Court Opinion

ID: 9521997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:41.905117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:11.615704
License: Public Domain

NEAL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent to the conclusion reached in Issue III. I concur in all other issues in the majority opinion.
First, there was no evidence produced in the factual base of the case which could cause the concept of wanton and willful conduct to be invoked.
Secondly, I fail to perceive any connection between the mental state of the manufacturer, a necessary element where wanton and willful conduct is alleged, and the open and obvious rule. Before liability can be impressed upon a manufacturer the defect must be hidden and not normally observable, thus creating a latent danger in the use of the product. Although the manufacturer who has actual knowledge of an unobservable defect is subject to liability for failure to warn of the danger, he has no duty to warn if the danger is open and obvious to all. Bemis Company, Inc. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058. To be actionable the danger must be latent so as to set a trap for an unwary user. Thus, the open and obvious concept is addressed to the knowledge and mental processes of the user. When he perceives the danger and continues to use the product, the original act of the manufacturer, or his mental state, is no longer a causative factor.