Court Opinion

ID: 9841147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 15:05:23.007097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:49.430638
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221825

                                                                             FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                Opinion filed: September 21, 2023

                                 No. 1-22-1825
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                        FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )       Appeal from the
                                                            )       Circuit Court of
            Respondent-Appellee,                            )       Cook County
                                                            )
                                                            )
v.                                                          )       No. 12 CR 15690 (01)
                                                            )
                                                            )
JERMALLE BROWN.                                             )       Honorable
                                                            )       Sophia Atcherson,
            Petitioner-Appellant.                           )       Judge, Presiding.

       JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                           OPINION

¶1     The petitioner, Jermalle Brown (hereinafter referred to as the “defendant”), appeals from

an order of the circuit court of Cook County, denying him leave to file a successive postconviction

petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). For

the reasons which follow, we affirm.
No. 1-22-1825

¶2     The defendant was charged with first-degree murder under a felony murder theory, the

underlying felony being home invasion. The evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial established

that he and several accomplices entered Dondra Sharkey’s apartment on East 73rd Street in

Chicago on July 25, 2012. One of the accomplices, Douglas Bufford, entered the apartment armed

with a revolver. Another accomplice, Dominique Harris, was armed with a shotgun. Harris ordered

Sharkey to get up and stand by the refrigerator. As Sharkey stood up and began walking to the

kitchen, the shotgun Harris was holding discharged, striking Bufford. Bufford died as a result of

the wound.

¶3     The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and home invasion, and the trial

court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial

court erred in permitting the jury to view a video of him making gang sign hand gestures while in

police custody. This court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Brown,

2018 IL App (1st) 151377-U.

¶4     On December 14, 2018, the defendant filed a petition seeking relief under the Act, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel. That petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court, and

this court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Brown, 2021 IL App (1st) 190705-U.

¶5     On December 1, 2021, the defendant, acting pro se, filed a pleading entitled “Notice of

Recapitulation under a Successive Post Conviction Petition.” The document requested that the

circuit court reduce his sentence because he was “not fully matured and psychologically scarred”

when he committed the offences for which he was convicted. The document states that:

       1. “Petitioner wishes to argue ‘fundamental Fairness’ based under the clause of

             Petitioner’s mental capacity at the commission of his participation in the crime he was

             arrested for.

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No. 1-22-1825

       2. Petitioner, Jermalle Brown, was not the initiated person that actually performed the act

           that led to the death of Douglass Bufford.

       3. Petitioner did not personally inflict an injury during the course of an underlying felony

           of a violent crime.

       4. Petitioner was young at the time and under the age of 21, thereby, showing that he was

           immature and his brain was not fully developed, as it is now.

       5. Petitioner, Jermalle Brown, states, ‘in looking back in retrospect, he has regrets and

           remorse, regardless of who was the initiation. However, petitioner, at the time of his

           arrest in this case was under zeitgeist conditions of peer pressure and broken cultural

           aspects of gang life” (sic).

The circuit court construed the document as a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition. For ease of analysis, and because that appears to reflect the defendant’s likely intention,

we too will refer to the document as motion for leave to file.

¶6     On October 28, 2022, the circuit court denied the defendant leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, finding that his pleading was frivolous and patently without merit. The

circuit court also found that the defendant failed to allege facts supporting either cause for failing

to raise his claims in his initial postconviction petition or prejudice. This appeal followed.

¶7     In urging reversal of the circuit court’s order denying him leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, the defendant argues that he made a prima facie showing of both cause

and prejudice for having failed to raise his constitutional claims in his initial postconviction

petition. We disagree.

¶8     Under the Act, a defendant may raise claims that his conviction or sentence violates the

United States or Illinois Constitutions. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21; see also People

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No. 1-22-1825

v. Wimberly, 2022 IL App (1st) 211464, ¶ 5. The language of the Act and the cases interpreting it

make clear that only a single postconviction proceeding is contemplated under the Act. See

Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22. Issues not raised in an initial petition are waived and the bar to

successive petitions is relaxed only where the defendant can establish “cause and prejudice” for

failing to raise the claim earlier or where there has been a “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

based on actual innocence. Id. ¶¶ 21–23; see also People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42. The

defendant must make a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice. People v. Bailey, 2017

IL 121450, ¶ 24. “Both elements of the test must be met for a defendant to overcome section

122-3’s waiver provision or to establish fundamental fairness for relaxing the res judicata

doctrine.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47. The Act defines “cause” as “an objective factor

that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction

proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). The Act states that a defendant shows prejudice

by “demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings

so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” Id. At the leave-

to-file stage, a defendant “ ‘is not required to make the “substantial showing” that will later be

required at a second-stage hearing after counsel is appointed.’ ” Wimberly, 2022 IL App (1st)

211464, ¶ 5 (quoting People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 20). Instead, “ ‘leave of court

to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied only where it is clear from a review

of the petition and attached documentation that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot set forth

a colorable claim.’ ” Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Sanders, 2016 IL

118123, ¶ 24). We review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo.

Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39.

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No. 1-22-1825

¶9     In his brief, the defendant argues that his pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition asserted a claim that his 30-year sentence violated the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, sec. 11). He contends that he

alleged that “his sentence was disproportionate because he was convicted under a theory of felony

murder” and that, “[i]n light of the evolution of Illinois law regarding the felony murder, *** [he]

has demonstrated cause for [failing to raise] his claim” in his initial postconviction petition. The

evolution on which the defendant relies is the 2021 amendment to the felony murder statute (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2021); P.A. 101-652, § 10-216 (eff. July 1, 2021)).

