Court Opinion

ID: 9945004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 20:00:38.418739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:19.796160
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 23-1001
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

BRANDON CADE,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
        No. 1:21-cr-223-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
                    ____________________

 ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2024
              ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
   KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Brandon Cade and a female com-
panion (“T.J.”) were standing in the street next to a parked
sedan when two Chicago police officers approached. T.J. was
drinking from a red solo cup. When the officers asked her
what she was drinking, she stated that the drink contained
alcohol. The officers also noticed an open bottle of alcohol in
the back of the sedan. As a result, the officers executed a
search of the car, during which they recovered a firearm. After
2                                                  No. 23-1001

the officers read Cade and T.J. their Miranda rights, they asked
about the firearm. Cade admitted that it belonged to him and
that he did not have a proper license to carry the weapon. The
officers consequently took Cade into custody. The govern-
ment charged Cade with one count of possession of a firearm
by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), after which Cade unsuccess-
fully sought to suppress evidence of the gun and his incrimi-
nating statements. He ultimately pleaded guilty but reserved
his right to appeal the suppression ruling, though he now
concedes he only has standing to seek suppression of his
statements. Because the initial encounter with the officers was
consensual, and because Cade’s incriminating statements
were sufficiently attenuated from any allegedly unlawful sei-
zure, we affirm.
                               I
   On September 6, 2020, at around 8:30 pm, Chicago Police
Oﬃcers Eric Myers and Bryan Perez Pacheco, each wearing
body cameras, were patrolling a neighborhood in their
marked car when they drove past Brandon Cade and T.J.
standing next to a white sedan. While doing so, they observed
Cade carrying a bag over his shoulder. The oﬃcers turned
their car around and drove back to Cade and T.J.’s location.
After pulling over in front of the sedan and turning on their
emergency lights, the oﬃcers exited their vehicle and ap-
proached Cade and T.J.
    Cade notably no longer had a bag on his person. T.J. was
holding a red solo cup. When Oﬃcer Myers asked about the
contents of the cup, T.J. admitted that it contained liquor. Of-
ﬁcer Pacheco then began leading Cade to the rear of the vehi-
cle. Simultaneously, Oﬃcer Myers asked T.J. about the se-
dan’s ownership and requested her identiﬁcation. T.J.
No. 23-1001                                                   3

responded that the sedan belonged to her grandmother.
While T.J. searched for her identiﬁcation, the oﬃcers asked
Cade about the bag they had previously seen him carrying,
but he denied possessing any bag. Oﬃcer Myers then noticed
an unsealed bottle on the ﬂoor of the sedan’s back passenger
compartment. He asked T.J. if the bottle was Don Julio (a
brand of tequila); she responded aﬃrmatively.
    Oﬃcer Myers directed T.J. to step away from the sedan
and move toward the rear alongside Cade. He then opened
the driver door, found a large bag on the driver’s seat, and
noticed a ﬁrearm inside of it. At the same time, Oﬃcer
Pacheco handcuﬀed Cade and T.J. to one another, leaving
both with one arm free. Oﬃcer Myers then asked Cade and
T.J. if either of them had a license to carry a ﬁrearm; each re-
sponded that they did not. Oﬃcer Myers turned back to the
sedan, pulled the ﬁrearm out of the bag, and emptied the
magazine onto the roof of the car.
   While Oﬃcer Myers continued inspecting the ﬁrearm, Of-
ﬁcer Pacheco read Cade and T.J. their Miranda rights. After
Cade and T.J. acknowledged that they understood their
rights, Oﬃcer Pacheco asked, “Whose gun is it?” Cade admit-
ted the gun belonged to him. He also admitted he did not have
a ﬁrearm license. Accordingly, Oﬃcer Pacheco placed Cade
under arrest.
    After the oﬃcers transported Cade to a police station, Of-
ﬁcer Myers again read Cade his Miranda rights. Cade agreed
to respond to questioning, and in doing so, conﬁrmed that the
ﬁrearm found during the stop belonged to him. He added that
he had possessed the bag containing the ﬁrearm prior to the
stop.
4                                                 No. 23-1001

