Court Opinion

ID: 9760495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:53.778052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.928291
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion which holds that appellant cannot base a cause of action on the failure to erect a stop sign, as appellee is prohibited from placing such a sign on Avon Road by statute. See, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6125(a). I cannot agree with the portion of the majority opinion which affirms the summary judgment holding that *618appellee had no duty to control the vegetation on another’s property. Accordingly, I must dissent.
The majority correctly states the law as to the duty of a property owner to maintain a private roadway. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the property owner’s duty of maintenance and repair is limited to that portion of the private road abutting or located on his own land. See, Borgel v. Hoffman, 219 Pa.Super. 260, 280 A.2d 608 (1971); Mscisz v. Russell, 338 Pa.Super. 38, 487 A.2d 839 (1984); Oswald v. Hausman, 378 Pa.Super. 245, 548 A.2d 594 (1988). I also agree that the law imposes the duty to remove vegetation which obstructs the vision of motorists on an adjacent roadway only on the owner of the property where the vegetation is located. See, Harvey v. Hansen, 299 Pa.Super. 474, 445 A.2d 1228 (1982); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6112(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 363. Finally, I agree with the proposition that the law does not impose a duty on a landowner to correct a defective artificial condition on a neighbor’s property. See, Magner v. Baptist Church, 174 Pa. 84, 34 A. 456 (1896); Kearns by Kearns v. Rollins Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 89 Pa.Cmwlth. 596, 492 A.2d 1204 (1985); Houck v. Samuel Geltman & Co., 400 Pa.Super. 534, 583 A.2d 1244 (1991). My disagreement with the majority lies in the application of these principles to the case at bar.
The majority correctly decides that the covenant and subsequent agreement with the Township are ambiguous and could be construed to mean that appellee had undertaken an obligation to perform maintenance work on
... a larger sphere of activity, which would include maintenance of the area adjacent to the roadway, in particular as that area relates to the removal and replacement of trees. It is- further possible to construe “trees” to include vegetation ...
Majority at 434. Thus, the question presented is not whether the law imposes an obligation to control the vegetation on appellee, but whether appellee has undertaken such an obligation by the covenant and subsequent agreement. It is *619on this issue that a material factual question exists which precludes summary judgement. Mscisz, supra; see also, Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 522 Pa. 367, 369, 562 A.2d 279, 280 (1989) (summary judgment is only proper in clearest of cases).
Nor am I persuaded that practical and legal considerations dictate the granting of summary judgment here. If the property in question is subject to the covenant and subsequent agreement, permission to enter onto the land to perform the obligation is necessarily implied in those agreements. Further, adequate legal remedies exist to enforce compliance with the covenant and agreement by a reluctant property owner.
Appellants are entitled to their day in court to prove whether or not appellee voluntarily undertook the obligation to control the vegetation in question. Reversing summary judgment does not impose a duty to do so under the law, it merely recognizes that individuals can assume duties by agreement above those imposed by law. I respectfully dissent.