Court Opinion

ID: 9961266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:42.590667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:31.188457
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                                                    RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2023-SC-0132-MR

TIMOTHY R. MAYS                                                        APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
V.             HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE
                           NO. 20-CR-00076

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      A jury of the Marion Circuit Court found Appellant Timothy R. Mays

guilty of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and violation of a Kentucky

interpersonal order of protection (“IPO”). The jury recommended a total

sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. The trial court

sentenced in accordance with that recommendation. Mays now appeals to this

Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). After careful review, we

affirm.

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Mays and Nina Hunt began dating in August 2019. The relationship was

tumultuous and almost immediately marred by domestic violence. During the

course of the relationship, Hunt’s daughters observed injuries on her including

bruising and black eyes. In one instance, Hunt also went to the hospital with
broken ribs. Hunt thereafter obtained an IPO against Mays, and also obtained

a gun from a friend. The gun later went missing from her residence.

          On April 2, 2020, Hunt ended her relationship with Mays. Mays then

called Hunt incessantly for the next three days, leaving her forty voicemails

over the course of that short time.

         On April 5, 2020, Mays was with his daughter Dawn, who testified that

he was upset, pacing back and forth, and refused to speak to her. He then got

in his car and drove away. Security camera footage showed Mays’ car pull into

Hunt’s driveway, at which time Hunt texted her daughter Paige and said “he’s

here!!!!” Paige immediately began driving to her mother’s residence.

         The security camera footage showed Mays’ car leaving Hunt’s residence

fifteen minutes after his arrival. Paige arrived three minutes later, could not

get into the residence, and called 911. Law enforcement arrived, broke into the

home, and discovered Hunt lying near the back door with a gunshot wound to

her head. Hunt was alive and taken to the hospital, where she died two days

later.

         On the evening of the shooting, law enforcement obtained a search

warrant, found Mays at home sleeping, and arrested him. During a search of

his residence, law enforcement located a gun hidden behind an access panel to

the furnace. Laboratory testing later identified a bullet found at the crime

scene as having been fired from this gun.

         Mays was ultimately charged with murder, tampering with physical

evidence, and violation of a Kentucky IPO. After an evidentiary hearing, the

                                         2
trial court found Mays suffered a serious intellectual disability and was thus

ineligible for the death penalty. At trial, the jury found him guilty on all three

counts and recommended a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for

25 years on the murder conviction, 5 years on the tampering conviction, and

12 months on the violation of an IPO conviction. The trial court imposed a

concurrent sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. Mays

now appeals as a matter of right.

                                     ANALYSIS

        Mays raises six issues for our review: (1) whether he was denied a right

to a fair trial when the trial court and Commonwealth’s counsel had an ex

parte conversation regarding a witness’s refusal to testify due to an outstanding

fine; (2) whether the prosecutor engaged in flagrant misconduct; (3) whether

the trial court erred in declining to give an extreme emotional disturbance

(“EED”) instruction; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing a physician to

testify that Hunt told him Mays had injured her; (5) whether Mays’ right to a

fair trial was violated by a law enforcement officer’s reference during testimony

to Mays’ status as a convicted felon; and (6) whether reversal is warranted for

cumulative error. We review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as

necessary.

   I.      The Trial Court’s Ex Parte Conversation With The Prosecution
           Did Not Violate Mays’ Right To A Fair Trial.

        Mays’ first allegation of error relates to an ex parte conversation between

the trial court and the Commonwealth’s counsel regarding the refusal of Hunt’s
                                          3
daughter Haley to testify at trial. On the first day of trial, the Court conducted

voir dire and then recessed for lunch. Two minutes later the Commonwealth

approached the bench without defense counsel present and advised the trial

court that Haley was unwilling to testify because she had an outstanding fine

and did not want to be arrested. The trial court responded that Haley would

not be arrested for the fine, and instructed someone off camera (presumably

the bailiff) not to serve the warrant on Haley. The prosecution did not inform

Mays’ counsel about the conversation. Haley testified later that afternoon.

