Court Opinion

ID: 9912444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:04:23.927462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:23.123507
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                 No. 21–1666

           Submitted November 16, 2023—Filed December 15, 2023
                       Amended December 15, 2023

MARC HARDING d/b/a HARDING LAW FIRM,

      Appellee,

vs.

RICK SASSO d/b/a INDIANA SPINE GROUP,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

      Interlocutory appeal from the denial of motion to dismiss suit for lack of

personal jurisdiction. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT

COURT ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED.
      McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

      Brent R. Ruther of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Engberg & Helling, PLC,
Burlington, for appellant.

      Jeffrey M. Lipman of Lipman Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellee.
                                        2

MCDONALD, Justice.
      Iowa attorney Marc Harding engaged Indiana doctor Rick Sasso to provide

expert witness services in a potential medical malpractice suit in Iowa. Things

did not go according to plan, and Harding filed this suit against Sasso in Polk

County, Iowa. Harding sought to recover all or part of the $10,000 retainer he

paid to Dr. Sasso plus additional damages. Dr. Sasso moved to dismiss the suit

for want of personal jurisdiction over him. The district court denied the motion,

and Dr. Sasso filed an application for interlocutory review. We granted the

application and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals

reversed the district court and remanded the case with instruction to dismiss

the case. We granted Harding’s application for further review.

                                        I.

      A state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is

limited by both the Federal Constitution and state law. See Sioux Pharm, Inc. v.

Summit Nutritionals Int’l, Inc., 859 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Iowa 2015).

      With respect to the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court holds that

“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power

to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). Under the Court’s Fourteenth

Amendment jurisprudence, a state’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant “depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with

the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context

of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)).

      With respect to state law, Iowa law provides that “[e]very corporation,
individual, personal representative, partnership or association that shall have
                                          3

the necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the

jurisdiction of the courts of this state.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.306. We have explained

that rule 1.306 authorizes the widest exercise of personal jurisdiction allowed

under the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 583 (Iowa 2015);

Sioux Pharm, Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 188; Ostrem v. Prideco Secure Loan Fund, LP,

841 N.W.2d 882, 891 (Iowa 2014). Because Iowa law allows for the exercise of

personal jurisdiction up to the federal constitutional limit, we focus on the

federal constitutional requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction.

      The Supreme Court has “recogniz[ed] two kinds of personal jurisdiction:

general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes

called case-linked) jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024. “A state

court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at

home’ in the state.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). General jurisdiction over a defendant allows a state

court to adjudicate any and all claims against a defendant without regard to

whether the claims relate to the forum state or the defendant’s activities in the

forum state. See id. In the paradigmatic case, an individual is subject to a state’s
general jurisdiction if the state is his domicile. See id.

      “Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately

connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Id. The contact

necessary to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction is not great. The

defendant need only take “some act by which [he] purposefully avails [himself] of

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. (quoting

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). “The contacts must be the

defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ ” Id. at 1025
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Even when the
                                         4

defendant has sufficient minimum contact with the forum state, the forum state

has jurisdiction over the defendant for only a limited set of claims. Specifically,

the nonresident defendant can be sued in the forum state only when the

plaintiff’s claims “ ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the

forum.” Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255,

262 (2017)).

      If a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contact with the forum

state and the claim relates to the contact, the court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over the defendant only where it “would comport with ‘fair play and

substantial justice.’ ” Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting Cap. Promotions,

L.L.C. v. Don King Prods., Inc., 756 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Iowa 2008)). In making that

determination, courts focus on

      “the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in
      adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
      convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s
      interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,”
      and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering
      fundamental substantive social policies.”

Id. (quoting Cap. Promotions, 756 N.W.2d at 834). In conducting this analysis,

courts must be cognizant of not allowing jurisdictional rules to severely
disadvantage a defendant. See Shams v. Hassan, 829 N.W.2d 848, 857 (Iowa

2013).

                                        II.

      Dr. Sasso moved to dismiss Harding’s petition for lack of personal

jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is a special

proceeding that requires the district court to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law in resolving the motion. See PSFS 3 Corp. v. Michael P.

