Court Opinion

ID: 9459562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:24:04.693144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:13.106622
License: Public Domain

MATTHES, Chief Judge
(concurring in part — dissenting in part).
The rejection of appellant’s contentions of error set forth in the margin of the majority opinion, footnote 1, has my full approval.
But, for reasons stated below, I respectfully disagree with the holding that the district judge impermissibly commented upon the evidence in his charge to the jury, and I therefore dissent from the reversal and remand.
We are considering an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a protracted jury trial which commenced on February 11, 1971, and terminated by the return of verdicts on March 3, 1971. This ease is typical of many prosecutions for violating the mail fraud statute, in that the scheme and artifice to defraud was so designed as to require the manipulation and juggling of the bank accounts, certain assets and the records of the two companies involved, namely, Midwest Mutual and Gibraltar Management Company. This manipulation over a span of more than four years placed the Government in the position where it was required to introduce into evidence voluminous documents and the testimony of many witnesses in order to sustain and carry the burden of proving the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There were 18 Government witnesses and three testified on behalf of the appellant (appellant did not testify). In this setting, the court’s charge was, of necessity, quite lengthy. It required 43 typewritten pages of the trial transcript to reproduce the court’s charge.
From this brief background, we turn to the question in controversy.
We need cite no authority for the settled principle that the charge must be viewed and considered in its entirety and as a whole. It is also a cardinal principle of federal jurisdiction that the trial judge in a criminal case is more than a mere moderator. He is charged with the heavy responsibility of so conducting the trial that justice is rendered. To that end, the judge may assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence and by expressing his opinion upon the facts, provided, of course, he makes it clear that all factual questions are left to the jury for determination.
*840Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
“In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts; and the expression of such an opinion, when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the determination of the jury, cannot be reviewed on writ of error.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553, 7 S.Ct. 1, 2, 30 L.Ed. 257 (1886), cited with approval in Ray v. United States, 367 F.2d 258, 262 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 863, 17 L.Ed.2d 785 (1967). This principle was adhered to by the Supreme Court in Quercia v. United States. 289 U.S. 466, 469, 53 S. Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933), and again in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394, 54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933). Cases decided by the federal courts of appeals standing for the same principle are legion. It is sufficient for the purpose of this dissent to cite only Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621, 55 S.Ct. 216, 79 L.Ed. 708 (1934), and Franano v. United States, 310 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 940, 83 S.Ct. 1545, 10 L.Ed.2d 694 (1963).
In the Franano case, which I authored on behalf of a unanimous court, I delineated the function of a trial judge in presiding over a criminal case and cited many authorities to support my conclusions. I adhere to everything written in the Franano opinion, and would pursue the same course in disposing of this appeal.
In the final analysis, as I see the situation, every case must rest upon its own bottom. I find no quarrel with the proposition that a trial judge should exercise care and discretion in expressing an opinion and should never identify his position so as to appear partial. In brief, and to the point, if a judge deems it desirable for the sake of achieving a just result to comment upon the evidence solely for the purpose of aiding and guiding the jury in arriving at a just and fair verdict he is privileged to do so; but he must be careful not to intrude upon the province of the jury to make an unfettered and uninfluenced determination of fact matters submitted for their consideration.
The comments which the majority condemns here are quite different in my view than the charge that was found fatally defective in Quercia v. United States, supra and United States v. Murdock, supra. In Quercia, the court stated:
“ ‘And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant’s testimony. You may have noticed, Mr. Foreman [of the jury] and gentlemen, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we don’t know, but that is the fact. I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government’s testimony, was. a lie.’ ”
289 U.S. at 468, 53 S.Ct. at 698. In Murdock, the condemned charge was submitted in this language:
“The court feels from the evidence in this case that the Government has sustained the burden cast upon it by the law and has proved that this defendant is guilty in manner and form as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
290 U.S. at 393, 54 S.Ct. at 225.
In Hartzell v. United States, supra, the trial judge gave this instruction:
“Now, with that caution I will say to you, gentlemen, that I have listened *841to all this evidence as intently as you have I think, and in the opinion of the court the government has established the facts which ought to convince reasonable men beyond a reasonable doubt, and taking the evidence as a whole I think the government has established the allegations of these several counts that remain in the indictment.”
72 F.2d at 586.
It seems to me that the Hartzell instruction was far more poisonous than that portion of Chief Judge Becker’s comments which the majority condemns as impermissible and prejudicial. Yet, in the Hartzell case, also involving a mail fraud prosecution, this court held that the court’s comment was not prejudicial.
After careful consideration of Judge Becker’s charge in its entirety I have reached the conclusion that Judge Becker’s assailed comments were not so impermissible as to constitute prejudicial error. At the outset of Judge Becker’s charge, he informed the jury of the presumption of innocence and that it was necessary for the Government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact no less than four times was the jury told that before they could convict, the Government was required to produce evidence which convinced the jury the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Nowhere in the instructions, including the comments which are complained of, did Judge Becker even remotely suggest that he felt that the Government had proved the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and he cautioned the jury to decide the case on the basis of the evidence.
As I view this record, there was negligible conflict in the evidence concerning three of the devices, commented upon by the judge, which were successfully used by the appellant in perpetrating the fraudulent scheme which eventually resulted in the financial collapse of the companies involved: (1) the check kiting procedure; (2) the improper and unlawful pledging of the United States Treasury bills owned by Midwest to secure Gibraltar loans; and (3) the diversion of a substantial amount of premium remittances (between $50,000 and $127,000) for the purpose of deceiving the Missouri Division of Insurance. Since the matters were proved beyond doubt, I am not willing to fault the judge for telling the jury that they were.
Certainly, I recognize the appellant was entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect one. I am convinced that the able and seasoned trial judge exercised restraint and caution throughout the trial and in submitting the case to the jury. The evidence of guilt was strong and convincing. Consequently, I cannot bring myself to believe that Judge Becker’s comments, which are the sole ground for sending the case back for another long trial, improperly influenced the jury. I would affirm.