      Mays contends this ex parte conversation violated his right to a fair trial

in a number of ways. First, Mays contends his Confrontation Clause rights

were violated because he was not informed of the conversation, leaving him

unable to cross-examine Haley as to any potential bias in favor of the

Commonwealth arising from the trial court’s decision not to enforce the

warrant at that time. Second, Mays asserts the ex parte conversation also

violated his right to be present at critical stages of trial. Finally, Mays also

maintains the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the conversation was a Brady

violation.

      Mays acknowledges this issue is unpreserved, and therefore requests

palpable error review pursuant to RCr 1 10.26. Under RCr 10.26, “[a] palpable

error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered . . . by

an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for

review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that

      1 Rule of Criminal Procedure.

                                          4
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” In determining whether an

error is palpable, we consider

      “whether on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that
      the result would have been any different.” To be palpable, an error
      must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.”
      A palpable error must be so grave that, if uncorrected, it would
      seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. “It should be so
      egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.”

Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted). Even

where an error is palpable and thus meets this standard, however, relief is

warranted only where the error also results in manifest injustice.

Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Ky. 2018). An error results in

manifest injustice if it “so seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the proceeding as to be ‘shocking or jurisprudentially

intolerable.’” Conrad v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Ky. 2017)

(quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006)).

      A. Mays’ Confrontation Clause Rights Were Not Violated.

      “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right

of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses

against him.’” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). This right

secures for the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination, one important

function of which is “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying.” Id.

(quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974)). A right to reveal

“possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may

relate to the issues . . . in the case at hand” through effective cross-

examination is fundamental to a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 556
                                          5
S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316); Williams v.

Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Ky. 1978). Indeed, “a showing of bias

can be particularly important in cross-examination because, unlike other forms

of impeachment ‘which might indicate that the witness is lying[,] evidence of

bias suggests why the witness might be lying.’” Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d at 602

n.17 (quoting Star v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Ky. 2010)).

      While defendants are thus assured of a right to conduct effective cross-

examination, that does not mean trial judges are unable to impose limits on

inquiries into a witness’s potential bias. To the contrary, “trial judges retain

wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based

on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of

the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. “So long as a reasonably

complete picture of the witness’ veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the

judge enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries.” Davenport v.

Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997)).

      A Confrontation Clause violation occurs when a defendant is “prohibited

from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to

the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences

relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231

(1988) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680). A defendant satisfies his burden

                                         6
of establishing such a violation by showing that “[a] reasonable jury might have

received a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility had

[the defense’s] counsel been permitted to pursue” the desired cross-

examination. Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d at 603 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

680).

        Notably, courts have found this burden met when the cross-examination

the defendant was unable to conduct would “clearly support[] an inference that

the witness was biased, and when the potential for bias exceeds mere

speculation.” Id. (quoting Davenport, 177 S.W.3d at 769). Of course, as a

corollary, a defendant’s allegation of a Confrontation Clause violation fails

where his contention that cross-examination might have revealed bias is based

on nothing more than mere speculation and unsupported by credible evidence

supporting an inference of bias. Id.; Davenport, 177 S.W.3d at 769.

        Here, Mays’ assertion that evidence of Haley’s treatment by the trial

court could be used to show potential bias in favor of the Commonwealth is

based on mere speculation and unsupported by credible evidence that could

support an inference of such bias. First, the record shows that the

Commonwealth’s counsel simply informed the trial court that Haley refused to

appear due to her outstanding fine. There was no request by Commonwealth’s

counsel that Haley receive any favorable treatment. Rather, the trial court

itself sua sponte directed the warrant not be served on Haley at that time. It

thus appears that any favorable treatment enjoyed by Haley was at the trial

                                         7
court’s sua sponte direction rather than by request of the Commonwealth. 2

That the trial court directed a temporary reprieve from the warrant—without

any request by the Commonwealth to do so—in no way supports an inference

Haley might have been biased in favor of the Commonwealth.

