Court Opinion

ID: 9384687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:38.431822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.598674
License: Public Domain

J-S07028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                             :
                                               :
    HENRY DIAZ-AYALA                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1223 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2021,
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001882-2019.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED APRIL 4, 2023

       After a jury convicted him of felony murder, criminal conspiracy, and

related offenses,1 Henry Diaz-Ayala appeals from the judgment of sentence of

incarceration for life without the possibility of parole. We affirm.

       Around 9:10 p.m. on January 23, 2019, Diaz-Ayala, Justin Mitchell, and

Russel Montalvo-Fernandez broke into the home of David Pass and his father,

Ralph Williams. Carrying guns, the men intended to rob Mr. Pass “of money

he owed to Mitchell, who in turn owed it to [Diaz-Ayala] and Montalvo[-

Fernandez].” Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/22, at 4.

       While Montalvo-Fernandez and Mr. Pass were on the third floor, Diaz-

Ayala was with Mr. Williams in his second-floor bedroom. Mr. Williams resisted

and stabbed Diaz-Ayala, who screamed. Upon hearing Diaz-Ayala’s scream,

____________________________________________

1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a)(1), 907(a), 2505(b), 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i),
3701(a)(ii), and 3701(a)(1)(iv).
J-S07028-23

Montalvo-Fernandez shot Mr. Pass in the leg and buttocks.           Montalvo-

Fernandez ran downstairs, where he repeatedly shot and killed Mr. Williams.

      The three home invaders fled the scene. Diaz-Ayala left a trail of blood

from Mr. Williams’ bedroom, down the stairs, through the kitchen, out the

back door, and into the street. Montalvo-Fenandez drove Mitchell home and

then took Diaz-Ayala to a hospital.

      Several months passed, and police eventually apprehended Diaz-Ayala

and Mitchell. Meanwhile, Montalvo-Fernandez escaped to Mexico with the help

of his close friend, Elijah Moody.

      The Commonwealth chose to try Diaz-Ayala and Mitchell together. Diaz-

Ayala moved to sever his and Mitchell’s trials. Diaz-Ayala argued a joint trial

would prejudice him, because the codefendants had conflicting theories of

what occurred on the night of the home invasion. Also, the Commonwealth

intended to admit Mitchell’s grand-jury testimony against Mitchell, and Diaz-

Ayala feared that testimony would incriminate him without an opportunity to

cross-examine Mitchell. The trial court denied severance.

      Also, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to admit the testimony

of Elijah Moody regarding statements Montalvo-Fernandez made to him in the

days after the homicide. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion

and explained its ruling from the bench as follows:

              It’s important to note that Moody and Montalvo[-
         Fernandez] were friends prior to the homicide. It’s also
         important to note that, at the time these statements were
         made, [none] of the defendants had been arrested for
         homicide. The case law does say that the conspiracy ends

                                      -2-
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        upon arrest. We don’t have that in this particular situation.
        We know that Mr. Moody testified before the Investigating
        Grand Jury on two occasions, that being September 3, 2019
        and . . . July 24, 2019.

              On August 7, 2019, he and his attorney met with
        Detective Mitchell, and I’ll quote, “to clarify false information
        that he previously testified to before the Investigating Grand
        Jury.” There was no question-and-answer statement taken
        at the time, and it is not clear from the record why no formal
        statement was taken. It’s also not clear what generated this
        meeting on August 7th. Was Mr. Moody being threatened
        with contempt of court for lying to the grand jury? It’s just
        not clear. But a police report was generated, and it says
        various things that Montalvo[-Fernandez] is reported to
        have said to Moody.

              At some point, . . . Mr. Moody came to Detective
        Mitchell, and he did give a Q-and-A statement. I believe it
        was two pages and basically adopted a police report. That
        was March 12, 2020.

               So, what we have here is knowing the facts of this
        case, we know that the three people came together. After
        the homicide, they left in a car together. Two of them were
        wearing masks during the crime. We know that there was
        cell phone contact between them, after the time and prior
        to their arrest. I think it can be readily inferred that there
        was an agreement, as part of the original plan, to get away
        with the crime, to cover up, to evade capture, and I think
        that can be readily inferred as part of the plan. So, I find
        that the conspiracy did not end. The statements were made
        in furtherance of the conspiracy, and they are admissible.

