Court Opinion

ID: 9809916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:33:06.597612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:10.245742
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
dissenting: This is the first case, I believe, where a justice of the peace has been held to have jurisdiction of an action for the recovery of damages for a tort which did not consist in a direct injury to property. My own opinion is, and always has been, that it was never intended by the Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 27, to confer jurisdiction in actions not ex contractu, except for the recovery of specific property or, at most, for the recovery of damages to property not exceeding the value of fifty dollars. Jurisdiction of the justice could only be vested by express provision of the Constitution, or by legislative grant given in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 27, provides that “The several justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction, under such regulations as the General Assembly shall prescribe, of civil actions founded on contract, wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed $200, and wherein the title to real estate shall not be in controversy; and of all criminal matters arising within their counties wherein the punishment cannot exceed a fine of $50 or imprisonment for thirty days. And the General Assembly *469may give to justices of the peace jurisdiction, of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50.” The Constitution does not in terms confer jurisdiction upon justices to try actions for damages arising from torts, and it limits the power of the General Assembly in conferring jurisdiction to those cases wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50. In Malloy v. Fayetteville, 122 N. C., 480, it was held that a justice of the peace has jurisdiction of an action for damages not exceeding $50 for injury to personal property, though such property be of greater value than $50; but this was held by a bare majority of the Court, and, with all respect, I submit, against the correct interpretation of the Constitution.
Unless sec. 27 of Art. IY is a restriction upon the legislative power to confer jurisdiction upon justices of the peace, then there is no restriction upon the legislative will in this direction, and jurisdiction may be conferred upon them in any amount and covering every variety of action.
Art. IY, sec. 12, which is cited in the opinion in Malloy v. Fayetteville, in support of the decision in the case, concludes with the sentence, “so far as the same may be done without conflict with other provisions of this Constitution.” Any allotment of other jurisdiction than that mentioned in see. 27 is certainly in conflict with that section. The enumeration of powers which may be exercised is always held to exclude the exercise of other powers not enumerated. When the Constitution says, “and the General Assembly may give, to justices of the peace jurisdiction of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50,” it is manifest that the meaning would not be added to it if it had said further, “it shall confer no further or other jurisdiction.” If sec. 12 of Art. IY authorizes an allotment of jurisdiction not mentioned in see. 27, why would it not be competent for the Legislature to increase the juris*470diction in actions founded on contract to any amount it pleases beyond $200 ? Why would it not also be competent for tbe Legislature to give to justices of the peace jurisdiction in criminal matters without the limitation of punishment ? Section 27 does not expressly forbid the Legislature to confer'jurisdiction beyond $200 in civil suits nor in criminal matters where the punishment exceeds a fine of $50 or imprisonment for thirty days. It simply says that justices shall have jurisdiction up to that limit, but certainly does not say that they shall not have jurisdiction beyond that limit.
■ It is true that there are a number of cases having their origin before justices of the peace which .were brought to recover damages for injury to personal property and which came to this Court and were upheld before the case of Malloy v. Fayetteville was decided; but not in a single one of those cases was the question of the constitutional power to confer jurisdiction raised. It appears for the first time in Malloy v. Fayetteville, and the authority of that case is greatly weakened by the force of the two dissenting opinions. Even if the Legislature could confer the jurisdiction on a justice of the peace of an action for the recovery of damages for injury to personal property, it appears to me that it has not done so.
Section 1420 of the Revisal of 1905 provides: “Justices of the peace shall have concurrent jurisdiction of civil actions not founded on contract, wherein the.value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50.” This section is in exact harmony with sec. 27 of Art. IY of the Constitution, and in express terms confers the jurisdiction which the Constitution permitted the Legislature to confer.
