Court Opinion

ID: 9738303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:39.393248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.354970
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 55. (concurring). This case is in an unusual posture. In the instant case the consumer is the plaintiff, and the *167creditor is the defendant. In many, if not in most, consumer credit cases the creditor is the plaintiff, seeking a remedy against a consumer who is the defendant.
¶ 56. The rules adopted in the present case will apply in all cases, regardless of who is the plaintiff or defendant, and any interpretation of the statutes must promote the purposes and policies of the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
¶ 57. I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court to dismiss the action.
¶ 58. I reach this result even though the result seems harsh and at some level offends my sense of fairness. But the result reached is, in my opinion, required by the statute.
¶ 59. The sense of unfairness arises because Nuvell Credit Corporation (the defendant) knew that Brunton (the consumer/plaintiff) had brought the action in the wrong county. Nevertheless, Nuvell Credit continued to litigate the case in Dane County and then shouted, "Gotcha — wrong county!" only after doing so would end the consumer/plaintiff s case. Nuvell Credit actively participated in the litigation in Dane County Circuit Court, including discovery, for more than a year before objecting to venue; while participating in the litigation Nuvell Credit did not advise the circuit court of the defect in venue; then Nuvell Credit sought dismissal of the action only after the statute of limitations had run against the consumer/plaintiff, making it impossible for her to refile the claim in the proper county. Nuvell Credit's conduct seems "tricky" and wasteful of the circuit court's time, and means that the consumer/plaintiff never gets her day in court.
*168¶ 60. The appearance is that Nuvell Credit unfairly relied on a "technicality" to prevent the consumer/plaintiff forever from getting a determination on the merits of her claim. But the so-called "technicality" is a legislative enactment governing a court's jurisdiction, an enactment binding on the litigants and on the courts. See Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999).
¶ 61. The sense of unfairness is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the consumer/plaintiff also knew that Dane County was the wrong venue, had the time to change the venue to Rock County, but did not act to change the venue.
¶ 62. I agree with the majority opinion in many respects: This case is a statutory interpretation case arising under the Wisconsin Consumer Act, chapters 421 to 427 of the statutes. The decision turns specifically on the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2). The legislature instructed the court how to interpret chapters 421 to 427 of the statutes. Section 421.101(1) instructs the courts to give a liberal construction and application to provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act to promote their underlying purposes and policies. A basic purpose of the Wisconsin Consumer Act is "the protection of customers." Majority op., ¶ 26.1
¶ 63. Section 421.401(2) requires dismissal of an action brought in the wrong county unless the defendant "appears and waives the improper venue." The *169parties agree, as do the majority opinion and I, that the defendant in the present case "appeared."2
¶ 64. The principal issue in the present case is what the word "waives" means in the statute.
¶ 65. The majority opinion determines that "waives" means "intentionally] relinquishes] . . . the known right to proper venue"3 and that this intentional relinquishment can be accomplished by an "express statement" or by conduct.4 According to the majority opinion, waiver by conduct "occurs when a party's conduct is 'so inconsistent with a purpose to stand upon one's rights as to leave no room for a reasonable inference to the contrary.'" Majority op., ¶ 38.5
*170¶ 66. I disagree that "waives" in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) includes waiver by conduct.6 Rather, I agree with Nuvell Credit that the meaning of "waives" in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) requires an express waiver of improper venue. An express waiver is an affirmative expression in writing or by oral stipulation on the record in open court. Such an affirmative expression must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
¶ 67. This interpretation of "waives" gives litigants and courts a rule as "bright line" as possible, one that will protect the consumer and discourage confusion and litigation about the collateral issue of waiver by conduct.
¶ 68. This interpretation comports with the legislative statement of the purposes and policies of the Wisconsin Consumer Act. The explicit legislative rule of construction is that the Wisconsin Consumer Act "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote [its] un*171derlying purposes and policies." Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1). The legislature stated the underlying purposes and policies of chapters 421 to 427 as follows in § 421.102(2):
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing consumer transactions;
(b) To protect customers against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable practices by merchants;
(c) To permit and encourage the development of fair and economically sound consumer practices in consumer transactions; and
(d) To coordinate the regulation of consumer credit transactions with the policies of the federal consumer credit protection act.
¶ 69. Express waiver promotes the legislative policy of "protecting] customers against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable practices by merchants."7 The consumer/customer is often the defendant, is often unsophisticated about the law, and frequently represents himself or herself, without an attorney. A requirement of express waiver protects the consumer against unwittingly relinquishing a right that the statute provides.
¶ 70. Express waiver also serves the purposes to "simplify" and "clarify" the law governing consumer transactions8 and to "encourage the development of fair and economically sound consumer practices in consumer transactions."9 Express waiver is simpler and clearer than construing waiver by conduct and it en*172courages the fair and sound practice of clear and explicit communication of consumers' rights in Wisconsin.
¶ 71. Nuvell Credit did not expressly waive its right to a proper venue in the present case. Nuvell Credit did not execute an affirmative expression in writing or enter into an oral stipulation on the record in open court to waive improper venue. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and conclude that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the present action.
¶ 72. For the reasons set forth, I write separately to state what I consider the proper interpretation of "waives" in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2).
¶ 73. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 "[T]he venue provision must be interpreted to protect consumers and favor their participation in the legal process. The legislature understood that consumers are likely to have limited resources, whereas creditors are more apt to have resources and be familiar with the law." Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999).

 I have some other questions about the majority opinion but do not enumerate all of them. For example, I think the majority speaks too broadly in stating at ¶ 32: "To appear and to waive cannot be found in a single act." The accuracy of this generalization will depend on what is viewed as a single act.
The Wisconsin Consumer Act, created by 1971 Wis. Act 239 (published April 18, 1972), refers to "the federal consumer credit protection act." Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(d) (emphasis added). A federal Consumer Credit Protection Act was adopted a few years before the Wisconsin Consumer Act. See Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.). The majority opinion relies on cases referring to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was adopted after the Wisconsin Consumer Act. See Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.). No explanation is given for reliance on this later Act. See majority op., ¶¶ 41-43.
The majority opinion at n.10 cites Tower Auto. Milwaukee, LLC v. Samphere, an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals, as precedent, contrary to court rules. See Wis. Stat. § 809.23(3).

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 36, 37, 38.

 Majority op., ¶ 38.

 I wonder whether the majority opinion's alternative way of expressing this thought — "affirmative acts unambiguously *170demonstrating that his conduct is intentionally undertaken and meant to give up the right to proper venue" — expresses a different test. Majority op., ¶ 38.

 IO also disagree with the majority opinion's application of its definition of conduct to the facts of the present case.
The majority opinion concludes that although Nuvell Credit knew that the venue was improper and that it could get a dismissal of the action, its conduct of continuing litigation was merely "defending itself," not an intentional relinquishment of the known right to proper venue. Majority op., ¶ 50. If Nuvell Credit's conduct in the present case does not constitute an intentional relinquishment of the known right to proper venue, what conduct would be an intentional relinquishment of the known right to proper venue?
If I were to agree with the majority opinion's "conduct/waiver" approach, I would have to dissent. In addition to filing an answer and appearing, Nuvell Credit participated in discovery. I conclude that Nuvell Credit's conduct constitutes a waiver under the majority opinion's test.

 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(b).

 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(a).

 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(c).