Court Opinion

ID: 9544026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:30.166609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:48.860745
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
concurring:
For the reasons discussed below, I join in part and concur in part with the holding of the majority.
This divorce action presents a factual pattern that in many aspects is typical of the cases requiring determination of the substantive issue to be determined: the proper interpretation of Section 103 of the Divorce Code of 1980, specifically the meaning of the phrase stating that “upon application granted” a divorce action pending under the Divorce Law of 1929 may proceed under the new Code.
THE FACTS
The marriage in the instant action is a long-term one of some twenty-two years duration. Two children were born and raised during this time. The wife has functioned as housewife and has also held occasional short-term jobs, but she has no skills at present that would produce a steady, adequate income. The husband, in contrast, earns more than fifty thousand dollars per year and has significant other assets in his own name. Both parties have an entire-ties interest in the marital home.
The husband initiated the divorce action in January of 1979, and the wife contested his entitlement to a divorce on the grounds that her conduct sprang from mental illness and thus did not constitute indignities. There was no counterclaim.
*519Master’s hearings were held, and on April 2, 1980,1 the Master filed his report recommending that a decree in divorce be granted. Exceptions were taken to the recommendation of the Master, and in early July, while the matter was still pending, the appellant petitioned for transfer to the 1980 Code.
The court below denied the petition after review of the record, and the wife appealed that decision to this court. The husband then filed a Motion to Quash, which was denied.
Despite the appeal of the wife from denial of her petition to proceed under the new code, the lower court entered a final decree in divorce on September 4, 1980. Wife appealed that Order as well. The two appeals were considered and were argued before this court en banc on April 22, 1981. The case thus presents three issues on appeal: whether the final decree of divorce is valid; whether the denial of the petition to proceed under the Code of 1980 is interlocutory; whether the trial court was correct in its decision that the wife’s petition for use of the 1980 Code should be denied. The short answer to all the above issues is no; the trial court in this initial incursion into new territory held incorrectly. This concurring opinion will discuss the first two issues briefly and the third issue at length.
THE DIVORCE DECREE
The issuance of a final decree in divorce in this action was clearly improper. As the majority has noted, an order of the court denying an application as interlocutory does not empower the court below to enter a decree while the appeal is pending. The validity of the appeal is a question for the appellate court. Therefore, the divorce decree entered in this action must be vacated.
*520THE INTERLOCUTORY ISSUE
I also join in the reasoning of the majority that it was error for the lower court to find the appellant’s petition an issue which was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. The reasoning of the majority opinion is sound; the wife in these circumstances is effectively out-of-court on those issues which can only be presented under the new code.
Her defense from a divorce recommendation under the Law of 1929 could not include introduction of claims of her own as to equitable distribution of property or alimony, as these claims are non-existent under former law. Conversely, proof of marital misconduct, which is of enormous importance under the Law of 1929,2 is but a single factor among fourteen others in determining any right to alimony and is irrelevant to equitable division of property.
The majority states the matter clearly: the lower court’s denial of the wife’s application “did not put appellant completely out of court, for she remains in court to defend appellee’s claim to a divorce under the Divorce Law. However, so far as appellant’s own claims under the Divorce Code are concerned, the order did put appellant completely out-of-court, for it completely deprived her of her day in court on those claims.”
Therefore, the decision of the lower court that the appeal was interlocutory and not immediately appealable was error, and this court may review the issue before the rendering of a final decision of the lower court in this action.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 103
I concur in the result of the holding of the majority: Mrs. Gordon should be permitted to proceed with the divorce case under the provisions of the Divorce Code of 1980. I reach *521that conclusion, however, by reasoning from somewhat different premises. I would note, but would not stress, analysis of language taken from former divorce laws, which in one case is outdated, and in another case, was never enacted by the Legislature. Also, although I do agree with the analysis of Section 103 under the provisions of Section 102 of the Divorce Code, as will be seen in the discussion infra, I would broaden the base of inquiry to include other sources of light for interpretation. Specifically, prior divorce procedure, the legislative debates, and statutory instruction on the general problem of statutory construction are relevant to the result I reach.
The interpretation of statutory law is guided by the provisions in Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Title I, as set forth below:
Sec. 1921. Legislative Intent Controls.
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
This opinion will regard section 103 of the Divorce Code in the light of these directives.
