Court Opinion

ID: 9950185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:12:20.355703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:01.194147
License: Public Domain

492                  March 13, 2024               No. 173

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
              TROY DONAVAN BAYLISS,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 21CR28429; A177681

  Bradley A. Cascagnette, Judge.
  Submitted May 25, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JACQUOT, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                             493

            JACQUOT, J.
        Defendant was convicted of one count of driving
under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, and
one count of recklessly endangering another person, ORS
163.195, after an incident in which he crashed his car while
driving with his 14-year-old son in the vehicle. In one assign-
ment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to dismiss the reckless-endangering
charge pursuant to a civil compromise. We affirm.
         Defendant was driving with his 14-year-old son in
the back seat when he lost control of the vehicle. The car
suffered “significant damage” in a single vehicle accident.
Defendant showed signs of intoxication at the scene and a
breath test indicated a blood alcohol content of 0.25 percent.
Neither defendant nor his son suffered physical injuries as
a result of the crash. Defendant was charged with DUII and
recklessly endangering another person, with his son named
as the victim.
         Defendant entered into diversion on the DUII
charge.1 Regarding the reckless-endangering charge, defen-
dant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to a civil compromise
under ORS 135.705. The motion contained letters from the
victim and the victim’s mother, defendant’s former spouse,
explaining that a letter of apology they had received from
defendant was sufficient satisfaction for their injuries, and
requesting that the court dismiss the charge.
          At a hearing on the motion, the state argued that the
charge was statutorily ineligible for civil compromise because
the crime was committed “[b]y one family or household mem-
ber upon another family or household member,” as defined
in the domestic violence statutes. ORS 135.703(1)(d) (crime
of recklessly endangering another person cannot be civilly
compromised if committed by one “family or household mem-
ber, as defined in ORS 107.705,” against another). The defense
argued that the victim did not fall under ORS 107.705’s defi-
nition of “family or household member” because he was not an
adult. It further contended that, for a variety of reasons, the
court should exercise its discretion to accept the compromise.
   1
       The DUII charge is not at issue on appeal.
494                                               State v. Bayliss

         The trial court agreed that the charge was not statu-
torily excluded from civil compromise as a crime committed
by one “family or household member” against another, but
it denied the motion for two reasons. First, the court did
not believe that the crime of recklessly endangering another
person was a charge that could be civilly compromised in
and of itself due to a lack of civil remedy available to a vic-
tim. Second, as an independent basis, the court would not
exercise its discretion to allow the compromise, stating,
       “I think, frankly, the Legislature’s incorporation of fam-
   ily or household members is designed in part to deal not
   only with domestic violence and elder abuse, but just to rec-
   ognize family dynamics, that the pressure on—especially
   the pressure on a child to agree with a parent that, ‘Oh, I’m
   okay. I don’t want you to get in trouble,’ is too extreme, and
   I don’t think it is something that should be allowed to be
   civilly compromised. And I will not exercise the discretion
   to allow that to happen in this case.
      “* * * * *
       “Therefore, the request for civil compromise as to Count
   2 is denied. Both, one, because I don’t think it’s eligible;
   and two, as a separate and independent * * * basis, even if it
   were, I would not be inclined to exercise the discretion and
   allow it in this matter as a matter of policy.”
        Following a stipulated facts trial, defendant was
convicted of one count of recklessly endangering another
person and sentenced to 24 months of bench probation, a
90-day driver’s license suspension, and fines.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by refusing to accept the civil compromise for two
reasons. First, he argues that the trial court was incorrect
when it determined that the crime of recklessly endangering
another person, ORS 163.195, is not subject to civil compro-
mise, and that victims do have a remedy by civil action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Second, defendant
argues that, because the legislature declined to create a cat-
egorical exclusion to civil compromises between parents and
their minor children when enacting ORS 135.703(1)(d), the
trial court could not exercise its discretion to reject the civil
compromise in this case on the ground that, because he was
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                            495

