Court Opinion

ID: 9709299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:23.786774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.543642
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in reversal). I agree that the trial judge did not err in finding defendant Holt guilty of actionable negligence. My inability to sign Mr. Justice Boyles’ opinion as proposed stems from *437the 8th paragraph thereof, the result of which is affirmance of judgments for all plaintiffs against both defendants for the total damage each plaintiff suffered as a result of both collisions. I think we should adhere to the first premise of Frye  — that appellant Holt is responsible to the plaintiffs only for the consequences of his own tort—and that we should re-examine Frye’s result with a view toward worthy answer of that plaguing question Frye and DeWitt  unitedly deposited in the trial offices of Michigan 2 decades ago.
For the sake of continued and convenient understanding, appellant Holt will henceforth he termed “the second tort-feasor.”
First: Assuming hut not conceding guilt of causal negligence on his part, the second tort-feasor contends on strength of Frye that there is no evidence in the record on which .damages stemming from his tort may. be assessed. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that such second tort-feasor may. and should he held for all of the damages shown in evidence. They rely, as the trial judge did, on Shearman & Redfield’s rule (quoted in Barkman v. Montague, 297 Mich 538, 542; and Gleason v. Hanafin, 308 Mich 31, 38), viz.,
“Concurrent, as distinguished from joint negligence, arises where the injury is proximately caused by the concurrent wrongful acts or omissions of 2 or more persons acting independently. That the negligence of another person than the defendant contributes, concurs or cooperates to produce the injury is of no consequence. Both are ordinarily liable. And unless the damage caused by each is clearly separable, permitting the distinct assignment of responsibility to each, each is liable for the entire damage. The degree of culpability is im*438material." (1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence [6th ed], § 122, pp 317-319.)
Both contentions are wrong, in my view.
Shearman & Redfield’s text, especially the last 2 quoted sentences, does tend toward support of plaintiffs’ claim that the second tort-feasor may of right be held for the entire damages proven as having been suffered on account of the successive yet separated torts of the defendants. However, and on eareful scrutiny of authorities cited by them in support, I find that the authors had in mind the instance of successive separate torts, proximately connected with a finally applied force the result of which finally applied force is “a single indivisible injury.”* We' have no such case presently before us — hence inapplicability of the quoted text.
Where, as here, the first tort-feasor separately causes the plaintiff to suffer an unknown or uncertain part or portion of the damages claimed by the latter, and the second tort-feasor separately causes that plaintiff to suffer the remainder of such claimed damages, the latter is responsible to such plaintiff only for the harm his tort has caused. Such is the rule to which Michigan has committed herself (Albrecht v. St. Hedwig’s Roman Catholic Benevolent Society, 205 Mich 395; Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich 466; DeWitt v. Gerard, 274 Mich 299; DeWitt v. Gerard, 281 Mich 676) and it fully accords with the declared views of Mr. Justice Cooley. He said:
“Although it is not always definitely so stated the rule seems to have become generally established that, although there is no concert of action between tort-feasors, if the cumulative effect of their acts is a single, indivisible injury, which it cannot ccr*439tainly be said would have resulted but for the concurrence of such acts, the actors are to be held liable as joint tort-feasors; whereas, if the results, as well as the acts, are separable, in theory at least, so that it can be said that the act of each would have resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion of injury caused thereby, each can be held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.” (1 Cooley on Torts [4th ed], § 86, pp 279, 280.)
Second: The difficulty is not so much with the rule as with its application. Before us is a typical case where innocent victims of successive torts are confronted with understandable difficulty in proving by direct' testimony the extent and amount of damages they have suffered on account of the last tort. We are asked to listen to protest of the last wrongdoer that he is entitled to exculpatory judgments, as a matter of law, because he has succeeded in injuring each plaintiff to uncertain if not unknown extent. Let us test this argument.
We said, in DeWitt (274 Mich 299, 302):
“If the operator of the streetcar (the second tortfeasor) was guilty of negligence, causing injury to plaintiff, then defendant city is liable to respond in damages for the injuries inflicted by the streetcar.
“The burden is on plaintiff to show the specific injuries occasioned by the streetcar, for defendant city is not liable for any injuries occasioned by the automobile of defendant Gerard. This may be difficult, but is an issue of fact for the jury.”
It is said that DeWitt is distinguishable, both from Frye and the present case, in that (quoting from DeWitt, at page 301):
“A witness who saw plaintiff as he lay on the pavement on his left side after he was struck by th<) automobile testified that he saw no blood but that *440as he lay under the streetcar his face was a ‘mass' of blood.’ ”
' The Court did not note in its opinion that the same witness also testified, with respect to his failure to' see blood as the plaintiff lay on the pavement prior to being struck by the' streetcar, as follows:
' “Q. So the left side of his face and the front of his face vou could not see at all, could you?
“A. No.
“Q. So that if he had a cut in his left temple at that time you could not see at all, could you?
“A. No. - - -
“Q. And if it were bleeding you would not know it, would you?
“A. No.”'
My purpose in pointing up the quoted testimony is to show that it is just as susceptible to inference that the cut (from which- all bleeding was ultimately traced) may- well have started to hemorrhage between blows without- the fact being known or visible so far as the witness was concern,ed, and that the asserted distinction- between Frye and DeWitt— which counsel for appellant advance with ability and vigor — is so tenuous as to suggest a more direct and forthright course.* I turn now to the latter.
*441The DeWitt Case, on retrial (281 Mich 676), disclosed no further proof that the city’s negligence paused a delineated portion of plaintiff’s damages as claimed, yet this Court reaffirmed right of the triers of fact in that case to determine extent and amount, if any, of damages suffered by the, plaintiff on account qf the second blow. I think we should do likewise here and, at the same time, announce that Frye is .modified to extent of holding that liability and extent of liability of the last tort-feasor, in cases where it is difficult if not impossible to show the specific damages his negligence has inferably caused, become questions of fact for the- trier or triers of fact.
