Court Opinion

ID: 9548284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:01:02.66948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:45.858624
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting)—For the reasons hereinafter stated, I am of the opinion that the majority, in interpreting *742Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution, has gone far beyond the bounds of judicial interpretation and has, in effect, amended it. This is a power which the people have reserved exclusively to themselves.
Furthermore, even if the majority opinion be considered as an interpretation of § 10, it is directly contrary to our decision in Wade v. Tacoma, 4 Wash. 85, 29 Pac. 983, which is discussed below.
Because of the importance of the question involved not only to the people of Vancouver but also, in a greater degree, to the people of the entire state of Washington (who have adopted their constitution and reserved to themselves exclusively the power to amend it), I deem it proper to state my views at some length.
In interpreting our constitution, we should have in mind two provisions thereof (Art. I, §§29 and 32) which were included in it for our guidance.
Section 32 lays down this basic principle of interpretation:
“A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights, and the perpetuity of free government.”
Concerning this constitutional provision, this court, in Wheeler School Dist. v. Hawley, 18 Wn. (2d) 37, 137 P. (2d) 1010, said:
“This is not in any sense an inhibition on legislative power. Clearly, it is but an admonition not only to the legislature but also to the courts to keep constantly in mind the fundamentals of our republican form of government— among others, the cleavage between the legislative and the judicial powers. It is thought, however, that the clause warrants the court in holding the act unconstitutional on the theory that it is violative of the principles of local self-government.” (Italics mine.)
One of the fundamentals of our republican form of gov- ■ ernment is the separation of powers into three departments (executive, legislative, and judicial), with the residue of all power of government being reserved by the people (Art. I, § 1). In our constitution, the power to amend it, whether by proposal made by two thirds of each house *743of the legislature, or by a constitutional convention called by such vote of the legislature, is vested solely in the people. See Art. XXIII.
Notwithstanding this fundamental principle, the majority has, under the guise of interpreting three words in Art. XI, § 10, held that the provision requiring that the “proposed charter shall be published in two daily newspapers published in said city” does not mean what it says, but that publication in one daily newspaper and in one allegedly weekly newspaper distributed every fourth day by high school students to homes in one fourth of the city is sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements of § 10.
This holding ignores another fundamental principle which is stated in our constitution in Art. I, § 29, as follows:
“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.” (Italics mine.)
Since there are no express words in Art. XI, § 10, declaring the provisions thereof to be nonmandatory, those provisions are mandatory. Nothing could be plainer than that.
Notwithstanding this plain mandate of the people,. the majority divides the constitution into two divisions: those parts containing so-called “substantive” provisions, and those containing so-called “procedural” provisions. As to the former, the majority recognizes that they must be obeyed, but it holds that the latter are directory only and need not be followed as written. Thus is the will of the people thwarted and the continuance of constitutional government in this state jeopardized.
As applied to Art. XI, § 10, which is construed by the majority in this case, the following words are held to be mandatory:
. . “Any city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this state, ...”
(The majority cites State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wn. (2d) 575, 183 P. (2d) 813, as recognizing that the *744right of the city of Vancouver to adopt a charter is “inviolate” under the quoted language.)
But the later sentence in this same section, reading:
“Said proposed charter shall be published in two daily newspapers published in said city, for at least thirty days prior to the day of submitting the same to the electors for their approval, as above provided,”
is said to be merely “procedural” and, therefore, not mandatory.
The people have said in their constitution that each of the above quoted sentences is of equal force and validity, but the majority holds that the first provision is inviolate, while the second need only be substantially complied with. There is no justification whatever for the court’s thus rewriting the constitution in defiance of the plain meaning of Art. I, § 29, supra.
With the provisions of Art. I, §§ 29 and 32, supra, in mind, let us consider the facts of this case concerning the publication of the proposed city charter in the Clark County News, the legal sufficiency of which is the sole legal question involved. The facts material to this controversy appear in an agreed statement of facts prepared by the parties.
Paragraph I of the agreed statement of facts admits the allegations of the first ten paragraphs of appellant’s petition. Consequently, it is admitted in this case:
“5. That Section 10 of Article 11 of said State Constitution and Section 8953 of Remington’s revised Statutes of Washington provided that such proposed Charter shall be published for 30 days in two daily newspapers published in said City before being submitted to a vote of the electors in said City for approval.
“6. That at all times mentioned herein only one Daily Newspaper was published in said City, to-wit: The Columbian and Sun; that the Clark County News was at all times mentioned herein a Weekly newspaper, published in said City.
