Court Opinion

ID: 9579697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:38.048563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:41.811421
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to bar introduction of highly probative evidence of the defendant’s intoxication1 at *185trial on charges of manslaughter with a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor causing death, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), and felonious driving, MCL 752.191; MSA 28.661. The majority’s holding is flawed because it results from a misapprehension of the proper focus of a probable cause determination in evaluating the validity of a search warrant. Further, by applying case law that deals with warrants based on information supplied by unnamed sources, the majority erroneously obscures the principle contained in both federal law and state statute. If the source is named and is a police officer, the source is presumptively reliable. Thus, the affidavit need only contain affirmative allegations that permit the magistrate to conclude that the source had personal knowledge of the facts alleged. As Professor LaFave describes the relevant inquiry, it includes four ingredients—time, crime, objects, and place—and requires a sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the thing to be seized, and the place to be searched. 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure (2d ed), § 4.5(a), p 214.
The probable cause issue is not whether defendant was drunk, but whether it is reasonable to assume if defendant was drunk, his blood would contain evidence of that fact. Affidavits, for example, typically offer the conclusory statement that appellant is suspected of drug dealing and the question is whether there is probable cause that the place to be searched will yield evidence of such activity. See 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.1(d), pp 127-139. By requiring law enforcement officers to justify *186their observations that persons appear to be intoxicated, the majority questions both the veracity and experience of police officers and gives a cramped construction of their ability to evaluate whether a person appears to be intoxicated.
Under an appropriate analysis, the affidavit presented to the magistrate provided a basis to support a finding of probable cause to justify issuance of the search warrant authorizing withdrawal of the defendant’s blood for testing. The statements in the affidavit that the defendant had been operating a vehicle that was involved in a fatal accident shortly before the affidavit was presented to the magistrate and that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated provided adequate justification for the magistrate to conclude that evidence of intoxication would then be found in a sample of defendant’s blood. That is all that is necessary to support a finding of probable cause. Although in my view the affidavit was satisfactory, I would also find that the Fourth Amendment permits supplementation of a deficient affidavit by sworn, unrecorded, oral testimony. Finally, I find no support for the conclusion that the Legislature intends exclusion of evidence in this situation.
i
A
The affidavit in this case was not deficient. MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1)(1) directs an authorized magistrate to issue a warrant sanctioning a search requested through an affidavit made on oath, if the magistrate is satisfied that there is reasonable or probable cause supporting the grounds stated to justify the search.2 MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) *187explains further that "[t]he magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her.” These statutes do no more than put into action state constitutional edicts protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The Michigan Constitution, in turn, provides the same protection as the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, absent "compelling reason[s].” See, e.g., People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 20; 360 NW2d 841 (1984); People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (Brickley, J.). The taking of blood after an arrest without a warrant, even without a defendant’s consent, does not offend due process, Breithaupt v Abram, 352 US 432; 77 S Ct 408; 1 L Ed 2d 448 (1957), nor the Fourth Amendment, Schmerber v California, 384 US 757; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966).
We have held that the removal of blood for testing presents no compelling reason to afford greater protection under the Michigan Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 313, n 7; 462 NW2d 310 (1990). We have also held that the language of the *188antiexclusionary clause of art 1, § 11, of the Michigan Constitution "clearly indicates that the people of Michigan had no intention of imposing more stringent restrictions upon law enforcement than is mandated by the Fourth Amendment.” People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 32-33; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).
The Legislature has repudiated attempts by this Court to interpret MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) to impose additional requirements supplementing constitutional search and seizure protections. Collins, supra at 13, n 7 (noting that People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 [1984], had been superseded by statute); see also People v Powell, 201 Mich App 516, 524-527; 506 NW2d 894 (1993) (Corrigan, P.J.). It should follow that if seizure does not offend the Fourth Amendment or the constitution of this state, this Court should implement the will of the people in aid of enforcement of the law. Given that expression of the people’s will, it should be presumed that the Legislature does not intend to forbid what the Fourth Amendment would permit. There is no constitutional impediment to taking the blood of an intoxicated person arrested on probable cause without a warrant, even over objection. Schmerber, supra. Moreover, repeated legislative amendments of the drunk driving laws are persuasive evidence of the legislative commitment to the use of blood-alcohol evidence in enforcement of these laws. The Legislature’s reaction to this Court’s restrictive interpretation of statutes that would preclude the location and use of such evidence could not be more clear. See People v Pittinger, 105 Mich App 736, 743, n 1; 307 NW2d 715 (1981). Nevertheless, although it is anomalous to look to authority defining the quantum of probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment for search warrants when the Fourth Amendment would permit a *189seizure of blood without a warrant incident to an arrest on probable cause,4 because the issue presented is framed as the sufficiency of the affidavit, we look to precedent in that area.
