Court Opinion

ID: 9373577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:57.954362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.364477
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TIMOTHY MOHLER,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                            CH-1221-18-0119-W-2

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                            DATE: July 18, 2022
  SECURITY,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Richard R. Renner, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

      Karen R. Hiyama and Patricia Boxold, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

      Gregory Guaccio, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, Office of
        Special Counsel.

                                        BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                          Member Leavitt recused himself and
                  did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contra st, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                    REMAND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initi al decision, which
     denied corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal. For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,
     MODIFY the initial decision to find that the appellant established a prima facie
     case of whistleblower reprisal, MODIFY the basis for but still find that the
     appellant did not engage in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C),
     VACATE the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved by clear and
     convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of
     the appellant’s disclosure, and REMAND the case to the regional office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is employed as a GS-12 Field Technology Officer (FTO) with
     the agency’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Information
     Technology (OIT). Mohler v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket
     No. CH-1221-18-0119-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1; Mohler v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-18-0119-W-2,
     Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 13 at 5, Tab 26 at 4. Prior to the events at issue
     in this appeal, he was allowed to use office space at the U.S. Border Patrol
     (USBP) Detroit Sector Headquarters on Selfridge Air National Guard Base
     (ANGB) in Harrison Township, Michigan. 2 RAF, Tab 26 at 4.
¶3        On August 11, 2015, a Maintenance Mechanic with CBP’s Facilities
     Management and Engineering, who was also stationed at the USBP’s Detroit
     Sector Headquarters, reported “constant harassment” by an unspecified employee,
     who was subsequently determined to be the appellant. IAF, Tab 16 at 32-34. On

     2
       The agency explained that, although the OIT offices were located in Walled Lake,
     Michigan, the appellant was allowed to use office space of USBP, a CBP component, to
     avoid a 50-mile commute from his home. IAF, Tab 16 at 9.
                                                                                        3

     August 12, 2015, the appellant’s supervisor reported the harassment allegation to
     the Joint Intake Center (JIC), the agency’s clearinghouse for allegations of
     misconduct, which opened an inquiry into the matter (case number 201509037).
     Id. at 12, 32, 59. On August 13, 2015, the appellant emailed the JIC and the
     agency’s Computer Security Incident Response Center (CSIRC) alleging multiple
     instances of misconduct by the Maintenance Mechanic, including that he left his
     Government computer unattended and unlocked with his perso nal identity
     verification (PIV) card still in the card reader, and attaching as evidence a number
     of photos of the workstation and PIV card taken during 2014 and 2015. 3 IAF,
     Tab 16 at 186-97; RAF, Tab 20 at 26, 32-40. Shortly thereafter, his email to
     CSIRC was forwarded to his supervisor. RAF, Tab 20 at 31.
¶4         On August 14, 2015, the Acting Deputy Executive Director for Field
     Support for OIT (DxD) participated in the Assistant Commissioner’s daily
     telephonic briefing regarding information technology matters . Hearing Transcript
     (HT) at 115-20 (testimony of the DxD). After the telephonic briefing, he sent an
     email to management officials stating he had heard that an FTO had reported that
     another employee had taken photos of his unlocked and unattended comput er with
     his PIV card in the card reader and, although he later acknowledged that he must
     have misheard this detail, that the employee used the FTO’s email account to send
     those photos.    IAF, Tab 16 at 206; HT at 118 (testimony of the DxD).           On
     August 17, 2015, the appellant’s supervisor reported to JIC that the appellant had
     used the Maintenance Mechanic’s email account, and the JIC opened a new
     inquiry into this allegation (case number 201509237). IAF, Tab 16 at 181, 184.
¶5         The agency referred both administrative inquiries into the appellant’s
     conduct (case numbers 201509037 and 201509237) to a factfinder for
     investigation.   IAF, Tab 16 at 200-02.         Pending the completion of the
     investigation, the agency temporarily relocated the appellant to the Walled Lak e
     3
       The JIC opened an administrative inquiry (case number 201509102) into the
     appellant’s allegations against the Maintenance Mechanic. RAF, Tab 20 at 23.
                                                                                           4

