Court Opinion

ID: 9648096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:02:09.304885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.188834
License: Public Domain

REID, Justice,
dissenting in Order denying petition to rehear.
I dissent from the order denying the defendant’s Petition to Rehear because the petition presents undeniable authority that the defendant is not death eligible under T.C.A. § 39-13-203.
The affirmations of the conviction and the sentence, and the denial of the petition to rehear, are based on the majority’s finding that the legislature did not define “deficits in adaptive behavior” when it enacted T.C.A. § 39-13-203 (1990). The majority then bases its denial of relief upon its definition of mental retardation. Supra at 918.
“Deficits in adaptive behavior” is one of three components of mental retardation.1 As discussed in the dissent, the State conceded that the other two components were established by the proof. The proof also clearly established “deficits in adaptive behavior” as defined in the American Association on Mental Retardation’s (AAMR’s) manual entitled Classification in Mental Retardation (1983). This manual, which contains technical definitions for all of the terms used in T.C.A. § 39-13-203, defines “deficits in adaptive behavior” as follows:
Deficits in adaptive behavior are defined as significant limitations in an individual’s effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales.
The majority rejected this definition, stating
It would be expected that the General Assembly would have included a definition of the term “deficits in adaptive behavior” *934or referred to those materials in which a definition or standards could be found if it had meant for this term, or the statute as a whole, to have been interpreted in a way other than its ordinary meaning.
Supra at 917.
•If there were any doubt regarding the definition of this critical phrase, the answer is found in the legislative history of the statute: “Once we conclude that the proper interpretation [of the statute] is left open to dispute, it is appropriate to turn to the legislative history of the statute for guidance.” Chapman v. Sullivan County, 608 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tenn.1980).
In the petition to rehear, the defendant presents the following legislative history of T.C.A. § 39-13-203:
On March 13, 1990, Representative Jackson, the sponsor of the bill in the House, addressed the House Judiciary Committee, and said,
The bill adopts the standard definition of mental retardation recognized by the American Association of the Mentally Retarded.
Tape: H. Judiciary # 1, 3/13/90 (1225) (emphasis added).2
Also on March 13, 1990, Senator Henry, the sponsor of the bill in the Senate, addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and said,
The terminology set out in the bill is of a technical nature, but it is susceptible of proof. If the Committee would be willing to hear Mr. Blue, who is an expert in this field, to respond to Senator Cohen’s question, I think he could do it better than I could because of the technicalities of retardation I’m not that up on.
Tape: S. Judiciary # 1, 3/13/90 (1580) (emphasis added).
Roger Blue, the executive director of the Association for Retarded Citizens of Tennessee, addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and said,
The definition, as spelled out in this legislation, is the accepted definition of the American Association on Mental Retardation, which is the universally accepted definition used in the field (1602). * * * [Mental retardation] is a very specific kind of evaluation. It is based on a whole battery of testing that has to be done, not just on intelligence (1640). * * * There is a whole battery of exams from testing adaptive behavior [to] everything else that is related to that, not just IQ in itself (1758). * * * There are very specific kinds of testing standards used to determine mental retardation (1840).
Tape: S. Judiciary # 1, 3/13/90 (emphasis added).
On March 13, 1990, Judge Barbara Haynes of the Tennessee Sentencing Commission also addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and said,
If a person has stood trial and been found guilty of murder in the first degree, then the judge will make the determination that this person is retarded, and if that person, under the national guidelines, not one that’s mentally ill or sick, if that person meets the national guidelines, they will be automatically sentenced to life in prison.
Tape: S. Judiciary # 1, 3/13/90 (2055) (emphasis added).
On April 3, 1990, Gary Halsepian, an attorney with the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and said,
[T]he universally accepted definition of mental retardation by the American Association on Mental Retardation is the one that is incorporated in this bill. It also is the same definition of mental *935retardation that is currently in our state law in the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Title 33 definition of mental retardation, and it also is the one that ... the ABA recommends.
Tape: S. Judiciary #3, 4/3/90 (540) (emphasis added).
Finally, on April 5, 1990, Representative Jackson addressed the full House, and said,
What amendment # 1 does, it adopts the definition of mental retardation that is the nationally accepted definition adopted by the national association for the mentally retarded.
Tape: H-62 Session # 1, 4/5/90 (260) (emphasis added).
This legislative history establishes beyond dispute that the legislature adopted the AAMR definitions in the statute, which include the AAMR’s definition of deficits in adaptive behavior. As previously stated, according to that definition, the defendant is not death eligible.
The majority opinion and the order denying the petition to rehear disregard a diagnosis accepted by the medical profession, the certain meaning of a legislative enactment, and a basic rule of statutory construction. The result is the defendant is denied a substantial right granted by the legislature and the law regarding the punishment of persons who are mentally retarded is hopelessly confused until the legislature writes again.
I would grant the petition to rehear and remand the case to the trial court.

. T.C.A. § 39 — 13—203(a)(1), (2), (3).

. Numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the counter numbers on the tape where the quoted statements appear.