Court Opinion

ID: 9946333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 18:02:44.855536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:40.783457
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10262

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                1:18-cr-00043-LEK-5
 v.

PATRICK BELL,                                   MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Hawaii
                   Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 15, 2024**
                               Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      In this appeal, Defendant Patrick Bell raises several challenges to his

conviction and sentence after being found guilty of four federal drug trafficking

counts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the parties are

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
context to our ruling. We affirm Bell’s conviction and affirm his sentence in large

part, but we vacate the district court’s imposition of the “standard conditions” of

supervised release and remand for the district court to orally pronounce any such

conditions it chooses to impose.

      1. Bell raises two challenges to the district court’s denial of his requested

jury instructions. We review both challenges for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Spentz, 653 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Tuan Ngoc

Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 985 (9th Cir. 2020).

      First, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to offer an

entrapment instruction with respect to Counts 4 and 5. A defendant is not entitled

to an entrapment instruction unless he can point to evidence showing that (1) he

“was induced to commit the crime by a government agent,” and (2) he “was not

otherwise predisposed to commit the crime.” Spentz, 653 F.3d at 818. “Only

slight evidence will create the factual issue necessary to get the [entrapment]

defense to the jury,” and such evidence may be “weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or

of doubtful credibility.” Id. However, “there still must be some evidence

demonstrating the elements of the defense before an instruction must be given.”

Id. (emphasis added).

      Bell cannot point to sufficient evidence to establish that either element of

entrapment was present here. With respect to inducement, the evidence tends to

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show merely that government agents created the opportunity for Bell to pick up

drug parcels, which, although relevant, is insufficient on its own. See, e.g., United

States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An ‘inducement’ consists

of an ‘opportunity’ plus something else — typically, excessive pressure by the

government upon the defendant or the government’s taking advantage of an

alternative, non-criminal type motive.” (citation omitted)).

      Even if Bell could show that there was “slight evidence” of inducement, he

does not point to anything to plausibly demonstrate his lack of predisposition.

Instead, the record clearly shows that Bell was eager to engage in the specific

conduct underlying Counts 4 and 5 (i.e., picking up a drug parcel on March 19,

2018, and picking up his payment of drugs the day after), and that he was far from

reluctant to engage in drug trafficking generally. Additional evidence tends to

support the other factors the Ninth Circuit has concluded are relevant to the

question of lack of predisposition. United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 955

(9th Cir. 2003) (listing relevant factors and noting that, although no single factor

controls, “the most important is the defendant’s reluctance to engage in criminal

activity”). On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by declining to offer an entrapment instruction.

      Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bell’s

request for a specific unanimity instruction with respect to Count 2. Although

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specific unanimity instructions are necessary in some circumstances, we have held

that “[i]n the typical case, a district court’s general unanimity instruction to the

jury adequately protects a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.” United

States v. Gonzalez, 786 F.3d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 2015). Bell contends that specific

jury unanimity was required here because the evidence showed that there were two

separate points on February 2, 2018, at which he could have possessed fifty or

more grams of methamphetamine: (a) when Bell picked up a parcel containing five

pounds of crystal methamphetamine from Chika’s Gas Station and delivered it to

Oscar Robles-Ramos, and (b) when Bell received a small bag containing two

ounces of crystal methamphetamine from Robles-Ramos later that day as payment

for picking up the parcel. Without a specific unanimity instruction, Bell argues,

the jury could have convicted him on Count 2 without necessarily agreeing as to

which of these two acts of possession occurred.

      We have previously rejected similar arguments and held that a specific

unanimity instruction is not required even where there is evidence that a defendant

possessed a controlled substance at separate points across a prolonged timespan.

See United States v. Mancuso, 718 F.3d 780, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2013) (multiple

alleged instances of possession of cocaine across seven-year timespan); United

States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1983) (multiple alleged

instances of possession of LSD across two-month timespan). Because possession

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of a controlled substance with intent to distribute is a continuing offense, “[i]t does

not matter that different jurors may have found different pieces of testimony

credible, as long as the jury is unanimous on the bottom line conclusion that [the

defendant] was guilty of the acts charged.” Mancuso, 718 F.3d at 793 (citing

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1991) (plurality opinion), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)).

      Bell does not address these cases or explain why their holdings should not

apply. True, the separate acts of possession evidenced here were not literally

continuous: Bell presumably lost possession of the five-pound parcel of crystal

methamphetamine when he delivered the parcel to Robles-Ramos, and it was only

later that day when Robles-Ramos gave Bell the two-ounce payment of crystal

methamphetamine in return. Nevertheless, these two acts were undoubtedly “set

on foot by a single impulse” and thus part of the same continuing offense of

possession with intent to distribute. Mancuso, 718 F.3d at 792. In any event, Bell

provides no authority supporting his contention that a specific unanimity

instruction is required where a defendant’s separate acts of possession were, in his

words, “without continuity or overlap.”

