Court Opinion

ID: 9623871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:45:14.163219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:36.004501
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority correctly states that the true ground of the owner’s liability to an invitee in slip and fall cases is the owner’s superior knowledge of a condition or hazard that was the proximate cause of the invitee’s injury. Thus, “if his invitee knows of the condition or hazard, there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn the *748invitee and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Froman v. George L. Smith &c. Auth., 197 Ga. App. 338, 339 (398 SE2d 413) (1990).
In the present case the alleged hazard was an inclined ramp which had existed unaltered on the premises for over 30 years. During that time there is no evidence that the City as owner had any notice of any fall or injury on the ramp prior to the present incident. In order to establish that the City had the necessary knowledge of a condition or hazard that caused his injury, appellant produced an expert witness who testified that the ramp, because of its steep slope, smooth surface, lack of handrails, and slippery condition at the time of the accident, constituted a patently obvious hazard of which the City was or should have been aware. Given that the appellant’s own expert produced evidence that the ramp was an obvious defect or hazard, the appellant was in the position of having to explain why, by the exercise of ordinary care, he did not see it, and have as much knowledge of the patent hazard as the City.
Although appellant testified in his deposition that he slipped and fell because mud and water on the ramp made it slippery, he also stated that he did not see the ramp or any mud and water before he fell taking his first step onto the ramp. He explained that he was walking about six to twelve inches behind his mother in crowded conditions looking straight ahead, and that the people around him prevented him from seeing. He knew muddy conditions existed at the hog show requiring that he be careful in walking. As the majority notes, he also testified there were no “distractions” which diverted his attention.1
The majority concludes that because appellant was not familiar with the area, and was in crowded conditions, they cannot as a matter of law agree that the ramp was a patent defect, or that appellant failed to exercise ordinary care. There is no evidence tending to show that the ramp was anything other than a long-standing patently obvious and observable condition on the premises. In other words, it was a structural condition whose presence was both obvious, static and discernible to those exercising ordinary care. Harmon v. Reames, 188 Ga. App. 812, 815 (374 SE2d 539) (1988). This is not a latent defect case where the invitee claims that, despite his knowledge of the observable conditions, he could not fully appreciate the inherent danger. Compare Atkinson v. Kirchoff Enterprises, 181 Ga. App. 139 (351 SE2d *749477) (1986). Rather, appellant claims he was prevented from seeing the patent hazard because he was walking in a crowd.
Decided July 11, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1991
Adams & Hemingway, William P. Adams, Rentz & Shepard, Danny S. Shepard, for appellant.
Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Thomas F. Richardson, Robert E. Little, for appellee.
I cannot agree with the majority that a question of fact remains as to whether appellant exercised ordinary care under these circumstances. Although an invitee is not required to inspect the premises to discover latent defects, nor even to observe every patent defect, neither is the owner an insurer of the invitee’s safety, and “[t]he invitee must also exercise ordinary care for his own safety and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the owner or occupier’s negligence when it becomes apparent to him, or in the exercise of ordinary care [he] should have learned of it.” Amear v. Hall, 164 Ga. App. 163, 167 (296 SE2d 611) (1982); Fowler v. Campbell, 191 Ga. App. 872 (383 SE2d 163) (1989). Appellant cannot recover on the basis of the City’s superior knowledge of the condition or hazard, if his lack of equal or superior knowledge was caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the condition or hazard. The exercise of ordinary care does not require an invitee to continuously scan the floor for possible defects, but depends on all the circumstances at the time and place. Pinkney v. VMS Realty, 189 Ga. App. 177, 178 (375 SE2d 90) (1988). Only when the facts are so plain and palpable that they demand a finding as a matter of law that one has failed to exercise ordinary care for one’s own safety will summary judgment be appropriate. Folks, Inc. v. Dobbs, 181 Ga. App. 311, 312 (352 SE2d 212) (1986).
Here, appellant was in an unfamiliar area on a floor he knew to be muddy and slippery. Moving in a crowd of people, which, by his own admission, prevented him from seeing the floor in front of him, he nevertheless proceeded, and was looking straight forward when he stepped onto the ramp covered with mud and water, and fell. Proceeding blindly under these circumstances is, as a matter of law, failure to exercise ordinary care for one’s own safety. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.

 Appellant does not suggest or rely upon the theory that a lesser degree of caution under the circumstances was sufficient to constitute ordinary care because he was distracted by somethign attributable to the proprietor. Compare, e.g., Magee v. Federated Dept. Stores, 187 Ga. App. 620 (371 SE2d 99) (1988).