The section relied on in the opinion of the Court in Malloy v. Fayetteville is now sec. 1476 of the Revisal of 1905, and reads as follows: “All actions in a court of justice of the peace for the recovery of damages to real estáte, or for the *471conversion of personal property, or any injury thereto, sliall be commenced and prosecuted to judgment under the same rules of procedure as provided in civil actions in a justice’s court.” This section assumes the existence of the jurisdiction of the justice in such cases, and merely provides rules for the conduct of the trials, but it does not confer jurisdiction. It is significant that sec. 1420 appears in the Kevisal under subdivision III, chap. 27, entitled “Civil Jurisdiction,” while sec. 1476 appears under subdivision VII, chap. 27, entitled “Eules of Procedure.” Section 1420, conferring the jurisdiction which the Constitution says the Legislature may confer,, limits that jurisdiction to cases wherein the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $50. Section 1476 places no limitation upon the jurisdiction. If sec. 14-76 does confer jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to hear and determine cases involving injury to personal property, to what amount is their jurisdiction limited ? The Court in Malloy v. Fayetteville assumes that the amount is limited to $50; but why to $50? Section 1476 mates no limitation. It simply lays down the rule of procedure, which is certainly not the same thing as jurisdiction, and that rule of procedure is to be the same as provided in civil actions in the justice’s court. Now there are two kinds of civil actions in the justice’s court: one founded on contract, wherein the jurisdiction is limited to $200, and one founded on tort, wherein the jurisdiction is limited to $50. Which shall he the limitation here, and what did the Legislature mean ? It seems clean to me that the Legislature, even if it had the power, has not conferred upon justices of the peace jurisdiction in matters of this sort. When the Constitution established the courts of justices of the peace, it fixed their jurisdiction, and when it conferred upon the Legislature the authority to add to that jurisdiction, it in express terms states in what particular it may add to it. But whether or *472not jurisdiction is conferred in cases of tort for injury to property, and is not confined to tbe recovery of specific property, an action, such as this one, is certainly one of the first impression. The Convention could not have intended to grant such jurisdiction in all cases of wrongs, whether to property, person or character, and without regard to their nature, by the mere use of the word “property,” which has a well-defined meaning, when used in the Constitution in connection with the subject to which it relates.
In Malloy v. Fayetteville, it appears, at p. 483, that the present Chief Justice, who there spoke for the Court, evidently thought there was a clear distinction between the word “property,” as used in the Constitution, and- the word “damages,” or the right to recover them, and he places the decision of the Court upon the ground that the right to recover “damages” as distinguished from “property” is conferred, and conferred only, by Art. IY, sec. 12, of the Constitution, which provides that the portion of power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to this Court may be allotted and distributed by the Legislature among the other courts created by that instrument or which may be established by law, in such manner as it may deem best, and that the Legislature has actually given the jurisdiction under this section by passing what is now sec. 1476 of the Revisad
But it has been shown, it seems to me, that no such jurisdiction was conferred by that enactment (Revisal, sec. 1476) or intended to be conferred by the Constitution, Art IY, sec. 12. But there is more to be said: When conferring jurisdiction of non-residents upon courts a sharp distinction has always been drawn between the word “property” and the term “subject-matter” of the action. The latter term signifies the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. It relates to the right to prosecute the particular suit and to obtain the relief demanded; while the word *473“property” is used in quite a different sense as denoting something tangible, or at least something which may be subjected to the process of the Court, as in the case of attachment dr garnishment. It is the res and not the mere right in the particular action to sue for damages. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U. S., 308; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714; Foltz v. Railroad, 19 U. S. App., 581; Hall v. Hall, 12 W. Va., 15. When we refer to the constitutional protection over property or the right of a married woman to acquire and own property in her own right, as her separate estate, or to the subjects of taxation — and perhaps there are some other instances — we may very well say that the word “property” as there used should be considered a nomen general-issimum and should embrace within its meaning everything owned and possessed, whether tangible or intangible, for that is the manifest purpose. This meaning is given to the word in order to comply with the evident intent, as ascertained from the context, and the necessity arising out of the particular nature of the law being construed. Cases referring to such a use of the word are not, therefore, in point. It would seem that my view is supported by the case of Smith v. Campbell, 10 N. C., 590, where the Court gave a restricted meaning to the word “property” when construing a clause of the Constitution in respect to the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. See also Pippin v. Ellison, 34 N. C., 61. When the word was used in the Constitution it was meant to refer to the thing for the recovery of which the action is brought, and not to the right to bring the action to recover that thing. It is the value of the former, and not of the latter, that determines the jurisdiction, and it can make no difference whether the thing to be recovered is personal property in possession or a chose in action. If either is the thing sought to be recovered, or the value of it, if there has been a conversion, it is the “property in controversy.” The divis*474ion of property into real and personal and- of the latter into property in possession and in action can have no material bearing’ on this case,. and will tend, I think, more to obscure than to elucidate the real question involved. The framers of the Constitution evidently meant that the thing for the recovery of which, or of damages for its conversion, the suit is brought, should be considered as the property in controversy. This is the natural and, it seems to me, the only meaning they could have intended to express. If it is not, it logically follows from the decision in this case that a justice will have the power to try all kinds of tort's, such as libel, slander, seduction and the many others known to the law. It cannot be that it was intended to confer such an extensive jurisdiction.
CoNNOR, T., concurs-in the.dissenting opinion.