Court Opinion

ID: 9693188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:29:13.905846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:27.784766
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
I join the Court in holding that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, prohibits the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and the Monmouth Council of the Boy Scouts of America (collectively, Boy Scouts), as places of public accommodation, from expelling a member based solely on his sexual orientation. I fully endorse the Court’s reasoning in reaching that result. I further emphasize, in the context of this case, the significance of the role of “genuine membership selectivity” as a material factor in the characterization of a place of accommodation as “public.”
*625This case also pits an individual’s right to be protected under the LAD from discrimination based on his sexual orientation against the First Amendment expressional rights of a public accommodation. In resolving that conflict, we must consider the significance of the connection between the individual’s speech and his identity when both relate to his sexual orientation.
I
On July 19, 1990, soon after learning that highly decorated Eagle Scout James Dale was gay, Boy Scouts revoked Dale’s membership privileges and requested that he sever all relations with the organization. After Dale inquired about the basis for his expulsion, he was first informed that Boy Scouts “forbid[s] membership to homosexuals,” and later that “[BSA] does not admit avowed homosexuals to membership in the organization.” Ante at 579, 734 A.2d at 1205. Dale thereafter commenced this lawsuit, charging Boy Scouts with violations of the LAD. Dale specifically contended that Boy Scouts, as a place of public accommodation, illegally expelled him based on his “affectional or sexual orientation,” contrary to N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.
A.
The critical question in deciding whether Boy Scouts violated the LAD by terminating Dale’s membership, as the Court recognizes, is whether Boy Scouts may be deemed.a “place of public accommodation.” Ante at 585, 734 A.2d at 1208. The Court observes that the term “place” in the LAD is not limited to a single geographic situs and, therefore, a fixed location is not a prerequisite to satisfying its definition. Id. at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210. A “place” encompasses any location or facility at which an organization undertakes its activities. Boy Scouts, the Court determines, as an organization that performs its functions at numerous locales, is clearly a “place” under the LAD. Id. at 589, 734 A2d at 1213. We also conclude that Boy Scouts is an “accommodation” for purposes of the LAD, especially given its *626uniquely educational and recreational nature. Id. at 594, 734 A.2d at 1213. Further, Boy Scouts is sufficiently “public” to be covered by the LAD. Id. at 591-92, 734 A.2d at 1211-12. If an organization either expressly or impliedly engages in broad public solicitation, it is considered “public” for purposes of the LAD. Id. at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210-11. Because Boy Scouts extends general membership invitations through such media as national broadcast and print advertising, public service announcements, recruiting drives and materials, as well as through the unique symbol of the scout uniform, Boy Scouts qualifies as “public.” Id. at 590-91, 734 A.2d at 1211. In addition, Boy Scouts’ close relationship with other established public accommodations lends it a “public” character. Id. at 591-93, 734 A.2d at 1211-13. I fully agree that these characteristics are sufficient to justify the Court’s conclusion that Boy Scouts meets the LAD’s definition of “place of public accommodation.”
B.
A closely related organizational characteristic, “genuine selectivity,” also bears on the “place of public accommodation” analysis. The absence of any genuine criteria for membership selectivity reinforces the “public” nature of an organization.
Membership selectivity, as the Court stresses, is a critically important factor in determining whether an organization is “distinctly private” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5 — 5Z, and therefore exempt from the LAD’s proscriptions applicable to an entity that is otherwise a “place of public accommodation.” See ante at 596, 734 A.2d at 1214 (noting that “selectivity issue [is] the principal determinant of ‘distinctly private’ status”). Membership selectivity is equally relevant to whether an organization may be initially considered to be a “place of public accommodation.” See id. at 597, 734 A.2d at 1214 (recognizing that absence of membership selectivity “weigh[s] in the public accommodation calculus”). The reason for this confluence is that the “distinctly private” exception *627is the “other side of the ‘public accommodation’ coin.” Kiwanis Int’l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir.1986), reh’g denied, 811 F.2d 247 (1987). Realistically, and in most contexts, one characteristic cannot exist without negating the other:
[ I]f an organization “is not a ‘place of public accommodation’ because of its selective membership practices, it must be private as that term is used in the statute.” In contrast, if an organization qualifies as a “place of public accommodation” ... the “private” club exception ... does not apply.
[Brounstein v. American Cat Fanciers Ass’n, 839 F.Supp. 1100, 1106 (D.N.J.1993) (citation omitted).]
Thus, the selectivity that we require to meet the LAD’s “distinctly private” exception also bears on the initial determination of whether a place of accommodation should be characterized as “public.” As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “unselectivity, unrestrictedness, and open invitation” are critical determinants of whether an organization is a “place of public accommodation.” Kiwanis, supra, 806 F.2d at 476.1 Of these three, selectivity has been described as the “touchstone of the determination of whether a membership organization is a ‘place of public accommodation’.” Brounstein, supra, 839 F.Supp. at 1106.
The focus of that investigation — as the Court requires in the context of our “distinctly private” exception analysis, ante at 599, 734 A.2d at 1216 — must be selectivity in practice, i.e., “genuine selectivity.” “The genuine selectivity of the membership process is the most important factor in ascertaining private club status.” United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F.Supp. 785, 797 *628(E.D.Pa.1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.1990); accord United States v. Trustees of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472 F.Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (E.D.Wis.1979) (observing that “most important factor” in determining whether club is private and thus not public accommodation subject to Civil Rights Act, is “process which the club actually uses in selecting its members”). The United States Supreme Court has recognized genuine selectivity as an integral characteristic of a private club. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 438, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 1094, 35 L.Ed.2d 403, 409-10 (1973). The absence of genuine selectivity in membership decisions constitutes persuasive evidence of the public nature of an organization.
1.