     Field Support Office and suspended his administrative rights, which precluded
     him from utilizing any administrative account to access any Government -owned
     workstation or network. Id. at 87. On December 9, 2015, CBP Internal Affairs
     completed    an   administrative    inquiry   report   based    on   the   factfinder’s
     investigation, which was forwarded to the appellant’s second -level supervisor for
     review on January 5, 2016. IAF, Tab 16 at 30-31, 43-50. On February 22, 2016,
     he informed the appellant that the allegations against him were found to be
     unsubstantiated and that the case had been closed. Id. at 29. The agency then
     restored his administrative access and returned him to the USBP Detroit S ector
     Headquarters Selfridge ANGB. 4 Id. at 25; RAF, 16 at 140, Tab 26 at 4.
¶6         In or around June 2017, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that, in retaliation for his August 13, 2015
     disclosure to CSIRC regarding the Maintenance Mechanic’s computer security
     violation—namely, leaving his Government computer unattended while unlocked
     with his PIV card still in the card reader on multiple occasions —the agency
     conducted an unwarranted investigation into his conduct , moved him to another
     duty station, and suspended his administrative access, which precluded him from
     performing his usual duties, deprived him of overtime opportunities, and caused
     him to lose out on performance award and career advancement opportunities . 5
     RAF, Tab 16 at 139-40. In a letter dated October 10, 2017, OSC informed the
     appellant that it had made a preliminary determination to close its inquiry into his
     allegations without action. Id. at 139-44. The appellant responded by email on
     October 19 and 23, 2017, restating the allegations made in his initial complaint.
     4
      It appears that, although the appellant was allowed to return to Selfridge ANGB in
     February 2016, his duty station was subsequently moved back to Walled Lake. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 1; RAF, Tab 16 at 140, 143.
     5
       OSC docketed this complaint as OSC File. No. MA-17-3672. RAF, Tab 16 at 139.
     OSC indicated in its preliminary determination letter that the appellant filed his OSC
     complaint on May 22, 2017. RAF, Tab 16 at 139. In its closure letter, it indicated that
     he filed it on June 8, 2017. Id. at 145. The appellant did not provide a copy of his OSC
     complaint or any subsequent correspondence with OSC.
                                                                                               5

     Id. at 145. By letters dated November 8, 2017, OSC informed him that it was
     closing its investigation into his complaint without action and that he had the
     right to request corrective action from the Board. 6 Id. at 145-47.
¶7         The appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal regarding the matters
     raised in OSC File No. MA-17-3672, alleging that the agency retaliated against
     him for reporting a computer security violation by suspendin g his computer
     systems access, assigning him administrative duties, moving his duty station, and
     conducting an unwarranted investigation into his conduct. 7              IAF, Tab 1 at 5,
     Tab 10 at 4-5, Tab 11 at 4. The administrative judge found that the appellant
     established jurisdiction over his IRA appeal and that he was entitled to the
     hearing he requested. IAF, Tab 19 at 2. On April 20, 2018, the administrative
     judge granted the appellant’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal without
     prejudice to refiling.      IAF, Tab 35, Initial Decision.            After refiling, the
     administrative judge held the requested hearing and issued an initial decision
     denying the appellant’s request for corrective action.           RAF, Tab 42, Refiled
     Initial Decision (RID).
¶8         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.         The agency has responded to the petition for
     review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. 8 PFR File,
     Tabs 3, 6. In addition, OSC has filed an amicus brief. PFR File, Tab 10.