“7. That subsequent to the framing of said proposed Charter the duly elected and qualified officials of said City entered into a contract with the above named newspapers to publish said purposed Charter for 30 days, the said Clark County News agreeing to issue its Newspaper 5 days each *745week until it had published said proposed Charter in 30 issues; that said Clark County News has never qualified as a Legal Daily Newspaper under the provisions of Chapter 213 of the Laws of 1941 of the State of Washington.”
Paragraphs IV, V, and VI of the agreed statement of facts state:
“IV. That the Clark County News distributed the daily edition of its paper printed in accordance with its bid, copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, by having it distributed from house to house by high school students; that one thousand (1,000) copies of the paper containing á copy of the proposed charter would be distributed in a certain section of the city on one day and then one thousand (1,000) copies distributed in another section on the next day and so forth, and on the 5th day they would start distribution again, thus covering the same section of the city every 4th day; that this method of distribution continued for thirty (30) Issues and resulted in covering the same section of the city only one day in each four (4); that no copies of the Clark County News were distributed by mail.
“V. That the publisher of the Clark County News had no mailing permit permitting the distribution of the Clark County News by mail during the time the Clark County News was printing the proposed city charter.
'“VI. That at the time the Clark County News was distributed as set out in Paragraph IV. there were not more than one thousand (1,000) copies of the newspaper distributed each day; that at that time there were approximately fourteen thousand five hundred (14,500) homes or home units occupied in Vancouver as established by the records of the Public Utility District for the area within the City.”
Paragraph VII of the agreed statement of facts admits that, unless the charter was legally adopted, the seven councilmen are not legally elected or appointed and are not qualified to act as such officials.
Paragraph IX thereof states that the proposed charter was published in thirty issues of the Vancouver Columbian, a daily newspaper, and that wide and general publicity was given to the charter proposition by way of radio programs, newspapers stories and articles in both local newspapers *746and in the Oregon Journal and Oregonian, newspapers published in Portland, Oregon, but with general circulation in Clark county.
As I see it, the constitutional question arising from the agreed statement of facts was substantially settled in 1892 in Wade v. Tacoma, 4 Wash. 85, 29 Pac. 983. There the city had adopted a charter in compliance with Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution. In it there was a provision for amending it by adoption of a resolution declaring the council’s intention to submit the proposed amendment to the voters and by causing it to be published for thirty days in the official newspaper. This procedure was followed. The plaintiff taxpayer instituted an action to enjoin the operation of the amendment. The city urged that publication of the proposed amendment in the one newspaper was sufficient, because an amendment was not governed by the same constitutional provisions as an original charter. In holding that the provisions of Art. XI, § 10, applied to amendments as well as to charters, and that this amendment was not legally adopted, this court said:
“It may well be presumed that the constitution makers intended to guarantee to the citizens of cities as full and complete a notice of the amendments to charters as of the original charters. In fact there is no reason why they should not. There is no difference in the effect or operation of charter laws because one happens to be in the original charter adopted and the other an amendment to such original charter. The amendment may effectually supplant or destroy the original charter and institute a new policy altogether. It is urged by the respondent that the notice provided by the charter and under which the city acts is sufficient. That is probably true, and it is probably true that it would have been a sufficient notice in fact if the original charter had been published for thirty days in the official newspaper of the city; but the trouble is that it is not the notice prescribed by the constitution, and although other modes in the opinion of this court might be equally, and even more, efficacious, such considerations can have no weight in determining this question. Without entering into an extended analysis of this section we are satisfied that the contention of the appellant is warranted by the *747plain and natural construction of the constitution.” (Italics mine.)
The majority opinion does not even mention this decision. In my opinion, until it is overruled or distinguished, it must be followed in the present case and the judgment of the trial court reversed.
The Wade case is referred to in State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn. (2d) 138, 146 P. (2d) 543 (cited by the majority), but nothing there said in reference to Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution in any way impairs the effectiveness of our decision in the Wade case.
State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, supra, has no bearing upon our problem, because the sufficiency of the publication of the city charter involved, as required in Art. XI, § 10, was not discussed at all.
As indicated above, the issue involved in this case is of much greater importance than the question whether cities of twenty thousand or more population having only one daily newspaper may adopt a charter. The real issue is whether the people of this state are to continue to have constitutional government at all. In other words, is the right to amend the constitution which the people reserved to themselves to be usurped by the courts because they consider their hindsight more practical than the foresight of the framers of the constitution in 1889?
