Court Opinion

ID: 2964725
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:09.083536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:00.502931
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1588

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                     PEDRO MURIEL A/K/A PEDRO JUAN REYES-MURIEL,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                     [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Scott A. Lutes for appellant.
            ______________
            Margaret E.  Curran, Assistant United  States Attorney, with  whom
            ___________________
        Sheldon  Whitehouse,  United  States Attorney,  and  Zechariah Chafee,
        ___________________                                  ________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 5, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   Defendant-appellant
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            Pedro  Muriel  appeals the  district  court's  denial of  his

            motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.  We affirm.      

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                      Muriel  was arrested  during  the  execution  of  a

            warrant to  search his  girlfriend's apartment.   When police

            entered  the  apartment on  September  14,  1995, they  found

            Muriel  standing in a  bedroom in his  underwear and reaching

            toward  the bed, upon which  police found a  loaded Smith and

            Wesson 10-millimeter  handgun under a pillow.   Muriel claims

            that he was not reaching for the gun but for his pants.  

                      Police had obtained the  warrant to search the two-

            bedroom  apartment  rented  by  Muriel's  girlfriend,  Ingrid

            Ostos, on  the basis  of information  provided by  a reliable

            informant previously used by  the police.  In the  bedroom in

            which they found Muriel and the gun, police also found $1,065

            in cash in a nightstand, an ammunition box containing sixteen

            live .45  caliber rounds, and some  personal papers belonging

            to  Muriel and  Ostos.   In the  other bedroom  they  found a

            plastic bag holding twenty-three glassine  packets containing

            traces of heroin and a small electronic scale.  

                      Muriel  had previously  been  convicted  for  other

            offenses.   At  the  time he  was arrested,  he was  facing a

            pending  violation of  a  probationary term  and a  suspended

            sentence  in Rhode  Island Providence County  Superior Court.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            In  the case  at bar,  Muriel was  indicted on  three counts:

            Count I,  violation  of 21  U.S.C.    841(a)  (possession  of

            heroin with intent to distribute),  Count II, violation of 18

            U.S.C.   924(c)(1) (using or carrying a firearm during and in

            relation  to   a  drug-trafficking  crime),  and  Count  III,

            violation  of  18  U.S.C.     922(g)  by  being a  "felon-in-

            possession" (i.e., possession of  a firearm after having been

            convicted of a felony).   Muriel entered a plea of not guilty

            to the charges at his arraignment, and the case was placed on

            the  trial calendar for December 1995.  On November 30, 1995,

            the  parties signed a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule

            of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B),  in which Muriel agreed to

            plead guilty  to Count  III (the  felon-in-possession charge)

            and the government agreed  to drop the other two  charges and

            recommend  to the court that  Muriel be sentenced  at the low

            end  of the applicable guideline  range.  The government also

            orally  agreed  not to  oppose  a  three-level reduction  for

            acceptance of responsibility.

                      Between the  time the  plea agreement was  accepted

            and Muriel's sentencing, the  Supreme Court decided Bailey v.
                                                                _________

            United  States, 116  S.  Ct. 501  (1995),  which altered  the
            ______________

            prevailing interpretation of  the term "use"  in 18 U.S.C.   

            924(c)(1),  one  of  the   offenses  with  which  Muriel  had

            originally  been  charged,  but  which  was  dropped  by  the

            government  pursuant  to the  plea  agreement.   18  U.S.C.  

                                         -3-
                                          3

            924(c)(1) provides,  in relevant  part, that any  person who,

            "during  and in  relation to  any crime  of violence  or drug

            trafficking crime . . . uses  or carries a firearm, shall . .

            .  be sentenced to imprisonment for five years  . . . ."   In

            Bailey, the Supreme  Court held that, in  order to constitute
            ______

            an offense under the  "use" prong of   924(c)(1),  there must

            be evidence  of  "active  employment" of  a  firearm  in  the

            commission  of the  predicate offense;  mere possession  of a

            firearm by  a person committing an offense is not sufficient.

            Id. at 505.    At  the sentencing  hearing  on  February  23,
            ___

            1996, Muriel  moved to vacate his  plea of guilty so  that he

            could move to  suppress evidence seized during  the search of

            September 14, 1995.   The district  court denied the  motion,

            and Muriel was subsequently  sentenced to thirty-three months

            in  prison, a three-year period of  supervised release, and a

            fine of $7,130.80.  He then timely filed this appeal.  

