Court Opinion

ID: 9672707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:59:06.607609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.932149
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I agree with the majority’s analysis that operation of a state mental hospital is a governmental function and, therefore, within the purview of statutory governmental immunity. See Perry v Kalamazoo State Hospital, 404 Mich 205; 273 NW2d 421 (1978). See generally MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). I must take exception, however, to the majority’s analysis of Michigan nuisance law.
In the present case, we are faced with examining the scope of nuisance law and its effect on the defense of governmental immunity. This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in two companion cases, Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124; 268 NW2d 230 (1978) (3-2-2 decision), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978) (3-2-2 decision). Of these two cases, Gerzeski, *111although a multiple-opinion decision, appears to have some semblance of agreement among a majority of the justices as to the proper evidentiary forms of nuisances and their effect on governmental immunity. There, the late Justice Moody, joined by Justice Williams, presented a discussion of negligence law. Justices Fitzgerald, Kavanagh, and Levin, writing separately, stated that:
"Justice Moody has aptly analyzed the semantic difficulties inherent in our nuisance case law. We agree with that analysis insofar as it explains the different methods of classifying nuisance for evidentiary and liability considerations.” Gerzeski, supra, p 153.1
Thus, it appears, at least to this interested observer, that Justice Moody’s discourse on nuisance law stands as the Supreme Court’s controlling word in this area.
Justice Moody defines nuisances per se as "nuisances created by illegal conduct”. Gerzeski, supra, p 161. In contrast, the majority in the instant case defines a nuisance per se as "an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances”.2 Although Justice Moody, as well as Justice Fitzgerald in Rosario, did quote from earlier Michigan cases which contained definitions of nuisance per se similar to that used by the majority in the instant case, it is not clear that such a definition was adopted by the Supreme Court. Rather, it is apparent that Justice *112Moody looked not to whether a nuisance was at all times a nuisance, but rather to the conduct which created the nuisance. See Gerzeski, supra, pp 160-162. Indeed, Justice Moody stated that:
"More importantly, the definition of an intentional nuisance clearly reflects that the nature of the conduct complained of in an intentional nuisance situation is more akin to conduct creating a per se nuisance than the careless or neglectful conduct which produces a negligent nuisance.” Gerzeski, supra, p 161 (emphasis added).
I believe that the majority has also improperly analyzed the present definition of an intentional nuisance. The majority opines that a "plaintiff must show that the defendant who created or continued the nuisance knew or must have known that harm to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow as a result of defendant’s actions”. The element of intent in an intentional nuisance, however, is directed at intentionally creating the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance, not intentionally harming the plaintiff. Indeed, Justice Moody stated that
"[t]he bar of governmental immunity is inapplicable when a trier of fact determines as in this case, that the alleged nuisance was intentional, i.e., that the governmental agency intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance.” Gerzeski, supra, p 162.
Plaintiff has alleged that the hospital failed to take certain actions regarding separation of residents, staff size, and provisions for a safe living environment. If plaintiff can establish that these "failures” were nuisances "created by conduct intended to bring about the conditions”, plaintiff *113would have demonstrated the existence of intentional nuisances. Thus, governmental immunity would not be a defense to plaintiffs claim.
I would reverse and allow plaintiff to present his proofs.

 Justices Fitzgerald, Kavanagh, and Levin, however, would apparently proceed further than Justice Moody and find no governmental immunity defense to any type of nuisance. See Gerzeski, supra, pp 153-154; Rosario, supra, pp 129-141.

 Although the majority opinion provides no citation in support of this definition, a similar definition can be found in Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333, 335; 283 NW2d 739 (1979). Similarly, however, Ford cited no authority in support of this definition as well.