     6
       In its closure letter, OSC clarified that its final determination applied only to OSC File
     No. MA-17-3672 and that its investigation into the appellant’s other OSC complaint
     (OSC File No. MA-18-0164), which he filed on October 11, 2017, regarding incident s
     from 2016, was still open. RAF, Tab 16 at 145.
     7
       Although the appellant indicated on his initial appeal from that he was appealing an
     involuntary resignation, he subsequently clarified that he was not challenging any
     alleged involuntary resignation. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 11 at 4.
     8
       The appellant has also filed two motions to amend the petition, one alleging an
     additional error in the initial decision, PFR File, Tab 8, and one requesting an
     opportunity to brief Delgado v. Department of Justice, 966 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2020),
     which was issued after the close of the record on review, PFR File, Tab 13. We grant
     the appellant’s motion to amend for an additional allegation of error, but we deny his
                                                                                           6

                                           ANALYSIS
¶9          Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) , the Board
      has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted his
      administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations of the
      following: (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
      engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
      (C), or (D); and (2) the protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
      in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5
      (2016). Once he establishes jurisdiction over his IRA appeal, he is entitled to a
      hearing on the merits of his claim at which he must prove his prima facie case,
      i.e., that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity that was
      a contributing factor in a personnel action taken again st him, by preponderant
      evidence. 9   5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v. Department of Homeland Security,
      122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). If the appellant makes out a prima facie case, the
      agency is given an opportunity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
      that it would have taken the same personnel action in the abse nce of the protected
      disclosure or activity. 10 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Lu, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7.
¶10         Here, the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant
      established jurisdiction over this appeal. IAF, Tab 19 at 2; RID at 6 -7. On the
      merits of his appeal, however, she found that he failed to establish a prima facie
      case of whistleblower reprisal and that, in the alternative, the agency

      motion to amend for additional argument on Delgado. The appellant will have an
      opportunity to brief Delgado on remand to the extent that he deems it still relevant to
      the issues at that stage of the proceedings.
      9
        Preponderant evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
      considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
      fact is more likely true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
      10
        Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
      mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
                                                                                               7

      demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have temporarily
      suspended the appellant’s computer systems access, resulting in his assignment to
      administrative duties, in the absence of any whistleblowing. RID at 7-18. The
      appellant challenges many of these findings on review. 11 PFR File, Tabs 1, 6, 8.
      The appellant made a protected disclosure.
¶11         A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes
      evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
      gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
      public health or safety.     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Chavez v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18 (2013). A reasonable belief exists if a
      disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to, or readily
      ascertainable by, the appellant could reasonably conclude that the agency’s
      actions evince one of the types of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A).
      Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18. The appellant need not prove that the matter
      disclosed actually established one of the listed types of wrongdoing but only that
      a reasonable person in his position would have believed that it did. Id.
¶12         As noted above, the exhausted disclosure at issue in this appeal involves the
      appellant’s report to CSIRC on August 13, 2015, that the Maintenance Mechanic
      consistently left his Government computer unattended while unlocked with his
      11
         In addition, the appellant argues on review the administrative judge erred in denying
      his request to compel discovery—namely, his request for “all emails, text messages and
      other electronically stored information” directed to or received by 21 agency officials
      from July 1, 2015, onwards that included “any of the following strings of characters
      (not case sensitive):      violat, discrim, retaliat, repris, investigat, Tim, Mohler,
      whistleblow, OSC”—on the ground that it was overbroad and burdensome when
      compared to the three alleged personnel actions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 39; RAF, Tab 11
      at 25, Tab 23 at 4-5. An administrative judge has broad discretion in ruling on
      discovery matters, and absent an abuse of discretion the Board will not find reversible
      error in such rulings. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16 (2016).
      We find no such abuse of discretion here, especially in light of the fact that, pursuant to
      the administrative judge’s order, the agency provided declarations from 20 of the
      officials identified in the appellant’s document request attesting that they did not
      possess any relevant or material emails that had not already been produced by the
      agency in the agency file or during discovery. RAF, Tab 23 at 4-5, Tab 37.
                                                                                          8

