Court Opinion

ID: 9369860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 20:02:20.675326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.603685
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 Ruiz v. Ruiz CA2/6

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

MANUEL L. RUIZ,                                                  2d Civ. No. B315514
                                                               (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-
  Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant                                   00524937-CU-OR-VTA)
and Respondent,                                                   (Ventura County)

v.

MARIBEL RUIZ,

  Defendant, Cross-
Complainant and Appellant.

       Manuel L. Ruiz and his sister, Maribel Ruiz, are co-owners
of residential property located at 1254 South K. Street in Oxnard
(the Property). Manuel claims an 83.5 percent interest, while
Maribel asserts an adverse 50 percent joint tenancy interest.1
       Manuel brought this action to quiet title to the Property
and for partition by sale and an accounting. Maribel cross-

      For sake of clarity, we refer to the parties by their first
         1

names. No disrespect is intended.
complained for partition, appointment of a receiver and an
accounting. The parties waived a jury.
      The trial court heard evidence regarding the legal effect of
the recorded grant deeds and the allocation of the anticipated
partition sale proceeds. A principal issue was the effect of a
September 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) purporting to transfer
Manuel’s entire interest in the Property to Maribel. Finding that
Manuel’s signature was forged and that “Maribel’s explanation,
knowledge, or lack thereof, of the ‘Forged Deed’ was not credible,”
the court ruled in Manuel’s favor. It determined he has an 83.5
percent interest in the Property and that Maribel holds the
remaining 16.5 percent.
      Maribel contends the trial court erred by failing (1) to
correctly assess the parties’ respective ownership interests in the
Property; (2) to correctly determine the parties’ obligations
regarding the mortgage loan Maribel obtained to renovate the
Property; (3) to apply the partition statutes to award Maribel
compensation for those renovations; and (4) to consider whether
the doctrine of ratification applies to Manuel’s conduct. Maribel
further asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
Manuel the $4,490 in costs he incurred in proving a fact she
denied in response to his request for admissions. We affirm in all
respects.
       I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                           A. The Property
      The parties’ parents purchased the Property in 1971.
Manuel, Maribel, and their siblings grew up in the home.
      In 1993, Manuel purchased his father’s interest in the
Property. His mother later transferred her interest to him,
giving Manuel sole legal title.

                                 2
       In 2003, Manuel agreed to give Maribel a 33 percent
interest in the Property if she obtained the funds to construct
room additions. The parties recorded a grant deed to that effect
in August 2003 (Trial Ex. 6), and Maribel applied for a mortgage
loan in her name only.
       The parties hired a contractor, Omar Lara, to construct the
addition to the Property. The existing one-story home was
“roughly 1500, 1600, or 1900 square feet.” The renovation, which
cost $161,000, resulted in a two-story, 3,000-square-foot home.
Both Manuel and Maribel signed the construction contract.
       After the lender approved the $217,600 loan, Maribel
executed a promissory note and deed of trust securing the loan
(Trial Ex. 8). The deed of trust was recorded on September 25,
2003. Earlier that same day, the September 2003 grant deed
(Trial Ex. 7) transferring Manuel’s entire interest in the Property
to Maribel also was recorded.
       Manuel testified that he did not sign the September 2003
grant deed and did not know of its existence until after it was
recorded. After receiving the deed in the mail, Manuel
confronted Maribel and “told her to go and fix these papers
because they were very wrong.”
       Although Manuel did not know who signed his name to the
grant deed, he testified that Maribel “knows who signed” it.
Maribel, however, disclaimed any knowledge of the grant deed.
The trial court found that “Maribel’s explanation, knowledge, or
lack thereof, of the ‘Forged Deed’ was not credible.” It noted that
“Maribel closed the mortgage loan, borrowed the money for the
room additions that she wanted, in her name alone, and she
wanted the house for herself.” (Italics added.)
       Handwriting examiner Sheila Lowe testified that she
analyzed the September 2003 grant deed, comparing it to

                                 3
Manuel’s known signatures. She concluded that the signature on
the deed is “an unsuccessful attempt to simulate [Manuel’s]
signature and, therefore, not genuine.”
       Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the
September 2003 grant deed “is a forgery” and is therefore “void
ab initio.”
       In February 2004, Maribel executed and recorded a grant
deed transferring her interest in the Property to herself and
Manuel as joint tenants (Trial Ex. 9). Given that the September
2003 grant deed was deemed “void ab initio,” the trial court
determined Maribel held only the 33 percent interest previously
granted to her by Manuel (Trial Ex. 6). The court found that the
February 2004 grant deed divided that 33 percent interest in
half, giving both Maribel and Manuel a 16.5 percent interest as
joint tenants.
       The trial court concluded that Manuel had established, by a
preponderance of the evidence that, as of June 14, 2019, he has
an 83.5 percent interest in the Property (67 percent as sole owner
plus 16.5 percent as a joint tenant), and that Maribel has a 16.5
percent interest as a joint tenant.
                         B. Mortgage Loan
       The mortgage loan proceeds were distributed as follows:
“$12,772.00 to creditors of Maribel; $10,559.88 for closing costs;
and $194,268.12 to Maribel.” Maribel paid for the home
renovation from those funds and also made the monthly
mortgage loan payments. For “about a year,” Manuel and their
brother Lionel each gave Maribel $100 a month toward the loan.
When Maribel moved out in 2012, she stopped making the loan
payments. Manuel then started making the payments, believing
he would lose the Property otherwise.

                                4
       The trial court rejected Maribel’s assertion that Manuel
agreed to pay 50 percent of the mortgage loan payments and
therefore owes her $87,144.52. It noted that “[a]ny alleged
agreement to pay 50% of this loan is not memorialized in a
writing signed by the parties, and is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, as the loan here is a 30-year term and . . . ‘by
its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof.’ (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1).)”
       The trial court granted Manuel’s claim for reimbursement,
finding he is entitled to recover the payments he made on
Maribel’s mortgage loan between April 1, 2012 and April 1, 2021.
                            C. Judgment
       The judgment allows Manuel to purchase Maribel’s
“interest in the Property at fair market value, via a receiver . . . ,
or other method as agreed upon by the parties;” and provides that
the gross sale proceeds shall be divided in accordance with the
parties’ respective ownership interests. In addition, Maribel is
charged with the mortgage loan payoff amount, the $59,353.89
owed to Manuel for mortgage loan principal payments and the
$54,000 owed to Manuel for mortgage loan interest payments.
Should these charges result in a negative number, Manuel is
entitled to a money judgment “for the amount of that shortfall.”
                      D. Costs of Proof Award
       During discovery, Manuel propounded requests for
admission to Maribel, in which he asked her to admit: 1. “The
signature purporting to [b]e that of Manuel Ruiz on the Grant
Deed recorded in the Official Records of Ventura County as
Instrument number 20030925-0364570 is a forgery.” Maribel
responded by stating: 1. “Responding party lacks sufficient
information to admit or deny this request for admission and
therefore denies it.”

                                  5
       Maribel’s denial of the request required Manuel to prove
the issue at trial. After he prevailed, Manuel moved for costs of
proof in the sum of $4,490. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420.)2 The
trial court granted the motion and awarded Manuel “$4,490 in
costs associated with the proof of the denied request for
admissions.” The court found that the “claimed costs are
reasonable” and that Maribel had failed to establish “one of the
grounds listed under [section 2033.420, subdivision (b).]”
                          II. DISCUSSION
                         A. Standard of Review
       “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of
review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this
deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981; see Fladeboe v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 59-60.
       “An appellate court has no right to retry a case on the facts.
Our whole duty as to the factual showing is to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier
of fact even though there is contrary evidence equal to, or even
greater than, that which favors the trial court’s decision. We
cannot weigh the evidence, or pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses. If we reach a conclusion that there is substantial
evidence to support a judgment or order we must affirm it
(Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439), even though we

      All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
      2

Procedure unless otherwise stated.

                                 6
might have reached a contrary conclusion . . . if we had been the
triers of fact below.” (Kallman v. Henderson (1965) 234
Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 (Kallman); In re Michael G. (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)
       We review “an interlocutory judgment of partition [for]
abuse of discretion.” (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
589, 596-559.) Under that standard, “[t]he trial court’s
‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.]” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th
145, 159.)
       We review an order granting fees and costs fees under
section 2033.420 for abuse of discretion. (Laabs v. City of
Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1275-1276; Wimberly v.
Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 637, fn. 10.)
        B. Maribel Has Not Demonstrated that the Trial Court
          Abused Its Discretion by Partitioning the Property
       Maribel contends the trial court erred by failing to consider
the partition statutes in its ruling. She cites section 872.140,
which states: “The court may, in all cases, order allowance,
accounting, contribution, or other compensatory adjustment
among the parties according to the principles of equity.” Maribel
claims she was entitled to compensation for enhancing the
Property’s value through the home renovation.
       It generally is true that a cotenant who improves real
property is entitled to contribution from other cotenants and, on
partition by sale, is entitled to reimbursement for those
expenditures before division of the proceeds among the property
owners. But the parties can agree otherwise. (See, e.g., Milian v.
De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1194 (Milian).)
       In Milian, the trial court declined to order an accounting
and reimbursement “because it found an agreement between the

                                 7
parties to own and divide the property equally irrespective of the
exact dollar contributions of each party to the purchase price or
to the subsequent improvement, maintenance, or preservation of
the property.” (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1194.) The
court found that the parties were competent to make such an
agreement and that the “critical question on appeal is whether
the court’s finding of such an agreement is supported by
substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)
       Here, the trial court found “Manuel agreed to grant Maribel
a 33% interest in the Property in exchange for Maribel’s
monetary investment in the Property for the construction of room
additions,” and “had [the August 2003] grant deed drawn up for
this purpose.” Maribel contends the trial court misconstrued the
effect of the August 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 6). Instead of
granting her a 33 percent interest in the Property, as found by
the trial court, Maribel claims the deed granted her sole title to
33 percent of the Property plus a 50/50 joint tenancy interest
with Manuel in the remaining 67 percent. We are not persuaded.
       Grant deeds generally are interpreted in the same manner
as contracts. (Civ. Code, § 1066; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521.) “The interpretation of a written
instrument, even though it involves what might properly be
called questions of fact [citation], is essentially a judicial function
to be exercised according to the generally accepted canons of
interpretation so that the purposes of the instrument may be
given effect. [Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is ‘admissible to
interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it
is not reasonably susceptible’ [citations], and it is the instrument
itself that must be given effect. [Citations.].” (Parsons v. Bristol
Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866.)

                                  8
       The parties agree the grant deed’s language is ambiguous
in that the grant is from Manuel to “MANUEL L. RUIZ, a single
man, and MARIBEL RUIZ, a single woman with the 33%, all as a
joint tenant.” (Italics added.) It is undisputed Maribel did not
previously have an ownership interest.
       Manuel testified that he and Maribel had agreed to the 33
percent interest and that he instructed the notary public who
prepared the grant deed “to add 33 percent for my sister, and
that’s it.” No other explanation was given for the words “a single
woman with the 33%.”
       As for the words “joint tenant,” the trial court correctly
noted that a joint tenancy cannot exist where, as here, the parties
were accorded unequal interests. (Yeoman v. Sawyer (1950) 99
Cal.App.2d 43, 45-46; Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 1185 at
p. 1195 [“[B]y definition joint tenancy ownership means equal
ownership”]; see Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (a) [“A joint interest is
one owned by two or more persons in equal shares”].) Given the
parties’ unequal ownership interests, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Maribel had received a
33 percent interest in the Property as a tenant in common with
Manuel. (See Yeoman, at pp. 45-46.)
       We also are not persuaded by Maribel’s argument that the
contract for the renovation establishes the parties’ intent to own
the Property 50/50 as joint tenants. Both Manuel and Maribel
signed the contract, thereby agreeing to pay for the renovation
costs, but the contractor, Omar Lara, testified that all the
renovation costs were paid by Maribel. This evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that Manuel and Maribel agreed she
would receive a 33 percent interest in the home in exchange for
payment of the renovation costs.

                                9
          C. Maribel Has Failed to Demonstrate that the Trial
             Court’s Ruling on the Statute of Frauds Defense
                       Constituted Prejudicial Error
       Maribel testified that Manuel had orally agreed to pay 50
percent of all the mortgage loan payments. The trial court
rejected this testimony, citing the statute of frauds. It concluded
that “[a]ny alleged agreement to pay 50% of this loan is not
memorialized in a writing signed by the parties, and is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, as the loan here is a
30-year term and . . . ‘by its terms is not to be performed within a
year from the making thereof.’ (Civ. Code, § 1624[, subdivision]
(a)(1).)”
       Maribel argues this was error because Manuel did not
assert the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense in his
answer to her cross-complaint. As Manuel points out, however,
Maribel did not allege the existence of an oral agreement in her
cross-complaint. Since the claim first arose during her trial
testimony, Manuel appropriately asserted the defense at that
time.
       Maribel does not contend the trial court’s application of
Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(1) to the claimed oral
agreement is incorrect. Rather, she asserts the court committed
reversible error by failing to “address[] the issues raised by its
usage” of the statute of frauds defense, and to “examine[] the
legal and/or factual basis of that usage, and whether any
exception applied.”
       A statement of decision requires an explanation of the
factual and legal bases of the court’s decision on the principal
controverted issues at trial; the court is not required to address
every question. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th

                                 10
1509, 1530-1531; Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf & Country Club
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.)
       But even if we assume the trial court erred by failing to
issue a more detailed statement of decision regarding its
application of the statute of frauds, such error “is not reversible
per se, but is subject to harmless error review.” (F.P. v. Monier
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) Under this standard, the appellant
must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. (In re Marriage
of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337; F.P., at p. 1114 [It
“‘is not error, or at least, . . . not a prejudicial error’” where the
trial court’s failure to make a finding on an issue “‘could make no
possible difference in the result’”]; Citizens for Open Government
v. City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 308 [“[A]ppellant
bears the burden to show it is reasonably probable he or she
would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error
not occurred”].)
       Having made no attempt to demonstrate prejudicial error,
Maribel has forfeited the issue as a basis for appellate relief.
(Vought Construction Inc. v. Stock (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 622,
630, fn. 7; Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 829,
fn. 4.) Among other things, Maribel complains the trial court
failed to consider the “numerous exceptions” to the statute of
frauds, but she does not identify those exceptions or explain how
their consideration would have made a difference in the outcome.
               D. Maribel has Not Demonstrated the Trial
             Erred by Rejecting Her Ratification Defense
       Maribel contends the trial court erroneously failed to
consider her ratification defense. Maribel raised this contention
in her objections to the proposed statement of decision. The trial
court overruled the objection, evidencing its consideration of the
issue.

                                 11
       “Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt
in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly done on
his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to some or all
persons, is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him.”
(Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73 (Rakestraw).)
       Maribel claims Manuel “accepted [her] actions in obtaining
the loan and renovating the residence and by doing so he ratified
the use of the September 2003 Grant Deed, the loan, the
construction contract and the renovation, and his responsibility
to pay for it all.” (Italics omitted.)
       We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Manuel did not ratify the forged September 2003
grant deed. As soon as he became aware of that deed, he
demanded that Maribel restore his name to title. There was no
finding that Manuel believed the mortgage lender relied upon the
forged deed.
       “Ratification can only occur where the person ratifying has
full knowledge of the facts.” (McNulty v. Copp (1949) 91
Cal.App.2d 484, 492.) That did not occur here. This case is not
like Rakestraw, where the wife knew the lender had relied upon
and she benefited from the forged promissory note and deed of
trust yet she took no action to remedy the situation until the
lender filed suit three years later. (Rakestraw, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
p. 71.)
       In addition, the trial court found that Maribel’s testimony
regarding her knowledge of the September 2003 grant deed, i.e.,
the forged deed, was not credible and that she “closed the
mortgage loan, borrowed the money for the room additions that
she wanted, in her name alone, and she wanted the house for
herself.” These factual findings, which are supported by
substantial evidence, are inconsistent with Maribel’s ratification

                                12
defense. We are bound by these findings, particularly as they
involve credibility. (Kallman, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at pp. 96-
97.)
                 E. The Trial Court Properly Found That
             Maribel Has a 16.5 Percent Interest in the Property
       Maribel claims the trial court erred when it determined,
based upon the February 2004 grant deed (Trial Ex. 9), that she
now has only a 16.5 percent ownership interest in the Property.
Despite what either party intended, that grant deed on its face
transferred Maribel’s interest in the Property to herself and
Manuel as joint tenants. The question is what exactly was her
interest at that time.
       The prior grant deed in the chain of title – the September
2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) – granted Maribel exclusive title to
the property. The trial court found that the grantor’s signature
had been forged. “‘[A] forged document is void ab initio and
constitutes a nullity; as such it cannot provide the basis for a
superior title as against the original grantor.’ [Citations.]”
(Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 380.)
       The trial court determined that because the September
2003 grant deed was void ab initio, it did not transfer any
property interest to Maribel. Instead, the court looked to the
prior deed in the chain of title – the August 2003 grant deed
(Trial Ex. 6) – which granted Maribel a 33 percent interest in the
Property pursuant to her agreement with Manuel. The court
determined that was Maribel’s property interest at the time she
executed the February 2004 grant deed.
       Maribel maintains the February 2004 grant deed gave her
and Manuel 50/50 joint tenancy title. That may have been the
case if the September 2003 grant deed had not been declared void
ab initio. Without that deed in the chain of title, the trial court

                                13
properly looked to the prior grant deed in the chain. That deed
granted Maribel a 33 percent interest, which was divided in half
by her grant in the February 2004 grant deed. Maribel has not
demonstrated that the court erred by finding Manuel has an 83.5
percent interest in the Property (67 percent as sole owner plus
16.5 percent as a joint tenant), and that Maribel has a 16.5
percent interest as a joint tenant.
             F. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
                   by Awarding Costs of Proof to Manuel
       Maribel contends the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Manuel’s request for the $4,490 expended in proving
that the September 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) is a forgery.
       Section 2033.420, subdivision (a) provides: “If a party fails
to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any
matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the
party requesting that admission thereafter proves the
genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the
party requesting the admission may move the court for an order
requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including
reasonable attorney’s fees.”
       Maribel argues that (1) Manuel’s declaratory evidence was
insufficient to establish that he incurred $4,490 in costs to prove
the forgery, (2) Manuel should have moved to compel a further
response to the request for admission before seeking costs, (3)
Maribel had a reasonable basis for believing she would prevail on
the forgery claim and (4) Maribel had a good reason for failing to
admit the request because she had yet to file an answer to
Manuel’s complaint.
       We are not persuaded by these arguments. We agree with
the trial court that the $4,490 cost of proving the forgery was

                                 14
reasonable given Maribel’s denial. Manuel had to retain a
handwriting expert, who testified at trial, and his attorney had to
prepare for and present that defense.
      The attorney’s declaration itemizes the costs incurred in
proving the defense: $2,600 in expert fees for consultation,
analysis and trial testimony, and $1,890 in attorney fees (5.4
hours at $350 per hour). The declaration amply supports these
relatively modest expenses.
                        III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his
costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      CODY, J.*

We concur:

      GILBERT, P.J.

      YEGAN, J.

      *Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
constitution.

                                 15
                    Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge
                Superior Court County of Ventura
                 ______________________________

      Law Office of Michael A. Morrow, Michael A. Morrow, on
behalf of Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant.
      Christina Vanarelli, Inc., Christina Vanarelli, on behalf of
Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent.

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