Court Opinion

ID: 9549068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:12:49.435836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:47.869650
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion in In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210 [168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087] (from which I dissented) established that the 1978 death penalty initiative converted a term of “life imprisonment” to “an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence” for first degree murder without special circumstances. (P. 221.) The majority in Jeanice D. argued that “If the drafters of the current version of Penal Code section 190 had intended to establish a determinate life sentence, with some minimum parole fixing date, they surely would not have specifically utilized language that unequivocably [sic] connotes an indeterminate sentence.” (P. 216.)
Thus, the majority in Jeanice D. held that the new “indeterminate” term did not constitute “imprisonment for life” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5, which makes an offender so sentenced ineligible for commitment in Youth Authority facilities.
*657The present majority now holds that, notwithstanding Jeanice D., the new indeterminate term does constitute “imprisonment... for life” under Penal Code section 1070, thereby entitling a defendant faced with such a sentence to 26 rather than 10 peremptory challenges. In my view, such inconsistent holdings, based upon substantially identical statutory language, are very unfortunate. They suggest the use of selective or “result-oriented” adjudication which is not dependent upon the consistent application of recognized legal principles.
One such principle, for example, is that where two statutes are in pari materia, the interpretation of language in one statute controls the interpretation of virtually the same language in the other. (In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 845 [186 P.2d 134].) Both Penal Code section 1070 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 are in pari materia because both sections are concerned with specifying the rights and disabilities of those persons facing death or imprisonment “for life” rather than some lesser sentence. By reason of the adoption of the 1978 initiative, a sentence of “life imprisonment” became a sentence of “25 years to life,” and in my view we should be consistent in determining whether the new sentence is one of “life imprisonment” under these statutes.
To summarize, in Jeanice D. the majority said that a sentence of “25 years to life” was not a “life” sentence. I thought that it was and so stated in my dissent. Here, the majority hold that a “25 years to life” sentence is a “life” sentence for purposes of determining peremptory challenges. Based on Jeanice D. I think that it is not a life sentence, and do not see how I can be wrong both times.
By reason of the majority’s holding in Jeanice D. the 1978 death penalty initiative established an indeterminate sentence, not “life imprisonment.” Although I continue to disagree with that holding, it controls the present case.
I would affirm the judgment.
On October 6, 1983, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.