                      Muriel wants to withdraw his plea of  guilty to the

            felon-in-possession  charge.    He  argues that  he  did  not

            receive the benefit of his bargain in pleading guilty to this

            charge because the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, handed
                                                           ______

            down after Muriel had pled  guilty pursuant to the agreement,

            would nullify the 18  U.S.C.   924(c)(1) charge, Count  II of

            the indictment, which was  dropped by the government pursuant

            to  the plea agreement.  Muriel argues further that since the

            sentencing court was not convinced by a fair preponderance of

                                         -4-
                                          4

            the evidence on Count I, Count III is the  only viable charge

            left against him.  Appellant's Br. at 8.  

                      Muriel does  not request  a trial; indeed,  he does

            not profess his  innocence, but  wishes to file  a motion  to

            suppress evidence  in order  to challenge the  affidavit upon

            which  the search warrant which  led to the  discovery of the

            gun  was based.    Muriel thus  contends  that he  should  be

            permitted to  withdraw  his guilty  plea  in order  to  avail

            himself of another strategy in his defense. 

                                       ANALYSIS
                                       ANALYSIS

                      Muriel makes  two arguments  on appeal.   First, he

            contends  that the  district court  abused its  discretion in

            denying  his motion  to  withdraw  his  plea because  he  has

            asserted a fair and just reason for doing so.  Second, Muriel

            contends  that the  district court  committed clear  error in

            sentencing  him  by denying  him  a  downward adjustment  for

            acceptance of responsibility.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                      Muriel moved  to vacate  his guilty plea  before he

            was  sentenced.   Federal Rule  of Criminal  Procedure 32(e),

            which governs  plea withdrawals,  states, in  pertinent part:

            "If a motion to withdraw a  plea of guilty or nolo contendere

            is  made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit the

            plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just

            reason."  A  defendant has  no absolute right  to withdraw  a

                                         -5-
                                          5

            guilty plea.   See United  States v. Isom,  85 F.3d  831, 834
                           ___ ______________________

            (1st Cir.  1996); United  States v. Ribas-Dominicci,  50 F.3d
                              _________________________________

            76,  78  (1st  Cir.  1995).   Moreover,  a  district  court's

            decision granting or  denying a motion  to withdraw a  guilty

            plea  may  be reversed  only  upon  a demonstrable  abuse  of

            discretion.   See United  States v. Sanchez-Barreto,  93 F.3d
                          ___ _________________________________

            17, 23 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Arroyo-Reyes v.
                                    _____ ______ ___ ____ _______________

            United  States,  117  S.  Ct. 711  (1997);  United  States v.
            ______________                              _________________

            Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1994).     
            _______________

                      We  have  employed  four  criteria  in  determining

            whether a defendant has asserted a "fair and just" reason for

            withdrawing a guilty plea:  

                      (1)  the  plausibility  of   the  reasons
                      prompting the requested  change of  plea;
                      (2) the timing of the defendant's motion;
                      (3) the existence  or nonexistence of  an
                      assertion of innocence; and  (4) whether,
                      when  viewed  in  the  light  of emergent
                      circumstances,   the   defendant's   plea
                      appropriately  may  be  characterized  as
                      involuntary,   in   derogation   of   the
                      requirements  imposed by Fed. R. Crim. P.
                      11, or otherwise legally suspect.  

            Sanchez-Barreto, 93  F.3d at  23.  The  fourth consideration,
            _______________

            which  hinges on whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and

            intelligent,  is most  significant.  Ribas-Dominicci, 50 F.3d
                                                 _______________

            at 78.  

                      If, under this analysis, the defendant successfully

            meets  his burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason for

            withdrawing  his plea,  the  court must  inquire whether  the

                                         -6-
                                          6

            government will suffer  any demonstrable  prejudice from  the

            withdrawal of  the plea.   Parrilla-Tirado, 22  F.3d at  371.
                                       _______________

            Because  we find that Muriel  does not meet  his burden under

            this analysis,  however, we need not address  the question of

            prejudice.  See id. at 373  n.5; United States v. Doyle,  981
                        ___ ___              ______________________

            F.2d 591, 596 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992).  

