Court Opinion

ID: 9748086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:51:28.883019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.377714
License: Public Domain

HOLLENHORST, J.
I concur in the result but I completely disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion. The majority has misconstrued Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) to reach a result which jurisdictionally limits the time within which a mandate petition alleging a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violation may be served to 10 days. In my view, such a narrow holding is not compelled by Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) or any other provision of law.
I read the majority opinion to rest on the following conclusions:
1. Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) includes a requirement for jurisdictional service in CEQA proceedings.
2. The term “service,” as used in Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a), means personal service (or an acceptable alternative method of service).
*8503. The failure to personally serve the original complaint within 10 days affects the validity of a timely filed and served amended complaint.
4. Notwithstanding the failure to obtain jurisdiction, dismissal is not required if petitioner acts out of an excusable mistake of law.
I disagree with each of these conclusions.
1. Public Resources Code Section 21167.6, Subdivision (a) Does Not Contain a Requirement for Jurisdictional Service.
The underlying action consisted of a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The writ was brought to review the administrative detíision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5.
Service of the writ petition was therefore governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1107: “When an application is filed for the issuance of any prerogative writ, the application shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon the respondent and the real party in interest named in such application. The provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2 shall apply to the service of the application. However, when a writ of mandate is sought pursuant to the provisions of Section 1088.5, the action may be filed and served in the same manner as an ordinary action under Part 2 (commencing with Section 307).” Accordingly, California Rules of Court, rule 56(b) provides that the petition shall be accompanied by proof of service on both the respondent and the real party in interest and local rule 1(b) of the Fourth Appellate District requires personal service in all original proceedings except for good cause shown. The majority opinion therefore concludes that “[a]t one stage or another, personal service of either the alternative writ or the petition must be made.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 840.)
The majority holds that although these sections apply to the manner of service, they are overridden in CEQA actions as to the time of service by Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a). That subdivision provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions or proceedings brought pursuant to Section 21167 . . . [j[] (a) At the time the action is filed, the petitioner shall file a request that the respondent public agency prepare the record of proceedings relating to the subject of the action or proceeding. The request, together with the petition, shall be served upon the public agency not later than 10 business days after the action is filed.”
Public Resources Code section 21167 provides shortened time limits for CEQA actions. As the majority opinion points out, these requirements reflect *851a concern that CEQA actions be filed promptly and prosecuted diligently. However, the majority concedes that Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) is at least ambiguous and that we must therefore attempt to construe the intent of the Legislature to effectuate the purpose of the law.
The majority undertakes this task by first pointing out the repeated admonitions of our Supreme Court that CEQA is “ ‘to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of the University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390 [253 Cal.Rptr. 426, 764 P.2d 278], quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].)
Having stated the proposition, the majority fails to apply it on grounds that the defect was procedural, not substantive. Nevertheless, neither CEQA nor our Supreme Court differentiates between substantive and procedural defects. The result of a narrow interpretation is the same in either case—the environment is left unprotected.
Public Resources Code sections 21000 through 21003 state the purposes of CEQA in detail, and we need not repeat them here. The point is that the overall purpose of protection of the environment is not served if an ambiguous statute is construed in such a way as to foreclose judicial review of environmental decisions.
The majority relies on the fact that CEQA provides unusually short limitations periods in which actions must be brought. Thus, Public Resources Code section 21167 provides for a 30- to 180-day period in which to bring an action. Such actions are also given statutory preference in the hearing or trial (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.1) and they may be dismissed if they are not filed within the required time (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.2).
In view of the potentially significant costs which may be incurred when a project is delayed, the requirement that actions be filed within a short period of time and prosecuted diligently is not unreasonable. Thus Public Resources Code section 21167.4 requires the petitioner to request a hearing within 90 days of filing the petition, and Public Resources Code section 21167.6 requires the petitioner to request preparation of the record within 10 days of filing of the petition.
The only section dealing specifically with service, Public Resources Code section 21167.5, requires only that proof of written notice of commencement *852of the action be given to the agency and filed with the initial pleading. This section, which was complied with in this case, has been said to establish merely a notice requirement, not a jurisdictional requirement (Whitman v. Board of Supervisors (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 397, 404, fn. 2 [151 Cal.Rptr. 866].)
The same should be true of Public Resources Code section 21167.6. On its face, it deals with preparation of the record within 60 days. Even the request for preparation is not mandatory, for the petitioner may elect to prepare the record itself, or the parties may agree to an alternative method of preparation under subdivision (b). If the request is not mandatory, how can service of the request, together with the petition, be mandatory?
The majority finds the service requirement to be not only mandatory, but jurisdictional. It elevates an alleged requirement that the request for preparation of the record, together with the petition, be served within 10 days to a jurisdictional requirement for the prosecution of the CEQA action. By thus adding a very short-fiise requirement to the already short time in which a CEQA action may be brought, the majority undercuts and ignores the very purpose of CEQA, which is to allow judicial review to ensure that the agency has considered the environmental effects of its action. The majority does so even while conceding that “[t]he copy of the petition could just as reasonably be considered as essential to ensure that the local public agency knows what record is to be prepared.”
