Court Opinion

ID: 9366382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 17:07:53.486451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.818247
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re P.S., 2023-Ohio-144.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE P.S.                                    :
                                              :          No. 111817
A Minor Child                                 :
                                              :
[Appeal by O.S., Mother]                      :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 19, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. AD-19900639

                                       Appearances:

                 Christina M. Joliat, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Appellant, Mother, appeals a juvenile court judgment granting

permanent custody of her child, P.S., to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children

and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). She claims the following error:

        The trial court order granting permanent custody to the agency was
        based upon insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight
      of the evidence, and it erred in finding permanent custody to be in the
      best interest of the child.

               We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                          I. Facts and Procedural History

               On January 16, 2019, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that P.S. was

a neglected and dependent child and requesting an order granting temporary

custody of the child to CCDCFS. Following a hearing that same day and with

Mother’s consent, the trial court ordered the child into the predispositional

temporary custody of CCDCFS. After a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered

P.S. placed in the temporary custody of CCDCFS in May 2019.

               In June 2020, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to

permanent custody. The court conducted a trial on the motion on May 23, 2022.

Deidre Hogue (“Hogue”), an extended-service social worker with CCDCFS, testified

that she received P.S.’s case in February 2019, and worked with Mother for the

duration of the case. According to Hogue, the agency became involved in P.S.’s case

in December 2018, when Mother was hospitalized for having thoughts of harming

the child. (Tr. 93.)1 Mother initially agreed to the terms of a safety plan that

prohibited her from being alone with P.S., and Mother and child moved in with a

family friend. However, a short time later, Mother and P.S. moved back in with the

child’s alleged father, who had a criminal history of assaults and domestic violence.

(Tr. 11, 15, 54.) Consequently, CCDCFS sought and obtained temporary custody of

      1   All citations to the transcript refer to the May 23, 2022 trial transcript.
P.S. on January 16, 2019. P.S. was three years old at the time of trial in May 2022,

and was, therefore, an infant when she entered agency custody in January 2019.

(Tr. 11.)

             The agency developed a case plan aimed at promoting permanent

reunification of Mother and child. The case plan included services to address

Mother’s issues with parenting, mental health, domestic violence, and provision of

basic needs such as stable housing and employment. (Tr. 12, 14-15, 18.) The agency

also had concerns regarding the child’s alleged father and his violent criminal

history and history of domestic violence. The alleged father refused to meet with

case workers to discuss the case plan, and he is not a party to this appeal.

             Mother was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”)

and claimed to hear voices. (Tr. 23, 93-94.) She initially engaged in mental-health

services through FrontLine Service and Ohio Guidestone, but her compliance with

the services was inconsistent. She attended therapy sessions from February 2019

through October 2019, but stopped services altogether in January 2020. She did

not resume mental-health services until February 2021. (Tr. 22-23, 24, 87.) Mother

testified at trial and acknowledged that she resumed mental-health services at

FrontLine Service in early 2021, explaining that she was more comfortable with in-

person services rather than virtual appointments. (Tr. 121-122.)

            Hogue testified that Mother was not compliant with her psychiatric

medications. (Tr. 32-34, 87-88.) Hogue explained that during her most recent

home visit, shortly before trial, she observed that Mother was out of her medication.
Mother told Hogue that she threw the medication away and that she had missed her

appointment to obtain a refill of the medication. (Tr. 33-34, 149.) Hogue testified

that Mother also failed to take her medication from September 2021 through April

2022. (Tr. 34-36.)

             Mother admitted during her trial testimony that she sometimes forgot

to take her medication as prescribed and that she missed a recent psychiatric

appointment for medication management because she failed to check her email to

verify the appointment. (Tr. 124-126, 156-157.) Hogue testified that Mother’s lack

of compliance with mental-health services was an ongoing concern because she

hears voices and previously had thoughts of harming the child. (Tr. 37-38, 59, 93-

94.) Hogue explained:

      At one point I believe in February she told me that the voices are kinda
      like non-stop and that she is hearing them more frequently than she
      had been hearing in a long time, * * * actually she did tell me that ─
      mom reports that the medication she has helps her with the voices.

(Tr. 38.)

