Court Opinion

ID: 9734197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:27:37.652877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:46.070602
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.,
The appellant, Bernard Temple, files this direct appeal, nunc pro tunc, from his convictions after trial before a jury, on charges of armed robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Temple contends:
(1) The search and seizure of the credit card was made pursuant to an invalid warrant issued without probable cause,1 and;
(2) The in-court identification of the appellant was improperly tainted by an, uncounselled “illegal” lineup.
We must first consider the claim of invalidity as to the search warrant. The record shows that a gasoline credit card was taken forcibly (along with other items and money in a purse) from a victim in Pittsburgh in May 1968. The gasoline credit card was thereafter fraudulently used for purchases by the driver of a blue Cadillac. *455On December 19, 1968, police noticed a blue-grey Cadillac with two white males and one black male cruising in another section of the city. Its license number was noted. Less than a half hour later, two white and one black assailants robbed a victim at her home in the same vicinity. The police, figuring the men in the Cadillac they had seen cruising shortly before the crime might have been involved, located the car shortly thereafter parked by a bar in a nearby section of the city.
Upon closer examination, they found that the Cadillac bore two different sets of license plates, one covering the other. Upon a check they found the Cadillac to be registered to the appellant. The police entered the bar to ask questions, but all the patrons, including appellant, denied knowledge of the ownership of the car. Upon further questioning, appellant gave the police a fictitious name. He and his Cadillac were taken to the police station, where a warrant was secured for a search of the car— ostensibly to discover possible fruits of the day’s robbery. Instead, the credit card from the May robbery was discovered on the sun visor of the car.
In the application for the search warrant, the police officer involved gave the magistrate written information, in proper form and under oath, of the following matters:
(1) Details on the robbery, including dates, times and a description of the robbers;
(2) Detailed facts of the observance by officers of the Cadillac and its occupants (including its license number) twenty minutes before the robbery in the same neighborhood;
(3) The discovery of the car shortly thereafter in a nearby area with the two license plates;
(4) The details of their investigation in the bar, including the fact that appellant gave them a false name, but was later found to be the registered owner of the Cadillac; and
*456(5) The fact that the visible license plate was registered to a Buick.
We must evaluate whether the above-related facts support the finding of probable cause by the magistrate. It is clear that it is only the probability, and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity that is the standard of probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964); Commonwealth v. Billock, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 441, 289 A. 2d 749 (1972). The magistrate of course need not be supplied with information sufficient to justify a conviction. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed. 2d 684 (1965). The magistrate is to take a “common sense” approach in evaluating the information. Commonwealth v. Payton, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 254, 243 A. 2d 202 (1968). With these guidelines in mind, we hold that the series of facts described to the magistrate more than justified his conclusion that criminal activity was probably involved and probable cause existed for the search of the car in question.2
Appellant’s second claim is that his in-court identification was improperly tainted by an earlier illegal lineup. While the appellant maintains that he repeatedly requested counsel at the line-up stage, the police testimony contradicted this claim. They said appellant was advised of his right to counsel and waived it.3 The trial judge credited the police on this point and we must accord this conclusion great weight; there is certainly no abuse of discretion apparent. Moreover, our review of the lineup procedure explained in the record reveals that it was conducted in a fair manner and not in any way which *457might be described as unnecessarily suggestive or conducive or irreparable mistaken identification. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). Lastly, the record demonstrates that the victim had an excellent and prolonged opportunity to view her assailant at the time of the crime, when her credit card was taken. He was in her plain view in a well lighted area for 10 to 12 minutes. At times his face was close to hers as he pushed her down on the seat of her car. She gave a good description of him to the police which description was not weakened at trial. There is ample testimony in the record to support the conclusion that her in-court identification was based upon her independent recollection of the appellant at the time of the crime. Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A. 2d 738 (1970).
Affirmed.

. Contrary to the discussion contained in the Dissenting Opinion in this case, the appellant does not argue on this appeal, nor did he contend in the court below, that his arrest was improper, but only that the search warrant obtained after the arrest was not issued on a showing of probable cause.

. Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A.2d 342 (1970), cited by the Dissent, is inapplicable here. That case featured a stop and frisk on a street and did not involve a search warrant.

. This case is pre-Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167 (1974).