I would select the reasonable interpretation which is in accordance with the statutory purpose and find that Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) is not a jurisdictional service requirement but rather a notice provision.
2. Public Resources Code Section 21167.6, Subdivision (a) Does Not Contain a Requirement for Personal Service.
After concluding that Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) contains a jurisdictional service requirement, the majority leaps to. the conclusion that the service required is personal service. It does so by distinguishing between the time and the manner of service. It applies the Code of Civil Procedure personal service sections together with the Public Resources Code time limits to create a requirement for personal service of the petition within 10 days.1
Since the majority finds that the introductory phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” preempts the Code of Civil Procedure service *853provisions in CEQA actions, it should logically disregard the Code of Civil Procedure in interpreting the allegedly special jurisdictional requirement of Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a). If it did so, it would find that petitioner “served” the petition within the meaning of the subsection by mailing a copy of the petition to the agency within 10 days, as required by the subsection.
Nothing in the subdivision requires personal service, and the term “service” is generally used as an inclusive term to mean personal, constructive, mail, publication or other substituted service. (Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) pp. 1227-1228.) In terms of the purported legislative intent discussed by the majority, it can be argued that, if the Legislature did select a very short-fuse service requirement, it allowed, as a trade-off, a less formal method of service on a public agency, i.e., service by mail.
The majority thus applies the Code of Civil Procedure when it suits the result the majority seeks to reach, and disregards the Code of Civil Procedure when it finds it convenient to do so. It does so by artificially separating the time for service from the method of service.
If Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) is to stand alone as a special jurisdictional statute requiring service of CEQA actions within 10 days of filing of the action, I would hold that deposit of the petition in the mail within 10 business days of the filing of the action is sufficient “service” to comply with the section.
I reiterate, however, my basic conclusion that Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a) merely requires the requisite request that the public agency prepare a record of the proceedings relating to the subject of the action to be accompanied by a copy of the petition. In this way, the agency is given notice of the record which is to be prepared.
3. The Majority Fails to Consider the Effect of the Amended Petition.
Without discussion, the majority rejects the county’s contention that service of the amended petition on March 29, 1993, was untimely because *854the “window” for obtaining jurisdiction had closed.2 The majority therefore apparently concludes that a valid service could be made at a later date.
If valid service could be made at a later date, the servicé was timely. The amended petition was filed on March 23, 1993, and served on March 29, 1993, less than 10 days later. This service therefore satisfied even the majority’s restrictive view of service under Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision.(a). Significantly, the county did not even request that the service made on March 29th be rejected. Instead, it argued that the “window” for service was closed, a position the majority rejects.
The only reason valid service could not be made at the later date would be because the filing of the amended petition would not be timely under the 30-day limitations period set forth in Public Resources Code section 21167. However, such a petition was timely because the amended petition related back to the original filing date for statute of limitations purposes.3 “While it is true that an amended complaint supersedes the original, the time of filing the original complaint is still the date of commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations, except where a wholly different cause is pleaded in the amended complaint.” (Walton v. Guinn (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1360 [232 Cal.Rptr. 451].)
Since the original petition was filed within the 30-day period specified in Public Resources Code section 21167, the action was timely commenced. Assuming that the amended petition contained the same cause of action, I would find that the subsequent filing of the amended petition related back to the time of filing of the original petition. The amended petition was therefore timely filed.
Even if we apply the majority’s theory that the petition had to be personally served within 10 days of filing, the amended petition was personally served within a 10-day period following the filing of the amended petition. This personal service was not challenged by the motion to quash service. Thus, even if Public Resources Code section 21167.6 contains a jurisdictional service requirement, that requirement was met by the timely personal service of the amended petition.
*855Nevertheless, despite my disagreement with the majority on this issue, I reemphasize my belief that Public Resources Code section 21167.6 does not contain a jurisdictional service requirement. As a result, I believe that the filing and personal service of the amended petition was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the agency in a timely manner under the normal service rules.
4. There Is No Statutory Basis for the Majority’s Conclusion That a Jurisdictional Requirement Can Be Overlooked If Petitioner Acts out of an Excusable Mistake of Law.
The majority, having found that the alleged statutory requirement for jurisdictional service was not satisfied, refuses to follow its own logic and dismiss the petition.
Perhaps my strongest disagreement with the majority arises from this refusal. The majority, immediately after stating that it declines to create a dismissal remedy because the Legislature has not provided for dismissal, proceeds to create its own remedy.4 Specifically, the majority finds that “[c]ourts are thus authorized to fashion new remedial procedures when it is advisable to do so, in order to deal with new issues or protect the rights of the parties.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 848.)
In brief, the majority’s new procedure requires the respondent to move to dismiss on failure of service grounds, the petitioner to state its reasons for failing to do so, and the court to weigh the excuse against prejudice resulting from untimely service and exercise its discretion to conclude whether there was an excusable mistake or not. Applying this new procedure retroactively to this case, without an actual hearing, the majority concludes that the trial court was right for the wrong reason and that Temecula Ranchos acted out of an excusable mistake of law.
To state the proposition is to refute it. This completely invented procedure, applied retroactively on the basis of speculative and assumed facts, is totally inappropriate. I would find that the trial court acted correctly in denying the county’s motion because Public Resources Code section 21167.6 is purely a procedural notice statute. Although I agree that there has been a mistake of law in this case, it has not been the mistake of Temecula Ranchos or the trial court.
*856I concur in the judgment only. I would also award costs of this proceeding to Temecula Ranchos.