            (1)  Plausibility
            (1)  Plausibility

                      Muriel  must  demonstrate  a  plausible  reason for

            withdrawing his guilty plea.  See Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at
                                          ___ _______________

            371.    Plausibility  cannot  just rest  on  Muriel's  second

            thoughts "'about  some fact or a  point of law, or  about the

            wisdom  of  his earlier  decision.'"   Isom,  85 F.3d  at 837
                                                   ____

            (quoting Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at 371).  Our review of the
                     _______________

            record supports the district court's assessment that Muriel's

            change  of  heart, while  "understandable,"  was  prompted by

            second thoughts about the wisdom of his decision to enter the

            plea agreement rather than file a motion to suppress evidence

            of the  gun.  Memorandum  and Order of  March 19, 1996  at 4.

            Muriel  advances  the  following  as  plausible  reasons  for

            withdrawing  his plea: (1) his motion to withdraw was not the

            product of  second thoughts  but was  prompted by  the Bailey
                                                                   ______

            decision; (2) an alleged defect in the warrant makes his plea

            suspect;  and  (3)  the plea  bargain  ceased  to  be to  his

            benefit.  We find none of these to be plausible reasons.     

             

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      By his own admission Muriel had second thoughts all

            along about his  strategic choice to plea bargain  because he

            had doubts about  the sufficiency of the  evidence upon which

            the search warrant  was based.   But Muriel  made a  tactical

            decision to forgo the warrant challenge because, at the time,

            he thought it was  in his best interests to  secure dismissal

            of the  most  serious  charge, 18  U.S.C.     924(c)(1)  (the

            "Bailey   charge"),  which  carries   a  five-year  mandatory
             ______

            sentence.   Appellant's  Memorandum in  Support of  Motion to

            Vacate  Plea of Guilty at 2.  Nearly three months later, when

            Muriel concluded  that circumstances had changed  such that a

            potential motion to  suppress seemed to be  a better strategy

            than his plea bargain, he decided that withdrawal of his plea

            was  in  order.   But,  as  we  have  already stated,  second

            thoughts do not constitute a plausible reason for withdrawal.

                      Muriel  also argues that  the information contained

            in  the affidavit  in  support  of  the  search  warrant  was

            insufficient to establish probable cause, and  that this is a

            plausible  reason for  withdrawing his  plea.   Specifically,

            Muriel contends  that the warrant "contained  lies," and that

            this  renders  his  plea  and conviction  "legally  suspect."

            Appellant's  Br. at 12.   But, as the  district court pointed

            out,  Muriel has  not  met his  burden  of showing  that  the

            affidavit did not sustain a finding of probable cause for the

                                         -8-
                                          8

            warrant.   Memorandum  and  Order of  March  19, 1996  at  5.

            Muriel has neither demonstrated  that, under the "totality of

            the  circumstances" test,  the  information contained  in the

            affidavit does not  show that there  was "a fair  probability

            that contraband or  evidence of a crime"  would be discovered

            at a specific  place, Illinois  v. Gates, 462  U.S. 213,  238
                                  __________________

            (1983), nor presented evidence of "deliberate falsehood or of

            reckless  disregard for the truth" on the part of the affiant

            detective, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).  
                       __________________

                      Aside  from  the  affidavit  itself  and  his  bare

            allegations  that  the   affidavit  contained  lies   by  the

            informant and  misstatements by the  investigating detective,

            Muriel  offers  no proof  that  probable cause  to  issue the

            warrant was lacking.   On the facts before us,  we cannot say

            that the  district court  abused its discretion  in rejecting

            Muriel's  argument that deficiencies  in the warrant rendered

            his plea legally suspect.1    We  add  that  Muriel   has  no

            argument  that he was   previously deprived of  the chance to

            file  a  motion to  suppress because  he  was unaware  of the

            facts.  To  the contrary, Muriel's decision to  plead guilty,

            rather  than  file  a  motion to  suppress,  was  a  tactical

            decision made months  before he moved  to withdraw his  plea.

                                
            ____________________

            1.    Although we review  the denial of a motion to  suppress
            de  novo, see United States  v. Zayas-Diaz, 95  F.3d 105, 111
            __  ____  ___ ____________________________
            n.6 (1st Cir. 1996),  we review the denial of  a pre-sentence
            motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            At the time Muriel pled guilty, he possessed all the relevant

            information  about  the  affidavit  that  he  now  claims  is

            defective.  This is not a  case where the defendant can point

            to newly-discovered  evidence.   Cf. United States  v. Ramos,
                                             ___ _______________________

            810 F.2d 308,  313 (1st  Cir. 1987) (finding  that the  lower

            court  did not  abuse  its discretion  in  refusing to  "give

            weight  to a  self-serving,  unsupported  claim of  innocence

            raised  judicially  for  the  first time  after  the  Rule 11

            hearing,"  particularly where the  defendants had not offered

            insight into  the substance of  the exculpatory information).

