Court Opinion

ID: 9719405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:51:09.951518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:06.906803
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from tire opinion of the majority. The statute pertaining to criminal trespass to land states that notice must be given “immediately prior” to the unauthorized entry. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 21—3(a).) In my opinion, the statutory requirement of immediate notice was not satisfied under the facts in this case. In construing a criminal statute, the legislative intention must be ascertained by examining the language employed, the evil to be remedied, and the objective sought to be accomplished. (People v. Spencer (1971), 131 Ill.App.2d 551, 268 N.E.2d 192; People v. Gill (1961), 30 Ill.App.2d 32, 173 N.E.2d 568.) It is presumed that the legislature intended words to have their ordinary meaning unless a statutory definition indicates a contrary intention (People v. Spencer (1971), 131 Ill.App.2d 551, 268 N.E.2d 192; People v. LaPorte (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 139, 171 N.E.2d 95.) The ordinary meaning of “immediately” according to Webster’s Dictionary (1971 ed.), is “next in line or relation, not secondary or remote.” The evidence in this case showed that there were no printed or written notices posted at the entrance to the tenth floor of the Goldblatt’s building, either at the stairwell or elevator entrances. The only notice received by the defendant occurred 27 days prior to the incident. The intervening period of almost 1 month was, in my judgment, too remote to constitute immediate notice as required by the statute. In People v. Mims (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 32, 288 N.E.2d 891, a former student was arrested on school property. The arresting officer testified that he approached the defendant, who said he was in the building to visit friends, advised him that he was not to be on the premises, and immediately placed him under arrest. We reversed the judgment of conviction, stating at pages 34-35: “Although the State contends that the record establishes that defendant had knowledge that he was not to be on the school premises, the record contains no indication that ‘immediately prior’ to defendant’s entry he was notified that such entry was forbidden. Thus, the conviction could not be sustained * * Siimlarly, in the instant case I would hold that the conviction should be reversed because the evidence failed to show that defendant received immediate notice prior to his entry that his presence upon the premises was unauthorized.