Court Opinion

ID: 9725467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:48:48.34156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.425247
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand the decision of the trial court. The doctrine of parental immunity has been significantly narrowed in recent years. The majority decision runs contrary to that trend by applying the doctrine, for the first time, to foster parents. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 122, at 905 n.43 (5th ed. 1984). The majority concludes the foster parents here should be granted immunity because of the policy consideration favoring " 'the preservation of parental authority and discipline.’ ” 288 Ill. App. 3d at 513, quoting Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 92, 619 N.E.2d at 723. In my view, there is a significant difference between (many) foster parents on the one hand, and natural parents, adoptive parents, and stepparents on the other. As I argued in my dissent when this case first came before this court, that difference is permanency of relationship. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peoples Bank, 286 Ill. App. 3d 356, 362-66, 675 N.E.2d 1031, 1035-37 (1997) (Cook, J., dissenting). A foster parent is often only "a temporary way station on the road of a child’s life until the difficulties at home can be straightened out.” Johnson v. Burnett, 182 Ill. App. 3d 574, 582, 538 N.E.2d 892, 897 (1989). To some extent children are stuck with their natural parents, and perhaps it is best to bar some tort actions in the interest of the "preservation of parental authority and discipline.” Children are not stuck with their foster parents, however. If problems arise, new foster parents may be appointed. If Louise had survived this incident, would we really expect her to be returned to the care of the Augsburgers? The Augsburgers also had temporary custody of Louise’s brother, Sean, and that custody was terminated immediately after the incident. Preservation of parental authority and discipline is not a realistic concern in this case. Perhaps the majority’s concern is not with the particular parent-child relationship in this case, but with the effect of this case on future relationships. Will there be a "chilling effect” on future foster parents who attempt to discipline children placed in their care? The fact of the matter is that foster parents do not decide for themselves how parental authority should be exercised or discipline imposed. The discipline of foster children is already closely regulated by the DCFS. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code § 402.21 (1996) ("Discipline of Children”). The majority indicates that "the discouragement of fraud and collusion” (288 Ill. App. 3d at 515) is no longer recognized as a valid reason for a parental immunity rule. See 288 Ill. App. 3d at 515. To the extent that reason has any lingering validity, I would note there is no possibility of fraud or collusion in this case. Unlike natural parents, adoptive parents, or stepparents, there is no way that foster parents will receive any pecuniary benefit in a case like this. Louise was a ward of the court, and her financial affairs are under the control of the court, not the Augsburgers. The majority finds it significant that plaintiff did not allege willful and wanton misconduct, where parental immunity would not be a defense. 288 Ill. App. 3d at 516. There may be reasons why plaintiff did not allege the conduct was willful and wanton. Plaintiff has also filed an action regarding this incident in the Court of Claims against DCFS (95 Ill. Ct. Cl. 3757) and may be concerned that an allegation of willful and wanton misconduct in this case would hinder the prosecution of that case. I agree with the majority that this action is not barred by sovereign immunity.