Court Opinion

ID: 9897477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:49.435593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.247479
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 0 6:1

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    HELEN JORRIN,                                          No. 85155
                    Appellant,
                    vs.
                    THE STATE OF NEVADA
                    EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION;                             FILE
                    LYNDA PARVEN, IN HER CAPACITY
                    AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE                                    SEP 07 20
                    EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIWSION;                              ELI     H A. BROWN
                                                                                     UP     E GRT

                    J. THOMAS SUSICH, IN HIS                             BY
                                                                                IEF DEPUTY CLERK
                    CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF
                    THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
                    BOARD OF REVIEW; AND CLARK
                    COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
                    Respondents.

                              Appeal from a district court order dismissing a petition for
                   judicial review in an administrative law case.    Eighth Judicial District
                   Court, Clark County; Adriana Escobar, Judge.
                              Affirmed.

                   Nevada Legal Services and Kristopher S. Pre, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Clark County School District, Office of the General Counsel and Patrick J.
                   Murch, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent Clark County School District.

                   State of Nevada/DETR and Carolyn M. Broussard and David Kalo Neidert,
                   Carson City,
                   for Respondents Lynda Parven, J. Thomas Susich, and the State of Nevada
                   Employment Security Division.

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                                                                                    73- vi231
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                    BEFORE  THE     SUPREME              COURT,       HERNDON,         LEE,     and
                    PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

                                                      OPINION

                    PER CURIAM:
                                We have previously noted that the former version of NRCP 6(d),
                    which adds three days to certain time periods when service is made by mail,
                    applied to the time period for filing a petition for judicial review challenging
                    a decision by the Nevada Employment Security Division's (NESD) Board of
                    Rev,iew under NRS 612.530(1). Kame v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 105 Nev. 22, 23
                    n.1: 769 P.2d 66, 67 n.1 (1989) (citing former NRCP 6). In revisiting this
                    issue, we now conclude that, based on its plain language, NRCP 6(d)'s three-
                    day mailing rule does not apply to extend the time period for filing a petition
                    for judicial review under NRS 612.530(1) and overrule Kame to the exteht
                    it holds otherwise. In this case, because the petition was filed beyond the
                    statutory time period, the district court properly dismissed the petition, and
                    we therefore affirm.
                                                        FACTS
                                Appellant Helen Jorrin sought and was denied unemployment
                    benefits. Aft.er an appeals referee confirmed the denial of benefits, she
                    sought relief from NESD's Board of Review. The letter denying the request
                    was mailed on August 27, 2021, stating that the Board •of Review's decision
                    becine final as of September 7, 2021. It further stated that Jorrin had until
                    SePtember 20, 2021, to appeal that decision. Jorrin filed her appeal, a
                    petition for judicial review to the district court, on September 21, 2021.
                    NESD moved for dismissal, arguing that the untimeliness of Jorrin's
                    petition stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the case. The district
                    court granted NESD's motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the•
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                petition because jorrin had filed it a day late. The district court also denied
                Jortin's motion to alter or amend the judgment, and Jorrin now appeal,s.
                                               DISCUSSION
                            Jorrin asserts that her petition was timely because NESD
                served its decision by mail and thus NRCP 6(d) provided three additional
                days to file the petition.     •She therefóre argues that she had until.

                September 23 to file her petition and the district court erred in dismissing
                her petition as untimely. NESD argues that NRCP 6(d) does not apply and
                the.district court correctly granted dismissal because it lacked jurisdiction
                over Jorrin's untimely petition.    Because this case present§ an issue of

                statutory construction, our review is de novo. See Hardin v. Jones, 102 Nev.
                469, 470, 727 P.2d 551, 552 (1986) (reviewing the proper Construction of a
                statutory- appeal period de novo because it presents "a legal, rather than a
                factual, question").
                            NRCP 6(d) provides that "[w]hen a party may •or must act
                within a specified time after being served and service is made [by mail], 3
                days are added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a)."
                The rule thus applies only when service triggers the time for a party to act.
                See. id. The former version of the rule, NRCP 6(e) (1953), amended by ADkT
                522 (Order Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Appellate
                Procedure, and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Comiersion Rules, Dec. 31,
                2018), similarly based its application on service, stating that "[w]henevet a
                party has the right or is required to do some act within a proscribed period
                after service of a notice . . . upon him and the notice. . is served upon him
                by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period." We have therefore
                applied the former version of NRCP 6(d) to extend deadlines in
                adininistrative cases where a statute specifies that a party has to act within
                a certain time after being served.    For example, we applied the former
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                NRCP 6(d) to extend the tiine to administratively apPeal the initial.. denial
                of unemployment benefits to an appeal referee under NRS 612.495(1)
                (1981), arnended by A.B. 502, 73d Leg. (Nev. 2005), which provided "Nile
                appeal must be filed within 10 days after the date of mailing, electronic
                transmission or personal service of the -?notice of determination or
                redetermination." See Hardin, 102 Nev. at 2170 n.2, 471, 727 P.2d at 551
                ri.2, 552.1 We also applied the former version of NRCP 6(d) to the 30-day
                time period to file a petition for judicial review of an agency decision under
                NRS 233B.130(2)(c) (2005), amended by A.B. 94, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007),
                where the 30-day period begins "after service of the final agency decision."
                See. Mikohn Gaming v. Espinosa, 122 Nev. 593, 598, 137 P.3d 1150, 1154
                (2006).2
                              In this case, the statute setting the time to file a petition for
                judicial review from the NESD Board of Review's determination is NRS
                612.530(1).     We have held that NRS 612.530(1)'s requirements "are
                jurisdictional and mandatory." Bd. of Review, Nev. Dep't of Emp't, Training
                & Rehab. v. Second Judicial Di.st. Court, 133 Nev. 253, 255, 396 P.3d 795,
                797'r (2017). Under that statute, a party has "11 days after the deciSion of
                the [NESD] Board of Review has become final" to file a petition for judicial
                   ,
                review. NRS 612.530(1). Because the statute uses the date the decision
                becennes final, rather than the decision's service date, to trigger the time to

