Court Opinion

ID: 9788981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:50.267684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:18.195878
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Judge
(dissenting):
52 I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court's grant of Brixen's petition to quash the CID because I consider section 76-10-917, to the extent information obtained thereunder may be used in a criminal proceeding, to be unconstitutional, This is an appropriate case for this court to exercise its ability to affirm on any ground. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, ¶ 4, 1 P.3d 564 (stating "[tlhis court may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternative ground even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling" (quotations and citation omitted)).1
T53 CIDs are a method by which the attorney general may compel an individual or corporation to provide "information relevant to a civil antitrust investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(1) (1999). Thus, CIDs are essentially administrative subpoenas issued by the attorney general.2 See id. at § 76-10-917(1)-(2) (stating attorney general may demand documentary material, oral testimony, and responses to interrogatories, and attorney general may compel compliance by appearance before district court); cf. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1998) (stating " 'court should not set aside a CID unless it would quash the same request contained in a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum issued by a district court in aid of a grand jury investigation' " (citation omitted)). However, unlike most subpoenas, the attorney general may issue CIDs without any prior serutiny or approval by a court or grand jury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(1) (1999). Therefore, a court does not have the opportunity to review the validity and seope of a CID until after a person or entity has been served with a CID. See id. at § 76-10-917(7)(b)M). Consequently, a person or entity served with a *665CID must take affirmative actions to ensure that their rights are not violated.3
154 The attorney general's unfettered ability to issue CIDs is especially troubling because CIDs are used to uncover evidence of criminal, as well as civil antitrust violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-920(1) (1995) (providing individual who violates seetion 76-10-914 may be fined up to $100,000 or imprisoned up to three years and corporation may be fined up to $500,000)4 Further, regardless of whether a person or entity has engaged in illegal anticompetitive activities, "the attorney general may disclose testimony or documents obtained [through a CID] ... to (i) any grand jury; and (ii) officers or employees of federal or state law enforcement agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(8)(b) (1999); see also id. § 76-10-917(2)(a)(ii) (stating CID must state "that the documents, materials, or testimony in response to the demand may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding"). Thus, the attorney general may utilize a CID to gather evidence that may be used in a criminal prosecution.
155 As the majority points out, we are bound by the supreme court's ruling in Av-ans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998), regarding the attorney general's burden in obtaining judicial enforcement of a CID. However, Evans does not appear to control the application of section 76-10-917 in criminal proceedings and the unconstitutionality thereof in that context. Specifically, in Zv-ans the court stated:
The notion that the reason to believe standard is a relatively low burden is further supported by the purposes behind the federal antitrust investigative provisions. One federal court has noted that such purposes are twofold: "(1) to enable the Attorney General to determine whether there has been a violation of the antitrust laws, and if so (2) to enable the Attorney General to allege properly the violations in a civil complaint." Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co.; 221 F.Supp. 391, 397 (D.Minn. 1963). Thus, CIDs simply facilitate the attorney general's investigations into antitrust violations and enable the attorney general to gather enough information to initiate a proper civil action. Likewise, the CIDs issued by the Utah Attorney General assist that ageney in gathering enough information to make a proper determination as to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated.
Evans, 9683 P.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
11 56 The above language suggests that the supreme court considered the information sought in a CID would be used solely in the context of civil actions.5 Thus, the court did not address the constitutional concerns that arise when a statute permits a prosecutor to use what amounts to an administrative subpoena to obtain evidence that may be used in a criminal prosecution. Consequently, Evans does not appear to control the issue of whether portions of section 76-10-917 violate *666a person's rights under the federal and state constitutions.6
T57 The attorney general's ability to use CIDs in criminal investigations implicates constitutional concerns that do not arise when subpoenas are used for civil investigations.
The difference between civil and criminal investigations lies at the very foundation of much of our procedural law, in part because of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has relied upon the distinction invariably in cases involving subpoenas issued by administrative agencies and special commissions and challenged on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the government's deliberate use of administrative subpoenas to gather evidence in a criminal case im-permissibly disregards the "safeguards and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 80 S.Ct. 688, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). In other words, the Court has impliedly determined that the safeguards appropriate in civil administrative proceedings are inadequate to protect the constitutional rights of individuals in criminal law proceedings.
In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 665 (Utah 1988) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Consequently, "[the flexible standards applicable to administrative subpoenas should not apply to subpoenas issued by a state's prosecuting attorney in the context of a eriminal investigation." Id.