A number of features reflect a club’s genuine selectivity in membership practices:
[T]he substantiality of the membership fee; the numerical limit on club membership (apart from the capacity of the facilities); the membership’s control over the selection of new members; the formality of the club’s admission procedures; the standards or criteria for admission; and whether and how many [ ] applicants have been denied membership relative to the total number of [ ] applicants.
[Lansdowne Swim Club, supra, 713 F.Supp. at 797 (citations omitted).]
The hallmark of genuine selectivity is that the organization actually uses its stated selection criteria to limit its membership in accordance with those criteria.
The Court’s holding that a showing of genuine selectivity is required to satisfy the “distinctly private” exception in the LAD, ante at 599, 734 A.2d at 1216 (rejecting application of “distinctly private” exception to Boy Scouts because “[w]e do not find [ ] that the Oath and Law operate as genuine selectivity criteria”), is consistent with our existing LAD jurisprudence. In Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966), both a sign at a swimming club’s entrance and the club’s promotional literature referred to itself as a “private” facility. Id. at 34, 219 A.2d 161. The literature further stated that “all applications would be subject to approval by club officials.” Ibid. The Court held that such “[s]elf-serving declarations by the owner of *629an accommodation are not determinative of its character.” Ibid. The relevant inquiry was whether in practice the club had exercised any actual discretion in its selection of new members.
Other courts have likewise recognized that selectivity in practice is integral to the determination of whether an organization is private and thus exempt from antidiscrimination laws. For example, in Lansdowne Swim Club, supra, the Third Circuit relied on principles of genuine selectivity in assessing whether a swimming club, charged with racial discrimination, qualified as a private club, thus exempting it from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 894 F.2d at 85-86. The court pointed out that although the club required an interview for membership, it was “not probing, having the sole purposes of describing the club and its membership procedures and verifying the names and ages of children in the applicant’s family,” and that the club undertook virtually no other investigation of an applicant’s background. Id. at 86 n. 4. The court reasoned that “formal membership requirements ‘have little meaning when in fact the club does not follow a selective membership policy.’ ” Id. at 86 (quoting Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir.1980) (citing Tillman, supra, 410 U.S. at 438-39, 93 S.Ct. at 1094-95, 35 L. Ed.2d at 409-10)). The court further noted that evidence of only a few instances of applicant rejections by the club was probative of a lack of genuine selectivity. Ibid.
In Fraternal Order of Eagles, supra, the defendant claimed private club status based on an elaborate set of requirements codified in its statutes:
Those statutes ... include[d] the following requirements: (1) “[e]very applicant for membership in any Local Aerie shall be recommended by two members of the Order”; (2) “[n]o person shall be eligible to be elected to membership in any Local Aerie unless such person is a male, is of good moral character, and believes in the existence of a Supreme Being, ...”; (3) “[n]o application for membership shall be considered if the applicant shall not reside within the jurisdiction of the Aerie to which such application is submitted”; (4) “[ejaeh person desiring to become a member of an Aerie must properly fill out and sign an application. .;” (5) “[a]U applications for membership ... shall be referred to the Investigating Committee”; and (6) “[ajfter the report of the Investigating Committee is submitted, the *630application shall be voted upon, and, if elected, the Aerie may proceed with the initiation of the applicant.”
[ 472 F.Supp. at 1176.]
Despite those formal published criteria, the court rejected private status because the club’s formal admissions policy “[stood] in stark contrast to the admission process that ... the Eagles Club actually uses,” and showed little selectivity. Ibid, (noting further that club in one year turned down only three of over 1000 applicants and had 7000 to 8000 members at any one time).
A number of other cases, in considering the public versus private nature of an organization, have demanded that selectivity be actually employed in practice in accordance with formal admissions criteria. See Nesmith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir.1968) (noting that despite “some of the trappings of a private club,” including membership application, regularly recorded list of members, substantial dues, and membership cards to gain access to club facilities, “[e]xamination [ ] must go beyond these mere superficialities,” and concluding that club is public establishment because almost every applicant is accepted to membership); Rogers v. International Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 636 F.Supp. 1476, 1479-80 (E.D.Mich.1986) (characterizing club as public despite formal admissions criteria — including, requirements that new member have “good moral character and good reputation in his community,” be sponsored by current members, complete application forms, pass background investigation, and secure Board approval — concluding that “[wjhile it is true that this application procedure has the appearance of being elaborate, formal, and structured, in reality, it is not selective and almost all men who apply are admitted to membership”); New York v. Ocean Club, Inc., 602 F.Supp. 489, 494-96 (E.D.N.Y.1984) (concluding that uninformative application form, absence of background investigation of applicant, interview that merely informed applicant about club and its facilities without probing into applicant’s background and character, and fact that no member was ever rejected, all demonstrated club was not genuinely selective, notwithstanding formal admission criteria in club constitution and *631bylaws requiring sponsorship and Board approval); Brown v. Loudoun Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 399, 402-03 (E.D.Va.1983) (holding that admission fee, membership ceiling, and requirements that two members sign, and Board approve, application were insufficient, without more, to show that procedures operated in practice to make club’s membership practices selective).
2.
If an accommodation engages in little or no selectivity in choosing its members, this constitutes strong evidence that it is “public,” and thus subject to the proscriptions of the LAD. Accord Concord Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 402 Mass. 716, 524 N.E.2d 1364, 1367 (1988) (noting that “determinative factor” in characterizing organization — already stipulated by parties as being “place” and “accommodation”- — as “public,” and thus subject to state antidiscrimination law, is “total absence of genuine selectivity in membership”).
The mere fact that there is some genuine selectivity in acceptance of members is not incompatible with “public” status. That principle is supported by the understanding and practice of the Division on Civil Rights (Division), the administrative agency that is empowered under the LAD to enforce its antidiscrimination provisions. See Nelson v. Board of Educ., 148 N.J. 358, 364, 689 A.2d 1342 (1997) (“The interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight.”).
