Court Opinion

ID: 9370832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 19:00:35.578384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.047915
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30625     Document: 00516645415          Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                           FILED
                                                                    February 14, 2023
                                   No. 21-30625                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                           Clerk

   Percy Taylor,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   James LeBlanc, Secretary,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Louisiana
                             USDC No. 3:21-CV-72

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
          The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive
   any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
   Const. amend. XIV. § 1.          So it should go without saying that the
   government cannot hold a prisoner without the legal authority to do so, for
   that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due process of
   law.” Id. Consistent with these principles, “[o]ur precedent establishes that
   a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”
   Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “Detention of a prisoner
   thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially
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                                     No. 21-30625

   valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”
   Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Crittindon v.
   LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[I]t is without question that
   holding without legal notice a prisoner for a month beyond the expiration of
   his sentence constitutes a denial of due process.”).
          As our court has recently observed, however, the Louisiana
   Department of Public Safety and Corrections has identified and exposed a
   pattern of Louisiana inmates being detained past the expiration of their
   sentences.     See id. (describing study that “exposed widespread
   overdetentions of DPSC prisoners”).
          Percy Taylor was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence.
   After his release, he sought redress for this violation of his rights by bringing
   a lawsuit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
   Louisiana state law. The district court dismissed most of Taylor’s claims,
   but allowed a supervisory liability claim against Department Secretary James
   LeBlanc to proceed by denying qualified immunity. Now Secretary LeBlanc
   appeals the denial of qualified immunity arguing, inter alia, that his conduct
   wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
          The right to timely release is clearly established. But Taylor failed to
   adequately brief—and has thus forfeited—any meritorious argument that
   Secretary LeBlanc’s behavior was objectively unreasonable in light of that
   right. Accordingly, we must reverse.
                                          I.
          For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in
   Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
   (2009).

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                                    No. 21-30625

          Plaintiff Percy Taylor was sentenced in 1995 to 10 years imprisonment
   for a drug felony offense in Louisiana, but he was later released on parole for
   good behavior. While on parole, Taylor committed a new felony offense in
   July 2001 but wasn’t arrested until February 20, 2002. Taylor was detained
   pending trial, convicted on October 15, 2003, and subsequently sentenced as
   a habitual offender. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and his parole
   for the 1995 offense was revoked. Eventually, his life sentence for the 2003
   felony conviction was amended to 20 years of imprisonment with “‘credit
   for all time served.’”
          In 2017, Taylor learned that his full-term release date was March 16,
   2021, and that his good time adjusted date was May 5, 2020. But he believed
   that his release date “should have been the last of October 2017 and no later
   than January 1, 2018” had his good time credit been correctly calculated. So
   he filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure grievance with the warden of
   the facility where he was held. He contended that he should have received
   credit toward the completion of his 10-year sentence for the 1995 drug
   conviction based on the time he spent in jail between February 2002 and
   October 2003 awaiting trial for his most recent felony offense. He contended
   that he’d been wrongfully denied double credit for his period of pretrial
   detention for his 1995 and 2003 sentences. The warden assigned the
   grievance to a non-attorney employee of the Louisiana Department of Public
   Safety and Corrections, who denied the grievance in July 2018. The denial
   explained that Taylor wasn’t entitled to good time credit because the relevant
   law didn’t go into effect until 2010, after both sentences were imposed.
          The Administrative Remedy Procedure process allows for first and
   second step review. See La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(a)–
   (b). Taylor accordingly appealed to James LeBlanc, the Secretary of the
   Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. The appeal was
   denied. The denial explained that, under a 2011 law, the 18 months of pretrial

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   detention could apply only toward completion of the 20-year sentence
   ultimately imposed for the 2003 felony conviction, and not also toward the
   completion of the 10-year sentence imposed for the 1995 felony conviction.
   See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 880(E). It noted that overlapping credits
   are prohibited when the sentences in question are consecutively, rather than
   concurrently, imposed. See id. at 880(B).
          Taylor sought review from the state district court. A commissioner of
   the state district court issued a report recommending that the court grant the
   petition for review. According to the report, Taylor’s parole had been
   revoked no later than his arrest in February 2002, so he “should have been
   shown as being in custody on both offenses” as of February 20, 2002, and
   should have received credit toward the completion of his 1995 sentence as
   well as his 2003 sentence for the time spent in custody between February 20,
   2002 and October 15, 2003. The report noted that the version of the relevant
   state law in effect when Taylor’s parole was revoked and he was convicted of
   the 2003 felony offence didn’t expressly prohibit double counting of credit.
   The state district court adopted the recommendation and ordered Taylor’s
   master prison record be recalculated to give credit for time served as to both
   sentences from February 20, 2002.
          Taylor was released from prison on February 18, 2020—over two
   years after the latest date he alleges he should have been released.
          In late 2020, Taylor brought various claims against officials in state
   court seeking damages for false imprisonment—including a § 1983
   supervisory liability claim against LeBlanc. Defendants removed to federal
   district court and moved to dismiss. Plaintiff amended the complaint and
   responded to the motion to dismiss. The operative complaint alleged, inter
   alia, that Secretary LeBlanc—a final policymaker—failed to initiate policies
   ensuring inmates’ timely releases, that he failed to train or supervise

