Court Opinion

ID: 9480852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:00:34.407469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:57.436957
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Because the arresting officers had probable cause to suspect Winfrey of engaging in drug courier activity prior to his detention pending the arrival of Officer Gentry of the DEA, and because the two searches of Winfrey’s body — occurring over approximately a twenty-five minute period of time —would, absent probable cause, have constituted an impermissibly intrusive Terry-type stop, I concur separately in the panel majority’s opinion.
An investigatory Terry stop must be “no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir.1988). “Moreover, ‘the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.’ ” United States v. Wiggins, 828 F.2d 1199, 1201 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).
The officers exceeded the outer limits of a permissibly scoped Terry stop when they patted-down Winfrey, found nothing, directed him to stay with them for an additional twenty to twenty-five minutes while Officer Gentry was summoned back to the parking garage, and then patted down his body again. It stretches the boundaries of the Terry stop beyond their tolerable limits to conclude that the detention — an encounter less intrusive than full-scale arrest because supported by a lesser standard of suspicion — may encompass two searches and a compulsory delay of nearly half an hour.
Although the scope of a permissible Terry stop was exceeded in the case at bar, no violation of the fourth amendment occurred *219because the officers had probable cause to arrest Winfrey subsequent to the conduct of the first pat-down search. “Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). Probable cause is a “fluid concept” that turns on an ad hoc calculation of probabilities; it is not “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id., 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-11. Accord Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). “[P]robable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found’_” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332).
In view of this standard, the discovery by Officer Adams of a bulge in the crotch of Winfrey’s trousers (a favorite place used by drug couriers to conceal drugs), coupled with the spectrum of unanswered questions that remained with respect to Winfrey’s conduct after completion of the first pat-down frisk, unquestionably gave rise to the formation of probable cause necessary to detain Winfrey pending the arrival of law enforcement officers trained and expert in the field of narcotics interdiction. These additional facts, aggregated with all that was already known to the officers, gave rise to the probable cause necessary to detain — or arrest — Winfrey pending the re-arrival of the DEA agents.
Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s judgment that the fruits of the encounter that occurred between Winfrey and the police in the Detroit Airport should not have been suppressed.