Court Opinion

ID: 9778030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:30:30.062372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.203067
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that the judgment must be reversed, but cannot agree with the reasons set forth in the principal opinion.
The defendant was charged with capital murder. Instruction 6 set out the five elements of capital murder as follows:
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that on August 2, 1976, in the County of Franklin, State of Missouri, Richard Chandler, alone or together with, Darrell Chandler and/or Michael Chandler caused the death of Joseph Langworthy by stabbing him, and
Second, that Richard Chandler, Darrell Chandler, Michael Chandler and the defendant intended to take the life of Joseph Langworthy, and
Third, that Richard Chandler, Darrell Chandler and Michael Chandler knew that they were practically certain to cause the death of Joseph Langworthy, and
Fourth, that Richard Chandler, Darrell Chandler, Michael Chandler and defendant considered taking the life of Joseph Langworthy and reflected upon this mat*63ter coolly and fully before he was killed, and
Fifth, that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged Richard Chandler who engaged in the conduct submitted in the above paragraphs,
then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder.
The jury was also instructed on murder in the second degree, which omitted paragraph Fourth of the capital murder instruction, while copying the other four elements word for word.
The jury found the defendant guilty under the manslaughter instruction, which contained only two paragraphs, as follows:
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that Richard Chandler, alone or together with, Darrell Chandler and/or Michael Chandler caused the death of Joseph Langworthy by stabbing him, and
Second, that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged Richard Chandler who engaged in the conduct submitted in the above paragraph,
then you will find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
It is patent that the manslaughter instruction did not require any finding that was not contained in the verdict director for capital murder. I always understood that a prosecutor had the discretion to charge a lesser offense, even though the evidence supported a greater charge, and conviction of the lesser might be irrational.1 A lesser offense is one which contains some, but not all, of the elements of the greater.
Also of interest are the provisions of § 556.220, RSMo 1969, in effect when the offense was alleged to have been committed and reading as follows:
Upon indictment for any offense consisting of different degrees, as prescribed by this law, the jury may find the accused not guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, and may find him guilty of any degree of such offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit such offense, or any degree thereof; and any person found guilty of murder in the second degree, or of any degree of manslaughter, shall be punished according to the verdict of the jury, although the evidence in the case shows him to be guilty of a higher degree of homicide.2
Instruction 10 is deficient, however, because the facts required to be proved are not appropriately hypothecated. What the evidence shows is that the defendant promised Chandler a sum of money for killing Langworthy and then associated with Chandler in stalking Langworthy to learn his schedule. The term “aided” does not adequately inform the jury as to what it must find, because it omits essential re*64quirements stating that the person responsible for the criminal conduct of another must act “with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense.”3 It is not even charged that the defendant aided in the “planning” of the offense, which more appropriately describes the conduct shown by the evidence. The instruction is not sufficient to submit the offense of manslaughter against this defendant, and for this reason alone the judgment must be reversed.4
I would be reluctant to allow a defendant to benefit because of an uncritical following of a note on use to MAI, if the instruction submits the ultimate facts necessary to support conviction. Contrary to what some of its advocates have claimed, however, MAI instructions, civil and criminal, do not excuse lawyers and judges from resorting to the case law and the statutes. MAI is not a massive project of judicial, or committee, legislation. State v. Mudgett, 531 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. banc 1976), demonstrates ample reason to omit a manslaughter submission in a case such as this one, where there is absolutely no state of facts which would support the giving of the instruction and a manslaughter verdict could be reached only by ignoring elements which the jury must necessarily have found in order to find guilt. Lawyers and judges continue to believe, however, that MAI is scriptural, and I would require a demonstration of prejudicial legal error to abort a conviction in which MAI has been followed.
I have serious doubts about the capital murder verdict director in this case, and about the adequacy of MAI to submit the “hired killer” scenario presented in this record. Would it not be better to hypothe-cate the ultimate facts relied on by the prosecution to support the charges, in terms of the evidence m the case at hand, rather than relying on a mold into which the facts of the particular case can only be forced uneasily?
Perhaps such holdings as Brown v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. banc 1967), deter lawyers and judges from modifying MAI forms so as to frame instructions which speak in terms of the facts of the case, rather than obliquely. If so, our instruction system is seriously flawed, with emphasis on ritual rather than communication. I have always had an uneasy feeling that MAI does not do well by the atypical case. Cf. Williams v. Enochs, 742 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. banc 1987), in which the verdict directing instruction used an MAI formulation which did not submit the essential elements of a real estate commission claim.
The jury must have believed that the defendant had a part in the murder of Joseph Langworthy. Thus a conviction of an offense more heinous than many for which this Court has affirmed death sentences must be aborted because of the failure of MAI-CR to reflect the current state of the authorities.5 But the facts give us no alternative.
I concur in the result reached by the principal opinion.

. Section 556.046, RSMo 1986, provides some guidance on this issue. Subsection 1 provides that, "A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. ...” Subsection 2 then states, “The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." (Emphasis supplied). The obvious inference is that, although not obligated to do so, the court does not lack the authority to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense not supported by the evidence. This statute was adopted after the offense charged against the defendant is alleged to have occurred, but states sound general principles.

. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in State v. Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.1965). This Court held that “the Missouri rule is clear that when the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder a defendant is not entitled to complain that a submissible case was not made to a lesser degree of homicide.” 556.220, RSMo 1959. The Court also noted that 545.030.1(17), RSMo 1959, precluded an appellate court from staying or otherwise affecting the judgment of conviction "because the evidence shows ... [the defendant] to be guilty of a higher degree of the offense than that of which he [was] convicted.” Wallach, supra, at 12. This statutory provision remains unchanged to this day. 545.030.1(17), RSMo 1986. See also, State v. McQuerry, 406 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo.1966) (court rejected defendant's argument that a manslaughter instruction was erroneous because the evidence showed he was either guilty of second degree murder or innocent).

. The quotation is taken from § 562.041.1(2), RSMo 1986. This statute was not in force at the time Langworthy was killed, but it states a sound proposition about the criminal liability of a person for the acts of another. See State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. banc 1970), opinion by Donnelly, J.; 1 Devitt & Blackmar Federal Practice and Instructions (3rd Edition), § 12.01; § 12.03.

. The disjunctive "or encouraged” produces an alternative which is probably impossible of application to the facts at hand, and which, itself, probably renders the instruction erroneous.

.A rereading of State v. Ayres, 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. banc 1971), and State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. banc 1975), persuades me that neither opinion commands a manslaughter instruction in a case like this one. But the legislature has removed any doubts and we need not probe further into ancient history.