Court Opinion

ID: 9859414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:30:18.404266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:09.423080
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Peoctoe, J.
In this proceeding plaintiff Harold E. Vickers challenges the validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance of the defendant Gloucester Township. This amendment prohibits “Keeping, locating, establishing, maintaining or operating a trailer camp, trailer park * * *” in its industrial district.1 After hearings, the Superior Court, Law Division, sustained the validity of the amendment. On plaintiff’s appeal the Appellate Division reversed. 68 N. J. Super. 263 (1961). The township appeals to this court under R. R. 1:2-1 (a).
On July 1, 1957 the township adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance establishing Eesidence Districts “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” a Business District, an Agricultural District and *235an Industrial District. The ordinance enumerated the uses permitted within all residence, business and agricultural districts, not mentioning trailer camps. The section regulating uses within the industrial district was drafted in different form; it permitted lands to be used and buildings to be erected for any lawful purpose with the exception of 41 specified uses. Trailer camps were not among the barred uses. By the terms of the ordinance dwellings which conformed to the requirements of the “A” residence district were permitted in the industrial district, provided prior approval of the Board of Adjustment was obtained. “A” residence district houses were required to be “One-family detached dwellings” located on a lot not less than 75 by 125 feet with at least 800 square feet of usable first floor area.
On September 3, 1957 the township adopted an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance to Regulate and Control Trailers, Trailer Coaches, Camp Cars and Trailer Camps in the Township of Gloucester.” (Trailer Ordinance.) The effect of this ordinance and the zoning ordinance was to repeal a 1947 trailer ordinance barring trailer camps in the entire township and to ban such camps in the residence, business and agricultural districts, but permit them in the industrial district. At present there are no trailer camps in the township.
In April 1959 this court decided Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N. J. 481, which concerned the validity of the zoning ordinance as it applied to trailers in residential districts. We held “the provisions of the zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of trailers in residence districts * * * bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes of zoning as outlined in R. S. 40:55-32, and should be upheld.” Id., at p. 496. We expressly left open the question of whether such uses could be completely excluded from the township. Id., at p. 497.
On August 26, 1959 Vickers applied to the township for a permit to operate a trailer camp upon his ten acres of *236industrially zoned land which he had purchased in November 1957. While this application was pending, he acquired ten additional acres of land across the road from his prior holdings but still within the industrial district. The Township Committee denied his application in a letter dated December 8, 1959. As a result, Yickers instituted an action in lieu of prerogative writ on December 30, 1959, wherein he alleged he had complied with the Trailer Ordinance requirements and sought a judgment compelling the township to grant him permission to operate his proposed trailer camp. In their answer, the defendants stated that plaintiff’s application was denied because his plans did not meet the requisite health standards and that the granting of the permit would be in violation of the zoning ordinance, subdivision ordinance and building code.
Much of the testimony introduced by the plaintiff at the trial on March 17, 1960, concerned his compliance with the requirements of the State Department of Health. Plaintiff also introduced evidence as to the characteristics of the township, particularly the area surrounding his property. This area is almost entirely in the industrial district (an “A” residential district is not far from Yickers’ lands) and is for the most part undeveloped. Several buildings ranging from dilapidated shacks to modest homes are situated in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff’s property. There are no residential developments or industrial plants in this area, nor are there any between plaintiff’s land and the Freeway which runs through the township and is about two miles west of the property. An expert called by plaintiff testified that plaintiff’s land could be appropriately used as a trailer camp site and that such use would not have an adverse economic effect upon the neighborhood.
Apparently realizing during the course of the trial that his application and plans did not meet the required standards of the State Department of Health, plaintiff moved for an opportunity to amend his application and plans as submitted. The court granted plaintiff’s motion and further *237allowed the township to “take such administrative action and review what action they may be desirous of taking in the interim time, which means that the Court will hold this issue in abeyance until such time as those amendatory actions are taken on the part of both parties.” The trial was adjourned for an unspecified period.
