Court Opinion

ID: 9550682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:40:18.427792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:09.152006
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard
dissenting.
In potency this dissenting opinion may be likened unto that of the court’s opinion, which is nil. In sum the court’s opinion is a gratuitous criticism of the trial court for exercising an unchallengeable jurisdictional function in the matter of a criminal proceeding, and at a stage thereof when such action forever foreclosed all courts from further or different action.
The charge was manslaughter. At the conclusion of all evidence, counsel for defendant, challenging the sufficiency thereof to sustain a conviction, and stating their contention variously, moved for a directed verdict of *185not guilty, which was granted. Such a verdict was returned in full form, and defendant was discharged. It follows, that, since from the beginning of the trial proper, as per all the books, defendant was in jeopardy, his acquittal ended the prosecution on the charge stated in the information for all time. Const., art. II, §18. Why, then, the furor indulged here? Why do we employ the futile language that “there was ample evidence to require submission of the question of guilt to the jury?” The words used, or their equivalent, are pertinent in a civil action where on review we conclude the trial court should not have directed a verdict; but in a criminal prosecution in the circumstances here, such words are void of pertinence. Whether at the close of all the evidence in a criminal prosecution there shall be direction of acquittal is determinable solely by the trial judge, and if denied, and conviction follows, the ruling is subject to review at the instance of the defendant; but if based on the trial court’s appraisal of the evidence there shall be a directed verdict of not guilty, as here, perforce, we are powerless to require the court to undo its orders or otherwise change or alter the status of defendant resulting therefrom. In such circumstances, as clearly we have held, the case is not reviewable and the writ of error will be dismissed. People v. Hopkins, 70 Colo. 163, 197 Pac. 1020; People v. Kippy, 64 Colo. 597, 173 Pac. 395.
The opinion in the Kippy case was written by the late Chief Justice Hill, and in the Hopkins case by former Chief Justice Burke. In compelling logic those eminent jurists, writing en banc opinions, made clear that where the accused has been acquitted by direction of the court, and the question involved rests on the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a conviction, this court will not entertain a writ of error on behalf of the people. In the Kippy case we said: “Section 1997, Rev. Stats., 1908 [’35 C.S.A., c. 48, §500], provides that writs of error shall lie upon behalf of the people to review decisions *186in criminal cases upon questions of law arising upon the trial, motions to quash, demurrers, pleas in bar, pleas in-abatement, motions in arrest of judgment or where a statute is declared unconstitutional. This is followed with a proviso that nothing in the act shall be construed so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. This defendant cannot be tried again for the crime charged in the information. There is nothing in the testimony to make it specially applicable to other cases which may follow. It is improbable that. a similar state of facts will arise in another case, hence, a consideration of the testimony and a declaration concerning it, would not establish any real principle of law-, or be of any assistance, or act as a guide * * *, for which reason we cannot conceive, by the language used, that the legislature intended to provide for what would be a useless review of a state of facts as here presented. The writ of error will be dismissed.” In the Hopkins case, we said: “At the close of the people’s evidence defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground among others, that there was no sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. The motion was sustained, verdict was so entered, and defendant discharged. The district attorney brings error under Sec. 1997, R.S. 1908 [’35 C.S.A., c. 48, §500], authorizing the people to have so reviewed ‘decisions of the trial court in any criminal case upon questions of law arising upon the trial,’ etc. * * * The only question for consideration here is, Was there sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to carry the cause to the jury? In construing said Sec. 1997, we have held that the question of the sufficiency of the whole evidence, where ‘there is nothing in the testimony to make it specially applicable to other cases which may follow,’ is not a question reviewable here under said section. People v. Kippy, 64 Colo. 597, 173 Pac. 395. If the question of the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole is not so reviewable, certainly the question of the sufficiency of that evidence as to any particular element of the *187crime such as the venue, the identity of the defendant, or the corpus delicti, where, as here, ‘there is nothing in the testimony to make it specially applicable to other cases which may follow,’ is not so reviewable, and that case is conclusive here. The former opinion is withdrawn and the writ dismissed.”
In emphasis of the philosophy of the Colorado' cases just reviewed, I pause to state that the prosecution here grew out of the following unusual circumstances. It appears that the decedent, driving his car at night, carelessly drove into the rear of a moving heavy truck loaded with stone, which was traveling at twenty-two miles per hour. Decedent’s car was greatly damaged, and he, gravely injured, was thrown violently into the street. Shortly thereafter, and when decedent lay on the street where he was thrown as the result of his own carelessness, defendant, and while under the influence of liquor, as charged, struck decedent with his car. Whether he died of the first happening before the second untoward occurrence will never be known. There was no evidence, as the court’s opinion practically concedes, that the wounds which the experts testified caused death, were the result of the second accident. There was expert evidence, however, not controverted, as the trial court expressly found, “that all the injuries set forth in the anatomical findings in the autopsy report could have been sustained in the first accident.” In that view, and since the first accident was the result of the decedent’s own carelessness, may it be said that defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, on the ground, inter alia, that “it has not been established by all of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the decedent suffered injuries in a collision with a motor vehicle operated by defendant Cox,” was not to be considered by the trial court, and, if considered, was not resolvable there? And, further, since the resolution of the motion was favorable to defendant, does it lie with us to examine as to the sufficiency of the evidence? In the Kippy and Hopkins *188cases our right to be so concerned not only is expressly disclaimed, but it is held that to take such steps would constitute a “useless review.” Consequently, if nothing else moved us to that end, “not so,” as our distinguished late Chief Justice Denison was wont to say, the unavailability thereof should stay the hand of reviewing ministers of justice. A further thought in line with the philosophy of those causes is, that a state of facts less likely to recur than that here, as I think, is hardly conceivable.
Lest it be thought I have overlooked the cases cited in the court’s opinion, I respectfully emphasize that those cases involved reviews invoked by defendants who had suffered conviction below, and whose contention on error was that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain conviction. I venture to challenge their application in a review sought by the people in a case where the defendant has been found not guilty and formally discharged, as here.
On the authority of our pronouncements set forth above, and proceeding in recognition of the eternal fitness of things, I think the words “writ of error dismissed,” should conclude the disposition of this inquiry. The liberties of the people, as has been said, are preserved through the instrumentality of an “independent judiciary.” The quoted words, as reasonably may be said, apply not less to trial judges than to reviewing judges.
So, since the court has written to no effect, and I in vain, I apprehend that trial judges, acting under an oath which is quite as solemn as ours, will continue to entertain motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction in criminal cases, and, disregarding futile observations from whatever source, make determination as advised.
Mr. Justice Holland concurs in this dissenting opinion.