      Second, the favorable treatment of Haley—if any—was also of a

temporary nature, consisting solely of the trial court’s direction that the

warrant for a fine not be served on her at trial. Thus, given that Haley enjoyed

only a temporary reprieve from the warrant at the sua sponte direction of the

trial court, Mays’ contention that such treatment may have led Haley to be

biased in favor of the Commonwealth is not only mere speculation, but

demonstrably refuted by the record. Notably, Mays also points us to no other

evidence that could otherwise support an inference that Haley’s treatment

could support a finding of bias in the Commonwealth’s favor. As such, we find

no Confrontation Clause violation arising from the trial court’s ex parte

conversation with the Commonwealth regarding Haley’s appearance at trial.

      We further note that even if we were to find that Mays has shown a

Confrontation Clause violation, the violation would not rise to the level of

reversible error.

      A trial court’s improper denial of the defendant’s opportunity to
      impeach a witness for bias is subject to harmless error analysis.
      Because the error is of constitutional significance, “[t]he correct
      inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the
      cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might
      nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
      doubt.” Therefore, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable

      2  Indeed, in his briefing before this Court, Mays himself states “the jury was
entitled to hear about the leniency given to [Haley] by the court.” (Emphasis added).
                                         8
      doubt if there is no “reasonable possibility that exclusion of the
      evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”

Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d at 604 (citations omitted). Courts consider a number of

factors in determining whether the improper denial of a defendant’s

opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. These factors include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the

prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness

on material points, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted,

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Olden, 488 U.S.

at 233 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684).

      Here, while Haley’s testimony was undoubtedly significant given that she

was one of the victim’s daughters, it was not the crux of the prosecution’s case.

Her testimony was largely limited to the historical context of Hunt’s

relationship with Mays, in contrast with Paige’s testimony that covered that

issue as well as additional topics of serving as her mother’s contact in times of

distress with Mays and the discovery of her mother’s body shortly after the

shooting. Haley’s testimony was also largely cumulative of Paige’s testimony,

with two minor and insubstantial differences. First, while Paige testified

someone stole Hunt’s gun, Haley testified Mays stole it. While Haley’s more

specific testimony that Mays stole Hunt’s gun might appear at first blush to

have more than minor significance, that significance is diminished by the fact

that Haley acknowledged on cross-examination she was merely assuming Mays

stole Hunt’s gun. Second, Haley testified Mays messed with and stole Hunt’s
                                        9
security cameras, while Paige testified only that Mays stole them. Haley’s

testimony was also consistent with and corroborated by Paige’s testimony.

This significantly undercuts any suggestion that Haley’s testimony was the

product of bias due to her treatment by the trial court. In addition, Mays’

counsel was able to and did cross-examine Haley.

      Finally, the prosecution’s case against Mays was unquestionably strong,

even without considering Haley’s testimony. The evidence at trial showed that

Mays and Hunt had a turbulent relationship rife with domestic violence, and

that Hunt ended that relationship and ceased communicating with Mays three

days before the murder. Over those three days, Mays nonetheless persisted in

repeatedly calling Hunt, ultimately leaving her forty voicemail messages in that

short span of time. Paige testified that Hunt feared Mays and that Hunt

repeatedly asked her to check in to make sure she was safe. In addition,

security footage showed Mays’ vehicle arriving at the residence around the time

of the killing and leaving shortly thereafter. Finally, laboratory testimony

identified a bullet found at the crime scene as having been fired by a gun

discovered hidden in Mays’ home.