We have agreed that the Fourth Amendment requires no more of a magistrate than a substantial basis that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, and that the magistrate’s determination is entitled to great deference. People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604-607; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). "[S]o long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . . concluding]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 236; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983) (citations omitted). See also Russo, supra at 603-604. In reviewing an affidavit requesting a search warrant, a magistrate determines if the facts and circumstances presented demonstrate that it is likely that the affiant will find (1) seizable evidence of criminal conduct, (2) in the place to be searched. In the present case, the question for the magistrate was whether the facts attested to by the police officer made it probable that (1) evidence relevant to defendant’s criminal operation of a vehicle involved in a fatal accident, (2) could be found in the blood sought to be withdrawn. Our role as a reviewing court is simply to determine if there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion. Russo, supra at 604.
B
The majority errs because it fails to consider whether the facts and circumstances stated in the affidavit provide a substantial basis for the magis*190trate’s conclusion that the evidence sought was likely to be found in the place searched. The majority instead focuses on whether the affidavit provides an independent basis for assessing the reliability of the facts and circumstances stated, by requiring notation of specific observations made by the affiant, or persons upon whose information the affiant is relying. This additional level of proof is not required by the constitutional protections against searches without warrants, where the facts supporting a search are the result of direct police observation.
I agree that "a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause,” Gates, supra at 239, is insufficient to constitute a basis for issuance of a valid search warrant. The statement at issue in the present case, however, was not an unilluminating assertion that the police officer "has cause to suspect and does believe” that there was evidence of defendant’s criminal operation of a motor vehicle to be found in defendant’s blood. Nathanson v United States, 290 US 41, 44; 54 S Ct 11; 78 L Ed 159 (1933); see also People v Effelberg, 220 Mich 528, 530; 190 NW 727 (1922) (probable cause was not shown where an affidavit stated that the affiant "believes and has good cause to believe” that a violation of the prohibition law was taking place in the place to be. searched); People v Rosborough, 387 Mich 183; 195 NW2d 255 (1972) (the affiant noted seemingly innocent conduct of carrying bags in and out of an establishment, and then concluded that those persons had conspired to violate the state gambling laws). Nor did the officer assert that the basis of the request was "reliable information from a credible person, and . . . believe[d]” that the defendant was criminally responsible for a death and that *191evidence of that criminal responsibility could be found in defendant’s blood. Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 109; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). instead, on the basis of direct observation of investigating officers transmitted to the affiant officer in the present case, the affidavit stated that (1) the defendant had been operating a vehicle in a specified location on or about 11:40 p.m.,5 (2) that a collision had occurred, (3) that the defendant appeared under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and (4) that the defendant had been involved in an accident involving death.
The majority appears to believe that the affidavit should have provided the underlying details of why the defendant appeared to be intoxicated. Thus, the majority states "[w]ithout such facts, it would be impossible for the magistrate to have independently concluded that there was probable cause to search.” Ante at 171 (Cavanagh, J.). This approach misfocuses a very simple question: Could the magistrate believe that the defendant’s blood would contain evidence of alcohol? The answer is evident—because a police officer, a presumptively reliable source, trained to make such observations,6 swore that defendant had been in an automobile accident, shortly before the time that the affidavit was sought and appeared to be intoxi*192cated. This information did not state a conclusion of criminal activity, i.e., defendant violated the statute. Rather, the affidavit provided the basis for the magistrate to determine that the place to be searched (the defendant) probably contained evidence of a statutory violation because he had very recently been involved in an accident causing a fatality and appeared to be intoxicated.
c
1
When police seek a search warrant on the basis of information provided by either named or unnamed informants, the affiant must provide a basis on which the magistrate can evaluate the reliability of the material supplied. See Gates, supra. Unlike informants, however, whose suspected unreliability warrants the need for information validating the information provided, law enforcement officers are presumed to be inherently reliable, and consequently require no special showing of reliability. "Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” United States v Ventresca, 380 US 102, 111; 85 S Ct 741; 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965). See also People v Mackey, 121 Mich App 748; 329 NW2d 476 (1982).7
*193In People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691, 696-699; 222 NW2d 749 (1974), we held that a police officer is authorized to make a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in the officer’s presence, where the presence requirement is fulfilled through information obtained from other police officers:
[A] "police team” qualification of the presence requirement, permitting officers who are working together on a case to combine their collective perceptions so that if the composite otherwise satisfies the presence requirement that requirement is deemed satisfied although the arresting officer does not himself witness all the elements of the offense. [Id. at 698.]
The principle presented in Ventresca and Dixon is applicable to the present case. The affiant police officer presented inherently reliable information to the magistrate, representing the collective direct knowledge and observations of the investigating police team at the accident. This inherent reliability renders the need for further proof supporting the statements of the officer in the present case unnecessary.8 _
