Court Opinion

ID: 9861149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:47:17.358534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:23.836226
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs right to recover for medical and funeral expenses for which he became liable under the Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2002)) was barred by the 1985 amendment to the Dramshop Act (Act) (235 ILCS 5/6 — 21 (West 2002)). I do not disagree that the amendment applies because it became effective on September 12, 1985, and the accident occurred on February 25, 2001. The 1985 amendment eliminated a cause of action by the intoxicated person for injuries to her person or property and eliminated a claim for loss of means of support on behalf of the intoxicated person or others asserting such a claim. The majority contends that the legislature’s elimination of these causes of action reflected its intent to also eliminate what the majority characterizes as damage to Michael’s property “wholly derivative of the injuries sustained by his -wife.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 283. I disagree with the majority’s assumption that the legislature intended to preclude a cause of action by family members for recovery of property damage they incurred as a result of the intoxicant’s actions. As noted by the majority, prior to the 1985 amendment of the Act, it was well established that a spouse could recover medical and funeral expenses. See Bachman v. Sharon & Lo’s Place, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 40, 541 N.E.2d 153 (1989). We presume that the legislature knew how the Act was judicially interpreted prior to its amendment and acted with that knowledge. See Morris v. William L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 499, 719 N.E.2d 715, 718 (1999). While the legislature eliminated several causes of action with the 1985 amendment, it did not eliminate the cause of action by a spouse for property damage. I find nothing in the amending language to support the majority’s interpretation of the statute. In fact, the legislative history reveals that the legislature intended that claims by an intoxicant’s family for property damages that they suffered as a result of the intoxicant’s actions continue to remain viable. During the House proceedings on the amendment, its sponsor, Representative Countryman, stated that the amendment “does not take away that cause of action for ... by relative[s] for the other 2 potential causes of action[,] that is[,] personal injury and property damage.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1985, at 162-63 (statements of Representative Countryman). In response to a comment that the amendment would leave the family of a deceased intoxicant without recourse, Representative Countryman specifically noted that the family “does have recourse under the personal injury and property damage.” He added that “[a]nd there are instances where the funeral bill[,] for instance[,] is a family expense, there may be some potential in that instance.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1985, at 168 (statements of Representative Countryman). In my opinion, the 1985 amendment of the Act does not alter the ability of an intoxicant’s spouse to recover hospital and funeral expenses. I would allow Michael to pursue his cause of action to recover for damage to his property resulting from his liability for his wife’s medical and funeral expenses.