Respondent argues that, if the framers had foreseen in 1889 that in 1952 very few cities of twenty thousand or more population would have two daily newspapers, they would have provided for publication of the proposed charter by one such paper or for some other method of publication. No doubt this is true, but it does not follow that the courts may disregard the plain mandatory provision of the constitution and speculate as to what the framers would do now if they were proposing a constitution today. The right of amendment resides solely in the legislature and the people as provided in Article XXIII. No matter how inconvenient or cumbersome or impossible of compliance the procedure may be, the courts must accept and enforce the constitution *748as written until it is amended by the legislature and the people.
A similar situation arose in State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 27 Wn. (2d) 99, 176 P. (2d) 459, 170 A. L. R. 1425, which involved an attempt to circumvent the constitutional provision fixing the limits of the salaries of certain state officers. These salaries which had been fixed in 1889 had become woefully inadequate by 1945, and the legislature then attempted to remedy the situation by creating a commission on interstate co-operation and providing for additional compensation for the same state officers as members thereof. In holding that the only recourse available to the state officers was to persuade the people to amend the constitution so as to remove these salary limitations, we said:
“But even though we should find, in this case, that the additional duties imposed on these officers by the act in question are extrinsic and foreign to the duties otherwise required of them, and that the legislation was enacted for the purpose of forming the commission, rather than to raise salaries, the act would still contravene the constitution. The people themselves, by placing §§ 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of Art. Ill in the basic law, stated definitely and positively that the salaries of state officers could be raised so high and no higher. In addition to stating that the compensation (not salary) for state officers shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which they have been elected, the people have placed a distinct limitation, as to each of the officers, on the amount of salary each may receive. For instance, as to the superintendent of public instruction, Art. Ill, § 22, says: ‘He shall receive an annual salary of twenty-five hundred dollars, which may be increased by law, but shall never exceed four thousand dollars per annum.’ (Italics ours.) The people realized that the duties of the superintendent of public instruction might be' increased from time to time and gave the legislature authority to raise the salary, but placed an absolute limit on it of four thousand dollars per annum. There are similar salary limitations placed against each state officer with the exception of the commissioner of public lands. We may agree that the people, in framing the constitution, did not contemplate inflation or high prices. But the only recourse which relators have is to go to the people themselves for relief, and not to the legislature or the courts.” (Italics mine.)
*749As a result of this decision, the constitution was amended, and the hardship on the state officers was eliminated. See amendment 20, now Art. XXVIII, § 1, of the constitution, which amended certain sections of Art. II and Art. III. The same procedure should be followed with regard to Art. XI, § 10, if the procedure for the adoption of charters by cities having twenty thousand or more population is to be simplified.
We recently disposed of a similar plea for a judicial amendment of the constitution in State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wn. (2d) 82, 273 P. (2d) 464, with this statement:
“The vice of this reasoning is that it destroys the usefulness and the very purpose of a written constitution. The function of a state constitution under our form of government is well stated in 11 Am. Jur. 651, Constitutional Law, § 44, as follows:
“ ‘A written Constitution is not only the direct and basic expression of the sovereign will, but is the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it and must control as it is written until it shall be changed by the authority that established it. No function of government can be discharged in disregard of, or in opposition to, the fundamental law. The state Constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore or disregard its mandates; and the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot lawfully act beyond the limitations of such Constitution.’
“If it be a fact that public convenience and administrative efficiency can be promoted by maintaining the thirteen state agencies at Seattle or elsewhere than at the seat of government, the constitution may be so amended by majority vote of the people. They have reserved to themselves the sole power to change our state constitution. What we said in State ex rel. Banker v. Clausen, 142 Wash. 450, 253 Pac. 805, quoting with approval from 6 R.C.L. 46, is applicable to the present case:
“ ‘ “A cardinal rule in dealing with constitutions is that they should-receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so that they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the *750circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable. In accordance with this principle, a court should not allow the facts of the particular case to influence its decision on a question of constitutional law, nor should a statute be construed as constitutional in some cases and unconstitutional in others involving like circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire. The will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action; and therefore the courts should never allow a change in public sentiment to influence them in giving a construction to a written constitution not warranted by the intention of its founders.” ’ (Italics ours.)
“Accordingly, we are bound by the mandatory language of Article III and Article XIY of the constitution as adopted by the people in 1889 until such time as the people see fit to exercise their sovereign right to change it.”
