Court Opinion

ID: 9763204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:44.122642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:17.210221
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s determination that the order appealed from is a final one. Since the enactment of the new Rule 341 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,1 final orders have been defined as follows:
(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims or of all parties; or
(2) any order that is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or
(3) any order entered as a final order pursuant to subsection (c) of this rule.
*639(c) When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other governmental unit may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or parties shall not constitute a final order.
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 341(b) and (c), 42 Pa.C.S.A. (Supp.1995).
In the instant case, the economic claims of the parties have not yet been adjudicated. Thus, the order appealed from does not dispose of all of the claims pertinent to this action. Id., Rule 341(b). In addition, the trial court has not determined that an immediate appeal of the order would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Id., Rule 341(c). The reasons given by the majority for the conclusion that the order is “final” are based on the type of reasoning employed under the former Rule 3412 to determine the finality of an order. Since the present Rule 341 explicitly defines a final order, this type of analysis is inapplicable.
Because I do not believe that the order appealed from constitutes a final order as presently defined in Rule 341, I would quash the appeal.3

. Pa.R.A.P., Rule 341, 42 Pa.C.S.A. (Supp.1995).

. Pa.R.A.P., Rule 341, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Former Rule 341 provided in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. Except as prescribed in Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.

Id.

. Another reason exists in favor of quashing this appeal. The lower court granted wife's (appellee's) petition to bifurcate on November 30, 1994. Husband (appellant) did not immediately file an appeal of this order, but rather waited until the decree of divorce was entered before filing his notice of appeal on January 17, 1995. Since appellant essentially is challenging the correctness of the lower court’s decision to allow bifurcation, appellant should have filed a notice of appeal within *640thirty days of the November 30, 1994 order. Thus, the present appeal is untimely and for that reason also, the appeal should be quashed.