             FrontLine therapist, Angela Zamora (“Zamora”), testified that she has

been working with Mother since February 2022, when she took over as Mother’s

therapist.   Zamora testified that Mother had been engaged in counseling at

FrontLine since March 2021. According to Zamora, Mother was “fairly consistent”

in attending her scheduled appointments, and that Mother was diagnosed as having

PTSD. (Tr. 104.) Zamora testified that her therapy focused on interpersonal

relationships, but she indicated that a mental-health goal could be added to Mother’s
treatment plan. Zamora does not participate in Mother’s psychiatry appointments,

nor does she regularly discuss Mother’s medication compliance, but Mother

admitted to Zamora that she missed some of her psychiatry appointments. (Tr. 106-

107, 115.) Zamora acknowledged that she is not familiar with the medications

prescribed to Mother. (Tr. 110.) On cross-examination, Zamora also admitted she

had no knowledge of the fact that Mother had had thoughts of harming her child,

and she acknowledged it would be important for Mother to make all psychiatric

visits if that were the case. (Tr. 115.)

               At the time P.S. was removed from Mother’s care, Mother was

homeless and unemployed. (Tr. 19.) Consequently, Mother’s case plan included a

basic needs objective, and the agency referred Mother to Community Collaborative

for assistance with housing and employment. (Tr. 19.) Mother was staying at the

North Point Shelter from February 2019 through March 2020. Over the course of

the proceedings, Mother lived in three different homes and at the shelter. (Tr. 52-

53, 89.)

              Mother acknowledged at trial that she has struggled with

homelessness. When asked how many times over the course of the proceedings she

stayed in a shelter, Mother replied, “There was North Point. I was in and out of

North Point three times.” (Tr. 127.) Although Mother eventually obtained her own

apartment, the agency remained concerned about Mother’s ability to maintain

stable housing because she had not paid rent for the last six months prior to trial,

and the agency was worried she could be evicted. (Tr. 48-49, 82-83, 89.) And
despite referrals, Mother failed to seek assistance with rent through Community

Collaborative. (Tr. 99-100.)

              Additionally, when Hogue visited Mother’s home in April 2022, the

month before trial, the home lacked heat and hot water. (Tr. 49.) Mother told

Hogue she had been heating the home with an electric stove. (Tr. 49.) There were

also plumbing problems in the home. A bathroom drain had been clogged since

Mother moved into the home in September 2021, and the kitchen sink pipes were

leaking. (Tr. 49-50, 52.) The hot water problem was subsequently fixed, but Mother

had not asked the landlord to fix the heating problem, which remained an issue of

concern. (Tr. 77-78, 80.)

              Mother also failed to keep adequate food in the home. Mother told

Hogue that she had been employed doing credit collections for a few months prior

to trial, but she only produced one pay stub. She also claimed to have been employed

at McDonald’s for almost a year, but never produced any documentation to

substantiate the claim. (Tr. 53, 79.)

              Hogue testified that Mother was referred to a parenting program

through Ohio Guidestone and for domestic-violence services through Domestic

Violence Advocacy Center (“DVAC”). Mother completed the domestic-violence class

at DVAC, but she was subsequently involved in another domestic-violence incident.

Consequently, the agency referred Mother to Able Counseling for additional

domestic-violence classes, but she failed to complete the classes. (Tr. 20-21.)

Mother completed a second series of domestic-violence classes through Moore
Counseling in June 2021, and Hogue believed that she benefitted from the second

program because she has not had any domestic-violence incidents since she

completed the class. (Tr. 21, 27.)

              Mother completed a parenting program in 2019, but she did not

appear to benefit from the program and later engaged in a second parenting

program that she completed in June 2021. (Tr. 21.) Despite having participated in

two parenting programs, Mother continued to demonstrate concerning behaviors

during visits with P.S. Hogue explained that Mother has difficulty redirecting P.S.

when she misbehaves and that she has hit the child three times during visits. (Tr.

28-30, 152.) Mother admitted to Hogue that she hit P.S. within three weeks of trial,

but she claimed that she did not hit her with any force. Mother also claimed that

she “popped the child on the behind,” but agency personnel observed a red mark on

the child’s leg. (Tr. 30-31.)

              Hogue discussed Mother’s method of disciplining P.S. with Mother

and tried to direct Mother to more appropriate forms of discipline in keeping with

the parenting-program training. However, Mother told Hogue that she uses the

verbal commands and timeouts that she learned in parenting classes “in addition to

popping the child.” (Tr. 31.)

              CCDCFS scheduled visits between Mother and P.S. once per week.

Although the agency offered a second weekly visit, Mother declined the additional

visit. (Tr. 40-41.) Mother stopped visiting P.S. altogether from May 2020 through

August 2020, when visits were virtual rather than in-person due to the Covid-19
pandemic. Mother resumed visits briefly in August 2020, but she again stopped

attending visits between December 2020 and February 2021. Mother resumed

visits in February 2021, and Mother and child appeared to be bonded and “happy to

see each other.” (Tr. 44-45.)