The plaintiff’s amended plans were submitted to the Township Committee at a meeting held on April 1, 1960. At that meeting the Mayor announced that a “proposed amendment to the Zoning Ordinance to exclude trailer camps is being submitted to the Planning Board for its consideration and comment at its next meeting, to be held April 5, 1960.” After this announcement the1 Committee meeting was adjourned until April 5, 1960, “to take up any action regarding such proposed zoning ordinance amendment, and any other things that may be considered at the adjourned meeting.” At the Township Committee meeting held April 5, 1960, the amending ordinance barring trailer camps from the industrial district and an ordinance repealing the Trailer Ordinance were read for the first time. The Township Planning Board met and approved the amending ordinance on the same night. In a letter formally notifying the Township Committee of this action, the Planning Board stated:
“The Board believes that trailer camps do not contribute anything to the general appearance of the local scenery and do not enhance the use or value of the local real estate and, in fact, do have a directly opposite effect, that the areas where they may exist are prejudiced thereby, that real estate values instead of being preserved or enhanced, would be depreciated, that the establishment of such camps would retard and, perhaps, choke the development of real estate for the area. To permit trailer camps and camp sites would not be in the interest of the general welfare of the community. The Board, therefore, registers its approval of the amendment * * *”
This letter was read to the Township Committee at its next meeting which was held on April 22, 1960. At that meeting the zoning ordinance and the ordinance repealing the *238Trailer Ordinance were read for the second time and adopted by the Township Committee. The minutes disclose the following:
“Mayor Yost, Mr. Harrison and Mr. McCann in reply to statements and questions raised by the members of the public, stated, in substance, that the Township Committee in presenting the ordinance to amend the zoning ordinance was taking into consideration the over all planning for the township, present and future, and that the purpose of the amendment was to protect property values, both present and future, which might be adversely affected by a trailer camp, because a trailer camp is not attractive in appearance and that consideration must be given to the effect that such appearance would have on the development of the area in particular and the township in general.
Mayor Yost further pointed out that the township was in the heart of the Delaware Valley expansion that is taking place and that the township is growing fast and planning is necessary to cope with such growth.”
Since the result of the ordinances was to prohibit trailer camps throughout the township, plaintiff on May 5, 1960, filed a second complaint in lieu of prerogative writ demanding a judgment declaring the ordinances invalid and inapplicable to the use of his property as a trailer camp. In its answer the township contended it had the power to enact the ordinances under its zoning powers and general police powers.
The second action came to trial on June 20, 1960, before the same judge who heard the first case, and the actions were consolidated. The parties stipulated that plaintiff’s amended plans satisfied the prerequisite health standards applicable to trailer camps, thus leaving as the primary question whether the township had the power to adopt the amendment prohibiting trailer camps from its industrial district, which in effect barred them from the entire township. Also in issue was the legal propriety of the procedure followed in adopting the amendment, the plaintiff contending the Planning Board did not have the opportunity to properly consider the amendment as required bv N. J. S. A. 40:55-35.
*239The testimony, zoning map and photographs submitted at the trial showed that the township is in the main a rural community of about 23 square miles in Camden County. However, the nature of the township is rapidly changing, it being in the throes of expansion. The population has grown from 7,950 in 1950 to about 17,500 in 1960, and the number of houses has increased from 2,694 in 1955 to 4,113 as of September 1959. The bulk of this expansion is concentrated in the northern and western sections. The southern section, where plaintiff’s lands are situated, includes several residential districts and a business district, but is for the most part relatively undeveloped. The township’s sanitary land-fill area, where non-garbage refuse is disposed and promptly covered by earth, is located about 100 yards from plaintiff’s land. Although most of the southern section is in the industrial district, one-family houses can be constructed in that district if the Board of Adjustment gives permission. In fact, home developers have purchased 500 acres within the industrial district and adjacent to plaintiff’s property. Mayor Yost and Mr. Moffa, Chairman of the Planning Board, stated the township was continually considering changes in the existing zones in order to benefit the township. The record and zoning map indicate that certain areas which had been previously zoned residential, have recently been reclassified industrial. There was also testimony that the township, in an effort to eliminate blighted structures, had on February 8, 1960, appointed a Public Officer who is actively engaged in a program to rid the township of properties which are in “bad condition,” including those located in the vicinity of plaintiff’s land.
