Court Opinion

ID: 9949457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 18:02:37.184814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.484825
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 In re Jeremy R. CA2/7
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re JEREMY R. et al., Persons                               B329305
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06458 A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

              Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

CHRISTOPHER R.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Conditionally affirmed and remanded with instructions.
      Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   ________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Christopher R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights over Jeremy R. (born 2016), and
twins Angel R. and Jordan R. (born 2021) under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Christopher’s sole contention
on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court
failed to comply with the initial inquiry requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) and related California law.
       Christopher argues the Department failed to interview the
children’s maternal grandfather, paternal aunt and great-aunt,
and maternal aunt and uncle as to the children’s possible Indian
ancestry, and the court prejudicially erred in finding without a
further inquiry that ICWA did not apply. The Department
argues it thoroughly inquired about Indian ancestry from the
paternal great-grandmother, the paternal great-grandfather, the
paternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, the maternal
grandmother and the maternal great-grandmother, and

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

                                2
contacted several relevant tribes and agencies which indicated
the children were not Indian children. Thus, the Department
contends substantial evidence supports a finding that ICWA does
not apply to the children and any error in failing to interview
additional extended family members was harmless.
      We agree with Christopher the juvenile court and the
Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of
ICWA and related California law. We consider such error
prejudicial and reversible because the relatives he identifies were
readily available and information they had was likely to be
meaningful in determining whether Jeremy, Angel, and Jordan
are Indian children. In particular, information from the
maternal grandfather was likely to be meaningful and not
duplicative of information available from the other relatives
interviewed. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the court’s
order terminating Christopher’s parental rights and remand the
matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to comply
with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and California
law.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Dependency Proceedings
      On October 10, 2018 the Department filed its underlying
juvenile dependency petition regarding Jeremy. The Department
alleged pursuant to former section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),
that the parents had a history of engaging in domestic violence in
Jeremy’s presence and histories of substance abuse, and that
they were current abusers of amphetamine, methamphetamine,

                                 3
and marijuana.2 At the detention hearing on October 11, 2018
the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining Jeremy
and ordered him detained in foster care. Jeremy was placed with
his paternal great-grandmother, Audrey. The court found
Christopher to be Jeremy’s presumed father.
       On March 4, 2019 at the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, Christopher and S.G., Jeremy’s mother, executed
waivers of rights and agreed to plead no contest to the petition.
The juvenile court sustained the petition after amending it by
interlineation to strike the a-1 domestic violence count, to alter
and remove certain language regarding the b-1 domestic violence
count, and to edit the b-2 and b-3 counts relating to substance
abuse to state that the parents were recent, rather than current,
substance abusers. The court declared Jeremy a dependent of
the juvenile court, removed him from parental custody, and
ordered reunification services for both parents.
       At the six-month review hearing on October 15, 2019 the
juvenile court found the Department had provided the parents
with reasonable reunification services and ordered services
continued. At the 12-month review hearing on September 17,
2020 the juvenile court found the Department had provided the
parents with reasonable reunification services, and the parents’
compliance with their case plans had not been substantial. The
court terminated reunification services for both parents and set

2     Section 300 was amended effective January 1, 2023, after
the juvenile court issued its jurisdiction findings in this case.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments do not impact our
analysis.

                                 4
the case for a selection and implementation hearing under
section 366.26.
       On March 18, 2021 the juvenile court identified adoption as
a specific goal for Jeremy.
       On June 2, 2021, shortly after Angel and Jordan were born,
the Department filed its underlying juvenile dependency petition
regarding the newborn twins pursuant to former section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). The Department alleged the
parents had a history of engaging in verbal and physical
altercations in the presence of their older sibling Jeremy,
resulting in Jeremy becoming a dependent of the juvenile court;
Angel and Jordan were born with positive toxicology screenings
for amphetamine; and the parents had a history of substance
abuse, with current use by S.G. and recent use by Christopher.
On June 4, 2021 the juvenile court found a prima facie finding for
detaining Angel and Jordan and ordered them detained in
hospital care.
       On September 2, 2021 the juvenile court again identified
adoption as a specific goal for Jeremy.
       On September 27, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the
petition regarding Angel and Jordan as to the b-3 and b-4 counts
relating to the parents’ substance abuse and the j-3 count
regarding parental altercations in Jeremy’s presence, dismissed
the remaining counts, and ordered the matter continued for
disposition.
       The juvenile court ordered a bonding study regarding
Christopher and Jeremy on November 8, 2021, and continued
Jeremy’s section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
       On January 31, 2022 the juvenile court declared Angel and
Jordan dependents of the court and removed them from parental

