Court Opinion

ID: 9628906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:49.669407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:22.370062
License: Public Domain

GOULD, Circuit Judge,
with whom TALLMAN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, join, Concurring:
Our per curiam opinion for the court affirms the district court’s decision that Gerardo Esparza-Herrera’s prior conviction for violating A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(11), based on his guilty plea, does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(l)(A)(ii) for purposes of enhancement. Under our precedent there seems to be no doubt that a reckless assault, even one causing significant injury, is not a “crime of violence” because it is not a generic “aggravated assault” for Guidelines purposes if the recklessness is not heightened by an extreme indifference to the value of human life, and the Arizona statute to which Esparza-Herrera pled guilty did not so require.
This precedential line of reasoning, however, largely ignores that U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(l)(A)(ii) calls for enhancement of sentence in cases of a prior conviction for a crime of violence to support a longer sentence for those who pose a danger to the public. A conviction for violation of A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(11) by its necessary terms shows that a person has previously and recklessly assaulted another, causing a substantial physical injury. The statute encompasses any “temporary but substantial” disfigurement or bodily impairment, which is serious enough to warrant the public’s protection.
I would prefer to conclude that Espar-za-Herrera might deservedly be sentenced to a longer term in the public’s interest, without regard to our doctrinal standard requiring us to assess what the majority of jurisdictions view as aggravated assault. In my view it would be better if we could look at the matter functionally, balancing fairness to the defendant being sentenced with fairness to the public that deserves protection. A “common sense approach” *1026that examines the “ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning” of A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(11) would strike this balance. United States v. Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir.2007).
But in this esoteric sphere of legal analysis our circuit precedent in substance says that common sense is out and instead we must canvass and assess what the majority of jurisdictions have concluded. I might disagree with the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Mungia-Portillo to the extent it suggests that there is no relevant difference between extreme indifference and ordinary recklessness, but I don’t think that such a difference should be very important in assessing whether there has been an aggravated assault. I would prefer to use the Fifth Circuit’s “common sense” approach, rather than trying to assess the standard jurisdiction by jurisdiction. What is important to me is whether the Arizona statute to which Esparza-Herrera pled guilty shows an offense sufficiently serious that we should consider it a “crime of violence” warranting a higher sentence under the advisory Guidelines in the interest of protecting the community. Using a common sense approach, I would have no problem concluding that Esparza-Herrera’s guilty plea to violating A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(11) yielded a prior conviction of a crime of violence for purposes of calculating the range of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, even if supported only by the recklessness required under the statute to which he pled guilty.1