Court Opinion

ID: 9576937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:08.821919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:44.212092
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority insofar as it remands to the trial court to “address the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”1 Petitioner testified that his appointed counsel had not discussed with him the possibility of deportation. The attorney testified that he did not advise petitioner just before his plea of that possibility. The attorney also did not sign the certification attached to the plea petition that he had explained its effect and that it was “understandingly made.”
The record shows, moreover, that the printed text of the plea petition that petitioner signed is garbled. It recites, in bold type:
“THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU IF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, CONVICTION OF A CRIME MAY RESULT IN DEPORTATION FROM *785ADMISSION TO THE U.S.A. OR DENIAL OF NATURALIZATION.”
That language is not what ORS 135.385(2) (d) provides. Conviction may not result in “deportation from admission” to the United States, but rather deportation from the United States.2 In an affidavit, defendant stated:
“Although there was a notice on the bottom of' the plea petition which I signed indicating that an entry of a plea of guilty could render me deportable, I did not understand the meaning of said language. Neither my attorney nor the court attempted to clarify said language.”
Under these circumstances, it was even more important that counsel have advised petitioner just before he made his plea that his conviction could result in his deportation.
I would, however, also remand the case to the trial court to consider further an additional ground petitioner raised for post-conviction relief — whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his guilty plea when the court had not informed him that conviction could result in his deportation. Petitioner asserts that failure of the court to advise him, as required by ORS 135.385(2), that as an alien his conviction could result in his deportation violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, sections 10 and 11, of the Oregon constitution.
The majority recognizes that, in Oregon, there is a constitutional right to be advised of the “basic legal consequences” of a guilty plea. 66 Or App at 782. The majority relies, however, on Jones v. Cupp, 7 Or App 415, 490 P2d 1038 (1971), rev den (1972); and Gaffey v. State of Oregon, 55 Or App 186, 637 P2d 634 (1981), to hold that failure to advise an alien of possible deportation is not failure to advise of a basic legal consequence” of a guilty plea. I disagree.
Jones concerned the court’s failure to advise of parole eligibility. Gaffey concerned the court’s failure to advise of suspension of a driver’s license. Neither concerned the court’s failure to advise an alien that his guilty plea could result in deportation.
ORS 135.385(2), first enacted in 1973, now provides:
*786“(1) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony or other charge on which the defendant appears in person without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the defendant understands the nature of the charge.
“(2) The court shall inform the defendant:
“(a) That by a plea of guilty or no contest the defendant waives the right:
“(A) To trial by jury;
“(B) Of confrontation; and “(C) Against self-incrimination.
“(b) Of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including the maximum possible sentence from consecutive sentences.
“(c) When the offense charged is one for which a different or additional penalty is authorized by reason of the fact that the defendant may be adjudged a dangerous offender, that this fact may be established after a plea in the present action, thereby subjecting the defendant to different or additional penalty.
“(d) That if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States conviction of a crime may result, under the laws of the United States, in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States or denial of naturalization.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature added subsection (d) in 1979 (Or Laws 1979, ch 118, § 1).
Of course the interpretation of constitutional provisions is, as the majority states, a judicial function, and the legislature cannot “amend the constitution by adopting a statute.” 66 Or App at 783. The question here, however, is whether, for an alien, deportation is a “basic legal consequence.” The dictum in Jones and Gaffey is not a “judicial interpretation” that settles this question.
Subsection (d) recognizes the fundamental importance of deportation to an alien. The legislative declaration is entitled to weight, particularly when the legislation added subsection (d) to a list of such fundamental rights as trial by jury, confrontation and freedom from self-incrimination. I can think of no consequence more basic to an alien than deportation, which is the equivalent of banishment or exile. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 US 6, 10, 68 S Ct 374, 92 L Ed 433 (1954). It may result, to use the words of Justice Brandeis, in *787loss “of all that makes life worth living.” See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 284, 42 S Ct 492, 66 L Ed 938 (1921) (Brandeis, J.); United States v. Parrino, 212 F2d 919, 924-925 (2nd Cir) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert den 348 US 840 (1954).3 Under 8 USC §1251 (a) (4), the United States may deport an alien who is twice convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. If deported, an alien loses all constitutional rights afforded by the Oregon and United States constitutions, including trial by jury, confrontation and freedom from self-incrimination. I would hold that, if the court failed to inform petitioner that his conviction could result in deportation, it did not advise him of a basic legal consequence of his plea.4 Accordingly, if the court did not so advise petitioner, he did *788not knowingly and intelligently make his guilty plea and was deprived of his rights under Article I, sections 10 and 11, of the Oregon constitution. Such a claim may be raised by a petition for post-conviction relief. ORS 138.530(1)(a).
The court did not orally advise petitioner that his conviction could result in his deportation but gave him an opportunity to read the plea petition and confer with counsel. It relied on petitioner’s subsequent advice to the court that he had conferred with counsel and had had an “opportunity to read” the petition. At the trial of this post-conviction proceeding, the court clearly was unaware that the plea petition contained a garbled version of ORS 135.358(2)(d). Petitioner asserts that he was unaware of its meaning. Although the plea petition may be sufficient to place a person on notice to inquire, petitioner, as far as we know on this record, did not inquire. Moreover, to be informed in order to make a knowing and intelligent plea is not simply to be placed on inquiry. The trial court should address the question of whether petitioner was informed when he entered his plea of a basic legal consequence of that plea — that his conviction could result in his deportation.

 The majority opinion states that- the court shall address the claim “which is limited to the allegation of the petition.” 66 Or App at 784. The allegation is that counsel “failed to inform the petitioner that a plea to the above charge would result in his deportation.”

The printed form of plea petition used in Multnomah County should be corrected.

 Judge Frank’s dissent stated:
“Deportation, while not literally constituting criminal punishment, may have far more dire effects on this defendant than his sentence of imprisonment for two years. For all practical purposes, the court sentenced him to serve (a) two years in jail and (b) the rest of his life in exile. For the Supreme Court has said that ‘deportation is a drastic measure, at times the equivalent of banishment or exile’ and ‘is a penalty.’ Mr. Justice Jackson has described it as ‘a life sentence of banishment.’ I cannot believe that no ‘manifest injustice’ exists merely because the sentence of banishment for life was not imposed directly by the judge.” United States v. Parrino, supra, 212 F2d at 924.

 State v. Evans, 290 Or 707, 625 P2d 1300 (1982), is not authority to the contrary. The defendant, a non-alien, took a direct appeal after pleading guilty to a prostitution charge after a plea bargain. He did not raise a constitutional claim, but asserted that his plea of guilty should not have been accepted, because the court failed to advise him under ORS 135.385(2)(d). This court held that a failure to advise the defendant under 135.385(2) (d) was cognizable on direct appeal, explaining:
“It is true, as the state points out, that this court has previously and specifically held that a defendant’s claim that his guilty plea should be set aside on the ground that the trial court failed to advise him of a consequence of his plea could not, by virtue of ORS 138.050, be considered on direct appeal. State v. Ferren, 3 Or App 224, 473 P2d 165 (1970). However, Ferren involved the right to be told of a direct consequence of the plea — the maximum sentence. This is a consideration of constitutional significance. Jones v. Cupp, 7 Or App 415, 417, 490 P2d 1038 (1971), rev den (1972), and therefore cognizable under post conviction relief. ORS 138.530(1)(a). By contrast, defendant’s right to be advised here is statutory only and not cognizable under post conviction relief. See, e.g., Jones v. Cupp, supra. If the right is to be enforced at all, it must be enforced by direct appeal.” (Emphasis added.) 48 Or App at 774-75.
In reversing, the Supreme Court stated:
“We hold that as a matter of judicial administration in criminal cases a defendant represented by counsel who makes a plea bargain and then pleads guilty, but is not informed by the trial judge of the consequences of his conviction in the event that he is an alien and who does not raise that question in the trial court, cannot raise that question for the first time on appeal.” 290 Or at 714.
*788The Supreme Court also stated:
“We need not decide in this case whether this defendant had a right to appeal from this judgment of conviction for failure of the trial court to inform him of the consequences of his conviction if he was an alien because we affirm the trial court for two other reasons: (1) Defendant failed to raise that question in the trial court, and, in any event, (2) any such error was “harmless error” in this case because it now appears affirmatively from the record, as supplemented, that defendant was not an alien and, thus being so, he would not have been prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to so inform him.” 290 Or at 712-13. (Emphasis in original.)
Evans is, accordingly, distinguishable. Contrary to the facts in Evans, petitioner here is an alien, faces deportation because of his conviction and raised the constitutional claim by post-conviction proceedings.