              Mother eventually progressed to unsupervised visits in September

2021, but, as previously stated, Mother continued to struggle to redirect P.S. when

she would smack and hit Mother, throw her stuff on the floor, and fail to follow

through on Mother’s directions. (Tr. 43-45.)

              Finally, Hogue testified that P.S. has been with the same foster family

since she was removed from Mother in January 2019. The foster mother is a friend

of Mother’s family. Indeed, Mother suggested the friend for placement at the time

of P.S.’s removal. (Tr. 54-55, 57-58.) According to Hogue, P.S. is “very bonded” with

the foster family and is thriving in their care. (Tr. 57-58.) P.S. is a healthy child with

no special needs.

               CCDCFS was seeking permanent custody of P.S. because it did not

believe that either parent could provide a safe and permanent home for her within a

reasonable time. When asked whether either parent could provide a safe and stable

home for P.S., Hogue replied:

      No. * * * Mom is inconsistent with her mental health and she has
      demonstrated being inconsistent with her mental health.

      * * * [A]lthough there’s no evictions for her housing currently that I’m
      aware of, mom still has a history of struggling with homelessness and
      even know [sic] she has an issue with providing for [P.S.] and
      maintaining her home and the rents.
      You know, for parenting it is a concern for me that mom has had three
      allegations of hitting the child during visits, especially when the child
      was removed for mom having thoughts of wanting to harm the child.

(Tr. 59.) Hogue further stated she believes permanent custody is in P.S.’s best

interest because she needs a safe and permanent home. The foster family is willing

to adopt P.S. and, as previously stated, P.S. is thriving in their care.

              At the conclusion of the hearing, Jean Brandt (“Brandt”), P.S.’s

guardian ad litem, recommended the court grant permanent custody of P.S. to the

agency. She explained that “the child’s best interest would be served by granting the

CCDCFS motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody.” (Tr. 158.)

Brandt observed that P.S. had been in agency custody for more than 24 months and

that, “despite a genuine effort on her part, [Mother] has failed to fully resolve the

issues that led to this matter being initiated.” (Tr. 158.) Brandt also noted that

Mother “is still struggling with mental health services and to be completely

medication-compliant.” (Tr. 159.)

               The juvenile court later issued a judgment entry ordering that P.S. be

placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS. Mother now appeals the trial court’s

judgment.

                               II. Law and Analysis

               In the sole assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court’s award

of permanent custody is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the

manifest weight of the evidence.
               A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest * * * in the care, custody,

and management of [his or her child].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102

S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The termination of parental rights is regarded as

“‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” In re J.B., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio

St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14. Consequently, parents “‘must be

afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’” In re Hayes,

79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d

1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991).

              Nevertheless, a parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her

child is not absolute. In re L.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110789, 2022-Ohio-529,

¶ 49. “‘[T]he natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare

of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principal to be observed.’” In re

L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham,

59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

               Ohio statutes governing child custody and protection “appropriately

reflect the need to balance * * * [the] parents’ * * * interest in the custody, care,

nurturing, and rearing of their own children, and the state’s parens patriae interest

in providing for the security and welfare of children under its jurisdiction[.]” In re

Thompson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1358, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1890 (Apr.

26, 2001).
                             A. Standard of Review

              R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a juvenile

court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523,

115 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). This first prong authorizes

the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after

a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the

following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and

there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-

month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents

from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused,

neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state

or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).

              Only one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) must be

established to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis for granting permanent

custody of a child to an agency. In re D.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110505, 2021-

Ohio-3821, ¶ 27, citing In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104881, 2017-Ohio-657.

If any one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) is established, the court

may move to the second prong of the analysis, which requires the juvenile court to
determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether it is in the best interest of the

child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).

               “A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains

some competent, credible evidence from which the court could have found that the

essential statutory elements for permanent custody had been established by clear

and convincing evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-

1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16.

               “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be

established.’” In re T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99931, 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). Although

sufficiency and manifest weight are distinct legal concepts, a finding that a judgment

is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding

that sufficient evidence supports the judgment. In re C.N., 10th Dist. Franklin No.

15AP-67, 2015-Ohio-2546, ¶ 9, citing State v. Howze, 10th Dist. Franklin N0. 13AP-

386, 2013-Ohio-4800, ¶ 10.

                                   B. First Prong

              With respect to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the

juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that “[t]he child has been

in the temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing
agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period.” (July

20, 2022, journal entry p.3.)

