Court Opinion

ID: 9766748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:57:47.461006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:25.629073
License: Public Domain

Pkoctob, J.
(concurring). The majority holds that if, as a result of defendant’s act, a plaintiff becomes insane at any time before the period of limitations expires, the running of the period of limitations shall be suspended. I do not believe that the resolution of the case before us requires such a radical departure from the language of the statute or from the ancient and settled rule, in this State and many others, that once the period of limitations commences to run a subsequent disability does not interrupt it. See, e g., Valente v. Boggiano, 107 N. J. L. 456 (E. & A. 1930); Freeman v. Conover, 95 N. J. L. 89 (E. & A. 1920); Clark v. Richards, 15 N. J. L. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1836); Annotation 41 A. L. R. 2d 726 (1955).
The applicable statute provides:
“If any person entitled to * * * the [actions] specified in [§ 2A:14-2] * * * is or shall be, at the time of any such cause of action * * * accruing * * * insane, such person may commence such action * * * within such time as limited by [§ 2A:14-2], after his coming to or being of * * * sane mind.” N. J. S. 2A :14-21.
A literal interpretation of the above language would exclude its benefit to any plaintiff whose insanity results from the injury complained of, since it will be technically true that an injury which causes insanity must necessarily precede the insanity. Perceiving the harshness of literal interpretation of similar statutory language, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Nebola v. Minnesota Iron Co., 102 Minn. 89, 112 N. W. 880 (1907) adopted the rule that when the injury and the resulting insanity occur on the same day, the two events will be considered legally simultaneous. See also Pannell v. Glidewell, 146 Miss. 565, 111 So. 571 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1927); Taylor v. Houston, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 211 F. 2d 427, 41 A. L. R. 2d 724 (D. C. Cir. 1954); Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537, 550 (D. Ct. App. 1964). *115But see Roelefsen v. Pella, 121 Iowa 153, 96 N. W. 738 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
The same-day rule of Nebola, supra, while it avoided a harsh result in that ease, draws an arbitrary line which fails to protect a plaintiff who, as a practical matter, cannot be expected to take the preliminary steps necessary to preserve his legal rights within a fraction of a day. I think the proper rule should be: If the interval between the tort and the resulting insanity is so brief that plaintiff, acting with diligence, cannot take preliminary steps to enforce his legal rights, then the defendant is estopped from asserting that the statute of limitations has commenced to run. Cf. Taylor v. Houston, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 211 F. 2d 427, 428-429, 41 A. L. R. 2d 724 (D. C. Cir. 1954). This rule would require that the insanity occur soon after the accident. It would recognize the equitable doctrine that a defendant should not benefit from his own wrongful act. Yet the settled rule of law —that once the period of limitations commences to run, a subsequent disability will not interrupt its course—will be preserved. As I understand the majority opinion, its rule would suspend the running of the period of limitations during the plaintiff’s insanity even though that insanity did not occur until one year and eleven months after the accident, during which period the plaintiff was perfectly capable of enforcing his rights. It is one thing to interpret a statute so as to avoid requiring a plaintiff to perform an impossible act. It is quite another to stretch the statute to reach a rule which would benefit a plaintiff who is sane and capable of enforcing his legal rights during a period of time sufficient for him to do so. I have always thought that the primary purpose of the statute of limitations was to protect defendants from the unexpected enforcement of stale claims by plaintiffs who fail to use reasonable diligence in asserting their claims.
The rule I have suggested above is all that is necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s cause of action here. The case came before this Court on plaintiff’s appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant. Other than the pleadings, the *116only matter considered by the trial court was the deposition taken from the plaintiff. The deposition did not reveal, nor did plaintiff contend before this Court, that there is any basis for doubting the plaintiff was sane prior to the accident. Nor is there a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff’s sanity on the day of the accident. But shortly thereafter, while confined in the hospital, she noticed physical symptoms similar to those which accompanied her previous mental ailment in 1942. Furthermore, her deposition reveals that she received psychiatric care at Mountainside Hospital within three weeks of her accident. Thus, at this juncture of the case I cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff’s insanity (which at this posture of the ease I must assume resulted from the accident) occurred so soon after the accident that she, acting with diligence, could not have taken the preliminary steps to preserve or effectuate her legal rights. Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant should not have been granted.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor and Schettino—5.
For affirmance—Justices Hall and Haneman—2.