Court Opinion

ID: 9726556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:57:11.625397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.519805
License: Public Domain

BUEKE, P. J., dissenting: The defendant is neither the owner of the building nor the occupant of the space in which the alleged violations of the code relating to exit and fire escape signs occurred. It is the managing agent of the building. At all relevant times the space was under the exclusive occupancy and control of the Internal Eevenue Service of the United States. Neither lease with the United States has a forfeiture clause entitling the lessor to forfeit the lease for breach of covenant or for use of the premises in violation of a law or city ordinance or even for nonpayment of rent. In People v. Gilbert, 64 Ill.App. 203, the court said (207): “The breach of a condition is essentially different in its results from a breach of a covenant. In the case of a condition broken the right of re-entry by the landlord, if the condition were of such nature, would ensue, but for a breach of covenant, where no right of entry for such breach is reserved, only an action for damages would follow. White v. Naerup, 57 Ill. App. 114.” The same principle applies where the lessee is using the leased premises for a purpose forbidden by law or ordinance. Pritchett v. King, 56 Ga. App. 788, 194 S. E. 44; Pickalo v. Mack, 217 Mich. 274, 186 N. W. 502; Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal.App.2d 110, 108 P.2d 479. The defendant had no right to compel the United States to install exit and fire signs by threatening to forfeit the lease if it did not do so. While the leases gave the defendant the right to inspect the premises, this provision did not give the right to compel the United States to install exit and fire escape signs. The provision of the leases requiring the lessor to comply with all city ordinances in the operation of the building cannot be construed to require the lessor to install such signs at its expense in the government occupied space. This clause refers to the operation of the building and has no bearing upon the duty to install exit and fire signs. The United States has complete control of the space it occupies in the building. The leases provide that the government will “comply with all building and fire codes and ordinances pertaining to the maintenance of the interior” of the premises. The government has informed the defendant that it will comply with whatever signs that the Fire Department wants and is waiting for the latter’s recommendations. Section 39-2 of Chapter 39 of the Municipal Code provides that the owner and the managing agent of a building, in any part of which there is a violation of the provisions of the code enumerated in Section 39-1 of that chapter, shall be liable for any violation therein existing or occurring, or which may have existed or occurred at or during any time that such person is or was the managing agent. Usually the managing agent selects the tenants, draws the leases and has the right to evict if the tenant fails to install exit and fire signs where the lease casts such duty on the tenant. The United States prescribes the form of lease and can use the power of eminent domain to take possession if the building owner refuses to accept the lease prepared by the United States. The government has complete control of the space it occupies in the building. The defendant as managing agent has no right to compel the government to take any action in the space. Under the circumstances presented the trial judge was right in finding the defendant not guility of violating the provision of the code requiring the placing of signs. I do not think that the provisions of the Municipal Code relating to the installation of standard inside standpipe systems apply to the State-Madison Building. The only issue under Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint is whether the standpipe requirements of the code apply retroactively to a building which was erected long before Sections 64-2 and 90-3 were enacted. The question of the power of the City Council to enact an ordinance making the standpipe requirements apply retroactively to existing or pre-ordinance buildings is not in issue. The language of Section 78-3 (b) of the code, stating that every “existing building shall comply with the code requirements in force and applicable to such building at the time of its construction or alteration and shall also comply with such provisions of this code which are specifically made applicable to existing buildings” makes it plain that the code is prospective in its operation except where specifically made retroactive. Applying the rule of construction of the quoted section it is manifest that the standpipe provisions of the code do not apply to a pre-ordinance building such as the State-Madison Building. It will be observed that Section 64-2 contains no language specifically making the section apply to existing or pre-ordinance buildings. Section 78-4 of the code provides that existing “buildings shall comply with all applicable fire protection requirements of this code and with the special provisions of section 78-4.1 to 78-4.3 inclusive.” Only those fire protection requirements of the code as are made applicable to existing buildings elsewhere in the code apply to existing buildings. Section 78-4.2, and the sections to which it refers, also show that the standpipe provisions of the code do not apply to preordinance buildings. It requires that every “preordinance building shall comply with the requirements of chapters 64 and 90 of this code pertaining to the installation of portable fire extinguishers and fire alarm systems.” Chapter 64, entitled “Fire Extinguishing Apparatus,” deals with automatic sprinkler systems, standard inside standpipe systems, fire alarm systems and standard portable fire extinguishers. Chapter 90, entitled “Fire Protection,” deals with a number of subjects including standard fire alarm systems and standard fire extinguishers. Since Section 78-4.2 provides that pre-ordinance buildings shall comply only with the “requirements of Chapters 64 and 90 of this code pertaining to the installation of portable fire extinguishers and fire alarm systems” it is clear that pre-ordinance buildings such as the State-Madison Building are not required to comply with the requirements of Chapter 64 relating to standard inside standpipe systems. In my opinion the case was correctly decided and the judgment should be affirmed.