*522A search of the Code itself, and of legislative history, for direct discussion of the phrase “upon application granted” proves fruitless. However, examination of “plain meaning” brings results, and these can be amplified by resort to examination of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, former law and procedure, and the other dictates of Sec. 1921(c).
INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Since legislative intent controls in the interpretation of statutes, the focus of argument must be to determine the desires of the General Assembly.
The first line of attack for statutory interpretation remains a consideration of the plain meaning of the words of the statute. Clearly, if the words of Sec. 103 were free from all ambiguity, the matter would not have been presented to this court en banc. Even so, examination of the words themselves yields considerable insight into the intent of the legislature.
Section 103, which contains the phrase to be considered, and which is also intended to provide general information as to the construction of the entire Divorce Code, is set forth below in its entirety:
Sec. 103. Construction.
The provisions of this act, so far as they are the same as those of existing laws, are intended as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments. The provisions of this act shall apply to all cases, whether the cause for divorce or annulment arose prior or subsequent to enactment of this act. The provisions of this act shall not effect any suit or action pending, but the same may be proceeded with and concluded either under the laws in existence when such suit or action was instituted, notwithstanding the repeal of such laws by this act, or, upon application granted, under the provisions of this act. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any case in which a decree has been rendered prior to the effective date of the act. This act shall not affect any *523marital agreement executed prior to the effective date of this act or any amendment or modification thereto, (emphasis supplied).
A shortened form of the statement supra can be construed which, without distortion, states that “the provisions of this act shall apply to all cases, whether the cause for divorce . . . arose prior or subsequent to enactment . . . any suit .. . pending . .. may be . . . concluded either under the laws in existence when such suit . . . was instituted ... or, upon application granted, under the provisions of this act.” The language undeniably contemplates that actions begun under the prior law may be proceeded with under either the old statute or the new. Only the single phrase “upon application granted” presents an ambiguity.
A sensible application of the words to the circumstances surrounding its enactment, per Sec. 1921 supra at (c)(2), brings forcibly to mind the thousands of outstanding divorce cases pending under former law and the futility of demanding that all parties amend to conform with the new code. Unnecessary paperwork for the judicial system and increased expense for couples merely processing an uncontested divorce through former channels are two undesirable results that the scheme of Sec. 102 avoids.
On the other hand, where a party wished to avail himself of the protection of the new provisions—a clearly permitted option—some orderly process would be needed to inform all parties and the judicial system that an election has been made for change of law. A simple solution is for one party to make application to the court, which in turn acknowledges the decision with an order granting the request. These documents, when docketed, act as notice for an orderly change to the Divorce Code. This was the method chosen by the Legislature.
It is arguable that the wording implies a court decision, not a pro forma response. Indeed, wording simply providing that a party could “elect” to proceed under the Code would have appeared to be a possibility, bypassing court approval completely. However, our courts have always held a tight *524rein on the procedures governing marriage and divorce. Under former practice, for instance, plaintiff’s counsel could not even discontinue a divorce action without court approval, although this is a routine procedure in other civil cases.3
Requirement of an application to the court is certainly in line with prior custom and is relevant to interpretation under 1921(c)(5). Legal tradition demands direct court control of procedure in divorce; that tradition can, and apparently has, remained unchanged in the face of enormous substantive differences between prior and present divorce law.
The plain meaning of “upon application granted” does imply some formal exchange between a party who prays a boon and a court which grants that boon, but in light of former practice, an assumption that court discretion should ordinarily extend beyond a weighing of minor jurisdictional averments would be reading too much into the phrase.
The plain words of the statute also expressly provide a method for construing the provisions of the Code:
Sec. 102(b): The objectives set forth in Section 102(a) shall be considered in construing provisions of this act and shall be regarded as expressing the legislative intent.
The Legislature clearly intended its own findings to be the basis of attempts to construe the Code. It is impossible to read an intent that individual judges use their own discretion in construing the directives of the statute, or even that in the process of trial and appeal the judicial system in its collective wisdom should substitute its discretion for that of the Legislature.
