Court Opinion

ID: 9379036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 15:01:12.154665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.764548
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2238   Document: 40     Page: 1   Filed: 03/14/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    LEWIS BROWN,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                            v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2021-2238
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 19-8563, Judge Amanda L. Mere-
 dith.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: March 14, 2023
                 ______________________

    KENNETH DOJAQUEZ, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka,
 KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

     ASHLEY AKERS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented
 by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD,
 REBECCA SARAH KRUSER, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; Y. KEN
 LEE, SAMANTHA ANN SYVERSON, Office of General Counsel,
Case: 21-2238    Document: 40      Page: 2    Filed: 03/14/2023

 2                                      BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH

 United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washing-
 ton, DC.
                ______________________

 Before REYNA, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
      Lewis Brown served in the U.S. Army in the 1950s and
 60s. In 2011, he filed a supplemental claim with the De-
 partment of Veterans Affairs for disability benefits for a
 back condition stemming from his time in the Army. In
 2019, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted Mr. Brown a
 September 13, 2011 effective date for a service-connection
 award for left and right lower extremity radiculopathy and
 for a rating of “total disability based on individual unem-
 ployability” or “TDIU” (a benefit for certain eligible disa-
 bled veterans who are unable to work due to a service-
 connected disability). Mr. Brown appealed from the
 Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals for Veterans
 Claims, arguing that he is entitled to an effective date that
 is earlier than September 13, 2011. The Court of Appeals
 for Veterans Claims remanded the matter back to the
 Board on grounds that the Board’s analysis lacked suffi-
 cient detail and thoroughness. Brown v. McDonough, No.
 19-8563, 2021 WL 2169764 (Vet. App. May 28, 2021) (“De-
 cision”).
     Mr. Brown appeals to this court arguing that the Court
 of Appeals for Veterans Claims committed legal error in re-
 manding to the Board. He recognizes that we generally
 lack jurisdiction to review remand orders because they are
 non-final. But he argues that his appeal falls within an
 exception to that general rule. We disagree and dismiss
 Mr. Brown’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                         BACKGROUND
    Mr. Brown served in the Army from June 1953 to May
 1955 and from September 1961 to August 1962. Decision,
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 BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH                                        3

 at *1. In 1977, he filed a claim in the VA for disability com-
 pensation for a back condition. J.A. 107–110. The VA re-
 gional office (“RO”) denied the claim, noting that his service
 medical records were unavailable. J.A. 106. He did not
 appeal that decision.
     In September 2011, he filed a supplemental claim for
 benefits. J.A. 105. In a 2013 rating decision, the RO noted
 that the VA had received Mr. Brown’s service medical rec-
 ords, which reflected that he had been treated for back pain
 in 1962. J.A. 104. But the RO continued to deny disability
 benefits because the RO found that Mr. Brown’s back con-
 dition was not service connected. Id.
     Mr. Brown filed a Notice of Disagreement. J.A. 94–99.
 He requested that the VA apply 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c), which
 he argued requires the VA to reopen a claim when new ser-
 vice records are associated with the claim, and to make any
 award based on the new records effective as of the date that
 the original claim was denied. J.A. 98. Mr. Brown sought
 disability benefits for a service-connected back condition;
 TDIU; and a May 1977 effective date for both. Id. In a
 February 2016 rating decision, the RO granted Mr. Brown
 a 40% disability rating—effective May 2, 1977—for degen-
 erative disc disease of the lumbar spine with bilateral
 radiculopathy. J.A. 86. In a separate order, it denied com-
 pensable TDIU. J.A. 83–84. In 2019, the Board granted
 an effective date of September 13, 2011 (but no earlier) for
 an award of service connection for left and right lower ex-
 tremity radiculopathy and for entitlement to TDIU. J.A.
 27–34.
     Mr. Brown appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veter-
 ans Claims (“CAVC”). J.A. 10. He asserted that May 1977
 was the correct effective date for his radiculopathy ratings
 and TDIU claim because the RO in 2016 reconsidered his
 May 1977 claim for a back condition under § 3.156(c) and
 the Board favorably found that his radiculopathy ratings
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 4                                      BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH

 and TDIU arose from the same claim for a low back disa-
 bility. Decision, at *2.
     The CAVC vacated the Board’s decision that denied an
 effective date earlier than September 13, 2011, and re-
 manded for further proceedings. Id. at *1–5. The CAVC
 explained that “the Board favorably determined that the
 RO awarded benefits for bilateral radiculopathy and TDIU
 as part of [Mr. Brown’s] September 13, 2011[] claim for a
 low back disability.” Id. at *4. But in denying an effective
 date earlier than the date of the claim, “the Board did not
 address § 3.156(c) or the import of the RO’s February 2016
 rating decision, which reconsidered [Mr. Brown’s] May
 1977 claim for a low back condition and awarded service
 connection based on the date of receipt of the original claim
 pursuant to § 3.156(c)(3).” Id.
      The CAVC explained that its review was “frustrated”
 by the Board’s failure to make any factual findings concern-
 ing the scope of Mr. Brown’s 1977 claim and whether it in-
 cluded the issues of entitlement to separate ratings for
 radiculopathy and TDIU. Id. at *5. The CAVC remanded
 the case to the Board explaining that “where the Board . . .
 failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases
 for its determinations, . . . a remand is the appropriate rem-
 edy.” Id. (quoting Tucker v. West, 11 Vet. App. 369, 374
 (1998)). It also “remind[ed] the Board that ‘[a] remand is
 meant to entail a critical examination of the justification
 for the decision.’” Id. (citation omitted).
     Mr. Brown appeals the remand order, asking us to find
 that the CAVC erred by ordering the Board to review bind-
 ing factual findings on remand. We dismiss this appeal for
 lack of jurisdiction.
                         DISCUSSION
     We review appeals of CAVC decisions under 38 U.S.C.
 § 7292. Joyce v. Nicholson, 443 F.3d 845, 849 (Fed. Cir.
 2006). Although § 7292 does not explicitly impose a final
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 BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH                                        5

