Court Opinion

ID: 9911172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 17:03:36.747511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:20.242240
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Dec 19 2023, 8:47 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Alexander N. Moseley                                      Zachary J. Stock
Matthew C. McConnell                                      Carmel, Indiana
Dixon & Moseley, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gerard M. Dierckman,                                      December 19, 2023
Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-DN-2801
        v.
                                                          Appeal from the Decatur Circuit
                                                          Court
Sandra E. Dierckman,
                                                          The Honorable James D.
Appellee-Petitioner.                                      Humphrey, Special Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause Nos.
                                                          15C01-2103-CB-13
                                                          16C01-1912-DN-758

                                  Opinion by Judge Bailey
                                Judges May and Felix concur.

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                          Page 1 of 25
      Case Summary
[1]   The marriage of Gerard Dierckman (“Husband”) and Sandra Dierckman

      (“Wife”) was dissolved by a Decree of Dissolution and Judgment dated

      October 26, 2022. Husband appeals the final dissolution order as it relates to

      the marital property.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issues
[3]   Husband raises five issues which we consolidate and restate as the following

      four issues:

              I.       Whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

              II.      Whether the trial court erred in the valuation dates it chose
                       for the marital assets, i.e., real estate, farm income, farm
                       inventory, and accounts receivable.

              III.     Whether the trial court erred in valuing the marital debt as
                       of the date of the petition for dissolution.

              IV.      Whether the trial court erroneously reduced Wife’s
                       equalization payment by the amount Wife paid Husband
                       for his personal expenses incurred during the dissolution
                       proceedings.

      Facts and Procedural History

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023        Page 2 of 25
[4]   Husband and Wife were married in 1987. They have four grown sons born of

      the marriage. Over the course of the marriage, Husband and Wife acquired

      farmland in Rush and Decatur Counties. Title to some of the land was

      acquired through litigation with Husband’s family, and some of the land was

      purchased. All the land was held jointly by Husband and Wife as a sole

      proprietorship.

[5]   Husband, Wife, their four sons, and, periodically, farm employees operated the

      parties’ farm year-round. The parties’ sons worked on the farm throughout

      their childhoods, and Wife was “the primary bookkeeper” who “pa[id] the bills,

      … t[ook] care of the financing, … secure[d] the operating l[oans],” and

      obtained contracts for crop sales and deliveries. Tr. v. II at 68. Wife also

      hauled grain during harvest season, “ran the grain elevator,” Tr. v. II at 223,

      and “ran the planter,” Tr. v. III at 113.

[6]   When the sons grew into adults and stopped helping on the farm, Husband and

      Wife began to experience difficulty running the farm. The sons became

      estranged from Husband due to the “rude, mean, aggressive, sporadic, erratic,

      crazy manner [with which] he handled himself with the boys, with grain buyers,

      [and] with machinery dealers.” Tr. v. II at 222. Husband and Wife became

      “more financially strapped” and had difficulty securing financing. Id. at 61. In

      March 2018, the parties secured a two-year line of credit from Citizen’s Union

      Bank just in time to buy that year’s farming inputs.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023     Page 3 of 25
[7]   In October 2018, Husband was arrested and charged with strangulation and

      domestic battery of Wife. Following a jury trial, Husband was found guilty of

      strangulation, pled guilty to the domestic battery charge, and was sentenced to a

      year in jail. At the time of Husband’s arrest, there were still crops in the fields,

      and the parties’ sons helped Wife harvest the remaining crops. Following

      Husband’s release from jail, he was initially excluded from the farm pursuant to

      a no-contact order. That order was later modified to allow Husband to access

      only the farm but not the residence located on the farm.

[8]   The parties’ attempts to reconcile failed, and in December 2019, Wife filed her

      Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. The parties’ sons, along with their wives,

      continued to help Wife with operating the farm, and Wife also helped the sons

      with their own farms. In retaliation for Wife’s refusal to “drop the divorce,”

      Husband refused to provide his necessary participation to extend the Citizen’s

      Union Bank operating line of credit for the farm for the year 2020. Tr. v. II at

      73. Therefore, the line of credit was not extended, but farm mortgage payments

      were still due.

