Court Opinion

ID: 9556183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 15:05:09.912823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:41.559647
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                        JAMES W. YOUNG, JR.,
                             Appellant,

                                    v.

                      MARY STRUNK KOPCHAK,
                             Appellee.

                             No. 4D22-2289

                            [August 16, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian River County; Janet Croom, Judge; L.T. Case No.
312021CA000808.

   Clive N. Morgan of Morgan Legal, P.A., Jacksonville, and Laura H.
Mirmelli of Busch Mills & Slomka, LLP, Milton, Georgia, for appellant.

   Kevin M. Rollin of Napier & Rollin, PLLC, Vero Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

   James W. Young, Jr., appeals the trial court’s order granting final
summary judgment in favor of Mary Strunk Kopchak in a defamation
lawsuit arising from comments which Kopchak made in a social media
post. Because we find genuine issues of material fact exist, we reverse.

   Young and Kopchak were initially involved in a separate dispute
relating to the ownership of a family business, Strunk Funeral Home (“the
business”). Shortly before the death of Kopchak’s father, who owned the
business, Kopchak was appointed as the business’s president. With the
help of Kopchak’s stepmother, Dorothy Strunk (who was also Young’s
aunt), Young attempted to sell the business without Kopchak’s approval,
leading Kopchak to challenge the sale in court.

   During that litigation, Young made various statements regarding the
lawsuit that were published in local newspapers. In response, Kopchak
posted the following comment to a Facebook group regarding Young and
the ongoing litigation:
      It’s sad that . . . Jim Young [thinks] it is just fine to make our
      personal, family business public information. I suppose I
      understand Jim Young’s motivation.              He is trying to
      undermine our business hoping to gain something for which
      he is not worthy. He worked for Strunk many years ago. My
      father fired him for character unbecoming of a funeral director.
      That is fact.         Unfortunately, unscrupulous people do
      unscrupulous things which I am afraid is the case with Jim
      Young & Dorothy Strunk as well as will be shown as our legal
      matters unfold.

(emphasis added).

   Young then filed suit asserting one count of libel per se against
Kopchak, claiming Young “enjoyed a reputation for honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness in this community and his profession” prior to Kopchak’s
Facebook comment, and that Kopchak “intentionally published” the
comment “with the express intent to harm [] Young in his business . . . .”
Kopchak countered with multiple defenses, notably that her comments
were protected by the litigation privilege and Young was a limited public
figure who “invited public comment and scrutiny of himself.”

   Kopchak moved for summary judgment and filed a supporting
deposition from a former director at the business who recounted an event
where Young was heard shouting expletives at guests who were attending
a viewing. The director testified that he had tried to stop Young from
continuing this behavior, but when Young persisted, the director fired
Young. The director described Young’s comments and actions that night
as “conduct unbecoming of a funeral director.” During the deposition, the
director denied having a dispute with Young regarding overtime pay,
noting had any such disagreement existed, he would have referred it to
Kopchak’s father as the business’s owner.

    In opposition to summary judgment, Young filed an affidavit from a
former employee of the business who attested that he had personal
knowledge of the events which had occurred when Young left his
employment. That employee stated he was present when Young resigned
“[a]s a result of his concerns about overtime pay” and after complaining
about salary. That employee also stated Young was never fired from the
business.

  The trial court granted final summary judgment for Kopchak, finding
Young “voluntarily published statements” regarding the business litigation
and, thus, Kopchak’s comment posted on social media was protected by

                                      2
the litigation privilege. The court further found Young was a limited public
figure who had invited the comments, barring recovery even if the litigation
privilege did not apply. This appeal followed.

    The standard of review for an entry of summary judgment is de novo.
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormand Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). Under Florida’s new summary judgment standard, which
mirrors the standard for directed verdict, the focus of the analysis is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–
52 (1986). As with the old standard, the moving party must prove there is
no genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “A genuine dispute of material fact
exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.’” Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 345 So. 3d 893,
895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)).

    The first question presented is whether Kopchak was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law under the litigation privilege
pertaining to a business lawsuit for her statement in the Facebook post.
Florida courts recognize a privilege for comments made during the course
of litigation “no matter how false or malicious the statements may be, so
long as the statements are relevant to the subject of the inquiry.” Levin,
Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co.,
639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994). The purpose of the privilege is twofold:
(1) to prevent the initial trial from “needlessly devolv[ing] into another trial;
and (2) that the potential exposure to a subsequent lawsuit would have a
chilling effect on litigants seeking to redress their injuries.” DelMonico v.
Traynor, 116 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (Fla. 2013).

   Our decision in Ball v. D’Lites Enterprises, Inc., 65 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011), is instructive. There, the plaintiffs filed a breach of contract
action against a corporation. Id. at 638. The corporation then published
“warnings to the public on their website stating that [the] plaintiffs had
violated certain trademarks.” Id. The plaintiffs claimed the statements
were defamatory, but the trial court found the statements were “directly
related to the litigation and thus were absolutely immune.” Id. We
reversed by analogizing “publication of statements on the internet to
calling a press conference with the media or otherwise publishing
defamatory information to the newspapers or other media” and noted
comments made to media normally “do not have any functional tie[s] to a
judicial proceeding.” Id. at 639–40.

