Court Opinion

ID: 9961632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:07:52.00243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:13.054883
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 12, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-1230-ME

JASON D. MILLS                                                      APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
v.                     FAMILY COURT DIVISION IV
                  HONORABLE LUCAS M. JOYNER, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 23-D-00077-001

E.M., A MINOR                                                         APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Jason Mills (“Jason”) appeals the Knox Family Court’s

issuance of a Domestic Violence Order (“DVO”) against him on behalf of E.M.,

Jason’s minor daughter. Jason argues the family court failed to make adequate

findings of fact to support the issuance of a DVO. Jason further argues the family

court abused its discretion by entering the DVO because there was no evidence that

domestic violence may occur again. We conclude adequate findings were made
based on substantial evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion by the family

court. We affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               E.M. was fifteen years old at the time of the DVO hearing. E.M.’s

mother passed away in October 2019. Jason and E.M.’s mother were not living

together when she died, and Jason had joint custody with timesharing. When

E.M.’s mother died, Jason became the sole legal custodian of E.M.

              Despite Jason having sole custody of E.M., there is a dispute as to

whether E.M. lived with him full time after her mother’s death, or if she resided for

some time with her maternal aunt and uncle, Deborah and Terry Lee (collectively

“Lees”). The Lees filed a petition1 in the Knox Family Court in February 2023,

seeking custody or visitation with E.M. In July 2023, the family court awarded the

Lees visitation with E.M. every other weekend.

              In August 2023, the Lees filed a motion to hold Jason in contempt for

disregarding the visitation order. A different family court division conducted a

hearing on this contempt motion on August 30, 2023. Immediately after this

hearing the events leading to the issuance of the DVO took place. On that same

1
  No. 23-CI-00073. None of the record of this separate case was submitted for review, but
references made in the present case indicate issues included de facto custodian status and waiver.

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day, E.M. filed her Petition/Motion for Order of Protection, and an Emergency

Protective Order (“EPO”) was entered.

             A hearing on E.M.’s petition was held on September 13, 2023. E.M.

testified that after the court hearing on August 30, Jason was angry because of the

presiding judge’s statements that Jason must abide by the visitation order, which

Jason insists violates his parental rights. While walking out of the courthouse,

E.M. and her stepmother exchanged words. E.M. told her stepmother to “shut up.”

(E.M. acknowledged during the hearing that she should not have told an adult to

shut up.) Jason told E.M. not to say anything else, and she responded by asking

“why?” E.M. testified that Jason then hit her in the back with his hand or fist,

which caused her to stumble, and Jason then grabbed her by her shirt, pulling her

towards him. E.M. pulled away and ran back inside the courthouse, where she

made a report to an officer.

             E.M. testified that Jason had never hit her before, but she has

witnessed him be physically aggressive to other family members. She recalled an

occasion at her grandmother’s house where Jason slapped her teenage cousin in the

face and continued to hit him after he fell onto a couch. She also recalled an

instance when Jason shoved a former stepmother against a car. She asked the court

for a DVO because she was scared Jason would hit her again if she went back to

his home.

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             Jason also testified at the hearing. He denied hitting E.M., although

he acknowledges pulling on her sweatshirt to “get her attention.” He stated he has

not used any type of physical discipline on E.M. in many years. He argues the

reason E.M. filed the petition was so she could live with the Lees, who allow her

much more freedom and do not require her to follow his rules. He does not believe

he hurt her, nor did he intend to hurt her.

             The Barbourville police officer called to the scene testified. The

officer described Jason as “angry” and E.M. as “extremely shook.” The officer

saw no visible marks or injuries on E.M. The officer further investigated the

incident and watched the available courthouse security video. While the

courthouse security cameras recorded E.M. running back inside the courthouse, the

altercation was outside any camera view.

