Court Opinion

ID: 9705693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:16:54.875859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.882393
License: Public Domain

Graffeo, J. (concurring).
I concur with Judge Read’s analysis as well as the result she reaches but write separately to explain why I believe our decision in Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. (77 NY2d 651 [1991]) must be reaffirmed. There, we held that the term “parent” in Domestic Relations Law § 70 encompasses a biological or adoptive parent, i.e., only a person with a legally-recognized parental relationship to the child. We noted that a child’s parent has a constitutionally protected right to determine with whom the child may associate. Under New York law, a legal parent’s right to make such determinations “may not be displaced absent grievous cause or necessity” (Alison D., 77 *602NY2d at 656; see Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG., 70 NY2d 141, 144 [1987]; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546 [1976]). A similar right has been recognized under the Federal Constitution (see Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 [2000]). The Legislature authorizes parents to bring proceedings to ensure the proper care and custody of their children and has permitted a limited class of other persons—siblings and grandparents— standing to seek visitation in specified circumstances (see Domestic Relations Law §§ 71, 72; Matter of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d 150 [2007]). Rather than employing an “equitable estoppel” or “in loco parentis” basis for establishing parental status, Alison D. created a bright-line rule that made it possible for biological and adoptive parents to clearly understand in what circumstances a third party could obtain status as a parent and have standing to seek visitation or custody with a child. For 19 years the rule articulated in Alison D. has provided certainty and predictability to New York parents and their children.
The Alison D. decision was criticized by some because it was unclear at that time whether a same-sex partner that was not biologically related to a child could become a legal parent through second-parent adoption. Any concern in that regard was resolved four years later in Matter of Jacob (86 NY2d 651 [1995]) where we held that the adoption statutes permit second-parent adoption by the unmarried partner of a child’s biological parent. Thus, the law in New York is clear: a person who lacks a biological relationship to a child and desires to become a legal parent must undertake a second-parent adoption. Parents—whether in heterosexual or same-sex relationships, whether married or unmarried—have been able to order their lives accordingly. This rule has avoided confusion, particularly in the event a relationship is dissolved years later, as to whether the party lacking biological or legal ties to the child (i.e., who failed to pursue an adoption) would have standing to petition for custody or visitation.
As Judge Read points out, our decision in Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D. (7 NY3d 320 [2006]) applying equitable principles in the context of a paternity dispute was fully consistent with Alison D. Beyond the fact that the Legislature has incorporated an equitable standard in the Family Court Act provisions governing paternity determinations (see Family Ct Act § 418 [a]; § 532 [a]), Shondel J.—the biological mother in that case—did not object to a finding that Mark D. was the father of the child. To the contrary, Shondel J. initiated a proceeding expressly seeking to have Mark D. adjudicated the father for purposes of *603obtaining financial support. Thus, the constitutional right of a fit parent to determine with whom her child associates was not implicated in Shondel J., nor were equitable principles relied on in that case to declare a person lacking biological or adoptive ties to a child to be a parent over the objection of the child’s fit biological mother. Consistent with the relevant statute, and with the consent of the biological mother, equitable estoppel was merely used as a vehicle to preclude Mark D. from withdrawing his prior sworn and unsworn statements that he was the child’s father and from relying on genetic marker or DNA tests to disprove paternity.
Shondel J. did not undermine Alison D. and the objective standard for determining parental status emanating from that case continues to serve the interests of both parents and children. Alison D.’s clear standard encourages a party who seeks to form a parental relationship with a child but lacks biological ties to pursue a legal adoption as soon as possible, without leaving a question as important as parental status undetermined perhaps for years, subject to the credibility battles that characterize equitable estoppel hearings held long after the relationships between the parties have soured. By encouraging early adoptions, the Alison D. rule serves the best interests of New York’s children as it is optimal to expeditiously establish legal parenthood, especially to protect a child against unforeseen events such as the death of a biological parent. And since the express written consent of the biological parent is a condition precedent to a second-parent adoption, the rule also guarantees that standing to seek visitation or custody will never hinge on an after-the-fact dispute as to whether the other party’s relationship with the child was sufficiently close or had been fostered by the biological parent. Under Alison D., when a romantic relationship ends, whether the parties were same-sex or heterosexual partners, a hearing to determine who is the child’s legal parent is generally unnecessary as the parentage issue can readily be determined as a matter of law based on objective genetic proof or documentary evidence. Thus, protracted litigation on the standing of a party hoping to obtain custodial rights or visitation is avoided, which further promotes the settlement of these issues rather than the contentious litigation that is all too frequently harmful to children.