There are numerous decisions from other courts of last resort holding that changing economic conditions do not warrant judicial amendment of the constitution:
Straughan v. Coeur D’Alene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P. (2d) 321.
Louisville v. Presbyterian Orphans Home Society, etc., 299 Ky. 566, 185 S. W. (2d) 194.
State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N. E. (2d) 778.
State v. King, 262 Wis. 193, 54 N. W. (2d) 181.
In the last cited case, it was said:
“If and when it appears to the people that a constitutional inhibition or restraint is objectionable or that changed social, economic, or political conditions require departure from what has been considered to be necessary for the protection and preservation of formerly recognized rights or the imposition of new obligations the means of eliminating or adding are adequately provided by the constitution itself. The refusal of the court to usurp the power reserved to the people themselves to amend the fundamental law does not place the people nor their representatives in a strait jacket, helpless to adapt the law to their needs or wishes.
“The fact that time may be consumed and delay, possibly costly, may result from the necessity for permitting the people to exercise their exclusive right to amend the constitution or that there may in some instances be other considerations of expediency which would suggest un*751authorized action by the court, does not permit us to arrogate to ourselves that power. The results of orderly procedure, if they appear to be objectionable, can easily be obviated if the people find it necessary or desirable to submit to the consequences of their elimination. The heads of dictatorial governments have not been hampered in that regard. Until the people express a willingness to submit to the evils of that form of government the court should confine its operations and activities to those delegated to it, and in compliance with the oaths of its members, so function as to aid them in the preservation of the rights and the limitations expressed in the constitution.” (Italics mine.)
The court of appeals of Maryland, in disposing of the argument that it give great weight to contemporaneous construction of an ambiguous constitutional provision, said in Johnson v. Duke, 180 Md. 434, 24 A. (2d) 304:
“The doctrine is based upon the assumption that the contemporaries of the framers have claims to our deference on the question of interpretation, inasmuch as they enjoyed the best opportunities of learning the intention of the framers and the understanding of the people who ratified the instrument. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 290, 6 L. Ed. 606, 632. But it is equally well settled that contemporaneous construction should be resorted to with caution and reserve, and can never be allowed to enlarge, restrict, or contradict the plain meaning of the text. Black, Interpretation of Laws, sec. 31. It is the sacred duty of the courts to preserve inviolate the integrity of the Constitution. Hence it would be a violation of their duty to treat the fundamental law as subject to modification except in conformance with constitutional methods. McPherson v. Blacker, Secretary of State, 92 Mich. 377, 52 N. W. 469, 472, 16 L. R. A. 475, 31 Am. St. Rep. 587. Failure to exercise a power expressly granted by the Constitution does not destroy that power. In order that the doctrine of practical construction can be applied by the court, the construction must not result in any unconstitutional usurpation.” (Italics mine.)
The warning sounded by George Washington in 1796 in his Farewell Address as to the evils resulting from disregard of the people’s right to amend the constitution, is still applicable to every republican form of government. He said:
*752“If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may. be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.” (Italics mine.)
If we are to have a government of laws and not of men, the constitution as presently written must be applied to this case. It has been said (Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39; 15 Am. Rep. 563) that there are only three methods of changing the constitution: (1) by amending it as provided therein, (2) by a convention called in the manner prescribed therein, and (3) by revolution. This court has now sanctioned a fourth method, to wit, by judicial interpretation.
Numerous courts of last resort, in passing upon the validity of attempts to amend their respective state constitutions or city charters, have held that the method prescribed therein must be faithfully followed. Several of these courts cited and followed Cooley, Constitutional Limitation (4th ed.) 94-95 (now found in his 8th edition at page 159), in which the learned author stated:
“But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the *753sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as possible to implication.” (Italics mine.)
