Court Opinion

ID: 9952038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 16:15:10.326788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:05.876566
License: Public Domain

J-A02009-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 ANNE MARIE SHULTZ                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 WILLIAM A. SHULTZ AND APRIL             :   No. 1027 MDA 2023
 PASSETTI                                :

               Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2023-3695

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                        FILED: MARCH 19, 2024

      Appellant Anne Marie Shultz appeals from the order sustaining

preliminary objections filed by William A. Shultz and April Passetti and

dismissing Appellant’s custody complaint for lack of standing.      Appellant

argues that she established in loco parentis status and that the trial court

erred in concluding that she lacked standing. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history in

this matter as follows:

      On March 30, 2023, [Appellant] filed a complaint for grandparent
      custody/visitation alleging that she stood in loco parentis to the
      minor child, M.S. ([Child]), who was born [in December of] 2015.
      The complaint alleges that [C]hild resides with [Child’s parents,
      William A. Shultz and April Passetti (Appellees)] in a home owned
      by [Appellant]; that [Appellees] do not pay rent but are
      responsible to pay utilities and taxes; and that [C]hild and
      [Appellees] have resided in the home for the past seven years.
      The complaint further alleges that [Appellees] ceased all contact
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      with [Appellant] since January 6, 2023[,] after a dispute arose
      over transfer of title to [Appellees].

      On April 12, 2023, [Appellees] filed preliminary objections to
      [Appellants’] complaint based on lack of standing. The [trial
      c]ourt scheduled a hearing for June 23, 2023. [Appellant] filed
      her answer to the preliminary objections also on June 23, 2023.

                                  *    *    *

      The parties stipulated to the facts alleged in paragraph 11 of
      [Appellant’s] answer to [Appellees’] preliminary objections.
      Paragraph 11 states that [C]hild has resided with [Appellant] for
      extended weekends, and weeknights; that [Appellant] has
      assumed many parental duties including but not limited to: (a)
      arrange pick-up of [C]hild after school/daycare; (b) transport
      [C]hild and attend [C]hild’s physician related appointments
      (doctor’s appointments, eye appointments, etc.); (c) transport
      [C]hild to and from birthday parties, and extracurricular events;
      (d) ensure that [C]hild was properly clothed, bathed, and ensure
      that [Child’s] homework was timely completed (and assist [C]hild
      with his homework, studying, and school related assignments);
      that [Appellant] joined the local library to aid [C]hild in his
      academic studies; (e) prior to January 6, 2023, [Appellant] had
      custody over [C]hild Monday through Friday after school from
      3:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m., approximately three weekends per
      month during the school year, during the Christmas holiday and
      every day during the summer (including overnights); and (f) since
      [C]hild’s birth, [Appellant] has been an integral part of [C]hild’s
      life and has established a special bond with [C]hild.

      Paragraph 11 further stated that since [C]hild’s birth [Appellant]
      assumed the following responsibilities on behalf of [C]hild: (a)
      paying for [C]hild’s private schooling ($800.00/month, when
      [C]hild was in daycare); and (b) paying for [C]hild’s
      extracurriculars, food, clothing and other child-related expenses.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/24/23, at 1-3 (formatting altered).

      On June 26, 2023, the trial court sustained Appellees’ preliminary

objections and dismissed Appellant’s custody complaint for lack of standing.

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Appellant timely appealed, and both the trial court and Appellant complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

      1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in holding
         that [Appellant] lacked standing where [Appellant] had a
         special bond with [Child]?

      2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in its findings
         that the facts set forth in this matter do not support the finding
         of in loco parentis status for [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Both of Appellant’s claims challenge the trial court’s conclusion

regarding standing. Id. at 20. Specifically, Appellant argues that she has a

special bond with Child sufficient to establish in loco parentis status pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2), and that in loco parentis status affords her standing

to bring her complaint for custody of Child. See id. at 11-16. Appellant also

contends that the trial court’s order will have a negative impact on Child’s

intellectual, social, physical, and financial development. See id. at 16-20.

      We review a challenge to an order sustaining preliminary objections

under the following standard:

      Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or
      granting preliminary objections is to determine whether the trial
      court committed an error of law.          When considering the
      appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the
      appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.

      Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal
      sufficiency of the complaint.       When considering preliminary
      objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings
      are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably

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       deducible therefrom.       Preliminary objections which seek the
       dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in
       which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable
       to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If
       any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it
       should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary
       objections.

P.J.A. v. H.C.N., 156 A.3d 284, 287 (Pa. Super. 2017).

       Further, in cases under the Child Custody Act (the Act),1 we are guided

by the following principles:

       In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
       and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
       of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
       record, as our role does not include making independent factual
       determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
       and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
       judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
       However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
       inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
       the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
       evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
       court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
       light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.L. v. M.P., 255 A.3d 514, 520 (Pa. Super. 2021) (formatting altered and

citation omitted). “The paramount concern in any custody case decided under

the Act is the best interests of the child.” Id.

       However, “[d]etermining standing in custody disputes is a threshold

issue that must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the underlying

custody action.” C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 898 (Pa. 2018). Standing is a

conceptually distinct legal question which has no bearing on the central issue
____________________________________________

1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-5340.

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within the custody action [concerning] who is entitled to physical and legal

custody of a child in light of his or her best interests. Id. (citation omitted

and formatting altered).       Issues of standing are questions of law, and our

standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Id.

