Court Opinion

ID: 9411774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 20:07:11.462214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:12.358523
License: Public Domain

John Paul Sexton v. State of Maryland, No. 1324, September Term 2022. Opinion by
Albright, J.

Appeals – Appealability of Orders Generally

A ruling on a motion is appealable if it conclusively settles a movant’s rights in the
subject matter and is not the result of the exercise of the court’s discretion but rather an
incorrect legal determination that the court lacked authority to grant the motion.

Criminal Procedure – Juvenile Restoration Act

Under the Juvenile Restoration Act, the Court may reduce the duration of a sentence for
an individual who was convicted as an adult for an offense committed as a minor and
sentenced before October 1, 2021, if the individual has been imprisoned for at least 20
years for the offense. Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 8-110(a). To do so, the court must
determine that (1) the individual is not a danger to the public; and (2) the interests of
justice will be better served by the reduced sentence. Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 8-110(c).

Criminal Procedure – Juvenile Restoration Act

Under the Juvenile Restoration Act, regardless of whether the Court decides to grant or
deny a motion to reduce the duration of a sentence, the Court must issue its decision in
writing and address the factors listed in subsection 8-110(d) of the Criminal Procedure
Article. The fact that a sentence is parole-eligible does not impair the right to be
considered for a sentence reduction, and the Court does not have discretion to defer to the
Parole Commission. See Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 8-110(d) & (e).
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. 00009893
                                                                               REPORTED

                                                                      IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                                                            OF MARYLAND*

                                                                                 No. 1324

                                                                          September Term, 2022

                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                          JOHN PAUL SEXTON

                                                                                     v.

                                                                         STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                     Friedman,
                                                                     Albright,
                                                                     Meredith, Timothy E.
                                                                      (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

                                                                                  JJ.
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                          Opinion by Albright, J.
                                                                ______________________________________

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials          Filed: July 27, 2023
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.
                2023-07-27 15:20-04:00

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

       * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December
14, 2022.
       This appeal arises out of a motion for reduction of sentence filed in the Circuit

Court for Frederick County by John Paul Sexton, appellant. After a hearing on September

23, 2022, the circuit court denied the motion, explaining that the question of Mr. Sexton’s

release was a matter for the parole board. This timely appeal followed.

       The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the circuit court applied

the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion in denying the motion. For the reasons

set forth below, we shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court.

                                     BACKGROUND

                                A. The Underlying Crime

       In 1988, Mr. Sexton, a minor, was charged as an adult with various crimes arising

out of the shooting death of Marc Uher. The shooting occurred on October 26, 1988, the

evening before Mr. Sexton’s seventeenth birthday. A jury trial was held in October 1989.

The record showed that Mr. Sexton “shot and killed Marc Uher, his friend, in the course

of a robbery.” Sexton v. State, No. 681, Sept. Term 1990 at *1 (per curiam) (filed April

15, 1991). The shooting occurred when Mr. Sexton was accompanying Mr. Uher, who

was delivering receipts from a gasoline station to the station owner. Id. at *2. At trial, Mr.

Sexton testified on his own behalf that he “grabbed one of the money sacks and was

getting out of the car when the victim suddenly accelerated the car causing the gun to

strike the seat and accidentally discharge.” Id. “Other evidence indicated that the victim

was shot in the right temple from a distance of approximately six inches.” Id.

                                              1
       Mr. Sexton was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony

murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery, three counts of use of a handgun in

the commission of a crime of violence, and theft. On December 13, 1989, he was

sentenced to life in prison for first-degree premeditated murder, a consecutive twenty

years for one of the use of a handgun counts, and another consecutive twenty years for

robbery with a dangerous weapon. The remaining counts merged for sentencing

purposes. The judgment was affirmed on appeal to this Court. Sexton, No. 681, supra.

The Supreme Court of Maryland (at the time named the Court of Appeals of Maryland)1

denied Mr. Sexton’s petition for writ of certiorari.

