Court Opinion

ID: 9899875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:04.970211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.985014
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 (unmodified opn. attached)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION TWO

 TAK CHUN GAMING                            B317918
 PROMOTION COMPANY
 LIMITED,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                            Super. Ct. No.
        Plaintiff and Appellant,            21BBCV00094)

        v.                                  ORDER MODIFYING
                                            OPINION AND DENYING
 KEVIN C.S. LONG,                           REHEARING

      Defendant and                         NO CHANGE IN THE
 Respondent.                                JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 26, 2023, be
       modified as follows:

   1. On page 11, in lines 5 and 6 of footnote 4, delete the phrase
      “Tak Chun distastefully implies” and replace it with the
      phrase “Tak Chun’s comparison could be read to
      distastefully imply” so the full footnote reads as follows:

            4      Tak Chun’s comparison to our Supreme Court’s
            decision in In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th
            757 is ill conceived, for this decision was an
            acknowledgment that persons of different sexual
            orientations are entitled to the equal protection of the
            law authorizing marriage rather than, as Tak Chun’s
            comparison could be read to distastefully imply, an
            illustration of a “substantial shift of public
            acceptance or morality” in California.

                           *     *      *

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

——————————————————————————————
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J. KWAN, J.*

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

                                 2
Filed 10/26/23 (unmodified version)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION TWO

 TAK CHUN GAMING                        B317918
 PROMOTION COMPANY
 LIMITED,                               (Los Angeles County
                                        Super. Ct. No.
        Plaintiff and Appellant,        21BBCV00094)

        v.

 KEVIN C.S. LONG,

      Defendant and
 Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John J. Kralik, Judge. Affirmed.

      Greenan, Peffer, Sallander & Lally, John P. Makin, Nelson
S. Hsieh, and Helen H. Chen for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg
& Rhow, Thomas R. Freeman, Ekwan E. Rhow, and Kimmy Yu
for Defendant and Respondent.
                              ******
       During our state’s infancy, our Legislature declared “[t]he
common law of England” to be “the [default] rule of decision in all
the courts of this State.” (Civ. Code, § 22.2; see also former Pol.
Code, § 4468; Merritt v. Hill (1894) 104 Cal.184, 185.) In so
doing, our state imported the English common law rule that
prohibits resort to the courts to enforce gambling debts. (E.g.,
Bryant v. Mead (1851) 1 Cal. 441, 442-443 (Bryant).) In the
intervening 173 years, our state has legalized many discrete
types of gambling. Does this shift to a selective and partial
legalization of gambling warrant the abandonment of the
common law rule shuttering the California courts to lawsuits
seeking to enforce gambling debts? We hold that it does not. The
public policy basis for not legalizing gambling and the public
policy basis for not providing a judicial forum to enforce gambling
debts are distinct; erosion of the former does not call the latter
into question. We consequently agree with the trial court that
the lawsuit in this case seeking to enforce a gambling debt was
properly dismissed. Thus, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts
       Kevin C.S. Long (Long) resides in Arcadia, California, and
holds a Chinese resident identification card. In 2019, Long made
several trips to Macau, which is an autonomous region on the
south coast of China.1 Gambling is legal in Macau.
       While in Macau, Long entered into seven loan agreements
with Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited (Tak
Chun)—one in January 2019, five in September 2019, and one in