      PIV card inserted in the card reader. RAF, Tab 16 at 139-40, Tab 20 at 32-40.
      The appellant argued that this disclosure evidenced a violation of the agency’s
      computer security policy and the Computer Security Act of 1 987, as well as a
      substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.     IAF, Tab 1 at 16;
      RAF, Tab 41 at 14-16.       The administrative judge found that, although the
      appellant disclosed a violation of the agency’s computer security policy, his
      disclosure was not protected because he made the disclosure in furtherance of a
      personal vendetta and not because he had a reasonable belief that the disclosure
      evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation or an immediate likelihood of
      harm.     RID at 7-11.   As the appellant points out on review, however, an
      appellant’s motive in making a disclosure is not relevant to whether the
      disclosure is protected.      See Parikh v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      116 M.S.P.R. 197, ¶ 18 (2011) (finding that the appellant’s allegedly vindictive
      motive for disclosing the misdiagnosis was immaterial to whether the disclosure
      was protected); Williams v. Department of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 553 n.5
      (1991) (recognizing that personal motivation for making a disclosure is irrelevant
      to whether the disclosure is protected). Accordingly, the administrative judge
      improperly relied on the appellant’s motive in finding that his disclosure was not
      protected, and we modify the initial decision consistent with this section to apply
      the correct analysis and to find, for the reasons discussed below, that the
      appellant made a protected disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regulation.
¶13           As noted above, the appellant contends, among other things, that his
      disclosure evidenced a violation of the agency’s computer security policy. RAF,
      Tab 41 at 14-16; PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-24. Although the parties did not provide a
      copy of the agency’s computer security policy, the record reflects that there i s
      such a policy and that it requires employees to secure their equipment, ensure that
      it was not left unattended, and to remove their PIV cards when they were not in
      use. RAF, Tab 16 at 221; HT at 38 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor);
      91-92 (testimony of the appellant’s third-level supervisor).      We find that this
                                                                                            9

      policy constitutes a rule within the meaning of section 2302(a)(2). See Rusin v.
      Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶¶ 15-17 (2002) (finding that,
      although the WPEA does not define “rule,” it includes established or authoritative
      standards for conduct or behavior). Accordingly, we find that the appellant made
      a protected disclosure of a rule as he had a reasonable belief that leaving a
      workstation unattended while unsecured with the PIV card inserted violated the
      agency’s computer security policy. 12

      The appellant has not shown that he engaged in protected activ ity.
¶14         The appellant also argued below that he engaged in protected activity when
      he   reported     the    computer        security   violation   to   CSIRC     because
      section 2302(b)(9)(C) protects cooperating with or disclosing information to the
      Inspector General or “any other component responsible for internal investigation
      or review.” RAF, Tab 41 at 14. In the refiled initial decision, the administrative
      judge found that the appellant’s report to CSIRC did not constitute protected
      activity under section 2302(b)(9)(C) because CSIRC does not qualify as “any
      other component responsible for internal investigation or review,” explaining that
      CSIRC does not investigate the agency but only investigates internal complaints
      and issues.     RID at 17-18.    The appellant challenges this finding on review.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26. Although we agree with the administrative judge that
      the appellant’s CSIRC report does not constitute protected activity under
      section 2302(b)(9)(C), we modify the initial decision consistent with this section
      to clarify the basis for this holding.

      12
         Because we find that the appellant’s disclosure evidenced a violation of a rule, we
      need not determine whether he had a reasonable belief that it also evidenced a violation
      of the Computer Security Act of 1987, which was repealed in 2002, or a substantial and
      specific danger to public health and safety.       See Kraushaar v. Department of
      Agriculture, 87 M.S.P.R. 378, ¶ 11 (2000) (finding that, in light of the Board’s finding
      that the appellant’s disclosure evidenced a violation of an agency regulation, it was
      unnecessary to determine whether the disclosure also evidenced an abuse of authority);
      see also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 305(a), 116 Stat. 2899,
      2960 (2002) (repealing the Computer Security Act).
                                                                                           10

