Court Opinion

ID: 9861862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:50:56.346678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:35.221636
License: Public Domain

LILLIE, J.
I concur with my colleagues in their view that respondent court would be acting in excess of its jurisdiction if it were to carry out the procedure for an in camera inspection of defendant’s hospital file as set forth in its order of November 2, 1967, but I dissent insofar as they conclude that *294defendant is entitled to the benefit of the privilege with respect to those portions of the hospital records which relate to Ms alleged intoxicated condition.
The privilege here asserted by defendant is predicated upon considerations precluding “the humiliation of the patient that might follow disclosure of his ailments.” (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 232 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418].) Yet had defendant, when removed from the scene by ambulance to Community Hospital for medical care and treatment for his own injuries, been so unfortunate as to have been arrested for drunk driving by an alert law enforcement officer who requested the doctor treating, or a nurse attending him in the hospital to draw a blood sample (even without defendant’s consent), the results of a blood test showing the alcoholic content in the blood would be admissible against him in a criminal prosecution (§§23101, 23102, Veh. Code). (People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 257 [260 P.2d 8]; People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690]; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 [1 L.Ed.2d 448, 7.7 S.Ct. 401]; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 [16 L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826].) The rationale of these cases is found in People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, at page 772 [312 P.2d 690]: “The incidence of death and serious injury on the highways has undeniably assumed tragic dimensions and has been due in a significant degree to the effects of alcohol upon drivers. (See National Safety Council Accident Facts—1955, pp. 43-71.) So long as the measures adopted do not amount to a substantial invasion of individual rights, society must not be prevented from seeking to combat this hazard to the safety of the public. The extraction of blood for testing purposes is, of course, an experience which, every day, many undergo without hardship or ill effects. When this fact, together with the scientific reliability of blood alcohol tests in establishing guilt or innocence, is considered in the light of the imperative public interest involved, the taking of a sample for such a test without consent cannot be regarded as an unreasonable search and seizure where, as here, the extraction is made in a medically approved manner and is incident to the lawful arrest of one who is reasonably believed to have violated section 501 of the Vehicle Code.” Thus, the obtaining and use of such evidence in criminal cases has been held to be justified by the “imperative public interest” in combating ■the serious “incidence of death and serious injury” caused by intoxication on our highways which is a “hazard to the safety of the public. ’ ’
*295While it is true that the privilege here claimed is wholly unavailing to a defendant in a criminal proceeding (Evid. Code, § 998; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 864 [145 P.2d 676]; People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 91 [39 P. 207]; People v. Combes, 56 Cal.2d 135, 149 [14 Cal.Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4]) and the distinction between the applicability of the privilege in civil and criminal cases has been sanctioned (although it is ■ being modified—see additional specified exceptions to the physician-patient privilege in sections 997, 999, Evidence Code), it is my view that the right of recovery by the innocent victim against the intoxicated driver in a civil action for damages is entitled to as much protection as the generic “public,” of whom he is a specific member-victim, on whose benefit the criminal rule is based. The innocent injured guest can recover in a civil action for damages against the driver only if he pleads and proves intoxication or wilful misconduct on the driver’s part. (§ 17158, Veh. Code.) His right to present such evidence on the issue of intoxication, as is permitted to the public in criminal eases, should be protected as much as the right of the public. There is here involved the balancing of rights, i.e., the injured guest’s right to present evidence of the driver’s intoxication as against the driver’s right to invoke the physician-patient privilege from disclosure of his “ailments.” To my mind intoxication is not the kind of “ailment” with which the rationale of the application of the privilege (see City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 232 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418]) is concerned, but is the same condition (self-indulged and personally caused), which constitutes the serious menace to the public and results in serious injuries to its members, that has been held to be the basis for the criminal rule hereinabove noted. Further, there is as much, if not more, “humiliation” caused by disclosure of intoxication in a criminal case as in a civil action. Moreover, the intoxicated driver, charged with felony drunk driving, faced with the results of a blood test administered with blood taken by the doctor treating him, might well plead guilty; such plea, as an admission, could be used against the driver in a subsequent civil action brought by the injured guest based upon his intoxication. Yet in the absence of arrest, if the injured guest sues the driver in a civil action for damages for personal injuries caused by his intoxication, he cannot use evidence thereof revealed to or observed by the doctor treating the driver for his injuries. The same intoxication of the same driver proximately causing' *296the same injuries to the same guest may well be both a crime and a tort. The effect of the majority opinion is that if the intoxicated driver is prosecuted in a criminal proceeding, the privilege is not available to him but if he is sued by his victim for personal injuries it is available.
It is inconceivable to me that justice can be obstructed by such patently arbitrary, fictitious and unrealistic reasoning and distinction. It is my view in this day of extensive trial discovery and enlightened reappraisal of various rules and doctrines that, applied to the facts of this ease,1 the construction which my colleagues have placed on the subject statute does not best serve the interests of truth and justice. I would permit plaintiff to inspect the hospital records relating to defendant’s alleged intoxication.
A petition for rehearing was denied May 15, 1968 and the following opinion was then rendered:

This is not to be understood as sanctioning orders for such.inspection routinely in automobile accident cases in which a general charge of negligence is lodged.