1   Macau is officially known as the Macao Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.

                                 2
November 2019. Tak Chun is a licensed junket operator that
owns and operates gaming clubs inside Macanese casinos; among
other things, Tak Chun loans funds to gamblers. The agreements
obligated Long to repay the loaned amounts within 30 or 45 days,
or face an interest rate at “five times the amount stipulated by
law” in Macau. The agreements did not contain a forum selection
clause.
      Tak Chun loaned Long “casino tokens” worth a total of $88
million in Hong Kong currency (that is, over US$11 million);
Long repaid only HK$13,668,680 (that is, around US$1.7
million).
II.   Procedural Background
      On February 1, 2021, Tak Chun sued Long in a California
state court seeking HK$74,331,320 (that is, US$9,904,787) under
causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit,
and (3) common counts.
      Long moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
the lawsuit was barred by California’s public policy against
allowing the California courts to be used as a forum for enforcing
gambling debts, even when the gambling giving rise to those
debts was lawful where it occurred.2 Tak Chun opposed, urging
that this public policy was now outdated. After further briefing
and a hearing, the trial court granted Long’s motion.
      The court acknowledged that California’s legalization of
certain pockets of gambling had “undoubtedly reduced the
integrity and moral force” of California’s public policy against
gambling, but ruled that the prohibition on using California’s

2     Prior to Long’s filing of this motion, the parties litigated
Tak Chun’s application for a writ of attachment against Long’s
assets, which the trial court denied.

                                  3
courts as a forum to collect gambling debts had been a “clear[]
and consistent[]” policy for “hundreds of years.” As for Long
specifically, the court noted that he was “headed down the road to
perdition,” yet Tak Chun continued “giving him more help along
the way again and again and again.” The court concluded that
“California[’s] public policy” “strongly disfavor[ing]” the
“enforcement of gambling debts” barred Tak Chun’s claims.
       Following the entry of judgment for Long, Tak Chun filed
this timely appeal.
                              DISCUSSION
       Tak Chun argues that the trial court erred in granting
judgment on the pleadings.
       A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate
when the operative complaint “does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds.
(c)(1)(B)(ii) & (c)(3)(B)(ii).) A motion brought on this basis is
equivalent to a demurrer (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777), such that our
task is to examine the complaint’s allegations and any judicially
noticed documents in order to assess whether the pled causes of
action are legally viable (ibid.; Barajas v. Sativa L.A. County
Water Dist. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1224 (Barajas)). A cause
of action is not viable if, as pertinent here, it offends public policy.
(Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U.S. 498, 506 [“It is ‘rudimentary’
that a state ‘will not lend the aid of its courts to enforce a
contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would be
repugnant to good morals . . . or . . . violate the public policy of
the State where the enforcement of the foreign contract is
sought’”].) As to contract claims specifically, although public
policy encourages the making of contracts, the courts will decline

                                   4
to enforce a contract if it violates “‘“‘sound public policy.’”’”
(Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 171, 184.)
       We independently evaluate whether the trial court properly
granted judgment on the pleadings.3 (Barajas, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 1224.) We also independently review any
subsidiary questions of law, including whether enforcement of a
contract in the California courts is contrary to public policy.
(Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 832, 838.)
I.     California’s Public Policy Against the Enforcement
of Gambling Debts
       Although Tak Chun’s complaint alleges three causes of
action, all seek to enforce the gambling debts Long incurred in
Macau. Thus, the legal viability of Tak Chun’s claims turns on
whether California provides a judicial forum for their
adjudication.
       It does not.
       In 1850, our Legislature enacted a statute declaring that
“[t]he common law of England . . . is the rule of decision in all the

3      Our review of a judgment on the pleadings ordinarily
includes a second step—that is, whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend. (Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 24, 31-32.) We
need not reach that issue because Tak Chun conceded in the trial
court that any amendment “would not be useful” to this “issue of
law” and because Tak Chun has not asked this court to grant
leave to amend. (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016)
62 Cal.4th 919, 924 [leave to amend properly denied where cause
of action is legally invalid and cannot be cured by additional
allegations]; Starlight Cinemas, at p. 32 [appellant has burden of
proving an amendment would cure legal defect].)