a minor compromising a claim against his parent, defen-
dant’s son may have felt unduly pressured to compromise
the claim based on a desire to keep his father from getting
in trouble.
         The state responds that defendant failed to preserve
his argument that the court was erroneously creating a cat-
egorical exclusion as opposed to exercising its discretion in
the circumstances of this particular case and, regardless,
that the trial court has very broad discretion when decid-
ing whether to deny a motion for civil compromise and did
not abuse that discretion in this case. Alternatively, the
state argues that we should affirm on an alternative basis
that it did not raise below, namely, that the acknowledge-
ments made by the victim and his mother were insufficient
because the victim, as a minor, lacked capacity to make an
acknowledgement, and his mother could not contract on
his behalf. See State v. Fitterer, 109 Or App 541, 544, 820
P2d 841 (1991), rev den, 313 Or 75 (1992) (neither a minor
child nor the child’s custodial parent has both capacity and
authority to enter into a civil compromise).
        As explained below, we conclude that defendant
adequately preserved his argument, and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. Because we affirm on the
ground that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we
need not, and do not, consider whether there is a civil rem-
edy available to a victim of the crime of recklessly endanger-
ing another person, nor do we consider the state’s proffered
alternative basis for affirmance.
         As an initial matter, we address the state’s pres-
ervation argument. The state argues that, because defen-
dant did not raise his objection to the trial court’s refusal
to allow compromises between minor children and their
parents at the hearing, he failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. However, defendant asserted generally that the
court should allow the compromise and that, for a variety
of reasons, the court should exercise its discretion to accept
the civil compromise and, accordingly, dismiss the case. As
to the court’s specific reasoning regarding crimes by parents
against minor children, there was no indication before the
court’s ruling that it intended to deny the motion on those
496                                              State v. Bayliss

grounds. Given that, defendant had no reason or opportu-
nity to object to the trial court’s reasoning until after it had
announced its ruling. “Once a court has ruled, a party is
generally not obligated to renew his or her contentions in
order to preserve them for the purposes of appeal.” State v.
Walker, 350 Or 540, 550, 258 P3d 1228 (2011). Defendant
adequately raised the issue by advocating for the court to
exercise its discretion and accept the compromise; he had
no obligation to renew his objection after the ruling based
on the court’s reasoning, which, until the ruling, he had no
reason to anticipate.
         Thus, we turn to the merits of defendant’s argument.
         ORS 135.705(1)(a) provides:
      “If the person injured acknowledges in writing, at any
   time before trial on an accusatory instrument for the crime,
   that the person has received satisfaction for the injury, the
   court may, in its discretion, on payment of the costs and
   expenses incurred, enter a judgment dismissing the accu-
   satory instrument.”
When determining whether to accept a civil compromise,
the trial court must engage in a two-step process. First,
it must determine whether the claim is one that may be
compromised or, in other words, whether it has the statu-
tory authority to accept the compromise. Second, if it does
have the authority, it must exercise its discretion to decide
whether to accept the proposed compromise and dismiss the
charge.
        Beginning with step one, a trial court has statutory
authority to dismiss a charge based on a proposed civil com-
promise only if four conditions outlined by ORS 135.703 and
ORS 135.705(1)(a) are met:
   “(1) the defendant is charged with a crime punishable as
   a misdemeanor, (2) the person injured by the act consti-
   tuting the crime has a remedy by civil action, (3) the per-
   son injured acknowledges in writing before trial that the
   person has received satisfaction for the injury, and (4) the
   defendant pays costs and expenses incurred.”
State v. Ferguson, 261 Or App 497, 500, 323 P3d 496 (2014).
In addition to those requirements, the legislature has placed
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                              497

