Court Opinion

ID: 9948970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:16:58.274732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.389107
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0890-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEROME L. GAYDEN,
a/k/a ROBERT GAYDEN,
JEROME L. GAYDON, and
J SKI,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Argued December 18, 2023 – Decided March 8, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 21-10-0676.

                   Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Tamar Yael Lerer, of
                   counsel and on the brief).

                   Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
            General, attorney; Frank Muroski, of counsel and on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Jerome L. Gayden pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). In accordance with a plea

agreement, he was sentenced to a five-year term of incarceration with a forty-

two-month period of parole ineligibility. He appeals from the August 16, 2022

order of the Law Division denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during

what the court found to be a lawful investigatory stop of defendant on a public

sidewalk. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not conducting an

evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. Because there were disputed

issues of material fact surrounding the stop and subsequent search of defendant,

we vacate the August 16, 2022 order and remand for a full evidentiary hearing

on defendant's motion to suppress.

                                        I.

      In light of the trial court having not held an evidentiary hearing, we recite

the facts as they are represented in the State's written submissions and as

described by the trial court from its out-of-court viewing of a surveillance

camera recording of the stop and search. On August 13, 2021, a Paterson police

dispatcher transmitted a message to patrol cars that a "caller" reported there was

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a suspicious person with a weapon in front of a specific address on Rosa Parks

Boulevard. The dispatcher relayed the caller's description of the person as a

black male with dreadlocks wearing blue shorts and a white tank top, using

crutches and with a gun in his pocket. No information was transmitted with

respect to how the caller obtained the information the dispatcher conveyed.

      Approximately five minutes later, officers arrived at the address, in what

they described as a high-crime area, and saw defendant, who matched the

physical description provided by the caller. Officer Mendez filed a written

report stating when he and his partner arrived they "made eye contact with

[defendant] and he appeared startled by our police presence." According to the

report, Mendez told defendant to stop at which point defendant "immediately

accelerated his walking pace while using crutches to further his distance away"

from the officers. Mendez wrote that defendant "was wearing a black fanny

pack that had a large bulge around the front of his torso and as he was walking

with crutches at a fast pace, it appeared that there was a heavy object inside, due

to the manner in which it was sway[ing]."

      According to the report, Mendez "wrap[ed] his hand across [defendant's]

torso" and "immediately advised [his partner] that he felt a heavy, hard, metallic

object inside the fanny pack across his torso."           Mendez's partner then

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"conduct[ed] the pat down" during which he "observed a black object protruding

out of the large pocket on the side of the fanny pack, which [he] immediately

recognized as the butt of a handgun." The officers arrested defendant and

removed the gun, which was loaded with illegal ammunition. A search of

computer records revealed that the gun had been reported stolen in Georgia.1

      A grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with six counts relating to

his possession of a weapon, a large-capacity ammunition magazine, a prohibited

device, and stolen property, as well as being in possession of a weapon while a

convicted felon.

      Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. He

argued that an anonymous tip of criminal activity requires corroboration before

officers can conduct an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968).   According to defendant, the officers failed to corroborate the

information reported by the anonymous caller. In support of his argument,

defendant noted that the video recording showed the officers arrested defendant

two seconds after they arrived on the scene, an insufficient amount of time for

1
   Although the report is signed by Mendez as the reporting officer, it begins
with "I, Off. J. Dabal was assigned to the Emergency Response Team as Unit
514 with my partner Off. H. Mendez" and refers to Mendez in the third person.
It is not clear if the narrative in the report was provided by Dabal or Mendez.
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them to make the observations described in the police report. Defendant denied

the officers ordered him to stop or made eye contact with him. He argued his

fanny pack was not swaying because he was moving slowly on crutches and that

he made no attempt to flee before the officers arrested and searched him.

      According to defendant, the officers nearly hit him with their vehicle when

they pulled up to the scene and he had to quickly hop to avoid being struck.

