Court Opinion

ID: 9931401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 22:04:13.782013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:55.237393
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 230521-U
                                         No. 2-23-0521
                                  Order filed February 8, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Lake County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 23-CF-1050
                                       )
DERRICK WELLS,                         ) Honorable
                                       ) Victoria Rossetti,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

      JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1    Held: (1) The failure to hold an immediate hearing on the State’s petition to detain did
            not require reversal of detention order where defendant filed a motion for pretrial
            release and the proceedings on defendant’s motion would have been meaningfully
            the same regardless of whether the State had filed its petition; (2) the trial court’s
            finding that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed
            the charged offense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the
            trial court’s finding that the State proved that defendant was a threat to any
            individual or the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence;
            but (4) the trial court’s failure to include oral or written findings indicating whether
            any condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the
            threat posed by defendant required remand.
2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

¶2     Defendant, Derrick Wells, appeals the November 20, 2023, order of the circuit court of

Lake County denying pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of

1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act

(Act). See Pub. Acts. 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023);

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September

18, 2023).1 Defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that (1) the proof

is evident or the presumption great that he committed the charged offenses, (2) he was a threat to

any individual or the community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate

the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. Defendant also

argues that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s petition to detain “weighs in

favor of reversal.” For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the trial court’s detention order and

remand with directions.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On May 29, 2023, defendant was arrested for and charged by complaint with various

offenses, including first degree murder. Defendant’s bond was set at $5 million (10% to apply).

Defendant was unable to post bond, so he remained incarcerated. On June 28, 2023, a Lake County

grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with three counts of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2022)).

       1
           The Act has also been referred to as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-

Today (SAFE-T) Act. However, neither the titles “Pretrial Fairness Act” nor “SAFE-T Act” is

official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or the public acts. Rowe, 2023 IL

129248, ¶ 4 n.1.

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

¶5     A pretrial services “Public Safety Assessment Report” (Report) was completed on May 31,

2023. The Report indicated that defendant was 32 years of age and scored a three on the “failure

to appear” scale and a three on the “new criminal activity” scale. 2 The Report also reflected that

defendant had a prior failure to appear, although it was older than two years. The Report noted that

defendant had prior misdemeanor and felony convictions, which included convictions of criminal

trespass to land (2013), possession of cannabis (2013), and aggravated battery of a peace officer

(2022). The Report further indicated that, on February 15, 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to the

charge of aggravated battery of a peace officer and was sentenced in Cook County to 24 months’

probation, which probation was being monitored by Lake County.

¶6     On September 15, 2023, the State filed a “Verified Petition to Detain” (Petition) pursuant

to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State requested the court

to order the detention of defendant pending trial. In the Petition, the State noted the offenses for

which defendant was arrested and asserted that “[i]n light of the specific facts of this case and/or

*** [d]efendant’s criminal history, this offense qualifies as one for which a Court can order

detention awaiting trial.” The State further asserted that “[t]he proof is evident, or the presumption

great, that *** [d]efendant committed the [described] offense.” In paragraph three of the Petition,

the State alleged as follows:

       “[T]he Defendant’s pre-trial release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of a

       person, persons or the community for the following specific reason: Defendant is charged

       with [f]irst [d]egree [m]urder following an incident that occurred on May 29, 2023 in

       2
           The Report does not indicate the scoring range of either the “failure to appear” or “new

criminal activity” scales.

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

       Waukegan, Lake County, Illinois. Defendant *** had been in the parking lot of the

       Bowlero at a bar-b-que party when a fight broke out. Defendant *** provided a loaded

       firearm to [c]o-[d]efendant [Josiah] Mars who then shot the victim twice in the chest area.

       The victim ultimately succumbed to the gunshot wounds, dying at a local area hospital.

       These actions provide a threat to the public and community as the offense occurred in a

       public parking lot with numerous individuals present, involved a firearm, and resulted in

       the death of another.”

The State further alleged that, absent pretrial detention, there is a high likelihood of willful flight

to avoid prosecution as set forth in section 110-6.1(a)(8) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8)

(West 2022)) because “[d]efendant’s forcible felony charge resulted in the death of another and

carry [sic] the possibility of natural life in prison, providing an incentive of willful flight to avoid

prosecution.” Finally, the State asserted that there is “no set of conditions which mitigate or

alleviate the risk(s) set forth in paragraph 3” because “[a]s effective as pre-trial monitoring may

be in many cases, there is not [sic] technology that can confine *** [d]efendant to his home with

certainty nor can Pre-Trial Bond Services Division engage in effective 24-hour surveillance of ***

[d]efendant’s residence.” No action was taken on the State’s Petition, and defendant, still not

having posted bond, remained incarcerated.

¶7     Meanwhile, on October 30, 2023, defendant filed a “Motion for Pretrial Release” (Motion).