limitations on when charges may be compromised. As rel-
evant here, ORS 135.703(1) limits the availability of civil
compromise in some circumstances, including when certain
crimes are committed by “one family or household member
upon another family or household member,” as defined in
the domestic violence statutes. ORS 135.703(1)(d). Whether
a trial court correctly determined that a charge is or is not
statutorily barred from a civil compromise is a question of
law that we review for legal error. See State v. Aguilera, 324
Or App 478, 479, 526 P3d 1206 (2023).
         At step two, once the trial court has determined
that the charge is statutorily eligible and it has the author-
ity to accept a civil compromise, it must exercise its discre-
tion to decide whether to allow the proposed compromise.
We review a trial court’s refusal to dismiss a charge based
on civil compromise for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Orians, 335 Or 257, 259, 66 P3d 468 (2003) (so reviewing).
Discretion is the authority of a trial court to choose among
several legally correct outcomes. State v. Rogers, 330 Or
282, 312, 4 P3d 1261 (2000). “If the trial court’s decision
was within the range of legally correct discretionary choices
and produced a permissible, legally correct outcome, then
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Id. However, if
a trial court’s “purported exercise of discretion flows from
a mistaken legal premise, its decision does not fall within
the range of legally correct choices and does not produce a
permissible, legally correct outcome.” State v. Romero, 236
Or App 640, 643-44, 237 P3d 894 (2010).
         A trial court may dismiss a case pursuant to a civil
compromise only after the victim has acknowledged com-
plete satisfaction, but, once the victim has so acknowledged,
“[t]he only question that remain[s] [is] whether public pol-
icy would be better served by proceeding with the pros-
ecution or dismissing the case * * *. At this stage it [is] a
public policy question appropriate for the exercise of judi-
cial discretion.” State v. Martindale, 30 Or App 1127, 1131,
569 P2d 659 (1977), rev den, 281 Or 1 (1978). The legislature
has “vested the power to compromise solely in the court’s
discretion.” State v. Dumond, 270 Or 854, 858, 530 P2d 32
(1974). The statute’s “grant of discretion is not limited in any
498                                            State v. Bayliss

explicit way, once the parties satisfy the statutory formali-
ties.” Orians, 335 Or at 262. Rather, “[t]he trial court is left
to take into consideration virtually any factor that it deems
relevant (short of considerations such as race, religion, or
the like, which cannot be given decisional weight for consti-
tutional reasons).” Id.
         However, there are some limitations on the court’s
discretion. For example, as noted above, a trial court abuses
its discretion if it bases its decision on constitutionally pro-
tected characteristics such as race or religion. Id. A trial
court abuses its discretion when it attempts to direct the
terms of a compromise or refuses to accept the compromise
because it believes the injured party is requesting too much.
Martindale, 30 Or App at 1130-31. Additionally, we have
concluded that a trial court abused its discretion when it
promised that it would accept the compromise if two other
events occurred, then refused to honor the compromise when
those events did occur. Orians, 335 Or at 264-65.
         Here, defendant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion when it rejected the civil compromise in his
case based on the relationship between the minor victim,
his son, and defendant. He argues that the court’s discretion
could not include that consideration because the legislature
necessarily considered and declined to create a categorical
exclusion to civil compromises between minor children and
their parents when it enacted ORS 135.703(1)(d).
         Relying on State v. Schwab, 95 Or App 593, 771 P2d
277 (1989), defendant argues that once the legislature has
made a policy decision about an issue, the trial court can-
not use its discretion to override that decision. In Schwab,
the trial court used its discretionary authority to impose
a special condition of probation that required the defen-
dant to submit to searches by his probation officer even if
the probation officer did not have the requisite reasonable
grounds to believe they would find evidence of a probation
violation articulated in the statute. Id. at 596. We vacated
the decision, concluding that the court could use its discre-
tion to impose “other types of conditions that are not already
addressed in the statute,” but “[c]onditions that the legisla-
ture specifically defined are statutory restrictions to which
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                                              499