¶15         Prior to December 12, 2017, the whistleblower protection statutes provided
      that “cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an
      agency, or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable prov isions of law,”
      is protected.    5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C); Edwards v. Department of Labor,
      2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 29.        Effective December 12, 2017, the National Defense
      Authorization Act of 2018 (NDAA) amended section 2302(b)(9)(C) to provide
      that, in addition to the Inspector General of an agency or the Special Counsel, a
      disclosure to “any other component responsible for internal investigation or
      review” is also protected. Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1), 131 Stat. 1283, 1618
      (2017).      The    Board     has    held   that   the    NDAA’s      amendment      to
      section 2302(b)(9)(C) is not retroactive. Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 30-33.
¶16         As described above, all of the events relevant to this appeal occurred prior
      to the December 12, 2017 effective date of the NDAA. Accordingly, as it is not
      retroactive, the amendment to section 2302(b)(9)(C) does not apply to this appeal,
      and we need not determine whether the CSIRC constitutes a “component
      responsible for internal investigation or review” so as to fall within the coverage
      of the amended section 2302(b)(9)(C). 13 Id.        Rather, to be covered under the
      pre-NDAA section 2302(b)(9)(C), the appellant must show that he cooperated
      with or disclosed information to the Inspector General or OSC. Id., ¶ 29. He has
      not alleged, and the record does not reflect, that he cooperated with or disclosed
      information to the Inspector General. Although the appellant filed a complaint
      with OSC in May or June 2017, he has not alleged that the agency’s actions at
      issue in this appeal resulted from that complaint, nor did he exhaust such a claim.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not shown that he engaged in
      protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(C) for purposes of this appeal.

      13
        In its amicus brief, OSC argues that CSIRC falls within the meaning of the expanded
      language of section 2302(b)(9)(C), because it uses formalized investigation procedures.
      PFR File, Tab 10 at 10-11. We do not reach this issue in light of our determination that
      the post-NDAA language does not apply here.
                                                                                     11

      The agency subjected the appellant to covered personnel actions.
¶17        As noted above, the appellant must also prove by preponderant evidence
      that the agency subjected him to a covered personnel action. See Scoggins v.
      Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21 (2016). A “personnel action” is
      defined as an appointment; a promotion; an action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 or
      other disciplinary or corrective action; a detail, transfer, or reassignment; a
      reinstatement; a restoration; a reemployment; a performance evaluation under
      5 U.S.C. chapter 43 or under title 38; a decision about pay, benefits, or awards
      concerning education or training if the education or training reasonably may be
      expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other
      action described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); a decision to order psychiatric
      testing or examination; the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure
      policy, form, or agreement; and any other significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
¶18        In the refiled initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant established that the agency subjected him to a covered signifi cant
      change in his duties, responsibilities, or working conditions when it temporarily
      suspended his administrative access, which resulted in a temporary change in his
      duties and responsibilities, and relocated him to the Walled Lake facility. RID
      at 12-13. She found that the investigation, however, did not constitute a covered
      personnel action.    RID at 12.     On review, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge failed to consider his allegation that the agency subjected
      him to a hostile work environment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-30.
¶19        We find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s determination that the
      appellant’s temporary relocation to a new duty station and temporary suspension
      of his computer systems access, which resulted in his assignment from his FTO
      duties to administrative duties, constitute significant changes in his duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions. RID at 12-13; see Skarada v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16 (explaining that agency actions that,
                                                                                                12

      individually or collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall
      nature   and    quality     of        an   employee’s   working   conditions,   duties,   or
      responsibilities will be found to constitute a personnel action covered by
      subsection 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)).            In addition, we agree with the administrative
      judge that the investigation does not constitute a personnel action. R ID at 12;
      Johnson v. Department of Justice, 104 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 7 (2007). Nonetheless, it
      is proper to consider evidence regarding the investigation because it is so closely
      related to the personnel actions that it could have been a pretext for gathering
      information to retaliate for whistleblowing. See Johnson, 104 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 7.
¶20         We recognize that, as the appellant argues on review, the administrative
      judge did not explicitly address his claim that, considering the investigations,
      relocation,    suspension        of    computer   systems   access,   and   assignment    to
      administrative duties together, the agency subjected him to a hostile work
      environment. RAF, Tab 41 at 20-21. However, any error in this regard did not
      affect the outcome of the appeal. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
      22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). Although the Board stated in Savage v. Department
      of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23 (2015), that a hostile work environment
      itself may constitute a covered personnel action in an IRA appeal, the Board later
      clarified that allegations of a hostile work environment may establish a personnel
      action in an IRA appeal only if they meet the statutory criteria, i.e., constitute a
      significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, Skarada,
      2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)). Here, as discussed above,
      the appellant’s temporary relocation to a new duty station, suspension of his
      computer systems access, and assignment to administrative duties constitute
      significant changes in his duties, responsibilities, and working conditions under
      subsection 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine whether
      these actions also constitute a significant change in his duties, responsibilities, or
      working conditions based on a hostile work environment.                 To the extent the
      appellant argues that the investigation was part of a hostile work environment
                                                                                         13

