Court Opinion

ID: 9446350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:52:44.255495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:37.566742
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting)
The error alleged on this appeal is the admission in evidence at appellant’s trial, over his objection, of a written confession taken from him by the police on the afternoon of August 1, 1956, the day after his arrest.
My views on the prompt arraignment question have been expressed in a number of opinions, most recently in Trilling v. United States, -U.S.App.D.C. -, 260 F.2d 677; and Mallory v. United States, - U.S.App.D.C. -, 259 F.2d 796. Basically, it suffices to say here, Rule 5 is the mechanism for effectuating the individual’s constitutional rights to be free from restraint except upon probable cause, to be bailed from confinement in. proper cases, and not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Whether there is probable cause to detain an arrested person requires a judicial determination, Even if there is such cause he is entitled, within recognized limitations, to be free °n ball pending trial. And he must be informed of his right to counsel and of his right to refuse to make any state-m<mt lest he incriminate himself. With°ut ™ch protection our citizens would be subject to police control rather than dae Prof f There be a Pollf. state. The essence of Rule 5 is fat removes the arrested individua f(ro“ ce contro1 ^ ;*ial contro1 without unnecessary delay.
While the phrase “without unnecessary ry delay may connote something less „ than immediacy, it allows arresting oi ficers little more leeway than the interval between arrest and the ordinary administrative steps required to bring a sus fl pect before the nearest available magistrate" Mallory v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S 449, 453 S.Ct 1356. That the police m the present case thought the “ordinary administrative steps” had heen completed is plain from the fact that the prisoner had been taken to court for the Rule 5 commitment proceedings a+ 10:00 A.M., some twelve hours after his arrest.
The complaining officer was in court ready to make the assauit charge, When word was received that the victim of the assauit had died, appellant could have been arraigned on the assault charge, or the officer could have made a homicide charge, or another officer could have stepped across the street from police headquarters to make the homicide charge. In any event, there were no fur*694ther “administrative steps” to be taken which necessitated delay of the commitment proceedings.
The Government said at the argument that appellant could not have been charged with homicide when he was in the Municipal Court because the report of the death was only unconfirmed hearsay at that time. But if the police had reason to doubt the accuracy of the information, they could easily have confirmed it and then made a homicide charge. If they had no confidence in the homicide charge, they should have proceeded on the assault charge. An unconfirmed rumor is no basis for a homicide charge, but neither is it a valid reason for depriving a prisoner of his right to speedy arraignment on a pending assault charge.
The real purpose in delaying the arraignment is disclosed in the Government’s alternative contention that it was proper to bring appellant back to police headquarters, without arraigning him, for the purpose of putting in writing the oral statements which appellant had made shortly after 9:00 A.M. under questioning by Detective Wallace of the Homicide Squad.1 This, of course, is a callous admission that the arraignment was postponed and appellant “taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself * * * to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.” Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. at page 454, 77 S.Ct. at page 1359. Since this is exactly what the law forbids, the ensuing confession was inadmissible in evidence.
I cannot agree with the majority’s view that receiving the confession in evidence was harmless error, if error. As the majority recognizes, it was through that confession that the Government proved appellant’s boxing training, such as it was. But the majority finds it “inconceivable * * * that such testimony could harmfully affect appellant’s rights.” Since the Government referred to this evidence in its opening argument to the jury, it obviously did not consider it inconceivable that it would influence the jury. Nor do I. And, if it is conceivable that the evidence may .have tipped the scales in favor of conviction, we usurp the jury’s function by assum*ng that it did not. Krulewitch v. United States, 1949, 336 U.S. 440, 445, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790.
The confession may have been harmful to appellant in another respect as well, The Government, anticipating that the jury might be disinclined to condemn a man for throwing his wife’s paramour out of his home, made a considerable point of the fact that appellant and his wife's bad been separated at the time of ^he incident. This fact was supplied by inadmissible confession,
The other confessions discussed in the majority opinion — a written one taken from appellant the night of his arrest and an oral one shortly after 9:00 o’clock the next morning — are not before us. Both were received in evidence without objection and neither was attacked on appeal. Yet the majority considers them and concludes that they were admissible under Mallory v. United States, supra. I consider that conclusion clearly erroneous.
