Court Opinion

ID: 9384212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 10:09:59.020182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.474425
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-22-00203-CR

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

              TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                    TYLER, TEXAS

STEVEN SCOTT SUTTON,                            §      APPEAL FROM THE 3RD
APPELLANT

V.                                              §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE                                        §      ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Steven Scott Sutton appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and
indecency with a child by sexual contact. In one issue, Appellant argues that his sentences
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

                                         BACKGROUND
       Appellant was indicted for four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one
count of indecency with a child by sexual contact. Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the offenses
and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Appellant “guilty” of all five offenses
and assessed punishment of ninety-nine years’ imprisonment on each aggravated sexual assault
of a child count and twenty years’ imprisonment for the indecency with a child by sexual contact
count, with the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.

                              CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
       In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the four sentences of ninety-nine years and one
sentence of twenty years assessed by the jury are grossly disproportionate to the crimes
committed and amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution and
the Texas Constitution.     In his brief, Appellant contends that his sentence is grossly

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disproportionate to the crimes because he has only a limited criminal history and other
defendants in Texas received lesser sentences for the same offenses.
       Before a complaint may be presented for appellate review, the record must show that
Appellant raised the complaint to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.
ref’d). A complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment may be preserved by objecting at the punishment hearing, or when the sentence is
pronounced. Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Kim, 283 S.W.3d at
475. An appellant may raise a sentencing issue for the first time in a motion for new trial only if
he did not have an opportunity to object during the punishment hearing. Burt, 396 S.W.3d at
577 n.4. In this case, Appellant did not object at the punishment hearing when his sentences
were pronounced. Because Appellant had the opportunity to object to his sentences at the
punishment hearing and failed to do so, we conclude that he failed to preserve this issue for our
review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Burt, 396 S.W.3d at 577-78.
       Even if Appellant had preserved his issue, we could not grant him relief because his
sentences do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The United States Constitution
provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII . This provision was made applicable
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. State, 325
S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.”     TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13.        The difference between the Eighth
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” phrasing and the Texas Constitution’s “cruel or unusual”
phrasing is insignificant. Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
       The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See
Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons
v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held
that punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel,
or unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State,
495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664.

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       In this case, Appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child, a first-degree felony with a punishment range of no less than five years but no more than
ninety-nine years or life imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a); 22.021(a)(1)(A),
(2), (b) (West 2021). Thus, the ninety-nine-year sentence imposed by the trial court for each
count falls within the range set forth by the legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not
prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. See Harris, 656 S.W.2d at 486; Jordan, 495
S.W.2d at 952; Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. Appellant was also convicted of indecency with a
child by sexual contact, a second-degree felony with a punishment range of two to twenty years
of imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a); 21.11(d) (West 2021). Thus, the
twenty-year sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the legislature.
Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. See Harris,
656 S.W.2d at 486; Jordan, 495 S.W.2d at 952; Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664.
       Nevertheless, Appellant urges this Court to consider the factors originally set forth in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the
proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id., 463
U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas
courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a
threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before
addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v.
State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
       We are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estelle in making the threshold
determination of whether Appellant’s sentences are grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 445
U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court considered
the proportionality claim of an appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a
prior version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. In that case, the appellant received a life
sentence because he had two prior felony convictions—one for fraudulent use of a credit card to

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obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount
of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 265–66, 100 S. Ct. at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative
prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and, further, considering the purpose of the habitual
offender statute, the court determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 284–85, 100 S. Ct. at 1144–45.
         In this case, the offenses Appellant committed—multiple counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child, as well as indecency with a child by sexual contact—are far more serious than
the combination of offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while Appellant’s sentences
are less severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in Rummel is not unconstitutionally disproportionate,
neither are Appellant’s sentences in this case. 1 Because we do not find that the threshold test is
satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s sole issue.

                                                  DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                      JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                         Chief Justice

Opinion delivered March 31, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

          1
            In his brief, Appellant makes a conclusory statement that his sentences are grossly disproportionate,
stating that other persons sentenced in Texas for the same crimes received sentences significantly less harsh than
Appellant received. However, he cites no authority to support this contention. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[t]he
brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to the
authorities....”).

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                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                           MARCH 31, 2023

                                         NO. 12-22-00203-CR

                                    STEVEN SCOTT SUTTON,
                                           Appellant
                                              V.
                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                           Appellee

                                  Appeal from the 3rd District Court
                     of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 3CR-18-33719)

                        THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
                        It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
                    James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

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