Court Opinion

ID: 9559329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:26:47.147819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:43.970066
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting)—While I would have no difficulty in arriving at the same conclusion as the majority if I were of the opinion that this court had jurisdiction of this *416appeal, I must dissent because I am firmly convinced that we have none.
Article IV, § 4, of our constitution provides, so far as applicable to this case, that our appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money where the original amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars.
The complaint alleges that forty-four persons, having wage claims against respondent in varying amounts ranging from $7.20 to $26.40 (total $756.06), have assigned their claims to appellant by an instrument reading as follows:
“The undersigned hereby transfer and assign to Carrie McDowell, for value received, all of their claim, right and title, chose of action of whatsoever kind or nature arising out of the employment by Farwest Garments Inc. for Christmas, 1949 and New Years, 1950, hereby authorizing Carrie McDowell to make claim therefor, to sue in our names or in her name; to compromise, settle and receive payment therefor in our names or otherwise and to give receipts therefor with the same effect as if the said receipts were executed in our names, hereby confirming all that the said Carrie McDowell may do in the premises.”
In Smaby v. Shrauger, 9 Wn. (2d) 691, 115 P. (2d) 967, five plaintiffs, having separate causes of action against the same defendants, joined them in one complaint. On motion of respondents (defendants in the trial court), we held that we had no jurisdiction as to three claims because the amount in controversy in each instance did not exceed two hundred dollars. In dismissing their appeals, we said:
“Article IV, § 4, of the Washington constitution provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars.
“It has long since been established in this state that where several plaintiffs or cross-complainants, having separate and distinct claims for money, are joined in one complaint or cross-complaint, the several amounts of their respective claims cannot be added together so as to confer a right of appeal either in favor of or against those plaintiffs or cross-*417complainants whose individual claims are under the jurisdictional amount. Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 20 Wash. 97, 54 Pac. 771; National Surety Co. v. Bratnober Lumber Co., 67 Wash. 601, 122 Pac. 337; Cascade Const. Co. v. Snohomish County, 105 Wash. 484, 178 Pac. 470; State ex rel. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hurn, 106 Wash. 362, 180 Pac. 400.
“No question of assignment of the claims to one person, thereby creating an aggregate amount in excess of two hundred dollars, is here involved, as was the case in National Ass’n of Creditors v. Grassley, 159 Wash. 185, 292 Pac. 416.”
Recently, in Dygert v. Hansen, 31 Wn. (2d) 858, 199 P. (2d) 596, we dismissed three appeals on our own motion because the amount in controversy did not exceed two hundred dollars.
I recognize that our decision in National Ass’n of Creditors v. Grassley, 159 Wash. 185, 292 Pac. 416, is directly in point and holds that, under circumstances similar to those present in the instant case, a motion to dismiss the appeal will be denied. The reasoning upon which this holding was based is stated in the following language:
“Respondents here move to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the amount in controversy is less than two hundred dollars, it being argued that appellant admittedly took the assignments of the several causes of action for the purpose of collecting the claims. Respondents cite, in support of their motion, Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 20 Wash. 97, 54 Pac. 771, and Denison v. Denison, 16 Conn. 34. The first case cited does not meet the present issue, and if the other case does, we cannot follow it.
“Our statute, Rem. Comp. Stat., § 179, requiring every action to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, has so often been construed so as to permit the person to whom the cause of action has been assigned for the purpose of collection, to maintain an action thereon, that authorities need not be cited. If, by such an assignment, the assignee obtains sufficient legal title to become the real party in interest for the purpose of prosecuting the action, he also has sufficient title to prosecute the appeal. To hold otherwise would be illogical, and we need pursue the subject no further; but see Shannon v. Abrams, 98 Kan. 26, 157 Pac. 449, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 502, and note following. The motion to dismiss is denied.” (Italics mine.)
*418In my opinion, this decision is illogical-and should be overruled. Because'RCW 4.08.080 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 191) permits an assignee for collection to prosecute an action in his own name in the superior court on assigned claims, it does not follow that he may prosecute an appeal. A procedural statute cannot have the effect of amending the constitution. The term “original amount in controversy” as used means the amount which the assignor claimed against the defendant at the time the controversy arose. The assignee by piling claim upon claim until the total exceeds two hundred dollars cannot give this court appellate jurisdiction.
The fallacy of permitting this to be done is well illustrated in this case. The above quoted assignment permits appellant to sue either in her name or the claimants’ several names. If she sues in their names, we must dismiss the appeal under Smaby v. Shrauger, supra. But if she sues in her name she is permitted, under National Ass’n of Creditors v. Grassley, supra, to add the trivial amounts of the claims ($7.20 to $26.40) together and thus circumvent the constitution and confer appellate jurisdiction on this court.
The Grassley case was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Since this court plainly has no jurisdiction of this appeal, it should be dismissed on our' own motion.
Mallery and Weaver, JJ., concur with Donworth, J.