The Division has held that some genuine selectivity may be rendered inconsequential when balanced with other overwhelmingly unselective membership criteria. See Hinden v. United States Power Squadrons, No. PO2S-105 (Div. on Civil Rights Dec. 21, 1973), aff'd, No. A-3104-73 (App.Div. July 18, 1975), certif. denied, 69 N.J. 382, 354 A.2d 310 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943, 96 S.Ct. 3160, 49 L.Ed.2d 1180 (1976). In Hinden, the Division held that the Power Squadrons, a national boating organization that *632had local chapters in New Jersey, was a public accommodation operating in violation of the LAD because it refused admission to women. The Power Squadrons exhibited some genuine selectivity in the selection of new members, requiring the successful completion of a basic piloting course as a prerequisite for admission. The Division, however, recognized that the piloting course was itself a public accommodation because it was open to all members of the public free of charge, and regardless of sex or any other limitation. Hinden, supra, No. PO2S-105, slip op. at 2 (incorporating Sylvia B. Pressler, hearing examiner (now Presiding Judge, Appellate Division), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 14 (June 1, 1973)). “Moreover, and almost without exception, every man who passe[d] the basic piloting examination [was] invited to membership,” while every woman who passed was excluded. Ibid. The Division concluded that, despite the fact that the piloting test was used in the admissions process and was a genuine criterion in that a passing grade was required, on balance the Power Squadrons’s “membership invitation [was] basically as publicly oriented as [was] the public piloting course itself.” Ibid.
Additionally, other factors, traditionally relied upon in the determination of whether a place of accommodation is “public,” may outweigh the presence of genuine selectivity in ultimately finding that an organization is subject to the LAD. See ante at 589, 734 A.2d at 1210 (noting that broad public solicitation, maintenance of close relationships with government or other public accommodations, or similarity to enumerated or previously recognized public accommodations are factors that are helpful in determining whether organization is “public accommodation”); Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 104, 576 A.2d 241 (1990) (holding that eating club with very selective membership criteria was public accommodation because of its “symbiotic relationship” with university, which was itself subject to LAD).
In sum, membership selectivity is relevant but may not be determinative of whether an organization meets the LAD’s definition of “place of public accommodation.” Such membership selec*633tivity, genuinely applied in practice, may show that a place of accommodation that is otherwise “public” satisfies the LAD’s “distinctly private” exception. Conversely, the absence of genuine selectivity is always persuasive proof that an organization qualifies as “public.”
3.
The reality is that Boy Scouts rarely, if ever, denies membership based on any selection criteria other than age or gender. See ante at 597-600, 734 A.2d at 1215-16. According to A Representative Membership, a Boy Scouts publication prepared in 1975 for BSA Executive Board members; national and local council presidents, members and staff; district committee members; and commissioners:
Neither the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusicm, of any boy. The National Council and Executive Board have always taken the position that Scouting should be made available for all boys who meet entrance age requirements.
[ 7d at 2 (emphasis added).]
As a result of Boy Scouts’ unselective membership criteria, the organization has more than five million youth and adult members in the United States, and over 100,000 in New Jersey.
Boy Scouts’ lack of genuine selectivity is further underscored by the testimony of James William Kay, the highest ranking employee in Monmouth Council and the official who first made the decision to terminate Dale. Kay stated in deposition that he was. not aware of any previous rejection by BSA’s National Council of an adult application for membership in Monmouth Council. Kay was likewise unaware of any membership rejection in the previous council with which he was affiliated for eight and one-half years. Moreover, the fact that Boy Scouts does not require new members to be sponsored by a current member is further evidence that Boy Scouts does not engage in a genuine selection process. See Kiwanis, supra, 806 F.2d at 475.
The Appellate Division properly viewed Boy Scouts’ “undisputed invitation for membership in its literature to ‘all boys,’ ” as rendering its stated “ ‘selectivity’ criteria inconsequential.” 308 N.J.Su*634per. 516, 538, 706 A.2d 270.2 The absence of any evidence of genuine selectivity on the part of Boy Scouts compels the conclusion that Boy Scouts is “public.”
II
Boy Scouts maintains that even if it is deemed a “place of public accommodation” that is subject to the LAD, its decision to expel Dale based on his expression of his sexual orientation is protected under the First Amendment. The Court rejects that defense because Boy Scouts has failed to demonstrate a sufficiently protectable expressive interest in respect of homosexuality. Ante at 612-13, 734 A.2d at 1223.
The crux of the First Amendment analysis lies in an identification of the expressive interests of the organization and a determination of whether those interests are undermined or frustrated by the membership of the excluded person. Central to that inquiry is *635the question of whether membership was denied based on the person’s identity or status per se, or alternatively, on the person’s expressed views. We recognize today that Boy Scouts engaged in status-based discrimination when it terminated Dale. Id. at 615-16, 617, 624, 734 A.2d at 1225, 1226, 1230. I fully concur in that reasoning and result. The Court’s holding is especially significant because of the distinctive interdependence of expression and identity for lesbians and gay men, and the effect of that merger of speech and status on an organization’s First Amendment freedom of expressive association.
A.
A hallmark of the case law defining the contours of the right of expressive association is an identifiable demarcation between a person’s status and expression. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1947, 95 L.Ed.2d 474, 486 (1987) (noting that because clubs “do not take positions on ‘public questions,’ including political or national issues,” the inclusion of women, as such, as members will not “affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes”); see also New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2234, 101 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (1988) (“If a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club’s members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of ... legitimate criteria for determining membership.”); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3254, 82 L.Ed.2d 462, 477 (1984) (holding that law prohibiting sex discrimination was not violative of all-male organization’s freedom of expressive association in part because it “imposes no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members”).