*1942
The issue in this case is not whether the information was reliable. It is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for believing that the place sought to be searched, the defendant’s blood, was likely to contain alcohol within hours of a fatal accident. It is well established that in making this determination, weight is to be given to the experience and expertise of the police officers. "This is as it should be, for there 'would be little merit in securing able, trained men to guard the public peace’ if their actions were to be 'measured by whát might be probable cause to an untrained civilian.’ ” 1 LaFave, Search & Seizure (2d ed), § 3.2(c), p 571 (citations omitted).
In State v Babbell, 770 P2d 987, 989 (Utah, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s claim that a warrant issued to search the defendant’s truck was not supported by probable cause, where the affidavit merely stated that the truck "matched the description” of the truck used to transport the alleged victim of an aggravated sexual assault given to police by the victim and several witnesses. The affidavit included a detailed description of the truck used to transport the victim to the place where the assault occurred, but in requesting a warrant to search the particular defendant’s truck, the affiant police officer stated only that defendant’s truck "matched the descrip*195tion” of the truck described, based on direct police observation. Despite expressing some disappointment in the quality of drafting of the affidavit, id. at 992, n 3,9 and acknowledging that the question was a close one, the court found it to be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Noting that the affiant was a trained officer, the court concluded that "it was within the magistrate’s discretion to construe [the affiant’s] statement that [the defendant’s] truck 'matched the description’ to mean that the truck matched with respect to those characteristics expressly described in the affidavit.” Id. at 992.
In United States v Fannin, 817 F2d 1379 (CA 9, 1987), Drug Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service agents had direct knowledge of the defendant’s involvement in drug trafficking, as a result of undercover investigations that placed the agents in contact with the defendant at locations away from the defendant’s home. Although the federal agents had not been to the defendant’s residence, they sought a warrant to authorize a search of the location where the agents believed books and records of illegal transactions could be found. The affidavit supporting the request for a warrant was based on direct observation by the officers of the defendant during the investigation, which was described in an affidavit, as well as the affiant’s and other agents’ stated experience and expertise in federal narcotics and financial investigations. The Fannin court rejected the defendant’s contention that the search warrant issued was not supported by probable cause to search his resi*196dence, noting that "in weighing the evidence supporting a request for a search warrant, a magistrate may rely on the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found.” Id. at 1382.
In the present case, I find it reasonable to allow the magistrate to construe from the statement in the affidavit that the defendant "appears . . . under the influence of intoxicating liquor” to mean that the defendant exhibited those characteristics typical of an intoxicated person. Police with any significant experience, especially in the area of traffic accident investigation, have significant experience in the observation of persons who are intoxicated and training in blood-alcohol levels and dissipation rates. I am hard-pressed to find that the magistrate’s reliance on these experienced observations of police officers to conclude that evidence of intoxication would be found in defendant’s blood advances the danger of unwarranted intrusions against which the protections of the Fourth Amendment are meant to stand guard.
D
In the present case, police officers investigating the scene of a fatal automobile accident observed behavior by the defendant that led them to suspect that he had been driving his car while under the influence of alcohol.10 The officers sought to obtain a sample of the defendant’s blood to be tested for blood-alcohol content as quickly as possible,11 while *197still adhering to the preferential procedure of obtaining court authorization for the search.12 The magistrate found that it was likely that evidence of crime was to be found in the blood of an *198individual who was involved in an accident shortly before operating a vehicle and who appeared to be intoxicated. Neither constitutional protections against unreasonable searches, nor the statutory provisions that were enacted to implement those constitutional protections require more.
[T]he Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the [United States Supreme] Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. [Ventresca, supra at 108.]
II
Assuming arguendo that the written affidavit in the present case is defective, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the affidavit cannot be supplemented by sworn, unrecorded, oral statements by the affiant. I further disagree with the decision to utilize the exclusionary rule to suppress highly probative evidence.
A
By holding that all the facts and circumstances supporting a finding of probable cause must be *199contained within the four corners of an affidavit presented in support of a request for a search warrant, the majority engrafts a requirement for search warrant applications beyond those that are constitutionally required. Contrary to such a conclusion, I find the Legislature’s past disagreement with this Court’s attempt to impose requirements for search warrant applications beyond those that are constitutionally required, ante at 188, and this Court’s explicit holding that no compelling reasons exist in the context of the removal of blood for testing to find that the Michigan Constitition affords greater protections than those provided by the Fourth Amendment, ante at 188-189, to provide a clear indication that the Legislature meant the search warrant statutes to implement protections commensurate with, but not more stringent than, the Fourth Amendment.
