Court Opinion

ID: 9931689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 18:01:32.328216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:18.178363
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-4056    Document: 010110997715   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1
                                                              FILED
                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     February 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     EARL E. BRAMHALL,

           Plaintiff - Appellant,

     v.                                                No. 23-4056
                                              (D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00477-RJS)
     CYPRESS CREDIT UNION;                              (D. Utah)
     BROOKE BENNION; SALT LAKE
     COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
     OFFICE; SIMARJIT S. GILL;
     ROBERT N. PARRISH; MELANIE
     M. SERASSIO; STEVEN C.
     GIBBONS; NATHANIEL J.
     SANDERS; NATHAN J.
     EVERSHED; CHOU CHOU
     COLLINS; THOMAS V.
     LOPRESTO, II; CRAIG STANGER;
     JARED W. RASBAND,

           Defendants - Appellees,

     and

     CHRISTINA P. ORTEGA;
     GREGORY N. FERBRACHE;
     JARED N. PARRISH,

           Defendants.
                          _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
Appellate Case: 23-4056    Document: 010110997715   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 2

                          _________________________________

       This appeal grew out of the prosecution of Mr. Earl Bramhall for

 making a terroristic threat. After roughly nine years and two trials, Mr.

 Bramhall obtained an acquittal. He then sued various individuals and

 entities. Only one of these defendants is involved in this appeal: The

 district attorney of Salt Lake County.

       The claim against the district attorney involves the denial of a speedy

 trial. On this claim, the district court granted summary judgment to the

 district attorney, concluding that the delays hadn’t violated Mr. Bramhall’s

 right to a speedy trial. For this conclusion, the court reasoned in part that

 most of the delays had resulted from defense counsel’s motions for

 continuances, three changes in defense counsel, and numerous competency

 evaluations requested by defense counsel.

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

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Appellate Case: 23-4056   Document: 010110997715   Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 3

                          Ten Continuances of the Trial
  Vacated Trial           Reason for Continuance
  Settings
  January 6–8, 2009       Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
  February 10–12,         Petition to determine competency filed by Mr.
  2009                    Bramhall’s counsel
  March 30–April 1,       Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
  2010
  September 14–16,        Stipulation for competency evaluation “based
  2010                    primarily on the concerns of [Mr. Bramhall’s
                          counsel]”
  April 26–29, 2011       Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
  October 4–7, 2011       Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
                          and Mr. Bramhall’s pro se motion to represent
                          himself
  January 30–             Petition to determine competency filed by Mr.
  February 3, 2012        Bramhall’s counsel and Mr. Bramhall’s pro se
                          motion to remove his attorneys
  September 29–           Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
  October 3, 2014
  January 5–9, 2015       Unopposed motion to continue filed by the
                          prosecution to allow Mr. Bramhall to meet the
                          statutory notice requirements for an expert witness
                          he intended to utilize at trial
  September 19–21,        Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel
  2016

       Mr. Bramhall insists that the court disregarded his personal harm

 from the 4+ years that he had spent in pretrial detention. According to Mr.

 Bramhall, the district court mistakenly assumed that he hadn’t suffered any

 harm from his pretrial confinement while his attorneys continued to delay

 the trial.

       Mr. Bramhall has misinterpreted the district court’s ruling. The court

 didn’t overlook Mr. Bramhall’s harm from his pretrial detention; the court

 simply applied the appropriate test for the denial of a speedy trial. See

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Appellate Case: 23-4056   Document: 010110997715   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 4

 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Under that test, the court must

 consider the reasons for the delay. Id. at 530–31. These reasons, as Mr.

 Bramhall acknowledges, largely involved his attorney’s requests for

 continuances and competency evaluations. The court wasn’t disregarding

 Mr. Bramhall’s understandable frustration with his pretrial confinement.

 Though the delay harmed Mr. Bramhall, the Court couldn’t disregard his

 attorneys’ requests for more time and for competency evaluations. See

 Vermont v. Brillon, 566 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2009) (stating that the court must

 consider whether the defense attorney had requested the continuances

 because the attorney is acting as the defendant’s agent in the litigation).

       In his reply brief, Mr. Bramhall suggests false imprisonment (p. 19)

 and nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence (p. 20). But Mr. Bramhall did

 not sue the district attorney for false imprisonment or nondisclosure of

 exculpatory evidence. To the contrary, Mr. Bramhall sued the district

 attorney for denial of the right to a speedy trial. And in adjudicating that

 claim, the district court didn’t overlook or minimize Mr. Bramhall’s

 4+ years in pretrial confinement. So we affirm the award of summary

 judgment to the district attorney.

                                        Entered for the Court

                                        Robert E. Bacharach
                                        Circuit Judge

                                        4