Court Opinion

ID: 9407323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 16:01:02.031167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.955084
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                      No. 22-30021

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               D.C. No.
                                               3:12-cr-05085-
    v.                                             BHS-1

JERRAMEY LYNDELL ROPER,
                                                 OPINION
                Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
         Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted March 27, 2023
                    Seattle, Washington

                       Filed July 6, 2023

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Andrew D. Hurwitz,
      Circuit Judges, and David A. Ezra, * District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Ezra

*
 The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
2                     UNITED STATES V. ROPER

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    Vacating the district court’s denial of Jerramey Lyndell
Roper’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and remanding for the district court to
consider the motion anew, the panel held that district courts
may consider non-retroactive changes in post-sentencing
decisional law affecting the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines when assessing whether a defendant has
established the requisite “extraordinary and compelling
reasons.”
    Over the decade following the imposition of Roper’s
sentence as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a),
intervening case law disqualified three of his prior
convictions as predicates for the career-offender
enhancement. If sentenced today, Roper would not qualify
as a career offender.
    The panel wrote that the logic of United States v. Chen,
48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022) (addressing post-conviction
change in statutory sentencing law and holding that a district
court’s discretion in sentence modifications is limited only
by an express statement from Congress), which rested on
Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022)
(holding that the First Step Act allows district courts to
consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising
their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First
Step Act), applies with full force when the relevant change

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   UNITED STATES V. ROPER                   3

in sentencing law is decisional. The panel wrote that
considering decisional law in the extraordinary-and-
compelling-reasons inquiry does not circumvent habeas, as
Roper does not claim that his original sentence violated the
Constitution or federal law and does not seek to correct
sentencing errors.
    The panel expressed no opinion as to the proper
disposition of the motion on remand, holding only that the
district court is not prohibited from considering the relevant
changes in decisional law.

                        COUNSEL

Terrence Kellogg (argued), Law Office of Terrence Kellogg,
Port Townsend, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.
Tania M. Culbertson (argued) and Teal L. Miller, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Nicholas W. Brown, United States
Attorney, Western District of Washington; Office of the
United States Attorney; Seattle, Washington; David R.
Jennings, Assistant United States Attorney; Office of the
United States Attorney; Tacoma, Washington; for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
4                  UNITED STATES V. ROPER

                         OPINION

EZRA, District Judge:

    In this case, we must determine whether district courts
may consider non-retroactive changes in post-sentencing
decisional law affecting the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines when assessing whether a defendant has
established the “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
required for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We hold that they can.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 2013, Roper pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine
base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). The district court applied
a “career-offender enhancement” to the sentence on the drug
offense, which the Sentencing Guidelines recommend if,
among other things, “the defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The
Guidelines define a “[p]rior felony conviction” as “a prior
adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by
death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. Roper had four Washington state
convictions that qualified as relevant felony offenses. Roper
was sentenced to 204 months.
    Over the next decade, intervening case law disqualified
three of Roper’s prior convictions as predicates for the
career-offender enhancement.       See United States v.
Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215, 1218–24 (9th Cir. 2019)
                   UNITED STATES V. ROPER                  5

(holding that whether a Washington state conviction
qualifies as a predicate felony for the career-offender
enhancement depends on the maximum sentence a defendant
“actually could have received” under the Washington
sentencing scheme, rather than the statutory maximum);
State v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (Wash. 2021) (holding state
statute prohibiting unlawful possession of a controlled
substance unconstitutional). If sentenced today, therefore,
Roper would not qualify as a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(a).
    Roper moved for sentence reduction in 2021. Although
the district court concluded that Roper’s Guideline range
would be reduced to 140 to 175 months if he were sentenced
at the time of his motion, it denied relief, believing itself
categorically prohibited from considering changes to
sentencing law in determining whether “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” warrant a reduction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For the following reasons, we disagree.
 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and review the denial of a request for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th
Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Statutory interpretation is a
question of law that we review de novo. See United States
v. Paulk, 569 F.3d 1094, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
 III. DISCUSSION
    After the district court denied Roper’s motion, we held
that “Congress has only placed two limitations directly on
extraordinary and compelling reasons: the requirement that
district courts are bound by the Sentencing Commission’s
6                      UNITED STATES V. ROPER