   B. Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to the Juvenile Restoration Act

       On May 27, 2022, more than 32 years after he was sentenced, Mr. Sexton, who

remains incarcerated, filed in the circuit court a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant

to Section 8-110 of the Criminal Procedure Article. See Md. Code, Crim. Proc. (“CP”) §

8-110 (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.). That section of the Maryland Code is part of

what is known as the Juvenile Restoration Act (“JUVRA”).2 Chapter 61, Laws of

Maryland 2021. Enacted in 2021, and effective October 1, 2021, JUVRA made three

       1
         At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the
Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. See,
also, Md. Rule 1-101.1(a) (“From and after December 14, 2022, any reference in these
Rules or, in any proceedings before any court of the Maryland Judiciary, any reference in
any statute, ordinance, or regulation applicable in Maryland to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland shall be deemed to refer to the Supreme Court of Maryland….”).
       2
           Other provisions of JUVRA are set forth in CP § 6-235.

                                              2
significant changes to Maryland’s sentencing practices for juvenile offenders convicted

as adults. “Specifically, it gave sentencing courts discretion to impose less than the

minimum required by law, prospectively banned sentences of life without the possibility

of parole, and authorized offenders sentenced before October 1, 2021 who have spent

more than 20 years in prison to file a motion to reduce their remaining sentence.” Malvo

v. State, 481 Md. 72, 85 (2022) (citing CP §§ 6-235, 8-110). Only the final provision is at

issue here. It applies “only to an individual who: (1) was convicted as an adult for an

offense committed when the individual was a minor; (2) was sentenced for the offense

before October 1, 2021; and (3) has been imprisoned for at least 20 years for the offense.”

CP § 8-110(a).

       JUVRA specifies that the court may reduce the duration of a sentence if it

determines that “(1) the individual is not a danger to the public; and (2) the interests of

justice will be better served by a reduced sentence.” CP § 8-110(c). The court is required

to consider factors set forth in subsection (d), which provides:

       (d) A court shall consider the following factors when determining whether
       to reduce the duration of a sentence under this section:
          (1) the individual’s age at the time of the offense;
          (2) the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
          individual;
          (3) whether the individual has substantially complied with the rules of
          the institution in which the individual has been confined;
          (4) whether the individual has completed an educational, vocational, or
          other program;
          (5) whether the individual has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and
          fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction;
          (6) any statement offered by a victim or a victim’s representative;
          (7) any report of a physical, mental, or behavioral examination of the
          individual conducted by a health professional;

                                              3
            (8) the individual’s family and community circumstances at the time of
            the offense, including any history of trauma, abuse, or involvement in
            the child welfare system;
            (9) the extent of the individual’s role in the offense and whether and to
            what extent an adult was involved in the offense;
            (10) the diminished culpability of a juvenile as compared to an adult,
            including an inability to fully appreciate risks and consequences; and
            (11) any other factor the court deems relevant.

CP § 8-110(d).

          The statute is silent as to the weight to be given to each factor, and Maryland’s

appellate courts have not addressed that issue. Regardless of whether the court decides to

grant or deny the motion to reduce the duration of a sentence, it must issue its decision in

writing and address the factors listed in subsection 8-110(d). See CP § 8-110(e)(1). If the

motion is denied or granted in part, the individual may file another motion after three

years. CP § 8-110(f)(1). A third and final motion may be filed after an additional three-

year waiting period. Id. JUVRA does not affect the individual’s opportunity to seek

parole.

          In the instant case, there is no dispute that Mr. Sexton was eligible to file his

motion to reduce the duration of his sentence pursuant to CP § 8-110, but the State

opposed any reduction of his sentence.

                                                 4
                                   C. JUVRA Hearing

       A hearing on the motion for reduction of sentence was held on September 23,

2022. The judge advised the parties that she had read the transcript of Mr. Sexton’s trial

and reviewed all of the documents and exhibits filed by both Mr. Sexton and the State.3

       Counsel for Mr. Sexton argued that the court should reduce Mr. Sexton’s sentence

to time served or set a future release date. In support of that request, counsel explained

Mr. Sexton’s experience with addiction as a teenager, stating:

       John Paul Sexton deserves our mercy. John was a latchkey kid growing up.
       His parents loved him dearly but worked long hours and instilled in him a
       great pride in doing work, and doing work well.
               That work ethic in doing the job, started at 13 for John when he
       started working at a sanitation plant. The summer he was 16, he could work
       full time and over the table. So he suddenly had the disposable income of
       an adult with an adolescent mindset.
              The job was long, had labor intensive hours, and he became friends
       with his coworkers, adult men. They partied, so Mr. Sexton partied as well.

