Court Opinion

ID: 9919532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 18:03:30.797789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:04.274458
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

      IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 23-0134
                               FILED 01-18-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JS520308
           The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Judge, Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant

Stuart & Blackwell PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellees
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.
                        Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr., and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1            Kara C. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
granting Tyler C.’s (“Father’s”) petition to terminate her parental rights as
to their minor child, L.C. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           L.C. was born in 2012 in Indiana. Father was only minimally
involved with L.C. for the first few years of L.C.’s life, during part of which
Father was attending college in Arizona. He did not provide any child
support for L.C. until the Indiana court established paternity and ordered
child support in 2016.

¶3            In October 2016, Indiana Department of Child Services
responded to an allegation that Mother neglected L.C. after alleged
domestic violence incidents between Mother, her husband at the time J.
Horner, and Horner’s mother. In January 2017, an Indiana court granted
Father emergency custody of L.C. The Indiana Department of Child
Services put Mother on a program of informal adjustment, which she did
not complete.

¶4            In July 2017, Mother and Father mediated a parenting
agreement. Father retained sole legal custody and primary physical custody
of L.C. and Mother was entitled to unsupervised visitation during breaks
in the school year. However, Horner was not to be present during Mother’s
visitation. Mother was also entitled to three weekly telephone calls with
L.C., which Father was to help coordinate.

¶5            Father claimed Mother rarely sought to exercise her phone
and in-person visitation, and Mother contended Father prevented her from
doing so. Father testified Mother was angry and aggressive in the phone
calls with L.C. The last time she saw L.C. was at an in-person visit in July
2018, and the last time she spoke with L.C. was by phone in January 2019.
According to Father’s testimony at the termination hearing, L.C. disclosed
that Horner had been present at his July 2018 visitation with Mother, in

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.
                        Decision of the Court

violation of the mediated agreement. Mother denied Horner was present at
the July 2018 visit, claiming L.C. mistook her brother for Horner. Mother
also claimed Father prevented her from calling L.C. at all after January 2019
and he threatened to have her “arrested for harassment.”

¶6            In October 2018, Father filed in Arizona to modify the
parenting plan. In June 2019, the Indiana circuit court issued an order
declaring Arizona had jurisdiction over the case going forward. In July
2019, the Arizona juvenile court modified the parenting plan, permitting
Mother supervised parenting time in Arizona, suspending the telephonic
visitation, and imposing child support of $235 per month on Mother. The
order required Mother to work through L.C.’s therapist if she desired to
resume telephone calls. Mother provided no testimony that she attempted
to work with L.C.’s therapist to resume calls and Father testified that, to his
knowledge, Mother never did so.

¶7             Father testified that since July 2019, Mother never contacted
him to exercise her visitation rights or to ask about L.C. He presented an
email from her, also from July 2019, stating she was “willing to sign over
[her] full rights” so Father’s wife could adopt L.C., although Mother denies
sending that email and believes Horner may have sent it instead. Father
further testified Mother never paid child support. He also received a card
and a letter in the mail and a virtual card from Mother for L.C. In January
2022, Mother emailed Father to inform him she was back in the military and
could add L.C. to her insurance.

¶8            Father filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in
February 2022 on abandonment grounds pursuant to Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(1). The court conducted trial and, in June 2023,
terminated Mother’s parental rights on the abandonment grounds. It found
that she had abandoned L.C. for a period of at least six months, that Father
did not cause the abandonment, and that termination was in L.C.’s best
interests because L.C. was adoptable and continuing a relationship with
Mother would be detrimental to L.C.

¶9             Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶10           Our review requires that we “evaluate all the statutory
elements found by the juvenile court.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 26 (2023). To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.
                         Decision of the Court

must “find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for
termination exists” under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and then “determine by a
preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child’s best
interests.” Id. at 477 ¶ 20 (citations omitted). In reviewing the termination
of parental rights, we accept the court’s factual findings “if reasonable
evidence and inferences support them” and will affirm the court’s legal
conclusions “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31
(citations omitted).

¶11            A parent may petition to terminate the parental rights of
another parent who has abandoned their child in common. A.R.S. § 8-
533(A), (B)(1). The petitioning parent must prove the other parent failed to
“provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child,
including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent’s
failure to maintain a “normal parental relationship with the child without
just cause” for six months creates a rebuttable presumption of
abandonment. Id. The non-petitioning parent may rebut that presumption
by showing just cause, including that the other parent “persistently and
substantially restricted [her] interaction with their child.” Calvin B. v.
Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293 ¶ 1 (App. 2013). However, a parent must act
persistently to pursue the parent-child relationship beyond merely
“minimal efforts,” and a court evaluates the parent’s conduct, not her
subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50
¶¶ 18, 22 (2000).

¶12           Citing Calvin B., Mother contends the juvenile court “may not
prove abandonment based on evidence that [Mother] has had only limited
involvement” with L.C. because Father interfered with her relationship
with L.C. 232 Ariz. at 293 ¶ 1. But the juvenile court found “Father’s actions
do not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to
abandonment” and “Mother made an insufficient showing that she actively
sought more involvement than the other parent would allow.” Reasonable
evidence supports these findings.

¶13            In Calvin B., we held the record “lack[ed] evidence sufficient”
to prove abandonment because the father in that case had “actively sought
more involvement with [the parties’] son than [the mother] would allow”—
including up to ten visits a year—despite the mother’s strong opposition,
such as filing multiple orders of protection against the father. Id. at 297–98
¶¶ 21–27. Here, by contrast, Father testified Mother never contacted him or
L.C.’s therapist to set up visitation after July 2019, and Mother did not
submit any documentation to refute that testimony. And Father waited
until February 2022 to petition to terminate her rights, a substantially longer

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.
                        Decision of the Court

period than the six months necessary to establish a rebuttable presumption
of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶14            Father conceded Mother mailed a card and a letter and sent
one virtual card to L.C. since July 2018, though Mother testified she sent
more letters. She also provided text messages and emails showing conflict
between the parents as to her visitation. Mother further argues she did not
always have correct contact information for Father, or that he blocked her,
but she was able to email him in January 2022 about adding L.C. to her
insurance. Moreover, she did not present evidence of any effort to enforce
her parental rights. Nor has she paid any child support, resulting in over
$10,000 in arrears. Though there may be conflict in the evidence, “[w]e will
not reweigh the evidence.” See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207
Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). On this record, we conclude there is reasonable
evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that Father’s actions did
not rise to the level of interference required to establish a defense to
abandonment and Mother’s actions were insufficient to rebut the
presumption of abandonment.

¶15           We further conclude there is reasonable evidence supporting
the court’s termination based on abandonment. Per Father’s testimony,
Mother had not attempted to set up any visits or initiated any contact with
L.C. since 2019, and we will not reweigh that evidence. Id. Therefore, the
court did not err in finding Mother abandoned L.C. without just cause.

¶16            Mother did not contest the court’s finding that termination of
her parental rights was in L.C.’s best interests. She has therefore waived the
argument. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234 ¶ 14
n.6 (App. 2011) (holding failure to develop argument on appeal constitutes
waiver of that argument). Nevertheless, there is reasonable evidence to
affirm the court’s best-interests finding. Mother testified Father’s wife has
taken good care of L.C. and intends to adopt L.C. Because there is
reasonable evidence L.C. is adoptable and his needs are being met, we find
no error in the court’s best-interests finding. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 579 ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (holding that a child being
adoptable is sufficient to find termination of parental rights is in the child’s
best interests).

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           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C.
                       Decision of the Court

¶17           Accordingly, the court did not err in terminating Mother’s
parental rights as to L.C.

                               CONCLUSION

¶18          We affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: TM

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