                                5
custody, bypassed the parents for reunification services pursuant
to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and ordered the matter set
for hearing under section 366.26.
       On March 14, 2022 the juvenile court identified adoption or
guardianship as a specific goal for Jeremy. The juvenile court
modified that goal on August 1, 2022 to placement in foster care
with a permanent plan of adoption and selected the same plan as
a specific goal for Angel and Jordan.
       At the selection and implementation hearing on April 24,
2023 the court found all three children adoptable and that no
exception to the statutory preference for adoption applied,
terminated the parental rights of S.G. and Christopher, and
ordered the children placed for adoption with maternal
grandmother Angela.
       Christopher timely appealed on April 24, 2023.

B.     The Department and Juvenile Court’s ICWA-related Actions
       At the time it filed the petition on behalf of Jeremy, the
Department attached the required ICWA-010(A) form, dated
October 9, 2018, indicating inquiry had been made and Jeremy
had no known Indian ancestry. ICWA-020 forms signed by both
parents and filed on October 11, 2018 indicated Christopher and
S.G. each had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. On
October 11, 2018 the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply to
the case.
       On November 16, 2018, Christopher told a social worker he
had Native American ancestry through his father, paternal
grandfather Desmon. Paternal great-grandmother Audrey told a
social worker on November 18, 2018 that she had Choctaw
ancestry.

                                6
      On November 29, 2018 S.G. told a social worker her father,
maternal grandfather Stephen, had Blackfeet and Cherokee
ancestry.
      On January 14, February 6, and March 4, 2019 the
Department submitted return receipts and responses received
from several tribes stating Jeremy was not a member or eligible
for membership, including from the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians; the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma; the Blackfeet Tribe of
Montana; the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians; the Jena
Band of Choctaw Indians; the Cherokee Nation; and United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.
      On March 4, 2019 the juvenile court again found ICWA did
not apply.
      At the time it filed the petition on behalf of Angel and
Jordan, the Department attached the required ICWA-010(A)
form, dated June 1, 2021, indicating a social worker interviewed
the parents and had no reason to believe the twins were Indian
children. ICWA-020 notices signed by both parents and filed
June 3, 2021 indicated the twins had no Indian ancestry. On
June 4, 2021 the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to
Angel or Jordan.
      On August 1, 2022 the juvenile court ordered the
Department to conduct and document a full ICWA inquiry.
      The Department interviewed maternal great-grandmother
Beverly (mother of Stephen), who reported she may have
Cherokee and Blackfeet heritage through her own paternal great-
grandmother. Beverly was not able to provide a name of that
ancestor or other vital information. Stephen was not
interviewed, and the record reflects no attempt to contact him or
explanation why he was not interviewed. Stephen’s father,

