Court Opinion

ID: 9882656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:06.556246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:40.205387
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn., 2023-Ohio-3608.]

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                HARRISON COUNTY

                       FAITH RANCH AND FARMS FUND, INC.,

                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                    v.

                  PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

                                    Defendants-Appellants.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                              Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002

                                   Civil Appeals from the
                       Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, Ohio
                                  Case No. CVH 2021-0062

                                        BEFORE:
                Mark A. Hanni, Carol Ann Robb, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.

                                             JUDGMENT:
                                               Affirmed.

Atty. Michael G. Simon and Atty. Carl A. Frankovitch, Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon,
Decapio & Pearl, LLP, 337 Penco Road, Weirton, West Viriginia, 26062 for Plaintiff-
Appellee Faith Ranch and Farms Fund, Inc. and
Atty. Charles L. Kidder and Atty. Steven R. R. Anderson, Kidder Law Firm, LLC, 5131
Post Road, Suite 101, Dublin, Ohio 43017, for Defendants-Appellants Sidney Turner,
Michele M. Lazzaro, Esq., Trustee, and Marilyn Stolz and
Atty. Edward M. Janis, Edward M. Janis Co., LPA, 24500 Center Ridge Road, Suite 170,
Westlake, Ohio 44145 for Defendants-Appellants James M. Roller and Laurie Edna
Evanko.
                                                                                      –2–

                                Dated: October 3, 2023

HANNI, J.

       {¶1}   Defendants-Appellants, Sidney Turner, Michele M. Lazzaro, Esq., Trustee
of the Sidney Turner Trust created by the Last Will and Testament of Virginia Fay Mayer,
and Marilyn Stolz, individually and as Successor Trustee of the Virginia Fay Mayer Trust,
as Modified January 21, 2011, along with Defendants-Appellants, James M. Roller and
Laurie Edna Evanko, individually, and as Successor Trustee of The Frederick Roller
Revocable Trust dated October 18, 2012, appeal from a Harrison County Common Pleas
Court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, Faith Ranch
and Farms Fund, Inc., and determining Appellee is the owner of oil and gas rights
underlying certain property in German and Rumley Townships.
       {¶2}   This case involves the disputed ownership of oil and gas rights underlying
11 parcels of land (the Subject Parcels) owned by Appellee. At issue is whether the oil
and gas was excepted and reserved from the conveyance of the Subject Parcels by a
deed dated November 9, 1953, from C.C. Fay and Agnes B. Fay to Judson Rosebush
(the 1953 Deed). Appellee is the successor-in-interest to Rosebush. Appellants are the
heirs of the Fays.
       {¶3}   The 1953 Deed contains the following reservation (the Reservation):

       EXCEPTING AND RESERVING to the Grantor from the lands herein
       conveyed all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if any under vein
       exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove
       such coal or other minerals of any vein, using any convenient underground
       mining methods, and to transport coal and minerals from other premises
       through and under the surface of said lands; and particularly reserving the
       seam of coal, if any, now being mined at the Nelm’s mine of the Y.&O. Coal
       Company, near Unionvale, Ohio, with all mining rights necessary or
       convenient for the mining and removal thereof, and the right to transport
       other coal of the same vein under said lands.

(Emphasis added).

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
                                                                                     –3–

      {¶4}   In May 2021, Appellant Marilyn D. Stolz, one of the successors to the Fay
estate, filed a claim to preserve a mineral interest. Appellee then sought a declaration
that it is the owner of the oil and gas underlying the Subject Parcels and sought to quiet
title in its name. Subsequently, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the 1953
Deed included oil and gas in the Reservation. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion
to dismiss finding the language of the Reservation was not clear and unambiguous that
the Reservation included oil and gas.
      {¶5}   The parties next filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial
court found that the Reservation clearly and unambiguously reserved coal and other
minerals obtained by mining. The court found no language that would broaden the
Reservation to include oil and gas.     It noted that the Reservation only used terms
conducive to underground mining of coal and minerals. And it pointed to the absence of
any reference to surface reservation or drilling. Based on its findings, the trial court
granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, overruled Appellants’ motion for
summary judgment, and quieted title to the oil and gas underlying the Subject Parcels in
Appellee.
      {¶6}   Appellants Stolz, Turner, and Lazzaro filed a timely notice of appeal on
January 12, 2023. Appellants Roller and Evanko filed a timely notice of appeal on
January 19, 2023. This Court consolidated the two appeals.
      {¶7}   Appellants now raise two assignments of error. Because the assignments
of error share a common basis in law and fact, we will address them together.
      {¶8}   Appellants’ first assignment of error states:

      THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S
      MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

      {¶9}   Appellants’ second assignment of error states:

      THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS-
      APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

      {¶10} Appellants argue the trial court correctly found that the Reservation
language was unambiguous but incorrectly found that the term “other minerals” did not

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
                                                                                        –4–

include oil and gas. They argue the words “other minerals” as used in the Reservation is
presumed by case law to include oil and gas. Under this presumption, Appellants argue,
the case at hand must be evaluated to determine if the parties intended to include those
interests.
       {¶11} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo. Comer v.
Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Thus, we shall apply
the same test as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. A
court may grant summary judgment only when (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists;
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) the evidence can
only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving party. Mercer v. Halmbacher,
9th Dist. Summit No. 27799, 2015-Ohio-4167, ¶ 8; Civ.R. 56(C).
       {¶12} The initial burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements
of the case with evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d
280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). A “material fact” depends on the substantive law of the
claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662
N.E.2d 1088 (8th Dist.1995), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-
248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E). “Trial courts should award summary
judgment with caution, being careful to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of
the nonmoving party.” Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346,
617 N.E.2d 1129 (1993).
       {¶13} In examining whether the phrase “other minerals” in a deed reservation
includes oil and gas, this Court has recently stated:

       It is clear from this line of cases that we are now to begin our analysis with
       a presumption that the phrase “other minerals” includes oil and gas
       interests. With that in mind, it must then be determined if the deed
       demonstrates whether the parties intended to include oil and gas interests.
       If the deed is ambiguous, then the parties are permitted to introduce
       extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the parties’ intent.

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
                                                                                       –5–

O'Bradovich v. Hess Ohio Developments, LLC, 7th Dist. No. 20 JE 0007, 2021-Ohio-
1287, ¶ 26.
        {¶14} Thus, based on our prior case law, we begin our analysis here with the
presumption that “other minerals” includes oil and gas.
        {¶15} Next, we must examine the language of the 1953 Deed to determine if it
demonstrates the parties’ intent to either include or exclude oil and gas interests. In so
doing, O’Bradovich instructs us to “look to whether the easement language includes
language that may be relevant to the extraction of oil and gas.” Id. at ¶ 27.
        {¶16} The Reservation contained language suggesting that “other minerals” does
not include oil and gas. It refers to the “right to mine” and using “mining methods” as the
means of removing the coal and other minerals. It also refers to “vein”, as is used in
reference to coal as opposed to oil and gas. Significantly, it does not refer to a right to
“drill”, as would be used to remove oil and gas. In O’Bradovich, in finding that “other
minerals” included oil and gas, this Court found significant that the word “drilling” was
used in the reservation easement demonstrating an intent to include oil and gas. Id. at ¶
29. We noted that “this language is also consistent with Detlor [v. Holland, 57 Ohio St.
492, 49 N.E. 690 (1898)], which specifically remarked on the absence of the word
‘drilling.’” Id.
        {¶17} In Detlor, 57 Ohio St. at 504, the Ohio Supreme Court found that where
there was nothing to show that it was the parties’ intention that oil should be included in
the word “minerals,” and the easements granted in connection with the mining right were
not applicable to producing oil, then the term “minerals” did not include oil. In that case,
the Court stated that if oil was intended to be included in the conveyance, “apt words
would have been used to express such intention.” Id. The Court was referring to words
such as “derricks, pipe lines, tanks, the use of water for drilling, or the removal of
machinery used in drilling or operating oil or gas wells.” Id. at 503. In discussing Detlor,
this Court has noted that: “On the one hand, the word ‘mine’ was used by the recent
[Chesapeake Exp., LLC v.] Buell [, 144 Ohio St.3d 490, 2015-Ohio-4551, 45 N.E.3d 185,]
case in connection with an oil and gas case. On the other hand, this would not affect the
intent of the parties to the deed at the time the deed was drafted.” (emphasis sic); Sheba
v. Kautz, 7th Dist. No. 15 BE 0008, 2017-Ohio-7699, 97 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 33.