                                 5
courts of this State” unless “repugnant to or inconsistent with”
federal or state constitutional law or state statutes. (Civ. Code, §
22.2; former Pol. Code, § 4468; Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills
Gateway, L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12, 21 [“Since the beginning
of California’s statehood, the common law of England has been
the law of the state except where it conflicts with the United
States Constitution or other California law”].) Through this
statute, California imported not only the “whole” “‘body of judge-
made,’” decisional law of the English courts, but also “the written
statutes enacted by Parliament.” (Martin v. Superior Court
(1917) 176 Cal. 289, 292-293 (Martin); People v. Williams (2013)
57 Cal.4th 776, 782; Moore v. Purse Seine Net (1941) 18 Cal.2d
835, 838-839; Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home (1914)
167 Cal. 570, 573-574; but see In re Estate of Fair (1901) 132 Cal.
523, 534 [excluding “‘English statutes’” from definition of
“‘common law’”], overruled by Martin, at pp. 292-293.) Among
the enactments of Parliament adopted as California common law
was the Statute of Anne, which declared all gambling debts
“utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and
purposes whatsoever.” (9 Anne, ch. 14, § 1.)
       On this basis, our Supreme Court has issued a long line of
unbroken decisions “traced back virtually to the inception of
statehood,” declaring the California courts off limits when it
comes to enforcing gambling debts. (Kelly v. First Astri Corp.
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 462, 477 (Kelly); Bryant, supra, 1 Cal. at
pp. 442-443; Carrier v. Brannan (1853) 3 Cal. 328, 329 (Carrier).)
With one exception, the intermediate appellate courts have all
uniformly toed that line. (Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs (1968) 266
Cal.App.2d 61, 64-65; Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1821, 1824 (Metropolitan); Kelly, at p. 477;

                                 6
Kyablue v. Watkins (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294 (Kyablue);
but see Crockford’s Club Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
1402, 1406 (Crockford’s Club).)
       Adhering to this line of precedent, the trial court properly
dismissed Tak Chun’s complaint because it seeks to use the
California courts to enforce Long’s gambling debts.
II.    Tak Chun’s Arguments
       Tak Chun offers what boil down to three reasons why we
should take the common law of our state in a new direction and
depart from this precedent.
       A.    The “loosening morality” argument
       First and chiefly, Tak Chun makes a “times have changed”
argument. It observes that, over the last several decades,
California has legalized gambling in four discrete areas—namely,
(1) pari-mutuel horse racing (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19400 et seq.);
(2) the California State Lottery (Cal. Const., art IV, § 19, subd.
(d); Gov. Code, § 8880 et seq.); (3) draw poker clubs and similar
card games (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19800 et seq.); and, although it
springs from a federal mandate, (4) gambling on tribal land
pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721). From this receptivity to legalize
gambling in certain circumstances, Tak Chun extrapolates that it
“defies facts and logic” to believe that there remains any “moral”
justification for shuttering the California courts to claims seeking
to collect gambling debts.
       To be sure, California’s public policy against gambling has
“wan[ed]” and “eroded” somewhat as our state’s initial and more
sweeping prohibition against gambling—as embodied in prior
iterations of the California Constitution and Penal Code section
330—has given way to the legalization of discrete types of

                                 7
gambling. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19 [authorizing certain types of
gambling but prohibiting Legislature from “authoriz[ing] . . .
casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New
Jersey”]; Pen. Code, § 330 [enumerating gambling in many
instances as a misdemeanor]; see Kyablue, supra, 210
Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [noting “waning public policy against
gambling in general”]; Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p.
1828 [noting how “California’s historical public policy against
gambling has been substantially eroded”]; Crockford’s Club,
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1406 [noting “expanded acceptance of
gambling in this state”]; Nevcal Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-Neva
Lodge, Inc. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 177, 180 (Nevcal) [noting how
“modern day[] Californians” are no longer “too pious” about
“gambling”].) What was once a mostly impermeable wall against
gambling is undoubtedly more porous.
       But there are three reasons why this shift in public
attitude toward some types of gambling does not erode the public
policy against opening the California courts to the litigation of
gambling debts.
       First, the public policy that justifies keeping litigation over
gambling debts out of the California courts is independent of—
and hence not inextricably dependent upon—the public policy
prohibiting gambling. (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p.
1828 [noting the “critical distinction” between those two
policies].)
       Originally, the public policy against litigating gambling
debts in the California courts was grounded in two rationales—
namely, (1) that gambling itself was immoral and unlawful, such
that the courts should not open their doors to vindicate rights
grounded in immoral or unlawful contracts (Bryant, supra, 1 Cal.

