Court Opinion

ID: 9882360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:08:39.233676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:41.041772
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Levitin v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3559.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3559
  THE STATE EX REL . LEVITIN, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
                                OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
                may be cited as State ex rel. Levitin v. Indus. Comm.,
                          Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3559.]
Workers’ compensation—Violation of specific safety requirements—Ohio
        Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a) —Industrial Commission did not abuse
        its discretion in denying additional award—Record contained some
        evidence supporting commission’s findings that modified nip-point guard
        provided reasonable protection to employees and that employer had no
        forewarning of increased risk of injury or malfunction due to prior failure
        of modified nip-point guard—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of
        mandamus affirmed.
     (No. 2022-1187—Submitted June 27, 2023—Decided October 4, 2023.)
      APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 20AP-495,
                                      2022-Ohio-2750.
                                   __________________
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} This case is a direct appeal from an original action in mandamus filed
in the Tenth District Court of Appeals. Appellant, Rimma Levitin, suffered a
serious hand injury while operating one of appellee Menasha Corporation’s die-
cutter machines.       Levitin requested an award in addition to her workers’
compensation benefits, arguing that her injury was a result of Menasha’s violation
of specific safety requirements (“VSSR”). Appellee Industrial Commission of
Ohio found that Menasha did not commit a VSSR and denied Levitin’s request for
an additional award.
        {¶ 2} Levitin asked the Tenth District for a writ of mandamus to compel the
commission to vacate its decision and to issue a new order granting her an
additional award. The Tenth District concluded that the commission did not abuse
its discretion and denied the writ. Levitin appealed to this court and filed a motion
for oral argument. Because some evidence in the record supports the commission’s
decision, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment. We also deny Levitin’s motion
for oral argument.
                                I. BACKGROUND
        {¶ 3} Levitin was employed by Menasha for over 20 years.               Orbis
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Menasha, operated the facility at which
Levitin worked. For the ten years immediately preceding her injury, Levitin
operated one of three nearly identical Pioneer die-cutter machines. To operate the
machine, Levitin placed pieces of corrugated plastic onto the die. The die was then
pulled by conveyor belts between two rollers, the rollers compressed the plastic,
and the die cut the plastic.
        {¶ 4} Where the two rollers meet on each machine is a “nip point,” which
is defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(94) as “the point or points at which
it is possible to be caught between the moving parts of a machine, or between the
moving and stationary parts of a machine, or between the material and the moving

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part or parts of a machine.” For each machine, the only access to the rollers is the
opening where the die enters and exits. The original manufacturer of the machines
installed protective flip-guards at the top of this opening, which were attached to
each machine by a long piano hinge resting on a small switch. For each machine,
the guards were designed to immediately shut off power to the machine if triggered
by contact.
       {¶ 5} In August 2016, Menasha decided to replace the guards on each
machine because the guards were bowed.           Menasha could not consult the
manufacturer of the machines because the manufacturer was no longer in business.
Menasha contracted another company to duplicate the original manufacturer’s
specifications for each guard and requested a modification of adding a one-inch-
square steel tube across the entire length of each guard. With each steel tube
weighing approximately 14 pounds, the modification increased the approximate
weight of each guard from 25 pounds to 39 pounds.
       {¶ 6} Approximately ten months later, in June 2017, Levitin’s gloved right
hand was caught and crushed in the nip point of the rollers on one of the machines.
The modified guard did not trigger an automatic shutdown of the machine.
Levitin’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for several conditions related
to the injuries to her right hand and fingers.
       {¶ 7} Levitin applied to the commission for an additional award, alleging
that Menasha had committed multiple safety-requirement violations. She narrowed
her claim to alleged violations of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a), which
provides, “Means shall be provided to protect employees exposed to contact with
nip points created by power driven in-running rolls, rollover platen, or other flat
surface material being wound over roll surface,” and of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
05(H), which provides, “Power-driven feed rolls, when exposed to contact, shall be
guarded so as to prevent the hands of the operator from coming into contact with
in-running rolls at any point.” The evidence before the commission included