       The concept of standing, an element of justiciability, is a
       fundamental one in our jurisprudence: no matter will be
       adjudicated by our courts unless it is brought by a party aggrieved
       in that his or her rights have been invaded or infringed by the
       matter complained of. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that
       cases are presented to the court by one having a genuine, and not
       merely a theoretical, interest in the matter. Thus[,] the traditional
       test for standing is that the proponent of the action must have a
       direct, substantial and immediate interest in the matter at hand.

                                       *       *   *

       In the area of child custody, principles of standing have been
       applied with particular scrupulousness because they serve a dual
       purpose: not only to protect the interest of the court system by
       assuring that actions are litigated by appropriate parties, but also
       to prevent intrusion into the protected domain of the family by
       those who are merely strangers, however well-meaning.

D.G. v. D.B., 91 A.3d 706, 708 (Pa. Super. 2014) (formatting altered and

citations omitted). The Act provides that “[t]he following individuals may file

an action under this chapter for any form of physical custody or legal custody:

. . . A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2).2

       The term in loco parentis literally means in the place of a parent.
       A person stands in loco parentis with respect to a child when he
       or she assumes the obligations incident to the parental
       relationship without going through the formality of a legal
____________________________________________

2 Appellant only argues that she may seek custody of Child pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. 5324(2), and she has not argued the applicability of other subsections
of Section 5324. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-13, 19, 20.

                                           -5-
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      adoption. The status of in loco parentis embodies two ideas[:]
      first, the assumption of a parental status[;] and, second, the
      discharge of parental duties. Critical to our discussion here, in
      loco parentis status cannot be achieved without the consent and
      knowledge of, and in disregard of, the wishes of a parent.

K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498, 504–05 (Pa. Super. 2017) (formatting altered

and citations omitted).

      An important factor in determining whether a third party has
      standing is whether the third party lived with the child and the
      natural parent in a family setting, irrespective of its traditional or
      nontraditional composition, and developed a relationship with the
      child as a result of the participation and acquiescence of the
      natural parent.

D.G., 91 A.3d at 709 (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s issue as follows:

      In this case, although [C]hild spent overnights with [Appellant],
      [C]hild never resided with [Appellant], but in fact [C]hild and both
      [p]arents have always lived as a family unit.

      Moreover, the third party, in this case [Appellant], cannot place
      herself in loco parentis in defiance of [Appellees’] wishes and the
      parent/child relationship. [Appellees] here have not acquiesced
      in a parent-child relationship between [C]hild and [Appellant]. In
      fact, [Appellees] do not consent to any such relationship.

      In her argument in favor of a finding of in loco parentis [Appellant]
      relied upon the Superior Court’s decision in M.J.S. v. B.B., 172
      A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, the facts in M.J.S. are
      significantly different than those in this case.           In M.J.S.,
      grandmother lived with the subject child and the child’s mother as
      an intact family unit for five years. Here [Appellees] and [C]hild
      have lived as an intact family for the past seven years. [Appellant]
      cannot be considered a member of the family unit under these
      facts.    Moreover in M.J.S., the father acquiesced in the
      grandmother performing parental duties while a resident of the
      child’s household with the child’s mother. Here, that is not the
      case. [Here, Child’s father is a part of the family unit with [Child’s]
      mother and [C]hild. Neither [Child’s father] nor [Child’s m]other

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      has consented to [Appellant] acting in the role of a parent such
      that [Appellant] can be considered in loco parentis to [C]hild.

      [Appellant] further argues that the [c]ourt found there is a special
      bond between [Appellant] and [C]hild which supports the finding
      of in loco parentis status.

      The Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue in C.G. vs.
      J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 909 (Pa. 2018). In that case the Supreme
      Court was asked to adopt a rule that the decisive factor in
      determining standing is the existence of a bond between the third
      party and the child. In rejecting such a rule, the Court stated:

         Of course, it is a concern to the courts whether a child has
         developed strong psychological bonds, however such bonds
         must necessarily be based on the assumption of parental
         status and discharge of parental duties in order to achieve
         this legal status. . . . Indeed, if the determining factor were
         the child’s development of a bond with the person seeking
         standing, it would be of no moment to the Court if the bond
         was forged contrary to the natural parent’s wishes.
         Acceptance of such a rule would undermine well-established
         principles of in loco parentis analys[e]s.        See T.B.[v.
         L.R.M.,] 786 A.2d [913,] 917 [(Pa. 2001)] (explaining that
         a third party cannot place himself in loco parentis in defiance
         of the parent’s wishes and the parent/child relationship).

      Id. 193 A.3d [at] 910.

Trial Ct. Op., at 4-6 (some formatting altered).

      After review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the

trial court. See P.J.A., 156 A.3d at 287; D.G., 91 A.3d at 708. As noted by

the trial court, Appellees did not consent to Appellant acting in place of a

parent, and Appellant cannot obtain in loco parentis standing in defiance of

Appellees’ wishes and the parent/child relationship between Child and

Appellees. See K.W., 157 A.3d at 504-05 (providing that in loco parentis

status cannot be achieved without the consent of, and in disregard of, the

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wishes of a parent). On this record, we recognize that Appellant has been an

essential part of Child’s life since birth and has established a close and special

bond with Child, investing considerable resources and time for Child’s care

and well-being, abruptly disrupted by a painful dispute with Appellees over

the transfer of title to a house. Although we empathize with Appellant and

her predicament, we are constrained to conclude that Appellant did not

establish in loco parentis status, based on binding precedent. Accordingly,

the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant lacked standing to seek

custody. See D.G., 91 A.3d at 708; 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2).

      For these reasons, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/19/2024

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