Court Opinion

ID: 9766117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:33:00.559061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:51.654359
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice.
I do not concur in the opinion of the majority.
The majority have denied to appellant, Bonney, any recovery for his injuries caused by the negligence of the Transit Company on the theory that Vern Ship-ler, the owner .and driver of the automobile, and Bonney were engaged in a joint enterprise and, therefore, the contributory negligence of Shipler is imputed to Bonney, which bars his recovery.
The issue of joint enterprise was not submitted to and passed on by the jury, only two questions were submitted, No. 42, asking whether Bonney exercised any control over the Shipler car, to which the jury answered' that he did not, and No. 43, which asked the jury whether or not Bon-ney had any right of control of .the Ship-ler car, to which the jury answered that he did.
' It occurs to me that the theory of joint adventure was, therefore, abandoned and the defense of the Transit Cortipany was *74thereafter based entirely upon the single fact question as to the right of Bonney to control the Shipler car. The right of control is a pure fact question which must be supported by the evidence. When the jury has found that a joint adventure exists, supported by sufficient evidence, then a legal presumption arises of joint and equal control of the car. Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash.2d 561, 143 P.2d 554. -However, the majority have held that Question No. 43 was a subsidiary issue on joint adventure and, therefore, the trial court could make findings on other issues relating to joint adventure that were not submitted to the jury nor requested by Bonney. For the purpose of this dissenting opinion, I shall treat the holding as correct. Thus, the sole question presented is whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of joint adventure.
There are four elements which constitute joint adventure, namely, (1) a contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a community of interests, (4) an equal right to voice accompanied by an equal right of control. Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash.2d 347, 95 P.2d 1043.
In my opinion the evidence here is insufficient to show that Shipler and Bonney were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time Bonney was injured.
The facts are undisputed and are very clear. Vern Shipler resided in Burt, Iowa, and decided to make a trip to San Antonio, Texas, to visit his uncle and cousin who resided there. He decided to make the trip in his 1951 Packard automobile. He did not want to travel by himself but wanted company, so he invited his uncle, Bryan (Brink) Shipler, who lived at Swea City, Iowa, and two of his friends to go along with him. They accepted the invitation.
Vern Shipler was going to Texas to visit his relatives, and Ralph Bonney and the other two men were going along just for the ride and for a vacation. Either before they left or after they were on the road, they made up a “kitty” out of which gas, oil, meals, and other similar expenses were to be paid. This was a voluntary contribution on the part of the guests, because they did not want to “sponge” off Vern Shipler. They did not offer to pay anything for the use of the car or to pay the cost of repairs in the event of a wreck, such as the one that did occur. Not one word was said about who was to do the driving, or who was to have control of the car. They all examined a map and agreed upon the route to be taken and along the way they used the map to select places to stop for gas, meals, etc.
To my mind this shows nothing more than four friends taking a pleasure trip with a common destination, but with no common or mutual purpose. Vern Ship-ler was coming to San Antonio to see his relatives and the others were coming just for the ride and a vacation. Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57, 280 P. 932. This seems to be the leading case on the question of community of interests. It was there held that two boys making a trip to pick up the key of each to his own locker, had no community of interests. Making up the “kitty” was nothing more than a friendly gesture or a free will offering on the part of the guests. The using of the map to select the route and the places to stop, was something that any gracious host would have gladly extended to his guests, so long as it did not materially interfere with his overall plan. Bonney never drove at all, and never in any way attempted to take over the driving of the car. Vern Shipler drove all the way coming down, except his uncle, Bryan (Brink) Shipler, relieved him for a time on one occasion, while Vern Shipler sat upon the front seat, where he was presumed in law to still be in full charge of his own car. Johnston Testers, Inc., v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 309 S.W.2d 117. Vern Shipler was still driving his own car when the collision occurred.
These facts, to my mind, show nothing more than that Vern. Shipler as host and three of his friends as guests were taking *75a pleasure trip. While they had a common destination, they had no community of interests in the purpose of the trip. The fact that the guests paid part of the expenses of the trip Was nothing more than a generous offer on their part. Blashfield, Automobile Law, Vol. 4, Part 1, § 2372, p. 496; Raub v. Rowe, Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 190, writ refused; Noel v. Lapointe, 86 N.H. 162, 164 A. 769; Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.2d 48; Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 A. 224; Moen v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 3 Wash.2d 347, 101 P.2d 323; Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash.2d 561, 143 P.2d 554; Williamson v. Fitzgerald, 116 Cal.App. 19, 2 P.2d 201; Manos v. James, 7 Wash.2d 695, 110 P.2d 887; Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash.2d 347, 95 P.2d 1043.
The relationship of parties to a joint adventure is a far-reaching matter and prevents one person from recovering damages proximately caused by the negligence of another person because a third person has been contributorily negligent. In other words, it authorizes the imputing of the negligence of one person to another, and where the owner and driver of a car invites friends to go on a pleasure trip with him, his guests should not be found to be joint adventurers with him simply because they volunteered to pay part of the cost of gas and oil, unless the evidence clearly shows that they intentionally entered into a solemn contract making themselves joint adventurers. Joint adventure must be based on contract, either expressed or implied. Mere loose conversation and the doing of social amenities that might be expected between friends on a pleasure trip should not be construed as constituting them joint adventurers, and thereby authorizing the imputing of the negligence of the driver to them, and rendering them liable for an injury proximately caused by such driver to another, or preventing one of such passengers from recovering from a third person for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of the third person. The rule is to the contrary where the purpose of the trip is business. Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash.2d 347, 95 P.2d 1043.