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investigatory findings, conflicting expert reports, hearing testimony, and numerous
depositions from Levitin, other machine operators, maintenance employees,
supervisors, and managers.
       {¶ 8} Orbis, the facility operator, conducted an internal investigation. On
its incident investigation form, “no machine guarding” and “safety rule infraction”
were both selected as a “root cause / contributing factor” of the accident. The report
further explained that “[t]he guards in place on the [machines] allow for roughly a
[five-]inch gap where a hand could slip into the roll. The guards must be extended
to make the gap small enough where a hand cannot fit into it.”
       {¶ 9} The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) also
investigated the accident and issued a citation. OSHA initially found that “the
employer failed to ensure that effective machine guarding was in place on the
[machine] to prevent employees from reaching the point of operation hazard” and
that the “guard was ineffective in that [a one-]inch metal bar stock was added [to]
the length of the guard making it too heavy to be lifted in the event an employee hit
it.” OSHA later modified its finding, as reflected in an informal settlement
agreement with Orbis, concluding that the “ ‘guarding in place on the [machine]
was not sufficient to prevent employees from reaching the point of operation
hazard, in that, the factory installed guard on the [machine] did not operate
efficiently and effectively for that piece of equipment.’ ”
       {¶ 10} Some Menasha employees testified in depositions that the modified
guard was not tested during normal operations and that it was too heavy for
accidental contact to trigger a shutdown of the machine. Other employees testified
that the guard continued to work as it had before the modification and that it was
tested regularly by verifying that it could be lifted. The testimony disclosed that
some, but not all, employees were able to lift the modified guard with one hand.
       {¶ 11} Levitin and another machine operator testified that they had
informed management that the modified guard was too heavy to lift. The other

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                                  January Term, 2023

machine operator also testified that she told management that the guard was too
heavy to function as designed. Several managers testified, however, that they were
never informed of these concerns and were not aware of any prior accidents with
the machine. Levitin also testified that prior to the accident, she had never had an
incident where a part of her body triggered a shutdown on the machine, and she
was not aware of anyone else who had either. Additionally, it is undisputed that
the maintenance logs for each machine did not document any prior failure or
malfunction of the modified guards after their installation.
          {¶ 12} A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the commission found that the
modified guard provided reasonable protection from the nip point because,
although it was heavier and less effective than the original guard, it “was not
equivalent to no guard at all.” The SHO further found that because there was no
evidence that the modified guard had previously failed, Menasha could not be held
liable for the first-time failure of the safety device. The SHO also found that the
regulation pertaining to power-driven feed rolls, Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-05(H),
did not apply to this case. Accordingly, the SHO found no VSSR and denied
Levitin’s application for an additional award. Levitin’s request for a rehearing was
denied.
          {¶ 13} Levitin filed a complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
arguing that the commission had abused its discretion in denying her application
for an additional award.       She requested a writ of mandamus to compel the
commission to vacate the SHO’s order and to issue a new order granting her an
additional award for a VSSR. Levitin limited her argument to an alleged violation
of the nip-point regulation, Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a). The Tenth
District concluded that there was some evidence supporting the commission’s
decision and denied the writ. 2022-Ohio-2750, ¶ 4-5.
          {¶ 14} Levitin appealed as of right.

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

                            II. LEGAL STANDARDS
       {¶ 15} In a direct appeal of a mandamus action originating in a court of
appeals, we review the judgment as if the action had been originally filed here.
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 164, 228 N.E.2d 631
(1967). Levitin is entitled to a writ of mandamus if she shows by clear and
convincing evidence that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that the
commission has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that there is no adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Indus.
Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, 184 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10. A writ of
mandamus will lie when there is a legal basis to compel the commission to perform
its duties under the law or when the commission has abused its discretion in
carrying out its duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio
St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9. “Where a commission order is
adequately explained and based on some evidence, even evidence that may be
persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order will not be
disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus.
Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584, 679 N.E.2d 300 (1997).
       {¶ 16} “No employer shall violate a specific safety rule adopted by the
administrator of workers’ compensation pursuant to section 4121.13 of the Revised
Code or an act of the general assembly to protect the lives, health, and safety of
employees pursuant to Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution.”              R.C.
4121.47(A); see also State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 114,
2015-Ohio-976, 28 N.E.3d 101, ¶ 20 (“A VSSR award is given only when an
employer’s acts contravene express, specific, and definite statutory or regulatory
provisions”). To prevail on a VSSR claim, the claimant must establish that an
applicable specific safety requirement was in effect at the time of the injury, that
the employer failed to comply with the requirement, and that the failure to comply
proximately resulted in the injury. State ex rel. Sunesis Constr. Co. v. Indus.

