Court Opinion

ID: 9719200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:46.094081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.146166
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Jones :
Although the majority opinion accurately summarizes the facts and precisely recites the narrow issue presented by this appeal, I am unable to agree with the conclusion of a majority of my colleagues.
Initially, I must note my disagreement with the majority that Section 55(3) of The Divorce Law, Act of May 2,1929, P. L. 1237, §55, as amended, 23 P.S. §55(3) (Supp. 1971), “is of no help in deciding the case at hand. . . .” In addition to stating that all property rights dependent upon a marital relationship are terminated by a divorce decree, Section 55(3) of The Divorce Law further provides that, “[a] 11 duties, rights and claims accruing to either of said parties at any time heretofore in pursuance of said marriage, shall cease and determine . . . .” Although a spouse’s right or claim to retirement funds under the Act of July 28, 1953, P. L. 723, §1701 et seq., as amended, 16 P.S. §4701 et seq. (Supp 1971), does not automatically accrue “in pursuance of said marriage” since the employee must designate “such person or persons ... as his or her beneficiary,” Act of July 28, 1953, P. L. 723, §1714, *185as amended, 16 P.S. §4714 (Supp. 1971), appellant’s right or claim accrued pursuant to the marriage. I make this statement in view of the fact that decedent did not designate appellant as the beneficiary until six days after the marriage even though decedent could have done so beforehand. As appellant’s right or claim accrued pursuant to the marriage, it was dissolved by the divorce under Section 55(3) of The Divorce Law.
If decedent was so interested in appellant’s well-being after the divorce, and that is the assumption implicit in the majority opinion, why did decedent wait until after the marriage to designate appellant? It seems most logical to me that just as decedent’s concern for appellant’s well-being did not arise until after the marriage, his concern lapsed after the divorce. Indeed, decedent was married to appellant for less than four months when appellant filed for divorce. While I do not profess to be an expert on human affairs, I do not believe decedent intended to benefit appellant. Moreover, this result is in accord with the public policy of this Commonwealth as evidenced by Section 55(3) of The Divorce Law and Section 7(2) of the Wills Act of 1947, Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 89, §7(2), as amended, 20 P.S. §180.7(2) (Supp. 1971).
As the majority expressly recognizes, if the term “wife” were used alone, unaccompanied by the name of a person, appellant would not be entitled to this fund. Erny Trust, 415 Pa. 8, 202 A. 2d 30 (1964). Similarly, the majority opinion implicitly acknowledges that a contrary result would occur if this transfer of retirement benefits were deemed testamentary. In light of Section 55(3) of The Divorce Law, the public policy of this Commonwealth and the facts of this case, I believe that appellant is not entitled to this fund.
I dissent.