit the area of testimony to the identity of conversation or event to which any person testifies in behalf of the representative. These views expressed in dissent are deemed consistent with the opinion in Manning v. Mock (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 788, 457 N.E.2d 447. I would affirm the trial court.