      personnel action, we disagree because he not shown that the investigation,
      individually or considered collectively with other agency actions, had any
      practical and significant effect on the overall nature and quality of his working
      conditions, duties, or responsibilities. 14 See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.

      The appellant established contributing factor based on the knowledge/timing test.
¶21        As discussed above, the appellant made a protected disclosure on
      August 13, 2015, when he emailed CSIRC regarding the Maintenance Mechanic’s
      computer security violation, and the agency thereafter subj ected him to a covered
      personnel action. To establish a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, he
      must next prove by preponderant evidence that his disclosure was a contributing
      factor in a covered personnel action. Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21. The
      term “contributing factor” means any disclosure that affects an agency’s decision
      to threaten, propose, take, or not take a personnel action regarding the individual
      making the disclosure. Id. The most common way of proving the contributing
      factor element is the “knowledge/timing test.” Id. Under that test, an appellant
      can prove that his disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action
      through evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the
      whistleblowing disclosure and took the personnel action within a period of time
      such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. Once an appellant has satisfied
      the knowledge/timing test, he has demonstrated that a protected disclosure was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action. Id.
¶22        In the refiled initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant established that the August 13, 2015 disclosure contributed to his

      14
           The NDAA amended 5 U.S.C. § 1214 to allow OSC to petition the Board for
      corrective action on behalf of an employee due to an agency’s investigation of the
      employee if it was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for protected
      whistleblowing activity. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(i). Regardless of any questions as to whether
      this amendment applies retroactively, it does not apply to this appeal because OSC has
      not petitioned the Board for such relief.
                                                                                        14

      third-level supervisor’s decision to temporarily suspend his administrative access
      based on the knowledge/timing test. RID at 14. The parties have not challenged
      this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it.         Because the
      suspension of the appellant’s access to Government systems precluded him from
      performing usual duties as a FTO, we further find that he established contributing
      factor in connection with his temporary assignment to administrative duties.
¶23         Next, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish
      that his August 13, 2015 disclosure contributed to the agency’s decision to
      temporarily relocate him to the Walled Lake facility.        RID at 13-14.     In so
      finding, she determined that the USBP Detroit Sector Headquarters Director
      credibly testified that she decided to relocate the appellant on August 11 or 12,
      2015, after the Maintenance Mechanic filed his most recent harassment complaint
      against the appellant on August 11, 2015, but before he made his disclosure on
      August 13, 2015.      Id.   She further found that the appellant’s second- and
      third-level supervisors only made the decision regarding where to temporarily
      relocate him after the Director decided that the Detroit Sector could no longer
      accommodate his work location at the Selfridge ANGB. RID at 14. Accordingly,
      she concluded that the appellant failed to show that his disclosure contributed to
      the agency’s decision to temporarily change his work location. RID at 14. The
      appellant challenges these findings on review. PFR File, Tab 6, at 20-22, Tab 8
      at 4-6. For the reasons that follow, we modify the initial decis ion to find that the
      appellant established contributing factor in connection with his temporary
      relocation.
¶24         While disclosures made after an action has been finalized, even if it is not
      yet implemented, cannot be a contributing factor in the action, an action that was
      only “contemplated and in preparation” prior to a disclosure can serve as the
      predicate personnel action in an IRA appeal. See Fickie v. Department of the
      Army, 86 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 9 (2000). Here, the record reflects that the Director of
      USBP Detroit Sector Headquarters determined that it was no longer tolerable for
                                                                                            15

