Court Opinion

ID: 9919084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 15:08:22.156381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:26.420358
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rinella, 2024-Ohio-152.]

STATE OF OHIO                      )                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                   )ss:               NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                   )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.       30629

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
DAVID RINELLA                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   CR 21 07 2320

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 17, 2024

        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant David Rinella (“Mr. Rinella”) appeals from the judgment of

the Summit County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress because he contends

the stop of his vehicle did not give the officers authority to search the vehicle or a container in a

backpack on the front seat. We affirm as the officers had probable cause to believe that there was

drug contraband in Mr. Rinella’s vehicle based upon his statements and behavior.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     In June 2021, Officer Edward Simmons of the Barberton Police Department was

on patrol when he observed Mr. Rinella’s truck driving on the roadway with no visible license

plate on the rear of the vehicle. Officer Simmons first noticed the truck because it stopped at a

stop sign for an unusually long time at the intersection of 5th Street and Fairview Avenue. Officer

Simmons pulled out behind the truck and followed it for a short time until it got to an appropriate

place to conduct a traffic stop. Upon initiating the stop, Officer Simmons approached the truck on
                                                 2

the driver’s side. His partner approached the truck from the passenger side. At that time, Officer

Simmons had been employed with the Barberton Police Department for over five years and had

received specialized training for drug interdiction with the Ohio State Highway Patrol.

       {¶3}    Officer Simmons identified Mr. Rinella and spoke with him about the reason for

the stop. Mr. Rinella said he did not realize the rear plate was not affixed to the vehicle, and that

the reason for his delay in proceeding through the intersection was that he noticed Officer Simmons

behind him. He also stated he was going to the Tap Tap gambling establishment on Wooster Road

in Barberton, which Officer Simmons recognized as a location known for drugs and other illegal

activity. Based on his training and experience, Officer Simmons observed several indicators of

drug activity from Mr. Rinella’s appearance, including abnormal nervousness, abnormal body

language, avoiding eye contract, constricted pupils, and fixation on a backpack in the passenger

seat. After a brief conversation, Officer Simmons returned to his police car and confirmed that the

vehicle was registered to Mr. Rinella, but that it was supposed to have an expired thirty-day tag.

       {¶4}    Officer Simmons approached Mr. Rinella’s truck again from the driver’s side and

asked for permission to search the vehicle. Mr. Rinella denied consent. Office Simmons explained

that he was suspicious Mr. Rinella might be under the influence or that the vehicle might contain

drugs based on the observations noted above. Officer Simmons questioned Mr. Rinella about his

constricted pupils and any drug use. Mr. Rinella denied taking any prescription medication but

admitted that he does smoke marijuana and that he had used a marijuana pen to consume marijuana

earlier in the day. He also admitted that there may be a “marijuana roach” in the truck. Mr. Rinella

further admitted that his vehicle would probably indicate for marijuana upon a K-9 sniff.

Throughout the conversation, Officer Simmons once again thought Mr. Rinella seemed

abnormally focused on and worried about the backpack in the passenger seat.
                                                  3

       {¶5}     At this point, Officer Simmons asked Mr. Rinella to step out of the truck and began

a search of the truck. During the search, Officer Simmons located a hard plastic case inside the

backpack on the passenger seat. The case had a lock on the right side, but Officer Simmons was

able to open it from the left side by pushing the lid up with his fingers without disturbing the lock.

Once opened, Officer Simmons observed multiple small plastic bags, which in his experience, was

consistent with the manner in which people carry illicit drugs. He removed one of the bags and

found that it contained a white powdery substance he believed was methamphetamines. Mr.

Rinella admitted that the substances may be methamphetamines. Officer Simmons then placed him

under arrest.

       {¶6}     Mr. Rinella was indicted on one count of aggravated possession of drugs in

violation of R.C.2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony. Mr. Rinella moved to suppress all

statements and evidence flowing from the stop. In his motion to suppress, he argued that the

warrantless search of his vehicle and its contents violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights;

specifically, that Officer Simmons used the minor misdemeanor traffic violation as a pretext to

search his vehicle without probable cause to do so, and that the warrantless search of the backpack

and plastic case exceeded the permissible scope.