       3
         Those documents included the following attachments to Mr. Sexton’s motion for
reduction of sentence: pages from Mr. Sexton’s 1989 Pre-Sentence Investigation; his
1991 high school diploma; a 1995 Dean’s List certificate from Coppin State College; a
certificate for completing 1,920 hours as a computer clerk for Maryland Correctional
Enterprises in 2007; a certificate for 9 years of experience in clerical and computer
graphic arts, welder, and tag production while employed at Maryland Correctional
Enterprises; a 2016 positive reference letter from the veterinarian for the puppies trained
by America’s Vet Dogs; a positive letter of reference from Sgt. Vinson, a liaison for
America’s Vet Dogs; a 2016 positive reference letter from Rebecca Offutt, a Case
Management Specialist at the Maryland Correctional Institute; letters of recognition and
certificates for Mr. Sexton’s work in the Youth Challenge Program; a 2016 letter of
acknowledgement for Mr. Sexton’s work with the Lifer’s Conference; 2008 Maryland
Parole Commission recommendation/decision; page 866 from the trial transcript; and a
2021 letter of support from Minister Ila A. Thompson. The trial court also considered
documents provided prior to the hearing which included letters of support from a
corrections officer, Mr. Sexton’s older brother, and Mr. Sexton’s mother.

                                              5
       And by the end of that summer, he had a full-fledged addiction to crack
       cocaine.
              When school started, he could work less and less, and the disposable
       income he had to feed his addiction dried up. Mr. Sexton was playing an
       adult with the training, experience, and mindset of an adolescent. He could
       not appreciate the stakes.
              To feed his addiction, Mr. Sexton started resorting to things he’s not
       proud of. Theft, it snowballed to robbery and murder. Adolescence and
       addiction strained John’s decision and actions 33 years ago.
       Counsel highlighted Mr. Sexton’s achievements while incarcerated. Mr. Sexton

“spent the first two weeks” in prison in solitary confinement, “detoxing, withdrawing,

sobering up to the reality that he had taken a friend’s life.” After being released to the

general population, he had only two infractions in all his years of incarceration, both of

which occurred in the early years of his prison sentence. Mr. Sexton earned his GED

within his first two years of incarceration, took college courses when permitted, and

made the dean’s list. He also joined a victim’s rights organization that hosted an annual

victim’s rights week, arranged for speakers, and engaged with victims. From 2014 to

2019, Mr. Sexton worked as a trainer for America’s Vet Dogs, a nonprofit organization

that provided service dogs for veterans and first responders. In all, Mr. Sexton trained ten

dogs, five from puppies. Counsel played for the court a recording of a local news story

about America’s Vet Dogs that included Mr. Sexton, who highlighted some of his work

with a dog named Raven, the fourth dog he trained.

       The State argued that regardless of Mr. Sexton’s achievements while incarcerated,

his motion should be denied. The State presented the court with victim impact statements

shared with the State’s Attorney’s Office after Mr. Sexton’s motion was filed, including

                                              6
one from Marc Uher’s brother, Paul. Among other things, Paul Uher stated that Mr.

Sexton had not apologized or made “any attempt at amends to” his family. Marc Uher’s

father, who was about 81 years old, found it too difficult emotionally to participate in the

hearing.

       The State argued that Mr. Sexton’s motion should be denied because of the

premeditated nature of the offense, the senselessness of the crime, Mr. Sexton’s lack of

remorse, and the level of harm and loss caused by Mr. Sexton’s crimes. In support of

those arguments, counsel noted that evidence presented at trial showed that for a couple

of days leading up to the shooting, Mr. Sexton had in his possession a gun that belonged

to his brother. Mr. Sexton used his “friendship to con Marc4 into telling him how the

[gas] station was run, how much money they got, what they did with the money in the

evenings, where they took it, and how it was taken away.” On the day before the

shooting, Mr. Sexton attempted to flag down another employee of the gas station as he

was driving the money to the owner, but that employee did not stop. On the day of the

shooting, Mr. Sexton, with a gun in his possession, spent all evening at the gas station

with Marc. According to the State, Mr. Sexton did not commit the murder for money but

instead to cover up his crime and to escape because he knew he could not get away with

the money without killing his friend.

       4
       At times in the circuit court, the State and Mr. Sexton referred to Mr. Marc Uher
as “Marc.” We do so as well in order to be accurate. We mean no disrespect in doing so.

