Court Opinion

ID: 9717191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:49.027907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.933378
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which denies Minor’s claim that a contract exists by virtue of estoppel, thus *54I do not reach the damage issue. This court has set out the elements of equitable estoppel:
In order to constitute an equitable es-toppel or estoppel in pais, false representations or concealment of material facts must exist; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge of the real facts; that representations or concealments must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon; and the party to whom it was made must have relied thereon to his injury.... There can be no estoppel if any of these essential elements are lacking, or if any of them have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, (citations omitted)
Cromwell v. Hosbrook, 81 S.D. 324, 329, 134 N.W.2d 777, 780-1 (1965).
The record is clear that Minor refused a proffered two-week trial period at the outset. By tendering a contract, accepting it back with Minor’s signature, and then failing to complete it, the officials duped Minor into a two-week trial period. That Minor relied on the contract to his injuries without question for the trial court and the majority of this court have awarded him damages. The essential elements are abundantly clear.
I recognize that the doctrine of estoppel is rarely applied against municipalities and that the same rule applies to school districts. The bulk of the cases in which municipalities have been protected from es-toppel claims involve right-of-way encroachments, annexation enactments, or rate-making ordinances. Estoppel is understandably denied when the public interest outweighs a potential claim, such as in the cases listed above; however, the rule goes on to state that estoppel may be applied “where there is manifest injustice."
In City of Rapid City v. Hoogterp, 85 S.D. 176, 180, 179 N.W.2d 15, 17 (1970), this court quoted, with favor, McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., § 30.181 (1981):
“While the doctrine of equitable estop-pel is sometimes invoked in what are termed ‘exceptional cases,’ it is always applied, and wisely so, with much caution to municipal corporations in matters pertaining to their governmental functions. The basis of its application usually is not because of nonaction by municipal officers but because they have taken some affirmative action influencing another which renders it inequitable for the municipality to assert a different set of facts.”
In Missouri River Telephone Co. v. City of Mitchell, 22 S.D. 191, 116 N.W. 67 (1908), and Tubbs v. Custer City, 52 S.D. 458, 218 N.W. 599 (1928), estoppel was granted because each city took some affirmative action which influenced another. In this case, the school district acted affirmatively and influenced Minor.
Bak v. Jones County, 87 S.D. 468, 210 N.W.2d 65 (1973), cited in the majority opinion, is simply not applicable. Bak involved a public works contract. The decision was predicated on the claimant’s failure to comply with public bidding requirements as a condition precedent to a valid contract with a municipal corporation. Bak at 68-69. That simply is not the case here. Minor refused to move on a two-week trial basis. He was then tendered a written contract which he signed and immediately began to perform. After his performance, the school board paid him without argument. To follow the majority reasoning to its logical conclusion, that payment was illegal. I think that it was the school board’s acknowledgement that there was a contract.
I would reverse the trial court on the estoppel issue and remand for further proceedings to determine damages for breach of the contract.