Court Opinion

ID: 9905733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 00:03:51.913573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:51.957887
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 P. v. Shirley CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A165769
    v.
    MARKIS CAPRICE DEWAYNE                                             (Humboldt County
    SHIRLEY,                                                            Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                       CR2101816 &
           Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                       CR2101667)

         Defendant Markis Caprice Dewayne Shirley (appellant) appeals from a
judgment of conviction and a third-strike sentence imposed after a jury found
him guilty of burglary, possession of a firearm by a felon, and assault. He
contends: (1) the trial court erred by rejecting a proposed plea bargain in the
middle of the trial; (2) his motion to represent himself, which he brought after
the trial began, should have been granted under Faretta v. California (1975)
422 U.S. 806 (Faretta); (3) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by not objecting to certain testimony; (4) he should not have been
punished for both burglary and possession of a firearm under Penal Code
section 654;1 (5) his motion to strike his prior strike convictions should have
been granted under section 1385, subdivision (a); (6) his lawyer was

1    Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                                               1
ineffective for not seeking dismissal of his enhancements for prior serious
felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)) under section 1385, subdivision (c); and (7) one of
those two enhancements should have been stricken because they arose out of
the same prior proceeding. We will vacate one of the section 667
enhancements and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      In June 2021, appellant was charged in case No. 2101667 with first
degree robbery in concert with two or more other persons (§§ 211, 212.5,
subd. (a), 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 1), first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (a); count 2), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b);
counts 3 & 4), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 5). The Information alleged that appellant personally used a firearm
during the commission of counts 1 and 2. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subd. (b).) It also alleged that appellant had two prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that were strikes under section 667,
subdivisions (b)–(i). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.2
      A. Trial Evidence
      Amanda G. testified that she and her boyfriend, J.L., were staying at a
Motel 6 in Eureka on November 3, 2020. In the early morning, J.L.’s friend,
Josie Craig, arrived at their motel room and asked to “hangout.” At some
point, Craig left the room for a few minutes and returned. Craig left the
room a second time, stating she was receiving a phone call, and left the door
ajar. Very soon thereafter, appellant and Tavin Evans pushed their way into

2     After jury selection began, appellant sought new counsel and then
asked to represent himself. Those requests were denied. After the
prosecution’s case, appellant accepted the terms of a plea bargain that the
prosecutor had offered before trial. The trial court rejected the plea bargain.
We discuss these issues later in the opinion.

                                        2
the room through the open door. Appellant and Evans each had a
semiautomatic firearm.
      Appellant pushed J.L. against a wall and “pistol whipped” him at least
12 times. J.L. had bloody gashes on the back of his head and neck. Amanda
G. tried to help J.L., but Evans hit her in the back of the head with his gun.
Evans grabbed Amanda G.’s purse, dumped it out, and took a baggie of
marijuana and $100. Evans and appellant left the room. Amanda G. later
called Eureka Police Detective Jonathan Eckert, with whom she had
previously worked as a confidential informant.
      Detective Eckert testified that he received the call from Amanda G. on
November 5, 2020, and collected surveillance video from the Motel 6. The
camera outside Amanda G.’s and J.L.’s room showed Craig going inside,
coming out, and going back inside. As Craig entered the room the second
time, appellant and Evans crouched nearby, wearing sunglasses, face masks,
and hoods over their heads. When Craig left the room again with the door
ajar, Evans and appellant rushed in. Appellant had his hand in his jacket in
a position consistent with pulling out a gun.
      The video showed Evans and appellant leaving the room a few minutes
later and running to a silver Honda SUV parked on the street in front of the
motel. Craig, waiting in the driver’s seat, drove appellant and Evans from
the motel.
      On November 8, 2020, Arcata Police Officer Joseph Rodes observed a
silver Honda Pilot that had been reported stolen. Officer Rodes conducted a
felony car stop and detained appellant, who was driving. During a search of
the vehicle, Officer Josh Phinney found a black Bersa .380-caliber
semiautomatic firearm under the driver’s seat. Craig, the registered owner of
the Pilot, came to the scene with another man to collect the vehicle.

                                       3
        On November 11, 2020, Eureka Police Officer Spencer Barnett
conducted another vehicle stop on the silver Honda Pilot because Craig had a
warrant for her arrest. Evans was driving, and Craig was the passenger.
Evans also had an arrest warrant. After arresting Craig and Evans, Officer
Barnett located a loaded semiautomatic firearm behind the front passenger
seat.
        The prosecution played recordings of phone calls appellant made from
the Humboldt County Correctional Facility to his mother. In one call,
appellant admitted going into Amanda G.’s and J.L.’s motel room. He said he
“beat up” on J.L. but “we never touched” Amanda G. In another call,
appellant said: “You feel me I—I—I’m admitting to—I’m admitting to going
in there looking for [my] pistol and my clothes, we ended up getting my
pistol—you feel me and that’s about it—you feel me? I beat—I beat—we beat
up on cuz—yeah we beat up on him. Yeah I beat up on him. Yeah that—
that’s what we did do—you feel me? But you’re gonna get me for assault—
okay I’ll take that—run it concurrent with my pistol charge you feel me? I
got a pistol charge I’m going down with hard with. So that I know—assault—
assault doesn’t mean nothing to me . . . you feel me?”
        B. Verdict and Sentence
        In September 2021, the jury found appellant guilty of first degree
burglary (count 2) and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 5). The jury
found the firearm enhancement on count 2 not true. The jury found
appellant not guilty on both counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(counts 3 and 4) but guilty of the lesser included misdemeanor assault (§ 240)

