Court Opinion

ID: 9811619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:26:05.834317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:20.093223
License: Public Domain

SMITH, C. J.,
Dissenting. The plaintiff and defendant, on April 29th, 1871, entered into an agreement for grinding corn at the plaintiff’s mill, at the price of 8 cents per bushel, and that 50 lbs. of meal be returned for 56 lbs. of corn. The terms of the contract were controverted before the jury, but they found that the defendant bound himself to send to the mill a quantity of corn, sufficient for the toll to pay off and discharge a judgment, which he held against the plaintiff', and that it should be thus applied. Between *116the 1st day .of May and September following, 5791 8-56 bushels of corn were delivered and ground, when the defendant denied his obligation, and refused to send any more ■corn to the mill. Conflicting evidence was ■ offered as to what was a fair charge for grinding, when 50 lbs. of meal were to be returned for 56 lbs. of corn, the plaintiff’s witnesses estimating it at fifteen, and some as high as twenty cents a bushel, while those of defendant estimated it at eight cents, the contract price.
There was no evidence, that plaintiff’s mills were stopped or delayed, in consequence of the' defendant’s refusal to send the additional quantity, for which he contracted; or that the withdrawal of his patronage was not supplied with a full equivalent, from other sources; or that the mills were not taxed to their working capacity, after the breach. It was shown that the expense of grinding to the plaintiff was three cents a bushel. The sum due for the corn ground was credited on the defendant’s judgment, and the plaintiff compelled to pay the residue. ’ The plaintiff was prepared and ready to do the work, if the corn had been delivered. The second issue submitted to the jury was to this effect:
What is the difference between the contract price and the actual cost to the plaintiff of grinding the quantity of corn necessary to pay off’the judgment, and what additional quantity was required to raise that sum? The jury responded that the difference was five cents a bushel, and the additional corn needed, 20,430 bushels.
The defendant asked the Court to charge the jury that the profits which the plaintiff’ would have made, if the contract alleged in the complaint had been fully carried out, were not the proper measure of damages, and that the plaintiff is only entitled to actual damages, and having offered no proof of any such, is only entitled to nominal damages. The Court refused to give the charge, and instructed the jury that the measure of damages was the difference *117between the cost of grinding and the contract price. To this the defendant excepts. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages at the rate of five cents per bushel.
In this ruling of the Court I do not concur. For the violation of the contract, the plaintiff was entitled to recover those damages, which fairly flowed from the breach, and no more, Had the mill been stopped, or so interrupted in its operation as to have lost as much time as would he required to do the additional grinding, and that after reasonable efforts to prevent the loss, the plaintiff could have claimed the full sum awarded him under the instruction of the Court. But he should have shown the extent of his losses in this respect. He had no right quietly to close up his mill, or permit it to lie idle for a period necessary to do the defendant’s grinding, and then charge him as for a total loss. It was his duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent those losses, by seeking patronage elsewhere. If the losses were fully, or partially replaced by the employment of others, the defendant was entitled to an equivalent reduction on the full claim now made against him. This rule, just and reasonable in itself, which fully indemnifies against all losses sustained for. a broken contract, is abundantly supported by authority.
The general principle is this lucidly stated by Mr. Greenleaf: “ In cases of special contract, where one party agrees to do a certain thing, or to perform specific services for a stipulated sum of money, as for example, to perform a piece of mechanical work for an agreed price, or to occupy a tenement for a certain time, at a specified rent, and deserts the undertaking before it is completed, or is turned away and forbidden to proceed by the' other party, the measure of damages is not the entire contract price, but a just recompense for the actual injury, which the party has sustained. And in all cases of breach of such specific contracts, it is to be observed that if the party injured can protect himself *118from damages at a trifling expense, or by any reasonable exm'-tions, he is bound to do so. He can charge the delinquent party only for such damages, as by reasonable endeavors and expense, he could not prevent.” 2 Greenl. Ev., § 261.
So an eminent writer on the law of damages says: In actions for breach of contract, the measure of damages is not the price stipulated to be paid in full performance, but the actual injury sustained in consequence of the defendant’s default. For the rule that the contract furnishes the measure of damages, is subject to the other rule, already stated, that compensation is only to be given for actual loss. Sedg. Damages, 210. To same effect Mayne on Damages ; 82 Law Lib., 113.
There is some conflict in the cases in regard to the damages to which one wrongfully dismissed, during his contracted term of service, is entitled, but the better opinion seems now to bring these cases under the rule, applicable to other .special contracts.
In Elderton v. Emmens, 60 E. C. L. R., 117, an attorney, who had contracted to render professsional service during the year at the sum of an hundred pounds, was dismissed before it expired, and brought his action. Parke, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, thus expresses himself: “ If it be held that such a contract as this is for service and pay respectively, and that although the employer has determined the relation by an illegal dismissal, the employed may entitle himself to the wages for the whole time by being ready to serve, a doctrine would be sanctioned that would be of pernicious consequence, as in the case of a business being discontinued, or a dismissal for misconduct, without legal proof.”
