Court Opinion

ID: 9959565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 06:07:01.012752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.910226
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    April 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 363446
                                                                    Ionia Circuit Court
JUSTIN DEWAYNE STEPHENS,                                            LC No. 2010-014917-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and FEENEY and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and second-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), in 2022. The trial court originally sentenced defendant to life without
parole (LWOP) for the murder conviction and 8 to 15 years in prison for his home invasion
conviction.

        Defendant challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal. This Court issued a
per curiam opinion affirming his convictions but remanding for resentencing under Miller v
Alabama, 567 US 460, 489; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). People v Stephens,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 27, 2013 (Docket
No. 306032), pp 1, 8.

      On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to a prison term 40 to 60 years for his
murder conviction. Defendant now appeals that sentence by right. We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The basic facts of this case were summarized in this Court’s previous opinion:

               This case arises from the victim’s son finding his mother’s body at her home
       on December 1, 2006. At the time of the discovery, the victim was found in a pool
       of blood near a broken Santa Clause [sic] statue, [and] a broken mirror which was
       parallel to a hole in the drywall. The victim’s son found his mother’s purse without

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any money. He testified at trial that the victim always had money in her purse and
kept her house immaculate.

                                      * * *

On May 6, 2010, [a Texas Ranger] interviewed defendant for the first time.
Defendant was cooperative, and initially denied killing the victim. [The Texas
Ranger] probed defendant’s alibis for several hours. At the end of that time, [the
Texas Ranger] told defendant that he believed that defendant murdered the victim
based on inconsistencies in defendant’s statements. Defendant broke down, started
crying, and indicated that “he had done it.” Defendant then agreed to provide [the
Texas Ranger] with a report of exactly what happened. . . .

        [The Texas Ranger] interviewed defendant a second time in July 2010.
During the interview, [the Texas Ranger] wrote the word “others” on a piece of
paper, shoved it toward defendant, and told him that “you’re not gonna (sic) get it
until you understand that it’s not about you. It’s about others. It’s about who you
affected; the family, the victim, everyone who knew her. “This caused defendant
to break down and start crying. [The Texas Ranger] worked with defendant to elicit
details of what happened, starting with hypothetical’s [sic], moving toward what
actually happened. Eventually, defendant confessed. [The Texas Ranger]
described what defendant told him as follows:

       [h]e gave me details in that he said you know he killed her, and he
       told me the story, which was basically he had broken into the house.
       The side door was open. He knew the lady. I guess he’d been over
       there twice before and figured that she had some money. He was
       despondent because he thought his girlfriend was pregnant. He
       wanted to go back to Texas. He had all these major life issues going
       on. But he broke into the side door of the house and he was in there
       going through the drawers and he found a purse. And in the purse
       he found I believe he said five $20.00 bills. So he takes it and he
       puts it in his pocket. Everything’s quiet and he’s still going through
       the house and he said all of a sudden he hears what are you doing
       here or what are you doing. And he turns around and [the victim] is
       standing in the doorway. And he said he looked and he was shocked.
       He didn’t know what to do. He stood up and he basically walked by
       her. He said he was basically acting like she wasn’t there and he
       was going to walk by her. He said as he did this she grabbed him
       and basically carried him towards the dining room table by a shirt
       sleeve and set him down. While this was going on she was saying
       what are you doing, why are you doing this? And he said he didn’t
       say anything. He just basically did what she did. She directed him
       to the table. He sat down at the table. She said I’m gonna (sic) call
       the police. At that point in time he said he just couldn’t do that. He
       couldn’t have that happen. And he said he stood up and he started
       walking out. He said she grabbed him by the arm and he said he
       grabbed whatever was on a shelf. I don’t know that [he] ever

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               articulated what it was, but he grabbed whatever was on the shelf
               and he hit her with it; hit her in the head with it. She fell, stumbled,
               did whatever [sic] said that she started going towards the door. As
               she was going towards the door, [defendant] realized that this
               couldn’t happen. He tackled her. He said he thinks he may have
               stabbed her. He said the next thing he knows he’s outside covered
               in blood behind the house.

                                               * * *

       [T]he jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based both on a
       premeditation theory and also a felony murder theory, and second-degree home
       invasion. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for first-degree
       murder and to 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment for second-degree home invasion . . . .
       [Stephens, unpub op at 1-3.]

        In his first appeal, defendant asserted that, at the time of his offense, he was just 17 years
of age. Id. at 7. Defendant admitted that, at the time of the sentencing, he failed to raise the issue
of his age. Id. This Court affirmed defendant’s conviction but remanded the case for resentencing
on his first-degree murder conviction in accordance with Miller. Id. at 8.

       On remand, the prosecution filed a supplemental motion under MCL 769.25 and 769.25a,
seeking the re-imposition of defendant’s LWOP sentence. The parties engaged in a three-day
Miller hearing, during which the trial court heard arguments and testimony regarding the
prosecution’s motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant
should be sentenced to a term of years, not life without parole.