                                  8
at pp. 442-443; Carrier, supra, 3 Cal. at p. 329; Union Collection
Co. v. Buckman (1907) 150 Cal. 159, 162, 164; Wong v. Tenneco,
Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 126, 135 (Wong); Lee On v. Long (1951) 37
Cal.2d 499, 502; Braverman v. Horn (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 379,
381; Lavick v. Nitzberg (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 381, 383; Fong v.
Miller (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 411, 413 (Fong); Tokar v. Redman
(1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 350, 353; Homami v. Iranzadi (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1104, 1109-1110; Kyablue, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1292; see generally, Civ. Code, §§ 1667 [contract is “not lawful”
if it is “contrary to good morals”], 1607 [“consideration of a
contract must be lawful”]); and (2) that closing the courts to
litigation over gambling debts “discourage[s]” the creation of such
debts, which is good for public policy because gambling—whether
unlawful or lawful—leads to the “ruin of [the gamblers’]
families,” and courts should not “‘become a handmaid of [such]
iniquity,’” for doing so would be “humiliating to the Courts”
(Takeuchi v. Schmuck (1929) 206 Cal. 782, 786-787; Bryant, at p.
442; Wallace v. Opinham (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 25, 28; Carrier, at
p. 329; Homami, at pp. 1111-1113; Metropolitan, supra, 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 1829).
        Critically, however, either of these two rationales is
sufficient on its own to support the public policy of denying a
judicial forum in California for adjudicating gambling debts.
This is why, from the very beginning, “California’s public policy
against judicial resolution of civil claims arising out of gambling
contracts or transactions” has “applie[d] to all forms of gambling,
whether legal or illegal.” (Kelly, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 490,
480, italics added; Bryant, supra, 1 Cal. at p. 444 [noting that
legality of gambling by holding a license would not “confer[] a
right to sue for a gaming debt”]; Hamilton v. Abadjian (1947) 30

                                 9
Cal.2d 49, 51-52 (Hamilton) [refusing to adjudicate gambling debt
incurred in Nevada, where gambling is legal].) And it is why the
“substantial[] ero[sion]” of the “public policy against” gambling
has not eroded “California’s deep-rooted policy against [the]
enforcement of gambling debts.” (Metropolitan, supra, 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 1828.) Other jurisdictions have reached similar
conclusions. (Accord, King International Corp. v. Voloshin
(Conn.Super.Ct. 1976) 366 A.2d 1172, 1174-1175; Carnival
Leisure Indus. v. Aubin (5th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 624, 626; Cie v.
Comdata Network (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) 656 N.E.2d 123, 128.)
      The only California case to disagree with this otherwise
unbroken line of precedent is Crockford’s Club, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d 1402. Crockford’s Club held that the “expanded
acceptance of gambling” in California justified opening the
California courts for adjudicating a claim to enforce an English
default judgment based on a casino gambling debt incurred in
England, where the gambling was legal. (Id. at p. 1406.)
Crockford’s Club is an outlier in that it is the only decision to
conflate the public policy against gambling with the public policy
against using the California courts as a forum for enforcing
gambling debts; tellingly, its three-paragraph analysis of this
issue did not cite—let alone distinguish—Hamilton or any of its
progeny (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1828 [so
observing]), choosing instead to cite a single out-of-state case
applying that state’s different public policy. Not surprisingly,
every court to subsequently consider the issue has rejected
Crockford’s Club. (Ibid.; Kelly, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 485-
488.) We join that chorus.
      Second, the premise of Tak Chun’s argument—that
California has legalized gambling—is overstated. California did