                                        4
on count 3.3 The jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery charged in
count 1, as to which the trial court declared a mistrial.
      In March 2022, appellant pleaded guilty in case No. 2101816 to
possession of a controlled substance in custody (§ 4573.6) on the condition
that the sentence would run concurrent to the sentence in case No. 2101667.
      In July 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term
of 30 years to life. Appellant timely appealed.
                               II. DISCUSSION
      A. Faretta Motion
      Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for
self-representation under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, after trial began. His
argument is unpersuasive.
            1. Background
      During jury selection, appellant moved for new counsel pursuant to
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Outside the prosecutor’s
presence, appellant complained that his attorney was being “allowed to
excuse jurors [that appellant] may not want him to excuse.” The trial court
explained to appellant that the law allowed the prosecutor to excuse jurors he
might not want counsel to excuse, and that the court could excuse jurors for
cause and hardship and appellant’s counsel “doesn’t have much of a choice
about that.” The court further explained that once peremptory challenges
started, appellant could give his attorney input on which jurors to exclude,
although the ultimate tactical decision would rest with counsel. Appellant
responded, “I will fire him, and I will go by myself.”

3     During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged there was
insufficient evidence to prove count 4. The jury left blank the lesser-included
verdict form for that count.

                                        5
      The trial court found no cause to relieve counsel. The court stated:
“We haven’t even started exercising peremptory challenges yet. We haven’t
even started. Once we get started, I expect the two of you will consult about
it, and he may very well agree with you on all of those. [¶] If you have some
sincere concerns when we get into or through the peremptory challenge
process, then you can certainly raise that with me again.” The court denied
the Marsden motion without prejudice.
      The next day, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor advised
the trial court of a jail call in which appellant expressed interest in
representing himself or finding a new attorney. The prosecutor was
concerned “about the defendant’s right to represent himself or to have
counsel of his own choosing.”
      The trial court summarized for the record the prior day’s Marsden
hearing and appellant’s request for self-representation. The court then made
“a specific finding that the [Faretta] motion is untimely,” citing People v.
Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham) and People v. Lynch (2010) 50
Cal.4th 693 (Lynch), because the attorneys declared they were ready for trial,
counsel were in fact prepared for trial, and “we are in the midst of jury
selection” on the second day of jury voir dire. As a “sidenote,” the court
observed that jury selection during the COVID pandemic was particularly
difficult and substantial effort had been expended to acquire a jury since
appellant had not waived time. As for the criteria for handling untimely
Faretta motions under Windham, the court noted that appellant had two
strikes and faced a potential life sentence, in limine motions had already
been heard and decided, jury selection was ongoing, and “there is nothing [in
the transcript of the Marsden proceeding] that would suggest that the quality
of representation is such that it would justify a request for

                                        6
self[-]representation.” The court concluded, “for all of those circumstances, a
request for self[-]representation at this point is not only untimely but
inappropriate.”
      Defense counsel immediately advised that appellant “would like to
disqualify the judge,” acknowledging that counsel was “not aware of any
factors pursuant to [section] 170.1.” The trial court denied the
disqualification request, noting appellant’s “fundamental misunderstanding
of the court process and the role of the Court.”
      In response, appellant personally stated, “I don’t wish to be represented
by [defense counsel] any longer. You can take me upstairs. This is over.”
The trial court gave appellant a 15-minute break to think further about his
request to represent himself. Upon his return to the courtroom, appellant
asserted: “I want it on the record, I am present, and I do not want to be
represented by [defense counsel] or anyone else. I am not asking for a
continuance, so there would be no delay, and the reason for the untimely
manner does not come into act [sic]. And if [defense counsel] is to be present,
he is to be behind me or under me as an adviser in my constitutional right to
represent myself.”
            2. Law
      A defendant in a state criminal trial has a federal constitutional right
to self-representation. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) To invoke this
unconditional right, the defendant “should make an unequivocal assertion of
that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”
(Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127–128, italics added.) When “a motion
to proceed pro se is timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant
to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and
intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might

                                       7
appear to be.” (Id. at p. 128; see Faretta, at pp. 835–836; People v. Dent
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217.)
      As the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however,
“Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (Lynch, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 722; People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499–500; see, e.g.,
People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102 [Faretta motion made before jury
selection untimely].) “When a motion for self-representation is not made in a
timely fashion prior to trial, self-representation no longer is a matter of right
but is subject to the trial court’s discretion.” (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at
p. 128; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 959.)
      In exercising its discretion whether to grant an untimely request for
self-representation, the trial court shall inquire into the facts underlying the
request and should consider, among any other relevant factors, “[1] the
quality of counsel’s representation, [2] the defendant’s prior proclivity to
substitute counsel, [3] the reasons for the request, [4] the length and stage of
the proceedings, and [5] the disruption or delay which might reasonably be
expected following the granting of such a motion.” (Windham, supra, 19
Cal.3d at pp. 128–129.)
            3. Analysis
      The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s Faretta motion as
untimely. The motion was not brought within a reasonable time before trial,
but after the court had already decided in limine motions, a prospective jury
pool had been summoned, jury selection had begun, and jurors were being
excused for hardship and cause. (See People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 102 [Faretta motion made before jury selection untimely]; People v.
Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 502 [motion brought two weeks before
scheduled trial date was untimely]; People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780,