Judge Smith proposes a standard that addresses the parental status of certain same-sex partners that employ artificial insemination to conceive a child. He proposes that “where a child is *604conceived through ADI [artificial donor insemination] by one member of a same-sex couple living together, with the knowledge and consent of the other, the child is as a matter of law—at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances—the child of both” (see Smith, J., concurring op at 612). Like the equitable estoppel test, this formulation invites litigation over whether the parties were “living together” (presumably, they must be living together in a romantic relationship, not merely as roommates) at the time of insemination, whether the insemination was “with the knowledge and consent” of the other partner, and whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist, whatever those might be. Under this set of factors, the same types of factual controversies that typify the equitable estoppel analysis would ensue.1
I do not suggest that a specialized approach should not be developed for same-sex couples who conceive children through artificial insemination or other assisted reproduction technologies (ART), particularly as medical techniques continue to evolve. But the criteria for establishing parental rights should be objective to ensure certainty for the parties and consistency in application. For these reasons, I believe it is more appropriate for the Legislature to develop the standards and procedures under which parenthood will be determined for same-sex couples in the artificial insemination and ART context, just as it has done for married couples under Domestic Relations Law § 73 (providing that any child born to a married woman through artificial insemination is the child of her husband if he gave prior written consent to the procedure).
*605Indeed, some states have enacted statutes that specifically address the parental rights of same-sex partners who rely on artificial insemination or ART to conceive a child. For example, the New Mexico Legislature adopted a provision stating that “[a] person who provides eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction . . . with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child” (NM Stat Ann § 40-11A-703). The statute contemplates that the “intended parent or parents shall consent to the assisted reproduction in a record signed by them before the placement of the eggs, sperm or embryos” (NM Stat Ann § 40-llA-704[A]). The New York Legislature could craft a provision addressing the parental status of same-sex partners in the artificial insemination or ART context either by incorporating an objective standard that promotes predictability for parents and children, or by pursuing a different approach. But, to date it has not done so, nor has it legislatively overruled Alison D. I therefore conclude that there is no basis for this Court to depart from the analysis applied in that case and emphasize that, at present, the surest way for same-sex couples to protect the interests of children born during their relationships is to promptly undertake second-parent adoptions that constitute conclusive proof of parental status.
Although parental status for visitation and custody depends on a biological or adoptive relationship under New York law, Judge Read aptly demonstrates why it is appropriate in this case to consider Vermont law. Here, unable to marry or enter into a civil union in New York, the parties chose to enter into a civil union in Vermont when Janice R. was eight months’ pregnant. At that time, as is the case today, the Vermont civil union statute clearly stated that “[t]he rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage” (Vt Stat Ann, tit 15, § 1204 [f]). Under Vermont’s statute, a child born by artificial insemination to one partner of a civil union becomes the child of the other partner, meaning that this nonbiological parent has automatic standing to seek custody or visitation if there is a breakdown in the adult relationship (see Miller-Jenkins v Miller-Jenkins, 180 Vt 441, 912 A2d 951 [2006], cert denied 550 US 918 [2007]). The parties in this case are presumed to have understood the legal ramifications of their decision to enter into a civil union and one of *606those legal ramifications was that each partner would be a parent of any child born during the union.2 A legal, parental relationship was therefore created between Debra H. and the child.
Of course, the doctrine of comity would be inapplicable if the parentage provision in Vermont’s civil union statute was inconsistent with New York public policy. But, in this regard, our sister-state’s law—like New York’s—predicates parentage on objective evidence of a formal legal relationship—the civil union. Since Debra H.’s status as a parent under Vermont law does not turn on the application of amorphous equitable standards but depends on the fact that she and Janice R. entered into a civil union before the child was born, it does not run afoul of the policy underlying Alison D. as it does not undermine New York’s interest in ensuring certainty for parents and children.

. Although Matter of H.M. v E.T. (14 NY3d 521 [2010] [decided today]) does not involve an application for custody or visitation, the allegations in that case demonstrate some of the issues that arise in this context. There, 12 years after a same-sex relationship ended, the biological mother of a child born during the relationship through artificial insemination sought child support from her former same-sex partner and the same-sex partner denied that she was a parent of the child. The former partner alleged that, although she and the biological mother were living in the same household during the relevant period, this was not the product of a romantic relationship—she and her husband had hired the biological mother as a live-in nanny to their children and the mother had remained in the home in that capacity after the marriage ended. The former partner asserted that she had assisted the biological mother with the process of insemination because they were close friends; although they had been involved in a brief romantic relationship at that time, she denied that she had ever agreed to become a parent to the child. Obviously, under Judge Smith’s approach, these disputes as to the parties’ living and relationship status more than a decade ago, as well as whether they consented to parent the child together, would be the subject of a hearing.

. Another child was born to Janice R after the parties’ relationship ended but during the course of the civil union (which apparently has not been dissolved). Having failed to promptly attempt to establish a relationship with the second child and petition for custody or visitation, I believe that Debra H. has likely forfeited any right she may have had to assert parental rights.