j hold to the view that confessions obtained through police interrogation of an arrested person before he has been arraigned under Rule 5 are inadmissible, My reasons for that view are set forth at length in Trilling v. United States, supra. I shall not repeat them here. I shall only comment upon two propositions asserted by the majority,
The majority asserts that to hold these confessions inadmissible “would be to *695say no statement to police is admissible after arrest — a step that the Supreme Court has not taken in the Rules and has declined to adopt in the McNabb, Mitchell and Carignan cases.” This assertion completely misses the point that is involved here. To be sure the Supreme Court has not said that no statement made to the police after arrest is admissible. The type of statement it has held admissible, however, is that which is “promptly and spontaneously” made. Upshaw v. United States, 1949, 335 U.S. 410, 413, 69 S.Ct. 170, 171, 93 L.Ed. 100. A person who is arrested is, of course, free to unbosom himself of his guilt. If he does so, his statement may be used against him
. . , , . ,, That is the principle embodied m the British practice to w ic e majorny refers. To make certain that the prisoner’s statement is a voluntary one the arresting officer cautions him immediately upon the arrest t a e is lee o remain silent and that whatever he says may be used against him. Then the offlcer asks the prisoner whether he desires to make any statement. If the prisoner wishes to make a statement, he does so; but he is not subjected to an interrogartion.
Only by disregarding facts we conclude that the practice by which these two confessions were obtained bears any resemblance to the British practice. When appellant was arrested on the Might of the assault, he was questioned by Detective Reinhardt. After the interrogation, Detective Reinhardt inserted m a typewriter a prepared police form reading as follows:
Date.............. Re:........................ You are requested to make a statement of the facts in this case to the best of your knowledge. However you are advised that you are not compelled to make a statement, are not promised anything for making one, and do so at your own free will. If necessary, the statement you make will be used against you in Court. Having been so advised, are you willing to make a statement? Reply by......•.............. Statement:
, He typed m the date, appellants name, and the word Yes m the blank for Re- & ^ And under Statement, he ^Ped m a condensation of his understanding of what appellant had orally adraitte(L Appellant then read the statement and si®ned . Mere1^ ^lvin^ the Pns°ner “ opportunity to read the boil- “ Plat« of a ?rePared form is no substitute for giving him a meaningful eautionary statement. Moreover, even if appeIlant,s eighth-grade education were enough permit him to understand from the form that be wag not required ^ confeggj ^ understanding would haye come to() late- He had already con. fessed orally in the course of the interrogation_ No eautionary statement had been giyen Hm before ^ confession.
The majority also asserts that appelWant’s arrest occurred “past the ordinary h®urs for appearances” and concludes that this circumstance gave the police a license not only to postpone his arraign- , ... ,, . , ment until the opening oí court the next , , , , , ,. . . ... . , day but also to question him m the mter- , . . val. There are no ordinary hours for „ , . .. appearances, for, as we said in Akowskey v. United States, 1946, 81 US.App.D.C. 353, 354 158 F.2d 649, 650, “both by law and practice a prisoner may be brought before a committing magistrate „at hom,„ The United gtates Commissioner is available for night time arraignments when the Government sees fit to have a prisoner arraigned without delay.2 Recently a rotation system was established among the Sixteen Municipal Court judges whereby at least one of them is available for arraignment of arrested persons at any hour of the day or night.3 Even the United States Attor *696ney has abandoned the argument that a late-hour arrest justifies postponing arraignment and receiving in evidence a confession obtained through questioning the prisoner in the interval.4 Mallory v. United States,-U.S.App.D.C.-, 259 F.2d 796; see my opinion in Trilling v. United States, supra. It is regrettable that this court should disinter an argument which has been decently laid to rest by the prosecutor, which has no basis in fact, and which disregards the fundamental rights of arrested persons.

. The interrogation at the Homicide Squad office was conducted by Sergeant Clarke, not a single question being asked by Detective Wallace. If the purpose were to record what appellant had earlier told Wallace, it would seem that the latter would have participated in the interrogation. Detective Wallace testified that appellant was brought back to lieadquar-ters “to take the statement,” referring to the written confession which is here at issue.

. See United States v. Hoffa, Crim. No. 294-57 (D.D.C.), and my opinion in Trilling v. United States, supra.

. Washington Post-Times Herald, April 4, 1958, p. A-l.

. What justified the postponement of appellant’s arraignment, according to the Government, was not the late hour of his arrest, but rather the fact that he was too drunk to be taken before a magistrate. I agree that it may be fair to postpone for a short time an arrested person’s Rule 5 proceeding if he is. mentally unfit, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, to avail himself of the rights afforded him therein. But the very same considerations of fairness which call for postponing his arraignment forbid'subjecting such a prisoner to an interrogation- dtu-ing the period of postponement. See my opinion in Mallory v. United States, supra.