Court Opinion

ID: 9596821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:53:15.815957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:52.692286
License: Public Domain

A. Lee Chandler, Acting Associate Justice:
I respectfully dissent.
The grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action cannot be upheld if facts alleged in the complaint and inferences reasonably deductible therefrom, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case. Brown v. Leverette, 291 S.C. 364, 353 S.E. (2d) 697 (1987).
Here, Newton’s complaint alleged that the Commission’s crossing signal had been malfunctioning continuously for several days, and that the Commission knew or should have known of the malfunction. The complaint also alleged that Ross knew the crossing signal had been malfunctioning for some time.
In my opinion, an inference reasonably deducible from these allegations is that, because the signal had been continuously malfunctioning for several days, Ross ignored the signal, presumed Newton would do the same, and approached the signal behind Newton in a less cautious manner than he would have if the signal had been operating properly or had been malfunctioning for only a short period of time.
Assuming this inference is proven, the accident which occurred between Ross and Newton was, in my opinion, a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Commission’s alleged negligence in failing to repair the crossing signal. The fact that Ross may have been negligent in driving less cautiously when approaching the signal does not relieve the Commission of liability if Ross’s negligence was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Commission’s alleged negligence. See Hughes v. Children’s Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 237 S.E. (2d) 753 (1977) (in order to establish actionable negligence, the *434plaintiff is required only to prove that the defendant’s negligence was at least one of the proximate causes of his injury); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 110 (1966) (two or more separate and distinct acts of negligence operating concurrently may both constitute proximate causes of an injury).
Based on the facts alleged in Newton’s complaint and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, I believe this Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Newton’s injury was not a foreseeable consequence of the Commission’s alleged negligence. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court erred in granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss. Brown v. Leverette, supra.1
Waller, J., concurs.

 This is not to say Newton would have necessarily prevailed at trial. As the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, Newton would still have had the burden of proof on the issue of proximate causation.