Appellant’s brief suggests that the Legislature might have followed the wording of the Illinois Divorce Law which provided that all cases pending at the time of the effective date were to be decided under provisions of the new Illinois act. It is true that the Illinois solution, among many others, was an available model. It is also true that not a shred of *525evidence exists to show that the Illinois model was ever contemplated by the Legislature or that it has any particular virtue as a practical pattern.4 Indeed, as discussed supra, requiring all outstanding actions to shift to the new Code would appear to promote unwarranted expense and trouble.
A final discussion on the “plain meaning” of the actual words of the statute can be centered around the provisions of Sec. 102(a) which, as we have seen, represent the stated legislative intent and are mandated to be considered in construing the Divorce Code.
This particular argument presents the heart of the matter for interpretation and has therefore been adequately covered by judicial construction several times over in opinions of this court and lower courts. The arg-ument is both central and compelling and will doubtless continue in use for examination of the entire Code. Therefore, in deference to the excellent coverage Sec. 102(a) has already received, I shall offer only a brief review.
The philosophy of the Divorce Code rejects almost completely the assumptions upon which prior Divorce Law was based. Vindication of private rights and punishment of matrimonial wrongs5 has yielded to a primary consideration for family welfare and an articulated concern to mitigate the harm dissolution of a marriage causes to spouses and their offspring.
Appellee’s view that the party seeking to proceed under the Code must “at the very least be free of a claim . . . that substantial harm or detriment would occur if such relief were granted” is simply an example of wishful thinking. The only “substantial harm or detriment” that the legislature had in mind to prevent was the economic injustice listed in Sec. 102. The two concepts, under the instant facts, are simply inconsistent. Vindication of the husband’s private *526wrongs by denying use of the Divorce Code to his wife would prevent a fair and just determination of property rights and a consideration of need and ability to pay alimony.
If the lower court properly limits itself to consideration of the objectives enumerated in Sec. 102(a), which were made a basis for construing the provisions of the act in Sec. 102(b) and designated as applicable in all cases not finally settled by decree or private agreement in Sec. 103, I am compelled to conclude that a court would have very little to weigh in granting the application of a party to proceed under the new code.
If only considerations stated in the act or unavoidably implied by the statute itself or by 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 may be pondered by the trial judge or master, this statute provides no leeway for discussion of court time expended or the private investment of parties in expense or emotional trauma. Legislative history, when examined, supports this view as well.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Appellee implies that legislative history is not relevant to analysis because the phrase “upon application granted” was not specifically debated. I disagree. Certainly debate on the terms of Section 103 was limited, but it was relevant to our present inquiry.
An amendment was proposed for inclusion in that section which provided that the new act “shall not affect any marital agreement executed prior to the effective date of this act . . .. ” In explanation of this choice of words, the sponsor drew a parallel to the provision that a final decree in divorce entered before the effective date acts as a bar to the use of the new act:
“.. . the intent of this part of the amendment is to treat those matters that have been settled, either in court or out of court, as settled, and not allow parties to open them up.” Legislative Journal Vol. 1, No. 67, Sept. 25,1979, pp. 1825-1826 (emphasis supplied).
*527Further, the sponsor re-emphasized that awards of alimony and equitable distribution would be made only in conjunction with the granting of the decree in divorce under the new code. Id. at 1826. The amendment passed without opposition, id. at 1827, so we may assume that the legislature endorsed this wholeheartedly. The language was appended just below the wording making a final decree a bar to use of the new Code.
The legislator’s choice of language validates the converse of his proposition as equally true: matters not settled are not settled, and awards of alimony and equitable distribution, tied irrevocably to a decree in divorce under the new code, are not determined either, absent final decree of divorce.6
Repeatedly, the legislators emphasized the antiquity of the divorce laws of the Commonwealth. The House sponsor characterized Pennsylvania as having
“.. . the distinction of having the worst Divorce Code in the entire nation. It has the most unfair law and it offers the least protection to an economically dependent spouse.” Legislative Journal, House, Sept. 26, 1979, p. 1851.
Although the former law was officially dated “1929”, its philosophical base had been essentially unchanged for almost two hundred years. The Senate sponsor, in an impassioned plea to decide a complete package now and not to defer controversial provisions “to some nebulous future airing”, remarked:
“Rarely, Mr. President, do we have a major law or code so utterly antiquated—we have not changed it since 1784 —and so universally condemned, awaiting our attention.” Legislative Journal, Senate, March 10, 1980, p. 1369.
