Court Opinion

ID: 9671535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:38:32.815128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:10.551568
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The motion for rehearing of Technical Chemical Company deals principally with *201semantics. It concerns the use of the words “danger” and “defect”. Was the “defect” in the can of freon the absence of warning or was the defect the explosive nature of the can? Was the “danger”, which the jury found to be an unreasonable one, the explosive character of the can or its failure to have a warning on it ?
The argument of Technical Chemical Company is that the “defect” and the “danger” were in the absence of a warning that the can would explode if connected to the high pressure outlet of the air conditioning unit. Such is not a true analysis. The pressurized can of freon had an inherent capacity to explode. The evidence showed that it would have exploded if exposed to sufficient heat. There was a warning or instruction on the can not to permit its temperature to exceed 125 degrees. Because of such warning or instruction that danger of explosion from exposure to heat was not an unreasonable one.
The testimony of Howard Dudley, president of Technical Chemical Company, based on a physical examination of the remains of the can, excluded the possibility that the can had exploded from overheating. His testimony, based upon such examination also excluded the possibility that the can had exploded from a flaw in its construction or because it, the can, had been compressed by a blow or other compressing force.
The other possibility that could cause the can to explode, as shown by the evidence, was in pumping gaseous matters into it so as to increase the pressure of its contents beyond its capacity to contain. The occurrence of such pumping of pressure into the can was foreseeable because it was intended to be used in charging an automobile air conditioner. An automobile air conditioner includes a mechanism, a compressor, that is capable of pumping further pressure into the can. The possibility of such pumping was a danger. That danger was an unreasonable one because of the absence of any warning of it. The jury’s finding to such effect is not challenged. The pumping of more pressure into the can, of which there was a foreseeable possibility which, because of the absence of a warning, constituted an unreasonable danger, occurred in this case and was a producing cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
It was the explosion of the can of freon that hurt the plaintiff, not the failure to warn him. The possibility of the occurrence of an explosion when the can was used for the purpose for which it was intended constituted a danger in it. It doesn’t really matter whether that possibility be called a “danger”, which became an unreasonable one because of the failure to warn, or a danger which became a “defect” because of the failure to warn. The fact is that the very occurrence, the possibility of which constituted either an unreasonable danger or a defect, depending upon one’s choice of terminology, was a producing cause of this plaintiff’s injuries.
This analysis is borne out by the language of comment j, following Sec. 402A, Restatement of Torts, 2d. The last sentence of that comment is in the following language:
“Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”
Thus, the writers treat the giving of warning as relating to the existence of an unreasonable danger or a defect, and not as relating to the causal connection between a danger or defect and an injury.
Technical Chemical Company has construed our holding as being to the effect that under 402A one may recover for injuries without proving the causal connection between those injuries and that capacity of the product which made it unreasonably dangerous. We have not so held. Technical Chemical Company sold a can of freon to be used in charging an automobile *202air conditioner. There was a chance that a user in attempting to charge an automobile air conditioner would connect it to the high side of the compressor and thereby cause it to explode. The chance of such occurrence constituted a danger in the use of the product. The failure to warn of that chance made the danger an unreasonable one. The incident the chance of which constituted an unreasonable danger did occur and caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Thus the required causation was shown as a matter of law.
The plaintiff’s deposition was taken before the trial. At one point in his deposition he testified that he had not even connected the can to the air conditioner, but was holding it in his hand looking at it when it exploded. Because of that statement of the plaintiff Technical Chemical Company contends in its motion for rehearing that we may not hold, as a matter of law, that the can exploded because it was connected to the high pressure side of the air conditioner.
As noted above, the testimony of the president of Technical Chemical Company, Mr. Dudley, excluded all other possible causes of the can’s explosion except its connection to the high pressure side of the air conditioner. From an examination of the bottom which had blown out of the can he testified that its shape showed that it had blown out because of pressure inside the can. He identified indentations on the top of the can has having been made by the clamp on the connecting hose. He testified that the can had exploded because it was connected to the high pressure side of the air conditioner.
Technical Chemical Company filed a cross-action against the supplier of the cans used in packaging the freon. By that cross-action Technical Chemical Company sought indemnity from such supplier if the can was found to be defective. At the conclusion of the trial that cross-action was dismissed.
Mr. Walter F. Marion, a neighbor who lived across the street from the plaintiff, was called as a witness by plaintiff. He testified that he walked over to where he saw plaintiff working on his car in plaintiff’s front yard. The hood on the car was up. The motor was running. The can which plaintiff held in his hands was connected by a hose to some part of the car under the hood. The front door of the car was open and while the can was so connected plaintiff reached his free hand inside the car and remarked that the air conditioner had not begun to cool. Mr. Marion had just left plaintiff’s yard when the explosion occurred. He found the bottom of the can about 50 feet away from the car.
Plaintiff’s wife was in the house when she heard the explosion. She helped another neighbor in tending to plaintiff’s injuries. That neighbor took plaintiff to the hospital. Later plaintiff’s wife with the help of Mr. Marion collected the items found in the yard. Those items included the connecting hose.
There was no special issue inquiring as to whether the can exploded because it was connected to the high side of the air conditioner and there was no objection to the charge because of such omission.
The answer of Technical Company, after a general denial, includes the following allegation :
“Technical Chemical Company specifically denies that the accident occurred while Mr. Jacobs' was in the process of preparing to put the contents of the can into the air conditioning system’ as Mr. Jacobs’ attorneys have alleged in the petition. On the contrary, the can exploded because Mr. Jacobs had installed the can on the wrong side of the compressor, and the compressor simply pumped into the can until it exploded.”
During the trial the plaintiff testified in person only very briefly. He admitted *203having said in his deposition that he had not connected the can before it exploded but said that after hearing his wife and neighbor testify he guessed he really didn’t know v/hat had happened.
The record shows that the plaintiff suffers from a serious malady not connected with the injury received from the explosion in question. His wife, with some apparent reluctance, testified to conduct or conversations by him that suggest some mental impairment.
Where a party testifies to a fact, even that which is adverse to his position, that is so contrary to the uncontroverted physical facts as to be wholly incredible such testimony may be disregarded. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949). Particularly is that true where, as here, there is evidence of such party’s mental incapacity.
We are of the opinion that the credible evidence in this case shows as a matter of law that the freon can exploded because it was connected to the high pressure side of the air conditioner. We also are of the opinion that the record, on the whole, shows that the parties tried the case in the trial court upon the theory that such was the cause of the explosion. As noted in our original opinion, defensive issues were submitted as to misuse, assumed risk and volenti non fit injuria.
If the jury’s failure to find that the absence of warning was a producing cause of the explosion were dependent upon the existence of evidence that the can exploded from some other cause than connecting it to the high side of the compressor, then we would hold such failure to find to be in such disregard of the preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong.
The motion for rehearing of appellee, Technical Chemical Company is overruled.