Seidman, D.D.S., P.C., 962 N.W.2d 810, 826 (Iowa 2021). It is the plaintiff’s
burden to make a prima facie showing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
                                         5

is allowed. See id. In determining whether the plaintiff met that burden, the

district court must accept as true the allegations of the petition and the content

of any uncontroverted affidavits offered by the parties. See id.; see also Mass.

Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In

conducting the requisite analysis under the prima facie standard, we take

specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not

disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s

jurisdictional claim. We then add to the mix facts put forward by the defendants,

to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” (citation omitted)). Once the plaintiff

makes a prima facie showing that the exercise of jurisdiction is allowed, the

burden shifts to the defendant to show the exercise of jurisdiction is

unreasonable or otherwise improper. PSFS 3 Corp., 962 N.W.2d at 826.

      The operative pleading in this case is Harding’s first amended petition.

According to the first amended petition, Harding is an Iowa attorney practicing

in Des Moines. Harding represented an Iowa resident pursuing a potential

medical malpractice action in Iowa. The potential defendants were a surgeon that

practices in Polk County, Iowa, and a medical facility located in Polk County,

Iowa. Harding provided his client’s medical records to an initial reviewer to make
a preliminary assessment of the claim. The initial reviewer emailed an opinion to

Harding stating that there was a breach of the standard of care that favored

proceeding with the case. Harding then contacted Dr. Sasso d/b/a Indiana Spine

Group. Dr. Sasso is an orthopedic surgeon who practices in Indiana. “On

February 24, 2021, Harding and Sasso negotiated and agreed that Sasso would

serve as an expert to both evaluate a potential malpractice claim and to testify

as an expert in any ensuing litigation.” Dr. Sasso’s rate was $1,000 per hour.

Harding sent Dr. Sasso a $10,000 advance for his services. The parties agreed
that “any unearned portion of that advance would be returned to Harding.” There
                                         6

was no written contract memorializing the agreement. Harding provided

Dr. Sasso with the initial reviewer’s one-page email plus 166 pages of Harding’s

client’s medical records. Dr. Sasso reviewed the records. On March 4, Dr. Sasso

informed Harding via telephone that the potential defendants had not breached

the standard of care. Dr. Sasso also informed Harding “that he spent 12 hours

reviewing the 166 pages and one-page email and would not be returning any of

the $10,000 advance.” Dr. Sasso informed Harding that he had not kept time

records. According to the first amended petition, Dr. Sasso never returned any

portion of the advance and never provided an accounting for the advance. The

first amended petition sets forth claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary

duty, conversion, and fraud against Dr. Sasso.

      The parties then filed competing affidavits in support of and in resistance

to the motion to dismiss. Dr. Sasso’s affidavit provided that he is an orthopedic

surgeon and the president of Indiana Spine Group. He formed Indiana Spine

Group in Indiana in 2002. All of Indiana Spine Group’s offices and business are

in Indiana. Neither Dr. Sasso nor Indiana Spine Group have advertised or

solicited business in Iowa. According to Dr. Sasso, Harding called him and

requested that Dr. Sasso review the medical records. According to the affidavit,
Harding did not share any plans for litigation in Iowa. Dr. Sasso informed

Harding that he “would give [his] opinion of compliance with the standard of care

. . . for a flat fee of $10,000.” Dr. Sasso “did not commit to provide any particular

result or opinion and did not commit to providing testimony in any case that

Mr. Harding might file in the future.” Dr. Sasso “did not imagine that any

lawsuits could ever arise.” He was “surprised to be sued in the State of Iowa.”

Dr. Sasso did not “engage in business in Iowa and performed all work for

Mr. Harding at [his] office in Carmel, Indiana.”
                                         7

      Harding filed an affidavit in support of his resistance to the motion to

dismiss. In the affidavit, Harding disputed the terms of the parties’ agreement.

According to Harding, Dr. Sasso agreed that he “could serve as an expert at trial,

and that he would require a $10,000.00 retainer, at which he would charge

$1,000.00 per hour for his record review and trial testimony.” Dr. Sasso never

said the “retainer was non-refundable.”