Further, the sponsor pointed out that the relative rarity of contested divorces under old law was attributable to the fact that they were hugely expensive, rarely successful, and “vicious, vitriolic, scheming, vindictive and every other ad*528jective that one would want to apply to the situation.” In contrast, he endorsed the expenditure of court time on settlement of property matters: “the courts should be dealing with those situations rather than contested divorce actions .. . and having those [contested actions] take the time of the court or a master . . . . ” Id. at 1370. The emphasis is unmistakably at odds with any argument that judicial economy is a valuable consideration when contrasted with economic justice.
The sponsors were far from alone in these views. Debate by legislators of all political persuasions and in both houses expressed concern for economic justice between the parties, emphasizing of course the plight of the dependent spouse left with the wreckage of a marriage and very little else, but also reflecting concern for the supporting spouse as well.
The theme of immediate need for just economic provisions was so general and so oft-repeated as to make selection of a sampling of representative statements for the body of this opinion a difficulty.7
*529Yet another facet of the legislative findings that becomes clear during a reading of the legislative debates is the lack of rancor felt toward parties for behavior in manipulating the law of 1929.8 Emphasis was upon economic justice and the two new claims available to effectuate that justice. No disapproval was expressed toward parties for techniques used in battles under the law of 1929. In fact, one of those “realities of matrimonial experience” causing greatest “harm” to the family under former law was repeatedly emphasized in debate to be the unavoidability of bitter, protracted, and perjured actions. The evil was perceived as inherent in the former system of law, and not as attributable to the evil nature of one or the other of the parties.
Therefore, while the expenses of in-fighting under the former law, as clearly set forth in the record of the action, would certainly be applicable to an adjustment of the equities in distribution,9 those expenses should not be “chalked-up” to the detriment of one party or the other at the discretion of individual judges as a means to permit or deny the use of the new code.10
The legislative history on the Code does amplify the meaning of the plain words of the statute as reduced to writing, despite the lack of discussion of the phrase “upon application granted.” The legislators regarded the manipulations of parties under prior law as the fault of the law *530itself, which vitiates appellee’s argument that his detriment under prior procedure should weigh in his favor.
Similarly, references to judicial economy were sparse, but the indications certainly favor a view that court time was not begrudged for settlement of concerns of “economic justice”, although lengthy fault actions were deplored.11 Only “settled” matters were deemed “settled.” 12 Legislative history does not support the view that any fixed point along the progress of the action could be chosen as the decisive factor in whether to grant or deny an application.
CUSTOMARY PROCEDURE
Earlier in this opinion I briefly discussed the fact that our judicial system has always kept a “tight rein” on the procedure of divorce cases. The usual procedure of the courts can be useful to analysis of the problem presented by Sec. 103 in yet another instance.
There is no provision in the new code for “Petition and Rule to Show Cause” nor is any “hearing” mandated to be scheduled on the matter.13 The lack of specific provision for a Rule would not necessarily militate against its use. The court in McCormick’s Contested Election, 281 Pa. 281, 126 A. 568 (1924) concluded as follows:
“The custom of allowing rules to show cause even when not expressly provided for, is well-established in Pennsylvania.” Id., 281 Pa. at 285, 126 A. 568.
The lack of a specific provision for a hearing on the matter, however, does have an important impact on a party’s right to demand one as “due process.” The McCormick court found that the lower court judge was correct in “insisting on strict adherence to statutory requirements,” one of which, under the facts of McCormick, was that the statute provided that “upon petition” the court was to *531“appoint a suitable time for a hearing ...” Id. 281 Pa. at 284, 126 A. 568.
The Divorce Code does not provide in its terms for “Petition and Rule to Show Cause”, as some statutes and Rules do.14 More importantly, however, the Code itself does not provide for “hearing” on the matter. The legislators were not naive on the uses of due process, which they discussed in other contexts,15 and I conclude that the court review contemplated in Section 103 does not reach the level of a hearing on the matter.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of Section 103 and especially of the wording “upon application granted” can be reasonably made in terms of the statute itself, traditional procedure in divorce, and study of the legislative debates. I conclude that court *532review was intended, but that such review by no means mandates a hearing. Where cursory review under the considerations set forth in Section 102 leaves a lower court with any doubt that legislative intent would be furthered by granting of the application, a hearing could be requested to clarify the record. This would be rare indeed, perhaps as rare as hearing and denial of a petition for discontinuance under the Law of 1929.
I am not, however, prepared to agree with Judge Popovich that an application must be granted pro forma upon the application of a party. The actual facts of cases have a seemingly endless capacity to present situations that could never be anticipated. The wording of “upon application granted” does imply review.
For all of the above reasons, I would reverse- the divorce decree, hold the denial of appellant’s petition to be appealable, and find the lower court in error in its decision not to permit Mrs. Gordon to transfer this action to the Divorce Code of 1980.

