Court Opinion

ID: 9884505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:00:11.284125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.164848
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the trial court committed reversible error by failing to submit to the jury the requested lesser included charges of criminal sexual conduct in the second and fourth degree and lesser included charges of attempted criminal conduct in the first and third degree.
I dissent with some reluctance as I conclude from reviewing the record that appellant was given a fair trial, and that the evidence presented is sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. However, I am left with an inescapable conclusion that the requested lesser includeds were justified by the facts and should have gone to the jury. Respondent State of Minnesota concedes that the requested instructions on second and fourth degree criminal sexual conduct and attempted criminal sexual conduct in the first and third degree are lesser included offenses under Minn.Stat. § 609.04 (1984), and agrees that these offenses which appellant requested satisfy the first part of the controlling two-part test on the question of lesser includeds. Under the two-part test, (1) it must be determined whether the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense, as outlined in Minn.Stat. § 609.04; and (2) it must be determined whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to permit the jury rationally to acquit the defendant of the charged offense and convict him of the included offense. State v. Patch, 329 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn.1983).
Respondent argues that the second part of the test is not met because appellant totally denies touching the victim with any kind of criminal sexual intent. The majority opinion appears to accept respondent’s argument that Loftus v. State, 357 N.W.2d 419 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), controls, and that Loftus stands for the proposition that if there is a complete denial of culpability, lesser includeds can not be submitted.
I do not find that Loftus stands for this proposition. In Loftus, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by refusing the instructions on a lesser included offense of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. This court affirmed the refusal to submit that lesser included and held:
Loftus’ theory of the case was that no contact at all occurred on July 14, 1983; his defense was a complete denial of the charged offense.
That defense stance put Loftus at odds with People v. Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45 (1984), wherein the California Supreme Court stated:
[T]he instructions must be justified by the defendant’s reliance on a theory of defense that would be consistent with a conviction for the related offense. Thus, the instruction need not be given if the defense theory and evidence reflect a complete denial of culpability as when the defense is alibi, or the only issue is identity, unless the defendant argues the evidence at most shows guilt only of the related offense.
Id. at 531-32, 674 P.2d at 1316, 199 Cal.Rptr. at 58 (footnote omitted). Loftus was not entitled to a lesser included offense instructions because there was no dispute over the elements differentiating the two crimes.
Id. 357 N.W.2d at 422-3 (emphasis added).
A careful examination of this holding and the facts shows that the holding was predicated on Loftus’ complete denial of any physical contact and there being “no dispute” over the elements which differentiate criminal sexual conduct in the first degree from criminal sexual conduct in the second degree.
That is not the case with appellant here, and I find support in that portion of the Geiger case which states the instruction need not be given:
*854[u]nless the defendant argues the evidence at most shows guilt only of the related offense.
Geiger at 531-2, 674 P.2d at 1316, 199 Cal.Rptr. at 58.
Accepting the facts set out in the majority opinion, both appellant and J.P. agree that at one point appellant was laying on top of J.P. on the floor and struggling with her. J.P. testified that appellant’s intent and actions were sexual, and appellant’s testimony was that his intent and actions were to calm her down. But everyone agrees that he was on top of her, and that this much was seen by an independent witness, Randy Lee.
Thus, it is clear that this much evidence supports submitting to the jury criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree, and attempted criminal sexual conduct in the first and third degrees. The testimony as to penetration was based only on the testimony of the victim. Appellant vigorously denied any penetration and there was a complete lack of corroborating evidence on this point. It is true, of course, that for a jury to find penetration, there need be no corroborating evidence. Minn.Stat. § 609.-347, subd. 1 (1985). However, the complete lack of corroborating evidence, while not proof that there was no penetration, is certainly not proof that there was.
The inadequate follow-up investigation by the officers and the complete lack of supporting medical testimony are matters that a conscientious jury could take into account in coming to the conclusion that, while they did not accept appellant’s story that the physical contact was not sexually oriented, they could not find that the evidence on penetration came up to that high degree of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the majority opinion points out, J.P. did not wish any medical treatment, and the officers did not press on her any need to have it done. The investigating officer did not instruct her not to shower or clean herself until a full investigation had been completed. J.P. did, in fact, shower and clean herself, thus lessening her chance for either the State or the appellant to get evidence favorable to their position. A conscientious jury could easily have found the lesser includeds, not requiring actual penetration, to have been proven by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but not the greater charges which necessitated penetration.
While one witness testified that J.P.’s belt buckle was undone and that her pants were unsnapped as she rose from the floor, that witness made no claim that he observed actual penetration. The State concedes that there is no direct testimony of any penetration except that of the victim.
As in Geiger, appellant argues that the evidence at best, if it shows guilt, is guilt only of sexual conduct, not penetration. On the other hand, obviously the State is entitled to argue that criminal sexual conduct in the first and third degree should go to the jury based on the victim’s testimony. With no dispute by either side that the physical evidence presented to the jury could support a finding of guilt of the lesser includeds, but a genuine dispute as to whether or not the evidence presented would justify finding of criminal sexual conduct in the first and third degree, I would hold that a careful reading of the cases relied upon by the majority, namely, Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269 (Minn.1986) and State v. Lienweber, 303 Minn. 414, 228 N.W.2d 120 (Minn.1975), require the submission of the requested lesser included offense, and that failure to do so was reversible error.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial with instructions to the court that, should the record at the second trial support the submission of lesser included offenses, using the two-part test of Patch, the defendant is not precluded from requesting a “lesser included” simply because he denied sexual intent as the basis for his physical contact with the victim. To hold otherwise would have a chilling effect on a defendant’s right to take the stand and deny all guilt, while at the same time claiming the benefit of any lesser includeds which the law and the facts justify.
*855The majority opinion comes close to holding that, before a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense, the defendant must come forward and admit some involvement with the main charge and argue that, while he has done something wrong, some essential element of the crime charged is missing, and thus, the lesser included is deserved.
It is decidedly not the law that some tacit admission of guilt or involvement with the victim is required before lesser includeds can be given. Obviously this defendant and his attorney accept the risk of appearing inconsistent to a jury as they argue, on the one hand, that nothing was done but, on the other hand, that if something was done it was a lesser evil than the main charge.
That is a risk defendants have to accept and are entitled to accept. If the facts, as here, show that despite defendant’s denial of any criminal intent, there is a rational basis for a conviction on the offense of criminal sexual contact, the defendant can argue for the submission of those lesser includeds to the jury while denying both sexual contact and penetration.
The element which separates criminal sexual contact in the second and fourth degree from criminal sexual penetration in the first and third degree is “penetration” and that element was “* * * sufficiently in dispute.” See State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 532.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.