*636The rationale for drawing a distinction between status and expression, as explained in Roberts, supra, is that “unsupported generalizations” and stereotypes based on a person’s identity are not permissible means of ascertaining the particular views of that person:
In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, or that the organization’s public positions would have a different effect if the group were not “a purely young men’s association,” the Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women---- [W]e have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such assumptions____ [W]e decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of the organization’s speech.
[ 468 U.S. at 627-28, 104 S.Ct. at 3255, 82 L.Ed.2d at 478.]
In contrast to exclusion based on status-based stereotypes, when the denial of membership is premised on actual expression, the organization can legitimately claim a basis for its assessment that the excluded person would “change the content or impact of the organization’s speech.” Id. at 628, 104 S.Ct. at 3255, 82 L.Ed.2d at 478.
Organizations may rely on their First Amendment right to exclude potential members solely on the basis of status in certain narrowly prescribed circumstances. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion.
[New York State Club Ass’n, supra, 487 U.S. at 13, 108 S.Ct. at 2234, 101 L.Ed.2d at 16.]
Thus, for example, when an organization has a unifying purpose that motivates its members to join together as an association or group, i.e., a core purpose, and the inclusion of a particular person would be inconsistent or incompatible with that purpose, the expressive association rights of the organization would support the exclusion. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Town of Thurmont, 700 F.Supp. 281, 289 (D.Md.1988) *637(upholding exclusion of African American participants in political march because “group’s primary purpose is to advocate one main concept — that blacks and whites should not mix. Allowing blacks to march with the KKK would change the primary message which the KKK advocates.”). A “specific expressive purpose” is frequently, although not necessarily, the core or primary purpose of an organization. Such a central purpose, if compromised, would most evidently inhibit an association’s ability to effectively advocate its viewpoints. The critical point is that a “specific expressive purpose” must be clear, particular, and consistent.
These considerations bear relevantly on the right of expressive association. The line between status-based and speech-based exclusion has been decisive to expressive association jurisprudence, even when that distinction was not readily apparent. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995), the Supreme Court held that GLIB, an organization of Irish lesbians and gay men, was properly excluded from marching in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade under a banner conveying a message of Irish and lesbian and gay pride. The Supreme Court noted that it was this expression, and not the homosexual identity of the marchers themselves, that formed the petitioning parade organizers’ basis for the exclusion of GLIB:
[Petitioners do not object to] the participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the parade. Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.
[Id. at 572, 115 S.Ct. at 2347, 132 L.Ed.2d at 503.]
The Supreme Court observed that “the record [ ] corroborates the expressive nature of GLIB’s participation.” Id. at 570, 115 S.Ct. at 2346, 132 L.Ed.2d at 502. Specifically, the Supreme Court determined that “GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in [the parade] ... in order to celebrate its members’ identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in the community, and to support the like men and women who sought to *638march in the New York parade.” Ibid., 115 S.Ct. at 2346, 132 L.Ed.2d at 501.
The Supreme Court also determined that the parade itself is a “form of expression, not just motion.” Id. at 568, 115 S.Ct. at 2345, 132 L.Ed.2d at 500. For that reason, the Supreme Court noted that “GLIB understandably seeks to communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its own,” id. at 570, 115 S.Ct. at 2346, 132 L.Ed.2d at 501, and that by engaging in that form of expressional activity, GLIB’s inclusion was incompatible with or compromised the expressional activities of the parade itself.
Fundamental to the analysis of the Supreme Court, then, was its extrapolation from the record of a basis for concluding that GLIB had sought to engage in expression that was conspicuously and unmistakenly separate from simply serving to identify its members. The Supreme Court’s description of that expression as distinct from status was central to its Hurley holding.
1.
This case does not squarely fall within the paradigm suggested by those authorities defining the contours of the expressive association right because the speech here is so closely intertwined with the identity of the speaker. Thus, as the Court recognizes, while Boy Scouts frames its expulsion of Dale as grounded on an objection to his expression of his homosexuality, that exclusion is tantamount to one based on Dale’s status as a homosexual. Ante at 624, 734 A.2d at 1229; cf. Able v. United States, 880 F.Supp. 968, 973 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (noting in challenge to constitutionality of military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that plaintiffs, in stating that they are homosexuals, “have done no more than acknowledge who they are, that is, their status,” and that such speech “implicates the First Amendment value of promoting individual dignity and integrity”), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir.1996) (vacating primarily on ground of judicial deference to military).3
*639The Court’s recognition of the speciousness of drawing a distinction between discrimination grounded in expression versus status in this context, ante at 624, 734 A.2d at 1230, was previously recognized by Justice Brennan, who observed that sometimes “‘speech’ [] is better evaluated as no more than a natural consequence of [a person’s] sexual orientation.” Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1017 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. 1373, 1379 n. 11, 84 L.Ed.2d 392, 397 n. 11 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). In Rowland, the jury found that the petitioner, a schoolteacher, had been dismissed from her job “for no other reason” than “because she was a homosexual who revealed her sexual preference.” Id. at 1009, 105 S.Ct. at 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d at 392 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan likened the petitioner’s expression of her sexual identity to fellow employees to the generally held knowledge of co-workers about “whom their fellow employees are dating or to whom they are married.” Ibid. In such instances, wrote Justice Brennan, “it is realistically impossible to separate [] spoken statements from [] status.” Ibid.