               Hogue testified that P.S. went into agency custody on January 16,

2019, where she remained until the time of trial on May 23, 2022. (Tr. 11, 54.) R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) states, “For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall

be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of

the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or

the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.”

               Mid-March 2019 would have marked 60 days from the date P.S. was

removed from Mother’s care. Trial was held on May 23, 2022, more than three years

later. And, as previously stated, Hogue testified that P.S. remained in agency

custody for the entire duration of those three years, and there was no evidence to

contradict this testimony. Therefore, there was competent, credible evidence to

support the juvenile court’s finding that P.S. had been in temporary agency custody

for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, and the first prong of the

permanent custody analysis has been established.

               Having found that P.S. had been in temporary custody for more than

12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, the juvenile court had concluded the

first prong of the permanent custody analysis and moved on to consider the best

interest of the child. Nevertheless, the juvenile court further found that “one or more

of the factors in division (E) of section 2151.414 of the Revised Code exist and the

child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable period of
time or should not be placed with either parent[.]” (July 20, 2022, journal entry

p.3.)

               R.C. 2151.414(E) provides a list of factors the court must consider in

determining whether or not children can be placed with a parent within a reasonable

time. If the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one

of these enumerated factors exists as to each of the child’s parents, the juvenile court

must find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414(E).

               The juvenile court found that P.S. could not be placed with either

parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) provides that the court shall enter a

finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with either parent if it finds that

        [f]ollowing the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
        notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
        agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
        caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
        continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
        causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.

               Hogue testified that the agency developed a case plan to assist Mother

in addressing her issues with parenting, mental health, domestic violence, and the

provision of basic needs, including housing and employment. Mother initially

engaged in mental-health services with FrontLine Service and later with Ohio

Guidestone, from February 2019 through October 2019, after which she missed
several appointments and stopped treatment altogether in January 2020. Mother

did not reengage in these services until February 2021.

              Although Mother was “fairly consistent” in attending therapy

appointments since February 2022, she was not compliant in taking her medication

as prescribed. (Tr. 23, 32-34, 87-88.) Hogue testified that during the most recent

home visit, she discovered that Mother was out of medication. When Hogue

questioned Mother about the medication, Mother told her that she threw the

medication away and that she had missed her appointment to obtain a medication

refill. (Tr. 33-34, 149.) Mother admitted during her trial testimony that she

sometimes forgot to take her medication as prescribed, and admitted that she

missed a recent psychiatry appointment for medication management because she

failed to check her email to verify the appointment. (Tr. 124-126, 156-157.)

              Hogue testified that Mother’s failure to take her prescribed

medication was an ongoing concern because she “hears voices.” (Tr. 37.) Mother

told Hogue shortly before trial that “the voices are kinda like non-stop” and that “she

is hearing them more frequently than she had been hearing in a long time.” (Tr. 37-

38, 93-94.) Thus, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother was

not compliant with her mental-health services.

              The record also supports a finding that Mother failed to benefit from

the parenting component of her case plan. Mother completed a parenting program

through Ohio Guidestone, but she continued to exhibit concerning behaviors after

completing the parenting class.      Consequently, Mother engaged in a second
parenting program that she completed in June of 2021. Despite having completed

two parenting programs, Mother continued to have difficulty redirecting P.S. when

necessary, and Mother continued to hit P.S. inappropriately.            When Hogue

attempted to remind Mother of more appropriate forms of discipline such as

redirection and timeouts, Mother replied that she used verbal commands to redirect

P.S. and timeouts “in addition to popping the child.” (Tr. 31, 71-72.) The court found

Mother’s acts of hitting the child particularly alarming since Mother admitted to

previously having thoughts of harming P.S. Therefore, the court’s concern that

Mother failed to benefit from the parenting classes is supported by competent,

credible evidence.

              The evidence also shows that Mother failed to demonstrate that she

could provide basic needs such as employment and housing. Mother claimed to be

employed in various jobs, but she only produced one pay stub for one of the jobs,

despite Hogue’s requests for more documentation. And, Mother had not paid rent

for the six months prior to trial, and there was threat that she could be evicted.

Moreover, Mother’s home did not have heat, and Mother made no effort to contact

the landlord to remediate this problem. Therefore, the evidence showed that

Mother failed to significantly benefit from the basic needs component of her case

plan.

              Moreover, Brandt opined at trial that Mother “has failed to fully

resolve the issues that led to this matter being initiated.” (Tr. 158.) Brandt observed

that Mother “is still struggling with mental health services and to be completely
medication-compliant.”      Therefore, the trial court’s finding, pursuant to R.C.

