Court Opinion

ID: 8079988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 13:56:13.749368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:38:22.728549
License: Public Domain

By the Court :
The first question to be decided in this case is, whether an administrator can, by appealing, take up the case as to his co-defendants, without any bond being given upon the appeal. Manjr reasons may be urged, with about equal force, upon both sides of this question.
There are some cases in which one of several co-defendants may appeal the cause separately without affecting the others. This may be done where the action is in its nature joint and several. In an action of trespass, tried in the supreme court of Warren county, against two defendants, one was acquitted and the other found guilty by the jury. The. court decided that the defendant convicted had a right to appeal without his co-defendant; and that the plaintiff, if he wished to keep both parties in court, could do it by appealing himself.
But where the action is joint, the defendants must stand or fall ."together, and the question presents more difficulty.
It may be said, shall one defendant, who is satisfied with the judgment, be compelled to follow his co-defendant to the Supreme *517Court, where additional costs may be awarded, and higher damages? And this in a case where the defendant who appeals is irresponsible, and that very irresponsibility a strong inducement to indulge a litigious disposition, in the security of having nothing to lose? In this there would be great injustice.
On the other side, it may be asked, shall the only responsible defendant, and upon whom the whole burden rests, be deprived of his appeal, where he thinks justice has not been done him, because his co-defendant, secure in his ^poverty, will not unite in consummating the appeal ? This result would at least be equally unjust. The question, therefore, must be decided without reference to the inconvenience of either view of it, and upon the naked: matter of right and power under the statute.
The provision of the law is, that in civil cases an appeal shall be allowed of course from any judgment or decree. The mode is prescribed in which the party wishing to appeal shall consummate it. One defendant can give notice, and if he can give the bond the law requires, he can perfect the appeal. No act is required calling for the joint agency of all the defendants; but the whole power of appealing the cause is given to any party who desires to exercise it. To require the concurrence of all the defendants in consummating an appeal, would be to give the statute an interpretation not warranted by its terms, nor by its general object and spirit. The court are consequently of opinion, that in a joint action one defendant or one plaintiff can appeal the whole cause by giving the notice and' the bond required by law.
The law regulating this right of appeal directs, that in general cases the appellant shall give a bond, but with respect to executors- and administrators the right of appeal is given upon different terms; no bond is required, and it is sufficient for an executor or administrator to give notice and docket the appeal in the Supreme Court. As one defendant can consummate an appeal of the whole case by doing what the law requires in giving the bond, so, by the same rule, an executor or administrator, by doing what the law requires of him, can perfect an appeal of the cause, not only for himself, but for his co-defendants, in all cases where the interest is joint, and where an appeal as to one must be an appeal as to all. This must be the rule, otherwise the administrator can not use the privilege of appeal without subjecting himself to a responsibility not imposed, by law.
*518, 519Against this rule it is objected, that it permits the privilege given to executors and administrators alone, to be enjoyed by others for whom it was not intended, and thus prejudices the plaintiff’s right to have security upon the appeal. This is true; but the absolute right of the administrator *to appeal, without giving security, is as clear and as strong as the absolute right of the plaintiff to have security from the co-defendant, and it is certainly the policy of our laws, that, in this collision, the right of the administrator should prevail.
The exemption is secured to him that he may proceed with confidence in protecting the interests committed to him ; for were his duty to be connected with his personal responsibility, the feelings of self-interest might prevail so far that the administrator would regard rather his own safety than the interest under his direction. Require an executor or administrator to give security upon an appeal, and you require him to hazard his own estate; for, as the law now stands, he would be personally liable upon his bond, and personally liable to indemnify the security in case of loss. Impose this responsibility upon an executor or administrator, and its natural consequence would be to induce, at least in cases of difficulty, an abandonment of the interests he represents and should protect. It is obviously of much more public importance that the estates of deceased persons should be faithfully administered, than that an individual, setting up a claim against such estate, should fail to obtain an additional security for his claim in the progress of litigation. For it must be remembered, that in allowing the appeal to be perfected, without the bond and security, the complainant loses nothing that he ever possessed ; and in respect to the right so confidently asserted to be an absolute one, it is, in fact, a decision that upon a just construction of the whole statute, no such right is, in the particular case, secured to him. The appeal must be sustained.
The merits of the case are easily disposed of. The parties have settled the subject of controversy, and by written agreement referred the question of costs to the court of common pleas, to be decided upon the point whether the complainant’s bill could be sustained; and if sustained, to tax the costs against the defendants, otherwise against the complainant. This point the court of common pleas decided in favor of the complainant; and thus the whole cause is disposed of under the agreement of the parties by the umpire to whom they referred it. Nothing is left for this *court *519to do, but decree the costs to the complainant, conformable to this agreement. This court never investigates the rights of parties settled by themselves, except upon suggestion of fraud or imposition.