In the Motion, defendant acknowledged that an individual charged with a forcible felony may be

detained pending trial if he or she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Defendant alleged, however, that “there is and will be no evidence that

[he] poses a real and present threat to any person” because he is blind and needs assistance in the

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

activities of daily living. Defendant also denied that he is a flight risk and indicated that, if released,

he will comply with any conditions imposed by the court and will reside with his mother and

brother in Thornton, Illinois. At a case management conference, the trial court scheduled a hearing

on defendant’s Motion for November 20, 2023.

¶8      At the November 20, 2023, hearing, the State initially noted that it had filed a verified

petition to detain. The State asserted that defendant was charged with “Class X murder,” which

qualifies as a detention-eligible offense. The State then stated that “the proof is evident and the

presumption great that *** defendant has committed the offense of first degree murder, as this

matter has also previously been indicted.” As for the factual basis, the State proffered that on May

29, 2023, defendant and Mars attended a party in the parking lot of a bowling alley in Waukegan.

A fight broke out and defendant provided Mars with a loaded firearm. Mars then shot the victim

twice in the chest area. The victim succumbed to the wounds at a local hospital. The State argued

that defendant “is a great threat to the community and no combination of pretrial factors would

ensure the community’s safety” because “[t]his [was] a public event with multiple individuals

present where *** defendant’s actions resulted in the death of another.” The State therefore

requested that the court enter an order detaining defendant pending trial.

¶9      In response, defense counsel argued that the State failed to meet its burden. Defense

counsel provided some additional details regarding the events of May 29, 2023. He stated that

defendant, who is blind, was driven by Mars to the bowling alley for a party. During the party, two

women got into a fight. The victim and Mars, both of whom were armed, attempted to intervene.

Mars and the victim got into a fight and Mars shot the victim. Defense counsel further argued that

the only evidence that the State had tying defendant to the alleged crime—which evidence came

from one of the women who was involved in the initial fight—was that defendant gave a gun to

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

Mars. According to defense counsel, however, the woman gave two conflicting statements. At one

point, she stated that she heard shots while she was on the ground during the fight. At another

point, she stated that defendant gave the gun to Mars, who then shot the victim. Defense counsel

also asserted that another person claimed that defendant gave Mars the gun two days before the

incident at the bowling alley. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant “had some altercation

two days before with some relative of the [victim] and then said that he was angry at the [victim].”

But, he argued, since the victim was already dead, there is no specific, articulable fact that

defendant is a threat or danger to anyone else. Defense counsel stated that being in jail is extremely

difficult for defendant because he is the victim of a shooting incident several years earlier that

resulted in a brain injury and vision loss. Defense counsel said that, if released, defendant would

reside with family in Thornton and would abide by any conditions imposed by the court. Defense

counsel represented that defendant had “only one prior, which involved an altercation with a

policeman during an arrest or something like that, but he was on probation at the time.”

¶ 10   Following defense counsel’s remarks, the trial court inquired if defendant was on probation

on May 29, 2023. Defense counsel responded, “I am new to the case. I think he was. I think he

completed his probation.” The State indicated that defendant “was either just done or just

finishing” probation on May 29, 2023. The court noted that defendant was sentenced to 24 months’

probation on February 15, 2022. The court then stated, “[o]h, this is out of Cook. There’s a Cook

County case. I’m sorry. Never mind.”

¶ 11   The court found that the offense with which defendant was charged to be a detainable

offense. The court further found that the State had shown by specific, articulable facts that

defendant, although blind, was at a party in a parking lot with a number of people, that defendant

had a loaded weapon, that he gave the loaded weapon to another person, and that the other person

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

shot the victim who died. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the State had proven by

clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant

committed the offenses, (2) he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community, (3) there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can mitigate the real and

present threat to the safety of any person, and (4) less restrictive conditions would not assure safety

to the community. As such, the court ordered that defendant be detained pending trial. The court

signed a preprinted order of detention, checking boxes where applicable to reflect its ruling.

Thereafter, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 12                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13   The Act amended the Code by abolishing traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial

release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a)

(West 2022). In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. 725

ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, a defendant’s pretrial

release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations (qualifying offenses). 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). For most of the qualifying offenses, upon filing a verified

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed the offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), that the defendant’s pretrial

release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2022)) or a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)), and that no condition or combination

of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community

or the risk of defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)).

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

“Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact

as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023

IL 127712, ¶ 74.

¶ 14   We review a trial court’s decision to detain a defendant using a two-part standard of review.

We apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court’s factual determinations,

including whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a

qualifying offense, whether a defendant poses a threat, and whether any conditions would mitigate

that threat. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence only if a conclusion opposite that to the trial court’s is clearly apparent. In

re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. The ultimate decision of whether a defendant should

be detained is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An

abuse of discretion occurs only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. People v.