. By an interesting coincidence, the date of filing of the Master’s Report was also the date upon which the Legislature passed the Divorce Code of 1980, to take effect on July 1, 1980.

. Under the Law of 1929, marital misconduct entitled the innocent and injured spouse to absolute divorce and put an end to any possibility of support. Where the parties were only separated or divorced a mensa et thoro, the ongoing duty of support was ordinarily terminated upon proof of adultery on the part of the recipient spouse.

. See discussion at 1 Goodrich-Amram 2d 229:8 and cases cited therein.

. Judge Spaeth’s opinion points out that the roots of the wording chosen lie in the tradition of this Commonwealth’s own divorce law drafting.

. Fault is retained as one ground of divorce, however, and is one of fourteen factors to be considered in awards of alimony.

. A final decree in partition of property, like an executed property agreement, would appear to be “a matter settled.” There may be other instances of this sort to be considered under future facts.

. This annotation will therefore set forth a few quotations in an attempt to convey the flavor of the spontaneous speeches of the legislators in support of the official “intent and purposes.”
(1) “Dependent spouses with serious grounds for divorce but no economic protection under current law would be able to free themselves from intolerable situations without being reduced to poverty.” September 25, 1979 at p. 1830.
(2) “... I see people right next door to me where the woman is going to be exploited. That poor woman has given her whole life to a man having no possibility of making a proper living and she is being thrown over for a young frill who seduced her husband ...” September 25, 1979, pp. 1834-1835.
(3) “I submit to you that recognition of this law is not in fact an encouragement of the breakdown of the moral fabric ... but rather the recognition of a social reality and the granting of the economic security that a dependent spouse has so woefully sought through the centuries that this decrepit divorce law under which we not operate has been in existence. September 25, 1979 at 1849.
(4) Here is a man in his late thirties, and for whatever reasons he has found life at home intolerable .... Four years later he is paying 55 percent of his net income to this woman with whom he is not living. October 16, 1979 at p. 2035.
(5) We see justice in terms of the appropriate settlements of rights and responsibilities____ Our goal is that both parties can make the best of a future apart from each other. March 10, 1980, p. 1367.

. This is not to be confused with attitudes toward marital misconduct leading to need for use of either Divorce Law. Legislators were often deeply condemnatory of bad behavior during the ongoing marriage.

. Where one spouse has borne all expenses of litigation, or where one has greatly prolonged the process with frivolous issues, Sec. 401(d)(7) may make these contributions and dissipations of the marital property by the respective spouses relevant to an equitable distribution.

. An instance of this viewpoint is set forth as an example:
“For those of you who do not know anything about contested divorces ... the scars rarely heal. It is the adversary system of justice that is most painful. It is a raw, searing battle that some commentators have likened to guerrilla warfare. The rancor and bitterness ... almost guarantees the scaring [sic] of children .... Is that what we want to do? I do not think that we do.” Legislative Journal, House, September 25, 1977, p. 1832.

. See this opinion supra, above Note # 7.

. See this opinion supra, above Note #6.

. In contrast, § 201(d)(1) mandates a hearing where either party objects to the three-year unilateral divorce provision.

. For instance, Rules of Civil Procedure 3110, 2352, 2353 all specifically mention this procedure as proper.

. See Note 13, Supra. For instance, the legislators debated lack of a hearing on unilateral termination of a marriage at great length. Eventually, safeguards were provided for due process in the form of hearings relating to that portion of the statute. The legislators were fully aware of the value of hearings as necessary for due process in protection of “fundamental” rights—and apparently did not consider a mere change-of-law “fundamental”.
Due process does require notice and opportunity to be heard where property rights are at issue, Commonwealth ex rel. Ryan v. Rundel, 411 Pa. 613, 192 A.2d 362 (1963). The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends on the presence of a legitimate “property” interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
It is axiomatic, however, that a change in law must prove detrimental to the interests of a certain number of the people affected by the change. Courts in the past have faced similar challenges by parties who lose a favored position when “the rules change,” and have held that an individual cannot have vested property rights in having “the law remain unchanged for his benefit.” Middleton v. Texas Light and Power Co., 249 U.S. 152, 163, 39 S.Ct. 227, 231, 63 L.Ed. 527 (1918).
The legislature might have provided appellant and others like him with the right to a hearing and a judicial determination of equities in this particular matter, but it did not choose to do so and that decision was not unconstitutional.