Court Opinion

ID: 9535138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:45:55.340268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:10.619110
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. It is fundamental error to cross-examine a defendant upon his post-arrest silence. Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91. This is especially true where the trial court permits the cross-examination questions without admonishing or instructing the jury that the defendant has no duty to break his silence after receiving his Miranda warning. Jones v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402 (Givan, C. J. and Arterburn, J. dissenting). The rationale for this fundamental error is based upon the Miranda warning given to the defendant when he is arrested. This warning advises the defendant that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he may say may be used against him. As Justice Powell explained in Doyle :
“Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.”
426 U.S. at 617, 96 S.Ct. at 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97.
The cross-examination questions regarding Vann’s post-arrest silence were:
“Q. Now do you recall Sgt. Cordill, this gentleman right here — would you stand, please, Sgt. Cordill. Do you remember t[iis gentleman right here?
“A. I remember one of them.
“Q. Do you remember Sgt. Cordill coming down to talk to you after you were arrested on the date in question — shortly thereafter to ask you if you wanted to tell him what happened? Do you remember that?
“MR. SURBECK: Objection, Your Honor.
“COURT: Well, now it’s not necessary for you to slap your hands when you make an objection. All you have to do is make an objection and state it on the record. Now do you—
*1171“MR. SURBECK: May counsel approach the bench?
“COURT: All right. You can come up to the bench.
“(At which time, there is conversation at the bench outside the hearing of the Jury and this reporter.)
“COURT: The Court will overrule the objection. He may answer the question.
“Q. Do you remember the question?
“A. Yes, I do.
“Q. Okay. Did you tell Sgt. Cordill the story that you just told to the Jury and the Court today?
“A. No, I didn’t.
“Q. You didn’t, did you?
“A. No, I didn’t.
“Q. In fact, this is the first time this has surfaced with regard to any police officers or investigation, is that correct, your story?
“A. Come again?
“Q. This is the first time you’ve mentioned this story to any police officers when they’ve been present as they’ve been present throughout here today?
“A. Besides that the one that came over that was talking about doing this case here, no.
“Q. Why didn’t you tell Sgt. Cordill or some of the other officers that story that you told today that you were out having drinks and doing this and doing that and give an explanation as to where you got your Twenty-Seven Dollars — a Twenty Dollar bill, a Five Dollar bill, and two Ones?
“A. Well, during the present time the. guy that I was with told me that this was his radio and I believed that was his radio and I felt like I didn’t have any reason to talk to him.
“Q. Okay. And you didn’t offer any explanation as to where you were when they arrested you right along with Mr. Beachem, or Joe Henry Day, whatever his name really is, and charged you with the same offense?
“A. Cause he didn’t ask me — they didn’t ask me.
“Q. They asked to talk to you, they asked you what you knew probably, didn’t they? They asked you where you were? Basic simple questions, and you didn’t offer an explanation right on the spot.”
In Doyle, supra, Justice Powell stated that:
“[Wjhile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial .
******
“We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 618-19, 96 S.Ct. at 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d at 98.
The majority opinion attempts to dispose of this due process issue, whether Vann was denied a fair trial when the prosecution was permitted to ask questions regarding his post-arrest silence, by treating it as waived on procedural grounds. Fundamental error does not require a specific objection before this Court may consider its merits. Winston v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 369, 332 N.E.2d 229.1 As our Indiana Supreme Court clearly stated in Jones the “use of an accused’s post arrest silence to impeach his trial testimony is fundamentally unfair. . . .” 265 Ind. at 450, 355 N.E.2d at 404.
Vann remained silent after his arrest. Justice Prentice made a very crucial distinc*1172tion between the defendant who remains silent after his arrest and the defendant who attempts to give an exculpatory account of his apparent involvement. In Nelson v. State (1980), Ind., 401 N.E.2d 666, Justice Prentice wrote:
“There is, however, a crucial distinction between those cases and the instant case. Jones remained silent after arrest and advisement of his rights. Doyle’s silence was not absolute, but his statements to arresting officers were tantamount to silence: he merely inquired, ‘What’s this all about.’ 426 U.S. at 615, note 5, 96 S.Ct. at 2243, 49 L.Ed.2d at 96. Charles, in the case before us, did not remain silent. Instead, he elected to give an account, albeit brief, of his participation in the events.”
401 N.E.2d at 668. The prosecutor’s reference to Vann’s silence after his arrest violated Vann’s fundamental right to a fair trial.
In further justification of its affirmance, the majority opinion characterizes the evidence as “nearly overwhelming” and concludes that the fundamental error is harmless. A careful review of the evidence indicates that it should be characterized as circumstantial evidence from which the defendant could have been found guilty by the jury if he had been given a fair trial. The evidence is not overwhelming. Phelps v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 66, 360 N.E.2d 191, cert. denied 434 U.S. 844, 98 S.Ct. 146, 54 L.Ed.2d 110.
This is the circumstantial evidence cited by the majority opinion as “nearly overwhelming”:
“Vann’s clothing and his height matched the description given by Morris. He was found in a car matching the description given by Schroeder. The car in which Vann was found was being driven by a man matching Morris’ description of Vann’s accomplice. The car contained a flashlight, a radio stolen from the residence and a crowbar. Paint chips matching those taken by police from the door of Schroeder’s house were found on the crowbar. At the time of his arrest Vann had in his possession $27 in bills in the same denominations and in the same condition as those taken from one of the victims. Furthermore, Vann and his companion were apprehended within a few blocks of the Schroeder residence only minutes after the burglary and robbery took place. . . . ”
Vann testified that a police officer asked him to put on the black jacket which was in the back seat of the car and to pull out his shirt. The car did not belong to Vann. He was a passenger. He testified that he had been given a ride by the owner of the car. Furthermore, it appears that more than a few minutes elapsed between the burglary and the apprehension. Morris, who was in the house during the burglary, testified that the police arrived several minutes after they were called on the telephone. The police spent about five minutes obtaining the description of the burglars and then telephoned the description to a dispatcher. Several minutes later the police reported a possible apprehension of the subjects described in the dispatch.
If ten or fifteen minutes elapsed between the flight of the burglars and their apprehension by the police, it would seem reasonable that the Cadillac automobile would have been able to travel more than five or six blocks from the scene of the burglary. Officer Bennett testified that he followed the Cadillac for six or eight blocks after he received its description over the radio. The Cadillac was stopped five or six blocks from the scene of the burglary. As to Vann, the passenger in the Cadillac, the evidence is very circumstantial. It may be sufficient for a guilty verdict, but it is not overwhelming. Therefore, I do not agree with the conclusion of the Majority that the fundamental error was harmless.
I would grant Vann a new trial.

. “The doctrine of ‘fundamental error’ allows an appellate court to by-pass the normal rules of appellate procedure, such as the requirement of a timely and specific objection, . . Winston v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 369, 332 N.E.2d 229 at 231.