Court Opinion

ID: 9559774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:35:27.263322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:42.904592
License: Public Domain

DOOLING, J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion is open to the objection that it does not state the facts most favorable to support the trial court’s action. The following facts relied upon by respondent, and not mentioned therein, seem to me important.
1. In addition to national advertising petitioner furnishes free of charge to its wholesale distributors electrotypes and illustrations for their use in local advertising.
2. It furnishes as many working or moving window displays for distribution to retailers (free of charge) as the wholesale distributors request.
3. It encourages purchasers of its hammers which break or are defective to deal directly with it, soliciting them to send the hammers direct to petitioner and petitioner in those cases makes adjustments directly with the purchasrs. This accounts for about one-third of all adjustments made and is a continuous and established practice.
In Travelers Health Assn. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 at p. 647 [70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154] the court said: “But where business activities reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional ‘consent’ in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state.”
Here by its adjustment program petitioner has created “continuing relationships and obligations” with citizens of California. The test of jurisdiction is whether the corporation had “certain minimum contacts with it (the State) such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and justice. ’ ” (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, etc., 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) These requirements “may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend *263the particular suit which is brought there.” (Id. p. 317.) The California courts have fully accepted this concept. (Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.2d 490 [244 P.2d 968], cert. den. 344 U.S. 897 [73 S.Ct. 277, 97 L.Ed. 693]; Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 134 [214 P.2d 541]; Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal.App.2d 376 [265 P.2d 130]; Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, Inc., 118 CalA.pp.2d 211 [257 P.2d 727].)
The activities of petitioner mentioned herein in my judgment are sufficient to distinguish this case from Martin Bros. Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal.App.2d 790 [264 P.2d 183].
I would deny the writ.
The petition of the Real Party in Interest for a rehearing was denied November 19, 1954, and his petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 15, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.