Defendant also disputed that the stop took place in a high-crime area. See State

v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 404 (2022) ("The State must do more than simply

invoke the buzz words 'high-crime area' in a conclusory manner to justify

investigative stops."). Finally, defendant argued that the video recording, which

had been submitted to the trial court by the State, had not been authenticated

and was not, therefore, admissible without an evidentiary hearing establishing

its authenticity.

      On the return date of the motion to suppress, defense counsel requested

an opportunity to challenge the officers' credibility and explore the admissibility

of the video recording at an evidentiary hearing. The court denied that request

and issued an oral opinion based on the written police reports and its viewing of

the video recording, which took place outside of the presence of counsel.

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       The court began its opinion with its presumption that the caller contacted

the police department dispatcher via 9-1-1, that the call was recorded, and that

police gathered information about the caller. The court found that these facts,

which do not appear in the written police report, were indicative of the caller's

reliability.

       In addition, based on its out-of-court viewing of the video recording, the

court made additional findings of fact. The court stated:

               As for the disputed facts in this case the [c]ourt having
               reviewed the surveillance footage and either (sic)
               submitted evidence largely disagrees with the defense's
               characterization of these events. With regard to the
               time line the police vehicle can first be seen entering
               the frame of the surveillance footage at 9:24:01 as it
               turned onto Rosa Parks Boulevard.

               The [c]ourt acknowledges that there is a vehicle parked
               on the street near where the defendant was standing that
               would somewhat obstruct the officer[s'] view of him.
               [W]here the defendant's brief . . . suggests that the
               officers were only able to observe him for
               approximately two second as a result of the obstructed
               view[,] law enforcement appeared to have a clear line
               of sight to the defendant who's already on the move
               starting at 9:24 and 09 seconds p.m.

               The officers likewise come on a second later and the
               police vehicle is slowly moving parallel to the
               defendant as he walks on the sidewalk for another five
               seconds prior to turning into the driveway at 9:24 and
               15 seconds p.m. The [c]ourt notes that this turn was not
               abrupt by any means. Additionally the defense claims

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that the police vehicle stopped suddenly causing the
vehicle to shake. However, viewing the surveillance
footage it appears to have actually been caused by the
front tire of the vehicle passing over the curb.

      ....

The [c]ourt does not credit the argument that the
officers did not and would have been able to observe a
large – a bulge in the defendant's fanny pack which
swung as though . . . there was a heavy object inside of
it.

The officer[s'] vehicle was parallel to the defendant for
five seconds as he walked on the sidewalk. The front
of their vehicle is then facing the defendant as they
pulled into the driveway for an additional four seconds
before the officers ultimately exit their vehicle and
detain the defendant three seconds later. This means
that the police had the opportunity to observe the
defendant from a vantage point where they would have
been able to see the fanny pack for at least 12 seconds
prior to the detention.

Further, during the time frame the defendant took five
steps, one larger hop, and then two additional steps. A
bag which is weighed down by a heavy object would
sway with each step giving the officer[s] clear
opportunity to observe it doing so.

Additionally, the fact that the defendant was on
crutches would have made the swing of that fanny pack
more dramatic because he was limping. Even if the
defendant's normal stride did not cause the fanny pack
to sway, which the [c]ourt doubts, that bag certainly
would have visibly shifted during defendant's hop.

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      The court also made a critical credibility determination based only on its

review of the written police report. With respect to defendant's contention that

the officers did not tell him to stop, the court found: "[t]his [c]ourt also finds no

reason to doubt that Officer Menendez (sic) gave the defendant orders to stop."

The court found that even if the officer's car window, which cannot be seen on

the video, was closed as the vehicle arrived on scene as defendant contends, and

he did not give the order to stop until he exited the vehicle, those facts would

"not make the officer's recollection of these events less believable."

