Court Opinion

ID: 9838877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 16:09:01.198671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:27.964369
License: Public Domain

J-A08024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  SUZETTE M. INTIHAR               :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :                PENNSYLVANIA
                  Appellant        :
                                   :
                                   :
            v.                     :
                                   :
                                   :
  BRETT E. BOSTIAN, WAL-MART       :           No. 500 WDA 2022
  STORES EAST, L.P.; WAL-MART REAL :
  ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST; AND       :
  WAL-MART, INC.                   :

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2020-2500

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                       FILED: September 8, 2023

       Suzette M. Intihar (“Intihar”) appeals from the order granting summary

judgment in favor of Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Wal-Mart Real Estate

Business Trust, and Wal-Mart, Inc. (collectively, “Wal-Mart”) in Intihar’s

personal injury action.1 We affirm.

       Intihar’s personal injury action arises from an accident that occurred in

front of a Wal-Mart Supercenter (“the store”). Intihar left the store and was

walking in the crosswalk to the store’s parking lot when Brett E. Bostian

(“Bostian”) struck her with his motor vehicle.        See Intihar’s Complaint,
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court’s order granting Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion          did
not dispose of all claims between all parties in Intihar’s personal injury action.
See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). However, as discussed below, the trial court timely
certified the order for an immediate appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
J-A08024-23

7/6/20, at 3 (unnumbered); see also Intihar’s Deposition Exhibit 11;

Bostian’s Deposition Exhibit 14.2 The paint for the crosswalk’s markings and

instruction to “YIELD” on the roadway was faded. See Intihar’s Deposition

Exhibit 7. There was a yellow “pedestrian crossing” street sign on the curb by

the crosswalk where the accident occurred. See Intihar’s Deposition, Part I,

3/26/21, at 45; Intihar’s Deposition, Part II, 4/1/21, at 281-82.

       Bostian remained at the scene and told a police officer that he looked

away from the roadway before the accident because he thought he heard

someone call his name. See Bostian’s Deposition, 4/29/21, at 29-31; see

also Bostian’s Deposition Exhibit 16. Intihar suffered injuries to her leg, foot,

and knee, including a “[c]omminuted and displaced left tibial plateau.”

Intihar’s Complaint, 7/6/20, at 3-4. Intihar underwent surgery and spent four

days in the hospital after the accident.         See Intihar’s Deposition, Part II,

4/1/21, at 197-99.

       Intihar filed a complaint asserting Bostian’s negligent operation of his

vehicle and Wal-Mart’s negligent design and maintenance of its premises.

Wal-Mart and Bostian filed separate answers and new matter, as well as

crossclaims against each other.

____________________________________________

2 Surveillance cameras recorded the accident and showed two cars passing
through the crosswalk as Intihar left the store and approached the crosswalk.
See Intihar’s Deposition Exhibit 11; Bostian’s Deposition Exhibit 14; see also
Bostian’s Deposition, 4/29/21, at 77-81. Moments after the second car passed
through the crosswalk, Intihar entered the crosswalk, and Bostian struck
Intihar. See Bostian’s Deposition, 4/29/21, at 55-59, 77-81.

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       During discovery, Intihar produced a preliminary letter report from Brad

Avrit, P.E. (“Avrit”), a civil engineer. Avrit concluded the installation of “traffic

calming devices,” such as stop signs, could have prevented the accident.

Letter Report from Brad Avrit, P.E., 12/15/21 at 7 (“Avrit’s report”).3 Intihar

and Bostian subsequently testified at depositions.4 At his deposition, Bostian

testified he was familiar with store and believed, mistakenly, there were stop

signs on the roadway at the marked pedestrian crossings in front of the store.

See Bostian’s Deposition, 4/29/21, at 25. He asserted he thought he had

stopped, or would have stopped but got distracted immediately before the

accident because he thought he heard someone call his name and looked away

from the crosswalk.       See Bostian’s Deposition, 4/29/21, at 26-27, 35, 69.

____________________________________________

3 There had been a total of five accidents involving pedestrians struck in the

parking lot of the store in the three years before the present accident, two of
which occurred in the crosswalk. See Avrit’s Report at 6. According to Intihar,
one of those reports concerned an earlier accident at a different crosswalk by
the same store. Intihar alleged that Wal-Mart subsequently placed stop signs
at the site of the earlier accident. She also asserted Wal-Mart did the same
shortly after her accident. The trial court did not rule on Wal-Mart’s assertion
that evidence of its subsequent remedial measures would be inadmissible.
See Wal-Mart’s Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment, 3/24/22, at 4;
see also Pa.R.E. 407 (noting that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, defects in a design,
or the need for warning or instructions, but a court may admit such evidence
for other purposes).

4 At her deposition, Intihar testified that she and Bostian had made eye contact

just as she entered the crosswalk, but that Bostian proceeded to strike her as
she was in the crosswalk. See Intihar’s Deposition, Part I, 3/26/21, at 57-58.

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Bostian maintained he did not see Intihar until just before impact. See id. at

26-27, 35.5

       Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment arguing, in part, that it did not

proximately cause Intihar’s injuries.          See Wal-Mart’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, 2/11/22, at 7. Wal-Mart asserted Bostian’s statement to police

and his deposition testimony were consistent and uncontradicted and

established Bostian struck Intihar because he looked away from the crosswalk

when he thought he heard someone call his name. See id. at 5-6, 8. Wal-

Mart further argued Avrit’s report did not raise a genuine issue of material fact

because Avrit ignored Bostian’s testimony concerning his familiarity with the

roadway, his belief that he thought he needed to stop regardless of the type

of sign posted at the crosswalk, and his claim that he would have stopped but

for the distraction caused when he thought someone called his name. See

id.   at   6,   11.     Intihar   answered       and   generally   denied   Wal-Mart’s

characterizations of the record. Intihar maintained that the installation of a

stop sign could have prevented the accident, and relied on Avrit’s conclusion

that Wal-Mart’s failure to erect or install reasonable safety measures was a

substantial contributing factor in the accident. See Intihar’s Answer to Wal-

Mart’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/9/22, at 8-9 (unnumbered).

       The trial court heard arguments on Wal-Mart’s motion and, on April 6,

2022, granted Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned
____________________________________________

5 Wal-Mart produced recordings and still pictures from surveillance cameras

at the front of the store.

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that Bostian’s distracted driving was the sole cause of the accident and Avrit’s

report failed to establish genuine issues of material fact concering whether

Wal-Mart proximately caused the accident. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/22,

at 11-15. Intihar timely filed a motion to amend the order granting Wal-Mart’s

summary judgment motion to include a determination of finality,6 which the

court granted on April 21, 2022.               See Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).   Intihar timely

appealed. Both Intihar and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Intihar raises the following issues for review:

       A. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
          favor of [Wal-Mart]?

       B. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Wal-Mart’s
          actions and/or inactions were not the proximate cause of
          [Intihar’s] injuries[?]

       C. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that [Bostian] was
          solely responsible for the harm suffered by Intihar?

       D. Whether the trial court erred by substituting its own judgment
          as to the allocation of fault between [Wal-Mart and Bostian]
          rather than allowing a jury to make that determination?

Intihar’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).

       Intihar’s issues challenge the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This Court’s standard of review requires that

we reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court commits an

error of law or abuses its discretion. See Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991,

____________________________________________

6 Intihar, in seeking a certification of finality pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c),
asserted that she and Bostian entered into a pro rata joint tortfeasor release
that released Bostian from all claims in the matter. See Intihar’s Motion to
Amend Order, 4/21/22, at 3 (unnumbered).

                                           -5-
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996 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). Our scope or review is plenary, and we

must examine the entire record. See Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fackler,

835 A.2d 712, 715 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      It is well settled that “summary judgment is appropriate only in those

cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” See Truax, 126 A.3d at 996 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

“[A] record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material

facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out

a prima facie cause of action or defense.” Olszewski v. Parry, 283 A.3d

1257, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citation omitted) (italics added). A

court must examine the factual record of a case in a light most favorable to

the non-moving party. See Brown v. City of Oil City, 294 A.3d 413, 427

(Pa. 2023). This includes expert reports. See Bourgeois v. Snow Time,

Inc., 242 A.3d 637, 652 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a court may not sua sponte

undermine an expert’s opinion if there is sufficient support for the expert’s

conclusion).