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   employees carrying out the Administrative Remedy Procedure process, and
   that he was aware that inmates were held for longer than their sentences due
   to reports, public statements, and various cases documenting instances of
   inmates being detained beyond their sentences. The district court granted in
   part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
           Relevant here, the district court denied the motion as to the
   supervisory liability claim against Secretary LeBlanc, finding that he wasn’t
   entitled to qualified immunity.          The district court found that Taylor
   “sufficiently alleged that his unlawful detention and the patterns of unlawful
   detention in [the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections]
   stem from the same source—inadequate training and guidance,” noting that
   the allegations included citations to various cases, reports, and statements
   suggesting Secretary LeBlanc “was aware of similar constitutional violations
   but failed to correct them.” In its discussion of whether Secretary LeBlanc’s
   conduct was objectively unreasonable, the district court only addressed
   whether Secretary LeBlanc acted with deliberate indifference to Taylor’s
   constitutional     rights.      But    deliberate     indifference     and    objective
   unreasonableness are separate inquiries. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth,
   Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Obviously, the analysis for
   objective reasonableness is different from that for deliberate indifference (the
   subjective test for addressing the merits).”).
           Secretary LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity. 1
           “Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review
   orders denying qualified immunity.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310

           1
            Taylor argues that the district court shouldn’t have dismissed the other claims,
   but he did not file a notice of appeal, so only the district court’s denial of Secretary
   LeBlanc’s assertion of qualified immunity is properly before us on this appeal.

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                                     No. 21-30625

   (5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
   dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, accepting as true all well-pleaded
   facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
   Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
                                          II.
          “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
   from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
   established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
   would have known.”         Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
   (quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
   unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
   plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
   objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
   violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “Both steps in the qualified immunity
   analysis are questions of law.” Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir.
   2013). We are free to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis
   to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he judges of the district
   courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the
   order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
   disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
          We proceed to consider whether Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions were
   objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
   violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “The second prong of the qualified
   immunity test is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the
   allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
   the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was
   objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.”
   Hare, 135 F.3d at 326 (emphasis omitted).

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                                      No. 21-30625

          It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
   from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
   F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. Taylor’s claim against Secretary
   LeBlanc nevertheless fails because he has forfeited any argument that the
   Secretary’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.
          The objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official action is
   protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
   previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing law
   the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)
   (citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id. at 739–
   41. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
   clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his
   conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
   U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at
   236.
          Taylor does not present any meritorious argument that Secretary
   LeBlanc acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in this case.
          To begin with, he argues that whether Secretary LeBlanc acted
   objectively unreasonably is a fact question not amenable to appellate review
   at this stage in the proceedings. But we have long held precisely the opposite.
   Whether “a given course of conduct would be objectively unreasonable in
   light of clearly established law” is a “purely legal question” and plainly
   within our jurisdiction on interlocutory review. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d
   337, 347 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 503 (noting both steps
   of the qualified immunity analysis “are questions of law”).
          To the extent that Taylor argues the merits, it’s inadequately briefed.
   Taylor’s entire presentation on the issue of objective unreasonableness
   amounts to just this single conclusory statement:              “It is inherently

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   unreasonable for the secretary . . . to fail to enact policies and procedures to
   ensure the prompt release of inmates who have served their sentences in
   accordance to law.”       A single, unsupported sentence isn’t enough to
   adequately brief the issue. See Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ’g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d
   375, 382 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that when an “issue [is] inadequately
   briefed, it is forfeited”). To be sure, we have said that forfeiture principles
   may apply “more leniently when the party who fails to brief an issue is the
   appellee” rather than the appellant. Hernandez v. Garcia Pena, 820 F.3d 782,
   786 n.3 (5th Cir. 2016). But Taylor bears the burden on the issue of objective
   unreasonableness. See, e.g., Angulo v. Brown, 978 F.3d 942, 949 (5th Cir.
   2020) (“The plaintiff has the burden to negate a properly raised defense of
   qualified immunity.”). And he has not meaningfully briefed that issue. See,
   e.g., Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir.
   2013) (applying forfeiture to the appellee because an issue “has not been
   meaningfully briefed”).
          We reverse.

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