T58 The Legislature has recognized that the recipient of an administrative subpoena, used as part of a criminal investigation, is entitled to "the 'safeguards and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States'" Id. (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 80 S.Ct. 683, 690, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960)). Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 77-22a-1 (1999) allows prosecutors to issue administrative subpoenas in controlled substance investigations only "under circumstances where it is clear that the subpoenaed information is not subject to a claim of protection under the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution, or a similar claim under Article I, See. 12 and See. 14, Utah Constitution." Id. § T77-222a-1(2) (1999). This requirement protects the recipient of the subpoena from having to take affirmative action to prevent the State from intruding on his, her, or its constitutionally protected rights.7
{59 Unlike section 77-22a-1, section 76-10-917 does not provide any constitutional safeguards prior to issuance of the CID. Section 76-10-917 does allow a recipient of a CID to file a petition to set aside the CID based upon "any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of the petitioner." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(7)(b)(i) (1999). However, section 76-10-917 does not contain any provision ensuring that, prior to issuance, the attorney general's intrusion upon the person's liberty is lawful. See In re Crimi nal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 665 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating "[elxcept for grand jury subpoenas, the general rule is that until a criminal charge is formally made, the state bears the burden of first establishing that its intrusion upon a citizen's liberty is lawful" (citations omitted)).
The point is not trivial,. There is a great difference between allowing the government to curtail personal liberty until a citizen obtains a court order commanding the government to cease and requiring the government to first justify its intrusion of personal liberty before it actually does so. See State v. Gri[jalva], 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 588 (1975) (requiring an initial court order). The point deals with a fundamental aspect of the relationship of citizens to the government.
*667Id. at 664. Further, many people "will assume the [CID] is legally authorized and will comply with it, no matter how invasive it is" given the air of authority that the CID carriess.8 Id. Other persons may not be able to afford to petition the court to set aside the CID and will comply with the order even though they could lawfully refuse. Thus, in light of the possibility of criminal prosecution and lack of pre-issuance safeguards, I consider section 76-10-917, to the extent information obtained thereunder may be used in a criminal proceeding, to be unconstitutional on its face.9 See Abel, 362 U.S. at 237, 80 S.Ct. 683 ("Searches for evidence of crimé present situations demanding the greatest, not the least, restraint upon the Government's intrusion into privacy; although its protection is not limited to them, it was at these searches which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed."); see also Church of Scientology v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 13, 113 S.Ct. 447, 450, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) ("A person's interest in maintaining the privacy of his 'papers and effects' is of sufficient importance to merit constitutional protection.").
1 60 I also consider section 76-10-917 to be unconstitutional because it effectively allows the government to conduct a general search. Specifically, regardless of whether a person has engaged in illegal anticompetitive activities, "the attorney general may disclose testimony or documents obtained [through a CID] ... to (@) any grand jury; and (@i) officers or employees of federal or state law enforcement agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(8)(b) (1999); see also id. § 76-10-917(2)(a)@iii) (stating CID must state "that the documents, materials, or testimony in response to the demand may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding"). Thus, the attorney general may use a CID to search for evidence of crimes other than illegal anticom-petitive activities. This is true even though the attorney general may have no reason to believe that other crimes have been committed. Therefore, the attorney general may use a CID to conduct a general search.10
4 61 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protect[s] against all general searches. Since before the creation of our government, such searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every State in the Union. The need of protection against them is attested alike by history and present conditions. The Amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of *668vigilance for its effective enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153, 158, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1981) (citations omitted); see also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1985) (Stewart, J., concurring)11 - Consequently, section 76-10-917 violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it allows the attorney general to conduct general searches. Cf. Walling v. American Rolbal Corp., 135 F.2d 1003, 1005 (24 Cir.1943) ("It is true, of course, that the data sought by subpoena duces tecum must be relevant to the inquiry at hand and that the use of this power must at all times be closely confined to 'the rudimentary principles of justice'") (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 307, 44 S.Ct. 336, 338, 68 L.Ed., 696 (1924)).
T62 Finally, even if section 76-10-917 were constitutional, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court because I am not convinced that the trial court ruled incorrectly when it set aside the CID-especially in light of the fact that we afford the trial court a "'mes-sure of discretion'" Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). Specifically, to withstand a petition to set aside a CID, the State must have "'in its possession sufficient information to satisfy a judge that it is reasonable to believe that there has been a violation of the act." Id. at 182 (citation omitted). Further, this information must consist of "objective evidence.12 Id. at 183. In the present case, the State's information consisted solely of an affidavit from the attorney general's antitrust investigator. The trial court was clearly concerned with the sufficiency of the State's information as evidenced by the trial court's repeated questions regarding whether the State had more objective evidence." Despite the trial court's concerns, the attorney general did not provide the court with any documents or other objective evidence supporting the CID.13 Because the attorney general did not provide any evidence other than the affidavit of its investigator, I cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to set aside the CID was incorrect. Cf. Evans, 963 P.2d at 184 (ruling that trial court erred in concluding State failed to meet its burden where State presented court with documents as well as affidavit).
[63 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.

