Court Opinion

ID: 9538100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:30:33.100487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:29.791289
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority opinion in holding that the evidence relating to appellant’s forfeiture of bail was erroneously admitted, but cannot agree with the holding that its admission did not constitute reversible error.
In my opinion, it is impossible for this court to determine from the record whether the jury was unduly influenced by this inadmissible evidence in returning its verdict and, therefore, its admission must be deemed prejudicial to appellant.
A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Lundberg v. Baumgartner, 5 Wn. (2d) 619, 106 P. (2d) 566, where a pedestrian had been killed by being struck by an automobile. In an action for wrongful death the driver of the car contended that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Police officers were permitted to testify that on two occasions seven or eight months prior to the accident the decedent had been arrested for being intoxicated. After a verdict in favor of the defendant the *462administratrix appealed contending that the admission of this evidence constituted reversible error. In sustaining this contention and remanding the case for a new trial, this court said:
“The next question for consideration is 'whether the testimony regarding decedent’s arrests was so prejudicial to appellant as to constitute reversible error.
“Lay jurors, as a rule, do not readily distinguish between an arrest and a conviction and are, therefore, prone to assume that, because a man has been taken into custody or to jail by the police, he must necessarily be guilty of some criminal misconduct. Moreover, the fact that the decedent had been arrested might w;ell have caused the jurors to infer a greater degree of intoxication on his part than would otherwise have been the case. To be ‘under the influence’ of liquor is one thing, but to be so drunk as to necessitate arrest by police officers is something quite different.
“Can it be said, then, that considering its bearing upon the decisive issues of the case and the manner in which it was brought to the attention of the jury, the objectionable testimony did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict?”
After discussing the nature of the testimony objected to by appellant, we concluded as follows:
“The testimony as to the arrests was thus brought to the attention of the jury in such a way as to indicate that it did have a bearing upon the decedent’s condition as to insobriety at the time of the accident. There was nothing in the course of the trial, either in the court’s instructions or otherwise, to indicate to the jury that the testimony should not have been considered in that connection. Under the circumstances, the testimony was prejudicial to the appellant, and its reception and retention in evidence constituted reversible error under the principles stated in 5 C. J. S. 973, § 1724, as follows:
“ ‘On the other hand, error in admitting evidence may be deemed to be prejudicial where it is impossible to determine in the particular case whether or not the jury were, in the admission of the evidence complained of, unduly influenced in reaching the verdict which was actually returned in the lower court. ... At all events, error in admitting evidence in any particular case will more readily be deemed to be prejudicial and to require a reversal . . . where the manner of admitting particular evidence or the nature *463thereof is peculiarly such as to create a situation prejudicial to the party against whom such evidence is introduced, 9 99
It is pointed out in the majority opinion that the police officer testified to certain damning admissions made by appellant immediately after the accident, in view of which the testimony regarding the traffic ticket, bail and forfeiture should be considered only as cumulative. In my opinion, this court cannot speculate as to the weight given by the jury to this inadmissible testimony.
Here, a jury of laymen might readily have inferred from this testimony that this accident had been investigated by an officer of the law who came to the conclusion that appellant was guilty of negligent driving at the time of the accident, that appellant was formally charged with that offense and that he had so little confidence in his defense that he defaulted and let his bail be forfeited rather than stand trial as he would have done if he had had any substantial defense.
It is to be noted that the principal issue which the jury was required to decide upon all the evidence admitted by the trial court was precisely the same as the issue involved in the criminal charge, to wit, was appellant guilty of negligent driving at the time of the accident? His failure to defend that charge may have indicated to the jury that he had no confidence in his defense' to either the civil or criminal charge of negligent driving.
Under the circumstances here presented, the following language from State v. Nist, 66 Wash. 55, 118 Pac. 920, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 409, is applicable to this case:
“The state’s learned counsel, however, contend that there was an abundance of evidence to sustain the conviction outside of the objectionable evidence, and argue that its admission is, for that reason, not so far prejudicial as to require a reversal. But this court has no means of knowing what effect the erroneous evidence had upon the minds of the jury. It may have been the controlling factor that induced the verdict of guilty. Before the erroneous introduction of evidence can be regarded as nonprejudicial, it must clearly appear that it is so.”
*464Since we have no means of knowing what effect the evidence erroneously admitted had on the minds of the jury in this case, I think that its admission was not only error but was also prejudicial to appellant and that a new trial should be granted.
Schwellenbach, C. J., and Hamley, J., concur with Don-worth, J.