       At the resentencing hearing, the trial court resentenced defendant to 40 to 60 years
imprisonment with credit for 4,444 days already served. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s sentencing decisions to
determine whether the trial court violated the principle of proportionality. People v Steanhouse,
500 Mich 453, 471, 477; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). Whether a sentence is reasonable depends on
whether it is disproportionate to the “seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and
offender.” People v Posey, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 162373); slip
op at 3-4. See also Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 59; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010). A
trial court abuses its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 303; 933 NW2d 719 (2019); People v Grant, 329
Mich App 626, 635, 637; 944 NW2d 172 (2019).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider his youth as a mitigating
factor as required by Miller and its progeny, and that it imposed a disproportionate and therefore
unreasonable sentence. We disagree.

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       In Miller, 567 US at 465, the United States Supreme Court concluded that “mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The Court reasoned that
mandatory LWOP sentencing precludes a trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s

       chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
       impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking
       into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from
       which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.
       It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his
       participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have
       affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of
       a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his
       inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement)
       or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. [Id. at 477-478.]

The Court concluded that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider such mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty, including life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, for a juvenile. Id. at 489.

        After Miller was issued, the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 769.25, which states in
relevant part that, if a resentencing court does not sentence a defendant to LWOP, then the court
shall sentence the defendant to a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 60 years, and
the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years. MCL 769.25(9). In
People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171; 987 NW2d 58 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that,
although trial courts should consider a defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor at Miller hearings,
they “need not articulate their bases for considering an offender’s youth” when sentencing a
defendant to a term of years. Id. at 190.

       The Michigan Supreme Court summarized the Miller factors as follows:

       (1) “[defendant’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them,
       immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “the
       family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot
       usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional”; (3) “the
       circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in
       the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him”;
       (4) whether “he might have been charged [with] and convicted of a lesser offense
       if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal
       with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity
       to assist his own attorneys”; and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation . . . .” [People
       v Skinner, 502 Mich 89, 114-115; 917 NW2d 292 (2018), quoting Miller, 567 US
       at 477-478.]

        Regarding youth as a mitigating factor, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that youth
affects consideration of the four objectives of sentencing. See People v Snow, 386 Mich 586; 194
NW2d 314 (1972), Boykin, 510 Mich at 188, 189. These objectives are (1) the reformation of the

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offender, (2) the protection of society, (3) disciplining the offender, and (4) deterring others from
committing similar offenses. Snow, 386 Mich at 194, Boykin, 510 Mich at 188. Similarly, this
Court has stated that when a court sentences a minor convicted of first-degree murder to a term of
years, the court should be “guided by” a balancing of the Snow objectives as well as the attributes
of youth described in Miller. People v Wines, 323 Mich App 343, 352; 916 NW2d 855 (2018).

        Regarding the first objective, the Supreme Court has stated that, without considering an
offender’s youth, a sentence cannot adequately address the offender’s prospects for reformation.
Boykin, 510 Mich at 189. As for the second objective, the young have a heightened capacity for
change relative to adults. Id. Regarding the third objective, because even heinous crimes
committed by juveniles are less likely to support the existence of a depraved character in a minor
relative to an adult, disciplining the wrongdoer must be viewed differently “under the lens of
youth.” Id. Lastly, regarding deterrence, the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults render them less likely to consider potential punishment. Id. Consequently,
the Michigan Supreme Court has concluded that, as a mitigating factor, a defendant’s youth will
“inevitably” impact the objectives of sentencing articulated in Snow. Id.

        At the conclusion of the Miller hearing in this case, the trial court found that defendant was
impetuous, lacking in complete growth, and impulsive in his behavior, and that he had failed to
appreciate the risks or consequences of his behavior. The trial court also acknowledged
defendant’s upbringing and home environment, including the fact that his parents were largely
absent from his life, leaving him to be raised by his sickly grandmother. The trial court also
discussed defendant’s lack of a bond with his parents and the fact that defendant’s childhood was
characterized by bullying, substance abuse, academic struggle, trauma, and domestic violence. As
for the prospect of rehabilitation, the trial court found that defendant was working toward
rehabilitation. The record shows that the trial court more than adequately considered defendant’s
youth in light of Miller. See Skinner, 502 Mich at 114, 115. Further, at sentencing, the trial court
discussed all four Snow objectives and how they impacted its sentencing decision.

         Although the trial court expressed confusion regarding Boykin’s requirement that trial
courts consider a defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor without having to articulate that
consideration on the record, defendant has failed to establish that the trial court inadequately
considered his youth as a mitigating factor. See Boykin, 510 Mich at 190, 193, 194. The record
in this case shows that the trial court gave thorough and well-reasoned consideration to defendant’s
age as it affected the proportionality of his sentence.