Mayor Yost testified that many factors motivated the township to prohibit trailers. He said:
“The Committee took many things into consideration; future over all planning of our Township; the acquisition of 500 acres of development ground bought by developers, adjacent to Mr. Vickers’ property, also taking in connection with the Freeway, the other *240sections of our Township are fairly well built up and the development is working further south.
* * * * * * * *
We feel that the trailers, as a general run, are unsightly, and couldn’t see with the present growth, also with the view in mind of future growth of planning where trailers would add to it.”
The trial court, after noting the expanding nature of the community, held that the challenged ordinances were valid because “this is a municipality where prohibition of trailer camps can be legislated,” and it further held the adoption of the amendment accorded with the statutory procedure. The Appellate Division reversed, holding “the amendment of the zoning ordinance of April 22, 1960 must be set aside as an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the zoning power.” It said, at p. 270:
“The entire picture presented very definitely gives the impression that the planned future of the township, as reflected by the high proportion industrial districts bear to the whole, does not contemplate that the township will become what is commonly called a ‘residential town.’ On the contrary it appears that the zoning power has been used in the hope of attracting industry.
* * * * * * * *
Surely, in this vast rural area, there must be some portion in which the operation of trailer parks would be compatible with the scheme of zoning the township has seen fit to select, and yet would not adversely affect existing or future uses of property located anywhere in the township, and however zoned.”
The Appellate Division further held the township was free to repeal its Trailer Ordinance and “its action in that regard will not be disturbed.” In view of its disposition of the case, the Appellate Division found it unnecessary to pass upon the alleged procedural irregularity.
The parties agree the only issues on this appeal are: (1) In the circumstances, could the township through its zoning power totally exclude trailer camps from the municipality? and, (2) Were the procedural requirements of N. J. S. A. 40:55-35 met in the adoption of the zoning ordinance amendment?
*241As to the first issue, the township contends the zoning ordinance as amended represents a valid exercise of the municipality’s power to "develop itself as an orderly and well integrated community,” and that trailer camps with their accompanying disadvantages can only interfere with its planned growth. The plaintiff argues the township, although it can regulate the operation of trailer camps, cannot absolutely prohibit them, that such an attempt i¡/ invalid since it "goes beyond the essential objects of zoning.” He asserts “There is everything to indicate that Gloucester Township is not the type of community where the absolute prohibition of mobile home parks is warranted.”
Our Constitution empowers the Legislature to enact general laws under which municipalities may adopt zoning ordinances “’“limiting and restricting to specified districts and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State.” N. J. Const. Art. IV, Sec. VI, par. 2. And our Constitution commands that all laws concerning local government, and zoning laws are in that class, be construed liberally in favor of municipal power. N. J. Const. Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 11.
In N. J. S. A. 40:55—30 and N. J. S. A. 40:55-31 the Legislature has given municipalities extensive power to create districts and regulate structures and the use of land therein through zoning ordinances. The guiding purpose in exercising this power is set forth in R. S. 40:55-32 as:
“Suck regulations skall be in accordance witk a comprekensive plan and designed for one or more of the following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets; secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; promote health, morals or the general welfare'; provide adequate light and air; prevent the overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of population. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving the value *242of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.”
 The role of the judiciary in reviewing zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to the statutory grant of power is narrow. The court cannot pass upon the wisdom or unwisdom of an ordinance, but may act only if the presumption in favor of the validity of the ordinance is overcome by an affirmative showing that it is unreasonable or arbitrary. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N. J. 154, 167 (1957); see Cunningham, “Control of Land Use in New Jersey,” 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 37, 48 (1959). By these standards which control judicial review, the plaintiff to prevail must show beyond debate that the township in adopting the challenged amendment transgressed the standards of R. S. 40:55-33. In other words, if the amendment presented a debatable issue we cannot nullify the township’s decision that its welfare would be advanced by the action it took.