Among the decisions referred to are:
State ex rel. Wood v. Looker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840
Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S. W. 457
McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 Pac. 97
Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3
Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100
Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424
McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 162 S. W. 99
People v. Gunn, 85 Cal. 238, 24 Pac. 718
Koehler & Lange v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N. W. 738
In re Board of Equalization, 24 Colo. 446, 51 Pac. 493
Herman v. Oconto, 100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W. 364
State ex rel. Fleck v. Dalles City, 72 Ore. 337, 143 Pac. 1127
In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 119 N. W. 408
State ex rel. City of Dexter v. Gordon, 251 Mo. 303, 158 S. W. 683
State v. Patterson, 98 N. C. 660, 4 S. E. 350
It would unduly extend this already overly long dissenting opinion to quote the many portions of the cited decisions which are directly in point on the proposition that the mandatory provisions of a state constitution relative to its amendment must be strictly followed. An example is found in the last case cited above, in which the supreme court of North Carolina said:
“More particularly, for the present purpose, when the Constitution prescribes and directs in terms, or by necessary implication, that a particular power shall be exercised in a specified way, or a particular thing shall be done by a particular co-ordinate branch of government—as the Legislature—or by a particular officer or class of officers, and prescribes the way and manner of doing it—such direction *754cannot be disregarded—a due observance of it is essential, because the Constitution so provides, and its provisions are not in vain or of trifling moment. It is not of the nature of constitutions of government to provide non-essentials—useless unimportant details—such as may be disregarded and dispensed with. As we have said, they are organic—made upon solemn consideration-by the sovereign authority, and contain general, essential provisions—details are avoided, unless deemed important—essential. Non-essential details are left to the discretion of those who exercise and administer the powers of -government. If this were not so, why prescribe the way and manner? Why not leave these things to convenience and the authority charged with the exercise of the power? Why direct them? Why restrict them? And if such directions may be disregarded, ignored, suspended in some respects, then to what extent and in what respects? If one co-ordinate branch of the government, or one class of officers, may do so, why may not another, and all, as to duties devolved upon them respectively directly by the Constitution?
“The answer to these and like questions must be, that requirements of the Constitution shall prevail and be observed; and when it prescribes that a particular act or thing shall be done in a way and manner specified, such direction must be treated as a command, and an observance of it essential to the effectiveness of the act or thing to be done. Such act cannot be complete—such thing is not effectual until done in the way and manner so prescribed.”
The majority opinion holds that the words “daily newspaper” are unclear and ambiguous, and that the court must construe their meaning. I can see no need for construction. During the sixty-five years since the constitution was adopted, the format, content, and the total number of daily papers in the state may have changed, but their essential features have not changed. Among these are regular subscribers and purchasers on the street and at newsstands, or, in other words, general circulation. In order to serve its subscribers, a newspaper must be delivered either by carrier or through the mail or by both these means.
The essential reason for requiring publication of the proposed charter in two daily newspapers was that it would be available to two sets of regular subscribers and purchasers *755and thus reach more voters of the city than by publication in only one daily newspaper.
As this court observed in Times Printing Co. v. Star Publishing Co., 51 Wash. 667, 99 Pac. 1040, the courts, in construing statutes relating to publication of official city notices, assume the implied qualification that the paper has a general circulation.
The facts, as stipulated here, show that the “daily edition” of the Clark County News, a weekly newspaper, had no circulation at all. No carriers were employed to deliver it to any regular subscribers, because it had no subscribers. It was barred from the mails. No copies were sold on the street or at newsstands. Therefore, it lacked the essential feature of all newspapers, to wit, general circulation.
The artificial means employed to distribute this “daily edition” of a weekly newspaper by high school students to homes in one fourth of the city of Vancouver each day is no adequate substitute for normal circulation. To hold that this paper was a daily newspaper within the meaning of Art. XI, § 10, of the Constitution during the temporary period of its publication and distribution in the manner set forth in the agreed statement of facts, in my opinion, does violence to the plain and unambiguous language of that section.
Judge Weaver’s opinion concurring in the result of the majority opinion, while holding that the constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, expresses the view that the trial court must be affirmed because we are bound by the agreed statement of facts, wherein it is stated the Clark County News, a weekly newspaper, contracted with the city of Vancouver to issue its newspaper five days per week until it had published the proposed charter in thirty issues, and that the Clark County News distributed its “daily edition” by having it distributed from house to house by high school students in the manner described therein.
While to my mind there is a serious question whether the conclusion stated in a stipulation of facts made between private parties affecting matters of public interest (such as compliance with the constitution) are binding on the courts (see note in 92 A. L. R. 663, 668-671), I pass that question *756and consider the language of the agreed statement of facts in this case.
I do not believe that the statement therein that this weekly newspaper “distributed the daily edition of its newspaper” by high school students in the manner described, compels the conclusion that the Clark County News thereby became a daily newspaper during the period that it purported to publish the proposed charter.
During this period, as pointed out above, the Clark County News had no subscribers to its daily edition. It could not be sent through the mail to anyone. It was not sold on the streets or at newsstands. One of the essentials of a newspaper is that it have a general circulation through the usual channels.