      The district court denied Dr. Sasso’s motion to dismiss. The district court

took as true the averments set forth in the first amended petition and then

considered the averments in Dr. Sasso’s motion to dismiss along with his

affidavit in support of the same to the extent the affidavit was uncontroverted.

In reviewing the record, the district court found that Dr. Sasso agreed “to provide

expertise and expert testimony to Plaintiff for a cause of action in an Iowa forum.”

The district court concluded that this was “sufficient to establish minimum

contacts and personal jurisdiction over Defendant.” Dr. Sasso did not file any

motion to enlarge or amend the district court’s ruling but instead sought

interlocutory appeal. As noted above, the court of appeals reversed the order of

the district court. We granted Harding’s application for further review.

                                        III.
      We review the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss for the

correction of errors at law. See Sioux Pharm, Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 188; Shams,

829 N.W.2d at 853. We are not bound by the district court’s application of law

or the district court’s legal conclusions. See Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 853. We are

bound by the district court’s finding of facts, however. See id. “Unlike other

grounds for dismissal . . . a court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction must make factual findings to determine whether it has

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. “The trial court’s findings of fact
have the effect of a jury verdict and are subject to challenge only if not supported
                                        8

by substantial evidence in the record.” Hodges v. Hodges, 572 N.W.2d 549, 551

(Iowa 1997). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw

different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether [the evidence]

supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a

different finding.” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800–01 (Iowa 2021) (quoting

Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Iowa 2010)).

Where the district court does not make explicit factual findings, we “presume the

court decided the facts necessary to support its decision.” Bankers Tr. Co. v.

Fidata Tr. Co. N.Y., 452 N.W.2d 411, 413–14 (Iowa 1990).

      The following facts are supported by the record. Dr. Sasso provides

medical services in Indiana and has never solicited or done business in Iowa.

Dr. Sasso did not contact Harding in Iowa regarding this matter but was instead

contacted by Harding from Iowa. Dr. Sasso agreed “to provide expertise and

expert testimony to Plaintiff for a cause of action in an Iowa forum.” While

Dr. Sasso disputed this in the district court, the finding is supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, that finding is supported by the

averments in the first amended petition and Harding’s affidavit in support of his

resistance to the motion to dismiss. Dr. Sasso reviewed the medical records at
issue from his office in Indiana. Dr. Sasso called Mr. Harding in Iowa to report

his findings and conclusions to Harding.

      On these facts, the question presented is whether the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over Dr. Sasso to resolve a dispute regarding this contract is

constitutional. “Personal jurisdiction is only appropriate when ‘the defendant’s

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there.’ ” Book, 860 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The
essential inquiry is whether there was “some act by which the defendant
                                         9

purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Sioux Pharm,

Inc., 859 N.W.2d at 189 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

475 (1985)). “Random or attenuated contacts with the forum state do not satisfy

the minimum contacts test.” Book, 860 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting Ostrem,

841 N.W.2d at 891). Instead, the contacts “must show that the defendant

deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, . . . entering a

contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025

(quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).

      Here, Dr. Sasso had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with respect to claims arising out of

and related to the parties’ contract. Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa was not

random or attenuated. Instead, he purposefully availed himself of the privilege

of doing business in Iowa. He entered into a contractual relationship with an

Iowa lawyer. Dr. Sasso agreed to evaluate a medical malpractice claim involving

an Iowa resident, a physician practicing in Iowa, and a medical facility located

in Iowa. Critically, he also agreed to provide expert testimony at any trial in the

medical malpractice case, which would have been venued in Iowa. Thus, at the
time of the parties’ agreement, one of the “contemplated future consequences” of

the contract was that Dr. Sasso would perform part of the contract in an Iowa

court. Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479). In

addition, the dispute between Harding and Dr. Sasso directly arises out of

Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa. “A single contact with the forum state can be

sufficient to satisfy due process concerns when the plaintiff’s claim arises out of

the contact.” Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 855; see also Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262

(explaining that there must be “an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy” (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919)); Sioux Pharm, Inc.,
                                       10

859 N.W.2d at 189 (stating a single contact can be enough when the claim arises

out of the contact).