                                             7
       The State asserted that Mr. Sexton had failed to show remorse. The State noted

that after Mr. Sexton shot Mr. Uher, he pushed him into the passenger seat and then

drove to the side of some railroad tracks where he dumped Mr. Uher’s body. For three

and a half days thereafter, Mr. Sexton interacted with Mr. Uher’s family and friends,

went to Mr. Uher’s house, and purposely directed groups looking for Mr. Uher not to go

to the place where he had dumped the body. The day after the shooting, Mr. Sexton told a

Sheriff that he had been with Mr. Uher at the gas station until he got off work. Mr. Uher

then drove him to a location where Mr. Sexton had planned to meet a girl and then drove

away. Although Mr. Sexton provided a name for the girl he said he was with, no such

person was ever found.

       The State also pointed to the transcript of an interview of Mr. Sexton conducted by

the police after he had been arrested and which had been admitted in evidence at the

murder trial. In that interview, Mr. Sexton gave different versions of what occurred. He

admitted that he took the money and ran off and claimed that Mr. Uher tried to run after

him for a bit. Mr. Sexton denied that the money was for drugs. Later, Mr. Sexton

admitted that he had a gun and said it went off accidentally while getting out of the car.

Because he did not know what to do, he jumped back in the car, pushed Mr. Uher to the

other side of the car, and drove around for a bit before dumping his body at the railroad

tracks. After dumping Mr. Uher’s body, Mr. Sexton drove to Frederick. He opened the

bags of money, bought some crack cocaine, and then hung out in his car. Later, he met up

with friends and family to look for Mr. Uher.

                                             8
       At trial, Mr. Sexton stuck “with the story that the gun accidentally went off,” but

pending sentencing, Mr. Sexton wrote a letter to a Supreme Court of Maryland judge

claiming that someone else shot Mr. Uher and that he had been framed. Mr. Sexton

asserted that he knew “who did it but he needs somebody he could talk to in confidence.”

According to the State, the statements in the letter were in contrast to statements in Mr.

Sexton’s psychological, drug, and alcohol evaluation prepared in anticipation of

sentencing, where Mr. Sexton maintained the shooting was accidental. The State

highlighted that “testimony throughout the trial show[ed] that the gun was placed within

inches of Marc’s head.”

       For all these reasons, the State argued that while Mr. Sexton might be a reformed

prisoner, he was not a reformed person, that it did “not have trust that [Mr. Sexton] will

not reoffend in some way,” and that he was not ready to be released back into society.

According to the State, none of the justifications for passing JUVRA applied to Mr.

Sexton except for his “age and the, probably biological definition of what his brain was at

that time.” The State noted that Mr. Sexton was not influenced by an adult when

committing the crimes, that he did not have a mental health diagnosis, and that he did not

have a history of abuse. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Sexton

acted impulsively or that he lacked impulse control.

       Mr. Sexton’s attorney challenged the State’s claim that Mr. Sexton did not have

remorse. She stated that Mr. Sexton had made efforts to reach out to the Uher family to

apologize and “have some sort of restorative justice conversation,” but he was not able to

                                             9
get in touch with the family or had been advised by counsel not to do that. She also noted

that Mr. Sexton was not disputing any of the facts about the crimes he committed and that

the State “created a false dichotomy between [the victim] and Mr. Sexton.” She argued

that this was in contrast to the purpose of JUVRA, which “was to override the executive

retributive way that we treated children,” and that the “facts of the incident” was only one

of eleven factors the court was required to consider. Counsel for Mr. Sexton also argued

that Mr. Sexton’s actions after the incident were “adolescent” and “immature” and that

“trying to lie their way out of an issue” is an “adolescent’s way of responding.”

       Mr. Sexton testified at the motions hearing. He did not know that Marc’s mother

had died and had hoped Marc’s father would be at the hearing because he wanted “to tell

them how sorry [he was] for all the pain and all the suffering that [he] caused them

because of what [he had] done to Marc.” He explained that Department of Public Safety

and Correctional Services protocols prohibited him from contacting the victim’s family.