The agreed statement of facts, by stating that a weekly newspaper distributed the “daily edition” of its paper by high school students to homes in one fourth of the city each day, does not compel a holding that that procedure is what the people had in mind when, in adopting the constitution, they required publication of the proposed charter in two daily newspapers. One essential attribute of a newspaper is that it have a general circulation by carrier and by mail to regular subscribers in addition to being sold on the streets and at newsstands.
I cannot agree that we are bound to hold that the Clark County News was a daily newspaper merely because the agreed statement of facts states the anomalous conclusion that this weekly newspaper distributed its “daily edition” during the period in question in the manner described therein.
While the majority opinion expressly disavows reliance upon the substantial compliance doctrine in interpreting the constitutional provision before us (a doctrine which is applicable only to statutes), the effect of the opinion is to do that very thing. The mention of the publicity given to the proposed charter by radio, by Portland daily papers and speeches to local organizations, clearly shows that the opinion is based largely on the doctrine of substantial compliance.
*757I cannot find any basis for the majority opinion except that inapplicable doctrine. The last paragraph thereof clearly holds that the Clark County News was a daily newspaper during the time it was publishing the proposed charter and distributing it in the manner previously described, and, therefore, the opinion concludes that such publication, together with the publication in the Columbian, a daily paper, constituted a compliance with Art. XI, § 10, requiring publication in two daily newspapers. The opinion then states:
“We are reassured in this conclusion by the fact that widespread publicity was also given to the proposed charter by radio, by articles in the large dailies of the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan district, by speeches and discussion in local, civic and community clubs.”
If the substantial compliance doctrine was not relied upon (as the opinion previously stated), why mention radio talks, Portland newspapers, and speeches in local clubs? There is no statement in the agreed statement of facts that the contents of the proposed charter were communicated verbatim to the voters by any of these means. If the manner of publication in the two papers mentioned did not comply with Art. XI, § 10, these other means of communication could not cure the defect.
With due deference to the views of the majority, I cannot see how this result can be viewed as anything but an attempt to amend the provisions of Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution, by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to the mandatory requirements thereof for the publication of the proposed city charter. This' is a prerogative which the people have reserved to themselves in Art. XXIII. As stated above, the courts must apply the mandatory provisions as written, no matter how inconvenient, cumbersome, or even impossible, it may be to comply with them.
The language of Judge Huston of the Idaho supreme court in his concurring opinion in People ex rel. Lincoln County v. George, 3 Idaho 72, 26 Pac. 983, is applicable to the problem before us:
“No better rule, it seems to me, can be found for the *758guidance of courts in the decision of these cases than that expressed by Chief Justice Bronson in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547. Says that learned jurist in his opinion in that case: ‘It is highly probable that inconveniences will result from following the constitution as it is written. But that consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but those who made the instrument, to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may take that office upon themselves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the people may well despair of ever being able to set any boundary to the powers of the government. Written constitutions will be more than useless. Believing, as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influence that constitutions are gradually undermined, and finally overthrown. My rule has ever been to follow the fundamental law as it is written, regardless of consequences. If the law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconveniences can be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a wound upon the constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the legislature or the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the government opens the door for another, which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the government are just what those in authority please to call them.’ Says Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, fifth edition, page 86, note; ‘We agree with the supreme court of Indiana (Greencastle Tp. v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 565), that in construing constitutions courts have nothing to do with the argument ab inconveniente and should not bend the constitution to suit the law of the hour.’ ” (Italics mine.)
In the present case, the majority has approved a method of publication of the proposed charter which does not comply with Art. XI, § 10, because it holds that the method *759employed by the city of Vancouver was substantially as effective as the constitutional method.' Even though the method pursued actually was a more effective means of publicity than the constitutional method, it would still be invalid. Under the authorities cited herein, the majority may not substitute its judgment as to the sufficiency of the publication for that of the people as expressed in their constitution. It has been said that every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step. In this instance, the only logical end of ignoring the constitutional mandate is anarchy.
The final question before us for decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order respondent, as prosecuting attorney of Clark county, to institute a quo warranto proceeding as prayed for in the petition. State ex rel. Winters v. Steele, 37 Wn. (2d) 434, 224 P. (2d) 332.
For the reasons stated herein, it is my opinion that it plainly appears that the trial court did abuse its discretion in refusing to order respondent, as prosecuting attorney of Clark county, to institute an action in the nature of quo warranto. Consequently, the order of dismissal should be reversed and the trial court directed to enter an order in accordance with the prayer of appellant’s petition.
SCHWELLENBACH, J., COnCUTS with DONWORTH, J.