Court Opinion

ID: 9764436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:21:49.919669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:56.542614
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
In February of 1990, A.P., a juvenile, was subjected to a search following arrest and found to be carrying sixty-four vials of crack cocaine on his person. Following a hearing in the Juvenile Division of the Family Court, the Honorable Sheldon C. Jelin found A.P. guilty of possession of a controlled substance and adjudicated him delinquent. A.P. was sixteen years of age at the time of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearing. He was living in New York with his mother, who attended the hearing in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
At the conclusion of the adjudicatory stage, the assistant defender representing A.P. requested that A.P. be allowed to go back to the jurisdiction in New York City, to the residence of A.P. and his mother on Farragut Road, East Flatbush, Brooklyn. Judge Jelin, after confirming A.P.’s out-of-state residency, placed him on probation. The disposition hearing was concluded as follows:
*156THE COURT: All right. At this point I am going to dispose of the case as follows: I am going to place the defendant [sic] on probation. Probation is to be transferred to Brooklyn, New York, through the interstate compact.
And I’m telling this to you, young man: You stay out of Philadelphia. Is that clear to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Because if you come to Philadelphia, unless you have some very good reason, I will assume that you’re here with respect to getting involved in drugs and I’m going to take you off the street and put you in a Juvenile facility. Is that clear to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: How soon are you going to leave for New York?
THE DEFENDANT’S MOTHER: As soon as you release him to me, your Honor, I’ll take him right out of here.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
Adjudicatory/Dispositional Hearing Transcript, February 26, 1990, pp. 42^3.
On March 7, 1990, Judge Jelin received a Motion to Reconsider Verdict. He entered a rule to show cause and scheduled a hearing for March 22, 1990, for consideration of the motion. On the date scheduled for a hearing on the motion, the matter was continued due to the unavailability of counsel. Defense counsel did not attempt to appeal from the disposition order of February 26, 1990, within the allowable thirty day period. The motion for reconsideration was heard and denied on-April 16, 1990.
New defense counsel, from the Appeals Division of the same Defender Association that has represented A.P. throughout this matter, filed a Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days on May 4, 1990, which was denied following a hearing, on May 9, 1990. The Defender Association filed two separate notices of appeal. The first notice of appeal, filed May 11, 1990, was purportedly from the order of *157April 16, 1990, which denied the Motion to Reconsider the Verdict. This appeal was docketed at No. 1370 Philadelphia 1990 in this Court.
The second notice of appeal, docketed in this Court at No. 1413 Philadelphia 1990 and filed May 17, 1990, in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, is brought from the order of May 9, 1990 denying the Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days.
Relying on Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439, 561 A.2d 756 (1989), the Majority on this appeal would find that A.P. has been denied his “constitutional right to appeal” and that the Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days should have been granted. The Majority then turns to address the substantive suppression issue. My colleagues find themselves unable to find probable cause to support AP.’s arrest and, accordingly, reverse the denial of the pre-hearing suppression motion, vacate the disposition order, and remand for further proceedings. I am unable to agree with any of these conclusions and must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I would first address the ability of this Court to consider the substantive issue. The disposition order, entered February 26, 1990, was a final order from which any direct appeal would have to be taken. Counsel for A.P. concedes as much. The notice of appeal from the order denying the motion to reconsider the verdict was filed May 11, 1990 at No. 1370 Philadelphia 1990. The grant of a rule to show cause on March 7, 1990, was not a grant of reconsideration and, therefore, did not operate to prevent the thirty-day appeal period from expiring. Valentine v. Wroten, 397 Pa.Super. 526, 528, 580 A.2d 757, 758 (1990) appeal denied 527 Pa. 650, 593 A.2d 422 (1991); Luckenbaugh v. Shearer, 362 Pa.Super. 9, 13, 523 A.2d 399, 401 (1987). On January 31, 1991, this Court entered an Order at that docket number, setting forth in its entirety:
ORDER
The appeal docketed at No. 1370 Philadelphia 1990 is taken from the denial of post-verdict motions filed after *158sentencing in juvenile proceedings. The court hereby quashes No. 1370 Philadelphia 1990 as filed more than 30 days after the entry of judgment of sentence. See Pa. R.A.P. 903; Commonwealth v. McCleary, 333 Pa.Super. 443, 482 A.2d 651 (1984) (fact that defendant filed motion for a reconsideration did not extend 30-day period within which he was required to take appeal from his judgment of sentence). The petition for consolidation is denied as moot.