       {¶7}     The trial court held a hearing on the matter. During the hearing, the State presented

testimony from Officer Simmons and submitted the video from his body worn camera. The trial

court issued a written judgment entry denying Mr. Rinella’s motion to suppress. The trial court

found that a traffic violation occurred sufficient to support Officer Simmons’ stop of Mr. Rinella’s

truck. It also found that Officer Simmons had probable cause to believe the truck contained

contraband, likely marijuana, and that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement

supported the search of the truck. It further found that the automobile exception extended to
                                                4

containers within an automobile that would logically contain the marijuana, and thus, Officer

Simmons was permitted to search the backpack and plastic case.

       {¶8}    Mr. Rinella entered a no contest plea on the indictment. The trial court found him

guilty and sentenced him to a definite term of two years and a maximum of three years in prison.

This timely appeal followed. Mr. Rinella asserts two assignments of error for our review.

                                                II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT DAVID
       RINELLA’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THEREBY ALLOWING
       INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CASE AT BAR.

       {¶9}    In this assignment of error, Mr. Rinella argues that the trial court erred by

determining that Officer Simmons had probable cause to search his vehicle; that the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement applied; and that the search of the backpack and plastic box

was within the permissible scope of Officer Simmons’ authority. He maintains that there was no

indication he was under the influence at the time of the stop, and that his constricted pupils and

admission of smoking marijuana several hours earlier were not sufficient to support that belief. He

further argues that Officer Simmons’ search of the backpack and opening of the locked plastic case

was beyond the scope of the permissible search. We disagree.

       {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

       Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.
       When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
       fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate
       the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
       court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
       Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
       determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
       satisfy the applicable legal standard.
                                                 5

(Citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Pursuant to

Burnside, “[o]nce this Court has determined that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by

the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Iloba, 9th Dist.

Wayne No. 20AP0030, 2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 7, citing Burnside at ¶ 8. Here, Mr. Rinella does not

challenge the trial court’s factual findings. Therefore, this Court accepts them as supported by the

evidence.

       {¶11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated * * *.” Article I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution contains nearly identical language.

       {¶12} The traffic stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996). “Although the Fourth Amendment

recognizes that individuals have privacy interests in their vehicles, the inherent characteristics of

vehicles ‘justif[y] a lesser degree of protection of [the privacy] interests [in them].’” State v.

Friedman, 194 Ohio App.3d 677, 2011-Ohio-2989, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting California v. Carney,

471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). “‘Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a

vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the

well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.’” Friedman at ¶ 7, quoting State

v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000).

       It is now well settled that the absence of a warrant does not render an automobile
       search invalid on constitutional grounds. All that is required to support a
       warrantless intrusion is probable cause to believe that a particular vehicle is
       carrying evidence of a crime. When probable cause is found to exist under the facts
       and circumstances of a given case, law enforcement officers have the necessary
       constitutional justification to explore any areas in the vehicle, such as locked trunks
       and glove compartments, that may reasonably contain the object of their search.
                                                  6

(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Lang, 117 Ohio App.3d 29, 36 (1st Dist.1996).

       Probable cause consists of “‘a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” State v.
       Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49 (2000), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
       132, 161 (1925). While “[t]he amount of evidence necessary for probable cause *
       * * is less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction * * *[,]” State
       v. McGinty, 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0039-M, 2009-Ohio-994, ¶ 11, probable
       cause is “a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion[,]” State v.
       Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 23. See also Brinegar v. United
       States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (probable cause means “more than bare
       suspicion”). The question of whether an officer had probable cause to arrest a
       defendant “is a fact-intensive inquiry * * *.’” State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No.
       29273, 2020-Ohio-473, ¶ 19. “The determination ‘is made from the totality of the
       circumstances.’” State v. R.L., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29573, 2020-Ohio-2811, ¶ 9,
       quoting State v. White, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, ¶ 24.
       “‘Factors to be considered include an officer's observation of some criminal
       behavior by the defendant, furtive or suspicious behavior, flight, events escalating
       reasonable suspicion into probable cause, [and] association with criminals and
       locations.’” White at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Shull, 5th Dist. Nos. 05-CA-30, 2005-
       Ohio-5953, ¶ 20.