                     'The amendment to NRS 612.495 changed the time to
                administratively appeal from 10 days to 11, but the relevant language
                remains the same. NRS 612.495(1).

                      2 Theamendment to NRS 233B.130 changed the numbering of the
                subsections, but the relevant language remains the same.    NRS
                233B.130(2)(d).
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                    file a petition, NRCP 6(d) does not apply by its plain language. See Leven
                    v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 403, 168 P.3d 712, 715 (2007) ("[W]hen a statute's
                    language is plain and its meaning clear, the courts will apply that plain
                    language."). Jorrin's reliance on Hardin and Mikohn is unavailing because•
                    the triggering statutes in those cases were based on the service of the
                    agency's decision, as noted above. Indeed, the differences in the statutory
                    language between those statutes and NRS 612.530(1) lend further support
                    to dur conclusion. See State, Dep't of Bus: & Indus. v. Titlemax of Nev., Inc.,
                    137 Nev. 540, 545, 495 P.3d 506, 510 (2021) (stating that, when discussing
                    statutory interpretation, "this court presume[s] that the variation in•
                    language [between statutes] indicates a variation in meaning" (internal
                    quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original)). And we note that
                    the time between the mailing of the decision letter, August 27, and the date
                    the decision became final, triggering the 11-day timeline to file a petition
                    for judicial review, September 7, allowed more time for mailing than the 3
                    days provided by NRCP 6(d).
                                We recognize that we previously applied the former version of
                    NRCP 6(d) to extend the time to file a petition for judicial review of an
                    NESD Board of Review decision. See Kame, 105 Nev. at 23 n.1, 769 P.2d at
                    67 n.1.   The main issue in that case, however, was whether filing the
                    petition in an incorrect format tolled the time for filing, and the opinion did
                    not address former NRCP 6(d)'s service language or that the time to file a
                    petition under NRS 612.530(1) is based on the date the decision becomes
                    final rather than when it is served. See generally id. As the issue of whether
                    the three-day mailing rule applied to NRS 612.530(1) was not squarely'
                    presented to or decided by the court in Kame, that decision does not "hold
                    [a] position[] of permanence in this court's jurisprudence" such that the

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                   stare decisis doctrine would compel against revisiting it. See Miller v. Burk,
                   124 Nev. 579, 597-97 & p.65 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 & n.65 (2008) (discussing

                   when the stare decisis doctrine applies such that the previous decision
                   should not be overruled without "weighty and conclusive reasons" for doing
                   so (internal quotation marks omitted)).       Even if we concluded Kame's

                   application of the three-day 'nailing rule constituted stare deciSis,
                   overruling the decision is appropriate, as it was "badly reasoned" for the
                   reasons Stated above. Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. 239; 243, 299 P.3d 364,
                   367 (2013) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. - 808;            827 (1991)).

                   Therefore, to the extent Karne can be read to hold that the three-day mailing
                   rule under NRCP 6(d) can apply to extend the time tO file a petition for
                   judicial review under NRS 612.530(1), we explicitly overrule it.
                               Here, as stated in NESD's decision letter, its decision became
                   final on September 7, such that any petition for judicial review had tò be
                   filed by. September 20.3 NRCP 6(d) does not apply to extend that deadline.
                   Thus, Jorrin's petition was untimely, and the district court properly
                                                                             • '33 Nev. at 255, 396
                   dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. See Bd. of Review, 1
                   P.3d at 797. As the district court correctly dismissed the petition, it also did
                   not: abuse its discretion in denying Jorrin's motion to alter or amend. the
                   dismissal order. See AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578,
                   589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (reYiewing an order denying suet' relief for
                   an abuse of discretion).

                       . 3The 11-day time period ended on September 18, a Saturday, and was
                   therefore extended to the following Monday.          See NRCP 6(a)(1)(C)
                   (providing that, when a statute does not provide how to compute time, if the
                   last day of the period "is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period
                   continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
                   Sunday, or legal holiday").
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                                               CONCLUSION
                             We overrule Kame v. Employment Security Department, 105

                Nev. 22, 769 P.2d 66 (1989), to the extent it holds that NRCP 6(d)'s three-
                day mailing period can extend the deadline to file a petition for judicial
                review under NRS 612.530(1). The district court did not apply NRCP 6(d)
                in this case and correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Jorrin's
                untimely petition for judicial review. We therefore affirm the district court's
                orders.4

                                                                      J.

                Lee.                                        Parraguirre

                       4 This opinion has been circulated among all justicOs of this court, any

                two of whom under IOP 13(b) may request en banc review of a case. The
                two votes needed to require en banc review in the first instance of the
                question of overruling Kame were not cast.
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