Court Opinion

ID: 9395235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 16:03:10.167009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.561215
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/16/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re A.H., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 NAPA COUNTY HEALTH &
 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,            A166532
 v.
                                              (Napa County
 A.Y.,
                                              Super. Ct. No. 22JD0000031)
         Defendant;
 J.B.,
         Appellant.

         Appellant J.B. is a “nonrelative extended family member” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 362.7) of dependent A.H. (Minor). After J.B.’s request to have Minor
placed with her was denied, J.B. petitioned under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 388 to change the juvenile court’s disposition order so as to place
Minor with her rather than in a foster home. J.B. now appeals from the
juvenile court’s summary denial of her petition. As a nonrelative extended
family member, J.B. lacks standing to bring this appeal, and therefore we
shall dismiss it.

                                         1
                                BACKGROUND
                                        I.
                     Proceedings in the Juvenile Court

      On June 6, 2022, the Napa County Health and Human Services Agency
(Department) filed a petition alleging that newborn A.H. (Minor) came within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j).1 Minor was detained and placed in a
foster home.
      In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed in July 2022, the Department
recommended that the juvenile court sustain the allegations in the petition,
bypass reunification services to Minor’s mother, and continue Minor’s
placement in a foster home.2 The Department reported that J.B. had been
assessed for placement as a nonrelative extended family member, but that
her request for placement had been denied.
      There is no dispute that J.B. is a first cousin, twice removed, to Minor
and is therefore Minor’s relative in the sixth degree of kinship. Thus,
although J.B. is biologically related to Minor, she is not a “relative” for
purposes of preferential consideration for placement of a child who is
removed from parental custody under section 361. (See § 361.3, subd. (c)(2)
[defining “relative” as an adult related to the child within the fifth degree of
kinship].) For purposes of this dependency proceeding, the parties agree that
J.B. is a “nonrelative extended family member” (NREFM), defined by statute
as an adult with “a familial or mentoring relationship with the child” or with

      1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise stated.
      2   Subsequent dates are in 2022 unless otherwise stated.

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“an established familial relationship” with a relative of the child, where
“relative” is defined as in section 361.3, subdivision (c)(2). (§ 362.7.)
      On August 17, J.B. filed a form JV-285, “Relative Information,” with
supporting documents, in which she requested that Minor live with her. At
the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on August 18, counsel for the
Department objected to the court’s considering J.B.’s filing, on the ground
that J.B. was not a relative for purposes of the proceedings. The juvenile
court sustained the objection and stated it would not consider the information
J.B. had submitted. In its jurisdiction and disposition orders, the juvenile
court stated that it independently considered placement with several
relatives as well as with NREFM J.B. and denied placement with those
individuals “for the reasons stated in the Social Worker’s Report and for any
other reasons just stated on the record.”3 The court ordered Minor to be
placed in a foster home and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for
November 17.
      On October 24, J.B. filed form JV-180, “Request to Change Court
Order,” in which she petitioned under section 388 to change the disposition
order so as to place Minor with her. The juvenile court summarily denied
J.B.’s petition on October 25, on the grounds that the request did not state
new evidence or a change of circumstances, and the proposed change did not
promote Minor’s best interest. J.B. timely filed a notice of appeal on
November 4.

      3  The Department reported that in the dependency case of Minor’s
half-sibling, J.B. “created a division” between the Department and the
sibling’s parents, falsely accused the sibling’s caregiver of neglect, harassed
the caregiver and put the caregiver and her family at risk of harm.

                                         3
      On November 17, 2022, the juvenile court issued an order terminating
parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. No appeal was
taken, and that order is now final.
                                        II.
                J.B.’s Appeal and the Department’s Motion
      In her opening brief on appeal, J.B. argues that the juvenile court
abused its discretion and violated her due process rights when it denied her
section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. She also argues that the
court abused its discretion at the disposition hearing when it declined to
consider the relative information form that she submitted, and when it
declined to order Minor placed with her.
      After J.B. filed her brief, the Department filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of standing, which J.B. has opposed. The Department also filed a
request for judicial notice, which has not been opposed and which we now
grant.
                                 DISCUSSION
      The Department argues that J.B. lacks standing to appeal a denial of
placement. The Department’s position is that J.B. has no cognizable interest
in Minor’s placement, and therefore she cannot appeal from the summary
denial of her section 388 petition, which challenged the order placing Minor
with a foster family rather than with her.
      Section 388, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes any “person having an
interest in a dependent child of the court to petition the court for a hearing to
change, modify, or set aside any previous order on the grounds of change of
circumstance or new evidence.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246,
250.) A petition filed by anyone other than the dependent child must “state
the petitioner’s relationship to or interest in the child.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).)