                               7
Norman, was not interviewed; the ICWA-030 form indicates it
was unknown whether he was alive or deceased.
      The Department interviewed paternal great-grandmother
Audrey, who indicated she had Choctaw ancestry through her
grandmother, but did not have her grandmother’s birthdate or
know of other people with knowledge regarding that ancestry.
Paternal great-grandfather Joe told a social worker he had heard
his grandmother was Native American, but that he did not know
what tribe. He reported his son, paternal grandfather Desmon,
was Choctaw and receiving services through Rio Hondo. On
August 11, 2022 paternal grandfather Desmon was interviewed
and stated he was not registered with the Choctaw tribe.
      The Department also interviewed maternal grandmother
Angela and paternal grandmother Rose, who denied Indian
ancestry.
      On November 28, 2022 the juvenile court ordered the
section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for all three
children continued for further ICWA updates from the
Department, and ordered the Department to verify and correct
paternal grandfather Desmon’s birth date and full name in its
notice to the Choctaw Nation.
      On January 30, 2023 the juvenile court ordered the matter
continued for further receipt of ICWA responses.
      On March 9, 2023 the Department reported it had inquired
further from Christopher and was told he had no additional
information. S.G.’s whereabouts were unknown. Paternal great-
grandmother Audrey and maternal great-grandmother Beverly
also reported they had no additional information.
      On March 27, 2023 the juvenile court ordered the matter
continued for receipt of one outstanding ICWA response.

                                8
      In all, the Department received responses that the children
were not members or eligible members for ICWA purposes from
the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, the Cherokee Nation, the
Blackfeet Nation, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.
      On April 24, 2023 the juvenile court found, without
objection from any party, that ICWA did not apply to this case.

                         DISCUSSION

A.     ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice
       ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimum federal standards a state
court must follow before removing Indian children from family
and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551; accord, In re T.G. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The statute
“authorizes states to provide ‘a higher standard of protection to
the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child
than the rights provided under’ ICWA.” (In re T.G., at pp. 287-
288; see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting
state court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian
children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits tribes to
intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a
child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).
       To ensure Indian tribes have the opportunity to exercise
their rights in dependency proceedings, an investigation of a
family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry must be
undertaken and notice provided, where appropriate, to the

                                9
relevant tribes. (See § 224.2, subdivision (a) [imposing on the
court and child protective services agencies “an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an
Indian child.”].) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a child
is or may be an Indian child ‘can be divided into three phases:
the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the
duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re Y.W., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 552; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429.)
       The duty to inquire “‘begins with initial contact (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
child may be an Indian child.’” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) The duty of
inquiry also extends to the juvenile court, which is required to
“ask each participant present in the hearing whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a)
[“[s]tate courts must ask each participant in an emergency or
voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child”]; In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735,
742.)
       The Department’s initial duty of “[i]nquiry includes, but is
not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1) [the
Department “must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and

                                10
the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
where applicable the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is or may be an Indian child”]; In re Y.W.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551-552.) ICWA and state law
define “extended family member,” if not separately defined by the
law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe, as “a person who has
reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c) [providing “extended family member” follows definition
stated in ICWA].)
       The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court
or the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(4); In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.)
That further inquiry requires interviewing, “as soon as
practicable,” extended family members, contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other
person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or
eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e) & (e)(2)(C)); see also
rule 5.481(a)(4).)
       If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3,

                                 11
subd. (a) [notice under ICWA “shall be provided” if the court,
social worker, or probation officer “knows or has reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved”].)
       “‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department,
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; accord, In re
Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [“the agency has a
duty to gather information by conducting an initial inquiry,
where the other party—here a parent . . . has no similar
obligation”].)
       “[I]n determining whether the failure to make an adequate
initial inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the information in
the hands of the extended family members is likely to be
meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child,
not whether the information is likely to show the child is in fact
an Indian child. In most circumstances, the information in the
possession of extended relatives is likely to be meaningful in
determining whether the child is an Indian child—regardless of
whether the information ultimately shows the child is or is not an
Indian child.” (In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435,
see In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 325 [“the failure to
fully comply with a mandatory duty may be harmless error, so
long as the record affirmatively reflects that the protections
intended to be afforded through the exercise of that duty have
been provided”]; see also In re Benjamin M., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“in ICWA cases, a court must reverse
where the record demonstrates that the agency has not only
failed in its duty of initial inquiry, but where the record indicates

                                 12
that there was readily obtainable information that was likely to
bear meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child”].)