As acknowledged by the majority, numerous federal courts have held that warrant application procedures that include consideration by a magistrate of sworn, but unrecorded, oral testimony provided at the time of application, satisfy the Fourth Amendment. See, i.e., United States v Clyburn, 24 F3d 613 (CA 4, 1994), United States v Shields, 978 F2d 943 (CA 6, 1992), and other cases cited by the majority. Ante at 181-182 (Cavanagh, J.). The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of oral supplementation of deficient affidavits, but has held only that appellate review of a determination of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant must be based solely on the information brought to the attention of the magistrate. Aguilar v Texas, supra at 109, n 1. This principle is not offended by supplementation of a deficient affidavit by oral statements to a magistrate. Nor does such supplementation offend the express protection embodied in the Fourth Amendment, *200which only requires that a finding of probable cause for issuance of a warrant be "supported by Oath or affirmation.” US Const, Am IV (emphasis added). Because sworn oral supplementation of a deficient affidavit does not violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and that is all that is required by our statutes and state constitution, I would allow supplementation in the manner utilized in the present case. See Clyburn, supra at 617, Shields, supra at 946 and see also Powell, supra at 525-526 (Corrigan, P.J.).
B
Application of the exclusionary rule to any technical violation of our search warrant statute that may have occurred in the present case is unwarranted. Particularly where the magistrate is a sitting judge, as are virtually all magistrates in this state, I cannot conclude that the risk of relying on after-the-fact allegations are so substantial that we must suppress evidence. The exclusionary rule is intended to serve a deterrent purpose, and loses any useful force and effect when applied to technical errors that do not rise to the level of negligent or wilful conduct, serving then only to deprive the trier of fact of relevant and probative evidence. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433, 446-447; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L Ed 2d 182 (1974):
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
*201* * *
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
In the present case, police officers pursued the constitutionally preferable course of seeking a search warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate by way of presentation of a handwritten affidavit rushed to the home of a magistrate and presented to him in the early morning hours. Working against the time constraint presented by the dissipation of the alcohol level in defendant’s blood over time, I cannot find in any failure of draftsmanship an "error” justifying correction through the unwarranted remedy visited by the majority.
The deterrence rationale has no force whatsoever in this setting. The investigator did not engage in misconduct worth deterring in a rational society. The "error” attributable to the police procedure was technical. I am unwilling to equate the slight human imperfection in draftsmanship depicted here in the "midst and haste of a criminal investigation” with misbehavior warranting the drastic remedy of suppression. Far from advancing the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, exclusion of this evidence promotes public disrespect for the legal process. [Powell, supra at 529 (Corrigan, P.J.).]
In United States v Hill, 500 F2d 315, 322 (CA 5, *2021974), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed similar disdain over the possibility of exclusion of relevant evidence seized through a search warrant obtained by presentation of a deficient affidavit supplemented by oral statements regarding certain informers’ reliability:
[T]his situation furnishes no occasion to apply the exclusionary rule to bar evidence of Hill’s criminality that was obtained in executing the warrant. Phillips acted properly in going to the magistrate and seeking a warrant. Magistrate Sear acted properly in calling for additional information to demonstrate credibility. Thus, the only error attributable to the procedure they followed is a technical one that would in no way serve the deterrent purposes of the rule.
The facts of the present case present an even more compelling argument against utilization of the exclusionary rule to bar objective evidence of defendant’s blood-alcohol content. Unlike the affiant in Hill, who relied on information provided by inherently unreliable informants, the affiant in the present case relied on inherently reliable information provided by police officers who obtained their information by direct' observation. The only "error,” if at all, was in not including in the affidavit needless supporting details explaining the trained observation that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated. Where the exclusionary rule is used in such a situation to bar relevant and probative evidence, the rule does violence to the truth-seeking function that the Fourth Amendment does not require and that should not be countenanced.
The majority’s assertion of legislative acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine, supra, to use of *203the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of the statute before us is wholly mistaken. In Sherbine, this Court’s majority interpreted the former version of the statute as if it imposed a more restrictive standard than the Fourth Amendment and suppressed evidence on the basis of that consideration. The swift reaction of the Legislature was to amend MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3), to make it clear that the Court was incorrect in concluding that what had occurred was a statutory violation. The Legislature had no need to say what should not be excluded; it relied on the Court’s word that were it clear that the Legislature had authorized the warrant, suppression would not be ordered.
Acting on our representation, the amended legislation tracked the Fourth Amendment. Because "our holding that evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded,” ante at 183 (Cavanagh, J.), was wholly derived from our narrow reading of MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3), the legislative amendment of the statute is not an acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the view in Sherbine that the evidence should be excluded,
hi
For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the majority’s decision in the present case. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of tests conducted to detect the defendant’s blood-alcohol content.
Riley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 As the majority notes, ante at 184, n 19 (Cavanagh, J.), the record suggests that defendant had a blood-alcohol content of 0.30 percent shortly after the accident, and continued to have a blood-*185alcohol content of 0.19 percent approximately four and one-half hours after the accident. Both test results demonstrate a blood-alcohol content significantly above the 0.10 level, which gives rise to a presumption that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. MCL 257.625a; MSA 9.2325(1).