                                         4
Thus, a petition may be filed by someone who is not a party to the
dependency proceeding. It does not follow, however, that a person with an
interest in a dependent child can necessarily appeal the decision, because
“[t]o have standing, a person must have rights that may suffer injury.” (In re
P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1361.)
      As our Supreme Court has held, “Although standing to appeal is
construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its favor, only a person
aggrieved by a decision may appeal. [Citations.] An aggrieved person, for
this purpose, is one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the
decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or
remote consequence of the decision. [Citations.] These rules apply with full
force to appeals from dependency proceedings.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th
231, 236.)
      As an NREFM, J.B. has no legally cognizable interest in the placement
of the Minor. In this respect, she differs from a “relative,” as defined in
section 361.3, subdivision (c)(2), who has a right to preferential consideration
for placement of a minor in a dependency proceeding before the termination
of parental rights.4 (§ 361.3, subd. (a) [“In any case in which a child is
removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to
Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a

      4  The rules governing placement after parental rights have been
terminated are different from the rules governing placement at a disposition
hearing. Before parental rights are terminated, preferential consideration in
placement is given by statute to a relative within the fifth degree of kinship
to the child under section 361.3, subdivision (c). After parental rights are
terminated, section 366.26, subdivision (k), grants a preference in placement
for adoption to an application from a relative caretaker or foster parent who
has cared for the child. (See Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
1023, 1031 [discussing application of section 361.3].)

                                        5
relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative”].) Because
section 361.3 “confers upon a [relative] the right to preferential consideration
for placement,” a relative has a legally protected separate interest in his or
her relationship to the dependent child and has standing to challenge a
placement decision before parental rights are terminated. (Cesar V. v.
Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1034-1035.) Accordingly, a
relative may have standing to appeal from the denial of a section 388 petition
that seeks to modify a disposition order with respect to the child’s placement.
(See In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1293-1294, 1299-1300 [reviewing
denial of § 388 petition brought by aunt and uncle seeking to modify
placement in disposition order on the grounds that they were denied
preferential consideration for placement].)
      Although the Legislature has granted preferential consideration in
placement to relatives, which gives rise to standing to protect their separate
interests, there is no such preference for an NREFM. Section 361.2,
subdivision (e)(3) authorizes the placement of a dependent child in the home
of an NREFM, but nothing in the statutory scheme grants any preference to
NREFM’s for placement. J.B. does not cite any authority holding that a
NREFM has a legally cognizable interest in a minor’s placement that confers
standing, and we have found none.
      Moreover, for an NREFM to have standing to appeal decisions
concerning the placement of a dependent child would be inconsistent with the
overall dependency scheme, as set forth in the Welfare and Institutions Code
and interpreted by the courts. A “de facto parent” is “a person who has been
found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent,
fulfilling both the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and
affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period.” (Cal.

                                        6
Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).) De facto parents, unlike NREFM’s, have the
right to an attorney, the right to be present at dependency hearings, and the
right to present evidence and be heard. (In re P.L., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1361.) But de facto parents have no right to visitation, reunification
services or custody, and courts have held that they lack standing to complain
of an order approving the placement of the child with someone else. (Id. at
pp. 1361-1362; see also In re B.S. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 888, 895, 897 [“While
de facto parents may feel aggrieved and, no doubt, may be emotionally
affected by orders affecting the custody of a minor, a de facto parent has no
standing to appeal a custody decision because they cannot show how their
legal rights were injuriously affected”]; but see In re Vincent M. (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 943, 949, 953 [de facto parents who were approved to adopt
minor have standing to appeal from order granting father’s section 388
motion for modification requesting presumed father status and reunification
services, where grant of father’s motion meant vacating orders for
permanency planning services and for section 366.26 hearing, and removed
the case from “the adoption track”].) It would make little sense to treat the
interest of an NREFM, who might have no relationship with a child, as
sufficient to establish standing when de facto parents, who have an
established and significant parental relationship with the child, have been
held to lack such standing.
      In sum, although J.B. may have an “interest” in Minor that is sufficient
to authorize her filing a petition under section 388, she does not have a
legally cognizable interest in Minor’s placement such that she has standing to
challenge the juvenile court’s placement decision, which is what she
ultimately seeks to do here. In her section 388 petition, J.B. sought to modify
the juvenile court’s disposition order to place Minor with her, and because

                                       7
J.B. has no standing to challenge the placement order, we conclude that J.B.
has no standing to challenge the denial of her section 388 petition.
                               DISPOSITION
      Respondent’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted. The
appeal is dismissed.

                                       8
                                        STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

MARKMAN, J. *

In re A.H. (A166532)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    9
Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Robert Stamps, Commissioner

Counsel:

J.B, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Renne Public Law Group, Amy S. Ackerman and M. Abigail West for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

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