Court Opinion

ID: 9770229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:55:16.875124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.873321
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Parents have lost their children forever. This result may be properly supported by the evidence and commanded by law. I hope so. For in spite of requests by both the parents and the State, we will not fully review the trial court’s decision because the parents’ lawyers failed to file the statement of facts on time. This willful refusal is not required by the Common Law nor by statute; it is required by a rule of procedure.1 I agree with the majority that rule 2(b) and Evitts do not apply here.2 I agree that application of 54(c) does not violate notions of due process of law. And, I agree that without a statement of facts, we must presume that the facts support the judgment. But, Rule 54(c) which Click holds prohibits our consideration of a late filed statement of facts is manifestly unjust.3 It must be changed.
Our jurisdiction to hear an appeal attaches when an appeal bond (or notice of appeal where appropriate) is timely filed in the trial court.4 The appeal bond in this case was timely filed. This court has jurisdiction.
But, there is a catch. Rule 54(c) prevents us from considering the statement of facts if it is late, and if the motion to extend time to file is itself not timely filed.5 *934However, we have neither lost jurisdiction nor have we been relieved of the duty to proceed with consideration of the merits of the appeal.6 We must still await briefing of the issues by the parties; we must still hear argument if requested by the parties; we must still write an opinion expressing our reasons for our decision in the case. All of that happened in this case. Regardless, the appeals process was illusory.7 In this case, the statement of facts was not filed in time and the motion to extend the time to file was tendered late, therefore, we could not review the evidence in the trial.
A rule such as Rule 54(c) is promulgated to move appeals through the courts at an appropriate rate of speed. That is to say, encourage litigants to give due regard to time limits and permit the appellate court to dispose of the appeal under circumstances where litigants are less than prompt in meeting appellate deadlines. Thus, limited judicial resources are not wasted and the dispute is timely resolved. I do not argue with this premise. But the premise fails with Rule 54(c); it does not save this Court any measurable, limited judicial resources nor does it necessarily provide a prompt resolution of the dispute. As a general proposition, attorneys know that a motion for extension to file the statement of facts must be filed within fifteen days after the original due date. Not a countable fraction of appeals do we dispose of because a lawyer failed to timely file an extension motion. As to those appeals which are disposed of due to a late-tendered statement of facts, nearly all foundered in the appellate sphere until the briefs were tendered because, regardless of whether we have a statement of facts before us, we must still review the transcript and consider all points of error not eviden-tiary based. I acknowledge that one reason given in Click for a non-discretionary application of Rule 54(c)’s predecessor was the need for finality in judgments.8 However, that statement is but the reason behind the proposition that appeals should be expeditious. I state again, whatever sureness this harsh rule gives to finality or time savings, it is too small to even measure.
I do not advocate abolition of Rule 54(c). The purpose of appellate deadlines is to ensure a prompt resolution of the appeal. This inures to the benefit of the Court, the litigants, and the citizens of this State. However, a guiding principle of our appellate rules should be “to eliminate, insofar as practical, the requirements which sometimes resulted in disposition of appeals without consideration of the merits.”9 Specifically, the rules should not create unnecessary traps for the inattentive or unwary. An unnecessary trap is making some deadlines deadly and others deadly only if the court determines that this is the proper remedy for a recalcitrant litigant or attorney.10 Under the discretionary rules such as rule 74(1), it is this Court’s practice to notify an attorney who has missed a deadline that the appeal may be dismissed if no action is taken in a stated period of time (or if the appellee was the defaulting party, that the case would be submitted v/ithout consideration of the matters appel-lee wished to have brought forward). Arguably, it makes equally good sense that the appellate court have the opportunity to notify a defaulting appellant of the failure to timely file the statement of facts (or even the transcript if that had been the case here). Perhaps it makes more sense. Unlike a brief which is under the sole control of the attorney, the transcript is prepared by the trial court clerk and the statement of facts is prepared by the court reporter, and consequently, the attorney *935who is the “responsible” party may, in fact, not know that the record has not been filed.
Exceptions to Rule 54(c) have been urged.11 However, I do not advocate exceptions to this rule, its failure to allow appellate court discretion is equally damaging to litigants regardless of the nature of the case, and it, in fact, provides none of the benefit that it theoretically purports to give. I would change the rule so that appellate courts, subject to the showing of a reasonable explanation, have the discretion to allow the late filing of the record.

. Tex.R.App.P. 54(c).

. Tex.R.App.P. 2(b); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).

. B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.1982).

. Tex.R.App.P. 41.

. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd. v. Taylor, 111 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Tex.1986).

. Tex.R.App.P. 54(a); B.D. Click Co., 638 S.W.2d at 861.

. See Archer v. Wood, 771 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1989, no writ).

. Click, 638 S.W.2d at 862.

. Click, 638 S.W.2d at 861.

. Compare, Tex.R.App.P. 54(c) with Tex.R.App.P. 74(1), (n).

. See E— T— J— v. State, 766 S.W.2d 871, 872-74 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, no writ) (Kin-keade, J., dissenting).