Court Opinion

ID: 9682937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:19:58.693792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.414710
License: Public Domain

DIES, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the case we review is almost identical to City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.1963). There, respondents alleged the sewage disposal plant of the City of Abilene caused
“ ‘. . . the obnoxious fumes and obnoxious odors which spread across and invaded the property and buildings became so offensive as to make their premises unfit for continuous habitation; that such odors from and after the date here-inabove set out being generated on and originating from the sewage disposal plant of the defendant have become so offensive and collect on the property of these plaintiffs that their property has been diminished in value and damaged as hereinafter set out in violation of Section 17, Article One of the Constitution of Texas.’ ” (367 S.W.2d 156).
The Court held:
“The damages consequent therefrom are recoverable as a taking or damaging of private property for a public use under Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution only if, and after, the operations of the sewer farm constitute a nuisance.” (367 S.W.2d 158)
It is true that in discussing the limitation question the Court said:
“Article 5526, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Stats., imposes a limitation period of within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued regarding actions in trespass for injury done to the estate or property of another.” (367 S.W.2d 159)
But it did not dispose of the case on the basis of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art 5526 (1958). Nor did the Court conclude this was the applicable statute of limitation.
The Court concluded the burden was on the City of Abilene to establish its defensive plea of limitation which it had failed to do by not requesting or securing a finding when operations of the sewage facilities were such as to constitute a nuisance under the standard to be applied.
Our case then is one of inverse condemnation which had its inception in the creation of a nuisance in 1967, as found by the jury. This case was filed in 1975.
Limitation in such a case is governed by Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99, 109-110 (Tex.1961):
“We might add, however, that insofar as the sewage disposal plant is concerned, we have a taking by inverse condemnation and the great weight of American authority supports the position that, absent a particular statute covering the situation, the land limitation rather than the general limitation statutes apply to such inverse condemnation proceedings, [citing authorities] The Texas rule is in accord. In case of a ‘taking’ of property, the city’s right thereto would not be barred if ever until the expiration of the ten year period necessary to acquire lands by adverse possession under Art. .5510, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Stats.”
One of the cases cited by J. Norvell in Brazos River Authority, supra, is Tarrant County Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Fowler, 175 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1943, writ ref’d w. o. m., 142 Tex. 375, 179 S.W.2d 250 (1944). There, Fowler was the owner of 184 acres of land on both banks of Ash Creek which flows from the west into the West Fork of the Trinity River. The water district completed Eagle Mountain Dam across the West Fork of the Trinity. Fowler sued on the basis that the dam produced a backwater condition in Ash Creek causing water constantly to be stored in the channel of Ash Creek, which caused his riparian valley lands to be inundated.
*159The Court held this was a “taking” and damaging of property under Art. 1, Sec. 17 of the Texas Constitution and had this to say about the question of limitations:
“ ‘When under such a Constitution property is appropriated to the public use without complying therewith, the owner’s right to compensation is not barred except by adverse possession for the prescriptive period.’ ” (175 S.W.2d 700)
In Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Reid, 208 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (also cited in Brazos, supra), Reid alleged that the Eagle Mountain Dam slowed down the overflow water across his land, thereby depositing sand, gravel and other debris and also caused the channel of the river adjacent to his land the branch there of running through his land to be filled with sand to the point where they were wholly inadequate to carry the normal flow of water.
The court held this to be a “taking” under the Texas Constitution and that a claim would not become barred before the period necessary to acquire land by adverse possession.
I do not agree with the majority that City of Houston v. McFadden, 420 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.) is not persuasive. There, plaintiff purchased his property in 1954. In 1960, the City extended its runway to make possible the landing and takeoff of jet propelled aircraft, causing physical damage to his property, such as vibrations, wall cracks and noise. In citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962), the Houston court said:
“This type of action has been recognized and approved as a ‘taking’ of property, in the constitutional sense, in the nature of an air easement for which compensation must be made.” (420 S.W.2d 814)
It is difficult for me to accept that noise and vibrations from aircraft constitute a “taking”, while leaking sewer fumes do not.
The majority cites Jefferson County v. Cohrt, 487 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Civ.App.— Beaumont 1972, no writ), and declares, “wherein it was held that eminent domain proceedings constituted the proper method of acquiring such an easement.” But there, a “clear zone easement” was taken pursuant to the Municipal Airports Act of Texas acquiring “a perpetual easement within the said Clear Zone Approach Area over and above . . . said property and premises an air space unobstructed by any structure or tree, as defined by law.”
. The Cohrt Case might be regarded as the typical or direct “taking” of property under the Constitution, but it in no way, as I see it, offers any method of relief for the plaintiffs in our case who are seeking damage for an “inverse condemnation”, a taking by the City without court action. A “taking” under Cohrt provides a method of assessing damages to recompense an owner. In a situation of inverse condemnation, as in the case we review, no damages are paid unless and until the owner brings suit and prevails.
Originally our plaintiffs filed suit for negligence against City in the operation of its sanitary sewer system. Bowling v. City of Port Arthur, 522 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.). They gave notice to the City Manager, who referred it to the City’s insurance carrier, and a City representative inspected the claimed damage. But because the notice was not verified and sent to the City Manager rather than the City Commission, we affirmed an order granting City a summary judgment. Now we propose to reverse a judgment for plaintiffs and render it for the City because plaintiffs failed to bring their suit within two years from the occurrence of the nuisance. This may make good “law”, but it is poor equity.