policy statement . . . and the requirement that ‘rehabilitation
alone’ is not extraordinary and compelling.” United States
v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). Chen joined the First, Fourth,
and Tenth Circuits in holding that “district courts may
consider non-retroactive changes in sentencing law, in
combination with other factors particular to the individual
defendant, when analyzing extraordinary and compelling
reasons for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id. Our decision
was guided by Concepcion v. United States, which held that
“the First Step Act allows district courts to consider
intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their
discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step
Act.” 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). Critically, Concepcion
identified only two “limits [on] the scope of information that
a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to
what extent, to modify a sentence”: “those set forth by
Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” Id. at 2396,
2400. Though Concepcion dealt with a different provision
of the First Step Act than the one before us in Chen, 1 we
found its understanding of the district court’s broad
discretion equally applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions,
stressing that Congress has only placed only two limitations
on what may constitute extraordinary and compelling
reasons: “the requirement that district courts are bound by
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement,” and the
prohibition on considering rehabilitation alone. Chen, 48
F.4th at 1098; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (giving the Sentencing

1
  Section 404 of the First Step Act, at issue in Concepcion, authorizes
district courts to “impose a reduced sentence” for qualifying movants “as
if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the
time the covered offense was committed.” Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
                      UNITED STATES V. ROPER                        7

Commission the task of “describ[ing] what should be
considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for
sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a
list of specific examples”).
    The Sentencing Commission’s current policy statement,
§ 1B1.13, does not apply to defendant-filed motions for
sentence reduction. 2 See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 801–02; Chen,
48 F.4th at 1095. The question before us is thus whether the
district court’s discretion extends to changes in decisional
law impacting the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. The
First, Second, and Fourth Circuits have “kept the door open
to motions” for sentence reduction based on such changes.
United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2023);
see United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022);
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237–38 (2d Cir.
2020); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 288 (4th Cir.
2020). In contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits have found that decisional law cannot be considered
an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence
reduction. See United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048,
1065–66 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Brock,
39 F.4th 462, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v.
Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S.
Ct. 2781 (2022); United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185,
1200 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

2
   Although the Sentencing Commission recently issued a policy
statement addressing defendant-filed motions, it is not yet in effect.
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 28,254
(May 3, 2023).
8                   UNITED STATES V. ROPER

    A. Concepcion Informs Our View that Courts May
       Consider Decisional Law in the Extraordinary and
       Compelling Reasons Inquiry.
    Chen, which addressed post-conviction change in
statutory sentencing law, held that “a district court’s
discretion in sentence modifications is limited only by an
express statement from Congress.” 48 F.4th at 1096 n.3.
The logic of that holding, which rested on Concepcion,
applies with full force when the relevant change in
sentencing law is decisional.
    Indeed, Concepcion expressly cited the statute now
before us, § 3582(c), in concluding that Congress knew how
to “cabin[] district courts’ discretion” to determine eligibility
for sentence reduction. 142 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court
stressed that although “[i]n many cases, a district court is
prohibited from recalculating a Guidelines range in light of
nonretroactive Guidelines amendments . . . the court may
find those amendments to be germane when deciding
whether to modify a sentence at all, and if so, to what
extent.” Id. at 2400 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2403
(“Moreover, when raised by the parties, district courts have
considered nonretroactive Guidelines amendments to help
inform whether to reduce sentences at all, and if so, by how
much.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 65 F.4th 1000,
1004 (8th Cir. 2023) (observing that “Concepcion concerned
what district judges may consider in exercising their
discretion to grant or deny a sentence reduction”).
    Concepcion’s animating principle is the “venerable
tradition of discretion” in sentencing and sentence-
modification proceedings. Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2401
n.4. The Court thus cautioned that “‘[d]rawing meaning
from silence is particularly inappropriate’ in the sentencing
                       UNITED STATES V. ROPER                          9