In Goodman v. Pocock, 69 E. C. L. R., 583, a clerk who was dismissed in the middle of his quarter sued his employer for his wrongful act, and Earle, J,, says : “ I think the true measure of damages is the loss sustained at the *119lime of dismissal. The servant, after dismissal, may and ■ought to make the best of his time, and he may have an •opportunity of turning it to advantage.”
Commenting on these cases, and referring to what had been said by others that a dismissed servant could recover for the whole time upon the doctrine of constructive service, Mr. Mayne uses this language: That doctrine, however, rafter being severely commented on in Smith v. Haywood, ■•seems to have been tacitly overruled by the Exchequer Chamber in Elderton v. Emmens, and expressly by Patter-SON and Earle, JJ., in Goodman v. Pocock. Mayne on Damages, 113.
The rule in this country seems to have been similarly •settled:
In Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 457, the contract was to transport horses on a canal boat for a given •sum of money, and the action was brought to recover dam.ages for the breach. The Court say: £< Suppose that the •plaintiff had the next hour been furnished with freight entirely adequate to the voyage at the same sum, he would have been entitled to the damage arising from the detention for that time, but no more. A tender and offer to perform is quasi performance, but it does not regulate the amount of damages.
Dy way of illustration Cowen, J., proceeds thus : “ A ■mason is engaged to work for a month and tenders himself and offers to perform, but his hirer declines his service. The next day this mason is employed at equal wages elsewhere for a month. Clearly his loss is but a day and it is his -duty to seek other employment. Idleness is itself a breach of moral obligation-. But if he continues idle for the purpose of charging another, he superadds a "fraud which the law had rather punish than countenance.”
In this case, and also in the subsequent case of Hecksher v. McLean, 24 Wend., the words of Chief Justice MelleN, of *120the Supreme Court of Maine, used in Miller v. Mariners Church, 3 Greenleaf 51, 55, 56, are quoted with strong approval : “ If the party, entitled to the benefit of the contract,, can protect himself from a loss, arising from a breach, at a reasonable expense, or with reasonable exertions, he fails in his social duty if he omits to do so, regardless of the increased amount of damages, for which he may intend to hold the other contracting party liable.”
So too in Kentucky, it was held that a party contracting-to work at a stipulated price who is ready and willing to perform his agreement, but is prevented by the defendant,, can not recover the price named in the contract for the whole work, but only the actual damages sustained by him. Chamberlain v. McAllister, 6 Dana 352.
These cases, some of which are almost identical with that, before us, clearly, and as I think, conclusively show that the rule, laid down by the Judge, and by which the jury assessed the damages, is entirely erroneous. The damages were to be ascertained by evidence of interruptions of the mill and loss of time, and not by the profits which a fulfilled contract would have brought. It may be that the mill had full employment, and if so, at more remunerative price, and that no loss whatever resulted from the defendant’s act. How' this was, it was in the power of the plaintiff, and in my opinion, his duty to show to the jury. He was required to prove the extent of his damages, and such damages as he could not by reasonable efforts avert. The rule finds illustration in a familiar case of trespass. The defendant pulls down the plaintiff’s fence around his cultivated field for the purpose of passing through, and neglects to put it up. In consequence, stock enter the field and depre-date upon the crops. As soon as the plaintiff is advised off this, it becomes his duty to replace the fence, and his claim to compensation for injury suffered is the cost of repairs,, and the value of the injury to the crop before he had notice *121and time to replace the fence. He could not remain passive, after knowledge, and permit his entire crop to be destroyed, and then demand compensation for its value. It was his duty to make prompt and reasonable efforts to prevent un-necesary damage, and if he will not, he has no just ground of complaint against the wrong-doer.
Suppose the plaintiff had brought his action at once upon the defendant’s repudiation of the contract, the damages, it would seem, must be estimated upon the same principle, as when he waits a year or more before doing it. In such case the estimate must be purely speculative and conjectural, and the anticipated profits certainly could not be recovered. There are many contingencies attendant upon all business — the possible loss by fire, the breaking of machinery, death, sickness, and other causes may interrupt, or suspend its prosecution. . These can not be estimated in advance, and profits must be largely dependent upon them. It is for this reason that the actual, not conjectural loss, constitutes the plaintiff’s claim to compensation.
The case of Clements v. The State, 77 N. C. 142, seems to conflict with the doctrine enunciated. There, the plaintiff was permitted to recover as damages, in the Court below, the profits which he would have made if he had been permitted to execute his contract, and which he lost by the default of the State, and this ruling was sustained on the appeal. The opinion delivered here, simply declares that there is no error, and the subject does not seem to have-been fully and carefully considered. Recognizing the importance of adhering to the decisions of this Court, to give stability and firmness to our system of jurisprudence, yet a principle so eminently practical, and so far reaching in its results, should not be permanently settled without ample and thorough examination of all its bearings, and I have felt myself at liberty to treat it as an open question still.
*122I am constrained therefore to dissent from the opinion of the Court and to say that I think there was error in the •charge entitling the defendant to a new trial.
No error.
Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.