¶ 10   The State argues that the defendant never made a proportionate penalties claim before the

circuit court based on the 2021 amendment to the felony murder statute and, therefore, cannot raise

the claim for the first time on appeal. The State contends that the only claim that the defendant

raised before the circuit court was a claim based on his youth and lack of maturity at the time of

the commission of the home invasion for which he was convicted, the fact that his brain was not

fully developed, and his limited involvement in the acts leading to Bufford’s death.

¶ 11   In determining whether a petitioner has satisfied the statutory requirements for leave to file

a successive postconviction petition, the cause-and-prejudice test is applied to each claim

individually. As noted earlier, “cause” is some objective factor that impeded the petitioner’s ability

to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)

(West 2020).

¶ 12   We will first address the factual assertions in the defendant’s pro se motion referencing his

age, lack of maturity, and brain development. When the defendant was sentenced in 2015 and

when he filed his initial postconviction petition in 2018, “Illinois law recognized the special status

of young adults, especially those subject to adverse influences, for purposes of applying the

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No. 1-22-1825

principles of the proportionate penalties clause.” See People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42. As

was the case in Moore, the defendant in this case had the “essential legal tools” to raise his

sentencing claims based on age, lack of maturity, and brain development when he filed his initial

postconviction petition. Id. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant did not, and cannot, satisfy

the cause requirement necessary for leave to file a successive postconviction challenge to his

sentence based on age, maturity, or brain development. Having found that the defendant failed to

establish cause for not having raised such a claim in his initial postconviction petition, we need

not address the question of whether he made a showing of prejudice.

¶ 13   The defendant’s pro se motion also references the fact that he did not shoot Bufford, or

injure anyone, during the course of the underlying home invasion. These facts were known by the

defendant both at the time that he filed his direct appeal and at the time that he filed his initial

postconviction petition. The defendant failed to raise an issue on direct appeal addressed to the

length of his sentence in light of his limited involvement in the underlying offense. Any issue that

could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and cannot form the basis for

postconviction relief. See People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22; People v. Ligon, 239 Ill. 2d

94, 103 (2010).

¶ 14    We are left with the issue of whether the defendant’s pro se motion set forth a claim that,

in light of the recent changes to the felony murder statute, his 30-year sentence for first-degree

murder under a felony murder theory violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution. The defendant argues that he “should be granted leave to file his successive petition

where he raised a proportionate penalties claim regarding his 30-year sentence for felony murder

on the basis that he did not personally inflict harm where the legislature recently changed the

felony murder rule and where the record contains significant mitigation.” The defendant contends

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No. 1-22-1825

that, although “the recent change to the felony murder rule does not explicitly apply to the situation

here – where an accomplice accidentally killed another accomplice – [,] the legislature’s rejection

of the old ‘proximate cause theory’ suggests that the current felony murder rule has much stricter

application.” Contrary to the State’s argument, the defendant contends that he raised the issue

before the circuit court by asserting that his sentence violated “fundamental fairness.” We disagree.

¶ 15   In his pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the defendant

raised “fundamental fairness” in relation to his mental capacity claim, not in relation to any claim

based on his limited involvement in the underlying home invasion. Assuming for the sake of

analysis that one could interpret the defendant’s invocation of “fundamental fairness” as being

related to his limited role in the underlying home invasion, the fact remains that he made no

assertion in his motion that his 30-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution based upon the amendment to the felony murder statute. Issues that were not

raised before the circuit court or in the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See People v. Jones, 213 Ill.

2d 498, 508–09 (2004). We also find that, had the defendant made such a claim, it would have

been frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 16   The amended version of section 9-1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 2012 on which the

defendant relies provides that:

                “(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first

       degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:

                (3) he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or attempts

       to commits forcible felony other than second degree murder, and in the course of or in

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No. 1-22-1825

       furtherance of such a crime or flight therefrom, he or she or another participant causes the

       death of a person.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2021).

¶ 17   The crime of home invasion of which the defendant was convicted is a forcible felony. See

720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2010). During the course of the home invasion, Bufford died as the result

of a gunshot fired by Harris, a coparticipant in the home invasion with the defendant. As the State

correctly contends, the defendant’s “conduct was criminal and falls squarely within the definition

of felony murder both at the time of the offense and now.” Nothing in the recent amendment to

section 9-1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides the defendant with a claim for relief under

the Act based on the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 18     For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying the defendant

leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

¶ 19   Affirmed.

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No. 1-22-1825

                   People v. Jermalle Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 221825

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
                           12 CR 15690 (01), Honorable Sophia Atcherson.
                           Judge, presiding.

Attorneys for Appellant:   Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender
                           Chan Woo Yoon, Asst Appellate Defender
                           Office of the State Appellate Defender
                           203 N. LaSalle St., 24th Floor
                           Chicago IL 60601
                           (312) 814-5472
Attorneys for Appellee:    Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney of Cook County
                           Enrique Abraham, Matthew Connors, Zachary M. Slavens –
                           Asst. State’s Attorneys, Of Counsel
                           309 Richard J. Daley Center
                           Chicago, IL 60602
                           (312) 603-5496

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