[9]   The trial court held a provisional hearing on February 27, 2020, at which both

      parties testified. Wife testified that she had obtained an agreement with Agri

      Business Finance (“ABF”) for a new operating loan, provided that she gave

      them proof of a provisional order allowing her exclusive use and possession of

      the farm operations pending a final dissolution order. Addam Carmony, a loan

      officer with ABF, also testified and affirmed that ABF would provide an

      operating loan to Wife if she obtained a provisional order giving her exclusive

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023       Page 4 of 25
       use and possession of the farm. Carmony did not “want to work with

       [Husband] at that time.” Tr. v. IV at 36. Husband testified that he agreed to

       Wife having provisional exclusive rights to the farm so that the farm did not

       “go broke or have to file bankruptcy.” Provisional Hearing Tr. at 34-35.1

[10]   On March 4, 2020, the trial court entered a provisional order granting Wife

       exclusive use, possession, and control of the “marital real estate”—which

       included the farm and farming equipment—pending a final determination on

       dissolution. App. v. II at 43. Wife was also ordered to “timely pay the

       monthly mortgage, taxes[,] and insurance.” Id. The provisional order also

       directed Wife to use any new operating loan “consistent with past practices

       which includes the payment of personal expenses … for both Husband and

       Wife.” Id. Each party was also restrained from “selling, removing,

       encumbering, transferring, destroying, concealing, or otherwise interfering with

       the parties’ assets” during pending proceedings. Id. However, the order stated

       that it did “not preclude Wife from continuing to operate the farm as outlined

       above.” Id.

[11]   Since March 2020, Wife has been solely legally responsible for the operation of

       the parties’ 1,500-acre farm, including making all decisions, managing the farm

       finances, maintaining the ABF line of credit, and delivering grain. Wife has

       1
          The transcript of the provisional hearing is not included in the record on appeal, but we accessed it via the
       trial court records contained in the Odyssey court case management system under Cause Number 16C01-
       1912-DN-758.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                                Page 5 of 25
       also maintained good working relationships with her sons, who assist her with

       the farm operations and anticipate continuing to do so. However, three of the

       parties’ sons testified that the sons would not work with Husband if he were

       awarded the farming operations because they “can’t get along” with him due to

       his verbal abuse. Tr. v. IV at 79.

[12]   While the dissolution proceedings were pending, Wife used proceeds from the

       farming operation to pay down the parties’ marital debts. As of October 2021,

       Wife had reduced the debts by $941,728.17, and by August 2022, Wife had

       increased the debt reduction to $1,260,563.04. During the dissolution

       proceedings, Wife also used farm proceeds to pay Husband $70,393.00 for his

       personal expenses.

[13]   The final dissolution hearings took place over the course of seven days between

       October 2021 and August 2022. Both parties submitted certified appraisals of

       the marital real estate. Wife’s appraisal valued the total real estate at

       $15,516,222.00 as of October 2020; Husband’s appraisal valued the total real

       estate at $15,436,000.00 as of January 2021. The only income included in each

       parties’ appraisal was $183,000 from the sale of part of the farmland. Neither

       party provided an updated appraisal or expert testimony regarding market

       appreciation of the real estate while the dissolution proceedings were pending.

[14]   On October 26, 2022, the trial court issued its final order, which included

       specific findings. The trial court held that, per the Wife’s agreement, the

       parties’ marital estate would be divided evenly between them, even though

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023       Page 6 of 25
       there was some evidence that might support an unequal distribution in Wife’s

       favor. Because each party provided only one appraisal of the real estate, their

       respective appraisals were conducted within a four-month period of each other,

       and there was only a “negligible” difference between each party’s appraisal, the

       trial court found it “just and reasonable to use the … average of the [two]

       appraised values as the total value of the real estate.” Appealed Order at 4.

       Thus, the court entered a real estate value of $15,476.111.00.

[15]   Wife submitted an appraisal of $1,380,220.00 as the value of the farm

       equipment as of December 3, 2020. Husband did not submit any appraisal of

       the farm equipment.2 The court valued the marital debts, inventory, accounts

       receivable, and bank accounts as of the date the dissolution petition was filed,

       i.e., December 2019.

