Court Opinion

ID: 9759890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:31:48.584487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:05.924626
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Majority that appellant’s counsel was not ineffective. However, because I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that appellant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in advising him to reject a plea offer is cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), I respectfully dissent.
Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(v) of the PCRA, a claim was cognizable if the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a “violation of the provisions of the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States which would require the granting of Federal habeas corpus relief to a State prisoner.” In order to be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the applicable provisions of the federal constitution and laws, appellant must establish (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the eomplained-of ineffective actions of counsel, the result of the proceeding would have *119been different. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). The Majority opinion does not address this two-part analysis, but instead bases its holding on Commonwealth v. Korb, 421 Pa.Super. 44, 617 A.2d 715 (1992), in which the Superior Court found that counsel was ineffective under Pennsylvania law for failing to advise his client that a plea offer had been made. However, there is a vast difference between that failure and the circumstances at hand, where counsel advised the client not to accept an offer based upon his professional opinion that the client would be acquitted because of the weakness of the prosecution’s case.
Based upon the evidence elicited at appellant’s trial, counsel had a reasonable basis for believing that appellant would be acquitted. Prior to trial, trial counsel had attempted to negotiate a guilty plea to a charge of simple assault by mutual combat, a third degree misdemeanor which carries a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(b)(1), 1104(3). The Commonwealth did not agree to such a plea, and the case proceeded to trial. However, at trial the victim testified that he had committed perjury at the preliminary hearing. Immediately after the victim testified, the Commonwealth offered the same plea bargain which trial counsel had attempted to secure prior to trial. Given the credibility questions raised by the admission to perjury by the Commonwealth’s key witness, as evidenced by the Commonwealth’s change of heart regarding the earlier plea offer to a third degree misdemeanor, counsel certainly had a reasonable basis to believe the appellant would be acquitted. As the Majority acknowledges on page 7 of the slip opinion, this advice was reasonable.
Because it was reasonable to believe that a jury could have found appellant not guilty given the circumstances of this case, appellant has failed to prove that counsel’s strategy fell below the standard such that he would be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. Because the first prong of the Lockhart test is not met, this claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. Moreover, notwithstanding the allegations of ineffectiveness leveled against trial counsel, appellant would have still been convicted *120had he accepted the plea offered to him. The only difference would have been the length of his possible maximum sentence. Since appellant fails to meet the second prong of the Lockhart test, this claim is not cognizable under the PCRA.
My research reveals only one case in which a federal court granted a writ of habeas corpus based solely on a claim that trial counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer and to proceed to trial was ineffective. In Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902, 109 S.Ct. 3208, 106 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989), petitioner’s counsel prior to trial had the benefit of knowing the sentences of petitioner’s two co-conspirators when he advised petitioner to reject a plea offer. One of petitioner’s co-conspirator’s had accepted a plea offer and had been sentenced to two years imprisonment, while the other had been convicted after trial and had received a sentence of seventy years imprisonment. Petitioner was offered the same plea agreement of two years imprisonment that the one co-conspirator received, but rejected it on counsel’s advice. Petitioner was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a term of life plus eighty years imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that counsel’s advice was incompetent and affirmed the district court’s order granting petitioner a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Factually, advising a client to reject a pre-trial plea offer which carries a substantially lighter sentence than that imposed on a coconspirator who has already been convicted and sentenced is not comparable to advising a client, based upon the attorney’s reasonable professional opinion that a conviction was not likely, to reject a plea agreement offer made mid-trial after the victim had admitted perjuring himself. The mere fact that appellant was nevertheless convicted does not impact on trial counsel’s effectiveness or the reasonableness of his advice. To so hold would be nothing more than, using the well-known sports metaphor, “Monday morning quarterbacking.”
The Majority’s reliance on Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.1981), is misplaced. In that case, counsel advised his client to withdraw his guilty plea and counsel *121assured his client that he would not be exposing himself to any greater sentence than the five years agreed to in the plea bargain. Counsel had no legal basis upon which to make that assurance. Acting on this advice, the defendant withdrew his guilty plea and counsel stipulated to all the elements of the crime at trial, arguing only that his client was not sane during the commission of the crime. The defendant was convicted and was later sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that trial counsel was ineffective because he “affirmatively misstated the consequences” of standing trial rather than accepting the plea offer. Id. at 266. Such a baseless assurance is clearly not analogous to counsel’s advice in the present case.
I would also note that any discussion on this issue is of limited applicability, since the provision under which the Majority analyzed the cognizability of appellant’s claim has been repealed, effective December 29,1995.
NIX, Former C.J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
NEWMAN, J., joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.