Court Opinion

ID: 9954475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:15:58.636591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:25.332165
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Fulton and Ortiz

              DAVID JOSHUA WOOD
                                                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1951-22-2                            CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
                                                                                MARCH 26, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NOTTOWAY COUNTY
                                                 Paul W. Cella, Judge1

                               (M.G. Henkle; Henkle Law Firm, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
                               submitting on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      David Joshua Wood appeals his convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and driving

              on a revoked license, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and 46.2-391. He argues that the trial court

              erroneously admitted a certificate of analysis to prove his level of intoxication. Wood further

              contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. For the following reasons, we

              affirm the trial court’s judgment.2

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                      1
                       Judge Joseph M. Teefey, Jr., presided over the trial in this case. Judge Paul W. Cella
              presided over the sentencing hearing.
                      2
                       Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that
              oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” See Code
              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). In addition, “the dispositive issue or issues have been
              authoritatively decided,” and the appellant “has not argued that the case law should be
              overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).
                                            BACKGROUND3

        This appeal arises from an encounter that Wood had with police officers on February 14,

2022, as a result of a single-vehicle accident. At 8:43 p.m., Nottoway County Sheriff’s Deputy

Domanick Jenkins was the first police officer to arrive to the scene of the accident. He found that

the car, a Taurus, had been driven off the road and into a ditch. The car was unoccupied, but Wood

and his fiancée, Crystal Gray, were standing on the road near the vehicle. Jenkins’s body-worn

camera captured his investigation of the accident, and that video was entered into evidence. Deputy

Jenkins asked how the vehicle ended up in the ditch, and Wood claimed that Gray “just went off the

left side of the road.” Jenkins asked who had been driving, and Wood repeatedly implicated Gray.

Gray at first hesitated but ultimately identified Wood as the driver.

        Wood maintained that he had consumed no alcohol that day. Jenkins accused Wood of

lying. When Deputy Jenkins accused him of “wreck[ing] a vehicle,” Wood did not respond.

Jenkins discovered three cans of Four Loko—an alcoholic beverage—in the Taurus. Wood told

Deputy Jenkins that he had crawled out the window of the vehicle after the accident. Jenkins

noticed that the windows on the car were closed. When Deputy Jenkins asked him where he had

been sitting, Wood responded, indicating that he was in the driver’s seat, but then he immediately

changed his answer to the passenger seat.

        Virginia State Trooper Sean Williams arrived at the scene of the accident around 9:00 p.m.

and spoke with Wood, who again claimed that Gray had been driving. Williams detected an odor of

alcohol on Wood’s person and noted Wood’s slurred speech. He observed that Wood’s eyes were

        3
           On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires this Court to
“discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as
true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
                                                  -2-
red and irritated and that he had trouble maintaining his balance. Although Wood continued to deny

that he had driven the Taurus, he told Trooper Williams that he had crawled out of the window.

Williams, however, confirmed that the windows were closed.

        Wood again denied consuming any alcohol that night and agreed to perform three field

sobriety tests for Trooper Williams. After the tests, Williams arrested Wood at 9:23 p.m.

        Trooper Williams then transported Wood to the Nottoway County Sheriff’s Office. Once

there, Williams administered a breath test. The results of the breath test indicated that Wood’s

blood alcohol content (BAC) was .23 grams per 210 liters of breath.

        Afterward, Williams took Wood to the magistrate’s office. En route, Trooper Williams

stopped to refuel his police car. While the trooper refueled, Wood retrieved his mobile phone and

made a call. Wood informed the other party to the phone call that he needed a favor and asked that

person to claim to be the driver. This phone conversation was captured by the trooper’s recording

device that he left in the center console area of the car.

        At Wood’s ensuing bench trial, Gray testified that on the day of the wreck, she spent most of

the day with Wood. Sometime after 5:00 p.m., Wood left her apartment in their shared 2005 Ford

Taurus. At around 8:30 p.m., Wood returned to Gray’s apartment—on foot—and informed her that

he needed a tow because the car was in a ditch. The pair walked to the site of the wreck, which took

about five minutes. Wood asked Gray to say that she was driving at the time of the wreck. Gray

acknowledged that she did not actually see Wood leave her apartment complex in the Taurus. She

further conceded that she thought she had the keys to the car in her possession when Deputy Jenkins

arrived at the scene, but she could not remember exactly how she had obtained them.