[16]   After noting Husband’s bad relationships with Wife, the parties’ sons, and

       “lenders and vendors” and his poor behavior during the course of the

       dissolution proceedings, the trial court nevertheless stated that it “did not

       consider fault as a factor in dividing this marital estate.” Id. at 6. Rather,

       because Wife provided some “evidence of her ability to refinance the secured

       debt and to make an equalization payment to Husband” but Husband did not

       do the same, the trial court found it “just and reasonable to award all real estate

       2
         Regarding farm equipment, Husband only submitted a list of equipment with certain values attributed to
       each item. The source of the alleged values is not indicated, nor did Husband provide testimony regarding
       the source of those alleged values. See Ex. BB, Ex. v. IV at 43.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                          Page 7 of 25
       to Wife along with the corresponding secured debt, subject to an equalizing

       payment.” Id. at 7. The court also awarded Wife the value of the farm

       equipment, inventory, accounts receivable, and bank accounts. The court

       ordered Wife to pay husband an equalization payment of “$4,974,222.45 less

       the personal expenses she paid on his behalf [of] $70,393.00, for a net judgment

       of $4,903,829.45.” Id. at 10. Husband now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review
[17]   Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated the standard of review of a trial

       court’s division of a marital estate in a dissolution proceeding.

               An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial
               court’s … division of marital assets. A trial court abuses its
               discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect
               of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or
               if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. When,
               like here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of
               law, an appellate court may set aside the trial court’s judgment
               only when clearly erroneous. The party challenging the trial
               court’s division of marital property must overcome a strong
               presumption that the court considered and complied with the
               applicable statute.

       Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022) (quotations and citations

       omitted); see also Crider v. Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

       (noting “that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our

       consideration on appeal”).
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023        Page 8 of 25
[18]   On appeal, we “may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of

       witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial

       court’s disposition of the marital property.” Bringle v. Bringle, 150 N.E.3d 1060,

       1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Moreover, “we will reverse a property

       distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award.” Smith v. Smith, 854

       N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “Although the facts and reasonable

       inferences might allow for a different conclusion, [we] will not substitute [our]

       judgment for that of the trial court on appeal from distribution of marital

       property in dissolution proceedings.” Bringle, 150 N.E.3d at 1073.

       Findings of Fact
[19]   Husband challenges several of the trial court’s specific findings, either as a

       matter of law or as lacking supporting evidence.

       Findings 15 and 16

[20]   Husband maintains that findings 15 and 16 impermissibly consider fault as a

       fact relevant to the distribution of the marital estate. As Husband correctly

       notes, Indiana is a “no-fault divorce” state, and, as such, our “divorce statutes

       do ‘not provide for factoring in any pre- or post-petition conduct of either

       party’” in the disposition of the marital property. Cruz v. Cruz, 186 N.E.3d 152,

       155-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 578 N.E.2d 747, 751 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1991)). Thus, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to consider the

       “fault” of either party as a factor in the distribution of the marital estate. See

       Clark, 578 N.E.2d at 751.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023       Page 9 of 25
[21]   However, here, the trial court did not impermissibly consider “fault”; in fact,

       the court specifically stated that it “did not consider fault as a factor in dividing

       this marital estate.” Appealed Order at 6. Rather, the trial court discussed

       Husband’s poor relationships with Wife, his sons, and the lenders and vendors

       as evidence that it was unlikely that Husband would be able to refinance the

       secured debt and make an equalization payment to Wife if the real estate were

       awarded to him. The fact that Husband’s poor and erratic behavior continued

       during the proceedings is further evidence of his likely continuing inability to

       secure the assistance he would need to take over the farm operations. Findings

       15 and 16 are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous as a

       matter of law.