    The government charged Cade with one count of posses-
sion of a ﬁrearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Cade moved to suppress the gun and the
statements he made to police; he also sought an evidentiary
hearing. The district court denied Cade’s motion, concluding
(1) that the oﬃcers initially engaged in a consensual encoun-
ter with Cade and T.J.; (2) that the oﬃcers thereafter had rea-
sonable suspicion to execute an investigatory stop based on
violations of city ordinances; (3) that the oﬃcers had probable
cause to search the sedan and bag based on the unsealed te-
quila bottle; and (4) that even if they did not, Cade lacked
standing to challenge the search of the sedan or bag. The dis-
trict court also denied Cade’s request for an evidentiary hear-
ing after determining that he failed to identify any material
factual disputes.
    Cade pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the dis-
trict court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The district
court sentenced Cade to 65 months’ imprisonment. This
timely appeal followed.
                              II
    When a district court denies a motion to suppress, we re-
view ﬁndings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de
novo. United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1140–41 (7th Cir.
2015). Cade has conceded that he lacks standing to challenge
the admission of the gun because he had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the sedan or the bag he had abandoned.
He now only seeks suppression of the incriminating state-
ments he made after the gun was found.
No. 23-1001                                                      5

                                A
    Cade ﬁrst argues the initial encounter with the oﬃcers was
an unlawful seizure, and any evidence recovered in the ensu-
ing stop, which includes his statements, must be suppressed.
A seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment if a reasona-
ble person would not feel free to leave, but not every encoun-
ter with police oﬃcers implicates the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Holly, 940 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2019). We
have recognized three basic categories of police-citizen en-
counters:
       The ﬁrst category is an arrest, for which the
       Fourth Amendment requires that police have
       probable cause to believe a person has commit-
       ted or is committing a crime. The second cate-
       gory is an investigatory stop, which is limited to
       a brief, non-intrusive detention. This is also a
       Fourth Amendment “seizure,” but the oﬃcer
       need only have speciﬁc and articulable facts suf-
       ﬁcient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
       a person has committed or is committing a
       crime. The third category involves no restraint
       on the citizen’s liberty, and is characterized by
       an oﬃcer seeking the citizen’s voluntary coop-
       eration through non-coercive questioning. This
       is not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
       Amendment.
United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2015) (quo-
tation omitted). For the third category, often called a “consen-
sual encounter,” see id., “the degree of suspicion that is re-
quired is zero,” United States v. Pace, 48 F.4th 741, 748 (7th Cir.
2022) (cleaned up). To be sure, “[t]he Supreme Court has
6                                                   No. 23-1001

stated clearly that there is no constitutionally cognizable sei-
zure ‘simply because a police oﬃcer approaches an individ-
ual and asks a few questions.’” Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).
    In determining whether a police encounter was consen-
sual, we consider these factors: (1) the location of the interac-
tion, including whether it was in public; (2) the number of of-
ﬁcers present; (3) the extent to which the police presence was
threatening; (4) whether the oﬃcers made a show of weapons
or physical force; (5) the oﬃcers’ language and tone;
(6) whether the oﬃcers implied that the defendant was sus-
pected of a crime; and (7) whether the defendant was in-
formed he was free to leave. Holly, 940 F.3d at 1000. Whether
a police-citizen encounter was consensual is a question of fact,
so we review the district court’s determination for clear error.
United States v. Whitaker, 546 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Applying the above factors, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in deeming the initial encounter con-
sensual. Oﬃcers Myers and Pacheco ﬁrst drove past Cade and
T.J. standing in the street alongside a parked sedan. When
they returned to the pair, they pulled their car oﬀ to the side
of the road slightly in front of the sedan, turned on their emer-
gency lights, calmly exited their vehicle, and asked T.J. a rea-
sonable question about the contents of her red solo cup. The
interaction took place on a public road with other cars and
people nearby, only two oﬃcers were present (matching the
number of suspects), and the oﬃcers’ conduct was not threat-
ening—they did not rush out of their vehicle or have their
hands on their service ﬁrearms. Further, the oﬃcers did not
show their weapons, talk to Cade or T.J. in an aggressive tone,
or imply that anyone was suspected of a crime. While the
No. 23-1001                                                      7

