Court Opinion

ID: 9724088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:44:01.958166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:55.357271
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: Based-on his counsel’s advice, defendant pled guilty to counts of intentional, knowing and felony murder. The trial court entered judgment on only one count of felony murder. This was improper. Because all counts involved the same homicide and because intentional murder involves a more culpable mental state and is a more serious crime than felony murder, the trial court should have entered a judgment of conviction only for intentional murder and vacated defendant’s convictions for knowing and felony murder. See People v. Pitsonbarger (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 353, 377-78; People v. Lego (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 323, 344; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 104. Although the majority concedes that counsel’s advice was based upon a misapprehension of the law, it concludes that defendant did not sustain prejudice at the guilt phase of the proceedings as a result of counsel’s misguidance because defendant’s claim of accident would not have prevented his conviction for felony murder and, based on the trial court’s error, judgment was in fact entered for felony murder. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that errors committed by the trial court, regardless of the windfall they may bestow upon a defendant, should be considered in determining whether that defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance. Here, but for the trial court’s error, defendant would be death-qualified based upon his counsel’s advice to plead guilty to all counts. Had the defendant been fully advised, he would have realized to what extent he was placed in jeopardy by the plea. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand how it would have been to his advantage to plead guilty to counts of intentional, knowing and felony murder. Therefore, I would hold that there was a “reasonable probability” that, but for defense counsel’s mistaken belief that felony murder alone was sufficient to qualify defendant for the death penalty, defendant would have rejected the plea arrangement. Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370; see also People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 61, 73. While the majority is correct in noting that accident would not relieve defendant of guilt for felony murder (People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536, 545), the statutory aggravating factor necessary to impose the death penalty is not proved by a conviction of felony murder alone (see People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 159). Intent or knowledge must also be established. If defendant had gone to trial and been acquitted on the intentional and knowing murder counts, the State would have been precluded from seeking the death penalty. Instead, defendant followed counsel’s advice, pled guilty to those counts and stipulated to the requisite statutory aggravating factor necessary for the death penalty. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9— 1(b)(6). It is therefore clear that defendant gained nothing in entering a guilty plea, despite the presence of evidence which the majority admits may relieve him of guilt for intentional and knowing murder. Further, it cannot be concluded that defendant made an informed decision that his interest required entry of a guilty plea despite his belief he did not intentionally kill Brian Douglas. (See People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319, 332 (discussing North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160).) Defendant’s guilty plea was based on ineffective assistance of counsel and should be vacated. I would therefore reverse and remand the judgment of the circuit court. While I realize that defense counsel’s misapprehension of the law went to the death penalty aspect of this case, counsel’s ineffectiveness so infected defendant’s defense that the ends of justice would be better served by permitting defendant to withdraw his entire guilty plea.