This does not mean that the question is always one of fact. Indeed, it is easy to conceive the case .of Chain vehicular pile-up'where, as a matter of law, the last or next to last negligent motorist is shown as having caused no damage to the precedently injured plaintiff. We should hold, on the facts presented here, only that the parties .are entitled to determination by the trier of. facts of the amount of damages, if any be found by him, each plaintiff has apparently suffered on account of the second tortfeasor’s negligence. To make it plain, the fact that the second tort-feasor’s car collided with the one occupied by the plaintiffs and did so with some little .violence, combined with the fact that each plaintiff was found injured thereafter, should bring into play the judicially-lrealthy rule I shall now consider. ■
The path for these cases was cleared many years ago by distinguished forefathers sitting here. But yesterday we quoted (Ruediger v. Klink, 346 Mich 357) the essence thereof from Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich 542, 554-556. Once a tort is shown with in*442ferential if uncertain resulting damage to the complainant at bar, the law requires no more in proof of that damage than the nature of the case will fairly permit; given that, the trier or triers of fact take over. Starting with Allison, and closely followed by Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich 117, our said forefathers gave to great writers upon the common law this special and needful rule of justice; that no guilty tort-feasor shall escape because he has succeeded in distilling, from his wrong, contention that the victim thereof is unable to prove with any certainty the injurious results of that wrong.
The history of Michigan’s leadership in this field will be found in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 US 555, 563 (51 S Ct 248, 75 L ed 544) (quoted in Federal Gravel Co. v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 263 Mich 341, 357). Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the court, said:
“Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.” (Citing and analyzing cases including Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich 542; and Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich 117.)
Allison summarizes this way (p 555 of report):
“The law does not require impossibilities; and cannot* therefore, require a higher degree of cér*443tainty than the nature of the ease admits. And we can see no good reason for requiring any higher degree of certainty in respect to the amount of damages, than in respect to any other branch of the cause.”*
Gilbert puts it this way (p 131 of report):
“There is no sound reason in such a case, as there may be, to some extent, in actions upon contract, for throwing any part of the loss upon the injured party, which the jury believe from the evidence he has sustained, though the precise amount cannot be ascertained by a fixed rule, but must be matter of opinion and probable estimate. And the adoption of any arbitrary rule in such a case, which will relieve the wrongdoer from any part of the damages, and throw the loss upon the injured party, would be little less than legalized robbery.”
Turning finally to the ultimate substance of Story (p 562 of report), we may with propriety say this of the cases before us:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of damage suffered by the respective plaintiffs on account of the second tort-feasor’s negligence, but none as to the prima facie fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that each of these plaintiffs- sustained some damage as a result of the second tort-feasor’s negligence, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the trier of facts to fix the amount of such damage. Story concludes discussion this way (pp 565, 566 of report):
“The constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery.”-
*444Story’s reasoning is pursued by Professor Prosser in the latest edition of Ms work on torts.* He says (Prosser on Torts [2d ed], § 45, p 229):
“The difficulty of proof in assessing such separate damages has received frequent mention in all these cases, but it is not regarded as sufficient justification for entire liability. The emphasis is placed upon the logical possibility of apportionment, and the separate invasion of the plaintiff’s interests which may be traced to each cause. ■ The difficulty may have been overstated. The courts necessarily have beén very liberal in awarding damages where the uncertainty as to their extent results from the nature of the wrong itself.”
What has been said means that enlightened courts cannot hear, above the victim’s righteous prayer for relief, screams of the convicted wrongdoer that he is being hurt by the uncertainties of conjecture and speculation. It is enough to say that his wrong is the cause of the very uncertainty of which he complains and that he should bear the consequences in stoical silence. If we do not have sufficient courage to say just that, then the only remaining alternative — consistent with justice of course — is the one to which the supreme court of California has turned (Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal2d 80 [199 P2d 1, 5 ALR2d 91]; Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal2d 409 [218 P2d 17]), that of shifting the burden of proving apportionment of damages in these successive or simultaneous injury cases to the wrongdoer defendant or defendants.
Third: Lest there be too much fretful lamentation over the projected passing of Frye’s rule of instructed absolution, reference is made to a separate *445reason why the case no longer should be regarded as supporting a directed verdict in like instance. Frye involved successively sustained injuries and ultimate death. The decedent was definitely alive for an appreciable period following the second blow. Frye’s cause was consequently planted on and complicated by the now extinct survival act.  Frye’s measure of damages regardless of nominee or nominees for payment thereof would now be fixed by our present draft of Lord Campbell’s act (CL 1948, §§ 691.581, 691.582 [Stat Ann §§27.711, 27.712]). Should the events shown in its record be repeated with review here, the case would present a new and special question, one that was absent when Frye came here in 1931 and is absent in this appeal of Holt (compare Kolehmainen v. E. E. Mills Trucking Co., Inc., 301 Mich 340). The quoted rules of Allison and Gilbert may therefore he utilized despite Frye in cases of personal injury or property loss caused by separate torts.
The foregoing indicates full agreement with Mr. Justice Boyles’ observation that there can he, and were in each of thé cases before us (on favorable view), 2 proximate causes of the injuries and damages shown in evidence. When we so ■ affirm, however, our assigned work in these cases is not finished. We must, or at least should, reason out the legal extent of appellant Holt’s liability to the respective plaintiffs. I have attempted so to do in the foregoing opinion.
Since the trial judge assumed to hold defendant Holt responsible for all damages claimed by such plaintiffs, distinguished from the portion Holt’s negligence inferentially caused, I would reverse for partial retrial devoted to determination of the *446amount of damages each plaintiff suffered, if any, on account of Holt’s adjudged negligence.
The present judgments as against defendant Caswell should not of course be disturbed. Caswell, the first tort-feasor, has not appealed. Appellant Holt should recover costs of this appeal.

