Court Opinion

ID: 9748312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:59:27.927388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.270165
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent. The State argues on appeal that the incident with Corla Ridout was “similar” to S.P.B.’s description of Davis’s assault on her. The State further argues that Davis’s “similar” conduct with Ridout was “independently relevant to establish that Davis sexually assaulted” S.P.B. The State therefore argues that proof of Davis’s criminal disposition to engage in this form of conduct against Ridout is proof that he later assaulted S.P.B. in the same way. We recently stated that “[t]he general rule is that evidence of other crimes by the accused, not charged in the indictment or information and not a part of the same transaction, is not admissible at the trial of the accused.” Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333, 342 (2004). Unfortunately, although we still state this rule occasionally, we have not actually followed the rule in years. Over the last few years, we have dutifully recited the language from Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” then noted that such evidence is, however, admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” We then approve admission of the evidence without any real analysis. It is obvious that the State offered the evidence to prove Davis’s character, that he is a sexual predator who preys on women. This conclusion is most obvious because the similarity that the State relies upon is Davis’s criminal disposition to assault women in a specific way. However, whether Davis had a plan or method was not at issue or even relevant where the crime charged, as well as the crime of which Davis was convicted, required an act by forcible compulsion. The jury could either believe S.P.B.’s testimony or not believe it. If the testimony was believed, motive was not open to doubt. If the jury had believed Davis, then all that happened was consensual. Clearly the jury believed S.P.B. The jury concluded that Davis assaulted S.P.B. There is no connection between the incident with Ridout and the assault on S.P.B. Rape is not a continuing offense; it is a separate crime for each occurrence. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W. 3d 542 (2003); Rains v. State, 329 Ark. 607, 953 S.W.2d 48 (1997); Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W. 2d 202 (1986). Other incidents that are totally unrelated to the charge in question are “clearly inadmissible.” Rowdean v. State, 280 Ark. 146, 655 S.W. 2d 413 (1983). The evidence of the incident with Ridout was offered to show that Davis was a bad man who acted in conformity with his character when he attacked S.P.B. The prohibition of the use of evidence of prior wrongs and crimes to show the criminal disposition of the defendant is said to have been assumed and maintained by the English courts “ever since the common law itself has been in existence.” People v. Shea, 147 N. Y. 78, 99, 41 N.E. 505 (1895). I believe that some of the confusion is a consequence of its ancient origin in the common law, making it arguably an odd appendage rather than an integral part of modern codes of evidence. One might forcefully argue that the rule is to some extent redundant of current concepts of relevance and exclusion based on the balance between prejudicial harm and probative value. However, the rule rises above codes of evidence, and along with other fundamental principles that also have their origins in ancient common law, remains important in safeguarding rights held fuiidamental in Anglo-American law since its beginnings. In Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W. 2d 804 (1954), we stated that the rule is so familiar in English and American courts that its acceptance need not be discussed at length. In Alford, we set out the purpose of the rule, stating that it rests upon the “spirit of fair play which, perhaps more than anything else, distinguishes Anglo-American law from the jurisprudence of other nations.” Id. at 333-34. We went on to state that the rule is based on the principle that “a finding of guilty should rest upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the exact offense for which he is being tried.” Id. at 334. See also Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999); Hickey v. State, 263 Ark. 809, 569 S.W.2d 64 (1978). The right to have one’s conviction rest upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requirement of due process, a right arising from the common law, and is a right which has its origins in ancient times. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Likewise, due process requires that the accused enjoy the presumption of innocence, which this court has stated “is a fundamental right in the American system antedating any constitution and an essential of due process of law.” Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 672, 535 S.W.2d 842 (1976). See also Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384, 108 S.W. 3d 592 (2003). This presumption puts at issue the truth and credibility of all of the evidence offered against an accused. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). Where the State is allowed to introduce evidence to convince the jury that the accused has a criminal disposition, and that on that basis, he or she is guilty, both the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the requirement that the accused be presumed innocent are violated and bypassed. We once accurately stated: It was appropriate for the circuit judge to be extremely cautious about the admission of such testimony, as any real doubt about the question should be resolved in favor of the accused. We have zealously guarded the rights of accused persons to have the state’s evidence strictly confined to the issues to insure that no one is convicted because he has committed offenses other than that for which he is on trial or because he is of bad character and addicted to crime. Tarkington v. State, 250 Ark. 972, 980, 469 S.W.2d 93 (1971). However, we have now digressed so far that we recently stated the idea as “any circumstance that ties a defendant to the crime or raises a possible motive for the crime is independently relevant and admissible.” Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 305, 197 S.W. 3d 468, 474 (2004) (emphasis added). In this sentence one can barely discern the deteriorated, skeletal remains of the once fundamental and familiar principle. First, it should be understood that the rule in all its long history never excluded evidence of former wrongs or crimes where the former wrongs or crimes constituted relevant evidence of an element in a charged crime, unless the prejudicial harm outweighed the probative value. However, the tired recitation of a conclusory phrase that the evidence is independently relevant as to motive or intent in the place of analysis, as well as a failure to determine whether intent or motive is even at issue makes the rule a nullity. Worse, by this approach, we not only lose the ancient protection of the rule, but also the ancient protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are compromised. In Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 243-44 (1840), this court stated that evidence of the commission of a crime or felony “wholly unconnected with that for which” an accused is on trial is inadmissible, a premise the court accepted as “unquestionable.” Id. However, the court also stated: But in cases where the scienter or the quo animo, is requisite to, and constitutes a necessary and essential part of the crime with which the prisoner is charged, and proof of such guilty knowledge, or malicious intention is indispensable to establish his guilt, in regard to the transaction in question, as in cases of forgery, murder and the like; testimony of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent, is competent legal testimony to go to the jury, notwithstanding they may in the law constitute a distinct crime. Dunn, 2 Ark. at 243-44. This court noted that in the case of murder, former “grudges and antecedent menaces may be proved to show the prisoner’s motives against the deceased.” Dunn, 2 Ark. at 244. Under Dunn, unless the other crime establishes an element of the crime charged, it is inadmissible. In Billings v. State, 52 Ark. 303, 309, 12 S.W. 574 (1889), we stated: The facts laid before the jury should consist exclusively of the transaction that forms the subject of the indictment, and matters relating thereto. To enlarge the scope of the investigation beyond this would subject the defendant to the dangers of surprise against which no foresight might prepare and no innocence defend. Under this rule it is generally improper to introduce evidence of other offenses; but if facts bear upon the offense charged, they may be proven, although they disclose some other offense. The test of admissibility is the connection of the facts offered, with the subject charged. Again, if the evidence of other wrongs or crimes constitutes evidence of the crime charged, then such evidence is admissible. In State v. DuLaney, 87 Ark. 17, 22-23, 112 S.W. 158 (1908), we stated: The principle of evidence that offenses or acts similar to the one charged may be competent for the purpose of showing knowledge, intent or design is as throughly established as the general prohibition that other crimes or offenses cannot be shown in evidence against a defendant charged with a particular crime. While the principle is usually spoken of as being an exception to the general rule, yet as a matter of fact, it is not an exception; for it is not proof of other crimes as crimes, but merely evidence of other acts, which are from their nature competent as showing knowledge, intent or design, although they may be crimes, which is admitted. In other words, the fact that evidence shows the defendant was guilty of another crime does not prevent it being admissible when otherwise it would be competent on the issue under trial. In other words, to be admissible, the evidence must be competent proof of an issue actually being tried. It must be independently relevant to prove an element of the crime being tried. In Haire v. State, 340 Ark. 11, 16, 8 S.W.3d 468 (2000), we first made the vague statement that “[t]he test for establishing motive, intent, or plan as a Rule 404(b) exception is whether the evidence of the other act has independent relevance.” See also Morgan v. State, 359 Ark. 168, 195 S.W. 3d 889 (2004); Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W. 3d 485 (2003); McCoy v. State, 354 Ark. 322, 123 S.W.3d 901 (2003); Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003); Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W. 3d 351 (2000). As already noted, the rule has now been reduced to “any circumstance