Court Opinion

ID: 9744665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:11:55.631857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.875677
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur in the judgment of the court. The majority properly rejects the defendant’s argument that reversible error occurred in the proceedings below when the defendant was allowed to decide whether to request that the jury be instructed on second degree murder as an included offense of the principal charge of first degree murder. I do not agree, however, with the implication in the majority opinion that the decision whether to tender jury instructions on an included offense is a matter of trial strategy that defense counsel alone may normally resolve. (158 Ill. 2d at 493-94.) In my view, this vital determination properly belongs to the defendant, who, in consultation with counsel, must decide whether to provide a jury with the third option of a conviction on a less serious charge. Because the defendant in the present case was allowed to make that important decision, I agree with the majority’s ultimate holding that no error in this regard occurred in the proceedings below. Deciding whether to seek the submission to the jury of instructions on an included offense is closely related to the initial decision of what plea to enter — a decision that properly belongs to the defendant. Section 4 — 5.2(a) of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice states: "Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf.” 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function § 4 — 5.2(a) (2d ed. 1980). The commentary to the ABA Standards explains the relationship between a defendant’s initial plea decision and the decision whether to ask that an included offense be submitted to the jury for its consideration: "It is also important in a jury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully with the accused about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit to the jury. Indeed, because this decision is so important as well as so similar to the defendant’s decision about the charges to which to plead, the defendant should be the one to decide whether to seek submission to the jury of lesser included offenses. For instance, in a murder prosecution, the defendant, rather than the defense attorney, should determine whether the court should be asked to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of manslaughter.” 1 ABA Standards, § 4 — 5.2, Commentary, at 4 — 68. Adopting the view expressed in the ABA Standards, our appellate court has concluded that the decision whether to request the submission of an included offense to the jury is one ultimately for the defendant to make, in consultation with counsel (People v. Blommaert (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 811, 817; People v. Brocksmith (1992) , 237 Ill. App. 3d 818, 827-28, appeal allowed (1993) , 149 Ill. 2d 653), as have courts of other States (State v. Boeglin (1987), 105 N.M. 247, 249, 731 P.2d 943, 945; In re Trombly (1993), 160 Vt. 215, 218, 627 A.2d 855, 856-57; State v. Ambuehl (App. 1988), 145 Wis. 2d 343, 355-56, 425 N.W.2d 649, 654; contra Van Alstine v. State (1993), 263 Ga. 1, 3-4, 426 S.E.2d 360, 362-63). Given the close relationship between the initial plea decision and the decision whether to tender jury instructions on an included offense, I would not construe Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 103 S. Ct. 3308, cited by the majority in support of its discussion, to mean that the included-offense decision is simply a matter of trial strategy that counsel alone may determine. Notably, when Jones states, "It is also recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal” (Jones, 463 U.S. at 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 993, 103 S. Ct. at 3312), the Court cites section 4 — 5.2 of the ABA Standards as authority for that proposition. If, as the commentary to the Standards states, the decision whether to seek the submission of a lesser offense is analogous to the decision regarding what plea to enter, and thus something that the defendant himself must ultimately determine, then Jones contradicts rather than supports the view suggested by the majority in the present case. As the record demonstrates, the defendant knowingly and intelligently decided not to tender to the trial court jury instructions on the included offense of second degree murder. The defendant was not prevented from consulting with counsel on this important matter, and the defendant made his determination with full awareness of the potential consequences. The defendant had already discussed the question with counsel and, after a moment’s vacillation, reaffirmed his original decision not to tender instructions on the less serious charge. We have no reason now to interfere with the defendant’s decision, or to relieve him of the responsibility for his choice.