 The “single indivisible injury” rule is considered, consistent with Cooley’s herein quoted observations, in 5A Blashfield’s “Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice,” §§ 3151, 3152, pp 109 and 114.

 If we were disposed as in DeWitt to search for favorably-viewed threads-Qf .events occurring between the first and second collisions, such would be easy so far as concerns the claim of plaintiff Stephen Toth and his subrogee — also the claim of Mrs. Toth.
■ The first collision — of ears driven by Toth and Caswell — was head to head. This, collision left the Toth ear,- with Mr. and Mrs. Toth still occupying it, crosswise' on .the highway with right side facing the direction of Holt’s approach. The front end of Holt’s car thereupon struck the right side of .Toth’s car. Mr. Toth thereafter found himself lying on the shoulder of the highway. ■ • •
As'to injuries .inferably sustained by Mrs. Toth on account of the second collision, we find that the following statements taken from brief of her counsel are fairly sustained by the record: '•
“It was on the right side that Mrs. Toth was sitting. She sustained a-serious and permanent injury: to; her right elbow, her right chest was crushed and 8 ribs were broken. That such injuries were not received in the first collision is inferable, at least, from the fact that *441none of the usual injuries found after head-on collisions is present— they were all on her side, nearest the point of impact with Holt ear.” (Italics by counsel.)

 That the foregoing rule applies-to personal injury eases will be seen on examination of Pawlicki v. Detroit United Railway, 191 Mich 536, 540; and Voss v. Adams, 271 Mich 203.

 Por an exhaustive study of questions dealt with in present opinion, see that portion of Prosser’s treatise, “Joint Torts and Several Liability” in 25 California Law Review 411, headed “Successive Injuries,” commencing at page 434.