State v. Dudsak, 9th Dist. Medina No. 21CA0033-M, 2021-Ohio-3632, ¶ 16.

       {¶13} In this case, Officer Simmons had the requisite probable cause of criminal activity

to search Mr. Rinella’s vehicle. The unchallenged factual findings establish that Officer Simmons

observed multiple indicators of criminal activity, including the unusually long stop at the

intersection, abnormal nervousness, avoiding eye contact, and fixation on the backpack in the front

passenger seat. Mr. Rinella told Officer Simmons that he was traveling to an establishment known

to be associated with drug trafficking. He also admitted that he had smoked marijuana earlier in

the day, that there may be a marijuana roach in the vehicle, and that a K-9 sniff would probably

alert for marijuana. The trial court noted these facts in its decision denying the motion to suppress.

Under those facts and circumstances, an objectively reasonable police officer would have probable

cause to believe that evidence of drugs would be found in Mr. Rinella’s vehicle. See Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Consequently, we reject Mr. Rinella’s argument that

Officer Simmons lacked the requisite probable cause to search his vehicle for drugs.
                                                 7

       {¶14} Secondly, Mr. Rinella argues that even if the officer had probable cause to search

his vehicle, he did not have probable cause to search the plastic box found in his backpack in the

vehicle. We disagree.

       {¶15} According to the United States Supreme Court, “if probable cause justifies the

search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its

contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825

(1982). “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of

the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search

and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id. at 824. The

vehicle “contents” subject to search include “all movable containers and packages” found inside

the vehicle. State v. Maddox, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-72, 2021-Ohio-586, ¶ 20.

       {¶16} The permissible scope of the search has been extended to specific items found

inside a vehicle. See State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St. 3d 569, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 18 (sealed envelopes);

State v. Kumuhone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112272, 2023-Ohio-2586, ¶ 28 and State v. Fritz, 12th

Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2019-12-094, CA2019-12-095, 2020-Ohio-5231, ¶ 35 (a backpack); State

v. Sullivan, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2018-10-016, 2019-Ohio-2279, ¶ 23 (a locked tool box).

       {¶17} As previously established, Officer Simmons had probable cause to believe that Mr.

Rinella’s vehicle contained evidence of marijuana. Because probable cause existed to search Mr.

Rinella’s vehicle, Officer Simmons also had probable cause to search the backpack and plastic

case, both of which could have concealed marijuana. Therefore, this Court rejects Mr. Rinella’s

argument that Officer Simmons was not authorized to search the backpack and plastic case.

       {¶18} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that based on the totality of the circumstances,

Officer Simmons had probable cause to search Mr. Rinella’s vehicle; that the automobile exception
                                               8

to the warrant requirement applied to permit the warrantless search of Mr. Rinella’s vehicle; and

that the scope of the search included the plastic box inside the backpack. Accordingly, the trial

court did not err by denying Mr. Rinella’s motion to suppress. Mr. Rinella’s first assignment of

error is overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCING OF APPELLANT, DAVID
       RINELLA, UNDER THE REAGAN TOKES ACT, WHICH ALLOWS THE
       DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION TO
       ADMINISTRATIVELY EXTEND A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S PRISON
       TERM BEYOND THE PRESUMPTIVE MINIMUM TERM IS
       UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

       {¶19} Mr. Rinella challenges his sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act. He argues that

the Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of the separation of

powers and deprives him of his constitutional right to due process of law. The Ohio Supreme

Court rejected these arguments and concluded that the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional. State

v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535. Accordingly, Mr. Rinella’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

                                              III.

       {¶20} Mr. Rinella’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                             Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
                                                 9

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     SCOT STEVENSON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
CONCURS.

CARR, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

APPEARANCES:

KIMBERLY STOUT-SHERRER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.