Court Opinion

ID: 9503224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:38:39.283066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:20.064221
License: Public Domain

KISTLER, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that police officers may take reasonable steps to protect themselves when they reasonably suspect that they are faced with the risk of an immediate threat of serious physical injury. Those steps include the ability to engage in a “protective sweep” of a home to ensure the officers’ safety. I disagree with the majority, however, when it holds that Detective Mogle did not reasonably perceive an immediate threat of serious injury to another officer. In my view, he did, and his response to that threat was a reasonable one. Because Mogle lawfully discovered defendant’s methamphetamine while taking reasonable steps to protect another officer’s safety, I agree with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was no basis for suppressing that evidence. I respectfully dissent.
Officer Deese of the Klamath Falls Police Department received a report from an informant that “drugs were being sold out of [a] residence” at 614 North Third Street in Klamath Falls. The informant also reported that a brown Jeep pickup was either delivering drugs to the house or associated with the delivery of drugs to the house. Deese passed that information on to Mogle of the Oregon State Police and told him that “if [he] saw the pickup [at that address] there’d probably be a good chance to [contact the homeowner].” One evening, Mogle drove by the house and “spotted the brown pickup in [an] alley” beside the house. On driving by the house, Mogle realized that it was the same house that a different informant had recently shown Mogle “as a location *263that they were selling narcotics out of and [the informant had] said [that] they hide wanted people there.” Mogle was also aware that the house on Third Street was “associated with an address on 5th Street where Nicholas Monteith and Vince Fonseca had been,” and he knew that there was an outstanding warrant for Fonseca’s arrest.
On seeing the brown pickup parked in the alley, Mogle called Deese and suggested that they go to the house, knock on the door, and talk with the occupants. A third officer, Detective Morrison, went with them. When they got to the house, they noticed a back door to the house that opened onto the alley.1 Mogle told Deese “that if anybody would want to, they’d probably run out” that door. Mogle asked Deese if “he’d cover the exit of the back door which is on the side in the alley by the pickup.” Deese did so, while Mogle and Morrison went to the front door. They knocked, and a man named Tidwell came to the door. Mogle identified himself and Morrison as police officers and told Tidwell that they had information that “there were wanted people” living at the house. Tidwell replied that “it was just him, his girlfriend and a guy named Sam.” There also was a child in the living room. Mogle asked if they could look through the house to see if anyone else was there, and Tidwell replied, “go ahead and look.”2
Morrison stayed in the living room with the girlfriend and the child while Mogle and Tidwell started walking through the house. They walked through a kitchen, down a hall, and came to a stairway that leads to a lower level. The lower level contains two bedrooms and opens onto the alley, where Deese was waiting. (Defendant’s bedroom was on the first floor while Tidwell occupied the two bedrooms on the lower level.) As Mogle got to the stairway, he saw “two men running down the stairs.” He “hollered stop police. They stopped for a short time. Looked back and then started running again.”3 Mogle ran down the stairs after the two men, *264who ran out the door to the alley and into Deese. At that point, they stopped.
Mogle caught up with the two men and asked them why they were running, but “[t]hey didn’t give [him] an answer.” Mogle asked Deese to check whether either man had any outstanding warrants while he “went back upstairs to clear the upstairs because my other officer was up there by himself.” Mogle then “cleared” the upstairs by briefly looking into the rooms to see if there were any other unexpected persons there. When asked why he had not taken Tidwell with him, Mogle explained:
“Because I didn’t want to have, I was told there was only go[ing to] be one other person there, now all of a sudden I got two other people there and Mr. Tidwell makes three. I didn’t want to go back upstairs with Mr. Tidwell after seeing two people already run, because as I testified, he [Tidwell] was associated with Vince Fonseca and Nick Monteith and I knew that at that time Fonseca had warrants so I thought maybe he might be upstairs.”