       Finding 17

[22]   Husband challenges the factual finding that he failed to present evidence of his

       ability to qualify for refinancing of the approximately $5.5 million of debt for

       the farm mortgage and equipment. However, the trial court correctly found

       that Husband’s 2021 income tax return showed that he had a gross income of

       only $2,619.00 that year. See Ex. LL, Ex. v. V at 229. And, unlike Wife,

       Husband did not provide any evidence that he would be approved for an

       adequate loan if the court entered an order giving him exclusive use and

       possession of the property. Rather, Husband merely “testified that he had

       made efforts to speak to the loan officer to secure [such] preapproval” but had

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023      Page 10 of 25
       not actually obtained it. Appellant’s Br. at 16; Tr. v. III at 137-38.3 The trial

       court did not clearly err in finding that was insufficient evidence of an ability to

       secure refinancing.

[23]   Husband asserts that he, “like Wife, would use the land as collateral” to obtain

       such a loan, and that he “has extensive experience in obtaining loans for the

       farmland.” Id., citing Tr. v. IV at 112. However, not only is this an

       impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness

       credibility, but it also lacks support in the record; there is no testimony at the

       cited portion of the transcript discussing Husband’s experience in obtaining

       loans or stating that Husband could use the land as collateral to obtain a loan.

       Findings 18 and 19

[24]   Husband challenges findings 18 and 19 to the extent they find there was no

       evidence supporting deductions from Wife’s portion of the marital estate due to

       alleged “missing grain” or Husband’s “inheritance” of part of the farm.

       Appealed Order at 6-7. Husband alleges there is evidence of missing grain and

       cites to “Tr. Vol. Exhibits Vol. IV, C-O.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. However,

       those exhibits consist of ninety-five pages of documents, and Husband provides

       no specific page citations. That is insufficient citation under Rules 46(A)(8)(a)

       and 22(C) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, and “we will not

       3
         We note that Husband’s brief contains typographical errors that refer to Transcript volume II, rather than
       Transcript volume III. Hereinafter, we simply cite to the correct transcript volume rather than noting
       Husband’s typographical errors.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                           Page 11 of 25
       undertake the burden of combing the record on [Husband’s] behalf.” Clark

       Cnty. Drainage Bd. v. Isgrigg, 963 N.E.2d 9, 19 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); see also

       Ind. Appellate Rule 22(C) (requiring that references to the record on appeal

       “shall be supported by citation to the volume and page where it appears in the

       Appendix, … Transcript or exhibits”).

[25]   Husband also asserts that evidence that Wife increased the profitability of the

       farm is not relevant to whether Husband should be awarded part of the real

       property. However, that is not the purpose for which the trial court cited that

       evidence; it cited the increased profitability as evidence that “financial

       improprieties, … such as selling grain for cash,” were not taking place.

       Appealed Order at 6. And there is no indication that the trial court’s findings

       relied upon loan officer Carmody’s testimony that Wife and sons are not

       “liars,” as Husband claims.4 However, even if it had, Husband is incorrect that

       such testimony would not have been relevant to whether Wife and/or sons

       were hiding income from grain sales.5

[26]   Husband also maintains that there was evidence that he inherited some of the

       real property from his parents, namely, his own testimony; however, his

       4
         We note that Husband misstates the record when he asserts that “Carmody testified that he did believe that
       Wife was hiding grain…;” Carmody’s cited testimony stated the opposite. See Tr. v. IV at 46-47. However,
       given the context, we assume that Husband’s misstatement was merely a typographical error.
       5
         In addition to being relevant, testimony about Wife’s and sons’ characters for truthfulness would be
       admissible under Rule of Evidence 608(a), as Husband had attacked their characters by accusing them of
       stealing and/or hiding grain. And, in any case, Husband did not object at any point to Carmody’s testimony
       and has, therefore, waived the issue on appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                          Page 12 of 25
       testimony was only that he obtained some real property through the settlement

       of a lawsuit, not through inheritance. See Appellant’s Br. at 18; Tr. v. III at 112.

       The trial court’s finding is supported by evidence that the property from

       Husband’s parents was obtained through the settlement of a lawsuit. See Ex.

       57, Ex. v. III at 142.

[27]   The evidence supports trial court findings 17 and 18; Husband’s contentions to

       the contrary are, at best, simply requests that we reweigh the evidence, which

       we will not do.