                                        8
791 [Faretta motion made six days before trial was untimely]; People v.
Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 690 [Faretta motion untimely when made
after “a full day of voir dire” and at the end of preliminary jury instructions].)
Whether to grant appellant’s motion was therefore in the trial court’s
discretion.
      Appellant fails to show an abuse of discretion. Acknowledging
Windham, the trial court observed that defense counsel was providing
adequate representation and that appellant’s concerns about his counsel
having tactical control over peremptory challenges had not come to “fruition.”
Although appellant had not previously substituted counsel, his Faretta
motion came immediately after the denial of his Marsden motion, indicating
his Faretta motion was likely a negative reaction to the Marsden denial and
an attempt to circumvent it. (See People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197,
1205 (Scott) [fact that defendant immediately moved to represent himself
after the trial court denied his Marsden motion contributed to the conclusion
that his request was equivocal].) As for appellant’s purported reason for the
request, the trial court noted that appellant’s sole concern was a belief
counsel was excusing jurors without consulting him, which merely reflected
appellant’s misunderstanding of procedure and counsel’s tactics. (See Scott,
at p. 1207; People v. Wilkins (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 299, 309, fn. 4 [mere
disagreement with counsel's trial tactics is an insufficient reason to grant an
untimely Faretta request].) As to the length and stage of the proceedings,
appellant’s request was made well after jury voir dire had begun and after
great effort had already been made to obtain a jury pool.4 And while

4     As a “sidenote,” the court observed that “jury selection in the time of
the COVID pandemic, where we are right now, is particularly difficult. The
number of jurors that are willing to participate is incredibly diminished, and
so substantial effort has to be made in acquiring a jury.” The court also

                                        9
appellant had not requested a continuance, his courtroom behavior suggested
that disruption would follow if he represented himself. Despite the court’s
explanation of jury selection, appellant responded that he would fire his
attorney and represent himself (and ultimately sought to disqualify the
judge), indicating he not only misunderstood the court process, he also would
likely have difficulty abiding by the court’s rules.
      Appellant argues that his request was timely because “federal circuit
courts have held ‘a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury
is empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay.’ ” (Quoting
Fritz v. Spaulding (9th Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 782, 784.) However, “this is not,
and never has been, the law in California.” (People v. Jackson, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 690.) When a defendant has chosen to proceed to trial, a request
for self-representation is addressed to the court’s discretion. (Windham,
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.)
      Appellant also cites People v. Herrera (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 167
(Herrera) for the proposition that “ ‘even a Faretta motion made on the day of
trial is not untimely per se.’ ” However, Herrera did not hold that a
day-of-trial Faretta motion would always be timely—a notion rejected by our
Supreme Court. It assumed a Faretta motion was untimely and ruled that
the trial court abused its discretion by making “no attempt to comply with
the mandate of the Windham court” to inquire into the factors underlying the
request, so there was no adequate record to review the court’s decision. (Id.
at p. 174.) Here, by contrast, the trial court considered and analyzed the
motion under the Windham standards.

considered the complexity and seriousness of the case, recognizing that
appellant faced a life sentence if convicted. The court in Windham indicated
that its list of factors was not exhaustive. (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at
pp. 128–129.)

                                        10
      Contrary to the People’s depiction in their respondent’s brief, the
appellate court in Herrera did go on to rule that the Faretta motion “was not
untimely” because the defendant had brought the motion before the jury was
selected and had not sought a continuance of the trial. (Herrera, supra, 104
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1174–1175.) Whether a Faretta request is timely, however,
is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. The court may consider the totality
of the circumstances, including the time between the motion and the
scheduled trial date, whether counsel is ready to proceed, the number and
availability of witnesses, the complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial
proceedings, and whether the defendant had an earlier opportunity to assert
his right of self-representation. (People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 500.) Appellant fails to establish that the trial court in this case abused its
discretion in light of these factors.
      B. Rejection of Midtrial Plea Agreement
      Appellant contends the trial court erred by rejecting a plea bargain he
purported to accept pursuant to section 1192.5 after the prosecution
presented its evidence. His contention lacks merit.
             1. Background
      After the prosecution rested its case, defense counsel and the
prosecutor stated for the record that appellant was agreeable to a plea
bargain that the prosecutor had offered before trial, and that the trial judge
had indicated it was too late for a negotiated settlement. The trial judge then
explained he had “gone back and forth” on whether to accept the plea and had
consulted with the presiding judge. The trial judge concluded that “it comes
down to an issue of policy more than anything,” since the offer was made
before trial began, substantial effort had been expended in bringing the case
to trial, the court had spent enormous resources during “COVID” to assemble

                                        11
and swear a jury, extensive resources of the court, counsel, and jury had been
expended during the trial, and it would send the wrong message to suggest
an offer made before trial could be accepted after all of that effort.
             2. Court’s Discretion to Reject Untimely Plea Bargain
      The parties may, pursuant to section 1192.5, enter into a proposed plea
agreement that specifies the punishment the defendant will receive. The
plea bargain has no effect, however, until approved by the trial court. (In re
Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 941; see § 1192.5.) Whether to approve or
reject a plea bargain is within the court’s discretion. (People v. Morris (1979)
97 Cal.App.3d 358, 363.)
      In exercising this discretion, a trial court may impose reasonable time
limitations on proposed plea agreements and decline to approve those that
are untimely. (People v. Cobb (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 578, 584–587 (Cobb)
[upholding rejection of plea bargain that was untimely under a local rule
barring plea bargains after the trial readiness conference].) Policy interests
justifying strict adherence to such a deadline include the proper scheduling of
cases and saving the “ ‘time, difficulty and expense to jurors and witnesses
who would otherwise have to be summoned needlessly to attend court
sessions.’ ” (Id. at p. 583.)
      Here, the trial court considered the proposed plea agreement under the
circumstances of appellant’s case, concluding it was too late after trial began
for appellant to accept a plea offer he could have accepted before the trial
began. The court considered the difficulty in seating a jury, as well as the
judicial and party resources expended in trying the matter, including the
presentation of the People’s witnesses.
      Appellant nonetheless relies on the dissenting opinion in Cobb, which
stated that, “regardless of when a plea bargain is presented to a court, the

                                        12
court must exercise its discretion by considering the bargain in light of the
substantive facts of the case; it may not reject the bargain out of hand solely
because of the tardiness of its presentation under a local rule.” (Cobb, supra,
139 Cal.App.3d at p. 589 (dis. opn. of Franson, J.).)
      A dissenting opinion, however, has no precedential value. To the
extent the dissent reflected one jurist’s view that untimeliness, by itself, is
not enough to reject a plea bargain, the majority in Cobb held otherwise.
(Cobb, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 585.) In the 40 years since Cobb, no
published decision has disagreed with the majority opinion or adopted the
idea that a court cannot reject a plea bargain on the ground it was untimely.
(See People v. Loya (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 932, 947 [a “court may set a deadline
in the pretrial process for the acceptance of a plea bargain to facilitate
effective calendar management”].)
      In any event, the dissent in Cobb is inapposite because the trial court
here did not “reject the bargain out of hand solely because of the tardiness of
its presentation under a local rule.” (Cobb, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 589
(dis. opn. of Franson, J.), italics added.) Instead, the trial court based its
ruling on the circumstances of appellant’s case.
      Recognizing there was no pre-existing policy barring plea bargains
after the start of trial here, appellant next claims the trial court “decided to
create and implement a new local policy prohibiting mid-trial plea
agreements.” Similarly, he contends the court created a “policy” that
“automatically” prohibited midtrial pleas, thus removing the court’s
discretion.
      Nothing in the record supports appellant’s assertion. While the trial
court used the word “policy” in explaining its ruling, it was obviously
referring to matters of public policy, not to a new rule that would apply to

                                        13
every mid-trial plea bargain in every proceeding regardless of the
circumstances. To the contrary, the court explicitly considered the difficulty
obtaining jurors under the circumstances of the pandemic (and presumably
that those jurors, if the plea bargain had been accepted earlier, could have
been used to empanel a jury for another case), and the time and resources
expended by the court, the parties, the witnesses, and the jury during the
trial to that point. As appellant acknowledges, those are factors that apply
when a plea is offered midtrial. How those factors might be weighed in any
given case is a matter for the trial court’s discretion.
      In any event, Cobb held that even a bright-line rule prohibiting plea
bargains after the readiness conference was a proper limitation on the court’s
discretion to accept or reject a plea bargain. (Cobb, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at
p. 581.) Appellant fails to establish error.
            3. Constitutional Arguments
      Appellant contends the rejection of his plea bargain violated his rights
to due process and equal protection. His contention fails.
      Appellant did not object to the rejection of his plea bargain on
constitutional grounds in the trial court, so respondent argues that his
challenge is forfeited. (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 290.) In his
reply brief, appellant counters that “[a] defendant is not precluded from
raising for the first time on appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of
certain fundamental, constitutional rights,” quoting People v. Vera (1997) 15
Cal.4th 269, 276, disapproved on other grounds in People v. French (2008) 43
Cal.4th 36, 47, fn. 3.) We need not resolve the forfeiture issue, because we
proceed to the merits of the constitutional claims to forestall a contention of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282.)

                                        14
      Appellant contends his due process rights were violated because there
was no “pre-existing local rule” that midtrial plea bargains would be rejected,
and because he was not notified that the trial court would “automatically
reject a plea agreement once the trial commenced.” His argument is
meritless. Contrary to his assertion, the court did not “automatically” reject
the plea bargain but considered the plea bargain based on the circumstances
of the case. Moreover, case law gave appellant ample notice that a court
would not be obligated to accept a plea bargain that the defendant waited
until mid-trial to accept. (E.g., Cobb, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 584–587.)5
      As for his equal protection claim, appellant argues that a policy
prohibiting mid-trial plea agreements violates equal protection because
similarly situated defendants in other counties can enter into mid-trial plea
agreements. More specifically, he argues that he “is similarly situated to a
defendant in another county, facing the same charges, who wishes to enter a
plea mid-trial,” and the court in that other county “would exercise its
discretion by considering whether to accept or reject the plea within the
context of the facts of the case,” but “here, pursuant to the newly created
policy by the trial court, no discretion was exercised; rather, the mid-trial
plea agreement was automatically and mechanically rejected.”
      Appellant’s argument is untenable. He again relies on the premise that
Humboldt County enacted a “policy” of “automatically and mechanically”
rejecting mid-trial plea bargains, but there was no such policy. Furthermore,
to establish an equal protection violation, a defendant must show “that the
state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated

5     Appellant also argues that the rejection of the plea agreement
exclusively on the basis of his late acceptance violated due process. He
provides no authority for that proposition.

                                       15
groups in an unequal manner.” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530.)
Appellant fails to demonstrate that the state (or Humboldt County) has
adopted a classification affecting similarly situated groups differently
depending on the county. Even if Humboldt County Superior Court had
enacted a rule applicable to defendants in its own jurisdiction, it is not
responsible for disparities in other counties arising from the actions of other
superior courts.6 Nor has appellant established from the appellate record
that defendants in other counties were similarly situated yet treated
differently than appellant, or that any other county had a policy allowing
midtrial plea bargains at the time of the trial court’s decision in this case.
(See Cobb, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 581, 586–587 [noting inconsistencies
in plea bargain practices among counties, while rejecting an equal protection
argument].) Appellant fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation.
      C. Decision Not to Object to Amanda G.’s Testimony
      Appellant contends defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to testimony by Amanda G. that she had been threatened by appellant’s
brother before trial. He recognizes that evidence of threats against a witness
are relevant to the witness’s credibility, but he argues that his counsel should
have objected that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code
section 352 because it suggested that he was behind his brother’s threats.
His contention has no merit.

6     Appellant does not assert an equal protection claim on the ground
Humboldt County impermissibly distinguished between plea bargains
accepted before trial and plea bargains accepted during trial. Defendants
who attempt to accept a plea bargain before trial are not similarly situated
with those who wait to accept one during trial.

                                        16
             1. Background
      Amanda G. was called as a witness by the prosecution. At the
beginning of the prosecutor’s direct examination, the following exchange
occurred. “Q. Are you nervous about being here and testifying today? [¶] A.
Yeah. [¶] Q. Why is that? [¶] A. Because of, like, my being at risk, you
know, like somebody, you know, like attacking me or whatever because of it.
[¶] Q. And why do you think that would happen? [¶] A. Because I have
seen that happen, you know, with certain cases, you know. [¶] Q. Have you
been threatened at all with regard to this case? [¶] A. Um, a little while
back a car had driven by, and it was his—[appellant]’s older brother, and he
had me come and in and testify and said, ‘I’m going to get you’ and drove off.
[¶] . . . [¶] Q. You are indicating [appellant]’s brother drove by and did some
sort of gesture or something and threatened you? [¶] A. Yeah.” Defense
counsel did not object to Amanda G.’s testimony.
             2. Law and Analysis
      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant
must show that counsel’s performance was (1) deficient, in that it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,
and (2) prejudicial, in that there is a reasonable probability the result would
have been more favorable to appellant but for counsel’s failings. (Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552,
561.) If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act, the
claim generally must be rejected unless there is no possible satisfactory
explanation for counsel’s conduct. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th
264, 266.)
      Appellant fails to establish deficient performance by counsel. Evidence
that a witness may be afraid to testify due to threats against a witness “may

                                       17
be admissible whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant.”
(People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1087.) Evidence Code section 352
requires a showing that the probative value was “substantially outweighed”
by “substantial danger of undue prejudice” (Evid. Code, § 352, italics added),
and appellant presents no authority that the evidence here was sufficiently
inflammatory to meet that standard (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
188, 205 [“prejudice” referred to in § 352 pertains to “ ‘ “ ‘ "evidence which
uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an
individual and which has very little effect on the issues” ’ ” ’ ”]). It is not
deficient performance for “counsel to fail to register a meritless objection.”
(People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 309.)
      Moreover, the absence of objections to evidence reflects “tactical
decisions on counsel’s part and seldom establish a counsel’s incompetence.”
(People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 158.) Here, trial counsel may have
reasonably concluded that the objection would likely be overruled and did not
want to draw the jury’s attention to the testimony. (See People v. Wharton
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) While appellant argues in his reply brief that his
attorney “could easily have asked to approach the bench and lodged the
objection outside the presence of the jury,” asking to approach the bench and
discussing the issue with the court after the prosecutor’s question and before
the witness’s answer, would have drawn undesirable attention to the
testimony too.
      In any event, appellant fails to demonstrate the prejudice required for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as there is no reasonable
probability appellant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial
if counsel had objected and the objection had been sustained. (Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) The jury convicted appellant only on counts where