        Jessica Lester also testified against Wood. At around 6:40 p.m. on the evening of the wreck,

Lester was driving her car when another vehicle “came and . . . cut straight in front of” her. The

vehicle did not hesitate or brake, and it forced Lester to “speed up and go over almost . . . into the

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curb” to avoid a collision. Lester followed the vehicle while she videorecorded its erratic

movements. She testified that the driver was a man. Lester’s recordings captured images of the

vehicle and its license plate. At trial, Lester was unable to affirmatively identify Wood as the driver

because it had “been a while” and instead stated only that Wood’s face was “familiar.”

       The Commonwealth introduced into evidence the BAC certificate of analysis. Wood

objected, arguing that the document did not comply with the implied consent law because the

Commonwealth failed to establish that Trooper Williams took the breath sample within three hours

of the driving behavior. The trial court found that the evidence supported the timeline, overruled

Wood’s objection, and admitted the certificate of analysis.

       After the close of the evidence, Wood made a motion to strike. He argued that the

Commonwealth failed to establish the time of the accident or the identity of the driver. He

contended that the only evidence of his involvement consisted of his own statement that he crawled

out the passenger window after the accident. The trial court denied the motion.

       The court convicted Wood of DWI, with a prior felony conviction for driving under the

influence and with a BAC greater than .20, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Wood was also

convicted of driving on a revoked license while endangering the life or limb of another, in violation

of Code § 46.2-391(D)(2). He was sentenced to a total of ten years of incarceration with seven

years suspended.

                                              ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Wood challenges the admission of the certificate of analysis and the sufficiency

of the evidence proving his identity as the driver of the wrecked car.

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                              I. Admission of the Certificate of Analysis

        Wood argues that the trial court erred in admitting the certificate of analysis because the

Commonwealth did not establish that any driving behavior occurred within three hours of

Wood’s arrest at 9:23 p.m.4 We disagree.

        “It is well-settled that ‘[d]ecisions regarding the admissibility of evidence “lie within the

trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion.”’” Nottingham v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 221, 231 (2021) (alteration in

original) (quoting Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697 (2019)). “In evaluating

whether a trial court abused its discretion, . . . we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court. Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.” Kenner

v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 423 (2021) (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543

(2017)). “An abuse of discretion does not occur if reasonable jurists could differ.” Fields v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 652, 672 (2021). “This deferential principle applies not only to

‘matters of witness credibility’ but also to the factfinder’s ‘interpretation of all of the evidence,

including video evidence’ presented at trial.” Commonwealth v. Barney, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Mar.

16, 2023) (quoting Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 806 (2022)). The “burden of proof

with respect to factual questions underlying the admissibility of evidence is proof by a

preponderance” of the evidence. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 275 (2019) (quoting

Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 (2001)).

        4
         The Commonwealth suggests that this assignment of error is not preserved because
Wood initially objected under the wrong standard. See generally Rule 5A:18 (providing that an
objection must be “stated with reasonable certainty”). However, the prosecutor responded with
the correct standard. The trial court had the appropriate standard when ruling, and therefore we
consider this issue preserved. See generally Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743-44
(2019) (stating that the rule “enable[s] the trial judge to rule intelligently” on the issue (quoting
Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 573, 579 (2017))).
                                                  -5-
        Under Virginia’s implied consent law, a person who “operates a motor vehicle upon a

highway” of the Commonwealth impliedly consents to give breath and blood samples for testing if

arrested for driving while intoxicated “within three hours of the alleged offense.” Code

§ 18.2-268.2(A). A certificate of analysis is not admissible unless the Commonwealth has complied

with the requirements of the implied consent law. Roseborough v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 233,

238-39 (2011). Here, to be admissible, the Commonwealth had to present evidence that Wood was

operating a motor vehicle on a public highway and was validly arrested for an offense under Code

§ 18.2-266 within three hours of the alleged offense. See id.