In its brief, the Commonwealth properly argues that there is no issue before this Court, on this appeal, other than A.P.’s claim that the trial court wrongly denied his request for a nunc pro tunc appeal. Brief for Appellee on En Banc Reargument, p. 15. It correctly points out that the appeal at No. 1370 remains quashed as untimely and not subject to review. My colleagues in the Majority do not challenge that the appeal from the juvenile court disposition has been quashed as untimely. The Majority misstates the record in declaring that “the substantive issues appellant seeks to have considered on direct appeal have been briefed and argued by the parties.” Opinion by Hudock, J., pp. 146-149. To the contrary, the Commonwealth expressly states, I believe most appropriately:
5Should this Court request the Commonwealth to do so, it will, of course, file a brief addressing the substantive and procedural issues that the quashed appeal at No. 1370 raised. Unless this Court so acts, it would truly be illogical and unfair for it to grant relief on an issue raised exclusively in another appeal that the Commonwealth has never had a proper opportunity to contest. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 479 Pa. 84, 387 A.2d 845 (1978).
Brief for Appellee on En Banc Reargument, p. 16 n. 5.
I am unaware of any authority which would permit this Court to entertain and decide an issue which had been the principal subject of another, separate direct appeal under circumstances where that separate appeal had been quashed as untimely. The Majority has not responded to the well-reasoned argument set forth by the Commonwealth in declining to argue an issue contained in a separate appeal that has already been quashed. I do not find the Commonwealth’s *159reasons for not briefing the issue “sophistic.” Nor can I join my esteemed colleagues’ conclusion that the Commonwealth “knew, or should have known, that ... judicial economy would dictate that this Court address the only substantive issue raised—the suppression issue.” Majority p. 148. One might wonder whether counsel for A.P. “knew or should have known”, when filing his Motion for Consolidation of the two appeals on August 13, 1990, that this Court would—after quashing the appeal at No. 1370—reach out and decide the substantive issue in the quashed appeal, based upon theories of “judicial economy.” Were the Majority to direct me to some, or any, authority for such a proposition, I would be eager to reconsider.
Our Court has recently adopted an amendment to our Internal Operating Procedures whereby we have declared that an order denying a motion to quash “shall be deemed to be the law of the case.” I.O.P. 302.H, adopted April 29, 1992. I should think that, a fortiori, an order which grants a motion to quash would be deemed to be the law of the case. It would appear “unseemly” to this writer for this Court to reverse or overrule a prior order of this Court, in reliance upon which the Commonwealth has abstained from arguing the appeal on the merits. Compare I.O.P. 302.H, Comment.
Based upon all of the above, I can only conclude that this Court may not properly entertain the substantive suppression issue on the record before us.
I now turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying A.P.’s Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days. I find no error. First, let us examine the argument underlying the decision of my colleagues to grant the appeal. On six separate occasions, the Majority refers to A.P.’s “constitutional right to appeal [appellate review]”, pp. 144-145, 146-147 (2), and 147-149 (3). Reference is made to Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which guarantees a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record. However, I do not understand my colleagues to be arguing that the Pennsylvania Constitution has been violated. Rather, the argument seems to be that “coun*160sel’s failure to properly effectuate an appellant’s constitutional right of appeal, unless expressly waived by an appellant, is ineffective [assistance of counsel] per se.” p. 147. The Majority cites to Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 299, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980) in support of its contention. I find Wilkerson inapposite.
