Court Opinion

ID: 9953536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:11.708771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.822656
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0020-MR

KYLE THOMPSON                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 14-CR-00344

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Kyle Thompson appeals from the denial of his

postconviction motion brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure

(RCr) 11.42 by the Hardin Circuit Court. We affirm.

            Thompson was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted

of, among other offenses, murder. Our Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal in

2016. Thompson v. Commonwealth, No. 2015-SC-000245-MR, 2016 WL

5239680 (Ky. Sep. 22, 2016). Primarily alleging his counsel was ineffective,
Thompson filed the RCr 11.42 motion at hand roughly six years later. The motion

thus facially violates RCr 11.42(10), which requires an 11.42 motion to be brought

“within three years after the judgment becomes final . . . .” Thompson

acknowledged that his motion was untimely but asserted it should nonetheless be

deemed timely by application of equitable tolling due to his mental health

challenges, which he asserted prevented him from timely filing an RCr 11.42

motion. The trial court denied the motion without first holding a hearing.

Thompson then filed this appeal.

             Thompson bears the burden of demonstrating an entitlement to

equitable tolling. Williams v. Hawkins, 594 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Ky. 2020). Our

Supreme Court has set an extremely high bar for an RCr 11.42 movant to surmount

to receive an evidentiary hearing as to whether equitable tolling should be applied.

             Thompson is not automatically entitled to application of equitable

tolling merely because he claims he was mentally incompetent. Commonwealth v.

Carneal, 274 S.W.3d 420, 429 (Ky. 2008). Instead, Thompson must show that

“the circumstances preventing [him] from making a timely filing were both beyond

[his] control and unavoidable despite due diligence.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). What that means in practical terms is that, under the

language of Carneal, Thompson must show that he was “totally incompetent for

the uninterrupted duration” of the three-year filing period. Id.

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               Thompson has not met that extremely steep burden. Thompson

claims that antidepressants given to him in prison rendered him incompetent, but

the documents he attached to his motion do not adequately support that argument.

               For example, Thompson submitted as an exhibit to his RCr 11.42

motion a June 2017 letter sent to him by an attorney at the Department of Public

Advocacy which begins by stating that the attorney had “read your [Thompson’s]

11.42 petition . . . .”1 The attorney offers constructive criticism about improving

the motion but does not describe it as indecipherable or incomprehensible. Thus,

within a year after our Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming on direct appeal,

Thompson had the ability to draft an RCr 11.42 motion and correspond with an

attorney about ways to improve it.

               In early 2017, Thompson also submitted a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis and for appointment of counsel. That motion erroneously stated that

Thompson had filed an RCr 11.42 motion. Therefore, within the three-year filing

period, Thompson had the mental acuity to seek relief in the courts despite now

claiming he was incompetent. A person suffering from total mental incapacitation

1
  Unfortunately, the 11.42 and the dozens of pages of attachments thereto are unpaginated and
contained in a manilla envelope separated from the rest of the record. The lack of pagination and
binding makes it difficult to locate, and cite, specific portions of the motion and its attachments.
In the future, the circuit court clerk must place documents in a bound, paginated volume of
record under Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 26(B).

                                                -3-
would logically lack the ability to file any type of pro se motion, or to draft an RCr

11.42 motion and correspond with an attorney about ways to improve it.

              Thompson also attached medical records to his RCr 11.42 motion, but

they also are insufficient to show he was completely incapacitated “for the

duration.” Those records generally indicate that Thompson was suffering from

depression and was prescribed medications for that condition, but Thompson has

not pointed to documentation showing he was mentally incompetent. To the

contrary, at least some records state Thompson was doing well and was not

delusional.

              Thompson also submitted a generic list of potential side effects which

persons taking the medications he was prescribed may potentially suffer. But the

issue is not what side effects some persons may suffer; the issue is whether

Thompson suffered side effects so serious that he was incapacitated. Thompson

points to no proof indicating that he suffered from incapacitating side effects.

              Our conclusion is reinforced by our Supreme Court’s decision in

Carneal, supra. In that case, Carneal pleaded guilty but mentally ill to murder and

submitted an RCr 11.42 motion, along with other motions such as to withdraw his

guilty plea, five years later. Carneal, 274 S.W.3d at 424. Carneal presented

evidence from experts that he suffered from schizophrenia and had been

incompetent to plead guilty as he had suffered from hallucinations and delusions.

