Court Opinion

ID: 9834107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:18:02.433082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.678781
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In illustrating the fact that no explanation of the agent Price’s failure to account for the premiums collected by him, we stated in our original opinion that—
“If in fact he (Price) became insolvent or because of some calamity was unable to make remittances between the time he collected the premiums and the time when, in accordance with his custom, he was required to make remittances, it is not shown by the agreed statement of facts.”
Appellant in its motion now says, among other things, that—
“As already stated, we think that counsel will agree with us that the whole case was tried and submitted to this court upon the theory-that Jack Price was insolvent. But for this fact, no reason appears why he did not pay, or could not be compelled to pay.”
And appellee, in reply to the’ motion for rehearing, says:
“We conclude that Jack Price was insolvent on the 30th day of September, 1922, and at all times since said date, and respectfully request this court to consider the motion for rehearing in the light of this admission.”
As stated in our original opinion, the case below was tried upon an agreed statement of facts in accordance with article 1949, Rev. Statutes. This article provides:
“The parties may in any case submit the matter in controversy between them to the court’ upon an agreed statement of facts made out and signed by them or their counsel, and filed with the clerk, upon which judgment shall be rendered as in other cases; and, in such case, the statement so agreed to and signed and certified by the court to be correct, and the judgment rendered thereon, shall constitute the record of the cause.”
And article 1607, Rev. Statutes, relating to proceedings in cases in the Courts of Civil Appeals, provides, among other things, that—
“In all case of appeal or writ of error to the courts of civil appeals, the trial shall be on a statement of facts or agreed statement of the pleadings and proof as agreed upon by the parties or their attorneys, or the conclusions of law and fact, as the case may be, certified to by the judge of the court below.”
The agreed statement upon which the case was tried below was certified by the court to be correct, as provided in article 1949, above, and pursuant to article 1607 we proceeded to dispose, of the eaáe upon that statement, and nowhere in the statement does it appear that Jack Price was insolvent at or during the time he failed to report his collections as he was required to do under 'his contract of agency, and it is conceded by appellant, as will be seen from the quotation from its motion above, that no fact, other than Price’s insolvency, appears “why he did not pay or could not be compelled to pay.”
 On original hearing, we disposed of this case upon the agreed statement, agreed to by counsel below and certified to by the trial judge in accordance with the requirements of the statutes above quoted, and we do not feel disposed to give weight to a fact not shown by such agreed statement and not certified by the trial judge as a basis for a reversal of the conclusion originally announced. But if it be conceded that this should now be done and that we should accept the admission of counsel for appellees that Price was insolvent, we nevertheless think this fact of itself would constitute no defense. While the agreed statement of facts shows that it was Price’s habit to deposit in the bank premiums collected for his principal in his own name, it nowhere appears that this was done with the knowledge of his principal. His contract provided that he should make remittances of his premiums within at least 90 days from his collection, and this privilege, permitted doubtless as a matter of convenience, by no means authorizes the conclusion that Price had the right to mingle and use the moneys of his principal with those of his own. Had it appeared that Price upon his collection of the premiums for his principal had deposited them in the name of the principal and that the moneys had been lost by robbery, or failure of the bank, or by some vis., major, then indeed it might be said that his failure to account for the premiums would not constitute fraud or dishonesty within the meaning of appellant’s guaranty. But as trustee, as we think was his true relation to his principal, it was his duty upon the collection of premiums to hold them for his principal and no one else, and to make remittances thereof as provided in his contract, and if in violation of such duty he undertook to mingle such funds with his own and use them for purposes of his own, he did so’ assuming the hazard of his insolvency, and cannot now be heard to say that he is excused on that ground. See Insurance Co. v. Gloge, 229 F. 327, 143 C. C. A. 446, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 416.
The cases of Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 128 Tenn. 70, 157 S. W. 416, by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Williams v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 105 Md. 490, 66 A. 495, Monongahela Coal Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 94 F. 732, 36 C. C. A. 444, and Sinclair & Co. v. National Sure*1066ty Co., 132 Iowa, 549, 107 N. W. 184, cited in behalf of appellant, we think are distinguishable from this case. In the first three cases referred to, the warranty was against “larceny” or “embezzlement” of an employee, which is distinguishable in the authorities from “fraud” or “dishonesty,” covered by the guaranty in this case, while the case last referred to was disposed of, among other things, on the ground of an erroneous charge.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.