            We  conclude that  Muriel's unsupported claims  regarding the

            sufficiency of the search warrant  do not provide a plausible

            reason for withdrawal here.

                      Finally, Muriel argues that  he did not receive the

            benefit of his bargain because of Bailey's impact on his plea
                                              ______

            agreement, because  he  received no  downward adjustment  for

            acceptance of responsibility, and because he was sentenced at

            the higher  end of the applicable guideline range rather than

            the  lower  end.    We  have   frequently  stated  that  plea

            agreements are contractual in nature.  See Parrilla-Tirado 22
                                                   ___ _______________

            F.3d  at 371; United States v. Atwood, 963 F.2d 476, 479 (1st
                          _______________________

            Cir.  1992).   We  have  further explained  that  a defendant

            receives  some  "built-in" benefits  when  he  or she  pleads

            guilty and that,  barring material misrepresentation, default

            on a promise, or  breach of the agreement by  the government,

                                         -10-
                                          10

            no additional  consideration is required to  support a guilty

            plea.  Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at 371-72.       
                   _______________

                      Muriel's  memorandum in  support  of the  motion to

            withdraw his plea states that he ultimately decided to  forgo

            filing a motion to  suppress evidence of the gun  in exchange

            for the  chance to bargain  away the most  significant charge

            against  him, the  Bailey charge,  which carried  a mandatory
                               ______

            minimum of five years.  There was ample consideration for the

            agreement--in exchange for Muriel's guilty plea to Count III,

            the  government agreed  to drop  Counts I and  II and  not to

            oppose  a  reduction  in   his  sentence  for  acceptance  of

            responsibility.   Muriel cannot be permitted  now to withdraw

            his plea in  the hopes  of renegotiating a  better deal  just

            because Counts I and II later looked like weak charges.  

                      Although Muriel may believe that he did not receive

            any "built-in" benefits  of his bargain, his bargain was with

            the  government,   which  could  only   make  the   agreed-to

            recommendations  to the  court and  could not  guarantee that

            Muriel would  receive a  particular sentence.   Sentencing is

            within  the discretion of  the district court.   Moreover, as

            Rule 11(e)(1)(B) itself makes clear, a plea agreement of this

            kind is made with the "understanding that such recommendation

            or request  shall not be  binding upon the court."   We agree

            with  the district court that Muriel should not be allowed to

            vacate his guilty plea on this basis.

                                         -11-
                                          11

            (2)  Timing
            (2)  Timing

                      The  length of time  between the entry  of the plea

            and the  filing of the motion  to withdraw is a  factor to be

            considered.  Ramos, 810 F.2d at 312.  "Because the  timing of
                         _____

            a defendant's attempted plea  withdrawal is highly  probative

            of  motive, close scrutiny of the  chronology is important in

            adjudicating whether  retraction is  fair and just."   Doyle,
                                                                   _____

            981 F.2d at 595.  

                      Muriel moved  to withdraw his plea  on February 23,

            1996, over two  months after Bailey  was decided, and  almost
                                         ______

            three months  after  his  guilty  plea  was  entered.    This

            circuit's case  law counsels against withdrawal  after such a

            delay.   See Isom, 85 F.3d at 839 (two-month delay too long);
                     ___ ____

            Ramos, 810 F.2d at 313  (thirteen-day delay too long); United
            _____                                                  ______

            States  v. Keefe, 621 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1980) (three-week
            ________________

            delay  too long).  What is more significant, however, is that

            Muriel's motion to withdraw came one month  after the release

            of the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI Report"), which

            recommended a sentence of  30 to 37 months, and  found Muriel

            to  be  ineligible  for  probation.    If  timing  is  indeed

            probative  of motive,  then  it would  seem  that Muriel  was

            actually  prompted  to  move  to  withdraw  his  plea  by his

            disappointment  with  the  recommended  sentence  in the  PSI

            Report.

            (3)  Claim of Innocence
            (3)  Claim of Innocence

                                         -12-
                                          12

                      A defendant's assertion  of innocence  may cause  a

            court  to   look  favorably   upon  a  motion   to  withdraw.

