Court Opinion

ID: 9550352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:24.027951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:25.800902
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
specially concurring:
The issue presented by this case is whether the legislature intended that a person convicted of possession of contraband in the first degree, which requires that the actor have been confined in a detention facility when the offense was committed, be sentenced in the aggravated range solely because he was under confinement in a correctional institution as a convicted felon at the time of the offense. I agree with the majority that the relevant statutes reflect such a legislative intent and therefore specially concur.
The defendant was convicted of possession of contraband in the first degree. The elements of this offense are set forth in section 18-8-204.1(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), as follows:
A person being confined in a detention facility commits the crime of possession of contraband in the first degree if he knowingly obtains or has in his possession contraband as listed in section 18-8-203(l)(a) or alcohol.
Possession of marijuana in violation of this statute is a class 5 felony. § 18-8-204.1(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
“Detention facility” is defined in section 18-8-203(3), and there is nothing to suggest that its meaning when used in section 18-8-204.1 is any different. Section 18-8-203(3) provides:
“Detention facility” means any building, structure, enclosure, vehicle, institution, or place, whether permanent or temporary, fixed or mobile, where persons are or may be lawfully held in custody or confinement under the authority of the United States, the state of Colorado, or any political subdivision of the state of Colorado.
Section 18-8-204.1 is violated, therefore, when any person confined in any detention facility knowingly possesses contraband. The general assembly, however, has elected to view an offense as more serious when committed by a person who is a convicted felon confined in a prison or correctional institution. Section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V), 8B C.R.S. (1986), provides that such facts constitute extraordinary aggravating circumstances requiring a sentence in the aggravated range.1 This reflects a legislative intent to punish more severely the possession of contraband by convicted felons incarcerated in facilities housing persons convicted of more serious crimes, while permitting lesser sentences for persons engaging in such conduct while confined in other detention facilities.2 This is *452a matter entirely within the legislative province. See People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986) (legislative use of element of crime to mandate sentencing in the aggravated range does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection or double jeopardy).
I specially concur in the judgment of the court.
QUINN, C.J., joins in this special concurrence.

. § 18-1-105(9)(a)(V), 8B C.R.S. (1986), prescribes as an extraordinary aggravating circumstance mandating sentencing beyond the presumptive range:
The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution within the state as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution within the state for another felony at the time of the commission of a felony;

. This is not a case in which the extraordinary aggravating circumstance is identical to an essential element of the crime, and in which the legislature has not made clear whether an increased sentence is mandated based solely upon that element. See People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d at 118-19; People v. Manley, 707 P.2d 1021 (Colo.App.1985); People v. Russell, 703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.1985).