Court Opinion

ID: 9649556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:00:50.630542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:56.741963
License: Public Domain

21-6083
     Ouattara v. Garland
                                                                                 BIA
                                                                            Sponzo, IJ
                                                                         A206 298 274
                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 23rd day of August, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 9                 Chief Judge,
10            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
11            EUNICE C. LEE,
12                 Circuit Judges.
13   _____________________________________
14
15   DAOUDA OUATTARA,
16            Petitioner,
17
18                         v.                                  21-6083
19                                                             NAC
20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22            Respondent.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                       Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
27                                         NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:               Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                 Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
 3                                 Senior Litigation Counsel; Kevin
 4                                 J. Conway, Trial Attorney, Office
 5                                 of Immigration Litigation, United
 6                                 States Department of Justice,
 7                                 Washington, DC.

 8         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

12         Petitioner Daouda Ouattara, a native and citizen of the

13   Cote d’Ivoire, seeks review of a January 28, 2021 decision of

14   the   BIA   affirming   a   September   4,   2018    decision   of   an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

16   withholding   of   removal,   and   relief   under    the   Convention

17   Against Torture (“CAT”).       In re Daouda Ouattara, No. A 206

18   298 274 (B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2021), aff’g No. A 206 298 274

19   (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 4, 2018).          We assume the parties’

20   familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history,

21   and arguments on appeal.

22         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the

23   BIA——i.e., minus the firm resettlement finding that the BIA

24   did not rely on.    See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

25   426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e review the judgment
                                  2
 1   of the IJ as modified by the BIA’s decision——that is, minus

 2   the single argument for denying relief that was rejected by

 3   the BIA.”).       We review factual findings for substantial

 4   evidence    and   questions    of   law    de    novo.      See     8 U.S.C.

 5   § 1252(b)(4)(B); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.

 6   2010).

 7     I.     Asylum and Withholding of Removal Claims

 8          An asylum applicant must establish past persecution or a

 9   well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race,

10   religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

11   group, or political opinion.            See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),

12   1158(b)(1)(B)(i).     “Claims for withholding of removal under

13   the INA are closely related to asylum,” Ramsameachire v.

14   Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004), but the Attorney

15   General must grant withholding of removal if the applicant

16   establishes that it is more likely than not that his “life or

17   freedom would be threatened in [the] country because of [his]

18   race,    religion,   nationality,       membership    in    a   particular

19   social     group,     or      political         opinion,”       8    U.S.C.

20   § 1231(b)(3)(A).       Here, the agency determined that Ouattara

                                         3
 1   had established past persecution based on his membership in

 2   “the Dyula ethnic tribe.”           CAR at 34, 54.

 3       Ouattara testified at his removal hearing and submitted

 4   letters from his mother and sister, as well as country

 5   conditions evidence.         Ouattara’s evidence indicated that in

 6   2002 a group of armed civilians and uniformed men broke into

 7   his home, beat him unconscious, and raped his sister and

 8   sister-in-law.        The men abducted Ouattara, along with his

 9   brothers and father, to a camp where they suffered repeated

10   beatings, shocking with electric batons, and other forms of

11   violence.    Shortly      after     being       released   from   the   camp,

12   Ouattara’s   father     died    from      the    abuse.     Following     his

13   father’s death, a group of military personnel and civilians

14   attacked and burned Ouattara’s home, took him to the camp

15   again, and subjected him to further abuse for three days.

16       The IJ credited Ouattara’s testimony and other evidence,

17   finding that he had established past persecution and was

18   therefore entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of

19   future   persecution.         See    8 C.F.R.      § 1208.13(b)(1).       The

20   government could rebut that presumption by establishing by a

21   preponderance    of    the   evidence      that    “[t]here   has   been   a

                                           4
 1   fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant

 2   no        longer          has       a          well-founded         fear          of

 3   persecution.”       Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i), (ii); see also Cao He

 4   Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 428 F.3d 391, 399 (2d Cir. 2005).

 5   In determining whether the government has met its burden, the

 6   IJ must conduct “an individualized analysis of whether the

 7   changes    in   conditions         in    the    relevant    country       were    so

 8   fundamental        that     they        are    sufficient     to    rebut        the

 9   presumption.”       Lecaj, 616 F.3d at 115 (alterations adopted;

10   internal    quotation       marks       omitted).      And    the    IJ    should

11   consider    “how    [the]       changed       conditions    would   affect       the

12   specific petitioner’s situation.”                  Id. (internal quotation

13   marks omitted).           Notably, DHS submitted no evidence before

14   the IJ.

