Court Opinion

ID: 9700591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:36:41.082621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.971119
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(on motion for reconsideration) (dissenting). On August 27, 1992, upon the insurance companies' motion for reconsideration, this court reversed its published decision of May 20, 1992, without explanation and without giving the parties notice or opportunity for further written or oral argument on the merits of the case. School District v. Wausau Ins. Co., 170 Wis. 2d 347, 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992). I dissented from the granting of reconsideration on August 27, 1992, on procedural and substantive grounds. 170 Wis. 2d at 379 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting).
I would grant the school district's motion for reconsideration of the August 27, 1992, decision. The court should take this opportunity to correct a breach that creates the impression of arbitrary action.
The school districts argue that the court's granting of the insurance companies' motion for reconsideration and reversal of its decision violated the court's internal operating procedures. I agree.
The Internal Operating Procedures of this court provide that " [a] change of decision on reconsideration will ensue only when the court has overlooked controlling legal precedent or important policy considerations or has overlooked or misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in the record,"1 The court's *731August 27, 1992, opinion changing the decision on reconsideration gives no explanation for the change of result; it makes no reference to the court's having overlooked or misconstrued legal precedent, policy considerations, or facts. Thus the opinion itself evidences a violation of the court's internal operating procedures.2
The Internal Operating Procedures, which were adopted on May 24, 1984, are intended to describe the manner in which the court currently operates in order to advise "counsel practicing in the Supreme Court and for information to the public...." Introduction to the Internal Operating Procedures.3 The procedure for reconsideration guides lawyers in preparing motions for reconsideration and their responses to such motions. More importantly, the procedure for reconsideration demonstrates the court's intention to avoid arbitrary action and to give litigants a fair process and finality. The court's violation of its own procedures does a disservice to the lawyers and litigants who relied on them in this case and opens the door to speculation that the court has acted in an arbitrary manner. Speculation of this type can undermine the public's confidence in the courts. I *732believe the Sheboygan Press expressed the sentiments of the people of Wisconsin when it stated, "[c]all us old-fashioned, but we like having our court system in compliance with the law."4
The school districts further assert that this court's reversal of a published decision without explanation and without an opportunity for the losing party to be heard on the merits "damages confidence in our judicial system." They contend that "the reversal violates the concept of the rule of law and the principles of notice and opportunity for a hearing."
I take seriously the school districts' arguments about institutional integrity. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. —, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 707 (1992), United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor emphasized the importance of institutional legitimacy and the public's perception that the judiciary is principled and independent as follows:
As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.... Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that trust and confidence in the legal system are directly related to *733litigants' perceptions of fairness and that litigants equate fairness with opportunities to present their stories to decision-makers who follow established neutral procedures.5 Thus the court's procedure in this case risks the appearance of arbitrariness and tends to undermine trust in the legal system.
For the reasons set forth, I would grant the school districts' motion for reconsideration, order new briefs, and set the case for oral argument. A fresh look at the merits of this case is in order.

 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules and Internal Operating Procedures, Procedure II J, at p. 341 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 1/1/92).

 An internal operating procedure may be suspended or modified by majority vote of a quorum of the court. Introduction to the Internal Operating Procedures, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules and Internal Operating Procedures, at p. 323 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 1/1/92). Nothing in the opinion indicates that the internal operating procedure was suspended or modified.
Justices Ceci, Day and Steinmetz in their concurring opinion assert that there was no violation of the court's internal operating procedures. I conclude that the court's violation of the internal operating procedures stems not only from a flaw in procedure but also from its change of decision when the substantive bases for a change as set forth in Procedure II J do not exist.

 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules and Internal Operating Procedures at p. 323 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 1/1/92).

Editorial, 12/8/92.

 See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990); E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. and Soc'y Rev. 953 (1990); James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice and Political Tolerance, 23 L. and Soc'y Rev. 469 (1989).