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                                 January Term, 2023

Comm., 152 Ohio St.3d 297, 2018-Ohio-3, 95 N.E.3d 377, ¶ 23. “These issues are
questions of fact within the final jurisdiction of the commission, which is solely
responsible for evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence before it.”
(Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Jeep Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 42 Ohio St.3d 83,
85, 537 N.E.2d 215 (1989).
        {¶ 17} Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(A) describes the purpose of specific
safety requirements as providing reasonable, not absolute, safety for employees.
“Decisions of this court have acknowledged the practical impossibility of
guaranteeing that a device will protect against all contingencies or will never fail.”
Jeep at 84. Thus, “[t]he fact that a safety device that otherwise complies with the
safety regulations failed on a single occasion is not alone sufficient to find that the
safety regulation was violated.” State ex rel. M.T.D. Prods., Inc. v. Stebbins, 43
Ohio St.2d 114, 118, 330 N.E.2d 904 (1975). When the employer raises this “first-
time failure” argument (also referred to as the “one-time malfunction” defense or
exception), the question before the commission is “ ‘whether [the employer] had
ever been forewarned of the malfunction on the date of injury by a prior
malfunction of the safety device.’ ” (Brackets added in Penwell.) Penwell at ¶ 22,
quoting State ex rel. Precision Thermo-Components, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-965, 2011-Ohio-1333, ¶ 29.
                                  III. ANALYSIS
                          A. Motion for Oral Argument
        {¶ 18} A request for oral argument in a direct appeal is subject to this
court’s discretion.   S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).      In exercising that discretion, we
consider whether the case involves (1) a matter of great public importance, (2)
complex issues of law or fact, (3) a substantial constitutional issue, or (4) a conflict
among courts of appeals. State ex rel. Davis. v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111
Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15.

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       {¶ 19} Levitin contends that this case involves a novel, important, and
complex application of the “some evidence” rule in the context of a fact question
relating to a corporate-employer’s knowledge of a risk of injury. However, the
“some evidence” standard has long been used to review mandamus actions that
challenge commission decisions, see, e.g., State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc.,
31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987), and the parties have sufficiently
argued application of the standard in their merit briefs to resolve this case, see State
ex rel. Mignella v. Indus. Comm., 156 Ohio St.3d 251, 2019-Ohio-463, 125 N.E.3d
844, ¶ 22. Accordingly, we conclude that Levitin has not demonstrated that oral
argument is necessary, and we therefore deny the motion.
                                  B. VSSR Claim
       {¶ 20} Here, the applicable specific safety requirement is found in Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a), which provides: “Means shall be provided to
protect employees exposed to contact with nip points created by power driven in-
running rolls, rollover platen, or other flat surface material being wound over roll
surface.”
       {¶ 21} Levitin argues that because Menasha intentionally modified the
guard so as not to trigger a shutdown on accidental contact with a body part, the
modified guard did not provide reasonable safety from accidental injury and
Menasha cannot claim a lack of forewarning of the increased risk of injury or
malfunction.
       {¶ 22} First, the premise of this argument is unfounded. Levitin asserts that
Menasha intentionally committed a VSSR by purposely modifying the guard so
that the only remaining use “was to feign compliance with the nip-point guarding
rule.” However, the commission did not find that Menasha intentionally modified
the guard to disable the safety feature, but instead found that Menasha modified the
guard to prevent the guard from bowing and “accidentally actuating” a shutdown.

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This is supported by deposition testimony that Menasha had determined that each
of the guards were bowed, which was causing shutdowns to be triggered too easily.
       {¶ 23} Moreover, there is some evidence to support the commission’s
determination that Menasha did provide “means”—albeit less effective means—
“to protect employees exposed to contact with nip points” under Ohio Adm.Code
4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1174 (11th Ed.2019)
(defining “means” as “[s]omething that helps to attain an end; an instrument; a
cause”). Relying on deposition testimony and other evidence and noting OSHA’s
revised conclusion that the “guarding in place on the [machine] was not sufficient
to prevent employees from reaching the point of operation hazard, in that [it] did
not operate efficiently and effectively for that purpose,” the commission found that
“the heavier [modified] guard was less effective than the previous guard, but that
the heavier guard was not equivalent to no guard at all.” Levitin counters that
Menasha’s own investigation concluded that a “root cause” of the accident was “no
machine guarding.” However, whether the modified guard provided reasonable
safety from accidental injury is a factual determination, and “[f]actual questions
relevant to proof of a VSSR rest exclusively within the discretion of the
commission,” State ex rel. Scott v. Indus. Comm., 136 Ohio St.3d 92, 2013-Ohio-
2445, 990 N.E.2d 598, ¶ 12.
       {¶ 24} The same is true of the commission’s finding that Menasha had no
forewarning of an increased risk of injury or malfunction due to the modification
of the guard. This finding is supported by testimony from multiple employees that
this type of failure had never occurred and that no one had complained about the
increased weight of the modified guards, either orally or in writing. Additionally,
the maintenance logs for each of the machines do not exhibit a prior history of
malfunctions or problems with the modified guards such that Menasha should have
been aware that this type of accident would occur. See Penwell, 142 Ohio St.3d
114, 2015-Ohio-976, 28 N.E.3d 101, at ¶ 22. Although Levitin points to conflicting

