Court Opinion

ID: 9849645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:32.376387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.526418
License: Public Domain

FINNEY, Chief Justice
(Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand. In my view, the inappropriate possession and use of the extraneous pamphlet by jury members so tainted the jury that its contents affected the ability of the jury to be fair and impartial at both the guilt and penalty phases of appellant’s bifurcated trial.
After a recess at the close of the presentation of penalty phase evidence, the trial judge held a conference in chambers with counsel and the appellant. The judge advised that he had received from a juror a note which stated that a pamphlet was being passed around in the jury room concerning God’s word on the death penalty. Juror S was brought into chambers and the following is a portion of her examination by the judge.
THE COURT: Can you tell me a little bit about what that pamphlet says?
THE JUROR: I haven’t had it in my hands, so I don’t know, but I saw the outside cover of it. It says — it’s like God’s word on criminal punishment; and I know they have that; and one of the girls brought her Bible this morning. She has been like quoting passages and having everybody read out of the Bible. Well, not everybody, but like two people and having them read some stuff. I mean, I’m one of the most Christian people you can ever meet, but I don’t think this is the time or the place.
*151THE COURT: All right. Have you seen this pamphlet?
THE JUROR: I’ve seen the outside of it. I have not looked inside of it.
THE COURT: Do you know if any other jurors have seen it?
THE JUROR: Yes, they have.
THE COURT: Can you tell me how many?
THE JUROR: I can’t think how many, but I can say probably at least four — at least.
BY THE COURT: Do you know which ones?
THE JUROR: [Juror O] has it. I saw her put it in her purse.
BY THE COURT: Is she the one that brought it?
THE JUROR: Yes, I’m almost positive she is the one that brought it. I mean, it is in her purse right now. I saw her put it in there. There’s her; there’s I think four of them have seen it. I’m pretty sure [Juror H] has. I’m not positive on [Juror H], but I’m pretty sure she has.
THE COURT: That’s [Juror H],
THE JUROR: Yes. And also I think [Juror A] has seen it — [Juror A]. I didn’t realize until, you know, the last person was looking at and they had been talking about it, but I did not know what it was until I saw the outside cover of it.
THE COURT: All right. And in so far as the reading of the scriptures, is that something that they have done individually?
THE JUROR: Yes. I mean, I just heard yell out, you know, read Deuteronomy, like 4:16, or something like that, and that’s a good one to read, this one, and that one will make you think, or something like that.
At the conclusion of her examination, Juror S was sent to a separate jury room, and each of the other jurors was examined out of the presence of the other jurors. The trial judge asked whether they had personally seen, read, been confronted by or exposed to any materials or literature other than the testimony and evidence presented in the courtroom or any *152discussions concerning the case besides jury deliberations at the conclusion of the guilt phase.
Ten of the jurors, including Jurors A, H, 0, and the alternate, responded in the negative. Juror P qualified his response by saying that he had not seen anything “concerning this ease or trial.” Juror S was recalled to give a more detailed description of the pamphlet. The remaining eleven jurors and the alternate were then brought in separately and questioned specifically about the pamphlet. Eight, including Juror P, denied that a pamphlet or any other literature was passed around or discussed in the jury room. In the pertinent portions of their examination, the remaining four responded as follows.

From the examination of Juror OR:

THE COURT: ... Have .you since this trial began read a pamphlet entitled God’s Word on Criminal Punishment?
THE JUROR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You have? Could you tell me what it says?
THE JUROR: I couldn’t really remember what it said. I just was reading through it while we was waiting.
THE COURT: When was that?
THE JUROR: This morning.
Juror W stated that she had seen a pamphlet, but had neither seen the name on it nor held it. She recalled one juror saying to another “here, read, you know, you might want to read this,” or something ...