      Having determined Dr. Sasso had sufficient minimum contact with the

State of Iowa to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with

respect to this contract dispute, we must still “determine whether the assertion

of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ”

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320); see also

Guardi v. Desai, 151 F. Supp.2d 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“Second, if minimum

contacts exist, the court must determine if exercising jurisdiction over the

defendant would comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’ ” (quoting Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co.,

75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996))). Dr. Sasso must present a “compelling case

that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unreasonable.” Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at

477). These compelling reasons “are limited to the rare situation in which the

plaintiff’s interest and the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute in the

forum are so attenuated that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of

subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.” Id. (quoting Pat. Rts.
Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 603 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.

2010)).

      We cannot conclude this is a compelling or rare case where the exercise of

jurisdiction is unreasonable or offends the “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Int’l Shoe,

326 U.S. at 316). The maintenance of the suit in Iowa does not place an

unreasonable burden on Dr. Sasso. The parties contemplated and agreed that

Dr. Sasso would perform part of the contract in Iowa. In particular, the parties
contemplated and agreed he would testify in an Iowa court in any medical
                                         11

malpractice claim. Dr. Sasso cannot now claim it is unexpected or unreasonable

to make him appear in an Iowa court when he contracted to appear in an Iowa

court. Further, “Iowa has a legitimate interest in adjudicating a dispute between

one of its residents . . . and an out-of-state” party that contracted for services to

be performed in this State. Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 903. “Certainly Iowa ‘has a

manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents.’ ” Id.

(quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). These last two factors

alone, “the interests of the plaintiff and the forum,”—the United States Supreme

Court has explained—often “will justify even the serious burdens placed on the

alien defendant.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114

(1987).

      In concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally

permissible here, we are persuaded by the decisions of other courts that have

reached the same conclusion in materially indistinguishable circumstances. In

McNally v. Morrison, Illinois plaintiffs filed a suit for breach of contract, consumer

fraud, fraud, and professional negligence in Illinois against an Ohio doctor who

they had retained to serve as an expert witness in an Illinois medical malpractice

case. 951 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). As in this case, the expert witness
“never performed any physical activities in Illinois in conjunction with the

medical malpractice case . . . and neither party assert[ed] that there [was] a

written contract governing [the doctor’s] services as an expert witness.” Id. at

191. The circuit court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and

the appellate court reversed. Id. at 194. The appellate court concluded there were

sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois because the doctor was contractually

“serving as an expert witness in an Illinois medical malpractice case.” Id. at 193.

“[E]ven though the only services that he had actually performed took place in
Ohio, [the doctor’s] services were intended to produce a result in Illinois.” Id.
                                        12

      The McNally court also concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction would

not be unreasonable. “The burden on [the doctor] to defend in Illinois does not

appear to be unduly great. Ohio and Illinois are relatively close geographically.”

Id. The same is true here. In addition, the court explained that the doctor could

not show how “defending a suit in Illinois under Illinois law would be unduly

burdensome when he had already agreed to testify in an Illinois case.” Id. The

same is true here. “Third, exercising jurisdiction would further the plaintiffs’

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.” Id. The same is true here.

The court concluded that “Illinois’s interest in protecting its citizens . . .

outweigh[ed] Ohio’s interest in protecting its citizens from the inconvenience of

defending a lawsuit in another state.” Id. at 194. The same is true here as well.

      In Golden v. Stein, a lawyer defendant in a professional malpractice case

filed a third-party claim against an accounting firm he hired to provide damages

opinions in the underlying case that ultimately gave rise to the malpractice case

against the lawyer. 481 F. Supp. 3d 843, 846 (S.D. Iowa 2019). The expert

witness moved to dismiss the third-party claim for lack of personal jurisdiction

in Iowa. Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Id. The underlying

case was venued in Iowa. The expert witness agreed “to provide expert services
for legal proceedings in” Iowa. Id. at 857. The parties understood that there was

a “95–99 percent chance that the case would settle,” id. at 849, “and that it was

