Court Opinion

ID: 9627342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:31.559853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:44.964717
License: Public Domain

Armstrong, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. In State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 143, 150, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992), the Supreme Court, applying a pretrial strict construction, held that in a charge of “ ‘unlawfully deliver [ing] a controlled substance’, the informations failed to contain language clearly suggesting the requisite criminal intent[,]” i.e., knowledge of the nature of the substance. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d at 150. The question here is whether, under the same strict construction, a charge of “assault” clearly suggests an “intentional” act. I believe that it does.
*612The Supreme Court has held that the term “assault” by itself conveys an intentional or knowing act. State v. Hopper, 118 Wn.2d 151, 822 P.2d 775 (1992), cited with approval in State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359, 956 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). Although Hopper was a postconviction challenge to the charging document, the analysis turned upon the meaning of the single word “assault.” Because of this, we need not apply a liberal construction to the charging document to see “if the necessary facts appear in any form, or by a fair construction can be found within the terms of the charge.” State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 104, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). In short, if the single word “assault” defines an intentional act postconviction, it surely does so preconviction as well.
Although Division One did not cite Johnson in State v. Chaten, 84 Wn. App. 85, 925 P.2d 631 (1996), they applied the preverdict standard of review and concluded that “an assault is commonly understood to be an intentional act.” Id. at 86. I agree.
I would affirm the conviction.
Review granted at 137 Wn.2d 1007 (1999).