From the examination of Juror H:

THE COURT: Since the jury has been placed together and sequestered, have you read a pamphlet entitled God’s word on Criminal Punishment?
THE JUROR: I’ve seen it floating around. I haven’t actually read it myself.
THE COURT: You haven’t read it.
THE JUROR: I have looked at it.
THE COURT: I beg your pardon?
THE JUROR: I have looked at it, but I haven’t actually read it as far as reading it.
*153Juror 0 admitted obtaining the pamphlet prior to sequestration from her “prayer partner,” and stated that she had been reading it for reassurance that she was making the proper decision.
Appellant moved for a mistrial, asserting that the jurors had been less than truthful when first questioned, that at least four jurors had been tainted by the pamphlet, and that because Juror 0 had obtained the pamphlet prior to the commencement of trial, she harbored a bias toward guilt and capital punishment.1 The trial judge removed Juror 0 from the jury, but denied the motion for a mistrial.
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the trial to proceed with a jury whose deliberations had been tainted by the introduction of extraneous material. I agree.
I concur in so much of the majority’s opinion as alludes to the criteria for a fair and impartial jury as set out in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); and S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 14.
However, removing Juror 0 from the jury was inadequate to cure the prejudicial effect of the pamphlet. The record reflects that at least four jurors had involvement with the pamphlet. Excluding Juror 0, two of the four admitted either looking at or reading through the pamphlet in the jury room. “It is fundamental that every litigant who is entitled to trial by jury is entitled to an impartial jury, free to the furthest extent practicable from extraneous influences that may subvert the fact-finding process.” Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1534 (1986); State v. Cameron, 311 S.C. 204, 207, 428 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Ct.App.1993).
Where the misconduct involves the jurors’ exposure to outside influences, the “cases are strongest in which the juror *154has lent himself to such influence as signified a willingness to receive advice or favors.” State v. Rowell, 75 S.C. 494, 511, 56 S.E. 23, 29 (1906). Contrary to the majority’s view, I find in this record ample evidence that the jury had access and exposure to the pamphlet throughout the morning. When the judge examined the jurors the second time, at least one juror besides Juror 0 admitted to “reading through the pamphlet while we were waiting,” on the morning in question. Another “saw it floating around,” turned a page or two and “saw” the captions; and a third juror “saw” the pamphlet. Not until after mid-day did one of the other jurors advise the judge of the pamphlet. Obviously, members of the jury were willing to receive the information and advice contained in the pamphlet.
Furthermore, the jurors were less than forthcoming when questioned by the judge. Compare State v. Rowell, supra. Their demeanor with regard to candor raises concern when viewed in connection with daily admonitions by the trial judge that the only thing they were “to consider is what they see and hear in that courtroom, nothing more and nothing less.”
I would hold that the extraneous material in the jury room and the presence of Juror 0 throughout most of the proceedings so prejudiced the outcome of both phases of appellant’s trial that a new trial is mandated. State v. Wasson, 299 S.C. 508, 386 S.E.2d 255 (1989). First, Juror 0 stated that she obtained the pamphlet prior to sequestration, which raises the-stark implication that guilt was already presumed and that. appellant’s death sentence was a foregone conclusion as a result of the jury being tainted by the influence of Juror 0 and through its exposure to the pamphlet.
Second, the inordinate brevity of jury deliberations in this capital case under the circumstances here raises serious questions relating to the deliberative process. The jury required approximately thirty minutes to render the guilty verdict and less than two hours to return the death sentence. In my opinion, the record clearly infers that the jury was improperly influenced throughout its deliberations by Juror 0 and the author’s views as expressed in the pamphlet.
The 31 page pamphlet, entitled God, Law, and Capital Punishment, by Richard W. De Haan, “teacher of the Radio Bible Class, worldwide ministry through radio, television, liter*155ature” bears a copyright date of 1974 and is a part of the record on appeal. Author De Haan makes an impassioned plea in favor of capital punishment and cites uncorroborated facts and unsubstantiated statistics to support his argument.
In my judgment, exposing appellant’s jury to the pamphlet is tantamount to permitting an advocate of capital punishment to offer unauthorized evidence in circumvention of the constitution, statutory and common law, and the rules of court; ■ to make unregulated rebuttal of evidence properly admitted at trial; and to present unrestrained argument in support of the death sentence.
