Court Opinion

ID: 9965745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:07:29.873953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:37.878454
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2023-CA-0739-MR

SHEILA LACEFIELD                                                       APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CR-00108

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Sheila Lacefield (Lacefield), appeals from an Order

of the Butler Circuit Court denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

Lacefield also contends that the trial court erred in imposing costs against her.

After our review, we affirm.

             On July 28, 2022, Lacefield was indicted for tampering with physical

evidence, first-degree promoting contraband, possession of synthetic drugs (second
offense), possession of marijuana, and possession of a controlled substance

prescription not in the original container.

             On February 23, 2023, in exchange for her plea of guilty, Lacefield

received an offer from the Commonwealth of five years on the charge of first-

degree promoting contraband and three years on possession of synthetic drugs

(second offense) -- to run concurrently for a total of five years -- with dismissal of

the remaining charges and recommended probation. Lacefield filed a motion to

enter a guilty plea and to accept the offer.

             The plea colloquy of February 23, 2022, is accurately recounted at

pages 1-2 of the Commonwealth’s Appellee’s brief, and we need not repeat it here.

In summary, Lacefield affirmed that she understood that she was pleading guilty to

a felony offense, and she was also warned that if she were subsequently convicted

of another offense, her plea of guilty in this case could be used to enhance the

penalty in such a subsequent case.

             On March 1, 2023, the trial court entered Judgment as follows:

                    This Honorable Court finds the defendant
             understands the possible penalties and that the defendant
             knowingly and voluntarily waives the following rights:
             the right to plead not guilty, the right to be tried by a jury,
             the right to compel the attendance of witnesses, the right
             to be represented by an attorney at each stage of the
             proceedings, the right to appeal his/her case to a higher
             court, to have an attorney appointed to represent the
             defendant at each stage of the proceedings, that the
             defendant understands and voluntarily waives his/her

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             right not to incriminate himself/herself, and finding that
             the plea is voluntary and the Defendant is mentally
             competent, the Court accepts the plea.

             On April 10, 2023, before final sentencing, Lacefield filed a motion to

withdraw her guilty plea, asserting “that she did not understand that she was

pleading to a felony offense. Had she recognized this fact she would not have

entered into that plea agreement.”

             On April 20, 2023, trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on

Lacefield’s motion. On direct examination, Lacefield testified that she recalled

entering a guilty plea -- but that she did not understand what a felony was. She

stated that she does not understand a lot of things and that she has cerebral palsy.

When asked whether that condition affects her cognitive abilities, Lacefield

responded that “it affects a lot of abilities.” Lacefield repeatedly testified that she

did not feel that she had done anything wrong. Asked if she recalled the judge’s

inquiring if she had anything that would keep her from understanding what was

going on that day, Lacefield responded that she did not mention her cerebral palsy

because it was embarrassing to tell about her health problems.

             On cross-examination, Lacefield was asked about her recollection of

the plea colloquy. Lacefield remembered that the judge asked if she understood

what was going on and if she was satisfied with the advice of her attorney. She

remembered that the judge said she was pleading to a felony offense which could

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be enhanceable in the future and that he asked her a series of questions. However,

Lacefield testified that she “did not understand it all” until she talked to the

probation officer, who explained the ramifications of the plea to her. Lacefield

also remembered that the judge asked if she was pleading guilty because she was

in fact guilty and for no other reason. Lacefield testified that she had not

understood.

              At the close of the hearing, the court explained that it had taken great

care to assure that Lacefield’s guilty plea was voluntary and that she knew what

she was doing. Consequently, on April 24, 2023, the trial court entered a written

Order denying Lacefield’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

              On May 9, 2023, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing.

The court sentenced Lacefield to a total of five (5) years, probated for five (5)

years, and ordered that she pay all court costs and fees in the total amount of

$170.00 as reflected in the Formal Sentencing Order and accompanying Order of

Probation entered on May 12, 2023.

              Lacefield appeals. She first argues that the trial court erred in denying

her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In essence, Lacefield reargues her case.

                    When a criminal defendant pleads guilty, Rule
              8.10 of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
              requires the trial court receiving the guilty plea to
              determine on the record whether the defendant is
              voluntarily pleading guilty. Whether a guilty plea is
              voluntarily given is to be determined from the totality of

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               the circumstances surrounding it. The trial court is in the
               best position to determine the totality of the
               circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. Once a criminal
               defendant has pleaded guilty, he may move the trial court
               to withdraw the guilty plea, pursuant to RCr 8.10. If the
               plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must be
               granted. However, if it was voluntary, the trial court
               may, within its discretion, either grant or deny the
               motion. . . . [W]hether the plea was voluntarily entered is
               reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A
               decision which is supported by substantial evidence is
               not clearly erroneous. If, however, the trial court
               determines that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily,
               then it may grant or deny the motion to withdraw the plea
               at its discretion. This decision is reviewed under the
               abuse of discretion standard.

Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 287-88 (Ky. App. 2004) (cleaned up).

