Court Opinion

ID: 9690394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:10:33.093504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:56.521459
License: Public Domain

SANDERS, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, the majority erroneously holds that the trial judge’s refusal to give the special charge requires reversal of the conviction.
The requested charge reads as follows:
“Where the offense charged has ‘unauthorized entry’ as one of its elements, the entry into a truck stop, or other place of public accommodation during the business hours is not an ‘unauthorized entry’ as required by law and was made in the exercise of his right to enjoy equal access to a place of public accommodation under the civil rights act .
The entering of a building which is open to the public in general, does not constitute an authorized entry as required by LSA-R.S. 14:60 . . .”
Article 807 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
. “A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given.”
Obviously, the charge is not wholly correct and pertinent.
The truck stop referred to in the special charge is completely foreign to the case. The buildings allegedly burglarized here were a washateria and a high school building. Likewise, the Civil Rights Act appears to be foreign to the subject matter of the litigation.
The final paragraph of the charge conveys the meaning that all entries into buildings that are open to the public are ««authorized, an incorrect statement of the law.
The trial judge states that the matter contained in the special charge was covered by the general charge. The general charge was not made a part of the bill of exceptions. Hence, under the established jurisprudence, we accept the trial judge’s declaration as conclusive. State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (on rehearing); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705, 198 So.2d 897; State v. Bickham, 236 La. 244, 107 So.2d 458; State v. Stracner, 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571; State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 154 So. 437.
Assuming, however, that we can consider the content of the general charge, as the majority has done, the trial judge’s position is amply supported, for he instructed the jury as follows:
“The crime of burglary must have the following elements. First, there must be entry of a building. Second: This entry must he unauthorized, that is to say *68if the entry is an authorized entry as opposed to an unauthorized one, then one of the essential elements is lacking. Thirdly: there must be the intent to commit a theft of forcible felonj'-. (Italics mine).
“If you entertain any reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant’s guilt, it is your sworn duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of acquittal. And, even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, yet, if it does not establish it beyond a reasonable doubt it is your duty to acquit.’’
For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent.