Court Opinion

ID: 9491492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:15:43.493261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:46.758615
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. GILMAN, J. (pp. 813-817), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
OPINION
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Alvin Jones appeals a district court order granting summary judgment for defendants in his prisoner’s civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that his segregation from the general prison population for an excessive period of time involves the deprivation of a state-created liberty interest without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
Plaintiff is currently an inmate at the Mansfield Correctional Institute. His complaint against Ohio correctional facility officials seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly sentenced to disciplinary and administrative segregation for an excessive period of time, therefore depriving him of a liberty interest, and that the procedures used to place and keep him in segregation are deficient.
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility during severe riots that erupted at the prison in 1993. Hostages were taken and nine inmates and one officer were murdered. Plaintiff was a maximum security inmate serving 15-25 years for aggravated robbery.
After the riot, plaintiff and 128 other inmates were transferred to Mansfield Correctional Institute. Upon their arrival, all Inmates were placed in nondisciplinary segregation, known as Security Control, while the circumstances of the riot at the Southern Ohio facility were investigated by a special prosecutor. In June 1993, all the transferred inmates were then placed in Administrative Control, which is more re*812strictive than Security Control. In accordance with established procedures, each inmate was afforded an opportunity to be heard. At plaintiffs hearing he refused to speak. After negotiations with prison officials, the inmates were placed back in Security Control in late 1993 and their records expunged of the Administrative Control placements.
During the course of the investigation into the riots, inmates were placed back in the general prison population if and when they were cleared of wrongdoing. As a result of the investigation, plaintiff was implicated in the murder of the prison officer. The Department of Corrections decided that until the investigation was concluded and the allegations against plaintiff resolved, he should remain segregated from the general population for safety reasons.
In December 1995, the special prosecutor informed the Department of Corrections that he was no longer actively investigating criminal charges against plaintiff and the Department could pursue administrative charges against him. Based on the information the Department of Corrections had concerning plaintiffs complicity in the murder of the prison officer, plaintiff was charged with violating the administrative prison rule that prohibits criminal conduct. .
A two-day hearing was held in January 1996 at which plaintiff and others testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Rules Infraction Board concluded that plaintiff and another inmate had strangled the prison officer. It was recommended that plaintiff be placed in Administrative Control thereafter.
II.
The key issue presented in this case is whether plaintiffs confinement in administrative segregation from the time of his initial transfer to Mansfield Correctional Institute until the administrative hearing in January of 1996, a period of approximately two and one-half years, violated the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff has not challenged his continued confinement in administrative segregation since the January 1996 hearing.
In order to determine whether segregation of an inmate from the general prison population involves the deprivation of a state-created liberty interest protected by the due process clause, courts are to determine if the segregation imposes an “atypical and significant” hardship on the inmate “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
Plaintiff contends that the extraordinarily long time during which he has been held in segregation establishes the “atypical and significant” hardship necessary under Sandin to create a liberty interest. First, administrative segregations have repeatedly been held not to involve an “atypical and significant” hardship implicating a protected liberty interest without regard to duration. See, e.g., Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir.1995); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997). Second, we note that under Ohio law, administrative segregation may continue for an “indefinite time period.” Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-13(A). Admittedly, few cases of segregation extend to the length of plaintiffs stay here. However, we agree with the district court that under Sandin a liberty interest determination is to be made based on whether it will affect the overall duration of the inmate’s sentence and there is no evidence here that the segregation will impact plaintiffs sentence.
The “atypical” length of plaintiffs stay in administrative segregation is with good reason. First he was placed in security control with all other transferred inmates. He then remained in administrative segregation for the duration of the investigation into the riots in which he played a significant role. At the conclusion of the investigation it was determined, after a hearing, that he had violated a prison rule by committing murder.
It is not “atypical” for a prisoner to be in segregation while his or her participation in violent conduct inside the prison walls is investigated. While the length of time that plaintiff has been in segregation may be atypical, it was justified and does not lead to the conclusion that plaintiff suffered an “atypical and significant” hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. When a prisoner is implicated in the killing *813of a prison guard during a large prison riot, it is not unreasonable for corrections officials to make some adjustment in the conditions of his or her imprisonment until a full and thorough investigation is completed.
In addition, the record demonstrates that the conditions of plaintiffs confinement do not rise to an “atypical and significant” hardship. Plaintiffs stays in administrative segregation and security control were not much different than that experienced by other inmates in segregation.
In sum, because the administrative, nondisciplinary segregation at issue here does not deprive plaintiff of a liberty interest without due process, we affirm the district court. We note that our holding here does not mean that every administrative segregation regardless of length or the reason for the segregation will not implicate a liberty interest. The facts of this case and the extraordinarily good reasons for holding plaintiff in segregation form the basis for this decision.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.