In Wilkerson, our Supreme Court considered the denial of a P.C.H.A. petition, filed pro se, alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. The defendant, Wilkerson, alleged that he “wanted. an appeal and that he took steps to perfect an appeal on his own.” Wilkerson, supra at 300, 416 A.2d at 479. The Supreme Court stated:
Clearly, if, as alleged, Wilkerson wished to appeal and counsel merely failed to file an appeal and an Anders brief, if appropriate, Wilkerson did not effectively waive his right and counsel would have to be deemed ineffective. Accordingly, the facts alleged, if proven, would warrant relief and the court should have granted a hearing and given Wilkerson an opportunity to prove he advised counsel of a desire to appeal.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to observe:
[N]othing is present in this record to contradict Wilkerson’s claim that by correspondence he requested an appeal or his claim, made in his pro se petition, that he was misled into believing that, if he successfully prosecuted an appeal and was granted a new trial, he could then be convicted of murder of the first degree.
Id. at 302, 416 A.2d at 480. (emphasis added).
The Wilkerson case does not stand for per se ineffectiveness merely upon a showing of a lack of express waiver, as the Majority seems to suggest. The Wilkerson case stands for the proposition that (1) an accused has an absolute right to appeal, and (2) where the accused has declared a desire to take *161an appeal, that (3) counsel can be faulted for allowing that right to be waived unless the accused himself effectively waives that right. In vacating the order denying P.C.H.A. relief and remanding for a hearing in Wilkerson, our Supreme Court focused on what the accused, himself, had alleged, including the accused’s allegations that counsel had misled him and, most importantly, that the accused, himself, desired to take an appeal. The matter was remanded for a hearing at which Wilkerson would have an opportunity to prove his claims. None of that is present in the appeal now before us.
The hearing before Judge Jelin on February 26, 1990, concluded with A.P.’s mother assuring the court that she would remove A.P. from the court and from this Commonwealth, just as soon as the court released A.P. to his mother. Adjudicatory/Dispositional Hearing Transcript, supra at p. 42, set forth above. This Court should conclude, based upon the complete record before us, that A.P. exited Pennsylvania on February 26, 1990, returned to Flatbush, and has not been back in Pennsylvania with respect to this juvenile case since February 1990.
A.P. has been represented post-trial in the Family Court and is represented on this appeal by extremely competent counsel. The Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days, filed May 4,1990, does not contain any allegation that A.P. desired to take an appeal, as required by Wilkerson, supra. Rather than alleging anything at all concerning the desires or wishes of A.P., the Petition merely sets forth, in its only pertinent part:
5. Although it was trial counsel’s intention to preserve the issues for appeal and to perfect that appeal, by the failure to have filed an appeal within 30 days of February 26, 1990 or to have the disposition vacated within that time period, counsel may have waived the right to appeal. This is a plain example of ineffectiveness.
WHEREFORE, A[.] P[.], through counsel, requests that this Honorable Court grant him 30 days in which to perfect an appeal.
Respectfully submitted
*162[Defender Association of Philadelphia]
Petition for Judicial Permission, etc., filed May 4, 1990, unnumbered p. 2, (emphasis added). I am not prepared to charge the omission of reference to A.P.’s desires to inadvertence. Wilkerson requires some evidence, in the record, that the accused desired to appeal before an analysis as to whether the constitutional right to appeal can be instituted. Wilkerson, swpra at 10, 416 A.2d at 480-81. This Court need not even speculate that A.P. has bid “good riddance” to this Commonwealth and has no present concern about an appeal, where he has been released on probation and there is nothing in the certified record to even suggest that that probation was effectuated. It is enough that the record is devoid of any indication, even by way of hearsay, that A.P. has had any interest or concern -with these proceedings since February 26, 1990. The Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days contains no allegation that A.P. desires to perfect an appeal. Without a desire on the part of the accused to take an appeal, there can be no violation of the constitutional right to appellate review.