Nevertheless, he tried to have attorneys, family members, and a mediator reach out to the

Uher family but was unsuccessful. He expressed remorse, stating, in part:

              You can address me. You can ask me whatever questions that you
       would want to. My behavior was wretched and deplorable. There’s no
       excusing what I did. There’s no causation for what I did. And I know that
       I’ve hurt you, and I’ve … hurt the [Uhers] more than anybody can ever
       imagine.

Later, Mr. Sexton said:

               I often think about Marc, a lot of times, and what has been lost. Not
       just in terms of his character, but what he would have produced. He might
       have came up with the cure for cancer. But we’ll never know because of
       me.

                                             10
              And I am remorseful for that. I am ashamed of that. And I am sorry
       for that.

       Mr. Sexton noted that he had not pursued any collateral attacks or post-conviction

proceedings and stated, “I haven’t been trying to skirt my responsibilities and taking

responsibility for my actions.” He explained that he used his time in prison as “an

atonement journey of the highest order,” sought “to do positive, not just for himself[,]”

and tried “to help people” and “do better things for this world.” He claimed he “can’t

stand drugs today” and had not “done a drug” since the crime.

       Mr. Sexton spoke about his work in prison planning victims’ rights events,

training service dogs, engaging with “wayward youth,” and teaching music classes. He

rejected the State’s suggestion that he had not been rehabilitated or that he would “always

be the same horrible person” that he was when he was “16 and strung out on drugs.” Mr.

Sexton claimed there were “a lot of things that [he] can contribute to society, rather than

wasting away somewhere in a dungeon.” He also suggested that he was in need of

medical treatment, although no specific evidence on that point was presented.

                     D. Court’s Findings on the Required Factors

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took a recess to review written victim

impact statements. When court reconvened, the judge addressed the factors set forth in

CP § 8-110(d). As to the first four factors, the court found as follows:

              First factor that the Court has to consider is what was the
       individual’s age at the time of the offense. At the time of the offense, Mr.
       Sexton was 16. However, I note it was very shortly before his 17th birthday.
       But at the time, he was 16 years old.

                                             11
              This conviction was – is for first degree premeditated murder, as
       well as armed robbery and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. There
       were also some additional offenses that went to the jury that were
       consumed in the convictions for first degree murder, premeditated murder,
       as well as the robbery and the handgun convictions.
              Mr. Sexton is the actor, is the sole principal in this offense. This was
       not a codefendant case. And again, there were no other individuals that
       were involved in the commission of this offense, other than Mr. Sexton.
              The Court next has to consider whether the individual has complied
       with the institution – the rules of the institution in which he has been
       confined. And clearly, from the record before me, Mr. Sexton has complied
       with the rules of the institution as noted in the parole commission notes that
       he has been – his record in the division has been exemplary.
              He’s done very, very well. He has completed his educational
       requirements and has fulfilled and enhanced other programs available
       through the Division of Correction. So he has been using his time
       appropriately and productively during his period of incarceration.

       As to the fifth required factor, the court determined that Mr. Sexton had

“demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and that there was “no evidence indicating

that he has had any behavior in the prison that would adversely affect his being released

in society.” The court deferred its finding on whether a sentence reduction was justified

until after discussing “other things.”

       The court addressed required factors six through ten as follows:

              I do note, I’ve received and read statements by the victims and the
       victims’ representatives that the pain and the hurt from this offense
       continues to this day, 34 years later. There is – Mr. Sexton has referenced
       he has some physical concerns. There is not any evidence of any mental
       behavioral concerns for Mr. Sexton at the present time, although there are
       health concerns.
               Mr. Sexton’s family and community circumstances at the time of the
       offense, which include any history of trauma, abuse, or other involvement
       in the child welfare system. Although clearly Mr. Sexton was not in the
       child welfare system, there’s no significant history of trauma.

                                             12
              I did have the opportunity to review the psychological evaluation
       that was completed after the conviction, and prior to the sentencing, which
       indicated there was some family issues and Mr. Sexton was not residing at
       home for the few days shortly before the murder in this case.
               And that there was some – there were family issues going on at that
       time, and that that was known to the Court at the time of the initial
       sentencing in this case, that there were some factors there, but not a
       significant fact.
              The next is the individual’s role in the offense and whether and the
       extent to which an adult was involved in this offense. As I indicated earlier,
       there were no other individuals involved and that Mr. Sexton was the sole
       actor in this, in this crime – crimes.
               Factor ten talks about the diminished culpability of a juvenile as
       compared to an adult, including an inability to fully appreciate the risks and
       consequences. That is a factor that the Court generally takes notice of, is
       there are studies that indicate that, of course, that juvenile brains develop
       much more slowly and that as a consequence, it is kind of an assumption
       that the individual can’t appreciate the risks and consequences.
              I don’t have any definitive study from the time, or actually looking
       back at the time, that indicates what Mr. Sexton’s culpability determination
       was at that time. There’s just no evidence of that.