extremely unlikely that she would ever be asked to travel anywhere, let alone

Iowa, for purposes of the [u]nderlying [a]ction,” id. at 857. The witness never

actually had to travel to Iowa in the underlying case. That did not change the

fact that the expert witness understood at the time of contracting that “by

agreeing to provide expert witness services in litigation in Iowa, some of the

future consequences of failing to provide those services would occur to some
degree in Iowa.” Id. Further, the district court found the expert witness purposely
                                         13

availed itself “of the privilege of conducting expert witness activities in this forum

to earn expert witness fees, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this

forum’s laws.” Id. at 860. The court held that “the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over [the expert witness] in this forum [was] proper.” Id. at 861.

      Also directly relevant here is Guardi v. Desai, 151 F. Supp. 2d 555. In that

case, Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed suit against a Colorado doctor who agreed to

review medical records as an expert witness for “a potential medical negligence

action in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 559. The plaintiffs’ lawyers mailed mammograms

to the doctor for her review, but the doctor lost the mammograms; without the

original mammograms, the plaintiffs were unable to proceed with their potential

malpractice claims. Id. at 557. The court held this single contractual

arrangement was sufficient minimum contact with the forum state to support

the exercise of jurisdiction. The expert “purposefully availed herself of the

privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 560. The expert’s agreement

to serve as an “expert in the potential malpractice case . . . created a continuing

obligation between herself” and the plaintiffs. Id. The expert “should have

expected that her activities . . . could cause her to be haled into court in

Pennsylvania.” Id. at 561. The court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction
would not be unreasonable. “While Defendant [did] have the burden of coming

to Pennsylvania from Colorado, given her actions impacting on Pennsylvania

residents, it [was] not unfair to require that she conduct her defense in

Pennsylvania.” Id. at 562.

      Similarly compelling is Echavarria v. Beck, 338 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.P.R.

2004). Like this case, Echavarria involved an expert witness who agreed to

provide expert services in a different forum, and the dispute between the parties

arose out of that agreement. Id. at 260. The district court in that case denied the
expert’s motion to dismiss, concluding:
                                         14

            The facts before this Court demonstrate that Beck had
      minimum contacts with this forum that are sufficient to allow this
      Court to exercise jurisdiction over him. Beck was aware that he was
      rendering an expert opinion for a case in Puerto Rico, and that he
      would need to travel to Puerto Rico at least for a deposition and
      perhaps a trial. He received economic benefit from his contact, and
      could reasonably foresee that a cause of action could arise from said
      contact. This Court believes that plaintiffs have met the required
      prima facie burden to establish specific in personam jurisdiction
      over Beck.

Id. at 263.

      Dr. Sasso argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore,

571 U.S. 277, compels a different result. In Walden, a Georgia police officer

working at an Atlanta airport seized money from two Nevada residents traveling

back to Nevada. Id. at 280. The Nevada residents sued the officer in Nevada. Id.

at 281. The Court held that Nevada did not have personal jurisdiction over the

defendant even though “his conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the

forum State.” Id. at 291.

      “But Walden has precious little to do with the cases before us.” Ford Motor

Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1031. As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Ford

Motor Co., “In Walden, only the plaintiffs had any contacts with the State of

Nevada.” Id. The officer had never “ ‘purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege

of conducting activities’ in the forum State.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). But that is not true here. Dr. Sasso did purposefully

avail himself of the privilege of providing expert witness services to an Iowa

lawyer in a potential Iowa case involving a claim between Iowans with the

understanding he might have to testify in an Iowa court. So, the only issue here

is whether Dr. Sasso’s single contact with Iowa is “related enough” to Harding’s

suit. Id. As set forth above, Dr. Sasso’s contact with Iowa is “related enough” to

this suit because Harding’s claim against Dr. Sasso arises directly out of
                                       15

Dr. Sasso’s agreement to serve as an expert witness in an Iowa case, involving

Iowans, to be litigated in an Iowa court.

                                       IV.

      For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying the

defendant’s motion to dismiss, and we remand this case for further proceedings.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT ORDER
AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED.