Court Opinion

ID: 6916735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 22:43:58.303524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:06:40.692417
License: Public Domain

GARDNER, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I would affirm on the grounds stated by Judge Lemley in his opinion. Aaron v. Cooper, D.C.E.D.Ark., 163 F.Supp. 13.
Because of the limitation of time within which this case must be decided it is not possible to prepare a dissenting opinion and, hence, I am preparing only a short memorandum.
It is conceded that the school authorities have acted in good faith both in formulating a plan for integrating and in attempting to implement that plan. Their efforts in this regard were met with unprecedented and unforeseen opposition and resistance as set out and enumerated in the majority opinion. This opposition included acts of violence to such an unprecedented extent that the armed forces of the United States were stationed in and about the school building. The events pertinent to the attempts of the school authorities during the school year to implement its plan for integrating are set forth in the majority opinion. The normal conduct of the school was continuously disrupted *41and the state of mind, both within and without the school, was to a greater or lesser extent in a state of hysteria. Under circumstances and conditions set out in Judge Lemley’s opinion the school authorities made application for an extension of time so as to permit a cooling off or breathing spell so that both pupils, parents, teachers and the public might to some extent become reconciled to the inevitable necessity for public school integration. Having in mind that the school officials and the teaching staff acted in good faith and that the school officials presented their petition for an extension of time in good faith, it was the duty of the court “to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles”. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083. In this situation the action of Judge Lemley in extending the time as requested by the school officials was the exercise of his judicial discretion. The background is well set forth in Judge Lemley’s opinion. For centuries there had been no intimate social relations between the white and colored races in the section referred to as the South. There had been no integration in the schools and that practice had the sanction of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States as constitutionally legal. It had become a way of life in that section of the country and it is not strange that this long-established, cherished practice could not suddenly be changed without resistance. Such changes, if successful, are usually accomplished by evolution rather than revolution, and time, patience, and forbearance are important elements in effecting all radical changes. The action of Judge Lemley was based on realities and on conditions, rather than theories. The exercise of his discretion should not, I think, be set aside as it seems to me it was not an abuse of discretion but rather a discretion wisely exercised under the conditions. We should not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Judge Lemley’s decision is not without precedent in principle. It is, I think, warranted by the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083. See also Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, D.C.E.D.Va., 164 F.Supp. 786; Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, D.C.E.D.Va., 149 F.Supp. 431; State of Wisconsin v. State of Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 49 S.Ct. 163, 73 L.Ed. 426, modified 281 U.S. 179, 50 S.Ct. 266, 74 L.Ed. 799; 289 U.S. 395, 53 S.Ct. 671, 77 L.Ed. 1283; 309 U.S. 569, 60 S.Ct. 789, 84 L.Ed. 953; State of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, & Penn. v. State of Ill., 311 U.S. 107, 61 S.Ct. 154, 85 L.Ed. 73; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619. It was the judgment of the school officials as indicated by their petition and, after hearing, the judgment of the trial court, that the extension of time requested should be granted. I do not think it can be said that the findings of the trial court and its conclusion based thereon are clearly erroneous. I would affirm.