      the appellant to use their facilities and that he needed to be relocated to another
      facility at least 1 day prior to his August 13, 2015 disclosure.          IAF, Tab 16
      at 33-34; RAF, Tab 20 at 32-40.           However, there is no evidence that his
      relocation was finalized until after he made the disclosure; rather, there is no
      evidence that his relocation was finalized until August 19, 2015, when the
      appellant’s second-level supervisor issued him a letter stating that he would be
      temporarily reassigned to the Walled Lake Field Support Office effective
      immediately. 15   IAF, Tab 16 at 87.        Thus, the appellant may still establish
      contributing factor in connection with his temporary relocation if he meets the
      applicable criteria, notwithstanding the fact that the relocation was contemplated
      and in preparation before he made his August 13, 2015 disclosure. See Fickie,
      86 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 9.
¶25         The appellant’s email to CSIRC disclosing the computer securit y violation
      was forwarded to his first-level supervisor several hours after he submitted it on
      August 13, 2015.     RAF, Tab 20 at 31.       In addition, on August 14, 2015, the
      appellant’s second-level supervisor forwarded to his third-level supervisor the
      email from the DxD regarding his belief that someone had used an FTO’s account
      to send emails, indicating that it pertained to the “Tim saga at sector.” IAF,
      Tab 16 at 206.    The appellant’s second-level supervisor signed the August 19,
      2015 letter reassigning the appellant to Walled Lake and, at the hearing, his
      third-levels supervisor testified that “[w]e made the decision as his management
      chain to move him to [Walled] Lake.” IAF, Tab 16 at 87; HT at 94 (testimony of
      the appellant’s third-level supervisor).        Thus, because it is clear that the
      appellant’s first-, second-, and third-level supervisors were aware of his

      15
          The record reflects that the appellant’s supervisor met with the appellant on
      August 17, 2015, and informed him that his administrative access was suspended until
      further notice. IAF, Tab 16 at 181. There is no indication, however, that he also told
      the appellant that he would be moved to Walled Lake at that time. Id.; HT at 53
      (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). In any event, even if the temporary relocation
      was finalized by that meeting, it occurred after the appellant made his disclosure.
                                                                                        16

      disclosure to CSIRC by no later than August 14, 2015, before they finalized his
      reassignment to Walled Lake, we find that the appellant has establ ished
      contributing factor based on knowledge/timing.
¶26         In light of the foregoing, we find that the appellant established a prima facie
      case of whistleblower retaliation.      Specifically, he proved by preponderant
      evidence that he made a protected disclosure of a violation of a law, rule, or
      regulation and that this disclosure contributed to the agency’s decision to
      temporarily relocate him and temporarily suspend his administrative access,
      which resulted in the change to his duties and responsibilities.

      We vacate the administrative judge’s alternative finding that the agency met its
      burden to show that it would have taken some of the same actions in the absence
      of the appellant’s disclosure and remand for a new clear and convincing analysis.
¶27         As noted above, when an appellant makes out a prima facie case of
      whistleblower reprisal, the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and
      convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
      absence of the protected disclosure or activit y. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Lu,
      122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7. Here, after finding that the appellant failed to establish a
      prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the administrative judge determined in
      the alternative that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have temporarily suspended the appellant’s computer systems access,
      which resulted in a temporary change to his work duties, even in the absence of
      his disclosure. RID at 15-17. Under the WPEA, however, the Board may not
      proceed to the clear and convincing test unless it has first made a finding that the
      appellant established his prima facie case.      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Clarke v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014), aff’d,
      623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).       Accordingly, because the administrative
      judge found that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of
      whistleblower reprisal, it was inappropriate for her to proceed to the clear and
      convincing test. See Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28. Nonetheless, in light of
                                                                                      17