            Conversely,  the lack of a claim of innocence weighs in favor

            of sustaining a guilty plea.  See Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d at
                                          ___ _______________

            373;  Doyle, 981 F.2d  at 596.   Muriel does not  claim to be
                  _____

            innocent of  the felon-in-possession charge to  which he pled

            guilty.  He admitted his guilt at the Rule 11 hearing and has

            not   asserted   otherwise  at   sentencing  or   on  appeal.

            Obviously, Muriel's  failure to  assert a claim  of innocence

            weighs against his contention that his reason for withdrawing

            his plea is fair and just.       

            (4)  Voluntary and Knowing Plea
            (4)  Voluntary and Knowing Plea

                      "[B]y   entering   a  guilty   plea,   a  defendant

            effectively waives  several constitutional rights.   For that

            waiver to  be valid, the plea must  amount to a voluntary and

            intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or

            privilege."  United States v. Gray, 63  F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir.
                         _____________________

            1995)  (citing United  States v.  Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d  1, 4
                           _______________________________

            (1st   Cir.),  cert.   denied,   116  S.   Ct.  94   (1995)).
                           _____   ______

            Accordingly, while  technical violations  of Rule 11  "do not

            count," violations of any of the three core concerns--absence

            of coercion,  understanding of the charges,  and knowledge of

            the consequences of the guilty plea--mandate that the plea be

            set aside.  Ribas-Dominicci, 50 F.3d at 78.
                        _______________

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Muriel  does  not  assert  that his  plea  was  not

            voluntarily entered or that he did not understand the Rule 11

            plea  colloquy.   Instead,  he claims  that,  at the  time he

            agreed to the plea bargain, he could not have known  that the

            Bailey decision would nullify Count II of the indictment, and
            ______

            that  therefore he  was  operating under  a false  assumption

            regarding the applicable law  when he entered his plea.   The

            argument that the change in  law rendered his plea  unknowing

            under  the law at  the time,  and that  he was  prejudiced in

            giving  up  the opportunity  to  challenge  the admission  of

            evidence (the gun) fails for several reasons.  

                      First,  there  are  no allegations  of  coercion or

            mistake, nor is there any evidence of such on the part of the

            government.  Second, the  record shows that Muriel understood

            the charges against him and that he was aware of the possible

            risks involved in  pleading guilty.  The district court found

            that at the change  of plea hearing, "Muriel was  apprised of

            the precise nature of the charge set forth in Count III,  the

            elements the government  was required  to prove  in order  to

            convict him, the sentence that could be imposed if his guilty

            plea  was accepted  and the  rights he  was relinquishing  by

            pleading  guilty."  Memorandum and Order of March 19, 1996 at

            7.   In  addition,  Muriel's plea  agreement  stated that  he

            understood  the constitutional  rights he  was relinquishing,

            and that he  understood that he had no right  to withdraw his

                                         -14-
                                          14

            plea in the event  the court did not accept  the government's

            sentencing  recommendations.    Muriel  acknowledged  that he

            signed  the agreement  and  understood its  contents, and  he

            concedes that he understood the Rule 11 colloquy.  

                      This  court  has  not  allowed  defendants,  absent

            coercion  or mistake,  to  renege on  plea agreements  on the

            basis that  they have miscalculated their  risks and benefits

            or have belatedly discovered a new defense.  United States v.
                                                         ________________

            Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1243 (1st Cir. 1991).  
            ______

                      In reaching a  plea bargain, a  defendant
                      assesses the likelihood of conviction and
                      balances   that   against  the   relative
                      severity  of the  sentence he  expects to
                      receive  pursuant  to  the agreement  and
                      that   which   could   be  imposed   upon
                      conviction.   In many cases, that process
                      results in a compromise pursuant to which
                      the defendant makes a  conscious decision
                      to  relinquish a perceived defense. . . .
                      To  hold  otherwise  would   render  plea
                      agreements and the pleas entered pursuant
                      to them meaningless.    

            Id. (collecting cases).
            ___

                      Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated in Brady v.
                                                                 ________

            United   States  that,  "absent  misrepresentation  or  other
            _______________

            impermissible conduct  by state  agents, a voluntary  plea of

            guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable
                                      ___________________________________

            law  does  not  become  vulnerable   because  later  judicial
            ___

            decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise."