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
                                                                                       –6–

       {¶18} Given the above, we conclude the parties’ intent was not clear from the
language of the Reservation. “The purpose of contract construction is to discover and
effectuate the intent of the parties.” Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311,
313, 667 N.E.2d 949 (1996). The Reservation language is open to interpretation. “Terms
in a contract are ambiguous if their meanings cannot be determined from reading the
entire contract, or if they are reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations.”   Tera,
LLC v. Rice Drilling D., LLC, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 21 BE 47, 2023-Ohio-273, ¶ 39.
       {¶19} Because the Reservation language is ambiguous, we may look beyond the
four corners of the document and consider parole evidence in order to determine the
parties’ intent. Ramunno v. Murphy, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 0203, 2017-Ohio-
998, ¶ 45.
       {¶20} Here, Appellee provided significant evidence of C.C. Fay’s intent when
drafting the Reservation. C.C. Fay had specifically included the reservation of oil and gas
in multiple deeds within ten years prior to the drafting of the Deed and Reservation, in
several nearby unrelated parcels. (Appellee’s Ex. A-30, 43, and 56.).
       {¶21} Particularly, in a 1940 deed, C.C. Fay conveyed a 61.37-acre tract of land
to Harold Floyd Wilson. In the reservation contained within this deed, Fay stated:

       Reserving from the above described tracts of land all minerals, coal, oil and
       gas thereunder, with all rights of entry thereon or thereunder, the right to
       mine and remove the same, and to move other coal under said premises,
       be the same more or less, but subject to all legal highways.

(Emphasis added; Complaint Ex. A-30).
       {¶22} And in 1944, C.C. Fay conveyed a 7.68-tract of land to John H. Zimmerman,
which contained the following reservation:

       Excepting and reserving coal and mineral rights underlying said premises,
       with right to remove same, but not through surface area. Reserving, also,
       the oil and gas rights, for drilling and removing.

(Emphasis added; Complaint Ex. A-43).

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
                                                                                       –7–

       {¶23} Yet again in 1944, C.C. Fay conveyed a 27.79-acre parcel to Clearfield
Bituminous Coal Corporation, which contained this reservation:

       Excepting and reserving all the minerals, coal and oil and gas that may
       underlie the aforesaid premises, if any, with all rights necessary and
       convenient for the mining and removal thereof through or under the surface
       herein conveyed.

(Emphasis added; Complaint Ex. A-56).
       {¶24} Based on the language C.C. Fay chose to use in his previous reservations,
it is reasonable to conclude that C.C. Fay possessed the knowledge to decisively include
or not include the specific words “oil and gas” in drafting the reservations in the deeds he
conveyed.
       {¶25} The trial court here found that the Reservation language unambiguously did
not include oil and gas and, therefore, Appellee was entitled to summary judgment. While
we disagree with the trial court’s finding, we nonetheless agree with its decision granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellee. “[A] reviewing court may affirm the trial court's
judgment for reasons that are different from those used by the trial court.” DeLost v. Ohio
Edison, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 162, 2012-Ohio-4561, ¶ 15.
       {¶26} Based on the above, we conclude summary judgment in favor of Appellee
was proper. Accordingly, Appellants’ assignments of error are without merit and are
overruled.
       {¶27} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Robb, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Case Nos. 23 HA 0001, 23 HA 0002
[Cite as Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn., 2023-Ohio-3608.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Harrison County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellants.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                      NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.