         Further, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was reasonable and
proportionate. Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Michigan
Supreme Court has held that “appellate courts must review all sentences for reasonableness . . . .”
Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29. In determining a sentence’s reasonableness, appellate courts
must look to “whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter.” Posey, ___
Mich at ___; slip op at 29. In People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 656; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), the
Michigan Supreme Court stated that a reviewing court may consider the following, nonexhaustive
list of factors when determining a sentence’s proportionality:

       (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
       the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
       relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct

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       while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s
       potential for rehabilitation. [People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 126; 933 NW2d
       314 (2019).]

        The trial court noted that defendant had expressed genuine remorse for killing the victim.
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged the possibility that defendant may have the potential to
be a law-abiding citizen upon release. However, the trial court was also presented with an
evaluation from the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) that classified defendant as a
having a high risk of recidivism and a medium risk for violence. Further, as the trial court noted,
defendant had committed numerous crimes in Texas after committing the murder in Michigan.
Notwithstanding the fact that they did not involve murder, defendant’s subsequent crimes in Texas
cast further doubt on defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.

        The trial court also considered defendant’s potential for dishonesty. At the resentencing
hearing, the trial court discussed in depth certain inconsistencies in defendant’s testimony about
the murder. The trial court noted that defendant had stated during the Miller hearing that he had
no memory of what had occurred during the murder because he was under the influence of
methamphetamine. The trial court asked defendant why he had returned to the victim’s house and
hid the bloody clothing in the woods, if he had no memory of the murder itself. Further, the court
noted that, despite his claim not to remember the crime, defendant had confessed to police officers
that he had grabbed an object from the shelf and struck the victim.

       Additionally, the trial court explicitly considered defendant’s age as it impacted his
potential for rehabilitation:

               Age certainly factors into that type of determination. I think we all are in
       agreement, or studies certainly show, that the older a person is when he or she is
       released from incarceration, the less likely he or she will be to reoffend. I think
       there’s some significance, some statistical significance to that. But we just don’t
       know.

               Ideally, [defendant], while he is incarcerated, will continue to engage in the
       programming, and I’ve seen all of these certificates that have been provided, and
       they’re very impressive. And hopefully, [defendant], you are very sincere in
       wanting to continue improving your situation, or acquiring a trade, or whatever it
       is that might be available to you now that you’re receiving a term of years.

        The trial court also considered the sentencing objectives of deterrence, the protection of
society, and discipline of defendant. See Boykin, 510 Mich at 188. The trial court noted that prison
sentences protect society from individuals who would commit offenses like home invasion and
murder, that society requires that individuals who commit such crimes be punished, and that there
was likely some deterrent effect to lengthy prison sentences as punishment for those crimes.

       The trial court also considered the horrific nature of the crime and the suffering of the
victim’s family. This Court has stated that trial courts may consider a victim’s vulnerability and
the nature of a defendant’s offense against the victim when sentencing a defendant. People v
Reincke, 261 Mich App 264, 269-271; 680 NW2d 923 (2004). In this case, the trial court stated

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that the victim, an 80-year old woman, was the matriarch of her family, as well as a loving mother
and grandmother. At the time she was murdered, the victim had obviously been preparing for the
Christmas holiday season. See Stephens, unpub op at 1. The trial court described defendant’s
crime as senseless, selfish, and intolerable, noting that defendant had committed this violent
murder to obtain a hundred dollars from the victim’s purse. During resentencing, the victim’s
daughter testified to the trauma experienced by the family and their community. The daughter
described this trauma as irreversible.

        Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court’s reasoning and sentencing decision fell
outside the range of principled outcomes. Odom, 327 Mich App at 303. Defendant argues that
the petty crimes against property committed by defendant in Texas are not as serious as the crime
of murder, but does not explain how the trial court abused its discretion by considering defendant’s
repeated criminality in the context of determining his potential for rehabilitation. Further, the
record shows that the offenses committed by defendant in Texas included criminal trespass, theft,
and burglary of a building—offenses similar in nature to the home invasion that led to defendant’s
murder of an elderly woman. Defendant also argues that the MDOC did not properly evaluate
defendant as required by caselaw, but he fails to provide any legal or factual support for this
assertion; moreover, it is clear from the record that the trial court engaged in its own analysis and
did not merely adopt the MDOC’s evaluation. Defendant also argues that the prosecution
incorrectly claimed that defendant had offered his use of methamphetamine as an “excuse” for
committing murder, and that defendant had been dishonest about his childhood and upbringing.
However, the record does not show that the trial court adopted those arguments—in fact, the trial
court acknowledged the difficult upbringing defendant had, and it formed its own conclusion
regarding defendant’s dishonesty based on its review of defendant’s own statements and actions
after the murder.

        Defendant has not demonstrated that his sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate
under the circumstances of this case, or that the trial court failed to adequately consider his youth
in imposing a term of years sentence for first-degree murder. Therefore the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant. Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                              /s/ Adrienne N. Young

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