The majority concedes that, although the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” at the beginning of Public Resources Code section 21167.6 would have the effect of *853prevailing over directly contradictory provisions in other statutes, the subdivision in issue here “does not have a direct counterpart over which it prevails.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 841.) Nevertheless, the majority finds that the phrase eliminates the Code of Civil Procedure time restrictions for service, but not the sections specifying the manner of service.

The only discussion is in the context of the conclusion that, although the alleged statutory requirement for jurisdictional service was not satisfied, there was no statutory basis for dismissal of the action.

From correspondence in the administrative record, it appears that the differences between the original petition and the amended petition were that the original petition requested that Riverside County Resolution No. 92-565 be set aside in its entirety. The correspondence suggested that this attack was too broad because the resolution adopted all fourth cycle comprehensive general plan amendments for 1992. The amended petition then focused on one of those amendments (CGPA 254), the land-use approvals and the negative declaration for the project here. It therefore appears that the only differences between the two petitions is that the amended petition narrows the focus of the attack to the approvals for this project alone.

The majority states that it is not justifiable to assume that the failure to provide a dismissal remedy was a mere legislative oversight. I agree. I think it more likely that the Legislature did not provide for dismissal because it did not think it had created a requirement for jurisdictional service when it enacted Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a). The absence of a dismissal provision thus supports the position that the subdivision is a notice statute, not a jurisdictional statute.