“It cannot be said that every municipality must provide for every use somewhere within its borders.” Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 36 N. J. 330, 335 (1958). The fact that a municipality is largely undeveloped does not impose a contrary obligation. Sound planning and zoning look beyond the present into what lies ahead in the hopes of the planners. “It requires as much official watchfulness to anticipate and prevent suburban blight as it does to eradicate city slums.” Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N. J. 165, 173 (1953), appeal dismissed 344 U. S. 919, 73 S. Ct. 386, 97 L. Ed. 708 (1953).
This court has considered several cases in which a municipality’s zoning ordinance was attacked as unreasonable because it prohibited certain structures or uses.
In Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N. J. 509 (1949) this court held a municipality could through its zoning ordinance permit light industry and totally exclude heavy industry.
*243In Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, supra, this court sustained a zoning ordinance provision barring the construction anywhere in the township (which included residential, business and industrial districts) of dwellings containing less than 768 square feet of living area. After alluding to health factors, the court said, at p. 174:
“But quite apart from these considerations of public health which cannot be overlooked, minimum floor-area standards are justified on the ground that they promote the general welfare of the community and, as wb have seen in Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, 9 N. J. 405 (1952), supra, the courts in conformance with the constitutional provisions and the statutes hereinbefore cited take a broad view of what constitutes general welfare. The size of the dwellings in any community inevitably affects the character of the community and does much to determine whether or not it is a desirable place in which to live.”
In Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N. J. 194 (1952), this court upheld a zoning ordinance which placed most of the township in a residence zone with a miTiinnim lot size of five acres for each residence. The court said, at p. 204: “As much foresight is now required to preserve the countryside for its best use as has been needed to save what could be salvaged of our cities.”
In Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N. J. 17 (1955), this court sustained a zoning ordinance barring motels from a municipality which included residential,' business and industrial districts. In so doing, we reiterated the proposition that “general welfare” is a broad concept and noted that it includes “public convenience” and “general prosperity.”
In Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, supra, the validity of the zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of apartment houses anywhere in the borough was under attack. The borough was zoned for residence, business and industry. The plaintiff sought to construct an apartment hotfse in the business district on a lot which contained a dilapidated residence. The plaintiff contended inter alia the ordinance was invalid because one and two-*244family houses were permitted in the industrial zone, while apartment houses were excluded. In sustaining the ordinance, we said, at p. 328:
“True, as the ordinance now stands, one and two-family homes may be erected in those districts. Nonetheless, and apart from the unlikelihood of that development, a multi-family structure in an industrial setting would grossly accentuate the resulting problems. The matter is one of classification, and we cannot say a distinction between one and two-family houses as against multi-family ones even in industrial districts is devoid of reasonable factual support.”
In Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, supra, the provisions of this township’s zoning ordinance which prohibited trailers and trailer parks from the residential, business and agricultural districts were under attack. The plaintiff wanted to place a trailer on her four-acre tract for use as her permanent residence. Although the land was situated in a residential zone, the area about her plot was mainly rural and was likely to remain so for the reasonably foreseeable future. After noting that: (1) some states have upheld regulations limiting the time during which a trailer could remain in a municipality to short intervals thus making them strictly temporary abodes and effectively eliminating trailer parks which cater to trailers used as permanent residences; (2) other states have permitted municipalities to apply their house building codes to trailers, thus effectively barring all trailers since none could possibly comply; and (3) some states have permitted the unequivocal prohibition of trailers throughout the municipality, we said, at p. 493:
“The decisions elsewhere highlight the fact that the use of trailers as permanent residences present problems which are ofttimes inimical to the general welfare. * * * And from the point of view of aesthetic considerations (which are inextricably intertwined with conservation of the value of property) trailers may mar the local landscape.”
We concluded that the Township of Glocester had the power to prohibit trailers from all residential districts, even though those districts include rural areas which will remain un*245developed for the reasonably foreseeable future. We said, at p. 494: “Zoning must subserve the long-range needs 'of the future as well as the immediate needs of the present and the reasonably foreseeable future. It is, in short, an implementing tool of sound planning.”