The confluence of status and expression when both relate to the speaker’s sexual orientation is “self-identifying speech.” Such expression as “the statement T am gay’ is illocutionary — like the statements ‘J’accuse,’ T thee wed,’ or T bet you,’ it not only describes, but performs, the action named.” Kenji Yoshino, As-similationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, ” 108 Yale L.J. 485, 550 (1998) (footnote omitted). Self-identifying speech “makes the connection between speech and status,” and is illustrated by the ACT UP slogan, “I am out, therefore I am.” Ibid, (footnotes omitted). Some scholars maintain that the ability to self-identify is critical to being a lesbian or gay man. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 443, 468 (1998) (“Self-realization [] is what speech (including *640expressive activity) makes possible.”); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and, Equality, 79 Va. L.Rev. 1695, 1718 (1993) (“Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect or communicate one’s identity; it is a major factor in constructing identity.”).
For purposes of antidiscrimination laws, the relevance of self-identifying speech is not so much in realizing identity, as in its singular role in revealing identity. The importance of self-identifying speech inheres in its legal effect — that is, in the functional capacity of such speech to disclose or clarify the status of a person when that status is entitled to protection against discrimination. A person covered by the LAD has the right to enjoy his or her protected status without suffering discrimination because of who he or she is. If the very means of making those characteristics known' — self-identification'—can legitimately justify discrimination against that person, then the antidiscrimination protections of the LAD are illusory.
The interdependence of identity and speech is particularly evident where a distinguishing characteristic of identity is not readily apparent, as in the case of sexual orientation. In that regard, there is a clear parallel between status based on sexual orientation and that based on religion. See David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as' a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 491 (1994). Unlike characteristics that are obvious upon casual observation, religion and sexual orientation are unknowable unless the person self-identifles.
Courts have recognized that expression and identity can be interdependent in the context of religion. See Islamic Center v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 300 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that expression of religious beliefs “communicates to outsiders the identity of the group and [a person’s] own identity as a member of it, a form of self-expression”). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that in order to adequately insulate religion from state interference, government may not “impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious *641status.” Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 884 (1990).
The significance of the connection between identity and expression in respect of sexual orientation has been similarly recognized by New Jersey’s Legislature in enacting protections for sexual minorities in the LAD. See ante at 619-21, 734 A.2d at 1227-28. When amending the LAD in 1991 to prohibit discrimination based on “affectional or sexual orientation,” the Legislature defined the scope of protection to encompass both concepts:
“Affectional or sexual orientation” means male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation.
[N.J.S.A 10:5-5(hh) (emphasis added).]
In so doing, the Legislature affirmed the significant role of self-identifying speech for lesbians and gay men, much in the same way that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that role in respect of religion.
2.
A prime example of self-identifying speech is the language of “coming out,” that is, publicly acknowledging one’s self as lesbian or gay. Dale’s acknowledgment of his homosexuality, therefore, constitutes self-identifying speech, and his exclusion from Boy Scouts cannot be based solely on that expression. As self-identifying speech, “it is realistically impossible to separate [Dale’s] spoken statements from [his] status.” Rowland, supra, 470 U.S. at 1017 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1379 n. 11, 84 L.Ed.2d at 397 n. 11. Thus, as the Court concludes, Dale’s expulsion was not based on his expression of views, but on his sexual orientation. Ante at 615, 617, 624, 734 A.2d at 1225, 1226, 1230.
The Court explains that Dale first acknowledged his own sexual orientation to himself, his family, and his friends while he was a student at Rutgers University. Id. at 578, 734 A.2d at 1204. Boy Scouts became aware of Dale’s sexual orientation only by way of a *642newspaper article,4 id. at 578, 734 A.2d at 1204-05, which identified Dale as gay:
James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance ... said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while attending a military academy.
He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second year at Rutgers.
“I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting of me,” Dale said, adding he wasn’t just seeking sexual experiences, but a community that would take him in and provide him with a support network and friends.
[Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, Star-Ledger (Newark), July 8, 1990, § 2, at 11.]
To treat this public identification as only expression ignores the reality that such speech is inextricably linked to Dale’s status as a gay man. As an editorial commenting on the Appellate Division’s judgment in this case recognized:
The Boy Scouts would never have known if James Dale hadn’t told them. That has always been the difference about the movement for gay rights. Homosexuals aren’t visible. They have to stand up and identify themselves in order to be discriminated against.
[The Invisible Victory, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1998, at A26.]
Had Dale expressed more general views on the morality, social implications, history, or etiology of homosexuality in his role as a Boy Scout leader, which directly conflicted with Boy Scouts’ stated positions, Boy Scouts could claim that its discrimination was based purely on expression.5 Dale’s statement of his identity, however, *643does not express a view about homosexuality generally or specifically advocate that homosexuality is moral. See Merino, supra, No. 659236, slip op. at 16 (noting that “acknowledgment of homosexuality does not translate to a ‘teaching’ that homosexuality is proper or improper any more than a Scout admitting he is Catholic amounts to a ‘teaching’ that Catholicism is the only proper religion”). As the Court recognizes, “Dale has never used his leadership position or membership to promote homosexuality, or any message inconsistent with Boy Scouts’ policies____[and] there is no indication that Dale intends to actively ‘teach’ anything whatsoever about homosexuality as a scout leader, or that he will do other than Boy Scouts instructs him to do — refer boys to their parents on matters of religion and sex.” Ante at 623, 734 A.2d at 1229.
3.
Because Boy Scouts excluded Dale based on his status as a homosexual, Boy Scouts must demonstrate a “specific expressive purpose” in respect of homosexuality for that exclusion to be permissible. See supra at 636-37, 734 A.2d at 1236-37. That requirement demands a showing of a clear, particular, and consistent message. Supra at 637, 734 A.2d at 1223.