oﬃcers did not inform Cade and T.J. that they could leave, the
factors in Holly are “neither exhaustive nor exclusive.” 940
F.3d at 1000 (quotation omitted).
    Cade argues that the oﬃcers demonstrated the requisite
authority needed for a seizure by activating their emergency
lights and positioning their vehicle in front of the sedan. Po-
lice oﬃcers routinely use emergency lights to signal motorists
to stop, but encounters with pedestrians on the street can be
diﬀerent. When police oﬃcers park a police vehicle in a public
street to approach pedestrians on foot, especially at night, the
oﬃcers’ use of emergency lights on the parked vehicle does
not necessarily convert a consensual encounter into a seizure.
See United States v. Clements, 522 F.3d 790, 794–95 (7th Cir.
2008) (“The oﬃcers approached the car to investigate why the
car had been parked and running on a public street for four
hours, a circumstance unusual enough to at least merit some
investigation. The oﬃcers illuminated their ﬂashing lights to
alert the car’s occupants that they were going to approach the
vehicle. Without identifying themselves appropriately to the
car’s occupants, the oﬃcers would have put themselves at
risk in approaching a parked car late at night.”); cf. Pace, 48
F.4th at 749 (encounter was consensual until oﬃcer estab-
lished reasonable suspicion and then activated emergency
lights, initiating stop). Here, Cade and T.J. stood outside of a
vehicle as pedestrians on a street late at night. In this context,
the oﬃcers’ activation of emergency lights did not transform
their initial consensual encounter with Cade and T.J. into a
seizure.
   As for blocking T.J.’s car, such tactics can contribute to
non-consensual stops of parked cars, even when occupants
have exited their cars. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 111 F.3d
8                                                    No. 23-1001

515, 517 (7th Cir. 1997) (oﬃcers parked to block driveway
where driver had just exited his own vehicle); United States v.
Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1986) (three police cars
blocked car that suspect had exited). In this case, however,
Cade and T.J. had been outside the car all along, and by stop-
ping in the street, the oﬃcers were necessarily going to block
in at least one or two cars no matter where they stopped. The
district court found that a reasonable person in Cade’s posi-
tion, as a pedestrian approached by oﬃcers in the manner
they did, would have believed he was free to leave, at least on
foot. That ﬁnding was not clearly erroneous.
                                B
    Notwithstanding the consensual encounter, Cade next ar-
gues that his statements should be suppressed because the of-
ficers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him near the
rear of the sedan and handcuff him to T.J. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The government disagrees, countering
that the officers had the reasonable suspicion needed to effec-
tuate an investigatory stop. We need not decide whether any
seizure at the back of the sedan was unlawful, however, be-
cause the statements Cade seeks to suppress were attenuated
from any allegedly unlawful conduct. See United States v.
Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A confession obtained
through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest must be
excluded from evidence unless the confession is attenuated
enough from the illegal arrest.”); see also United States v. Liss,
103 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We need not decide whether
the police exceeded the scope of Liss's consent … because we
find that Liss’s subsequent consent to search his home purged
the evidence seized under the warrant of any taint from the
illegal search of the barn.”). While the government raises
No. 23-1001                                                    9

attenuation for the first time on appeal, Cade did not file a
reply brief to address the issue or to argue waiver. Regardless,
the government, as appellee, may present new arguments for
affirmance when the district court record is adequately devel-
oped, even if the argument was not presented before the dis-
trict court. See United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793, 803 n.11
(10th Cir. 2019). Here, all the facts pertinent to attenuation
were before the district court. In evaluating attenuation, we
consider “the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct to the
statements, the presence of any intervening circumstances,
and, most importantly, the purpose and flagrancy of the po-
lice misconduct.” Reed, 349 F.3d at 463.
    Recall that Cade was directed toward the rear of the sedan
shortly after T.J. admitted that her cup contained alcohol. Of-
ficer Myers then noticed, in plain view, an unsealed bottle of
tequila on the floor by the backseat of the sedan. At that point,
the officers had probable cause to search the sedan for addi-
tional contraband or evidence. See 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-
502(a) (“[N]o driver may transport, carry, possess or have any
alcoholic liquor within the passenger area of any motor vehi-
cle upon a highway in this State except in the original con-
tainer and with the seal unbroken.”); United States v. McGuire,
957 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Once Trooper Newman dis-
covered that McGuire was transporting open, alcoholic liquor
in violation of Illinois law … he had probable cause to believe
that the car contained additional contraband or evidence.”).
Upon conducting the lawful search, Officer Myers found
Cade’s firearm. Only after that discovery, and after acknowl-
edging that he understood his Miranda rights, did Cade make
the incriminating statements he now seeks to suppress.
10                                                    No. 23-1001

