Court Opinion

ID: 9373062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:26.128716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.377150
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JENNIFER A. BRITTON,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       CH-0752-16-0492-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: January 20, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Bernard K. Weiler, Esquire, Sugar Grove, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Lauren Hoyson, Esquire, and Virginia C. Costello, Esquire, Des Plaines,
             Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such
     as this one only in the following circumstances:        the initial decision contains

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argume nt is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         In February 2016, the agency’s regional flight surgeon determined that the
     appellant, an Air Traffic Control Specialist, AT-2152-EH, was no longer
     medically qualified to perform the duties of her position.       Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 5 at 7-8. The appellant did not request reconsideration of the regional
     flight surgeon’s determination and informed the agency that she wished to seek
     other employment in the region. Id. at 10-11. Also in February 2016, the agency
     reviewed staffing at the appellant’s facility and did not locate any vacant
     positions for which she was qualified. Id. at 10. According to the appellant, she
     undertook her own search for a position and applied and interviewed for multiple
     positions within the agency, without agency assistance. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The
     appellant applied for and was offered a position as an Air Traffic Assistant, FV‑
     2154-F. IAF, Tab 5 at 17-18. The salary for the new position was $17,904 less
     than the appellant’s original salary and reduced both her basic and locality pay.
     Id. at 23. The appellant requested that the agency restore some or all of the pay
     difference, stating that the agency previously had done so for other employees
                                                                                                3

     moving to different positions within the agency. Id. at 22. The agency declined
     to provide any additional pay, stating that the selection was competitive and
     voluntarily accepted by the appellant.         Id. at 21.   In June 2016, the appellant
     accepted and was reassigned to the Air Traffic Assistant position at the lower pay
     rate. Id. at 20, 23.
¶3         The appellant timely filed a Board appeal alleging that she was subjected to
     an involuntary reduction in pay. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5. Specifically, she alleged that
     she had to take the Air Traffic Assistant position, and hence a pay cut, because
     she was near the end of the 1-year period after losing her medical clearance
     before she was removed from the agency, and that the agency did not assist her in
     locating a position and had discriminated against her because of her mental
     illness. 2 Id. at 5. She did not request a hearing. Id. at 2. The administrative
     judge issued an order notifying the appellant of the requirements to establish
     Board jurisdiction over her appeal and directing her to file evidence and argument
     establishing jurisdiction within 15 days of the date of the order.             IAF, Tab 7
     at 2-4. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal because the appellant failed to
     make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, as she voluntarily sought and
     accepted the Air Traffic Assistant position. IAF, Tab 8 at 5 -7. The appellant did
     not respond to the administrative judge’s order or to the agency’s motion. IAF,
     Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 3.         The administrative judge issued an initial
     decision based on the written record, in which she found that the appellant’s
     acceptance of the Air Traffic Assistant position was voluntary and dismis sed the
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 3-5.

     2
       In its response to the appellant’s petition for review, the agency asserts that at the time
     of her initial appeal, the appellant was pursuing the same claims of discrimination made
     in her Board appeal before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 8. Neither party has provided any further
     information or documentation regarding the appellant’s alleged EEOC claim and
     whether she was informed of the requirement to elect either to appeal to the EEOC or to
     the Board. See, e.g., McCoy v. U.S. Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶ 14 (2008).
                                                                                       4

¶4        The appellant timely filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response opposing the petition, to which the
     appellant has filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        It is undisputed that the appellant applied for and was offered the Air
     Traffic Assistant position, at a lower pay rate than her original position, which
     she accepted. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. An employee-initiated action is presumed to be
     voluntary, and the Board does not have jurisdiction over voluntary actions.
     Soler-Minardo v. Department of Defense, 92 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 5 (2002). However,
     an appellant may establish that an employee-initiated action was involuntary, and
     thus within the Board’s jurisdiction, by presenting sufficient evidence that it was
     the result of duress or coercion brought on by the agency, or the result of her
     reasonable reliance on misleading statements by the agency.              Harris v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs 114, M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 8 (2010); Reed v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 99 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 12 (2005), aff’d, 198 F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir.
     2006).   Coercion is present if the appellant can establish that she accepted a
     reduction in pay to avoid a threatened removal, and if she can further show that
     the agency knew or should have known that the action could not be substantiated .
     Harris, 114 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 8; Soler-Minardo, 92 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 6. When, as
     here, the appellant has not requested a hearing, she must establish by
     preponderant evidence that the reduction in pay is within the Board’ s jurisdiction.
     See Vitale v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 18 (2007)
     (stating that when the appellant has not requested a hearing, “the threshold
     question is . . . whether he has established by preponderant evidence that the
     Board has jurisdiction over his appeal”).
                                                                                        5

