Court Opinion

ID: 9423615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:08:28.32782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:45.068769
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, there is a word I would add. This is a “rule of reason” case stemming from Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 62. Whether an exclusive territorial franchise in a vertical arrangement is per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws is a much mooted question. A fixing of prices for resale is conspicuously unreasonable, because of the great leverage that price has over the market. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 221. The Court quite properly refuses to say whether in the newspaper distribution business an exclusive territorial franchise is illegal.
The traditional distributing agency is the neighborhood newspaper boy. Whether he would have the time, acu*155men, experience, or financial resources to wage competitive warfare without the protection of a territorial franchise is at least doubtful. Here, however, we have a distribution system which has the characteristics of a large retail enterprise. Petitioner’s business requires practically full time. He purchased his route for $11,000, receiving a list of subscribers, a used truck, and a newspaper-tying machine. At the time his dispute with respondent arose, there were 1,200 subscribers on the route, and that route covered “the whole northeast section” of a “big city.” Deliveries had to be made by motor vehicle and although they were usually completed by 6 o’clock in the morning, the rest of the workday was spent in billing, receiving phone calls, arranging for new service, or in placing “stop” or “start” orders on existing service. Petitioner at times hired a staff to tie and to wrap newspapers.
Under our decisions* the legality of exclusive territorial franchises in the newspaper distribution business *156would have to be tried as a factual issue; and that was not done here.
The case is therefore close to White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, where before ruling on the legality of a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement, we remanded for findings on “the actual impact of these arrangements on competition.” Id., at 263.

 “Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.” Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238. Cf. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (economics of the drug distribution business); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (economics of the bicycle business). In the latter case we noted that the evidence of record “elaborately sets *156forth information as to the total market interaction and interbrand competition, as well as the distribution program and practices.” 388 U. S., at 367.