        Wood did not argue in the trial court, and does not argue to this Court, that Williams lacked

probable cause to arrest him for DWI. Consequently, we do not consider the lawfulness of the

arrest and consider only whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Wood

operated the vehicle within three hours of his arrest. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 546

(2002) (restricting the analysis to a reasonable force determination where the Commonwealth failed

to challenge the trial court’s ruling that the detention was unlawful).

        Williams arrested Wood at 9:23 p.m. Accordingly, for the certificate to be admissible, the

Commonwealth had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Wood operated the vehicle

after 6:23 p.m. See Roseborough, 281 Va. at 238-39. Wood argues that the only evidence of his

operation during the relevant period is Lester’s “unsupported, uncorroborated, and obviously vague

testimony.”

        Lester testified that she encountered the Taurus at around 6:40 p.m. The accident must have

occurred after 6:40 p.m. because the Taurus was not yet in the ditch. Other evidence placed Wood

behind the wheel of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Gray testified that Wood left her

apartment in the Taurus sometime after 5:00 p.m. Wood returned to Gray’s residence around

                                                  -6-
8:30 p.m. in need of a tow truck. Wood admitted to Trooper Williams that he was in the driver’s

seat of the vehicle at the time of the wreck.

        The record supports the trial court’s finding that Wood operated the car after 6:23 p.m.,

within three hours of his arrest. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it admitted the

certificate.5

                                    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Wood contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence because the Commonwealth did not establish that he was the person who drove the

Taurus. He does not challenge any other elements of the offenses.

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether

‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth,

        5
         In light of this holding, we do not address whether the alleged error was harmless
because Trooper Williams testified, without objection, about the results of the breath test. See
generally Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 633, 639 n.1 (2005) (noting that the
affirmance of the appeal on the merits rendered analysis of the Commonwealth’s harmless error
argument unnecessary).
                                                -7-
69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).

Based on these principles, we defer to the trial court’s interpretation of the evidence, including

video evidence. See Meade, 74 Va. App. at 805-06.

       Appellate review of whether the Commonwealth presented adequate evidence to support

its case “does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463 (2017). “Circumstantial evidence is not ‘viewed in isolation’ because

the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself,

may lead a reasonable [fact finder]’ to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is

guilty.” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 27 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)).

       Wood argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had operated the motor vehicle,

an essential element for each of his two convictions. See Code § 18.2-266 (driving while

intoxicated); Code § 46.2-391 (driving with a revoked license). He specifically challenges the

weight of Lester’s identification testimony.

       We do not view Lester’s testimony in isolation but instead in context of the record as a

whole. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Wood was

the person who drove the Taurus into the ditch. Gray’s testimony placed Wood in the vehicle after

5:00 p.m. At 6:40 p.m., Lester saw the Taurus driving erratically. At approximately 8:30 p.m.,

Wood informed Gray that he needed a tow truck because the car was in a ditch.

       Wood attempted to induce Gray to take responsibility for the accident. He repeatedly

maintained to the investigating police officers that Gray was driving when the accident occurred,

not him. Wood briefly admitted, however, that he was in the driver’s seat when the accident

occurred. Contrary to his repeated claims that Gray was the driver, Gray testified that Wood took

the car and returned to her apartment on foot because the car was in a ditch. The trial court, as the

                                                 -8-
fact finder, was entitled to accept Gray’s testimony as credible and disbelieve Wood’s self-serving

statements that he was not the driver. See, e.g., Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525-26

(2015); Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011). Along with claiming Gray was

the driver, Wood said that he did not drink any alcohol at any time that day, despite testing well

over the legal limit for alcohol consumption. The trial court could treat Wood’s prevarications as

affirmative evidence of guilt. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25 (2008).

       On this record, a rational finder of fact was permitted to determine that Wood drove the

Taurus into the ditch, attempted to persuade Gray to take the blame, and lied when she did not do

so. Based on this record, we hold that the trial court did not err when it found the evidence

sufficient to convict him of driving while intoxicated under Code § 18.2-266 and driving with a

revoked license under Code § 46.2-391.

                                            CONCLUSION

       We hold that the trial court did not err by admitting the certificate of analysis showing the

appellant’s blood-alcohol content. In addition, we reject his challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence because the Commonwealth adequately proved that he was the driver of the vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.

                                                                                                Affirmed.

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