Court Opinion

ID: 9481121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:08:14.902232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:06.351835
License: Public Domain

RESTANI, Judge:
I concur in the majority opinion, except to note that Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) does not entirely resolve the issue of the applicability of Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) to this matter.
In speaking with approval of ancillary jurisdiction in cases of third party actions, Owen was referring to impleader under Rule 14. Such third party actions, by their very nature, logically depend upon the underlying law suit. Owen, 437 U.S. at 376, 98 S.Ct. at 2404. The ease at bar differs from the impleader described in Owen in that 417 Fifth’s alleged liability to Towers, *1127which is to be asserted pursuant to a Rule 13(h) joinder to a counterclaim, does not logically depend upon Towers’ alleged liability to Associated. Nonetheless, if not a logical dependency, there is a logical relationship and an intertwining between Towers’ proposed claim against 417 Fifth and the underlying action. That is, the claim against the landlord is logically related to and intertwined with claims based on the sublease because of the necessity to construe the landlord’s consent to sublease. The consent to sublease was part of the Associated-Towers contractual arrangement, which is the essence of the dispute.
One should not read Owen to establish a rigid test for ancillary jurisdiction based on logical dependence. Although it does not address joinder to a compulsory counterclaim, Owen has been viewed as representing a flexible approach to ancillary jurisdiction, at least in the area of defendant’s joinder of additional claims. See King Fisher Marine Service v. 21st Phoenix Co., 893 F.2d 1155, 1162-63 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 2603, 110 L.Ed.2d 283 (1990) (logically related claim added against a non-diverse third party im-pleaded under Rule 14.)
Neither Owen nor Finley address directly jurisdiction over new parties ancillary to a compulsory counterclaim. The pre-Fm-ley Second Circuit decisions on this issue, however, do enable resolution of claims that are inextricably enmeshed in resolution of the dispute between the parties to the primary action. See Newburger Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 769, 54 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978); United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods. Inc., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir.1955). Finley should not be read so broadly as to upset a flexible approach to ancillary jurisdiction in a case such as the one at hand.