In charging his interpretation of God’s law on capital punishment, the author assumes the role of pre-eminent trial judge and implies that where there may be conflict between the law as charged by the state judge and that charged by the author, the author’s instructions should be controlling. Mr. De Haan, through his pamphlet, is present in the jury room as a thirteenth juror deliberating upon evidence and the law received from two sources — the trial court and his pamphlet.
The following are excerpts from the pamphlet. “Over the past decade, nearly 300 policemen have been killed while performing their duties.” (pg. 1) Quoting the distraught father of a girl who had been raped and murdered, “This sort of thing has happened all too often, and must be stopped!” (pg. 2)
I find it difficult to minimize the prejudicial effect of the following comments upon the emotions of a jury considering the guilt and punishment of a defendant on trial for his life.
Whenever this principle of an “eye for an éye ...” is followed by a society, mankind is bettered. God is pleased when this expression of His will [capital punishment] is carried out ... (pg. 13) We must not fail to carry out the proper sentence [capital punishment] ... (pg. 14)
He has given specific demands for the punishment of those who break these laws, including the death penalty for deliberate murder.... The Lord in His perfect holiness and justice therefore has ordained that the deliberate killer must pay for his crime by forfeiting his own right to life, (pp. 18-19) Government must see to it that God’s principles *156are in force, and this includes capital punishment for willful murder, (p. 21)
... In 1966 and 1967, when the death penalty was still on the books in our country, not one policeman was killed from ambush. But during the 4 years from 1968 through 1971, after capital punishment was no longer a threat, 49 policemen died as a result of being shot down....
The price of leniency toward murderers is heavy.... Hundreds of people have been slain by men released after serving time for a murder conviction. J. Edgar Hoover told a congressional subcommittee that 19 men who killed policemen from 1960 to 1970 had previously been convicted of first-degree murder.
In conclusion, then, capital punishment is reasonable and fair. It meets God’s holy demands of justice ... Most important of all, it is commanded by God. Through revelation He established it as the way to deal with killers. He expects every society to carry it out, and is displeased when a community disregards this important obligation.
Mr. De Haan concludes the chapter with a cautionary note to the jury. “Let me ask you a personal question. Are you prepared for the day you must stand before God’s tribunal? His judgments are always fair, and He never makes mistakes.” (pp. 21-23)
The trial court is under an obligation to safeguard the right to trial by an impartial jury throughout the proceedings. The right to an impartial jury is not satisfied until the collective judgment of the jury is the product of a trial by an impartial trier of fact, capable and willing to follow the law and render an impartial verdict on the evidence. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 225.
Although this dissent is specific as to Issue I of appellant’s appeal, insofar as it relates to the impartiality of appellant’s trial jury, reference is made to Issue II. The record reflects that while he was a student in 1986, Juror P led a group of 40 students on a trip to Columbia to support the execution of Terry Roach. Voir dire examination for appellant’s jury did not specifically address Juror P’s participation in a death penalty rally and the facts were not divulged prior to trial. When questioned about his “position” on the death penalty, *157Juror P admitted that he had thought about the death penalty, but indicated that he could be fair and impartial.
After the jury returned appellant’s sentence, a newspaper quoted Juror P as saying, “I think the only thing I regret is that [appellant] has only one life to give for the two he took.” When considered in its totality, the compelling conclusion is that the outcome of both phases of appellant’s trial was influenced by cumulative bias on the part of his jury.
I find that the interjection of extraneous facts and editorial comments into the jury’s deliberations created bias and prejudice against the appellant and affected the ability of the jury to render fair and impartial verdicts at both phases of appellant’s bifurcated trial. I would reverse appellant’s conviction and death sentence and remand for a new trial.
TOAL, J., concurs.

. We note that in his argument to the trial judge, counsel for appellant did not explicitly assert that the evidence showed that at least some of the jurors were engaging in premature deliberations. We view such misconduct as very serious; especially where, as here, the jury has been warned against it. See, e.g., Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273, 414 S.E.2d 780 (1992).