       The eleventh required factor is “any other factor the court deems relevant.” Under

that factor, the court considered two cases, Harris v. State, 479 Md. 84 (2022) and

Jedlicka v. State, 481 Md. 178 (2022). The court recognized that neither case was

factually similar to Mr. Sexton’s, but both discussed the applicability and appropriateness

of a life sentence in a case involving crimes committed by juveniles.5 The judge

concluded:

       5
        Harris involved a direct appeal after a trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court
of Maryland determined that a life sentence with the possibility of parole for a juvenile
offender convicted of first-degree felony murder was not grossly disproportionate under
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Harris, 479 Md. at 121-23.
                                                                                (continued)

                                             13
              Those cases are dramatically different than the factual case – the
       factual predicate here in this case. This was a serious crime. [The trial
       judge] took into consideration Mr. Sexton’s youth in rejecting a life without
       parole sentence. His sentence, although a lengthy one, is a sentence that is
       parole eligible. He has had a parole hearing.

                                  E. The Court’s Ruling

       After making those findings, the court denied Mr. Sexton’s motion for reduction of

sentence, stating:

               I am not convinced that the sentence issued by [the trial judge] under
       all these circumstances is inappropriate, despite all of the things that Mr.
       Sexton has accomplished in his incarceration, and I am not minimalizing
       the effect on an inmate of 34 years in the Division of Correction.
              But as I said earlier, this is a parole eligible sentence. And whether
       or not Mr. Sexton has exhibited behavior that entitles him to a release from
       incarceration is, in this Court’s mind, a parole board decision and not this
       Court’s decision.
              Therefore, I do not find that the defendant has met the requirements
       under the statute to justify a reduction in sentence, and his motion is denied.

(emphasis added).

                                      DISCUSSION

       Mr. Sexton contends that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard and,

thereby, abused its discretion in denying his motion for reduction of sentence under CP §

8-110. The State agrees and so do we.

Jedlicka involved an appeal from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a). The Supreme Court of Maryland held, among other
things, that a “stacked” sentence for non-homicide offenses was not a de facto sentence
of life without the possibility of parole and, therefore, was not illegal under the Eighth
Amendment. Jedlicka, 481 Md. at 195-98.

                                             14
                A. Appealability and the Applicable Standard of Review

       Whether there is a right to appeal the denial of a motion to reduce a sentence under

JUVRA generally has not been addressed by the appellate courts of this State. We need

not resolve that issue here. Generally, in other contexts, the denial of a motion for

modification of a sentence is not an appealable order. Recently, in Johnson v. State, we

recognized that Maryland’s “Supreme Court has held that a ‘discretionary denial’ of a

motion for modification of sentence, under Maryland Rule 4-345(e), which bears at least

a superficial similarity to a motion for modification of sentence under [CP] § 8-110,

generally is not appealable.” 258 Md. App. 71, 87 (2023). In support of that statement,

we cited Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 615 (2008), a case in which Maryland’s Supreme

Court “distinguished ‘motions to correct a sentence based upon an error of law and

motions to reconsider sentence that are entirely committed to the court’s discretion.’”

Johnson, 258 Md. App. at 87 (quoting Hoile, 404 Md. at 617). In Hoile, the Court

“concluded that only an appeal from the denial of a motion ‘entirely’ within a sentencing

court’s discretion is barred.” 404 Md. at 617.

       In other cases, Maryland’s appellate courts have recognized that a ruling is

appealable if it is not the result of the exercise of the court’s discretion but rather an

incorrect legal determination that the court lacked authority to grant the motion. See, e.g.,

Brown v. State, 470 Md. 503, 548-552 and 548 n.52 (2020) (discussing appealability of

motions to modify under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) and the Justice Reinvestment Act, 2016

                                               15
Md. Laws, ch. 515); Coley v. State, 74 Md. App. 151, 155-57 (1988) (the court, in

refusing to consider modifying appellant’s sentence, abused its discretion to revise a

sentence which Md. Rule 4-345(b) vested in it). In Johnson, the issue was whether

Johnson satisfied the eligibility criteria to seek relief under CP § 8-110. Johnson, 258

Md. App. at 87. In addressing that issue, the circuit court did not exercise discretion but

rather ruled in each case that Mr. Johnson was ineligible to seek relief under the statute.