Williams, 2022 IL App (2d) 200455, ¶ 52. Questions of law and the construction of statutes are

reviewed de novo. People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 16.

¶ 15   On appeal, defendant raises four arguments. First, defendant argues that the State failed to

meet its burden of establishing that the proof is evident and the presumption great that he

committed first degree murder. Second, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Third,

he argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Lastly,

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

defendant argues that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s Petition (see 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)) “weighs in favor of reversal.”

¶ 16                                   A. Immediate Hearing

¶ 17   We first address defendant’s argument that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on

the State’s Petition “weighs in favor of reversal.” Section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)) provides that upon filing a petition to detain by the State, “the court

shall immediately hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance is granted.” In this case, the

State’s Petition was filed on September 15, 2023. The Act became effective on September 18,

2023 (see Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September

18, 2023)), but no hearing was held until November 20, 2023. Indeed, the State does not dispute

that the hearing on its Petition—held more than two months after both the date the Petition was

filed and the effective date of the Act—was not “immediate” as the statute requires.

¶ 18   Despite the State’s concession, we find defendant’s argument unavailing where, as here,

it was defendant’s motion for pretrial release which prompted the hearing which resulted in the

detention order at issue. In People v. Wetzel-Connor, 2023 IL App (2d) 230348-U, ¶ 27, this court

noted the overlapping nature of the factors to consider raised in a petition by the State for pretrial

detention and a motion by a defendant for pretrial release. In that case, the court rejected a claim

that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a petition by the State to detain because

the defendant had filed a motion for pretrial release and the proceedings would have been

essentially the same regardless of whether the State had filed its petition. Wetzel-Connor, 2023 IL

App (2d) 230348-U, ¶ 27. Likewise in this case, regardless of whether the State ever filed a petition

to detain, the proceedings on defendant’s motion for pretrial release would have been meaningfully

the same. See People v. Borgert, 2023 IL App (2d) 230371-U, ¶ 19. Accordingly, we reject

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

defendant’s argument that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s Petition weighs

in favor of reversal.

¶ 19                                   B. Qualifying Offense

¶ 20   Next, we address defendant’s claim that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing

that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder. As charged

here, a person commits first degree murder when he or she kills a person without lawful

justification and, in performing the acts which cause the death the person, (1) either intends to kill

or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to

that individual or another (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022)) or (2) knows that such acts create a

strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)

(West 2022)). First degree murder is a qualifying offense under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022).

¶ 21   Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the proof is evident or the presumption

great that he committed first degree murder because it merely read into the record a paragraph

describing the events of May 29, 2023, and there was no evidence as to precisely when defendant

allegedly handed Mars a loaded gun. At this stage, however, the State was not required to prove

the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute merely requires clear and

convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). “Clear and convincing evidence”

requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, n.3. As noted above, evidence is “clear and

convincing” if it “leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the

proposition in question.” Chaudhary, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

¶ 22   The State’s proffer indicated that defendant brought a loaded weapon to a party that was

held in a parking lot at which numerous individuals were present and which was accessible to the

public at large. At some point, defendant handed the weapon to Mars who got into a fight with and

eventually shot the victim. The trial court relied on these facts to conclude that the State had proven

by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant

committed first degree murder. We agree with the trial court that the State has met its burden here.

Defendant does not point to anything that is inherently incredible in the State’s proffer. He does

posit that the recited evidence could support the conclusion that Mars fired the weapon in self-

defense during the fight because the victim was allegedly armed. However, this argument is best

left for trial. Defendant also argues that there was no explanation offered as to how defendant was

aware that giving a gun to Mars would result in first degree murder charges. But the fact that

defendant merely provided a weapon to the individual who allegedly inflicted the fatal shots does

not necessarily relieve him of culpability. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 398 Ill. 256, 262-263

(1947) (finding that the defendant, who procured a gun and participated in an unlawful assembly

preceding the fatal shooting, was responsible for the act of co-defendant in killing the victim);

People v. Amigon, 388 Ill. App. 3d 26, 33 (2009) (“[A] defendant will be found criminally liable

where his or her criminal acts ‘set in motion a chain of events’ culminating in the victim’s death”),

aff’d, 239 Ill. 2d 71 (2010); People v. Robinson, 113 Ill. App. 2d 89 (1969) (abstract only) (holding

that both parties who acted in concert in assault which resulted in death of victim were equally

accountable for death regardless of which one inflicted fatal wound). Hence, we conclude that the

trial court’s finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident

or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

¶ 23                                         C. Threat

¶ 24   Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the State proved by clear

and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons in the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. According to

defendant, the State merely used the “alleged facts of the charged crime” as a basis to argue that

he presented a threat to others. Relying principally on People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,

defendant argues this was improper.

