Court Opinion

ID: 9773230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:40:22.384742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.136117
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but would hold that section 14.41(b) of the Family Code is both a jurisdictional statute and a statute of limitation.
Section 14.41(b) of the Family Code reads as follows:
(b) Time Limitations. The court of continuing jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support in arrears and enter judgment for past-due child support obligations if a motion to render judgment for the arrearages is filed within four years after:
(1) the child1 becomes an adult; or
(2) the date on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by operation of law.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.41(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
The very words of the statute demonstrate its jurisdictional requirement and its intended limitations analysis. In fact, the Beaumont Court of Appeals so held in In re C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ). By enacting sec*728tion 14.41(b), the legislature did not change the legal principle that, at some point, the trial court loses continuing subject matter jurisdiction over child support arrearages. In re C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d at 792. Section 14.41(b) gives the trial court longer in enforcement of child support matters, but it clearly limits the continuing subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. A “due diligence” analysis should, therefore apply with respect to section 14.41 when service is accomplished after limitations has run.
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that to “bring suit” within the limitations period, a plaintiff must not only file suit within the applicable limitations period,2 but must also use diligence to have the defendant served with process. Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex.1990); see Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Tex.1975); see also Butler v. Ross, 836 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Perry v. Kroger Stores, Store No. 119, 741 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). “Due diligence” is tested by (1) whether the plaintiffs acted as ordinary prudent persons would act under the same circumstances, and (2) whether the plaintiffs acted diligently up until the time the defendant was served. Eichel v. Ullah, 831 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no writ). Lack of due diligence has been found: (1) as a matter of law, where there were unexplained periods of six months, 20 months, and 12 months during which no efforts were made to serve the defendants, Gant, 786 S.W.2d at 260; (2) where there was no activity or effort at service for a period of five and one-half months and no showing of diligence in obtaining issuance of substituted service or checking an alternative address suggested by the constable, Butler, 836 S.W.2d at 836; (3) where service was accomplished nine months after suit was filed and the record showed no action to secure service after the first failed attempt for a period of eight months, Perry, 741 S.W.2d at 534; and (4) where issuance of citation was not requested for two and one-half months, service was not accomplished until 14 months after suit was filed, and no due diligence exercised for a period of nine months after citation issued, Eichel, 831 S.W.2d at 44. In Zale Corp., the supreme court reversed a summary judgment, based on limitations, where the cause of action arose on July 2, 1971, the suit was filed on June 28, 1973, and issuance of citation was requested on August 3, 1973. 520 S.W.2d at 890. The supreme court held that where the nonmovant interposes a suspension statute or pleads diligence in requesting issuance of citation, the limitation defense is not conclusively established until the movant meets his burden of negating these issues. Id. at 891.
In the findings of facts and conclusions of law, the trial court found the attorney general exercised due diligence in accomplishing service on Mr. Zolan. Those findings are not conclusive when a statement of facts appears in the record. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Co., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), writ refd n.r.e. per cu-riam, 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1985). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards we use to review the evidence to support jury findings. IFG Leasing Co. v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
The attorney general filed the motion to reduce unpaid child support to judgment on June 9, 1992. The prayer included “that process be issued as required by law, [and] that an order setting hearing be issued.” The citation issued on September 3, 1992, and was served on Mr. Zolan on September 22, 1992, approximately three and one-half months after suit was filed. Mr. Zolan was not served at the address listed in the citation because he had been evicted. He was served “at the eviction court.”
At the hearing on the motion, a representative of the district clerk’s office testified as follows:
Q: Would you tell the Court the procedure for issuing citations on Attorney General’s eases?
A: What occurs on these cases is when a suit is filed — if it’s a new suit — if there is *729an Order required before the service can be issued, the file is sent to the Court, the Order is signed, the file is maintained in the court until 30 or 45 days prior to the hearing date.
At such time the court clerk who monitors these files sends these files down to the Service Department for issuance.
Q: Yes, Ma’am. Can you tell what is the average time that it takes to issue citations on these cases?
A: From the date the Order has been signed?
Q: Yes.
A: On an average right now the hearings are being given two or three months off— you know — three or four months off so it takes approximately three months in some cases and in some eases longer to get it issued.
On cross-examination, the representative agreed it was possible to get “rush service,” if the proper form were completed or a verbal request made, but said even then the attorney general would not be treated like any other plaintiff because of the volume of work coming from the attorney general’s office and the limited staff of the clerk’s office. The representative did not know if rush service had been requested in this case. She also stated:
A: If it was strictly a citation only with no order being required on the hearing, it should be done within two or three days from the date it was filed. If it has an order, then it would depend on the court. It would be entered, should reach the court within two or three days, depending on the court’s situation — the availability— if the judge is here, then the Clerk would present it to the Judge for signature. If he’s not, then they would take steps necessary to find another judge to sign it and get it signed and back down to service; and once it reached service, they would process it.
Q: But in any event if the Court was in session and the Court on the bench, it could never take more than a week or two, could it?
A: It should not....
The delay in service here was caused largely by the delay between the filing date and the date of issuance of citation. There was evidence that the delay in issuance of citation was caused not by a lack of diligence on the part of the attorney general, but by the volume of these kinds of cases and the inability of the clerk’s office to rapidly process them given its staff size.
Like the majority, I would overrule appellant’s first and third points of error, but because the record shows that the attorney general exercised due diligence in procuring the issuance of service of process.

. "Child" or “minor” means a person under 18 years of age who is not and has not been married or who has not had his disabilities of minority removed for general purposes. In the context of child support, "child" includes a person over 18 years of age who is fully enrolled in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma. "Adtdt” means any other person.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.01(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).

. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 16.002, 16.003, 16.004 (Vernon 1986).