Id. We held that those rulings constituted “legal determinations that were ‘unqualified’

and conclusively settled Mr. Johnson’s rights in the subject matter and were, therefore,”

appealable final judgments. Id. That is the situation here as well.

                                        B. Analysis

       Mr. Sexton argues that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard, failed to

recognize its authority to rule on his motion, and thereby abused its discretion in denying

the motion. Under JUVRA, the decision to grant or deny a motion for reduction of

sentence under CP § 8-110 generally rests in the discretion of the circuit court upon

consideration of the required factors. Yet even under that deferential standard of review,

the circuit court’s discretion is tempered by the requirement that the court apply the

“correct legal standards[.]” Faulkner v. State, 468 Md. 418, 460-61 (2020) (citing

Jackson v. Sollie, 449 Md. 165, 196 (2016)); Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006)

(quoting LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 301 (2004)). When a court fails

to do so, it abuses its discretion. See, e.g., Wilson-X v. Dep’t of Human Res., 403 Md.

667, 675 (2008) (“[T]rial judges do not have discretion to apply inappropriate legal

                                             16
standards, even when making decisions that are regarded as discretionary in nature.”);

Matter of Dory, 244 Md. App. 177, 203 (2019) (“[T]rial courts do not have discretion to

apply incorrect legal standards.”). Whether the circuit court properly construed and

applied CP § 8-110 is a question of law that we review de novo. Mayor and City Council

of Baltimore v. Thornton Mellon, LLC, 478 Md. 396, 410 (2022) (citing Schisler, 394

Md. at 535); Davis v. State, 474 Md. 439, 451 (2021) (With issues of law, “[w]e are not

looking at whether the trial court abused its discretion in its ultimate determination, but

whether it applied the proper legal standard[] in exercising its discretion.”).

       Under Eighth Amendment6 jurisprudence, a sentence imposed on a juvenile

offender ordinarily must provide “some meaningful opportunity for release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).

See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209-10 (2016) ( “[L]ife without parole

is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity” and may

be imposed only on “the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect

permanent incorrigibility.”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 479 (2012) (Eighth

Amendment prohibits sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory sentences of

life without parole because such sentences fail to “consider[ ] a juvenile’s ‘lessened

       6
        The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend VIII. Marylanders’ rights against cruel and
unusual punishment are also protected by Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. The appellant has not advanced any separate arguments on that basis so we
address only the federal right.

                                             17
culpability’ and greater ‘capacity for change[.]’”). One way of providing a meaningful

opportunity for release is “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for

parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212; see also Farmer

v. State, 481 Md. 203, 215 (2022) (“[M]ost juvenile offenders must be afforded a

meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation. And, often, that ‘meaningful opportunity’ comes through the availability of

parole.” (cleaned up)). But the possibility of parole is not the only way. See Farmer, 481

Md. at 230.

       JUVRA offers another option. As Maryland’s Supreme Court has recognized, in

enacting JUVRA, the “General Assembly has both reformed the parole process and, for

juvenile offenders sentenced as adults, provided another avenue for release of those who

can demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation following a substantial period of

incarceration.” Jedlicka, 481 Md. at 182-183 (footnote omitted).

       In Farmer v. State, 481 Md. 203 (2022), the State moved to dismiss Mr. Farmer’s

appeal on the ground that it was moot as a result of the enactment of JUVRA. Farmer,

481 Md. at 230. The State argued that “regardless of any deficiencies in the Maryland

parole process, JUVRA provides the necessary meaningful opportunity for release and

that Mr. Farmer’s motion to correct an illegal sentence” pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-

345(a) was “therefore moot.” Id. Maryland’s Supreme Court held that Mr. Farmer’s

claim was not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) and, as a result, it was “unnecessary to

reach the State’s motion to dismiss.” Id. at 230-31. In explaining its holding, the Court