      The court also found that "in reviewing the police report it appears to this

[c]ourt that law enforcement intended to convey that several of the[] things

[described in the report] were happening simultaneously" rather than in the

sequence described by defendant. The court continued,

             [t]he defendant also claims that he did not make eye
             contact with the officers and that he was not startled by
             police but that he hopped out of the way so that he did
             not get hit by their oncoming vehicle. The [c]ourt does
             not credit the defendant's argument that he did not
             appear startled because his subsequent argument
             contradicts the assertion.        The defendant was
             attempting to get out of the way of a vehicle that he
             believed would hit him the [c]ourt highly doubts that he
             would appear unfazed to those around him.

      The court stated that it manipulated the video recording during its out-of-

court viewing of that evidence:

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            While the [c]ourt does not find to some extent that at
            least initially the defendant's startled appearance was
            likely attributable to the car coming toward him it
            believes that his subsequent actions indicate that he was
            startled by the police presence as well. Specifically[,]
            when the [c]ourt zoomed in on the surveillance footage
            the defendant can be seen turning his head in the
            direction of the police vehicle. This occurs at 9:24 and
            17 seconds p.m. as the vehicle turns into the driveway.
            It appears as though the vehicle's headlights are what
            draws the defendant's attention to it and that at this
            point though it is moving slowly the vehicle's in close
            proximity to him which would support the defense's
            argument.

            However, within half a second the defendant turns his
            head back towards the sidewalk and takes on[e] hop. It
            seems unlikely that [defendant] would take his eyes off
            that vehicle if he was actually fearful that it was going
            to hit him.

      The court made additional findings of fact based on the video recording.

The court found that even assuming the police vehicle's "headlights were bright

enough that defendant could not see" the officers in order to make eye contact,

"he still would have been able to see that this was a police vehicle." In addition,

the court found that "defendant did in fact pick up his pace in the two steps he

took following that hop" and "defendant accelerated his pace to nearly double

what his stride was initially" once the officers arrived.

      Based on these findings, as well its finding that Rosa Parks Boulevard is

located in a high-crime area, the court concluded that the officers' observations

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                                         9
were sufficient independent corroboration of the caller's report to constitute

reasonable articulable suspicion defendant was about to engage in criminal

activity to warrant the investigative stop and Terry pat down. 2

      An August 16, 2022 order memorializes the trial court's decision. After

the court denied defendant's motion, he entered his guilty plea and was

sentenced.

      This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments.

             THE OFFICERS' STOP AND SEARCH OF
             DEFENDANT      BASED    ON        AN
             UNCORROBORATED, ANONYMOUS 9-1-1 CALL
             WAS ILLEGAL.

             A.    The Police Unlawfully Stopped Defendant.

             B.    The Police Unlawfully Searched Defendant.

             C.     If This Court Declines to Reverse the Denial of
             the Motion to Suppress, the Matter Must be Remanded
             for the Evidentiary Hearing the Defense Requested.

      Although the State argues that the trial court correctly denied defendant's

motion to suppress, it also concedes "that factual disputes were asserted by

2
  The court, acknowledging the holding in Goldsmith, stated the following about
whether the location of the stop was a high-crime area: "is that a material issue
of dispute? I guess. Maybe it is a material issue of dispute. But at the end of
the day the fact of the matter is even if you remove that from the equation
everything else here provides an articulable and reasonable suspicion to law
enforcement to stop this particular defendant."
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                                       10
defendant that required an evidentiary hearing where credibility and factual

findings should have been made to establish a record on which this [c]ourt can

perform a full appellate review of the legal issues presented."

                                        II.

      Both the federal and state constitutions protect citizens against

unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art.

I, ¶ 7. The parties agree that the officers' encounter with defendant was an

investigatory stop, which constitutes a seizure under both the federal and state

constitutions. An investigatory stop or detention, sometimes referred to as a

Terry stop, involves a temporary seizure that restricts a person's movement. A

Terry stop implicates a constitutional requirement that there be "'specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,'

give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Elders, 192

N.J. 224, 247 (2007) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

The State has the burden to establish that a stop was valid. State v. Mann, 203

N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010); State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004). If there was

no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop, evidence

discovered as a result of the stop is subject to exclusion. State v. Chisum, 236

N.J. 530, 546 (2019).

