Court Opinion

ID: 9529862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:56.936639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:56.242817
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from my colleagues position that exigent circumstances need not exist before police may enter a private dwelling without a search warrant to effect an arrest. Nor can I agree that the facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that exigent circumstances, nevertheless, do exist. Before embarking further, I believe it is essential to clarify the type of warrant that is at issue here and in similar cases. The warrant which I believe necessary for police intrusion into any private dwelling is a search warrant and not an arrest warrant. Decisions have failed to distinguish between an arrest on probable cause and an intrusion into a private dwelling to search for someone who may be subject to an arrest. An arrest warrant speaks only to whether sufficient evidence exists to arrest a defendant and is silent as to where police may go in an effort to locate the subject of the arrest warrant. In contradistinction, the express terms of our Federal and State constitutions require that whether persons or things are to be seized, the warrant must describe the place to be searched. Hence, a determination of probable cause to arrest is not directed to the question of whether a search warrant is required before police may enter a private dwelling in an effort to locate the individual who is subject to arrest. While I have tittle disagreement with my colleagues determination that probable cause to arrest the defendant existed, I believe that reference to such a determination of probable cause does not in any way justify the failure of police to obtain a search warrant before entering the premises in question in an attempt to locate defendant. Probable cause to arrest goes only to whether police may restrain an individual’s freedom and not where police may go in an effort to find that individual. Absent exigent circumstances, an independent judicial determination must be made as to whether there exists probable cause to search for someone at a particular location. The majority reties on section 107 — 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107—2(c)) to buttress its position that a warrantless arrest is still proper in the absence of exigent circumstances. Application of section 107 — 2(c) to justify police intrusion into a private dwelling without a warrant raises grave concerns to me as to the constitutionality of such procedure. The Louisiana Supreme Court, when presented with a similar statute and argument, stated: “We have grave doubts whether the provision may be constitutionally applied where an officer, although having probable cause to arrest, makes an unauthorized entry of a dwelling to effect the arrest under non-exigent circumstances. Our doubts are premised on the proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in Article 1, §5 of the Louisiana Constitution (1974), and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Ranker (La. 1977), 343 So. 2d 189, 190-91. The court continued by quoting article 1, section 5, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, which is virtually identical to article 1, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Thereafter, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that “[a]n application of this language # ” would appear to have required the issuance of a warrant before the search, seizure and invasion of privacy.” 343 So. 2d 191. This court has previously reached a similar conclusion in People v. Wolgemuth, 43 Ill. App. 3d 335,356 N.E.2d 1139, appeal allowed, when it stated: “By its own terms the Federal and State constitutions require that, whether persons or things are to be seized, the warrant must describe the place to be searched.” (43 Ill. App. 3d 335,339-40,356 N.E.2d 1139, 1142.) The subject of the search may be either an inanimate object or person, but, in either case, police intrusion into a private dwelling to conduct a search is reasonable within Federal and State constitutions only when police possess a search warrant or exigent circumstances excuse the failure to obtain such a warrant. As was aptly observed by Mr. Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 477-78, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,589-90,91 S. Ct. 2022: “It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man’s house in order to arrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a man’s house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well defined ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” However in Coolidge, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue confronting us today. While the Supreme Court again failed to resolve the issue in Johnson v. Louisiana (1972), 406 U.S. 356,32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 92 S. Ct. 1620, the following colloquy occurred at oral argument and seems to support my position that either a search warrant or exigent circumstances must exist before police may enter a private dwelling. During oral argument, the following colloquy occurred upon an assertion by the attorney for the State that it would be unreasonable to require the police to obtain a warrant: “Mr. Justice Stewart: ‘Are you familiar with this Court’s case in Warden v. Hayden?’ [Attorney for the State]: ‘Yes, Your Honor, I am.’ Mr. Justice Stewart: ‘Well, why do you think this Court spent so long in carving out an exception if there was no general rule that you cannot enter a house without a warrant?’ ” Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, & J. Israel, Modem Criminal Procedure 311-12 n.a. (4th ed. 1974). Without exigent circumstances, police must obtain a warrant before entering a private dwelling. In State v. Ranker (La. 1977), 343 So. 2d 189, and People v. Wolgemuth, 43 Ill. App. 3d 335, 356 N.E.2d 1139, appeal allowed, further authorities are given to support the foregoing proposition, but no useful purpose would be served by citing them in this opinion. Nor can I agree with the majority that section 107 — 5(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107—5(d)), which authorizes police to use all necessary and reasonable force to effect an arrest, somehow excuses the failure of police to obtain a warrant for the nonexistence of exigent circumstances. The literal terms of the statute do not discuss searches or search warrants, but concern only the quantum of force police are authorized to use to effect an arrest. The amount of force which may be used to effect an entry does not resolve the precursory question of whether an entry in any manner is permitted. Only if exigent circumstances exist or police possess a search warrant does section 107 — 5(d) apply and then only as a standard by which police may gage the amount of force they are permitted to use. My colleagues have also cited People v. Barbee (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 407, 220 N.E.2d 401, in support of their position that police were authorized to enter the premises which defendant occupied by breaking open the door. Since Barbee was decided, several important decisions have been handed down in the area of warrantless entries, and Barbee must be considered in light of those subsequent opinions. First, it is important to note that the doctrine of exigent circumstances was not created until the year following Barbee in Warden v. Hayden (1967), 387 U.S. 294, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642. In addition, when deciding Barbee, our supreme court was without the guidance of Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022, and the more recent decisions of United States v. Watson (1976), 423 U.S. 411, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 96 S. Ct. 820, and United States v. Santana (1976), 427 U.S. 38, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 96 S. Ct. 2406. In light of these cases as well as the development of the Dorman rule (Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (en banc)), Barbee cannot be regarded as persuasive precedent. It is interesting to note that in supporting their decision in Barbee, the court discussed many of the factors which were later enunciated as part of the Dorman rule. Even though the court in Barbee speaks in terms of a nonconsenual entry without a search warrant, the fact is the original entry was made under color of a search warrant which the trial court later held invalid. When authorities subsequent to Barbee are interpreted and applied, I believe they dictate a rule that requires either a search warrant or the existence of exigent circumstances before police may enter a private dwelling to effectuate an arrest. The majority, while concluding that exigent circumstances need not exist to justify a warrantless entry, did, nevertheless, consider the question of the existence and found them present. I cannot agree that on balance exigent circumstances existed and thereby excused police from their obligation to obtain a search warrant. While the Dorman case does set forth certain criteria which are relevant in determining whether exigent circumstances exist, these factors are not exclusively controlling and each case must be determined on its individual facts. I believe many of the Dorman criteria are but specific questions directed to the broader and I believe more important area of inquiry, to wit, what is the nature of the consequences that will naturally flow from any delay involved in obtaining a search warrant. If no sufficient prejudice to police or citizenry can be shown to flow from such a delay, while the private dwelling owner is forced to forgo his fourth amendment rights, little justification can be found for the failure of police to obtain a warrant. Here, defendant became a suspect shortly after the robbery occurred. The process of obtaining a search warrant for the address of defendant’s last known place of residence could have been set it motion at this time, but was not. Police proceeded to this address arriving about one hour after the robbery but did not decide to forcibly enter the apartment for over 45 minutes. The police obviously did not feel that delay created any danger to themselves or the occupants of the building, nor does it appear they were concerned with the destruction of evidence. The presence of an officer at the rear of the apartment along with officers outside defendant’s door, made it unlikely that any occupant of the premises would escape if not swiftly apprehended. In short, prompt action by police was not dictated by the existence of prejudice to police or citizenry. I also cannot agree with my colleagues that the police had strong reason to believe the defendant was actually in the apartment. The only person to tell police that the defendant had recently entered the apartment was a tenant, Mrs. Ford, living next to the apartment where defendant was eventually arrested. She identified a mug shot of the defendant as the man who had entered the apartment. The State admitted that Mrs. Ford was an old woman verging on senility and was a frequent complainer to the office of the State’s Attorney and the Joliet Police Department. During the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the prosecutor refrained from calling Mrs. Ford, apparently because the prosecutor believed her testimony was unreliable. Instead, police officers were allowed to testify as to Mrs. Ford’s out-of-court statements, apparently because the trial court felt her truthfulness or credibility had no connection with the reasonableness of the police officer’s actions. The manager of the apartment building did not see the defendant in the apartment and was unaware if defendant was in the apartment at the time. Since the only information given police as to whether defendant was actually in the apartment was provided from an unreliable witness, police could not have strong reason to believe defendant was in the apartment. After considering all the factors and the totality of circumstances surrounding the police entry, I cannot agree with the majority that the State established exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome an individual’s fourth amendment rights. I therefore believe the entry by police without a search warrant was constitutionally impermissible. In summary, the State must demonstrate the existence of exigent circumstances before a police intrusion into a private dwelling without a search warrant can be excused. Having failed to so demonstrate in this case, I believe the evidence seized in defendant’s apartment must be suppressed.