Court Opinion

ID: 9627690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:50:48.308248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:49.045660
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I
I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in People v. Griggs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 557, 561 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174] (Griggs), that “[Regarding [Penal Code] section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), the failure to include those offenses ‘described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony’ (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(B)) must be viewed as a drafting oversight.”1 I share this conclusion because I find it highly unlikely the drafters of the “Three Strikes” law did not intend that prior juvenile adjudications of residential burglary (and certain other felonies identified below) committed by 16- or 17-year-old juveniles could not under most circumstances be counted as “prior conviction[s] of a felony” (§ 667, subd. (d)) for Three Strikes sentencing purposes.
Accepting that conclusion, I am placed in an uncomfortable position in this case. To follow Griggs (as did the Court of Appeal below) would require *17rewriting section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D) by adding a parallel reference to the offenses “described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony” in order to cross-reference the lists of serious or violent felonies referenced in section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(B). As the majority observe, “[cjonsistent with the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3), we have previously limited ourselves to relatively minor rewriting of statutes and, even then, only resorted to that drastic tool of construction when it has been obvious that a word or number had been erroneously used or omitted. [Citations.]” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)
On the other hand, giving effect to the literal language of section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), as I shall explain, leads to anomalous results at odds with the purpose and intent behind the Three Strikes law.
Faced with this dilemma, consideration of the separation of powers doctrine leads me to join in the majority’s conclusion that “[i]n these circumstances, we must limit ourselves to interpreting the law as written, and leave for the People and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) If the Legislature is unsatisfied with the interpretation the statutory rules of construction compel this court to place on section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D) as presently worded, it can amend that provision with a parallel reference to the offenses “described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony” to more accurately reflect its intent. (§ 667, subd. (j).)
II
In prescribing a “wardship adjudication” requirement in section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D) as the fourth prong for determining whether a prior juvenile adjudication qualifies as a “strike” for Three Strikes sentencing purposes, it is unlikely the Legislature intended to partially gut the source list of qualifying prior juvenile adjudications found in section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(B).2 Yet section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), as presently worded and if literally interpreted, does just that.
The formula set forth in section 667, subdivision (d)(3) for determining which prior juvenile adjudications qualify as strikes under the Three Strikes law was obviously not intended to be convoluted or overly complicated. There are four prongs which together determine whether a prior juvenile adjudication will qualify for Three Strikes use.
*18Section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(A) requires that the prior juvenile adjudication was suffered when defendant was 16 or 17 years of age. No matter what crimes a defendant committed prior to his 16th birthday, prior juvenile adjudications of such offenses cannot be used for Three Strikes purposes.
Section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(B) (paragraph (B)) is the clause listing the qualifying offenses. It includes the crimes or circumstances listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) on June 30, 19933— approximately 24 violent or serious crimes and several criminal circumstances that reflect heightened violence or seriousness (e.g., gun use, infliction of great bodily injury, victim over 60 years of age, disabled, or in a wheelchair). It also includes all other offenses that qualify as adult strikes under “paragraphs (1) and (2)” of section 667, subdivision (d). Prior felony convictions qualifying as adult strikes include all violent felonies listed in section 667.5, subdivision '(c) (consisting of approximately eight of the most violent felonies) and all serious felonies listed in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) (a list of thirty-four “serious” felonies). Residential burglary is included in the section 1192.7, subdivision (c) “serious felony” listing.
Section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(C) is the clause requiring that “[t]he juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law.” In People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 938 P.2d 938], we held that the fitness finding need not have been express.
Finally, the clause with which we are here concerned—section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D) (paragraph (D))—requires that the juvenile “was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”
As the Griggs court concluded, “Regarding section 667, subdivision (d) (3)(D), the failure to include those offenses ‘described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony’ (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(B)) must be viewed as a drafting oversight. There is no other rational explanation for the omission. It would make no sense to require a prior offense to be listed in statute A—even if it was not listed in statute B—but then to bar use of the resulting adjudication because the adjudicated offense was not listed in statute B. We will not presume the Legislature intended such a bizarre result. Moreover, it makes *19no sense—and would frustrate the express intent of the three strikes law (see § 667, subd. (b))—to allow the use of juvenile adjudications as ‘strikes’ but to permit only adults to incur a ‘strike’ as the result of an offense listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or section 1192.7, subdivision (c).” (Griggs, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 557 at p. 561.)
If the single sentence comprising paragraph (D) ended with the phrase “or described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony,” the symmetry between paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) would be maintained, and the four-pronged test for qualifying prior juvenile adjudications as Three Strikes priors would be unambiguous, simple to apply, and most importantly, fully consistent with the underlying intent and purpose of the Three Strikes law. Like the Griggs court and the Court of Appeal below, I conclude the failure to include in paragraph (D) a parallel reference to those offenses “described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony” (as is found in paragraph (B)) was in all probability a drafting error or oversight.
