Court Opinion

ID: 9894172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 18:04:07.047854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:50.667916
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

MIKE DAVIDYAN,                                                      B315222

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct.
         v.                                                         No. 21VECV00054)

MOHAMMAD MOAYERY et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.

         Mike Davidyan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Dennis P. Block & Associates, Dennis P. Block and
Vicken Hagop Karagueuzian for Defendants and Respondents.
                     _________________________
       Appellant Mike Davidyan (Davidyan) was evicted from a
property owned by respondents Mohammad Moayery (Moayery)
and Parvaneh Moshir Afshar (Afshar) (collectively respondents).
Two years later, Davidyan sued respondents for damages caused
by mold exposure during his tenancy. The trial court sustained
respondents’ demurrer, finding that because Davidyan had raised
the mold issue as a habitability defense in the unlawful detainer
case, his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I.     The Unlawful Detainer Action
       In February 2017, Davidyan entered into a lease for a
residential property owned by respondents (the property). In
October 2018, Moayery sued Davidyan for unlawful detainer.
Davidyan’s answer alleged that the property was not habitable
due to, among other things, “fungus” in the home. Two months
later, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for
Moayery and awarded him nearly $20,000 in holdover damages.
       Davidyan appealed from the unlawful detainer judgment,
arguing that the trial court ignored his testimony that the
property had “fungus and mold and . . . is in not habitable [sic].”
Davidyan also attached a declaration “which discussed the mold

1      Although we granted Davidyan’s motion to augment the
record, the appellate record is incomplete. It contains only four
documents: (1) Davidyan’s first amended complaint;
(2) respondents’ demurrer to Davidyan’s original, inoperative
complaint; (3) the trial court’s ruling; and (4) Davidyan’s notice of
appeal. Our summary of the case is compiled from these
documents.

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and [his] health.” The appellate division of the superior court
affirmed the unlawful detainer judgment.2
II.    Davidyan’s Lawsuit and Appeal
       In May 2021, Davidyan filed a first amended complaint
suing respondents for negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.3 Both claims arose from injuries allegedly
caused by mold exposure during his tenancy. Respondents
demurred, arguing, among other things, that Davidyan’s claims
were barred by collateral estoppel. After reviewing the available
record from the unlawful detainer case, the trial court agreed and
sustained respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.4
       Davidyan timely appealed.
                          DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       “Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review
for ruling on a demurrer dismissal as follows: ‘On appeal from a
judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled.
The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable

2     As this document does not appear in the appellate record,
we presume that the trial court’s order describing it is correct.
(See Evid. Code, § 664.)

3     Davidyan’s original complaint, filed four months earlier,
included several additional claims not repeated in his amended
complaint.

4      Although Afshar was not a party in the unlawful detainer
action, the trial court also sustained respondents’ demurrer as to
her because, as Moayery’s wife and co-owner of the property, she
was his privy and thus equally entitled to the protection of
collateral estoppel.

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interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however,
assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.
[Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the
several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]”
[Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a
demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under
any possible legal theory. [Citation.]’” (Payne v. National
Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043–1044
(Payne).)
       “Where ‘all of the facts necessary to show that an action is
barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to
judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general
demurrer. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Shine v. Williams-Sonoma,
Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076–1077.)
II.    Applicable Law
       “Collateral estoppel is one aspect of the broader doctrine of
res judicata. [Citation.] ‘Where res judicata operates to prevent
relitigation of a cause of action once adjudicated, collateral
estoppel operates (in the second of two actions which do not
involve identical causes of action) to obviate the need to relitigate
issues already adjudicated in the first action. [Citation.]” (Syufy
Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878.)
       Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, an issue cannot be
relitigated if it is identical to one that was litigated and
necessarily decided in a previous proceeding, and if the party
seeking to relitigate the issue was either a party to the prior
proceeding or in privity with a party. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 871, 895–896.)

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III.   Analysis
       The demurrer in this case, sustained solely on collateral
estoppel grounds, was “well taken” (Payne, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1043) and thus must be affirmed. In the unlawful detainer
action, Davidyan argued that the property was uninhabitable due
to, among other things, significant levels of fungus and mold. He
reiterated this argument in his appeal from the judgment,
explicitly connecting the mold problem to health issues. In both
proceedings, the presiding courts ruled against him. The
unlawful detainer judgment thus resolved the issue of the
property’s habitability, which is central to Davidyan’s current
claims about mold exposure.
       Davidyan insists that the unlawful detainer judgment
should not preclude this lawsuit, due to the summary nature of
the unlawful detainer hearing. But while “a judgment in
unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect”
due to the “‘summary’ . . . character” of the proceedings, the “‘full
and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense . . . if it is raised
without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is
provided[,] will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues
material to that defense.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251,
255, 256–257.) In this case, Davidyan twice argued—both at the
unlawful detainer trial and on direct appeal—that the property
was uninhabitable due to dangerous levels of mold; that
argument was twice rejected. Under these circumstances,
collateral estoppel attaches to the unlawful detainer judgment
and bars Davidyan’s current claims.
       Davidyan also appears to challenge the trial court’s finding
that habitability issues were fully and fairly litigated in the
unlawful detainer proceedings. However, because he provides no

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records or transcripts from the unlawful detainer trial or appeal,
he has not presented an adequate record to show that these
issues were not fully adjudicated therein. (In re Marriage of Deal
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Under well-established rules of
appellate procedure, . . . the appellant . . . has the burden to
provide an adequate record on appeal and to affirmatively show
error.”]; see also Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“‘Failure to provide an adequate
record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against
[the] appellant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”].)
       Lastly, Davidyan argues that collateral estoppel should not
apply because his claims are based on new evidence discovered
after the unlawful detainer judgment.5 But “new evidence,
however compelling, is generally insufficient to avoid application
of collateral estoppel.” (Direct Shopping Network, LLC v. James
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561; see also Evans v. Celotex
Corp. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 [“An exception to collateral
estoppel cannot be grounded on the alleged discovery of more
persuasive evidence. Otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation”].)
       Even if we were to consider this new evidence, it would not
affect our collateral estoppel analysis. Regardless of what
evidence is used to support Davidyan’s current claims, the fact
remains that they are premised on an issue identical to one
decided in the unlawful detainer judgment—namely, the
existence of significant levels of mold in the property during his
tenancy.

5     The new evidence includes information about the level of
mold in the property, the mold’s effect on Davidyan’s health, and
respondents’ alleged concealment of habitability issues.

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                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                _____________________, Acting P. J.
                                ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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