Court Opinion

ID: 9497272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:47:12.473738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:05.636574
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion is not properly deferential to the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) finding that Eduard and Pakkung could reasonably relocate to parts of Indonesia where they would not be subject to future persecution. It cites no evidence in the record that “compels a contrary conclusion,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), and ignores the “substantial evidence” cited by the IJ demonstrating that such a relocation would be reasonable, see Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir.2001). Further, the majority opinion incorrectly concludes that Eduard and Pakkung raised their Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claims in their asylum applications. Eduard and Pakkung neither requested relief under the CAT, nor did they articulate a factual basis to support such a claim in either their asylum *197applications or in their hearing before the IJ. Thus neither the IJ nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred by not considering the claims. Because I believe there is no evidence in the record compelling reversal of the IJ’s refusal to grant the petitioners asylum petitions, I respectfully dissent.
“An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality ... if under the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii). “[T]he applicant shall bear the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate.... ” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3). Based on a country report from the State Department which concluded that most of the attacks against Christians in Indonesia “occurred in north Maluku and central Sulawesi provinces,” the IJ determined that “the more serious incidents of violence and forced conversions ... have been localized.” It then concluded, taking into account “differences in Indonesia with regard to the diverse populations, that the respondents could, if necessary, relocate within Indonesia” to avoid the areas where the religious persecutions are most acute.
The majority opinion concludes that the IJ applied a “heightened standard of proof by requiring Petitioners establish they would be unable to relocate even ‘if necessary.’ ” The IJ did not apply a fictional “if necessary” standard to the petitioners’ claims. Rather, it simply noted that upon returning to Indonesia the petitioners could reasonably relocate to parts of the country where violence against Christians is significantly less prevalent, if necessary. If Eduard and Pakkung, however, found that their fear of persecution in their home region was unwarranted, then such a relocation would be unnecessary. Admittedly, the IJ never used the magical word “reasonable” in concluding that the petitioners could relocate to safer parts of Indonesia upon their return home. However, such a conclusion is implicit in the IJ’s finding that the petitioners could relocate “if necessary,” and its ultimate denial of both petitions for asylum for failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
Further, the majority opinion points to no evidence in the record compelling a contrary conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“The administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812; Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir.2002) (Petitioner “must set forth evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find” a well-founded fear of persecution.). The majority opinion cites to testimony from Eduard that he believes that it would be difficult to relocate within Indonesia and to the IJ’s finding that Laskar Jihad has infiltrated Christian settlements within Indonesia to support its reversal of the IJ’s ruling.
The majority opinion’s reliance on this evidence is unwarranted. The IJ specifically found that the Laskar Jihad’s activities were limited to particular regions of Indonesia — giving the petitioners the opportunity to relocate to other parts of the country." Further, Eduard’s conclusory testimony that he believes that it would be too difficult to relocate in Indonesia does not by itself make the IJ’s conclusion to the contrary unreasonable. The IJ relied on a State Department report to conclude that the threat of persecution was limited to certain regions of the country, and considered the ethnic and cultural differences between regions of Indonesia in concluding *198that relocation was reasonable. Eduard’s testimony, though informative, does not negate the veracity of the State Department report, the reasonableness of the IJ’s reliance on it, or the IJ’s ultimate conclusion that the petitioners could reasonably relocate.
The majority opinion points to no evidence in the record that suggests that the IJ’s conclusion that religious persecution of Christians is limited to certain regions of Indonesia is unreasonable, or even incorrect. Further it points to no evidence that establishes that moving to a different part of Indonesia would demonstrate a unique hardship to the petitioners, or that they would be targeted for religious persecution in parts of Indonesia not identified by the State Department’s report or the IJ’s opinion. The majority’s decision to reverse the IJ’s ruling seems to be due to its uncomfortableness with “the tone of the IJ’s decision.” Improper tone is not a legitimate reason to reverse an IJ’s ruling. This is especially the case here because the IJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and there is no evidence in the record compelling a contrary ruling.
The majority opinion finds that the IJ and the BIA erred in not considering Eduard and Pakkung’s CAT claims, first raised in their appeal to the BIA, because the petitioners might have believed that they raised their CAT claims as part of their application for withholding of removal. The majority opinion concedes that neither Eduard nor Pakkung'explicitly requested relief under CAT in their asylum applications or during their hearing before the IJ. But it concludes that because the petitioners checked the YES box under the question “Do you fear being subjected to torture ... if you return?” on their asylum applications the IJ should have assumed they were seeking relief under CAT and considered their unarticulated claims. I cannot agree.
As the majority notes, an applicant must demonstrate specific intent to raises a claim for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(b) (requiring alien to “apply for withholding of removal under [the CAT]”). There is no doubt that neither Eduard nor Pakkung specifically requested relief under CAT. While I am comfortable with the majority opinion’s conclusion that an alien may articulate a claim under CAT without specifically referring to the convention, under certain circumstances, I do not believe that the petitioners articulated such a claim. Indeed, both Eduard and Pakkung checked the YES box under the question “Do you fear being subjected to torture ... if you return?”; however, neither articulated a factual claim of fear of torture.
The regulations implementing the CAT define torture:
as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
8 C.F.R. 208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
In his asylum application Eduard simply states that he fears that he will be beaten or killed because of his religion. He never claims that he would be tortured by “a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” as is required by the *199regulations. In fact, his fear of being killed or beaten is based, he claims, on “the long history of violence between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia,” not on any belief on his part that the Indonesian government would target him for torture.
Pakkung’s asylum application is similarly devoid of a claim of fear of torture. While in her affidavit she does articulate a grim scene in Indonesia where “killings, bloodshed, [and] burnings” are occurring in parts of the country, she does not claim that either she or anyone she knows has either been tortured or is targeted for torture. Pakkung neither uses the term torture in her affidavit, nor does she describe any factual situation where a public official has inflicted or intends to inflict severe physical or mental pain on her or anyone similarly situated to her.
While I can understand that an alien may be confused as to the process for applying for relief under CAT, I do not believe that a person intending to seek relief under the convention would be at all confused about the need to articulate a factual claim of fear of torture. Neither Eduard nor Pakkung claimed in their asylum applications and affidavits or during their hearing before the IJ that they believed that they would be tortured if they returned to Indonesia, much less that they would be tortured by a public official.
An IJ cannot consider and rule on a claim for relief under CAT if he does not know that a claim has been made. The IJ cannot possibly know that such a claim has been made if the alien does not specifically request relief under the convention or at least articulate a factual claim of fear of torture that would be cognizable under the regulations implementing CAT. Cf. Portis v. First Nat. Bank of New Albany, Mississippi 34 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.1994) (“The raising party must present the issue so that it places the opposing party and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised.”). Because Eduard and Pakkung never articulated to the IJ that they either feared being tortured if they returned to Indonesia or that they desired to seek relief under CAT, I do not believe they raised their CAT claims to the IJ. Neither the IJ nor the BIA erred by not ruling on these claims.
I believe there is substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s refusal to grant Eduard and Pakkung applications for asylum, and the IJ and BIA did not err by not considering the petitioners claims under the CAT. I would affirm its decision, and thus respectfully dissent.