Court Opinion

ID: 9570179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:47.759714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:05.494599
License: Public Domain

*180Almand, Justice,
concurring specially. It appears from the record that, at the time the jury asked the court for certain information relative to the possibility of the defendant not serving a life sentence if such sentence should be imposed upon him, neither the defendant nor his counsel made any objection to the court answering the jury’s question. The defendant’s objection was first made in the amendment to his motion for a new trial. This comes too late. After neither objecting to the court answering the question, nor moving for a mistrial after the court had explained to the jury the conditions under which a parole could be granted by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the defendant cannot for the first time urge his objection in a motion for a new trial. I adhere to the rulings in Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416 and Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65 (1), which hold that in the trial of one for murder, it is erroneous for the trial judge to charge the jury, in response to a question from the foreman, as to any facts or law pertaining to the duties and functions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. These rulings should be modified to the extent that error on such a recharge cannot be assigned in a motion for new trial unless either (a) objection was made at the time the request was made to the court by the jury, or (b) a motion for a mistrial was made at the time the court gave the erroneous recharge. We do not have before us a case where the prejudicial part of the court’s charge was a part of the main charge, where counsel has no opportunity of knowing what the court will cover in its instructions, but a situation where, after the case had been submitted to the juiy, they returned to the courtroom and asked the judge a question which it was not proper or lawful for the judge to answer. The defendant or his counsel must move then and there to assert their objections, otherwise they should be deemed to have waived their rights. The reason why the rulings in the Thompson and Strickland cases, supra, should be modified, is that we apparently overlooked in those cases the full-bench decision in Gravett v. State, 74 Ga. 191 (2a), where in a criminal case, after the jury had retired and upon their return to the courtroom had requested instructions of the court upon a particular question, it was held that the defendant and his counsel, having been in the courtroom when the special instructions were requested and given, and *181having made no objections thereto, or asked for additional instructions, acquiesced in what was done.
I do not agree to the ruling that the instructions by the court in its recharge were not erroneous. I adhere to the rulings in the Thompson and Strickland cases, supra, that such instructions are improper, and where given constitute prejudicial error. I do not agree that the ruling in McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55. (5), and other cases cited in the majority opinion, are controlling here. In each of those cases, the objection was to the argument of the prosecuting attorney in telling the jury that, if the prisoner was given a life sentence, he probably would be paroled or pardoned. It is quite a different thing for the court to inform the jury under what circumstances a defendant serving a' life sentence may be pardoned or paroled. The jury takes the law only from the court. When the prosecuting attorney refers to the possibility of a pardon or parole, it is merely a matter of argument, and in no way binds the jury;-but when the court speaks, the jury receives it with solemn verity, as coming from the only source that they can look to as binding upon them. In the trial of a capital case, where the jury have the power of sentencing the defendant to death, or recommending him to mercy, the court should not give any instructions that would in the remotest realm influence them for or against mercy.
I concur specially in the ruling in the first headnote and corresponding division of the opinion. In other rulings and the judgment of affirmance I fully concur.