Court Opinion

ID: 9372466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 18:00:50.539323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.638391
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12266    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-12266
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RAMIRO BURGOS, JR.,
       a.k.a. Junior,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20413-PAS-2
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                      21-12266

                               ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Ramiro Burgos, Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
       peals the district court’s denial of his counseled motion for compas-
       sionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Burgos asserts the
       district court erred in denying his motion because it was allowed
       to consider intervening changes of law and fact in reducing his sen-
       tence, and because he established extraordinary and compelling
       reasons for his release. The Government, in turn, has moved for
       summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing that
       Burgos failed to show he was entitled to relief. After review, 1 we
       grant the Government’s motion.
             District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
       of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act,
       § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant part, that:
               [t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bu-
               reau of Prisons [BOP], or upon motion of the defend-
               ant after the defendant has fully exhausted all

       1 We review de novo a district court’s determination about a defendant’s eli-
       gibility for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
       996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We review a district court’s denial of a
       prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an abuse of discretion stand-
       ard. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
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       21-12266               Opinion of the Court                        3

             administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP]
             to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the
             lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by
             the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
             earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . af-
             ter considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.
             §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable if it
             finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
             warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction
             is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
             by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
              Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the ap-
       plicable policy statement for compassionate release motions and
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The application notes to
       U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compel-
       ling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age,
       (C) his family circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id., comment.
       (n.1(A)–(D)). Subsection D serves as a catch-all provision, provid-
       ing a prisoner may be eligible for relief if, “[a]s determined by the
       Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant’s case an ex-
       traordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination
       with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id.,
       cmt. (n.1(D)). We concluded § 1B1.13 applies to all motions for
       compassionate release filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those
       filed by prisoners, and thus a district court may not reduce a sen-
       tence unless a reduction would be consistent with § 1B1.13’s
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12266

       definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” United
       States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1252–62 (11th Cir. 2021). Next, we
       concluded the catch-all provision in the commentary to § 1B1.13
       did not grant to district courts, in addition to the BOP, the discre-
       tion to develop other reasons outside those listed in § 1B1.13 that
       might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1248,
       1263, 1265.
               As an initial matter, Burgos does not argue the district court
       erred in concluding that § 1B1.13, Subsection A did not provide
       him relief, nor does he argue the district court should have consid-
       ered Subsections B or C, devoting his brief to Subsection D argu-
       ments. Thus, he has abandoned any challenge to the district
       court’s conclusions as to Subsections A, B, or C. Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating although we
       liberally construe pro se briefs, “issues not briefed on appeal by a
       pro se litigant are deemed abandoned”).
                Moreover, Burgos’s various challenges under Subsection D
       are foreclosed by our decision in Bryant. Burgos’s arguments
       about changes in law, his medical conditions, and his rehabilitation,
       all fail because we concluded the district court could not develop
       other reasons outside those listed in § 1B1.13. Bryant, 996 F.3d at
       1248, 1263, 1265.
              Burgos’s arguments about Concepcion v. United States do
       not change this conclusion as the Supreme Court in that case dealt
       with a sentence reduction request under § 404 of the First Step Act,
       not a motion for compassionate release under § 603(b). 142 S. Ct.
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       21-12266               Opinion of the Court                       5

       2389, 2404 (2022). In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held a dis-
       trict court considering a First Step Act § 404 motion may consider
       intervening changes of law and fact. Id. While the Supreme Court
       concluded there is no restraint on the information a court modify-
       ing a defendant’s sentence can consider absent a limiting statutory
       or constitutional provision, it acknowledged that Congress has “ex-
       pressly cabined” district courts’s discretion in the § 3582(c)(1)(A)
       context. Id. at 2400-01.
              Burgos did not show an extraordinary or compelling reason
       under § 1B1.13. The absence of that reason, one of the necessary
       conditions, foreclosed Burgos’s motion for a sentence reduction.
       See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021)
       (“Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary con-
       ditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction,” and the absence
       of any one of the necessary conditions—support in the 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adher-
       ence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement—forecloses a sentence
       reduction).
             Accordingly, because the Government’s position is clearly
       correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the Government’s motion
       for summary affirmance and DENY its motion to stay the briefing
       schedule as moot per 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). Groendyke Transp., Inc.
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                    21-12266

       v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 2 (providing summary
       disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the position of one of the
       parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no
       substantial question as to the outcome of the case . . . .”).
              AFFIRMED.

       2 In our en banc decision in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
       (11th Cir. 1981), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former
       Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.