Court Opinion

ID: 9721070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:47:52.317029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.263636
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(concurring, with whom Liacos, C.J., joins). I agree with the opinion of the court, but I add the following comments concerning the instructions in answer to the dissent’s contention that the judgments should be affirmed.
1. Identification.1 The defendants challenge the trial judge’s instruction on identification as inappropriate and prejudicial. They also claim that the judge’s instruction on this point impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from prosecution to defense in violation of the defendants’ right to due process of law. The defendants’ contentions are based on the inappropriateness of any identification instruction at all *270in the circumstances of the case. They are correct. Positive identification of the defendants was never at issue. The defendants were linked to the crime by the testimony of an accomplice, William DeVincenzi, who had known them for some time before the murder.
The judge’s instructions on identification applied to the testimony of Joseph Rugnetta and Christine Lennon, two defense witnesses. Both witnesses observed the getaway car and testified that neither defendant was among the men they saw in the car. Because these witnesses were not “identification” witnesses for the prosecution, an instruction of the sort normally given when a prosecution witness identifies a defendant was wholly inappropriate.
The instruction was not only incorrect but also gravely prejudicial to the defendants. The judge repeatedly referred to factors that might give rise to reasonable doubt if the identification witnesses were testifying for the prosecution; she urged the jury to consider the credibility of Rugnetta and Lennon and whether they might be mistaken or lying when they claimed that the defendants were not the men they had seen in the getaway car. These admonitions, which normally serve the function of requiring a jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of a crime, in this case were applied in a way that encouraged the jury to regard defense witnesses with suspicion. Because of the truthtelling aspect of DeVincenzi’s agreement (see the opinion of the court, ante at 258-259), combined with the skepticism with which the jurors were instructed to weigh the testimony of the defense witnesses, the error was prejudicial.
After timely objection by defense counsel, the judge attempted to fashion a curative instruction.2 In the “curative” instruction, the judge stated, “[T]he burden is on the Commonwealth to prove identity of any defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In mentioning the witnesses Christine Lennon and Joseph Rugnetta, I did not mean to imply that they had *271any burden to prove anything.” The judge then lapsed into her previous error by adding: “The purpose of my giving you the identification charge, as far as [Rugnetta and Lennon] are concerned, was so that you could evaluate their credibility as identification witnesses” (emphasis added). This reference to credibility had the effect of reemphasizing the skepticism with which these defense witnesses should be viewed. The attempted correction therefore did not eliminate the legal error.
Both the original and the “curative” instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the Commonwealth to the defense in violation of the defendants’ right to due process of law. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). These instructions plainly were errors of law. Assuming the failure to object to the attempted curative instruction requires analysis under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the lowering of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof resulted in a “substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice [had] occurred.” Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 38 (1980). See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
2. Consciousness of guilt.3 The defendants challenge the instruction on consciousness of guilt on the grounds that it deprived them of their constitutional right to present a defense to the charges against them and impermissibly reduced the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.
Both defendants offered alibi witnesses. The Commonwealth then offered a witness, Anthony Pezzella, to rebut the alibi of the defendant Ciampa. Pezzella testified that, shortly *272after the murder, he questioned Ciampa about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, and Ciampa said that he had been at home that night. Because these two exculpatory accounts offered by Ciampa — his alibi at trial and his statement to Pezzella — were in conflict, the prosecutor requested, and the judge gave, an instruction concerning conflicting accounts as evidence of consciousness of guilt.4
The judge’s charge improperly broadened the scope of evidence that can be taken as indicating a guilty conscience. Generally, only a defendant’s own statements or actions can indicate consciousness of guilt. Testimony by alibi witnesses, therefore, is an inappropriate basis for an instruction on consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 624 (1982).
With respect to Orlandella, there is no evidence of any statement by him as to his whereabouts on April 11. The jurors were permitted to infer his consciousness of guilt if they disbelieved his alibi witnesses. This was an unconstitutional burden on his right to present evidence. “[Ejvery subject [in a criminal prosecution] shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him.” Art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 695 (1983).
As to both defendants, the instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the Commonwealth. In People v. Leasure, 34 A.D.2d 688 (N.Y. 1970), the court reversed a conviction on these same grounds, with the admoni- ' tian that “[t]he burden of proof of guilt never shifts from the People.” Id. at 689. Cf. Commonwealth v. Berth, 385 Mass. 784, 787 (1982) (burden of proof shifts when a judge instructs, “You either believe one side or you believe the other side”); Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 200 (1892) (prosecution may not contend that a denial of guilt is itself evidence against the defendant). This lowering of the *273Commonwealth’s burden of proof also resulted in a “substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice [had] occurred.” Commonwealth v. Cole, supra at 38. See G. L. c. 278, § 33E. I would grant a new trial on the erroneous instructions as well as the manner in which the written plea agreement was handled.

 The judge stated to the jury: “Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the individual . . “Are you satisfied that the witness had the eye-sight and the time necessary under the circumstances to see the individual . . “[A]re you convinced that the witness did not make a good faith mistake in the identification of an individual . . “You may consider whether or not a witness may have a motive for lying. You have to be convinced that the identification made by a witness subsequent, in other words, after the offense, was the product of his own recollection ....’’ (Emphasis added.)

 At side bar, the assistant district attorney also expressed concern as to the appropriateness of the instructions as applied to defense witnesses.

 The instructions were as follows: “It is your memory that controls . . . you have heard . . . testimony from various witnesses, which if you believe it, concerns where Ciampa and Orlandella were at various times on April 11, 1983, the date of this incident. Based upon your determinations of the facts and reasonable inferences based upon credible evidence, it is for you to say whether a defendant has given conflicting stories, or whether in fact you find that there has been presented to you a false alibi. I don’t mean to suggest that that is the situation. I am only indicating to you that these are matters you may consider as consciousness of guilt if you first find that they are present in [the] evidence.”

 Although this instruction apparently was meant to apply only to Ciampa, the judge did not so limit it.