      Given the strength of this evidence and the overall case against Mays, as

well as the other factors considered, we cannot conclude that Mays’ inability to

cross-examine Haley regarding her treatment by the trial court in any way

contributed to his conviction. As such, even if Mays’ Confrontation Clause

rights had been violated, any such error would have been harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

                                        10
      B. Mays’ Right To Be Present At Critical Stages Was Not Violated.

      Mays next asserts the trial court’s ex parte communication with the

Commonwealth about Haley’s fine and warrant violated his right to be present

at all critical stages of trial. RCr 8.28(1) provides that a criminal defendant

“shall be present at . . . every critical stage of the trial[.]” In determining

whether proceedings constitute a “critical stage of the trial,” we ask “whether

there has been any interference with the defendant’s opportunity for effective

cross-examination.” Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Ky.

2009) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 n.17 (1987)).

      We pause to note that the ex parte conversation between the trial court

and the prosecution was at best inadvisable. The Kentucky Rules of

Professional Conduct applicable to attorneys and the Kentucky Code of

Judicial Conduct both generally prohibit lawyers and judges, respectively, from

engaging in ex parte communications. SCR 3 3.130(3.5)(b); SCR 4.300, Canon

2, Rule 2.9. Here, there appears no reason the conversation between the judge

and the prosecutor should have been conducted outside the presence of Mays’

counsel. We admonish the judges and attorneys of the Commonwealth to

remain mindful of their ethical obligations and to avoid unnecessary ex parte

communications whenever possible unless otherwise authorized by the relevant

Rules.

      Nonetheless, Mays’ contention that Haley’s treatment by the trial court

may have biased her in favor of the Commonwealth is mere speculation

      3 Supreme Court Rule.

                                          11
contrary to the record and unsupported by credible evidence. There is simply

no basis to support an inference that either the ex parte conversation between

the trial court and the prosecution or the resulting temporary reprieve of the

warrant may have led Haley to be biased in favor of the Commonwealth. As

such, it cannot be said that Mays’ absence from that conversation in any way

interfered with his opportunity for effective cross-examination. Thus, Mays

was not denied his RCr 8.28 right to be present at all critical stages of the trial.

      C. There Was No Brady Violation.

      Finally, Mays asserts the prosecutor’s failure to inform his counsel of her

ex parte conversation with the trial court constitutes a Brady violation. Again,

we disagree.

      Under Brady, a prosecutor’s suppression of evidence favorable to an

accused “violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or

to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This includes “indirectly

exculpatory” evidence that “impeaches the credibility of a witness whose

testimony may be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Williams, 569 S.W.2d at

143. One form of such evidence is proof of a deal or promise of leniency to a

witness, given the value of such evidence “to the accused to show that the

witness possessed a motive to fabricate.” Id.

      Notably, however, Brady is violated only if the evidence the prosecution

fails to disclose is material. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. For Brady purposes,

evidence is material

                                        12
         only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
         disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been
         different. . . . [I]n the context of this different result consideration,
         a reasonable probability [is] one sufficient to undermine confidence
         in the outcome.
         ...

         “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than
         not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether
         in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
         resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”

Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775, 780 (Ky. 2008) (quoting Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).

         Even considered in the light most favorable to Mays, the evidence the

prosecutor failed to disclose was simply that the trial court directed a

temporary reprieve from the warrant so Haley would testify. Such evidence in

no way establishes or even suggests Haley may have been biased in favor of the

Commonwealth. Moreover, Haley’s testimony was in any event cumulative of

and corroborated by Paige’s testimony. And as discussed above, the evidence

against Mays was strong. As such, evidence regarding Haley’s treatment by the

trial court was wholly immaterial and the prosecutor’s failure to disclose that

treatment or the ex parte conversation in no way leads us to question whether

the jury’s verdict is worthy of confidence. Thus, because we perceive no

violation of Mays’ Confrontation Clause rights, RCr 8.28, or Brady, reversal on

those grounds is not warranted.

   II.      The Prosecutor’s Alleged Misconduct, If Any, Was Not Flagrant
            And Does Not Warrant Reversal.

         Mays next asserts reversal is warranted on grounds of two separate

incidents of purported prosecutorial misconduct during trial. First, during the
                                            13
guilt-phase closing arguments the prosecutor addressed Hunt’s daughter Paige

directly, stating “Paige, you did a darn good job. You saved her many times.

You told us about the times that you went there and picked her up and got her

out of that situation.” The prosecutor then turned to the jury and said “She

did her best. She missed it by less than three minutes. But she just couldn’t

protect this time.”

      Second, Mays called Dr. Martine Turns during the penalty phase to

testify in mitigation regarding Mays’ intellectual disability. The Commonwealth

cross-examined Dr. Turns. In the penalty-phase closing arguments, the

prosecutor told the jury she did not agree with Dr. Turns that Mays had an

intellectual disability:

      She just told you he suffered from an intellectual disability. Which
      again, I cross-examined and disagreed with her on several aspects
      of it. The way she conducted the test by using a previous
      psychologist upon which he had hired. I just disagreed and we
      looked at her school records. She gave you what those test
      findings were. We already knew what those were. Obviously, we
      talked about previous testimony. We knew that they were in the
      range that I disagreed with. I’m not a trained psychologist, but I
      wanted you all to hear it because I feel differently, and I didn’t
      know if you all would or not either.

Mays acknowledges that his contention these incidents constitute prosecutorial

misconduct is unpreserved, and he thus requests palpable error review under

RCr 10.26.

      For unpreserved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we reverse only

if the conduct was both flagrant and palpable error resulting in manifest

injustice. RCr 10.26; Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606, 607

n.4 (Ky. 2006). To determine if the misconduct is flagrant, we consider “(1)
                                       14
whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2)

whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or

accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against

the accused.” Mayo v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010) (quoting

Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Ky. 2010)).

      Mays asserts the prosecutor’s direct address to Paige and her comments

that Paige did a “darn good job” and saved her mother many times, before

turning to the jury and stating Paige did her best but missed the opportunity to

save her mother by three minutes, was victim impact evidence improperly

introduced during the guilt phase of the trial. We have held that the

introduction of victim impact evidence during the guilt phase is reversible

error. Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 763 (Ky. 2005), declined to

follow on other ground by Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2018).

However, we have also held that prosecutors have latitude to “introduce

evidence in the guilt phase identifying a victim as a living person rather than a

simple statistic” because such victim background evidence “does not unduly

prejudice a defendant ‘as long as the victim is not glorified or enlarged.’” Id.

(quoting Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 302-03 (Ky. 1997)).

“Victim impact evidence differs from victim background evidence, in that the

former is ‘generally intended to arouse sympathy for the families of the victims,

which, although relevant to the issue of penalty, is largely irrelevant to the

issue of guilt or innocence.’” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978

S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Ky. 1998)).

                                        15
      Here, misconduct in the prosecutor’s statement, if any, was minimal.

The statement was largely a repetition of facts from the evidence presented at

trial, namely that Paige had to help her mother on many occasions but was

unable to do so on the day of the murder. Admittedly, the prosecutor’s

addressing of the beginning of these comments directly to Paige and her

statement that Paige did “a darn good job” were gratuitous and likely strayed

from the proper role of the prosecutor in presenting the facts of the case to the

jury. However, we do not find that they rise to the level of conduct misleading

or prejudicial to Mays. The comments were also isolated and short in length,

lasting approximately thirty seconds during the three-day trial. They also do

not appear to be a deliberate attempt to prejudice Mays. Rather, the evident

thrust of the statements was to bring back to the jury’s mind the fact of Hunt’s

repeated need for Paige’s assistance in dealing with Mays’ violence rather than

to arouse sympathy for Paige or Hunt as victims. Finally, as noted above, the

strength of the evidence against Mays was in any event strong. As such, the

prosecutor’s minimal misconduct, if any, was not flagrant.

      Mays also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she told

the jury she disagreed with the expert testimony that Mays suffered an

intellectual disability. A prosecutor should not insert her “own personal belief”

or make “comments that imply that the prosecutor has special knowledge of

facts not in front of the jury or of the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses

and their testimony.” Towe v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Ky. 2021)

(quoting Hall v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 18 (Ky. 2018)). Here, however,

                                        16
the prosecutor’s remarks were not framed in a manner to suggest special

expertise or insight into intellectual disability, but rather appropriately limited

to expression of a reasonable disagreement with the expert witness’s

conclusion. Indeed, the prosecutor stated she “just disagreed” and that she

“fe[lt] differently.” While the prosecutor perhaps could have more artfully

framed her comments as an invitation for the jury to disagree with Dr. Turns,

she ultimately suggested only a reasonable difference of opinion rather than

special knowledge providing insight that the expert was wrong.

      Moreover, the alleged misconduct, if any, could not be found flagrant as

required to warrant reversal on grounds of this unpreserved error. Again,

because the prosecutor framed her remarks as a reasonable disagreement

rather than specialized knowledge, those remarks did not prejudice Mays.

That framing likewise suggests no deliberate attempt to prejudice Mays, but

rather an intentional effort to avoid a prejudicial suggestion of specialized

knowledge or insight. Finally, the comment was also isolated, and again the

evidence against Mays was strong. As such, we find no flagrant prosecutorial

misconduct warranting reversal of Mays’ conviction.

   III.   Mays Was Not Entitled To An EED Instruction.

      Mays next argues reversal is required because the trial court refused his

request for an EED instruction. Because Mays requested such an instruction

at trial, the error is preserved. RCr 9.54(2). We therefore review for abuse of

discretion. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d at 367. That is, we ask “whether the trial

                                        17
judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      Under Kentucky law,

      a person shall not be guilty [of intentional murder] if he acted
      under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
      there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness
      of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
      defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant
      believed them to be.

KRS 507.020(1)(a). 4 This Court has defined “extreme emotional disturbance”

as “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to

overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the

impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or

malicious purposes.” Benjamin, 266 S.W.3d at 782 (quoting McClellan v.

Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986)).

      A necessary element of EED is the existence of “[a]dequate provocation,

or a ‘triggering event’” precipitating the extreme emotional disturbance. Id.

This “triggering event” must be sudden and uninterrupted. Id. at 783.

However, it need not be contemporaneous with the homicide, but rather may

“‘fester in the mind’ before surfacing to exact its damage.” Id. (quoting Springer

v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (Ky. 1999)). As a corollary, EED is

unavailable where “there intervened between the provocation and the homicide

a cooling-off period sufficient enough to preclude a conclusion that the

provocation was adequate.” Id. A second necessary element of EED is that the

      4 An intentional homicide committed under the influence of extreme emotional

disturbance constitutes the crime of first-degree manslaughter. KRS 507.030(1)(b).
                                         18
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the extreme emotional

disturbance, considered subjectively from the “viewpoint of a person in the

defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them

to be.” KRS 507.020(1)(a); Benjamin, 266 S.W.3d at 783.

      A trial court must “instruct the jury on the ‘whole law of the case, and

this rule requires instructions applicable to every state of the case deducible or

supported to any extent by the testimony.’” Posey v. Commonwealth, 595

S.W.3d 81, 86 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355,

360 (Ky. 1999)). Of course, the obligation to give an instruction is “dependent

upon there being sufficient evidence to warrant” the instruction. Id. “The trial

court has no duty to instruct on theories of the case that are unsupported by

the evidence.” Id. (quoting Driver v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 877, 888 (Ky.

2012)). An EED instruction “must be supported by definite, non-speculative

evidence.” Id.

