Court Opinion

ID: 9472066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:48:33.737756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:43.816876
License: Public Domain

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff had the burden of proving that she was unable to return to her job as a head linen clerk. The AU found that she had not met the burden and rejected her claims of unbearable pain. In doing so, he gave specific and detailed reasons. Because I believe that his findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, I respectfully dissent.
The facts and legal principles are fully set out in the Magistrate’s * report and recommendation, which Chief Judge Nangle (correctly, I think) accepted. I add a few observations.
1. This Court stresses, ante, p. 648, that an AU may not reject a claimant’s testimony “solely” because of her appearance or demeanor at the hearing. That is not what the AU did here. He relied upon plaintiff’s demeanor as only one factor among several. There is nothing illegitimate about that. Triers of fact do it every day, and we routinely approve credibility findings based on exactly this kind of observation of the behavior of witnesses.
2. The Court criticizes the AU for stating that there was no medical evidence to substantiate plaintiff's testimony that she had fallen and broken her ribs. The Court cites Dr. Poetz’s office notes of October 11, 1980, as evidence of such a fall. A quotation from the AU’s opinion will expose the fatal difficulty with this reasoning:
She testified that she fell one week prior to the hearing in November 1981. However, the clinical notes from Dr. Poetz, which ran through December 23, 1981, *650make no mention of any treatment for this fall____
Tr. 17. Thus, the claimed fall, evidence of which the ALJ found lacking, occurred in November 1981. That Dr. Poetz’s notes mention a fall that happened before October 11, 1980, in no way undermines the ALJ’s reasoning on this point.
3. The opinion of a treating doctor is ordinarily to be preferred over that of a consultant who sees the claimant only once. But here the AU did not mechanically and uncritically accept the opinion of the consulting physician. He analyzed Dr. Poetz’s (the treating doctor’s) opinion in some detail and also observed that Dr. Powell, as an orthopedic surgeon, was entitled to more deference on a question of musculoskeletal condition than Dr. Poetz, an osteopath. This reasoning is well within the customary province of the finder of fact. In addition, the Court is mistaken when it says “there is no evidence of malingering.” Ante, p. 648. Dr. Chao, an associate of Dr. Poetz, treated plaintiff in June 1980 and had this to say:
It is felt the pt. [patient?] may have some pain, but this is quite exaggerated at this time. Evidence of malingering has to be ruled out.
Tr. 158. (The second sentence, I take it, means that a sufficient possibility of malingering exists to require further evidence to rule it out, not that there is no evidence of malingering.)
4. Lack of objective findings cannot alone support an ALJ’s rejection of testimony of pain. But again, that is not what happened here. The ALJ simply considered the weakness of the objective medical evidence as one element in his analysis. Surely this Court is not holding such reasoning erroneous as a matter of law. Subjective evidence of pain must be carefully considered, but it would be a complete abandonment of common sense to outlaw any reference in an ALJ’s opinion to the strength or weakness of the objective findings.
5. I have not been slow to decry the Secretary’s persistent refusal to follow our cases. See, e.g., Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F.Supp. 88, 92-93 (W.D.Ark.1982) (Arnold, J., sitting by designation), aff'd, per curiam, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.1983); cf. id. at 430 (McMillian, J., concurring) (Secretary’s actions may in the future lead to contempt proceedings). The Secretary’s behavior is lawlessness in high places. But we also have forms and limitations of law to observe, one of the most important of which is respect for the unique role of the trier of fact, especially when the demeanor and credibility of witnesses are involved. In my view, the Court today exceeds those limitations.

 The Hon. David D. Noce, United States Magistrate for the Eastern District of Missouri.