    First, we acknowledge that if Cade was unlawfully seized,
the temporal proximity factor weighs against attenuation. But
this single factor is not dispositive. See United States v. Carter,
573 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We have previously held
that a search was attenuated from illegal conduct even where
only a few minutes passed between the conduct and the
search.”) (citing United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, 1078–79
(7th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, the incriminating statements were
made in such a short period because Officer Myers found the
gun only a few minutes after Cade was moved to the rear of
the vehicle.
    Next, there were significant intervening circumstances be-
tween Cade’s allegedly unlawful seizure and his incriminat-
ing statements. The officers saw open alcohol in the rear pas-
senger compartment of T.J.’s sedan and conducted a lawful
search supported by probable cause. During the search, the
officers found a bag bearing a striking resemblance to the one
they had previously seen on Cade’s person, but which Cade
affirmatively denied ever holding. The officers then found a
gun in that bag. After the officers read Cade and T.J. their Mi-
randa rights, Cade confessed that he owned the gun but lacked
the required license. Though Cade’s confession would not
have occurred but for his allegedly unlawful seizure at the
back of the sedan, a but for cause does not automatically taint
evidence and compel suppression. See United States v. Meece,
580 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Evidence is not automati-
cally tainted ‘simply because it would not have come to light
but for the illegal actions of the police.’”) (quoting Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)); Liss, 103 F.3d at
620 (“[T]he Supreme Court has rejected a ‘but for’ test of sup-
pression.”). Rather, the independent recovery of the gun pur-
suant to a lawful search constituted a wholly intervening set
No. 23-1001                                                   11

of circumstances that “sever[ed] the causal connection” be-
tween the seizure and Cade’s Mirandized statements. Reed, 349
F.3d at 464 (citation omitted); see also id. (remarking that the
“discovery of other incriminating evidence implicating the
defendant and causing the defendant to confess spontane-
ously” constituted an intervening circumstance) (citing Rawl-
ings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108–09 (1980)); United States v.
Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that while Mi-
randa warnings alone are not sufficient for attenuation, they
“can nonetheless be a relevant consideration” with regard to
intervening circumstances).
    The final factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the police
misconduct, likewise favors attenuation. This “most im-
portant” factor asks whether law enforcement acted in bad
faith. United States v. Davis, 44 F.4th 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted). “This inquiry matters because we do not
employ the exclusionary rule when ‘suppression would do
nothing to deter police misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011)). There is simply no ev-
idence of bad faith by the officers in this case, and Cade makes
no developed argument to the contrary. The officers reasona-
bly engaged with Cade and T.J., had probable cause to search
T.J.’s vehicle, and read Cade his Miranda rights before he
made his incriminating statements. See Conrad, 673 F.3d at 736
(finding that a reading of Miranda rights supported attenua-
tion under the purpose and flagrancy factor). Cade’s incrimi-
nating statements were sufficiently attenuated from his alleg-
edly unlawful seizure, and suppression is unwarranted.
                               C
    One final point. The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying an evidentiary hearing before deciding
12                                                No. 23-1001

Cade’s motion to suppress. A district court need only conduct
an evidentiary hearing when “a substantial claim is presented
and there are disputed issues of material fact that will affect
the outcome of the motion.” United States v. Edgeworth, 889
F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
    Cade raises two factual disputes: (1) whether the tequila
bottle in the back of the sedan was unsealed and (2) whether
he obstructed traffic. Because Cade concedes that he lacks
standing to challenge the search of the sedan, whether the te-
quila bottle was unsealed is irrelevant. And as discussed
above, the officers’ initial encounter with Cade and T.J. was
consensual, with the remainder of the encounter stemming
from T.J.’s open container of alcohol. Thus, whether Cade ob-
structed traffic is likewise irrelevant. Without any material
factual disputes, an evidentiary hearing is not needed.
                                                    AFFIRMED