     The administrative judge properly found that the appellant did not establish that
     her reduction in grade was involuntary and thus did not establish Board
     jurisdiction over her appeal.
¶6        The appellant has not established by preponderant evidence that her
     acceptance of the Air Traffic Assistant position at a lower rate of pay was
     involuntary and thus within the Board’s jurisdiction. First, the appellant has not
     shown that she accepted the reduction in pay to avoid a threatened removal. See
     Harris, 114 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 8. Although the appellant suggested that she would
     have been removed from the agency 1 year after the loss of the medical clearance
     required for her original position, the record does not reflect that the agency in
     fact threatened to remove her. IAF, Tab 1 at 5; cf. Goldberg v. Department of
     Transportation, 97 M.S.P.R. 441, ¶ 3 (2004) (noting that the appellant alleged
     that the agency’s administrative officer told him several times that he would be
     separated from the agency if he did not accept the position offered).
¶7        The appellant also has not shown that the agency knew or should have
     known that a removal action, if taken, could not be substantiated. See Harris,
     114 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 8. The appellant does not dispute that she was no longer
     medically qualified to perform the duties of her Air Traffic Control Specialist
     position. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 5 at 7, 11. Her medical inability to perform the
     duties of her original position could have served as the basis for a removal action.
     O’Connell v. U.S. Postal Service, 69 M.S.P.R. 438, 443 (1996). The appellant
     further alleged in her appeal that the agency did not assist her in locating a
     position and that, had the agency assisted her, she would not have had to take
     such a large pay reduction. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The record reflects that the agency
     performed a search for a vacant position for which she was qualified shortly after
     she informed the agency she wished to seek other employment within the agency.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 10. The appellant has not shown that this search was deficient or
     that the agency otherwise failed to follow its policies regarding reassignment.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 5; cf. Goldberg, 97 M.S.P.R. 441, ¶ 9 (finding that the appellant
                                                                                         6

     nonfrivolously alleged that his reassignment was involuntary whe n he alleged
     that, rather than being subject to removal following his medical disqualification,
     he was entitled to a position at the highest available grade or level at or below his
     current grade or level).     Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not
     established that a removal action could not be substantiated and cannot show that
     her reduction in pay was coerced.

     The appellant’s allegations of discrimination do not establish that her reduction in
     pay was involuntary.
¶8         On review, the appellant appears to argue either that the administrative
     judge did not properly consider her discrimination claim in support of her
     argument that her acceptance of the Air Traffic Assistant position was
     involuntary, or that the Board has jurisdiction over her claim as a discriminatory
     nonselection for positions to which she applied prior to accepting th at position.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. Under either theory, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the
     appellant’s claim.
¶9         To the extent the appellant argues that the administrative judge did not
     properly consider her allegation of discrimination in support of her claim that her
     acceptance of the Air Traffic Assistant position was involuntary, her argument is
     without merit. The appellant alleged below that she applied and interviewed for
     multiple positions prior to accepting the Air Traffic Assistant position; for the
     first time on review, she alleges that her failure to be hired for these positions
     was the result of disability discrimination. Compare IAF, Tab 1 at 5, with PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The issue of the Board’s jurisdiction is always before the
     Board and may be raised by either party or sua sponte by the Board at any time
     during a Board proceeding.          Simnitt v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     113 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 5 (2010).         Accordingly, we consider the appellant’s
     arguments regarding discrimination as they pertain to the jurisdictional questions
     of coercion and involuntariness, but find they are insufficient to establish that her
     reduction in pay was coerced or involuntary.
                                                                                        7

