Court Opinion

ID: 9572395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:21.136744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:46.490691
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
With issue 1, I outright concur. There being a reversal of this conviction on issue 1, my concern for the treatment of issues 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 would be mooted, were it not for the fact that those issues are all treated, in full, to apparently give guidance to the Bench and Bar upon retrial.
On issue 2, I disagree that the hearsay testimony of Candice Cummings did not violate Moriarty’s confrontation clause rights. Essentially, I disagree because Candice Cummings testified concerning what her child had told her, about something two other children said, regarding what S.M. had said Moriarty was doing to S.M. This is too much hearsay for me to swallow! As lawyers and judges, we cannot tolerate this kind of evidence. Particularly disturbing is that Candice Cummings never, at any time, interviewed S.M. This testimony violated Moriarty’s rights as set forth in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). Such type of hearsay upon hearsay evidence also violates our holdings in State v. Buller, 484 N.W.2d 883 (S.D.1992); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242 (S.D.1992); and Matter of R.S.S., 474 N.W.2d 743 (S.D.1991).
On issue 3, the testimony of Candice Cummings invaded the province of the jury and also Moriarty’s rights under the confrontation clause. Cummings was permitted to testify and explain that which she perceived was contained in certain pictures drawn by S.M. During this phase of the testimony, Candice Cummings testified that based upon her perception of these pictures, she had to report this scenario to Protective Services. This testimony might possibly have survived had not the prosecutor made an opening statement which assumed facts which should not be placed in evidence. These remarks included: “And she [Candice Cummings] works primarily in her field as a social worker with victims of sexual crimes, sexual abuse victims both adult and children. And she knew what the pictures meant.” (Emphasis added). The purpose of the opening argument advo*361cacy, joined with the picture testimony, was calculated to bolster credibility of S.M.’s statements to three tiny girls. Remember, this germane fact: Candice Cummings never interviewed S.M. Permitting this hearsay upon hearsay evidence was an abuse of discretion. State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 486 (S.D.1986).
I also disagree on the treatment of issue 4 concerning the testimony of Dr. Willman. In all fairness to the trial judge, his ruling was specific in that testimony could be elicited as to whether the child had sexual abuse characteristics but Dr. Willman could not say by whom the characteristics were perpetrated. Notwithstanding, Dr. Willman testified: “Yes, she said her stepfather.” Therefore, the witness violated the trial judge’s order. It is true that, initially, the prosecutor attempted to abide by the trial judge’s order. However, the prosecutor plunged onward asking several questions to try to get the witness to identify Moriarty as the perpetrator. Finally, the prosecutor asked Dr. Willman: “Did [S.M.] describe to you any instance of any type of sexual abuse with her [stepjfa-ther?” Thereupon, Dr. Willman identified Moriarty. The prosecutor knew better. He wanted to win the case. And he elevated winning over playing by fair rules. This Court has taken the position oft-over that a trial judge’s orders concerning the conduct of a trial must be obeyed. State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793 (S.D.1981). Direct violation of a trial court’s order is “contemptible and inexcusable.” Id. This prosecutorial conduct was misconduct to such extent that there exists prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction and a new trial. A plain error is one which must be both “obvious” and “substantive” to come within its ambit. People In Interest of R.R., 447 N.W.2d 922, 927 (S.D.1989) (citing State v. Dornbusch, 384 N.W.2d 682 (S.D.1986)). The plain error rule, SDCL 23A-44-15 should be applied.
The prosecutor’s closing argument was ethically rank. It was so bad that the jury sent a note, after deliberation, as follows: “Could the mother have been present when [S.M.] was on the stand?” As the majority has detailed, it was the prosecutor who kept the mother and the grandparents out of the courtroom. This was all a ploy to engage in improper methods, calculated to produce an unlawful conviction. We cannot tolerate such type of conduct. State v. Blaine, 427 N.W.2d 113 (S.D.1988). I would invoke the plain error rule. SDCL 23A-44-15; State v. Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111 (S.D.1981). I would suggest that defense counsel in this state sharpen up their legal practice by reading State v. Kidd, 286 N.W.2d 120, 123 (S.D.1979) (Henderson, J., concurring specially) as well as State v. Handy, 450 N.W.2d 434 (S.D.1990). In other words, trial counsel make a proper record and not hope that the plain error rule will be invoked. Hope might not succeed at the appellate level but a good record will, providing the error is “obvious” and “substantial.”