            397  U.S.   742,  757  (1970)   (internal  citation  omitted)

            (emphasis  added).   Muriel's  post-hoc  determination  after
                                           ________

                                         -15-
                                          15

            Bailey  that  he  would be  better  off  filing  a motion  to
            ______

            suppress the gun and then bargaining anew with the government

            does not constitute grounds for vacating his plea.  

                      We do not believe that a district court abuses  its

            discretion by denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that

            is premised on the basis that a decision by the Supreme Court

            interpreting a  criminal statute  might affect a  count which
                                              _____

            was  dropped by agreement of the parties in the plea bargain.

            Other  circuits have  also  faced post-Bailey  plea-agreement
                                                   ______

            appeals, but in contrast to the case at bar, the guilty pleas

            that  have been vacated  or remanded involve  guilty pleas to

            the  Bailey-affected  charge.2    In  other  words,  Muriel's
                 ______

            assertion here  that he pled guilty under  a false assumption

                                
            ____________________

            2.  In ruling on the validity of  a guilty plea to a  Bailey-
                                                                  ______
            affected charge, the Fifth Circuit has explained that, "where
            intervening law has established that a defendant's actions do
            not constitute  a  crime  and  thus  that  the  defendant  is
            actually  innocent of  the charged  offense," a  defendant is
            permitted to attack a guilty plea.  United States v. Andrade,
                                                ________________________
            83 F.3d 729, 731  (5th Cir. 1996).  In Andrade, the defendant
                                                   _______
            pled  guilty to  a    924(c)(1) charge  in addition  to three
            other charges.  Determining  that there was no factual  basis
            for  the      924(c)(1)   offense,  the  court   vacated  the
            defendant's  conviction  and  sentence  on  that  charge  and
            remanded  to the district court.   See also  United States v.
                                               ___ ____  ________________
            Abdul, 75 F.3d 327 (7th Cir.),  cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2569
            _____                           _____ ______
            (1996).
                      But the case at bar differs fundamentally from such
            cases.    Here,  the  Bailey  decision  did  not  change  the
                                  ______
            interpretation of  a statute to which the  defendant had pled
            guilty;  rather,   it  affected  a  charge   dropped  by  the
            government  before Bailey was decided.  We are not faced with
                               ______
            a defendant who may have been sentenced for conduct which did
            not  constitute a federal offense, as  in Andrade.  Moreover,
                                                      _______
            Muriel  does  not  deny that  he  is  guilty  of the  offense
            charged.  

                                         -16-
                                          16

            about the law does not provide a fair and just reason because

            the change in law does not affect the charge to which he pled

            guilty,  but a  separate count  of the  indictment which  was

            dropped.  A case on point is United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d
                                         _______________________

            307  (8th Cir.  1996),  cert. denied,  No.  96-8236, 1997  WL
                                    _____ ______

            134752 (Apr. 14, 1997), in which the defendant pled guilty to

            a  drug-conspiracy  charge  in return  for  the  government's

            agreement to drop a   924(c)(1) charge, along with other drug

            offenses.  The  defendant did  not assert that  his plea  was

            unknowing, but argued that "a change in the law applicable to

            the  gun  charge  materially  altered  the  plea  agreement's

            basis."   Id. at 309.   On appeal, the Eighth Circuit decided
                      ___

            that the  possibility that the defendant's  conduct would not

            qualify  as an offense under    924(c)(1) in  light of Bailey
                                                                   ______

            did  not undermine his bargain with  the government where the

            defendant had  been indicted  on several other  charges which

            were dropped pursuant to the plea agreement.  Id.  
                                                          ___

                      We therefore need not  review the factual basis for

            the dropped Bailey charge against Muriel to determine whether
                        ______

            the district court was correct in concluding that it was "far

            from certain" that Bailey would nullify Count II.  Memorandum
                               ______

            and Order  of March 19, 1996 at 6.   It is sufficient to note

            that  Muriel's contention  that Count  II would  be nullified

            because of  Bailey is  not a  sure bet.   The district  court
                        ______

            found  that  "evidence  that  Muriel  had  a  firearm  within

                                         -17-
                                          17

            reaching distance and made  a movement toward it  when police

            entered  could be  sufficient to  establish that  he actively

            'used' the firearm."  Id. at 6.        
                                  ___

                      We conclude  that the district court  did not abuse

            its discretion  in refusing to  allow Muriel to  withdraw his

            guilty plea.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                      Muriel  also  contends  that  the   district  court

            committed  clear  error  by   not  awarding  him  a  downward

            adjustment  of   two  or  three  levels   for  acceptance  of

            responsibility  under Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing

            Guidelines.3

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The  United  States Sentencing  Guidelines  Section 3E1.1
            states:  