 judgment requirement, we “typically will not review re-
 mand orders by the [CAVC] ‘because they are not final
 judgments.’” Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1364
 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In fact, we will only
 review a remand order if three conditions are met:
     (1) there must have been a clear and final decision
     of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the remand
     proceedings, (b) will directly govern the remand
     proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court, would
     render the remand proceedings unnecessary; (2)
     the resolution of the legal issues must adversely af-
     fect the party seeking review; and (3) there must be
     a substantial risk that the decision would not sur-
     vive a remand, i.e., that the remand proceeding
     may moot the issue.
 Id. (footnotes omitted). This so-called Williams exception
 is “narrow.” Ebel v. Shinseki, 673 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.
 Cir. 2012). And it applies only in “rare cases.” Conway v.
 Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
     Mr. Brown fails to establish that this is one of those
 rare cases. Indeed, the remand order fails to meet at least
 the first and third Williams conditions.
      As for the first condition, Mr. Brown has not estab-
 lished that the remand order provides “a clear and final de-
 cision of a legal issue.” Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364. Mr.
 Brown argues that the CAVC determined that the Board
 favorably found that the RO awarded benefits for bilateral
 radiculopathy and TDIU as part of Mr. Brown’s September
 13, 2011 claim for a low back disability. Appellant’s Br. 10.
 By doing so, he asserts, the CAVC “determined that the
 Board ‘favorably determined’ that the scope of the 1977
 claim, decided by the [RO] in 2016 and reviewed by the
 Board on appeal, included a request for benefits for TDIU
 and radiculopathy.” Id. at 15. But the CAVC, he argues,
 then ordered the Board on remand (1) to re-determine the
 scope of the 1977 claim, and (2) to review a favorable
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 6                                       BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH

 finding of fact to which the Board is already bound. Id. at
 11. He asserts that “when the [CAVC] ordered the Board
 to determine the scope of the 1977 claim [on remand], it
 ignored the application of [38 U.S.C.] § 5104A and the law
 of the case doctrine.” 1 Reply Br. 15; see also id. at 11 (as-
 serting that CAVC remanded to the Board “to determine
 the scope of the 1977 claim anew,” which “runs afoul of . . .
 § 5104A and the law of the case doctrine”).
      Mr. Brown fails to persuade us that the remand is a
 clear and final decision on a legal issue. Mr. Brown is es-
 sentially arguing that the CAVC implicitly “ignored”—or
 implicitly “ordered” the Board to ignore—§ 5104A and the
 “law of the case” doctrine. But even if those actions
 amounted to a “decision on a legal issue” under Williams,
 we cannot say that they amounted to a “clear” decision. See
 Goffney v. McDonough, No. 22-1130, 2023 WL 355107, at
 *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2023) (CAVC’s alleged “implicit” de-
 cision interpreting a regulation that the CAVC never cited
 or discussed was not a “clear” decision for purposes of the
 first Williams condition).
      The CAVC simply concluded that the Board had not
 sufficiently explained its decision and thus remanded “for
 further consideration of the issues by the Board as a pred-
 icate to further review of those issues by the [CAVC],” Wil-
 liams, 275 F.3d at 1365. As discussed above, remand is
 appropriate when the Board “fail[s] to provide an adequate
 statement of reasons or bases for its determinations,” De-
 cision, at *5 (quoting Tucker, 11 Vet. App. at 374). Because
 Mr. Brown fails to show that the remand order was a clear

     1  Section 5104A states: “Any finding favorable to the
 claimant as described in section 5104(b)(4) of this title shall
 be binding on all subsequent adjudicators within the De-
 partment, unless clear and convincing evidence is shown to
 the contrary to rebut such favorable finding.” 38 U.S.C.
 § 5104A.
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 BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH                                       7

 and final decision on any legal issue, he has not established
 that the order meets the first Williams condition.
     As for the third condition, Mr. Brown fails to show that
 there is “a substantial risk that the decision would not sur-
 vive a remand”—“that the remand proceeding may moot
 the issue.” Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364. The question under
 this Williams condition is whether Mr. Brown will be una-
 ble to raise the issue on appeal if he loses on remand. Don-
 nellan v. Shineski, 676 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
 Essentially, Mr. Brown’s “claim must be that he has a legal
 right not to be subjected to a remand.” Id. Mr. Brown
 makes no such claim and, in fact, argued to the CAVC that
 the case should be remanded. J.A. 25–26. His counsel also
 suggested at oral argument that Mr. Brown will be able to
 later raise the issues here on appeal from an adverse final
 judgment. See Oral Arg. at 2:35–3:33. We agree. If the
 Board rejects Mr. Brown’s claim for an earlier effective
 date, Mr. Brown can appeal to the CAVC and continue to
 argue a violation of § 5104A and the “law of the case” doc-
 trine. And he can then, if need be, press that argument to
 this court on appeal from a final judgment. Mr. Brown thus
 has not shown that the remand order meets the third Wil-
 liams condition.
      Because we hold that the remand order does not meet
 at least two of the Williams conditions, we dismiss this ap-
 peal. 2

     2   Given our holding, we need not reach the remain-
 ing Williams factor. See Donnellan, 676 F.3d at 1091–93
 (dismissing case after finding that the third Williams con-
 dition was not met).
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 8                                    BROWN   v. MCDONOUGH

                       CONCLUSION
     We have considered Mr. Brown’s other arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we dismiss
 Mr. Brown’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                      DISMISSED
                          COSTS
 No costs.