In briefly checking the rooms on the first floor for other persons, Mogle saw, in plain view in what turned out to be defendant’s bedroom, a “mirror with white powder residue and a yellow straw on a table next to the bed.” Mogle continued to check for other persons. When he had satisfied himself that Morrison was safe, Mogle came back to the alley where Deese, defendant, Tidwell, and the other man (who turned out to be Sam) were. At that point, Mogle learned that the bedroom in which he had found the powder, mirror, and straw was defendant’s and that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant but not for Sam. Mogle also learned for the first time that Tidwell may not have had authority to consent to a search of the entire house; that is, although Tidwell initially had told Mogle to “go ahead and look” through the house and had placed no restriction on Mogle’s ability to do so, Mogle learned after he had checked defendant’s bedroom *265for wanted persons that Tidwell may have lacked authority to consent to a search of that bedroom.
The issue in this case is narrow. There is no dispute that Mogle searched-defendant’s bedroom when he entered the room to look for wanted persons. Because Mogle did not have a warrant, the search must come within an exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent or officer safety, to comply with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-24, 94 P3d 872 (2004). On that issue, the state does not argue that Tidwell had authority to consent to Mogle’s search; that is, the state does not contend that Tidwell’s initial, unrestricted consent to look through the house was sufficient to permit Mogle’s later search of defendant’s bedroom.4 Rather, the state argues that Mogle’s search was valid because it came within the officer safety exception; that is, the state contends that Mogle had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that there was a risk of serious physical injury to Morrison. In resolving that issue, the majority and I part company over one aspect of it. We disagree whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to meet that standard.
The question whether Mogle’s actions came within the officer safety exception entails three related but separate issues, and it is helpful to distinguish them. The first issue is whether Mogle had a reasonable suspicion to believe that there were other persons in the house. If he did, the second *266issue is whether Mogle reasonably suspected that those persons might pose an immediate risk of serious physical injury to Morrison. The final issue is whether the steps that Mogle took to protect Morrison from the risk of injury were reasonable.
In resolving those issues, we consider both the quality and quantity of information that Mogle possessed when he went back into the house to check for wanted persons. See Alabama v. White, 496 US 325, 330, 110 S Ct 2412, 110 L Ed 2d 301 (1990) (considering those issues). As other courts have recognized, the quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that required for probable cause. Id.; cf. State v. Montigue, 288 Or 359, 363-67, 605 P2d 656 (1980) (establishing a higher evidentiary standard for probable cause determinations). In considering that issue, the courts have distinguished among anonymous tips, information obtained from known but undisclosed informants, and information obtained from disclosed informants. See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.5(h), 570-98, (4th ed 2004). For instance, in the context of determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the courts have recognized that information obtained from an undisclosed informant may have sufficient indicia of reliability because the informant is subject to criminal charges for supplying false information to an officer. See Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143, 146-47, 92 S Ct 1921, 32 L Ed 2d 612 (1972); LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.5(h) at 573-74. Conversely, the courts have found reasonable suspicion based on anonymous tips only when corroborating circumstances provide grounds for determining the reliability and basis of the anonymous tipster’s information. Compare White, 496 US at 331-32 (anonymous tip that accurately predicted the defendant’s future behavior sufficient to support reasonable suspicion), with Florida v. J. L., 529 US 266, 271-72, 120 S Ct 1375, 146 L Ed 2d 254 (2000) (anonymous tip that failed to provide any predictive information and thus left the police without a basis to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
In this case, Mogle relied on information from two known but undisclosed informants. Because both informants *267were subject to criminal penalties for falsely reporting information to the police, ORS 162.375, their reports have some reliability. See State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 584-85, 835 P2d 904 (1992) (so holding regarding named informant). Additionally, the two reports cross-corroborate each other, and the officers observed a brown Jeep pickup parked by the house, consistently with one informant’s report. It may be that the two informants’ reports would not be sufficiently reliable, standing alone, to establish a reasonable suspicion that drug sales were being conducted out of the house on Third Street or that wanted persons were hidden inside. However, what Mogle learned once he was inside the house corroborated the informants’ reports.