                                         18
Amanda G.’s testimony was corroborated by independent evidence such as
appellant’s admissions, video surveillance, and police searches. As to those
counts, the evidence overwhelmingly proved appellant’s guilt.
      D. Decision Not to Object to Testimony About Felony Car Stop
      Officer Rodes testified that he conducted a felony car stop on Craig’s
Honda Pilot on November 8, 2020, because the car had been reported stolen.
Appellant contends his lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to the
testimony on the ground it was “more prejudicial than probative” under
Evidence Code section 352.
      Appellant fails to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. The
evidence that the vehicle had been reported stolen was relevant to Officer
Rodes’s credibility because it explained why he not only detained appellant
but also searched appellant and searched and seized the vehicle. Defense
counsel could have reasonably believed that this probative value was not
“substantially outweighed” by “substantial danger of undue prejudice” (Evid.
Code, § 352), because the fact the vehicle was reported stolen did not confirm
it was stolen or suggest that appellant stole it, especially when the registered
owner (Craig) and appellant knew each other. Furthermore, even if an
objection to the evidence (or motion to strike) would have been meritorious,
trial counsel could have reasonably concluded it was better not to call
attention to the testimony with an objection or motion.
      Appellant contends Officer Rodes “could easily have testified to the stop
of [appellant] and the search of the vehicle without providing a basis for the
stop.” In his reply brief, he similarly contends the officer “could easily have”
testified that the purpose of the stop was to “investigate a legal violation”
rather than that the car was stolen. Both arguments miss the point. The
question is not whether the officer could have testified to something else, but

                                       19
whether appellant has shown that his counsel should have objected to the
question or testimony that was given, and that counsel lacked an adequate
reason not to object. Appellant fails in that regard.
      Furthermore, appellant has not shown that the absence of an objection
was prejudicial. As mentioned, the jury convicted appellant only on counts he
admitted or were corroborated by video surveillance and supported by
overwhelming evidence. There is no reasonable probability the jury would
not have convicted him on those counts merely because it was unaware the
vehicle he was later seen driving was reported to be stolen.
      E. Cumulative Prejudice
      Appellant contends the “foregoing” errors resulted in cumulative
prejudice. Because we have found no error, appellant’s claim of cumulative
prejudice fails too.
      F. Section 654
      At sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life on
appellant’s burglary conviction (count 2) and a concurrent four-year term on
his felon-in-possession conviction (count 5). Appellant contends that because
the jury did not convict him of robbery or felony assault, his felonious intent
in committing the burglary must have been to possess a firearm, so his
punishment for the firearm possession should have been stayed pursuant to
section 654. He is incorrect.
      Under section 654, “ ‘[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in
different ways by different provisions [of law] may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case [shall the act or omission] be punished
under more than one’ ” provision. The statute prohibits punishment for two
crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Latimer
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1207–1208.) Whether a course of conduct is indivisible

                                       20
for purposes of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.
(Ibid.)
      If all the defendant’s offenses are incidental to one objective, the
defendant may be punished for only one of them. (People v. DeVaughn (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1112; see People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116,
130 [defendant cannot be punished for both a burglary and the felony he
intended in perpetrating the burglary].) If the defendant entertained
multiple criminal objectives, independent of each other, the defendant may be
punished for each violation. (People v. DeVaughn, at p. 1112.) The issue is
thus whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the
defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives. (Id. at p. 1113; People v.
Nelson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638 [whether or not trial court makes an
express finding].)
      Here, the jury was instructed that a “burglary was committed if the
defendant entered with the intent to commit theft or robbery or assault with
a semi-automatic firearm or possession of a firearm after having been
convicted of a felony.” (Italics added.) The jury was therefore authorized to
convict appellant of burglary based on any of those criminal objectives, and
there was evidence to support the conclusion that appellant entered the motel
room to accomplish each of them.
      In particular, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that
appellant entered the motel room with an intent to commit robbery. The
surveillance video showed appellant and his cohort crouching outside the
motel room, wearing sunglasses, face masks, and hoods. Appellant had his
hand in his jacket as if he were pulling out a gun. In a call from jail,
appellant “admit[ed] to going in there looking for [his] pistol and [his] clothes”
and beating up J.L. (Italics added.) Appellant attacked J.L. as soon as

                                       21
appellant entered the room. Because substantial evidence supported the
conclusion that appellant entered the motel room harboring an intent to
rob—a felonious intent besides possessing the firearm—appellant could be
punished for both the burglary conviction and the conviction for his
possession of a firearm.
      Appellant contends the acquittal on the charge of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm and the mistrial on the robbery charge preclude a
finding that he intended to perpetrate those felonies when he entered the
motel room. Not so. In the first place, the count 1 robbery charge was for
robbery in concert with two or more other persons (§ 213(a)(1)(A)); the jury
may have been undecided on that count because they were unsure if Craig
had been a knowing participant, not because they thought appellant had not
committed a robbery. Furthermore, although the jury did not find that
appellant completed those crimes, it also did not find that appellant lacked an
intent to commit them when he entered the motel room. Appellant fails to
demonstrate error.
      G. Romero Motion to Strike Prior Strikes (§ 1385, subd. (a))
      Appellant received a sentence of 25 years to life on his burglary
conviction pursuant to the three strikes law. He contends the court erred in
denying his motion to strike one or both of his prior strike convictions
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a) and People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). His contention has no merit.
      The trial court may strike a prior strike allegation “in furtherance of
justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) To do
so, the court must determine that justice would be furthered “in light of the
nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent convictions, and the particulars of his background,