                                             18
commented that “[i]t seems quite possible that JUVRA will provide a meaningful

opportunity for release for most juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences, as its

sponsors and advocates intended.” Id. at 231. In a footnote, the Court highlighted some of

the extensive legislative history that supported the idea that JUVRA was intended to

provide the meaningful opportunity for release envisioned in Graham, Montgomery, and

Miller:

       A sponsor of the Senate bill that was enacted as JUVRA remarked that the
       legislation would provide juvenile lifers an opportunity to be released from
       prison by proving they have reformed their lives and shown that
       “[r]edemption is possible.” Written testimony of Senator Christopher West
       (March 26, 2021) submitted to the House Judiciary Committee concerning
       Senate Bill 494 (2021). In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee
       concerning the cross-filed House Bill, a retired circuit court judge noted
       that the federal Constitution requires that juvenile offenders have “a
       meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
       and rehabilitation” and opined that the bill would “alleviate that
       constitutional problem” and bring “Maryland into conformance with what
       the Supreme Court has mandated and what other states have already done.”
       Testimony of Gary Bair on January 21, 2021, concerning House Bill 409
       (2021), available at https://tinyurl.com/5xr5pn6f at 4:35:23. Testimony by
       other advocates for the bill, such as the Campaign for Fair Sentencing of
       Youth and the Maryland Catholic Conference, also equated the legislation
       with the standards set by the Supreme Court in Graham, Miller, and
       Montgomery.

Id. at 231 n.24.

       The plain language of CP § 8-110 makes clear that the General Assembly

authorized and, indeed, required the circuit court to consider the factors listed in

subsection (d) to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to reduce the sentence and

to issue its decision in writing. There is no mention of parole in CP § 8-110, nor anything

to suggest that the Parole Commission’s authority takes precedence over the circuit

                                             19
court’s authority. There is also no provision in CP § 8-110 that permits the circuit court

simply to defer to the Parole Commission or to pass to that body the question of whether

an inmate is entitled to a reduction of sentence under JUVRA.7 “[A] trial judge who

encounters a matter that falls within the realm of judicial discretion must exercise [that

judge’s] discretion in ruling on the matter,” and “[t]hat exercise of discretion must be

clear from the record.” Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 (1997) (citations and

emphasis omitted).

       At the conclusion of the hearing on Mr. Sexton’s motion for reduction of sentence,

the court stated that it was “not convinced” that the sentence imposed by the original

sentencing judge “under all these circumstances is inappropriate[.]” But the

appropriateness of the original sentence, and the facts considered by the original

sentencing judge, were not at issue before the court. The fact that Mr. Sexton’s original

sentence was parole-eligible did not impair his right to be considered for a sentence

reduction by the circuit court under CP § 8-110. The circuit court was required to decide

the merits of Mr. Sexton’s motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to the requirements

of the statute; under the relevant legal standards set forth in CP § 8-110, that decision

belonged to the circuit court, not the parole board. Thus, the circuit court committed an

error of law in ruling that “whether or not Mr. Sexton has exhibited behavior that entitles

       7
         That is not to say that the circuit court must disregard materials concerning the
Maryland Parole Commission. To the contrary, such materials may relate to one or more
of the factors in CP § 8-110(d), a list that also includes “any other factor the court deems
relevant.” CP § 8-110(d)(11).

                                             20
him to a release from incarceration is . . . a parole board decision and not this Court’s

decision.” We shall vacate the judgment of and remand the case to the circuit court for

further consideration of and a decision on Mr. Sexton’s motion.

       In so holding, we express no opinion on the proper result in deciding Mr. Sexton’s

motion—that matter is committed to the sound discretion of the circuit court. On remand,

the circuit court should again weigh and address the factors set forth in CP § 8-110(d) and

make the determinations required by CP § 8-110(c), both in light of the purpose of

JUVRA and the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from which the statute derives. The

court must also comply with subsection (e), which requires that the court’s decision be

issued in writing and address the factors set forth in subsection (d). We agree with Mr.

Sexton that, in light of the passage of time and the nature of the required factors, prior to

making its determination, the circuit court should allow the parties to present any

additional evidence developed since the last hearing.

                                           JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
                                           FOR FREDERICK COUNTY VACATED;
                                           CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
                                           PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
                                           THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
                                           APPELLEE.

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