      Here, the proof Mays contends entitled him to an EED instruction does

not satisfy this standard. First, an EED instruction is warranted only where

the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant actually

suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance. The only evidence Mays

offers that he was in such a state at the time of the killing is that he left Hunt

numerous and repetitive voicemails expressing escalating emotions, and that

he was silent, pacing, and apparently upset immediately before leaving to

commit the crime. Mays’ characterization of the voicemails as showing

escalating emotion is fanciful at best. A review of the voicemails shows they

                                        19
are consistent, fairly calm messages from Mays alternating between

conciliatory and questioning themes of love, being “done wrong”, and seeking

an explanation. More importantly, the voicemails in no way portray any lack of

emotional control by Mays. This falls far short of definite, non-speculative

evidence sufficient to support a finding Mays operated under a “a temporary

state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s

judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of

the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious

purposes.” See Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817, 823 (Ky. 1997)

(noting that evidence the defendant was “upset” does not suffice to show

extreme emotional disturbance).

      It also bears noting that the evidence showed Mays absconded after the

killing and was shortly thereafter found asleep in his home, further

undercutting the possibility of any reasonable finding he was so enraged,

inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome his judgment. Quite simply, an EED

instruction was not warranted because the evidence could not support a

reasonable finding Mays experienced an extreme emotional disturbance.

      Second, an EED instruction is also warranted only if the evidence is

sufficient to support a finding that there was a reasonable explanation or

excuse for the extreme emotional disturbance, considered subjectively from the

“viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as

the defendant believed them to be.” KRS 507.020(1)(a). Here, the only

provocation pointed to by Mays is the fact that Hunt ended their relationship

                                       20
and cut off communication with him. Even considered subjectively from the

perspective of a person in Mays’ situation and under the circumstances he

experienced, Hunt’s ending of her relationship and communication with Mays

cannot possibly be construed as adequate provocation or reasonable

explanation or excuse for so extreme an emotional disturbance as to result in

her death. Mays points to no evidence of some subjective aspect of his

situation or beliefs that could possibly render the breakup a reasonable

explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance resulting in homicide.

Indeed, we find it impossible to conceive of any subjective set of situations,

beliefs, and circumstances that could warrant a finding that the mere ending of

a relationship and cutting off of communication is a reasonable explanation or

excuse for an extreme emotional disturbance. See Meredith v. Commonwealth,

677 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Ky. 2023) (“The event must be so dramatic as to render

the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provoke ‘an explosion of violence.’”

(quoting Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015))). Thus,

because there was no evidence to support a finding that Mays labored under

an extreme emotional disturbance or that he experienced adequate provocation

or had reasonable explanation or excuse for such a state, the trial court

properly denied his request for an EED instruction.

   IV.      Admission Of A Physician’s Statement That Hunt Stated Mays
            Caused Her Injuries Was Harmless Error.

         Mays next argues reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed

Dr. Paul Thomas, a doctor who treated Hunt for broken ribs, to testify that

Hunt told him Mays had punched her in the eye with a closed fist and then
                                         21
also kicked her in the ribs while wearing boots after she fell. Mays objected to

admission of this evidence and his allegation of error is thus preserved. KRE 5

103(a)(1).

      We review a preserved allegation of nonconstitutional evidentiary error

for abuse of discretion. Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky.

2018). Preserved evidentiary errors are also subject to harmless error review.

Carson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.3d 443, 450 (Ky. 2021).

      “[A] nonconstitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if
      the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment
      was not substantially swayed by the error.” “[T]he inquiry is not
      simply ‘whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result,
      apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so,
      whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is
      left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”

Mason, 559 S.W.3d at 339-40 (quoting Murray v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d

398, 404 (Ky. 2013)). Here, while we agree that Hunt’s statements to Dr.

Thomas that Mays inflicted her injuries was inadmissible hearsay, we find the

error in the admission of that evidence at most harmless.

      Hearsay, defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted,” is generally inadmissible. KRE 801(c); KRE 802. KRE

803(4) provides a hearsay exception allowing for admission of “[s]tatements

made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and describing medical

history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or

general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably

      5 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                         22
pertinent to treatment or diagnosis.” Typically, however, the identity of a

perpetrator “is not relevant to treatment or diagnosis.” Colvard v.

Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 244 (Ky. 2010). Thus, we have held that as a

general rule, KRE 803(4) does not authorize a medical provider to testify to a

patient’s hearsay statements regarding who inflicted her injuries. 6 Id. at 246-

47. As such, Hunt’s out-of-court statement to Dr. Thomas that Mays caused

her injuries was not admissible under KRE 803(4).

      However, the error in admitting that statement was at most harmless

because it was cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial that Mays

physically abused Hunt. Paige and Haley both testified to physical injuries

suffered by Hunt during her relationship with Mays. Paige also testified to a

violent incident she personally observed in which Mays threw Hunt against a

wall. The jury also heard evidence regarding the IPOs entered against Mays,

including that the IPOs included judicial findings domestic violence had

occurred as well as a verbatim reading of the contents of Hunt’s sworn affidavit

stating Mays threatened her, physically harmed her, and put her in the

hospital with broken ribs. As such, Dr. Thomas’s testimony was purely

cumulative and cannot be said to have substantially swayed the judgment in

this case. The admission of that testimony was thus at most harmless error.

      6 This prohibition is not absolute.  See id. at 247 (noting “[t]here may be
circumstances in which [a patient’s hearsay identification of a perpetrator] will be
found to comport with the requirements of KRE 803(4) . . . .”). For example, where it
is shown that the patient’s identification of the perpetrator was reasonably pertinent to
treatment or diagnosis and arose “from the patient’s desire for effective medical
treatment,” the statement may fall within the scope of KRE 803(4). See id. at 246.
                                            23
   V.       Trooper Forbus’ Reference To Mays’ Status As A Convicted Felon
            Was Not Palpable Error.

         Mays next argues reversal is required because Trooper Forbus, an officer

who responded to Paige’s 911 call on the day of the murder, testified the

citation he wrote to Mays included a charge of being a convicted felon in

possession of a firearm. Mays acknowledges the error is unpreserved, and we

therefore review the issue for palpable error.

         Mays’ status as a convicted felon was irrelevant to the charges he faced

at trial and thus the jury should not have been informed of that fact. However,

Trooper Forbus’ statement was fleeting and the Commonwealth did not elicit

the testimony nor seek to emphasize it to the jury. When considering the

fleeting brevity of the passing remark in comparison with the overall strength of

the evidence of Mays’ guilt, we find no possibility—much less a substantial

possibility—that the trial would have resulted in a different outcome had the

error not occurred. See Davis, 620 S.W.3d at 30 (“To determine if an error is

palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole case there is

a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different.”

(quoting Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983))). As such,

Trooper Forbus’s comment was not palpable error and does not warrant

reversal.

   VI.      There Was No Cumulative Error.

         Finally, Mays asserts reversal is warranted under the doctrine of

cumulative error. Under this doctrine, “multiple errors, although harmless

individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the

                                         24
trial fundamentally unfair.” Leavell v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 171, 184

(Ky. 2023) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010)).

The errors we have found here are the fleeting reference to Mays’ felon status,

Dr. Thomas’s wholly cumulative statement that Hunt stated Mays caused her

injuries, and prosecutorial comments that at most constitute minimal and non-

flagrant misconduct. Significantly, none of these errors resulted in prejudice to

Mays. As we have previously noted, “[w]here, as in this case, . . . none of the

errors individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to

hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds

up to prejudice.” Id. (quoting Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 631). We thus do not find

that the doctrine of cumulative error warrants reversal here.

                                 CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Marion Circuit Court.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Lambert, Nickell, and

Thompson, JJ., concur. Keller, J., concurs in result only.

                                        25
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin L. Conder
Assistant Attorney General

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