15        Nevertheless, the IJ denied all relief.                   See CAR at 30.

16   The BIA, in affirming, described the IJ as holding “that the

17   DHS carried its burden to rebut the presumption of a well-

18   founded fear . . . . Specifically, the Immigration Judge found

19   that the DHS established that there has been a fundamental

20   change in circumstances . . . .”                CAR at 3.     We conclude that

21   the BIA erred in affirming because the IJ improperly shifted

                                               5
 1   the burden of proof to Ouattara and failed to analyze whether

 2   the government had met its burden to rebut the presumption of

 3   a well-founded fear of future persecution.

 4          Here, the agency first erred by incorrectly shifting the

 5   burden of proof to Ouattara to show a fundamental change in

 6   circumstances.    Contrary to the description by the BIA, the

 7   IJ’s decision did not hold “that DHS carried its burden,” but

 8   instead held only that “respondent’s otherwise presumed well-

 9   founded fear of future persecution is rebutted,” without ever

10   mentioning DHS.    CAR at 28.    That the IJ in fact incorrectly

11   placed the burden of proof squarely on Ouattara is indicated

12   by the IJ’s repeated references to the absence of affirmative

13   proof from Ouattara that he faced a future threat, rather

14   than    to   evidence   from    the   government   rebutting   the

15   presumption that he did.        See CAR at 29–30 (reasoning that

16   the record “is devoid of sufficient evidence of a threat to

17   respondent since his departure from Cote d’Ivoire in 2002,”

18   and “lacks sufficient evidence establishing the objective

19   reasonableness of a fear of future persecution”).

20          Because Ouattara was entitled to a presumption of a well-

21   founded fear of future persecution, the appropriate inquiry

                                       6
 1   was    not   whether      he    had    made      an   affirmative      showing    of

 2   fundamentally       unchanged          country        conditions.        See     id.

 3   Rather, at this stage, “[t]he burden rest[ed] firmly with the

 4   government,” Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2010),

 5   to show by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]here has

 6   been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the

 7   applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution,”

 8   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i), (ii) (emphasis added).

 9         While   DHS     was       not    necessarily       required   to    present

10   evidence to meet its burden of showing a fundamental change,

11   the IJ’s sua sponte finding of changed circumstances was not

12   otherwise “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative

13   evidence in the record when considered as a whole.”                            Iouri

14   v.    Ashcroft,     487    F.3d       76,   81    (2d   Cir.   2007)    (internal

15   quotation     marks       and    citation        omitted).     “[W]here        facts

16   important to an ultimate agency conclusion have been totally

17   overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized,

18   we conclude that an error of law has occurred.”                        Acharya v.

19   Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 300 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

20   marks and citation omitted).                As to at least three material

21   aspects of the record, the IJ seriously mischaracterized or

                                                 7
 1   overlooked Ouattara’s evidence——the only evidence in the

 2   record——in    concluding     that       the   presumption   of   future

 3   persecution had been rebutted.

 4       First, in noting that Ouattara “testified that conditions

 5   are ‘a little bit better in Cote d’Ivoire’ today,” CAR at 29,

 6   the IJ mischaracterized Ouattara’s testimony as suggesting he

 7   did not fear future persecution.          In fact, when asked whether

 8   the 2011 election made things better for his tribal group,

 9   Ouattara responded ”[t]here is still the xenophobia problem.

10   Even though Alassane is in power . . . . It got a little

11   better but it continued.         Because they are still the arms

12   that are circulating in the hands of the young people.”               CAR

13   at 86–87 (emphasis added).          At most, Ouattara’s testimony,

14   which noted a continuing threat, suggested a reduction of

15   abuse, but “[t]he [agency] apparently did not fully perceive

16   the significant distinction between a drop in abuses and an

17   end to abuses.”     Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 304 (2d

18   Cir. 2006) (emphases added).

19       The IJ compounded this specific error by overlooking

20   other aspects of Ouattara’s testimony.          For example, Ouattara

21   testified    that   he   fears   persecution      on   account   of   his

                                         8
 1   ethnicity by armed civilians and uniformed men——similar to

 2   the mobs that beat him unconscious, raped his family members,

 3   and   burned    down    his   farm——who      continue   to    operate      with

 4   impunity despite the change in government. 1                 CAR at 57–58,

 5   61, 68, 214–15.        The IJ utterly failed to address these facts,

 6   stating simply that the “[c]urrent president is supportive of

 7   respondent’s particular ethnic group.”             CAR at 29.