      our determination on review that the appellant has established a prima facie case
      of whistleblower reprisal, it is now necessary and appropriate to address whether
      the agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
      the same actions in the absence of his protected disclosure.
¶28        In determining whether an agency has met this burden, the Board will
      consider the following factors:     (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in
      support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on
      the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any
      evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are not
      whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security
      Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does not view
      these factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear
      and convincing evidence.    Lu, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7. Rather, the Board will
      weigh the factors together to determine whether the evidence is clear and
      convincing as a whole.     Id.    A proper analysis of the clear and convincing
      evidence issue requires that all of the evidence be weighed together—both the
      evidence that supports the agency’s case and the evidence that detracts from it.
      Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37 (2013) (citing
      Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
¶29        In the refiled initial decision, the administrative judge did not address
      whether the agency met is burden to prove that it would have temporarily
      relocated the appellant in the absence of his disclosure but, as noted above, found
      that the agency met its burden with respect to the temporary suspension of his
      computer systems access and assignment to administrative duties. RID at 15-17.
      In so finding, she determined that, as to the first Carr factor, the agency’s
      decision to suspend the appellant’s computer systems access pending an
      investigation was supported by reasonably strong evidence. Id. As to the second
      Carr factor, she found that the appellant’s third-level supervisor, who was
      responsible for the decision to suspend his computer systems access, had no
                                                                                        18

      motive to retaliate against him for his protected disclosure because it concerned a
      security violation by a person with whom she had no contact or supervisory
      connection. RID at 17. As to the third Carr factor, she found that the agency did
      not provide any evidence of nonwhistleblowers who had their computer systems
      access suspended under similar circumstances.       Id.   The appellant challenges
      these findings on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 31-37.
¶30         Although we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      credibility-based determination that the agency’s action was supported by
      reasonably strong evidence, her analysis of the second and third Carr factors are
      incomplete and inconsistent with Board and Federal Circuit ca se law.             In
      particular, she took an overly restrictive view of the second Carr factor by not
      considering motive to retaliate on the part of the DxD, whose email influenced
      the appellant’s third-level supervisor’s decision to temporarily suspend his
      computer systems access pending an investigation into his alleged use of the
      Maintenance Mechanic’s email account.            See Phillips v. Department of
      Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 21 (2010) (explaining that, when evaluating
      the second Carr factor, the Board will consider any motive to retaliate on the part
      of the agency official who ordered the action, as well as any motive to retaliat e on
      the part of other agency officials who influenced the decision). She further took
      an overly restrictive view of the second Carr factor by not addressing whether the
      appellant’s disclosure reflected on the responsible officials in their capacities as
      managers and employees, which is sufficient to establish a substantial retaliatory
      motive even when the disclosure does not directly implicate or harm them . See
      Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 33 (citing Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370-71).
      Moreover, the administrative judge appeared to find, without analysis, that the
      third Carr factor was neutral because there was no comparator evidence. RID
      at 17. However, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that it is the agency’s burden
      to produce relevant comparator evidence and that its failure to do so “may be at
      the agency’s peril,” and may imperil the agency’s overall case. See Whitmore,
                                                                                      19

      680 F.3d at 1374-75. Our reviewing court has also stated that, when the agency
      fails to introduce relevant comparator evidence, the third Carr factor cannot
      weigh in favor of the agency. Smith v. General Services Administration, 930 F.3d
      1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Siler v. Environmental Protection Agency, 908 F.3d
      1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we vacate the administrative judge’s
      clear and convincing analysis.
¶31        Although the record is complete, we find that the administrative judge is in
      the best position to conduct a new clear and convincing analysis because she
      heard the live testimony and made credibility determination s.        See Shibuya,
      119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶¶ 37‑38. Therefore, we find it appropriate to remand this
      appeal for a new clear and convincing analysis.         See id.     On remand, the
      administrative judge must determine whether the agency proved the following by
      clear and convincing evidence: (1) the agency would have temporarily relocated
      the appellant to the Walled Lake facility in the absence of his protected
      disclosure; and (2) the agency would have temporarily suspended the appellant’s
      computer systems access (resulting in his assignment to administrative duties) in
      the absence of his protected disclosure. In conducting her clear and convincing
      evidence analysis, the administrative judge must comply with the requirements
      set forth above and in the Federal Circuit’s decision in Whitmore, 680 F.3d
      at 1368-74, fully evaluate all of the pertinent evidence, and make credibility
      determinations in order to resolve any contradictory testimony.        See Shibuya,
      119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37. In addition, the administrative judge shall specifically
      determine the weight to afford to each of the three Carr factors.
                                                                                   20

                                          ORDER
¶32        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.