                                       3
      [Absolute immunity] does not apply to or include any
      publication of defamatory matter before the commencement,
      or after the termination of the judicial proceeding (unless such
      publication is an act incidental to the proper initiation thereof,
      or giving legal effect thereto); nor does it apply to or include any
      publication of defamatory matter to any person other than those
      to whom, or in any place other than that in which, such
      publication is required or authorized by law to be made for the
      proper conduct of the judicial proceedings.

Id. at 640 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 277 n.8 (1993)). When discussing the website comments in question,
we observed the comments were “not made in the proceedings itself, nor
[were they] made to a participant connected to the proceeding such as a
witness.” Id. at 641.

    Like the statement in Ball, Kopchak’s Facebook post was not connected
to the business litigation by its content or by the site of its publication.
See id. First, Kopchak’s post was not made directly to Young but rather
to a general community Facebook page. Second, Kopchak’s post was made
as a reply to a non-party’s post on the same community page. Finally, the
content of Kopchak’s post does not directly relate to the business litigation
and instead is about Young and his motives for bringing the suit. While
Young’s motives might be tangentially related to the business litigation,
Kopchak’s comment did not serve any direct purpose pertaining to the
litigation itself. Cf. McCullough v. Kubiak, 158 So. 3d 739, 740–41 (Fla.
4th DCA 2015) (noting litigation privilege applied to defendant’s comments
made during a deposition and, thus, “bore some relation to settlement
negotiations in that proceeding”). As such, Kopchak’s post is not afforded
immunity under the litigation privilege pertaining to the business lawsuit.

   Next, Kopchak’s claim that Young is a limited public figure is not
substantiated because, based on the evidence proffered to the court on
summary judgment, the extant business litigation does not clearly rise to
the level of a public controversy. Limited public figures are individuals
“who have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2002) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). To
determine whether one is a limited public figure, courts must “determine
whether there is a ‘public controversy’” and “then determine whether the
plaintiff played a sufficiently central role in the instant controversy to be
considered a public figure for purposes of that controversy.” Id. at 845–
46.

                                       4
    A public controversy is “any topic upon which sizeable segments of
society have different, strongly held views.”          Della-Donna v. Gore
Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d 72, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (quoting Lerman
v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984)). However,
“[a]ttracting the public’s interest is not enough.” Id. In determining
whether a controversy is public, a court “should ask whether a reasonable
person would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in
the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution. If the issue was being
debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for
non-participants, it was a public controversy.” Id. at 77 (emphases added).

    The underlying legal dispute that was contested in the business
litigation, despite whatever coverage was provided in local newspapers,
does not appear by the record to have a substantial impact on anyone
outside of the immediate parties to the case and their families. Cf. Della-
Donna, 489 So. 2d at 73 (public controversy “concerned a dispute between
Della-Donna and the Trustees of Nova University over the final
disbursement of a 14.5 million dollar gift to Nova”); Friedgood v. Peters
Pub. Co., 521 So. 2d 236, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (public controversy
centered around the “highly publicized criminal prosecution[]” of the
plaintiff and her father). While it is possible the funeral home and its
eventual ownership might have some importance to the public, or at least
the local community, the public’s interest in the matter or its outcome was
not established in the record below. Cf. Arnold v. Taco Props., Inc., 427 So.
2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (finding “there is competent substantial
evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that an identifiable public
controversy existed” (footnote omitted)). Here, the question of the funeral
home’s eventual owner does not clearly impact the public beyond creating
merely curious spectators, nor does the record indicate sizable differences
in public opinion about the litigation sufficient to make it a public
controversy. Cf. Della-Donna, 489 So. 2d at 77; Arnold, 427 So. 2d at 219.
Therefore, Young is not a limited public figure as a matter of law.

    Finally, although Kopchak claims truth as a defense to her comments,
the record evidence does not conclusively show her comments were either
the whole truth or substantially true. See Readon v. WPLG, LLC, 317 So.
3d 1229, 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“Florida recognizes the substantial
truth doctrine” which notes that “a statement does not have to be perfectly
accurate if the ‘gist’ or the ‘sting’ of the statement is true.” (quoting Smith
v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 731 So. 2d 702, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999))). Here,
there is a factual dispute about whether Young’s original employment with
the business was terminated involuntarily due to Young’s conduct with a
client, as the director’s deposition indicates, or voluntarily due to a

                                      5
disagreement regarding overtime pay, as the employee’s affidavit indicates.
See Glickman v. Potamkin, 454 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
(reversing summary judgment in a defamation action because the defense
of truth presents a question of fact to be determined by the jury).

   The trial court did not rule the employee’s affidavit was legally
insufficient and, thus, not entitled to consideration as a matter of law.1
On this record, the contradictory testimony created a genuine issue of
material fact that cannot be resolved by the trial court on summary
judgment.

    Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s final summary judgment entered
in favor of Kopchak and remand for further proceedings.

   Reversed and remanded.

FORST and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                             *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 The recently amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c)(4) states “[a]n

affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show
that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”

                                       6