Court Opinion

ID: 9897775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:57.617372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:44.450174
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Fulton
UNPUBLISHED

              KEVIN BARTLEY KERNS
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1453-22-4                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                               SEPTEMBER 26, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FREDERICK COUNTY
                                            William W. Eldridge, IV, Judge

                              (Jason E. Ransom; Ransom/Silvester, on brief), for appellant.
                              Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Michael L. Eaton, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury convicted Kevin Bartley Kerns (“appellant”) of possessing cocaine.1 On appeal,

              appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the cocaine found in

              his vehicle. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that

              oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     On appeal, we review the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,

              the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

              (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       Following his guilty pleas, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of driving
              on a suspended operator’s license, third offense within ten years, and felony failure to appear.
              Appellant did not appeal those convictions.
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

        In the afternoon on October 3, 2019, Frederick County Sheriff’s Deputy Eric White

conducted a traffic stop on a pickup truck. After obtaining consent to search, Deputy White

removed appellant—the truck’s owner, driver, and sole occupant—from the truck and searched

him, but did not find any contraband. Appellant also consented to a search of his truck. The

truck was “messy” and contained tools and other property in the passenger area behind the

driver’s seat.

        Deputy White found a “socket” and a “push rod” “on top of the stuff that was behind” the

driver’s seat. At trial, he opined that the socket and push rod had been fashioned into a “smoking

device” resembling those commonly used to consume “crack cocaine.” Underneath the driver’s

seat was a spoon that contained “white residue” and had “burn marks,” which Deputy White

opined indicated “[p]ossible drug use.” Subsequent forensic testing established that the residue

on the spoon found under the driver’s seat contained cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.

        When Deputy White asked whether appellant “forg[o]t” to remove the spoon and

smoking device from his vehicle, appellant said that he had been released from prison in August

and “[i]t’s been in there” since “before [he] got locked up.” He then signed a document

admitting that he had used crack cocaine “within” seven days before the traffic stop. Appellant

said that he had been traveling to “pick up a friend” before going “to a job site.”

        At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, appellant moved to strike, arguing

that he did not possess the cocaine residue on the spoon found in his vehicle. He contended that

his statements to Deputy White were ambiguous and the other evidence established only his

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proximity to the contraband, which is insufficient to prove possession. The trial court denied the

motion.

       Alice Whirley, appellant’s friend, testified that appellant owned a “concrete” business and

had several employees who used appellant’s truck regularly to travel to work sites, including at least

one time a few months before the traffic stop. Darren Stotler, appellant’s business associate,

testified that around 7:30 a.m. on October 3, 2019, he saw appellant drive his truck to a work site,

drop off two employees, and drive away.

       At the conclusion of the evidence, appellant renewed his motion to strike on the same

grounds. Additionally, he argued that the evidence failed to exclude his reasonable hypothesis of

innocence that his employees had left the spoon in his truck without his knowledge. The trial court

denied the motion. The jury then convicted him of possessing cocaine. Appellant appeals.

                                             ANALYSIS

      “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

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the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

        Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly and

intentionally possessed the cocaine residue on the spoon found in his vehicle. He argues that the

evidence established only his “occupancy of his truck” and “proximity to the spoon,” which is

insufficient to prove possession. Additionally, he asserts that the evidence was “unclear” whether

he was referring to the spoon when he told Deputy White that he knew that “it” had been in his

truck since his last arrest. We disagree.

        “A conviction for the unlawful possession of [contraband] can be supported exclusively

by evidence of constructive possession,” whether sole or joint. Smallwood v. Commonwealth,

278 Va. 625, 630 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148 (2008)).

Constructive possession may be established by “evidence of acts, statements, or conduct by the

defendant or other facts and circumstances proving that the defendant was aware of the presence

and character of the [contraband] and that the [contraband] was subject to his dominion and

control.” Id. (quoting Bolden, 275 Va. at 148). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is

entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the circumstantial evidence is

sufficiently convincing.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (alteration in

original) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). “While no single piece

of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances

. . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Id. at 512-13 (quoting Muhammad

v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)).

        Consistent with those principles, we have recognized that “[a] person’s ownership or

occupancy of premises on which” contraband is found and “proximity to the item,” while

insufficient alone to prove possession, are “probative factors to be considered in determining

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whether the totality of the circumstances supports a finding of possession.” Watts v.

Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 217, 233 (2010). Moreover, a fact finder may infer a defendant’s

knowledge of the nature and character of a controlled substance from his confessed prior use of

that drug. Brown v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 489, 492 (1988). Similarly, the presence of a

“smoking device” or other paraphernalia “commonly used” to consume a specific controlled

substance may be probative of that drug’s possession. Wymer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.

294, 300-01 (1991).

       The record supports the trial court’s finding that appellant knowingly and intentionally

possessed the cocaine residue on the spoon found inside his truck. To begin, appellant owned

the truck, was the driver and sole occupant, and sat near the spoon containing the contraband and

the “smoking device” behind his seat. See Watts, 57 Va. App. at 233. The spoon had “burn

marks,” which Deputy White opined were consistent with “[p]ossible drug use,” and the

smoking device resembled those typically used to consume crack cocaine. See Wymer, 12

Va. App. at 301 (holding evidence proved defendant knew of the “presence of cocaine” where

police found a “smoking device” and other paraphernalia typically used to consume that drug).

Indeed, when Deputy White confronted him with the spoon and smoking device, appellant

admitted that he knew “[i]t’s been in there” for at least a month and that he had recently

consumed crack cocaine. See Prince v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 610, 613 (1985) (“An

admission deliberately made, precisely identified and clearly proved affords evidence of a most

satisfactory nature and may furnish the strongest and most convincing evidence of truth.”

(quoting Tyree v. Lariew, 208 Va. 382, 385 (1967)).

       Although appellant did not specify whether he was referring to the spoon when he

admitted that he knew “it” was in his truck, this Court must presume that the fact finder

“resolved all factual ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the prevailing

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party and gave that party the benefit of all reasonably debatable inferences from the evidence.”

Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 808 (2019). Accordingly, any ambiguity in appellant’s

statement was properly submitted to the jury, which reasonably could have determined that

appellant admitted to knowing that the spoon containing the contraband was in his truck.

       Appellant further contends that the evidence failed to exclude his reasonable hypothesis

of innocence that his employees left the spoon in his truck without his knowledge. Citing

Whirley and Stotler’s testimony establishing that appellant’s employees sometimes borrowed his

truck and that appellant dropped off two employees the morning before the traffic stop, appellant

asserts that “the jury could not have reasonably excluded [his] theory . . . that others had access

to his truck and could have left the spoon behind.”

       “Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact.” Wood

v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 286, 306 (2010) (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43

Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)). Accordingly, a fact finder’s rejection of a hypothesis of innocence

“is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong,” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 13

(1997), even if there is “some evidence to support” the hypothesis of innocence, Commonwealth

v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003). On appeal, the issue is whether a reasonable fact finder

could have rejected appellant’s hypothesis and found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

       As previously explained, the evidence established that appellant admitted that he knew

that the spoon containing the cocaine had been underneath the driver’s seat of his truck for at

least a month. That admission undermines his alternative theory that an employee recently

placed the spoon in his truck without his knowledge. Accordingly, the jury reasonably rejected

that hypothesis, and we will not disturb its verdict.

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                                  CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                               Affirmed.

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