a court must conform when imposing probation conditions.”
Id. at 597. Defendant argues that the principle articulated
in Schwab applies here and, in light of the legislature’s
enactment of ORS 135.703(1)(d), barred the trial court from
relying on his parental status to reject the civil compromise
in this case. Assuming without deciding that defendant is
correct, we consider the legislative history of ORS 135.703.
         As noted above, ORS 135.703(1)(d) provides that the
charge of recklessly endangering another person may not be
civilly compromised if committed by “one family or house-
hold member upon another family or household member,
as defined in ORS 107.705.” ORS 107.705(4), which provides
definitions for the Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA),
addresses spousal or sexually intimate relationships, as
well as relationships between parents and adult children.2
         Defendant argues that the victim, defendant’s
minor son, is excluded from this definition because the only
subsection that might encompass a parent-child relationship
specifies only “adult” persons. We understand defendant’s
argument to be that because in common language “family or
household member” would presumably include parents and
their minor children, when enacting ORS 135.703(1)(d) and
referencing the definition provided in ORS 107.705(4), the
legislature must have considered whether to prohibit com-
promises between parents and minor children and explicitly
decided not to do so. Defendant asserts that the reference
to ORS 107.705 in the civil compromise statute, and ORS
107.705(4)(c)’s inclusion of the word “adult” to modify “chil-
dren,” shows that the legislature made a conscious choice
    2
        The entirety of ORS 107.705(4) reads:
    “Family or household members” means any of the following:
    “(a) Spouses.
    “(b) Former spouses.
    “(c) Adult persons related by blood, marriage or adoption.
    “(d) Persons who are cohabiting or who have cohabited with each other.
    “(e) Persons who have been involved in a sexually intimate relationship with
    each other within two years immediately preceding the filing by one of them
    of a petition under ORS 107.710.
    “(f) Unmarried parents of a child.”
The term “cohabitate,” means a romantic relationship rather than simply living in
the same home. Edwards and Edwards, 73 Or App 272, 278, 698 P2d 542 (1985).
500                                            State v. Bayliss

not to categorically exclude minor children from civilly com-
promising the charge of recklessly endangering another per-
son. If it had wanted to categorically exclude minor children
from civilly compromising reckless-endangering charges
against their parents, he asserts, it could have adopted a
definition of “family or household member” that includes
minor children.
         However, the relevant legislative history does not
support defendant’s position. Instead, it shows that, in includ-
ing “adult persons related by blood” in ORS 107.705(4)(c)
and cross-referencing ORS 107.705 in the civil compromise
statute, the legislature was focused exclusively on domes-
tic violence between adults and did not implicitly or explic-
itly consider whether minor children should be able to civ-
illy compromise offenses committed against them by their
parents.
         In 1981, the legislature amended the definition of
“family and household members” in ORS 107.705 to add
“adult persons related by blood or marriage.” Or Laws 1981,
ch 780, § 1. Prior to the amendment, the definition included
only domestic partners such as spouses, former spouses, and
persons cohabitating with each other. ORS 107.705 (1979).
The addition was intended to address the problem of elderly
people being abused by their grown children, which was
not previously covered under the statute. Testimony, House
Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee 3, SB 355, June 12,
1981, Ex E (statement of Ruth Gundle, Attorney and liti-
gation coordinator for Oregon Legal Services) (“This bill,
if enacted, would also expand the definition of ‘family or
household members’ to include parents and adult children.
The purpose of this is to include within the protection of the
act elderly people who are physically abused by their adult
children.”). The legislature included the qualifier “adult”
because abuse and issues related to minor children were
covered elsewhere in the statutes; it did not want to inter-
fere with child and family services and other agencies that
would handle problems with minor children; and some issues
would come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, SB 355, Mar 3,
1981, Tape 45, Side A (statement of Ruth Gundle, Attorney
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                               501