       Finding 21

[28]   Finally, Husband challenges the finding that “Wife has provided evidence of

       her ability to refinance the secured debt and to make an equalization payment

       to Husband.” Appealed Order at 7. That finding cites Exhibit 55 as support.

       Exhibit 55 is a February 23, 2022, letter from MetLife Investment Management

       which states, in relevant part, that: Wife “inquired about a financing in the

       approximate amount of $11,300,000, secured by real property in Decatur and

       Rush Counties[;]” the bank reviewed the financial information Wife provided

       to it; and “subject to final determination of [Wife’s] division of assets and our

       determination that the proposed collateral meets our loan to value

       requirements, we would be pleased to consider the financing of [Wife’s]

       request.” Ex. v. III at 140.

[29]   Husband asserts that the letter in Exhibit 55 is not sufficient to support finding

       21 because it “simply shows that there is a potential for approval, which is no

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023    Page 13 of 25
       different than the evidence presented by Husband.” Appellant’s Br. at 19.

       Husband’s contention is incorrect. First, Exhibit 55 is, as the court found,

       evidence of Wife’s ability to refinance; the trial court never found that it was

       evidence of a final commitment to lend, nor was such a finding required in

       order to support finding 21. Second, Exhibit 55 is “different than the evidence

       presented by Husband,” because Husband’s only relevant evidence was his

       testimony that he “contacted” and sent financial information to a loan officer at

       Metropolitan Life to secure a refinancing loan but had not heard back from the

       bank yet. Tr. v. III at 138. He testified that he also contacted another bank but

       the loan officer would not “even consider looking at [his] status for

       preapproval” without a divorce decree. Id. at 139. The trial court did not err in

       determining that Husband’s meager evidence is not equivalent to a bank letter

       stating that the bank would be “pleased” to consider granting Wife a loan for

       $11 million, subject to a final determination of the assets. Ex. v. III at 140.

       And we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal.

       Conclusion

[30]   In sum, the challenged trial court findings are supported by the evidence and/or

       not contrary to law.

       Assets in the Marital Estate
[31]   Husband alleges that the trial court erred by excluding from the marital estate

       alleged appreciation of the value of the real estate. Similarly, he asserts the trial

       court erroneously excluded farm inventory, farm accounts receivable, and farm

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023      Page 14 of 25
       income allegedly accrued during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings.

       However, the trial court did not exclude any of those categories from the

       marital pot. See Appealed Order at 10. Thus, Husband’s contentions are really

       a challenge to the trial court’s choice of the dates as of which to value those

       assets.

[32]   Regarding the value of the farmland and income therefrom, Husband asserts

       that the court erred in valuing it as of the end of 2020/beginning of 2021

       because the land allegedly appreciated in value and produced income after that

       date and before the final hearing. Regarding the remaining assets, Husband

       contests the trial court’s decision to value them as of the date the dissolution

       petition was filed—December 2019—rather than some date thereafter that

       would have accounted for additional accounts receivable and alleged

       appreciation of the value of farm inventory.

[33]   In dissolution actions, trial courts are required by statute to divide the marital

       property “in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b).

       “Indiana courts utilize a ‘one-pot’ method for calculating and distributing

       marital property, whereby all property is included in the marital pot and subject

       to division.” Crider, 26 N.E.3d at 1048. The marital pot consists of all

       “property of the parties, whether: (1) owned by either spouse before the

       marriage; (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right … after the

       marriage[] and …before final separation of the parties; or (3) acquired by their

       joint efforts.” I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a). There is a rebuttable statutory presumption

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023     Page 15 of 25
       “that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and

       reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5.

[34]   After identifying the marital assets and debts, the trial court must choose a date

       for setting the value of the marital pot. “Generally, the marital pot closes on

       the day the petition for dissolution is filed.” Goodman v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d

       733, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. However, the trial court “has

       discretion to set any date between the date of filing the dissolution petition and

       the date of the hearing for their valuation.” Id. Further, “there is no

       requirement in [Indiana] law that the valuation date be the same for every

       asset.” Wilson v. Wilson, 732 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans.

       denied.