It would come as no surprise to me were the Legislature to amend paragraph (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) in the wake of our opinion in this case. Interpreting paragraph (D) strictly and literally renders a key portion of paragraph (B) nugatory. Serious or violent felonies as defined in sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)—including the offense of residential burglary in question here—were plainly intended to be included among the offenses that could qualify as prior juvenile adjudications under the Three Strikes law. Under a literal interpretation of paragraph (D) as currently worded, however, a defendant can have one, five, ten or any number of prior juvenile adjudications of any combination of those offenses which are serious or violent felonies under section 667.5, subdivision (c) or section 1192.7, subdivision (c), but which are not also listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,. subdivision (b), and even have been declared a ward of the juvenile court in connection with some or all such prior juvenile adjudications, and yet none of those prior juvenile adjudications could be used for Three Strikes sentencing purposes.
The offenses falling into this category, in addition to residential burglary (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)), include unarmed robbery (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)), voluntary manslaughter (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), 667.5, subd. (c)(1)), rape committed by means other than force, violence or threat of great bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)), simple kidnapping committed other than in the course of a carjacking and without infliction of bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(20)), and any felony in which the defendant was alleged and found to have inflicted great bodily injury (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)).
Why would the Legislature have excluded from the scope of the Three Strikes law prior juvenile adjudications for residential burglary, and the *20other offenses noted above, simply because the defendant had not also been declared a ward of the court in connection with a prior juvenile adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)-listed offense in that earlier proceeding? Such a construction of paragraph (D) effectively eliminates a whole category of felonies referenced in paragraph (B) that were obviously intended to be included as potentially qualifying Three Strikes prior juvenile adjudications, and in so doing contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the habitual offender enhancement provisions of the Three Strikes law.
The linchpin of the fourth prong embodied in paragraph (D) is that the defendant had to have been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in connection with the prior juvenile adjudication under consideration for Three Strikes use in order for it to qualify as a Three Strikes prior. (See § 667, subd. (d)(3) [“A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement if . . . .”].) It is most reasonable to presume the Legislature believed prior juvenile adjudications of any felony referenced in the source list of qualifying offenses in paragraph (B) for which the defendant had been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court were inherently more serious, and for that reason could qualify as strikes under the Three Strikes law, in contrast to prior juvenile adjudications of any such offense for which the juvenile had not been declared a ward of the court. In this regard, it is important to note that a juvenile who comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for having committed any offense referenced in paragraph (B) does not necessarily have to be declared a ward of the juvenile court; lesser dispositions such as probation are an option. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.) The Legislature appears to have concluded, reasonably so, that a declaration of wardship in connection with the prior juvenile adjudication under question should serve as one of the factors distinguishing prior juvenile adjudications that qualify for Three Strikes treatment from those that do not.
Under a literal interpretation of paragraph (D) .as presently worded, a defendant who has a single or multiple prior juvenile adjudications for residential burglary, unarmed robbery, voluntary manslaughter, rape committed by means other than force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm, simple kidnapping without infliction of bodily harm, or any crime for which he was found to have inflicted great bodily injury upon his victim, and who was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in connection with some or all such offenses, escapes the reach of the Three Strikes law on the fortuity that he was not also adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in connection with at least one Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)-listed offense.
*21And under a literal interpretation of paragraph (D) as presently worded, even if in the prior juvenile proceeding giving rise to the qualifying adjudication the juvenile had been adjudged a ward of the court because of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) offense, whether or not that offense is the same as the offense currently alleged as a strike, such would still not fully effectuate the drafters’ likely intent behind the four-pronged qualifying test because it would still lead to anomalous results: A prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary or one of the other felonies noted above would qualify as a Three Strikes prior only if the juvenile happened to have also been declared a ward of the juvenile court in the same proceeding in connection with a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)-listed offense—whereas the juvenile’s second or third adjudication for repeats of that same offense later on in his juvenile criminal career, even if leading to a wardship declaration for such offense, will not later qualify as a Three Strikes prior if a wardship declaration was not also made in connection with a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b)-listed offense in that later proceeding. Why should a string of prior juvenile adjudications of the same offense be treated differently for Three Strikes purposes on the mere fortuity that some arose from proceedings in which a declaration of wardship was also made in connection with another (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)) offense, and some did not?
in
I conclude the drafters of the Three Strikes law intended that paragraph (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) prescribe a simple and straightforward requirement that a wardship declaration had to have been made in connection with the prior juvenile adjudication of any offense contained in the source list in paragraph (B) presently under scrutiny for qualification as a Three Strikes prior felony conviction. The omission in paragraph (D) of a parallel reference to offenses “described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony” (as found in paragraph (B)) was almost certainly drafters’ error or oversight, as inclusion of such a parallel reference would harmonize all four prongs of the statutory scheme and most clearly effectuate the purpose and intent behind the Three Strikes law.4
*22Nevertheless, consideration of the proper role of this court under the separation of powers doctrine compels me to join in the majority’s conclusion that it is not the proper function of this court to “rewrite” statutory language to comport with legislative intent. It bears repeating: If the Legislature is unsatisfied with the construction we are compelled to place on paragraph (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) as that clause is presently worded, it can amend the provision with a parallel reference to offenses “described in paragraph (1) or (2) as a felony” if such amendment will more accurately reflect its original intent. (§ 667, subd. (j).)

