Court Opinion

ID: 9954781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 21:03:36.515747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:08.678780
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 230444-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                      NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/26/24. The
                                                                           This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-23-0444
                                                                           Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                              not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                      limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Effingham County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 22-CF-254
                                                )
EDWIN C. TAPPAN,                                )     Honorable
                                                )     Allan F. Lolie Jr.,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The circuit court properly denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence
               where defendant attacked the victim with a knife, he had a prior conviction of
               aggravated battery and was on probation for a misdemeanor battery at the time of
               the offense. Further, no procedural error occurred where the circuit court and
               defense counsel complied with applicable supreme court rules. As any argument
               to the contrary would lack merit, we grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal
               leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2       Defendant, Edwin C. Tappan, pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery. The circuit

court sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the circuit court’s order denying

his motion to reconsider the sentence. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State

Appellate Defender (OSAD), has moved to withdraw, concluding that there is no nonfrivolous

argument that the circuit court erred. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has

notified defendant of the motion, and this court has provided him with ample opportunity to

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respond. However, he has not done so. After considering the record on appeal and OSAD’s motion

and supporting memorandum, we agree that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit.

Accordingly, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶3                                     BACKGROUND

¶4     Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated battery against his girlfriend, Danielle

Wagner. The State dismissed an additional charge of misdemeanor domestic battery. The court

admonished defendant about the nature of the charge, the possible penalties, and the rights he

would be giving up by pleading guilty. He said that he understood. The State’s factual basis was

that Wagner would testify that on July 30, 2022, defendant cut her with a knife while she was a

household member. The court found defendant’s plea knowing and voluntary and accepted it.

¶5     At sentencing, sheriff’s deputy Andrew Mudgette testified that on July 30, 2022, he went

to Wagner’s home to investigate a reported domestic dispute. He met Wagner, who was on

crutches and had a cast that was cracked. She said that defendant had shoved her earlier that night,

breaking her cast. The cast was necessitated by a previous injury. She also stated that defendant

carved his initials in her left arm and shoulder with a razor blade and made other cuts along her

back. She said that defendant held her down during this incident and specifically denied that it was

consensual.

¶6     Mudgette clarified that the shoving and cutting incidents occurred on different nights, and

that the police had been contacted particularly about the shoving incident, not the cutting incident.

However, Wagner wanted to prosecute both incidents.

¶7     In mitigation, defendant’s aunt, Sandra Shelton, testified that defendant had been very

dependent on his late mother. According to Shelton, defendant had taken positive steps since his

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release from jail. If he were to be sentenced to probation, Shelton would help him—for example,

by continuing to take him to his Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings.

¶8     Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) showed that he had a prior conviction

for aggravated battery. He was initially sentenced to drug-treatment probation, but that was

revoked, and he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He was on probation for a

misdemeanor battery conviction when he committed the present offense.

¶9     The PSI further showed that defendant had an alcohol-abuse problem and had been

diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and ADHD. He had two minor children who resided in

Effingham with their respective mothers. He obtained his GED in 2009. He was not employed at

the time due to his incarceration but had been working at CRC Global Solutions.

¶ 10   Defendant’s employer, as well as friends and relatives, submitted letters on his behalf.

Wagner submitted a victim impact statement in which she stated that she did not want to see

defendant go to prison and stated that she consented to having her arm cut. The prosecutor

recommended that defendant be sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel requested

probation with counseling.

¶ 11   The court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment. It noted that probation was an

option but found that that resolution would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and pose a

threat to the public. The court disregarded Wagner’s statement that she consented to being cut

because she had specifically told the deputy otherwise. The court commented that it would

probably have given defendant the maximum sentence had the State asked for it.

¶ 12   Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, along with a certificate of

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), arguing that the sentence was excessive, the

“State’s evidence in aggravation” was insufficient to justify the sentence, a lesser sentence would

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satisfy remedial goals, and the court did not give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors.

The court denied the motion and defendant timely appealed.

¶ 13                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 14    OSAD concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the court erred in

denying the motion to reconsider the sentence. It further concludes that there is no good-faith

argument that defense counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d).

¶ 15    A reviewing court may not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by

the trial court. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). A sentence will be deemed an

abuse of discretion if it is “ ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210

(2000)). The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing

decisions are entitled to great deference. Id. This is so because “ ‘[t]he trial judge has the

opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing

court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have

weighed these factors differently.’ ” Id. (quoting Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209).

¶ 16    Here, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS

5/12-3.2(a)(1), 12-3.3(a), (b) (West 2020). The sentencing range for such a felony is between three

and seven years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020). Thus, the four-year prison term

was only one year above the statutory minimum term. Although defendant could have been

sentenced to probation, the circuit court specifically found that such a sentence would deprecate

the seriousness of the offense and pose a danger to the community.

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¶ 17   We cannot say that the sentence was an abuse of discretion. Defendant cut his girlfriend

with a knife. He had a previous conviction of aggravated battery and was on probation for a battery

conviction when he committed the present offense. Wagner reported to the deputy that defendant

had previously pushed her while she was in a cast as a result of a previous, unrelated injury. While

defendant largely blamed his conduct on his alcoholism, he had failed at a previous opportunity to

obtain treatment following his earlier felony conviction. Accordingly, the four-year sentence was

not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 18   OSAD further concludes that there is no good-faith argument that defense counsel failed

to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). That rule provides that

where an attorney files a postplea motion on behalf of a defendant, he or she must

       “file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the

       defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant’s

       contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the

       trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of

       proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion

       necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Id.

¶ 19   Here, counsel filed a certificate closely tracking the language of the rule. Thus, there is no

meritorious argument that counsel failed to comply with the rule.

¶ 20                                   CONCLUSION

¶ 21   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 22   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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