[35]   As Indiana courts have repeatedly acknowledged, “the date selected for the

       valuation of an asset has the effect of allocating the risk of a change in the

       asset’s value to one party or the other[; however,] this allocation of risk is entrusted

       to the discretion of the trial court.” Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 544, 558 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), trans. denied; see also Quillen

       v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996) (specifically disapproving of the

       Court of Appeals’ holding that a trial court abuses its discretion when it selects

       a valuation date that does not account for changes in value between the date of

       final separation and the final hearing); Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888,

       918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“So long as the date assigned by the trial court is

       between the final separation date and the date of the final hearing and the trial

       court’s allocation of subsequent risk—expressed by the date selected—is not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023        Page 16 of 25
       clearly against the facts and circumstances before the court, we will not find an

       abuse of discretion.”), trans. denied.

[36]   We will affirm a trial court’s valuation if it is within the range of values

       supported by the evidence. Campbell v. Campbell, 118 N.E.3d 817, 821 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019), trans. denied. The “burden of producing evidence as to the value of

       the marital property rests squarely on the shoulders of the parties and their

       attorneys.” Galloway v. Galloway, 855 N.E.2d 302, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)

       (quotation and citation omitted). “A valuation submitted by one of the parties

       is competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution action and may

       alone support the trial court's determination in that regard.” Henderson v.

       Henderson, 139 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotations and citations

       omitted). Moreover, “‘any party who fails to introduce evidence as to the

       specific value of the marital property at a dissolution hearing is estopped from

       appealing the distribution on the ground of trial court abuse of discretion based

       on that absence of evidence.’” Perkins v. Harding, 836 N.E.2d 295, 301 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2005) (quoting In re Marriage of Church, 424 N.E.2d 1078, 1081

       (Ind.Ct.App.1981)).

       Real Estate

[37]   Each party submitted one real estate appraisal of the parties’ farmland, and the

       trial court averaged those two appraisals to decide on the value of the real estate

       as of the end of 2020 (Wife’s appraisal)/beginning of 2021 (Husband’s

       appraisal). The trial court acted within its discretion in doing so, as the value it

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023      Page 17 of 25
       assigned was within the range of the evidence provided. See, e.g., Alifimoff v.

       Stuart, 192 N.E.3d 987, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding the trial court acted

       within its discretion when its assigned value of the real estate was based upon

       an average of the two values submitted by the parties), trans. denied.

[38]   Husband contends that the trial court erred by not considering the appreciation

       in the real estate’s value pending the final dissolution hearing. However, the

       trial court acted within its discretion in choosing the date by which to value the

       real estate and, thereby, assigning the risk of a future change in value. See

       Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102; Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d at 558. That allocation of

       subsequent risk—expressed by the valuation date selected—is not clearly

       against the facts and circumstances before the court. The only evidence

       regarding possible appreciation of the land pending the final dissolution hearing

       was the parties’ testimonies that they believed the market price of farmland in

       the area had increased during that time. The trial court did not err in refusing

       to credit the parties’ anecdotal testimony over the appraised values or in finding

       that anecdotal testimony insufficient to support a finding of increased value.

       Husband’s contentions to the contrary are requests that we reweigh the

       evidence, which we will not do.

       Farm inventory and accounts receivable

[39]   The trial court valued the farm inventory and accounts receivable as of the end

       of the month in which the dissolution petition was filed, i.e., December 31,

       2019. See Appealed Order at 8, citing Exhibits 26, 27, and 29. Husband

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023    Page 18 of 25
       maintains that the trial court erred by not including the increase in the value of

       the inventory and accounts receivable after December 2019; he points to

       exhibits showing that the price of those items increased from $729,248.96 in

       December 2019 to $1,249,830.37 as of October 2021. However, again, the trial

       court’s allocation of subsequent risk—expressed by the selected valuation date

       for inventory and accounts receivable—is not clearly against the facts and

       circumstances before the court. The valuation date selected was between the

       date of the filing of the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing, and the

       value assigned was within the range of values supported by the evidence. That

       is, Wife provided evidence that the total bank accounts, farm inventory, and

       accounts receivable as of December 31, 2019, were $729,248.96, and that is the

       approximate value the court assigned to those assets.6

       Farm income

[40]   Husband asserts that the trial court erred by failing to include income from