                               10
not flip a switch from “all gambling is illegal” to “all gambling is
legal.” Instead, California has maintained its longstanding
presumptive constitutional and statutory rules against gambling,
but has expanded the types of gambling for which that
presumption has been rebutted. But California has not fully
embraced the legalization of all gambling. Just last year, for
instance, the California voters rejected two ballot propositions
that would have legalized in-person gambling on tribal lands and
online sports betting. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Election
(Nov. 8, 2022), text of Prop. 26, archived at
<https://perma.cc/RB66-XEQY> [as of Oct. 23, 2023]; Voter
Information Guide, Gen. Election (Nov. 8, 2022), text of Prop. 27,
archived at <https://perma.cc/69PA-3ZDG> [as of Oct. 23, 2023].)
Contrary to what Tak Chun implies, California has not become
Sodom and Gomorrah.4
       Third, our Legislature has at no point expressed an intent
to deviate from the common law rule barring resort to the
California courts to enforce gambling debts. To be sure, our
Legislature has the power to alter the common law. (People v.
Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 479; Lowman v. Stafford (1964)
226 Cal.App.2d 31, 39.) But it must exercise that power—either
by an express repeal of the common law or by a “plain[]
declaration of legislative intent” that necessarily (but implicitly)
repeals the common law. (Saala v. McFarland (1965) 63 Cal.2d

4     Tak Chun’s comparison to our Supreme Court’s decision in
In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 is ill conceived, for
this decision was an acknowledgment that persons of different
sexual orientations are entitled to the equal protection of the law
authorizing marriage rather than, as Tak Chun distastefully
implies, an illustration of a “substantial shift of public acceptance
or morality” in California.

                                 11
124, 130 [“‘“Statutes are not presumed to alter the common law
otherwise than the act expressly provides”’”]; Martin, supra, 176
Cal. at pp. 296-297; Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 245, 258.) Absent such an exercise,5 we must
presume our Legislature and the voters were aware of the
preexisting common law rule against use of the courts to
adjudicate gambling debts at the time they added new islands of
legalized gambling amid an ocean of its presumptive illegality,
and by not countermanding that rule—either expressly or
implicitly—they thereby opted to leave the common law rule in
place. (Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 503; People v. Giordano (2007) 42
Cal.4th 644, 659.) Tak Chun’s subsidiary argument that we must
infer an intent to alter the common law rule from legislative or
voter silence accordingly has it backwards. Indeed, Nevada’s
common law rule against resort to its courts to enforce gambling
debts persisted despite that state’s legalization of gambling until
the Nevada Legislature enacted a statute that expressly
overturned its common law rule. (Compare West Indies, Inc. v.
First Nat. Bank of Nevada (Nev. 1950) 214 P.2d 144 [adopting
Statute of Anne into Nevada’s common law] with Nev. Rev. Stat.

5      At oral argument, Tak Chun pointed us to a regulation
authorizing “cardroom business[es]” to “extend credit” to their
patrons. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 4, § 12388, subd. (a).) But this
regulation does not purport to authorize enforcement in court of
any resulting debts. Indeed, the regulation’s very existence—and
its self-imposed limitation that it does not apply if extending
credit is otherwise “prohibited by any statute, law, regulation, or
local ordinance” (ibid.)—reaffirms that our Legislature has not
overturned the longstanding common law rule against the
enforcement of gambling debts in California courts.