                                       22
character, and prospects.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
Because the intent of the three strikes law is to ensure longer prison
sentences for career criminals, it is only in the “extraordinary” circumstance
that a defendant who has committed numerous offenses will fall outside the
spirit of the scheme. (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 332.)
      We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371.) “Where the record demonstrates
that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial
decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial
court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.”
(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
      Here, in denying appellant’s motion, the trial court outlined its
thorough consideration of the issue in a passage covering over eight pages of
reporter’s transcript. Despite liking appellant and trying “very diligently to
come to consider a sentence short of what is proposed in the probation
officer’s report,” the court concluded that striking the priors would not be
appropriate given appellant’s substantial criminal history and the fact that
the current offense indicated “a planning, discussion, a premeditation, . . . not
something that simply [appellant] fell into,” as well as a “fascination that
[appellant] seems to show towards firearms.” The court noted appellant’s
“numerous prior felony convictions, numerous violations on probation,
numerous violations of post release community supervision, trips to state
prison, and now a third prior strike offense.”
      Appellant argues that one of his two prior strike convictions should
have been stricken because they arose from the same act against the same
victim. (See, e.g., People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638–639.)
However, the trial court explicitly found that the underlying acts—burglary

                                       23
and making criminal threats—were separate strikes for purposes of the three
strikes law. Appellant fails to demonstrate otherwise.
      In addition, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion
because his prior convictions besides the two prior strikes were “either
drug-related offenses, many offenses that would now be considered
misdemeanors, or minor non-violent offenses,” so the trial court’s
characterization of his criminal history “paint[ed] a picture that is much
harsher than the reality.” But appellant proves how extensive his criminal
history was by listing it in a footnote. Besides his two prior strike
convictions, appellant was convicted in 2011 of transportation/sale of
narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); in 2012 of possession or
purchase for sale of narcotics (id., § 11351); in 2013 of possession of narcotics
(id., § 11350; also in 2013 of possession of narcotics (id., § 11350); also in 2013
of flight from a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)); and in
2016 of vehicle theft (id., § 10851, subd. (a)) and driving on a suspended
license (id., § 14601.1, subd. (a)). He also suffered a juvenile disposition for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a)) and a probation violation in that case.
      Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the denial of his motion to strike
his prior strike convictions.7

7      Appellant contends the trial court erred in not striking “both prior
serious felony enhancements” (§ 667, subdivision (a)). As appellant
acknowledges, his written Romero motion did not explicitly ask to strike the
priors for purposes of a section 667 enhancement. His argument is therefore
forfeited. Furthermore, appellant fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel: even if counsel had made the request, there is no reasonable
probability that the trial court would have stricken the priors for purposes of
the proposed section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements, given its decision not
to strike the priors for purposes of the three strikes law. To the extent
appellant challenges the failure to dismiss the enhancements on other

                                        24
      H. Serious Felony Enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a))
      In addition to the 25-year-to-life term for burglary (based on the prior
strikes for burglary and criminal threats), the trial court imposed a
consecutive five-year term for one of those prior serious felony convictions
and a concurrent five-year term for the other, pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a). In his supplemental opening brief, appellant argues that
because both felonies underlying the enhancements were charged in the same
prior case, the court “erred by ordering one of the enhancements to run
concurrently instead of striking one of the enhancements.” As respondent
acknowledges, appellant is correct.
      Section 667, subdivision (a) applies to any “person convicted of a
serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony” and
establishes “a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on
charges brought and tried separately.” (Italics added. See In re Harris (1989)
49 Cal.3d 131, 136.) Because “the finding that two serious priors existed was
itself erroneous,” one of the prior serious felony findings must be vacated.
(People v. Jones (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1417, italics in original.) We
will vacate the prior serious felony enhancement that the trial court had
ordered to run concurrently.8
      I. Serious Felony Enhancements – Dismissal (§ 1385, subd. (c))
      Appellant also contends the trial court should have dismissed both of
the prior serious felony enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c).

grounds, we address those issues next.

8     The trial court erred in imposing this enhancement concurrently,
because “[t]he terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run
consecutively.” (§ 667, subd. (a). Italics added.) The error is moot because
we are vacating the enhancement.