2.     The Department Failed To Comply Fully with Its Duty of
       Inquiry Under Section 224.2, Subdivision (b)
       As discussed, the Department had a duty pursuant to
section 224.2, subdivision (b), to ask not only the parents, but
also extended family members whether the children had possible
Indian ancestry.
       Christopher identifies the following available relatives
likely to have information bearing on the children’s ancestry, but
who were not asked: maternal grandfather Stephen; paternal
aunt Nvelyn and paternal great-aunt Merel, who were each
interviewed by a social worker on October 1, 2018 but were not
asked about any possible Indian ancestry; and maternal uncle
Aaron and maternal aunt Omega (S.G.’s half-siblings and
children of the maternal grandmother).3

3       Christopher also mentions his minor half-sister Abigail
(i.e., the paternal aunt) “who is now [at the time of appellate
briefing] approximately thirteen or fourteen years old.” To the
extent Christopher suggests the Department should have
interviewed his minor half-sister, she does not fall within the
statutory definition of extended family because she has not
reached age 18 and Christopher makes no argument that tribal
law or custom dictates otherwise. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2)
[extended family member for ICWA inquiry purposes must be “a
person who has reached the age of eighteen” unless otherwise
defined by tribal law or custom]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c) [providing “extended family member” follows definition
stated in ICWA].)

                                13
       As detailed above, the Department’s reports confirm its
social workers or investigators contacted and inquired about
Indian ancestry from the paternal grandfather, the paternal
grandmother, the paternal great-grandmother, the paternal
great-grandfather, the maternal grandmother (mother of S.G.,
Aaron, and Omega) and the maternal great-grandmother (mother
of Stephen).
       Section 224.2, subdivision (b), does not establish an
absolute (and often impossible) standard mandating that every
living extended family member be interviewed. What is required,
however, is that the Department interview all known and
available maternal and paternal extended family members and
make reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter to interview
any other extended family members, as well as other individuals
who have an interest in the child, regarding the child’s possible
Indian ancestry. Here, although we do not suggest the
Department did not make a dedicated effort to determine Indian
ancestry, its efforts did not fulfill its statutory obligation.
       Specifically, the Department did not interview, or make
any showing of reasonable efforts to contact and interview, the
maternal grandfather, Stephen, despite the fact that S.G. told a
social worker she had Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry through
Stephen, her father, and that she had a good relationship with
him.
       In addition, although the Department interviewed paternal
aunt Nvelyn and paternal great-aunt Merel on October 1, 2018, it
made no inquiry of either of them regarding Indian ancestry.
And, there is no indication that maternal uncle Aaron and
maternal aunt Omega were ever interviewed about Indian
ancestry, although S.G. reported she was very close with them

                               14
and a social worker reported “Jeremy has a maternal Aunt and
Uncle who love to buy him things and spoil him.”
       While it made a concerted attempt to determine the
children’s possible Indian ancestry and notify relevant tribes, the
Department did not satisfy its duty of inquiry under
section 224.2, subdivision (b). (See, e.g., In re M.B. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 617, 629-630 [Department did not conduct
adequate inquiry into child’s possible Indian ancestry prior to
terminating parental rights because it failed to contact the child’s
maternal grandmother, did not determine whether the maternal
grandfather was available for an interview, and did not ask
ICWA-related questions of a maternal great-aunt who had been
identified as the child’s prospective adoptive parent]; see also
In re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 311 [Department
failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members
about their Indian ancestry despite having contact with maternal
grandmother and maternal cousin and information about
paternal grandfather’s residence].)
       This error is not harmless. As we have consistently held,
because we do not know what information these relatives might
have, prejudice is established when the record reflects that
information from extended family members who were not
contacted is “likely to be meaningful in determining whether the
children involved were Indian children—whether the information
ultimately showed they were or established they were not.” (In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 324; accord, In re Antonio R.,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435 [“Where the Department fails to
discharge its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA and related
California law, and the juvenile court finds ICWA does not apply
notwithstanding the lack of an adequate inquiry, the error is in

