Court Opinion

ID: 9856564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:50:31.309959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:22.187284
License: Public Domain

TROUT, Justice,
dissenting.
After much thought about the expert testimony presented in this case and the importance of judicial discretion in ruling on the admission of testimony at trial, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on rehearing.
The defendants’ expert, Dr. Blotter, testified at his deposition that he could not say what was the most likely cause of plaintiff’s injury. Dr. Blotter stated “it seems unlikely that the nail came from the subject gun so I don’t know for sure how it [the injury] happened.” Deposition of Dr. Blotter, p. 76 (taken August 31, 1989). Dr. Blotter further speculated that the injury could have been caused by “ricochets from guns in other locations” or that injury was caused by something other than a nail such as a staple or some other metal object. Id. at 73. At trial, however, after informing defendants’ counsel that he had conducted additional testing after his deposition, Dr. Blotter testified that based upon this additional testing, he had changed his opinion and now concluded that the subject nail gun had in fact fired the nail which injured the plaintiff. Dr. Blotter opined that “the most likely scenario” is that the operator of the subject nail gun “simply missed the board with the nail” which thereafter struck the plaintiff.
It is difficult for me to imagine a case where plaintiffs’ counsel could have been more circumspect in assuring himself that no new testimony would be forthcoming from the defendants’ expert after the expert’s deposition was concluded. The excerpt from the Blotter deposition set forth in the majority opinion makes clear that plaintiffs’ counsel wanted to know if Dr. Blotter anticipated doing any further work in advance of trial. Additionally, plaintiffs’ counsel made it unmistakably clear at the Blotter deposition, taken just two weeks before trial, that the plaintiff needed sufficient opportunity to respond to additional tests performed by Blotter:
Mr. Howard: If you are going to have him do that additional stuff [testing], then I will want to continue this deposition. I am even taking a position quite frankly I may ask the Court to disallow him to testify unless I am afforded sufficient opportunity to discover and respond to any additional tests. This is beyond the 11th hour. We don’t need to argue that now, I just want you to know that.
In response, defendants’ counsel gives his assurance that plaintiffs’ counsel would be given access to any additional tests:
Mr. Farley: I understand your position. My position is that you will be given full and free access to whatever other information other than what has been testified to today may come up.
Mr. Howard: When?
Mr. Farley: Just as soon as I know it. If it is Tuesday, then you will have access to it. If it is the weekend before he testifies, you will have access to it. Just whenever. You will be given the opportunity to take his deposition if you want to do that or if you want to sit down and talk to him about anything additional I will give you that opportunity as well.
Deposition of Dr. Blotter, pp. 90-91.
Notwithstanding the moral duty imposed on defendants’ counsel as a result of the above representations, I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1) statutorily obligates counsel to supplement responses to discovery, in particular the substance of an expert’s testimony:
[A] party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, *218and (B) the identity of each person expected to be called as a witness at trial and with regard to expert witnesses the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1). (Emphasis added.)
In Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991), we recognized the importance and purpose of I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1) in promoting candor and fairness in the pre-trial discovery process when expert witnesses are involved:
It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, and this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved ... Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to await examination at trial to get this information, he often will have too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony.
120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.2d at 900 citing Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party’s Expert Information, 14 Stan.L.Rev. 455, 485 (1962).
Defendants’ counsel in the present case was under a statutory duty to notify plaintiffs’ counsel “seasonably” that the substance of Dr. Blotter’s testimony had changed, i.e. he had conducted further tests and was now able to conclude that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a nail from the subject nail gun after the operator missed a board.
Defendants’ counsel apparently takes the position that he did supplement the response by advising plaintiffs’ counsel of the additional testing shortly before his expert was to take the stand and after plaintiffs’ counsel specifically asked if there was any additional work that has been done by Dr. Blotter. Defense counsel’s explanation for this late disclosure was that “[I] learned last night that he [Dr. Blotter] has, in essence, done some force tests by going down into his lab.” Thus, because defense counsel did not require his expert to conduct his tests and reach his conclusions prior to the deposition, and because he didn’t bother to ask his expert until the night before his testimony at trial, we are asked to accept that he has seasonably supplemented his discovery responses and the expert testimony should be allowed.
At the time this disclosure was made, plaintiffs’ counsel had already rested and his expert witness had left. Plaintiffs’ counsel was placed in the position of being right in the middle of a trial, with a jury which had apparently been promised that the trial would be over soon, and only then finding out that his assumptions about defendants’ expert witness’ testimony were in error. He was in no position at that point to conduct further discovery or bring his expert witness back to the trial.
The term “seasonably” as used in Rule 26(e) must have a reasonable meaning to assure members of the bar that some degree of consistent fairness exists in the rules of procedure. “Seasonably” cannot possibly mean moments before the witness is to testify and it must place some requirement on counsel that they ask their witnesses to set aside the “press of business” in order to prepare early and fully. Offering opposing counsel a few minutes to speak with the witness, a continuance, or even the cost of another deposition cannot possibly compensate opposing counsel for all of the expense and time which goes into trial preparation. Rule 26(e)(4) gives the court both the authority and the responsibility to exclude the testimony not seasonably disclosed, which places the penalty on the party who did not supplement, where it properly belongs. To hold otherwise encourages a lack of diligence on the part of counsel, realizing that their last minute trial preparation and consultation with their expert witnesses will place opposing counsel at an extreme disadvantage.
I am very familiar with our standards on the exercise of judicial discretion set forth in Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991), and I have considered carefully the *219comments of the trial judge in exercising his discretion to permit this testimony. While I believe strongly in the importance of vesting the trial courts with the discretion to make these very difficult decisions, I cannot in good conscience affirm the exercise of discretion in this instance. In my opinion, it was manifest error for the trial court to allow Dr. Blotter to testify at trial concerning his recently formulated opinion on the most critical element of plaintiffs’ case, the cause of the injury. To hold otherwise sends a message to the trial bar of this state that they can permit their witnesses to change their testimony at the last minute with impunity. I do not understand that to be the intent behind our rules of discovery. For that reason I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.