that ties a defendant to the crime or raises a possible motive for the crime is independently relevant and admissible.” Jackson, supra (emphasis added). This court in Alford, supra, warned against broad statements such as the court now embraces. At the time, the error this court was concerned about was citing the rule as only recency and similarity. We stated further that if such a test were applied, “the result would be to deprive the accused of much of the protection that the rule is intended to provide.” Alford, 223 Ark. at 335. The problem is not just the words of the test now stated by the court in recent cases, although they are broad and barely sufficient. The problem is in failing to analyze the question of independent relevance. We stated in Alford that “[t]he issue of intent is theoretically present in every criminal case, and for that reason it is here that we are most apt to overlook the basic requirement of independent relevancy.” Alford, 223 Ark. at 336 (emphasis in the original). We also stated that “[w]hat has happened is that the emphasis has shifted from evidence relevant to prove intent to evidence offered for the purpose of proving intent, by showing that the defendant is a bad man.” Id. (emphasis in the original). We first used the term independent relevance in Alford, supra, stating: We have repeatedly rejected unfounded appeals to the protection of the basic rule of exclusion. If other conduct on the part of the accused is independently relevant to the main issue — relevant in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal — then evidence of that conduct may be admissible, with a proper cautionary instruction by the court. Alford, 223 Ark. at 334. To be independently relevant the evidence must be proof of the “main issue.” Morgan v. State, 308 Ark. 627, 629, 826 S.W.2d 271 (1992). This means that the evidence of the prior conduct is relevant to proof required in the case in which it is presented even though it may also involve proof of another offense. Price v. State, 268 Ark. 535, 538, 597 S.W.2d 598 (1980). In Dunn, supra, this court stated that while evidence of prior incidences of grudges or threats against a murder victim may be admissible as proving intent in the trial for the murder of that victim, evidence of a distinct murder or other felony committed against a different person at a different time which is wholly unrelated to the murder in the case at trial is not admissible. In Alford, the prosecution offered testimony of a woman who suffered an attempted rape by Alford under very similar circumstances within two to three weeks of raping the victim. In the crime for which Alford was on trial, he was accused of threatening the victim with a knife, dragging her from the building, and raping her. With respect to the other victim, Alford was accused of using a gun instead of a knife and taking the second victim to a another place where he attempted to rape her. This court held that the evidence of this other victim was improperly admitted. This court stated: In the case at bar it seems to us idle to contend that there was any real question about Alford’s intent, concerning which the jury needed further enlightenment . . . The jury’s problem was to determine whether the acts described by the prosecutrix took place; if so, their motivation is not open to doubt. The earlier attack upon Mrs. Austin could have no conceivable pertinence except to brand Alford as a criminal, which is just what the State is not allowed to do ... Nor could this deadly prejudice be removed by the instruction confining Mrs. Austin’s testimony to the issue of intent. Alford, 223 Ark. at 338-39. Alford would have been charged under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3401 (1947), which defined rape as carnal knowledge by force without consent. S.P.B. testified that upon entering Davis’s office he “attacked” her “right when we walked in.” She said that “it was not even a split second, just enough for me to get right inside the door.” She stated that Davis physically grabbed her three times before he caught her and on the fourth attempt, held her, touching her on her “butt and my breast and over my stomach . . . .” She further testified that over the course of this, Davis made a number of extremely vile proposals of sexual conduct including the involvement of a third person. She also testified that Davis struggled with her, tried to put her hands behind her back, and that he tried to lay her over a table. Ridout testified of an incident when she was alone with Davis in a car, and that Davis “reached his arm past me, right across here, right across my frame. Right across my chest, which would be my breast.” She testified that Davis did not touch her, but that she believed that he was about to touch her. This conduct does not involve physical assaults as S.P.B. alleged in her incident. The element of force is missing. On that basis, its similarity to the charged crime, as well as the lesser-included offense, is missing. The similarity that the State alleged was that Davis is a sexual predator and that his actions earlier with Ridout show that he acted in conformity with this character in the attack on S.P.B. The evidence of the incident with Ridout was inadmissible in this case. The sad thing is that the State had ample evidence on which to try Davis. The jury clearly believed S.P.B. However, this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.