Court Opinion

ID: 9679895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:12:32.590684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:23.157891
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
filed a concurring opinion.
“ ‘As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.’ ” Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 707 (Tex.1990) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, (1983) 2 All E.R. 72, 74). Texas courts seem to be the venue of choice. See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 690 & n. 2 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (noting the danger of Texas becoming the forum for all mass-tort lawsuits); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika, Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603, 639 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1994, writ granted) (affirming $29,000,000 judgment in a suit between *598Nevada, Georgia, and Minnesota corporations that involved no contacts with Texas). When a suit is brought against a party with no ties to Texas, it not only denies the non-forum defendant’s constitutional rights, but it also clogs our already-crowded dockets. Al-faro, 786 S.W.2d at 690 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting). Denying a defendant’s special appearance when the state clearly lacks personal jurisdiction is inherently harmful, both to the defendant and to our court system. Appeal is not an adequate remedy for such harm, and therefore mandamus relief is appropriate. I concur with the Court’s judgment that mandamus should issue in this case. I disagree with the Court’s opinion, however, because it retains the requirement that a relator challenging the denial of a special appearance by mandamus must make a specific showing of irreparable harm. Such proof is not necessary because the harm is inherent. Further, I would address the tension between our opinions in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.1994) (orig.proceeding) and National Industrial Sand Association v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding).
Unfortunately, in this era of complex mul-ti-party litigation, defendants must take a hard look at whether they can afford to defend a case regardless of the merits. One notorious example is a mass products-liability lawsuit pending in Morris County, in which it is claimed that the products of more that 300 defendants, including such items as paper clips, hand soap, marking pens, and metal tables, contributed to a “toxic cloud” that caused injury to more than 3,000 plaintiffs. See generally Able Supply Co. v. Moye, 898 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding); Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.1990) (orig.proeeeding); Hollandsworth, The Lawsuit from Hell, Tex. Monthly, June 1996, at 105, 141. Although the case had been pending for more than eight years, the plaintiffs had never been required to produce evidence or testimony linking their injuries to any of the defendants’ products. Able Supply, 898 S.W.2d at 769. Despite this lack of evidence, many defendants have felt compelled to settle for millions of dollars and cut their losses. By September 1994, nearly 200 defendants had settled for more than $66 million, and it is not clear that the case is any closer now to being tried than when it was filed. Hollandsworth, supra, at 145.
The burdens of this sort of litigation are exacerbated when, as in this case, the defendant has no contacts with the forum state. Such defendants face demands of travel and time that go beyond “mere increased cost and delay.” Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09. More important is the damage done to the defendants’ fundamental rights of due process under the state and federal constitutions. See State ex rel. Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407, 410 (1989) (per curiam) (noting that fundamental notions of fairness and due process prohibited suit against a defendant who had no known contacts with the forum state “other than to attempt, unsuccessfully so far, to extricate himself from being sued here”).
We have struggled with this issue, first in Canadian Helicopters, then in National Industrial Sand. In Canadian Helicopters, the Court denied mandamus relief to correct the special-appearance ruling in that case, but held that mandamus might be appropriate in some cases. The Court stated that mandamus might be available when the “trial court, in denying a special appearance, ... act[s] with such disregard for guiding principles of law that the harm to the defendant becomes irreparable, exceeding mere increased cost and delay.” Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09. The Court did not explain what that harm might be. In National Industrial Sand, we granted mandamus to correct a denial of a special appearance when the court clearly had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. National Indus. Sand, 897 S.W.2d at 776. Although the holdings in Canadian Helicopters and National Industrial Sand are superficially consistent, it is clear that the application of the law to the facts in the two opinions is not reconcilable. The defendant in Canadian Helicopters had no more contacts with Texas than the defendant' in National Industrial Sand. Thus, I would overrule Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992) (orig.proeeeding) and its progeny, including Canadian Helicopters, to the extent they hold that a foreign defendant *599■with no ties to Texas must make a separate showing of harm before mandamus will issue to correct an order denying a special appearance.