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testimony on the issue of notice, the presence of contrary evidence is immaterial;
we do not reweigh the evidence, State ex rel. World Stamping & Mfg. Co. v. Indus.
Comm., 84 Ohio St.3d 433, 435, 704 N.E.2d 1230 (1999).
       {¶ 25} Finally, Levitin argues that in cases like this one, where a corporate
party denies knowledge of a fact, a court should determine whether any evidence
demonstrates knowledge of that fact by any employee of the corporation. In other
words, she contends that “application of the some-evidence rule should essentially
be inverted.”
       {¶ 26} Appellees insist that Levitin did not raise this argument below and
cannot raise it for the first time here. See State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v.
Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). Levitin responds that the
argument is implicit within those she raised below regarding notice and
foreseeability and, therefore, has not been forfeited. She relies on this court’s
declaration that “[w]hen an issue of law that was not argued below is implicit in
another issue that was argued and is presented by an appeal, we may consider and
resolve that implicit issue.” Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E.
Roark Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), modified in part
on other grounds, Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-
4827, 895 N.E.2d 538, syllabus.
       {¶ 27} Regardless of when the argument to invert the “some evidence” rule
was first raised by Levitin, we reject the argument as a veiled attempt to compel
this court to reweigh the evidence and second-guess the commission’s credibility
assessments. We are limited to a determination of whether there is some evidence
in the record to support the commission’s decision, Sunesis, 152 Ohio St.3d 297,
2018-Ohio-3, 95 N.E.3d 377, at ¶ 22, and have repeatedly expressed our
commitment to the “some evidence” rule and a refusal to reweigh the evidence,
State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm., 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216
(1989). Additionally, Levitin’s contention that “if a company may deny knowledge

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of a risk of injury simply by pointing to specific uninformed employees, no
corporation will ever be held accountable for knowing or intentional violations of
specific safety regulations” is simply unsound. Noting that Levitin admitted that
she had not complained to her immediate supervisor about the safety of the
modified guard and that no complaints about the modified guard were made to
management in writing, the commission may have found more credible the
testimony from supervisors and management employees that the corporate
employer did not have notice of the increased risk of injury or malfunction. But
the commission’s credibility determinations have not always and will not always
favor the employer. See, e.g., Precision Thermo-Components, 2011-Ohio-1333, at
¶ 6 (“[A supervisor’s] statement and [the claimant’s] affidavit are ‘some evidence’
supporting the commission’s decision that [the corporate employer] had prior
knowledge of the press’ malfunctioning safety device, as the statement and affidavit
‘present indicia of credibility’ ”).
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 28} Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution allows for an award
of additional compensation to a worker who sustains injuries as a result of a “failure
of the employer to comply with any specific requirement,” i.e., a VSSR. The
additional award “is in the nature of a penalty, and it was the purpose of the
Constitution to impose such penalty upon the employer who failed to comply, and
not upon him who did comply.” State ex rel. Whitman v. Indus. Comm., 131 Ohio
St. 375, 379, 3 N.E.2d 52 (1936). However, the law neither requires foolproof
safety features, Jeep, 42 Ohio St.3d at 84, 537 N.E.2d 215, nor penalizes
unforeseeable first-time failures of safety devices, M.T.D. Prods., 43 Ohio St.2d at
118, 330 N.E.2d 904.
        {¶ 29} Here, the commission determined that the modified guard provided
reasonable protection to employees and that the employer had no forewarning of
an increased risk of injury or malfunction due to a prior failure of the guard. These

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determinations are supported by some evidence. We therefore conclude that the
commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Levitin’s request for an
additional award for a VSSR and that Levitin is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.
We deny Levitin’s motion for oral argument and affirm the Tenth District Court of
Appeals’ judgment denying the writ.
                                                               Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                              __________________
       Bentoff & Duber Co., L.P.A., Brandon Duber, and Glen S. Richardson; and
Flowers & Grube, Louis E. Grube, Paul W. Flowers, and Melissa A. Ghrist, for
appellant.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Cindy Albrecht, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
       Thomas & Company, L.P.A., Michael A. Moskowitz, and Scott W.
McKinley, for appellee Menasha Corporation.
                           ________________________

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