                                15
most circumstances, as here, prejudicial and reversible.
Speculation as to whether extended family members might have
information likely to bear meaningfully on whether the child is
an Indian child has no place in the analysis of prejudicial error
where there is an inadequate initial inquiry.”].)
      That standard of prejudice is satisfied here. Although S.G.
indicated her father Stephen had Blackfeet and Cherokee
ancestry, the record contains no indication the Department ever
interviewed him or made any attempts to contact him. Nor did
the juvenile court direct the Department to attempt to contact
Stephen. Responses from Stephen, the children’s maternal
grandfather, would have provided meaningful information with
which to assess S.G.’s assertion of possible tribal ancestry.
      That the Department inquired of Stephen’s mother
Beverly, the children’s maternal great-grandmother, does not
change this conclusion. Beverly would not necessarily possess
the same information as Stephen regarding his ancestry,
particularly with regard to Stephen’s paternal lineage. No one in
Stephen’s paternal line provided any information: Stephen’s
father Norman, the maternal great-grandfather, was not
interviewed and the record contains no indication the
Department made any attempts to contact him. (The ICWA-030
form provided no date of birth or other vital information about
Norman beyond his name, and stated it was unknown whether
he was deceased.)
      Nor does the fact that notice was provided to Blackfeet and
Cherokee tribes affect our conclusion. S.G.’s belief that Stephen
had Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry does not mean that her
information was accurate in the absence of interviewing him
directly; without interviewing Stephen it is impossible to know

                               16
whether he would confirm S.G.’s information, deny it, or claim
ancestry from another tribe or tribes altogether. As discussed,
the Department’s obligation to interview extended family
members is not dependent on a parent’s statement of Indian
ancestry. (See In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317
[“‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a child is
an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, not the
parents or members of the parents’ families.’”]; accord, In re
Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [parent “has no
similar obligation” as agency to gather information about
ancestry].)
      Moreover, Stephen’s full and correct information was
apparently not provided to the identified tribes and agencies in
any event: his birth year was missing from the ICWA-030 notice.
Although the juvenile court ordered the Department to verify and
correct a similar omission (incorrect birthday and incomplete
name) as to the paternal grandfather in its notice to the Choctaw
Nation and continued the section 366.26 hearing on this basis,
the record reflects no similar effort by the court with regard to
verifying or correcting Stephen’s vital information. This notice
error must be corrected on remand as well.
      Because we conclude the failure to interview Stephen was
not harmless, we need not additionally determine whether the
Department’s failure to interview the additional available
relatives identified by Christopher was also harmless given its
inquiry of other extended family members.4

4     Although initial inquiry error “is in most circumstances, as
here, prejudicial and reversible” (In re Antonio R., supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435), we do not suggest that harmless error

                                17
      On remand the Department must make an initial inquiry of
the identified relatives meeting the statutory definition of an
“extended family member,” including the children’s maternal
grandfather Stephen, paternal aunt Nvelyn, paternal great-aunt
Merel, maternal uncle Aaron, and maternal aunt Omega. (See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c).)
Christopher does not contend there are other extended family
members over the age of 18 whom the Department needs to
contact.

                         DISPOSITION

      The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally
affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to ensure
the Department complies fully with the inquiry and notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law. If the court finds
Jeremy, Angel, and Jordan are Indian children, it shall conduct a
new section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in

may never be found. In In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
page 325, responding to the Department’s mischaracterization of
our prior decisions as holding that any ICWA-related inquiry
error, no matter how trivial, required an automatic reversal, we
described a hypothetical situation in which the agency’s failure to
contact all of a child’s close relatives would not require a remand.
We provided the following hypothetical: “The child protective
agency interviews the maternal grandfather; several, but not all
of his four siblings; and the maternal grandfather’s surviving
parent, none of whom indicates the family has any Indian
ancestry.” (Id. at p. 325.) The failure to interview the
grandfather’s remaining siblings, we said, “would certainly be
harmless absent some additional unusual circumstance.” (Ibid.)

                                18
compliance with ICWA and related California law. If not, the
court’s original section 366.26 orders will remain in effect.

                                     MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     FEUER, J.

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