N.T., 7/15/21, at 18-19.

     The matter proceeded to trial. The jury convicted both men, and the

trial court sentenced Diaz-Ayala as described above.         This timely appeal

followed.

     Diaz-Ayala raises three appellate issues:

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         1.      Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
                 in denying [Diaz-Ayala’s] pretrial motion to sever?

         2.      Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
                 in permitting hearsay evidence at trial . . . ?

         3.      Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
                 in giving a confusing progression charge to the jury,
                 which led to an inconsistent verdict?

Diaz-Ayala’s Brief at 5. We address each issue in turn.

1.    Motion to Sever Codefendants’ Trials

      First, Diaz-Ayala challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever

his trial from that of his codefendant, Mitchell.

      At the outset of his brief, Diaz-Ayala correctly acknowledges that “The

decision whether to sever trials of codefendants is one within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.” Id. at 2 (citing Commonwealth v. Morales, 494 A.2d 367,

372 (Pa. 1985)). Further, Diaz-Ayala correctly defines an abuse of discretion

as “[n]ot merely an error of judgment, an abuse of discretion occurs when

[(1)] the law is overridden or misapplied; [(2)] or the judgment exercised is

manifestly unreasonable; or [(3) the decision is] the result of partially,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. 2009)). In addition, he

correctly reiterates our standard of review in the argument portion of his brief.

See id. at 19.

      However, Diaz-Ayala never indicates which type of abuse of discretion

the trial court supposedly committed. Rather than identify the alleged abuse

                                       -4-
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of discretion, Diaz-Ayala argues why the trial court should have severed his

and Mitchell’s trials, as if our standard of review were de novo.

      He asserts he “established during pretrial hearings that the antagonistic

defenses would cause him prejudice at a joint trial.” Id. at 20.    Diaz-Ayala

then relitigates his arguments from below, instead of explaining how the trial

court’s reasoning was manifestly unreasonable, what law the court overrode,

or how its decision arose from bias or prejudice against him.

      Moreover, Diaz-Ayala suggests that the “scales of justice should have

tipped toward protecting [his] right to be tried separately due to the strong

antagonistic defenses.”   Id. at 21 (emphasis added).       He contends that,

because he “showed that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial, and in fact

prejudice resulted, the trial court should have ordered separate trials for the

defendants.” Id. (emphasis added).

      When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we do not ask how the scales

of justice should tip or reconsider how a given judicial officer should exercise

discretion, as if we were sitting in the place of the trial court. Even if we

disagree with a trial court’s judgment on the severing of codefendants’ trials,

Pennsylvania courts have long held that an “abuse of discretion is not merely

an error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an

unreasonable exercise of judgment.” Johnson v. Johnson, 222 A.3d 787,

789 (Pa. Super. 2019). Thus, it is insufficient to convince us that “the lower

tribunal reached a decision contrary to the decision that the appellate court

would have reached.” B.B. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 118 A.3d 482, 485

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(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (some punctuation omitted). Instead, an appellant must

persuade this Court that one of the three abuses of discretion occurred. See

Montalvo, surpa.

       Here, Diaz-Ayala disregards our deferential standard of review for

orders denying motions to sever codefendants’ trials. He does not argue –

much less convince this Court – that the trial court’s analysis and decision

were manifestly unreasonable or that they overrode or misapplied the law.

Nor does Diaz-Ayala argue that the trial court’s determinations were the result

of bias, prejudice, or ill-will. Hence, his appellate argument does not persuade

us that the trial court abused its discretion.

       Diaz-Ayala’s first issue entitles him to no relief.

2.     Hearsay Statements of Conspirators

       As his next issue, Diaz-Ayala contends the “trial court erred and abused

its discretion in permitting hearsay testimony at trial over [his] objections.”

Diaz-Ayala’s Brief at 22. He challenges two subcategories of hearsay: (1) the

grand-jury testimony of Mitchell and (2) the statements that Montalvo-

Fernandez made to Mr. Moody in the days following the murder.

