Court Opinion

ID: 9443855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:32:23.99141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:37.641063
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
T have great respect for the ability, experience, and integrity of the trial judge. But I think that his participation in this trial far exceeded the limits of judicial discretion. The explanation of this unusual conduct appears pretty clearly in the attempted excuse stated in the government’s brief, i. e., the inexperience of the assistant United States attorney who tried the case; as the brief reports, he was “manifestly not a master of the art of cross-examination.”
Of course, a federal trial judge is no mere moderator or umpire. He has the duty to ask questions where necessary to elicit truth. Arid it may have been true in this case that, as the government says, “the questions which were asked by the trial judge were skillfully contrived, and could well have been characterized as effective direct examination, or cross-examination, as the case may be, had they been asked by counsel.” That argument, however, ignores this important fact: The judge, on objections by defendants’ counsel, would never have allowed the prosecutor to behave as the judge did here, i. e., to interrupt disruptively, by cross-examination, defense counsel’s direct examination of witnesses called by the defense. Moreover, as Judge Shelby remarked more than forty years ago, “A cross-examination that would be unobjectionable when conducted by the prosecuting attorney might unduly prejudice the defendant when it is conducted by the trial judge.”1 I think it significant that my colleagues make no mention of U. S. v. Brandt, 2 Cir., 196 F.2d 653, 65,5-656, where this court recently held that activities of the trial judge, markedly similar to those here, constituted reversible error. There we said that the trial judge must remain “impartial, judicious, and, above all, responsible for a courtroom atmosphere in which guilt or innocence may be soberly and fairly tested. * * * In the case at bar this mandate of judiciousness appears to ihavc been breached on unfortunately more than a single occasion. Thus the examination of witnesses and discussions with counsel by the court were spotted with a number o E remarks which were not of the form to elicit information or direct the trial procedure into proper channels, but rather to cut into the presumption of innocence to which defendants are entitled. Beyond this the court actively cross-examined several witnesses, notably the defendant Brandt himself, to a quite unusual extent. This interrupted the orderly presentation of evidence by the defense. But further the questioning appeared mainly to underline inconsistencies in the positions, or to elicit admissions bearing on the credibility, of defense witnesses.”2 In Brandt’s case, the government, on the strength of U. S. v. Aaron, 2 Cir., 190 F.2d 144, cited here by my colleagues, had argued that the charge had cured these defects. This court replied: “Such admonitions may offset brief or minor departures from strict judicial impartiality, but cannot be considered sufficient here. For the 900 questions asked by the court during this eight-day trial *212present far more examples of serious incidents. The cumulative effect of these we are unable to hold cured by the formal charge given.” In the case at bar, in six days of trial, the judge asked more than 700 questions, of which some 250 were directed to Juliano, the one defendant who took the stand.3
I would be the last person to suggest that a federal trial judge must not tell the jury his belief about the credibility of the witnesses, provided he promptly — not much later — emphatically warns that the jury must reach their own independent conclusion. But when the judge discloses that belief by his manner of questioning a witness, his belief, being implied and not expressed, is seldom coupled with such a warning. No such contemporaneous warnings were given here during the many hours in which the judge griddled witnesses for the defense. Certainly a trial judge may, and often should, ask questions. Particularly should be interrogate a defendant in a criminal case when defense counsel proves incompetent, a not infrequent situation when defendants have limited financial resources. But when the judge’s questions aid the government, he should be singularly careful lest he appear so partisan as to interfere with the (so-called) presumption of innocence. He must then refrain from “exhibiting a prosecutor’s zeal, inconsistent with that detachment and aloofness which courts have again and again demanded, particularly in criminal trials. Despite every allowance he must not enter the lists; he must not by his ardor induce the jury to join in a hue and cry against the accused. Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions in the administration of justice; they must not merge.”4
It is no excuse that government counsel lacked experience. As the United States has the largest and most expensive law firm in the country, the judge in such circumstances should at most suggest that the assistant United States attorney be guided by a more-experienced prosecutor.5 For it is no secret that a defense counsel is at a grave disadvantage whenever the judge, interrogating a witness, puts a question which, if put by the prosecutor, would prompt an objection the judge would be obliged to sustain; If the lawyer objects, he may anger the judge and prejudice the jury against the defendant.6
I have not forgotten the comment of *213this court in the Brandt case, that “particular incidents are not to be overstressed apart from their context”.7But (as was true in the Brandt case) the record here shows that the partiality manifest in the court’s examination of the defendant Juliano, and of the witnesses (particularly those called by the defense), and] in the interjection of cross-examination in the course of direct, was given added color by unwarranted remarks to defense counsel.8 As Judge A. N. Hand said in another case involving a judge’s indiscreet criticism of defense counsel, “The court exhibited unreasonable impatience with defendants’ counsel and failed to maintain that detached and impartial attitude which is necessary to preserve a proper atmosphere and to insure a fair trial. Furthermore, there plainly was no justification for the constant interference by the court with counsel in their attempt to examine their witnesses. It did not expedite matters for the judge to take over such a large proportion of the examination and imposed unmerited burdens.”9
I repeat that I have the highest respect for the trial judge. Accordingly, I would hesitate to criticize him, were nothing more involved than judicial etiquette. But here the liberty of another human being is at stake.