                                12
Ann. § 463.368 (1983) [statute altering common law rule and
allowing for the enforcement of gambling debts in Nevada
courts].) California has yet to do that. (Kelly, supra, 72
Cal.App.4th at p. 489 [“The Legislature has not enacted a statute
permitting the use of the process of the courts in California to
resolve” gambling-related claims].)
      B.      The “weighing” argument
      Second, Tak Chun argues that the common law rule
declaring the California courts off limits to disputes over
gambling debts does not erect an absolute barrier; rather, it
obligates courts to make a case-by-case determination of whether
to grant access to the courts after weighing a variety of factors,
including (1) the “relative moral fault of the plaintiff and the
defendant,” (2) “whether refusing a remedy can protect the
public,” (3) “the degree of moral turpitude involved,” and (4)
“whether application of the [common law] rule will result in the
unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff.” (Kyablue, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.) For
support, Tak Chun cites Kyablue as well as Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi
Corp. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 199, 218-219, Kelton v. Stravinski (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 941, 949, and Southfield v. Barrett (1970) 13
Cal.App.3d 290, 294. (See also Fong, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d at p.
413.)
      This argument mixes apples and oranges. The cases Tak
Chun cites all address whether a court, after invalidating a
contract on public policy grounds, should nonetheless grant some
type of equitable relief despite the absence of a contract. This is
irrelevant to this case, as the invocation of California’s public
policy against enforcing gambling debts does not invalidate any of
the loan agreements between Tak Chun and Long; instead, we

                                13
hold that those contracts may not be enforced in this forum. Tak
Chun remains free to attempt to enforce them in a different
forum, and Tak Chun’s decision not to have insisted that Long
agree in those contracts to litigate disputes arising therefrom in a
particular forum lies with Tak Chun and Tak Chun alone. There
is no support in the case law to let California courts decide—on a
case-by-case basis—whether to lift the denial of access after
weighing various factors. Indeed, such a case-by-case weighing
process would significantly undercut the efficacy of the across-
the-board ban California has adopted by leaving it to individual
judges to decide whether to apply the ban; the exception would
swallow the rule, and quite likely force our courts into the role of
“handmaid[s] to iniquity.”
       C.      The “change the common law” argument
       Third and lastly, Tak Chun urges us to exercise our
authority as a common law court, and reject the common law rule
in favor of the outlier decision in Crockford’s Club, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d 1402.
       To be sure, the common law of California is meant to be
“‘flexib[le].’” (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d
382, 393-394.) Thus, we as a court have the ability to “modify[] . .
. the common law” (Schmier v. Supreme Court (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 703, 709), and even have a duty to modify the
common law “‘[w]henever an old rule is found unsuited to present
conditions or unsound’” (Rodriguez, at p. 394). We accordingly
reject Long’s contention that our Legislature’s use of a statute in
1850 to cut and paste English common law into California
somehow transmogrified and elevated that decisional law into
something statutory in nature, and hence beyond the power of
the courts to modify. (Cf. People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th

                                14
935, 950 [courts lack the authority to modify statutes when they
disagree with “the wisdom of the Legislature’s chosen” rule].)
       However, for the reasons articulated above, we conclude
that the common law rule barring resort to the California courts
to collect gambling debts rests on a rationale with continued
vitality—namely, a policy of discouraging the creation of those
debts and the financially ruinous consequences that often flow
from them, regardless of whether those debts were lawfully
incurred.
       Tak Chun resists this conclusion with what boil down to
four arguments.
       First, Tak Chun asserts that a common law doctrine may
be upheld only if the rationale originally articulated to support it
remains viable, such that the concern articulated by recent
decisions that gambling is an addiction (and even a mental
illness) cannot support adherence to the common law rule barring
use of the California courts to enforce gambling debts. (See
Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830 [citing the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders].) This
assertion ignores that the common law rule barring use of the
California courts to collect gambling debts has—since its
inception—relied on two rationales, one tied to the underlying
illegality of most gambling at that time and the other aimed at
discouraging judicial enforcement of gambling debts and their
ruinous consequences even when those debts were incurred
lawfully. Modern innovations in the diagnosis of mental health
conditions may better explain the second rationale by expanding
on why certain gamblers incur debts that lead to ruinous
consequences—but they do not somehow erase that these

