Court Opinion

ID: 9681856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:59:47.934704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.239464
License: Public Domain

KILGARLIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons so ably stated by the author of the opinion in this case in the court of appeals,1 I would hold that the doctrine of strict liability, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), is applicable to cases involving injurious contact with public utility power lines. 712 S.W.2d 766-67. *788Electricity is a product. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal.App.3d 68, 212 Cal.Rptr. 283 (Cal.Ct.App.1985); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis.2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (Wis.1979). The electricity causing the grievous injuries to the Reynolds boy had already entered the stream of commerce. Aversa v. Public Serv. and Gas Co., 186 N.J.Super. 130, 451 A.2d 976 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1982). Once Houston Lighting & Power released the electricity into the transmission lines, it was never to be stored, never to be recalled. Houston Lighting & Power had forever relinquished control of the electricity. Indeed, this court concedes that Houston Lighting & Power only produced electricity to meet anticipated demand, and thus released all of the electricity it produced.
The court, however, reasons that because the Reynolds boy came into contact with a transmission line containing electricity that had not yet been reduced by a transformer, it was not in final form for consumer usage. In support of this position, the court relies upon Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975). Admittedly, the court correctly quotes the applicable proposition in Rourke that strict liability of a seller depends upon the product reaching the user without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Id. at 798. What the court does not do, however, is to discuss the facts of Rourke, which are not dissimilar to those in this case. In Rourke, the lessor of a disassembled scaffold was held to be strictly liable when the scaffold, once assembled into its final usable form, was determined to be defective. Just as in Rourke, in our case all the component parts of the product designed for consumer usage were present in the 35,000 volt transmission line, albeit not yet assembled or transformed into the intended final condition.
Also, the court seems to place emphasis on the delivery aspect of the product, for after conceding that electricity once in the transmission line could not be recalled, the court states “[hjowever, this is not evidence that the electricity was delivered to any customer prior to transformation into a usable voltage” (emphasis added). 765 S.W.2d at 785. But, under Texas law, there is no requirement of proof of delivery of the product. “The liability created by the doctrine of strict liability rests on foreseeability, and not on esoteric concepts relating to transfer or delivery of possession.” Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 691 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio), writ refd n.r.e., 513 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1974).
The court seemingly draws comfort that a majority of jurisdictions do not apply strict liability to incidents of contact with high voltage lines. That Texas might find itself among a minority of jurisdictions should we adopt strict liability is of no great import. Indeed, on other occasions this court has aligned itself with minority positions. “[Wjhatever may be the majority rule in other jurisdictions or be the expression of commentators does not necessarily mean it will be the rule of law in Texas.” Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex.1984). See also Givens v. Dougherty, 671 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.1984), and LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 346 (Tex.1986) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Additionally, I am concerned about the potentially constraining impact of the court’s opinion on courts considering evidence of the adverse health effects of prolonged exposure to electric and magnetic fields emitted by high voltage lines. By declaring at this time that prior to entering the transformer electricity is not a product in the stream of commerce, we possibly curtail in its infancy the development of an area of law speaking to new compelling and terrifying scientific evidence. See, e.g., Klein Indep. School Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1986) (for allegations that prolonged exposure to high power lines may produce leukemia, brain tumors, and other forms of cancer) and Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Klein Indep. School Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508, 516 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ pending) (for proof of those allegations with a resulting $25,000,-000 punitive damages verdict).
*789Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from a judgment of reversal.
RAY, ROBERTSON and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Retired Chief Justice of the First Court of Appeals Tom F. Coleman, sitting by assignment.