 When an affidavit is made on oath to a magistrate authorized *187to issue warrants in criminal cases, and the affidavit establishes grounds for issuing a warrant pursuant to this act, the magistrate, if he or she is satisfied that there is probable cause for the search, shall issue a warrant to search the house, building, or other location or place where the property or thing to be searched for and seized is situated. [MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1)(1).]

 In pertinent part, Const 1963, art 1, § 11 states:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

 I would hold that the evidence in the present case providing probable cause to search would also be sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest the defendant.

 As a result of the dissipation of blood-alcohol content over time, it was important to the magistrate’s probable cause determination that the accident in question had only recently occurred. Because the critical inquiry was whether the "place to be searched” would yield sizeable evidence, notation of the time of the accident made it reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that evidence of the defendant’s alcohol ingestion would be found in the blood withdrawn. See LaFave, supra, § 3.7, pp 74-88.

 In fact, this observation is so well within the common understanding that a layperson could attest to it. See, e.g., Beaubien v Cicotte, 12 Mich 459, 501-503 (1864); People v Borgetto, 99 Mich 336, 340-341; 58 NW 328 (1894) (laypersons are competent to testify regarding a person’s insanity, and the observations on which such an opinion is based).

 The affiant in the present case did not expressly state in his affidavit that he was relying on information received from fellow officers. See Mackey, supra; United States v Kirk, 781 F2d 1498, 1505 (CA 11, 1986). The requirement that an affiant state in his affidavit that he is relying on information provided by other officers is met, however, "if it is clear from reading the affidavit as a whole, that it is based in part upon information obtained from other law enforcement officers.” Id. I find it clear from reading the affidavit as a whole, and interpreting it in a common sense, and not a hypertechnical manner, Ventresca, supra at 108-109, that the affidavit was based on information received from other law enforcement officers. The affidavit makes *193no claim that the affiant is relying on information from informants, and it would be known to the magistrate that officers would be investigating the scene of a fatal accident. It would further be clear to the magistrate from the time of the accident noted in the affidavit that it would have been impossible for the affiant to go to the scene of the accident, make a personal investigation, and then travel to the magistrate’s home to present the affidavit in support of the search warrant.

