Court Opinion

ID: 9547117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:41:59.293514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:20.948693
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Justice,
dissenting.
The legal principles applicable to this case were set forth in Pacific Fruit Express v. Industrial Commission, 153 Ariz. 210, 735 P.2d 820 (1987). The administrative law judge recognized and applied those principles to the facts. The Court of Appeals carefully considered this case and applied the same legal principles as this court. I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and dissent from the disposition made by this court.
Pacific Fruit Express held that: (1) The determination when the alleged injury became manifest or when the claimant knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had sustained a compensable injury is a fact determination which the Industrial Commission has the exclusive power to make. (2) This court’s review is limited to determining whether there is evidence in the record to support the finding of the Commission. (3) This court does not weigh the evidence but considers it in the light most favorable to sustaining the award. The evidence in the record should be reviewed with the foregoing principles in mind.
In addition to the evidence set out in the majority opinion, the record shows that the claimant admitted that the reason he went to the doctor employed by the City in 1962 or 1963 was to receive treatment for his nervous condition, and he realized that the condition was caused by the incident in his employment because he related that incident as part of the history he gave to the doctor.
The record shows that the claimant knew how to file a report of injury with the Commission because he did so on at least three occasions. It is apparent that the reason he did not pursue his nervous condition was his concern for his job future and not because of any lack of understanding about the connection of his mental condition to the 1960 incident.
After the termination of the claimant’s employment with the City in 1965 there was no longer any reason for him to fail to pursue his remedy with the Commission, but the claimant did not file a claim.
Over the intervening years the record shows that in seeking treatment the claimant has related his current condition as beginning with the 1960 incident. The difficulty has not been that the claimant has recently discovered that his condition is related to the job incident, but he has only since 1984 been able to convince an expert that his condition was actually caused by the 1960 incident. The opinion of the claimant’s expert is not shared by other treating physicians. The diagnosis of “post traumatic stress disorder” by claimant’s expert was rejected by the carrier’s expert. The merits of the medical diagnosis is now a matter which must be deter*71mined when the claim is heard on the merits. It is worthy of note, however, that the claimant has consistently believed his problems began with the 1960 job incident, yet he never filed for compensation until 1984.
If in fact the claimant’s present condition is due to the job incident, the long delay in failing to file a claim has aggravated the condition when prompt action might well have resulted in effective treatment. The claimant’s inaction has exacerbated the condition and increased expense for medical care. It was to avoid such results that the statute mandated prompt filing of claims.
The record supports the conclusion of the administrative law judge that the claimant knew, as early as 1962, that his mental condition was the result of the job incident in 1960, but he did not file a claim. The 1984 filing was not timely, and the ruling that the Commission was without jurisdiction should have been affirmed.