Court Opinion

ID: 9571994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:37:09.824897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:17.991003
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority ignores the inadequacy of the equitable relief fashioned by the trial court in this matter and concludes that the permanent injunction at issue meets the requirement that it be crafted in a manner “the least oppressive to the defendant while still protecting the valuable rights of the plaintiff” This conclusion overlooks that the trial court failed in two respects: (1) by refusing to fashion a remedy which addressed abatement of the nuisance, and (2) compelling the affected party to bear expenditures to clean up a nuisance it has not created. Because I disagree with the majority and believe instead that the narrow relief provided for in the injunction amounts to no remedy for the Goodes, I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that there were no further reasonable means that could be taken to abate the flow of surface water from MLI’s property onto the Goode property. This conclusion overlooks the evidence presented by MLI’s own expert that there were further reasonable steps that could be undertaken on MLI’s property to decrease the water flow. The record establishes that the atypical flooding commenced subsequent to MLI’s purchase and commercial development of the property. Changes made by MLI to the property were substantial and included alteration of the slope of the property to accommodate additions of a manufacturing plant, a road and a parking lot. It is uncontroverted that these changes so increased the amount of surface water channeled onto the Goode property that the property flooded 93 times after the start of MLI’s construction. Because the trial court had full knowledge of its earlier decision that MLI created a trespass and nuisance by interfering with the natural flow of water, and that MLI was responsible to abate the nuisance, the trial court should have mandated that MLI use one of the remaining alternative remedies to alleviate the water problem. Instead, the trial court’s order allows MLI’s trespass and nuisance to continue and burdens the Goodes’ property and their pocketbook by requiring them to abate a nuisance created by another. Compare Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553 (2) (501 SE2d 501) (1998). Because a review of the facts of this case demands the conclusion that the trial court’s order constitutes clear error and a manifest abuse of discretion by that court, I dissent to the majority’s opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.
*726Jenkins & Nelson, Frank E. Jenkins III, John W. Nichols, for appellants.
McGee & Oxford, James J. Brissette, for appellees.