               We agree with the Commonwealth that Lacefield’s affirmation in

open court under oath refutes her claim that she did not fully understand the

charges to which she was pleading. “Solemn declarations in open court carry a

strong presumption of verity.” Simms v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 141, 144

(Ky. App. 2011) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S. Ct.

1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977)). Our review of the record persuades us that

the trial court’s determination that Lacefield’s guilty plea was voluntary is amply

supported by substantial evidence; accordingly, it is not clearly erroneous. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lacefield’s motion to withdraw

guilty plea.

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                Next, Lacefield argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay

court costs. She acknowledges that the issue is unpreserved and requests palpable

error review pursuant to RCr 10.26.

                KRS1 23A.205(2) provides in relevant part that:

                The taxation of court costs against a defendant, upon
                conviction in a case, shall be mandatory and shall not be
                subject to probation, suspension, proration, deduction, or
                other form of nonimposition in the terms of a plea
                bargain or otherwise, unless the court finds that the
                defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS
                453.190(2)[.]

KRS 453.190(2) defines a “poor person” as:

                a person who has an income at or below one hundred
                percent (100%) on the sliding scale of indigency
                established by the Supreme Court of Kentucky by rule or
                is unable to pay the costs and fees of the proceeding in
                which he is involved without depriving himself or his
                dependents of the necessities of life, including food,
                shelter, or clothing.

                Lacefield contends at page 15 of her Appellant’s brief that “[i]n this

case, the trial court found [her] to be a poor person, then levied costs against her at

sentencing.” We cannot agree with Lacefield’s characterization of events. The

trial court did not make a determination of Lacefield’s status as a poor person

under KRS 23A.205(2) prior to sentencing.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -6-
             The record reflects that the trial court ordered Lacefield to pay costs at

the May 9, 2023, sentencing hearing. As the Commonwealth explains, at her

sentencing hearing, Lacefield did not ask for costs to be waived, nor did she ask

that the trial judge make a finding that she was a “poor person.” She never raised

the issue before the trial court.

             On May 12, 2023, the trial court entered its Formal Sentencing Order

which ordered Lacefield to pay “all court costs and fees in the amount of $170.00.”

             On May 30, 2023, Lacefield filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. In that motion, Lacefield requested that the trial court “permit her to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.” Lacefield stated that “she was previously

determined to be indigent by this Court and her financial means have not improved

since that time. She is a poor person who is unable to pay costs and fees associated

with an appeal.” (Emphasis added.) On June 19, 2023, the trial court entered an

Order which reflects that it was “prepared by” Lacefield’s counsel and was

tendered with the motion to proceed in forma pauperis as follows in relevant part:

                    This Court having determined that Sheila Lacefield
             is a poor person unable to pay the costs associated with
             the instant appeal, she shall be permitted to proceed in
             Forma Pauperis for all matters associated with
             prosecuting this appeal. The Department of Public
             Advocacy is reappointed for purposes of this appeal.

             In Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26 (Ky. 2014), our Supreme

Court explained as follows:

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                     The assessment of court costs in a judgment fixing
             sentencing is illegal only if it orders a person adjudged to
             be “poor” to pay costs. Thus, while an appellate court
             may reverse court costs on appeal to rectify an illegal
             sentence, we will not go so far as to remand a facially-
             valid sentence to determine if there was in fact error. If a
             trial judge was not asked at sentencing to determine the
             defendant’s poverty status and did not otherwise presume
             the defendant to be an indigent or poor person before
             imposing court costs, then there is no error to correct on
             appeal. This is because there is no affront to justice
             when we affirm the assessment of court costs upon a
             defendant whose status was not determined. It is only
             when the defendant’s poverty status has been established,
             and court costs assessed contrary to that status, that we
             have a genuine “sentencing error” to correct on appeal.

                    In this case, the record does not reflect an
             assessment of Appellant’s financial status, other than that
             he was appointed a public defender and permitted to
             proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. A defendant who
             qualifies as “needy” under KRS 31.110 because he
             cannot afford the services of an attorney is not
             necessarily “poor” under KRS 23A.205. Maynes v.
             Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Ky. 2012). Thus,
             simply because Appellant was represented by a public
             defender does not mean he is necessarily exempt from
             court costs. Because the trial judge’s decision regarding
             court costs was not inconsistent with any facts in the
             record, the decision does not constitute error,
             “sentencing” or otherwise . . . .

Id. at 35 (emphasis original).

             As the Commonwealth observes, the record in the case before us does

not reflect an assessment of Lacefield’s financial status other than that she received

the appointment of a public defender and that she was permitted to proceed in

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forma pauperis on appeal. The trial court was not asked whether Lacefield is a

poor person under KRS 23A.205(2), nor did it make such a determination prior to

sentencing. Accordingly, pursuant to Spicer, supra, we cannot conclude that the

trial court erred in imposing court costs.

             We affirm the judgment of the Butler Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                         BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Roy Alyette Durham, II                       Russell Coleman
 Frankfort, Kentucky                          Attorney General of Kentucky

                                              Courtney J. Hightower
                                              Assistant Attorney General
                                              Frankfort, Kentucky

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