It is necessary to look at the total picture to determine whether the township’s ordinance violated the statutory zoning standards in the light of the above decisions. As in all zoning cases, the question is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under the circumstances. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, supra, at p. 325.
It is clear the tide of suburban development has begun to engulf the rustic character of the township. Its population has more than doubled in the past ten years with a corresponding increase in the number of homes. There is every indication this markedly accelerated growth will continue ; housing developers have acquired large tracts of land in the sparsely settled areas. While the record does not show any significant industrial development, the new Ereeway and the Walt Whitman Bridge have recently opened up this particular section of south Jersey to the business and shipping centers of Philadelphia and Camden, and to the industrial and commercial areas along the Delaware River. See Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, supra, at p. 494. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that industry, creating new ratables which will help allay local tax problems, may be encouraged by sound planning and zoning to look favorably to this area for plant sites. Indeed, unless there is such planning and zoning, the municipality may suffer from the adverse effects of helter-skelter and deleterious property uses, thus discouraging industry from settling in the township. Industry may shun the disharmony resulting from discordant uses side by side.
Choosing to take advantage of the community benefits which can flow from thoughtful planning, the township in 1957 adopted its first comprehensive zoning ordinance and *246recognized the difference between modern industrial development and unrestricted factory constructions. The ordinance excludes from the industrial district 41 nuisance type industries which were determined to be unsuitable to the kind of community planned. As to the permitted structures, there are restrictions as to lot size, percentage of area occupied by buildings, height of buildings and set-backs, and requirements for off-street parking and loading facilities. These provisions are in harmony with modern concepts of industrial planning which aim to promote an attractive industrial area, compatible in appearance with nearby residences. Much of the current industrial development in this State is in fact taking place in areas resembling parks where nuisance type plants are excluded and attractive architecture prevails. Such types of industry often lend to the prosperity of the entire municipality.
Trailer camps, because of their particular nature and relation to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, present a municipality with a host of problems, and these problems persist wherever such camps are located. See Zullo v. Board of Health, Woodbridge Tp., 9 N. J. 431 (1952); “Regulation and Taxation of House Trailers,” 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738, 739 (1955); “Trailer Parks vs. The Municipal Police Power,” 34 Conn. B. J. 285 (1960); “Regulation of Mobile Homes,” 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 125 (1961). In Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, supra, we said, at p. 325: “Apartment houses are not inherently benign. On the contrary, they present problems of congestion and may have a deleterious impact upon other uses.” This description is equally applicable to trailer camps. Clearly trailer camps bring problems of congestion with all their attendant difficulties. In the present case the plaintiff proposes to place each .trailer on a 40 by 60 foot lot. The smallest lot upon which a one-family dwelling (the only type permitted in the zone) can be erected in the same zone is 75 by 135 feet. Therefore, in the same square area the township would have to cope with nearly four *247times as many trailer families and motor vehicles as would be present if the tract were devoted to one-family houses. As we recognized in Fanale, at p. 328, a town may properly conclude that, because of the gross difference in the resulting problems, it will permit in its industrial zone the types of residences which do not foster congestion while excluding those which bring with them heavy concentration of population.
And if the township is to avoid the “deleterious impact” which one use may have upon other uses and encourage “the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality,” it must be concerned with the future as well as the present values of property. Our recent decisions have uniformly held, in conformance with the constitutional provisions and the zoning statutes hereinbefore cited, that “general welfare” should be given a broad interpretation. Pierro v. Baxendale, supra; Fischer v. The Township of Bedminster, supra; Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, supra. If the zoning ordinance is reasonably calculated to advance the community as a social, economic and political unit, it furthers the general welfare and therefore is a proper exercise of the zoning power. Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, 9 N. J. 405 (1952).