 8         Second,    the     IJ    mischaracterized        Ouattara’s      family

9    letters, inaccurately asserting that neither letter makes any

10   mention of a present threat of persecution.                  But Ouattara’s

11   mother wrote that Cote d’Ivoire had many areas that remained

12   dangerous      and   outside     government     protection,        which    she

13   described as a “precarious peace.”             CAR at 29, 137 (emphasis

14   added).      His sister’s letter likewise noted that the people

15   of    Cote    d’Ivoire     suffer     from   “arbitrary      arrests”       and

16   highlighted that the government lacks “total control” over

17   public    security.        CAR   at   146.      Contrary      to    the    IJ’s

18   characterization, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled

19   to    view     these     letters——which,       after     detailing         past

     1 This was not a newly identified fear: Ouattara made a similar
     statement in his written application for asylum. See CAR at
     215.
                                           9
 1   persecution, refer to an ongoing and precarious security

 2   situation despite a change in government—as at least making

 3   “mention of a present threat [of persecution].”             CAR at 29.

 4   And,    on   any   fair   reading,    the   letters   do   not    provide

 5   affirmative support for the conclusion that “[t]here has been

 6   a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant

 7   no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.”               8 C.F.R.

 8   § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (emphasis added).

9           The IJ further misconstrued Ouattara’s sister’s letter

10   as supporting changed conditions based on the fact that she

11   “remain[ed] without incident in Cote d’Ivoire” since being

12   “attacked in 2002,” and the letter did not specifically

13   mention further incidents.           CAR at 29.       An inference of

14   changed conditions based on this silence, however, cannot

15   satisfy the DHS’s burden to overcome the presumption of future

16   persecution.       First, not only does the sister’s own suffering

17   since 2002 have little or no bearing in the circumstances of

18   this case on whether Ouattara himself faces a present threat

19   of persecution, the absence of any explicit mention of a

20   present threat in her letter should not have been held against

21   Ouattara without giving him a chance to respond.            See Cao He

                                          10
 1   Lin, 428 F.3d at 394–95 (holding that, even where an applicant

 2   is not entitled to the presumption, “if [an IJ] intends to

 3   rely on the absence of certain corroborative evidence to hold

 4   that an applicant has not satisfied his burden of proof, [the

 5   IJ] must give the applicant an opportunity to explain its

 6   absence”).

 7        Third and finally, the IJ’s decision did not explicitly

 8   discuss any of the country conditions reports in the record.

 9   These reports uniformly support the existence of a well-

10   founded fear of future persecution.         The IJ merely stated

11   that the “[c]urrent president is supportive of respondent’s

12   particular ethnic group.”      CAR at 29.     But “the mere fact

13   that . . . the former dictator was replaced . . . [is]

14   insufficient to show changed country circumstances” where the

15   election and post-election period have been suffused with

16   violence,    impunity,   arbitrary   detention,      and   unlawful

17   killings.    Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2009).

18        In denying Ouattara’s asylum and withholding claims, the

19   IJ   incorrectly     shifted   the   burden     of     proof   and

20   mischaracterized or overlooked Ouattara’s evidence.            For

21   these reasons, we vacate the BIA’s ruling affirming the denial

                                    11
 1   of Ouattara’s petition for asylum and withholding of removal.

 2   See Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289

 3   (2d Cir. 2007).

 4     II. CAT Claim

 5       The BIA did not err in finding that Ouattara waived his

 6   CAT claim because it may deem an issue waived where the

 7   applicant fails to assert a meaningful challenge on appeal.

 8   See Matter of Y–I–M–, 27 I. & N. Dec. 724, 729 n.2 (B.I.A.

 9   2019), vacated on other grounds by Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th

10   49 (2d Cir. 2023); Matter of R–A–M–, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658

11   n.2 (B.I.A. 2012).       A party does not raise a meaningful

12   challenge when it “devotes only a single conclusory sentence

13   to the argument . . . .”      Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d

14   540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).      The BIA did not err in finding

15   that Ouattara waived his CAT claim because his argument

16   consisted   of   a   single   sentence   challenging       an   adverse

17   credibility determination that the IJ did not make.

18

19               *                    *                     *

20

                                      12
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.   All pending motions and

3   applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

4                              FOR THE COURT:
5                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                              Clerk of Court

                                 13