Court Opinion

ID: 9545250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:08:55.076462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:23.909870
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because: (1) I do not think the telephone call alone gave the police officers probable cause to search without a warrant; and (2) I do not think the record supports the majority’s assumption that the officers who performed the warrantless search acted with an awareness or reasonable belief that fellow officers had information sufficient to *293constitute probable cause, and the state does not so contend.
At the outset, we should remind ourselves that where the motion to suppress challenges evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving the validity of the search is on the prosecution. ORS 133.693C4).1 The burden of proof carries with it the burden of persuasion. McCormick, Evidence, § 336 (2d ed E. Cleary 1972). With respect to the contention that the telephone call alone constituted probable cause, I do not think the state has met its burden; with respect to the searching officers’ having acted on the basis of collective knowledge, the state does not even urge the proposition, so it is difficult to understand how it has fulfilled its burden of persuasion.
The state’s only contention here is that the officers had probable cause to search defendant and his car upon his arrival at the scene after making the telephone call. That contention conforms to the testimony of the officers who searched defendant. In my opinion, those facts were sufficient to give the police a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed a crime, permitting them to stop him and make a reasonable inquiry, ORS 131.615(1),2 and to pat him down to see if he had any weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 29 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Since they *294did not feel any object that might be a weapon, they could not go any further. State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 554 P2d 1014 (1976).
The majority seems to say that probable cause exists if there is "reasonable ground for suspicion,” quoting from a law review article quoted in State v. Keith, 2 Or App 133, 142, 465 P2d 724, rev den (1970). If there is a difference between a reasonable suspicion (ORS 131.615(1)), which the legislature has provided authorizes a "stop” but not an arrest, search or seizure, and a "reasonable ground for suspicion,” which the majority states constitutes probable cause authorizing a search, etc., we are not told. The problem may be in the fact that Keith was decided in 1970 and the statute was enacted in 1973.
I do not agree that an ambiguous telephone message: "Tell him they’re done and I’m on my way over,” which was given to a complete stranger to the defendant at dinner time may give rise to a "well-warranted suspicion”3 that the caller would be bringing more drugs to the house. While that message could make the officer reasonably suspicious that the defendant had committed the crime of criminal activity in drugs, it does not rise above that.
In State v. Ford, 20 Or App 384, 531 P2d 740 (1975), we held, on more provocative facts than appear here, that probable cause was lacking to permit a warrant-less search. There, the defendant arrived at a house where officers were in the process of successfully executing a search warrant for amphetamines and related paraphernalia. An officer thought he recognized defendant as a person present dining the execution of a search warrant for illegal drugs a year earlier. He had also heard that defendant had been involved in the illicit sale of amphetamines within the preceding 90 days. This information would appear to *295be the substantial equivalent of the ambiguous telephone call Officer Huff answered in the instant case: it was enough to arouse a reasonable suspicion.
After defendant Ford entered the house, the officer approached to within about three feet of him and observed a bent spoon in the breast pocket of the shirt defendant was carrying. The officer considered the bent spoon to be of the type used to cook amphetamine drugs, and took it from defendant. As he did so, he noticed in the same pocket a vial, which he also seized. The vial contained an olive-colored liquid which the officer’s experience told him was amphetamine sulphate. Suppression of the spoon and vial was upheld by this court.
In State v. Parks, State v. Tarpley, Jr., 5 Or App 601, 485 P2d 1246 (1971), the pipe, which drew police attention to the defendant, was recognized as of a type commonly used to smoke hashish, but could also be used to smoke tobacco; yet its presence in plain view was held insufficient to provide probable cause. Cf. State v. Chipley, 29 Or App 691, 564 P2d 1096, rev den (1977). In the case at bar, the state stipulated at the suppression hearing that the telephone message could have meant that they were done with dinner and that Ronny would be right over.
Given the testimony of the searching officers and the contention of the state in this court, I would reverse for the foregoing reasons. The majority, however, has assumed the burden of persuading itself (successfully) that since Officer Houck had all of the collective information which would be sufficient to constitute probable cause, the warrantless search was valid. I would agree if she had passed that information on to the officers who searched defendant, or even if they had testified that they assumed Officer Houck had information in addition to the telephone call about which they already knew. But they did not. The situation is as if Officer Houck did not know anything.
*296The majority relies on State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 456 P2d 67 (1969). There the arresting officers had sufficient facts to constitute probable cause to arrest, but did not articulate their justification properly. Here the searching officers did not have sufficient facts to justify the search. Surprisingly, the majority also relies on State v. Mickelson, 18 Or App 647, 526 P2d 583, rev den (1974), which holds that even though officers working as a team may have collective knowledge which would constitute probable cause, if that knowledge is not communicated in such a way that the officer who searched the defendant had an awareness or reasonable belief that there was probable cause, the warrantless search is invalid. We recognized, nevertheless, that:
"* * * A police officer working in a team or in a modem police organization is entitled reasonably to arrest or search on the command or summary information of another officer. But somewhere in joint police action there must be a nexus between the probable cause and the invasion of privacy, between the justification and the act.” 18 Or App at 650-51. (Emphasis added.)
We also said:
"* * * To hold the search in this case justified would encourage police officers to search on the hope that the total knowledge of all those officers involved in a case will later be found to constitute probable cause if the search is challenged. We think it better to require that an arresting officer reasonably believe that his fellow officers have probable cause before he arrests or searches on the basis of their knowledge.” 18 Or App at 650.
In State v. Crossen, 21 Or App 835, 838, 536 P2d 1263, rev den (1975), we reiterated our concern for the "search now and justify later” approach to the state’s invasion of individual privacy and freedom; we said that such a dilution of the exclusionary rule "would encourage unlawful searches in the hope that probable cause would be developed after the fact.”
In this case, the nexus we required in Mickelson is missing. As a result, the majority opinion encourages *297warrantless searches which may be justified fortuitously ex post facto. I would reverse, and therefore respectfully dissent.

 ORS 133.693(4) provides:
"Where the motion to suppress challenges evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the search is on the prosecution.”
See State v. Miller, 269 Or 328, 334, 524 P2d 1399 (1974), in which the Supreme Court said:
"In considering the sufficiency of the motions to suppress in this case it must be kept in mind that a search and seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable and that the state has the burden to establish the legality of the search in such a case. * * *”

 ORS 131.615(1) provides:
"A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that he is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry.”

 State v. Evans, 16 Or App 189, 517 P2d 1225, rev den (1974).