      To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the

defendant owed her a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3)

causation between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual

damage to the plaintiff. See Newell v. Montana West, Inc., 154 A.3d 819,

822 (Pa. Super. 2017).    To establish a prima facie case of negligence, the

plaintiff must establish a causal connection between defendant’s conduct and

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the plaintiff’s injury, even when the record demonstrates the defendant

breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff. See Hamil v. Bashline, 392

A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 1978); Straw v. Fair, 187 A.3d 966, 993 (Pa. Super.

2018).

      Causation has two components: (1) cause-in-fact and (2) legal or

proximate cause. See Pomroy v. Hosp. of University of Pennsylvania,

105 A.3d 740, 745 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Cause-in-

fact means that the plaintiff would not have suffered a harm “but-for” the

defendant’s alleged negligence. See First v. Zem Zem Temple, 686 A.2d

18, 21 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1996). Proximate cause requires that the defendant

be a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff.

Straw, 187 A.3d at 993 (internal citation omitted).

      As explained by our Supreme Court, proximate cause

      involves the making of a judgment as to whether the defendant’s
      conduct although a cause in the “but for” sense is so insignificant
      that no ordinary mind would think of it as a cause for which a
      defendant should be held responsible. Section 431, comment a,
      Restatement [(Second) of Torts], explains the distinction between
      substantial cause and cause in fact as follows:

         “The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact that the
         defendant’s conduct has such an [e]ffect in producing the
         harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause,
         using that word in the popular sense, in which there always
         lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called
         ‘philosophic sense,’ which includes every one of the great
         number of events without which any happening would not
         have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-
         called ‘philosophic sense,’ yet the effect of many of them is
         so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them
         as causes.”

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Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. 1977) (internal citations omitted).

“[T]he concept [of proximate cause], like that of negligence itself, was

designed not only to permit recovery for a wrong but to place such limits upon

liability as are deemed socially or economically desirable from time to time.”

Straw, 187 A.3d at 994 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Factors

relevant to the consideration of proximate cause include: “the number of other

factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect

which they have in producing it”; “whether the actor's conduct has created a

force or series of forces which are in continuous and active operation up to

the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon

by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; and the “lapse of time.”

Id. at 994-95 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433.)

      More than one cause may contribute to and thus proximately cause an

injury. See id. at 995. However, a co-defendant, like Wal-Mart, is not liable

to the plaintiff where a third-party co-defendant, like Bostian, is a

“superseding cause” of the plaintiff’s injury.   To constitute a superseding

cause, the third party’s conduct must be so extraordinary that the defendant

could not foresee it. See id. Thus,

      [i]f the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
      manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor
      negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally
      tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable
      for harm caused thereby.

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Id. at 995-96 (internal citation, quotations, and brackets omitted).         The

negligence of the third-party will not relieve the defendant of liability if the

defendant created the risk of a particular harm and was a substantial factor

in causing the harm. See id. at 995.

      Determinations of whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial

factor and whether a third party’s conduct was “extraordinary” are ordinarily

matters for the finder of fact at trial. See id.; Ford, 379 A.2d at 114. A court

properly enters summary judgment only where “the facts are so clear that

reasonable minds could not differ . . ..” Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner

U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 896 (Pa. 2006)

(internal citation omitted).

      We summarize Intihar’s arguments in this appeal together because they

are related to the trial court’s conclusion that Bostian was the sole cause of

the accident and Wal-Mart’s negligence in the design of the crosswalk was not

a proximate cause. Intihar initially asserts Wal-Mart knew, or should have

known, that the crosswalk where Bostian struck Intihar was defective, the

crosswalk constituted a safety hazard for its customers entering and leaving

the store, and the posting of stop signs could have prevented the accident.

See Intihar’s Brief at 16-17.

      As to the causation, Intihar argues Bostian’s careless driving was a

foreseeable risk that did not relieve Wal-Mart of liability because the design of

the roadway increased the risk of similar accidents occurring. See id. at 18-

20. She asserts the fact that Wal-Mart placed stop signs at the crosswalk

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after prior accidents would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Wal-Mart

was a substantial factor in bringing about her injuries. See id. at 21. She

further contends that “[t]raffic calming devices would have caused vehicle

traffic in front of Mr. Bostian to stop before the crosswalk, would have alerted

Mr. Bostian to his duty and obligation to stop before the crosswalk, and would

have prevented the injuries and damages to [her].” Id. at 22.7 She maintains

that Avrit’s opinion that the accident would not have occurred had Wal-Mart

installed appropriate traffic calming devices raised a genuine issue of material

fact concerning causation and any issues concerning Avrit’s methodology,

analyses, and conclusions were subjects of cross-examination that went to the

weight of his opinion. See id. at 28-29, 31.

       The trial court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, concluded Intihar failed to

establish a genuine issue or material fact that additional or different signage,

safety designs, or features would have prevented the accident.        See Trial

Court Opinion, 7/7/22, at 12-13. The court reasoned that Bostian’s deposition

testimony that he only failed to see and stop for Intihar due to his own

inattentiveness established that Bostian was the sole cause of the accident.
____________________________________________

7  Intihar also argues the trial court violated Borough of Nanty-Glo v.
American Surety Co. of New York, 163 A. 523, 524 (Pa. 1932), which
prohibits a court from entering judgment as a matter of law based exclusively
on oral testimony, when the court considered Bostian’s deposition testimony.
See Intihar’s Brief at 25-28. Intihar did not preserve a Nanty-Glo objection
in her answer to Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we
find this claim waived. See Krentz v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 910 A.2d
20, 37 (Pa. 2006) (discussing waiver of a Nanty-Glo issue on appeal);
Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 149 (Pa. Super. 2006) (same).

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Id. at 12. The court further concluded Avrit’s report did not raise “material

questions” concerning causation. See id. at 13-15. The court explained that

Avrit opined that additional traffic control signals, such as stop signs, could

have prevented the accident, but Bostian testified that he believed a stop sign

already governed the crosswalk. The court emphasized that “Avrit’s report

fail[ed] to take into consideration” Bostian’s deposition testimony that he

struck Intihar because he got “distracted” when he believed someone had

called his name and turned his head away from the direction of the crosswalk.

Id. at 13-14. According to the court, even if Walmart installed stop signs as

Avrit recommended, Bostian’s deposition testimony established that he would

not have seen them because of the distraction. See id. at 15. The court,

among other reasons,8 concluded that a reasonable finder of fact could not

find Wal-Mart’s design of the parking lot was a proximate cause of Intihar’s

injuries.   See id.

       Our review of the record and Intihar’s arguments compels us to conclude

that no relief is due. As discussed by the trial court, the record demonstrates

____________________________________________

8 We note that the trial court, when discussing Avrit’s report, cited case law

concerning the competence of an expert opinion and several factors cited by
Wal-Mart that would affect the weight of the Avrit’s opinion. See Trial Court
Opinion, 7/7/22, at 13-14 (discussing the Avrit’s report’s lack of foundation
and Avrit’s failure to cite applicable industry standards or studies
demonstrating that stop signs would be superior to yield signs). We disagree
with the trial court that these factors merited summary judgment. See
Bourgeois, 242 A.3d at 658 (concluding that this Court erred by failing to
view expert reports in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and
disregarding the reports because they failed to define industry standards).

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that the critical force giving rise to the accident was Bostian’s belief that he

heard someone call his name, and there was no indication that additional or

different signage or markings could have prevented the specific accident

injuring Intihar.9

       We acknowledge, as did the trial court, Intihar’s production of Avrit’s

report opining that “Bostian’s careless driving could have potentially been

ameliorated with a reasonably designed parking lot that included appropriate

traffic calming devices” and “had such additional traffic calming measures

been in place, the subject incident would likely have been avoided altogether.”

Avrit’s Report, 12/15/21, at 7; see also Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/22, at 13-

15. In support of these conclusions, Avrit opined regarding Wal-Mart’s duties

to maintain the store’s parking lot to (1) “[m]inimize the number of decisions

a driver needs to make so it reduces the risk of not seeing one thing because

their attention is distracted by multiple other threats that need to be

avoided[;]” and (2) “[i]nstall and maintain adequate traffic control or traffic

calming devices to slow traffic down so there is more time to perceive and
____________________________________________

9 Intihar does not dispute the evidence that Bostian looked away from the
crosswalk when he believed he heard someone calling his name. Moreover,
although there is some indications that Intihar and Bostian may have seen
each other before Intihar entered the crosswalk and Bostian had been
following several cars that passed through the crosswalk before the accident,
Intihar does not develop arguments based on those facts in her arguments
before this Court; nor did she do so in response to Wal-Mart’s motion for
summary judgment before the trial court. We recognize this Court’s plenary
scope of review requires consideration of the entire record. See Fackler, 835
A.2d at 715. At the same time, we may not develop arguments on behalf of
an appellant. See 9795 Perry Highway Mgmt., LLC v. Bernard, 273 A.3d
1098, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 289 A.3d 888 (Pa. 2022).

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react to all potential threats.” Avrit’s Report, 12/15/21, at 4. Avrit noted,

“Slowing traffic down gives a driver more time to make decisions (particularly

when faced with multiple decisions at specific points in the parking lot) and

avoid all potential threats or interference.” See id.

      Turning to the specifics of the accident that injured Intihar, Avrit noted

that around the location of the accident, a driver faced “multiple specific

decisions all at once[,]” including: (1) clearing vehicular traffic from the

driver’s left; (2) clearing pedestrian traffic in the upcoming crosswalk; (3)

clearing pedestrian traffic going to and coming from the parking lot from

multiple directions; and (4) looking for a parking space. Id. Avrit asserted

because a driver needed to “have their head on a swivel” to take in the

information and make multiple decisions at one, and without adequate traffic

controls, it was foreseeable that a pedestrian would go unnoticed. Id. at 5.

Avrit noted that the lack of sufficient traffic calming measures created “a high

risk of pedestrian-vehicle interactions which are specifically dangerous for

pedestrians.” Id. at 6. Avrit proceeded to opine that that “[t]raffic control

devices, such as stop signs, are means” to clearly communicate the intentions

of drivers and pedestrians, reduce the speed of traffic, and “significantly

increases the ability/likelihood of a driver to observe and avoid potential

hazards such as pedestrians cross through” the driver’s path of travel. Id.

      Thus, Avrit’s specific opinions and conclusions were based on a general

theory that complex decisions a typical driver confronts when driving in front

of the store.    Despite indicating that he reviewed Bostian’s deposition,

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moreover, Avrit formed no opinions based on the specific and somewhat

atypical facts of this case. Avrit made no mention of Bostian’s familiarity

with the parking lot, Bostian’s belief, albeit mistaken, that his movement was

already controlled by stop signs. Critically, Intihar presented no evidence that

any of the multiple decisions Avrit discussed caused Bostian’s failure to

perceive Intihar or stop for the pedestrian crosswalk. Rather, it was Bostian’s

reflexive reaction to believing someone called his name that caused him to

look away from the roadway. Based on this record, we agree with the trial

court that Avrit’s report did not have a sufficient basis in the record to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that the absence of a traffic control device, such

as a stop sign, either caused or increased the risk of Bostian failing to see

Intihar, failing to stop at the crosswalk, and ultimately striking Intihar when

she in the crosswalk.

      In sum, Intihar’s evidence did not establish genuine issues of material

facts causally linking the allegedly defective traffic controls to this unfortunate

accident. Accordingly, she did not establish a prima facie claim of negligence

against Wal-Mart. Finding no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

order granting summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Pellegrini joins this memorandum.

      Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/8/2023

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