Court Opinion

ID: 9545515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:14:33.076628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:00.891305
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
Traditional concepts regarding the fact-finding function of the jury in claims of a legal nature and of the court in claims of equitable cognizance are recognized and maintained by Rules 38 and 39, R.C.P. Colo. Any other construction of these rules disserves language and its rather plain meaning as used in the rules.
Cases interpreting the former Code of Civil Procedure can be of little value as precedent for the construction of Rules 38 and 39, R.C.P. Colo. Material changes were effected by the adoption of the present rules, as was pointed out in an address (No. 9) by a member of the Revision Committee when he stated: “This chapter changes a good deal of our former practice and should be carefully analyzed before trial.” In the same address he further pointed out that “under this provision you can demand a jury trial on a single issue or on all issues.”
Under Rules 38 and 39 (with one exception not pertinent to the present problem) , only the party having a procedural right to trial of an issue or issues to a jury *132may act to lose that right; it is not within the power of his adversary to bring about such a result. The words of the rules make this manifest. The mention of the ways in which the party who is entitled to have a jury trial of an issue loses this procedural right excludes the notion that his adversary may compass the loss of such right.
How many he lose this right? I enumerate:
1. “An issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is thereafter waived.” Rule 38 (a) and (d).
2. A demand for a jury trial of certain issues may constitute a relinquishment of such trial as to other issues. Rule 38 (b) and (c).
3. He may “consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury,” either by written stipulation filed with the court or by oral stipulation made in open court. Rule 39 (a).
The only way in which the adversary can effect a denial of jury trial is by his failure “to appear at the trial.” Rule 39 (a). That the rule provides but one way that an adversary may circumvent jury trial strongly suggests that the adversary has no other way to achieve it.
“Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable by a jury. . . .” Rule 38 (b). “In his demand a party may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all issues so triable.” Rule 38 (c). This is plain language; and yet is not its meaning beggared by the construction contained in the majority opinion?
If demand for jury trial includes issues as to which a party is not entitled to a jury trial, court should not deny demand but should limit it to issues on which a jury trial could properly be sought. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F. (2d) 46.
I agree that the claim of the plaintiffs, being equitable in nature, should be tried to the court without a jury. Defenses asserted to defeat this claim should also be resolved by the court. If the resolution of the issues drawn by the complaint and answer leave the counterclaim of *133defendants (legal in nature, and hence triable by a jury) not subject to the defense of res judicata, the trial court then should call a jury for the determination of the counterclaim and answers directed to it. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F.S. 645. See City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 169 F. (2d) 713.
Once a proper demand for jury trial has been made, the trial court is divested of its authority as fact-finder. If the counterclaim becomes triable, the trial court, I would hold, has not the authority to resolve it since a proper demand for jury was made.