Court Opinion

ID: 9690769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:41:50.607191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:20.355556
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
HARWOOD, Justice.
In brief in support of appellee’s application for rehearing counsel strenuously argues that in our original opinion we, in .effect, overruled in part Cherry Investment Corp. v. Folsom, 273 Ala. 575, 143 So.2d 181, which counsel contends holds that every presumption must be indulged in favor of a decree dissolving a temporary injunction, even in the absence of an answer or evidence and even though the bill for the temporary injunction contained equity.
Cherry, supra, was an appeal from an order denying a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. No answer was filed to the motion to dissolve. Concluding that the bill for the temporary injunction contained equity, the decree of the lower court was affirmed. This is the true basis, the ratio decidendi, of the Cherry case.
It is true that in the opinion in Cherry we find the following statement:
“Moreover, in considering the question of the dissolution of the injunction, the court is vested with a wide discretion and will weigh the relative degree of injury or benefit to the respective parties and especially where the discretion of the lower court has been exercised without apparent abuse.”
For this statement the court cites Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516.
A reading of Holcomb v. Forsyth, supra, shows the following:
“In considering the question of dissolution on the denials of the answer, the court is invested * * * ” (Emphasis ours.) The remaining portion of this statement is the same as set out in Cherry, supra.
Thus in Holcomb, supra, the source of the statement in Cherry, the discretion of the lower court in dissolving a temporary injunction is posited upon the existence of an answer. If the temporary injunction is issued on a bill containing equity, and no answer is filed to the bill nor evidence presented, we can see no basis for the exercise of discretion solely upon a motion to dissolve, the sole question then being the equity of the bill.
*167'Counsel further argues that we erred in applying the presumption of amendment rule to the original' bill, in that the failure of the bill to allege payment to respondent of monies earned, which, counsel contends,' is a substantive fact which cannot be presumed as cured by amendment. In this regard counsel cites Mudd v. Lanier, 247 Ala. 363, 24 So.2d 550. In Mudd the appeal was by the respondents from a decree on their demurrer, and on their motion to dissolve an injunction issued pending the cause. Some of the appellees (complainants) requested that the injunction be maintained on a theory of estoppel, a matter not alleged in bill originating the proceedings. This court held that this new substantive matter (estoppel) could not be presumed, but only matters defectively pleaded. It must be. remembered that in Mudd it was the. appellees-complainants seeking to.in-, voice this presumed amendment to uphold their bill.
Where the complainant is seeking an injunction, no condition for assumption of amendments obtains, for the complainant is the actor. On a motion to dissolve, the respondent is the actor, and hence, his motion to dissolve on want of equity in the bill presupposes that amendable defects should be taken as cured, the implication being that objections'in the form of a motion to dissolve confesses the bill as perfected. McHan v. McMurry, 173 Ala. 182, 55 So. 793. When it is apparent, if the facts were well pleaded, a case for relief would exist, a respondent should be put to a demurrer, specifying the grounds of objection, and affording’the complainant the opportunity of removing such grounds. Seals v. Robinson and Company, 75 Ala. 363.
Both at law and in equity, liberal rules for amendment of pleadings are the established policy. Farmer v. Hill, 243 Ala. 543, 11 So.2d 160. In the present case a presumption of an amendment to show payments to McNaughton by Block would in no wise be a radical departure from the cause of action stated in the original bill, nor' would it make an' entirely new' case. Of'course it would not work ah 'entire change of parties. As stated in our original opinion, the original bill 'could easily have been amended without any departure from matters reasonably -inferred in the language of the bill.
The original opinion has been corrected to show the date of the contract of employment to be 28 December 1963.
Opinion extended, application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL, J., concur.
SIMPSON, J., concurs in conclusion!