             The family court frankly agonized over this decision. After obvious

consideration with acknowledgement that this was a very close call, the family

court issued a DVO for a period of one year. The family court stated that while

Jason did not believe his actions rose to the level of an act of domestic violence,

E.M. certainly did. The court described E.M. as traumatized. The court deemed

E.M. credible and found by a preponderance of the evidence that E.M. was more

likely than not a victim of domestic violence and the required likelihood of it

occurring again existed. But the family court did not impose the standard DVO

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restrictions. The family court did not include firearm restrictions. It ordered Jason

and E.M. to undergo counseling together, and it did not prohibit communication

between Jason and E.M. The family court believed therapeutic contact was

necessary to repair the relationship. This appeal follows.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

                A review of a trial court’s decision regarding the entry of a domestic

violence order is limited to “whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly

erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112,

115 (Ky. App. 2010). “Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is

unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.” Dunn v. Thacker, 546 S.W.3d 576,

578 (Ky. App. 2018). A trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if

supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.

2003). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient probative value that it permits

a reasonable mind to accept as adequate the factual determinations of the trial

court. Id.

                                       ANALYSIS

                Domestic violence orders are governed by KRS2 Chapter 403. In

order to enter a Domestic Violence Order, a trial court is required to find by a

preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence has occurred and is likely to

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -5-
occur again. KRS 403.740. “The preponderance of the evidence standard is

satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely

than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Dunn v. Thacker, supra at

580. “The definition of domestic violence and abuse, found in KRS 403.720(1),

includes ‘physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the

infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,

or assault between family members.’” Abdul-Rahman v. Peterson, 338 S.W.3d

823, 825 (Ky. App. 2011).

             Jason first argues the family court failed to make adequate findings of

fact. In Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Ky. 2021), the Kentucky Supreme

Court noted that only the “essential facts” are required to support the issuance of a

DVO. “[I]n issuing a protective order, the only ‘essential facts’ the trial court is

required to find are (1) whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating

violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has occurred, and (2) whether it may

occur again.” Id. (citation omitted).

             The family court in this case filled out AOC Form 275.3. This form

recites these “essential facts” necessary for issuing a DVO. And in this instance,

the family court checked the box which states under Additional Findings: “For

Petitioner against Respondent in that it was established, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that an act(s) of: domestic violence and abuse . . . has occurred and may

                                          -6-
again occur.” A properly completed AOC Form 275.3 constitutes sufficient

findings to support the issuance of a DVO. Id. at 818. See also Williford v.

Williford, 583 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. App. 2019).

               Jason argues that no evidence was presented to support a finding that

domestic violence may again occur. E.M. presented evidence to support this

finding. She testified to other instances which she witnessed in which Jason was

physically violent or abusive toward other family members. E.M. stated she was

afraid if she went home with her father, he would hit her again. The family court

believed the parties had reached a “boiling point” from which they needed to be

pulled back.

               We agree with the family court’s acknowledgement that this case

presents a very close call. But when reviewing the issuance of a DVO, “the test is

not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the court’s findings

were clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254

S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008). We must give great deference to the family

court as the finder of fact. “It has long been held that the trier of fact has the right

to believe the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to another.”

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). “The trier of fact

may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the

                                           -7-
credibility of the witness[es].” Id. The family court remarked at length on E.M.’s

credibility.

               We additionally recognize the “enormous significance to the parties

involved” in a DVO. Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2005). The

family court attempted to strike a delicate balance in this case to protect E.M. and

still work toward a better relationship with her father. It did not order the full

range of restrictions that are common in DVO cases. It did not impose a no-

contact restriction, a distance restriction, or a firearm restriction. Further, it

ordered the parties to undergo counseling together to attempt to mend the

relationship. We do not believe this order constitutes an abuse of discretion.

                                    CONCLUSION

               The Knox Family Court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence and are thus not clearly erroneous. The Knox Family Court acted within

its discretion and is AFFIRMED.

               ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Allison Spencer Russell                     Hailey Scoville Bonham
 Louisville, Kentucky                        London, Kentucky

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