Court Opinion

ID: 9903564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:53:39.569642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.236984
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
OMNI HEALTHCARE, INC.,

            Appellant,

v.                                       Case No. 5D22-786
                                         LT Case No. 05-2021-CA-035363-X
NORTH BREVARD COUNTY
HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A
PARRISH MEDICAL CENTER
AND CRAIG DELIGDISH,

          Appellees.
________________________________/

Opinion filed February 3, 2023

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
George Paulk, Judge.

Adam M. Bird, and Ryan D.
O’Connor, of WhiteBird, PLLC,
Melbourne, for Appellant.

Joseph I. Zumpano, and Leon N.
Patricios, of Zumpano Patricios,
P.A., Coral Gables, and Nicolette C.
Vilmos and Michael J. Bittman, of
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP, Orlando, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.
      Omni Healthcare, Inc. (“Omni”) appeals the trial court’s order

disbursing rental monies from the court registry to North Brevard County

Hospital District d/b/a Parrish Medical Center (“Parrish”). We conclude that

the disbursement order was a nonfinal order for which a motion for

rehearing/reconsideration did not toll the timeframe to appeal. Omni’s notice

of appeal was filed after the denial of its motion for rehearing/reconsideration

and more than thirty days after the entry of the disbursement order.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

      Parrish leased certain commercial property to Omni. After disputes

arose between the parties, Omni stopped making rent payments.

Subsequently, Parrish filed a three count complaint against Omni—for

eviction, breach of lease agreement and breach of guaranty agreement.

Thereafter, pursuant to section 83.232, Florida Statutes (2021), Omni filed a

motion to determine the amount of rent that it was to deposit into the court

registry during the pendency of the litigation.

      After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order directing

the past due sum of $468,780.81 and ongoing monthly rents of $21,871.57

be deposited into the court registry. Later, after Omni deposited substantial

monies into the court registry, Parrish filed an emergency motion alleging

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that it had ongoing expenses that needed to be paid and that it could not wait

until the matter proceeded to trial to receive the monies.

      Following an emergency hearing, the trial court ordered that the sum

of $626,258.52 be immediately disbursed to Parrish. Omni seeks review of

that order.

      This court has previously concluded that an order authorizing the

disbursement of monies from the court registry is a nonfinal order reviewable

under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). 1 Vance Realty

Grp., Inc. v. Park Place at Metrowest, Phases Six & Seven, Ltd., 909 So. 2d

516, 517–18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); accord Tribeca Aesthetic Med. Sols, LLC

v. Edge Pilates Corp., 82 So. 3d 899, 901 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“Because

the order [disbursing rental payments from the court registry prior to trial]

determines the right to immediate possession of property, we have

jurisdiction   pursuant   to   Florida    Rule   of   Appellate    Procedure

9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii).”).

      “[A] motion for rehearing directed to a non-final order . . . is not

authorized under the rules and does not toll the time for filing the notice of

appeal.” Deal v. Deal, 783 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citations

      1
         Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) authorizes an
appeal to a district court of appeal of a nonfinal order that determines “the
right to immediate possession of property.”

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omitted); see also Morton & Oxley Ltd. v. Charles S. Eby, M.D., P.A., 916

So. 2d 820, 821 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[A] motion for rehearing of a

nonfinal order is unauthorized and does not toll the time for filing a notice of

appeal.” (citing Decktight Roofing Servs. Inc. v. Amwest Sur. Inc., 841 So.

2d 667, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003))).

       Furthermore, we reject Omni’s argument that the disbursement order

was an appealable partial final judgment. A partial final judgment is

appealable as a final order when the judgment resolves a distinct and

severable cause of action, i.e., the remaining claims do not arise from a set

of common facts for a single transaction. Jensen v. Whetstine, 985 So. 2d

1218, 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Here, as Parrish correctly argues, the

disbursement order arose from the same set of facts involved in Parrish’s

complaint—all three counts of which remain pending. See, e.g., Lenmar

Realty, LLC. v. Sun Elec. Works, Inc., 317 So. 3d 125, 128–29 (Fla. 4th DCA

2021) (holding that the trial court erroneously concluded that landlord was

not entitled to release of the rents deposited into the court registry because

it did not assert such claim in pleading, but instead pursued claim by motion;

landlord was entitled to assert claim by motion because “entitlement to the

rent deposits in the court registry was ancillary to the asserted claims for

relief”).

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      Because the notice of appeal in the instant case was filed more than

thirty days from the date of the disbursement order, we do not have

jurisdiction to review this matter.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

LAMBERT, C.J., EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.

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