                                15
consequences have been a justification for California’s public
policy from the very beginning.
       Second, Tak Chun contends that the common law rule
reaches beyond its current rationale. Specifically, it argues that
(1) the sole rationale for barring the enforcement of gambling
debts in the California courts is to protect gambling addicts, (2)
gambling addicts comprise only a subset of all gamblers, and (3)
the bar against enforcing all gambling debts is overbroad because
it bars litigation to enforce the debts of gamblers who are not
addicts. Although the second step of Tak Chun’s argument may
be correct (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830), the
first and third steps are most certainly not. The first step is
wrong because, as explained above, the common law rule barring
litigation of gambling debts in the California courts is not based
solely on a need to protect gambling addicts against ruin;
instead, it is meant to protect all gamblers against such ruin.
And the third step is wrong because—even if the sole justification
for the common law rule was to protect addicts—the right to
enforce a gambling debt is not a “fundamental right” triggering
strict scrutiny (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288),
such that the “fit” between the “ends” (of protecting gambling
addicts) and the “means” (by not allowing for enforcement of any
gambling debt in California courts) need not be “[]perfect” (Heller
v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321); it need only be rational, and
here it is because closing off California courts as a forum is one
step toward protecting those addicts (Kaanaana v. Barrett
Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 180 [“[t]he
Legislature is permitted to attack problems one step at a time”]),
even if it additionally protects non-addicts.

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       Third, Tak Chun urges that the common law rule is riddled
with so many “exceptions” that it should be abandoned, and
points to three such “exceptions.” Yet the “exceptions” Tak Chun
identifies do not undermine the rule so much as they reasonably
define its contours. To begin, California courts may enforce out-
of-state judgments regarding gambling debts, but this does no
more than reflect the deference accorded to a sister state’s
judgments under principles of full faith and credit. (Kelly, supra,
72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 476-477; Metropolitan, supra, 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 1824.) Where, as in this case, a gambling debt
has yet to be reduced to a judgment and is merely a cause of
action, full faith and credit considerations do not trump, and the
common law embodying California’s public policy against using
the California courts to facilitate collection of those debts applies.
(Kelly, at pp. 476-477; Metropolitan, at p. 1824.)6 Next,
California courts may ostensibly entertain a lawsuit by a credit
card company to enforce its unpaid debts, even if its customer has
used the card to purchase one or more lottery tickets, but in such
a situation, the credit card company would have no
foreknowledge that the card would be used to purchase lottery

6      Similar concerns provide one potential way to harmonize
Crockford’s Club, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1402, with the bulk of
other precedent. The plaintiff in that case sought to enforce a
foreign country’s judgment. Because full faith and credit only
applies to the judgments of other states and not other countries,
full faith and credit considerations did not trump. (Wong, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 135; Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p.
1828.) That being said, the fact that the plaintiff was seeking to
enforce a judgment makes that case different from the typical
case where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking to litigate their claim
in the first instance.

                                 17
tickets. (See Rose v. Nelson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 751, 751-752
[recognizing “exception[]” to the “general rule” barring access to
the courts “when there is no evidence that the lender knew that
the loan was intended to be used for gambling purposes”].)
Where, as in this case, the lender knows that the money will be
used for gambling (as Tak Chun knew because it tendered Long
casino tokens), the common law rule applies. Lastly, California
courts will entertain a lawsuit seeking an accounting following a
transaction to sell a casino (Nevcal, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at pp.
180-182), but such a lawsuit does not directly involve any
gamblers and hence does not hasten any gambler’s financial ruin;
while such a lawsuit involves the gambling industry in general, it
does not implicate the rationale underlying the common law rule.
       Fourth and finally, Tak Chun argues that tradition alone is
not sufficient to sustain this public policy-based common law
prohibition against the enforcement of gambling debts in the
California courts. As we have explained, this prohibition has a
still-viable and still-vital rationale that goes far beyond
upholding “tradition for tradition’s sake.”

                               18
                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Long is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                      ______________________, J.
                                      HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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