Court Opinion

ID: 9723899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:37:32.834459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.190255
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court:' In his petition for rehearing, defendant raises matter which requires consideration in view of the fact that our opinion may have been, as indicated by defendant, the first to construe Linmark as requiring the balancing of the government’s interest in imposing a “For Sale” sign ban ordinance against a person’s first amendment right to engage in commercial speech. Initially, we note that our opinion should not, as suggested by defendant, be read as saying that the challenged ordinance survives first amendment scrutiny, as we held only that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine that question. We were not prepared to say that there is no situation in which the urgency of restoring and maintaining the peaceable character of the city’s neighborhoods could outweigh the first amendment rights of realtors or the economic interest of home buyers or sellers. Our belief that Linmark does not foreclose the opportunity for such an evidentiary hearing is reinforced by the supreme court’s treatment of Barrick in footnote 9 of Linmark where, in stating that it expressed no view as to whether the facts in Barrick could withstand first amendment analysis, the court implies the possibility that a ban ordinance could be upheld in the proper case. Moreover, a ruling on a motion to dismiss was not involved in either of the two cases cited by defendant in its petition for rehearing as being in opposition to our balancing of interests concept and, in fact, each was decided after a factual presentation. In Daugherty v. City of East Point (N.D. Ga. 1978), 447 F. Supp. 290, the City was enjoined from enforcing its sign ban ordinance, but only after a full evidentiary hearing. In Mayor of Baltimore v. Crockett (1979), 45 Md. App. 682, 415 A.2d 606, cert, denied (1981),_U.S__, 67 L. Ed. 2d 616, - S. Ct. _, the holding of the unconstitutionality of a sign-ban ordinance was made in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment after the court had been apprised of all the underlying facts. Defendant also suggests in his petition that in remanding we should make “a specific statement of the parameters permissible in the City’s anticipated proof.” It is noteworthy, however, that Linmark does not set forth guidelines as to the proof necessary to establish the governmental interest. It appears to us that Linmark avoided doing so in recognition of the need to make that determination on a case-to-case basis. Moreover, by its treatment of Barrick, Linmark suggests in broad outline that only an emergency situation threatening a sudden and perhaps wrenching change in a neighborhood could justify derogation from protected commercial speech by means of a ban ordinance. The nature of such emergencies would necessarily vary from one community to another and be influenced by many unforseen factors. Consequently, it would be presumptuous for us to attempt a full assessment of the situation, based on the scant record before us, and it would be equally inappropriate to impose rigid guidelines. For the reasons stated, the petition for rehearing is denied. MEJDA and WILSON, JJ., concur.