Court Opinion

ID: 9469315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:37:23.445843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:19.687571
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
On consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing, filed June 21, 1982, it is
ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid petition is denied.
On Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, BA-ZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, WRIGHT, TAMM, MacKINNON, WILKEY, WALD, MIKVA, EDWARDS, GINSBURG and BORK, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Appellant’s suggestion for rehearing en banc has been circulated to the full Court and the Court not having voted in favor thereof, it is
ORDERED by the Court en banc that the aforesaid suggestion is denied.
A statement of Senior Circuit Judge Ba-zelon concerning his call for a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc is attached.
Statement of Senior Circuit Judge BA-ZELON as to why he called for a vote on rehearing en banc.
This case has no bearing whatsoever on the question of James K. Green’s guilt or innocence. It has nothing to do with being “soft” or “hard” on crime. There is no possibility of a new trial. Green’s request for a hearing on his attorney’s conduct at sentencing does, however, put the integrity of the entire sentencing process on the line. In rejecting his request, the court’s per curiam opinion recurrently notes that he was convicted of a repugnant crime and that 11% years passed before he filed the instant petition.1 The court does not, as of course it cannot, explicitly rely on the stink of the crime or the passage of time.2 I believe the arguments it does articulate are just as unsupportable. This decision is a dangerous precedent.
First, the court argues that no “likely prejudice” resulted from counsel’s shoddy behavior.3 However, under a clear and long-standing exception to the prejudice requirement, no such demonstration has ever been required where counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a conflict of interest or other disabling differences.4 The record amply shows that there was a serious conflict between Green and his counsel, and there can be little question that this conflict contributed to counsel’s self-serving conduct at sentencing.5
Second, the court states that a trial judge’s duty to inquire into the possibility of attorney conflict of interest arises only where there is an “actual” conflict.6 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated quite clearly that the duty to inquire is triggered by (a) possible conflict of interest, and (b) *206either “timely objection” or “special circumstances” that alert the judge to that possibility. Both factors were triggered here.7
Third, although the court concedes that the district court never reached the likely prejudice issue,8 it inexplicably decides for itself that the district court’s opinion “amounts to the same thing” as a finding of no likely effect on the outcome.9 This rush to judgment flies squarely in the face of previous decisions by this court requiring a remand for a factual determination of the prejudice issue.10 Contrary to the court, I believe this record reeks with doubt about the likely effects of counsel’s performance.11
Fourth, the court’s mechanical application of the likely prejudice standard shows little comprehension of or sensitivity to the unique and subtle complexities of the sentencing calculus.12
Finally, this decision seriously erodes our long-standing commitment to the proposition that defense counsel’s investigation and allocution are pivotal to the sentencing process.13 The reality is that all too many defendants are unable to afford counsel who are willing or able to carry out these duties effectively. The courts must respond when alarm bells go off indicating possible incompetence, conflict, or other impropriety. Today this court has turned a deaf ear to the alarm, however, and has sent a message to the bench and bar that we couldn’t care less if defense counsel’s contribution to the sentencing process is carried out competently, incompetently, or not at all.

. See Maj. op. at 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190.

. See dissenting op. at 205 n.70.

. See Maj. op. at 188-191.

. See dissenting op. at 184-190.

. See id. at 184-186.

. See Maj. op. at 191 n.12.

. See dissenting op. at 190-191. The circularity of this court’s reasoning is striking: the only purpose of an inquiry is to determine whether a conflict actually existed, but because Green has not demonstrated that a conflict actually existed, no inquiry need be held. See Maj. op. at 191 n.12.

. Maj. op. at 189. The district court did not reach the issue because it held that Green’s counsel had performed competently at sentencing. If this court had not gone out of its way to avoid that issue, I believe it could not honestly have concluded that Green’s counsel met the minimum standard of competency required by the Constitution. Green’s counsel is alleged never to have shown him his presentence report. According to counsel’s own version of the story, she failed to pursue any independent investigation into the facts relevant to sentencing, even after Green complained about the accuracy and tone of the sentencing report. And her behavior at sentencing was so self-serving and counter-productive that I doubt it could honestly be said that she presented any allocution at all or that Green had, in practical terms, any representation at all. See dissenting op. at 191-201.

. Maj. op. at 190 n.ll; see also id. at 189 (district court “effectively ruled out the possibility of prejudice”) (emphasis added).

. See dissenting op. at 202 n.53, 203 n.60; United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

. See dissenting op. at 203, 205.

. See id. at 205.

. See id. at 204 n.66.