. Adler v. U. S., 5 Cir., 182 F. 404, 472; see also Hunter v. U. S., 5 Cir., 62 F.2d 217, 220; Gomila v. U. S., 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 372, 373-375 (reversed for judicial misconduct despite absence of objection from counsel); Williams v. U. S., 9 Cir., 93 F.2d 685; Frantz v. U. S., 6 Cir., 62 F.2d 737, 739.

. The record here is replete with such interrogation, too extensive for repetition.

. I do not feel that the quantum of questioning by the court serves alone as an index of the propriety of his participation. But the number here, and the judge’s other conduct, make the parallel deadly.

. B. Hand, O. X, in tf. S. v. Marzano, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 923, 926. I agree that Marzano’s case involved a different type of judicial misconduct from that in the Brandt and instant cases, but Judge Hand’s statement of the principle is nonetheless applicable.
I am at a loss to understand why my colleagues cite Billeci v. U. S., 87 U.S. App.D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394, 24 A.L.R. 2d 881, which reversed a conviction with an explanation which I might adopt here, except that it announces a rule, for the conduct of a trial judge, which is perhaps stricter in some respects than I would be ready to accept;
My colleagues say that Simon v. U. S., 4 Cir., 123 F.2d 80, shows that discretion was here exercised within permissible grounds. I think the report of the Simon case discloses no facts which furnish a yardstick for the judge’s role in the instant case.

. The record indicates that the government undertook to provide such guidance at the trial, when Mr. Burchill, an experienced prosecutor, was advising the assistant who tried the case. Thereupon, the following colloquy took place between a defense attorney and the court:
“Mr. McAuley: Tour Honor, the defense has no objection to Mr. Burchill conducting the examination if he wishes.
“The Court: Now, I\Ir. McAuley, there is no reason for you to make any such statement. Sit down. Perfectly proper for Mr. Burchill, assistant United States attorney, to sit there and to aid a younger, junior assistant. Nothing wrong in that.
“Mr. McAuley: I didn’t say there was anything wrong.
“Tlie Court: Go ahead.
“Mr. McAuley: I said we are perfectly willing to have the older assistant—
“The Court: Tou know your comment was improper. Don’t do it again. Next question.”

. Adler v. United States, 5 Cir., 182 F. 464, 472; Puttkammer, Administration of Criminal Law (1953), 199-200.

. 196 F.2d at page 656, fn. 1.

. X cull the following illustrations:
During examination of the defendant Juliano by his counsel and the court alternately, this colloquy occurred:
“The Court: Do you have another question, Sir. McAuley?
“Mr. McAuley: Yes.
“The Court: 1 suggest you ask the witness the question, and stop those shenanigans you are doing now.
“Mr. McAuley: 1 am sorry. I must turn the pages.
“The Court: Do it in the back. You have had that book around for some time.
“Mr. McAuley: Yes, but I haven’t lived with it, your Honor. I respectfully except to your Honor’s comment.
“The Court: That is your fault.
“Mr. McAuley: I can’t take the Government’s word—
“The 'Court: None of these dramatics. Next question.
“Mr. McAuley: No dramatics.”
During the prosecutor's examination ®f a government witness:
“Q. Is Joseph O. Juliano here in this court? A. Yes, he is.
“Q. Will you please point him out? A. He is the man with 1he Hue suit, with the small mustache and heavy hair, black hair.
“Prosecutor: Correctly indicating Joseph Juliano.
“Q. Did you have a conversation with him at that time? A. I did.
“Q. Did you ask him—
“Mr. Chapman (one of defense counsel) : Just a moment. Any inquiry made and any answers given would be only binding on Juliano individually.
“The Court: 1 am the ono to make that ¡ruling, Mr. Chapman.
“Mr. Chapman: I understand.
“The Court: Thank you very much for your guidance.
“Mr. Chapman: Your Honor, I am sure you don’t mean to be sarcastic to me about that.”
Defense counsel had a comb in his hand while cross-examining a government wit-mess, This ensued:
Mr. Andersen, were you with Investiga tor Ginantasio on March 1st at the Juliano farm?
“The Court: Will you put that knife away, or whatever you have in yonr hand.
“Mr. McAuley: Not a knife.
“’Hie Court: Put it in your pocket.
“Mr. McAuley: Yes.”
While the defense was cross-examining another government witness, a government agent, the following unusual rebuff was delivered:
“Q. Did you bring them here? Were you asked to bring all your records? A. No. Mr. Valenti rented a truck—
“Q. Just a minute. A. —not long ago from us.
“Q. Just a minute. You answer the question without volunteering anything, please.
“The Court: Let me instruct the witness.
“Mr. Chapman: I wish your Honor would iheu, if you please—
“The Court: I will give instructions, if necessary. I don’t like counsel to usurp my prerogative. Next question.”
It should be noted that the exchange quoted in footnote 2 of my colleagues’ opinion came on the heels of the Court’s refusal to admonish the same witness, a government agent, for his first unresponsive answer to a cross-question.

. United States v. Minuso, 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 36, 39.