       grain sales in 2019 through 2021 in the marital pot. The trial court did not

       provide a separate category in the marital pot for farm income. Instead, it

       6
         Wife’s Exhibit 29 is a balance sheet showing the value of assets as of December 31, 2019. Ex. v. II at 180.
       According to that exhibit, the total amount for inventory and accounts receivable was $728,716.78. Id. The
       $729,248.96 number used by the court for inventory and accounts receivable included $532.18 from bank
       accounts. That is, in its calculation of assets, the trial court erroneously counted the $532.18 from bank
       accounts twice: once in the $729,248.96 number it labeled “Inventory and acct rec.,” and once again in the
       following line where it included $532.18 labeled “Bank Accounts.” Appealed Order at 10. However, neither
       party raises that error. Moreover, the $532.18 error is de minimus given the multimillion-dollar assets at issue;
       therefore, the error is harmless. See, e.g., D & M Healthcare, Inc. v. Kernan, 800 N.E.2d 898, 900-01 (Ind. 2003)
       (discussing the “de minimis doctrine”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                              Page 19 of 25
       chose to value the farm and its income by averaging the parties’ real estate

       appraisals, both of which included only the income of $183,000 from the sale of

       part of the farm, and both of which had valuation dates as of the end of

       2020/beginning of 2021. Moreover, neither party included farm income

       produced during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings in their proposed

       divisions of the property. See Ex. 47, Ex. v. III at 114 (Wife’s proposed

       division); Ex. AA, Ex. v. IV at 42 (Husband’s proposed division). Again, the

       trial court acted within its discretion when it chose to value the real estate,

       including the income of $183,000 from a real estate sale, as of the end of

       2020/beginning of 2021 by averaging the parties’ appraisals. The trial court’s

       allocation of a subsequent risk of a change in value—expressed by the selected

       valuation date—is not clearly against the facts and circumstances before the

       court.

[41]   Thus, the evidence of income from grain sales in years subsequent to 2020 is

       not relevant. However, given that the court chose to value the farm, including

       its income, as of the end of 2020/beginning of 2021, farm income from the

       years 2019 and 2020 should be included in the marital pot. See, e.g., Smith v.

       Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Net income from the property

       bought before or during the marriage is a marital asset.”). Nevertheless, as we

       explain below, we conclude that the trial court’s decision not to include that

       income in the marital pot was harmless error.

[42]   Income earned by marital property “after the petition for dissolution was filed

       and before the court’s valuation date” must be considered a marital asset under

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023     Page 20 of 25
       Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4. Id. at 7. However, where the income so

       produced is “entirely through one party’s efforts and investment without the

       other’s participation,” we have determined that it would not be appropriate to

       award such income to the non-participating party. Hudson v. Hudson, 176

       N.E.3d 464, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Moreover, the improper

       exclusion of an asset from the marital estate may be harmless error where the

       evidence supports an unequal distribution of that asset. See Helm v. Helm, 873

       N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Smith, 854 N.E.2d at 6 (“[W]e will

       reverse a property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award.”).

[43]   Such is the case here. The evidence establishes that the farm income in the

       years 2019 through 2022 was produced solely through Wife’s efforts and not at

       all through Husband’s efforts. Husband was incarcerated during the year 2019

       and did not help at all with the farm operations during that year or at any time

       thereafter. In fact, Husband refused to provide his essential participation to

       extend the operating line of credit through 2020, thereby placing the entire farm

       operation in jeopardy. It was only through Wife’s efforts in working the farm

       with her sons and obtaining financing that the farm was not only saved, but

       actually produced income. Therefore, there was a rational basis for the trial

       court’s failure to divide the 2019 and 2020 farm income between the parties.7

       7
         The fact that the farm income produced during dissolution proceedings was all due only to Wife’s efforts is
       what distinguishes this case from Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, cited by Husband, and other rental income cases.
       That is, in those cases, there was no evidence that the rental income was obtained solely through the effort or
       investment of one party.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                            Page 21 of 25
       Any error in the failure to include that income in the marital pot was harmless,

       as the evidence supported an award of that income to Wife. See Helm, 873

       N.E.2d at 89.