In the present case the township is seeking to create an attractive industrial zone. The purpose of the zoning ordinance is to guide the township in its transition from a laissez faire growth to a well-ordered community. The zoning ordinance does not presently envision exclusively industrial districts since it permits dwellings to be erected in those areas. However, these houses can only be one-family detached dwellings on a lot not less than 75 by 125 feet. The governing body determined that such houses would be compatible with industrial uses. It thought that trailer camps would strike a discordant note and be detrimental to property values, present and prospective, and retard the progress of the township. The governing body stated “a trailer camp is not attractive in appearance” and *248considered this factor in reaching their conclusion. Aesthetics may properly be considered in establishing a zoning scheme “with a view of conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land.” See Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, supra, at p. 494; Pierro v. Baxendale, supra, at p. 28; Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion, 3 N. J. Super. 222, 225 (App. Div. 1949).
 The township has begun to feel the effects of its potential for extensive and rapid development, and has concluded that the presence of trailer camps would hamper this potential. It believes that the prohibition of trailer camps is in keeping with the orderly growth of the township and best serves the interests of the entire municipality in its development as a desirable place in which to work and live. Since, as this court has held, municipalities can properly determine that the construction of small houses, Lionshead Lalce, apartment houses, Fanale, and motels, Pierro, may have an adverse effect upon other properties throughout those municipalities (including industrial • districts), and that living units which produce congestion can be excluded, we would be flying in the face of the broad powers granted to municipalities by the Constitution and zoning statutes as interpreted by our decisions if we held that the township in the present case must, against the will of its governing body, allow the construction and operation of trailer camps in its industrial district. Accordingly, we 'hold the plaintiff has failed to show the township acted unreasonably in amending its zoning ordinance to exclude trailer camps from its industrial district.
Since trailer camps are not permitted in the other districts, the effect of the amending ordinance prohibiting them in the industrial district is to bar them from the entire municipality. There are no trailer camps in the township at present. Plaintiff contends that total prohibition is illegal. However, we have held that a municipality need not provide a place for every use. Fanale v. Borough of *249Hasbrouck Heights, supra. We do not think that a municipality must open its borders to a use which it reasonably believes should be excluded as repugnant to its planning scheme. It must be remembered that once a use is legally established, even though conditions impel a revision of the zoning ordinance and the use strikes a jarring note, it cannot be eliminated by such a revision under existing law. See R. S. 40:55-48. If through foresight a municipality is able to anticipate the adverse effects of particular uses and its resulting actions are reasonable, it should be permitted to develop without the burdens of such uses. In his inaugural address on January 16, 1962, Governor Hughes recognized the need for a “planned development” of communities. He said:
“[A] balanced distribution of people, jobs and industries between our urban and suburban communities is essential for the revitalization of urban life and the orderly groioth of suburban areas. We cannot stand by while the bright face of New Jersey is disfigured by decay of its cities and a haphazard groioth of its suburbs.” (Italics supplied)
Our conclusion that the township had the authority to adopt the amendment is based upon the facts presented, the circumstances of the township today and its projected development. We have noted that the township is in a state of flux. Its ultimate character remains indeterminate. In fact, there have been several amendments to the zoning ordinance since its enactment in 1957 and the testimony indicates more are contemplated. We are not unmindful of the reported improvements in design and rising popularity of trailers and the accompanying increased need for trailer camps. Mays, “Zoning for Mobile Homes,” Journal of America Institute of Planners, 204 (1961). McKeever, “The Motionless Mobile Home,” 19 Urban Land 1 (April 1960); Bartley, Mobile Home Parks and, Comprehensive Community Planning, p. 3 (1960); Hodes and Roberson, The Law of Mobile Homes, p. 3 (1957); Note, “Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxa*250tion” 71 Yale L. J. 702 (1962). It may be that circumstances will change and trailers and trailer camps will be an appropriate use in some areas of the township. If at that time the provisions of the ordinance become unreasonable they may be set aside. As we said in Pierro v. Baxendale, supra, at p. 29, “If and when conditions change, alterations in zoning restrictions and pertinent legislative and judicial attitudes need not be long delayed.”
It is of no significance that plaintiff’s proposed trailer camp would not be detrimental to his immediate neighborhood as it now exists. The validity of a zoning ordinance is not to be determined by reference to an individual parcel of land. Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, supra, at p. 205. Moreover, the township has embarked upon an active program designed to eliminate the blighted structures which are near plaintiff’s property. We repeat what we said in Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, supra, at p. 494: “Zoning must subserve the long-range needs of the future as well as the immediate needs of the present and the reasonably foreseeable future.” The township officials have a basis to expect plaintiff’s neighborhood will not remain in its present run-down condition and they are justified in considering the envisioned betterment.
