Court Opinion

ID: 9473342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:27:00.222437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:28.097499
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The issue as framed by the majority and the district court in this case is whether the petitioner, Fred Reed, had adequate notice that the compulsion defense would not be available to him at trial when he was allegedly forced to participate in the murder of Robbins. Despite the majority’s well-written opinion to the contrary, I believe the petitioner had adequate notice that the compulsion defense would not be available to him at trial because of his participation in the second murder involving the witness Truitt. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
At the time the crimes in the present case were committed, August 1977, Illinois law provided that the compulsion defense was available unless the offense charged was punishable by death. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 7-11(a). According to the Illinois law at the time, a person could be punished by death if he was convicted of murdering two or more individuals. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 9-l(b)(3). The majority correctly notes that a person must have adequate notice of the law prohibiting certain conduct in order for that person to be charged with a criminal violation. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). When Reed participated in the Robbins’ murder, arguably he did not have notice that if charged with the murder he would be unable to raise the compulsion defense at trial. The record reveals, however, that Reed participated in a second murder, involving the witness Truitt. The Illinois Appellate Court found that Hall pushed Truitt into her apartment and told Reed to wait in the hallway. Reed did not attempt to flee or get help; rather, he waited for Hall, heard the shots, and when Hall reappeared asked him for a share of the jewelry taken from Truitt. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that these facts were sufficient, in and of themselves, to support Reed’s conviction for the first-degree murder of Truitt under the accountability theory. People v. Reed, 104 Ill.App.3d 331, 339, 60 Ill.Dec. 80, 86, 432 N.E.2d 979, 985 (1982).
For purposes of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 9-l(b)(3), I believe Reed had sufficient notice that his participation in the second murder would strip him of his compulsion defense for both murders. A literal reading of § 9-l(b)(3) reveals that this statute does not require contemporaneous acts; rather, the acts may be punishable by death if they “occurred as a result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts____” Thus, although the compulsion defense may have been initially available for the murder of Robbins, in my opinion Reed’s subsequent participation in the sec*625ond murder stripped him of any right he may have had to assert the compulsion defense at trial.
Clearly, Reed’s guilt for the second murder was a real possibility under an accountability theory and the relevant Illinois statutes provided adequate notice to Reed that participation in the second murder would cause the compulsion defense to be forfeited in its entirety. Thus, I believe that when Reed made his choice to remain and support Hall during the Truitt murder, he forfeited his compulsion defense.. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1

. Even if one would disagree with the conclusion that there was adequate notice in this case, Reed’s conviction should be reversed only as to the murder of Robbins. Reed only complains that he was denied his compulsion defense as to the murder of Robbins; he asserted no compulsion defense as to the murder of Truitt. The Illinois Appellate Court has made a sufficient finding that Reed’s acts in the hallway during the murder of Truitt and his subsequent request for part of Truitt’s jewelry constituted enough evidence to sustain the conviction for the second offense. I do not agree with the district court that had the compulsion defense been available for Robbins’ murder, that this would have necessarily impacted upon Reed's conviction for the murder of Truitt. As noted by the Illinois Appellate Court, there were sufficient facts involving the murder of Truitt to separately sustain the conviction for the murder of Truitt under the accountability theory.