 The affidavit did not violate the statutory requirements of MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) by failing to describe those persons from whom the affiant officer had obtained the information contained in the affidavit. Ante at 172, n 5 (Cavanagh, J.). The provisions cited by the majority were added by amendment in 1988 to repudiate this Court’s decision in Sherbine, supra, and make it clear that the statute required no more to support information provided by an informant than was constitutionally required. See ante at 166-168. The language *194of the amendment is intended only to require further authentication of the information provided by informants, as is constitutionally necessary, not evidence by which a magistrate would unnecessarily test the reliability of information communicated by one inherently reliable police officer that represents the collective knowledge of the entire team investigating the accident. If the source of the information is a police officer, the source is presumptively reliable under both the United States Constitution, Chambers v Maroney, 399 US 42; 90 S Ct 1975; 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970), and Michigan law, People v Goeckerman, 126 Mich App 517, 522; 337 NW2d 557 (1983).

 I do not doubt that the affidavit in the present case could have been more artfully drafted. It would clearly have been preferable if more detail had been provided. We are not primarily concerned here, however, with providing instruction to affiants on the preferable content of affidavits, but with the legal sufficiency of the affidavit before us.

 The record indicates that officers at the scene of the accident who interacted with the defendant before he was transported to the hospital for treatment believed that the defendant was "f’d up” or, more specifically, "filthy drunk.”

 While provisions are made in the implied consent statutes of our Motor Vehicle Code for blood tests to be taken upon a police officer’s determination that he has "reasonable grounds” to believe that a *197person has committed certain enumerated crimes, the statute requires the officer to advise the person suspected, at least if the person is competent to grant or refuse consent, of certain statutory rights. MCL 257.625a(6); MSA 9.2325(1)(6). If the person then refuses the officer’s request that a blood test be taken, the officer must obtain a court order before proceeding with the test. MCL 257.625d; MSA 9.2325(4). The more efficient route, therefore, may often be direct application for a search warrant. "The warrant procedure exists independently of the testing procedure set forth in the implied consent statute.” Manko v Root, 190 Mich App 702, 704; 476 NW2d 776 (1991). See, also, e.g., People v Cords, 75 Mich App 415, 421; 254 NW2d 911 (1977).
In the alternative, if, after an accident, a sample of the blood of a driver involved in the accident is withdrawn for medical treatment, "the results of a chemical analysis of that sample are admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding” to show the driver’s blood-alcohol content. MCL 257.625a(6)(e); MSA 9.2325(1)(6)(e). The exigency presented by the rapid dissipation of a driver’s blood-alcohol level over time, however, may counsel against investigating officers waiting for the withdrawal of blood for medical treatment.
Police officers may be further concerned over delays in blood withdrawal as a result of several decisions by lower courts stating that before the results of tests for intoxication can be admitted into evidence, a foundational requirement of proof that the test was performed within a reasonable time after arrest must be met. People v Schwab, 173 Mich App 101; 433 NW2d 824 (1988) (affirmed suppression of Breathalyzer tests performed 2!4 hours after the defendant. was first stopped by the police), People v Kozar, 54 Mich App 503, 509, n 2; 221 NW2d 170 (1974) (holding that there need not be expert testimony interpreting results of chemical tests conducted to detect blood-alcohol level or relating the results back to the time of the alleged offense, but outlining four foundational prerequisites for introduction of the results as evidence, including proof that the tests were performed a reasonable time after arrest). Because a person’s blood-alcohol level dissipates over time, the danger to the rights of the defendant that are being protected by .such a rule is not readily apparent.

 Factual situations similar to those presented in the instant case have been found to justify withdrawal of blood without a warrant to test alcohol content incident to a lawful arrest, even over a defendant’s objection, because of the exigency of the dissipation of blood-alcohol levels shortly after alcohol consumption ceases. Schmerber, supra. Given that the police had probable cause to place the defendant under arrest before the blood was seized, it is immaterial that the formal arrest came after the seizure. Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98, 110-111; 100 S a 2556; 65 L Ed 2d 633 (1980).