As noted, when Mogle first spoke with Tidwell, Tidwell told him that there were three adults in the house: Tidwell, his girlfriend, and Sam. However, when Mogle saw two men running down the stairs, he realized that there was at least one more person in the house than Tidwell had reported. The information that Mogle learned corroborated the informants’ reports in two respects. First, the men’s sudden flight and their refusal to stop when Mogle directed them to do so corroborated the informants’ reports that people inside the house were involved in criminal activity. Second, Mogle reasonably could infer that the reason that Tidwell had not been truthful about the number of people in the house was because the people in the house were involved in drug sales or because the house was used to hide wanted persons, further corroborating the information that both Mogle and Deese had received from the informants. That corroboration sufficiently validated the informants’ reports so that those reports, together with the information that Mogle personally observed once inside the house, should be considered in determining whether Mogle reasonably suspected that another person could be in the house who posed a risk of serious physical injury to Morrison.
That substantive determination entails two issues. The first is whether Mogle reasonably suspected that another person could be at large in the house. The second is whether he reasonably suspected that any person still at large posed a risk of serious physical injury to Morrison. On *268the first issue, when Mogle undertook a protective sweep, he knew that Tidwell had “underreported” the number of persons in the house. Specifically, Mogle had already discovered one more person than Tidwell had reported, and he reasonably suspected that there could be other people in the house — persons whom Tidwell had not disclosed either because Tidwell was hiding wanted persons or because those persons were engaged in drug sales or for both those reasons.
On the second issue, Mogle reasonably suspected that any persons still at large in the house posed a risk of serious physical injury to Morrision, who remained in the living room. Tidwell had not told the truth about the number of persons in the house. That fact, coupled with defendant’s and Sam’s sudden and unexplained flight down the stairs, tended to corroborate the informants’ reports that drug sales were occurring in the house and that Tidwell was hiding wanted persons there. Mogle reasonably suspected that any person still at large in the house had pressing reasons to avoid capture and could pose a risk of serious physical injury to Morrison, who at that point stood in the way of the only other exit from the house.
It may be that not every person who sells drugs or is subject to warrants poses a risk of danger to the police. But when the two persons whom Mogle had uncovered in the house had sought to flee despite the detective’s commands to stop and when the detective had reason to suspect that other wanted persons could still be hiding in the house, he also had reason to suspect that any person who remained at large in the house posed a risk of danger to the one officer who, at that point, was still inside. The question, after all, is not whether Mogle was certain that any person still at large in the house posed a risk of danger to Morrison or even whether Mogle had probable cause to believe that fact. Rather, the question is whether Mogle had a reasonable suspicion “that [any person still at large in the house] might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer.” State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524, 747 P2d 991 (1987) (emphasis added). He did.
To be sure, as the majority notes, when Mogle undertook a protective sweep of the house, he was not aware that *269defendant, Sam, or Tidwell possessed any weapons, nor had they made any threats or belligerent gestures toward Deese or himself. Tidwell, however, had lied about the number of people in the house, and defendant and Sam had continued to flee despite Mogle’s command to stop. When asked why they had run, they had provided no explanation, and Mogle reasonably suspected that they, and anyone else still at large in the house, were involved in drug sales or were wanted persons. This is not a case, such as a roadside traffic stop, in which the officers have no basis for suspecting that the occupants of the car are engaged in criminal activity and in which we consequently have required some evidence of the presence of a weapon or furtive gestures before upholding a search for officer safety. See, e.g., State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 632-33, 89 P3d 1163 (2004) (discussing cases). In that regard, in determining whether Mogle reasonably suspected that any person who remained in the house “might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury,” it is helpful to compare this case to our most recent officer safety case, State v. Morgan, 348 Or 283, 230 P3d 928 (2010).