                      Acceptance of Responsibility
                      ____________________________

                      (a)  If     the     defendant     clearly
                      demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
                      for  his  offense,  decrease the  offense
                      level by 2 levels.
                               2

                      (b)  If  the  defendant  qualifies for  a
                      decrease   under   subsection  (a),   the
                      offense  level  determined  prior to  the
                      operation of  subsection (a) is  level 16
                                                             16
                      or   greater,   and  the   defendant  has
                      assisted authorities in the investigation
                      or prosecution  of his own  misconduct by
                      taking  one  or  more  of  the  following
                      steps:

                           (1)  timely  providing complete
                           information  to  the government
                           concerning his  own involvement
                           in the offense; or

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      A defendant who pleads guilty is  not entitled to a

            downward adjustment  for  acceptance of  responsibility as  a

            matter  of right.    U.S.S.G.    3E1.1,  application note  3;

            United States v. Royer,  895 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st  Cir. 1990).
            ______________________

            The  defendant has  the burden  of proving  entitlement to  a

            decrease  in   the  offense   level,  including   a  downward

            adjustment for  acceptance of responsibility.   United States
                                                            _____________

            v.  Morillo, 8  F.3d 864,  871 (1st  Cir. 1993).    Whether a
            ___________

            defendant has  accepted responsibility  for the offense  is a

            fact-dominated issue,  and therefore we  review the  district

            judge's ruling for clear error.   Royer, 895 F.2d at 29.   We
                                              _____

            give  the  findings  of  the   district  court  "a  wide  and

            deferential  berth"  because the  court  has  the benefit  of

            assessing  the  credibility  of  the   defendant  first-hand.

            U.S.S.G.   3E1.1 application  note 5; Royer, 895 F.2d  at 30.
                                                  _____

            While the facts are a close call, we accept the determination

            made  by  the  district  judge  because  it  is  not  clearly

            erroneous.               

                                
            ____________________

                           (2)  timely  notifying  author-
                           ities of his intention to enter
                           a   plea  of   guilty,  thereby
                           permitting  the  government  to
                           avoid  preparing for  trial and
                           permitting    the   court    to
                           allocate      its     resources
                           efficiently,

                      decrease   the   offense   level   by   1
                                                              1
                      additional level.  

                                         -19-
                                          19

                      Muriel   did  take  some  steps  towards  accepting

            responsibility for  his offense--he wrote a  letter to accept

            responsibility and he  testified in court as  to the purchase

            of the gun.  (PSI Report at 4; Sent. Hr'g Pt. IV at 94.)  The

            prosecution and the probation officer both recommended to the

            district court that Muriel receive a three-level reduction in

            his  offense level  for  acceptance of  responsibility.   The

            district court  did not follow the  recommendation because it

            found that Muriel had lied.  

                      It is  within the discretion of  the district court

            to deny a reduction on the  basis of its determination that a

            defendant has  resorted to  half-truths or evasions  from the

            truth  in an  effort  to  minimize  his or  her  culpability.

            United  States v.  Ocasio-Rivera,  991 F.2d  1,  5 (1st  Cir.
            ________________________________

            1993).  The district judge did not believe  Muriel's repeated

            assertion that the gun no longer belonged to him on the night

            the  police  executed  the   warrant,  but  belonged  to  his

            girlfriend.   In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Ms.  Ostos  was

            unfamiliar with the gun,  Muriel continued to insist  that he

            had given it to her,  and that she kept the loaded  gun under
                                           ___

            the pillow upon  which he  had been sleeping.   The  district

            court  found  that,  while  Muriel  may  have  made  the  gun

            available  to Ostos  while he  was in  the apartment,  Muriel

            continued to possess  the gun  up until his  arrest.   (Sent.

            Hr'g Pt.  IV  at  162.)   The  district  court's  credibility

                                         -20-
                                          20

            determination  that  Muriel   was  lying   was  not   clearly

            erroneous. 

                                         III.
                                         III.

                      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                                                            affirmed
                                                            ________

                                         -21-
                                          21