context.” Id. at 2402 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007)). Congress’s silence is, if anything,
more significant here than in Chen, which involved a
statutory sentencing change that Congress expressly made
non-retroactive. 3 See 48 F.4th at 1096. Because Congress
has not adopted a categorical bar to considering decisional
law, we again “decline to create one now.” Id. at 1099.
    B. Considering Decisional Law in the Extraordinary
       and Compelling Reasons Inquiry Does Not
       Circumvent Habeas.
    The government contends that Roper cannot use a
motion for sentence reduction to bring claims “about the
validity of his sentence that otherwise would be barred by the
collateral-attack waiver in his plea agreement.” Decisions
by some of our sister Circuit courts have expressed similar
concerns. See Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1202 (holding that the
habeas-channeling rule of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973), forbids “compassionate release based on legal
errors at sentencing, including errors made clear through the
retroactive application of intervening precedent”); Brock, 39
F.4th at 465; Crandall, 25 F.4th at 586; McCall, 56 F.4th at
1057–58. But although both a defendant-filed motion for
sentence reduction and a habeas petition may each result in
an inmate’s early release from custody, the two require
different showings and carry different implications about the
defendant’s original conviction and sentence. “Section 2255
grants a prisoner in custody the right ‘at any time’ to bring a

3
  See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22 (“This
section, and the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any
offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a
sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of
enactment.”).
10                 UNITED STATES V. ROPER

motion ‘to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence’ upon the
ground that the ‘sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law . . . .’” United States v. Baron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). A motion
for sentence reduction, on the other hand, “allows defendants
to seek modifications even if their sentences were not
imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal law.”
Chen, 48 F.4th at 1101; see also Trenkler, 47 F.4th at 48
(“[H]abeas and compassionate release are distinct vehicles
for relief.”).
    Roper does not claim that his original sentence violated
the Constitution or federal law. Nor does he seek “to correct
sentencing errors.” Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1201. Rather he
seeks to invoke the sentencing judge’s discretion to reduce
his    sentence,     presenting    an    amalgamation      of
circumstances—including legal changes creating a
sentencing disparity among similarly situated defendants—
that he claims are extraordinary and compelling. See
Trenkler, 47 F.4th at 48 (describing habeas as “a method for
automatic vacatur of sentences,” and sentence reduction as
an “exercise [of] leniency based on an individualized review
of a defendant’s circumstances”).
    The Supreme Court’s habeas-channeling jurisprudence
“has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use
only habeas corpus . . . remedies when they seek to
invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly
through an injunction compelling speedier release or
indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily
implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). But, because “the court’s
disposition of a compassionate release motion ‘is
                    UNITED STATES V. ROPER                    11

discretionary, not mandatory,’” United States v. Wright, 46
F.4th 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020)), granting such a
motion does not imply that the original sentence was
unlawful. And, permitting the court to consider a change in
sentencing law when analyzing a motion for sentence
reduction “does not guarantee a particular result.” Chen, 48
F.4th at 1101.
  IV. CONCLUSION
    Although Roper does not challenge the district court’s
decision that his other proffered reasons for sentence
reduction do not by themselves justify granting his motion,
that court should consider in the first instance whether the
changes in decisional law tip the balance in Roper’s favor.
See id. (remanding for the district court to reassess the
extraordinary and compelling analysis in light of all the
defendant’s proffered reasons); see also United States v.
Vaughn, 62 F.4th 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 2023) (“[A]
combination of factors may move any given prisoner past
[the threshold for relief], even if one factor alone does not.”).
We therefore vacate and remand for the district court to
consider the motion anew. We of course express no opinion
as to its proper disposition, holding only that the district
court is not prohibited from considering the relevant changes
in decisional law.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.