Boy Scouts’ position in respect of homosexuality cannot be characterized as clear or particular. While Boy Scouts advocates traditional moral values through its Boy Scout program, ante at 613, 734 A.2d at 1223, it is not at all apparent that this position embraces any view concerning homosexuality. Further, while Boy Scouts professes that the terms “morally straight” and “clean” in the Scout Oath and Law stand for the proposition that homosexuality is immoral, those terms fail to convey any clear or particular message on homosexuality or the precept that homosexuality is immoral. See ante at 614, 734 A.2d at 1224. This fact is under*644scored by Dale’s testimony, as well as the affidavits of hundreds of other scouts, that they were unaware of any BSA position on the morality of homosexuality.
The inconsistency and vagueness of Boy Scouts’ position regarding its members’ views on morality generally, and homosexuality in particular, further belies the existence of a “specific expressive purpose” in this regard. See id. at 614-15, 734 A.2d at 1224-25. Boy Scouts acknowledges that “moral fitness” is an individual choice and defers its ultimate definition to its members:
Morality ... concerns the “principles of right and wrong” in our behavior, and “what is sanctioned by our conscience or ethical judgment.” ... In any consideration of moral fitness, a key word has to be “courage.” A boy’s courage to do what his head and his heart tell kirn is right. And the courage to refuse to do what his heart and his head say is wrong.
[Scoutmaster Handbook 71 (1990) (emphasis added).]
Dale appears to have heeded and lived by Boy Scouts’ dictate that individual conscience should guide a Scout’s moral decision-making. Dale wrote in his affidavit:
As a Scout, I promised to live by the Scout Oath____ I believed that the Scout Oath stood for my commitment to live an honorable life, to set standards for myself, and to do my best to serve others____ As I grew older, my commitment to Scouting deepened____ Scouting ... taught me how to deal with the ethical choices I encountered, as a teenager.
Boy Scouts’ official position on issues of sexuality is that “boys should learn about sex and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual beliefs.” Ante at 576, 734 A.2d at 1203. Numerous religious denominations sponsoring Boy Scout units subscribe to the view that homosexuality is compatible with their religious precepts. Id. at 575-76, 734 A.2d at 1203. Boy Scouts’ directive that its members should follow those entities on matters of individual morality, including sexual mores, indicates that tolerance concerning homosexuality is implicit in Boy Scouts’ own message on morality. See id. at 618, 734 A.2d at 1226 (noting that exclusion of members solely on basis of their homosexuality is “antithetical to the organization’s goals and philosophy” and “inconsistent with Boy Scouts’ commitment to a diverse and ‘representative’ membership”).
*645Moreover, BSA only charters and approves sponsoring organizations that are “ ‘compatib[le] with the aims and purposes of [Boy Scouts].’ ” Id. at 572, 734 A.2d at 1201. The Court recognizes that the fact that BSA has repeatedly renewed the charters of religious organizations adhering to a view that homosexuality is moral, negates and undermines the alleged consistency of a contrary message. See id. at 615, 734 A.2d at 1224-25. Additionally, approximately one-fifth of the BSA chartering organizations in New Jersey are public schools and school affiliated groups, and over two hundred Boy Scout units are sponsored by other public entities, such as fire departments and law enforcement agencies. Ante at 573, 734 A.2d at 1201. The LAD mandates that those entities may not discriminate on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation. N.J.S.A. 10:5-4. The continued sponsorship of Boy Scouts units by such public entities is at odds with Boy Scouts’ purported view on homosexuality, and thus constitutes further direct evidence of the inconsistency of Boy Scouts’ message.
Because Boy Scouts has not established a clear, particular, and consistent message concerning homosexuality, the First Amendment cannot excuse Boy Scouts’ status-based discrimination against a member, based solely on his sexual orientation, in violation of the LAD.
B.
Self-identifying speech that serves only to reveal the status of the speaker is always vulnerable to misinterpretation and misunderstanding based on stereotypes that are associated with the speaker’s status. The reliance on such stereotypes to import additional meaning to self-identifying speech is impermissible.
The Court observes that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold the enforcement of a state’s antidiscrimination statute against an expressive association claim based on assumptions in respect of status that are not part of the group members’ shared expressive purpose.” Ante at 615, 734 A.2d at *6461225. The very reason for the distinction between status-based and speech-based exclusion in the Supreme Court’s expressive association jurisprudence is that such stereotypical assumptions may not be relied upon to ascertain a person’s views. See supra at 636, 734 A.2d at 1236. In contrast, an organization may rely on expression to justify a speaker’s expulsion from membership when that speaker’s expression encompasses “ideolog[y] or philosoph[y that is] different from those of [the organization’s] existing members.” Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 627, 104 S.Ct. at 3254, 82 L.Ed.2d at 477. When an organization does not ground its decision to exclude on stereotypes, but rather on the expressed views of the speaker, that decision is based on a verifiable measure of whether the speaker’s membership would be antithetical to the organization’s purposes. See supra at 636, 734 A.2d at 1236.
In the context in which speech serves to identify the speaker, expression of one’s sexual orientation is inseparable from status. See supra at 638-41, 734 A.2d at 1237-39. Under that construct, status itself is revealed and realized by speech. It follows that expression that serves only to self-identify cannot be further infused with additional content that is derived from status-driven generalizations or stereotypical assumptions serving as “shorthand measures” of a person’s unexpressed views. See New York State Club Ass’n, supra, 487 U.S. at 13, 108 S.Ct. at 2234, 101 L.Ed.2d at 16. Stripped of all adverse implications that rest solely on such stereotypes, statements like “I am gay” express nothing more than the sexual orientation of the speaker; no legitimate inference about the speaker’s morality can be drawn. Accordingly, a homosexual cannot be said to interfere with the expressive associational rights of Boy Scouts merely because he publicly self-identifies as such.