2151.414(E)(1), that P.S. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with either parent is supported by competent, credible

evidence.2

                           C. Best Interest of the Child

               Having determined that the manifest weight of the evidence supports

the juvenile court’s finding that P.S. had been in temporary agency custody for 12 or

more months of a consecutive 22-month period, and could not be returned to either

parent within a reasonable time, we now turn to the second prong of our analysis,

which requires the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether it

is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(D).

               We recognize that, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact

the court’s decision will have on the lives of the parties concerned, the juvenile court

enjoys broad discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in

the child's best interest. In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th

Dist.1994). We, therefore, review a juvenile court’s determination of a child’s best

interests under R.C. 2151.414(D) for an abuse of discretion. In re D.A., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47.

      2  The trial court also found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(3), that P.S.’s alleged
father abandoned her because he failed to communicate with the child, failed to visit the
child, and refused to engage in any services that could assist in reuniting him with P.S.
However, as previously stated, Father is not a party to this appeal.
               An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

In other words, “[a] court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts a decision

to a judge’s discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the

legally permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-

Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 19.

               This court has held that an abuse of discretion may be found where a

trial court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard,

or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio

App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). When applying the

abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22

(8th Dist.).

               In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D) requires

the court to consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to (1) the

interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings,

relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may

significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the

child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child;

(4) the child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and

(5) whether any factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are applicable.

               Although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent custody determination, “there is not

one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In

re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. Moreover,

only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find

that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 102350, 2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30.

               Although there was evidence that P.S. was bonded with Mother and

that they love each other, there was also evidence that P.S. is bonded with her foster

family and that she is thriving in their home. Therefore, the factor set forth in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) is neutral to the extent the evidence shows that P.S. is bonded to both

Mother and her foster family. However, the guardian ad litem stated she believes

P.S. will thrive with the foster family because the foster family provides a safe and

stable home whereas Mother has failed to resolve her mental-health issues and has

failed to demonstrate that she provide a stable home for P.S. Therefore, the factor

set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) weighs in favor of permanent custody.

               With regard to P.S.’s custodial history, the evidence shows that she

has been living with the same foster family almost her entire life. She has lived with

the foster family for over three years, and she was three years old at the time of trial.

Moreover, the foster family is willing to adopt P.S. and will, therefore, provide her a
permanent home. Therefore, the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(3) and

2151.414(D)(4) weigh heavily in favor of permanent custody, and the trial court’s

findings are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

             Moreover, if all the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) are

established, then the trial court must grant permanent custody of the child to the

agency. See In re P.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110121, 2021-Ohio-1821, ¶ 26

(“Because all the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) apply, permanent custody was

necessarily in the best interest of the child and the juvenile court was required to

grant permanent custody to CCDCFS.”). R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) states:

      (2) If all of the following apply, permanent custody is in the best interest
      of the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent
      custody of a public children services agency or private child placing
      agency:

      (a) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or
      more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist and the child
      cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable
      time or should not be placed with either parent.

      (b) The child has been in an agency’s custody for two years or longer,
      and no longer qualifies for temporary custody pursuant to division (D)
      of section 2151.415 of the Revised Code.

      (c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned permanent
      living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of section 2151.353 of
      the Revised Code.

      (d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other interested
      person has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal custody of
      the child.

              As previously explained, the record supports the trial court’s finding

that P.S. could not be placed with either of her parents within a reasonable time or
should not be placed with either parent as outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(a). The

undisputed evidence also demonstrates that P.S. has been in temporary custody for

approximately three years and, therefore, was in agency custody for two or more

years, as outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(b).

               P.S. could not meet the requirements for a planned permanent living

arrangement as provided in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(c), because she was only three years

old and one of the requirements is that the child is 16 years of age or older. See R.C.

2151.353(A)(5).

               Finally, the consideration listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d) is

established if “[p]rior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other interested

person has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal custody of the child.”

The record shows that no motion for legal custody was filed by any individual in this

case. Therefore, this factor was satisfied at the time of trial, and the trial court noted

in its entry that “no relative or other interested person has filed or has been

identified in a motion for legal custody of the child[.]” (July 20, 2022, journal entry.)

              The record demonstrates that all the factors listed in R.C.

2151.414(D)(2) apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, permanent custody was

necessarily in the best interest of the child, and the juvenile court was required to

grant permanent custody to CCDCFS. In re P.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110121,

2021-Ohio-1821, at ¶ 26. Therefore, the sole assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.
      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR