Court Opinion

ID: 9766975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:05:15.942301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:02.292126
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the prejudicial effect of the presence on the Commonwealth’s table of an evidence box conspicuously labelled “Police shooting — homicide of police officer” is, under the circumstances of this case, “of such a speculative nature as not to require that a new trial be granted.” (At 286).
Both counsel and the trial court were obviously concerned lest the introduction at trial of the evidence concerning appellant’s apprehension convey the impression that appellant was involved in unrelated criminal activity. Such concern over the impression made by the evidence that was introduced at trial is greatly exacerbated by the possible exposure of the jury to evidence that was not introduced. “Due process requires that the jury consider only the evidence developed before it at trial.” Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 262, 352 A.2d 40, 49 (1976) (emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Bobko, 453 Pa. 475, 309 A.2d 576 (1973), this Court reversed the appellant’s conviction because the jury panel had seen a list of all of the criminal prosecutions scheduled for that term in the prosecuting county, which list indicated that the defendant was being prosecuted in an additional trial on unrelated criminal charges. We stated:
We believe that presenting the jury with information indicating that appellant was charged with other crimes is prejudicial error. Certainly, possession by the jury of a *291list of charges pending against the appellant might well have predisposed the jurors to believe the appellant guilty, thus denying him the presumption of innocence. The prejudice created requires that the conviction be set aside and that a new trial be granted.
453 Pa. 475, at 477, 309 A.2d 576, at 577.
Similar concerns were presented in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 449 Pa. 50, 295 A.2d 303 (1972). In that murder case, after trial had commenced defense counsel became aware that the murder victim’s father had been a member of the panel from which the jury was selected. The trial court denied the defense motion to withdraw a juror without a hearing or inquiry to determine whether any of the jurors had made any significant association with the victim’s father. In Stewart, we wrote:
The requirement that a jury’s verdict “must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial” goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.
In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the “evidence developed” against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.
449 Pa. 50, at 54, 295 A.2d 303, at 305, quoting from Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549-50, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). In reversing the lower court and granting a new trial, we further observed:
We realize that what we are in effect doing is presuming prejudice for the sake of insured fairness; however, this is exactly what the United States Supreme Court did in Turner, supra. Moreover, the Court employed this same presumption in the Sam Sheppard case where there was a question of prejudice as a result of pretrial stories in the news media. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 [16 L.Ed.2d 600] (1966). [Further citations *292omitted]. As was aptly stated by Mr. Justice Black in In re Murchison,. 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 [625, 99 L.Ed. 942] (1955), “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”
449 Pa. 50, at 56-57, 295 A.2d 303, at 306.
In Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976), highly prejudicial publicity regarding the appellant’s suppressed confession had occurred during the trial in circumstances rendering it quite likely, though by no means certain, that some jurors may have been exposed to the articles and broadcasts. This Court made the following salient observations:
Our cases also make clear that the trial court can avoid this presumption of prejudice [arising when the jury is exposed to “inherently prejudicial” publicity] by taking careful precautionary measures. For example, in Commonwealth v. Dukes, 460 Pa. 180, 331 A.2d 478 (1975), the jury was drawn from the same panel as the jury in a previous trial of the same defendant. The same situation occurred in Commonwealth v. Free, 214 Pa.Super. 492, 259 A.2d 195 (1969), and a new trial was ordered because of the possibility of prejudice. This Court, in Dukes, distinguished Free because “the trial court was meticulously careful to ascertain that no member of the jury was aware of the previous trial.” Each juror was questioned in private, and an extensive voir dire examination was allowed. We held:
“We are satisfied that the careful precautionary measures taken by the trial judge adequately served to insure the selection of a fair and impartial jury, one untainted by any knowledge that Dukes had been charged with another crime. There was thus no probability of any prejudice to appellant.”
When there is a possibility of highly prejudicial materials reaching the jury, the trial court must take appropriate protective action. Although the proper precautions are inevitably dictated by the circumstances of each *293case, they must reasonably ensure that no prejudice will occur.
Here, details of appellant’s suppressed confession were the subject of highly prejudicial front page news articles and news broadcasts. Even a random glance at a news rack would have been sufficient to convey the existence of the confession. The court gave an inadequate precautionary instruction to the jury and took no direct action to ensure that they were not exposed to such highly prejudicial information. In such circumstances, the trial court should have questioned each juror as appellant’s counsel frequently requested to ensure that the publicity had not in fact reached the jury. The failure to do so denied appellant any chance to show actual prejudice. Such a procedure is required, upon the request of either party, under the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press § 3.5(f):
“If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court on its own motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material____”
466 Pa. 245, at 266-67, 352 A.2d 40, at 51.
These cases illustrate that a jury may be contaminated by exposure to inadmissible, prejudicial information in a variety of ways. The possibility of such exposure may not necessarily require withdrawal of a juror or granting of a new trial, because prompt investigation by the trial court may reveal that the jury members were not, in fact, exposed or influenced. The court may also take measures designed to cure the possible prejudicial effects of such exposure. When such exposure is brought to the court’s attention, however, and the lower court takes no steps to learn whether and to what extent the jury may have been influenced thereby, this Court must not be quick to dismiss the matter or to speculate as to what inferences or impressions the jury may have formed.
In the instant case, the trial court made no attempts to determine whether any jurors were actually cognizant of *294the inflammatory label on the evidence box, nor did the court issue any precautionary instructions pertaining thereto. Instead, the court indicated “I can’t read it from you holding it up from the bench, and 1 don’t know whether anybody else can. ” See at 285-286, n. 3. If the trial court did not “know whether anybody” on the jury could have read “Police shooting — homicide of police officer” on the evidence box, then it was the court’s obligation to find out by polling the jurors.1 In the interests of due process and fundamental fairness, I would therefore hold that the lower court committed prejudicial error in failing to poll the jury or take such measures as may have been appropriate in order to determine the impact, if any, of the prosecutor’s “blatant and inexcusable inattention” so “strongly condemned” by the majority. At 286.

. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and did not specifically request the court to poll the jury. While the failure to make such request might present waiver problems in a non-capital case, the fact that this is a death penalty case with its irrevocable punishment warrants relaxation of our waiver rules. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 50 n. 19, 454 A.2d 937, 955 n. 19 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983).