The same repudiation of status-based stereotypes compelled by the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is demanded by the LAD. See ante at 618-19, 734 A.2d at 1226-27 (observing that “[t]he invocation of stereotypes to justify discrimination is *647all too familiar,” and that LAD is intended to “eliminate the destructive consequences of discrimination from our society”). The Appellate Division soundly observed that by amending the LAD in 1991 to protect persons from discrimination based on “affectional or sexual orientation,” the Legislature “implicit[ly] recognized] that discrimination based on ‘archaic’ and ‘stereotypical notions’ about homosexuals that bears no relationship to reality cannot be countenanced.” Ante at 620, 734 A.2d at 1227 (quoting 308 N.J.Super. at 549, 706 A.2d 270). Accordingly, we emphatically reject the use of stereotypical assumptions about homosexuals as justification for discrimination based on “affectional or sexual orientation.” Id. at 620-21, 734 A.2d at 1227-28.
One particular stereotype that we renounce today is that homosexuals are inherently immoral. That myth is repudiated by decades of social science data that convincingly establish that being homosexual does not, in itself, derogate from one’s ability to participate in and contribute responsibly and positively to society. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer’s Guide to Social Science Research 1 L. & Sexuality 133, 134 (1991) (presenting “considerable body of social science data” that counter “longstanding cultural myths and stereotypes that depict lesbians and gay men as immoral, criminal, sick, and drastically different from what most members of society would consider ‘normal’ ”). Like stereotypes about an individual based on sex or race, similar assumptions about a lesbian or gay man are false and unfounded, and reveal nothing about that individual’s moral character, or any other aspect of his or her personality:
A homosexual orientation tells nothing reliable about abilities or commitments in work, religion, politics, personal and social relationships, or social activities, except to the extent that in many areas the lives of gay people are frequently conditioned by the attitudes of others.
[Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C.App.1987) (citations omitted).]
In short, a lesbian or gay person, merely because he or she is a homosexual, is no more or less likely to be moral than a person who is a heterosexual. Accordingly, as the Appellate Division recognized below, there is no reason to view “a gay scoutmaster, *648solely because he is a homosexual, [as lacking the] strength of character necessary to properly care for [and] impart BSA humanitarian ideals to the young boys in his charge.” 308 N.J.Super. at 552, 706 A.2d 270. “Plaintiffs exemplary journey through the BSA ranks is testament enough that these stereotypical notions about homosexuals must be rejected.” Ibid.
The Appellate Division also observed that another particularly pernicious stereotype about homosexuals is implicit in Boy Scouts’ arguments: “the sinister and unspoken fear that gay scout leaders will somehow cause physical or emotional injury to scouts.” Id. at 551, 706 A2d 270. The myth that a homosexual male is more likely than a heterosexual male to molest children has been demolished. See Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 Pediatrics 41 (1994) (concluding that most child abuse appears to be committed by situational child abusers who present themselves as heterosexuals); A. Nicholas Groth & H. Jean Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7 Archives Sexual Behav. 175, 180-81 (1978) (concluding that “homosexuality and homosexual pedophilia are not synonymous----[and] that the adult heterosexual male constitutes a greater sexual risk to underage children than does the adult homosexual male”); see also Herek, supra, 1 L. & Sexuality at 152-56 (citing studies and concluding that “[i]t appears from these studies that gay men are no more likely than heterosexual men to molest children”); David Newton, Homosexual Behavior and Child Molestation: A Review of the Evidence, 13 Adolescence 29 (1978) (surveying data concerning male homosexuality and child molestation and concluding that “there is no reason to believe that anything other than a random connection exists between homosexual behavior and child molestation”).
In light of this evidence, the belief that a gay scoutmaster poses a risk to young boys because of his sexual orientation is patently false, and cannot in any way bolster Boy Scouts’ First Amendment defense. Accordingly, it must be rejected as an unfounded stereotype. Accord Doe v. British Universities N.A. Club, 788 F.Supp. *6491286, 1292 (D.Conn.1992) (rejecting argument that child molestation was “foreseeable consequence of [ ] sexual orientation,” noting that plaintiff “offers not one scintilla of credible evidence to suggest that homosexuals pose a greater risk of committing sexual molestation, assault, or criminal conduct than heterosexuals____ To find otherwise would be to hold that homosexuals are predisposed towards molesting or sexually assaulting minor males simply by virtue of their sexual orientation. The court cannot and will not adopt such a position absent sufficient evidentiary support.”).
The trial court in this case impermissibly invoked stereotypical assumptions about homosexuals to give a specific meaning to “traditional morality,” which it then ascribed to Boy Scouts. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92, slip op. at 39-41 (Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995). The court, equating homosexuality with sodomy, expressed the view that because at the founding of Boy Scouts in 1910, “sodomy was a serious criminal offense in every state in the Union, ... [t]o suggest that Boy Scouts had no policy against active homosexuality is nonsense.”6 Id. at 39-40. The court reasoned that sodomy laws were expressive of societal moral values, and from that concluded that Boy Scouts adopted and continues to adhere to those mores today.
Sodomy laws, as applied against homosexuals, reflect the same stereotypical thinking that we now recognize as invidious, including untenable assumptions about the morality of homosexuals, that have long been superseded and overcome. In successfully defending the constitutionality of its sodomy statute, for example, the State of Georgia relied on the stereotypes of homosexuals as immoral people and child molesters. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2847, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, 149 (1986); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L.Rev. *6501574, 1641-49 (1987) (discussing arguments of Georgia Attorney General in Bowers). That same sodomy statute was later struck down as unconstitutional under the Georgia State Constitution. Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998). The 1979 repudiation of New Jersey’s sodomy statutes, N.J.S.A. 2A:143-1, - 2, is further evidence of the evolution in social thinking about homosexuality.
Sodomy laws and their implicit moral assumptions about homosexuals very much parallel miscegenation statutes, which were grounded in similar stereotypical notions concerning the morality of African Americans. See Bowers, supra, 478 U.S. at 210 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 2854 n. 5, 92 L.Ed.2d at 158 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that parallel between miscegenation and sodomy laws “is almost uncanny”); id. at 216 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2857 n. 9, 92 L.Ed.2d at 162 n. 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that “miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy”). Miscegenation laws, which existed in many states at Boy Scouts’ founding in 1910, were grounded in antiquated notions of race and morality and were considered valid “measures designed to maintain White Supremacy”7 until declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-24, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017-18 (1966). The indefensibility of basing contemporary moral views regarding race on those laws is obvious. The same is true of placing current reliance on the archaic moral views underlying sodomy laws, which are totally inconsistent with present day conceptions of homosexuality.
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
[Id. at 3, 87 S.Ct. at 1819, 18 L.Ed.2d. at 1013.]
*651It is not tenable to conclude that because at one time “traditional moral values” were based on unsupportable stereotypes about homosexuals, those values have survived and endured unchanged in contemporary times. It is similarly untenable to conclude, in the absence of a clear, particular, and consistent message to the contrary, that Boy Scouts — a federally chartered and nationally recognized organization with significant ties to governmental institutions and public entities that fully adhere to contemporary laws rejecting anachronistic stereotypes about homosexuality — remains entrenched in the social mores that existed at the time of its inception.
Stereotypes cannot be invoked to extend the meaning of self-identifying expression of one’s own sexual orientation, and thereby become a vehicle for discrimination against homosexuals. Such stereotypes, baseless assumptions, and unsupported generalizations reflecting a discredited view of homosexuality as criminal, immoral and improper are discordant with current law and public policy. Accordingly, they cannot serve to define contemporary social mores and morality. Boy Scouts’ adherence to “traditional moral values,” its “belief in moral values,” and its uncontroverted purpose to “encourage the moral development of its members,” ante at 613, 734 A2d at 1223, remain undisturbed and undeterred by Dale’s open avowal of his homosexuality.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the opinion of the Court.
HANDLER, J., concurs in the result.
Far affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.

 The Kiwanis court correctly identified the relevance of "unselectivity, unre-strictedness and open invitation” to the identification of a "place of public accommodation.” It overstated those factors, however, as comprising the "test” for satisfying that definition. Kiwanis, supra, 806 F.2d at 476. If an organization possesses those characteristics, it will certainly qualify as a "place of public accommodation.” Nevertheless, the absence or mere partial satisfaction of one or more of those factors does not preclude a finding that an organization is a "place of public accommodation.” See infra at 631-33, 734 A.2d at 1233-34; Kiwanis, supra, 811 F.2d 247 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from sur denial of rehearing) (criticizing Kiwanis for suggesting that all associations that are not completely open, unselective and unrestrictive are not "public”).

 Courts and jurists of other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion. For example, in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 17 Cal.4th 670, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 410, 952 P.2d 218, 236 (1998), although the California Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts is not the functional equivalent of "a classic 'public accommodation or amusement' " under California's common law, the court noted that "Boy Scouts is generally nonselective in its admission policies." See also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1283 (7th Cir.) (Cummings, J., dissenting) (observing that "[mjembership [in Boy Scouts] is not selective"; "[o]ther than the mention of God in the oath, which must exclude an extremely small — though indeterminate — number of children, the only substantive requirement for membership is age, which is not so much a matter of selectivity as a basic common denominator"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 602, 126 L.Ed.2d 567 (1993); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 Or. 327, 551 P.2d 465, 473 (1976) (O'Connell, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is commonly known that membership in the Boy Scouts of America is open to any boy within the specified age group without any other limitation whatsoever.”); Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 659236, slip op. at 9 (Cal.App. Dep't Super.Ct. July 7, 1994) (finding that "membership criteria for both juvenile and adult members [of Scouting] are non-selective”). But see Welsh, supra, 993 F.2d at 1276 ("Although the Scouts intentionally admit a large number of boys from diverse backgrounds, admission to membership is not without the exercise of sound discretion and judgment. This is evident from the Constitution and By-laws as well as the Boy Scouts Oath and Scout Law.”).

 The District Court in Able further rejected as unconstitutional "a policy that purportedly directs discharge based on 'conduct' ” while "defining 'conduct' to *639include statements revealing one’s homosexual status” because such policy transmogrifies "a mere acknowledgment of status" into "an admission of misconduct.” 880 F.Supp. at 975.

 The article reported on a conference held at Rutgers University, sponsored by several groups including the National Association of Social Workers-New Jersey Task Force on Lesbian/Gay Issues and Rutgers University School of Social Work, which addressed the unique problems faced by homosexual teenagers struggling to come to terms with their sexual orientation, including an alarmingly high incidence of suicide attempts.

 A recent California case, wherein a young man was denied Boy Scouts membership after he stated to a local council's executive director that he wanted to join the Boy Scout program "because he so firmly believed personally in a homosexual lifestyle that there was ... not anything wrong with it, and he wanted to make sure that other kids understood that,” illustrates this distinction. See Curran, supra, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 410, 952 P.2d at 254 (Kennard, J., concurring) (observing that requiring plaintiff's membership would have violated Boy Scouts' *643right to expressive association). Here, unlike in Curran, Dale did not seek membership in order to challenge Boy Scouts’ purported views on homosexuality or to project his own views on other scouts.

 In addition to the court’s reliance on stereotypes, its failure to differentiate between Dale's status as a homosexual and homosexual conduct was manifestly in error. E.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Va. L.Rev. 1721, 1736 (1993).

 The trial court in Loving, for example, cited the following justification for Virginia's miscegenation statute: