Court Opinion

ID: 9812526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:40:25.518706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:03.988871
License: Public Domain

Faircloth, C. J.,
dissenting: The facts are stated in the opinion of a majority of the Court and I will simply state my position briefly. My reasoning is stated in Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C., 223. In that case it was held that where a bill had been duly signed by the presiding officers of the Assembly, the Court cannot go behind such ratification to *408inquire how the bill was passed. The ratification is a record and concludes the matter. It does not certify that the bill was read three times or a less number of times. Omnia presumunter, etc. It is argued, however that the case above stated applies when the Assembly is legislating under its inherent power unrestricted by the Constitution, and that that principle does not apply when legislating under restricted clauses of the Constitution, as in this case under Article II, Section 14, i. e., that in one instance the ratification is a record and conclusive, and in the other instance the ratification means nothing because one section of the Constitution is restrictive and the other is not. I cannot reach that conclusion.
Article II, Section 14, saying that no law shall be passed to allow Counties, etc., to raise money on their credit, etc., unless the bill shall have been read three times, etc., is a restriction directed to the Legislature, and no such indebtedness can be imposed except by a majority vote of the tax payers at the ballot box. That Article and Section do not declare that any legislative Act under i-t is void, but leaves much to the judgment and discretion of the Legislature.
But is the distinction well taken? Article II, Section 12, declares that, “The General Assembly shall not pass any private law unless it shall be made to appear that thirty days notice of the application to pass such a law shall have been given, under such direction and in such manner as shall he provided by law.” This is a restrictive clause, and yet in Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, it was held by this Court that if a private Act for the purpose of levying a special tax for -the- County be certified by the presiding officers of the two branches of the Legislature, as duly ratified, it is not competent for the judiciary to go behind such record and inquire collaterally whether the thirty days notice of an application therefor, required bj'' the Constitution, had *409been given. Pearson, C. J., said: “We do not think it necessary to enter into the question whether this is a public local Act or a mere private Act, in regard to which thirty days notice of the application must be given; for, taking it to be a mere private Act, we are of opinion that the ratification certified by the Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House of Representatives makes it a “matter of record” which cannot be impeached before the Courts in a collateral way. Lord Coke says “a record, until reversed, importetli verity.” There can be no doubt that Acts of the Legislature, like judgments of Courts, aré matters of record, and the idea that the “verity of the record” can be averred against in a collateral proceeding is opposed to all of the authorities.” The Courts must act on the maxim, omnia presumunter, etc. And so, if the distinction is sought to be applied to the many sections of the Constitution on various subjects, whether restrictive or general, the law might change as each case was presented.
The Legislature has a general power to levy and raise taxes. Article V, Section 1. When the poivcr of taxation is conferred, it is difficult for the Courts to enforce restraints imposed by the Constitution upon the procedure of the Legislature in passing the necessary laws for the exercise of the power. That is saying to a co-ordinate branch of the Government, “you have not done your work or duty with a proper degree of precision and we will declare it. void.” When the prohibition is absolute, then the Courts may declare the result void, not on the ground of irregularity in the Legislative proceedings, but because the poiuer does not exist, whether the proceedings were regular or irregular. For instance, Article I, Section 1, declares that, “The State shall never assume or pay or authorize the collection of any debt or obligation, express or implied, incurred in aid of *410insurrection or rebellion against the United States” unless the proposition to pay such debt shall be submitted to the people and ratified by them by the vote of a majority of all the qualified voters of the State, at a regular election held for that purpose. Here, we find a restriction, not on the procedure of a co-ordinate branch, but an absolute prohibition and denial of power, which the Courts can see on the face of the Constitution, without looking at the Journals of the Assembly, and without impeaching the record of ratification.
It is argued that the' legislative Journals are public documents and open to the inspection of the purchasers of the bonds in question. That is true, and it is equally true that they were open to the plaintiffs and the tax payers of Stanly County when they held forth these bonds to the public and received the money for them and invested the same for the permanent improvement and benefit of their County. They have recognized and paid the annual interest on their bonds for several years without objection, and it is possible that they never discovered the absence of the words “yea” and “nay” on the Journals, until since the decision of this Court in Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 214.
I think the true principle is found in the first two cases cited supra.