Court Opinion

ID: 9666995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:32:22.629128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.983820
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
In appellant’s motion for rehearing he raises for the first time a contention that the charge was fundamentally defective because it did not require the jury to find that appellant took or attempted to take the property without the owner’s effective consent.
Appellant cites Evans v. State, 606 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) and Rushing v. State, 621 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) in support of his proposition. Rushing, in turn, cites Young v. State, 621 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Although the charge in the instant case is in some respects similar to the charges in Evans and Young, both of those cases can be distinguished on one important point. In Evans and Young re-*498versáis were required because, while both charges properly defined “theft” and “in the course of committing theft,” neither charge required the jury to find that the robbery occurred while in the course of committing theft. In the case at bar, however, the charge properly defined “theft” and “in the course of committing theft,” and then required the jury to find that the robbery occurred while in the course of committing theft. The jury was thus instructed that the elements of the offense included an appropriation of property without the owner’s effective consent.
The motion for rehearing is denied.