To the same effect is Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439, 561 A.2d 756 (1989) upon which the Majority so heavily relies. There, our eminent colleague, the Honorable James E. Rowley, stated, in pertinent part:
We hold that failure of trial counsel to take a direct appeal, when his client so requests, is a demonstrated miscarriage of justice within the meaning of [Commonwealth v.] Lawson [519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107 (1988)]. Here, Mr. Hoyman having established that an important state constitutional right has been denied him is entitled to have that right reinstated and to proceed with a direct appeal. In the case at bar, appellant told the Assistant Public Defender who had represented him at trial that he wanted to take a direct appeal, and it was determined at the PCRA hearing that she knew of appellant’s request that a direct appeal was to be filed on his behalf. Through no fault of his own a direct appeal was not filed. Because a *163miscarriage of justice has occurred in the case at bar, appellant is entitled to the relief he seeks in this PCRA proceeding, i.e., a direct appeal.
Hoyman, supra 385 Pa.Super. at 444, 445, 561 A.2d at 758, 759. (Underlining added; bolding in original).
Neither Wilkerson nor Hoyman support the Majority’s assertion that A.P. has been deprived of the constitutional right to an appeal. The manner by which the Majority would resolve this appeal points up, I submit, the difficulties which remain unresolved following this Court’s many opinions filed in In the Matter of Brandon Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39, 573 A.2d 1077 (1990) (en banc). In that case, at least five of the judges, and arguably six members of this Court, concluded that post-trial motions are inappropriate following an adjudication of delinquency. See and compare, Opinion, Beck, J., concurring and dissenting, 393 Pa.Super. at 54, 56, 573 A.2d at 1084, 1084-86; Opinion, Tamilia, J., concurring and dissenting, 393 Pa.Super. at 58, 61, 573 A.2d at 1086-89; Opinion, Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting, 393 Pa.Super. at 70, 76, 573 A.2d at 1092, 1095.
I am also left uncomfortable by the Majority’s refusal to go through a traditional three-prong analysis for ineffectiveness, presumably on its finding that somehow, the Defender Association of Philadelphia is, solely on its self-serving assertion contained in its Petition ... to File an Appeal, etc., ineffective per se. See Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 3, 559 A.2d 504, 505 (1989). The second prong of the traditional three-prong analysis considers whether the particular course chosen by counsel had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interests. Id.
In In Re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. 152, 454 A.2d 1008 (1982), our Supreme Court was required to balance the competing interests of the Commonwealth and of the individual in a civil commitment context. The Court chose to apply an ineffectiveness standard, in reviewing the failure of respondent’s counsel to object to certain hearsay testimony, even though the involuntary commitment of an individual based solely on the hearsay testimony of a single witness would be constitutionally *164prohibited without regard to counsel’s conduct. In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. at 159 n. 8, 454 A.2d at 1011-1012 n. 8; Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.Super, 155, 173-74, 339 A.2d 764, 773-74 (1975). In Hutchinson, Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix recognized the clear difference between a criminal case and the involuntary civil commitment proceeding which the Supreme Court faced in that appeal. There, in considering the difficulties which arise when one seeks to overlay a criminal process standard on a civil proceeding, Mr. Justice Nix observed that the “best interest of the client in [civil commitment mental health] cases is not necessarily served by striving to seek the client’s release.” In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. at 159, 454 A.2d at 1012.
In In the Matter of Brandon Smith, supra, this writer questioned whether the release and discharge of a juvenile would be in his best interest, especially if counsel knew or reasonably could have known that the juvenile had discharged a weapon which wounded a party seeking to intervene in a neighborhood disturbance, and the juvenile would benefit from residency at Glen Mills School. Id. at 75, 573 A.2d at 1094-95. I concluded that the strict application of the ineffectiveness standard as brought over from criminal proceedings into juvenile court proceedings was contrary to the whole concept of juvenile courts which were created in an attempt to depart from the traditional treatment of children as ordinary criminal defendants.
I would pose the same question to my colleagues here. A.P. was apprehended carrying sixty-four vials of crack cocaine, a quantity sufficient to give rise to an inference that it was possessed with an intention to deliver. A.P. secured a disposition by which he was permitted to depart from Pennsylvania, albeit on probation, without any further penalty. Is it really in A.P.’s best interest, as a sixteen-year old youth, to now have his adjudication of delinquency reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings? What message does this send to A.P. and other youths contemplating involvement in heavy drug trafficking?
