Court Opinion

ID: 9654591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:43:03.823133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:07.490577
License: Public Domain

• DONNELLY, Judge.
Plaintiff is the Special District for the Education and Training of Handicapped Children of St. Louis County, Missouri, a public school district. Defendants are Hubert Wheeler, State Commissioner of Education, and the members of the State Board of Education. Intervenor Plaintiff is the State of Missouri by its Attorney General.
During the 1963-64 school year, the Special District provided speech therapy to parochial school children by sending its speech teachers (clinicians) into the parochial schools. On February 27, 1964 the Special District brought this suit for a declaratory judgment asserting the validity of its 1963-64 practice after the State Board of Education refused to reimburse the Special District for its expenses in providing such therapy.
During the 1964-65 school year the Special District changed its program and provided speech therapy for parochial school children in buildings maintained by the Special District. Parochial school children who desired to receive such therapy were released from the parochial schools for part of their regular six-hour school day.
During the 1965-66 school year, the Special District continued to offer speech therapy for parochial school children in buildings which it maintained. However, the time spent by the parochial school children for such therapy was in addition to their regular school day. The validity of this particular practice is not before this Court for review and we express no opinion as to it.
On October 12, 1965, the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, entered judgment holding invalid the practices followed in the 1963-64 school year and the 1964-65 school year. An appeal was perfected to this Court.
Section 5 of Article IX of the Missouri Constitution, V.A.M.S., reads as follows: “The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall be paid into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.”
Section 161.180 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., read as follows: “There is hereby created a state public school fund which shall consist of all certificates of indebtedness issued under the provisions of this law, and all moneys, bonds, lands and other prop*63erties belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes and the net proceeds of all sales of lands and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat. All such funds shall be paid into the state treasury and securely invested by the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund, the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.”
Section 3(a) of Article IX of the Missouri Constitution reads as follows: “All appropriations by the state for the support of free public schools and the income from the public school fund shall be paid at least annually and distributed according to law.”
Section 3(b) of Article IX of the Missouri Constitution reads as follows: “In event the public school fund provided and set apart by law for the support of free public schools, shall be insufficient to sustain free schools at least eight months in every year in each school district of the state, the general assembly may provide for such deficiency; but in no case shall there be set apart less than twenty-five per cent of the state revenue, exclusive of interest and sinking fund, to be applied annually to the support of the free public schools.”
The Seventy-Second General Assembly passed an act appropriating from the State School Moneys Fund to the State Board of Education, for the period beginning July 1, 1963, and ending June 30, 1965, “[A]ll sums credited to the State School Moneys Fund from whatever source and not elsewhere appropriated, or as much as may be necessary for the support of the free public schools under the Foundation Plan.” Laws of Missouri, 1963, p. 8.
In McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927, this Court en Banc held that the use of public school funds to transport pupils to and from a parochial school was not for the purpose of maintaining free public schools and that such use was unlawful. Is the use of public school moneys to send speech teachers of the Special District into the parochial schools for speech therapy a use for the purpose of maintaining free public schools ? We think not. The use of public school funds for the education of pupils in parochial schools is not for the purpose of maintaining free public schools. We hold the 1963-64 practice unlawful and invalid.
The trial court found the 1964 — 65 practice of providing speech therapy during regular school hours for parochial school children in buildings maintained by the Special District contravened the Missouri compulsory attendance law (§ 164.010, RS Mo 1959, V.A.M.S.; see § 167.031, Laws 1963, p. 274, § 8-3, effective July 1, 1965). The decisive portion of both statutes reads as follows: “Every parent, guardian or other person in this state having charge, control or custody of a child between the ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause the child to attend regularly some day school, public, private, parochial or parish, * * * »
The school day is a six-hour day. Section 163.020, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; §; 160.041, Laws 1963, p. 209, § 1-4, effective July 1, 1965.
The parties stipulated that “ * * parochial school children are released from their regular schools for part of their regular six-hour school day so that they may attend speech correction classes in buildings maintained by the Plaintiff District.” By statute it is mandatory that each child “attend regularly some day school.” We are asked to change the statutory requirement to read “some day schools” or to read “some day school or schools.” We cannot do this. We find no ambiguity which would permit us to. judicially ascertain the legislative intent. We must apply the statute as written. *64Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Thomason, Mo., 384 S.W.2d 651, 659. Our view is well stated in State v. Pilkinton, Mo.App., 310 S.W.2d 304, at 309, 310, as follows: “In the construction and application of statutes bearing upon school and educational matters * * * as in the construction and application of other statutes * * *, our appellate courts have observed time and again that the wisdom of legislative policy, as reflected and expressed in statutory enactments, is for the General Assembly and is beyond and without the pale of judicial inquiry and review. Bluntly put, our function is to declare, apply and enforce the law as we find it, not to legislate by judicial fiat. * * * The General Assembly is presumed to have intended what it has stated directly and unambiguously, and we may not, under the guise of construction, add to or take from the clear and definite terms of Section 164.010.”
The Special District directs our attention to subparagraph (1) of the compulsory attendance law which read as follows : “(1) A child who, to the satisfaction of the superintendent of schools of the district in which he resides or another person authorized to act for him, is determined to be mentally or physically incapacitated may be excused from attendance at school for the full time required, or any part thereof; * * * ”, and contend that the parochial school children involved here come under this exception. The record does not support this assertion. There is no showing that the “determination” required was made. Had such a “determination” been made, the constitutional validity of the practice could be subjected to judicial scrutiny. See Sections 6 and 7 of Article I and Section 8 of Article IX of the Missouri Constitution. However, this question is not before this Court for review and we express no opinion as to it.
The Special District and the Attorney General contend that the compulsory attendance law does not apply here- in that it is properly directed against the parents or legal custodians of the children and not against the defendants. This contention is without merit. The State Commissioner of Education, with others, is charged with the duty of enforcing the compulsory attendance law. See § 164.090 RSMo 1959, effective prior to July 1, 1965 and § 167.111, Laws 1963, p. 277 § 8-11, effective July 1, 1965. Also, Section 3(a) of Article IX of the Missouri Constitution requires that “appropriations by the state for the support of free public schools * * * shall be * * distributed according to law.”
The Attorney General contends the condemnation of the practice here in question by the trial court is unconstitutional because it deprives non-public school pupils of liberty without due process of law and of equal protection of the laws. There is no merit in this contention. The fact that parochial school students, not public school students, are involved here, is incidental. There is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court invoked the compulsory attendance law because the students were parochial school students and not public school students. We recognize inherent difficulties in reconciling the desire on the one hand that children not be discriminated'against because of their religious beliefs and the desire on the other hand that there be no acts permitted which would involve constitutional invalidity. We also recognize that children cannot be compelled to attend public schools when their parents desire to send them to parochial schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468. However, these questions must be treated and resolved another day. If the General Assembly should decide to change the compulsory attendance law to permit attendance by students generally at more than one school during the school day, and constitutional questions arise incident to practices initiated pursuant thereto, we will consider them when properly presented to us.
The Special District contends the trial court erred in ignoring an opinion *65rendered by the Attorney General and in not directing payment of at least partial state aid. These particular contentions were not asserted in the motions for new trial and cannot be considered on appeal. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, Franklin County, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573.
The judgment is affirmed.
STORCKMAN, C. J., and HOLMAN, HENLEY and EAGER, JJ., concur.
FINCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed.
HYDE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and concurs in separate opinion of FINCH, J.