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      To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, a judge must consider

the totality of the circumstances, viewing the "whole picture" rather than taking

each fact in isolation. State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554 (2019) (quoting State

v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 361 (2002)). Investigatory stops are justified "if the

evidence, when interpreted in an objectively reasonable manner, shows that the

encounter was preceded by activity that would lead a reasonable police officer

to have an articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or would

shortly occur." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 505 (1986).

            A [judge] must first consider the officer's objective
            observations. The evidence collected by the officer is
            "seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
            scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field
            of law enforcement. [A] trained police officer draws
            inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well
            elude an untrained person. The process does not deal
            with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second,
            a [judge] must determine whether the evidence "raise[s]
            a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped
            is engaged in wrongdoing."

            [Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
            411, 418 (1981)) (alterations in original).]

      "The proper mechanism through which to explore the constitutionality of

warrantless police conduct is an evidentiary hearing." State v. Atwood, 232 N.J.

433, 445 (2018) (first citing N.J.R.E. 104; and then citing State v. Gamble, 218

N.J. 412, 419 (2014)). When there are disputed material facts, the State must

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                                      12
present witnesses at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate the basis for the

challenged warrantless conduct and where "the defense is afforded the

opportunity to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses." Ibid.; see also

R. 3:5-7(c) (requiring testimony to be taken in open court "[i]f material facts are

disputed . . . .").

       An evidentiary hearing is mandated where "the parties made clear in their

respective written submissions that they had diametrically irreconcilable

accounts about what [police officers] claimed occurred when [they] approached

[the] defendant." State v. Parker, 459 N.J. Super. 26, 30 (App. Div. 2019). "The

motion judge . . . must make factual findings that will be substantially influenced

by an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses." Ibid.

       We agree with defendant that the trial court erred when it resolved

disputed issues of material fact relating to his motion to suppress without

holding an evidentiary hearing. The parties dispute a number of critical facts

surrounding the officers' stop and search of defendant. Material facts in dispute

include, among others, whether: (1) the caller used the 9-1-1 system to report

information to police; (2) the officers made eye contact with defendant when

they arrived on scene; (3) defendant appeared startled by police presence; (4)

the officers ordered defendant to stop and had sufficient time to give such an

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                                       13
order before arresting defendant; (5) defendant attempted to flee; (6) the officers

had sufficient time to make the observations detailed in their written report; (7)

whether the stop took place in a high-crime area; and (8) whether officers

observed defendant's fanny pack swaying in a manner indicative of it containing

a heavy object. The trial court resolved all these issues without the benefit of

hearing sworn testimony from the officers and possibly defendant. Instead, the

court made credibility determination based on a written police report and its

viewing of a video recording outside the presence of counsel. Defendant was

not given an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the officers through

cross-examination, test the admissibility of the video recording, offer his view

of what is depicted in the video recording, and raise objections to the trial court's

manipulation of the recording by magnifying its images through "zooming in." 3

      We, therefore, vacate the August 16, 2022 order and remand for an

evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Because the judge who

decided defendant's motion has already engaged in weighing the evidence and

rendered an opinion on the credibility of the defendant and officers, the hearing

3
  We note that a video recording must be properly authenticated before it can
be admitted as evidence. See State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 16 (1994).
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                                        14
should take place before a different judge. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family

Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617 (1986).

      We are not vacating defendant's conviction.      If, after the evidentiary

hearing, the evidence is suppressed, defendant can move to withdraw his guilty

plea. If the evidence is not suppressed, defendant can decide if he wants to

appeal from the ruling following the remand.

      The August 16, 2022 order is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full

evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.       We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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