                                       25
Appellant forfeited this claim, and his assertion of ineffective assistance is
meritless.
      Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so . . . . (2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)–(2).)
      As relevant here, “subparagraphs (A) to (I)” of section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) include the following: “(C) The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed. [¶] . . . [¶] (H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15;
see also Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Appellant contends the convictions
underlying his serious prior felony enhancements were older than five years
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), his sentence in the case was over 20 years (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H)), and the trial court did not make an express finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety.
             1. Forfeiture
      At the sentencing hearing in July 2022, appellant did not ask the trial
court to dismiss the serious felony enhancement allegation or strike the
punishment based on section 1385, subdivision (c). He therefore forfeited his

                                         26
argument on appeal. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th 367, 375–376
[failure to request dismissal under § 1385, subd. (a), forfeits the issue]; People
v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351–354 [claims involving exercise of sentencing
discretion cannot be raised for the first time on appeal].)
            2. Ineffective Assistance
      Appellant contends counsel was ineffective for not arguing that section
1385, subdivision (c) required dismissal of the prior serious felony
enhancements. He fails to demonstrate any reasonable probability of a
different outcome if the argument had been made.
      Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) provides that an enhancement “shall
be dismissed” if “[t]he application of [the] enhancement would result in a
sentence over 20 years.” (Italics added.) Here, appellant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life for burglary and five consecutive years
for the serious felony enhancement. Section 669 provides: “Whenever a
person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run
consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term
of imprisonment shall be served first.” Thus, appellant is deemed to serve his
five-year enhancement before his 25 years to life term, and the sentence
length beyond 20 years is not the “result” of the enhancement. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(C).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not apply here.
      Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) pertains if “[t]he enhancement is
based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” Appellant’s prior
offenses occurred in October 2015, and the current offense occurred just over
five years later in November 2020. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H),
however, does not require automatic dismissal of an enhancement.
      Indeed, as appellant recognizes, it has been repeatedly held that trial
courts retain discretion over the decision to strike enhancements, even in the

                                        27
context of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) and its language that the
enhancement “shall be dismissed.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 297; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 241, review granted
Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098
(Ortiz), review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87
Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21; People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396
(Walker), review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.) In other words, nothing in
subdivision (c) of section 1385 requires a trial court to dismiss an
enhancement solely because there exists a mitigating factor enumerated in
subdivision (c)(2) of the statute.9
      There is a conflict in the case law, currently before our Supreme Court,
as to the extent of the trial court’s discretion not to dismiss an enhancement
despite proof of a mitigating circumstance enumerated in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2). In Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 396–398, the court
ruled that the mitigating circumstance results in a rebuttable presumption
favoring dismissal, which can be overcome by a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety. In Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1097–1098, the
court concluded that the mitigating circumstance is afforded “great weight”
under subdivision (c)(2), but it can be outweighed by any sufficient
countervailing factors the court might consider in its exercise of discretion,
which might, but need not, include endangerment of public safety.
      We agree with Ortiz. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides that an
enhancement shall be dismissed only “if it is in the furtherance of justice to

9     Appellant argues that Mendoza and Lipscomb were wrongly decided.
We are not persuaded. In any event, as to the mitigating circumstance based
on the age of the priors under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H)—the only
mitigating circumstance available here—appellant acknowledges that the
circumstance does not result in an automatic dismissal of the enhancements.

                                       28
do so,” a broad concept that embraces the court’s exercise of discretion based
on a full range of relevant factors. A specific concern with public safety is
introduced in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), which provides that a
mitigating circumstance weighs greatly in favor of dismissal “unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” The
subdivision therefore relieves the trial court (or prohibits the trial court) from
weighing the circumstance greatly in favor of dismissal if the dismissal would
endanger the public, but it does not strip the trial court of its broader
discretion to conclude, in light of other countervailing information, that
dismissal of the enhancement would not be in “furtherance of justice” under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(1).
      Here, given the trial court’s careful consideration of appellant’s Romero
motion and its findings that the prior strikes should not be stricken under
section 1385, subdivision (a) due to appellant’s criminal history (and
fascination with firearms), appellant fails to show a reasonable probability
that the court would have stricken either serious felony enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c). Indeed, appellant barely qualified for a
mitigating circumstance under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) because his
prior strike convictions were just over five years old. Therefore, even if
defense counsel should have sought dismissal of the enhancements under
section 1385, subdivision (c), appellant has not established the prejudice
required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Moreover, as
discussed in the preceding section of this opinion, one of the enhancements is
being stricken because the enhancements are based on priors brought and
tried in the same case. We find no reasonable probability that the trial court

                                       29
would have stricken more than one of the enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c). Appellant fails to demonstrate prejudicial error.10
                                III. DISPOSITION
      We vacate the sentence enhancement that the trial court imposed
concurrently under section 664, subdivision (a). In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall enter a new abstract of judgment
consistent with this opinion.

10      Even if Walker stated the correct rule, and a mitigating circumstance
could be rebutted only if dismissal would endanger public safety, we would
still conclude that appellant has not established ineffective assistance of
counsel. Appellant’s criminal history was substantial, his prior strikes and
current convictions constituted violent felonies or crimes that risked or
threatened the personal safety of others, the trial court found that appellant
had premeditated his attack, and the court remarked on appellant’s
“fascination” with firearms, noting he was drawn to them “like a moth to the
light,” which “is just disaster waiting to happen.” While appellant argues
that dismissing an enhancement would not pose a danger to public safety
because he was already sentenced to an indeterminate life term, he fails to
show a reasonable probability that the court would have dismissed the
enhancements under either Walker or Ortiz.

                                       30
                                   CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

People v. Shirley / A165769

                              31