In Morgan, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic offense. Id. at 285. She got out of the car on her own, acted “agitated and nervous,” and clutched her purse or tote bag tightly. Id. at 286. When the officer told her that he would have to check her purse for weapons if she were going to keep it with her, she began backing away, shaking her head, and reached into the purse. Id. At that point, the officer seized the purse and, in doing so, saw drug paraphernalia inside. Id. This court held that the officer’s actions came within the officer safety exception to Article I, section 9. Id. at 290. Specifically, we held that the officer in Morgan reasonably suspected that the defendant posed a risk of immediate serious physical harm based on her unexpected exit from the car, her visibly nervous behavior, and the fact that she had reached into her purse. Id.
The officer in Morgan had no reason to suspect that the defendant in that case was involved in drug sales or hiding from the police, as Mogle did here. For all the officer in Morgan knew, the defendant was merely a passenger in a car stopped for a minor traffic offense. If the defendant’s actions *270in Morgan were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that she might pose an immediate, serious threat to the officer’s physical safety, a fortiori so was defendant and Sam’s unexplained flight from the officer, when coupled with the fact that Mogle reasonably suspected that defendant, Sam, and anyone else still at large in the house was involved in drug sales or was wanted by the police and hiding from them.
The final question is whether Mogle took reasonable steps to check whether anyone else was present in the house. On that point, the officers did not have to be at Tidwell’s house. They did not, for example, have to be there to execute an arrest or search warrant or serve a restraining order on anyone. If all the officers had been safely out of the house when Mogle caught up with defendant, Sam, and Deese in the alley, it might not have been reasonable, at least for officer safety purposes, for Mogle to have reentered the house to ensure that no one else was inside. Morrison, however, remained in the living room with defendant’s girlfriend and the child, and Mogle reasonably went back into the house to briefly check through a cursory visual scan that no one else was there. The check was no more extensive than necessary to ensure Morrison’s safety.
In my view, Mogle was well within the scope of the officer safety exception when he came upon the methamphetamine in defendant’s bedroom and, for that reason, did not violate defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights. I would hold, as both the Court of Appeals and the trial court did, that the officer’s actions stayed within constitutional limits. I respectfully dissent.
Linder, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Although Mogle referred to the door as a hack door, it appears to have been a side door that opened onto an alley running beside the house.

 At that point, Tidwell did not place any restrictions on where Mogle could look in the house.

 Mogle testified that he yelled, “[S]top police.” When asked whether Mogle had yelled “stop,” Deese initially said, “No.” Deese then immediately added, “Not that I *264recall.” When asked again whether Mogle had said stop, Deese explained, “I just don’t recall that.” The trial court found that, when Mogle saw the “two men run down the stairsf] Officer Mogle yelled at them to stop.” The two officers’ testimony differed only in whether Mogle had yelled “stop,” not whether Mogle also had identified himself as a police officer. When the trial court credited Mogle, it implicitly credited his testimony that he “hollered stop police.”

 In 1983, this court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have actual authority to consent to a search of someone else’s property. State v. Carsey, 295 Or 32, 46, 664 P2d 1085 (1983). This court implied in Carsey that actual authority also would be required under Article I, section 9, but it specifically did not decide that question. See 295 Or at 34 n 1. Seven years later, the United States Supreme Court rejected this court’s Fourth Amendment holding in Carsey. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 186, 110 S Ct 2793, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990). The Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, actual authority is not required to consent to a search of someone else’s property; apparent authority is sufficient. Id. This court has never returned to the state law question that it did not decide in Carsey — whether Article I, section 9, requires actual authority to consent. In this case, the state has not argued that Tidwell had either actual or common authority to consent to the search of defendant’s bedroom, nor has it argued that apparent authority is sufficient under Article I, section 9. Accordingly, I assume, as does the majority, that some other exception to the warrant requirement is necessary to justify Mogle’s entry into defendant’s bedroom.