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

Indeed, one legislative committee report noted that “Under this bill, a prior juvenile adjudication would count as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. This provision would apply if the person was 16 or older when adjudicated, and the offense committed was from the list of offenses enumerated in Welfare & Institutions Code Section 707(b) or if it was a serious or violent offense.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 26, 1994, p. 9, italics added.)

We need to refer back to the version of section 707, subdivision (b) in effect on June 30, 1993, because the Three Strikes law tells us that whenever it is referencing another statute, it is referring to the statute as it existed on that date. (§ 667, subd. (h).)

Although Justice Brown and I share many of the same concerns regarding the discordance between a strict and literal interpretation of paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) as presently worded, and the probable legislative intent underlying the statutory scheme, I cannot subscribe to her ultimate construction of the statute. Substituting the word “and” for “or” in paragraph (B) may be one way to address the equal protection concern hypothetically raised by this defendant, but it hardly “harmonizes the remaining provisions of section 667(d)(3) with minimal judicial interference.” (See conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., *22post, at p. 26.) Under that construction, prior juvenile adjudications for the offenses I have noted, which are listed as violent or serious felonies in sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c), but which are not also listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), could never qualify as strikes for Three Strikes sentencing purposes, a result even further at odds with the probable legislative intent than the strict and literal reading of the statute adopted by the majority. The Legislature has already signaled the manner in which a constitutional or other defect in the statutory scheme should be remedied— subdivision (i) of section 667 provides that, “If any provision of subdivisions (b) to (h), inclusive, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of those subdivisions which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of those subdivisions are severable.” In my view, the constitutional concern would most appropriately be addressed “with minimal judicial interference” in a case in which it is actually presented, and then by simply declaring prior juvenile adjudications of the felonies giving rise to the equal protection problem unavailable for Three Strikes sentencing purposes by operation of subdivision (i).