. In addition, the concerns expressed by the trial court relative to, among other things, the absence of objective evidence implicate the constitutional considerations contained herein.

. Although a CID is not issued in the "name of the court or judge," the CID "carriles] with it a command dignified by the sanction of the law." 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 7 (2000).

. The majority notes that corporations do not have a right against self incrimination, see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102, 108 S.Ct. 2284, 2287, 101 LEd.2d 98 (1988); however, CIDs may be issued to natural persons as well as corporations. Moreover, "[the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures protects both individuals and corporations." - In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988).

. In addition, the definition of, and penalties for, illegal anticompetitive activities are contained in the Utah Criminal Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-914, 76-10-920 (Supp.2000).

. The supreme court's view that CIDs are used solely for civil actions is further evidenced by the fact that the court adopted the "sound reasoning and the sensible definition of 'reasonable cause' elucidated by the Babbitt court." Id. at 182. In Babbitt v. Herndon, 119 Ariz. 454, 581 P.2d 688 (1978), the Supreme Court of Arizona interpreted the reasonable cause standard of Arizona's Consumer Fraud Act. See id. However, unlike section 76-10-917, Arizona's Consumer Fraud Act does not provide for criminal penalties See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 44-1407 (2000) (stating "attorney general may bring an action for appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief and civil penalties"). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a standard appropriate for civil actions when it utilized the reasonable cause definition contained in Babbitt. See Babbitt, 581 P.2d at 692. Further, section 76-10-917 creates some confusion by providing for issuance of a CID "prior to the commencement of a civil action." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(1) (1996) It is not clear whether the statute refers to the results of the investigation or an action to enforce the CID.

. Incredibly, the Babbitt court deemed evidence "sufficient," regardless of its accuracy. Babbitt, 581 P.2d at 692.

. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution states that a person accused of a crime "shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself" and, "[in no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein granted." Utah Const. art. I, § 12.

. A CID is statutorily authorized, formally served and issued by the attorney general. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917 (1999).

. The majority cites In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 642 (quoting Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415, 104 S.Ct. 769, 773, 78 L.Ed.2d 567 (1984)) for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires only that the CID recipient have the opportunity to challenge a CID after it is issued. I consider the majority's reliance on these cases misplaced because, unlike section 76-10-917, the subpoenas at issue in both of these cases contained pre-issuance protections. First, the type of subpoena at issue in In re Criminal Investigation, contained the pre-issuance protection that "the overall investigation may be approved only after the district court has made an objective determination that 'good cause' has been shown." Id. at 643-44 (stating that "the only plausible reason for requiring a good cause showing is to limit the scope of the authorized investigation accordingly"). Moreover, the statute governing the type of subpoenas at issue in In re Criminal Investigation was subsequently amended to require that the prosecutor "apply to the district court for each subpoena." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(3)(b)(i) (2000). Second, the administrative subpoena at issue in Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc. is governed by the safe- ' guards provided under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2001). Specifically, section 6002 states that once a person refuses to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, "no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in a criminal case." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2001). While this protection would not protect a corporation, such a distinction is irrelevant to my analysis because CIDs may be issued to natural persons.

. - Only after a CID recipient fails to comply or petitions the court to modify or set aside the CID must the attorney general demonstrate that the information demanded is relevant to the suspected antitrust violation. See id. § 76-10-917(7)(b)(ii). However, this requirement does not prevent the attorney general from searching through the demanded documents for evidence of other crimes regardless of whether these crimes were within the of the CID.

. Although decided under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution contains language identical to the Fourth Amendment. Compare U.S. Const. amend IV, with Utah Const. art. I, § 14.

. For example, on several occasions the trial court asked the assistant attorney general whether he had documents to support allegations contained in the affidavit.

. While the attorney general did claim to possess such information, it is not enough to merely possess the information. The attorney general must present enough objective evidence to satisfy the court that there is "reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this act." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917(7)(b)(ii) (1999).