       Regarding Mitchell’s grand-jury testimony, Diaz-Ayala argues that the

admission of that testimonial evidence violated the Sixth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.2 The Commonwealth replies that Diaz-Ayala

waived this sub-issue. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-20. We agree.
____________________________________________

2 The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal defendants “shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”

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      Waiver presents “a question of law, over which our standard of review

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Barbour,

189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018).

      “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, “issues, even those

of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new

and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first

time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884

(Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019).

      When the Commonwealth began to ask one of its witnesses about the

testimony that Mitchell provided before the grand jury, counsel for Diaz-Ayala

requested a sidebar. There, his attorney did not object to the admission of

Mitchell’s grand-jury testimony. Defense counsel said, “I’d ask the court to

give a cautionary instruction that anything [Mitchell said] in front of the grand

jury or in front of the [investigating] detective cannot be used in any way

against my client.” N.T., 12/15/21, at 57.

      The trial court granted the requested relief. The court instructed the

jury as follows: “you may hear statements made by Mr. Mitchell. Anything

you hear regarding what Mr. Mitchell allegedly said cannot be used against

Mr. Diaz-Ayala.” Id. at 58.

      Thus, Diaz-Ayala made no objection to the admission of Mitchell’s grand-

jury testimony. In fact, he received the relief that he requested at sidebar.

Simply put, Diaz-Ayala did not assert that Mitchell’s grand-jury testimony

                                      -7-
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violated his confrontation-clause rights at the trial.    Hence, he raises this

constitutional theory for the first time on appeal. Under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), we

dismiss Diaz-Ayala’s constitutional theory as waived.

      Turning to his second sub-issue (i.e., Montalvo-Fernandez’s hearsay to

Mr. Moody) Diaz-Ayala recognizes that our standard of review for evidentiary

issues is an abuse of discretion. See Diaz-Ayala’s Brief at 2 (citing Montalvo,

986 A.2d at 94). However, similar to his first appellate argument, he does

not state which of the three types of abuse of discretion he believes the trial

court committed. Instead, he argues that the trial court’s decision to admit

Montalvo-Fernandez’s hearsay statements “was erroneous, because . . . that

trial court failed to analyze whether [the statements] were made to further

the common design of the conspiracy.” Id. at 27.

      First, this is inaccurate. The trial court performed the analysis that Diaz-

Ayala claims it did not. The court clearly stated that:

         it can be readily inferred that there was an agreement, as
         part of the original plan, to get away with the crime, to cover
         up, to evade capture, and I think that can be readily inferred
         as part of the plan . . . The statements were made in
         furtherance of the conspiracy, and they are admissible.

N.T., 7/15/21, at 19 (emphasis added).

      Second, as mentioned, an “abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable

exercise of judgment.” Johnson, 222 A.3d at 789 (emphasis added). Diaz-

Ayala does not claim that either occurred when the trial court granted the

                                      -8-
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Commonwealth’s motion in limine to admit Montalvo-Fernandez’s statements

to Mr. Moody. Thus, he fails to persuade us that such an abuse occurred.

      Diaz-Ayala’s second issue is partially waived and partially meritless.

3.    The Jury Charge

      Lastly, Diaz-Ayala asserts the trial court “erred and abused its discretion

in giving a confusing progression charge to the jury which resulted in an

inconsistent verdict.” Diaz-Ayala’s Brief at 29. He believes the charge on the

progressive degrees of murder “confused the jury and led to inconsistent

verdicts of guilty of [murder of the] second degree and not guilty of [murder

of the] third degree.” Id.

      The record reveals that Diaz-Ayala requested the progressive charge on

murder. His counsel said to the trial court, “I am not asking for a progressive

charge on anything other than the homicide.”            N.T., 12/16/21, at 11

(emphasis added). Also, Diaz-Ayala did not object to the charge after it the

trial court gave it. See id. at 231.

      As such, he did not preserve this issue for our review. Under Pa.R.A.P.

302(a), we dismiss Diaz-Ayala’s final appellate issue as waived.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                       -9-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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