The only decision of an appellate court cited by the plaintiff to sustain his contention that total prohibition of trailer camps in a municipality is beyond the zoning power is Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N. W. 2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1955). There the court said, “The test of validity is not whether the prohibition may al some lime in the future bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, but whether it does so now.” (Italics supplied.) 70 N. W. 2d 774, 775. This view is contrary to our concept of zoning which requires a looking beyond an immediate “now.” Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, supra, at p. 494. Therefore, we are not persuaded by a result based on the philosophy of the court in Gust.
*251Plaintiff further contends that even if the township could exclude trailer camps, the adopted amendment is void because the Planning Board did not have the opportunity to give proper consideration to the matter as required by N. J. S. A. 40:55-35.
The amendment was introduced by a first reading at. the Township Committee meeting on April 5, 1960. Shortly thereafter, a recess was called to enable the Committeemen who were also members of the Planning Board to attend the Board meeting being held in the same building. After a 45-minute recess the Committee meeting reconvened and it was orally reported that the Planning Board had approved the amendment during that period. This approval was formally communicated to the Committee in a letter dated April 5, 1960, and read at its April 22, 1960 meeting before final adoption of the amendment.
The Chairman of the Planning Board had received a copy of the proposed amendment on April 3, 1960. He discussed the matter informally with several members prior to the meeting of April 5, 1960. The exclusion of trailers and trailer camps had been a subject of frequent discussion prior to the Napierkowski decision in 1959, and even more so since then, but this specific amendment was considered formally by the Planning Board for only 45 minutes.-
The plaintiff asserts the action of the Planning Board violated the essential principle of N. J. S. A. 40:55-35 because the Board did not take a reasonable time to consider the specific amendment, and that it was in effect “a mere rubber stamp.”
N. J. S. A. 40:55-35 prescribes the procedure for amending a zoning ordinance. It provides in pertinent part:
“[N]o amendment or change shall become effective unless the ordinance proposing such amendment or change shall first have been submitted-to the planning board, when such board exists, for approval, disapproval or suggestions, and the planning board shall have a reasonable time, not less than thirty days, for consideration and report * * *."
*252The policy of the above provision is to afford the Planning Board a reasonable time, not less than 30 days, to perforin its statutory function. However, it may act in less time and, if it does, the statutory prerequisite is met. Wollen v. Fort Lee, 27 N. J. 408, 417 (1958). The statute does not specify a minimum period of time during which the Board must consider the amendment. The reasonableness of the time allotted depends on the facts in each case. The amendment in the present case was not a long and complicated document couched in ambiguous language. On the contrary, it was short and easily understood. The subject matter was discussed by the Board “from time to time” prior to the approval of the specific amendment. In view of the circumstances here, we cannot say the action of the Board did not represent its considered judgment arrived at independently. It could have reasonably concluded it was as prepared to pass upon the amendment on April 5 as it would be at some later time.
In light of the above, we hold that the township zoning ordinance amendment barring trailer camps from its industrial district was a valid exercise of its zoning power and was adopted in conformity with the statutory requirements.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the judgment of the Law Division is reinstated.

 The Definitions section of the amendment to the ordinance provides:
“442: TRAILER, TRAILER-COAOH or CAMP-OAR: Any unit which is, or may be, used for living, sleeping, or business purposes by one or more persons and that is equipped with wheels or similar devices used for the purpose of transporting said unit from place to place, whether it be self-propelled or otherwise, and whenever the word ‘trailer’ is used herein it shall mean and include ‘trailer coach’ and ‘camp car’ * * *
443: TRAILER CAMP or TRAILER PARK: Any place, area, lot or tract of land which is so designed or intended for placing or locating thereon a trailer, trailer-coach or camp-car, one or more, as above defined, other than a garage or other similarly enclosed type of building in which such vehicles may be placed.”