       Marital Debts
[44]   As he did with the marital assets, Husband challenges the date of valuation the

       trial court chose for the marital debts. Husband provided no evidence of the

       total marital debt as of any date.8 However, he points to Wife’s Exhibit 56, Ex.

       v. III at 141, which showed a decrease in the marital debt as of October 20,

       2021, and August 18, 2022, and he maintains that the trial court should have

       accounted for that decrease in the debt. However, for the same reasons

       discussed above, we hold that the trial court’s chosen valuation date was within

       its discretion.

[45]   The trial court chose to value the marital debt as of the date of the petition for

       dissolution, i.e., December of 2019. Wife provided evidence showing the debt

       as of December 31, 2019, was a little over $7.5 million, and the trial court cited

       that evidence in support of its calculation of the total debt value of

       $7,612,937.50 as of December 2019. Appealed Order at 9, citing Exhibit 44.

       Thus, the debt value assigned by the court was not clearly against the facts and

       8
         While Husband’s “Proposed Division of Property,” contained in Exhibit AA, shows the marital debt as
       $3,839,257.00, that exhibit does not provide a valuation date nor does it contain all of the marital debts.
       Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it discounted the debt information in
       Exhibit AA.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023                            Page 22 of 25
       circumstances before the court; rather, it was within the range of values

       supported by the evidence. And, by choosing the valuation date of December

       2019, the trial court necessarily allocated to Wife the risk of any subsequent

       increase or decrease in the amount of debt. It was within the trial court’s

       discretion to do so. See, e.g., Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d at 558.

[46]   Husband asserts that it was “unjust” to assign the debt amount as of December

       2019 rather than the lower debt values in subsequent years, and he points out

       that Wife paid down the debt with income produced by the farmland while the

       dissolution action was pending. Appellant’s Br. at 25-26. However, as we

       noted above, the farm produced income during that time period solely due to

       Wife’s farming efforts and procurement of financing, the latter of which was

       actually hindered by Husband’s refusal to cooperate with Wife. We find no

       injustice in the trial court’s valuation of the marital debt; rather, the court acted

       within its discretion in choosing the valuation date and thereby allocating the

       risk of a subsequent change in the amount of the debt.

       Payment of Husband’s Personal Expenses
[47]   Finally, Husband contends that the trial court erred by reducing Wife’s

       equalization payment by the amount she paid to Husband for his personal

       expenses while the dissolution action was pending, without similarly

       accounting for the amount of Wife’s personal expenses during that time period.

       This claim fails for several reasons. First, Husband did not make this assertion

       in the trial court; rather, his proposed division of the marital property did not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023      Page 23 of 25
       include the amount of anyone’s personal expenses. See Ex. AA, Ex. v. IV at 42.

       Second, the record contains no evidence of the value of Wife’s personal

       expenses while the dissolution was pending, and a party who fails to introduce

       evidence as to the specific value of the marital property is estopped from

       alleging an abuse of discretion in the property distribution based on that

       absence of evidence. See Perkins, 836 N.E.2d at 301. And, finally, Husband’s

       expenses were paid using income from the farm that Wife obtained through her

       own efforts alone and despite Husband’s refusal to cooperate in obtaining

       refinancing of the farm. There is nothing inequitable in crediting Wife with the

       amount she paid for Husband’s personal expenses with farm income that she,

       alone, produced while the dissolution was pending. See Hudson, 176 N.E.3d at

       479 (finding it inappropriate to award income produced entirely through one

       party’s efforts and investment to the non-participating party).

       Conclusion
[48]   The trial court findings challenged by Husband are supported by the evidence

       and/or not contrary to law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

       valuing the farm and its income as of the end of 2020/beginning of 2021, nor

       did it err in valuing the farm inventory, accounts receivable, and marital debt as

       of the date of the dissolution petition, i.e., December 2019. And the trial court

       acted within its discretion when it decreased Wife’s equalization payment by

       the amount she paid Husband for his personal expenses while the dissolution

       was pending.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023   Page 24 of 25
[49]   Affirmed.

       May, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DN-2801 | December 19, 2023   Page 25 of 25