It is a difficult matter for more than one person at a time to control the driving of an automobile, especially as to things that happen suddenly and unexpectedly, and, therefore, where an owner of an automobile is driving his own car on a pleasure trip with his friends who were invited to ride with him, the law presumes that he and no one else is in full control of his own car, and it takes strong and clear proof to show that he has given an equal right to another to control the driving of his own automobile. Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124. A. 224.
The only Texas case I have been able to find to the contrary is the one cited in the opinion of the majority, Douty v. Delta Drilling Co., Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W.2d 164, in which the Supreme Court refused a writ of error, n. r. e. In that case the jury found that Douty, the appellant, failed to keep a proper lookout for his own safety, that he failed to warn Glynn Holder, owner and driver of the car in which Douty was riding, of the approach of a vehicle on the highway, and that he failed to protest to Glynn Holder of his entering upon and attempting to cross the highway without first determining that he could do so with safety. Everybody will agree that if the passenger himself was guilty of contributory negligence in these three particulars he could not recover, and it would be immaterial whether he was a joint adventurer with the owner. What was said by the Court of Civil Appeals in that case about there being a joint adventure is so out of line with the great weight of authority cited above that I conclude the Supreme Court in refusing the writ n. f. e., intended only to approve that part of the decision that held one who is himself guilty of contributory negligence cannot recover for his injuries.
The majority also cite with approval some of the dicta found in Lampe v. Tyrell, 200 Wash. 589, 94 P.2d 193. What was *76actually held in that case is very much in line with my position in this case.
Even if it he regarded that Bonney by contributing to the “kitty” was paying for his transportation and was therefore a paying passenger, still this would not invoke the doctrine of imputed negligence. Some states hold that a pleasure trip cannot constitute a joint venture. Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash.2d 561, 143 P.2d 554. In Burnett v. Howell, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W.2d 410, 411, the Court said:
“Appellee contends that under the holding of Raub v. Rowe, Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 190, 193 (error ref.) that the payment for gasoline or a portion of the automobile expense by one accompanying the driver and owner of an automobile is not payment for transportation under the meaning of Art. 6701b, V.A.C.S. That case holds and we concede it to be a well settled law, that when one is invited to ride with the owner on a trip for their mutual pleasure that the payment for the gas and oil or a portion thereof even though by prior agreement, is merely an exchange of courtesies, and that such would not constitute payment for transportation under the meaning of said Art. 6701b. In the case of Raub v. Rowe, supra, the moving and prime cause of the trip to be taken was a mutual desire of the parties to visit a relative. The payment by the rider of a portion of the automobile expense was merely incidental.”
I think that the majority rule governing the question here presented is well stated in McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909, 912, 913, wherein the Court said:
“The great weight of authority is to the effect that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and oil consumed on a trip, when that trip is taken for pleasure or social purposes, is nothing more than the exchange of social amenities and does not transform into a passenger one who without such exchange would be a guest, and consequently is not payment for the transportation or compensation within the meaning of the statute. It is obvious that if a different result obtained under any construction of the statute its purposes would be defeated and its effect annulled. The relationships which will give rise to the status of a passenger must confer a benefit of a tangible nature and are limited. Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn. 183, 175 A. 470, 472, 95 A.L.R. 1177. * * *
“On the other hand, following the precepts and rules of construction herein noted, the cases indicate, either by a direct holding or by recognition, that where the relationship between the parties is one of business and the transportation is supplied in the pursuit thereof for their mutual benefit, compensation has been’given and the plaintiff is a passenger and not a guest.”
As before stated, the facts in this case are undisputed. They show clearly that Vern Shipler decided to make a pleasure trip to Texas and invited Bonney and the others to go along with him, simply for company. There was no mention on his part of any consideration. The “kitty” was an afterthought, a freewill offering and an exchange of friendly courtesies between Vern Shipler and his guests. Burnett v. Howell, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W.2d 410; Raub v. Rowe, Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 190, writ refused. There was not one word said about who was going to do the driving and Vern Shipler drove his own car, and was driving it at the time of the accident. Bryan (Brink) Shipler relieved him only one time, and during that time Vern Shipler sat on the front seat with Brink, where it would be presumed in law to still be in full charge of his car. Under these circumstances, Vern Shipler was the host and Bonney his guest and not even a paying guest at the time of the accident. McCarty v. Moss, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W.2d 883; Burnett v. Howell, supra; Raub v. Rowe, supra; Urban v. Chars, 1 Wis.2d 582, *7785 N.W.2d 386. Joint adventure is not in the case. Bonney did not have any right of control over Vern Shipler’s automobile and there is no reason in the world why the negligence of Vern Shipler should be imputed to him.
It would be absurd to hold that the voluntary paying of a part of the expenses of the trip by a guest would not constitute him a paying passenger under the provisions of the guest statute, art. 6701b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, but would constitute him a joint adventurer where joint adventure has been plead.
I would grant the motion for a rehearing of appellant and here render judgment for Bonney in the amount found by the jury.