and litigation coordinator for Oregon Legal Services); Tape
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 355A, July 9,
1981, Tape 539, Side A (statement of Rep Joyce Cohen) (“[W]e
did not tamper with the child abuse statutes here[.]”).
         In 1991, the legislature added the prohibition on
civil compromise of recklessly endangering another person
between “family and household members” found in current
ORS 135.703. Or Laws 1991, ch 938, § 1. The amendments
were intended to eliminate civil compromises in domestic vio-
lence cases in order to protect victims and address pressures
and coercion within abusive relationships between adults.
Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Family, HB 3051, Mar 20, 1991, Ex H (statement of
Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Stephen B. Herrell)
(“The original intent behind the civil compromise provi-
sion is to substitute a civil remedy for a criminal remedy.
In these domestic violence cases no civil remedy ever takes
place. In reality, the civil compromise is actually a device
misused to talk a fragile victim into dropping prosecution.”).
Although trial courts “can always say no,” civil compromises
were being inappropriately used as a docket management
tool to get rid of cases, and some judges considered domes-
tic violence a “family problem,” not criminal conduct, per-
petuating societal acceptance of domestic abuse and failing
to punish abusers. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on
Judiciary, HB 3051, June 3, 1991, Tape 206, Side B (testi-
mony of Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Stephen B.
Herrell) (“In this instance, I’m asking you to bridle me and
my colleagues.”).
         Defendant’s overarching argument appears to be
that, because the legislature could have included parent-
minor child relationships when creating the statutory lim-
itations to the trial court’s authority in ORS 135.703(1)(d) but
did not do so, it deprived courts of the discretion to deny civil
compromises of those charges based on the victim being
defendant’s minor child. However, contrary to defendant’s
assertion that the legislature’s use of the FAPA definition
of “family and household member” in creating its list of
exclusions from civil compromise necessarily shows that it
considered compromises between minors and their parents,
502                                           State v. Bayliss

the legislative history reveals that no such consideration
occurred. FAPA was not intended to cover minor children,
and there is no reason to assume that, by adopting the exist-
ing FAPA definition, the legislature considered and declined
to add minor children and intended to limit trial courts’
discretion to reject compromises on those grounds. That is
particularly true because, as demonstrated by the legisla-
tive history of ORS 107.705 discussed above, legal issues
involving minors involve specific considerations inapplicable
to adults. See also Fitterer, 109 Or App at 544 (minor victim
in proposed civil compromise “lacks the capacity” to make
an acknowledgment and custodial parent cannot contract
on her behalf).
          Additionally, defendant’s argument is inconsistent
with the broad grant of discretion provided to the trial court
and conflates step one statutory limitations with step two
limitations on the trial court’s discretion. If, as defendant’s
argument ultimately would have it, the trial court may reject
compromises based only on grounds explicitly stated in the
statutes, the statute’s grant of discretion becomes meaning-
less. In this case, the trial court agreed with defendant that
the proposed compromise was not forbidden as a crime com-
mitted by one “family or household member upon another,”
ORS 135.703(1)(d), and then moved to step two to exercise
its discretion. Defendant’s argument relies upon the legisla-
ture’s silence as to minors compromising with their parents
to show that it intended to limit the trial courts’ discretion
to reject compromises on that basis. We are not persuaded.
         Finally, defendant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by not considering the individual mer-
its of defendant’s proposed civil compromise and inquiring
whether defendant, in fact, asserted improper pressure on
the victim to compromise, and that the trial court may not
base its decision on a single factor. These arguments are
unavailing, and the reasoning in the authorities cited by
defendant to support his position are inapplicable to civil
compromises. See State v. Justice, 273 Or App 457, 467-
68, 361 P3d 39 (2015) (statute providing responsibilities of
trial court in plea negotiations requires the court to make
an individualized assessment due to obligatory language:
Cite as 331 Or App 492 (2024)                             503

“the trial judge shall give the [plea] agreement due consid-
eration,” ORS 135.432(4)); State v. Harrell/Wilson, 353 Or
247, 263-64, 297 P3d 461 (2013) (when determining whether
to consent to the defendant’s exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected right to waive a jury trial, “[a]s with any other waiver
of a constitutional right,” the trial court should have focused
on the validity of the defendant’s elections using already
established factors for constitutional rights waivers).
         The trial court in this case determined that justice
would be better served by proceeding with the prosecution
than by dismissing the case, due to its concerns about the
propriety of allowing compromises between minor victims
and their parents. Defendant has not established that the
trial court’s concern about coercive family dynamics was an
improper or legally incorrect basis for denying the proposed
compromise. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied defendant’s proposed civil compromise.
        Affirmed.