Court Opinion

ID: 9853386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:47:37.784767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.571662
License: Public Domain

Irwin, Judge,
dissenting.
“[T]he relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.” Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978). “[A] parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ ” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981). A juvenile court order providing for visitation between a 16-year-old boy and his 2-year-old sister, whom he has not seen since she was 5 months old, surely affects a substantial right. The substantial right affected is that of a parent to decide how to raise a child who has not been brought within the jurisdiction of the judicial system.
Neither the statutes of this state nor developed jurisprudence provides a basis for a juvenile court to order visitation between a minor sibling who is within the jurisdiction of the court and a minor sibling who is not within the jurisdiction of the court. Put *647another way, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to compel a parent of a child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and in the custody of the Department of Social Services, to produce the child’s nonadjudicated sibling for visitation. “ ‘The right to raise one’s children has long been recognized as one of our basic civil rights.. . . [G]overnmental intrusion into the family is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. The statutory bas[e]s for court interference with the parents’ right to custody are limited and specific, reflecting that philosophy.. . .’ ” In Interest of C.F., 436 Pa. Super. 83, 91, 647 A.2d 253, 256-57 (1994) (quoting Weber v. Weber, 362 Pa. Super. 262, 524 A.2d 498 (1987), appeal dismissed 517 Pa. 458, 538 A.2d 494 (1988)).
The case In Interest of C.F., supra, which is cited by the majority, is “on all fours” with the instant case. In that case, the court held that since no statutory basis existed which would allow court interference with the parents’ right to undisturbed custody of a nonadjudicated daughter, the parents could not be required to produce their daughter for visitation with the child’s sibling. The court in In Interest of C.F. also discussed whether visitation was in the best interests of the child. This latter issue should not be reached or become the focus of discussion in our case, however, since there exists no authority to order the visitation in the first place.
Three Nebraska statutes and a case from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, are cited as the legal basis for the juvenile court’s action in the case before us. Those are Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-246(4), 43-285(2), and 43-289 (Reissue 1993) and L. v. G., 203 N.J. Super. 385, 497 A.2d 215 (1985).
Section 43-246 states as follows:
Code, how construed. Acknowledging the responsibility of the juvenile court to act to preserve the public peace and security, the Nebraska Juvenile Code shall be construed to effectuate the following:
(4) To achieve the foregoing purposes in the juvenile’s own home whenever possible, separating the juvenile from his or her parent only when necessary for his or her welfare or in the interest of public safety and, when *648temporary separation is necessary, to consider the developmental needs of the individual juvenile in all placements and to assure every reasonable effort possible to reunite the juvenile and his or her family.
Section 43-285 states:
Care of juvenile; authority of guardian; placement plan and report; when; standing; State Foster Care Review Board; participation authorized; immunity....
(2) Following an adjudication hearing at which a juvenile is adjudged to be under subdivision (3) of section 43-247, the court may order the department to prepare and file with the court a proposed plan for the care, placement, and services which are to be provided to such juvenile and his or her family.
Section 43-289 states in relevant part:
Juvenile committed; release from confinement upon reaching age of majority; hospital treatment; custody in state institutions; discharge. . . . Whenever any juvenile has been committed to the Department of Social Services, the department shall follow the court’s orders, if any, concerning the juvenile’s specific needs for treatment or special care for his or her physical well-being and healthy personality.
None of the statutes set out above provide that a juvenile court may order visitation, against the parents’ wishes, between their minor child who is within the jurisdiction of the court and their other child, who is not within the jurisdiction of the court. If in fact these statutes were to be interpreted to allow such, there would be no limit to what a juvenile court might do in the name of what is in the best interests of the adjudicated child. Besides visitation, could the juvenile court order the parents to place the nonadjudicated child in treatment, counseling, therapy, classes, and whatever else was viewed as being in the adjudicated child’s best interests? It must also be remembered that if, in fact, these statutes vest the juvenile court with such broad powers, then a parent who refuses to do any of the above is subject to the court’s contempt power, as in fact the parents in this case were reminded:
THE COURT: That’s fine. Mr. W[.], we shouldn’t even *649be here fighting about this.
KEN W[.]: That’s true, it should be somebody —
THE COURT: No, let me finish. You’ve talked.
You ought to be putting forth an effort to get to know your son, and I submit to you you’ve put forth no effort. You better change.
Despite what your attorney says, I do have contempt powers, and I promise you if evidence is appropriately presented to me, I will use it. Also understand under the law I can assess costs against you, and I can order you to pay the costs of the representation of your son, which is currently born[e] by Sarpy County through a contract with Mr. O’Neal. It’s time you put forth some effort. This boy deserves it.
It is also noteworthy that § 43-246(2) states that when construing the juvenile code, those doing the construing should give “due regard to parental rights and capacities.” Also, § 43-246(5) reminds us that the statutes in the juvenile code should be construed “ [t]o provide a judicial procedure through which these purposes and goals are accomplished and enforced in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced” (Emphasissupplied.)
While I am compelled to write this dissent, it should not be interpreted as lowering the value of sibling relationships. Such relationships should be closely guarded and nurtured, since it is those relationships that will provide a haven in which a child may find refuge during the often turbulent journey of life. Moral or personal value of such does not, however, serve as a basis to ignore Ken and Diane W.’s constitutional rights as parents of Megan W.
The relevant law in this case centers on the constitutional rights of the parents regarding their nonadjudicated child, and absent authority of the juvenile court to interfere with such, the result of this case necessitates reversal.