Court Opinion

ID: 9838498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:29.951876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.028842
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CHARLES TALBERT                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2095 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 18, 2019
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008348-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                    FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

      Charles Talbert brings this direct appeal from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of recklessly endangering another person

(“REAP”) and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). We affirm.

      In a late afternoon in September 2018, Talbert approached two women,

Alice Conteh and Naima Koroma, on the street in Philadelphia. The women

had stopped their car due to a mechanical problem and opened the hood.

Conteh asked Talbert if he was a mechanic, and he responded by pulling a

knife out of his pocket, pointing the knife at Conteh, and making a slashing

motion toward her torso. The women fled to a nearby building and called the

police.

      Talbert was arrested and charged with aggravated assault, PIC, simple

assault, and REAP. At trial, Talbert did not deny his actions; he asserted that
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he was high on PCP at the time and that he pulled out the knife to reposition

it in his pocket. A jury convicted Talbert of PIC and REAP and acquitted him of

aggravated assault and simple assault. The trial court sentenced Talbert to

serve a term of incarceration of 29 to 60 months for the conviction of PIC and

12 to 24 months for the REAP conviction.

       Talbert filed a pro se post-sentence motion, which was eventually denied

by operation of law. We now address Talbert’s direct appeal.1

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1 We note that this case is replete with procedural irregularities. Initially,
Talbert perfected a direct appeal at 1225 EDA 2020. While that appeal was
pending, original counsel was permitted to withdraw, and Attorney William
Ciancaglini was appointed. The following month, Attorney Ciancaglini was
permitted to withdraw and current counsel was appointed. However, it
appears that Attorney Ciancaglini remained as the attorney of record in this
Court, such that he continued to erroneously receive notifications about the
case.
       Nevertheless, while 1225 EDA 2020 was pending, Talbert filed a pro se
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, which was dismissed, and a
notice of appeal was filed at 127 EDA 2022.
       Then, the pending direct appeal at 1225 EDA 2020 was dismissed for
failure to file a brief, and Talbert filed a pro se petition for allowance of appeal
in our Supreme Court at 27 EM 2022.
       Thereafter, we remanded the appeal at 127 EDA 2022 for a hearing to
determine whether Talbert had been abandoned by counsel. While the petition
at 27 EM 2022 was still pending before the Supreme Court, the trial court
entered an order stating counsel had not abandoned Talbert and reinstated
the appeal rights at both 1225 EDA 2020 and 127 EDA 2022.
       On August 10, 2022, current counsel filed a praecipe to discontinue the
appeal at 127 EDA 2022. Counsel also filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment of sentence, which established the instant appeal at 2095 EDA 2022.
Meanwhile, our Supreme Court has placed a hold on 27 EM 2022, pending this
Court’s disposition of 2095 EDA 2022.
       As alluded to earlier, Attorney Ciancaglini had been listed as Talbert’s
attorney. In a letter dated February 22, 2022, Attorney Ciancaglini alerted this
Court to the fact that he had been erroneously receiving the notifications
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Talbert presents this Court with three issues for review challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence, the adequacy of a jury instruction, and the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Upon careful review, we conclude that

none of the claims merit relief.

       Talbert first argues that his conviction of PIC must be reversed because

the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the knife for criminal

purposes.2 See Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. He asserts that because the jury

acquitted Talbert of the crimes of aggravated and simple assault, he cannot

____________________________________________

concerning Talbert’s cases. However, that letter was not received until after
the direct appeal at 1225 EDA 2020 was dismissed.
       Suffice it to say we are satisfied that this Court’s improper listing of prior
counsel as Talbert’s attorney of record precipitated much of the confusion in
this case. This breakdown resulted in the lack of proper court filings leading
to the dismissal of Talbert’s timely filed direct appeal at 1225 EDA 2020 and
led to the appearance of an abandonment by counsel. Accordingly, we will not
quash as untimely the instant appeal at 2095 EDA 2022. See
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding a
breakdown in the court system occurred and appeal should not be quashed).

2 To the extent Talbert’s argument challenges the credibility of the testimony

offered by Conteh, see Appellant’ Brief at 15, thereby presenting a challenge
to the weight of the evidence, such a claim is waived. Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 607 and its comment instruct that in order to preserve for
appellate review a claim that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
the issue must be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial either
orally prior to sentencing, by written motion prior to sentencing, or in a post-
sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. Here, Talbert never filed an oral or
written motion for a new trial prior to sentencing, or a post-sentence motion
challenging the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that any
argument challenging the weight of the evidence is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
607; Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(“[t]he purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight
of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived”).

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be considered to have possessed the knife with the intent to employ it

criminally. See id. at 14-15. Talbert alleges the Commonwealth “failed to

present any evidence to prove that [his] possession of the knife was intended

for anything other than … self-defense purposes.” Id. at 16.

      We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with great

deference to the credibility determinations of the fact finder:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (citation omitted).

      A person is guilty of PIC “if he possesses any instrument of crime with

intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a). The statute defines

“instrument of crime” as “[a]nything used for criminal purposes and possessed

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by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it

may have.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d)(2).

      “‘[I]t is the actor’s criminal purpose that provides the touchstone of his

liability’ for possessing an instrument of crime.” Commonwealth v.

Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 317-18 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). We have long

held that wholly circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

of possession of an instrument of crime. See Commonwealth v. Young,

692 A.2d 1112, 1114 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that circumstantial evidence

was sufficient to sustain conviction of possession of instrument of crime).

      Further, we are mindful that “[w]here an appellant has been acquitted

of the underlying crime, and no other evidence has been presented to

establish criminal intent, an appellant cannot be deemed to possess the

requisite intent to employ a weapon criminally -- a prerequisite to a conviction

for PIC.” Commonwealth v. Weston, 749 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 2000)

(citations omitted). Moreover, a conviction for possession of an instrument of

crime may be sustained when a defendant has been otherwise acquitted of

related offenses involving the use of that instrument of crime. See

Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1245-50 (Pa. 2014) (relying on

the “long-standing principles that juries may issue inconsistent verdicts and

that reviewing courts may not draw factual inferences in relation to the

evidence from a jury’s decision to acquit a defendant of a certain offense”).

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      Talbert argues that the jury’s decision not to convict him of aggravated

or simple assault leaves us with no underlying crime to support his PIC

conviction. However, this argument conveniently overlooks that the jury did

convict Talbert of REAP. And the evidence of record is sufficient to support the

REAP conviction.

      Our review of the record reflects Conteh testified that Talbert

approached her and her sister on the street, took out a knife from his pocket,

and made slashing motions toward Conteh’s chest and face. See N.T.,

10/7/19, at 33-36. Conteh expressed that it was “a big knife” and indicated

that it was approximately six inches from her body. Id. at 36. She also

testified that she “was so scared.” Id. 35. Conteh further indicated that when

she and her sister ran, Talbert followed them. See id. at 47. Likewise,

Conteh’s sister, Koroma testified concerning the incident. She indicated that

Talbert approached the women, pulled a knife from his pocket, and pointed it

at Conteh’s upper body. See id. at 67-68.

      Here, regardless of whether Talbert was convicted of the crimes of

aggregated and simple assault, the facts of the incident were sufficient to

support his conviction for REAP. The jury, sitting as finder of fact, chose to

believe the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, and we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Under the totality of the

circumstances, the evidence presented at the trial, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, establishes that Talbert

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pulled a knife on Conteh and pointed it at her upper body and face. This

evidence is sufficient to sustain Talbert’s conviction of REAP. Accordingly, his

claim the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of his criminal intent lacks

merit.

      Talbert next argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly

instruct the jury on the legal definition of intent. See Appellant’s Brief at 16.

However, Talbert has not properly developed this issue for appellate review.

      It is undisputed that the argument portion of an appellate brief must be

developed with pertinent discussion of the issue, which includes citations to

relevant authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Moreover, if reference is made to

a jury charge appearing in the record, the argument must set forth a reference

to the place in the record where the jury charge appears. See Pa.R.A.P.

2119(c).

      Here, the argument section of Talbert’s brief addressing this issue

consists of general statements without any citation to legal authority

supporting his allegation of trial court error. Also, in contradiction to Rule

2119(c), in the argument portion of his appellate brief, Talbert has failed to

comply with the mandatory briefing requirements by offering no citation to

the notes of testimony where a proper objection to the jury instruction had

been made. Accordingly, because Talbert has not developed any significant

argument relating to the issue in the argument section of his appellate brief

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and has not directed this Court to the portion of the record to be reviewed,

we deem this issue to be waived.3

       In his final two arguments, Talbert argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in fashioning his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-20. Initially,

Talbert contends the trial court imposed a sentence that was not based upon

proper consideration of pertinent factors, as contemplated under 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9721(b). See id. at 17-19. Talbert further asserts the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing consecutive maximum sentences, which he asserts

resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence. See id. at 19-20.

       Our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. Sentencing is a

matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       It is well settled there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805

____________________________________________

3  Even if we did not find waiver based on Talbert’s appellate brief, and
addressed the issue, we would have found waiver due to his failure to make a
specific objection to the jury instruction before the jury retired. Our Supreme
Court has held that, in the event counsel fails to posit the appropriate
objection prior to the jury’s retirement for deliberation, the underlying point
is not preserved for appellate review and will be deemed waived on appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 223 (Pa. 2005). Our review
of the portion of record cited by the Commonwealth in its brief reflects that
after jury deliberations began, the trial court gave a clarifying instruction, and
Talbert did not object. See N.T., 10/9/19, at 2-17. Talbert’s failure to make
such an objection resulted in waiver of this issue.

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(Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
            whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
            see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
            properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
            reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
            720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
            Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
            substantial question that the sentence appealed from
            is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
            Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met. Talbert

brought an appropriate appeal, filed a post-sentence motion raising the issue,

and included in his appellate brief the necessary concise statement of the

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We

next determine whether he has raised a substantial question requiring us to

review this claim challenging the discretionary aspects of the sentence

imposed.

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       Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case

basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v.

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must

show actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Talbert argues the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing an excessive sentence that was not based upon the

gravity of the violation, the extent of Talbert’s record, his prospect of

rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors of

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. See Appellant’s Brief at 9. This Court has held that an

assertion that a sentence was excessive and that the trial court failed to

properly consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)4 raises a

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770

(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d

1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence claim—in

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4 The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) include: the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b).

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conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question” (internal citation omitted)). We

therefore grant permission to appeal and proceed to review the merits of this

sentencing claim.

       We next apply the four-part test to Talbert’s claim that the trial court

abused its discretion in imposing consecutive maximum sentences, which

resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence. Here, the first requirement of the

four-part test is met because Talbert properly brought this appeal. However,

our review of the record reflects that he did not meet the second requirement

because he did not include a challenge to the imposition of consecutive

sentences in his post-sentence motions or at the time of sentencing.5 See

Post-Sentence Motion, 12/23/19 (Record Entry #27). Therefore, Talbert’s

issue challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences is waived, and we

are precluded from addressing the merits of his claim on appeal.

       We now review Talbert’s claim that the sentencing court failed to

properly consider relevant sentencing factors. In his brief, Talbert argues

“[t]he court only considered the nature of the offense, without consideration

of the characteristics of appellant or his rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief

____________________________________________

5 In his post-sentence motion, Talbert presented the following challenge to his

sentence: “The sentence was excessive considering Petitioner’s age, his dual
diagnosis of PTSD, his bipolar disease, his life-long need for inpatient
hospitalization and treatment listed in the mental health report, and other
mitigating evidence.” Post-Sentence Motion, 12/23/19, at 1.

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at 18. He further alleges the court did not state any of the findings upon which

the sentence was based. See id.

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super.

2022). In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error

in judgment. See id. Rather, an appellant must establish by reference to the

record that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision. See id.

      The sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the proper

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is

the sentencing court that is in the best position to view a defendant’s

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect

and nature of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961

(Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). As we have stated, “a court is

required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant's prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. (citation omitted).

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      In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted).

      Our review of the record reflects, and it is undisputed that, at Talbert’s

sentencing, the trial court received and reviewed a presentence report,

considered argument from defense counsel, heard Talbert’s allocution, and

received argument from the Commonwealth. Prior to announcing the

judgment of sentence, the trial court read into the record the full evaluative

summary of the presentence report, which evinced a complete understanding

of the relevant factors surrounding Talbert’s sentence. See N.T., 12/18/19, at

10-16.

      We conclude the comments the trial court offered for the sentence

imposed were more than sufficient to conclude that the court properly

considered all relevant factors in fashioning Talbert’s sentence. Also, because

the trial court had been fully informed and relied upon the presentence report,

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in creating the instant

sentence. Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133. Accordingly, Talbert’s claim that the

trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors in imposing the sentence

lacks merit.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/06/2023

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