Court Opinion

ID: 9591560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:05:06.954251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:09.538702
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). It has been the invariable practice of this Court to issue an order to show cause to a prosecutor, who has not responded to a defendant’s application for leave to appeal, before deciding whether to peremptorily reverse a Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a defendant’s conviction.
This Court should, therefore, issue an order to show cause to the defendant1 before further considering the draft per curiam opinion. Sholl has been released from custody on an order issued by the trial court. He is a layman, and, therefore, probably inadequately apprised that this Court might, in lieu of granting the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, issue a peremptory order or decision reversing the Court of Appeals without providing him an *744opportunity to seek counsel if he is indigent, to respond to the prosecutor’s application, or to retain counsel if he can afford to do so.2
Further, this Court should either grant or deny the application for leave to appeal. I dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals for reasons set forth in earlier statements.3
*745Cavanagh, J., concurred with Lew, J.

 A possible form of such an order might read as follows:
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(F)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we order the defendant to show cause in writing to this Court within 28 days why his conviction should not be reinstated on the grounds that (a) the prosecution properly introduced evidence of voluntary statements made by the defendant following a proper set of warnings with regard to his constitutional rights, (b) evidence of a threat against a witness is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and (c) testimony concerning drug use is part of the complete story, and would assist the jury in evaluating the testimony given by the complainant and the defendant regarding the disputed events that gave rise to this prosecution. The prosecutor may respond to the defendant’s submission within 21 days.

 The prosecutor’s proof of service shows that he served only the retained lawyer, who did not respond to the prosecutor’s application.

 People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872, 872-873 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior'v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Eston (Grievance Administrator v Eston), 440 Mich 1205, 1205-1207 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207, 1207-1209 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); McFadden v Monroe Civil Service Comm, 440 Mich 890, 890-891 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Holly Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources (Holly Twp v Holly Disposal, Inc), 440 Mich 891, 891-893 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Marzonie v ACIA, 441 Mich 522, 535-539; 495 NW2d 788 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Waleed, 441 Mich 902, 902-903 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Hardison, 441 Mich 913, 9144516 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Justice, 441 Mich 916, 917-919 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v LaClear, 442 Mich 867, 867-871 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); Auto-Owners Ins Co v City of Clare, 446 Mich 1, 16-18; 521 NW2d 480 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Weisgerber v Ann Arbor Center for the Family, 447 Mich 963, 964-969 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Howard v White, 447 Mich 395, 405-410; 523 NW2d 220 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting).
*745See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Summary reversal ‘should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).