¶10         When an appellant raises allegations of discrimination in connection with
      an involuntariness claim, evidence of discrimination may be considered only in
      terms of the standard for voluntariness in a particular situation , not whether such
      evidence meets the test for proof of discrimination established under Title VII.
      Markon v. Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 578 (1996). In other words,
      even if the agency’s actions are discriminatory, the appellant still must show how
      those actions coerced the action at issue. Tripp v. Department of the Air Force,
      59 M.S.P.R. 458, 461 (1993).       The appellant has not presented evidence in
      support of her claim that her nonselection for the positions she applied for prior
      to accepting the Air Traffic Assistant position was as a result of discriminat ion,
      nor has she presented evidence to establish that a reasonable person would have
      felt compelled to accept the Air Traffic Assistant position following the
      nonselections. See Loredo v. Department of the Treasury, 118 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶ 8
      (2012) (concluding that the appellant had not presented sufficient evidence of
      religious discrimination that would establish that a reasonable person would have
      felt compelled to accept the demotion under the circumstances) .
¶11         The appellant also appeared to raise a claim below that the agency failed to
      accommodate her when it did not assist her with locating a new position. An
      appellant may establish that coercion is present when she proves that: (1) the
      agency threatened to remove her; (2) she is a qualified disabled employee entitled
      to reasonable accommodation; and (3) the agency would not accommodate her
      disability.   O’Connell, 69 M.S.P.R. at 444.       Here, the record reflects that,
      following the regional flight surgeon’s finding that she was no longer medically
      qualified to perform the duties of her original position, the agency conducted a
      search for a vacant position for which the appellant would qualify but did not find
      one. IAF, Tab 5 at 10. Although the appellant alleges for the first time on review
      that she was excluded from selection for higher-paying positions than the Air
      Traffic Assistant position, she has not set forth sufficient evidence to establish
      that she was entitled to be reassigned to a vacant position at a higher grade or pay
                                                                                        8

      level. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5; cf. Goldberg, 97 M.S.P.R. 441, ¶ 9
      (noting the appellant specifically alleged that there were two positions available
      after his medical disqualification and closer to his original rate of pay and grade
      than the position to which he was reassigned). The appellant has not set forth any
      other evidence to establish that the agency would not accommodate her or
      otherwise establish that discrimination caused her to accept the Air Traffic
      Assistant position.
¶12         To the extent that the appellant argues that the basis for the Board’s
      jurisdiction is the agency’s discriminatory failure to select her for positions to
      which she applied following medical disqualification, she cannot establish
      jurisdiction. An agency’s failure to select an applicant for a vacant position is
      generally not appealable to the Board.      Prewitt v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 133 F.3d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998).            Given this general lack of
      jurisdiction, the only circumstances under which an appellant may appeal a
      nonselection to the Board are through other statutory means, such as under the
      Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) or the Uniform ed
      Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), or
      through an individual right of action appeal under the Whistleblower Protection
      Act (WPA) or the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA).
      Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 5 (2007). The
      appellant did not raise any allegations under VEOA, USERRA, WPA, or WPEA,
      however, nor does she raise any such allegations on revie w. IAF, Tab 1; PFR
      File, Tab 1.   Moreover, the Board cannot consider an affirmative defense of
      discrimination in the absence of an otherwise appealable action.      See Hicks v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 114 M.S.P.R. 232, ¶ 13 (2010) (stating that allegations of
      discrimination and retaliation do not confer jurisdiction in the absence of an
      otherwise appealable action). Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s claims of
      discrimination do not establish Board jurisdiction.
                                                                                            9

¶13         We conclude that the administrative judge properly found that the
      appellant’s allegations of coercion were insufficient to establish that her
      reduction in pay was involuntary, and we find that the appellant’s arguments on
      review are without merit.      Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s
      finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      3
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        10

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of p articular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representati ve receives this decision before
                                                                                 11

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, nati onal origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court ‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                          Office of Federal Operations
                   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                P.O. Box 77960
                           Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                          Office of Federal Operations
                   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               131 M Street, N.E.
                                 Suite 5SW12G
                           Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     12

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 4   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             13

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.