*165The Defender Association of Philadelphia asserts that the issue on this appeal is whether Judge Jelin erred in refusing to grant the Association leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc where the failure to timely file notice of appeal was due to the Association’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The only possible evidence of ineffectiveness is Paragraph 5 contained in the Petition, the bulk of which is quoted above at page 9. The paragraph concludes with the self-serving statement of the Association: “This is a plain example of ineffectiveness.”
I agree with the Commonwealth that under the present facts, this Court had no jurisdiction over the appeal from the adjudication. Here, defense counsel neglected to ask the trial court to vacate the disposition order pending disposition of motions, and thus, failed to perfect an appeal within thirty days. As I have attempted to point out above, the appeal from the denial of the Motion to Reconsider the Verdict was properly quashed and should not, and could not, be before us. The appeal from the denial of the Petition.... to File an Appeal Within Thirty Days should be reviewed on straight grounds of abuse of discretion. When this is done, it is clear that Judge Jelin properly applied existing law and did not abuse his discretion.
Judge Jelin correctly recognized that time limitations for filing notices of appeal cannot be extended as a matter of indulgence. Trial courts do not have jurisdiction or power to extend or obviate time in which an appeal may be lodged in appellate courts. Reading Anthracite Company v. Rich, 525 Pa. 118, 577 A.2d 881 (1990); Jones v. Unguriet, 364 Pa. 200, 71 A.2d 240 (1950). Except to relieve fraud or its equivalent, the thirty day time limitation set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) may not be extended. Dixon Estate, 443 Pa. 303, 279 A.2d 39 (1971). Some breakdown in the court’s operation may justify an extension. West Penn Power Company v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, 333 A.2d 909 (1975); Appeal of Girolamo, 49 Pa. Cmwlth. 159, 410 A.2d 940 (1980). The Defender Association has not alleged any such excuse(s) on this appeal. Mere negligence of counsel is not a ground for obtaining a nunc pro *166tunc appeal. Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979); In Re Glosser Brothers, Inc., 382 Pa.Super. 177, 555 A.2d 129, 145-46 (1989).
Our standard of review in evaluating an order refusing to grant permission to appeal nunc pro tunc must surely be whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Judge Jelin, in the case now before us, set forth his reasoning, in his Opinion filed August 2, 1990, for denying the Petition as follows:
In the instant case the adjudication and disposition occurred on February 26, 1990. The Notice of Appeal was filed on May 11, 1990, a full 74 days after the order from which the appeal was taken. Clearly the defendant has exceeded the statutory limitations. Although Post-Verdict Motions were filed and ruled upon they did not toll the statutory limitations because the original order was never stayed or vacated. Technically the application for reconsideration of the verdict should have been filed, thereby, preserving the defendant’s right of appeal if the petition for reconsideration was denied.
Notwithstanding the above, the defendant did not file an appeal within thirty days of the entry of the order adjudicating the defendant delinquent and placing him on probation. Defendant’s Post-Verdict Motions, which did not toll the appeal period, were denied by this Court. There is no valid reason why Defendant’s Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal within 30 days should have been granted.
For all the above reasons the Petition for Judicial Permission to File an Appeal Within 30 Days was properly denied. Opinion, Jelin, J., August 2, 1990, p. 3 (citation omitted).
I find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the action of the trial court. I would accordingly affirm the order denying permission to appeal nunc pro tunc. Since the order arising from the disposition order has already been quashed by this Court, I would refuse to consider the suppression issue sought to be introduced by the Defender Association. If the suppression issue were to be examined, I would concur in the Majori*167ty’s finding that the record supports the factual findings of Judge Jelin. Based upon my independent review of the record and the law, I would find no error in Judge Jelin’s conclusion that the arrest and search were reasonable.
I find no basis for disturbing the disposition order of February 26, 1990. Hence this dissent.
OLSZEWSKI, J., joins in this dissenting opinion by JOHNSON, J.