      Furthermore, there were no other special considerations here suggesting that

a specific unanimity instruction should have been provided. The facts presented to

the jury were relatively straightforward, and there was “no communication or other

                                           5
indication from the jury suggesting that it was in any way confused.” United

States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1989). Taking these facts and

our precedent into account, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by declining to require specific jury unanimity as to Count 2.

      2. Next, Bell raises several challenges to the district court’s imposition of

his sentence. Bell first argues that the district court erred by not affording him a

two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) because “he clearly demonstrated

acceptance of responsibility for his offenses” during his confession to law

enforcement on March 20, 2018. Reviewing for clear error, see United States v.

Rosas, 615 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010), we affirm. Although Bell admitted to

engaging in conduct relevant to his indicted charges, we agree with the government

that Bell was not forthcoming about his own efforts to sell crystal

methamphetamine to others (and, indeed, denied any knowledge of selling drugs).

Bell likewise did not disclose many of the other ways in which he aided the drug

trafficking operation, such as by helping package and send drug proceeds from

Hawai‘i to Mexico on at least two occasions.

      Bell also expressed little in the way of contrition or remorse for his actions.

See United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The primary

goal of the reduction is to reward defendants who are genuinely contrite.”).

Notably, Bell proceeded to trial where he contested his culpability as to the

                                           6
different counts. We thus conclude that this is not one of the “unusual cases in

which a defendant is entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction despite

having pleaded not guilty.” Id. at 852.

      The district court also did not clearly err by finding Bell ineligible for safety

valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). See United States v. Salazar, 61 F.4th 723,

726 (9th Cir. 2023). Again, although Bell was forthcoming about some of his

involvement in the drug trafficking operation, we agree that he did not provide the

government “all of the information” he knew, as is required to obtain safety valve

relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Namely, the record reflects that Bell had a

“network of customers to whom he intended to distribute” crystal

methamphetamine, yet Bell denied any knowledge of how to sell drugs.

      For many of the same reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err

in declining to grant Bell a mitigating role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.1

Even if Bell played a more minor role than several of his coconspirators and may

not have “exercised decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of

decision-making authority,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)(iii), the record supports

1
  There appears to be a split of authority as to whether the district court’s
determination about whether a defendant was engaged in a mitigating role is
reviewed for clear error, or for abuse of discretion. Compare United States v.
Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2022), with Rosas, 615 F.3d at
1066. We need not decide which standard applies because Bell’s argument fails
under either.

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the district court’s conclusion that Bell was “not a minor participant.” See United

States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006) (under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2,

“[i]t is not enough that a defendant was less culpable than his or her co-

participants, or even that he or she was among the least culpable members of the

group”). Among other things, Bell was “involved in picking up parcels” of crystal

methamphetamine, and volunteered his own address to receive drug parcels. Bell

also stood to benefit financially from his participation in the drug trafficking

operation — at least to be able to pay his own bills, and perhaps to bring in

substantially more money. We thus affirm the district court in this respect.

      3. Finally, in his Reply Brief, Bell for the first time raises two additional

challenges to his sentence. Citing our decision in United States v. Stephens, 424

F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005), Bell argues that the district court’s imposition of a

sentencing condition requiring him to undergo alcohol testing “at the direction of

the probation office,” was an improper delegation of authority to a nonjudicial

officer. Because he could have raised this argument in his Opening Brief but failed

to do so, Bell waived this argument, and we decline to consider it. See, e.g.,

United States v. Kelly, 874 F.3d 1037, 1051 n.9 (9th Cir. 2017).

      However, the parties agree that a limited remand is appropriate in light of

our recent en banc decision in United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640 (9th Cir.

2023) (en banc). Montoya was decided after the district court imposed Bell’s

                                           8
sentence, and after Bell filed his Opening Brief and the government filed its

Answering Brief. We agree that a limited remand is appropriate and, accordingly,

“vacate only the conditions of [Bell’s] supervised release that were referred to as

the ‘standard conditions’ in the written sentence but were not orally pronounced”

at sentencing. Id. at 656. On remand, the district court shall orally pronounce “any

of the standard conditions of supervised release it chooses to impose,” such that

Bell has an opportunity to object to them. Id.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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