Court Opinion

ID: 9708973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:36:49.109016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.024309
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Hunter, J.
I concur in result because the power vested in the Indiana Health Facilities Council to issue cease and desist orders to facilities which are not in compliance with the Health Facilities Licensing and Regulation Act, Ind. Code § 16-10-2-1 (Burns 1973), et seq., and duly promulgated rules thereunder facially guarantees minimum due process rights prior to the exercise of that power. The party is entitled to a hearing when the “possibility” of a violation exists, as determined by the council, and Ind. Code § 16-10-2-1 (Burns 1973) provides that “Such hearing shall be conducted in the manner provided by law.” “The manner provided by law” includes the provisions of the Administrative Adjudication Act, Ind. Code § 4-22-1-1 (Burns 1974), et seq., guaranteeing the rights of the party charged to appear at an open hearing, to present evidence in his behalf, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, and to have the record at the hearing form the basis for any decision.
Plaintiff in the action before respondent’s court maintained *355that she was excused from exhausting her administrative remedies because the only question was a question of law, i.e. whether the above statutory scheme was unconstitutional as denying her “minimum due process” by permitting the Health Facilities Council to make an initial investigation and then allowing the council or its nominee to hear evidence regarding the charge. Specifically, plaintiff relied upon our holding in City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, (1974) 261 Ind. 670, 310 N.E.2d 65, arguing that the attorney general’s representation of the council and his role as advisor to the council contaminated the hearing provided for by the statute. City of Mishaivaka is distinguishable because separate acts of the legislature required the city attorney to act as prosecutor and then sit as judge. Here, the attorney general may assist in prosecuting the claims or in advising the council, but Ind. Code § 16-10-2-4 defining the composition of the council which sits in judgment does not include the attorney general. Thus, plaintiff’s question is not a pure question of law where the statutes governing the procedure for depriving plaintiff of her rights are clearly incapable of constitutional application. That being the case, plaintiff should be required to meet the exhaustion requirement. In so doing, even if the outcome is not in her favor, she will have developed a factual record to support her claim that the Health Facilities Council, under the statutory arrangement assigning preliminary investigative functions to it, is not sufficiently impartial to satisfy the Due Process Clause. See generally, Wolff v. McDonnell, (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935.
The majority opinion finds it necessary to support the foregoing argument with broad generalizations on the autonomy of administrative agencies based on the separation of powers principle. The majority opinion goes too far when it states, “Such a board is not a court and does not perform a strictly judicial function. . . .” Of course, the Health Facilities Council is not a court. But it is a quasi-judicial body, *356and when it performs a quasi-judicial function it must do so in accordance with the United States and Indiana Constitutions and “court-made rules” pursuant thereto, as well as the applicable statutes governing the agency, and such quasi-judicial actions will be subject to review.
For the reasons stated above, I concur with the majority that the claim presented here is properly reviewable through the machinery of the Administrative Adjudication Act and not by way of this original action.
For these reasons I concur in making permanent the temporary writ of prohibition heretofore issued.
Note. — Reported at 344 N.E.2d 846.