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Id. at 425. Carneal argued that his mental incompetence meant he was entitled to

equitable tolling to “save[] an otherwise untimely RCr 11.42 motion.” Id. at 429.

The trial court rejected the equitable tolling argument and denied Carneal’s RCr

11.42 motion as untimely. Id. at 425.

             Our Supreme Court summarily and emphatically rejected Carneal’s

claim that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The entirety of our Supreme Court’s

substantive discussion of equitable tolling is as follows:

                     The trial court also rejected Carneal’s argument
             that his ongoing mental incompetence saved an otherwise
             untimely RCr 11.42 motion. This Court has recognized
             the doctrine of equitable tolling as applicable to post-
             conviction motions. While an ongoing mental
             incompetence may warrant equitable tolling, a claim of
             mental incompetence does not constitute a per se reason
             to toll a statute of limitations. Rather, the critical inquiry
             remains whether the circumstances preventing a
             petitioner from making a timely filing were both beyond
             the petitioner’s control and unavoidable despite due
             diligence. Carneal has not satisfied this burden.

                    Dr. Cornell’s report concerns Carneal’s mental
             state at the time of the offense and the sentencing, with
             some analysis of his current mental condition. What
             reference is made to Carneal’s mental condition during
             the intervening six years does not support a finding of
             ongoing mental incompetence. Carneal has been
             medicated since 1999, and all psychological reports
             indicate that the intensity of his mental disorder ebbs and
             flows, logically indicating at least temporary periods of
             mental competency. Reports filed at the 18-year-old
             hearing indicate Carneal’s mental condition stabilized
             during his juvenile detention, that he was able to
             meaningfully participate in group therapy, and that he

                                          -5-
             earned a high school diploma and GED. In adult
             corrections, Carneal has been treated with more effective
             medication and has earned credits towards an associate’s
             degree.

                    In his report, Dr. Cornell explains that
             schizophrenia is a severe mental illness that is
             characterized by episodes of psychosis followed [by] less
             severe periods when the patient may have residual
             symptoms or in some cases, relatively normal
             functioning. As is consistent with the disorder, Carneal
             has experienced temporary periods of mental
             incompetence since the time of the offense, but has not
             been totally incompetent for the uninterrupted duration.
             He has been aware of his mental disability for many
             years and has actively sought treatment. In light of
             Carneal’s intermittent competence, we are unconvinced
             that his condition prevented compliance with the RCr
             11.42 time limitation such that equitable tolling would be
             appropriate. Further, because the evidence in the record
             refutes Carneal’s claim of an ongoing mental
             incompetence, an evidentiary hearing on this issue was
             unnecessary.

Id. at 429 (alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

             In sum, our Supreme Court required an RCr 11.42 movant to show

that he or she was totally incapacitated for the entire duration of the filing period.

Carneal thus was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if equitable

tolling should apply, even though he presented seemingly uncontested expert

opinions that he had schizophrenia which caused, at minimum, some periods of

incompetence. Id. Thompson, in turn, cannot be entitled to a hearing because he

                                          -6-
submitted comparatively less detailed, compelling documentation showing he had

a mental condition which rendered him unable to file a timely RCr 11.42 motion.

             An evidentiary hearing is required before an RCr 11.42 motion may

be resolved if “there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved,

i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.” Haley v.

Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky. App. 2019). But there is no material

issue of fact regarding Thompson’s incompetence “for the duration” because

Thompson has not cited evidence which, if believed, would show that he was

totally incompetent.

             Instead, Thompson has submitted documents which would, if

believed, show that he was diagnosed with depression and prescribed medications

to treat that condition. We do not minimize the impact depression may have on the

human body and mind. We also acknowledge that all medications may cause side

effects, some of which may be so serious as to be incapacitating. However, to

receive an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling under the holding of Carneal,

Thompson was required to present more than documents showing that someone

with depression who took the same medications as did he might possibly be

incapacitated. He instead was required to present evidence which, if believed,

would show that he was actually totally incapacitated for the duration of the filing

period. Thompson has not cited to any evidence from which a reasonable

                                          -7-
decisionmaker could reach that conclusion. Therefore, the trial court properly

denied his motion as untimely.

             We have concluded any arguments in the parties’ briefs not discussed

herein are redundant, irrelevant, or otherwise unnecessary to discuss in order to

properly resolve this appeal.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kyle Thompson, pro se                     Daniel Cameron
Sandy Hook, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Christopher Henry
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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