¶ 25   Under the Code, factors that the trial court may consider in making a determination of

dangerousness, i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the

community, include, but are not limited to: (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense

charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense;

(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identify of any person to whom the

defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or

attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age

and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or

complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any

weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on

probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors,

including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)), the court

deems to have a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent,

abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

¶ 26   In Stock, the court, in addressing whether the State had proven that no less restrictive

conditions of release would serve to mitigate any threat the defendant posed, found that the mere

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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U

fact that a defendant is alleged to have committed a violent crime is insufficient to establish that

no less restrictive conditions of release would serve to mitigate any threat the defendant posed.

Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18; see also People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028,

¶ 18 (“But the fact that a person is charged with a detainable offense is not enough to order

detention”). Seizing upon this holding from Stock, defendant insists that there was no evidence

beyond “the alleged facts of the charged crime” to show that he poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community.

¶ 27   We find defendant’s argument unpersuasive. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the State in

this case did not rely on the mere fact that defendant was charged with first degree murder to

support its position that defendant poses a threat to the safety of any person or the community.

Rather, the State relied on the specific facts surrounding the offense charged. At a bare minimum,

defendant’s behavior, as alleged, was dangerous and shows an utter disregard for the safety of any

person or persons in the community. See Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 14 (holding that the

State provided clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, who was charged with aggravated

battery/discharge of a firearm, posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community where the evidence established that he needlessly discharged a firearm in his

home in the presence of various individuals, including his 15-year-old daughter). Considering this

record, we cannot say that the trial court’s factual finding that defendant poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 28                                 D. Conditions of Release

¶ 29   Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State proved by clear

and convincing evidence that there are no conditions that could mitigate the risk of his release.

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Defendant’s argument is twofold. First, again relying on Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,

defendant asserts that there was no evidence beyond the crime charged to establish this element.

Second, defendant asserts that the error was compounded because the trial court failed to either

orally enunciate or enter a written finding as to why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific

articulable facts of the case.

¶ 30    Section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)) directs a court

to consider the conditions set forth in section 110-10. (725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)). Section

110-10(a) requires all defendants released under the Act to appear for court dates, obey court

orders, refrain from committing further offenses, and surrender all firearms. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a)

(West 2022). In addition, a court may impose additional conditions, including the supervision of

Pretrial Services or a similar agency, and compliance with any other reasonable condition. 725

ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022).

¶ 31    We observe that the trial court’s written findings on this issue are cursory. It signed a

preprinted form that provides that “no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real

and present threat to the safety of any person or persons for offenses listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1) through (7) OR the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(8).” The form provides no space for the trial court to explain its findings and the court did

not attach an addendum doing so. In People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19, we

discussed the Act’s requirement in section 110-6.1(h)(1) of a written order with a summary of the

trial court's “reasons for concluding less restrictive conditions would not avoid” a threat to safety

posed by defendant’s release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). Looking at the Act as a

whole, we found the purpose of that requirement was to ensure that detention decisions (1) were

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based upon specific articulable facts and individualized to each defendant, (2) provided notice to

the parties of the reasons for the court’s decision, and (3) preserved this reasoning for appellate

review. In Andino-Acosta, we held that in assessing the sufficiency of a trial court’s findings, its

written findings must be read in conjunction with its oral pronouncements. Andino-Acosta, 2024

IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19.

¶ 32   Here, while the trial court’s oral pronouncement adequately addressed why defendant

posed a threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific

articulable facts of the case, it is devoid of findings why any condition or combination of conditions

would not mitigate the risk of his release. The court merely noted that defendant, although blind,

was at a party in a parking lot with a number of people, that defendant had a loaded weapon, that

he gave the loaded weapon to another person, and that the other person shot the victim who died.

It then pronounced that, “[b]ased on these facts,” the State had proven by clear and convincing

evidence that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can mitigate the real and

present threat to the safety of any person and that less restrictive conditions would not assure safety

to the community. In other words, the trial court cited nothing to explain why less restrictive

conditions to detention would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case.

¶ 33   In short, there is no indication in the trial court’s oral ruling or written order that it

considered less restrictive conditions to detention, let alone did it provide an explanation of why

less restrictive conditions would not mitigate the threat defendant poses. Accordingly, we vacate

the trial court’s detention order and remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider its decision

on this element. On remand, should the trial court decide to detain defendant, it shall make

individualized findings explaining why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and

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present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific

articulable facts of the case. We, of course, express no opinion on what the trial court’s ruling

should be. We merely direct the trial court to consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives

under section 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022)) and explain why or why

not such alternatives would mitigate the threat defendant poses.

¶ 34                                     IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 35   In light of the foregoing, the order of the circuit court of Lake County is vacated and this

cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 36   Vacated and remanded, with directions.

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